REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION Commission Evaluation Report on the operation of the Motor Vehicle Block Exemption Regulation (EU) No 461/2010
Date: 2021-05-28
Institutions: Directorate-General for Competition, European Commission
Subjects: EU competition policy, application of EU law, control of restrictive practices, general mechanical engineering, motor vehicle, motor vehicle industry, provision of services, restriction on competition, vehicle parts, vertical agreement

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   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 28.5.2021  COM(2021) 264 final  REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION Commission Evaluation Report on the operation of the Motor Vehicle Block Exemption Regulation (EU) No 461/2010         {SWD(2021) 112 final}  
 
 
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Pursuant to Article 7 of Regulation (EU) No 461/2010 of 27 May 2010 on the application 
of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“the Treaty”) 
to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices in the motor vehicle sector1 
(the "MVBER") the Commission is required to monitor the operation of this Regulation 
and draw up a report by 31 May 2021.  

Article  101(1)  of  the  Treaty  prohibits  agreements  between  undertakings  and  concerted 
practices that restrict competition, unless, in accordance with Article 101(3) of the Treaty, 
they  contribute  to  improving  the  production  or  distribution  of  goods  or  to  promoting 
technical  or  economic  progress,  while  allowing  consumers  a  fair  share  of  the  resulting 
benefits.  The  MVBER  provides  that  with  effect  from  1  June  2013,  Commission 
Regulation  (EU) No 330/2010  of 20 April 2010  on the application of  Article 101(3) of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements 
and concerted practices (the “VBER”) applies to agreements for the distribution of new 
vehicles. As to agreements relating to the sale or resale of spare parts for motor vehicles 
or the provision of repair and maintenance services for motor vehicles, Article 4 MVBER 
provides that Article 101(1) of the Treaty does not apply, provided that such agreements 
fulfil the requirements for an exemption under the VBER and do not contain any of the 
hardcore clauses2 listed in Article 5 MVBER. 

This resulting configuration implies that this report should evaluate the functioning of the 
MVBER  and  the  Supplementary  Guidelines3  (“SGL”),  as  well  as  the  VBER  and  the 
Guidelines on vertical restraints4 (“VGL”) as far as they apply to the distribution of new 
motor vehicles, the provision of repair and maintenance services and the distribution of 
spare  parts  within  the  European  Union  (“EU”).  These  four  sets  of  rules  are  referred  to 
collectively as the “MVBER regime” throughout this report.5 

This  report  is  accompanied  by  a  Staff  Working  Document  (“SWD”)  and  six  technical 
annexes.  The  report  does  not  prejudge  the  final  nature  or  content  of  any  act  that  the 
Commission may prepare following the publication of this report. 

1.  Background to the intervention and sources 

The  Commission’s  decision  whether  to  grant  a  block  exemption  for  the  motor  vehicle 
sector and if so, in what form, must be based on the requirements of Article 101(3) of the 

1

2

3

4

5

   OJ L 129, 28.5.2010. 

   Hardcore  clauses  are  those  that  if  included  in  a  vertical  agreement  remove  the  benefit  of  the  exemption  from  the  whole 

agreement, meaning that an individual assessment under Article 101 (3) of the Treaty would need to be conducted.  

Supplementary guidelines on vertical restraints in agreements for the sale and repair of motor vehicles and for the distribution of 
spare parts for motor vehicles. OJ C 138, 28.5.2010. 

   Guidelines on Vertical Restraints. OJ C 130, 19.5.2010. 

The VBER has also been subject to an evaluation (see Staff Working Document available here) and is currently under revision. 
The VBER expires on 31 May 2022, i.e., one year before the MVBER.  

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Treaty.6 The MVBER regime pursues general and specific objectives designed to ensure 
that the requirements of Article 101(3) of the Treaty are met. The specific objectives of 
the MVBER regime are (i) to provide legal certainty to stakeholders in the motor vehicle 
sector as to which vertical agreements can be considered compliant with Article 101 of 
the  Treaty;  (ii)  to  reduce  the  risk  of  “false  positives”  (i.e.,  over-exemption)  and  “false 
negatives” (i.e., under-exemption); (iii) to  provide a common framework of assessment 
for  National  Competition  Authorities  (“NCAs”)  and  national  courts,  in  order  to  ensure 
consistency  in  the  application  of  Article  101  of  the  Treaty;  and  (iv)  to  protect  certain 
forms  of  competition  in  the  motor  vehicle  sector.  These  four  specific  objectives  all 
support  the  general  objective:  to  preserve  the  deterrent  effect  of  Article  101  of  the 
Treaty  by  facilitating  the  enforcement  work  of  the  Commission,  NCAs  and  national 
courts and to help businesses conduct the self-assessment of their vertical agreements in 
the motor vehicle sector. Since the legal and factual background to competition rules is 
fluid,  the  Commission  must  analyse  whether  the  MVBER  regime  and  its  objectives 
remain  appropriate  today,  with  reference  to  the  five  criteria  of  the  Better  Regulation 
Guidelines7 (i.e., effectiveness, efficiency, relevance, coherence and EU added value). 

