The Indo-Pacific concepts of France, Germany and the Netherlands in comparison : implications and challenges for the EU.
Date: 2021-05-30
Institutions: European University Institute
Subjects: Asia, EU relations, European Union, France, Germany, Netherlands, geopolitics

The Indo-Pacific concepts 
of France, Germany and the 
Netherlands in comparison: 
Implications and Challenges for 
the EU1

Abstract

The Indo-Pacific as a geo-economic and geostrategic concept has 
at least partially replaced the term Asia-Pacific over the last decade, 
with Japan, Australia, the United States and India each adopting and 
promoting their own respective vision. Before 2020, France was the 
only EU country to develop an Indo-Pacific strategy, based mainly on 
the fact that it sees itself as a resident power in the region. Germany 
and  the  Netherlands  reformulated  their  perspectives  of  the  area  in 
September and November 2020. Together, the three member states 
have initiated a debate at the EU level with the goal to adopt an EU 
position on the Indo-Pacific. Despite some notable differences in the 
three approaches, they agree on the region’s economic and strategic 
importance for Europe and share fundamental interests and objec-
tives. A major challenge for the national strategies as well as a pos-
sible future EU positioning on the Indo-Pacific will be how to address 
China and its role within this new framework. In this context, cooper-
ation with the U.S., which is barely mentioned in the documents, also 
needs to be thought through. The comprehensiveness especially of 
the German Policy guidelines for the Indo-Pacific raises the (not at 
all new) question concerning which objectives will be given priority if 
hard choices are to be made. The biggest challenge will be to allo-
cate the necessary financial and human resources to fulfil expecta-
tions that have been created among partners in the Indo-Pacific.

Gudrun Wacker, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin

1 

 This paper is based on a shorter version published by the Elcano Royal Institute: “Europe 
and the Indo-Pacific: Comparing France, Germany and the Netherlands”, March 9, 2021 
(=  ARI  29/2021),  http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_en/contenido?W-
CM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/ari29-2021-wacker-europe-and-
the-indo-pacific-comparing-france-germany-and-the-netherlands.

 EU-Asia project

Issue 2021/19
May 2021

POLICY BRIEFAuthorsBackground and context

Over the last decade, Japan, Australia, the United 
States and India have each adopted the concept 
of  the  Indo-Pacific  region  as  a  new  geographic, 
geo-economic  and  strategic  frame  of  reference, 
replacing  –  at  least  in  part    the  previously  dom-
inant  construct  of  the Asia-Pacific.  The  individu-
al countries’ conceptions of the Indo-Pacific vary 
considerably  with  respect  to  geographical  defini-
tion, policy priorities (security versus connectivity), 
concrete initiatives, emphasis of multi-, mini- and/
or bilateral approaches to trade and security in the 
region  as  well  as  the  question  of  excluding  ver-
sus  including  China.1  While  the  U.S.  and  Japan 
use  the  term  ‘Free  and  Open  Indo-Pacific’, Aus-
tralia and India have abstained from using these 
adjectives  in  connection  with  the  Indo-Pacific  in 
official  speeches  and  documents.  The  countries 
also  employ  different  terms  to  characterise  their 
approach to the region. The U.S. has an Indo-Pa-
cific strategy; Japan, which initially had also used 
the word strategy, switched to Indo-Pacific vision 
in 2018, signifying a ‘lighter’ approach. However, 
all four countries share the perception that the In-
dian and the Pacific Oceans constitute one contig-
uous and integrated space. There are also other 
common  denominators  like  the  commitment  to  a 
rules-based  international  and  regional  order  and 
international  norms  like  the  Freedom  of  Naviga-
tion. The rise of China and the question of how to 
respond to the challenges that come with it plays 
a central role in all versions of the concept. Offer-
ing alternatives to China’s Belt and Road Initiative 
(BRI)  is  a  common  feature  in  the  four  countries’ 
agendas for the Indo-Pacific.

The main difference between the U.S. on the one 
hand, and Japan, Australia and India on the other, 
is that the U.S. – at least under the Trump admin-

istration  clearly pursued the goal of preserving US 
strategic primacy in the region and of containing 
China.2 For the latter three (smaller) powers, the 
aim is primarily to balance China’s growing power 
and to preserve their respective sovereignty. This 
means  that  the  US  Indo-Pacific  focus  has  been 
mainly  on  security  and  new  technologies,  while 
Japan, India and Australia additionally emphasise 
trade and investment.

China views the US version of the Free and Open 
Indo-Pacific (FOIP) in particular not only as an ef-
fort  of  containment,  but  also  of  anti-China  coali-
tion  building.  It  tends  to  equate  the  Indo-Pacific 
with the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), a 
format initiated in 2007 between the U.S., Japan, 
Australia and India3 that was revived after an eight 
year hiatus in 2017. Initially, Beijing had expected 
the Indo-Pacific as a strategic framework and the 
Quad  to  be  short-lived,  but  this  turned  out  to  be 
a  miscalculation  –  not  least  due  to  China’s  own 
assertive  and  coercive  behaviour  in  and  beyond 
the region.

