COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying the document Proposal for a Council Regulation on the establishment and operation of an evaluation and monitoring mechanism to verify the application of the Schengen acquis and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1053/2013
Date: 2021-06-02
Institutions: Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs, European Commission
Subjects: EU Member State, EU police cooperation, EU visa policy, Schengen Agreement, application of EU law, data protection, evaluation method, external border of the EU, internal border of the EU, personal data

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   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 2.6.2021  SWD(2021) 119 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT  IMPACT ASSESSMENT  Accompanying the document Proposal for a Council Regulation on the establishment and operation of an evaluation and monitoring mechanism to verify the application of the Schengen acquis and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1053/2013             {COM(2021) 278 final} - {SEC(2021) 225 final} - {SWD(2021) 120 final}  
 
 
Contents 

1. 

INTRODUCTION: POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT ................................................. 5 

1.1.  A New Strategy for Schengen....................................................................................... 5 
1.2.  Schengen  Governance  and  the  role  of  the  Schengen  Evaluation  and  Monitoring 

Mechanism .................................................................................................................... 6 
1.3.  Shortcomings of SCH-EVAL ....................................................................................... 9 

2. 

PROBLEM DEFINITION ..................................................................................................... 11 

2.1.  What are the problems? .............................................................................................. 11 
2.2.  What are the problem drivers? .................................................................................... 21 
2.3.  How will the problem evolve? .................................................................................... 35 

3.  WHY SHOULD THE EU ACT? ........................................................................................... 36 

3.1.  Legal basis .................................................................................................................. 36 
3.2.  Subsidiarity: Necessity of EU action .......................................................................... 37 
3.3.  Subsidiarity: Added value of EU action ..................................................................... 37 

4.  OBJECTIVES: WHAT IS TO BE ACHIEVED?.................................................................. 37 

4.1.  General Objective ....................................................................................................... 37 
4.2.  Specific Objectives ..................................................................................................... 37 

5.  WHAT ARE THE AVAILABLE POLICY OPTIONS? ....................................................... 39 

5.1.  What is the baseline from which options are assessed? .............................................. 40 
5.2.  Option 1:  Operational changes ................................................................................... 43 
5.3.  Option 2:  Targeted legislative changes ...................................................................... 46 
5.4.  Option 3:  Ambitious legislative changes ................................................................... 49 
5.5.  Option 4: Combined approach .................................................................................... 53 
5.6.  Policy options discarded at an early stage .................................................................. 56 

6.  WHAT ARE THE IMPACTS OF THE POLICY OPTIONS? ............................................. 60 

6.1.  Economic impact ........................................................................................................ 60 
6.2.  Social Impact .............................................................................................................. 61 
6.3. 
Impact on fundamental rights ..................................................................................... 61 
6.4.  Administrative costs ................................................................................................... 62 

7.  HOW DO THE POLICY OPTIONS COMPARE? ............................................................... 71 

7.1.  Effectiveness ............................................................................................................... 71 
7.2.  Efficiency .................................................................................................................... 79 
7.3.  Proportionality ............................................................................................................ 81 
7.4.  Coherence ................................................................................................................... 82 
7.5.  Stakeholders’ support ................................................................................................. 83 

8. 

PREFERRED POLICY OPTION.......................................................................................... 86 

8.1.  Choice of Preferred Policy Option .............................................................................. 86 
8.2.  REFIT (simplification and improved efficiency)........................................................ 87 

9.  HOW WILL ACTUAL IMPACTS BE MONITORED AND EVALUATED?............ ........ 89 

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ANNEX 1: PROCEDURAL INFORMATION ....................................................................................91 

ANNEX 2: STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION ...............................................................................93 

ANNEX 3:  IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SCH-EVAL REGULATION .......................................117 

ANNEX 4: WHO IS AFFECTED AND HOW? .................................................................................131 

Figures 

Figure 1 – Schengen Governance ............................................................................................................6 
Figure 2 – SCH-EVAL evaluation cycle .................................................................................................9 
Figure 3 – Evaluations under the first five-year cycle...........................................................................16 
Figure 4 – Length of the evaluation process .........................................................................................20 
Figure 5 – Formally closed procedures .................................................................................................20 
Figure 6 – Currently evaluated policy fields .........................................................................................25 
Figure 7 – Number of experts per Member State during the first five-year cycle .................................35 
Figure 8 – Intervention logic .................................................................................................................39 
Figure 9 – Evaluation visits (2015-2020) ..............................................................................................41 
Figure 10 – Number of experts ..............................................................................................................42 
Figure 11 – Yearly average length of the evaluation process ................................................................42 
Figure 12 – Evaluations – Comparison of policy options .....................................................................77 
Figure 13 – Member State experts – Comparison of policy options .....................................................78 
Figure 14 – Length of the procedure – Comparison of policy options ..................................................79 
Figure 15 – Evaluation visits (2015-2020) ..........................................................................................118 
Figure 16 – Evaluation visits – Comparison of policy options ...........................................................122 
Figure 17 – Number of Member States Experts per evaluation ..........................................................124 
Figure 18 – Member States Experts – Comparison of policy options .................................................126 
Figure 19 – Main steps of the evaluation process ...............................................................................127 
Figure 20 – Length of the evaluation process (2015-2019) .................................................................128 
Figure 21 – Length of the evaluation process – Comparison of policy options ..................................130 

Tables 

Table 1 – Problem 1 and corresponding Drivers ...................................................................................14 
Table 2 – Problem 2 and corresponding Drivers ...................................................................................18 
Table 3 – Problem 3 and corresponding Drivers ...................................................................................21 
Table 4 – Failures in the design and implementation of the Regulation ...............................................23 
Table 5 – Overview of Option 1 ............................................................................................................45 
Table 6 – Overview of Option 2 ............................................................................................................48 
Table 7 – Overview of Option 3 ............................................................................................................52 
Table 8 – Overview of Option 4 ............................................................................................................55 
Table 9 – Synopsis of the policy options and key measures .................................................................58 
Table 10 – Impact on administrative costs – Comparison of policy options.........................................62 
Table 11 – Situation in the first five-year cycle (2015-2019) ...............................................................63 
Table 12 – Summary of administrative costs (complete table in Annex 4)...........................................70 
Table 13 – Comparison of policy options .............................................................................................71 
Table 14 – Evaluation team size – Comparison of the policy options ..................................................78 
Table 15 – Overview – Comparison of policy options ..........................................................................85 

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Table 16 – Impacts on simplification and administrative burden .........................................................87 
Table 17 – Areas of administrative simplification potential .................................................................88 
Table 18 – Success indicators................................................................................................................89 
Table 19 – Stakeholders’ consultation ..................................................................................................94 
Table 20 – First five-year cycle – evaluation and monitoring activities .............................................120 
Table 21 – Options 1 and 2 evaluation and monitoring activities .......................................................121 
Table 22 – Option 3 evaluation and monitoring activities ..................................................................121 
Table 23 – Option 4 evaluation and monitoring activities ..................................................................122 
Table 24 – Evaluation team size – Comparison of the policy options ................................................124 
Table 25 – Overview of benefits .........................................................................................................131 
Table 26 – Overview of costs ..............................................................................................................133 
Table 27 – Costs for Member States ...................................................................................................136 
Table 28 – Costs for the Member States evaluated .............................................................................137 
Table 29 – Yearly administrative costs for the Commission ...............................................................139 
Table 30 – Yearly costs for EU bodies / agencies risk analyses .........................................................140 
Table 31 – Yearly costs for EU bodies / agencies observers ...............................................................141 
Table 32 – EU bodies’ and agencies’ trainings ...................................................................................142 
Table 33 – Summary of administrative costs ......................................................................................143 

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Glossary 

Term or acronym 

Meaning or definition 

DPA 

EASO 

Data Protection Authority 

European Asylum Support Office 

ECRIS-TCN 

European Criminal Records Information System 

EDPS 

EES 

ETIAS 

eu-LISA 

European Data Protection Supervisor 

Entry / Exit System 

European Travel Information and Authorisation 
System 

EU Agency for the Operational Management of 
Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice 

EURODAC 

European Asylum Dactyloscopy Database 

Europol 

European Union Agency for Law Enforcement 
Cooperation 

EUROSUR 

European Border Surveillance System 

FRA 

Frontex 

Fundamental Rights Agency 

European Border and Coast Guard Agency 
(EBCG) 

Schengen Committee 

Committee assisting the Commission [within the 
meaning of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011] 

SCH-EVAL 

Schengen Evaluation And Monitoring Mechanism 

SCH-EVAL working 
party  

Council Working Party for Schengen Matters – 
Schengen Evaluation 

SIS 

TFEU 

VIS 

Schengen Information System 

Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 

Visa Information System 

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1. 

INTRODUCTION: POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT 

1.1.  A New Strategy for Schengen 

Schengen  is  one  of  the  most  significant  achievements  of  the  European  integration.  It  is  an 
area where more than 420 million people, as well as goods and services, can circulate freely 
without  being  subject  to  border  controls.  Schengen  contributes  to  the  functioning  of  the 
Single  Market  and  its  creation  has  brought  social  and  economic  benefits  to  the  European 
society1. 
The area without internal borders controls relies on Member States2 applying effectively and 
efficiently the Schengen legal framework. It requires common efforts to maintain a high level 
of  mutual  trust  between  Member  States  and  ultimately  on  a  correct  and  efficient 
implementation of the Schengen legal framework. Deficiencies in one Member State (e.g. in 
the external border management) can affect all others and subsequently put Schengen at risk. 
The  Schengen  Evaluation  and  Monitoring  Mechanism  (hereafter  ‘SCH-EVAL’  or  ‘the 
Mechanism’)  is  essential  for  the  effective  functioning  of  Schengen  by  identifying  and 
remedying  problems  and  improving  Member  State  implementation  of  the  legal  framework. 
As  a  peer-to-peer  instrument,  the  Mechanism  supports  the  building  of  mutual  trust  among 
Member States. 

For  the  last  35  years,  Schengen  has  been  subject  to  continuous  revisions  to  reinforce  this 
trust.  Today,  it  faces  a  different  reality  and  challenges  than  when  it  was  established. 
Instability  in  Europe’s  neighbourhood  and  beyond,  the  2015  refugee  crisis  and  its 
consequences, the persistent terrorist threat, and the COVID-19 pandemic have led to some 
Member  States  reintroducing  internal  border  controls.  In  some  cases,  controls  have  been 
renewed several times since 2015. 

These developments have highlighted the need to improve the governance structure and the 
tools  available  to  make  Schengen  work.  To  address  the  challenges  faced  by  the  Schengen 
area, Commission President von der Leyen announced a Strategy on Schengen in her State of 
the Union address3.  In the New Pact  on Asylum  and Migration4, the Commission indicated 
that  the  Strategy  would  combine  legislative  and  operational  initiatives  aimed  at  ensuring  a 
stronger,  more  resilient  area  without  internal  border  controls,  while  reinforcing  its 
governance  and  monitoring  structures  Schengen.  One  such  initiative  is  the  revision  of  the 
Mechanism.  

1 

2 

3 

4 

In  2016,  it  was  estimated  that  the  full  reestablishment  of  internal  border  controls  would  generate 
immediate direct costs between EUR 5 and 18 billion annually, COM(2016) 120 final of 4.3.2016, p. 3. 
Beyond EU Member States, Schengen covers also Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and Liechtenstein (so-
called ‘Schengen Associated Countries’). Ireland is not part of the area  without internal border controls 
but  it  will  apply  the  Schengen acquis  in  part  as  of  1  January  2021.  Bulgaria,  Croatia,  Cyprus  and 
Romania are bound by the Schengen acquis, however, internal border controls have not yet been lifted in 
respect of these Member States. This impact assessment refers to all these countries as Member States. 
State  of  the  Union  Address  by  President  von  der  Leyen  at  the  European  Parliament  Plenary,  16 
September 2020. 
State  of  the  Union  Address  by  President  von  der  Leyen  at  the  European  Parliament  Plenary,  16 
September 2020. 
COM(2020) 609 final of 23.9.2020, pp. 14-15. 

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Other  EU  institutions  stressed  the  need  to  reform  the  Mechanism.  Both  the  European 
Parliament,  in  its  2017  resolution5,  and  the  Council,  already  through  the  consultation 
launched by the Finnish Presidency in 20196, invited the Commission to act. More recently, 
the Council adopted conclusions on the Mechanism inviting the Commission to put forward 
initiatives,  in  its  proposal  for  the  revision  of  SCH-EVAL,  to  streamline  and  clarify  where 
necessary  the  evaluation  process,  and,  in  particular,  asked  to  ensure  that  the  Mechanism  is 
adaptable to the evolving circumstances and developments of the Schengen acquis in order to 
address new challenges and to adapt to new realities7.  

The objective of the revision is to ensure that SCH-EVAL becomes a fully effective tool for 
evaluating the functioning of Schengen and for ensuring that the recommendations stemming 
from the evaluations are effectively implemented by Member States.  

1.2. 

Schengen  Governance  and  the  role  of  the  Schengen  Evaluation  and 
Monitoring Mechanism  

includes  (1)  measures  at 

Schengen is supported by a significant body of measures that compensate for the absence of 
controls  at  internal  borders  and  effectively  ensure  a  high  level  of  security.  The  so-called 
Schengen acquis 
the  external  borders  (external  borders 
management),  (2)  compensatory  measures  (common  visa  policy,  police  cooperation,  return 
policy and the Schengen Information System), and (3) a robust monitoring mechanism. These 
measures include the respect for data protection requirements  and other fundamental rights. 
These  three  essential  and  complementary  pillars  of  Schengen  form  the  ‘Schengen 
Governance’ and make the area without controls at internal borders possible (see Figure 1). 
The  stability  of  this  complex  architecture  depends  on  the  strength  of  each  individual  pillar 
and on the coherence and cohesion of the whole system. 

Figure 1 – Schengen Governance 

external 

initiatives 

In the last years, a number 
have 
of 
reinforced  the 
legislative 
framework in the first and 
second pillars. For the field 
of 
border 
management,  the  initiatives 
included the development of 
a  new  IT  architecture  (such 
as  EES8,  ETIAS9),  and  the 
the 
interoperability 
various 
systems 
IT 
underpinning the functioning 
of Schengen. Recent reforms 
systematic 
also 

included 

of 

5 

6 
7 
8 
9 

Report on the annual report on the functioning of the Schengen area (2017/2256(INI)), (the  ‘European 
Parliament 2017 resolution’). 
Council doc. 13244/2019. 
Council doc. 7939/21, p. 3 and 4 (the ‘2021 Council conclusions’). 
Entry and Exit System (EES). Regulation (EU) 2017/2226, OJ L 327, 9.12.2017, p. 20. 
European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS). Regulation (EU) 2018/1240, OJ L 236, 
19.9.2018, p.1.  

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checks  of  EU  citizens  against  relevant  databases  at  external  borders10,  the  adoption  of  the 
Frontex11  Regulation  in  201612,  and  its  subsequent  review  in  201913  (which  reinforced  the 
mandate  and  competences  of  the  agency  with  the  inclusion  of  revised  provisions  on 
EUROSUR14), as well as the gradual development of an integrated system for managing the 
EU’s  external  borders  (the  European  integrated  border  management).  More  recently,  the 
Commission put forward a proposal for a pre-entry screening15 applicable to all third-country 
nationals who cross the external borders without authorisation. 

Recent  crises  have  shown  that  the  EU  is  not  sufficiently  equipped  to  foresee,  prepare  and 
react in a coordinated and rapid manner to threats that may have an impact on the functioning 
of  Schengen  and  require  the  adoption  of  measures  of  last  resort.  The  Commission  plans  to 
strengthen Schengen’s architecture further by setting up a mechanism to tackle concrete and 
immediate  threats  to  the  Schengen  area  in  a  coordinated  manner16  under  the  Schengen 
Borders Code17. To enhance the security of Schengen, the Commission intends to replace the 
Directive18 on the obligation of carriers to communicate Advance Passenger Data (API).  

New  developments  have  been  introduced  under  the  second  pillar  and  further  changes  are 
expected.  The  legislative  package  adopted  in  201819  has  widened  the  scope  and 
functionalities  of  the  Schengen  Information  System  (SIS)20.  The  implementation  of  the 
revised Visa Information System (VIS) is planned to be completed by the end of 2021. The 
Commission has put forward proposals for a recast Return Directive21 and a revision of the 
Europol22  mandate23,  and  is  planning  to  strengthen  police  cooperation  via  an  EU  Police 
Cooperation Code.  

Any  legislation  is  only  as  good  as  its  implementation.  A  well-functioning  Schengen  area 
depends on the correct and efficient implementation of the common rules, i.e. the Schengen 
acquis  and,  in  more  general  terms,  on  mutual  trust  among  Member  States.  It  is  therefore 
crucial  to  have  an  effective  monitoring  mechanism  to  verify  how  countries  implement  the 

10 

11 
12 

13 

14 

15 
16 
17 

18 
19 

20 

21 
22 
23 

Regulation  (EU)  2017/458,  OJ  L  74,  18.3.2017,  p.  1,  amending  Regulation  2016/399  as  regards  the 
reinforcement of checks against relevant databases at external borders.  
European Border and Coast Guard Agency (EBCG), also known as Frontex. 
Regulation  (EU)  2016/1624,  OJ  L  251,  16.9.2016,  p.  1  (the  ‘2016  Frontex  Regulation’).  Repealed  in 
2019 by Regulation (EU) 2019/1896, OJ L 295, 14.11.2019, p. 1 (the ‘2019 Frontex Regulation’).   
The 2019 Frontex Regulation introduced expanded tasks  and powers for the agency, which will benefit 
of new resources. 10 000 standing corps will be deployed starting from 2021 and will carry out executive 
task under the authority and control of the host Member State. 
European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR). Regulation (EU) 1052/2013, OJ L 295, 6.11.2013, 
p. 11. Repealed and replaced by Regulation (EU) 2019/1896. 
COM(2020) 612 of 23.9.2020. 
Regulation (EU) 2016/399, OJ L 77, 23.3.2016, p. 1, as amended. 
The initiative to amend the Schengen Borders Code is subject to a separate Impact Assessment. Inception 
(https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/12827-
Impact  Assessment 
Amendment-of-the-Schengen-Borders-Code). 
Council Directive 2004/82/EC, OJ L 261, 6.8.2004, p. 24–27. 
Regulation  (UE)  2018/1860,  OJ  L  312,  7.12.2018,  p.  1–13,  Regulation  (UE)  2018/1861,  OJ  L  312, 
7.12.2018, p. 14–55,  and Regulation (UE) 2018/1862, OJ L 312, 7.12.2018, p. 56–106.  
The implementation of the revised Schengen Information System is expected to be concluded by the end 
of 2021. 
COM(2018) 634 final of 12.9.2018. 
European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol). 
COM(2020) 796 final of 9.12.2020. 

6 

 
                                                           
Schengen acquis  and  recommend  improvements  to  its  implementation24.  In  its  origins,  the 
Mechanism  was  intergovernmental  and  remained  in  the  hands  of  the  Council.  In  2013,  the 
Council  and  the  Parliament  adopted  the  ‘Schengen  Governance  package’.  This  package 
included  a  Council  Regulation25  establishing  the  current  ‘Schengen  Evaluation  and 
Monitoring  Mechanism’.  The  Regulation  transferred  the  responsibility  for  the  coordination 
and overall organisation of the Mechanism to the Commission.  
However, under Article 70 TFUE26, the Mechanism remains a shared responsibility, with the 
Commission carrying out evaluations jointly with Member State experts and supported by EU 
agencies and bodies. The Regulation introduced a five-year evaluation cycle and new tools so 
that  the  Mechanism  can  better  respond  to  new  challenges  and  provide  an  overview  of 
horizontal issues affecting Schengen’s functioning.  

Within  the  Schengen  Governance  architecture,  the  purpose  of  SCH-EVAL  has  remained 
unchanged  i.e.  to  maintain  a  high  level  of  accountability,  ownership  of  results  and  mutual 
trust  among  participating  Member  States.  It  contributes  to  a  well-functioning  Schengen  by 
guaranteeing that Member States apply the Schengen acquis effectively following the agreed 
common standards, fundamental principles and norms. SCH-EVAL is supposed to achieve 
these goals by objective and impartial evaluations that are able to: 

  quickly identify deficiencies in the application of the Schengen legal framework that 

could disrupt Schengen;  

  ensure  these  deficiencies  are  swiftly  addressed  (to  prevent  these  disruptions  and 

ensure correct application of the Schengen acquis); and  

  provide the basis for a political dialogue on the functioning of Schengen as a whole.  

Thanks to the peer-to-peer element, Member States can get direct knowledge of the situation 
in other Member States by their experts’ participation in the evaluation visits. Member State 
experts  check  what  their  peers  are  doing,  recommending  solutions  and  urging  action  if  the 
Member State does not implement them.  

This all-encompassing mutual trust element and its intergovernmental origin explain some of 
the key features of the Mechanism and current institutional balance:  

  The  Mechanism  covers  all  areas  of  the  Schengen  acquis  (pillars  one  and  two  of 

Schengen governance); 

  Evaluation teams are composed by Commission and Member State experts (80% of 
the  team  is  made  of  national  experts  and  the  remaining  20%  of  Commission’s 
representatives;  the  representatives  from  EU  agencies  and  bodies,  although 
observers, are not formally part of the team); 

  While the Commission is responsible for adopting reports, these are co-drafted and 
agreed by the evaluation team and must be discussed with the evaluated Member 

24 

25 
26 

In 1998, the contracting parties, as part of the Schengen Convention, set up a Standing Committee with 
the mandate to identify shortcomings in the implementation of Schengen and propose solutions within an 
intergovernmental framework. See Decision of the Executive Committee of 16 September 1998 setting 
up  a  Standing  Committee  on  the  evaluation  and  implementation  of  Schengen  (SCH/  Com-ex  (98)  26 
def.),  OJ  L  239,  22.09.2000,  p. 138,  as  part  of  the  1985  Schengen  Agreement  (OJ  L  239,  22.9.2000, 
p. 13)  and  the  1990  Schengen  Convention  (OJ  L  239,  22.9.2000,  p. 19)).  The  Council  took  over  the 
coordinating role and evaluations were carried out at regular intervals by teams of Member State experts 
accompanied by a Council’s representative and a Commission’s observer. 
Council Regulation (EU) No 1053/2013, OJ L 295, 6.11.2013, p. 27 (the ‘Regulation’). 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 

7 

 
                                                           
State,  and  receive  the  positive  opinion  of  the  Schengen  Committee,  in  which 
Member States are represented; 

  The  Council  adopts  recommendations  for  remedial  action  upon  a  Commission 
proposal; The Commission is responsible for the monitoring of how Member States 
are addressing deficiencies while keeping the Council and the European Parliament 
informed; and 

  The findings are discussed only between Member States and the Commission with 

little transparency vis-à-vis other actors, i.e. reports are EU RESTRICTED. 

Figure 2 – SCH-EVAL evaluation cycle 

The  significant  legislative  developments  under  the  two  first  pillars  of  the  Schengen 
architecture require effective implementation  by the Member States. Despite the substantial 
reinforcement  of  pillars  one  and  two,  SCH-EVAL  remained  unchanged27  in  the  last  years, 
which affected its capacity to keep up with the legislative developments. For a stronger and 
resilient Schengen, it is important that the Mechanism remains fit for purpose and reaches its 
full  potential  in  order  to  be  able  to  adapt  to  recent  legislative  developments,  address  new 
challenges  and  include  new  Member  States  that  are  fully  or  partly  applying  the 
Schengen acquis.  However,  as  shown 
the  current  Mechanism  has 
shortcomings that need remediation for the Mechanism to  become a  fully effective tool for 
evaluating  the  functioning  of  Schengen  and  for  ensuring  that  recommendations  stemming 
from the evaluations are effectively implemented.  

in  section  1.3, 

1.3. 

Shortcomings of SCH-EVAL 

In  line  with  its  reporting  obligations  to  the  Council  and  European  Parliament,  the 
Commission undertook a comprehensive review of the Mechanism’s functioning presenting 
information  on  the  effectiveness  and  relevance  of  the  Regulation.28  The  five-year  review29, 
building  of  the  six  policy  areas  currently  under  evaluation30  provides  a  state  of  play  of  the 
implementation  of  the  Schengen  acquis  and  it  serves  as  basis  for  reflection  on  how  to 
improve  the  Mechanism.  For  this  exercise,  the  Commission  collected  and  analysed  data  on 

27 

28 
29 
30 

The  third  pillar  was  reinforced  with  the  2019  Frontex  Regulation,  which  established  the  Vulnerability 
Assessment process which offers a snapshot of Member States operational capacity in external borders 
management with a view to identifying potential weaknesses in the system. 
Articles 20 and 22 of the Regulation. 
COM(2020) 779 final of 25.11.2020 (the ‘five-year review’). 
As indicated in the five-year review, the Mechanism currently evaluates six policy areas: external boder 
management,  common  visa  policy,  police  cooperation,  Schengen  Information  System,  data  protection 
and return. 

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the  first  five-year  cycle  and  took  into  consideration  information  from  relevant  actors  about 
the most critical aspects of this Mechanism. 
This  Impact  Assessment  builds  on  the  data31  collected  in  the  framework  of  the  five-year 
Review  and  its  results  (see  Annex  3)32.  It  covers  the  overall  functioning  of  the  Mechanism 
and the problem analysis is not limited only to shortcomings related to the substance of the 
evaluation, i.e. six policy areas. 

Overall,  the  five-year  review  confirmed  that  the  Mechanism  has  led  to  substantial  and 
concrete  improvements  in  the  implementation  of  the  Schengen acquis,  proving  its 
added-value  in  ensuring  Schengen’s  efficient  functioning.  The  more  than  200  evaluations 
carried out helped identify a number of serious deficiencies and address them swiftly. It also 
brought about tangible improvements in all policy fields, and made an essential contribution 
to the further development of the Schengen acquis33.  

The  added-value  and  necessity  of  having  an  evaluation  and  monitoring  mechanism  of  the 
Schengen  acquis  is  recognised  by  the  Council  which  considered  that  ‘[w]hile  fulfilling  its 
core role of monitoring the proper application of the Schengen acquis, the evaluation process 
has  brought  further  benefits  in  most  Member  States,  including  by  strengthening  national 
coordination,  increasing  expertise  and  exchanges  via  the  experts  participating  in  the 
evaluations,  and  feeding  recommendations  into  national  plans  and  strategies.’34  The 
European  Parliament  stressed  the  ‘great  value  [of]  the  renewed  Schengen  evaluation 
mechanism as it promotes transparency, mutual trust and accountability between the Member 
States by scrutinising the way they implement the different fields of the Schengen acquis’.35 

However,  the  five-year  review  also  identified  a  number  of  shortcomings  that  prevent  the 
Mechanism from working as effectively as it could and should, undermining its full potential. 
This finding was in line with the 2017 report by the European Parliament, the Member States’ 
consultation  under  the  Finnish  presidency  in  2019  and  the  2019  report  of  the  Court  of 
Auditors36.  The  study  carried  out  in  2020  on  behalf  of  the  European  Parliament37  and  the 
stakeholders’ consultation supporting this impact assessment reinforced this conclusion. 

Box 1 – Shortcomings of SCH-EVAL 

Main shortcomings identified in the functioning of SCH-EVAL following the review of the first five-
year Multiannual Evaluation Programme 

  The excessive length of the evaluation process, even in cases of serious deficiencies; 
  The high resource intensity for Member States, the Commission and EU agencies and bodies; 
  The excessive focus of evaluations (and then recommendations) on very specific and numerous 

details rather than the core elements of the Schengen acquis; 

31 

32 

33 
34 
35 
36 
37 

Some of the data presented in the Impact Assessment may slightly differ from the information indicated 
in the five-year review, given that, by the time of adoption of the Impact Assessment, additional data was 
available on the first five-year cycle and taken into consideration.  
A full ex-post evaluation of the Regulation was not possible due to the length of the evaluation procedure 
under SCH-EVAL and the fact that a relevant number of Member States were only at the beginning of 
their evaluation process at the end of 2019. Sufficient evidence was nevertheless available substantiating 
the urgent need for reform of SCH-EVAL.  
See COM(2020) 779 final of 25.11.2020. 
Council doc. 13244/2019. 
The European Parliament 2017 resolution. 
Court of Auditor, Special Report 20/2019. 
The  state  of  play  of  Schengen  governance:  An  assessment  of  the  Schengen  evaluation  and  monitoring 
mechanism in its first multiannual programme, 2020 (‘The state of play of Schengen governance’).  

9 

 
                                                           
  The  lack  of  horizontal  findings  about  the  state  of  Schengen  and  the  interplay  among  various 

policy fields; 

  Unannounced  visits  not  being  as  effective  as  originally  conceived  and  little  strategic  use  of 

thematic evaluations;  

  Slow follow-up and implementation of the action plans to remedy identified deficiencies and the 

 

monitoring generally not being comprehensive and consistent; 
Insufficient effectiveness of recommendations as a tool to ensure that Member States take rapid 
action with deficiencies in the expected peer-to-peer pressure; 

  Lack  of  triggering  political  discussions  on  the  state  of  Schengen  in  relevant  fora,  and  the 

irregular involvement of the European Parliament; 

  Member States’ contribution in terms of experts’ participation not always matching the needs; 
  Duplications with other EU mechanisms, notably Frontex Vulnerability Assessment; and  
  Drawbacks  in  the  integration  of  fundamental  rights  in  the  evaluations  of  external  borders 

management. 

Thus, the five-year review concluded that the Mechanism had succeeded in identifying many 
deficiencies  and  addressing  them,  driving  towards  the  higher  harmonisation  of  Member 
States practices according to high standards. However, it had failed to do so at the speed that 
the  Member  States  and  the  European  Parliament  considered  needed,  given  the  current 
challenges and new realities, and in the areas that matter. It has also failed to provide for 
the  basis  that  would  facilitate  a  political  discussion  on  the  state  of  Schengen  and  its 
functioning.  

Several  unforeseen  changes  to  material  conditions  and  great  uncertainty  marked  the 
beginning  of  the  new  evaluation  cycle  (2020-2024)  as  the  COVID-19  pandemic  spread 
throughout Schengen. The Commission had to postpone repeatedly a number of evaluations 
scheduled  in  the  annual  programme38.  Covid-19  brought  to  the  fore  the  rigidities  of  the 
Mechanism  and  its  unsuitability  to  account  for  changing  conditions.  To  address  these 
shortcomings,  the  five-year  review  indicated  possible  operational  measures  to  improve  the 
Mechanism but it highlighted that, for the instrument to work fully effectively, it is essential 
to complement them with legislative changes.  

2.  PROBLEM DEFINITION 

2.1.  What are the problems? 

Recent challenges have revealed a fragile trust among Member States that has manifested in 
several ways. The most notable was the prolonged reintroduction of internal border checks by 
six Member States39. SCH-EVAL is a technical instrument that aims at facilitating political 
dialogue.  External  political  factors  will  always  influence  even  the  best-designed  and  most 
effective  instruments.  In  the  past  five  years,  the  visibility  of  SCH-EVAL’s  results  and  its 
capacity to build trust and promote political discussion has not been optimal. Evidence of this 
is  that  despite  positive  evaluations  in  external  borders  management,  police  cooperation  and 
the  Schengen  Information  System,  and  an  overall  assessment  that  Member  States  are 
implementing  the  Schengen acquis  adequately,  Member  States  continue prolonging  internal 
border  controls  based  on,  among  other  reasons,  weaknesses  at  the  external  borders. 
Furthermore,  as  shown  in  section  2.1.1,  even  when  SCH-EVAL  identified  serious 

38 
39 

C(2015)4827 final of 23.7.2015. 
In the  period between 2006 and 2014, internal border controls  were only reintroduced 35. Since 2015, 
such  border  controls  were  reintroduced  212  times  and  overwhelmingly  for  the  same  three  reasons: 
migratory  flows,  terrorism  and  COVID-19  pandemic,  as  recalled  also  by  a  citizen  during  the 
consultation. 

10 

 
                                                           
deficiencies,  discussions  on  the  findings  hardly  reached  the  ministerial  level.  SCH-EVAL 
identified  serious  deficiencies  in  10  evaluation  visits40.  However,  SCH-EVAL  triggered 
ministerial discussion only in the case of Greece’s serious deficiencies in the external border 
management.  

Given  SCH-EVAL’s  role  in  the  overall  Schengen  Governance  architecture,  it  is  important 
that  the  Mechanism  is  fit  for  purpose  and  deploys  its  full  potential,  while  being  more 
manageable  from  a  resource  point  of  view.  The  Impact  Assessment  analyses  the  problems 
affecting  the  functioning  of  the  Mechanism.  These  problems  (as  well  as  drivers  and  policy 
options)  were  identified  based  on  the  conclusions  of  the  five-year  review  of  the 
implementation  of  the  current  Regulation,  the  recommendations  collected  during  the 
stakeholders’ consultation organised for this Impact Assessment as well as studies carried out 
on the functioning of the Mechanism and information from Council documents and European 
Parliament resolutions. 

The  shortcomings  identified  in  the  first  five-year  cycle  can  be  summarised  as  three 
interlinked problems: 

  Limited strategic focus and significant fragmentation, preventing an overview of the 
functioning  of  Schengen  as  a  whole  that  would  otherwise  facilitate  political 
discussion; 
Insufficient  capacity  to  identify  and  quickly  adapt  and  react  to  new  circumstances, 
legislative developments and trends, particularly  violations of fundamental  rights  at 
the external borders; and 

 

  Slow adoption and implementation of remedies, with a peer-to-peer system that does 

not exert the expected pressure. 

2.1.1.  Problem 1 – Limited strategic focus and significant fragmentation 
preventing an overview of the functioning of Schengen as a whole 
that would otherwise facilitate political discussion 

The Regulation clearly states that SCH-EVAL should contribute to ‘political discussions at 
ministerial level  on the  correct  functioning of  Schengen, including  discussions in  situations 
where evaluation reports have shown serious shortcomings …[and] should assist the Council 
in taking decisions… to ensure the efficient functioning of Schengen’ (Recital 11). To do so, it 
is important to verify that Member States are correctly applying the various elements of the 
Schengen acquis. 

However, in the first five-year cycle, the limited strategic focus and significant fragmentation 
of the evaluations prevented the Mechanism from providing an overview of the functioning 
of  Schengen,  limiting  political  discussion  (e.g.  how  well  Schengen  was  working,  common 
problems to all Member States and best practices). 

Given  the  substantial  number  of  policy  fields  and  legal  acts  that  sustain  Schengen  (around 
200 acts), it is impossible to focus on the implementation of all provisions. The Mechanism 
should  ensure  that  Member  States  properly  implement  the  core  elements  and  have  a 
helicopter view across different policy fields. The actors involved (the Member States and the 
Commission  in  the  Schengen  Committee41)  ‘pre-selected’  six  priority  policy  fields  that 

40 

41 

As indicated by the five-year review, the Mechanism identified serious deficiencies in ten evaluations in 
three  fields:  external  border  management  (Greece,  Iceland,  Spain  and  Sweden);  common  visa  policy 
(Finland and the Netherlands); Schengen Information System (Belgium, France, Spain and UK). 
See Article 21 of the Regulation and Box 9. 

11 

 
                                                           
should  be  evaluated  in  the  first  five-year  cycle,  which  they  also  confirmed  for  the  second 
cycle.  These  fields  include  external  border  management,  common  visa  policy,  police 
cooperation,  Schengen  Information  System,  data  protection,  and  return42.  In  theory,  the 
Mechanism  also  developed  a  method  for  identifying  more  targeted  evaluations  for  each 
Member State, based on risk analysis submitted by relevant EU agencies and bodies. 

However,  in  the  attempt  to  cover  as  many  provisions  as  possible,  SCH-EVAL  has  mainly 
focused on the correct transposition and implementation of all the provisions of the Schengen 
acquis  in  these  six  policy  fields  (about  25  legal  acts).  This  focus  resulted  in  voluminous 
detailed  reports  with  numerous  findings  that  produced  equally  numerous  and  punctual 
recommendations,  often  related  to  local  issues,  without  assessing  their  overall  impact  on 
Schengen.  From  the  shade  of  blue  in  the  signposting  of  the  border  crossing  points  to  the 
insufficient  light  in  the  booths,  evaluations,  reports  and  recommendations  focused  on  too 
many issues that, although linked to specific obligations under the Schengen acquis, did not 
necessarily have an impact on the functioning of Schengen.  

This  focus  on  details,  while  instructive,  has  meant  that  evaluations  have  not  been  used  to 
identify system-based deficiencies across Member States or to draw conclusions on how well 
a  Member  State  applies  the  legal  framework  overall.  Even  a  Member  State  with  a  robust 
system  could  still  receive  40  recommendations  in  one  single  policy  field,  15  related  to 
material problems limited to specific airports43. In one year, the Mechanism evaluates about 
6-8  Member  States  in  each  of  the  six  policy  fields.  A  single  Member  State  could  receive 
hundreds of recommendations to implement through a minimum of six action plans. For the 
Commission, it has meant drawing conclusions about the state of Schengen from as many as 
1 000 findings and recommendations. Because of this focus on details, it has become almost 
impossible to identify potential problems generated by the interplay between policy fields.  

Box 2 – Links between policy fields 

With  the  entry  into  force  of  the  new  legal  basis  for  using  the  Schengen  Information  System  (SIS),  SIS  will 
become  a  key  element  to  support  return  systems  by  recording  entry  bans  issued  under  the  Return  Directive. 
Since  these  entry bans prohibit entry into the  territory of all Member States,  not only into the territory of the 
issuing Member State, its timely issuance and upload into the SIS is particularly important. If country X does 
not systematically issue and register in SIS these entry bans, the evaluation reports on the Schengen Information 
System and in the  field of return  for that country  might  not consider it as a  key deficiency, since in isolation 
these are not core elements of the SIS or of the return system. However, without the alert in SIS, the European 
dimension of the measure will not be effective. It would not be possible for another Member State to prohibit 
the entry into Schengen territory of a person subject to an entry ban somewhere else. These deficiencies may go 
unnoticed amid other deficiencies. However, suppose a Member State with a significant flow has one or both of 
these  deficiencies  or  these  deficiencies  are  present  in  many  Member  States.  This  scenario  could  impact 
Schengen’s functioning44. 

As  the  Mechanism  focused  on  these  detailed  regular  evaluations  in  the  six  policy  fields,  it 
failed  to  utilise  thematic  evaluations,  created  partly  to  help  the  system  identify  common 
challenges and trends. Only two thematic evaluations took place in five years, respectively on 

42 

43 
44 

The  previous  Mechanism  did  not  evaluate  return.  In  2015,  the  actors  involved  agreed  that  judicial 
cooperation was no longer a priority. Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA on the European arrest 
warrant  and  the  surrender  procedures  between  Member  States  does  not  qualify  as  Schengen acquis 
although it replaced provisions on extradition in the Schengen Convention. Such provisions apply only in 
relation to Switzerland and Liechtenstein as well as between all associated countries. 
See Council doc. 12869/20. 
This link will become even more important in the future, as SIS’s use will be further extended in the field 
of return. See Regulation (EU) 2018/1860, OJ L 312 of 7.12.2018, p. 1.  

12 

 
                                                           
local  Schengen  cooperation  in  the  area  of  visa  policy  and  on  the  national  strategies  for 
integrated border management. The use of thematic evaluations (which aim at verifying the 
application  of  specific  parts  of  the  Schengen  acquis  across  several  Member  States)  could 
have  been  more  strategically  use  to  obtain  an  overview  of  Member  States’  performance  in 
specific areas of the Schengen acquis.  

The  five-year  review  highlighted  that  the  localised  nature  of  recommendations  has  also 
discouraged discussion in the Council. There were too many detailed reports (about 35-40 a 
year)  and  thus  they  were  rarely  discussed  in  the  Schengen  Committee,  the  SCH-EVAL 
working party45 or at  political  level.  As a result, in the past  five  years, Ministers have only 
once discussed SCH-EVAL findings. It was Greece’s serious deficiencies on external border 
management, which led to the reintroduction of internal border controls46. Even when a later 
evaluation considered that Greece had addressed those deficiencies, the Mechanism failed to 
trigger Ministerial level discussions.  

The  lack  of  strategic  focus  and  political  discussion  on  results  emerged  during  the 
stakeholders’ consultation as one of the main problems. Several  Member States (during the 
consultation  and  the  2021  Council  conclusions47)  stressed  the  need  to  foster  political 
discussion on the deficiencies identified during the Schengen evaluations. Some DPAs48 and 
EDPS49  highlighted  the  lack  of  visibility  of  the  Mechanism  and  its  results  at  the  national 
level.  Some  civil  society  organisations  indicated  that  SCHEVAL  should  guarantee  proper 
political  discussion  on  the  state  of  Schengen  and  put  pressure  on  Member  States  to  adopt 
remedial actions.  

A recent study conducted on behalf of the European Parliament also highlighted the lack of 
strategic focus and resulting lack of overview of Schengen’s functioning as one of the main 
criticisms: ‘[SCH-EVAL] does not leverage its findings for broader aims such as the further 
development of national or EU/Schengen policies’. ‘[I]t provides a snapshot-style evaluation 
of  specific  Schengen  policy  area(s)  in  a  particular  country  but  does  not  provide  the 
instruments  to  extract  from  those  findings  Schengen-wide  conclusions  of  a  more  strategic 
nature’.50  During  the  stakeholders’  consultation,  the  European  Parliament  echoed  that  the 
Mechanism’s  current  design  and  functioning  prevented  it  from  having  an  overview  on 
Schengen as a whole51. 

As further clarified in the section on drivers, the limited political discussion of the evaluation 
findings  derives  from  the  significant  number  of  reports  (due  to  the  fragmentation  of  the 
instrument into six policy fields) and sets of very detailed recommendations as well as from 
the  complicated  decision-making  process.  All  this  led  to  reports  remaining  at  the  technical 
level. In addition, the Council’s involvement in all the different procedures have limited the 

45 
46 
47 

48 
49 
50 
51 

Council Working Party for Schengen Matters - Schengen Evaluation.  
Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/894, OJ L 151, 8.6.2016, p. 8. 
The  2021  Council  conclusions,  p.  3,  indicate:  ‘The  Council  [...]  invites  the  Council  and  the  Member 
States to regularly address, at the appropriate political level, the identified deficiencies, their impact on 
the overall functioning of the Schengen area without border control at internal borders and the measures 
taken to remedy them…’. 
Data Protection Authorities (DPAs). 
European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS). 
The state of play of Schengen governance, pp. 53 and 18. 
During the workshop, the European Parliament recommended to ensure more flexibility when using all 
the tools currently available and dedicate more time to horizontal findings and to have a better overview 
of the Schengen area as a whole. 

13 

 
                                                           
Council’s  capacity  to  exert  the  aimed-for  peer  pressure  and  focus  on  the  most  politically 
relevant  aspects  that  could  have  an  impact  on  the  functioning  of  Schengen.  On  the 
Commission’s side, the regular adoption of the annual SCH-EVAL report52 would have also 
helped bringing political attention to evaluation results and progress made by Member States.  

Table 1 – Problem 1 and corresponding Drivers 

Problems 

Drivers 

Limited strategic 
focus and 
significant 
fragmentation 
preventing an 
overview of 
Schengen 

Primary drivers 
  A broad scope with gaps and not adapted to new realities 

(Driver 1.1), which does not entirely ensure a fully efficient 
evaluation of Schengen’s functioning and limits the Mechanism’s 
strategic focus. 

  A fragmented articulation of evaluations into six policy fields that are 
not adapted to new legislative developments and needs (Driver 1.2), 
which leads to a significant number of reports / recommendations per 
Member State and limits the Mechanism’s strategic focus and its 
capacity to provide an overview of a Member State performance 
overall and of Schengen’s functioning. 

  A too limited temporal scope to allow for a flexible use of available 
tools (Driver 1.3), limiting the Mechanism’s strategic focus and its 
capacity to react to new circumstances. 

  Unbalanced & underused sources of information and expertise 
(Driver 4.1) and limited coordination and synergies with other 
instruments (Driver 4.2) when designing specific evaluations, the 
combination of which does not allow for targeted and strategic 
evaluations and leads to very technical and numerous 
recommendations, leading to fragmentation thereby limiting the 
Mechanism’s strategic focus. 

Secondary drivers 
 

Inadequate criteria underlying evaluation and monitoring tools 
(Driver 2.2), in particular thematic evaluations and revisits, which 
does not allow for the Mechanism to make the best and most strategic 
use of the tools available.  

  Complex decision making evaluation process (Driver 3.1) and a 

potential disproportionate institutional balance (Driver 3.3) with too 
much Member State/Council supervision, which reduces the capacity 
of the Council to have a political discussion on the state of Schengen 
and the areas that matters (serious and recurrent deficiencies), thereby 
reducing the Mechanism’s strategic focus. 

Area of 
intervention 

Material and 
temporal scope 

Evaluation 
design / 
implementation 
– actors & 
synergies 

Evaluation & 
monitoring tools 

Decision-making 
& institutional 
balance 

2.1.2.  Problem 2 – Insufficient capacity of the Mechanism to identify and 
legislative 
quickly  adapt  and  react 
developments  and  trends,  particularly  violations  of  fundamental 
rights at the external borders 

to  new  circumstances, 

The Regulation introduced multiannual and annual evaluation programmes to create certainty 
in  evaluations’  consistency  and  frequency.  The  Mechanism  considered  these  ‘periodic 
evaluations’ as the main tools to ensure an overall correct application of the  acquis. It also 
introduced  the  possibility  of  ad-hoc  evaluations  in  the  form  of  unannounced  visits  and 
revisits  (which  can  be  announced  or  unannounced)  particularly  in  the  case  of  serious 

52 

Article 20 of the Regulation. 

14 

 
 
 
                                                           
deficiencies.  It  foresaw  thematic  evaluations  for  the  application  of  specific  parts  of  the 
Schengen acquis across several Member States.  

Despite  these  new  tools,  the  Mechanism  was  not  sufficiently  capable  to  identify  quickly 
deficiencies,  react  to  new  circumstances,  i.e.  emerging  problems  not  identified  in  a  risk 
analysis,  or  to  new  legislative  changes  intervening  in  the  middle  of  the  evaluation  cycle.  It 
also failed to adjust to new types of violations. In addition, it underutilised the new tools.  

  Insufficient capacity to quickly react to new circumstances  

One  year  often  passes  between  programming  an  evaluation  and  carrying  it  out.  Even 
unannounced visits, which should be the most flexible tool, must be programmed one year in 
advance based on a risk analysis concluded one year before the visits take place. By the time 
of  the  visit,  operational  circumstances  might  have  changed  and  the  information  received  in 
the risk assessment might be outdated. In the first five-year cycle, this was clearly the case. 
The  2015  migration  crisis  dramatically  changed  the  circumstances  under  which  Member 
States operated, making evaluations more urgent. It took, however, disproportionately long to 
organise an evaluation visit. The Commission cancelled one unannounced evaluation, as, by 
the time it was due to take place, the circumstances justifying it were no longer present.  

  Insufficient  capacity  to  adapt  to  new  legislative  developments  that  occurred  in 

the middle of the cycle 

Pertinent  legislation  was  also  amended  and  brought  new  requirements  that  Member  States 
need  to  implement.  The  Mechanism  found  it  challenging  to  evaluate  Member  States’ 
compliance with the numerous new legal requirements that entered into force in the middle of 
the  cycle  and  respect  equal  treatment  among  Member  States.  As  a  rule,  the  Mechanism 
evaluates  Member  States  only  once  in  five  years  in  the  six  policy  fields.  If  new  measures 
enter  into  force  after  the  cycle  has  begun,  the  Mechanism  is  unable  to  assess  their 
implementation in the Member States that have already been subject to an evaluation in the 
policy field concerned.  

A  more  systematic  use  of  thematic  evaluations  to  assess  new  legal  requirements  as  they 
entered  into  force  would  have  helped  address  this  issue.  As  this  tool  aims  at  verifying  the 
application of specific parts of the Schengen  acquis across several  Member States, it  could 
have  offered  a  snapshot  of  Member  States’  compliance  with  new  requirements  at  once, 
identifying trends and common shortcomings in their implementation. SCH-EVAL only used 
thematic  evaluations  to  this  end  once:  the  evaluation  of  national  strategies  for  integrated 
border management.  

Box 3 – Thematic evaluation of national strategies for integrated border management 

In 2016, the EBCG Regulation defined the elements for integrated border management and required Member 
States  to  establish  national  strategies.  Given  the  strategic  importance  of  ensuring  all  Member  States  have 
robust and harmonised strategies, in 2017 the Commission proposed to carry out a thematic evaluation of the 
national strategies. The Council, supporting this  view, in  its Conclusions of 4 and 5 June 2018, invited the 
Commission  to  carry  out  this  thematic  evaluation  in  2019-2020.  The  exercise  resulted  in  the  evaluation  in 
parallel of the strategic approach to border management in 25 Member States53. This is an example of SCH-
EVAL  using  available  tools  to  adapt  to  legislative  changes  while  ensuring  equal  treatment  and  draw 
horizontal findings relevant to the entire Schengen area54. 

53 

54 

All  Member  States  applying  in  full  the  Schengen acquis  and  that  are  part  of  the  area  without  internal 
border controls, except Liechtenstein that has no external borders. 
C(2020) 8000 final of 17.12.2020. 

15 

 
                                                           
Figure 3 – Evaluations under the first five-year cycle 

In  conclusion,  the  first  five-year  cycle 
focused on periodic, comprehensive and 
predictable  evaluations  per  Member 
State  and  per  policy  field  rather  than 
based  on  risk  analysis.  In  the  first  five-
year  cycle,  only  29  unannounced 
evaluation visits, 2 thematic evaluations 
and  9  revisits  took  place.  Overall,  83% 
of the visits were announced evaluations 
(see  Figure  3).  The 
stakeholders 
intervi
ewed 

Source: computation DG HOME 

Source: computation DG HOME 

during  the  preparation  of  the  study  requested  by  the  European  Parliament  noted  that  SCH-
EVAL,  being  designed  as  an  instrument  to  evaluate  effectively  the  performance  of  an 
individual Member State at a specific point of time, ‘cannot keep pace with fluid policy and 
legal developments and evolving situation on the ground’.55  

  Insufficient capacity to adapt to new types of violations of fundamental rights at 

the external borders 

The  Mechanism  was  notably  unable  to  adjust  to  new  type  of  violations  that  emerged  since 
2015 in the area of fundamental rights.  

For a long time, in the context of Schengen, fundamental rights protection mainly focused on 
data  protection  due  to  the  prominent  role  of  information  exchange  under  the  Schengen 
acquis.  However,  apart  from  evaluating  how  Member  States  apply  data  protection 
requirements, the Regulation recalls that ‘[d]uring the evaluation and monitoring particular 
attention to respect for fundamental rights in the application of the Schengen acquis should 
be paid’.56 The Schengen acquis includes a wide and diversified range of safeguards for the 
protection of fundamental rights57. These safeguards come on top of those stemming directly 
from Member States’ general obligation to respect the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights58 
while implementing EU law59. 

Fundamental  rights  are  mainstreamed  in  all  policy  fields.  Fundamental  rights  is  also  a 
particular area of attention in the return field, where procedural rights and material detention 
conditions are core elements of the evaluation. The Mechanism has also proved effective in 
detecting deficiencies related to procedural rights in external border management. According 
to FRA’s latest report60, each of the evaluations conducted between 2015 and 2019 to assess 
border  management  led  to  one  or  more  fundamental  rights-related  recommendations, 
producing  more  than  150  recommendations  in  total.  A  large  share  relates  to  shortcomings 
identified  at  individual  border-crossing  points,  focusing  on  issues  arising  during  the  border 

55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 

The state of play of Schengen governance, p. 71. 
Recital 14 of the Regulation. 
See, for example, Article 4 Schengen Borders Code. 
OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, p. 391. 
Article 51 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
Fundamental  Rights  Agency  (FRA),  Migration:  Fundamental  rights  issues  at  land  borders,  2020 
(https://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2020/migration-fundamental-rights-issues-land-borders). 

16 

 
 
                                                           
check  procedure.  Deficiencies  include  the  right  to  privacy,  lack  of  language  skills  of  the 
border guards and unavailability of interpretation, or the lack of information giving reasons 
for second-line checks or for refusal of entry. 

However, migration flows increased and  allegations  of mistreatment  at  the external  borders 
grew  in  several  Member  States.  Since  the  2015  migration  crisis,  the  number  of  migrants 
arriving irregularly increased the pressure on front line Member States to protect the external 
borders.  The  measures  adopted  to  ensure  the  security  of  the  external  borders  and  return 
migrants  became stricter to  meet  unprecedented  challenges. The protection of third country 
nationals’ fundamental rights turned to a reason of concern, leading to an increased reporting 
of violations of fundamental rights at the external borders (violence and pushbacks). 

The Mechanism proved less effective in detecting, reacting and addressing those claims and 
material  breaches.  Member  States  have  an  obligation  to  refuse  entry  to  third-country 
nationals not fulfilling the Schengen Borders Code requirements and to return them to their 
countries of origin, while respecting the fundamental right of third-country nationals to apply 
for  asylum  and  to  be  treated  with  dignity.  At  the  same  time,  the  principle  of  non-
refoulement61 forbids returning asylum seekers to a country in which they would be in likely 
danger  of  persecution.  Determine  whether  there  are  fundamental  rights  violations  becomes 
very difficult. Detecting them also requires reacting as soon as information is available with 
an element of surprise. 