On 3 December 2018, the Commission officially launched the evaluation process for the 
MVBER  regime,8  with  a  view  to  drawing  up  this  report.  The  evaluation  is  based  on  a 
broad  range  of  information  sources:  the  Commission’s  monitoring  and  enforcement 
activities  in  the  sector,  a  public  consultation9  with  stakeholders,  a  fact-finding  study 
regarding the evolution  of the motor vehicle sector between 2007  and 2017, as well as 
two targeted consultations10 with NCAs to (i) gather data on the NCAs’ enforcement of 
the MVBER regime and equivalent national rules; and (ii) collect their opinions on the 
performance of the MVBER regime.  

2.  Sector characteristics 

2.1.Markets under evaluation 

The  motor  vehicle  industry  has  a  complex  supply  chain  with  heterogeneous  entities 
coexisting and interacting at different levels. As to vehicle distribution, the suppliers are 
vehicle  manufacturers  and  their  importers.  On  the  demand  side,  the  main  actors  are 
private individuals and companies. Some of the latter are professional transport / mobility 
operators,  while  others  are  active  in  other  sectors,  but  use  motor  vehicles  to  transport 
goods  and workers. With regard to  repair and  maintenance, the service providers are 
authorised repairers (companies with formal contractual arrangements with motor vehicle 
suppliers)  and  independent  repairers.  On  the  demand  side,  the  main  actors  are  again 

6

7

8

9

   Council  Regulation  (EEC)  19/65  enables  the  Commission  to  apply  Article  101(3)  of  the  Treaty  by  regulation  to  certain 
categories of vertical agreements and corresponding concerted practices falling within Article 101(1) of the Treaty for which it 
can be assumed with sufficient certainty that they satisfy the conditions of Article 101(3) of the Treaty.  

   Commission staff working document, Better Regulation Guidelines, Brussels, 7 July 2017, SWD (2017) 350. 

See Section 4.1 of SWD. 

The consultation ran from 12 October 2020 to 25 January 2021. See Annex 3 to SWD for further details.  

10

   The consultations ran from 8 June 2020 to 16 January 2021. See Annex 3 to SWD for further details. 

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private individuals and companies. Spare parts are provided by the Original Equipment 
Suppliers  (“OES”),11  either  directly,  or  through  the  vehicle  manufacturers,  and  by 
independent suppliers, which – in contrast to the OES – do not supply parts for vehicle 
assembly. On the demand side, the main actors are repairers, and to a lesser extent fleet 
operators and private individuals. 

Whether a particular agreement may benefit from exemption under the MVBER regime 
depends, inter alia, on market share. Correct market definition is therefore an important 
factor in any assessment. In some circumstances, a system market which includes motor 
vehicles and spare parts together may be defined, taking into account, inter alia, the life-
time of the motor vehicle as well as the preferences and buying behaviour of the users.12 
In  such  cases,  the  relevant  market  shares  would  be  those  for  the  whole  (multi-brand) 
system rather than for repair and maintenance and the supply of spare parts.  

During the consultations leading up to this report, some NCAs suggested that the motor 
vehicle markets could be considered to be such a system. 

An  important  factor  for  analysing  the  strength  of  market  links  is  whether  a  significant 
proportion  of  buyers  make  their  choice  taking  into  account  lifecycle  costs.  Another 
relevant  factor  is  the  existence  and  relative  position  of  entities  operating  in  the 
aftermarket  independently  from  the  suppliers  of  the  primary  goods.  Based  on  the 
information  collected  during  the  evaluation,  it  appears  that  at  least  for  passenger  cars, 
there are likely to be brand-specific aftermarkets, in particular because: (i) the majority of 
buyers  are  private  individuals  or  small  and  medium-sized  undertakings  that  purchase 
motor vehicles and aftermarket services separately; (ii) although the elements uncovered 
in the fact-finding show that consumers increasingly use the Internet for research before 
buying a passenger car, they do not demonstrate that such buyers swiftly and consistently 
adapt their purchasing behaviour in response to variations in aftermarket conditions; and 
(iii)  there  is  a  well-developed  framework  of  entities  offering  only  aftermarket  products 
and  services.  This  might  not  be  the  case  for  other  vehicle  categories,  where  the  higher 
presence of professional consumers might result in more complex purchasing patterns. 

2.2. Market developments  

This sector has undergone several changes since the adoption of the MVBER in 2010.  

As  regards  concentration  in  the  sector,  the  market  shares  fluctuated  over  time,  which 
indicates  vigorous  inter-brand  competition.  In  addition,  although  the  financial  crisis 
affected the entire sector from 2008, the research and development (“R&D”) expenditure 
of passenger car manufacturers remained quite stable.13 

11

12

13

   These are the manufacturers of the parts used for the initial assembly of the vehicle. 

   See  footnote  26  SGL  and  paragraph  56  of  Commission  notice  on  the  definition  of  the  relevant  market  for  the  purposes  of 

Community competition law, OJ C 372, 9.12.1997. 

   See Section 5 of SWD and Annex 2 to SWD for further details and figures. 

