COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL On the assessment of the Agreement on Operational and Strategic Cooperation between the Kingdom of Denmark and the European Police Office
Date: 2021-02-23
Institutions: Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs, European Commission
Subjects: Denmark, Europol, cooperation agreement (EU), crime, data protection, exchange of information, fight against crime, personal data, police cooperation, terrorism

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 23.2.2021  SWD(2021) 22 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL On the assessment of the Agreement on Operational and Strategic Cooperation between the Kingdom of Denmark and the European Police Office   {COM(2021) 77 final}  
 
 
Content 

1. 

Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 2 

2.  Methodology .............................................................................................................................. 4 

3.  Governance cooperation ........................................................................................................... 5 

4. 

Information exchange ............................................................................................................... 6 

4.1.  Access to Europol databases ............................................................................................... 6 

4.2. 

4.3. 

Information Exchange via the Secure Information Exchange Network Application .......... 9 

Liaison officers ................................................................................................................. 10 

4.4.  Data protection safeguards ................................................................................................ 11 

5.  Operational cooperation ......................................................................................................... 13 

5.1.  Analysis Projects ............................................................................................................... 13 

5.2. 

5.3. 

Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment ............................................................ 14 

European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats ...................................... 14 

5.4.  High Value Targets /Operational Task Forces .................................................................. 16 

6.  Operational consequences of being a third country ............................................................. 17 

7.  Financial contribution ............................................................................................................ 18 

8.  Conclusions .............................................................................................................................. 18 

8.1.  Operational effectiveness .................................................................................................. 18 

8.2.  Data protection safeguards ................................................................................................ 20 

1 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.  Introduction  

The Agreement on Operational and Strategic Cooperation between the Kingdom of Denmark 
and the European Police Office (hereafter “the Agreement”)1 establishes the legal framework 
for  Denmark’s  cooperation  with  Europol.  Under  Article  25  of  the  Agreement,  the 
Commission shall assess the provisions of this Agreement, and in particular the operational 
effectiveness  of  the  Agreement  and  Denmark’s  compliance  with  the  data  protection 
provisions thereof. 

Until  1  May  2017,  Denmark  participated  fully  in  the  2009  Europol  Council  Decision 
(hereafter “the Council Decision”)2. Under Protocol (No 22) on the position of Denmark3, it 
has an opt-out of all EU Justice and Home Affairs legislation adopted after the Lisbon Treaty 
entered into force on 1 December 20094. Regulation (EU) 2016/7945 on the European Union 
Agency  for  Law  Enforcement  Cooperation  (hereafter  “the  Europol  Regulation”)  adopted  in 
2016 replaces the Council Decision. It became fully applicable on 1 May 2017. Because of 
the opt-out and due to a negative result of a national referendum held on 3 December 2015 on 
the  question  whether  Denmark’s  opt-out  on  Justice  and  Home  Affairs  matters  should  be 
changed, Denmark is unable to participate in the Europol Regulation.  

Following  the  referendum,  the  President  of  the Commission,  the  President  of  the  European 
Council  and  the  Prime  Minister  of  Denmark  issued  a  Declaration6  on  15  December  2016, 
stating their agreement “on the need for operational arrangements, minimising the negative 
impact  of  Denmark’s  departure  from  Europol  on  1  May  2017,  for  the  mutual  benefit  of 
Denmark and the rest of the European Union in the combatting of cross border serious and 
organised crime and international terrorism. Such arrangements must be Denmark specific, 
and not in any way equal full membership of Europol, i.e. provide access to Europol’s data 
repositories,  or  for  full  participation  in  Europol’s  operational  work  and  database,  or  give 
decision-making  rights  in  the  governing  bodies  of  Europol.  However,  it  should  ensure  a 
sufficient  level  of  operational  cooperation  including  exchange  of  relevant  data,  subject  to 
adequate safeguards”. 

The  Agreement  establishes  the  legal  framework  for  Denmark’s  cooperation  with  Europol 
called upon in the Declaration of 15 December 2016. It entered into force on 30 April 2017. 
On 27 April 2017, the Danish Parliament (Folketing) adopted Law No 411 on the European 

https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/agreement-operational-and-strategic-cooperation-

1 
between-kingdom-of-denmark-and-europol. 
2  Council  Decision  (2009/371/JHA)  of  6  April  2009  establishing  the  European  Police  Office  (Europol),  OJ  L 
121, 15.5.2009, p. 37. 
3 OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, p. 299. 
4  Treaty  of  Lisbon  amending  the  Treaty  on  European  Union  and  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European 
Community, OJ C 306, 17.12.2007, p. 1–271. So far Denmark has not exercised the option provided for in Part 
IV of Protocol (No 22) which would allow it to participate fully in the Europol Regulation. 
5 Regulation (EU) 2016/794 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 on the European 
Union  Agency  for  Law  Enforcement  Cooperation  (Europol)  and  replacing  and  repealing  Council  Decisions 
2009/371/JHA, 2009/934/JHA, 2009/935/JHA, 2009/936/JHA and 2009/968/JHA, OJ L 135, 24.5.2016, p. 53. 
6 Declaration by the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, the President of the European 
Council,  Donald  Tusk  and  the  Prime  Minister  of  Denmark,  Lars  Løkke  Rasmussen,  Brussels,  15  December 
2016, Commission press release IP/16/4398. 

2 

 
 
                                                           
Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) allowing the Danish Government 
to conclude the Agreement. The European Parliament adopted a resolution on 27 April 2017 
approving  the  draft  Council  implementing  decision.7  The  Council  gave  Europol  its 
authorisation to agree to the Agreement on 28 April 2017.8  

The recitals to the Agreement make clear that it is intended to “minimise the negative effects 
of  the  Danish  departure  from  Europol”  by  establishing  cooperation  at  “a  level  at  least 
equivalent”  to  that  of  third  countries  that  have  concluded  similar  agreements  with  Europol 
(recital 3). 

A particular feature of the Agreement is Denmark’s specific position as an EU and Schengen 
Member State. Denmark’s specific position as an EU Member State is reflected in recital 4 of 
the  Agreement.  Recital  5  states  that  Denmark  is  part  of  the  Schengen  area  and  has 
implemented  fully  in  its  national  law  the  Schengen  acquis.  Furthermore,  recital  6  outlines 
that Denmark is part of the so-called Nordic passport union together with other Nordic States, 
two  of  which  are  EU  Member  States  and  two  of  which  are  associated  with  the 
implementation of the Schengen acquis and its further development. For these reasons, and in 
order  to  mitigate  the  adverse  effects  of  the  Danish  departure  from  Europol,  the  Agreement 
pays  particular  attention  to  the  exchange  of  information  between  Denmark  and  Europol 
through provisions that are unique.    

The  most  interesting  aspect  in  this  respect  is  the  unique  service  that  Denmark  receives 
through  dedicated  Danish  speaking  Europol  staff  or  seconded  national  experts  for  treating, 
under the authority of Europol, Danish requests to input, retrieve and cross-check data on a 
24/7 basis. This is subject to a number of conditions: 

  accepting the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice as regards questions on the validity and 
interpretation  of  the  Agreement  raised  by  Danish  courts  or  tribunals  and  as  regards 
compliance  by  Denmark  with  the  Agreement  (recital  11  and  Articles  18  and  20  of  the 
Agreement);  

  applying the data protection safeguards set out in the Europol Regulation (Article 10(4)(c) 

of the Agreement); 

  complying with the EU Directive on data processing within the law enforcement sector9 
when  exchanging  personal  data  under  the  Agreement  (hereafter  “the  Law  Enforcement 
Directive”),  as  this  Directive  forms  part  of  the  Schengen  rule  book  which  Denmark 
implements in its domestic law (recital 12 and Article 10(4)(d) of the Agreement); 

7  European  Parliament  legislative  resolution  of  27  April  2017  on  the  draft  Council  implementing  decision 
approving  the  conclusion  by  the  European  Police  Office  (Europol)  of  the  Agreement  on  Operational  and 
Strategic  Cooperation  between  the  Kingdom  of  Denmark  and  Europol  (07281/2017  –  C8-0120/2017  – 
2017/0803(CNS)), P8_TA(2017)0136.  
8 7281/1/17 REV 1 of 28 April 2017. 
9 Directive (EU 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of 
natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the 
prevention,  investigation, detection or  prosecution of criminal offences or the  execution of criminal penalties, 
and  on  the  free  movement  of  such  data,  and  repealing  Council  Framework  Decision,  OJ  L  119  of  4.5.2016, 
p. 89.     

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 

recognising  the  role  of  the  European  Data  Protection  Supervisor  (recital  12  and  Article 
10(4)(c) of the Agreement); 

  making an “appropriate” annual contribution to Europol’s budget (recital 12 and Article 

22 of the Agreement); and 

  continuing  to  be  a  member  of  the  Schengen  area  and  be  bound  to  the  Schengen  acquis 

(recital 12 and Article 27(1) of the Agreement). 

Nonetheless Denmark’s status as a third partner country in terms of cooperation with Europol 
has a number of consequences of which the most important ones are listed below: 

 

  Denmark  has  no  direct  or  indirect  computerised  access  to  information  held  in  Europol 
databases (Article 10(6) of the Agreement, Article 47 of the Implementing Arrangement);  
In  case  of  relevant  information  identified  in  Europol  databases,  Europol  has  to  comply 
with any access or use restrictions imposed by the data owner which may include seeking 
its authorisation before the information can be transferred to Denmark (Articles 10(5) and 
11(3) of the Agreement); 

  Denmark participates in the Management Board and its subgroups as an observer without 

voting rights (Article 8(1)(d) of the Agreement); and 

  Denmark participates in the regular Heads of National Units meetings as a third partner 
country  in  an  observer  role  with  limited  rights  and  possibilities  to  discuss  and  resolve 
problems that occur in the context of operational cooperation with Europol(Article 8(1)(c) 
of the Agreement). 

Article  24  of  the  Agreement  foresaw  a  6-month  transition  period,  meaning  that  the 
Agreement  only  became  fully  applicable  on  1  November  2017.  Also  the  Administrative 
Arrangement  that  accompanies  the  Agreement  entered  into  force  on  4  October  2017.  The 
cooperation  covered  in  this  report  concerns  cooperation  on  the  areas  of  governance, 
information exchange, and operations. The assessment covers the period of application of the 
Agreement from 1 November 2017 to 1 September 202010.  

2.  Methodology  

As part of the assessment process, the European Commission services sent on 15 September 
2020 a questionnaire to the Danish Ministry of Justice (including the Danish National Police 
and its  Data Protection  Officer) and the Danish  Data Protection Agency. The questionnaire 
and the replies provided by the Ministry can be found in Annex A.  

