COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying the document Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure and repealing Regulation (EU) No 347/2013
Date: 2021-01-22
Institutions: Directorate-General for Energy, European Commission
Subjects: electrical energy, electricity supply, energy cooperation, energy grid, gas supply, project of common interest, reduction of gas emissions, renewable energy, security of supply, trans-European network

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 22.1.2021  SWD(2020) 346 final/2  CORRIGENDUM This document corrects document SWD(2020) 346 final of 15.12.2020 Parts of the text revised as summarised in Annex I, point b). The text shall read as follows: COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT  IMPACT ASSESSMENT  Accompanying the document Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure and repealing Regulation (EU) No 347/2013   {COM(2020) 824 final} - {SEC(2020) 431 final} - {SWD(2020) 347 final}  
 
 
Table of Contents 

1 

INTRODUCTION: POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT ............................................................... 3 

1.1  Legal framework ............................................................................................... 3 
1.2  Benefits of the TEN-E Regulation .................................................................... 5 
1.3  Political context ................................................................................................. 6 

2 

PROBLEM DEFINITION .................................................................................................................... 7 

scale  of  cross-border 

2.1  Problem  1:  Type  and 

infrastructure 
developments  are not  fully aligned with  EU  energy policy objectives 
in  particular  as  regards  the  European  Green  Deal  and  the  climate 
neutrality objective ............................................................................................ 9 
2.2  Problem 2: Delays in project implementation ................................................. 15 
2.3  How will the problem evolve? ........................................................................ 19 
2.4  Scope of the initiative ...................................................................................... 20 

3  WHY SHOULD THE EU ACT? ........................................................................................................ 20 

3.1  Legal basis   ..................................................................................................... 20 
3.2  Subsidiarity: Necessity of EU action ............................................................... 21 
3.3  Subsidiarity: Added value of EU action .......................................................... 21 

4 

OBJECTIVES: WHAT IS TO BE ACHIEVED? ............................................................................... 21 

4.1  General objectives ........................................................................................... 21 
4.2  Specific objectives ........................................................................................... 22 

5  WHAT ARE THE AVAILABLE POLICY OPTIONS? .................................................................... 23 

5.1  What is the baseline from which options are assessed? .................................. 25 
5.2  Description of the policy options .................................................................... 26 
5.3  Options discarded at an early stage ................................................................. 35 

6  WHAT ARE THE IMPACTS OF THE POLICY OPTIONS? ........................................................... 37 

6.1  Scope 
 ..................................................................................................... 37 
6.2  Governance / Infrastructure planning .............................................................. 51 
6.3  Permitting and public participation ................................................................. 55 
6.4  Regulatory treatment ....................................................................................... 58 

7 

8 

HOW DO THE OPTIONS COMPARE? ............................................................................................ 60 

PREFERRED OPTION ...................................................................................................................... 68 

8.1  Package of preferred policy options ................................................................ 68 
8.2  REFIT (simplification and improved efficiency) ............................................ 71 

9 

HOW WILL ACTUAL IMPACTS BE MONITORED AND EVALUATED? .................................. 72 

Indicators 

9.1 
 ..................................................................................................... 72 
9.2  Operational objectives ..................................................................................... 73 

10  GLOSSARY 

 ........................................................................................................................ 74 

ANNEX 1: PROCEDURAL INFORMATION ............................................................................................ 75 

1 

 
 
ANNEX 2: STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION ....................................................................................... 82 

ANNEX 3: WHO IS AFFECTED AND HOW? .......................................................................................... 92 

ANNEX 4: ANALYTICAL METHODS ................................................................................................... 102 

ANNEX 5: EVALUATION REPORT ....................................................................................................... 104 

ANNEX 6: PCIS AND CEF FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE ....................................................................... 132 

ANNEX 7: ADDITIONAL DISCARDED OPTIONS ............................................................................... 137 

ANNEX 8: INTRODUCTION OF A MANDATORY SUSTAINABILITY CRITERION ....................... 139 

ANNEX 9: ASSESSMENT OF ADDITIONAL POLICY OPTIONS ....................................................... 140 

ANNEX 10: REFIT (SIMPLIFICATION AND IMPROVED EFFICIENCY) .......................................... 148 

2 

 
 
 
 
1 

INTRODUCTION: POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT 

1.1  Legal framework 

The  Regulation  on  trans-European  energy  networks  (TEN-E),  adopted  in  2013,  lays 
down  rules  for  the  timely  development  and  interoperability  of  trans-European  energy 
networks  in  order  to  achieve  the  energy  policy  objectives  of  the  Treaty  on  the 
Functioning  of  the  European  Union  (TFEU)1  to  ensure  the  functioning  of  the  internal 
energy  market  and  security  of  supply  in  the  Union,  to  promote  energy  efficiency  and 
energy  saving  and  the  development  of  new  and  renewable  forms  of  energy,  and  to 
promote the interconnection of energy networks. 

The TEN-E is a policy that is focused on linking the energy infrastructure  – electricity, 
natural  and  biogas,  oil,  CO2  –  of  EU  countries.  The  TEN-E  Regulation  puts  in  place  a 
framework  for  Member  States  and  relevant  stakeholders  to  work  together  in  a  regional 
setting  to  develop  better  connected  energy  networks  with  the  aim  to  connect  regions 
currently  isolated  from  European  energy  markets,  strengthen  existing  cross-border 
interconnections, and help integrate renewable energy. 

As  such,  the  TEN-E  is  a  central  instrument  in  the  development  of  an  internal  energy 
market and necessary to achieve the European Green Deal objectives. To achieve climate 
neutrality  by  2050  and  higher  levels  of  greenhouse  gas  emission  reductions  by  2030, 
Europe  will  need  a  more  integrated  energy  system,  relying  on  higher  levels  of 
electrification based on renewable sources and the decarbonisation of the gas sector2. The 
TEN-E can ensure that the EU energy infrastructure development supports the required 
energy transition.  

The  key  tools  of  the  current  TEN-E  guidelines  to  identify  and  speed  up  the 
implementation of the key infrastructure projects are to address the following problems: 
a) market and regulatory failures for cross-border energy infrastructure investments also 
due  to  asymmetric  benefits  and  costs  among  Member  States,  b)  too  strong  focus  on 
national  priorities  in  infrastructure  investments  decision  and  the  need  to  align  cross-
border infrastructure projects with European infrastructure priorities to achieve synergies, 
and  c)  insufficient  market  based  financing    to  address  the  investments  needs  in  cross-
border energy infrastructure. 

Under the TEN-E Regulation, the Commission shall ensure that a Union list of PCIs is 
established every two years. The TEN-E Regulation sets general and specific criteria for 
the  selection  of  PCIs.  PCIs  span  Member  State  borders  or,  while  remaining  within  the 
territory  of  a  single  Member  State,  address  an  important  bottleneck  with  significant 
impact  on  cross-border  trade.  Specific  selection  criteria  are  defined  for  each 
infrastructure  category  considering  specific  policy  objectives  (see  Annex  5).  While  the 
current framework includes the mid- and long-term decarbonisation objectives, it is not 
systematically  applied  to  all  candidate  PCI  projects  and  hence  limits  the  possibility  to 

1 Articles 170-172 TFEU 
2  COMMISSION  STAFF  WORKING  DOCUMENT  IMPACT  ASSESSMENT,  Stepping  up  Europe’s 
2030 climate ambition, SWD(2020) 176 final 

3 

 
                                                 
identify  projects  that  support  the  energy  transition  to  reach  the  European  Green  Deal 
objectives. 

For  electricity  and  gas  projects,  in  order  to  be  eligible  for  inclusion  in  the  PCI  list, 
projects must be part of the latest available 10-year network development plan (TYNDP). 
Every two years the European Network of Transmission System Operators (ENTSOs for 
Electricity  and  for  Gas)  establishes  first  the  system  needs  under  different  future  and 
disruption  scenarios.  Then,  a  cost-benefit  analysis  (CBA)  is  performed  for  every 
submitted project, assessing their contribution to the system needs. For smart grids, CO2 
networks and oil projects specific assessment methods are used. 

Project  promoters  submit  their  projects  for  selection  as  PCIs.  The  Regional  Groups, 
chaired  by  the  Commission  and  including  representatives  from  the  Member  States, 
transmission system operators and their European networks, project promoters, national 
regulatory  authorities, as well as the  Agency  for  the Cooperation of  Energy Regulators 
(ACER), assess the projects' contribution to implementing the priorities, the fulfilment of 
the  relevant  criteria  and  their  maturity.  Stakeholders  are  invited  to  take  part  in  these 
meetings  and  bring  their  insight  on  the  infrastructure  bottlenecks  and  on  the  candidate 
PCIs into the assessment process. The decision-making power in the Regional Groups is 
restricted to a body comprising Member States and the Commission. 

Based on this assessment, the Regional Groups propose regional lists of PCIs. Based on 
the agreed regional lists, the Commission adopts the Union list of PCIs in the form of a 
delegated  regulation.  When  doing  so,  the  Commission  ensures  compliance  with  the 
relevant criteria, cross-regional consistency, and aims for a manageable total number of 
PCIs. A Member State to whose territory a proposed project relates may not approve its 
inclusion in the PCI list. 

So far, four Union lists of PCIs have been established. The 4th PCI list  was adopted in 
2019 and entered into force in  March 2020. Since the first  PCI list  the total  number of 
PCIs  per  list  has  been  significantly  reduced  and  the  distribution  across  the  different 
sectors has changed significantly with electricity PCIs representing two thirds of the total 
number  of  projects  in  the  latest  PCI  lists.  Oil,  CO2  and  smart  electricity  grids  have 
represented a minor share (see Figure 1). 

Figure 1: Number of PCIs per infrastructure category per PCI list 

1st PCI list (2013) (n=248)

2nd PCI list (2015) (n=195)

131     

108     

3rd PCI list (2017) (n=169)

102     

109 

77 

53 

2 
6 

7 

3 

6 

4 

4 

4th PCI list (2019) (n=149)

100     

32 

6 

5 

6 

0%

25%

50%

75%

100%

Electricity

Gas

Oil

CO2

Smart grids

There  is  no  automatism  between  the  PCI  status  and  CEF  funding.  Most  PCIs  are 
expected to be commercially viable and financed through regulated network tariffs, CEF 
funding for works is considered as ‘last resort option’ for the financing of PCIs. CEF is 

4 

 
 
designed to address the gap between the socioeconomic value at regional/European level 
(such  as  security  of  supply,  innovation  and  solidarity)  and  the  commercial  viability  of 
projects. CEF promotes cooperation between countries to develop and implement energy 
interconnection  PCIs  that  otherwise  would  not  happen.  This  is  especially  the  case  for 
cross-border  projects  located  in  countries  with  smaller  population  sizes  or  in  a  more 
remote location, where energy tariffs would need to  be increased substantially to  cover 
the investment needs. 

The key elements of the TEN-E Regulation are summarised in Figure 2 and Annex 5.  

Figure 2: Key elements of the TEN-E Regulation 

1.2  Benefits of the TEN-E Regulation 

The  TEN-E  Regulation3  has  established  a  new  approach  to  cross-border  energy 
infrastructure planning. It brings together stakeholders in regional groups to identify and 
help implement projects of common interest (PCIs) that contribute to the development of 
energy infrastructure priority corridors and thematic areas.  

In  addition  to  an  effective  and  cost-efficient  approach  to  infrastructure  planning,  the 
regulation has improved the permitting procedures. It requires Member States to ensure a 
streamlined  permit  granting  process  for  PCIs  within  a  timeframe  of  3½  year  for  a 
permitting  decision.  They  are  to  receive  the  highest  national  priority  status  and  be 
included  in  national  network  development  plans.  The  regulation  also  provides  for 
regulatory assistance, rules and guidance for the cross-border allocation of costs and risk-
related  incentives,  and  provides  access  to  financing  opportunities  from  the  Connecting 
Europe Facility (CEF). 

The evaluation of the current TEN-E Regulation shows that it has effectively contributed 
to  connecting  Member  States  networks  and  removing  bottlenecks.  Market  integration 
between Member States and competitiveness have improved, as reflected in the progress 
towards the interconnection targets and the convergence of energy prices across the EU 

3 OJ L 115, 25.4.2013, p. 39-75 

5 

 
 
                                                 
(see  Annex  5  for  more  details).  The  implementation  of  electricity  PCIs  will  help  most 
Member States reach the 10% interconnection target for 2020. As a result, the EU energy 
market is more integrated and competitive than it was in 2013. The projects also enable 
the integration of renewable electricity and power exchange across borders reducing the 
need to curtailment.  

Security  of  supply,  as  one  main  driver  behind  the  current  TEN-E  Regulation,  has  been 
significantly  improved  through  PCIs.  By  the  early  2020s,  when  the  gas  PCIs  currently 
under implementation will be in operation, Europe should achieve a well-interconnected 
and shock-resilient gas grid and all Member States will have access to at least three gas 
sources or the global liquefied natural gas (LNG) market, a key element to improve the 
Union’s energy security through the diversification of gas sources.  

Since  its  adoption  in  2013,  TEN-E  enabled  the  implementation  of  over  40  key  energy 
infrastructure projects and further 75 projects are expected to be implemented by 2022. 
The  financing  support  provided  by  CEF  of  EUR  4.7  billion  in  total  enabled  the 
implementation  of  95  PCIs.  Since  2014,  CEF  has  provided  financing  to  149  actions  of 
which 114 (EUR 519 million) for studies and 35 (EUR 4.2 billion) for works. Of the total 
budget of EUR 4.7 billion, EUR 1.5 billion were allocated to gas projects and EUR 2.8 
billion  to  electricity  projects.  So  far,  around  one  fifth  of  all  PCIs  have  received  CEF 
financial assistance for studies and/or works4.  

1.3  Political context 

Achieving climate neutrality by 2050, starting with a 55% reduction in GHG emissions 
by 2030, is the key climate objective of the European Green Deal presented by the von 
der Leyen Commission in December 20195. With the current climate and energy policy 
framework,  the  EU  is  not  on  track  to  achieve  carbon  neutrality  by  mid-century.  The 
impact assessment carried out for the climate target plan estimates that full achievement 
of the currently legislated 2030 energy targets  would lead to a reduction of 60% below 
1990  by  20506.  Adopted  before  the  climate  neutrality  objective,  current  climate  and 
energy legislation is thus not sufficiently ambitious to deliver a 2030 climate target of at 
least 55% GHG emission reductions, as proposed by the Commission7.  

Energy  production  and  consumption  represent  75%  of  total  EU  GHG  emissions.  To 
achieve the 55% target and to become climate neutral by 2050 Europe needs to lower its 
energy  consumption  and  transition  to  cleaner  energy.  Energy  infrastructure  is  a  key 
enabler for the energy transition as reflected in the Commission’s communication on the 
European Green Deal and A Clean Planet for all8. Infrastructure is a long-lived asset and 
will therefore need to be consistent with the climate neutrality objective so as to enable 
rapid  and  cost-effective  decarbonisation  of  the  energy  system  and  more  broadly  the 
economy.  This  will  require  stepping  up  electrification  of  the  economy;  the  average 

4 See Annex 6 for more information. 
5 The European Green Deal, COM(2019) 640 final 
6  COMMISSION  STAFF  WORKING  DOCUMENT  IMPACT  ASSESSMENT,  Stepping  up  Europe’s 
2030 climate ambition, SWD(2020) 176 final 
7 Stepping up Europe’s 2030 climate ambition, Investing in a climate-neutral future for the benefit of our 
people, COM(2020) 562 final 
8 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52018DC0773  

6 

 
                                                 
annual investments needed for the period 2021-2030 amount to EUR 50.5 billion for the 
power grid including both the transmission and distribution networks – more than twice 
the investments in the period 2011-20209.  

Furthermore,  to  achieve  the  levels  of  renewable  energy  for  a  55%  reduction  of  GHG 
emissions  by  2030,  Europe  needs  to  significantly  scale  up  renewable  electricity 
generation. This requires investment in offshore renewable energy, which can bring the 
scale  that  is  needed.  The  Commission  adopted  an  EU  strategy  for  offshore  renewable 
energy  in  November10.  In  order  to  achieve  the  required  massive  scale  up  of  offshore 
renewable energy in the whole EU up to 2050, the strategy will also address the issue of 
coordinating  long-term  planning  and  development  of  offshore  and  onshore  electricity 
grids,  which  are  assessed  as  part  of  this  impact  assessment.  Other  on-going  policy 
initiatives of direct relevance include the revision of the TEN-T Regulation11 and the EU 
taxonomy for sustainable investments12, as well as the review of the Renewable Energy 
Directive envisaged for 2021.   

At  the  same  time,  the  Commission’s  communication  on  energy  system  integration13 
underlines the need for integrated energy infrastructure planning across energy carriers, 
infrastructures, and consumption sectors. Such system integration addresses in particular 
the  decarbonisation  needs  of  the  hard  to  abate  sectors,  such  as  industry  or  transport, 
where  electrification  can  be  technically  or  economically  challenging.  Such  investments 
include  emerging  technologies  such  as  hydrogen,  power-to-gas  which  are  progressing 
towards commercial large-scale deployment. 

Already  in  March  2019,  as  part  of  the  political  agreement  between  the  European 
Parliament and the Council on the Connecting Europe Facility for the period 2021-2027, 
the  co-legislators  agreed  that  the  Commission  should  evaluate  the  effectiveness  and 
policy  coherence  of  the  TEN-E  Regulation  and  submit  an  evaluation  to  the  European 
Parliament  and  to  the  Council  by  31  December  2020.  The  Commission  is  requested,  if 
appropriate, to accompany the evaluation by a legislative proposal for the revision of the 
guidelines.14 Stakeholders as well have called for this revision to align the TEN-E policy 
framework with the new policy context. 

2  PROBLEM DEFINITION 

An  evaluation  of  the  current  TEN-E  Regulation  was  carried  out  back-to-back  with  this 
impact  assessment  to  identify  potential  shortcomings.  The  main  results  can  be 
summarised as follows (for more details see Annex 5): 

9  COMMISSION  STAFF  WORKING  DOCUMENT  IMPACT  ASSESSMENT,  Stepping  up  Europe’s 
2030 climate ambition, SWD(2020) 176 final 
10 COM(2020) 741 final 
11 https://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/infrastructure/ten-t/review_en  
12  https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/banking-and-finance/sustainable-finance/eu-taxonomy-
sustainable-activities_en 
13 COM(2020) 299 final 
14 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/38507/st07207-re01-en19.pdf, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2019-0420_EN.pdf  

7 

 
                                                 
  The  TEN-E  Regulation  has  effectively  improved  integration  of  Member  States’ 
networks, stimulated energy trade and hence contributed to EU competitiveness, 
as shown in  the evidence on interconnection targets  and  energy prices  and their 
convergence across the EU. 

  PCIs in electricity and in particular in gas have strongly contributed to security of 
supply  as  a  main  contextual  driver  to  the  design  of  the  TEN-E  Regulation.  For 
gas, the infrastructure is now well connected and supply resilience has improved 
substantially since 2013.  

  Regional  cooperation  in  Regional  Groups  and  through  cross-border  cost 
allocation is an important enabler for project implementation. However, in many 
cases the cross-border cost allocation did not result in reducing the financing gap 
of the project, as intended. 

  While  permitting  procedures  have  been  shortened,  long  permitting  procedures 
persist in some cases. While the underlying reasons are mainly related to national 
implementation  and  outside  the  scope  of  the  TEN-E  Regulation  and  need  to  be 
addressed through an increased focus on implementation and enforcement, there 
are elements that can be improved also at Union level. 

  CEF  financial  assistance  was  an  important  factor,  grants  for  studies  helped 
projects to reduce risks in the early stages of development while grants for works 
supported  projects  addressing  key  bottlenecks  that  market  finance  could  not 
sufficiently address. 

  While the objectives of the current Regulation remain largely valid, their focus on 
2020/30 targets must be upgraded to reflect the new political context and the 2050 
climate neutrality objective  under the European Green Deal. 

  Besides the new political context and objectives, technological development has 
been rapid in the past decade. This progress should be taken into account in the 
infrastructure categories  covered by the Regulation, the PCI selection criteria as 
well as the priority corridors and thematic areas. 

  The TYNDP process as basis for the identification of PCIs has proven effective. 
However,  while  the  ENTSOs  and  TSOs  have  an  important  role  to  play  in  the 
process,  there  is  a  need  for  more  scrutiny,  in  particular  as  regards  defining  the 
scenarios  for  the  future,  setting  long-term  infrastructure  needs  and  bottlenecks 
and assessing individual projects, to enhance trust in the process. 

It  is  worth  noting  that  the  evaluation  did  not  look  specifically  at  the  issue  of  offshore 
grids as this was not a specific objective of the current TEN-E Regulation. As mentioned 
above,  enhancing  renewable  energy  and  specifically  offshore  is  a  necessary  part  of  the 
energy  transition  to  achieve  climate  neutrality  by  2050  in  a  cost-effective  manner.  The 
problems defined in this section and the policy options defined in Section 5 build on the 
results of the evaluation and on the numerous comments received from stakeholders (see 
Annex 2).15  

15 In 2017, a mid-term evaluation of the TEN-E Regulation was completed. In 2019, an evaluation of the 
TEN-E  Regulation  was  formally  launched  with  the  publication  of  an  evaluation  roadmap,  which  was 
complemented in May 2020 with the publication of an inception impact assessment. 

8 

 
                                                 
2.1  Problem 1: Type and scale of cross-border infrastructure developments are 

not fully aligned with EU energy policy objectives in particular as regards the 
European Green Deal and the climate neutrality objective 

The  increased  2030  climate  target  and  the  2050  climate-neutrality  objective  of  the 
European  Green  Deal  and  the  Communication  “A  Clean  Planet  for  All”  require  a 
profound transition of the European energy system, both on the supply and the demand 
side. Energy will be produced and consumed in a different manner and in different places 
than  today.  The  role  of  electricity  will  increase  radically,  but  there  will  also  be  an 
increasing role for renewable and low carbon gases.  

The Commission’s analysis shows that by 2050 more than 80% of electricity will stem 
from renewable energy sources, to an increasing extent located offshore16. EU renewable 
electricity production should as a minimum double from today’s 32% share of renewable 
electricity  in  the  energy  mix  to  around  65%  share  in  203017.  To  achieve  the  European 
Green  Deal  objective  of  climate  neutrality  2050  and  55%  GHG  emission  reduction  by 
2030, the EU needs to significantly scale up the generation of renewable energy. For the 
upscaled deployment of renewable generation to have real economic, climate and societal 
value, the relevant grid infrastructure should be in place. Electricity grids are essential to 
transport renewable energy over medium to long distances, from production sites to the 
sites  of  consumption,  and  for  integrating  the  European  energy  markets.  An  annual 
average  investment  of  EUR  50.5  billion  are  needed  in  the  electricity  transmission  and 
distribution grids, to achieve the 2030 targets alone. This compares to an annual average 
investment  of  EUR  24  billion  in  the  period  2011-2020.  This  means  that  the  grid 
investment should double from the previous decade. 

The Commission’s impact assessment for the 2030 targets shows that the offshore wind 
capacity in Europe should increase to about 280 GW by 2050 in order to meet the 2030 
energy and climate objectives.18 This represents an increase of about 25 times compared 
to  the  current  situation.  As  much  as  two  thirds  of  the  costs  of  the  foreseen  upscale  in 
offshore  renewable  energy  is  related  to  infrastructure,  a  large  part  of  which  will  be  of 
cross-border  nature.  Over  the  last  30  years,  about  12  GW  offshore  wind  has  been 
deployed in Europe, mainly as national projects. Continuing with the current deployment 
pace, offshore wind and related infrastructure would reach about 25 GW in 2050, or  1/10 
of the required 280 GW to achieve climate neutrality. 

At the same time, all existing scenarios modelling pathways for the achievement of the 
climate  neutrality  objective  by  2050  require  a  substantial  role  for  renewable  and  low-
carbon gases in the energy mix, since a 100% electrified energy system is not considered 
feasible.19  Therefore,  by  2050  the  use  of  unabated  natural  gas  is  to  be  reduced  by  66  - 

16 A Clean Planet for all. A European long-term strategic vision for a prosperous, modern, competitive and 
climate neutral economy, COM(2018) 773 final 
17 Stepping up Europe’s 2030 climate ambition, Investing in a climate-neutral future for the benefit of our 
people, COM(2020) 562 final 
18  COMMISSION  STAFF  WORKING  DOCUMENT  IMPACT  ASSESSMENT,  Stepping  up  Europe’s 
2030 climate ambition, SWD(2020) 176 final 
19  These  scenarios  include  those  in  the  EU  Long-Term  Strategy  (2018),  the  TYNDP  2020  scenarios 
developed by ENTSOG and ENTSO-E (2020), Eurelectric's "Decarbonisation pathways" (2018) or those 

9 

 
                                                 
 
71%,  with  a  steep  increase  of  renewable  and  low-carbon  gases,  with  hydrogen 
accounting for approximately 46% - 49% of all renewable and low-carbon gases in 2050. 
However, there is currently very limited dedicated or retrofitted infrastructure in place to 
transport and trade hydrogen across borders from one Member State to another. By 2030, 
total  investments  needs  in  hydrogen  electrolysers  are  estimated  between  EUR  24-42 
billion.  About  EUR  65  billion  is  needed  for  hydrogen  transport,  distribution  and 
storage47. 