Several  stakeholders,  in  particular  the  European  Parliament  and  the  consulted  civil  society 
organisations  stressed  the  Mechanism’s  limited  capacity  in  this  regard.  Some  EU 
bodies / agencies pointed out the limited evaluation of fundamental rights’ aspects across all 
policy fields (with the exception of data protection). 

Box 4 – European Parliament’s assessment of SCH-EVAL shortcomings to detect and 
react fundamental rights violations (other than data protection violations) 

‘From  a  fundamental  rights  perspective,  recommendations  are  of  a  more  general  nature  (related  to  e.g.  staff 
training) and the persistent fundamental rights violations that exist, such as  non-refoulement, are not picked up 
by  the  [SCH-EVAL]  due  to  the  nature  of  the  evaluation  visits  and  the  restrictive  approach  to  considering 
evidence. The understanding is that the [SCH-EVAL] cannot be expected to detect fundamental rights issues (e.g. 
refoulement and push-backs) due to the orchestrated nature of announced visits and the fact that, for unannounced 
visits to external borders, the host state must be informed 24 hours in advance. In addition, it is not designed to 
respond and react in a speedy way to possible violations.’62 

In its latest report, FRA notes that ‘[r]ecommendations to Member States relating to the issue 
of refoulement and push-backs have so far not been adopted, despite the number of reported 
incidents in different Member States in recent years’.63  

As  further  explained  in  the  section  2.2,  the  Mechanism’s  limited  capacity  to  detect  such 
fundamental  rights  violations  at  the  external  borders  originates  from  failures  in  the 
Mechanism’s design (rigidity of programming and conditions for unannounced visits). It also 
derives from failures in the Mechanism’s implementation (insufficient experts with the right 
profile, inadequate risk analysis, insufficient use of sources of information from third parties, 

61 

62 
63 

Non-refoulement is a core principle of international law that prohibits States from returning individuals to 
a  country  where  there  is  a  real  risk  of  being  subjected  to  persecution,  torture,  inhuman  or  degrading 
treatment or any other human rights violation.  
The state of Schengen governane, p.51. 
2020 FRA Report, p. 35. 

17 

 
                                                           
not  sufficient  involvement  of  the  Fundamental  Rights  Agency  in  external  borders 
evaluations64). 

Table 2 – Problem 2 and corresponding Drivers 

Problems 

Drivers 

Insufficient 
capacity to 
identify and 
quickly adapt and 
react to new 
circumstances, 
particularly 
violations of 
fundamental 
rights at the 
external borders 

Primary drivers  
  Rigid evaluation programming (Driver 2.1) planned a year ahead the 
evaluation takes place (including for unannounced evaluations), with 
too many details and requiring a cumbersome procedure for amending 
it, that does not allow the Mechanism’ to quickly react to new 
information / circumstances, new legislative developments, or 
specific allegations of fundamental rights violations at the external 
borders.  
Inadequate criteria and conditions underlying evaluation and 
monitoring tools (Driver 2.2) including unannounced evaluations 
(which must be planned a year in advance and require a 24h notice), 
revisits (which become new evaluations), and thematic evaluations 
(which do not have a clear purpose), limiting the Mechanism capacity 
to react and adapt to new circumstances and legislative developments 
or specific allegations of fundamental rights violations at the external 
borders. 

 

  Unbalanced and underused sources of information and expertise 

(Driver 4.1), in particular third party information, which is not 
systematically considered as source of information across policy 
fields, which undermines the capacity of the Mechanism to react to 
specific violations of fundamental rights at the external borders. 
  Limited coordination and synergies with other instruments (Driver 

4.2) – information which is provided a year ahead the evaluations are 
taking place – which reduces the quality of the specific evaluation’s 
design and the capacity of the Mechanism to quickly adapt and react 
to new circumstances.  

  Qualification and size of evaluation teams and unbalanced 

contribution of experts (Driver 4.3), with experts not always having 
the necessary expertise, in particular to detect violations of 
fundamental rights at the external borders, short-notice given to 
mobilise experts for specific evaluations (including unannounced 
evaluations) and heavenly relying on five Member States (which 
provide 1/3 of all experts). All this limits the capacity of the 
Mechanism to react to new developments and violations of 
fundamental rights at the external borders. 

Secondary drivers 
  A too limited temporal scope to allow for a flexible use of available 
tools (Driver 1.3). In particular, it does not allow the Mechanism to 
use thematic evaluations (which would help adapting when legislative 
changes happening in the middle of the cycle while ensuring equal 
treatment among Member State) and organise more unannounced 
evaluations and revisits to react to new circumstances and emerging 
issues.  

Area of 
intervention 

Programming  
Evaluation & 
Monitoring tools 

Evaluations 
design / 
implementation 
– actors & 
synergies 

Scope 

64 

The  five-year  review,  p.  16,  indicates:  ‘[…]  during  the  evaluation  and  follow-up,  the  respect  for 
fundamental rights in the implementation of the  Schengen acquis needs particular attention.[…] wider 
participation  of  the  Fundamental  Rights  Agency  in  the  evaluations  […]  could  be  beneficial  in  this 
regard’. 

18 

 
 
 
                                                           
2.1.3.  Problem 3 – Slow adoption and implementation of effective remedies 

A  third  problem  of  the  Mechanism,  as  shown  in  the  five-year  review,  is  the  slow  adoption 
and  implementation  of  remedial  actions  by  Member  States,  which  derives  in  part  from  the 
excessive length of the evaluation and follow-up process. The data collected for the five-year 
review indicated that, between 2015 and 2019, it took on average about one year from the end 
of the evaluation visit until the adoption of the recommendations, with some cases taking up 
to 18 months, if not longer (see Figure 4).  

The length  of the evaluation process  delayed the capacity of the Mechanism to bring about 
concrete  changes  swiftly,  as  the  adoption  of  the  recommendations  is  what  triggers  the 
Member States’ obligation to start addressing the deficiencies by adopting remedial actions. 
This delay risks undermining the results of the whole evaluation and monitoring process.  

Box 5 – Length of the process in cases of ‘serious deficiencies’ 

Since 2015, in ten cases, evaluation reports identified ‘serious deficiencies’. While the Regulation sets shorter 
time limits for monitoring such cases in the follow-up due to their urgency, in the first phase of the process the 
time  for  adopting  the  recommendations  (425  days)  was  even  longer  than  the  average  adoption  length, 
undermining  the  benefit  of  shorter  time  limits  in  the  follow-up.  Only  in  one  case  was  the  evaluation  report 
adopted swiftly, within 3 months. Data on the length of the process do not indicate any significant correlation 
with  the  number  of  priority  recommendations  either.  Overall,  the  process’s  length  was  not  shorter,  but 
sometimes even longer in the most problematic cases. 

Since SCH-EVAL started operating in 2015, Member States have made significant progress 
in  improving  the  application  and  implementation  of  the  Schengen  acquis.  Yet,  for  several 
Member  States,  the  fulfilment  of  the  recommendations  was  slow.  The  process  was  so  slow 
that,  at  times,  recommendations  were  no  longer  relevant  or  Member  States  had  presented 
several  progress  reports65  before  the  Commission  had  finalised  its  assessment  of  the  action 
plan. The length was also variable with a third of the cases taking over a year. This variability 
was also not linked to the case’s urgency or priority (see Box 5).  

Figure 4 – Length of the evaluation process 

Source: five-year review  

65 

In  a  recent  case,  a  Member  State  had  already  submitted  its  fourth  progress  report  by  the  time  the 
Commission formally adopted the assessment of the action plan. 

19 

 
 
                                                           
The Court of Auditors highlighted that ‘[F]rom the time a shortcoming is detected, it could 
take almost two years before a [Member] State starts to report on the corrective action it has 
taken.’66  The  five-year  review  confirmed  that  on  average  it  took  over  2  years  to  close  the 
action plan from its submission. A relevant number of recommendations remained open for 
years. At the end of the five-year cycle, the Commission has formally closed only about 25% 
of the procedures. The action plans of the first five-year cycle are still open even for Member 
States evaluated in 2015-2016 and which are undergoing evaluations for the second time in 
2020. 

Figure 5 – Formally closed procedures 

Source: five-year review 

All  stakeholder  groups  (notably,  the  majority  of  Member  States,  the  European  Parliament, 
some  EU  bodies / agencies  and  civil  society  organisations)  indicated  the  delays  in  the 
adoption  and  implementation  of  remedies  as  one  of  the  main  shortcomings  affecting  the 
Mechanism’s effectiveness. 

Area of 
intervention 

Decision-making 
& institutional 
balance 

Table 3 – Problem 3 and corresponding Drivers 

Problems 

Drivers 

Slow adoption 
and 
implementation of 
remedies 

Primary drivers 
  Complex decision making evaluation process (Driver 3.1) with a 

two-step approach (Commission adopts reports and the Council 
recommendations) and with no time-limits, which makes the 
evaluation process too long (between 10 and 12 months between the 
visit and the adoption of recommendations even for cases of serious 
deficiencies– adoption of the recommendations being what triggers 
Member States obligations to address deficiencies). 

  Cumbersome and inadequate monitoring and follow up process 

(Driver 3.2) – e.g. too many steps required, too formalistic, excessive 
reporting obligations and with no timelines (or deadlines) for 
implementing recommendations –, undermining the capacity of the 
Mechanism to put pressure on Member State to implement remedies 
promptly.  

  A potential disproportionate institutional balance (Driver 3.3) with 
excessive supervision by Member States and Council, which affects 
the length of the procedure, and which undermines the capacity of the 
Mechanism to put pressure on Member State to implement remedies 
promptly (the Council is involved in all reports and all 

66 

Court of Auditor, Special Report 20/2019, p. 21. 

20 

 
 
 
                                                           
Problems 

Drivers 

recommendations even with minor findings). 

Secondary drivers 
 

Inadequate criteria underlying evaluation and monitoring tools 
(Driver 2.2), in particular revisits, which become new evaluations 
adding even more recommendations rather than focusing on exerting 
pressure on the Member State to implement existing ones. 

Area of 
intervention 

Evaluation & 
Monitoring tools 

2.2.  What are the problem drivers? 

The drivers relate to failures in the Mechanism’s design and in its implementation (see Table 
4). Drivers are interlinked, reinforcing each other, and relate to one or more of the problems. 
All three problems concern directly: 

  The substance of the evaluations, i.e. the scope of evaluations, meaning the legislative 
provisions falling under the Mechanism (the Schengen acquis), and the articulation of 
announced  evaluations  into  specific  policy  fields  (Driver  1);  the  way  individual 
evaluations for the specific policy field and Member State are designed (Driver 4);  
  The evaluation process i.e. the way evaluations are programmed and the types of tools 

used (Driver 2) and the way evaluations are carried out (Driver 4); and  

  The Mechanism governance, i.e. decision-making and institutional balance (Driver 3).  

However, it is not possible to limit the problems entirely to these three elements substance of 
the  evaluations  (scope  and  evaluation  design),  the  process  (programming)  and  the 
Mechanism’s  governance  (decision-making).  Given  the  multitude  of  drivers,  the  Impact 
Assessment  groups  the  shortcomings  around  the  main  areas  of  intervention  based  on  how 
SCH-EVAL is constructed:  

  Scope of evaluations (too fragmented, articulated around policy fields but with gaps 
in its coverage and too limited temporal scope to allow for an optimal use of all tools 
available - Driver 1) 

  Programming  (too  rigid  and  formalistic  so  the  Mechanism  cannot  adapt  and  react  - 

Driver 2); 

  Evaluation  and  monitoring  tools  (criteria  for  their  use  not  adapted  to  the 

needs / purpose, resulting in some tools being underutilised - Driver 2); 

  The  evaluation  and  the  follow-up  procedures  and  processes  (decision-making  too 
complex  and  bureaucratic,  with  no  clear  timelines,  it  takes  too  long  for  both 
evaluations and follow up. and heavily relies on Member States supervision - Driver 
3); 

  Specific  evaluations  design  and  implementation  –  the  actors  involved  and  synergies 
with  other  instruments  (the  inadequate  and  insufficient  use  of  information  and  risk 
analyses and synergies with other instruments to identify what needs to be evaluated 
concretely  for  each Member State in  the main  policy fields,  and  a deficit of experts 
with  the  right  profile  from  specific  Member  States  and  for  specific  policy  fields  - 
Driver 4). 

21 

 
 
 
Table 4 – Failures in the design and implementation of the Regulation 

Problems 

Drivers 

Problem Drivers 

Regulation design 

Regulation implementation 

Specific Objectives 

Limited strategic focus and 
significant fragmentation 
preventing an overview of 
Schengen 

Driver 1: Material and temporal scope 
1.1.  A scope with gaps   
1.2.  Fragmented articulation of evaluations in 

policy fields not adapted to new legislative 
developments and needs 

1.3.  A too limited temporal scope to allow for a 

flexible use of available tools 

Insufficient capacity to identify 
and quickly adapt and react to 
new circumstances, legislative 
developments and trends 
(including specific fundamental 
rights violations at external 
borders) 

Driver 2: Rigid evaluation programming and 
inadequate criteria underlying evaluation and 
monitoring tools 
2.1.  Rigid programming 
2.2.  Inadequate conditions and criteria underlying 

evaluation and monitoring tools 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Exclusion of provisions relevant for the 
functioning of Schengen not belonging to the 
Schengen acquis; 
Legislative elements that lead to fragmentation 
(Article 4 lists the specific policy fields); 
Evaluation cycle length. 

Conditions and timeframe to programme 
evaluation visits; 
Absence of (clear) criteria for the use of 
unannounced and thematic evaluations, and 
revisits; 
Advance notice limiting the effectiveness of 
unannounced evaluations. 

Slow adoption and 
implementation of remedies 

Driver 3: Inadequate articulation of processes 
and procedures with a portential 
disproportionate institutional balance 
3.1.  Complex decision-making for evaluation 

process  

3.2.  Cumbersome and inadequate process for 

monitoring and follow up 

3.3.  A potential disproportionate institutional 

balance 

Insufficient capacity to identify 
and quickly adapt and react to 
news circumstances, legislative 
developments and trends 
(including specific fundamental 
rights violations at external 
borders)  

Driver 4: Inadequate and insufficient 
participation of relevant actors in the design and 
implementation of evaluations / synergies with 
other instruments 
4.1.  Unbalanced and underused sources of 

information and expertise 

4.2.  Limited coordination and synergies with other 

Limited strategic focus and 
significant fragmentation 
preventing an overview of 
Schengen  

instruments 

4.3.  Qualification and size of the evaluation team 
and unbalanced contribution of experts 

 

 

 
 
 

 

  Multi-steps decision making process;  
 
 

Absence of a clear time-line;  
Legal form of the action plans’ assessment 
(Commission Communications); 
Disproportionate reporting obligations on the 
Member States (one report every three months); 
Heavy supervision by Member States and 
limited involvement of the European 
Parliament. 

Standardised evaluation team size; 
Short term calls for designations of experts; 
Absence of provisions on the coordination 
between SCH-EVAL and other mechanisms and 
actors; 
Legal obstacles to the exchange of information 
about SCH-EVAL evaluations with actors other 
than Member States. 

22 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 
 

 

 

Strict articulation per policy field (six policy 
fields evaluated); 
Policy fields currently evaluated not adapted to 
recent developments and needs (does not cover 
new legislative developments or EU agencies 
activities). 

Limited use of risk analysis and information 
from other monitoring tools in the organisation 
of the evaluations; 
Underuse of unannounced and thematic 
evaluations, and revisits. 

Slow processing of the files (inside Commission 
but also in the continuous ping-pong with the 
evaluated Member State to finalise the report 
ahead of its presentation at the Schengen 
Committee); 
Use of revisits as new evaluations (due to 
different interpretations of the legal act). 

Limited use of third parties sources; 
Unbalanced Member States experts’ 
contribution (5 Member States provide 1/3 of 
experts); 
Absence of trainings in certain areas and limited 
trainings in fundamental rights; 
Limited exchange of information with EU 
bodies and agencies. 

Avoid gaps in the evaluation findings 
and increase strategic focus 

Rationalise the distribution  of tasks 
and responsibilities, and simplify and 
accelerate processes and procedures 

Strengthen the implementation of 
fundamental rights safeguards under 
the Schengen acquis  

Optimise the participation of MS 
experts and the involvement of EU 
bodies and agencies / synergies with 
other instruments 

 
 
2.2.1.  Driver  1  -  Material  and  temporal  scope  of  evaluations:  the 
substance of evaluations and the temporal scope of the SCH-EVAL 
cycle 

2.2.1.1.Driver  1.1.  A  scope  with  gaps  and  which  is  not  adapted  to  new 
realities  thereby  not  ensuring  a  fully  efficient  evaluation  of 
Schengen’s functioning limiting the Mechanism’s strategic focus  

The  scope  of  SCH-EVAL  falls  at  times  short  in  covering  all  elements  needed  to  ensure  an 
efficient and effective implementation of the Schengen acquis. Article 4 sets that ‘evaluations 
may  cover  all  aspects  of  the  Schengen  acquis,  including  their  effective  and  efficient 
application by Member States’. 

The most notable gap regards the impossibility of addressing effectively issues linked to the 
implementation of provisions that do not belong to the Schengen acquis, even if this may 
significantly  affect  the  functioning  of  Schengen.  Police  cooperation  offers  striking 
examples. The Prüm Decision67, a keystone of cross-border cooperation, does not qualify as 
development  of  the  Schengen acquis,  which  precludes  its  evaluation  under  SCH-EVAL. 
Nonetheless, the correct  implementation of the Prüm Decision may have a strong influence 
on the information exchange under Schengen (see Box 6), which is a key element for its well-
functioning.  The  evaluation  team  cannot  directly  evaluate  whether  a  Member  State  is 
compliant  or  non-compliant  with  the  Prüm  Decision.  Any  issues  identified  –  even  when 
directly  affecting  Schengen  –  may  only  lead  to  a  finding  of  need  for  improvement.  This 
restricts the means to require remedies from the Member State68. 

Box 6 – The Prüm Decision 

A  terrorist  attack  happens  in  Country  X.  The  terrorist  manages  to  escape  but  leaves  behind  a  DNA  sample. 
Country X forensic service uploads the sample to the national system after which the automated comparison of 
DNA profiles through Prüm is carried out. A match occurs in Country Y. However, since Country Y’s forensic 
service did not properly adopt the evaluation procedure as foreseen in the Prüm Decision, the evaluation does 
not  take  place,  preventing  the  identification  of  the  terrorist.  The  police  cooperation  evaluation  under  the 
Regulation, which took place in Country Y the previous year, had not evaluated issues with the Prüm Decision 
implementation since it is not considered part of the Schengen acquis. 

Article  4’s  specific  reference  to  ‘by  Member  States’  also  created  a  situation  where 
evaluations did not cover new relevant activities of EU agencies properly, even though they 
were  traditionally  Member  States’  responsibility.  This  created  an  asymmetry  as  the 
Mechanism does cover the activities that are implemented by private entities on behalf of a 
Member  State  (e.g.  external  service  providers  in  the  field  of  visa  policy  or  airlines  under 
external border management). This limitation applies to Frontex, which deploys operational 
staff  at  the  external  borders,  carries  out  return  operations  and  can  be  fully  responsible 
temporarily on behalf of the Member State concerned for the surveillance of segments of the 
external border. It also applies to Europol as it carries out second-line security checks. It may 
also  apply  in  the  future  to  additional  Europol  activities  (related  to  Schengen  Information 

67 
68 

Council Decision 2008/615/JHA, OJ L 210 of 6.8.2008. p. 1. 
Under  Article  14(3), one  of  the  following  assessments  shall  be  given  to  each  finding  in  the  evaluation 
report: ‘compliant’, ‘compliant but improvement necessary’ or ‘non-compliant’. In case of ‘improvement 
necessary’, Member States are not strictly obliged to report to the Commission on the fulfilment of the 
recommendations (Article 16(8)). 

23 

 
 
                                                           
System). With these limitations, there is the risk of gaps and the Mechanism cannot provide 
the  overall  picture  for  example  of  external  borders  management,  particularly  as  Member 
States under pressure rely increasingly on EU agencies and private companies to support the 
implementation  of  the  Schengen acquis.  Member  States,  the  Council69  and  the  European 
Parliament stressed this limitation, pointing out the opportunity for the reform to address it. 

Box 7 – EU agencies and the establishment of hotspots 

The  hotspot  concept70  established  in  the  2016  by  the  Frontex  (ECBG)  Regulation  entails  an  integrated 
migration management process comprising identification, fingerprinting, registration, screening and debriefing 
of migrants at the border segments under heavy migratory pressure. The 2019 review of Frontex has increased 
EU agencies’ involvement in external border management. EU agencies already provide significant support on 
the  ground by working directly together with and under the supervision of national authorities. For example, 
Frontex fingerprints, identifies and registers migrants, and carries out debriefing activities. Europol carries out 
security  screening and second-line  checks. This type of activities are covered in the  evaluation of a Member 
State. If SCH-EVAL cannot verify how the agencies are helping country X in the surveillance of its external 
borders or  to  carry  out  border  control,  the  overview  on  the  functioning  of  the  external  borders  in  country  X 
would be incomplete. 

2.2.1.2.Driver  1.2. A fragmented articulation  of  evaluations  into  individual 
policy fields not adapted to new legislative developments and needs, 
and limiting the capacity of the Mechanism to provide an overview of 
a Member State performance overall and of Schengen’s functioning, 
thereby limiting the Mechanism’s strategic focus 

Figure 6 – Currently evaluated policy fields 

Article  471  of  the  Regulation  leaves  a  priori  wide 
flexibility  in  defining  the  scope  of  the  evaluations  as 
evaluations may cover all aspects of the Schengen acquis. 
However,  as  Article  4  specifically  lists  external  borders, 
visa  policy,  the  Schengen  Information  System,  data 
protection  and  police  cooperation, 
it  creates  an 
expectation  that  these  are  the  policy  fields  to  be 
evaluated. As a result, the Mechanism evaluates Member 
States  in  the  six  policy  fields  (as  indicated  in  Figure  6) 
individually  within  a  two-month  period.  Evaluations  in 
six  policy  fields  require  six  different  evaluation  reports 
and  six  different  sets  of  recommendations  for  each 

69  

70  

71  

The 2021 Council conclusions, p. 4, indicate: ‘The Council [...]invites the Commission to ensure in its 
announced  proposal  that  the  SEMM  remains  a  flexible  mechanism,  adaptable  to  the  evolving 
circumstances  and  developments  of  the  Schengen  acquis,  such  as  […]  the  increasing  operational 
activities  of  Frontex  and  other  relevant  EU  agencies  in  the  implementation  of  the  acquis,  in  order  to 
address new challenges and to adapt to new realities’. 
Article 2 (23) of the 2019 Frontex Regulation reads: ‘hotspot area means an area created at the request 
of the host Member State in which the host Member State, the Commission, relevant Union agencies and 
participating  Member  States  cooperate,  with  the  aim  of  managing  an  existing  or  potential 
disproportionate migratory challenge characterised by a significant increase in the number of migrants 
arriving at the external borders’. 
Article 4 reads: ‘Evaluations may cover all aspects of the  Schengen  acquis, including the effective and 
efficient application by the Member States of accompanying measures in the areas of external borders, 
visa policy, the Schengen Information System, data protection, police cooperation, judicial cooperation 
in criminal matters, as well as the absence of border control at internal borders’. 

24 

 
                                                           
Member  State,  creating  a  significant  fragmentation.  As  the  2020  study  put  it,  ‘[a]  single 
evaluation  on  specific  Schengen  policy  area(s)  has  the  clear  disadvantage  that  it  does  not 
show the overall performance of a Member State on managing Schengen’.72  

Apart  from  limiting  the  overview  on  single  Member  States,  the  current  functioning  of  the 
Mechanism  risks  restricting  significantly  the  possibility  to  draw  conclusions  on  the  overall 
state of Schengen, considering that, between 2015 and 2019, the Commission adopted around 
200  evaluation  reports  (35-40  per  year).  During  the  consultation,  the  European  Parliament 
confirmed this risk, as it stressed the need to dedicate more time to horizontal findings and to 
have  a  better  overview  of  the  Schengen  area  as  a  whole.  Several  Member  States  also 
indicated the limited coherence among the various policy fields and evaluation reports with a 
couple of Member States requesting a single report per Member State. 

In  addition,  there  have  been  significant  developments  in  the  Schengen  acquis  in  recent 
years that make these traditional policy fields inadequate. For example, a new series of IT 
systems will become operational in 2023 and complement the Schengen Information System. 
As  the  security  acquis  develops,  evaluations  need  to  take  into  account  additional  elements, 
particularly in  police cooperation. Various policy  areas,  given legislative developments,  are 
becoming more and more interlinked and interdependent (for example SIS and return or SIS 
and police cooperation) or implementing authorities have extended powers (for example the 
supervision  system 
the  consultation  activities,  several 
stakeholders’  categories  broadly  supported  the  possibility  for  SCH-EVAL  to  cover  new  IT 
tools73. This was also indicated in the 2021 Council conclusions74. 

in  data  protection).  During 

2.2.1.1.Driver 1.3. A too limited temporal scope to allow for a flexible use of 
available  tools  limiting  the  Mechanism’s  strategic  focus  and  its 
capacity to react to new circumstances  

Currently, the Mechanism  works according to  a five-year cycle. Given the large number of 
Member States, it is only possible to carry out the programmed ‘periodic’ evaluations (around 
35-40  in  a  year).  There  are  almost  no  resources  for  thematic  evaluations  to  help  draw 
horizontal conclusions across policy fields or across countries subject to  similar challenges. 
There is also little space for unannounced evaluations or revisits, by which the Commission 
could monitor activities and react to emerging issues (e.g. allegations of mistreatment at the 
external borders).  

2.2.2.  Driver  2  –  Rigid evaluation programming and inadequate criteria 

underlying evaluation and monitoring tools 

The  Regulation  includes  a  comprehensive  set  of  evaluation  and  monitoring  tools,  but  the 
procedural  and  material  conditions  for  their  use  lead  to  an  underutilisation  of  flexible  tools 

The state of play of Schengen governance, p. 53. 

72  
73   Member States indicated that the scope of SCH-EVAL should be adjusted to include the new IT systems 
other  than  the  Schengen  Information  System  such  as  Entry-Exit  system  and  ETIAS;  the  European 
Parliament  proposed  to  include  the  assessment  of  new  information  systems  and  their  interoperability; 
DPAs  /  EDPS  suggested  that  SCHEVAL  should  provide  for  the  possibility  to  evaluate  the  new  IT-
systems like EES and ETIAS including in relation to their data protection requirements. 
The 2021 Council conclusions, p. 4, indicate: ‘The Council […] invites the Commission to ensure in its 
announced  proposal  that  the  SEMM  remains  a  flexible  mechanism,  adaptable  to  the  evolving 
circumstances  and  developments  of  the  Schengen  acquis,  such  as  the  implementation  of  the  new  IT 
architecture and interoperability framework in this area […] in order to address new challenges and to 
adapt to new realities’. 

74  

25 

 
                                                           
such  as  unannounced  and  thematic  evaluations,  and  revisits.  This  driver  undermines  the 
capacity of the Mechanism to quickly react and adapt to new circumstances (problem 2).  It 
also  undermines its strategic focus (problem 1) and its capacity to  put  pressure on Member 
States to accelerate the implementation of remedies (problem 3). 

2.2.2.1.Driver  2.1 A rigid programming  not  providing the Mechanism with 

capacity to quickly adapt and react to new circumstances  

The Regulation introduced a multiannual programming system over a five-year cycle that 
defines the Member States’ order for evaluation in the pre-defined set of policy fields (largely 
those listed in Article 4 of the Regulation). Article 6 requires the Commission to adopt by 31 
October75  each  year  an  annual  programme  with  all  evaluations  to  occur  in  the  following 
year.  This  procedure  concerns  equally  announced  (‘periodic’)  evaluations,  thematic 
evaluations and unannounced evaluations. It includes the Member States to be evaluated, but 
also whether evaluations will be carried out on a questionnaire only or through on-site visits 
and the specific sites that the evaluation team should visit as a minimum. The Commission 
should  base  the  programming  on  the  information  collected  from  the  replies  provided  by 
Member  States  to  the  standard  questionnaire  and  risk  analyses  prepared  already  in  the 
summer  the  year  before  (August  n-1)  by  Frontex  and  other  EU  bodies  and  agencies.  Any 
change  to  the  evaluation  programme  requires  a  formal  amendment  through  a  cumbersome 
procedure that needs the Schengen Committee’s positive opinion.  

Although  it  creates  predictability  and  helps  Member  States  to  prepare,  this  rigid  long-term 
planning is difficult to reconcile with the rapidly changing threat landscape. For instance, it 
might  limit  the  scope  of  the  evaluations,  keeping  out  new  legislative  developments  that 
require adjusting the articulation of policy fields. It might exclude from the evaluations new 
emerging issues, which are not included in the risk analysis, and that might need adjustments 
to  the  evaluations’  programmes,  i.e.  visiting  alternatives  sites.  As  a  result,  the  annual 
programme needs amendments regularly with the additional administrative burden76. In 2020, 
it was particularly difficult to cope with the uncertainty surrounding the Covid-19 pandemic. 
By the time the Commission had amended the annual programme, new changes were already 
needed. 

Box 8 – Frequent amendments to the annual programme 

In  2020,  the  evaluation  of  Germany  in  the  field  of  visa  policy  was  to  take  place  in  the  German  consulate  in 
Teheran.  As  the  political  situation  became  unstable  in  January  2020,  the  Commission  in  agreement  with 
Germany  identified  an  alternative  location.  This  alternative  required  an  amendment  of  the  annual  evaluation 
programme  (proposal  of  the  Commission  to  be  presented  to  the  Schengen  Committee  two  weeks  in  advance 
after which it can initiate the adoption process within the Commission). The amendment was adopted in March, 
when the Covid-19 crisis began, which required new amendments to the annual programme.  

This  rigid  procedure  also  applies  to  unannounced  evaluations.  The  Commission  must  plan 
them  one  year  in  advance  based  on  risks  assessments  provided  in  the  year  before  the 
evaluation, making it impossible to respond to new unforeseen circumstances, and defeating 
their purpose. The rigidity of the programming for unannounced evaluations undermines the 
possibility for the Mechanism to react quickly to allegations of serious breaches (i.e. Member 
States  breaching  relevant  legislation)  and  of  fundamental  rights’  violations  by  organising 
visits swiftly as soon as the allegations emerge. Although the Mechanism is not an investigate 

75  

76  

The annual programme is an implementing decision. The Commission should adopt the second section of 
the annual programme with the unannounced evaluations at the latest at the end of the previous year. 
See Annex 4. 

26 

 
                                                           
instrument designed specifically to spot the practice of push-backs, the current set-up limits 
the efforts of SCH-EVAL to respond to this challenge emerging increasingly at the external 
borders. 

2.2.2.2.Driver  2.2.  Inadequate  criteria  and  conditions  to  use  the  various 
evaluations and monitoring tools limiting the Mechanism capacity to 
react and adapt to new circumstances and legislative developments, 
and  reducing  its  strategic  focus  and  capacity  to  quickly  implement 
remedies 

Contrary to the rigid programming, the Regulation is quite flexible regarding the criteria and 
conditions to use the various evaluations and monitoring tools. This would seem like an 
advantage at first sight. However, this flexibility has created confusion and underutilisation of 
the new tools available. An EU agency explicitly remarked the need to ‘clarify the scope, aim 
and main differences between thematic evaluations, announced and unannounced visits.’ 

Thematic evaluations addressing specific issues in several Member States aim to contribute to 
strengthening  the  strategic  focus  of  the  Mechanism.  However,  the  potential  of  this  type  of 
evaluations was not sufficiently exploited during the first five-year cycle in part because of 
the  insufficient  clarity  and  general / vague  character  of  the  rules  for  carrying  out  these 
evaluations.  The  Regulation  simply  specifies  that  thematic  evaluations  have  to  be 
programmed and may cover the application of specific parts of the Schengen  acquis across 
several  Member  States.  There  is  no  clarity  as  to  what  can  trigger  the  need  for  a  thematic 
evaluation or what its scope should be.  

The  lack  of  definition  of  the  conditions  and  scope  for  thematic  evaluations  contributed  to 
only  two  thematic  evaluations  carried  out  with  significantly  varying  topics  and  outcomes. 
One was extremely localised looking at visa cooperation between Member State consulates in 
Ankara (Turkey) and New Delhi (India). The second covered a major horizontal theme across 
all Member States  (national strategies for integrated border management). The Commission 
included the first in a regular evaluation, while the other was proposed by the Commission, 
supported  by  the  Council  conclusions,  and  subsequently  programmed.  One  did  not  lead  to 
any recommendations; the other led to far-reaching horizontal recommendations addressed to 
all Member States. 

Similarly, for revisits, the Regulation only specifies that they can be considered depending on 
the degree of seriousness of deficiencies to verify the action plan’s implementation. Revisits 
help to monitor progress made and to put pressure on Member States to implement quickly 
the remedies provided for in the recommendations. Although a monitoring tool under Article 
16(5)  of  the  Regulation,  revisits  in  practice  became  a  re-evaluation  requiring  an  evaluation 
report  and  triggering  new  Council  recommendations  and  action  plans.  Ultimately,  the 
administrative burden linked to those procedures (see section 2.2.3.2) limited the use of this 
tool.  

For  unannounced  evaluations,  the  Regulation  explains  at  length  how  to  carry  out  the 
evaluation visit. However, it does not set any criteria for the situation that would trigger an 
unannounced  evaluation.  Recital  12  states  that  it  is  a  tool  conceived  ‘to  supplement 
announced on-site visits, in particular with regard to border controls and visas.’ Its purpose 
is  not  clear  (random  ‘health’  check  or  detection  of  serious  breaches?)  particularly  as  the 

27 

 
Commission must inform the Member State 24 hours before an unannounced visit occurs77, 
which  many  stakeholders78  believe  may  defeat  its  purpose.  The  European  Parliament  and 
consulted civil society organisations particularly criticised the 24-hour notice.  

2.2.3.  Driver  3  –  Inadequate  articulation  of  processes  and  procedures 

with a potential disproportionate institutional balance  

The cumbersome decision-making processes and procedures in place led to the slow adoption 
and implementation of remedies by Member States (problem 3). The Council’s involvement 
in  all  the  different  procedures  limited  the  Council’s  capacity  to  exert  the  aimed-for  peer 
pressure  to  accelerate  the  implementation  of  remedies.  This  Impact  Assessment  focuses  on 
those  aspects  that  emerged  as  the  most  problematic  during  the  consultation:  the  decision-
making  process  for  adopting  evaluation  reports  and  recommendations,  and  the  monitoring 
and  follow-up  process.  In  both  cases,  the  absence  of  clear  time  limits  exacerbates  inherent 
issues.  

2.2.3.1.Driver  3.1  –  Complex  decision-making  for  the  evaluation  process 

affecting the length of the procedure 

Under Articles 14 and 15, the decision-making process includes two distinct and subsequent 
steps  involving  the  Commission  and  Member  State  representatives  (in  the  Schengen 
Committee and in the Council): 

  The evaluation team prepares the draft evaluation report within six weeks from the 
visit.  The  evaluated  Member  State  can  provide  comments  within  two  weeks  from 
receiving  the  draft  report.  A  drafting  meeting  between  the  team  and  the  evaluated 
Member State, at the Member State’s request, may occur after the submission of the 
comments  and  before  the  Commission  presents  the  report  in  the  Schengen 
Committee;  

  The Commission adopts the final evaluation report by means of an implementing 

decision after the positive opinion of the Schengen Committee (see Box 9); and 

  The  Council  adopts  the  recommendations  after  discussion  in  the  SCH-EVAL 
Working  Party,  based  on  a  Commission’s  proposal  made  after  the  adoption  of  the 
evaluation report (the usual practice being that the Commission adopts the report and 
the Commission proposal for a Council recommendation at the same time). 

In  the  evaluation  phase  between  the  evaluation  visit  and  the  adoption  of  recommendations, 
the Regulation sets time limits only at the beginning of the procedure for the transmission of 
the  draft  report  to  the  Member  State  evaluated  (six  weeks)  and  for  the  Member  State’s 
comments on the draft report (two weeks). There are no time limits for the drafting meeting, 
the  transmission  of  the  report  to  the  Schengen  Committee,  or  for  adoption  and  subsequent 
steps.  The  absence  of  time  limits  increases  the  risks  of  bottlenecks  and  of  delays  in  the 

77  

78  

Only unannounced on-site visits to the internal borders shall take place without prior notification (Article 
13(2) last para). 
The  European  Parliament  and  civil  society  organisations  generally  shared  this  view  and  requested  the 
removal of the 24-hour notice as well as a better definition of what could trigger an unannounced visit 
(see  Annex  2).  Instead,  Member  States  generally  consider  the  24-hour  notice  beneficial.  However,  a 
Member State indicated that ‘[p]rovided that all necessary organisational aspects will be dealt with by 
the EC in advance of the visit, unannounced visits would benefit from abstaining of prior consultations. 
The  MS  evaluated  by  an  unannounced  visit  will  not  have  the  possibility  to  take  any  influence  on  the 
evaluation results.’ 

28 

 
                                                           
procedure. The Regulation does not foresee any specific accelerated procedure in the case of 
serious deficiencies, which arguably requires the most rapid action.  

Each  year,  the  Commission  and  the  Council  adopt  about  40  evaluation  reports  and 
recommendations.  The  administrative  burden  is  disproportionate  to  the  human  resources 
available79 which, combined with a lack of clear timelines, have had a major impact on the 
evaluation process’s length. It took on average about one year from the evaluation visit until 
the recommendation’s adoption: 9.5 months (282 days) to adopt the evaluation report80 and 
2.5  months  (81  days)  to  adopt  the  recommendations.  The  excessive  length  of  the  process 
limits the capacity of the Mechanism to keep up with and reflect evolving situations on the 
ground as the information in the reports might already be outdated and the recommendations 
might have become obsolete by the time of their adoption.  

Box 9 – Procedure for the adoption of Commission implementing decisions 

The  adoption  of  implementing  decisions  by  the  Commission  is  subject  to  the  following  procedural 
requirements:  

  Article  21  of  the  Regulation  in  combination  with  Articles  3  and  5  of  Regulation  (EU)  No  182/2011 
submits the adoption of the evaluation report to the Comitology examination procedure, hence to the 
positive vote of representatives of the Member States by qualified majority. The draft evaluation report 
has to be transmitted 14 days before the vote takes place. In duly justified cases, the chair may shorten 
the  14  days-time limit  or  obtain  the  committee’s  opinion  by  written  procedure  under  simplified 
conditions.  

  Article  21  of  the  Commission  Rules  of  Procedure  requires  the  consultation  of  other  departments 

associated or concerned as well as of the Legal Service on the draft evaluation report. 

  Article  3  of  Regulation  No  1  requires  that  the  evaluation  report  be  translated  into  the  evaluated 

Member State’s language. 

  Article  17  of  the  Regulation  requires  that  the  evaluation  report  be  treated  as  classified  as  EU 
RESTRICTED/RESTREINT  UE  which  imposes  technical  restrictions  on  their  handling  (also  for 
translations) and transmission to comply with applicable security rules. 

2.2.3.2.Driver 3.2 – Cumbersome and inadequate monitoring and follow-up 
process undermining the capacity of the Mechanism to put pressure 
on Member State to implement remedies promptly 

Under Articles 16, the follow-up procedure includes notably the following main steps:  

  The Member State presents its action plan to remedy the deficiencies identified in 
the evaluation  report to  the Commission  and the Council (within  three months from 
the  recommendations)  and  the  Commission  further  transmits  it  to  the  European 
Parliament.  A  longer  (six  months)  or  shorter  (one  month)  time  limit  applies  if  the 
evaluation  reports  do  not  include  any  non-compliant  findings  or  include  serious 
deficiencies, respectively; 

  The  assessment  of  the  action  plan 

the  form  of  a  Commission 
Communication, adopted after consulting the evaluation team as appropriate, within 
one  month  from  the  submission  of  the  action  plan.  The  Commission  has  had 

takes 

79  

80  

In  2020  when  the  number  of  evaluation  visits  started  to  decrease,  the  length  of  the  procedure  also 
decreased to 7 months. In 2020, evaluation reports for evaluations carried out in the second half of 2019 
were on the other side delayed due to COVID-19 to an average of 11 months.  
It  is  not  possible  to  estimate  the  time  for  the  preparation  of  the  draft  report  and  the  adoption  by  the 
Commission due to the lack of complete data on the drafting meeting and transmission by the evaluation 
team  for  adoption.  However,  the  drafting  meetings  were  organised  often  back-to-back  with  Schengen 
Committees  or  SCH-EVAL  working  parties.  At  times,  this  added  one  or  two  extra  months  to  the 
procedure before the presentation to the Schengen Committee. 

29 

 
                                                           
difficulties  in  providing  a  timely  assessment  of  the  action  plan  due  to  the  excessive 
formalism  required  for  this  step.  In  2019  and  2020,  the  Commission  adopted  on 
average over 20 Communications; 

  The Member State  concerned submits to  the Commission  progress  reports every 3 
months,  even  if  the  nature  of  the  recommendations  (requiring  procurement  of  new 
equipment  or  introducing  legislative  changes)  makes  it  is  difficult  to  report  any 
progress;  

  A revisit can take place if required by the seriousness of the deficiencies. This revisit 
leads to a new report, which includes new findings resulting in new recommendations 
and  a  new  action  plan  that  the  Commission  should  assess,  as  per  the  second  bullet 
point,  and  it  leads  to  the  submission  of  the  related  progress  reports.  So,  a  Member 
State may end up having three sets of Council recommendations and action plans in 
the  same  policy  field  if,  for  example,  it  has  been  subject  to  a  revisit  and  an 
unannounced visit in addition to the regularly programmed visit; and  

  The Commission should regularly inform the European Parliament and the Council 

about the implementation of the action plans. 

After the adoption of the recommendations, in the follow-up, the Regulation sets time limits 
for  the  presentation  of  the  action  plan  by  the  Member  State  and  for  its  assessment  by  the 
Commission.  Member  States  are  also  obliged  to  report  to  the  Commission  every  three 
months. No other time limits are set for the fulfilment of the action plan. Revisits added an 
administrative burden, including additional recommendations, rather than serving as a proper 
the  Council 
monitoring 
recommendations are not legally binding instruments. As a result, if a Member State decides 
not  to  implement  a  recommendation  or  is  seriously  neglecting  the  implementation  of  the 
action  plan  or  delaying  it,  the  Commission  has  little  options  to  make  the  Member  State 
comply. In principle, peers should put pressure on the Member State concerned. In practice, 
they have rarely done so, as there has been little Council’s involvement and discussion in the 
Council about Member States’ follow-up.  

the  Commission  evaluation 

tool.  Moreover, 

report  and 

2.2.3.3.Driver  3.3  –  A  potential  disproportionate  institutional  balance 
undermining  the  capacity  of  the  Mechanism  to  put  pressure  on 
Member  States  to  implement  remedies  promptly  and  its  strategic 
focus 

According to the current institutional set up, the Commission adopts the report, the Council 
adopts recommendations, and the Commission monitors the follow up while informing both 
the  Council  and  the  European  Parliament.  Arguably,  the  Regulation  created  this  two-step 
approach in favour of the Member States and the Council to ensure political discussion and 
peer-pressure at Council level (see Recital 11 in section 2.1.1), and to a lesser extent in the 
Parliament. The five-year review of the functioning of SCH-EVAL concluded that this set-up 
did not serve its purpose while adding to the heavy and lengthy procedure. 

All  evaluation  procedures  entail  heavy  involvement  by  Member  States  (and  the 
Council). Examples include the drafting of the report by the evaluation team (composed of 
Member State experts in its majority), all report’s adoption requiring the positive opinion of 
Member States in the Schengen Committee, and the adoption of all recommendations by the 
Council.  The  follow-up,  that  according  to  the  Regulation  is  the  responsibility  of  the 
Commission,  also  increased  the  Council’s  workload  as  revisits  and  unannounced  visits 
become  new  re-evaluations  requiring  reports  and  recommendations.  Member  States  can 
comment on action plans, but they hardly do. However, there was little proper involvement of 

30 

 
the  Council  in  the  follow  up  of  serious  cases  or  where  a  Member  State  was  not  properly 
implementing the action plan. The heavy workload in the Council and the very detailed and 
localised  nature  of  recommendations  prevented  any  real  discussion  limiting  the  Council’s 
power  to  exert  the  required  peer-pressure  and  have  general  discussions  on  the  state  of 
Schengen. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  European  Parliament  has  only  limited  formal  involvement 
reducing  its  capacity  to  pressure  Member  States  to  implement  recommendations.  The 
Council  recommendations  are  transmitted  to  the  European  Parliament  and  the  national 
Parliaments  and  are  published.  The  evaluation  report,  which  is  a  classified  document,  is 
shared  with  the  European  Parliament,  while,  under  Article  19,  the  Commission  merely 
informs  the  national  parliaments  of  the  evaluation’s  content  and  results.  To  strengthen 
accountability  vis-à-vis  the  Council  and  the  European  Parliament,  the  Commission  must 
regularly inform them about the action plans’ implementation. In addition, the Commission 
shall present  a comprehensive yearly report to the European Parliament and the Council on 
the evaluations carried out and the state of play regarding remedial action (Article 22).  

2.2.4.  Driver  4  –  Inadequate  and  insufficient  participation  of  relevant 
actors in the design and implementation of evaluations / synergies 
with other instruments 

One of the drivers for the lack of strategic focus (problem 1) and its limited capacity to detect 
and  react  to  new  circumstances  (problem  2)  is  the  way  individual  evaluations  are  designed 
and implemented. This driver includes the inadequate and insufficient use of information and 
risk  analyses  and  synergies  with  other  instruments  to  identify  what  needs  to  be  evaluated 
concretely for each Member State in the main policy fields, and a deficit of experts with the 
right profile from specific Member State and for specific policy fields.  

2.2.4.1.Driver 4.1 – Unbalanced and underused sources of information and 

expertise 

The Schengen evaluation guide81 acknowledges that ‘[t]he analysis of data collected should 
be based on facts and arguments from several sources and analysed with several methods, to 
avoid a one-sided approach and biased results.’ The Regulation mentions only two sources 
of information explicitly: the Member States’ replies to a standard questionnaire and the 
risk analyses provided by EU bodies and agencies under Article 7 and 8 of the Regulation. 
Article 7 imposes an obligation on Frontex to provide two risk analyses82 by 31 August of 
each  year.  FRA  and  Europol  also  provide  regularly  risk  analyses  upon  request  by  the 
Commission. Eu-LISA83 shares statistical reports on the functioning of SIS and VIS.  

Certain  stakeholders,  as  EU  bodies / agencies,  explained  that  the  scope  and  timing  of  the 
information is often inadequate and stressed the importance of pre-visit information, since, by 
the time the visit takes place, the risk analyses’ information is already outdated in most cases. 
The  concept  of  risk  analysis  is  also  very  restrictive  and  does  not  cover  all  information 
available to the EU bodies and agencies to develop situational awareness.  

81  

82  

83 

Under Article 13, general guidelines on practical arrangements for such visits shall be established by the 
Commission in close cooperation with the Member States. 
One  risk  analysis  includes  recommendations  on  the  priorities  for  regular  evaluations  in  the  following 
year. The second risk analysis includes recommendations  on unannounced visits in the  following  year, 
irrespective of the order of Member States to be evaluated each year. 
EU Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice (eu-LISA). 

31 

 
                                                           
The  Regulation  does  not  prevent  the  evaluation  team  from  relying  on  different  sources. 
However,  the  fact  that  the  Regulation  does  not  explicitly  mention  the  role  of  third  parties 
has  led  to  uneven  practices  across  policy  fields.  Some  policy  fields  strictly  rely  on  the 
information  covered  expressly  in  the  Regulation  and  only  reflect  what  the  team  witnessed 
during the visit. Other policy fields, such as return (see Box 10), rely widely on third parties, 
as per the evaluation guide. Neglecting the factual importance of third parties as a source of 
information may impact the quality of evaluations and create distortion between interlinked 
policy fields.  

For example, it undermines the capacity of the Mechanism to react to specific violations of 
fundamental rights at the external borders. As also noted in the 2020 study by the European 
Parliament, ‘[e]vidence of push-backs and collective expulsions in violation of the principle 
of non-refoulement may be well documented but will never be witnessed during on-site visits, 
whether  announced  or  unannounced’.  During  the  consultation,  the  European  Parliament 
criticised the limited scope of evidence used in  evaluations, particularly  external  sources of 
information, i.e. information from NGOs or national and international monitoring bodies. The 
consulted civil society organisations, some EU bodies and agencies, and some Member States 
also stressed the opportunity to expand the scope of the information sources.  

Box 10 – Participation of third parties in the field of return 

In the field of return, third parties play a role in two ways: their reports are used, directly or indirectly  - as FRA 
takes  into  account  NGOs’  and  International  Organisations’  reports  in  the  risk  analysis  provided  to  the 
Commission  -  to  set  the  annual  programme.  During  the  evaluation  visit,  when  relevant  and  appropriate,  the 
evaluation  team  meets  with  third  parties,  notably  the  Ombudsman  (usually  one  of  the  institutions  with  the 
mandate  to  monitor  forced  returns)  and  the  International  Organization  for  Migration  (usually  for  Assisted 
Voluntary Return and Reintegration) as well as NGOs dealing with return counselling, alternatives to detention 
or in charge of monitoring forced-returns.  

2.2.4.2.Driver  4.2  –  Limited  coordination  and  synergies  with  other 

instruments  

Both at the EU and national levels, several instruments complement SCH-EVAL in ensuring 
a better implementation of the Schengen acquis. The Vulnerability Assessment by Frontex is 
the  most  notable  example.  Since  2016,  Frontex  assesses  the  preparedness  of  the  Member 
States to face challenges at their external borders, based on yearly evaluations. SCH-EVAL’s 
more  extensive  five-yearly  evaluations  rather  focuses  on  structural  aspects.  Relevant 
examples,  in  other  policy  fields  are  EDPS  audit  (data  protection),  the  European 
Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats - EMPACT (police cooperation), or the 
fundamental rights officer at Frontex (external borders). National quality control mechanisms 
(encouraged under the EBCG Regulation) could become similarly important in the future. 

This variety of instruments creates the potential risk of duplications but also opportunities for 
significant synergies to better target evaluations under SCHEVAL. The Regulation however, 
disregards  these  instruments  completely.  Coordination  takes  place  mostly  on  an  informal 
basis  or  based  on  provisions  under  other  legal  acts,  such  as  Article  33  of  the  EBCG 
Regulation in the case of the Vulnerability Assessment.  

The provisions of Article 17 of the Regulation, on the sensitivity of information, impose the 
classification of the evaluation reports and confidentiality on other actors when participating 
in SCH-EVAL, making coordination even more difficult. 

This  situation  creates  an  asymmetry  that,  as  stressed  by  the  2020  study  by  the  European 
incoherent 
Parliament,  does  not  effectively  prevent 

the  risk  of  duplication  and 

32 

 
recommendations  to  Member  States84  with  the  Vulnerability  Assessment.  The  same  risk  is 
likely  to  materialise  also  for  other  instruments  developed  in  the  future,  undermining  the 
potential positive effects of SCH-EVAL. 

2.2.4.3.Driver  4.3  –  Qualification  and  size  of  the  evaluation  team  and 

unbalanced contribution of experts 

In  line  with  the  principle  of  peer  review,  and  to  ensure  adequate  participation  of  qualified 
experts, there is a general obligation for all Member States under the Regulation (Articles 385 
and  1086)  to  nominate  experts.  Member  States  and  the  Commission,  in  cooperation  with 
relevant EU bodies and agencies, shall also provide appropriate training, including on respect 
for fundamental rights. The experts’ selection for the evaluation starts with an ad-hoc call by 
the Commission  to  designate experts for  each evaluation  at  the latest  three  months  before 
the  evaluation  visit  takes  place.  The  evaluation  team  includes  all  experts  designated, 
regardless of the needs of the evaluation, with the only limitation that the maximum number 
of Member State experts in the team is eight87. If Member States’ designations exceed eight, 
the Commission, after consulting the Member States concerned, choses the eight members of 
the team based on geographical balance and the experts’ competences.  

EU  bodies  and  agencies  experts  also  participate  regularly  in  the  evaluations  as  observers, 
upon  Commission  invitation  (Article  10(5)).  During  the  first  five-year  cycle,  EU  agencies 
provided trainings in all policy fields, except for common visa policy and data protection. 

The five-year review found that contribution of experts by Member States did not always 
match the needs of the individual evaluations in terms of the number or qualifications of 
the experts.  

According  to  the  data  collected  for  the  five-year  review,  all  Member  States  contributed 
experts to the Schengen evaluations, however in very different proportions. The burden was 
heavily  unbalanced  among  Member  States  with  one-third  of  experts  provided  by  five 
Member States (see Figure 7). The contribution also differed according to the policy fields. In 
particular, common visa policy and data protection experienced recurrent shortages of experts 
and  at  times,  the  evaluation  team  included  only  four  or  five  Member  State  experts.  For 
announced  evaluations,  the  teams  generally  consisted  of  the  maximum  number  of  eight 
experts. Yet, on several occasions the time limit for the designation of expert was extended 
(occasionally even several times) due to a limited number of designations received. Overall, 
12 Member States  did  not  contribute experts to  at  least  one policy field, with  five Member 
States designating experts only in three policy fields or less. In the fields of return and visa, 
seven Member States never designated any experts. 