ASEAN responded relatively late with its own Out-
look on the Indo-Pacific in June 2019, presenting 
an inclusive approach upholding ASEAN central-
ity  and  basically  repeating  and  underlining  long-
held core principles of this group of ten Southeast 
Asian states.4 While New Zealand has not devel-
oped an Indo-Pacific strategy, it included the term 
(replacing  ‘Asia-Pacific’)  in  the  document  of  the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade Strategic In-
tentions 2020-2024. One of seven strategic goals 
listed here is to ‘[e]mbed New Zealand as an ac-
tive and integral partner in shaping an Indo-Pacific 
order that delivers stability and economic integra-
tion’.5 Canada and South Korea still seem some-
what reluctant to endorse the concept, mainly (but 
not only) because of China’s negative response to 
it.6 As for the UK, it published a document on its 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

 For a systematic comparison of the different concepts see Felix Heiduk, Gudrun Wacker: From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific. Significance, 
Implementation  and  Challenges,  Berlin,  July  2020  (=SWP  Research  Paper  9),  https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/
research_papers/2020RP09_IndoPacific.pdf, especially table on p.30.

 See the White House National Security Council’s U.S. strategic framework for the Indo-Pacific, February 2018, declassified in January 
2021, https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/20455499/ips-final-declass_ocr.pdf.

 These four countries had formed an ad hoc group in response to the 2004 tsunami. On the Quad see e.g. Patrick Buchan and Benjamin 
Rimland, “Defining the Diamond. The Past, Present and Future of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue”, March 2020, https://www.csis.org/
analysis/defining-diamond-past-present-and-future-quadrilateral-security-dialogue 

  ASEAN  Outlook  on  the  Indo-Pacific,  22  June  2019,  https://asean.org/storage/2019/06/ASEAN-Outlook-on-the-Indo-Pacific_FI-
NAL_22062019.pdf. 

 New Zealand Foreign Affairs & Trade: Strategic Intentions, 2020-2024, https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/About-us-Corporate/MFAT-strat-
egies-and-frameworks/MFAT-Strategic-Intentions-2020-2024.pdf, p.20f. The earlier version of Strategic Intentions for 2019-2023 still used 
“Asia-Pacific”  as  a  frame  (https://www.theprif.org/sites/default/files/documents/MFAT-Strategic-Intentions-2019-2023.pdf,  p.20f.).  For 
more detail on the position of New Zealand see Veerle Nouwens’ podcast with David Capie “New Zealand’s Indo-Pacific Calibration” here: 
https://rusi.org/multimedia/new-zealands-indo-pacific-recalibration. 

 On South Korea see Andrew Yeo, “South Korea and the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy”, July 20, 2020, https://www.csis.org/analy-
sis/south-korea-and-free-and-open-indo-pacific-strategy. On Canada see Hugh Stephens, “Canada’s Indo-Pacific Future”, Nov. 18, 2020, 
https://opencanada.org/canadas-indo-pacific-future/. 

2  

  Robert Schuman Centre | May 2021

future  foreign  policy  in  March  2021  that  adopted 
the  term  Indo-Pacific  and  outlined  a  ‘tilt’  towards 
this  region  in  a  short  chapter.  Its  noted  ambition 
here is to ‘[…] be the European partner with the 
broadest and most integrated presence in the In-
do-Pacific […].’7

It is important to note that while it is not clear yet 
how exactly US policy vis-à-vis China will devel-
op under the Biden administration, the rivalry and 
strategic competition between the two great pow-
ers will definitely not disappear and the Indo-Pacif-
ic will remain the overarching strategic framework 
of the U.S. in this region. Moreover, the first ever 
Quad summit meeting held in March 2021, which 
focused  on  vaccine  production,  climate  change 
and  critical  technologies,  demonstrated  that  the 
four  countries  are  planning  to  deepen  their  co-
operation in the future, including in areas beyond 
security.8

Comparing the French, German and 
Dutch approach to the Indo-Pacific

Within  the  EU,  France  published  Indo-Pacific 
strategy papers in 2018 and 2019, and Germany 
and  the  Netherlands  followed  in  September  and 
November  2020  respectively.  These  three  coun-
tries have also been working together to promote 
an Indo-Pacific strategy or vision to be adopted by 
the EU. 

France was the first member state of the EU that 
developed  its  own  Indo-Pacific  strategy.  French 
president Emmanuel Macron outlined the position 
of  his  country  in  a  speech  at  the  Garden  Island 
naval  base  in  Australia  in  May  2018,9  speaking 

about a new Indo-Pacific axis, with India and Aus-
tralia as ‘critical partners’. Official documents were 
published  by  the  French  Ministry  of  Defence  (in 
2018, updated in May 201910, and another one lat-
er in 201911) and by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(June 2019)12.

The  German  Policy  guidelines  for  the  Indo-Pa-
cific13,  published  first  in  German  in  September 
2020 and shortly afterwards in English, were ap-
proved by the German cabinet; they represent a 
whole-of-government  approach  on  the  issue.  A 
relatively short Dutch ‘non-paper’14 followed in No-
vember 2020. It is noteworthy that in May 2019 the 
government of the Netherlands also came out with 
a new China strategy.15 Both, the German and the 
Dutch guidelines on the Indo-Pacific make it clear 
from the beginning that they are to be understood 
as contributions and building blocks to developing 
an EU position towards the Indo-Pacific.

