COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT IMPACT ASSESSMENT REPORT Accompanying the document COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS Forging a climate-resilient Europe - The new EU Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change
Date: 2021-02-24
Institutions: Directorate-General for Climate Action, European Commission
Subjects: adaptation to climate change, climate change, environmental cooperation, environmental impact, environmental risk prevention, international cooperation, natural disaster, reduction of gas emissions, water protection

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 24.2.2021  SWD(2021) 25 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT  IMPACT ASSESSMENT REPORT  Accompanying the document COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS Forging a climate-resilient Europe - The new EU Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change {COM(2021) 82 final} - {SEC(2021) 89 final} - {SWD(2021) 26 final}  
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

2. 

4. 

TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................................................................... 0 
INDEX OF TABLES AND BOXES ............................................................................................................................. 251 
INDEX OF FIGURES ................................................................................................................................................... 252 
ABBREVIATIONS ....................................................................................................................................................... 252 
INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................................................... 3 
1. 
European Union political and legal context ............................................................................................................ 4 
International political and legal context .................................................................................................................. 7 
Impacts of COVID-19 on EU adaptation policies: resilient recovery ..................................................................... 8 
PROBLEM DEFINITION  ..................................................................................................................................... 9 
Problems for the new EU Adaptation Strategy and their evolution ......................................................................... 9 
What are the problem drivers? .............................................................................................................................. 15 
3.  WHY SHOULD THE EU ACT?  ......................................................................................................................... 24 
Legal basis ............................................................................................................................................................ 24 
Subsidiarity: Necessity and Added Value of EU action ........................................................................................ 24 
OBJECTIVES: WHAT IS TO BE ACHIEVED?.................................................................................................. 25 
General objective .................................................................................................................................................. 25 
Specific objectives ................................................................................................................................................ 26 
5.  WHAT ARE THE AVAILABLE POLICY OPTIONS? ....................................................................................... 30 
What is the baseline against which the options are assessed? ............................................................................... 31 
Option 1: Deepening of existing actions of the 2013 Strategy .............................................................................. 32 
Option 2: Deepening of existing actions and addition of novel actions to Strategy .............................................. 33 
Options discarded at an early stage ....................................................................................................................... 35 
6.  WHAT ARE THE IMPACTS OF THE POLICY OPTIONS?.............................................................................. 36 
Summary of impacts ............................................................................................................................................. 37 
Economic impacts ................................................................................................................................................. 39 
Social impacts ....................................................................................................................................................... 47 
Environmental impacts .......................................................................................................................................... 51 
Cross-cutting impacts ............................................................................................................................................ 54 
HOW DO THE OPTIONS COMPARE ................................................................................................................ 55 
Effectiveness ......................................................................................................................................................... 56 
Efficiency .............................................................................................................................................................. 56 
Coherence ............................................................................................................................................................. 57 
Added Value ......................................................................................................................................................... 57 
Proportionality ...................................................................................................................................................... 58 
PREFERRED OPTION......................................................................................................................................... 58 
8. 
9. 
HOW WILL ACTUAL IMPACTS BE MONITORED AND EVALUATED? .................................................... 61 
ANNEX 1: PROCEDURAL INFORMATION ............................................................................................................... 63 
Lead DG, Decide Planning/CWP references ......................................................................................................... 63 
Organisation and timing ........................................................................................................................................ 63 
Consultation of the RSB ........................................................................................................................................ 63 
ANNEX 2: STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION – CONSULTATION SYNOPSIS .................................................... 65 
ANNEX 3: WHO IS AFFECTED AND HOW?.............................................................................................................. 91 
ANNEX 4: ANALYTICAL METHODS ......................................................................................................................... 97 
Economic modelling ............................................................................................................................................. 97 
GINFORS-E: Short model description .................................................................................................................. 99 
Uncertainty and sensitivity analysis .................................................................................................................... 102 
Detailed modelling results ................................................................................................................................... 103 
References ........................................................................................................................................................... 109 
ANNEX 5: IMPACT SCREENING .............................................................................................................................. 111 
ANNEX  6:  NON-EXHAUSTIVE  LIST  OF  MEASURES  TO  BE  DEVELOPED  UNDER  THE  NEW  EU 

ADAPTATION STRATEGY ............................................................................................................................. 116 
ANNEX 7: MINI–ASSESSMENTS .............................................................................................................................. 129 
ACTION 1: Closing further gaps in adaptation-relevant knowledge, through systematic data collection and 

7. 

sharing, and working with key public and private partners. ................................................................... 129 

ACTION  2:  Further  developing  Climate-ADAPT  as  the  ‘first-stop  shop’  for  adaptation  information  in 

Europe. ................................................................................................................................................... 136 

ACTION 3: Strengthening the evaluation, monitoring, reporting and implementation of adaptation strategies 
at national and subnational levels, including in cities, cross-border, and in the Outermost Regions. 
(including through the Climate Law via Climate-ADAPT). .................................................................. 143 

ACTION  4:  Prioritising  nature-based  adaptation,  including  coastal  protection  and  green  and  blue 

infrastructure. ......................................................................................................................................... 143 
ACTION 5: Stepping-up efforts to build resilience in cities and empower local action...................................... 161 
ACTION 6: Further mainstreaming and integrating adaptation in EU legislation and instruments .................... 171 
ACTION 7: Climate Proofing of Infrastructure and beyond. .............................................................................. 171 

 
 
ACTION 8: Narrowing the Climate Protection Gap—Micro-economic policy .................................................. 178 
ACTION  9:  Supporting  partner  countries  in  their  efforts  on  climate  change,  disaster  preparedness,  and 

comprehensive risk management approaches ......................................................................................... 187 

ACTION 10: Scaling up international adaptation finance and disaster risk financing, including by unlocking 

innovative finance and mobilising the private sector. ............................................................................ 192 
ACTION 11: Strengthening EU engagement globally and learning from adaptation frontrunners. .................... 198 
ACTION 12: Adaptation Solutions / Horizon Europe Mission on adaptation to Climate Change,  including 

Societal Transformation ......................................................................................................................... 205 
Action 13: Closing the Climate Protection Gap - Macroeconomic aspects of adaptation to climate change. ..... 218 
ACTION 14: Ensuring the availability of fresh water. ........................................................................................ 222 
ANNEX 8: LEGAL BASIS FOR EU ACTION IN CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION ......................................... 232 
ANNEX 9: CLIMATE CHANGE AND ITS IMPACTS ............................................................................................... 233 
ANNEX 10: GLOSSARY ............................................................................................................................................. 247 

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1.  INTRODUCTION 

Global warming is happening and is already affecting Europeans – its impacts are here 
and  now  and  they  are  a  daily  confirmation  of  the  case  for  urgent  action  that  science  has 
provided for some time. Temperatures continue to break records and climate-related extreme 
events  are more frequent and more intense. Europeans continue to  call for stronger  climate 
action even in the current health and economic crisis resulting from the Covid-19 pandemic. 
This means higher ambition on both mitigation and on adaptation to climate change1.  

The  impacts  on  people,  planet  and  prosperity  are  already  pervasive  but  unevenly 
distributed across the globe. In 2018, most of the natural hazards affecting nearly 62 million 
people  globally  were  associated  with  extreme  weather  and  climate  events2.  Out  of  17.2 
million  new  displacements  associated  with  disasters  in  2018,  16.1  million  were  weather 
related3.  Between  2000  and  2016,  the  number  of  people  exposed  to  heatwaves  globally 
increased by around 125 million4. Climate-related disasters doubled compared to the previous 
20  years5.  At  the  global  level,  least  developed  countries  and  small  island  states  are 
particularly  vulnerable  to  the  impacts  of  climate  change  and  have  the  lowest  adaptive 
capacity, while at the same time contributing the least to greenhouse gas emissions. Climate 
change  also  impacts  disproportionately  the  most  vulnerable  parts  of  our  society,  thus 
exacerbating  inequalities  further.  The  changing  climate  has  reduced  oxygen  levels  in  the 
ocean by ~1-2 % since the middle of the last century6, while increasing ocean temperatures 
have  resulted  in  habitat  shifts  for  species  and  coral  bleaching  (causing  worldwide  reef 
degradation). 

Moreover,  even  stopping  all  greenhouse  gas  emissions  would  not  stop  the  climate 
impacts that are already occurring, and which, due to the concentration of these gases in 
the atmosphere, are likely  to  continue for decades. Temporary  decreases  of  greenhouse  gas 
emissions, like those caused by the 2008 financial crisis or the current economic disruption 
from the Covid-19 pandemic, have little effect on the evolution of the planetary climate (and 
emissions can bounce back quickly).  

The global  temperature averages (already 1.2°C above pre-industrial  levels)  hide even 
more extreme regional impacts. An average of 3°C or 4°C global rise in temperature means 
temperature increases above 5°C or 6°C for some regions (and Europe warms faster than the 
average). This ranges from unprecedented forest fires and heatwaves above the Arctic Circle 
to  increasingly  devastating  droughts  in  Western  Europe  and  the  Mediterranean  region;  and 
from accelerating coastal erosion on the Atlantic coast to more severe flooding and decimated 
forests in Central and Eastern Europe7.  

1  In  this  impact  assessment,  Adaptation  refers  to  policies,  practices  and  projects  which  can  moderate  damage,  improve  resilience  and/or 
realise opportunities associated with the impacts of climate change at all levels of society. 
2 https://library.wmo.int/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=20799#.XmIqSKhKjb0  
3 https://www.internal-displacement.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/2019-IDMC- GRID.pdf  
4 https://www.who.int/health-topics/heatwaves#tab=tab_1  
5 https://www.undrr.org/news/drrday-report-dramatic-rise-climate-disasters-over-last-20-years  
6 https://portals.iucn.org/library/node/48892  
7 The 2020 State of the European environment report concludes that climate change has substantially increased the occurrence of climate 
and weather extremes.  

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Without drastic emission abatement measures (at a global scale, matching the EU goal 
on  climate  neutrality  by  2050  and  increased  ambition  by  2030),  continued  climate 
change  will  increase  the  likelihood  of  severe,  pervasive  and  irreversible  consequences 
such as the decline or collapse of natural ecosystems (e.g. Arctic or Alpine ecosystems), the 
erosion  of  global  food  security,  or  displacement  of  people8.  Extreme  sea  level  events  and 
floods  will  occur  more  frequently,  with  severe  damages  to  Europe’s  coastal  communities. 
Climate  change  and  its  impact  is  interrelated  with  other  environmental  crisis  (biodiversity 
loss,  natural  resources  depletion,  pollution);  their  effects  are  cumulative  –  but  solutions  are 
also common. 

European Union political and legal context 
The  2013  EU  Adaptation  Strategy9  was  evaluated  in  November  201810.  The  Evaluation 
found that the strategy had delivered on its objectives, with progress recorded against each of 
its  eight  individual  actions.  Nevertheless,  several  areas  of  societal  vulnerability  were 
identified for improvement, drawing on lessons learnt from implementation, and in the light 
of  international  developments  since  its  adoption  (such  as  the  Paris  Agreement11  and  the 
Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction12).  
The European Green Deal13 sets out the Commission’s commitment to tackling climate 
and environmental-related challenges and introduces the green oath to “do no harm”. It is 
essential  as  a  roadmap  and  a  growth  strategy  towards  a  prosperous,  resilient  and  healthy 
future, made more necessary in light of the very severe effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on 
our health and economic well-being. Unprecedented near term investments will be needed to 
overcome the negative impact of the COVID-19 crisis on jobs, incomes and businesses. The 
political choices we make today will define the future for the next generations. A new, more 
ambitious Adaptation Strategy was announced in the European Green Deal Communication, 
and  subsequently  as  part  of  the  Commission  Work  Programme  202114.  An  extensive 
Blueprint15 informed the public debate with citizens and stakeholders on the new Strategy.  

Recent  calls  to  raise  the  ambition  of  the  EU  strategic  approach  to  climate  change 
adaptation build on earlier progress16. These take place against a background of increasing 
public visibility of climate change impacts  (both current  and projected  – see section 2) and 
other  environmental  problems  that  has  also  led  to  direct  calls  for  action  from  citizens  and 
civil  society.  There  has  been  a  corresponding  increase  in  attention  from  EU  Institutions: 

8 https://www.eea.europa.eu/highlights/soer2020-europes-environment-state-and-outlook-report  
9 European Commission (2013) An EU Strategy  on adaptation to climate change, Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions COM/2013/0216 final 
10  European  Commission  (2018)  Evaluation  of  the  EU  Strategy  on  adaptation  to  climate  change,  Report  from  the  Commission  to  the 
European Parliament and the Council SWD/2018/461 final 
11 Council Decision (2016) On the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Paris Agreement adopted under the United Nations  
Framework Convention on Climate Change, (EU) 2016/1841 (OJ L 282, 19.10.2016, p. 1) 
12 European Commission (2014) The post 2015 Hyogo Framework for Action: Managing risks to achieve resilience, Communication from 
the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the  
Committee of the Regions COM/2014/0216 final 
13  European  Commission  (2019)  The  European  Green  Deal,  Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament,  the 
European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions COM/2019/640 final 
14 European Commission (2020) Commission Work Programme 2020 A Union that strives for more, Communication from the Commission 
to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions COM/2020/37 
final  
15 European Commission (2020) Adaptation to Climate Change Blueprint for a new, more ambitious EU strategy 
16  For  a  more  detailed  account  of  the  historical  background,  the  interested  reader  is  directed  to  the  2018  Evaluation  of  the  Adaptation 
Strategy, which provides a comprehensive review up to 2018. 

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European  Council  conclusions  repeatedly  stress  the  need  for  further  action  on  adaptation17, 
the European Parliament Resolution on the new EU Strategy18 considers it as an opportunity 
to show the EU global leadership on adaptation.  

Over  the  next  decade,  the  implementation  of  the  European  Green  Deal  would  further 
deliver  on  European  climate  change  adaptation  ambitions,  with  adaptation  to  address 
climate change impacts as a key priority, as impacts will continue to create significant stress 
despite  mitigation  efforts.  The  Commission  proposal  for  a  European  Climate  Law 
Regulation19, establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality in the EU and at the 
heart of the Green  Deal, recognises  adaptation  as a key  component of the long-term  global 
response  to  climate  change.  It  requires  Member  States  and  the  Union  to  enhance  their 
adaptive  capacity,  strengthen  resilience  and  reduce  vulnerability  to  climate  change.  It  also 
introduces  a  requirement  for  the  implementation  of  national  strategies  and  regular  progress 
assessments as part of the overall EU governance on climate action. 

The  new  Strategy  will  step-up  the  ongoing  drive  to  mainstream  adaptation 
considerations  in  EU  legislation  and  instruments,  as  adaptation  affects  almost  the  entire 
spectrum of EU policy. Climate change adaptation is being mainstreamed in new initiatives 
under the European Green Deal, including the EU Biodiversity Strategy20, the Farm to Fork 
Strategy21, the Circular Economy Action Plan22, the Renovation Wave23, the Forest Strategy24 
the  Urban  Agenda  for  the  EU25  and  the  Habitat  III  new  Urban  Agenda26,the  Sustainable 
Development  2030  Agenda27,  and  the  Zero  Pollution  ambition.  Other  channels  for 
mainstreaming of adaptation in EU policy include the implementation of the EU’s Strategic 
partnership  with  the  EU's  outermost  regions28  and  cooperation  with  the  European 
Standardisation  Organisations29.  Most  recently,  the  implementing  regulation  on  the 
Governance  of  the  Energy  Union  and  Climate  Action  30  31  stipulates  the  structure,  format, 
submission  processes  and  review  of  adaptation  information  reported  by  Member  States32. 

17 Council conclusions on Climate Diplomacy, ST-5033-2020 of 20 January 2020, https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-5033-
2020-INIT/en/pdf 
18 European Parliament resolution of 17 December 2020 on the EU strategy on adaptation 
to climate change (2020/2532(RSP))  https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2020-0382_EN.pdf  
19 European Commission (2020) Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the framework for 
achieving climate neutrality and amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 (European Climate Law), COM/2020/80 final 
20  European  Commission  (2020)  EU  Biodiversity  Strategy  for  2030,  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament,  the  Council,  the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM/2020/380 final 
21  European  Commission  (2020)  Farm  to  Fork  Strategy,  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament,  the  Council,  the  European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM/2020/381 final 
22 European Commission (2020) A new Circular Economy Action Plan For a cleaner and more competitive Europe, from the Commission to 
the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM/2017/0623 
final 
23 European Commission (2020) A Renovation Wave for Europe - greening our buildings, creating jobs, improving lives COM(2020) 662 
final 
24 https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/12674-Forests-new-EU-strategy 
25 https://ec.europa.eu/futurium/en/urban-agenda 
26 https://www.habitat3.org/the-new-urban-agenda 
27 https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-enjeux_developpement/priorities-priorites/agenda-

programme.aspx?lang=eng 

28 European Commission (2017) A stronger and renewed strategic partnership with the EU's outermost regions, from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM/2020/98 final 
29 Mandated in 2014 by the Commission, CEN-CENELEC‘s Coordination Group ‘Adaptation to Climate Change’ (ACC-CG) supports the 
implementation of the new EU Adaptation Strategy by coordinating activities relating to standardisation. Currently, the ACC-CG  
coordinates the process of revising 12 existing standards in the buildings, energy, transport and ICT sectors, and is exploring other sectors 
where adaptation to climate change is identified as necessary. 
30  European  Parliament  (2018)  Governance  of  the  Energy  Union  and  Climate  Action,  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council, 
Regulation (EU) 2018/1999,  
31 European Commission (2020), on structure, format, submission processes and review of information reported by Member States pursuant 
to Regulation (EU) 2018/1999, of the European Parliament and of the Council, Regulation (EU) No 2020/1208 
32 An updated list of Developing Countries and Least Developed Countries can be found, respectively, at the Word Bank's and IMF's official 
websites 

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This  reporting  also  supports  national  energy  and  climate  plans  (NECPs),  e.g.  by  protecting 
the security of the Union's energy supply against climate impacts33. 

The  European  Commission  has  been  instrumental  in  taking  forward  the  2015  Sendai 
Framework  for  Disaster  Risk  Reduction  (DRR)  through  its  Communication  setting  out 
initial views on shaping the post-2015 Hyogo Framework for Action34. In November 2017, a 
communication  from  the  Commission  highlighted  the  need  for  Strengthening  EU  Disaster 
Management  through  “rescEU  -  Solidarity  with  Responsibility”35  and  in  2019  the  revised 
Union  Civil  Protection  Mechanism  was  published36.  The  mechanism  promotes  more  robust 
and  comprehensive  EU  disaster  management  through  the  contribution  of  all  the  Union’s 
policies  and  instruments  to  reinforce  the  capacity  to  prevent,  prepare  for,  respond  to,  and 
recover from disasters, including climate-driven natural disasters. 37  

Local  engagement  was  identified  as  an  area  for  improvement  in  the  evaluation  of  the 
2013  Strategy38,  which  called  for  more  ambition  in  the  adoption,  implementation  and 
monitoring  of  national,  regional  and  local  adaptation  strategies.  As  part  of  the  European 
Green Deal, the Commission [will] launch a European Climate Pact to give actors at all levels 
a  voice  and  space  to  design  new  climate  actions,  share  information,  launch  grassroots 
activities, and highlight solutions that others can follow, including on adaptation. At the local 
level, the Covenant of Mayors is one of the EU’s key initiatives for responding to the climate 
emergency  and  for  steering  local  and  regional  authorities  (LRAs)  in  the  transition  towards 
climate neutrality and climate change adaptation. Today bringing together more than 10,400 
signatories  in  Europe,  the  Covenant,  alongside  other  regional  and  local  institutions  and 
institutions, represents a key complement to the involvement of local and regional authorities 
in drawing up NECPs.  

The  new  Adaptation  strategy  anticipates  the  demands  created  by  other  initiatives  in 
supplying  a  larger  array  of  solutions  and  information  on  adaptation.  The  European 
Green  Deal  Investment  Plan39  is  the  investment  pillar  of  the  European  Green  Deal  and  is 
intended to mobilise at least EUR 1 trillion of private and public sustainable investments over 
the  upcoming  decade,  including  climate  action,  and  climate  resilience  will  be  an  important 
beneficiary of the delivery of this ambition. To further help  direct  and mobilise sustainable 
investments,  the  Commission  committed  to  review  Directive 2014/95/EU  on  Non-Financial 
Reporting  Directive  (NFRD)40.  The  NFRD  requires  companies  to  report  on  non-financial 
issues annually, including the environment, social and employee issues and human rights. In 
particular,  the  Taxonomy  Regulation  (2019/2088)41  requires  companies  under  the  scope  of 
the NFRD to disclose certain indicators of the proportion of their activities that are classified 
as sustainable. Moreover, the Delegated Act on the Sustainable Finance Taxonomy42 further 

33 https://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/adaptation-in-energy-system 
34 European Commission (2014) The post 2015 Hyogo Framework for Action: Managing risks to achieve resilience COM/2014/0216 final 
35  European  Commission  (2017)  Strengthening  EU  Disaster  Management:  rescEU  Solidarity  with  Responsibility  Solidarity  with 
Responsibility,  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament,  the  Council,  the  European  Economic  and  Social  Committee  and  the 
Committee of the Regions, Communication COM/2017/0773, final  
36 Decision (EU) 2019/420 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 March 2019 amending Decision No 1313/2013/EU on a 
Union Civil Protection Mechanism (OJL77 I, 20.3.2019, p.1.) 
37 In June 2020 a further review of the UCPM was proposed (COM(2020)220 final of 2.6.2020. 
38 European Commission (2018) Evaluation of the EU Strategy on adaptation to climate change SWD/2018/461 final 
39 European Commission (2020) Sustainable Europe Investment Plan European Green Deal Investment Plan, from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM/2020/21  
40 European Parliament (2014) amending Directive 2013/34/EU as regards disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by certain 
large undertakings and groups, of the European Parliament and of the Council Regulation (EU) No 2014/95/EU  
41 European Parliament (2020)  on the establishment of a framework to facilitate sustainable investment, and amending Regulation,  of the 
European Parliament and of the Council Regulation (EU) No 2019/2088  
42 https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/banking-and-finance/sustainable-finance/eu-taxonomy-sustainable-activities_en  

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specifies  technical  screening  criteria  for  making  a  significant  contribution  to  adaptation. 
Together,  these  developments  are  expected  to  encourage  reporting  firms  to  invest  in 
sustainable activities, including activities that build climate resilience. Overall, this will also 
create a wider pool of sustainable investment projects available for adaptation action, as well 
as increase demand for the adaptation solutions, tools and knowledge to be developed by the 
Strategy.  

International political and legal context 

There is increasing prominence of adaptation needs in the international public agenda. 
The World Economic Forum listed extreme weather and climate-change policy failures as the 
gravest  threats43  for  several  years  in  a  row.  Moreover,  international  actors  like  the  World 
Bank44  and  the  International  Monetary  Fund45  are  responding  to  the  growing  attention  to 
climate risks and the need for adaptation. 

In  2010,  the  UNFCCC  Conference  of  the  Parties  established  the  Cancun  Adaptation 
Framework46  to  strengthen  adaptation  action  in  developing  countries  through  international 
cooperation.  The  Conference  also  established  an  Adaptation  Committee  to  promote  the 
implementation  of  stronger  adaptation  action,  provide  technical  support  and  guidance  to 
countries, strengthen knowledge sharing and promote synergy between stakeholders. 

These  decisions  paved  the  way  for  the  adoption  in  2015  of  the  Paris  Agreement,  the  new 
global  framework  for  renewed  ambition  in  reducing  greenhouse  gas  emissions  and  in 
implementing  adaptation  measures47.  Among  its  milestone  objectives,  the  Paris  Agreement 
enshrines  the  global  goal  on  adaptation  of  enhancing  adaptive  capacity,  strengthening 
resilience and reducing vulnerability to climate change. The Paris Agreement set up a Global 
Stocktake to review the overall progress made in achieving the global goal on adaptation, and 
the  Paris  Decision  provides  the  Adaptation  Committee  with  a  comprehensive  mandate  to 
support  the  work  and  substantiate  the  consideration  of  progress  towards  the  global  goal  of 
adaptation. 

At  EU  level,  the  implementing  regulation  for  the  Governance  of  the  Energy  Union  and 
Climate Action also asks Member States to share information on the provision of financial, 
technological  and  capacity-building  support  to  developing  countries.  It  thus  facilitates  the 
implementation  of  the  Union's  commitments  under  the  UN  Framework  Convention  on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Paris Agreement. 

The  European  Union  launched  the  “Global  Climate  Change  Alliance”  (GCCA)  flagship 
initiative  in  200748.  Its  second  iteration  (GCCA+)  had  amongst  its  priority  areas  to  support 
the formulation and implementation  of concrete  and integrated sector-based climate change 
adaptation and mitigation strategies in Small Island Developing States and Least Developed 
Countries.  The  new  EU  Development  Cooperation  programme  for  2021-2027  (under 
preparation)  brings  opportunities  for  enhanced  support  and  partnerships  -  the  new  Strategy 
will help by giving a greater focus to adaptation.  

https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2019/01/15/world-bank-group-announces-50-billion-over-five-years-for-climate-

43 https://www.weforum.org/reports/the-global-risks-report-2020  
44 
adaptation-and-resilience  
45 https://blogs.imf.org/2019/12/02/straight-talk-the-adaptive-age/ 
46 UNFCCC (2010) The Cancun Adaptation Framework, https://www.unsystem.org/content/unfccc-cancun-adaptation-framework  
47 https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/Pages/LatestSubmissions.aspx  
48 https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/clima/files/docs/gcca_brochure_en.pdf 

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The 2030 Sustainable Development Goals49 (SDGs) lay down the specific objective to “take 
urgent  action  to  combat  climate  change  and  its  impacts”  (Goal  13).  Progress  towards  the 
SDGs is likely to increase resilience to climate change (e.g. SDGs on hunger, water, health, 
and ecosystems) or address some of the fundamental causes of climate change (e.g. by SDGs 
on energy, infrastructure, cities, and consumption and production)50. Additionally, the Union 
supports cities to exchange solutions and jointly tackle adaptation challenges, thereby making 
a direct contribution to the UN-Habitat New Urban Agenda and SDGs.  

Impacts of COVID-19 on EU adaptation policies: resilient recovery 

Climate change hazards are compounding the COVID-19 outbreak and its economic effects, 
e.g.  cardiovascular  and  chronic  pulmonary  disease  —  recognized  risk  factors  for  severe 
Covid-19  —  are  closely  linked  to  climate  change,  through  effects  including  extreme  heat, 
ground-level  ozone,  wildfire  smoke,  and  increased  pollen  counts  over  longer  seasons  (i.e. 
‘compound risk’)51. Although the final impacts of COVID-19 cannot yet be determined, there 
is  recognition  of  a  lack  of  preparation  for  potentially  compounding  crises,  such  as  the 
incidence  of  extreme  wildfires  and  heatwaves,  together  with  the  current  health  crisis.52 
Examples  of  the  added  complexity  of  such  compound  problems  include  the  difficulty  of 
respecting  social  distancing  during  a  crisis  like  wildfires  or  flooding,  or  enforcing 
confinement policies during heatwaves.  

The European Union has  argued that fighting climate change should be central  to  Europe’s 
economic  recovery  from  the  coronavirus  pandemic53,  including  in  its  Recovery  and 
Resilience  Facility,  the  Renovation  Wave  and  other  initiatives.  Similar  calls  for  adaptation 
measures and investments to play a key role in the recovery are echoed by the IMF54.  

Similarities  exist  between  the  problem  drivers  of  the  COVID-19  pandemic  and  climate 
change adaptation: in both cases, decision-makers and societies are subjected to a ‘normality 
bias’,  which  leads  people  to  underestimate  the  likelihood  of  a  disaster.55  The  onset  of  the 
pandemic  also  led  to  triggering  the  Union  Civil  Protection  Mechanism  and  extending  its 
scope on stockpiling of medical equipment for instance. The inclusion of pandemics as risks 
that the EU may face emphasises the links with other forms of disasters56. 

While  climate  change  is  relatively  slow-onset  compared  to  the  pandemic’s spread,  for both 
the lag between measures and effects, and the trade-offs between immediate economic costs 
and  long-term  health  benefits  make  it  difficult  for  political  leaders  to  take  immediate  bold 
action.  Lastly,  the  link  between  climate  change  and  health  impacts  in  Europe  was  further 
reinforced by a recent  European Environment  Agency  (EEA) analysis57, e.g. with  the latest 
evidence that climate change, together with air pollution, noise, chemicals, contributes to the 

49  United  Nations  (2015)  Transforming  our  world:  the  2030  Agenda  for  Sustainable  Development,  by  the  General  Assembly,  Resolution 
A/RES/70/1 
50 An overview at the level of the sub-goals is made by several, including the ETC/CCA in this report https://www.eionet.europa.eu/etcs/etc-
cca/products/etc-cca-reports/tp_3-2018 
51 Salas, R. N., Shultz, J. M., & Solomon, C. G. (2020). The Climate Crisis and Covid-19—A Major Threat to the Pandemic Response. New 
England Journal of Medicine. 
52 OECD (2020), Report of Special meeting of the Task Force on Climate Change Adaptation (30/06/2020). 
53General Secretariat of the Council (2020). Conclusions adopted in Special meeting of the European Council (17,18, 19, 20 and 21 July).  
54 https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/FM/Issues/2020/09/30/october-2020-fiscal-monitor  
55 OECD (n.d.). Recovery for Resilience (R4R). Policy brief. Not published, available upon request.  
56 2020 edition of the SWD ‘Overview of natural and man-made disaster risks the EU may face 
57 EEA Report No 21/2019 https://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/healthy-environment-healthy-lives  

8 

 
 
                                                 
burden  of  cardiovascular  disease,  while  noise,  chemicals  and  climate  change  all  drive 
neuropsychiatric disorders58. 

58 Further evidence on these links is available from the scientific opinion on ‘Adaptation to climate change-related health effects’ published 
in June 2020 by the European Commission’s independent Group of Chief Scientific Advisors (SAM). Source:  
https://ec.europa.eu/info/news/new-scientific-opinion-adaptation-climate-change-related-health-effects-recommends-more-support-
resilience-health-sector-2020-jun-29_en 

9 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
2.  PROBLEM DEFINITION  

This  chapter  discusses  the  problem  tree  that  must  be  addressed  by  the  new  Strategy, 
stemming  from  the  fact  that  the  EU  is  still  underprepared  for  current  and  projected 
climate  change  impacts.  This  problem  tree  builds  on  the  problem  analysis  of  the  2013 
Strategy and its Evaluation, extensive foresight into projected climate impacts carried out by 
the Joint Research Centre (hereafter referred to as PESETA)59, assessments by the EEA (both 
at  national60  and  local/regional  level61)  and  contributions  from  stakeholders.  Figure  1 
provides an overview of the problem definition; drivers and problems are described in detail 
in following sections. 

Figure 1: Problem definition for the new EU Adaptation Strategy  

Drivers are numbered (D1-D9), as are the Problems (P1-P4) and (in chapter 4) Objectives (O1-O4). These numbers are 
used later in this report as a guide to the development of policy options. The figure can be read as a flow in columns, whilst 
noting that the problems and drivers are mutually reinforcing and/or overlapping. 

Problems for the new EU Adaptation Strategy and their evolution 

P1: Insufficient knowledge to support decision making 

There is a lack of relevant indicators and meaningful data for informing, and assessing 
national  and local adaptation action.  Data and knowledge gaps cut  across all drivers and 
problems in various ways: from knowledge or data that is not available to knowledge that is 
not reaching the necessary audiences and decision makers; and from data that is not available 
at the level, or in a form to be useful to the lack of skills/knowledge to understand the data 
and make adequate decisions. Data is needed to enable stakeholders to validate their progress 
in  implementing  adaptation  actions;  to  enable  policy  makers  to  maintain,  simplify,  and 
strengthen  climate  policies,  and  to  enable  researchers  and  innovators  to  explore  novel 
adaptation solutions.  

When  available,  climate  data  and  projections  to  anticipate  impacts  are  frequently  not 
available  at  the  local  level,  where  many  critical  decisions  need  to  be  taken.  Similarly, 
adaptation solutions are often either not customised for the local specificities or not yet 
tested  on  a  large  enough  scale  to  facilitate  replication  elsewhere.  Integrating  climate 
change  adaptation  in  local  governance  frameworks  has  been  raised  in  prior  studies  as  a 

59 Feyen L., Ciscar J.C., Gosling S., Ibarreta D., Soria A. (editors) (2020). Climate change impacts and adaptation in Europe. JRC PESETA  
IV final report. EUR 30180EN, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, ISBN 978-92-76-18123-1, doi:10.2760/171121, 
JRC119178. 
60 EEA Report No 6/2020 Monitoring and evaluation of national adaptation policies throughout the policy cycle.  
61 EEA Report No 12/2020 Urban adaptation in Europe: how cities and towns respond to climate change 

10 

 
 
 
                                                 
limiting factor for effective adaptation action62. An analysis of 885 European cities sought to 
investigate the extent to which a mainstreaming approach was used in local climate planning 
as  compared  with  a  dedicated  approach,  i.e.  dedicated  stand-alone  climate  policy 
documents.63  The  results  highlighted  the  importance  of  choosing  either  a  "dual-track 
approach" in which municipalities develop and adopt the dedicated and mainstreaming plan 
simultaneously,  or  first  focus  on  a  dedicated  approach  and  later  mainstream  local  climate 
issues. This would encourage effective implementation of tangible climate actions as well as 
subsequent diffusion of climate issues into other local sector policies.  

There is a lack of appropriate methodologies and indicators to integrate climate change 
adaptation  with  disaster  risk  reduction  strategies.  Climate-related  disaster  loss  and  risk 
data are important not only for crafting and implementing National Adaptation Plans (NAP) 
and Strategies (NAS), but also for disaster risk assessment and management, risk monitoring, 
risk  modelling,  loss  accounting,  economic  and  social  policy,  accessing  the  EU  Solidarity 
Fund, local authority planning, and the provision of green investments. Despite the usefulness 
of these types of data, they are currently not widely available to public authorities, research 
institutions, and other stakeholders. The available data is often incongruous, inconsistent over 
time, lacking the granularity and standardisation required to draw comparisons across regions 
and  Member  States.  The  data  is  also  often  incomplete:  for  certain  perils  there  is  only 
information  on the number of people affected (insured and uninsured), the economic losses 
(indirect  and  direct),  and  the  affected  area.  Moreover,  non-economic  losses  (e.g. 
environmental  degradation  of  ecosystems,  reduction  in  biodiversity,  destruction  of  items  of 
cultural significance, emotional and psychological damages) are entirely absent from existing 
datasets.  

P2: Weaknesses in implementing, monitoring and reporting of adaptation action 

There  is  currently  only  limited  agreement  on  principles,  requirements  and  guidelines 
for adaptation. This results in the lack of a common method for systematic monitoring and 
evaluating the implementation of adaptation policies. For public investment, The Monitoring 
Mechanism  Regulation  (to  be  replaced  by  the  provisions  of  the  Energy  Union  Governance 
Regulation from 2021 onwards) requires Member States to report to the Commission on their 
adaptation activities. 64 The regulation does not prescribe a definition for adaptation activities 
nor a methodology to track adaptation activities, so it continues to be a challenge to compare 
progress  between  Member  States  or  to  track  horizontal  progress  on  the  Strategy’s 
objectives65.  

For  private  investment,  a  problem  identified  in  the  Strategy's  Evaluation  is  the  tracking  of 
private  finance  flows  for  adaptation  action  in  Europe,  which  would  allow  for  a  clear 
understanding of how investments needs are being met by the private sector. Indicators that 
are more relevant are needed to accurately monitor private sector commitments to adaptation. 

62 Idem 
63  Reckien,  D.,  et  al.  (2019)  Dedicated  versus  mainstreaming  approaches  in  local  climate  plans  in  Europe.  Renewable  and  Sustainable 
Energy Reviews 112: 948-959. 
64  COM(2016)  759:  Proposal  for  a  Regulation  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  the  Governance  of  the  Energy  Union, 
amending Directive 94/22/EC, Directive 98/70/EC, Directive 2009/31/EC, Regulation (EC) No 663/2009, Regulation (EC) No 715/2009, 
Directive 2009/73/EC, Council Directive 2009/119/EC, Directive 2010/31/EU, Directive 2012/27/EU, Directive 2013/30/EU and Council 
Directive (EU) 2015/652 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 525/2013 
65 EEA Report No 6/2020 Monitoring and evaluation of national adaptation policies throughout the policy cycle. 

11 

 
 
                                                 
In this regard, the EU Taxonomy on Sustainable Finance provides a possible common metric 
for the EU for the development of associated incentives and verification measures.66  

The  lack  of  effective  mechanisms  to  monitor  and  report  on  the  implementation  of 
national  and  local  strategies  hinders  progress.  The  recent  policy  developments  and 
increased public awareness highlight the need for a comprehensive monitoring and evaluation 
system  to  effectively  measure  progress.  New  tools  that  allow  assessment  not  only  of 
preparedness (as in the 2013 Strategy), but also of resilience, and which monitor it over time, 
would need to be complemented by relevant and comparable indicators among EU countries. 

The  2018  Evaluation  concluded  that  more  should  be  done  in  this  area,  particularly  for  the 
transport,  construction,  and  energy  sectors67.  Other  work  has  pointed  to  deficiencies  in  EU 
level  monitoring  and  reporting  of  adaptation  spending.68,69  The  2018  Evaluation  also 
concluded that Member States’ monitoring and reporting on their NAS and/or NAP is not yet 
robust  and  there  is  a  need  to  develop  stakeholder  involvement  (including  at  subnational 
levels)  in  their  assessment,  evaluation  and  review.  The  evolution  from  the  EU  Greenhouse 
Gas  Monitoring  Mechanism  Regulation  (MMR)70  to  the  Energy  Union  Governance 
Regulation  from  2021  onwards  for  Member  State  reporting  on  adaptation  activities  is  an 
opportunity to redefine the role for adaptation preparedness scoreboards.71 Similarly, at city 
level,  although  the  pledges  by  cities  are  increasing,  it  is  unclear  to  what  extent  these  are 
turned to action, indicating more should be done to track progress at the local level72. 

The unevenness of progress in the development of climate change adaptation agendas across 
Europe is reflected in the adoption of the NAS and NAP, which are published on the Climate-
ADAPT  platform.73  By  April  2020,  all  27  EU  Member  States  had  adopted  a  NAP  and/or 
NAS. Nonetheless, many are not yet in the implementation stage. For example, Italy, Ireland, 
Slovakia,  Slovenia,  Greece,  Hungary,  and  Poland  have  not  yet  adopted  NAPs,  while  many 
more have yet to establish monitoring indicators and methodologies74. 

Cross-boundary  effects  of  climate  impacts  within  the  EU  are  also  not  sufficiently 
considered.  The  2018  Evaluation  of  the  Adaptation  Strategy  indicated  that  transboundary 
cooperation within the EU remains relatively weak.75 The strong cross-border dimension of 
many climate change impacts stresses the need for enhanced cooperation to advance towards 
effective  cross  border  climate  change  adaptation  strategies  as  well76.  Nonetheless,  the 
unevenness of climate change adaptation agendas is also seen in the approaches implemented 
by  countries  across  Europe  to  comprehensively  reduce  and  adapt  to  climate-related  risks. 
Opportunities for transboundary cooperation should be more systematically considered, e.g. 
in  the  fields  of  freshwater,  wildfires,  transport  infrastructure,  telecommunication,  energy 

66  European  Technical  Expert  Group  on  Sustainable  Finance  (2020).  Financing  a  sustainable  European  Economy.  Taxonomy  Report: 
Technical Annex. 
67 https://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/adaptation-in-energy-system 
68 Grzebieluch, B., Dembek, A., Meier, N., & European Parliament. (2018). The EU spending on fight against climate change. April.  
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2018/603830/IPOL_IDA(2018)603830_EN.pdf  
69 https://www.oecd.org/dac/environment-development/Revised%20climate%20marker%20handbook_FINAL.pdf  
70 Regulation (EU) No 525/2013 on a mechanism for monitoring and reporting greenhouse gas emissions and for reporting other information 
at national and Union level relevant to climate change and repealing Decision No 280/2004/Ec. 
71 The adaptation preparedness scoreboard aims to create an overview of Member States’ adaptation policies. See for more information:  
EEA (n.d.). Working Document on the Adaptation Preparedness Scoreboard.  
72 The recently published EEA report provides evidence for this point: https://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/urban-adaptation-in-europe  
73 Climate Adapt- Country profiles. https://climate-adapt.eea.europa.eu/ 
74 EEA Report No 6/2020 Monitoring and evaluation of national adaptation policies throughout the policy cycle. 
75 European Commission (2018) Study to support the evaluation of the EU Adaptation Strategy, Final Report – available at  
https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/clima/files/adaptation/what/docs/adapt_strat_eval_report_en.pdf  
76 https://www.eea.europa.eu/themes/climate-change-adaptation/adaptation-policies/adaptation-policies-in-transnational-regions. 

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infrastructure77 and other types of 'critical infrastructure'.78 Climate hazard impacts to critical 
infrastructures and EU regional investments may rise strongly in Europe: modelling predicted 
that damages could already triple by the 2020s, could increase six-fold by mid-century, and 
could  increase  by  more  than  ten-fold  by  the  end  of  the  century  compared  to  a  1981-2010 
baseline.79  The  EU  Sendai  Action  Plan  promotes  resilient  investments 
in  critical 
infrastructure  across  EU  countries,  although 
transboundary  aspect  could  be 
strengthened.80  

the 

P3: Adaptation action is not taken quickly enough 

Mainstreaming  of  adaptation  in  relevant  policies  is  progressing,  but  at  a  suboptimal 
pace  in  light  of  the  increasing  frequency  and  intensity  of  the  impacts.  Although  the 
increase  in  ambition  for  climate  mainstreaming  of  30%  in  the  new  Multiannual  Financial 
Framework (2021-2027)81 is likely to benefit adaptation action, the EU's tracking system for 
climate action does not differentiate between how much is spent on climate change mitigation 
and  on  adaptation.82  Another  issue  is  that  economic  models  and  financial  decision-making 
tools  used  to  underpin  investments  still  do  not  include  the  damage  costs  and  benefits  of 
investments in resilience (climate risk assessments).83  

Guidance for mainstreaming has been provided in some policy areas, but its effectiveness is 
unclear.  The  2018  Evaluation  noted  that  there  is  still  a  need  to  better  understand  how  the 
guidance documents are being used by Member States. In its remarks on the new MFF 2021-
2027,  the  European  Court  of  Auditors  (ECA)  repeated  its  concerns  regarding  the  Common 
Agricultural  Policy  (CAP)  link  to  climate  and  environmental  objectives84,  including 
adaptation,  as  this  is  not  tracked  in  expenditure.85  The  Commission  replied  to  ECA  that  a 
clear-cut  separation  between  adaptation  and  mitigation,  as  well  as  for  other  environmental 
objective, is often not possible in agriculture and forestry. Given the importance of the CAP 
and Cohesion Policy in the total EU budget, these will remain crucial areas to address.  

(Un-)insured  losses  and  risks  are  inadequately  reported  and  acted  upon.  The  2018 
Evaluation  identified  the  role  of  insurance  and  financial  products  in  involving  the  private 
sector in adaptation and in mitigation of disaster risks as a key priority. A related issue is that 
the approach to insurance of climate risks varies widely across Member States. In a first step, 
it would be helpful to gather information on the approach adopted in each Member State in 
relation to public versus private insurance mechanisms, to assess where private insurance can 
make a significant  contribution. A prerequisite for private insurance for  climate risks is  the 
sufficiency  and  robustness  of  data  to  put  insurers  in  a  position  to  build  projections  on  the 
climate  and  to  allow  accurate  assessment  and  pricing  of  those  risks.  However,  even  where 

77 https://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/adaptation-in-energy-system 
78 European Environment Agency (2017). Climate changes, impacts and vulnerabilities in Europe 2016. An indicator-based report.  
Retrieved from: https://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/climate-change-impacts-and-vulnerability-2016 
79 Forzieri, G., Bianchi, A., Marin Herrera, M.A., Batista e Silva, F., Feyen, L. and Lavalle, C., 2015. Resilience of large investments and 
critical  infrastructures  in  Europe  to  climate  change.  EUR  27598  EN.  Luxembourg  (Luxembourg):  Publications  Office  of  the  European 
Union. 
80: Action Plan on the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, SWD(2016) 205 final/2. 
81 European Commission (October 2019). Time to decide on the Union’s financial framework for 2021-2027 (COM). Retrieved from:  
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/publications/communication-time-decide-unions-financial-framework-2021-2027_en 
82  European  Court  of  Auditors  (2016).  Spending  at  least  one  euro  in  every  five  from  the  EU  budget  on  climate  action:  ambitious  work 
underway, but at serious risk of falling short'. 
83 E3G (2017). Climate Risk and the EU Budget investing in resilience. Retrieved from: 7 European Court of Auditors (2017), Landscape 
review: EU action on energy and climate change 
84  European  Court  of  Auditors  (ECA)  (2019):  ECA  remarks  in  brief  on  the  Commission's  legislative  proposals  for  the  next  multiannual 
financial framework (MFF). 
85 European Commission – DG AGRI (2019). Evaluation study on the impact of the CAP on climate change and Greenhouse Gas emissions.  
Retrieved from: https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/29eee93e-9ed0-11e9-9d01-01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF 

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insurers  have  sufficient  data,  the  insurance  industry  may  not  be  willing  or  able  to  provide 
insurance  against these risks at  an affordable price where  risk become too high.86  The may 
lead to mismatches between insurers’ premium and clients’ ability to pay. 

Moreover,  not  acting  upon  risks  urgently  will  lead  to  distributional  consequences,  because 
regions will be affected differently based on their location, climate, population, legal system 
and  geography.  There  is  a  clear  north-south  divide  in  the  regional  distribution  of  welfare 
losses,  southern  regions  having  aggregated  welfare  losses  several  times  larger  compared  to 
those  in  the  north  of  Europe,87  and  thus  climate  change  may  increase  future  intra-regional 
disparities.88  Key  economic  sectors  in  regions  will  also  be  affected,  such  as  tourism89, 
agriculture  and  low-carbon  energy90,  which  could  further  exacerbate  existing  inequalities. 
Climate  change  can  also  heavily  affect  communities  dependent  on  natural  resources  for 
traditional  practices.  Assessments  of  the  role  of  socio-economic  status  and  age  also  show 
higher  exposures  and  vulnerabilities  to  climate  health  hazards,  with  concentrations  in 
Southern Europe, due to higher proportions of elderly, rural and low-income people, who are 
particularly vulnerable.91  

The  varying  effects  of  climate  change  on  women  and  men  and  how  climate  impacts 
internationally  may  amplify  gender  inequalities  (e.g.  social  responsibilities,  practices)  have 
also shown to be essential to any adaptation effort.92,93 

P4: Climate impacts from outside the EU are not addressed 

The  EU  strategic  approach  to  adaptation  and  international  developments  need  to  be 
better  aligned.  The  European  Green  Deal  reaffirms  that  the  global  challenges  of  climate 
change and environmental degradation require a global response.94 While the EU has pursued 
adaptation  priorities  internationally,  particularly  through  its  development  cooperation 
activities, the Evaluation identified only limited integration of international activities into the 
broader climate change adaptation strategy. The current Strategy, nevertheless, does refer to 
transboundary issues in its guidance on the development of NASs, as well as in the priorities 
of the LIFE programme for adaptation flagship projects that address trans-regional issues. 

At  the  same  time,  international  policy  developments  such  as  the  adoption  of  the  Paris 
Agreement,  the  adoption  of  the  UN  Sustainable  Development  Goals  and  many  others 
demonstrate that international climate change adaptation issues require further consideration 
by the EU in the new Strategy. The international angle is not only relevant from a climate and 
environmental policy perspective, but also to address foreign and security policy, e.g. effects 
in  Europe  from  global  climate  change  impacts  on  international  stability  and  security,  or  on 
population  displacement  95.  Moreover,  the  spillover  effects  matter  from  an  economic 

86  Surminski  &  Eldridge  (2015).  Flood  insurance  in  England:  an  assessment  of  the  current  and newly  proposed  insurance  scheme  in  the 
context of rising flood risk. Journal of Flood Risk Management. 
87 Feyen L.et al (2020). Climate change impacts and adaptation in Europe. JRC PESETA IV final report. 
88  Kovats,  R.S.  et  al  (2014)  Europe.  In:  Climate  Change  2014:  Impacts,  Adaptation,  and  Vulnerability.  Part  B:  Regional  Aspects. 
Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, pp. 1267-1326. 
89 COACCH (2019). The Economic Cost of Climate Change in Europe: Synthesis Report on Interim Results. 
90 IPCC (2018) Global Warming of 1.5°C. Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related 
global greenhouse gas emission pathways. 
91 Marí-Dell’Olmo, M., et al (2019) Social inequalities in the association between temperature and mortality in a South European context. 
Int. Journal of Public Health. 
92 Resurrección, B., et al. (2019) Gender-Transformative Climate Change Adaptation: Advancing Social Equity. Paper commissioned by the 
Global Commission on Adaptation (GCA)  
93  European  Insitute  for  Gender  Equality  (2020)  Women  and  the  environment:  climate  change  is  gendered.  Available  at: 
https://eige.europa.eu/publications/beijing-25-policy-brief-area-k-women-and-environment 
94 European Commission (2019) The European Green Deal, section 3 ‘The EU as a Global Leader’.  
95 Council of the European Union (20 January 2020). Council Conclusions on Climate Diplomacy. Retrieved from:  

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perspective:  global  and  EU  supply  chains  (e.g.  for  EU  agriculture  and  manufacturing)  are 
already being disrupted, and increasingly so96.  
The implications  of such transboundary effects of climate impacts in 3rd countries are 
not  yet  integrated  in  the  EU  adaptation  policy,  even  if  climate  impacts  in  developing 
countries are already given considerable attention in the EU development policy. There is an 
increasing need for the EU to conduct further research and review existing evidence to inform 
guidance  to  Member  States  on  how  to  tackle  likely  impacts  from  international  spillover 
effects97. The EU, due to its geo-political, security, and trade ties with other countries, as well 
as its proximity to countries that are likely to be less able to adapt to climate change, is highly 
vulnerable  to  international  spillover  effects98.  Thus,  thorough  assessments  of  the  EU's 
exposure to international spillover effects, including of the EU's key global interdependencies 
and their related climate risks, are necessary.  

Furthermore, EU support to developing countries’ own adaptation efforts is in line with the 
EU’s  vision  of  global  solidarity  in  facing  climate  change.  In  2019,  the  EIB  provided  €3.2 
billion in lending to support climate action. The European Commission provided €2.5 billion 
in  finance  to  developing  countries  in  2019.  While  the  global  public  finance  flows  in 
adaptation, with significant contribution from the EU and its Member States, is consistent and 
substantial,  it  urgently  needs  to  be  scaled  up.  Examples  include  pledges  to  multilateral 
climate funds (the Green Climate Fund and the Adaptation Fund); support channelled through 
the GCCA+ targeted at Least Developed Countries and Small Island Developing States; and 
the  mobilisation  of  innovative  financial  instruments  through  the  support  to  the  preparation 
and  financing  of  bankable  climate-relevant  development  projects.  EU  Member  States 
provided  €4.8  billion  in  climate  adaptation  financing  in  2019  and  €6.7bn  to  cross  cutting 
projects addressing both mitigation and adaptation, totalling over half of total Member States’ 
Climate Finance.  

Box 1: Stakeholder views on the main problems for the EU Adaptation strategy 

Stakeholder views99:  
In  all  consultation  work  streams,  stakeholders  expressed  an  interest  in  the  EU  providing 
consistent  guidelines  and  indicators  for  monitoring  and  reporting  on  adaptation.  For 
interviewees  and  workshop  participants  representing  national  and  local  authorities,  civil 
society  businesses  and  international  organisations,  the  EU  should  play  a  key  role  in 
facilitating  knowledge  sharing  at  all  levels  of  governance,  between  countries  and  within 
them.  The  lack  of  effective  mechanisms  to  support  mainstreaming  of  ecosystem-based 
approaches  was  also  mentioned  multiple  times  by  civil  society  representatives  as  well  as 
some national authorities, international organisations, EU institutions and businesses. These 
stakeholders  agreed 
the  development  of  standard 
methodologies to quantify the costs and benefits of  ecosystem-based approaches, in order 
to  help  with  the  implementation  of  solutions.  Other  needs  for  guidance  mentioned  by 
businesses,  international  organisations  and  other  stakeholders  include  guidance  on 
adaptation planning, financing (investments), and monitoring. Overall, the role of the EU in 

the  EU  should  promote 

that 

https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-5033-2020-INIT/en/pdf 
96 Ibid  
97 COACCH (2018). The Economic Cost of Climate Change in Europe: Synthesis Report on  State of Knowledge and Key Research Gaps. 
Policy brief by the COACCH project. Editors: Paul Watkiss, Jenny Troeltzsch, Katriona McGlade. Published May , 2018. (pg. 56). 
98 Benzie, M., T. Carter, F. Groundstroem H. Carlsen, G. Savvidou, N. Pirttioja, R. Taylor & A. Dzebo (2017). Implications for the EU of  
cross-border climate change impacts, EU FP7 IMPRESSIONS Project Deliverable D3A.2. 
99 See Annex 2 for more details on the stakeholder consultation.  

15 

 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
providing consistent guidance was reported by all stakeholder groups. 

identified  as  a  general  barrier,  particularly  among 

In  the  stakeholder  workshops  and  targeted  interviews,  Member  State  “inertia”  towards 
adaptation  was 
international 
organisations and civil society representatives, though it was also reported by some national 
authorities,  EU  institutions  and  businesses  representatives.  As  one  representative  of  a 
European  Business  Association  mentioned:  “the  Member  States  tend  to  be  barriers  to 
making  progress  on  the  issue  themselves.”  More  specifically,  workshop  participants  and 
interviewees  explained  this  inertia  with  the  lack  of  formal  (legal)  commitments  for 
adaptation  and  clear  political  targets  (especially  in  comparison  to  mitigation),  the  lack  of 
mechanisms  and  indicators  to  monitor  and  report  implementation,  and  the  lack  of 
alignment  of  standard  practices.  The  lack  of  funding  was  also  identified  by  several 
stakeholders  (representing  business  organisations,  civil  society,  EU  institutions,  local 
authorities, national authorities and international organisations) as a barrier to adaptation 
in  the  EU,  though  it  was  highlighted  that  this  is  most  likely  not  caused  by  a  lack  of 
availability, but rather differing priorities and commitments. 

What are the problem drivers? 

The adaptation gap is already large, as identified in global and European assessment reports, 
and getting larger. This is due to impacts being increasingly prevalent and because science is 
pushing our understanding of impacts (e.g. on cascading impacts).  

Multiple reports highlight the global state of unpreparedness (IPCC more broadly, but more 
specifically  the  United  Nations  Environment  Programme  report  series  of  Adaptation  Gap 
reports). Most worrying  is  the lack of preparation for possible tipping points  in  the climate 
dynamics. At EU level, the European Environment Agency has continually highlighted this 
issue in  its  adaptation  reporting, most recently on urban adaptation.  Continued construction 
on  floodplains,  the  increased  covering  of  soil  surfaces  by  concrete  or  asphalt,  the  small 
amount of green spaces, and urban sprawl encroaching on wildfire and landslide prone areas 
are making European cities much more vulnerable to climate change. The EEA’s latest report 
(October 2020, quoted in the Impact Assessment) gives the latest state of play on European 
climate  change  adaptation  planning  and  action  efforts  at  local  level.  While  many  local 
authorities have realised the importance of becoming resilient to climate change, progress in 
adaptation  planning  remains  slow.  Implementation  of  adaptation  measures  and  the 
monitoring of the success of these actions are even slower. Measures currently put in place 
mostly  focus  on  developing  knowledge,  awareness  raising  or  policy  developments. 
Implementation  of  actual  physical  or  transformative  adaptation  solutions  is  far  behind  — 
such  as  developing  more  green  spaces  to  reduce  the  impacts  of  heatwaves  or  adjusting 
sewerage systems to cope with flash flooding. 

D1: Accelerating pace of climate change impacts 

With record high temperatures in 2020 globally and across much of Europe, and with a clear 
message  from  climate  models  that  temperatures  will  continue  to  increase,  the  urgency  to 
adapt seems undeniable.100,101 Although climate change mitigation may reduce, or even avoid, 

100 Copernicus Climate Change Service (2020) 2019 was the second warmest year and the last five years were the warmest on record.  
Retrieved from https://climate.copernicus.eu/copernicus-2019-was-second-warmest-year-and-last-five-years-were-warmest-record  

16 

 
 
                                                 
some impacts  of climate change in  the EU102, stopping all  greenhouse  gas  emissions in  the 
EU would not stop the climate impacts that are already occurring, and which are projected to 
continue to increase for decades (see Annex 9). 

This  reflects  the  message  of  the  IPCC  Special  report  that  even  in  a  best-case  scenario  of 
sustained emission limitations, and global warming limited to 1.5°C, there will be severe (and 
unequally distributed) stress on agri-food systems, infrastructure, ecosystems, natural capital 
and  human  health.103,104  There  are  heavy  economic,  social,  and  environmental  costs 
associated with inaction. The PESETA IV study found that “exposing the present economy to 
global  warming  of  3°C  would  result  in  an  annual  welfare  loss  of  at  least  €175  billion”  in 
Europe105.  A  recent  Horizon  2020  COACCH  project  study  estimated  costs  of  inaction  in 
Europe in 2050 to be close to  €200 billion per year in a 4°C pathway, and more than €100 
billion per  year in a 2°C pathway, and the COACCH study  generally  estimate higher costs 
than PESETA as they also include socio-economic changes106. Moreover, conditions for vital 
ecosystems, which provide critical services for mitigation (e.g. carbon sinks) and adaptation 
(e.g. protection against floods, desertification, water and air purification) are worsening. Box 
2 summarises the climate impacts for the EU in a scenario without additional climate change 
mitigation (warming of 3°C or more above pre-industrial temperature) and without additional 
adaptation measures: 

Box 2: Foresight to 2100 on projected climate impacts – cost of non-action in Europe 

People:  

  An additional 15 million Europeans living in the proximity of woodland would be exposed to high-to 

extreme fire danger for at least 10 days/year. 

  Each year nearly 300 million people would be exposed to deadly heatwaves, resulting in a 30-fold rise 

in deaths from extreme heat (90,000 annual deaths compared to around 3,000 each year today). 

  Water  resources  availability  would  drop  by  up  to  40%  in  southern  regions  of  Europe  and  droughts 

would happen more frequently in most of southern and western Europe. 

  Water scarcity and drought would increasingly affect agriculture, energy production and water supply 

in regions that already suffer from water stress. 

Planet: 

  The  alpine  tundra  domain  would  contract  by  84%  and  practically  disappear  in  the  Pyrenees.  The 

natural climatic tree line would shift vertically up by up to 8 m/year.  

101 WMO (2020) WMO confirms 2019 as second hottest year on record. Retrieved from https://public.wmo.int/en/media/press-release/wmo-
confirms-2019-second-hottest-year-record  
102 Feyen L., Ciscar J.C., Gosling S., Ibarreta D., Soria A. (editors) (2020). Climate change impacts and adaptation in Europe. JRC PESETA  
IV final report. EUR 30180EN, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, ISBN 97 
103 IPCC, 2018: Global Warming of 1.5°C. Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related 
global greenhouse gas emission pathways. Retrieved from: https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/ 
104  IPBES  (2019):  Summary  for  policymakers  of  the  global  assessment  report  on  biodiversity  and  ecosystem  services  of  the 
Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services. S. Díaz, J. Settele, E. S. Brondízio E.S., H. T. Ngo, M. 
Guèze,  J.  Agard,  A.  Arneth,  P.  Balvanera,  K.  A.  Brauman,  S.  H.  M.  Butchart,  K.  M.  A.  Chan,  L.  A.  Garibaldi,  K.  Ichii,  J.  Liu,  S.  M. 
Subramanian,  G.  F.  Midgley,  P.  Miloslavich,  Z.  Molnár,  D.  Obura,  A.  Pfaff,  S.  Polasky,  A.  Purvis,  J.  Razzaque,  B.  Reyers,  R.  Roy 
Chowdhury, Y. J. Shin, I. J. Visseren-Hamakers, K. J. Willis, and C. N. Zayas (eds.). IPBES secretariat, Bonn, Germany. 
105 Feyen L., Ciscar J.C., Gosling S., Ibarreta D., Soria A. (editors) (2020). Climate change impacts and adaptation in Europe. JRC PESETA 
IV final report. EUR 30180EN, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, ISBN 978-92-76-18123-1, doi:10.2760/171121, 
JRC119178. 
106 Horizon 2020 project COACCH (2018). The Economic Cost of Climate Change in Europe: Synthesis Report on State of Knowledge and 
Key Research Gaps. Policy brief by  the COACCH project. Editors: Paul Watkiss, Jenny Troeltzsch, Katriona McGlade. Published May , 
2018. (pg. 56).  

17 

 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
  Ecological domains would shift northwards, resulting in severe changes of the current ecosystems in 

Europe (e.g. Alpine, Boreal), and the development of Tropical ones.  

  Wildfire  and  pest  outbreaks  in  forests  would  become  more  frequent  and  severe,  increasing  biomass 

loss and carbon release. 

Prosperity: 

 

In  the  absence  of  international  market  adjustments,  with  current  crops  and  practices,  yields  would 
decline by more than 10% in southern Europe.  

  Total drought losses would increase to nearly 45 €billion/year with 3°C warming in 2100 compared to 

9 €billion/year at present.  

  Almost half a million people would be exposed to river flooding each year, or nearly three times the 
number  at  present,  and  river  flood  losses  would  rise  6-fold  in  magnitude,  reaching  nearly  50 
€billion/year with 3°C in 2100.  

  Coastal flood losses would grow by two orders of magnitude and climb to 250 €billion/year in 2100, 
while  2.2  million  people  would  be  exposed  per  year  to  coastal  inundation  compared  to  100,000  at 
present 

 

If  3°C  global  warming  occurred  in  today’s  economy,  annual  welfare  loss  could  represent 
approximately  0.5%  of  EU  GDP,  when  considering  only  a  limited  set  of  climate  impacts  (river  and 
coastal flooding, agriculture, droughts, energy  supply, and windstorms). Furthermore,  mortality from 
temperature extremes would also cause significant additional economic losses in the range of EUR 122 
billion.  

Source: JRC PESETA IV final report (2020) 

D2: Knowledge gaps on climate change adaptation 

Uncertainty about climate change pathways is itself a barrier to adaptation action.107 If 
we  can  better  understand  climate  change  impacts,  and  make  that  information  widely 
available,  people  will  take  wise  decisions  and  adapt.  would  need  to  mobilise  additional 
support  for  e.g.  the  development  of  better  economic  models  for  the  impacts  of  climate 
change,  sectoral  interlinkages,  and  their  (economic  and  non-economic)  cost,  a  deeper 
understanding  of  health  and  environmental  impacts,  including  on  ecosystem  services,  and 
foster  innovative  uses  of  climate  data.  There  remain  large  knowledge  gaps  that  would  still 
need to be bridged, such as on economic losses from climate change, cascading effects from 
simultaneous or sequential climate impacts, spill-over effects from outside Europe on the EU, 
or  tipping  points  beyond  which  the  human  and  natural  ecosystems  would  not  recover. 
Moreover,  the  diverse  information  sources  on  climate  impacts  in  Europe  (e.g.  European 
Forest Fires Information System, European Drought Observatory) and internationally need to 
be  better  federated  to  increase  visibility  and  coverage,  and  to  ensure  compatibility  of 
information. 

There is increasing demand for translating the existing wealth of climate data and information 
into customised tools and products i.e. solutions. These tools are part of the backbone of the 
transition to a climate-resilient and low-carbon society, as they are needed to help decision-
makers  take  informed  decisions  to  boost  resilience  and  adaptation  capacity  of  their 
communities. More actions are needed to scale up local adaptation solutions through national 
and EU funding for regional development and innovation.  

107 Aguiar, F. C., et al. (2018) Adaptation to climate change at local level in Europe: an overview. Environmental Science & Policy 86: 38-
63. 

18 

 
 
  
                                                 
The  uncertainty  of  losses  and  climate  damage  estimates,  and  the  absence  of  sufficiently 
reliable  predictive  models,  have  impacts  on  the  accurate  pricing  of  insurance  products;  this 
creates a major barrier for private sector investments. This lack of knowledge also contributes 
to decision makers not taking decisions that place due value on climate resilience. Such tools 
exist (e.g. Figure 2 illustrates one developed by the EEA to improve knowledge of forest fire 
risks), but they are not precise enough to serve local administrations or private insurers. 

Figure 2: Example of projected change in meteorological forest fire danger by the late 
21st century compared with the period 1981-2010. 

Source: EEA Story maps http://discomap.eea.europa.eu/climate  

D3: Low public engagement and professional awareness 

All levels of government, including cities and regions, need a sound understanding of the 
climate  risks  and  vulnerabilities  on  their  territory  to  guide  their  decision-making  and 
policy shaping.108 Therefore, in  the implementation of the 2013 Strategy,  efforts  have been 
made  towards  a  better  understanding  of  risks  and  vulnerabilities  throughout  Europe.  Public 
awareness  is  on  the  rise  from  directed  policies  (e.g.  local  awareness  campaigns)  and  from 
daily news of climate-change related impacts such as extreme weather and forest fires. Seven 
in  ten  respondents  to  a  2019  special  Eurobarometer109  agreed  that  adapting  to  the  adverse 
impacts of climate change could have positive outcomes for citizens in the EU. 

There  has  been  a  significant  increase  in  the  knowledge  base  for  vulnerability 
assessments  since  2014,  boosted  by  a  number  of  EU-funded  research  (e.g.  ESPON, 
PESETA);  however,  the  assessments  still  vary  significantly;  and  thus,  so  does  the  level  of 
understanding of adaptation options to reduce vulnerability and risks.110 To illustrate this, the 
2018 EEA report on National climate change vulnerability and risk assessment111 provided a 

108  European  Commission  Joint  Research  Centre  (2018)  Guidebook  'How  to  develop  a  Sustainable  Energy  and  Climate  Action  Plan 
(SECAP)' Available at: https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC112986/jrc112986_kj-nb-29412-en-n.pdf 
109 Special Eurobarometer 490 https://ec.europa.eu/clima/citizens/support_en  
110 Ecofys (2017) Assessing Adaptation Knowledge in Europe: Vulnerability to Climate Change.  
111 EEA (2018) National climate change vulnerability and risk assessments in Europe 

19 

 
 
 
                                                 
review of national climate change impact, vulnerability, and risk assessments (CCIV) across 
Europe.  The  evaluation  showed  that  almost  all  EEA  member  countries  have  conducted  at 
least  one  national  CCIV,  which  was  then  used  as  a  key  information  source  for  the 
development  of  national  adaptation  policies.  The  analysis,  however,  also  noted  challenges 
related  to  gaps  in  data,  integration  of  quantitative  and  qualitative  information,  and  cross-
sector comparisons.  

The European Green Deal mentions that involvement and commitment of the public and 
of all stakeholders  is  crucial to  its success.  For  adaptation  in  particular,  the distribution of 
roles  and  responsibilities  between 
the  Member  States’ 
the  European 
governments,  regional and local  authorities, citizens and the private sector remains unclear. 
This is partly due to the cross-sectoral nature of adaptation.  

institutions, 

Moreover,  there  are  different  approaches  to  stakeholder  engagement  in  EU  countries 
and different approaches to stakeholder engagement throughout the policy cycle: in the 
process  of  setting  climate  change  adaptation  goals,  some  countries  engage  stakeholders  via 
consultation processes, whereas others provide on the ground technical adaptation support.112 
To  differing  extents  in  different  countries,  involving  stakeholders  in  the  process  of 
developing  adaptation  strategies  has  increased  awareness  and  acceptance,  which  ultimately 
helps  successful  implementation  of  a strategy. This  is  also  closely  related to  the need  for  a 
multi-disciplinary understanding of climate change adaptation, which is recognised by local 
authorities  and  stakeholders  as  a  way  to  avoid  maladaptation.  This  often  means  fixing  one 
single  problem  that  creates  bigger  ones  elsewhere  e.g.  the  over-reliance  on  irrigation  to 
continue growing crops no longer suited for the new local climate thereby exacerbating water 
shortages  for  other  users.  Likewise,  some  economic  practices  are  no  longer  suitable  under 
changing climate change conditions, like the exploitation of monoculture plantations of trees 
prone to fire (e.g. eucalyptus in Portugal or Spain). Despite these examples, the use of cross-
sectoral approaches remains limited113. 

D4: Insufficient priority given to adaptation in some Member States and regions 

Adapting  to  climate  change  is  first  about  building  resilience  and  anticipating  the 
impacts,  and  ultimately  reacting  and  managing  impacts  if/once  they  arrive.  The  Paris 
Agreement  calls  for  a  balance  between  adaptation  and  mitigation114;  however,  in  the  EU 
adaptation  investment  tends  to  have  a  lower  priority  than  mitigation.115  At  the  local  level, 
cities  have  mostly  dealt  with  mitigation  and  adaptation  as  two  separate  strategies.  Local 
authorities that participate in networks are more likely to have started the adaptation process; 
being a member of multiple networks is associated with higher levels of adaptation planning, 
sharing of best practices, and receiving support in developing their Strategy.116  
Policy tends to give greater priority to climate change mitigation117, but this behaviour is 
also more widespread for the private and public sector, and citizens, constituting a significant 
obstacle to adaptation.118 On the side of the private sector, we see that financial markets for 
adaptation  are  less  developed  than  for  mitigation.  This  preference  might  be  motivated  by 

112 Committee of the Regions (2016) Regional and Local Adaptation in the EU since the Adoption of the EU Adaptation Strategy in 2013 
113 https://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/national-adaptation-policy-processes  
114 UNFCCC (2015). Paris Agreement. Article 9, paragraph 4. 
115  FEPS  and  IEEP  (Forthcoming).  A  Green  Deal  for  All.  Achieving  sustainable  equity  between  the  people,  regions,  countries  and 
generations of Europe, Foundation for European Progressive Studies and Institute for European Environmental Policy, Brussels, Belgium 
116  Heidrich,  Oliver,  et  al  (2016)  National  climate  policies  across  Europe  and their impacts  on  cities  strategies. Journal  of  environmental 
management 168 (2016): 36-45. 
117 Ibid 
118 Adger, W. Neil, et al. (2013) Cultural dimensions of climate change impacts and adaptation. Nature climate change 3.2 : 112-117. 

20 

 
 
                                                 
other  perceived  benefits  of  climate  change  mitigation  measures.  These  include  economic 
savings  and improved energy security119;  or by  a  belief that mitigation action is  a common 
good better suited to public policy, while the benefits of climate change adaptation are largely 
related  to  private  goods  (e.g.  climate  proofing  supply  chains,  flood  protection  for  private 
residences), or that in some sectors a clear-cut separation between adaptation and mitigation 
is  not  evident.120  In  addition,  the  actual  impact  of  adaptation  measures  is  more  difficult  to 
measure than the effect of mitigation (i.e. GHG emissions reduction). Adaptation actions are 
most successful when there are no damages, and therefore less visible and attributable. 

Choosing  between  adaptation  and  mitigation  is,  however,  a  false  choice—we  must  do 
both.121  Sustained  emission  limitations  will  decrease  the  medium-to-long  term  severity  of 
climate impacts. An integrated approach of both mitigation and adaptation action, is therefore 
warranted.  Moreover,  adaptation  requires  as  much  attention  as  mitigation  because  even  the 
most  successful  mitigation  action  (i.e.  achieving  globally  a  limited  temperature  increase  of 
just  1.5°C)  still  comes  with  severe  impacts  to  which  we  must  adapt.  One  example  of 
synergies between adaptation and mitigation is the implementation of Nature-based Solutions 
(NbS)  –  these  can  contribute  to  climate  change  mitigation  through  both  storing  and 
sequestering  carbon  and  reducing  energy  demand  (e.g.  by  improving  thermal  comfort  in 
cities)  and  increasing  water  retention  thus  reducing  the  risk  of  flooding  and  recharging 
groundwater(see  Annex  9),  amongst  other  adaptation  benefits.122  In  addition,  prevention  of 
climate  related  disasters,  and  reduction  of  their  impacts  as  far  as  possible  is  more  cost 
effective than dealing with the unmitigated consequence, for instance in terms of emergency 
response. 

D5: Slow adoption and implementation of local adaptation strategies 

The  Evaluation  found  that  progress  on  local  adaptation  strategies  has  been  slower  than 
envisaged  in  2013.123  This  is  evident  in  the  relatively  low  number  of  cities  working  on 
adaptation  compared  to  those  committed  to  mitigation,  for  example  based  on  the  actions 
submitted to the Covenant of Mayors as of 2020, only 2% (almost 4,000 out of 175,120) are 
adaptation focused, the remaining being related to climate change mitigation.124 Reasons for 
this slow up take include, among others, the lack of human and financial resources, especially 
in Southern Europe, whereas, in Northern Europe, uncertainty on climate change scenarios is 
seen  as  an  important  barrier.  125  For  Eastern  Europe,  both  the  limited  capacity  in  policy, 
practitioners and research communities and lack of political commitment were noteworthy.  

Research has shown that how societies respond and adapt to climate change is influenced by 
culture, historical memory and identity126, each of which can either improve awareness and 
sense of urgency for specific climate-related risks, or shift attention away from others.127 

119 Reckien, D. et al. (2018). How are cities planning to respond to climate change? Assessment of local climate plans from 885 cities in the 
EU-28. Journal of Cleaner Production. 191. 207-219. 10.1016/j.jclepro.2018.03.220. 
120 Schneider, T. 2014. Responsibility for private sector adaptation to climate change. Ecology and Society 19(2): 8. http://dx.doi.  
org/10.5751/ES-06282-190208 
121 Global Commission on Adaptation (2019). Adapt now: A Global Call for Leadership on Climate Resilience. Retrieved from:  
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/GlobalCommission_Report_FINAL.pdf 
122 European Commission (forthcoming) Nature-based solutions- State of the art in the EU-Funded projects. 
123 European Commission (2018) Evaluation of the EU Strategy on adaptation to climate change, Report from the Commission to the  
European Parliament and the Council.  
124Covenant 
of 
https://www.covenantofmayors.eu/about/covenant-initiative/covenant-in-figures.html  
125 Aguiar, F. C., et al. (2018) Adaptation to climate change at local level in Europe: an overview. Environmental Science & Policy 86: 38-
63. 
126 Marschütz, B. et al. (2020). Local narratives of change as an entry point for building urban climate resilience. Climate Risk Management, 
100223. 

17.06.2020. 

Retrieved 

Covenant 

Figures. 

Climate 

Energy. 

Mayors 

for 

in 

& 

21 

 
 
                                                 
D6: Insufficient public and private sector adaptation investment 

Financial support for adaptation is not sufficient for the challenges we are facing. Based 
on estimates of the investment needed to meet adaptation needs, it can be assumed that there 
is a sizeable unmet finance need for climate resilient investments in Europe128,129. Competing 
policy and spending priorities, such as currently the COVID-19 response, and the unevenly 
distributed  impacts  of  climate  change  and  means  to  adjust  across  Member  States,  place  a 
burden on the role of policy interventions and public finance to bridge the adaptation-finance 
gap.130131  Investments  being  mobilised  for  the  COVID-19  recovery  through  the  Next 
Generation EU Fund and a reinforced long-term budget for the European Union provide an 
opportunity  for  investments  in  adaptation  and  resilience  to  be  upgraded.132  Moreover,  the 
further  strengthening  in  the  next  MFF  of  the  EU's  social  dimension  and  European  Social 
Fund (ESF+)133 may give more support to the protection of the most vulnerable. Within the 
EU, the aim from the 2014-2020 MFF that at least 20% of European budget  expenditure is 
climate-related,  has  been  increased  to  30%  in  the  2021-2027  MFF  adopted  in  December 
2020134.  

The  European  Green  Deal  emphasises  the  role  of  private  investment  alongside  public 
investment,  and  reaffirms  the  importance  of  access  to  data  and  the  development  of 
instruments  for  investors,  insurers  and  business  to  integrate  climate  change  into  their  risk 
analyses.135 Moreover, the Paris Agreement (Article 2.1(c)) establishes the core objective of 
"making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low GHG emissions and climate-
resilient  development".  In  order  to  meet  international  climate  goals,  there  is  a  collective 
challenge  to  "shift  the  trillions"  in  capital  to  help  drive  the  transition  to  a  zero  carbon, 
climate-resilient economy. Public sources of finance will not be able to meet this demand on 
their  own.136  More  and  more  Europeans  are  finding  that  solidarity  is  needed  in  the  face  of 
unpredictable disasters (both  distinct and slow-onset), and  governments  are more suited for 
this than markets. Public funds continue to play the major role in prevention and resilience; 
however, private capital is required to mainstream resilience in private investment, including 
through climate proofing, and through risk pooling via private insurance. 
Several  general  barriers  exist  for  private  sector  financing  of  adaptation  projects.  137 
Firstly, adaptation does not typically generate a revenue stream and is therefore less attractive 
for  private  finance.  Secondly,  adaptation  includes  a  range  of  wider  benefits  to  society  (in 

of 

of 

costs 

(OECD 

benefits. 

adaptation 

papers;  No. 

environment  working 

127 Ibid 
128 Bottom-up Climate Adaptation Strategies Towards a Sustainable Europe (BASE) (2016) EU-wide economic evaluation of adaptation to 
climate change. Retrieved from: https://base-adaptation.eu/sites/default/files/D.6.3_1.pdf 
129  De  Bruin,  K.  C.,  Dellink,  R.  B.,  &  Agrawala,  S.  (2009). Economic  aspects  of  adaptation  to  climate  change:  integrated  assessment 
Paris: 
and 
modelling 
OECD. https://doi.org/10.1787/225282538105 
130  No  estimations  of  the investment  needs  for  adaptation  exist  that  reflect  the  total, comprehensive  (across  all  adaptation-relevant action 
areas  and  sectors)  investment  needs  for  Europe.  A  large  range  exists  between  the  two  main  studies  that  are  believed  to  best  capture  the 
adaptation investment needs in the EU , varying from €35 billion up to more than €500 billion 
131  De  Bruin,  K.  C.,  Dellink,  R.  B.,  &  Agrawala,  S.  (2009). Economic  aspects  of  adaptation  to  climate  change:  integrated  assessment 
modelling 
Paris: 
and 
OECD. https://doi.org/10.1787/225282538105 
132 European Commission (2020). Financing the Recovery Plan for Europe. Retrieved  
from:https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/factsheet_3_04.06.pdf 
133 European Commission (2020). A new, stronger European Social Fund Plus. Retrieved from:  
https://ec.europa.eu/esf/main.jsp?catId=62&langId=en 
134  European  Council  press  release,  ‘’Long-term  EU  budget  2021-2027  and  recovery  package’’,  17  December  2020 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2020/12/17/multiannual-financial-framework-for-2021-2027-adopted/. 
135 Commission Work Programme 2020 (COM (2020)37 final).  
136 Climate Policy Initiative (2019). Measuring the Private Capital Response to Climate Change: a proposed dashboard. Retrieved from:  
https://climatepolicyinitiative.org/publication/measuring-the-private-capital-response-to-climate-change-a-proposed-dashboard/ 
137 United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) Finance Initiative (2016). Demystifying adaptation finance for the private sector.  
Nairobi: UNEP. 

environment  working 

papers;  No. 

adaptation 

benefits. 

(OECD 

costs 

no. 

no. 

6). 

6). 

- 

22 

 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
addition to the direct, private benefits of avoided damages, such as the recreational values for 
restored floodplains meant to protect private farms, biodiversity gains from green roofs meant 
to  cool  individual  buildings  etc.)  that  are  not  necessarily  captured  by  the  private  financial 
return  on  investments  (public  good  problem).  Thirdly,  many  financial  markets  are 
characterised  by  a  shortage  of  the  longer-term  credit  that  is  necessary  for  long-term 
adaptation  investments.  Finally,  reliable  information  on  climate  impacts  on  the  economy  is 
often  unavailable  or  unequally  distributed  among  different  actors,  who  are  often  unaware. 
This disempowers actors from making informed decisions and investing accordingly.  

D7: Lack of customised and cost-effective adaptation solutions 

The 2018 evaluation concluded that there is a need to climate-proof investments supported by 
research and innovation. This need is reaffirmed by the Mission on “Adaptation to Climate 
Change,  including  Societal  Transformation”;  this  is  proposed  under  Horizon  Europe,  and 
employs  innovation  as  a  way  to  catalyse  systemic  change.138  The  proposed  Mission  would 
test  integrated  solutions  to  address  the  complex,  multi-faceted  nature  of  the  transformation 
needed.  
Moreover,  recent  research139  shows  the  importance  of  a  focus  on  innovation.  The  share  of 
climate  change  adaptation  inventions  in  2015  was  roughly  the  same  as  in  1995,  and  this 
stagnation  stands  in  sharp  contrast  to  the  trend  for  climate  change  mitigation  technologies, 
whose  share  in  total  innovation  (including  non-climate-related)  nearly  doubled  during  the 
same period. Moreover, few adaptation inventions are transferred across borders, and there is 
virtually no transfer of patented knowledge to low-income countries. 

In particular, effective mechanisms to support mainstreaming of NbS are missing. Despite the 
fact  that  NbS  have  proved  to  be  cost-efficient  policy  approaches  to  address  climate  change 
adaptation, they are  yet  not used on a large enough scale.140 Reasons for this relatively low 
uptake  are  multiple  (e.g.  cultural  perceptions,  knowledge  and  awareness  gaps,  lack  of 
guidance), and have driven to, among others, unevenness of climate change adaptation action 
across  Member  States.  In  addition  to  this,  even  though  interest  in  the  NbS  concept  is 
increasing in different areas, it has mainly been applied in the agriculture and forestry sectors, 
for  which  NbS  are  at  the  same  time  also  contributing  to  mitigation.  Experts  continue  to 
advocate  for  supporting  legislation  that  enables  its  systematic  mainstreaming  into  urban 
planning,  i.e.,  incorporating  its  principles  (e.g.  multi-benefit,  sustainability)  into  relevant 
policies and planning tools across sectors.141 

Finally, the lack of accurate models, data and knowledge on damages and losses means that 
climate impacts are not being priced in private decision making, particularly by SMEs as they 
often lack the capacity to do so. Currently, climate-related events such as drought, hail, and 
extreme  heat  are  often  not  insurable.  The  insurance  policies  that  are  available  cannot 
adequately cover the increasing risks SMEs face. This affects the availability of cost-effective 
solutions and skills.  

138 DG Research and Innovation (September 2020). Proposed Mission: A Climate Resilient Europe. Retrieved from:  
https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/climate-resilient-europe_en  
139 Dechezlepretre,Antoine; Fankhauser,Sam; Glachant,Matthieu Michel Marcel; Stoever,Jana; Touboul,Simon.2020.  Invention and Global 
Diffusion  of  Technologies  for  Climate  Change  Adaptation:  A  Patent  Analysis  (English).  Washington,  D.C.:  World  Bank 
Group.https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/648341591630145546/invention-and-global-
diffusion-of-technologies-for-climate-change-adaptation-a-patent-analysis  
140  European Commission  (2019). Review  of  Progress  on  the  Implementation  of  the  EU  Green  Infrastructure  Strategy.  SWD  (2019)  184 
final. Retrieved from: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52019DC0236&qid=1562053537296 
141 Pauleit, S. et. al (2017). Nature-based solutions and climate change–four shades of green. In Nature-Based Solutions to Climate Change  
Adaptation in Urban Areas (pp. 29-49). Springer, Cham. 

23 

 
 
                                                 
D8: International policy developments 

Several  important  international  agreements  were  adopted  after  the  2013  Strategy,  including 
the  Paris  Agreement,  the  UN  Sustainable  Development  Goals  (in  particular  SDG  13  on 
climate  action,  SDG  11  on  sustainable  and  resilient  cities,  but  also  others)142,  the  Sendai 
Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 and the EU Sendai Action plan143. These 
developments  in  international  policy  increased  the  need  to  harmonise  and  closely  integrate 
the EU strategy with international climate change adaptation issues.  

D9: Climate impacts increasingly generate spillover effects across the globe 

The 2013 Strategy does not sufficiently recognise and address the EU's vulnerabilities to 
international spillover effects from climate change impacts outside Europe144. Globally, 
climate  change  has  the  potential  to  affect  trade,  food  security,  stability  and  security,  and 
biodiversity. In terms of trade, risks extend along supply chains. What occurs outside Europe 
due  to  a  changing  climate  will  affect  the  production  and  transport  of  raw  materials  and 
intermediate  goods145.  In  fact,  indirect  impact  of  effects  of  climate  change  internationally 
could  be  as  large  as  the  direct  impacts  within  Europe.  Imports  from  non-EU  regions  could 
decline by 2% by 2050, while exports to non-EU regions could also decline by up to 0.3%146. 
An  EEA  2016  report147  details  Europe's  vulnerabilities  from  international  spillover  effects 
related  to  food  production  and  supply,  including  economic  effects  through  climate-induced 
price volatilities, and disruptions to transport networks and changes to shipping routes. The 
COACCH  project  found  that  the  EU  -  due  to  the  single  market  and  stronger  export 
orientation – receives more supply chains shocks from abroad than the USA. The effects are 
largest for manufacturing and agriculture148.  

Box  3:  Stakeholder  views  on  problems  drivers  hindering  the  new  EU  Adaptation 
Strategy  

Stakeholder views149: 

Impacts: Most of the respondents to the open public consultation (OPC) considered that the 
growing speed of climate impacts is a “very important” driver for the new EU Adaptation 
Strategy  (75.5%).150  An  important  difference  between  OPC  respondents’  reports  of  most-
experienced  events  and  those  of  contributors  to  other  consultation  activities  was  their 
appreciation  of  water-related  events.  While  OPC  respondents  seem  to  have  experienced 
these climate-related events less than other events, the majority of workshop participants and 
interviewees  from  all  stakeholder  groups  (including  civil  society,  national  authorities,  EU 
institutions and international organisations) referred to coastal erosion, flooding, saltwater 

142 https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/  
143 Commission Staff Working Document: Action Plan on the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, SWD (2016) 205 
final/2. 
144  Commission  Staff  Working  Document  (2018)  Evaluation  of  the  EU  Strategy  on  adaptation  to  climate  change  Accompanying  the 
document  Report  From  The  Commission  To  The  European  Parliament  And  The  Council  on  the  implementation  of  the  EU  Strategy  on 
adaptation to climate change SWD/2018/461 final 
145 Lühr, Oliver, Dr Jan-Philipp Kramer, Jannis Lambert, Christian Kind, and Jonas Savelsberg. 2014. ‘Analyse spezifischer Risiken des  
Klimawandels und Erarbeitung von Handlungsempfehlungen für exponierte industrielle Produktion in Deutschland (KLIMACHECK)’.  
Studie im Auftrag des Bundesministeriums für Wirtschaft und Energie Bearbeitungsnr.: I C 4 –02 08 15 – 30/12. Berlin: Prognos / adelphi. 
146 COACCH (2018). The Economic Cost of Climate Change in Europe: Synthesis Report on State of Knowledge and Key Research Gaps.  
Policy brief by the COACCH project. Editors: Paul Watkiss, Jenny Troeltzsch, Katriona McGlade. Published May , 2018. 
147 'Climate change, impacts and vulnerability in Europe 2016, Report No 1/2017', European Environment Agency, 2017: Chapter 6.4 
148  COACCH  (2019).  The  Economic  Cost  of  Climate  Change  in  Europe:  Synthesis  Report  on  Interim  Results.  I_O  Analysis  by  Stefan 
Borsky, Martin Jury. Policy brief by the COACCH project. Editors: Paul Watkiss, Jenny Troeltzsch, Katriona McGlade, Michelle Watkiss.  
149 See Annex 2 for more details on the stakeholder consultation. 
150 See Figure 3-11 in Appendix 1.A accompanying the consultation synopsis presenting the analysis of the OPC. 

24 

 
 
                                                 
intrusion  and  lack  of  water  availability  as  some  of  the  most  important  slow-onset  changes 
caused by climate change in Europe. This was due to the substantial proportion of the EU 
population  which  is  coastal  (including  in  the  outermost  regions),  and  the  importance  of 
water  availability  for  agriculture.  River  flooding  was  mentioned  by  workshop  participants 
representing national authorities and interviewees representing civil society organisations as 
another  important  security  concern  for  the  large  share  of  the  population  living  close  to 
rivers.  They  also  highlighted  strong  differences  in  vulnerabilities  across  Europe.  Southern 
Europe  and  Mediterranean  regions  were  reported  as  the  most  vulnerable  regions  by  the 
majority of respondents across all stakeholder groups, though Central and Eastern Europe 
were considered increasingly vulnerable. 

