COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Evaluation Report Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Evaluation of Decision N° 534/2014/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 providing macro-financial assistance to Tunisia
Date: 2021-01-29
Institutions: Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, European Commission
Subjects: EU aid, European neighbourhood policy, Tunisia, balance of payments, balance of payments assistance, economic reform, economic stabilisation, macro-financial assistance, political reform, structural adjustment

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 29.1.2021  SWD(2021) 8 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Evaluation Report Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Evaluation of Decision N° 534/2014/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 providing macro-financial assistance to Tunisia  {COM(2021) 33 final}  
 
 
Table of contents 

GLOSSARY ................................................................................................................................................... 2 

1. 

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................ 4 

Purpose of the evaluation 
Scope of the evaluation 

4 
4 

2. 

BACKGROUND TO THE INTERVENTION ..................................................................................... 5 

Description of the intervention and its objectives 
Points of comparison 

5 
7 

3. 

IMPLEMENTATION / STATE OF PLAY .......................................................................................... 7 

Implementation of the MFA operation  
Economic situation 
      MFA-I and MFA-II 

7 
9 
             12 

4.  METHODOLOGY .............................................................................................................................. 12 

Evaluation techniques used 
Risks and limitations 

12 
14 

5.  ANALYSIS AND ANSWERS TO THE EVALUATION QUESTIONS .......................................... 15 

Evaluation Question 1: Relevance of the operation 
Evaluation Question 2: Effectiveness 
Evaluation Question 3: Efficiency of the operation 
Evaluation Question 4: EU added-value of the operation 
Evaluation Question 5: Coherence of the operation 
Evaluation Question 6: Social impact of the operation 
Evaluation Question 7: Public Debt Sustainability of the operation 

15 
17 
19 
20 
21 
23 
24 

6. 

CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................................................. 25 

ANNEX 1: PROCEDURAL INFORMATION ............................................................................................ 28 

Organisation, design and timing 

28 

ANNEX 2: STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION STRATEGY……………………………………………………. 29 

       Mapping of stakeholder groups 
       Methods and tools for engaging with stakeholders 

                          29 
            30 

ANNEX 3: METHODS AND DATA SOURCES ....................................................................................... 32 

ANNEX 4: LIST OF KEY MFA-I DOCUMENTS REVIEWED……………………………………………………..37 

ANNEX 5: TIMELINE OF THE TUNISIA MFA-I OPERATION ............................................................. 39 

1 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Term  
AA 
ACAA   
AFD 
AfDB 
ANCSEP 
ANER 
CAD 
CBT 
CdC 
CONECT 
CPR 
CRES 
DCFTA  
DG ECFIN 
DG NEAR 
DSA 
EBRD 
EC 
EEAS 
EFF 
EIB 
EIDHR   
EIU 
ENI 
ENP 
ENPI 
EQ 
EU 
EUR 
FDI 
FSAP 
FX 
GDP 
GIZ 
GNI 
GOJ DPL 
IACE 
IDA 
IFI 
IMF 
INS 
ISG 
LHS 
LOB 

Glossary 

Meaning or definition 
Association Agreement 
Agreement on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance 
Agence Francaise de Développement 
African Development Bank 
Agence Nationale de Contrôle Sanitaire et Environnemental des Produits 
Agence Nationale d'Evaluation des Risques  
Current Account Deficit 
Central Bank of Tunisia  
Cour des Comptes 
Conféderation des Entreprises Citoyennes de Tunisie  
Congress for the Republic  
Centre de Recherches et d'Etudes Sociales  
Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement 
Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs 
Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations 
Debt Sustainability Analysis 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
European Commission 
European External Action Service 
Extended Facility Fund 
European Investment Bank 
European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights  
Economic Intelligence Unit 
European Neighbourhood Instrument 
European Neighbourhood Policy 
European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument  
Evaluation question 
European Union 
Euro 
Foreign Direct Investment 
Financial Sector Assessment Programme 
Foreign exchange 
Gross Domestic Product 
German Society for International Cooperation 
Gross National Income 
Governance, Opportunities and Jobs Development Policy Loans 
Institute Arabe des Chefs d’Entreprises  
International Development Association 
International Financial Institution 
International Monetary Fund 
Institut National de la Statistique 
Inter-Service Steering Group 
Left hand scale 
Loi Organique Budgétaire 

2 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MDIIC   
MENA   
MFA 
MOF 
MoU 
NEET 
NGO 
NIS 
OA 
ODA 
PAI 
PAR 
PFM 
PNAFN  
PPP 
RHS 
SAO 
SBA 
SIA 
SCF 
SSN 
SWD 
TA 
TND 
ToR 
UGTT 
UN 
US 
USAID   
VAT 
WB 
WB DPO 

Ministry of Development, Investment and International Cooperation  
Middle East and North Africa  
Macro-financial assistance 
Ministry of Finance 
Memorandum of Understanding 
Not in Employment, Education or Training  
Non-governmental organisation 
National Institute of Statistics  
Operational Assessments 
Official Development Assistance  
Programme d'Appui a l'Intégration  
Programme d’Appui à la Relance 
Public Finance Management 
Programme national ď aide aux familles necessiteuse 
Public Private Partnership 
Right Hand Scale 
State Audit Office 
Stand-By Agreement 
Social Impact Analysis 
Stand-By Credit Facility  
Social Safety Net 
Staff Working Document 
Technical Assistance 
Tunisian Dinar 
Terms of Reference 
Tunisian General Labour Union 
United Nation 
United States 
United States Agency for International Development 
Value Added Taxes 
World Bank 
World Bank Development Policy Operations 

3 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. 

INTRODUCTION 

Purpose of the evaluation 

This  Staff  Working  Document  (SWD)  presents  an  evaluation  of  the  Macro-Financial 
Assistance (MFA) operation to Tunisia  provided by the European Union (EU) over the 
period 2015-2017. It largely draws on an independent, ex-post evaluation1 conducted by 
an  external  contractor  and  a  consultation  process  that  involved  targeted  stakeholders  in 
Tunisia as well as EU staff.  

The aim of the evaluation is to assess whether the MFA operation of 2015-2017 met its 
objectives  to  support  Tunisia  in  addressing  its  balance-of-payments  problems  and 
implementing  economic  and  structural  reforms  that  would  stabilise  its  economy  and 
enhance  the  sustainability  of  its  external  position.  The  purpose  of  the  evaluation  is  to 
support  decision-making  by  identifying  areas  of  improvement  for  similar  on-going  or 
future MFA operations, while also ensuring transparency and accountability. 

Scope of the evaluation 
MFA  is  a  policy-based  financial  instrument  of  untied  and  undesignated2  balance-of-
payments support to partner third countries. It is designed to assist third countries that are 
geographically,  economically  and  politically  close  to  the  EU.  MFA  takes  the  form  of 
medium/long-term  loans,  grants  or  a  combination  of  the  two.  Unlike  other,  regular 
development aid provided by the EU, MFA is exceptional in nature and is mobilised on 
an  ad-hoc  case-by-case  basis.  Its  objective  is  to  help  restore  a  sustainable  external 
financial situation, while encouraging economic adjustment and structural reforms in the 
partner country. MFA always complements (and is conditioned on) financing provided in 
the context of a reform programme agreed with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 

Since  the  Arab  Spring  began,  the  EU  has  committed  to  supporting  Tunisia  in  its 
economic  and  political  reform  process.  This  support  has  remained  consistent  with  the 
EU’s  policy  towards  the  Southern  Neighbourhood  region,  set  out  in  the  context  of  the 
European Neighbourhood Policy. 
In May 2014, the European Parliament and Council adopted a decision3 to provide EUR 
300 million - as part of a wider package of international assistance - to support Tunisia’s 
economic  and  political  transition  following  the  2011  revolution.  The  aim  of  the  MFA 
was to help Tunisia cover its external financing needs and to support structural reforms. 
The  assistance  was  disbursed  in  three  tranches  between  May  2015  and  July  2017, 
alongside IMF assistance and contributions from  other donors like the World Bank and 
the African Development Bank. The MFA disbursements were linked to the fulfilment of 
nine  specific  structural  reform  conditions  related  to  reforms  in  six  areas,  namely: 
taxation, public finance management, social safety net, financial sector, public statistical 
system and trade. 

1     Ex-post evaluation of the first Macro-Financial Assistance operation in Tunisia over the period 2014-
2017, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/evaluation-reports-economic-and-financial-affairs-
policies-and-spending-activities_en 

2     In terms of the use of funds. 
3     Decision No 534/2014/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 providing    

macro-financial assistance to the Republic of Tunisia 

      https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1476964844762&uri=CELEX:32014D0534 

4 

 
 
                                                           
In accordance with Article 34(1) of the Financial Regulation4, MFA operations in third 
countries are subject to an ex-post evaluation. In turn, the aforementioned MFA Decision 
for  Tunisia  stipulates  that  the  European  Commission  is  required  to  “submit  to  the 
European Parliament and to the Council an ex post evaluation report”. 

To  this  end,  the  Directorate-General  for  Economic  and  Financial  Affairs  (DG  ECFIN) 
engaged  an  external  contractor  to  complete  an  independent  assessment,  which  informs 
this Staff Working Document and which ran from September 2018 until July 2019, with 
the objectives of:  

1.  Analysing the impact  of the MFA on the economy of Tunisia and, in  particular, on 

the sustainability of its external position; 

2.  Assessing the added-value of the EU’s intervention. In general, the evaluation seek to 

draw lessons with respect to the EU’s financial assistance, i.e. 
a.  Whether  the  ex-ante  considerations  determining  the  design  and  terms  of  the 
operation  were  appropriate,  taking  due  account  of  the  economic,  political  and 
institutional context; and 

b.  Whether the outcome of the programme met the objectives. 

These  areas  were  assessed  along  the  following  key  evaluation  criteria:  relevance, 
effectiveness,  efficiency,  EU  added-value,  and  coherence  with  both  other  EU  policies 
and  interventions  from  international  donors.  In  addition,  the  evaluation  assessed  the 
social impact of the MFA and the impact on the sustainability of Tunisia’s public debt. 
This is further specified in the Evaluation Roadmap.5 

2.  BACKGROUND TO THE INTERVENTION 

Description of the intervention and its objectives 

Following  the  Jasmine  Revolution  and  due  to  the  conflict  in  neighbouring  Libya,  the 
Tunisian economy experienced a recession in 2011, with GDP contracting by 2% during 
the year. While economic growth resumed in 2012, persistently high unemployment rates 
(notably among the youth), a deepening political crisis and widening external and fiscal 
imbalances  created  considerable  macroeconomic  uncertainty  and  prompted  the  need  of 
international financial support.  

As regards the external sector, the current account deficit continued to widen after the 
2008  global  financial  crisis,  driven  by  a  deteriorating  trade  balance.  The  turmoil 
following  the  2011  revolution  caused  severe  disruptions  to  industrial  production  and 
services,  with  investor  sentiment  weakening  while  the  EU,  Tunisia´s  main  trading 
partner,  was  hit  by  the  sovereign-debt  crisis.  The  conflict  in  neighbouring  Libya  also 
prompted a loss of remittance income, owing to the return of a large number of migrant 
workers.  Buoying  imports  (especially  energy  and  capital  goods)  and  declining  oil  and 
phosphate  exports  in  2013  and  2014  worsened  the  trade  balance  and  added  further 
strains. As a result, the current account deficit stood at almost 9% of GDP, on average, 
between 2012 and 2014. 

Turning to the fiscal situation, after 2008, the Tunisian government resorted to various 
fiscal policy measures with the aim of reinvigorating the economy, including increases in 

4    https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32018R1046 
5    https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/1812-Ex-post-evaluation-of- 

macro-financial-assistance-to-Tunisia 

5 

 
 
 
                                                           
public  sector  wages  and  subsidies  on  food  and  energy.  By  2012,  the  fiscal  deficit  had 
increased  to  nearly  6%  of  GDP.  Faced  with  economic  stagnation  and  rising 
unemployment, the transition government in Tunisia opted for further expansionary fiscal 
measures. These contributed to a budget deficit widening further to almost 7% of GDP in 
2013 and public debt increasing to almost 47% of GDP in the same year.  

