European Migrant Smuggling Centre : 5th annual report.
Date: 2021-05-17
Institutions: Europol
Subjects: EU Member State, EU activity, activity report, fight against crime, illegal migration, organised crime, trafficking in human beings

European Migrant  
Smuggling Centre 

5TH ANNUAL REPORT

2021

EUROPEAN MIGRANT SMUGGLING CENTRE 
5 th ANNUAL REPORT – 2021

PDF  |  ISBN 978-92-95220-24-9  |  ISSN  2600-3287  |  doi: 10.2813/90877  |  QL-AP-21-001-EN-N

© European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation, 2021

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Cite this publication: Europol (2021), European Migrant Smuggling Centre - 5th Annual Report, 
Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg.

This publication and more information on Europol are available on the Internet.

2

www.europol.europa.eu

Europol’s European Migrant Smuggling Centre5th Annual ReportTABLE OF   
C ONTENTS

1

FOREWORD

Foreword Executive Director of 

Europol  04

Foreword Head of EMSC  05

2

ACTIVITY REPORT

EMSC’s performance  06

Operational highlights facilitated illegal 

immigration 08

Operational highlights trafficking in 

human beings   10

3

INTELLIGENCE PICTURE

Migrant smuggling   12

Trafficking in human beings   14

4

TRENDS AND MODI OPERANDI

Crime Priority: Migrant smuggling  15

Crime Priority: Trafficking in human beings  22 

5

WAY FORWARD

Expected challenges  26

Europol’s reaction  28

3

Europol’s  European Migrant Smuggling Centre 5th Annual Report 
F OREWORD

Catherine De Bolle 
E X E C U T I V E   D I R E C T O R ,   E U R O P O L

I am pleased to present the 5th edition of 
the Annual Report of the European Migrant 
Smuggling Centre hosted at Europol. 

While the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic 
continued to dominate many aspects of our 
lives in 2020, criminal networks continued 
with their activities in the areas of migrant 
smuggling and trafficking in human beings 
(THB). 

The sustained demand for migrant 
smuggling services will allow the smuggling 
networks involved in these activities to 
maintain their criminal businesses. The 
perception of the EU as being economically, 
politically and environmentally more stable 
compared to many regions in the world is a 
powerful pull factor. 

4

Every year, irregular migrants perish on 
their way to Europe or during secondary 
movements within the EU. In 2020, there 
have been more such tragic cases often 
linked to the dangerous activities of ruthless 
migrant smugglers.

THB continues to affect all Member States in 
2020. The exploitation of all types of victims 
continues to pose a high threat in the EU.

In April 2021, Europol presented the EU 
Serious and Organised Crime Threat 
Assessment (SOCTA) 2021, which identified 
migrant smuggling and THB as key crime 
threats facing the EU. I am encouraged by 
the fact that these key threats will also be 
adopted as crime priorities for the 2022 – 
2025 cycle of the European Multi-disciplinary 
Platform Against Criminal Threats 
(EMPACT).

In 2021, the European Migrant Smuggling 
Centre continues to support Member States 
and partners in the fight against migrant 
smuggling and THB targeting the most 
threatening criminal networks and high-value 
targets involved.  

Europol will continue to deliver the services 
and the operational support our law 
enforcement partners in the EU and beyond 
now rely on for their day-to-day work.

Europol’s European Migrant Smuggling Centre5th Annual Report 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F OREWORD

Robert Crepinko 
H E A D   O F   E M S C

congratulate all the EU Member States and our 
operational partners for such as impressive 
and agile response, constantly supporting 
relevant investigations where Europol’s EMSC 
is a trusted partner, allowing curbing many 
criminal networks.

Despite the pandemic, criminal networks have 
shown a solid footprint and networks involved 
in both criminal areas were already quick to 
adapt their modi operandi to the new reality, 
posing new challenges for all of us, such as 
the fuelled online environment increasingly 
used for recruiting victims or to advertise 
illicit services. Therefore we need to continue 
boosting and enhancing our operational 
responses, here, the EMSC will continue fully 
supporting you.

It is our pleasure to continue building strong 
partnerships with our operational stakeholders 
and to continue operationally evolving, 
providing strong support and disrupting 
criminal networks who are treating human 
beings as commodities and putting their lives 
in high risk.

Stay safe, stay strong and looking forward to 
continue with our cooperation.

5

One more year we are releasing our activity 
report, and this edition also shows the 
excellent work done by the EMSC, Member 
States and our operational partners. This is 
especially relevant due to the unexpected and 
cumbersome moments we are all experiencing 
since 2020, due to the impact of COVID 19. 
Definitely, 2020 has been heavily affecting 
our policing routines and working procedures, 
these unexpected developments are requiring 
robust, solid and resilient law enforcement 
responses, and we did it together

During 2020 the EMSC has supported 
a significant number of international 
investigations aimed to investigate and 
prosecute high value targets (HVT) posing a 
serious threat for the EU. I would like to  

Europol’s  European Migrant Smuggling Centre 5th Annual Report 
 
 
 
ACTIV IT Y REP ORT

EMSC’s 
performance

While the COVID 19 pandemic has brought unprecedented 
travel restrictions, criminal networks have continued to 
thrive, displaying a high degree of adaptability and as such, 
Europol’s operational support and services have been 
increasingly requested, despite the challenges in providing 
on-the-spot support. 