In  order  for  the  Commission  to  provide  insight  to  the  way  in  which  the  Agreement  has 
functioned, the Commission services also held videoconferences on 24 September 2020 with 
representatives  of  the  Danish  Ministry  of  Justice,  the  Danish  National  Police  including  its 
Data  Protection  Officer,  and  on  28  September  2020  with  representatives  from  Europol 
responsible for the application of the Agreement, including analysts who use and have access 
to  the information  exchanged under the Agreement.  It  also  held  talks with the office of the 

10 The Agreement became fully applicable on 1 November 2017, after the 6-month transition period as foreseen 
in Article 24.  

4 

 
 
                                                           
Danish Data Protection Agency and the office of the European Data Protection Supervisor on 
22 September 2020. 

The assessment relied on the further following elements: 

  The reports from the Danish Ministry to the Danish Parliament (Folketing) on the status 
of  the  situation  of  the  Danish  Police  in  relation  to  Europol  (covering  the  years  2017  to 
2019); 

  Further documentation and information received from Denmark and from Europol; and 
  The evolution of the security environment in the EU and globally, including the impact of 

the COVID-19 sanitary crises on crime.11 

Due  to  the  sensitive  nature  of  the  cooperation  between  Denmark  and  Europol,  some 
information was provided to the Commission by Denmark and Europol on the condition that 
it would be treated as confidential. This limitation has not stood in the way of the assessment, 
nor has this prevented an open and frank exchange of views with the Danish authorities and 
Europol in a very constructive spirit.  

3.  Governance cooperation 

The  purpose  of  the  Agreement  is  defined  as  “to  establish  cooperative  relations  between 
Europol and Denmark in order to support and strengthen action by the competent authorities 
of  the  other  Member  States  of  the  European  Union  and  of  Denmark  and  their  mutual 
cooperation in preventing and combating serious crime affecting two or more Member States 
of the European Union, terrorism and forms of crime which affect a common interest covered 
by a Union policy, in particular through the exchange of information between Europol and 
Denmark”.   

In this context, Article 8(1)(d) of the Agreement foresees the possibility to invite Denmark to 
attend the Management Board of Europol and its subgroup meetings and the meetings of the 
Heads of Europol National Units. Denmark can participate in its capacity as an observer and 
without the right to vote. The observer status allows Denmark to take part in the discussions 
at  the  meetings.  This  does  not  apply  in  case  of  special  agenda  items  where  the  discussion 
takes place only between the Member States who are full members of Europol.12 

Representatives  from  Denmark  attended  all  Management  Board  meetings  since  the 
Agreement became fully applicable on 1 November 2017. Other third countries that have an 
operational  cooperation  agreement  with  Europol  do  not  have  the  right  to  attend  such 
meetings.13 This  possibility  to  engage with  other  EU Member States within the governance 

11 Notably reporting by Europol on the impact of the COVID-19 crises on crime. 
12  Report  of  the  Danish  Ministry  of  Justice  to  the  Folketing  (Danish  Parliament)  of  26  October  2018  on  the 
status  of  the  situation  of  the  Danish  Police  in  relation  to  Europol,  Legal  Affairs  Committee  2018-19,  p.  3 
(hereafter “the 2018 Folketing Report”).   
13 The 2018 Folketing Report, p.3; Report of the Danish Ministry of Justice to the Folketing (Danish Parliament) 
of  29  October  2019  on  the  status  of  the  situation  of  the  Danish  Police  in  relation  to  Europol,  Legal  Affairs 
Committee 2019-20, p. 3-4 (hereafter “the 2019 Folketing Report”).  

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structure of Europol is one of the features reflecting the special status of Denmark under the 
Agreement. 

Representatives from Denmark also attended the Heads of Europol National Units meetings 
since the Agreement became fully operational, again as observers. Contrary to Management 
Board meetings, third countries having an operational cooperation agreement with Europol as 
mentioned  in  Article  25(1)  Europol  Regulation  may  also  attend  the  Heads  of  Europol 
National Units meetings as observer in agreement with them.14    

According to the report of the Danish Ministry of Justice to the Danish Parliament in 2018 on 
the Agreement, the Danish National Police is of the opinion that Danish participation in the 
Management  Board  and  Heads  of  Europol  National  Units  meetings  is  of  operational  and 
strategic value to them.15  

4.  Information exchange 

4.1.  Access to Europol databases 

As  part  of  the  overall  purpose  of  the  Agreement  to  establish  cooperative  relations  between 
Europol and Denmark, and in particular regarding the exchange of information, a key feature 
of  the  Agreement  reflecting  the  unique  status  of  Denmark  is  Article  10(6),  stipulating  that 
“Europol  shall  assign  up to  8 Danish speaking  Europol  staff  on a 24/7 basis  to  the task of 
processing  Danish  requests,  as  well  as  inputting  and  retrieving  the  data  coming  from  the 
Danish  authorities  into  the  Europol  processing  systems.  Denmark  shall  second  national 
experts to Europol for that purpose”.   

Since the entry into force of the Agreement, four Danish speaking seconded national experts 
have been assigned to these tasks.16 They work under the authority of Europol. Under Article 
10(6) of the Agreement, the Management Board can decide that national experts be deployed 
in Denmark if necessary in accordance with the purpose of the assignment. The Management 
Board decided on 1 May 201717 that seconded national experts can be deployed in Denmark 
who,  because  of  their  proximity,  will  be  the  interface  between  the  Danish  authorities  and 
Europol. As a result, two seconded national experts are posted in Denmark, whilst the other 
two remain posted at Europol in The Hague. While the latter can perform the same tasks as 
other seconded national experts posted at Europol, the two seconded national experts posted 
in  Denmark  have  limited  possibilities  in  the  area  of  information  exchange  due  to  the 
restrictions mentioned in Article 10(6) of the Agreement, i.e. such staff shall not have access 
to Europol’s systems beyond what is available to other Member States. This means that the 
two seconded national experts posted in Denmark are treated in the same way as the national 
units of Member States and hence do not have access beyond what is granted to such units. In 
practical terms, this means that they can search the Europol Information System and retrieve 

14 The 2019 Folketing Report, p. 4; the Heads of Europol National Units Rules of Procedure, Article 2(2), as in 
force as of 1 May 2020. 
15 The 2018 Folketing Report, p. 3. 
16 The 2018 Folketing Report, p. 4 and the 2019 Folketing Report, p. 7. 
17 The 2018 Folketing Report, p. 4. 

6 

 
 
                                                           
information, can insert and store information received the Danish authorities in the Europol 
Information  System  and  are  responsible  for  the  quality  control  and  review  of  such 
information, but cannot access other Europol databases.  

The seconded national experts in The Hague can: 

  Process Danish requests, i.e. insert Danish data into the Europol Information System and 
the Europol Analysis System (as well as retrieve data from these systems). According to 
the Agreement they can also modify, correct or delete such data; 

  Cross-check  information  provided  by  Denmark  against  Europol  databases  following  a 

Danish request; and   

  Provide  to  Denmark  any  relevant  information  identified  in  Europol  databases  whilst 
respecting  any  use  or  access  restriction  established  pursuant  to  Article  11(3)  of  the 
Agreement.   

Requests from the Danish police and transfer of data to the Europol Analysis System within 
normal  working  hours  are  processed  by  the  seconded  national  experts  posted  at  Europol  in 
The  Hague.  Police  districts  can  send  requests  directly  during  normal  working  hours  to  the 
seconded  national  experts  posted  in  Denmark,  who  then  process  the  data  in  the  Europol 
Information  System  and  send  a  reply  whether  a  hit  was  generated  directly  back  to  the 
requesting  police  district  and  a  full  reply  to  Denmark  via  Europol’s  Secure  Information 
Exchange Network Application .18 

In relation to requests for a search in the Europol Information System made outside normal 
working  hours,  they  are  processed  by  the  seconded  national  experts  in  Denmark  within 
normal  working  hours  on  the  first  subsequent  weekday,  unless  the  police  district  considers 
the  request  urgent  in  nature.  In  such  a  situation  the  police  district  sends  the  request  to  the 
Danish National Police’s 24-hour National Situations and Operations Centre, which forwards 
the  request  as  soon  as  possible  to  the  Europol  Operational  Centre  via  Europol’s  Secure 
Information  Exchange  Network  Application.  The  written  request  is  followed  up  by  a 
telephone  request  to  the  Europol  Operational  Centre,  where  the  Danish  National  Situations 
and Operations Centre draws attention to its urgent nature. The Europol Operational Centre 
will  provide  the  reply  to  the  Danish  National  Situations  and  Operations  Centre  by  phone, 
which  will  be  followed  up  by  a  message  in  writing  through  Europol’s  Secure  Information 
Exchange Network Application. The Danish National Situations and Operations Centre will 
then notify the police district of the outcome of the search as soon as possible. 19 The Danish 
National Situations and Operations Centre is staffed 24/7 with staff from the Danish National 
Investigation  Centre  and  are  specially  trained  in  overseeing  communication  between  the 
Danish National Police and international partners. 

Due to restrictions in the Agreement, the seconded national experts located in Denmark are 
not allowed access to any other system than the Europol Information System, leaving out all 
of  Europol’s  other  databases,  which  their  Danish  colleagues  who  are  located  at  Europol  in 

18 The 2018 Folketing Report, p. 5. 
19 The 2018 Folketing Report, p. 5. 

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The Hague can access. The seconded national experts in Denmark are thus limited in relation 
to which tasks they can perform for Europol. Therefore, the Danish National Police finds that 
there  is  potential  for  improvement  in  terms  of  the  tasks  of  the  seconded  national  experts 
located in Denmark. The Danish National Police and Europol are in an ongoing dialogue to 
improve procedures that can help to better utilize their skills and working hours. 

Denmark  is  a  frequent  user  of  the  Europol  Information  System.  In  particular,  the  Danish 
National Police requests the seconded national experts at Europol to run searches against the 
Europol Information System on a daily basis and provides a weekly input of relevant criminal 
cases  and  suspects.  The  Danish  National  Police  considers  “results  and  hits  in  the  analysis 
projects  and  the  Europol  Information  System  highly  valuable  when  investigating  organized 
criminals committing border-crossing crime”. 

Examples of the use of the Europol Information System20:  

I. 