In this difficult macroeconomic context, in June 2013, Tunisia entered into a USD 1.75 
billion (400% of quota), 24-month Stand-by Arrangement (SBA) with the IMF. Shortly 
upon the conclusion of the SBA in December 2015, a 48-month Extended Fund Facility 
(EFF)  of  USD  2.9  billion  was  signed  between  the  two  parties,  in  May  2016.  The  IMF 
EFF programme aimed to promote stronger and more inclusive growth by consolidating 
macroeconomic  stability,  reforming  public  institutions—including  the  civil  service, 
facilitating  financial  intermediation,  and  improving  the  business  climate.  In  addition, 
Tunisia  was  in  receipt  of  development  policy  loans  provided  by  the  World  Bank.  The 
World  Bank  loans  aimed  to  help  lay  the  policy  foundations  for  a  more  competitive 
business  environment,  a  strengthened  financial  sector,  more  inclusive  and  accountable 
social services, as well as more transparent public governance. 

To  complement  Tunisia’s  arrangements  with  the  IMF,  the  EU  pledged  to  grant  MFA. 
Upon Tunisia’s request and following an ex-ante evaluation, the European Commission 
proposed6  in  December  2013  up  to  EUR  250  million  in  macro-financial  assistance 
(MFA) loans. The European Parliament and Council approved the MFA on 15 May 2014 
and agreed to increase the amount of the assistance to EUR 300 million7.  

Following the consultation of the Member States' Committee on MFA on 9 July 2014, a 
Memorandum  of  Understanding  (MoU)8  and  Loan  Facility  Agreement  related  to  this 
assistance  were  signed,  while  the  ratification  by  the  Tunisian  Parliament  took  place  in 
March 2015. Annex 5 of this report summarizes the timeline of the operation.   

The  assistance  was  provided  in  three  tranches  of  EUR  100  million  each,  disbursed 
between  May  2015  and  July  2017,  and  conditional  to  good  progress  under  the  IMF's 
SBA,  political  prerequisites9,  and  to  the  fulfilment  of  the  set  of  policy  conditions 
specified in the Memorandum of Understanding.  

The  MFA  operation  aimed  to  help  Tunisia  move  forward  with  its  planned  economic 
reforms  while  also  underpinning  its  political  reform  efforts.  The  general  intervention 
logic  of  the  MFA-I  operation,  applicable  to  the  2015-2017  Tunisia  programme,  is 
summarised in the graph below. 

6    https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1476964783648&uri=CELEX:52013PC0860 
7    https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1476964844762&uri=CELEX:32014D0534 
8    https://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/eu_borrower/mou/tunisia_mfa_mou_signed_en.pdf 
9    https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-

coordination/international-economic-relations/macro-financial-assistance-mfa-non-eu-partner-
countries_en 

6 

 
                                                           
Figure 2.1 Intervention logic of MFA-I operation to Tunisia 

Source: ICF 

Points of comparison  

The points  of  comparison, against which the MFA operation of 2015-2017 is  assessed, 
refer to the situation in Tunisia (1) prior to the intervention, on one hand, and (2) during 
and immediately after the implementation of the MFA operation, on the other hand. As 
noted  in  the  previous  subsection,  which  describes  the  situation  prior  to  the  MFA 
operation, particular attention is paid to the external sector and the fiscal situation of the 
Tunisian  economy.  Section  3  will  describe  the  implementation  and  following  phase  of 
the MFA operation. It will focus both on the main developments in Tunisia in the areas 
of political reform covered by the programme, and on the wider economic development 
of the country. 

7 

 
 
 
3. 

IMPLEMENTATION / STATE OF PLAY 

This  section  briefly  describes  the  implementation  of  the  MFA-I  operation  to  Tunisia, 
looking at the key developments on the policy reform areas supported by the programme. 
It will then describe the economic situation in Tunisia during and immediately after the 
implementation  of  the  MFA  operation,  with  particular  reference  to  the  points  of 
comparison  in  the  external  sector  and  the  fiscal  situation.  The  assessment  of  the 
effectiveness of the MFA operation will be then addressed in section 5.   

Implementation of the MFA operation  

To  achieve  the  objectives  detailed  in  section  2,  and  as  per  the  usual  MFA  procedure, 
disbursements under this operation were tied to the fulfilment of political pre-condition 
(the  respect  of  human  rights,  effective  democratic  mechanisms,  including  a  multi-party 
parliamentary  system,  and  the  rule  of  law),  as  well  as  good  progress  with  the 
implementation  of  the  IMF  programme.  The  disbursement  of  the  second  and  third 
tranches was also subject to the fulfilment of a set of country-specific policy conditions, 
specified in the MoU and related to six structural reform areas10. 

The  operation  was  disbursed  in  full,  in  three  instalments,  over  the  period  May  2015  – 
July 2017:  

  First tranche of EUR 100 million loan, disbursed in May 2015; 
  Second tranche of EUR 100 million loan, disbursed in December 2015; and 
  Third tranche of EUR 100 million loan, disbursed in July 2017.  

MFA loans were provided on highly favorable terms. Maturity and interest rates differed 
for each tranche, varying between (1) the coupon of 0.49 per cent and the maturity of 12 
years for the first instalment, and (2) the coupon of 1.25 per cent and the maturity of 15 
years  for  the  last  instalment.  For  all  the  three  instalments,  it  was  envisaged  a  bullet 
capital  repayment  (i.e.  a  lump  sum  of  the  full  outstanding  amount)  in  the  last  year  of 
maturity. With respect to the interest rates, no grace period was applied. 

The operation covered nine specific conditions under six reform areas: 

Figure 3.1 Structural reform areas under MFA-I to Tunisia 

Structural Reform Area 

No. of related Policy 
Conditions 

Taxation 

Social Safety Net 

Financial Sector 

Public Finance Management 

Statistics 

Trade Policy 

1 

2 

2 

1 

1 

2 

Tunisia satisfactorily fulfilled all the policy conditions necessary for the disbursement of 
the  three  instalments,  with  the  exception  of  condition  8  on  trade  policy,  for  which  a 
waiver  was  granted  by  DG  ECFIN11.  The  condition  required  the  publication  of  the 

10  For the detailed list of policy conditions, please refer to the Memorandum of Understanding, available 

at: https://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/eu_borrower/mou/tunisia_mfa_mou_signed_en.pdf 

11 DG ECFIN, 2017. Report on mission to Tunis (18-21 April 2017). 

8 

 
 
                                                           
decrees  implementing  the  new  technical  regulations  converting  the  existing  system  of 
industrial compulsory standards (normes homologuées) into a system  aligned  with  that 
of  the  EU,  for  two  priority  sectors:  building  materials,  and  electrical  and  electronic 
products.  

According  to  the  external  evaluation  report,  the  relative  complexity  of  the  reform  was 
coupled both with: 
  shortages in the qualified staff in some of the departments at the Ministry of Industry 

and SMEs, involved in the technical aspects of the implementation; and  

  regular  changes  of  the  Tunisian  governments,  that  clearly  affected  the  configuration 
and  collaboration  among  the  multiple  ministries  involved.  Furthermore,  continuous 
updates  of  the  European  directives  (i.e.  norms  related  to  the  EU  acquis)  made  the 
legislative work of the Tunisian side more challenging.  

In  light  of  the  delay,  and  due  to  efforts  made  by  the  Tunisia  authorities  to  achieve 
progress in relation to this condition, a waiver was deemed fully justified.   

In  the  area  of  public  finance  management,  MFA  policy  conditionality  supported  the 
adoption of an Organic Law of Cour des Comptes (CdC), strengthening the external audit 
of public accounts and ensuring the financial  independence of the Court. The  Law was 
first  adopted  by  the  Tunisian  Government  in  2016,  but  only  became  effective  with  the 
adoption by the local Parliament on the 16th of April 2019. Regarding the social safety 
net,  MFA  conditions  have  helped  to  improve  the  management  of  the  system,  through 
better targeting by setting up a dedicated database and launch a dedicated survey.  In the 
financial  sector,  MFA  conditions  have  supported  the  strengthening  of  the  Central 
Bank’s governance and a new banking law to strengthen the banking sector. In terms of 
trade and competition policies, MFA conditions have supported export performance and 
strengthened the competition regulation by fostering a general alignment with the EU in 
this area, including a law on security of industrial products and a law on food security. 
On fiscal management, MFA supported the adoption of a decree reducing the number of 
economic  activities  eligible  for  the  regime  forfaitaire  with  a  view  to  increasing  the  tax 
collection  and  make  the  system  more  equitable.  The  conditions  also  strengthen  the 
statistical system through the adoption of a national chart of public statistics (consistent 
with the UN fundamental principles of statistics) by the National Institute of Statistics. 

The  Tunisian  authorities  were  generally  effective  in  the  implementation  of  the 
conditionality,  notwithstanding  the  waiver  on  condition  8.    On  the  EU’s  side,  the 
monitoring process was adequate and the Commission complied with all checks ensuring 
that  Tunisia  had  satisfactory  fulfilled  the  reform  measures  supported  by  the  MFA. 
Implementation of MFA policy conditions is assessed in detail in section 5 of the present 
document, as part of the relevance and effectiveness of the MFA operation of 2015-2017. 

Economic situation  

During  the  review  period  and  due  to  the  negative  effects  of  two  terrorist  attacks, 
Tunisia’s  economy  remained  stagnant  until  the  end  of  2016,  then  registering  a  slight 
recovery starting from the following year, with a real GDP growth rate of 1.9% in 2017 
and of 2.7% in 2018. 

Tunisia’s  external  imbalances  persisted,  bringing  down  foreign  exchange  reserves. 
Despite a slight recovery in 2015-16, a number of factors maintained the pressure on the 
current  account.  These  included:  1)  the  worsening  energy  deficit  following  reduced 
domestic  energy  production  because  of  the  maturation  of  oil  fields  and  reduced 

9 

 
exploration during the revolution period; (2) reduced external demand from the EU until 
2018, a region that accounts for 65% of trade with Tunisia; (3) negative supply shocks in 
the  phosphate  mining  sector  because  of  labour  disruptions  and  social  unrest;  and  (4) 
reduced FDI inflows and tourism revenue in the wake of the 2015 terror attacks.  

The balance of payments deteriorated in 2018 and the current account deficit reached 
11.2%  of  GDP  at  the  end  of  2018,  against  10.2%  one  year  earlier.  The  trade  account 
deficit  reached  about  16.3%  at  the  end  of  November  2018,  up  from  15%  a  year  later. 
Growing  volumes  of  imported  energy,  coupled  with  the  increasing  price  of  oil  and  the 
depreciating dinar, translated into a widening import bill overall, which was not offset by 
exports in spite of the latter’s increasing prices. The tourism sector experienced a revival 
in  2018  while  remittances  from  abroad  decreased  slightly  throughout  the  year.  The 
combined inflow was 22% higher than in 2017. 

Figure 3.2 Current account balance and trade balance, as % of GDP 

Source: National Institute of Statistics 

Tunisia’s  public  debt  continued  to  rise  sharply  in  the  years  following  the  2011 
revolution. The debt ratio increased from 41% of GDP in 2010 to 71% of GDP at the end 
of  2017.  Tunisia's  elevated  fiscal  deficits  drove  up  government  debt  and  adverse 
exchange rate dynamics, as more than 68% of Tunisia's government debt is denominated 
in foreign currency, also had a heavy impact on debt. Debt service costs had once again a 
considerable impact on total expenditures in 2018.  

10 

 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Public debt and public deficit, as % of GDP 

Note:  Figure  3.3  illustrates  the  trend  of  Tunisian  public  debt  and  public  deficit  (%  of  GDP)  between  2000-2017.  
Measurement scales on the y-axis reported on the left and right side of the graph refer to public debt and public deficit, 
respectively. 
Source: IMF 

In  terms  of  the  fiscal  situation,  the  deficit  increased  dramatically  during  the  reference 
period,  as  shown  in  Figure  3.3.  An  increase  in  public  spending  in  the  immediate 
aftermath of the revolution was followed by some fiscal restraint in 2014. This increase 
mainly  reflects  higher  government  spending  (notably  public  sector  wages  and  social 
spending)  even  if  fiscal  consolidation  was  meant  to  be  one  of  the  key  elements  of  the 
second agreement with the IMF.  

