JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL State of play of EU-Turkey political, economic and trade relations
Date: 2021-03-22
Institutions: European Commission, Secretariat-General
Subjects: EU relations, Türkiye, bilateral relations, cooperation policy, foreign policy, political situation, regional security, trade relations

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION HIGH REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SECURITY POLICY Brussels, 22.3.2021  JOIN(2021) 8 final/2  JOIN(2021) 8 final of 20.3.2021 downgraded on 22.3.2021. JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL State of play of EU-Turkey political, economic and trade relations  
 
 
1. 

INTRODUCTION  

The December 2020 European Council1 noted that Turkey has engaged in unilateral actions 
and  provocations  and  escalated  its  rhetoric  against  the  European  Union,  its  Member  States 
and  European  leaders.  It  reaffirmed  that  the  European  Union  has  a  strategic  interest  in  the 
development of a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship with Turkey. It underlined 
that the offer of a positive EU-Turkey agenda remains on the table, provided Turkey shows 
readiness  to  promote  a  genuine  partnership  with  the  Union  and  its  Member  States  and  to 
resolve differences through dialogue and in accordance with international law. It also stressed 
that  the  European  Union  remains  committed  to  defending  its  interests  and  those  of  its 
Member States as well as to upholding regional stability. 

In this regard, the European Council invited the High Representative and the Commission to 
submit a report on the state of play of EU-Turkey political, economic and trade relations and 
on instruments and options on how to proceed, including on the extension of the scope of the 
Council  Decision  of  11  November  20192,  for  consideration  at  the  latest  at  the  March  2021 
European  Council.  The  following  Joint  Communication  responds  to  this  invitation.  It  does 
not  replace  or  prejudge  the  next  Commission  enlargement  package  including  the  country 
report on Turkey. 

II. 

POLITICAL RELATIONS 

The  political  context  in  EU-Turkey  relations  has  progressively  deteriorated  over  the  past 
years,  bringing  to  a  virtual  halt  the  various  instruments  and  processes  for  bilateral 
engagement  and  cooperation.  This  has  been  mostly  due  to  Turkish  actions  in  the  Eastern 
Mediterranean,  directly  challenging  the  rights  of  the  Republic  of  Cyprus  in  its  maritime 
zones,  and  a  sharp  increase  of  Turkey’s  provocative  actions  against  Greece;  the  failure  to 
advance in the Cyprus settlement process, coupled with Turkey’s related threatening actions 
and  disparaging  rhetoric;  and  assertive  Turkish  interventions  in  most  of  the  surrounding 
regional conflicts, in ways that often were at odds with broader EU interests. Moreover, the 
further deteriorating domestic situation in Turkey, notably in the area of fundamental rights 
and  economic  governance,  has  had  clear  negative  effects  on  Turkey’s  relations  with  EU 
Member States and on the bilateral EU-Turkey agenda.   

1.   Eastern Mediterranean 

Over the recent years, tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean increased. They reached a peak 
at the end of February 2020, when Turkey, in contradiction with the March 2016 EU-Turkey 
Statement, actively encouraged migrants and refugees to force their way into the EU. This led 
to  situations  of  violence  at  Greek  land  and  maritime  borders.  A  major  crisis  was  averted 
following  strong  diplomatic  action,  including  the  visit  to  Ankara  of  the  President  of  the 
European Council and the High Representative/Vice-President and a joint visit to the Greek 
border by the Presidents of the European Parliament, the European Council and the European 
Commission.  This  was  followed  by  a  return  visit  to  Brussels  of  President  Erdogan  in  early 
March.  

1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/47296/1011-12-20-euco-conclusions-en.pdf 
2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32019D1894&from=GA 

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Throughout  the  year,  Turkish  authorities  continued  to  pursue  unauthorised  deployments  of 
drilling or exploratory vessels in the maritime zones of the Republic of Cyprus.  

Turkey’s  disputing  Greece  over  maritime  boundaries  in  the  Aegean  and  the  Eastern 
Mediterranean remained a major irritant. In August and October, Turkey deployed a seismic 
research vessel near the Greek island of Kastellorizo, escalating tensions close to a possible 
clash  between  the  two  NATO  allies.  These  actions  were  accompanied  by  abundant 
antagonistic rhetoric challenging the rights of both the Republic of Cyprus and Greece. The 
Turkish  Navy  accompanied  the  drilling  ships  during  their  operations.  The  actions  at  sea 
comprised military manoeuvres and led to incidents with Member States.   

As  regards  Greece,  the  signing  of  a  bilateral  Memorandum  of  Understanding  on  the 
delimitation  of  maritime  jurisdiction  areas  between  Turkey  and  the  National  Accord 
Government  of  Libya  in  November  2019  further  increased  tensions.  The  Memorandum 
ignored  the  rights  of  Greece’s  islands  in  the  areas  concerned.  There  was  a  further  sharp 
increase  in  other  provocative  actions  by  Turkey  towards  Greece,  in  particular  Turkish 
overflights  of  Greek 
inhabited  areas,  as  well  as  threatening  naval  exercises  and 
accompanying  rhetoric  throughout  the  year.  While  Greek-Turkish  maritime  issues  have 
existed for a long time, dialogue aimed at addressing them was interrupted in 2016 and 2020 
was  a  year  of  constant  flare-ups  and  sustained  tension,  which  led  NATO  to  pursue  de-
confliction talks between Greece and Turkey.  

The 2020 December European Council, while condemning again Turkish provocative actions 
during the past period, underlined simultaneously the relevance of EU-Turkey relations and 
offered a perspective of reengagement should Turkey cease pursuing an antagonistic path. It 
also indicated that other options would be considered, if this was not the case.  

The  situation  began  to  change  towards  year-end.  Turkey  broadly  welcomed  the  December 
European Council conclusions and started sending signals on the importance attached to the 
relationship  with  the  European  Union  and  its  Member  States.  To  date,  conflictual 
deployments of Turkish  vessels have ceased, messages of reengagement  have  continued. A 
positive momentum for dialogue and negotiations has been created and the first steps for the 
two major negotiation processes have been re-initiated: the relaunching of exploratory talks 
on maritime issues between Greece and Turkey on 25 January and the dialogue on a relaunch 
of the Cyprus settlement, for which informal talks have now been scheduled (27-29 April in 
Geneva).  