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Concerning  light  commercial  vehicles,  no  manufacturer  held  particularly  high  market 
shares  over  the  period  2007-2017,  although  this  may  recently  have  changed  since  two 
major  manufacturers  –  FCA  and  PSA  –  have  merged  to  create  a  new  company  named 
Stellantis.14 As with passenger cars, market shares for manufacturers of light commercial 
vehicles have also fluctuated. However, in contrast to passenger cars, since the MVBER 
regime  entered  into  force,  the  light  commercial  vehicle  sector  has  become  more 
concentrated,  and  even  more  so  following  the  FCA/  PSA  merger.  The  bus  and  truck 
sectors  are  traditionally  also  more  concentrated.15  Both  have  witnessed  some  shifts  in 
terms of market positions. The fact-finding study shows that R&D expenditure increased 
throughout  the  observation  period  (2007-2017)  for  buses  and  trucks,  which  might 
indicate a degree of competition. 

Intra-brand competition does not appear to have decreased significantly between 2007 
and  2017,  at  least  as  far  as  passenger  cars  are  concerned.  The  observed  decline  in 
aggregate  network  density  for  passenger  cars  and  the  increase  in  market  concentration 
appear to have been moderate overall. Moreover, there has been some diversification in 
distribution  systems,  albeit  limited  and  without  significant  changes  in  the  way  that  the 
different systems are used at country level.  

Statistics show that the size of the market for repair and maintenance services increased 
between  2007  and  2017.  They  also  show  a  decreasing  trend  in  the  density  of  the 
authorised  networks,  which  could  be  due  to  several  factors,  including  the  continuing 
movement  observed  toward  consolidation  of  authorised  dealer  networks,  or  the  need  to 
incur greater investments to meet the demands of digital technologies and hybrid/ electric 
power trains. 

The  fact-finding  study  indicates  that  independent  operators  competing  with  authorised 
repairers on the repair and maintenance markets may still face difficulties in accessing the 
inputs  they  need  to  repair  vehicles.  This  aspect  may  become  more  relevant  with  the 
increased  use  of  on-board  digital  technologies  and  the  development  of  alternative  fuel 
vehicles that require specific expertise, tooling and spare parts. 

The market for spare parts supply in selected Member States increased by almost 30% in 
terms of sales value between 2007 and 2017. Over the same period, parts manufacturers 
registered a stable operating margin, averaging around 6-7%.  

3.  Achievement of objectives16  

This section evaluates whether the objectives of the MVBER regime have been achieved 
in  practice  and  to  what  extent  the  MVBER  regime  has  proven  to  be  effective,  and/or 
relevant. 

14

15

16

   M.9730 FCA / PSA. 

   Section 5 of SWD and Annex 2 to SWD include an overview of market shares and concentration indexes for  passenger cars, 

light commercial vehicles, trucks and buses.  

   See Annexes 3 and 6 to SWD for further details on the specific views of the respondents to the public consultation and NCAs 

regarding the achievement of the objectives of the MVBER regime.  

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A.  General and specific objectives 

The  first  specific  objective  of  the  MVBER  regime  is  to  increase  legal  certainty  for 
stakeholders,  making  it  easier  for  them  to  perform  the  self-assessment  required  by  the 
wider competition law framework.17  

The submissions from NCAs and respondents to the public consultation suggest that the 
regime has provided a high degree of legal certainty. In particular, the Commission has 
received relatively few informal questions18 as to how the rules should be interpreted, and 
none of the formal complaints that it has received concerning vertical agreements in this 
motor vehicle sector hinged on a misunderstanding of the substantive rules. Nevertheless, 
the  evaluation  identified  certain  provisions  that:  (i)  may  benefit  from  further 
clarifications; (ii) may be difficult to apply; or (iii) may require adjustments due to recent 
market developments, new business models and / or new technologies.  

The second specific objective of the MVBER  regime is  to  reduce the  risk of:  (i) false 
positives,  i.e.,  exempting  agreements  for  which  it  cannot  be  assumed  with  sufficient 
certainty  that  they  satisfy  the  conditions  of  Article  101(3)  of  the  Treaty  (over-
exemption);  and  (ii)  false  negatives,  i.e.,  where  the  respective  vertical  agreement  or 
practice is  not  block  exempted despite fulfilling the conditions  of Article  101(3) of the 
Treaty (under-exemption).19  

The conditions to be met by all agreements are:  (i) the market share threshold,20 below 
which  the  exemption  is  granted;  and  (ii)  the  absence  of  hardcore  restrictions,21  which 
remove the benefit of the block exemption for the whole agreement. The conditions also 
include  excluded  restrictions,22  to  which  the  block  exemption  does  not  apply,  although 
the remainder of the agreement in which they are contained may still be exempted. 

In light of the views of the majority of respondents to the public consultation and NCAs, 
the current market share threshold of 30% seems to have been appropriate and to remain 
relevant today. The Commission’s enforcement practice supports this view. To date, the 
Commission has not identified any category of agreements that are unable to benefit from 
the  exemption  because  of  the  parties’  market  share,  but  which  are  relatively 
unproblematic in terms of competition; the identification of such a category would have 
been an indication that the threshold was set too low. Nor has it found any elements that 
have  led  it  to  consider  withdrawing  the  exemption  from  any  agreement  or  category  of 

17

18

19

20

21

22

   See Section 6.1 of SWD.  

   About 14% of the informal submission received by the Commission between 2010 and 2020 concerned general questions on the 

applicability of the MVBER regime. 

   See Section 6.1 of SWD. 

   Article 3 VBER. 

   Article 4 VBER and Article 5 MVBER. 