Structuring the approaches

France:  The  Indo-Pacific  strategy  document  of 
the  French  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs,  with  the 
subtitle  ‘For  an  Inclusive  Indo-Pacific’,  covers  in 
detail  France’s  role  as  a  player  in  the  region.  It 
starts off by describing the Indo-Pacific as being 
at the heart of global challenges characterised by 
tensions and crises, the new assertiveness of Chi-
na,  the  rise  of  religious  extremism,  and  also  the 
demographic and urban transition and a growing 
middle  class.  France’s  ambition  is  to  strengthen 
its  ‘presence  and  activities  in  the  region  in  the 
political,  strategic,  economic  and  environmental 
spheres  […]’.  (p.16)  This  is  to  be  accomplished 
by first, continuing to strengthen and balance the 

7 

8 

9 

 Full text HM Government: Global Britain in a competitive age. The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign 
Policy,  March  2021,  https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/975077/Glob-
al_Britain_in_a_Competitive_Age-_the_Integrated_Review_of_Security__Defence__Development_and_Foreign_Policy.pdf, part on “The 
Indo-Pacific tilt: A framework”, p.66-67, here: p.66.

  Joint  Leaders’  Statement:  “The  Spirit  of  the  Quad”,  March  12,  2021,  https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releas-
es/2021/03/12/quad-leaders-joint-statement-the-spirit-of-the-quad/

 Discours à Garden Island, base navale de Sydney (video only), May 3, 2018, https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2018/05/03/dis-
cours-a-garden-island-base-navale-de-sydney

10   France and Security in the Indo-Pacific, https://franceintheus.org/IMG/pdf/France_and_Security_in_the_Indo-Pacific_-_2019.pdf 

11    France’s  Defense  Strategy  in  the  Indo-Pacific,  https://www.defense.gouv.fr/content/download/559608/9684004/file/France's%20De-

fence%20Strategy%20in%20the%20Indo-Pacific%20-%202019.pdf 

12    French  Strategy  in  the  Indo-Pacific:  “For  an  Inclusive  Indo-Pacific”,  https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/asia-and-oceania/

the-indo-pacific-region-a-priority-for-france/ 

13   The Federal Government: Policy guidelines for the Indo-Pacific. Germany - Europe – Asia. Shaping the 21st century together, Sept- 1, 

2020, https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/blob/2380514/f9784f7e3b3fa1bd7c5446d274a4169e/200901-indo-pazifik-leitlinien--1--data.pdf. 

14   “Indo-Pacific: Guidelines for strengthening Dutch and EU cooperation with partners in Asia”. Unofficial English translation made available 

by Clingendael.

15   The Netherlands & China: a new balance, full text and summary available at https://www.government.nl/documents/policy-notes/2019/05/15/

china-strategy-the-netherlands--china-a-new-balance 

3  

  The Indo-Pacific concepts of France, Germany and the Netherlands in comparison: Implications and Challenges for the EU

strategic  partnership  with  China;  second,  devel-
oping  and  deepening  other  partnerships  in  the 
region  (with  Australia,  India,  Indonesia,  Japan, 
New Zealand, Singapore and South Korea); third, 
working to strengthen the positioning of the Euro-
pean Union in the region; fourth, playing a greater 
role  in  regional  organisations  such  as  the  ASE-
AN  Defence  Minister’s  Meeting  plus  (ADMM+), 
the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) or the 
Regional  Cooperation Agreement  on  Combating 
Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia 
(ReCAAP);  and  fifth  and  finally,  contributing  to  a 
comprehensive  response  to  Islamist  terrorism  in 
the  region.  The  French  network  in  the  region  is 
visualised in several maps covering its presence 
in terms of military, diplomacy, economy and de-
velopment, science and research, as well as cul-
ture, language and education. The last part of the 
paper  presents  recommendations,  listing  seven 
areas of action for French diplomacy with the fol-
lowing  four  priorities  (p.18):  the  safety  of  French 
citizens,  France’s  independence  combined  with 
EU  ambition,  transnational  solidarity  via  the  pro-
motion of common goods and France’s influence 
and attractiveness. It is noted three times in this 
document  that  France  aspires  to  act  as  a  medi-
ating  power  in  the  region.  This  role  had  already 
been mentioned by Emmanuel Macron in his Gar-
den Island speech. However, it has not been ex-
plained how France intends to play this particular 
role (while at the same time presenting itself as a 
resident power in the Indo-Pacific).

While  the  two  papers  published  by  the  French 
Ministry  of  Defence  focus  more  narrowly  on  se-
curity issues and France’s military presence and 
activities in the Indo-Pacific, it is noteworthy that 
the nexus between security and the environment 
is given special attention in this context.