These forecasts, and in particular the impact assessment accompanying the 2030 climate 
target  plan,  show  that  the  energy  mix  of  the  future  will  be  very  different  from  the  one 
today. The current energy infrastructure investments are clearly insufficient to transform 
and build the energy infrastructure of the future. This also means infrastructure needs to 
be  in  place  to  support  this  European  energy  transition,  including  rapid  electrification, 
scaling up of renewable electricity generation, the increased use of renewable and low-
carbon  gases,  energy  system  integration  and  a  higher  uptake  of  innovative  solutions. 
Given the role of clean hydrogen in the decarbonisation and as energy carrier and storage 
for an integrated energy system, the lack of dedicated energy infrastructure for hydrogen 
would  negatively  affect 
the 
decarbonisation  of  the  industry  sectors  that  have  limited  decarbonisation  options 
available.20  

to  climate  neutrality,  especially  for 

the  pathway 

Trans-European  cross-border  energy  infrastructures  have  to  make  a  more  important 
contribution to build and establish the cross-border infrastructure necessary for achieving 
climate neutrality. A recent JRC study assessing the impacts of replacing coal with non-
CO2-emitting resources, mainly onshore wind power, by 2030 concludes that, in a power 
system largely based on renewables electricity, interconnectors are “a definitive enabler, 
not  only  of  market  integration,  but  also  of  a  path  towards  a  renewables-based  power 
system”21.  Investments  to  upgrade  the  electricity  interconnections  between  European 
regions, within the EU but also with neighbouring countries, by 53 GW would have the 
potential  to  reduce  the  carbon  footprint  of  the  European  power  system  by  more  than  a 
quarter in 2030. A more interconnected power system would require the deployment of 
significantly  less  renewable  generation  capacity  as  well  as  significantly  less  thermal 
backup capacity. These findings confirm earlier studies pointing to the need and benefits 
of  a  more  interconnected  energy  systems  to  enable  a  decarbonised  power  system22. 
Concerning  the  future  gas  infrastructure  needs,  the  Commission’s  hydrogen  strategy 

developed for DG ENER in the framework of the study "Impact of the use of the biomethane and hydrogen 
potential on trans-European infrastructure" (2019). 
20  COMMISSION  STAFF  WORKING  DOCUMENT  IMPACT  ASSESSMENT,  Stepping  up  Europe’s 
2030 climate ambition, SWD(2020) 176 final 
21 Kanellopoulos K., Kavvadias K., De Felice M., Wind and other CO2-free assets replacing coal in 2030, 
EUR 30343 EN, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2020, ISBN 978-92-76-21440-
3, doi:10.2760/007407, JRC121605, p. 2 
22  Kanellopoulos  K.,  Scenario  analysis  of  accelerated  coal  phase-out  by  2030A  study  on  the  European 
power system based on the EUCO27 scenario using the METIS model, EUR 29203 EN,PublicationsOffice 
of  the  European  Union,  Luxembourg,  2018,  ISBN  978-92-79-81888-2,doi:10.2760/751272,  JRC111438; 
Faunhofer  ISI  (2014):  Optimized  pathways  towards  ambitious  climate  protection  in  the  European 
electricity system (EU Long-term scenarios 2050 II), Final Report. 

10 

 
                                                                                                                                                 
concluded  that  for  the  required  deployment  of  hydrogen  a  large-scale  infrastructure 
network is one important element that only the EU and the single market can offer.23   

A study on infrastructure needs, commissioned by the Commission, concluded that total 
investment  needs  in  the  trans-European  transmission  energy  infrastructure  are  around 
EUR 200 billion, in the period between 2021 and 2030.24 The upgrade of the electricity 
interconnections between European regions by 53 GW, as set out above, would require 
total investments of between EUR 35 and 70 billion by 2030.25  The upscale of offshore 
renewable energy in Europe by 2050 has an estimated cost of EUR 800 billion of which 
EUR  530  billion  EUR  is  related  to  grid  infrastructure.  To  reduce  the  costs  as  much  as 
possible, a strong focus on rational grid development is key. 

The  evaluation  showed  that  the  current  TEN-E  Regulation  has  made  an  important 
contribution  in  advancing  cross-border  energy  infrastructure  and  in  meeting  energy 
policy objectives, and in particular security of supply. While the share of electricity PCIs 
has constantly increased since the first PCI list (see Figure 1), the share of the different 
sectors does not fully reflect future needs. Although transmission networks for offshore 
renewables  are  eligible  under  the  current  TEN-E  Regulation  and  despite  a  priority 
corridor  for offshore  grid in  the Northern Seas,  very few offshore  grid PCIs have been 
selected  so  far.  The  number  of  PCIs  on  smart  electricity  grids  has  never  exceeded  six. 
Gas  PCIs  have  focussed  on  natural  gas  projects  with  no  role  for  renewable  and  low 
carbon gases, including hydrogen.  

Problem  driver  1.1:  TEN-E  infrastructure  categories  do  not  sufficiently  reflect  the 
Green Deal and technological progress 

The infrastructure categories eligible for PCI status under the current TEN-E Regulation 
do neither reflect the European Green Deal objectives and the related infrastructure needs 
nor  technological  progress  made  since  2013.  This  prevents  the  uptake  of  PCIs  that  are 
necessary to achieve the climate neutrality objective under the European Green Deal. In 
the  gas  sector,  hydrogen  networks  are  currently  not  eligible  for  PCI  status,  for  which 
nearly  all  stakeholders  considered  EU-wide  coordinated  planning  relevant  for  a  cost-
efficient transition to renewable and low-carbon gases.26 In addition to the technological 
advancement  in  renewable  and  low-carbon  gases,  digitalisation,  automation,  and  other 
innovations,  including  the  electrification  of  the  transport  sector,  have  made  important 
progress. Smart grid solutions, including demand response, have developed considerably 
over the past years because of the acceleration of the digital transformation of the energy 
sector and will play a crucial role in enabling renewable energy integration27. The need to 
update infrastructure categories  to  adapt  to  future challenges was  widely shared  among 

23 A hydrogen strategy for a climate-neutral Europe, COM(2020) 301 final 
24  Ecofys  (2017):  INVESTMENT  NEEDS  IN  TRANS-EUROPEAN  ENERGYINFRASTRUCTURE  UP 
TO 2030 AND BEYOND, Final report, http://publications.europa.eu/resource/cellar/431bc842-437c-11e8-
a9f4-01aa75ed71a1.0001.01/DOC_1  
25 Kanellopoulos K., Kavvadias K., De Felice M., Wind and other CO2-free assets replacing coal in 2030, 
EUR 30343 EN, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2020, ISBN 978-92-76-21440-
3, doi:10.2760/007407, JRC121605 
26 Most stakeholders who responded to the targeted survey consider that hydrogen is relevant for the TEN-
E framework and required at large scale. 
27 International Energy Agency (2017): Digitalisation and Energy, OECD. 

11 

 
                                                 
the  stakeholders28,  who  consider  that  the  current  set-up  is  not  aligned  with  today’s 
decarbonisation ambitions nor reflect emerging technologies.  

This  links  directly  to  the  eligibility  for  CEF  financial  assistance  for  which  PCI  status 
under  TEN-E  is  a  precondition.29  New  infrastructure  categories  that  can  make  an 
important contribution to achieve the climate neutrality objective, e.g. hydrogen are less 
mature  and  hence  need  access  to  financing  e.g.  for  studies  to  help  make  the  projects 
“bankable”.  

The  above-referenced  JRC  study  on  the  implications  of  a  renewables  based  energy 
system  also  shows  that  cross-border  interconnectors  with  third  countries  play  an 
increasing  role  to  achieve  a  decarbonised  energy  system  cost-effectively.  The 
Commission Expert Group on electricity interconnection targets also highlighted the role 
of  interconnectors  with  neighbouring  countries  for  the  better  integration  of  renewable 
energy  sources  and  security  of  supply.30  Under  the  current  TEN-E  Regulation  projects 
with third countries are only eligible if they show a physical cross-border impact for at 
least two Member States which is difficult to demonstrate.31 At the same time, the TFEU 
provides for the possibility that the Union may decide to cooperate with third countries to 
promote projects of mutual interest (PMI)32 and to ensure the interoperability of networks 
in the EU’s neighbourhood. Such cooperation can help reduce GHG emission in the EU 
and  in  third  countries,  thus  contributing  to  achieving  the  Green  Deal  objectives. 
However, PMIs do currently not benefit from the provisions of the TEN-E framework.  

Problem driver 1.2: Lack of a mandatory sustainability criterion in the PCI selection 
process 

The  current  TEN-E  Regulation  defines  a  set  of  selection  criteria  for  projects  that  are 
eligible  for  PCI  status.  The  specific  criteria  include  sustainability,  security  of  supply, 
market  integration  and  competition.  Electricity  and  gas  PCI  candidate  projects  need  to 
contribute significantly to at least one of these specific criteria. As a result, projects that 
enable, for example, the increase in gas supply/demand may become PCIs even if they do 
not  demonstrate  benefits  in  terms  of  sustainability  but  address  security  of  supply  risks. 
Some  stakeholders  consider  that  this  poses  a  risk  that  infrastructure  developments  and 

28  Replies to the targeted survey showed that there is higher disagreement than agreement in the fitness of 
the  current  priority  corridors  and  thematic  areas  to  the  future  challenges.  For  priority  corridors,  36 
respondents  (of  112)  disagree  and  32  agree  they  are  fit  for  purpose  for  future  challenges  to  the  energy 
infrastructure. As for thematic areas, 46 disagree, while only 15 respondents agree on the prior statement. 
29 Except for cross-border projects in the field of renewable energy  for  which a new  window is foreseen 
under the new CEF Regulation for the MFF2021-2027. 
30  “Electricity  interconnections  with  neighbouring  countries”,    Second  report  of  the  Commission  Expert 
Group, https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/785f224b-93cd-11e9-9369-01aa75ed71a1  
on electricity interconnection targets 
31  On  the  previous  and  current  4th  PCI  lists,  there  have  been  several  projects  with  third  countries  that 
fulfilled current conditions, i.e. demonstrating socio-economic benefits for at least two Member States  For 
example, electricity interconnections between Italy and Montenegro, between Italy and Tunisia (ELMED), 
and from Israel to Greece via Cyprus (Euroasia), the gas interconnection between Bulgaria and Serbia, the 
Southern Gas Corridor or an oil interconnector between Ukraine and Poland. 
32 Art. 171(3) TFEU: “The  Union  may  decide  to  cooperate  with  third  countries  to  promote  projects  
of  mutual  interest  and  to  ensure  the  interoperability  of  networks.” 

12 

 
                                                 
specifically  PCIs  may  not  be  on  track  to  achieve  EU  energy  and  climate  policy 
objectives.33  

Problem driver 1.3: Sectoral bottom-up approach to infrastructure planning  

The  evaluation  of  the  current  framework  concluded  that  the  approach  to  cross-border 
infrastructure  planning  is  in  principle  working  well  and  that  the  central  role  of  the 
ENTSOs (and TSOs) is justified by their specialised knowledge and expertise in network 
planning. However, it pointed to shortcomings of a sectoral approach to planning and to 
the  lack  of  an  independent  validation  of  the  assessment  methodology  and  underlying 
assumptions  used  since  TSOs  are  at  the  same  time  the  promoters  of  most  of  the 
infrastructure  projects  submitted  to  the  EU-wide  TYNPD  (and  hence  eligible  for  PCI 
status). This gives the ENTSOs an incentive to emphasise security of supply risks above 
e.g. investments in improving the efficiency of the system and hence to higher needs for 
infrastructure  construction.  Other  actors  such  as  the  Commission  and  ACER  have  a 
limited  role  under  current  TEN-E  Regulation,  which  cannot  prevent  that  the  ENTSOs 
assume  e.g  too  significant  gas/electricity  demand  for  the  future,  import  of  fuel  and 
unreasonable  technology  development.  This  in  turn  may  lead  to  the  identification  of 
infrastructure  gaps  that  are  not  realistic  and  overestimates  the  potential  benefits  of  the 
proposed projects. This problem is reinforced by a sectoral planning approach.  

Today’s energy system is built on parallel vertical energy value chains, which rigidly link 
specific  energy  resources  with  specific  end-use  sectors.  This  is  mirrored  in  a  sectoral 
approach to  infrastructure planning where  electricity  and  gas networks are planned  and 
managed mostly independently from each other. Whilst this approach has worked in the 
past,  the  Commission  communication  on  energy  system  integration34  recalls  that  this 
model  of  separate  silos  cannot  deliver  a  climate  neutral  economy  by  2050.  It  is 
technically  and  economically  inefficient,  and  leads  to  substantial  losses  in  the  form  of 
waste heat and low energy efficiency35. The insufficient integration of the energy system 
hinders  the  decarbonisation  of  electricity  as  well  as  major  energy  consuming  sectors, 
notably transport and industry.  

The  selection  of  infrastructure  projects  of  common  interest  in  the  electricity  and  gas 
sectors  is  based  on  10-Year  Network  Development  Plans  (TYNDPs).  These  plans  are 
developed  at  national  level  and  since  2013  integrated  to  the  EU  level  for  gas  and 
electricity.  The  EU-wide  TYNDPs  are  elaborated  by  the  European  Network  of 
Transmission  System  Operators  for  Electricity  (ENTSO-E)36  and  for  Gas  (ENTSOG)37 

33 In the public consultation several environmental NGOs, NRAs and industry stakeholders indicated that 
the current selection process has resulted in projects being selected that do not have a positive effect on the 
CO2  emissions,  do  not  sufficiently  support  network  innovation  and  include  traditional,  fossil  fuel 
infrastructure  which  will ultimately  hamper the  achievement of climate  neutrality. TSOs did not indicate 
strong opinions on the sustainability criterion.  
34 COM(2020) 299 final 
35  In  Trinomics  et  al.  (2018),  it  was  stressed  that  the  current  setup  for  selecting  PCI  projects  is  partially 
adequate  given  the  deficiency  in  accounting  for  energy  efficiency  in  the  evaluation  process,  although 
energy efficiency gains are accounted for in the demand levels of the scenarios to be modelled according to 
the TYNDP 2020 Scenario report.  
36 https://tyndp.entsoe.eu/about-the-tyndp/  
37 https://www.entsog.eu/tyndp#  

13 

 
                                                 
which consist of the National Transmission System Operators  (see Annex 5 for a more 
information). The two TYNDPs remain two separate sectorial processes. This represents 
a significant impediment in the identification of optimal infrastructure solution in cases 
where e.g. a need identified in the electricity sector could be tackled by a solution in the 
gas  sector.  Although  the  scenarios  reflect  the  2050  climate-neutrality  objectives,  the 
trajectories  chosen  are  debatable  and  tend  to  favour  in  particular  high  levels  of  gas 
demand38.  

A  significant  number  of  stakeholders  across  different  stakeholder  groups  agree  that  the 
current sectoral approach to infrastructure planning does not match the needs for system 
integration and question the adequacy of roles and the coordination with the distribution 
operators and synergies with other sectors. Stakeholders indicated the wish to weaken the 
role  of  the  ENTSOs  (39%)  and  to  strengthen  the  role  of  DSOs  (53%)  and  other 
stakeholders, such as NGOs (39% - 67% of whom represented industry or civil society). 
Stakeholders  state  that  the  process  is  geared  towards  the  construction  of  additional 
infrastructure39  and  may  be  at  odds  with  the  energy  efficiency  first  principle  and  not 
necessarily  lead  to  those  PCIs  being  selected  and  implemented  that  are  most  efficient 
from a technical, economic and social perspective.40 The risk of stranded assets exists. 

While  the  current  bottom-up  infrastructure  planning  via  the  TYNDP  provides  a  solid 
basis  for  the  identification  of  necessary  infrastructure  projects  onshore,  this  is  not  the 
case  for  offshore  grids.  The  onshore  electricity  grid  developed  over  a  long  period  and 
with  an  incremental  and  integrated  approach  when  utilities  were  the  owners  of  the 
generation  units  and  networks.  The  starting  point  for  the  development  of  offshore 
networks  is  fundamentally  different.  An  incremental  approach,  as  used  for  onshore 
networks, is not sufficient to identify offshore infrastructure needs at the necessary scale 
as  set  out  above.  The  bottom-up  approach  is  too  fragmented  and  nationally  focused, 
which leads to  a less  rational offshore wind development,  resulting in  higher  costs and 
irrational  use of maritime space.  Lack of  grids  and grid  connections are  perceived as a 
key barrier to large-scale offshore wind by the industry. Continuing the current practice 
would not bring along many new offshore wind parks at the required speed41.  

Like  for  onshore  infrastructures,  there  is  also  a  risk  of  stranded  assets  offshore.  A 
coordinated approach allows for developing an optimised offshore grid both with a view 
to interconnection and to evacuate offshore wind. A recent study42 has demonstrated that 
the  current  practice  of  nationally  developing  offshore  wind  with  radial  connections  to 

2020 

Report, 

TYNDP 

Scenario 

ENTSO-E/ENTSOG 

38 
(2020): 
https://eepublicdownloads.azureedge.net/tyndp-
documents/TYNDP_2020_Joint_Scenario_Report_ENTSOG_ENTSOE_200629_Final.pdf  
39 In the public consultation, a number of stakeholders indicated that ENTSOs role in planning and owning 
assets ultimately creates a potential conflict of interest that favours TSOs over non-TSOs promoters with a 
limited role of other technologies or actors. 
40 It is important to note that security of supply requires redundant infrastructure and needs to be taken into 
account in the context of the energy efficiency first principle. 
41  E.g.  Navigant/SWECO  (2020):  Study  on  the  offshore  grid  potential  in  the  Mediterranean  region, 
ENER/B1/2019-508,  Final  draft  report;  ENTSO-E  (2020):  Position  on  Offshore  Development, 
https://www.entsoe.eu/2020/05/29/entso-e-position-on-offshore-development/ 
42  E.g.  Roland  Berger  (2019;  “How  to  reduce  costs  and  space  of  offshore  development  :  North  Seas 
offshore  energy  clusters  study,  https://ec.europa.eu/energy/studies/hybrid-projects-how-reduce-costs-and-
space-offshore-developments_en?redir=1  

14 

 
                                                 
shore, and in parallel develop cross-border interconnectors often is not the optimal way, 
although  this  may  vary  between  regions.  Hybrid  assets  in  the  North  Sea  region,  i.e. 
interconnectors  with  offshore  production  connected  to  them  would  reduce  costs 
significantly  and  make  better  use  of  the  maritime  space,  compared  to  developing 
interconnections and evacuation of offshore wind separately. 

An inadequate framework for offshore infrastructure planning explains the slow progress 
in  the  identification  of  cross-border  offshore  infrastructure  projects,  whereas  current 
permitting procedures for offshore projects explain delays in project implementation (see 
problem driver 2.1).    

2.2  Problem 2: Delays in project implementation 

Delays in the implementation of the projects of common interest, identified as necessary 
to achieve the EU climate and energy policy objectives, would jeopardise the accelerated 
change in the energy system as set out above. The implementation of PCIs still takes too 
long as projects have to overcome several challenges during the implementation process 
as is further outlined below. In 2020, 27% of electricity PCIs were delayed by on average 
17  months  against  their  initially  planned  commissioning  date  and  the  share  of  delayed 
electricity  PCIs  has  been  fairly  stable  (23%-31%)  between  2016-2019.  This  would 
appear  particularly  problematic  given  the  increasing  role  of  electricity  and  resulting 
infrastructure  needs  to  achieve  the  2030  and  2050  GHG  reduction  targets.  As  for  gas 
PCIs, in 2020, 38% of all PCIs encountered delays of on average 33 months.43  

Problem driver 2.1: Long permitting procedures  

About 40% of PCIs are still expected to take more than the legal requirement to complete 
the  permit  granting  procedure.44  According  to  ACER,  the  average  permitting  durations 
are  4  years  for  electricity  PCIs  and  3.1  years  for  gas  PCIs  with  some  PCIs  requiring 
substantially longer than the foreseen maximum  of 3.5  years.45 However,  out  of the 18 
PCIs that already passed the 5-year mark, 13 had started the permitting process before the 
entry into force of the TEN-E regulation and therefore did not benefit from the permitting 
provisions therein due to the transitional provisions and are still in permitting under the 
applicable national rules. 

The  evaluation  (see  Annex  5)  finds  that  while  permitting  has  been  shortened  as  a 
consequence  of  the  provisions  in  the  TEN-E  Regulation,  long  permitting  procedures 
persist  in  some  cases.  However,  the  underlying  reasons  are  mainly  related  to  national 
implementation  and,  mainly,  outside  the  scope  of  the  TEN-E  Regulation.  The 
Commission will intensify enforcement and implementation efforts in this respect mainly 
through the mechanisms provided by the TEN-E Regulation, such as the regional groups. 
Nevertheless,  during  the  public    consultation  it  appeared  that  a  series  of  changes  and 

43 ACER (2020): Consolidated Report on the progress of electricity and gas Projects of Common Interest, 
https://www.acer.europa.eu/Official_documents/Acts_of_the_Agency/Publication/Consolidated%20Report
%20on%20the%20progress%20of%20electricity%20and%20gas%20Projects%20of%20Common%20Inter
est%20%282020%29.pdf  
44 Ibidem. 
45 Ibidem. 

15 

 
                                                 
improvements  at  Union  level  would  still  aid  in  further  accelerating  the  permitting 
process, avoiding delays and ensure an uniform adequate national practice. 

According  to  ACER’s  report,  three  electricity  PCIs  were  delayed  at  a  permitting  stage 
due to public opposition, while three more are facing lawsuits and court procedures that 
have resulted in delays as well46. Public opposition continues to be one of the key factors 
for lengthy implementation procedures of PCIs driven by reasons such as insufficient or 
late use of participatory processes.47 Lack of public awareness on the specific needs for 
new  infrastructure  hampers  the  acceptance  of  PCIs  and  may  result  in  a  significant 
number  of  objections  during  consultations,  thereby  leading  to  significant  additional 
efforts and delays in the permitting process. Ultimately, public opposition might lead to 
court  claims  by  organised  local  communities,  landowners  and  citizens  living  in  the 
vicinity  of  potential  installations  and  routing  of  PCIs.  Since  the  administrative  appeals 
and  judicial  remedies  before  court  or  tribunal  do  not  fall  under  the  foreseen  permitting 
timeline  of  3.5  years48,  this  causes  further  delays.  For  instance,  if  there  is  an  appeal 
regarding  any  of  the  issued  permits,  the  permitting  process  is  not  complete  until  the 
appeal  is  complete  and  the  permits  issued  are  final.  The  TEN-E  Regulation  does  not 
currently  provide  for  any  means  of  accelerating  project  implementation  from  the 
perspective of court proceedings. In this respect, a series of stakeholders mentioned that a 
streamlining of appeals regarding PCIs would also be considered so that the accelerated 
permitting process becomes truly effective.  

Strong  regional  cooperation  is  key  to  implement  more  cross-border  hybrid  and  joint 
offshore projects. The permitting experience49, so far, of offshore cables shows that they 
often encounter additional delays by comparison to onshore projects due to the need for 
additional studies, maritime spatial planning and crossing international waters of several 
countries. Cross-border hybrid and joint offshore projects bring even more challenges as 
the implementation of the infrastructure needs to be coordinated with the deployment of 
generation  projects.  As  such,  stakeholders  called  for  streamlined  permitting  procedures 
for  cross-border  offshore  projects.  Delays  in  permitting  leads  to  delay  in  infrastructure 
such  as  renewable  electricity  generation  and  grids  that  are  needed  for  the  energy 
transition towards climate neutrality in 2050. 

Problem  driver  2.2:  Sub-optimal  implementation  and  insufficient  use  of  cost  sharing 
tools and regulatory incentives 

The  TEN-E  Regulation  introduced  a  regulatory  framework  aiming  at  facilitating  the 
implementation of PCIs, by creating financial and regulatory certainty: the split of costs 
across borders (cross border costs allocation, CBCA), inclusion of the investment  costs 
into  tariffs  and  additional  investment  incentives  for  riskier  projects.  In  practice,  these 

46 Ecorys et al. (2020): Support to the evaluation of Regulation (EU) No 347/2013 on guidelines for trans-
European energy infrastructure, Draft final report 
47 Scope et al. (2020) Innovative actions and strategies to boost public awareness, trust and acceptance of 
trans-European energy infrastructure projects. Draft Revised Interim Report. DG ENER. 
48 Article 10 (6) 
49  Input  from  National  Grid  regarding  the  development  of  the  Viking  Cable  during  the  PCI  Days, 
December 
here: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uk84QPpEUyY,  and  input  in  the  stakeholder  consultation  regarding 
the development of projects such as the Baltic Pipe. 

accessible 

recording 

edition, 

2019 

the 

is 

16 

 
                                                 
provisions  remained  underutilised  depriving  PCIs  of  the  benefits  they  could  have 
obtained  thus delaying or failing to remove barriers to their implementation.  