6

Europol’s European Migrant Smuggling Centre5th Annual ReportTrafficking in Human Beings - AP PHOENIX

A

N

E

I

S

7 064

1 236

Number of messages received

Number of “new cases” received

10

9

Operational Meetings

On-the-spot Action Days

249

Operational Reports

Facilitated Illegal Immigration - AP MIGRANT SMUGGLING

A
N
E

I

S

18 203

3 931

Number of messages received

Number of “new cases” received

26

On-the-spot Action Days

29

Operational Meetings

1 045

Operational Reports

Trafficking in Human Beings - AP PHOENIX

A
N
E

I

S

7 064

1 236

Number of messages received

Number of “new cases” received

10

9

Operational Meetings

On-the-spot Action Days

249

Operational Reports

Facilitated Illegal Immigration - AP MIGRANT SMUGGLING

A
N

E

I

S

18 203

7

3 931

26

On-the-spot Action Days

Number of messages received

Number of “new cases” received

29

Operational Meetings

1 045

Operational Reports

Europol’s  European Migrant Smuggling Centre 5th Annual Report 
 
 
 
Operational 
highlights 
facilitated illegal 
immigration

OPERATION ALCATRAZ – ICEBERG1

OPERATION SHERE KHAN2

Europol support led to the arrest of 47 
individuals for smuggling Moroccan 
nationals into the EU.

The British Royal Gibraltar Regiment and the 
Spanish National Police, were supported by 
Europol with intelligence analysis, deployed 
a mobile office with real-time cross-checks 
against Europol databases, leading to the 
dismantling of a criminal network operating 
in Spain, Gibraltar and Morocco.

The criminal network supported migrants 
to fraudulently obtain British visas at the 
embassy in Rabat and facilitated them 
further to Europe. For these services, 
they charged approximately EUR 8 000 
to EUR 9 000 in total. Once the visa was 
granted, the migrants were facilitated via 
plane or ferry from Morocco to Gibraltar, 
picked up by facilitators with off-road 
vehicles with tinted windows and brought 
to Spain. After a temporary stop in Spain, 
further travel to other EU Member States was 
organised.

A criminal network facilitated about 10 000 
Iraqi-Kurdish, Syrian, Iranian and Afghan 
migrants from Le Mans and Poitiers in 
France to the United Kingdom.

For approximately EUR 7 000 per person, the 
facilitators transported the migrants at night, 
under life-threatening conditions, concealed 
in overcrowded refrigerated lorries. The 
criminal network collected an estimated 
EUR 70 million in profit, distributing their 
earnings via a hawala banking system run by 
a suspect.

Cooperation between the French and Dutch 
border guards and the French national police, 
with Europol’s support, resulted in the arrest 
of 23 suspects (19 in France and four in the 
Netherlands), five house searches and the 
seizure of firearms and vehicles in one action 
day. Discovered migrants were brought to 
safety.

This case was also part of the EMPACT JOT 
Dunqett operational action.

8

Europol’s European Migrant Smuggling Centre5th Annual ReportInvestigation Team. 27 house searches were 
performed. Moreover, three cars, money and 
electronic equipment were seized. A total of 
21 irregular migrants were rescued.

The criminal network facilitated the transfer 
of mainly Vietnamese nationals, under 
dangerous conditions hidden in lorries, 
through France and Belgium across the 
English Channel to the United Kingdom. It is 
likely that the smugglers facilitated several 
dozens of migrants per day for several 
months.

OPERATION HYDRA3 

Another investigation by the Spanish police 
and supported by Europol resulted in 19 
arrests, three house searches, the seizure 
of three cars, eight mobile devices, two hard 
discs and a server.

Situated in Spain and Morocco, the 
facilitators provided the migrants with 
cayucos – wooden boats similar to canoes. 
Migrants crossing the sea to the Canary 
Islands, under life-threatening conditions, 
were temporarily accommodated on 
Lanzarote in abandoned houses, campervans 
and motorhomes, before routing them by 
plane or ferry to their final destinations within 
the EU (France, Finland or Italy). Irregular 
migrants were equipped with look-alike or 
fraudulent documents and were charged 
EUR 1 000 to EUR 1 500 by the facilitators.

OTF MELROSE4

The tragedy of Essex in the United Kingdom 
in October 2019, which led to the death 
of 39 Vietnamese in a refrigerated lorry, 
prompted international investigations 
against a criminal migrant smuggling 
network. Europol set up an Operational 
Task Force and facilitated the exchange 
of information between law enforcement 
authorities. Further analytical reports and the 
deployment of an expert to France, as well 
as coordinating and real-time cross-checking 
of information during the action day, led 
to the arrest of 26 suspects (13 in France 
and 13 Belgium) by an international Joint 

9

Europol’s  European Migrant Smuggling Centre 5th Annual ReportOperational 
highlights 
trafficking in 
human beings

OPERATION CUMBIA5 

OPERATION COSTA/VELA6

A French-led investigation focused on a 
criminal network composed of Colombian 
nationals active since 2015. They recruited 
Colombian and other South American 
women to exploit them in prostitution in 
rented apartments in France. The network 
also arranged the journey from the victims’ 
home countries to Europe by air, targeting 
airports in Spain and Switzerland. The 
victims were advertised on specific adult 
websites. The customers paid directly to 
the victims, who then handed over the total 
amount to the facilitators.