Figure 3.4 Macroeconomic indicators 

Indicator 

2014 

2015 

2016 

2017 

2018 

Real GDP change, % 

Consumer price inflation, %, end of 
period 

Key monetary policy rate, %, end of 
period 

Unemployment rate, % LFS 

General government balance, % of GDP 

Gross Public debt, % of GDP 

Current account balance, % of GDP 

International reserves, USD billion 

International reserves, month of imports 

2,9 

4,8 

4,7 

15,0 

-5,0 

50,7 

-9,1 

7,6 

3,9 

1,2 

4,1 

4,2 

15,2 

-4,8 

55,4 

-8,9 

7,4 

3,9 

1,2 

4,2 

4,2 

15,5 

-6,1 

62,3 

1,9 

6,2 

5,0 

15,4 

-6,2 

70,4 

2,7 

7,5 

6,7 

15,5 

-4,8 

77,9 

-8,8 

-10,2 

-11,1 

6,0 

3,0 

5,5 

2,5 

5,2 

2,7 

Gross external debt, % of GDP 

63,6 

68,4 

75,2 

86,2 

99,4 

Foreign direct investment, % of GDP 

2,2 

2,2 

1,5 

2,0 

2,5 

Source: IMF; Central Bank of Tunisia; Tunisia National Statistical Institute 

11 

 
 
 
 
MFA-I and MFA-II  

In  2016,  Tunisia  requested  a  second  MFA  operation  from  the  EU,  which  would 
accompany  the  successor  IMF  Extended  Fund  Facility  (EFF)  programme  of  USD  2.9 
billion,  which  followed  the  Stand-by  Arrangement  that  was  concluded  in  December 
201512. 

In view of the strong impact the deteriorated security situation was having on Tunisia's 
economy;  and  after  an  updated  assessment  of  the  country’s  external  financing  needs 
conducted  in  liaison  with  the  IMF,  the  EU  adopted  a  second  MFA  (MFA-II)  to  the 
Republic  of  Tunisia  amounting  to  a  maximum  of  EUR  500  million,  in  the  form  of 
medium-term loans.  

The policy-reform measures included in the MoU for MFA-II build on sectors that had 
been  identified  as  priorities  in  the  policy  programme  attached  to  MFA-I.  The 
conditionality  for  MFA-II  focused  on:  improving  PFM;  reforming  the  tax  system  to 
increase  tax  collection  while  enhancing  tax  equity;  reinforcing  and  better  targeting  the 
social  safety  net;  strengthening  the  banking  system;  promoting  investment  and 
supporting  the  recovery  of  the  tourism  sector;  and  enhancing  active  labour  market 
policies so as to reduce Tunisia’s high unemployment rate. 

4.  METHODOLOGY 

Evaluation techniques used 

The  methodology  for  evaluating  the  MFA  operation  in  Tunisia  over  the  period  2015-
2017 was guided by the Commission’s Better Regulation Guidelines13 and the Guidelines 
for the Ex-Post evaluation of Macro-Financial Assistance Operations14. 

For the evaluation conducted by the external contractor, the evidence and the data were 
collected  through  several  complementary  approaches,  including  (i)  a  theory  based 
approach;  (ii)  quantitative  and  qualitative  research  methods;  and  (iii)  triangulation15. 
Overall,  the  quality  of  the  collected  evidence  by  the  external  contractor  (data, 
documentation, interviews and survey results) for this evaluation can be assessed as very 
good, within the limitations mentioned below. 

The  qualitative  research  was  grounded  in  logic  and  economic  theory,  whilst  the 
quantitative fieldwork was based on reliable statistical data, and purposeful sampling was 
used  for  the  interviews  and  the  focus  group  discussion.  To  collect  a  broad,  multi-
dimensional  and  triangulated  picture  of  the  economic,  financial  and  structural  issues 
surrounding  the  programme,  a  wide  range  of  relevant  stakeholders  and  civil  society 
organisations  was  also  involved.  Based  on  this  and  the  triangulation  of  evidence,  this 
evaluation can be considered reliable and valid.  

12    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/14/01/49/pr16238  
13   European Commission, May 2015. Better Regulation Guidelines. Available at:  
       http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/guidelines/toc_guide_en.htm. 
14   Available at: 

http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/economy_finance/procurement_grants/calls_for_tender/2015/015d/annex4-
methodological_orientations_en.pdf. 

15    For a brief presentation thereof, please refer to section 4.2 of the external evaluation report, available 
at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/evaluation-reports-economic-and-financial-affairs-policies-and-spending-
activities_en 

12 

 
 
                                                           
Methods  used  to  build  the  evidence  for  the  evaluation  are  explained  below16.  Overall, 
triangulation  of  findings  obtained  using  different  techniques  has  helped  to  increase 
validity  of  the  evaluation  results.  The  methodology  employed  was  comprehensive  and 
responded to the very specific and unique nature of the MFA operation.  

a.  Documentary Review 

The main documents used for the evaluation were the Ex-ante assessment of the MFA, 
the  Commission  proposal  and  MFA  Decision,  the  MoU  (MFA  I  and  II),  and  mission 
reports drafted by Commission’s Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs 
(DG ECFIN). Additional sources included other EU documents (such as the EU-Tunisia 
Neighbourhood  Agreement),  reports  of  the  IMF,  World  Bank  and  other  international 
organisations, as well as analyses carried out by research institutes. 

b.  Macroeconomic data Analysis (including DSA) 

For quantitative analysis, the evaluation used data from the national sources (mainly, the 
Ministry  of  Finance  and  the  National  Bank  of  Tunisia)  as  well  as  from  international 
organisations  such  as  the  IMF  and  the  World  Bank.  The  quantitative  analysis  notably 
covered macroeconomic fundamentals, fiscal indicators, external sustainability variables, 
financial  sector  variables,  and  structural  reforms  (e.g.  variables  measuring  socio-
economic performances). Additionally, a macroeconomic tool developed by the IMF was 
used  for  Debt  Sustainability  Analysis  (DSA),17  while  fiscal  savings  (resulting  from 
concessional  terms  of  the  MFA  operation  in  question,  as  compared  to  market-based 
alternatives) were calculated by comparing the face value and the net present value of the 
operation.   

c.  Semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders 
A series of 31 in-depth semi-structured interviews18 were conducted, aiming at gathering 
information on the design, implementation and results of the MFA operation. The focus 
was  primarily  on  the  macroeconomic  and  fiscal  situation  in  Tunisia,  on  structural 
reforms,  on the social  impact  and debt  sustainability. The interviews were confidential, 
and pre-interview questionnaires were used to improve the quality. Interviews were held 
with  key  stakeholders  representing:  the  European  Commission  and  the  interest  of  the 
European Union; International Financial Institutions; and Tunisia. Annex 2 of the present 
report provides further details about the stakeholder groups and the interviews-.  

d.  Focus group 
Half  a  day  focus  group  discussion19  with  locally-based  civil  society  and  business 
representatives was organised during the second mission to Tunisia (March 28th, 2019). It 
complemented  and  crosschecked  information  gathered  from  desk  research  and  targeted 
stakeholder interviews.  

e.  Delphi survey 

A  Delphi  survey  was  undertaken  with  a  panel  of  82  experts,  representing  the  business 
society,  think  thanks,  financial  and  macroeconomic  analysts,  and  the  Academia.  The 
scope  of  the  survey  was  to  assess  on  the  contribution  of  the  MFA  in  achieving 

16   Further information is available in chapter 4 of the  external evaluation report and in  Annex 3 of the 

present Staff Working Document.  

17   IMF Staff Guidance Note for Debt Sustainability Analysis in Market-Access Countries, available at: 

https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/050913.pdf.  

18   See the list of completed interviews in Annex III of the external evaluation report. 
19    See the summary note from focus group discussion in Annex VIII of the external evaluation report. 

13 

 
                                                           
macroeconomic stability, easing external  financing constraints and alleviating Tunisia’s 
balance of payments and budgetary needs20.  Experts were interviewed using a structured 
questionnaire and were asked to elaborate on plausible scenario would MFA-I not have 
been available, and the potential implications. The recruitment  to  the panel  was  carried 
out with the support of the local economic experts and with the advice from DG ECFIN 
and the EU Delegation in Tunis.  

f.  Case studies 

Two in-depth  case studies on MFA-promoted reforms  were developed in the following 
areas:  (1)  social  safety  net  reforms  and  (2)  tax  policy  (and  more  specifically  “regime 
forfaitaire”).  They  were  mainly  based  on  the  desk  research,  targeted  stakeholder 
interviews and interaction of the local economic experts. 

g.  Qualitative counterfactual analysis 

A  qualitative  counterfactual  analysis  was  preferred  by  the  evaluation  team  to  a 
quantitative approach, due to the difficulties of isolating the effects of MFA from other 
interventions  (i.e. the  IMF programme, other EU interventions  and supports  from  other 
donors)  and  other  exogenous  and/or  unobservable  factors.  It  applied  a  theory-based 
approach to draw inferences regarding the role and contribution of the MFA in promoting 
macroeconomic stabilisation. Information gathered through the other methods was used 
to deduce wat might have happened in the absence of the MFA (alternative 1) and in the 
absence of the MFA + IMF assistance programmes (alternative 2).  

h.  Social Impact Analysis (SIA) 

For the Social Impact Analysis, the evaluation analysed trends of key indicators prior to, 
during and after the MFA operation: (i) wages, (ii) poverty, (iii) household expenditure, 
(iv)  employment,  (v)  unemployment,  (vi)  education,  (vii)  health.  Counterfactual 
reasoning was applied to deduce the  extent to  which the MFA operation contributed to 
the observed outcomes.  

Risks and limitations 

While  the  overall  reliability  and  validity  of  the  evaluation  is  strong,  a  number  of 
methodological limitations and challenges affected the evaluation:  

  While  generally  data  coverage  is  good,  it  is  limited  in  some  areas  of  interest 
(notably,  as  regards  social  indicators)  and  longer  time  series  are  not  always 
available to carry out robust analyses. An additional limitation relates to the lack 
of sufficient debt sustainability and fiscal statistics. 

  Another  limitation  relates  to  the  reliability  of  the  judgment  provided  by  Delphi 
experts  and  key  stakeholders,  as  some  participants  had  very  limited  awareness 
and  knowledge  of  the  MFA  operation.  Moreover,  the  time  elapsed  between  the 
first  disbursement  under  MFA-I  and  the  external  evaluation  in  question  caused 
some ‘memory loss’.    

  The  changing  economic  environment  over  an  extended  period  and  the  fact  that 
the MFA operation was implemented in parallel with IMF and other international 
support programmes also made it difficult to disentangle the impacts of the MFA 
operation  from  the  impacts  resulting  from  other  factors  (therefore  limiting  the 
counterfactual analysis).  

20   Detailed results are available in Annex IX of the external evaluation report. 

14 

 
                                                           
The Inter-Service Steering Group, as well as other staff from the Directorate-General for 
Neighbourhood  and  Enlargement  Negotiations  (DG  NEAR),  the  European  External 
Action Service (EEAS) and the EU delegation in Tunisia, actively participated in dealing 
with these challenges, including by providing missing data to the evaluators and multiple 
rounds of feedback.    

In turn, the identified risks and limitations do not put into question the overall reliability 
of  the  evaluation  analysis,  as  they  were  mitigated  by  the  fact  that  information  was 
obtained from a wide range of sources, using different evaluation techniques, alternative 
scenarios  and  multiple  rounds  of  feedback.  Therefore,  the  conclusions  reached  in  the 
evaluation can be considered as valid.  

5.  ANALYSIS AND ANSWERS TO THE EVALUATION QUESTIONS 

Evaluation Framework 

The  ex-post  evaluation  covered  five  evaluation  criteria  used  in  the  assessment  of  EU 
programmes, namely: (1) relevance, (2) effectiveness, (3) efficiency, (4) EU added-value, 
and  (5)  coherence.  The  evaluation  considered  two  additional  criteria:  (6)  social  impact 
and (7) debt sustainability. 
Answers to questions21 

Evaluation Question 1: Relevance of the operation  

To what extent were the MFA operation design and outcomes appropriate in 
relation to the outputs to be produced and the objectives to be achieved? 

1.1. To what extent can the design of the financial assistance be considered to have been 
appropriate? 

1.2. Were the amount and terms of the financial assistance provided to Tunisia adequate?  

1.3. Was the conditionality of the MFA operation appropriate in relation to the objectives 
to be achieved? 

1.4. How did the long timeline of the MFA operation affect its relevance? 
Question  1.1  Based  on  the  MFA  Decision22  and  the  Memorandum  of  Understanding23, 
the  objectives  of  the  MFA  operation  were,  essentially,  to  alleviate  short-term  external 
financing pressure and help Tunisia return to a sustainable path.  

The  overall  design  of  the  MFA  operation  was  relevant  to  its  objectives.  More 
specifically,  the  criteria  for  the  first  instalment  (ratification  of  the  MoU  and  the  IMF 
programme being on track) allowed for a swift disbursement. This was in line with the 
objective to provide short-term relief. The second and third instalments were additionally 
subject  to  the  implementation  of  several  policy  conditions,  which  provided  a  suitable 
means for encouraging structural reforms.  