   Article 5 VBER. 

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agreements  in  the  motor  vehicle  sector,  which  is  an  indication  that  the  exemption 
threshold is not set too high. 23  

Taking  into  account  the  views  of  respondents  to  the  public  consultation  and  NCA,  the 
lists of hardcore and excluded restrictions remains appropriate. No additional clauses that 
should  have  been  considered  either  as  general  conditions  for  the  application  of  the 
Regulation, or as hardcore restrictions or excluded restrictions were identified during the 
evaluation.  

The third specific objective of the MVBER regime is to provide a common framework 
for the consistent application of Article 101 of the Treaty by NCAs and national courts, 
in view of the decentralised application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty.24 

The  evaluation  shows  that  the  MVBER  regime  provides  added  value  in  this  respect,  in 
that  it  appears  to  have  increased  legal  certainty  and  been  more  effective  compared  to 
more  general,  nationally-fragmented  guidance,  enforcement  practice  and  national  case-
law pertinent for the application of Article 101 of the Treaty to the motor vehicle sector. 
This  position  is  largely  supported  by  respondents  to  the  public  consultation  and  NCAs, 
although a few of the latter note that the technical character of these provisions may make 
them difficult to understand for non-lawyers.  

The  fourth  specific  objective  of  the  MVBER  is  the  protection  of  certain  aspects  of 
competition in the motor vehicle sector. In its Communication25 of 22 July 2009 (“2009 
Communication”)  the  Commission  found  that  a  number  of  specific  policy  objectives 
underlying Regulation (EC) No 1400/200226 remained valid. These objectives were set in 
view of a number of issues which, at that time, were considered particularly relevant for 
the motor vehicle sector. The evaluation therefore includes an analysis of whether each 
of these objectives had been met and to what extent they had proven to be effective and / 
or necessary. This evaluation is presented below: 

1.  Preventing foreclosure of competing vehicle manufacturers and safeguarding 

their access to the market 

As  explained  in  its  2009  Communication,  the  Commission  considered  that  in  certain 
circumstances, restrictions in distribution agreements - especially the widespread use of 
single-branding  clauses  -  might  make  it  unduly  difficult  for  competing  motor  vehicle 
manufacturers to access the markets. Thus, it sought to preserve the ability of competing 
motor vehicle manufacturers to enter the market and/or expand their presence. 

23

24

25

26

   Article 29(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on  the implementation of the rules on competition 
laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ L 1, 4.1.2003 gives the Commission the power to withdraw the benefit of the 
exemption from certain categories of agreements where it finds effects which are incompatible with Article 101(3) of the Treaty. 

In  assessing  the  effectiveness  and  relevance  of  this  objective,  the  evaluation  has  also  examined  the  EU  added  value  of  the 
MVBER regime. For further details, see Section 6.5 of SWD. 

   Communication  from  the  Commission  “The  Future  Competition  Law  Framework  applicable  to  the  motor  vehicle  sector”,  22 

July 2009. 

   Commission Regulation (EC) No 1400/2002 of 31 July 2002 on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of 

vertical agreements and concerted practices in the motor vehicle sector. OJ L 203, 1.8.2002. 

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Drawing,  in  particular,  on  input  received  from  NCAs  and  respondents  to  the  public 
consultation,  the  evaluation  shows  that  this  objective  appears  to  have  been  largely 
achieved.  Inter-brand  competition  for  new  passenger  cars  in  the  EU  is  vigorous  and 
stable.27  Moreover,  the  information  gathered  in  the  context  of  this  evaluation  has 
provided  no  indications  that  passenger  car  manufacturers  have  found  it  particularly 
difficult  to  access  the  EU  motor  vehicle  markets,  either  by  entering,  or  by  expanding 
their presence. It therefore appears that although inter-brand competition will continue to 
be an important objective for these markets, the specific protection of market access for 
competing  car  manufacturers  may  not  be  relevant.  In  contrast,  the  light  commercial 
vehicle,28  truck  and  bus  sectors  have  traditionally  been  more  concentrated,  and  inter-
brand  competition  on  these  markets  appears  to  be  weaker.29  In  light  of  the  above,  it 
appears that this objective may still be relevant for these market segments but that it 
may not be as relevant for passenger cars.  

2.  Protecting competition between dealers of the same brand  

The  protection  of  intra-brand  competition  is  of  particular  importance  when  inter-brand 
competition  is  relatively  low.  In  its  2009  Communication,  the  Commission  considered 
that there was a danger that intra-brand competition could be undermined, particularly in 
a  context  where  new  vehicles  were  distributed  through  dealers  with  near-identical 
business models. Thus, it considered it appropriate to protect price competition between 
dealers of the same brand and to encourage diversity in distribution formats. 

The evaluation,  which takes into account  the opinions  of NCAs and respondents  to  the 
public consultation, shows that this objective appears to have been largely achieved. 
Based  on  the  findings  of  the  fact-finding  study,  competition  has  not  decreased 
significantly  between  2007  and  2017,  at  least  as  far  as  passenger  cars  are  concerned.30 
Moreover,  although  the  density  of  the  authorised  networks  has  continued  to  decline 
between 2007 and 2017,31 it appears that consumers are increasingly using the Internet to 
shop around for passenger cars,32 and that this is extending the geographic reach of the 
remaining authorised dealers. Finally, since 2010, it has not pursued any cases based on 
claims that suppliers had put barriers in the way of intra-brand competition.33 However, 
the evaluation shows that the homogeneity in distribution formats observed prior to 2010 
is  still  present  in  the  markets  in  2021,  and  that,  in  particular,  the  vast  majority  of 

27

28

29

30

31

32

33

   See Section 6.3 of SWD and Section 2, Annex 2 to SWD. 