On 12 October 2020, France concluded 
an operational action day arresting eight 
suspects and rescuing 15 potential victims. 
Europol supported this transnational and 
complex investigation from the early stages, 
coordinating the information exchange and 
providing analytical support.

A large network exploiting young Romanian 
women was dismantled in Spain, Romania 
and the Czech Republic in an operation 
supported by Europol.

The operation resulted in the arrests of 14 
suspects (seven in Romania and seven in 
Spain), the safeguard of 10 victims and the 
seizure of cash, jewellery, luxury cars and 
digital equipment. During the coordinated 
operation, 16 house searches were carried 
out in the Czech Republic, Romania and 
Spain.

Romanian members of the criminal network, 
using the ‘lover boy’ method, seduced 
young women and, creating a dependant 
manipulative relationship between victim 
and exploiter, forced them into prostitution. 
The victims were often drugged, threatened, 
abused and trafficked among the members 
of the network for up to EUR 6 000 each. 
The women were also regularly moved from 
one location to another and one country 

10

Europol’s European Migrant Smuggling Centre5th Annual Reportto another as a strategy to minimise the 
risks of detection from law enforcement. 
The network is believed to have been 
operating in other EU countries. More than 
40 women have been identified as victims 
of sexual exploitation of the two criminal 
networks.

The criminal network was laundering the 
money through the purchase of real estate, 
expensive jewellery and vehicles. The profit 
from sexual exploitation was also used to 
create active checking accounts for drug 
use and gambling.

11

Europol’s  European Migrant Smuggling Centre 5th Annual ReportINTELLIGENCE P ICTURE

Migrant smugglingThe COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted that global crises do not significantly disrupt migration flows. After an initial slow-down during the first lockdown in March and April 2020, migrant smuggling activities quickly resumed. Criminal networks had new opportunities to demonstrate their adaptability, boosting new routes such as the revived Western African route, and adjusting their modi operandi to movement restrictions and enhanced border controls.Facilitation of secondary movements of irregular migrants already present in the EU and legalisation of residence status are key threats to the EU. Abuse of asylum procedures and of loopholes in legislation applicable to entry to and legalisation of stay in the EU are instruments on which criminal networks active in migrant smuggling systematically capitalise. Facilitation of secondary movements is diverse and sometimes multidirectional, with significant differences across nationalities of suspects and smuggled migrants. Smuggling networks continue to exploit routes departing from the first entry points in the EU (Spain, Italy, Greece) to destination countries as France, Germany, the UK and others, facilitating secondary movements by land, on foot or by vehicles, boats and plane. In 2020, the involvement of criminal networks was most visible in arranging transit via the Western Balkans region, towards Germany and Italy, as well as the United Kingdom. Running a profitable business generating millions of euros in illicit profits, criminal networks facilitating the journey of irregular migrants within the EU used the opportunities recently offered by the large number of irregular migrants stranded in transit countries on account of COVID-19 measures. Facilitated secondary movements easily remain under the radar, aided by EU’s efficient transport infrastructure and the use of simple but effective countermeasures such as built-in hiding places, rental cars or forerunners.Facilitation of illegal immigration unfolds in an increasingly networked environment, with document fraud and legislation expertise often provided as a service. Similarly, the use of legal business structures, corruption 
and money laundering form the criminal 
infrastructure sustaining smugglers’ 
operations.

Migrant smugglers treat irregular migrants 
as commodities, often prioritising the aim 
of maximising profits over the risks to the 
migrants’ physical and psychological health. 
Migrant smugglers frequently employ 
direct violence or the threat of violence 
against migrants, against law enforcement 
officers when avoiding apprehension and 
occasionally against other smugglers active 
in the same area. Furthermore, smugglers 
increasingly endanger the lives of migrants 

at risk by using unseaworthy vessels or 
concealing them in small confined spaces 
for prolonged periods. 

Digital solutions, encryption and 
opportunities offered by the online 
environment act as strong enablers of 
migrant smuggling, used in all stages 
of criminal operations, from advertising 
and recruiting of irregular migrants, to 
guidance and sharing of forged documents 
and instructions. The facilitation of illegal 
immigration unfolds in an increasingly 
networked environment, with document 
fraud and legislation expertise provided as a 
service.

13

Europol’s  European Migrant Smuggling Centre 5th Annual ReportTrafficking in 
human beings

Trafficking in human beings (THB) is a core 
activity of serious and organised crime in 
the EU and is set to remain a threat to the EU 
for the near future, with victims exploited by 
criminal networks originating from all over 
the world.

The entire process of trafficking a victim 
currently features a number of online 
components, both on the surface and dark 
web, which is another development set 
to become even more pronounced, in the 
aftermath of a pronounced shift towards the 
online environment driven by COVID-19.

Traffickers use online platforms and services 
to identify victims, orchestrate THB for 
sexual exploitation and advertise the services 
of victims. The use of websites to advertise 
the sexual services of victims to clients has 
become a fundamental feature of this type of 
exploitation.

One of the most frequently reported modus 
operandi for the recruitment of victims for 
sexual exploitation remained the lover-boy 
method, with offenders reverting increasingly 
to psychological pressure to the detriment of 
direct physical abuse. 