Germany: The German Guidelines are structured 
along eight interests concerning the Indo-Pacific: 
(peace  and  security,  diversifying  and  deepening 
relations, a region that is neither unipolar nor bi-
polar,  open  shipping  routes,  open  markets  and 
free trade, digital transformation and connectivity, 
protecting  our  planet  and    access  to  fact-based 
information), followed by seven principles: (Euro-
pean  action,  multilateralism,  the  rules-based  or-
der,  United  Nations  Development  Goals,  human 
rights,  inclusivity,  partnership  among  equals). 
Then they list a plethora of initiatives under sev-
en policy fields that fall partly into the category in-
terests, partly into the category principles, and, in 
one case (‘bringing people together’) in neither of 
these categories. The seven policy fields are pre-

sented in more detail in the second and main part 
of the Guidelines. The third and final part provides 
a  visual  overview  of  Germany’s  existing  network 
in the Indo-Pacific. From the maps presented here 
it can be concluded that the German government 
shares the narrower Dutch geographical definition 
of the Indo-Pacific (pp. 64ff., see below).

The  Netherlands:  The  short  Dutch  non-papers 
raises six key issues in the beginning, summaris-
ing the dynamic and growing importance of the In-
do-Pacific, the necessity to step up the Dutch and 
EU roles and to strengthen partnerships in the re-
gion, with a focus on ‘the international legal order, 
democracy  and  human  rights,  sustainable  trade, 
security and stability, safe passage and maritime 
security,  climate  change,  global  healthcare  and 
poverty  reduction’.  The  Netherlands  and  the  EU 
could help widen strategic options for countries in 
the  region  and  not  become  a  pawn  in  the  great 
power  rivalry.  The  EU  should  neither  over-  nor 
underestimate its role, especially as an economic 
heavyweight.  COVID-19  is  seen  as  an  accelera-
tor  of  geopolitical  trends,  but  also  as  a  driver  of 
more  international  cooperation.  (p.1)  The  chap-
ters in the main text address the following issues: 
towards a European vision of the Indo-Pacific, re-
ferring to EU policy documents already in place as 
well as to economic linkages with the region and 
geopolitical interests of the EU in the region. Next 
is a chapter on the elements of a European vision, 
namely, peace and security, working with partners 
in the region, sustainable trade, effective multilat-
eralism and the international legal order, sustain-
able  connectivity  and  global  challenges  (climate 
and Sustainable Development Goals). For each of 
these elements, a list of recommendations for the 
EU  is  included.  The  final  chapter  on  ‘The  Neth-
erlands and the Indo-Pacific’ covers contributions 
the Netherlands is willing to make to these differ-
ent elements, either nationally or through the EU 
or within other contexts.

Main differences

The  respective  starting  points  for  France  on  the 
one hand, and for Germany and the Netherlands 
on the other, regarding the Indo-Pacific are quite 
different. France (post Brexit) is the only EU coun-
try  that  still  has  territories  in  the  Indian  and  Pa-
cific  oceans,  spanning  from  the  eastern  coast  of 
Africa  (Mayotte,  Scattered  Island,  La  Réunion) 
and  the  French  Southern  and  Antarctic  territo-
ries  in  the  South  Pacific  (Vanuatu,  New  Caledo-
nia,  Wallis  &  Futuna,  French  Polynesia)  all  the 
way to Clipperton Island off the western coast of 

4  

  Robert Schuman Centre | May 2021

Central  America.  French  citizens  (1.6  million),  a 
permanent military presence (including 7,000 mil-
itary  personnel)  and  the  second  biggest  area  of 
Exclusive  Economic  Zones  (EEZs)  in  the  world, 
more than 90 percent of which are located in the 
Indo-Pacific,  make  France  a  ‘resident  power’  in 
the region in its own right. Given the geographical 
location of these overseas assets, the Indo-Pacific 
covers French interests more adequately than did 
the Asia-Pacific and also accounts for France’s – 
very broad  geographical definition of the Indo-Pa-
cific space.

In  absence  of  a  ‘natural’  role  in  the  region,  Ger-
many  and  the  Netherlands  raise  two  arguments 
for their stronger engagement with and in the re-
gion:  first,  their  interests  as  big  trading  nations, 
making  them  dependent  on  open  sea  lanes  and 
free access to markets, and second, their support 
for  maintaining  and/or  defending  a  rules-based 
order globally, but also at the regional level. The 
Indo-Pacific is presented here as the new political 
and economic centre of gravity in the world, where 
the  major  strategic  competition  between  the  US 
and China is playing out and where the future of 
the international order is likely to be decided. The 
COVID-19 pandemic is perceived as an accelera-
tor of the existing strategic trends. In geographical 
terms, both documents are less clear about what 
is included in the Indo-Pacific space than are the 
French ones.