   The light commercial vehicles’ sector has recently become more concentrated due to the merger of FCA and PSA M.9730 FCA / 

PSA. 

   The Commission will monitor these markets particularly carefully in the coming months and years. 

   See findings of the fact-finding study, Section 5 of SWD and Annex 2 to SWD. 

   This is a continuation of a long trend; see Section III of Commission Evaluation Report on the operation of Regulation (EC) N° 

1400/2002 concerning motor vehicle distribution and servicing, May 2008. 

   See Annex 2 to SWD. 

   See Annex 4 to SWD. 

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passenger  cars  continue  to  be  distributed  through  quantitative  selective  distribution 
networks.34 

Based  on  the  above,  it  appears  that  this  objective  remains  relevant  for  the  light 
commercial vehicle, truck and bus sectors, where concentration levels are higher, and 
there  is  weaker  inter-brand  competition.  As  regards  the  passenger  car  sector,  the 
existence of dealer groups that may hold a portfolio of brands in a particular local area, 
thereby  potentially  reducing  inter-brand  competition  in  that  area,  may  be  an  indication 
that the protection of intra-brand competition also remains a relevant objective for 
passenger car distribution.  

3.  Prevent restrictions on parallel trade in motor vehicles 

In its 2009 Communication, the Commission observed that the protection of cross-border 
trade  had  enabled  consumers  to  shop  within  the  Single  Market  and  take  advantage  of 
price  differentials  between  Member  States.  Thus,  it  found  it  necessary  to  ensure  that 
consumers  continued  to  have  this  opportunity,  and  that  distribution  agreements  did  not 
restrict parallel trade. 

Taking into account the opinions of NCAs and respondents to the public consultation, the 
evaluation  shows  that  this  objective  has  been  at  least  partially  achieved,  in  that 
consumers are generally able to purchase motor vehicles in other Member States without 
substantial  obstacles.  Although  the  Commission  has  had  exchanges35  and  formal 
complaints regarding restrictions on cross-border trade, it has not detected any substantial 
obstructions on the part of suppliers that would warrant an in-depth investigation.  

Moreover, the Commission’s assessment is that this objective is still relevant: a finding 
which was in  the main supported by  NCAs and  respondents  to  the public consultation. 
The protection and promotion of the Single Market continues to be a core objective of the 
Commission.36 For individual consumers to benefit from the Single Market, it is essential 
that they are able to purchase products and services across borders without encountering 
artificial  barriers.  Next  to  a  home,  the  motor  vehicle  is  the  most  expensive  investment 
that  the  average  consumer  will  make,  and  if  cross-border  purchases  are  hampered,  the 
risk of consumer harm is therefore high.  

4.  Enabling independent repairers to compete with the manufacturers' networks of 

authorised repairers 

In its 2009 Communication, the Commission  noted that independent  repairers provided 
consumers with an alternative channel for the upkeep of their motor vehicles and were a 
source  of  vital  competitive  pressure,  as  their  business  models  and  operating  costs  were 
different from those in the authorised networks. Independent repairers’ ability to compete 

34

35

36

   See Section 5 of SWD and Annex 2 to SWD.  

   About 25% of the informal submission received by the Commission since 2010 concerned restrictions of parallel trade. 

   The  New  industrial  strategy  for  Europe  (COM(2020)102  10.3.2020)  puts  the  single  market  at  its  core,  as  one  of  the 

fundamentals of Europe’s industrial transformation.  

8 

 
                                                           
depended on unrestricted access to essential inputs such as spare parts, tools, training and 
technical  information.  It  therefore  considered  it  necessary  to  safeguard  this  access,  as 
well  as  to  deter  suppliers  and/or  their  authorised  repairers  from  using  other  indirect 
means to foreclose independent repairers, such as by misusing warranties. 

NCAs and respondents to the public consultation broadly confirmed that this objective 
has been at least partially achieved. Since the Commission adopted the four Technical 
Information decisions in 2007,37 and included the lessons learned in the SGL, no robust 
complaints  have  been  brought  to  its  attention  on  this  specific  point.  However, 
independent  operators that  compete with  authorised repairers still report difficulties in 
accessing the inputs they need to repair vehicles (e.g., issues with obtaining full or up-
to-date  information  and  restrictions  on  access  to  in-vehicle  data).38  This  view  is 
supported by some NCAs, which also refer to  difficulties for independent  repairers to 
obtain timely access  to  inputs for repair and maintenance. While some of these issues 
may be linked to these operators’ (often multi-brand) business models, and to the major 
investments  needed  to  be  able  to  repair  increasingly  technologically-advanced  motor 
vehicles, it cannot be excluded that some of the difficulties encountered may be due to 
restrictions on the markets.  