Exploiters increasingly seek to exploit 

14

their victims in the context of supposedly 
voluntary business agreements. As part 
of these arrangements, the victims agree 
to engage in prostitution and hand over 
a share of their earnings in exchange for 
protection and support with administrative 
issues such as tax declarations, registration 
with chambers of commerce, or pension 
arrangements.

While still largely underreported, trafficking 
for labour exploitation continues to primarily 
take place in cash-intensive and less 
controlled businesses (e.g. agricultural and 
construction sectors, cleaning services and 
the food processing industry). However, 
labour exploitation in the agricultural sector 
remains under-investigated and under-
reported in the EU.

Legal business structures are commonly 
used to organise the exploitation of THB 
victims, while document fraud is used to 
legalise the stay of non-EU victims in the EU, 
and to obscure the real identity of victims 
and traffickers.

After sexual and labour-related exploitation, 
criminals increasingly focus on forced 
begging and forced criminality, particularly 
targeting vulnerable victims, like minors and 
disabled persons.

Europol’s European Migrant Smuggling Centre5th Annual ReportT RENDS AND  MO DI O PE RANDI

Crime Priority: 
Migrant smuggling

MODUS OPERANDI: 

CONCEALMENT IN 

VEHICLES

Smuggling of irregular migrants concealed in vehicles is the most 
common practice for the facilitation of illegal immigration in the 
Western Balkans and neighbouring countries. Migrant smugglers 
are frequently reported employing risky behaviour when trying 
to hide the highest possible number of irregular migrants inside 
a compartment of a vehicle to maximise their profits. Irregular 
migrants are frequently transported in locked, dark and airless 
cargo compartments, in crowded, inhuman conditions that are 
unsuitable for passenger transport. The types of compartments 
include cargo bays of lorries, trailers and transporter vans, hidden, 
purpose-built compartments in cars, vans or lorries, as well as 
boots and even engine compartments. Irregular migrants are 
usually transported for several hours without stopping, in order to 
avoid apprehension.

Along the Western Balkan Routes, in 2020, smuggling with this 
modus operandi was on an upward trend.  The number of cases 
reported in the fourth quarter of 2020 increased three-fold 
compared to the same period in 2019. In addition, the number of 
cases doubled in 2020, compared to 2019, while the number of 
facilitated irregular migrants tripled.

The top five nationalities of intercepted drivers during the last 
quarter of 2020 were Serbian, Romanian, Bulgarian, Turkish and 
Croatian nationals, with a similar situation recorded for vehicle 
registration countries. The number of cases in which a forerunner 
car was used has also increased. 

Criminal networks involved in migrant smuggling use large vehicles to 
transport numerous irregular migrants. A forerunner car is often used to 
clear the road ahead of police controls. The analysis of contributed cases 
shows two diverging approaches: while some drivers appear to diligently 
follow traffic regulations trying not to draw attention, others – specifically 
drivers of the transport vehicles – are reckless in their behaviour, attempting 
to avoid being caught by police. These drivers drive fast and dangerously; 
in the event of police controls, they crash or threaten to crash into police 
vehicles and the facilitated irregular migrants are exposed to serious traffic 
accidents. At the same time, some forerunner cars intentionally commit 
traffic violations in order to avoid police checks for the following transport 
vehicles, or obstruct the police when stopping the transport vehicles, in that 
way securing the movement of irregular migrants7.

While drivers of the forerunner cars frequently seem to be nationals of the 
country in which they operate, the drivers of the transport vehicles appear 
to be more often nationals of countries of origin. In Greece, drivers reported 
were often nationals of the Western Balkan region or with other non-
European nationalities, entering Greece illegally. The drivers are usually not 
the owners of the cars, and the vehicles were registered normally in various 
EU countries.

Pic. 1. Intercepted irregular migrants crowded in a van. Source: Croatian authorities.  

Pic. 2 and 3. Accident of a truck transporting irregular migrants. Source: Croatian authorities

16

Europol’s European Migrant Smuggling Centre5th Annual ReportSMALL BOATS 

VIA THE ENGLISH 

CHANNEL TO THE 

UNITED KINGDOM

In 2020, there was a significant upward trend in the phenomenon 
of using small boats for illegal immigration from mainland 
Europe across the English Channel to the UK. The increasing 
number of incidents with small boats (Rigid Inflatable Boats 
(RIB) or Rigid Hull Inflatable Boats (RHIB) across the English 
Channel has shown a consolidated trend throughout 2020, 
observed since November 2019. It has thus become the main 
modus operandi employed by migrant-smuggling networks 
offering smuggling services from the EU to the United Kingdom.

Most departures took place from the north of France, in areas 
close to Calais and Dunkirk and, to a much lesser extent, from 
the Belgian coast. From January to mid-December 2020, law 
enforcement authorities of the countries in question registered 
more than 1 300 incidents involving more than 15 000 irregular 
migrants crossing the English Channel in small boats. These 
numbers include attempts detected by the French authorities, as 
well as successful crossings detected on British territory.8 

In order to tackle this phenomenon, a proposal for an operational 
action was tabled in the framework of the Operational Action 
Plan 2021 for the priority Facilitation of illegal immigration in 
the EMPACT framework. The objective of the action is to tackle 
migrant smuggling in small boats across the English Channel in 
a more systematic and effective way.