The  German  paper  acknowledges  that  there  are 
different geographic understandings of the region 
and focuses more on its main features:

The Indo-Pacific region is not clearly delineat-
ed in geographical terms and is defined vari-
ously by different actors. The Federal Govern-
ment considers the Indo-Pacific to be the entire 
region characterised by the Indian Ocean and 
the Pacific. Strategic projections compete with 
each other and global value chains are inter-
twined here.16

The  Netherlands  defines  the  Indo-Pacific  as  the 
space between Pakistan and the Pacific islands:

For the Netherlands, the region encompasses 

in  any  event  the  countries  around  the  Indian 
and Pacific Oceans, including the South Chi-
na and East China Seas. The shipping routes 
through the Indian and Pacific Oceans that link 
Europe  with Asia  and  Oceania  are  central  to 
the concept. The region extends from Pakistan 
to the islands of the Pacific.17

The  documents  of  the  three  countries  also  vary 
significantly in terms of their status (official versus 
non-paper),  the  government  institutions  involved 
(in 
the  German  case,  whole-of-government), 
length/detail and structure, as shown above. But it 
is France’s starting point as a ‘resident power’ that 
sets it apart from Germany and the Netherlands.18 
After Brexit, France is also the only EU member 
state that has a permanent seat in the United Na-
tions  Security  Council  and  it  is  the  only  nuclear 
power in the EU. All three factors together explain 
France’s  different,  more  strategic  perspective. 
Since  two  of  the  French  papers  were  published 
by  the  Ministry  of  Defence,  there  is  understand-
ably  a  stronger  focus  on  the  security  dimension. 
Moreover, this is the area where France has put 
most the effort over the last years, building up a 
strong network of bilateral security dialogues and 
cooperation  with  countries  in  the  region  (espe-
cially India, Australia and Japan), membership or 
observer status in regional organisations such as 
the IORA and participation in regional military ex-
ercises.

Common interests and principles

All three countries have an inclusive approach to 
the Indo-Pacific. In contrast to the US FOIP, this 
also  applies  to  China.  None  of  the  three  adopt-
ed the ‘free and open’ rhetoric of the U.S. In this 
respect, the European approach is closest to the 
ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, published in 
June  2019.19 Actually,  the  fact  that ASEAN  had, 
after  some  hesitation,  adopted  its  own  position 
on the Indo-Pacific might have made it easier for 
Germany and the Netherlands to overcome their 
reservations about using the term Indo-Pacific.20

There is fundamental agreement between France, 
Germany  and  the  Netherlands  when  it  comes  to 

16   Policy Guidelines, p.8

17   Unofficial English translation of the Dutch non-paper on the Indo-Pacific, p.2.

18   The fact that France argues strongly from a national position might also be one of the reasons why the re-orientation and re-definition 

initially did not find a broad echo within the EU.

19   Australia and India also don’t speak of a “free and open” Indo-Pacific.

20   See also Felix Heiduk, Nedim Sulejmanović, Will the EU take view of the Indo-Pacific? Comparing France’s and Germany’s approaches, 
Research Division Asia, Working Paper 2021/Nr. 1, January 2021, https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/arbeitspapiere/
WP_EU_Indopacific_Heiduk_Sulejmanovic.pdf, p.18.

5  

  The Indo-Pacific concepts of France, Germany and the Netherlands in comparison: Implications and Challenges for the EU

the  assessment  of  the  major  trends  in  the  In-
do-Pacific  and  the  importance  of  the  region  for 
Europe/the  EU.  They  also  share  core  objectives 
to  be  achieved:  the  goals  of  strengthening  the 
role and profile of the EU (as well as their own, of 
course)  and  of  preventing  military  conflict  in  the 
region. All three concur that a unipolar or bipolar 
regional order is definitely not in the European in-
terest and that everything should be done to pre-
serve  a  rules-based  order  where  countries  don’t 
have to choose sides. They all want to strengthen 
partnerships  with  countries  in  the  region  beyond 
(but not excluding) China. ASEAN is attributed a 
central role as a partner for the EU in the region, 
and  all  three  are  committed  to  increasing  their 
contributions to ASEAN-centred and other region-
al  organisations.  Contributing  more  to  security 
and stability in the region is seen in the context of 
safeguarding the economic and political/strategic 
interests  of  the  three  countries  and  of  the  EU  in 
general.

It  is  remarkable  that  cooperation  with  the  US  is 
hardly mentioned in any of the European papers 
– the focus is clearly on deepening relations with 
partners  in  a  more  narrowly  defined  Indo-Pacif-
ic  space  such  as  South  Korea,  Japan, Australia, 
New Zealand, India, some ASEAN members and 
with ASEAN  as  a  whole.  This  can  be  explained 
by  the  fact  that  the  growing  strategic  rivalry  be-
tween  the  US  and  China  is  perceived  with  great 
concern  by  EU  countries.  In  light  of  this  great 
power  competition  and  the  Chinese  perception 
of the Indo-Pacific as a US containment strategy 
against  China,  the  explicitly  China-inclusive  ap-
proach of the Europeans to the region would have 
been  less  credible  had  the  U.S.  been  given  the 
role  of a vital partner for Europe in the Indo-Pacif-
ic. Moreover, the French and German documents 
were published before the presidential election in 
the  U.S.  in  2021,  so  it  was  not  clear  at  the  time 
if  there  would  be  a  second  term  for  the  Trump 
administration.  Trump’s  re-election  would  have 
made a more confrontational stance between the 
U.S. and China more likely and would have made 
any  prospect  of  transatlantic  coordination  and/
or  cooperation  in  the  Indo-Pacific  almost  impos-
sible. Even with Trump’s departure, a come-back 
of ‘America first’ with all negative implications for 
multilateral institutions in the future cannot be ex-
cluded. Consequently, the perspective presented 
in the European documents is one of smaller and 
medium powers which do not want to become a 
battleground and/or be forced to choose sides in 
the great power competition between the U.S. and 
China, and for this reason have the biggest stake 