The  Danish  Police  identified  a  case  of  money  counterfeiting,  where  Europol, 
upon  a  Danish  request,  conducted  a  search  in  April  2019  in  the  Europol 
Information  System. This produced a hit on a  Bulgarian citizen who had just 
been taken into custody in Denmark in a counterfeiting case. Information from 
the Europol Information System showed that the suspect had been reported to 
that  system  by  Europol  on  behalf  of  Switzerland  in  a  case  concerning 
counterfeiting.  The  suspect  had  put  two  counterfeit  200  euro  notes  into 
circulation  in  Switzerland,  and  the  Swiss  police,  in  a  search  of  the  person’s 
premises, had found the suspect to be in possession of 162 counterfeit 200 euro 
notes.  Information  from  the  Europol  Information  System  containing  a 
photograph and a copy of an ID card was forwarded to the Danish police, and 
the Danish National  Investigation Centre obtained supplementary information 
from  Switzerland  via  Europol  which  showed  that  the  suspect  had  been 
sentenced to 20 months in prison in Switzerland in 2018 and had been deported 
from Switzerland in February 2019. The information was presented in court in 
connection with the criminal case in Denmark. It is evident from the judgment 
that in assessing the question of guilt, the district court emphasised the fact that 
the  suspect  had  committed  similar  crimes  in  Switzerland.  The  person  was 
convicted in Denmark.  

II. 

In  June  2020  a  Danish  request  to  Europol  generated  a  hit  in  the  Europol 
Information  System  which  identified  two  potential  suspects.  The  hit  was 
related  to  two  Romanian  nationals  who  were  checked  by  the  Copenhagen 
Police.  The  hit  contained  information  about  one  of  the  Romanian  nationals. 
According to the hit, the Romanian national was suspected of theft from ATM 
machines  in  Switzerland  by  the  use  of  explosives.  Based  on  the  information 
from  Switzerland,  the  Danish  police  started  an  investigation  against  the  two 
Romanian  nationals  and  initiated  a  correspondence  through  Europol’s  Secure 

20 The 2019 Folketing Report, p. 8. 

8 

 
 
 
                                                           
Information Exchange Network Application with a number of Member States.  
This  investigation  led  to  the  arrest  of  the  two  Romanian  nationals  after  a 
similar attack in Denmark committed later in June 2020. On the background of 
the  correspondence  via  Europol’s  Secure  Information  Exchange  Network 
Application, Switzerland has since issued an extradition request on one of the 
suspects.  The Netherlands has forwarded a request  to  Denmark  regarding the 
other Romanian national who is a suspect of an attempted manslaughter in the 
Netherlands.  Furthermore,  in  September  2020  Europol  hosted  an  operational 
meeting in the case with the participation of a number of Member States. The 
two Romanian nationals are currently in pre-trial custody in Denmark. 

In  addition  to  the  exchange  of  information,  the  Agreement  outlines  a  number  of  areas  for 
cooperation, such as the exchange of specialist knowledge, general situation reports, results 
of strategic analysis and other forms of information sharing. The Danish National Police finds 
that  “these  areas  of  cooperation  are  of  great  value  to  the  Danish  police,  providing  both 
operational  and  technical  knowledge.  The  situation  reports  and  strategic  reports  provide 
knowledge to the management level and our national analysts”. 

4.2. 

Information Exchange via the Secure Information Exchange 

Network Application   

The Agreement  foresees that Denmark shall designate a national  contact  point to  act  as the 
central point of contact between Europol and the Danish competent authorities. 

It  its  reply  to  the  questionnaire  the  Danish  National  Police  mentioned  that  the  Danish 
National Contact Point is located within the National Situations and Operations Centre which 
serves  as  the  Single  Point  of  Contact  for  all  international  communications.  The  Agreement 
did  not  give  rise  to  a  change  of  its  structure.  According  to  the  Agreement,  Denmark  shall 
ensure the possibility for the national contact point to enable information exchange on a 24-
hour  basis.  The  national  contact  point  shall  also  ensure  that  information  can  be  exchanged 
without delay with the Danish competent authorities.  

Denmark  ensures  this  obligation  through  the  Single  Point  of  Contact,  which  operates  24/7 
and which, as mentioned above, is  located within the Danish  National  Police.  Furthermore, 
the Danish Desk at Europol can also be reached on a 24/7 basis. 

The following departments have (varying degrees of) access to Europol’s Secure Information 
Exchange Network Application: 

  The  National  Police:  mainly  the  Single  Point  of  Contact  and  the  units  of  International 

Cooperation and International Communication; 

  The national cyber-crime center; 
  The State Prosecutor for Serious International and Economic Crime, e.g. the Danish Asset 

Recovery Office; 

  The Danish Security and Intelligence Service; and 

9 

 
 
 
 
  Specialized  and  selected  units  in  the  police  districts  which  are  using  Europol’s  Secure 

Information Exchange Network Application for border policing purposes. 

It is important to underline again that under the Agreement the Danish authorities do not have 
direct or indirect access (i.e. an access system using a hit/no hit method) to data held in the 
Europol  Information System. The requested information  is  provided to the National  Danish 
Police by Europol’s Operational Centre.  

The information exchange of Denmark via Europol’s Secure Information Exchange Network 
Application and the number of cases initiated have steadily increased over the years. That has 
not changed since the Agreement entered into force. That applies also to the searches in the 
Europol  Information  System,  which  is  carried  out,  on  behalf  of  Denmark,  by  the  Danish 
speaking seconded national experts.  

The  number  of  messages  exchanged  in  Europol’s  Secure  Information  Exchange  Network 
Application  by  Denmark  in  2019  increased  by  27%  compared  to  2018.  In  terms  of  cases 
initiated by Denmark, the number increased by 81% in 2019 compared to 2018. 

The searches run in the Europol Information System on behalf of Denmark increased by 32% 
in 2019 compared to 2018. The objects inserted in the Europol Information System increased 
by 20% in 2019 compared to 2018. 

4.3.  Liaison officers 

One of the specific features of Europol is that it hosts liaison officers from all Member States, 
as well as from several third countries and international organisations, in its premises in The 
Hague.  The  Danish  liaison  officers  fulfil  a  large  number  of  tasks,  aimed  at  supporting 
cooperation with Europol and all other partners deploying liaison officers to Europol. Their 
tasks  are  of  a  strategic,  coordinating  and  investigation-supporting  nature,  as  well  as 
contributing to the exchange of information and criminal intelligence, which can be used in 
both national and cross-border investigations.21  

Europol  and  the  Danish  National  Police  entered  into  an  agreement  on  3  October  2017 
governing the tasks, rights and obligations of Danish liaison officers. That agreement relates 
primarily to the liaison officers posted at the Danish desk at Europol. 

The  Danish  National  Police  has  posted  one  Deputy  Chief  Superintendent  and  two  police 
officers  at  its  Liaison  Office  at  Europol  as  well  as  one  representative  from  the  Danish 
Security  and  Intelligence  Service.  They  are  trained  in  overseeing  communication  and 
international cooperation. They ensure a 24/7 support between law enforcement counterparts 
in need of Danish support or vice versa and are the extension of the national contact point in 
Denmark. 

The  cooperation  between  Danish  liaison  officers’  cooperation  with  Europol  and  the  other 
countries’  liaison  officers  is  good  and  constructive.  The  liaison  officers  have  been  a  great 
asset in organising virtual meetings, not least during the COVID-19 period. 

21 The 2019 Folketing Report, p. 5. 

10 

 
 
                                                           
4.4.  Data protection safeguards 

According to Article 6 of the Agreement, the national contact point is also the central point of 
contact in respect of review, correction and/or deletion of personal data.  

In  relation  to  the  question  how  many  requests  for  review,  correction  and/or  deletion  of 
personal  data  have  been  submitted  to  the  national  contact  point  and  by  who  (mainly  by 
Europol or mainly by the Danish competent authorities), over the reporting period the Danish 
National  Police  received  one  request  for  access,  rectification  and  deletion  of  personal  data 
submitted  to  Europol  by  the  data  subject.  This  request  was  forwarded  to  Europol  via  the 
national contact point and the data subject was informed about the transmission. The Danish 
National  Police  received  three  requests  made  by  the  data  subjects  for  deletion  of  personal 
data  relating  to  a  vehicle  in  the  national  databases  and  Europol’s  and  Interpol’s  databases. 
The  data  subjects  were  not  registered  in  Europol’s  database,  and  the  police  informed  the 
subjects accordingly.  

These  three  requests  were  processed  in  accordance  with  the  rules  laid  down  in  the  Danish 
Law  Enforcement  Act,  (hereafter  “the  Act”),  which  transposes  the  Law  Enforcement 
Directive22. According to Section 17 (2) of the Act, the data controller shall, at the request of 
the data subject, without undue delay, delete information processed in violation of chapter 3, 
or if it is required to comply with a legal obligation, to which the data controller is subject. . 

Denmark  also  specified  in  its  reply  that  it  has  received  a  few  notifications  from  Europol, 
where Denmark by mistake had requested the upload of data on minors. The information was 
corrected immediately. 

Europol has also contacted Denmark regarding the correction of data on persons updated with 
the wrong birth year, e.g. in 1901 instead of 2001. These updates were caused by a technical 
mistake in the input of spreadsheets in batch uploads to the Europol Information System. The 
updates were immediately assessed and corrected. 

Articles  11  to  13  of  the  Agreement  concern  the  implementation  of  provisions  covering 
specific data protection guarantees. Article 11 concerns the transfer of personal data between 
Europol and the Danish National Police, whereas Article 12 concerns the use of information 
by the Parties. Article 13 regulates onward transfer of the information received by Europol or 
by Denmark.  

As  described  in  the  introduction,  it  was  a  condition  for  the  Agreement  that  Denmark 
law  enforcement  sector. 
implemented 
Furthermore, it was a condition that Denmark applied the data protection safeguards set out 
in the Agreement.  

the  Law  Enforcement  Directive  within 

the 

Access to information from Europol by the Danish National Police is regulated by Article 11 
of the Agreement and by the Act.  

22 See footnote 9. 

11 

 
 
                                                           
Section 4 of the Act contains a number of basic data protection principles, which have to be 
complied with when the Danish National Police processes personal data for law enforcement 
purposes. That section provides that personal data must be collected for specified and explicit 
purposes which fall under the purposes listed in the Act’s section 1(1). Other principles laid 
down  in  that  section  are  that  processing  for  purposes  other  than  for  which  the  data  were 
collected must not be incompatible with these specified and explicit purposes (section 4(2)), 
and  that  the  information  processed  must  be  relevant  and  adequate.  Other  data  protection 
principles are laid down in  sections 4(3) and (4), i.e. the collection of personal  information 
must not exceed what is required to fulfil the purpose and must be accurate and if necessary, 
updated.  

Sections 9 and 10 of the Act list general criteria for the processing of personal data, for which 
the  Act  is  applicable.  According  to  section  9,  personal  data  may  only  be  processed  if 
processing is necessary in order to prevent, investigate, detect and punish criminal offences, 
including the protection against and prevention of threats against public security. According 
to the Act’s section 10, special categories of data, such as data revealing political or religious 
beliefs  or  biometric  data  may  not  be  processed  unless  strictly  necessary  and  only  if 
processing takes place in order to fulfil the purposes listed in the Act’s section 1. 