All  this  implied  a  disproportionate  amount  of  work  for  the  team  members  and  created  a 
significant  burden  on  the  Member  States  that  comply  with  the  Regulation.  There  is  no 
specific obligation for each individual Member State to designate experts for evaluations. If 

84  
85 

86  

87  

The state of play of Schengen governance (2020), p. 28. 
Article  3(1)  reads:  ‘The  Member  States  and  the  Commission  shall  be  jointly  responsible  for  the 
implementation  of  the  evaluation  and  monitoring  mechanism  as  specified  in  this  Regulation,  with  the 
support  of  the  Union  bodies,  offices  and  agencies  involved  in  the  implementation  of  the  Schengen 
acquis’. 
Article  10(1)  reads:  ‘A  team  responsible  for  on-site  visits  (the  ‘on-site  team’)  shall  consist  of  experts 
designated by Member States and of Commission representatives’. 
In unannounced evaluation, the Commission launches the call two weeks before the evaluation visit and 
the maximum number of experts is six. 

33 

 
                                                           
Member States do not designate enough experts, or a given Member State does not designate 
any  expert,  the  Commission  cannot  force  Member  States  to  do  so.  The  Commission  will 
renew the call for designations until a sufficient number of experts is ensured. As a result, the 
current rules could not guarantee the balanced contribution of experts by all Member States. 
In  2020,  with  the  pandemic  outbreak,  it  became  more  challenging  to  put  together  the  most 
appropriate  teams  and  gather  an  adequate  number  of  experts  even  in  policy  fields  like 
Schengen  Information  System  or  return  where  under  normal  circumstances  there  is  a 
sufficient number of experts. At the same time, during the consultation, some Member States 
complained  that  having  eight  experts  might  be  excessive,  making  the  evaluation  more 
difficult in certain circumstances. 

The  qualification  of  experts  also  represented  an  issue  in  the  first  five-year  cycle.  Member 
States confirmed that the appropriate profile of the experts is key. In particular, fundamental 
rights violations, especially the ones at the external borders, might be hard to detect in case of 
insufficient experts with the right profile. To ensure the identification of such violations, the 
European  Parliament  pointed  out  the  need  of  including  fundamental  rights  experts  in  the 
evaluation teams.  

During  the  consultation,  Member  States  mentioned  three  main  causes  for  the  occasional 
unavailability of experts: lack of training in certain policy fields (notably common visa policy 
and  data  protection),  short  notice  (three  months)  given  by  the  Commission,  and  perceived 
lack of incentives  (such  as financial compensation) for the experts. The heavy workload of 
the  evaluations  and  the  difficulty  reconciling  it  with  other  commitments  discourages 
participation.  

Figure 7 – Number of experts per Member State during the first five-year cycle 

2.3.  How will the problem evolve? 

Source: five-year review 

The  threat  landscape  and  developments  of  the  Schengen acquis  risk  amplifying  the 
consequences of these drivers.  

As a reaction to increasing challenges faced since 2015 (migratory pressure, terrorist attacks, 
and  Covid-19),  the  EU  has  undertaken  several  initiatives  to  make  Schengen  more  resilient 
such as, for instance, the proposal for an amendment of the Schengen Borders Code or for a 

34 

 
 
Regulation  introducing  a  screening  of  third-country  nationals  at  the  external  border88. 
Reforms are not only improvements of existing tools but brought in several new elements. In 
addition  to SIS and VIS, Schengen will by the end of 2023 count  on a new  IT architecture 
with  new  systems  (ETIAS,  EES)  at  the  external  borders  and  interoperability89  of 
information systems reinforcing the relation between pertinent databases (involving also non-
Schengen  databases  such  as  ECRIS-TCN90  and  EURODAC91)  (see  Box  11).  This  will 
provide comprehensive information on external border management and visa processing at all 
stages.  The  adoption  of  an  EU  police  cooperation  code  is  planned  under  the  EU  Security 
Union Strategy92. 

The role of EU agencies involved in the implementation of the Schengen acquis has gained 
further importance. In 2016, Frontex received executive powers to support Member States in 
the management of the external border. In 2019, the creation of the  European Border and 
Coast Guard, including the set-up of a 10 000 standing corps by 2027, has been a key step 
towards  genuinely  European  protection  of  the  external  borders  and  the  establishment  of  a 
European  return  system.  Further  reforms  under  negotiation  aim  to  extend  the  mandate  of 
Europol and EASO. 

Four Member States (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Croatia and Romania) are also waiting to be fully 
integrated  in  the  area  without  controls  at  the  internal  borders.  Therefore,  the  number  of 
Member States to be evaluated on a periodic basis is expected to increase considerably in the 
future.  

SCH-EVAL’s  current  limitations  risk  becoming  even  more  critical.  Today,  SCH-EVAL  is 
not  fully  effective  in  addressing  serious  situations  and  mainly  performs  its  basic  tasks. 
Without any action at the EU level to increase its effectiveness, the identified problems may 
only  worsen,  leading  to  the  Mechanism’s  political  and  practical  irrelevance  for  Schengen 
governance.  

Box 11 – EES, ETIAS and Interoperability 

The Entry/Exit System (EES) is a new automated IT system for registering travellers from third-countries, both 
short-stay visa holders and visa-exempt travellers, each time they cross an EU external border and will replace 
the current system of manual stamping of passports. ETIAS is also a new largely automated IT system created to 
identify  security,  irregular  migration  or  high  epidemic  risks  posed  by  visa-exempt  visitors  travelling  to  the 
Member States, whilst at the same time it facilitates crossing borders for the vast majority of travellers who do 
not  pose  such  risks.  Non-EU  nationals  who  do  not  need  a  visa  to  travel  to  Schengen  will  have  to  apply  for  a 
travel authorisation through the ETIAS system prior to their trip. EES and ETIAS are to be operational in 2022. 
The Interoperability Regulations establish a framework for the interoperability of the six central large-scale IT 
systems  in  the  field  of  borders,  security  and  migration,  namely  EES,  VIS,  ETIAS,  Eurodac,  SIS,  and  ECRIS-
TCN. It will be operational from 2023. If one Member State fails, the  whole architecture will suffer. Speed to 
detect and fix deficiencies will be crucial. The current Mechanism with its cumbersome and lengthy procedures 
is not suited for a rapid response in case deficiencies are identified, including corrective actions in real-time. 

88  
89  
90 
91 
92  

COM(2002) 612 final of 23.9.2020.  
Regulation (EU) 2019/817, OJ L 135, 22.5.2019, p. 27. 
European Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS-TCN). 
European Asylum Dactyloscopy Database (EURODAC). 
COM(2020)605 final of 24.7.2020. 

35 

 
                                                           
3.  WHY SHOULD THE EU ACT? 

3.1.  Legal basis 

The Proposal is to be based on Article 70 TFEU, which is also the legal base of Regulation 
No. (EU) 1053/2013, which it is amending93.  

Article  70  TFEU  empowers  the  Council  to  adopt,  on  a  proposal  from  the  Commission, 
measures laying down the arrangements, whereby Member States, in  collaboration with the 
Commission, conduct objective and impartial evaluation of the implementation of the Union 
policies referred to in Title V by Member States’ authorities, in particular in order to facilitate 
full application of the principle of mutual recognition.  

A statement from the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, accompanying 
the Regulation, clarifies that any future proposal to amend the Regulation will be submitted 
to the consultation of the European Parliament in order to take into consideration its opinion, 
to  the  fullest  extent  possible,  before  the  adoption  of  a  final  text94.  Accordingly,  the 
Commission consulted the European Parliament on the main elements of the proposal before 
its adoption on 12 May.  

3.2. 

Subsidiarity: Necessity of EU action 

A  specific  evaluation  and  monitoring  mechanism  to  verify  the  correct  application  and 
implementation of the Schengen acquis is  necessary  given the need to  ensure high uniform 
standards in its application in practice and to maintain a high level of mutual trust between 
those  Member  States  that  form  part  of  an  area  without  border  control  at  internal  borders. 
Schengen  created  a  common  external  border.  Even  though  the  management  of  the  external 
border  remains  under  the  responsibility  of  Member  States,  the  EU  has  to  ensure  that  the 
overall governance is  functioning well.  In an area without internal  borders, all cross-border 
relevant issues need to be regulated and managed at the EU level. Thus, Schengen by itself 
already answers the subsidiarity question. The shortcomings identified above require changes 
that can be made only at the EU level. 

3.3. 

Subsidiarity: Added value of EU action 

The  EU  added-value  of  the  initiative  stems  foremost  from  the  coordinated  participation  of 
Member  States,  directly  and  through  the  Council,  which  creates  a  strong  basis  to  generate 
mutual  trust  among  Member  States  compared  to  evaluations  at  the  Member  State  level. 
Evaluations  coordinated  at  the  EU  level  facilitate  a  comparison  of  the  implementation 
practices  across  Member  States  and  an  assessment  of  the  combined  effects  of  the 
implementation  in  different  Member  States.  Herewith,  it  is  possible  to  identify  deficiencies 
that  arise  from  asymmetries  and  divergences  in  the  implementation  of  the  Schengen acquis 
that  may  put  at  risk  the  integrity  of  Schengen.  The  peer  pressure  resulting  from  the 
Mechanism  may  create  an  additional  incentive  for  a  correct  implementation  of  the 
Schengen acquis. By ensuring equal contribution of experts by Member States and stronger 

93  

94  

Certain  stakeholders  submitted  that  the  proposal  should  be  adopted  on  the  basis  of  Article  77  TFEU 
which,  contrary  to  Article  70  TFEU,  would  allow  for  the  participation  of  the  European  Parliament.  It 
recalls  that,  in  2010,  the  Commission  had  proposed  the  adoption  of  the  Schengen  Evaluation  and 
Monitoring  Mechanism  based  on  Article  77(2)(e)  TFEU  that  provides  for  abolition  of  internal  border 
controls as the objective of an area of free movement of persons within the European Union, as laid down 
in  Article  26  of  the  TFEU.  Ultimately,  a  preference  was  expressed  for  Article  70  TFEU  as  it  was 
considered to provide an express legal basis for evaluations by Member States.  
OJ L 295, 6.11.2013, p. 37. 

36 

 
                                                           
participation of all Member States to the process, this initiative also strengthens SCH-EVAL 
as  a  shared  responsibility  of  all  Member  States.  It  reduces  the  risk  of  few  Member  States 
carrying a disproportionate burden for the functioning of the Mechanism. 

This initiative takes into due account the subsidiarity principle by laying down the basis for 
improved coordination with evaluations carried out under national quality mechanisms. One 
of  the  objectives  is  to  shift  the  focus  of  the  Mechanism  to  shortcomings  that  may  have 
adverse effects on Schengen’s well-functioning as a whole. Issues of limited scope should be 
dealt with at the national level. This approach should also encourage the development of the 
national quality control mechanisms as referred to in the EBCG Regulation.  

The  measures  under  the  policy  options  do  not  go  beyond  what  is  needed  to  achieve  the 
general and specific objectives and respect herewith the proportionality principle (see section 
7.3).  

4.  OBJECTIVES: WHAT IS TO BE ACHIEVED? 

4.1.  General Objective 

The initiative’s general objective is to improve SCH-EVAL, to boost its effectiveness, and to 
strengthen  the  monitoring  pillar  of  the  Schengen  governance  to  make  Schengen  more 
resilient.  Figure  8  describes  the  intervention  logic  of  the  initiative.  SCH-EVAL  should  be 
able to timely identify the most significant deficiencies and address them quickly, and allow 
drawing conclusions on the state of Schengen triggering political discussion.  

4.2. 

Specific Objectives 

The  four  specific  policy  objectives  addressed  in  this  Impact  Assessment  respond  to  the 
problems identified in section 2.1 and include initiatives that support the general objective set 
out in section 4.1. 

Specific Objective 1 - Avoid gaps and increase strategic focus. The first specific objective is 
mostly linked to the first problem (limited strategic focus and significant fragmentation). It is 
to  ensure  that  the  evaluations  assess  most  effectively  the  implementation  of  the 
Schengen acquis  so  to  identify  timely  all  relevant  deficiencies  and  issues  that  may  put  the 
integrity  of  Schengen  at  risk.  To  this  end,  it  is  necessary  to  adapt  SCH-EVAL’s  scope  to 
verify the implementation of the Schengen acquis comprehensively and make more strategic 
use of the different tools proportionately to the different situations.  

Specific Objective 2 -  Rationalise the distribution of tasks and responsibilities, and simplify 
and accelerate process and procedures. The second specific objective is mostly linked to the 
second  and  third  problems  (insufficient  capacity  to  identify  and  quickly  adapt  and  react  to 
new circumstances, legislative developments  and trends; slow adoption and implementation 
remedies).  This  objective  is  to  guarantee  that  the  different  actors  involved  may  sufficiently 
fulfil  their  role  and  contribute  to  more  efficient  administrative  and  decision-making 
procedures.  This  specific  objective  is  foremost  about  the  length  of  the  procedures.  It  is  to 
shorten  the  overall  process  and  reduce  the  heavy  administrative  burden  while  supporting  a 
strategic  use  of  SCH-EVAL.  This  requires  a  more  proportionate  institutional  balance  with 
simplified  decision-making  process,  strengthened  follow-up,  and  a  clear  timeframe  for  the 
participation of all actors involved.  

Specific Objective 3 - Strengthen  the  implementation  of  fundamental  rights  safeguards 
under  the  Schengen acquis.  The  third  specific  objective  is  related  to  the  second  problem 
(insufficient capacity to identify and quickly adapt and react to new circumstances, legislative 

37 

 
developments  and  trends,  particularly  violations  of  fundamental  rights  at  external  borders). 
This objective is to adopt targeted measures to better integrate fundamental rights protection 
in the Mechanism, apart from the evaluation of data protection requirements, which is one of 
the  evaluated  areas.  While  fundamental  rights  protection  will  benefit  any  horizontal 
improvements proposed to avoid gaps and to ensure strategic focus of the Mechanism, they 
still  deserve  particular  attention  given  their  horizontal  character  and  the  specificity  of  the 
challenges at the external borders. This specific objective aims to respond to the strong call 
from  the  European  Parliament,  civil  society  organisations  and  some  Member  States  to 
strengthen the integration of fundamental rights in the Mechanism. 

Specific Objective 4 - Optimise  the  participation  of  Member  State  experts  and  the 
involvement  of EU bodies and agencies and synergies with other instruments. The fourth 
specific objective is mostly linked to the  first and second problems (limited strategic focus; 
insufficient  capacity  to  quickly  react  and  adapt  to  new  circumstances,  legislative 
developments and trends). This specific objective is to create the conditions for more optimal 
participation of all actors that may support the Mechanism. It is also to make better use of the 
resources  available  at  the  EU  and  national  levels,  to  strengthen  mutual  trust  through  direct 
involvement and to ensure the quality of their input into the process. This specific objective 
also  intends  to  enhance  synergies  between  SCH-EVAL  and  other  instruments  that 
complement  the  Mechanism  in  ensuring  a  better  implementation  of  the  Schengen  acquis95. 
Ultimately,  the  aim  is  to  design  more  targeted  evaluations  and  implement  them  better, 
making the best use of all resources available. 

95 

The  reduction  in  the  number  of  experts  was  not  considered  as  a  specific  objective  of  the  initiative 
because it is not an aim as such, considering that the Mechanism is not a costly instrument. The revision 
aims  to  optimise  the  use  of  available  resources,  in  particular,  to  ensure  a  sufficient  number  of  experts 
with the right profile and better distribution of the burden of expert provision across all Member States. 

38 

 
                                                           
Figure 8 – Intervention logic 

5.  WHAT ARE THE AVAILABLE POLICY OPTIONS? 

This Impact Assessment analyses the key policy options, including the baseline scenario, to 
address the problems identified in section 2.1 and match the objectives set out in section 4. 
The  Commission  has  developed 
the  policy  options  based  on  all  stakeholders’ 
recommendations  and  on  the  five-year  review  of  the  implementation  of  the  current 
Regulation (see Annexes 2 and 4). 

The  causes  or  drivers  of  the  key  problems  described  in  the  previous  sections  lie  in  the 
implementation of the Regulation and its design. It has become apparent that there is a need 
for more drastic changes as the five-year review indicated.  

Four approaches are possible as an alternative to the baseline scenario. Option 1 is to adopt 
only  operational  measures  to  align  the  implementation  with  current  needs.  Option 2  is  a 
minimalist approach to adopt targeted amendments to the Regulation to clarify the scope of 
specific  provisions  to  increase  legal  certainty  about  the  obligations  of  the  different  actors 
involved, and streamline and simplify procedures. Option 3 is the more ambitious approach 
that  would  combine  elements  of  the  first  two  options  with  some  fundamental  changes  to 
SCH-EVAL’s  functioning.  These  options  build  on  each  other  being  cumulative  rather  than 
alternative, depending on the degree of ambition. Option 2 largely builds on Option 1, while 

39 

                     Scope Evaluation design / implementation – actors & synergies Driver 4. Inadequate and insufficient participation of relevant actors in the design and implementation of evaluations Driver 1. Material and temporal scope of evaluations 1.1 A broad scope not adapted to new developments 1.2 A fragmented articulation of evaluations into 6 police fields 1.3 A too limited temporal scope to allow for a flexible use of available tools 4.1 Unbalanced & underused sources of information & expertise 4.2 Limited coordination & synergies with other instruments 4.3 Qualification & size of teams – unbalanced experts distribution Increased effectiveness and efficiency of SCH-EVAL Programming Evaluation and monitoring tools Driver 2. Rigid evaluation programming and inadequate criteria underlying evaluation and monitoring tools 2.1 Rigid evaluation programming 2.2 Inadequate criteria underlying evaluation and monitoring tools Decision making evaluation / follow up  Institutional balance Driver 3. Inadequate articulation of processes and procedures with disproportionate institutional balance 3.2 Complex decision-making evaluation process 3.3 Cumbersome and inadequate monitoring and follow up process  3.3 A potential disproportionate institutional balance  
Option 3 on Options 2 and 1. Option 4 envisages a combination of measures proposed under 
the three options, depending on the area of intervention and level of ambition.  

5.1.  What is the baseline from which options are assessed? 

The baseline is a ‘no policy change’ scenario. The Regulation would remain unchanged. Its 
implementation  would  follow  the  current  pattern  with  no  significant  changes  to  the 
arrangements in place. However, today SCH-EVAL does not reach its full potential. It suffers 
from  shortcomings  regarding  in  particular  the  scope  of  the  evaluations,  participation  of 
experts,  the  length  and  administrative  costs  of  the  process,  and  the  implementation  of 
remedial actions by the Member States (see Section 2 and Annex 3).  

The Regulation imposed an obligation to carry out 164 announced periodic evaluations. This 
exercise  required  overall  184  evaluation  visits96.  For  the  first  five-year  cycle,  26  Member 
States applying in full the Schengen acquis were required to be evaluated in all (six) policy 
fields97. Ireland (data protection), Croatia (eight policy fields98), Cyprus (data protection) as 
well as the UK (Schengen Information System) were evaluated in all or selected policy fields. 
Between 2015 and 2019, the resources available allowed in addition for 27 unannounced (29 
evaluation  visits),  eight  announced  revisits  (nine  evaluation  visits)  and  two  thematic 
evaluations99. In total, 201 evaluations took place, including 222 evaluation visits (see Figure 
9). 

The number of evaluation visits that would be possible to carry out in the future with the 
resources available would most likely not change. Regarding the use of different evaluation 
tools, the baseline scenario would diverge from the current situation reducing even more the 
use  of  tools  other  than  announced  periodic  visits  (which  in  the  first  five-year  cycle 
represented 83% of all evaluation and monitoring activities). 

As explained in detail in Annex 3, there is a high probability that the number of mandatory 
evaluations  would  increase  to  188  (as  Bulgaria,  Romania,  Croatia  and  Cyprus  will  need 
periodic  evaluations  in  all  policy  fields  and  Ireland  would  be  evaluated  in  at  least  three 
instead  of  one  policy  field),  leaving  virtually  no  space  for  other  evaluation  tools,  such  as 
thematic evaluations or unannounced visits, or monitoring tools, such as revisits. It could also 
be necessary to increase the number of evaluated policy fields to incorporate new legislative 
developments. If so, there would be no margin left to use evaluation tools other than regular 
announced evaluations or carry out monitoring activities properly (including revisits).  

The Commission is trying in this second  evaluation cycle to combine policy fields partially 
on an ad-hoc basis but it largely depends on the will of the individual Member State100. As a 

96  

97  

98  

99  

100  

For  some  Member  States,  the  evaluation  of  external  border  management  required  more  than  one 
evaluation  (on-site)  visit  depending  on  the  need  to  evaluate  separately  land,  air  and  sea  borders.  Four 
evaluations were questionnaire-based only (no on-site visits). 
Liechtenstein was not evaluated in the fields of external border management and common visa policy due 
to the absence of external border. 
The Mechanism evaluated Croatia in eight policy fields: data protection, Schengen Information System, 
return,  police  cooperation,  external  border  management,  visa  common  policy;  legislation  on  firearms; 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters. 
The  two  thematic  evaluations  did  not  require  any  separate  evaluation  visits.  In  one  case,  the  thematic 
evaluation  was  combined  with  announced  evaluations  and,  in  the  second  case,  the  thematic  evaluation 
was a desk-review exercise. 
For  one  Member  State,  SCH-EVAL  will  combine  certain  elements  for  the  evaluations  in  the  fields  of 
Schengen Information System and police cooperation. The two evaluation teams will follow a combined 
online  presentation  in  advance  (while  usually  the  presentations  are  given  during  the  on-site  visits  in 

40 

 
                                                           
 
result,  so  far  it  has  only  succeeded  in  one  case.  This  experience  shows  that  a  more  drastic 
intervention is required. Similarly, the Commission has made efforts with a view to designing 
more targeted evaluations and increasing synergies with other instruments. For instance, the 
Commission  is  organising  regular  meetings  and  structured  information  exchange  with 
Frontex on the relevant products and results of both monitoring mechanisms. It has amended 
the  Standard  Schengen  Questionnaire  to  take  into  account  the  questions  asked  under  the 
Vulnerability Assessment to avoid any overlap. In accordance with Article 33 of the  EBCG 
Regulation, the Commission is sharing the results of Vulnerability Assessments with the on-
site team ahead of evaluations. Despite the efforts, there were limitations to further increase 
collaboration with EU agencies101. 

Figure 9 – Evaluation visits (2015-2020) 

Source: DG Home data 

In  relation  to  the  number  of  Member  State  experts  designated  during  the  first  cycle,  the 
five-year  review  found  the  availability  and  profile  of  experts  did  not  match  the  needs  (see 
Figure 10). For announced evaluations, as explained in section 2.2.4.3, the Commission had 
to extend the time limit for the designation of experts on several occasions due to a too low 
number of designations.  Overall, in  the first  five-year cycle, the average  number of experts 
per team was 7.3 (announced evaluations other than revisits), 7.4 (announced revisits) and 5.3 
(unannounced evaluations). The number of evaluations is expected to change in the medium 
term  given  the  likely  increase  of  evaluated  Member  States  and  policy  fields.  Under  the 
scenario  with  31  Member  States,  a  slight  increase  (by  5%)  of  human  resources  would  be 
necessary for creating the evaluation teams, in case the same number of experts and current 
fragmentation remain. 

The  Commission  is  currently  preparing  trainings  in  the  area  of  visa,  which  should  reduce 
expert  deficit  in  that  field.  However,  without  additional  intervention,  in  a  situation  of 

conference  rooms)  and  will  visit  the  national  Single  Point  of  Contact  (SPOC)  at  the  same  time.  The 
evaluation  visits  will  be  shorter.  This  combination  will  allow  enhancing  synergies  between  the  two 
evaluations  and,  on  a  practical  level,  limited  savings  for  the  Commission  (reduced  costs  for 
accommodation and conference rooms) and Member States (on daily allowances for shorter visits). 
Some  EU  bodies / agencies  pointed  out  the  limits  to  enhanced  cooperation,  i.e.  providing  additional 
information would have implied additional costs in certain cases and required a clarification of the legal 
framework. 

101  

41 

 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
increased  number  of  compulsory  evaluations,  the  asymmetries  and  deficits  described  in 
section 2.2.4.3 are likely to worsen. 

Figure 10 – Number of experts 

the  first  five-year  cycle, 

For  all  stakeholders,  the  current  length  of  the 
process  is  one  of  the  main  shortcomings  of  the 
Mechanism.  In 
the 
average  length  of  the  evaluation  process  was  one 
year  (357  days).  The  yearly  average  length  of  the 
evaluation  process  was  very  stable,  although  the 
length  of  the  individual  procedures  was  very 
variable,  ranging  from  3.5  months  to  over  two 
years.  The  longest  step  was  the  phase  from  the 
evaluation  visits  until  adoption  of  the  evaluation 
report, on average 9.5 months, while the  adoption 
of  the  recommendations  took  on  average  2.5 
additional months102. Based on the overall analysis 
of  all  the  procedures  carried  out  in  the  first  five-
year  cycle  (see  Annex  3), 
the  Commission 
Source: five-year review 
concluded  that  the  lack  of  clear  timeline  and  the 
administrative  burden  due  to  the  articulation  and 
complexity of the process are the main reasons for 

the length in the procedure. 

Figure 11 – Yearly average length of the evaluation process 

Source: five-year review 

For the follow-up, only a limited number of procedures could be closed at the end of the first 
five-year cycle, and about 25% of the action plans were closed at the end of 2020 (i.e. one 
year after the end of the first cycle). 

102   Due to the restrictive measures in place to limit the spread of the Covid-19 pandemic, there were delays 

in the adoption of the evaluation reports in 2020. 

42 

 
 
                                                           
As  regards  the  evaluation  process  length,  the  baseline  scenario  corresponds  to  the  current 
scenario.  No  significant  changes  are  predicted.  It  may  however  be  reasonable  to  speculate 
that  the  length  of  the  process  could  be  even  longer  if  the  number  of  announced  evaluation 
visits  (due  to  increased  number  of  evaluated  Member  States  and  policy  fields)  increases, 
generating additional workload. As there is no significant correlation between the number of 
procedures and the process length, an estimation is not possible.  

Already  at  the  end  of  the  first  five-year  cycle  and  beginning  of  the  second  one,  the 
Commission  started  addressing,  as  far  as  possible,  shortcomings  of  the  Mechanism  with  a 
number  of  operational  measures.  Despite  the  efforts  made  during  the  first  five-year  cycle, 
several EU bodies / agencies stressed that there are still opportunities for increased synergies 
and enhanced complementarity between SCH-EVAL and their work. Absent any initiative at 
the  EU  level,  the  issues  mentioned  in  this  section  will  remain  and  the  Mechanism’s 
effectiveness might be further undermined in view of new developments, as explained under 
section 2.3. 

5.2.  Option 1:  Operational changes 

This  option  consists  of  operational  measures  to  adjust  the  scope  of  evaluations  (but 
keeping  current  policy-field  fragmentation),  accelerate  the  evaluation  process  while 
maintaining the current decision-making and follow-up procedures, better involve Member 
State  experts  and  EU  bodies  agencies,  and  strengthen  the  evaluation  of  fundamental 
rights in SCH-EVAL. 

Option  1  keeps  the  current  scope,  which  covers  all  parts  of  the  Schengen  acquis,  while 
adapting  the  current  priorities  (policy  fields)  of  the  evaluation  to  the  new  realities  of  the 
Schengen acquis. This would allow, for instance, expanding evaluations beyond the existing 
assessment  of  the  Schengen  Information  System  to  cover  new  IT  systems;  adding  police 
cooperation measures  that  will emerge from  the  police cooperation code; and incorporating 
ETIAS  and EES  into evaluations of external  borders and, possibly, of other fields  like data 
protection,  as  proposed  by  a  wide  range  of  stakeholders  (European  Parliament,  Member 
States  and  EU  bodies  and  agencies)103;  and  activities  of  EU  agencies  performing  tasks  on 
behalf of a Member State. 

Operational  changes  also  make  announced  evaluations  more  targeted  and  coherent  (in 
line with all stakeholders’ suggestion104). The current individual policy-field evaluations are 
upheld but focused on the critical elements for each Member State. To attain this objective, 
the evaluation  design  abandons the current  holistic approach for each policy  field  by better 

103  

104  

Such changes are possible in principle at an operational level without amending Article 4 as the priorities 
(specific policy fields) for the evaluations are not defined in the Regulation, but agreed in the Schengen 
Committee  for  each  evaluation  cycle.  A  Member  State  recalled  that  ‘Article  4  stipulates  that 
“evaluations  may  cover  all  aspects  of  the  Schengen  acquis…”,  while  the  areas  listed  are  indicated 
generic  (return  missing  from  the  list,  but  as  the  wording  provides  all  aspects,  the  systematic 
interpretation  was  that  it  is  not  a  limitative  enumeration  of  areas)’.  Member  States  and  the  European 
Parliament identified the need for SCH-EVAL to incorporate the evaluation of the new IT systems, EES 
and ETIAS, and activities of EU bodies and agencies, particularly Frontex. The European Parliament in 
addition  referred  to  the  need  to  streamline  police  cooperation  and  consider  elements  going  beyond 
Schengen acquis like Prüm or Eurodac. 
The European Parliament asked to differentiate between the most relevant parts of the Schengen acquis 
that need to be assessed regularly and other parts that might be evaluated less frequently or even ad-hoc. 
Member  States  indicated  that  evaluations  should  be  more  strategic  and  targeted,  and  highlighted  the 
opportunity for enhanced coherence among evaluations of different policy fields.  

43 

 
                                                           
integrating improved risk assessments (see below) provided by EU agencies (and third parties 
input) and taking into account previous evaluation findings105. This option could also include 
the  possibility  of  carrying  out  evaluation  visits  covering  more  than  one  Member  State  with 
similar challenges, or combining evaluations of different policy fields (for instance, Schengen 
Information  System  and  police  cooperation).  Shortening  (as  more  targeted)  the  length  and 
reducing the number of announced evaluations facilitates wider use of other evaluation tools. 
Such operational changes are conditional to the agreement of the Member States concerned. 

To  improve  the  quality  of  evaluations  (and  making  them  more  targeted)  and  increase  the 
participation of EU agencies / bodies, the Commission continue implementing measures to 
ensure synergies with Vulnerability Assessment by Frontex and discuss with EU bodies and 
agencies the revision of the current scope of their risk assessments so they are fit for purpose. 
The  current  legal  framework  leaves  a  limited  margin  to  adopt  additional  measures  at 
operational level. 

As to decision-making processes and follow-up, the Commission implements measures to 
simplify the internal workflow or introduce informal time benchmarks106. Member States also 
suggested  to  the  Commission  the  organisation  of  more  frequent  Schengen  Committee 
meetings  (and  to  the  Council  of  more  frequent  SCH-EVAL  working  parties).  A  further 
possibility is to use video conferencing with Member States to discuss progress reports. The 
regular adoption of the comprehensive annual reports could also increase peer pressure in 
the  follow-up  and  foster  political  dialogue  on  recurrent  issues  and  deficiencies  while 
improving the transparency of the Mechanism, as these reports are public. The Commission 
could also organise exchanges with relevant civil society organisations to discuss the results 
of SCH-EVAL. 

To  address  some  of  the  shortcomings  related  to  the  designation  of  sufficient  qualified 
experts, the Commission will anticipate the call for designations to facilitate the organisation 
on  the  side  of  Member  States  (and  sharing  with  Member  States  the  specific  dates  for 
evaluations as early as possible). The Commission and EU bodies / agencies could establish 
training in those areas  where  it is currently  lacking  (visa policy  and data protection107) and 
improve current ones, as requested by stakeholders. Taking into Member States’ suggestions, 
the Commission under this option would create incentives of a non-financial nature, such as 
awarding  certificates.  Incentives  of  financial  nature  are  not  included  under  this  option.  The 
Commission  explored  the  possibility  of  introducing  daily  allowances.  According  to  the 
Financial Regulation, however, daily allowances are only paid to experts when a contract has 
been signed with them. This is not the case for experts participating in the implementation of 
this  Mechanism.  Member  States  may  explore  the  possibilities  of  providing  financial 
incentives for experts through their programmes under the new Border Management and Visa 
Instrument, in particular, with the options of operating support that allows them to cover staff 
costs. 

105  

106  

107  

This  option  reflects  the  remarks  of  several  Member  States  about  the  need  to  take  in  consideration  the 
specific situation of a Member State (‘The ‘peer-to-peer’ system - basis for the principle of mutual trust 
need among MS - needs to recognise the specificity of certain countries concerning certain policy fields, 
such as external border or return’).  
The Commission intends to introduce informal time benchmarks to speed up the adoption of evaluation 
reports.  
The  Commission  did  not  organise  trainings  for  the  data  protection  area  due  to  limits  in  available 
resources. 

44 

 
                                                           
As  to  fundamental  rights,  several  stakeholders  (the  European  Parliament,  some  Member 
States,  some  EU  bodies / agencies,  and  civil  society  organisations)  proposed  to  increase 
SCH-EVAL’s  capacity  to  identify  violations  of  fundamental  rights.  Such  measures 
include, first, wider involvement of FRA (as all stakeholders suggested) in the overall visits, 
notably  at  external  borders,  and  broader  use  of  its  guidelines108  by  evaluation  teams  in 
preparation of and during the evaluations. Second, the evaluation team would increase the use 
of  information  gathered  by  EU  bodies  and  agencies  and  –  as  suggested  by  the  European 
Parliament,  some  Member  States  and  civil  society  organisations  –  relevant  third  parties 
independent  authorities)109.  Third,  several 
(NGOs, 
stakeholders  (some  Member  States,  NGOs  and  European  Parliament)  suggested  the 
incorporation of fundamental rights elements in all training for evaluators. 

international  organisations  and 

Table 5 – Overview of Option 1 

Option 1 

Problems 

Key measures proposed 

Specific 
objectives 
1. Avoid gaps 
and increase 
strategic 
focus 

1. Limited strategic 
focus and significant 
fragmentation 
preventing an 
overview of Schengen 

-  Adapt evaluations to cover new elements of the 

- 

- 

Schengen acquis, including activities of EU agencies 
performing tasks on behalf of a Member State; 
Reduce fragmentation by merging policy fields (e.g. 
police cooperation and SIS); 
Prepare more targeted evaluations by focusing on 
critical elements, making better use of improved risk 
analysis (in discussion with EU agencies) resulting in 
a reduced number of recommendations; 

-  Adopt the annual SCH-EVAL report to have an 

- 

overview of Schengen; 
Increase political dialogue among EU institutions and 
Member States using as basis the annual report. 
-  Accelerate the adoption of evaluation reports by 

simplifying the internal workflows, and introducing 
internal benchmarks and higher frequency of 
Schengen Committees; 
Improve follow-up (by increasing the use of online / 
IT tools, i.e.  bilateral VCs with Member States); 
Increase peer-pressure to accelerate the 
implementation of remedies by adopting the annual 
SCH-EVAL report including an overview of Member 
State state of play in the implementation of 
recommendations. 
Increase the involvement of FRA in evaluations, and 
invite FRA to provide observers in external borders 
evaluations / visits; 

- 

- 

- 

-  Use more broadly the guidelines developed by FRA; 
-  Make wider use of third party information 

(reinforcing guidelines); 
Incorporate fundamental rights elements in all 
trainings. 

Area of 
intervention - 
Driver 

Scope  
(Driver 1) 

Specific 
evaluation design 
(Driver 4) 

Decision-making 
(Driver 3) 

Evaluation and 
follow-up 
procedures and 
processes 
(decision-making) 

(Driver 3) 

Specific 
evaluations 
design and 
implementation / 
actors involved 
and synergies 
with other 
instruments 

(Driver 4) 

2. Rationalise 
the 
distribution 
of tasks and 
responsibilitie
s, and 
simplify and 
accelerate 
process and 
procedures 

3. Strengthen 
the 
implementati
on of 
fundamental 
rights 
safeguards 
under the 
Schengen 
acquis 
4. Optimise 

2. Insufficient capacity 
to quickly react and 
adapt to new 
circumstances, 
legislative 
developments and 
trends 

3. Slow adoption and 
implementation of 
remedies 
2. Insufficient capacity 
to quickly react and 
adapt to new 
circumstances, 
particularly violations 
of fundamental rights 
at the external borders 

1. Limited strategic 

- 

- 

Increase and improve training for all policy fields, and  Specific 

108

109  

FRA,  Border  controls  and  fundamental  rights  at  external  land  borders  (2020),  Border  controls  and 
fundamental  rights  at  external  land  borders  |  European  Union  Agency  for  Fundamental  Rights 
(europa.eu). 
Stakeholders  suggested  to  widen  the  scope  of  evidence  to  include  third  sources  (European  Parliament, 
some  EU  bodies  /  agencies  and  NGOs),  and  it  is  also  indicated  in  the  study,  ECRE,  Policy  Note: 
Schengen – A Club where Fundamental Rights (Do Not) Matter?, 2019, p. 4.  

45 

 
                                                           
  
 
 
 
 
 
the 
participation 
of Member 
State experts 
and the 
involvement 
of EU bodies 
and agencies 
and synergies 
with other 
instruments 

focus and significant 
fragmentation 
preventing an 
overview of Schengen 

2. Insufficient capacity 
to quickly react and 
adapt to new 
circumstances, 
particularly violations 
of fundamental rights 
at the external borders 

- 

incorporate the new legislative developments; 
- 
Introduce non-financial incentives for experts; 
-  Anticipate calls for designation of experts and share 
information about the dates of evaluations early on; 
Increase the use of information gathered by EU bodies 
and agencies and relevant third parties; 
Increase request of risk analysis from EU 
agencies / bodies as well as revise with EU 
agencies / bodies the scope of risk analysis; 
Improve synergies with Vulnerability Assessment of 
Frontex. 

- 

- 

evaluations 
design and 
implementation / 
actors involved 
and synergies 
with other 
instruments  

(Driver 4) 

5.3.  Option 2:  Targeted legislative changes 

This  option  reinforces  operational  changes  by  building  on  them  and  increasing  legal 
certainty while it streamlines and simplifies procedures. It consists of targeted changes to 
the  current  provisions  of  the  Regulation  to  increase  flexibility  regarding  the  fields  the 
Mechanism  should  evaluate  and  its  programming  (building  on  Option  1).  It  rationalises 
processes by eliminating or simplifying existing procedural obligations while keeping the 
same institutional  balance.  It  creates  additional opportunities for better and  more targeted 
mobilisation  of  experts  and  coordination  with  EU  agencies  and  bodies,  and  increases 
legal certainty on the elements relevant for fundamental rights mentioned under Option 
1 codifying them and highlighting their prominence and political importance. 

This  option  keeps  current  scope  (the  Schengen acquis)  but  deletes  the  reference  to  the 
specific  policy  fields  mentioned  in  Article  4  of  the  Regulation  and  codifies  the  Schengen 
Committee’s current practice of agreeing on the specific policy fields at the beginning of 
the  evaluation  cycle.  By  deleting  the  list  of  specific  policy  fields,  this  option  increases  the 
flexibility  to  take  into  account  new  developments  in  the  Schengen  acquis  in  the  future  (as 
stressed  by  several  Member  States  and  the  European  Parliament).  It  will  offer  a  different 
starting  point  for  the  scope  of  the  evaluations  as  Article  4  would  not  refer  anymore  to  the 
current  policy  fields.  By  codifying  the  Schengen  Committee’s  practice,  this  option  ensures 
legal certainty as to the procedure to determine the specific policy fields that the Mechanism 
will evaluate in each cycle (and for a given Member State).  

It also clarifies in the legal basis that EU agencies fall under the Mechanism when they 
implement  executive  tasks  delegated  de  facto  or  de  iure  by  Member  States  and  that 
qualify  as  implementation  of  the  Schengen  acquis.  Given  the  wider  responsibilities  of 
some EU agencies today and possibly in  the future, the majority of Member States and the 
European Parliament suggested SCH-EVAL should cover the activities of relevant agencies, 
especially  Frontex.  However,  under  this  option,  it  would  not  be  possible  to  issue 
recommendations  to  the  EU  agency  concerned  when  shortcomings  are  imputable  to  the 
decisions  or  policy  of  an  EU  agency  carrying  out  the  delegated  tasks.  Article  70  of  TFEU 
provides for the evaluation of Member States only, which represents a legal obstacle in this 
respect.  As  a  possible  solution,  under  this  option  the  Commission  will  communicate  the 
identified deficiencies to the governing body of the EU agency concerned.  

46 

 
 
 
Additional  targeted  legislative  changes,  supported  by  the  majority  of  Member  States110, 
simplify the procedure for adopting and amending the annual programme. Article 5 is 
to be modified so to ensure flexibility to react flexibly to unforeseen changes to the material 
conditions having an impact on the programme of announced evaluations. In practical terms, 
it  means  no  need  for  a  formal  amendment  of  the  annual  programme  and  eliminating  the 
obligation  to  include  in  the  annual  programme  unannounced  evaluations,  which  the 
Commission could plan on a need-basis111 at short notice. 

As  to  the  rationalisation  of  procedures,  this  option  removes  or  simplifies  provisions  that 
create  unnecessary  procedural  obstacles,  as  resulted  from  the  five-year  review  and  the 
feedback  from  stakeholders  (Member  States  and  European  Parliament).  Firstly,  Option  2 
proposes the declassification of the evaluation reports112 as the rule to simplify and speed-
up the procedure by allowing quicker handling of reports and facilitating their transmission to 
the  national  Parliaments  and  the  European  Parliament113.  Evaluation  reports  would 
nevertheless be treated as confidential114 and Member States retain the possibility to ask for 
their classification. Secondly, simplified adequacy assessment so that the Commission does 
not  need  to  adopt  a  Communication  to  inform  the  Member  State  and  the  Council  on  its 
assessment  and  progress  made.  Finally,  a  reduced  frequency  of  follow-up  reports  (Article 
16(3)  and  (4)),  by  requiring,  as  a  rule,  a  progress  report  every  six  months  (instead  of  the 
current  three  months),  reducing  the  administrative  burden  both  on  the  Commission  and 
Member States. 

This  option  introduces  shorter  and  additional  (legal)  time  limits  to  structure  procedures 
further,  as  proposed  by  the  majority  of  Member  States  and  European  Parliament.  The 
Regulation would set time limits for all procedural administrative steps, also for intermediary 
steps  such  as  the  drafting  meeting,  reducing  the  length  of  the  process  from  current  10-12 
months to six months at most from the evaluation visit as indicated by a majority of Member 
States115).  The  Regulation  also  refers  to  the  possibility  of  setting  time  limits  for  the 
implementation  of  recommendations  especially  for  serious  deficiencies  (as  the  Court  of 
Auditors requested). 

The  decision-making  process  and  follow-up  procedures  remain  largely  unchanged  (the 
Council  keeps  adopting  recommendations).  As  Option  2  includes  the  operational  measures 
under  Option  1,  the  overall  transparency  of  the  Mechanism  would  improve  through  the 
operational changes indicated in section 5.2. The Commission would also increase reporting 

110  

111  

112  

113  
114  
115  

The majority of Member States (77%) submitted that a more flexible approach in the adjustment of the 
planning  of  evaluations  in  order  to  be  able  to  react  to  evolving  circumstances  would  have  a  positive 
impact.  In  general,  as  explained  by  Member  States  ‘[a]n  evaluation  visit  requires  a  lot  of  advance 
planning and preparation; hence it is important that Member States are given sufficient notice allowing 
them  to  prepare  properly’,  but  ‘[a]  more  flexible  approach  in  this  area  would  allow  to  react  more 
adequately  and  quickly  in  the  light  of  unexpected  circumstances  as  was  this  year  with  the  COVID-19 
pandemic.[…] [M]ore flexibility could help to have more effective and timely unannounced evaluations’. 
It is to recall that Member States are notified of the  unannounced evaluations 24 hours in advance. The 
European Parliament supports any measure that would increase the flexibility and the surprise effect of 
unannounced visits.  
Currently, 
treated  as  EU 
RESTRICTED/RESTREINT UE, which creates many administrative burdens on their handling (also for 
translations) and transmission. 
The European Parliament and NGOs called for wider access to the evaluation reports. 
Particularly in relation to the application of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 on access to document. 
In their replies to the questionnaire, 54% of the Member States indicated that the ideal length would be 
up to six months and 20% up to four months.  

the  Regulation  (Article  17)  requires 

the  evaluation  report 

to  be 

47 

 
                                                           
to  the  Council  and  the  European  Parliament,  which  should  lead  to  increase  pressure  to 
accelerate implementation of remedies.  

To  increase  the  input  of  EU  bodies  and  agencies,  this  option  introduces  a  specific 
coordination  obligation  for  SCH-EVAL  and  a  specific  obligation  to  take  their  findings  and 
actions  into  due  account  for  the  implementation  of  SCH-EVAL.  This  responds  to  the  EU 
bodies / agencies  request  for  clarification  in  the  Regulation  and  it  would  increase  legal 
certainty and the strategic focus in the evaluation’s design which depends fundamentally on 
the  information  provided  but  the  EU  agencies.  This  obligation  could  be  reciprocal,  which 
would  require  that  EU  agencies  have  wider  access  to  information  on  evaluations  directly 
relevant for their respective tasks.  

To  ensure  that  the  size  and  qualification  of  the  evaluation  team  matches  evaluation  needs, 
legislative changes would introduce flexibility to determine the number of experts needed 
per evaluation, as mentioned by Member States and civil society organisations (as opposed 
to  current  provisions  that  set  a  maximum  of  8  experts  and  no  minimum).  The  Commission 
would  indicate  the  team’s  appropriate  composition,  including  optimal  size,  for  each 
evaluation in the call for experts.  

Finally, to increase legal certainty on elements relevant for fundamental rights and highlight 
their prominence and political importance, this option includes targeted legislative changes to 
make an explicit reference in the Regulation to submission of risk analyses by FRA. It also 
strengthens  the  reference  to  fundamental  rights  in  the  provision  on  training  and  includes  a 
specific  provision  in  the  Regulation  regarding  the  use  of  the  evidence  supplied  by  third 
parties.  

Option 2 would also contribute to increase the transparency of the Mechanism. In addition to 
(as per Option 1) better reporting to the European Parliament and Council through the regular 
adoption  of  the  comprehensive  annual  reports,  which  are  public,  it  proposes  the 
declassification  of  the  evaluation  reports  which  may  facilitate  the  circulation  within  the 
European and national Parliaments.  

Table 6 – Overview of Option 2 

Option 2 

Specific 
objectives 
1. Avoid gaps 
and increase 
strategic focus 

 1. Limited strategic 
focus and significant 
fragmentation 
preventing an 
overview of Schengen 

Problems 

Key measures proposed (Option 1 AND) 

Areas of 
intervention 

Scope 
(Driver 1) 

Programming 
(Driver 2) 

Specific evaluations 
design  
(Driver 4) 
Programming 
(Driver 2) 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

Remove legislative elements that lead to 
fragmentation by deleting in Article 4 of the 
Regulation the current reference to the policy 
fields and clarify the flexible scope of the 
evaluations;  
Clarify that EU agencies fall under the 
Mechanism when they carry out executive tasks 
de iure or de facto delegated by Member States 
that qualify as implementation of the Schengen 
acquis; 
Codify the Schengen Committee’s current 
practice of agreeing on the specific policy fields 
at the beginning of the evaluation cycle; 
Specific obligation on the Commission to 
coordinate with EU agencies and monitoring 
mechanisms to increase synergies, avoid overlaps 
and make evaluations more targeted and focused. 
Simplify the procedure for adopting and 
amending the annual programme (i.e. it will be 
more general without so many details, eliminate 
the need of formal amendment of the annual 

48 

2. Rationalise 
the distribution 
of tasks and 
responsibilities, 

2. Insufficient capacity 
to quickly react and 
adapt to new 
circumstances, 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Specific 
objectives 
and simplify 
and accelerate 
process and 
procedures 

Option 2 

Problems 

Key measures proposed (Option 1 AND) 

legislative 
developments and 
trends 

3. Slow adoption and 
implementation of 
remedies 

- 

programme); 
Exclude from the annual programme 
unannounced evaluations so they can be 
programmed and organised with more flexibility, 
and also at shorter notice as needed; 

-  Declassify evaluation reports to allow for quicker 

- 

handling; 
Set up specific timelines for the various steps in 
the procedures for adopting evaluation reports (6 
months from the evaluation visit) and for the 
implementation of the recommendations by the 
evaluated Member States; 

Areas of 
intervention 

Evaluation and 
follow-up 
procedures and 
processes (decision-
making) 
(Driver 3) 

- 

-  Accelerate the communication of the assessment 
of the action plan by removing the obligation to 
adopt a formal Commission Communication in 
the language of procedure; 
Reduce reporting obligations (2 progress reports 
per year instead of 4) and focus more on 
supporting Member Statess in the implementation 
of remedies. 
Exclude from the annual programme 
unannounced evaluations so they can be 
programmed and organised with more flexibility, 
and also at shorter notice if needed.  

- 

- 

- 

- 

-  Make explicit reference in the Regulation to 
submission of risk analyses by FRA; 
Strengthen the reference to fundamental rights in 
the Regulation’s provisions on trainings; 
Include a specific provision in the Regulation 
regarding the use of the evidence supplied by 
third parties. 
Specific obligation to coordinate with EU 
agencies and monitoring mechanism to increase 
synergies, avoid overlaps and make evaluations 
more targeted and focused; 
Introduce flexibility in the size of the evaluation 
and monitoring teams to adapt the teams to the 
needs; 
Create (non-financial) incentives for Member 
State experts to work as evaluators. 

- 

- 

Programming 
(Driver 2) 

Specific evaluations 
design and 
implementation / 
actors involved and 
synergies with other 
instruments 
(Driver 4) 

Specific evaluations 
design and 
implementation / 
actors involved and 
synergies with other 
instruments 
(Driver 4) 

3. Strengthen 
implementation 
of fundamental 
rights 
safeguards 
under the 
Schengen 
acquis 

2. Insufficient capacity 
to quickly react and 
adapt to new 
circumstances, 
particularly violations 
of fundamental rights 
at the external borders 

4. Optimise the 
participation of 
Member State 
experts and the 
involvement of 
EU bodies / 
agencies and 
synergies  

1. Limited strategic 
focus and significant 
fragmentation 
preventing an 
overview of Schengen 

2. Insufficient capacity 
to quickly react and 
adapt to new 
circumstances. 

5.4.  Option 3:  Ambitious legislative changes 

Option  3  presents  a  more  ambitious  approach  that  incorporates  the  operational  and 
legal improvements under Options 1 and 2 combining them with fundamental changes 
to  the  Mechanism’s  design  and  functioning.  This  option  does  away  with  policy-field 
specific evaluations as a rule, favouring  comprehensive Member State evaluations based 
on risk assessment and situational awareness, while opening the possibility for a limited 
extension of the scope of SCH-EVAL beyond the Schengen acquis. However, it increases 
fundamental  rights focus by creating a specific ‘fundamental rights’ evaluation  given the 
shortcomings identified and retaining data protection evaluations as a particular policy field. 
It  also  extends  the  current  five-year  cycle  to  seven  years  to  facilitate  more  flexible  use  of 
available tools, while modifying the conditions and criteria for their use, creating new and 
more  fit-for-purpose  tools.  It  alters  the  current  institutional  balance  in  the  decision-
making  and  follow-up  procedures  and  fundamentally  changes  the  process  to  designate 
Member  State  experts,  creating  a  yearly  permanent  pool  managed  by  the  Commission.  It 
maximises  the  input  and  coordination  with  EU  bodies  and  agencies  and  other  quality 

49 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
control mechanisms.  

The  scope  of  the  Mechanism  would  go  beyond  the  Schengen  acquis  to  cover  ‘all  aspects 
related to the implementation and functioning of Schengen’. However, this enlargement 
would  be  within  the  limits  of  the  evaluations  agreed  under  the  multiannual  and  annual 
programme  (per  the  flexibility  in  Option  2).  The  teams  could  evaluate  provisions  such  as 
Eurodac  Regulation116  or  Prüm  Decision,  as  suggested  by  the  European  Parliament.  This 
approach would necessarily require developing parallel legal acts given Schengen’s variable 
geometry.  This  term  refers  to  the  differentiated  integration  of  the  Member  States  in 
Schengen: the States bound by the Schengen acquis are not the same group of States that are 
bound by provisions under EU law identified also as relevant for the functioning of Schengen 
(e.g. Eurodac Regulation and Prüm Decision). It follows that, for the Mechanism to cover the 
elements  functionally  linked  to  the  Schengen  acquis,  it  would  require  developing  parallel 
legal acts covering non-Schengen aspects. It would be difficult to create a specific legal act 
for a very limited extension of the SCH-EVAL scope beyond the Schengen  acquis without 
discussing  asylum  integration.  A  large  group  of  Member  States  strongly  opposes  this  last 
aspect and it is not coherent with the pending proposal that the new European Union Asylum 
Agency will carry out an evaluation of Member States’ asylum systems.  