Problem  drivers:  OPC  respondents  identified  the  following  factors  as  important  for  the 
design of the new Strategy: a lack of interest in climate impacts in some Member States or 
regions  (57.7%);  insufficient  public  finance  for  adaptation  to  climate  change  (55.2%); 
insufficient  public  awareness  of  the  need  to  adapt  to  climate  change  (51.4%);  and  low 
private sector  investment and action on adaptation  (44.4%). In both  the OPC, stakeholder 
workshops  and  interviews,  the  lack  of  knowledge  and  awareness  was  reported  as  key 
problem driver by all stakeholder groups. According to them, at the policy-making level, the 
lack  of  knowledge  and  awareness  on  climate  change  adaptation  most  likely  stems  from  a 
lack  of  access  to  available  and  usable  knowledge  and  data.  Stakeholders  from  EU 
institutions,  government  authorities  and  international  organisations  have  highlighted  the 
difference  between  access  and  usability  of  data  as  a  problem  driver  as  opposed  to  lack  of 
data,  pointing  that  sufficient  data  currently  exists.  In  the  stakeholder  workshops,  several 
participants  across  various  stakeholder  groups  agreed  on  the  lack  of  awareness  at  the 
citizens’  level,  which  manifests  itself  as  a  lack  of  information  on  the  cost  of  inaction  and 
unpreparedness and prevents a necessary behavioural change. 

3.  WHY SHOULD THE EU ACT?  

Legal basis 

The various legal bases for the Adaptation Strategy are addressed in the 2013 EU Adaptation 
Strategy and include at the highest level the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU  Articles  191  and  192(1)).  The  Commission  proposal  for  a  European  Climate  Law 
Regulation also contains provisions on adaptation to climate change. Furthermore, the Paris 
Agreement constitutes an additional international legal basis on which the Union can anchor 
its efforts in climate change adaptation. A full overview of the legal base is in Annex 8. 

Subsidiarity: Necessity and Added Value of EU action 

According  to  the  principle  of  subsidiarity,  the  new  EU  Adaptation  Strategy  must  be 
necessary, and bring added value in comparison to individual actions from the Member States 
alone.  The  EU  was  an  early  actor  on  adaptation,  and  the  European  Commission  was 
recognised  by  the  Global  Commission  on  Adaptation151,  as  a  pioneer  in  integrating 
considerations  of  climate  risk  into  decision-making.  An  ambitious  and  more  proactive  EU-
level intervention is warranted.  

The  consultation  undertaken  as  part  of  the  2018  Evaluation  indicated  that,  although 
governments  at  different  levels  would  have  independently  worked  on  adaptation,  progress 

151 https://gca.org/global-commission-on-adaptation/report 

25 

 
 
                                                 
would  have  been  much  less  significant  in  the  absence  of  the  EU  Strategy.  Moreover,  the 
current Strategy brings EU added value by, e.g. encouraging the identification and bridging 
of  knowledge  gaps  in  research,  supporting  regional  cooperation,  and  by  integrating 
adaptation  in  its  own  policies.  The  EEA  has  demonstrated  the  added  value  of  adaptation 
action at EU level with the example of Climate-ADAPT152. 

As much as individual cities and regions must take action to become more resilient to global 
warming, the Union as a whole must take steps to prepare itself better. For optimal adaptation 
in  the  Union,  all  levels  of  government  have  to  contribute,  including  EU,  national,  regional 
and  local.  Moreover,  there  is  increasing  clarity  that  civil  society  and  individuals  have  an 
important  role  to  play,  and  EU  level  action  can  help  empower  them  in  their  actions  (e.g. 
through  the  Climate  Pact).  EU  action  also  can  significantly  enhance  local  and  regional 
adaptation  action,  for  instance  through  geospatial  information  and  modelling  (e.g.  the  EU 
Copernicus  programme)  or  EU  and  international  exchanges  of  best  practices,  e.g.  via  the 
European and Global Covenants of Mayors. 

Even if adaptation challenges are often local and specific (a strong argument for local-level 
adaptation  policy),  solutions  are  just  as  often  widely  applicable  on  a  regional,  national  or 
transnational  scale.  Moreover,  there  are  also  EU-specific  impacts  (e.g.  threats  to  the  Single 
Market,  effects  on  EU  budget,  on  trade  deals,  additional  pressure  on  migratory  flows,  the 
spread  of  infectious  diseases  and  plant  pests)  or  regions  with  specific  vulnerabilities  (e.g. 
EU’s  nine  outermost  regions  in  the  Atlantic  and  Indian  Oceans  as  well  as  Mediterranean 
countries).  

The  compatibility  and  added  value  of  the  EU  Adaptation  strategy  with  the  principle  of 
subsidiarity are underpinned by: 

  Shared  vulnerable  assets:  The  Strategy  addresses  areas  of  shared  competence, 
including challenges that pertain to transnational governance such as the management 
of  water  catchments,  civil  protection,  biodiversity,  and  marine  and  terrestrial 
ecosystems-based services (COM (2020)/2509310).  

  Transboundary impacts: Climate change impacts occur irrespective of administrative 
boundaries. There is a strong cross-border dimension of many climate change impacts 
(EU  macro-regions  sharing  common  climate  risks,  e.g.  seas  and  river  basins  and 
Alpine  mountainous  areas).  Lack  of  preparedness  in  one  Member  States  may  have 
negative  consequences  for  the  other  Member  States.  The  Covid-19  outbreak,  which 
started  in  a  region  to  later  escalate  into  a  global  crisis,  illustrates  the  economic  and 
social 
the  benefits  of 
coordinated action at EU level.  

interconnectedness  between  countries,  demonstrating 

  Shared solutions: The EU can identify and promote transboundary solutions through 
its existing instruments, actions and policies in transnational sectors and regions153 at 
risk,  such  as  the  CAP,  the  Biodiversity  Strategy  etc.  It  can  also  identify  regional 
knowledge  gaps,  harmonise  tools  and  facilitate  science-policy  interactions  to  foster 
mutual  learning across the Member States and systematise information  for decision-
makers. 

Finally, solidarity and convergence across and within the Member States and ensuring a just 
transition  (as  well  as  a  just  resilience  to  climate  change),  have  a  key  role  to  play  for 

152 https://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/sharing-adaptation-information-across-europe   
153 https://www.eea.europa.eu/themes/climate-change-adaptation/adaptation-policies/adaptation-policies-in-transnational-regions  

26 

 
 
                                                 
adaptation  as  highlighted  in  the  European  Green  Deal  and  the  Commission  proposal  for  a 
European Climate Law.154  

4.  OBJECTIVES: WHAT IS TO BE ACHIEVED? 

General objective 

Adaptation is  about understanding, planning and acting  to prevent the impacts in the 
first place, minimise their effects, and address their consequences. Against all the gloom 
of climate impacts and the inevitability of certain shocks, the benefits of adaptation  actions 
extend beyond the avoided human, natural and material losses. They have many positive and 
significant socio-economic effects, with high cost-benefit ratios: 

  environmental  and  social  benefits  accompany  many  adaptation  actions  (e.g.  nature-
based solutions for flooding that also clean the air and waters and restore habitats to 
support biodiversity); 

 

reducing  climate  impacts  on  vulnerable  groups  and  countries  enhances  social 
cohesion; 

  adaptation  actions  targeting  better  management  of  natural  resources  can  reduce 

tensions between communities and support conflict prevention efforts; 

  effective  adaptation  helps  secure  EU  strategic  autonomy  (as  it  provides  the  stability 

required to progress on emission reductions, security, migration, sustainability); 

  enhanced  financial  and  budgetary  stability,  and  economic  growth  (as  it  reduces 
vulnerability to climate-related macroeconomic shocks and pay-outs after disasters);  

  avert,  minimise  and  address  population  displacement  associated  with  the  adverse 

effects of climate change; 

  competitiveness in the growing global adaptation industry (a market worth ~EUR 280 

billion in 2016, growing at ~6% per year); 

 

increased resilience and sustainability in EU firms’ operations and supply chains; 

  a sense of empowerment to citizens, by demonstrating that preventing and managing 

climate impacts can be achieved, and that they can be engaged in it. 

In order to tackle the problems identified in Section 2, it is important to clarify the objectives 
of  EU  action  in  the  field  of  climate  change  adaptation.  Therefore,  this  section  presents  the 
overarching  objective  of  the  new  EU  Adaptation  Strategy:  “By  2050,  the  Union  will  be  a 
climate-resilient  society,  fully  adapted  to  the  unavoidable  impacts  of  climate  change,  with 
reinforced adaptive capacity and minimal vulnerability, and that contributes to achieving the 
Paris Agreement global goal on adaptation.” 

This  objective  builds  on  the  2013  Strategy’s  objective,  which  is  “to  contribute  to  a  more 
climate-resilient  Europe”  by  enhancing  the  preparedness  and  capacity  to  respond  to  the 
impacts  of  climate  change  at  the  local,  regional,  national  and  EU  levels,  developing  a 
coherent  approach  and  improving  coordination.  155  It  is  fully  aligned  with  the  Commission 

154  Proposal  for  a  REGULATION  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT  AND  OF  THE  COUNCIL  establishing  the  framework  for 
achieving climate neutrality and amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 (European Climate Law) COM/2020/80 final 
155 European Commission (2013) An EU Strategy on adaptation to climate change, Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions COM/2013/0216 final, available 
at - https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52013DC0216 

27 

 
 
                                                 
proposal for a Climate Law, which sets Europe on a path towards the global adaptation goal 
(Article 7 of the Paris Agreement) 156. The current objective is more ambitious than the 2013 
objective, as it sets out a vision for Europe towards 2050 to become a climate-resilient society 
and  goes  beyond  a  contribution  to  resilience.  Moreover,  it  includes  a  strengthened 
international  dimension,  as  per  the  problem  definition.  The  specific  objectives  also 
incorporate  a  novel,  mainstreamed  citizen-dimension,  similarly  identified  in,  and  supported 
by, the stakeholder consultation. 

Specific objectives 

In  order  to  achieve  this  general  objective,  four  specific  objectives  are  identified  which 
correspond  to  each  of  the  problems  discussed  in  section  2.1.  The  relationship  between  the 
objectives and problems is presented in Figure 3. Objectives 1 to 3 aim to help actors at all 
levels to improve their knowledge of climate impacts, reinforce planning and climate risk 
management  and  to  accelerate  adaptation  action.  Objective  4  targets  an  increase  in  the 
EU’s contribution to global climate resilience.  

Figure 3: Objective tree for EU Adaptation Strategy 

Objective 1 (O1) - Improve knowledge of climate impacts and development of solutions: 
The new Strategy will aim to increase awareness, education and access to knowledge and fit-
for purpose data on individual and collective climate risks, it will seek to develop innovative 
solutions, and the dissemination of good practice to improve decision making. 

O1  addresses  the  need  for  investment  in  frameworks,  models  and  tools  to  support 
decision making within uncertainty. Efforts to do so are reflected in the ongoing study of 
the European Commission (DG CLIMA) on adaptation modelling.  157 Adaptation modelling 
aims  ultimately  to  act  as  a  tool  to  guide  innovation  of  adaptation  solutions  within  the  new 
Strategy.  

The objective aims to step up ambition on improving knowledge and to invest in an (updated) 
EU risk and vulnerability assessment, including in the outermost regions. This action is 
in  line  with  the  2018  Evaluation,  which  concludes  that  the  knowledge  gaps  remain.  The 
objective also increases ambition through the establishment of valuation methodologies for 
climate change adaptation benefits and effectiveness of measures, with a focus on NbS.  

156 Proposal for a European Climate Law COM/2020/80 final Explanatory Memorandum: “The proposal aims to complement the existing 
policy  framework  by  setting  the  long-term  direction  of  travel  and  enshrining  the  2050  climate-neutrality  objective  in  EU  law,  enhancing 
adaptation  efforts,  establishing  a  process  to  set  out  and  review  a  trajectory  until  2050,  regular  assessment  and  a  process  in  case  of 
insufficient progress or inconsistencies.” 
157European  Commission  DG  Climate  Action  A.3.  (2020).  Study  on  Climate  Modelling.  Task  2  Comprehensive  Desk  Review:  Climate 
Adaptation Models and Tools. Final draft report. 

28 

 
 
 
                                                 
The  objective  increases  the  focus  on  newly  identified  knowledge  gaps  related  to 
interdependencies, synergies  with  other  relevant  goals  (e.g.  biodiversity,  mitigation).  It  will 
also  focus  on  research  and  innovation-inspired  activities  to  help  deliver  large-scale 
solutions  for  climate  change  adaptation  as  foreseen  under  the  Mission  on  “Adaptation  to 
Climate  Change,  including  Societal  Transformation”  (and  similarly  in  the  Soil,  Starfish 
2030,  and  Climate-Neutral  and  Smart  Cities  missions),  which  is  part  of  the  upcoming  EU 
Research  and  Innovation  Framework  Programme,  Horizon  Europe  (2021-2027).158  The 
Strategy will guide research under Horizon Europe (including in relevant Partnerships) with 
the aim to encourage greater uptake of innovation, and achieve positive economic impact and 
job  creation  for  the  pandemic  recovery.  Copernicus  Climate  Change  Services  will  also 
continue to play a key role. 

Objective 2 (O2) – Reinforce planning, implementation, and climate risk management: 
through  risk  assessments  and  management,  and  through  helping  to  close  the  climate 
protection159 gap via risk-transfer mechanisms. 

There  is  a  continued  need  to  strengthen  mainstreaming  of  climate  change  adaptation 
across all sectors at EU level. The Strategy will therefore focus on increased mainstreaming 
within  EU  funds,  research  and  innovation,  and  key  vulnerable  sectors,  such  as  coastal 
protection, energy infrastructure, agriculture, forestry, biodiversity, spatial planning, transport 
and communication, urban development, public health, and water. Moreover, it will focus on 
strengthening  synergies  and  coherence  with  policies  that  share  similar  or  interrelated 
objectives, like disaster risk reduction and civil protection. 

The Strategy will also  include a reinforced focus on  resilience of insurance and financial 
markets. Even though the 2013 Strategy aimed to improve the market penetration of natural 
disaster insurance and to unleash insurance pricing for risk awareness prevention, measures 
need  to  be  scaled  up.  Another  important  aspect  of  risk  management  includes  closing  the 
climate protection gap, which has been defined as the difference between the insured losses 
and the total economic losses caused by an extreme weather or climate-related event.160  

Regarding  financial  markets  in  a  broader  sense,  the  new  Strategy  will  increase  efforts  to 
‘build the business  case for adaptation’. This includes EU project  finance and support to 
the development of methodologies to quantify the costs and benefits of resilient investments, 
and to facilitate integrating climate risk management in the full policy cycle. 

Objective 3 (O3) – Accelerate adaptation action: with a focus on solutions (in addition to 
understanding),  by  deploying  innovation  (in  addition  to  research),  implementation  (in 
addition to planning) and prevention (in addition to ex-post solutions). 

The new Strategy needs to focus particularly on accelerating action at the local level. The 
continuing need for this remains clear in light of recent evidence that the impacts of climate 
change are already being felt across cities and rural areas in Europe.161 The European Green 
Deal emphasises that, under the new EU Adaptation Strategy, cities and regions should be 
able to access data and to develop instruments to integrate climate change into their risk 
management practices. There is a need for strengthened support of knowledge sharing and 

158 DG Research and Innovation (September 2020). Proposed Mission: A Climate Resilient Europe. Retrieved from:  
https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/climate-resilient-europe_en  
159 https://www.epc.eu/en/publications/Adapting-to-change~2fce48  
160 EIOPA (2019). Protection gap for natural catastrophes. Staff discussion paper. Retrieved from:  
https://register.eiopa.europa.eu/Publications/EIOPA-19-485_EIOPA%20Staff_Discussion_Paper_Protection_Gap.pdf 
161 EEA (2020). Urban Adaptation in Europe: how cities and towns respond to climate change.  
https://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/urban-adaptation-in-europe  

29 

 
 
                                                 
capacity building as well as (access to) financial support, tailored to the local level. The role 
of  peer-to-peer  learning  and  the  access  to  usable  data  for  local  governments  are  important 
elements  of  strengthening  local  action  under  the  Strategy.  The  local  capacity  building 
anchored in  latest  science and innovation, and based on user-friendly, fit  for purpose tools, 
services and solutions will also be a the centre of the Horizon Europe Mission on Adaptation 
to Climate Change, including Societal Transformation. 

The  need  to  adapt  (critical)  infrastructure  to  the  impacts  of  climate  change  will  have 
increased  attention  in  the  new  Strategy,  e.g.  through  Nature-based  Solutions  and  digital 
technology.  
Objective  4  (O4)  –  Strengthen  global  action  for  climate  change  adaptation  and 
resilience:  strengthening  cooperation  on  enhancing  action  on  climate  change  adaptation  is 
necessary in  order to  make progress  towards the global  goal  on adaptation  enshrined in  the 
Paris Agreement, and in line with other international commitments including the SDGs.  

This will be achieved by assisting partner countries in adaptation planning processes and the 
implementation  of  actions,  promoting  comprehensive  risk  management  approaches,  scaling 
up  and  enhancing  the  effectiveness  of  support,  and  sharing  information,  good  practices, 
experiences and lessons learnt (e.g. through Climate-ADAPT). 

The  new  Strategy  will  provide  a  framework  to  support  the  EU’s  partner  countries  in 
stepping  up  climate  change  adaptation  and  resilience.  Developing  countries  are 
particularly  vulnerable  to  the  impacts  of  climate  change  and  have  the  least  capacity  to 
adapt.162 Additional and better-targeted financial resources for climate change adaptation 
are  thus  urgently  needed,  both  from  domestic  and  international  public  sources,  as  well  as 
from the private sector and innovative sources of finance.  

The  new  Strategy  will  also  address  shared  challenges  of  interconnected  economies  (e.g. 
supply  chains,  or  risk  assessing  cascading  climate  impacts).  At  the  same  time,  the  EU  can 
learn from others: many of the EU’s international partners have long been on the frontlines 
of  climate  change  and  have  valuable  experiences  that  could  help  European  communities 
become more resilient, for example on the topic of early warning systems and preparedness.  

In addition, the objective contributes to:  

  Improved  governance:  alignment  and  integration  of  regional,  national  and  sub-

national policy frameworks, with a specific focus on local authorities.  

  Gender-responsive  planning,  implementation,  and  leveraging  on  local  and 

indigenous knowledge and expertise. 

Box 4: Stakeholder views on objective setting for the new EU Adaptation Strategy 

Stakeholders views on specific objectives163: 

According  to  expert  interviewees  and  the  majority  of  workshop  participants  from  all 
stakeholder groups (including international organisation, civil society, businesses and one EU 
institution), the better use of data was considered an important objective of the new Strategy. 
Stakeholders explained that, even though a lot of data is available, this could be perceived as 
an overload by Member States and local governments. This echoes respondents’ identification 
of problems and drivers in the OPC, according to which knowledge and solutions are already 

162 United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) (2016). The Adaptation Finance Gap Report 2016. Nairobi: UNEP  
163 See Annex 2 for more details on the stakeholder consultation. 

30 

 
 
                                                 
available to adapt to climate change, and that the focus should move from planning to action 
and addressing issues such as the need for financing.  

Stakeholders  also  agreed  that,  in  addition  to  funding  support,  the  EU  should  promote  the 
development  of  standard  methodologies  to  quantify  the  costs  and  benefits  of  ecosystem-
based  approaches,  in  order  to  help  with  the  implementation  of  solutions.  This  was 
particularly mentioned across Member States and business representatives, but also reported 
by  a  few  experts  from  civil  society.  Stakeholders  from  most  stakeholder  groups  (EU 
institutions,  national  authorities,  local  authorities,  international  organisations  and  civil 
society) also suggested the Strategy could support a dedicated mechanism to provide tailored 
adaptation guidance and peer-to-peer knowledge sharing for local public authorities and non-
state  actors.  Moreover,  they  mentioned  a  need  for  the  Strategy  to  encourage  cross-sector 
cooperation for the best solutions.  

Although planning needs to be reinforced, most participants of the OPC strongly agreed that 
an  increased  focus  on  implementation  (in  addition  to  planning)  is  needed  (74.9%).164 
Respondents  of  the  OPC  strongly  agreed  that  the  EU  should  support  Member  State  level 
action  on  adaptation  (59.3%).165  EU  support  at  the  local  level  also  received  strong  support 
from all stakeholders. In the stakeholder consultations, there was an endorsement of continued 
support  for  action  at  Member  State  level,  with  a  focus  on  supporting  and  ensuring  proper 
implementation  of  national  strategies.  This  was  endorsed  by  national  authorities,  EU 
institutions  representatives,  international  organisations  and  civil  society organisations  alike. 
In  addition,  in  the  stakeholder  workshops  and  interviews,  the  majority  of  participants 
highlighted  the  importance  of  supporting  adaptation  at  the  local  level,  including  by  local 
authorities.  This  was  emphasised  by  all  stakeholder  groups  but  particularly  among  civil 
society organisations and several Member States’ representatives. As one stakeholder from a 
national  government  institution  explained,  support  at  the  national  and  local  level  should  go 
beyond  EU  leaflets.  The  majority  of  stakeholders  also  agreed  in  the  workshops  on  faster 
deployment of solutions. One Member State representative suggested that this needs to come 
not only via Horizon Europe, but action should be scaled up at all levels. 

Overall,  the  lack  of  an  international  dimension  of  the  2013  Strategy  was  identified  as  a 
deficiency  in  all  stakeholder  consultations.  According  to  OPC  respondents,  it  is  most 
important for the new Strategy to be aligned with the global goal on adaptation as expressed 
in the Paris Agreement (71.8%166). This was most highlighted by international organisations, 
Member  States’  representatives,  academic  and  research  institutions,  non-governmental 
organisations  and  EU  institutions,  and  less  so  by  citizens  and  business  representatives.  The 
importance of Paris Agreement alignment has also been mentioned throughout the stakeholder 
workshops and interviews. 

5.  WHAT ARE THE AVAILABLE POLICY OPTIONS? 

This  section  describes  policy  options,  and  the  corresponding  actions  and  measures, 
considered  for  inclusion  in  the  new  Strategy.  The  two  policy  options  under  consideration 
represent an umbrella for various actions and measures and form the main level at which the 
Impact  Assessment  will  take  place.  The  actions  represent  the  main  activities  that  would 
potentially take place under each option and are based on the structure of the 2013 Strategy 

164 See Figure 3-13 in Appendix 1.A accompanying the consultation synopsis presenting the analysis of the OPC. 
165 See Figure 3-14 in Appendix 1.A accompanying the consultation synopsis presenting the analysis of the OPC. 
166   See Figure 3-10 in Appendix 1.A accompanying the consultation synopsis presenting the analysis of the OPC. 

31 

 
 
                                                 
and its eight actions (see Table 5 below). While Option 1 expands on the actions of the 2013 
Strategy,  new  ones  are  proposed  under  Option  2.  The  measures  are  the  specific,  tangible 
steps that will be put in place to implement the actions. They are the measure of the choices 
for this Impact assessment in terms of ambition.  

While many of the measures are not of a legislative nature, several notable examples will be 
pursued  with  separate  legislative  action.  Climate  proofing  should  be  integrated  in  the 
Strategic  Environmental  Assessment.  The  collection  of  climate-related  loss  data  from 
(re)insurers would be explored also in a legislative context (through the possible revision of 
the  legal  base  of  the  European  Insurance  and  Occupational  Pensions  Authority  Regulation 
and/or the Solvency 2 directive). In order to be able to count on a truly EU climate insurance 
pool,  the  integration  of  a  “build  back  better”  requirement  in  the  Solidarity  Fund  would 
require a revision of its legal base. In addition, several upcoming reviews (e.g. Urban Waste 
Water  Treatment  Directive)  could  see  adaptation  mainstreaming  reinforced.  For  other 
processes, legislative follow up was not deemed necessary at this stage (e.g. there will be no 
revision  of  the  Water  Framework  Directive  following  its  fitness  check,  so  climate  change 
adaptation  will  be  reinforced  via  guidance  for  the  Common  Implementation  Strategy). 
Further work will require a pre-legislative follow up, such as white papers or blueprints, but 
also pilots of initiative (e.g. trying out with the Digital Europe Programme a pilot on loss data 
collection before rolling it out in legislation). 

Ultimate success of the Strategy would mean a succession of positive assessments of progress 
towards  increased  climate  resilience  at  Union  level.  The  Paris  Agreement  global  goal  on 
adaptation  is  similarly  a  dynamic  one  (i.e.  enhancing  adaptive  capacity,  strengthening 
resilience and reducing vulnerability to climate change). Dealing with climate impacts means 
dealing  with  complexity,  uncertainty,  tipping  points,  cascading  risk  –  adaptation  to  these 
impacts  therefore  requires  a  dynamic  implementation  (i.e.  not  just  one  script  to  follow  but 
multiple).  As  for  any  policy  of  disaster  risk  management  (e.g.  pandemics,  earthquakes), 
success  of  adaptation  action  is  often  invisible  because  it  constitutes  averted  damage  (a 
counterfactual is difficult to construct). 

Actions and measures were identified from a variety of sources; the 2018 Evaluation of the 
Strategy was nevertheless a key source, as it provided a detailed set of recommendations for 
measures in a revised Strategy. In addition, desk review, feedback from stakeholders through 
the  Open  Public  Consultation,  expert  interviews  and  stakeholder  workshops  were  all 
considered  and  contributed  to  the  list  of  actions  and  measures  proposed.  The  new  strategy 
will  indicate  a  vision  for  EU  climate  resilience  and  pursue  it  both  directly,  through  the 
identified  measures,  and  indirectly,  through  the  principles  it  puts  forward.  This  increased 
attention  and  strategic  guidance  will  help  bring  existing  instruments  in  line  with  the  new 
reality  of  climate  impacts  (and  add  further  justification  for  some  instruments).  It  will  also 
guide  EU  funding  instruments  (e.g.  in  the  context  of  the  37%  target  for  Recovery  and 
Resilience  Facility,  or  in  programming  for  NDICI,  CAP,  Horizon  Europe  etc.)  in  terms  of 
highlighting  adaptation  vs  other  policy  priorities.  In  this  regard,  the  strategy  comes  at  an 
opportune moment because of priority setting and programming for the next MFF. Moreover, 
adaptation is most effective when it builds on the multiple benefits it can deliver (e.g. flood 
plain  restoration  as  an  opportunity  to  decrease  flood  impacts  but  also  add  recreation  value, 
help biodiversity, reduce pollution etc.). 

In  this  section  we  present,  for  each  policy  option,  a  selection  of  measures  for  which  more 
detailed mini-assessments are carried out. Detailed descriptions of the measures can also be 
found  in  the  annexes:  Annex  7  for  the  measures  selected  for  the  mini-assessments 
contributing to the Impact Assessment in chapter 6, and Annex 6 for the other measures. 

32 

 
 
The  selection  of  measures  for  mini-assessment  was  made  in  order  to  concentrate  on  the 
measures  with  the  highest  estimated  direct  impact  relevant  for  Better  Regulation  (i.e. 
economic,  social  and  environmental).  The  selection  was  based  on  a  screening  which 
considered the types of impacts each measure could have, the measurability of those impacts 
and  the  availability  of  evidence  on  them,  whether  the  measures  would  impose  significant 
costs  on  stakeholders,  and  the  balance  of  measures  across  the  actions.  In  this  way  a  broad 
range of measures that are likely to provide the most relevant and assessable economic, social 
and  environmental  impacts  were  selected,  with  particular  attention  to  those  which  may 
impose  costs  on  stakeholders,  raise  political  problems  or  encounter  resistance 
in 
implementation.  

What is the baseline against which the options are assessed? 

Consistent  with  the  Better  Regulation  Toolbox  (#12,  #17),  the  baseline  option  represents  a 
‘no  policy  change’  scenario  (i.e.  a  policy  baseline).  This  is  taken  as  a  continuation  of  the 
2013 Adaptation Strategy in its current form, the 8 actions of which are presented in Table 5 
below – a full assessment  of this baseline option is  available in  the Evaluation  of the 2013 
Strategy.  

The Union could continue with the current strategy, as its evaluation was positive, including 
on continue relevance, but would operate in an increasingly changing context (see Section 1) 
to  which it is  not  equipped to  respond. Changes  in  the international and  EU context  would 
continue  to  erode  the  relevance  of  the  few  actions  not  yet  concluded  in  their  original 
ambition.  

Climate change impacts, and our understanding of them, have themselves evolved since the 
2013  Strategy;  the  updated  starting  point  and  understanding  of  the  impacts  is  an  important 
part of the baseline, which draws on various IPCC reports and other authoritative source as 
well  as  recent  research,  including  PESETA  IV,  Horizon  2020  COACCH  project  and  the 
Study on Adaptation Modelling167. 

Furthermore,  the  COVID-19  crisis  is  having  very  significant  impacts  across  the  EU,  and 
therefore  both  the  crisis,  and  the  policy  response  to  it,  will  have  impacts  on  the  baseline 
scenario. There are two main ways in which this occurs: (1) the Recovery Fund will bring a 
large new source of EU investment, with a number of priorities announced that can influence 
adaptation,  including  through  Horizon  Europe  and  actions  on  climate  change  mitigation, 
which  should  reduce  future  climate  impacts;  and,  (2)  it  increases  attention  on  resilience, 
particularly in the area of health, but also more broadly, which should give the actions of the 
2013  Strategy  more  traction.  These  changes  will  also  be  considered  in  the  baseline  to  the 
extent possible, but it should be noted that, as many details remain to be finalised through the 
legislative  process,  and  the  proposals  are  quite  recent,  there  is  limited  information, 
particularly quantitative information, on which to base an assessment. 

Table 5: Baseline option – Actions 

 ACTION 

1. Encourage all Member States to adopt comprehensive adaptation strategies 

2. Provide LIFE funding to support capacity building and step up adaptation action in Europe (2014-2020) 

3. Introduce adaptation in the Covenant of Mayors framework (2013/2014) 

167 Forthcoming 2021 

33 

 
 
                                                 
 ACTION 

4. Bridge the knowledge gap 

5. Further develop Climate-ADAPT as the ‘first-stop shop’ for adaptation information in Europe 

6. Facilitate the climate proofing of the Common Agricultural Policy, Cohesion Policy and Common Fisheries Policy 

7. Ensuring more resilient infrastructure 

8. Promote insurance and other financial products for resilient investment and business decisions 

Option 1: Deepening of existing actions of the 2013 Strategy 

Based  on  the  thorough  Evaluation  and  extensive  stakeholder  feedback  both  as  part  of  that 
Evaluation and in the design of the new Strategy, this option proposes ambitious changes to 
both  the  form  and  nature  of  the  eight  actions  of  the  2013  Strategy.  It  also  provides  a  wide 
range of new measures to deepen their impact.  

Table  6  lists  the  selected  measures  for  which  more  detailed  mini-assessments  have  been 
carried out (Annex 7). The full list of measures included in this option is presented in Annex 
6.  This  option  represents  a  clear  step  up  in  ambition,  with  commensurate  increases  in 
visibility and effectiveness for EU-level action while remaining well within the policy space 
of  the  2013  Strategy.  The  relevance  at  action  level  is  much  increased  compared  to  the 
baseline  option,  ensuring  that  the  new  Strategy  would  be  adequately  equipped  to  deal  with 
the many of the domestic and international developments since 2013. It also proposes novel 
measures, which raise ambition compared to those in the baseline. This option could also help 
meet (albeit to a limited extent) the international objective (O4). 

Table 6: Deepening of existing actions and their connectivity to the Drivers (D), Problems 
(P) and Objectives (O)168 

ACTION 
1.  Closing further gaps in 
adaptation-relevant 
knowledge, through 
systematic data collection and 
sharing, and working with 
key public and private 
partners.  

2.  Further developing Climate-
ADAPT as the ‘first-stop 
shop’ for adaptation 
information in Europe. 
Strengthening the evaluation, 
monitoring, reporting and 
implementation of adaptation 
strategies 

3. 

4.  Prioritising nature-based 

adaptation, including coastal 
protection and green and blue 
infrastructure. 

MEASURE 
1.5: Close the climate disaster loss and risk data gap through (1) 
facilitating the recording, collecting and sharing of loss data from public 
and private sources through standards (2) establishing a climate risk data 
governance framework and ensuring open access to data, (3) collecting 
data on direct economic losses, non-economic losses and slow-onset 
events, and aligning existing programmes and data sources. 

LINKING TO* 
D2, D3, D4, D6 
P1, P3 
O1, O3 

2.1: Establish an EU Observatory for climate change and health. 

No mini-assessment 

4.1: Building inter alia on relevant provisions under the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD) and on the new IUCN Global Standard for 
Nature-based Solutions*, promote the deployment of robust and 
effective nature-based solutions (NBS) for adaptation to climate change, 
notably by stepping up and scaling up their implementation and by 
further developing methods and tools to a) assess the vulnerability and 
expected resilience of planned NBS to projected climate change; b) 
determine their cost-efficiency and effectiveness with regards to their 
expected adaptation functions; c) quantify their wider economic, social 

D2, D3, D4, D6 
P1, P2 
O1, O2, O3 

D4, D5 
P1, P2 
O1, O2, O3, 

D1, D4, D5 
P2, P3 
O2, O3 

168 Actions and measures are directly linked to the specific objectives (O), and seek to address their associated problems (P) and problem  
drivers (D). 

34 

 
 
 
                                                 
ACTION 

5. 

Stepping-up efforts to build 
resilience in cities and 
empower local action. 

6.  Further mainstreaming and 
integrating adaptation in EU 
legislation and instruments 

MEASURE 
and environmental co-benefits. 
5.4: Launch a climate change adaptation Policy Support Facility / 
Technical Assistance project supporting local climate change adaptation 
action through the Covenant of Mayors. 
5.6: Support vulnerable groups and enterprises through education, social 
security policy and reskilling initiatives for green jobs and new business 
models, including through the European Skills Agenda and European 
Social Fund Plus (ESF+), with a particular focus on adaptation and 
resilience. 
No mini-assessment 

7.  Climate Proofing of 

Infrastructure and Disaster 
Risk Management 

8.  Closing the Climate 
Protection gap - 
microeconomic aspects of 
adaptation to climate change.  

7.2: Climate proofing of guidelines and standards to ensure the adaptive 
capacity and climate resilience of new infrastructures in Europe and 
abroad. 
8.2: Funding instruments: mainstreaming of resilience, adaptation and 
climate risk management concerns in the design of calls and of project 
selection criteria and the identification of “EU interest” resilience 
upgrades required for interconnected critical infrastructure. 

LINKING TO* 

D2, D3, D5, D6 
P1, P2, P3 
O1, O2, O3 
D2, D3, D4 
P2, P3 
O2 

D3, D4, D5, D9 
P1, P2, P4 
O1, O2, O4  

D4, D5, D7, D9 
P2, P3, P4 
O3 
D2, D3, D6, D7 
P1, P3, P4 
O1, O3, O4 

8.3: EU policy used to further influence private finance. Focus on the 
importance of adaptation ambition in the revision of the Non-Financial 
Reporting Directive and of prudential rules. 

D2, D3, D6 
P2, P3 
O3 

* Please refer to chapter 2 (drivers and problems) and chapter 4 (objectives)  

Option 2: Deepening of existing actions and addition of novel actions to Strategy  

In addition to the measures listed in Option 1 (which are also included in option 2), Option 2 
adds new actions to the Strategy, each of which includes a number of novel and innovative 
measures. The following Table 7 lists the measures for which more detailed mini-assessments 
to contribute to the IA have been carried out (see Annex 7 for these assessments). The full list 
of measures included in this option is presented in Annex 6. 

This  option  is  one  of  greater  political  ambition  in  EU  adaptation  policy,  on  par  with 
international  commitments.  It  expands  into  thematic  areas  of  prime  importance  (e.g. 
ecosystems,  innovation,  freshwater)  and  broadens  the  approach  to  other  national  relevant 
processes  (e.g.  fiscal  frameworks.  See  Box  2  below).  By  seeking  to  add  greater  policy 
coherence to  the Union’s actions on adaptation,  including internationally, it sets  itself apart 
from  the  baseline.  Most  importantly,  it  brings  full  thrust  to  the  achievement  of  the 
international objective (O4). 

Table  7:  Novel  actions  and  their  connectivity  to  the  Drivers  (D),  Problems  (P)  and 
Objectives (O) 

NOVELTY ACTION 

9. 

Supporting partner 
countries and regions in 
their efforts on climate 
change adaptation and 
disaster management  

MEASURE 
9.1: Support upgrade and implementation of Nationally Determined 
Contributions (NDCs) and NAPs by providing technical and financial 
assistance dedicated to: building capacity at national and sub-national 
level, developing adaptation plans in line with national priorities and 
vulnerabilities; supporting climate-proof structural governance reforms; 
implementing monitoring and evaluation schemes to assess progress 
towards climate change resilience; enhancing coherence with national and 
local disaster risk reduction strategies and environmental sustainability 
strategies; promoting nature-based solutions, especially in coastal areas. 
9.4: Work with leading institutions in Africa, the Caribbean, the Pacific 
and Asia sub-regions to promote and support climate change adaptation 
and disaster risk management approaches, and develop regional adaptation 
plans and action: Propose regional programmes in Africa (e.g. with AU or 
regional economic communities) to develop regional adaptation and DRR 

LINKING TO* 
D4, D5, D8, D9 
P1, P2, P3, P4 
O1, O2, O3, O4 

D2, D5, D9 
P2, P4 
O2, O4 

35 

 
 
NOVELTY ACTION 

10.  Scaling up international 
adaptation finance and 
disaster risk financing, 
unlocking innovative 
sources of finance, and 
mobilising private finance  

11.  Strengthening EU 

engagement globally and 
learning from adaptation 
frontrunners. 

12.  Adaptation Solutions / 

Horizon Europe Mission 
on adaptation to Climate 
Change, including Societal 
Transformation  

13.  Closing the Climate 
Protection Gap - 
macroeconomic aspects of 
adaptation to climate 
change.  

14.  Ensuring the availability 

of fresh water. 

MEASURE 
strategies. 
10.3: Use the External Investment Plan and the European Fund for 
Sustainable Development to leverage private sector finance for climate 
change adaptation, in line with the EU Sustainable Finance Taxonomy, and 
promote the engagement of partner countries in the International Platform 
for Sustainable Finance. 
10.5: Enhance climate and sustainability proofing of all EU external 
investments, including grants, guarantees and blending instruments, by 
enhancing Environmental and Social Safeguards due diligence, monitoring 
and follow-up processes 
11.4: Strengthen the production and delivery of user-friendly and timely 
climate data and services), in particular through the promotion of space-
based application, the use of Copernicus Climate Change Services and 
Emergency Management Services in partner countries. 
12.1: Implement the Horizon Europe Mission on Adaptation to Climate 
Change, including Societal Transformation with the objectives of preparing 
Europe, Accelerating the transition, and building deep resilience.  
12.2: Develop forestry agriculture and ecosystems decision support tools, 
including trees and crop suitability, weather and climate forecasts and 
disturbance risks 
13.1: For public finance/macro financial stability risk: Introduce a stepwise 
approach whereby the Commission engages a discussion on national 
disaster risk management frameworks with finance ministers’ fora, 
underpinned by best practices and evidence from EU Member States and 
EU level scenario analysis and stress testing. This would lay the ground for 
mainstreaming climate change in the national fiscal processes. 
14.1: Use the Common Implementation Strategy of the Water Framework 
Directive to improve policy implementation for securing sustainable water 
use across sectors, through improvements to and intensification of among 
others: water resource allocation and management plans, water-permitting 
systems, cost recovery through water pricing incorporating externalities, or 
cost recovery rate calculations. 
14.3: Promote Water Safety Plans under the Common Implementation 
Strategy to reduce exposure to contaminated or acutely polluted water due 
to climate impacts such as low flows, higher water temperature or flooding, 
and also to ensure availability of adequate quantities of tap water. 

LINKING TO* 

D4, D6, D7, D9 
P3, P4 
O3, O4 

D6, D8, D9 
P2, P3, P4 
O2, O3 

D2, D3, D8 
P3, P4 
O2, O4 

D2, D3, D5, D6 
P1, P2, P3 
O2, O3 
D2, D3, D4 
P1, P2, P3 
O2, O3 
D4, D6, D8 
P2, P3 
O2, O3 

D3, D4, D6, D7  
P1, P2, P3 
O2, O3 

D2, D3, D4 
P1, P3 
O3 

* Please refer to chapter 2 (drivers and problems) and chapter 4 (objectives)  

36 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Box  8:  Disaster  Risk  Management,  financing  strategies,  and  National  Fiscal 
Frameworks 

Disaster  risk  management  (DRM)  and  fiscal  and  financial  strategies  are  key  settings  for  robust 
adaptation  strategies.  These  frameworks  provide  citizens,  businesses  and  policy-makers  with  an 
evaluation and oversight of risks, of the civil protection resources and fiscal  and financial tools to 
address the human,  material  and  economic  consequences  of  disasters  in  the  emergency,  recovery 
and reconstruction phases. 

A  thorough  understanding  and  assessment  of  natural  and  man-made  disaster  risks  and  the 
evaluation of the impacts if disasters occur is essential for building robust frameworks for disaster 
management  and  financing  strategies.  Citizens,  local  authorities  and  businesses  may  find  this 
information useful for building in certain areas, subscribing to the right type of disaster insurance, 
setting business or to invest in projects that increase resilience to climate change, in particular to 
prevent  and  mitigate  effects  of  climate  driven  disasters.  Moreover,  understanding  the  financial 
impacts  of  disasters  by  Finance  Ministries  is  the  basis  for  designing  the  fiscal  and  financial 
strategy. 

The impacts of disasters can be addressed ex-ante through physical risk reduction measures where 
DRM plays a central role. Along climate-change resilience to disaster risks, financial resilience can 
be enhanced by endowing the national budgetary processes with necessary financing structures and 
risk  transfer  mechanisms  to  avert  financial  distress.  This  is  all  the  more  relevant  as  public 
authorities are responsible for the economic, financial and fiscal policymaking, planning of public 
investment and prioritising public expenditures and act as the provider of support and insurer of last 
resort in case of disaster. 

An  encompassing  approach  to  understanding  and  dealing  with  disaster  risks  is  based  on  several 
principles: 

• 
Developing  the  national  fiscal  risk  management  framework  to  include  disaster  risks: 
building  on  quantitative  disaster  risk  assessments  to  ensure  rapid,  timely  and  commensurate 
availability of funds in the emergency, recovery and reconstruction phases; 
• 
Announcing ex-ante the rules regarding the post disaster financial compensation to ensure 
adherence to the solidarity arrangements and reducing moral hazard; this clarifies the allocation of 
disaster costs and promotes risk transfer instruments such as private insurance; 
• 
Having in place governance rules for the monitoring and evaluation of the effectiveness of 
public funds  disbursed in dealing  with  disasters  and disaster risks:  public  investments in  projects 
for  risk  reduction  and  adaptation, financial  compensation  and  reconstruction  of  public  assets  and 
infrastructure, targeted financial compensation (unemployment, business continuity, etc.); 
• 
Involvement  of  private  and  public  actors  in  promoting  financial  resilience  and  offering 
financial  instruments,  a  framework  and  risk  sharing  arrangements  to  deal  with  the  financial 
consequences of disasters; 
• 
through proper regulation and incentives, stress testing, etc. 

Promoting  the  resilience  of  the  financial  (insurance)  sector  with  respect  to  disaster  risks 

Options discarded at an early stage 

The  increased  urgency  of  climate  action,  and  increased  evidence  of  climate  impacts,  is 
reflected  in  the  mandate  of  the  new  Commission.  The  need  for  and  value  of  the  EU 
Adaptation  Strategy  was  confirmed  in  its  2018  evaluation.  As  there  is  no  serious  political 
consideration  of  not  having  an  active  policy  on  adaptation,  a  ‘no  EU  Adaptation  Strategy’ 
option  was  not  considered.  Discontinuing  the  Adaptation  Strategy  would  also  be  difficult 
from a legal perspective as international commitments, such as those in Paris Agreement and 
under the UNFCCC, require the EU to take various actions on adaptation to climate change. 

37 

 
 
 
Similarly,  a  standardised  ‘one-size-fits-all’  type  regulation,  mandating  Member  States  and 
other stakeholders to take specific actions (like strategic retreat from areas that are sure to be 
affected by sea-level rise, or stopping support for non-climate adapted crops, making climate 
insurance  mandatory  at  EU-level  etc.)  was  also  not  considered  suitable  for  further 
assessment.  As  adaptation  is  an  issue  which  is  very  specific  to  circumstances,  spatial  and 
temporal  variables,  it  would  be  ill  suited  for  top-down  regulation  to  set  more  than  a  few 
overarching requirements. Trying to take a comprehensive top-down approach would likely 
be  inefficient,  costly  and  potentially  lead  to  maladaptation.  It  would  also  raise  questions 
relating to the subsidiarity and proportionality of EU action. 

6.  WHAT ARE THE IMPACTS OF THE POLICY OPTIONS? 

This chapter presents the main impact assessment of the policy options. The impact indicators 
that  are  assessed  were  selected  based  on  the  impact  screening  presented  in  Annex  5.  An 
aggregated  impact  assessment  at  the  policy  option  level  is  carried  out,  based  on  the  mini-
assessments of the selection of measures presented in chapter 5. These mini-assessments are 
detailed  in  Annex  7  to  this  report.  Key  points  from  the  assessments  of  these  individual 
measures are highlighted in the text, but the options are evaluated as an aggregate of all of the 
mini-assessments  and  also  relevant  reflections  on  the  potential  impact  of  the  full  list  of 
measures presented in Annex 6. The Options are all assessed for their impact compared to the 
Baseline  option  (see  below),  not  their  absolute  impact.  Option  2  also  includes  impacts 
assessed for Option 1, as it subsumes all Option 1 actions and measures.  

Assessment is necessarily qualitative in many aspects 

The  intended  impact  pathways  of  the  actions  and  measures  in  the  Adaptation  Strategy  are 
typically  quite  long-term,  indirect  and  acting  in  concert  with  other  instruments,  or  in 
anticipation  of  action  by  others.  This  makes  it  difficult  to  attribute  impacts  to  the  policy 
Options. The distinction between direct and indirect impacts is made across the assessments 
and  is  important.  Direct  effects  are  expected  to  be  applicable  in  the  short  term.  Indirect 
impacts are typically relevant to measures that promote, support or enable action, and which 
therefore  generally  induce  impacts  on  a  slower  timescale,  and  where  the  attribution  of 
impacts to the Strategy is more difficult.  

Furthermore, analytical tools and instruments in the context of climate change adaptation are 
not yet developed enough to provide good resources or methodologies for the assessment of 
the  impact  of  adaptation  measures169.  There  are  particular  deficiencies  in  the  assessment  of 
costs  and  effectiveness  of  measures,  which  make  quantitative  assessment  very  difficult. 
Further research is necessary to develop tools and approaches to improve the possibilities for 
modelling  such  impacts170.  Therefore,  out  of  necessity  the  approach  and  the  consequent 
comparison in chapter 7, is qualitative and cannot offer a traditional cost-benefit perspective 
to the same depth possible for other programmes or policies. 

The adoption or take-up of measures proposed under the different options of the Strategy is 
important  to  the  assessment  of  impact.  The  Options  include  very  few  measures  that  are 
mandatory  for  the  targeted  groups.  Therefore,  assumptions  of  the  voluntary  take-up  of  the 
measures are important. In the mini-assessments in Annex 7 the assumptions of take-up used 
for the quantitative and qualitative assessments are detailed, these are based primarily on desk 
review,  which  used  data  on  predecessor  measures,  or  similar  measures  in  other  areas,  to 

169 See Study on Adaptation Modelling, Forthcoming 2021 
170 Ibid 

38 

 
 
                                                 
inform a judgement on potential take-up of a measure beyond the baseline. As the measures 
offer benefits  to  participants  (e.g. training, support, data, information,  funding) mostly with 
low reciprocal requirements then take-up is typically assumed to be reasonable. Nevertheless, 
this  assumption  on  take-up  can  be  regarded  as  one  of  the  main  uncertainties  in  the 
assessment, the reality could be higher or lower than assumed. 

Temperature scenarios 

The impact  assessment applies a sensitivity analysis-type approach in  an attempt to capture 
how  different  climate  pathways  might  affect  the  expected  impact  of  the  Options  in  two 
temperature range scenarios for global climate change projections; in general, the relevance 
and impact of a measure increases as the temperature increases. Measures that have positive 
impacts even in the ‘low’ (i.e. Paris Agreement compatible) range of temperature scenarios 
(+1.5°C  and  +2°C)  could  be  considered  ‘no-regret’  measures,  good  to  pursue  in  any  case. 
Some measures  may only  become  attractive in  the high temperature scenario (+4.0°C). We 
return to this in sections 8 and 9. 

Economic modelling 

The  impact  assessment  combines  results  from  economic  modelling  of  the  impacts  of  the 
policy measures along with qualitative analysis based on desk review and stakeholder inputs. 
The  economic  modelling  approach  is  further  detailed  in  Annex  8  of  this  report,  but  in 
summary  is  based  on  macro-econometric  modelling  using  the  GINFORS  model171.  This 
models the economic feedbacks expected from selected measures for which mini-assessments 
were carried after making assumptions on how these measures will affect demand, supply and 
damages in the directly affected sectors. Nevertheless, this modelling is subject to a number 
of  limitations172,  so  results  are  accompanied  by  a  qualitative  indicator  supporting  the 
assessment. 

Summary of impacts 

The  following  table  (4)  provides  an  overview  of  the  assessed  impacts  of  the  two  policy 
options relative to the baseline (i.e. continuation of the 2013 Strategy). This is done across the 
most representative temperature scenarios used for sensitivity analysis (i.e. a Paris Agreement 
warming scenario of 2.0°C by 2100 and one of 4°C). Scenarios achieving 1.5°C and 2.0°C by 
2100 are still similar in temperature impacts by 2050, with increasing divergence after 2050. 
Especially for impacts assessed qualitatively, it is not feasible to usefully differentiate these 
two scenarios, therefore only the 2.0°C is presented in the summary table173. Instead, impacts 
of  no  abatement  are  already  more  pronounced  by  2050  in  the  scenario  resulting  in  a  4C 
temperature change by 2100.  

For  the  macroeconomic  and  employment  indicators,  both  quantitative  and  qualitative 
assessments are provided. The quantitative assessments are based on the economic modelling 
of the impact of the measures for which mini-assessments were carried out (see Annex 4 and 
Annex 7). For the quantitative indicators on economic welfare and employment, percentage 
point  difference  in  annual  GDP  and  employment  values  in  2050  relative  to  the  baseline. 

171 https://www.gws-os.com/de/index.php/global-developments-and-resources/models/model-details/ginfors.html  
172  See  EC  DG  CLIMA  (2020)  Study  on  Adaptation  Modelling,  Task  3  Recommended  Approach  to  Analysis  and Modelling  for  a  more 
comprehensive  detailing  of  the  significant  difficulties  and  limitations  that  remain  for  quantitative  modelling  of  climate  impacts  and 
adaptation action. 
173 Later in this chapter, quantitative modelling results for the 1.5 degree scenario are presented for reference, as it was feasible to make this 
differentiation in the modelling. The modelling shows that the differences with the 2 degree scenario are relatively small, and smaller than 
the difference between the 2 and 4 degree scenario. 

39 

 
 
                                                 
Comparison  with  the  absolute  numbers  from  the  baseline  is  provided  in  the  following 
sections, and addresses the point that although the options are better than the baseline, they 
still  act  only  to  reduce  the  scale  of  losses  due  to  climate  damages.  Furthermore,  given  the 
limited  extent  to  which  the  selection  of  the  proposed  measures  were  captured  by  the 
economic model used, it is very likely that these values (for the majority benefits) are lower 
bounds, under-representing the positive impacts of the strategy along these dimensions. This 
is  a  known  problem  in  adaptation  policy174  i.e.  that  its  benefits  are  undervalued  by  not 
integrating co-benefits the adaptation measures have, and by not accounting for the avoided 
damages  of  climate  change.  The  qualitative  indicators  aim  to  address  these  limitations,  to 
include  a  view  on  measures  which  were  not  modelled,  and  to  bring  in  consideration  of  the 
broader  issues  related  to  economic  welfare  and  employment,  for  example  skills.  It  is  also 
important  to  note  that  whilst  the  numbers  for  economic  welfare  may  appear  small  at  this 
aggregate EU level, they can represent much more significant sums for localities particularly 
affected by climate change, and which would also significantly benefit from the Options. 

Table  9  uses  a  negative/positive  scale  from  (---/--/-/0/+/++/+++).  For  all  qualitative 
indicators, the baseline would be represented as a zero (i.e. the reference). This is not shown 
in  the  table,  but  the  situation  the  baseline  represents  is  described  in  the  following  sections, 
which  provide  the  full  assessment  per  impact  indicator  and  option.  The  colour  shading 
emphasises  the  assessed  impacts:  darker  shading  indicates  greater  impact,  with  red  for 
negative and green for positive impacts. The scores are based on the detailed assessments in 
the  following  sections,  which  are  built  up  from  the  mini-assessments  provided  in  Annex  7 
and high-level consideration of any significant additional impact of all measures under each 
Option, as listed in Annex 6.  

Table 9: Summary of impact assessment relative to the baseline 

Impact  
(by 2050) 

Sub-indicator 

Paris scenario (2.0°C by 
2100175) 

High temperature scenario 
(+4.0°C by 2100176) 

Macroeconomic  

Change in economic 
(welfare) (p.p. GDP/year)  

Qualitative (+/-) 

Competitiveness 
trade and 
investment 

Impact on 
competitiveness, trade 
and (climate resilient) 
investments (+/-) 

Regulatory burden (+/-) 

Regulatory 
burden on 
businesses 

Innovation and 
research 

Impact on adaptation 
innovation  (+/-) 

Option 1 

Option 2 

Option 1 

Option 2 

+0.22pp 

+0.22pp 

+0.47pp 

+0.47pp 

+ 

+ 

0/- 

+ 

+/++ 

+/++ 

++ 

+/++ 

++ 

++/+++ 

- 

+++ 

0/- 

+ 

- 

+++ 

174 https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/publications/pub_nwp_costs_benefits_adaptation.pdf  
175 Quantitative modelling results are presented for 2050 for an approximate 2.0°C temperature increase (by 2100) scenario based  on RCP 
4.5; in the following sections, results are also presented for a 1.5°C temperature increase (by 2100) scenario based on RCP 2. 
176 Quantitative modelling results are presented for 2050 for an approximate 4.0°C temperature increase (by 2100) scenario based  on RCP 
8.5 

40 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Public authorities 
and budgets 

Public spending on 
adaptation (+/-) 

Employment  

Change in employment by 
2050 (p.p.) 

Qualitative analysis (+/-) 

Income distribution, social protection and 
social inclusion (of particular groups) (+/-) 

Public health & safety and health systems 
(+/-) 

Climate resilience (+/-) 

Quality of natural resources/fighting 
pollution (water, soil, air etc.) (+/-) 

Biodiversity, including flora, fauna, 
ecosystems and the services they provide 
and landscapes (+/-) 

Impacts in 3rd countries and international 
relations(+/-) 

++ 

+++ 

++ 

+++ 

+0.37pp 

+0.42pp 

+0.79pp 

+0.80pp 

+ 

+ 

+ 

++ 

0/+ 

0/+ 

+/++ 

+ 

++ 

+++ 

+/++ 

0 

++ 

++ 

++ 

+ 

+/++ 

++ 

+++ 

+++ 

++/+++ 

+/++ 

0/+ 

++/+++ 

0/+ 

++/+++ 

0 

+++ 

Note: the table uses a scale from (---/--/-/0/+/++/+++). The scoring represents, compared to the baseline, --- 
large  negative,  --  medium  negative,  -  small  negative,  0  neutral,  +  small  positive,  ++  medium  positive,  +++ 
large  positive.  Scores  can  also  fall  between  these  categories  and  are  assessed  as  e.g.  0/+  or  ++/+++. 
Quantitative  results  available  for  only  a  selection  of  impacts,  and  the  score  and  shade  consider  both 
quantitative and qualitative assessments. 

Economic impacts 

Option 0 (Baseline) 

Macroeconomic environment [impact measured in economic (welfare) losses (€)]. 

The  PESETA  IV  study  estimated  the  economic  losses  from  climate  change  in  different 
climate  scenarios,  this  found  that  in  a  +1.5°C  scenario  would  lead  to  a  €42  billion/year 
(0.33% of GDP) loss, a  2.0°C scenario a  would lead to  a €83 billion/year (0.65% of  GDP) 
loss, and a +3.0°C scenario a would lead to at least a €175 billion/year (1.38% of GDP) loss. 
An estimate in the PESETA III study for a +4.0°C scenario suggested an economic welfare 
loss of 1.92% of GDP (approximately €245 billion/year using the PESETA IV values)177.  

The COACCH project has also used a large number of sectoral models and put these into a 
macroeconomic model to estimate the impacts of climate change in Europe at Member State 
and regional level  (NUTS2). The modelling results  find higher estimates  than the PESETA 
study for the same levels of temperature change. In the majority of EU countries and regions, 
climate  change  losses  are  estimated  at  1-2%  of  GDP  by  2050.  However,  there  are  strong 
distributional patterns and countries and regions in Southern Europe experience much larger 
impacts. These impacts increase significantly under 3° and 4°C scenarios. As an example, the 

177 All values from the PESETA work are valued in 2015 euros and represent annual damages in the year 2100. The PESETA scenarios are 
based on climate models that estimate the impacts of different temperature features. They provide an analysis of adaptation policies in river 
and coastal floods that would be in place to limit the damages. PESETA uses historical baselines for damages and impacts up to 2010, and 
therefore  does  not  include  any  impact  the  2013  Adaptation  Strategy  has  already  had  (and  its  continuation  would  have)  on  reducing  the 
identified damages. 

41 

 
 
 
                                                 
COACCH study estimates that coastal flood damages in Europe could reach more than €500 
billion/year by the 2080s under the RCP4.5 scenario and could exceed €1 trillion for higher 
warming  scenarios  (RCP8.5)178.  These  studies  illustrate  the  scale  of  potential  economic 
damages from climate change, growing with the temperature scenarios and over time. 

Both PESETA IV report and the COACCH project point out that there is a clear north-south 
divide  in  the  regional  distribution  of  welfare  losses.  According  to  PESETA  the  sum  of 
impacts  in  northern  regions  are  relatively  small  or  even  positive  for  some  scenarios  (e.g. 
northern Europe with 1.5°C and 2°C) as these regions experience gains from climate change 
for some of the sectors considered (e.g. agriculture, energy supply). In southern EU regions, 
the impacts are mostly negative. As a result, aggregated welfare losses in southern regions are 
several times larger compared to those in the north of Europe. The new COACCH numbers 
for  costs  are  much  higher179,  especially  for  the  second  half  of  the  century,  and  for  high 
temperature scenarios. This takes into account increasing sea-level rise, and socio-economic 
drivers. 

The modelling in this work is based on the PESETA IV climate damage results, the baseline 
outputs  are  presented  below  and  show  losses  increasing  over  time  and  with  temperature 
scenario to around 1.1% of GDP losses annually by 2050 in a 4°C scenario; this is consistent 
with  the  annual  economic  welfare  losses  of  1.92%  of  GDP  by  2100  described  above.  For 
context, 1.1% of EU GDP corresponds to around €200 billion in current values. The losses 
primarily stem  from  health losses, followed by  losses from  floods  and droughts,  depending 
on  the  region.  Losses  vary  by  region,  and  are  estimated  to  be  highest  in  central  southern 
Europe180  (up  to  -1.55%  [2050/4°C]),  and  lowest  in  northern  Europe181  (up  to  -0.80% 
[2050/4°C])182. As noted above, in comparison to COACCH, the numbers are a robust lower 
bound for losses. 

Table 10 Annual welfare loss 
Indicator 

1.5°C  

2°C  

4°C 

Annual welfare loss [% GDP] 
Source: GWS modelling results 

2030 

2050 

2030 

2050 

2030 

2050 

-0.12% 

-0.52% 

-0.20% 

-0.67% 

-0.30% 

-1.10% 

Competitiveness,  trade  and  investment,  measured  by  an  indicator  on  the  impact  on 
competitiveness,  trade  and  (climate  resilient)  investments  (see  Annex  5):  In  terms  of 
competitiveness  under  climate  change,  climate  disruptions  can  have  important  impacts, 
although  the  relative  exposure  of  the  EU  compared  to  other  competitor  regions  is  not  well 
understood. It is possible to offer insight in some sectors, for example a significant shift in the 
agricultural  sector  is  expected,  particularly  a  shift  in  agricultural  production  and  yields 
between  European  countries.  Changes  in  relative  yields  and  productivity  would  result  in 
agricultural  losses  in  Southern  and  Eastern  Europe,  but  are  expected  to  create  gains  in 
Northern,  Western,  and  Central  Europe.  On  a  global  scale,  the  EU  has  a  comparative 
advantage  in  terms  of  climate  change  impacts  on  agricultural  production,  which  may 
positively  affect  its  competitiveness.  The  Actions  in  the  2013  Strategy  do  not  significantly 

178 COACCH (2019). The Economic Cost of Climate Change in Europe: Synthesis Report on Interim Results. Policy brief by the COACCH 
project. Editors: Paul Watkiss, Jenny Troeltzsch, Katriona McGlade, Michelle Watkiss. 
179 COACCH (2020 forthcoming) 
180 France, Slovenia, Slovakia, Czechia, Romania 
181 Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Denmark, Sweden 
182 A full summary of the modelling results is presented in an Annex. 

42 

 
 
 
                                                 
address competitiveness concerns, aside from general pushes on knowledge gaps and climate 
resilience, therefore competitiveness risks exist in the baseline scenario. 

In  terms  of  trade,  it  was  identified  in  chapter  2  that  the  2013  Strategy  does  not  consider 
climate  impacts  outside  the  EU,  which  are  a  particular  risk  for  trade  and  supply  chains  of 
various industries. The lack of actions or measures in  this area in  the 2013 Strategy means 
that  the  baseline  scenario  is  that  these  risks  would  be  expected  to  be  only  addressed 
piecemeal by the most active firms and Member States. This poses a significant risk to firms 
that import from outside the EU, particularly SMEs, as they rarely have resources to plan and 
react to risks183.  

Actions 6, 7 and 8 of the 2013 Strategy addressed climate resilient investments from different 
angles  and  would  continue  to  have  an  impact.  The  coming  years  would  see  the 
standardisation efforts of Action 7 start to bear fruit as standards are scheduled to be agreed 
in the coming years, this will provide an impetus towards climate resilient investments in the 
base  case.  This  is  increasingly  needed  in  order  to  take  into  account,  for  example,  the 
acceleration of the corrosion process in buildings induced by climate change and provide for 
measures to limit it. Action 8 would be supported by other recent policy developments, such 
as the 2018 Action Plan on financing sustainable growth, and the Taxonomy Regulation for 
climate change mitigation and adaptation. Combined these actions are intended to accelerate 
climate  resilient  investments  significantly  and  Action  8  would  be  a  (likely  minor) 
complement  to  the  work  of  these  instruments’.  Overall,  the  most  effective  of  the  existing 
actions  would  be  on  standards,  with  this  having  some  impact  on  boosting  investments 
through shifting industry standards.  

Regulatory burden on businesses: The 2018 evaluation examined the costs and burdens on 
private  and  public  stakeholders  and  found  that  these  were  very  low  overall,  almost  non-
existent  for  the  private  sector,  and  very  small  for  Member  States  as  the  2013  Strategy  has 
very few mandatory measures. In the baseline scenario, this would not be expected to change. 

Innovation and research, measured by an indicator on the impact on adaptation innovation 
and innovation  adoption:  To date, Action 4 of the 2013 Strategy has  addressed knowledge, 
adaptation modelling and region-specific intelligence, which has been generated by the EU's 
Horizon 2020 research programme and projects,  and by the EC  Joint Research Centre. The 
dissemination of adaptation innovations into the market is also accelerated by, for example, 
the Climate-KIC184, which stimulates innovation in the European market. Looking forward, it 
would  be  expected  that  in  a  baseline  scenario  Action  4  would  continue  to  guide  research 
beneficial to  adaptation  through these policy instruments. Yet  the persistence of knowledge 
gaps as highlighted in the 2018 evaluation and in this work, strongly suggests that knowledge 
and  innovation  deficiencies  will  remain,  for  example  in  relation  to  nature-based  solutions. 
The  impact  of  the  2013  Strategy  on  innovation  would  not  be  expected  to  vary  with 
temperature scenarios, although the need for innovation would increase.  

Public authorities and budgets, measured by an indicator on public spending on adaptation: 
At  the  moment,  adaptation  expenditures  in  public  budgets  are  not  transparently  identified, 
and  are  therefore  difficult  to  assess.  Actions  1  and  3  of  the  2013  Strategy  promote  the 
monitoring of adaptation expenditure at national and city level. Whilst some large cities, like 
Paris, have established a comprehensive monitoring system within which different adaptation 

183 COACCH (2019). The Economic Cost of Climate Change in Europe: Synthesis Report on Interim Results. Policy brief by the COACCH 
project. Editors: Paul Watkiss, Jenny Troeltzsch, Katriona McGlade, Michelle Watkiss. 
184  The  Climate-KIC  (Knowledge  and  Innovation  Community)  is  supported  by  the  EC  European  Institute  of  Innovation  and  Technology 
(EIT). 

43 

 
 
                                                 
financing  actions  are  labelled  and  tracked,  this  is  quite  rare  and  the  existing  Strategy  has 
found  little  traction.  Weaknesses  in  EU  level  monitoring  and  reporting,  and  a  lack  of 
commitment  in  Member  States,  were  highlighted  earlier  in  chapter  2.  These  each  point  to 
significant  deficiencies  in  the  2013  Strategy  in  promoting  public  spending  on  climate 
resilience. In the baseline scenario it is expected that Action 1 and 3 would continue to only 
have  limited  success  in  highlighting  the  need  for  and  enabling  greater  public  spending  on 
climate  resilience.  With  no  new  measures  to  encourage  and  support  public  spending  or 
action,  it  can  be  expected  that  in  the  baseline  growth  in  spending  will  be  slow  and  highly 
unlikely  to  match  the  scale  and  urgency  of  the  adaptation  need,  particularly  in  high 
temperature scenarios.  

Option 1 

Macroeconomic  environment:  The  actions  and  measures  as  part  of  this  option  attempt  to 
directly or, most often, indirectly, reduce the economic welfare losses by increasing climate 
resilience in the EU by increasing the quality and reach of data, improving planning and risk 
management  and  by  encouraging  greater  adaptation  action  and  spending.  Generally,  the 
evidence is quite clear that EU sector adaptation has a positive cost-benefit ratio. 

A  qualitative  assessment  of  the  option  would  be  likely  to  award  a  (+)  impact  on  economic 
welfare, at least in the short term, but increasing over time, and also with increasing severities 
of  temperature  scenarios,  as  the  effects  of  the  measures  fully  manifest  themselves  in 
implementation,  and the scale of losses  avoided  increases with  the temperature  and climate 
impacts.  Particular  highlights  for  impact  potential  are  found  in  the  measures  to  close  the 
climate  disaster  loss  and  risk  data  gap  (1.5)  and  closing  the  climate  protection  gap  (8.2  & 
8.3). The former measure would be expected to allow for better-informed decision making by 
public  and  private  actors,  which  ensures  better  risk  mitigation  strategies  and  insurance 
coverage. The latter measures would particularly ensure damages for EU funded projects are 
reduced, and through greater transparency, private losses are similarly avoided.  

The  modelling  results  for  Option  1  are  presented  below;  they  show  losses  increasing  over 
time  and  with  temperature  scenario.  The  more  ambitious  actions  under  the  Strategy  are 
modelled  to  reduce  the  economic  losses  from  climate  impacts  in  each  scenario.  The 
improvements are driven by reductions in damages and increased spending in sectors such as 
construction and health. The results vary by region, such that in a 1.5°C scenario the central 
northern  Europe  region  experiences  almost  zero  losses.  By  2030  in  a  4°C  scenario,  the 
avoided damages compared to the baseline equate to some €20 billion/year. The differences 
in  regional damages  across  the temperature scenarios, relative to  the  costs of implementing 
the  modelled  measures,  mean  that  in  percentage  point  terms  the  annual  welfare  loss  gain 
compared to the baseline, whilst still positive, is smaller in percentage point terms in the 2°C  
than 1.5°C scenario.  

Table 11: Annual welfare loss – change in option 1 compared to baseline 

Indicator 

1.5°C  

2°C 

4°C 

Annual welfare loss [% GDP] 

-0.08% 

-0.23% 

-0.12% 

-0.45% 

-0.18% 

-0.63% 

2030 

2050 

2030 

2050 

2030 

2050 

Change  compared  to  baseline  [GDP 
p.p.] 
Source: GWS modelling results 

+0.04 

+0.29 

+0.08 

+0.22 

+0.12 

+0.47 

Competitiveness, trade and investment: the actions and measures under this option aim to 
increase  investments  in  climate  resilience,  primarily  indirectly.  The  improved  data, 

44 

 
 
 
mainstreaming  of  climate  resilience  and  other  measures,  are  expected  to  encourage  and 
enable  decision  makers  towards  more  resilient  investment  decisions.  The  benefit  of  this 
would increase in higher temperature scenarios, as supply chain resilience would increase in 
importance.  As  with  the  indicator  for  economic  losses,  particular  highlights  for  impact 
potential are found in the measures to close the climate disaster loss and risk data gap (1.5) 
and  close  the  climate  protection  gap  (8.2  &  8.3).  The  former  measure  would  allow 
investments  to  better  avoid  or  mitigate  climate  risks,  and  the  latter  measures  would  ensure 
that  EU  investments  take  climate  resilience  more  effectively  into  account  and  that  private 
investments  are  more  transparent  on  their  exposure  to  climate  risks,  encouraging  more 
resilient investment choices. Overall assessment of Option 1 impact: + (low temp. scenarios) 
++ (high temp. scenarios) 

Regulatory burden on businesses: The additional burdens and costs to private stakeholders 
are estimated very low, as few of the actions and measures are mandatory. Requirements for 
open data, improved access and greater transparency in reporting can impose additional costs 
for (mostly) financial sector stakeholders compared to the baseline. These would be expected 
to be more than offset by the benefits of improved data sharing and access, and also the co-
benefits  of  a  number  of  other  measures  under  Option  1,  such  as  those  with  a  focus  on 
improving workforce skills and developing sector specific knowledge; in addition, the overall 
reduction  in  economic  losses  at  the  macroeconomic  level  could  be  expected  to  bolster 
competitiveness of private stakeholders. The impact on non-financial SMEs is expected to be 
a  minor  positive  impact  compared  to  baseline,  as  the  resilience  of  the  overall  operating 
environment  increases.  The  cost  impact  would  not  change  across  temperature  scenarios, 
although the co-benefits to businesses of the measures would increase. Overall assessment of 
Option 1 impact: -/0  

Innovation and research: this option includes two actions (1 & 2) which directly address the 
objective of improving knowledge of climate impacts  and solutions, whilst a number of the 
other  actions  also  indirectly  address  knowledge,  innovation  and  innovation  adoption. 
Specifically  under  action  1  the  development  of  a  Research,  Development  and  Innovation 
(RDI)  roadmap  and  supporting  models  and  tools  will  organise  efforts  towards  specific 
knowledge  gaps.  Furthermore,  a  variety  of  measures  are  designed  to  provide  better,  more 
granular data, addressing the local level, and accessible to a broader audience, which will fill 
gaps, spur further research and boost adaptation efforts and the adoption of measures. Efforts 
under action 2 to improve the use of expert networks and provide exchange platforms would 
be  expected  to  increase  the  dissemination  of  relevant  knowledge  of  climate  risks  and 
solutions.  In  addition,  measures  under  action  4  encourage  further  knowledge  development, 
and  the  piloting  and  adoption  of  adaptation  measures,  particularly  nature-based  solutions, 
which can provide an important boost to innovation more broadly. No significant variation in 
impact  is  expected  in  different  temperature  scenarios.  The  implementation  of  actions  in 
agriculture is stimulated by the EIP Agri185 operation groups and thematic focus groups in the 
context of the Common Agricultural policy. Overall assessment of Option 1 impact: + 

Public authorities and budgets: this option includes various actions with a strong focus on 
public  authorities,  including  under  action  3  which  focuses  on  strengthening  their  planning 
and  strategies,  whilst  bolstering  and  harmonising  monitoring  and  reporting.  Moreover,  and 
under action 5, this includes further technical  support to  local  authorities and strengthening 
the  Covenant  of  Mayors,  and  other  actions  on  mainstreaming  that  can  bolster  local  action. 

185 https://ec.europa.eu/eip/agriculture/en  

45 

 
 
                                                 
The  linking  of  EU  funding  to  participation  in  the  Covenant  of  Mayors  and  the  consequent 
encouragement  of  climate  planning  and  action,  would  be  expected  to  have  an  important 
influence  on  public  spending  on  climate  resilience.  In  addition,  the  measures  that  provide 
technical support, local data and mainstreaming of adaptation in other policies, mean that the 
expertise,  tools,  data  and  resources  available  to  public  authorities  will  be  improved. 
Specifically,  the  sharing  of  higher  quality  disaster  loss  data  will  allow  public  authorities  to 
better target, plan and prepare their responses to climate disasters (see measure 1.5). Overall, 
it can be expected that as a result climate resilience will be more readily taken into account 
by  public  authorities  and  public  spending  which  could  be  considered,  as  climate  resilience 
spending is likely to increase as a proportion of existing spending. The Option may also result 
in greater public spending on resilience, as once plans are in place and reporting frameworks 
established  could  incentivise  their  implementation.  The  Option  does  include  measures  that 
will increase the costs incurred by public authorities, in terms of both increased reporting 
requirements,  or  of  additional  resources  needed  to  improve  climate-related  losses  data 
collection. The alignment and harmonisation of reporting, and further guidance and technical 
support, will offset at least part of any additional costs. No significant variation in impact is 
expected in different temperature scenarios. Overall assessment of Option 1 impact: ++ 

Option 2 

Macroeconomic  environment:  The  actions  and  measures  as  part  of  this  option  attempt  to 
directly or indirectly reduce the economic welfare losses by increasing climate resilience in 
various ways. For reference, The EU’s green economy (i.e. environmental goods and services 
for environmental protection and resource management is a small but growing segment of the 
economy,  providing  ~  EUR  300  billion  GVA  per  year  (~  2%  of  EU  GDP)  and  4.5  million 
green jobs (ESTAT 2016 figures). 

The macroeconomic impacts for the EU are not that strong for actions 9, 10 and 11, which 
have  a  specific  international  focus.  Whilst  there  are  indirect  benefits  of  reduced  economic 
losses in partner countries, these are addressed in the following indicator on competitiveness, 
trade and investments.  The main economic welfare benefits  assessed derive indirectly from 
action 12 which can bring gains and/or reduced losses for the forestry sector; from action 13 
to  close  the  climate  protection  gap,  which  will  reduce  overall  macroeconomic  exposure  to 
climate damages; and through action 14 which focuses on resilience in the water sector and 
will  serve  to  protect  the  sector  itself  and  the  multiple  other  sectors  that  are  affected  by  it, 
particularly  agriculture,  food  and  drink,  services  and  manufacturing.  These  will  each  have 
small  positive  macroeconomic  effects.  Overall  the  impact  of  Option  2  could  be  ranked  as 
(0/+),  which  when  added  to  the  (+)  estimated  for  option  1,  would  result  in  a  qualitative 
assessment of a (+/++) impact on economic welfare. The impact of the option may increase 
with  higher  temperature  scenarios,  as  the  scale  of  losses  avoided  increases  with  the 
temperature and climate impacts. 

Modelling  of  the  impact  of  the  option  focuses  on  the  potential  changes  in  productivity  and 
damage avoidance to  the land-based sectors  (forestry,  agriculture) as  part  of Action 12, the 
other actions were not suitable for modelling. The quantitative results of the modelling show 
the following impacts.  

The modelling results for Option 2 are presented below; these are the same as for Option 1 as 
the modelled measure for Option 2 does not have a significantly different impact at this level 
of granularity. A small difference is observed for the connected employment impact.  

Table 12: Annual welfare loss – change in option 2 compared to baseline 
Indicator 

1.5°C 

2°C 

4°C 

46 

 
 
Annual welfare loss [% GDP] 

-0.08% 

-0.23% 

-0.12% 

-0.45% 

-0.18% 

-0.63% 

2030 

2050 

2030 

2050 

2030 

2050 

Change  compared  to  baseline  [GDP 
p.p.] 
Source: GWS modelling results. 

+0.04 

+0.29 

+0.08 

+0.22 

+0.12 

+0.47 

Competitiveness,  trade  and  investment:  this  Option  addresses  the  competitiveness,  trade 
and investment impact in two main ways. Firstly, the international actions (9, 10 and 11) each 
provide measures that seek to strengthen climate resilience in partner countries by providing 
technical and financial assistance, knowledge sharing and partnerships. The potential impact 
of these measures on resilience is unclear, and the trade and investment benefits, whilst likely 
to  be  positive,  are  likely  to  be  small.  On  competitiveness,  the  proposed  partnership  and 
alliance approaches, especially in selected regions in Africa, the Balkans and elsewhere, may 
provide  benefits  for  EU  firms  through  reduced  disruptions  to  global  supply  chains  (for 
reference, the size of such impacts has been estimated at greater than zero but less than 0.5% 
of GDP in the case of Germany).  

Other  potential  benefits  may  arise  from  the  direct  investments  made  through  EU  external 
funding,  and  through  the  goodwill  in  cooperative  approaches.  Taken  together,  all  of  these 
benefits  are  likely  to  equate  to  only  a  small  (e.g.  0/+)  positive.  Secondly,  the  other  actions 
address  the  climate  protection  gap  and  specific  sectors  such  as  water  and  forestry,  each  of 
which can affect climate resilience, primarily indirectly. Action 12 is particularly relevant for 
agriculture and forestry  and would build upon the measures under Action 1 from Option 1, 
and would provide knowledge to support more climate resilient investments in these sectors, 
bolstering  their  productivity  and  competitiveness.  Action  13  to  close  the  climate  protection 
gap  could  be  expected  to  strengthen  and  complement  Action  8  in  option  1,  and  to  further 
encourage decision makers, particularly finance ministries at national level and the financial 
sector, to ensure that their investments better avoid or mitigate climate risks. Action 14 would 
bolster investments in the water sector. Overall, we would see a small positive benefit of the 
Option  (0/+).  The  impact  on  SMEs  would  not  be  expected  to  vary  significantly  from  this 
overall  assessment.  The  benefit  of  the  Option  would  be  expected  to  increase  in  higher 
temperature scenarios, as the greater international resilience would become more important to 
EU competitiveness, trade and investment. Building upon the + (low temperature) / ++ (high 
temperature) assessment for option 1, our Overall assessment of Option 2 impact: +/++ (low 
temp. scenarios) ++/+++ (high temp. scenarios) 

Regulatory burden on businesses: The additional burdens and costs to private stakeholders 
in  the  EU  are  estimated  very  low,  as  few  of  the  actions  and  measures  impose  mandatory 
measures. The international actions (9, 10 and 11) provide no new requirements for EU firms; 
indeed,  they  are  more  likely  to  improve  access  to  new  opportunities  and  markets  than  to 
impose additional costs, for example providing new international  users for services such as 
Copernicus (9.6) or customers for insurance products (10.2). Action 12 only provides support 
and  therefore  no  additional  costs.  Action  14  may  indirectly  have  a  broader  cost  impact  on 
firms  as  it  targets  improved  policies  and  their  implementation,  the  main  costs  would  be 
attributed to the other policies, i.e. Eco-design if additional water efficiency requirements for 
appliances  were  introduced,  although  a  contributory  role  of  the  Strategy  would  be  noted. 
Policy  reforms  for  the  water  sector  on  pricing,  permitting  and  cost  recovery  would  impact 
upon  firms,  probably  to  the  benefit  of  firms  in  the  water  sector  but  by  increasing  costs  for 
water  users.  The  macroeconomic  impact  of  this  was  modelled,  and  was  marginal,  although 
there may be distributional impacts for firms, for example, major water users in industry and 
agriculture  could  see  cost  increases.  Overall,  weighing  the  benefits  and  costs  to  firms  we 

47 

 
 
 
would see a potentially small negative impact of the Option (-/0). The impact on SMEs would 
not be expected to vary significantly from this overall assessment. The cost impact would not 
change across temperature scenarios, although the co-benefits to businesses of the measures 
would increase. Overall assessment of Option 2 impact: - 

Innovation and research: this option includes one action (12) which directly addresses the 
objective of improving knowledge of climate impacts and solutions, whilst a number of the 
other  actions  also  indirectly  look  to  develop  and  apply  new  knowledge,  e.g.  Action  13 
climate  stress  tests,  Action  14  water  policy  measures.  Specifically  under  action  12,  the 
Horizon  Europe  Mission  on  Adaptation  is  expected  to  have  an  important  influence  on 
accelerating  adaptation  innovation through establishing 100 deep demonstrations of climate 
resilience  across  Europe.  Action  1  of  Option  1  will  identify  measures  for  the  land  use, 
agriculture  and  forestry  sector,  and  measures  under  Action  12  in  disseminating  and 
implementing  these  solutions  can  have  an  important  beneficial  impact  in  these  sectors.  A 
toolbox for faster decision making by policymakers and practitioners may also prove useful, 
although  further  clarity  would  be  needed.  The  international  actions  may  also  support 
innovation  by  providing  for  exchange  and  cooperation  mechanisms  to  bring  international 
innovations from partner countries to the EU, where stakeholders anticipate partner countries 
already  exposed  to  major  climate  risks  will  have  developed  practical  solutions  from  which 
the EU can learn. Overall, we expect to see a positive impact (+) on innovation and research 
resulting from Option 2, but no significant variation in impact across temperature scenarios. 
Building on the + assessment for option 1, our Overall assessment of Option 2 impact: ++ 

Public authorities (and budgets): the internationally oriented actions under this option have 
important implications for public authorities. Within the EU, the main implications are for the 
EU External Action and Development activities, which will find a much-increased focus and 
need  for  spending  on  climate  resilience.  This  can  significantly  increase  the  EU  climate 
resilient spending internationally. This would be achieved by measures under Action 9 and 10 
ensuring the alignment of spending with disaster risk reduction and national adaptation plans 
in the partner countries, and by moving towards a balance between climate change mitigation 
and adaptation in EU spending.  

Member  State  public  authorities  are  not  strongly  impacted  by  the  internationally  oriented 
actions, nor by Action 12, but Actions 13 and 14 can have an impact on public authorities. 
Action 13 on the climate protection gap includes engaging with EU Member States (Finance 
Ministries  fora)  on  disaster  risk  management  and  disaster  risk  financing  strategies  and 
exploring  options  to  better  reflect  climate  change  risk  in  fiscal  policy  and  EU-level  fiscal 
sustainability  assessments  (improve  estimates  and  reporting  of  fiscal  impact  of  disasters  as 
well  as  of  fiscal  costs  of  adaptation  and  mitigation  measures  promote  risk  transfer 
instruments). These measures are expected to contribute to closing of the climate protection 
gap as Member States better identify and address gaps in climate disaster risk management, 
and better assess related fiscal sustainability risks. Action 14 encourages policy action in the 
water  sector,  which  can  lead  to  action  within  the  Member  States  in  piloting  new  policy 
measures, which given that public ownership is still common can have an impact on public 
spending.  The  overall  thrust  of  the  policies  is  towards  increasing  investment  and  cost 
recovery,  therefore  the  impact  in  the  sector  is  expected  to  see  users  pay  more,  with  water 
firms, including those in public ownership, able to invest more, or require less public support.  

48 

 
 
The  Option  does  include  measures  that  will  increase  the  costs  incurred  by  public 
authorities186, for the EU greater consideration of climate resilience in external finance will 
require  greater efforts  and amendments to  existing processes. The international  cooperation 
mechanisms,  and  creation  of  modelling  tools,  guidance,  and  monitoring  and  reporting 
mechanisms  for  natural  disaster  insurance,  will  each  require  resources  to  establish  and 
implement. Costs to Member States are expected to be low and consist primarily in the time 
and  resources  necessary  to  engage  with  the  monitoring  and  reporting  of  natural  disaster 
insurance  penetration,  although  it  is  noted  that  one  of  the  measures  (13.4)  intends  to 
streamline these aspects. Other engagement will take place through existing fora.  

No significant variation in impact is expected in different temperature scenarios. Overall, we 
expect to see a positive impact (+) on innovation and research resulting from Option 2, but no 
significant  variation in  impact  across temperature scenarios. Building on the ++ assessment 
for option 1, the Overall assessment of Option 2 impact is: +++ 

Social impacts 

Option 0 (Baseline) 

Employment:  it has  been estimated that up to  500,000 jobs  could  be  created and a further 
136,000  saved  across  the  EU  by  2050  in  a  reference  scenario  of  some  adaptation  action 
(which assumed, differently to this study, 0.5% of GDP spent on adaptation)187, compared to 
what  would  be  expected  in  the  absence  of  adaptation  action.  In  an  ambitious  scenario, 
(assuming  1%  of  GDP  spent  on  adaptation)  these  impacts  would  increase  further.  The 
impacts  are  net  of  the  results  from  climate  damages  (and  in  some  regions/cases  benefits), 
changes  to  labour  productivity  and  investment  in  adaptation  activities.  However,  the 
development  and  take  up  of  green  jobs  is  heterogeneous  across  Members  States,  and  they 
experienced different patterns in the promotion of green skills and jobs188. 

The  largest  impacts  are  estimated  in  the  sectors  in  which  investment  will  be  made 
(construction)  and  those  in  which  damages  would  be  severe  without  action  and  which 
therefore  benefit  most  from  greater  resilience  (manufacturing,  public  utilities,  retail  and 
tourism). A few sectors  in  particular are likely to see the biggest  investments and therefore 
the  largest  net  employment  gains  due  to  investment  in  climate  change  adaptation:  water 
management, construction, energy supply, and transport infrastructure. Analysis also suggests 
that proportionally the largest employment gains will be in Central and Eastern Europe189. 

The modelling employed in  this work includes  an assumed effect  of the 2013 Strategy  and 
make estimates of the baseline employment impact for 2030 and 2050. The modelled baseline 
outputs for employment  are presented below and show reductions in  employment, with  the 
size  of  employment  decline  increasing  over  time  and  with  temperature  scenario  to  around 
1.9%  by  2050  in  a  4°C  scenario.  Based  on  2019  employment  of  191  million  people  in  the 
EU,  1.9%  represents  around  3.6  million  job  losses.  The  percentage  value  demonstrates  a 

186 Assessment focused on the impact for the EU public authorities but note that the target of many of the actions of Option 2 is to strengthen 
and support public authorities in partner countries and  that significant support, finance and expertise will be provided to this end. This is 
likely to have important beneficial impacts on climate resilience in partner countries and to encourage some matching increases in public 
spending  on  climate  resilience  in  these  countries.  Part  of  the  impact  of  this  for  the  EU  is  seen  above  in  the  competitiveness,  trade  and 
investment impact indicator. 
187 Trinomics, TNO and Ricardo, for DG CLIMA (2014) Assessing the Implications of Climate Change Adaptation on Employment in the 
EU. Note: this study also models a baseline scenario of no adaptation action in which 410,000 jobs could be lost across the EU by 2050. 
188 Cedefop (2019). Skills for green jobs: 2018 update. European synthesis report. Luxembourg: Publications Office. Cedefop reference  
series; No 109. http://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2801/750438 
189 Trinomics, TNO and Ricardo, for DG CLIMA (2014) Assessing the Implications of Climate Change Adaptation on Employment in  
the EU 

49 

 
 
                                                 
higher magnitude of impact than for the economic losses as relatively labour-intensive sectors 
are  most  effected.  Again,  losses  vary  by  region,  and  compared  to  the  distribution  of  the 
economic  impacts.  These  are  estimated  to  be  highest  in  southern  Europe190  (up  to  -3.3% 
[2050/4°C]), and lowest  in  central  northern  Europe191 (up to  -0.25% [2050/4°C]). As noted 
previously, these numbers are likely to represent an underestimate of the losses.  