The  Danish  National  Police  has  designated  a  data  protection  officer  for  the  processing  of 
personal data by the Danish police within the scope of the Act. The Data Protection Officer 
has,  inter  alia,  been  entrusted  with  the  task  of  monitoring  compliance  with  the  Law 
Enforcement Directive.  

As regards the implementation of safeguards related to the use of special categories of data as 
per  Article  11(5),  under  section  10  of  the  Act,  special  categories  of  data,  such  as  data 
revealing political or religious beliefs or biometric data may not be processed unless strictly 
necessary and only if processing takes place in order to fulfil the purposes listed in the Act’s 
section 1. 

As regards the implementation of Article 12 on the use of information received from Europol, 
Denmark has to respect any restrictions given by the data owner. This refers to the possibility 
for Europol, as laid down in the Europol Regulation, to restrict access to the information or to 
other specific terms it may add as part of the use of the information shared. This is reflected 
in  Article  12(1)  of  the  Agreement.  In  case  of  a  transfer  of  information  from  Denmark  to 
Europol related to a Danish case, the Danish contact point will liaise with the investigators in 
charge of the investigation to check if such a transfer could jeopardize the investigation. 

On the question how often the Danish National Police has been asked to grant authorization 
to  use  information  for  a  different  purpose  than  the  purpose  for  which  the  information  was 
provided and how often such authorisation is granted under Article 12, including examples, 
Denmark  has  no  statistics  on  the  frequency  of  requests  to  grant  authorization  to  use 
information for different purposes than for which it was initially provided. Denmark provided 
a number of examples where an authorization could be granted. This concerns requests to use 
information from police reports in cases which are about to be presented in a court hearing. 

12 

 
 
Another example given is where a request and authorization can also be related to data under 
which the data owner and the details of a cross match is hidden. 

In  relation  to  Article  13  on  onward  transfer  of  information  received  from  Europol,  onward 
national  transfers  to  competent  authorities  are  done  through  Europol’s  Secure  Information 
Exchange  Network  Application  or  via  the  police  communication  system.  The  Danish 
National  Police  does  not  share  personal  or  operational  data  with  private  parties  unless  the 
data  owner  has  given  consent.  Such  onward  transfers  are  most  relevant  in  relation  to 
Denmark’s  sovereign  areas  Greenland  and  the  Faroe  Islands,  which  are  considered  third 
countries  under  EU  law.  However,  such  transfers  did  not  take  place  yet.  Denmark  has  not 
requested Europol to authorise an onward transfer as described.  

In  reply  to  the  question  on  Article  11(5)  of  the  Agreement  (on  transfer  by  Europol  of 
sensitive  personal  data  which  is  prohibited  unless  strictly  necessary  and  proportionate),  the 
Danish National Police said that it is not privy to information regarding such transfers.  

As regards the question how often Denmark is asked by Europol to agree on onward transfer 
other  than  to  the  competent  authorities  in  the  Member  States  of  the  European  Union  (i.e. 
onward transfers to  third States or international  organisations), Denmark  has given its prior 
consent allowing Europol to share data with such third States and international organisations 
that have operational agreements with Europol. 

5.  Operational cooperation 

The  Europol  Analysis  System  is  a  central  system  used  to  analyse  the  data  provided  in 
accordance  with  the  processing  purposes  established  in  Article  18  (2)(b)  and  (c)  of  the 
Europol  Regulation.  It  contains  a  number  of  analysis  projects  which  represent  crime  areas 
falling within Europol’s mandate, for example human trafficking and cybercrime.  

5.1.  Analysis Projects 

The purpose of the analysis projects is to support Member States’ analytical activities with a 
view  to  fighting  organised  crime  and  other  types  of  serious  crime,  as  well  as  monitoring 
organised and serious crime in Europe at a strategic and operational level. 

Under  Article  14  of  the  Agreement,  Denmark  is  invited  by  Europol  to  take  part  in  new  or 
existing  operational  analysis  projects  in  which  it  was  not  taking  part  when  the  Agreement 
entered into force on 30 April 2017.  It  also  allows Denmark to  continue to  take part in  the 
operational analysis projects in which it was taking part before 1 May 2017. 

In the annual report of October 2019 on the Agreement to the Danish Parliament, the Danish 
National  Police  outlined  that  “The  analyses  are  supplied  to  the  Member  States  and  third 
countries with an operational agreement in various forms, ranging from simple cross-match 
reports  and  link  charts  to  more  in-depth  analysis  reports.  Based  on  such  information,  the 
countries participating in a particular  analysis project  can initiate a meeting to  coordinate 
operational  efforts  or  to  enhance  Member  States’  knowledge  of  particular  criminal 

13 

 
 
individuals  or  criminal  organisations.  Denmark  can  itself  initiate  or  seek  support  for  such 
meetings and can participate by invitation”. 23  

Before  1  May  2017,  Denmark  participated  in  26  analysis  projects.  This  continued  during 
2017 and 2018. As of 1 July 2019, Denmark took  part in  31 analysis projects.24 Since July 
2020, Denmark again participates in 26 analysis projects. In addition, Denmark has pending 
requests for membership of two analysis projects.  

Denmark  participated  in  two  ongoing  investigative  analysis  projects  since  the  Agreement 
entered  into  force.  Most  recently,  Denmark  initiated  an  operational  meeting  in  September 
2020 in the context of an analysis projects. 

5.2.  Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment  

The  Serious  and  Organised  Crime  Threat  Assessment  is  a  strategic  analysis  product  taking 
the form of a threat assessment that Europol prepares for a four-year period. It forms the basis 
for the European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats (hereafter “EU Crime 
priorities”)  described  below.  Half  way  through  the  four-year  cycle  Europol  assesses  the 
Serious  Organised  Crime  Threat  Assessment  to  see  if  it  continues  to  adequately  reflect  the 
threats  identified  earlier.  All  Member  States  and  third  countries  can  contribute  to  this 
assessment. Denmark contributed in the past to this assessment, and the change in Denmark’s 
status in relation to Europol has not changed this.  

5.3.  European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats  

The EU Policy Cycle for serious and organised crime (hereafter “the EU Policy Cycle”) and 
its implementation mechanism, the EU Crime priorities, put into practice the EU’s strategic 
priorities  on the  fight  against organised  and serious crime  as established  by the Council on 
the basis of the Serious Organised Crime Threat Assessment. It is the operational follow-up 
to this threat assessment. It does so by translating each of the EU Crime priorities into annual 
operational action plans.  

The  operational  cooperation  under  the  EU  Crime  priorities  is  driven  by  the  EU  Member 
States.  Denmark  participates  with  other  EU  Member  States  in  the  meetings  of  the  national 
coordinators of the EU Crime priorities. Each of the priorities is led by a Member State (the 
so-called  “driver”).  A  third  country  can  take  on  the  role  of  driver.  Europol  supports  the 
cooperation  through  the  support  unit  for  the  EU  Crime  priorities.  This  support  also  has  a 
financial  component.  As  a  result  of  its  status  as  a  third  country  in  relation  to  Europol, 
Denmark  cannot  independently  apply  for  funding  from  the  resources  earmarked  under  the 
Europol budget for the EU Crime priorities. 

Denmark  continues  to  be  among  the  relevant  actors  that  can  take  part  in  all  the  EU  Crime 
priorities for 2018-2021. From 2021 on, Denmark will take part in all priorities. Denmark’s 
participation  in  the  EU  Crime  priorities  is  “rooted  in,  among  others,  the  Danish  National 

23 The 2019 Folketing Report, p. 9. 
24 The 2019 Folketing Report, p. 9. 

14 

 
 
                                                           
Police’s National Investigation Centre, the Danish National Police’s National Cyber Crime 
Centre,  the  National  Traffic  Centre,  the  State  Prosecutor  for  Serious  Economic  and 
International Crime and the Danish Customs Agency”.25 

Europol indicted that Denmark is an active contributor to the Operational Actions under the 
EU Crime priorities, being involved in about half of all such Operational Actions. Under the 
2020 Operational Actions the Danish National Police participates in 120 of such Actions out 
of a total of 249.  

Europol  also  frequently  invites  Danish  investigators  to  operational  meetings  in  cases  with 
connections  to  Denmark.  Representatives  from  the  Danish  National  Police  attended 
operational meetings in cases such as skimming and black box attacks, drug smuggling, and 
trafficking in human beings. 

Examples of cooperation with Europol as of the investigation of specific cases26:  

I. 

II. 

It  may  be  mentioned,  for  example,  that  on  16  July  2019  an  operation  was 
launched against an Albanian criminal  network,  primarily of drug smugglers, 
in what is known as “Operation Goldfinger”, relating to the smuggling of 1650 
kg of cocaine into Denmark. The case has been investigated in Denmark by the 
Copenhagen  Police  since  October  2019  in  a  cooperation  with  the  Albanian 
police and several European countries coordinated by Europol. The combined 
operation  resulted  in  31  arrests  in  Denmark  and  another  five  arrests  in  other 
countries, the seizing of large quantities of cocaine, and the seizing of weapons 
and various items of property, cars, cash and other assets. The Danish National 
Police’s view is that the cooperation between Europol and the other countries 
taking  part  in  the  operation  worked  very  well,  and  the  coordination  with  and 
assistance from Europol made a very positive contribution to the case.  

Another  major  case  can  also  be  mentioned,  concerning  theft  of  expensive 
hospital  equipment  from  February  and  March  2019,  where  the  cooperation 
between Denmark and several Member States and assistance from Europol was 
crucial  in  clearing  up  the  case.  The  Danish  police  were  made  aware  through 
the Secure Information Exchange Network Application in February 2019 that a 
member  of  a  criminal  gang  was  on  the  way  to  Denmark.  Based  on  this 
information,  the  Danish  police  were  able  to  take  the  necessary  measures  and 
subsequently arrest  four  foreign nationals  who could  be linked to the theft  of 
hospital  equipment  to  a  value  of  around  DKK  13  million  from  a  Danish 
hospital.  In  subsequent  close  cooperation  between  the  Danish,  German  and 
Spanish  police  and  Europol’s  Analysis  Projects,  six  packs  of  hospital 
equipment were found in Frankfurt, all containing objects from the theft at the 
Danish hospital. 

III.  Mention can be made of a case of unlawful deprivation of liberty and violence 

25 The 2019 Folketing Report, p. 4. 
26 The 2018 Folketing Report, p. 12-13. 

15 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
committed  against  a  Danish  citizen  in  Spain,  which  was  solved  in  an 
uncomplicated  and  successful  cooperation  between  the  Danish  and  Spanish 
police,  coordinated  by  the  Danish  and  Spanish  liaison  officers  at  Europol 
headquarters in The Hague. 