This option does away with specific individual policy-field evaluations as a rule (in line 
with  the suggestion by  civil  society organisations117  and the  recommendations  made by the 
European Parliament’s study118). Rather, the Mechanism would carry out comprehensive 
risk-based Member State evaluations covering only the elements identified through risk 
analysis and situational awareness.  All findings would be presented in a single report per 
Member State. However, in the case of fundamental rights, as an alternative to Option 2, this 
option  creates  a  specific  evaluation  focusing  on  fundamental  rights,  disentangling  them 
from  other policy fields.  It also  retains the separate evaluation  on data protection,  given its 
specificity (as preferred by DPAs). Moving to all-encompassing evaluations as per Option 3 
could  be difficult  to  implement  in  practice in  the short-term  as these evaluations imply far-
reaching  changes  in  the  way  they  are  organised  and  carried  out.  In  particular,  it  might  be 
difficult in the short-term to create multidisciplinary teams with the appropriate profiles given 
the high level of specialisation per policy field. 

This  option  also  foresees  the  possibility  to  address  recommendations  directly  to  EU 
agencies  in  relation  to  all  their  executive  tasks  that  qualifies  as  implementation  of  the 
Schengen  acquis.  As  Article  70  of  TFEU  limits  the  evaluations  to  Member  States  only,  it 
would be necessary to amend the founding Regulations of each of the relevant EU agencies, 
through the adoption of  separate legal  acts.  The  adoption of such separate legal  acts  would 
specifically  provide  for  agencies  to  be  subject  to  SCH-EVAL  evaluations.  However, 
amending  the  Regulation  of  the  relevant  EU  agencies  would  be  practically  and  politically 
difficult as some of them have undergone major changes in recent years and, in other cases, 
this  would  require  to  amend  proposals  recently  submitted  at  the  risk  of  delaying  their 

116  
Regulation (EU) 603/2013, OJ L 180, 29.6.2013, p. 1 (‘Eurodac Regulation’). 
117   As indicated by the Meijers Committee during the stakeholders’ consultation. 
118  

The state of play of Schengen governance, p. 76, indicates ‘[…] opportunity to draw broader conclusions 
from evaluations by introducing instruments in the SEMM that allow it to 1) provide a national Schengen 
fitness check covering all Schengen policy fields within a Member State…’. 

50 

 
                                                           
adoption119.  In  addition,  it  could  create  duplications  with  monitoring  activities  already 
foreseen under those Regulations.  

To make the best use of evaluation and monitoring tools, this option changes the conditions 
and criteria and / or the features of available tools to ensure a different use depending on the 
objective. In particular: 

a)  To ensure a systematic use of thematic evaluations, the Regulation includes  criteria 
on  when  a  thematic  evaluation  should  take  place  (reflecting  the  proposals  of 
Member  States,  European  Parliament  and  EU  bodies / agencies).  For  example,  this 
could  be  when  major  legislative  changes  enter  into  force,  to  assess  Member  States 
with similar challenges, or assess a specific issue across relevant policy fields.  

b)  To  increase  the  effectiveness  of  unannounced  visits,  the  Regulation  clarifies  their 
purpose,  i.e.  random  ‘health  check’  or  investigative,  and  the  conditions  to  trigger 
the latter ones, for example a risk analysis by one of the relevant EU agencies or an 
emerging  situation  highlighted  by  reputable  third  parties.  In  support  of  the 
unannounced  character  and  purpose  of  the  visit,  an  advance  notice  to  the  Member 
State (currently 24h notice) should not apply in duly justified cases (e.g. investigative 
visits). This would allow making unannounced evaluations more effective in the case 
of  illegal  refusal  of  entry.  This  solution  balances  also  the  necessity  of  the  ‘surprise 
effect’  with  the  conditions  necessary  for  a  proper  organisation120  and  could  be  a 
reasonable  and  proportionate  compromise  between  the  position  of  the  majority  of 
Member States and the other stakeholders (notably the European Parliament and civil 
society organisations), who urged to refrain from the 24h notice. 

c)  To  increase  the  use  and  efficiency  of  revisits,  the  legal  basis  differentiates  between 
two situations. If an evaluation identifies serious deficiencies, the revisit would focus 
only on those deficiencies (‘serious deficiencies revisits’). In other cases, the revisit 
would  be  limited  to  verifying  the  implementation  of  an  action  plan  (‘verification 
visits’). In this last case, the Commission does not formally adopt an evaluation report 
and the revisit would not trigger new Council recommendations nor require an action 
plan from the Member State. The monitoring team would consist of Commission and 
Member State leading experts and an EU agency observer in the case of verification 
visits.  

As proposed by some Member States and the European Parliament, this option  extends the 
length  of  the  multiannual  evaluation  cycle  to  seven  years  to  make  space  for  a  more 
balanced  use  of  the  different  tools  and  closer  monitoring,  while  absorbing  the  likely 
additional workload required to evaluate more Member States and policy fields in the coming 
years. 

This option combines the streamlining and simplification legislative changes under Option 2 
with a new decision-making procedure that has a significant impact on the length of the 
process  and current institutional  balance.  To respond to  the general  call for speeding up 

119 

Frontex has already undergone two major reforms in the last years and Europol’s mandate is also planned 
to be reformed. 

120   A  Member  State  submitted:  ‘Due  to  organisational  and  logistical  issues  that  may  arose  during 
unannounced  on-site  visits  without  previous  notifications,  ability  to  coordinate  evaluation  team  and 
representatives of local institutions and having in mind possibility  that evaluation team might not gain 
appropriate  required  information  for  certain  reasons,  it  is  important  to  have  24  hours  notifications 
which would not consequently endanger findings on site’. A wide majority of Member States shares this 
view. 

51 

 
                                                           
the  evaluation  process  and  increased  peer-pressure  requested  by  Member  States,  the 
European  Parliament  and  EU  bodies / agencies,  this  option  proposes  that  the  Commission 
adopts  both  the  evaluation  report  and  recommendations  in  a  single  document  using  the 
examination  procedure  (Article  14(5)  and  15(3)).  This  would  ensure  more  clarity  on  the 
causal  link  between  the  findings  in  the  report  and  the  recommendations  while  ensuring 
sufficient Member States involvement in adoption of recommendations (through comitology 
examination procedure). It would further reduce the length of the process (from 6 months in 
Option 2 to 4 months). However, for thematic evaluations, first-time evaluations as well as in 
the  case  of  serious  deficiencies, 
to  adopt 
recommendations and in some cases to close the action plans, to increase peer pressure and 
focus on areas of general interest for the well-functioning of Schengen. Some Member States 
explicitly supported this solution while another group of Member States saw advantages from 
combining  in  a  single  document  evaluation  findings  and  recommendations.  Civil  society 
organisations showed support for the combined adoption of report and recommendations by 
the Commission.  

the  Council  would  retain 

the  power 

In addition, under this option, the Regulation would introduce a fast-track procedure (e.g., 
adoption of the report and recommendations within 2.5 months from the evaluation visit) for 
serious deficiencies, as it is crucial to address deficiencies swiftly in this case as stressed by 
all stakeholders with a significant increased involvement of the Council in the follow-up. 

Furthermore, this option reinforces the Commission’s obligations to report to the Council 
and the European Parliament on progress made in the implementation of recommendations 
by  each  Member  State,  thus  responding  to  the  Parliament’s  call  for  better  reporting  and 
information exchange. It also encourages the Council to issue yearly conclusions based on the 
annual  SCHEVAL  report.  The  Council’s  role  in  the  follow  up  overall  will  also  be 
significantly increased particularly in cases where Member States are not making progress in 
the implementation of the action plans.  

As  to  the  participation  of  EU  agencies / bodies,  under  this  Option,  the  Commission 
requires  all  relevant  EU  agencies / bodies  to  provide  more  comprehensive  information  not 
limited  to  risk  analysis  but  including  also  ‘other  relevant  information  for  situational 
awareness’  with  increased  frequency  (before  the  annual  programme  and  one  month  before 
each evaluation mission). The Commission would maintain the possibility to address specific 
requests  as  needed.  This  would  improve  preparation  of  evaluations  and  experts’  situational 
awareness  of  the  evaluated  country.  The  Regulation  would  require  reducing  the  risk  of 
duplications  between  different  evaluation  mechanisms  by  requiring  coordination  to 
strengthen synergies and prevent overlapping or conflicting recommendations. 

Finally, in addition to the flexibility in the teams’ size, additional training, and non-financial 
incentives (Option 2), Option 3 introduces a different process to select experts as proposed 
by  several  Member  States  already  in  2019.  This  option  includes  an  annual  call  for  experts 
covering  all  evaluations  combined  with  Member  States’  obligation  to  designate  one  expert 
per  policy  field,  while  taking  into  account  the  different  sizes  and  capacities  of  the 
administrations,  and  the  need  for  a  variety  of  profiles.  Based  on  the  designation,  the 
Commission would build and manage a pool of experts that it would use to designate experts 
for evaluations while ensuring geographical balance and rotation. If there were no sufficient 
experts  with  the  right  profile,  the  Commission  would  launch  a  targeted  call.  During  the 
consultation,  the  majority  of  Member  States,  EU  bodies / agencies  and  DPAs / EPDS 
supported the establishment of a pool of experts. In addition, the European Parliament’s study 

52 

 
recommended building an expert pool for evaluation experts in the various Schengen policy 
areas121. 

Table 7 – Overview of Option 3 

Option 3 

Specific 
objectives 
1. Avoid gaps 
and increase 
strategic focus 

 1. Limited strategic 
focus and significant 
fragmentation 
preventing an 
overview of Schengen 

Problems 

Key measures proposed (Option 2 AND) 

Extend the scope to Schengen issues that do not 
strictly qualify as implementation of the Schengen 
acquis & introduce the possibility to addressed 
recommendations to EU agencies;  
Eliminate fragmentation by carrying out a single 
evaluation per Member State solely based on risk 
analysis and situational awareness (except for 
fundamental rights and data protection which 
would be evaluated separately); 
Extend cycle to 7 years for more balanced and 
strategic use of evaluation and monitoring tools; 
Focus Council’s decision-making powers on 
politically relevant cases;  
Request risk analysis updates from EU 
agencies / bodies for more focused evaluations 
and better react to new challenges in Member 
States; 
Clarify criteria for thematic evaluations to 
increase their use. 
Clarify criteria and conditions to use thematic and 
unannounced evaluations and revisits in line with 
their objective & eliminate the 24h advance notice 
for ‘investigative’ unannounced evaluations; 
Combine the adoption by the Commission of 
evaluation report and recommendations, further 
introduce a time limit for the adoption of the 
report of 4 months from the evaluation visit. For 
thematic evaluations and in cases of serious 
deficiencies and political important cases the 
Council would retain possibility to adopt the 
recommendations and be more involved in 
follow-up phase to increase peer-pressure and 
thus accelerate the implementation of remedies by 
the Member State concerned; 
Introduce a fast track procedure for the adoption 
of the reports and recommendations in case of 
serious deficiencies (2.5. month from the 
evaluation visit); 
Reinforce Commission’s obligations to report to 
the Council and the European Parliament on 
progress made in the implementation of 
recommendations by Member States & Council to 
issue yearly conclusions based on the annual 
SCHEVAL report. 
Introduce a specific evaluation focusing on the 
implementation of fundamental rights safeguards 
under the Schengen acquis; 
Eliminate the 24h advance notice for 
‘investigative’ unannounced evaluations. 

Areas of 
intervention 

Scope 
(Driver 1) 

Decision-making 
(Driver 3) 
Specific evaluations 
design (Driver 4) 
Evaluation and 
monitoring tools 
(Driver 2) 

Evaluation and 
monitoring tools 
(Driver 2) 

Evaluation and 
follow-up 
procedures and 
processes (decision-
making) 
(Driver 3) 

Scope 
(Driver 1) 

Introduce one single call for experts per year with 
an obligation on Member States to designate 1 

Specific evaluations 
design and 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

2. Rationalise 
the distribution 
of tasks and 
responsibilities, 
and simplify 
and accelerate 
process and 
procedures 

2. Insufficient capacity 
to quickly react and 
adapt to new 
circumstances, 
legislative 
developments and 
trends, particularly 
violations of 
fundamental rights at 
the external borders 

3. Slow adoption and 
implementation of 
remedies 

3. Strengthen 
implementation 
of fundamental 
rights 
safeguards 
under the 
Schengen 
acquis 
4. Optimise the 
participation of 

2. Insufficient capacity 
to quickly react and 
adapt to new 
circumstances, 
particularly violations 
of fundamental rights 
at the external borders 

1. Limited strategic 
focus and significant 

121  

The state of play of Schengen governance, p. 75.  

53 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Specific 
objectives 
Member State 
experts and the 
involvement of 
EU bodies and 
agencies and 
synergies with 
other 
instruments 

Option 3 

Problems 

Key measures proposed (Option 2 AND) 

fragmentation 
preventing an 
overview of Schengen 

2. Insufficient capacity 
to quickly react and 
adapt to new 
circumstances, 
legislative 
developments and 
trends. 

- 

- 

expert per policy field per year; 
Create a pool of experts managed by the 
Commission for choosing experts according to the 
needs of the specific evaluation or monitoring 
activity, including emerging issues and 
announced visits; 
Request risk analysis updates from EU 
agencies / bodies for more focused evaluations 
and better react to new challenges in Member 
States and increase coordination /  synergies with 
EU bodies / agencies. 

5.5.  Option 4: Combined approach 

Areas of 
intervention 

implementation / the 
actors involved and 
synergies with other 
instruments 
(Driver 4) 

Option 4 is a combination of measures envisaged under the three options, depending on 
the  intervention  area  and  the  level  of  ambition.  It  presents  operational  measures  and 
legislative  changes  that  would  contribute  to  an  extremely  flexible,  yet  legally  certain, 
Mechanism, which would easily adapt to future challenges and opportunities.  

Based on stakeholders’ positions (as indicated in the presentation of the three other options), 
and  taking  into  account  the  legal  and  operational  obstacles  that  some  of  the  options  face, 
Option  4  combines  measures  under  the  previous  options,  depending  on  the  area  of 
intervention. 

As to the scope of evaluations, Option 4 keeps the current scope covering all aspects of the 
Schengen  acquis.  However,  it  removes  legislative  elements  that  lead  to  fragmentation  by 
deleting  in  Article  4  of  the  Regulation  the  current  reference  to  the  policy  fields.  It  also 
clarifies the flexible scope of the evaluations as per Option 2. By removing the specific policy 
fields  to  be  evaluated,  this  option  allows  the  Mechanism  to  quickly  adapt  to  the  dynamic 
nature of the Schengen acquis. In addition, this option adapts the priorities (policy fields) to 
the new realities and actors (covering EU agencies’ activities delegated by Member States) 
and  introduces  a  more  flexible  programming  (as  per  Option  2)  for  defining  the  policy 
priorities  of  the  cycle  and  the  articulation  of  evaluations.  This  option  has  the  advantage  of 
creating  a  flexible  legislative  framework  for  programming  and  defining  priorities  for  each 
cycle. The option adapts the rules on the multiannual and annual programming to be able to 
react faster to emerging problems and challenges, and to allow operating the Mechanism in a 
more  efficient  manner.  As  specific  evaluations  become  more  and  more  targeted,  given  that 
risk analyses improve with the changes proposed (see below), this option could achieve the 
same  objectives  as  those  under  Option  3  in  the medium  term.  The  new flexible  framework 
allows, for example, to carry out a single evaluation per Member State covering all relevant 
policy areas with a single evaluation report, or to evaluate at the same time several Member 
States facing the same challenges. To increase strategic focus and allow for a more balanced 
and  strategic  use  of  all  available  evaluation  and  monitoring  tools,  including  closer 
monitoring, this option extends the evaluation cycle to seven years (as per Option 3). 

As  to  the  monitoring  and  evaluation  tools,  Option  4  proposes  ambitious  legislative 
changes to broaden the range of tools available and clarify the criteria  and conditions 
for  their  use,  as  per  Option  3:  systematic  thematic  evaluations,  two  types  of  unannounced 
visits  with  or  without  24h  notice  depending  on  the  purpose  (‘random  health  check’  or 
‘investigative’),  and  two  types  of  revisits  (‘serious  deficiencies  revisits’  and  ‘verification 
revisits’). This approach found broad support among stakeholders. The only disputed element 
could be changes to unannounced visits. Member States seem less keen to eliminate the 24h 

54 

 
 
advance notice but the European Parliament and civil society organisations have strong views 
about  it.  This  option,  as  Option  3,  is  a  compromise  that  looks  into  the  purpose  of  the 
unannounced visit to determine whether the 24h advance notice would be justified. 

As to the decision-making procedures and follow up, Option 4 proposes amendments to 
accelerate  processes  and  simplify  procedures  (as  per  Option  2)  as  well  as  ambitious 
legislative  changes  to  modify  the  decision-making  process,  altering  the  current 
institutional  balance  so  that  the  Commission  would  adopt  both  the  evaluation  report  and 
recommendations  as  a  rule  while  increasing  the  role  of  the  Council  in  most  politically 
relevant  cases  (e.g.  serious  deficiencies,  thematic  evaluations  and  first  time  evaluations122) 
and follow-up, and creating fast-track procedures for serious deficiencies (as per Option 3).  

Acceleration  and  simplification  measures  found  broad  support  among  stakeholders.  As  to 
decision-making,  while  only  few  Member  States  support  explicitly  the  Commission’s 
empowerment  to  adopt  both  reports  and  recommendations,  several  Member  States  see  the 
advantage  of  having  findings  and  recommendations  in  a  single  document  and  focusing  the 
Council’s work on peer pressure and on areas of general interest for the well functioning of 
the  Schengen  are.  This  option  would  attain  those  objectives.  It  combines  the  simplification 
foreseen in  Option  2 with a realignment and strengthening of the roles of both  the Council 
and the European Parliament as per Option 3, and that would also help increase the strategic 
focus  of  the  Mechanism.  Overall,  the  Option  4 would  reduce  the  current  length  of  the  first 
phase of the evaluation procedure (see Annex 3) from the current 12 months to 4-6 months 
(ordinary procedure) and from the current 12 months to 2.5 months (for fast-track procedure 
in the case of serious deficiencies).  

As to Member State expert’s participation, Option 4 proposes ambitious legal amendments 
to  fundamentally  change  the  process  to  designate  experts,  creating  a  yearly  permanent 
pool managed by the Commission (as per Option 3) while increasing flexibility in the size 
of  the  teams  (as  per  Option  2)  and  increasing  non-financial  incentives  for  participation 
(as per Option  1). As to  the EU bodies and agencies’ involvement, this  option maximises 
the  input  and  coordination  with  EU  agencies  and  bodies  and  other  quality  control 
mechanisms by improved risk analyses (as described in Option 1), enhanced coordination 
and situational awareness reports (as per Option 2) and strengthened coordination with 
new  legal  obligations  (as  per  Option  3).  These  measures  found  broad  support  among 
stakeholders. 

Concerning  fundamental  rights  integration  into  SCH-EVAL,  the  Option  4  introduces 
legislative  changes  to  increase  legal  certainty  on  elements  relevant  for  fundamental 
rights  and  highlight  their  prominence  and  political  importance  as  per  Option  2.  To 
summarise, include a reference to the regular submission of risk analyses by FRA, strengthen 
the reference to fundamental rights in the provision on trainings, increase FRA participation 
in evaluation visits, and include a specific provision regarding the use of evidence provided 
by third parties. These measures found broad support among stakeholders. 

122  

‘Serious deficiency’ means one or more deficiencies identified during an evaluation  which concern the 
effective application of key elements of the Schengen acquis, and which individually or in combination, 
have,  or  risk  to  have  over  time,  a  significant  negative  impact  on  the  rights  of  individuals  or  on  the 
functioning  of  the  Schengen  area.  ‘First  time  evaluation’  means  an  evaluation  to  verify  whether  a 
Member State bound by the Schengen acquis and for which internal border controls have not been lifted 
fulfils the conditions to apply the Schengen acquis in full or, in the case of a Member State not bound by 
the  Schengen acquis and that has opted in to apply parts of the Schengen acquis, to verify whether the 
Member State fulfils the conditions to apply the Schengen acquis in part.  

55 

 
                                                           
Table 8 – Overview of Option 4 

Specific 
objectives 
1. Avoid gaps 
and increase 
strategic focus 

Areas of 
intervention 

Scope 
(Driver 1) 

Programming & 
Evaluation and 
monitoring tools 
(Driver 2) 

Option 4 

Problems 

Key measures proposed 

 1. Limited strategic 
focus and significant 
fragmentation 
preventing an 
overview of Schengen 

-  Keep the current scope covering all aspects of the 
Schengen acquis, and remove legislative elements 
that lead to fragmentation by deleting in Article 4 
of the Regulation the current reference to the 
policy fields and clarify the flexible scope of the 
evaluations (to cover EU-agencies) as per Option 
2; 

-  Adapt the policy fields to the new realities (as per 

- 

- 

- 

Option 1); 
Codify the Schengen Committee’s current 
practice of agreeing on the specific policy fields 
at the beginning of the evaluation cycle and a 
more flexible programming (as per Option 2);  
Extend the duration of the evaluation cycle to 
seven years (as per Option 3); 
Broaden the range of tools available and clarify 
the criteria and conditions for their use (as per 
Option 3); 

2. Rationalise 
the distribution 
of tasks and 
responsibilities, 
and simplify 
and accelerate 
process and 
procedures 

2. Insufficient capacity 
to quickly react and 
adapt to new 
circumstances, 
legislative 
developments and 
trends, particularly 
violations of 
fundamental rights at 
the external borders 

3. Slow adoption and 
implementation of 
remedies 

3. Strengthen 
the 
implementation 
of fundamental 
rights 
safeguards 
under the 
Schengen 
acquis 

2. Insufficient capacity 
to quickly react and 
adapt to new 
circumstances, 
particularly violations 
of fundamental rights 
at the external borders 

4. Optimise the 
participation of 
Member State 
experts and the 
involvement of 
EU bodies and 
agencies and 

1. Limited strategic 
focus and significant 
fragmentation 
preventing an 
overview of Schengen 
2. Insufficient capacity 
to quickly react and 

- 

- 

- 

-  Maximise the input and coordination with EU 
agencies and bodies and other quality control 
mechanisms by improved risk analyses / 
situational awareness and progressively move 
towards risk-based evaluations (as per Option 3). 
Introduce more flexible programming and exclude 
unannounced visits from programme (as per 
Option 2),  
Introduce amendments to accelerate processes and 
simplify procedures, i.e. declassification of 
evaluation reports, time limits (as per Option 2); 
Broaden the range of tools available and clarify 
the criteria and conditions for their use (as per 
Option 3); 
Introduce the adoption of evaluation reports and 
recommendations by the Commission while 
focusing the Council decision-making powers on 
most politically relevant cases (as per Option 3); 
Fast-track procedure in case of serious 
deficiencies (as per Option 3); 
Reinforce Commission’s obligations to report to 
the Council and the European Parliament on 
progress made (as per Option 3). 
-  All measures under Options 1 and 2; 
- 
Eliminate the 24h advance notice for 
‘investigative’ unannounced evaluations (as per 
Option 3). 

- 

- 

- 

-  All measures under Options 1, 2 and 3. 

56 

Programming & 
Evaluation and 
monitoring tools 
(Driver 2) 

Decision-making  
(Driver 4) 

Programming & 
Evaluation and 
monitoring tools 
(Driver 2) 

Specific evaluations 
design and 
implementation / 
actors involved and 
synergies with other 
instruments 
(Driver 4) 
Specific evaluations 
design and 
implementation / the 
actors involved and 
synergies with other 
instruments 
(Driver 4) 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Option 4 

Key measures proposed 

Areas of 
intervention 

Specific 
objectives 
synergies with 
other 
instruments 

Problems 

adapt to new 
circumstances, 
legislative 
developments and 
trends 

5.6.  Policy options discarded at an early stage 

The Commission did not consider at any stage replacing SCH-EVAL by a different type of 
mechanism without the involvement of Member States and their experts. All stakeholders and 
the five-year review stressed the merit of the Mechanism in its current form in this respect.  

At an early stage, the Commission discarded other options as non-viable alternatives. 

Any options implying a significant widening of the Mechanism’s scope (such as including 
comprehensive  evaluations  of  the  asylum  systems)  do  not  appear  workable.  First  and 
foremost,  SCH-EVAL  with  its  peer-to-peer  approach  is  a  lex  specialis  compared  to  the 
general role of overseeing the proper implementation of the EU law which is a role attributed 
to  the  Commission  as  ‘Guardian  of  the  Treaties’.  This  naturally  implies  a  certain  prudence 
when it comes to reconsidering the scope of the Mechanism. Because of Schengen’s variable 
geometry, the extension to areas not belonging to the Schengen acquis would also require the 
adoption of a separate legal act. The core of this initiative, as explained in the introduction, is 
to strengthen Schengen Governance and the implementation of the Schengen acquis needs to 
remain the focus of SCH-EVAL. Widening the scope to new policy fields at this stage ‘could 
make the system more complicated and less easy to manage’, as indicated by a Member State. 
Politically a solid group  of Member States clear  oppose a comprehensive integration of the 
asylum  systems.  This  possibility  would  also  not  be  coherent  with  the  proposal  to  set  up  a 
fully-fledged  European  Union  Agency  for  Asylum  with  the  relevant  competence  for 
monitoring the implementation of the asylum acquis by Member States123.  

A  further  option  discarded  at  an  early  stage  is  a  complete  abolishment  of  the  evaluation 
cycle, to carry out evaluations on a need basis. Several Member States submitted that it is key 
to maintain certain guarantees of transparency and predictability about each Member State's 
evaluation.  The  cycle  seems 
the  easiest  and  most  straightforward  option. 
Comprehensive evaluations help exchange good practices and contribute to the development 
of  the  Schengen acquis.  A  stakeholder  noticed  that  ‘[t]he  cyclical  nature  of  evaluations 
remains  pertinent,  as  this  can  constitute  a  driving  force  for  change  in  the  Member  State’. 
Regular  evaluations  create  an  additional  incentive  for  Member  States  to  bring  about 
improvements. 

to  be 

123  

COM(2016) 271 final of 4.5.2016 and COM/2018/633 final of 12.9.2018. 

57 

 
                                                           
Option 1 

Operational changes 

Option 2 

Option 3 

Targeted legislative changes (and 
measures proposed by Option 1) 

Ambitious legislative changes (and measures 
proposed by Option 2) 

Option 4 

Combined approach 

Table 9 – Synopsis of the policy options and key measures 

Specific 
Objectives 

1. 

Avoid gaps in the 
evaluation 
findings and 
increase strategic 
focus 

• 

and 

IT-systems) 

• Adapt the areas of the Schengen acquis 
to be evaluated to current priorities (e.g., 
Reduce 
including 
fragmentation  by  merging  policy  fields 
(e.g. police cooperation and SIS) • More 
strategic 
flexible 
announced 
evaluations  by 
focusing  on  critical 
elements  and  making  better  use  of 
improved  risk  analysis  •  Adopt 
the 
annual  SCH-EVAL  report  to  have  an 
overview of Schengen • Increase political 
dialogue  using  as  a  basis  the  annual 
report 

• Simplification of the procedural steps • 
Informal  time  benchmarks  for  all  steps 
and  higher 
frequency  of  Schengen 
Committee  •  Improve  follow-up  (by 
increasing the use of online / IT tools) 

2. 

Rationalise the 
roles and 
distribution of 
responsibilities 
and simplify 
processes and 
procedures 

the 

they 

•  Codify 

implementation  of 

• Delete in Article 4 of the Regulation the 
reference  to  the  policy  fields  and  clarify 
the  flexible  scope  of  the  evaluations  • 
Clarify  that  EU  agencies  fall  under  the 
Mechanism  when 
carry  out 
executive  tasks  de  iure  or  de  facto 
delegated  by  Member  States  that  qualify 
the  Schengen 
as 
acquis 
Schengen 
Committee’s  practice  of  agreeing  on  the 
policy  fields  at  the  beginning  of  the 
evaluation 
to 
coordinate  with  EU  agencies  and 
monitoring  mechanisms 
increase 
synergies,  avoid  overlaps  and  make 
evaluations more targeted and focused 
• Simplify the procedure for adopting and 
• 
amending 
Exclude 
programming 
unannounced  evaluations  •  Declassify 
evaluation  reports  •  Set  up  timelines  for 
the  steps  for  adopting  evaluation  reports 
(6  months  from  visit)  and  for 
the 
implementation of the recommendations  

the  annual  programme 
from 

cycle•  Obligation 

the 

to 

•  Improve  follow-up  (by  increasing  the 
use of online / IT tools, i.e.  bilateral VCs 
with  Member  States)  •  Increase  peer-
pressure to accelerate the implementation 
of remedies by adopting the annual SCH-
EVAL  report  including  an  overview  of 

• Set up timelines for the implementation 
of the recommendations •  Accelerate the 
assessment of the action plan (no need of 
Commission  Communication)  •  Reduce 
reporting  obligations  (2  progress  reports 
per year instead of 4) and focus more on 

58 

introduce 

situational  awareness 

• Extend the scope to Schengen issues that 
do not strictly qualify as implementation of 
the 
the  Schengen acquis  & 
possibility  to  address  recommendations  to 
EU agencies when evaluated • Carry out a 
single  evaluation  per  Member  State  based 
on  risk  analysis  and  situational  awareness 
(except  for  fundamental  rights  and  data 
protection  which  would  be  evaluated 
separately)•  Extend  cycle  to  seven  years  •  
Focus  Council’s  powers  on  politically 
relevant  cases  and  increase  its  role  in 
follow  up  •  Request  risk  analysis  updates 
and 
from  EU 
agencies  /  bodies  •  Clarify  criteria  for 
thematic evaluations  
•  Clarify  criteria  and  conditions  of 
thematic,  unannounced  evaluations  and 
revisits • Eliminate the 24h advance notice 
for 
unannounced 
evaluations • Adoption by the Commission 
of  evaluation  report  and  recommendations 
•    Time  limit  for  adoption  of  evaluation 
report  of  4  months  from  visit  •  Focus  the 
Council’s decision-making role on political 
important  cases  •  Introduce  a  fast  track 
procedure  for  the  adoption  of  the  reports 
and  recommendations  in  case  of  serious 
deficiencies (2.5. month from visit)  
•  Set  up  timelines  for  the  implementation 
of  the  recommendations  by  the  evaluated 
MS  •  Reinforce  Commission’s  obligations 
to  report  to  the  Council  and  the  European 
Parliament  on  progress  made 
the 
implementation  of  recommendations  by 

‘investigative’ 

in 

All measures under Option 1 and 2 
•  Extend  the duration  of  the  evaluation  cycle 
to seven years (as Option 3) 
•  Broaden  the  range  of  tools  available  and 
clarify  the  criteria  and  conditions  for  their 
use, including thematic evaluations (as Option 
3) 
•  Maximise  the  input  and  coordination  with 
EU  agencies  and  bodies  and  other  quality 
control  mechanisms,  progressively  moving 
towards risk-based evaluations (as Option 3) 
•  Request  risk  analysis  updates  from  EU 
agencies / bodies and situational awareness. 
•    Focus  Council’s  decision-making  powers 
on  politically  relevant  cases  and  increase  its 
role in follow up (as Option 3)  
 All measures under Option 1, 2 and 3 

All measures under Option 1, 2 and 3 

 
 
 
Specific 
Objectives 

Option 1 

Operational changes 

Option 2 

Option 3 

Targeted legislative changes (and 
measures proposed by Option 1) 

Ambitious legislative changes (and measures 
proposed by Option 2) 

Option 4 

Combined approach 

on 

based 

Member  States  &  Council  to  issue  yearly 
conclusions 
annual 
SCHEVAL report 
•  Dedicated  evaluations  for  fundamental 
rights  •  Eliminate  the  24h  notice  for 
‘investigative’ unannounced evaluations  

the 

All measures under Option 1 and 2 
•  Eliminate  the  24h  notice  for  ‘investigative’ 
unannounced evaluations (as per  Option 3) 

•  Introduce  one  single  call  for  experts  per 
year with an obligation on MS to designate 
1 expert per policy field per year • Create a 
pool  of 
the 
Commission  
•  Request  risk  analysis  updates  from  EU 
agencies / bodies and increase coordination 
with EU bodies / agencies 

experts  managed  by 

 All measures under Option 1, 2 and 3  

 All measures under Option 1, 2 and 3  

MS state of play in the implementation of 
recommendations 

support  Member 
implementation of remedies 

States 

in 

the 

3.  

Strengthen the 
implementation 
of fundamental 
rights safeguards 
under the 
Schengen acquis 

4.  

Optimise the 
participation of 
MS experts and 
the involvement 
of EU bodies and 
agencies 

 •  Increase  the  involvement  of  FRA  in 
evaluations,  and  invite  FRA  to  provide 
observers in external borders evaluations 
/  visits  •  Make  wider  use  of  FRA 
guidelines  and  third-party  information  • 
Incorporate  fundamental  rights  elements 
in all trainings 

by 

for 

designations 

•  Call 
the 
Commission  made  as  early  as  possible  • 
Improved  training  and  incorporate  new 
legislative developments • Introduce non-
financial incentives for experts 
• Increase the use of information gathered 
by  EU  bodies  and  agencies  and  relevant 
third  parties  •  Revise  scope  of  risk 
analysis  and  increase  their  request  • 
Improve synergies with VA of Frontex 

from 

•  Exclude 
the  programming 
unannounced evaluations • Make explicit 
reference in the Regulation to submission 
of  risk  analyses  by  FRA•  Strengthen  the 
in 
reference 
fundamental 
to 
legislative  provisions  on 
trainings  • 
Include  a  provision  in  the  Regulation 
regarding evidence by third parties 
•  Introduce  flexibility  in  the  size  of  the 
evaluation and monitoring teams 

rights 

•  Specific  obligation  to  coordinate  with 
EU agencies and monitoring mechanism  

59 

 
 
 
6.  WHAT ARE THE IMPACTS OF THE POLICY OPTIONS? 

This initiative is expected to have a positive impact on the application and functioning of 
the  Schengen   acquis  and  trust  among  Member  States.  By  contributing  to  the  well-
functioning of the Schengen area, the range of the initiative’s potential indirect impacts 
on  the  life  of  citizens  is  very  wide,  including  positive  economic  and  social  impacts  as 
well as a positive impact on the respect of fundamental rights. In addition, the initiative 
has  secondary  yet  direct  and  appreciable  impacts  on  a  restricted  circle  of  stakeholders 
directly  affected  by  SCH-EVAL,  which  includes  Member  States,  Commission  and 
selected EU bodies and agencies124.  

The assessment of the size of the impacts of the initiative is however challenging.  

The impact of a more effective SCH-EVAL on a better functioning of Schengen, which 
is  at  the  core  of  this  initiative,  is  only  indirect.  It  depends  eventually  on  the  expected 
positive  impact  of  the  material  rules  building  the  Schengen  acquis  on  the  well-
functioning  of  Schengen.  It  would  be  outside  the  scope  of  this  Impact  Assessment  to 
evaluate  the  benefits  of  the  Schengen  acquis  as  such  and  even  highly  speculative  to 
measure  SCH-EVAL’s  contribution  to  the  correct  implementation  of  the  Schengen 
acquis.  

Direct  benefits  for,  and  costs  on,  stakeholders  immediately  involved  in  SCH-
EVAL’s  functioning  are  as  such  easier  to  identify  but  are  very  fragmented.  Most 
benefits highlighted by the stakeholders concerned (e.g. training of experts) are by nature 
not  quantifiable  and  difficult  to  include  under  a  specific  category.  As  to  the 
administrative  and  financial  costs,  neither  European  Union  nor  national  law  obliges  to 
collect data and the stakeholders concerned were unable to provide comprehensive data 
covering all aspects.  

An  additional  limitation  is  due  however  to  the  fact  that  the  initiative  introduces  more 
flexibility and a risk-based approach. This means that the material implementation of the 
new provisions may vary depending on several variables. While it is for instance possible 
to forecast with a certain confidence the cost savings for announced periodic evaluations, 
there are no sufficient elements to predict additional costs of an increased number of ad-
hoc  evaluations  (i.e.  unannounced  and  thematic  evaluations,  revisit  and  verification 
visits).  In  a  best-case  scenario,  it  will  be  possible  to  limit  the  number  of  ad-hoc 
evaluations and in general ad-hoc evaluations are less expensive. Yet ad-hoc evaluations 
are by nature not standardised and their use will be asymmetric. Hence, it cannot be ruled 
out that there may be only limited cost savings for some Member States. 

6.1.  Economic impact  

By  strengthening  the  Schengen  area,  this  initiative  is  expected  to  have  a  positive 
economic  impact.  The  creation  of  an  area  without  internal  border  controls  has  brought 
major economic benefits to citizens and business alike, including small and medium size 
enterpresises (SMEs). The instability of the Schengen area would deprive citizens of the 
huge benefits, including economic ones, deriving from the exercise of their right to free 

124 

The  functioning  of  SCH-EVAL  directly  affects  also  the  European  Parliament  and  occasionally 
certain  third  parties  (NGOs  and  International  Organisations),  but  do  not  generate  any  appreciable 
costs. Some of the options include a wider participation of the European Parliament in the follow-up 
and  of  third  parties  notably  in  relation  to  fundamental  rights  protection,  which  can  be  seen  as 
beneficial  for  these  actors,  while  there  are  no  additional  obligations  for  these  actors.  Similarly 
certain  activities  generate  benefits  and  costs  for  the  Council.  Overall,  the  impact  for  Council, 
Parliament and third parties is however negligible. Therefore, it is not further assessed below. 

60 

 
                                                           
movement  (which  is  one  of  the  most  cherished  accomplishment  of  the  European 
integration), but it would also have severe consequences on the functioning of the Single 
Market in general. In the past, the Commission estimated that the full re-introduction of 
border  controls  to  monitor  the  movement  of  people  within  the  Schengen  area  would 
generate immediate direct costs for the EU economy in a range between EUR 5 and EUR 
18 billion annually125.  

All  policy  options  have  a  positive  economic  impact,  by  increasing  the  effective 
implementation  of  the  Schengen  acquis,  although  it  is  not  possible  to  quantify  this 
impact. 

6.2. 

Social Impact  

By  contributing  to  a  well-functioning  Schengen  area,  the  initiative  is  expected  to  have 
indirectly a positive social impact. An effective implementation of the Schengen acquis 
facilitates the exercise by EU citizens as well as non-EU citizens legally present on the 
territory  of  their  freedom  of  movement  and  residence  in  the  EU.  There  are  1.7  million 
workers in the EU crossing a border every day to go to their jobs. Border controls at the 
internal borders would cost commuters and other travellers between EUR 1.3 and EUR 
5.2  billion  in  terms  of  time  lost.  More  importantly,  long  waits  at  the  border  would 
discourage  people  from  looking  for  cross-border  opportunities  in  the  labour  market, 
reducing  the  pool  of  potential  workers.  In  the  same  vein,  the  common  visa  policy 
facilitates legitimate travel to the entire Schengen area by avoiding the need for travellers 
to  apply  for  visas  to  the  individual  Member  States.  This  helps  business,  tourism  and 
social contacts, while at the same time mitigating migratory and security risks126.  

An effective implementation of the Schengen acquis fosters the security of the Schengen 
area, ensuring the respect of fundamental rights obligations. For this aim, Member States 
facilitate cooperation among the national  law enforcement authorities in  order to  tackle 
organised  cross-border  crime  and  terrorism.  Therefore,  it  is  necessary  to  ensure  the 
continuous and efficient exchange of information between authorities so as not to put in 
jeopardy the judicial and police cooperation that has become one of the key elements of 
added-value  arising  from  the  Schengen  area.  This  exchange  of  information  has  to  be 
carried out in line with the personal data protection legislation. In addition, consistent and 
efficient  implementation  of  the  return  acquis  is  necessary  to  ensure  the  capacity  of  the 
asylum  system  to  provide  the  necessary  support  to  persons  seeking  protection  from 
persecution  or  serious  harm  and  to  ensure  the  integrity  of  the  overall  EU  migration 
policies. Moreover, harmonised implementation of the common rules at external borders 
and at consulates, when processing short-stay visa applications, contribute to security to a 
large extent. 

All policy options have a positive impact on social rights, by increasing the effective 
implementation  of  the  Schengen  acquis,  although  it  is  not  possible  to  quantify  this 
impact. 

6.3. 

Impact on fundamental rights 

Strengthening  the  respect  and  effective  enforcement  of  fundamental  rights  is  one 
objective of the initiative. One of the areas evaluated with this Mechanism is the respect 
for  the  fundamental  right  to  protection  of  personal  data.  In  addition,  although  the 
Mechanism  was  not  established  with  the  primary  objective  to  monitor  the  respect  of 

125 
126 

COM(2016) 120 final of 4.3.2016, p. 3. 
See COM(2016) 120 final. 

61 

 
                                                           
fundamental  rights,  it  contributes  to  the  respect  for  all  relevant  fundamental  rights 
obligations in the implementation of the Schengen acquis and to the compliance with the 
EU  Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights.  The  Mechanism  is  used  to  check  if  there  are  any 
backward  steps  regarding  the  effective  implementation  of  the  fundamental  rights 
protection by Member States or to identify possible violations in the areas covered by the 
Mechanism. By strengthening the Mechanism, the proposal would have a positive impact 
on continuing to guarantee the fundamental rights’ protection. 

All policy options have a positive impact on fundamental rights’ protection, although 
it is not possible to quantify this impact. Horizontal measures under the four options, by 
increasing the effectiveness of SCH-EVAL evaluations, would also strengthen evaluation 
in the field of protection of personal data and the evaluation of elements already assessed 
in  the  different  policy  fields.  In  addition,  one  specific  objective  of  this  initiative  is  to 
integrate  better  the  protection  of  fundamental  rights  by  addressing  the  gap  of  the 
Mechanism in relation to the identification of specific violations occurring at the external 
borders. This aspect will be further assessed as part of the effectiveness of the initiative.  

6.4.  Administrative costs 

This  section  describes  the  main  impact  of  the  four  policy  options  on  the  benefits  and 
costs of the stakeholders more immediately concerned by the initiative, namely Member 
States, Commission and EU bodies and agencies.  

to 

the  overall  economic 

Arguably,  in  absolute  terms,  such  benefits  and  costs  are  only  secondary  and  relatively 
small  compared 
impact  of  SCH-EVAL.  The  correct 
implementation of certain provisions may have an economic impact of many millions. It 
is sufficient to consider the negative impact that longer waiting times for obtaining a visa 
or at the external borders due to shortage of staff may have on tourism. The operational 
costs  of  SCH-EVAL  amount  overall  to  only  few  millions.  Yet,  such  costs  are  not 
negligible  for  the  actors  concerned,  often  small  administrations.  Reducing  the 
administrative burden on the actors involved is also a pre-condition for a more effective 
use  of  SCH-EVAL  under  the  assumption  that  resources  cannot  be  increased.  The 
objective  of  the  initiative  is  to  do  more  with  current  resources  by  optimising  their  use. 
Therefore the assessment of the impact of the different options on the costs of the actors 
involved in running SCH-EVAL is key in the architecture of the initiative and needs to 
be accordingly factored in in the assessment of the efficiency of the different options. 

Compared to the baseline scenario, all options would have on balance an overall positive 
effect  both  in  terms  of  increased  benefits  and  costs  reduction.  The  impact  on  the 
administrative  costs  is  summarised  in  the  Table  10  and  further  explained  below  and  in 
further details in Annex 4. 

Table 10 – Impact on administrative costs – Comparison of policy options 

  Impacts assessed 

Baseline 

Option 1  Option 2  Option 3 

Option 4 

Administrative costs 

On national administrations 

On EU institutions 

On EU bodies and agencies 

0 

0 

0 

+ 

+ 

– 

++ 

++ 

0 

+++ 

+++ 

– 

+++ 

+++ 

– 

The  scores  are  given  on  the  expected  magnitude  of  impact  as  explained  below:  +++  being  strongly 
positive, ++ very positive, + moderately positive and – negative.  

To estimate the current administrative costs, the Commission relied on internal data and 
data collected from Member State and EU agencies / bodies during the consultation. The 

62 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the  most  resource 

questionnaires addressed to Member States and EU agencies / bodies, reported in Annex 
2, contained open and closed questions, to obtain both quantitative and qualitative data. 
Given  the  fragmented  character  of  the  cost  sources127,  the  Commission  chose  to  focus 
only  on 
the  preparation  and 
implementation of evaluations and monitoring activities, and in particular on-site visits. 
It is worth to stress that this initiative does not seek to reduce the regular evaluations of 
all Member States. Rather, it proposes to rebalance the use of all evaluation tools so to 
make  the  Mechanism  fit  for  purpose  and  able  to  react  and  adapt  to  different 
circumstances and needs. 

intense  activities.  These  are 

As  explained  in  section  5.1,  between  2015  and  2019,  the  Regulation  imposed  an 
obligation  to  carry  out  164  announced  evaluations  and  in  addition,  it  was  possible  to 
organise  two  thematic  evaluations,  eight  revisits  and  27  unannounced  evaluations. 
Overall,  200  evaluations  took  place,  which  translated  in  222  evaluation  visits  with  an 
average of 44.4 visits per year. For the thematic evaluations, there were no on-site visits. 
While the 2019 thematic evaluation was carried out as desk exercise, the 2015 thematic 
evaluation  in  the field  of visa was a hybrid  exercise. The on-site part of  the evaluation 
took  however  place  in  the  framework  of  on-site  visits  carried  out  for  announced 
evaluations. In principle, also thematic evaluations may however be carried out on-site. 

Table 11 – Situation in the first five-year cycle (2015-2019) 

Announced 
visits 

Unannounced 
visits 

Revisits 

Thematic 
evaluations  

5-years 

Yearly average 

184 

36.8 

29 

5.8 

9 

1.8 

0 

0 

Source: internal Commission data 

Overall,  in  the  first  five-year  cycle,  the  average  number  of  experts  per  team  was  7.3 
(announced  evaluations  other 
than  revisits),  7.4  (announced  revisits)  and  5.3 
(unannounced  evaluations)  128.  As  to  the  thematic  evaluations,  in  2019,  a  thematic 
evaluation  covering  25  Member  States  –  questionnaire-based  –  required  overall  20 
Member State experts while the 2015 thematic evaluation in the field of visa policy was 
carried  out  in  connection  with  announced  evaluations  and  did  not  require  additional 
human resources. 

Based  on  the  simulations  reported  in  Annex  3,  the  Commission  attempted  a 
quantification of the impact of the different options on the use of the different evaluation 
tools and required number of Member States experts that serves as starting point for the 
impact  of  the  different  options  on  administrative  costs  as  well  as  later  to  assess  the 
effectiveness. The results of these simulations are also summarised in section 7.1. 

6.4.1.  Member States 

Benefits for Member States 

Member  States  are  directly  involved  in  SCH-EVAL  because  of  (a)  their  active 
participation  in  evaluating  other  Member  States  and  addressing  recommendations  to 
remedy deficiencies and (b) their passive participation as ‘evaluated’ subjects that receive 

127   Different sources of costs are described in Annex 4. 
128  

For  unannounced  evaluations,  the  average  is  based  on  a  data  sample  covering  82%  of  the 
evaluations. Data for announced evaluations, including revisits, cover 100% of the evaluations.  

63 

 
 
                                                           
the  recommendations.  In  both  cases,  Member  States  benefit  from  the  participation  to 
SCH-EVAL but also bear certain costs.  

During the stakeholders’ consultation, Member States stressed their interest in the active 
participation in the functioning of SCH-EVAL. The primary benefit is the possibility 
to monitor and evaluate directly the implementation of the Schengen acquis on a regular 
basis  in  the  whole  area.  This  is  important  as  the situation  in  other  Member  States  may 
have  an  impact  on  the  situation  on  their  own  territory  and  of  their  own  citizens.  SCH-
EVAL allows both to influence the situation in other Member States when necessary and 
to  adopt  appropriate  measures  on  the  own  territory.  Having  experts  in  the  evaluation 
teams enables Member States to be informed directly about the actual situation in other 
Member  States,  instead  of  relying  exclusively  on  the  Commission’s  assessment.  The 
general benefit from the passive participation to evaluations, i.e. the benefit for Member 
States from being evaluated, is arguably less appreciable and not self-evident. However, 
Member  States  may  benefit  from  an  impartial  assessment  of  their  administrations  and 
recommendations  about  the  areas  where  improvement  might  be  necessary.  This  also 
facilitates a better use of available EU funds.  

Beyond this key general benefit, there are also minor but more concrete and immediate 
benefits  and  costs  generated  by  the  participation  in  the  instrument.  During  the 
stakeholders’  consultation,  Member  States  mentioned  as  an  important  benefit  the 
transfer  of  knowledge129.  Member  State  experts  receive  trainings  by  the  EU  agencies 
and  the  Commission,  and  can  immediately  observe  best  practices  in  other  Member 
States.  Networking  among  Member  State  administrations  is  also  perceived  as  an 
additional benefit. While such general benefits cannot be quantified and may also vary, 
they are generally perceived as appreciable and – as it clearly emerged from the Member 
States’  consultation  –  justify  the  costs  generated  by  the  participation  of  the  Member 
States.  

Costs for Member States 

The main source of costs for the active participation in the functioning of SCH-EVAL is 
the contribution of experts, with an overall estimated workload of about 24 000 working 
hours per year for all Member States together130. At present, this common burden is 
unevenly distributed among Member States as indicated by the five-year review and also 
stressed  by  several  Member  States  during 
the  stakeholders’  consultation.  The 
participation of experts in the follow-up is negligible while the participation of Member 
State representatives in the Schengen Committee and Schengen working party requires a 
moderate amount of resources. Member States do not contribute to the financial costs 
of the evaluations, except for daily allowances for their experts, which may significantly 
vary across Member States and depending on the destination of the visit.  

The level of costs that Member States incur into when they are evaluated are limited in 
absolute  terms,  but  still  appreciable  for  smaller  administrations.  Based  on  the 
submissions of the Member States during the consultation and on the experience of the 
Commission,  three  main  sources  of  costs  were  identified:  (1)  the  formulation  of  the 

129   A  study  carried  out  in  Norway  extensively  studied  the  benefit  resulting  from  the  participation  to 
SCH-EVAL 
involved.  See 
increased  professionality  of 
Stein/Nøkleberg/Gundhus,    Schengen  evaluation:  An  educational  experience  the  example  of 
Norway, 2020. 

terms  of 

experts 

the 

130   Given  relevant  differences  in  wages  of  the  experts  concerned  and  the  uneven  contribution  of 

in 

Member States, it is not possible to provide an estimation in Euro. 

64 

 
                                                           
replies  to  the  standard  questionnaire  (on  average  around  800  working  hours)  every 
five  year;  (2)  further  preparatory  measures  in  view  of  the  on-site  visits  as  well  as 
measures to support the on-site visits as such (EUR 10 000 and 5 000 working hours or 
more for the announced evaluations in the six policy fields; (3) submission of the action 
plans  and 
the 
recommendations (up to 250 working hours for the submission of an action plan and 
up to 500 working hours yearly for the progress reports). 

three-month  progress  reports  on 

implementation  of 

the 

While  it  is  appropriate  to  make  a  distinction  between  the  costs  from  the  active 
participation and the passive participation of Member States, there is a certain trade-off 
between the two categories of costs. An administration that needs to dedicate significant 
resources  for  its  own  evaluation  may  not  have  sufficient  resources,  notably  experts,  to 
contribute at the same time to the evaluation of other Member States. 

Against  this  background,  all  options  would  have  a  positive  impact  on  the  benefits  of 
the  Member  States  by  increasing  the  number  of  trainings  and  rationalising  the  use  of 
SCH-EVAL. In addition, none of the options generates new categories of costs for the 
Member States.  

As  regards  the  impact  on  current  administrative  costs,  all  four  policy  options  are 
expected to reduce current costs, but with remarkable differences as it follows from 
(a)  an  analysis  based  on  the  simulations  reported  in  Annex  3  about  the  impact  of  the 
different options on the use of evaluation tools and number of experts, (b) an analysis of 
the  data  provided  by  Member  States  during  the  stakeholders’  consultation,  and  (c) 
Commission internal data. 

Under Option 1, the main impact on the administrative costs depends on the possibility 
to  merge  the  evaluation  visits  in  different  policy  fields  and  on  shortening  the  visits  for 
announced evaluations. As further explained in Annexes 3 and 4, based on the position of 
Member States and case studies on possible synergies by merging the visits of different 
policy fields, it is estimated that overall it would be possible to slightly reduce the overall 
number of Member States experts required per year by 3-4%, which would translate 
in  a  proportional  decrease  of  total  working  hours.  The  costs  savings  would  amount  to 
about 1 000 working hours.  

The  assessment  of  the  impact  on  the  administrative  costs  for  the  evaluated  Member 
States is more difficult and depends on the length and complexity of the visit and number 
of hosted experts. Based on a case study (see  Box 13), a best estimate is that the costs 
for the evaluated Member States could typically decrease by at most 15%131 with the 
measures  envisaged.  The  number  of  action  plans  and  progress  reports  would  remain 
substantially unchanged.  