Table 13: change in Employment 

Indicator 

1.5°C  

2°C 

4°C 

2030 

2050 

2030 

2050 

2030 

2050 

-1.94% 

-0.25% 

-0.40% 

-0.60% 

-0.92% 

-1.27% 

Change in Employment [%] 
Source: GWS modelling results 
Income  distribution,  social  protection  and  social  inclusion  (of  particular  groups):  the 
impacts  of  climate  change  will  be  experienced  unevenly  across  Europe,  with  some  groups 
and  places  being  particularly  vulnerable  and  severely  impacted,  and  some  existing  social 
problems  being  exacerbated  by  climate  change.  The  impact  on  income  distribution  and  the 
socio-economic inequalities (poverty, deprivation) that stem from this will be highly linked to 
the  economic  impacts,  with  particularly  vulnerable  regions  in  southern  Europe,  Alpine 
regions  that  rely  on  tourism  and  coastal  regions  threatened  by  sea  level  rise.  Age-linked 
vulnerabilities and inequalities can also be exacerbated by climate change with elderly groups 
often less able to adapt, but more vulnerable to stress and damages from the climate impacts. 
Increased  climate  resilience  can  also  go  hand-in-hand  with  improved  social  conditions,  as 
social  co-benefits  from  investments  in  climate  resilience  can  be  achieved.  The  2013 
Adaptation  Strategy  does  not  provide  for  a  significant  specific  focus  on  social  inequalities, 
but  could  address  these  by  supporting  Member  States  to  identify  and  take  action  on  these 
vulnerabilities  in  their  own  Strategy  development  (action  1).  As  a  result,  whilst  the  2013 
Strategy  Baseline  option  would  have  some  benefit,  it  would  not  provide  significant 
improvements on social issues.  

Public health & safety and health systems: public health and civil emergency systems will 
come under significantly increasing pressure due to climate change, with the intensity of the 
pressure  increasing  with  the  temperature  scenarios.  Impact  studies  have  estimated  the 
increased  morbidity  and  mortality  expected  due  to  climate  change  which  are  include  both 
increases from heatwaves and decreases from reductions in extreme cold, the former being by 
far the larger of the two effects, as illustrated in the table 9 below. This illustrates some of the 
increasing  pressure  that  will  be  placed  on  health  systems  as  the  temperature  increases,  but 
other  impacts  such  as  the  impacts  of  extreme  temperature  on  ambient  air  quality,  ozone 
pollution during heatwaves, and particulate matter pollution from wildfires (one of the most 
dangerous air pollutants to human health), are also relevant. 

Table 14: Summary of impact of heat and cold wave impacts 

Impact 

 1.5°C 

 2°C 

 3°C 

People annually exposed to a 50-year heatwave [million] 

Annual fatalities from heatwaves [‘000s] 

People annually exposed to a 50-year coldwave [million] 

103 

28.8 

4.9 

168 

49.4 

2.7 

288 

89.0 

1.2 

190 Cyprus, Malta, Austria, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Croatia 
191 Poland, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Germany, Belgium, Ireland 

50 

 
 
 
                                                 
Annual fatalities from coldwaves [‘000s] 

0.03 

0.02 

0.01 

Source: adapted from PESETA IV – NB: different temperature scenario used for high-end warming 

Action  2  of  the  2013  Strategy  would  continue  to  promote  and  pilot  nature-based  solutions, 
whose aims  can include  minimising the urban heat  island  effect,  as well  as have a positive 
impact  on  air  quality,  both  of  which  can  reduce  pressure  on  public  health  systems.  Yet,  as 
noted  in  the  2018  Evaluation,  the  2013  Strategy  has  not  been  particularly  successful  in 
promoting  the  adoption  of  nature-based  solutions  and  without  further  action,  this  is  not 
expected to change. 

Option 1 

Employment:  the  impact  of  the  Option  on  employment  is  tied  closely  to  the  economic 
impacts  on  the  macroeconomic  environment  and  competitiveness.  The  earlier  assessment 
showed that the impact of Option 1 on these parameters is expected to be positive, equivalent 
to a (+) on a qualitative scale as the actions stimulate climate resilience and reduce losses to 
welfare.  

The  impact  on  employment  includes  qualitative  impacts  on  skills  and  other  employment-
related aspects. These are not a major focus of the Option or Strategy but this Option includes 
one  measure  (5.6)  which  aims  to  use  the  ESF+  and  European  Skills  Agenda  to  support 
vulnerable  groups  with  education  and  skills  training  for  green  jobs  and  with  a  focus  on 
climate change adaptation and resilience. This measure will provide some (likely small given 
potential scale) benefit to skills and employment.  

The modelled outputs for Option 1 for employment are presented below and show reductions 
in  employment  losses  compared  to  the  baseline.  The  more  ambitious  actions  under  the 
Strategy are modelled to reduce employment losses from climate impacts. The improvements 
driven by reductions in damages and increased spending in sectors such as construction and 
health. For context, each 0.1% change in employment represents approximately 200 000 jobs, 
therefore this option could save around 800 000 jobs/year by 2050 in a 2°C scenario. 

Table 15: Change in Employment in option 1 compared to baseline 

Indicator 

1.5°C  

2°C 

4°C 

Change in Employment [%] 

-0.20% 

-0.67% 

-0.25% 

-0.90% 

-0.35% 

-1.15% 

2030 

2050 

2030 

2050 

2030 

2050 

Change  compared 
[p.p.] 
Source: GWS modelling results 

to  baseline 

+0.05 

+0.25 

+0.15 

+0.37 

+0.25 

+0.79 

Income  distribution,  social  protection  and  social  inclusion  (of  particular  groups):  this 
Option addresses climate vulnerabilities in multiple ways, and therefore social vulnerabilities. 
Specifically,  Action  5  through  the  proposed  Policy  Support  Facility  could  target  assistance 
towards  smaller  cities  and  local  authorities  that  are  more  vulnerable  to  climate  impacts. 
Increased  granularity  of  and access to  data on damage and risk  (Action 1), and the  climate 
and  health  observatory  (Action  2),  will  each  identify  specific  social  vulnerabilities  due  to 
climate change, enabling public authorities in the Member States to provide further support, 
and  citizens  and  advocacy  groups  to  more  easily  identify  their  risks  and  needs.  Better 
dissemination  of  knowledge  and  data  at  geographically  targeted  and  sector  level  will  help 
sectors  to  adjust,  reducing  the  geographical  distributional  impacts.  Action  4,  promoting 
nature-based solutions, aims to improve the quantification of social co-benefits of measures 
and  contribute  to  their  greater  adoption;  this  better  quantification  of  social  impacts  would 

51 

 
 
 
itself help to adjust spending and thereby address distributional effects. The option does not 
include  further  measures  specifically  addressing  other  social  inclusion  or  protection  issues. 
As  damages  increase  with  temperature  scenarios,  so  does  the  mitigating  effect  of  the 
proposed actions.  Overall  assessment  of  Option 1: + (low temp. scenarios) ++  (high  temp. 
scenarios) 

Public health & safety and health systems: this option includes a variety of measures that 
address public authorities and how they can ensure that civil emergency and health systems 
can respond to climate change impacts. Among the leading measures are those under Action 
5 which encourage participation in the Covenant of Mayors and which therefore require local 
authorities to consider these systems and their climate resilience. Action 2 with the planned 
observatory  on  health  and  climate  change  addresses  an  important  aspect  of  health  system 
resilience,  although  primarily  as  an  information  tool  to  highlight  vulnerabilities  and  enable 
comparisons,  with  the  expectation  that  this  helps  public  authorities  to  address  potential 
deficiencies  and  risks  in  their  health  system,  strengthening  these  systems  compared  to  the 
baseline.  Additionally,  other  measures  to  support  greater  data  sharing  and  sectoral  risk 
assessment (Action 1), and the use of climate-resilience guidance (Action 7) are intended to 
enable  businesses  and  citizens  to  make  better-informed  choices  and  to  reduce  the  overall 
burden  upon  civil  emergency  systems  when  climate  disasters  occur.  The  benefit  of  these 
measures will scale with  the temperature scenarios, as greater resilience of civil  emergency 
and  health  systems  will  be  required  in  the  event  of  higher  temperatures  and  more  extreme 
weather  events.  Overall  assessment  of  Option  1:  +  (low  temp.  scenarios)  ++  (high  temp. 
scenarios) 

Option 2  

Employment:  the  impact  of  the  Option  on  employment  is  tied  closely  to  the  economic 
impacts  on  the  macroeconomic  environment  and  competitiveness.  The  earlier  assessment 
showed that the impact  of Option  2 on these parameters is  expected to  be a small positive, 
equivalent  to  a  (0/+)  on  a  qualitative  scale  as  the  actions  stimulate  climate  resilience  and 
reduce losses to economic welfare. A similar qualitative impact of a small positive (0/+) can 
be  expected  for  employment.  The  impact  on  employment  will  be  driven  primarily  by  the 
actions that bolster the land-based sectors (forestry, agriculture) and the water sector and its 
dependent sectors. The focus on the land-based sectors is important for more labour-intensive 
economies in  the south, centre and east  of the EU where these sectors typically represent  a 
relatively larger share of the economy and employment.  

The modelled outputs for Option 2 for employment are presented below and show reductions 
in  employment  losses  compared  to  the  baseline;  these  are  quite  comparable  to,  but  a  little 
higher than, those presented for Option 1, due to the positive impact of measures in the water 
sector. In the 4°C scenario, the 0.8% change is the equivalent of around 1.6 million jobs/year. 

Table 16: Change in Employment in option 2 compared to baseline 

Indicator 

1.5°C  
(RCP2.6) 

2°C  
(RCP4.5) 

4°C  
(RCP8.5) 

2030 

2050 

2030 

2050 

2030 

2050 

Change in Employment [%] 

-0.20% 

-0.67% 

-0.25% 

-0.85% 

-0.35% 

-1.14% 

Change compared to baseline [p.p.] 

+0.05 

+0.25 

+0.15 

+0.42 

+0.25 

+0.80 

Income  distribution,  social  protection  and  social  inclusion  (of  particular  groups):  this 
Option  mostly  has  a  focus  on  climate  and  social  vulnerability  outside  of  the  EU,  the 

52 

 
 
 
 
international benefits of which are addressed in section 6.5. Through action 14 for the water 
sectors,  and  to  a  lesser  extent  action  12  for  the  land-based  sectors,  the  option  can  address 
climate  vulnerabilities  in  the  EU  linked  to  these  issues.  This  can  provide  socio-economic 
benefits  to  groups  particularly  vulnerable  to  damages  from  these  sectors.  However,  the 
measures  in  the  water  sector,  if  successful  in  encouraging  better  water  pricing  would  add 
costs to most households across the EU with negative impacts on low-income social groups. 
It is unclear if compensating measures to address water saving would offset these additional 
costs, but on balance it is likely Action 14 would have a small negative impact across the EU. 
Nevertheless,  the  Horizon  Europe  Mission  on  Adaptation  has  a  strong  focus  on  issues  of 
equality and social justice, and as a result, the innovations, knowledge and pilots developed 
under this initiative are likely to provide significant social impact. In addition, Action 13 aims 
to  address  geographic  inequalities  by  improving  coverage  for  climate  damages.  Overall  a 
broad  balance  between  the  negative  impact  on  water  and  the  positive  impact  of  the  other 
measures is assessed, so that the impact of Option 2 is scored as (0), which when added to the 
(+)  estimated  for  option  1  in  low  temperature  scenarios  and  the  ++  in  high  temperature 
scenarios, would result in: Overall assessment of Option 2: + (low temp. scenarios) ++ (high 
temp. scenarios) 

Public health & safety and health systems: Actions 12, 13 and 14 each have measures that 
indirectly address public health and safety systems, with a focus on the civil emergency more 
than public health aspect. Action 12, through the Mission on Adaptation, aims to assess the 
climate  resilience  of  goals  proposed  under  the  Union  Civil  Protection  Mechanism  (UCPM) 
and through the EU4Health programme contribute to  the understanding of societal climate-
linked  public  health  risks.  Action  13  by  engaging  with  finance  ministries  on  climate 
resilience  is  expected  to  result  in  Member  States  and  then  in-turn  regional  and  local 
authorities,  to  assess  their  climate  vulnerabilities,  and  thereby  to  lead  to  greater  protection 
against financial impacts of climate damages. Action 14 on freshwater would both improve 
the  overall  resilience  of  water  companies  and  the  water  system,  but  would  also  ensure  that 
climate impacts are integrated into Water Safety Plans across the EU, which would improve 
the preparedness of civil emergency services for water-related climate impacts. The benefit of 
these  measures  will  scale  with  the  temperature  scenarios,  as  greater  resilience  of  civil 
emergency and health systems will be required in the event of higher temperatures and more 
extreme weather events. Overall, Option 2 is assessed as a further + impact in low and high 
temperature  scenarios,  although  the  impact  may  also  scale  positively  in  high  temperature 
scenarios, which when added to Option 1 results in: Overall assessment of Option 2: ++ (low 
temp. scenarios) +++ (high temp. scenarios) 

Environmental impacts 

Option 0 (Baseline) 

Climate resilience: the key focus of the Adaptation Strategy is to improve climate resilience, 
in line with the overarching objective of becoming ‘a climate-resilient society, fully adapted 
to the unavoidable impacts of climate change, with reinforced adaptive capacity and minimal 
vulnerability’.  The  actions  and  measures  of  the  2013  Strategy  were  designed  to  address 
various  aspects  of  this  objective.  The  2018  Evaluation  of  the  Strategy  examined  progress 
against  the  three  specific  objectives  rather  than  the  overarching  objective,  and  found  that 
while  substantial  progress  was  being  made,  none  of  the  three  specific  objectives  had  been 
fully achieved, a deficiency in climate resilience being one of the logical outcomes thereof. In 
the baseline scenario it is  expected that similar deficiencies would remain, so that although 
some  progress  would  be  made  in  improving  knowledge,  reinforcing  planning  and  taking 

53 

 
 
actions, the actions  and  measures of the 2013 Strategy would be insufficient to  address  the 
accelerating pace of climate change impacts and the need for action  

Quality of natural resources/fighting pollution (water, soil, air etc.): climate change will 
have  significant  impacts  on  natural  resources  such  as  water,  air  and  soil,  which  are  each 
important for their functions for life, the economy, health and ecosystems. The 2013 Strategy 
attempted to address these impacts mainly through actions and measures to promote nature-
based solutions, or through the assumption of co-benefits to natural resources from increased 
climate resilience. Particularly under its Action 2 of the 2013 Strategy, the LIFE and Horizon 
2020  programmes  included  projects  to  pilot  nature-based  solutions,  with  benefits  to  natural 
resources. These types of projects  and beneficial impacts  would be expected to  continue in 
the baseline scenarios. The broader co-benefits to natural resources from the Strategy would 
be quite indirect for most of the actions and measures in the 2013 Strategy, although there is 
particular  scope  for  these  to  be  further  addressed  in  the  baseline  via  Action  3  and 
consideration in the Covenant of Mayors of environmental quality and resource management 
at  city  and  regional  level;  similarly,  through  Actions  4  and  5  to  further  research  and  its 
dissemination,  and  through  Action  6  by  mainstreaming  adaptation  into  major  EU  spending 
programmes and projects. Opportunities for further development were identified in the 2018 
evaluation, such as with coastal protection and green and blue infrastructure, but these would 
not be expected to be significantly addressed in the baseline.  

Biodiversity,  including  flora,  fauna,  ecosystems  and  the  services  they  provide  and 
landscapes:  Closely  linked  to  the  natural  resources  indicator,  the  main  avenues  to  address 
this  impact  in  the  2013  Strategy  would  be  broadly  the  same,  seeking  primarily  through 
Action 2 to address biodiversity and ecosystems as part of the projects supported by the LIFE 
programme,  and  more  indirectly  through  the  other  actions.  Whilst  the  baseline  would 
continue actions  in  these areas and lead to  better outcomes for biodiversity  and ecosystems 
than no action, the co-benefits to this indicator would be limited.  

Option 1  

Climate resilience: the measures in Option 1 strengthen the Strategy and provide numerous 
additional ways in which the original actions can contribute to increased climate resilience by 
improving data, planning and management, and by supporting additional action by public and 
private  stakeholders.  Action  1  contains  measures  that  focus  on  improving  and  harmonising 
monitoring, reporting and evaluation methodologies; by addressing these existing weaknesses 
it is expected that public authorities and others will be better able to identify issues and gaps 
in their planning and action, and to address these. Action 4 focuses on NbS, supporting their 
piloting,  dissemination  and  deployment;  these  measures  directly  benefit  climate  resilience 
and  often  bring  cost,  social  and  environmental  co-benefits.  Action  5  can  be  particularly 
powerful  at  increasing  climate  resilience  of  cities  and  local  authorities,  with  a  mix  of 
technical  and  methodological  support,  and  reporting  and  funding  requirements  giving  a 
significant  boost  to  planning  and  action  on  climate  resilience.  Actions  1  and  2  are  more 
indirect  in  their  impact,  but  it  is  accepted  that  knowledge  gaps  are  a  major  problem  that 
stakeholders need to address; therefore, these Actions, with measures that address these gaps 
and weaknesses in multiple ways, are expected to empower many more stakeholders to take 
action. Action 6, by further mainstreaming adaptation in EU programmes in the context of the 
Green Deal  and European Green Deal  Investment  Plan, would ensure increased availability 
of multi-billion funding streams to address climate resilience. Action 7 will improve guidance 
for climate resilient infrastructure and construction, and try to ensure these are used as widely 
as possible, particularly within EU funded programmes such as TEN-E and TEN-T; this will 
have an important benefit for long-term climate resilience for key infrastructure. Action 8, by 

54 

 
 
addressing  the  financial  and  public  sector  interface  on  climate  resilience,  is  expected  to 
increase  the  appropriate  assessment,  pricing  and  coverage  of  climate  risk  by  these 
stakeholders, thereby increasing climate resilience.  

The impact on climate resilience of the actions will be the same across temperature scenarios; 
the increased beneficial impact of the increased resilience in higher temperature scenarios is 
noted in the assessment of the other impact indicators. Overall assessment of Option 1: ++  

Quality of natural resources/fighting pollution (water, soil, air etc.): the actions taken to 
promote  climate  resilience  often  have  co-benefits  for  the  wider  natural  environment  and 
resources.  Action  4  addresses  the  natural  environment  most  directly,  focusing  on  nature-
based  solutions  for  climate  resilience,  with  the  types  of  solutions  to  be  piloted  and 
disseminated having important benefits to natural resources. Action 5 contains measures that 
will  bring  broader  environmental  quality  and  resources  into  closer  focus  at  city  and  local 
authority level.  Other Actions and measures  are  also  likely to bring indirect  co-benefits  for 
natural resources and pollution control. Nevertheless, the impact of Option 1 on this indicator 
is not assessed as large given the limited direct attention given to these impacts. The benefit 
of the Option is expected to increase with the temperature scenario, as the beneficial impacts 
on water especially would become more valuable. Overall assessment of Option 1: 0/+ (low 
temp. scenarios) + (high temp. scenarios) 

Biodiversity,  including  flora,  fauna,  ecosystems  and  the  services  they  provide  and 
landscapes:  the  actions  taken  to  promote  climate  resilience  also  often  have  co-benefits  for 
biodiversity and ecosystems. The support within Action 4 for nature-based solutions can be 
expected  to  have  beneficial  impacts  on  biodiversity  and  ecosystems,  as  the  use  of  these 
solutions  over  ‘hard’  infrastructure  or  solutions  provides  more  hospitable,  less  damaging 
outcomes.  The  measures  under  Action  5,  whilst  bringing  some  benefit  to  environmental 
quality  and  resources  at  city  and  local  authority  level,  do  not  address  biodiversity  and 
ecosystems  as  a  headline  objective.  The  other  Actions  and  measures  are  likely  to  also 
indirectly have co-benefits for biodiversity and ecosystems. The benefit of the Option is not 
expected to significantly increase with temperature, as the beneficial impacts are quite small 
and indirect. Overall assessment of Option 1: 0/+  

Option 2  

Climate  resilience:  within  Option  2  the  international  actions  focus  primarily  on  increasing 
climate  resilience  in  partner  countries,  the  benefits  of  which  are  assessed  as  part  of  the 
crosscutting  impacts.  Nevertheless,  there  are  measures  within  these  actions,  particularly 
Action  11,  that  do  focus  on  greater  cooperation,  exchange  and  learning  for  the  EU  from 
partner countries, with China, India and the Balkan countries identified. Actions 12, 13 and 
14  have  a  stronger  focus  on  climate  resilience  in  the  EU.  Action  12  and  the  Mission  on 
Adaptation is significantly geared towards the development and dissemination of knowledge 
for  climate  resilience,  including  through  deep  demonstrations,  this  can  have  an  important 
impact. Action 13, addressing the climate protection gap, will better engage Member States 
finance ministries  and in-turn other public authorities to  review  and improve their National 
Risk  Assessments  and  to  take  actions  to  improve  preparedness  and  protections.  Action  14, 
focusing  specifically  on  the  water  sector  will  also  have  an  important  impact  on  resilience. 
Overall,  the  climate  resilience  impact  of  this  option  is  scored  as  a  (+),  added  to  Option  1, 
which results in an overall assessment of Option 2: +++ 

Quality of natural resources/fighting pollution (water, soil, air etc.): the cross-boundary 
nature of natural resources means that the international actions taken by the EU under Option 
2  can  also  lead  to  co-benefits  for  these  resources  in  the  EU.  Actions  9  and  11  include 

55 

 
 
measures  supporting  partner  countries  in  their  adaptation  actions  and  mainstreaming 
environmental and sustainability concerns into these, promoting ecosystem conservation and 
restoration as a measure to boost resilience and measures to boost environmental concerns in 
trade,  each  of  which  could  indirectly  provide  co-benefits  to  natural  resources  in  the  EU. 
Action 12 includes measures that specifically focus on land resources, particularly forests and 
soils, with a focus on developing knowledge and innovations to improve the management and 
resilience of these resources. In addition, Action 14 provides for a dedicated set of measures 
to address water resources with a focus on improved, sustainable use and allocation of water, 
and  in  improved  management  in  disaster  situations  to  reduce  contamination  risks.  The 
potential  impact  of  these  actions  and  measures  is  anticipated  to  be  higher  than  Option  1, 
given the specific focus and targeting of sustainability and natural resources, and is scored as 
(+), increasing in high temperature scenarios to (+/++), added to Option 1, this results in an: 
Overall  assessment  of  Option  2  impact:  +/++  (low  temp.  scenarios)  ++/+++  (high  temp. 
scenarios) 

Biodiversity,  including  flora,  fauna,  ecosystems  and  the  services  they  provide  and 
landscapes: similar to the previous indicator there can be benefits to the EU from the cross-
boundary impacts of the international actions of this Option, but these are not expected to be 
as  strong  as  biodiversity  and  ecosystems  are  more  localised,  and  therefore  the  impact 
pathway  is  weaker.  The  co-benefits  of  international  actions  can  provide  for  healthier 
ecosystems in the EU and the conservation of ecosystems in partner countries that can be part 
of  EU  species  migration  routes.  The  Mission  on  Adaptation  in  Action  12  includes  an 
alignment with  the EU Biodiversity Strategy  and therefore the solutions  to  be implemented 
by  this  measure  will  provide  benefits  for  ecosystems  and  biodiversity,  particularly  through 
the deployment of nature-based solutions. Action 14 on water resources includes a focus on 
securing  environmental  water  flows  and  ensuring  that  environmental  externalities  are 
included  in  water  pricing,  both  of  which  can  be  powerful  instruments  to  benefit  ecosystem 
quality and resilience. The potential impact of these actions and measures is anticipated to be 
higher  than  for  Option  1,  given  the  specific  focus  and  targeting  of  biodiversity  and 
ecosystems within actions 12 and 14, scoring a (+). In contrast to the assessment of option 1 
and  based  on  the  more  direct  impact  pathway  of  action  14,  the  benefits  are  expected  to 
increase  in  high  temperature  scenarios  to  (+/++).  Added  to  Option  1,  this  results  in  an: 
Overall  assessment  of  Option  2  impact:  +/++  (low  temp.  scenarios)  ++/+++  (high  temp. 
scenarios) 

Cross-cutting impacts 

Option 0 (Baseline) 

Impacts in 3rd countries and international relations: The EU and its Member States have 
taken  on  greater  international  commitments  on  adaptation  and  climate  change  through 
various international treaties and programmes. For example, the EU and Member States are 
committed  under  the  Paris  Agreement  to  continuing  to  scale  up  the  mobilization  of 
international  climate  finance,  as  part  of  the  developed  countries'  collective  goal  to  jointly 
mobilize  USD  100  billion  per  year  by  2020  through  to  2025  for  mitigation  and  adaptation 
purposes.  However,  the  2013  Adaptation  Strategy  lacks  alignment  with  these  most  recent 
international policy developments. It therefore has very limited international focus with few 
of the Actions having much more than minor avenues for international impact. In the baseline 
scenario,  this  would  be  expected  to  result  in  neighbouring  and  partner  countries  to  the  EU 
being  less  climate  resilient  than  they  would  be  with  EU  action.  This  has  numerous 
implications, including in the political and diplomatic sphere, where the EU’s global standing 

56 

 
 
could be reduced by lack of action in line with international treaties, and in the humanitarian 
sphere, as greater numbers of people would suffer as climate impacts increased. 

Beyond  this,  the  potential  spillover  effects  on  the  EU  can  also  be  significant,  from  the 
economic  impacts  on  trading  partners  reducing  demand  for  EU  goods  and  services,  or  the 
impact on international supply chains. Security and migration concerns are also relevant, as 
climate change could act as a threat multiplier and further exacerbate displacement of people, 
and increase the risk of conflicts. PESETA IV indicated that it is very challenging to assess 
these  consequences,  as  detailed  information  is  lacking.  Other  examples  from  sub-Saharan 
Africa,  South  Asia  and  Latin  America,  suggest  that  the  changing  climate  is  expected  to 
displace  more  than  140  million  people  within  their  national  borders  by  2050192.  In  the 
baseline, there is a heightened risk of all of these impacts negatively affecting the EU and its 
partners. 

Option 1  

Impacts in 3rd countries and on international relations: this Option has very few measures 
that  take  a  specific  international  perspective.  Some  international  benefits  could  induced  by 
the Option, for example through the changes in  Action 3 to the Covenant of Mayors which 
includes  non-EU  cities  and  a  Policy  Support  Facility  which  would  include  an  international 
aspect; Actions 1 and 2 which provide data which can be globally useful; or Actions 6 and 7 
which  could  mainstream  climate  resilience  into  funding  and  practice  of  EU  programmes, 
including  those  spending  outside  the  EU.  Whilst  the  latter  Actions  in  particular  can  be 
expected to have some impact, it is clear that only updating the existing actions of the 2013 
Strategy  does  not  significantly  address  the  constraints  and  weaknesses  of  its  international 
impact as identified in the 2018 Evaluation. As a result, the impact on developing countries is 
assessed as marginal, and as not significantly increasing with temperature scenario. Similarly, 
the positive impact on international relations is minimal; indeed the lack of action may lead 
to  criticism of the EU, as well as increased humanitarian and  emergency aid  needs in  third 
countries (which are already only partially met). Overall assessment of Option 1 impact: 0/+ 

Option 2 

Impacts in 3rd countries and on international relations: one of the key aims of actions 9, 
10  and  11  is  to  provide  for  a  concerted  set  of  measures  to  make  EU  international 
commitments on adaptation an effective and visible part of the new Strategy. Action 9 takes a 
strong  focus  on  encouraging  and  supporting  partner  countries  to  improve  their  adaptation 
arrangements, including a focus on disaster risk reduction, risk and vulnerability assessment 
and strategy development. Action 10 is focused on the design of climate resilience supporting 
policies  and  instruments  and  in  the  financing  of  such  measures  to  support  their 
implementation, with the intention to use EU External Action and development aid to drive 
significant  resources  to  the  adaptation  issue  in  partner  countries,  at  the  very  least  ensuring 
that  EU  spending  in  these  countries  is  climate  proof.  Action  11  is  intended  to  boost 
engagement  and  cooperation  for  mutual  benefit  of  the  EU  and  partner  countries,  this  is  an 
important diplomatic and political action, but can also bring practical lessons and benefits for 
all  participants.  There  is  a  particular  focus  on  developing  countries  across  these  actions, 
which is a natural focus given both the instruments to be used, the needs and the benefits for 
the EU. Actions 12, 13 and 14 have no specific international dimension. Overall, Option 2, 
with  almost  20 proposed measures across three internationally  targeted  actions will already 

192 Rigaud, K. K., Jones, B., Bergmann, J., Clement, V., Ober, K., Schewe, J., & Midgley, A. (2018). Groundswell: Preparing for Internal  
Climate Migration. Washington, DC: World Bank. 

57 

 
 
                                                 
significantly increase the impact of EU action compared to the baseline of near zero impact, 
and the Option 1 marginal impact. The actual impact to be achieved will depend significantly 
on  the  willingness  of  the  partner  countries  to  engage  with  the  EU,  but  the  benefits  to  both 
parties  and  the  amounts  of  funding  available  through  the  targeted  channels  provides  for  a 
positive  outlook  for  both  the  impact  in  partner  countries  and  on  the  EU  international 
relations.  This  option  is  scored  for  an  impact  of  ++,  with  the  benefits  expected  to  increase 
significantly  in  high  temperature  scenarios  to  (+++).  Added  to  Option  1,  this  results  in  an: 
Overall  assessment  of  Option  2  impact:  ++/+++  (low  temp.  scenarios)  +++  (high  temp. 
scenarios) 

7.  HOW DO THE OPTIONS COMPARE 

This  chapter  presents  the  comparison  of  the  options,  as  summarised  in  Error!  Reference 
source not found.17.  

Table 17: Summary of option comparison assessment 

Indicator 

Effectiveness 

Efficiency 

Coherence 

Added Value 

Proportionality 

Indicator 

Effectiveness 

Efficiency 

Coherence 

Added Value 

Proportionality 

Effectiveness 

Baseline 

0/+ 

++ 

0/+ 

+ 

+ 

Baseline 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

Assessment 

Option 1 

++ 

+/++ 

++ 

++ 

+ 

Assessment 

Option 1 

+/++ 

0/- 

+/++ 

+/++ 

0/+ 

Option 2 

+++ 

+ 

+++ 

+++ 

++ 

Option 2 

+++ 

- 

+++ 

+++ 

++ 

The  following  section  ranks  the  options  in  terms  of  their  effectiveness  in  achieving  the  4 
objectives  of  the  Strategy  (see  chapter  4).  Firstly,  we  note  that  three  of  the  four  objectives 
bear a resemblance to the three objectives of the 2013 Adaptation Strategy. The new strategy 
has  re-focused  and  increased  the  ambition  of  these  objectives,  and  added  a  new  fourth 
objective to strengthen climate resilience globally.  

Option  0:  continuation  with  the  2013  Strategy  would  only  partially  address  the  new 
objectives, as this option would not have more detailed measures and actions to achieve the 
higher climate resilience ambitions. It also would not address the fourth objective at all, and 

58 

 
 
 
 
 
 
this  would  be  a  significant  deficiency.  These  deficiencies  would  become  more  apparent  in 
higher temperature scenarios. Option 0 overall assessment: 0/+  

Option 1: by significantly deepening the existing actions and measures taken over from the 
2013  Strategy,  this  option  would  constitute  progress  compared  to  baseline  as  shown  in  the 
positive  overall  assessment  of  its  impact  on  climate  resilience.  Yet  Option  1  would  not 
address  the  fourth  objective  at  all.  Furthermore,  it  would  not  take  full  advantage  of  the 
available  knowledge  instruments  such  as  the  Mission  on  Adaptation,  nor  would  it  fully 
address all aspects of the climate protection gap or sector level needs, which would reduce its 
potential to  accelerate adaptation  action. The lack of international  actions would reduce the 
effectiveness of this option in higher temperature scenarios when greater global cooperation 
and resilience would be needed. Option 1 overall assessment: ++ 

Option  2:  building  on  Option  1,  this  Option  includes  a  suite  of  actions  and  measures  that 
specifically address the fourth objective for global climate resilience, and additionally it also 
includes  actions  and  measures  which  provide  additional  boosts  to  improving  knowledge  of 
climate  impacts  and  solutions,  through  the  Mission  on  Adaptation,  and  in  addressing 
additional  aspects  of  the  climate  protection  gap  and  sector  coverage.  By  addressing  all 
objectives, this option has the greatest impact on climate resilience, and would be particularly 
beneficial in high temperature scenarios. Option 2 overall assessment: +++ 

Efficiency 

As noted earlier in the assessment the Strategy imposes few additional mandatory obligations 
or  costs  on  non-EC  stakeholders.  The  actions  and  measures  are  primarily  voluntary  and 
provide  assistance,  support,  knowledge,  guidance,  information  and  funding.  Only  in  a  few 
cases do the proposed actions lead to costs for non-EC stakeholders, by affecting markets or 
reporting  requirements.  In  any  case,  the  actions  of  the  Strategy  place  an  emphasis  on 
maximising  co-benefits  for  stakeholders  and  society  as  a  whole.  The  main  expenditures, 
which will require  greater specification,  fall upon the EC,  with  costs expected to be higher 
than the baseline for Option 1 and higher again for Option 2.  

Option 0: the existing actions of the 2013 Strategy impose few mandatory costs on non-EC 
parties;  this  would  not  be  expected  to  change.  Therefore,  whilst  this  option  only  partially 
contributes to the objectives, it does so cost-efficiently. Option 0 overall assessment: ++ 

Option 1: the modifications to the existing actions of the 2013 Strategy would lead to some 
additional  spending  by  EC  in  various  new  programmes  and  initiatives.  Cost  estimates  (see 
chapter 6 and Annex 7) show that these are not likely to significantly increase the costs of the 
Strategy. For example, the costs of the measure to establish a policy support facility (measure 
5.4) are estimated at around €1.5 million. The move towards tying EC project funding to the 
development  of  climate  resilience  plans  would  increase  costs  for  public  and  private 
stakeholders seeking EU funding, although the benefits of implementing the plans would be 
expected  to  offset  these  costs.  Increased  reporting  and  monitoring  requirements  would  also 
increase  costs  for  public  authorities  and  a  handful  of  financial  sector  stakeholders.  Costs 
would  therefore  be  somewhat  higher  than  baseline,  but  as  the  option  is  likely  to  be  much 
more effective, it remains quite cost efficient. Option 1 overall assessment: ++ 

Option  2:  the  additional  actions  of  this  Option  address,  largely,  existing  EC  funds,  e.g.  in 
development aid, or Horizon research spending, therefore the overall cost impact is neutral. 
However,  some  of  the  new  international  actions  and  measures  will  require  additional 
resources  and  efforts  by  the  EC  to  initiate  and  maintain,  and  the  actions  on  the  climate 
protection gap will bring some additional reporting and engagement costs to Member States 
and private stakeholders. The expenditure and investments required by the EC are expected to 

59 

 
 
be low, but higher than for Option 1. Finally, the action on water is likely to have significant 
cost implications for users and the water industry. Overall, this option will cost the most, but 
also delivers the most. Option 2 overall assessment: + 

Coherence 

Option 0: the 2013 Strategy was evaluated in 2018 to be adequately coherent with other EU 
policies, but the developments in the policy context since 2018 such as the Climate Law and 
European  Green  Deal  stand  out.  There  is  a  risk  that  this  coherence  would  be  reduced  over 
time  and  with  insufficient  flexibility  within  the  Option  to  adjust  to  a  changing  policy 
environment.  This  Option  would  not  provide  alignment  with  EU  commitments  under  the 
Paris Agreement and other international agreements. Option 0 overall assessment: 0/+ 

Option  1:  the  updated,  deepened  actions  of  Option  1  of  the  new  Strategy  would  be  much 
more  aligned  with  EU  policy  developments  since  2018,  including  through  measures 
specifically designed to take advantage of and provide synergies with these developments. In 
a similar way to Option 0, the main gap would be in the area of international climate policy 
where the Option would not contribute to coherence. Option 1 overall assessment: ++ 

Option  2:  in  addition  to  the  alignment  with  EU  domestic  policy  noted  for  Option  1,  this 
option would provide an important additional alignment and coherence with other European 
Green  Deal  policies  (e.g.  Biodiversity  Strategy,  Forest  Strategy,  Circular  Economy  Action 
Plan,  Zero  Pollution  Ambition)  and  well  as  international  commitments  and  external  policy 
through the international actions. Option 2 overall assessment: +++  

Added Value 

Option  0:  The rationale for EU added value was established and positively  assessed in  the 
2018 evaluation: this would continue to be relevant, though the 2013 Strategy would become 
increasingly  deficient  in  addressing  growing  needs  for  transboundary  cooperation  and 
contributing to EU international commitments. Option 0 overall assessment: + 

Option  1:  The  updated,  deepened  actions  would  deliver  more  added  value  than  the  2013 
Strategy as shown in the effectiveness assessment; the improvements to the measures would 
in particular improve the EU level added value of transboundary cooperation and knowledge 
sharing. Option 1 overall assessment: ++ 

Option  2:  The  alignment  of  EU  international  action  and  addressing  EU-wide  problems 
through  the  Mission  on  Adaptation  and  its  deep  demonstration  and  other  projects,  and 
through  sector-level  measures  such  as  Action  14,  would  provide  significant  additional  EU 
added value compared to other options. Option 2 overall assessment: +++ 

Proportionality 

Option  0:  The  rationale  for  the  proportionality  of  EU  action  was  established  for  the  2013 
Strategy and positively assessed in 2018. No changes would be expected, except perhaps that 
the  EU  role  could  become  disproportionately  insufficient  as  climate  impacts  increase, 
particularly in the international area. Option 0 overall assessment: + 

Option 1: The deepening of actions and increase of outreach to local and citizen level moves 
a step closer to what are usually regarded as Member State competencies, but remains within 
the  bounds  of  what  the  EC  can  and  should  do,  complementing  national  action.  It  does  not 
impose significant new costs for public authorities and the voluntary and supporting nature of 
the measures leaves the major responsibility for action and freedom to act with the relevant 
national authorities. Option 1 overall assessment: + 

60 

 
 
Option  2:  The  additional  international  actions  and  measures  increase  the  ambition  of  the 
Strategy  and  fall  under  the  umbrella  of  EU  competences  for  External  Action.  The  other 
actions  under  this  option  also  work  proportionally  under  EU  competences,  through  the 
Horizon  Europe  programme,  and  sector  policy  on  water  (e.g.  developing  EU  competencies 
related to the Water Framework Directive). Option 2 overall assessment: ++ 

8.  PREFERRED OPTION  

Following  the  comparison  of  options  in  the  previous  chapters,  Option  2  emerges  as  the 
preferred option, as it is the most beneficial across the assessed impacts and criteria taking 
account of the costs incurred and the expected benefits. In summary, Option 2 (the deepening 
of  existing  actions  supplemented  with  novel  actions)  adds  greater  ambition  to  the  Union’s 
actions on climate change adaptation, in particular with regard to international actions. Novel 
actions that address the international dimension of the EU’s adaptation policy are needed to 
progress  on  its  objective  to  increase  climate  resilience  globally.  Moreover,  international 
actions  also  contribute  to  the  Adaptation  Strategy’s  objective  of  ‘improving  knowledge  of 
climate  impacts  and  solutions’  by  providing  for  exchange  and  cooperation  mechanisms  to 
bring  international  innovations  from  partner  countries  to  the  EU.  The  other  options  do  not 
address  this  important  international  objective,  and  would  hamper  the  EU  approach  to 
adaptation. 

Option 2 also ensures that the EU’s adaptation policies are aligned with broader EU policies 
and  the  Commission  priorities  resulting  from  the  European  Green  Deal.  New  actions  to 
reduce the climate protection gap and actions to increase transboundary cooperation address 
Just Transition policy and the need to “build back better” after the COVID crisis. Moreover, 
deepening actions to scale up private finance are aligned with the EU’s Renewed Strategy on 
Sustainable Finance.  

It  follows from  the summary tables in  chapters 6 and 7 that option 2 does  pose the highest 
costs to business compared to the baseline and option 1. Overall, the additional  burden and 
costs to private stakeholders in the EU are estimated low, as few of the actions and measures 
impose mandatory measures. Furthermore, the negative impact of higher costs is mitigated in 
a  few  ways.  Firstly,  the  Strategy  provides  a  variety  of  guidance,  support,  data  and  funding 
sources  for  firms  that  can  help  them  take  action  on  climate  resilience  and  reduce  their 
exposure  to  damages.  Secondly,  this  option  has  benefits  across  the  whole  macro-economic 
environment, reducing the volume of economic losses. Finally, the costs of the Actions under 
Option 2 (and 1) make use of existing funding infrastructure and knowledge platforms, such 
as Climate-ADAPT, the Covenant of Mayors and the ESF+, reducing new burdens. Overall, 
the additional costs are estimated proportional to the beneficial impacts achieved. 

Similarly,  the  implementation  of  measures  in  option  2  may  have  some  additional 
administrative  costs.  These  will  be  measured  in  the  future  impact  assessments  for 
implementation  of  individual  measures  that  will  be  announced  in  the  strategy.  We  expect 
these costs to be low to moderate and to be largely outweighed by the benefits of adaptation 
action.  

An intervention logic for the new EU Adaptation Strategy is presented below.  

61 

 
 
Figure 4 Intervention logic for the new EU Adaptation Strategy 

 
 
9.  HOW WILL ACTUAL IMPACTS BE MONITORED AND EVALUATED?  

This  impact  assessment  evaluates  actions  to  further  improve  the  resilience  of  the  EU  to  the 
impacts  of  climate  change.  Many  of  the  actions  under  Option  2  are  action  oriented  and 
envisage  immediate  effects,  while  others  anticipated  to  deliver  their  full  effects  in  years  to 
come.  Monitoring  will  be  required  not  only  to  assess  whether  the  actions  defined  in  the 
Strategy are on track but also to review the evolution of the global context and to determine 
whether additional new measures need activation. The Adaptation Strategy is not a classical 
case for monitoring and evaluation (neither for the baseline nor for the progress), the nature 
of  its  key  objective  ‘climate  resilient  society’  is  not  something  that  can  be  measured 
numerically. The long-term nature of both the problem being dealt with (climate change) and 
the  impact  of  the  measures  does  not  lend  itself  to  tracking  and  evaluating  the  impact  of  the 
Strategy.  

Developments  in  adaptation  tracking  and  indicators  are  somewhat  limited,  only  a 
handful  of  countries  in  Europe  have  developed  frameworks  to  track  their  adaptation. 
The  existing  systems  focus  heavily  on  indicators  that  track  the  early  parts  of  the  adaptation 
process, e.g. identifying climate change impacts and vulnerabilities, or on providing contextual 
indicators  on  how  the  impacts  may  be  felt.  Work  in  Member  States  provides  some  useful 
lessons to build on, and can help defining output and outcome indicators, that bridge the gap to 
impact indicators.  

At  EU  level,  the  implementation  of  the  Governance  Regulation  and  the  mandate 
assessment of progress as part of the Climate Law will provide an important new source 
of information for monitoring and evaluation of progress. This would add to, and enrich, 
the  adaptation  preparedness  scoreboard  exercise  in  2017-2018,  and  the  reporting  under  the 
Monitoring  Mechanism  Regulation  in  2015  and  2019.  First  reporting  under  the  Governance 
regulation  will  need  to  be  assessed  to  consider  how  useful  the  information  would  be  for 
evaluation  the  Strategy.  Refinements  to  reporting  templates  can  be  made  in  the  future  to 
encourage MS to report the most useful information. 

Indicators  on  public  and  private  spending  on  adaptation  can  be  valuable  and  can  be 
improved,  taking  advantage  of  the  Taxonomy  and  international  tracking.  The  gaps  in 
current  data  are  addressed  by  actions  in  the  Strategy  and  complementary  policy  initiatives. 
Tracking of international adaptation  climate finance, i.e. towards the $100 billion adaptation 
fund  goal,  is  currently  more  robust  than  most  domestic  public  adaptation  finance  tracking. 
Lessons  can  be  learnt  and  indicators  may  be  developed  in  this  area.  The  taxonomy  offers 
potential for some simple tracking of spending towards adaptation.  

Further development will be needed on the nature and purpose of indicators. Looking to 
build indicators for which a time-series can be developed and indications of progress  can be 
made  can  already  be  an  important  step  at  this  relatively  early  stage.  Moving  at  a  later  stage 
towards indicators more closely tied to and relevant to objectives could be valuable. Caution 
also  needs  to  be  taken  with  numerical  indicators,  it  is  important  to  recognise  that  in  many 
cases,  counting  is  not  enough  (e.g.  whether  a  Member  State  has  a  NAS),  as  this  misses 
important  issues  and  also  potentially  biases  towards  easy-to-measure,  rather  than  relevant, 
indicators.  Quantitative  indicators  must  be  contextualised  with  qualitative  analysis.  Work  of 
the  Global  Commission  on  Adaptation  will  be  useful  for  the  definition  of  relevant 
indicators193.  

193 See tables 1 and 2 especially in Leiter, T., Olhoff, A., Al Azar, R., Barmby, V., Bours, D., Clement, V.W.C., Dale, T.W., Davies, C., and  
Jacobs, H. 2019. “Adaptation metrics: current landscape and evolving practices”. Rotterdam and Washington,DC. Available online at  

63 

 
 
                                                 
 
Indicators should be re-used and repurposed from other sources and initiatives. Work for 
the  Sendai  Framework,  or  Sustainable  Development  Goals  includes  indicators  that  can  be 
relevant  for  adaptation  action,  with  the  right  contextual  backing.  Using  these  provides 
synergies  and  avoids  re-inventing  the  wheel  on  some  aspects.  Ongoing  work  under  the 
Strategy  itself  will  be  necessary  to  further  develop  the  set  of  indicators  for  monitoring  and 
evaluating  the  Strategy.  This  will  need  to  take  advantage  of  the  various  synergies  that  are 
possible  and  encourage  a  mutual  learning  environment  with  other  stakeholders  active  in  the 
adaptation indicator space. 

The  following  Error!  Reference  source  not  found.  provides  a  simple,  illustrative  first 
summary of some potential indicators for the Adaptation Strategy. While these examples for 
indicators focus on measures covered by mini-assessments (i.e. in Annex 7), a monitoring and 
evaluation scheme for the 2021, EU Adaptation Strategy will have to include the full portfolio 
(i.e. in Annex 6). 

Table 18: Monitoring and evaluation indicators 

Main 
objective 

Specific 
objective 

Action 

Core indicator 

e
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a
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O1: improve 
knowledge 
of climate 
impacts and 
development 
of solutions: 

O2: 
Reinforce 
planning 
and climate 
risk 
management 

O3: 
Accelerate 
adaptation 
action 

Assessment of knowledge gaps by machine learning194. 

A1 

A2 

A12 

JRC research: number of projects dealing with adaptation and budget allocated, disaggregated by 
regions 

Use of Climate-ADAPT (e.g. number of visitors, pages most visited, number of registered users, 
assessment of the content, databases and metadata) 

Use of Climate-ADAPT – Health Observatory usage (e.g.: number of visitors, pages most visited, 
number of registered users, assessment of the content, databases and metadata) complemented by a 
qualitative assessment of fitness-for-purpose. 

Horizon Europe and Adaptation Mission projects: number of projects dealing with adaptation and 
budget allocated, disaggregated by regions 

Horizon Europe and Adaptation Mission projects: detailed information resulting in tangible impact 
and the reduction of physical material risks 

A3 

Number of National Adaptation Strategies and Action Plans and climate change risk assessments,, 
including status of implementation (i.e. on full adaptation policy cycle) 
Number of Emergency Management Services risk and recovery maps produced for ‘clients’ in Europe 

A4 

Number and amount of Life+ grants used for experience transfer on nature-based solutions. 

A5 

A6 

A7 

A8 

Proportion of local and regional authorities that have an adaptation plan or strategy (e.g. through the 
EU Covenant of Mayors or similar initiatives)  

List of policies and legal acts where adaptation has been mainstreamed (available) 

Number of standards amended or developed coordinated by CEN/CENELEC, including the tracking 
of adopted standards by stakeholders 

Tracking of non-financial disclosure (NFD) and in particular climate risk-related impacts in corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) reporting. Aligned with the EU Strategy on CSR 

Number of and total investment in adaptation infrastructure investments (co-) financed by EU funds 
and/or public financial institutions. 

A12  Amount of estimated climate-related insured losses. 

A14 

Number of Water resource allocation established, including the assessment of regional and temporal 
scope 

www.gca.org 
194  Biesbroek,  R.,  Badloe,  S.,  &  Athanasiadis,  I.  N.  (2020).  Machine  learning  for  research  on  climate  change  adaptation  policy  integration:  an 
exploratory UK case study. Regional Environmental Change, 20(3), 1-13. 

64 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                          
Main 
objective 

Specific 
objective 

Action 

Core indicator 

O4: 
Strengthen 
climate 
resilience 
globally 

A9  Monitoring Member State contributions by Adaptation Finance tracking in developing countries 

A10 

A11 

Number of and total private investment in adaptation investments (co-) financed by EU funds and/or 
public financial institutions. 

Number of commitments made by EU Member States to engage with other Nations to increase the 
bilateral exchange in knowledge and learning. 

65 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex 1: Procedural information 

Lead DG, Decide Planning/CWP references 

The Directorate-General (DG) for Climate Action was leading the preparation of this initiative 
and the work on the Impact Assessment in the European Commission. The planning entry was 
approved in Decide Planning under the reference PLAN/2020/7621. It is included in the 2020 
Commission  Work  Programme  under  the  policy  objective  “Commission  contribution  to 
COP26 in Glasgow “. 

Organisation and timing 

The planned adoption date (Q3 2020) included in the Commission Work Programme adopted 
on 29 January 2020, was changed to Q1 2021 in the revised version adopted on 27 May 2020 
following  the  COVID-19  crisis.  An  inter-service  steering  group  (ISSG)  was  established  for 
preparing this initiative, as well as several thematic sub-groups.  

Consultation of the RSB 

A  draft  Impact  Assessment  was  submitted  to  the  Regulatory  Scrutiny  Board  (RSB)  on  4 
November  2020.  Following  the  Board  meeting  on  2  December  2020,  it  issued  a  positive 
opinion (with reservations) on 4 December 2020.   

Several  recommendations  and  feedback  were  made  in  the  initial  Impact  Assessment  Quality 
Checklist,  which  have  been  incorporated  in  the  final  Impact  Assessment.  These  include  the 
addition  of  a  Glossary,  indices  of  figures  and  tables,  and  a  list  of  acronyms  (in  Annex  10). 
Also in response to the Board’s feedback, several improvements and clarifications have been 
made throughout the text, for example in the way modelling results were reported, or how the 
expected  degree  of  implementation  of  the  proposed  measures  was  integrated  into  the 
assessment. The introduction of section 6 further details the voluntary take-up of measures and 
compliance of parties – this is also expanded upon in Annex 7 for the mini-assessments. The 
macroeconomic  costs  and  benefits  are  evaluated  together  as  part  of  the  economic  (welfare) 
impact indicator, and the risks of higher damages are addressed by country in Annex 4 – with 
relevant deviations from the average effect also noted in the full assessment in section 6. The 
risks are also, importantly differentiated by temperature scenario (in section 6). Differences in 
regional damages in different temperature scenarios and over time, compared to expenditures 
influence the relative gain compared to baseline, in all scenarios there is  positive change (as 
damages increase with temperature, gains compared to baseline increase). This is particularly 
relevant in Central Southern Europe (see Annex 4), where the timing and nature of damages 
means that option 1 impacts more effectively in the 1.5 degree scenario than in the 2 degree 
scenario - this was clarified in the report. 

RSB Opinion 4 December 2020 [Ares(2020)7339457] – Positive with reservations 

The  Board  notes  the  additional  information  provided  in  advance  of  the  meeting  and 
commitments  to  make  changes  to  the  report.  In  forming  its  opinion,  the  Board  took  into 
account that the impact assessment accompanies a high-level strategy, which raises particular 
challenges  in  terms  of  proportionate  level  of  analysis.  However,  the  report  still  contains 

66 

 
 
significant  shortcomings.  The  Board  gives  a  positive  opinion  with  reservations  because  it 
expects the DG to rectify the following aspects:  

(1)  The  report  is  not  clear  enough  about  what  will  be  decided  in  this  Strategy  and  which 
actions  will  require  separate  (legislative)  follow-up.  It  does  not  sufficiently  specify  what 
actions should be taken at the EU-level, as opposed to national or local levels. It is not clear 
to  what  extent  the  listed  actions  refer  to  new  elements,  or  whether  they  are  part  of  other 
existing initiatives or programmes.  

(2)  There  is  a  discrepancy  between  the  positive  outcome  of  the  2018  evaluation  and  the 
problem description that identifies a lack of preparation for climate change impacts.  

(3) It is not clear what an appropriate degree of preparedness would be, taking into account 
the high degree of uncertainty on local climate change impacts. 

The  Board’s  recommendations  have  been  addressed  in  the  final  version  of  the  Impact 
Assessment as follows: 

(1) The issues for decision in the Strategy have been clarified in the Introduction (Section 1.1), 
and the Options description (Section 5). These pertain to the political choices on the level of 
ambition,  in  line  with  the  political  mandate  in  the  European  Green  Deal  for  a  “new,  more 
ambitious EU strategy”.  

The legal follow-up of certain of the actions, as well as the level at which these will be taken 
has  been  clarified  in  Annex  7  (per  the  respective  mini-assessment  of  each  relevant  action). 
Several upcoming reviews (e.g. Urban Waste Water Treatment Directive) could see adaptation 
mainstreaming  reinforced.  For  other  processes,  legislative  follow  up  was  not  deemed 
necessary  at  this  stage  (e.g.  there  will  be  no  revision  of  the  Water  Framework  Directive 
following its  fitness  check, so climate  change adaptation  will be reinforced via  guidance for 
the Common Implementation Strategy). Further work will require a pre-legislative follow up, 
such as white papers or blueprints, but also pilots of initiative (e.g. trying out a pilot on loss 
data collection before rolling it out in legislation).  

Lastly,  it  has  been  clarified  in  Section  5,  Policy  Options,  as  well  as  the  Annex  7  Mini-
assessments  that  all  proposed  actions  and  measures  considered  as  part  of  the  macro  policy 
options are referring to new elements, which would not otherwise be pursued. Several would, 
however, be launched other already established instruments, like Horizon Europe, but the level 
of detail would come in the programming stages, hence they would still be novel. 

(2) The evaluation identified several shortcomings and room for improvement, in addition to 
its positive assessment of the Strategy still being fit for purpose. The discrepancy between the 
evaluation of the 2013 Strategy and the problem description justifying intervention for a new 
Strategy was clarified in Section 2 Problem definition. Throughout the text (mainly in Section 
5, where the 2013 Strategy acts as policy baseline), the articulation between the 2013 Strategy 
and the new one has been further clarified. 

(3)  The  adaptation  gap  is  already  large,  as  identified  in  global  and  European  assessment 
reports,  and  getting  larger  (both  because  impacts  are  increasingly  prevalent  and  because 
science  is  pushing  our  understanding  of  impacts  e.g.  on  cascading  impacts).  This  has  been 
clarified in Section 5 when dealing with the macro policy options, as well as further developed 

67 

 
 
in Section 9 (monitoring and evaluation). The Paris Agreement global goal on adaptation is a 
dynamic  one  (i.e.  enhancing  adaptive  capacity,  strengthening  resilience  and  reducing 
vulnerability  to  climate  change).  As  for  any  policy  of  disaster  risk  management  (e.g. 
pandemics, earthquakes), success of adaptation action is often invisible because it constitutes 
averted damage (a counterfactual is difficult to construct). Dealing with climate impacts means 
dealing  with  complexity,  uncertainty,  tipping  points,  cascading  risk  –  adaptation  to  these 
impacts therefore requires a dynamic implementation.  

Annex 2: Stakeholder consultation – consultation synopsis  

1.  Outline of the consultation strategy  

The  ex-ante  impact  assessment  of  the  new  EU  Adaptation  Strategy  supports  the  European 
Commission’s  efforts  in  updating  the  EU  Adaptation  strategy  by:  (1)  Suggesting  a  range  of 
policy  options  to  achieve  specific  objectives;  (2)  Analysing  the  likely  economic,  social  and 
environmental  impacts  of  these  options;  and  (3)  Identifying  the  distributional  aspects  of 
adaptation across the diverse climates and regions of the EU. 

The  outputs  of  the  consultation  activities’  form  an  important  part  of  the  evidence  used  to 
complete the impact assessment. Key objectives of the consultation process were: 

  To ensure that all relevant stakeholders are identified and given the opportunity to engage 

with the consultation 

  To  provide  the  opportunity  for  stakeholders  to  inform  the  impact  assessment,  in 
particular, offering an opportunity for them to inform the development of policy options 
addressing the problems identified 

  To  gather  stakeholder  opinion  on  the  potential  policy  options  together  with  data  and 
qualitative evidence concerning the relevant impacts of the policy options considered 
  To draw insights into triggers for behavioural changes and other triggers supporting the 

take-up of adaptation measures 

  To provide insights for short analytical topic reports that were also developed as part of 

the impact assessment process. 

At  the  start  of  the  impact  assessment  process,  a  comprehensive  consultation  strategy  was 
developed  in  order  to  ensure  that  the  stakeholder  consultation  was  effective  and  useful.  The 
consultation  strategy  helped  to  ensure  that  stakeholders’  views  were  sought  on  all  key 
questions in accordance with the requirements of the Better Regulation Guidelines. 

Through various methods of engaging with stakeholders, the consultation informed the impact 
assessment by providing answers to the following questions: 

  Are the problems identified in the previous strategy’s evaluation exhaustive? Have other 
problems  arisen  which  should  be  taken  into  consideration  in  the  new  EU  Adaptation 
Strategy? (Problem to be tackled) 

  What  are  other  ongoing  initiatives  for  adaptation  at  the  local,  regional,  national  and 
international levels? What is the EU added value to existing efforts? Are other platforms 
and/or  levels  of  action  more  relevant  for  adaptation?  Can  the  EU  Adaptation  Strategy’s 
relevance  and  efficiency  be  threatened/enhanced  by  other  actions  and/or  actors  and/or 
events?  Does  the  EU  Adaptation  Strategy  conflict/align  with  other  EU  international 
engagements? (EU dimension) 

68 

 
 
 
  Based on the 2013 EU Adaptation Strategy, what other interventions are needed, and what 
are  the  policy  options  for  these?  Who  should  they  reach?  Where  should  the  funding  be 
sourced?  When  should  they  be  triggered?  Which,  if  any,  existing  policies  are  deemed 
redundant?  (Available  policy  options,  scope  for  efficiency  improvement,  simplification 
measures) 

  Based on the 2013 EU  Adaptation  Strategy’s evaluation,  have other unintended impacts 
occurred  since  the  evaluation  and  should  be  taken  into  consideration  in  the  new  EU 
Adaptation  Strategy?  Based  on  future  temperature  and  climate  impact  scenarios,  what 
policy  implications  can  we  foresee?  How  do  those  impacts  and  their  magnitude  differ 
within the population? Across businesses? Across Member States’ borders? Across EU’s 
borders? Across sectors of the economy? (Impacts of the policy options) 

2.  Consultation activities  

The  main  consultation  activities  were  the  following:  Open  public  consultation  (OPC), 
Targeted stakeholder engagement through interviews, Public webinar, and online stakeholder 
workshops. Details of each of the consultation activities are provided below. 

Open public consultation 

An internet-based open public consultation was open for responses between 14 May 2020 and 
20 August 2020, via the EC’s EU Survey system195. 
The  OPC  began  with  an  introduction  to  the  consultation  and  an  initial  set  of  background 
questions  about  the  respondent.  The  main  body  of  the  questionnaire  contained  22  multiple-
choice questions. These consisted of statements, and respondents were asked about either their 
familiarity with, or the perceived importance of, or their level of agreement with each of a set 
of  statements,  using  a  scale,  which  was  subsequently  converted  to  Likert-scales  of  5 
options196.  The  scales  for  all  of  the  questions  included  ‘opt-  out’  responses  such  as  ‘Do  not 
know’  or  ‘I  am  not  familiar  with’.  This  was  to  avoid  agreement  bias  and  to  prevent 
respondents feeling pressured to give an opinion that they may not feel qualified to give or are 
uncomfortable providing. Finally, one open question at the end asked the respondent for any 
further relevant feedback, information or opinions they wished to share. Respondents also had 
the  opportunity  to  upload  any  supporting  documents  (and  were  requested  to  summarise  the 
main ideas of these papers). 

Targeted stakeholder interviews 

In  order  to  gather  more  detailed  feedback,  targeted  stakeholder  interviews  were  conducted 
with key adaptation experts. In total, 40197 interviews were undertaken with key stakeholders. 
Stakeholders  were  selected  based  on  their  field  of  expertise,  their  country  of  origin  and  in 
order to ensure coverage of a range of stakeholder categories. Categories represented include 
businesses;  EU  institutions,  civil  society/NGOs;  research  and  academia;  local  authorities, 

195 https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/12381-EU-Strategy-on-Adaptation-to-Climate-Change  
196 The questions on extent of familiarity, importance and agreement with statements were accompanied by the possibility of selecting from a  
0-5  scale  (6-point).  However,  6-point  scales  present  interpretation  difficulties,  as  a  ‘neutral’  response  is  not  available.  In  contrast,  5-point 
Likert  
scales are more widely used and enable clearer interpretation of questionnaire results, measuring respondents’ agreement with statements. For  
this reason, revised interpretation scales were agreed on with the European Commission and have been used in the analysis. Full details of the  
methodology that has been used are provided in Appendix 1.A. 
197 The 40 interviews are calculated as follows: A total of 31 interviews were conducted. Two interviews were organised as group discussions  
with multiple participants, who were intentionally interviewed for representing different Member States and thematic focuses. Given that each  
of those interviewees provided different inputs to each interview questions, their contribution was analysed as separate interviews. As a result,  
the total number of interviews feeding in feedback from stakeholders representing different organisations is treated as being 40. 

69 

 
 
 
                                                 
regional  authorities  and  national  authorities;  development  banks  and  other  international 
organisations. 

The selection ensured a representative coverage of all geographical, thematic and stakeholder 
categories  across  the  EU.  The  interviews  were  conducted  between  March  and  October  2020 
and were sequenced as follows: 

 

 

 

17 preliminary interviews were undertaken to provide general directions in support of 
the initial identification of the impact assessment policy options. These interviews also 
helped to test the interview questionnaire and the method. 
18 main interviews were then targeted at  stakeholders with specific expertise on the 
preliminary policy options identified. 
Finally,  five  final  gap-filling  interviews  were  undertaken  to  address  any  gaps 
identified  in  thematic,  geographical  or  stakeholder  coverage  identified  at  the  end  of 
the “main interview stage” and to help finalising the impact assessment. 

Public webinar 

A public webinar was held  for two hours, on 2  July 2020. This  included presentations from 
key  experts  in  the  field,  a  panel  discussion  with  these  experts  and  a  question  and  answer 
(Q&A) session with the audience. The event featured a presentation by the consultants on the 
planned  method  for  impact  assessment  and  the  preliminary  findings  from  the  OPC.  The 
webinar aimed to raise awareness of the development of the new EU Adaptation Strategy, the 
challenges it seeks to address and the added value of EU action. It was also used to promote 
the OPC to the audience. 

Online stakeholder workshops 

Interactive online discussions with targeted stakeholders took place in a two hour-long online 
workshop on 3 July 2020. This included breakout sessions to discuss potential policy options put 
forward by the consultants building on the Commission’s Inception Impact Assessment (IIA). 

A similar interactive online workshop was held on 7 July 2020, with members of the Working 
Group  6  (WG6)  on  Climate  Adaptation  of  the  Climate  Change  Committee  of  the  European 
Commission. Breakout sessions were also organised to discuss the potential policy options put 
forward by the consultants building on the IIA. 

The  two workshops allowed for  discussion  of  the  detailed policy  options  and the  interactive 
discussions between experts and facilitators from the breakout groups sought to gather feedback 
and further suggestions on potential actions that could be included in the new Strategy. 

3.  Stakeholder groups participating 

An overview of the audience reached across the stakeholder consultation activities is presented 
in  the  figures  below.  A  comprehensive  stakeholder  mapping  exercise  was  undertaken  at  the 
start of the impact assessment which helped to ensure that stakeholders who could be affected 
by the policy; will implement it; or have a stated interest in it were engaged. 

Figure 5 shows the total number of participants of each activity, while  Figure 6 and Figure 7 
show the share of participants by stakeholder type. Due to the pre-set tools used for the OPC, 
stakeholder categories  have been defined differently for that consultation  activity  (Figure 7). 
Finally, Figure 8 shows the share of participants by Member State. 

70 

 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Number of participants by consultation activity 

Source: Own analysis of participation by consultation activity 

71 

 
 
 
Figure 6: Participants by stakeholder type for the consultation activities (except OPC) 

Source: Own analysis of participation by consultation activity  

Figure 7: Participants by stakeholder type for the consultation activities (OPC only) 

Source: Own analysis of participation by consultation activity  

Figure 8: Participants by Member State for the consultation activities 

72 

 
 
 
 
Source: Own analysis of participation by consultation activity  

4.  Methodology and tools used to process data 

Open public consultation 

Questionnaire  data  was  obtained  from  the  European  Commission  Survey  system.  Data  was 
inspected  to  allow  adjustment  if  needed.  For  the  final  OPC  data  download,  no  significant 
update of formatting/data structure was required. 
Questionnaire  raw  data  was  imported  and  cleaned  using  the  Pandas  library198  to  ensure 
consistency  and  repeatability.  Graphics  summarising  the  questionnaire  results  were  then 

198 A data manipulation and analysis tool using the Python programming language. 

73 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
created using an in-house survey analysis tool developed by Ricardo Plc based on Matplotlib 
charting library in python. 
Qualitative information collected through the OPC was analysed through a labelling system in 
Excel.  Those  labels  were  identified  based  on  the  topics  most  covered  in  the  respondents’ 
answers to open text questions, and on their position papers’ summaries. They are listed in the 
box below. 

Box 19: List of labels representing most frequently mentioned areas of action 

involvement/  Behavioural 

List of labels representing most frequently mentioned areas of action 
Agriculture  and  fisheries;  Air  quality;  Biodiversity  and  ecosystems;  Businesses;  Cities; 
“Citizen 
Communication/  Citizen 
communication  and  involvement”);  Disaster  risk  reduction;  Energy;  EU  Added  value; 
Finance/  Funding;  Forest;  Health;  Impacts;  Infrastructure;  Insurance;  International 
dimension;  Mainstreaming/  climate  proofing/ 
(henceforth 
“Mainstreaming/ proofing/ integration”); Monitoring/ reporting and guidelines; Nature based 
solutions;  Ocean;  Other;  Regional  approaches;  Standards/  standardisation;  Technology  and 
knowledge sharing; Transport; Waste; Water. 

integration  of  actions 

(henceforth 

change 

Additional  labels  used  to  identify  non-relevant  responses:  Emotive;  Irrelevant;  Mitigation 
focused. 

In  addition,  the  responses  to  the  final  open  text  question  were  systematically  checked  for 
overlapping responses to indicate possible coordinated replies by groups of respondents. Each 
question’s  open  text  answers  were  checked  against  all  other  open  text  responses  in  terms  of 
their  textual  similarity  by  checking  the  cosine  similarity  of  all  answers  against  all  other 
answers  in  python.  This  simple  mathematical  algorithm  can  be  used  to  interpret  text  and  is 
resilient to slight wording changes between similar answers. The algorithm was calibrated to 
identify similarities among any set of three or more responses. 

Stakeholder and expert interviews and events 

Trends  identified  based  on  the  OPC  analysis  were  verified  against  interview,  webinar  and 
workshop notes.  

Interviews 

A  contact  pool  was  developed  in  collaboration  with  the  Commission  to  identify  key 
stakeholders across all types of stakeholders and geographic regions. Some contacts were also 
reused from the evaluation of the 2013 EU Adaptation Strategy. 
Prior to  reaching out  to  the potential interviewees an interview questionnaire was developed 
which  was  tested  as  part  of  the  preliminary  phase  of  the  interviews.  The  questionnaire  was 
revised for the main and gap-filling interviews. 
Stakeholders were contacted via the central email address and were invited for an interview, 
which was conducted via Microsoft Teams. In those cases where the interviewees agreed, the 
interviews  were  recorded  in  order  to  help  the  interviewer  to  better  capture  the  discussion. 
Interview notes were taken and shared with the interviewees for approval. 

Workshop and webinars 

The webinar took place on GoToWebinar while the  workshops were held through the Zoom 
platform, to benefit from the functionalities allowing breakout sessions, question and answer 
sessions,  hand  raising  and  polling  features.  An  invitation  to  register  was  shared  through  the 
consultants’  network  and  on  social  media.  The  stakeholders  who  were  consulted  during  the 

74 

 
 
 
evaluation of the current Adaptation Strategy were also invited. Interviewees consulted as part 
of this impact assessment were also directly invited via email. Panellists for the webinar were 
selected, with the agreement of the Commission, to represent various stakeholder groups and 
governance levels. 
Several test sessions were organised amongst the consultants and with DG CLIMA to ensure 
the  functioning  of  the  platforms.  Detailed  facilitators  notes  were  developed  for  the  project 
team to help the smooth running of each event. 
All participants were required to register through a site hosted by the consultants, featuring a 
link  to  the  consultant’s  privacy  note199.  In  advance  of  the  webinar,  participants  were  sent 
background documents including the Blueprint for the new Adaptation Strategy, the Inception 
Impact  Assessment  and  a  link  to  the  OPC.  Similarly,  a  concept  note  was  shared  with 
participants in advance of the workshops. After the events, presentation slides and recordings 
were disseminated to attendees and workshop notes were sent to the panellists for approval. 

5.  Results of consultation activities 

For  each  element  of  the  impact  assessment  (problem  drivers  and  problems,  objectives  and 
actions, and impacts), we first present the most relevant results from the OPC, identifying the 
answers that have received the most and the least support. When presenting those results, we 
identify  the  percentage  of  responses  in  relation  to  each  answer.  We  then  compare  the  OPC 
results  to  inputs  received  from  the  experts  interviewed  and  the  workshops,  identifying  key 
similarities and differences. Unless specified otherwise, inputs from interviews and workshop 
is  reported  in  this  section  when  it  represents  the  views  of  the  majority  of  participants  and 
interviewees. 
Additional individual inputs and inputs provided by a minority of stakeholders are recorded in 
the  appendices  accompanying  this  consultation  synopsis:  full  details  of  the  analysis  of  the 
OPC  results  are  provided  in  Appendix  1.A.  An  overview  of  the  stakeholder  interviews  is 
presented in Appendix 2.A. While notes from the stakeholder events are provided in Appendix 
3.A. A full list of accompanying appendices is provided at the end of this annex. 

Problem drivers and specific problems identified for the new EU Adaptation Strategy 

Results from the OPC 

Problem drivers: climate change 
According  to  their  responses  to  the  OPC200,  stakeholders  have  most  often  experienced 
seasonal  shifts  (94.8%),  abnormally  warm  overall  temperatures/droughts  during  one  or 
more  seasons  (93%),  and  heatwaves  causing  health  problems  and  death  among  the 
vulnerable (74.8%). Water-related events, such as a reduction in water availability (60%) and 
river and coastal floods (70%), were less reported in the survey. Most of the respondents have 
not  experienced  the  disappearance  of  glaciers’  long-lasting  snowfields  (54.6%201),  seaside 
storm surges (47.2%), intrusion of seawater in freshwater aquifers (44.2%) and emergence of 
tropical diseases (42.5%). 

These results may reflect the fact that seasonal shifts and warm overall temperatures/droughts 
can  be  easily  and/or  frequently  witnessed  by  the  respondents,  or  that  they  tend  to  associate 

199 https://ee.ricardo.com/climate-change/impact-assessment-for-the-new-eu-adaptation-strategy  
200 See Figure 3-5 and Figure 3-6 in Appendix 1.A accompanying the consultation synopsis presenting the analysis of the OPC.  
201 Percentage refer to the proportion of respondents that have provided a negative answer to the specific statement (here, “disappearance of  
glaciers’ long-lasting snowfields”) 

75 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
those  events  with  climate  change  more.  Heatwaves  and  river  and  coastal  floods  are  less 
witnessed,  or  less  associated  with  climate  change.  The  low  reported experience of coastal-
related events (seaside storm surges, intrusion of seawater in freshwater aquifers) and of the 
disappearance  of  glaciers’  long-lasting  snowfields  and  the  emergence  of  tropical  diseases 
may be a reflection of the geographical representation of the respondents, assuming that they 
are more likely to witness those impacts if they live near a coast, glaciers or in tropical areas. 
As the five most represented Member States202all have coasts, these low reporting rates may 
also imply that respondents do not associate these events with climate change. Coastal events 
were reported as important threats by participants in both workshops and by interviewees. 

Problem drivers: EU level 

Most  of  the  respondents  considered  that  the  growing  speed  of  climate  impacts  is  a  “very 
important”  driver  for  the  new  EU  Adaptation  Strategy  (75.5%).203  According  to  them,  the 
following  factors  should  also  drive  the  definition  of  the  new  Strategy:  a  lack  of  interest  in 
climate  impacts  in  some  Member  States  or  regions  (57.7%),  insufficient  public  finance  for 
adaptation  to  climate  change  (55.2%),  insufficient  public  awareness of the need to adapt to 
climate  change  (51.4%),  insufficient  private  sector  investment  and  action  on  adaptation 
(44.4%)  and  unclear  distribution  of  responsibilities  between  levels  of  governance  (40.6%). 
The  driver  with  the  lowest  number  of  ‘Very  important’  responses  was  insufficient  science/ 
knowledge on climate risk assessment for adaptation (30.3%).  

Specific problems at the EU level 

Over  half  of  the  respondents  strongly  agreed  that  financial  support  for  adaptation  to  climate 
change  is  insufficient  (53.1%),  indicating  that  the  amount  of  financial  support  currently 
available  is  seen  as  not  matched  to  the  needs,  implying  that  that  more  funding  is  needed.204 
Other problems were reported, receiving scores in the 45% to 48% range. This includes: weak 
implementation  of  adaptation  strategies  and  plans  (48.3%),  insufficient  mechanisms  and 
indicators  to  monitor  and  report  on  the  implementation  of  adaptation  strategies  and  action 
(47.5%),  unclear  alignment  between  the  EU  Adaptation  Strategy  and  international  policy 
developments (45.2%) and a lack of appropriate involvement of businesses and the financial 
sector in adaptation efforts (45.2%). 

Out of all suggested specific problems, the 2013 EU Adaptation Strategy’s predominant focus 
on  the  EU  may  have  been  a  problem  preventing  adaptation  action is  the  statement  that  most 
stakeholders strongly disagreed with (5.1%).   

Similarities and differences with feedback from other consultation activities 

Problem drivers: climate change 

An  important  difference  between  OPC  respondents’  reports  of  most-experienced  events  and 
those of contributors to other consultation activities was their appreciation of  water- related 
events.  While  OPC  respondents  seem  to  have  experienced  these  climate-related  events  less 
than other events,  the  majority of interviewees  and workshop  participants referred to  coastal 
erosion,  flooding,  saltwater  intrusion  and  lack  of  water  availability  as  some  of  the  most 
important  slow-onset  changes  caused  by  climate  change  in  Europe.  This  was  due  to  the 
substantial proportion of the European population which is coastal (including in the outermost 
regions),  and  the  importance  of  water  availability  for  agriculture.  River  flooding  was  also 

202 Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Spain. 
203 See Figure 3-11 in Appendix 1.A accompanying the consultation synopsis presenting the analysis of the OPC. 
204 See Figure 3-12 in Appendix 1.A accompanying the consultation synopsis presenting the analysis of the OPC. 

76 

 
 
 
                                                 
mentioned  by  interviewees  as  an  important  security  concern  for  the  large  share  of  the 
population living close to rivers. 
In  contrast,  seasonal  shifts,  which  were  considered  by  OPC  respondents  as  the  most 
experienced event, were not reported as much by interviewees and workshop participants as a 
specific  climate-related  event  causing  concern.  Only  one  interviewee  (a  civil  society  expert) 
highlighted that this was an element that could not be controlled, and which would drive the 
impacts of climate change. 
These  differences  in  perception  of  the  “most  experienced  climate-related  events”  may 
illustrate a lack of information and awareness on climate impacts and costs among the wider 
population, an issue reported by the majority of workshops and interview participants. 
in 
Finally, 
vulnerabilities across  Europe.  While most acknowledged that all  geographical  regions  will 
be impacted, they indicated that they will be impacted differently. Interviewees and workshop 
participants  across  all  stakeholder  groups  highlighted  that  some  regions  are  more  vulnerable 
identify  and  prioritise  vulnerabilities. 
than  others  and,  hence, 
Overwhelmingly,  Southern  Europe  and  Mediterranean  regions  were  reported  as  the  most 
vulnerable  regions,  though  Central  and  Eastern  Europe  were  considered  increasingly 
vulnerable.  Northern  Europe  was  considered  less  vulnerable,  though  changing  ecology  and 
forest  systems  are  anticipated.  EU  citizens  were  also  perceived  as  varying  in  their 
vulnerabilities depending on their occupation, gender, access to services and wealth. 

interviewees  and  workshop  participants  highlighted  strong  differences 

is  a  need 

there 

to 

Problem drivers: EU level 

The  main  challenges  identified  by  respondents  to  the  OPC  were  also  largely  reported 
throughout  the  other  consultation  activities.  In  particular,  the  lack  of  knowledge  and 
awareness  was  reported  by  almost  all  workshop  and  interview  participants  from  all 
stakeholder groups. This is characterised by a lack of knowledge at the policy-making level, 
and  at  the  level  of  individual  citizens.  Interviewees  and  workshop  participants  representing 
national and local authorities, civil society businesses and international organisations felt that  
the  EU  should  play  a  key  role  in  facilitating  knowledge  sharing  at  all  levels  of 
governance, between countries and within them. 
At the policy-making level, the lack of knowledge and awareness of climate change adaptation 
most  likely  stems  from  a  lack  of  access  to  available  and  usable  knowledge  and  data 
reported by most participants. Like the OPC respondents, the majority of participants from all 
groups  to  the  workshops  and  interviewees  considered  that  there  is  enough  existing  data  and 
knowledge.  However, 
its  format,  standardisation,  and 
accessibility,  particularly  at  the  local  level.  According  to  many  interviewees  and  workshop 
participants from all stakeholder groups, challenges arise from the: 

they  reported  problems 

in 

  Lack of relevance, granularity, and usefulness of the existing data for local situations, 

and 

  Lack  of  common  methods  of  monitoring  adaptation  action  at  MS  and  EU  levels  as 

decision-support tools. 

At the level of citizens, a lack of information on the costs of inaction and unpreparedness 
prevents necessary behavioural change, according to some interviewees (representatives from 
business  organisations,  international  organisations  and  civil  society  organisations).  The  need 
to  increase  awareness  and  peer-to-peer  learning  about  co-benefits  was  also  raised  by  all 
stakeholder groups during the workshops. 
Overall, according to interviewees and workshop participants, the main knowledge gap to be 
bridged is the one between decision-makers, practitioners and researchers. This problem was 

77 

 
 
 
widely  reported  among  international  organisations  and  civil  society.  Other  knowledge  gaps 
reported by stakeholders across all stakeholder groups  are gaps between EU Member States, 
with countries internationally, and vertically between levels of governance. 

Specific problems at the EU level 

A  frequently  reported  barrier  was  the  weak  implementation  of  adaptation  action,  sometimes 
perceived by participants as “Member States inertia”. More specifically, participants mainly 
from international organisations and civil society representatives pointed to the lack of formal 
commitments to adaptation (especially in comparison to mitigation commitments), the lack of 
clear political targets and commitments, the lack of mechanisms and indicators to monitor and 
report  implementation,  and  the  lack  of  alignment  of  standard  practices.  Some  stakeholders, 
including  civil  society  representatives  but  also  stakeholders  from  EU  institutions  considered 
that this lack of implementation may result from the lack of binding laws and/or constraints 
or from the lack  of centralised knowledge to build political  case for adaptation. During 
the workshops, implementation in Member States was also discussed, with specific attention 
on  how  it  should  be  monitored  and  reported.  Participants  in  all  consultation  activities 
expressed an interest in the EU providing consistent guidelines and indicators for monitoring 
and reporting on adaptation. 
A  lack  of  funding  was  also  identified  by  several  interviewees  (representing  business 
organisations,  civil  society,  EU  institutions,  local  authorities,  national  authorities  and 
international organisations) as a barrier to adaptation in the EU, though it was suggested that 
this may not be due to differing priorities and commitments. During the webinar, a panellist 
from an international organisation highlighted a further challenge to funding: ensuring that it 
trickles  down  to  all  sectors  and  can  be  leveraged  to  increase  resilience.  Overall,  lack  of 
funding was discussed less during interviews and workshops than implementation by Member 
States  and  the  availability  of  knowledge  and  data.  However,  an  interviewee  from  EU 
institutions  identified  the  importance  of  making  more  funding  available  to  implement 
measures  at  the  local  level,  which  is  consistent  with  further  feedback  received  from  the 
workshops and the OPC. 
Overall,  interviewees  and  workshop  participants  highlighted  the  following  additional 
challenges, which were not reported by OPC respondents (challenges are listed in order from 
the most to least reported): 

 

 

Insufficient  consideration  for  the  international  dimensions  of  climate  change 
adaptation.  According  to  many  interviewees  and  workshop  participants,  the  current 
strategy  looks  inward  rather  than  also  outwards.  As  a  result,  both  interviewees  and 
workshop  participants  reported  a  lack  of  focus  on  spill-over  effects  of  adaptation 
(citing  supply  chain  disruptions,  climate  migration,  etc.),  insufficient  EU  support  for 
adaptation  in  third  countries,  and  a  missed  opportunity  to  share  knowledge  globally, 
including learning from third countries currently experiencing more severe impacts. 
Insufficient  coherence  of  adaptation  across  EU  policies.  Workshop  participants  and 
interviewees  particularly  mentioned  the  Common  Agriculture  Policy  (CAP)  and 
Cohesion  Policy.  Other  policies  reported  by  interviewees  as  lacking  coherence  with 
adaptation objectives included the Water Framework Directive. Lack of consideration 
of  potentially  conflicting  actions  across  such  policy  areas  that  could  lead  to 
maladaptation was pointed out by interviewees and workshop participants. 

  Lack  of  certainty  in  the  projections  of  climate  impacts.  According  to  workshop 
participants, prospects of acting on uncertainty may be causing inertia. An interviewee 
highlighted  the  need  for  a  more  proactive  approach  and  the  importance  of  preparing 
and planning before adverse impacts arise. 

78 

 
 
  Disconnect  between  climate  change  and  climate  security  in  European  public 
discourse. A few participants reported that that the security impacts of climate change 
mainly affect vulnerable populations in poor countries, but that this is not a sustainable 
view. 
Insufficient  focus  on  ecosystem-based  adaptation  and  nature-based  solutions, 
including in the CAP. 

 

  Lack  of  long-term  planning.  Current  action  plans  and  policies  were  reported  as 
tending to be very short term, whereas adaptation also demands consideration of longer 
time horizons (20-50 years). 
Insufficient differentiation between slow onset and extreme weather events. 

 
  Too much focus on cities rather than local action more generally, as there is a need to 

increase local resilience and, thereby, reduce inward migration to cities. 

  An  insufficient  focus  on  the  adaptation-mitigation  nexus.  Some  interviewees 
highlighted  that  mitigation  and  adaptation  should  be  considered  as  an  overarching 
synergistic objective. 

While  drivers  of,  and  challenges  to,  the  new  EU  Adaptation  Strategy  were  not  explicitly 
discussed  in  the  workshop,  the  challenges  identified  above  were  raised  in  the  context  of  the 
EU Adaptation Strategy’s existing actions and the need for new actions. Hence, they are also 
reflected in the results presented below.  

Objectives and actions of the new of the new EU Adaptation Strategy 

Results from the OPC  

Identification of objectives 

According to OPC respondents, it is most important for the new EU Adaptation Strategy to 
be  aligned  with  the  following  EU  and  international  policies:  The  Paris  Agreement 
(71.8%),  the  European  Green  Deal  (69.4%),  the  UN  Sustainable  Development  Goals 
(62.2%)  and  the  UN  Convention  of  Biological  Diversity  (60.0%)205.  Fewer  respondents 
rated  the  Sendai  Framework  for  Disaster  Risk  Reduction  and  the  EU  Civil  Protection 
Mechanism  as  important.  This  may  indicate  less  concern  for,  and/or  awareness  of,  the 
immediate  security  issues  needing  to  be  addressed  by  climate  change  adaptation  and  an 
insufficient appreciation of the “virtual certainty” (IPCC AR5) of the increasing frequency 
and magnitude of extreme events as global mean temperatures rise. 

Most respondents strongly agreed that an increased focus on implementation (in addition 
to planning) is also needed (74.9%).206 The objective to increase focus on innovation (in 
addition to research) had the lowest number of ‘Strongly agree’ responses (52.2%). This 
echoes  respondents’  identification  that  enough  knowledge  and  solutions  are  available  to 
adapt  to  climate  change  now,  indicating  no  need  for  further  innovation  and  planning,  but 
rather a need for financing and action. 

Among  more  specific  objectives,  most  respondents  strongly  agreed  that  the  EU  should 
support Member State-level action on adaptation (59.3%).207 EU support at the local level 
also received strong support, though less than support at Member State level. 

205 See Figure 3-10 in Appendix 1.A accompanying the consultation synopsis presenting the analysis of the OPC. 
206 See Figure 3-13 in Appendix 1.A accompanying the consultation synopsis presenting the analysis of the OPC. 
207 See Figure 3-14 in Appendix 1.A accompanying the consultation synopsis presenting the analysis of the OPC. 

79 

 
 
 
                                                 
Respondents  indicated  that  the  lack  of  private  sector  investment  and  action  on  adaptation 
should  be  a  driver  of  the  strategy.  However,  EU  support  to  private  sector  action  on 
adaptation  received  the  least  support  from  respondents  (33.1%).  This  may  imply  that 
respondents would  prefer to see public  investment and  actions compensate for the lack  of 
financing  from  private  sources,  rather  than  the  EU  Adaptation  Strategy  supporting  its 
development. 

Identification of actions 

Existing actions 

Respondents  mostly  identified  the  water,  agriculture,  energy,  and  transport  sectors  as 
well  as  ecosystems  as  requiring  further  action  for  sustainable  adaptation  to  climate 
change.208 Most of them neither agreed nor disagreed with implementing further action in 
the insurance and finance sector, supporting the previous conclusion on the importance of 
public action to make up for, rather than support, private actions. 

Respondents agreed that all actions of the 2013 EU Adaptation Strategy should be “retained 
and  reinforced”209.210  Action  1:  Encourage  all  Member  States  to  adopt  comprehensive 
adaptation  strategies,  received  the  highest  level  of  support  from  respondents  (74.2%), 
which reflects responses received strongly agreeing with the objective to  support Member 
State-level  action  on  adaptation.  The  action  that  fewest  respondents  suggested  continuing 
was Action 8: Promote insurance and other financial products for resilient investment and 
business (9.6%). This may be due to a lack of awareness of it, as indicated in the previous 
answers. It may also result from most insurance products only covering a narrow range of 
climate-related risks, as indicated by EU citizens, businesses and NGOs alike. 

Potential new actions 

All potential actions for a new EU Adaptation Strategy suggested as part of the consultation 
were considered important by respondents. The action that was considered “very important” 
by  most  of  the  stakeholders  was  to  support  the  resilience  of  agriculture  and  forest 
ecosystems  (65.2%),  which  reflects  the  priority  sectors  identified  previously.211  In 
addressing  this  action,  nature-based  solutions  and  diversification  of  systems  were 
considered the most important elements for climate-resilient agriculture and forests by the 
respondents. 

The second highest level of support for an action was for more open access to climate loss 
and disaster risk data from private and public sources to allow all actors to take an active 
role  in  adaptation  action  and  to  help  integrate  climate  risks  in  decision-making  (51%). 
Hence, while stakeholders previously replied that knowledge and data already exists, they 
indicated  here  that  this  data  may  not  be  sufficiently  available.  In  another  question,  the 
majority of respondents indicated that, out of all the stakeholder categories, citizens  should 
have  the  greatest  priority  for  easier  access  to  asset-specific  information  about  the 
physical  and  economic damage  from  past  climate  related  disasters  (101/133),  then  local 
authorities (94/133).212 

208 See Figure 3-16 in Appendix 1.A accompanying the consultation synopsis presenting the analysis of the OPC. 
209  Currently,  the  actions  of  which  the  respondents  were  least  aware  of  are  actions  pertaining  to  awareness  raising  on  the  availability  of 
insurance  
options  against  climate  change  damage  (56.8%),  the  increase  of  green  areas  in  towns  to  cope  with  heatwaves/floods  (56.2%)  and 
reinforcement  
of infrastructure to better withstand natural disasters like floods, heatwaves etc. (48.8%). 
210 See Figure 3-15 in Appendix 1.A accompanying the consultation synopsis presenting the analysis of the OPC. 
211 See Figure 3-17 in Appendix 1.A accompanying the consultation synopsis presenting the analysis of the OPC. 
212 See Figure 3-23 in Appendix 1.A accompanying the consultation synopsis presenting the analysis of the OPC. 