The Joint Intelligence Cell (JIC) was operationalised in July 
2020 between French and British law enforcement authorities. 
Following the approval of the partners involved, Europol has 
joined efforts, enhancing cooperation and continuous data 
flow. A dedicated Task Force has been set up in the EMSC, to 
focus and coordinate existing analytical capabilities, between 
experts from Joint Operational Team (JOT) MARE9 and EMSC’s 
operational teams. The aim of the Task Force is to assess 
the developments on the ground and reflect their outcomes 
in investigations, to timely process information related to the 
topic and to keep a constant contact with Liaison Bureaus’ 
representatives.

17

Europol’s  European Migrant Smuggling Centre 5th Annual ReportMIGRANT 

SMUGGLING VIA 

THE WESTERN 

AFRICAN ROUTE 

TO THE CANARY 

ISLANDS 

In 2020, more than 23 000 new arrivals of irregular migrants 
were registered to the Canary Islands, almost a 10-fold increase 
compared to the same period in 201910. The peak was recorded 
during October and November 2020, with 8 506 and 9 662 new 
arrivals, respectively.

Departures from Morocco to the mainland of Spain have 
significantly decreased, since Moroccan authorities reinforced 
surveillance and police operations in the northern part of the 
country (areas traditionally used by smugglers as departure 
points towards southern coasts of the Spanish mainland) to 
counter the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. This definitely 
had an impact on the increased use of routes from Moroccan 
southern regions and neighbouring countries (Mauritania, 
Senegal, Gambia) and from Algeria to Spain.

Migrant smugglers played a significant role in this long and risky 
crossing from the region, to the Canary Islands, by organising 
sea crossings in fishing boats (cayucos) and creating new 
synergies and opportunities such as the trade of cayucos to 
Senegal produced in Gambia at lower manufacturing prices11.

In some cases, since this route is highly dangerous, the larger 
part of the smuggling fee is paid upon successfully reaching the 
Canary Islands (for example, EUR 500 is paid in advance and 
EUR 1 800 upon successful facilitation).

Pic 4. Cayuco arriving to the Canary Islands. Source: Spanish authorities

18

Europol’s European Migrant Smuggling Centre5th Annual ReportTHE DIGITISATION 

OF MIGRANT 

SMUGGLING AND 

TRAFFICKING IN 

HUMAN BEINGS

Social media platforms and messaging communications (often 
encrypted) are widely used by smugglers to coordinate and 
communicate before and during smuggling operations. Such 
channels are also used to advertise services and fraudulent 
documents. The use of mobile applications has been detected 
to share maps with pre-established routes and safer transit 
points along borders, with live sharing of secure places to 
obtain logistic support during the journey (accommodation, 
water, food). Closed groups in social media and communication 
applications are particularly popular among document forgers 
and suppliers. In addition, burner smartphone applications12 are 
used by smugglers, enabling the random creation and use of 
temporary virtual phone numbers.

Social media is also used by criminals to recruit and offer 
services to potential victims. Employment advertisement 
on social media targets irregular migrants, often for further 
exploitation, either for sexual services or for labour. This occurs 
particularly in cases where irregular migrants are bound by the 
debt of fees for lengthy and complex journeys.  

Criminal networks involved in trafficking of human beings (THB) 
have increasingly become technology-savvy. In October 2020, 
Europol published a report on digitisation of THB, aiming to 
inform the law enforcement community involved in the fight 
against international THB on how modern communication 
technologies (especially the use of internet and social 
media), impact the way in which criminal groups operate. The 
advantages of technology for traffickers include increased 
anonymity, the ability to take part in real-time yet encrypted 
communications, the possibility of reaching a broader audience 
(in terms of victims and clients), geographical mobility, and the 
ability to control victims from a distance.13 

19

Europol’s  European Migrant Smuggling Centre 5th Annual ReportDocument fraud entails the production of false documents as 
well as the use of genuine documents obtained by means of 
deception, misrepresentation or theft. False documents can be 
complete counterfeits or partly forged. They can also be altered 
genuine stolen documents (including blank documents) or 
pseudo documents.

Document fraud continues to be a key enabler for the facilitation 
of illegal immigration. Enhanced surveillance at the EU’s external 
border and improved security features for identity documents 
will continue to drive the demand for fraudulent documents. 

Fraudulent documents are multi-purpose criminal tools and each 
document can be used repeatedly to support different criminal 
activities. Identity documents are in high demand and they are 
the most commonly traded type of fraudulent document. 35% of 
the documents reported to Europol were identity cards, followed 
by passports (31%), driving licences (15%) and residence permits 
(7%).14 Most reported misused identity cards were of Romanian, 
Greek and Italian origin and the most misused reported 
passports were Italian, Greek and Israeli. Most documents are 
counterfeit or forged, while misused genuine documents have 
been reported with a smaller incidence.15

As an information hub, the EMSC received in 2020 several 
contributions on operations relating to document fraud. On 
average, one fourth of the contributions addressed to the 
Analysis Project Migrant Smuggling have a document fraud 
component. The intelligence picture reveals the following 
developments and variations in the criminal landscape:

•  Abuse of labour provisions: criminal groups often supply 
workers with counterfeit Romanian and Bulgarian identity 
cards, with construction and renovation companies often 
involved in the criminal scheme.