Question 1.2 The amount of the EU contribution under MFA-I to Tunisia corresponded 
to circa 0.5% and 0.3% of the country’s GDP in 2015 and 2017, respectively. In absolute 

21   For more detail, please refer to chapter 5 of the external evaluation report, available at: 

https://ec.europa.eu/info/evaluation-reports-economic-and-financial-affairs-policies-and-spending-
activities_en 

22    https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1476964844762&uri=CELEX:32014D0534 
23    https://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/eu_borrower/mou/tunisia_mfa_mou_signed_en.pdf 

15 

 
 
                                                           
terms, this was the third largest MFA operation since 2000 (leaving aside the MFA I, II 
and III to Ukraine, which were of unprecedented size). There was consensus among the 
consulted stakeholders that an increase of the MFA size from initially proposed EUR 250 
mln  to  EUR  300  mln,  advocated  strongly  by  some  Member  States,  was  an  appropriate 
decision. The envelope covered 14.8% of the residual financing gap in 2015 and around 
11.3%  for  the  whole  period  2015-2016.24  The  EU  contribution,  was  considered  to  be 
appropriate (in terms of  burden sharing with  other donors) and proportional  (limited to 
the minimum necessary to achieve short-term macroeconomic stability in Tunisia).  

The  first  two  instalments  were  disbursed  in  2015  when  the  external  financing  needs  of 
Tunisia (as reassessed by the Commission25 and the IMF26 in 2014) were still growing. 
As  for  the  third  instalment  disbursed  in  2017,  it  helped  to  close  the  financing  gap 
identified  as  part  of  the  EFF  programme  agreed  with  the  IMF,  mostly  in  form  of 
replenishing Tunisia’s foreign exchange reserves. 

Regarding  the  terms  of  the  MFA  operation  of  2015-2017,  stakeholders  have 
acknowledged this coherence during the interviews. The MFA financing was provided in 
the form of EUR 300 million loan on the highly concessional terms that could not have 
been obtained on the market.  The initial  assessment of the guiding principles including 
inter,  alia,  per  capita  income  of  Tunisia,  debt  sustainability  and  poverty  level  excluded 
correctly  the  grant  component  from  the  consideration.  The  form  of  the  MFA  (entirely 
loan) was therefore deemed appropriate.  

Question  1.3  As  confirmed  by  the  civil  society  during  the  focus  group,  and  by  the  EU 
Delegation and the World Bank, the areas of MFA policy conditionality (public finance 
management,  financial  sector,  social  safety  net,  statistics,  trade  and  taxation  policies) 
covered  the  most  relevant  reform  challenges  in  Tunisia.  The  reforms  promoted  by  the 
MFA  were  found  to  be  in  line  with  the  country  priorities  and  backed  by  thorough 
analytical work conducted by DG ECFIN, which also comprised consultations with other 
donors present in Tunisia, in particular the World Bank and the IMF. 

Likewise, at the level of specific conditions, the focus of most of the conditions was also 
(highly)  relevant  with  some  emblematic  examples  such  as  the  reform  of  the  simplified 
income tax declaration system (regime forfaitaire).  In case of two particular conditions 
(namely,  the  trade  related  condition  concerning  the  approximation  of  the  industrial 
compulsory standards with  the EU  acquis, and the social  safety net  reform,  concerning 
the progress in the establishment of a unified database and targeting system based on a 
single Social Identification Number), it appears that their focus may have been too broad/ 
ambitious, albeit their relevance remained high. 

Overall,  the  focus  of  the  MFA  reforms  was  found  to  be  right.  While  some  selected 
reforms were ambitious and arguably surpassed the capacity of the Tunisian authorities, 
they  related  to  areas  were  fast  and  very  meaningful  improvements  have  been  urgently 
needed.  

The  impact  of  the  timeline  (from  proposal  to  disbursement)  of  the  operation  on  its 
relevance  (Question  1.4)  was  limited.  Overall,  despite  protracted  negotiations  and  the 
subsequent lag between 2nd and 3rd tranche, the relevance of the MFA remained high, 
given  the  prevailing  macro-economic  conditions  and  increasing  budgetary  needs  of  the 
Tunisian State, following the terrorist attacks in 2015. The objectives of macroeconomic 

24   Gap remaining after the contributions from the IMF and the World Bank. 
25     
26    https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr14362.pdf 

16 

 
                                                           
stabilisation  and  supporting  structural  reforms  were  just  as  relevant  in  2014  (when  the 
MoU  was  negotiated)  as  in  2017  (when  the  last  tranche  was  disbursed).  In  terms  of 
macroeconomic challenges, Tunisia was facing political turmoil and a regional crisis that 
affected both its balance-of-payments and fiscal situation. In terms of structural reforms, 
the MFA operation under evaluation not only supported them directly during a difficult 
period  but  also  (indirectly)  created  space  for  reforms  by  easing  the  macroeconomic 
adjustment.  These  views  have  been  confirmed  by  the  Delphi  survey  and  the  targeted 
stakeholder  interviews,  which  broadly  agreed  that  MFA  I  helped  making  the  necessary 
economic adjustment in Tunisia less harsh and abrupt. 

Evaluation Question 2: Effectiveness  

To what extent have the objectives of the MFA operation been achieved? 

2.1. To what extent has the MFA operation been effective in promoting macroeconomic 
stability, easing external financing constraints and alleviating Tunisia balance of 
payments and budgetary needs? 

2.2. To what extent has the MFA operation been effective in promoting structural 
reforms? 

Question  2.1.  In  order  to  assess  the  role  of  MFA-I  in  promoting  macroeconomic 
stability,  easing  external  financing  constraints  and  alleviating  Tunisia  balance  of 
payments  and  budgetary  needs,  the  external  evaluation  report,  at  first,  analysed  the 
developments  achieved  in  the  country,  irrespective  of  the  actual  role  played  by  the 
MFA27. Subsequently, it inferred the contribution given by the operation in question, by 
implementing two alternative counterfactual analyses (Alternative 1 and Alternative 2).  

Counterfactual analyses were based on:  

-  Literature review covering DG ECFIN and IMF documents related to the operation;  
-  Trend analysis of macroeconomic data;  
-  Scoping interviews with targeted stakeholders (DG ECFIN officials involved in design 
and  implementation  of  the  programme,  representatives  of  the  IMF,  World  Bank  and 
Tunisian institutions);  

-  Discussions with the Steering Group;  
-  Results from the Delphi survey;  
- 

Insights from local economic experts and NGOs.  

In  the  absence  of  the  MFA  (Alternative  1),  the  evidence  suggests  that  obtaining 
alternative financing from the international financial markets would have been the most 
plausible  course  of  action.  The  difference  in  the  cost  of  the  MFA  loan  versus  the  one 
obtained from the international financial markets would have oscillated around EUR 110 
mln accrued over 15  years, due to  higher interest  rates for the latter option  and shorter 
maturities  available.  From  the  debt  sustainability  perspective,  this  increase  would  not 
have been large enough to drastically change the debt burden; and in terms of the impact 
on  the  real  economy,  Tunisia  would  have  registered  a  slightly  lower  real  GDP  growth 
between 2015-2017.  

27    Please refer to section 3 of the present Staff Working Document, on the economic situation in Tunisia, 

during and immediately after the implementation of the MFA operation in question. 

17 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
Figure 5.2.1 Summary – alternative scenarios for obtaining financing had MFA I not been available (but 
with IMF support continuing) 

Source: ICF 

The hypothetical absence of both the MFA and IMF support programme (Alternative 2) 
could  have  had  far  more  severe  implications.  In  fact,  given  the  ‘catalytic  effect’  of  the 
IMF  assistance,  its  absence  could  have  also  resulted  in  the  absence  of  African 
Development Bank and World Bank budget support operations. Under this scenario, this 
would  have  resulted  in  the  absence  of  EUR  1099  mln  in  2015,  EUR  726  mln  in  2016, 
and  EUR  835  mln  in  2017,  or  circa  3.1%,  2.1%  and  2.5%  of  GDP  in  these  three 
consecutive years.  

In  this  case,  the  authorities  would  have  had  to  resort  to  few  options  including:  far  less 
concessionary lending from  bilateral  donors (Saudi  Arabia and Qatar) and international 
financial markets (with no certainty that these latter would have financed Tunisia without 
an IMF programme); and potentially some cuts of capital expenditures of limited size.  

Consequences  would  have  been  an  increase  in  the  cost  of  debt  servicing,  loss  of 
contracting power for financing from Gulf countries, and decrease in public investments, 
with a subsequent worsening of the GDP performance, inflation level and depreciation of 
Tunisian dinar.  

Question 2.2 With respect to the short and medium-term structural effects of the MFA 
operation  of  2015-2017,  we  should  distinguish  between:  progress  in  the  reform 
implementation  within  the  narrower  scope,  as  defined  in  the  text  of  the  specific  MFA 
conditions;  and  the  overall  progress  in  the  broader  sense,  as  demonstrated  by  tangible 
results achieved. In the first instance, the MFA has been broadly successful. Conditions 
related to the new banking law had the law on Central Bank made positive contributions 
and  reinforced  the  efforts  of  the  IMF.  Yet,  when  we  consider  the  broader  perspective 
(beyond the narrow definition of conditionality), progress has been considerably slower 
than expected in a number of areas including SSN reforms, trade or régime forfaitaire28, 
and there is little evidence of tangible results.  

28    The simplified income tax declaration system 

18 

 
 
 
                                                           
This,  however, has  to  be viewed in  the context of a challenging economic background, 
characterized  by  weak  institutional  capacity,  fragmented  political  landscape  and 
frequently changing governments, all of which reduced the political ownership. It should 
also be noted that the overall level of ambitiousness of the MFA conditionality package 
(as  compared  to  past  MFA  operations)  was  high,  and  so  were  the  benchmarks  for  its 
effectiveness. Therefore, this should be taken into consideration, when making an overall 
judgment on the most challenging conditions. 

Evaluation Question 3: Efficiency of the operation 

To  what  extent  did  the  MFA  operation  design  and  implementation  allow  to  carry 
out the intervention efficiently? 

3.1. In what way has the design of the MFA assistance conditioned the performance of 
the operation in respect to its costs and its objectives? 

Question  3.1  To  answer  to  this  question,  the  evaluation  primarily  focused  on  the 
ownership of the programme by the Tunisian authorities, on their capacity to reform, and 
on  the  effectiveness  of  monitoring  activities.  Flexibility  of  the  operation  to  adjust  to 
contextual changes, effectiveness of dialogue among concerned parties and visibility of 
the MFA itself were also considered. 

As assessed by some interviewed stakeholders, the sense of ownership of the MFA was 
lower  than  initially  expected  by  the  European  Commission.  One  of  the  main 
impediments was the political instability resulting from frequent changes of government, 
which  led  Tunisian  authorities  to  focus  more  on  short-term  objectives.  Some  of  the 
reduced  ownership  had  been  anticipated  by  DG  ECFIN  at  the  design  stage  of  MFA, 
leading to more contained and less ambitious conditionalities. However, the discrepancy 
between actual and expected ownership was still high, stressing the need for a better ex-
ante assessment of local capabilities and political stability for future MFA interventions 
in the country.  

The  study  team  found  some  reduced  capacity  in  some  Tunisian  institutions  exposed 
throughout  the  design  and  implementation  of  the  MFA,  which  hindered  reforms.  The 
impaired  capacity  was  partially  caused  by  budgetary  pressures  faced  by  the  local 
institutions, which led to an outflow of experienced staff. It was, moreover, amplified by 
a challenging political context (frequent changes of the governments), influential vested 
interests’ groups having often a disproportionate say in the policy discussions (i.e. some 
trade  unions),  and  by  the  design  of  some  conditions,  requiring  cross-ministerial 
collaboration, that added difficulty to the task.  

However, it is important to notice that young Tunisian institutions have operated in the 
democratic context since only several years, a very limited time to expect full adjustment 
to  materialize.  Furthermore,  it  is  also  warranted  to  recognize  that  the  level  of 
ambitiousness  of  some  of  the  MFA  reforms  was  rather  high  and  there  have  been  also 
numbers  of  other  conditions  promoted  by  alternative  donors  that  absorbed  resources  of 
the state apparatus.  