80 

 
 
                                                 
All the other actions were considered as ‘very important’ though without a clear majority. 
Supporting  resilience  investments  and  natural  disaster  insurance  penetration  through  EU 
and MS policies and helping to identify health and/or social risks linked to climate change 
(39.2% each) received the least support from respondents. 

81 

 
 
 
 
 
Similarities and differences with feedback from other consultation activities 

Identification of objectives 

Overall,  the  majority  of  interviewees  and  participants  in  the  workshops  agreed  with  the 
objectives of the current strategy, and suggested the following enhancements: 

  Objective 1 – Promoting action by Member States - While recognising the importance 
of  supporting  Member  States,  most  interviewees  and  workshop  participants 
highlighted the importance of supporting adaptation at the local level, including 
by  supporting 
the 
importance  of  promoting  local  action  beyond  cities,  one  pointing  to  the  need  to 
increase local resilience and, thereby, reduce inward migration to cities. 

interviewees  also  highlighted 

local  authorities.  Several 

  Objective  2  -  “Climate-proofing”  action  at  EU  level:  Interviewees  and  workshop 
participants overwhelmingly emphasised the need to ensure coherence and synergies 
with other key EU policies. 
Beyond “climate proofing”, mainstreaming of adaptation issues in all policies was 
considered by all stakeholders to be a key objective of the new strategy, to ensure 
that  all  policies’  actions  are  aligned  with  adaptation  objectives  and,  where  possible, 
conducive to resilience. While the Green Deal was considered as a welcome step for 
adaptation  by  many  interviewees,  the  vast  majority  highlighted  the  importance  of 
ensuring coherence across policy areas, in order to direct investments towards climate-
friendly objectives and prevent maladaptation. 

In  particular,  the  Common  Agricultural  Policy  and  the  Water  Framework  Directive 
were  mentioned  by  many  participants.  Interviewees  and  workshop  participants  alike 
identified that both policies can currently lead to funding that may be contradictory to 
adaptation objectives. 

  Objective  3  –  Better-informed  decision  making:  promoting  better-informed 
decision-making  was  recognised  by  all  participants  as  a  key  objective  to  be 
maintained and expanded, in particular, through ensuring standardised knowledge- 
and implementation-sharing platforms. 

While  interviewees  and  workshop  participants  agreed  with  the  existing  objectives, 
participants  also  suggested  adding  to  them.  Two  new  objectives  were  suggested  by  a  large 
majority of interviewees and workshop participants across all stakeholder groups: 

  An  “outward-looking”  objective  to  recognise  the  international  dimension  of 
adaptation,  enable  global  knowledge  sharing,  local-to-local  knowledge  sharing 
between locations facing similar challenges, support to enhance adaptive capacity in 
third  countries  and  other  preparatory  actions  to  counter  spill-over  effects  from 
climate-related events elsewhere affecting Europe. 
Given the importance of such an international dimension, this has been considered as 
a  new  objective  for  the  new  Adaptation  Strategy  under  the  Impact  Assessment; 
therefore  more  detail  on  the  comments  received  from  stakeholders  on  this  issue  is 
provided below. 

  A “citizens-focused” objective, dedicated to ensuring that citizens are more aware of 
climate change impacts and associated costs, as well as the opportunities presented by 
adaptation, and that they feel empowered to take adaptation actions. 

82 

 
 
 
 
 
Box 20: The international dimension of the new EU Adaptation Strategy 

The international dimension of the new EU Adaptation Strategy  

Open public consultation 

77%  of  the  OPC  respondents  agreed  or  strongly  agreed  that  “the  EU  should  support 
internal  action  on  adaptation”.  When  asked  for”any  further  information  that  [they] 
believed  would  be  useful  for  preparing  the  EU’s  new  Adaptation  Strategy”,  17  OPC 
respondents provided further comments supporting an international dimension for the new 
EU Adaptation Strategy. These included the following points: 

  Two stakeholders from academic and research institutions highlighted that “it is 
also important to adapt to risks cascading on Europe though trade, financial and 
political network” and that “it is important to develop innovative technological 
tools  […]  not  only  pertaining  to  the  European  Union,  but  also  to  the  global 
extent and certainly developing countries.” 

  Two  representatives  from  public  authorities  highlighted  that  “transnational 
collaboration  is  key  and  further  efforts  are  needed”  and  that  “international 
adaptation  should  also  include  adaptation  in  countries  outside  Europe  where 
climate  change  could  lead  to  large  scale  economic  damage  or  starvation,  with 
subsequently  social  unrest  and  conflicts  which  also  could  lead  to  large  scale 
migration”. 

  Among  others,  an  NGO  also  provided  the  following  statement:  “We  strongly 
recommend the EU external relations be included and addressed in the strategy 
beyond  climate  security.  […]  The  EU  should  address  the  global  challenges  of 
climate  change  adaptation,  disaster  risk  reduction  and  environmental 
degradation as a priority through its bilateral and multilateral relations, sending 
a  strong  signal  to  the  rest  of  the  world  on  the  importance  of  prioritising 
adaptation  planning  and  investment.  We  encourage  the  strengthening  of 
international  and  regional  cooperation  on  climate  (and  disaster)  resilience, 
including attention to cross-border risks.” 

  An EU citizen has also highlighted that “governments should also cooperate, and 
not only within the EU. […] The new Strategy should have a strong international 
dimension, as shown with the current COVID crisis.” 

Additional material submitted 

In addition to the responses to the OPC, the international dimension was also apparent in 
additional  materials  submitted  by  stakeholders.  25%  of  all  position  papers  and  other 
documents  submitted  via  the  OPC  or  received  directly  via  email  or  following  experts’ 
interviews  highlighted  the  importance  of  the  international  dimension  in  the  new  EU 
Adaptation Strategy. Among them, 48% of all public authorities, 25% of all academic 
and  research  institutions  and  13%  of  all  companies,  business  organisations  and 
association  who  submitted  papers  across  all  channels  highlighted  this.  Additional 
material  received  which  highlighted  the  international  dimension  was  submitted  by 
stakeholders  from  17  different  countries,  and  mainly  from  France,  Belgium  and 
Germany. 

Interviews and stakeholder events 

When questioned about the existing and new actions of the new EU Adaptation Strategy, 

83 

 
 
 
 
the  need  to  strengthen  the  international  aspect  of  actions  and/or  to  develop  a  new 
internationally  focused  action  was  brought  up  by  interviewees  in  12  out  of  31 
interviews.  Interviewees  from  EU  institutions,  international  organisations,  businesses, 
and  NGOs  alike  highlighted  actions  in  two  potential  spheres  internationally:  (1) 
“addressing spill-over effects” and (2) “assisting other countries to adapt (particularly 
least  developed  countries)”.  International  actions  were  suggested  in  specific  areas 
including  knowledge  sharing,  disaster  risk  reduction,  security,  mainstreaming  and 
development aid. 

The  same  conclusions  were  drawn  during  stakeholder  workshops,  where  the  global 
component was  welcomed  and  highlighted  as  a  very  important  element.  Representatives 
from  different  Member  States across the Working  Group  6 emphasised that global action 
needs to be reinforced and further developed in the new Strategy. It was considered by one 
participant  as  the  most  important  improvement  to  the  strategy,  alongside  the  health 
observatory. 

Identification of actions 

Existing actions 

No  participants  in  any  of  the  consultation  activities  suggested  discontinuing  any  of  the 
current  EU  Adaptation  Strategy’s  eight  actions.  Instead,  they  overwhelmingly  suggested 
there was a need to expand them, as discussed below. 

Action  1  –  Encourage  all  Member  States  to  adopt  comprehensive  adaptation 
strategies: All interviewees and workshop participants agreed that this should be 
reinforced  through  the  development  of  standardised  monitoring  and 
reporting  guidelines.  In  particular,  participants  in  the  Working  Group  6 
workshop  representing  national  authorities  highlighted  that  Member  States  are 
insufficiently aware of the current progress of adaptation implementation, partly 
because of lack of monitoring, partly because of  the  very  nature  of  adaptation, 
where actions such as flood risk management are not systematically labelled as 
“adaptation”.  To  support  Member  States  further,  many  interviewees  and 
workshop  participants  also  mentioned  the  need  for  the  EU  to  facilitate  cross-
country knowledge exchange. 
In  a  similar  way  to  the  OPC  respondents,  interviewees  overwhelmingly 
supported  the  need  to  move  from  planning  to  more  implementation.  Some 
workshop  participants  representing  Member  States  also  highlighted  that  the 
focus on implementation  of the National  Adaptation  Strategies and/or  National 
Adaptation Plans should be strengthened, moving away from “planning” only. In 
general,  they  supported  a  focus  on  implementation,  while  noting  associated 
challenges. 

  Action 2 – Provide LIFE funding to support capacity building and step up action 
in  Europe:  LIFE  funding  was  considered  by  most  interviewees  and  workshop 
participants  (including  EU  institutions,  international  organisations  and  national 
authorities) as insufficient  by itself to  support  climate change adaptation. They 
supported the need for greater funding and capacity building within but not only 
through LIFE but also through existing sectoral actions, including the CAP, the 
Cohesion Policy etc. 

  Action  3  –  Introduce  adaptation  to  the  Covenant  of  Mayors  framework:  The 
majority of interviewees and stakeholder participants supported the Covenant of 
Mayors and suggested that this action should be expanded to support adaptation 

84 

 
 
 
action at the local level more generally. To this end, interviewees and workshop 
participants  alike  highlighted  that  the  Covenant  of  Mayor’s  mandate  could  be 
expanded to support adaptation not just in cities, but also to support resilience 
in  non-urban  areas  and/or  at  regional  level,  and  to  support  knowledge 
exchange across governance levels and between cities. 

  Action 4 - Bridge the knowledge gap: Like OPC respondents, more open access 
to climate loss and disaster risk data received some support from other consultees, 
in particular, during the workshops with national authorities but also according to 
civil  society, 
international  organisations  and  businesses  representatives. 
However,  this  was  mainly  considered  as  a  support  for  engagement  from  the 
private  sector  by  enabling  the  estimation  of  gains  and  losses  from  climate 
change  adaptation  and  inaction  within  relevant  sectors.  This also reflects calls 
to  enhance  knowledge  exchange  across  practitioners  and  to  provide  more 
standardised data. 
Most  importantly,  almost  all  interviewees  and  the  majority  of  workshop 
participants from all stakeholder groups indicated that the knowledge gap that 
needs  bridging  is  the  one  between  decision-makers,  practitioners  and 
researchers. To close this gap, they highlighted the importance of “learning-by-
doing” as a means of knowledge sharing.  

  Action  5  –  Further  develop  Climate  ADAPT  as  the  ‘one-stop-shop’  for 
adaptation information in Europe: While not all stakeholders were familiar with 
the  platform,  the  majority  of  interviewees  across  all  stakeholder  groups 
suggested  enhancing  the  role  and  reach  of  climate  ADAPT  to  address  the 
knowledge gaps identified in Action 4. 

  Action 6 – Facilitate the climate proofing of the Common Agriculture Policy, the 
Cohesion  Policy  and  the  Common  Fisheries  Policy:  Most  interviewees  and 
workshop  participants,  including  members  of  Working  Group  6  representing 
national authorities, reported that there was a need for further mainstreaming of 
adaptation  objectives  across  these  policy  areas,  particularly  in  relation  to  the 
CAP,  which  it  was  suggested  was  potentially  working  against  adaptation 
objectives and promoting maladaptation. 
Interviewees and workshop participants, including Working Group 6 participants 
representing  national  authorities,  suggested  expanding  this  action  to  include 
mainstreaming  and  implementation  of  adaptation  action  through  all  EU 
instruments, with the Water Framework Directive often specifically mentioned. 
Other suggested policies for mainstreaming included: European Pillar of Social 
Rights; EU Skills Agenda; EU Cohesion  Policy;  EU Gender Equality Strategy; 
Non-Financial Reporting Directive. 

  Action  7  –  Ensuring  more  resilient  infrastructure:  While  this  action  was  less 
discussed by interviewees and workshop participants than the other actions, the 
majority  of  them  highlighted  the  importance  of  making  greater  use  of  green 
infrastructure  and  nature-based-solutions,  implying  that  this  action  should  also 
be expanded. 

  Action  8  –  Promote  insurance  and  other  financial  products  for  resilient 
investment and business decisions: While this action was the least supported by 
OPC  respondents,  most  interviewees  highlighted  the  need  to  expand  it  beyond 
the  insurance  sector  and  include  other  financial  products  and  services  in  its 
sphere of influence. 
In the workshop’s breakout groups, participants representing national authorities 
and international organisations notably pointed out the importance of overseeing 
how  private  and  public  investments  are  made,  and  to  develop  guidance  to 

85 

 
 
ensure  win-wins  between  the  adaptation/mitigation  objectives  of  policymakers 
on the one hand, and risk minimisation objectives of investors on the other. The 
new  EU  taxonomy  was  mentioned  as  playing a  major  role  in  incentivising 
investments. This can be seen as echoing the demand for more standardisation 
in reporting and more prescriptive guidelines in the public sector. 
Overall,  private  sector  engagement  was  considered  by  interviewees  and 
workshop participants from all stakeholder groups as an important component of 
the  strategy  to  (1)  ensure  behavioural  change  and  (2)  to  provide  necessary 
funding  (though  without  being  the  main  source).  Interviewees  from  local 
authorities  pointed  to  a  lack  of  direct  return  on  investment  (in  terms  of  cash 
flows) of adaptation projects in general, including at the local level. 

Potential new actions 

Additional  actions  frequently  suggested  by  workshop  participants  and  interviewees  alike 
include: 

  An emphasis on international  action. A large  majority of interviewee and workshop 
participants  noted  the  importance  for  the  EU  of  continuing  support  for  other 
countries to enhance their adaptive capacity and thereby prevent spillover effects of 
climate-related  events  elsewhere  affecting  Europe.  This  was  highlighted  by  all 
stakeholder  groups,  but  less  so  among  business  representatives.  Reported  spillover 
effects included climate-induced migration and disruption to supply chains. In turn, as 
part of the knowledge sharing efforts previously reported, interviewees highlighted an 
important  opportunity  for  two-way  learning  on  adaptation  best  practices  with  other 
countries that are already facing the impacts of climate change more severely. 

  In addition, a new action encouraged by all stakeholders from interviews and workshops 
alike was the  communication to and involvement of EU citizens in  climate  change 
adaptation. To this end, interviewees and webinar panellists mentioned the role of the 
media and use of digital tools to actively engage citizens and make knowledge and data 
accessible to all. 

The  following  general  considerations  were  also  highlighted  by  the  majority  of  interviewees 
and workshop participants  when discussing potential  new actions (actions are listed in  order 
from the most to least suggested): 

  Unlike  OPC  respondents,  most  interviewees  and  workshop  participants  from  all 
stakeholder  groups  advocated  that  sectors  should  not  be  prioritised.  Rather,  they 
highlighted  the  importance  of  identifying  actions  horizontally  across  all  sectors,  to 
maximise  cross-sectoral  benefits  and  to  prevent  potential  maladaptation.  Those 
interviewees who did prioritise specific sectors were mostly experts from the relevant 
sectors (e.g. water was prioritised by an interviewee representing a water organisation, 
forestry was prioritised by an interviewee representing a forestry organisation). 

Instead  of  prioritising  sectors,  interviewees  and  workshop  participants  from  all 
stakeholder  groups overwhelmingly recommended that actions should be  prioritised 
in relation to vulnerabilities, acknowledging the differences across Europe. The use 
of  an  EU-wide  vulnerability  assessment  was  highlighted  by  several  workshop 
participants representing national authorities and was supported in some interviews by 
international organisations, civil society and business representatives. However, some 
workshop  participants  and  interviewees  from  EU  institutions  and  other  national 
authorities’  representatives  did  not  consider  it  a  priority  in  comparison  to  other 
suggested  actions  and  considered  that  it  might  duplicate  current  efforts  by  the 
European Environment Agency. 

86 

 
 
 
  Workshop  participants  and  interviewees  from  civil  society,  national  authorities  and 
businesses alike encouraged greater implementation of nature-based solutions and 
the  communication  of  successful  and  best-practice  examples.  Several  references 
were made to the value of water and forest ecosystems to the EU economy, justifying 
the importance of specific actions in those sectors. The diversification of systems was 
mentioned less by interviewees and workshop participants than by OPC respondents, 
and  the  transport  and  energy  sectors  were  mostly  considered  in  light  of  synergies 
between adaptation and mitigation. 

  Some  interviewees  and  workshop  participants,  in  particular  from  businesses  and 
national authorities, encouraged the promotion of actions that span the adaptation-
mitigation  nexus.  They  suggested  that  actions  should  be  prioritised  where  there  is 
potential for substantial synergies between mitigation and adaptation. 

Workshop  participants  representing  Member  States  highlighted  the  importance  of 
differentiating between adaptation to slow-onset and extreme-weather events. For 
the  latter,  in  particular,  interviewees  highlighted  the  importance  of  being  proactive, 
preparing, and planning before adverse impacts arise. 

Given  the  importance  of  feedback  received  from  national  authorities,  key  points  on  their 
opinion of potential new actions of the strategy are presented in the box below. 

Box 21: Feedback from National Authorities 

Open public consultation 

In total, 60 public authorities completed the OPC for the new EU Adaptation Strategy, 
including  23  national  authorities  from  14  EU  Member  States213.  These  included 
Austria, Belgium, Czechia, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, the 
Netherlands,  Portugal,  Romania  and  Slovakia.  Furthermore,  three  non-EU  national 
authorities (one from Andorra and two from the United Kingdom) provided responses. 

When  asked  to  rate  potential  new  actions  for  the  new  EU  Adaptation  Strategy,  the 
majority of national authorities have indicated that “helping to identify health and/or 
social  risks  linked  to  climate  change  at  an  early  stage  by  developing  an 
observatory  of  social/health  vulnerability”  was  very  important  (9).  Other  actions 
that  were  considered  as  fairly  important  by  the  majority  of  national  authorities 
included:  “supporting  resilience  investments  and  natural  disaster  insurance 
penetration through EU and MS policies” (11) and “increase in private investment 
in adaptation via increased public-private investment opportunities or incentives” 
(9). “Strengthening the climate risk and vulnerability assessment at EU level, including 
on the EU outermost regions” was considered not important at all by 7 out of 23 national 
authorities,  with  the  majority  considering  it  only  slightly  important.  “Providing 
tailored  adaptation  guidance  and  peer-to-peer  knowledge  exchange  to  public 
authorities  and  non-  state  actors”  was  also  deemed  not  important  (5)  or  only  slightly 
important (8) by half of the national public authorities respondents, although it was the 
action most identified as “very important” by the wider public authorities stakeholders’ 
group. Other actions were considered as important or slightly important. 

National  authorities  who  provided  as  an  open-text  response  “further  information  that 

213 Multiple responses were received from: Austria, Greece, Ireland and Portugal. 

87 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
[they believed] would be useful for preparing the EU’s new Adaptation Strategy” have 
highlighted  the  importance  of  knowledge  exchange  and  further  guidance  on 
adaptation.  They  also  mentioned  the  following  other  areas  needing  action:  better 
integrating and supporting sub-national  authorities,  including  in  rural  areas;  ensuring 
mainstreaming  adaptation in  sectoral  policies; accounting for climate impacts  outside 
the  EU  and  collaborating  internationally;  and  integrating  mitigation  and  adaptation 
objectives together. 

Additional material submitted 

In  total,  eight  position  papers  were  received  from  EU  national  authorities,  including 
three via the OPC and five directly over email. These came from the following Member 
States Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Portugal and Spain. 

Health and social impacts were only discussed in four of these position papers. These 
reiterated  their  support  for  an  observatory  dedicated  to  social/health  vulnerability,  or 
generally  highlighted  the  importance  for  the  Strategy  to  be  equipped  to  address  the 
impacts of climate change on the most exposed and most vulnerable citizens. As in the 
wider OPC results, the need to increase investment in adaptation was highlighted in 
the majority of the position papers, though with no specific focus on private investment. 
Respondents suggested an increase in adaptation funding overall, including through a 
new financial instrument from  EU  funds, or in  general  by increasing EU funding  for 
adaptation. Public-private partnership was only specifically mentioned in one position 
paper. 

Climate  risks  and  vulnerability  assessments  were  not  specifically  emphasised  in  the 
position  papers. On the other hand, peer-to-peer knowledge exchange were deemed 
important aspects  of  the  new  Strategy  in  seven  of  the  nine  position  papers  received. 
National  authorities  called  for  a  reinforcement  of  knowledge  exchange  and  better 
coordination  of  adaptation  action  at  different  levels  including  better  knowledge 
exchange  across  Member  States,  but  also  with  governments  outside  the  EU  and 
between  public  authorities  and  practitioners.  They  suggested  that  the  EU  adopt  a 
coordination  role  in  these  exchanges,  by  facilitating  dialogue  but  also  harmonising 
monitoring and evaluation criteria and data collection, and ensuring the convergence of 
national  and  regional  strategies,  climate  plans,  legal  and  technical  regulations  and 
legislation between neighbouring states to account for the vulnerability of cross-border 
territories and spill over effects. 

Other  areas  for  action  suggested  in  national  authorities’  position  papers  included 
nature-based solutions, international cooperation, and mainstreaming adaptation 
objectives in EU policies and funding.  

Stakeholder events 

At  the  second  stakeholder  workshop,  representatives  from  different  Member  States 
across the Working Group 6 were consulted again on potential actions for the new EU 
Adaptation Strategy. Participating Member States included Austria, Belgium, Czechia, 
Denmark,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Greece,  Ireland,  Latvia,  Portugal,  Italy,  Malta; 
the Netherlands, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden. 

Out  of  the  four  breakout  groups,  two  groups  supported  a  new  action  addressing  the 
health  and  social  aspects  of  adaptation  and  three  groups  supported  further  action  in 
knowledge  sharing.  Investment  and  financing  were  not  reported  as  needing  a  new 
action  or  further  enhancement  by  any  group.  In  contrast,  supporting  Member  States 
through improved mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation  of adaptation action 

88 

 
 
was  highlighted  as  a  key  new  strand  of  action  in  all  groups.  Three  groups  also 
highlighted  the  need  for  better  and  harmonised  data,  and  two  groups  explicitly 
welcomed  a  new  action  in  international  cooperation.  Potential  new  actions  were  also 
welcome  to  (1)  engage  the  wider  public  at  an  EU  level,  (2)  increase  the  use  of 
ecosystem- based solutions, in particular for green infrastructure and (3) further involve 
corporate businesses and the financial sector.  

Impacts of the new EU Adaptation Strategy 

Results from the OPC  

Stakeholders  mostly  considered  it  very  important  for  the  new  EU  Adaptation  Strategy  to 
achieve the following impacts: 

  Healthier ecosystems with improved resilience to climate impacts (73.3%), 
  Preventing climate risks (69.9%), 
  Enhancing the resilience of the agri-food system to climate change (66.8%) and 

  Enabling climate-informed decisions by citizens (60.9%).  

The latter was one of the most common topics addressed in the final open text replies, with a 
majority of respondents reiterating the importance of communication, citizen involvement and 
behavioural change. In response to the question on ‘In your opinion, how  important  is  it  for 
local authorities to promote the engagement in adaptation action of citizens and stakeholders 
in  the  following  ways?’  the  majority  of  respondents  indicated  that  informing  about  local 
climate  risks  and  impacts  (74%)  and  ensuring  resources  are available for the development 
and delivery of adaptation projects (70%)214 were very important. 

Consistent  with  previous  answers,  more  mixed  responses  were  received  for  the  closing  of 
climate  protection  gap  (e.g.  increasing  insurance  coverage),  climate  and  risk  proofing  of 
infrastructure  and  investments  (45.8%),  incorporating  climate  risk  management  into  fiscal 
frameworks (44.1%), averting, minimising  and addressing population  displacement  (43.6%) 
and increasing financial and economic resilience (35.8%). 

Similarities and differences with feedback from other consultation activities 

Impacts  of  the  new  EU  Adaptation  Strategy  were  only  specifically  discussed  during 
interviews.  Interviewees  were  asked  to  identify  whether  the  new  EU  Adaptation  Strategy 
should prioritise economic and/or social and/or environmental impacts. 

All  interviewees  from  all  stakeholder  groups  emphasised  the  importance  of  considering  all 
impacts  as  interconnected,  recognising  that  environmental  impacts  have  economic  and 
social repercussions, economic impacts have environmental and social repercussions, etc. As 
a result, it was not suggested that any specific impacts should be prioritised. 

However,  interviewees  agreed  with  OPC  respondents  in  highlighting  the  importance  of 
achieving healthier ecosystems with improved resilience to climate impacts. 

Economic impacts were less discussed compared to social and environmental impacts,  apart 
from representatives of businesses. This may be due to most respondents’ understanding that 
economic  activity  itself  relies  on  the  services  that  ecosystems  provide.  A  large  number  of 

214 See Figure 3-33 in Appendix 1.A accompanying the consultation synopsis presenting the analysis of the OPC.  

89 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
workshop participants and interviewees from all stakeholder groups (mostly civil society but 
also including businesses and national authorities) emphasised the importance of ecosystem-
based adaptation and nature-based solutions. 

Health  and  other  social  impacts  were  considered  very  important  by  interviewees,  despite 
not being emphasised by the majority of OPC respondents. Differences in social impacts and 
the  “leaving  no-one  behind”  principle  were  highlighted  as  underlying  principles  to  be 
considered in implementing each of the strategy’s actions. Some interviewees argued that the 
current  focus  on  social  adaptation  is  insufficient, particularly  for  women  and  workers,  in 
particular among civil society representatives. 

According to interviewees, focusing on social impacts is important due to: 

  Differing  vulnerabilities  across  members  of  society  (gender  and  occupation  were 

highlighted), requiring prioritisation of actions. 

  The risk of negative spillover effects of some actions potentially leading to maladaptation 

in some social groups. 

6.  Identified campaigns for consultations 

The OPC open text responses were analysed to see  if any of them had been co-ordinated by 
different  respondents.  Co-ordinated  in  this  case  refers  to  open  text  responses  from  different 
respondents  that  are  identical  or  almost  identical.  To  see  how  similar  two  sentences  are,  a 
Cosine  Similarity  calculation  has  been  carried  out215.    The  higher  the  cosine  similarity,  the 
more  similar  two  responses  are  to  one  another,  with  a  cosine  similarity  of  1.0  indicating 
identical  text  submissions.  A  cosine  similarity  of  0.5  or  above  indicates  similarity  between 
texts and hence the possibility of coordination.  

The results of this analysis are summarised in Table 14. Each row in the table shows a set of 
similar  co-ordinated  responses  and  the  stakeholder  type  of  each  response.  For  example,  the 
first row shows that there were two responses, both submitted by trade union stakeholders, that 
were  most  likely  co-ordinated,  with  a  very  high  level  of  similarity  between  responses.  Very 
high similarity has a cosine similarity of 0.9 and above.   

The  table  indicates  that  there  were  only  pairs  and  a  triplet  (see  the  second  row  of  the  table 
which  shows  that  there  were  two  responses  from  business  associations  and  one  from  a 
company/business  organisation,  that  were  most  likely  co-ordinated)    of  organised  responses, 
and  there  were  no  large  campaigns  of  similar  answers.  The  most  common  stakeholder  type 
involved in these co-ordinated responses was business associations. 

The triplet consisting of the same response highlighted that railways have adaptation plans in 
place. The co-ordinated response states that due to interlinkages mainly with the energy sector, 
a holistic approach is needed to guarantee resilience of the rail infrastructure. 

215 The calculation involves converting sentences to vectors and the similarity calculation measures the cosine of angle between two vectors.  

90 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
Table 22: Results of cosine similarity analysis detecting co-ordinated responses 

Level of similarity 
between the 
responses 216 

Stakeholder type 

Trade 
union 

NGO   Business 

association 

Company/ 
business 
organisation 

Public 
authority 

Academic 
research 
institution 

Other 

Very high 
Very high 
Very high 
Very high 
Very high 
High 
High 
High 
High 
High 
High 

1 

1 

1 

2 

1 

2 

2 

1 

1 

1 

2 

1 

1 

1 

2 

1 

1 

1 

7.  Ad-hoc contributions 

Ad-hoc  contributions  (i.e.  position  papers  and  other  types  of  documents  submitted)  were 
provided  over  email  and  referred  to  by  stakeholders  during  the  targeted  stakeholders’ 
interviews.  These  contributions  have  been  analysed  in  the  same  way  as  contributions 
submitted via the OPC. 

Overall, 26 contributions were received over emails from various stakeholders. Figure 9 shows 
the topics covered in those contributions by stakeholder type. 

216 Very high has a cosine similarity of 0.9 and above. High has a cosine similarity of 0.5 to 0.9 

91 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Figure 9: Overview of ad-hoc contributions’ content provided over email by stakeholder 
type (a contribution can tackle one or more than one topic) 

Source: Own analysis 

Under the “Other” category, contributions  from  stakeholders covered the following topics to 
be  addressed  in  the  new  Strategy:  cross-border  cooperation  between  Member  States; 
strengthening  local  structures,  processes,  and  institutions,  working  with  civil  society  actors 
and existing networks; reinforcing the link with mitigation; providing data on monetary value 
for green infrastructure; reinforcing multi-level governance and prioritising initiatives with co-

92 

 
 
 
benefits;  accounting  for  differing  social  vulnerabilities, 
vulnerabilities. 
Furthermore, seven interviewees provided additional contributions over email following their 
interviews. Overall, 22 additional documents were received.  Figure 10 provides an overview 
of these documents’ content, by stakeholder type. 

including  gender-  specific 

Figure  10:  Overview  of  ad-hoc  contributions’  content  provided  by  interviewees  by 
stakeholder type (a contribution can tackle one or more than one topic) 

Source: Own analysis 

Under  the  “Other”  category,  contributions  from  stakeholders  discussed  the  integration  of 
gender issues into policymaking, including how and why it should be mainstreamed in the new 
EU  Adaptation  Strategy.  These  papers  highlighted  gender  imbalances  in  the  agriculture  and 
fisheries sectors, among others, and in climate policymaking in general. 

93 

 
 
 
 
8.  How information from consultation is used in the impact assessment 

The  evidence-base  collected  through  the  consultation  activities  was  recorded  by  the 
consultation team in the form of interview notes, webinar and workshop notes; summaries of 
position  papers’  and  additional  material  received  through  the  OPC  or  other  channels;  and 
graphs to visualise results from the OPC. 

This information from the consultation formed a major part of the evidence considered in the 
impact  assessment.  The  evidence  was  compared  with  evidence  from  other  strands  of  the 
consultation  and  also  with  results  of  the  literature  review  to  identify  the  overall  level  of 
agreement or divergence of the evidence. 

This  was  done  (1)  upstream,  by  providing  support  to  the  impact  assessment  team  through 
weekly  updates  on  the  findings  of  the  consultation  activities,  and  (2)  downstream,  by 
crosschecking  each  policy  option  suggested  against  the  evidence  provided  by  consultation 
activities.  

The full list of appendices accompanying this consultation synopsis include: 

  Appendix  0.A:  Summaries  of  ad-hoc  contributions  Appendix  1.A:  Open  public 

consultation 

  Appendix  1.B:  Open  public  consultation  questionnaire  Appendix  1.C:  Open  public 

consultation - Open text responses 

  Appendix 1.D: Open public consultation - Summaries of submitted position papers and 

other documents 

  Appendix  1.  E:  Open  public  consultation  -  ‘Other’  responses  Appendix  2.A: 
Stakeholder  interviews  –  Scripts  and  respondents  Appendix  2.B:  Stakeholder 
interviews  –  Preliminary  interview  script  Appendix  2.C:  Stakeholder  interviews  – 
Main interview script 

  Appendix 2.D: Stakeholder interviews – European Commission invitation to contribute 

Appendix 3.A: Stakeholder events 

  Appendix  3.B:  Stakeholder  events  -  Presentation  of  the  webinar  on  2  July  2020 
Appendix  3.C:  Stakeholder  events  -  Presentation  of  the  workshop  on  3  July  2020 
Appendix  3.D:  Stakeholder  events  -  Concept  note  of  workshop  on  3  July  2020 
Appendix 3.E: Stakeholder events - Presentation of the workshop on 7 July 2020 
  Appendix 3.F: Stakeholder events - Concept note developed for the workshop on 7 

July 2020 

94 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex 3: Who is affected and how? 

Table 23: Overview of Benefits (total for all provisions) – Preferred Option 

I. Overview of Benefits (total for all provisions) – Preferred Option 

Description 

Amount 

Comments 

Direct benefits 

A1 – Effective utilization of 
knowledge through systematic 
data collection and sharing, 
between key public and private 
partners. 

Common  benefits  for  public  and  private  entities:  Data 
harmonization;  effective  alignment  between  public  and 
private  responsibilities  and  effort  sharing; 
improved 
adaptation  planning;  better  informed  decision  making; 
better  understanding  between  public  and  private  losses. 
Reduced costs to be expected as robust data can drive CBA 

Assumption:  Climate  data  and  knowledge 
is 
perceived  as  common  good  with  great  societal 
relevance. Data is of sufficient granularity  

A2 – Proven performance from 
Climate-ADAPT as the ‘first-stop 
shop’ for adaptation information 
in Europe. 

A  single  platform  would  reduce  time  to  action,  reducing 
costs.  A  first  stop  platform  can  guide  to  others  without 
trying to stay up-to-date on everything at all time. 

Distinction  to  be  made  between  data  provisioning, 
gathering  of  information  and  knowledge  sharing. 
like  Copernicus, 
Different  platforms 
EUROSTAT  already  provide  some  climate-related 
data. These services should be expanded per platform 
and linked to Climate-ADAPT 

for  data, 

A3 - Robust evaluation, 
monitoring, reporting and 
implementation of adaptation 
strategies 

Insight into Europe’s vulnerability at the efficient level of 
granularity.  Uniform  and  harmonized  indicators  can  track 
impacts  across  Europe,  and  promote  better  exchange 
between Member States.  

A4 - Mainstreaming nature-based 
adaptation, including coastal 
protection and green and blue 
infrastructure. 

Socio-economic  and  environmental  benefits  are  more 
easily  associated  with  ecosystems  services.  Therefore 
making more robust business cases warranting contribution 
and progress for sustainable development goals 

A5 - Stepping-up efforts to build 
resilience in cities and empower 
local action. 

A6 - Further mainstreaming and 
integrating adaptation in EU 
legislation and instruments 

Reduced public expenditures on losses as result of climate 
impacts as city action plans put into action.  

Greater  spending  on  climate  resilience  in  sectors  affected 
by policy. 

A7 - Climate Proofing of 
Infrastructure and Disaster Risk 
Management. 

Standardized guidelines and procedures to design, develop 
and  integrate  climate  proofing  solutions  to  ensure  robust 
and resilient infrastructure across Europe  

A8 - Closing the Climate 
Protection gap - microeconomic 
aspects of adaptation to climate 
change.  

A9 - Supporting partner countries 
and regions in their efforts on 
climate change and disaster 
preparedness 

A10 - Scaling up international 
adaptation finance and disaster 
risk financing, and unlocking 

Having  systematic  approach 
to  assess,  reduce,  and 
optimally transfer climate-related disaster risk in economic 
activities  

Implementation  of  NDCs  and  to  building  capacity  at 
national  and  sub-national  level  in  line  with  national 
priorities and vulnerabilities 

Having  more  funds  available  from  both  the  public  and 
private sector, fostering the transition to be become climate 

95 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
private finance  

resilient 

A11 - Strengthening EU 
engagement globally and learning 
from adaptation forerunners. 

A12 - Horizon Europe Mission on 
adaptation to Climate Change 
effectively deploying adaptation 
Solutions 

Access  to  granular  and  meaningful  data  information  to 
ensure better informed decision making  

Better informed decision making by means of climate risk 
management and community-based emergency plans 

-  Closing 

A13 
the  Climate 
Protection  Gap  -  macroeconomic 
aspects of adaptation 

Better-informed  decision  making  for  fiscal  and  financial 
stability: on disaster risk assessment and management, risk 
pooling and cross-sectoral losses. 

A14 - Ensuring the availability  of 
Fresh water 

Indirect benefits 

Overall benefits to society from wide range of stakeholders 
benefitting  from  better  data  availability  and  informed 
decision making by public authorities and firms. 

A1  –  Effective  utilization  of 
systematic 
knowledge 
through 
sharing, 
data 
between  key  public  and  private 
partners. 

collection 

and 

A2  –  Proven  performance  from 
Climate-ADAPT  as  the  ‘first-stop 
shop’  for  adaptation  information 
in Europe. 

N/A  

Direct benefit to users is most relevant. 

- 

A3 
monitoring, 
implementation 
strategies. 

Robust 

evaluation, 
and 
adaptation 

reporting 

of 

A4  -  Mainstreaming  nature-based 
adaptation, 
coastal 
protection  and  green  and  blue 
infrastructure. 

including 

A5  -  Stepping-up  efforts  to  build 
resilience  in  cities  and  empower 
local action. 

A6  -  Further  mainstreaming  and 
integrating  adaptation 
in  EU 
legislation and instruments 

Benefits  to  vulnerable  stakeholders  as  monitoring  and 
reporting  brings  public  action  into  focus,  and  stimulates 
further action.  

Benefits  to  biodiversity  and  climate  change  mitigation 
from  projects  in  addition  to  main  climate  resilience 
benefits. 

to  vulnerable 

Benefits 
in  cities  as 
strengthened  CoM  and  action  by  cities  can  lead  to  co-
benefits in air quality, transport and public spaces. 

stakeholders 

Benefits  to  recipients  of  funding,  as  their  vulnerabilities 
will be better addressed. 

-  Climate  Proofing  of 

A7 
Infrastructure and beyond. 

Long term benefits to public budgets in Member States as 
reduced  costs  for  repairs  from  climate  damages  to 
infrastructure. 

-  Closing 

A8 
the  Climate 
Protection  gap  -  microeconomic 
aspects  of  adaptation  to  climate 
change.  

A9  -  Supporting  partner  countries 
and  regions  in  their  efforts  on 
climate 
and  disaster 
preparedness 

change 

Improved  EU  standing  on  adaptation,  and  working  with 
partners,  may  support  building  of  diplomatic  coalitions  in 
other  climate  (mitigation)  areas,  or  policy  and  economic 
areas more broadly. 

96 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A10  -  Scaling  up  international 
adaptation  finance  and  disaster 
risk 
financing,  and  unlocking 
private finance  

- 

Strengthening 

EU 
A11 
engagement  globally  and  learning 
from adaptation forerunners. 

Pioneering  innovations  can  create  opportunities  for  EU 
firms to commercialise success stories. 

A12 - Horizon Europe Mission on 
adaptation 
to  Climate  Change 
effectively  deploying  adaptation 
Solutions 

-  Closing 

the  Climate 
A13 
Protection  Gap  -  macroeconomic 
aspects of adaptation 

A14 - Ensuring the availability  of 
Fresh water 

Better  water  pricing  and  practices  improves  resource 
efficiency and water availability and quality for ecosystems 
and recreation. 

(1) Estimates are relative to the baseline for the preferred option as a whole (i.e. the impact of individual actions/obligations of the 
preferred option are aggregated together);  (2) Please  indicate which stakeholder group is  the main recipient of the  benefit in the 
comment  section;(3)  For  reductions  in  regulatory  costs,  please  describe  details  as  to  how  the  saving  arises  (e.g.  reductions  in 
compliance costs, administrative costs, regulatory charges, enforcement costs, etc.; see section 6 of the attached guidance). 

Table 24: Overview of costs – Preferred option 

II. Overview of costs – Preferred option 

Citizens/Consumers  

Businesses 

Administrations 

One-off 

Recurrent 

One-off 

Recurrent 

One-off 

Recurrent 

A1 – Effective 
utilization of 
knowledge through 
systematic data 
collection and 
sharing, between key 
public and private 
partners. 

A2 – Proven 
performance from 
Climate-ADAPT as 
the ‘first-stop shop’ 
for adaptation 
information in 
Europe. 

Direct 
costs 

Indirect 
costs 

Direct 
costs 

Indirect 
costs 

A3 - Robust 
evaluation, 
monitoring, 
reporting and 
implementation of 
adaptation strategies. 

Direct 
costs 

to 

sharing 

Data 
provision 

and 

Measures 
develop 
Roadmap, 
establish 
framework 
(EC) 

Provision 
additional data 

of 

Through 
Europe 

Horizon 

Establish 
maintain 
Observatory (EC) 

and 
Health 

Potential 
costs 
related to aligning 
business  activities 
with the strategies 

Potential 
related 
implementation 

costs 
to 

Establish 
framework 
(EC) 

Potential  costs 
related 
to 
implementation 
(behaviour 
change, 
investments 
individual 
resilience) 

in 

97 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
II. Overview of costs – Preferred option 

Citizens/Consumers  

Businesses 

Administrations 

One-off 

Recurrent 

One-off 

Recurrent 

One-off 

Recurrent 

MRE  under  Climate 
Law (MS & EC) 

Policy support facility 
(EC) 

Implementation 
of 
adaptation  plans  (MS, 
cities) 

Revision  of  existing 
legislation 
and 
instruments  which  do 
incorporate 
not 
adaptation 
considerations (EC) 

Potential  loss  of 
for 
revenue 
still 
sectors 
building 
grey 
infrastructure  

via 
of 

Possible 
linking 
insurance 
products to NbS 

Tool 
development 
(EC) 

Legislation 
to 
protect  workers 
from 
high 
temperatures 

higher 
associated 
alignment 
new 

Potential 
costs 
with 
with 
adaptation 
requirements 

Applying  climate 
proofing 
guidelines 

Enhance  and 
apply  climate 
proofing 
methodology 
(EC)  

on 
risk 

Study 
Climate 
management 
(EC) 

Indirect 
costs 

A4 - Mainstreaming 
nature-based 
adaptation, including 
coastal protection 
and green and blue 
infrastructure 

Direct 
costs 

Indirect 
costs 

to 

-  Stepping-up 
A5 
build 
efforts 
resilience 
in  cities 
and  empower  local 
action. 

A6 
- 
mainstreaming 
integrating 
adaptation 
legislation 
instruments 

Further 
and 

in  EU 
and 

A7 
- 
Proofing 
Infrastructure 
beyond. 

Climate 
of 
and 

Direct 
costs 

Indirect 
costs 

Direct 
costs 

Indirect 
costs 

Direct 
costs 

Indirect 
costs 

the 
A8  -  Closing 
Climate  Protection 
gap - microeconomic 
aspects of adaptation 

Direct 
costs 

Common 
methods 
risk 
management 

for 

Mainstreaming 
BRG (EC) 

in 

Allies 

for 

climate 

98 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
II. Overview of costs – Preferred option 

Citizens/Consumers  

Businesses 

Administrations 

One-off 

Recurrent 

One-off 

Recurrent 

One-off 

Recurrent 

Adaptation 
integrated 
SEAI 

into 

(EC) 

resilience (EC) 

reporting 
MS 
disaster aid (MS) 

on 

Various 
(EC) 

measures 

to climate change. 

Indirect 
costs 

-  Supporting 
A9 
partner countries and 
regions 
their 
efforts  on  climate 
change  and  disaster 
preparedness 

in 

Direct 
costs 

Indirect 
costs 

A10  -  Scaling  up 
international 
adaptation 
and 
financing, 
unlocking 
finance 

finance 
risk 
and 
private 

disaster 

A11  -  Strengthening 
EU 
engagement 
globally and learning 
from 
adaptation 
forerunners. 

A12 
-  Horizon 
Europe  Mission  on 
adaptation 
to 
Climate 
Change 
effectively deploying 
adaptation Solutions 

A13  -  Closing  the 
Climate  Protection 
Gap 
- 
macroeconomic 
aspects of adaptation 

Direct 
costs 

Indirect 
costs 

Direct 
costs 

Indirect 
costs 

Direct 
costs 

Indirect 
costs 

Direct 
costs 

Indirect 
costs 

Studies 
on 
just  resilience 
(EC) 

Climate  proofing  of 
EU 
external 
investments (EC) 

Balance  in  mitigation 
adaptation 
and 
spending 
(all 
countries) 

Discussions, 
exchanges,  alliances 
(EC and partners) 

Horizon  Europe  and 
other 
activities 
funding (EC) 

EC 
activities (EC) 

engagement 

EC  activities 
provide 
to 
tools,  models, 
tests (EC) 

Potential  need  to 
engage  with  and 
use EC tools. 

in  EC 
Involvement 
driven processes (MS) 

A14  -  Ensuring  the 
availability  of  Fresh 
water  

Direct 
costs 

Indirect 
costs 

Potentially 
higher  product 
costs 

Potentially 
higher 
costs 

water 

of 

Redesign 
products, 
processes.  New 

Potentially  higher 
water costs 

99 

Regulatory 
changes  and 
studies 
to 
support  them 
(EC) 

Water  Safety 
Plans 
development 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
II. Overview of costs – Preferred option 

Citizens/Consumers  

Businesses 

Administrations 

One-off 

Recurrent 

One-off 

Recurrent 

One-off 

Recurrent 

standards/labels  

(MS) 

 (1)  Estimates  to  be  provided  with  respect  to  the  baseline;  (2)  costs  are  provided  for  each  identifiable  action/obligation  of  the 
preferred option otherwise for all retained options when no preferred option is specified; (3) If relevant and available, please present 
information on costs according to the standard typology of costs (compliance costs, regulatory charges, hassle costs, administrative 
costs, enforcement costs, indirect costs; see section 6 of the attached guidance). 

100 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex 4: Analytical methods 

Aside from desk review, thematics reports and consultative approaches the Impact Assessment 
also utilised economic modelling to estimate the impact of a handful of the measures taken for 
mini-assessment (see Annex 7). The key characteristics of this are described below. 

Economic modelling 

The GINFORS-E model was used to provide macro-econometric estimations of the impact of 
measures under the Adaptation Strategy. A more complete description of baseline assumptions 
and how measures proposed under the Strategy were modelled is provided below, along with 
the summary of the main model features. 

Three climate change scenarios and the respective adaptation scenarios are compared against a 
references  scenario,  which  is  mainly  calibrated  to  the  IEA’s  WEO  2019  stated  policies 
scenario (IEA 2019). For EU countries, GDP and population development is calibrated to meet 
the  EU  (2018)  aging  report  results  (Lutz  et  al.  2020).  GINFORS-E217  is  a  global  economy-
energy model including national models for all EU countries and major trade partners linked 
by  bilateral  trade  at  industry  level  (solved  annually  until  2050).  It  is  a  macro  econometric 
model similar to E3ME (Barker et al. 2011; Lehr, Lutz 2020). 

Using quantifications of damages from past events as input, GINFORS_E estimates impacts at 
industry  level,  including  macroeconomic  effects  (GDP,  employment,  production,  consumer 
prices) and impacts on income and consumption structure for each EU Member State. Other 
examples  include  the  detailed  economic  assessment  of  the  German  adaptation  policies, 
applying a single country model with the same philosophy as GINFORS-E (Lehr et al. 2020).  

Results  are  reported  as  relative  differences  in  2030,  2040  and  2050  against  the  reference 
scenario.  Country  specific  economic  structures,  damages  due  to  climate  change  and  policy 
measures  to  adapt  to  climate  change  translate  into  different  impacts  on  country  level.  The 
results are available on country level, but are shown for four regions and the current EU-27. 

The economic losses are calculated for 2050, the model interpolates from today. The sources 
are used as follows: 

• 
• 

• 

EEA Report No 1/2017 Climate change, impacts and vulnerability in Europe 2016  
An indicator-based report is used to determine the losses in agriculture for the RCP4.5 
scenario. The upper and lower scenario is calculated based on own assumptions.  
Energy  costs  are  simulated  using  the  changes  in  electricity  production  costs  from 
PESETA IV. The results are assumed for 2050 with model interpolation from today. 

The assumptions  used for the reference scenario  are taken  from  a variety of sources and are 
combined  in  a  methodologically  rough  way  for  feasibility  of  impact  assessment  study.  One 
example,  while  the  results  from  PESETA  come  from  a  comparative  static  analysis,  the 
GINFORS-E  model  is  a  dynamic  environment  where  the  economies  of  the  member  states 
develop  over  time.  The  increasing  (or  in  some  cases  possibly  decreasing)  vulnerability  of  a 

217 https://www.gws-os.com/de/index.php/energy-and-climate/models/model-details/ginfors-e.html  

101 

 
 
                                                 
member  state’s  economy  by  2050  is  not  accounted  for.  This  would  be  a  relevant  and 
interesting, but far more comprehensive study than can be provided here. The different types 
of models used in the analyses make comparison difficult, but the most comprehensive work 
on  climate  damages  in  Europe  stems  from  the  PESETA  project  cycle.  Therefore,  the  results 
from  the  comparative  static  analysis  in  PESETA  IV  haven  been  interpreted  against  the 
macroeconometric models background and tried to reach similar results. 

Five types of damages due to climate change have been implemented in the baseline. (1) For 
agriculture, climate change effects result in higher prices for the products, if the sector suffers 
from climate change. They translate into output losses via the input-output tables, mainly for 
agriculture,  but  also  for  other  industries,  such  as  food,  that  use  agricultural  products.  (2) 
Higher cooling and lower heating demand are implemented in the physical energy balances of 
the  models,  i.e.  as  changes  in  consumption  of  electricity  (for  cooling)  and  different  energy 
carriers (for heating). Changes in energy consumption (and transformation) in physical terms 
are  translated  into  the  monetary  demand  changes  in  the  input-output  tables  and  respective 
percentage  changes.  Consumers  will  adjust  their  consumption  structure.  (3)  Changes  in 
tourism turnover are interpreted as changes in final demand for the sector accommodation and 
food  services.  Intermediate  inputs  and  other  final  demand  categories  will  also  change 
according to the economic structures in the IO tables. It is assumed that lower demand will not 
be compensated by additional demand in other categories to get a more pronounced negative 
economic impact of lower tourism activities and thus to be able to isolate and track effects. (4) 
Coastal damages  and damages of the transport system are related to less transport. As in  (3) 
these damages have been modelled as lower demand for (maritime) transport, which also has 
negative  impacts  on  output  of  the  transport  industry  and  of  other  connected  industries.  (5) 
Health impacts  of climate change, i.e. of heat  waves and an increase in  average temperature 
are considered as lower labour productivity. This is introduced to the model as an increase in 
user  costs,  which  determine  production  prices,  for  all  industries.  This  means  that  negative 
health  impacts  will  increase  the  price  level  of  the  respective  economy,  which  has  negative 
effects on international competitiveness and reduces the purchasing power of consumers in the 
country.  In  contrast  to  (1)  to  (4)  the  effects  spread  widely  across  the  economy.  Changes  in 
GDP  in  the  countries  reflect  direct,  indirect  and  induced  effects  of  these  assumptions  for 
changes in prices and in demand. Employment is also a result of the model, mainly depending 
on production and relative prices (labour costs to production prices) in each industry. Wages in 
turn are a function of productivity development and price levels. As a consequence, percentage 
changes  in  employment  as  the  number  of  employees  are  in  general  lower  than  percentage 
changes in production or GDP respectively. 

Modelling  reduced  damages  due  to  adaptation  measures  is  straightforward.  If  adaptation 
reduces  a  damage  by  e.g.  10%,  assumptions  described  above  to  model  climate  change  have 
been  reduced  by  10%  as  well.  Additional  economic  effects  stem  from  explicit  modelling  of 
adaptation measures. Adaptation measures in retention areas, resilient cities and infrastructure 
(measures  4.1,  5.6,  7.2  respectively)  have  been  modelled  as  additional  investment  of  the 
construction industry. There is no crowding out assumed. Adaptation that improves the health 
situation (measure 2.1) is modelled as additional investment of the sector “human health and 
social work”. Again, no potential crowding out is assumed. Adaptation measures to reduce the 

102 

 
 
impacts  of  draughts  have  been  implemented  as  additional  demand  for  machinery  (measure 
14.3). In all cases no crowding out has been assumed. 

The specific assumptions per measure are discussed within the macroeconomic impact of the 
mini-assessments  provided  in  Annex  7,  specifically  for  the  five  measures  (2.1,  4.1,  5.6,  7.2 
and 14.3) for which economic modelling was possible. 

The  Impact  Assessment  study  has  been  reviewed  by  an  independent  adaptation  expert  and 
sections  of  the  report,  including  the  mini-assessments,  have  received  inputs  from  sector 
experts within and outside of the European Commission – these have increased the robustness 
of the findings.  

GINFORS-E: Short model description 

The  GINFORS-E  (global  inter-industry  forecasting  system  –  energy)  model  is  a  bilateral 
world  trade  model  mainly  based  on  OECD  data,  which  consistently  and  coherently  models 
exports  and  imports  of  25  goods  groups  for  64  countries  and  one  ‘rest  of  the  world'  region 
(Error! Reference source not found.). It incorporates a macro-model, consisting of exports 
and imports, other core  components of  final  demand (private and public sector consumption 
and investment), markets for goods and the labour market, for each country. The models are 
also  divided  into  36  goods  categories  in  accordance  with  the  latest  OECD  (2019) 
internationally  harmonised  input-output  (IO)  tables  (see  Table  25:  Industry  classification  of 
OECD Input-Output Tables (GINFORS-E) for sector detail).  

Figure 11: Country coverage of GINFORS-E 

For  every  country  OECD,  bilateral  trade  data  on  industry  level  is  linked  to  the  IO  tables 
(Error! Reference source not found.). IO table detail is shown in Error! Reference source 
not found.13. In Lutz et al. (2010) the model is clearly described in detail, although some of 
the  relations  have  changed  (e.g.  OECD  has  adjusted  the  sector  classification  several  times). 
GINFORS-E  flexibly  models  trade  structures,  labour  markets,  energy  intensities  and  energy 
source  structures,  taking  into  account  price  dependencies  and  the  situation  in  specific 
countries. The use of intermediate inputs, domestic and imported, labour demand and foreign 

103 

Country coverage GINFORS-EIO + Energy modelOnly trade explicitly modeledRest of World 
 
 
trade  are  modelled  price  dependent.  The  parameters  used  in  the  model  equations  are 
econometrically estimated (OLS) based on time-series data, if the time series are sufficiently 
long. 

GINFORS-E  incorporates  a  macro-model  from  TINFORGE  (Mönnig,  Wolter  2020), 
consisting of exports and imports, other core components of final demand (private and public 
sector  consumption  and  investment),  markets  for  goods  and  the  labour  market,  for  each 
country. 

Production prices of 36 industries are driven by unit costs. If prices of electricity in the steel 
industry  increase,  producer  prices  will  increase  according  to  their  electricity  price  share. 
Higher  producer  prices  will  influence  global  competitiveness  of  the  respective  industry  and 
other downstream production (e.g. in the automotive industry). 

the  model  are  estimated  econometrically,  and  different 
Behavioural  parameters  of 
specifications  of  the  functions  are  tested  against  each  other,  which  gives  the  model  an 
empirical validation. An additional confirmation of the model structure as a whole is given by 
the  convergence  property  of  the  solution,  which  has  to  be  fulfilled  on  a  yearly  basis.  The 
econometric estimations build on times series from OECD, UN, IMF and IEA from 1990/2005 
to 2015/2017.  

Figure 12: Country model of GINFORS-E 

104 

 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Structural detail of IO country model of GINFORS-E 

Source: OECD 2019 

Each  national  model  is  linked  to  an  energy  model,  which  determines  energy  conversion, 
energy  generation  and  final  demand  for  energy  for  19  energy  sources  disaggregated  by 
economic sector. The model takes into account technological trends and price dependencies.  

For  DG  CLIMA  the  model  has  been  used  to  project  consumption-based  emissions  and 
evaluate specific technology scenarios taking global supply chains into account (Wiebe et al. 
2016).  For  DG  GROW  (Asselin-Miller  et  al.  2017)  the  model  has  been  used  to  explore 
macroeconomic impacts of different scenarios for powertrains and the competitiveness of the 
European  automobile  industry.  It  also  shows  how  electric  cars  can  be  captured  in  an  input-
output framework. 

Table 25: Industry classification of OECD Input-Output Tables (GINFORS-E) 

Industries 1-24 

Industries 25-48 

1 Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 

19 Other transport equipment 

2 Mining and quarrying 

20 Manufacturing nec.; recycling 

3 Food products, beverages and tobacco 

21 Electricity, gas and water supply 

4 Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear 

22 Construction 

5 Food products, beverages and tobacco 

23 Wholesale & retail trade; repairs 

6 Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear 

24 Hotels & restaurants 

105 

 
 
 
7 Wood and products of wood and cork 

25 Transport & storage 

8 Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing 

26 Post & telecommunications 

9 Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 

27 Financial intermediation 

10 Chemicals and chemical products 

28 Real estate activities 

11 Rubber & plastics products 

29 Renting of machinery & equipment 

12 Other non-metallic mineral products 

13 Basic metals  

14 Fabricated metal products 

15 Machinery & equipment, nec  

30 Computer & related activities 

31 Computer & related activities 

32 Research & development and other business activities 

33 Public admin. & defence; compulsory social security 

16 Computer, Electronic and optical equipment 

34 Education 

17 Electrical machinery & apparatus, nec 

35 Health & social work 

18 Motor vehicles, trailers & semi-trailers 

36 Other community, social & personal services 

Source: OECD 2019 https://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/IOT_Industries_Items.pdf 

Ultimately,  two  basic  types  of  macroeconomic  models  can  be  distinguished,  which  are  used 
for  the  macroeconomic  assessment  of  the  energy  transition  and  climate  policies  or  climate 
change:  general  equilibrium  models  (CGE)  and  macro-econometric  models  (sometimes  also 
known as macro-econometric input-output models). According to an EC study, the two types 
of  models  can  be  distinguished  as  follows  (Pollitt  et  al.  2017):  Computable  General 
Equilibrium (CGE) models are based on neo-classical theory that households and businesses 
maximize  their  benefits  and  profits.  The  markets  of  different  goods  are  cleared  (are  in  an 
equilibrium),  i.e.  supply  and  demand  balance  and  economic  resources  are  fully  utilized. 
Involuntary unemployment is not possible in the standard case. Higher demand for a good (for 
example,  renewable  energy  required  for  the  energy  transition)  leads  to  higher  prices  of 
primary  factors  (energy,  capital,  labour)  and  a  reallocation  of  resources  away  from  the 
optimal. Macro-econometric models are based on the post-Keynesian theory that emphasizes 
the demand side, with both market sides playing an important role, unlike simple input-output 
approaches. Behavioural parameters are determined by econometric estimation of time series 
data,  so  the  empirical  estimation  of  model  parameters  is  of  great  importance.  Markets  are 
usually  not  cleared,  as  the  economy  is  assumed  not  to  be  in  equilibrium.  Involuntary 
unemployment and idle capital are included. Imbalances between supply and demand are more 
likely  to  be  offset  by  demand-driven  rather  than  price  effects.  However,  the  study  also 
emphasizes  that  the  models  used  in  policy  advice  break  away  from  rigid  theories  to  more 
adequately reflect reality. 

Uncertainty and sensitivity analysis 

Uncertainty has an important role in analysis of climate change and its future impacts as there 
is both (1) uncertainty in the modelling of impacts, with our understanding of these improving 
but  not  complete;  and,  (2)  uncertainty  in  the  mitigation  efforts  that  will  shape  the  future 
climate  impacts  we  will  face.  Uncertainty  in  climate  analysis  is  typically  dealt  with  using 
climate scenarios, modelling different policy, emissions and temperature pathways. This work 
also  utilises  a  scenario-based  approach  to  sensitivity  check  the  impacts.  Quantitatively,  as 
described above three scenarios are modelled based on the IPCC RCP scenarios 2.6, 4.5 and 
8.5. These correspond to estimated temperature increases, although within a range due to the 
modelling  uncertainty  described  above  (1),  which  could  be  described  as  low-medium-high. 
The  detailed  quantitative  results  for  economic  welfare  and  employment  in  chapter  6  present 

106 

 
 
the  impact  at  this  level.  The  qualitative  assessment  of  the  results  is  unable  to  make  such  a 
precise  distinction  between  scenarios  and  these  are  therefore  assessed  simply  as  Paris 
(low/medium) and High temperature scenario impacts. This provides a useful indication of the 
sensitivity  of  the  assessment  to  climate  uncertainties.  The  measures  are  held  constant  across 
the  scenarios,  but  with  the  underlying  rationale:  that  climate  damages  increase  with 
temperature, and that  measures also  typically have a  greater impact  on avoiding or  reducing 
these damages as the temperature increases.  

Detailed modelling results 

Climate change scenarios 

Climate  change  will  reduce  economic  welfare  in  the  coming  decades  depending  on  country 
specific damages. While Northern Europe can even partly profit regarding energy demand for 
heating  of  buildings  from  climate  change,  especially  southern  Europe  will  be  hit  by  high 
temperatures, which will increase the possibility of droughts and energy demand (and costs) of 
cooling. Countries with high shares of agriculture and tourism will suffer more. 

Figure 14 shows impacts of climate change on GDP in different EU regions. Southern Europe 
(SE) and Central Southern Europe (CES) will be hit most by climate change. Relative losses in 
Central Northern Europe (CEN), in Northern Europe (NE) and in Ireland are lower than in the 
South,  but  still  significant.  In  scenarios  with  faster  climate  change  (8.5)  GDP  losses  will  be 
significantly  higher  than  in  scenarios  with  lower  temperature  rise  (2.6).Figure  12  shows 
impacts of climate change on GDP in different EU regions. Southern Europe (SE) and Central 
Southern  Europe  (CES)  will  be  hit  most  by  climate  change.  Relative  losses  are  below  EU 
average  in  Central  Northern  Europe  (CEN),  in  Northern  Europe  (NE)  and  in  Ireland.  In 
scenarios  with  faster  climate  change  (8.5)  GDP  losses  will  be  significantly  higher  than  in 
scenarios with lower temperature rise (2.6). 

Figure 14: Economic welfare in climate change scenarios by macro region - relative 
difference from baseline [% of real GDP] 

Own results 

107 

-1,80%-1,60%-1,40%-1,20%-1,00%-0,80%-0,60%-0,40%-0,20%0,00%203020402050 
 
 
A  similar  pattern  of  changes  can  be  observed  for  employment  (Figure  15).  However,  the 
magnitude of effects will be much higher, especially in Southern Europe, where employment 
is  reduced by more than 3% in  the 8.5 scenario  (Figure 13).  Nevertheless, the magnitude of 
effects will be much higher, especially in Southern Europe, where employment is reduced by 
more than  

Figure 15: Employment in climate change scenarios - relative difference from baseline of 
employment by macro region 

Adaptation scenarios – Option 1 

Adaptation  measures  as  described  above  (see  also  Annex  6  and  7)  can  reduce  the  negative 
economic impacts of climate change in terms of economic welfare. They could be more than 
halved for the EU-27 in the 8.5 scenario compared to the baseline (Option 0). High reductions 
can  also  be  seen  for  Southern  Europe  and  Central  Southern  Europe  (Figure  16Error! 
Reference source not found.). 

108 

-3,50%-3,00%-2,50%-2,00%-1,50%-1,00%-0,50%0,00%203020402050 
 
 
Figure 16: Adaptation scenario (Option 1)- relative difference from baseline of real GDP 
by macro region [as % of real GDP] 

Own results 

Adaptation scenarios – Option 1 and Option 2 

The  added  effects  of  the  Option  2  measures  are  almost  identical  to  Option  1  (Error! 
Reference source not found.), as it was only possible to model measure 14.3 which improves 
water  availability  in  agriculture  in  some  (southern)  EU  countries  slightly  and  “costs”  are 
accounted  for  as  a  shift  from  water  to  machinery  inputs.  This  only  has  small  impacts  in  the 
additional economic activities triggered by construction, the health system, or other economic 
sectors. Note that investment in  these purposes  is  treated as  additional with no assumptions, 
for instance, regarding crowding out.  This  highlights  one of the important  limitations of this 
kind of analysis, as the economic parameters become more and more uncertain when looking 
more than a few years ahead. 

Adaptation  can  lead  to  neither  GDP  nor  employment  to  reach  identical  levels  than  in  the 
absence  of  climate  change  effects,  because  it  can  lower  damages  from  climate  change,  but 
never completely compensate for them. However, some of the adaptation measures considered 
above would be low- or no-regret strategies. Retention areas, for instance have other benefits, 
also without the major flooding event, which they have been developed to prevent. They can 
serve  as  parks  or  recreation  areas  during  the  times  without  flooding  (for  example  see  the 
research project MUST; https://www.must.nl/).  

109 

-1,00%-0,80%-0,60%-0,40%-0,20%0,00%0,20%203020402050 
 
 
 
Figure 17: Adaptation scenario (Option 2) - relative difference of economic welfare 
compared to baseline by macro region [as % of real GDP] 

Own results 

The  reasons  for  positive  macroeconomic  effects  from  adaptation  lie  in  the  reduction  of 
damages  

The results of the simulation of the additional options are optimistic. The measures suggested 
are fairly soft and require full implementation to reach their impacts. However, for simulation 
purposes, we have assumed that they will be fully effective and implemented 1:1 in practice. 

Employment  losses  will  also  be  lower  with  adaptation  measures  (Error!  Reference  source 
not found.). The relation between economic welfare losses and employment losses reflects the 
different productivities and industrial structure of reduced losses and additional measures for 
each country. The figure shows that employment losses which totalled 1.27% in the baseline 
(for  RCP  4.5)  could  be  reduced  to  0.85%  by  Option  2,  the  difference  is  the  equivalent  of 
around  800,000  jobs  based  on  current  EU  employment  of  191  million.  Avoided  job  losses 
increase further in the high temperature (RCP 8.5) scenario.  

110 

-1,00%-0,80%-0,60%-0,40%-0,20%0,00%0,20%203020402050 
 
 
 
Figure 18: Adaptation scenarios (Option 2) - relative difference of employment by macro 
region compared to baseline [as % of total employment] 

Own results 

Country and temperature scenario details for Option 2 

The following figures, Figure 19,  and  21, provide insight at the country level for the impact 
of  Option  2,  by  comparing  the  with  and  without  adaptation  outcomes  for  economic  welfare 
across the 3 temperature scenarios. These show that across every temperature scenario every 
country  experiences  reduced  economic  losses  due  to  the  adaptation  actions  modelled  for 
Option  2.  In  a  handful  of  countries,  e.g.  especially  Austria,  but  also  Germany,  Estonia  and 
Latvia in different scenarios, the measures even reverse the economic welfare losses into small 
economic welfare gains.  

111 

-2,50%-2,00%-1,50%-1,00%-0,50%0,00%203020402050 
 
 
Figure 19: 1.5°C scenario (RCP 2.6) Relative differences in economic welfare compared 
to baseline by 2050 [as % of real annual GDP] 

Figure  20:  2.0°C  scenario  (RCP  4.5)  Relative  differences  in  economic  welfare  by  2050 
compared to baseline [as % of real annual GDP] 

112 

-0.025-0.02-0.015-0.01-0.00500.0052050 CC2050 Adapt-0.03-0.025-0.02-0.015-0.01-0.00500.0052050 CC2050 Adapt 
 
 
 
 
Figure 21: 4°C scenario (RCP 8.5) Relative differences in economic welfare by 2050 
compared to baseline [as % of real GDP] 

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Annex 5: Impact screening 

Following Better Regulation Tool #19 we have undertaken an impact screening to identify the 
most significant impacts to be assessed as part of the IA. The impacts to be assessed flow from 
the problem definition and the objectives as presented in chapters 2 and 4 of the main IA.  

The Adaptation Strategy has, through the various actions and proposed measures, a huge mix 
of  intended  direct  and  indirect  actions  and  behavioural  changes  interlinked  across  the  many 
actions and measures considered under the policy options. The Strategy also aims to address 
almost  all levels  of society and public authorities,  and across multiple themes and economic 
sectors, as  the need for  adaptation  is  quite all-encompassing. The impact screening involved 
consideration of the following channels of action: 

Direct behavioural changes 
  Obligations  to  public  authorities,  particularly  Member  States,  but  potentially  also  other 
levels,  and  also  private  sector  organisations.  E.g.  to  produce  adaptation  strategies,  to 
integrate adaptation in industry standards, etc.;  

  Support to organisations, public and private, to take action, e.g. Pilot programmes funded 
under LIFE, Horizon Europe, or other programmes, policy (technical) support facilities; 
  Obligations  within  EC  on  mainstreaming  of  action  across  policy  areas,  e.g.  inclusion  of 

resilience in major project funding; 

Indirect behavioural changes 
 

Increased  information  and  awareness  –  including  through  the  production  of  guidance, 
development  of  methodologies,  orientation  of  research  programmes,  organisation  and 
dissemination of their outputs and solutions, good practices 

  Better  decision  making  –  by  encouraging  planning  and  action,  and  broadening  the 

knowledge base especially on solutions and good practice 

Ultimate impacts on public policy goals 
 

Increased  resilience  from  greater  implementation,  from  better  decisions,  based  on 
increased knowledge 

As the number and variety of actions and measures under the Adaptation Strategy is high (see 
Annex 6), the specific impacts of individual measures and actions are too numerous to form 
the  basis  of  the  impact  assessment  therefore  the  impacts  need  to  be  considered  at  a  higher, 
aggregated  level.  Starting  from  the  base  list  of  the  Better  Regulation  Tool  we  made  the 
following screening, as shown in Table 18. 

The results of Q12 of the OPC have been taken into account in this screening, highlighting the 
importance attached to  healthier ecosystems  – addressed via the impact  indicator on ‘Use of 
ecosystem-based  solutions  and  increased  resilience  of  ecosystems’;  on  preventing  climate 
risks  –  addressed  as  part  of  the  indicator  on  ‘Impact  on  climate  resilience‘;  and  enabling 
climate-informed  decisions  by  citizens  –  addressed  as  part  of  the  impact  indicator  on 
’distributional and equity impacts’. 

The  results  of  the  interviews  are  also  considered,  which  identified  that  the  impacts  are  all 
linked,  and  that  environmental  and  social  impacts  are  at  least  as  important  as  economic 
impacts  for  adaptation.  Reduced  damages  were  identified  as  a  key  economic  indicator,  and 
impacts on wellbeing and health were highlighted amongst the social indicators. For economic 
damages, it may be covered with the Gross Value Added (GVA) indicator, which will reduce 
with  damages,  or  we  consider  to  potentially  also  have  a  damage  indicator  to  sit  alongside. 
Wellbeing  is  encompassed  within  the  social  protection  aspect  of  the  impact  indicator  on 
‘Distributional  and  equity  impacts’,  whilst  health  is  covered  by  both  this  and  the  impact 
systems’.
indicator 

emergency 

‘impact 

public 

civil 

and 

on 

on 

health 
115 

 
 
Table 26: Impact screening of key impact indicators 

Impact indicator 

Economic 

Macroeconomic environment  

Competitiveness, trade and 
investment flows 

Operation/conduct of SMEs 

Regulatory burden on business  

Increased innovation and research 

Relevance 

Decision 

Method 

Indicator 

Impacts on the economy are a hugely significant driver for 
action and reducing damages can be an important indicator 
of increased resilience. 

Vulnerability of supply chains to impacts can be relevant 
and The Strategy will significantly influence the types of 
investments being made.  

Strategy is society-wide, but not specifically an economic 
intervention, SME impacts not a direct goal of the 
intervention. Attention given to SMEs within other 
indicators on competitiveness and regulatory burden. 

The Strategy will result in only very limited new 
obligations on business, the main intention is to encourage, 
promote and inform own action by businesses. 
Nevertheless, important to include. 

The Strategy will guide research under Horizon Europe, 
and hopes to encourage greater adoption of innovation. 

Included 

To be assessed quantitatively with 
modelling (GWS) and qualitatively. 

Economic welfare (losses) (€) 

And (-/+) 

Included 

Qualitative assessment 

Impact on competitiveness, trade 
and (climate resilient) investments 
(+/-) 

Excluded 

Included 

Qualitative assessment 

Regulatory burden on business (+/-) 

Included 

Qualitative assessment 

Impact on adaptation innovation 
adoption (+/-) 

Technological development / digital 
economy 

No significant impact on technological development / 
digital economy. 

Excluded 

Third countries and international 
relations 

The new international objective aims to address EU impact 
in 3rd countries. The context of this is broader than 
economic; it is therefore addressed below under 
crosscutting impacts. 

Addressed 
elsewhere 

Addressed as part of an ‘Impact on 
3rd countries’ impact indicator 

Functioning of the internal market 
and competition 

Unlikely to have significant impacts on free movement or 
competitive markets. 

Excluded 

Energy independence 

Whilst the Strategy may improve energy infrastructure 
resilience, the independence aspect is more mitigation 
related. 

Excluded 

Deeper and fairer economic and 
monetary union 

Unlikely to have major impacts on economic and monetary 
union. 

Excluded 

116 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Impact indicator 

Relevance 

Decision 

Method 

Indicator 

Consumers and households  

Strategy hopes to indirectly influence citizens, but more 
socially/behaviourally than economically. Better addressed 
under social impacts (income distribution, social protection 
and inclusion). 

Addressed 
elsewhere 

Addressed as part of the income 
distribution, social protection and 
social inclusion impact indicator 

Property rights 

No significant impact on property rights 

Excluded 

Public authorities (and budgets) 

The Strategy will significantly impact on public spending 
on climate resilience, primarily through indirect routes. 

Included 

Qualitative assessment 

Impact on public authorities and 
budgets (-/+) 

Social impacts 

Employment 

Working conditions 

Income distribution, social 
protection and social inclusion (of 
particular groups) 

Impacts on the economy and in-turn on employment are a 
hugely significant driver for action and reducing damages 
and job losses can be an important indicator of increased 
resilience. 

Climate change will affect working conditions but the 
impact is not considered significant in the context of the 
other impacts. 

Distributional impacts of climate change can be significant, 
the Strategy is intended to address and mitigate 
inequalities, promote wellbeing, including through better 
informing citizens and encouraging action. Needs to 
address broader questions of equity (see other impacts) 
such as location, gender and also of fundamental rights. 

Included 

To be assessed quantitatively with 
modelling (GWS) and qualitatively. 

Employment (FTE) 

And (+/-) 

Excluded 

Included 

Qualitatively 

Distributional and equity impacts 
(+/-) 

Public health & safety and health 
systems  

Increased resilience of public health and safety systems is 
an important goal of the Strategy.  

Included 

Qualitatively 

Impact on public health and civil 
emergency systems (+/-) 

Job standards and quality 

Unlikely to be a significant impact  

Education and training, education 
and training systems  

Unlikely to be a significant impact  

Crime, terrorism and security 

Unlikely to be a significant impact  

Preserving the cultural heritage / 
multi-lingualism  

Whilst particular locations and buildings of cultural 
significance may be affected by climate change and the 
Strategy, this impact is not considered significant in the 
context of the other impacts nor the proportion of cultural 
heritage that would be affected.  

Excluded 

Excluded 

Excluded 

Excluded 

117 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Impact indicator 

Relevance 

Decision 

Method 

Indicator 

Governance and good 
administration 

Environmental impacts 

The climate  

No specific impacts on governance, the increased 
awareness of citizens may increase participation, but this 
impact is not considered significant in the context of the 
other impacts 

Excluded 

Critical impact targeted by the strategy. Increase of 
resilience to climate impacts, and preventing climate risks. 
In addition, potential synergies with mitigation may be 
worth considering. 

Included 

Qualitatively 

Impact on climate resilience (+/-) 

Efficient use of resources 
(renewable & non-renewable)  

Strategy will hope to impact on land-use, but rather from a 
quality than efficiency perspective.  

Excluded 

Quality of natural resources/fighting 
pollution (water, soil, air etc.)  

Strategy intends to address impacts of climate change on 
natural resources, e.g. forests, agriculture, marine 
environment.  

Biodiversity, including flora, fauna, 
ecosystems and the services they 
provide and landscapes  

Strategy intends to address impacts of climate change on 
biodiversity and ecosystems functions/services to improve 
resilience, and to make use of nature-based solutions.  

Included 

Qualitatively 

Include 

Qualitatively 

Reducing and managing waste 

Unlikely to be a significant impact  

Excluded 

Impact on natural resource 
resilience (+/-) 

Use of nature-based solutions and 
increased resilience of ecosystems 
(+/-) 

Minimising environmental risks  

Improving the resilience of infrastructure will reduce 
important environmental risks, but this impact can be 
addressed indirectly through the indicator on climate 
resilient investments. Not considered significant enough to 
evaluate separately in the context of the other impacts  

Protecting animal welfare  

Unlikely to be a significant impact 

International environmental 
impacts  

Cross cutting impacts 

Economic and social cohesion 
(specific regions and sectors) 

Strategy hopes to support improved climate resilience of 
3rd countries. But this impact to be assessed in aggregate as 
part of the Impact on 3rd countries and international 
relations indicator (see above) 

The distributional effects of climate change are important; 
the Strategy aims to address these impacts. To be 
addressed under the umbrella of the distributional and 

Addressed 
elsewhere 

118 

Addressed 
elsewhere 

Excluded 

Addressed 
elsewhere 

Addressed within other 
environmental indicators and the 
indicator on competitiveness, trade 
and climate resilient investments 

Addressed as part of the impact on 
third countries and international 
relations indicator 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Impact indicator 

Relevance 
equity impacts indicator. 

Decision 

Method 

Indicator 

Impacts in developing countries 

Sustainable development 

Fundamental rights (dignity, 
freedoms, equality, solidarity, 
citizens’ rights, justice) 

As highlighted above impacts in developing countries are 
important to EU economically (supply chains / markets) 
and socially (family ties, migration, security). Strategy 
hopes to support improved climate resilience of 3rd (not 
only developing) countries.  

Climate resilience is at the core of sustainable 
development. Do not propose to assess this impact 
separately, but would rather point to the overall assessment 
as an assessment of sustainable development. 

The fundamental rights effects of climate change are 
important; the Strategy aims to address these impacts. To 
be addressed under the umbrella of the distributional and 
equity impacts indicator. 

Included  

Qualitative assessment 

Impact on third countries and 
international relations (+/-) 

Excluded 

Addressed 
elsewhere 

Addressed as part of the income 
distribution, social protection and 
social inclusion impact indicator 

119 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex 6: Non-exhaustive list of measures to be developed under the new EU Adaptation Strategy 

As described in chapter 5, not all measures envisaged under this strategy have been assessed in this impact assessment. The table in this annex lists a 
more comprehensive, yet not exhaustive list of measures that are considered for the strategy. The measures in green have been subjected to the impact 
assessment treatment, providing an analysis of the impact of measures based on desk review and impact pathways targeted or expected up to 2050. 

Table 27: Non-exhaustive list of measures to be developed under the new EU Adaptation Strategy up to 2050 

ACTIONS 

MEASURES 

1. Closing further gaps in adaptation-
relevant knowledge, through systematic 
data collection and sharing, and working 
with key public and private partners.  

POLICY OPTION 1 

1.1: Ensure broad data collection, exploit new data sources and involve citizens in the collection of data 
(e.g. citizen science). Promote access to comparable and granular data related to adaptation and climate 
risks.  

1.2: Develop an research and innovation roadmap and progress the state of the art on adaptation 
modelling (including agent-based modelling) and risk assessment tools – “Towards asset-level 
modelling” 

1.3: Develop a spatially explicit assessment of future climate risks, and ecosystems vulnerabilities and 
shifts under different climate change scenarios. 

1.4: Research supporting wetland and floodplain restoration and nature-based solutions in drought and 
flood management  

1.5: Close the climate disaster loss and risk data gap through (1) facilitating the recording, 
collecting and sharing of loss data from public and private sources through standards (2) 
establishing a climate risk data governance framework and ensuring open access to data, (3) 
collecting data on direct economic losses, non-economic losses and slow-onset events, and aligning 

120 

 
 
 
existing programmes and data sources. 

1.6 Advancing the digital frontier in adaptation through the Digital Europe Programme and Destination 
Earth by support the development of federated local data ecosystems and AI-enabled urban data 
services in cities and, notably through Destination Earth and the deployment of Urban Digital Twins.  

1.7: Closing further knowledge gaps on climate change impacts through Horizon Europe and its 
Mission on Adaptation to Climate Change, including Societal Transformation. 

1.8: Research into solutions to mitigate and cope with water shortages, including improving 
desalination technologies 

1.9: Collect data on sustainable water uses disaggregated by sector 

1.10: Develop a comprehensive forest health and resilience module of the Forest Information System 
for Europe (ENV, EEA), providing interactive maps, downloadable data at country and regional level, 
and a regular EU forest damage report 

1.11: Ensure that climate monitoring programmes and assets are fully integrated in a legislation 
proposal for a more efficient and effective marine observation framework in the EU. 

1.12: Ensure that coastal adaptation needs, with local inputs, are well reflected in Member State reports 
on ocean observation plans. 

1.13: Ensure that all actors involved, e.g. competent authorities, developers of new observation 
technology, new observation protocols and standards and the private sector, cater for coastal adaptation 
needs, notably at local level. 

2. Further developing Climate-ADAPT as 
the ‘first-stop shop’ for adaptation 

2.1: Establish an EU Observatory for climate change and health. 

2.2: Create an EU-meta observatory on climate impacts, federating various knowledge pools. 

121 

 
 
information in Europe. 

2.3: Increase the usability of, facilitate access to, and leverage synergies from knowledge sources and 
repositories through updating and expanding the role of Climate-ADAPT as an adaptation monitoring 
and reporting mechanism. Use the power of networks and provide experts and practitioners with 
exchange platforms. Showcase and presenting the monitoring results to a broader audience and making 
the experience gained and lessons learned available to all kinds of stakeholders through reporting.  

3. Strengthening the evaluation, 
monitoring, reporting and 
implementation of adaptation strategies 

3.1: Focus monitoring and reporting systems around a common standard. Establishing an EU climate 
change resilience framework. Facilitating the monitoring of climate change impacts and adaptation 
efforts. 

3.2: Progress in implementing the EU Adaptation Strategy through the creation of a monitoring and 
evaluation framework, including for cities & align the adaptation monitoring and reporting 
mechanisms.  

3.3: Further upgrade Monitoring Reporting and Evaluation on adaptation at the EU and MS level as 
mandated by the European Climate Law (and reporting under the National Energy and Climate Plans 
and the Energy Union Governance Regulation). 

3.4: Use the EU macro-regional strategies cooperation frameworks and the Interreg funding 
programmes as needed and relevant to strengthen the implementation of climate change adaptation 
strategies through coordinated and joint actions across borders, between EU Members States and also 
between EU Member States and non-EU countries. 

3.5: Foster the exchange of best practices and solutions to address common climate adaptation 
challenges between the outermost regions and their neighbours, and between the outermost regions 
themselves. 

122 

 
 
 
 
4. Prioritising nature-based adaptation, 
including coastal protection and green 
and blue infrastructure. 

4.1: Building inter alia on relevant provisions under the CBD and on the new IUCN Global 
Standard for Nature-based Solutions, promote the deployment of robust and effective nature-
based solutions (NBS) for adaptation to climate change, notably by stepping up and scaling up 
their implementation and by further developing methods and tools. 

4.2: Further link insurance products and services to nature-based adaptation efforts.  

4.3: Provide legislative incentives to protect and restore ecosystems with important water cleaning and 
regulating functions, such as wetlands and floodplains. Promotion of Natural Water Retention. 
Measures, through legislation if appropriate 

4.4: Improve compliance with Water Framework Directive requirements for good ecological status on 
floods infrastructure. 

4.5: Update the Natura 2000 and climate change guidance 

5. Stepping-up efforts to build resilience 
in cities and empower local action. 

5.1: Strengthen the reporting and planning on adaptation in the Common Reporting Framework of the 
Covenant of Mayors by refining the Covenant Office work and strengthening awareness and co-
benefits of adaptation at city-level. 

5.2: Encourage more involvement of intermediate actors at regional level crucial for urban adaptation. 

5.3: Enable the Covenant of Mayors to focus more on identifying and targeting climate change 
adaptation in the sectors currently lagging behind in adopting actions, such as the water and health 
sectors. 

5.4: Launch a climate change adaptation Policy Support Facility / Technical Assistance project 
supporting local climate change adaptation action through the Covenant of Mayors.  

5.5: Develop a work placement programme for students with experience related to urban planning and 
resilience, to work in local authorities through the Erasmus+ programme 

123 

 
 
 
 
5.6: Support vulnerable groups and enterprises through education and reskilling initiatives for 
green jobs and new business models, including through the European Skills Agenda and 
European Social Fund Plus (ESIF+), with a particular focus on adaptation and resilience. 

5.7: Study just resilience aspects for access to housing in low risk areas. 

5.8: Promote local climate and energy action through the EU Covenant of Mayors, with an ambition for 
the initiative to cover 60% of the EU population by 2030 

5.9: Support and encourage regional and local public authorities and employer's organisations to work 
together with trade unions in mapping and assessing the negative impacts climate change may have on 
the regional economic environment and workers (health, working conditions, job losses, need for new 
qualifications); and to promote the adoption of long-term economic diversification strategies and 
policies that will allow for a requalification and relocation of workers in growth sectors. 

5.10: Make participation in the EU Covenant of Mayors a prerequisite for access to relevant EU 
financing programmes. 

5.11: Develop a professional training and exchange programme for agricultural and forest planners and 
practitioners 

5.12: Finance Fisheries Local Action Groups (FLAGs) from EMFF (possibly jointly with other Funds) 
with a focus on adaptation. 

5.13: Support for adaptation of low-carbon aquaculture farms via BlueInvest and the EMFF 

6.1: Actively mainstream adaptation considerations in all European Green Deal initiatives. 

6.2: Strengthen collaboration with all levels of governance in the mainstreaming of adaptation actions. 

124 

6. Further mainstreaming and integrating 
adaptation in EU legislation and 
instruments. 

 
 
6.3: Consider new legislative instruments that recognise and aim to protect workers from the adverse 
effects of climate change, including exposure to high temperatures 

6.4: Strengthen support for climate proof agriculture and forestry under the Common Agriculture 
Policy. 

6.5: Include an adaptation analysis in the 2022 report on the Common Fisheries Policy and provide 
joint guidance for climate resilience of Member States plans under the Marine Strategy Framework 
Directive and the Maritime Spatial Planning Directive. 

6.6: Include provisions on climate-proof decision making in the legislation on the production and 
marketing of seed and other propagating material 

7. Climate-proofing of Infrastructure and 
Disaster Risk Management. 

7.1: Enhance the climate proofing methodology to address the climate resilience of existing 
infrastructure, in particular for critical infrastructures and more broadly the built environment 
underpinning the functioning of the economy and society. 

7.2: Ensure climate-proofing guidelines are applied as widely as possible for the climate resilience 
of new infrastructures in Europe and abroad. 

7.3: Conduct a study on comprehensive climate risk management approaches and implications for 
adaptation and Disaster Risk Reduction planning and implementation. 

7.4: Establish an EU-wide climate risk assessment, including a comprehensive risk and vulnerability 
assessment of critical infrastructures and TEN-T and TEN-E corridors and networks hotspots. 

7.5. Expanding and developing further the work on making standards climate resilient, undertaken 
under the 2013 Adaptation Strategy on infrastructure standards, in collaboration with the European 
Standardisation Organisations (ESOs) 

7.6: Improve Member States’ preparedness for climate change impacts on floods through the Common 

125 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Implementation Strategy of the Water Framework Directive 

7.7: Enforce Floods Directive requirements for proper land use planning 

7.8: Better addressing storm water overflows and urban runoff under the Urban Waste Water Treatment 
Directive 

7.9: Introduce reinforced regulatory provisions for the prevention of water pollution through industrial 
and other (e.g. municipal landfills) accidents caused by flooding and droughts 

7.10: Making existing and future EU energy, transport and ICT infrastructure climate resilient from the 
point of view of water 

8. Closing the Climate Protection gap - 
microeconomic aspects of adaptation to 
climate change.  

8.1: Introduce a common method to upgrade existing policy instruments: update of the Better 
Regulation rules and its risk management toolbox to include climate-risk management “policy 
coherence principles” (i.e. ensure that regulation and funding take into account disaster risk before 
creating new exposure; reduce existing risk by building up resilience; manage residual financial risk) 

8.2: Funding instruments: mainstreaming of resilience, adaptation and climate risk management 
concerns in the design of calls and of project selection criteria and the identification of “EU 
interest” resilience upgrades required for interconnected critical infrastructure. 