•  Sham marriage networks facilitate illegal immigration into 

the EU by setting up marriages of convenience between third-
country nationals and EU nationals. 

•  Over recent years, Germany and other EU destination 

countries have increasingly detected the use of fraudulently 
obtained visas for entry into the Schengen area. The general 
modus operandi shows that the issuance of Schengen visas 
is based on forged breeder documents.

DOCUMENT FRAUD/

VISA FRAUD

20

Europol’s European Migrant Smuggling Centre5th Annual Report•  Europol has recorder several cases linked to the fraudulent 

use of genuine identity or travel documents. 89% concern the 
use of look-alike documents, in which genuine documents 
are used by someone else than the legitimate owner, based 
on physical resemblance. These are mostly lost or stolen 
documents that end up in the hands of criminal networks.  

•  Criminal networks produce false documents in fully equipped 
print shops and ship them via courier companies. In 2020, 
EMSC supported the operational activities of MS, targeting 
and dismantling four print shops in which hundreds of 
travel and identification documents were produced for the 
facilitation of migrant smuggling activities.  

•  Fraudulent documents are traded online in an increasing 

number. A number of messages received by the EMSC are 
linked to social media and instant communication platforms, 
surface or dark web sites used by criminals to advertise and 
trade a wide range of documents, allowing forgers and sellers 
to receive orders directly from potential customers. 

Key locations for the production and/or distribution of identity 
documents are closely related to hubs for migrant smuggling. 
Many criminal networks active in document fraud operate from 
there, providing documents to migrants and sending documents 
via parcel services or couriers. Similarly, criminals use parcel 
services to ship stolen, forged and counterfeit documents to 
migrant smugglers and/or directly to irregular migrants in both 
transit countries and EU destination countries. Social media 
platforms and encrypted messenger apps are widely used to 
promote, trade and order fraudulent documents.

Pic. 5. Documents and devices seized during an action day. Source: French authorities

21

Europol’s  European Migrant Smuggling Centre 5th Annual ReportCrime Priority:  
Trafficking in  
human beings

Criminals abuse their victims for forced begging, forced 
criminality, trafficking of organs and tissues and, at times, 
to obtain financial and social benefits using their identities. 
Female victims are trafficked to participate in illegal surrogacy 
programmes, selling their new-borns, concluding sham 
marriages and as victims of domestic slavery. As with other 
types of THB, the recruitment of victims increasingly takes place 
online. Victims are lured with false job offers, advertisements to 
marry strangers and offers to purchase babies or organs. Most 
trafficked victims are homeless, suffer from mental and physical 
disabilities, are single parents with children or are elderly. 

Child trafficking 

Child trafficking is a heinous crime targeting a particularly 
vulnerable section of society. The trafficking and exploitation of 
underage victims occurs across the EU and targets both EU and 
non-EU victims. Criminals traffic children for various types of 
exploitation. Female victims face sexual exploitation and forced 
marriage to adult men. Traffickers exploit children as domestic 
servants, or force them to beg, pickpocket, shoplift or sell 
stolen commodities. Children are also trafficked through illegal 
adoption schemes. 

FORCED 

CRIMINALITY AND 

OTHER FORMS OF 

EXPLOITATION 

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Europol’s European Migrant Smuggling Centre5th Annual Report 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Criminal networks comprised of both EU and non-EU nationals are involved in child 

trafficking in the EU and can vary in type and aim:

Criminal networks 
sexually exploiting both 
adults and minors;

Family clans abusing their 
children, or children of other 
families, and forcing them 
into begging, criminality 
and sexual abuse;

Criminal groups which are 
mainly involved in other 
criminal activities and make 
use of vulnerable children, 
often of non-EU origin, to 
perpetrate crimes.

Illegal adoption and surrogate motherhood 

Different EU countries have reported cases of exploitation of 
pregnant women and the subsequent sale of new-born babies. 
The modus operandi in general foresees the recruitment of 
women to act as surrogate mothers, sometimes via the internet. 
The women are then medically treated for increased fertility 
and receive in-vitro fertilisation in specialised clinics. Towards 
the end of the pregnancy, they are brought into the EU or to 
another EU country for childbirth and registration of the child. 
The children are then either sold with fraudulent documentation 
for illegal adoption, or the fatherhood is claimed fraudulently at 
registration of the new-borns, and the supposed fathers take the 

new-borns with them to yet another country.

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Europol’s  European Migrant Smuggling Centre 5th Annual Report 
During the first semester of 2020, there was a significant 
increase of contributions to Europol regarding cases of sexual 
exploitation involving suspects and potential female victims 
of THB from South America (mainly from Colombia, Brazil, 
Venezuela, Paraguay and Peru). 

A common factor witnessed in these cases is that victims often 
work in hidden prostitution circles and are accommodated in 
rented apartments, making it more difficult for law enforcement 
agencies to detect and protect potential victims.

In addition, the conditions for sexual workers in this underground 
prostitution business are often outside any regulatory control, as 
they are exposed to serious abuse and health risks.