in a rules-based order rather than one based on 
might.  Diversifying  relations,  deepening  partner-
ships  with  other  middle  and  small  powers  and 
reducing  dependencies  on  China  (economically) 
and on the U.S. (for security) are objectives that 
the EU and member states share with many coun-
tries in the region, even if this is not always articu-
lated in clear terms.

(National) Initiatives in comparison

Listing  all  the  initiatives  mentioned  in  the  docu-
ments is beyond the scope of this paper. The three 
countries elaborate on what should be done by the 
EU and what they are prepared to do themselves, 
either nationally or in coalitions within the EU or in 
other  contexts  such  as  the  UN  and  its  organisa-
tions, the G7, G20 and the alliance for multilateral-
ism. Many of the projects and initiatives are either 
already  on  the  way  or  even  have  been  recently 
accomplished, such as upgrading EU-ASEAN re-
lations  to  a  strategic  partnership  (the  agreement 
was signed on December 1, 2020). The majority 
of  commitments  made  at  the  respective  nation-
al  levels  are  about  increasing  or  intensifying  di-
alogue  and  cooperation  with  individual  countries 
and ASEAN as well as with ASEAN-centred and 
other organisations in the Indo-Pacific. France (in 
2006),  the  EU  (in  2012)  and  Germany  (in  2019) 
have  already  acceded  to  the  ASEAN  Treaty  of 
Amity and Cooperation; the Netherlands plans to 
do so. The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) is seen 
by all three countries as a venue to strengthen di-
alogue and cooperation with the Indo-Pacific. 

Germany  and  the  Netherlands,  but  not  France, 
mention intensifying security cooperation through 
NATO’s ‘partnerships across the globe’ with coun-
tries in the region (namely Australia, New Zealand, 
Japan and South Korea).

So far, France is the only country that has created 
a new ambassadorial position for the Indo-Pacif-
ic,  appointing  its  then  ambassador  to  Australia, 
Christophe  Penot,  in  October  2020.  This  under-
lines  the  importance  attributed  to  the  region  in 
France’s foreign policy. It is expected that France 
will publish a more comprehensive strategy paper 
on the Indo-Pacific in the course of 2021. 

One  of  the  few  really  new  projects  mentioned  in 
the German Guidelines is the establishment of a 
regional  information  centre  in  Singapore.  (p.10, 
17) The mandate of this centre – ostensibly coun-
tering disinformation in the Indo-Pacific in general 
or disinformation on Germany and the EU  is not 
clear from the information currently available. An-

6  

  Robert Schuman Centre | May 2021

other  new  development,  a  few  months  after  the 
publication of the Guidelines, was the announce-
ment  by  the  German  defence  minister  in  virtual 
meetings with her counterparts in Australia, Singa-
pore and Japan that Germany planned to dispatch 
a frigate into the region in August 2021. Germany 
and  Japan  also  held  their  first  2+2  meeting  (for-
eign  and  defence  ministers  of  both  countries)  in 
April 2021.

The EU moving toward a strategy 
for its engagement with the Indo-
Pacific

To  get  the  discussion  on  the  Indo-Pacific  at  the 
EU level started, France, Germany and the Neth-
erlands  together  prepared  a  non-paper  on  the 
Indo-Pacific  in  fall  2020.  Their  initiative  found 
support  from  some  of  the  other  member  states 
in  the  EU  (among  them  Portugal,  Poland,  Italy, 
Sweden).  It  was  first  discussed  on  December  8, 
2020  at  the  meeting  of  the  Asia-Oceania  Work-
ing  Party  (COASI). The  debates  on  an  EU  posi-
tion on the Indo-Pacific will continue in 2021 with 
the goal of coming to a consensus. Four areas in 
particular  have  been  earmarked  for  EU  focus  in 
this context: trade, connectivity, maritime security 
and global issues such as climate change and bio-
diversity. While trade is a given, since free trade 
agreements can only be negotiated by the EU, for 
connectivity  with  Asia  and  for  maritime  security 
and climate change the EU has broad frameworks 
in  place  that  could  be  modified  to  accommodate 
a  shift  of  focus  to  the  Indo-Pacific.  In  the  mean-
time,  the  term  Indo-Pacific  has  already  found  its 
way into the official language of the EU. The Joint 
Communication  to  the  European  Parliament,  the 
European Council and the Council: A new EU-US 
agenda  for  global  change  in  December  2020  in-
cludes the following paragraph:

Increased EU focus on the challenges and op-
portunities  in  the  Indo-Pacific  region  will  help 
deepen cooperation with like-minded partners 
in  the  region.  Working  closely  with  the  US 
to  align  our  strategic  objectives  and  support 

democratic progress in Asia will be essential.21

In  a  blog  published  on  March  12,  2021,  High 
Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy Josep Borrell signals that the EU 
is moving forward with its deliberations on the In-
do-Pacific.22  He  briefly  summarises  the  progress 
made  in  strengthening  partnerships  in  Asia  (be-
yond China) over the last years. He underlines the 
stake  the  EU  has  in  the  Indo-Pacific  space  and 
its  interest  in  an  ‘open  and  rules-based’  regional 
architecture. The common vision on the Indo-Pa-
cific that the EU is developing emphasises areas 
of trade and investment, climate and biodiversity, 
emerging technologies and new security threats, 
states  Borrell.  India  is  assigned  a  pivotal  role  in 
the region and as a partner of the EU, including on 
connectivity.23 Connectivity in general is highlight-
ed  as  the  field  where  the  EU  is  already  a  super 
power and, due to its standard-setting power, can 
change the perception that it is only a payer and 
not a player.

The EU foreign ministers discussed the Indo-Pa-
cific  in  mid-April  2021  and  adopted  a  10  page 
long  document,  Council  Conclusions  on  an  EU 
Strategy  for  cooperation  in  the  Indo-Pacific.24  It 
consists  of  seven  points  stating  the  objectives 
and principles of EU engagement with the region 
(points 1-5). The geographical definition is identi-
cal  with  the  French  understanding,  covering  the 
space from the east coast of Africa to the Pacific 
Island  States  (point  6). The  EU  is  determined  to 
‘reinforce its strategic focus, presence and actions 
in the Indo-Pacific with the aim of contributing to 
the  stability,  security,  prosperity  and  sustainable 
development of the region, based on the promo-
tion of democracy, rule of law, human rights and 
international law’ (point 1). The main areas where 
new  impetus  will  be  provided  are  covered  under 
point 6, again listing six broad topics, each spec-
ifying EU activities and initiatives: 1. working with 
partners  in  the  region,  2.  supporting  the  interna-
tional  community’s  global  agenda,  3.  advancing 
the  EU’s  economic  agenda  and  securing  supply 
chains, 4. playing a stronger role in security and 
defence, 5. ensuring high quality connectivity, and 

21   European Commission, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Joint Communication to the 
European Parliament, the European Council and the Council: A new EU-US agenda for global change, Brussels, 2.12.2020, https://ec.eu-
ropa.eu/info/sites/info/files/joint-communication-eu-us-agenda_en.pdf. 

22   Josep Borrell: “The EU needs a strategic approach for the Indo-Pacific”, March 12, 2021, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquar-

ters-homepage/94898/eu-needs-strategic-approach-indo-pacific_en

23   Borrell mentions the upcoming EU-India summit in Porto in May 2021, which will also be attended by the EU-27 heads of state/govern-

ment, where it is hoped that a connectivity partnership will be signed (similar to the one between EU and Japan).

24   Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on an EU Strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, 16 April 2021 (7914/21), 

https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-7914-2021-INIT/en/pdf. 

7  

  The Indo-Pacific concepts of France, Germany and the Netherlands in comparison: Implications and Challenges for the EU

6. advancing collaboration in research, innovation 
and digitalisation. The final paragraph of the paper 
(point  7)  tasks  the  High  Representative  and  the 
Commission to draw up a Joint Communication on 
the topic until September 2021.

Overall, the Council Conclusions are basically in 
line with the three member states’ papers, but with 
some  nuances.  The  document  shares  the  con-
cerns about destabilising dynamics in the region. 
The explicitly inclusive approach is also adopted, 
and  by  declaring  that  the  EU’s  strategy  is  ‘prag-
matic, flexible and multifaceted’, it acknowledges 
the diversity of the region, where cooperation on 
specific  issues  can  be  based  on  shared  values 
and principles or on mutual interests. It is under-
lined  that  the  EU’s  engagement  with  the  region 
should enhance its capability as a global actor and 
also reinforce strategic autonomy (while the U.S. 
or transatlantic cooperation is not mentioned). It is 
noteworthy that the part on the EU as a security 
actor  in  the  region  covers  quite  a  specific  agen-
da.25

Challenges ahead

The  political  will  of  the  three  governments  of 
France,  Germany  and  the  Netherlands  to  work 
with  the  support  of  other  EU  member  states  to-
wards  an  EU  positioning  on  the  Indo-Pacific  be-
cause  of  the  growing  economic  and  strategic 
importance  of  this  region  is  reflected  in  all  the 
documents issued so far. As Borrell’s blog and the 
Council Conclusions demonstrate, the discussion 
within the EU on developing a strategy has been 
moving forward faster than expected by many ob-
servers.