5.4.  High Value Targets /Operational Task Forces 

In  the  summer  of  2017,  Europol  launched  a  new  concept  for  target  identification  and 
combating  of  what  are  known  as  High  Value  Targets.  High  Value  Targets  are  defined  as 
organised criminals who pose a high crime threat to one or more EU Member States, and who 
commit crimes covered by Europol’s mandate27.  

The  concept  means  that  the  Member  States  can  present  proposals  regarding  the  individuals 
who appear on the list of High Value Targets, after which Europol selects individuals on the 
list based on various criteria set out in an established procedure. Examples of criteria may, for 
example,  be  the  ability  and  desire  to  harm  private  or  public  interests,  access  to  expertise, 
access to financial resources, the ability and desire to use violence and the ability and desire 
to engage in corruption. 

When the Member States, in cooperation with Europol, have selected a High Value Target, 
an Operational Task Force is established. The precondition is that the Member States allocate 
sufficient  investigative  resources  and  expertise  and  commit  to  use  Europol’s  tools  and 
services,  such  as  the  Secure  Information  Exchange  Network  Application,  the  Europol 
Analysis System and other support services for operational and analytical support. 

Because of its status as a third country in relation to Europol, it is not possible for Denmark 
to propose High Value Targets. This means that Denmark cannot initiate the process leading 
to  an  Operational  Task  Force.  However,  Denmark  can  be  invited  to  take  part  in  an 
Operational  Task  Force  by  a  Member  State  or  by  Europol  and  be  operationally  and 
financially  supported  when  implementing  activities  defined  within  the  operational  plan. 
Denmark has taken part in one Operational Task Force. 

Organised crime groups in Denmark are central to criminal activities and the distribution of 
drugs in the Nordic region. These networks are controlled by persons who could reasonably 
be  proposed  to  appear  on  the  High  Value  Target  list.  However,  Denmark  is  limited  in 
contributing to the High Value Target list, i.e. it can make suggestions to include names list 
but cannot propose them.  

Denmark can only participate in Operational Tasks Forces by invitation, and cannot initiate 
an Operational Task Force.  

Europol  frequently  invites  Danish  investigators  to  operational  meetings  in  cases  with 
connections to Denmark. In its replies, the Danish National Police mentions in particular that 
they  attended  operational  meetings  in  cases  such  as  skimming  and  black  box  attacks,  drug 
smuggling, and trafficking in human beings. 

27 The 2019 Folketing Report, p. 5. 

16 

 
 
 
                                                           
6.  Operational consequences of being a third country   

Compared  to  the  possibility  for  the  other  Member  States  to  directly  query  the  Europol 
Information  System,  the  Danish  model  inevitably  leads  to  a  delay  in  the  exchange  of 
information,  as  the  Danish  National  Police  has  to  make  a  request  to  the  seconded  national 
experts who will do the search on behalf of the Danish National Police, instead of doing the 
search themselves.  

This  lack  of  access  also  has  other  consequences,  such  as  the  impossibility  for  the  Danish 
National  Police  to  use  the  Europol  application  called  QUEST  (which  stands  for  Querying 
Europol Systems) and which would allow a Danish front line officer to directly access certain 
data in the Europol Information System from smartphones or tablets. 

The  lack  of  access  also  led  to  a  lack  of  integration  between  the  Danish  National  Police’s 
analysis platform called POL-INTEL and the Europol Information System. The reason is that 
this analysis platform is used to search information in various Danish databases. Because the 
Danish National Police cannot have access to  the Europol  Information System, the Europol 
Information System cannot be integrated with its analysis platform. It was originally assumed 
when the analysis platform POL-INTEL was implemented that it would directly integrate the 
Europol  Information  System  with  a  view  to  support  the  ability  of  the  police  to  create  a 
combined  intelligence  picture  for  use  in  combating  in  particular  cross-border  crime.  The 
Europol  Information  System  would  thus  have  represented  a  data  source  in  the  Danish 
National  Police  analysis  platform  POL-INTEL.  However  this  is  not  possible  within  the 
framework of the Agreement. This limits the operational value of this investigative tool as it 
cannot  make optimum use of available investigations and information  on foreign criminals, 
and trends in the patterns of crime. 

From  an  operational  perspective,  the  lack  of  access  means  that  when  on  patrol,  Danish 
National police officers are not in a position to conduct searches in the Europol Information 
System  with  the  same  flexibility  as  the  police  in  other  EU  Member  States,  who  can  do  so 
within a very short timeframe. This means, among other things, that the special arrangement 
under the Agreement relating to access to the Europol Information System might, in certain 
cases,  delay  and  complicate  law  enforcement  activities  in  the  context  of  border  controls. 
Hence the officers are reluctant to request a search through the seconded national experts or 
the Single Point of Contact depending on the time of day, who must then contact Europol and 
await an answer. This is not an appropriate solution in case a car is stopped and the officer 
does a search on the driver in  different  databases. Due to  the workflow in  such a situation, 
where messages must be sent back and forth, it is difficult to estimate how long a delay will 
be if the officers request a search through the seconded national experts or the Single Point of 
Contact. It would take anywhere between 5 minutes and a couple of hours depending on the 
urgency of other tasks at the Single Point of Contact and Europol. As the police in the other 
EU  Member  States  gain  direct  access  to  Europol  databases  other  than  the  Europol 
Information  System,  the  operational  value  to  the  Danish  police  will  be  further  restricted  in 
comparison with the police in the other EU Member States.   

17 

 
 
The Danish National Police is not, however, aware of such a delay having been significant to 
the outcome of specific cases or investigations. The Danish National Police’s view is that the 
arrangement continues, in general, to be operationally satisfactory. 

7.  Financial contribution 

Prior  to  1  May  2017,  Denmark  contributed  to  the  funding  of  Europol  through  the  Danish 
contribution  to  the  EU  budget.  Under  Article  22  of  the  Agreement,  Denmark  is  obliged  to 
contribute directly to Europol with an annual sum equivalent to Denmark’s percentage share 
of the aggregate gross national income of the EU Member States.  

For the period from 1 May 2017 to 31 December 2017 the Danish contribution corresponded 
to 1.5 million euro, which is equivalent to the contribution Denmark would have had to pay 
through  the  EU  budget  if  Denmark  had  remained  a  member  of  Europol28.  Denmark’s 
contribution to Europol in 2018 was 2.5 million euro29. Denmark’s contribution to Europol in 
2019 was 2.7 million euro30. The contribution to Europol is budgeted in the 2020 Finance Bill 
at 2.7 million euro annually from 2020 on. The amount is adjusted annually when the updated 
aggregate gross national income figures, which represent the basis for calculation of the size 
of the contribution, are available. 

Under the Agreement, with  a few exceptions, Denmark has to  meet  all the costs associated 
with the employment of the seconded national experts. The costs associated with employing 
the four seconded national experts were half a million euro in 2018, and it is expected that the 
arrangement  in  future  will  continue  to  cost  half  a  million  euro  on  an  annual  basis.  Any 
decision  raising  the  number  of  seconded  national  experts  will  obviously  increase  these 
costs.31 

8.  Conclusions 

8.1.  Operational effectiveness 

Position of Denmark 
Denmark is very satisfied with the ongoing cooperation with Europol. It takes the view that 
the  Agreement,  which  gives  Denmark  a  special  status  compared  to  other  third  countries, 
generally  means  a  smooth  cooperation  for  the  benefit  of  Denmark,  Europol  and  Member 
States  in  the  fight  against  serious,  cross-border  crime.  According  to  its  reply  to  the 
questionnaire,  the  Danish  National  Police  “is  very  satisfied  with the  daily  cooperation  with 
Europol. The present agreement has been working under the given context. However, it is the 
opinion  of  the  Danish  police  that  the  pace  of  changes  in  the  complexity  of  international 
organised crime requires a constant attention to the obligations to share information under 
Article 10 of the Agreement if the conditions for sharing information are met”.  

Due to restrictions in the Agreement, the seconded national experts located in Denmark are 
not  allowed  access  to  other  systems  than  the  Europol  Information  System,  leaving  out 

28 The 2017 Folketing Report, p. 9. 
29 The 2018 Folketing Report, p. 12. 
30 The 2019 Folketing Report, p. 11. 
31 The 2019 Folketing Report, p. 11. 

18 

 
 
                                                           
Europol’s other databases, which their Danish colleagues, who are located at Europol in The 
Hague, can access. In this context the Danish National Police finds that there is potential for 
improvement in terms of the tasks of the seconded national experts located in Denmark.  

The  Danish  National  Police  also  considers  “Europol  to  be  the  main  hub  concerning 
international  information  exchange,  analysis  and  innovation  in  the  European  law 
enforcement community” and takes the view that “bi- and multilateral cooperation with other 
countries  would  be  difficult  and  deficient  without  the  support  and  services  provided  by 
Europol”.  

At  the  same  time  the  Danish  National  Police  observes  that  “Denmark’s  withdrawal  from 
Europol  has  operational  consequences  for  the  Danish  police”.32  In  particular,  the  Danish 
National  Police  assessment  at  present  is  that  the  lack  of  access  to  the  Europol  application 
called QUEST (which stands for Querying Europol Systems), when it is fully implemented, 
will substantially restrict the prospects of the Danish National Police combatting cross-border 
crime compared with the police in the other EU Member States.  

The  Danish  National  Police  also  takes  the  view  that  the  integration  of  data  held  in  the 
Europol Information System into the Danish National Police analysis platform POL-INTEL 
would increase the operational value of this investigative tool.  

The  Danish  National  Police  has  stated  that  there  are  several  examples  of  cooperation  with 
Europol having led to good results in connection with the investigation of criminal offences.  

Position of Europol 
The Agreement provides the necessary instruments required to have a successful operational 
cooperation  with  Denmark.  The  Agreement  provides  for  exclusive  conditions  that  make 
Denmark a privileged and unique third partner for Europol. 

The successful state of play of the cooperation is demonstrated by the continuous increase of 
information  exchange  activities  via  the  Secure  Information  Exchange  Network  Application 
between  Europol  and  Denmark,  as  well  as  by  the  valuable  use  that  Denmark  makes  of  the 
Europol Information System since it became a third country for Europol.33 

The secondment of Danish speaking national experts to Europol, primarily to process Danish 
requests,  as  well  as  to  input  and  retrieve  from  Europol  systems  data  coming  from  Danish 
competent authorities, has proven to be a successful instrument. It allows Denmark to receive 
a tailored and effective service from Europol that serves to counter-balance the shortcomings 
created by the status of Denmark as a third country. However, due to the limitations imposed 
by  Article  10  (6)  of  the  Agreement  as  regards  the  tasks  of  the  Danish  speaking  seconded 
national experts in Denmark, there is room to improve the effectiveness of the cooperation. 