The current CBCA provisions have rarely been used as intended to reduce or eliminate 
the  financing  gap  but  have  been  applied  only  for  projects  requesting  CEF  funding  for 
works50,  as  the  CBCA  is  one  of  the  required  documents  to  be  submitted.  This  is 
supported  by  ACER’s  finding  of  70%  of  all  CBCA  decisions  made  up  to  March  2018 
concerning  projects  with  only  a  single  Member  State  involved51.  By  March  2020,  this 
share  decreased  to  just  under  50%.52  Allocation  of  costs  to  non-hosting  countries,  with 
the benefits that entails in terms of enabling and accelerating implementation, has only so 
far occurred for gas PCIs.53 

Moreover,  the  manner  in  which  national  regulators  approach  CBCA  decisions  is  very 
diverse  and  very  often  diverts  from  the  principles  above  as  regards  the  financing  of 
infrastructure. NRAs often only allocate partially the investment costs into tariffs (or not 
at all) mentioning that the rest of the financing should come from  a CEF grant or even 
issue  CBCA  decisions  conditional  upon  obtaining  CEF  grants.  This  creates  regulatory 
instability for the projects, which cannot obtain financing on the market and are rendered 
completely  dependent  on  Union  financial  assistance  leading,  thus,  to  hampering  their 
realisation.  In  addition,  viewing  the  CBCA  procedure  solely  as  a  precondition  to  CEF 
applications54 deprives the provision of its main purpose, which is creating a framework 
for  the  procedure  of  splitting  the  costs  of  PCIs  across  borders  for  the  purposes  of 
enabling and accelerating their implementation.  

An  additional  issue  arises  with  the  application  of  the  ACER  CBCA  Guidelines  from 
2015, which are not legally binding. Some NRAs and project promoters apply them and 
others  do  not,  some  choose  to  apply  the  most  convenient  elements.  The  correct 
implementation  of  the  CBCA  procedure  becomes  even  more  relevant  in  the  context  of 
infrastructure to support the development of offshore renewables. The reason is that  the 
constructing countries will not necessarily coincide with the beneficiary countries due to 
the location of the offshore renewable energy potential in  a certain  sea basin,  maritime 
spatial planning and environmental restrictions. Without the application of clear CBCA 
guidelines, the benefits from such projects could be widely split amongst Member States, 
not reflecting the benefits, and thus make the realisation of the projects difficult. 

The  use  of  regulatory  investment  incentives  introduced  by  the  TEN-E  for  projects  that 
incur  higher  risks  has  been  low  and,  even  though  they  were  crucial  for  some  of  the 
projects, their overall contribution to the advancement of PCIs remains limited, with only 

50  Ecorys et al. (2020): Support to the evaluation of Regulation (EU) No 347/2013 on guidelines for trans-
European energy infrastructure, Draft final report. 
51  ACER  (2018),  Third  Edition  of  the  Agency’s  Summary  Report  on  Cross-Border  Cost  Allocation 
Decisions – Status update as of March 2018. 
52 Ecorys et al. (2020): Support to the evaluation of Regulation (EU) No 347/2013 on guidelines for trans-
European energy infrastructure, Draft final report. 
53 Ibidem. 
54 For all cases  where  CBCA decisions  were  made, the  project promoters consecutively applied for CEF 
grants. The objective of accessing CEF funding was indicated by stakeholders as more important than the 
allocation of costs between Member States. 

17 

 
                                                 
eleven PCIs applying.55 According to ACER only in four cases overall (one electricity, 
three  gas), risk-based incentives have been  granted.56 Stakeholder input has shown that 
while some TSOs see an added value in these incentives in adjusting the financial risk, 
regulators  refer  to  the  low  number  of  applications  to  illustrate  the  lacking  need  for 
additional risk-based incentives.  

Offshore wind  related infrastructure projects  will most likely  have a higher risk profile 
than  traditional  interconnectors57  also  substantiated  by  offshore  energy  industry 
stakeholders  and  project  promoters,  and  could  benefit  from  a  facilitating  regulatory 
regime  that  starts  from  an  acknowledgement  of  their  inherent  higher  risk,  to  be 
recognised  in  their  regulatory  regime.  As  such,  stakeholders  called  for  a  clear  legal 
framework for cross-border hybrid projects notably as regards the assessment of benefits 
and the cross-border allocation of costs. Moreover, the current provisions for investment 
incentives do not cater for more innovative grid solutions, for instance if they are more 
OPEX intensive relative to the CAPEX intensive traditional grids. 

In sum, the identified problem drivers are largely independent from each other, although 
reinforcing  sustainability  during  PCI  selection  can  contribute  to  limit  the  number  of 
projects that are not fully in line with Green Deal objectives. The problem drivers behind 
problem 1 are largely driven by a new political context and technological progress. The 
problem drivers behind problem 2 are mainly related to implementation and the current 
TEN-E legal framework and to a lesser extent to technological progress (offshore wind). 
Figure 3 summarises the problems and the underlying drivers. 

55 Ecorys et al. (2020): Support to the evaluation of Regulation (EU) No 347/2013 on guidelines for trans-
European energy infrastructure. 
56 ACER (2019). Consolidated Report on the Progress of Electricity and Gas Projects of Common Interest. 
ACER (2018). Summary report on project-specific risk-based incentives. 
57  As  resulting  from  the  Study  on  How  to  reduce  costs  and  space  of  offshore  development:  North  Seas 
offshore  energy  clusters  study,  European  Commission,  Roland  Berger  GmbH,  available  at: 
https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/59165f6d-802e-11e9-9f05-01aa75ed71a1/language-
en?WT.mc_id=Searchresult&WT.ria_c=37085&WT.ria_f=3608&WT.ria_ev=search    and  the  Study  on 
Baltic offshore wind energy cooperation under BEMIP, COWI , Directorate-General for Energy (European 
Commission) , Ea 
at: 
https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/9590cdee-cd30-11e9-992f-01aa75ed71a1/language-
en/format-PDF/source-search  

Analyses , THEMA 

Consulting 

available 

Energy 

group, 

18 

 
                                                 
 Figure 3: Problems and problem drivers 

The initiative is justified by market and regulatory failures also driven by a new policy 
context,  new  technological  developments,  and  achievements  since  the  adoption  of  the 
current TEN-E Regulation in 2013. 

2.3  How will the problem evolve? 

increase 

the  mid-  and 

to  significantly 

the  ambition  on 

The  problems  and  the  underlying  problem  drivers  are  likely  to  become  even  more 
important  in  the  short  and  mid-term.  Adopted  or  planned  policy  initiatives  such  as  the 
2030  Climate  Target  Plan,  the  revision  of  the  ETS  Directive,  the  Effort  Sharing 
Regulation,  the  Energy  Efficiency  Directive,  the  Renewable  Energy  Directive,  the 
Energy Taxation Directive and the planned initiative for the decarbonisation of  gas are 
expected 
long-term 
decarbonisation and renewable energy targets, in line with the 2030 55% GHG reduction 
objective. This will lead to an accelerated pathway to the decarbonisation of the energy 
system,  significantly  higher  penetration  of  renewables  in  power  and  heating  at  the 
expense  of  fossil  fuels,  reduction  of  demand  for  energy,  and  hence  to  a  significant 
increase in the need for an enabling energy infrastructure in place by 2030 and beyond. 
Without  changes  in  TEN-E  Regulation,  investments  necessary  for  this  transition  will 
happen in a sub-optimal, uncoordinated manner at a higher cost. The gap in cross-border 
infrastructure  investments  in  line  with  the  decarbonisation  objectives  is  expected  to 
increase,  in  particular  as  regards  investment  related  to  renewable  generation,  although 
there should be a lower demand for gas projects due to the progress in the completion of 
new  gas  infrastructure  projects  and  changes  in  the  market  framework  such  as  the 
taxonomy. Investments in technologies that allow moving towards decarbonisation more 
quickly  would  not  be  fully  prioritised.  Investments  in  cross-border  hydrogen  pipelines 
would not come forward fast enough, offshore wind developments would be incremental, 
smart  grids  needed  for  better  functioning  of  the  European  network  could  not  be  fully 
exploited.  Also,  the  identification  of  the  future  infrastructure  needs  and  their  planning 
would  continue  to  be  in  silos,  without  contributing  to  the  integration  of  the  energy 
system.  

Moreover, the Covid19 sanitary crisis reinforces some of the identified problems such as 
delays in project implementation and access to financing for cross-border infrastructure 
projects. However, investments in energy infrastructure, in particular in the context of the 
roll  out  of  renewable  energy  generation,  is  a  key  component  of  the  recovery  and 
resilience  fund  (RRF).    Investments  in  smart  and  sustainable  energy  infrastructure  has 

19 

 
 
been identified as  a key enabling factor to achieve the European Green Deal objectives 
and a green recovery in line with political objectives.  

The  Taxonomy  Regulation58  creates  a  classification  system  for  (environmentally) 
sustainable  economic  activities,  a  fundamental  tool  to  channel  capital  towards 
investments  crucial  for,  inter  alia,  the  decarbonisation  of  the  EU.  The  Taxonomy 
Regulation creates disclosure obligations for financial market participants with respect to 
financial  products  and  for  certain  non-financial  undertakings.  The  Commission  is 
currently  preparing  two  Delegated  Acts  to  establish  an  actual  list  of  environmentally 
sustainable  economic  activities  by  defining  technical  screening  criteria  for  climate 
change mitigation and adaptation, which should enter into force by mid-2021. Without a 
review of TEN-E there  would be a  risk of increasing incoherence  with  the  guidance to 
private investment as established in the Taxonomy Regulation. 

2.4  Scope of the initiative 

Based on the evaluation results, the stakeholder feedback, and the problem analysis, key 
principles of the current TEN-E Regulation would remain unchanged and are not further 
analysed in the impact assessment: the TYNDP as such as tool to European infrastructure 
planning as basis for the PCI selection process (except for smart grids and CO2 transport 
networks),  and  regional  cooperation  based  on  priority  corridors  and  thematic  areas. 
Whilst  the  regional  groups  and  the  priority  corridors  and  areas  will  remain  as  the  key 
working  method  to  identify  and  monitor  the  implementation  of  PCIs,  they  would  be 
adjusted  to  the  new  scope  of  the  TEN-E  Regulation  in  terms  of  eligible  infrastructure 
categories.  The  focus  of  the  initiative  is  on  four  impact  areas  of  the  current  TEN-E 
framework 
b) 
governance/infrastructure  planning  (planning  for  offshore  grids,  and  cross-sectoral 
infrastructure planning/PCI selection criteria), c) permitting, and d) regulatory treatment. 

(infrastructure 

categories), 

Figure 

scope 

(see 

2): 

a) 

3  WHY SHOULD THE EU ACT? 

3.1  Legal basis 

Article  170  of  the  Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the  European  Union  foresees  that  the 
Union shall contribute to the establishment and development of trans-European networks, 
inclosing  in  the  area  of  energy  infrastructure.  The  Union  will  need  to  promote 
interconnection of national networks. The TEN-E Regulation is based on Article 172 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union which provides for the legal base to 
adopt guidelines covering the objectives, priorities and broad lines of measures envisaged 
in the sphere of trans-European networks as set out in Article 171. The guidelines are to 
identify  projects  of  common  interest  that  are  necessary  for  making  the  TEN-E  fit  for 
purpose.  The  guidelines  also  set  the  conditions  under  which  the  EU  may  financially 
support the PCIs. 

58 Regulation (EU) 2020/852 on the establishment of a framework to facilitate sustainable investment, and 
amending Regulation (EU) 2019/2088, OJ L 198, 22.6.2020, p. 13 

20 

 
                                                 
3.2  Subsidiarity: Necessity of EU action 

Energy transmission infrastructure (including an interconnected offshore grid and smart 
grid  infrastructure)  has  a  European  added  value  due  to  its  cross-border  impacts  and  is 
essential to achieve a climate neutral energy system. The TEN-E Regulation has provided 
value  and  has  contributed  to  achieving  results  regarding  the  EU  energy  market 
integration,  competition  and  security  of  supply.  A  framework  for  regional  cooperation 
across  Member  States  is  necessary  to  develop  cross-border  energy  infrastructure. 
Individual  Member  State  regulations  and  actions  are  insufficient  to  deliver  these 
infrastructure projects as a whole.  

3.3  Subsidiarity: Added value of EU action 

Internal  energy market  is based on cross-border  interconnectors, development of which 
requires  cooperation  of  two  or  more  Member  States,  all  with  their  own  regulatory 
framework.  The  TEN-E  Regulation  has  provided  additional  value  compared  to  what 
could  have  been  achieved  at  national  or  regional  level  alone.  There  is  widespread 
agreement  among  stakeholders  on  the  EU  added  value  of  the  Regulation,  achieved 
through  regional  cooperation,  access 
information  and 
transparency, and improved planning and permitting processes. The majority believe that 
TEN-E  achieved  more  than  could  have  been  achieved  at  national/regional  level  (92  %, 
79% respectively agree) and that the issues addressed by the TEN-E Regulation continue 
to  require  action  at  EU  level  (91%  agree,  0  disagree)  (see  Annex  2).  Many  Member 
States have benefitted from an increase in security of supply, more competitive markets 
and more interconnected energy networks. Given the recognition of TEN-E as effective 
and cost-efficient instrument  in  the evaluation,  the current  instrument  should be further 
improved  to  address  the  above-identified  problems  instead  of  developing  a  new 
instrument. 

to  financing, 

improved 

4  OBJECTIVES: WHAT IS TO BE ACHIEVED? 

In line with the results of the evaluation, the general objective of the initiative builds very 
closely on the general objective of the current TEN-E Regulation but develops it further. 
By  referring  explicitly  to  both  energy  and  climate  objectives  as  well  as  the  2030/50 
targets,  the  revised  general  objective  reflects  the  new  political  context  and  the 
achievements  of the current  TEN-E Regulation,  e.g. in  terms  of  gas security of supply. 
The  overall  objective  is  to  align  the  TEN-E  Regulation  with  the  European  Green  Deal 
objectives,  and  the  policy  initiatives  proposed  within  its  framework  and  thereby  to 
support  the  timely  transition  towards  climate  neutrality  by  2050,  starting  with  a  55% 
reduction in GHG emissions by 2030 in a cost-efficient manner. 

4.1  General objectives 

The general objective of the revision is to facilitate the timely development of adequate 
energy infrastructure across the EU and in its neighbourhood to enable delivering on the 
EU’s energy and climate objectives in line with the European Green Deal, in particular 
on  the  2030/50  targets  including  the  climate-neutrality  objective,  as  well  as  market 
integration,  competitiveness,  and  security  of  supply  at  least  cost  to  consumers  and 
businesses.  Stakeholders  in  the  targeted  survey  identified  greenhouse  gas  emission 
reductions  /  climate  neutrality  as  the  most  important  challenge  in  the  field  of  energy 

21 

 
 
infrastructure today followed by the integration of renewable energy sources and energy 
system integration, both closely linked to greenhouse gas emission reduction.  

4.2  Specific objectives 

The specific objectives to be pursued by the policy  options are to  correct the problems 
and underpinning drivers identified in Section 2, namely to: 

  Enable the identification of the cross-border projects and investments across the 
EU  and  with  its  neighbouring  countries  that  are  necessary  for  the  energy 
transition and climate targets 
 
Improve infrastructure planning for energy system integration and offshore grids  
  Shorten permitting procedures for PCIs to avoid delays in projects that facilitate 

the energy transition 

  Ensure the appropriate use of cost sharing tools and regulatory incentives 

Figure  4  illustrates  how  the  problems  and  their  underlying  drivers  relate  to  the  general 
and specific objectives of the initiative. The last column indicates how the policy options 
that will be developed in more detail in the next section relate to the problem drivers and 
objectives.  

Figure 4: Intervention logic diagram 

Problem/Driver 

Problem 1  

Objective 

Policy option 

General objective (Part 1) 

Type  and  scale  of  cross-border 
infrastructure  developments  are 
not fully aligned with EU energy 
policy  objectives  in  particular  as 
regards European Green Deal and 
the climate neutrality objective 

to 

Facilitate 
the  development  of 
adequate  energy  infrastructures 
across 
its 
the  EU  and 
in 
enable 
neighbourhood 
delivering  on  the  EU’s  energy 
and 
in 
particular on the 2030/50 targets, 
as  well  as  market  integration 
competitiveness,  and  security  of 
supply 

objectives, 

climate 

Driver 1.1  

Specific objective 1 

TEN-E  infrastructure  categories 
do  not  sufficiently  reflect  the 
Green  Deal  and  technological 
progress 

projects 

Enable  the  identification  of  the 
cross-border 
and 
investments  across  the  EU  and 
with  its  neighbouring  countries 
that  are  necessary  for  the energy 
transition and climate targets 

Driver 1.2  

of 

mandatory 
a 
Lack 
sustainability criterion in the PCI 
selection process 

Driver 1.3  

Specific objective 2 

Sectoral  bottom-up  approach  to 

Improve  infrastructure  planning 

Option  A.1: 
electricity 
grids 
electricity storage 

Smart 
and 

A.2: 

Gas 
Option 
infrastructure,  hydrogen 
networks  and  power-to-
gas 

Option  A.3:  Projects  of 
mutual interest (PMIs) 

Option  B.2:  Cross-
infrastructure 
sectoral 
planning 

Option  B.1:  Offshore 
renewable 
grids 

for 

22 

 
 
 
infrastructure planning 

for energy system integration and 
offshore grids 

energy 

Option  B.2:  Cross-
sectoral 
infrastructure 
planning 

Problem 2 

General objective (Part 2) 

Delays in project implementation 

Facilitate the timely development 
of  adequate  cross-border  energy 
infrastructures  across  the  EU  at 
least  cost  for  consumers  and 
businesses 

Driver 2.1  

Specific objective 3 

Option C.1: Permitting 

Long permitting procedures  

Shorten  permitting  procedures 
for  PCIs 
in 
projects that  facilitate  the energy 
transition 

to  avoid  delays 

Driver 2.2  

Specific objective 4 

Sub-optimal  implementation  and 
the  cost 
insufficient  use  of 
regulatory 
tools  and 
sharing 
incentives 

Ensure  the  appropriate  use  of 
cost  sharing  tools  and  regulatory 
incentives 

Option  D.1:  Regulatory 
treatment 

In  addition  to  the  above  objectives,  the  initiative  seeks  to  simplify  and  improve  the 
efficiency of the TEN-E Regulation as further specified in section 8.2. 

5  WHAT ARE THE AVAILABLE POLICY OPTIONS? 

Building  on  the  inception  impact  assessment  and  the  evaluation  as  well  as  the  issues 
identified in Section 2 and the objectives set out in Section 4, policy options to address 
the problems and its underlying drivers, will be presented and discussed for four impact 
areas  of  the  current  TEN-E  framework:  scope,  governance/infrastructure  planning, 
permitting  and  public  participation,  and  regulation.  A  preliminary  analysis  will  allow 
discarding  those  (sub-)options  with  the  least  positive  impact.  Table  1  provides  an 
overview of the policy options subject to assessment.  

23 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Overview of assessed policy options  

Policy option 

Description 

Option A.1. 
Option A.1.0 
Option A.1.1 

Option A.2 
Option A.2.0 
Option A.2.1 
Option A.2.2 

Option A.3 
Option A.3.0 
Option A.3.1 

Option B.1 
Option B.1.0 
Option B.1.1 
Option B.1.2 
Option B.2 
Option B.2.0 
Option B.2.1 
Option B.2.2 

Option C.1 
Option C.1.0 
Option C.1.1 
Option C.1.2 

Option D.1 
Option D.1.0 
Option D.1.1 

A) SCOPE 

Smart electricity grids and electricity storage 
Business as usual 
Broadened scope to reflect technological developments 
Sub-option: Non-mechanical storage 
Gas infrastructure, hydrogen networks and power-to-gas 
Business as usual 
Exclude all natural gas infrastructure but include hydrogen and P2G 
Exclude natural gas infrastructure but include hydrogen, P2G and smart gas 
grids for low-carbon and renewable gases 
Sub-option: Natural gas infrastructure for renewable and low-carbon gases 
Sub-option: Exceptions for natural gas PCIs (advanced implementation) 
Projects of mutual interest (PMIs) 
Business as usual 
Inclusion of projects of mutual interest (PMIs) 

B) GOVERNANCE / INFRASTRUCTURE PLANNING 

Offshore grids for renewable energy 
Business as usual 
Integrated offshore development plans 
Regional Independent System Operator / Joint Undertaking  
Cross-sectoral infrastructure planning 
Business as usual 
Strengthened governance and sustainability 
New governance set-up and expansion of scope and role of the TYNDP 

C) PERMITTING  

Permitting 
Business as usual 
Use of urgent court procedures 
One-stop shop per sea basin for offshore renewable infrastructure projects 

D) REGULATORY TREATMENT 

Regulatory treatment 
Business as usual 
Inclusion of full investment costs 

The  options  set  out  in  this  section  are  those  with  a  significant  potential  to  address  the 
problems  identified  above.  Additional  options  are  set  out  in  Annex  9.  These  options 
propose  changes  or  improvements  of  mainly  technical  nature  and  are  considered  non-
essential  in  view  of  their  potential  to  address  the  problem  drivers.  They  do  not  entail 
political choices concerning the future TEN-E Regulation.  

During  the  evaluation  study  and  the  stakeholder  consultations,  several  issues  were 
subject to a large consensus between stakeholders. They are not re-discussed in detail in 
this report, as their positive impacts and contribution to the objectives of the initiative are 
considered well accepted. These issues are the following: 

a)  Removal of oil pipelines as infrastructure category and thematic area: 

New cross-border oil pipelines are not in line with the long-term decarbonisation 
objectives.  The  Green  Deal,  and  the  relevant  interim  emission  reduction 
objectives,  put  the transport sector on a more dynamic decarbonisation  pathway 

24 

 
 
 
 
 
then earlier targets59. This is expected to drastically reduce oil demand and phase-
out  all  unabated  oil  consumption.  This  trend  and  the  already  existing  crude  oil 
supply  infrastructure  coupled  with  the  security  of  supply  measures  (e.g. 
emergency  oil  stocks)  does  not  necessitate  the  inclusion  of  oil  supply 
infrastructure in the revised TEN-E.  

b)  Removal  of  electricity  highways  as  infrastructure  category  and  thematic 

area: 
Electricity  highways  are  fully  covered  under  the  priority  electricity  corridors. 
Hence, the removal of electricity highways would not  affect  the outcome of the 
PCI  selection  procedure  but  simplify  the  process  and  remove  unnecessary 
administrative burden. 

5.1  What is the baseline from which options are assessed? 

In the baseline, the current TEN-E Regulation is assumed to continue. The provisions as 
described  above  would  continue  to  apply  and  constitute  the  basis  of  the  bi-annual 
selection of PCIs and their implementation. The Regulation is likely continue to deliver 
results/outcomes and impacts as shown in the evaluation (see Annex 5) and the expected 
benefits  from  future  PCIs.60  While  the  infrastructure  planning  and  the  PCI  selection 
process  would  not  change  in  substance,  a  methodology  to  assess  the  sustainability 
criterion for gas projects has been developed and may affect the number of gas projects 
on  future  PCI  lists  under  the  current  TEN-E  Regulation.  Investments  in  system 
integration  projects,  such  as  hydrogen  or  biogas,  would  happen  at  local  level  but  the 
necessary scaling up for an European market to emerge would be hampered because of 
lack of cross-border cooperation and planning framework. As for permitting, the existing 
Regional Groups could be used to support better enforcement of the existing provisions, 
which  may  improve  and  ultimately  shorten  project  implementation.  These  changes  are 
incremental and would not significantly affect the outputs, results/outcomes and impacts 
as  identified  in  the  evaluation.  At  the  same,  the  significant  progress  in  establishing  a 
resilient gas infrastructure is likely to decrease the number of natural gas candidate PCIs, 
whereas an increase of electricity candidate PCIs can be expected – within the limits of 
the  current  scope  of  the  Regulation.  In  addition,  external  factors  will  affect  the  PCI 
process. Adopted or planned policy initiatives such as the 2030 Climate Target Plan, the 
revision of the Energy Efficiency Directive, the Renewable Energy Directive, and the gas 
package  may  enter  into  force  and  increase  the  demand  for  energy  infrastructure.  The 
taxonomy  regulation  is  expected  to  influence  private  investments  towards  more 
sustainable  infrastructure  categories.  The  Covid-19  sanitary  crisis  is  likely  to  affect  the 
level of investments and may delay project implementation (see also section 2.3). 

59  COMMISSION  STAFF  WORKING  DOCUMENT  IMPACT  ASSESSMENT,  Stepping  up  Europe’s 
2030 climate ambition, SWD(2020) 176 final 
60 See modelling results in Ecorys et al. (2020): Support to the evaluation of Regulation (EU) No 347/2013 
on guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure, Draft final report 

25 

 
 
                                                 
5.2  Description of the policy options 

5.2.1  Scope 

5.2.1.1  Smart electricity grids and electricity storage 

Option A.1.0: Business as usual 

The  TEN-E  Regulation  defines  each  infrastructure  category  and  a  set  of  general  and 
specific  selection  criteria  for  PCI  projects.  The  criteria  for  a  smart  electricity  grid  is 
exhaustive and very detailed from a technical point of view and are thus  difficult to be 
met at the same time. Only a few smart grid projects have been eligible as PCIs to date, 
nine  in  total  since  the  adoption  of  the  first  PCI  List.  Concerning  electricity  storage  the 
current definition is limited to mechanical storage with 13 storage projects on the current 
PCI list. 