Under Option 2, the measures propose to increase flexibility in the number of experts are 
expected  to  lead  to  further  optimisation.  In  this  case,  taking  into  consideration  the 
combined  effect  with  more  targeted  evaluations,  the  need  of  Member  States’ 
contribution of experts would decrease by 13% compared to the baseline scenario(s) 
with proportionally some additional cost savings (about 3 000 working hours).  
A lower frequency for the submission of the progress reports132 would also reduce the 
administrative costs. If the number of reports per year decreases from four to two, costs 

131  
132  

See Annex 4. 
Costs  related  to  the  implementation  of  the  recommendations  are  not  included,  as  they  are  not  a 
consequence of SCH-EVAL but of the implementation of the Schengen acquis. 

65 

 
                                                           
would  decrease  by  at  least  50%.  More  targeted  recommendations  would  simplify  the 
action plan, which should arguably lead to lower working hours. The costs savings could 
amount to 250 working hours per year per Member State133. 

Under Options 3 and 4, the measures to facilitate experts’ nomination (pool and annual 
call)  would  strengthen  the  possibility  of  meeting  the  target  of  smaller  teams  as  these 
mechanisms  would  improve  the  team’s  composition  in  terms  of  qualifications  and 
rotation  of  the  designating  Member  State.  In  addition,  the  increase  in  the  number  of 
unannounced  visits,  revisits  and  verification  visits  (which  require  smaller  teams)  will 
further  decrease  the  average  number  of  experts  needed.  This,  combined  with  smaller 
teams  for  revisit  and  verification  visits,  would  mean  under  Option  3,  43%-44%  less 
Member  State  experts  than  in  the baseline  scenario(s)  and,  under  Option  4,  33%-
36%  less  experts.  Option  3  and  4  would  also  have  a  positive  impact  in  terms  of 
redistributing  more  equally  the  costs  among  Member  States  with  adequate  rotation  of 
contribution of experts. 

On the side of the evaluated Member States, combining the measures under Option 1 and 
2 with  the fact  that evaluation  teams  would be smaller and that the costs of announced 
periodic  evaluations  would  spread  over  seven  years  instead  of  five,  the  Commission 
estimated that costs for announced evaluations would be reduced by almost 40%134 
under  Option  4  and  by  up  to  60%  under  Option  3  by  further  reducing  the  number  of 
visits per evaluation.  

As  per  Option  2,  Options  3  and  4  would  reduce  the  administrative  costs  for  the 
submission of the progress reports by at least 50% but would also reduce by 29% the 
workload  for  the  replies  to  the  standard  questionnaires  that  would  be  due  every  seven, 
instead of five, years as a consequences of the longer evaluation cycle.  

Finally, it is reasonable to assume that the cost savings for announced evaluations could 
be offset largely, but not entirely, by the costs linked to a possible increased use of  ad-
hoc  visits  (e.g.  thematic  and  unannounced  evaluations,  serious  deficiencies  and 
verification  revisits).  While  the  estimations  above  already  reflect  the  fact  that  ad-hoc 
evaluations require fewer experts, an analysis of the costs of different past unannounced 
evaluations  clearly  suggests  that  ad-hoc  evaluations  are  always  less  costly,  require  less 
preparation from the Member States and can be also designed with more flexibility so to 
take  into  consideration  the  costs  for  the  Member  States  concerned.  Any  estimation  is 
however  impossible  due  to  the  non-standardised  character  of  ad-hoc  evaluations,  but  it 
can  be  concluded  that,  in  sum,  under  all  options  there  would  be  administrative  costs 
reductions. 

6.4.2.  Commission  

Benefits for the Commission 

133   Member  States  that  do  not  have  action  plans  open  or  have  almost  closed  their  action  plans  have 

134  

obviously no, or negligible, costs. 
The costs to prepare the replies to the standard questionnaire would decrease by up to 29% due to 
the fact that this task would be performed every seven years instead of every five years and it can be 
reasonably  assumed  that  longer  time  between  submissions  does  not  increase  the  time  for  the 
preparation of the replies. For other costs, Option 3 and 4 would combine cost savings  of at least 
33% (Option 3) and 15% (Option 4) per announced evaluations due to the reduction of on-site visits 
combined with the fact that they would take place only every seven years, which might amount to 
cost savings of up to 58%-59% and 39% respectively. 

66 

 
                                                           
The  general  benefit  for  the  Commission  from  the  coordination  and  direct  active 
participation  in  the  Mechanism  derives  principally  from  the  complementarity  of  SCH-
EVAL  with  other  tools  of  the  Commission,  like  infringement  procedures,  in  its  role  as 
guardian  of  the  Treaty.  In  addition,  as  also  highlighted  in  the  five-year  review,  SCH-
EVAL  helped  policy-making.  It  enables  the  Commission  to  learn  about  emerging 
problems  and  challenges  that  might  need  to  be  addressed  by  new  initiatives.  In  this 
respect, the increase use of thematic evaluations will support the Commission in drawing 
horizontal findings across policy  fields  or Member States subject  to  similar challenges. 
Beyond  such  general  benefit  linked  to  the  added-value  of  SCH-EVAL  in  ensuring  a 
correct  implementation  of  the  Schengen  acquis,  Commission  experts  acquire  thanks  to 
the evaluations additional expertise that is beneficial for their function.  

Costs for the Commission 

The Commission is bearing the highest share of costs for the functioning of SCH-EVAL. 
Pursuant  to  Article  13(7),  the  Commission  covers  the  most  substantial  part  of  the 
financial costs for the evaluation visits, overall per year EUR 1.2 to 2 million. These 
costs  are  largely  depending  on  the  number  of  Member  State  experts  participating  to 
evaluations as well as length and location of the evaluations. 

Other costs for the Commission are generated by the coordination of the Mechanism and 
the  adoption  of  the  evaluation  reports  as  well  as  by  the  direct  participation  of  Member 
State  experts  and  Commission  representatives  to  the  evaluations.  Overall,  about  20 
Commission officials are working full time on SCH-EVAL. The most resource intensive 
tasks  are  (1)  the  provision  of  trainings  (overall  about  720  working  hours  and  EUR 
12 000 to cover travel costs and daily allowance), (2) organisation and preparation of 
the evaluations (1 000 working hours per year), (3) the participation to the evaluations 
and  adoption  of  the  evaluation  reports  (14 000  working  hours  per  year)  as  well  the 
assessment  of  the  action  plans  and  adoption  of  related  communication  (1 800  working 
hours  per  year)  and  progress  reports  (3 000  working  hours  per  year).  Translations 
costs  for  the  evaluation  reports  and  the  assessment  of  the  action  plans  are  also  not 
negligible and included in the working hours summarised above. 

All policy options have a positive impact on the general benefit of the Commission from 
the Mechanism, which is assumed to increase as more flexibility is given to use resources 
in  a  more  targeted  way  and  increase  the  number  of  ad-hoc  evaluations  and  thematic 
evaluations, hence particularly under Options 3 and 4.  

As regards the costs, all options allow for certain cost savings but also in this case such 
cost  savings  are  different.  All  options  would  also  generate  additional  new  costs  in 
particular  in  relation  to  the  possibility  to  increase  and  improve  current  training.  These 
costs  cannot  be  exactly  quantified  but  additional  training  in  the  field  of  visa  or  data 
protection would amount to more than EUR 70 000 per year. 

Under Options 1 and 2, more targeted, and possibly, shorter evaluations would reduce 
the workload for the organisation of the evaluations in the case of announced evaluations. 
In particular, also for the Commission (based on internal data) it is assumed that  – like 
for  the  evaluated  Member  States  –  savings  would  lead  to  a  reduction  of  15%  of  both 
financial and administrative costs for announced evaluations. This would correspond to 
possibly 2 400 working hours and EUR 200 000-300 000 yearly. 

In  addition,  under  Option  2,  a  number  of  simplifications  would  also  reduce  the 
administrative costs for the Commission in appreciable measures, even if a quantification 
is  only  partially  possible.  In  particular,  the  most  appreciable  cost  saving  would  result 

67 

 
from the informal communication of the assessment of the action plans, in particular in 
terms of translation costs, and the declassification of the evaluation reports (800 working 
hours less). The lower frequency of the submission of the progress reports would further 
reduce the workload related to this task by 50% (1 500 working hours less). 

Under  Options  3  and  4,  rebalancing  the  use  of  the  different  tools  may  decrease  the 
costs.  Combining  the  measures  under  Option  1 and  2  with  those  under  Option  3  and 4 
would also lead to reducing for the Commission the costs of announced evaluations 
by almost 40% under Option 4 and by up to 60% under Option 3 by further reducing 
the  number  of  visits  due  to  the  combined  effect  of  shorter  visits  (targeted  approach), 
reduced number of experts (flexibility of the team sizeand smaller teams) and the lower 
number  of  announced  periodic  evaluations  (extension  of  the  evaluation  cycle135)  which 
should  spread  the  costs  of  announced  periodic  evaluations  over  seven  years  instead  of 
five.  

Yet, similarly to the case of Member States, the cost savings for announced evaluations 
would  be  offset  largely  by  the  costs  linked  to  a  possible  increased  use  of  ad-hoc  visits 
(e.g.  thematic  and  unannounced  evaluations,  serious  deficiencies  and  verification 
revisits). 

Box 12 – Costs variation between evaluations 

As an example, for the same Member State the costs (allowances not included) for the evaluation visits in 
different fields were: 

-  Common Visa Policy field: EUR 47 000; 
-  Other policy fields: EUR 26 000 to 31 000; 
-  Unannounced evaluation: EUR 17 000. 

Source: internal Commission data 

The Commission developed the following case-study (see Box 13) using the information 
from the Member State that had provided the most comprehensive dataset as well as the 
information from costs of the various evaluations as per the five-year cycle to assess the 
impacts of the options. 

Box 13 – Costs of announced evaluations 

Country  X  was  evaluated  in  20XX  in  six  policy  fields  in  line  with  the  multiannual  programme.  The 
evaluation  included  eight  on-site  visits  (overall  43  days)  with  the  participation  of  86  experts:  16 
Commission  representatives  (eight  of  which  leading  experts),  61  Member  States  experts  (eight  of  which 
leading experts) and nine experts from the EU bodies and agencies as observers. The financial burden on 
the Commission was of EUR 256 380, and for the EU bodies and agencies of about EUR 18 000. Country 
X indicated136 that the preparation of the evaluation required 2 448 working hours and EUR 14 400. 
As the evaluation found that country X is overall implementing correctly the Schengen acquis, the scope of 
the subsequent evaluation could be shortened (on-site visits on average of 3-4 rather than 4-6 days), a lower 
number  of  experts  could  be  sufficient  (52  instead  of  61).  Altogether,  this  would  result  in  savings  for  all 
actors involved of 10%-15% (see Annex 4).  

However, these are the maximum estimated savings. The participation of additional FRA observers, more 
frequent thematic evaluations and, depending on material circumstances, additional targeted unannounced 
visits  would  generate  additional  costs.  Yet  a  thematic  evaluation  in  2019  involved  overall  20  Member 
States experts for the evaluation of 25 Member States (on average less than one Member States experts per 
Member  States  evaluated)  as  well  as  a  proportionally  lower  number  of  Commission  and  EU  agencies’ 
experts.  Unannounced  evaluations  do  not  require  the  same  preparation  on  the  side  of  the  Member  State. 

135   As the extension of the cycle would allow replacing some of the evaluation visits with other types 

that are in general cheaper (like unannounced evaluations and revisits). 
Reply of a Member State to Q5 of the short questionnaire for Member States. 

136  

68 

 
                                                           
Financial  costs  for  the  Commission  are  more  limited  (a  previous  unannounced  evaluation  was  half  as 
expensive as the announced evaluation in the same policy field). 

6.4.3.  EU bodies and agencies 

Benefits for EU bodies and agencies  

EU  bodies / agencies  stressed  during  the  consultation  that  the  benefits  from  their 
participation  in  SCH-EVAL,  that  are  very  similar  to  those  indicated  by  the  Member 
States,  namely  transfer  of  knowledge  and  networking  with  colleagues  from  Member 
State  administrations.  In  their  replies  to  the  short  questionnaire,  an  EU  agency / body 
includes  in  the  main  merits  of  SCH-EVAL  “[e]xchange  with  experts  (our  peers)  from 
national [administrations] (exchange best practices, networking”. According to other EU 
bodies / agencies,  ‘[t]  he  evaluations  help  the  Agency  to  be  in  touch  with  MS  and  the 
operational work’ or ‘[t]he Observer has the opportunity to liaise and network with the 
evaluation team and feel the pulse of contemporary issues affecting also their respective 
countries as it relates to police cooperation and Schengen acquis’. An EU agency also 
mentions  that  ‘[t]he  agency  has  the  possibility  to  boost  its  profile  with  external 
stakeholders in the field and promote by example its services and support’.  

However, it is also stressed that ‘[t]here are no particular shortcomings other than the 
resources required to support the Commission led evaluations’. 

Costs for EU bodies / agencies 

The  participation  of  EU  bodies / agencies  in  SCH-EVAL  generates  costs  in  relation  of 
three types activities: (1) submission of risk analysis and information sharing with the 
Commission (240 to 480 working hours) (2) trainings for experts (about EUR 200 000 
yearly  all  trainings  together,  with  an  average  cost  of  EUR  900  per  expert)  (3) 
participation of experts as observers (about 40 experts per year with a total workload 
of at least 2 500 working hours and financial costs of EUR 60 000-70 000). 

An  increased  involvement  of  the  EU  bodies / agencies  under  all  policy  options  would 
strengthen  the  existing  benefits  for  the  EU  bodies/ agencies.  Yet  by  difference  to  other 
actors,  the  expected  cost  savings  are  negligible,  while  the  different  options  include 
provisions that may create new sources of costs or increased current costs.  

All  policy  options  aim  at  increasing  and  improving  training,  which  may  generate 
additional costs. It is not possible to estimate these costs that will depend ultimately on a 
case-by-case  decision  of  the  cost-benefit  of  additional  training.  Based  on  the  available 
data on the costs of training, the cost increase would not be negligible. 

Under Option 1 and 2, additional costs would also arise for the FRA from the occasional 
participation of their experts in the evaluations in policy fields other than return (the only 
policy field in which FRA experts are systematically involved) as well as in unannounced 
evaluations. In this case, the costs can also not be estimated but it is reasonable to assume 
that they would be contained, as the participation of an additional expert would amount 
to at least 50-70 working hours and about EUR 1 000-2 000. 

Option  2  in  addition  may  generate  limited  new  costs  from  increased  coordination,  but 
such costs should be  generally limited in  terms  of working hours  and would  not  imply 
financial obligations. 

Option  3  and  4  would  have  possibly  the  highest  impact  on  costs  as  they  widen  the 
sharing  of  information,  but  it  is  to  note  that  to  a  large  extent  this  would  concern  the 
transmission of information already available to the EU bodies / agencies.  

In  addition,  Option  3  might  require  a  significant  increase  of  costs  for  FRA  that  would 

69 

 
probably  be  attending  systematically  evaluations  dedicated  to  fundamental  rights  in 
addition to those in the field of return. 

All in all, the initiative would on balance increase the costs for the EU bodies / agencies, 
but such costs are not quantifiable given the flexibility left in the implementation of such 
measures. 

70 

 
 
Table 12 – Summary of administrative costs (complete table in Annex 4)  

Baseline 

Option 1 

Option 2 

Option 3 

Option 4 

Source of costs 

Working hours (Wh) 

Euro 

Active participation of Member states (for all Member States) 

Evaluation (experts) 

24 000 wh 

Not quantifiable in EUR 

23 000 wh 

21 000 wh 

14 000 wh 

16 000 wh 

Participation in the adoption of the evaluation reports and 
recommendations 
Passive participation of Member states (average per Member State) 
Reply to the questionnaire 

Announced Evaluation (experts)  

Announced Evaluation (other costs)  

Ad-hoc evaluations 
Submission of progress reports (working hours yearly / per Member 
State) 
Commission 
Multiannual and Annual Programme 
Evaluation (logistic costs) 
Evaluation (Administrative organisation) 

Not quantifiable 

Unchanged 

Unchanged 

Decreasing 

Decreasing 

800 wh 

5 000 wh 

Not quantifiable in EUR 

EUR 100 000-150 000 

EUR 10 000  

Not quantifiable 

800 wh 
EUR 85 000 – 
130 000 

EUR 8 500 
Increasing 

800 wk 
EUR 85 000 – 
130 000 

EUR 8 500 
Increasing 

550 wh 

550 wh 

EUR 41 000 – 61 500   EUR 61 000 – 91 500 

EUR 4 100 
Increasing 

EUR 6 100 
Increasing 

Not quantifiable - Significant  

Unchanged 

Decreasing by 50% 

Decreasing by 50% 

Decreasing by 50% 

60 wh 

1 000 wh 

Not quantifiable in EUR 
EUR 2 000 000 
Not quantifiable in EUR 

Unchanged 
Decreasing 
Unchanged 

40 wh 
Decreasing 
Unchanged 

Evaluation (visit and adoption of evaluation report) 

14 000 wh 

Not quantifiable in EUR 

Unchanged 

Unchanged 

Assessment of the action plans 

Assessment of the follow-up reports and closure of the action plan  
EU agencies/bodies 
Trainings  
Evaluations (observers) 
Evaluations (logistic costs) 

1 800 wh 

3 000 wh 

2 500 wh 

Not quantifiable in EUR 

Unchanged 

Not quantifiable in EUR 

Unchanged 

EUR 200 000 

Not quantifiable in EUR 
EUR 60 000-70 000 

Increasing 
Increasing 
Increasing 

1 000 wh 

1 500 wh 

Increasing 
Increasing 
Increasing 

71 

40 wh 
Decreasing 
Decreasing 

Unchanged 

1 000 wh 

1 500 wh 

Increasing 
Increasing 
Increasing 

40 wh 
Decreasing 
Decreasing 

Unchanged 

1 000 wh 

1 500 wh 

Increasing 
Increasing 
Increasing 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.  HOW DO THE POLICY OPTIONS COMPARE? 

Table 13 – Comparison of policy options 

Baseline 

Option 1 

Option 2 

Option 3 

Option 4 

Effectiveness 

Efficiency 

Coherence 

Proportionality 

Stakeholders’ support 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

+ 

+ 

+ 

+ 

+ 

++ 

++ 

++ 

++ 

+++ 

+++ 

+++ 

+ 

+ 

++ 

+++ 

+++ 

++ 

++ 

+++ 

+++ high, ++ medium, + low, 0 neutral and – negative. For proportionality and coherence, + and – means that it is 
positive or negative. 

7.1.  Effectiveness 

Measures under Option 1 are expected to have at most a low-to-moderate positive 
impact on the effectiveness of SCH-EVAL.  

Regarding  the  Specific  Objective  1  (avoid  gaps  and  increase  strategic  focus),  the 
measures  proposed  to  make  announced  evaluations  more  strategic  and  targeted  could 
improve the focus of evaluations (through improved risk assessment) and quality of the 
findings.  This  should  result  in  an  increased  focus  of  recommendations  on  each  policy 
field’s  most  important  elements,  thereby  limiting  their  number.  This  would  potentially 
facilitate a swift reaction by the Member States to address shortcomings.  

However, these measures would have only a limited positive impact on the current policy 
fragmentation. Although there would be more opportunities to focus within each policy 
field on the most important issues, the policy-field specific evaluations would continue. 
Therefore,  there  would  be  only  limited  possibilities  to  identify  horizontal  findings  and 
have an overview of a Member State’s overall performance in the implementation of the 
Schengen acquis.  

Shortening  and  combining  evaluation  visits  under  current  conditions  would  at  most 
reduce  the  resources  necessary  for  announced  evaluations  by  10-15%,  leaving  little 
space  to  rebalance  the  use  of  different  evaluation  tools,  if  at  all.  If  four  new  Member 
States  were  to  be  evaluated  (as  is  expected  in  coming  years  with  Romania,  Bulgaria, 
Croatia and Cyprus), the situation would remain substantially unchanged, while – even in 
the  scenario  with  27  Member  States  to  be  evaluated  –  announced  periodic  evaluations 
would still require 69% of the feasible on-site visits. 

Furthermore,  the  possibility  of  modifying  the  policy  fields  evaluated  or  covering  EU 
agencies’  activities  would  depend  on  the  goodwill  and  cooperation  of  stakeholders. 
Operational  measures  would  fail  to  include  under  the  Mechanism  elements  outside  the 
scope of the Schengen acquis. 

the 
Operational  measures  would  also  have  a  negligible  potential 
rationalisation  of  processes  and  roles  (Specific  Objective  2)  given  the  rigid  constraints 
resulting  from  Articles  14  to  16  of  the  Regulation.  Other  administrative  and  legal 
provisions applying to the procedure leave limited margin for simplification (see Box 9). 
Derogations from standard rules (language waivers, use of the written procedure for the 
comitology  process)  may  apply  only  in  duly  justified  cases  and  would  have  a  minor 
impact  on  the  length  of  the  process  (two  or  three  weeks  at  most).  A  more  frequent 
organisation of the Schengen Committee would also have a marginal effect given that the 
Committees  take  place  already  on  an  almost  monthly  basis.  Frequent  meetings  would 

impact  on 

72 

 
 
even  generate  an  additional  workload  at  the  risk  of  delaying  other  activities  without 
simplifying existing ones. Option 1 would not have any relevant impact on the length 
of the process. 

The  institutional  balance  would  remain  unchanged  under  Option  1.  With more  focused 
recommendations,  the  capacity  of  the  Council  to  exert  peer-to-peer  pressure  might 
improve, but the workload and variety of the issues to cover would remain the same, not 
giving space for close follow-up of important issues / problematic Member States or for 
political  discussions.  The  adoption  of  the  annual  report  by  the  Commission  may  have 
only  a  limited  positive  impact  in  increasing  pressure  if  other  conditions  remain 
unchanged as it would remain difficult to draw horizontal findings. 

As  to  fundamental  rights  (Specific  Objective  3),  operational  measures  would  have  a 
positive  impact  to  increase  the  prominence  of  certain  aspects  related  to  the  role  of 
fundamental rights in the process but without immediate legal effects. This would depend 
very  much  on  the  good  will  of  the  actors  involved  in  accepting  FRA’s  involvement  or 
taking  into  account  third  parties’  information  when  designing  and  carrying  out 
evaluations.  

The  impact  of  operational  measures  on  the  involvement  of  EU  agencies  (Specific 
Objective 4) would be negligible. During the consultation, an EU agency explicitly noted 
that  ‘the  ability  of  different  EU  agencies  to  support  SCH-EVAL  depends  also  on  the 
extent to which they are able to attach the necessary priority to these activities. In this 
regard,  it  would  be  helpful  if  the  role  of  individual  agencies  were  more  explicitly 
enshrined in EU law, as is already the case for a number of them’. In relation to Specific 
Objective  4  (optimise  the  participation  of  Member  State  experts),  operational  measures 
under Option 1 would not be adequate to ensure that a sufficient number of experts 
with the appropriate qualification is available. It is also to consider that the number of 
experts  necessary  is  lower  than  under  the  baseline  scenarios  (about  3%-4%  fewer 
experts).  But  in  the  scenario  with  31  Member  States  to  be  evaluated,  the  proportion  of 
announced evaluation visits remains virtually unchanged compared to today, and so the 
number  of  experts  (the  decrease  compared  to  today  is  below  1.5%).  During  the 
consultation,  the  majority  of  the  Member  States  and  EU  bodies / agencies  stressed  the 
importance  of  training  and  the  need  to  enlarge  further  the  scope  of  the  training  to 
incentivise  wider  expert  participation  in  evaluations  and,  in  particular,  the  need  for 
training  in  the  fields  of  visa  and  data  protection.  Yet,  such  measures  could  have 
realistically  only  a  limited  impact  on  increasing  the  potential  offer  of  experts  available 
for  current  policy  evaluations  with  the  highest  deficit  of  participation.  It  is  so  also 
because participation in the training does not impose any obligation to participate in the 
evaluations.  The  range  of  non-financial  incentives  is  similarly  limited.  Ultimately,  the 
impact  of  operational  measures  in  this  case  depends  on  the  goodwill  of  the  Member 
States and their experts. 

Option  2  includes  a  set  of  measures  that  would  have  a  moderate-to-high  positive 
impact  on  the  effectiveness  of  SCH-EVAL  particularly  to  increase  flexibility, 
simplification and protection of fundamental rights.  

In  particular,  regarding  the  scope  of  the  evaluation  and  increased  strategic  focus 
(Specific  Objective  1),  Option  2  would  reduce  possible  gaps  about  the  inclusion  of  the 
EU  agencies  by  providing  legal  clarity.  It  would  also  reinforce  the  strategic  use  of  the 
different  tools  by  allowing  a  more  flexible  programming;  creating  additional  legal 
opportunities for merging, modifying or limiting current policy fields; and covering EU 

73 

 
agencies’ activities. The measures to improve the coordination with agencies would also 
have a positive impact by further focusing the evaluations on the most crucial elements.  

All  these  measures  could  result  in  an  increased  capacity  to  identify  and  correct 
inconsistencies  across  policy  fields  or  to  have  an  overview  of  the  application  of  the 
Schengen  acquis  as  a  whole  in  a  Member  State.  However,  the  approach  would  remain 
partially fragmented. Only in the long term (as evaluations increase their focus with each 
new  cycle),  this  option  might  lead  to  at  least  single  reports  covering  a  given  Member 
State’s overall performance. This option would also fail to address other gaps identified 
in the scope of the evaluations in relation to provisions not belonging to the development 
of the Schengen acquis. Option 2 would have limited effects (same as per Option 1) in 
rebalancing the use of the currently available evaluation tools and, consequently, would 
find limitations in increasing the strategic focus of the Mechanism.  

In  terms  of  rationalising  procedures  (Specific  Objective  2),  measures  under  Option  2 
would have a moderate positive impact. Setting legal time limits for main milestones in 
the procedure and simplifying the follow-up process (from assessment of action plans to 
reporting obligations) would positively affect the structure of the process. It would help 
shorten the length of evaluations (from current  practice of 10-12 months to 6 months) 
and  it  is  assumed  that  all  simplification  would  not  undermine  the  effectiveness  of  the 
Mechanism  while  reducing  the  workload  to  support  the  respect  of  the  different  time 
limits. 

largely 

the  same,  not  giving  space  for  close  follow-up  of 

The main limit of this option is that the institutional balance would remain substantially 
unchanged. The process  for the adoption of the  Council’s recommendations would still 
have a negative impact on the length of the procedure (adding at least two months to the 
process). As under Option 1, the workload and the variety of the issues to cover would 
remain 
important 
issues / problematic Member States or for political discussions. Many Member States as 
well  as  the  Court  of  Auditors  and  a  civil  society  organisation  see  the  introduction  of 
deadlines  to  fulfil  the  recommendations  foreseen  in  Option  2  favourably  to  accelerate 
Member  States’  compliance  with  recommendations.  However,  it  may  not  generate  in 
itself  sufficient  pressure  in  the  absence  of  other  measures  that  increase  the  focus  and 
involvement of the Council and the European and national Parliaments in the follow-up 
of the most important issues.  

Finally, the limited legal measures under Option 2 to increase the prominence of certain 
aspects related to the role of fundamental rights (Specific Objective 3) would strengthen 
the  effectiveness  of  possible  operational  measures.  Compared  to  the  current  soft-law 
instrument,  the  inclusion  of  a  reference  to  the  use  of  third  sources  would  create  a 
commitment  to  use  those  sources  in  all  policy  fields  and  for  planning  the  different 
evaluations. A clearer definition of FRA’s role would  also  be helpful for the agency to 
attach  the  necessary  priority  to  the  pertinent  activities  as  –  unlike  for  some  other  EU 
agencies – its role in SCH-EVAL is not explicitly enshrined in EU law.  

As to increased actors’ participation (Specific Objective 4), as noted by a Member State: 
‘A  higher  number  of  experts  does  not  necessarily  result  in  a  better  evaluation.  While 
creating evaluation teams also the organisational burden for MS must be considered’.137 
The  possibility  for  the  Commission  to  determine  the  composition  and  size  of  the  team 
would allow redistributing the experts more appropriately, optimising herewith the 
use of current resources. In this way, it is expected that it would be possible to reduce 

137  

Reply of a Member State to Q5 of the short questionnaire for Member States. 

74 

 
                                                           
the average number of experts in the evaluation teams by 7% (5 experts instead of 5.4 for 
unannounced evaluations) to 12 % (6.5 instead of 7.3-7.4 for announced evaluations) and 
combined with the changed proportion in the use of the different tools by 13%. Thus, it 
would  create  more  opportunities  to  involve  the  experts  with  the  right  profile  in  a  more 
proportionate  way,  reducing  competition  between  different  evaluations,  while  not 
correcting, however, the current geographical unbalance. Measures aimed at reducing the 
number of policy fields (e.g. merging some policy fields) may also positively affect the 
demand for experts, with better mobilisation across policy fields.  

In  order  to  optimise  the  synergies  with  other  instruments  (Specific  Objective  4),  the 
introduction of a general obligation in SCH-EVAL to coordinate with other instruments 
would increase synergies, which would improve the design of evaluations and thus their 
strategic focus. 

The  measures  under  Option  3  would  overall  have  a  high  positive  impact  on  the 
effectiveness  of  SCH-EVAL,  as  they  would  allow  attaining  fully  three  of  the  four 
specific objectives.  

The  measures  under  Option  3  would  have  a  very  high  impact  on  increasing  the 
instrument’s  strategic  focus  and  closing  all  possible  gaps  (Specific  Objective  1). 
Comprehensive  evaluations  per  Member  State  would  eliminate  current  fragmentation 
allowing  for  a  clear  overview  of  a  Member  State’s  performance  in  implementing  the 
Schengen acquis.  It  would  then  allow  identifying  the  main  problems  in  that  Member 
State  regardless  of  the  specific  Schengen-policy  area.  In  addition,  this  comprehensive 
evaluation would include compliance with elements that go beyond the Schengen acquis 
but  directly  affect  its  functioning.  Despite  the  all-encompassing  evaluation,  a  certain 
fragmentation  would  remain  considering  that  this  option  proposes  separate  evaluations 
for data protection and fundamental rights. 

Extending the cycle to seven  years would already reduce the  yearly average number of 
announced  evaluations  by  29%  further  to  the  reduced  frequency  of  Member  State- 
periodic evaluations. If in addition every evaluation would encompass no more than four 
evaluation  visits  (compared  to  the  six  to  eight  now),  the  yearly  number  of  announced 
evaluation visits would decrease by over 33%, and overall by 53% to 59 %, respectively 
with 27 and 31 Member States. Announced evaluations would require at most 34%-39% 
of the resources available for on-site visits. This would allow for a significant increase in 
the use of alternative ad-hoc evaluation tools and monitoring activities that would use the 
majority of resources available. This would consistently make up for the bigger timespan 
in  between  regular  evaluations  for  a  given  Member  State.  Changing  and  clarifying  the 
other evaluation  tools’ conditions  would also  improve their effectiveness, making them 
adapted to their purpose: monitoring or investigative.  

Option 3 would also have a high impact on the effectiveness of SCH-EVAL in relation to 
rationalisation of the distribution of tasks and responsibilities, and simplification of the 
process  and  procedures  (Specific  Objective  2).  Changes  made  to  rationalise  the 
distribution  of tasks  and  responsibilities  in  the  evaluation  process  and  follow-up  would 
reinforce  the  positive  effect  of  Option  3  on  the  strategic  focus  of  evaluations.  The 
additional  measures  under  Option  3  would  further  shorten  the  process  as  the  further 
step before the Council would be deleted allowing to set a time limit of four months. 

Some  Member  States  acknowledged  that  combining  the  adoption  of  the  report  and 

75 

 
recommendations  would  simplify  and  shorten  the  process  significantly138.  However, 
diverging  views  emerged  as  to  the  impact  of  changing  the  current  inter-institutional 
balance. To recall, in the transition from the old to the new Mechanism, it was decided to 
maintain  with  the  Council  the  power  to  adopt  the  recommendations  ‘[i]n  order  to 
strengthen mutual trust between the Member States, to ensure their better coordination 
at Union level and to reinforce peer pressure amongst them’.  In addition, this appeared 
essential ‘to improve the governance of the Schengen area through political discussions 
at  ministerial  level  on  the  correct  functioning  of  the  Schengen  area,  including 
discussions in situations where evaluation reports have shown serious shortcomings.’ 139  

Nonetheless, the five-year review indicated that the recommendations have not proved to 
be a sufficiently effective tool to ensure that Member States take rapid action. Discussion 
at Council level on the recommendations was generally very limited. Member States are 
already involved in the process of adopting the evaluation report through the Committee 
examination  procedure,  and  most  issues  identified  during  the  evaluations  are  of  a 
technical  rather  than  political  character.  A  Member  State  stressed  ‘the  need  to  better 
prioritise the issues so that the most important are submitted to the Council for political 
discussion’.  

The  institutional  set-up  of  Option  3  would  increase  SCH-EVAL’s  effectiveness  by 
alleviating the Council’s workload so it can strengthen its focus (and role) on decision-
making  and  follow-up  in  the  politically  most  sensitive  cases,  namely  first-time 
evaluations  and  serious  deficiencies  as  well  as  thematic  evaluations.  The  number  of 
evaluations falling under these special procedures would be limited and would not have 
any significant impact on the average length of the process. In politically important cases, 
where no serious deficiencies were identified, the procedure will be prolonged herewith 
to six months, but this is justified on balance by the absence of urgency and the need to 
closely involve the Council given the issues of general interest for the well-functioning of 
Schengen  addressed  by  those  evaluations.  The  fast-track  procedure  would  introduce 
anyway  a  prioritisation  of  the  most  urgent  cases  that  would  be  dealt  with  in  only  2.5 
months. In other cases,  the Comitology examination procedure would ensure sufficient 
participation of the Member States in the process, including defining recommendations. 
Other  measures  (adoption  of  the  annual  report  to  increase  political  dialogue  and 
deadlines  for  the  adoption  of  the  recommendations)  should  allow  stepping  up  the 
pressure in the follow-up.  

For Specific Objective 3 (strengthen the implementation of fundamental rights safeguards 
under  the  Schengen  acquis),  Option  3  introduces  a  separate  evaluation  focusing  on 
fundamental rights (apart from data protection evaluations). In the view of the different 
categories  of  stakeholders,  the  possibility  of  establishing  dedicated  evaluations  for 
fundamental  rights  would  have,  overall,  a  negative  impact  on  fundamental  rights’ 
protection. As indicated in the conclusion of the 2020 study of the European Parliament, 
‘[SCH-EVAL]  is  not  an  appropriate  tool  to  assess  and  monitor  compliance  with 
fundamental  rights.  Additionally,  turning  fundamental  rights  into  a  specific  evaluation 
area  would  affect  their  horizontality  as  a  matter  of  concern  to  be  taken  into 
consideration  across  the  [SCH-EVAL]’s  policy  fields’.140  Given  its  peer-to-peer  review 
character,  SCH-EVAL  lacks  the  necessary  elements  to  be  a  useful  monitoring  tool  for 
fundamental rights and therefore dedicated evaluations may not be sufficiently effective. 

138  
139  
140  

See Annexes 3 and 4. 
See recital 11 of the Regulation. 
The state of play of Schengen governance, p. 35. 

76 

 
                                                           
It  risks weakening the  fundamental  rights’  aspects  in  other policy fields  and hinder the 
progress made in the past. It follows that Option 3 is not the most effective in relation 
to fundamental rights. 

Option 3 would have the highest impact on the effectiveness of SCH-EVAL in relation to 
the  Specific  Objective  4  (optimise  the  participation  of  Member  State  experts  and  the 
involvement  of  EU  bodies  and  agencies,  and  synergies  with  other  instruments).  The 
legislative  changes  proposed  for  the  designation  of  Member  States  experts  could 
significantly affect the evaluation team’s composition by clarifying the obligation of the 
Member  States  to  provide  experts  compared  to  the  current  legislative  framework  and 
ensuring  an  appropriate  number  of  experts  with  the  most  suitable  mix  of  profiles.  This 
would  also  strengthen  the  effect  of  the  introduction  of  additional  flexibility  as  to  the 
number  of  experts  (as  per  Option  2).  During  the  consultation,  Member  States  widely 
agreed  that  an  annual  call  for  experts  and  the  establishment  of  a  pool  might  have  a 
positive  impact  to  enhance  the  availability  of  qualified  experts.  More  rotation  and 
geographical  balance  among  Member  States  would  be  possible,  as  the  Commission 
would have an overview of the needs and a list of available experts. 

By widening the information that may be requested from the EU bodies and agencies, in 
addition  to  a  general  obligation  on  SCH-EVAL  to  coordinate  with  other  mechanisms, 
Option  3  increases  synergies.  The  Mechanism  would  make  wider  use  of  available 
information increasing the quality of the evaluation and reducing duplications as regard 
the  information  requested  from  Member  States.  This  would  also  minimise  the  risk  of 
inconsistencies  between  complementary  instruments  as  all  actors  concerned  would  be 
able to have access to the same base of evidence reducing asymmetric information. 

Option  4  largely  includes  all  measures  under  Option  3,  measures  under  Option  1 
and 2 as a combined approach. It would overall have a high positive impact on the 
effectiveness of SCH-EVAL.  

In  relation  to  Specific  Objective  1  (avoid  gaps  and  increase  strategic  focus),  Option  4 
would allow for a stronger strategic focus. It follows Option 2 in proposing to adapt the 
policy  fields  to  the  new  realities  and  actors  with  a  more  flexible  programming.  Partial 
fragmentation and gaps would remain and, in principle, it would not immediately move 
towards comprehensive evaluations (as per Option 3).  

However,  in  terms  of  possible  areas  of  evaluation,  this  option  does  not  foresee  an 
evaluation of fundamental rights, so compared to Option 3, it foresees all Member States 
evaluated in  five  areas  (while Option  3 foresees  four areas).  Furthermore, by removing 
the  legal  constraints  that  lead  to  individual  policy-field  evaluations,  and  creating 
obligations to take the results of other mechanisms into account as well as the result of 
previous  evaluations,  and  provisions  for  more  comprehensive  situational  awareness, 
Option  4  has  potentially  an  equivalent  effectiveness  to  Option  3.  Through  these 
measures, the Mechanism is laying down the ground for purely risk-based evaluations. It 
will be able to design more and more targeted evaluations, which will allow combining in 
one  evaluation  visit  in  a  short  period  of  time  (1-2  weeks)  more  policy  fields.  For 
example,  in  the  not-so  distant  future,  one  could  envisage  four  evaluation  visits,  one 
covering  integrated  border  management  (merging  external  borders  and  return),  one 
covering  compensatory  measures  (merging  police  cooperation  and  SIS / new  IT  tools), 
one on visa and another on data protection. More targeted evaluations would contribute 
in  the  medium-long  term  to  increase  links  among  the  evaluations  of  four  policy  fields 
and,  ultimately,  facilitate  creating  a  single  evaluation  report  assessing  the  overall 
performance of the Member State. 

77 

 
Furthermore, to increase strategic focus, Option 4 extends the duration of the evaluation 
cycle to seven years, broadens the range of tools available, and clarifies the criteria and 
conditions for their use (as per Option 3).  

For the Specific Objective 2 (rationalise the distribution of tasks and responsibilities, and 
simplify  and  accelerate  the  process  and  procedures),  Option  4  proposes  the  measures 
indicated  per  Option  3  and  it  would  lead  to  faster  evaluation  process,  higher  peer-
pressure, less bureaucratic procedure and high potential for simplification.  

In  relation  to  fundamental  rights  (Specific  Objective  3),  Option  4  does  not  include  the 
possibility of specific evaluations (as per Option 3) considering that this is not the most 
effective measure. Instead, it proposes to increase legal certainty on elements relevant for 
fundamental  rights  and  highlight  their  prominence  and  political  importance  (as  per 
Option 2), which would have a high positive impact for achieving this objective.  

As  regards  to  Specific  Objective  4  (optimise  the  participation  of  Member  State  experts 
and  the  involvement  of  EU  bodies  and  agencies  and  synergies  with  other  instruments), 
Option  4  combines  a  number  of  measures  indicated  under  the  three  options.  As  in  the 
case of Option 3, it has the highest impact in relation to Specific Objective 4 to increase 
participation of experts and synergies with other instruments.  

Overall, the effectiveness of Option 4 was measured in particular having in mind the fact 
that the Mechanism is an instrument functional to the respect of the rule of law within the 
framework of Schengen and in the believe that contributing to a more resilient Schengen 
would have in turn a positive social and economic impact, impossible to be assessed on 
its own merit. 

Figure 12 – Evaluations – Comparison of policy options 

Source: computation by the Commission based on internal data 

78 

 
 
 
Figure 13 – Member State experts – Comparison of policy options 

Source: computation by the Commission based on internal data 

Table 14 – Evaluation team size – Comparison of the policy options 

2015-2019 & 
Baseline 
Scenario 

Option 1 

Option 2 

Option 3 &4 

Announced 
than revisit) 

(other 

7.3 

Unannounced 
than revisit) 

(other 

5.4 

Verification Revisits 

N/A 

Revisit  (Announced  or 
Unannounced) 

7.4 

7.3 

5.4 

N/A 

7.4 

↓ 6.5 

↓ 6.5 

↓ 5 

N/A 

↓ 6.5 

↓ 5 

1 

↓ 4 

Source: computation by DG Home based on internal data 

79 

 
 
 
 
Figure 14 – Length of the procedure – Comparison of policy options 

7.2.  Efficiency 

The reform intends to make the Mechanism more efficient. As explained above, the aim 
is not a reduction of the total administrative and financial costs per se. But any gain in 
effectiveness  is  conditional  to  make  better  use  of  the  available  resources  as  existing 
human  and  budgetary  resources  are  not  expected  to  increase.  Already  now  the 
Mechanism is not a costly instrument.  In fact, it costs no more than EUR 2 million for 
the Commission  on a  yearly  basis  for organising evaluation  and monitoring visits.  It is 
also  not  costly  for  Member  States,  about  EUR  100 000  -150 000141  per  Member  State 
every five years. These amounts are negligible compared to the economic impact of the 
correct  implementation  of  certain  provisions  of  the  Schengen  acquis  that  can  easily 
amount to several millions. Longer waiting times, for the issuing of visa or crossing the 
external borders due to insufficient staff, can, for instance, have very negative impact on 
the economy of border areas or on tourism. 

The  Commission  does  not  expect  the  measures  proposed  under  the  four  options  to 
generate  significant  additional  costs  compared  to  the  baseline  scenario  as  regards  the 
main changes in the organisation of evaluations (see section 6.4). Only the Commission 
and  EU  agencies  would  face  new  or  additional  costs  under  the  different  options 
(especially  trainings,  and  for  the  EU  agencies  also  wider  contribution  of  experts  and 
more comprehensive data sharing). This is so in particular because the Regulation would 
leave  a  sufficient  margin  to  decide  on  a  case-by-case  basis  on  the  proportionate 
implementation of the measures in question. They would also be largely offset by certain 
cost savings in other areas (announced evaluations) to abide with the current resources. 

Option  1  has  the  lowest  efficiency  as  it  combines  the  lowest  effectiveness  in 
achieving the specific objectives with several measures that may generate additional 
administrative  costs,  notably  training  and  wider  contribution  of  experts  by  EU 
agencies / bodies.  A  one-week  training  in  the  visa  field  with  a  mock  evaluation  of 
consulates  in  third  countries  costs  approximately  EUR  70 000,  while  a  mostly  on-line 
training  in  the  field  of  data  protection  would  be  a  fraction  of  this  amount.  The 
participation of an expert by FRA would amount on average to between EUR 1 347 and 
EUR 2 147 in  addition  to between 50 working hours to  at  least  70 working hours. The 
scope of these measures should therefore be limited to balance the increase in costs with 

141  

This  is  a  rough  estimation  based  on  the  data  on  working  hours  and  financial  costs  provided  by 
Member States. 

80 

 
 
                                                           
their positive effects on a case-by-case basis. In this respect, as explained above trainings 
generate important benefits for the Member States but also several EU agencies stressed 
the benefit from the participation of their experts to SCH-EVAL (‘The evaluations help 
the  Agency  to  be  in  touch  with  MS  and  the  operational  work’).  On  the  other  side,  the 
inclusion of new elements would not create additional costs, as those elements would be 
absorbed  in  the  already  existing  evaluations  and  cost  savings  are  expected  by  having 
more targeted and strategic evaluations. 

Option 2 is more efficient than Option 1 as it includes, in addition to the measures 
under  Option  1,  a  set  of  measures  that  significantly  reduce  the  administrative 
burden  and  bring  about  simplification.  In  particular,  this  regards  the  possibility  of 
adjusting in a more flexible way the annual programme to limit the need of amendments, 
declassifying  the  evaluation  reports  as  a  rule,  reducing  the  frequency  of  follow-up 
reports, and introducing more flexibility in the number of experts. As explained above, it 
was  possible  to  quantify  the  impacts  of  these  measures  only  partly,  but  all  concerned 
stakeholders  confirmed  that  –  compared  to  the  size  of  the  administration  concerned  – 
such measures would have a non-negligible impact. Option 2 is also more efficient than 
Option  1  in  relation  to  the  integration  of  fundamental  rights,  as  it  does  not  generate 
additional costs while increasing legal certainty is expected to generate benefits. Yet, on 
balance,  the  moderate  impact  of  Option  2  on  the  effectiveness  of  SCH-EVAL 
undermines the potential efficiency generated by cost savings. 

Option  3  is  a  highly  efficient  option  due  to  its  high  effectiveness  and  possible  cost 
reduction. Overall, the scope of the unified evaluations would be smaller than the sum of 
the  current  evaluations  in  six  policy  fields.  Even  a  higher  number  of  unannounced  and 
thematic  evaluations  –  which  are  normally  less  costly  than  announced  periodic 
evaluations – would not offset the cost savings in relation to announced evaluations. The 
establishment of a pool of experts would facilitate the selection of experts with the most 
appropriate mix of profiles, which in turn would allow covering all required skills with a 
lower number of experts. The costs arising from the management of the pool would be at 
most  equivalent  to  the  burden  resulting  from  an  individual  call  for  experts  for  each 
evaluation.  Having  a  single  evaluation  report  per  Member  State  in  addition  to  new 
procedures  for  adopting  the  evaluation  reports  and  recommendations  would  have  a 
significant positive impact on the effectiveness in terms of the length of the process and 
the  administrative  burden.  Additional  costs  would  result  for  the  EU  agencies  from 
requests to provide additional risk analyses and reports. The costs would depend on the 
EU  agency  concerned.  However,  costs  would  be  limited,  as  additional  requests  should 
concern primarily information already available to the EU agencies. 

However, when it comes to fundamental rights (Specific Objective 3), the expansion of 
the scope by the introduction of  dedicated evaluations for fundamental  rights would 
imply  that  a  relevant  share  of  the  resources  for  announced  evaluations  would  be 
dedicated  to  fundamental  rights.  Although  on  balance  the  costs  for  announced 
evaluations  would  decrease,  there  would  be  a  relevant  shift  of  costs  from  other  policy 
fields  to  fundamental  rights.  In  proportion,  as  regards  fundamental  rights  only,  this 
measure is therefore the most costly compared to measures under Option 1 and 2, while 
also being the least effective. With regard to Specific Objective 3, Option 3 is not the 
most efficient. 

Option  4  introduces  a number  of  measures  contributing  to  high  efficiency  and,  as 
shown  in  section  6,  would  be  largely  equivalent  to  Option  3.  In  this  respect,  the 
Commission  carried  out  a  cost / benefits  analysis  with  the  data  collected  during  the 
stakeholders’ consultation. As in the case of Option 3, more targeted evaluation visits and 

81 

 
a  more  balanced  use  of  evaluation  tools  (decreased  use  of  announced  periodic 
evaluations,  compared  to  other  evaluation  tools)  would  require  less  financial  resources 
from  the  Member  States  and  Commission,  while  enhancing  the  strategic  focus  of  the 
Mechanism. 

Option 4 would simplify and accelerate the administrative procedures and reduce related 
working  hours.  Simplification  would  derive  from  a  number  of  measures,  i.e.  lower 
frequency  for  Member  States  to  reply  to  the  standard  questionnaire  (for  the  reduced 
number of announced evaluations), declassification of evaluation reports, and reduction 
of follow-up reports by the Member States and related assessment by the Commission.  

In relation to the reduced number of Member State experts (due to the flexibility in  the 
size of the evaluation team and the proportion of the different types of evaluations), the 
changes  would  reduce  the  costs  for  Member  States  as  regards  both  their  active  and 
passive participation in the Mechanism. These cost savings would not be as high as under 
Option 3, but still appreciable. 

Regarding fundamental rights, Option 4 would aim to better integrating their protection 
under the Mechanism without requiring additional resources for a separate evaluation. 

7.3. 

Proportionality 

Operational measures under Option 1 do not impose additional obligations on the actors 
and their practical implementation will depend on the assessment of their proportionality 
by the actors involved on a case-by-case basis.  

The limited scope and legal effects of the measures included under Option 2 ensure their 
proportionality.  Option  2  is  a  minimalist  approach  that  would  increase  legal  certainty, 
simplify and streamline procedures. The declassification of the evaluation reports is also 
a  proportionate  measure,  as  it  would  enhance  the  transparency  of  the  Mechanism  (by 
facilitating the transmission of reports to European Parliament and national Parliaments) 
but  it  would  not  affect  otherwise  the  level  of  confidentiality  of  the  reports142.  Member 
States would have the right, where necessary and in accordance with national law, to ask 
for the classification of the report as EU RESTRICTED in full or in part. 

Option  3  includes ambitious  legislative changes  in  a number of areas. As explained in 
the previous section, the necessity and suitability of the proposed measures are justified 
by their close link with the drivers of the problems identified. The proposed measures do 
not  have  generally  automatic  legal  effects  and  are  subject  to  strict  conditions  ensuring 
their  proportionality143.  Furthermore,  measures  on  the  institutional  balance  increase  the 
proportionality  of  the  involvement  of  the  different  actors  by  strengthening  their  role  in 
the  politically  most  important  cases,  while  simplifying  the  procedure  in  cases  having 
rather  a  technical  profile.  However,  the  measures  entailing  the  adoption  of  parallel 
legislative  acts,  to  expand  the  scope  of  the  Mechanism  or  to  amend  the  founding 
Regulations of the relevant EU agencies and bodies, may be considered disproportionate 
given  the  work  and  political  risks  entailed  compared  to  the  benefits,  particular  as  an 
equivalent objective might be attained by other less burdensome means.  

Being Option 4 a combination of measures of the three other options, all proportionate, it 
goes  without  saying  that  the  measures  under  Option  4  do  not  go  beyond  what  is 

142   As regards the application of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001; OJ L 145, 31.5.2001, p. 43. 
143  

In particular, it is to note that the possibility to carry out unannounced visits without previous notice 
would be limited to cases where this may be proportionate in the light of the position of the different 
stakeholders. 

82 

 
                                                           
necessary  to  achieve  the  specific  objectives  of  the  initiative.  It  is  also  a  more 
proportionate  option  than  Option  3,  as  it  does  not  entail  the  development  of  several 
parallel legal acts. 

7.4.  Coherence 

The  four  options  include  measures  that  are  coherent  with  the  overall  objective  of 
strengthening  the  effectiveness  of  SCH-EVAL  and  herewith  the  proposed  Schengen 
Strategy.  The  options  will  contribute,  in  different  measures,  to  this  goal  by  reinforcing 
the monitoring pillar of the Schengen Governance. Nonetheless, it should be noted that 
the  new  challenges  of  Schengen,  such  as  migration  and  terrorism,  will  not  be  resolved 
directly  by  the  revision  of  the  Mechanism  (by  any  of  the  proposed  policy  options)  and 
will have to be addressed by other initiatives, amending the specific instruments that deal 
with these issues and that constitute the “substance” of the Schengen evaluations. 

More  targeted  and  strategic  evaluations  can  support  in  particular  the  assessment  of  the 
necessity and proportionality of the unilateral decisions of the Member States concerning 
the reintroduction or prolongation of internal border checks under the Schengen Borders 
Code. 

Further, all four options take in due account the significant changes of the legal context 
in which SCH-EVAL operates. Widening the scope of the evaluations to include new IT-
systems  related  to  Schengen  would  allow  strengthening  the  implementation  of  the  new 
regulations144. The proposed approach allows enough flexibility to reflect future changes 
that might result from measures proposed under the New Pact on Asylum and Migration 
and the EU Security Union Strategy, and others that might occur in years to come. 

Options 2, 3 and 4 are consistent with reforms introduced by the EGBC Regulation. They 
include the possibility of extending the evaluations’ scope to support the verification of 
relevant  Frontex’  activities  in  so  far  as  they  perform  functions  on  behalf  of  a  Member 
State, and put in place the basis for stronger synergies with the Vulnerability Assessment. 
They  also  improve  the  conditions  of  the  involvement  of  other  EU  agencies  reflecting 
their increased role since 2015 and proposed development of their respective mandates. 
However,  by  providing  for  the  possibility  to  address  recommendations  immediately  to 
the EU agencies, Option 3 may implicitly conflict with the competence of other actors to 
overview  the  EU  agencies  activities  and  decide  on  the  most  appropriate  measures  to 
address any issues emerged on occasion of the evaluations. 