Field  missions  led  by  DG  ECFIN  staff  constituted  a  primary  tool  for  monitoring  the 
MFA  operation;  four  missions  took  place  between  the  ratification  of  the  MFA  by 
Tunisian  Parliament  in  early  2015  and  the  closure  of  the  operation.  Some  weaknesses 
were found in the coordination of the MFA on the Tunisian side, led by the Ministry of 

19 

 
 
 
Development,  Investment  and  International  Cooperation.  Nonetheless,  overall,  the 
outcomes were deemed appropriate.  

Finally, the focus group and stakeholder consultation suggested that the visibility of the 
MFA has been negligible, and limited to narrow groups of experts. Indeed, the review of 
the  visibility  of  the  operation  and  the  EU  communication  activity  indicated  scope  for 
improvement. Being this evidence largely in line with the findings from other past MFA 
evaluations, the European Commission (EC) decided to improve the visibility and public 
understanding  of  all  MFA  programmes.  To  his  end,  since  mid-2014,  the  EC  started  to 
publish on the web site of DG ECFIN the Memoranda of Understanding that lay down 
the reform measures related to each MFA operation.  

Evaluation Question 4: EU added-value of the operation 

What  was  the  rationale  for  an  intervention  at  EU  level?  To  what  extent  did  the 
MFA  operation  add  value  compared  to  other  interventions  by  other  international 
donors? Did the operation actually lead to the expected impacts and added-value of 
international cooperation and what can be learnt for future operations? 

4.1. To what extent have the expected benefits of the EU intervention been attained? 

4.2.  What  is  the  value  resulting  from  the  EU  assistance,  which  is  additional  to  the 
assistance, obtained at other levels (IMF, other donors)? 

4.3.  To  what  extent  has  the  sharing  of  roles  between  the  European  Commission  (DG 
ECFIN and other DGs), the IMF, Member States and others contributed to optimise the 
impact of the assistance? 

Question  4.1  The  EU  intervention  primarily  lead  to  financial  benefits  for  the  Tunisian 
economy,  with  the  highly  concessional  terms  of  the  MFA  loans  granting  fiscal  savings 
for  the  local  government  and  a  gradual  adjustment  of  the  primary  public  deficit.    The 
financial  added-value  of  MFA  operations  also  derives  from  the  fact  that  the  EU  could 
mobilise  and  coordinate  a  wider  amount  of  resources,  as  compared  to  any  other 
individual donor country. Moreover, MFA included conditions on SSN reforms, granting 
a  politically  reinforcing  effect  that  contributed  to  the  sustained  mobilisation  of  local 
authorities around this reform area.  

Question  4.2  In  certain  reform  areas,  MFA  added  additional  endorsement  to  the 
reforms driven by the IMF (i.e. financial sector) and the World Bank (i.e. SSN reforms). 
It  was  justified  to  give  those  reform  further  push,  given  their  importance  and  the 
historical delays in their progress.  In a context of political transition marked by limited 
capacity  of  Tunisian  institutions,  it  has  been  also  crucial  from  a  donors’  coordination 
point of view that both priorities set and the number of reform areas promoted across all 
donors remain manageable (to avoid overwhelming the young Tunisian institutions). 

There were also areas where MFA conditions promoted reforms that were not addressed 
by other donors.  In  three areas  (statistics,  public finance management and trade), MFA 
conditions provided further leverage to reform efforts promoted under some EU budget 
support  operations.  Furthermore,  in  the  case  of  the  simplified  income  tax  declaration 
system  (regime  forfaitaire),  the  MFA-I  was  the  only  instrument  promoting  related 
reforms.  

Question 4.3 The level of coordination with the international donor community was 
considerable  and it proved to be  crucial for  achieving faster and  more effective results. 
There has been a high degree of reform interdependence/ cross-conditionality, especially 

20 

 
 
in the areas of SSN and financial sector. As such, the MFA gave additional leverage for 
the  advancement  of  reforms  seen  as  key  at  the  EU  and  international  level,  but  where 
progress was not materializing fast enough.  

Evaluation Question 5: Coherence of the operation  

To what extent was the MFA operation  in line with  key principles, objectives and 
measures taken in other EU external actions towards Tunisia? 

Over  the  period  2013-2017,  EU  deployed  a  total  of  EUR  388  million  to  Tunisia,  via 
budget support programmes. While all types of aid are coherent elements of the broader 
support provided to Tunisia, only budget support type of assistance is meant to stabilize 
the  macro-economic  situation  while  encouraging  the  reform  process.  The  most  sizable 
budget support programmes implemented in Tunisia are known as Programmes d’Appui 
à  la  Relance  (PARs),  which  are  general  budget  support  programmes  running  for  a 
maximum of two years, to which the EU contributed in a grant form.  

Since  2011,  there  has  been  five  consecutive  PARs,  under  which  disbursements  were 
conditional upon pre-agreed reform progress29. Over the five programmes, the conditions 
covered  a  wide  range  of  areas,  including:  (i)  transparency,  democratic  participation, 
justice and the fight against corruption, (ii) public finance, (iii) regional disparities, (iv) 
unemployment and social inclusion, (v) micro-finance, and (vi) economic growth.  

Figure 5.5.1 MFA I and PARs conditionalities – mapping 

MFA-I Conditionality 

PARs 

Tax reform- regime 
forfaitaire (adoption of a 
decree) 

Not covered by PAR programmes.  
NB: PAR 4 – it had only some policy implementation conditions in relation to tax 
administration reform (set up of a Large Taxpayer Unit). 

PAR conditions pre-dating MFA-I and pursuing the same aims: 
PAR 1: Policy implementation conditions on definition of selection criteria which 
could be used to determine access to social programmes (with an aim to increase the 
coverage and targeting of those programs). 

PAR conditions pre-dating MFA-I and pursuing the same aims: 
PAR 2: Policy implementation condition (adoption of a circulaire) on setting up an 
integrated database gathering information on the beneficiaries of all social 
programmes (with an aim to track beneficiaries and improve targeting of the 
programmes). 

All PARs had some policy implementation conditions / indicators in relation to 
the financial sector – however in relation to different sub-areas than MFA-I 
(mostly in relation to public banks, prudential issues and microfinance). 

SSN - households survey 

SSN – database / cash 
transfer support 
programme 

Financial sector- New 
Central Bank Law 
(submission to 
Parliament) 
Financial sector- New 
Banking Law (submission 
to Parliament) 

29    In addition, to be eligible for the budget support programmes, the following eligibility criteria need to 

be met: 

       (i) a well-defined national or sectorial development or reform policy and strategy; (ii) a stable 
macroeconomic framework; (iii) good public financial management or a credible and relevant 
programme to improve it; (iii) transparency and oversight of the budget (budget information must be 
made publicly available). 

21 

 
 
 
                                                           
Statistics - Adoption of a 
national chart of public 
statistics  

PAR conditions post-dating MFA-I and pursuing the same aims: 
PAR 4: Policy implementation condition linked to adoption of the Statistics Law by 
Council of Ministers + variable tranche indicators on availability/ quality of statistics 
and staffing levels.  

PFM – external audit - law 
on the Cour des Comptes 
(Submission to 
Parliament) 

Trade –  
ACAA/ technical 
regulations/ 
market surveillance 

PAR conditions pre-and post-dating MFA-I and pursuing the same aims: 
PAR 1/2: Policy implementation condition related to publication of reports produced 
by CdC for the years 2005 to 2009; 
PAR 4: Policy implementation condition linked to adoption of the law on the Cour 
des Comptes by the Parliament (not met, waivered) + adoption of Organic Budget 
Law (which inter alia tasks the CdC with the realization of performance audits);  
PAR 5: Particular prior condition on the adoption of the Organic Budget Law + two 
variable tranche indicators on audit modernization by CdC. 

Not covered in PAR programmes. 
Some related measures in the PAC and PACE sector budget support programmes on 
trade facilitation. 

MFA  conditions  often  complemented  the  reform  package  associated  with  the  IMF’s 
arrangements  with  beneficiary  countries,  as  well  as  those  related  to  the  World  Bank 
support programmes. There were two main areas with synergies among  donors, namely 
financial sector and SSN. Some cases of cross-conditionality at same or different points 
in time can be observed: 

  For instance, in the case of the development of a unified database (MFA Action 2 
and,  implicitly  6  on  SSN),  the  IMF  introduced  similar  condition  calling  for  an 
“establishment  of  a  databank  on  vulnerable  households”  as  from  the  beginning  of 
the  EFF  programme  (in  June  2016).  The  World  Bank  was  providing  a  crucial 
technical assistance in parallel. 

  When  it  comes  to  the  cash  transfer  support  programme  to  compensate  vulnerable 
households  affected  by  the  reform  of  the  energy  price  subsidies,  while  the  MFA 
called  for  the  adoption  or  reinforcement  of  such  programme  (Action  6),  the  IMF 
required  the  “submission  to  the  Council  of  Ministers  of  a  new  targeted  household 
support programme to accompany the reform of the generalized energy subsidies”, 
from the beginning of the SBA until the fourth review30. 

 

In relation to the central bank law, the IMF had among its structural benchmark in 
its 1st and 2nd review (May 2014) the “Submission to the CBT board of the draft of 
the new central banking law in line with best international practices” while the EU 
had for the 2nd tranche of the MFA (disbursed in December 2015) the condition that 
the central banking law meant to be submitted to the Parliament. 

In other reform areas, there was more of a split of roles.  

  For example, investment  climate was an  area addressed by both  IMF and WB but 

not by MFA-I31.  

 

IMF focused on several aspects of PFM reforms while the MFA focused exclusively 
on external audit and the World Bank on transparency and public procurement. 

30    The plan of setting up a new programme was abandoned meanwhile. 
31    It is addressed under MFA-II, under labour market. 

22 

 
 
                                                           
  Tax reform was also widely addressed by the IMF (in relation to the Large Taxpayer 
Unit  for  instance)  but  there  was  nothing  specifically  on  the  regime  forfaitaire32  in 
IMF programmes. 

At the level of specific conditions, the desk research and the interviews with the World 
Bank and the IMF concluded that there may have been five specific conditions where the 
EU  was  the  sole  promoter  of  the  reforms,  namely:  the  condition  related  to  the  regime 
forfaitaire and the external audit (CdC); discrete pieces of broader reforms promoted by 
the IMF and WB; the two trade related conditions; and the condition on statistics. 

Overall,  it  can  be  stated  that  the  MFA  was  aligned  with  the  broad  policy  framework 
guiding  EU-Tunisia 
relations,  either  complementing  or  strengthening  parallel 
programmes  and  boosting  the  effectiveness  of  simultaneous  international  interventions. 
Notwithstanding  the  original  intention  of  reducing  as  much  as  possible  cross-
conditionality  with  IMF/WB,  the  evaluation  proved  the  choice  of  stressing  further  on 
already  tackled  conditions  to  be  a  successful  one  in  view  of  its  systemic  effect.  The 
finding is deemed relevant also for future interventions.  

Evaluation Question 6: Social impact of the operation  

What was the social impact of the MFA operation? 

6.1.  Which  were  the  direct  effects  of  MFA  conditionalities  on  the  social  situation  in 
Tunisia? 

6.2. Which have been the indirect effects of MFA operations on government policies and 
economic stability (as explored in the counterfactual analysis)? 

Question  6.1  The  direct  effects  of  the  MFA-I  stem  from  the  conditionalities  on  SSN 
outlined  in  the  Memorandum  of  Understanding.  The  analysis  found  that  increases33  in 
monthly  disbursements  of  the  existing  social  security  system,  the  Programme  national 
d'aide  aux  familles  nécessiteuses  (PNAFN),  coupled  with  the  expanding  household 
coverage  of  this  policy  are  likely  to  have  compensated  households  for  the  reduction  in 
energy  subsidies  on  average.  This  finding  is  predicated  on  evidence  of  consumer  fuel 
price increases, which have been relatively modest34. However, given the shortfalls in the 
targeting  of  PNAFN,  there  is  no  guarantee  that  vulnerable  households  have  been 
receiving 
is 
operationalized  and  used  to  implement  well-designed  policies,  the  targeting  is  likely  to 
remain fundamentally weak. 

the  support  required.  Indeed,  until 

the  social  security  database 

Question  6.2  The  indirect  effects  of  the  MFA  operation  to  Tunisia  can  be  defined  as 
those effects which stem, more broadly, from wider macroeconomic stability. 

Unemployment, although lower than rates observed during the crisis, was still stubbornly 
high  by  the  end  of  2018,  especially  among  women  and  recent  graduates.  Inflation  has 
also been following an upwards trajectory since 2000, and spiked at 7.8% in June 2018. 
Unless addressed, this could have considerable implications for the affordability of key 
household commodities and living standards.  