8.3: EU policy settings influencing private finance. Focus on the importance of adaptation 
ambition in the revision of the Non-Financial Reporting Directive and of prudential rules. 

8.4: EU policy settings influencing insurance solutions. Assess climate-friendliness of insurance 
products development legislation, identify best practises in climate risk underwriting and encourage 
cross border provision of natural disaster insurance. 

8.5: EU policy settings influencing public finance. Explore “climate resilience” advisory services to 
contracting authorities and, the mainstreaming resilience in Green Public Procurement. Encourage MSs 
to report on how disaster aid does not disadvantage those who take insurance coverage/those who do 

126 

 
 
 
not and assess how State Aid to disasters could be modernised as part of the State Aid Review. 

8.6: EU regulatory settings with impact on land use/asset design. Integrate of climate change adaptation 
into the Strategic Environmental Assessment framework 

8.7: Open an “allies for climate resilience” dialogue gathering the EU (re)insurance industry, public 
authorities and other relevant stakeholders. 

8.8: Invest in climate risk literacy and improve disaster risk awareness. 

POLICY OPTION 2 (i.e. additional to measures listed for Option 1) 

9. Supporting partner countries and 
regions in their efforts on climate change 
adaptation and disaster risk management 

9.1: Support upgrade and implementation of NDCs and NAPs , by providing technical and 
financial assistance dedicated to: building capacity at national and sub-national level; assessing 
exposure and vulnerabilities; developing adaptation plans in line with national priorities and 
vulnerabilities; promoting climate-proof structural governance reforms; implementing 
monitoring and evaluation schemes to assess progress towards climate change resilience; 
enhancing coherence with national and local disaster risk reduction strategies and environmental 
sustainability strategies; promoting nature-based solutions and ecosystem-based approaches, 
especially in coastal areas. 

9.2: Enhance anticipatory and preventive actions throughout humanitarian and development 
cooperation programmes, including by promoting ecosystem conservation and restoration and a more 
systematic use of conflict sensitivity and climate risk analysis and triggers for action, including relevant 
territorial and investment planning tools. 

9.3: Reinforce support to local authorities, including by enhancing adaptation in urban areas (e.g. 
through the Global Covenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy), promoting sustainable and resilient 
urbanisation, supporting communities’ engagement in planning and implementation, and channelling of 

127 

 
 
 
 
 
financial resources to the local level. 

9.4: Work with leading institutions in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific to support regional 
climate change adaptation and disaster risk management approaches building on ongoing 
initiatives such as the Africa Adaptation Initiative, and develop regional adaptation plans and 
action. 

9.5: Launch a regional programme for climate change adaptation and exchanges in the Western 
Balkans, as well as with EU Southern Neighbourhood countries in line with the Union for the 
Mediterranean Ministerial Declaration on Environment and Climate Action, and enhance identification 
and implementation of climate resilience and adaptation measures in the Eastern Neighbourhood.  

9.6: Support data collection, analysis and policy-relevant use, on the climate change – security – 
migration interconnections by: promoting the use of space based applications, enhancing the role of 
climate change in the EU Conflict Early Warning System, and integrating climate change adaptation as 
an instrument towards conflict prevention and resolution with a focus on fragile countries and regions. 

9.7: Support climate change considerations in the works of the relevant Regional Fisheries 
Management Organisations and Agreements (RFMO/As) within their respective mandates. Continue to 
table proposals to establish marine protected areas (MPAs) in the Weddell Sea and East Antarctica, 
respectively, in the Southern Ocean at the Commission of the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living 
Resources.  

10. Scaling up international adaptation 
finance and climate disaster risk 
financing, unlocking innovative finance 
and mobilising the private sector 

10.1: Strive towards achieving a balance between international climate finance for mitigation and 
adaptation, in line with the Paris Agreement, of at least 50% of international climate finance from the 
EU budget for external action, on a grant basis, dedicated to climate change adaptation in the 2021-
2027 period. 

10.2: Promote the use of innovative financial instruments for climate risks reduction and increase 
countries’ financial resilience to climate related disasters, including by promoting disaster risk 
financing strategies, risk and forecast based financing for early intervention and joining global 
initiatives such as InsuResilience Global Partnership. 

128 

 
 
 
11. Strengthening EU engagement 
globally and learning from adaptation 
frontrunners. 

10.3: Use the External Investment Plan and the European Fund for Sustainable Development + 
amongst other innovative financial instruments to leverage private sector finance for climate 
change adaptation, in line with the EU Sustainable Finance Taxonomy, and promote the 
engagement of partner countries in the International Platform for Sustainable Finance. 

10.4: Develop guidelines, tools and capacity development actions to support partner countries in the 
design of policies and incentives towards climate change resilience investments, such as: approaches to 
mobilising domestic financial resources for climate change adaptation, facilitate access to international 
climate finance, climate stress testing public and private assets, conducting assessments of portfolios 
exposure to climate change risks. 

10.5: Enhance climate and sustainability proofing of all EU external investments, including 
grants, guarantees and blending instruments, by enhancing Environmental and Social 
Safeguards due diligence, monitoring and follow-up processes. 

11.1: Submit the EU’s Adaptation Plans and actions under the Paris Agreement, in the most appropriate 
form, and in line with the parity of the importance of adaptation with mitigation. 

11.2: In line with EU climate diplomacy efforts, deepen political engagement with international and 
regional partners and partner countries, in particular SIDS and LDCs, on climate change adaptation, 
including by joining and supporting global and regional initiatives on adaptation and resilience, and 
launching “EU adaptation Dialogues” in key countries, as high level political and business meeting 
aimed at increasing cooperation on climate change adaptation, achieving a better understanding of 
adaptation challenges in third countries, and promoting climate change adaptation action and 
international support. 

11.3: Support exchanges on climate change adaptation knowledge and tools, including by engaging in 
existing regional and global fora and in initiatives such as Adaptation Futures, and launching a 
programme of exchange between the EU and third countries on climate change adaptation, such as the 
EU-Africa Research and Innovation Partnership. 

11.4: Promote adaptation in Green Partnership and Green Alliances with proactive partner countries or 
regions. 

129 

 
 
 
11.5: Strengthen the production and delivery of, and access to, user-friendly and timely climate 
data and information (climate services), in particular through the promotion of space based 
application, the use of Copernicus Climate Change Services and Emergency Management 
Services in partner countries, thus building on the existing European investments in climate 
research, data, information and services. 

11.6: In line with EU climate diplomacy efforts, strengthen the role of trade agreements and aid for 
trade programmes in promoting environmental and climate action in partner countries. 

11.7: Adhesion to the International Coral Reef Initiative. 

11.8: Support the conclusion of an ambitious legally binding agreement on marine biological diversity 
of areas beyond national jurisdiction (BBNJ) by the end of 2020, in line with the International Ocean 
Governance agenda 

11.9: Broaden the All-Atlantic Ocean Research Alliance by including more Small Island Developing 
States of the Atlantic (including the Caribbean). 

11.10: Support climate change considerations in the works of the relevant Regional Fisheries 
Management Organisations and Agreements (RFMO/As) within their respective mandates. Continue to 
table proposals to establish marine protected areas (MPAs) in the Weddell Sea and East Antarctica, 
respectively, in the Southern Ocean at the Commission of the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living 
Resources.  

12. Adaptation Solutions / Horizon 
Europe Mission on adaptation to Climate 
Change, including Societal 
Transformation  

12.1: Implement the Horizon Europe Mission on Adaptation to Climate Change, including 
Societal Transformation with the objectives of preparing Europe, Accelerating the transition, 
and building deep resilience.  

12.2: Develop forestry and agriculture decision support tools, indicating e.g. trees and crop 
suitability, weather and climate forecasts and disturbance risks. 

12.3: Facilitate rapid decision-making and enriching toolbox for practitioners through (1) developing 
solutions for policy makers that allow a rapid analysis to support rapid policy response, (2) developing 
rapid decision-making tools for cities and citizens, and (3) developing solutions for the business and 

130 

 
 
 
 
financial sector that allow rapid responses. 

12.4: Horizon Europe mission on Adaptation to Climate to focus on implementing innovative sharing 
of water resources in specific regions and communities 

12.5: Use results of latest science in projects and studies (.e.g. Gentree, Invite, Liveseed, Sustree, 
Lifegenmon, GenResBridges) to further improve genetic diversity and the use of plant genetic 
resources for food and agriculture adaptation, including by implementing relevant parts of the European 
Genetic Resources Strategy. 

13. Closing the Climate Protection Gap - 
macroeconomic aspects of adaptation to 
climate change.  

13.1: For public finance/macro financial stability risk: Introduce a step-wise approach whereby 
the Commission engages a discussion on national disaster risk management frameworks with 
finance ministers’ fora, underpinned by EU level scenario analysis and stress testing. This would 
lay the ground for mainstreaming the issue climate change in the national fiscal processes.  

14. Ensuring the availability of Fresh 
water. 

13.2: For reducing the climate-related disaster insurance protection gap. Launch a mechanism to 
measure, monitor and promote natural disaster insurance penetration in the Member States, which 
would lead to country level diagnostic assessments and potentially to recommendations to Member 
States.  

13.3: Break down the climate risk management silos so that reporting requirements from MSs, data 
specifications and research needs are streamlined and multipurpose.  

14.1: Continue to use the Common Implementation Strategy to improve policy implementation 
for securing sustainable water use across sectors, through improvements to and intensification of 
among others: water resource allocation, water-permitting systems, cost recovery through water 
pricing incorporating externalities, or cost recovery rate calculations. 

14.2: Coordinate planning across relevant instruments for sustainable water use 

14.3: Improve compliance with existing water legislation with regard to water quantity. 

131 

 
 
 
 
14.4: Promoting the use of drought management plans more widely in the EU through the Common 
Implementation Strategy. 

14.3 Reduce exposure to contaminated or acutely polluted water due to climate impacts such as 
low flows, higher water temperature or flooding, and to ensure availability of adequate quantities 
of tap water. 

14.6: More ambitious requirements on water saving for products subject to eco-design, energy 
labelling, ecolabel and green public procurement. 

14.7: Address water saving and reuse in the revised Industrial Emissions Directive and its 
implementation. 

14.8: Reducing agriculture’s water footprint through promoting water reuse and other measures. 

14.9: Addressing water use by the energy sector. 

14.10: Introduce measures supporting zero water new sanitation systems in housing 
developments/buildings. 

14.11: Promote financing mechanisms to smoothen the transition to higher water prices through water-
saving technologies. 

14.12: Develop monitoring services by applying new technologies (such as smart sensors) in a 
coordinated way. 

132 

 
 
 
 
Annex 7: Mini–Assessments218 

ACTION  1:  Closing further  gaps  in  adaptation-relevant  knowledge, through  systematic  data  collection  and  sharing,  and working with  key 

public and private partners. 

MEASURE  1.5:  Close  the  climate  disaster  loss  and  risk  data  gap  through  (1)  facilitating  the  recording,  collecting  and  sharing  of  loss  data  from 
through standards (2) establishing a climate risk data governance framework and ensuring open access to data, (3) collecting data on direct 
economic losses, non-economic losses and slow-onset events, and aligning existing programmes and data sources. 

Baseline, context and rationale 

Climate-related  disaster  loss  and  climate  risk  data  are  important  not  only  for  crafting  and  implementing  NAPs  and  NASs,  but  also  for  disaster  risk 
reduction,  risk  modelling,  loss  accounting,  economic  and  social  policy,  EU  Solidarity  funding,  local  authority  planning,  and  the  provision  of  green 
investments.  Despite  the  usefulness  of  these  types  of  data,  they  are  not  widely  available  to  public  authorities,  research  institutions,  and  other 
stakeholders. The data that is available is often incongruous, lacking the granularity and standardisation required to draw comparisons across regions 
and Member States, or incomplete, with certain perils missing coverage for the amount of people affected (insured and uninsured), the economic losses 
(indirect and direct), and the affected areas.  

Interviews: In response to Question 2 of the stakeholder interviews (i.e. “What are the main barriers to the EU in the process of adjusting to the adverse 
effects of climate change?”), several interviewed experts pointed to “Insufficient level of public awareness” (explaining the misperception of increased 
frequency  and intensity  of weather  events  as normal rather than  a result  of climate  change) and  “Lack of  a single, standardised data collection and 
recording system for disaster losses.”. Another interview group discussed the difficulties with standardisation practices across the EU. In response to 
question 6A, additional Strategy actions, one expert discussed at length the issue of loss data, “(Actions 1, 4, 5) .1) Information on losses as a public 

218 The mini-assessments provide an analysis of the impact of selected measures based on desk review and impact pathways - the tables below highlight the main impact pathways targeted or expected up to 2050. It is primarily 
an information tool  which  addresses  weaknesses  in understanding  risks,  vulnerabilities, and possible  solutions.  In  doing  so,  it  improves  decision  making by  actors  across  sectors.  We  make  a distinction  between  direct and 
indirect impacts: Direct impacts – are impacts that directly occur from the implementation of a measure, i.e. water resource allocations are spread more equally across sectors; and Indirect impacts – are impacts that may occur 
because of the measure, as other stakeholders respond to it, i.e. ecosystems are improved through incorporating externalities in water prices. 

133 

 
 
                                                 
good. 2) EEA and EIOPA should be empowered and resourced to be able to monitor and map risks. 3) Transparent reporting mechanisms for climate 
risks and climate-related disaster losses. 4) Developing EU metrics to evaluate the impacts of adaptation efforts.” 

OPC: Over half of respondents to the OPC responded that it was very important to support a more open access to climate loss and disaster risk data 
from private and public sectors (51%) (75% with very important and fairly important combined).  

Description of measure 

The new Adaptation Strategy aims to become a catalyst to promote consistent and comparable loss data recording, storage, and sharing among Member 
States. Measures taken in this regard recognise that a governance solution is necessary to promote and ensure the (voluntary) provision of this data and 
create open repositories for academia, public authorities, and industry partners to utilise loss data more effectively. In addition, it is important that risk 
models based on such data are transparent in both their underlying data and methodologies.  

Objectives and actions 

Close the climate-related disaster loss and risk data gaps through the following activities:  

(a) Collection of data on direct economic losses, non-economic losses and slow-onset events aligned with existing programmes and databases 

(b) Facilitation of the recording, collection and sharing of loss data according to standard methodologies through the creation of a climate (and disaster) 
loss data mandate: in that context the European Commission should develop harmonised loss recording data standards with and for public and private 
actors. 

(c) Establishment of a climate risk data governance framework, with a consistent taxonomy, and ensured open access to data with the possibility for the 
European Commission to mandate the recording, collection and sharing of standardised climate-related disaster loss data streams  

d) Improved observation of changes in the environment on which the loss data are based that are partly or wholly caused by climate change including a 
new legislative initiative on ocean observation.  

Impact pathways 

In the table below impacts are assessed using a scale from (--/-/0/+/++) negative to positive. Impacts are assessed up to 2050 relative to the baseline. It 
assumes the full uptake of the measure as the increasing severity of physical climate risks is more widely recognized, and consequently the relevance 
of sharing data.   

134 

 
 
Table 28: Mini-assessment on Closing further gaps in adaptation-relevant knowledge 

Relevance 

Indicator 

Baseline  

impact pathway 

Envisaged impact 2050 (relative to baseline) 

Impact 
indicator 

Economic 
impacts 

Macroeconomic 
environment  

Impacts  on  the  economy  are  a  hugely 
significant  driver  for  action  and  reducing 
damages  can  be  an  important  indicator  of 
increased resilience. 

Economic 
welfare 
(losses) (-
/+) 

Economic damages  and  losses  impacts 
of  hazards  associated  with  a  changing 
climate  are  not  well  known,  and  risk 
models  are  not  able  to  adequately 
forecast  damages.  Risk 
reduction 
strategies do not see full potential, and 
European 
built 
environments,  and  communities  face 
significant annual losses. 

infrastructure, 

Direct impact 

More accurate, robust, granular and comparable data leads to better-informed 
decision  making.  Areas  facing  high  risk  are  able  to  develop  more  effective 
risk  reduction  and  adaptation  strategies,  reducing  their  vulnerability  to 
damages. The insurance and re-insurance industries are able to better predict 
insurance  premiums  and  offer  products  suitable  to  regions,  and  collaborate 
with local authorities where risk cannot/should not be mitigated by insurance 
alone.  
Assessment: (+) 

Competitiveness
, 
and 
trade 
investment 
flows 

Vulnerability  of  supply  chains  to  impacts 
can  be  relevant  and  The  Strategy  will 
significantly 
of 
influence 
investments being made.  

types 

the 

Impact  on 
competitiv
eness, 
trade  and 
(climate 
resilient) 
investment
s (+/-) 

Supply  chains  and 
industries  face 
unmitigated  risks  to  perils  and  hazard 
further  exasperated  by  a  changing 
climate.  There  will  continue  to  be 
direct 
physical 
infrastructure,  and  indirect  losses  due 
to  shutdowns  and  reduced  operations 
during the recovery of events.  

damages 

to 

Regulatory 
burden 
business 

on 

Requirements  for  open  access  to  data  and 
introduction  of  new  standard  frameworks 
can lead to additional costs for firms. 

Regulatory 
burden  on 
business 
(+/-) 

and 

insurance 

Financial 
sector 
businesses  have  some  data  sharing 
requirements,  but 
established 
processes should not lead to additional 
costs in the baseline scenario. 

as 

135 

Indirect impact 

Harmonised  climate-related  disaster  loss  data  will  lead  to  risk  that  is  more 
effective  reduction  measures  and  bolster  adaptation  to  climate  change. 
Industries are able to better understand, predict, prevent and prepare for their 
risk thanks to more accurate risk models.  

Sustainable investment decisions require data, and where disclosure and data 
exist,  there  tends  to  be  insight  that  leads  to  record  investment.  For  a 
significant  contribution  to  the  adaptation  objective  in  the  taxonomy  on 
Sustainable  Finance,  a  risk  analysis  should  be  made  where  this  type  of 
collected loss data is one of the key elements. 

Loss  data  availability  would  not  only  allow  models  to  be  more  precise,  but 
also provide investors with quantitative information on climate-related losses 
related to a particular asset. Due to the role of the taxonomy, the impact can 
be higher than the one of innovation and research. 
Assessment: (++) 

Direct impact 

Requiring greater provision of data and defining the format and granularity of 
this data would impose additional costs on firms that hold and would need to 
provide  this  data.  Affected  firms  will  be  mostly  large  firms  concentrated  in 
the financial sector. 

Assessment: (-) 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Increased 
innovation  and 
research 

The  Strategy  will  guide  research  under 
Horizon  Europe  and  aims  to  encourage 
greater adoption of innovation. 

Impact  on 
adaptation 
innovation 
adoption 
(+/-) 

Climate-related  loss  data  that  is  not 
comparable 
is  not  useful  multiple 
applications, and hampers both closing 
the knowledge gap on climate impacts, 
and 
risk 
models. 

into  predictive 

research 

Direct Impact 

Public  authorities 
(and budgets) 

The  Strategy  will  significantly  impact  on 
public  spending  on  climate  resilience, 
primarily through indirect routes. 

Public 
spending 
on 
adaptation 
(€) 

Public  authorities  lack  the  key  metrics 
to  make 
informed  decisions  on 
adaptation measures and risk reduction 
strategies. The current and future costs 
in terms of economic damages and loss 
due  to  climate  change  are  not  well 
understood or known, and thus it is not 
known how much needs to be budgeted 
to address these risks.  

Direct Impact 

This  measure  would  provide  data  that  is  more  precise  (clear  taxonomy  and 
definitions)  comprehensive  (total  losses  including  both  insured  and  public 
losses, for every disaster type, and every sector), comparable (every event is 
unambiguously  defined  across  databases  and  data  can  be  aggregated  or 
compared) and transparent (metadata and uncertainty assessment). Such data 
would  benefit  decision-making  and  research  reliant  on  historical  climate-
related  disaster  loss  data,  such  as  determining  vulnerability,  establishing 
baselines,  building  models  to  predict  future  risk,  and  drawing  comparisons 
between regions and Member States.  
Assessment: (++) 

The facilitation of harmonised climate-related disaster loss data will ease the 
reporting burden for Member States and contribute to collecting data once and 
having it serve multiple initiatives. High-quality climate-related disaster loss 
data are used as crucial evidence for disaster forensic, which seeks to identify 
loss drivers to improve DRR measures. Disaster forensic is particularly useful 
to municipalities and other public authorities, who require high levels of detail 
to  plan  risk  reduction  actions, model  risk  (both  current  and  ex  ante  risk and 
loss models), and develop contingency plans. Thus with the better provision 
of this data, public authorities are able to mobilise effort to reduce risk, budget 
for future costs, and more easily apply for Solidarity funding if needed. 
Assessment: (+) 

Social impacts 

Employment 

Impacts  on  the  economy  and  in-turn  on 
employment  are  a  hugely  significant  driver 
for  action  and  reducing  damages  and  job 
losses  can  be  an  important  indicator  of 
increased resilience. 

Employme
nt (FTE)  

Businesses,  especially  SMEs,  suffer 
during  catastrophic  events.  Operations 
can  be  halted,  assets  destroyed,  and 
the 
business  can  slow  down 
aftermath  of  events.  The 
recent 
COVID-19 crisis has demonstrated the 
adverse  effect  hazards  and  perils  can 
have on employment and the economy 
in general. 

in 

Indirect Impact 

Livelihoods,  business  operations  and  thus  employment  can  be  adversely 
affected by climate impacts. Establishing vulnerability through the provision 
of  granular,  comparable,  decision-useful  climate-related  disaster  loss  data 
leads  to  measures  to  reduce  these  adverse  effects,  establish those  in  need  of 
solidarity funding, and shorten the amount of time needed for recovery after 
an event.  
Assessment: (+) 

Income 
distribution, 
social  protection 
social 
and 
(of 
inclusion 

Distributional impacts of climate change can 
be  significant,  the  Strategy  is  intended  to 
address  and  mitigate  inequalities,  including 
informing  citizens  and 
through  better 
to  address 
encouraging  action.  Needs 

Distributio
nal 
and 
equity 
impacts 
(+/-) 

Those  most  vulnerable  to  the  impacts 
of  national  catastrophes  and  perils  are 
those  on  the  lower  end  of  the  socio-
economic  spectrum.  The  exposure  of 
this group to climate change risks is not 

Indirect impact 

More  informed  decisions  could  be  taken  to  provide  support  to  vulnerable 
groups.  More  assessable  climate-related  disaster  loss  data  allows  for  public 
authorities to measure the losses not typically captured (due to low insurance 
penetration) for vulnerable groups and regions. Furthermore, this assists with 
Solidarity  Fund  applications,  ensuring  that  losses  of  vulnerable  groups  are 

136 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
particular 
groups) 

broader  questions  of  equity  (see  other 
impacts)  such  as  location,  economic  and 
social  cohesion,  gender  and  of  fundamental 
rights. 

fully understood. 

Public  health  & 
safety and health 
systems  

Increased  resilience  of  public  health  and 
safety  systems  is  an  important  goal  of  the 
Strategy. 

Impact  on 
public 
health  and 
civil 
emergency 
systems 
(+/-) 

increase  for 

Losses  will 
the  next 
decades without adaptation investments 
unleashed  at  scale219.  Public  support 
systems will be burdened and there will 
be loss of life and livelihood that could 
have been mitigated. 

Direct impact 

captured, and the appropriate level of support is provided.  
Assessment: (+) 

Better-informed  decisions  making  because  of  this  measure  will  lead  to 
increased resilience of public health and safety systems. This is due to being 
able  to  accurately  determine  the  impacts  of  a  given  event  and  share  this 
information  with  local  authorities  so  they  are  better  able  to  tailor  their 
response and budget for emergencies. Better climate-related disaster loss data 
also enables citizens to increase their understanding of the impacts of climate 
change  on  their  community,  and  take  steps  and  make  plans  to  increase  the 
resilience of their household to relevant perils.  
Assessment: (+) 

Environmental 
impacts 

The climate  

Critical  impact  targeted  by  the  strategy. 
Increase of resilience to climate impacts and 
preventing  climate 
In  addition, 
potential  synergies  with  mitigation  may  be 
worth considering. 

risks. 

of 

Quality 
natural 
resources/fightin
g 
pollution 
(water,  soil,  air 
etc.)  

intends 

to  address 

Strategy 
impacts  of 
climate  change  on  natural  resources,  e.g. 
forests, agriculture, marine environment.  

Impact  on 
climate 
resilience 
(+/-) 

(possible) 
Synergy 
with 
climate 
mitigation 
(+/-) 

Impact  on 
natural 
resource 
resilience 
(+/-) 

219 Climate Protection Gap Scoping Report of Working Group 3- Data aspects 

impacts  will  continue 

to 
Climate 
threaten  all  parts  of  society,  and 
strategies  will  not  be  as  effective  in 
reducing  these  impacts  due  to  large 
knowledge gaps around who is/will  be 
impacted, to what extent, and what can 
be done. 

Direct Impact 

Leverage  the  power  of  data  for  increased  resilience  of  society  to  climate-
related  risks  going  forward.  Importantly,  it  also  allows  broadening  the 
resilience  approach  beyond  climate-related  risk  information  to  other  risk 
information such as those from geological, biosafety or environmental risks. 

Assessment: (+) 

Minimal Impact 

137 

 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Biodiversity, 
including  flora, 
fauna, 
ecosystems  and 
the services they 
provide 
and 
landscapes  

intends 

to  address 

Strategy 
impacts  of 
climate change on biodiversity, and to make 
use of Ecosystem-based solutions.  

Cross cutting impacts 

in 

Impacts 
developing 
countries 

As highlighted above impacts in developing 
countries  are  important  to  EU  economically 
/  markets)  and  socially 
(supply  chains 
(family  ties,  migration,  security).  Strategy 
aims  to  support  improved  climate  resilience 
of 3rd (not only developing) countries.  

Some key reports in the field 

Use 
of 
ecosystem-
based 
solutions 
and 
increased 
resilience 
of 
ecosystems 
(+/-) 

Impact  on 
third 
countries 
and 
internation
al  relations 
(+/-) 

Minimal Impact 

EU Focused 

  Corbane, C., De Groeve, T., Ehrlich, D., & Poljansek, K. (2015). A European framework for recording and sharing disaster damage and loss data. 
International  Archives  of  the  Photogrammetry,  Remote  Sensing  and  Spatial  Information  Sciences  -  ISPRS  Archives,  40(3W3),  277–283. 
https://doi.org/10.5194/isprsarchives-XL-3-W3-277-2015 

  De Groeve, T., Poljansek, K., Ehrlich, D., & Corbane, C. (2014). Current status and best practices for disaster loss data recording in EU Member 

States. https://doi.org/10.2788/18330 

  European Environment Agency. (2017). Climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction in Europe. Enhancing coherence of the knowledge 

base, policies and practices. In EEA Report (Issue 15). https://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/climate-change-adaptation-and-disaster 

  European Environment Agency. (2019). Economic losses from climate-related extremes in Europe. https://www.eea.europa.eu/ds_resolveuid/IND-

182-en  

  Faiella, A., Antofie, T., Luoni, S., Ríos Díaz, F., & Marin Ferrer, M. (2020). The Risk Data Hub loss datasets. https://doi.org/10.2760/488300 

138 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Joint  Research  Centre.  (2015).  Guidance  for  Recording  and  Sharing  Disaster  Damage  and  Loss  Data.  JRC  Science  and  Policy  Reports,  28. 

https://doi.org/10.2788/186107 

 

Integrated Research on Disaster Risk. (2014). Perils Classification and Hazards Glossary (IRDR DATA Publication No. 1). 

  Marín  Ferrer,  M.,  Do  Ó,  A.,  Poljanšek,  K.,  &  Vallés,  A.  C.  (2018).  Disaster  damage  and  loss  data  for  policy:  Pre-  and  post-event  damage 

assessment and collection of data for evidence-based policies. https://doi.org/10.2760/840421 

  Marín  Ferrer,  M.,  Antofie,  T.,  Eklund,  G.,  &  Luoni,  S.  (2019).  THE  DISASTER  RISK  MANAGEMENT  KNOWLEDGE  CENTRE  –  RISK 

DATA HUB: Vision Paper & Roadmap. https://drmkc.jrc.ec.europa.eu/doc/18150 

  Ríos Díaz, F., & Marín Ferrer, M. (2017). Loss database architecture for disaster risk management. https://doi.org/10.2760/647488 

  Schneiderbauer,  S.,  Calliari,  E.,  Eidsvig,  U.,  &  Hagenlocher,  M.  (2017).  The  most  recent  view  of  vulnerability.  Science  for  Disaster  Risk 

Management 2017: Knowing Better and Loosing Less, 68–82. https://doi.org/10.2788/688605 

  UNDRR (2015). Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction (GAR). 

  UNDRR  (2017).  Technical  Guidance  for  Monitoring  and  Reporting  on  Progress  in  Achieving  the  Global  Targets  of  the  Sendai  Framework  for 

Disaster Risk Reduction, https://www.unisdr.org/files/54970_techguidancefdigitalhr.pdf 

  Whitaker,  D.,  Genillard,  C.  (2020).  H2020  Oasis  project  and  its  implications  for  the  future  of  EU  policy  to  promote  climate  adaptation  and 

understanding of risk for all. 

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ACTION 2: Further developing Climate-ADAPT as the ‘first-stop shop’ for adaptation information in Europe. 

MEASURE 2.1: Establish an EU Observatory for climate change and health  

Baseline, context and rationale 

Climate  change  is  already  affecting  health  of  human  beings,  animals  and  plants,  and  this  will  get  worse  over  time,  scaling  with  climate  impacts 
(heatwaves,  forest  fires,  floods,  landslides,  food  and  water  safety,  pests  and  diseases,  and  more).  Specific  vulnerable  groups  exist,  especially  low 
income, children, elderly, and those with existing medical conditions. Climate will also affect public (and private) health systems and their ability to 
function  effectively.  Equally,  for  plant  health  and  the  environment  where  effects  of  climate  change  will  challenge  the  resilience  of  phytosanitary 
services and agri-food systems to cope effectively with new emerging pests and diseases. 

Public health competence is national, so the main channel for EU action is not direct; it needs to act indirectly through supporting / promoting action by 
Member States.  The virtual  observatory intends to build on and connect  existing initiatives in  the areas of climate, health and environment  under  a 
single  platform  to  bring  knowledge  together  to  help  bridge  the  gaps  and  deficiencies.  Improving  knowledge  to  fill  gaps  and  better  connecting  the 
knowledge that is available, but dispersed across organisations and places, can improve insights and (Member States and others) responses, increasing 
resilience.  

A global report/tool does already exist – The Lancet Countdown on Health and Climate Change220 - launched in 2015, and publishing annually, with a 
report  and  data  explorer  dashboard.  This  tracks  41  indicators  relevant  for  climate  change  and  health  across  5  domains:  climate  change  impacts, 
exposures, and vulnerability; adaptation planning and resilience for health; mitigation actions and their health co-benefits; economics and finance; and 
public and political engagement.  In terms of preparedness it identifies (not EU specific) around half of countries have a national health and climate 
plan,  but  comprehensiveness,  scope,  update  status,  and  implementation  remain  major  challenges,  as  does  financing.  It  notes  climate  information 
services are not usually informing policy (only 4 of 47 WHO members). According to indicator 2.2 of the Lancet Countdown, 22 European countries 
provide some climate information services for health. Spending on health and adaptation is increasing (see Fig 11 of the 2019 report), is around €3-€4 
per capita annually in Europe. It is somewhat cumbersome to filter for EU only data and some indicators are not as relevant as for developing countries 
– therefore there can be some value in an EU-focused dashboard. Lancet Countdown would be a partner in the development of the Observatory to bring 
lessons across and potentially an EU-focused pilot in early 2021. 

220 https://www.lancetcountdown.org/ 

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Various EU tools exist which provide part of the data needs, and could be target for connection and integration in the Observatory, e.g. C3S European 
Health Service, many of these have already been identified as part of a concept paper for the Health Observatory. 

Many  stakeholders  identified  health  as  an  important  sector  and  theme  for  adaptation,  and  noted  the  potential  synergies/opportunity  presented  by 
COVID19  to  increase  resilience  in  this  area.  The  impacts  on  vulnerable  groups,  and  in  particular  the  possibility  to  identify  and  cater  for  specific 
vulnerabilities and distributional effects of climate change impacts, were identified as a specific potential benefit. 

OPC: The public responses were positive on the importance of health and climate change, yet less so than the experts. This could point to a possible 
lack of awareness. Response to Q10 suggested health was important, e.g. further action agreed by around 80% of respondents, which is a little less than 
Water, Agriculture, Energy, Transport, Water and Ecosystems. Q12 importance of impact, improved health, social cohesion and resilience was noted 
as  very  important  by  around  60%  of  respondents,  ranking  4th  of  11  impacts,  behind  Healthier  ecosystems,  enabling  climate-informed  decisions  by 
citizens and preventing climate risks. 

Description of measure 

A virtual observatory with strong contribution from other EU Agencies such as ECDC and EFSA, and hosted by EEA on Climate-ADAPT, aiming to 
pool relevant work, knowledge and expertise especially from across the Commission, but also from other technical experts (WHO, EFSA, ECDC, C3S, 
UN agencies such as FAO/IPCC, Lancet) in a multi-disciplinary platform based on the ‘One Health’ approach – addressing not only human health, but 
also  animal  and  plant  health.  Aims  are  (1)  to  monitor,  analyse,  assess,  anticipate,  prevent,  address  and  communicate  effects  of  climate  change  on 
human health; (2) Improve knowledge base for better-informed decision-making; and (3) raise awareness of the health benefits of climate adaptation 
policies in the relevant fields. Based on the experiences of the Climate-ADAPT evaluation, the coordination function across sectors and across Europe 
as  well  as  across  all  governance  levels  is  an  important  benefit  of  Climate-ADAPT  -  since  the  Health  observatory  would  be  embedded  in  Climate-
ADAPT, it would also benefit from the added value of a multi-governance approach. Expected primary users are EU and Member State institutions.  

Objectives and actions: 

  Gathering evidence on climate change and health – by expanding information, developing new methods and tools, gathering good practices – 

specific actions include: produce an annual report, preparation of GIS and data mapping 

  Enhance climate change preparedness in health systems across Member States and policy – by conducting situation analyses, improving early 

warning and rapid response capacities with relevant information, analysing the political, socio-economic and financial dimensions, assessing cost-
efficiency of measures, integrating existing monitoring and early warning systems keeping into account the One Health approach when relevant– 

141 

 
 
specific actions include: updating guidance on heat and health, country factsheets on policies, links to warning systems, handbook on vulnerability 
and impacts, integration with health reporting and other relevant sources of information. 

  Build, manage and scale up the observatory portal – by adjusting and further developing the content and functionalities of Climate-ADAPT – 
specific actions include: integrating an explorer into the portal, develop the structure and web-pages, combine GIS info and statistics, regular 
maintenance and further development of databases, development of case studies and adaptation options (and interlink them), and develop and 
decision-making tools. 

  Connect knowledge providers with target groups – by making target groups aware of the launch of the observatory, creating perception of trust in it 
as source, securing return visits to site and contributions / subscriptions – specific actions include: adjusting Climate-ADAPT newsletter, climate 
code for citizens, factsheet for general public on heatwaves and health, highlighting observatory, presenting observatory at relevant working 
groups. 

Cost 

The observatory would start with a pilot in early 2021 based on partner contributions; further decision leading to the full-fledged observatory will be 
taken in 2021 following a review. 

Impact pathways 

The table below notes the main impact pathways targeted or expected up to 2050 for the observatory, which is primarily as an information tool which 
aims to  address  weaknesses in  understanding and knowledge of vulnerabilities,  risks and solutions and in  doing so lead to better informed decision 
making by actors across the EU health systems. It is assumed that the demand for health information will further increase, as the severance of physical 
climate risks increases, and consequently the relevance of sharing data. This is also hoped to (indirectly) spur action by Member States, sectors and 
within the EC, in doing so it can help to increase resilience and reduce impacts for vulnerable groups.  

In the table below impacts are assessed using a scale from (--/-/0/+/++) negative to positive. Impacts are assessed relative to the baseline. 

142 

 
 
 
Table 29: Mini-Assessment of Health Observatory 

Impact indicator 

Relevance 

Indicator 

Baseline (health and climate) 

Health  Observatory  impact 
pathway 

Envisaged impact 2050 (relative to baseline) 

Economic impacts 

Macroeconomic 
environment  

Impacts  on  the  economy  are  a 
hugely significant driver for action 
and  reducing  damages  can  be  an 
important  indicator  of  increased 
resilience. 

Economic 
welfare 
(-/+) 

(losses) 

losses 

baseline: 

Modelled 
to 
productivity  /  from  absences  due  to 
health 
Scaling  with 
conditions. 
temperature increase scenario. 

Indirect  impact  –  economic 
reduced 
benefits 
of 
productivity  and 
sickness 
losses  from  Member  States 
action 
by 
Observatory. 

prompted 

Included  in  modelling  results  for  Option 1  in  chapter  6.  This 
measure will improve data on health importance and impacts, 
and  is  expected  that  this  will  stimulate  (some)  additional 
spending  and  planning  by  Member  States.  It  will  lower  the 
productivity  decreases  from  heat  waves  and  heat  stress. 
Additional  investment  is  assumed  by  the  health  sector. 
Through  this,  the  observatory  is  likely  to  exert  some  small 
influence on the economy indirectly. 

Assessment: Quantitative results included in Option 1 results 
in chapter 6, qualitative assessment (0/+) 

Competitiveness, 
trade and investment 
flows 

Vulnerability  of  supply  chains  to 
impacts  can  be  relevant  and  The 
Strategy 
significantly 
influence  the  types  of  investments 
being made.  

will 

Impact 
on 
competitiveness, 
trade 
and 
(climate 
resilient) 
investments (+/-) 

Minimal impact  

Minimal impact 

Regulatory  burden 
on business 

Measure  unlikely  to  significantly 
impact on firms. 

Regulatory 
burden 
business (+/-) 

on 

Minimal impact. 

Minimal impact 

Increased innovation 
and research 

The  Strategy  will  guide  research 
under Horizon Europe, and aims to 
encourage  greater  adoption  of 
innovation. 

Impact 
adaptation 
innovation 
adoption (+/-) 

on 

Minimal impact 

authorities 

Public 
(and budgets) 

The  Strategy  will  significantly 
impact  on  public  spending  on 

Public  spending 
on adaptation (€) 

Current  situation:  lack  of  awareness, 
information  and  spending  on  climate 

Direct impact 

Increased  availability  and 
accessibility  of  health  and 
climate  change  data  will 
facilitate  and  spur  additional 
research and innovation. 

Indirect impact 

Hope is that observatory will 

Small positive impact on innovation and research assessed. 

Assessment: (+) 

Health  is  becoming  an  increasing  priority  on  the  basis  of 
COVID.  Expectation  is  that  health  resilience  budgets  will 

143 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
climate 
through indirect routes. 

resilience, 

primarily 

and health – unlikely to scale much with 
temperature scenarios. 

Knowledge is dispersed, not consistently 
reaching  decision  makers  –  information 
tools not influencing spending. 

Indicator  2.4  of  Lancet  Countdown  and 
WHO  survey  can  help  provide  baseline 
e.g. €3-€4/per person spent on this issue. 

COVID19  will  likely  result  in  baseline 
in 
scenario  of  significant 
investments  in  public  health  systems 
preparedness in coming years – will not 
necessarily address climate risks. 

increase 

spur  additional  spending  by 
public  authorities  on  health 
and climate resilience. 

significantly increase in baseline in any case. Question of how 
much consideration climate may receive in any case (baseline) 
and how much influence the EU Observatory may have.  

Evidence  from  WHO  survey  shows  that  health  and  climate 
information tools do not tend to influence policy and spending. 
The  planned  actions  under  the  observatory  do  include 
consideration of these aspects and plans to connect to decision 
makers. It could therefore be expected for the measure to exert 
a  (minor)  influence  in  increasing  public  spending  on  climate 
change and health, ensuring that it finds a place in the review 
and improvement of health systems in the COVID aftermath. 

Assessment: not monetised, but positive (+), may increase in 
high temperature (3°C / 4.5°C) scenarios (+/++) 

Social impacts 

Employment 

Income  distribution, 
social protection and 
social  inclusion  (of 
particular groups) 

Impacts  on  the  economy  and  in-
turn  on  employment  are  a  hugely 
significant  driver  for  action  and 
reducing  damages  and  job  losses 
can  be  an  important  indicator  of 
increased resilience. 

Distributional  impacts  of  climate 
change  can  be  significant,  the 
Strategy is intended to address and 
including 
inequalities, 
mitigate 
through  better  informing  citizens 
and  encouraging  action.  Needs  to 
address  broader  questions  of 
equity  (see  other  impacts)  such  as 
location,  economic  and  social 
cohesion, 
of 
gender 
fundamental rights. 

and 

Employment 
(FTE)  

Minimal impact 

Minimal impact 

Distributional 
and 
impacts (+/-) 

equity 

Current  situation:  health 
inequalities 
across  EU,  different  vulnerabilities. 
increase  with 
/ 
Likely 
temperature scenarios.  

to  change 

COVID is exacerbating inequalities, and 
will  leave  legacy  of  vulnerable  people, 
but  also  tried  and tested  mechanisms  to 
shield these. 

Indirect impact 

Vulnerable  groups’  situation 
will  be  highlighted,  and  will 
benefit 
from  any  action 
spurred by Observatory. 

Observatory will draw attention to variety of vulnerabilities by 
location, age, income, gender and other aspects. Likely to also 
show how these increase with temperature scenario. 

Will  improve  information  and  add  weight  to  cases  within 
Member  States  to  target  their  planning  and  actions.  Some 
Member  States  will  already  have  plans  and  better  national 
understanding,  some  may  not  use  the  tools.  Expect  some 
(minor) influence on Member States action. 

Will  improve  information  available  to  citizens,  providing  a 
resource  they  can  use, although  they  are  not  a  specific target 
group of the Observatory. 

Assessment:  Positive  impact  (+),  likely  increasing  in  high 
temperature  (3°C  /  4.5°C)  scenarios  (++)  as  it  details 
increasing vulnerabilities. 

144 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Public 
health  & 
safety  and  health 
systems  

Increased 
resilience  of  public 
health  and  safety  systems  is  an 
important goal of the Strategy. 

Impact  on  public 
health  and  civil 
emergency 
systems (+/-) 

Environmental 
impacts 

The climate  

Critical  impact  targeted  by  the 
strategy.  Increase  of  resilience  to 
climate  impacts  and  preventing 
climate risks. In addition, potential 
synergies  with  mitigation  may  be 
worth considering. 

Impact 
on 
climate resilience 
(+/-) 

(possible) 
Synergy 
climate 
mitigation (+/-) 

with 

situation:  weaknesses 

Current 
in 
systems  exist  –  see  WHO  survey,  only 
half of countries have plan, and of these, 
many not well implemented or financed. 
May  result  in  unnecessary  loss  of  life  / 
impacts 
ill  health  due 
(extreme  events  &  slow  onset).  Will 
scale 
temperature 
scenario. 

(increase)  with 

to  climate 

Knowledge is dispersed, not consistently 
reaching decision makers. 

Current  situation:  no  specific  measures 
in  place  to  address  health  and  climate 
issues (although various local heat wave 
warning systems in place). 

deficiency  will 

scale 
Resilience 
(increase)  with  temperature  –  will  be 
reflected  especially  in  the  public  health 
indicator. 

COVID will result in increased focus on 
health  system  resilience;  will  likely 
factor 
in  climate  considerations  for 
spread  of  disease,  but  not  other 
considerations. 

Targeted direct impact. 

Measure  intends  to  lead  to 
decision 
better-informed 
making  by  Member  States 
institutions  responsible  for 
health. 

Observatory  will  bring  together  key  data  from  EU  level  and 
expert technical partners, and connect this to target groups in 
health  systems  and  institutions.  This  should  help  to  bridge 
knowledge  gaps,  identify  and  target  further  needs,  and  result 
in sharing of solutions and good practice. 

Assessment:  Positive  impact  (+),  likely  increasing  in  high 
temperature  (3°C  /  4.5°C)  scenarios  (++)  as  application  of 
knowledge will help to mitigate increasing damages. 

Targeted indirect impact. 

Measure  intends  to  improve 
climate  resilience  of  health 
systems. 

Aggregating across other impacts, observatory and its indirect 
impacts will influence increased climate and health resilience 
across the EU.  

Assessment:  Positive  impact  (+),  likely  increasing  in  high 
temperature (3°C / 4.5°C) scenarios (++). 

Possible synergy with climate mitigation 
Assessment: no impact 

Quality  of  natural 
resources/fighting 
pollution 
soil, air etc.)  

(water, 

Strategy intends to address impacts 
of  climate  change  on  natural 
resources,  e.g.  forests,  agriculture, 
marine environment.  

Impact on natural 
resource 
resilience (+/-) 

No impact 

No impact 

Biodiversity, 
flora, 
including 
fauna, 
ecosystems 
and the services they 
and 
provide 

Strategy intends to address impacts 
of  climate  change  on  biodiversity, 
and  to  make  use  of  Ecosystem-
based solutions.  

Use 
of 
ecosystem-based 
solutions 
and 
increased 
resilience 

of 

No impact 

No impact 

145 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
landscapes  

Cross 
impacts 

cutting 

Impacts 
in 
developing countries 

As  highlighted  above  impacts  in 
developing countries are important 
to EU economically (supply chains 
/  markets)  and  socially  (family 
ties,  migration,  security).  Strategy 
aims  to  support  improved  climate 
only 
resilience 
developing) countries.  

(not 

3rd 

of 

ecosystems (+/-) 

Impact  on  third 
countries 
and 
international 
relations (+/-) 

No impact, is EU focused 

No impact, is EU focused 

Some key reports in the field 

  European Commission (2020): Scientific opinion ‘Adaptation to health effects of climate change in Europe’ 

https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/adaptation-health-effects-climate-change-europe_en  

  EASAC (2019) ‘Climate action urgently required to protect human health in Europe’ 

https://easac.eu/projects/details/climate-change-and-health/  

  The Lancet Countdown (2019): Report of on health and climate change: ensuring that the health of a child born today is not defined by a changing 

climate 

  WHO (2018): Public health and climate change adaptation policies in the European Union. Final report.  

www.euro.who.int/en/health-topics/environment-and-health/Climate-change/publications/2018/public-health-and-climate-change-adaptation-
policies-in-the-european-union-2018  

  EEA (2018) Unequal exposure and unequal impacts: social vulnerability to air pollution, noise and extreme temperatures in Europe. EEA Report 

No 22/2018 

  The 2018 report of the Lancet Countdown on health and climate change: shaping the health of nations for centuries to come. 2018 

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(18)32594-7  

  US Fourth national climate assessment, 2018, Volume II: Impacts, risks, and adaptation in the United States. Chapter 14 Human Health 

https://nca2018.globalchange.gov/chapter/14/ 

146 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ACTION  3:  Strengthening  the  evaluation,  monitoring,  reporting  and  implementation  of  adaptation  strategies  at  national  and  subnational 

levels, including in cities, cross-border, and in the Outermost Regions (including through the Climate Law via Climate-ADAPT). 

NO MEASURE impact assessed for Action 3 

ACTION 4: Prioritising nature-based adaptation, including coastal protection and green and blue infrastructure. 

MEASURE  4.1:  Building  inter  alia  on  relevant  provisions  under  the  CBD  and  on  the  new  IUCN  Global  Standard  for  Nature-based  Solutions, 
promote the deployment of robust and effective nature-based solutions (NBS) for adaptation to climate change, notably by stepping up and 
scaling up their implementation and by further developing methods and tools. 

Baseline, context, and rationale 

Climate change and biodiversity loss are linked and interdependent. We can only achieve climate, biodiversity and sustainable development goals if we 
scale up and speed up the implementation of technological, societal and nature-based solutions. There is growing global consensus on the importance 
of addressing these challenges (and the wider set of Sustainable Development  Goals) in  an integrated manner and, consequently, on the urgency of 
identifying and implementing win-win solutions.  

Nature-based  solutions  (NbS),  actions  that  conserve,  manage  or  restore  nature  to  support  biodiversity  to  help  address  societal  challenges,  empower 
people and provide job  and business  opportunities  can be powerful tools for  combatting biodiversity loss and supporting  climate change mitigation 
and/or adaptation and disaster risk reduction while delivering further benefits to human well-being (e.g. health). NbS are based on the principle that 
ecosystems  in  healthy  condition  deliver  multiple  benefits  and  services  for  human  well-being  and  can  thereby  address  economic,  social  and 
environmental  goals  simultaneously.  Depending  on  their  context,  NbS  are  also  framed  as  Ecosystem-based  Adaptation  (EbA),  Green  Infrastructure 
(GI), Ecosystem-based Disaster Risk Reduction (EcoDRR), or Natural Water Retention Measures (NWRM). 

147 

 
 
 
Despite the fact that ecosystem-based solutions have proved to be cost-efficient policy approaches to address climate change adaptation, they are yet 
not  used fully.221  Reasons  for this  relatively low uptake are multiple (e.g. cultural  perceptions, knowledge gaps, low guidance), and have driven to, 
among others, unevenness of climate adaptation action across Member States.  

In 2017, though the interest for the ecosystem-based adaptation concept is increasing in different areas, it has mainly been applied in the agriculture 
and forestry sectors; and therefore, experts continuously have advocated for supporting legislation that enables its systematic mainstreaming into urban 
planning, i.e., incorporating its principles into relevant policies and planning tools across sectors. .222 Since then, both development and implementation 
of NbS have significantly increased. Nonetheless, there is still a large gap between the research efforts concerning small- (i.e. at urban or local scale 
such as filter drains, porous pavements, green roofs, etc.) and large-scale NbS (i.e. solutions which are applied in rural and coastal areas, river basins 
and/or at the regional scale such as large retention basins, lakes, flood plains, wetlands, beach nourishment, etc.).223 

During the targeted stakeholder consultation activities undertaken in the framework of this study it was indicated that, besides funding support, the EU 
should promote the development of standard methodologies to quantify the costs and benefits of ecosystem-based approaches, in order to help with the 
implementation of solutions. Projects supported under consecutive EU research framework programmes have investigated in these issues and results 
are  made  available  in  a  series  of  reports.  224  Stakeholders  also  suggested  the  Strategy  could  support  a  dedicated  mechanism  to  provide  tailored 
adaptation guidance and peer-to-peer knowledge sharing for local public authorities and non-state actors. The upcoming EEA report on nature-based 
solutions  –  ecosystem-based  approaches  to  climate  change  adaptation  and  disaster  risk  reduction  partly  fulfils  this  request.225  Moreover,  many 
stakeholders referred to the importance of ecosystem-based adaptation to increase the resilience of the infrastructural sector, for example in the context 
of coastal protection. The COVID 19 crisis has further amplified the importance of resilience and the importance of having access to nature for general 
well-being. 

221 European Commission (2019). Review of Progress on the Implementation of the EU Green Infrastructure Strategy. SWD (2019) 184 final.  
Retrieved from: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52019DC0236&qid=1562053537296 
222 Pauleit, S. et. al (2017). Nature-based solutions and climate change–four shades of green. In Nature-Based Solutions to Climate Change Adaptation in Urban Areas (pp. 29-49). Springer, Cham. 
223 European Commission (2020) Nature-based solutions for flood mitigation and coastal resilience 
224 See sectorial reports: https://ec.europa.eu/info/news/new-publication-what-nature-based-solutions-can-do-us-2020-jul-16_en  
225 EEA (forthcoming) Nature-based solutions and ecosystem-based approaches to climate change adaptation and DRR in Europe 

148 

 
 
                                                 
OPC: Respondents to the OPC reported that one of the main actions to support resilience building is information/guidance about management practices 
and nature-based solutions. During the interviews, stakeholders also highlighted the importance of NbS and recommended to give NbS interventions 
similar priority as for the Strategy’s eight existing actions.  

Description of measure 

This  measure  of  the  new  strategy  seeks  greater  prioritising/promoting  of  nature-based  solutions-  ecosystem-based  adaptation  in  relevant  areas  (see 
References  below).  This  will  be  achieved  through  scaling  up  and  stepping  up  the  implementation  of  nature-based  solutions  and  ecosystem-based 
approaches. 

Objectives and actions: 

This measure seeks to enhance NbS, including coastal protection, through their wider adoption and upscaling of blue and green infrastructure. Building 
inter  alia  on  relevant  provisions  under  the  CBD  and  on  the  new  IUCN  Global  Standard  for  Nature-based  Solutions226,  promote  the  deployment  of 
robust and effective nature-based solutions (NbS) for adaptation to climate change by developing methods and tools to 

a) assess the vulnerability and expected resilience of planned NbS to projected climate change; 

b) determine their cost-efficiency and effectiveness with regards to their expected adaptation functions; 

c) quantify their wider economic, social and environmental co-benefits.  

Guide the introduction of decision criteria when assessing adaptation strategies that allow to include multiple benefits in order to promote nature-based 
solutions-ecosystem-based approaches, in accordance with the EU Biodiversity and EU Forest Strategy. 

Use  public  tendering  to  stimulate  the  deployment  of  ecosystem-based  solutions  by,  for  instance,  sponsoring  the  building  of  green  infrastructure  in 
public buildings (EU Procurement Guides) 

226 Relevant provision include: Assessing the impacts of climate change on biodiversity (UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/X/33); Voluntary guidelines for the design and effective implementation of ecosystem-based approaches to  
climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction (CBD COP 14/5) (CBD/SBSTTA/22/INF/1); Guidance on enhancing positive and minimizing negative impacts on biodiversity of climate change adaptation activities  
(UNEP/CBD/SBSTTA/20/INF/1); Synthesis report on experiences with ecosystem-based approaches to climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction (CBD Technical Series N° 85) 

149 

 
 
                                                 
Amplify  and  consolidate  capacity  building  and  experience  exchange  among  rural,  coastal  and  urban  practitioners,  to  incentivise  the  shift  from  the 
traditional  bias  towards  built  infrastructure  to  nature-based  solutions-ecosystem-based  approaches,  including  practitioners  from  other  regions  (e.g. 
Global South) where NbS have been successfully implemented. 

Advance in the study of the climate resilience of the NBS, ensuring that the new NBS/infrastructures are climate-resilient, which would also incentive 
investments from the private sector. 

Further linking insurance products and services to nature-based solutions -ecosystem-based approaches adaptation, which may offer several financial 
opportunities for the risk industry (e.g. by reducing insured losses, creating new insurance opportunities).  

The results of this work will be used to inform and guide all relevant EU funding and investment programmes, to support the implementation of the 
network of protected areas and of the EU Nature Restoration Plan under the Biodiversity Strategy for 2030 (including the legally binding restoration 
targets; the new EU Forest Strategy, the EU Soil Thematic Strategy, the EU Urban Greening Platform), and to contribute to the European Climate Pact. 

Cost 
The EU Biodiversity Strategy227 indicates that actions to tackling biodiversity loss and restoring ecosystems (including NbS) will require significant 
public and private investments at the national and European levels. Therefore, the Commission estimates that to meet investment priorities for Natura 
2000 and green infrastructure, at least €20 billion a year should be unlocked for spending on nature. Specifically, 25% of the EU budget dedicated to 
climate action will be invested in biodiversity and nature-based solutions.  

Impact pathways 

In the table below impacts are assessed using a scale from (--/-/0/+/++) negative to positive. Impacts are assessed up to 2050 relative to the baseline. It 
assumes the full uptake of the measure as the increasing severance of physical climate risks is more widely recognized the benefits from nature-based 
adaptation become apparent and proven, and consequently the acceleration in the adoption of solutions.   

227 European Commission (2020) EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030, from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions,  
COM/2020/380 final, available at - https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1590574123338&uri=CELEX:52020DC0380 

150 

 
 
 
                                                 
Table 30: Mini-Assessment of stimulating the deployment of Nature-based solutions 

Impact indicator  Relevance 

Indicator 

Baseline  

Impact 

pathway  Envisaged impact 2050 (relative to baseline) 

Economic 

Macroeconomic 
environment  

Impacts  on  the  economy  are  a  hugely  significant 
driver for action and  reducing damages can be an 
important indicator of increased resilience. 

Economic 
welfare 
(losses) (-/+) 

Competitiveness, 
trade 
and 
investment flows 

Vulnerability  of  supply  chains  to  impacts  can  be 
relevant  and  The  Strategy  will  significantly 
influence the types of investments being made.  

on 

Impact 
competitiven
ess, trade and 
(climate 
resilient) 
investments 
(+/-) 

Results  are  included  in  modelling  in  chapter  6.  Mainstreaming  nature-
based  adaptation,  including  coastal  protection  and  green  infrastructure  is 
interpreted  as  stimulating  the  deployment  of  nature-based  solutions, 
including  through  increased  use  public  tendering  and  guidance  for 
quantifying  social  and  environmental  co-benefits  and  comprises  the 
adaption  by  retention  areas,  which has  been assessed  as  very  feasible  by 
PESETA  IV.  If all retention areas suggested there had been triggered by 
this  option,  damage  reduction  of  up  to  72%  were  feasible.  The  possible 
effects  span  a  wide  range:  from  80%  damage  reduction  due  to  retention 
areas in France, more than 60% for Germany to a mere 9% in Spain. We 
keep the structure of successes from the adaptation by increasing retention 
areas  and  assume  that  10%  of  the  respective  damage  reduction  can  be 
triggered.  Investment  leads  to  additional  demand  for  the  construction 
sector,  because  in  the  sector-specific  classifications  of  Eurostat’s  Input 
Output  Tables,  landscaping  is  included  in  the  construction  sector.  Any 
planning, design and other services are then included in full in the model, 
due  to  the  input  structure  and  the  demand  for  intermediate  goods  and 
services by the respective sectors. The adaptation costs are borrowed from 
PESETA IV and distributed into the regions proportional to the respective 
damage reduction, assuming more or less equal costs per reduced damage. 

Assessment: impact is included in modelled results, qualitatively (+) 

Indirect 
impact 

Minimal 
impact 

As a recent study by the  WEF shows228, 
more than half of the world’s total GDP 
is  moderately  or  highly  dependent  on 
nature  and  its  services  and  therefore 
exposed to nature loss. The three largest 
sectors  that  are  highly  dependent  on 
nature (i.e. construction, agriculture, and 
food and beverages) generate close to $8 
trillion  of  GVA,  and  as  nature  loses  its 
capacity  to  provide  such  services,  these 
sectors  could  suffer  significant  losses. 
The  study  shows  that  49%  of  Europe’s 
GDP is generated through sectors highly 
(13%)  and  medium  (36%)  dependent  on 
nature  

the  EU 
(e.g., 

international 
fires 
forest 

Large-scale  loss  of  nature  has  already 
trade 
affected 
agreements 
and 
deforestation  in  the  Brazilian  Amazon 
trade 
affecting 
agreement,  which  is  worth  €122  billion 
and  expected  to  generate  significant 

the  EU-Mercosur 

228 World Economic Forum (2020) Nature Risk Rising: Why the Crisis Engulfing Nature Matters for Business and the Economy. Available at: http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_New_Nature_Economy_Report_2020.pdf 

151 

 
 
 
                                                 
Regulatory  burden 
on business 

Rewarding  use  of  NbS  in  public  tendering  will 
incentivise  firms  to  include  it  in  their  offers,  may 
require  additional  efforts.  Nevertheless, 
these 
would be voluntary. 

Under the EU Taxonomy, investments are required  

Regulatory 
burden 
on 
business (+/-) 

market opportunities).  

Minimal (mandatory) impact 

Minimal 
impact 

Increased 
innovation 
research 

and 

The  Strategy  will  guide  research  under  Horizon 
Europe and aims to encourage greater adoption of 
innovation. 

on 

Impact 
adaptation 
innovation 
adoption  (+/-
) 

According  to  the  latest  review  of  the 
state of the art of EU-funded projects, the 
relevant  NBS  strands  of  the  Horizon 
2020  programme  include  35  projects 
with  a  total  budget  of  €288m,  delivered 
within  dedicated  focus  areas  e.g.  'Smart 
and Sustainable Cities with NbS. Further 
research  and 
investments 
innovation  have  been  delivered  through 
other  EU 
(e.g.  COST, 
ERDF, LIFE+ and EIB’s Natural Capital 
Financing Facility). Furthermore, H2020 
calls  for  proposals  on  NbS  have  been 
oversubscribed  with 
300 
proposals  received  for  11  call  areas 
relating to NBS.229 

instruments 

in  NbS 

nearly 

Direct 
impact 

The Horizon Europe Missions on Adaptation to Climate Change will aim 
to boost nature-based solutions and green-blue multipurpose infrastructure 
investments in ecosystems.  231 By promoting the deployment of NbS, this 
measure of the new Strategy is expected to incentivise the research in NbS 
and encourage the adoption of NbS-related innovative measures in cities.  
Assessment: Positive impact (+) 

In parallel, as part of the EU Biodiversity 
Strategy  the  Commission  will  promote 
and  facilitate  partnerships,  including  a 
dedicated  Biodiversity  Partnership,  to 
facilitate  the  bridge  between  science, 
policy  and  practice  in  regards  to  nature-
based solutions. 230 

229 European Commission (forthcoming) Nature-based solutions- State of the art in the EU-Funded projects. 
230 European Commission (2020) EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030, from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions,  
COM/2020/380 final, available at - https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1590574123338&uri=CELEX:52020DC0380 
231 European Commission (2020) “Accelerating the Transition to a Climate Prepared and Resilient Europe Interim report of the Mission Board for Adaptation to Climate Change, including Societal Transformation” Available at:  
https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/1d5234b9-b68a-11ea-bb7a-01aa75ed71a1 

152 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
Public  authorities 
(and budgets) 

The  Strategy  will  significantly  impact  on  public 
spending  on  climate  resilience,  primarily  through 
indirect routes. 

Public 
spending  on 
adaptation (€) 

Social impacts 

Employment 

in-turn  on 
the  economy  and 
Impacts  on 
employment  are  a  hugely  significant  driver  for 
action and reducing damages and job losses can be 
an important indicator of increased resilience. 

Employment 
(FTE)  

Income 
distribution,  social 
and 
protection, 
inclusion 
social 
particular 
(of 

Distributional  impacts  of  climate  change  can  be 
significant, the Strategy is intended to address and 
mitigate  inequalities,  including  through  better-
informing  citizens  and  encouraging  action.  Needs 
to  address  broader  questions  of  equity  (see  other 
impacts)  such  as  location,  economic  and  social 

Distributional 
and 
equity 
impacts (+/-) 

is 

infrastructure 

The  structure  of  municipal  revenues  is 
decisive for NBS  financing.232 However, 
natural 
still  often 
hampered  by  budgetary  constraints.233 
From  the  1  000  examples  of  NBS  from 
100  EU  cities  included  in  the  Urban 
Nature  Atlas234!  developed  by 
the 
NATure-based  URban 
innoVATION 
project,  49%  of  the  projects’  financing 
resources were earmarked public budget. 

Implementation  of  the  EU  Biodiversity 
Strategy 
for  2030  and  COVID19 
recovery  could  become  a  game-changer 
in this respect.  

NbS  have  shown  to  benefit  the  creation 
of jobs and to stimulating innovation for 
a  green  economy.235  Today,  in  Germany 
6  %  of  total  employment  relies  directly 
on  ecosystem  services;  while  in  the 
European  Union  (EU)  as  a  whole  the 
proportion is as high as 16 %236 

access 

healthy 

As  shown  by  a  recent  Horizon  2020 
study, 
natural 
to 
environments  is  especially  important  for 
vulnerable  populations,  which  makes 
NbS  key  to  reducing  inequalities  within 
and  between  societies  (SDG  10)  and 

Prioritising  and  mainstreaming  NbS  for  climate  adaptation  into  local 
policies is expected to ensure that part of the public budgets is allocated to 
finance NbS pilot installations, such as green roofs and walls. Moreover, 
by providing support for the economic valuation of NBS and the multiple 
benefits they deliver (e.g. clean air, habitat for nature, CO2 sequestration), 
sufficient public resources will be ensured not only for the implementation 
but also for the adequate maintenance of the NbS.  

In  addition,  following  the  EU  Biodiversity  Strategy,  this  measure  is 
expected to support the development of Urban Greening Plans by the end 
of  2021.  In  addition,  using  the  EU sustainable  finance  taxonomy as  a 
reference, it is expected to help guide investment towards a green recovery 
and the deployment of NbS. 
Assessment: Positive impact (++), 

This  measure  aims  to  amplify  and  consolidate  capacity  building  and 
experience exchange among practitioners, and it is, therefore, expected to 
incentivise the shift from the traditional bias towards built infrastructure to 
NbS approaches. This transformation is expected to stimulate the creation 
of new jobs. 

Assessment: Positive impact (+) 

By  consolidating  the  knowledge  and  tools  used  to  assess  NbS,  more 
informed  decisions  can  be  taken  to  support  vulnerable  groups.  The 
acknowledgment  of  the  potential  positive  impact  of  NbS  on  reducing 
inequalities and promoting social inclusion is expected to incentivise NbS 
adaptation approaches in cities. 

Direct 
impact  

Indirect 
impact  

Indirect 
impact 

232 Droste, N. et. al (2017). Implementing nature-based solutions in urban areas: financing and governance aspects. In Nature-based solutions to climate change adaptation in urban areas (pp. 307-321). Springer, Cham. 
233 van Ham, C., & Klimmek, H. (2017). Partnerships for nature-based solutions in urban areas–showcasing successful examples. In Nature-Based Solutions to Climate Change Adaptation in Urban Areas (pp. 275-289).  
Springer, Cham. 
234 See https://naturvation.eu/atlas 
235 Kabisch, Nadja, et al. (2017) Nature-based solutions to climate change adaptation in urban areas: Linkages between science, policy and practice. Springer Nature. 
236 ILO (2018) “The employment impact of climate change adaptation”. Input Document for the G20 Climate Sustainability Working Group International Labour Office – Geneva, 

153 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
groups) 

cohesion, gender, and of fundamental rights. 

improving 
(SDG3).237 

health 

and  well-being 

Assessment: Positive impact (+) 

Public  health  & 
safety  and  health 
systems  

Increased  resilience  of  public  health  and  safety 
systems is an important goal of the Strategy. 

Impact 
on 
public  health 
civil 
and 
emergency 
systems (+/-) 

Regarding  social  inclusion,  NbS  have 
proven to be an effective means to build 
processes  and  practices  for  sustainable 
communities,  with  many  NbS  projects 
giving attention to how to involve groups 
such  as  refugees,  young  people  and 
women.238 

The effect of NbS in reducing the urban 
heat effect (UHI) is only one example of 
how  NBS  can  benefit  public  health, 
which  has  been  studied  in  different 
European  countries.  For  instance,  the 
EU-RAMSES  project  found 
in 
northern  cities  increasing  green  areas 
from  the  current  25%  to  60%  would 
allow  an  average  cooling  of  around 
0.6°.239  

that 

In addition, it has been shown that crime 
prevention can be significantly improved 
by green infrastructure development.240 

Indirect 
impact 

By providing evidence of the multiple benefits that NbS deliver regarding 
public health and safety systems (e.g. heat stress, air pollution, and crime 
prevention)  is  expected  that  city  governments  and  communities  be 
support 
encouraged 
NbS interventions. 
Assessment: Positive impact (+) 

to 

Environmental impacts 

The climate  

Critical impact targeted by the strategy. Increase of 
resilience 
impacts  and  preventing 
climate risks. In addition, potential synergies with 
mitigation may be worth considering. 

to  climate 

on 

Impact 
climate 
resilience 
(+/-) 

(possible) 
Synergy  with 
climate 
mitigation 

There is growing scientific evidence that 
NbS  offer  multiple  benefits  for  climate 
change  adaptation  and  disaster  risk 
reduction  in  particular  for  sectors  that 
depend  on  ecosystems  and  natural 
resources  (e.g.  water),  such  as  forestry 
and  agriculture;  in  urban  areas,  NbS  are 
effective 
for 
adaptation  and  disaster  risk  reduction 

in  providing  benefits 

Targeted 
direct 
impact. 

The  measure  will  increase  the  deployment  of  NbS  and  is  expected  to 
motivate  cities  and  communities  to  sign  up  to  more  ambitions  2030 
targets, and to support the implementation of other NbS-related strategies 
at the EU level, such as the EU Biodiversity Strategy. The climate impact 
of  the  measure  is  expected  to  influence  both  climate  adaptation  and 
mitigation in Europe. 
Assessment: Positive impact (++) 

237 Faivre, Nicolas, et al. "Nature-Based Solutions in the EU: Innovating with nature to address social, economic and environmental challenges." Environmental research 159 (2017): 509-518. 
238 European Commission (2020) Nature-based solutions towards sustainable communities 
239 European Commission (2020) Nature-based solutions for microclimate regulation and air quality 
240 Shepley, Mardelle, et al. "The impact of green space on violent crime in urban environments: An evidence synthesis." International journal of environmental research and public health 16.24 (2019): 5119. 

154 

 
 
 
                                                 
(+/-) 

on 

Impact 
natural 
resource 
resilience 
(+/-) 

of 

Use 
ecosystem-
based 
solutions  and 
increased 
resilience  of 
ecosystems 

Quality  of  natural 
resources/fighting 
pollution 
(water, 
soil, air, etc.)  

Strategy  intends  to  address  impacts  of  climate 
change  on  natural 
forests, 
agriculture, marine environment.  

resources,  e.g. 

Biodiversity, 
including 
flora, 
fauna,  ecosystems 
and 
the  services 
they  provide,  and 
landscapes  

Strategy  intends  to  address  impacts  of  climate 
change  on  biodiversity,  and  to  make  use  of 
Ecosystem-based solutions.  

reducing  damage 

from  heavy 
(e.g. 
and 
precipitation 
flooding, alleviating impacts of droughts 
and heat-related challenges)241 

Moreover, NBS can contribute to climate 
through  both  storing  and 
mitigation 
sequestering carbon and reducing energy 
demand  (e.g.  by 
thermal 
comfort  cities  and  promoting  the  use  of 
walking and cycling routes).242  

improving 

NbS  interventions  such  as  green  roofs 
can  achieve  cost-effective  reductions  in 
drainage 
improving 
systems,  whilst 
urban  environmental  quality,  decreasing 
nutrient and chemical pollution level243 

Moreover,  a  number  of  studies,  such  as 
the BRIDGE project, have evidenced the 
to  removing  air 
NBS’s  contribution 
pollutants  such  as  O3,  PM2.5,  NOX,  and 
SO2.

244

high 

projects 

have 
Several  EU-funded 
identified  types  of  NbS  that  have  offer 
particularly 
for 
biodiversity.  Examples  of  relevant  NBS 
sites, 
include 
corridors, 
brownfields 
restoration  of  catchments  and  coastal 

renaturing 
and 

benefits 

landfill 

river 

241EEA (forthcoming) Nature-based solutions and ecosystem-based approaches to climate change adaptation and DRR in Europe 
242 European Commission (forthcoming) Nature-based solutions- State of the art in the EU-Funded projects. 
243 European Commission (2020) Nature-based solutions improving water quality and waterbody conditions 
244 European Commission (2020) Nature-based solutions for microclimate regulation and air quality 

155 

Targeted 
direct 
impact. 

The  quality  of  natural  resources  (including  soil,  water,  and  air)  will  be 
positively  impacted  by  the  increased  adoption  of  NbS,  which  will  be 
mainly achieved through  prioritising and mainstreaming NbS for climate 
adaptation at local level. 
Assessment: Positive impact (+) 

Targeted 
direct 
impact. 

The  measure  is  expected  to  increase  the  attractiveness  and  thus 
deployment  of  NbS.  Based  on  the  identified  benefits  of  NbS,  the  EU 
biodiversity  will  be  positively  impacted  as  more  NbS  interventions  are 
supported. 
Assessment: Positive impact (+) 

 
 
 
                                                 
(+/-) 

landscapes,  arboreal  interventions,  and 
pollinator sites.245 

in 

Impacts 
developing 
countries 

impacts 

As  highlighted  above 
in  developing 
countries  are  important  to  the  EU  economically 
(supply chains / markets) and socially (family ties, 
migration,  security).  Strategy  aims  to  support 
improved  climate  resilience  of  3rd  (not  only 
developing) countries.  

on 

Impact 
third 
countries  and 
international 
relations (+/-) 

are 

and 

the  Convention 

NbS 
increasingly 
becoming 
important  in  international  agreements 
and  policy  frameworks,246  including  the 
UN  Framework  Convention  on  Climate 
Change 
on 
Biological  Diversity.  To  support  the 
impact  of  NBS  implementation  in  third 
the  EU  has  established 
countries, 
different 
the 
such 
programs 
Strengthening  international  cooperation 
on  sustainable  urbanisation:  nature-
based  solutions 
for  restoration  and 
rehabilitation  of  urban  ecosystems.247 
Specific NBS sector dialogues have also 
been  conducted  with  successful  results, 
such as the EU – Brazil Sector Dialogue 
on nature-based solutions.248 

as 

Indirect 
impact 

Particular  measures  taken  to  promote  global  mainstreaming  of  NBS 
include  Sector  Dialogues,  which  intend  to  capitalise  upon  existing 
experiences and good practices in Europe and beyond. In accordance, this 
measure is expected to have an indirect impact in developing countries, as 
knowledge and experience exchange is incentivised.  

Impact indicator  Relevance 

Indicator 

Baseline  

Impact 

pathway  Envisaged impact 2050 (relative to baseline) 

Economic 

Macroeconomic 
environment  

Impacts  on  the  economy  are  a  hugely  significant 
driver for action and reducing damages can be an 
important indicator of increased resilience. 

Economic 
welfare 
(losses) (-/+) 

As a recent study by the  WEF shows249, 
more than half of the world’s total GDP 
is  moderately  or  highly  dependent  on 
nature  and  its  services  and  therefore 
exposed to nature loss. The three largest 
sectors  that  are  highly  dependent  on 
nature (i.e. construction, agriculture, and 

Indirect 
impact 

Results  are  included  in  modelling  in  chapter  6.  Mainstreaming  nature-
based  adaptation,  including  coastal  protection  and  green  infrastructure  is 
interpreted  as  stimulating  the  deployment  of  nature-based  solutions, 
including  through  increased  use  public  tendering  and  guidance  for 
quantifying  social  and  environmental  co-benefits  and  comprises  the 
adaption  by  retention  areas,  which has  been assessed  as  very  feasible  by 
PESETA  IV.  If all retention areas suggested there had been triggered by 

245 European Commission (2020) Biodiversity and Nature-based Solutions 
246 European Commission (forthcoming) Nature-based solutions- State of the art in the EU-Funded projects. 
247 See: https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/portal/screen/opportunities/topic-details/sc5-13-2018-2019 
248 European Commission (2019) The EU – Brazil Sector Dialogue on nature-based solutions. Available at: https://oppla.eu/sites/default/files/docs/EU-Brazil-NBS-dialogue-1610.pdf 
249 World Economic Forum (2020) Nature Risk Rising: Why the Crisis Engulfing Nature Matters for Business and the Economy. Available at: http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_New_Nature_Economy_Report_2020.pdf 

156 

 
 
 
                                                 
food and beverages) generate close to $8 
trillion  of  GVA,  and  as  nature  loses  its 
capacity  to  provide  such  services,  these 
sectors  could  suffer  significant  losses. 
The  study  shows  that  49%  of  Europe’s 
GDP is generated through sectors highly 
(13%)  and  medium  (36%)  dependent  on 
nature  

this  option,  damage  reduction  of  up  to  72%  were  feasible.  The  possible 
effects  span  a  wide  range:  from  80%  damage  reduction  due  to  retention 
areas in France, more than 60% for Germany to a mere 9% in Spain. We 
keep the structure of successes from the adaptation by increasing retention 
areas  and  assume  that  10%  of  the  respective  damage  reduction  can  be 
triggered.  Investment  leads  to  additional  demand  for  the  construction 
sector,  because  in  the  sector-specific  classifications  of  Eurostat’s  Input 
Output  Tables,  landscaping  is  included  in  the  construction  sector.  Any 
planning, design and other services are then included in full in the model, 
due  to  the  input  structure  and  the  demand  for  intermediate  goods  and 
services by the respective sectors. The adaptation costs are borrowed from 
PESETA IV and distributed into the regions proportional to the respective 
damage reduction, assuming more or less equal costs per reduced damage. 

Assessment: impact is included in modelled results, qualitatively (+) 

Competitiveness, 
trade 
and 
investment flows 

Vulnerability  of  supply  chains  to  impacts  can  be 
relevant  and  The  Strategy  will  significantly 
influence the types of investments being made.  

on 

Impact 
competitiven
ess, trade and 
(climate 
resilient) 
investments 
(+/-) 

the  EU 
(e.g., 

international 
fires 
forest 

Large-scale  loss  of  nature  has  already 
trade 
affected 
agreements 
and 
deforestation  in  the  Brazilian  Amazon 
trade 
affecting 
agreement,  which  is  worth  €122  billion 
and  expected  to  generate  significant 
market opportunities).  

the  EU-Mercosur 

Regulatory  burden 
on business 

Rewarding  use  of  NbS  in  public  tendering  will 
incentivise  firms  to  include  it  in  their  offers,  may 
require  additional  efforts.  However,  these  would 
be voluntary. 

Regulatory 
burden 
on 
business (+/-) 

Minimal (mandatory) impact 

Increased 
innovation 
research 

and 

The  Strategy  will  guide  research  under  Horizon 
Europe and aims to encourage greater adoption of 
innovation. 

on 

Impact 
adaptation 
innovation 
adoption  (+/-
) 

According  to  the  latest  review  of  the 
state of the art of EU-funded projects, the 
relevant  NBS  strands  of  the  Horizon 
2020  programme  include  35  projects 
with  a  total  budget  of  €288m,  delivered 
within  dedicated  focus  areas  e.g.  'Smart 
and Sustainable Cities with NbS. Further 

Minimal 
impact 

Minimal 
impact 

Direct 
impact 

The Horizon Europe Missions on Adaptation to Climate Change will aim 
to boost nature-based solutions and green-blue multipurpose infrastructure 
investments in ecosystems.  252 By promoting the deployment of NbS, this 
measure of the new Strategy is expected to incentivise the research in NbS 
and encourage the adoption of NbS-related innovative measures in cities.  

252 European Commission (2020) “Accelerating the Transition to a Climate Prepared and Resilient Europe Interim report of the Mission Board for Adaptation to Climate Change, including Societal Transformation” Available at:  
https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/1d5234b9-b68a-11ea-bb7a-01aa75ed71a1 

157 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
Assessment: Positive impact (+) 

in  NbS 

instruments 

investments 
research  and 
innovation  have  been  delivered  through 
other  EU 
(e.g.  COST, 
ERDF, LIFE+ and EIB’s Natural Capital 
Financing Facility). Furthermore, H2020 
calls  for  proposals  on  NbS  have  been 
300 
oversubscribed  with 
proposals  received  for  11  call  areas 
relating to NBS.250 

nearly 

In parallel, as part of the EU Biodiversity 
Strategy  the  Commission  will  promote 
and  facilitate  partnerships,  including  a 
dedicated  Biodiversity  Partnership,  to 
facilitate  the  bridge  between  science, 
policy  and  practice  in  regards  to  nature-
based solutions. 251 

250 European Commission (forthcoming) Nature-based solutions- State of the art in the EU-Funded projects. 
251 European Commission (2020) EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030, from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions,  
COM/2020/380 final, available at - https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1590574123338&uri=CELEX:52020DC0380 

158 

 
 
 
                                                 
Public  authorities 
(and budgets) 

The  Strategy  will  significantly  impact  on  public 
spending  on  climate  resilience,  primarily  through 
indirect routes. 

Public 
spending  on 
adaptation (€) 

is 

infrastructure 

The  structure  of  municipal  revenues  is 
decisive for NBS financing.253 However, 
natural 
still  often 
hampered  by  budgetary  constraints.254 
From  the  1  000  examples  of  NBS  from 
100  EU  cities  included  in  the  Urban 
Nature  Atlas255!  developed  by 
the 
NATure-based  URban 
innoVATION 
project,  49%  of  the  projects’  financing 
resources were earmarked public budget. 

Social impacts 

Employment 

in-turn  on 
the  economy  and 
Impacts  on 
employment  are  a  hugely  significant  driver  for 
action and reducing damages and job losses can be 
an important indicator of increased resilience. 

Employment 
(FTE)  

Implementation  of  the  EU  Biodiversity 
Strategy 
for  2030  and  COVID19 
recovery  could  become  a  game-changer 
in this respect.  

NbS  have  shown  to  benefit  the  creation 
of jobs and to stimulating innovation for 
a  green  economy.256  Today,  in  Germany 
6  %  of  total  employment  relies  directly 
on  ecosystem  services;  while  in  the 
European  Union  (EU)  as  a  whole  the 
proportion is as high as 16 %257 

Direct 
impact  

Prioritising  and  mainstreaming  NbS  for  climate  adaptation  into  local 
policies is expected to ensure that part of the public budgets is allocated to 
finance NbS pilot installations, such as green roofs and walls. Moreover, 
by providing support for the economic valuation of NBS and the multiple 
benefits they deliver (e.g. clean air, habitat for nature, CO2 sequestration), 
sufficient public resources will be ensured not only for the implementation 
but also for the adequate maintenance of the NbS.  

In  addition,  following  the  EU  Biodiversity  Strategy,  this  measure  is 
expected to support the development of Urban Greening Plans by the end 
of  2021.  In  addition,  using  the  EU sustainable  finance  taxonomy as  a 
reference, it is expected to help guide investment towards a green recovery 
and the deployment of NbS. 
Assessment: Positive impact (++), 

This  measure  aims  to  amplify  and  consolidate  capacity  building  and 
experience exchange among practitioners, and it is, therefore, expected to 
incentivise the shift from the traditional bias towards built infrastructure to 
NbS approaches. This transformation is expected to stimulate the creation 
of new jobs. 

Indirect 
impact  

Assessment: Positive impact (+) 

Income 
distribution,  social 
and 
protection, 
inclusion 
social 
particular 
(of 

Distributional  impacts  of  climate  change  can  be 
significant, the Strategy is intended to address and 
mitigate  inequalities,  including  through  better-
informing  citizens  and  encouraging  action.  Needs 
to  address  broader  questions  of  equity  (see  other 

Distributional 
and 
equity 
impacts (+/-) 

As  shown  by  a  recent  Horizon  2020, 
access to healthy natural environments is 
especially 
for  vulnerable 
populations,  which  makes  NbS  key  to 
reducing inequalities within and between 

important 

Indirect 
impact 

By  consolidating  the  knowledge  and  tools  used  to  assess  NbS,  more 
informed  decisions  can  be  taken  to  support  vulnerable  groups.  The 
acknowledgment  of  the  potential  positive  impact  of  NbS  on  reducing 
inequalities and promoting social inclusion is expected to incentivise NbS 
adaptation approaches in cities. 

253 Droste, N. et. al (2017). Implementing nature-based solutions in urban areas: financing and governance aspects. In Nature-based solutions to climate change adaptation in urban areas (pp. 307-321). Springer, Cham. 
254 van Ham, C., & Klimmek, H. (2017). Partnerships for nature-based solutions in urban areas–showcasing successful examples. In Nature-Based Solutions to Climate Change Adaptation in Urban Areas (pp. 275-289).  
Springer, Cham. 
255 See https://naturvation.eu/atlas 
256 Kabisch, Nadja, et al. (2017) Nature-based solutions to climate change adaptation in urban areas: Linkages between science, policy and practice. Springer Nature. 
257 ILO (2018) “The employment impact of climate change adaptation”. Input Document for the G20 Climate Sustainability Working Group International Labour Office – Geneva, 

159 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
groups) 

impacts)  such  as  location,  economic  and  social 
cohesion, gender, and of fundamental rights. 

Public  health  & 
safety  and  health 
systems  

Increased  resilience  of  public  health  and  safety 
systems is an important goal of the Strategy. 

Impact 
on 
public  health 
civil 
and 
emergency 
systems (+/-) 

societies (SDG 10) and improving health 
and well-being (SDG3).258 

Regarding  social  inclusion,  NbS  have 
proven to be an effective means to build 
processes  and  practices  for  sustainable 
communities,  with  many  NbS  projects 
giving attention to how to involve groups 
such  as  refugees,  young  people  and 
women.259 

The effect of NbS in reducing the urban 
heat effect (UHI) is only one example of 
how  NBS  can  benefit  public  health, 
which  has  been  studied  in  different 
European  countries.  For  instance,  the 
EU-RAMSES  project  found 
in 
northern  cities  increasing  green  areas 
from  the  current  25%  to  60%  would 
allow  an  average  cooling  of  around 
0.6°.260  

that 

In addition, it has been shown that crime 
prevention can be significantly improved 
by green infrastructure development.261 

Assessment: Positive impact (+) 

Indirect 
impact 

By providing evidence of the multiple benefits that NbS deliver regarding 
public health and safety systems (e.g. heat stress, air pollution, and crime 
prevention)  is  expected  that  city  governments  and  communities  are 
support 
encouraged 
NbS interventions. 
Assessment: Positive impact (+) 

to 

Environmental impacts 

The climate  

Critical impact targeted by the strategy. Increase of 
resilience 
impacts  and  preventing 
climate risks. In addition, potential synergies with 
mitigation may be worth considering. 

to  climate 

on 

Impact 
climate 
resilience 
(+/-) 

(possible) 
Synergy  with 
climate 
mitigation 

There is growing scientific evidence that 
NbS  offer  multiple  benefits  for  climate 
change  adaptation  and  disaster  risk 
reduction  in  particular  for  sectors  that 
depend  on  ecosystems  and  natural 
resources  (e.g.  water),  such  as  forestry 
and  agriculture;  in  urban  areas,  NbS  are 
effective 
for 
adaptation  and  disaster  risk  reduction 

in  providing  benefits 

Targeted 
direct 
impact. 

The  measure  will  increase  the  deployment  of  NbS  and  is  expected  to 
motivate  cities  and  communities  to  sign  up  to  more  ambitions  2030 
targets, and to support the implementation of other NbS-related strategies 
at the EU level, such as the EU Biodiversity Strategy. The climate impact 
of  the  measure  is  expected  to  influence  both  climate  adaptation  and 
mitigation in Europe. 
Assessment: Positive impact (++) 

258 Faivre, Nicolas, et al. "Nature-Based Solutions in the EU: Innovating with nature to address social, economic and environmental challenges." Environmental research 159 (2017): 509-518. 
259 European Commission (2020) Nature-based solutions towards sustainable communities 
260 European Commission (2020) Nature-based solutions for microclimate regulation and air quality 
261 Shepley, Mardelle, et al. "The impact of green space on violent crime in urban environments: An evidence synthesis." International journal of environmental research and public health 16.24 (2019): 5119. 

160 

 
 
 
                                                 
(+/-) 

on 

Impact 
natural 
resource 
resilience 
(+/-) 

of 

Use 
ecosystem-
based 
solutions  and 
increased 
resilience  of 
ecosystems 

Quality  of  natural 
resources/fighting 
pollution 
(water, 
soil, air, etc.)  

Strategy  intends  to  address  impacts  of  climate 
change  on  natural 
forests, 
agriculture, marine environment.  

resources,  e.g. 

Biodiversity, 
including 
flora, 
fauna,  ecosystems 
and 
the  services 
they  provide,  and 
landscapes  

Strategy  intends  to  address  impacts  of  climate 
change  on  biodiversity,  and  to  make  use  of 
Ecosystem-based solutions.  

reducing  damage 

from  heavy 
(e.g. 
and 
precipitation 
flooding, alleviating impacts of droughts 
and heat-related challenges)262 

Moreover, NBS can contribute to climate 
through  both  storing  and 
mitigation 
sequestering carbon and reducing energy 
demand  (e.g.  by 
thermal 
comfort  cities  and  promoting  the  use  of 
walking and cycling routes).263  

improving 

NbS  interventions  such  as  green  roofs 
can  achieve  cost-effective  reductions  in 
drainage 
improving 
systems,  whilst 
urban  environmental  quality,  decreasing 
nutrient and chemical pollution level264 

Moreover,  a  number  of  studies,  such  as 
the BRIDGE project, have evidenced the 
to  removing  air 
NBS’s  contribution 
pollutants  such  as  O3,  PM2.5,  NOX,  and 
SO2.