Position of the Commission services 
The  Agreement,  which  gives  Denmark  a  special  status  compared  to  other  third  countries, 
provides for a cooperation between Denmark and Europol that has met the overall objective 

32 The 2019 Folketing Report, p. 12. 
33 See chapters 4.1 and 4.2. 

19 

 
 
                                                           
of  establishing  cooperative  relations  between  Denmark  and  Europol  in  the  fight  against 
terrorism  and  serious  cross-border  crime  and  has  minimised  the  negative  effects  of  the 
Danish departure from Europol as of 1 May 2017. 

This  is  in  particular  due  to  the  enhanced  service  that  Denmark  receives  through  dedicated 
Danish  speaking  seconded  national  experts  for  treating,  under  the  authority  of  Europol, 
Danish  requests to  input, retrieve and cross-check data on a 24/7 basis.  Both  Denmark  and 
Europol  explicitly  recognised  that  the  secondment  of  Danish  speaking  national  experts  to 
Europol  has  proven  to  be  a  successful  instrument  in  this  respect.  At  the  same  time  both 
parties also recognised that due to the limitations imposed by Article 10 (6) of the Agreement 
as regards the tasks  of the Danish  speaking seconded national  experts in Denmark, there is 
room to improve the effectiveness of the cooperation. 

The  Commission  services  therefore  consider  that  the  Agreement  has  been  effective  in 
providing for the necessary operational arrangements, thus minimising the negative impact of 
Denmark’s departure from Europol on 1 May 2017.  

8.2.  Data protection safeguards 

It  was  a  condition  for  the  Agreement  that  Denmark  transposed  the  Law  Enforcement 
Directive.  Furthermore,  it  was  a  condition  that  Denmark  applied  the  data  protection 
safeguards set out in the Agreement. The Danish Law Enforcement Act aims at transposing 
the Law Enforcement Directive. It entered into force on 30 April 2017. The Danish National 
Police  has  designated  a  Data  Protection  Officer  for  the  processing  of  personal  data  by  the 
Danish police within the scope of the Act. The Data Protection Officer has, inter alia, been 
entrusted with the task of monitoring compliance with the Law Enforcement Directive. 

Access by the Danish National Police to information from Europol is regulated by Article 11 
of the Agreement and by the Act. Article 11(5) concerns the transfer by Europol of sensitive 
personal  data  which  is  prohibited  unless  strictly  necessary  and  proportionate.  The  Danish 
National Police said that it is not privy to information regarding such transfers. 

As regards the implementation of Article 12 on the use of information received from Europol, 
the Danish National Police indicated that it respects any restrictions given by the data owner. 

In  relation  to  the  implementation  of  Article  13  on  onward  transfer  of  information  received 
from Europol, the Danish National Police indicated that such transfers are most relevant for 
Denmark’s  sovereign  areas  Greenland  and  the  Faroe  Islands,  which  are  considered  third 
countries under EU law. However, no such transfers have taken place. Furthermore Denmark 
does  not  share  personal  data  with  private  parties  unless  the  data  owner  has  given  consent. 
Also, Denmark has not requested by Europol to authorize any onward transfers so far.  

Position of Denmark  

The  Danish  National  Police,  supported  by  its  Data  Protection  Officer,  takes  the  view  that 
Denmark has effectively implemented, and in practice applied, both the requirements of the 
Law Enforcement Directive and the Agreement with regard to the protection of personal data 
received under the Agreement. 

20 

 
 
Position of Europol 

During  the  period  under  assessment,  Denmark  and  Europol  addressed  a  couple  of  data 
protection  related  issues.  They  related  to  information  from  Denmark  which  was  corrected 
immediately  after  Denmark  had  received  notifications  from  Europol  on  the  matter.  The 
Danish National Police received one request for access, rectification and deletion of personal 
data submitted to Europol by the data subject. It also received three requests for deletion of 
personal data. 

Position of the Commission services 
The Commission services consider that the data protections provisions of the Agreement have 
been applied correctly.  

The questionnaire was also sent to the Danish Data Protection Agency, who replied that it had 
not  looked  into  the  implementation  of  the  data  protection  safeguards  of  the  Agreement. 
Hence  it  took  the  view  that  the  Danish  Ministry  of  Justice  and  the  Danish  National  Police 
were better placed to reply to the questionnaire.   

The  Agreement  has  not  been  assessed  from  a  data  protection  perspective  by  the  European 
Data Protection Supervisor who oversees data processing by Europol. 

21 

 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX A 

Assessment of the Agreement on Operational and Strategic Cooperation 
between the Kingdom of Denmark and the European Police Office34 

Questionnaire for the competent Danish Law Enforcement Authorities responsible under 
Danish national law for preventing and combating criminal offences, including such 
offences in respect of which Europol is competent (henceforth “Danish Competent 
Authorities”) 

Note:  Please  ensure  that  any  statistics/figures  provided  cover  the  full  period  of  this  Agreement 
(November  2017  to  September  2020).  All  figures  should  be  presented  in  such  a  way  that  the 
different years during which the Agreement was applied can be compared. 

Questions of general nature 

Q1: What are the overall benefits of this Agreement for the work of the Danish competent 
authorities, bearing in mind the wish to ensure cooperation between Europol and Denmark 
and to minimise the negative effects of the Danish departure from Europol as a consequence 
of the application of Protocol No 22 on the position of Denmark? Can you provide examples? 

Organized  criminal  networks  are  cooperating  in  regional,  European  and  global  structures 
both  physically  and  virtually.  Economic  gain  is  the  prime  motivation  for crime  and  money, 
including money-laundering activities.  

For  the  Danish  police  and  law  enforcement  authorities  it  is  therefore  vital  to  have  a  very 
close, trusting and efficient co-operation with Europol. 

Europol is the main hub for the Danish police concerning international information exchange, 
analysis  and  innovation  in  the  European  law  enforcement  community.  Bi-  and  multilateral 
cooperation  with  other  countries  would  be  difficult  and  deficient  without  the  support  and 
services provided by Europol. 

To mention some of the areas that most significantly benefits from Denmark’s cooperation 
with Europol, attention is drawn to: 

34 Agreement on Operational and Strategic Cooperation between the Kingdom of Denmark and the European 
Police Office.  All questions and replies provided will be included in a report prepared by the Commission. 

22 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
-  The  analytical  capacity  provided  by  Europol,  such  as  cross-match  and  strategic 

reports.  

-  The  access  to  Secure  Information  Exchange  Network  Application  (SIENA),  which 
provides a fast and secure communication platform, making us able to communicate 
swiftly with both Europol and its Member States and third parties.  

-  The Danish liaison office at Europol, which ensures and strengthens the presence of 
Danish  police  in  Europol  and  provides  a  perfect  platform  for enhanced  cooperation 
with both Europol and its Member States. The liaison officers also provide a unique 
possibility  for  easy  communication,  knowledge  and  best  practice  sharing  with 
Europol’s experts, cooperating partners, Member States and third parties. 

-  The  possibility  of  participation  in  operational  meetings  organized  or  held  by 

- 

EUROPOL. 
Implementation  of  innovative  solutions  such  as  the  Austrian  initiative  from  2018 
related to SIENA.  

Q2:  The  Agreement  defines  the  Danish  competent  authorities  as  all  police  and  other  law 
enforcement  services  existing  in  Denmark,  which  are  responsible  under  national  law  for 
preventing and combating criminal offences. Within this overall category, which authorities 
are the main beneficiaries of the Agreement and why? 

The following fall under the definition of Danish competent authorities: 

-  The Danish National Police 
-  The police districts  
-  The Prosecution Service 
-  The Danish Security and Intelligence Service 
-  The State Prosecutor for Serious International and Economic Crimes 

The  Danish  National  Police  provides  expertise  in  complex  investigations  concerning 
organized crime, cross border crime or cybercrime. The National Police similarly coordinates 
international cooperation.  The technological  developments  and  the  crime  networks’  use  of 
technology means that some crime areas by nature have a border crossing aspect. Denmark 
therefore considers its national investigators, who are handling these types of cases, as the 
main  beneficiaries  of  the  agreement  with  EUROPOL,  granting  the  investigators  access  to 
easy, fast and efficient communication with Europol and cooperating partners across Europe 
as  well  as  providing  access  to  the  analytical  capacity  of  Europol’s  Analysis  Projects  and 
databases. 

The  police  districts  and  investigative  units  within  the  Danish  police  are  dependent  on  the 
in  their  continuous  work  towards 
information  passing  through  Europol 
operational 
disrupting organized crime groups on a national and European level. 

Purpose and scope (Articles 1 and 3) 

Q1: The purpose of the Agreement is defined as "to establish cooperative relations between 
Europol  and  Denmark  in  order  to  support  and  strengthen  action  by  the  competent 
authorities  of  the  other  Member  States  of  the  European  Union  and  of  Denmark  and  their 
mutual  cooperation  in  preventing  and  combating  serious  crime  affecting  two  or  more 
Member States of the European Union, terrorism and forms of crime which affect a common 

23 

 
 
interest  covered  by  a  Union  policy,  in  particular  through  the  exchange  of  information 
between Europol and Denmark".  Has this purpose been met in your view? If so, why, and if 
not, why not? 

It  is  the  overall  opinion  of  the  Danish  police  that  the  purpose  of  the  Agreement  has  been 
met.  

The  Danish  police  are  very  satisfied  with  the  daily  cooperation  with  Europol.  The  present 
agreement  has  been  working  under  the  given  context.  However,  it  is  the  opinion  of  the 
Danish  police that  the  pace  of changes  in the  complexity  of international  organised  crime 
requires a constant attention to the obligations to share information under Article 10 of the 
Agreement if the conditions for sharing information are met.   

In relation to the cooperation with the Member States, Denmark is very satisfied with the 
ongoing and fruitful cooperation and sharing of information.  

In  the  area  of  data  protection,  Denmark  meets  all  legal  guarantees.  However,  a  few 
countries  do  not  share  data  with  Denmark.  Some  countries  may  by  mistake  regard 
Denmark as an ordinary third country.  

Q2: The Agreement covers all areas of crime within Europol’s competence, including related 
crimes, within the meaning of the Europol Regulation. Does the Agreement capture all of the 
crime areas necessary to achieve its objectives? 

Overall,  Denmark  finds  that  the  Agreement  fundamentally  covers  Denmark’s  needs.  The 
Danish police are pleased with the establishment of the new financial center, which is in line 
with the development concerning the investigation of financial crime in Denmark as well. 

Q3: Are you aware of any crime areas where the Agreement has been of particular benefit?  
If so, can you illustrate this by way of examples? 