On  the  cross  border  criterion  for  the  smart  electricity  grids,  a  project  needs  to 
demonstrate  in  detail  the  involvement  of  the  project  promoters  (a  TSO  or  a  DSO  from 
two  or  more  Member  States,  or  from  at  least  one  Member  State  and  an  EEA  country). 
Since the concept of “involvement" is not clearly defined in the current Regulation, the 
current practice has provided further interpretation regarding the necessary support from 
a TSO level (not being a direct project promoter but supporting it in any case) . Under the 
current cross border criterion, only large hydro and compressed air storage facilities are 
eligible  for  PCI  status  for  electricity  storage,  prohibiting  utilisation  of  other  advanced 
electricity storage technologies such as batteries. 

Option A.1.1: Broadened scope to reflect technological developments 

The  definition  and  the  description  of  smart  electricity  grids  thematic  area  would  be 
updated  by  including  elements  regarding  innovation  and  digital  aspects  that  could  be 
considered  among  the  equipment  or  installations  for  smart  grids.  The  criteria  would  be 
adjusted  accordingly  to  reflect  the  broadened  scope.  Whereas  the  requirement  for  the 
involvement of project promotors from two or more Member States remains,  it would be 
clarified that not all involved DSOs and TSOs do not need to be project promoters, but it 
is important that the relevant TSOs and DSOs are duly informed about and supportive of 
the project. In addition, smart grid projects at TSO level, not involving DSOs, would also 
be allowed.  The update  would also  include a specific reference to  smart grids  enabling 
charging infrastructure for electric vehicles at the medium to high-voltage level. 

Sub-option: Non-mechanical storage technologies 

The  definition  of  electricity  storage  would  be  updated  by  including  elements  related  to 
new  technologies  utilised  for  electricity  storage.  Key  changes  would  be  to  define  new 
criteria  to  prove  significant  cross  border  impact  for  new  non-mechanical  storage 
technologies  (for  ex.  electrochemical  storage  in  batteries  or  chemical  storage  in 
hydrogen).  For non-mechanical  storage technologies new values for minimum  installed 
power in MW and energy capacity in MWh would be proposed. Those values would be 
smaller  compared  to  the  current  values  and  be  based  on  the  latest  Commission  storage 

26 

 
study61 and would need to be sufficiently high to ensure significant cross-border benefits. 
The current criteria would remain for mechanical storage facilities. 

This  would  allow  the  TEN-E  frameworks  integrate  technological  progress  necessary  to 
support a cost-efficient energy transition.   

Stakeholder  views:  Many  stakeholders  underline  the  significance  of  electricity 
distribution infrastructure in an interconnected European energy market that increasingly 
relies  on  distributed  generation  and  active  participation  of  end  consumers62.  In  this 
context,  many  stakeholders  pointed  out  a  necessary  update  of  smart  electricity  grids 
thematic area by including new smart technologies, solutions and concepts. Stakeholders 
suggested  that  the  current  eligibility  criteria  for  storage  technologies  do  not  provide 
sufficient flexibility for the support of different and emerging storage technologies. 

5.2.1.2  Gas infrastructure, hydrogen networks and power-to-gas 

Option A.2.0: Business as usual 

This policy option would keep the status quo regarding the scope of the Regulation with 
regard to gas infrastructure. Natural gas projects would remain eligible for PCI status and 
CEF  funding,  if  they  contribute  to  the  TEN-E  objectives.  Hydrogen,  power-to-gas 
facilities  and  smart  gas  grids  are  not  in  the  scope  of  the  regulation  and  therefore  not 
eligible  for  PCI  status,  nor  CEF  funding,  except  in  case  they  fall  under  the  new  cross-
border renewable window of CEF II coming into force under the 2021-2027 MFF.  

Retrofitting  to  allow  for  hydrogen  blends  and  projects  aiming  specifically  to  integrate 
renewable gases (biogas/biomethane) would remain eligible in principle (as long as they 
affect  the  transmission  infrastructure)  but  in  practice  unlikely  to  meet  all  the  current 
selection  criteria,  since  such  projects  typically  do  not  aim  at  increasing  cross-border 
transport capacity.  

Option A.2.1: Exclude all natural gas infrastructure, but include hydrogen and P2G  

Under  this  policy  option,  the  scope  of  the  TEN-E  Regulation  would  cover  only  the 
following projects:  

  Dedicated  new  and  repurposed  hydrogen  networks  with  cross  border  relevance 
(including  hydrogen  transmission  pipelines  and  related  equipment  such  as 
compressors; storage facilities; facilities for liquefied hydrogen). 

  Power-to-gas facilities and related infrastructure with cross-border relevance (i.e. 
aiming  to  supply  at  least  two  Member  States  and  consideration  of  setting  a 
capacity threshold  

61  Artelys/Trinomics/Enerdata  (2020):  Study  on  energy  storage  –  Contribution  to  the  security  of  the 
electricity  supply  in  Europe,  https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/a6eba083-932e-11ea-
aac4-01aa75ed71a1    
62  Stakeholder  views  are  briefly  summarised  for  each  sub-section,  for  further  details  on  the  different 
stakeholder positions see Annex 2. 

27 

 
                                                 
Only the above projects would be eligible for PCI status (apart from electricity and CO2 
transportation projects). All infrastructure projects related to the methane gas grid would 
be excluded from the scope.  

Policy option A.2.2: Exclude natural gas infrastructure but include hydrogen, P2G 
and smart gas grids for low-carbon and renewable gases  

In  addition  to  the  inclusion  of  new  and  repurposed  hydrogen  networks  and  P2G  (as 
described  in  the  previous  option),  a  new  PCI  category  would  be  created  for  smart  gas 
grids.  This  would  support  investments  at  distribution  and/or  transmission  level  to 
integrate  locally  produced  renewable  and  low  carbon  gases  (typically  biogas  and 
biomethane but also hydrogen) in the network and help manage a resulting more complex 
system,  building  on  innovative  technologies.  The  candidate  projects  would  consist  of  a 
range  of  investments  directed  at  "smartening"  and  decarbonising  a  given  gas  network. 
Some  of  the  investments  would  affect  the  TSO  level,  such  as  for  instance  compressor 
stations  to  enable  DSO-to-TSO  reverse  flow.  The  following  requirements  could  help 
ensure project scale and cross-border impact:  

  To require the involvement of DSOs and TSOs from at least two Member States 

(mirroring the cross-border criterion for smart electricity grids). 

  To require involvement of one or several DSOs as well as one or several TSOs. 
  To establish a threshold, for instance based on the number of consumers and/or 

energy consumption volume, similar as for smart electricity grids. 

Sub-option: Natural gas transport infrastructure for renewable and low-carbon gases 

Under  this  option,  natural  gas  projects  would  no  longer  be  eligible  for  PCI  status, 
regardless of their contribution to the TEN-E objectives. 

However, an exception could be made for gas infrastructure projects that specifically aim 
at  integrating  renewable  and  low-carbon  gases  (i.e.  biogas,  biomethane,  synthetic 
methane  produced  from  hydrogen,  or  pure  hydrogen)  into  the  existing  natural  gas 
(methane)  transmission  network.  This  exception  could  comprise  one  or  both  of  the 
following project types: 

1.  Newly  built  gas  transmission  infrastructure  projects  of  cross-border  relevance 
aiming  to  integrate  biomethane  and  synthetic  methane  into  the  European  gas 
network; 

2.  Retrofits  of  existing  natural  gas 

transmission  assets 

for  hydrogen 

admixtures/blends.  

While certain investments on the transmission level could also form part of a smart gas 
grid  project,  the  infrastructure  categories  under  this  exception  would  affect  exclusively 
the transmission level and would not necessarily involve any “smart” elements.  

Sub-option: Exceptions for natural gas PCIs at an advanced implementation stage 

28 

 
A further exception could be made (under either of the two policy options) for existing 
natural  gas PCI projects at  an  advanced stage of implementation  to  cater for legitimate 
expectations  by  the  affected  promoters.  This  would  mean  the  following:  existing  gas 
PCIs which are already under construction, or will start construction before [the end of 
2022]63, or for which a CEF grant agreement for works has been concluded before [the 
end  of  2022],  would  remain  eligible  for  PCI  status  under  current  rules  to  allow  the 
finalisation of these projects under a preferential treatment. There could be an additional 
limitation  which would  make the affected projects  eligible under the  current  rules only 
for the first list to be adopted under the revised TEN-E.  

The  choices  on  the  updated  gas  infrastructure  priorities  and  eligible  infrastructure 
categories will be reflected in the structure and objectives of the affected regional groups 
and thematic priority areas defined in the TEN-E Regulation.  

Table 2: Overview of policy options for gas infrastructure 

Gas policy options 
and infrastructure 
categories 

A.2.0: 
Business-as-
usual 

A.2.1: 
Hydrogen and 
P2G  

A.2.2: Green 
gas 
infrastructure 

Hydrogen networks 

Power-to-gas 

Smart gas grids 

Natural gas 
infrastructure 

Exception for advanced 
natural gas PCIs 

Exception for natural 
gas TSO  infrastructure 
to integrate biomethane 
and synthetic methane  

Exception for natural 
gas TSO retrofits for 
hydrogen admixtures  

X 

X 

X 

✔ 

NA 

(✔) 

(✔) 

✔ 

✔ 

X 

X 

✔ 

X 

X 

✔ 

✔ 

✔ 

X 

✔ 

✔ 

✔ 

Legend: ✔ : infrastructure category possibly included in the scope; (✔): included in principle but unlikely 
to meet (all) PCI eligibility criteria; X: excluded from the scope; NA: not applicable 

The  eligibility  for  CEF  financial  assistance  would  be  adjusted  to  the  infrastructure 
categories of the revised TEN-E Regulation, i.e. expand eligibility to all or some of those 
categories that were added, while those removed would by default be excluded from CEF 

63  Exact  date  tbd  –  but  should  be  sufficiently  early  before  the  establishment  of  the  first  list  under  the 
revised TEN-E Regulation. Counting with a legislative proposal in December 2020 and entry into force of 
the revised regulation in June 2022 (ambitious timeline of 1.5 years for co-decision), and counting with the 
6th  list  being  adopted  by  end-2023    –  requiring  sufficient  maturity  by  the  end  of  2022  seems  like  a 
meaningful working assumption for a cut-off date.  

29 

 
                                                 
financial assistance. For CEF financial assistance for works the same principles as under 
the  current  framework  (commercial  non-viability  and  externalities)  would  apply. 
However, as electrolysers would be already eligible for CEF financial assistance as cross-
border  projects  in  the  field  of  renewable  energy  under  CEF  II  (so-called  cross-border 
RES  window),  under  this  option  electrolysers  would  not  be  eligible  for  CEF  financial 
assistance under the future TEN-E Regulation. 

Stakeholder  views:  While  several  stakeholder  groups,  mainly  representing  TSOs  and 
industry  associations,  considered  the  inclusion  of  hydrogen  infrastructures,  smart  gas 
distribution  grids  as  well  as  power-to-gas  important,  there  was  mixed  support  notably 
from NGOs. Environmental NGOs in particular, but also some stakeholders representing 
the electricity sector, were against the inclusion of natural gas infrastructure in the future 
scope of TEN-E and voiced concerns about the sustainability of the new types of gases. 

5.2.1.3  Projects of mutual interest (PMIs) 

Option A.5.0: Business as usual 

Only projects, which are able to demonstrate socio-economic benefits for at least two EU 
Member  States  are  eligible  for  PCI  status.  Significant  cross-border  impact  needs  to  be 
demonstrated by meeting a certain capacity threshold.  

Option A.5.1: Inclusion of PMIs under the TEN-E Regulation  

The  status  of  projects,  which  are  able  to  demonstrate  significant  net  socio-economic 
benefits  for  at  least  two  EU  Member  State  and  at  least  one  third  country  could  be 
recognised  by  the  revised  TEN-E  Regulation  by  introducing  specific  criteria  for  such 
projects.  For  such  projects  to  obtain  a  priority  status,  the  conditions  of  regulatory 
approximation  with  the  EU  would  need  to  be  fulfilled,  and  the  projects  would  need  to 
contribute to the EU overall energy and climate objectives in terms of security of supply, 
decarbonisation. In addition, the third country, when supporting the priority status of the 
given project, would also commit to full support of the project in view of complying with 
a similar timeline for accelerated implementation and other policy support measures, as 
stipulated in the TEN-E Regulation. 

The presented options would not effect the very few projects with third countries which 
already qualify under the existing PCI eligibility criteria. 

This  would  allow 
the  EU  and 
neighbourhood  countries  that  is  mutually  beneficial  and  necessary  for  the  energy 
transition and the achievement of the climate targets.   

identifying  cross-border 

infrastructure  between 

Stakeholder views: There was mixed support among stakeholders to extend the scope of 
the  Regulation  to  Energy  Community  countries  and  other  third  countries.  Support  was 
mainly expressed by TSOs of Member States with borders to non-EU countries as well as 
non-EU  stakeholders.  Some  stakeholders  called  for  a  specific  regime  for  this  kind  of 
projects to ensure that similar regulatory standards are complied with. 

30 

 
5.2.2  Governance / Infrastructure planning 

5.2.2.1  Offshore grids for renewable energy 

The  offshore  grids  for  renewable  energy  is  a  transmission  infrastructure,  with  dual 
functionality:  interconnection  and  transport  of  offshore  renewable  energy  from  the 
offshore  generation  sites  to  two  or  more  Member  States  (thereafter  hybrid  grids).  The 
offshore  grid  can  also  include  the  Member  States  internal  high  voltage  transmission 
infrastructures  (new  or  reinforcements)  that  demonstrate  significant  necessity  for  the 
transport of offshore renewable energy to the consumption sites, as well as any offshore 
adjacent  equipment  or  installation  essential  to  operate  safely,  securely  and  efficiently, 
including protection, monitoring and control systems and necessary substations. 

Option B.1.0: Business as usual 

This  option would continue the incremental  development  of offshore  grids observed so 
far.  As  regards  planning,  ENTSO-E  would  identify  and  analyse  within  the  Regional 
Investment Plans (which are part of the ten-Year Network Development Plans package) 
the necessary regional offshore grid infrastructure. The identification of the infrastructure 
needs,  project  proposals  and  assessment  done  in  line  with  the  latest  available 
Commission scenarios and Member States commitments on offshore renewable energy. 
This enhanced TYNDP would be the basis for the PCI selection process.  

Option B.1.1 Integrated offshore development plans 

This  option  would  strengthen  the  cooperation  in  offshore  infrastructure  planning  and 
implementation. It would require Member States within each sea basin to jointly commit 
to the amount of the offshore renewable deployment for each sea basin64. In addition, it 
would mandate ENTSO-E, with the involvement of the relevant  TSOs  and in  line with 
the political  commitments, to  develop  offshore plans for time horizons 2030, 2040 and 
2050  respectively  for  all  the  sea  basins.  The  integrated  offshore  network  development 
plan is to be coherent with the TYNDP and developed under the Commission’s steering 
and  binding  opinion.  If,  based  on  ENTSO-E’s  report,  a  group  cannot  agree  on  an 
integrated offshore network development plan, or ENTSO-E does not develop such plans 
on time, the Commission may take over, possibly with input from a third party in view of 
having  an  integrated  offshore  network  development  plan  established  per  sea  basin. 
Finally,  this  option  would  include  a  requirement  for  the  Commission  to  develop  a 
specific cost-benefit and cost-sharing method for offshore infrastructure that will enable 
Member  States  to  properly  assess  the  direction  they  want  to  take  and  carry  out  a 
preliminary cost sharing procedure. 

Option B.1.2 Regional Independent System Operator / Joint Undertaking 

This  option  gives  the  task  of  offshore  grid  planning,  including  the  identification  of 
infrastructure gaps, proposal and implementation and offshore grids, investment per sea 

64 In line  with the NECPs, considering also the new ambition of the proposed Climate Target Plan, other 
national  and  regional  investment  plans,  renewable  potentials,  maritime  spatial  plans  and  environmental 
aspects 

31 

 
                                                 
basin and cross border cost allocation process for offshore infrastructures to a new entity, 
either a regional Independent System Operator or a Joint Undertaking e.g. per sea basin. 
A  single  entity  could  optimise  the  grid  planning  and  investment  per  sea  basin  more 
efficiently, than a group of TSOs. The entity would have to take over key responsibilities 
from the national TSOs. 

Options  B.1.1  and  B.1.2  would  allow  going  beyond  the  bottom-up  approach  to 
infrastructure planning for offshore infrastructure. 

Stakeholders  view:  Stakeholders  did  not  express  specific  views  on  the  future  offshore 
infrastructure  planning  regime.  However,  there  was  the  general  view  that  hybrid  assets 
and  meshed  offshore  wind  hubs  will  be  essential  for  the  development  of  offshore 
renewable energy in Europe.  

5.2.2.2  Cross-sectoral infrastructure planning 

Option B.2.0: Business as usual 

The  current  conditions  continue  to  apply  without  changes.  The  Electricity  and  Gas 
Regulations  mandate  the  ENTSOs  to  develop  every  two  years  their  respective  10-year 
Network  Development  Plans  (TYNDP)  and  give  ACER  the  power  to  deliver  a  non-
binding opinion on these plans. The Commission has no direct role in the development of 
these  plans.  The  sole  oversight  of  the  Commission  is  on  the  ENTSOs’  gas/electricity 
Cost-Benefit  Analysis  (CBA)  methodologies,  which  must  receive  approval  from  the 
Commission before their use in the TYNDPs and the PCI selection process. 

Sustainability is an integral part of the CBA methodologies for PCI selection. Under the 
TEN-E  framework,  sustainability  is  as  optional  criterion  alongside  security  of  supply, 
competition  or  market  integration.  Although  in  practice  the  Cost-Benefit  Analysis 
methodology provides leeway to prioritise some criteria over others, prioritisation is not 
enshrined  in  the  current  TEN-E  text.  Thus,  keeping  the  current  frame  would  allow  a 
project  with  negative  impact  on  the  sustainability  criterion  but  good  results  on  other 
criteria be selected as PCI. 

Option B.2.1: Strengthened governance and sustainability 

This  option  entails  maintaining  the  current  governance  of  the  TYNDPs  and  the  role  of 
the ENTSOs with significant improvements in the Commission and ACER oversight on 
the  TYNDP.  This  includes  in  particular  three  elements.  First,  a  strengthened  oversight 
role for the Commission, through means of binding opinions, on the ENTSOs’ scenarios 
and  system  needs  identification,  which  are  key  steps  in  the  process  to  deliver  the 
TYNDPs and define what infrastructures are needed. This would allow the Commission 
to safeguard the alignment of the ENTSOs’ scenarios to climate and energy targets and 
Commission scenarios, along with the improved identification of the infrastructure needs. 

Second,  a  reinforced  role  for  ACER  in  the  development  of  scenarios  and  in  the  Cost-
Benefit  Analysis  methodology  by  mandating  the  Agency  to  develop  framework 
guidelines for the ENTSOs’ scenarios and approve incremental improvements of the Cost 
Benefit  methodology.  Third,  a  deeper  interlinkage  between  the  sectoral  TYNDPs  to 
reinforce  their  contribution  to  the  energy  system  integration  process  and  increased 
participation of the DSOs in the planning process.  

32 

 
This option would also require the inclusion of a mandatory sustainability criterion for all 
infrastructure categories with at least one other criterion (market integration, security of 
supply, competition) at the stage of project selection. The relevance of each criterion in 
the  ranking  of  the  projects  would  be  defined  in  the  assessment  methodology  for  the 
ranking  of  the  candidate  projects.  This  methodology  is  discussed  and  validated  by  the 
regional  groups  as  under  the  current  TEN-E  Regulation65.  While  the  details  of  the 
assessment  methodology  would  be  agreed  by  the  regional  groups,  all  candidate  project 
would need to contribute to at least the sustainability criterion.  

Option B.2.2: New governance set-up and expansion of the scope and the role of the 
TYNDP 

This  option  would  establish  a  new  governance  set-up  for  the  TYNDPs  and  expand  the 
scope of the TYNDP in order to integrate energy system-wide cost-efficiency. Through a 
governance  reform,  a  neutral  actor  (such  as  the  Commission  or  ACER)  would  take  a 
leading role in the TYNDPs development. Within this frame, the Commission or ACER 
would not be responsible of delivering any opinion or approval of the ENTSOs work as 
in  option  B2.1.  Instead,  the  neutral  actor  will  be  responsible  of  the  entire  planning 
process, meaning developing scenarios and the associated data, run market and network 
studies  to  identify  infrastructure  gaps  within  electricity  and  gas  sectors,  assess  the 
benefits of possible and draft and publish the planning reports. The role of ENTSOs and 
TSOs  would  be  limited  to  providing  information  given  their  unique  expertise  in 
networks.  This  option  would  also  require  the  inclusion  of  a  mandatory  sustainability 
criterion for all infrastructure categories as per option B.2.1. 

Options B.2.1 and B.2.2 would allow overcoming the sectoral approach to infrastructure 
planning  and  ensuring  that  sustainability  will  be  considered  during  the  PCI  selection 
process. 

Stakeholders  view:  ACER  and  a  majority  of  other  stakeholders,  while  recognising  the 
merits  of  having  the  ENTSOs’  expertise  in  the  process,  asked  for  a  stronger  oversight 
from the Commission and ACER on scenarios, cost-benefit analysis and identification of 
system  needs.  There  is  a  large  consensus  among  stakeholders  that  the  importance  of 
sustainability in the PCI selection process of the (decarbonised) gas projects needs to be 
reinforced. Some categories of stakeholders also underline the importance of maintaining 
strong  weighting  for  other  criteria,  in  particular  security  of  supply,  in  a  multi-criteria 
selection approach. 

5.2.3  Permitting and public participation66 

Option C.1.0 Business as usual 

The permitting provisions in the TEN-E Regulation, which are very innovative and have 
already  proven  their  effectiveness  with  the  permitting  duration  of  PCIs  decreasing 
significantly, would remain unchanged.  

65 See Annex 8 for more information. 
66 For improving  the readability of the report,  we  maintained in the  man text only political options,  with 
additional options of a technical nature being include and assessed in Annex 8. 

33 

 
                                                 
Option C.1.1: Use of urgent court procedures 

While  the  evaluation  of  the  TEN-E  Regulation  finds  that  the  underlying  reasons  for 
permitting  delays  are  to  a  large  extent  related  to  national  implementation  and,  mainly, 
outside the scope of the TEN-E Regulation,  some aspects could still be tackled at Union 
level that would allow a swifter implementation of PCIs. For example, the length of PCI 
related court procedures was not tackled in the current TEN-E Regulation, but appears, in 
accordance  with  the  stakeholders  views,  to  be  a  factor  that  could  delay  project 
implementation. 

Administrative appeal procedures and judicial remedies before a court or tribunal do not 
fall within the time limit prescribed for the permitting process of 3.5. years meaning that 
their duration, if they happen, adds on to the project implementation delay. To accelerate 
the  completion  of  the  permitting  process,  Member  States,  which  already  have  urgent 
court procedures under national legislation in other  domains, would have to ensure that 
these accelerated litigation procedures are applicable to PCIs under national legislations.  

Option  C1.2:  One-stop  shop  per  sea  basin  for  offshore  renewable  infrastructure 
projects  

The  one-stop  shop  would  issue  the  comprehensive  decisions  for  the  infrastructure 
elements for offshore projects by coordinating all the national and regional permits to be 
obtained  within  the  3.5  years  time-limit  and  ensure  that  offshore  projects  do  not 
encounter  delays  beyond  this  period.  It  would  enable  coordination  between  the 
permitting  process  for  the  infrastructure  and  the  one  for  the  generation  assets  and  it 
would act as a single point of contact for project promoters and a repository of existing 
sea basin studies and plans, which would facilitate the permitting of individual projects. 
The  one  stop  shop  would  be  comprised  of  staff  from  all  the  already  existing  national 
permitting one-stop shops. This option is complementary to the ones mentioned above. 

Options C1.1 and C1.2 would allow shortening permitting procedures.  

Stakeholder  views:  While  a  series  of  stakeholders  pointed  to  the  difficulties  with 
complex  and  lengthy  permitting  process  for  offshore  projects  crossing  several 
jurisdictions and called for a simplified permitting process, no stakeholder expressed any 
specific  opinion  on  a  possible  new  one-stop-shop  for  offshore  wind  projects. 
Stakeholders involved in the permitting procedures indicated that several  notions in the 
permitting  chapter  could  be  clarified  (see  additional  options  in  Annex  9).  Stakeholders 
also raised the delay with the court and appeal procedures regarding PCIs and called for 
streamlines court procedures for PCIs. 

5.2.4  Regulatory treatment67 

Option D.1.0: Business as usual  

67 For improving the readability of the report, the main text includes only political options, with additional 
options of a technical nature being included and assessed in Annex 9. 