265

high 

projects 

have 
Several  EU-funded 
identified  types  of  NbS  that  have  offer 
particularly 
for 
biodiversity.  Examples  of  relevant  NBS 
sites, 
include 
corridors, 
brownfields 
restoration  of  catchments  and  coastal 

renaturing 
and 

benefits 

landfill 

river 

262EEA (forthcoming) Nature-based solutions and ecosystem-based approaches to climate change adaptation and DRR in Europe 
263 European Commission (forthcoming) Nature-based solutions- State of the art in the EU-Funded projects. 
264 European Commission (2020) Nature-based solutions improving water quality and waterbody conditions 
265 European Commission (2020) Nature-based solutions for microclimate regulation and air quality 

161 

Targeted 
direct 
impact. 

The  quality  of  natural  resources  (including  soil,  water,  and  air)  will  be 
positively  impacted  by  the  increased  adoption  of  NbS,  which  will  be 
mainly achieved through  prioritising and mainstreaming  NbS for climate 
adaptation at local level. 
Assessment: Positive impact (+) 

Targeted 
direct 
impact. 

The  measure  is  expected  to  increase  the  attractiveness  and  thus 
deployment  of  NbS.  Based  on  the  identified  benefits  of  NbS,  the  EU 
biodiversity  will  be  positively  impacted  as  more  NbS  interventions  are 
supported. 
Assessment: Positive impact (+) 

 
 
 
                                                 
(+/-) 

landscapes,  arboreal  interventions,  and 
pollinator sites.266 

in 

Impacts 
developing 
countries 

impacts 

As  highlighted  above 
in  developing 
countries  are  important  to  the  EU  economically 
(supply chains / markets) and socially (family ties, 
migration,  security).  Strategy  aims  to  support 
improved  climate  resilience  of  3rd  (not  only 
developing) countries.  

on 

Impact 
third 
countries  and 
international 
relations (+/-) 

are 

and 

the  Convention 

NbS 
increasingly 
becoming 
important  in  international  agreements 
and  policy  frameworks,267  including  the 
UN  Framework  Convention  on  Climate 
Change 
on 
Biological  Diversity.  To  support  the 
impact  of  NBS  implementation  in  third 
the  EU  has  established 
countries, 
different 
the 
such 
programs 
Strengthening  international  cooperation 
on  sustainable  urbanisation:  nature-
based  solutions 
for  restoration  and 
rehabilitation  of  urban  ecosystems.268 
Specific NBS sector dialogues have also 
been  conducted  with  successful  results, 
such as the EU – Brazil Sector Dialogue 
on nature-based solutions.269 

as 

Indirect 
impact 

Particular  measures  taken  to  promote  global  mainstreaming  of  NBS 
include  Sector  Dialogues,  which  intend  to  capitalise  upon  existing 
experiences and good practices in Europe and beyond. In accordance, this 
measure is expected to have an indirect impact in developing countries, as 
knowledge and experience exchange is incentivised.  

Some key reports in the field 

  EEA (forthcoming 2021) Nature-based solutions and ecosystem-based approaches to climate change adaptation and DRR in Europe  

  2020 IUCN Global Standard for Nature-based Solutions first edition 

  European Commission (2020) Nature-based solutions for flood mitigation and coastal resilience 

  European Commission (2020) Nature-based solutions improving water quality and waterbody conditions 

266 European Commission (2020) Biodiversity and Nature-based Solutions 
267 European Commission (forthcoming) Nature-based solutions- State of the art in the EU-Funded projects. 
268 See: https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/portal/screen/opportunities/topic-details/sc5-13-2018-2019 
269 European Commission (2019) The EU – Brazil Sector Dialogue on nature-based solutions. Available at: https://oppla.eu/sites/default/files/docs/EU-Brazil-NBS-dialogue-1610.pdf 

162 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
  European Commission (2020) Nature-based solutions for microclimate regulation and air quality 

  European Commission (2020) Nature-based solutions towards sustainable communities 

  European Commission (2020) Nature-based solutions for climate mitigation 

  European Commission (2020) Biodiversity and Nature-based Solutions 

  Droste, N. et. al (2017). Implementing nature-based solutions in urban areas: financing and governance aspects. In Nature-based solutions to 

climate change adaptation in urban areas (pp. 307-321). Springer, Cham. 

  van Ham, C., & Klimmek, H. (2017). Partnerships for nature-based solutions in urban areas–showcasing successful examples. In Nature-Based 

Solutions to Climate Change Adaptation in Urban Areas (pp. 275-289). Springer, Cham. 

 

ILO (2018) “The employment impact of climate change adaptation”. Input Document for the G20 Climate Sustainability Working Group 
International Labour Office – Geneva 

  European Commission (forthcoming) Nature-based solutions- State of the art in the EU-Funded projects  

  Relevant platform on NBS https://climate-adapt.eea.europa.eu/eu-adaptation-policy/sector-policies/ecosystem  

Horizon 2020 funded projects related to NbS 

RESCUE 

River flood Embankments Subject to Climate change: Understanding Effects of future floods and novel ‘low-carbon’ adaptation measures 

DIVERSIFOOD 

Embedding crop diversity and networking for local high quality food systems  

PEGASUS 

Public Ecosystem Goods And Services from land management - Unlocking the Synergies  

Ecopotential 

IMPROVING FUTURE ECOSYSTEM BENEFITS THROUGH EARTH OBSERVATIONS  

ESMERALDA 

Enhancing ecoSysteM sERvices mApping for poLicy and Decision mAking  

GREEN-WIN 

Green growth and win-win strategies for sustainable climate action  

TransRisk 

Aquacross 

Transitions pathways and risk analysis for climate change mitigation and adaption strategies  

Knowledge, Assessment, and Management for AQUAtic Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services aCROSS EU policies  

163 

 
 
INSPIRATION 

INtegrated Spatial PlannIng, land use and soil management Research ActTION  

BiodivERsA3 

Consolidating the European Research Area on biodiversity and ecosystem services  

Placard 

RESIN 

SMR 

PLAtform for Climate Adaptation and Risk reDuction  

Climate Resilient Cities and Infrastructures  

Smart Mature Resilience 

INNOVCITIES 

Institutional Innovation for Adapting to Climate Change in Water Governance within Cities  

OPTWET 

Finding optimal size and location for wetland restoration sites for best nutrient removal performance using spatial analysis and modelling 

BlueHealth 

Linking Up Environment, Health and Climate for Inter-sector Health Promotion and Disease Prevention in a Rapidly Changing Environment  

INHERIT 

INter-sectoral Health Environment Research for InnovaTions  

Sim4Nexus 

Sustainable Integrated Management FOR the NEXUS of water-land-food-energy-climate for a resource-efficient Europe 

INCOVER 

Innovative Eco-Technologies for Resource Recovery from Wastewater  

Aquanes 

MERCES 

AMBER 

BRIGAID 

FOODEV 

Demonstrating synergies in combined natural and engineered processes for water treatment systems  

Marine Ecosystem Restoration in Changing European Seas 

Adaptive Management of Barriers in European Rivers  

BRIdges the GAp for Innovations in Disaster resilience  

Food and Gastronomy as leverage for local development  

SustUrbanFoods 

Integrated sustainability assessment of social and technological innovations towards urban food systems  

BioCarbon 

UNALAB 

Rapid tree-planting through the use of remote sensing and unmanned vehicle planting technologies for large scale reforestation  

Urban Nature Labs  

CONNECTING nature 

COproductioN with NaturE for City Transitioning, INnovation and Governance 

NATURVATION  

Nature Based Urban Innovation  

EN-SUGI 

Eranet Sustainable Urbanisation Global Initiative 

164 

 
 
GROW GREEN 

Green Cities for Climate and Water Resilience, Sustainable Economic Growth, Healthy Citizens and Environments 

Think Nature 

Development of a multi-stakeholder dialogue platform and Think tank to promote innovation with Nature based solutions  

Clarity 

Integrated Climate Adaptation Service Tools for Improving Resilience Measure Efficiency  

UrbanGreenUp  

New Strategy for Re-Naturing Cities through Nature-Based Solutions 

Nature4Cities 

Nature Based Solutions for re-naturing cities: knowledge diffusion and decision support platform through new collaborative models  

NAIAD 

ProGIReg 

NAture Insurance value: Assessment and Demonstration  

productive Green Infrastructure for post-industrial urban regeneration 

CLEVER Cities 

Co-designing Locally tailored Ecological solutions for Value added, socially inclusivE Regeneration in Cities  

EdiCitNet 

Phusicos 

Edible Cities Network Integrating Edible City Solutions for social resilient and sustainably productive cities 

'According to nature' - solutions to reduce risk in mountain landscapes  

URBiNAT 

Healthy corridors as drivers of social housing neighbourhoods for the co-creation of social, environmental and marketable NBS  

Operandum 

OPEn-air laboRAtories for Nature baseD solUtions to Manage environmental risks  

Reconect 

ReNature 

Regenarating ECOsystems with Nature-based solutions for hydro-meteorological risk rEduCTion  

promoting Research Excellence in NAture-based soluTions for innovation, sUstainable economic GRowth and human wEll-being in Malta 

EU-VNP-Net 

EU Valuing Nature Programme and Network  

CLEARING HOUSE 

Collaborative Learning in Research, Information-sharing and Governance on How Urban tree-based solutions support Sino-European urban futures 

165 

 
 
 
 
ACTION 5: Stepping-up efforts to build resilience in cities and empower local action. 

MEASURE  5.4:  Launch  a  climate  adaptation  Policy  Support  Facility  /  Technical  Assistance  project  supporting  local  climate  adaptation  action 

through the Covenant of Mayors 

Baseline, context and rationale 

2020 is a crucial year for local climate action, not only due to the Green Deal and the need to ensure a green recovery from  COVID-19, but also as it 
marks the first major milestone for initiatives such as the EU Covenant of Mayors (EU CoM). Founded in 2008, the EU Covenant of Mayors (CoM) is 
today a well-established initiative. Since its start, it has undergone a series of developments, including the incorporation of climate adaptation and the 
2016 formation of the Global Covenant of Mayors. Through the initiative, cities are setting ambitious climate targets, including a commitment to adapt 
to  climate  change  and  reduce  greenhouse  gas  emissions  by  at  least  40%  by  2030.270  The  Covenant  is  also  working  closely  with  the  European 
Commission to support and ensure its compatibility with other upcoming EU initiatives such as the European Climate Pact. 

The initiative has grown year-on-year since its beginning, and the progress of the initiative today features as one of the key indicators used to track the 
EU’s  progress  on  Sustainable  Development  Goal  (SDG)  13.271  With  9,654  signatories  registered  in  the  EU27  as  of  June  2020,  the  initiative 
encompasses more than  186 million  people, or 42% of the EU population. 88% of the signatories are considered to be  actively  participating in the 
initiative today, but only 26% of the signatories have so far signed up to the more ambitious 2030 targets. Failing in this transition would jeopardise the 
initiative, weaken the Commission’s ties with local authorities, and hamper progress on the EU’s energy and climate targets. 

With respect to policy implications, research has shown that in particular smaller and economically weaker European cities and towns, as well as those 
at high risk from future climate change, need support to engage in adaptation. A dedicated climate network for those highly vulnerable and potentially 
highly  impacted  e.g.  coastal  local  authorities  might  be  very  useful.  This  is  also  supported  by  conclusions  from  the  recent  EEA  report  on  cities  and 
adaptation272. 

270 The Commission services are currently in a dialogue with the EU Covenant of Mayors Office on how the Covenant’s can be updated to reflect the EU’s long-term ambitions and potentially revised 2030 targets.  
271 Eurostat, 2020 – Sustainable Development in the European Union: Monitoring report on progress towards the SDGs in an EU context, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-statistical-books/-/KS-02-20-202  
272 https://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/urban-adaptation-in-europe  

166 

 
 
                                                 
Description of measure 

The 3-year technical assistance project on climate adaptation would be implemented to provide support for some 200 cities/local authorities in Europe. 
The primary goal of this project is to assist EU cities to catalyse their action on adaptation, and in turn, reduce the vulnerability of Europeans to the 
impacts of climate change. Through its focus on small and medium-sized cities with lower capacities, the project will target the cities in greatest need 
and support the Commission’s goal of ensuring no one is left behind in the transition to a more sustainable Europe. 

The technical assistance will be facilitated in three ways: remote/virtual and on-site technical assistance, and mutual learning webinars and workshops. 
First, the remote technical assistance will be provided supporting their work on climate adaptation, and including the development and implementation 
of their Sustainable Energy and Climate Action Plans (SECAPs). Second, the missions will consist on a 2-day visit to the selected cities by a technical 
expert, who will work on the ground with the city officials to underpin and support the remote assistance. Finally, the mutual learning webinars and 
workshops  will be conducted to  complement  and further support the technical  assistance and promote knowledge  exchange among cities  at  the  EU 
level and internationally.  

Objectives and actions: 

o  Provide tailor-made assistance to EU cities over a period of 3 years to catalyse their action on adaptation, and in turn, reduce the vulnerability of 

Europeans to the impacts of climate change. 

o  Assist climate adaptation in vulnerable, small and medium-sized cities (e.g. fewer than 150,000 inhabitants) with limited capacity to adapt to the 

impacts of climate change.  

o  Support EU cities in identifying adaptation actions, moving from planning to implementation, and beyond guidance (i.e. capacity building). 
o  Increase the political visibility and attractiveness of the EU CoM as the key flagship initiative for local climate action in the EU as well as globally, 

incentivising cities for joining the initiative and signing up to the 2030 targets.  

o  Facilitate access and knowledge on tools to enable cities to independently continue their work on climate adaptation, increase their adaptive 

capacity, and eventually become leaders on adaptation in their regions, who disseminate their knowledge to other cities that face similar challenges. 

o  Establish the baseline to consider the establishment of a stand-alone climate adaptation support facility. 

167 

 
 
Cost 

The  project  would  be  delivered  through  assistance  provided  by  consultants  or  technical  experts.  For  example,  this  would  be  done  through  an 
amendment of the existing Covenant of Mayors contract, and the EU Covenant of Mayors Office subcontracting the technical assistance services. The 
overall budget for the project is estimated to a total of ~EUR 1,5M. 

Impact pathways 

In the table below impacts are assessed using a scale from (--/-/0/+/++) negative to positive. Impacts are assessed up to 2050 relative to the baseline. It 
assumes the full uptake of the measure as the increasing severity of physical climate risks is more widely recognized in cities, and consequently the 
relevance for the provision of tailored support to cities.   

Table 31: Mini-assessment of Policy Support Facility / Technical Assistance project 

Impact indicator  Relevance 

Indicator 

Baseline  

Impact pathway 

Envisaged impact 2050 (relative to baseline) 

Economic 

Macroeconomic 
environment  

Impacts  on  the  economy  are  a 
hugely  significant  driver  for 
action  and  reducing  damages 
can be an important indicator of 
increased resilience. 

Economic 
welfare  (losses) 
(-/+) 

Losses  to  productivity  from  absences  due  to 
effects  of  climate  change  in  cities.  The  CoM 
signatories  are  encouraged  to  evaluate  and 
report  impacts  on  socio-economic  sectors  of 
climate change.  The baseline  would be  based 
on  the  contributions  by  the  top  10  cities  to 
GVA. 

Indirect  impact  – 
economic  benefits 
of 
reduced 
productivity 
from 
losses 
climate adaptation 
action 
in  cities 
prompted  by  the 
technical 
assistance project. 

Impacts  included  in  modelling  results  in  chapter  6.  This  measure  is 
interpreted as reducing the heat stress in urban areas, largely through green 
infrastructure and climate resilient adapted buildings. The direct measure is 
to  launch  climate  adaptation  policy  support  facility  and/or  a  technical 
assistance  project.  Assuming  such  a  facility  will  improve  investment  in 
adaptation,  we  modelled  investment  in  cities.  We  assumed  this  leading  to 
increased  resilience  and  a  damage  reduction  of  1%  of  the  productivity 
losses  from  heat  waves  (Orlov  et  al. (2019))  for the RCP2.6  scenario,  5% 
reduction under  the  warmer  RCP4.5 scenario  and a  10%  less  productivity 
loss  under  the  4°C  scenario.  These  values  are  based  on  own  assumptions. 
The  productivity  losses  from  heat  in  the  reference  case  are  modelled  to 
match (Orlov et al. (2019)). They range from 0.7% in the North to 2.8% in 
the southern Member states. The spread over different warming scenarios is 
taken  from  Orlov,  the  distribution  over  European  regions  stems  from  the 
distribution of fatalities across Europe in Szewczyk (2020). The investment 
goes mostly into additional demand for construction. The amounts are taken 
from Lehr et al. (2020) and are rescaled for the Member States proportional 
to the population. 

Assessment:  Quantitative  results  included  in  chapter  6,  qualitative 

168 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Competitiveness, 
trade 
and 
investment flows 

Vulnerability  of  supply  chains 
to  impacts  can  be  relevant  and 
The  Strategy  will  significantly 
of 
types 
the 
influence 
investments being made.  

Impact 
on 
competitiveness, 
trade 
and 
(climate 
resilient) 
investments (+/-) 

Minimal impact  

Minimal impact 

Regulatory burden 
on business 

to  public 
Support  provided 
authorities  unlikely 
to  have 
significant effect on businesses. 

Regulatory 
burden 
business (+/-) 

on 

Minimal impact 

Minimal impact 

assessment, (0/+) 

Increased 
innovation 
research 

and 

guide 
Strategy  will 
The 
research  under  Horizon  Europe 
and  aims  to  encourage  greater 
adoption of innovation. 

on 

Impact 
adaptation 
innovation 
adoption (+/-) 

Public  authorities 
(and budgets) 

The  Strategy  will  significantly 
impact  on  public  spending  on 
climate 
resilience,  primarily 
through indirect routes. 

Public  spending 
on adaptation (€) 

to 

is  one  of 
the 

encouraging 
in 
innovate 

the 
The  CoM  Awards  call 
CoM 
opportunities 
signatories 
their  climate 
adaptation  planning  (particularly  in  financial 
instruments).  It  awards  three  signatories:  1 
small-sized  signatory  (<10,000  inhabitants)  1 
medium-sized  signatory  (10,000-  250,000 
inhabitants) 1 large-sized signatory (>250,000 
inhabitants) 

Targeted 
impact 

direct 

The  Technical  Assistance  project’  impact  on  innovation  is  expected  to  be 
high, as it will foster the exchange between different communities and cities 
and  stimulate  demand  for  adaptation  services  and  innovation.  The  impact 
could  be  evaluated  based  on  the  number  of  CoM  cities  participating  in 
initiatives that recognise innovative adaptation planning.  
Assessment: Positive impact (+) 

The  total  public  spending  as  a  percentage  of 
public  spending  on  climate  adaptation  and 
resilience  as  a  percentage  of  the  city’s  GDP 
(GDPc). 

(Goergeson  L.  et  al,  2016)  can  help  provide 
baseline: Between 0.14 and 0.33% GDPc was 
in  climate 
allocated  by  cities  globally 
adaptation. 0.22% GDPc was spent by the city 
of  Paris  on  adaptation  and  resilience  in 
2014/2015.  growth  of  the  spending  between 
2008-2015 was 4.03% 273 

Since the Technical Assistance project will increase the attractiveness of the 
CoM  and  motivate  cities  to  sign  up  to  more  ambitions  2030  targets,  it  is 
expected  that  the  percentage  of  public  spending  on  climate  adaptation 
measures will increase in the selected cities. 

Targeted 
impact  

direct 

Assessment: Positive (+), 

273 Georgeson, L. et al (2016) "Adaptation responses to climate change differ between global megacities" Nature Climate Change 6.6 (2016): 584-588. 

169 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Social impacts 

Employment 

Income 
distribution, social 
and 
protection 
social 
inclusion 
(of 
particular 
groups) 

Impacts on the economy and in-
turn  on  employment  are  a 
hugely  significant  driver  for 
action  and  reducing  damages 
and 
losses  can  be  an 
important indicator of increased 
resilience. 

job 

Employment 
(FTE)  

to 

change 

impacts 
can 

the  Strategy 
address 

of 
Distributional 
be 
climate 
is 
significant, 
intended 
and 
mitigate  inequalities,  including 
through 
informing 
better 
citizens and encouraging action. 
Needs 
address  broader 
questions  of  equity  (see  other 
impacts) 
location, 
such  as 
economic  and  social  cohesion, 
fundamental 
gender  and  of 
rights. 

to 

Distributional 
and 
impacts (+/-) 

equity 

Moreover,  according 
the  2019  CoM 
assessment274,  700  million  EUR  have  been 
allocated to adaptation by CoM signatories. 

to 

job 

Adaptation measures can lead to employment 
gains  and  prevent 
losses.  Evidence 
suggests 
that  in  Europe  around  500,000 
additional  jobs  will  be  directly  and  indirectly 
created by  2050 as a  result  of  the  increase  in 
adaptation-related activities.275 

Today, in  Germany 6 % of total  employment 
relies directly on ecosystem services; while in 
the  European  Union  (EU)  as  a  whole  the 
proportion is as high as 16 %.276 

Based on the 2019 CoM assessment278: 

Most  of  the  Covenant  of  Mayors  signatories 
(90  %)  are  small-  and  medium-sized  towns, 
which  are  in  more  need  of  support  due  to 
limited financial and human resources. 

Regarding  the  participation  across  different 
EU  countries,  the  CoM  still  plays  a  very 
different  role  in  each  country.  The  large 
majority  of  CoM 
reporting 
adaptation  goals  (82%)  are  from  Italy,  Spain 
and Belgium. 

signatories 

Targeted 
impact  

direct 

Indirect impact 

Skills development is a core component of the Technical Assistant project. 
Capacity-building activities increase the adaptive capacity of a city because 
it helps displaced workers to move on to sectors where there is employment 
growth,  thus  protecting  them  against  income  losses  and  other  adverse 
effects  of  climate  change.  A  shortage  of  skills  would  in  any  case  be  an 
obstacle to the implementation of adaptation measures.277 

The  number  of  participants  on  the  capacity  building  activities  related  to 
skills development on climate adaptation of the Technical Assistant project 
will provide an indication of the impact of initiative on the resilience of the 
employment in the selected cities. 
Assessment: Positive impact (+) 

The  Technical  Assistance  project  aims  to  primarily  support  small  and 
medium-sized  cities,  which  are  most  vulnerable  to  climate  change. 
However,  it  has  been  reported  that  the  proportion  of  cities  with  an 
autonomous and comprehensive adaptation plan increases in line with their 
size279,  which  suggests  that  small  cities  are  more  likely  to  lack  adaptation 
strategies in place.  
Assessment: Positive impact (+) 

Targeted 
impact 

direct 

The  impact  of  the  Technical  Assistance  project  on  social  inclusion  is 
expected to be reflected in: 
- percentage of population covered by CoM signatures per country. 

In  addition,  the  percentage  of  the  CoM 

- percentage of CoM signatories reporting vulnerabilities that are small- and 

274 Bertoldi, P et. Al (2020), “Covenant of Mayors: 2019 Assessment”, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg” ISBN 978-92-76-10722-4, doi:10.2760/775755, JRC118927 
275 Triple E Consulting. (2014). “Assessing the implications of climate change adaptation on employment in the EU: Final report and annexes”  
276 ILO (2018) “The employment impact of climate change adaptation”. Input Document for the G20 Climate Sustainability Working Group International Labour Office – Geneva, 
277 Ibid. 
278 Bertoldi, P et. Al (2020), “Covenant of Mayors: 2019 Assessment”, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg” ISBN 978-92-76-10722-4, doi:10.2760/775755, JRC118927 
279 Reckien, D. et al. (2018). How are cities planning to respond to climate change? Assessment of local climate plans from 885 cities in the EU-28. Journal of Cleaner Production. 191. 207-219. 10.1016/j.jclepro.2018.03.220. 

170 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
signatories  reporting  vulnerabilities  is  low 
(36-42%),  despite  vulnerabilities  are  a  key 
dimension for the climate risk assessment. 

Moreover,  as  a  baseline,  public  participation 
in  adaptation  planning  is  to  be  used,  as  it 
makes  urban  adaptation  more  equitable  and 
ensures the inclusion of the views of the most 
vulnerable communities. 

today  only  43-44%  of 

the 
Nonetheless, 
to  have 
signatories  of 
involved  stakeholders  and  citizens  in  climate 
adaptation planning. 

the  CoM  report 

Public  health  & 
safety  and  health 
systems  

Increased  resilience  of  public 
health  and  safety  systems  is  an 
important goal of the Strategy. 

Impact on public 
health  and  civil 
emergency 
systems (+/-) 

According  to  the  2019  CoM  Assessment, 
CoM  signatories  have  reported  +310  actions 
(including ongoing completed, not started) on 
the health sector, and +320 on civil protection 
and  emergency  in  their  climate  adaptation 
strategies. 

Indirect impact 

Environmental impacts 

medium-sized. 

-  percentage  of  CoM 
vulnerabilities 

signatories 

reporting 

socio-demographic 

-  the  average  percentage  of  CoM  signatories  reporting  stakeholders  and 
citizens engagement in climate adaptation planning.  

The  project  will  encourage  stakeholder  participation  throughout  the 
adaptation policy cycle. 
Assessment: Positive impact (++) 

The  Technical  Assistance  project  will  increase  the  attractiveness  of  the 
CoM.  It  is  expected  that,  from  the  start,  the  Technical  Assistance  project 
will motivate several cities to adhere to CoM.  

Therefore,  the  number  of  completed  actions  for  the  health  and  civil 
protection and emergency sectors reported by the CoM signatories after the 
launch  of  the  Technical  Assistance  Project  will  provide  evidence  of  the 
impact of the initiative on the health and safety services of the cities.  
Assessment: Positive impact (+) 

The climate  

climate 

impacts 

Critical  impact  targeted  by  the 
strategy.  Increase  of  resilience 
and 
to 
preventing  climate  risks.  In 
addition,  potential 
synergies 
with  mitigation  may  be  worth 
considering. 

on 

Impact 
climate 
resilience (+/-) 

(possible) 
Synergy 
climate 
mitigation (+/-) 

with 

and 

drivers 

significant 

CoM membership is currently one of the most 
influential 
of 
adaptation, to the extent that the capacity of a 
city  to  engage  in  climate  actions  is  a  more 
important  driver  of  adaptation  planning  than 
anticipated 
anticipated 
vulnerability280. 

impacts 

and 

According  to  the  2019  CoM,  429  signatories 
out  of  2221  (370  from  EU28+EFTA  and  59 

Targeted 
impact. 

direct 

The  technical  assistance  will  increase  the  attractiveness  of  the  CoM  and 
motivate cities to sign up to more ambitions 2030 targets. 

Therefore,  the  number  reported  adaptation  goals  and  implemented 
actions by the CoM signatories after the launch of the Technical Assistance 
Project  would  provide  evidence  of  the  impact  of  the  initiative  on  the 
climate. 

Assessment: Positive impact (++) 

280 Reckien, D. et al (2015) "The influence of drivers and barriers on urban adaptation and mitigation plans—an empirical analysis of European cities." PloS one 10.8 (2015): e0135597. 

171 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
Quality  of  natural 
resources/fighting 
pollution 
(water, 
soil, air etc.)  

intends 

to  address 
Strategy 
impacts  of  climate  change  on 
natural  resources,  e.g.  forests, 
agriculture, 
marine 
environment.  

Impact 
on 
natural  resource 
resilience (+/-) 

non-EU28+EFTA)  have  already  provided 
information  regarding  their  adaptation  goals, 
risk  and  vulnerability  assessments  or  action 
plans.  

Some  of  the  CoM  signatories  especially  in 
EU28+EFTA  municipalities  have  already 
completed  the  implementation  of  adaptation 
actions and reported the associated impacts on 
the  environment.  Concretely,  the  majority  of 
actions (ca. 600), including all completed, on-
going  and  planned  actions,  are  reported  to 
have an impact on the water sector.  

On air quality, the data reported by Monforti-
Ferrario,  F.  et  al  (2018)  281  on  Air  Quality 
Benefit  (AQB)  different  kinds  of  SEAP 
measures  proposed  by  146  CoM  cities  could 
be explored to be used as a baseline. 

Indirect impact 

Biodiversity, 
including 
flora, 
fauna,  ecosystems 
and  the  services 
they  provide  and 
landscapes  

intends 

Strategy 
to  address 
impacts  of  climate  change  on 
biodiversity, and to make use of 
Ecosystem-based solutions.  

Use 
of 
ecosystem-based 
solutions 
and 
increased 
of 
resilience 
ecosystems (+/-) 

According  to  the  2019  CoM  Assessment, 
CoM  signatories  have  reported  +270  actions 
(including ongoing completed, not started) on 
the biodiversity and environment sector, +320 
on land-use planning, +290 on agriculture and 
forestry.  

Indirect impact 

The  Technical  Assistance  project  will  increase  the  attractiveness  of  the 
CoM.  It  is  expected  that,  from  the  start,  the  Technical  Assistance  project 
will motivate several cities to sign up to CoM. Once part of the coalition, 
the  city  will  commit  to  set  up  climate  adaptation  targets  through  the 
development  of  the  SECAP.  On  this,  the  Guidebook  for  CoM  signatories 
developed by the JRC includes water as a key vulnerable sector to evaluate. 

Therefore, the number of completed actions for the water reported by the 
CoM  signatories  after  the  launch  of  the  Technical  Assistance  Project  will 
provide  evidence  of  the  impact  of  the  initiative  on  the  quality  and  natural 
resources of the cities. 

If  data  is  available,  the  change  of  the  AQB  in  time  will  also  provide 
evidence of the impact on resource quality in CoM cities.  

Assessment: Positive impact (+) 

The  Technical  Assistance  project  will  increase  the  attractiveness  of  the 
CoM.  It  is  expected  that,  from  the  start,  the  Technical  Assistance  project 
will motivate several cities to sign up to CoM. Once part of the coalition, 
the  city  will  commit  to  set  up  climate  adaptation  targets  through  the 
development  of  the  SECAP.  On  this,  the  Guidebook  for  CoM  signatories 
developed  by  the  JRC  includes  biodiversity  and  environment,  land-use 
planning, and agriculture and forestry, as key vulnerable sectors to evaluate. 

Therefore,  the  number  of  completed  actions  for  the  above-mentioned 
sectors  reported  by  the  CoM  signatories  after  the  launch  of  the  Technical 
Assistance  Project  will  provide  evidence  of  the  impact  of  the  initiative  on 
the biodiversity of the cities. 
Assessment: Positive impact (+) 

281 Monforti-Ferrario, F. et al (2018) "The impact on air quality of energy saving measures in the major cities signatories of the Covenant of Mayors initiative." Environment international 118 (2018): 222-234. 

172 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Cross cutting impacts 

in 

Impacts 
developing 
countries 

As  highlighted  above  impacts 
in  developing  countries  are 
important  to  EU  economically 
(supply  chains  /  markets)  and 
socially  (family  ties,  migration, 
to 
security).  Strategy  aims 
climate 
support 
resilience  of  3rd 
(not  only 
developing) countries.  

improved 

Impact  on  third 
countries 
and 
international 
relations (+/-) 

In  total,  up  to  November  2019,  2  221 
municipalities have become signatories of the 
Global  Covenant  of  Mayors  and  reported 
through  MyCovenant  platform,  that  includes 
providing information on adaptation.  

From these total number of signatories, 1 922 
belong  to  EU28+EFTA  countries  and  299  to 
non-(EU28+EFTA).  

Further,  the  number  of  non-EU  cities  taking 
part  of  the  outreach  activities  of  the  CoM 
could be used as a baseline. 

Indirect impact 

Although  the  recipients  for  the  Technical  Assistance  project  would  be 
participants in the EU Covenant of Mayors, the project will include mutual 
learning webinars and workshops that could be open to participation of 
cities  outside  Europe  as  well.  This  will  allow  EU  cities  to  share  their 
experiences, lessons learned and good practices with non-EU countries and 
thus, further promote the adoption of climate adaption plans globally. 

Moreover, the output of the Technical Assistance project, including relevant 
data,  risk  assessments  and  adaptation  plans  would  be  made  publicly 
available and disseminated, through platforms such as Climate-Adapt and 
the  EU  CoM  website.  This  will  enable  non-EU  cities  to  make  use  of  the 
acquired knowledge to develop their own adaptive capacity. 

Finally,  the  project  would  also  increase  the  political  visibility  and 
attractiveness  of  the  EU  CoM  as  the  key  flagship  initiative  not  only  for 
local climate action in the EU but also globally. 
Assessment: Positive impact (+) 

Some key reports in the field 

  EEA (2020) Urban Adaption in Europe https://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/urban-adaptation-in-europe  

  Reckien, D. et al (2015) "The influence of drivers and barriers on urban adaptation and mitigation plans—an empirical analysis of European 

cities."  

  Monforti-Ferrario, F. et al (2018) "The impact on air quality of energy saving measures in the major cities signatories of the Covenant of Mayors 

initiative. 

  Bertoldi, P et. Al (2020), “Covenant of Mayors: 2019 Assessment”, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg” ISBN 978-92-76-

10722-4, doi:10.2760/775755, JRC118927 

  Reckien, D. et al. (2018). How are cities planning to respond to climate change? Assessment of local climate plans from 885 cities in the EU-28. 

Journal of Cleaner Production.  

173 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MEASURE  5.6:  Support  vulnerable  groups  and  enterprises  through  education  and  reskilling  initiatives  for  green  jobs  and  new  business  models, 

including through the European Skills Agenda and European Social Fund Plus (ESF+), with a particular focus on adaptation and resilience. 

Baseline, context and rationale 

The Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) serves as the basis for the implementation of the EU budget and allows the European Commission 
and Member States to implement EU policies and deliver the objectives of the EU mission, such as those to support vulnerable groups and enterprises. 
The  MFF  covers  seven  areas  of  funding,  of  which  over  half  is  channelled  through  the  5  European  Structural  and  Investment  Funds  (ESIF)282.  The 
European Social Fund (ESF) is one such channel, and aims at enhancing employment and fairer life opportunities for all. It is the EU’s main tool for 
helping people find employment (or better employment), integrate disadvantaged people into society, and ensure fairer life opportunities for all. The 
European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) is the successor of the ESF under the newest MFF budget period. The governance for the ESF+ and the other 
ESIF funds is laid out in the Common Provisions Regulation (CPR). In the next budget period, these funds will be managed by a new CPR. The new 
CPR builds off the current one and introduces a number of innovations, such as: 

  a smarter Europe, through innovation, digitisation, economic transformation and support for small and medium-sized businesses;  

  a greener, carbon free Europe, implementing the Paris Agreement and investing in energy transition, renewables and the fight against climate 

change; 

  a more connected Europe, with strategic transport and digital networks; 

  a more Social Europe, delivering on the European Pillar of Social Rights and supporting quality employment, education, skills, social inclusion and 

equal access to healthcare; 

  a Europe closer to citizens, by supporting locally led development strategies and sustainable urban development across the EU. 

Of these, the ESF+ will contribute the Social Europe policy pillar. From the proposal for the ESF+ regulation, it is clear that the rules and guidelines 
for climate action within the Fund are still under development283. The regulation mentions that the contribution of the ESF+ to the 30% target of the 

282 European Commission (2018). European structural and investment funds.  
Retrieved from: https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/funding-opportunities/funding-programmes/overview-fundingprogrammes/european-structural-and-investment-funds_en#thefunds  
283 European Commission (2018). Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+), COM (2018) 382 final, 30.5.2018. 

174 

 
 
                                                 
MFF will be tracked through an EU climate marker system at an appropriate level of disaggregation, including the use of more precise methodologies 
where these are available. Climate change will affect labour markets through impacts from regulations affecting supply and demand side employment, 
as well as direct impacts on natural  and built environments284. According to the most recent PESETA III report285, the total EU welfare loss due to 
climate change under a high warming scenario is estimated to be around 1.9% of GDP (EUR 240 billion) per year by the end of the century. This is 
mostly associated to heat-related mortality, coastal and river flooding, decrease in labour productivity, and agriculture losses. Welfare losses are further 
vulnerable to changes in trade flows associated with climate change which could increase losses by another 20%. A previous study by Trinomics286 
estimated that potential job losses around 410,000 by 2050 if no adaptation measures are taken. On the other end of the spectrum, the study estimated 
that  adaptation  measures  could  lead  to  the  creation  of  500,000  jobs  by  2050.  Three  sectors,  water  management,  energy  supply,  and  transport 
infrastructure, are likely to see the largest investments in Europe’s adaptation to climate change, and thus the largest net employment gains287. Together 
these sectors account for 90% of employment gains associated with adaptation investments. 

The question of what constitutes green skills and jobs is difficult to answer. Primarily because each Member State approaches reskilling employees for 
the green economy differently, with no common approach to data collection or definition for green jobs. This means that methods for categorising and 
measuring the amount of green jobs varies among countries. Despite these differences in classifications and methods, changes in green employment are 
largely contributed to two factors: 1) the general economic cycle, and trends in government policy and the availability of governmental incentives and 
subsides. Permanent mechanisms dedicated to the green economy and green employment, including green skills anticipation, are needed but rather rare 
in the EU. The European Skills Agenda, a five-year plan to assist skill building for individuals and businesses is one such foray. It enshrines social 
fairness, such as access to education, training and lifelong learning, and seeks to strengthen sustainable competitiveness and build resilience to crises. 
The European Skills Agenda also seeks to unlock investments (both public and private) in skills. 

Interviews: In the interviews, social impact of the Strategy was mentioned by several interviewees. One interviewee felt that the biggest added value 
for analysis on adaptation is with a focus on the economic case. Where the economic impact is being regarded as the enabler of environmental and 
social action. They further specified that social impact, which is closely related to the economic impact, should focus on well-being, job security, and 

284 Martinez-Fernandez, C., Hinojosa, C., & Miranda, G. (2010). Greening jobs and skills labor market implications of addressing climate change oecd. 
285 Ciscar J.C., Feyen L., Ibarreta D., Soria A. (2018), Climate impacts in Europe, Final report of the JRC PESETA III project, https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/news/climate-change-human-and-economic-outlook-europeans 
286 Trinomics (formerly: Triple E consulting) (2014), Assessing the implications of climate change adaptation on employment in the EU, available at: https://climate-adapt.eea.europa.eu/metadata/publications/assessing-the- 
implications-of-climate-change-adataptation-on-employment-in-the-eu-1 
287 Görlach, B., Thie, JE., Faber, R., Stenning, J., Lonsdale, J. (2020) Employment policies to support a low-carbon and climate resilient transition 
Draft Final Report - Adaptation component. 

175 

 
 
                                                 
health. Another interviewee discussed the overall resistance to some of the big changes that need to happen for jobs, i.e. moving people from one sector 
to another. They felt that the EU needs to focus on vulnerable sectors and people.  

OPC:  Question  12  of  the  OPC  asked  respondents  how  important  it  is  for  a  new  EU  Adaptation  to  achieve  improved  health,  social  cohesion  and 
resilience. The majority of respondents felt it was very important (58%).  

ACTION 6: Further mainstreaming and integrating adaptation in EU legislation and instruments 

NO MEASURE selected on Action 6 

ACTION 7: Climate Proofing of Infrastructure and beyond. 

7.2: Ensure climate-proofing guidelines are applied as widely as possible for the climate resilience of new infrastructures in Europe and abroad. 

Baseline, context, and rationale 
The 2013 Strategy through Action 7 led to the development of guidelines and technical standards for climate proofing in the infrastructure sector288. 
The 2018 Evaluation  concluded that there remains  room for improvement  in  the awareness  and  actual use of these  guidance documents  for project 
managers. The provision of guidance documentation on how to use methodologies or develop the required infrastructure project documentation relating 
to climate adaptation is crucial for the effective implementation of adaptation measures.289 

288 European Commission (2016). Non-paper Guidelines for Project Managers: Making vulnerable investments climate resilient. 
289 European Commission (2018). Climate change adaptation of major infrastructure projects. A stock-taking of available resources to assist the development of climate resilient infrastructure. Retrieved from:  
https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/information/publications/studies/2018/climate-change-adaptation-of-major-infrastructure-projects 

176 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
In  the  transport  sector,  for  instance,  incremental  climate  change  effects  (e.g.,  sea-level  rise,  heat  waves)  can  result  in  transportation  infrastructure 
damages, operational disruptions, and pressures on supply chain capacity and efficiency290. Nonetheless, as the 2018 evaluation concluded, there is still 
a lack of awareness about the importance of climate proofing in the infrastructural sector and room for improvement in the usage of guidelines and 
technical standards. This lack of awareness may be one of the causes of the uneven and weak understanding of vulnerabilities and the need to establish 
climate resilient transport infrastructure across Europe. Therefore, as part of the new EU Adaptation Strategy, planning and climate risk management 
will be reinforced by e.g. strengthening climate-proofing transport.  

When asked in the OPC how respondents would rate a list of potential actions for a new EU Adaptation Strategy, half of the respondents found it very 
important to increase infrastructure resilience through extended use of EU climate proofing guidance (50 %).In the context of the recovery from the 
COVID-19 crisis, the importance of application of climate proofing guidelines for the planned Renovation Wave has been reinforced.  Consequently, 
the new Strategy will seek to  set  up the needed tools and guidance to  support the investment  in  infrastructure that  is  coherent  with  the “build back 
better” approach. 

Description of measure 

This measure will seek to ensure that the climate proofing guidelines are applied as widely as possible for the climate resilience of new infrastructures 
in  Europe  and  abroad.  Building  on  the  existing  guidelines  and  technical  standards  developed  as  part  of  the  2013  Strategy  through  Action  7,  it  will 
promote the application of the guidelines to address the climate resilience of existing infrastructure, in particular for critical infrastructures (i.e. those 
essential for the maintenance of vital societal functions, health, safety, security, economic or social well-being of people), and networks (e.g. transport, 
communication, and energy). 

Objectives and actions: 

  Understand the reasons behind the low application of the climate proofing guidelines developed as part of the 2013 Strategy through Action 7 to 
address the climate resilience of existing infrastructure, to ensure that these are improved in accordance to the gaps expressed by the users (e.g. 
project managers, urban practitioners) 

290 UNECE - United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (2020). Climate Change Impacts and Adaptation for Transport Networks and Nodes. Available at:  
https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/trans/doc/2020/wp5/ECE-TRANS-283e.pdf 

177 

 
 
                                                 
  Ensure that the climate proofing guidelines are applied as widely as possible for the climate resilience of new infrastructures in Europe and abroad, 
taking into consideration the latest developments by the European Committee for Standardisation (CEN, Centre Européen de Normalisation) and 
the  International  Standards  Organisation  (ISO),  which  are  constantly  reviewing  existing  standards  to  better  address  climate  risk.  This  should  be 
done  by  e.g.  exchanges  with  operators  of  critical  infrastructures  and  relevant  engineering  companies,  to  assess  how  these  guidelines  could 
complement the current engineering and design requirements, as well as the operation and maintenance practices. 

  Disseminate the use of other existing tools to support climate proofing of infrastructure, such as the ‘HARmonized grids of Critical Infrastructures 
in Europe’ (HARCI-EU) dataset, which were produced by integrating geospatial and statistical data from multiple sources and provide a consistent 
mapping of critical infrastructure in key sectors that can serve as exposure information for large-scale risk assessments in Europe; and incorporate 
the  outcome  of  other  EU  funded  relevant  projects  such  as  IMPROVER  (Improved  risk  evaluation  and  implementation  of  resilience  concepts  to 
critical infrastructure), and EU Circle (a Pan-European framework Strengthening Critical Infrastructure Resilience to Climate Change) 

  Build  capacity  of  partner  countries  to  apply  climate  proofing  guidance,  e.g.  through  mechanisms  to  support  climate  proofing  of  investments 

(similarly to how it is currently done for EU-funded investments in the EU through Structural Funds). 

Impact pathways 

In the table below impacts are assessed using a scale from (--/-/0/+/++) negative to positive. Impacts are assessed up to 2050 relative to the baseline. It 
assumes the full uptake of the measure as the increasing severity of physical climate risks results in disruptive impacts across Europe, and consequently 
the relevance of climate-proofed infrastructure is widely recognised.   

Table 32: Mini-Assessment of Climate Proofing of Infrastructure and Disaster Risk Management 

Impact indicator 

Relevance 

Indicator 

Baseline  

Impact 
pathway 

Envisaged impact 2050 (relative to baseline) 

Economic 

Macroeconomic 
environment  

Impacts  on  the  economy  are  a 
hugely 
for 
action and reducing damages can 

significant  driver 

Economic 
welfare  (losses) 

A study led by the EU JRC291 assessed the risks on the economy of 
damages  on  critical  infrastructure  caused  by  climate  change 
extremes using a prognostic modelling framework. It was found that 

Direct impact 

Included  in  modelling  results  for  Option  1  in 
chapter  6.  This  measure  ensures  climate-
proofing  guidelines  are  applied  as  widely  as 

291 Forzieri, Giovanni, et al. "Escalating impacts of climate extremes on critical infrastructures in Europe." Global environmental change 48 (2018): 97-107.i 

178 

 
 
                                                 
be  an 
important 
increased resilience. 

indicator  of 

(-/+) 

the  expected  annual  damage  (EAD)  of  multihazard  and  -sector 
impacts of critical infrastructures was €3.4 billion per year for EU+ 
in  2010  but  is  projected  to  amount  to  approximately  €9.3  billion, 
€19.6  billion,  and  €37.0  billion  per  year  by  the  2020s,  2050s,  and 
2080s, respectively, only because of the effects of climate change. 

As  a  baseline,  in  2020  Q1  the  GVA  of  transport  of  good-related 
transport, 
sectors 
(e.g.  NACE  wholesale  and 
accommodation,  and  food  service  activities) 
in  EU27  was 
€546,557.3  million and  of  industry  (NACE  industry)  €  600  246 
million.292 

trade, 

retail 

Competitiveness, 
trade,  and  investment 
flows 

Vulnerability  of  supply  chains  to 
impacts  can  be  relevant  and  the 
Strategy  will  influence  the  types 
of investments being made.  

Impact 
on 
competitiveness
and 
trade 
, 
(climate 
resilient) 
investments 
(+/-) 

Estimates  of  annual  infrastructure  investment  needs  have  ranged 
from some US$ 3.7  -7 trillion a year, however, available funds are 
three  orders  of  magnitude 
significantly 
insufficient.293 

smaller  and 

this 

Indirect impact 

Regulatory  burden  on 
business 

to 

guidance 

Changes 
and 
standards  in  affected  sectors  will 
change  the  way  that  firms  work. 
Can  require  additional  actions  to 
meet climate resilient standards.  

Regulatory 
burden 
business (+/-) 

on 

Financial  and  insurance  sector  businesses  have  some  data  sharing 
requirements,  but  as  established  processes  should  not  lead  to 
additional costs in the baseline scenario. 

Direct impact 

possible  for  the  climate  resilience  of  new 
infrastructures  in  Europe.  The  damages  in  the 
tourism  and  in  the  transport-sector  are  reduced 
by  an  assumed  percentage  10%  in  the  tourism 
sector  and  20%  in  the  transport  sector.  The 
narrative  behind  this  would  be  region  specific. 
tourism  sector  are 
in 
the 
The  damages 
related  or  mitigatable  by 
infrastructure 
improved 
reduction  of 
damages  from  infrastructure  is  derived  from 
Lehr  et  al.  2019  estimates  for  Germany  and 
distributed  across  Member  States  according  to 
the damages in the transport sector.  

infrastructure.  The 

Assessment:  Quantitative  results  included  in 
Option  1  assessment  in  Chapter  6,  qualitative 
assessment (+) 

By  promoting  the  use  of  climate  proofing 
methodologies, this measure is expected to have 
a  positive  impact  on  investment  flows,  as  the 
participation of the private sector is expected to 
be encouraged. 

Assessment: Positive impact (+) 

Requiring greater provision of data and defining 
the  format  and  granularity  of  this  data,  would 
impose  additional  costs  on  firms  that  hold  and 
would need to provide this data. Affected firms 
will  be  mostly  large  firms  concentrated  in  the 
financial sector. 

Assessment: (-) 

Increased 
and research 

innovation 

The  Strategy  will  guide  research 
under Horizon Europe and aims to 

Impact 
adaptation 

on 

Minimal impact  The  success  of 

this  measure  significantly 
depends  on  the  level  of  understanding  of  the 

292 Eurostat. Gross value added and income A*10 industry breakdowns 
293 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/24724718.2019.1594567  

179 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
encourage  greater  adoption  of 
innovation. 

innovation 
adoption (+/-) 

Public authorities (and 
budgets) 

The  Strategy  will  significantly 
impact  on  public  spending  on 
climate 
primarily 
resilience, 
through indirect routes. 

Public spending 
on 
adaptation 
(€) 

Before  the  MFF  2021-2027  was  released,  20%  of  the  EU  budget 
was  spent  on  climate  action  explicitly,  but  there  were  no  ‘climate 
proofing’ requirements for the remaining 80% of the budget.294 

Indirect impact 

2013  Strategy 

reasons  behind  the  low  application  of  the 
climate proofing guidelines developed as part of 
the 
proposing 
improvement  approaches.  For  this,  past  (e.g. 
IMPROVER),  current,  and  future  Horizon 
Europe projects will be very relevant. 

and 

on 

Assessment: Positive impact (+) 

The  new  Strategy  will  ensure  climate-proofing 
guidelines are applied as widely as possible for 
the  climate  resilience  of  new  infrastructures. 
Moreover, it will require climate proofing of all 
EU  external  investments  (See  Measure  11.1) 
both  through  grants,  guarantees  and  blending 
instruments. 

As  a  result,  the  public  budget  allocated  to 
ensure 
new 
infrastructure is expected to increase. 

proofing 

climate 

the 

of 

Social impacts 

Employment 

Impacts  on  the  economy  and  in-
turn  on  employment  are  a  hugely 
significant  driver  for  action  and 
reducing  damages  and  job  losses 
can  be  an  important  indicator  of 
increased resilience. 

Employment 
(FTE)  

Investing in climate-resilient infrastructure has a positive impact on 
employment  since  it  increases  the  demand  for  construction  sector 
output. However, in Europe, the effect will be lowered compared to 
other regions. ILO (2018) 295 presents an estimate of the construction 
sector  employment  multiplier  for  every  US$1  million  invested  in 
adaptation  infrastructure,  which  can  serve  as  a  baseline.  In 
Germany,  for  every  US$1  million  invested  in  the  construction 
sector, it is expected that 15 jobs will be created. The magnitude of 
the employment impact varies for each infrastructure project. 

Indirect 
positive impact 

By  promoting 
the  climate  proofing  of 
infrastructure and beyond, it is expected that the 
new strategy will foster the creation of jobs not 
only  related  to  the  implementation  of  the 
improved  methodologies  but  in  the  critical 
infrastructure 
(construction, 
related-sectors 
transport)  because  of  an  increase  of  better-
informed investment flows. 

Assessment: Positive impact (+) 

Income 
distribution, 
social  protection  and 

Distributional  impacts  of  climate 
change  can  be  significant,  the 

Distributional 
and 

equity 

The  effects  of  climate  change  in  Europe  will  be  uneven  across 
countries, as indicated in the latest PESETA IV report. In the case of 

Targeted 
impact 

The  rigorous  application  of  climate  proofing 
guidelines for critical infrastructure ensures that 

Assessment: Positive impact (+) 

294 López, Sofia, et al. (2020). Adapting to change: Time for climate resilience and a new adaptation strategy. European Policy Centre. Issue Paper.  
295 ILO (2018) “The employment impact of climate change adaptation”. Input Document for the G20 Climate Sustainability Working Group International Labour Office – Geneva, 

180 

 
 
                                                 
social 
inclusion 
particular groups) 

(of 

citizens 

through 

mitigate 

Strategy  is  intended  to  address 
inequalities, 
and 
better-
including 
and 
informing 
encouraging  action.  Needs 
to 
address  broader  questions  of 
equity (see other impacts) such as 
location,  economic  and  social 
cohesion, 
of 
gender 
fundamental rights. 

and 

impacts (+/-) 

critical  infrastructure,  some  regions  will  experience  higher  direct 
damages.  For  instance,  increased  river  and  coastal  flooding  could 
disturb  significantly  energy  infrastructures  in  flood-prone  areas. 
Similarly,  countries  that  depend  largely  on  maritime  transport 
infrastructure (e.g. coastal zones), will be most severely affected by 
sea-level rise and coastal extremes.296  

the  adaptive  capacity  of  the  most  vulnerable 
regions  and  sectors  to  the  effects  of  climate 
change will be improved. 

Assessment: Positive impact (++) 

Public  health  &  safety 
and health systems  

Increased 
resilience  of  public 
health  and  safety  systems  is  an 
important goal of the Strategy. 

on 
health 
civil 

Impact 
public 
and 
emergency 
systems (+/-) 

A  number  of  actions  under  the  2013  Adaptation  Strategy  (such  as 
‘climate proofing’ infrastructure projects) did address some climate-
related  anticipatory  and  preventive  health  concerns  but  not  to  the 
extent needed.297 

Indirect impact 

for 

the 

improvement  of 

By ensuring the application of climate proofing 
guidelines 
the 
infrastructure of health and other public systems 
services,  the  new  Strategy  will  have  a  positive 
effect  on  the  prevention  of  disruption  of  the 
services  (electricity  supply,  transport,  water 
supply,  etc.).  Furthermore,  increased  asset  life, 
reduced  repair  and  maintenance  costs  because 
of climate proofing, is expected to decrease the 
need for retrofitting and maintenance costs and 
the  risk  of  the  asset  becoming  prematurely 
obsolete. 
Assessment: Positive impact (++) 

Environmental impacts 

The climate  

Critical  impact  targeted  by  the 
strategy.  Increase  of  resilience  to 
climate  impacts  and  preventing 
addition, 
climate 
with 
potential 

synergies 

risks. 

In 

on 

Impact 
climate 
resilience (+/-) 

(possible) 
Synergy  with 

Infrastructure  networks  will  be  affected  by  the  physical  impacts  of 
climate variability and change, but will also play an essential role in 
building resilience to those impacts, considering that the long-lived 
nature of infrastructure implies that decisions made now will lock-in 
vulnerability if they fail to consider these impacts.298 

Targeted  direct 
impact. 

Through  promoting  the  application  of  climate 
proofing  guidelines  for  critical  infrastructure, 
this measure will contribute to the achievement 
of 
the  Paris  Agreement  by 
increasing  the  capacity  to  adapt  to  climate 

the  goals  of 

296 Feyen L., Ciscar J.C., Gosling S., Ibarreta D., Soria A. (editors) (2020). Climate change impacts and adaptation in Europe. JRC PESETA IV final report. EUR 30180EN, Publications Office of the European Union,  
Luxembourg, ISBN 978-92-76-18123-1, doi:10.2760/171121, JRC119178. 
297 European Commission (2020) Adaptation to Health Effects of Climate Change in Europe Group of Chief Scientific Advisors. Available at: https://www.kowi.de/en/Portaldata/2/Resources/fp/scientific-opinion-adaptation-to-
climate-_change-related-health-effects.pdf  
298 OECD (2018) Climate-resilient Infrastructure – Policy perspectives 

181 

 
 
                                                 
mitigation  may 
considering. 

be  worth 

climate 
mitigation (+/-) 

Moreover,  climate  proofing  has  shown  to  be  very  relevant  for 
sectors with high climate mitigation potential, such as energy.299 

of 

natural 

Quality 
resources/fighting 
pollution  (water,  soil, 
air, etc.)  

to 

intends 

Strategy 
address 
impacts  of  climate  change  on 
natural  resources,  e.g.  forests, 
agriculture, marine environment.  

Biodiversity, including 
fauna, 
flora, 
ecosystems  and 
the 
services  they  provide 
and landscapes  

to 

intends 

Strategy 
address 
impacts  of  climate  change  on 
biodiversity, and also to make use 
of Ecosystem-based solutions.  

Impact 
on 
natural resource 
resilience (+/-) 

The quality and availability of natural resources can be improved by 
climate  proofing  infrastructure  dependent  on  these  resources.  For 
instance, climate-proofed investments in the hydropower sector can 
avoid  unintended  consequences  on  the  availability  and  quality  of 
water resources.  

Indirect impact 

of 

Use 
ecosystem-
based  solutions 
increased 
and 
resilience 
of 
ecosystems  (+/-
) 

Some approaches to climate-resilient infrastructure, particularly the 
use  of  natural  infrastructure,  can  lead  to  biodiversity  conservation, 
such as NbS.300 Coastal resilience, for example, can be achieved for 
substantially  lower  costs  through  restoration projects  in  mangroves 
and  salt  marshes  for  wave  reduction  compared  to  traditional 
alternatives such as breakwaters.301 

Indirect impact 

change  and  confirming  that  investments  are 
consistent  with  a  low-emissions  and  climate-
resilient development. 
Assessment: Positive impact (++) 

to  encourage  climate-
This  measure  aims 
proofed  investments  in  some  sectors  that  are 
highly dependent on the use of natural resources 
(e.g.  energy  generation).  Therefore,  it  can  be 
expected  that  it  will  have  a  positive  impact  on 
natural resources utilised. 

Assessment: Positive impact (+) 

raising  awareness  about 

By 
the  multiple 
benefits  of  some  approaches  for  climate-
resilient  infrastructure  such  as  NbS  for  coastal 
critical  infrastructure,  this  measure  is  expected 
to  have  a  positive  impact  on  biodiversity 
conservation 
these 
approaches are considered.  
Assessment: Positive impact (+) 

the  areas  where 

in 

Some key reports in the field 

  European Commission (2018) Climate change adaptation of major infrastructure projects- A stock-taking of available resources to assist the 

development of climate-resilient infrastructure 

  OECD (2018) Climate-resilient Infrastructure – Policy perspectives 

  OECD (2019) Good Governance for Critical Infrastructure Resilience 

299  Feyen  L.,  Ciscar  J.C.,  Gosling  S.,  Ibarreta  D.,  Soria  A.  (editors)  (2020).  Climate  change  impacts  and  adaptation  in  Europe.  JRC  PESETA  IV  final  report.  EUR  30180EN,  Publications  Office  of  the  European  Union, 
Luxembourg, ISBN 978-92-76-18123-1, doi:10.2760/171121, JRC119178. 
300 OECD (2018) Climate-resilient Infrastructure – Policy perspectives 
301 European Commission (2020) Nature-based solutions for flood mitigation and coastal resilience 

182 

 
 
 
                                                 
  CLARITY – Climate Resilience Project’s Documentation. https://clarity-h2020.eu/  
  EU-CIRCLE Project’s Documentation: (https://www.eu-circle.eu /) 
  RESISTO Project’s Documentation (http://www.resistoproject.eu/) 
 

INFRASTRESS Project’s Documentation (https://www.infrastress.eu/) 

183 

 
 
 
ACTION 8: Narrowing the Climate Protection Gap—Micro-economic policy 

MEASURE  8.2:  Funding  instruments:  mainstreaming  of  resilience,  adaptation  and  climate  risk management  concerns  in  the  design  of  calls  and of 
project selection criteria and the identification of “EU interest” resilience upgrades required for interconnected critical infrastructure 

MEASURE 8.3: EU policy settings influencing private finance. Focus on the importance of adaptation ambition in the revision of the Non-Financial 

Reporting Directive and of prudential rules. 

Baseline, context and rationale 

Given the unavoidable rise of climate pressures in the years ahead, the EU and its Member States need to review their financial preparedness to deal 
with  adverse  climate  impacts  and  to  consider  actions  to  make  societies  more  resilient.  Climate-driven  events  pose  risks  to  assets  and  economic 
activities.  As  losses  occur,  households,  firms  and  governments  are  affected.  Fiscal  sustainability  and  financial  stability  implications  may  arise  as 
extreme  climate  related  events  by  their  very  nature  tend  to  affect  many  economic  actors  at  the  same  time,  including  critical  interconnected 
infrastructure,  goods  and  services  such  as  energy,  transport,  ICT,  water  and  food  supplies.  The  extent  to  which  the  adverse  effects  from  the 
materialisation of such risks affect the real economy depend to an important extent on resilience, risk preparedness and business continuity approaches, 
but  also  on  how  losses  are  ultimately  allocated,  and  the  extent  to  which  they  are  covered/anticipated  including  by  risk  pooling  instruments,  both 
nationally and across borders.  

It  is  important  to  consider  that  not  all  environments,  activities,  assets  and  people  are  affected  in  the  same  way.  Impacts  can  therefore  only  be 
understood, measured, reduced and managed in a local and sectoral context. This calls for a multi-sectoral and cross-cutting approach to mainstreaming 
climate-related financial risk management into policy design and decision-making at EU level. 

The climate protection gap has been defined as the difference between the insured losses and the total economic losses caused by an extreme weather 
or climate-related event. Overall, only an estimated 35% of the total losses caused by climate extremes across Europe are currently insured. This leaves 
a climate protection gap for insurance of 65%.302 Increasing climate extremes will lead to greater economic and insured losses in the EU, but the extent 
to which observed climate change has already contributed to growing disaster losses is still difficult to estimate. The estimation of the losses may even 
be at the lower bound, because only economic losses that reflect the monetised direct damages to certain assets can be measured. Losses of human life, 

302 EEA (2019) Economic losses from climate-related extremes (https://www.eea.europa.eu/ds_resolveuid/IND-182-en )  

184 

 
 
                                                 
economic losses as a consequence of non-damage-related business interruption, cultural heritage or ecosystem services are not part of the estimations 
that are currently available.303 This does not mean, however, that all losses should be insured.  

Reliable data on insured and uninsured economic losses is necessary to inform the European and national macro-economic, microeconomic, climate 
adaptation and climate-related disaster risk resilience policies and to support climate adaptation efforts of all parts of society from individual citizens to 
the EU level. To allow comparability and aggregation of data from various sources, a set of common definitions and standards is needed.  

In  general,  insurance  markets  are  still  influenced  to  a  significant  degree  by  national  contract  laws.  Regarding  data  governance,  currently  no  EU 
mandate exists for climate-related loss data collection and sharing, open access to economic value of assets and replacement costs and to number of 
natural disaster insurance policies held by Europeans. EU action to promote this will therefore mainly be indirect. Direct actions to narrow the climate 
protection gap do exist through, for example, the uptake of conditions in the EU funding instruments, such as ‘build back better criteria’ that enhance 
resilience and risk preparedness. In the 2013 Adaptation Strategy, no clear baseline was developed of how the market for insurance and other financial 
products for resilient investment would develop as a result of the above activities. Still, the measures to narrow the climate protection gap can build on 
existing EU tools and legislation, which is explained in the objectives and actions.  

The importance for narrowing the climate protection gap has been articulated in the interviews and stakeholder workshops. Stakeholders mentioned 
that measures go beyond insurance, as it also includes public policy solutions, such as the collection of disaster loss data as well as supporting and de-
risking the creation of public-private partnerships that could develop climate risk-transfer mechanisms for increasing climate risks.  

The OPC results (Q13) show that, although respondents know where to find information about the climate-related risks they are exposed to (~20%), 
they are less aware of where to find financial support to invest in resilience (~11%). From Q15-16 of the OPC it follows that respondents are of the 
opinion that citizens at large and local authorities should have easier access to climate risk data for both historical and  projected damages to people, 
nature and assets (compare ~20% for citizens and local authorities to ~12.5% for prospective private and public buyers and commercial owners).  

Description of measure 

At a micro-economic level, the European Commission lacks a systematic approach to assess, reduce, and optimally transfer climate-related disaster risk 
in  its  activities.  Climate impacts  are  cross  cutting  across  all  sectors  and  consequently  all  EU  policy  areas.  To  adequately  address  mainstreaming  of 

303 EIOPA (2019). Discussion paper on the protection gap for natural catastrophes. Retrieved from: https://www.eiopa.europa.eu/content/discussion-paper-protection-gap-natural-catastrophes_en  

185 

 
 
                                                 
resilience,  adaptation,  and  risk  management,  the  EU  needs  tools  that  go  beyond  a  supportive  and  facilitative  role,  as  is  the  case  with  the  climate 
adaptation,  and  disaster  risk  management  policy  frameworks.  There  needs  to  be  particular  consideration  for  the  role  of  EU  legislation  to  close  the 
climate protection gap, including: 

  The identification of economic losses and socio-economic vulnerability;  

  The identification of vulnerable infrastructure critical to the EU economy;  

  Systematically mainstreaming climate adaptation in investment decision processes;  

  Developing adaptation focused risk transfer and natural disaster insurance solutions across EU Member States. 

In accordance with policy coherence principles (i.e. ensure that regulation and funding take into account disaster risk before creating new exposure; 
reduce existing risk by building up resilience; manage residual financial risk), this will be implemented as follows:  

  Funding instruments: mainstreaming of resilience, adaptation and climate risk management concerns in the design of calls and of project selection 

criteria and the identification of “EU interest” resilience upgrades required for interconnected critical infrastructure 

  EU policy settings influencing private finance. Already in planned Renewed Sustainable Finance Strategy but stress on the importance of 

adaptation ambition in the revision of the Non-Financial Reporting Directive and of prudential rules. 

Objectives and actions. 

These two measures will specifically:  

  Update Better Regulation guidelines and in particular its risk management toolbox; 

  Rollout increased risk literacy training programme; 

  Broaden sustainability and climate proofing and the promote enhanced insurance penetration; 

 

Identify vulnerability hotspots in interconnected critical infrastructure and enhance early warning systems, business continuity measures and 
sectoral enhance insurance penetration; 

186 

 
 
 
  Funding and investments instruments and EU Solidarity Fund: enhanced climate protection gap mainstreaming; 
 

Improving transparency on current and future climate-related disaster vulnerability of new and existing economic activities and assets; 

  Revisiting prudential rules to ensure higher standards with regard to climate physical risks considerations and recognise the reduced risk profile of 

resilient assets and activities. 

Impact pathways 

A distinction is made between measure 8.2 and 8.3 impact pathways and impact; however they share the same baseline, context and rational so they are 
assessed in the same table.  

In the table below impacts are assessed using a scale from (--/-/0/+/++) negative to positive. Impacts are assessed up to 2050 relative to the baseline. It 
assumes  the  full  uptake  of  the  measure  as  the  increasing  severity  of  physical  climate  risks  on  our  economic  activities  and  assets  is  more  widely 
recognized, and consequently the importance of understanding the actual risk and its mitigation.   

Table 33: Mini-assessment to narrowing the climate protection gap—Micro-economic policy 

Impact indicator 

Relevance 

Indicator 

Baseline  

Economic 

Micro-economic 
climate 
protection 
gap impact pathway 

Envisaged impact 2050 (relative to baseline) 

Macroeconomic environment  

Impacts  on  the  economy  are  a 
hugely significant driver for action 
and  reducing  damages  can  be  an 
important  indicator  of  increased 
resilience. 

Economic  welfare 
(losses) (-/+) 

The  diverse  and  the  pervasive  impacts  of  a 
changing  climate  cut  across  all  kinds  of  human 
activity. Without a multi-sectoral and cross-cutting 
approach 
climate-related 
financial  risk  management,  climate  impacts  will 
burden Member State economies with a clear North 
to South divide.  

to  mainstreaming 

Funding instruments 
Indirect Impact 

Measure will ensure high standards with regard 
to  climate  physical  risk  considerations  and 
bring  recognition  to  assets  and  activities  with 
high  risk  profiles.  This  measure  will  also 
enhance  early  warning  systems  and  roll  out 
business  continuity  measures, 
limiting  the 
negative  impacts  of  hazards  on  the  economy 
and shortening the recovery time. 
Assessment: Positive impact (+) 

Influencing  private 
finance 
Indirect Impact 

Revisiting  prudential 
rules  could  benefit 
insurers  from  a  single  market  for  natural 
disaster insurance by enhancing cooperation in 
cross  border  provision  and  supervision  of 

187 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Competitiveness, 
investment flows 

trade 

and 

Vulnerability  of  supply  chains  to 
impacts  can  be  relevant  and  The 
Strategy 
significantly 
influence  the  types  of  investments 
being made.  

will 

on 

Impact 
competitiveness, 
trade  and  (climate 
resilient) 
investments (+/-) 

Delivery  of  essential  services  will  be  severely 
impacted.  Infrastructure  and  assets  in  hazardous 
areas  will  be  susceptible  to  impact,  and  may  not 
have  appropriate  insurance  coverage  of  their  risks. 
Just-in-time 
alternative 
sources/routes/suppliers,  dependence  on  imports 
can  further  exacerbate  the  negative  impacts  of 
natural disasters. 

supply, 

few 

natural disaster insurance.  
Assessment: Positive impact (+) 

Measure  will  identify  critical  infrastructure 
hotspots  so  that  they  be  made  more  resilient 
and  in  turn  reduce  vulnerability  of  supply 
chains to climate impacts 
Assessment: Positive impact (+) 

Funding instruments 
Indirect Impact 

Influencing  private 
finance 
Minimal Impact 

Regulatory burden on business 

change 

Various  aspects  of  this  measure 
administrative 
will 
requirements  for  firms  applying 
for  EU  projects/funding.  Influence 
on  other  EU  policies,  e.g.  NFRD 
can  impact  on  firms,  but  costs 
attributable to NFRD. 

Regulatory burden 
on business (+/-) 

Minimal (mandatory) impact 

Minimal impact 

Increased innovation and research 

The  Strategy  will  guide  research 
under Horizon Europe, and aims to 
encourage  greater  adoption  of 
innovation. 

Impact 
adaptation 
innovation 
adoption (+/-) 

on 

Current  models  are  based  on  incomplete  historical 
data,  and  are  not  reliable/forward  looking  enough 
to  properly  identify  vulnerable  regions  and  critical 
infrastructure.  

Funding instruments 
Indirect impact 

Influencing  private 
finance 
Indirect impact 

vulnerability 

Will  spur  studies  and  modeling  efforts  to 
identify 
in 
interconnected  critical 
infrastructure,  and 
enhancement of early warning systems.  
Assessment: Positive impact (+) 

hotspots 

of 

improve 

transparency 

Will 
cliamte 
vulnerability of economic activities and assets, 
which can in turn provide more reliable inputs 
for  models  and  research 
into  NATCAT 
insurance and disaster risk reduction. 

Public authorities (and budgets) 

The  Strategy  will  significantly 
impact  on  public  spending  on 
climate 
primarily 
resilience, 
through indirect routes. 

Public 
spending 
on adaptation (€) 

Climate-related  risk  is  not  considered  throughout 
all  decision-making  processes,  and  there  lacks 
allocation of clear responsibilities and climate risk-
ownership.  Insurance  penetration  remains  low  and 
residual risk financial risk management is scarce.  

Funding instruments 
Direct impact 

Assessment: Positive impact (+) 

Measure  will  not  necessarily  lead  to  new 
its  own,  but  will 
public  spending  on 
mainstream  adapataion  and 
the  climate 
protection  gap  in  calls  for  proposals  and  the 
design  of  projects.  In  short,  insuring  public 
is  being  comissioned  will 
spending 

that 

188 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Social impacts 

Employment 

Impacts  on  the  economy  and  in-
turn  on  employment  are  a  hugely 
significant  driver  for  action  and 
reducing  damages  and  job  losses 
can  be  an  important  indicator  of 
increased resilience. 

Employment 
(FTE) 

The  importance  of  business  continuity  is  not 
included  in  natural  disaster  risk  management 
efforts, and the high level of dependency on system 
interconnectedness negatively impacts employment 
across sectors after a natural disaster.  

Income 
social 
distribution, 
protection  and  social  inclusion  (of 
particular groups) 

Distributional  impacts  of  climate 
change  can  be  significant,  the 
Strategy is intended to address and 
including 
inequalities, 
mitigate 
through  better  informing  citizens 
and  encouraging  action.  Needs  to 
address  broader  questions  of 
equity  (see  other  impacts)  such  as 
location,  economic  and  social 
cohesion,  gender  and  also  of 
fundamental rights. 

Distributional  and 
equity 
impacts 
(+/-) 

tolerance 

loss  and 
Low  socio-economic 
disruption.  Sections  of  the  population  and  the 
economy  that  do  not  have  access  to  reasonably 
priced coverage. 

for 

postively imapct climate resilience.  
Assessment: Positive impact (++) 

The  consideration  of  climate  adaptation 
resilience 
und 
budgeting  by  public  authorities  will  improve 
the insurability of climate-related risks. 

decision-making 

the 

in 

Assessment: Positive impact (+) 

Broad  climate  proofing  measures  to  reduce 
risks to the economy and in turn employment. 
Ensure  that  SMEs  have  appropriate  insurance 
coverage for their particular vulnerabilities, by 
assessing  vulnerable  hotspots  and  increasing 
the insurance penetration rate.  
Assessment: Positive impact (+) 

is 

cohesion 

Increasing  the  insurance  penetration  rate  will 
ensure  that  all  people  in  Europe  are  protected 
against  climate  risks,  especially  those  most 
vulnerable.  Social 
another 
important element of risk reduction, adaptation 
planning,  and  recovery  spending.  Once  the 
supply  exists,  the  frequency,  severity  and/or 
dependency  characteristics  of  the  risks  may 
still  imply  high  risk-based  premiums,  which 
put the insurance products out of reach, at least 
for  certain  low-income  households  or  small 
enterprises. 

Influencing  private 
finance 
indirect 

Funding instruments 
Indirect Impact 

Influencing  private 
finance 
Minimal impact  

Funding instruments 
Direct impact 

Influencing  private 
finance 
Minimal impact 

Assessment: Positive impact (+) if increases in 
supply  lead  to  more  affordable  insurance 
solutions.  Neutral  impact  (0)  if  premiums 
remain  high  and  insurance  products  are  too 

189 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Public  health  &  safety  and  health 
systems  

Increased 
resilience  of  public 
health  and  safety  systems  is  an 
important goal of the Strategy. 

Impact  on  public 
health  and  civil 
emergency 
systems (+/-) 

Risk-related  literacy  issues.  A  lack  of  awareness 
leads  to  reduced  resilience  of  public  systems 
concerning  risk 
transfer.  Public-private  sector 
cooperation remains low.  

Environmental impacts 

The climate  

Critical  impact  targeted  by  the 
strategy.  Increase  of  resilience  to 
climate  impacts  and  preventing 
climate risks. In addition, potential 
synergies  with  mitigation  may  be 
worth considering. 

Impact  on  climate 
resilience (+/-) 

(possible) Synergy 
with 
climate 
mitigation (+/-) 

Society  bears  the  full  weight  of  climate-related 
impacts, without appropriate risk transfer solutions. 
There  will  be  severe  disruptions  to  daily  life  and 
recovery from impacts will take longer and be more 
arduous.  

Quality 
natural 
of 
resources/fighting pollution (water, 
soil, air etc.)  

Strategy intends to address impacts 
of  climate  change  on  natural 
resources,  e.g.  forests,  agriculture, 
marine environment.  

Impact  on  natural 
resource resilience 
(+/-) 

Biodiversity, 

including 

flora,  Strategy intends to address impacts  Use of ecosystem-

190 

Funding instruments 
Direct impact 

Influencing  private 
finance 
Minimal impact 

Funding instruments 
Direct impact 

Influencing  private 
finance 
Indirect impact 

Minimal Impact 

Minimal Impact 

expensive for certain groups. 

in 

raising  public  climate 

Assessing insurance product development rules 
with  the  aim  of  strengthening  the  role  of  the 
risk 
industry 
awareness,  risk  culture  and  risk 
literacy. 
identified  best 
Additionally, 
practices  for  “impact  underwriting”  and  for 
reinsurers  in  the  adaptation  taxonomy  will 
promote  prevention  and  resilience  action  by 
insurance policy holders.  
Assessment: Positive impact (+) 

inclusion  of 

Mainstreaming  of  climate  risk  assessment  in 
Strategic  Environmental  Assessment  will 
enhance sustainable planning, avoid the risk of 
maladaptation and result in a better integration 
of  local  plans  and  programmes  with  local 
adaptation and disaster reduction plans. 
Assessment: Positive impact (+) 

Revisions  to  prudential  rules  and  increased 
transparency  of  asset  and  economic  activity 
vulnerability  will  lead  to  better  insurance 
coverage for climate impacts, and thus increase 
resilience. 
Assessment: Positive impact (+) 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
fauna, ecosystems and the services 
they provide and landscapes  

of  climate  change  on  biodiversity, 
and  to  make  use  of  Ecosystem-
based solutions.  

based 
solutions 
and 
increased 
resilience 
of 
ecosystems (+/-) 

Cross cutting impacts 

Impacts in developing countries 

As  highlighted  above  impacts  in 
developing countries are important 
to EU economically (supply chains 
/  markets)  and  socially  (family 
ties,  migration,  security).  Strategy 
aims  to  support  improved  climate 
resilience 
only 
developing) countries.  

(not 

3rd 

of 

third 
and 

Impact  on 
countries 
international 
relations (+/-) 

Minimal Impact 

Some key reports in the field 

  Trinomics (2020) Analytical Report 4—The Climate Protection Gap: Support Ex-ante Impact Assessment Adaptation Strategy 

  Disaster Risk Management Knowledge Centre (2020). Risk Data Hub. Retrieved from: https://drmkc.jrc.ec.europa.eu/risk-data-hub/ (13-4-2020). 

  Disaster  Risk  Management  Knowledge  Centre 

(2020.  Disaster  Loss 

and  Damage  Working  Group.  Retrieved 

from: 

https://drmkc.jrc.ec.europa.eu/partnership/Science-Policy-Interface/Disaster-Loss-and-Damage-Working-Group (13-4-2020).  

  European  Commission  –  Directorate  General  for  Climate  Action  (2017).  Insurance  study  of  weather  and  climate-related  disaster  risk.  Retrieved 

from: https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/4f366956-a19e-11e7-b92d-01aa75ed71a1/language-en (13-4-2020).  

  European Commission (2017) Overview of natural and man-made risks that the EU may face. Retrieved from: https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-

detail/-/publication/285d038f-b543-11e7-837e-01aa75ed71a1 (13-4-2020).  

  European  Environment  Agency  (2017).  Climate  change  impacts  and  vulnerability  in  Europe  2016.  An  indicator-based  report.  EEA  Report  No 

1/2017. Retrieved from: https://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/climate-change-impacts-and-vulnerability-2016 (13-4-2020). 

  European Environment Agency (2017). Climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction in Europe. Enhancing coherence of the knowledge 

base, policies and practice. Retrieved from: https://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/climate-change-adaptation-and-disaster (4-13-2020).  

191 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  European Insurance and Occupational Pension Authority (2019). Discussion paper on the protection gap for natural catastrophes. Retrieved from: 

https://www.eiopa.europa.eu/content/discussion-paper-protection-gap-natural-catastrophes_en (13-4-2020). 

  European  Insurance  and  Occupational  Pension  Authority  (2019).  Opinion  on  Sustainability  within  Solvency  II.  Retrieved  from: 

https://www.eiopa.europa.eu/content/opinion-sustainability-within-solvency-ii_en (13-4-2020). 

  European  Technical  Expert  Group  on  Sustainable  Finance  (2020).  Financing  a  sustainable  European  Economy.  Taxonomy  Report:  Technical 

Annex.  

  Geneva Association (2018). Climate Change and the Insurance Industry: Taking Action as Risk Managers and Investors. Perspectives from C-level 
executives in the insurance industry. Retrieved from:  https://www.genevaassociation.org/research-topics/extreme-events-and-climate-risk/climate-
change-and-insurance-industry-taking-action (13-4-2020).  

  Hudson et  al.  (2019). An assessment of best  practices  of extreme weather insurance  and directions for a more  resilient society.  Retrieved from: 

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17477891.2019.1608148 (13-4-2020). 

 

 

 

Insurance Europe (2019). Annual report 2017-2018. Retrieved from: https://insuranceeurope.eu/annual-report-2017-2018 (13-4-2020)  

Insurance Europe (2015). National natcat insurance schemes. Retrieved from: https://www.insuranceeurope.eu/natural-catastrophes 

IPCC (2012). Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate 

  Change Adaptation. A Special Report of Working Groups I and II of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Field, C.B., V. Barros, T.F. 
Stocker,  D.  Qin,  D.J.  Dokken,  K.L.  Ebi,  M.D.  Mastrandrea,  K.J.  Mach,  G.-K.  Plattner,  S.K.  Allen,  M.  Tignor,  and  P.M.  Midgley  (eds.)]. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, and New York, NY, USA, 582 pp. 

  Jarzabkowski,  P.,  K.  Chalkias,  D.  Clarke,  E.  Iyahen,  D.  Stadtmueller  &  A.  Zwick.  (2019).  Insurance  for  climate  adaptation:  Opportunities  and 

limitations.” Rotterdam and Washington, DC. Available online at www.gca.org. 

  Joint  Research  Centre 

(2018).  Mapping  of 

risk  web-platforms  and 

risk  data:  collection  of  good  practices.  Retrieved 

from: 

https://doi.org/10.2760/93157 (13-4-2020).  

  OECD DAC Statistics (2020). Insurance indicators. Retrieved from: https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=INSIND (13-4-2020) 

  OECD DAC (2016). Financial Management of Flood Risk. Retrieved from: https://www.oecd.org/daf/fin/insurance/OECD-Financial-Management-

of-Flood-Risk.pdf (13-4-2020) 

192 

 
 
  Munich Climate Insurance Initiative (2019). Closing the protection gap. Retrieved from: http://www.climate-insurance.org/about/who-we-are/ (13-

4-2020).  

  Surminski & Eldridge (2015). Flood insurance in England: an assessment of the current and newly proposed insurance scheme in the context of 

rising flood risk. Journal of Flood Risk Management. Retrieved from: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/66256/ (4-14-2020). 

ACTION  9:  Supporting  partner  countries  in  their  efforts  on  climate  change,  disaster  preparedness,  and  comprehensive  risk  management 

approaches 

MEASURE  9.1:  Support  upgrade  and  implementation  of  NDCs  and  NAPs  ,  by  providing  technical  and  financial  assistance  dedicated  to:  building 
capacity at national and sub-national level; assessing exposure and vulnerabilities; developing adaptation plans in line with national priorities 
and  vulnerabilities;  promoting  climate-proof  structural  governance  reforms;  implementing  monitoring  and  evaluation  schemes  to  assess 
progress towards climate change resilience; enhancing coherence with national and local disaster risk reduction strategies and environmental 
sustainability strategies; promoting nature-based solutions and ecosystem-based approaches, especially in coastal areas. 

MEASURE 9.4: Work with leading institutions in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific to support regional climate change adaptation and disaster 
risk management approaches building on ongoing initiatives such as the Africa Adaptation Initiative, and develop regional adaptation plans 
and action. 

Baseline, context and rationale 

National climate and adaptation strategies often fail to consider all the impacts on climate change. For instance, a 2018 GWP analysis of 80 NDCs 
(including most EU partner countries) revealed that even though water drives climate adaptation action (89 % plans) few countries include measures to 
robust their water management approaches.  304 Moreover, it has been shown that National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) are typically failing to include a 
broad range of stakeholders in the planning process, and greater attention needs to be given to increasing participation and coordination in the national 
adaptation planning processes.305  

304 GWP (2019) Addressing Water in National Adaptation Plans. Available at: https://www.gwp.org/en/About/more/news/2019/addressing-water-in-national-adaptation-plans/ 
305 Woodruff, Sierra C., and Patrick Regan. "Quality of national adaptation plans and opportunities for improvement." Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change 24.1 (2019): 53-71. 

193 

 
 
 
                                                 
To solve these gaps, the EU can support partner countries to adapt to the effects of climate change impacts at all levels: not only in terms of providing 
resources and prioritisation, but also in terms of improving effectiveness of action and support. 306 Accordingly, the European Green Deal contains four 
actions under the objective of positioning the EU as a global leader, including continue to lead the international climate and biodiversity negotiations, 
further  strengthening  the  international  policy  framework,  and  undertaking  bilateral  efforts  to  induce  partners  to  act  and  to  ensure  comparability  of 
action and policies.307 As, a according to the 2018 Evaluation, the 2013 Strategy failed to address broader international climate adaptation issues,  the 
new Strategy will increase the support to partner countries seeking to use potential for cooperation between the EU and other economies in this regard. 

Description of measures 

The following actions will be implemented to supporting partner countries in their efforts on climate change, disaster preparedness, and comprehensive 
risk management approaches 

Objectives and actions: 
Support upgrade and implementation of NDCs and NAPs by providing technical and financial assistance dedicated to: building capacity at national and 
sub-national  level,  developing  adaptation  plans  in  line  with  national  priorities  and  vulnerabilities;  supporting  climate-proof  structural  governance 
reforms; implementing  monitoring and evaluation schemes to  assess progress  towards climate change resilience;  enhancing coherence with  national 
and  local  disaster  risk  reduction  strategies  and  environmental  sustainability  strategies;  promoting  nature-based  solutions  and  ecosystem-based 
approaches,  especially  in  coastal  areas.  Work  with  leading  institutions  in  Africa,  the  Caribbean,  the  Pacific  and  Asia  sub-regions  to  promote  and 
support  climate  change  adaptation  and  disaster  risk  management  approaches,  and  develop  regional  adaptation  plans  and  action:  Propose  regional 
programmes in Africa (e.g. with AU or regional economic communities) to develop regional adaptation and DRR strategies. 

Impact pathways 

In the table below impacts are assessed using a scale from (--/-/0/+/++) negative to positive. Impacts are assessed up to 2050 relative to the baseline. It 
assumes the full uptake of the measure as the increasing severity of physical climate risks is globally more widely recognized,  and consequently the 
relevance of support to countries beyond EU borders that are prone to the effects of climate change.   

306 European Commission (2020) Adaptation to Climate Change Blueprint for a new, more ambitious EU strategy, available at - https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/clima/files/consultations/docs/0037/blueprint_en.pdf 
307 European Commission (2019) The European Green Deal, section 3 ‘The EU as a Global Leader’.  

194 

 
 
                                                 
 
Table 34: Mini-assessment on supporting partner countries 

Impact indicator 

Relevance 

Indicator 

Baseline  

Supporting 

partner countries  Envisaged impact 2050 (relative to baseline) 

Economic 

Macroeconomic environment  

Impacts  on  the  economy  are  a  hugely 
significant driver for action and reducing 
damages can be an important indicator of 
increased resilience. 

Economic  welfare  (losses)  (-
/+) 

The  findings  of  PESETA  IV 
confirm  a  more  comprehensive 
analysis  performed  in  PESETA 
that 
which 
III, 
international 
spill-over  effects 
could  increase  the  internal  EU 
welfare  loss  by  approximately 
20%. 

showed 

Indirect impact 

The  new  Strategy  will  give  support  to  partner 
countries to develop coherent and effective climate 
adaptation  and  disaster  risk  reduction  strategies. 
Therefore,  it  is  expected  that  the  impacts  of 
international  spill-over  effects  on the  EU’s  macro-
economic  environment,  will  be  reduced  to  some 
extent by this measure 
Assessment: Positive impact (+) 

Competitiveness, 
investment flows 

trade 

and 

Vulnerability of supply chains to impacts 
can  be  relevant  and  The  Strategy  will 
significantly 
types  of 
influence 
investments being made.  

the 

Impact  on  competitiveness, 
trade  and  (climate  resilient) 
investments (+/-) 

Minimal Impact 

Minimal impact (for EU) 

Regulatory burden on business 

Measure  will  not  significantly  affect  EU 
firms costs. 

Regulatory 
business (+/-) 

burden 

on 

Minimal Impact 

Minimal Impact 

Increased innovation and research 

The  Strategy  will  guide  research  under 
Horizon  Europe  and  aims  to  encourage 
greater adoption of innovation. 

Impact 
on 
innovation adoption (+/-) 

adaptation 

Public authorities (and budgets) 

The Strategy will significantly impact on 
public  spending  on  climate  resilience, 
primarily through indirect routes. 

Public 
adaptation (€) 

spending 

on 

Minimal Impact 

Minimal impact (for EU) 

Minimal Impact 

Minimal impact (for EU) 

Social impacts 

Employment 

Impacts  on  the  economy  and  in-turn  on 
employment  are  a  hugely  significant 
driver  for  action  and  reducing  damages 
and  job  losses  can  be  an  important 
indicator of increased resilience. 

Employment (FTE) 

Minimal impact 

Minimal impact (for EU) 

195 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Income 
social 
distribution, 
protection  and  social  inclusion  (of 
particular groups) 

to 

the  Strategy 

address 
including 

Distributional  impacts  of  climate  change 
is 
can  be  significant, 
and  mitigate 
intended 
inequalities, 
through  better 
informing  citizens  and  encouraging 
address  broader 
to 
action.  Needs 
questions  of  equity  (see  other  impacts) 
such  as  location,  economic  and  social 
cohesion,  gender  and  of  fundamental 
rights. 

Distributional 
impacts (+/-) 

and 

equity 

Minimal impact 

Minimal impact (for EU) 

Public  health  &  safety  and  health 
systems  

Increased  resilience  of  public  health  and 
safety systems is an important goal of the 
Strategy. 