32    The simplified income tax declaration system 
33    Monthly disbursements increased from 56.7 dinars to 115 dinars in 2014, and again to 150 dinars in 

2015. 

34    Average consumer price inflation for electricity, gas and other fuels was 2.3% over 2010-2018 (1.9% 

over 2015-2018). 

23 

 
 
                                                           
A counterfactual analysis was performed to formulate a view of what the social situation 
might have been in the absence of MFA operation, together with the IMF support. This 
analysis  was based on inputs from  various key  stakeholders from Tunisian government 
departments and international institutions, such as IMF and the World Bank. 
The  analysis  suggested  that,  if  MFA  was  not  provided  but  IMF  support  continued,  the 
indirect effects on the social situation in Tunisia would have been limited. Having access 
to  international  markets,  Tunisia  would  likely  have  been  able  to  replace  the  missing 
funds through a variety of domestic and international sources. Changes to fiscal policy, 
including  public  sector  pay  and  employment,  would  probably  not  have  occurred  under 
this scenario, and the public sector wage bill was expected to remain roughly unchanged. 
Impacts  to  the  social  situation  would  therefore  have  come  through  direct  channels, 
namely the MoU conditions related to the social safety net. 

If  both  MFA  and  IMF  support  were  revoked,  then  this  would  have  presented  an 
exceptionally  challenging  situation  for  the  Tunisian  authorities,  likely  triggering  a 
national  crisis.  Tunisia  would  probably  have  borrowed  from  bilateral  donor  countries 
such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia. The rising debt, cuts in public spending and destabilized 
economy would have had repercussions on the Tunisian labour market and threatened the 
living standards of local citizens. 

Evaluation Question 7: Public Debt Sustainability of the operation  

What was the impact of the MFA operation on public debt sustainability? 

7.1  To  what  extent  has  the  MFA/IMF  assistance  contributed  to  returning  the  fiscal 
situation of Tunisia to a sustainable path over the medium to longer-term? 

Question 7.1 The external evaluation assessed the contribution of the EU’s MFA to the 
sustainability of Tunisia’s public debt, relying on a counterfactual analysis in which the 
possible  paths  of  the  debt  burden  indicators,  (1)  debt-to-GDP  ratio,  and  (2)  gross 
financing  need-to-GDP  ratio,  are  evaluated  and  compared  across  different  scenarios. 
Specifically, the evaluation compared: 

-  what concretely happened (the baseline scenario); 

-  what  would  have  happened  without  the  MFA  operation  but  with  the  IMF 

programme still in place (Alternative 1: no MFA scenario); and 

-  what  would  have  happened  without  either  the  MFA  operation  or  the  IMF      

programme (Alternative 2: no MFA and no IMF scenario).  

The  analysis  highlighted  that,  if  Tunisia  had  not  received  MFA  funding  but  retained 
access to the IMF’s rescue programme (Alternative 1), debt sustainability is unlikely to 
have been adversely affected because there would not have been large changes in many 
of the variables which affect debt dynamics and sustainability. The most likely outcome 
would  have  involved  the  government  replacing  the  MFA  funds  by  borrowing  from 
international  financial  markets,  leading  to  an  increase  in  debt  due  to  the  higher  cost  of 
borrowing from financial markets compared to the MFA’s concessional rates. That said, 
because the MFA was relatively small in the absolute amount, this increase in debt would 
not  have  been  large  enough  to  drastically  change  the  evolution  of  the  debt  burden 
indicators.  

The Alternative 2, under which Tunisia receives neither the EU’s MFA nor IMF funding, 
had  the  potential  for  more  serious  consequences  for  debt  sustainability.  The  IMF’s 

24 

 
 
 
 
involvement in providing financial assistance to countries tends to attract other donors. A 
likely outcome, therefore, of Tunisia not having access to the MFA and IMF programmes 
is that other multilateral and bilateral donors would not have intervened, with the result 
being  increased  risks  to  Tunisia’s  debt  sustainability  and  its  economy  more  generally. 
Many of these donors tend to rely on an IMF programme being in place to ascertain that 
a recipient country is undertaking the necessary reforms.  

Comparing  the  course  of  events  under  the  three  scenarios,  it  is  clear  that  risk  to  debt 
sustainability  is  highest  in  the  absence  of  both  MFA  and  IMF  assistance.  In  pure 
financial terms, the analysis does suggest that the MFA made a positive contribution to 
Tunisia's debt sustainability. Moreover, the provision of EU MFA is likely to have also 
helped  spur  additional  support  from  other  sources,  over  and  above  the  financial 
contribution of the MFA itself. 

6.  CONCLUSIONS 

In  May  2014,  the  European  Parliament  and  Council  adopted  a  first  Macro-Financial 
Assistance (MFA) operation of EUR 300 million to support Tunisia. The EU agreed on 
this operation to support the country in addressing a growing balance-of-payment crisis, 
which was triggered by the economic and political transition that followed on the 2011 
Arab  spring  revolution.  The  operation  was  disbursed  in  full,  in  three  tranches  over  the 
period May 2015 and July 2017. 

This  Staff  Working  Document  is  based  on  an  external  ex-post  evaluation  by  ICF,  in 
collaboration with  Cambridge Econometrics35, which covered the relevance, efficiency, 
effectiveness,  coherence,  and  EU  value  added  of  this  MFA.  It  also  explored  the  social 
impact  of  MFA  and  its  effect  on  Tunisia’s  public  debt  sustainability.  Limitations 
encountered relate predominantly to data coverage in some areas (social indicators), the 
changing economic environment over the extended period during which the MFA-I was 
implemented,  and  the  fact  that  MFA-I  was  implemented  in  parallel  with  other  EU  and 
international  support  programmes  (making  it  somewhat  difficult  to  disentangle  the 
impact of the MFA operation specifically). Nevertheless, these limitations do not put into 
question  the  overall  reliability  of  the  evaluation  analysis  as  they  were  mitigated  by  the 
wide  range  of  sources,  the  use  of  different  evaluation  techniques,  alternative  scenarios 
and multiple rounds of feedback.   

The  evaluation  found  that  the  MFA-I  was  relevant  in  terms  of  its  objectives,  form 
(loans), timing (notwithstanding delays in the third disbursement) and design. The size of 
the  envelope  (300  million  EUR)  was  deemed  meaningful,  but  not  critical,  especially  if 
compared to the budget assistance provided by the World Bank and IMF over the same 
period.  

MFA  policy  conditionality  covered  the  most  relevant  reform  challenges  in  Tunisia, 
namely: (i) taxation, (ii) public finance management, (iii) social safety net, (iv) financial 
sector, (v) public statistical  system  and (vi) trade.  Particularly satisfactory proved to  be 
the  introduction  of  a  simplified  income  tax  declaration  system  (régime  forfaitaire),  as 
well  as  the  progress  achieved  in  the  area  of  public  finance  management,  where  MFA 
policy  conditionality  supported  the  adoption  of  an  Organic  Law  of  Cour  des  Comptes, 

35    Ex-post evaluation of the first Macro-Financial Assistance operation in Tunisia over the period 2014-
2017, available at:  https://ec.europa.eu/info/evaluation-reports-economic-and-financial-affairs-
policies-and-spending-activities_en 

25 

 
 
                                                           
strengthening  the  external  audit  of  public  accounts  and  ensuring  the  financial 
independence of the Court. Some difficulties have been encountered in the field of social 
safety  net  (SSN)  and  trade  reforms.  SSN  reform  has  been  technically  complex  and 
logistically challenging. It tackled a long-lasting problem that required a considerable in-
house expertise at the Ministry of Social Affairs, close coordination across donors on the 
ground,  and  the  successful  completion  of  a  number  of  sequential  tasks  with  some 
conditioning the progress of others. Similarly, the trade reform relating to advancing with 
the process of converting the existing system of industrial compulsory standards (normes 
homologuées)  into  a  system  aligned  with  that  of  the  EU  also  proved  ambitious,  given, 
inter alia, its technical  complexity and the reduced capacity of the Tunisian institutions 
involved in its implementation.   

These findings highlight the need for designing reforms in a way that secures achievable 
and  sustainable  results,  taking  into  account  the  challenges  faced  by  the  still  young 
Tunisian  institutions  in  terms  of  administrative  capacity  and  the  context  of  political 
instability  that  can  delay  the  implementation  of  reforms.  The  European  Commission 
managed  to  mitigate  part  of  these  risks  affecting  the  efficiency  of  the  operation.  It 
designed reform  actions  that were ambitious,  yet achievable and realistic within a two-
year implementation period, fostering a constant dialogue with the concerned parties and 
adjusting to contextual changes. 

The  MFA  was  deemed  coherent  with  the  broad  policy  framework  guiding  the  EU-
Tunisia relations. There is a high degree of consistency in a number of reform areas for 
budget  support  programmes  and  MFA  conditionality.  There  is  also  a  high  level  of 
coherence and continuity between this and the subsequent MFA operation. Finally, as far 
as  external  coherence  is  concerned,  the  MFA  not  only  contributed  to  ‘burden  sharing’ 
with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other donors in financial terms, but also 
reinforced reforms promoted by the IMF and World Bank (WB) through the use of cross 
conditionality  and  complementary  conditions.  Notwithstanding  the  original  intention  of 
reducing  cross-conditionality  with  the  IMF/WB,  the  evaluation  proved  the  choice  of 
stressing key reform areas, even if already tackled elsewhere, as a successful one in view 
of  their  systemic  effects.  Similar  considerations  are  encouraged  for  possible  future 
interventions.  

The evaluation found that MFA-I was effective in helping to improve Tunisia’s balance-
of-payments situation, as well as supporting fiscal consolidation and structural reforms. 
The MFA covered around 11.3% of the residual financing gap for the whole period 2015-
2016 and increased confidence in the Tunisian economy (by decreasing the market-based 
financing cost, as well as by helping to stabilise the national currency). 

Apart from contributing to the sustained mobilisation of local authorities around specific 
(sometimes  new,  as  was  the  case  for  the  regime  forfaitaire)  reform  areas,  the  EU’s 
added-value primarily concerned the financial benefits granted to the Tunisian economy, 
with  the  highly  concessional  terms  of  the  MFA  loans  allowing  for  fiscal  savings  and  a 
more  gradual  adjustment  of  the  primary  public  deficit  (thereby  avoiding  a  more 
disruptive budgetary adjustment path). The financial added-value of MFA operations also 
derives  from  the  fact  that  the  EU  could  mobilise  and  coordinate  a  wider  amount  of 
resources, as compared to any other individual donor country.  

A counterfactual analysis of what the social situation might have been in the absence of 
MFA  suggested  that,  if  MFA  was  not  provided  but  IMF  support  continued,  the  broad 
effects  on  unemployment,  public  sector  wage  and  fiscal  policy  in  Tunisia  would  have 

26 

 
been  limited.  On  the  contrary,  MFA  had  more  impact  through  direct  channels,  namely 
the specific MoU conditions relating to social safety net. The positive impacts registered 
also  stem  from  the  strong  coordination  and  complementarity  existing  between  MFA’s 
and  IMF’s  interventions.  This  finding  highlights  the  need  for  further  coordination  with 
MFA and IMF conditionality on social impact issues, to take advantage of their positive 
systemic effects.  

Finally, the evaluation found that the MFA-I had a positive effect on the sustainability 
of  Tunisia’s  public  debt  and  enabled  fiscal  savings.  The  fiscal  savings  resulted  from 
very  favourable  financial  conditions  of  the  MFA  operation  and  helped  to  smooth 
Tunisia’s  adjustment  path  and  create  fiscal  space  for  reforms  and  sustained  social 
spending.  However,  given  its  relatively  limited  size,  in  the  absence  of  the  MFA, 
Tunisia’s debt sustainability is unlikely to have been significantly adversely affected.  

In  conclusion,  MFA-I  was  relevant  to  support  Tunisia's  economic  recovery  after  the 
Jasmine Revolution in 2011 and the ensuing political transition, providing fiscal savings 
and  financial  benefits,  as  well  as  boosting  private  sector  confidence.  The  MFA 
conditionality package was fully aligned with the related IMF programme and created a 
politically  reinforcing  effect  that  contributed  to  the  mobilisation  of  local  authorities 
around  crucial  reforms,  even  in  areas  not  covered  by  other  international  donor 
programmes.  