34 

 
                                                 
The current CBCA provisions, which provide the principles and tools to ensure that costs 
are  allocated  cross-border  in  an  orderly  manner  enabling  the  development  of  such 
projects, would be maintained. However, in practice this means that the CBCA procedure 
would  be  used  only  as  a  pre-requisite  for  requesting  CEF  grants  for  work  and  the 
provisions would not reach their potential in enabling projects implementation.  

Option D.1.1: Inclusion of full investment costs 

This option aims at ensuring consistency between the CBCA decisions and safeguarding 
the primary goal of the CBCA. This would entail a two-stage approach in which: (i) The 
NRAs would allocate all investment costs across borders and include them in full in the 
national tariffs and, afterwards, if necessary, (ii) assess whether any affordability issues 
arise as regards the increase in tariffs due to the inclusion of such costs. The NRAs would 
always assess how much a certain  project  would  cost  if it were paid  for completely by 
tariffs  and  this  should  be  the  basis  for  the  affordability  test  and,  ultimately,  for 
calculating any public financing. 

This would allow for a better implementation and use of the cost sharing tools. 

5.3  Options discarded at an early stage 

  Expand CO2 infrastructure category to include CO2 transport by ship and 
infrastructure necessary for the permanent geological storage of CO2 

Mainly  stakeholders  representing  the  CO2  industry  argued  for  the  inclusion  of  CO2 
transport  by  ship  and  infrastructure  necessary  for  the  permanent  geological  storage  of 
CO2in  the  TEN-E  Regulation.  The  transport  infrastructure  category  would  be  enlarged 
from  only  pipeline  infrastructure  to  also  include  shipping  infrastructure,  both  the 
facilities necessary to enable shipping as the actual ships themselves, and infrastructure 
related to CO2 storage.  

However, it is not clear how the inclusion of transport with mobile assets such as ships in 
the  TEN-E  Regulation  would  help  the  implementation  of  such  projects.  There  are  no 
regulatory  or  administrative  barriers  in  relation  to  cross-border  networks  that  could  be 
addressed by the provisions in the TEN-E Regulation. The key barrier to the deployment 
of CO2 infrastructure, including for the geological storage of CO2 and shipping, is access 
to  financing.68  The  only  benefit  sought  by  such  projects  being  eligible  for  PCI  status 
would  be  that  they  may  get  access  to  CEF  financial  assistance.  However,  the  key 
objectives of the TEN-E is to support the timely implementation of infrastructure projects 
of cross-border nature where CEF financial assistance is only one element as a last resort 
financing  option.  Moreover,  such  expansion  would  not  relate  to  transmission  networks 
and interconnections in accordance with the legal base. Other EU and national financing 
instruments  are  available  to  support  CO2  infrastructure  for  geological  storage  and 
shipping such as the Innovation Fund. 

68  Ecofys  (2018):  Market  testing  for  low-carbon  innovation  support  to  energy  intensive  industry  and  to 
power 
https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/906bea83-b6fe-11e8-99ee-
01aa75ed71a1  

generation, 

35 

 
                                                 
 

Projects to reduce methane leakage 

Methane  leakage  projects  would  be  unlikely  to  demonstrate  cross-border  impact. 
Methane  leakage  projects  consist  of  retrofits  and  repairs  of  different  elements  of  a  gas 
network. They often do not involve capital investments but rather network management 
and repair methods (more related to operational expenses). The investments involved are 
often targeted at the distribution level, which is responsible for around 60% of methane 
emissions from  gas operations in  Europe. Such investments  are therefore per definition 
related  to  one  country’s  network  and  aim  at  improving  the  efficiency  of  the  network 
operation  and  emission  savings  but  do  not  aim  at  increasing  cross-border  capacity, 
neither  do  they  have  indirect  effects  on  cross-border  trade  or  capacities.  Therefore, 
projects  specifically  aiming  at  methane  leakage  reductions  do  not  really  fit  the 
intervention logic of the TEN-E Regulation nor under the concept of projects of common 
interest  of  a  trans-European  importance.  Based  on  IEA  data,  the  gas  industry  itself  has 
cost-effective  options  to  make  its  contribution  to  methane  emission  reductions  by 
deploying best available technologies for the various gas chain elements and processes; 
and by adopting best practices and implementing leak detection and repair programmes.  

  Removing cross-border requirements for smart electricity projects (inclusion 

of pure DSO level projects at local level) 

Different stakeholders have called for the eligibility of all smart electricity grid projects, 
also those with no involvement of TSOs, for PCI status. With 2 400 DSOs in Europe, the 
potential number of eligible projects would be very high. At the same time, without the 
involvement  of  a  TSO,  it  would  be  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  demonstrate  a 
significant  cross-border  impact  for  such  projects.  It  would  not  be  in  line with  the  legal 
base, which requires a clear link to the transmission level. The required resources for the 
selection  process  would  be  disproportionate  in  view  of  the  projects  that  could  actually 
qualify. The inclusion of projects at a DSO level and hence without a (significant) cross-
border  impact  would  neither  imply  more  investments  at  the  distribution  level  nor  an 
easier  implementation  process  for  such  projects.  To  the  contrary,  it  may  rather  create 
wrong  expectations  and  add  unnecessary  burden  on  all  parties  involved  in  the  PCI 
selection process. 

  Heat networks as new infrastructure category 

Some stakeholders such as heat network operators argued for the inclusion of smart heat 
networks  in  the  TEN-E  Regulation  as  this  could  bring  benefits  in  terms  of  system 
integration.  However,  heat  networks  are  local  in  nature  with  no  or  very  limited  cross-
border impact. There are no heat transmission networks as it is not efficient to transport 
heat  over  long  distances.  European  infrastructure  planning  for  the  purpose  of 
interconnections and interoperability is therefore not needed for heat networks. 

Additional  discarded  options  of  more  technical  nature,  also  based  on  the  evaluation 
results and stakeholder views, are included in Annex 7 and relate to the following topics: 
breaking the link between the CBCA and CEF financing, conditional CBCA decisions, 
and the easing of environmental and location approvals for PCIs. 

36 

 
6  WHAT ARE THE IMPACTS OF THE POLICY OPTIONS? 

The  assessment  of  the  impacts  of  each  policy  option  relies  to  a  large  extent  on  a 
qualitative approach looking at the main environmental, economic, and social impacts as 
well as administrative burden, if applicable. It  was not possible to quantify the impacts 
for  all  options  because  the  specifics  of  future  PCIs  would  need  to  be  available  for  that 
purpose which is particularly challenging for new or emerging infrastructure categories. 
Moreover,  many  of  the  proposed  changes  are  mainly  improvements  to  the  current 
framework, which has been deemed to work relatively well and broadly meet its aims.  

Relevant  sectoral  studies  or  literature  are  used  to  provide  a  quantitative  indication  of 
certain  impacts  even  if  their  scope  is  not  limited  to  PCIs.  While  PCIs  as  cross-border 
infrastructure  project  cover  a  comparatively  small  number  of  energy  infrastructure 
projects and needs in Europe, they constitute key infrastructure projects that enable and 
trigger additional investments with impacts beyond the direct benefits of the projects of 
common interest.  

The TEN-E Regulation  does not impose obligations on economic operators, but it does 
set requirements on promoters of PCIs, mainly TSOs and DSOs, which decide to apply 
for PCI status and subsequently become subject to certain obligations, mainly in the form 
of  monitoring  and  reporting  obligations.  In  addition,  the  TEN-E  Regulation  sets 
obligations  on  competent  national  authorities  and  regulators  concerning  permitting, 
regulatory  incentives,  and  public  participation  as  well  as  on  network  operators 
concerning long-term network planning. Consumers are mainly affected through network 
tariffs to finance investments in the regulatory asset base (RAB).  

6.1  Scope 

6.1.1  Smart electricity grids end electricity storage 

Option A.1.0: Business as usual 

To  keep  the  current  eligibility  criteria  would  imply  that  the  smart  electricity  grids 
thematic  area  remains  restricted  and  only  accessible  for  a  limited  number  of 
infrastructure  projects.  In  the  case  of  electricity  storage,  it  would  imply  that  it  remains 
limited to large mechanical/hydro storage projects. In the case of smart electricity grids, 
digitalisation  and  innovation  in  the  grids  creates  would  not  sufficiently  reflect  recent 
technologies  and  hence  potential  positive  environmental,  economic  and  social  impacts 
would  not  be  enough  exploited  (see  below).  Regulatory  frameworks  and  regulatory 
practice in the Member States in many cases do not sufficiently support innovative grid 
investments by the TSOs or even constitute a barrier to such investments.69 

Option A.1.1: Broadened scope to reflect technological developments 

Environmental impacts  

69 Ecorys 2019, Do currrent regulatory frameworks in the EU support innovation and security of supply in 
electricity and gas grids. 

37 

 
                                                 
The broadened scope for electricity smart grids would support the changing infrastructure 
and  system  security  needs  with  a  higher  uptake  of  innovation  and  digitalisation  in  the 
grids. Over 90% of distributed renewable energy generation will most likely continue to 
be connected at distribution grid level70. Consumers, mostly connected to the distribution 
grid, are allowed to  provide demand-side flexibility,  with  120 GW-150 GW of flexible 
load  available  by  2045.  The  ongoing  rollout  of  smart  metering  will  boost  this 
development.  Further  synergies  with  the  TEN-T  Regulation  would  help  to  enhance  the 
future  charging  infrastructure  for  electric  vehicles  and  would  benefit  users  of  electric 
vehicles  by  supporting  smart  grid  projects  enabling  charging  infrastructure  for  electric 
vehicles. It is expected that the vehicle stock share of electric cars will increase to up to 
11% by 203071 from currently below 1%. Electric vehicles with “smart charging” could 
provide  capacity  for  flexibility  and  demand  response.  These  use  cases  alone  or  as 
elements of virtual power plant platforms could become an important interface between 
energy and mobility, since digital infrastructure is a key enabler for the energy transition 
in these two sectors with a significant greenhouse gas reduction potential. While TEN-E 
would  only  cover  smart  grid  projects  with  a  cross-border  impact,  these  projects  could 
make a significant impact to ensure interoperability across Member States. 

Sub-option: Non-mechanical storage technologies 

The estimated daily flexibility required to be provided by electricity storage in 2030 is 97 
GW  for  EU-2772.  Electricity  storage  provides  flexibility  to  the  power  system  operation 
and decreases the need for new power lines within the power system73. In certain cases 
energy storage systems can be deployed faster than transmission lines and have a smaller 
footprint than transmission projects eliminating environmental impacts from construction 
of  those  projects74.  The  increased  demand  of  different  storage  technologies,  especially 
electrochemical (batteries) would support development and usage of new, more advanced 
storage systems, decreasing the overall impact on the environment. 

Higher  uptake  of  electric  storage  in  the  form  of  batteries  would  result  in  potential 
emissions  associated  with  the  production  of  batteries.  However,  the  emission  factors 
calculated vary significantly depending on the type of battery in terms of materials and 
energy  density  and  the  source  of  energy  used  for  its  production.  However,  it  is 
anticipated that the potential environmental impacts could decrease very significantly. In 
its 2019 Strategic Action Plan on Batteries75, the Commission points to the importance of 
improved  recycling  processes,  and  an  extension  of  the  battery  lifetime.  Re-use  of 
batteries in stationary applications can reduce environmental impacts over the life- cycle.  

Economic impacts  

70 Eurelectric (2019): The Value of the Grid,  https://cdn.eurelectric.org/media/3921/value-of-the-grid-final-2019-030-
0406-01-e-h-D1C80F0B.pdf  
71  COMMISSION  STAFF  WORKING  DOCUMENT  IMPACT  ASSESSMENT,  Stepping  up  Europe’s 
2030 climate ambition, SWD(2020) 176 final 
72  Artelys/Trinomics/Enerdata  (2020):  Study  on  energy  storage  –  Contribution  to  the  security  of  the 
electricity  supply  in  Europe,  https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/a6eba083-932e-11ea-
aac4-01aa75ed71a1 
73 IEA Energy Storage Study 2020, https://www.iea.org/reports/energy-storage  
74 FLUENCE 2019 White Paper, Redrawing the Network Map: Energy Storage as Virtual Transmission 
75 COM(2019) 176 final 

38 

 
                                                 
A  broadened  scope  of  smart  grids  would  increase  the  network  operational  efficiency 
through  the  implementation  of  flexibility  features  of  existing  HVDC  (High  Voltage 
Direct Connection) cables and the enhancement of the exploitation of demand-response 
management  services  based  on  the  increased  cross-border  data  and  capacity  exchange, 
together with the provision of ancillary services between the related TSOs and/or DSOs. 
In  addition,  cross-border  smart  electricity  grids  facilitate  the  growing  penetration  of 
renewable  energy  sources  in  the  grid  and  enable  a  better  integration  of  the  behaviours 
and actions of all users connected to the network across borders. 

In  the  light  of  changing  infrastructure  and  system  security  needs,  this  policy  option 
would contribute to stimulate the use and implementation of new innovative technologies 
and  activities  in  the  domain  of  digital  technologies,  which  will  enhance  the  already 
existing  positive  impact  of  cross-border  smart  electricity  grids.  Development  of  new 
standards  and  technology  for  the  interoperability  of  smart  grid  systems  with  increased 
reliability and cybersecurity protection would be further supported across borders.  

Comprehensive control and monitoring of the grid would reduce the need for curtailment 
of  renewables  and  enable  competitive  and  innovative  energy  services  for  consumers. 
According to  the  IEA, investments  in  enhanced  digitalisation would reduce curtailment 
in  Europe  by  67  TWh  by  204076.  Electricity  storage  could  simultaneously  reduce  the 
volatility  of  the  electricity  prices,  reduce  the  cost  of  the  electricity  system  increasing 
energy efficiency and facilitate a higher share of variable renewable energy sources in the 
energy  system77.  Due  to  lack  of  data,  it  is  not  possible  to  quantify  the  potential  cross-
border  impact  for  non-mechanical  storage  projects.  However,  at  this  stage  it  would  be 
difficult  for  non-mechanical  storage  technologies  (for  ex.  electrochemical  storage  in 
batteries  or  chemical  storage  in  hydrogen)  to  meet  cross-border  criteria  to  prove  a  
significant  cross-border  impact.  The  opportunities  provided  by  energy  storage  are 
increasingly  supported  by  the  momentum  in  research  and  innovation  making  the 
European economy more competitive.  

This  option  would  allow  more  market  players  to  get  involved  in  smart  electricity 
projects. The updated eligibility criteria would enable TSO/TSO cooperation in the area 
of smart grids, where DSO/DSO combinations would still be possible with the respective 
TSO  support.  To  open  the  possibility  to  purely  TSO  level  projects  would  enhance  the 
number  of  cross-border  smart  electricity  grids  to  be  developed  under  the  TEN-E 
framework, which are unlikely to happen otherwise. 

Social impacts  

The digitalisation of the grid and metering would facilitate customer participation  in  all  
stages  of  the  development  and  expansion  of  the  energy system by digital tools such 
as participative geographical systems and new energy market arrangements78. This would 

EC 

“Role 

report 

76 with demand-response accounting for 22 TWh and storage accounting for 45 TWh - IEA 2016 
77 
2017, 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/swd2017_61_document_travail_service_part1_v6.pd
f  
78  E.g.  ETIP  SNET  (2018):  DIGITALIZATION  OF  THE  ENERGY  SYSTEM  AND  CUSTOMER 
PARTICIPATION:  Description  and  recommendations  of  Technologies,  Use  Cases  and  Cybersecurity, 

electricity 

February 

storage”, 

energy 

of 

in 

39 

 
                                                 
 
allow consumers to directly benefit from a more competitive energy market and monetise 
the flexibility in their consumption patterns.  

6.1.2  Gas infrastructure, hydrogen networks and power-to-gas 

Policy  options  A.2  combine  different  infrastructure  categories.  The  overall  impact  of 
these  options  depends  on  the  impacts  stemming  from  the  individual  infrastructure 
categories included under each option. 

Option A.2.0: Business as usual 

Hydrogen networks,  power-to-gas projects,  smart gas  grids would remain out  of scope. 
Green  gas-related  transmission  infrastructure  projects  are  in  the  scope  but  unlikely  to 
meet the cross-border criterion. This option would mean that, as regards gas, the TEN-E 
would keep its focus on natural gas transmission infrastructure and fail to accommodate 
renewable  and  low  carbon  gas  projects.  Although  the  number  of  natural  gas  PCIs  is 
expected to decrease in the coming years (see section 5.1), the continued focus on natural 
gas  and  failing  to  stimulate  the  decarbonisation  of  the  gas  sector  would  significantly 
weaken TEN-E’s potential contribution to greenhouse gas emission reduction. 

Environmental impacts 

Continued PCI status for new natural gas infrastructure is not compatible with the long-
term  decarbonisation  objectives.  A  reduction  of  natural  gas  demand  is  expected  in  all 
decarbonisation  pathways  developed  by  the  Commission:  even  in  business-as-usual, 
demand for natural gas shrinks by 13% between 2015 and 2030 and, by 2050, natural gas 
is expected to be largely replaced by alternative renewable and low-carbon gaseous fuels 
in  all  decarbonisation  scenarios79.  Infrastructure  projects  create  assets  with  a  long 
lifetime (e.g. a gas pipeline can be used for 50 years or more) and would contribute to a 
lock  in  to  the  use  of  fossil  fuels  which  is  inconsistent  with  the  long-term  climate 
neutrality objective.  

Economic impacts 

Keeping  natural  gas  PCIs  in  the  scope  of  the  regulation  creates  risks  of  financing 
stranded  assets  because  there  is  no  need  for  policy  support  for  additional  cross-border 
natural  gas  infrastructure.  The  TEN-E  framework  has  been  successful  in  delivering  a 
secure and well-interconnected gas grid in Europe (see section Annex 5), which is largely 
sufficient to guarantee security of gas supply for consumers and to enable closer market 
integration.  The  evaluation  report80  confirms  that  the  existing  gas  infrastructure  allows 

https://www.etip-snet.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/ETIP-SNET-Position-Paper-on-Digitalisation-short-
for-web.pdf  
79 IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS IN SUPPORT OF THE COMMISSION COMMUNICATION COM(2018) 773 
A Clean Planet for all, A European long-term strategic vision for a prosperous, modern, competitive and 
climate 
economy, 
neutral 
https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/clima/files/docs/pages/com_2018_733_analysis_in_support_en_0.pdf  
80  REKK  study  concluded  that  Europe  overall  benefited  significantly  from  the  implementation  of  the 
already commissioned PCIs which are estimated to bring more than 132 m€ of socio-economic benefit per 
year,  leading  to  an  increase  in  trading  of  42.5  TWh/year  and  an  increase  in  LNG  flow  of  around  18.3 
TWh/year. 

40 

 
                                                                                                                                                 
access for a wide range of supplies and it is resilient in a number of disruption cases. This 
understanding is also supported REKK’s previous modelling81 along with the ENTSOG 
TYNDP results82. REKK concluded that there are no isolated markets in the EU and the 
market players can make good use of the substantial LNG terminal and storage capacities 
when  market  circumstances  are  favourable,  as  in  2019-2020.  Today  Europe  enjoys  a 
resilient  gas  network,  where  gas  prices  are  in  majority  correlated  and  infrastructure 
capacities are auctioned and used to provide the necessary flexibility to the market83. In a 
similar  vein,  ACER’s  latest  monitoring  report  on  the  incremental  capacity  procedure 
concludes that no market demand seems to exist for additional cross-border gas transport 
capacity. From 55 non-binding demand assessment phase projects, only five proceeded to 
the binding stage and none received sufficient market coverage to be realised.84  

The remaining and already well-identified natural gas infrastructure needs are primarily 
in the Eastern Baltic Sea region, the Central and South-Eastern part of Europe, and those 
needs can be addressed by the most advanced gas PCIs in the 4th PCI list. The evaluation 
study shows that the implementation of the most advanced projects would further reduce 
price  differentials  across  EU  countries.  However,  the  relatively  small  incremental 
benefits are also an indication that building even further natural gas projects do not seem 
justified from a security of supply, market integration or solidarity point of view.85  Nor 
would  it  align  well  with  the  more  ambitious  climate  objectives  of  the  European  Green 
Deal. 

Following the implementation of the existing gas PCIs, there is no need for support for 
additional  cross-border  natural  gas  infrastructure  or  LNG  terminals.  If  there  is  market 
demand for new capacity, it can be met through  the appropriate internal  energy market 
rules  (incremental  procedure  under  the  Network  Code  for  Capacity  Allocation  and 
Congestion  Management)  but  the  priority  status  coming  with  a  PCI  label  is  no  longer 
justified.  

Social impacts 

81 European Commission (2018) Quo vadis EU gas market regulatory framework –Study on a Gas Market 
Design for Europe, https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/quo_vadis_report_16feb18.pdf  
82ENTSO-G (2017), Ten Year Network Development Plan 2017,  
83  See  ACER  monitoring  reports,  eg.  ACER/CEER:  Annual  Report  on    the    Results  of  Monitoring  the 
Internal Natural Gas Markets in 2018  
84 ACER: Monitoring update on incremental capacity projects and virtual interconnection points, July 
2020, available at:  
https://www.acer.europa.eu/Official_documents/Acts_of_the_Agency/Publication/ACER%20Monitoring%
20update%20on%20incremental%20capacity%20projects%20and%20virtual%20interconnection%20point
s.2020.pdf  
85  REKK  modelling  concluded  that  by  implementing  all  the  advanced  gas  projects  (i.e.  those  that  have 
already  made  a  final  investment  decision)  from  the  4th  PCI  list,  Europe  would  have  a  decrease  in  price 
dispersion  of  about  EUR0.69/MWh  (reaching  EUR0.83/MWh  if  all  PCIs  on  the  4th  PCI  list  were  to  be 
build).  Although  minor,  this  decrease  in  average  wholesale  price  illustrates  that  on  some  markets  these 
projects  may bring incremental benefits.  Regarding  trade, all PCIs of the 4th PCI list  would decrease the 
total  flow  levels  on  the  network  by  1%,  showing  therefore  that  the  European  network  infrastructure  is 
adequate to serve the demand and PCIs from the fourth list will mostly help only with the better utilisation 
of the grid by providing shorter routes and route diversification. These messages are also supported by an 
internal JRC study run in parallel on the same topic. 

41 

 
                                                 
Support for stranded assets would inevitably translate into higher tariffs for consumers, 
thereby rendering the energy transition slower and less affordable.  

Option A.2.1: Exclude all natural gas infrastructure but include hydrogen and P2G 

Economic impacts 

A condition for a widespread use of hydrogen as an energy carrier in the European Union 
is the availability of dedicated cross-border hydrogen infrastructure. Today, the existing 
hydrogen networks are not regulated assets; they are typically privately owned pipelines 
connecting specific production and consumption sites. This is expected to change in the 
future, as hydrogen use expands and its transportation is expected to happen over longer 
distances.  Hydrogen  networks  –  which  may  initially  be  restricted  to  isolated  local 
distribution  grids  and  later  national  hydrogen  networks  –  will,  starting  around  2030, 
increasingly be connected to create an internal market for hydrogen and offer benefits in 
terms of competition and security of supply.86 This may have a profound impact on the 
pattern  of  gas  flows  in  Europe:  countries  with  renewable  power  generation  potential, 
where  green  hydrogen  can  be  produced,  may  become  hydrogen  exporters,  while 
consumption centres would be importers.  

There  is  today  no  systematic  network  planning  for  hydrogen  infrastructure  at  EU  or 
national  level.  The  TEN-E  framework  could  facilitate  the  European  level  planning  for 
hydrogen infrastructure. Depending on future developments, the planning and assessment 
of hydrogen network could either be based on the TYNDP or  the TEN-E could require 
that  hydrogen  projects  to  apply  for  PCI  status  in  the  context  of  a  hydrogen  network 
development plan, developed by the affected countries and/or project promoters87 which 
would reduce costs. Coordinated planning would allow for a more efficient utilisation of 
resources  and  locations,  save  costs,  and  speed  up  implementation.  Without  coordinated 
network planning, the resulting infrastructure risks being fragmented along national lines 
and hindering the emergence of an EU internal market for hydrogen. The location of P2G 
facilities with a cross-border relevance will be crucial for the planning of hydrogen grids. 
P2G facilities are also essential enablers for energy system integration, as they will create 
links  between  gas  and  electricity  systems,  facilitating  the  decarbonisation  of  hard-to-
decarbonize sectors, such as heavy goods transport or industry.88  

Future  hydrogen  networks  are  expected  to  consist  to  a  great  extent  of  infrastructure 
converted  to  hydrogen  from  existing  natural  gas  assets,  however  new  production  and 
consumption  centres  for  hydrogen  may  also  require  the  construction  of  new  assets 

86 For instance, up to 70% of additional demand for green hydrogen projected by German TSOs for 2025 
and 2030 is expected to be covere by imports of decarbonised hydrogen from the Netherlands (FNB Gas: 
Gas Network Development Plan 2020-2030, p. 142). European gas TSOs expect that a European hydrogen 
backbone  would  start  to  emerge  from  around  2030  and  the  initial  regional  clusters  would  progressively 
expand into a truly European hydrogen transport network (see European Hydrogen Backbone, report by 11 
European  gas  TSOs,  July  2020,  available  at:  https://gasforclimate2050.eu/sdm_downloads/european-
hydrogen-backbone/). 
87 This would be on analogy of CO2 networks which are also not included in a TYNDP. Depending on the 
infrastructure category, PCI status is not limited to projects that are included in a TYDNP. 
88 See A hydrogen strategy for a climate-neutral Europe, COM(2020) 301 final; and Powering a climate-
neutral economy: An EU Strategy for Energy System Integration, COM(2020) 299 final 

42 

 
                                                 
specifically for hydrogen.89  It  is  therefore important  to  include both  of those categories 
into  the  TEN-E.  The  conversion  of  existing  natural  gas  assets  into  dedicated  hydrogen 
pipelines  is  up  to  90%  cheaper  than  new  build90,  thus  this  can  ensure  a  more  cost-
effective pathway to the deployment of hydrogen infrastructure and avoid stranded assets 
in  the  existing  gas  network.  The  rollout  of  hydrogen  infrastructure  will  require 
coordinated planning, taking into account the location of supply and demand (see section 
6.2.2).  