Impact  on  public  health  and 
civil emergency systems (+/-) 

Minimal impact 

Minimal impact (for EU) 

Environmental impacts 

The climate  

Critical  impact  targeted  by  the  strategy. 
Increase  of  resilience  to  climate  impacts 
and preventing climate risks. In addition, 
potential  synergies  with  mitigation  may 
be worth considering. 

Impact  on  climate  resilience 
(+/-) 

(possible) 
climate mitigation (+/-) 

Synergy  with 

natural 
of 
Quality 
resources/fighting pollution (water, 
soil, air etc.)  

Strategy  intends  to  address  impacts  of 
climate change  on natural  resources, e.g. 
forests, agriculture, marine environment.  

Impact  on  natural  resource 
resilience (+/-) 

Direct impact 

Indirect impact 

By  enhancing  the  EU  cooperation  and  knowledge 
exchange with partner countries regarding climate 
adaptation  and  disaster  risk  reduction  plans,  the 
new  Strategy  will  contribute  to  improving  the 
resilience  to  climate  change  impacts  in  partner 
countries.  
Assessment: Positive impact (++) 

The  new  EU  Adaptation  Strategy  will  encourage 
partner countries to address the impacts of climate 
change  on  the  quality  of  natural  resources  (water, 
soil, air, etc.) in their adaptation and DRR plans. As 
a  result,  it  is  expected  that  the  impacts  on  the 
quality  and  availability  of  natural 
resources 
globally will be alleviated to some extent. 
Assessment: Positive impact (+) 

Biodiversity, 

including 

flora,  Strategy  intends  to  address  impacts  of  Use 

of 

ecosystem-based 

Indirect impact 

Biodiversity  is  a  priority  of  the  EU’s  external 

196 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
fauna, ecosystems and the services 
they provide and landscapes  

climate  change  on  biodiversity,  and  to 
make use of Ecosystem-based solutions.  

solutions 
increased 
and 
resilience of ecosystems (+/-) 

Cross cutting impacts 

Impacts in developing countries 

above 

impacts 

As  highlighted 
in 
developing countries are important to EU 
economically  (supply  chains  /  markets) 
and  socially  (family 
ties,  migration, 
to  support 
security).  Strategy  aims 
improved  climate  resilience  of  3rd  (not 
only developing) countries.  

Impact on third countries and 
international relations (+/-) 

Direct Impact 

action  and  an  integral  part  of  efforts  to  meet  the 
United  Nations  Sustainable  Development  Goals308. 
In  accordance,  the  new  EU  Adaptation  Strategy 
will  encourage  partner  countries  to  include  the 
impacts  of  climate  change  on  biodiversity  in  their 
adaptation  and  DRR  plans,  especially  through  the 
deployment of NbS. 
Assessment: Positive impact (+) 

Critical  impact  targeted  by  this  measure.  By 
working  with  leading  regional  institutions  (e.g. 
with  AU  or  regional  economic  communities),  the 
new  Strategy  is  expected  to  have  an  impact  in 
developing countries and their adaptation and DRR 
strategies. 
Assessment: Positive impact (++) 

Some key reports in the field 

  European Union, 2019. On the implementation of the European Union’s instruments for financing external actions in 2018 

  The World Bank (2019) LIFELINES The Resilient Infrastructure Opportunity 

  UNFCCC NDCs, Guidelines financing needs –  

  UNEP – Gap report, cost of inaction, World Bank lifeline. Direct, indirect impact, indication of costs 

  Commission RIO markers, report OECD 

308  European  Commission  (2020)  EU  Biodiversity  Strategy  for  2030,  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament,  the  Council,  the  European  Economic  and  Social  Committee  and  the  Committee  of  the  Regions, 
COM/2020/380 final, available at - https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1590574123338&uri=CELEX:52020DC0380 

197 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
ACTION  10:  Scaling  up  international  adaptation  finance  and  disaster  risk  financing,  including  by  unlocking  innovative  finance  and 

mobilising the private sector. 

MEASURE  10.3:  Use  the  External  Investment  Plan  and  the  European  Fund  for  Sustainable  Development  +  amongst  other  innovative  financial 
instruments to leverage private sector finance for climate change adaptation, in line with the EU Sustainable Finance Taxonomy, and promote 
the engagement of partner countries in the International Platform for Sustainable Finance. 

MEASURE  10.5:  Use  the  External  Investment  Plan  and  the  European  Fund  for  Sustainable  Development  +  amongst  other  innovative  financial 
instruments to leverage private sector finance for climate change adaptation, in line with the EU Sustainable Finance Taxonomy, and promote 
the engagement of partner countries in the International Platform for Sustainable Finance. 

Baseline, context and rationale 

On average, adaptation finance has accounted for about 5% of climate finance since 2015/2016 and, though it rose to US$30 billion in 2017/2018, still 
falls far from the estimated US$230 billion annual requirement.309 310 In line with these needs, the External Investment Plan (EIP) is an EU initiative 
designed to support investments into Africa and other countries by using public money to attract private investment, to foster sustainable and inclusive 
economic and social development, while addressing specific socioeconomic root causes of migration. Pillar 3 of the EIP is based on key the following 
building blocks:  

  deepening  the  investment  climate  analysis  (including  through  technical  assistance  facilities  such  as  the  Structural  Reform  Facility  for  the 

Eastern Partnership), 

  engaging in structured public-private dialogue (such as Sustainable Business for Africa – SB4A – Platform), in synergy with other tools such 

as EU trade and investment policies and EU Economic Diplomacy to identify obstacles and reforms needed. 

  Finally,  prioritised  interventions  to  support  adequate  reforms,  capacity  building  of  public  and  private  sector,  value  addition  and 

entrepreneurship, can address investors’ perceived risks. 

309 EDPM 2019 Boosting EU Climate Finance: Mitigate More Without Neglecting Adaptation In Poorer Countries 
310 CPI. 2019. Global landscape of climate finance 2019. Climate Policy Initiative 

198 

 
 
 
                                                 
As  a  domestic  reference,  InvestEU  (EUR  10.5  billion  budget  provision),  will  be  the  key  EU  instrument  to  crowd  in  private  capital  to  support 
investments in policy areas essential for achieving the European Green Deal objectives: including renewable energy, energy efficiency, decarbonised 
energy infrastructure or research and innovation in green technologies. Today, in the context of the green recovery for the climate and environmental 
proofing  of  infrastructure  investments,  Member  States  are  encouraged  to  apply  the  guidance  from  the  Commission  established  under  the  InvestEU 
Regulation.  For  the  climate  and  environmental  proofing  of  other  types  of  investment  than  infrastructure,  Member  States  are  encouraged  to  apply 
climate proofing as laid down in the guidance from the Commission on sustainability proofing under the InvestEU Regulation.311 

At the international level, the International Platform for Sustainable Finance (IPSF) is confirmed by 14 members that together represent 50% of global 
GHG emissions, 50% of the world population and 45% of the global GDP.312 The ultimate objective of the IPSF is twofold: to scale up the mobilisation 
of private capital towards environmentally sustainable finance to promote integrated markets for environmentally sustainable finance. 

In the OPC conducted for this Assessment, 57% of respondents strongly agreed that financial support for adaptation to climate change is insufficient, 
and 53% strongly agreed that businesses and the financial sector are not appropriately involved in adaptation efforts.  

Objectives and actions: 

  Use the External Investment Plan (EIP) and the EFTA 

 

 (EFSD) to leverage private sector finance for climate change adaptation, in line with the EU Sustainable Finance Taxonomy 

  Promote the engagement of partner countries in the International Platform for Sustainable Finance (IPSF) 

  Require climate proofing of all EU external investments, including through grants, guarantees and blending instruments 

  Adapt/translate the guidance on sustainability proofing for InvestEU (including the three pillars on climate proofing, environmental proofing, 

and social proofing) for all external investments. 

311 European Commission (2020) Guidance to Member States – Recovery and Resilience Plans Staff working Document. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/3_en_document_travail_service_part1_v3_en.pdf 
312 European Commission (2020) International platform on sustainable finance.  
Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/business_economy_euro/banking_and_finance/documents/international-platform-sustainable-finance-factsheet_en.pdf 

199 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
Impact pathways 

In the table below impacts are assessed using a scale from (--/-/0/+/++) negative to positive. Impacts are assessed up to 2050 relative to the baseline.   

Table 35: Mini-assessment on scaling up international adaptation and risk financing 

Impact indicator 

Relevance 

Indicator 

Baseline  

Economic 

Scaling  up  international 
adaptation 
risk 
financing 

and 

Envisaged 
baseline) 

impact  2050  (relative  to 

Macroeconomic environment  

Impacts  on  the  economy  are  a 
hugely significant driver for action 
and  reducing  damages  can  be  an 
important  indicator  of  increased 
resilience. 

Economic 
(losses) (-/+) 

welfare 

Competitiveness, 
investment flows 

trade 

and 

Vulnerability  of  supply  chains  to 
impacts  can  be  relevant  and  The 
Strategy 
significantly 
influence  the  types  of  investments 
being made.  

will 

Impact 
on 
competitiveness,  trade 
and  (climate  resilient) 
investments (+/-) 

The  openness  of  the  EU  international  market 
accounts for EUR 2 791 billion of exports and 
EUR  2  578  billion  of  imports  in  goods  and 
services. Economic openness has brought, and 
will keep on bringing, significant advantages to 
the EU, given that more than 30 million jobs in 
the EU depend on external trade and that 90% 
of global economic growth in the next 15 years 
is expected to be generated outside Europe.313 

While some countries targeted by the EIP (e.g. 
Egypt,  Kenya,  Morocco,  Nigeria  and  South 
Africa)  attract  collectively  58%  of  total  FDI 
(Foreign  Direct  Investment)  in  2016,  less 
advanced  and  more  fragile  countries  face 
systemic  challenges 
to  attract  sustainable 
private investment. The EU is Africa’s biggest 
investor,  with  EU  Member  States  holding 
approximately  40%  of  FDI  stock  worth  EUR 
291 billion in 2016.314 

Indirect impact 

Indirect impact 

By  scaling  up  international  adaptation 
finance  and  disaster  risk  financing,  the 
new Strategy is expected to have a positive 
impact  on  the  international  EU  exchange 
with  partner  countries,  as  these  becomes 
more  resilient  to  the  effects  of  climate 
change. 
Assessment: Positive impact (+) 

Despite  there  being  no  intention  to  bind 
third  countries  on  their  own  sustainability 
activities, by leveraging climate finance in 
line  with 
the 
international  level,  it  is  expected  that  this 
measure  and  disclosure  of  obligations  on 
financial products for EU corporations will 
create implications for international actors. 

the  EU  Taxonomy  at 

Assessment: Positive impact (+) 

313 European Commission (2019) Fact Sheets on the European Union - 2020 The European Union and its trade partners.  
Available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/160/the-european-union-and-its-trade-partners 

314 European Commission (2019) Handbook on Improving the Investment Climate through EU Action, Implementation of Pillar 3 in the integrated approach of the External Investment Plan. 

200 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
Regulatory burden on business 

Requirements for climate proofing 
of  investments  will  change  nature 
of  EU  investments.  Will  primarily 
institutions.  Firms 
affect  EU 
investments  will 
implementing 
to  offer  climate  resilient 
need 
products and services, but this will 
be  voluntary  and  to  benefit  from 
access to funding. 

Regulatory  burden  on 
business (+/-) 

Minimal impact. 

Minimal impact. 

Increased innovation and research 

The  Strategy  will  guide  research 
under Horizon Europe and aims to 
encourage  greater  adoption  of 
innovation. 

Impact  on  adaptation 
innovation 
adoption 
(+/-) 

Indirect impact  

in 

increase 

the  private 

sector 
The 
financing  for  climate  change  adaptation 
is 
the  EIP  and  EFSD 
supported  by 
expected 
and 
foster 
to 
entrepreneurship in the partner countries. 
Assessment: Positive impact (+) 

innovation 

Public authorities (and budgets) 

The  Strategy  will  significantly 
impact  on  public  spending  on 
climate 
primarily 
resilience, 
through indirect routes. 

spending  on 

Public 
adaptation (€) 

The  share  of  EU  climate  finance  targeted  at 
adaptation  is  increasing,  with  particular  focus 
on  the  most  vulnerable  countries.  In  2018 
alone, the EU, its Member States and the EIB 
provided  EUR  21.7  billion  in  public  climate 
finance, 
climate 
change adaptation. In addition, roughly 50% of 
international  climate  finance  from  the  EU 
budget  (excluding  Member  State  funds)  was 
dedicated  to  adaptation  projects  in  the  period 
2014-2019.315 

increasingly 

supporting 

Direct impact 

Assessment: Positive impact (++) 

Social impacts 

Employment 

Impacts  on  the  economy  and  in-
turn  on  employment  are  a  hugely 
significant  driver  for  action  and 
reducing  damages  and  job  losses 
can  be  an  important  indicator  of 

Employment (FTE) 

Indirect impact 

The private sector holds great potential for 
generating jobs and, therefore, sustainable 
investments 
receiving 
finance  aid  can 
international  climate 
generate  growth  opportunities  in  medium 

countries 

in 

315 European Commission (2020) Adaptation to Climate Change Blueprint for a new, more ambitious EU strategy, available at - https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/clima/files/consultations/docs/0037/blueprint_en.pdf  

201 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
increased resilience. 

Distributional  impacts  of  climate 
change  can  be  significant,  the 
Strategy is intended to address and 
mitigate 
including 
inequalities, 
through  better  informing  citizens 
and  encouraging  action.  Needs  to 
address  broader  questions  of 
equity  (see  other  impacts)  such  as 
location,  economic  and  social 
cohesion, 
of 
gender 
fundamental rights. 

and 

Income 
social 
distribution, 
protection  and  social  inclusion  (of 
particular groups) 

and long-term.  

Assessment: Positive impact (+) 

Distributional 
equity impacts (+/-) 

and 

Indirect impact 

Assessment: Positive impact (+) 

Public  health  &  safety  and  health 
systems  

Increased 
resilience  of  public 
health  and  safety  systems  is  an 
important goal of the Strategy. 

on 
and 

Impact 
health 
emergency 
(+/-) 

public 
civil 
systems 

Environmental impacts 

Minimal impact 

The climate  

Critical  impact  targeted  by  the 
strategy.  Increase  of  resilience  to 
climate  impacts  and  preventing 
climate risks. In addition, potential 
synergies  with  mitigation  may  be 
worth considering. 

on 

Impact 
resilience (+/-) 

climate 

(possible) 
with 
mitigation (+/-) 

Synergy 
climate 

Currently,  only  few  projects  of  the  EFSD 
incorporate sustainability policy reforms as an 
explicit objective.316 

In the MFF (2014-2020), climate proofing was 
neither  defined  nor  widely  and  consistently 
applied across EU funds and programmes.  

Direct impact 

316 https://ec.europa.eu/eu-external-investment-plan/about-plan/progress_en  

202 

promote 

This  measure  will 
the 
engagement  of  partner  countries  in  the 
IPSF. As a result, it is expected that more 
countries will join the platform, leading to 
the  overall  increase  of  climate  adaptation 
efforts.  Moreover,  by  the  use  of  the  EIP 
and  the  EFSD  to  leverage  private  sector 
finance,  it  is  expected  that  more  funded 
projects  incorporate  climate  adaptation  as 
key specific objective. Finally, the climate 
all  EU 
proofing 
the  climate 
investments  will 
resilience of new infrastructure abroad. 

requirement 

increase 

of 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Quality 
natural 
of 
resources/fighting pollution (water, 
soil, air etc.)  

Strategy intends to address impacts 
of  climate  change  on  natural 
resources,  e.g.  forests,  agriculture, 
marine environment.  

Impact 
natural 
on 
resource resilience (+/-
) 

including 

Biodiversity, 
flora, 
fauna, ecosystems and the services 
they provide and landscapes  

Strategy intends to address impacts 
of  climate  change  on  biodiversity, 
and  to  make  use  of  Ecosystem-
based solutions.  

Use  of 
ecosystem-
based  solutions  and 
increased  resilience  of 
ecosystems (+/-) 

Cross cutting impacts 

Impacts in developing countries 

As  highlighted  above  impacts  in 
developing countries are important 
to EU economically (supply chains 
/  markets)  and  socially  (family 
ties,  migration,  security).  Strategy 
aims  to  support  improved  climate 
resilience 
only 
developing) countries.  

(not 

3rd 

of 

on 

third 
Impact 
countries 
and 
international  relations 
(+/-) 

Minimal impact 

Minimal impact 

Direct impact 

Assessment: Positive impact (++) 

promote 

the 
This  measure  will 
engagement  of  partner  countries  in  the 
IPSF. As a result, it is expected that more 
developing 
the 
countries  will 
platform, leading to an improved exchange 
to 
and  dissemination  of 
promote  best  practices  and  lessons  learnt 
in environmentally sustainable finance. 
Assessment: Positive impact (++) 

information 

join 

Some key reports in the field 

  External Investment Plan 

 

Implementation Report of the EFSD and the EFSD Guarantee Fund 

  European  Commission  (2019)  Handbook  on  Improving 
in the integrated approach of the External Investment Plan 

the  Investment  Climate 

through  EU  Action,  Implementation  of  Pillar  3 

  European Commission (2019) Strengthening the EU’s partnership with Africa.  

203 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  European Commission (2020) International platform on sustainable finance. Available at: 

https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/business_economy_euro/banking_and_finance/documents/international-platform-sustainable-finance-
factsheet_en.pdf 

  EU Technical Expert Group on Sustainable Finance (2020) Taxonomy: Final report of the Technical Expert 

Group on Sustainable Finance. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/files/200309-sustainable-finance-teg-final-report-taxonomy_en 

  Navigant/Guidehouse (2019) Aligning EU budget expenditures with the objectives of the Paris Agreement 

ACTION 11: Strengthening EU engagement globally and learning from adaptation frontrunners. 

MEASURE 11. 5: Strengthen the production and delivery of, and access to, user-friendly and timely climate data and information (climate services), in 
particular  through  the  promotion  of  space  based  application,  the  use  of  Copernicus  Climate  Change  Services  and  Emergency  Management 
Services in partner countries, thus building on the existing European investments in climate research, data, information and services. 

Baseline, context and rationale 

Copernicus is  the  European  Union’s  Earth  Observation  Programme,  consisting  of  a  complex set  of  systems  that  collect  data  from  multiple  sources: 
earth  observation  satellites  and in  situ sensors  such  as  ground  stations,  airborne  and  sea-borne  sensors.317  To  respond  to  the  user  demands,  the 
Copernicus Service Component is organised into six thematic services: the Atmosphere Monitoring Service, Marine Environment Monitoring Service, 
Land  Monitoring  Service,  Climate  Change  Service,  Emergency  Management  Service,  and  Security  Service.  In  particular,  the  objective  of  the 
Copernicus  Climate  Change  Service  (C3S)  is  to  provide  knowledge-based  support  to  mitigation  and  adaptation  policies,  while  the  Copernicus 
Emergency  Management  Service  (EMS)  seeks  to  provide  on-demand  detailed  information  for  selected  emergencies  that  arise  from  natural  or  man-
made disasters anywhere in the world. 

Space  infrastructure  and  data  from  international  partner  countries  are  beneficial  for  the  Copernicus  programme  in  a  variety  of  areas  (e.g.  data 
processing, integration of third-party data into the Copernicus data system, data assimilation into models, and products of the Copernicus services). In 

317 Climate Adapt Copernicus Climate Change Service. Available at: https://climate-adapt.eea.europa.eu/knowledge/adaptation-information/climate- 
services#:~:text=Copernicus%20is%20the%20European%20Union's%20Earth%20Observation%20Programme.&text=Copernicus%20Climate%20Change%20Service%20gives,multiple%20Essential%20Climate%20Variables 
%20(ECV) 

204 

 
 
 
                                                 
turn,  partner  countries  benefit  from  the  multiple  advantages  of  using  data  from  the  Copernicus  programme,  including  improved  civil  protection 
responses, improved risk and vulnerability assessments, and monitoring of environmental indicators and risks and, as a result, reduced areas burnt by 
wildfires,  better compliance monitoring of environmental  policies, and reduced damages on ecosystems,  among  others.  Until  today, the Copernicus 
programme has concluded cooperation agreements with countries such as the United States, Australia, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, India, Ukraine, Serbia, 
and the African Union, while other countries have shown interest to conclude additional arrangements in the future.318 

The 2020 Copernicus Work Program  2020319 outlines the strategy to  increase the international  visibility of Copernicus, through the participation in 
various fora and conferences, supported by international partners, such as GEO, CEOS, WMO, FAO, UNEP, COP, etc. The prominent position of the 
European  Commission,  as  co-chair  of  the  Group  of  Earth  Observation  (GEO)  makes  it  the  ideal  forum  to  expose  European  know-how  in  earth 
observation and liaise with the international community to exchange expertise to turn earth observation data into actionable knowledge. According to 
the plan, specific contracts would be used in order to undertake sessions, workshops, seminars performed by international partners. Besides, ahead of 
the  Horizon  Europe  Strategic  Plan,  the  Copernicus  Research  and  Development  programme  expressed  its  priorities  and  needs  for  the  future  in  the 
framework of Horizon Europe in the document  Copernicus programme: research  & development  recommendations for Horizon Europe320. Therein, 
cooperation with international partners is seen as key to promoting the uptake of Copernicus globally, exploiting possibilities for integrating in-situ, 
space data, and information technologies. Further, it was outlined that following the Copernicus full, free and open data policy, the Commission seeks 
to  facilitate  access  to  Copernicus  data  and  information  for  interested  international  partners,  with  third  countries  being  of  special  interest  to  using 
Copernicus data to jointly develop processing methods, services and/or products which serve local user needs and/or enhance the Copernicus global 
product quality.  

Objectives and actions: 

  Strengthen the production and delivery of user-friendly and timely climate information and data (climate services) in partner countries. 

318 Copernicus (n.d.) International cooperation on data exchange. Available at: https://www.copernicus.eu/en/international-cooperation-area-data-exchange 
319 European Commission (2019) Annex to the Commission Implementing Decision on the financing of the Copernicus programme and on the adoption of the work programme for 2020. Available at:  
https://www.copernicus.eu/en/documentation/work-programmes/work-programmes  
320 Copernicus Research and Development (2019) Copernicus programme: research & development recommendations for Horizon Europe.  
https://www.copernicus.eu/sites/default/files/inline-images/R%26D%20recommendations%20for%20HE.pdf  

205 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
  Promote the use of space-based applications, in particular using Copernicus Climate Change Services, and Emergency Management Services in 

partner countries. 

  Take advantage of the GEO recognised partnership of more than 100 countries to facilitate access and use of Earth observation derived products 

and services. 

Cost 

For reference, in 2020 the budget for communication and dissemination activities of the Copernicus Program was 1 200 000, for international visibility 
EUR 50 000 were allocated321. The European contribution to the GEO initiative reaches an amount of € 1 000 000 on an annual basis (via its Research 
& Innovation Programme). 

Impact pathways  

In the table below impacts are assessed using a scale from (--/-/0/+/++) negative to positive. Impacts are assessed up to 2050 relative to the baseline. It 
assumes the full uptake of the measure as the increasing severity of physical climate risks is more widely recognised, and consequently the relevance of 
sharing information between countries and regions.   

Table 36: Mini-assessment on strengthening EU adaptation engagement globally 

Relevance 

Indicator 

Baseline  

Impact pathway 

Envisaged impact 2050 (relative to baseline) 

Impact indicator 

Economic 

Macroeconomic environment  

Impacts on the economy are a 
hugely significant driver for action 
and reducing damages can be an 
important indicator of increased 
resilience. 

Economic welfare 
(losses) (-/+) 

Competitiveness, trade, and 
investment flows 

Vulnerability of supply chains to 
impacts can be relevant and The 
Strategy will significantly 

Impact on 
competitiveness, trade 
and (climate resilient) 

Minimal impact 

Minimal impact (for EU) 

Minimal impact 

Minimal impact (for EU) 

321 European Commission (2019) Annex to the Commission Implementing Decision On The Financing Of The Copernicus Programme And On The Adoption Of The Work Programme For 2020. Available at:  
https://www.copernicus.eu/en/documentation/work-programmes/work-programmes  

206 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
influence the types of investments 
being made.  

investments (+/-) 

Regulatory burden on business 

Minimal impact. 

Increased innovation and research 

The Strategy will guide research 
under Horizon Europe and aims to 
encourage greater adoption of 
innovation. 

Regulatory burden on 
business (+/-) 

Impact on adaptation 
innovation adoption (+/-) 

Minimal impact. 

Minimal impact. 

Direct impact 

By diffusing the knowledge of data, information and 
products result from the work of the Copernicus 
programme, the new EU Strategy is expected to 
increase the innovation in partner countries, as best 
practices are shared.  
Assessment: Positive impact (+) 

Public authorities (and budgets) 

The Strategy will significantly 
impact on public spending on 
climate resilience, primarily 
through indirect routes. 

Public spending on 
adaptation (€) 

Minimal impact 

Minimal impact (for EU) 

Social impacts 

Employment 

Income distribution, social 
protection and social inclusion (of 
particular groups) 

Impacts on the economy and in-
turn on employment are a hugely 
significant driver for action and 
reducing damages and job losses 
can be an important indicator of 
increased resilience. 

Distributional impacts of climate 
change can be significant, the 
Strategy is intended to address and 
mitigate inequalities, including 
through better informing citizens 
and encouraging action. Needs to 
address broader questions of 
equity (see other impacts) such as 
location, economic and social 
cohesion, gender and also of 
fundamental rights. 

Employment (FTE) 

Minimal impact 

Minimal impact 

Distributional and equity 
impacts (+/-) 

Indirect impact 

The social benefits of the Copernicus programme are 
manifold: reduced casualties in natural disasters, 
improved robustness for food security, improved 
management of air quality in cities, among many 
others. It can also support countries/regions in their 
efforts to implement effective disaster risk financing 
strategies by supporting the issuance of payouts in the 
context of risk polling mechanisms or deployment of 
social safety nets programmes in the wake of a 
disaster promoting social protection.  

The expanded use of space-based data can help most 

207 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Public health & safety and health 
systems  

Increased resilience of public 
health and safety systems is an 
important goal of the Strategy. 

Impact on public health 
and civil emergency 
systems (+/-) 

Copernicus provides the necessary 
datasets to develop tools that can raise 
awareness on environmental health (e.g. 
on pollen dispersion or UV 
index).  

Indirect impact 

Environmental impacts 

The climate  

Critical impact targeted by the 
strategy. Increase of resilience to 
climate impacts and preventing 
climate risks. In addition, potential 
synergies with mitigation may be 
worth considering. 

Impact on climate 
resilience (+/-) 

(possible) Synergy with 
climate mitigation (+/-) 

Direct impact 

Quality of natural 
resources/fighting pollution (water, 
soil, air etc.)  

Strategy intends to address impacts 
of climate change on natural 
resources, e.g. forests, agriculture, 
marine environment.  

Impact on natural 
resource resilience (+/-) 

Early warning and forecasts 
have a great impact on the response to 
natural disasters. One of Copernicus 
applications is the Fire Risk Index at 
short and long term, assessing the risk of 

Indirect impact 

208 

vulnerable countries and communities without 
sufficient technical and financial resources to 
improve their regular monitoring of urban 
development (i.e. human settlements) 
Assessment: Positive impact (+) 

By encouraging partner countries to use Copernicus 
data, the new Strategy will help countries to increase 
the resilience of the health systems by improving the 
monitoring of air, noise pollution, and so-called 
Urban Health Islands. Moreover, countries can 
improve their civil protection responses and thus, the 
services provided. 
Assessment: Positive impact (+) 

Improved visibility and use of the Copernicus 
programme internationally is expected to raise 
awareness by the general public, by partner 
organisations and partner organisations in and outside 
Europe. By improving natural resources, management 
(e.g. water efficiency for industrial production) EU 
partner countries can improve their resilience to the 
effects of climate change. 

In the case of climate mitigation, this measure can 
have a positive impact in sectors such as energy, 
whereby the prediction of the availability of resources 
for renewable energy production can decrease the 
reliance on fossil fuels and, therefore, the reduction of 
GHG, 
Assessment: Positive impact (+) 

The increased use, production, and delivery of user-
friendly and timely climate data through space-based 
applications in EU-partner countries is expected to 
have multiple impacts on natural resources. Examples 
include reduced areas burnt by wildfires due to 

 
 
 
 
Biodiversity, including flora, 
fauna, ecosystems and the services 
they provide and landscapes  

Strategy intends to address impacts 
of climate change on biodiversity, 
and to make use of Ecosystem-
based solutions.  

Use of ecosystem-based 
solutions and increased 
resilience of ecosystems 
(+/-) 

fire ignition and the difficulty to control 
it. 

In Africa, the cooperation arrangement 
with Copernicus enables African Earth 
Observation data users to access to 
Sentinel Satellites data using high 
bandwidth terrestrial network 
connections between Europe and Africa, 
helping users to monitor their 
environment, crops, water bodies and 
coastal ecosystems among others.322 

Copernicus products are enhancing a 
growing set of different analyses to 
assess the conservation status of forests 
by covering more areas and by early 
change detection, thus helping 
to ensure the sustainability of the 
ecosystem and the compliance to global 
directives 

Indirect impact 

Cross-cutting impacts 

Impacts in developing countries 

Impact on third countries 
and international 
relations (+/-) 

As highlighted above impacts in 
developing countries are important 
to the EU economically (supply 
chains / markets) and socially 
(family ties, migration, security). 
Strategy aims to support improved 
climate resilience of 3rd (not only 
developing) countries.  

Direct impact 

The Climate Change Service of the 
Copernicus Program has already been 
identified by the Commission, as a 
major contributor to climate products for 
a range of climate adaptation issues as 
well as analyses to the World 
Meteorological Organization (WMO) 
Regional Climate Centres of the 
African, Caribbean, and Pacific region. 

As of September 2020, developing 

322 GMES, and Africa (n.d) A Joint Support Programme of the African Union Commission and the European Commission http://gmes4africa.blogspot.com/ 

209 

improved civil protection responses, better 
compliance monitoring of environmental policies, 
reduced damages on ecosystems (oil spills). Besides, 
given that, as a result of Copernicus data, the 
consumption of water, fertilisers, and pesticides has 
decreased through Earth Observation-based smart 
farming service. It can be expected that these benefits 
will increase as more countries around the world use 
the available data. 
 Assessment: Positive impact (+) 

By promoting the use of space-based data, the new 
Strategy will contribute to the increased resilience of 
ecosystems in partner countries. The expanded 
provision of accurate forest data and mapping is 
expected to help forest authorities to detect a change 
in the land cover and land use, and minimise 
problems related to deforestation and unsustainable 
land use management.  

Assessment: Positive impact (+) 

Improved visibility and use of the Copernicus 
programme internationally is expected to raise 
awareness by the general public, by partner 
organisations and partner organisations in and outside 
Europe. In consequence, resilience to the effects of 
climate change in partner countries is expected to 
improve. 
Assessment: Positive impact (++) 

 
 
 
                                                 
countries that are part of the 
international cooperation activities the 
Copernicus Programme are United 
States, Australia, Brazil, Colombia, 
Chile, India, Ukraine, Serbia, and the 
African Union. In February, the 
Philippines announced that it would start 
an Earth satellite data collaboration with 
EU’s Copernicus monitor deforestation, 
carbon sequestration, and coastal 
changes in the Southeast Asian 
nation.323 

Some key reports in the field 

  European Commission (2019) Copernicus Market Report 2019. Prepared by PwC. Available at: 

https://www.copernicus.eu/sites/default/files/2019-02/PwC_Copernicus_Market_Report_2019_PDF_version.pdf 

  Copernicus (2019) Copernicus Programme-Research & development. Recommendations for Horizon Europe – Working Document. Available 

at: https://www.copernicus.eu/sites/default/files/inline-images/R%26D%20recommendations%20for%20HE.pdf 

  European Commission (2019) Annex to the Commission Implementing Decision On The Financing Of The Copernicus Programme And On 
The Adoption Of The Work Programme For 2020. Available at: https://www.copernicus.eu/en/documentation/work-programmes/work-
programmes 

  Group on Earth Observation (2021) Highlights Report 2020. Available at: https://www.geohighlightsreport2020.org/  
 

323 Mongabay (2020). Press release. Philippines turns to EU’s Copernicus in Earth satellite data collaboration. Available at: https://news.mongabay.com/2020/02/philippines-turns-to-eus-copernicus-in-earth-satellite-data- 
collaboration/ 

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ACTION 12: Adaptation Solutions / Horizon Europe Mission on adaptation to Climate Change, including Societal Transformation 

MEASURE 12.1: Implement the Horizon Europe Mission on Adaptation to Climate Change, including Societal Transformation with the objectives of 

preparing Europe, accelerating the transition, and building deep resilience. 

Baseline, context and rationale 

Horizon Europe is the EU’s funding programme for research and innovation, which will run from 2021 to 2027 with a budget of ~€95 billion. As part 
of Horizon Europe, the Mission on Adaptation to Climate Change will support adaptation by connecting citizens with science and public policy. It was 
chosen  to  help  maximise  the  impact  of  the  EU’s  support  to  research  and  innovation  with  a  focus  on  solutions  and  preparedness  for  the  impacts  of 
climate change. The mission seeks societal transformation through behavioural changes and addressing vulnerable communities. It has a mission board 
of 15 experts tasked with identifying one or more specific missions for implementation under Horizon Europe. In September 2020, the Mission board 
presented  their  proposals  to  the  European  Commission  in  the  report  A  Climate  Resilient  Europe:  Prepare  Europe  for  climate  disruptions  and 
accelerate the transformation to a climate-resilient and just Europe by 2030. 

Description of measure 

The outputs of the Horizon Europe Mission align with the Adaptation Strategy, and the Strategy in turn can be used to implement the targets set out in 
the mission. There are three main objectives of the mission, with the ultimate goal to accelerate the transition to a climate prepared, more resilient, and 
fair Europe.  

Objectives and actions 

The first objective of the mission aims by 2030 to prepare Europe to deal with climate disruptions. It seeks to do so by: 

  Fostering a better understanding of climate risk exposure by providing accesses to fast track climate risk assessments and strengthening existing 

early warning systems; 

  Facilitating the adoption of climate risk management and community-based emergency plans; 

  Ensuring that community infrastructure is safe and essential services operable and assessable under critical conditions. 

211 

 
 
 
 
The mission also seeks to accelerate the transition to a climate resilient future. It has targeted support for 200 European communities and regions 
accelerate such a transition, and will: 

  Design vision with objectives, and build consensus around transformative social change enshrined in a community resilience contract; 

  Co-create adaptation pathways, and define possible courses of policy and innovation actions to deliver on the vision, resulting in a portfolio 

brief for action; 

  Create favourable conditions for societal transformations 

  Co-design and test actionable solutions, and share learning within and across the communities and regions. 

A third objective of the mission is to build deep resilience, scaling up multiplicative actionable solutions to build resilience in a systemic approach. 
This involves: 

  Creating impact at scale, building of resilience in single regions and communities focusing on key community systems; 

  Creating cross-border value, building of resilience and shared value creation across cross-border health systems and services, cross border 

natural and cultural heritage, cross-border knowledge and innovation, and cross border business and value chains; 

  Fostering systemic and citizen-centred co-evaluation, measuring progress made assessing what has been accomplished and communicating the 

progress and outcomes;  

Cost 

[Final Mission budget to be inserted when decision taken] 

Impact pathways 

In the table below impacts are assessed using a scale from (--/-/0/+/++) negative to positive. Impacts are assessed up to 2050 relative to the baseline. It 
assumes the full uptake of the measure as the increasing severity of physical climate risks is more widely recognised, and consequently the relevance of 
Europe being prepared and innovations required to build deep resilience.   

212 

 
 
 
 
Table 37: Mini-assessment on adaptation Solutions / Horizon Europe Mission on adaptation to Climate Change 

Impact indicator  Relevance 

Indicator 

Baseline  

Impact 
pathway 

Envisaged impact 2050 (relative to baseline) 

Economic 

Macroeconomic 
environment  

Impacts  on  the  economy  are  a 
hugely significant driver for action 
and  reducing  damages  can  be  an 
important  indicator  of  increased 
resilience. 

Economic 
(losses) (-/+) 

welfare 

Competitiveness, 
trade, 
and 
investment flows 

Vulnerability  of  supply  chains  to 
impacts  can  be  relevant  and  The 
Strategy 
significantly 
influence the types of investments 
being made.  

will 

Impact 
competitiveness, 
and 
(climate 
investments (+/-) 

on 
trade 
resilient) 

Regulatory  burden 
on business 

Horizon  Europe  projects  provide 
voluntary  funding  opportunities 
for firms. 

Regulatory  burden  on 
business (+/-) 

Minimal impact 

Increased 
innovation 
research 

and 

The  Strategy  will  guide  research 
under Horizon Europe and aims to 
encourage  greater  adoption  of 
innovation. 

Impact  on 
adaptation 
innovation adoption (+/-) 

Indirect 
impact 

Direct 
impact 

Minimal 
impact 

Direct 
impact 

to 

will 

make 

Mission 

The 
important 
seek 
contributions  to  the  achievement  of  the  economic  post-COVID  recovery  plans, 
including  the  enhancement  of  resilience  of  the  economic  systems,  building  new 
norms, practices, and habits that preserve the environment, and shift from a market-
fixing 
market-shaping 
to 
framework redefining the meaning of public value. 
Assessment: Positive impact (+) 

framework 

a 

The mission will promote sustainable business models for income diversification, 
organic farming and community agriculture, sustainable and circular supply chains. 
All  of  these  will  improve  the  resilience  of  economic  activities  and  decrease  the 
vulnerability  of  supply  chains  to  external  shocks.  Furthermore,  research  and 
innovation is to drive competitiveness in the EU by the development of innovative 
solutions and business models. 

Assessment: Positive impact(++) 

The  Mission  employs  innovation  as  a  way  to  catalyse  systemic  change.  It  will 
embrace a model of innovation designed to test and up-scaling solutions, providing 
horizontal support to all partner regions by implementing communities of practice 
across the key thematic issues. As a result, by 2030, the Mission will develop 100 
deep  demonstrations  of  climate  resilience  across  Europe  (i.e.  on-the-ground 
examples  on  a  large  scale  with  verifiable  impacts,  and  based  upon  citizen 
engagement).  The  100  deep  demonstrations  will  mostly  emerge  from  the  living 
Mission  Labs  that  will  be  established  by  the  Mission,  which  will  function  as 
accelerators  and  incubators  for  shared  learning,  crafting  innovations,  fostering 
dialogues, and maturing the regulatory frameworks needed for the implementation 
of emerging solutions. 

Assessment: Positive impact (++) 

Public  authorities  The  Strategy  will  significantly  Public 

spending 

on  The 

total  public  spending  as  a  Direct 

The Mission will engage all relevant actors at the local level, in the co-design, co-

213 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(and budgets) 

impact  on  public  spending  on 
primarily 
resilience, 
climate 
through indirect routes. 

adaptation (€) 

impact 

implementation,  and  co-evaluation  of  the  Mission.  This  is  expected  to  lead  to  an 
increase in societal ownership and have an impact on public spending on climate 
resilience. 

Besides, the Mission will support the partner regions in crowding-in and mobilising 
multiple  forms  and  sources  of  funding  and  finance.  To  achieve  this,  it  will  assist 
communities in accessing the EU funds and programmes, loans from the EIB and 
the  EBRD, as well as  other national and regional funds. Therefore, it is expected 
that the actions by the Mission will  motivate the complementary commitment for 
climate resilience of  funds such as the European Structural and Investment Fund, 
the European Regional Development Fund, and the Cohesion Fund, among others.  

Assessment: Positive impact (++) 

percentage  of  public  spending  on 
climate  adaptation  and  resilience  as 
a  percentage  of  the  city’s  GDP 
(GDPc). 

(Goergeson  L.  et  al,  2016)  can  help 
provide  baseline:  Between  0.14  and 
0.33% GDPc was allocated by cities 
globally 
in  climate  adaptation. 
0.22%  GDPc  was  spent  by  the  city 
of Paris on adaptation and resilience 
the 
in  2014/2015.  growth  of 
spending  between  2008-2015  was 
4.03% 324 

Moreover,  according  to  the  2019 
CoM  assessment325,  700  million 
EUR  have  been 
to 
allocated 
adaptation by CoM signatories. 

Social impacts 

Employment 

Income 
distribution,  social 
and 
protection 
inclusion 
social 
(of 
particular 
groups) 

Impacts  on  the  economy  and  in-
turn  on  employment  are  a  hugely 
significant  driver  for  action  and 
reducing  damages  and  job  losses 
can  be  an  important  indicator  of 
increased resilience. 

Distributional  impacts  of  climate 
change  can  be  significant,  the 
Strategy is intended to address and 
mitigate 
including 
inequalities, 
through  better  informing  citizens 
and  encouraging  action.  Needs  to 
address  broader  questions  of 

Employment (FTE) 

Distributional  and  equity 
impacts (+/-) 

Direct 
impact 

the  Mission  will  support  research  and  innovation  on  skills  forecasting  to  provide 
information on upskilling and reskilling needs, notably through designing curricula 
to  train  on  green  skills,  and  developing  community  learning  centres  for  adults. 
While  these  activities  focus  on  education  and  capacity  building,  they  ensure  the 
work force is prepared for upcoming job opportunities in green industries 

Assessment: Positive impact (+) 

Two  of  three  fundamental  principles  that  guide  the  Mission  are  related  to  this 
impact  indicator:  i)  the  resilience  of  social  and  economic  systems  with  a 
commitment to equity, social, and gender justice, and ii) the resilience of political 
systems,  with  a  commitment  to  inclusiveness,  deliberation,  shared  values, 
solidarity,  and  respect  for  diversity.  By  supporting  the  implementation  of  the 
Mission,  the  new  Strategy  will  encourage  the  creation  of  enabling  conditions  for 
fostering  community  engagement,  and  mitigating 
societal 

transformation, 

on 

Based 
2019  CoM 
the 
assessment326, public participation in 
it  makes 
adaptation  planning 
urban adaptation more equitable and 
ensures the inclusion of the views of 
the  most  vulnerable  communities. 
Nonetheless,  today  only  43-44%  of 

is 

324 Georgeson, L. et al (2016) "Adaptation responses to climate change differ between global megacities" Nature Climate Change 6.6 (2016): 584-588. 
325 Bertoldi, P et. Al (2020), “Covenant of Mayors: 2019 Assessment”, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg” ISBN 978-92-76-10722-4, doi:10.2760/775755, JRC118927 
326 Bertoldi, P et. Al (2020), “Covenant of Mayors: 2019 Assessment”, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg” ISBN 978-92-76-10722-4, doi:10.2760/775755, JRC118927 

214 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
equity (see other impacts) such as 
location,  economic  and  social 
cohesion,  gender  and  also  of 
fundamental rights. 

Public  health  & 
safety  and  health 
systems  

Increased 
resilience  of  public 
health  and  safety  systems  is  an 
important goal of the Strategy. 

Impact  on  public  health 
and 
emergency 
systems (+/-) 

civil 

Environmental impacts 

The climate  

Critical  impact  targeted  by  the 
strategy.  Increase  of  resilience  to 
climate  impacts  and  preventing 
climate risks. In addition, potential 
synergies  with  mitigation  may  be 
worth considering. 

on 
Impact 
resilience (+/-) 

climate 

(possible)  Synergy  with 
climate mitigation (+/-) 

Quality  of  natural 
resources/fighting 
(water, 
pollution 
soil, air, etc.)  

to 

intends 

Strategy 
address 
impacts  of  climate  change  on 
forests, 
resources,  e.g. 
natural 
agriculture, marine environment.  

Impact 
on 
natural 
resource resilience (+/-) 

the signatories of the CoM report to 
involved  stakeholders  and 
have 
citizens 
adaptation 
planning. 

climate 

in 

inequalities through better-informing citizens and encouraging action. 
Assessment: Positive impact (++) 

to 

the  2019  CoM 
According 
Assessment,  CoM  signatories  have 
reported  +310  actions  (including 
ongoing  completed,  not  started)  on 
the  health  sector,  and  +320  on  civil 
protection  and  emergency  in  their 
climate adaptation strategies. 

Direct 
impact 

The Mission will aim to help communities to increase the resilience of their public 
health  &  safety  systems  by  assisting  with  the  planning  and  implementation  of 
early-warning and surveillance systems. In particular, the Mission will help define 
and  assess  the  resilience  goals  proposed  under  the  Union  Civil  Protection 
Mechanism (UCPM) and contribute to improving the understanding of and societal 
preparedness for health risks. In addition, it will contribute to the EU4Health 2021-
2017 programme. 
Assessment: Positive impact (++) 

59 

have 

According  to  the  2019  CoM  429 
signatories  out  of  2221  (370  from 
non-
EU28+EFTA 
and 
EU28+EFTA) 
already 
provided information regarding their 
adaptation 
and 
goals, 
vulnerability  assessments  or  action 
plans. This can be used as a baseline 
the  percentage  of 
to 
European  cities  and  communities 
implementing  actions  to  increase 
climate adaptation resilience. 

indicate 

risk 

in 

have 

the  CoM 

signatories 
Some  of 
EU28+EFTA 
especially 
municipalities 
already 
completed  the  implementation  of 
adaptation  actions  and  reported  the 
the 
impacts 
associated 
environment. 
the 
majority  of  actions 
(ca.  600), 
including  all  completed,  on-going 
and  planned  actions,  are  reported  to 
have an impact on the water sector.  

on 
Concretely, 

Direct 
impact 

The  three  objectives  of  the  Mission  are  expected  to  have  a  significant  positive 
impact on improving the resilience to climate change in Europe. First, it will help 
citizens,  communities  and  regions  to  better  prepare  for  climate  change  effects  by 
providing  access  to  all  local  administrative  units  (LAU)  and  regions  (NUTS)  to 
climate risk profiles and reliable early  warning systems, and support the adoption 
of  climate  risk  plans,  and  safe  social  infrastructure  and  services.  Second,  it  will 
help 200 regions and communities to articulate their visions of social change and 
climate-resilient pathways. Finally, it will provide deep demonstrations of climate 
resilience on a large scale.  
Assessment: Positive impact (++) 

Direct 
impact 

Rethinking water management is one of the areas of research and innovation of the 
Mission.  The  aim  is  to  foster  innovations  towards  smart,  reliable,  and  efficient 
access to water and reduced vulnerability to water-related risks.  
Assessment: Positive impact (+) 

Biodiversity, 

Strategy 

intends 

to 

address  Use  of  ecosystem-based  According 

to 

the  2019  CoM  Direct 

Following the EU Biodiversity Strategy 2030, the Mission will boost nature-based 

215 

 
 
including 
flora, 
fauna,  ecosystems 
and 
the  services 
they  provide  and 
landscapes  

impacts  of  climate  change  on 
biodiversity,  and  to  make  use  of 
Ecosystem-based solutions.  

solutions  and  increased 
resilience  of  ecosystems 
(+/-) 

Assessment,  CoM  signatories  have 
reported  +270  actions  (including 
ongoing  completed,  not  started)  on 
the  biodiversity  and  environment 
sector,  +320  on  land-use  planning, 
+290  on  agriculture  and  forestry. 
This  can  be  used  as  a  baseline  to 
indicate  the  percentage  of  European 
cities 
communities 
implementing  actions  to  increase 
climate  adaptation  resilience  that 
impact biodiversity. 

and 

impact 

solutions and green-blue multipurpose infrastructure investments in ecosystems. It 
will seek to demonstrate high performance and efficiency of nature-based solutions 
at large scales, and its connections between ecosystem quality and human health. 
Assessment: Positive impact (++) 

Cross cutting impacts 

in 

Impacts 
developing 
countries 

countries 

As  highlighted  above  impacts  in 
developing 
are 
important 
to  EU  economically 
(supply  chains  /  markets)  and 
socially  (family  ties,  migration, 
security). Strategy aims to support 
improved  climate  resilience  of  3rd 
(not only developing) countries.  

Some key reports in the field 

Impact on third countries 
and 
international 
relations (+/-) 

Minimal 
impact. 
EU 
Focused. 

  European Commission (2020). A Climate Resilient Europe: Prepare Europe for climate disruptions and accelerate the transformation to a climate 
resilient and just Europe by 2030. Directorate-General for Research and Innovation. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/climate-
resilient-europe_en 

  European Commission (2020) Accelerating the Transition to a Climate Prepared and Resilient Europe Interim report of the Mission Board for 

Adaptation to Climate Change, including Societal Transformation. Directorate-General for Research and Innovation. Available at: 
https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/1d5234b9-b68a-11ea-bb7a-01aa75ed71a1 

  European Commission (2020) Research and innovation for the European Green Deal. Topics in the Green Deal call of Horizon 2020. 

https://ec.europa.eu/info/research-and-innovation/strategy/european-green-deal_en#relatedlinks 

216 

 
 
 
 
 
  European Commission (2018) A new horizon for Europe. Impact Assessment of the 9th EU Framework Programme for Research and Innovation  

  Dechezlepretre,Antoine; Fankhauser,Sam; Glachant,Matthieu Michel Marcel; Stoever,Jana; Touboul,Simon.2020. Invention and Global Diffusion 

of Technologies for Climate Change Adaptation : A Patent Analysis (English). Washington, D.C. : World Bank Group. 
https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/648341591630145546/invention-and-global-diffusion-of-
technologies-for-climate-change-adaptation-a-patent-analysis  

MEASURE  12.2:  Develop  forestry,  ecosystems  and  agriculture  decision  support  tools,  including  trees  and  crop  suitability,  weather  and  climate 

forecasts and disturbance risks. 

Baseline, context and rationale 

The negative impacts that climate change will have in European land ecosystems, agriculture, and forests in the coming years have been described in 
different reports.327,328 Even though progress has been made, the adaptive capacity of these sectors still requires that more information will be available, 
including  vegetation  change,  crop  water  needs,  and  risks  of  loss  and  extreme  events,  all  of  which  will  allow  stakeholders  to  make  climate-proof 
decisions.  
In the case of forests, according to the Analytical Report on forestry329, few databases are available addressing forest’s climate vulnerability. Although 
some  sources  exist  that cover  multiple  species  at  the  European  level,  limited  information  is  available  at  Member  State,  being  current  data  the  least 
available. Moreover, data about drought affecting forests, pest damage, climate related-economic damage, and vegetation change is also limited and 
often varies between the Member States.  

Regarding agriculture, most farm managers in the EU only have practical experience (68.3 %), only less than one in ten (9.1 %) farm managers had full 
agricultural training, and the rest (22.6 %) had basic agricultural training.330 In spite of this, farm owners and managers are on the frontline of adapting 
to climate change, and, as research has suggested, their decisions are affected by their own knowledge and beliefs.331 

327 Feyen L., Ciscar J.C., Gosling S., Ibarreta D., Soria A. (editors) (2020). Climate change impacts and adaptation in Europe. JRC PESETA IV final report. EUR 30180EN, Publications Office of the European Union,  
Luxembourg, ISBN 978-92-76-18123-1, doi:10.2760/171121, JRC119178. 
328 FAO and UNEP (2020). The State of the World’s Forests 2020. Forests, biodiversity and people. Rome. https://doi.org/10.4060/ca8642en 
329 Forthcoming, 2021 
330 European Union (2019) Agriculture, forestry, and fishery statistics. 2019 Edition. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/3217494/10317767/KS-FK-19-001-EN-N.pdf/742d3fd2-961e-68c1-47d0-11cf30b11489 
331 Yousefpour, R et al (2017). A framework for modeling adaptive forest management and decision making under climate change. Ecology and Society 22(4):40. https://doi.org/10.5751/ES-09614-220440 

217 

 
 
 
                                                 
OPC: Respondents to the OPC reported that the main actions to support resilience-building in agriculture and forests are information/guidance about 
management  practices  and  nature-based  solutions  that  enhance  climate  resilience,  information/guidance  to  better  use  existent  plant/forest  genetic 
diversity (varieties, species) to build resilience, and climate resilient land use planning. In accordance, OPC respondents also indicated that the main 
elements for climate resilient agriculture/forests are diversified systems (e.g. mixed farming, agro-forestry, different forest systems and management, 
age structure), and nature-based solutions. 

Description of measure 

By supporting forest owners and managers to consider climate change in their management approaches (from the choice of the species and their origin 
to  the  use  of  silvicultural  practices  and  forest  structure  that  mix  species  and  age  classes),  this  measure  will  seek  to  ensure  that  forest  management 
practices (afforestation, reforestation, restoration) are undertaken with a view to enhance the resilience of forest ecosystems to climate impacts.  

Objectives and actions: 

  Strengthen ecosystems resilience by providing the farming and forestry community with ready to use information combining information on plants 

and tree species and varieties and their suitability in a changing climate. 

  Raise awareness and accelerate action on adapting forests to climate change, by providing decision-makers with actionable information on the 

evolution of climate and forests.  

Some of the specific proposed actions are:  

  Monitor climate impacts on natural ecosystems, agriculture and forestry, ensuring EU-wide, consistent monitoring of disturbances and losses 
due to extreme events, capitalising on existing initiatives such as Forest Information System for Europe (FISE), European Forest Fire Information 
System (EFFIS), Copernicus land monitoring services (CLMS), Copernicus Climate Change Services (C3S). 

  Mapping projected natural vegetation changes and information about crops/trees suited to the projected climate in a particular area, 

providing geographically explicit information about expected vegetation changes and suitable plants and tree species/varieties building on JRC 
ongoing work in this area (e.g. EcoAdapt on vulnerability and adaptation of ecosystems, Forest@risk, FORGENIUS); and integrating information 
about current and projected bioclimatic zones suitable for plant/tree species and varieties catalogue (with searchable options). 

  Support on-the-ground dissemination and implementation (support to value chain’s actors and practitioners networks) by helping tree 
nurseries to ensure that they have the right material in the right quantities to support climate-proof forest management; supporting knowledge 

218 

 
 
dissemination, piloting and implementation in the farming and forestry community; and giving visibility and facilitating information dissemination 
and contact matchmaking 

Impact pathways 

In the table below impacts are assessed using a scale from (--/-/0/+/++) negative to positive. Impacts are assessed up to 2050 relative to the baseline. It 
assumes the full uptake of the measure as the increasing severity of physical climate risks on Europe’s natural capital is more widely recognised, and 
consequently the relevance of taking action on generating more data, protection, and successively making use of the adaptive capacity of ecosystems.   

Table 38: Mini-assessment Measures for Land ecosystems, agriculture and forests 

Impact indicator 

Relevance 

Indicator 

Baseline  

Land 
ecosystems, 
agriculture and forests 

Envisaged impact 2050 (relative to baseline) 

Economic 

Macroeconomic environment  

Impacts  on  the  economy  are  a 
hugely  significant  driver  for 
action  and  reducing  damages 
can be an important indicator of 
increased resilience. 

Economic  welfare 
(losses) (-/+) 

Climate  change  affects  land,  agriculture,  and 
forest-related industries such as wood processing 
and  manufacturing.  This  will  pose  great 
challenges in their economic growth. In 2017, the 
GVA of the agriculture, forestry and fishing was 
EUR 220 533 million for the EU27countries332.  

For  the  same  year,  based  on  Division  02  of 
NACE  Rev.  2333  the  forest  industry’s  GVA  for 
EU27  was  EUR  26  220  million  in  2017.334  The 
inclusion  of  other  activities  (NACE  16;  31)  by 
other studies estimating GVA of the forest sector, 
suggest  that  the  impact  on  the  economy  of 
changes  in  land,  ecosystems,  agriculture,  and 
forests could be much larger.335 

Indirect impact 

By  raising  awareness  and  accelerate  action  on 
adapting  forests  to  climate  change,  this  measure 
to  provide  decision-makers  with 
will  help 
actionable 
the  evolution  of 
information  on 
climate and forests.  

More accurate, robust, granular, and comparable 
data  leads  to  better  understanding  and  better  -
informed decision making actionable information 
on  the  evolution  of  climate  and  forests..  The 
identification  of  forests  that  are  on  critical  risk 
areas  will  decrease  the  negative  macroeconomic 
impact of climate change by reducing the loss of 
these ecosystems. 

332 Eurostat. Gross value added and income by A*10 industry breakdowns (Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing)  
333 NACE Rev. 2 Statistical classification of economic activities in the European Community https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/3859598/5902521/KS-RA-07-015-EN.PDF 
334 Eurostat. Gross value added of the forestry industry, at basic prices. https://data.europa.eu/euodp/en/data/dataset/WmwTGWdwfhwPyEUUQNiCg 
335 Klauss, K. (2020) The forest sector in the Baltic States: A united, growth-oriented economic ecosystem. The forest industry around the Baltic Sea region: Future challenges and opportunities. Centrum Balticum Foundation  
https://eustafor.eu/uploads/BSR_Policy_Briefing_2020.pdf#page=36 

219 

 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 Competitiveness, 
investment flows 

trade 

and 

Vulnerability of supply chains to 
impacts can be relevant and The 
significantly 
Strategy  will 
of 
types 
the 
influence 
investments being made. 

on 

Impact 
competitiveness, 
trade  and  (climate 
resilient) 
investments (+/-) 

EU 

2018, 

Institutions 

In 
committed 
USD$137 million  in  development  finance  to  EU 
countries  for  agriculture,  forestry,  fishing.  The 
EIB  committed  USD$127  million  for  the  same 
objective in 2018. In total, USD$477 million was 
committed to European development finance for 
agriculture, forestry, and fishing.336 

In  addition,  the  EU’s  trade  in  agricultural  goods 
was  EUR  275  billion  in  2018.During  the  same 
year,  the  value  of  trade  in  agricultural  goods 
accounted  for  7.0  %  of  total  EU  international 
trade in goods in 2018.337 

Indirect impact 

 Regulatory burden on business  

Publically provided information, 
data  and  support  services  will 
have  minimal  negative  impacts 
on businesses. 

Regulatory burden 
on business (+/-) 

Minimal impact  

Minimal impact  

Increased innovation and research 

The Strategy will guide research 
under  Horizon  Europe  and  aims 
to encourage greater adoption of 
innovation. 

Impact 
adaptation 
innovation 
adoption (+/-) 

on 

One  of  the  intervention  areas  (IAs)  included  in 
is 
the  new  structure  of  Horizon  Europe 
Agriculture,  Forestry  and  Rural  Areas.  This  IA 
covers, among others, innovation and research in 
sustainable  forest  management,  sustainable  land 
use,  rural  development  and  territorial  linkages, 
and sustainable management and efficient use of 
natural resources.339 

Direct Impact 

Assessment: (++) 

The  lack  of  available  capital  for  investing  in 
improved forest management is primarily caused 
by  the  perceived  high  risk  of  forest-based 
investments  partly  due  to  insufficient  data  and 
suitable tools.338 

With  this  measure,  the  new  Strategy  will  map, 
among  others,  current  and  projected  vegetation 
changes  and  provide  information  about  the 
geographic 
species, 
identifying  areas  of  risks,  and  informing  better 
decision-making.  

suitability 

trees 

of 

The  actions  included  will  not  only  allow  us  to 
have  more  precise  information  but  also  provide 
investors with quantitative information.  

Assessment: (+) 

ready 

to  use 

This  measure  aims  to  strengthen  ecosystems 
resilience  by  providing 
the 
information to farmers and forest managers. The 
development  of  this information  will  require  the 
refinement  of  monitoring 
tools,  mapping 
systems, and significant advances in the research 
of  species  adaptability  and  projected  vegetation 
changes.  The  required  data  and  knowledge 
acquisition  will  be  guided  by  the  combined 
efforts of the private sector and research projects 

336 Stockholm Environment Institute SEI (2020). Atlas of Development Finance. Accessed 04.09.2020 
337 European Union (2019) Agriculture, forestry, and fishery statistics. 2019 Edition. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/3217494/10317767/KS-FK-19-001-EN-N.pdf/742d3fd2-961e-68c1-47d0-11cf30b11489 
338 EIT-Climate KIC (2018) EIT Climate-KIC and the future of the forestry sector. Available at: https://www.climate-kic.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Climate-KICForestryWP_FINAL-210318.pdf 
339 European Commission (2020) Agriculture in Horizon Europe. Alexia Rouby. Research and Innovation Unit European Commission DG Agriculture and Rural Development. 
 https://bioeast.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Alexia_AgricultureInHorEU.pdf 

220 

 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
Public authorities (and budgets) 

The  Strategy  will  significantly 
impact  on  public  spending  on 
climate 
primarily 
resilience, 
through indirect routes. 

spending 

Public 
on adaptation (€) 

in 

the  agriculture  sector  are 

The  main  EU  programmes  financing  adaptation 
measures 
the 
Member  States  and  regional  rural  development 
programmes  (RDPs)  under  the  CAP.  Under  the 
RDPs,  several  adaptation  measures  are  available 
and  co-financed  by  the  European  Agricultural 
Fund  for  Rural  Development  (EAFRD).  The 
2014-2020  CAP  consisted  of 
three  main 
farmers, 
direct 
elements: 
(EUR 41.74 billion  annually);  market  support 
measures,  (EUR 2.7 billion  annually);  and  rural 
development  measures 
(EUR 14.37 billion 
annually). 340 

payments 

to 

Direct Impact 

Social impacts 

Employment 

social 
distribution, 
Income 
protection  and  social  inclusion  (of 
particular groups) 

Impacts on the economy and in-
turn on employment are a hugely 
significant  driver  for  action  and 
reducing damages and job losses 
can be an important indicator of 
increased resilience. 

Employment 
(FTE) 

Distributional impacts of climate 
change  can  be  significant,  the 
Strategy  is  intended  to  address 
inequalities, 
and 
better 
including 

mitigate 

through 

Distributional  and 
equity 
impacts 
(+/-) 

In  total,  about  535  800  persons  worked  in  the 
forestry  and  logging  sector  in  the  EU  in  2016. 
The  largest  workforces  were  recorded  in  Poland 
(76  700  persons  employed),  and  then  Romania 
(47 200 persons).341 

Moreover,  3.3  million  people  were  employed  in 
wood  based  industries,  accounting  for  11  %  of 
the total employment in the manufacturing sector 
in 2017.342 

Most of the farms (67%) in the EU are classified 
as  small  (<EUR  8  000  of  standard  output)  and 
family-owned (96%). Climate change impacts on 
the  agriculture  and  forestry  sector  is,  therefore, 
expected to affect small farmers significantly.  

Indirect Impact 

Indirect impact 

such as those funded under Horizon Europe.  

Assessment: (+) 

of 

agriculture 

This meassure seeks to support the climate-proof 
transformation 
forest 
ecosystems,  among  others,  through  the  financial 
support  to  the  adoption  of  preventive  adaptation 
practices, research and innovation programs, and 
capacity buidling activities.  

and 

Assessment: (++) 

to 

By  raising  awareness  public  awareness  on  the 
need 
increase  climate  change  adaption 
measures  on  forests  this  measure  is  expected  to 
have  an 
the 
employment stability of the sector.  

indirect  positive 

impact  on 

Assessment: (+) 

support 

The  set  of  actions  included  under  this  measure 
and 
will 
implementation of good practices to improve the 
climate resilience of the sector. This material will 
provide  support  mostly  to  small  farmers  and 

dissemination 

the 

340 European Environment Agency (2019) Climate change adaptation in the agriculture sector in Europe.  
Available at: https://www.euroseeds.eu/app/uploads/2019/09/Climate-change-adaptation-in-the-agriculture-sector-in-Europe.pdf 
341 European Union (2019) Agriculture, forestry, and fishery statistics. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/3217494/10317767/KS-FK-19-001-EN-N.pdf/742d3fd2-961e-68c1-47d0-11cf30b11489 
342 Ibid. 

221 

 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
citizens 

informing 
and 
encouraging  action.  Needs  to 
address  broader  questions  of 
equity  (see  other  impacts)  such 
as location, economic and social 
cohesion,  gender  and  also  of 
fundamental rights. 

Public  health  &  safety  and  health 
systems  

Increased  resilience  of  public 
health  and  safety  systems  is  an 
important goal of the Strategy. 

Impact  on  public 
health  and  civil 
emergency 
systems (+/-) 

(European  Forest  Fire 

The  response  of  emergency  systems  such  as  the 
EFFIS 
Information 
System)  and  associated  strategies  rely  on  the 
availability  and  quality  of  data,  for  example,  of 
wildland fires.344 

In  addition,  forest  loss  can  have  significant  on 
human health. In direct terms, these impacts vary 
from  loss  of  resources  to  the  effects  of  forest 
fires;  indirectly,  impacts  include  the  effects  of 
forest clearance on, for instance, the survival and 
spread of disease pathogens.345  

Direct impact 

Environmental impacts 

The climate  

Critical  impact  targeted  by  the 
strategy. Increase of resilience to 
climate  impacts  and  preventing 
risks.  Also  potential 
climate 

Impact  on  climate 
resilience (+/-) 

(possible) Synergy 

Forest owners and managers are on the frontline 
of  adapting  forest  management 
to  climate 
change,  and,  as  research  has  suggested,  their 
decisions  are  affected  by  their  own  knowledge, 

Direct Impact 

vulnerable  groups,  which  today  do  not  have 
access to the right tools and data. 

Moreover,  trustworthy  data  systems  can  help 
prevent  small  farmers  from  increasingly  losing 
control  and  becoming  overly  dependent  on 
agricultural corporations.343  

Assessment: (+) 

This measure of the new Strategy  will capitalise 
on  existing 
the  Forest 
initiatives  such  as 
Information  System  for  Europe  (FISE),  and  the 
Information  System 
European  Forest  Fire 
(EFFIS) 
the  monitoring  of 
improve 
to 
disturbances  and  losses  due  to  extreme  events. 
Moreover,  knowledge  dissemination  across  the 
forestry  community  will  be 
farming  and 
strengthened  to  promote  climate-resilient  forest 
management.  As  a  result,  it  is  expected  that  the 
new  Strategy  will  have  a  direct  positive  impact 
on the resilience of European safety systems.  

In  addition,  improved  forest  management  will 
lead to the increase of the resilience of European 
forests  and  thus  of  the  health  sector  overall 
through  the  reduction  of  related  diseases  by 
decreasing  exposure  to  noise  and  air  pollution, 
stress, among other health benefits.346 

Assessment: (++) 

Climate-proof 
forest  management  will  be 
particularly  fostered  by  this  measure  through 
forestry 
tailored 

farmers  and 

support 

to 

343 WBGU – German Advisory Council on Global Change (2019): Towards Our Common Digital Future. Flagship Report. Berlin: WBGU. 
344 EFFIS (European Forest Fire Information System) https://effis.jrc.ec.europa.eu/ 
345 FERN (2005) Forest loss and human health: focus on EU policies and practices 
346 FOREST EUROPE (2019) Liaison Unit Bratislava: Human Health and Sustainable Forest Management by, Marušáková Ľ. and Sallmannshoferet M., et al. FOREST EUROPE Study 

222 

 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
synergies  with  mitigation  may 
be worth considering. 

with 
mitigation (+/-) 

climate 

beliefs  and  the  mapping  of  management  options 
for the current and future conditions.347 

Quality 
natural 
of 
resources/fighting pollution (water, 
soil, air etc.)  

intends 

Strategy 
to  address 
impacts  of  climate  change  on 
natural  resources,  e.g.  forests, 
agriculture, marine environment.  

Impact  on  natural 
resource resilience 
(+/-) 

In  the  last  decades,  large  forest  fires  have 
occurred  in  Europe.  The  danger  of  forest  fires 
will increase with unmitigated climate change in 
Europe,  especially  around  the  Mediterranean 
region,  being  Portugal,  Spain  and  Turkey  the 
three countries with the highest danger.348 

Direct Impact 

communities that will ensure the conservation of 
forest area and farmland in Europe. Providing the 
right tools to these communities will help to raise 
awareness  about  the  key  role  agriculture  and 
forestry have to play in climate change action. 

Assessment: (++) 

The  improvement  of  forest  management  and 
monitoring  tools  will  help  Europe  to  cope  with 
the  effects  of  climate  change  on  forest  areas, 
reducing  the  loss  of  forests  and  associated 
damages to natural resources. 

Assessment: (++) 

including 

flora, 
Biodiversity, 
fauna, ecosystems and the services 
they provide and landscapes  

intends 

Strategy 
to  address 
impacts  of  climate  change  on 
biodiversity,  and  also  to  make 
use 
Ecosystem-based 
of 
solutions.  

Use of ecosystem-
solutions 
based 
increased 
and 
resilience 
of 
ecosystems (+/-) 

The  European  Red  List  of  Trees  indicates  that 
58 percent  of  the  region’s  endemic  trees  are 
threatened, while 42 percent of all native species 
are  threatened  with  regional  extinction.  The 
conservation status of these species will be much 
aggravated  by 
fires  and 
mismanagement of land.  

increase  of 

the 

Cross cutting impacts 

Impacts in developing countries 

important 

Impacts  in  developing  countries 
are 
EU 
economically  (supply  chains  / 
markets)  and  socially  (family 

to 

third 
and 

Impact  on 
countries 
international 
relations (+/-) 

Indirect impact 

Minimal impact 

on 

climate 

impacts 

The  improvement  of  knowledge  and  tools  to 
natural 
monitoring 
ecosystems, agriculture, and forestry will lead to 
a  better  understanding  of  the  effects  of  climate 
change  on  biodiversity.  This  will  be  achieved 
through 
the  mapping  of  projected  natural 
vegetation  changes  and  suitable  plants  and  tree 
species/  varieties,  which  can  contribute 
to 
ensuring the protection of threatened species. 

Moreover,  the  dissemination  of  practices  for 
raise 
climate-proof 
awareness  about  the  methods  that  are  beneficial 
for the conservation of the local biodiversity.  

land  management  will 

Assessment: (++) 

347 Yousefpour, R et al (2017). A framework for modeling adaptive forest management and decision making under climate change. Ecology and Society 22(4):40. https://doi.org/10.5751/ES-09614-220440 
348 Feyen L., Ciscar J.C., Gosling S., Ibarreta D., Soria A. (editors) (2020). Climate change impacts and adaptation in Europe. JRC PESETA IV final report. EUR 30180EN, Publications Office of the European Union,  
Luxembourg, ISBN 978-92-76-18123-1, doi:10.2760/171121, JRC119178. 

223 

 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
migration, 
aims 

security). 
ties, 
support 
Strategy 
improved  climate  resilience  of 
3rd 
developing) 
only 
(not 
countries.  

to 

224 

 
 
 
 
Action 13: Closing the Climate Protection Gap - Macroeconomic aspects of adaptation to climate change. 

MEASURE 13.1: For public finance/macro financial stability risk: introduce a step-wise approach whereby the commission engages a discussion on 
national  disaster  risk  management  frameworks  with  finance  ministers’  fora,  underpinned  by  best  practices  and  evidence  from  EU  Member 
States, and further assesses impact on sustainability of public finance based on EU level scenario analysis and stress testing. This would lay the 
ground for mainstreaming climate change in the national fiscal processes. 

Baseline, context and Rationale  

The measure would help inform the fiscal surveillance frameworks (EU and national). Expected economic losses related to climate change have 
the  potential  to  have  increasingly  large  implications  on  fiscal  stability  and  sustainability  of  the  EU  Member  States.  In  the  absence  of  financial 
protection tools for coping with disasters, the incidence of major disasters in several EU Member States may exacerbate economic imbalances and 
deteriorate credit ratings.  

Description of Measure 

Break national level silos between climate policy, disaster risk management and fiscal and budgetary processes; Incentivize Member States to consider 
and develop risk-sharing solutions; trigger climate protection gap discussion with Member States and consider inclusion of the fiscal aspects of disaster 
risk management in national budgetary framework 

Objectives and Actions 

  Research: Development of a model to estimate the loss distribution for the EU insurance sector, by country, in relation to the occurrence of 

extreme natural events and quantify the funding cost to cope with the estimated catastrophic risk.  

  Support Member States to strengthen the national risk assessments under the Union Civil Protection Mechanism, notably by including quantitative 
and qualitative assessments of all physical risks and complex compound risks for various scenarios (including climate change), that contribute to 
robust Disaster Risk Management (DRM) planning and better meet the needs for public sector financial risk management. This action starts with a 
thorough evaluation of current risk assessment methods and practices, legal reporting requirements and practices.  Assess the potential impact on 
public debt sustainability due to the improvement in resilience to climate risks through adaptation through scenario analysis; 

  Articulate the DRM and disaster risk financing (DRF) strategy with the national budgetary process to include ; 

225 

 
 
o  Quantitative assessments of fiscal implications by type of risk (including climate change) and all possible measures that could be used to 

address the risks. 

o  Information on the DRF strategy over the medium term – source of public funds available for the various DRM phases (risk assessment, 
prevention and preparedness, response and recovery); the rules to establish and access such funds and the governance arrangements; Details 
on “who pays for what” at national, regional and local level in ex ante (prevention and preparedness) and the expected share and conditions 
of  government  participation  in  ex-post  disaster  financial  compensation  or  if  not  available,  information  on  the  risk  sharing  arrangements 
between stakeholders;  

Impact pathways 

In the table below impacts are assessed using a scale from (--/-/0/+/++) negative to positive. Impacts are assessed up to 2050 relative to the baseline. 

Table 39: Mini-assessment on closing the climate protection gap 

Impact indicator 

Relevance 

Indicator 

Baseline  

Impact pathway 

Envisaged impact 2050 (relative to baseline) 

Economic 

Macroeconomic environment  

Impacts  on  the  economy  are  a 
hugely significant driver for action 
and  reducing  damages  can  be  an 
important  indicator  of  increased 
resilience. 

Economic 
welfare  (losses) 
(-/+) 

The  diverse  and  the  pervasive  impacts 
of  a  changing  climate  cut  across  all 
kinds  of  human  activity.  Without  a 
multi-sectoral 
cross-cutting 
and 
to  mainstreaming  climate-
approach 
related 
risk  management, 
climate  impacts  will  burden  Member 
State  economies  with  a  clear  North  to 
South divide.  

financial 

Indirect Impact 

and 

events 

reduce 

Insurance  and  climate-resilient  debt  instruments 
that are designed to mitigate the fiscal impact of 
climate-related 
fiscal 
sustainability risks can be implemented. The use 
of these financial instrument can be supported by 
including 
risk 
management  in  national  budgetary  frameworks, 
.broader  insurance  against  climate-related  risks 
would  secure  the  macroeconomic  environment 
by  reducing  risks  to  damage,  and  allocating 
funding 
the  consequences  of 
disasters when they do arrive.  

fiscal  aspects  of  disaster 

to  deal  with 

Improved  disaster  isk  management  frameworks 
to imrpvoe the knowledge base on physical risks 
to improve the macro-economic envirnment. 

Assessment: Positive impact (+) 

Competitiveness, 

trade 

and  Vulnerability  of  supply  chains  to 

Impact 

on  Delivery  of  essential  services  will  be 

Indirect Impact 

The broader use of insurance and other financial 

226 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
investment flows 

impacts  can  be  relevant  and  The 
significantly 
Strategy 
influence  the  types  of  investments 
being made.  

will 

competitiveness
and 
trade 
, 
(climate 
resilient) 
investments (+/-
) 

severely  impacted.  Infrastructure  and 
in  hazardous  areas  will  be 
assets 
susceptible to impact, and may not have 
appropriate  insurance  coverage  of  their 
risks. 
few 
supply, 
sources/routes/suppliers, 
alternative 
imports  can  further 
dependence  on 
exacerbate 
impacts  of 
natural disasters. 

the  negative 

Just-in-time 

Regulatory burden on business 

Measure  targets  actions  by  EU 
national 
and 
institutions 
authorities,  minimal 
impact  for 
business. 

Regulatory 
burden 
business (+/-) 

on 

Minimal impact 

Minimal impact 

Increased innovation and research 

The  Strategy  will  guide  research 
under Horizon Europe, and aims to 
encourage  greater  adoption  of 
innovation. 

on 

Impact 
adaptation 
innovation 
adoption (+/-) 

Public authorities (and budgets) 

The  Strategy  will  significantly 
impact  on  public  spending  on 
climate 
primarily 
resilience, 
through indirect routes. 

Public  spending 
on 
adaptation 
(€) 

data, 

Current models are based on incomplete 
not 
historical 
reliable/forward 
to 
properly identify vulnerable regions and 
critical infrastructure.  

looking  enough 

and 

are 

all 

Climate-related  risk  is  not  considered 
decision-making 
throughout 
processes,  and  there  lacks  allocation  of 
clear  responsibilities  and  climate  risk-
ownership. 
penetration 
Insurance 
remains  low  in  several  Member  States, 
risk 
risk 
residual 
and 
management is scarce.  

financial 

Direct impact 

Direct Impact 

techniques  will 

risk  mitigation 
incentivise 
making  supply  chains  more  resilient  and  reduce 
vulnerability  to  economic  hardship  after  climate 
events.Assessment: Positive impact (+) 

Development  of  a  model  to  estimate  the  loss 
distribution  for  the  EU  insurance  sector,  by 
country, in relation to the occurrence of extreme 
natural events and to quantify the funding needs 
necessary to cope with the estimated catastrophic 
risk.  Gathering  qualitiative  and  quantitative 
information  comparable  across  Member  States 
will also improve existing and future models. 

Assessment: Positive impact (+) 

to 

in  resilience 

Measure  the  potential  impact  on  public  budgets 
the 
and  public  debt  sustainability  due 
improvement 
to  climate  risks 
through adaptation. Incentives to Member States 
to develop risk-sharing solutions will mitigate the 
impacts  of  disasters  on  public  spending  on 
disasters.  Dedicating  upfront 
to 
prevention and preparedness and to deal with the 
immediate  consequences  of  climate-related 
events  reduces  the  burden  on  States  in  the 
instruments 
recovery  phase.  Using  financial 
rather  than  grants  for  productive  investments 
could crowd-in private finance and would reduce 
the  burden  on  the  state  during  prevention  and 
recovery. 

resources 

Improved  disaster  isk  management  frameworks 
to imrpvoe the knowledge base on physical risks 

227 

 
 
 
Social impacts 

Employment 

Income 
social 
distribution, 
protection  and  social  inclusion  (of 
particular groups) 

Impacts  on  the  economy  and  in-
turn  on  employment  are  a  hugely 
significant  driver  for  action  and 
reducing  damages  and  job  losses 
can  be  an  important  indicator  of 
increased resilience. 

Employment 
(FTE) 

Distributional  impacts  of  climate 
change  can  be  significant,  the 
Strategy is intended to address and 
mitigate 
including 
inequalities, 
through  better  informing  citizens 
and  encouraging  action.  Needs  to 
address  broader  questions  of 
equity  (see  other  impacts)  such  as 
location,  economic  and  social 
cohesion,  gender  and  also  of 
fundamental rights. 

Distributional 
and 
impacts (+/-) 

equity 

The importance of business continuity is 
not  included  in  natural  disaster  risk 
managements efforts, and the high level 
of 
system 
interconnectedness  negatively  impacts 
employment  across  sectors  after  a 
natural disaster.  

dependency 

on 

disruption.  Sections 

Low  socio-economic  tolerance  for  loss 
and 
the 
population and the economy that do not 
have  access 
reasonably  priced 
coverage. 

of 

to 

Indirect Impact 

Direct Impact 

Public  health  &  safety  and  health 
systems  

Increased 
resilience  of  public 
health  and  safety  systems  is  an 
important goal of the Strategy. 

on 
health 
civil 

Impact 
public 
and 
emergency 
systems (+/-) 

Risk-related  literacy  issues  and  risk 
related  understanding  of  public  health. 
A  lack  of  awareness  leads  to  reduced 
resilience of public systems in regard to 
sector 
transfer.  Public-private 
risk 
cooperation remains low.  

Direct Impact 

Environmental impacts 

The climate  

Critical  impact  targeted  by  the 
strategy.  Increase  of  resilience  to 
climate  impacts  and  preventing 
climate 
risks.  Also  potential 
synergies  with  mitigation  may  be 
worth considering. 

on 

Impact 
climate 
resilience (+/-) 

(possible) 
Synergy 
climate 
mitigation (+/-) 

with 

Society bears the full weight of climate-
related impacts, without appropriate risk 
transfer  solutions.  There  will  be  severe 
disruptions  to  daily  life  and  recovery 
from  impacts  will  take  longer  and  be 
more arduous.  

Direct Impact 

228 

to improve the macro-economic envirnment. 

Assessment: Positive impact (+) 

Broad climate proofing measures to reduce risks 
to the economy and in turn employment. Ensure 
that  SMEs  have  appropriate  insurance  coverage 
for  their  particular  vulnerabilities,  by  assessing 
vulnerable hotspots and increasing the insurance 
penetration rate.  

Assessment: Positive impact (+) 

Detailed geographic analyses at the regional level 
will  aid  in  identifying  where  vulnerability  to 
climate  hazards  overlap  with  socio-economic 
vulnerabilities  and  allow  authorities  to  increase 
the  resilience  of  these  groups.  A  key  aspect  of 
this  is  exploring  “just  resilience”  to  provide  an 
accurate  account  of  current  and  emerging 
inequalities 
and 
exposure, 
underinsurance  aspects.  This  will  lead  to  higher 
penetration  rates  of  insurance  to  protect  these 
vulnerable groups. 

impacts, 

in 

Assessment: Positive impact (+)  

Public authorities consider actions to narrow the 
insurance  protection  gap  and  increase  resilience 
of  public  health.  Identification  of  country-
relevant risks and types of desired coverage  will 
aid in closing the protection gap. 

Assessment: Positive impact (+) 

Strengthened National Risk Assessments (NRAs) 
under  the  Union  Civil  Protection  Mechanism  to 
include  quantitative  and  qualitative  assessments 
of all physical risks and complex compound risks 
for  different  scenarios  will,  among  other  things, 
the  needs  of  macro-
better  correspond 
economic  analysis  and  increase  the  resilience  of 

to 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Quality 
natural 
of 
resources/fighting pollution (water, 
soil, air etc.)  

Strategy intends to address impacts 
of  climate  change  on  natural 
resources,  e.g.  forests,  agriculture, 
marine environment.  

including 

Biodiversity, 
flora, 
fauna, ecosystems and the services 
they provide and landscapes  

Strategy intends to address impacts 
of  climate  change  on  biodiversity, 
and 
to  make  use  of 
Ecosystem-based solutions.  

also 

Cross cutting impacts 

Impacts in developing countries 

As  highlighted  above  impacts  in 
developing countries are important 
to EU economically (supply chains 
/  markets)  and  socially  (family 
ties,  migration,  security).  Strategy 
aims  to  support  improved  climate 
resilience 
only 
developing) countries.  

(not 

3rd 

of 

socieites to the impact of climate change.  

Assessment: Positive impact (+) 

Impact 
on 
natural  resource 
resilience (+/-) 

Use of NbS and 
increased 
resilience 
of 
ecosystems  (+/-
) 

Impact  on  third 
countries 
and 
international 
relations (+/-) 

Minimal Impact 

Minimal Impact 

Minimal Impact 

ACTION 14: Ensuring the availability of fresh water. 

MEASURE 14.1: Continue to use the Common Implementation Strategy to improve policy implementation for securing sustainable water use across 
sectors,  through  improvements  to  and  intensification  of  among  others:  water  resource  allocation,  water-permitting  systems,  cost  recovery 
through water pricing incorporating externalities, or cost recovery rate calculations. 

Baseline, context and rationale 

To achieve sustainable protection and use of water resources, which will become even more important due to climate change, it is particularly relevant 
to  ensure  the  security  of  supply  for  citizens,  and  a  balanced  and  coherent  approach  to  the  sometimes  competing  uses  of  water  by  different  sectors. 
Energy and agriculture are particularly pertinent in this respect and may clash with environmental protection. For example, wasteful/excessive water 
use in agriculture is a challenge for both water (and its alternative uses) and food security. Water reuse and efficient and sustainable irrigation can help 
reduce  the  agricultural  water  footprint  and  bring  environmental  and  societal  benefits  only  provided  they  are  implemented  in  a  sustainable  system, 

229 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
where environmental water flows are ensured. It will also be necessary to consider how further integration of water legislation with other policy areas 
can best be advanced in a mutually supportive way; this is especially important in view of the emerging challenges for water management caused by 
climate change and pollutants of emerging concern. 

Interviews: One expert interviewed for this study thought that binding targets in the EU Adaptation Strategy should be linked to other policies (e.g. 
Water Framework Directive). Several experts expressed that water scarcity problems are not just problems in the South, but in all of Europe, and that 
Southern Member States have relevant knowledge on managing water scarcity that can be shared with Northern Member States.  

OPC: Over half of respondents to the OPC reported experiencing restrictions on water availability due to prolonged drought in their place of residence 
due  to  climate  change  (54%),  even  more  reported  experiencing  river  and  coastal  floods  (65%).  Furthermore,  the  majority  of  respondents  strongly 
agreed that further action for sustainable adaptation to climate change is needed within the new Strategy for the water sector (75%). 

Objectives and actions: 

Further support implementation of the relevant existing CIS Guidance documents (e.g. CIS Guidance on water balances, environmental flows, etc.), 
revise  or  develop  new  guidelines  and  share  good  practice  under  CIS  for  sustainable  use  of  water  resources  across  sectors  (including  ensuring 
environmental  flows)  based  on  Commission’s  own  analysis  and  other  existing  studies  (including  OECD  work),  explore  the  best  policy  mix  of 
improvements to and intensification of, among others:  

  Water  resource  allocation.  (in  particular,  water  should  not  be  monopolised  by  particular  sectors,  e.g.  through  the  use  of  grey  infrastructure  like 

water reservoirs, which can be observed in some regions). 

  Water permitting systems 

  Cost recovery through water pricing, incorporating externalities 

  Cost recovery rate calculations according to Art 9 of the WFD349. 

Impact pathways 

349 A CIS Ad hoc Task Group on economics has recently been set up in the area of financing of measures under the WFD and the FD; in addition, two ongoing studies are relevant (1) on a mapping of economic data (including  
how cost recovery is applied in Member States), this will also serve as a building block for (2) a study with the OECD on investment needs (specifically for the WFD and the FD), which will start 2nd half of 2020. 

230 

 
 
                                                 
In the table below impacts are assessed using a scale from (--/-/0/+/++) negative to positive. Impacts are assessed up to 2050 relative to the baseline. It 
assumes the  full uptake  of the measure as the increasing severity  of physical  climate  risks on Europe’s  water resources is more  widely  recognised. 
Consequently, the implementation in legislative actions ensures its impact.    

Table 40: Mini-assessment on Common Implementation Strategy 

Impact indicator 

Relevance 

Indicator 

Baseline 

Impact pathway 

Envisaged impact 2050 (relative to baseline) 

Economic 

Macroeconomic 
environment  

Impacts  on  the  economy  are  a 
hugely  significant  driver  for 
action  and  reducing  damages 
can be an important indicator of 
increased resilience. 

Economic  welfare 
(losses) (-/+) 

Minimal impact. CIS is not used, and 
water  policy 
implementation  gap 
remains.  Certain  sectors  dominate 
consumption,  and  water  quantity  and 
quality 
to  burden 
Member States. 

issues  continue 

impact  – 
Indirect 
economic 
benefits 
and  costs  of  cost 
through 
recovery 
water pricing. 

Quantitative  impacts  included  as  part  of  Option  2  assessment  in  chapter  6. 
This  measur  improves  the  water  availability  and  lowers  the  effects  from 
droughts to a respective extent. Since the damages increase with temperature 
(Adapted  from  Iglesias  et  al.,  2012  and  Ciscar  et  al.,  2011),  the  decrease  is 
held constant at 10% across scenarios. The costs comprise a shift in demand 
from water to machinery costs. Resulting in reduced economic losses. 

Assessment: Quantitative results included in Option 2, chapter 6. Qualitative 
assessment: (+) 

Competitiveness, trade 
and investment flows 

Vulnerability  of  supply  chains 
to  impacts  can  be  relevant  and 
The  Strategy  will  significantly 
influence 
of 
types 
the 
investments being made.  

on 

Impact 
competitiveness, 
trade  and  (climate 
resilient) 
investments (+/-) 

Regulatory  burden  on 
business 

Direct  impact  on  water  sector 
firms (mix of public and private 
impacts  on 
firms), 
those  affected  by  changed  in 
water pricing. 

indirect 

Regulatory burden 
on business (+/-) 

Wasteful/excessive  water  use 
in 
agriculture  challenges  food  security 
with  increased  droughts.  Impacts  on 
inland shipping and hydropower.  

/  underinvest 

Firms  active  in  water  sector  struggle 
to recover costs, unless able to charge 
consumers  more 
in 
infrastructure.  Large  water  users 
continue to enjoy below cost access to 
water, leading to inefficient water use 
and  exacerbated  impacts  in  drought 
conditions. 