Nigerian criminal networks are largely active in THB for 
the prostitution market in Europe, posing a great challenge 
to EU law enforcement agencies since Nigerian networks 
have achieved significant influence in EU organised crime 
by regular cooperation with local criminal groups. Besides 
THB, Nigerian Confraternities are known to be active in other 
criminal businesses in the EU, such as drug trafficking, fraud, 
money laundering, migrant smuggling, corruption and currency 
counterfeiting.

Europol has been supporting several priority investigations 
involving a wider range of destination and transit countries used 

by Nigerian human traffickers.

The use of digital solution and of the online environment has 
influenced the traditional structure and the division of tasks 
within trafficking networks. Criminals known to be exploiting 
their victims through brothels, street or window prostitution, 
have shifted to online advertisement and extensive use of the 
internet and social media, for both recruitment and exploitation 
purposes. The online environment is perceived as more secure 
for clients, as well as for criminals. Skype, Viber, WhatsApp, 
Snapchat, WeChat, as well as Telegram are particularly sought 
after as they allow encrypted communication. They are widely 
used for communication among criminals, but also to arrange 

NATIONALS OF 

SOUTH-AMERICAN 

ORIGIN AS 

POTENTIAL VICTIMS 

OF TRAFFICKING

NIGERIAN 

CONFRATERNITIES

CRIME IN A DIGITAL 

ENVIRONMENT

24

Europol’s European Migrant Smuggling Centre5th Annual Reportappointments with clients – usually following the first contact 
established on the internet, and to exchange information 
with victims (regarding the arrival of customers, amount of 
earnings, locations, etc.).

People are spending more time on the internet throughout 
the day, using social media and applications to connect with 
each other and to look for opportunities online, both in terms 
of relationships or employment. Social media has become a 
powerful tool for criminal networks involved in THB and there 
is evidence that it is used as a virtual catalogue for traffickers 
to identify potential victims. An increase was recorded in 
activities related to the online distribution of child abuse 
material and the conversations of potential offenders around 
the increased accessibility and vulnerability of children online 
due to isolation, reduced supervision and greater online 
exposure.

With the use of the internet and social media, traffickers 
can model their recruitment strategy upon the behavioural 
traits of their victims. Two main ways of finding victims were 
identified: active recruitment and the passive recruitment.

Active recruitment resembles the ‘hook & line fishing’ 
technique: criminals produce false job advertisements (used 
as bait) to trigger the interest of potential victims. Trusted job 
portals and online marketplaces on well-known social media 
platforms are used, as they are commonly considered by 
victims to be safe places to look for jobs.

Passive recruitment takes the form of ‘net fishing’: criminal 
recruiters roam the internet and social media and reply to 
announcements posted by international job seekers. After a 
short conversation, recruiters usually ask potential victims for 
a fee in order to secure their spot abroad and start organising 
their travel to the country of destination. In some cases, 
trafficked victims arrive at the final location and discover that 
there is no actual job, they have been defrauded and their 
contact has disappeared.

25

Europol’s  European Migrant Smuggling Centre 5th Annual ReportWAY FORWARD

Expected 
challenges 

Migrant smuggling and trafficking in human 
beings have been highlighted by the SOCTA 
2021 as two of the key priority areas in the 
coming years to be further tackled via joint 
EU efforts. This outcome was based on the 
assessment of past experience and expected 
evolution for the future, and thus highlights 
the need to continue our efforts in ensuring 
a prompt and cohesive response, particularly 
in the light of the impact of COVID-19 on 
our society, our capabilities and on criminal 
strategies.

Developments in the spread of COVID-19 and 
in the speed of vaccination programmes in 
different countries will constitute strong pull 
factors for people willing to migrate from 
countries with less developed health systems. 
The impact of COVID-19 on labour markets in 
certain countries will also create additional 
motivation for economic migrants. The sharp 
increase in unemployment rates already 
seen in many parts of the world is likely to 
increase cross-border trafficking in persons 
from countries experiencing the fastest and 
longest-lasting drops in employment. 

The global pandemic has inevitably and  
significantly impacted trafficking in human 
beings. In sexual exploitation, direct contact 
between traffickers, victims and clients will 
most probably continue to decrease, with 
more operations carried out in the online 
environment, while the economic effects of 
the pandemic, which are already visible, will 
probably drive increased demand in labour 
exploitation. 

Experience has shown that in times of crisis, 
organised criminal groups react quickly, 
adapt and thrive. Furthermore, movement 
restrictions and enhanced controls at entry 
points have led smugglers to revert to more 
dangerous routes in harsher conditions, where 
migrants are exposed to violence, abuse 
and the risk of contracting the new virus. 
Smugglers continue to seize the opportunities 
created by people’s need to escape poverty, 
lack of employment, natural disasters, 
conflict or persecution, in the absence or 
unavailability of legal migration mechanisms. 

Bottlenecks and migrants stranded on route 
may trigger new massive and coordinated 

26

Europol’s European Migrant Smuggling Centre5th Annual Report 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
marches towards the EU. Such cases have 
already happened in Greece, were planned in 
Serbia and have been seen in South America. 
For example, the current situation in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, where COVID-19 cases 
have been on the rise in reception facilities, is 
triggering constant smuggling opportunities 
with a subsequent impact on neighbouring 
countries. 