The  International  Energy  Agency  (IEA)  estimates  that  the  transmission  of  hydrogen  as 
gas  by  pipeline  is  the  cheapest  option.91  Transporting  renewable  energy  in  the  form  of 
green hydrogen via pipeline offers a cost-effective solution to integrate renewable energy 
into  the  energy  grids.  It  can  also  help  overcome  network  bottlenecks  in  electricity  that 
limit the ability of the energy system to integrate renewable power production.  

While today only a few member states have 100% operating hydrogen networks, ongoing 
developments  in  this  area  are  likely  to  affect  the  whole  EU.  According  to  ACER,  11 
Member  States  have  or  are  working  on  a  hydrogen  strategy  and  4  member  states 
(Germany,  France,  Netherlands  and  Poland)  are  planning  to  roll  out  100%  hydrogen 
networks.92  Half  of  the  national  energy  and  climate  plans  (NECPs)  mention  concrete 
hydrogen related objectives and national hydrogen strategies, roadmaps, or plans been or 
are  being  developed.93  The  industry’s  vision  for  a  European  hydrogen  backbone  was 
presented by gas TSOs from 10 European countries: Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Sweden and Switzerland.94 

Investment  in  hydrogen  infrastructure  would  have  a  significant  economic  impact.  The 
European hydrogen backbone vision presented by the industry estimates  that creating a 
23 000 km dedicated hydrogen network by 2040 would require a total investment of €27-

89 In existing plans to create a hydrogen backbone in the Netherlands and in Germany, up to 90% of the 
future hydrogen network is planned to be based on the conversion of no longer needed natural gas assets, 
the rest would be new infrastructure (see http://www.get-h2.de/en/initiativeandvision/ and 
https://www.gasunie.nl/en/expertise/hydrogen/hydrogen-projects). The 23 000 km European hydrogen 
backbone envisaged by 11 European gas TSOs for 2040 would consist 75% of converted natural gas 
infrastructure, connected by 25% new hydrogen assets 
(https://gasforclimate2050.eu/sdm_downloads/european-hydrogen-backbone). 
90 European TSOs estimate that while new hydrogen pipelines could cost 10-50% more than similar natural 
gas  pipelines,  repurposed  hydrogen  pipelines  would  cost  only  10-35%  of  new  hydrogen  pipelines 
(European  Hydrogen  Backbone,  report  by  11  European  gas  TSOs,  July  2020,  available  at: 
https://gasforclimate2050.eu/sdm_downloads/european-hydrogen-backbone/).  German  TSOs  estimate  that 
investment costs for conversion projects is up to 90% cheaper than for new build (FNB Gas: Gas Network 
Development Plan 2020-2030, p. 148).  
91 International Energy Agency: The Future of Hydrogen, June 2019, esp. pp, 67-84. For cost estimates of 
different  hydrogen  transport  options,  see  also  Asset  project  (funded  by  the  European  Commission):  Jan 
Cihlar et al.: Hydrogen generation in Europe: Overview of costs and figures, June 2020, pp. 12-14. ; see 
also  Navigant  (2019):  Gas  for  Climate  The  optimal  role  for  gas  in  a  net-zero  emissions  energy  system, 
March 2019, table on p. 98 
92  ACER:  NRA  Survey  on  Hydrogen,  Biomethane,  and  Related  Network  Adaptations,  Evaluation  of 
Responses Report, July 2020 
93 see Trinomics: Study on Opportunities arising from the inclusion of Hydrogen Energy Technologies in 
the National Energy & Climate Plans, final report, June 2020, chapter 2 
94 https://gasforclimate2050.eu/sdm_downloads/european-hydrogen-backbone  

43 

 
                                                 
64 billion based on using 75% of converted natural gas pipelines connected by 25% new 
pipeline stretches.95  

The  Commission  has  put  forward  the  strategic  objective  to  install  at  least  40  GW  of 
renewable  hydrogen  electrolysers  in  Europe  by  2030.96  The  hydrogen  industry  has 
estimated the impact of building such electrolyser capacity (complemented by a further 
40 GW electrolyser capacity in neighbouring countries with the aim of exporting green 
hydrogen into Europe).97 This electrolyser capacity can produce 173 TWh of hydrogen, 
which represents around half of today’s hydrogen demand in Europe. This would require 
total investments investment of €25-€30 billion, of which over 85% would be realised in 
the  2025-2030  timeframe98  and  would  create  between  140,000  and  170,000  jobs  for 
manufacturing and maintenance of 2x40 GW electrolyser capacity up to 2030. 

A  recent  study  for  the  Fuel  cells  and  Hydrogen  Joint  Undertaking  (FCHJU)99  has 
estimated the overall accumulated investment in hydrogen technologies in the EU-28 at 
70-240 billion EUR up to 2030. Renewable energy supply accounts for 50%-60% of total 
investments,  end  user  applications  account  for  20%-30%  and  electrolysis  units  account 
for almost 10%. The investments related to infrastructure, including power and gas grids, 
refuelling stations and hydrogen storage are 5%-10% of total investments. Depending on 
the scenario, 7.5 billion or 29 billion EUR of value added can be generated annually in 
the whole EU-28, by investment in and operation of hydrogen technologies. Most of the 
value added is expected to be created by building and operating the renewable electricity 
plants that provide energy to electrolysers. A significant share of value added would also 
be created by the development of hydrogen transport infrastructure.  

Environmental impacts 

As mentioned above, the inclusion of hydrogen networks and P2G facilities with cross-
border relevance into the TEN-E would ensure a new coordinated and efficient planning 
to these types of infrastructure. Such a coordinated  process can reduce the overall need 
for infrastructure projects Allowing PCI status conversion projects  (existing natural  gas 
assets to be turned into hydrogen assets) will further limit the environmental impact, as it 
will avoid the need to build new infrastructure and make better use of the existing one. 

In  general  terms,  the  facilitation  of  hydrogen  and  P2G  projects  would  bring 
environmental  benefits  because  the  impact  of  renewable  and  low-carbon  hydrogen 
technology  is  expected  to  be  positive  in  terms  of  greenhouse  gas  emissions:  the 
substitution  of  fossil  fuels  by  renewable  or  low-carbon  hydrogen  would  translate  into 

95 https://gasforclimate2050.eu/sdm_downloads/european-hydrogen-backbone  
96 A hydrogen strategy for a climate-neutral Europe, COM(2020) 301 final 
97 Green Hydrogen for a European Green Deal – A 2x40 GW initiative, Hydrogen Europe, 2020 
98 These are electrolyser investment cost only, the figures do not include the investments in solar and wind 
farms, transport and storage infrastructure, nor end-use applications.   
99  Data  from  Trinomics:  Study  on  Opportunities  arising  from  the  inclusion  of  Hydrogen  Energy 
Technologies in the National Energy & Climate Plans, Final report, June 2020  

44 

 
                                                 
GHG emission reductions in the range of 20-65 MtCO2/a, corresponding to 1.4%-4.5% 
of the reduction gap at EU-28 level.100  

P2G  based  on  electrolysis  is  an  important  enabler  for  smart  sector  integration  and  the 
decarbonisation of the gas and hydrogen grids. The source of the hydrogen produced is 
crucial  in  terms  of  the  GHG  impact.  If  grid  electricity  is  used,  then  the  climate  impact 
would reflect the CO2 intensity of the electricity mix. However, if electricity comes from 
a  renewable  source,  then  the  hydrogen  produced  is  carbon-neutral.101  This  green 
hydrogen can be used in gaseous form (and injected in dedicated hydrogen networks or 
admixed to methane in natural gas networks) or it can be turned into synthetic methane or 
synthetic  liquid  fuels,  e.g.  kerosene  or  diesel.  Therefore,  green  hydrogen  can  play  a 
crucial role in decarbonising end use sectors, such as industry, transport or heating. It can 
also  offer  flexibility  options  for  the  power  grid  and  seasonal  storage  options  for 
renewable energy. 

The strategic goal is to support renewable hydrogen; however, other forms of low-carbon 
hydrogen  will  also  be  needed  in  the  short-to-medium  term  to  rapidly  reduce  emissions 
from  existing  hydrogen  production  and  support  the  parallel  and  future  uptake  of 
renewable hydrogen.102 P2G facilities should contribute to the strategic goal in order to 
maximize  the  positive  GHG  reduction  impact,  a  similar  approach  would  not  be 
appropriate  for  hydrogen  networks,  as  for  reasons  of  economic  efficiency  non-
discriminatory third party access to such infrastructure could be considered.  

Social impact 

The  inclusion  of  hydrogen  in  the  TEN-E  framework  and  eligibility  for  CEF  financial 
assistance would have no impact on consumer prices103. Support through TEN-E to these 
emerging  technologies  could  facilitate  upscaling  and  bringing  down  costs  and  hence 
improve  affordability  of  the  energy  transitions.  Hydrogen-related  investments  and 
operations are estimated to generate in 2020-2030 employment of 29 100–103 100 direct 
jobs (in production and operations & maintenance) and contribute to further 74 100–241 
150 indirect jobs.104  

Option  A.2.2:  Exclude  natural  gas  infrastructure  but  include  hydrogen,  P2G  and 
smart gas grids for low-carbon and renewable gases  

The  impact  of  the  inclusion  of  hydrogen  and  P2G  is  described  above.  The  additional 
impacts stem from the inclusion of smart gas grids. Specific impacts of the sub-option on 

100 Artelys-Trinomics (2020): Measuring the contribution of gas infrastructure projects to sustainability as 
defined in the TEN-E Regulation, Draft final report 
101  Artelys-Trinomics  (2020)  has  calculated  that,  when  substituting  natural  gas  with  hydrogen,  56  tCO2 
equivalent per TJ savings are achieved in case hydrogen from renewable sources is used and savings of 48 
tCO2 equivalent per TJ are achieved in case the hydrogen is produced from natural gas with carbon capture 
and storage; by contrast, the climate impact is negative when EU grid electricity used (72 tCO2 equivalent 
per TJ increase), see table 5 in Annex 8. 
102 See A hydrogen strategy for a climate-neutral Europe, COM(2020) 301 final 
103  Solidarity  and  the  effect  of  CEF  financial  assistance  in  terms  of  affordability  of  PCIs  is  one  element 
when assessing applications for CEF financial assistance. 
104 Artelys-Trinomics (2020): Measuring the contribution of gas infrastructure projects to sustainability as 
defined in the TEN-E Regulation, Draft final report 

45 

 
                                                 
the exception for natural gas transmission projects that enable renewable and low carbon 
gases  (i.e.  new  cross-border  transmission  infrastructure  for  biomethane  and/or  retrofits 
for hydrogen blends) are discussed separately.      

Economic impacts 

Indigenous  renewable  gas  sources  are  expected  to  play  an  important  role  in  the  way 
towards climate neutrality. The most significant current production of renewable gases in 
the  EU  are  biogas  and  biomethane105  with  some  17 bcm  annually.  The  Commission 
estimates that biogas consumption would have to increase between 14-48% in the period 
2015-2030 and between 37-378% in the period 2015-2050 to reach carbon neutrality.106 
After upgrading biogas to biomethane, this gas can be transported, distributed and stored 
in the existing methane gas grid. Hydrogen can also be blended into the methane grid up 
to certain limits or subject to adaptations.   

The  vast  majority  of  today’s  500  biomethane  plants  in  the  EU  are  connected  to  the 
distribution grid, without the possibility to inject gas into the transmission level, meaning 
the gas has to be consumed close to its place of production. Some of the green hydrogen 
is  also  expected  to  be  injected  at  DSO  level.  Smart  gas  grid  projects  would  aim  to  tap 
into  this  potential  by  implementing  infrastructure  facilitating  the  integration  of  those 
locally  produced  renewable  and  low-carbon  gases  into  the  DSO  and  TSO  grids  and 
making use of modern ICT technologies to help manage a more complex grid. Smart gas 
grid  projects  would  also  include  related  investments  enabling  reverse  flow  to  the 
transmission level, which could ensure that excess local green gas supply is injected into 
the  transmission  grid  and  used  elsewhere,  enabling  the  full  use  of  local  green  gas 
potential. 

The  inclusion  of  smart  gas  grids  would  ensure  the  seamless  integration  of  the 
transmission and distribution grids that will be increasingly necessary107  because of the 
rapidly changing natural gas infrastructure system.  

At  the  same  time,  smart  gas  grid  projects  would  not  meet  the  current  cross-border 
criterion  for  gas  transmission  infrastructure  because  they  would  not  aim  at  creating 
additional  transmission  capacity.  Instead,  the  cross-border  relevance  would  come  from 
the requirements to include promoters from at least two Member States in project design 
and implementation. While projects to enable biogas to be injected from the distribution 
to the transmission grid are indeed local, they may enable trade with those gases, as the 
gas  transmission  grid  is  already  interconnected  at  EU  level.  Biomethane  and  synthetic 
methane pose in principle no technical problems for their injection into natural gas grids 
as  long  as  they  meet  quality  standards.  At  transmission  level,  investments  in  grid 
expansion may be needed in case capacity at certain network sections or interconnection 

105 Biogas is about 60% methane, 40% CO2 + some impurities. To enable its injection into the transmission 
grid,  biogas  must  be  treated  to  meet  standardized  gas  quality  requirements.  The  upgrading  of  biogas  to 
biomethane requires the removal of CO2 and impurities. If used and,  more importantly,  stored, the CO2 
obtained in production of biomethane from biogas is sometimes argued to create ‘negative’ emissions. 
106  COMMISSION  STAFF  WORKING  DOCUMENT  IMPACT  ASSESSMENT,  Stepping  up  Europe’s 
2030 climate ambition, SWD(2020) 176 final 
107 Gas distribution projects are not currently in the scope of the TEN-E Regulation.  

46 

 
                                                 
points become insufficient due to a change in the gas flow patterns caused by an increase 
in biogas production in certain EU regions.  

Environmental impact 

Gas  infrastructure  projects  may  contribute  to  sustainability  by  enabling  the  substitution 
of  fossil  fuels  with  renewable  and  low-carbon  gases  in  various  applications.  The  exact 
impact will depend on the amount of renewable and low carbon gases injected into the 
grid and on the difference between the GHG intensity of the specific renewable and low 
carbon  gas  and  the  substituted  fuel.  For  the  substitution  of  natural  gas  with  biogas,  the 
GHG impact ranges from a 156 tCO2eq per TJ reduction to a 17 tCO2eq per TJ increase 
in emissions108.  

Specifically  on  projects  that  aim  to  increase  the  share  of  hydrogen  that  can  be  blended 
into the natural gas grid: it must be noted that, even when electrolysers run on renewable 
electricity to produce green hydrogen, the GHG reduction potential is limited by the fact 
that  hydrogen  has  a  lower  energy  content  than  methane.  Since  the  calorific  value  of 
hydrogen  is  about  1/3  of  the  calorific  value  of  natural  gas,  a  10  vol%  H2  admixture  is 
equivalent to only 3.3% of the energy content. This translates into -11.6% CO2 effect for 
an  admixture  of  30  vol%  hydrogen,  providing  only  relatively  limited  room  for 
decarbonisation in the medium- to long-term.109  

Projects  that  specifically  aim  at  enabling  the  integration  of  renewable  and  low-carbon 
gases into the gas grid would have to prove significant net GHG savings to be eligible for 
PCI  status.  This  poses  a  number  of  difficulties  because  fossil  and  green  gas  molecules 
share  the  same  network  infrastructure  and  therefore  the  GHG  reductions  would  result 
from  a planned increase  of renewable  and low-carbon gases in  a  given network, which 
are  enabled,  but  not  directly  influenced,  by  such  projects110.  The  project  promoter 
(typically  a  TSO)  has  limited  ability  to  influence  the  gas  mix.  Under  the  unbundling 
rules,  a  TSO  (or  DSO)  is  responsible  for  network  operation  but  it  does  not  determine 
what  type  of  gas  is  injected  into  its  grid  because  it  has  to  grant  equal  access  to  all 
network  users.  A  network  operator  can  invest  in  pipeline  projects  that  enable  more 
injections  of  renewable  and  low-carbon  gases  (for  instance  a  transmission  pipeline 
leading  to  an  area  with  major  biogas  production  potential  where  there  are  transmission 
bottlenecks)  but  this  pipeline  will  be  able  to  carry  biomethane  and  natural  gas  alike. 
Therefore,  investments  in  gas  networks  can  only  indirectly  reduce  GHG  emissions  by 

108  The  assessment  takes  negative  emissions  into  account.  The  net  CO2  impact  shows  the  difference 
between  the  natural  gas  CO2  emissions  factor  and  the  emissions  factor  of  a  specific  renewable  or  low-
carbon gas. For further details: Artelys-Trinomics (2020): Measuring the contribution of gas infrastructure 
projects to sustainability as defined in the TEN-E Regulation, Draft final report 

110 Methodologies such as the EIB's Project Carbon  Footprint Methodology elaborates on the assessment 
of  GHG  emissions  and  emission  variations  generated  by  a  wide  spectrum  of  projects,  including  energy 
transmission and distribution assets. However, such methodologies would not fit the purpose of the present 
IA in the case of power lines and gas transmission infrastructure, given that it is based on estimations of 
CO2 emissions for the entire network and an emissions factors per unit of supply. In most cases, emissions 
for the current level of supply would go up without the investment. The percentage share of the network 
assets  replaced/rehabilitated  is  estimated.  Carbon  footprints  (absolute  and  baseline)  are  calculated  using 
this percentage share of the total emissions of the network (with and without the project) for the pre-project 
levels of demand. 

47 

 
                                                 
 
enabling  a  greener  gas  mix,  while  the  actual  GHG  impact  will  depend  on  actual  gas 
flows, which is to a large extent beyond the control of network operators. This creates a 
risk of “greenwashing” as any new gas infrastructure ostensibly built for renewable gases 
could in practice end up being used for natural gas because it will in the end form part of 
a given gas network operator’s regulated asset base.   

Infrastructure types linked more closely to the supply of green gases can contribute more 
directly  to  the  decarbonisation  objectives.  For  instance,  a  connecting  pipeline  linking  a 
biomethane plant to the transmission grid can be expected to transport only biomethane. 
A P2G facility producing green hydrogen with a view to injecting it into the gas network 
(together  with  its  connecting  pipeline)  can  be  expected  to  directly  contribute  to  GHG 
reductions.  However,  such  connecting  pipelines  and  facilities  related  to  gas  supply  are 
typically non-regulated assets, meaning they relate to competitive activities and have no 
regulatory scrutiny of costs.  

To a certain extent, additional requirements could offer some safeguards that the selected 
gas  PCIs  do  indeed  contribute  to  significant  GHG  reductions  and  avoid  the  risk  of 
creating assets that would continue to be used predominantly for natural gas. This could 
include  a  stronger  sustainability  assessment  of  candidate  PCIs  (see  section  6.2.2)  or  a 
requirement  that  the  projects  are  presented  in  the  context  of  credible  policy  and/or 
network  development  plans  to  roll  out  renewable  and  low-carbon  gases  (see  section 
6.2.2).  However,  while  this  may  work  for  smart  gas  grids,  in  other  cases  such  as  new 
infrastructure for renewable gases or retrofits for hydrogen blends (see below sub-option, 
such safeguards may not entirely address the risk of financing infrastructure that would 
end up being used primarily for fossil energy in reality.  

Social impacts 

Access to PCI and CEF funding could limit the effect of related investments on tariffs. 

Sub-option: Natural gas transport infrastructure for renewable and low-carbon gases 

In addition to the above impacts, the following impacts are relevant for this sub-option. A 
study  for  DG  Energy111  has  estimated  a  total  technical  biogas/biomethane  production 
potential of 1 150 TWh/yr for 2050112. This compares to 193 TWh biogas production in 
2016,  almost  a  six-fold  increase.  The  full  deployment  of  the  biomethane  potential 
identified  in  the  study  would  have  a  profound  impact  on  the  pattern  of  gas  flows  in 
Europe with  flows  originating  from  countries with high biomass potential  to  centres  of 
consumption. While gas transmission grid capacity in the short- to mid-term is unlikely 
to present a bottleneck, there would be a need for investment in additional cross-border 
capacity  in  the  long  run113.  In  such  a  case,  the  TEN-E  framework  could  add  value  by 
prioritizing  such  possible  projects  of  cross-border  relevance  (even  though  it  has  to  be 
added that in  practice there have not  been any  projects  thus  far that would  have  aimed 

111  Trinomics  (2019):  Impact  of  the  use  of  the  biomethane  and  hydrogen  potential  on  trans-European 
infrastructure, Study for DG ENER 
112  This  is  equal  to  about  118  bcm,  based  on  a  calorific  value  of  35.17  MJ/m3,  see  https://unit-
converter.gasunie.nl/  
113 See assessment and depiction of the possible effect of hydrogen on gas flows and capacity investments 
in Trinomics (2019) pp. 102-111. 

48 

 
                                                 
specifically  at  enabling  cross-border  renewable  gas  flows).  A  methane-heavy  2050 
scenario involves higher investment need in cross-border gas networks than a hydrogen-
heavy scenario114. However, the system-wide costs are also higher, since the production 
of  carbon-free  methane  from  hydrogen  increases  conversion  losses  and  electricity 
consumption for the same amount of energy.  115  It should be noted that the biomethane 
potential assumed by the study is higher than in the Commission’s impact assessment for 
the climate target plan116, so the effect depends on those assumptions.  

By contrast to biomethane, the blending of hydrogen into the methane gas grid is much 
more complex and requires careful consideration. Hydrogen can also be directly injected 
into  the  natural  gas  (methane)  grid  –  but  only  up  to  strict  limits  because  hydrogen  is  a 
different molecule than methane. Industry data show that nearly all network elements at 
both  distribution  and  transmission  level  can  handle  up  to  10%  hydrogen  (with  the 
exception  of  compressor  stations  and  some  other  equipment).  Going  beyond  this  limit 
usually  requires  adaptations.117  Importantly,  blending  changes  gas  quality  and  prevents 
the  direct  use  of  hydrogen  in  higher-value  applications,  such  as  industry  and  transport. 
Therefore, the main bottleneck for blending is not necessarily the transport infrastructure 
but the end-use applications. While blending may be a relatively low-cost118 solution in 
specific circumstances and could lay the ground for scaling up hydrogen use, hydrogen 
admixture levels beyond 20% would be impractical and have important implications for 
end  users.  A  number  of  EU  countries  do  foresee  a  role  for  hydrogen  blends  during  a 
transition period and see a need for EU level coordination to avoid creating barriers for 
cross-border  gas  flows119.  Such  projects  are  unlikely  to  meet  the  existing  cross-border 
criterion,  as  they  are  not  directed  at  creating  additional  cross-border  transmission 
capacity.  The risk of “greenwashing”, as discussed above, is particularly relevant for this 
sub-option, i.e. new infrastructure  for renewable gases or  retrofits for hydrogen blends, 
which are intended to be used for renewable and low carbon gases but may in practice be 
used (predominantly or exclusively) for natural gas. 

Sub-option: Exceptions for natural gas PCIs at an advanced implementation stage 

New natural gas PCIs – beyond the most advanced PCI projects on the 4th PCI list – are 
unlikely to be needed for security of supply or market integration.  