The delimitation of the continental shelf and Exclusive Economic Zones should be addressed 
through  dialogue  and  negotiations  in  good  faith,  in  accordance  with  international  law, 
including the UNCLOS, having recourse, if necessary, to the International Court of Justice. 
In  the  above  context,  unequivocal  commitment  to  good  neighbourly  relations  and  to  the 
peaceful settlement of disputes remains essential.  

The  High  Representative  has  undertaken  continuous  efforts  to  create  a  conducive 
environment for sustainable de-escalation in the region. The withdrawal of Turkey’s seismic 
exploration  vessel  “Oruç Reis”  allowed  for  the  resumption  of  Greek-Turkish  direct 
exploratory talks on 25 January 2021. The last round of talks (62nd) took place on 16 March 
2021 in Athens, back to back with political consultations (17 March) at high officials’ level. 
It  is  necessary  to  see  a  credible  pattern  in  Turkey’s  stance  in  the  Eastern  Mediterranean, 
  to  prove  that  the  expressed  intentions  are  genuine,  and  to  ensure  that 
without 

setbacks,

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broader de-escalation in the region is sustained. Recent minor incidents remind us that the de-
escalation is still tenuous and needs to be consolidated. 

2.   Cyprus issue 

The Cyprus settlement issue is a core element of Turkey’s strong disagreements with the EU 
in  the  Eastern  Mediterranean.  During  2020,  hope  for  progress  on  the  Cyprus  settlement 
process had to be put on hold until after the elections  of the Turkish Cypriot community in 
October-November 2020. The electoral context led to an increase in polarising rhetoric and 
provocations, prompting strong reaction from  the EU as  reflected in  Council and European 
Council conclusions. 

Since the start of his mandate, and in particular during his visits to Cyprus in June 2020 and 
March  2021,  the  High  Representative/Vice-President  has  expressed  his  full  support  for  the 
United Nations Secretary-General  (UNSG) aiming  at  the speedy  resumption of the  Cyprus 
settlement talks. The UNSG office’s efforts continued unabated despite the unilateral actions 
in the fenced area of Varosha as well as repetitive statements directly questioning the agreed 
basis  for  the  solution  to  the  Cyprus  problem  as  provided  by  the  relevant  United  Nations 
Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR), the latest of which was adopted on 29 January 2021 
(UNSCR  2561).  Both  the  EU  and  the  UN  asked  Turkey  to  reverse  its  unilateral  action  in 
Varosha in November 2020 (opening of the fenced area of the beach). 

Since  the  Crans  Montana  peace  talks  of  2017,  the  UN  continued  to  engage  ‘with  the 
European Union in its capacity as an observer to the Conference on Cyprus’ and the EU kept 
in  very close contact  with  the representatives of the 5+1 format. The EU is  committed to  a 
fair,  comprehensive  and  viable  settlement  of  the  Cyprus  problem,  including  its  external 
aspects, within the UN framework and in accordance with the relevant UN Security Council 
Resolutions, in line with the principles on which the EU is founded. Talks between the two 
communities, eventually leading to an agreement, are essential for decreasing tensions in the 
Eastern Mediterranean. A number of proposals for confidence building measures have been 
exchanged among the parties including on the sharing of revenues from the exploitation of 
hydrocarbons, and the EU continues to stand ready to facilitate the necessary technical work 
in this regard. Positive outcomes related to practical and vital issues for the Turkish Cypriot 
community  –  such  as  facilitation  of  export  of  Haloumi/Helim  cheese  and  distribution  of 
COVID-19  vaccines  –  could  lead  to  an  environment  conducive  to  more  trust3.  The  EU’s 
engagement and support to the Cyprus issue is sine qua non for easing tensions in the region. 
It is clear how Turkey’s non-recognition of the Republic of Cyprus continues to lead to the 
blockage of different paths of cooperation. Normalisation of EU-Turkey relations will remain 
extremely challenging in the absence of a solution to the Cyprus issue.  

3.  Eastern Mediterranean Conference 

The European Council also tasked the High Representative/Vice President with organising a 
multilateral regional conference, involving Turkey, as part of a broader confidence building 
measure.  The  HRVP  continued  the  preparatory  work  for  a  Eastern  Mediterranean 

3 The Commission has launched the adoption of the legal instruments for the registration of Halloumi/Hellim as a Protected 
Designation of Origin, allowing Halloumi/Hellim produced in the Turkish Cypriot community to be traded across the Green 
Line,  provided  that  the  cheese  fulfils  the  relevant  EU  acquis.   The  decisions  will  stimulate  improvements  in  health  and 
sanitary standards in the Turkish Cypriot community, bring substantial economic benefits to both communities, and foster 
closer co-operation and confidence building between them.  

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Conference, through initial talks to explore its modalities (scope, participation, process and 
timeline)  and  potential  topics  whilst  not  pre-judging  any  decision  by  the  EU  on  the 
opportunity to hold or not hold the conference. All is still to be agreed. Clear reactions from 
other  potential  participants  show  that,  unless  circumstances  in  the  region  change 
substantially, it is unlikely such a Conference could be held in the short term.  

4.   The broader region 

Turkey’s increasingly assertive foreign policy collided with EU priorities under the Common 
Foreign  and  Security  Policy  (CFSP).  While  the  institutional  framework  enabling  Turkey's 
participation in CFSP and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is in place, in 
2020  Turkey  recorded  a  very  low  alignment  rate  of  around  11%.  Turkey  continued  not  to 
align  with  most  Council  decisions  (restrictive  measures),  including  related  to  Russia, 
Venezuela, Syria and Libya, and with EU declarations such as on Nagorno-Karabakh.  