Based on the above, the evaluation finds that the objective continues to be relevant, in 
that  independent  repairers  continue  to  provide  an  important  value  proposition  for 
consumers,  although  some  behaviour  by  market  players  may  need  deeper  scrutiny, 
notably in light of recent market developments concerning the increased importance of 
data access.  

5.  Protecting competition between authorised repairers of the same brand 

In its 2009 Communication, the Commission considered that effective competition on the 
market  for  repair  and  maintenance  services  not  only  depended  on  the  competitive 
interaction between independent and authorised repairers, but also on the degree of such 
interaction  within  the  network  of  authorised  repairers.  This  was  all  the  more  true  for 
owners  of  newer  motor  vehicles,  who  tended  to  have  them  serviced  in  authorised 
garages. Thus, it concluded that submitting  candidate repairers to  quantitative selection 
(including  by  obliging  them  to  also  sell  new  motor  vehicles)  was  likely  to  cause 
agreements  to  fall  within  Article  101(1)  of  the  Treaty.39  Since  most  authorised  repair 
agreements  could  not  benefit  from  block  exemption  due  to  the  market  shares  of  the 
parties,  this  implied  that  limits  on  repairer  numbers  would  need  individual  self-
assessment.  

In light  of the information  gathered in  the evaluation, in  particular the views of NCAs, 
but also those of stakeholders, it appears that this objective has, at the very least, been 

37

38

39

   See cases AT. 39140 - DaimlerChrysler, AT. 39141- Fiat, AT. 39142 - Toyota Motor Europe and AT. 39143 - Opel. 

   About 10% of the informal submissions received by the Commission since 2010 concerned restrictions on restrictions on access 

to repair and maintenance information / vehicle data. 

   See paragraph 70 SGL. 

9 

 
                                                           
partially met. Although the fact-finding study has highlighted a general decrease in the 
number  of  authorised  repairer  outlets  from  2007  to  2017,  as  well  as  a  reduction  of  the 
total  number  of  contracts  signed  by  motor  vehicle  manufacturers  with  authorised 
repairers, the Commission’s experience does not indicate any generalised practices on the 
part  of  suppliers  to  refuse  network  entry  to  candidate  repairers  that  met  the  applicable 
quality criteria.  

Drawing input from the NCAs and respondents to the public consultation, the evaluation 
shows that this objective continues to be relevant, in particular because the authorised 
networks continue to enjoy significant market power. 

6.  Preventing the foreclosure of spare parts suppliers 

In  its  2009  Communication,  the  Commission  observed  that  there  were  often  large 
differences  in  price  between  parts  sold  or  resold  by  a  motor  vehicle  manufacturer  and 
alternative brands of parts. The availability of alternatives brought considerable benefits 
to  consumers,  in  terms  of  both  choice  and  price.  Thus,  the  Commission  considered  it 
necessary to protect spare parts manufacturers’ access to the motor vehicle aftermarkets, 
in particular through the identification of three hardcore clauses in the MVBER, thereby 
ensuring that competing brands of spare parts continued to be available. 

Having  regard  to  the  views  of  NCAs  and  respondents  to  the  public  consultation,  the 
evaluation  shows  that  this  objective  has  been  partially  met.  Firstly,  in  the 
Commission’s  monitoring  and  enforcing  experience,40  alternatives  are  usually  available 
for the most common parts used in motor vehicle maintenance, and independent repairers 
often use such parts to repair and maintain customers’ vehicles. Secondly, although some 
stakeholders  have  indicated  that  independent  repairers  still  face  certain  difficulties,  the 
Commission  has  not  received  any  antitrust  complaints  in  this  area  that  would  indicate 
more than a limited likelihood of finding an infringement of Article 101 of the Treaty. 

As to the continued relevance of this objective, the spare parts markets generally seem to 
be  characterised  by  two  rigidities  in  particular.  Firstly,  OES’  contractual  arrangements 
with motor vehicle manufacturers may prevent or hamper the former from supplying the 
aftermarket directly, in competition with parts sold to the vehicle manufacturers and then 
resold as spare parts. In particular, suppliers in the sector seem to use so-called “tooling 
arrangements”,  and  sometimes  place  requirements  on  OES  to  transfer  intellectual 
property rights to their customers. Secondly, agreements between OEMs and authorised 
repairers may oblige or incite the latter to purchase most of their supplies of parts directly 
from the motor vehicle manufacturer. The evaluation therefore finds that  this objective 
continues to be relevant. 

7.  Preserving the deterrent effect of Article 101 of the Treaty – preventing suppliers 

from using indirect pressure and threats to achieve anticompetitive results 

40

   See Annex 4 to SWD. 

10 

 
                                                           
In its 2009 Communication, the Commission saw fit to include as what it described as a 
"flanking” measure, the objective of ensuring that suppliers did not use the safe harbour 
granted  by  the  block  exemption  to  inhibit  independent  pro-competitive  behaviour  by 
authorised dealers and repairers through various forms of indirect pressure and threats to 
achieve anticompetitive results. 