114  The  study  estimates  that,  by  2050,  investment  needs  in  cross-border  gas  infrastructure  would  be  €5 
billion per annum in a hydrogen heavy scenario and €1.2 billion p.a. in a methane heavy scenario, while 
overall  system  costs  are  lower  in  the  hydrogen  scenario  due  to  higher  efficiency,  i.e.  smaller  conversion 
losses (see Annex 8 for more details). 
115 Trinomics: Impact of the use of the biomethane and hydrogen potential on trans-European 
infrastructure, Study for DG ENER, 2019 
116 To note that the scenarios in the Commission’s impact assessment for the climate target plan count with 
biogas volumes of 56-63 Mtoe by 2050, or around 650-730 TWh (with a conversion factor of around 11.6 
TWh / Mtoe). 
117  See  Marcogaz:  Overview  of  available  test  results  and  regulatory  limits  for  hydrogen  admission  into 
existing natural gas infrastructure and end use, October 2019 
118  For instance, French gas operators count with limited costs up to 6-10% blending ratios (Technical and 
economic conditions for injecting hydrogen into natural gas networks, Final report by French gas network 
operators, June 2019, see esp. p. 22 for investment estimates). See Annex 8 for more detail. 
119 See ACER: NRA Survey on Hydrogen, Biomethane, and Related Network Adaptations, Evaluation of 
Responses Report, July 2020 

49 

 
                                                 
If the revised TEN-E Regulation  excludes natural  gas infrastructure from the scope, all 
existing PCI projects – including the most advanced ones – would lose eligibility for PCI 
status. There might be expectations for special treatment for existing PCIs which are still 
not completed but which will have started construction by the time the first PCI list under 
the revised regulation enters into force or which will have already received CEF support 
by  that  time  (as  described  in  the  policy  option).  The  implementation  of  those  projects 
should  not  be  prevented  or  significantly  delayed  due  to  the  loss  of  PCI  status  which 
would not affect signed grant agreements for CEF financial assistance. 

Based on the planned commissioning dates of the existing gas PCI projects on the 4th PCI 
list,  many  are  expected  to  be  completed  by  the  time  when  the  first  PCI  list  under  the 
revised  Regulation  would  be  established120  (provided  there  are  no  implementation 
delays). However, according to  ACER monitoring data, there may still be up to  21 gas 
PCIs121 from the current list that are presently less mature and may wish to apply for PCI 
status  under  the  revised  framework.  Provided  these  projects  are  advanced  by  then 
(according to the definition set out in the policy option), they could be captured by this 
possible exception. 

The  projects  that  could  benefit  from  the  exception  would  already  need  to  be  well-
advanced. For such projects, the loss of PCI status is unlikely to prevent or delay timely 
project  implementation,  as they  will have  either  started construction or  already secured 
funding, including through a CEF grant  agreement. Therefore, only the implementation 
of less advanced  gas projects  (i.e. those that are  only planned or still under permitting) 
would be affected by the loss of PCI status due to the change in the Regulation’s scope. 
However,  these  projects  are  unlikely  to  bring  significant  benefits  according  to  the 
evaluation report and other evidence presented in this impact assessment (see above). 

6.1.3  Projects of mutual interest 

Option A.5.0: Business as usual 

Projects, which are not able to demonstrate socio-economic benefits for at least two EU 
Member States, could be pursued relying on other policy instruments, in particular under 
the accession and neighbourhood policy, but would not benefit from the provisions of the 
TEN-E revision and would not have access to CEF financial assistance.  

Option A.5.1: Inclusion of PMIs under the TEN-E Regulation  

Socio-economic impacts 

The  inclusion  of  PMIs  in  the  TEN-E  framework  would  enable  the  identification  of 
additional projects that demonstrate significant net socio-economic benefits, e.g. in terms 
of enhancing security of supply and/or contributing to higher share of renewables in the 
EU and in  the neighbouring countries.  The requirement from  an involved third country 
that  a  priority  status  under  the  TEN-E  is  conditioned  to  project  specific  regulatory 

120 It is assumed that end 2023 is the earliest possible date for the adoption of the first PCI list under the 
revised TEN-E Regulation. 
121 ACER: Consolidated  Report on the progress of electricity and gas Projects of Common Interest,  July 
2020 

50 

 
                                                 
approximation  with  the  EU  in  terms  of  internal  energy  market    policies  can  provide 
socio-economic  benefits  by  extending  the  pro-competitive  impact  of  the  EU’s  internal 
market  rules  to  infrastructure  connecting  the  internal  market  with  third  countries, 
including avoidance of distortion of competition. 

Environmental impacts 

The  inclusion  of  PMIs  under  the  TEN-E  framework  would  be  conditional  on  the 
infrastructure projects beyond the EU territory, often in EU’s immediate neighbourhood, 
being  aligned  with  the  EU’s  energy  and  climate  objectives.  In  order  for  the  project  to 
benefit  from  priority  status  under  the  TEN-E,  there  would  be  a  requirement  on  the 
involved  third  country  for  approximation  with  the  EU  also  in  terms  of  sustainability, 
environmental  and  climate  policies,  which  could  contribute  to  the  achievement  of  the 
decarbonisation  objectives  beyond  the  EU’s  border  while  limiting  the  risk  of  carbon 
leakage. 

Administrative burden 

Building on the current governance model of the TEN-E and PCI process which already 
foresees  the  participation  of  stakeholders  from  third  countries  (like  project  promoters, 
energy  regulatory  agencies,  ministries,  and  NGOs),  there  would  be  very  limited 
adjustments  needed.  The  requirement  of  regulatory  alignment  concerning  different  EU 
policies from third countries which have not adopted the EU acquis yet (i.e. those which 
are not signatories of the Energy Community Treaty), would require the establishment of 
procedures  for  monitoring  and  enforcing  these  particular  provisions  vis-à-vis  the 
concerned third countries. The administrative burden would depend  on the number and 
specificities of the projects and countries involved. 

6.2  Governance / Infrastructure planning 

6.2.1  Offshore grids for renewable energy 

Option B.1.0: Business as usual  

Environmental impacts 

Despite the initiatives that will create more ambition on offshore renewable energy, the 
continuation  of  the  current  framework  would  not  change  the  incremental  progress  in 
developing the necessary offshore grid infrastructure. While this would reduce the impact 
on maritime space, the required greenhouse gas emissions to reach climate neutrality by 
2050 could not be achieved. 

Socio-economic impacts 

There  would  be  significant  costs  of  delays  and  lack  of  leveraging  the  infrastructure 
investments  needed  to  meet  the  2050  energy  and  climate  objectives,  which  is  a 
prerequisite for  a significant  upscale of offshore  wind energy in  Europe.  The European 
industry  would lose its  technology leadership in  an important  future technology market 
and not exploit the jobs and growth potential in this sector. 

Option B.1.1: Integrated offshore development plans 

51 

 
Environmental impacts 

An  optimised  offshore  grid  would  result  in  two  key  environmental  benefits:  first,  it 
would  enable  the  integration  of  a  significant  amount  of  renewable  electricity  from 
offshore  renewable  energy  sources  into  the  European  power  grid  and,  secondly,  the 
consideration,  from  the  initial  stage,  of  the  maritime  spatial  plans  and  environmental 
aspects  within  the  infrastructure  planning  will  allow  minimising  the  environmental 
impact of the future offshore infrastructure.  

The  potential  greenhouse  gas  emission  reductions  from  the  development  of  offshore 
renewable  energy,  and  related  infrastructure,  have  not  been  quantified  yet.  However, 
given the expected deployment the emissions reductions can be considered significant in 
a  mid-term  perspective.  These  would  depend  on  the  actual  deployment  rate  and  the 
greenhouse  gas  intensity  of  the  electricity  it  replaces.  This  is  influenced  by  various 
factors  including  demand  and  supply  patterns,  price  sensitivities,  localisations,  grid 
congestions.  It  is  expected that the coordinated and optimised grid planning at  regional 
level  would  reduce  the  need  for  landing  points.  This  would  have  a  direct  positive 
environmental impact. 

Economic impacts 

An efficient market framework and optimised offshore grid planning is likely to bring a 
higher overall social welfare than the current trajectory. In 2019, a Commission study on 
hybrid projects in the North Seas by Roland Berger shows possible cost savings of about 
10  percent,  which  would  be  equivalent  to  between  EUR  300  million  and  EUR  2500 
million  for  five  projects  alone,  depending  of  the  size  of  the  comparable  conventional 
projects122.  

According  to  ENTSO-E,  holistic  planning  and  coordination  of  development  of  on-  and 
offshore  transmission  systems  is  a  requirement  to  ensure  timely  development  and  low 
cost for the end consumer concerning offshore grids. Such an approach would limit the 
expected  increase  in  grid  expansion  costs  for  offshore  network  developments.  It  would 
also help to shorten the time required for offshore grid development and hence to keep 
pace with the shorter lead times for the deployment of offshore wind.123  

The establishment of an enabling grid planning framework for offshore grids would open 
up  a  significant  market  for  the  renewable  energy  industry,  in  particular  in  Europe,  and 
partially  compensate  for  the  slowdown  in  renewable  development  onshore  in  some 
regions  in  Europe.  This  could  have  significant  positive  impacts  on  turnover  and 
employment by contributing to maintain Europe’s technological leadership in this area. 

Social impacts 

It  is  expected  that  the  expansion  of  offshore  renewable  energy  could  have  a  positive 
effect on employment across the EU. For instance, based on industry estimates, 77,000 

122 Roland Berger (2019): Hybrid projects: How to reduce the cost and space of offshore wind projects 
123  WindEurope 
https://windeurope.org/wp-content/uploads/files/policy/position-papers/WindEurope-Industry-position-on-
how-offshore-grids-should-develop.pdf  

offshore 

Industry 

position 

(2019): 

should 

grids 

how 

on 

develop, 

52 

 
                                                 
people work in  offshore  wind in  Europe today  and this is expected to increase to  more 
than 200,000 if the commitments for offshore wind expansion such as in the NECPs are 
met124.  According  to  the  European  Technology  and  Innovation  Platform  for  Ocean 
Energy  (ETIP  Ocean125),  with  a  clear  development  strategy  and  by  creating  the  right 
policy conditions, 400,000 jobs could be created in the EU by 2050 in the ocean energy 
sector (e.g. wave, tidal, floating solar).   

Large TSO investments in offshore grids can lead to a tariff increase, to the detriment of 
consumers.  That  is  why  an  appropriate  cost-benefit  cost  allocation  is  key  to  stimulate 
these investments in the most efficient way (see policy option D.1.1). 

Administrative burden 

The option would build on ENTSOs’ existing capabilities on network  planning and the 
resource  implications  are  considered  limited  for  ENTSOs  and  TSOs.  It  would  require 
participation in regional group meetings, data collection. 

Option B.1.2: Regional Independent System Operator / Joint Undertaking 

While the environmental, economic and social impact are expected to be similar as under 
option B.1.2, there would be an initial administrative burden in setting up a new entity in 
the  form  of  Regional  Independent  System  operator  or  a  Joint  Undertaking  either  per 
regional priority corridors or sea basins. When established, this entity could reduce some 
of the administrative burden related to planning for the Commission, TSOs and Member 
States as the entity would take on the responsibility for developing the offshore gird. In 
addition to the resources for the administrative tasks, the entity would need the necessary 
network modelling capabilities with significant additional costs. 

This  option  would  have  significant  impacts  on  all  actors  involved  in  the  offshore 
planning. The Regional Independent System operator or Joint Undertaking bodies would 
not only be responsible for the planning of the offshore infrastructure but it would also 
decide  on  the  costs  to  be  allocated  to  each  Member  State.  Member  States,  TSOs,  and 
NRAs  would  lose  influence  in  this  process.  This  is  also  likely  to  result  in  higher 
transaction  costs  and  the  risk  of  non-synchronised  planning  due  to  split  responsibilities 
for the offshore and onshore infrastructure planning.  

While the role of ENTSOs and TSOs would be significantly weakened for the offshore 
planning,  they  would  remain  the  main  information  providers.  This  may  result  in 
decreased interest in cooperation between the TSOs on the planning level, and possibly 
in  decreased  data  accuracy  and  sharing.  Given  the  institutional  changes,  setting  up  a 
Regional  Independent  System  operator  or  Joint  Undertaking  bodies  would  require  a 
rather long lead time also because there is no equivalent body in place that could be used 
as best practice. 

124 EU27 + UK but excluding Norway, Source: WindEurope 
125 https://www.etipocean.eu/  

53 

 
                                                 
6.2.2  Cross-sectoral infrastructure planning 

Option B.2.0: Business as usual 

Environmental and economic impacts 

While the scenarios and system needs assessments that underpin the TYNDP and the PCI 
selection process, as carried out by the ENTSOs, are based on DG ENER scenarios and 
reflect  the  2050  climate-neutrality  objectives  and  relevant  policy  initiatives,  the 
trajectories  chosen  may  favour  in  particular  high  levels  of  gas  demand  and    result  in 
estimations of flows for the different energy carriers that favour the construction of more 
infrastructure  than  is  actually  required  for  achieving  the  2050  carbon-neutrality 
objective.126 Therefore, this option may lead to the selection of PCI projects that would 
not  be  in  line  with  long-term  policy  objectives.  This  would  lead  to  negative 
environmental and the socio-economic impact, the latter mainly linked to risk of stranded 
assets. The possibility to repurpose gas pipelines for hydrogen transport and the potential 
cost  savings  should  only  be  applied  to  existing  gas  pipelines  or  those  that  are  already 
under  construction  /  development.  Developing  new  natural  gas  infrastructure  projects 
with  the assumption that  they may be repurposed in  the future would need to  take into 
account  the  costs  for  developing  the  infrastructure  in  the  first  place  and  hence 
significantly affect the potential cost advantages of repurposing and bear the significant 
risk of green washing (see section 6.1.2). 

Option B.2.1: Strengthened governance and sustainability 

Environmental and economic impacts 

An  increased  oversight  by  the  Commission  over  the  scenarios  and  system  needs 
identification, a strengthened role for ACER in the methodology to assess the costs and 
benefits of the projects, as well as an increased role for the DSOs in the planning process 
is  expected  to  result  in  more  realistic  electricity  and  gas  demand  assumptions  and 
infrastructure needs identification as well as an improved project assessment.  

The mandatory sustainability criterion in the PCI process would be applied to all project 
categories that will be within the future scope of the TEN-E Regulation. This would have 
a  direct  impact  on  the  ranking  of  the  candidate  PCI  projects,  as  the  projects  with  little 
sustainability  benefits  would  be  ranked  lower  and  the  ones  that  prove  to  bring  high 
sustainability benefits would be ranked higher. While the actual ranking will depend on 
the details of the assessment methodology that will be agreed in the regional groups, the 
mandatory  sustainability  assessment  establishes  as  such  a  minimum  requirement  for 
candidate  projects  and  will  notably  ensure  that  they  contribute  to  greenhouse  gas 
emission  reductions  in  a  way  coherent  with  the  Green  Deal  objectives.  This  will 
contribute to align the PCI selection process with the EU policy objectives. Overall, this 
option is expected to lead to an optimised interlinked infrastructure planning.  

126 E.g. the ENTSOs 2020 Climate Action scenario assumes 70% gas import in 2050, while giving little to 
no consideration on how and where such amount of gas is to be fully decarbonized. 

54 

 
                                                 
Ensuring that the 2030-2050 assumptions reflect the agreed policy targets and objectives, 
the  consideration  of  the  energy  efficiency  first  principle  as  well  as  the  inclusion  of  a 
mandatory sustainability criterion  for all candidate projects  will align the PCI selection 
process with the EU policy objectives. 

Administrative burden 

This option would complement the ENTSOs’ current role with an increased Commission 
and ACER oversight. As such, the administrative burden on the Commission and ACER 
will  increase  in  line  with  the  additional  work  related  to  continuous  follow-up  of  the 
TYNDPs development. There would be no direct impact on project promoters. 

Social impact  

Optimizing  the  infrastructure  need  identification  and  projects  assessment  within  the 
frame of TYNDPs will minimise the impact on network tariffs and final energy prices.  

Option  B.2.2:  New  governance  set-up  and  expansion  of  scope  and  role  of  the 
TYNDP 

The  implementation  of  this  option  is  expected  to  deliver  similar  economic,  social  and 
environmental results as policy option B.2.1. 

The  key  difference  concerns  the  administrative  burden.  The  transfer  of  responsibilities 
also carries significant risks, as specific expertise would need to be built up very rapidly 
by the Commission and ACER. The Commission, possibly with the help of a third party, 
would  have  to,  not  only  approve  the  results,  as  in  option  two,  but  also  coordinate  data 
collections  and  crosschecks,  projects  submissions,  manage  studies  and  project 
assessments. It would ultimately lead to parallel structures, as grid planning requires very 
specific  expertise.  While  the  role  of  ENTSOs  and  TSOs  would  be  significantly 
weakened,  they  would  still  remain  the  main  information  providers  which  would 
significantly  increase  transaction  costs  and  may  result  in  decreased  data  accuracy  and 
data sharing (as under option B.1.3). 

6.3  Permitting and public participation 

Option C.1.0 Business as usual 

Environmental impacts 

The TEN-E Regulation already ensures that PCIs have to abide by the highest standards 
of  environmental  protection  provided  by  national  and  EU  law.  However,  lengthier 
permitting processes could cause that the environmental assessments performed become 
outdated and have to be redone.  

Social impacts 

Citizens would be affected as they would have less access to information regarding the 
projects due to the fact that project websites are very often outdated. Moreover, citizens 
would not be able to follow how their input was taken into account. 

55 

 
With lengthier, unclear, permitting processes, citizens are affected, firstly, because such 
projects  do not  realize their benefits  sooner, including their benefits  for consumers (eg. 
lower  energy  prices),  but  also  because  prolonged  permitting  procedures  can  create 
confusion  and  uncertainty  in  the  role  and  effect  of  public  consultations  which  could 
become obsolete by the time the permitting process is completed. 

Economic impacts and administrative burden 

The  duration  of  court  procedures,  such  as  appeals,  is  not  included  in  the  maximum 
duration  of  the  permitting  process  of  3.5  years.  Therefore,  such  court  procedures 
regarding PCIs can delay the overall implementation of the projects.  

The  current  transitional  provisions  mention  that  for  projects  which  submitted  their 
permitting application file before 16 November 2013, the permitting provisions and the 
priority status do not apply (Chapter III). Several projects are encountering this issue and 
have  not  yet  completed  their  permitting  process.  This  has  caused  significant  delays  in 
their implementation and the situation would continue.  

Lengthy  permitting  procedures  increase  administrative  costs  both  for  the  project 
promoter, but also for the national competent authorities and other authorities concerned 
as  certain  permits  that  expire  in  the  meantime  might  have  to  be  obtained  several  times 
before the completion of the entire permitting process. 

Option C.1.1: Use of urgent court procedures 

The time limits laid down for the permitting process, currently 3.5 years, do not include 
administrative appeal procedures and judicial remedies before a court or tribunal which 
delay implementation of the projects in addition to the timeline of the permitting process.  
Requiring  Member  States  that  currently  have  in  place  urgent  court  procedures  (e.g. 
cutting in half court deadlines) in other cases to extend these to PCIs keeps the necessary 
balance  between  the  rule  of  law  in  the  Member  States  and  their  sovereignty  and  the 
acceleration of the implementation of PCIs.  

The  introduction  of  the  requirement  for  Member  States    to  ensure  that  accelerated 
litigation procedures, where available, are applicable to PCIs under national legislations 
should  be  seen  in  a  similar  manner,  including  for  the  purposes  of  safeguarding  the 
sovereignty and rule of law of the Member States, as the introduction, as per the current 
Regulation, of the requirement that PCIs are granted the priority  status where this exists 
under  national  law:  “Where  such  status  exists  in  national  law,  projects  of  common 
interest  shall  be  allocated  the  status  of  the  highest  national  significance  possible…”.  
Member  States  that  do  not  have  this  status  do  not  have  the  obligation.  According  to 
available  data,  at  least  11  Member  States127  have  such  accelerated/urgent  litigation 
procedures  in  place  that  they  could  extend  to  PCIs.  These  procedures  are  used  for  a 
variety  of  matters  from  family  matters  to  insolvency  proceedings  or  setting-up  or 

127 Data from two studies prepared for the European Commission by CEPEJ (the European Commission for 
the Efficiency of Justice) on the functioning of judicial systems in the EU Member States – 2018, 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/cepej-studies-2019_en, as well as, The Rule of Law Stress Test – EU 
Member States’ Responses to Covid-19, https://democracy-reporting.org/dri_publications/the-rule-of-law-
stress-test-eu-member-states-responses-to-covid-19/ 

56 

 
                                                 
enforcing guarantees on movable or immovable assets. Some of these urgent matters are, 
in fact, quite complex, but due to their urgent nature require acceleration.  

The fact  that only a limited number of  Member  States  have in  place accelerated/urgent 
litigation procedures reduces the impact of the option. However, EU action in this respect 
remains  adequate  as:  (i)  this  would  mirror  the  priority  status  provisions  in  their  permit 
granting process and spatial planning enshrined in the current TEN-E legislation, which 
also  applies  in  the  limited  number  of  Member  States  where  such  procedures  are 
available, and (ii) introduces a new tool to save time in project implementation which has 
not  been  introduced  in  the  current  TEN-E  Regulation  and  which  concerns  a  source  of 
significant delays.  

Environmental impacts  

The acceleration of court procedures should not have any environmental impacts. 

Economic impact and administrative burden 

An  accelerated  accomplishment  of  the  project  implementation  through  faster  court 
procedures  decreases  costs  for  both  project  promoters  and  competent  authorities,  while 
entailing  additional  costs  for  national  courts  who  would  have  to  dedicate  additional 
resources to procedures regarding PCIs. However, the Union list of PCIs could  contain 
maximum  220  projects,  in  accordance  with  the  TEN-E  Regulation  and,  in  practice,  the 
actual  number  of  projects  has  been  significantly  lower.  For  example,  the  4th  Union  list 
contains 149 projects.  Therefore, the number of  court cases for the entire EU that such 
projects  could  generate  is  not  high,  by  comparison  to  the  frequency  of  other  types  of 
urgent court procedures Member States already have in place.   

An  accelerated  accomplishment  of  the  permitting  process  also  allows  for  a  faster 
implementation  of  the  project  therefore  bringing  forward  the  benefits  identified  in  the 
CBA. This  will have a significant  economic impact  on regional  energy  markets,  if not, 
even a European wide impact.  The economic impact  could  be determined based on the 
CBAs  of  the  projects  impacted  by  the  accelerated  procedures.  No  data  is  currently 
available for fully capturing the impact. However, in a Working Paper by the Renewable 
Grid  Initiative  and  ENTSOE,  Value  of  timely  implementation  from  May  2019, 
calculations  were  performed  as  to  how  much  delays  cost  for  an  example  project, 
including the “Garenfeld substation” (Germany).  A delay of 2  years due to an average 
court procedure was estimated at a cost of 150 million €128.  

Option  C1.2:  Creating  a  one-stop  shop  per  sea  basin  for  infrastructure  related  to 
offshore renewable projects 

The  creation  of  a  one-stop  shop  per  sea  basin  would  enable  the  acceleration  of  the 
permitting  process  for  infrastructure  related  to  the  deployment  of  offshore  renewable 
generation in order for such projects to finish permitting within the maximum limitation 

128  Renewable  Grid  Initiative  and  ENTSOE,  Value  of  timely  implementation  of  “better  projects”,  May 
2019, 
https://eepublicdownloads.azureedge.net/clean-
documents/Publications/Position%20papers%20and%20reports/20190517_RGI_ENTSOE_working_paper
_better_projects.pdf  

Working 

Paper 

57 

 
                                                 
 
of  3.5  years.  In  practice,  offshore  projects  cross  many  more  jurisdictions  than  onshore 
projects as they cross either national waters or the exclusive economic zones of several 
Member  States  and,  possibly,  third  countries.  This  makes  their  permitting  process 
particularly complex, as they have to follow all the specific rules of these jurisdictions.  

Environmental impact 

The  creation  of  a  one-stop  shop  per  sea  basin  would  bring  positive  environmental 
impacts as strategic environmental assessments could be performed at sea basin level. On 
this  basis,  environmental  assessments  for  specific  projects  could  be  strengthened. 
Moreover,  one  entity  coordinating  the  permitting  process  would  also  enable  a  better 
coordination of the environmental impact assessment across borders. 

Economic impact 

The creation of a one-stop shop per sea basin would have positive economic benefits as it 
would  lead  to  the  swifter  realization  of  infrastructure  related  to  the  deployment  of 
offshore  renewable  generation  which  would  realize  its  benefits  sooner.  There  are  no 
specific  data  allowing  the  calculation  of  the  economic  benefits  realised  by  the  swifter 
implementation  of  such  infrastructure  to  be  brought  as  example,  but  the  benefits 
calculated in the example provided Option C1.1. could be taken as an indication. 

Administrative burden 

The  option  would  considerably  diminish  the  administrative  burden  and  costs  for  the 
project  promoters  who  would  also  benefit  and be  able  to  use  data  from  studies  already 
conducted  for  the  sea  basin.  Project  promoters  would  have  to  employ  fewer  personnel 
and  use  less  resources  than  having  to  deal  with  every  competent  authority  in  all  the 
Member States where the project is located.   

The  one-stop  shop  would  require  very  limited  additional  resources  as  the  assessment 
afferent  to  all  permits  would  continue  to  take  place  on  the  basis  of  the  national 
requirements  for  the  different  Member  States  on  the  territory  of  which  the  project  is 
located.  The  one-stop  shop  is  not  a  new  institution,  but  would  consist  of  a  secretariat 
formed of staff from the national competent authorities, with no additional staff required.  
The one stop-shop would ensure a single point of contact for the project promoters and 
the coordination of the national one-stop shops. While the creation of the one-stop shop 
will lead to one off administrative costs for the establishment of the relevant procedures, 
it could  eventually save  resources in  national administrations as it would avoid parallel 
national work streams for issuing several (national) comprehensive decisions. 