The  last  EU-Turkey  high-level  political  dialogue  including  on  CFSP/CSDP  took  place  in 
Ankara  in  November  2018  and  the  last  dialogue  at  Political  Director’s  level  in  September 
2019. Many Member States have strong bilateral ties with Turkey on foreign policy, security 
and defence. In light of Turkey’s increasingly active and assertive foreign policy, substantial 
joint  work  has  to  be  sustained  to  defuse  further  tensions  and  introduce  confidence-building 
measures  in  the  broader  region.  Throughout  January  -  March  2021,  the  EU  and  Turkey 
initiated a diplomatic dialogue with a view of reaching a deeper understanding of respective 
interests and of possible mutually benefitting and sustainable solutions, in particular for two 
theatres where direct EU interests are at stake in Libya and in Syria. 

It  is  clear  that  since  Turkey’s  active  military  intervention  in  Syria  and  Libya,  Turkey  has 
pursued  its  own  foreign  policy  without  taking  into  account  the  broader  interests  of  the 
European Union, including the EU’s security concerns.  

Turkey’s military support in Libya, including through deployment of foreign fighters on the 
ground,  and  its  persistent  criticism  of  and  lack  of  cooperation  with  Operation  IRINI,  are 
detrimental to the EU’s effective contribution to the UN arms embargo implementation, and 
have  led  to  conflicting  approaches  in  Libya.  Following  the  formation  of  a  new,  inclusive 
government, which received the confidence of the House of Representative on 10 March and 
was  sworn  in  on  15  March  2021,  it  is  important  to  engage  with  the  new  authorities  and 
constructively supports the next steps. This includes, in particular, a swift transfer of power to 
the new authorities, the reunification of the institutions, the preparation of elections planned 
to  be  held  on  24  December  2021,  the  full  implementation  of  the  October  2020  Ceasefire 
agreement  and  a  genuine  national  reconciliation  process.  As  an  influential  actor  in  Libya, 
Turkey’s cooperation with the UN and the other regional and international players to move 
forward will be essential on all strands of this challenging process,  and in  particular on the 
political process, economy and security. 

As  a  direct  neighbour  Turkey  wants  to  see  a  stable  and  prosperous  Syria,  an  objective  it 
shares  with  the  EU.  Maintaining  Syria’s  territorial  integrity  and  promoting  a  peaceful 
resolution of the conflict through the UN led political process is paramount.  

The EU and Turkey agree on the need to accelerate the work of the Constitutional Committee 
and  other  elements  of  UNSCR  2254,  such  as  a  release  of  detainees  and  efforts  to  promote 
accountability for war crimes in Syria. The EU encourages Turkey to ensure that the Syrian 

4 

 
 
opposition  SNC  is  inclusive.  Turkey  made  significant  efforts  to  uphold  the  ceasefire  in 
northwest  Syria  (Idlib)  and  to  facilitate  large-scale  cross-border  humanitarian  aid  through 
Turkey to northwest Syria. It continues to host at least 3.6 million refugees from Syria. 

However, Turkey’s military actions, including through Turkish-backed militias, in Northern 
Syria, especially in the north east, have led to large-scale displacements and reports of human 
rights  abuses  against  the  civilian  population. Access  for  international  aid  organisations 
remains restricted while the Turkish Red Crescent continues to play a dominant role.  

Turkey’s  resettlement  of  Syrian  refugees  in  formerly  Kurdish  areas  remains  an  issue.  Any 
return of refugees to the country needs to be safe, voluntary and dignified, and carried out in 
consultation with, and according to the parameters and principles laid down by UNHCR. 

Turkey  is  also  active  militarily  in  northern  Iraq,  carrying  out  strikes  against  Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party (PKK).  

While  the  EU  considers  the  PKK  a  terrorist  organisation,  countries  in  the  region  are 
encouraged  to  coordinate  bilaterally  anti-terrorist  activities,  as  well  as  to  act  proportionally 
and in full respect of the rule of law. 

Turkey’s  most  recent  support  for  military  actions  in  the  Caucasus  during  the  Nagorno 
Karabakh  related  hostilities  have  led  to  further  questioning  of  Turkey’s  regional  role..  It 
departed  from  promoting  a  peaceful  settlement  and  supported  Azerbaijan’s  push  for  a 
military solution. The border between Turkey and Armenia has been closed since April 1993. 
The EU encourages Turkey to open its border with Armenia.  

In  December  2020,  Turkey  proposed  a  regional  cooperation  group  that  would  include 
Armenia,  Azerbaijan, Georgia,  Iran, Russia and  Turkey. The EU continues to  fully support 
the  efforts  of  the  international  format  of  the  OSCE  Minsk  Group  led  by  its  Co-Chairs  and 
expects Turkey to align with the EU in this regard. 

5.  Cooperation on Common Security and Defence Policy and Counter Terrorism  

Turkey is a key player in the area of security and defence. However, the non-recognition of 
the  Republic  of  Cyprus,  Turkey’s  broad  interpretation  of  the  agreed  framework  of  2003 
(Berlin  Plus  arrangements)  and  its  narrow  interpretation  of  the  EU-NATO  cooperation 
framework  create  practical  and  operational  difficulties,  including  to  further  developing  a 
genuine EU-NATO organisation-to-organisation relationship. Turkey continues to request to 
be  involved  in  EU  defence  initiatives  (Permanent  Structured  Cooperation  (PESCO), 
European Defence Fund (EDF). On counter-terrorism, bilateral cooperation between Turkey 
and EU Member States security services is working well. However, in autumn 2019, Turkey 
requested  to  postpone  the  regular  counter-terrorism  dialogue  with  the  EU  following  the 
condemnation  of  its  military  operation  in  North-East  Syria  and  adoption  of  framework  for 
restrictive measures related to the Eastern Mediterranean.  

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III. BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EU AND TURKEY 

1. Association Agreement 

The  Association  Agreement  of  1963  is  the  overarching  legal  framework  structuring  EU-
Turkey  relations.  It  aims  to  promote  the  strengthening  of  trade  and  economic  relations 
between the EU and Turkey, and to establish progressively a customs union.  