Direct impact 

Fair  water  pricing  levels  the  playing  field  for  industries  that  are  reliant  on 
freshwater.  Sectors  such  as  agriculture,  energy,  processing,  manufacturing, 
transport, and households are likely to face higher water costs, or restrictions 
to water availability. Assessment: (-) 

Direct  and  indirect 
impacts 

Changes  to  water  pricing  would  typically  benefit  water  sector  businesses  as 
income  would  increase  and  a  greater  part  of  costs  could  be  covered.  But 
across  the  wider  economy  businesses,  particularly  water  intensive  industries 
such as agriculture and food and drink manufacture would likely face increase 
costs, potentially significant increases, depending on how implemented.  

Assessment: (-) 

Increased 
and research 

innovation 

The 
guide 
Strategy  will 
research under Horizon Europe, 
and  aims  to  encourage  greater 
adoption of innovation. 

Impact 
adaptation 
innovation 
adoption (+/-) 

on 

Minimal  

Minimal  /  indirect 
impact 

Public authorities (and 

The  Strategy  will  significantly 
impact  on  public  spending  on 

Public 

spending 

Member  States  and  stakeholders  are 
not implementing policy to adequately 

Direct impact 

Financing  of  measures  under  the  Water  Framework  Directive,  as  well  as 
addressing  investment  needs  to  extend  and  intensify  cost  recovery  through 

231 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
budgets) 

climate 
through indirect routes. 

resilience,  primarily 

on adaptation (€) 

Social impacts 

Employment 

Impacts  on  the  economy  and 
in-turn  on  employment  are  a 
hugely  significant  driver  for 
action  and  reducing  damages 
losses  can  be  an 
and 
important indicator of increased 
resilience. 

job 

Employment 
(FTE) 

recovery 

address water security issues. There is 
not enough support for water resource 
allocation  and  management  plans. 
Cost 
incorporating 
environmental  and  resource  costs  is 
not  widely  done  across  Member 
States, and what actions is being taken 
isn’t 
a 
or 
transparent 
harmonised methodology. 

using 

water pricing. 

Assessment: (+)  

Minimal impact 

Included in modelling results for Option 2 in chapter 6 

Income 
distribution, 
social  protection  and 
social 
(of 
inclusion 
particular groups) 

to 

change 

impacts 
can 

the  Strategy 
address 

of 
Distributional 
be 
climate 
is 
significant, 
intended 
and 
mitigate  inequalities,  including 
informing 
better 
through 
encouraging 
and 
citizens 
action.  Needs 
address 
to 
broader questions of equity (see 
other impacts) such as location, 
economic  and  social  cohesion, 
gender and also of fundamental 
rights. 

Distributional  and 
impacts 
equity 
(+/-) 

Water  flows  affect  food  security,  and 
scarcity  could  lead  to  increased  food 
prices  as  well  as  less  water  available 
to  marginalized  groups.  Less  water 
available for human use.  

Indirect impact 

Water is a basic need, and securing water across sectors ensures the continued 
access to freshwater for all EU Citizens, especially those most vulnerable to 
the water related impacts of climate change.  

Assessment: (+) 

Public  health  &  safety 
and health systems  

Increased  resilience  of  public 
health and  safety  systems  is  an 
important goal of the Strategy. 

Impact  on  public 
health  and  civil 
emergency 
systems (+/-) 

Water  quality  and  quantity  is  not 
ensured  for  public  use 
in  future 
scenarios. 

Targeted 
impact. 

direct 

Climate  change  is  projected  to  exacerbate  droughts,  intensify  flooding, 
overflow  urban  drainage  systems,  increase  saltwater  intrusion  and  sea  level 
rise,  and  change  water  quality  conditions  by  increasing  temperatures  in 
sources  and  pipelines.  Additionally,  urbanisation  likely  to  augment  water 
demand  issues  with  stress  in  urbanised  areas  and  overcapacity  in  rural 
regions.  Future  water  supplies  reliant  on  surface  and  ground  water  will  be 
impacted. Improving policy implementation supports water supply managers 
in critical regions, ensuring access to water for human use. 

232 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Environmental impacts 

The climate  

climate 

impacts 

Critical  impact  targeted  by  the 
strategy.  Increase  of  resilience 
to 
and 
preventing  climate  risks.  Also 
potential 
with 
mitigation  may  be  worth 
considering. 

synergies 

Assessment: (+) 

Impact  on  climate 
resilience (+/-) 

(possible) Synergy 
with 
climate 
mitigation (+/-) 

The latest projections suggest that the 
current  level  of  implementation  may 
to  prevent  and 
not  be  sufficient 
manage  the  ongoing  impacts  of  the 
climate crisis.  

Direct Impact 

Increase resilience of Member States to climate impacts on water quantity, by 
adapting sectors to increasing supply pressures. 

Assessment: (++) 

of 

natural 

Quality 
resources/fighting 
pollution  (water,  soil, 
air etc.)  

intends 

Strategy 
to  address 
impacts  of  climate  change  on 
natural  resources,  e.g.  forests, 
agriculture, 
marine 
environment.  

Impact  on  natural 
resource resilience 
(+/-) 

EU  faces  water  scarcity  and  water 
quality  issues,  as  sectors  reliant  on 
heavy  water  use  (agriculture,  energy) 
continue  to  use  water  at  an  excessive 
rate, there will be less water available 
for  non-human  use.  Competition  for 
water as a natural resource. 

Direct Impact 

Reduces  the  competition  for  water  between  industry  and  environmental 
protection. Wasteful and excessive water use is challenged, and sectors adapt 
to become use water more efficiently. 

Assessment: (+) 

Biodiversity, including 
fauna, 
flora, 
the 
ecosystems  and 
services  they  provide 
and landscapes  

intends 

Strategy 
to  address 
impacts  of  climate  change  on 
biodiversity,  and  also  to  make 
use 
Ecosystem-based 
of 
solutions.  

Use of ecosystem-
based 
solutions 
increased 
and 
resilience 
of 
ecosystems (+/-) 

Cross cutting impacts 

Impacts  in  developing 
countries 

As  highlighted  above  impacts 
in  developing  countries  are 
important  to  EU  economically 
(supply  chains  /  markets)  and 
socially (family ties, migration, 
security).  Strategy  aims 
to 
climate 
support 
resilience  of  3rd 
(not  only 
developing) countries.  

improved 

third 
and 

Impact  on 
countries 
international 
relations (+/-) 

Less water available to ecosystems. 

Direct Impact 

Environmental water flows are ensured, and externalities are incorporated into 
water pricing.  

Assessment: (+) 

No impact, is EU focused 

No  impact,  is  EU 
focused 

233 

 
 
 
 
 
MEASURE 14.3: Reduce exposure to contaminated or acutely polluted water due to climate impacts such as low flows, higher water temperature or 

flooding, and also to ensure availability of adequate quantities of tap water 

Baseline, context and rationale 

Climate change leads to a higher frequency and intensity of water quantity-related extreme events, namely floods and droughts. Preparation for such 
events  requires  other  types  of  actions  than  preparing  for  gradual  changes,  starting  from  better  predicting  their  occurrence  through  planning 
preparedness measures all the way to upgrading relevant infrastructure, such as inland navigation. 

There  are  also  significant  health  concerns  over  predicted  changes  in  both  water  quantity  and  quality  as  climate  change  is  projected  to  shrink  water 
resources, reduce self-purification capacity of freshwater basins (warmer water has less dissolved oxygen and decreased flows fewer dilution capacity), 
increase  risks  of  water  pollution  and  pathogen  contamination  in  many  parts  of  Europe  (floods,  sewer  overflows,  more  pesticide  use,  higher 
concentration of pollutants during periods of drought - e.g. the rise of Vibriosis infections in the Baltic Sea area). Thus, there are important water safety 
vulnerabilities, which translate into growing human health risks. For these reasons, the WHO ‘Health in Climate’ working group considers water safety 
a matter of high priority. The notion of water safety could be extended to quantitative issues with drinking water, as not all Member States have clear 
strategies in place to secure that their water suppliers take actions to prevent disruptions in water supply. Under the revised Drinking Water Directive, 
however, Member States are required to carry out hazard and risk assessments on water quality (which can be impacted by water quantity as explained 
above) also with a view on climate change impacts. 

Interviews: One expert interviewed for this study thought that binding targets in the EU  Adaptation Strategy should be linked to other policies (e.g. 
Water Framework Directive). Several experts expressed that water scarcity problems are not just problems in the South, but in all of Europe, and that 
Southern Member States have relevant knowledge on managing water scarcity that can be shared with Northern Member States.  

OPC: Over half of respondents to the OPC reported experiencing restrictions on water availability due to prolonged drought in their place of residence 
due  to  climate  change  (54%),  even  more  reported  experiencing  river  and  coastal  floods  (65%).  Furthermore,  the  majority  of  respondents  strongly 
agreed that further action for sustainable adaptation to climate change is needed within the new Strategy for the water sector (75%). 

Description of measure 

Objectives and actions 

234 

 
 
o  Ensure that short term acute water pollution and contamination issues for situations that could arise from climate change impacts are taken 

into account under the new risk based approach under Article 7 of the revised Drinking Water Directive. 

o  Consider the exploration of further integrating climate change impacts into already established framework plans, as well as WHO’s Water 

Safety Plans and Sanitation Safety Plans, including quantitative aspects, especially once first implementation results from the new Drinking 
Water Directive are available and as part of the revision of the Urban Waste Water Treatment Directive. 

Impact pathways 

In the table below impacts are assessed using a scale from (--/-/0/+/++) negative to positive. Impacts are assessed up to 2050 relative to the baseline. 

The  table  below  highlights  the  main  impact  pathways  targeted  or  expected.  It  is  primarily  an  information  tool  that  hopes  to  address  weaknesses  in 
understanding and knowledge of vulnerabilities, risks and solutions and in doing so lead to better-informed decision making by actors across sectors. 
This  is  also  aimed  to  (indirectly)  spur  action  by  Member  States,  specific  economic  sectors  in  order  to  increase  resilience  and  reduce  impacts  for 
vulnerable groups.  

Table 41:Mini-assessment on Promoting the inclusion of climate aspects in already established framework plans, including in Water Safety 
Plans 

Impact indicator 

Relevance 

Indicator 

Baseline 

Water 
pathway 

impact 

Envisaged 
baseline) 

impact  2050 

(relative 

to 

Economic 

Macroeconomic 
environment  

Impacts  on  the  economy  are  a  hugely 
significant  driver  for  action  and  reducing 
damages  can  be  an  important  indicator  of 
increased resilience. 

Economic welfare (losses) (-/+) 

The economy faces risks to water 
quality  and  quantity  and  a  secure 
supply of potable water.  

Indirect impact  

Safety 

covering 

Water 
also 
plans 
quantitative  issues  and  other  water  quality 
guidance  ensure  the  safety  of  a  drinking 
water supply and benefit SMEs and industry. 

Competitiveness, 
trade and investment 
flows 

Vulnerability  of  supply  chains  to  impacts 
can  be  relevant  and  The  Strategy  will 
significantly 
types  of 
influence 
investments being made.  

the 

Impact  on  competitiveness,  trade  and 
(climate resilient) investments (+/-) 

Impact  on  industries  reliant  on 
safe drinking water. 

Indirect impact 

Assessment: (+) 

Cleaner  water  and  higher  availability  and 
resilience will benefit sectors, but may come 
at risk of higher costs. 

Assessment: (0) 

Regulatory  burden 
on business 

Improvements  to  water  cleanliness  and 
availability  will  benefit  firms.  The  costs 
to 
for 

implementing  plans  are 

likely 

Regulatory burden on business (+/-) 

Minimal impact. 

Indirect impact 

235 

to  plans  may 

Improvements 
to 
additional health and safety requirements for 
firms  in  the  water  sector  and  major  water 

lead 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
mostly,  but  not  entirely,  fall  upon  public 
authorities.  Private  businesses  can  be 
expected 
face  some  new  safety 
to 
requirements. 

users. Main costs likely to be public.  

Assessment: (-/0) 

Increased innovation 
and research 

The  Strategy  will  guide  research  under 
Horizon  Europe,  and  hopes  to  encourage 
greater adoption of innovation. 

Impact  on 
adoption (+/-) 

adaptation 

innovation 

Minimal / indirect impact? 

Minimal 
impact 

/ 

indirect 

Public 
(and budgets) 

authorities 

The  Strategy  will  significantly  impact  on 
public  spending  on  climate  resilience, 
primarily through indirect routes. 

Public spending on adaptation (€) 

Not all Member States have clear 
strategies  in  place  to  secure  their 
water supply. 

Direct impact 

publish 

authorities 

Public 
water 
quality/quantity  guidance,  and  establish 
monitoring  and  control  measures  for  Water 
Safety plans, and implement well the revised 
DWD. 

Social impacts 

Employment 

Income  distribution, 
social protection and 
social  inclusion  (of 
particular groups) 

Impacts  on  the  economy  and  in-turn  on 
employment are a hugely significant driver 
for  action  and  reducing  damages  and  job 
losses  can  be  an  important  indicator  of 
increased resilience. 

Distributional  impacts  of  climate  change 
can be significant, the Strategy is intended 
inequalities, 
to  address  and  mitigate 
including through better informing citizens 
and  encouraging  action.  Needs  to  address 
broader  questions  of  equity  (see  other 
impacts)  such  as  location,  economic  and 
social  cohesion,  gender  and  also  of 
fundamental rights. 

Employment (FTE) 

Minimal impact 

Assessment: (+) 

Distributional and equity impacts (+/-) 

Safe  drinking  water  by  tap  helps 
vulnerable  populations,  who  may 
not  have  access  to  filtered  water 
sources. 

Direct impact 

A stable and secure supply of drinking water 
is  guaranteed  for  all  of  society,  including 
those most vulnerable.  

Assessment: (+) 

health  & 
Public 
safety  and  health 
systems  

Increased  resilience  of  public  health  and 
safety systems is an important goal of the 
Strategy. 

Impact  on  public  health  and  civil 
emergency systems (+/-) 

Environmental impacts 

And incongruent rollout of Water 
Safety  Plans,  means  that  not  all 
Member  States  are  adequately 
prepared for the health challenges 
connected  to  climate  impacts  on 
water.  

Targeted direct impact. 

236 

Climate impacts are incorporated into Water 
Safety  Plans  increasing  water  security  and 
are 
safeguarding 
considered  as  part  of  the  risk  assessment 
carried out under the revised DWD. 

health, 

public 

and 

Assessment: (+) 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The climate  

Quality  of  natural 
resources/fighting 
pollution 
soil, air etc.)  

(water, 

Biodiversity, 
flora, 
including 
ecosystems 
fauna, 
and the services they 
provide 
and 
landscapes  

Cross cutting impacts 

in 
Impacts 
developing countries 

Critical  impact  targeted  by  the  strategy. 
Increase  of  resilience  to  climate  impacts 
and  preventing  climate 
risks.  Also 
potential synergies with mitigation may be 
worth considering. 

Impact on climate resilience (+/-) 

(possible) 
mitigation (+/-) 

Synergy  with 

climate 

Climate  change  will  require  rapid 
response  to  events  that  cause  an 
immediate 
to  water 
threat 
quality350 and quantity. 

Targeted 
impact. 

indirect 

Increased  resilience  to  impacts  of  climate 
through 
reducing  exposure 
change  by 
implementation  of  clear  water 
supply 
strategies.  

Assessment: (+) 

Strategy  intends  to  address  impacts  of 
climate  change  on  natural  resources,  e.g. 
forests, agriculture, marine environment.  

Impact  on  natural  resource  resilience 
(+/-) 

under 

quality 

continues 

to 
Water 
increased 
degrade 
temperatures, 
infrastructure 
leakages,  flooding,  and  exposure 
to contaminants.  

Targeted 
impact. 

indirect 

Water  quality  is  protected  by  reducing 
exposure to contaminated/polluted water due 
to climate impacts.  

Assessment: (+) 

Strategy  intends  to  address  impacts  of 
climate change on biodiversity, and also to 
make use of Ecosystem-based solutions.  

Use  of  ecosystem-based  solutions  and 
increased resilience of ecosystems (+/-) 

Ecosystems  will  face  drought, 
pollution, 
and 
flooding, 
negatively 
the 
impacting 
biodiversity they contain.  

Targeted 
impact. 

indirect 

Climate  impacts  are  incorporated  into  water 
quality  and  quantity  governance,  improving 
ecosystem health which is also dependent on 
flows. 
clean 
Additionally,  ecosystem  service  can  be 
explored  to  increase  water  quality,  and 
prevent evaporation/desertification. 

continuous  water 

and 

above 

impacts 

highlighted 

As 
in 
developing  countries  are  important  to  EU 
economically  (supply  chains  /  markets) 
ties,  migration, 
and  socially 
security).  Strategy  hopes 
to  support 
improved  climate  resilience  of  3rd  (not 
only developing) countries.  

(family 

Impact 
international relations (+/-) 

third 

on 

countries 

Assessment: (+) 

and 

No impact, is EU focused 

impact, 

No 
focused 

is  EU 

Some key reports in the field 

350 Mesquita, E., João, M. R., Menaia, J., Kardinaal, E., Eikebrokk, B., & Smeets, P. (2013). Adapted operation of drinking water systems to cope with climate change. 103.  
http://www.prepared-fp7.eu/viewer/file.aspx?FileInfoID=369 

237 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
  CIS Guidance document No. 24 (2009). River basin management in a changing climate. https://circabc.europa.eu/sd/a/a88369ef-df4d-43b1-8c8c-
306ac7c2d6e1/Guidance%20document%20n%2024%20-%20River%20Basin%20Management%20in%20a%20Changing%20Climate_FINAL.pdf  
  European Environment Agency (2020). Use of freshwater resources in Europe (incl. Water exploitation index plus (WEI+) for river basin districts) 

https://www.eea.europa.eu/ds_resolveuid/IND-11-en  

  Mesquita, E., João, M. R., Menaia, J., Kardinaal, E., Eikebrokk, B., & Smeets, P. (2013). Adapted operation of drinking water systems to cope with 

climate change. 103. http://www.prepared-fp7.eu/viewer/file.aspx?FileInfoID=369 

  Rosén, L., Hokstad, P., Lindhe, A., & Sklet, S. (2007). Generic Framework and Methods for Integrated Risk Management in Water Safety Plans. 

Techneau, June, 107. 

  Rustler,  M.,  Grützmacher,  G.,  Meseguer,  J.,  Cembrano,  G.,  &  Escaler,  I.  (2012).  Decision  Support  Systems  for  water  resource  planning  under 
framework.

Conceptual 

conditions 

climate 

change 

238 

 
 
Annex 8: Legal basis for EU action in climate change adaptation 

Table 42: Legal instruments in suport of EU action in climate change adaptation 

Legal basis 

Legal 
instruments 

Mandate for the EU 
to act 

Commentary 

s
t
n
e
m
u
r
t
s
n

i

l

a
g
e

l

U
E

s
t
n
e
m
u
r
t
s
n

i

l

a
g
e

l

l

a
n
o
i
t
a
n
r
e
t
n

I

Treaty on the 
Functioning of 
the European 
Union (TFEU)351 

Articles 
192(1) TFEU 

191 

and 

In accordance with Articles 191 and 192(1) TFEU, the European Union 
shall contribute to the pursuit, inter alia, of the following objectives: 
preserving, protecting and improving the quality of the environment, 
promoting  measures  at  international  level  to  deal  with  regional  or 
worldwide  environmental  problems,  and  in  particular  combating 
climate change. 

212 

on 
Article 
Economic,  Financial 
Technical 
and 
Cooperation 
with 
Third Countries. 

Article 7.1 

Giving  legal  basis  for  more  ambitious  international  cooperation 
objective under the new strategy. Spillover effects of climate change 
and  trade  relationships  with  third  countries  makes  international 
action 
the 
development policy of the Union” as stipulated in the article. 

in  climate  change  adaptation 

“consistent  with 

Parties hereby establish the global goal on adaptation of enhancing 
adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability 
to  climate  change,  with  a  view  to  contributing  to  sustainable 
development and ensuring an adequate adaptation response in the 
context of the temperature goal referred to in Article 2. 

Article 7.7 

Parties should strengthen their cooperation on enhancing action on 
adaptation, taking into account the Cancun Adaptation Framework. 

Paris Agreement 

Article 7.9 

Each  Party  shall,  as  appropriate,  engage  in  adaptation  planning 
processes  and  the 
including  the 
development  or  enhancement  of  relevant  plans,  policies  and/or 
contributions. 

implementation  of  actions, 

Article 7.10 and 7.11 

Each  Party  should  submit  and  update  periodically  an  adaptation 
communication,  which  may  include  information  on  its  priorities, 
implementation and support needs, plans and actions. 

Article 13.7 and 13.14  According to the transparency framework, all parties should provide 
information related to climate change impacts and adaptation under 
Article  7,  as  appropriate.  Support  shall  be  provided  to  developing 
countries for the implementation of this Article. 

Decision  9/CMA.1  of 
the  Conference  of 
the Parties352 

United Nations 
Framework 
Convention on 
Climate Change 

The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties 
to  the  Paris  Agreement,  recalling  relevant  provisions  of  the 
Convention  and  the  Paris  Agreement,  in  particular  Article  7,  notes 
that the purpose of the adaptation communication is to: (a) Increase 
the visibility and profile of adaptation and its balance with mitigation; 
(b)  Strengthen  adaptation  action  and  support  for  developing 
countries;  (c)  Provide  input  to  the  global  stocktake;  (d)  Enhance 
learning and understanding of adaptation needs and actions 

351 European Council (2012) Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2012/C 326/01,  
available at - https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A12012E%2FTXT 
352 UNFCC (2019) Report of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement on the  
Third part of its first session, held in Katowice, FCCC/PA/CMA/2018/3/Add.1,  
available at – https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2018_03a01E.pdf.  
Further details on adaptation communication and its elements are available:  
https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2018_03a01E.pdf 

239 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
Annex 9: Climate change and its impacts 

Climate change is already occurring and its impacts felt across the world. Europe has warmed 
faster than any other continent over recent decades with European temperature almost 2°C 
above temperatures of the latter half of the 19th century353, with impacts and adaptation needs 
that we are feeling already now and that are expected to grow.  

The past five years were the warmest on record354, with global average temperature reaching 
1.1°C  above  pre-industrial  levels  in  2019.  Human-induced  global  warming  is  presently 
increasing  at  a  rate  of  0.2°C  per  decade355.  However,  temperature  increase  is  not  the  same 
everywhere. Regions for example the Arctic regions are warming faster and if current trends 
continue, there is a risk for cascading tipping points. 

The effects of rising temperatures and greenhouse gas emissions are being felt in Europe and 
around  the  world.  Heatwaves  were  the  deadliest  meteorological  hazard  in  the  2015–2019 
period356 and are becoming more intense in Europe. In summer 2019 they led to more deaths 
than  the  seasonal  average  in  parts  of  Europe  as  temperatures  broke  records  in  several 
countries, including a new record of over 34°C above the Arctic Circle. In Europe almost all 
years  since  2000  show  above-average  fire  danger,  with  a  number  of  associated  disastrous 
events in the recent past, such as Pedrógão Grande wildfires (Portugal) in 2017, wildfires in 
Attica (Greece) in 2018 with 102 lost human lives, and the Scandinavian fire season in 2018.  

There  is  a  strong  possibility  that  global  warming  will  reach  and  overshoot  1.5°C,  at  least 
temporarily, before temperatures can be reduced again, raising the question of what it means 
for  warming  to  cross  the  global  1.5°C  threshold,  and  how  impacts  and  the  adaptation 
challenge in  Europe will evolve.  In examining these issues, this section builds upon section 
5.9  of  the  in-depth  analysis  in  support  of  the  Commission  Communication  on  the  EU  long 
term strategy357

 and updates findings since 2018. 

1.  Global impacts due to climate change 

The  recent  reports  of  the  IPCC358  find  that  robust  differences  in  climate  characteristics  are 
projected between the present-day and global warming of 1.5°C, and between 1.5°C and 2°C. 
The main differences in impacts between these warming levels are examined systematically in 
SR1.5. Further detail is provided in the subsequent IPCC reports on climate change and land 
(SRCCL)  and  on  ocean  and  cryosphere  in  a  changing  climate  (SROCC).  SRCCL  finds  that 
risks  associated  with  permafrost  degradation,  wildfire,  coastal  degradation  and  stability  of 

353 Copernicus Climate Change Service (2019). European State of the Climate, 2019.  
https://climate.copernicus.eu/ESOTC/2019/surface-temperature  
Note that land has warmed more rapidly than the ocean. Therefore, most populated regions of the world have experienced warming above the  
global average. However, Europe has warmed more than other regions.  
354 WMO Statement on the State of the Climate in 2019 
355 IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C (2018). Section 1.1 
356 United in Science (2019), High-level synthesis report of latest climate science information convened by the Science Advisory Group of  
the UN Climate Action Summit 2019. https://public.wmo.int/en/resources/united_in_science  
357 https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/clima/files/docs/pages/com_2018_733_analysis_in_support_en_0.pdf  
358 Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C – SR15 (2018), Special Report on Climate Change and Land – SRCCL (2019) and Special  
Report on Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate – SROCC (2019) 

 
 
                                                 
food systems are high at 1.5°C, while risks associated with soil erosion, vegetation loss, and 
change in nutrition become high at higher temperature thresholds due to increased possibility 
for  adaptation.  SROCC  focuses  largely  on  differences  in  impacts  between  a  below  2°C 
scenario  and  a  high  emissions  scenario359  and  shows  that  keeping  warming  below  2°C  will 
lead  to  multi-metre  differences  in  sea-level  rise  beyond  2100.  Limiting  warming  will  also 
slow  ice  loss  and  reduce  impacts  on  the  ocean  (such  as  marine  heatwaves  and  acidification 
due to the ocean’s absorption of CO2) which in turn harm marine life and fisheries. Limiting 
warming  to  1.5°C  therefore  increases  the  chances  of  ecosystem-based  adaptation  measures 
(such as wetland preservation and restoration) proving effective. 

On  the  issue  of  Earth  system  tipping  points,  such  as  slowdown  of  the  Atlantic  Meridional 
Overturning Circulation (Gulf Stream) or instability of the Greenland and West Antarctic ice 
sheets,  SR1.5  finds  greater  risks  at  lower  temperatures  compared  to  the  previous  (fifth) 
assessment report of IPCC, with moderate risk at 1°C of warming and high risk at 2.5°C of 
warming.  While  the  IPCC  does  not  explicitly  label  global  warming  of  1.5°C  as  an  Earth 
system tipping point, there is abundant  evidence that impacts and risks are greater at higher 
temperatures  (every  tenth  of  a  degree  matters).  For  example,  articles  such  as  Lenton  et  al. 
(2019)360  make  a  precautionary  case  for  keeping  global  warming  as  low  as  possible  on  the 
basis  that  while  low  probability,  high  impact  events  are  little  understood,  science  has 
progressively  assessed  them  as  being  more  likely  at  lower  temperatures  as  knowledge  has 
improved.  

The  Council  conclusions  on  Climate  Diplomacy361  underline  that  climate  change  multiplies 
threats to international stability and security in particular affecting those in most fragile and 
vulnerable  situations,  reinforcing  environmental  pressures  and  disaster  risk,  contributing  to 
the loss of livelihoods and forcing the displacement of people. 

359 These are scenarios RCP2.6 and RCP8.5 respectively. Warming under RCP8.5 is widely considered to be greater than current business-as- 
usual scenarios. 
360 Lenton, M., et al. (2019). Climate tipping points — too risky to bet against. Nature | Vol 575 | 28 November 2019. 
361 Council conclusions on Climate Diplomacy, ST-5033-2020 of 20 January 2020,  
https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-5033-2020-INIT/en/pdf  

241 

 
 
                                                 
Table 43: Selected Climate Change Impacts to Natural Systems at 1.5°C & 2°C warming 

Extreme hot days 

Sea level rise by 2100 

Ecosystems 

Habitat Loss 

At 2°C 

4°C hotter 

around 0.1m more than at 1.5°C 

(less time to adapt) 

13% of global land area changes 
from one ecosystem type to 
another 

At 1.5°C 

3°C hotter 

0.26-0.77m 

area at risk ~50% lower than at 
2°C 

18% of insects, 16% of plants and 
8% of vertebrates lose over half 
their climatically determined 
geographic range 

6% of insects, 8% of plants and 
4% of vertebrates lose over half 
their climatically determined 
geographic range 

Permafrost thawing 

1.5 – 2.5 million km2 greater than 
at 1.5°C 

Woody shrubs encroaching into 
the tundra already at 1°C 

Arctic Ocean 

At least one sea ice-free summer 
per decade 

One sea ice-free summer per 
century 

Coral reefs 

largely disappear (>99% loss) 

decline by 70-90% 

Fisheries 

Global annual marine catch 
(one model) 

over 3 million tonnes lower 

1.5 million tonnes lower 

Greater risk at 2°C than 1.5°C is specified but not quantified362 

  Droughts and precipitation deficits; 
  Heavy precipitation events;  
  Heavy precipitation associated with tropical cyclones; 
  Larger area affected by flood hazards due to precipitation; 
  Spread of invasive species  
  Forest fires 
  Marine ice sheet instability in Antarctica and/or irreversible loss of the Greenland ice sheet could be 

triggered around 1.5°C to 2°C of global warming 

  Oceans (greater risk at 2°C spanning several impacts including species range shift and impacts of 

ocean acidification on marine species) 

Note:  Impacts  above  are  attributed  a  confidence  level  of  at  least  medium  in  the  IPCC  report’s  Summary  for 
Policymakers 

Source: IPCC Special Report on global warming of 1.5°C 

362 Some of these impacts are regional rather than global, though regions in this context are large. E.g. heavy precipitation events are  
projected to be higher in northern hemisphere high latitude/high elevation regions, eastern Asia and eastern North America. More specific  
phenomena within these categories may be quantified in the underlying IPCC report. 

242 

 
 
 
                                                 
At 2°C 

At 1.5°C 

Populations exposed to 
climate-related risks and 
susceptible to poverty 

Numbers affected expected to 
increase 

Several hundred million fewer 
people affected than at 2°C by 
2050. 

Water stress 

Additional 8% of world’s 
population affected (based on 
year 2000 population) 

Affects up to 50% less of the 
world’s population compared to 
2°C 

Greater risk at 2°C than 1.5°C is specified but not quantified 

  Human health: heat-related morbidity & mortality, ozone-related mortality 
  Vector-borne diseases (e.g. malaria, dengue): increased risk, shifting geographic range 
  Crops (cereals, rice): reductions in yields and/or nutritional quality 
  Reductions in projected food availability 
  Risks to global aggregated economic growth 
  Exposure to multiple, compound climate-related risks 
  Greater adaptation needs 

Note:  Impacts  above  are  attributed  a  confidence  level  of  at  least  medium  in  the  IPCC  report’s  Summary  for 
Policymakers 

Source: IPCC Special Report on global warming of 1.5°C 

2.  The need to adapt in the EU 

Successful mitigation action is  the first  necessary  step to  reduce the  risk of climate change. 
However, in parallel, the EU economy as a whole must adapt to the risks that will result from 
already  committed  emissions.  These  risks  grow  as  we  lag  behind  schedule  in  stabilising 
temperatures.  Limiting  global  warming  to  1.5°C,  compared  with  2°C,  could  reduce  the 
number of people susceptible to poverty globally363 by up to several hundred million by 2050. 
Each 0.5ºC of warming avoided can be significant, increasing the chances of achieving SDGs 
related  to  poverty,  hunger,  health,  water,  cities  and  ecosystems.  Among  others,  the  EU 
agricultural, forestry, arctic and coastal dependent communities would benefit significantly as 
the  adaptation  of  fragile  ecosystems  and  the  services  they  provide  (e.g.  climate  and  water 
regulation)  would  be  more  effective.  In  general,  overshooting  the  1.5ºC  limit  will  make 
climate-resilient development pathways (CRDPs) more elusive and impacts on water-energy-
food-biodiversity links more difficult to manage. 

Conventional  and  incremental  approaches  to  adaptation  that  do  not  consider  long-term 
sustainable development or consider adaptation and mitigation separately will not deliver the 
Paris Agreement. More emphasis on ‘transformational’ adaptation measures as a complement 
to  ‘incremental’  adaptation may be  required364. These adaptation  measures and options  may 

363 Summary for Policymakers, IPCC Special Report, Global Warming of 1.5°C, B.5.1 
364 Transformational adaptation, according to the IPCC (2014 AR5, Chapter 14: https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/WGIIAR5-
Chap14_FINAL.pdf ) "seeks to change the fundamental attributes of systems in response to actual or expected climate and its effects, often 
at a scale and ambition greater than incremental activities. It includes changes in activities, such as changing livelihoods from cropping to 
livestock or by migrating to take up a livelihood elsewhere, and also changes in our perceptions and paradigms about the nature of climate 
change, adaptation, and their relationship to other natural and human systems". See also EEA 2017 climate, impacts and vulnerability report 
and 2016 EEA report on Urban adaptation to CC in Europe.  

243 

 
 
 
                                                 
(e.g. 

include  not  only  “hard”  structural  and  physical  measures  (e.g.  coastal  protection, 
infrastructure) but also “soft” social policies (e.g. awareness, health services) and governance 
improvements 
implementation,  cross-sector  coordination,  mainstreaming).  A 
combination  of  both  “hard”  and  “soft”  adaptation  may  produce  best  results365,  and  joining 
efforts  from  several  EU  Member  States  may  also  improve  protection,  e.g.  monitoring  and 
mapping  jointly  coastal  and  terrestrial  areas  for  a  more  reliable  early  warning  of  extreme 
weather366. 

It is necessary to better integrate long-term planning of emissions reduction and adaptation: 

a)  Adaptation  provides  opportunities  and  economic  and  social  stability  –  climate 
change  will  interact  with  other  socio-economic  developments367.  It  can  be  expected 
that climate change adaptation projects or the impact of climate extremes will involve 
a  higher  level  of  public  intervention  than  today368,  which  calls  for  effective  and 
efficient  adaptation  strategies,  particularly  at  local  scale.  Public  resources  may  be 
severely  drained  if  the  climate  reaches  certain  tipping  points369.  On  the  other  hand, 
both  public  and  private  investments  in  adaptation  provide  opportunities  and  risk 
management opportunities that can spur the creation of market niches: e.g. for climate 
services  or  green  infrastructure.  In  addition,  supporting  adaptation  in  developing 
countries may also bring stability and security within the EU's borders. The New EU 
Strategy  on  Adaptation  to  Climate  Change  will  have  a  prominent  international 
dimension. 

b)  There are co-benefits and, if done incorrectly, trade-offs between mitigation and 
adaptation  –  so  both  policies  must  be  developed  together  as  components  of  any 
credible long-term climate action. Early integration of both adaptation and mitigation 
in coherent climate-resilient development pathways entails that specific vulnerabilities 
are factored in when a given economic sectors starts implementing a decarbonisation 
strategy.  For  instance,  adaptation  must  ensure  that  low-emission  agricultural 
techniques  withstand  higher  temperatures,  it  must  lead  to  renewable  electricity 
networks that are climate-resilient and protect forests so that they keep functioning as 
carbon  sinks.  Transformative  climate  action  in  cities,  in  particular,  depends  on  the 
right mix of mitigation and adaptation actions to both protect citizens against climate 
impacts  and  enable  emissions  reduction  within  stringent  legal  and  budgetary 
boundaries.  

(c) Adaptation improves the functionality and resilience of human and natural systems. 
Effective adaptation action reduces both the vulnerability and exposure of natural ecosystems 
and  communities  to  the  risks  associated  with  climate  extreme  events  (floods,  wildfires, 

365 OECD (2015), Climate Change Risk and Adaptation - Linking Policy and Economics, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264234611-en  
366 For example, a new European seabed map stitched together from surveys originally made for navigation has improved storm surge  
forecasts in the North Sea. See: http://www.emodnet.eu/improving-storm-surge-modelling-north-sea  
367 EEA (2017), Climate change, impacts and vulnerabilities in Europe 2016, 
 https://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/climate-change-impacts-and-vulnerability-2016  
368 Daniel Bailey (2015), The Environmental Paradox of the Welfare State: The Dynamics of Sustainability, New Political Economy, 20:6,  
793-811, DOI: 10.1080/13563467.2015.1079169 
369 Steffen et al. (2018), Trajectories of the Earth System in the Anthropocene, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Aug 2018,  
115 (33) 8252-8259; DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1810141115  

244 

 
 
                                                 
hurricanes,  etc.),  and  improves  their  capacity  to  recover  and  re-establish  after  a  climate-
related perturbation. These aspects ensure that the functionality of ecosystems (e.g. absorption 
of  CO2,  provision  of  services)  is  maintained  over  the  long-term,  or  at  least  that  such 
functionality is recovered shortly after an extreme event. In 2013, the European Commission 
adopted  an  EU  Adaptation  Strategy  to  tackle  climate  change  risks  to  the  EU  economy  and 
society. The 2013 Adaptation Strategy – which will be updated with the New EU Strategy on 
Adaptation  to  Climate  Change  in  Q1 2021  –  focuses  on  developing  better  knowledge  and 
understanding  of  climate  impacts,  climate  proofing  of  specific  sectoral  policies  and  the 
promotion  of action by  Member States and cities through non-legislative means. The recent 
evaluation  of  the  Strategy  highlighted  the  urgency  for  action  because  of  the  important  risks 
facing the EU in certain economic areas370. For instance: 

  By  the  end  of  the  century,  under  a  high  emissions  scenario371  and  without  specific 
adaptation measures undertaken, the EU could experience a welfare loss of around 2% of 
GDP  per  year  by  2100,  i.e.  EUR  240  billion  per  year  from  only  six  impact  sectors 
assessed372: 

o  Weather-related disasters could affect about two-thirds of the European population 
annually  (351  million  people  per  year)373,  compared  with  5%  of  the  population 
between  1981-2010.  This  would  increase  the  related  fatalities  per  year  by  fifty 
times by the  year 2100 (from 3 000 deaths per  year presently, to 152 000 deaths 
per year by 2100)374;  

o  Flooding alone may cost EU countries up to EUR 1 trillion per year in damages by 
the end of the century. Most of this would be due to coastal flooding (up to EUR 
961 billion). Damages from river flooding could also rise to up to EUR 112 billion 
compared to EUR 5 billion today, and there is considerable increase in river flood 
risk  for  Europe  even  under  a  1.5º  C  warming  scenario375.  This  could  also  affect 
transport infrastructure. By the end of the century, under a high warming scenario, 
about 200 airports and 850 seaports of different size across the EU could face the 
risk of inundation due to higher sea levels and extreme weather events. 

  Climate  change  is  already  affecting  agriculture  production  both  in  direct  and  indirect 
ways: through temperature and precipitation changes, increasing variability, and extremes. 
It is also affecting the long-term perspective of agriculture through slow on-setting events 
such as soil salinization, soil erosion, land degradation and desertification, and sea-level 
rise. This has a direct impact on production and yields, income and livelihoods, as well as 

370 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the implementation of the EU Strategy on adaptation to  
climate change. 
371 In this section, the term "high emissions scenario", unless specified otherwise, refers to the IPCC's Representative Concentration Pathway  
(RCP) 8.5. In the RCP 8.5 scenario, greenhouse gas emissions continue to rise throughout the 21st century. 
372 JRC (2018), Climate Impacts in Europe, Final report of the JRC PESETA III project. doi:10.2760/93257. 
https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/publication/eur-scientific-and-technical-research-reports/climate-impacts-europe 
373 Forzieri et al. (2017), Increasing risk over time of weather-related hazards to the European population: a data-driven prognostic study,  
https://doi.org/10.1016/S2542-5196(17)30082-7  
374 High emissions scenario, in this particular case, means scenario SRES A1B. 
375 Alfieri et al. (2018). Multi-Model Projections of River Flood Risk in Europe under Global Warming. Climate, 2018 6, 16;  
doi:10.3390/cli6010016: https://www.mdpi.com/2225-1154/6/1/6/pdf  

245 

 
 
                                                 
the  processing  industry  altogether  accounting  for  high  economic  impacts.  In  a  2°C 
scenario  before  2100,  irrigated  crop  yields  are  projected  to  decline  in  most  regions  of 
Europe, with  rain-fed  yields  depending on changes in  water availability376. At EU level, 
the  prolonged  drought  of  2018  has  triggered  higher  CAP  advanced  payments  and 
derogations  from  greening  requirements.377  Repeated  droughts  in  Europe  will  have 
repercussions  for  climate  change  mitigation  policies:  the  water  and  carbon  cycles  are 
interlinked  because  CO2  rates  in  the  atmosphere  increase  when  terrestrial  water  storage 
diminishes: major droughts may cause drastic regional reductions in land carbon sinks378. 
Drought  is  already  ravaging  Europe's  soils,  whose  moisture  shows  a  marked  decreasing 
trend over the 1979-2017 period379. Furthermore, moisture decrease is a crucial factor in 
the ferocity  and  expanded reach of recent  forest  fires (that would jeopardise viability of 
forests as carbon sink and the provision of ecosystem services). 

  As regards the building  sector, new and renovated buildings need to  prepare for climate 
change  impacts  as  they,  together  with  most  of  the  remaining  built  environment,  are 
particularly  vulnerable  to:  (1) Extreme  temperatures  affect  the  comfort  of  the  occupants 
and  building  energy  efficiency;  (2) Climatic  conditions  (humidity,  temperatures)  can 
affect the structural integrity of the constructions; (3) More frequent and intense flooding 
events  can  do  more  harm  to  more  buildings;  and  (4) Water  scarcity  could  in  the  future 
make  domestic  water  supply  more  expensive.  Adaptation  may  for  instance  include: 
(i) Green roofs and walls contribute to reducing the heat island effect and enhance water 
retention  in  towns;  and  (ii) Domestic  rain  water  cisterns  contribute  to  urban  water 
retention and (iii) utilization of energy–efficient building materials contributing to energy 
efficiency and reducing water consumption.. 

The  PESETA380  project  analysed  climate  change  projections  for  2050  considering  the 
Representative  Concentration  Pathway  (RCP)  of  8.5  W/m2  (with  corresponding  global 
warming levels ranging between 1.6°C and 2.7°C compared to pre-industrial levels), as well 
as for 1.5°C and 2°C warming conditions. Results show that climate change will pose a threat 
to global food production in the medium to long term, and that Europe will also be affected. 
Forced by the projected changes in daily temperature, precipitation, wind, relative humidity, 
and  global  radiation,  grain  maize  yields  in  the  EU  will  decline  between  1%  and  22%.  In 
addition, wheat yields in Southern Europe are expected to decrease by up to 49%. 

The  vulnerability  of  forests  and  ecosystems  to  climate  change  has  been  highlighted  in  a 
number of studies and reports from the European Environment Agency (EEA)381 and the Joint 
Research Centre (JRC)382. 

376 Commission Staff Working Document: Evaluation of the EU Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change SWD(2018)461final. 
377 Commission Press release – “Commission offers further support to European farmers dealing with droughts”, Brussels, 2 August 2018.  
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-4801_en.htm  
378 Humphrey et al. (2018), Sensitivity of atmospheric CO2 growth rate to observed changes in terrestrial water storage,  
https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-018-0424-4  
379 Copernicus Climate Services (C3S): European State of the Climate 2017:  
https://climate.copernicus.eu/climate-2017-european-wet-and-dry-indicators  
380 PESETA: https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/peseta-iv  
381 https://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/climate-change-impacts-and-vulnerability-2016  
382 https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/peseta-iii ; https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/peseta-iv  

246 

 
 
                                                 
In  addition,  climate-change  related  risks  can  also  have  implications  on  the  assessment  of 
medium-term inflation outlook by central banks. Recently, the European Central Bank (ECB) 
stated  that  catastrophic  climate  change  could  force  the  ECB  to  rethink  its  current  monetary 
policy framework383. The EIB will end financing for fossil fuel energy projects from 2021384 

Looking  at  risks  from  a  more  territorial  angle,  evidence  is  mounting  on  the  distributional 
effects of climate impacts across Europe. Impacts and opportunities will not be equally spread 
across the EU territory, as shown in the map below: 

Figure 22: Risk of climate change impacts across Europe 

Source: European Environment Agency. https://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/climate-change-impacts-and-
vulnerability-2016 

There  are  specific  climate  risks  that  are  of  major  concern  to  some  EU  regions  and 
communities. In the absence of adaptation, for instance385: 

383 Speech by Benoît Cœuré, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at a conference on “Scaling up Green Finance: The Role of Central  
Banks”, organised by the Network for Greening the Financial System, the Deutsche Bundesbank and the Council on Economic Policies,  
Berlin, 8 November 2018 
384 https://www.eib.org/en/press/all/2019-313-eu-bank-launches-ambitious-new-climate-strategy-and-energy-lending-policy.htm#  
385 Where not otherwise specified, information provided comes from Commission Staff Working Document: Evaluation of the EU Strategy  
on Adaptation to Climate Change SWD(2018)461final. 

247 

 
 
 
                                                 
  While Europe as a whole will be more prone to flood risk (with mean annual river flow set 
to increase), water stress will be more pronounced in Southern European regions534, and 
may  well  cause  tensions  between  different  users  of  dwindling  reservoirs  and  aquifers. 
With  2°C  warming,  river  flows  in  Mediterranean  regions  are  expected  to  fall  in  all 
seasons.  

  Higher temperatures by the end of the century are expected to have various impacts such 
as a 10-15% loss in outdoor labour productivity in several Southern European countries as 
well as increases in heat-related mortality. 

  Habitat  loss  and  forest  fires  are  also  serious  risks.  16%  of  the  present  Mediterranean 
climate zone (an area half the size of Italy) could become arid by the end of the century. 
Drier soils in the Mediterranean also increase the area prone to forest fires. 

  Loss  of  Alpine  tundra,  even  at  2°C  could  have  important  impacts  on  water  regulation 
(including for human consumption), as well as economic impacts including in the tourism 
sector. 

  Specific risks (e.g. hurricanes, sea level rise, extreme heat) threaten to unravel EU efforts 
to  support  its  nine  Outermost  Regions,  most  of  them  small  and  isolated  islands.  The 
impacts of hurricanes Irma and Maria on the Caribbean in 2017, and notably on St-Martin, 
Guadeloupe and Martinique (three of the EU's outermost regions) came as a stark warning 
of the potential impacts such regions face.  

  Transport:  From  road  and  rail  networks  to  ports,  airports  and  inland  waterways,  critical 
transport  resources  are  facing  unprecedented  threats  from  a  climate,  which  is  already 
changing. Spain, for example, has just suffered the most powerful storms experienced in 
decades,  destroying  bridges,  cutting  off  roads  and  railway  lines  and  submerging  entire 
towns in coastal areas. Flooding from high precipitation and extreme storms, in possible 
association with related impacts including landslides and slope failures, will bring major 
risks  across  the  region  for  all  modes  of  transport  (road  -  and  airport  -  infrastructure, 
railway  and  inland  waterways).  Rising  sea  levels  and  greater  wave  activity  causing 
erosion put vital coastal transport infrastructure (i.e. coastal roads, railways, seaports and 
airports) at risk. Over 60% of EU seaports386 may be under high inundation risk by 2100, 
causing  disruptions  to  operations  and  damages  to  port  infrastructure  and  vessels, 
especially along the North Sea coast, where the traffic of over 500 ports accounts for up to 
15%  of  the  world’s  cargo  transport.  Rising  temperatures  linked  to  increased  heat  waves 
and  drier  and  hotter  summers  will  affect  roads,  where  pavement  damages,  damages  to 
bridges  and  increased  landslides  in  mountainous  areas  are  among  key  risks.  Areas 
considered  particularly  worthy  of  more  detailed  analysis  include  E-Roads  in  Southern 
Europe  (South-Eastern  France,  Italy,  Western  Balkans,  Portugal,  Spain,  Greece,  and 
Turkey) as well as in Nordic countries (Norway, Sweden and Finland). Climate proofing 
not only individual infrastructure investment projects, but also existing transport corridors, 

386 UNECE: https://www.unece.org/info/media/presscurrent-press-h/transport/2020/unece-study-maps-transport-infrastructure-at-high-risk-
due-to-climate-change-in-pan-european-region-and-canada/doc.html  

248 

 
 
                                                 
networks  and  systems  will  be  increasingly  relevant,  as  the  majority  of  the  existing 
infrastructure is built for the past climatic conditions. 

  On  major  rail  networks  –  where  potential  impacts  include  buckling  of  tracks,  slope 
failures and speed restrictions – infrastructure in the Mediterranean (Spain, Italy, France), 
northern Europe, and Croatia are among those that could warrant more in-depth review. 

  Warming  is  also  associated  with  increased  navigational  risks  on  inland waterways,  with 
significant  implications  for  the  transport  of  goods  and  people,  which  is  already 
problematic in parts of central Europe. 

  Cities as well as rural areas are directly and indirectly impacted by the impacts of climate 
change.  As  the  level  of  governance  closest  to  citizens,  they  are  often  at  the  forefront  of 
responding  to  natural  disasters  and  taking  action  on  mitigate  emissions  and  adapt  to 
climate  change.  Through  their  concentration  of  people  and  assets,  cities  are  the  major 
consumers of energy  and emitters of greenhouse gas emissions, but  have also  pioneered 
actions to reduce emissions and adapt to climate. Including through initiatives such as the 
EU and Global Covenant of Mayors, committing to reduce emissions by at least 40% by 
2030, and taking action to adapt to climate change". 

The EU Taxonomy on sustainable finance will also address climate related risks. 

3.  Mitigation and adaptation: co-benefits and trade-offs 

Measures to cut emissions can undermine resilience to climate change in certain contexts, and 
viceversa.  On  the  other  hand,  there  are  adaptation  measures  that  are  also  beneficial  for 
decarbonisation  (e.g.  protection  of  certain  coastal  ecosystems  that  both  tackle  sea  level  rise 
and remove CO2). A recent OECD report387 highlights that climate investments and projects 
must  consider  the  links  between  adaptation  and  mitigation  to  minimise  climate  risk:  the 
greater the perceived risks of a project, the higher the returns investors will demand, and the 
higher  the  costs  passed  onto  end  users  and  government  sources  of  funding.  The  report 
provides a summary of  potential synergies and trade-offs between adaptation and mitigation 
measures: 

387 OECD (2017), Investing in Climate, Investing in Growth, OECD Publishing, Paris. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264273528-en  

249 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
Table 44: Co-benefits and trade-offs between adaptation and mitigation for agriculture 
and forestry388 

Positive for mitigation 

Potential trade-off with mitigation 

deforestation: 
and  provides 

sequesters 
ecosystems 

Desalination: addresses water shortage but is 
energy intensive 

Reduced 
carbon 
services 

Agricultural practices (e.g. no till) that 
can  sequester  carbon  while  boosting 
farmers income 

Wetland 
sequestration and reduced flood risk 

restoration: 

carbon 

Renewable  energy  –  wind  and  solar: 
thermal 
use 
lower  water 
generation 

than 

Increased  irrigation:  helps  farmers  manage 
variable  precipitation  but  can  be  energy 
intensive 

Construction  of  hard  defences:  reduces  the 
risk  of  extreme  events,  but  the  construction 
may  in  some  cases  lead  to  substantial 
greenhouse gas emissions 

is  energy 

Air-conditioning: reduces the impact of high 
temperatures,  but 
intensive. 
However,  redesign  of  buildings  to  enable 
passive  cooling  and  natural  ventilation  in 
buildings  is  a  better  and  more  sustainable 
solution. 

Positive 
for 
adaptation 

Potential 
trade-off 
with 
adaptation 

Inappropriate  expansion  of  biofuels: 
could  exacerbate  food  price  shocks  if 
biofuels displace crops 

N/A 

Hydropower: 
complexity 
resources 

could 

the 
of  managing  water 

increase 

In  some  areas,  the  potential  to  maximise  the  mutual  reinforcement  between  adaptation  and 
mitigation should guide long-term EU efforts to decarbonise and climate-proof the economy. 
Examples for ecosystems, energy and cities are mentioned below. 

Land and coastal ecosystems 

Terrestrial and marine ecosystems globally absorb around 50% of anthropogenic emissions389. 
The  rest  remains  for  prolonged  times  in  the  atmosphere,  increasing  greenhouse  gas 
concentrations and causing climate change.  

Climate  change  is  affecting  ecosystems,  modifying  species  range  and  prompting  natural 
vegetation changes. Global warming has led to shifts of climate zones in many world regions, 
including  expansion  of  arid  climate  zones  and  contraction  of  polar  climate  zones.  As  a 

388 EEA has published a report CCA and agriculture which goes much more in details about adaptation measures and its benefits for  
mitigation and biodiversity. https://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/cc-adaptation-agriculture 
389 Around 50% globally, according to A. P. Ballantyne, C. B. Alden, J. B. Miller, P. P. Tans, J. W. C. White. Increase in observed net carbon  
dioxide uptake by land and ocean during the past 50 years. Nature, 2012; 488 (7409): 70 DOI: 10.1038/nature11299 

250 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
consequence,  many  plant  and  animal  species  have  experienced  changes  in  their  ranges, 
abundances, and shifts in their seasonal activities. 7.5% of global land area will change from 
one ecosystem type to another at 1.5°C, and 13% at 2°C. 

This absorption capacity has its own limits. In case of oceans, this uptake is associated with 
increased acidification, having negative impacts on marine biodiversity. In case of terrestrial 
ecosystems, ecosystem degradation and deforestation actually result in significant greenhouse 
gas  emissions,  while  being  detrimental  for  biodiversity.  Preserving  and  restoring  terrestrial 
and  marine  ecosystems  contribute  both  to  mitigation  and  adaptation  (for  example,  they 
contribute to water retention, control floods and protect against soil erosion or air pollution).  

In general, the joint implementation of adaptation and mitigation strategies contribute to the 
health, functionality and resilience of ecosystems, and therefore improve the availability and 
delivering  of  goods  and  services  to  EU  citizens.  Many  environmental,  welfare  and  climate 
objectives  may  be  reached  simultaneously  through  ecosystem-based  initiatives390.  For 
example,  marine  vegetated  habitats  (seagrasses,  salt-marshes,  mangroves  and  others) 
contribute  50%  of  carbon  storage  in  marine  sediments  despite  occupying  only  0.2%  of  the 
ocean surface globally. They reduce wave energy and raise the seafloor, and as such moderate 
the impacts of sea level  rise and contribute to safeguard people, infrastructure, and property 
along coastlines391. 

Land restoration, reforestation, afforestation and reduced and avoided degradation in forests, 
as well as rehabilitation of wetlands, contributes to and increased land use sink. Forests offer a 
good  example  of  the  co-benefits  that  can  arise  from  coordinated  adaptation  and  mitigation. 
Indeed, EU forests absorb the equivalent of just over 400 MtCO2, or almost 10% of total EU 
greenhouse  gas  emissions  each  year.  At  the  same  time,  they  lower  temperatures,  act  as  a 
buffer  for  hydrological  extremes  and  purify  water,  which  means  they  are  also  crucial  in 
adapting  to  climate  change.  Recent  case-studies  in  Ireland,  Spain  and  the  Czech  Republic 
have shown that adaptation measures and good forestry practices enhance the role of forests 
as  carbon  sinks392.  It  is  important  to  act  with  a  long-term  perspective  because  aging  and 
degraded  forests,  agro-forestry  systems  and  more  recent  forest  plantations  all  require 
adaptation planning today in order to withstand a changing climate.  

Energy393 

Due  to  climate  change  alone,  and  in  the  absence  of  adaptation,  annual  damage  to  Europe’s 
critical  infrastructure  could  increase  ten-fold  by  the  end  of  the  century  under  business-and-
usual  scenarios394,  from  the  current  EUR  3.4  billion  to  EUR  34  billion.  Losses  would  be 
highest for the industry, transport, and energy. One of the greatest challenges is how to assess 

390 Faivre et al. 2018; https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2017.12.015 
391 Duarte, C.M., Losada, I.J., Hendriks, I.E., Mazarrasa, I., Marbà, N. The role of coastal plant communities for climate change mitigation  
and adaptation. Nature Climate Change, 3 (11), pp. 961-968 (2013). 
392 European Forest Institute – 2018  
 https://www.efi.int/publications-bank/climate-smart-forestry-mitigation-impacts-three-european-regions  
393 https://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/adaptation-in-energy-system 
394 Forzieri et al. (2018), Escalating impacts of climate extremes on critical infrastructures in Europe, Global Environmental Change 48, 97– 
107,  

251 

 
 
                                                 
impacts on energy production which may occur as a consequence of the projected increase in 
the  intensity  of  extreme  weather  events,  as  research  gaps  include  economic  modelling  of 
extreme events and vulnerabilities of transmission infrastructure395.  

Impacts on renewable energy sources are of specific concern, given their critical contribution 
to emissions reduction. There is some evidence on impacts on hydropower production due to 
water scarcity, but also on wind, solar, biomass396. As regards hydropower in particular, the 
main  mechanisms  through  which  climate  change  can  affect  hydropower  production  are 
changes  in  river  ﬂow,  evaporation,  and  dam  safety397.  For  Europe,  most  studies  show  a 
positive effect of climate change impacts on hydropower for Northern Europe and a negative 
effect  for  South  and  Eastern  Europe557  398  399  400  401.  The  extent  to  which  climate  change 
affects hydropower in Europe as a whole differs among the studies from almost no effect558 to 
decreases of 5-10% by the end of the  century or even before559  402. Adaptation measures in 
hydropower production could offset these impacts in Europe on a yearly average (not for all 
months of the year): e.g. by increasing efficiency560 or water storage403. As regards solar and 
wind  energy,  there  are  studies  that  indicate  that  production  might  be  negatively  affected  on 
some regions in the EU404 405 406.  

Thermoelectric generation will be under more pressure in Southern European regions where 
their water cooling needs may no longer be met: they may generate up to 20% less under a 
3ºC scenario; 15% less in a 2ºC world. 555Thermal electricity generation may suffer most from 
water stress in the near term in the Mediterranean, France, Germany and Poland407. 

While  the  magnitude  of  these  impacts  is  not  expected  to  jeopardise  Europe's  long-term 
decarbonisation  path,  it  may  entail  higher  costs  and  different  regional  energy  mixes,  unless 
adaptive measures are deployed such as increased plant efficiencies, replacement of cooling 
systems and fuel switches560. Private stakeholders in the energy system and EU and national 
policies should reinforce the right market framework to ensure that the climate impacts do not 
jeopardise  the  EU’s  stability  and  security  of  energy  supply.  Transitions  in  the  electricity 

395 Chandramowli et Felder (2014), Impact of climate change on electricity systems and markets – A review of models and forecasts,  
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.seta.2013.11.003 
396 See COACCH 1st synthesis report. 
397 Mideksa and Kalbekken (2010), The impact of climate change on the electricity market: A review,  
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2010.02.035  
398 Hamududu and Killingtveit (2012), Assessing Climate Change Impacts on Global Hydropower, doi:10.3390/en5020305  
399 Lehner et al.,(2005), The impact of global change on the hydropower potential of Europe: a model-based analysis,  
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2003.10.018  
400 Van Vliet et al,(2016), Power-generation system vulnerability and adaptation to changes in climate and water resources,  
https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2903  
401 Teotónio et al.(2017), Assessing the impacts of climate change on hydropower generation and the power sector in Portugal: A partial  
equilibrium approach, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2017.03.002  
402 Chandramowli et Felder (2014), Impact of climate change on electricity systems and markets – A review of models and forecasts,  
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.seta.2013.11.003  
403 Berga (2016), The Role of Hydropower in Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation: A Review,  
https://doi.org/10.1016/J.ENG.2016.03.004  
404 Karnauskaset al. (2018), Southward shift of the global wind energy resource under high carbon dioxide emissions,  
https://doi.org/10.1038/s41561-017-0029-9 
405 Tobin et al. (2018), Vulnerabilities and resilience of European power generation to 1.5 °C, 2 °C and 3 °C warming,  
https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/aab211 
406 Jerez et al. (2015), The impact of climate change on photovoltaic power generation in Europe, https://doi.org/10.1038/ncomms10014  
407 Behrens et al. (2017): Climate change and the vulnerability of electricity generation to water stress in the European Union,  
https://doi.org/10.1038/nenergy.2017.114  

252 

 
 
                                                 
sector should encompass  both  mitigation and adaptation  planning, if they are to  sustain  and 
secure a sustainable water–energy nexus in the next few decades. 

The  2019  JRC  report408  provides  further  reading  on  the  water-energy  nexus.  Water 
availability  is  among  the  key  constraints  affecting  the  European  energy  sector,  which 
currently requires 74 billion m3/year of freshwater, similar to the water needs of agriculture. 
The decarbonisation of the energy system could reduce its water needs by 38% by 2050, yet 
water availability will play an essential role on the way to climate neutrality by 2050. At the 
same  time,  projections  indicate  that  water  resources  are  expected  to  be  under  major  stress, 
primarily due to climate change. Higher water stress is expected in Mediterranean regions and 
extreme weather variability is also expected in north-west Europe. That may lead to increased 
strain  in  regions  where  freshwater  is  key  for  cooling  thermal  power  plants  or  where 
hydropower capacity plays a significant role in the power system. 

Cities 

The  need  to  integrate  adaptation  and  mitigation  pathways  is  most  apparent  in  the 
transformation of European cities. They are home to 360 million people, i.e. 73% of Europe’s 
population,  and  account  for  80%  of  the  continent’s  energy  consumption  and  for  85%  of 
Europe’s  GDP409.  Yet,  only  around  40%  of  EU  cities  with  more  than  150.000  inhabitants 
have  adopted  adaptation  plans  to  protect  citizens  from  climate  impacts.  Globally,  a  2015 
OECD report recognises that, in  spite of the important role local  authorities have to  deliver 
climate  resilience  through  regulatory  frameworks  and  incentives,  “support  for  urban 
adaptation remains uneven”527. 

Trade-offs between mitigation and adaptation goals must be avoided in cities. In general, for 
example,  densification  may  benefit  emissions  reduction  (e.g.  less  transport  needs),  but  can 
also  increase  vulnerability  to  regional  climate  impacts  (e.g.  more  people  and  assets  in  less 
space when a flood occurs). Cities also suffer from higher temperatures than the surrounding 
areas, due to the concentration of built environment (“heat island effect”).  

There  are  opportunities  to  optimise  climate  action  when  developing  joint  mitigation  and 
adaptation in urban planning. For example, urban green spaces, corridors and green and blue 
infrastructure  can  deliver  adaptation  benefits  and  absorb  emissions  and  pollution,  and 
permeable  surfaces  to  address  floods  in  urban  areas.  Cities  will  also  be  major  clients  for 
climate services and emerging businesses may provide solutions to city planners that combine 
optimal mitigation and adaptation ideas. Cities that prioritise resilient and low-emission urban 
development at once will enjoy a competitive advantage and attract investments410.  

408 https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/publication/eur-scientific-and-technical-research-reports/water-energy-nexus-europe  
409 HELIX - https://www.helixclimate.eu/  
410 E3G (2014), “Underfunded, underprepared, underwater? Cities at risk”. 

253 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
Annex 10: Glossary, Indices, Abbreviations 

Glossary 

The majority of the following definitions are derived from the IPCC Glossary411 or otherwise 
indicated: 

Adaptation: In human systems, the process of adjustment to actual or expected climate and 
its effects, in order to moderate harm or exploit beneficial opportunities. In natural systems, 
the process of adjustment to actual climate and its effects; human intervention may facilitate 
adjustment to expected climate and its effects. 

Adaptation options: The array of strategies and measures that are available and appropriate 
for  addressing  adaptation.  They  include  a  wide  range  of  actions  that  can  be  categorized  as 
structural, institutional, ecological or behavioural. 

Carbon dioxide (CO2): A naturally occurring gas, CO2 is also a by-product of burning fossil 
fuels  (such  as  oil,  gas  and  coal),  of  burning  biomass,  of  land  use  changes  (LUC),  and  of 
industrial processes (e.g. cement production). It is the principal anthropogenic greenhouse gas 
(GHG)  that  affects  the  Earth's  radiative  balance.  It  is  the  reference  gas  against  which  other 
GHGs are measured and therefore has a Global Warming Potential (GWP) of 1. 

Climate:  Climate  in  a  narrow  sense  is  usually  defined  as  the  average  weather,  or  more 
rigorously,  as  the  statistical  description  in  terms  of  the  mean  and  variability  of  relevant 
quantities over a period of time ranging from months to thousands or millions of years. The 
classical  period  for  averaging  these  variables  is  30  years,  as  defined  by  the  World 
Meteorological Organization. The relevant quantities are most often surface variables such as 
temperature,  precipitation  and  wind.  Climate  in  a  wider  sense  is  the  state,  including  a 
statistical description, of the climate system. 

Climate  change:  Climate  change  refers  to  a  change  in  the  state  of  the  climate  that  can  be 
identified (e.g. by using statistical tests) by changes in the mean and/or the variability of its 
properties  and  that  persists  for  an  extended  period,  typically  decades  or  longer.  Climate 
change may be due to natural internal processes or external forcing such as modulations of the 
solar  cycles,  volcanic  eruptions  and  persistent  anthropogenic  changes  in  the  composition  of 
the  atmosphere  or  in  land  use.  Note  that  the  Framework  Convention  on  Climate  Change 
(UNFCCC),  in  its  Article  1,  defines  climate  change  as:  'a  change  of  climate  which  is 
attributed  directly  or  indirectly  to  human  activity  that  alters  the  composition  of  the  global 
atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable 
time periods'. The UNFCCC thus makes a distinction between climate change attributable to 
human activities altering the atmospheric composition  and climate variability  attributable to 
natural causes. 

411 IPCC Glossary accompanying the special report on global warming of 1.5℃: https://www.ipcc.ch/report/sr15/glossary/  

254 

 
 
                                                 
Climate  extreme  (extreme  weather  or  climate  event):  The  occurrence  of  a  value  of  a 
weather or climate variable above (or below) a threshold value near the upper (or lower) ends 
of the range of observed values of the variable. For simplicity, both extreme  weather events 
and extreme climate events are referred to collectively as ‘climate extremes.’ 

Climate neutrality: Concept of a state in which human activities result in no net effect on the 
climate  system.  Achieving  such  a  state  would  require  balancing  of  residual  emissions  with 
emission (carbon dioxide) removal as well as accounting for regional or local biogeophysical 
effects of human activities that, for example, affect surface albedo or local climate.  

Climate projection: A climate projection is the simulated response of the climate system to a 
scenario  of  future  emission  or  concentration  of  GHG  and  aerosols,  generally  derived  using 
climate  models.  Climate  projections  are  distinguished  from  climate  predictions  by  their 
dependence  on  the  emission/concentration/radiative  forcing  scenario  used,  which  is  in  turn 
based  on  assumptions  concerning,  for  example,  future  socioeconomic  and  technological 
developments that may or may not be realized. 

CO2  equivalent  (CO2-eq)  emission:  The  amount  of  carbon  dioxide  (CO2)  emission  that 
would cause the same integrated radiative forcing or temperature change, over a given time 
horizon, as an emitted amount of a greenhouse gas (GHG) or a mixture of GHGs. There are a 
number of ways to compute such equivalent emissions and choose appropriate time horizons. 
Most  typically,  the  CO2-equivalent  emission  is  obtained  by  multiplying  the  emission  of  a 
GHG  by  its  Global  Warming  Potential  (GWP)  for  a  100  year  time  horizon.  For  a  mix  of 
GHGs it is obtained by summing the CO2-equivalent emissions of each gas. CO2-equivalent 
emission is a common scale for comparing emissions of different GHGs but does not imply 
equivalence of the corresponding climate change responses. There is generally no connection 
between CO2-equivalent emissions and resulting CO2-equivalent concentrations. 

Cost-benefit analysis: Monetary assessment  of  all negative  and positive impacts  associated 
with  a  given  action.  Cost-benefit  analysis  enables  comparison  of  different  interventions, 
investments  or  strategies  and  reveal  how  a  given  investment  or  policy  effort  pays  off  for  a 
particular  person,  company  or  country.  Cost-benefit  analyses  representing  society's  point  of 
view  are  important  for  climate  change  decision  making,  but  there  are  difficulties  in 
aggregating costs and benefits across different actors and across timescales. 

Disaster412: Severe alterations in the normal functioning of a community or a society due to 
hazardous physical events interacting with vulnerable social conditions, leading to widespread 
adverse  human,  material,  economic,  or  environmental  effects  that  require  immediate 
emergency response to satisfy critical human needs and that may require external support for 
recovery. 

Environmental Impact  Assessment  (EIA):  the  process  of carrying out  an EIA as required 
by Directive 2011/92/EU, as amended by Directive 2014/52/EU on assessment of the effects 

412 IPCC SREX Glossary: https://archive.ipcc.ch/pdf/special-reports/srex/SREX-Annex_Glossary.pdf  

255 

 
 
                                                 
of certain public and private Projects on the environment. The main steps of the EIA process 
are: preparation of the EIA Report, publicity and consultation, and decision-making. 

Exposure412:  The  presence  of  people;  livelihoods;  environmental  services  and  resources; 
infrastructure;  or  economic,  social,  or  cultural  assets  in  places  that  could  be  adversely 
affected. 

Extreme  weather  event:  An  extreme  weather  event  is  an  event  that  is  rare  at  a  particular 
place and time of year. Definitions of rare vary, but an extreme weather event would normally 
be as rare as or rarer than the 10th or 90th percentile of a probability density function estimated 
from  observations.  By  definition,  the  characteristics  of  what  is  called  extreme  weather  may 
vary from place to place in an absolute sense. When a pattern of extreme weather persists for 
some time, such as a season, it may be classed  as an  extreme climate  event,  especially if it 
yields an average or total that is itself extreme (e.g. drought or heavy rainfall over a season). 

Global  Warming  Potential  (GWP):  An  index,  based  on  radiative  properties  of  GHG, 
measuring  the  radiative  forcing  following  a  pulse  emission  of  a  unit  mass  of  a  given 
greenhouse gas in the present day atmosphere integrated over a chosen time horizon, relative 
to  that  of  carbon  dioxide.  The  GWP  represents  the  combined  effect  of  the  differing  times 
these  gases  remain  in  the  atmosphere  and  their  relative  effectiveness  in  causing  radiative 
forcing.  The  Kyoto  Protocol  is  based  on  GWPs  from  pulse  emissions  over  a  100-year  time 
frame. 

Greenhouse gas (GHG): Greenhouse gases are those gaseous constituents of the atmosphere, 
both natural and anthropogenic, that absorb and emit radiation at specific wavelengths within 
the spectrum of terrestrial radiation emitted by the earth's surface, the atmosphere itself, and 
by clouds. This property causes the greenhouse effect. Water vapour (H2O), carbon dioxide 
(CO2),  nitrous  oxide  (N2O),  methane  (CH4)  and  ozone  (O3)  are  the  primary  GHGs  in  the 
earth's  atmosphere.  Moreover,  there  are  a  number  of  entirely  human-made  GHGs  in  the 
atmosphere, such as the halocarbons and other chlorine- and bromine-containing substances, 
dealt with under the Montreal Protocol. Beside CO2, N2O and CH4, the Kyoto Protocol deals 
with the GHGs sulphur hexafluoride (SF6), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) and perfluorocarbons 
(PFCs). 

Hazard: The potential occurrence of a natural or human-induced physical event or trend that 
may cause loss of life, injury, or other health impacts, as well as damage and loss to property, 
infrastructure, livelihoods, service provision, ecosystems and environmental resources. 

Infrastructure:  See  the  definition  in  chapter  Error!  Reference  source  not  found.  of  this 
guidance. 

Impacts  (consequences,  outcomes):  The  consequences  of  realized  risks  on  natural  and 
human systems, where risks result from the interactions of climate-related hazards (including 
extreme weather and climate events), exposure, and vulnerability. Impacts generally refer to 
effects on lives, livelihoods, health and wellbeing, ecosystems and species, economic, social 
and cultural assets, services (including ecosystem services), and infrastructure.  Impacts may 
be referred to as consequences or outcomes, and can be adverse or beneficial. 

256 

 
 
Representative  concentration  pathways  (RCPs):  Scenarios  that  include  time  series  of 
emissions and concentrations of the full suite of greenhouse gases (GHGs) and aerosols and 
chemically  active  gases,  as  well  as  land  use/land  cover  (Moss  et  al.,  2008).  The  word 
representative  signifies  that  each  RCP  provides  only  one  of  many  possible  scenarios  that 
would lead to the specific radiative forcing characteristics. The term pathway emphasizes the 
fact that not only the long-term concentration levels, but also the trajectory taken over time to 
reach  that  outcome  are  of  interest  (Moss  et  al.,  2010).  RCPs  were  used  to  develop  climate 
projections in CMIP5. 

RCP2.6:  One  pathway  where  radiative  forcing  peaks  at  approximately  3 W/m²  and  then 
declines  to  be  limited  at  2.6 W/m²  in  2100  (the  corresponding  Extended  Concentration 
Pathway, or ECP, has constant emissions after 2100). 

RCP4.5 and RCP6.0: Two intermediate stabilisation pathways in which radiative forcing is 
limited  at  approximately  4.5 W/m²  and  6.0 W/m²  in  2100  (the  corresponding  ECPs  have 
constant concentrations after 2150). 

RCP8.5: One high pathway which leads to > 8.5 W/m² in 2100 (the corresponding ECP has 
constant emissions after 2100 until 2150 and constant concentrations after 2250). 

Risk: The potential for adverse consequences where something of value is at stake and where 
the  occurrence  and  degree  of  an  outcome  is  uncertain.  In  the  context  of  the  assessment  of 
climate impacts, the term risk is often used to refer to the potential for adverse consequences 
of a climate-related hazard, or of adaptation or mitigation responses to such a hazard, on lives, 
livelihoods,  health  and  wellbeing,  ecosystems  and  species,  economic,  social  and  cultural 
assets,  services  (including  ecosystem  services),  and  infrastructure.  Risk  results  from  the 
interaction of vulnerability (of the affected system), its exposure over time (to the hazard), as 
well as the (climate-related) hazard and the likelihood of its occurrence. 

Risk assessment: The qualitative and/or quantitative scientific estimation of risks. 

Risk  management:  Plans,  actions,  strategies  or  policies  to  reduce  the  likelihood  and/or 
consequences of risks or to respond to consequences. 

Sensitivity413:  Sensitivity  is  the  degree  to  which  a  system  is  affected,  either  adversely  or 
beneficially, by climate variability or change. The effect may be direct (e.g. a change in crop 
yield in response to a change in the mean, range or variability of temperature) or indirect (e.g. 
damages caused by an increase in the frequency of coastal flooding due to sea-level rise). 

Slow  onset  events:  Slow  onset  events  include  e.g.  temperature  increase,  sea-level  rise, 
desertification,  glacial  retreat  and  related  impacts,  ocean  acidification,  land  and  forest 
degradation,  average  precipitation,  salinization,  and  loss  of  biodiversity.  As  regards  the 
statistical distribution of a climate variable (and how it may shift in a changing climate), slow 
onset events will often reflect how the mean value is changing (whereas extreme events are 
related to the tail ends of the distribution). 

413 IPCC AR4 Glossary WG2: https://archive.ipcc.ch/pdf/glossary/ar4-wg2.pdf  

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Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA): the process of carrying out an environmental 
assessment  as  required  by  Directive  2001/42/EC  on  the  assessment  of  the  effects  of  certain 
plans  and  programmes  on  the  environment.  The  main  steps  of  the  SEA  process  are 
preparation of the SEA Report, publicity and consultation, and decision-making. 

Urban  resilience:  The  measurable  ability  of  any  urban  system,  with  its  inhabitants,  to 
maintain  continuity  through  all  shocks  and  stresses,  while  positively  adapting  and 
transforming towards sustainability. 

Vulnerability [IPCC AR4414]: Vulnerability is the degree to which a system is susceptible to, 
and unable to cope with, adverse effects of climate change, including climate variability and 
extremes. Vulnerability is a function of the character, magnitude, and rate of climate change 
and variation to which a system is exposed, its sensitivity, and its adaptive capacity. 

Vulnerability  [IPCC  AR5415]:  The  propensity  or  predisposition  to  be  adversely  affected. 
Vulnerability  encompasses  a  variety  of  concepts  and  elements  including  sensitivity  or 
susceptibility to harm and lack of capacity to cope and adapt. 

Index of Tables and Boxes 

Box 1: Stakeholder views on the main problems for the EU Adaptation strategy ................................................ 14 
Box 2: Foresight to 2100 on projected climate impacts – cost of non-action in Europe ....................................... 16 
Box 3: Stakeholder views on problems drivers hindering the new EU Adaptation Strategy ................................ 23 
Box 4: Stakeholder views on objective setting for the new EU Adaptation Strategy ........................................... 29 
Table 5: Baseline option – Actions ....................................................................................................................... 32 
Table  6:  Deepening  of  existing  actions  and  their  connectivity  to  the  Drivers  (D),  Problems  (P)  and 

Objectives (O) ......................................................................................................................................... 32 

Table 7: Novel actions and their connectivity connectivity to the Drivers (D), Problems (P) and Objectives 

(O) ........................................................................................................................................................... 34 
Box 8: Disaster Risk Management, financing strategies, and National Fiscal Frameworks ................................. 35 
Table 9: Summary of impact assessment relative to the baseline ......................................................................... 38 
Table 10 Annual welfare loss ............................................................................................................................... 40 
Table 11: Annual welfare loss – change in option 1 compared to baseline........................................................... 42 
Table 12: Annual welfare loss – change in option 2 compared to baseline........................................................... 44 
Table 13: change in Employment ......................................................................................................................... 47 
Table 14: Summary of impact of heat and cold wave impacts .............................................................................. 48 
Table 15: Change in Employment in option 1 compared to baseline .................................................................... 49 
Table 16: Change in Employment in option 2 compared to baseline .................................................................... 50 
Table 17: Summary of option comparison assessment ......................................................................................... 55 
Table 18: Monitoring and evaluation indicators ................................................................................................... 62 
Box 19: List of labels representing most frequently mentioned areas of action .................................................... 71 
Box 20: The international dimension of the new EU Adaptation Strategy ........................................................... 79 
Box 21: Feedback from National Authorities ....................................................................................................... 83 
Table 22: Results of cosine similarity analysis detecting co-ordinated responses ................................................ 87 
Table 23: Overview of Benefits (total for all provisions) – Prefered Option ........................................................ 91 
Table 24: Overview of costs – Preferred option ................................................................................................... 93 
Table 25: Industry classification of OECD Input-Output Tables (GINFORS-E)................................................ 101 
Table 26: Impact screening of key impact indicators.......................................................................................... 112 
Table  27:  Non-exhaustive  list  of  measures  to  be  developed  under  the  new  EU  Adaptation  Strategy  up  to 

2050 ....................................................................................................................................................... 116 
Table 28: Mini-assessment on Closing further gaps in adaptation-relevant knowledge ..................................... 131 
Table 29: Mini-Assessment of Health Observatory ............................................................................................ 139 
Table 30: Mini-Assessment of stimulating the deployment of Nature-based solutions ...................................... 146 

IPCC AR4 Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability, Appendix I: Glossary,  

414  
https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/ar4-wg2-app-1.pdf   
415  
Glossary_en.pdf 

IPCC  AR5  SYR,  Synthesis  Report,  Annex 

II:  Glossary,  https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2019/01/SYRAR5-

258 

 
 
                                                 
Table 31: Mini-assessment of Policy Support Facility / Technical Assistance project ....................................... 163 
Table 32: Mini-Assessment of Climate Proofing of Infrastructure and Disaster Risk Management .................. 173 
Table 33: Mini-assessment to narrowing the climate protection gap—Micro-economic policy ......................... 181 
Table 34: Mini-assessment on supporting partner countries ............................................................................... 188 
Table 35: Mini-assessment on scaling up international adaptation and risk financing ....................................... 194 
Table 36: Mini-assessment on strengthening EU adaptation engagement globally ............................................ 200 
Table  37:  Mini-assessment  on  adaptation  Solutions  /  Horizon  Europe  Mission  on  adaptation  to  Climate 

Change ................................................................................................................................................... 207 
Table 38: Mini-assessment Measures for Land ecosystems, agriculture and forests .......................................... 213 
Table 39: Mini-assessment on closing the climate protection gap ...................................................................... 219 
Table 40: Mini-assessment on Common Implementation Strategy ..................................................................... 224 
Table 41: Mini-assessment on Promoting the inclusion of climate aspects in already established framework 

plans, including in Water Safety Plans .................................................................................................. 228 
Table 42: Legal instruments in suport of EU action in climate change adaptation ............................................. 232 
Table 43: Selected Climate Change Impacts to Natural Systems at 1.5°C & 2°C warming ............................... 235 
Table 44: Co-benefits and trade-offs between adaptation and mitigation for agriculture and forestry ............... 243 

Index of Figures 

Figure 1: Problem definition for the new EU Adaptation Strategy  ........................................................................ 9 
Figure  2:  Example  of  projected  change  in  meteorological  forest  fire  danger  by  the  late  21st  century 

compared with the period 1981-2010. ..................................................................................................... 18 
Figure 3: Objective tree for EU Adaptation Strategy ............................................................................................ 26 
Figure 4 Intervention logic for the new EU Adaptation Strategy.......................................................................... 60 
Figure 5: Number of participants by consultation activity .................................................................................... 68 
Figure 6: Participants by stakeholder type for the consultation activities (except OPC) ...................................... 69 
Figure 7: Participants by stakeholder type for the consultation activities (OPC only) .......................................... 69 
Figure 8: Participants by Member State for the consultation activities ................................................................. 69 
Figure 9: Overview of ad-hoc contributions’ content provided over email by stakeholder type (a contribution 

can tackle one or more than one topic) .................................................................................................... 88 

Figure  10:  Overview  of  ad-hoc  contributions’  content  provided  by  interviewees  by  stakeholder  type  (a 

contribution can tackle one or more than one topic) ................................................................................ 89 
Figure 11: Country coverage of GINFORS-E ...................................................................................................... 99 
Figure 12: Country model of GINFORS-E ......................................................................................................... 100 
Figure 13: Structural detail of IO country model of GINFORS-E ...................................................................... 101 
Figure 14: Economic welfare in climate change scenarios by macro region - relative difference from baseline 

[% of real GDP] ..................................................................................................................................... 103 

Figure  15:  Employment  in  climate  change  scenarios  -  relative  difference  from  baseline  of  employment  by 

macro region .......................................................................................................................................... 104 

Figure 16: Adaptation scenario (Option 1)- relative difference  from baseline of real  GDP by macro region 

[as % of real GDP]................................................................................................................................. 105 

Figure 17: Adaptation scenario (Option 2) - relative difference of economic welfare compared to baseline by 

macro region [as % of real GDP] ........................................................................................................... 106 

Figure 18: Adaptation scenarios (Option 2) - relative difference of employment by macro region compared 

to baseline [as % of total employment] .................................................................................................. 107 

Figure 19: 1.5°C scenario (RCP 2.6) Relative differences in economic welfare compared to baseline by 2050 

[as % of real annual GDP] ..................................................................................................................... 108 

Figure 20: 2.0°C scenario (RCP 4.5) Relative differences in economic welfare by 2050 compared to baseline 

[as % of real annual GDP] ..................................................................................................................... 108 

Figure 21: 4°C scenario (RCP 8.5) Relative differences in economic welfare by 2050 compared to baseline 

[as % of real GDP]................................................................................................................................. 109 
Figure 22: Risk of climate change impacts across Europe .................................................................................. 240 

Abbreviations 

BBNJ 
BRG 
CAP 
CBA 
CBD 
CEF 
CEN 
CEOS 
CES 
CGE 
CIS 
CLMS 

Biological Diversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction  
Better Regulation Guidelines 
Common Agricultural Policy  
Cost Benefit Analysis 
Convention on Biological Diversity 
Connecting Europe Facility  
European Committee for Standardization 
Committee on Earth Observation 
Central Southern Europe  
Computable General Equilibrium  
Common Implementation Strategy 
Copernicus Land Monitoring Services  

259 

 
 
 
 
 
CMA 
COP 
CPR 
CSR 
CWP 
DAC 
DG CLIMA 
DRF 
DRM 
DRR 
DWD 
EAD 
EAFRD 
EASAC 
EBRD 
EC 
ECA 
ECB 
EEA 
EFFIS 
EFSA 
EFSD 
EFTA 
EIB 
EIOPA 
EIP 
EMFF 
EMS 
ENER 
ENV 
ERDF 
ESF 
ESIF 
ESPON 
ESTAT 
ETR 
ETS 
EU 
FAO 
FDI 
FISE 
GAR 
GCCA 
GDP 
GHG 
GI 
GIS 
GVA 
GWP 
HARCI 
IA 
IEA 
IIA 
ILO 
IMF 
IOT 
IPCC 
IPSF 
IRDR 
ISO 
ISPRS 
ISSG 
IUCN 
JRC 
KIC 
LAU 
MFF 
MMR 
MRE 
MS 
NACE 
NAIAD 
NAP 
NAS 

Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement 
Conference of The Parties 
Common Provisions Regulation  
Corporate Social Responsibility 
Commission Work Program 
Development Assistance Committee 
Directorate-General for Climate Action 
Disaster Risk Financing  
Disaster Risk Management  
Disaster Risk Reduction  
Drinking Water Directive 
Expected Annual Damage  
European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development  
European Academies' Science Advisory Council 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development  
European Commission 
European Court of Auditors 
European Central Bank 
European Environmental Agency 
European Forest Fire Information System 
European Food Safety Authority 
European Fund for Sustainable Development  
European Free Trade Association  
European Investment Bank 
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority  
European Innovation Partnership 
European Maritime And Fisheries Fund 
Emergency Management Service 
Directorate-General for Energy 
Directorate-General for Environment 
European Regional Development Fund 
European Social Fund 
European Structural and Investment Funds 
European Spatial Planning Observation Network 
Eurostat 
Environmental Tax Reform  
Energy Trading System 
European Union 
Food and Agriculture Organization 
Foreign Direct Investment 
Forest Information System for Europe  
Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction  
Global Climate Change Alliance 
Gross Domestic Product 
Greenhouse Gases 
Green Infrastructure  
Geospatial Information System 
Gross Value Added 
Global Warming Potential 
Harmonized Grids of Critical Infrastructures In Europe 
Impact Assessment 
International Energy Agency 
Inception Impact Assessment 
International Labour Organization 
International Monetary Fund 
Internet of Things 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change  
International Platform for Sustainable Finance  
Integrated Research on Disaster Risk 
International Standardisation Organisation 
International Archives of the Photogrammetry, Remote Sensing and Spatial Information Sciences  
Inter-Service Steering Group  
International Union for Conservation of Nature 
Joint Research Centre 
Knowledge and Innovation Community 
Local Administrative Units  
Multiannual Financial Framework 
Monitoring Mechanism Regulation 
Monitoring, Reporting and Evaluation 
Member States 
Nomenclature Statistique des Activités Économiques dans la Communauté Européenne 
Nature Insurance Value: Assessment and Demonstration 
National Adaptation Plan 
National Adaptation Strategy 

260 

 
 
NATCAT 
NBS 
NFD 
NFRD 
NGO 
NWRM 
OECD 

OLS 
OPC 
RCP 
RDI 
RFMO 
RSB 
SDG 
SEAP 
SECAP 
SIDS 
SME 
TEN-E 
TEN-T 
TFEU 
UCPM 
UHI 
UN 
UNDRR 
UNEP 
UNFCCC 
WEF 
WEI 
WEO 
WFD 
WHO 
WMO 

Natural Catastrophes 
Nature Based Solution 
Non-Financial Disclosure  
Non-Financial Reporting Directive 
Non-Governmental Organization 
Natural Water Retention Measures  
Organisation For Economic Co-Operation And Development 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Technique Is The Most Popular Method Of Performing Regression Analysis And Estimating 
Econometrics 
Open Public Consultation 
Representative Concentration Pathways 
Research, Development And Innovation  
Regional Fisheries Management Organisations And Agreements 
Regulatory Scrutiny Board 
Sustainable Development Goal 
Sustainable Energy Action Plan 
Sustainable Energy And Climate Action Plan 
Small Island Developing States 
Small Medium Enterprises 
Trans-European Networks For Energy 
Trans-European Transport Network 
Treaty On The Functioning Of The European Union 
Union Civil Protection Mechanism 
Urban Heat Effect  
United Nations 
United Nations Office For Disaster Risk Reduction  
United Nations Environment Programme 
United Nations Framework Convention On Climate Change 
World Economic Forum  
Water Exploitation Index  
World Energy Outlook, 
Water Framework Directive 
World Health Organization 
World Meteorologic Organization 

261