27 

 
 
Annex 1: Procedural information 

A1.1 Organisation, design and timing 

The ex-post evaluation assessed the EUR 300 million MFA operation in Tunisia, which 
was approved in 2014 and implemented between 2015-2017. The assessment was in line 
with article 34(1) of the Financial Regulation36 and the relevant MFA Decision37, which 
required  the  European  Commission  to  submit  an  ex-post  evaluation  report  to  the 
European  Parliament  and  the  Council.  The  objective  of  the  evaluation  was  to  draw 
lessons  with  respect  to  the  EU’s  financial  assistance,  in  particular  the  design  and 
implementation  of 
to  achieving 
macroeconomic  stabilisation  and  fostering  structural  reforms.  Apart  from  identifying 
areas of improvement for similar on-going or future possible interventions, the evaluation 
also  aimed  at  ensuring  better  transparency  and  accountability  of  the  Commission’s 
activities.  

the  programme  and 

it  contributed 

the  way 

The  evaluation  looked  at  various  aspects  of  this  particular  EU  intervention  (relevance, 
effectiveness,  efficiency,  EU  added-value,  coherence  with  other  EU  policies  towards 
Tunisia, social impact and the impact on the sustainability of Tunisia’s public debt).  In 
order to ensure validity, the analysis and conclusions are based on the evidence obtained 
using  several  evaluation  methods  (documentary  review,  macroeconomic  data  analysis, 
targeted  stakeholder  interviews,  case  studies,  focus  groups,  qualitative  counterfactual 
analysis, a Delphi survey and a Social Impact analysis). 

The lead DG to  carry out  and manage this evaluation  has been the Directorate General 
for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN). DG ECFIN chaired the ISG that was 
set  up  to  manage  the  evaluation.  Apart  from  DG  ECFIN,  the  ISG  comprised  of 
representatives  of  other  Commission  services  (the  Secretariat  General  and  the 
Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations) and the EEAS. 

The indicative roadmap for the ex post evaluation of MFA for Tunisia was published in 
June  201838.  In  the  context  of  the  framework  contract  for  the  provision  of  evaluation 
services related to MFA programmes, on the 4th of March 2016 the Commission awarded 
the  specific  contract  to  undertake  the  external  evaluation  to  Consortium  ICF  (ICF 
Consulting Services Ltd. and Cambridge Econometrics Ltd.).   

A kick-off meeting, where the ISG and the external contractor discussed the deliverables 
and  the  evaluation  methods,  took  place  in  September  2018.  This  was  followed  by 
meetings  on  the  inception  and  interim  reports  in,  respectively,  December  2018  and 
March 2019. The draft final report was submitted in July 2019 with updates provided for 
a  final  version  approved  in  October  2019.  In  addition  to  meetings,  ISG  members  were 
continuously informed and consulted (via email and by phone) during the evaluation. The 
work of the external contractor was complemented by internal analysis from Commission 
services. 

36    https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32018R1046 
37    https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1476964844762&uri=CELEX:32014D0534 
38    https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/1812-Ex-post-evaluation-of- 

macro-financial-assistance-to-Tunisia 

28 

 
                                                           
Annex  2:  Stakeholder  consultation  strategy,  including  summary  of 
results 

The stakeholder consultation strategy was developed with the overall objective to collect 
factual  information  and  opinions  on  various  aspects  of  the  MFA  operation  in  Tunisia, 
structured  around  the  main  evaluation  criteria.  It  was  designed  to  capture  as  much 
relevant  information  as  possible  with  regard  to  the  MFA  operation  in  addition  to  the 
information  collected  through  key  documentation  review,  interviews  with  targeted 
stakeholders and data analysis.  

The  consultation  was  developed  in  line  with  the  Better  Regulation  Guidelines  on 
stakeholder consultation39 and it focused on (i) extracting recollections from the period in 
which the operation was designed and implemented, and also (ii) on collecting views on 
the period after the MFA had ended, to assess its impact and sustainability.  

Consultation tools were tailored to each targeted stakeholder group to collect information 
most  appropriate  to  their  knowledge  and  associated  with  different  aspects  of  the  MFA 
operation in Tunisia. As for primary data collection activities, these principally included: 
(1) a Delphi survey;  (2) depth interviews with key (EU and Tunisian) stakeholders; (3) 
(internal and external) workshops; and (4) a focus group with civil society organisations 
and other non-governmental stakeholders (based in Tunisia). 

A2.1 Mapping of stakeholder groups 

Consultation was targeted to specialists – either people who have been closely involved 
in  the  development  and/or  the  implementation  of  the  MFA-I  operation  or  people  with 
expert  knowledge  in  the  areas  related  to  the  objectives  of  the  MFA-I  operation  (i.e. 
macroeconomic  and  fiscal  policy,  structural  reforms  in  the  areas  of  public  finance 
management, social policy, trade and statistics. 

In turn, three core stakeholder groups were identified as relevant: (1) the EU side; (2) the 
Tunisian side; and (3) the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) / donor community.  

In  total,  close  to  100  people  were  consulted  through  a  Delphi  survey,  depth  interviews 
and a focus group. 

                   Figure A2.1 Relevant stakeholder groups  

EU side 

Tunisian side 

IFIs & the donor community 

European Commission 

Tunisian public authorities 
and other public entities 
involved in the 
implementation of the MFA 

IMF 

Member States and EU citizens 

Civil society organizations  World Banks 

Council of the EU, European 
Parliament 

Businesses and their 
representatives 

Other IFIs 

39    https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-making-process/planning-and-proposing-law/better-regulation-why-

and-how/better-regulation-guidelines-and-toolbox_en 

29 

 
 
 
                                                           
Businesses and their 
representatives 

Media 

Civil society organizations 

Bilateral and Multilateral Donors 

Media, Think Thanks, 
Academics 

Think Thanks and 
Academics 

A2.2 Methods and tools for engaging with stakeholders 

A2.2.1 Delphi Survey 
The Delphi Survey seek to  establish views on the role and  contribution  of the MFA in 
achieving macroeconomic stability, easing external financing constraints and alleviating 
Tunisia’s balance of payments and budgetary needs. Responses gathered from the Delphi 
panel  fed  into  the  analysis  of  the  relevance,  effectiveness,  and  efficiency  of  the  MFA 
operation as well as the debt sustainability and social impact analyses.  

The Delphi Survey was carried out on the basis of structured questionnaires. Specifically, 
participants were asked to elaborate on the plausible scenario(s) had (i) the EU MFA, or 
(ii) the joint  MFA-IMF  action not  been implemented. As mentioned above, the Survey 
also  covered  aspects  relating  to  the  role  of  the  MFA  operation  in  promoting  structural 
reforms and their social impacts. 

A2.2.2 In-depth interviews 
The  evaluator  conducted  intensive  (individual)  interviews  with  key  stakeholders.  An 
important  aim  of  these  targeted  interviews  was  to  explore  selected  stakeholders’ 
perspectives  on  the  MFA  operation  in  Tunisia.  Specifically,  detailed  information  was 
gathered  on 
its  design  and 
implementation, perceived / realised impact(s), notably its effectiveness in driving reform 
and  /  or  macroeconomic  stability,  its  ‘added-value’  when  compared  to  other/similar 
support, and potential future improvements.  

including  (but  not  restricted 

the  operation, 

to): 

The  objective  was  to  interview  various  officials  and  representatives  of  the  European 
Commission,  Tunisian  national  authorities  (and  other  public  entities  involved  in  the 
implementation of the operation) and the wider donor community. Additional interviews 
were conducted with representatives of the business community, the research sphere and 
the  general  population  (notably  in  the  recipient  country).  Officials/representatives  who 
were  still  or  no  longer  in  employment  with  the  relevant  institutions  were  targeted,  to 
ensure the consultation of stakeholders still closely involved in the MFA operation. 

A2.2.3 Focus group 
A half-day focus group discussion with a wider group of non-government / private sector 
representatives, based in Tunisia, was organised.  

The aim of the focus group was to capture additional insights, perspectives, and thoughts 
in  relation  to  the  MFA  operation  in  Tunisia.  The  discussion  was  steered  to  specific 
topics, including (but not restricted to): 

30 

 
A. Confidence-boosting effects associated with the MFA;  

B. The  political/operational-reinforcing  effect  of  EU/MFA  support  (e.g.  whether 
EU/MFA support influenced domestic political will, accelerated reforms  or resulted 
in a shift in emphasis, etc.); 

C. The effects of the MFA reforms (e.g. what benefits have materialised as a result of 

the MFA reforms undertaken by Tunisia);  

D. Relevant benchmarking of the MFA with the IMF and WB operations.  

A2.2.4 Stakeholder validation workshop 
A half-day validation workshop was organised, with relevant EC officials, Member State 
representatives,  Tunisian  authorities  and  selected  IFIs  and  donors.  Video-conferencing 
facilities  were  provided  to  allow  Tunisian  stakeholders  (and  other  stakeholders  if 
necessary) to attend virtually.  

assess 

and  validate 

A  primary  objective  of  the  workshop  was  to  bring  together  selected  stakeholders  to 
and 
critically 
recommendations.  The  workshop took  place at  the Draft Final Report stage. Workshop 
materials were shared with participants prior to the workshop to allow them to familiarise 
themselves with the content, thereby enabling a more informed / interactive discussion on 
the day. 

conclusions 

emerging 

findings, 

initial 

31 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex 3: Methods and data sources 

An evaluation matrix was developed to guide the choice and design of specific research 
methods,  as  well  as  to  provide  a  framework  for  subsequent  data  analysis  and 
interpretation.  The  table  below  provides  a  high-level  overview  of  the  data  collection 
methods  and  analytical  techniques  that  were  used  to  address  each  evaluation  criteria. 
Further details are provided in the sub-sections that follow.  

Table A3.1 Overview of the methods and techniques used for the evaluation 

Relevance  Effectiveness  Efficiency  Coherence 

EU 
added 
value 

●●● 

●●● 

●●● 

●●● 

●●● 

●●● 

●●● 

●● 

● 

●● 

●● 

● 

Documentary review 

Macroeconomic data 
analysis 

Key informant / 
stakeholder interviews 

Focus group discussion 

Delphi survey 

●●● 

●●● 

●●● 

● 

● 

Case studies (structural 
reforms) 

●● 

Qualitative counterfactual 
analysis 

Social impact analysis 

Debt sustainability 
analysis 

●● 

●●● 

●●● 

● 

●● 

●● 

●●● 

●●● 

●●● 

●●● a very important method for addressing the evaluation criterion 
●● an important method for addressing the evaluation criterion  
● a complementary method 

A3.1 Documentary review 

Table  A3.2  below  provides  an  overview  of  the  sources  and  types  of  documentary 
evidence  assembled  and  reviewed.  It  also  provides  an  assessment  of  the  usefulness  of 
each of the different types of documentary evidence for the evaluation.   

Table A3.2 Documentary sources of evidence for the evaluation 

Source of documentation 

Types of documentation 

European Commission, DG 
ECFIN 

-  Ex-ante assessment of the MFA 

-  Operational Assessment 

-  Commission proposal and MFA decision 

-  MoU (for MFA I and II) 

Usefulness 
for the 
evaluation 

●●● 

32 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-  Loan Agreements 

-  DG ECFIN Mission Reports 

-  Compliance statements 

-  MFA annual reports 

-  Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 

-  Multi-annual Indicative Programme 2014 - 2020 

Tunisia 

-  The EU Tunisia Neighbourhood Agreement 

-  Annual Action Programmes 

-  Selected EU Delegation publications 

-  EIB data on lending in Tunisia 

-  Letter of Intent 

-  MoU 

-  Article IV staff reports 

-  IMF reviews  

-  IMF Fiscal Monitor 

European Commission, other 
DGs and the EU Delegation 
in Tunis 

EIB 

IMF 

World Bank 

-  WB DPO implementation completion and results’ 

reports 

Other 

-  EIU Country Report 

-  Sovereign ratings reports (Moody’s) 

-  Academic and grey literature on political and 

economic developments and implementation of 
structural reforms in Tunisia 

-  Authorities’ strategies i.e. Five-Year Development 

Plan; 

-  Independent evaluations produced by Tunisian 

stakeholders (i.e. CRES and ASCETU research) 

-  Reports and data produced by other bilateral/ 

multilateral donors and IFIs including AfDB, EIB, 
EBRD, USAID and GIZ on their activities in Tunisia 

-  Selected indexes (i.e. WB Doing Business, Open 

Budget Index, EIU Democracy Index) 

-  Selected videos/podcasts on the reform progress in 

Tunisia (i.e. WB – Tunisia’s Unfinished Revolution) 

-  Selected financial and economic press (i.e. Financial 
Times, the Economist, Le Monde Diplomatique, Al 
Jazeera) 

●●● very useful ●● somewhat useful  

33 

●● 

●● 

●●● 

●● 

●●● 

 
 
 
A3.2 Macroeconomic data analysis 

Table A3.3 Key Macroeconomic Indicators and Data Sources 

Component 

Data Type 

Description 

Key data source(s) 

The Real 
Economy 

Balance of 
Payments 

The Government 

National 
accounts 

Indicators of macroeconomic  
Performance 

Ministry of Finance, IMF 

Balance of 
payments 
statistics 

Government 
finance 
statistics 

Indicators of external 
sustainability and trade 
conditions 

Indicators of the 
government’s fiscal 
sustainability (expenditure, 
budget balance, debt, tax 
revenue etc. data)  

IMF 

Ministry of Finance, IMF 
and World Bank 

The Financial 
System 

Monetary 
statistics 

Banking sector, financing 
condition, interest rates, 
foreign exchange data etc. 