While having succeeded in laying a firm basis for our bilateral relationship, with strong and 
growing political, economic and societal exchanges, the Association Agreement encountered 
a  number  of  serious  issues  over  the  years.  The  unresolved  Cyprus  issue  has  had  an  impact 
ever  since  the  Republic  of  Cyprus’s  accession  to  the  EU  in  2004.  Turkey  decided  in  July 
2005  not  to  implement  the  Additional  Protocol  to  the  Association  Agreement  extending  its 
Customs Union with the EU towards the Republic of Cyprus. This unilateral decision led to 
the  2006  Council  decision  blocking  the  opening  of  eight  chapters  in  the  accession 
negotiations  and  closing  of  all  chapters,  followed  by  bilateral  blocking  of  six  negotiating 
chapters by the Republic of Cyprus in 2009. Turkey does not allow direct trade between the 
Republic of Cyprus and Turkey, direct air and maritime connections, or any other direct link.  

Furthermore,  Turkey  is  blocking  the  Republic  of  Cyprus’  accession  to  several  international 
organisations, including the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. The 
absence  of  the  recognition  of  Cyprus  by  Turkey  also  prevents  the  direct  exchange  of 
information  with  Turkey (e.g. in the  context  of judicial cooperation or the fight  against tax 
avoidance) and the smooth functioning of the Customs Union. 

In light of the unauthorised drilling activities of Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean, in July 
2019 the Council decided not to hold for the time being the EU-Turkey Association Council. 
Preparatory Association Committees, chaired at senior officials’ level, have not taken place 
either. Technical cooperation within eight sectoral sub-committees continues. 

2. Accession negotiations, criteria and pre-accession aid 

Turkey  has  been  a  candidate  country  since  1999.  Accession  negotiations  were  opened  in 
2005. 16 chapters have been opened so far out  of 35 (the last one in 2016), one of them is 
closed.  In  light  of  the  continued,  serious  backsliding  on  core  EU  principles  and  values,  the 
Council noted in June 2018 and June 2019 that Turkey had been moving further away from 
the European Union and therefore Turkey's accession negotiations had “effectively come to a 
standstill and no further chapters can be considered for opening or closing.”  

The  underlying  facts  leading  to  this  assessment  still  hold.  Major  backsliding  on  reforms 
continues in the key areas of the accession process. Especially following the attempted coup 
in 2016, the rule of law, respect of human rights and the independence of the judiciary have 
continuously  deteriorated,  amidst  a  growing  centralisation  of  power.  This  trend  has  further 
accelerated following the entry into force of a new presidential system in 2018. Many of the 
checks and balances  of a democratic system are significantly  affected. The government  has 
reshaped  state  and  public  institutions,  undermining  their  independence.  The  role  of 
Parliament was weakened considerably.  

In  addition,  59  out  of  the  65  democratically  elected  mayors  from  the  pro-Kurdish  Peoples’ 
Democratic Party (HDP) were removed and replaced by government-appointed trustees. On 

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17 March, the Prosecutor of the Court of Cassation formally requested the dissolution of the 
HDP. 

Most  legislation  is  passed  in  urgency  procedures  without  proper  involvement  and 
consultation  of  stakeholders.  The  independence  of  regulatory  authorities  has  been 
compromised by the introduction of the Presidential system. 

Political  pressure  on  judges  and  prosecutors  has  a  significant  negative  effect  on  the 
independence  of  the  judiciary.  The  authorities  detain,  prosecute  and  convict  individuals 
including journalists, students, lawyers, opposition politicians and activists mostly on overly 
broad  terrorism-related  charges.  The  Turkish  authorities  also  refuse  to  implement  the 
European  Court  of  Human  Rights’  final  rulings,  including  those  related  to  the  release  of 
Osman  Kavala  and  Selahattin  Demirtas,  in  spite  of  resolutions  adopted  by  the  Council  of 
Europe Committee of Ministers. A new action plan for human rights was adopted by Turkey 
on  2  March.  However,  it  does  not  address  key  shortcomings  identified  regarding  human 
rights, the independence of the judiciary and the rule of law situation overall. 

Bilateral  relations  with  several  EU  Member  States  remain  tense,  also  due  to  at  times 
aggressive  rhetoric  from  Turkish  authorities  and  attempts  to  interfere  with  internal  policy 
decisions. 

An envelope of almost  EUR 4.5 billion was originally allocated for the Turkey programme 
under the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance for 2014-2020. Starting from 2017, the 
allocation was progressively reduced, given low absorption and Turkey’s serious backsliding 
in  the areas  of rule of law, fundamental  rights  and public administration reform, as well as 
illegal  drilling  activities  in  the  Eastern  Mediterranean.  Overall,  this  reduction  amounted  to 
thirty  percent  of  the  amount  originally  envisaged  in  2014.  Starting  from  2017,  the 
Commission  refocused  EU  financial  support  to  sectors  that  reflect  core  EU  principles  and 
priorities,  such  as  democracy  and  rule  of  law,  support  to  civil  society  (EUR  34  million  in 
2020) and human rights, people to people exchanges and other areas of EU interests (energy, 
climate  change,  migration).  The  Commission  also  reduced  the  share  of  funds  directly 
managed by Turkish authorities.  

Subject to the entry into force of the legal bases  of the 2021-2027 Multi-annual Financial 
Framework, tentative programming for the years 2021 and 2022 has started under the new 
instrument  (IPA  III).  The  focus  of  this  recalibrated  assistance  will  be  on  supporting  key 
reforms and values as highlighted in the Commission’s annual reports on Turkey.  

3. Migration and the 2016 EU-Turkey Statement 

The March 2016 EU-Turkey Statement4 provides the overall framework for the EU-Turkey 
cooperation  on  migration.  The  Statement  built  on  the  29  November  2015  EU-Turkey  Joint 
Action Plan and was a result of action taken by the EU to put in place a system of effective 
migration management and avoid a humanitarian crisis. The goal was to restore a legal and 
orderly admission system, put an end to irregular migration from Turkey to the EU, prevent 
the  loss  of  life,  take  action  against  migrant  smuggling  networks,  and  improve  living 
conditions for Syrian refugees in Turkey through comprehensive cooperation between the EU 
and Turkey.  