Having regard to the views of the NCAs and the respondents to the public consultation, 
the evaluation suggests that this objective has been partially, if not fully achieved. In 
particular, between 2010 and 2020, the Commission has not received any complaints that 
would allow it to find that suppliers had hindered pro-competitive behaviour by exerting 
indirect  pressure  or  threats  on  dealers  or  repairers  thereby  warranting  an  in-depth 
investigation. It appears that, as in many durable goods industries, distributors are often 
the weaker party to agreements with suppliers. While this is not anticompetitive of itself 
and  does  not  amount  to  prima  facie  evidence  of  anticompetitive  behaviour,  the 
Commission  would  nonetheless  take  such  imbalance  into  account  if  elements  were 
brought  to  its  attention  suggesting  that  suppliers  had  exerted  such  indirect  pressure  or 
threats on dealers or repairers. Contributions from a few NCAs as well as respondents to 
the  public  consultation  bear  out  these  observations  as  regards  the  relative  weakness  of 
dealers’  contractual  position,  but  do  not  seem  to  indicate  that  pressure  or  threats  have 
been used to exploit this weakness with a view to hindering pro-competitive behaviour.   

The  evaluation  indicates  that  this  objective  may  not  be  particularly  relevant, 
especially  with  regard  to  the  markets  for  passenger  cars  where,  as  the  fact-finding 
study  confirms,41  there  is  healthy  inter-brand  competition.  Firstly,  there  are  few 
indications  that  suppliers  achieve  anticompetitive  results  by  exerting  pressure  on,  or 
issuing  threats  to,  their  dealers/repairers.  Rather,  in  the  Commission’s  experience,  the 
ability  of  suppliers  to  influence  their  dealers’  /  repairers’  behaviour  tends  to  manifest 
itself  in  the  fact  that,  like  many  distributors  of  durable  goods,  the  latter  make  large 
investments in the brand, and are therefore unwilling to jeopardise those investments by 
going  against  what  they  perceive  as  their  supplier’s  interests.  However,  in  view  of  the 
comments  made by some stakeholders concerning a number of practices  which in  their 
view  could  serve  as  an  indirect  means  of  achieving  anticompetitive  results,42  further 
analysis may be needed as to whether this remains a relevant specific policy objective.  

The  evaluation  has  also  included  an  analysis  of  whether  other  competition-related 
objectives could be relevant, notably in light of recent market developments concerning 
access to in-vehicle data and the importance of sustainability.  

Much in-vehicle data, or the information derived from it (such as the fact that a vehicle 
has a particular fault, or needs a routine service), may be considered an essential input for 
repair  and  maintenance.  Where  such  data  or  information  is  not  available  from  other 
sources, and is supplied to authorised repairers, it should therefore also be supplied on an 

41

42

   See Section 2, Annex 2 to SWD. 

   See  footnote  150  of  SWD;  Section  2.3.1  (“Prevalence  of  particular  restrictions”)  and  Section  3.3.2,  Annex  3  to  SWD;  and 

Section 1.9, Annex 6 to SWD. 

11 

 
                                                           
equal  basis  to  independent  operators  that  compete  with  those  repairers.  However,  the 
evaluation finds that access to data, like access to other essential inputs, should be seen as 
a subset of the specific objective of enabling independent repairers to compete with the 
manufacturers' networks of authorised repairers, rather than as a separate objective.  

As  to  sustainability,43  the  most  effective  way  for  the  competition  rules  to  contribute  to 
such  objectives  is  to  ensure  effective  competition,  which  will  stimulate  innovation  and 
thereby  encourage  the  offer  of  sustainable  products  and  services.  The  MVBER  already 
allows  for  the  exemption  of  all  agreements,  including  those  that  target  sustainability 
objectives, so long as the market shares of the parties do not exceed the 30% threshold44 
and  there  are  no  hardcore  restrictions.45  Where  the  market  shares  exceed  the  30% 
threshold  such  agreements  will  remain  subject  to  individual  assessment  pursuant  to 
Article 101(3) of the Treaty.  

Finally, as for the relevance of the current material scope of the MVBER,46 this was set 
in  2010  following  a  full  analysis  of  the  sector,  which  showed  inter  alia  considerable 
rigidities47  on  the  markets  for  spare  parts  for  four-wheeled  vehicles.48  Although  a 
majority of respondents  to the public consultation considered that the scope should be 
widened  to  also  cover  two-wheeled  vehicles  and  some  vehicles  not  meant  for  roads 
(e.g.,  agricultural  machinery,  tractors  and  forestry  vehicles,  construction  vehicles),  the 
Commission’s  experience  over  the  last  decade  has  not  given  any  concrete  indications 
that  similar  rigidities  exist  in  respect  of  such  products.  Its  current  assessment  is 
therefore that the current scope remains relevant and appropriate: a view which is 
shared by the majority of NCAs.  

The  evaluation  therefore  shows  that  the  MVBER  regime  has  generally  met  its  four 
specific objectives, which continue to be relevant. It follows that the general objective of 
the MVBER regime49 has also been largely achieved and continues to be relevant. 

B.  Efficiency and coherence of the MVBER regime 

The evaluation  indicates  that the MVBER regime has been efficient, and that the costs 
resulting  from  assessing  compliance  of  vertical  agreements  in  the  motor  vehicle  sector 
with Article 101 of the Treaty are proportionate to the benefits brought by the MVBER 

43

44

45

46

47

48

49

   A number of respondents to the public consultation indicated that the application of the MVBER should facilitate or contribute 

to the pursuit of sustainability objectives.  

   See Article 3 VBER. 