Regarding the measures to better integrate fundamental rights protection, the four options 
are  coherent  with  the  proposal  for  a  monitoring  mechanism  about  screening  of  third-
country nationals at the external borders145 and the establishment of Frontex Fundamental 
Rights  Officer.  An  EU  body / agency  observed  that  there  is  no  substantial  risk  of 
the  proposed  mechanism  and 
duplication,  because 

the  scope  of  SCH-EVAL, 

144   Under the current This implies that as the legal basis of the SIS changes, evaluations will evaluate 
the implementation of the relative amendments and this would be covered by the initial decision to 
evaluate  SIS.  Yet  the  inclusion  of  new,  additional  provisions  would  not  be  covered  by  the  initial 
decision to evaluate  SIS. The same applies also when we look at other policy fields. The new IT-
systems  are  not  merely  amendments  of  provisions  already  evaluated  in  any  policy  field,  nor  data 
protection  nor  external  borders.  In  practical  terms,  agreement  should  be  reached  at  the  stage  of 
adopting the multiannual or annual programme. 
COM(2020) 612 final of 23.9.2020. See Article 7. 

145  

83 

 
                                                           
Fundamental  Rights  Officer  are  different.  On 
complementarity and room for ‘cross-fertilisation’146 among the different tools.  

the  opposite, 

there  would  be 

In broader terms, by better linking the different policy fields, the initiative may reinforce 
the  effectiveness  of  the  holistic  approach  proposed  by  the  Commission’s  strategies  and 
reinforce the complementarity of all tools developed as part of new legislative efforts. 

7.5. 

Stakeholders’ support 

As indicated in section 5, the Commission proposed the measures under the four policy 
options by taking into account the recommendations of stakeholders.  

Option  1  would  introduce  operational  measures  only.  All  stakeholders  agreed  on  the 
changes  proposed  under  this  option.  However,  Option  1  would  not  address  fully  the 
concerns  raised  by  some  stakeholders,  as  it  would  improve  the  functioning  of  the 
Mechanism to a certain extent only. In this respect, the limited changes to the scope and 
programming (i.e. no significant increase in using evaluation tools, other than announced 
evaluations, and keeping the 24h notice for unannounced evaluations) were criticised in 
particular  by  the  European  Parliament  and  civil  society  organisations,  as  these  changes 
would not allow having a comprehensive overview on the state of Schengen. This option 
would  not  solve  completely  the  issues  indicated  by  Member  States  in  relation  to  the 
insufficient number of highly qualified experts and unbalanced contribution of expert by 
Member  States  or  the  need  for  the  Mechanism  to  carry  out  more  targeted  evaluations 
focusing on the essential.  

By  reinforcing  operational  changes  and  increasing  legal  certainty,  Option  2  would 
establish measures that found broad support among all stakeholders. Despite the positive 
changes,  i.e.  declassification  of  evaluation  reports  (supported  by  European  Parliament 
and NGOs), the risk of fragmentation would remain and  this  option  would not  respond 
adequately to stakeholders’ call for having an overview of the state of Schengen’s state. 
Option 2 would simplify the existing procedural obligations and introduce time limits as 
widely  requested  by  Member  States,  the  European  Parliament  and  civil  society 
organisations. Nonetheless, keeping the current institutional set-up would still affect the 
length  of  the  processes,  which  was  indicated  as  one  of  the  main  shortcomings  by  all 
stakeholders, especially Member States and European Parliament. 

Option  3  would  improve  the  functioning  of  SCH-EVAL  significantly.  Several 
stakeholders supported a number of measures proposed under this option, i.e. modifying 
the  conditions  and  criteria  for  the  use  of  the  evaluation  tools,  in  particular  deleting  the 
24h  notice  for  unannounced  evaluations  (European  Parliament  and  civil  society 
organisations),  introducing  a  fast-track  procedure  (all  stakeholders),  creating  a  pool  of 
experts  (European  Parliament  and  Member  States),  better  reporting  to  the  Council  and 
European Parliament, etc. However, Member States were divided on expanding the scope 
of  SCH-EVAL,  creating  all-encompassing  evaluations  or  introducing  changes  to  the 
Council’s role in the evaluation process. Regarding the changes to the decision-making 
process,  Option  3  proposes  to  focus  the  Council  decision-making  in  the  adoption  of 
recommendations for the most politically relevant cases and to increase significantly its 
role  in  the  follow  up,  including  closure  of  action  plans  in  some  cases,  as  supported  by 
several Member States. Stakeholders did not support the proposed creation of a specific 
evaluation  for  fundamental  rights,  given  the  peer-to-peer  nature  of  the  Mechanism  and 
the existence of other instruments in the area. 

146  

See Annex 2. 

84 

 
                                                           
Option 4 combines the measures under the three other options that overall found broad 
support by all stakeholders. It adopts a more cautious approach on the introduction of all-
encompassing evaluations given Member States’ division on this matter. All stakeholders 
expressed  convergence  on  the  need  for  simplification  of  the  processes  and  procedures. 
This  option  would  achieve  this  goal  while  proposing  a  compromise  to  focus  the 
Council’s  decision-making  on  the  adoption  of  recommendations  in  the  most  politically 
relevant cases and increasing significantly its role in the follow up, including closure of 
action plans in some cases as supported by several Member States. Furthermore, Option 
4  would  increase  legal  certainty  on  elements  relevant  for  fundamental  rights  without 
adding a separate evaluation (which did not find support during the consultation).  

85 

 
 
Table 15 – Overview – Comparison of policy options 
Option 1 

Option 2 

Option 3 

Option 4 

Operational changes 

Targeted legislative changes 

Ambitious legislative changes 

Combined approach 

Impacts/Options 

1.  Effectiveness 

the 

focus  of  evaluations 

Low  to  Moderate  –  Operational  measures  would 
have only a  limited  impact on the effectiveness by 
increasing 
(through 
improved  risk  assessment)  and  quality  of  the 
findings.  However,  it  would  not  allow  for  a 
proportionate  use  of  the  different  instruments.  The 
effectiveness  of  operational  measures  depends  on 
the good will of the actors involved. With Option 1, 
there would be a reduction of announced visits of 
about  15%  and  the  number  of  Member  State 
experts  required  would  slightly  decrease  (by  3-
4%). 

Moderate  to  High  –  By  increasing  legal  certainty, 
Option  2  would  increase  effectiveness  by  filling 
possible  gaps  about  the 
inclusion  of  the  EU 
agencies,  increasing  the  focus  of  evaluations  and 
allowing  for  a  more  flexible  programming.  By 
simplifying, this option would increase effectiveness 
of  the  process;  yet  the  decision-making  process 
would  remain  unchanged  reducing  potential  for 
greater  peer  pressure  in  relevant  cases.  However, 
length of evaluation procedure will go from 12 to 
6 months. Flexibility in the number of experts could 
allow  redistributing  experts  across  evaluations  but 
would  not  address 
the  current  geographical 
unbalance.  Option  2  would  see  a  reduction  of 
announced  visits  of  about  15%  and  the  need  of 
Member  State  experts  would  decrease  by  13% 
compared  to  the  baseline  scenario(s).  Reporting 
cost reduced by 50% 

2.  Efficiency 

Low  –  Efficiency  of  operational  measures  is 
limited.  Trainings  in  particular  generate  additional 
administrative  costs  while  their  effectiveness  in 
promoting  contribution  of  experts  is  very  limited. 
This  option  does  not  provide  for  significant 
alleviation  of  administrative  burdens.  Option  1 
would  reduce  costs  for  Member  States  linked  to 
announced  evaluations  at  most  by  up  to  15%.  A 
reduction  of 15%  of costs  for the Commission  in 
the organisation of the missions would be possible. 

3.  Proportionality 

4.  Coherence 

5. 

Stakeholders’ support  

This  option  does  not  generate  any  automatic 
obligation for the actors. 

This  option  is  coherent  with  development  of  the 
Schengen acquis. 
Stakeholders  supported  operational  measures  but 
stressed  the  limited  capacity  of  this  Option  in 
improving the functioning of the Mechanism. 

in 

(flexibility 

Moderate  to  High  –  Option  2  includes  measures 
aiming to simplify the procedure and  increase legal 
certainty,  which  would  either  reduce  administrative 
the  number  of  experts, 
costs 
declassification,  reduced  obligations  in  the  follow-
up)  or  increase  effectiveness  without  generating 
additional  costs.  Option  2  would  reduce  costs  for 
Member  States  linked  to  announced  evaluations  at 
most  by  up  to  15.  A  reduction  of  15%  of  costs  for 
the Commission  in the organisation of the  missions 
would  be  possible.  Reporting  cost  reduced  by 
50% 
All measures under option 2 do not go beyond what 
is necessary to achieve the specific objectives. 

for 

and 

balanced 

conditions 

fragmentation, 

High  –  All-encompassing  evaluations  per  Member 
State  would  eliminate 
increasing 
strategic  focus,  and  extending  the  cycle’s  length 
would  effectively  rebalance  the  use  of  instruments. 
The  changes 
to  decision-making  process  would 
increase  the  Council’s  focus  on  political  sensitive  or 
important cases, increasing peer pressure, and create a 
more  proportionate  distribution  of  roles.  In  addition, 
it will reduce the length of procedure from 12 to 4 
months  and  in  case  of  serious  deficiencies,  to  2.5 
months.  The  pool  of  experts  and  clear  obligation  on 
the Member States to contribute experts would create 
the 
adequate 
contributions.  Better  use  would  be  made  of 
information  available.  The  creation  of  dedicated 
evaluation  for  fundamental  rights could weaken their 
monitoring.  Under  Option  3,  a  reduction  of 
announced visits of about 60%  would be achieved 
and  43%-44%  less  Member  State  experts  than  in 
the baseline scenario(s). 
High  –  Option  3  includes  measures  that  are  not 
expected to generate additional costs. Additional costs 
for EU bodies and agencies to provide  more targeted 
and  additional  information  would  be  balanced  with 
increased  effectiveness.  In  relation  to  fundamental 
rights,  to  create  dedicated  evaluations  generates 
appreciable 
in 
effectiveness.  Under  Option  3,  costs  for  Member 
States  related  to  announced  evaluations  would  be 
reduced  by  almost  60%.  A  lower  frequency  for  the 
presentation  of  the  follow-up  reports  would  reduce 
costs by 50%. 
All measures under option 3 do not go beyond what is 
necessary to achieve the specific objectives. 

costs  without 

increase 

any 

 High – Option 4 allows for a strong strategic focus 
and reduces the fragmentation to a certain extent in 
the short term. The extension of the cycle to seven 
years  would  contribute  to  a  more  balanced  use  of 
the  evaluation  tools.  In  the  medium-long  term, 
more targeted evaluations would make possible the 
combination  of  several  policy  fields.  Changes  to 
the  decision-making  process  reduce  the  length  of 
the  evaluation  process  and  administrative  burden. 
Focusing the Council’s role on politically sensitive 
or important cases would increase peer pressure.  it 
will reduce the length of procedure from 12 to 4 
months and in case of serious deficiencies, to 2.5 
months.  The  creation  of  pool  of  experts  would 
optimise 
the  participation  of  Member  States 
experts.  Under  Option  4,  a  reduction  of 
announced  visits  of  about  40%  would  be 
less  Member  State 
possible  and  33%-36% 
experts than in the baseline scenario(s). 

High  –  Option  4  introduces  measures  that  would 
reduce costs (shorter evaluations visits and smaller 
evaluation 
team)  and  alleviate  administrative 
burden on Member States and Commission. Under 
Option  4,  costs  for  Member  States  related  to 
announced evaluations would be reduced by almost 
40%. A lower frequency for the presentation of the 
follow-up  reports  would  reduce  costs  by  50%. 
Option  4  would 
the 
reduce 
Commission  of  the  announced  evaluations  by 
possibly 40%. 

the  costs 

for 

All measures under option 4 do not go beyond what 
is necessary to achieve the specific objectives. 

This  option  is  coherent  with  development  of  the 
Schengen acquis. 
All  measures  under  Option  2  found  broad  support 
among all stakeholders.  

This  option  is  coherent  with  development  of  the 
Schengen acquis. 
Broad support  for  measures. Stakeholders divided on 
extension  of  scope  beyond  Schengen acquis,  all-
encompassing  evaluations,  Commission  adopting 
recommendations  and  deleting  24h  notice.  They  all 
oppose a separate fundamental rights evaluation. 

This  option  is  coherent  with  development  of  the 
Schengen acquis. 
This  option  combines  a  number  of  measures  that 
found  wide  support  from  stakeholders  under  the 
other  options  but  keep  the  Commission  adopting 
recommendations  and  deleting  24h  advance  notice 
given their effectiveness.  

86 

 
 
 
8.  PREFERRED POLICY OPTION 

8.1.  Choice of Preferred Policy Option  

This  Impact Assessment has described and analysed a number of policy options for the 
consideration of policy-makers. Based on the stakeholders’ consultation, the main policy 
choices  that  policy-makers  will  have  to  consider  when  revising  the  Mechanism  are 
changes to: 

  The institutional balance in the decision-making process; 
  The scope of evaluations, in particular to decide whether to continue with the 
evaluations per policy field or move to a fully risk-based evaluations; whether 
to  extend  SCH-EVAL  to  areas  beyond  the  Schengen  acquis  and  cover  the 
activities of EU agencies; 

  The  criteria  and  functioning  of  evaluation  and  monitoring  tools, 
particularly  as  regards  the  necessity  of  short  advance  notice  in  case  of 
unannounced evaluations, and the duration of the evaluation cycle. 

Based  on  the  analysis  of  impacts,  and  in  particular  in  view  of  the  effectiveness  of  the 
Mechanism,  and  taking  into  account  the  positions  of  various  stakeholders,  the 
Commission considers Option 4 as the preferred Option. The other policy options are 
excluded  as  they  address  the  problems  only  to  a  certain  degree  or  are  difficult  to 
adopt / implement.  

Option 1 would solve the identified problems only to a limited extent. This was already 
indicated in the five-year review and it was clearly confirmed in the analysis of impacts 
and  even  the  call  by  the  Council,  the  European  Parliament  and  civil  society  to  make 
legislative changes to the current Regulation. 

Option 2 would improve the functioning of the Mechanism in certain areas particularly 
as  regard  simplification  and  streamlining.  It  creates  a  flexible  framework  for 
programming and defining priorities; simplifies or eliminates administrative burdens, and 
strengthens  relevance  and  legal  certainty  regarding  fundamental  rights  other  than  data 
protection.  Nonetheless,  it  would  still  face  some  limitations,  such  as  reduced  peer 
pressure to accelerate the implementation of recommendations, and would have limited 
impact on the length of the procedure and the capacity of the Mechanism to react to new 
issues that may arise or to increase the monitoring of Member States.  

Option 3 would be overall the most effective and efficient to achieve the objectives for 
certain areas of intervention. However, it presents legal obstacles for its implementation 
(such as the creation of parallel legal acts).  It also presents operational problems for its 
implementation, as moving to all-encompassing evaluations might require the creation of 
multidisciplinary  teams,  which  at  this  stage  might  be  problematic  and  did  not  found 
broad support among Member States. Furthermore, it does not eliminate fragmentation, 
as some of the benefits of the option would be offset by the continuation of specific data 
protection  evaluations  (given  their  specificity)  and  the  creation  of  a  new  specific 
evaluation for fundamental rights. 

the  measures;  potential  for  simplification  and  for  reducing 

The factors leading to the choice of Option 4 are the following: the effectiveness and 
efficiency  of 
the 
administrative  burden;  and  a  realistic  assessment  of  positions  of  different  stakeholders’ 
group,  taking  into  account  the  practical / legal  feasibility  of  proposed  measures.  The 
Preferred Option excludes from Option 3 those measures that present legal obstacles for 
their  implementation,  such  as  modifying  the  scope  beyond  the  Schengen acquis,  given 
the  variable  geometry  of  Schengen,  or  issuing  recommendations  to  EU  agencies  and 

87 

 
bodies (as indicated in section 5.4). The Preferred Option also excludes issues that were 
very  divisive  among  Member  States,  such  as  enlarging  the  scope  beyond  the 
Schengen acquis.  It  would  be  difficult  to  create  a  specific  legal  act  for  a  very  limited 
extension of SCH-EVAL’s scope beyond the Schengen acquis without discussing asylum 
integration,  which  was  strongly  opposed  by  several  Member  States.  Moving  to  all-
encompassing evaluations would require changes in the organisation of evaluations and 
trainings  (to  have  multidisciplinary  teams)  and  only  two  Member  States  openly 
supported it. As a result, the Preferred Option offers an alternative that would allow more 
flexibility  as  to  how  to  organise  and  design  evaluations  and  reports  but  leaving  more 
space  for  discussion  with  Member  States.  Option  4  is  still  a  very  ambitious  option 
creating  a  modern  and  flexible  instrument  able  to  adapt  to  the  dynamic  nature  of 
Schengen  legal  framework  (high  score  for  effectiveness  and  efficiency  considering  its 
potential to bring about crucial changes in the medium-long term – equivalent to Option 
3); yet, it would present a more realistic and pragmatic combination of measures.  

8.2.  REFIT (simplification and improved efficiency) 

According  to  the  Commission’s  Regulatory  Fitness  and  Performance  Programme 
(REFIT), all initiatives planning to change existing EU legislation should aim to simplify 
and deliver stated policy objectives more efficiently (i.e. reducing unnecessary regulatory 
costs).  

In  its  analysis  on  simplification,  the  Commission  focused  on  the  areas  for  highest 
potential  for  the  simplification  of  administrative  burdens,  identifying  areas  where  the 
biggest  positive  gains  could  be  achieved  by  reducing  administrative  and  bureaucratic 
burdens;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  to  be  able  to  discard  policy  options  that  would  imply 
disproportionate newly emerging costs. 

As  illustrated  by  Table  16,  the  analysis  of  impacts  suggests  that  the  Preferred  Option 
(Option 4) should reduce the overall burden on Member States and EU institutions. This 
option  includes  several  measures  that  simplify  the  procedures  in  place  and  reduce  the 
administrative costs to guarantee that the different actors involved may sufficiently fulfil 
their  tasks  and  contribute  to  more  efficient  administrative  and  decision-making 
procedures (see Annex 4 and 5 and Table 17). 

Table 16 – Impacts on simplification and administrative burden 

Baseline 

Option 1 

Option 2 

Option 3 

On national 
administrations 

On EU institutions 

On EU bodies and 
agencies 

0 

0 

0 

+ 

+ 

– 

+ 

++ 

0 

++ 

++ 

– 

Preferred 
/ Option 4 

++ 

++ 

– 

+++ high, ++ medium, + low, 0 neutral and – negative. 
Under  Option  4,  there  would  be  potential  for  simplification  and  for  reducing  the 
administrative burden (as indicated by Table 17) on the Commission, Member States and 
Council.  

The reduction of the administrative burden would result from a combination of measures, 
notably:  flexible  legislative  framework  for  programming;  more  balanced  use  of  the 
evaluation tools (less announced evaluations); yearly call for experts; declassification of 
the  evaluation  reports;  changes  to  the  decision-making  procedures  (adoption  of 
evaluation report and recommendations by the Commission, and Council’s role focused 

88 

 
 
 
on most politically relevant cases); simplified procedure for the adequacy assessment of 
action plans (no formal Communication); reduced frequency of the reporting obligations 
(from three to six months). 

Regarding  the  Commission,  frequent  amendments  to  the  multiannual  and  annual 
evaluation programmes would be no longer required with the same frequency. While the 
management of a pool of experts may add additional workload for the Commission, this 
would  be  offset  overall  by  the  savings  in  terms  of  the  individual  calls  for  experts  that 
would  no  longer  be  necessary.  The  burden  generated  by  the  need  to  encrypt  the 
evaluation  reports  would  be  eliminated  with  the  declassification  of  reports.  For  the 
follow-up,  the  Preferred  Option  would  delete  the  significant  administrative  burden  that 
arises from the adoption of a formal Communication and its translation.  

For  Member  States,  a  reduction  of  the  administrative  burden  would  derive  from  the 
changes  to  the  programming  by  lowering  the  frequency  of  announced  evaluations  and 
extending the evaluation cycle to seven years. Less announced evaluations would reduce 
Member  States’  replies  to  the  standard  questionnaire  (which  is  necessary  only  for 
announced evaluations). For the preparation of the evaluations, the Preferred Option may 
have  an  appreciable  impact  given  the  wider  use  of  evaluation  tools  that  are  less 
burdensome  (unannounced  evaluations)  in  combination  with  the  reduced  number  of 
experts.  The  Commission  expects  that  a  lower  frequency  of  announced  evaluations 
(extension of the evaluation cycle) would reduce the relative burden by at least 20%. In 
the  follow-up  phase,  the  proposed  measures  would  reduce  by  50%  the  burden  on 
Member States for the submission of the follow-up reports. 

As regard the Council, the changes to the decision-making would reduce the number of 
cases in which the Council would adopt the recommendations, limiting the administrative 
burden.  

Table 17 – Areas of administrative simplification potential 

Areas of 
administrative 
simplification 
potential 
Evaluation 
programme 
amendments 

Calls for experts 
Commission 
proposal for 
recommendations 

Baseline 

Option 1 

Option 2 

Option 3  

Option 4 
(Preferred 
Option) 

 0 

0  

0  

0  

0.5/year 
(counting the 
average but it is 
about 1/year)  

8 calls / year 
40/year 

6-8 calls / year  
41/year 

6-8 calls / year  
41/year 

Council 
recommendations 

40/year 

41/year 

41/year 

1 / year 
0-5 / year 
Only if serious 
deficiencies, 
thematic 
evaluations, first 
time evaluations 
0-5 / year 
Only if serious 
deficiencies, 
thematic 
evaluations, first 
time evaluations 
0 

1/ year 
 0-5 /year 
Only if serious 
deficiencies, 
thematic 
evaluations, first 
time evaluations 
 0-5 /year 
Only if serious 
deficiencies, 
thematic 
evaluations, first 
time evaluations 
 0 

20 

20 

0 

Assessment 
action plans 
(Commission 
Communications)  
Progress reports 

4 reports/ year 
per action plan 
(24 progress 

4 reports/ year 
per action plan 
(24 per MS)  

2 reports/ year 
per action plan 
(12 per MS) 

2 reports/ year 
per action plan 
(8 per MS) 

2 reports/ year 
per action plan 
(8-12 per MS) 

89 

 
  
Areas of 
administrative 
simplification 
potential 

Baseline 

Option 1 

Option 2 

Option 3  

Option 4 
(Preferred 
Option) 

reports per MS) 

9.  HOW WILL ACTUAL IMPACTS BE MONITORED AND EVALUATED? 

In line with Better Regulation rules, the evaluation of the functioning of SCH-EVAL will 
be based on a detailed programme for monitoring the outputs, results, impacts. Table 18 
includes  a  non-exhaustive  list  of  quantitative  indicators  proposed  to  monitor  the 
achievement of policy objectives identified in this Impact Assessment.  These indicators 
reflect  and  define,  in  practice,  the  success  of  the  policy  option  and  will  be  measured 
yearly.  While  certain  aspects  will  need  a  qualitative  analysis,  certain  indicators  cannot 
include  fix  quantitative  targets.  They  are  contingent  on  external  factors  as  they 
correspond to  activities reactive to  unpredicted risk situations.  This  is  most  notably the 
case for the participation of FRA observers.  
The  Commission  will  adopt  a  new  IT  tool  (‘KOEL’147)  for  a  continuous  monitoring  of 
the  fulfilment  of  the  recommendations  by  the  Member  States,  which  will  become 
operative already in 2021.  

The  Commission  will  assess  the  overall  success  only  at  the  end  of  the  cycle  when  all 
Member  States  will  have  undergone  at  least  one  evaluation  and  submit  a  report  to  the 
Council and the European Parliament within 6 months of the adoption of all evaluation 
reports regarding the evaluations covered by the five-year cycle following the entry into 
force of the amendment to the Regulation. Such review shall cover all the elements of the 
Regulation,  including  the  functioning  of  the  procedures  for  adopting  acts  under  the 
evaluation mechanism. 

Table 18 – Success indicators 

Specific Objectives 

Avoid gaps and 
increase the strategic 
focus  

Operational 
Objective 
 

Increase use 
of ad-hoc 
evaluations 

Rationalise the roles 
and distribution of 
responsibilities and 
simplify processes and 
procedures 

  Make the 
evaluation 
process and 
the follow-up 
faster  

Indicators 

  Number of unannounced and 

thematic evaluations (yearly average 
over the cycle) 

  Discussion at Ministerial level of 
findings or state of play of the 
recommendations 

Target 

↑ increasing 
trend 

↑ increasing 
trend 

  Average length of the evaluation 

6 months 

process 

  Deficiencies identified by the 

Schengen evaluation mechanism 
pending to be remedied at the end of 
year 

↓ decreasing 
trend 

Optimise the 
participation of MS 

  Ensure 

adequate 

  Average number of experts required 

per evaluation visit148 

6.5 

147   KOEL  (Knowledge  of  European  Legislation)  is  a  web-based  application  within  the  European 

Commission to manage knowledge on Legislative Acts and related regulatory documents. 
Thematic evaluations should not be included in the computation. 

148  

90 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Specific Objectives 

experts and the 
involvement of EU 
bodies and agencies 

Operational 
Objective 

contribution 
of experts  

 

Improve 
exchange of 
information   

Indicators 

Target 

  Ratio designated/required experts 

1 

  Number of risk analysis or other 

reports 

↑ increasing 
trend 

↑ increasing 
trend 

↑ increasing 
trend 

Strengthen the 
implementation of 
fundamental rights 
safeguards under the 
Schengen acquis 

  Widen the 

  Number of FRA observers in 

participation 
of FRA in the 
evaluations 

Schengen Evaluations 

  Number of experts trained on 

fundamental rights 

91 

 
 
Annex 1: Procedural information 

1.  LEAD DG, DECIDE PLANNING AND CWP REFERENCES 

The lead DG is the Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs (DG HOME). The 
agenda planning reference is PLAN/2020/8679. 
The Commission Work Programme for 2021149 provides, under the heading ‘Promoting our 
European  way  of  life’  a  legislative  initiative  to  amend  the  Regulation  establishing  the 
Schengen Evaluation and Monitoring Mechanism. 

2.  ORGANISATION AND TIMING 

The  Secretariat-General  set  up  the  Inter-service  Steering  Group  to  assist  in  preparing  the 
initiative  on  10  December  2020.  The  following  Directorates  General  representatives 
participated  in  the  ISSG  work:  SJ,  DG  GROW,  DG  MOVE,  DG  RTD,  DG  HOME,  DG 
JUST, JRC, DG SANTE and EEAS. 

An Inception Impact Assessment was published on 4 January 2021 and was open to feedback 
from all stakeholders for a period of 4 weeks, until 1 February 2021.  

Within this framework, the Impact Assessment was subsequently prepared. 

3.  CONSULTATION OF THE RSB 

An upstream meeting with the Regulatory Scrutiny Board (RSB) was requested by the lead 
Directorate-General  in  order  to  receive  guidance  for  the  finalisation  of  the  draft  Impact 
Assessment Report on the Revision of the Schengen Evaluation and Monitoring Mechanism. 
The meeting took place on 26 January 2021. 

On  17  February,  the  Directorate-General  submitted  the  draft  Impact  Assessment  to  the 
Regulatory Scrutiny Board, in view of a hearing that took place on 17 March 2021. Ahead of 
the meeting, the Board sent out a Quality Checklist indicating an initial assessment together 
with  a  number  of  questions  intended  to  guide  the  discussion  during  the  meeting.  On  16 
March,  DG  HOME  submitted  written  comments  in  response  to  the  issues  raised  in  the 
checklist. 

On 19 March, the Board delivered its opinion on the draft Impact Assessment Report.  

The lead DG finalised the Impact Assessment by addressing the comments of the Board.  

4.  EVIDENCE, SOURCES AND QUALITY 

The  starting  point  for  this  Impact  Assessment  report  was  the  five-year  review  of  the 
Schengen  Evaluation  and  Monitoring  Mechanism’s  functioning  in  the  first  Multiannual 
Evaluation Programme (2015-2019), adopted by the Commission on 25 November 2020150.  

Data collected in the framework of the five-year review on the implementation of the SCH-
EVAL Regulation’s individual provisions are the main source to define the baseline scenario 
and  shortcomings  of  the  current  Regulation  (see  Annex  3).  The  Commission  also  relied  on 

149  
150  

COM(2020) 690 final of 19.10.2020. 
COM(2020) 779 final of 25.11.2020. 

92 

 
                                                           
three studies published on SCH-EVAL between 2017 and 2020151 and on the previous reports 
by  the  European  Parliament,  the  Council  and  the  Court  of  Auditors.  In  relation  to 
fundamental rights, main sources of information are also the papers published by NGOs and 
reports by the Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA). 

To assess the impact of the different options, information on stakeholders’ views through the 
stakeholder consultation activities, as per Table 19, were a main source of information.  

Overall, the quality of the data on the implementation of the Regulation is very high as they 
cover, for almost all aspects, 100% of the procedures and rely on direct sources. Very little 
hard data is available however, as regards the actual administrative and financial costs of the 
instrument, despite the serious effort made by the Commission to collect such data, as part of 
the  preparation  of  this  Impact  Assessment.  As  the  data  submitted  by  the  Member  States 
varied widely in range, the impact assessment has consolidated the replies taking into account 
the most converging elements also based on some case studies of procedures for which more 
comprehensive data were available, and the Commission’s experience. 

5.  ANALYTICAL METHODS 

The  Impact  Assessment  relies  on  a  combination  of  different  analytical  methods.  It  uses 
quantitative  analysis  of  the  data  available  to  identify  trends  and  the  correlation  between 
different factors and measure the different options’ impact. In several cases, however, the size 
of  the  sub-set  of  data,  combined  with  the  high  variation,  does  not  allow  to  draw  any 
conclusion  on  a  mere  quantitative  level.  It  further  evaluates  quantitative  trends  based  on 
qualitative evidence on the different procedures. As a large part of the issues at stake do not 
have a quantitative but  rather qualitative profile,  the impact  assessments  bases a significant 
part of the analysis on the views expressed by different stakeholders and case study research.

151  

  The Commission conducted also two interviews with the authors of the studies to understand better their 

findings and recommendations. 

93 

 
                                                           
Annex 2: Stakeholder consultation 

1.  CONSULTATION STRATEGY 

This  Annex  provides  a  synopsis  report  of  all  stakeholders’  consultation  activities 
undertaken in the context of this Impact Assessment. 

The overall aim of the  consultation  activities was to  collect  relevant  input  from  a wide 
range  of  stakeholders  at  both  national  and  EU  level  to  enable  the  preparation  of  the 
initiative for the revision of the Mechanism.  
The  stakeholders’  consultation  took  place  between  December  2020  and  1st  February 
2021. 

The  consultation  encompassed,  primarily,  targeted  stakeholders  by  way  of  thematic 
workshops  and  questionnaires.  It  included  all  categories  involved  in  the  functioning  of 
SCH-EVAL,  namely  Member  States  and  EU  bodies  and  agencies.  This  format  was 
preferred  to  bilateral  interviews  as  it  allows  broader  exchange  of  views  among  the 
participants.  Nonetheless,  the  Commission  articulated  the  workshops  per  stakeholder 
category. This approach appeared preferable given the very different interests and issues 
at stake for the different stakeholders. 

Over the course of the consultation process, the Commission used a variety of methods 
and forms of consultation. These included:  

  An  opportunity  for  all  interested  parties  to  provide  feedback  on  the  Inception 

Impact Assessment via the Commission’s ‘Have your say’ platform;  

  Two  workshops  with  competent  Member  State  authorities,  complemented  by  a 

targeted questionnaire and written comments following the workshops; 

  A workshop with national Data Protection Authorities (DPAs) and the European 
Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), complemented by a targeted questionnaire; 

  A  workshop  with  EU  bodies  and  agencies  involved  in  the  functioning  of  SCH-

EVAL, integrated by a targeted questionnaire; 

  A workshop with representatives of the European Parliament; 

  A workshop with a very restricted circle of members of the organised civil society 
known to have an interest in SCH-EVAL, as they had submitted position papers 
or otherwise approached the Commission.  

The  outcome  of  these  consultation  activities  is  summarised  per  stakeholders’  group  in 
section 2 of this Annex. It should be noted that the circumstances related to the Covid-19 
pandemic, e.g. travel restrictions, excluded the possibility of physical meetings with the 
stakeholders.  The  consultation  activities  had  to  be  carried  out  using  alternative  means, 
e.g.  videoconference,  written  questionnaires  and  written  comments  following  the 
workshops. 

The feedback received through the targeted consultations was processed manually. This 
was  feasible  given  the  overall  number  of  inputs  received.  The  assessment  of  replies 
involved  reading  each  consultation  response  in  full  and  documenting  viewpoints, 
including  any  issues  and  concerns  that  were  raised.  The  feedback  was  then  used  as 
appropriate in conducting the Impact Assessment. 

94 

 
A derogation from an open public consultation on the Impact Assessment was granted on 
30 July 2020. The request was made considering the technicalities and specificities of the 
subject  and the limited number of stakeholders directly  affected by the Mechanism. As 
the  issues  related  to  the  functioning  of  the  Mechanism  are  very  specific  and  subject  to 
strict  confidentiality  rules,  it  was  considered  that  the  general  public  could  not  be 
contribute to these issues through a public consultation in a productive and constructive 
way.  In  fact,  evaluation  reports  drawn  up  following  on-site  visits  are  classified 
documents  and  not  accessible  to  the  public,  which  limits  the  public  knowledge  of  the 
instrument. 

That  being  said,  the  Commission  published  the  Inception  Impact  Assessment  on  its 
website  for  four  weeks,  but  only  received  limited  feedback.  The  participation  of  the 
public in the consultation (only two feedbacks on the Inception Impact Assessment and 
limited  nnumber  of  civil  society  representatives  in  the  technical  workshop)  suggests  a 
relatively limited public interest in this topic (which, again, may stem from its inherently 
technical nature). 

Furthermore, 
(summarised in this Annex): 

this  Impact  Assessment 

takes 

into  account  additional  resources 

  Conclusions of the 1st Schengen Forum; 

  EU institutions’ reports on SCHEVAL. 

Table 19 includes a synopsis of the consultation activities carried out.  

Table 19 – Stakeholders’ consultation 

Method of 
consultation 

Stakeholder group 

Consultation period 

1st Schengen 
Forum 

European Parliament,  Member 
States, European Commission 

30 Nov 2020 

Schengen Strategy 

Objective of the 
consultation 

To obtain support on 
the Schengen Strategy 
main elements, 
including the revision 
of SCH-EVAL 

Revision of the Schengen Evaluation and Monitoring Mechanism 

Inception  Impact 
Assessment 

Public 

4 Jan – 1 Feb 2021 

Workshops at 
technical level 

Questionnaires 

-  Member States 
-  EU bodies and agencies 
-  Civil Society 
-  European Parliament 
-  Data  Protection  Authorities 
(DPAs)  and  European  Data 
Protection Supervisor (EDPS) 
-  Member States 

11 and 17 Dec 2020 
14 Dec 2020 
8 Jan 2021 
14 Jan 2021 
13 Jan 2021 

30 Nov-18 Dec 2020 

-  EU bodies and agencies 

11-23 Dec 2020 

-  DPAs 

8-20 Jan 2021 

Interviews 

Authors  of  Studies  on  SCH-
EVAL 

July 2020 

95 

from 
Collect  views 
different  categories  of 
stakeholders 

views 

on 
options/ 
the 
on 
for  Member 

Collect 
possible 
information 
costs 
States 
the 
Collect  data  on 
participation  of  EU 
bodies and agencies  
Collect 
views 
possible options 
discussion 
Technical 
on  the  content  of  the 

on 

 
 
 
 
Method of 
consultation 

Stakeholder group 

Consultation period 

Objective of the 
consultation 

studies 

2.  CONSULTATION ACTIVITIES AND RESULTS 

2.1 Inception Impact Assessment 

The Inception Impact Assessment was published for feedback by all interested parties on 
the  Commission’s  website152.  The  consultation  period  was  four  weeks  long,  between  4 
January  and  1  February  2021.  Respondents  were  invited  to  provide  online  comments. 
The  Commission  received  two  comments:  one  from  ECRE  (European  Council  on 
Refugees  and  Exiles)  and  the  second  from  a  citizen  whose  comment  was  however  not 
immediately relevant for the reform of SCH-EVAL. 

2.2 Summary of Stakeholders’ position 

European Parliament  
The  European  Parliament  indicated  that  the  scope  of  SCH-EVAL  should  focus  on  the  most  relevant 
elements of the Schengen acquis covering new elements (i.e. new IT systems) and actors (EU agencies’ 
implementation of the acquis). The Parliament advocated for including fundamental rights’ protection 
horizontally in all evaluations. The Parliament proposed extending the evaluation cycle to seven years, 
increasing flexibility when using all tools available and to dedicate more time to horizontal findings. It 
suggested making a more strategic use of tools, by removing for unannounced visits the 24h notice to 
the evaluated Member State. The Parliament was in favour of introducing time limits for the adoption of 
the  evaluation  reports  and  recommendations,  and  indicated  the  need  to  speed  up  implementation  of 
recommendations. The Parliament suggested defining ‘serioius deficiencies’ and setting up a fast-track 
procedure  for  them.  The  Parliament  suggested  increasing  the  involvement  of  FRA  experts  and  other 
actors,  and  widening  the  scope  of  evidence  in  order  to  include  the  information  provided  by  civil 
society’s organisations and other reputable sources (e.g. national / international monitoring bodies). The 
European  Parliament  recommended  increasing  synergies  with  other  EU  mechanisms,  particularly 
vulnerability assessment, and reinforcing the links between SCH-EVAL and infringement procedure. 

Member States  
Member  States  recommended  that  the  scope  of  SCH-EVAL  should  reflect  the  development  of  the 
Schengen acquis, notably to include the new IT systems and EU agencies’ activities, and considered the 
possibility of hybrid evaluations (on-site / remote). Some Member States proposed to extend the length 
of  the  evaluation  cycle.  For  Member  States,  evaluations  need  to  be  more  strategic  and  targeted,  and 
they recommended a  wider use of  thematic evaluations  while  keeping the  notice  for the unannounced 
visits. Member States agreed on introducing legal time limits for the evaluation process (including fast-
track  procedure  for  serious  deficiencies)  and  implementation  of  recommendations.  A  number  of 
Member  States  expressed  support  for  the  combined  adoption  of  the  evaluation  report  and 
recommendations by the Commission (under comitology examination procedure) to allow the Council 
to  focus  on  the  most  politically  relevant  cases.  Others  saw  the  added-value  of  having  findings  and 
recommendations  in  a  single  document.  Few  Member  States  suggested  to  have  a  single  report  per 
Member  State.  Most  Member  States  agreed  on  the  declassification  of  the  evaluation  reports  with  the 
possibility for Member States to indicate information that is to be treated as classified. Member States 
generally  agreed  to  lower  the  frequency  of  follow-up  reports.  Member  States  proposed  an  improved 
training system and incentives. Member States generally agreed that the Commission could decide on 
the optimal number of national experts and on the creation of a pool of national experts. A number of 
Member States proposed to strengthen the links between Frontex Vulnerability  Assessment and SCH-
EVAL, promote a  wider  involvement  of EU agencies, and improve the risk analysis and information 
provided by the EU agencies. 

DPAs / EDPS  

152  The 

Inception 

and 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/12825-Schengen-
evaluation-and-monitoring-mechanism- 

Impact  Assessment 

feedback 

received 

the 

is 

available 

at: 

96 

 
 
 
                                                           
DPAs  /  EDPS  recommended  that  evaluations  should  be  dedicated  exclusively  to  data  protection  and 
carried out by data protection experts. The scope should be adjusted to evaluate the new IT-systems and 
stressed  that  the  evaluation  programme  should  focus  on  the  most  important  aspects.  DPAs  /  EDPS 
suggested training for data protection experts and possible hybrid evaluations (on-site / remote).  

EU bodies / agencies 
EU bodies / agencies recommended clarifying the  conditions for the use of the evaluation tools and 
asked for a clear definition of ‘serious deficiencies’ and a ‘grading system’ for recommendations that 
would  correspond  to  the  severity  of  the  deficiencies  identified.  EU  bodies  /  agencies  indicated  the 
opportunity to accelerate procedures and processes. EU bodies / agencies supported the idea of a pool 
of Member States experts and proposed that the trained  experts should participate  in  SCH-EVAL as 
evaluators.  EU  bodies  /  agencies  suggested  including  other  actors  that  might  be  able  to  provide 
information  and  evidence  (e.g.  human  rights  monitoring  bodies)  and  recommended  to  clarify  the 
elements of complementarity between SCH-EVAL and Vulnerability Assessment. 

Civil Society Organisations  
Civil  Society  Organisations  proposed  a  general  evaluation  per  Member  State  and  stressed  the  need  to 
better  incorporate  fundamental  rights’  compliance  in  the  evaluations.  NGOs  advised  to  increase  the 
use of unannounced evaluations without the 24-hour notice to the evaluated Member State and asked 
for  a  clearer  definition  of  serious  deficiencies  and  a  prioritised  procedure  for  these  cases.  NGOs 
supported the introduction of deadlines for the Commission-led phase of the Mechanism and follow-up, 
and  proposed  the  adoption  of  the  recommendations  by  the  Commission.  NGOs  indicated  that  the 
Commission  should  determine  the  composition  of  the  evaluation  teams  and  proposed  to  include  EU 
experts from relevant bodies and agencies and the European Parliament. NGOs invited the Commission 
to  use  more  actively  enforcement  powers.  NGOs  recommended  to  widen  the  scope  of  evidence  to 
include  sources  from  third  parties  and  suggested  considering  their  input  during  the  preparation  of 
evaluations and follow-up 

2.3 Consultation of European Parliament 

The Commission organised a workshop on 14 January 2021, at a technical level, with the 
European  Parliament.  Representatives  of  various  Parliamentary  groups  from  the  LIBE 
Committee153 attended the meeting.  

The  stakeholders  participating  in  the  meeting  stressed  the  convergence  between  the 
Commission’s  five-year  review  and  the  study  carried  out  on  behalf  of  the  European 
Parliament. 

Key messages by the European Parliament 

-  The current scope of SCH-EVAL should be adjusted, particularly to include new IT-
systems,  certain  instruments  in  the  field  of  police  cooperation,  and  some  EU 
agencies’ activities. It is also key to differentiate between the most relevant elements 
of the Schengen acquis that need to be assessed and the other components that might 
be excluded or evaluated less regularly; 

-  A  seven-year  cycle  could  be  considered  so  to  ensure  a  better  connection  to  the 
Multiannual Financial Framework and more flexibility to use all the tools currently 
available and dedicate more time to drawing horizontal findings;  

-  To improve the functioning of the mechanism, it would be necessary to make more 
strategic  use  of  unannounced  evaluations,  removing  the  24h  notice  to  the 
evaluated  Member  State  or,  at  least,  removing  it  for  specific  cases;  define  the 
conditions  for  thematic  evaluations  and  provide  a  clearer  definition  of  ‘serious 
deficiencies’  and  a  faster  procedure  for  them.  More  rapid  procedures  for  the 

153

   Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs. 

97 

 
 
 
                                                           
adoption of the evaluation reports and recommendations and their follow up  would 
be also essential.  

-  There  is  a  need  that  SCH-EVAL  investigates  alleged  violations  of  fundamental 
rights  at  the  external  border.  Fundamental  rights  protection  should  be  included 
horizontally in  all evaluations, with  experts in  fundamental  rights  in  the evaluation 
teams and relying on third sources (monitoring systems and complaints collected by 
monitoring bodies and NGOs (which could trigger a visit).  

-  To  increase  the  transparency  of  SCH-EVAL,  it  is  essential  to  involve  relevant 
stakeholders,  taking  into  account  external  sources  of  information,  i.e.  information 
from  NGOs  or  national / international  monitoring  bodies,  and  better  reporting  to 
and sharing information with the European Parliament.  

-  To  avoid  overlaps  with  other  instruments,  it  would  be  crucial  to  strengthen  SCH-
EVAL links with the Frontex Vulnerability Assessment. The Commission should 
also  reinforce  the  link  between  SCH-EVAL  and  the  infringement  procedure,  by 
clearly  defining  when  the  Commission  would  take  legal  action  against  a  Member 
State that fails to implement the Schengen rules. 

Recommendations by the European Parliament for the reform of SCH-EVAL 

Scope and evaluation tools 
 

Include  the  assessment  of  new  information  systems  and  their  interoperability,  extending  SCH-
EVAL to Eurodac given its role in border security; 

  Reconsider the  scope of the  police cooperation evaluation as  now it is too scattered and does not 

cover all relevant aspects; 

  Verify  the  implementation  of  the  Schengen acquis  by  EU  agencies,  in  particular  monitoring  the 

activities of eu-LISA, Europol and Frontex, given their enhanced responsibilities; 

  Assess more regularly the absence of internal border controls, considering the unilateral actions by 
Member States following the 2015 migration crisis and the outbreak of COVID-19 pandemic; 
  Differentiate between the  most relevant elements of the Schengen acquis that need to be  assessed 

and the other components that might be excluded or evaluated less regularly; 

  Ensure more flexibility when using all the tools currently available; 
  Modify the duration of the evaluation cycle so to dedicate more time to horizontal findings and to 
have  a  better  overview  of  the  Schengen  area  as  a  whole  and  ensure  a  better  connection  to  the 
Multiannual Financial Framework; 

  Make  more  strategic  use  of  unannounced  evaluations  removing  the  24h  notice  to  the  evaluated 

Member State or at least removing it for specific cases; 

  Better define the conditions for thematic evaluations; 
  Provide a clearer definition of ‘serious deficiencies’ and a faster procedure for them; 

Evaluation process and follow-up 
  Shorten the length of the overall evaluation process; 
 
  Faster implementation of recommendations; 

Introduce time-limits for the adoption of the evaluation reports and recommendations; 

Involvement of other actors and transparency 
  Enhance the involvement of  other actors and  widen the  scope of evidence in order to include  the 
information  provided  by  civil  society’s  organisations  and  other  reputable  sources  (e.g. 
national / international monitoring bodies); 
Integrate fundamental rights experts in the evaluation team; 
Increase  the  role  of  Fundamental  Rights  Agency,  indicating  the  possibility  for  its  experts  to 
participate in the evaluations as full members and not as observers; 

 
 

Coordination and synergies between SCH-EVAL and other mechanisms 
 

Increase  synergies  and  avoid  duplications  with  other  EU  mechanisms,  notably  the  Frontex 
Vulnerability Assessment; 

  Reinforce the links between SCH-EVAL and infringement procedure. 

98 

 
 
 
 
2.4 Consultation of competent Member States authorities 

The Commission organised two workshops with Member States at a technical level (see, 
in  addition,  section  1  of  this  Annex.).  As  a  follow-up,  all  Member  States  provided 
additional  written  submissions  by  replying  to  the  questionnaire  or  by  submitting  other 
comments  in  writing.  The  Commission  articulated  the  consultation  around  four  main 
topics (scope, process, follow-up, experts). 

Key  messages  by  Member  States  on  the  scope  of  the  evaluations  and  use  of  the 
evaluation tools 

The  Commission  invited  the  Member  States  to  take  a  position  in  particular  on  the  following 

points: 

  How could evaluations become more strategic in order to address comprehensively all those 

aspects that put the well-functioning of the Schengen area at risk?  

  How  could  be  ensured  that  all  regions  are  adequately  evaluated  given  the  limited  available 
resources  while  respecting  the  principle  that  the  entire  Schengen  area  should  be  regularly 
evaluated?  

  Is the current repartition per policy field still adequate? Do recent legislative and regulatory 
reforms require to adapt the scope of the policy fields or even completely reconsider policy-
specific evaluations? 

  Could  thematic  evaluations  allow  a  more  effective  comparison  of  the  implementation  of 
different  elements  of  the  Schengen  acquis  across  the  area  while  unannounced  or  revisits 
could address specific challenges? 

  How could issues related to fundamental rights be better integrated in the evaluation process? 

Regarding  the  scope,  Member  States  expressed  different  views  in  particular  on  the 
possibility of widening the scope of the mechanism to better integrate the evaluation of 
the  implementation  of  provisions  targeting  secondary  movements.  Others  supported  an 
increased role of SCH-EVAL in evaluating the absence of internal border controls. Some 
Member  States  raised  the  need  to  ensure  SCH-EVAL  is  equipped  to  evaluate  Frontex 
standing corps’ activities.  

As to the scope of the SCH-EVAL evaluations, Member States generally stress that 
- 

evaluations  need  to  be  more  strategic  and  targeted  and  focus  on  the  elements 
that could have an impact on the well-functioning of the Schengen area;  
the  scope  of  the  evaluation  mechanism  should  be  adjusted  to  reflect  the 
development of the Schengen acquis, notably to include the new IT systems other 
than  the  Schengen  Information  System  such  as  Entry-Exit  system  and  ETIAS 
(several Member States also called for a thematic evaluation of the IT systems); 
the  evaluation  cycle  has  to  be  maintained  (to  ensure  that  all  Member  States  are 
evaluated  regularly)  with  more  flexibility  in  articulating  the  announced 
evaluations.  Some  Member  States  consider  that  evaluations  need  to  consider  the 
particular  challenges  faced  by  certain  Member  States  in  certain  policy  fields. 
Hybrid evaluations combining different  policy areas (for instance, in  the fields  of 
SIS and Police Cooperation) or covering a geographic area including more than one 
Member State at the same time could be carried out, if appropriate. Some Member 
States  also  suggested  integrating  data  protection  in  other  policy  fields.  Besides, 
some  Member  States  proposed  to  extend  the  length  of  the  cycle  to  alleviate 
pressure on resources for making use of other evaluation tools; 
the Commission should make wider use of thematic evaluations;  
unannounced evaluations should not occur without any previous notice, as this 
would be detrimental to the evaluations’ organisation. However, one Member State 

- 

- 

- 
- 

99 

 
- 

considered  that  if  a  Member  States  has  reported  all  actions  as  completed,  there 
should not be any problem to carry out a verification visit without advance notice; 
and 
in  addition,  some  Member  States  also  raised  the  need  to  prevent  incoherence 
among policy fields and the various reports should avoid in the future formulating 
the same or similar recommendations. Some Member States indicated that ideally, 
a single report could include all policy fields. 

Results of replies to the questionnaire154 

Scope of the evaluations 
Should the articulation of 
evaluations according to the 
policy areas mentioned under 
Article 4 of the SCH-EVAL 
Regulation be strictly followed 
also in the future? 

Member States’ most recurrent comment is the necessity to integrate new IT system in the evaluations and 
to have more strategic and targeted evaluations. Several Member States consider the possibility of merging 
different policy fields, but in general, for Member States the repartition per policy fields is appropriate. An 
extension beyond the Schengen acquis is also clearly rejected by a number of Member State. One Member 
State asks for stronger integration of fundamental rights. 

Planning of the 
evaluations 
A more flexible 
approach in the 
adjustment of the 
planning of 
evaluations in order 
to be able to react to 
evolving 
circumstances would 
have: 

In  their  comments,  several  Member  States  consider  flexibility  important  notably  for  unannounced 
evaluations.  Several  Member  States  also  refer  to  the  Covid-19  situation  to  substantiate  a  need  to 
introduce more flexibility also for announced evaluations in case of force majeur. Only 1 Member State 
considers  that  the  procedure  in  place  provides  already  flexibility.  A  Member  State  recalls  that 
‘conducting  an  evaluation  requires  a  planning  of  several  months,  on  which  the  state  to  be  evaluated 
must be able to rely. In this respect, a balanced approach must be found but in total we appreciate more 
flexibility,  shorten  the  questionnaires,  more  video  conferences  and  shorter  evaluations  could  be 
adequate instruments’. 

154  

The  graphs  in  Annex  2  reflect  Member  States’  replies  to  the  questionnaire  submitted  during  the 
consultation. 

100 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Unannounced 
evaluations 
The possibility to 
conduct unannounced 
on-site visits without 
previous notifications 
would have: 

A  wide number of  Member States  mention  that the previous  notice  would be  necessary for logistic 
reasons  in their comments. The  most common reason advanced by Member  States in  favour of  not 
giving previous notice is that the Member State evaluated would not have any possibility to take any 
influence on the evaluation results.  

Key messages by Member States on the evaluation process 

The Commission invited the Member States to take position on the following points: 

  What  would  be  an  appropriate  target  for  the  length  of  the  evaluation  process  taking  into 

account the resources available and the need to ensure adequate evaluations’ standards? 

  Which procedural steps could be in particular shortened without affecting the quality of the 

exercise nor the participation of all directly or indirectly affected parties? 

  What  procedural  requirements  could  be  softened  without  any  appreciable  impact  on  the 
quality of the evaluations and involvement of all relevant actors to make the process more 
cost-efficient? 

-  Overall, MS experts agree, in line with the 1st Schengen forum’s conclusions at 
political  level,  that  the  process  needs  to  be  shortened.  A  majority  of  Member 
States consider that an ideal length for the adoption of the evaluation report would 
be  up  to  4-6  months  from  the  evaluation  report  with  the  possibility  of  a  fast-
track  procedure  in  case  of  serious  deficiencies.  The  introduction  of  a  legal 
time-limit  for  the  adoption  of  the  evaluation  report  by  the  Commission  (and  in 
general  for  all  steps  of  the  procedure)  found  also  wide  support,  while  some 
the 
the  possibility 
Member  States  also  support 
recommendations.  
In  the  view  of  one  Member  State,  it  is  important  that  the  Schengen  Committee 
and the Schengen Working Party meet on a frequent and regular basis.  

to  set  a  deadline  for 

- 

-  Most  Member  States  also  agree  that  declassification  of  the  evaluation  reports 
would facilitate their handling from a technical point, but Member States should 
maintain the possibility to indicate information that is to be treated as classified. 
Only  a  Member  State  asked  that  at  least  the  draft  evaluation  report  is  classified 
par default. 