4 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18/eu-turkey-statement/ 

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Since  the  start  of  the  implementation  of  the  EU-Turkey  Statement,  there  has  been  a 
substantial  decrease  in  the  numbers  of  irregular  crossings  from  Turkey  to  Greece5.  Even 
though  tragic  incidents  continued,  the  number  of  lives  lost  in  the  Aegean  Sea  has 
significantly decreased.  

In late February 2020, migrants were encouraged by Turkish actors to take the land route to 
Europe  through  Greece.  This  led  to  the  set-up  of  an  informal  camp  at  the  Greek-Turkish 
border, with a large number of migrants and refugees in dire conditions. In the extraordinary 
Council meetings of EU Ministers of Home Affairs on 4 March 2020, and of EU Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs on 6 March 2020, the EU reiterated the need for Turkey to abide fully by the 
EU-Turkey Statement. The Council also called on the Turkish government and all actors and 
organisations on the ground to relay the message that migrants should not be encouraged to 
attempt  illegal  crossings  by  land  or  sea,  as  well  as  to  counter  the  dissemination  of  false 
information. While the EU acknowledged the increased migratory burden and risks Turkey is 
facing on its territory and the substantial efforts it has made in hosting close to four million 
refugees,  it  strongly  rejected  Turkey  using  migratory  pressure  for  political  purposes.  Since 
then, the situation at both sea and land borders with Greece has stabilised and has remained 
calm overall. However, a shift to some of the alternative migratory routes has been observed6. 

The slow pace of returns has been an issue throughout the implementation of the Statement. 
The  Turkish  authorities  suspended  returns  under  the  Statement  in  March  2020,  citing 
COVID-19  restrictions.  Despite  repeated  requests  by  the  Greek  authorities  and  the 
Commission, the issue has not been resolved. The Commission has insisted that Turkey must 
fully stand by its commitments under the EU-Turkey Statement. On 14 January 2021, Greece 
addressed  an  official  request  for  the  readmission  of  1450  returnees  that  Turkey  did  not 
accept.   

Resettlement  to  the  EU  continues  to  outpace  the  number  of  returns  to  Turkey.  Only  2140 
irregular migrants  and asylum seekers, whose  applications have been declared inadmissible 
crossing from Turkey to the Greek islands, have been returned to Turkey, while 28300 Syrian 
refugees  have  been  resettled  from  Turkey  to  the  EU.  20  Member  States  contributed  to  this 
effort.  To maintain a steady pace of resettlements, the Commission provides funding to  the 
resettling  Member  States,  while  the  European  Asylum  Support  Office  provides  operational 
support to the process and facilitates the sharing of good practices among Member States. 

The EU-Turkey Statement envisages the activation of a Voluntary Humanitarian Admission 
Scheme,  once  irregular  crossings  have  ended  or  at  least  been  substantially  and  sustainably 
reduced.  In  December  2017,  Member  States  endorsed  the  Standard  Operating  Procedures, 
agreed with Turkey, but Member States have not yet decided to activate the scheme. 

Under  the  2016  Statement,  the  EU  mobilised  EUR  6  billion  in  assistance  to  refugees  and 
host  communities  in  Turkey.  By  end-2020,  the  operational  budget  of  this  Facility  for 
Refugees  in  Turkey  has  been  fully  committed  and  contracted  and  65%  has  already  been 

5  In  the  five  months  before  the  implementation  of  the  Statement,  on  average  3262  migrants  and  asylum  seekers  were 
crossing the Aegean Sea to the Greek islands every day. By contrast, in 2019 the average daily number of arrivals by sea 
stood at 165 and in 2020, also as a result of COVID-19 restrictions, it was down to 25. 
6 For example, irregular arrivals from Turkey to Italy increased by over 120% compared to 2019. Migratory pressure on the 
Republic of Cyprus has also increased considerably. 

8 

 
 
                                                           
 
disbursed,  in  line  with  the  respective  progress  of  projects.  This  is  a  major  European 
investment in stability.  

Facility  support  has  been  closely  coordinated  with  Member  States,  other  donors  and  the 
Turkish  authorities.  It  remains critical  for basic  needs, protection, access  to  health care  and 
education,  and  socio-economic  support.  Over  1.8  million  refugees  benefit  from  the 
Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN), and with the support of the Conditional Cash Transfer 
for Education (CCTE) nearly 670,000 refugee children are attending school.  

The  EU  has  already  lined  up  an  additional  EUR  585  million  in  humanitarian  bridge 
funding after the Facility, in order to continue some key protection and health projects and to 
ensure the continuation of the two EU flagship programmes, the ESSN and the CCTE, until 
early 2022. However, the situation of refugees in Turkey continues to deteriorate, aggravated 
by the COVID-19 pandemic and the economic downturn. Therefore,  continued EU support 
will be required over the next years, as highlighted by the December 2020 European Council 
conclusions. The Commission will put forward concrete proposals to this end shortly. Future 
EU funding shall also focus on the longer-term sustainability and the gradual transition into 
the Turkish system. 

Turkey has been repeatedly requesting an accelerated implementation of the 2016 Statement, 
in  particular  of  its  non-migration  elements:  the  quick  revitalisation  of  the  accession 
negotiations,  rapid  Customs  Union  modernisation  and  visa  liberalisation.  However,  in  the 
EU-Turkey  Statement,  all  those  elements  remain  subject  to  known  and  agreed  conditions, 
benchmarks  and  decision-making  procedures.  Turkey  has  yet  to  meet  the  respective 
conditions.  

4. Summits and high-level dialogues 

The EU and Turkey agreed to hold High Level political and sectoral Dialogues at the meeting 
of heads of state or government with Turkey in November 2015. It was also agreed to have 
regular  summits  twice  a  year  in  an  appropriate  format.  High  Level  sectoral  dialogues  were 
organised on political issues, the economy, transport and energy.  