The crime areas where the Agreement has proven especially beneficial are: 

-  Property crime, especially Mobile Organised Crime Groups 
-  Drug smuggling 
-  Weapons smuggling 
-  Trafficking in human beings 
-  Facilitation of illegal immigration 
-  Foreign Fighters 
-  Cybercrime 

Areas and mode of cooperation (Articles 4 and 6) 

Q1: In addition to the exchange of information, the Agreement outlines a number of areas 
for  cooperation,  such  as  the  exchange  of  specialist  knowledge,  general  situation  reports, 
results of strategic analysis and other forms of information sharing.  Has this possibility been 
used and if so, can an indication been given about the frequency of the use of these areas of 
cooperation and their importance for the Danish competent authorities? 

24 

 
 
 
Denmark  is  a  frequent  user  of  the  Europol  Information  System  (EIS).  The  Danish  National 
Police requests Europol to run searches against the EIS on a daily basis and provides a weekly 
input of relevant criminal cases and suspects. 

The  Danish  National  Police  considers  results  and  hits  in  the  analysis  projects  and  the  EIS 
highly valuable when investigating organized criminals committing border-crossing crime.  

Denmark receives  a  number  of general  situation  reports,  e.g.  the  weekly  report  from  the 
European  Migrant  Smuggling  Centre  (EMSC),  the  weekly  Internet  Referral  Unit  report, 
and the annual TE-report. During the COVID-19 crisis, Denmark has received and contributed 
to the situation reports provided by Europol. 

Denmark takes part in the weekly meetings held by the European Migrant Smuggling Centre 
(EMSC).  

Europol  frequently  invites  Danish  investigators  to  operational  meetings  in  cases  with 
connections to Denmark. We have attended operational meetings in cases such as skimming 
and black box attacks, drug smuggling, trafficking in human beings etc. 

Concerning  specialist  knowledge,  the  Danish  National  Cyber  Crime  Centre  has  exchanged 
knowledge related to decryption of software and ransomware with Europol and its partners. 

All  of  the  above-mentioned  types  of  cooperation  are  of  great  value  to  the  Danish  police, 
providing  both  operational  and  technical  knowledge.  The  situation  reports  and  strategic 
reports provide knowledge to the management level and our national analysts. 

Q2: Denmark shall designate a national contact point to act as the central point of contact 
between  Europol  and  the  Danish  competent  authorities.  What  are  the  experiences  of  the 
Danish  competent  authorities  with  this  structure?  Are  there  areas  for  improvement  in  the 
way in which the national contact point and Europol cooperate? 

The Danish National Contact Point is located within the Single Point of Contact (SPOC), which 
Investigation.  The  national  structure 
is  a  subdivision  of  the  National  Centre  of 
is principally the same as before the agreement. In general, the Danish Police operate with a 
single point of contact of all international communication. 

The following departments have (varying degrees of) access to SIENA: 

-  The  National  Police.  Relevant  departments.  Mainly  the  SPOC  and  the  units  of 

International Cooperation and International Communication. 

-  The national cyber-crime center. 
-  The State Prosecutor  for  Serious International  and  Economic Crime. E.g.  the Danish 

Asset Recovery Office. 

-  The Danish Security and Intelligence Service. 
-  Specializes and selected units in the police districts, which are using SIENA for border 

policing purposes. 

Danish authorities do not have access to data under subsections 2a and 2b of article 18 in 
the Europol Regulation concerning the EIS. These types of data are delivered to the National 
Danish Police on Danish requests to Europol’s Operational Centre. 

25 

 
 
Currently,  the  two  Danish  seconded  national  experts  working  from  Denmark  only  have 
access  to  the  EIS.  The  Danish  seconded  national  experts  working  from  The  Hague  have 
access  to  those  operational  systems,  which  are  implemented  in  the  operational  center 
(analysis projects). Denmark would welcome clarification as to whether Denmark’s seconded 
national experts could get access to the hit/no hit solution in the analysis projects when this 
is rolled out to the Member States.  

Due to restrictions in the agreement, the seconded national experts located in Denmark are 
not  allowed  access  to  any  other  system  than  the  EIS,  leaving  out  all  of  Europol’s  other 
databases,  which  their  Danish  colleagues,  who  are  located  at  Europol  in  The  Hague,  can 
access. The seconded national experts in Denmark are thus limited in relation to which tasks 
they  can  perform  for  Europol.  Therefore,  the  Danish  police  find  that  there  is  potential  for 
improvement in terms of the tasks of the seconded national experts located in Denmark. The 
National Police and Europol are in an ongoing dialogue to improve procedures that can help 
to better utilize their skills and working hours. 

There is some scope for the two seconded national experts working in Denmark to handle 
further  tasks.  They  are  as  of  now  somewhat  limited  in  their  access  and  tasks  due  to 
restrictions in the Agreement. 

Q3:  Although  the  exchange  of  information  between  Europol  and  the  Danish  competent 
authorities  normally  takes  place  via  this  contact  point,  the  Agreement  also  allows  direct 
exchanges  between  Europol  and  the  Danish  competent  authorities.  Did  the  Danish 
competent authorities use this possibility and if so, what were the reasons for doing so? In 
case  this  possibility  has  been  used,  has  the  national  contact  point  been  informed  of  such 
exchanges and if not, why not? 

Denmark has no record of any such cases where this possibility has been used. In general, 
the  Danish  guidelines  state  that  all  international  communication  must  pass  through  the 
SPOC.  

The Danish Police and Customs Coordination Centers have a limited SIENA access in order to 
communicate bilaterally with their cooperation partners in the other countries.  

Q4:  The  national  contact  point  is  also  the  central  point  of  contact  in  respect  of  review, 
correction  and/or  deletion  of  personal  data.  How  many  requests  for  review,  correction 
and/or  deletion  of  personal  data  have  been  submitted  and  by  who  (mainly  by  Europol  or 
mainly by the Danish competent authorities)? Are these requests mainly a  consequence of 
data  subjects  exercising  their  rights  as  provided  for  in  the  Europol  Regulation  and 
Denmark’s national legislation transposing the Law Enforcement Directive or do the Parties 
contact  the  central  point  of  contact  proactively?  Does  the  national  contact  point  confirm 
the requesting party that personal data has been reviewed, corrected or deleted? 

Our  records  show  that  the  Danish  National  Police  received  one  request  for  access, 
rectification  and  deletion  of  personal  data  submitted  to  Europol  by  the  data  subject.  This 
request was forwarded to Europol via the National Contact Point and the data subject was 
informed about the transmission.  

26 

 
 
Furthermore, the records show that The Danish National Police has received three requests 
made by the data subjects for deletion of personal data relating to a vehicle in the national 
databases and Europol’s and Interpol’s databases. The data subjects were not registered in 
Europol’s database, and the police informed the subjects accordingly.  

These  three  requests  were  processed  in  accordance  with  the  rules  laid  down  in  the  Law 
Enforcement Act, which implements the Law Enforcement Directive. According to Section 17 
(2) of the Act, the data controller shall,  at the request of the data subject, without undue 
delay, delete information processed in violation  of chapter 3, or if it is required to comply 
with  a  legal  obligation,  to  which  the  data  controller  is  subject.  Chapter  3  regulates  the 
general principles for the processing of personal data. The provisions are similar to those set 
out in the Law Enforcement Directive (EU) 2016/680, namely Article 4. 

Denmark  has  received  a  few  notifications  from  Europol,  where  Denmark  by  mistake  had 
requested upload of minors. The information was corrected immediately. 

Europol  has  also  contacted  Denmark  regarding  correction  of  persons  mistakenly  updated 
with  the  wrong  birth  year, e.g.  in  1901  instead  of  2001.  These  updates  were  caused  by  a 
technical mistake in the input of spreadsheets in batch uploads to the EIS. The updates were 
immediately assessed and corrected. 

Q5:  The  national  contact  point  is  also  the  central  contact  point  for  the  transmission  of 
personal  data  from  private  parties  established  within  Denmark,  as  well  as  for  information 
from private parties residing in Denmark, to Europol. How often has such information been 
transmitted  by  the  national  contact  point  to  Europol?  If  such  information  has  been 
transmitted, do they concern particular crime areas (for example cybercrime, financial crime, 
child abuse, where the role of private parties is considered of increasing importance)? 

Denmark has no record that transmission of data or information from private parties have 
occurred. 

Q6: Denmark shall ensure the possibility for the national contact point to enable information 
exchange on a 24-hour basis. The national contact point shall ensure that information can be 
exchanged without delay with the Danish competent authorities. Has this requirement been 
implemented and if so, how, and if not, why not? 

Denmark ensures this obligation through the Single Point of Contact, which operates 24/7. 
The Single Point of Contact is located within the Danish National Police.  

Furthermore, the Danish Desk at Europol can also be reached 24/7.  

Consultation and closer cooperation (Articles 8 and 9) 

Q1: The Agreement provides for various forms of consultations and cooperation (high level 
meetings  and  other  consultations)  between  Europol  and  the  Danish  competent 
authorities/national  contact  point  to  discuss  issues  relating  to  the  Agreement  and  the 
cooperation in general, and participation at meetings of the Heads of Europol National Units 
and the Europol Management Board. How many high level meetings between Europol and 
the  Danish  competent  authorities  and  meetings  between  the  national  contact  point  and 

27 

 
 
Europol took place since the Agreement entered into force on 30 April 2017? Has Denmark 
been invited to attend the meetings of the Europol Management Board and its subgroups? 
Has  the  national  contact  point  been  invited  to  attend  the  meetings  of  the  Heads  of  the 
Europol National Units? 

The  Director  of  Europol  and  the  Danish  National  Commissioner  of  Police  held  meetings  in 
February 2018 and October 2018. 

Denmark  has  participated  in  all  meetings  in the  Europol  Management  Board  and  its 
subgroups  Corporate  Matters  and  Information  Management.  Denmark  has  also  attended 
the meetings of the Heads of Europol National Units (HENU).  

Q2:  How  many  liaison  officers  have  been  seconded  to  Europol?  From  which  competent 
authorities? Has an administrative agreement been established governing their tasks, rights 
and obligations, numbers and costs involved? 

On October 3rd 2017 The Danish National Police and Europol entered into an administrative 
agreement,  which  relates  primarily  to  the  liaison  officers  posted  at  the  Danish  Desk  at 
Europol. 

The Danish National Police is posting at the moment one Deputy Chief Superintendent and 
two police officers to the Europol Liaison Office in The Hague as well as one representative 
from the Danish Security and Intelligence Service. 

In addition and as part of the operational Agreement with Europol, Denmark has seconded 
four  national  experts  to  Europol’s  Operational  Centre,  two  of  which  are  working  from 
Europol  in  The  Hague  and  the  other  two  from  the  Europol  Office  at  the  Danish  National 
Police in Denmark. 