-  As to the decision-making process, a number of Member States consider that the 
current  two-step  adoption  process,  i.e.  adoption  of  the  evaluation  report  by  the 
Commission and adoption of the recommendations by the Council is appropriate. 
Others see possible advantages in the combined adoption of the evaluation report 
and  recommendations  by  the  Commission  (under  comitology  examination 
procedure)  to  shorten  the  process  and  allow  the  Council  to  focus  on  the  most 
politically  relevant  cases.  Some  Member  States  also  asked  for  a  more  balanced 

101 

 
 
 
 
 
 
distribution  of  responsibilities  and  increased  synergies  between  the  Council  and 
the Commission. 

Results of replies to questionnaires 

Pursuant  to  Article  14(2)  of  the  SCH-EVAL  Regulation,  the  Commission  shall  communicate  the  draft 
evaluation  report  to  the  evaluated  Member  State  within  six  weeks  of  the  on-site  visit  and  the  evaluated 
Member State shall provide its comments on the draft evaluation report within two weeks of its receipt. 

Had  these  time  limits  an 
impact  on 
appreciable 
the effectiveness? 

Shorter  time  limits  for 
sending  the  draft  report 
to  the  evaluate  Member 
States  and  submission  of 
comments  on  the  draft 
report  by  the  evaluated 
Member  State  would 
have overall: 

In their comment, a  number  of Member States consider that the six-week time limit could be  shortened, 
even to two weeks. The two-week time limit for the evaluated Member State comments is considered by 
some Member States even now too short, and it could negatively affect the quality of the report to shorten 
it. 

A time limit for the 
evaluation report 
drafting meeting, if it 
takes place, would have: 

Member States’ comments stress the  importance that the drafting meeting should take place shortly after 
the  evaluation  visit  to  be  effective.  Some  Member  States  consider  that  the  meeting  could  take  place  per 
videoconference. A Member State mentioned that the classified nature of the information should be taken 
into consideration with respect of the possibility to hold the meetings online. 

102 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A time limit for the 
adoption of the 
evaluation report by the 
Commission would have: 

A time limit for the 
adoption of the 
recommendations by the 
Council would have 
overall: 

Member  States  consider  notably  that  time  limits  for  the  adoption  of  the  evaluation  report  and  the 
recommendations would have a positive impact on the length of the process and accelerate the follow-up. 
One  Member  State  considers  that  this  would  not  be  the  case  because  ‘to  start  implementing 
recommendations  that  are  deemed  necessary  by  the  Member  State  itself  it  is  not  necessary  to  await  the 
adoption of the evaluation report by the Commission’. 

Overall length 
What should be the 
overall length of the 
procedure from end of 
the on-site visit until 
adoption of the 
recommendations: 

Handling  of 
information 

sensitive 

103 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Do the measures in place 
generate additional costs 
to comply with the 
relevant technical 
requirements or delay 
the handling of the 
documents concerned? 

The most common view is that the system generate additional costs in terms of administrative burden and 
delays in the handling of the documents while the relevant technology is already in place although not 
directly available to all persons concerned. These costs are not quantifiable. 

Do you consider that the 
technological security 
system in place to protect 
the information 
exchanged is necessary? 

The most common comment is that classification would be necessary, but only for duly justified cases and 
the  possibility  for  Member  States  should  therefore  remain  to  require  the  classification  of  the  report,  if  it 
contains sensitive information. 

Key messages by Member States on the follow-up 

The Commission invited the Member States to take position on the following points: 

  In light of the issues described above, what measures could be proposed to ensure a swift 

follow-up on the recommendations by Member States? 

  What  support  or  incentives  could  be  offered  by  the  Commission  to  Member  States  to 

facilitate implementation of the recommendations? 

  Would it be beneficial to involve more closely the Council in the follow-up process? If so, 

what would be the most appropriate measures? 

  What  would  be  the  most  cost-efficient  system  to  ensure  that  the  Commission  receives 

timely and accurate information on the progress made by Member States? 

  Would it be appropriate to increase the level of transparency on the implementation of the 
recommendations  by  Member  States?  What  would  be  the  most  appropriate  way  to 
disseminate information about the state of implementation in a certain Member State? 

  What information should be shared with the European Parliament?  
  What are otherwise the main factors that in the past weakened the actual impact of SCH-
EVAL  on  the  well-functioning  of  the  Schengen  area?  What  measures  are  needed  to 
strengthen the follow-up in the future? 

-  Member States generally agree that the follow-up process should be revised, as it 
is  ineffective  while  generating  an  excessive  administrative  burden.  In 
particular, follow-up reports should not be required more often than every six 

104 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
months, but at least once per year. They also see with favour the use of a new IT 
tool  (KOEL)  for  the  reporting  (as  announced  by  the  Commission).  Monitoring 
should  also  focus  on  the  most  important  findings  and  the  Commission  should 
provide more timely feedback on the action plans. 

-  Several member States see with favour a  wider involvement of the Council in 
the  follow-up  process  and  stress  the  need  to  foster  political  discussion  on 
recurrent deficiencies. One Member State indicated that the respective roles of the 
Schengen Committee and Schengen Working Party should be clarified. 

-  For some member States, a deadline for the fulfilment of the recommendations 
is needed and non-compliant findings should be addressed within two years at the 
latest,  while others suggested more flexibility in  the use of funds to  support  the 
fulfilment of the recommendations. 

Results of replies to the questionnaire 

Follow-up 
The current time limits 
under Article 16 of the 
SCH-EVAL Regulation 
for the follow-up had: 

With which frequency 
should Member States 
report to the 
Commission to ensure an 
effective and cost-
efficient monitoring: 

In their comments, some Member States note that the time limits for the action plan are appropriate while 
several  Member  States  consider  that  the  three-month  time  limit  for  the  follow-up  reports  generate 
excessive administrative burden and is often disproportionately short. One Member State also notice that 
the  Commission  is  rarely  respect  the  time  limit  for  the  assessment  of  the  action  plan.  Another  member 
State also stresses that timely feedback on the follow-up reports in between reporting from the Commission 
is essential to be able to determine  if the actions taken are sufficient and / or if additional information is 
required by the Commission. Alignment with the Vulnerability Assessment is also proposed by a Member 
State. 

105 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A time limit for the 
implementation of the 
recommendation by the 
evaluated Member States 
with regard to the length 
of the implementation of 
the recommendations 
would have: 

In their comments, Member States predominantly submit that deadlines should be introduced in particular 
in the case of serious deficiencies. Deadlines should in general take into account the different nature of the 
recommendations, but some Member States warn that only the Member State concerned might be able to 
judge the appropriate framework. A public authority considers that it should be sufficient to implement the 
recommendations by the subsequent evaluation, i.e. within five years. 

Key messages by Member States on the participation of ‘Member States’ Experts’ 

  What are the  merits of the participation of the national  experts in the evaluations and  what are the 
main  issues  that  emerged  in  the  past?  What  measures  are  needed  to  strengthen  the  contribution  of 
national experts to SCH-EVAL in the future? Provide concrete information on specific policy areas. 
In the light of the issues described above, what measures could be taken to increase the number of 
national experts available with appropriate skills and qualifications also at short notice? 
In  case  of  the  creation  of  a  pool  of  experts,  which  rules  and  principles  may  be  most  opportune  to 
ensure a swift mobilisation and availability of the experts in case of need? 

 

 

  Would  it  be  appropriate  to  incentivise  a  stronger  rotation  of  experts  and  wider  participation  of  all 

countries? What would be the most appropriate arrangement to achieve this?  

  Do you consider that the Regulation should be reviewed to strengthen the participation of national 

experts? What legislative measures could be envisaged? 

What are the most urgent training needs to meet present and future challenges? 
Member  States  overall  strongly  endorse  and  value  the  participation  of  their 
national experts in the evaluations as a cornerstone of the peer review principle and 
to  guarantee  the  quality  of  the  evaluations.  National  experts  also  gain  from  the 
experience  as  well  as  the  importance  of  creating  networking  among  experts.  Yet, 
Member States acknowledge that current contributions are inadequate.  

On trainings: 

-  The  training  provided  by  the  EU  agencies  is  of  utmost  importance  and  the 
need  to  be  further  enlarged  as  to  their  scope  and  modalities  (including  e.g. 
tools, 
refreshing 
participation  as  observers  to  real  evaluations).  An  alignment  of  the 
methodology in the different policy fields is needed, to increase consistency and 
quality of reports.  

training,  multidisciplinary 

e-learnings 

training, 

-  Additional training would be needed in particular on the single point of contacts 
(SPOC)  in  police  cooperation,  the  Schengen  Information  System  (SIS),  Data 
Protection,  Visa  new  development  of  the  Schengen  acquis,  Return.  Training  in 
fundamental  rights  should  be  integrated  in  the  modules  of  the  different  policy 
fields. 

-  There  should  also  be  an  obligation  for  experts  trained  to  operate  as  evaluators 

afterwards.  

On incentives: 

106 

 
 
-  The workload for experts as evaluators is very heavy, and it adds to their regular 
Incentives  provided  at  present  are  not  sufficient,  and  national 
tasks. 
administrations  have  limited  possibilities.  The  Commission  could  provide 
additional incentives, including diplomas, more recognition but also incentives of 
financial nature.  

-  Several Member States invited the Commission to organise lighter programmes 

for future evaluations and make on-site visits more efficient.  

On the designation and nomination process  

-  Long-term planning may facilitate the organisation at national level.  
-  Member  States  acknowledge  a  need  to  increase  the  number  of  experts,  and 
several  Member  States  favour  a  stronger  rotation  of  experts  to  guarantee  more 
geographical  balance  and  stress  that  this  is  a  shared  responsibility,  as  it  is 
becoming  very  burdensome  for  some  Member  States.  A  certain  proportionality 
with the size of the Member States should be however maintained.  

-  The  Commission  could  decide  on  the  optimal  number  of  national  experts 
required  for  evaluations  on  a  case-by-case  basis,  taking  into  consideration  the 
specificities of the evaluations and between a legal minimum and maximum. 
-  The idea to create a list of national experts pools is supported by most Member 
States,  while  few  Member  States  considers  that  the  ideas  should  be  further 
explored,  but  they  see  advantages  as  much  as  risks  to  be  carefully  weighted. 
Some  Member  States  also  proposed  that  pools  are  instead  created  at  a  national 
level with guidance by the Commission; to create a database with all experts and 
their level of qualification to help nominations by creating a reserve list; to map 
experts at  a national  level  to  assess the current  capacity to  provide  good quality 
expert. 

On the role of EU agencies 

A number of Member States see a need to 

- 

strengthen  the  link  between  Frontex  Vulnerability  Assessment  and  SCH-
EVAL; 

-  promote  a  wider  involvement  of  eu-LISA  and  of  the  Fundamental  Rights 

Agency (FRA); 

-  avoid duplications between the activity of EU bodies and agencies;   
- 

improve and widen the scope of the risk analysis and information provided by 
the EU agencies.  

One Member State however considers that a wider involvement of the EU agencies might 
rather delay the process. 

Results of replies to questionnaire 

Pool of experts 
The creation of a reserve 
list (‘pool’) of experts 
available to be nominated 
if the number of 
designations by the 
Member States for a 
given evaluation is 
considered inadequate or 
the profile of the experts 
designated do not match 
the need, or otherwise in 

107 

 
 
the case of unannounced 
on-site visits, would have: 

A number of Member States stress that it is necessary to ensure that the pool does not generate excessive 
administrative burden on the Commission and Member States.  

Number of experts 
More flexibility on the 
number of experts 
participating in the 
evaluations so to take 
into account the material 
circumstances and 
characteristics of the 
evaluation concerned 
would have: 

The most frequent comment provided is that the size of the team should be adapted in particular to the size 
of the country and the policy field. Some Member States mention that this measure could have a positive 
impact on costs and on the quality of the evaluations. For a  Member State, a correct proportion between 
Commission and Member States experts should be ensured nonetheless. 

2.5 National Data Protection Authorities (DPAs) and European Data Protection 

Supervisor (EDPS) 

An additional workshop was organised with a specific focus on data protection, including 
the  National  Data  Protection  Authorities  (DPAs)  and  the  European  Data  Protection 
Supervisor (EDPS). These stakeholders were also invited to reply to a short questionnaire 
(see  below).  Overall  23  DPAs  attended  the  meeting  and  13  DPAs  provided  additional 
information in writing in reply to the questionnaire.   

Key  messages  by  the  Data  Protection  Authorities  (DPAs)  and  the  European  Data 
Protection Supervisor (EDPS) 

-  DPAs  and  EDPS  see  clear  merits  in  the  current  Mechanism  and  dedicated 
evaluations for data protection. The evaluation of the data protection requirements 
should  not  be  fully  integrated  into  the  other  evaluated  areas.  The  information  and 
experience  acquired  by  the  national  experts  is  of  high  added  value  for  the 
supervisory work of the DPAs. It is important to keep the peer review carried out by 
data protection experts; otherwise this could lead to a decrease of the importance of 
data protection aspects. Furthermore, the other areas would be overloaded by adding 
the data protection aspects. It would also cause even more work for the DPAs than 
currently  and  there  is  a  risk  that  not  sufficient  data  protection  experts  would  be 
available for the evaluation of the other areas. 

108 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-  DPAs expressed different views on extending the scope to the new IT-systems (EES, 
ETIAS).  The  system  should  be  made  flexible  enough  that  the  data  protection 
requirements of the new IT-systems could also be evaluated. 

-  The evaluation programme should focus on most important aspects. This is  in 
particular  important  if  also  EES  and  ETIAS  will  be  evaluated.  Methodology  of 
evaluations  should  be  revised  to  lower  the  workload  e.g.  preparation  of  the 
experts via team meetings before the on-site visit and finalising the report after the 
on-site visit. The Commission should provide additional supportive documents to the 
team members (e.g. checklists; list of recommendations of previous SCH-EVALs). 
-  Most  DPAs  consider  that  the  enhanced  supervision  powers  of  DPAs  should  not 
have an effect on the scope of the data protection evaluations. However, a few of 
those DPAs expressed that some adjustments might be necessary. 
It  is  important  to  keep  parts  of  the  evaluations  as  on-site  visits  (verification  of 
practical implementation of the data protection requirements); however, some parts 
could  also  be  done  remotely.  Most  DPAs  are  against  only  questionnaire-based 
evaluations. 

- 

-  Difficulties of DPAs to send sufficient experts has been aggravated by pandemic, 
but is mainly due to the fact that the new EU data protection acquis155 has caused a 
lot  of  additional  work  for  the  DPAs.  Therefore,  there  are  not  sufficient  experts 
available for evaluations. Further reasons for lack of nominations are high workload 
for the Member States experts, in particular during the on-site visit, lack of financial 
incentive and high turnover of DPA staff. 

-  There is a need for more official endorsement of the importance of SCHEVAL.  
-  DPAs are committed to improve their participation. There is support for the idea of 
creating  a  pool  of  experts  to  which  all  DPAs  have  to  contribute  according  to  their 
size  and  possibilities.  For  data  protection,  the  pool  should  include  lawyers  and  IT-
experts, but also other profiles e.g. auditors. The teams should consist of experienced 
experts and newcomers to SCHEVAL. 

-  Organisation  of  training  for  the  Member  States  experts  is  important.  It  could 
help in particular to introduce new colleagues into the topic, but all DPA staff would 
need training on the new acquis e.g. new SIS acquis. Theoretical and practical parts 
of training measures are seen as important. 

-  Many  DPAs  are  in  favour  of  enhancing  the  cooperation  of  DPAs  (in  the 
Supervision Coordination Groups) with the Commission and the SCHEVAL teams, 
but not necessarily via a more formalised cooperation e.g. a cooperation obligation 
laid down in the SCHEVAL Mechanism. 

Recommendations by DPAs and EDPS for the reform of SCH-EVAL 

Scope and evaluation tools 
  Maintain evaluations dedicated exclusively to data protection and carried out in the format of peer review by 

data protection experts; 

  The SCHEVAL system should provide for the possibility to evaluate the new IT-systems like EES and ETIAS 

including in relation to their data protection requirements; 

  The SCHEVAL system should maintain on-site visits while providing the possibility to cover some aspects of 

the evaluation remotely; 

Experts  
  A pool of experts should be created to which all Member States would have to contribute according to their 

155  

Regulation (EU) 2016/679, OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1 (‘General Data Protection Regulation’) and the 
Directive (EU) 2016/680, OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 89 (‘Law Enforcement Data Protection Directive’). 

109 

 
 
                                                           
size and possibilities; it should consist of lawyers and IT-experts, but also other profiles e.g. auditors; 

  There is a need for more official endorsement of the importance of SCHEVALs; 
  Create financial and other incentives for experts; 

Training 
  Training for data protection experts should be organised. It should cover theoretical and practical aspects of the 

QUESTIONNAIRE TO THE DPAs AND EDPS 

evaluations. 

Scope 

role, 

their  supervisory 

1. 
Do  you  consider  that  the  scope  of  the 
DP  SCHEVALs  (covering  currently  the  DPAs 
the  Schengen 
and 
Information  System  –  SIS  -  and  the  Visa 
Information  System  –  VIS)  should  be  extended 
to the new IT systems such as Entry-Exit system 
(EES) and ETIAS? Please elaborate why. 
2. 
Do you consider (as suggested by some 
Member  States  in  the  meeting  of  11  December 
2020)  that  the  evaluation  of  data  protection 
requirements  of  the  Schengen  system  should  be 
integrated in the other evaluated areas (currently 
in  particular  SIS,  Visa  policy  and  in  future 
possibly  EES,  ETIAS)?  As  a  consequence,  the 
DP  SCHEVALs  would  be 
the 
evaluation  of  the  DPAs  and  their  supervisory 
role. Please elaborate why.  
3. 
Do  you  consider  that  the  reinforced 
powers  of  the  DPAs  in  supervisory  activities 
should  lead  to  a  change  of  the  scope  of  the  DP 
SCHEVALs? Please elaborate why.  
4. 
evaluated in DP SCHEVALs?  
5. 
Do you consider DP SCHEVALs could 
be  carried  out  mainly  as  questionnaire-based 
evaluations?  
6. 
format of the DP SCHEVALs would you 
suggest? 

Which  aspects  should  in  any  case  be 

What other changes to the scope and/or 

limited 

to 

Experts  

7. 
What  are  the  reasons  that  DPAs  have 
to  nominate  sufficient  national 
difficulties 
experts?  What  are  the  reasons  why  some  DPAs 
have never or rarely nominated national experts?  
8. 
In  addition  to  the  creation  of  a  pool  of 
experts,  what  other  measures  and  incentives 
would  you  suggest  to  guarantee  the  nomination 

of  sufficient  national  experts  (lawyers  and  IT-
experts) for every DP SCHEVAL?  
9. 
In case the data protection requirements 
would be evaluated within the SCHEVAL of the 
specific  area  (e.g.  Visa  Policy,  SIS)  or  during  a 
thematic  evaluation,  would  you  be  able  to 
nominate 
and 
observers for those SCHEVALs?  

sufficient  national 

experts 

Training 

11. 
On  what  DP  SCHEVAL  aspects  your 
national  experts  and  observers  would  require 
training?  
12. 
Do  you  consider  that  on-line  training 
would  be  sufficient  or  should  also  on-site 
training be organised?  
13. 
Would you ask all your national experts 
and  observers  to  participate  in  DP  SCHEVAL 
training?  Do  you  think  the  possibility  of  this 
training  would  increase  the  number  of  national 
experts nominated for DP SCHEVALs?  
14. 
Would  your  national  experts  and 
observers  also  be  willing  to  contribute  to  the 
training e.g. by presentations (in the training for 
some  of  the  other  evaluated  areas  Member 
States’  experts  and  observers  are  also  providing 
parts of the training)? 

Other issues 

15. 
Do  you  consider  that  there  should  be  a 
more  formalised  cooperation/exchange  between 
the  DP  SCHEVALs  teams  and  the  SCGs  (SIS 
and  VIS)  as  well  as  in  the  future  with  the 
‘Coordinated  Supervision  Committee’  (once  it 
has taken over from the SIS SCG, possibly from 
the  VIS  SCG  and  if  the  scope  of  the  DP 
SCHEVALs is extended to EES and ETIAS) ?  
16. 
improve 

Do  you  have  any  other  suggestions  to 
SCHEVALs.

DP 

the 

2.6 Consultation of relevant EU bodies and agencies 

As part of the consultation, the Commission organised a workshop with the participation 
of  EU  bodies  and  agencies  currently  involved  in  SCH-EVAL  and  invited  to  reply  to  a 
short questionnaire  (see  below). All  concerned stakeholders  -  Frontex,  FRA, CEPOL, 
Europol,  eu-LISA  and  EDPS  -  attended  the  workshop  and  provided  additional 

110 

 
 
 
information  in  reply  to  a  short  questionnaire.  Overall  a  strong  convergence  of  views 
emerged among the participants during the workshop.  

Key messages by the EU bodies / agencies 

-  EU bodies/agencies’ contribution has been essential for the functioning of SCH-
EVAL and their experts, while being on paper merely observers, played a key role in 
the evaluation teams. 

-  EU bodies / agencies benefit from their participation in SCH-EVAL. It provides 
an additional opportunity to gain valuable insight into the evaluated Member States’ 
status, to connect with Member States experts and exchange best practices. 

-  Certain  EU  bodies / agencies  would  be  available,  and  wish,  to  participate  also  in 

further policy fields than they do now. 

- 

-  Earlier call for experts would facilitate the organisation, noting that the short calls 
of the last months (due to COVID-19 restrictions) represented a major challenge; 
Several developments are ongoing and EU bodies / agencies see a need to improve 
further  and  adjust  training.  However,  given  the  relevant  training  costs,  it  is 
important  to  ensure  that  participants  to  the  training  also  serve  afterwards  as 
evaluators. 

-  Risk of duplications between SCH-EVAL and other tools in their respective policy 

fields is limited, while there is actual and potential complementarity156. 

-  The time gap between risk analyses and evaluation visits is significant, so that the 
information  may  be  often  outdated.  Some  EU  bodies / agencies  would  dispose  of 
additional information that may be provided, but this would imply additional costs in 
certain cases and require a clarification of the legal framework. 

-  Participation  to  SCH-EVAL  is  very  demanding  for  EU  bodies / agencies.  Any 
further  involvement  is  subject  to  two  main  constraints:  available  human  and 
financial  resources  and  a  clear  legal  basis  about  the  obligations  of  the  EU 
bodies / agencies,  which  would  also  facilitate  the  exchange  of  information  and 
prioritisation of SCH-EVAL-related tasks. 

Recommendations by EU bodies / agencies for the reform of SCH-EVAL 

Scope and evaluation tools 
  Clarify  the  scope,  aim  and  main  differences  between  thematic  evaluations,  announced  and 

 
 

unannounced visits; 
Increase the number of unannounced visits vis-a-vis the number of announced visits; 
Increase  the  insufficient  number  of  evaluations  on  internal  borders  (thus  helping  to  bring  Schengen 
‘back  to  normal’,  ending  the  regime  of  exceptional,  prolonged  reintroduction  of  controls  at  internal 
borders); 

  Ensure an overarching, comprehensive and improved evaluation of fundamental rights’ aspects across 

the board of Schengen policy fields; 

  Provide  clear  definitions  of  ‘serious  deficiencies’  and 

introduce  a  ‘grading  system’  for 

recommendations that would correspond to the severity of the deficiencies identified; 

  Draw upon other actors that might be able to provide information and evidence that is relevant to the 
application of Schengen acquis (e.g. human rights monitoring bodies, ombudspersons, national human 
rights institutions or civil society organisations active in fields such as border monitoring, provision of 
legal assistance, monitoring of places of deprivation of liberty); 

Evaluation process 
 

Improve the timeliness of SCH-EVAL issuing processes, in particular for what concerns the adoption 

156  

Reference  was  made  in  particular  to  complementarity  with  Frontex  Vulnerability  Assessment, 
Frontex Fundamental Rights Officer and the proposed monitoring mechanism, EMPACT and EDPS 
audit work on Central Units at eu-LISA.  

111 

 
 
                                                           
of reports and of recommendations; 

  Keep  the  conduct  of  Schengen  evaluations  and  the  establishment  of  recommendations  at  technical 

level; 

  Design  processes  to  ensure  that  the  findings  from  SCH-EVAL  will  contribute  to  an  enhanced 
situational  awareness  and  improved  planning  for  stakeholders  in  the  European  Border  and  Coast 
Guard Community; 

Follow-up 
  Put in place an effective tool to ensure implementation of recommendations; 
  Ensure a closer follow-up and monitoring of the reporting by Member States on the implementation of 
the  SCH-EVAL  recommendations,  also  by  introducing  time  limits  for  the  implementation  of  the 
recommendations and procedural steps when time limits are not met; 
Indicate  how  technical  support  would  be  offered  to  Member  States  for  the  fulfilment  of  the 
recommendations by the Commission or by EU bodies / agencies; 

 

Experts and trainings 
  Establish processes for managing the pool of Member States experts, to ensure continuity of expertise 

and also cost-efficiency for related training activities provided by the Agencies; 

  Ensure that experts participating to the training; 
  Make experts of the EU bodies and agencies full member of the evaluation team; 

Coordination and synergies between SCH-EVAL and EU bodies and agencies  
  Clarify in the Regulation the main differences and elements of complementarity between SCH-EVAL 
and  Vulnerability  Assessment  and  ensure  that  Vulnerability  findings  effectively  contribute  to  SCH-
EVAL; 

  Clarify  how  data  and  finding  generated  by  SCH-EVAL  activities  across  all  policy  fields  are  shared 

with the EU bodies / agencies. 

QUESTIONNAIRE TO THE EU BODIES AND AGENCIES 

1. 

TRAININGS 

Under  Article  12  of  the  SCH-EVAL  Regulation, 
the  Member  States  and  the  Commission,  in 
cooperation  with  relevant  EU  bodies,  offices  or 
agencies,  shall  ensure 
that  experts  receive 
appropriate  training,  including  on  respect  for 
fundamental  rights.  EU  agencies  and  bodies 
played  a  key  role  in  the  first  multiannual 
evaluation programme.  
1.a. 

for 

the 

Please  indicate  the  number  of  trainings 
organised  between  2015  and  2019  and 
the  number of experts trained and their 
country of origin. 
Please indicate the average yearly costs 
in 
the 
reference  period 
trainings  for  SCH-
organisation  of 
EVAL. 
If  possible,  please  explain  the  main 
different  components  of  these  costs, 
differentiating in particular between fix 
and  marginal  costs;  what 
the 
maximum  number  of  experts  that  can 
be  trained  in  a  single  training  section 
and what is the fix cost of an additional 
training section? 

is 

1.b. 

1.c. 

1.d.  What  are  the  strengths  and  the  gaps  of 
the current training system in your field 
of  expertise?  What 
improvements 
would  be  possible  in  your  view  in  the 

112 

short  time  and  what  would  be  the 
estimated costs? 

2. 

RISK ANALYSIS 

on 

shall 
the 

include 
priorities 

Under  Article  7(1)  and  7(2)  of  the  SCH-EVAL 
Regulation, Frontex shall submit risk analysis to 
the  Commission  and  to  the  Member  States  and 
recommend  priorities  for  evaluations  in  the 
following  year  and  a  risk  analysis  to  the 
the 
Commission  which 
recommendations 
for 
evaluations  to  be  implemented  in  the  form  of 
unannounced on-site visits in the following year. 
In  addition,  under  Article  8  of  the  SCH-EVAL 
Regulation, 
shall,  where 
appropriate,  request  EU  bodies,  offices  and 
agencies, other than Frontex, which are involved 
in the implementation of the Schengen acquis to 
carry out risk analyses, including on corruption 
and  organised  crime,  in  so  far  as  these  may 
undermine  the  application  of  the  Schengen 
acquis  by  the  Member  States.  Such  analyses 
could  be  used 
the  annual 
evaluation programmes. 
2.a. 

the  Commission 

for  preparing 

Please  indicate  the  number  of  risk 
analysis  provided  between  2015  and 
2019 in view of SCH-EVAL and briefly 
explain 
information 
type  of 
provided.  

the 

 
 
 
 
 
 
2.b. 

2.c. 

Please  indicate 
the  yearly  cost  (in 
working hours) for establishing the risk 
analysis. 
Do  you  dispose  of  other  information 
be 
that 
your 
in 
exchanged/shared 
to 
the 
the  effectiveness  of  SCH-
improve 
EVAL,  in  particular  to  improve  the 
preparation and identification of sites to 
be visited? 

could 
future 

view 
in 

2.d.  What 

in 

the 

risk  analysis 

information  could  be  further 
to 
included 
strengthen  the  functioning  of  SCH-
EVAL  evaluations?  What  would  be  an 
estimated  cost  (in  working  hours  or 
to  improve  or 
equivalent  in  EUR) 
extend risk analysis accordingly? 

3. 

DIRECT  PARTICIPATION  OF 
IN 
OBSERVERS 
EVALUATIONS 

Under  Article  10(5)  of 
the  SCH-EVAL 
Regulation, The Commission may invite Frontex, 
Europol, or other EU bodies, offices or agencies 
involved  in  the  implementation  of  the  Schengen 
acquis to designate a representative to take part 
as an observer in an on-site visit concerning an 
area covered by their mandate. Regular use has 
been made of this possibility by the Commission 
in the first multiannual programme. 
3.a. 

Please indicate the number of times the 
experts  from  your  agency  participated 
in  evaluations  (on-site  visits)  and  the 
pertinent policy fields. 
Please indicate the average yearly costs 
in 
the 
participation  of  your  expert.  Please 

reference  period  of 

the 

3.b. 

that, 

taking 

indicate  the  different  components  of 
costs  and 
the  average  number  of 
working  hours  per  evaluation  and  per 
expert.  
What  has  been  the  main  merits  and 
shortcomings  of  the  participation  of 
your experts in SCH-EVAL? 
Do  you  consider 
into 
account the expertise of observers from 
your agency or body, their participation 
should  be  considered  also  in  further 
policy fields in addition to those  where 
they participate today? 
SYNERGIES 
Please  indicate  the  tools,  in  particular 
evaluation mechanisms or alike, of your 
agency  or  body  having  the  same  or  a 
complementary  scope  to  SCH-EVAL. 
Also explain whether in your view there 
are  currently  appreciable  duplications 
or  gaps  between  SCH-EVAL  and 
pertinent tools of your agency or body. 
How  do  you  consider  that  synergies 
should and could be improved?  

3.c. 

3.d. 

4. 
4.a. 

4.b. 

Do 
4.c. 
you  consider  that  there  are  further  tools  (in 
addition to trainings, sharing of risk analysis and 
participation  in  evaluations)  by  which  your 
the 
agency  or  body  could  contribute 
strengthening of the mechanism?  

to 

OTHERS 

5. 
What are in your view the main issues and merits 
of  SCH-EVAL  today?  What  legislative  and 
operational  measures  would  be  needed  for  the 
mechanism to reach its full potential 

113 

 
 
 
 
2.7 Consultation of representatives of the Civil Society  

As part of the consultation, a workshop was organised to give the civil society representatives 
the  opportunity  to  express  their  views  on  the  upcoming  reform.  Three  NGOs  attended  the 
meeting. 

Key messages by representatives of the civil society: 

- 

Fundamental  rights  should  not  be separated by  creating  - in  addition  to  evaluations for 
data  protection  –  further  evaluations  dedicated  to  fundament  rights  only,  but  better 
integrated in the existing evaluations in the various policy fields. 

-  There is a need for increased transparency and to make wider use of evidence beyond 
the information provided by the evaluated Member State and collected during the on-
site  visits.  Relevant  NGOs  and  International  Organisations  should  be  involved  in  both 
the  preparation  of  the  visits  and  in  the  evaluation  itself.  The  Commission  should  also 
develop  benchmarks  of  compliance  and  inform  NGOs  about  them  to  allow  the 
assessment  and  reporting  of  the  relevant  information.  Access  of  Members  of  the 
European Parliament and civil society organisations to the evaluation reports should be 
facilitated, with due respect for sensitive information. 

-  A  stronger  involvement  of  the  European  Parliament  would  be  beneficial.  The 
scrutiny by the national parliaments and European Parliament on Member States’ actions 
to  remedy  deficiencies  could  guarantee  proper  political  discussion  on  the  state  of 
Schengen  and  put  pressure  on  Member  States 
the 
recommendations, especially in relation to fundamental rights’ violations at the borders. 

to  better  comply  with 

-  A  better  link  should  be  established  between  Schengen  evaluations  and  availability  of 
funds  for  the  Member  States,  especially  when  fundamental  rights’  violations  were 
found during the evaluation. 

A  stakeholder  also  indicated  the  need  for  a  more  independent  mechanism  to  monitor 
better the respect for fundamental rights at the external border. To do so, unannounced 
evaluations should be carried out at the border, but better organised and more effective so to 
spot the practice of push-backs taking place at the external borders (covering both sides of the 
border).  This  mechanism  should  also  include  the  possibility  to  file  a  complaint  and  report 
fundamental  rights  violations  It  would  be  important  to  define  to  what  extent  evidence  of 
fundamental rights’ violations would trigger a truly unannounced visit. 

Recommendations by NGOs for the reform of SCH-EVAL 

Meijers Committee 
Scope and evaluation tools 
 

Include a general evaluation per Member State assessing the compliance with the Schengen  acquis rather 
than on selected topics only; 

  Allow  evaluation  teams  to  be  allowed  to  pay  unannounced  visits  to  Member  States,  instead  of  having  to 

give a 24-hour notice as is currently required; 

Process and follow-up 
  Empower the Commission rather than the Council to adopt recommendations on the basis of evaluations 
  Use more actively enforcement powers under Article 258 TFEU, in particular in case of a pattern of non-

compliance with the Schengen acquis and the respect for fundamental rights; 

  Ensure that the Commission informs both the Council and the European Parliament of the findings of the 

evaluation teams, as well the recommendations based thereon; 

  Guarantee  a  better  involvement  of  the  European  Parliament  and  national  Parliaments  so  to  mobilise  the 

necessary attention and debate at political level; 

  Facilitate access of individual Members of the European Parliament to the evaluation reports; 
  Ensure  that the Commission  makes the findings of the  evaluation  teams, as  well as the  recommendations 

114 

 
 
 

based thereon, publicly available, with due respect for sensitive information; 
Improve the follow-up to the findings by providing for shorter and clearer deadlines on the evaluators and 
the Member States being evaluated; 

Experts 
  Enable the Commission to determine the composition of the evaluation teams; 
 

Include EU experts from relevant bodies and agencies in evaluation teams, in addition to Commission and 
Member  State  experts,  such  as  Frontex,  as  well  as  an  independent  expert  appointed  by  the  European 
Parliament; 

Improve the overall transparency of the SCH-EVAL, with due respect for sensitive information; 
Incorporate fundamental rights compliance and involve the Fundamental Rights Agency; 

Fundamental rights 
 
 
  Ask the Fundamental Rights Agency, the European Ombudsman, EASO and UNHCR to indicate concrete 
issues  that  should  be  included  in  the  evaluation  and  grant  the  possibility  to  national  ombudsmen,  official 
human rights bodies and NGOs of reputed experience to provide similar information in advance. 

ECRE 
Scope and evaluation tools 
  Propose a definition of serious deficiencies and a prioritised procedure for these cases; 
  Build more flexibility into the annual programme and increase the number of unannounced visits; 

Process and Follow-up 
 
 

Introduce additional deadlines for the Commission-led phase of the Mechanism; 
Invite independent organisations and relevant national authorities to report on the implementation of action 
plans and consider their input in assessing progress; 

  Provide the European Parliament with an oversight role in the follow-up and monitoring phase; 
  The  European  Parliament  should  hold  to  account  the  European  Commission  and  Member  States  for 
addressing the shortcomings of the Schengen Evaluation and Monitoring Mechanism in next year’s review; 
Invite independent organisations and relevant national authorities to report on the implementation of action 
plans and consider their input in assessing progress; 

 

Fundamental rights 
  Develop objective and strict benchmarks against which the evaluation teams assess the fundamental rights 

compliance; 

  Consult 

the  Fundamental  Rights  Agency, 

independent  civil  society  organisations, 

international 
organisations  (UN  institutions  and  bodies),  state  bodies,  Ombudspersons  and  National  Preventive 
Mechanisms and include in the evaluations the evidence provided; 
Introduce additional deadlines for the Commission-led phase of the mechanism; 
Include  experts  from  Fundamental  Rights  Agency  in  the  evaluation  teams  when  fundamental  rights 
concerns  have  become  apparent  ahead  of  the  evaluation,  including  thorough  documentation  by  external 
sources; 

 
 

  Revise  the  Schengen  questionnaire  to  ensure  that  future  evaluations  consistently  assess  compliance  with 

obligations on access to asylum and non-refoulement; 

  Make sure that the responses by Member States to questions related to fundamental rights in questionnaires 
are  verified  by  independent  civil  society,  national  authorities  with  a  relevant  mandate  or  international 
organisations invited to respond to the same questions; 

  Make  public the progress  made by the Member States on  the  recommendations about  fundamental rights 

compliance; 

  Schedule  a  thematic  evaluation  of  fundamental  rights  compliance  under  the  next  Schengen  multi-annual 

evaluation programme (2020-2024) and make the findings publicly available; 

  Expand the scope of the monitoring to apply to all alleged fundamental rights violations by national border 

management authorities or during border control activities. 

115 

 
 
 
 
 
 
3.  ADDITIONAL RESOURCES 

3.1 1st Schengen Forum 

Under the New Pact on Migration and Asylum, the Commission announced the establishment 
of a dedicated Schengen Forum, involving the relevant national authorities such as Ministries 
of  Interior  and  (border)  police  at  national  and  regional  level,  in  order  to  stimulate  more 
concrete cooperation and more trust among Member States to support the well-functioning of 
Schengen. 
The 1st Schengen Forum took place on 30 November 2020. At the Forum, EU institutions and 
Member States provided political guidance on the future reform of SCH-EVAL, concluding 
in particular that there is a need to increase the speed and the efficiency of SCH-EVAL so 
that it can reach its full potential, to improve its use, but also to reflect on how fundamental 
rights are respected at the external borders.  

3.2 EU Institutions’ reports on SCH-EVAL 

In  2017,  the  European  Parliament  adopted  a  Report  in  which  –  while  stressing  to  ‘[see] 
great  value  in  the  renewed  Schengen  evaluation  mechanism  as  it  promotes  transparency, 
mutual  trust  and  accountability  between  the  Member  States  by  scrutinising  the  way  they 
implement the different fields of the Schengen acquis’ – it also indicated that any revision of 
SCH-EVAL  should  address  the  major  delays  from  the  on-site  visit  to  the  implementing 
decisions  and  action  plans  and  should  facilitate  swift  remedial  action  on  the  part  of  the 
Member States. The European Parliament also submitted that the value of unannounced visits 
in the context of the Schengen Evaluation Mechanism could be enhanced were such visits to 
be really unannounced (without 24-hours’ notice). 

In  2019,  the  Court  of  Auditors  issued  a  Special  Report  on  ‘EU  information  systems 
supporting border control’ covering SCH-EVAL in connection with external borders and IT-
systems.  The  main  remarks  of  the  Court  of  Auditors  in  the  report  are:  (a)  the  cost  of 
Schengen  evaluations  is  relatively  low  compared  to  the  expenditure  on  the  information 
systems; (b) reports are thorough and methodical, and address key aspects of the systems and 
provide  a  detailed  set  of  operational  recommendations  and  specific  recommendations  on 
improving  the  information  systems;  (c)  however,  it  can  take  several  years  to  address 
identified weaknesses. This is due to a lack of deadlines for adopting evaluation reports and 
the implementation of corrective action plans. 

Recommendations by the Court of Auditors 

 

 

to  include  in  its  five-year  report  information  on  the  delays  encountered  by  the  evaluated 
Member  States’ 
the  Council 
recommendations;  
to  propose  appropriate  legislative  and  procedural  measures  in  order  to  shorten  the 
timeframe of the Schengen evaluation cycle 

their  action  plans 

implementation  of 

to  address 

Finally, in 2019, under the Finnish Presidency, the Council launched a consultation of the 
Member  States  on  the  functioning  of  SCH-EVAL  and  ways  forward.  In  its  report  on  the 
consultation, the Council noted how ‘[w]hile fulfilling its core role of monitoring the proper 
application  of  the  Schengen  acquis,  the  evaluation  process  has  brought  further  benefits  in 
most Member States, including by strengthening national coordination, increasing expertise 
and exchanges via the experts participating in the evaluations, and feeding recommendations 
into national plans and strategies’. However, from the Member States’ consultation emerged 
a need for improvement, in particular: (a) the overall functioning of the Schengen system, and 

116 

 
especially identified deficiencies, is not sufficiently communicated at a political level and the 
results of the valuable work of the on-site teams have not been discussed at the political level; 
(b)  the  experts  participating  in  evaluations  should  receive  appropriate  training;  (c) 
unannounced visits should be used more promptly and flexibly when deemed necessary and 
include observers (Frontex); (d) the risk analyses prepared by Frontex according to Article 7 
of the Regulation, including recommendations for announced and unannounced visits, would 
be more useful if they included the main results of the Vulnerability Assessment.  

117 

 
Annex 3:  Implementation of the SCH-EVAL Regulation  

1.  INTRODUCTION 

At the end of 2020, the Commission published its five-year report on the functioning of SCH-
EVAL  according  to  Article  22  of  the  Regulation.  The  five-year  review  of  the  evaluations 
carried  out  in  the  first  five-year  cycle  allowed  taking  stock  of  the  implementation  of  the 
provisions of the Regulation. It led to the conclusion that insufficient use has been made of 
certain  evaluation  tools  (notably  thematic  evaluations),  the  Member  States’  contribution  of 
experts has not always matched the needs in term of evaluation team’s size and qualification, 
and the evaluation process (from the evaluation visit until adoption of the recommendations 
by the Council) was excessively long. This Annex presents statistics on these three aspects in 
order to outline the baseline scenario and the expected effects of the policy options assessed 
in this Impact Assessment.  

2.  NUMBER OF EVALUATIONS 

2.1 Current scenario (2015-2019) 

Under the Regulation (Article 1), evaluations are carried out to verify  

-  (Article 1(a)) the application of the Schengen acquis in the Member States to which it 

applies in full (26 Member States of the Schengen area) or in part (Ireland); 

-  (Article 1(b)) that the necessary conditions for the application of all relevant parts of 
the  Schengen acquis  have  been  met  in  those  Member  States  in  respect  of  which  a 
Council decision has not been taken yet to lift internal border controls. This provision 
does not apply to Bulgaria and Romania that are not evaluated as their evaluation was 
completed before the entry into force of the Regulation.  

Evaluations of these Member States take place as 
-  Announced (‘periodic’) evaluations; 
-  unannounced evaluations;  
-  revisits (announced or unannounced); and 
-  thematic  evaluations  on  the  application  of  specific  parts  of  the  Schengen acquis 

across several Member States. 

The  Regulation  leaves  wide  discretion  about  the  organisation  of  ad-hoc  unannounced 
evaluations, revisits and thematic evaluations. As for the announced (‘periodic’) evaluations, 
there is an obligation to evaluate at least once every five years Member States that apply in 
full or in part the Schengen acquis in the relevant policy fields. Member States falling under 
Article 1(b) are evaluated only once before the Council takes its decision. 

Between 2015 and 2019, these provisions imposed an obligation to carry out 164 announced 
evaluations.  Under  the  first  five-year  cycle,  the  26  Member  States  applying  in  full  the 
Schengen acquis  were  evaluated  in  the  six  policy  fields  (154  evaluations),157  one  Member 
State – Ireland – applying in part the Schengen acquis was evaluated in one policy field only 

157  

The  six policy  fields are external border management,  common  visa policy, return, police cooperation, 
the Schengen Information System and data protection. Liechtenstein undergoes however evaluations only 
in  four  policy  fields.  Due  to  the  absence  of  external  borders,  it  is  not  evaluated  in  external  border 
management and common visa policy. 

118 

 
                                                           
(data  protection).  In  addition,  Croatia  was  evaluated  in  eight  policy  fields158  and  Cyprus  in 
one policy field (data protection) under Article 1(b) (nine evaluations). This exercise required 
overall  184  evaluation  visits.  While  four  evaluations  were  questionnaire-based  only, 
evaluations in the field of external borders required as a rule more than one evaluation visit.  

Resources  available  allowed  in  addition  for  27  unannounced  evaluations  (with  29 
evaluation  visits),  8  announced  revisits  (with  9  evaluation  visits)  and  2  thematic 
evaluations159. The two thematic evaluations did not require any separate evaluation visits. In 
one  case,  the  thematic  evaluation  was  combined  with  announced  evaluations  and  in  the 
second case, the thematic evaluation was a desk-reviewed exercise.  

All in all, 201 evaluations took place, including 222 evaluation visits. 

Figure 15 – Evaluation visits (2015-2020) 

2.2 Baseline scenario 

Source: internal Commission data 

Based on internal Commission data and data collected from Member States, the Commission 
tried to develop a model to simulate the baseline scenario as well as possible effects of the 
different policy options on the future use of the different evaluation tools. 

The model is based on the following underlying assumptions: 

  The number of evaluation on-site visits carried out in the future would be equal to 
the number of evaluation on-site visits carried out between 2015-2019. It is to note 
that, under the constraint of constant resources at national and EU level, the number 
of evaluations could be easily altered by relying more widely on questionnaire-based 

158  

159  

In  addition  to  the  six  policy  fields,  Croatia  was  evaluated  also  in  the  field  of  judicial  cooperation  in 
criminal matters and firearms. 
For a complete list of the evaluation in the first five-year cycle, see SWD(2020) 327 final of 25.11.2020, 
p. 29. 

119 

 
 
                                                           
evaluations but  it is  not  an aim of the current  initiative to  switch to  a  desk exercise 
which  is  not  assumed  to  be  generally  as  effective.  On-site  visits  instead  cannot  be 
increased  given  fix costs that are independent  from  the characteristics of  the on-site 
visitss. 

  The number of evaluated Member States  may vary  between 27 and  31, whereby 
26 Member States would be evaluated in all policy fields and one Member State, 
Ireland,  only 
in  three  policy  fields,  namely  data  protection,  Schengen 
Information  System  and  police  cooperation.  While  the  number  of  evaluated 
Member States is not to expected to remain constant, it appears reasonable to consider 
two  alternative  extreme  scenarios  where  in  which  the  Council,  respectively,  would 
take or would not take the decision that the provisions of the Schengen acquis apply 
in  full  or in  part in  respect  to  Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia and Cyprus.  There  are no 
reasons  to  assume  at  present  that  Ireland  would  be  evaluated  in  additional  policy 
fields, and the inclusion of further third countries appears rather remote. 

  The  number  of  ad-hoc  evaluation  on-site  visits  (unannounced  evaluations  and 
verification visits and revisits would correspond to the difference between the total 
number of possible evaluation on-site visits and the number of mandatory evaluation 
on-site  visits,  i.e.  announced  evaluations.  As  to  the  repartition  of  resources  between 
these  ad-hoc  evaluation  tools  (1)  the  number  of  revisits  would  remain  unchanged, 
hence  nine,  (2)  additional  resources  would  be  equally  divided  between 
unannounced evaluation and verification visits, where verification visits would be 
envisaged;  otherwise  would  be  used  entirely  for  unannounced  evaluations.  The 
number  of  revisits  already  corresponds  essentially  to  the  number  of  serious 
deficiencies and a change in the proportion of announced and unannounced evaluation 
does not affect the number of cases in which serious deficiencies can be detected as 
serious deficiencies can emerge in both cases. 

  Thematic evaluations are not integrated in the model. This is due to the fact that 
given  the  limited  experience  with  thematic  evaluations  so  far,  there  are  insufficient 
elements to estimate the average costs of thematic evaluations. From a practical point 
of  view,  by  including  thematic  evaluations,  the  number  of  other  ad-hoc  evaluations 
(unannounced  evaluations,  announced  and  unannounced  revisits  and  verification 
visits) would decrease. While it is envisaged to make more systematic use of thematic 
evaluations  in  the  future,  their  number  should  remain  however  relatively  small 
compared to other types of ad-hoc evaluations. 

Based on this assumption, in terms of different evaluation tools’ use, the baseline scenario 
would  diverge  from  the  current  situation  as  the  number  of  Member  States  to  be 
evaluated is  higher than under the first evaluation cycle.  Ireland would  be evaluated, at 
least, in three policy fields (data protection, police cooperation and SIS)160. Once Cyprus will 
have  completed  its  evaluation  that  started  in  2019,  different  scenarios  are  possible.  If  the 
Council does not decide to lift internal border controls for any of the four Member States, in 
principle the number of mandatory evaluations will decrease from 164 to 156, corresponding 
to  178  evaluation  visits161.  If  the  Council  does  lift  internal  border  controls  for  all  four 
Member  States  concerned,  the  number  of  mandatory  evaluations  would  increase  to  188, 
including 209 evaluation visits, and leaving virtually no space for ad-hoc evaluations. Under 

160  
161  

Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2020/1745, OJ L 393, 23.11.2020, p. 3. 
This  corresponds  to  the  154  evaluations  of  the  26  Member  States  and  3  evaluations  for  Ireland,  while 
assuming that the number of policy fields would remain unchanged. 

120 

 
                                                           
the two extreme scenarios (it is obviously possible that the Council adopts a decision only for 
some Member States concerned) announced evaluations would account for 81% to 95% 
of  the  on-site  visits  (against  83%  in  the  first  five-year  cycle)  and  essentially  no 
unannounced evaluations would be possible.  

Verification revisits are not foreseen under the current Regulation. 

Table 20 – First five-year cycle – evaluation and monitoring activities 

Scenario 1 (27 Member 
States and Ireland) 

Announced visits 

Unannounced 
visits 

Revisits 

Thematic 
evaluations  

5-years 

Yearly average 

179 

35.8 

34 

6.8 

Scenario 2 (31 Member 
States and Ireland) 

Announced visits 

Unannounced 
visits 

5-years 

Yearly average 

210 

42 

2.3  Policy Options  

3 

0.6 

9 
constant) 

(assumed 

Revisits 

1.8 

9 

1.8 

0 

0 

0 

0 

Thematic 
evaluations  

Figure  16  shows  the  impact  of  the  different  policy  options  considered  in  this  Impact 
Assessment against the described baseline scenario. 

-  Under Option 1 and Option 2, the scope of the obligation to carry out announced 
evaluations  remains  unchanged  and  no  verification  revisits  would  take  place. 
Nevertheless, as part of the strategic approach stakeholders suggested the possibility 
to  combine  evaluation  visits  that  today  are  carried  out  separately  (for  instance, 
combining elements of different policy fields in the same evaluation visit or covering 
more than one Member  State at  once).  The Commission estimated that this  more 
targeted approach could reduce the number of announced evaluations at most by 
up  to  15%.  Preliminarily,  it  is  to  note,  that  the  possibility  to  change  the  design  of 
evaluation visits depends on the agreement of the Member States. First, based on the 
Member  States’  consultation,  it  would  be  possible  realistically,  that  a  number  of 
Member States could agree to combined evaluations in the visa field (evaluating two 
Member States on the same location at the same time, for example in the visa field,) 
or merging police cooperation and SIS. External border management evaluations are 
very  comprehensive  and  would  be  difficult  to  merge  with  other  policy  fields,  while 
strong opposition emerged about the opportunity to merge data protection with other 
policy  fields.  In  a  scenario  where  there  are  no  separated  evaluations  in  police 
cooperation and half of the evaluations in visa policy, there would be a reduction of 
about  20% visits  but  effectively a bit less as not  all Member States would probably 
agree.  Second,  based  on  some  case  studies  and  analysis  of  possible  synergies,  the 
Commission  came to  the conclusion that  combined evaluation  visits  would  be more 
complex  and  would  probably  require  proportionally  more  resources.  A  conservative 
estimation taking into consideration all these constraints is that the reduction would be 
of  no  more  than  10%.  In  addition,  a  5%  reduction  is  estimated  as  result  of  the 
shortening of the evaluations visits across all policy fields. 

121 

 
 
In  a  scenario  with  27  Member  States  falling  under  the  multiannual  evaluation 
programme,  the  number  of  announced  evaluations  would  decrease  to  about  69%, 
while  the  situation  would  remain  virtually  unchanged  if  four  new  Member  States 
would  be  added  (announced  evaluations  would  require  80%  of  the  possible  on-site 
visits).  As  the  number  of  revisits  is  not  assumed  to  change,  this  would  leave  the 
possibility  to  carry  out  61  or  35,  instead  of  28,  evaluation  visits  for  unannounced 
evaluations  or  thematic  evaluations.  Under  Option  1  and  2,  there  are  no 
verification visits. 