In light of the unauthorised drilling activities of Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean, in July 
2019 the Council decided that for the time being  no meetings of the High  Level  Dialogues 
and of the EU-Turkey Association Council would be scheduled. In reaction, Turkey decided 
to  suspend  foreign  policy  geographical  dialogues  with  the  EU.  Nevertheless,  a  Political 
Directors' meeting took place in September 2019 and Turkey now expresses renewed interest 
to resume discussions with the EU on foreign policy issues. Ad hoc contacts at Presidential 
and Ministerial level continued. 

Regular high level dialogues constitute an important part of the positive agenda agreed by the 
October  2020  European  Council  to  be  launched  provided  that  Turkey  shows  readiness  to 
promote  a  genuine  partnership  with  the  Union  and  its  Member  States  and  to  resolve 
differences through dialogue and in accordance with international law. 

5. People-to-people contacts and Turkey’s participation in EU programmes  

Participation in the Union Programmes and Agencies is an important element of integrating 
Turkey into EU policies and tools where it is in the mutual interest. In the 2014-2020 period, 
Turkey participated in nine programmes and two agencies, including Erasmus+ and Horizon 

9 

 
 
2020. Turkey has shown interest to continue participating in these and other EU Programmes 
and  Agencies  under  the  Multiannual  Financial  Framework  for  2021-2027  and  has  recently 
asked to resume its participation to the Creative Europe programme. 

6. Visa liberalisation  

On  16  December  2013,  the  EU  and  Turkey  launched  a  Visa  Liberalisation  Dialogue,  in 
parallel  with 
the  EU-Turkey  Readmission  Agreement.  The  Visa 
Liberalisation  Dialogue  is  based  on  the  Roadmap  towards  a  visa  free  regime  with  Turkey, 
which sets out 72 benchmarks that Turkey needs to meet. 

the  signature  of 

The EU-Turkey Statement envisages the acceleration of the fulfilment of the Roadmap with a 
view to lifting the visa requirements for Turkish citizens at the latest by the end of June 2016, 
provided of course that all benchmarks have been met by Turkey. However, six benchmarks 
of  the  Roadmap  remain  outstanding7,  while  those  considered  provisionally  fulfilled  also 
require continuous monitoring. Commission experts, together with experts from the Council 
of Europe, continue to offer technical assistance to Turkey to meet the remaining conditions. 

7. EU restrictive measures 

In  2019,  Turkey  stepped  up  its  illegal  drilling  activities  in  the  waters  surrounding  Cyprus. 
Although Turkey’s continued illegal  actions were clearly  and repeatedly  condemned by the 
EU,  they  were  not  halted.  In  this  context,  the  Foreign  Affairs  Council  decided  in  October 
2019 to establish a framework for restrictive measures, which was adopted on 11 November 
2019.  

This framework makes it possible to apply sanctions to individuals or entities responsible for 
or involved in drilling activities not authorised by Cyprus (in its territorial sea, its exclusive 
economic zone or on its continental shelf). Applicable sanctions are a travel ban and an asset 
freeze. The first listings under the sanctions regime were adopted on 27 February 20208.  

Following  Turkey’s  military  operation  in  North  East  Syria,  EU  Member  States  also 
committed in October 2019 to strong national positions regarding their arms export policy to 
Turkey  on  the  basis  of  the  provisions  of  Common  Position  2008/944/CFSP9,  but  have  not 
decided  to  impose  an  arms  embargo.  Such  a  decision  can  be  taken  by  the  Council  with 
unanimity.  

IV.  ECONOMY AND TRADE 

1. EU-Turkey trade framework 

7  The  six  outstanding  benchmarks  are:  1)  Concluding  an  operational  cooperation  agreement  with  Europol;  2)  Aligning 
legislation on personal data protection to EU standards, 3) Adopting measures to prevent corruption, 4) Offering effective 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters to all EU Member States; 5) Revising legislation and practices on terrorism in line 
with  European  standards;  6)  implementing  the  EU-Turkey  readmission  agreement  in  all  its  provisions,  including  those 
related to the readmission of third country nationals. 
8 They concern a Vice-President and a Vice-Director of the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO), as TPAO plans, directs 
and implements the unauthorised drillings. 
9 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/10/14/council-conclusions-on-north-east-syria/ 

10 

 
 
 
                                                           
EU-Turkey  trade  relations  are  governed  by  three  preferential  trade  agreements10.  The  EU-
Turkey Customs Union (CU), created in 1995, covers trade in industrial goods and thus the 
bulk  of  trade  flows.  However,  the  Customs  Union  involves  much  deeper  integration  than  a 
free trade agreement. It obliges Turkey to follow the EU’s Common Customs Tariff and rules 
for imports from third countries, to align domestic legislation with the EU acquis on goods, 
and  to  adapt  EU  rules  on  commercial  policy,  competition  policy  and  intellectual  property 
rights. 

In addition to the Customs Union, the Association Council agreed a free trade agreement for 
agricultural products in 1998. A separate free trade agreement on coal, iron and steel products 
was  concluded  in  1996  between  the  European  Coal  and  Steel  Community  (ECSC)  and 
Turkey.   

Bilateral  trade  in  goods  was  worth  almost  EUR  132.5  billion  in  2020.  Some  41%  of  all 
Turkish export in goods go to the EU, while imports from the EU represent almost a third of 
all Turkish imports. The EU is also by far the biggest source of foreign direct investment in 
Turkey, with a stock of EUR 58.5 billion in 2018.  

After an initially positive trend of increased Turkish alignment to the Customs Union rules, 
Turkey has been diverging in an increasingly systemic fashion from these rules over the past 
years.  The  main  issue  are  additional  customs  duties  levied  on  third  country  imports  (even 
when  imported  from  the  EU).  There  are  also  numerous  other  market  access  issues  of 
increasing concern to individual EU firms, industry associations and Member States, such as 
surveillance  measures,  requiring  disclosure  of  sensitive  data,  discrimination  against  EU 
tractor producers, and excessive testing and certification. In addition, Turkey has concluded 
trade agreements not in  line with those of the EU, despite its obligation under the Customs 
Union to do so. 