   See Article 4 VBER and Article 5 MVBER. 

   Articles 1(g) and 4 MVBER. 

   Namely: (i) OES’ contractual arrangements with vehicle manufacturers (e.g., so-called tooling arrangements); and (ii) incentives 

given to authorised repairers to purchase most of their supplies of parts directly from the OEM. 

   See para 64 et seq of Commission staff working document, The Future Competition Law  Framework applicable to the motor 
vehicle sector, Impact Assessment and Section 4 of the study on “Developments in car retailing and after-sales markets under 
Regulation N° 1400/2002”. 

   To preserve the deterrent effect of Article 101 of the Treaty by facilitating the enforcement work of the Commission, NCAs and 

national courts and to help businesses conduct the self-assessment of their vertical agreements. 

12 

 
 
                                                           
regime. Absent the latter, the costs would have been higher. Moreover, the evaluation has 
shown  that  the  MVBER,  VBER,  SGL  and  VGL  are  coherent  within  and  between 
themselves  as  well  as  with  other  EU  legislation.  Nevertheless,  some  stakeholders 
consider that the regime lacks consistency in a few areas such as the distinction between 
bilateral and unilateral behaviour as regards the issue of access to technical information, 
certain references to market shares in the SGL, or the relevant market definitions in the 
motor vehicle sector.50  

4.  Overall assessment  

Overall,  the  competitive  environment  on  the  motor  vehicle  markets  has  not  changed 
greatly  since  2010.  However,  the  sector  is  now  under  intense  pressure  to  adapt,  due  to 
three factors in particular. Firstly, there is technological evolution, in particular as regards 
communications  technologies  and  the  growing  importance  of  in-vehicle  data.  Second, 
there  is  a  constant  pressure  to  reduce  emissions,  particularly  in  light  of  the  EU 
Sustainable  and  Smart  Mobility  Strategy51  and  the  Green  Deal,52  and  to  shift  to  more 
environmentally-friendly  fuels  and  power  trains.  Thirdly,  the  sector  needs  to  face  the 
post-COVID-19 world and the likelihood that mobility patterns may to some extent have 
permanently  changed.  It  therefore  seems  likely  that  some  parts  of  the  motor  vehicle 
sector will evolve rapidly over the coming years and that this will have an impact on the 
conditions of competition that, as yet, cannot be quantified. 

Concerning  the  motor  vehicle  distribution  markets,  the  information  available  tends  to 
indicate  that  competitive  conditions  vary  depending  on  the  type  of  vehicle.  While 
competition in passenger cars is vigorous, it is less intense for light commercial vehicles, 
trucks and buses.  

At  this  stage,  there  are  no  indications  of  market  failure  or  actual  or  potential  consumer 
harm that would justify distinguishing motor vehicle distribution from the distribution of 
other  durable  goods.  Therefore,  the  application  of  the  VBER  appears  appropriate  for 
motor vehicle distribution. 

As  to  the  motor  vehicle  repair  markets,  the  evaluation  shows  that  many  authorised 
repairers  enjoy  considerable  local  market  power  (particularly  given  their  high  share  of 
repairs  on  newer  passenger  cars  and  light  commercial  vehicles),  and  that  it  would 
therefore  not  be  safe  to  raise  the  market  share  threshold  of  the  MVBER  to  capture 
agreements between such repairers and their suppliers. Although intra-brand competition 
within  the  authorised  networks  is  limited  by  strict  and  detailed  quality  criteria  and  the 
large  investments  that  authorised  repairers  are  required  to  make,  independent  repairers 
continue  to  exert  vital  competitive  pressure  on  authorised  repairers  and  ensure  that 

50

51

52

   For further details, see Section 4, Annex 6 to SWD. 

   Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee 
and the Committee of the Regions Sustainable and Smart Mobility Strategy – putting European transport on track for the future. 
COM/2020/789 final. 

   Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European council, the Council, the European Economic 

and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: The European Green Deal. COM/2019/640. 

13 

 
                                                           
consumers can enjoy choice in provision and prices. These operators can only continue to 
exert such pressure if they have access to key inputs such as spare parts, tools, training, 
technical  information  and  vehicle-generated  data.  The  current  regime  therefore  remains 
appropriate, but may require updating to take account of technological progress. 

The motor vehicle spare parts markets appears to have rigidities that (indirectly) reduce 
the  choice  available  to  end  consumers.  At  this  stage,  it  therefore  seems  that  special 
treatment of these markets continues to be merited.  

Overall, the current MVBER regime has proven to be appropriate and adapted to diverse 
situations.  The  Commission  therefore  does  not  consider  that  major  change  is  currently 
needed  to  the  existing  rules.  However,  it  also  observes  that  some  provisions  may  need 
updating, in particular to reflect the importance that access to data is likely to have as a 
factor of competition. Some of the specific policy objectives of the current regime may 
also need to be reconsidered in the light of this assessment. 

5.  Conclusion 

This  report  presents  the  results  of  the  evaluation  on  the  functioning  of  the  MVBER 
regime and does not prejudge in any respect the Commission’s decision whether to let the 
current MVBER regime lapse by 31 May 2023,53 renew it or revise it. The findings of the 
VBER evaluation will also be considered in this context. 

53

If the current MVBER were to lapse, the VBER would apply by default. 

14