One of the biggest challenges for any positioning 
on  the  Indo-Pacific  remains  the  role  of  China  in 
this  context  and  Beijing’s  response.  Despite  the 
fact that all three European governments and the 
EU have stated in their documents that they pur-
sue an inclusive approach to the region involving 
China  as  an  important  partner  on  issues  like  cli-
mate change and nuclear non-proliferation, it will 
be  difficult  to  convince  Beijing  that  the  Indo-Pa-
cific  concept  is  not  directed  against  China. After 
all, China’s rise and growing assertiveness in its 

neighbourhood and at the international level as a 
challenge to peace and stability in the region and 
to the rules-based order figure prominently in the 
European  Indo-Pacific  papers,  and  it  will  not  be 
easy to navigate the three dimensions of the EU’s 
China policy as outlined in the Strategic Outlook 
paper26 – to deal with China as a partner, a com-
petitor and a systemic rival –, be it for EU mem-
ber  states  or  for  the  EU  as  a  whole. The  agree-
ment  between  the  EU  and  the  U.S.  to  establish 
a high-level dialogue on China and the inclusion 
of the Indo-Pacific in the new US-EU agenda for 
global change make it clear that there will be clos-
er coordination with the new US administration.27 

How  to  ensure  coordination  and  cooperation 
with the UK in the region will also need to be ad-
dressed.  The  UK  has  formulated  an  ambitious 
agenda for the Indo-Pacific. It has already applied 
to become a member of the Comprehensive and 
Progressive  Agreement  for  Trans-Pacific  Part-
nership  (CPTPP).  It  has  also  been  pushing  for 
a  D-10,  which  would  add  three  regional  (demo-
cratic) countries to the G7: South Korea, Australia 
and India, and it plans to dispatch its new aircraft 
carrier  to  the  region  (joined  by  a  Dutch  frigate). 
Whether it will be possible to pursue a coordinat-
ed approach encompassing the UK, EU member 
states and the EU in the Indo-Pacific remains to 
be seen.

Finally, the comprehensiveness, especially of the 
German Guidelines, raises a long-standing ques-
tion  for  the  EU:  how  to  prioritise  objectives  and 
goals, especially if hard choices have to be made? 
The  biggest  challenge  for  any  vision  or  strategy 
vis-à-vis the Indo-Pacific, however, will be to fill the 
documents with life. This will require not only sus-
tained political will, but also considerable financial, 
material and human resources to follow-up on the 
commitments made. It will, moreover, require the 
flexibility and pragmatism (as rightfully mentioned 
in the Council Conclusions) in a region as diverse 
as the Indo-Pacific, where shared geostrategic in-
terests and concerns do not necessarily coincide 
with  shared  values  across  the  board.  Expecta-
tions have been created among the partners in the 
region and the EU and its members cannot afford 
to underperform. 

25   For a summary of the Council Conclusions see also Eva Pejsova, “The EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategy in 10 Points”, The Diplomat, April 20, 

2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/the-eus-indo-pacific-strategy-in-10-points/. 

26   European Commission and HR/VP Contribution to the European Council, EU-China – A strategic outlook, March 12, 2019, https://ec.eu-

ropa.eu/info/sites/info/files/communication-eu-china-a-strategic-outlook.pdf. 

27   It came as no surprise that Chinese media insinuated that EU sanctions on several officials and entities in Xinjiang in March 2021 were 
in fact a result of US pressure. See GT staff reporters, „US pressure, value bias behind EU sanctions against China“, Global Times, 17 
March, 2021, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202103/1218728.shtml.

8  

  Robert Schuman Centre | May 2021

www.eui/rsc

Views expressed in this publication reflect the opinion of individual authors and  
not those of the European University Institute or the European Commission. 
© European University Institute, 2021
Content © Philip Hanspach, Marina Sanchez del Villar.

9  

  RSC | Policy Brief | Issue 2021/16 | May 2021

doi:10.2870/859952ISBN:978-92-9084-974-2ISSN:2467-4540QM-AX-21-019-EN-NCo-funded by the Erasmus+ Programme of the European UnionRobert Schuman Centre for Advanced StudiesThe Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS), created in 1992 and directed by Professor Brigid Laffan, aims to develop inter-disci-plinary and comparative research on the major issues facing the process of European integration, European societies and Europe’s place in 21st century global politics. The Centre is home to a large post-doctoral pro-gramme and hosts major research programmes, projects and data sets, in addition to a range of working groups and ad hoc initiatives. The research agenda is organised around a set of core themes and is continuously evolving, reflecting the changing agenda of European integration, the ex-panding membership of the European Union, developments in Europe’s neighbourhood and the wider world.The Global Governance Programme The Global Governance Programme (GGP) is research turned into action. It provides a European setting to conduct research at the highest level and promote synergies between the worlds of research and policy-making, to generate ideas and identify creative an innovative solutions to global challenges. The Programme is part of the Robert Schuman Centre for Ad-vanced Studies of the European University Institute, a world-reknowned academic institution.  It receives financial support from the European Com-mission through the European Union budget. Complete information on our activities can be found online at:  globalgovernanceprogramme.eui.euEU-Asia ProjectThe EU-Asia project is a research and educational initiative within the Global Governance Programme. It is designed to contribute to mutual un-derstanding and exchange between Asia and Europe at a time of unprece-dented change in international politics and global governance. The project also aims at an ambitious academic programme on EU and Asia, with a particular focus on Japan.