Ministry of Finance, 
National Bank of Tunisia 
and IMF 

The Labour 
Market 

Other economic 
statistics 

Indicators of socio-economic 
performance 

Ministry of Finance, IMF 
and World Bank 

A3.3 Case studies 

Two  in-depth  case  studies  on  MFA  promoted  reforms  in  the  following  areas  were 
developed: (1) social safety net reforms and (2) tax policy (and more specifically “regime 
forfaitaire40”).  
The case studies addressed the following aspects: 

  The rationale behind the selection of specific MFA conditions in the above areas as 

well as the relevance and added-value of the MFA conditionality; 

  The significance of MFA conditionality in the context of the overall need for reform 

in a particular thematic area/ sector;  

  How  the  MFA  conditions  were  implemented  and  whether  the  authorities 
encountered any obstacles in  implementing these conditions  (e.g. lack of capacity, 
political or public resistance to change etc.); 

  The role and contribution of the MFA in promoting reforms including identification 

of the key ‘causal links’ 

  Short, mid and long-term benefits of the MFA conditions. 

In  addition,  the  case  studies  attempted  also  to  draw  on  some  lessons  learnt  from  the 
design and implementation of similar reforms in the past by two donors, the World Bank 
and the IMF.  

40 The simplified income tax declaration system 

34 

 
 
                                                           
The case studies were mainly based on the desk research, targeted stakeholder interviews 
and interactions of the local economic experts.  

A3.4 Focus Group with the civil society 

Table A3.4 Focus group participants 

No 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 

Organisation 
Solidar Tunisia 
University of Tunis 
Council of Economic Analysis 
Conféderation des Entreprises Citoyennes de Tunisie (CONECT) 
Institute Arabe des Chefs d’Entreprises (IACE) 
International Business and Economic Forum 
Le Manager Magazin 
Ecole Supérieure de Commerce in Tunis 

A3.5 Delphi survey 

The Delphi survey sought to establish views on the role and contribution of the MFA in 
achieving macroeconomic stability, easing external financing constraints and alleviating 
Tunisia’s  balance  of  payments  and  budgetary  needs.  In  particular,  participants  were 
asked to elaborate on plausible scenario would MFA-I not have been available, and the 
potential implications. The survey also covered aspects related to the role of the MFA-I 
operation in promoting structural reforms.  
The survey panel included 82 representatives of the following groups / institutions:  

  Business  representatives  and  financial  /  macroeconomic  analysts  from  the  private 
sector (e.g. research departments  of  commercial  banks and  credit rating  agencies); 
and  

  Researchers  from  think  tanks,  experienced  commentators  of  Tunisian  economic 
policies  (i.e.  specialized  press),  independent  fiscal  policy  experts,  and  academic 
experts.  

During the first round, 32 respondents provided the valid feedback which resulted in 40% 
response  rate.  The  first  round  of  survey  results  yielded  fairly  consistent  views  among 
respondents, thought there was still no consensus on a few aspects.   

Therefore,  a  second  round  was  conducted  among  experts  who  responded  to  the  first 
survey.  Among  32  experts  who  received  the  second-round  questionnaire,  23  responded 
resulting in 72% response rate. 

Table A3.5 Details of the Delphi Panel that were invited and responded 

Type of organisation 

Number of invitees 

Number of respondents 
in 1st round 

Number of 
respondents in 2nd 
round 

Academics  

16 

9 

8 

35 

 
 
 
 
 
Type of organisation 

Number of invitees 

Number of respondents 
in 1st round 

Number of 
respondents in 2nd 
round 

Experts (including former 
government staff or 
advisors) 

Media 

Representatives from 
business and financial 
sector 

10 

2 

32 

Research consultancy 

13 

Think tanks 

Other 

Grand total 

Source: ICF 

7 

2 

82 

5 

0 

10 

3 

5 

0 

3 

0 

7 

2 

3 

0 

32 (of which 2 partial) 

23 (of which 1 partial) 

36 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex 4: List of key MFA-I documents reviewed  

Association  Agreement  between the European Union  and the European  Atomic Energy 
Community  and  their  Member  States,  of  the  one  part,  and  Tunisia,  of  the  other  part, 
Official Journal of the European Union. 

Compliance Statements of the Government of Tunisia, 2014. 

Decision  No  534/2014/EU  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  15  May 
2014 providing macro-financial assistance to the Republic of Tunisia.  

European Commission (2015), Report on mission to Tunisia: review of compliance with 
conditions  for  2nd  tranche  of  МFА  and  possible  further  МFА  (Tunis,  31  August  -  4 
September 2015) 

European Commission (2016), Report on mission to Tunis (8-11 November 2016) 

European Commission (2017), Report on mission to Tunis (18-21 April 2017): Review 
of compliance with conditions for 3rd tranche of MFA-I; and discussions on launching of 
MFA-II 

European  Commission  DG  ECFIN  (2011a).  Proposal  for  a  Decision  of  the  European 
Parliament and of the Council providing macro-financial assistance to Tunisia. 

European  Commission  DG  ECFIN  (2011b).  Ex-ante  evaluation  statement  on  further 
macro-financial assistance to Tunisia, final. 

European Commission DG ECFIN (2013a), Ex-ante evaluation statement on EU macro-
financial assistance to the Republic of Tunisia. 

European  Commission  DG  ECFIN  (2013b),  EU-Tunisia  Macroeconomic  dialogue 
(Brussels, 12 February 2013). 

European Commission DG ECFIN (2013c), Proposal for MFA to the Republic of Tunisia 
for 2014-2015. 

European Commission DG ECFIN (2013d), Proposal for the Decision of the EP and the 
Council. Providing Macro-Financial Assistance to Tunisia.  

European Commission DG ECFIN (2014). Report on mission to Tunisia: Memorandum 
of Understanding negotiations for Macro-Financial Assistance to Tunisia. 

European  Commission  DG  ECFIN  (2014a),  Memorandum  of  Understanding  for  the 
MFA-I. 

to  Tunisia. 
European  Commission  DG  ECFIN 
Macroeconomic  Dialogue  and  launching  of  MoU  negotiations  for  Macro-Financial 
Assistance.    

(2014b),  Report  on  Mission 

European  Commission  DG  ECFIN  (2015a),  Macro-financial  assistance  to  the  Republic 
of Tunisia: disbursement of the first tranche (2015). 

European  Commission  DG  ECFIN  (2015b),  Macro-financial  assistance  to  the  Republic 
of Tunisia: disbursement of the second tranche (2015).  

European  Commission  DG  ECFIN  (2015b).  Macro-Financial  Assistance  to  Tunisia 
Disbursement of the First Tranche, Information Note to the European Parliament and the 
Economic and Financial Committee. 

37 

 
European  Commission  DG  ECFIN  (2016),  Nouvelle  opération  d'assistance  macro-
financière  (AMF-II)  de  l'UE  et  décaissement  de  la  dernière  tranche  de  l'opération  en 
cours (AMF-I). 

European  Commission  DG  ECFIN  (2017),  First  macro-financial  assistance  to  the 
Republic of Tunisia: disbursement of third tranche. 

European  Commission  DG  ECFIN  (2017a).  Macro-Financial  Assistance  to  Tunisia 
Disbursement of the Second Tranche, Information Note to the European Parliament and 
the Council. Ref. Ares(2015). 

European  Court  of  Auditors  (2017),  “Special  Report:  EU  Assistance  to  Tunisia”  No 
03/2017, Publications Office of the European Union. 

ICF  (2019)  Ex-post  evaluation  of  the  first  Macro-Financial  Assistance  operation  in 
Tunisia over the period 2014 – 2017. 

Macro-Financial Assistance for Tunisia Grant Agreement, 17.12.2014. 

Macro-Financial Assistance for Tunisia Loan Facility Agreement, 11.12.2014. 

Memorandum  of  Understanding  between  the  European  Union  as  Donor  and  Tunisia  as 
Beneficiary and the National Bank of Tunisia as Beneficiary's Financial Agent, 2014. 

38 

 
Annex 5: Timeline of the Tunisia MFA-I operation 

Date 

MFA progress 

Table A5.1 

August 2013 

Tunisian  authorities  official  request  for  Macro-Financial 
Assistance 
the  European 
addressed 
Commission (EC). 

(MFA) 

to 

MFA 
milestones 

Amount 

MFA-I request 
for assistance 

December 
2013 

The  EC  adopted  a  proposal  to  provide  up  to  EUR  the 
Commission adopted on 5 December 2013 a proposal for 
a Decision providing MFA of up to EUR 250 million to 
Tunisia in the form of loans. 

MFA-I 
proposal 

EUR 250 
million 

May 2014 

Commission non-paper proposed amending the proposal, 
notably to increase the amount of the assistance to EUR 
300 million. 

The  Parliament  and  the  Council  adopted  the  Decision 
(No.  534/2014/EU,  O.J.  L  151,  21.05.2014,  p.  9-15)  on 
15 May 2014. 

MFA-I 
decision 

EUR 300 
million 

June 2014 

Stand-By  Arrangement  (SAB)  with  the  International 
Monetary  Fund  (IMF)  approved  (USD  1.75  billion,  24-
month programme).  

August 2014 

Signature  of  Memorandum  of  Understanding  (MoU) 
outlining  the  specific  reform  criteria  attached  to  the 
assistance and Loan Facility Agreement (LFA). 

March 2015 

Ratification by the Tunisian Parliament of the MoU, LFA 
and the Grant Agreement.  

MFA-I  
MoU 

MFA-I  
Ratification 
and entry into 
force of MoU 

May 2015 

Disbursement of the first instalment of EUR 100 million, 
conditional  on  satisfactory  progress  under  the  IMF's 
SBA. 

MFA-I  
1st loan 
instalment  

EUR 100 
million 

December 
2015 

December 
2015 

2016- 2017 

following 

Disbursement  of  the  second  instalment  of  EUR  100 
million, 
the 
implementation  of  the  policy  conditionality  under  the 
MFA programme, as laid down in the MoU, and the IMF 
programme. 

satisfactory  progress  with 

MFA-I  
2nd  loan 
instalment  

EUR 100 
million 

Through  two  letters  dated  3  August  and  10  December 
2015, the Tunisian authorities requested additional MFA 
in the amount of EUR 500 million. 

MFA-II 
request 

EUR 500 
million 

Monitoring and review missions to assess the satisfactory 
 progress  of  policy  conditionality  implementation  under 
the MFA-I programme, as laid down in the MoU, as well 

MFA-I   
Review 
missions 

39 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Date 

MFA progress 

as the status of the IMF programme.  

MFA 
milestones 

Amount 

February 
2016 

On  12  February  2016,  the  Commission  adopted  a 
proposal for a second MFA operation (MFA-II) of up to 
EUR 500 million in loans 

MFA-II 
proposal 

July 2016 

Thee  decision  for  MFA-II  was  adopted  by  the  Council 
and the European Parliament on 6 July 2016.  

MFA-II 
decision 

EUR 500 
million 

April 2017 

Disbursement  of  third  and  final  instalment,  thereby 
completing the MFA-I operation. 

April 2017 

Signature  of  MFA-II  MoU  and  LFA.  Ratified  by  the 
Tunisian  Parliament  in  July  2017,  entry  into  force  in 
August 2017.  

MFA-I  
3rd loan 
instalment  

MFA-II 
MoU 

EUR 100 
million 

EUR 500 
million 

October 2017 

Disbursement of the first MFA-II instalment of EUR 200 
million,  conditional  on  satisfactory  progress  under  the 
IMF's SBA. 

MFA-II  
1st loan 
instalment 

EUR 200 
million 

40