Information exchange (Articles 10 – 13) 

Q1:  How  has  Denmark  implemented  Article  10  on  general  provisions,  in  particular  the 
transitional period in relation to the implementation of Article 10(6)? Article 10(6) reads that 
if the Europol Management Board decide to second Europol staff or national experts to the 
territory  of  Denmark,  such  staff  or  national  experts  shall  not  have  access  to  Europol’s 
systems  beyond  what  is  available  to  other  Member  States.  Article  10(6)  also  reads  that 
Denmark shall second national experts to Europol to, inter alia, process Danish requests on a 
24/7 basis. What is the scope of access of such seconded national experts to personal data 
processed  in  Europol  systems?  Are  such  seconded  national  expert  sharing  the  information 
they access in Europol systems with the authorities in Denmark? Under which conditions and 
safeguards? 

By request of Denmark, the seconded national experts forward hits in the EIS to the Danish 
contact points. On a weekly basis, Europol Operational Centre provides an overview of hits 
between  Danish  data  stored  in  the  EIS  and  data  inserted  in  Europol’s  Analysis  Projects  by 
request of Member States or third parties. 

The  Danish  seconded  national  experts  have  no  access  to  the  Danish  police’s  operational 
systems, but they may access a secure mail system provided by the Danish police. Answers to 

28 

 
 
Danish requests, which contain Europol data are forwarded by the seconded national experts 
through SIENA. Danish requests for uploads in the EIS or contributions to Europol’s Analysis 
Projects are similarly sent through SIENA.  

The  Danish  seconded  national  experts  have  access  to  the  EIS  but  no  other  Europol  system 
when  working from  Denmark.  According to Article 10  (6), the  Europol  Management  Board 
may  decide  to  second  Europol  staff  or  national  experts  to  the  territory  of  Denmark  if 
necessary  for  the  purpose  of  the  said  assignment.  Should  they  be  deployed,  such  staff  or 
national experts shall not have access to Europol’s systems beyond what is available to other 
Member States. 

The Danish police are not allowed to use Querying Europol System (QUEST) but as mentioned 
above,  the  seconded  national  experts  have  access  to  the  EIS.  In  the  near  future,  the 
possibilities  for  searches  in  QUEST  will  expand.  Thus,  QUEST+  at  some  point  will  support 
hit/no  hit  inquiries  from  Member  States  regarding  information  in  analysis  projects.  The 
Danish  police  expect  that  the  seconded  national  experts  in  Denmark  will  be  able  to  access 
hit/no hit data when implemented in the Member States. 

Q2:  How  has  Denmark  implemented  Article  11  on  transfer  of  personal  data  (including 
safeguards related to processing of personal data and the use of special categories of data 
as per Article 11(5))? 

According to Article 11 of the Agreement, Europol or Danish national competent authorities 
may  only  make  requests  for  personal  information  in  accordance  with  the  purposes  of  the 
Agreement,  and  personal  data  may  only  be  processed  in  accordance  with  the  specific 
purpose(s)  named  in  the  article’s  paragraph  2.  According  to  article  11(2),  the  contracting 
parties are required to indicate the specific purposes for which data are transmitted. In case 
Denmark has not done so, Europol, in agreement with Denmark, shall process the transmitted 
information in order to determine its relevance and the purposes for which it is to be further 
processed. Europol may only process data for other purposes, than those for which they were 
transmitted, if authorised by Denmark to do so.  

Danish  police’s  access  to  gather  information  from  Europol  is  furthermore  regulated  by  the 
Law Enforcement Act (the Act). The Act implements EU Directive 680/2016. The Act provides 
a similarly framework for the Danish police to process personal data as long as the processing 
is necessary to prevent, investigate, detect or prosecute criminal offences, etc. 

Section 4  of the Act contains  a  number  of  basic principles,  which  have to  be complied  with 
when processing personal data for law enforcement purposes. For example, section 4 codifies 
that personal data must be collected for specified and explicit purposes which fall under the 
purposes  listed  in  the  Act’s  section  1(1).   Further  processing  must  not  be  incompatible  with 
these purposes (section 4(2)), and the information processed must be relevant and adequate. 
Further, the collection of personal information must not exceed what is required to fulfil the 
purpose and must be accurate and if necessary, updated, cf. section 4(3) and (4).  

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The basic principles listed in section 4, in particular the principles of adequacy, relevance and 
proportionality,  imply  amongst  other  things  that  an  authority  may  not  collect  personal 
information which the authority has no purpose for collecting, or which the authority does not 
otherwise need in connection with the fulfilment of its tasks. 

Furthermore, section 9  and  10  of the  Act list  general criteria for  the  processing  of  personal 
data,  for  which  the  Act  is  applicable.  According  to  section  9,  personal  data  may  only  be 
processed  if  processing  is  necessary  in  order  to  prevent,  investigate,  detect  and  punish 
criminal  offences,  including  the  protection  against  and  prevention  of  threats  against  public 
security. According to the Act’s section 10, special categories of data, such as data revealing 
political or religious beliefs or biometric data may not be processed unless strictly necessary 
and only if processing takes place in order to fulfil the purposes listed in the Act’s section 1. 

Q3: How has Denmark implemented Article 12 on the use of information? In particular, how 
often is a Contracting Party asked to grant authorization to use information for a different 
purpose  than  the  purpose  for  which  the  information  was  provided?  How  often  such 
authorisation  is  granted?  Can  you  mention  examples  of  cases  in  which  this  happened  and 
what the different purpose was?   

Denmark  respects  any  restrictions  given  by  the  data  owner. If  a  transfer  of  information  to 
Europol related to a Danish case could jeopardize the investigation, the Danish contact point 
will liaise with the investigators in charge of the investigation. 

Denmark  has  no  statistics  on  the  frequency  of  requests  to  grant  authorization  to  use 
information for different purposes than for which it was initially provided. 

An  example  where  authorization  could  be  granted  as  stated,  would  be  requests  to  use 
information from police reports in cases, which are about to be presented in a court hearing. 
Request and authorization can also be related to data, under which the data owner and the 
details of a cross match is hidden. 

Q4: How has Denmark implemented Article 13 on onward transfers? In particular, how often 
Denmark  requests  Europol  to  authorise  onward  transfers  or  transfers  to  third  States  or 
international  organisations?  In  the  latter  case,  how  is  ensured  that  transfers  take  place 
under the same conditions as those applying to the original transfer? Please confirm if there 
have been transfers of data under Article 11(5)? If so, could you please detail the additional 
safeguards,  if  any,  that  have  been  provided?  How  often  is  Denmark  asked  by  Europol  to 
agree on onward transfer other than to the competent authorities in the Member States of 
the European Union (i.e. onward transfers to third States or international organisations)? 

Possible onward national transfers to competent authorities are done through SIENA or via 
the  police  communication  system. Generally,  Danish  police  do  not  share  personal  or 
operational data with private parties unless the data owner has given consent. 

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Such onward transfers would most likely be relevant in regard to Denmark’s sovereign areas 
Greenland  and  the  Faroe  Islands,  which  are  considered  third  countries  under  EU  law. 
However, such transfer has not taken place as of yet.  

Record  show  that  Denmark  has  not  requested  Europol  to  authorize  an  onward  transfer  as 
described. Denmark is aware of procedures should Denmark receive such a request.  

Article  11(5)  regulates  the  transfer  of  data  by  Europol.  As  such,  the  Danish  Police  are  not 
privy to information regarding such transfers.  

Denmark  has  given its  prior consent  allowing Europol to  share  data  with  third  parties  and 
international organizations, which have operational agreements with Europol. 

Other forms of cooperation (Articles 14 – 15) 

Q1: Are or were Danish competent authorities involved in Operational Analysis Projects since 
the entry into force of the Agreement? If so, how many and in which crime areas? Did they 
initiate any investigation or any meeting in the context of a particular  Operational Analysis 
Project? 

Currently  Denmark  participates  in  26  Analysis  Projects under  Serious  Organized  Crime  or 
Counter  Terrorism.  In  addition,  Denmark  has  pending  requests  for  membership  of  two 
Analysis  Projects.  For  the  purpose  of  cross  match  and  contributions,  Denmark  normally 
includes the relevant analysis projects in the SIENA correspondence.  

Denmark has participated in two ongoing investigative projects since the Agreement entered 
into force. 

 Q2: Did Denmark set up any joint investigation team with Europol and or participate in such 
teams set up by other Member States since the entry into force of the Agreement? If so, in 
how many cases did this happen and what were/are the crime issues these teams were/are 
addressing? 

Since  the  Agreement  entered  into  force,  Denmark  has  participated  in  four  (ongoing)  JIT’s, 
which  have  involved  Europol.  These  JIT’s  concern  trafficking  in  human  beings,  cybercrime 
and drug smuggling. 

Confidentiality of information (Articles 16 - 17) 

Q1:  Which  measures  Denmark  has  taken  to  implement  the  principles  of  security  and 
confidentiality under Article 16 of the Agreement, notably to protect and safeguard classified 
and non-classified information? 

The  Danish  Police  and  Prosecution  Service  are  subject  to  “The  Handbook  of  information 
security for the  police  and  the  prosecution  in the  police  districts”  which is  drawn  up  by the 
National  Police's  IT  Center.  The  handbook  contains  detailed  rules  on  information  security, 
data protection and confidentiality/classification.  

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Denmark  has entered  into the Agreement  “Implementing Arrangement for the  operational 
and strategic agreement between the Kingdom of Denmark and the European Union Agency 
for Law Enforcement Cooperation” on October 3rd 2017. The Agreement includes articles on 
confidentiality and secure communication lines.  

Q2:  Which  issues  have  been  implemented  by  way  of  an  administrative  arrangement  as 
mentioned in Article 17? 

Denmark refers to the Agreement mentioned above. The Agreement is attached. 

Rights to judicial remedy, liability and jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (Articles 
18 - 20) 

Q1:  Have  there  been  decisions  of  the  European  Data  Protection  Supervisor  against  which 
Denmark has launched a procedure with  the Court of Justice of the European Union under 
Article 18 of the Agreement? If so, what was the issue at stake and why did Denmark decide 
to use the possibility under Article 18? 

No. 

Q2:  Did  any  issue  of  liability  or  right  to  compensation  as  regulated  under  Article  19  occur 
since the Agreement entered into force? If so, what was the issue at stake and what was the 
nature of the compensation granted? 

No 

Q3: Has Article 20 been used by Danish courts since the entry into force of the Agreement? 
If so, what kind of cases where at stake and did any of them result in a ruling of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union and if so, which one(s)? 

No 

Final provisions (Articles 21 - 27) 

No specific questions, the issue of the transitional period in relation to the implementation 
of Article 10(6) as regulated in Article 24 has been addressed under Article 10.  

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