2. Modernisation of the Customs Union  

The Commission submitted to the Council in December 2016 draft negotiating directives on 
‘a new agreement to modernise the Customs Union (CU) and extend the scope of the bilateral 
preferential trade relationship’ with Turkey. They envisage increased mutual liberalisation on 
trade  in  agriculture  and  services,  market  opening  on  public  procurement  and  stronger 
commitments  on competition,  intellectual property  rights  and sustainable  development.  The 
proposal  also  addresses  the  serious  problems  of  the  functioning  of  the  current  set-up.  The 
impact  assessment  prepared  by  the  Commission  concluded  that  the  modernisation  would 
have a substantial positive impact on Turkey and clearly bring economic benefits to the EU.  

However, Council deliberations on this Commission  proposal  were discontinued in  2017 in 
the context of the deteriorating EU-Turkey relationship. The Council formally concluded on 
26  June  2018,  and  then  reiterated  on  18  June  2019,  that  "no  further  work  towards  the 
modernisation of the EU-Turkey Customs Union is foreseen". 

3. Economic cooperation: Economic Reform Programme, dialogue, IFI/DFI support 

Since  2015,  all  candidate  countries  and  potential  candidates,  including  Turkey,  have 
submitted annual Economic Reform Programmes (ERP) to the Commission, as part of efforts 

10 Details in the 2020 Individual reports and info sheets on implementation of EU Free Trade Agreements  - Staff Working 
Document available at:  https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2020/november/tradoc_159048.pdf 

11 

 
 
                                                           
to  strengthen  their  economic  governance  and  prepare  for  their  eventual  participation  in  the 
EU’s  economic  coordination  mechanism.  The  ERP  contains  medium-term  macroeconomic 
projections, budgetary plans for the next three years and structural reform plans. Based on the 
ERP  and  the  Commission’s  assessment,  the  annual  Economic  and  Financial  Dialogue 
between the EU and the Western Balkans and Turkey at  ministerial  level  provides targeted 
economic policy guidance for each country and reviews its implementation.  

Separately,  the  EU  and  Turkey  established  a  High-Level  Economic  Dialogue  in  2015  and 
held  its first  meeting in  2016, to  enhance bilateral  economic relations.  In view of Turkey’s 
drilling  activity  in  the  Eastern  Mediterranean,  in  July  2019  the  Council  suspended  this 
dialogue, too. 

The  European  Investment  Bank  Group11  and  the  European  Bank  for  Reconstruction 
and Development (EBRD) currently focus their operations in Turkey on the private sector.12  

4. Other key priority sectors  

The energy sector is of geostrategic importance in EU-Turkey relations. Exchanges on issues 
such as nuclear safety or renewables take place in Association Agreement sectoral meetings. 
A High Level Energy Dialogue framework was set up in March 2015 but only two meetings 
were held mainly due to Turkey’s refusal to meet at ministerial level. Turkey’s unauthorised 
drilling  activities  in  the  Eastern  Mediterranean  resulted  in  the  suspension  of  this  dialogue. 
The  observer  status  of  Turkey’s  transmission  system  operator  (TEIAS)  in  the  European 
Network  of  Transmission  System  Operators  for  Electricity  was  suspended  in  2018.  There 
were  concerns  regarding  TEIAS’  lack  of  cooperation  on  electricity  projects  related  to  the 
Turkish Cypriot Community, possibly affecting the grid of the entire island. In 2019, Turkey 
transmitted  the  revised  Stress  Tests  National  Report  regarding  the  Akkuyu  nuclear  power 
project  and  technical  experts  exchanged  views  on  the  organisation  of  the  peer  review  by 
ENSREG  in  which  Turkey  has  an  observer  status.  EU  financial  assistance  has  been  used 
extensively to fund multiple energy projects, with an increasing shift towards renewables and 
energy efficiency.  

Transport  relations  between  Turkey  and  the  EU  remain  challenging  in  spite  of  a  shared 
interest in road safety, sustainable urban mobility or green maritime shipping. Following the 
suspension  of  the  EU-Turkey  Comprehensive  Air  Transport  Agreement  negotiations  in 
line  with  the  July  2019  Council  Conclusions,  the  Commission’s  mandate  expired  in  June 
2020.  Turkey  has  recently  signalled  an  interest  in  restarting  the  negotiations.  At  the  same 
time, Turkey does not recognise the right of an EU carrier to operate to Turkey from an EU 
Member State which is different to the EU Member State which licenses it.  

Extension  of  the  core  TEN-T  network  to  Turkey  is  another  issue  hindering  EU-Turkey 
cooperation.  Turkey’s  lack  of  compliance  with  the  Ankara  protocol  on  access  to  ports  and 

11 Including the European Investment Fund. In its July 2019 conclusions, the Council invited the European Investment Bank 
to review its lending activities in Turkey, notably with regard to sovereign-backed lending. 
12 At the end of 2019, the European Investment Bank (EIB) had a total disbursed exposure in Turkey of EUR 12.3 billion. 
EIB lending to Turkey has fallen substantially since 2016 and following the EU restrictive  measures of 2019, no loans to 
Turkey were signed in 2020. The EBRD continued to support private sector operations in Turkey in 2020 and additionally 
provided highly selective public sector lending to finance the purchase of critical equipment needed by public hospitals in 
Turkey in the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic. The total volume of EBRD investment in Turkey in 2020 was EUR 1.8 
billion. 

12 

 
 
                                                           
airports  hampers  the  finalisation  of  the  TEN-T  extension.  Finalising  the  extension  is  also 
important as regards implementation of Halkali-Kapikule rail line project.  

Concerning cooperation in civil and commercial matters the EU has encouraged Turkey to 
accede to  relevant  international  conventions in  the area of civil  justice. Turkey is  already  a 
Contracting  Party  to  the  Hague  Conventions  in  the  field  of  family  law  and  transnational 
litigation. Turkey should take effective measures to ensure an acceptable reduction in delays 
to proceedings resulting from the 1980 Hague Convention on civil aspects of the international 
child abduction and to foster the use of international mediation in such cases.  