From an operational perspective, as long 
as the pandemic persists, on-the-spot 
activities from law enforcement officers will 
be subject to restrictions and limitations, 
to preserve the health of public servants. 
Similarly, Europol’s deployments and 
operational activities on the ground will also 
be subject to regulations and restrictions in 
the host countries. 

Criminals are increasingly networked, relying 
more and more on external service providers 
and experts to support their operations. 
Both migrant smuggling and trafficking 
in human beings vastly rely on the online 
environment and on widely available digital 
solutions to advertise and orchestrate crime 
from a distance. The COVID-19 pandemic has 
further boosted the shift of criminal activities 
into the digital realm, with criminals not 
only surviving but also prospering in such 
conditions. It is thus expected that new ways 
of capitalising on these opportunities will be 
found, posing a continuous challenge to law 
enforcement agencies in terms of prevention, 
detection and deterrence. 

27

Europol’s  European Migrant Smuggling Centre 5th Annual ReportEuropol’s 
reaction

In the face of the challenges triggered by the 
COVID-19 pandemic, Europol will continue 
to adapt and enforce a flexible and agile 
way to facilitate information exchange and 
operational support for Member States and 
its partners.

In order to direct EU investigations and 
address the most significant threats 
emerging from large-scale migrant 
smuggling, prioritisation processes must 
target high-risk organised networks active 
across the EU and the disruption of criminal 
business models – especially those that 
foster collaboration between several 
organised crime groups or networks.

Our strategy to tackle criminal networks 
involved in migrant smuggling and trafficking 
in human beings focuses on improved 
investigations into high-risk actors, 
corruption, legal business structure and 
financial processes accompanying crime, 
tackling crime enablers, and optimising law 
enforcement responses, by strengthening 
the cooperation framework with MS, third 
countries, international organisations and the 
private sector.

Such prioritisation may be supported and 
driven, among others, by a high-value target 
selection process established by the Member 
States with the support of Europol. An 
integral part of investigations 
should be asset-tracing and financial 
investigations leading to the effective 
confiscation of proceeds of these crimes, in 
the framework of a coherent action against 
parallel supporting activities, such as 
document fraud. Furthermore, developing 
a set of instruments to tackle the impact of 
digitalisation and online markets exploited by 
criminals will make it possible to bridge the 
gap between law enforcement intervention 
and developments in the criminal 
environment. 

Our joint reaction must additionally rely 
on ensuring a structured coordination and 
cooperation approach, not only in operational 
activities and investigations between 
Member States, Europol and its operational 
partners, relevant third countries and private 
stakeholders, but also on matters related 
to information exchange among all relevant 
law enforcement actors.

28

Europol’s European Migrant Smuggling Centre5th Annual ReportE NDNOTES 

1  Europol, ‘47 arrests for smuggling Moroccan citizens to the EU’, 13 January 2020, https://www.europol.europa.eu/
newsroom/news/47-arrests-for-smuggling-moroccan-citizens-to-eu

2  Europol, ‘23 arrests in France and the Netherlands as Iraqi-Kurdish smuggling network busted’, 23 January 2020, https://
www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/23-arrests-in-france-and-netherlands-iraqi-kurdish-smuggling-network-busted

3  Europol, ‘19 arrests for smuggling irregular migrants from Morocco to the Spanish Canary Islands’, 17 December 2020, 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/19-arrests-for-smuggling-irregular-migrants-morocco-to-spanish-canary-
islands

4  Europol, ‘26 arrested for smuggling irregular migrants through Belgium and France’, 27 May 2020, https://www.europol.
europa.eu/newsroom/news/26-arrested-for-smuggling-irregular-migrants-through-belgium-and-france, May 2020

5  Europol, ‘Web-enabled sexual exploitation gang taken down by French police’, 20 October 2020, https://www.europol.
europa.eu/newsroom/news/web-enabled-sexual-exploitation-gang-taken-down-french-police

6  Europol, ‘Fake love: devious men luring young women into prostitution busted in Spain and Romania’, 11 March 2020, 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/fake-love-devious-men-luring-young-women-prostitution-busted-in-spain-
and-romania

7  Europol information.

8  Europol, ‘Migrant smuggling: the use of small boats to cross the English channel’, 14 January 2021, https://www.europol.
europa.eu/migrant-smuggling-use-of-small-boats-to-cross-english-channel-0

9  JOT MARE was established on March 2015 to deliver an intelligence-led response to the organised sea smuggling 
phenomenon in which large capacity maritime vessels were used and was extended to any other sea asset used.

10  http://www.interior.gob.es/prensa/balances-e-informes/

11  Europol information.

12  Applications installed on mobile phones allowing the creation of temporary/virtual numbers that are not associated with 
the mobile phone itself. A so-called burner phone app doesn’t reveal the name on caller ID and can be erased at any time. 

13  Europol, 2020, ‘The challenges of countering human trafficking in the digital era’ , [News article, 18 October 2020] 
accessible at https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/challenges-of-countering-human-trafficking-in-digital-
era 

14  Europol data.

15  A counterfeit document is an unauthorised reproduction of an authentic/original document, entirely produced by a 
fraudster. A forged document is an unauthorised alteration of an authentic/original document lawfully issued by different 
means (photo substitution, data alteration, page substitution…)

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Europol’s European Migrant Smuggling Centre5th Annual Report