Table 21 – Options 1 and 2 evaluation and monitoring activities 

Scenario 1 (26 
Member States and 
Ireland) 

5-years 

Yearly average 

Scenario 2 (30 
Member States and 
Ireland) 

Announced 
visits 

Unannounced 
visits 

Revisits (Announced or 
Unannounced) 

Verification 
Revisits 

152 

30.4 

61 

12.2 

9  

1.8 

N/A 

N/A 

Announced 
visits 

Unannounced 
visits 

Revisits (Announced or 
Unannounced) 

Verification 
Revisits 

5-years 

Yearly average 

179 

35.7 

34 

6.9 

9 

1.8 

N/A 

N/A 

-  An estimation of the impact of Option 3 is more difficult as the possibility to carry 
out a single all-comprehensive evaluation implies an unknown number of evaluation 
visits  depending  on  several  variables  (such  as  the  size  of  the  Member  State,  risk 
situation, past evaluations, etc.). It was decided to consider an hypothetical scenario in 
which  four  evaluation  visits  would  be  organised  for  each  Member  State.  The 
extension of the evaluation cycle to seven years in addition would reduce by 29% the 
number of Member States to be evaluated each year. The combined effect of the two 
measures (a single evaluation and extension of the cycle) would lead to a situation in 
which only 34% - 39% of the evaluation visits per year would be announced. Option 
3 includes also verification visits. 

Table 22 – Option 3 evaluation and monitoring activities 

Scenario 1 (27 
Member States and 
Ireland) 

Announced 
visits 

Unannounced 
visits 

Revisits (Announced or 
Unannounced) 

Verification 
visits) 

7-years 

Yearly average 

104 

14.8 

97 

13.8 

13 

1.8 

97 

13.8 

Scenario 2 (31 
Member States and 
Ireland) 

Announced 
visits 

Unannounced 
visits 

Revisits (Announced or 
Unannounced) 

Verification 
visits) 

7-years 

Yearly average 

120 

17.4 

89 

12.6 

13 

1.8 

89 

12.6 

122 

 
-  Option 4 would combine the effect of Option 1 and Option 2 with an extension of the 
cycle  from  five  to  seven  years.  Under  Option  4,  a  reduction  of  announced  visits  of 
about 40%, while assuming that, with current Commission resources, the number of 
visits would remain constant (around 45 visits a year). 

Table 23 – Option 4 evaluation and monitoring activities 

Scenario 1 (27 Member 
States and Ireland) 

Announced visits 

Unannounced 
visits 

Revisits (Announced or 
Unannounced) 

Verification 
visits) 

7-years 

Yearly average 

Scenario 2 (31 
Member States and 
Ireland) 

152 

21.7 

73 

10.4 

13  

1.8 

73 

10.4 

Announced visits 

Unannounced 
visits 

Revisits (Announced or 
Unannounced) 

Verification 
visits) 

7-years 

Yearly average 

178 

25.5. 

60 

8.6 

13  

1.8 

60 

8.6 

Figure 16 – Evaluation visits – Comparison of policy options 

100%

90%

80%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

Evaluation and Monitoring Visits 
(yearly avarage total number) 

1,80 

5,80 

1,80 

1,80 

1,80 

6,80 

12,17  12,17 

13,80 

1,80 

13,80 

10,43 

1,80 

10,43 

36,80 

35,80 

30,43  30,43 

21,74 

15,00 

1,80 
0,60 

1,80 

1,80 

6,90 

6,90 

42,00 

35,70  35,70 

8,55 

1,80 

8,55 

12,60 

1,80 

12,60 

25,50 

17,40 

9
1
0
2
-
5
1
0
2

e
n
i
l
e
s
a
B

1
n
o
i
t
p
O

2
n
o
i
t
p
O

3
n
o
i
t
p
O

4
n
o
i
t
p
O

e
n
i
l
e
s
a
B

1
n
o
i
t
p
O

2
n
o
i
t
p
O

3
n
o
i
t
p
O

4
n
o
i
t
p
O

Scenario 1 (27 MS)

Scenario 2 (31 MS)

Announced Evaluations (other than Revisits)

Unannounced Evaluations (other than Revisits)

Revisits (Announced and Unannounced)

Verification Revisits

3.  NUMBER OF MEMBER STATES EXPERTS 

3.1 Current scenario (2015-2019) 

Under Article 10 and 11 of the Regulation, the team responsible for the evaluation consists of 
experts  designated  by  Member  States  and  Commission  representatives.  For  evaluation 
visits, the maximum number of Member State experts participating in an announced visit is 
eight and, for an unannounced visit, is six. In the case of questionnaire-based evaluations, 

123 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
there  is  no  maximum  number  of  experts.  Suppose  experts  designated  by  Member  States 
exceed the relevant maximum number set out in the Regulation; in that case, after consulting 
the Member States concerned, the Commission  shall appoint the team  members based on  a 
geographical balance and the experts’ competences. 

The selection procedure under Article 10 foresees that the Commission shall invite Member 
States  to  designate  experts  who  are  available  for  participation  in  the  respective  evaluation 
visits, indicating their area of expertise.  In case  of announced visits, the Commission sends 
the invitation at least three months before the visits, and the Member States shall designate 
experts within two weeks. In the case of unannounced visits, the timeframes are two weeks 
and 72 hours respectively. 

Under the first five-year cycle, all 32 Member States contributed experts to the Schengen 
evaluations  in  very  different  proportions.  One-third  of  the  over  1 500  nominations 
comprised  experts  from  five  Member  States,  namely  Romania  (7.7%),  Poland  (7.2%), 
Germany (6.9%), the Netherlands (6.5%) and Switzerland (4.9%).  

For announced evaluations, the teams generally (64% of the cases) consisted of the maximum 
number of eight experts and the number of designations was often higher than eight, so that 
not all proposed experts could be retained. Yet, on several occasions the Commission had to 
extend the time limit for the designation of experts (occasionally even several times) due to a 
limited number of designations received and for 21 (10%) evaluations the number of experts 
was  eventually  below  six,  hence  critically  low.  Scarce  availability  of  experts  applied,  in 
particular, evaluations in the data protection field where 12 (out of 29) evaluation teams had 
fewer  than  6  experts  and  only  four  teams  included  eight  experts.  Occasionally,  a  lack  of 
experts  also  affected  evaluations  in  the  fields  of  common  visa  policy  and  police 
cooperation162. 

Overall,  in  the  first  five-year  cycle,  the  average  number  of  experts  per  team  was  7.3 
(announced  evaluations  other  than  revisits),  7.4  (announced  revisits)  and  5.3163 
(unannounced evaluations). As to the thematic evaluations, in 2019, a thematic evaluation 
covering  25  Member  States  –  questionnaire-based  –  required  overall  20  Member  State 
experts. 

162  
163  

See for more details SWD(2020) 327 final of 25.11.2020, pp. 30-32. 
For  unannounced  evaluations,  the  average  is  based  on  82%  of  the  evaluations.  Data  for  announced 
evaluations, including revisits, cover 100% of the evaluations.  

124 

 
                                                           
Figure 17 – Number of Member States Experts per evaluation 

3.2 Baseline Scenario and policy options 

Source: five-year review 

While  the  total  number  of  evaluation  visits  is  assumed  to  remain  unchanged,  the  different 
proportion  of  the  use  of  the  various  evaluation  tools  would  change.  This  would  affect  the 
number of Member States experts already because at present the evaluation and monitoring 
team size varies depending on the type of evaluations. Some options would in addition affect 
the team size per evaluations type. 

Table 24 – Evaluation team size – Comparison of the policy options 

2015-2019 & 
Baseline Scenario 

Option 1 

Option 2 

Option 3 &4 

Announced  (other  than 
revisit) 

7.3 

Unannounced 
than revisit) 

(other 

5.4 

Verification Revisits 

Revisit  (Announced  or 
Unannounced) 

N/A 

7.4 

7.3 

5.4 

N/A 

7.4 

↓ 6.5 

↓ 5 

N/A 

↓ 6.5 

↓ 6.5 

↓ 5 

1 

↓ 4 

Source: computation by DG Home based on internal data 

-  Under  the  baseline  scenario  and  Option  1,  the  evaluation  team’s  size  and 
composition is not expected to change, as mere operational measures would not 
have any appreciable impact on experts’ designation. However, as the evaluation 

125 

 
 
visits’  scope  would  change,  the  overall  number  of  experts  required  would  slightly 
decrease  under  Option  1  (by  3-4%)  as  a  consequence  of  the  adjusted  proportion  of 
announced  and  unannounced  visits  and  because  the  latter  require  on  average  fewer 
experts. 

-  Under  Option  2,  the  flexibility  introduced  with  the  possibility  for  the 
Commission  to  indicate  the  team’s  optimal  composition  is  expected  to  bring 
about a redistribution of the experts in the first place. According to the views of 
several  Member States  during the stakeholders’  consultation,  in  general  it should be 
possible to create smaller teams. The Commission estimated that the average number 
of  experts  per  announced  evaluation  visits  –  both  regular  and  revisits  –  could 
arguably  not  exceed  6.5  (compared  to  7.4  under  the  baseline  scenario)  and  for 
unannounced evaluation 5 (compared to 5.4 under the baseline scenario). In this 
case,  the  need  of  Member  State  experts  would  decrease  by  13%  compared  to  the 
baseline scenario. 

-  Under Option 3, the measures to facilitate experts’ nomination (pool and annual call) 
would  strengthen  the  possibility  of  meeting  the  target  of  smaller  teams  as  these 
mechanisms  would  improve  the  team’s  composition  in  terms  of  qualifications  and 
rotation of the designating Member State. The average number of experts per revisit 
and verification visits would furthermore decrease from 7.4 to 4 and 1, respectively. 
In light  of the estimated changes in  the number  of visits,  overall it is  estimated that 
Option  3  would  require  43%-44%  less  Member  State  experts  than  the  baseline 
scenario(s). 

-  Under  Option  4,  the  average  size  of  the  evaluation  team  would  the  same  as  per 
Option  3.  Considering  the  estimated  changes  in  the  number  of  visits,  overall  it  is 
estimated that Option 4 would require 33%-36% less Member State experts than the 
baseline scenario(s). 

126 

 
Figure 18 – Member States Experts – Comparison of policy options 

Source: computation by DG Home based on internal data 

The  simulation  above  simply  combines  the  expected  number  of  on-site  evaluation  visits,  Figure  16,  with  the 
average team size, Table 24. 

4.  LENGTH OF THE PROCEDURE 

4.1 Current scenario (2015-2019) 

The procedure under SCH-EVAL is articulated into two main phases:  

(1)  

(2)  

the  evaluation  process  to  assess  the  implementation  of  the  Schengen  acquis, 
which  ends  with  the  adoption  of  recommendations  by  the  Council  for  the 
necessary  action  to  remedy  any  deficiencies  identified  in  the  evaluation  report 
adopted by the Commission; and  
the  follow-up  process  aiming  at  the  fulfilment  of  the  recommendations  to 
improve the implementation of the Schengen acquis. 

Each phase includes a series of administrative measures and actions as well as implementing 
decisions. The Regulation shapes and regulates the administrative procedure’s key structure 
by defining the rights and responsibilities of all actors involved. Time limits are set only for 

127 

 
 
certain intermediary steps, while a wide discretion is left to the actors involved in prioritising 
their tasks. Figure 19 shows the main steps of the procedure. 

Figure 19 – Main steps of the evaluation process 

In the first five-year cycle, the average length of the evaluation process was one year (357 
days).  The  yearly  average  length  of  the  evaluation  process  was,  however,  very  stable, 
although  the  length  of  the  individual  procedures  was  very  variable,  ranging  from  3.5 
months  to  over  two  years.  The  longest  step  is  the  adoption  of  the  evaluation  report  (on 
average  9.5  months),  while  the  adoption  of  the  recommendations  takes  on  average  2.5 
months. 

In  the  preparation  of  this  Impact  Assessment,  the  Commission  carried  out  an  analysis  to 
understand  the  main  factors  that  may  have  influenced  the  length  of  the  process.  In 
particular, it analysed, on a quantitative level, any possible correlation between the length of 
the  process  and  (a)  the  number  of  experts,  (b)  the  length  of  the  evaluation  visit,  (c)  the 
workload resulting from several evaluations in parallel164, (d) the policy field, (e) the number 
of  recommendations,  priority  recommendations  and  serious  deficiencies.  While  the  data 
available did not allow reaching firm conclusions165, none of these factors appeared to have 
any dominant effect. The strongest variation depends on the policy field. The average length 

164  

In this case, the Commission used the number of open procedures as a proxy for the workload in a certain 
point of time. Correlation was tested both with the number of open procedures at the time of the adoption 
of  the  evaluation  report  and  the  number  of  open  procedures  1,  2  and  3  months  before.  The  analysis 
regarded however, only the evaluation phase before the Commission. 

165   Due to possible multi-collinearity, in several cases it is also difficult to discriminate among the different 

effects. An example is the correlation between policy field and number of recommendations.  

128 

 
 
                                                           
for the adoption of evaluation reports may vary from one policy field to the other, from 322 
days to 459 days. 

Figure 20 – Length of the evaluation process (2015-2019) 

Source: five-year review 

In 2020, the picture changed suddenly. Due to  the restrictive measures in place to limit the 
spread  of  the  Covid-19  pandemic,  it  was  technically166  not  possible  to  adopt  evaluation 
reports from March until the beginning of June. This delayed the adoption of reports related 
to evaluations carried out in 2019. The average adoption time for 2019 evaluation reports was 
336 days, while on the other hand the reports for the evaluation carried out at the beginning 
of 2020 was faster than the average (198 days), which confirms the conclusion that the length 
of the process is due to a large extent to the administrative burden. 

166  

Security  measures  for EU RESTRICTED documents require the presence in the Commission premises 
which was not possible during the first lock-down. 

129 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
Overall, the analysis of the different procedures led to the conclusions that two factors delay 
in particular the process: the lack of a clear timeline and the administrative burden due to 
the articulation and complexity of the process. 

As regard the length of the follow-up, in the first five-year cycle, only a limited number of 
procedures could be closed as of today. An analysis of the data both from a qualitative and 
quantitative  point  of  view  has  limitations  given  the  limited  size  of  the  sample.  Only  about 
25% of the action plans were closed at the end of 2020. 

4.2 Baseline scenario 

As  regards  the  length  of  the  evaluation  process,  the  baseline  scenario  corresponds  to  the 
current  scenario.  However,  as  the  number  of  evaluation  visits  would  increase,  generating 
additional workload, it is also reasonable to expect that the length could further increase. 
As there is no clear correlation between the number of procedures and the process length, an 
estimation is not possible though. 

4.3  Policy options 

Figure  21  shows  the  impact  of  the  different  policy  options  considered  in  this  Impact 
Assessment against the described baseline scenario: 

-  Option  1  would  not  have  any  relevant  impact  on  the  length  of  the  process. 
Changing the number of experts and the length of the procedure would not per se be 
sufficient  to  have  any  impact.  Simplification  of  the  process  is  limited  due  to  the 
rigidity  of  the  legislative  and  administrative  provisions  regulating  the  procedure, 
while  a  more  frequent  organisation  of  the  Schengen  Committee  would  also  have  a 
marginal  effect  given  that  the  Committees  take  place  already  on  an  almost  monthly 
basis.  Frequent  meetings  would  even  generate  an  additional  workload  at  the  risk  of 
delaying other activities without simplifying existing ones. 

-  Option 2 is expected to have a positive impact on the length of the procedure thanks 
to  a  number  of  simplifications  introduced  that  would,  for  instance,  facilitate  the 
handling  and  translation  of  documents  and  reduce  the  overall  workload,  while  time 
limits  would  improve  the  structure  of  the  process  and  create  clear  benchmarks. 
However,  even  if  the  Commission  considers  possible  to  reduce  the  length  for  the 
adoption of the evaluation reports, at least two additional months should be added for 
the adoption of the recommendations, coming to a maximum length of six months.  
-  The  additional  measures  under  Option  3  and  Option  4  would  further  shorten  the 
process as the further step before the Council would be eliminated allowing to set  a 
time limit of four months. Under these options, specific procedures would be in place 
for politically important or sensitive cases and for urgent cases with the involvement 
of  the  Council.  The  number  of  evaluations  falling  under  these  special  procedures 
would  be  very  limited  and  would  not  have  any  significant  impact  on  the  average 
length  of  the  process.  In  politically  important  cases,  where  no  serious  deficiencies 
were identified, the procedure will be prolonged  herewith  to  six  months, but  this is 
justified  on  balance  by  the  absence  of  urgency  and  the  need  to  closely  involve  the 
Council. The fast-track procedure would introduce anyway a prioritisation of the most 
urgent cases that would be dealt with in only 2.5 months. 

130 

 
Figure 21 – Length of the evaluation process – Comparison of policy options  

131 

 
 
 
Annex 4: Who is affected and how? 

1.  PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE INITIATIVE 

The initiative would affect immediately the following stakeholders that participate actively or 
passively in the evaluations, namely:  

– 
– 
– 

Member States (Public Authorities); 
EU institutions (European Parliament, Council and Commission); 
EU  bodies  and  agencies  involved  in  the  implementation  of  the  Schengen acquis, 
currently in particular Frontex, the Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA), Europol, eu-
LISA and the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS). 

While  ultimately  citizens  and  undertakings  will  benefit  from  better  implementation  of  the 
Schengen acquis  and  are  the  main  beneficiaries  of  this  initiative,  the  Regulation  has  no 
immediate  or  practical  effects  for  them.  SCH-EVAL  as  such  is  not  an  instrument  that 
addresses individual situations and individuals are not involved in any form in the process. 

2.  SUMMARY OF COSTS AND BENEFITS 

During  the  consultation,  the  stakeholders  concerned  highlighted  the  benefits  of  their 
participation  to  the  evaluations  but  stressed  that  evaluations  became  today  a  resource-
intensive activity. 

Table 25 and Table 26 provide a short summary of the main benefits and costs expected from  
Option  4.  For  most  elements,  it  is  not  possible  to  quantify  the  effects  due  to  the  lack  of 
sufficient data or because the effect of the implementation of new measures will depend both 
on the actors involved and on external factors. 

2.1 Overview of Benefits 

Table 25 – Overview of benefits 

Overview of Benefits (total for all provisions) – Option 4 
Description 
Legal 
and 
provisions 
operational  measures  on  the 
scope of the mechanism, on the 
scope of the evaluations and on 
their programming 

Member States 
Costs saving for 
announced evaluations by 
40%. Not expected to be 
entirely offset by increased 
of ad-hoc evaluations – 
Non quantifiable 

Commission 
Cost savings for the 
Commission in 
particular as regard 
evaluations financial 
costs and reduced 
administrative burden 
for the participation 
to the evaluations  

EU bodies / agencies 
Cost  savings  thanks 
to  shorter  and  more 
announced 
targeted 
evaluations  –  Non 
quantifiable,  and  not 
expected 
be 
significant  

to 

132 

 
 
Overview of Benefits (total for all provisions) – Option 4 
Description 
Legal  provisions  aiming  at  the 
simplification of the procedure 

Member States 
Cost savings by 50% for 
the submission of the 
progress reports – Non 
quantifiable, but highly 
significant (per Member 
State up to 240 working 
hours yearly) 
Costs saving for 
announced evaluations by 
40%. Not expected to be 
entirely offset by increased 
of ad-hoc evaluations – 

Non quantifiable  

Legal provisions changing the 
institutional balance 

Legal 
and 
provisions 
operational  measures  on  the 
designation of experts, training 
and incentives of non-financial 
nature 

Cost savings and further 
benefits from a faster 
adoption process and 
reduce burden on the 
Council – Non 
quantifiable, but 
significant 

Reduced administrative 
burden due to the 
elimination of repeated 
calls for experts and 
facilitation in the 
composition of the teams 
and facilitation in 
programming - Non 
quantifiable, but 
significant to allow to all 
Member State to 
participate 
Increase in the 
professionality of Member 
State experts from 
trainings - Non 
quantifiable, but 
potentially highly 
significant 

EU bodies / agencies 
No direct benefits 

No direct benefits 

No direct benefits 

Commission 
Cost savings due to 
the declassification of 
the reports, informal 
communication of the 
assessment of the 
action plan and 
reduced frequency of 
the assessment of the 
actions plans – Non 
quantifiable, but 
highliy significant 
and above 2 400 
working hours   
Facilitation in the 
programmation of the 
evaluations – Non 
quantifiable, but 
highliy significant 
Cost savings and 
further benefits from 
a faster adoption 
process and reduce 
burden on the 
Council – Non 
quantifiable, but 
significant 
Reduced 
administrative burden 
due to the elimination 
of repeated call for 
experts and 
facilitation in the 
composition of the 
teams thanks to the 
pool - Non 
quantifiable, but 
expected to be non-
negligible 
A lower number of 
experts would imply 
cost savings as 
regards notably the 
financial costs of the 
evaluations - Non 
quantifiable, but 
expected to be highly 
significant (>25%) 

Legal 
and 
provisions 
operational measures aiming at 
reinforcing the implementation 
rights’ 
of 
safeguards 

fundamental 

No direct benefits 

No direct benefits 

for 

Benefits 
the 
Fundamental  Right 
Agency (FRA) from a 
wider  participation  in 
the Mechanism – Non 
quantifiable, 
but 
significant  compared 
corresponding 
to 
costs (see below) 

133 

 
Overview of Benefits (total for all provisions) – Option 4 
Description 
Legal 
and 
provisions 
operational measures aiming at 
input  and 
the 
maximising 
coordination 
EU 
agencies/bodies 

Member States 
No direct benefits 

with 

Commission 
Increased availability 
of timely information 
facilitating the 
programming of the 
evaluations and of the 
on-site visits – Non 
quantifiable, but 
highly significant  

EU bodies / agencies 
Increased availability 
of information from 
SCH-EVAL 
evaluations with 
significant synergies 
– Non quantifiable, 
but highly significant 

2.2 Overview of Costs 

Table 26 – Overview of costs 

Overview of Costs (total for all provisions) –  Option 4 

Description 

Member States 

Commission 

EU bodies/ agencies 

Legal 
and 
provisions 
operational  measures  on  the 
scope of the mechanism, on the 
scope of the evaluations and on 
their programming 

No 
costs 
additional 
expected on balance (see 
above) 

No  additional  costs 
expected 

Increased 
administrative costs for 
the preparation of more 
strategic evaluations – 
Non quantifiable but 
negligible compared to 
corresponding cost 
savings (see above) 

Legal  provisions  aiming  at  the 
simplification of the procedure 

costs 

additional 

No 
expected 
Declassification 
of 
evaluation  reports  would 
any 
generate 
not 
inconvenient  as  Member 
States  would  maintain 
the  possibility  to  request 
the classification 

Legal 
and 
provisions 
operational  measures  on  the 
designation of experts, training 
and incentives of non-financial 
nature 

additional 

No 
expected 

costs 

Additional costs for 
the organisation of 
trainings – Non 
quantifiable  

New costs for the 
organisation and 
administration of the 
pool of experts – Non 
quantifiable but 
comparable to 
corresponding cost 
savings due to the 
simplified designation 
procedure 
Additional costs for the 
organisation of 
trainings – Non 
quantifiable 

134 

 
 
 
Overview of Costs (total for all provisions) –  Option 4 

Description 

Member States 

Commission 

EU bodies/ agencies 

Legal 
and 
provisions 
operational measures aiming at 
reinforcing the implementation 
rights’ 
of 
safeguards 

fundamental 

Possible minor 
inconvenient due to the 
elimination of the 24h 
notice in advance in case 
of investigative 
unannounced evaluations  

additional 

No 
expected 

costs 

Legal 
and 
provisions 
operational measures aiming at 
input  and 
maximising 
the 
EU 
coordination 
agencies/bodies 

with 

No additional costs 
expected 

Additional costs for the 
of 
exchange 
information 
and 
coordination  –  Non 
but 
quantifiable, 
expected 
be 
negligible 

to 

Additional  costs  for 
the 
Fundamental 
Rights  Agency  (FRA) 
–  Non  quantifiable, 
but  expected 
to  be 
marginal  

Additional  costs  for 
the  more  frequent  and 
wider  submission  of 
information  –  Non 
but 
quantifiable, 
expected 
be 
reasonably  limited  as 
is 
most 
information 
to 
already  available 
the 
EU 
bodies/agencies 

to 

3.  COSTS FOR MEMBER STATES 

Member States are directly involved in SCH-EVAL in two ways because of (a) their active 
participation in evaluating other Member States and addressing recommendations to remedy 
deficiencies  and  (b)  their  passive  participation  as  ‘evaluated’  subjects  that  receive  the 
recommendations. In both cases, Member States benefit from the participation to SCH-EVAL 
but also bear certain costs. 

During  the  stakeholders’  consultation,  Member  States  stressed  their  interest  in  the  active 
participation in the functioning of SCH-EVAL. The primary  benefit is the possibility to 
monitor and evaluate directly the implementation of the Schengen acquis on a regular basis in 
the whole area. This is important as the situation in other Member States may have an impact 
on the situation on their own territory and citizens. SCH-EVAL allows both to influence the 
situation in other Member States when necessary and to adopt appropriate measures on their 
own territory. Having experts in the evaluation teams enables Member States to be informed 
directly about the actual situation in other Member States, instead of relying exclusively on 
the  Commission’s  assessment.  The  general  benefit  from  the  passive  participation  to 
evaluations,  i.e.  the  benefit  for  Member  States  from  being  evaluated,  is  arguably  less 
appreciable  and  not  self-evident.  However,  Member  States  may  benefit  from  an  impartial 
assessment of their administrations and recommendations about the areas where improvement 
might be necessary. This also facilitates a better use of available EU funds. 

Beyond  this  key  general  benefit,  there  are  also  minor  but  more  concrete  and  immediate 
benefits and costs generated by the participation in the instrument. 

During the stakeholders’ consultation, Member States mentioned as an important benefit the 
transfer of knowledge. Member States’ experts receive trainings by the EU agencies and the 
Commission,  and  can  immediately  observe  best  practices  in  other  Member  States. 
Networking  among  Member  States’  administrations  is  also  perceived  as  an  additional 
benefit.  While  such  general  benefits  cannot  be  quantified  and  may  also  vary,  they  are 

135 

 
generally  perceived  as  appreciable  and  –  as  it  clearly  emerged  from  the  Member  States’ 
consultation – justify the costs generated by the participation of the Member States. 

Yet,  Member  States  also  raised  the  increasing  administrative  burden  arising  from  the 
evaluations. 

Box 14 – Questions on costs to Member States 

Please  indicate  below  your  Member  States  estimation  of  the  administrative  costs  generated  in  2019167  in 
terms  of  working  hours  as  appropriate  in  order  to  comply  with  the  provisions  of  the  SCH-EVAL 
Regulation and operational measures in place. Please use ranges where the provision of a value would not 
be possible or appropriate. Also indicate the main components of cost and whether there were differences 
across different policy fields. 
Please also indicate whether the costs were significantly different in the preceding years.  
Member States evaluated in 2020 or to be evaluated in 2021 should provide an estimation of the expected 
administrative costs. 
10.a.  Designation  and  participation  of  the  experts  in  the  evaluations  of  other  Member  States  under 

10.b. 
10.c. 
10.d. 

Article 10 of the SCH-EVAL Regulation 
Submission of the action plan under Article 16 of the SCH-EVAL Regulation     
Submission of the follow-up reports under Article 16 of the SCH-EVAL Regulation 
Please indicate other significant costs generated by the provisions of the SCH-EVAL Regulation 
or operational measures in place, in particular those related to the evaluation of your country  

  Working hours for the preparation of the evaluation including the preparation of the reply 

to the standard questionnaire:  

  Working hours for carrying out the evaluation on-site visit: 
  Transportation, meals, other material costs: 

Other 

3.1 Costs linked to the ‘functioning of SCH-EVAL’ 

The  first  category  of  costs  includes  a  wide  number  of  tasks,  by  which  Member  States 
contribute  to  the  evaluations  but  also  to  the  decision-making  process  within  the  Council. 
These include notably: 

a. 
Participation  of  experts  in  evaluations  (Articles  10,  11,  14):  all  Member  States 
must  contribute  experts  who  participate  in  the  evaluation  and  draft  the  evaluation  report. 
Based on the data collected and Commission’s experience, preparation of and participation in 
the  evaluation  visits,  as  well  as  the  finalisation  of  the  draft  evaluation  report  may  vary 
depending on the characteristics of the evaluation and composition of the team, but require in 
a standard case about 88 working hours for a leading expert and 72 working hours for other 
experts. On average, Member States contributed per year about 315 experts, with an overall 
estimated workload of about 24 000 working hours168. In addition, Member States do not 
contribute  to  the  financial  costs,  except  for  daily  allowances  for  their  experts,  which  may 
significantly  vary  across  Member  States  and  depending  on  the  destination.  Data  are 
insufficient  to  provide  an  estimation  of  such  costs.  With  the  proposed  flexibility,  it  is 
estimated that Option 4 would require 33%-36% experts less than the baseline scenario(s), 
which would imply savings of 8 000 working hours. The Commission cannot quantify further 
reductions  due  to  shorter  evaluation  visits,  as  this  most  likely  would  be  offset  by  more 
preparation.  

167  

  Please mention the expected costs or the costs in a different year if due to any circumstances, e.g. state of 

the evaluation or implementation of recommendations 2019 would not be indicative.  
168   Given the difference in wages across Member States, working hours appears more indicative.  

136 

 
                                                           
b. 
Participation of experts to the follow-up (Article 16(2)): Member States experts may 
be  consulted  as  appropriate  for  the  assessment  of  the  action  plan,  but  this  task  was  not 
considered by any Member State as particularly time consuming. 

c.  Adoption  of  the  evaluation  report  and  recommendations  (Articles  14  and  15):  A 
Member  State  stressed  in  its  reply  that  coordination  work  and  participation  to  the  SCH-
EVAL-related meetings would require yearly at least 500 working hours. While estimation 
of  the  related  costs  is  not  possible,  the  proposed  decision-making  process  may  reduce  this 
administrative burden by combining several tasks at the level of the adoption. Costs linked to 
the adoption of the recommendations by the Council would generally disappear because the 
number of cases with serious deficiencies is normally very limited.  

Table 27 – Costs for Member States 

Task 

Evaluation  visit  (preparation,  participation  and 
drafting of the report)  
Assessment of the Action Plan 

Participation  in  the  adoption  of  the  evaluation 
reports and recommendations 

Sum of quantifiable savings for all Member State 

Estimated 
(working hours) 

costs 

Option 4 

24 000 working hours 

16 000 working hours 

Negligible 

Non-quantifiable 

Unchanged - negligible 

Significantly decreasing 
– non-quantifiable 

8 000 working hours 

Source: Member States’ replies to questionnaire 

3.2 Member States’ evaluation costs  

The  costs  for  the  Member  States  undergoing  the  evaluation  include  different  aspects  of  the 
preparation of the evaluation and the follow-up after the evaluation is concluded. 

a.  Reply to the standard questionnaire (Article 9(1)): before any announced evaluation, 
Member States must submit their replies to a standard questionnaire covering all policy fields 
and  including  overall  384  questions.  Based  on  the  replies  received,  preparing  the  replies 
would generally require 400-500 working hours, but up to 1 000 working hours or more for 
certain  Member  States;  thus,  on  average  around  800  working  hours.  By  lowering  the 
frequency of announced evaluations, the extension of the cycle to seven years would decrease 
proportionately  the  relative  burden.  A  similar  questionnaire  does  not  precede  unannounced 
evaluations. 

b. 
Preparation  and  logistic  support  of  the  evaluations  (Article  13)  imply  significant 
costs for the Member States evaluated. From the replies provided by Member States, the most 
significant  component of these costs is human resources that can amount to  5 000 working 
hours  or  more  for  the  evaluations  in  the  six  policy  fields.  Member  States  also  bear  certain 
financial  costs  for  the  evaluations  (translation,  catering,  transports  within  the  evaluated 
Member State, and financial costs related to the participation of their own experts to support 
the  evaluation),  which  may  significantly  vary  depending  on  the  price  level  the  country.  A 
cautious  estimation  suggests  that  announced  evaluations  may  require  EUR  10 000  per 
Member State evaluated based on the data received. Member States also indicate that a large 
share of these costs depends on the length of the visits, the number of locations visited, and 
experts’ number. These costs do not apply in principle to unannounced evaluations, requiring 
more limited logistic support. Option 4 may have an appreciable impact given the wider use 
of evaluation tools that are less burdensome (unannounced evaluations, revisits, verification 
visits)  in  combination  with  the  reduced  number  of  experts.  The  Commission  expects  that a 

137 

 
 
lower frequency of announced evaluations (extension of the evaluation cycle) will reduce the 
relative burden by at least 40%. 

In the follow-up phase (Article 16)169, Member States have to present an action plan 
c. 
and need to report on its implementation progress by submitting follow-up reports every three 
months.  In  this  case,  the  workload  can  be  extremely  different,  mainly  depending  on  the 
number of recommendations and the procedure’s state. Based on the Member States’ data, for 
each evaluation, a Member State dedicates up to 250 working hours for the presentation of 
the  action  plan  and  up  to  500  working  hours  yearly  for  the  follow-up  reports.  Member 
States  that  do  not  have  action  plans  open  or  have  almost  closed  their  action  plans  have 
obviously no, or negligible, costs. While the available data do not support any estimation of 
the  average  related  workload  per  year,  the  measures  under  the  Option  4  would  reduce  the 
relative  burden.  A  lower  frequency  for  the  presentation  of  the  follow-up  reports  would 
reduce  costs  by  50%  as  the  number  of  reports  per  year  will  go  from  four  to  two.  More 
targeted  recommendations  would  simplify  the  action  plan,  which  should  arguably  lead  to 
lower working hours. 

Table 28 – Costs for the Member States evaluated 

Task 

Reply to the questionnaire (working hours per 
Member State) 

Evaluation visit, including preparation (working 
hours per Member State, six policy fields) 

Action Plan (working hours yearly per Member 
State)170 
Follow-up reports (working hours yearly per 
Member State) 

Other costs (EUR)  

Sum of quantifiable savings per Member State 

Estimated costs (hours)  Option 4 

800 working hours 

570 working hours 

5 000 working hours 

4 000 working hours 

Non-quantifiable (Up to 250 
working hours) 

Decreasing, non- 
quantifiable 

Non-quantifiable (Up to 500 
working hours) 

Decreasing by 50% 

EUR 10 000  

EUR 8 000 

1 230 working hours 
/ EUR 2 000 

Source: Member States’ replies to questionnaire 

4.  BENEFITS AND COSTS FOR THE COMMISSION 

The Commission plays different roles in the Mechanism. First, it coordinates the evaluations 
and  organises  the  evaluations  activities  together  with  the  Member  State  under  evaluation. 
Commission representatives take actively part in the evaluations. The Commission adopts the 
report and has to carry out the follow-up.  

The general benefit for the Commission from the coordination and direct active participation 
in  the  mechanism  derives  principally  from  the  complementarity  of  SCH-EVAL  with  other 
tools of the Commission, like infringement procedures, in its role as guardian of the Treaty. 
In  addition,  as  also  highlighted  in  the  five-year  review,  SCH-EVAL  helped  policy  making. 
Beyond such general benefit linked to the added-value of SCH-EVAL in ensuring a correct 
implementation  of  the  Schengen  acquis,  Commission  experts  acquire  thanks  to  the 
evaluations additional expertise that is beneficial for their function.  

169  

170  

Costs  related  to  the  implementation  of  the  recommendations  are  not  included,  as  they  are  not  a 
consequence of the Mechanism but of the implementation of the Schengen acquis. 
The number of action plans depends on the number of evaluations. 

138 

 
 
                                                           
However,  the  Commission  is  also  bearing  the  highest  share  of  costs  for  the  functioning  of 
SCH-EVAl. The main tasks of the Commission and the relative costs are outlined below. 

a. 
The adoption of the multiannual and annual programme (Article 5 and 6) generates 
only  minor  administrative  costs.  While  the  overall  preparation  may  require  few  days,  the 
relative implementing decision’s preparation and adoption add at least three working days (24 
working hours)171. Frequent amendments added at least two working days,  which would be 
no longer required with the same frequency by introducing increased flexibility as per Option 
4. 

b. 
The Commission does not organise at present any training (Article 12) on its own but 
contributes  yearly  six  trainers  to  support  the  training  activities  organised  by  the  EU  bodies 
and agencies (overall about 720 working hours and EUR 12 000 to cover travel costs and 
day  allowance),  while  participation  of  Commission  experts  in  the  training  requires  only 
negligible  resources.  Improving  the  current  training  system  implies  additional  costs  for  the 
Commission, which cannot be quantified, as the scope of the training would still need to be 
identified.  The  Commission  expects  that  an  additional  training  for  visa  will  require  EUR 
70 000 while training in data protection may only imply a small fraction of this amount. 

c.  Organisation and preparation of the evaluations (Article 13) include a wide range 
of administrative tasks for the Commission. On average, each visit’s organisation may require 
at  least  24  working  hours  (⁓1 000  working  hours  per  year).  Shorter  evaluations  reduce  the 
administrative  burden  for  the  organisation.  While  the  management  of  a  pool  of  experts,  as 
stressed by several  stakeholders, may add additional workload, this would be offset  overall 
by the savings in terms of the individual call for experts that would no longer be necessary 
under Option 4. 

d. 
Participation to the evaluation visit and finalisation of the draft report (Articles 12 
and  14)  by  the  two  Commission  representatives  generally  require  at  least  one  week  to 
prepare  the  evaluations,  including  coordination  meetings  and  study  of  the  file.  This 
preparation  even  in  a  simple  case  entails  about  80  working  hours.  At  the  same  time,  the 
evaluation  visit  normally  lasts  one  additional  week,  the  finalisation  of  the  draft  report, 
including  also  the  consultation  of  the  Member  State  evaluated  and  other  Member  States  at 
least two additional working weeks. While a more targeted approach would probably increase 
the work for the preparation of the evaluations, this should be offset  by the savings  from  a 
shorter evaluation visit and a shorter evaluation report. An additional burden is generated by 
the  need  to  encrypt  the  evaluation  reports  (Article  17),  requiring  at  the  very  least  two 
working hours per each evaluation report, 80 working hours yearly. The proposed reform of 
Article 17 would cancel this cost. 

e.  Adopting  the  report  and  the  proposal  for  the  recommendations  (Article  14  and 
15), under the current two-step system, the Commission already adopts the evaluation report 
and  the  proposal  for  the  recommendations.  The  procedure  for  the  adoption  of  the 
recommendations  by  the  Council  does  not  generate  significant  additional  costs  for  the 
Commission.  The  measures  proposed  under  Option  4  to  rationalise  the  decision-making 
process and combine the two steps would not have as such a major impact, but rather transfer 
certain limited administrative costs (translation) from the Council to the Commission. 

171 

This  includes  for  the  discussion  in  the  Schengen  Committee,  translation  and  further  work  by  different 
Commission services. 

139 

 
                                                           
f. 
In the follow-up (Article 16), the Commission is required to present its assessment of 
each action plan to the Council. The assessment may take at least three days (960 working 
hours  in  a  year  for  40  action  plans).  A  significant  additional  administrative  burden  arises 
from  the  procedure  for  the  adoption  of  a  formal  Communication  and  its  translation.  The 
Commission  estimated  that,  even  combining  the  assessment  of  different  action  plans,  the 
procedure  required  yearly  about  800  working  hours.  The  proposed  modification  under 
Option 4 would have a significant positive impact by eliminating these costs. 

Table 29 – Yearly administrative costs for the Commission 

Task 

Multiannual and Annual Programme (working 
hours per year) 

Estimated costs  
60 working hours 

Option 4 
40 working hours 

Trainings (working hours per year) 

720 working hours 

Increasing, non-
quantifiable 

Administrative organisation of the evaluations 
(working hours per year) 

Evaluation visit and finalisation of the draft report 
(working hours per year) 

Encryption of evaluation reports (working hours 
per year) 

Adoption of the evaluation report and 
recommendation proposal (working hours per year) 

Assessment of the action plans (working hours per 
year) 

Assessment of the follow-up reports and closure of 
the action plan (working hours per year) 

1 000 working hours 

Decreasing 

14 000 working hours 

Unchanged 

At least 80 working hours 

0  

200 working hours 

Unchanged 

1 800 working hours 

1 000 working hours 

3 000 working hours 

1 500 working hours 

Sum of the quantifiable savings (working hours) 

2 400 working hours 

Source: internal Commission data 

g. 
Pursuant  to  Article  13(7),  the  Commission  covers  the  most  substantial  part  of  the 
financial  costs  for  the  evaluation  visits,  i.e.  the  travel,  accommodation  and  meals  for  the 
evaluation team members. In addition, it covers the financial expenses for the participation of 
its own experts and, partially, for the observers of the EU bodies and agencies. The overall 
cost of the evaluations per year amounted to EUR 1.2 to 2 million. In combination with the 
duration of the evaluation visit and team size, travel destination may significantly influence 
total  evaluation  costs. Missions for the field  of common visa policy tend to  be more costly 
because  they  are  carried  out  at  Member  States’  consulates  in  visa-required  third  countries. 
Unannounced evaluation visits are cheaper, because a smaller team usually carries them out. 
They tend to have a shorter duration (two to four days instead of up to six days). 

Rebalancing  the  use  of  the  different  tools  may  decrease  the  costs.  The  Commission 
estimated  that  the  measures  under  Option  4 would  reduce  the  costs  of  the  announced 
evaluations  by  possibly  40%172  due  to  the  combined  effect  of  shorter  visits  (targeted 
approach), reduced number of experts (flexibility of the team size) and the lower number of 
announced  evaluations  (extension  of  the  evaluation  cycle173).  Yet,  there  are  no  sufficient 

172  

Compared to the Member States, Commission costs are largely proportional to the length of the visit and 
the number of experts.  

173   As the extension of the cycle would allow replacing some of the evaluation visits with other types that 

are in general cheaper (like unannounced evaluations and revisits). 

140 

 
 
                                                           
elements  to  estimate  the  costs  arising  at  the  same  time  from  increased  use  of  alternative 
evaluation tools and measures, such as training.  

5.  BENEFITS AND COSTS FOR THE EU BODIES AND AGENCIES 

Also  EU  bodies / agencies  stressed  during  the  consultation  the  benefits  from  their 
participation  in  SCH-EVAL.  These  benefits  are  very  similar  to  those  indicated  by  the 
Member States, namely transfer of knowledge and networking with colleagues from Member 
States’  administrations.  In  their  replies  to  the  short  questionnaire,  EU  bodies / agencies 
include in the main merits of SCH-EVAL “[e]xchange with experts (our peers) from national 
[administrations] 
to  other  EU 
bodies / agencies,  “[t]  he  evaluations  help  the  Agency  to  be  in  touch  with  MS  and  the 
operational  work”  or  “[t]he  Observer  has  the  opportunity  to  liaise  and  network  with  the 
evaluation  team  and  feel  the  pulse  of  contemporary  issues  affecting  also  their  respective 
countries  as  it  relates  to  police  cooperation  and  Schengen  acquis”.  An  EU  agency  also 
mentions that “The agency has the possibility to boost its profile with external stakeholders in 
the field and promote by example its services and support”. 

(exchange  best  practices,  networking”.  According 

However,  it  is  also  stressed  that  “[t]here  are  no  particular  shortcomings  other  than  the 
resources required to support the Commission led evaluations”. 

The participation of EU bodies and agencies in SCH-EVAL generate costs in relation of three 
activities.  

a.  Risk  analysis  and  sharing  of  information  (Article  7  and  8):  Under  the  current 
Regulation, Frontex has a legal obligation to submit a risk analysis to the Commission and to 
the  Member  States  by  31  August  each  year,  with  recommendations  on  the  priorities  for 
announced  evaluations in  the following  year,  and on possible unannounced on-site visits  in 
the following year. Frontex submits this latter analysis only to the Commission). In addition, 
the  Commission  shall,  where  appropriate,  request  EU  bodies  and  agencies,  other  than 
Frontex, which are involved in the implementation of the Schengen  acquis to carry out risk 
analyses. At present, three agencies provide yearly risk analysis (Frontex, FRA and Europol) 
with estimated costs between 240-480 working hours. The EU agencies’ submissions show 
that  the  costs  are  much  lower  when  information  is  already  available  to  the  agencies. 
Quantifying the costs arising from the new obligations under Option 4 to widen the scope of 
the  EU  agencies’  information  is  impossible.  Still,  as  most  information  would  be  already 
available to the EU agencies, such costs are not expected to be very significant. 

Option 4 would have an impact on costs as it aims at widening the sharing of information, but 
it is to note that to a large extent this would concern the transmission of information already 
available to the EU bodies / agencies. The change is not quantifiable. 

Table 30 – Yearly costs for EU bodies / agencies risk analyses 

Type of contribution 

Preparation of risk analysis 
or report (average working 
hours per year) 

Body / Agency A 
Risk  analysis / statistical 
report 
320 working hours 

Body / Agency B 
Risk analysis / statistical 
report 
480 working hours 

Body / Agency C 
Risk analysis / statistical 
report 
240 working hours 

Source: EU bodies / agencies’ replies to the questionnaire 

b. 
Participation  of  experts  as  observers  (Article  10(5)):  Pursuant  to  Article  10(5), the 
Commission  may  invite  Frontex,  Europol,  or  other  Union  bodies,  offices  or  agencies 

141 

 
 
involved in the implementation of the Schengen acquis to designate a representative to take 
part  as  an  observer  in  an  evaluation  visit  concerning  an  area  covered  by  their  mandate. 
Currently  five  EU  bodies  and  agencies  provide  experts  on  a  regular  basis,  namely  Frontex, 
FRA, Europol, eu-LISA and EDPS. By difference to Member States experts, the Commission 
covers  only  partially174  the  financial  costs  for  the  participation  of  EU  bodies / agencies’ 
experts in the evaluations. The costs were on average EUR 60 000 to 70 000 per year for all 
experts in all missions in the first five-year cycle. EU bodies and agencies also indicated that 
their observers’ working time would be largely in line with the evaluation team’s members, 
50-70  working  hours  per  evaluation,  even  though  their  tasks  under  the  SCH-EVAL 
Regulation are in theory more limited. Shortening the evaluation visits, as per Option 4, may 
generate costs savings for the EU bodies and agencies that could partly offset the increased 
costs from wider participation. 

Option  4  leads  to  additional  costs  for  the  Fundamental  Rights  Agency  (FRA)  from  the 
occasional  participation  of  their  experts  in  the  evaluations  in  policy  fields  other  than 
return (the only policy field in which FRA experts are systematically involved) as well as in 
unannounced  evaluations.  The  increase  is  not  quantifiable  as  it  is  unknown  how  many 
additional  FRA  observers  would  be  need  and  it  is  reasonable  to  assume  that  it  would  be 
negligible. 

Table 31 – Yearly costs for EU bodies / agencies observers 

Body 
Agency A 

/ 

Body 
Agency B 

/ 

Body 
Agency C 

/ 

Body 
Agency D 

/ 

Body 
Agency E 

/ 

of 

⁓80 

23 

⁓27 

39 

19 

No data 
available 

˃1 610  
working hours 

1 350  
working hours 

No data 
available 

No data 
available 

Number 
observers 

Estimated 
working time 
(working 
hours) 

Financial  costs 
(EUR) 

EUR ⁓140 000  EUR 31 000 

EUR 37 800 

EUR 83 765 

EUR 4 200 

Source: EU bodies / agencies’ replies to questionnaire 

c. 
Information provided during the consultation indicates that the cost of training (Article 
12)  provided  by  the  EU  agencies  depends  on  the  form  of  the  training.  To  provide  an 
additional  module  to  existing  training  or  webinars175  may  cost  about  EUR  2 000  –  4 000, 
while the organisation of an in-person training is generally more expensive with very variable 
costs, ranging from EUR 5 000 to EUR 70 000, depending on the number of participants and 
affiliation  (i.e.  fully  covered  or  self-payers).  In  the  first  five-year  cycle,  the  training  costs 
were  yearly,  for  all  EU  agencies  together,  about  EUR  200 000  for  four  one-week  training 
sessions,  with  an  average  cost  of  EUR  900  per  expert.  Improved  training,  as  per  Option  4, 
including increasing their number, would imply additional costs and create new EU agencies’ 
workload. While it is not possible to estimate as the costs will depend ultimately on a case-
by-case  decision  of  the  cost-benefit  of  additional  training,  this  is  where  the  Commission 
expects  a  higher  cost  increase.  However,  it  could  be  considered  to  build  on  the  training 
already  in  place  to  offset  costs,  especially  regarding  additional  modules  in  fundamental 

The Commission cover the meals only for EU bodies’ and agencies’ observers. 

174  
175   At present webinars are offered to the evaluation team ahead of the evaluation and are rather targeted. 

142 

 
 
                                                           
rights,  as  suggested  by  Member  States.  E-learning  tools  should  also  be  used  for  the 
organisation of refreshers as far as possible. 

Option  4  would  generate  additional  costs  as  it  aims  at  increasing  and  improving 
trainings. It is not possible to estimate the amount of the additional because this will depend 
ultimately on a case-by-case decision of the cost-benefit of additional training. Based on the 
available data on the costs of training, the cost increase would be not negligible. 

Table 32 – EU bodies’ and agencies’ trainings 

Body / Agency 
A 

Body / Agency 
B 

Body / Agency 
C 

Body / Agency 
D 

Body / Agency 
E 

Type 
training 

of 

In-person 
training 

in 

Modules 
integrated 
other training, 
(Standalone) in-
person training 

In-person 
training 

Support to other 
EU agency 

Webinars 

Training 
(sessions) 

Number 
experts 
trained 

11 

12 + 2 

of 

826 

No data 
available 

9 

213 

5 

N/A 

31 

No data 
available 

Cost 
per 
session (EUR) 

EUR 60 000 – 
80 000 

EUR  2 000  – 
5 000 

EUR 4 200 

EUR  24 000  – 
29 000 

No data 
available 

Overall  Costs 
(EUR) 

EUR 660 000 - 
880 000 

EUR 30 000 

EUR 135 300 

EUR 7 000 

No data 
available 

Source: EU bodies / agencies’ replies to questionnaire 

143 

 
 
 
 
 
Table 33 – Summary of administrative costs 

Source of costs 

Working hours 
(Wh) 

Euro 

Active participation of Member states (for all Member States) 

Baseline 

Option 1 

Option 2 

Option 3 

Option 4 

Evaluation (experts) 

24 000 wh 

Not quantifiable in EUR 

23 000 wh 

21 000 wh 

14 000 wk 

16 000 wh 

Assessment of the Action Plan 
Participation in the adoption of the evaluation reports 
and recommendations 

Non-quantifiable – Negligible 

Unchanged 

Unchanged 

Unchanged 

Unchanged 

Not quantifiable 

Unchanged 

Unchanged 

Decreasing 

Decreasing 

Passive participation of Member states (average per Member State) 

Reply to the questionnaire 

800 

Not quantifiable in EUR 

800 wh 

800 wh 

550 wh 

550 wh 

Announced Evaluation (experts)  

5 000 

EUR 100 000-150 000 

Announced Evaluation (other costs)  

Ad-hoc evaluations 
Submission of the Action Plan 
Submission of progress reports (working hours yearly 
/ per Member State) 
Commission 

Multiannual and Annual Programme 
Trainings  
Evaluation (logistic costs) 

EUR 10 000 

Not quantifiable 
Not quantifiable - Significant  

Not quantifiable - Significant  

60 wh 
720 wh 

Not quantifiable in EUR 
Not quantifiable in EUR 
2  000 000 € 

Evaluation (Administrative organisation) 
Evaluation (visit and adoption of evaluation report) 

1 000 wh 
14 000 wh 

Not quantifiable in EUR 
Not quantifiable in EUR 

EUR 85 000 – 
130 000 
EUR 8 500 

Increasing 
Unchanged 

Unchanged 

Unchanged 
Increasing 
Decreasing 

Unchanged 
Unchanged 

EUR 85 000 – 
130 000 
EUR 8 500 

Increasing 
Unchanged 
Decreasing by 
50% 

40 wh 
Increasing 
Decreasing 

Unchanged 
Unchanged 

EUR 41 000 – 
61 500 
EUR 4 100 

Increasing 
Unchanged 
Decreasing by 
50% 

40 wh 
Increasing 
Decreasing 

Decreasing 
Unchanged 

EUR 61 000 – 
91 500 
EUR 6 100 

Increasing 
Unchanged 
Decreasing by 
50% 

40 wh 
Increasing 
Decreasing 

Decreasing 
Unchanged 

144 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
 
Encryption of evaluation reports 

80 wh 

Not quantifiable in EUR 

Unchanged 

0 

0 

0 

Baseline 

Option 1 

Option 2 

Option 3 

Option 4 

Adoption of the evaluation report and 
recommendation proposal 
Assessment of the action plans 
Assessment of the follow-up reports and closure of the 
action plan  
EU agencies/bodies 

Trainings  

200 wh 

Not quantifiable in EUR 

Unchanged 

Unchanged 

Unchanged 

Unchanged 

1 800 wh 

Not quantifiable in EUR 

Unchanged 

3 000 wh 

Not quantifiable in EUR 

Unchanged 

1 000 wh 

1 500 wh 

1 000 wh 

1 500 wh 

1 000 wh 

1 500 wh 

200 000 € 

Increasing 

Increasing 

Increasing 

Increasing 

Risk Analysis and information sharing 

240-480 wh 

Not quantifiable in EUR 

Unchanged 

Increasing 

Increasing 

Increasing 

Evaluations (observers) 

Evaluations (logistic costs) 

2 500 wh 

Not quantifiable in EUR 

EUR 60 000-70 000 

Increasing 

Increasing 

Increasing 

Increasing 

Increasing 

Increasing 

Increasing 

Increasing 

145