On  criminal  justice  cooperation,  Turkey  appointed  six  contact  points  in  2019  to  facilitate 
the exchange of non-sensitive information with Eurojust. In 2020, Turkey was involved in 20 
operational  Eurojust  cases.  In  addition,  Eurojust  included  Turkey  in  the  Eurojust  4  year 
cooperation  strategy  (2020-2024).  A  Decision  authorising  the  Commission  to  negotiate  a 
criminal  justice  cooperation  agreement  between  Eurojust  and  Turkey  is  pending  in  the 
Council. 

The  Council  adopted  conclusions  on  22  February  202113  on  the  revised  EU  list  of  non-
cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes. Turkey was requested to solve all open issues as 
regards effective exchange of information with all Member States, as specified in the Council 
conclusions.  Turkey  is  expected  to  commit  at  high  political  level  by  31  May  2021 to 
effectively  activate  its  automatic  information  exchange  relationship  with  all  Member  States 
by 30 June. 

Regarding  civil  protection,  Turkey  participates  in  the  Union  Civil  Protection  Mechanism 
(UCPM) since 2016. Turkey has been actively participating in the IPA regional programmes 
on  civil  protection  and  it  will  benefit  from  the  next  regional  IPA  programme  on  flood 
prevention and forest fires risk management, which officially started on 15 November 2020. 

V. CONCLUSIONS 

Since  last  December,  Turkey  has  shown  a  calmer,  more  constructive  attitude  on  various 
issues, including in its bilateral relations with several EU Member States. These are positive 
and  welcome  steps  forward.  The  COVID-19  pandemic  has  further  accentuated  the  mutual 
benefits of a cooperative relationship. However, this process of de-escalation remains fragile. 
We need more time to judge whether it is sustainable and credible and delivers lasting results, 
also in the light of the deteriorating domestic situation in Turkey.  

To deepen the present momentum and incentivise closer EU-Turkey ties across the board, we 
believe that the Union should put a number of possible areas of cooperation on the table to 
allow  for  a  progressive,  proportionate  and  reversible  approach.  These  are  in  our  common 
interest and could be pursued in incremental steps - provided of course that the constructive 
efforts by Turkey are sustained and reinforced in the next months.  

These measures could include the following: 

13 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6329-2021-INIT/en/pdf 

13 

 
 
 
                                                           
1.  A  more  effective  and  mutually  beneficial  implementation  of  key  areas  of  the  2016 
EU-Turkey  Statement,  notably  on  migration  management.  This  would  mean  in 
particular that Turkey would without any further delay restart the process of returns 
from  the  Greek  islands,  starting  with  the  1450  returnees  whose  legal  appeals  are 
exhausted.  

2.  Conversely,  EU  Member  States  should  step  up  resettlements  from  Turkey  to  the 
Union,  building  on  the  progress  made  so  far.  This  should  especially  cover  the  most 
vulnerable groups of Syrian refugees in Turkey. 

3.  Strengthening our already substantial  economic ties is another win-win situation for 
both sides, particularly in the currently difficult economic climate. At the heart of this 
would  be  the  modernisation  and  expansion  of  the  scope  of  the  current  EU-Turkey 
Customs Union as already proposed by the Commission. This would also provide a 
guiding framework for economic reforms in Turkey. EU Member States should agree 
on the negotiating directives and authorise the Commission  to  open negotiations for 
this modernisation, provided that Turkey takes concrete steps in resolving the current 
trade irritants.  

4.  Keeping  communication  channels  open  is  useful  -  not  least  to  support  Turkey’s 
economic  and  sectorial  reform  commitments.  Previously  suspended  High-level 
dialogues  could  thus  be  relaunched,  on  the  economy,  energy,  transport,  political 
developments, foreign and security policies, and initiated on other new topics, e.g. the 
green deal/climate, internal security, inter-faith relations and culture. 

5.  Increasing  people-to-people  contacts  is  a  further  confidence-building  measure.  The 
Commission  intends  to  continue  facilitating  Turkey’s  participation  in  the  next 
generation of EU programmes, such as Erasmus+, Horizon Europe etc. under the new 
Multi-annual Financial Framework. The Commission remains ready to advise Turkey 
on  the  specifics  of  the  outstanding  benchmarks  defined  in  the  Visa  Liberalisation 
Roadmap. 

Should  Turkey,  however,  not  move  forward  constructively  in  developing  a  genuine 
partnership with the EU, but instead return to renewed unilateral actions or provocations in 
breach  of  international  law,  aimed  at  causing  prejudice  to  the  interests  of  the  EU  and  its 
Member States, in particular in the Eastern Mediterranean, it should be made clear that this 
would bear political  and economic consequences, as  spelled out  in the report. Further EU 
measures  should  be  focused,  proportionate  and  reversible,  in  order  to  adapt  to  the  situation 
and  the  level  of  threat  or  challenge  in  the  best  possible  manner,  incentivise  a  return  to  a 
cooperative track and avoid a negative escalation dynamic.  

In addition to suspending the elements of the constructive cooperation offer set out above , 
we should foresee smart, scalable  yet  reversible  restrictive  measures, building on those in 
place. These could gradually include: 

1.  The  adoption  of  the  additional  listings  already  agreed  by  the  December  European 

Council; 

2.  Restrictive measures under the existing sanctions frameworks could be enhanced and 

consideration could be given to include legal entities;  

3.  Further  restrictions  on  EU-Turkey  economic  cooperation,  including  on  the 

operations of the European Investment Bank and other financial institutions; 

14 

 
 
4.  Measures  targeting  other  sectors  important  for  Turkish  economy,  such  as  a 
prohibition  to  supply  of  tourism  services,  negative  travel  advice  by  Member  States 
etc. 

5.  Additional  EU  measures  in  the  energy  and  related  sectors,  such  as  import/export 

bans on certain goods and technologies; 

Last  but  not  least  and  in  line  with  the  December  2020  European  Council  conclusions,  the 
Commission will also rapidly prepare options for continued funding for refugees and host 
communities  in  Turkey.  Given  the  serious  needs  on  the  ground  and  the  significant  burden 
that Turkey continues to shoulder in this regard, this is a European investment in stability and 
solidarity. We have a genuine self-interest to build on the success stories of the last years. 

15