6.4  Regulatory treatment  

According  to  stakeholders,  CBCA  decisions  are  the  main  instrument  to  improve  the 
regulatory  conditions  of  cross-border  projects.  While  the  approach  taken  to  share  costs 
between  Member  States  in  relation  to  benefits  is  largely  appraised,  the  details  of  the 
mechanism reduce its attractiveness. The number of PCIs with a CBCA decision remains 
relatively  low:  as  of  March  2020  only  42  CBCA  decisions  were  issued.  This  indicates 
that the desired effect is limited to a small number of projects only, but the contribution 
to  the  improvement  of  the  regulatory  framework  is,  however,  well  appraised.  Thus,  as 
issues  in  the  details  of  the  process  for  CBCAs  persist,  which  are  reflected  in  the  low 

58 

 
number of cost sharing decisions129, their removal should lead to an increased and correct 
use of the CBCA procedure.  

Option D.1.0: Business as usual 

Environmental impacts 

There  would  be  no  environmental  impacts  from  maintaining  unchanged  the  CBCA 
provisions. 

Social impacts 

CBCA  procedures,  as  currently  provided,  are  underutilized  and  do  not  reach  their 
potential in assisting projects’ realization. This leads to unrealized benefits for the society 
on  the  whole  and  for  citizens  directly  by  the  fact  that  benefits  such  as  energy  cost 
decreases are delayed.  

Economic impact and administrative burden 

Maintaining the current provisions regarding the CBCA procedure leaves this procedure 
to  be  utilized  mainly  as  a  prior  requirement  for  accessing  CEF  financial  assistance. 
Moreover,  many  CBCA  decisions  are  conditional  upon  the  receipt  of  CEF  financial 
assistance  or  do  not  fully  allocate  all  costs  of  the  projects  into  the  tariffs,  leaving  a 
financing gap and delaying project realization. 

This option would not have an impact on the administrative burden. 

Option D.1.1: Inclusion of full investment costs 

Environmental impacts  

CBCA  procedure  enables  the  implementation  of  PCIs,  which  have  benefits  across-
borders.  In  principle,  clarifying  the  CBCA  provisions  should  not  have  direct 
environmental impacts. 

Economic and financial impacts 

The split of investment costs across borders and their full inclusion of investment costs in 
the  tariffs  by  the  CBCA  decision  would  enhance  the  potential  for  CEF  financial 
assistance to be used solely as a last resort financing option.   

The CEF Regulation provides that: “First, the market should have the priority to invest. 
Second,  if  investments  are  not  made  by  the  market,  regulatory  solutions  should  be 
explored,  if  necessary  the  relevant  regulatory  framework  should  be  adjusted,  and  the 
correct application of the relevant regulatory framework should be ensured. Third, where 
the  first  two  steps  are  not  sufficient  to  deliver  the  necessary  investment  in  projects  of 
common interest, Union financial assistance could be granted if the project of common 

129 Ecorys et al. (2020): Support to the evaluation of Regulation (EU) No 347/2013 on guidelines for trans-
European energy infrastructure, Draft final report 

59 

 
                                                 
interest  fulfils  the  applicable  eligibility  criteria”130.  A  stable  regulatory  environment 
created  for  a  project  with  full  regulatory  coverage  is  therefore  a  pre-requisite  for  any 
project  in  order  for  it  to  have  explored  both  market  based  financing  solutions  and 
regulatory solutions.  

Stakeholder views were found to be mixed both on the need to carry out a cross-border 
cost  allocation  and  on  the  method  to  be  approach  by  NRAs.  However,  several 
stakeholders  indicated  that  affordability  should  be  key  to  making  a  grant  decision.  As 
such, the option safeguards the principle of “CEF last resort” whilst taking into account 
suggestions from stakeholders on improving the CBCA mechanism. 

Social impacts 

The CBCA will enable the realization of PCIs and in turn the benefits of such projects as 
identified in the CBA. This would also be taken into account for possible CEF financial 
assistance.  The  full  extent  of  such  benefits  cannot  be  estimated  as  there  are  no  data 
available, however, the example of costs of delay, as described above in the assessment 
of Option C.1.1, remains a good indication.131 

Administrative burden  

According to the stakeholder consultation, the costs for NRAs as a result of TEN-E are 
low  the  main  cost  driver  is  the  CBCA  process.  For  most  NRAs  less  than  1  FTE  is 
estimated to be currently involved132. 

This  option  increases  the  administrative  burden  on  NRAs,  which  will  have  to  allocate 
costs  in  full  and  include  them  in  the  tariffs.  It  also  imposes  on  NRAs  an  obligation  to 
assess the investment requests more thoroughly since all CBCA decisions will be final. 
However, this option decreases the administrative burden for project promoters and the 
financial market  as  the projects  will benefit from regulatory stability being able to  also 
obtain financing from the market. 

7  HOW DO THE OPTIONS COMPARE? 

The options considered are compared against the following criteria: 

  Effectiveness: the extent to which different options would achieve the objectives; 
  Efficiency: the benefits versus the costs; efficiency concerns "the extent to which 

objectives can be achieved for a given level of resource/at least cost"; 

  The coherence of each option with the overarching objectives of EU policies; 
  The compliance of the options with the proportionality principle. 

130 Regulation (EU) No 1316/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 
establishing  the  Connecting  Europe  Facility,  amending  Regulation  (EU)  No  913/2010  and  repealing 
Regulations (EC) No 680/2007 and (EC) No 67/2010 Text with EEA relevance 
OJ L 348, 20.12.2013, Recital 48 
131  The  CBCA  enables  the  timely  implementation  of  PCIs  and  hence  avoids  delays  in  project 
implementation. The benefits of a PCI are therefore realised earlier.  
132 Ecorys et al. (2020): Support to the evaluation of Regulation (EU) No 347/2013 on guidelines for trans-
European energy infrastructure, Draft final report 

60 

 
                                                 
Table  3  summarises  the  assessment  of  each  option  against  these  criteria.  The 
effectiveness of the policy options considers the extent to which the objectives, as set out 
in Section 4, are achieved. Specific measures to  simplify and improve the efficiency of 
the TEN-E Regulation are set out in Section 8.2. 

The  TEN-E  Regulation  is  a  key  instrument  to  achieve  the  timely  development  of 
sufficient  energy  infrastructures  to  enable  delivering  on  the  EU’s  energy  and  climate 
objectives in line with the European Green Deal, in particular the 2030/50 targets, market 
integration competitiveness, and security of supply. However, it is important to recognise 
that  it  is  only  one  element.  A  number  of  other  complementary  policy  measures  have 
already been or need to be put in place at EU and national. These include investments in 
the  necessary 
impact, 
investment  in  research,  development  and  innovation  for  new  technologies,  policies 
supporting renewable energy generation, and initiatives supporting the acceptance of new 
infrastructure projects. 

infrastructure  projects  without  a  significant  cross-border 

61 

 
 
 
Table 3: Comparison of policy options  

Policy option  Description 

Effectiveness  Efficiency  Coherence  Proportionality 
A) SCOPE 

o 
+ 
o 

o 
+ 

+ 

o 

- 

o 
o 

Business as usual 

Options A.1. Smart electricity grids and electricity storage 
o 
Option A.1.0 
++ 
Option A.1.1   Update of eligibility criteria  
+ 
Sub-option: Non-mechanical 
storage 

Option A.2 Gas infrastructure, hydrogen networks and power-to-gas 
Option A.2.0 
Option A.2.1 

o 
+ 

Option A.2.2 

Business as usual 
Exclude all natural gas 
infrastructure but include 
hydrogen and P2G 
Exclude natural gas 
infrastructure / include 
hydrogen, P2G & smart gas 
grids  
Sub-option: Natural gas 
infrastructure for renewable 
and low-carbon gases 
Sub-option: Exceptions for 
natural gas PCIs (advanced 
implementation) 

+ 

- 

- 

o 
+ 

Option A.3 Projects of mutual interest (PMIs) 
Option A.3.0 
Option A.3.1 

Business as usual 
Inclusion of projects of mutual 
interest (PMIs) 

B) GOVERNANCE / INFRASTRUCTURE PLANNING 

Option B.1 Offshore grids for renewable energy 
Option B.1.0 
Option B.1.1 

Business as usual 
Integrated offshore 
development plans 
Regional ISO / JU  

Option B.1.2 
Option B.2 Cross-sectoral infrastructure planning 
Business as usual 
Option B.2.0 
Strengthened governance and 
Option B.2.1 
sustainability 
New governance set-up  

Option B.2.2 

o 
++ 

++ 

o 
++ 

+ 

C) PERMITTING  

Business as usual 

Option C.1 Permitting 
Option C.1.0 
Option C.1.1.  Use of urgent court procedures 
One-stop shop per sea basin for 
Option C.1.2 
offshore renewable projects 

o 
++ 
++ 

o 
+ 

o 

o 
+ 

- 

o 
++ 
++ 

Option D.1 Regulatory treatment 
Option D.1.0 
Option D.1.1 

Business as usual 
Inclusion full investment costs 

o 
+ 

o 
+ 

D) REGULATORY TREATMENT 

o 
+ 
+ 

o 
+ 

++ 

- 

- 

o 
+ 

o 
++ 

++ 

o 
+ 

+ 

o 
+ 
++ 

o 
+ 

o 
+ 
- 

o 
+ 

+ 

o 

- 

o 
o 

o 
+ 

- 

o 
+ 

o 

o 
+ 
o 

o 
o 

Legend: -=small negative impacts; --= large negative impact; 0= no change; + = limited improvement; ++= 
significant improvement 

62 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Smart electricity grids and electricity storage 

The assessment in section 6 showed that cross-border smart electricity grids constitute an 
important infrastructure category to enable the achievement of climate neutrality, market 
integration,  competitiveness,  security  of  supply  in  a  rapidly  changing  and  increasingly  
digitalised  energy  system.  Nevertheless,  this  potential  is  currently  not  sufficiently 
exploited  which  would  continue  to  be  the  case  under  BAU.  Updating  the  eligibility 
criteria for electricity  smart  grids, whilst  safeguarding the cross-border impact  with  the 
participation of project promotors from two or more Member States, would significantly 
increase  the  effectiveness  of  the  policy  instrument  by  allowing  more  smart  electricity 
projects to apply for PCI status. It would therefore improve effectiveness by updating an 
infrastructure  category  necessary  for  the  achievement  of  the  climate  and  energy 
objectives. It would also have a positive impact on the efficiency as it would facilitate the 
cooperation  between  DSOs  and  TSOs  by  reducing  administrative  costs.  The  broadened 
scope would also improve the coherence of the policy instrument as it would address the 
digital transition and support the electrification of the transport sector. 

However,  while  the  importance  of  electricity  storage  has  been  demonstrated  in  general 
terms, reducing the threshold for non-mechanical storage technologies would undermine 
the  potential  cross-border  impact.  Therefore,  a  broadened  scope  with  a  sufficiently 
ambitious  cross-border  criteria  for  non-mechanical  storage  technologies  may  result  in 
very  few  projects  being  selected  potentially  leading  to  higher  costs  than  benefits, 
although this will depend on the exact definition of the cross-border impact as eligibility 
criterion and technological progress.  

Gas infrastructure, hydrogen networks and power-to-gas 

The continuation of the current framework would have a significantly negative impact on 
its  effectiveness  against  the  identified  objectives.  The  assessment  showed  that  no  new 
cross-border  natural  gas  infrastructure  is  needed  in  the  EU  due  to  the  already 
commissioned  gas  PCIs  or  those  under  development  as  well  as  due  to  the  expected 
reduction  in  demand  for  natural  gas  in  the  context  of  decarbonisation.  Maintaining 
eligibility  for  natural  gas  projects  would  create  unnecessary  administrative  costs  for  all 
actors  involved  in  the PCI  selection  process  as  such  projects  would  not  be  selected  for 
PCI  status  if  they  cannot  demonstrate  benefits  against  identified  needs.  It  could  even 
entail  the  risk  of  financing  stranded  assets  at  the  cost  of  consumers  through  network 
tariffs.  BAU  would  be  in  contradiction  with  the  climate  neutrality  objective,  strongly 
incoherent  with  other  EU  policies  and  be  at  odds  with  the  objective  to  create  a  future-
proof TEN-E framework. 

Limiting the scope to  new and repurposed hydrogen networks and P2G  would be fully 
coherent in view of the infrastructure required in the decarbonisation pathways towards 
2050  and  the  expected  role  of  hydrogen  in  it.  It  would  also  be  more  effective  than  the 
current  framework  in  identifying  the  projects  and  investments  needed  for  carbon-
neutrality. The inclusion of hydrogen networks with cross-border relevance is necessary 
for a wider and more cost-efficient role out of hydrogen infrastructure based on European 
infrastructure  planning  for  hydrogen.  While  current  costs  of  these  technologies  are 
significant,  these would  not  directly  affect  network tariffs and final  consumer prices as 
long  as  these  are  non-regulated  assets.  Moreover,  the  inclusion  of  full  conversion  of 
existing  natural  gas  assets  would  lead  to  a  more  cost-effective  and  more  socially 
affordable  pathway  to  the  deployment  of  hydrogen  infrastructure  and  avoid  stranded 

63 

 
assets in  the existing  gas  network.  In addition,  their inclusion under TEN-E could  help 
the deployment  of hydrogen in  different  regions  in  the EU, also  through  CEF financial 
assistance. As regards EU added value, the inclusion of hydrogen networks will facilitate 
the development of cross-border hydrogen infrastructure and P2G assets of cross-border 
relevance, which may otherwise not take place. The policy option is proportional, as the 
prioritized projects would have to prove cross-border impact.  

Including in the scope also smart gas grids could increase the effectiveness of the future 
TEN-E  and  would  help  to  deliver  decarbonisation  already  in  the  shorter  term  (because 
the emergence of cross-border hydrogen networks is expected as of 2030). The option is 
coherent with the EU decarbonisation policies and technology-neutrality, as low-carbon 
and renewable methane gases will play a role in the decarbonisation of the energy system 
and  projects  with  cross-border  relevance  can  reduce  the  related  costs.  The  inclusion  of 
smart gas grids would be proportional, as all projects would ensure better integration of 
renewable  and  low  carbon  gases  with  the  transmission  level;  at  the  same  time  such 
projects have to prove cross-border relevance and EU added value. 

In principle, keeping in  the scope natural  gas  transmission projects  specifically  for low 
carbon and renewable gases and adding hydrogen blending projects could also contribute 
to these criteria; however, the coherence and effectiveness of this policy option depends 
on  the  ability  of  such  projects  to  deliver  significant  net  GHG  savings.  This  could  be 
mitigated to a certain extent by safeguards on the projects’ sustainability impact but it is 
unlikely  to  fully  avoid  the  risk  of  “green  washing”  and  stranded  assets.  This  is  in 
particular  the  case  for  new  gas  transmission  infrastructure  built  for  renewable  gases, 
where the risk that the created assets continue to be used for natural gas would be too big, 
reducing  this  option’s  effectiveness  in  reaching  the  policy  objective  as  well  as  policy 
coherence. Retrofits of existing natural gas transmission assets for hydrogen admixtures 
have a limited scope to deliver sustainability benefits because of the lower energy value 
of  hydrogen  and  the  feasibility  and  cost-effectiveness  is  lowered  by  the  significant 
adaptation  and  investment  needs  on  the  end-use  side.  Furthermore,  such  projects  are 
unlikely to have significant cross-border impact.   

An exception for advanced natural gas PCIs would not be effective, neither coherent with 
the  more  ambitious  decarbonisation  objectives  of  the  climate  target  plan.  Furthermore, 
such an exception would not be efficient, as the projects captured by the exception should 
be already sufficiently advanced to ensure their completion even in the absence of a PCI 
status. Hence, such a provision could be considered disproportionate. 

Projects of mutual interest 

Under the BAU option, only a limited number of projects with third countries have been 
identified as PCIs which is unlikely to change and limits the effectiveness and coherence 
of the current framework. The inclusion of PMIs in the revised TEN-E Regulation would 
take account of the increasing role of interconnections with third countries. The selection 
of PMIs within the TEN-E framework would increase the effectiveness of the Regulation 
since  it  would  expand  the  scope  of  eligible  infrastructure  necessary  to  achieve  EU 
climate  and  energy  policy  objectives.  However,  this  would  require  project  specific 
regulatory approximation with the relevant EU policies to limit adverse socio-economic 
or environmental impacts. Procedures for monitoring and enforcement would need to be 
established. This would entail additional administrative costs which would depend on the 
number  and  specificities  of  the  projects  and  countries  involved.  However,  these 

64 

 
additional costs should be outweighed by the significant net socio-economic benefits of 
these  projects.  In  addition,  the  inclusion  of  PMIs  would  increase  the  coherence  of  the 
TEN-E framework with other policies such as the EU neighbourhood policies and allow 
extending the scope of benefits accruing from the implementation of the EU’s regulatory 
framework beyond its borders. 

Offshore grids for renewable energy 

As described in Section 6, the current framework is not effective to identify the projects 
necessary  to  contribute  to  the  large  role-out  of  the  offshore  infrastructure  which  are  a 
precondition  to  achieve  the  offshore  renewable  generation  capacity  needed  to  meet  the 
climate  neutrality  objective.  The  current  approach  to  infrastructure  planning  does  not 
address the specific needs and challenges for offshore grids. 

Integrated offshore development  plans would significantly improve the effectiveness  of 
the TEN-E framework by  departing from  a bottom  up planning approach to  a planning 
against agreed objectives at regional level whilst integrating aspects of maritime spatial 
planning  and  environmental  impact.  This  would  address  specific  situation  of  offshore 
grids starting from scratch and spanning across different Member States. An incremental 
approach  to  cross-border  interconnections  building  on  existing  (national)  infrastructure 
networks is not feasible and would not allow to progress at the speed  required to reach 
climate neutrality. Such  an approach would also  minimise the environmental impact  of 
the  future  offshore  infrastructure.  Due  to  an  optimised  cross-border  grid  planning  at 
regional level per sea basin it would reduce overall investments costs and provide an EU 
added value. This policy option scores highly in terms of policy coherence as it is fully in 
line  with  other  EU  policies  such  as  the  Green  Deal  and  the  forthcoming  Offshore 
Renewable Energy Strategy. 

relevant  parties 

The  establishment  of  a  regional  Independent  System  Operator  or  Joint  Undertaking 
would in the mid- to long-term be similarly effective to the previous option. However, it 
would take significant time to establish such a new entity which requires the agreement 
(Member  States,  TSOs,  NRAs)  concerning 
of  all 
responsibilities  and  tasks  of  such  an  entity  and  its  financing.  This  would  delay  the 
implementation  of  a  new  approach  to  offshore  infrastructure  planning.  It  would  also 
entail  significant  costs  which  would  be  disproportionate  and  premature  at  this  stage  of 
offshore  renewable  energy  deployment.  It  would  quite  significantly  interfere  with  the 
responsibilities of Member States, TSOs, and NRA and hence appears disproportionate. 

involved 

Cross-sectoral infrastructure planning 

As  regards  the  effectiveness  in  terms  of  both  supporting  the  identification  of  the 
infrastructure  necessary  to  meet  the  set  policy  objectives  and  achieving  an  integrated 
network planning, the continuation of the  current  TEN-E  would perpetuate the sectoral 
approach  to  network  planning.  This  would  not  ensure  that  only  those  projects  that  are 
necessary  for  the  energy  transition  and  climate  targets  are  identified  as  projects  of 
common interest. 

As compared to offshore grids for which the current infrastructure planning is considered 
not  suited  to  address  the  specific  challenges  and  achieve  the  energy  and  climate 
objectives, the situation for onshore infrastructure projects is different. The evaluation of 
the current TEN-E concluded that the TYNDP process as basis for the identification of 
PCIs  has  proven  effective,  but  underlined  the  need  for  a  more  integrated  approach  to 

65 

 
planning across the different sectors and a more balanced approach concerning the actors 
involved. A strengthened governance with a stronger oversight role for the Commission 
and ACER to ensure that the key steps in the infrastructure planning process fully reflect 
the  climate  neutrality  objective  and  energy  system  integration  would  significantly 
improve  the  effectiveness  of  the  policy  instrument  by  ensuring  a  more  accurate  needs 
assessment based on a cross-sectoral approach. It would also ensure that this assessment 
is based on objectively defined scenarios fully in line with decarbonisation objectives as 
well as the energy efficiency first principle. 

A  new  governance  set-up  would  considerably  weaken  the  role  of  the  ENTSOs  with  a 
new  actor  taking  the  lead  in  the  TYNDP  process.  This  would  require  the  built-up  of 
significant  expertise  on  infrastructure  planning  outside  the  ENTSOs  and  TSOs. 
Nonetheless,  it  would  still  need  to  rely  largely  on  the  data  and  expertise  of  the  TSOs. 
This  would  result  in  significant  additional  transaction  and  administrative  costs  and 
negatively  affect  the  efficiency  of  the  TEN-E.  The  effectiveness  of  this  options  is 
expected to be slightly lower compared to the previous option which acknowledges the 
central  role  of  the  TSOs  and  ENTSOs  in  the  infrastructure  planning  but  introduces 
additional “checks and balances”. 

Both  options  include  a  mandatory  sustainability  criterion  for  all  candidate  projects  that 
will be within the future scope of the TEN-E Regulation. This would have a direct impact 
on the ranking of the candidate PCIs and hence contribute to the identification of those 
projects  in  line  with  the  climate  neutrality  objective.  Such  inclusion  of  a  sustainability 
criterion would also improve the coherence of the initiative with other EU policies such 
as  the  EU  taxonomy  for  sustainable  investments.  The  approach  under  the  Taxonomy 
Regulation as such would not be sufficient for the purpose of the PCI selection process 
considering their different scopes and objectives.  

Whereas  the  Taxonomy  Regulation  creates  disclosure  obligations  for  financial  market 
participants with respect to financial products and for certain non-financial undertakings, 
the objective of the TEN-E Regulation is to facilitate the timely development of energy 
infrastructure across the EU that ensures market integration, competitiveness, security of 
supply,  affordability  and  importantly,  climate-neutrality.  Serving  this  general  objective, 
the  revised  TEN-E  Regulation  establishes  a  framework  to  identify  priority  projects 
necessary  for  the  energy  transition  and  to  meet  climate  and  energy  policy  objectives 
based on a  ranking list  of candidate projects.  This  framework requires  that  projects  are 
selected  based  on  specific  selection  criteria  that  address  the  climate  and  energy  policy 
objectives as set out in the TEN-E Regulation and allow for their quantification.  

While  the  Taxonomy  applies  a  binary  approach  to  defining  sustainability133,  the  PCI 
selection requires a more granular approach based on quantified criteria for the purpose 
of establishing a ranking list of candidate projects. Sustainability is  one element  in  this 
assessment,  besides  other  specific  criteria  such  as  security  of  supply  and  market 
integration.  This  requires  a  coherent  and  specific  assessment  methodology.  In  addition, 
an improved needs assessment would reinforce the energy efficiency first principle and 

133  In  addition  to  substantially  contributing  to  one  of  the  environmental  objectives  of  the  Taxonomy 
Regulation,  it  must  also  be  demonstrated  that  an  activity  does  not  significantly  harm  any  of  those 
objectives. 

66 

 
                                                 
consider  with  priority  all  relevant  non-infrastructure  related  solutions  to  address  the 
identified  gaps.  Such  an  approach,  combined  with  regular  reporting  on  the  compliance 
with  environmental  legislation  by  project  promoters,  during  project  implementation, 
would  ensure  that  projects  do  no  significant  harm  to  the  environment.  This  approach 
reflects  that  the  maturity  of  PCI  candidate  projects  would  not  allow  for  a  meaningful 
assessment  of  whether  projects  will  do  no  significant  harm  to  the  other  environmental 
objectives during the PCI selection process. 

This  approach  provides  EU  added  value 
through  an  optimised  cross-sectoral 
infrastructure  planning  at  European  level  based  on  consistent  assumptions.  A  better 
planning  framework  as  achieved  through  this  option  would  also  establish  an  enabling 
framework to trigger and accelerate necessary investments.  

Permitting 

As  explained  in  Section  6,  business  as  usual  is  not  considered  effective  to  achieve  the 
timely  implementation  of  PCIs.  Although  the  evaluation  of  the  TEN-E  Regulation  has 
found  that  permitting  of  PCIs  has  significantly  accelerated  and  the  main  problems  that 
remain  concern  national  implementation,  EU  level  action  by  further  improving  the 
provisions in the TEN-E Regulation would accelerate project implementation and hence 
the  achievement  of  the  policy  objectives.  In  terms  of  efficiency,  delays  in  the 
implementation  of  PCIs  create  exponentially  higher  costs  to  society  than  the 
administrative  burden  brought  by  the  permitting  process  to  the  project  promoters  and 
national  competent  authorities.  Therefore,  the  use  of  urgent  court  procedures  in  those 
Member States where such procedures exist, even if less than half of the Member States, 
would  reduce  cost  and  significantly  improve  efficiency.  It  is  also  coherent  with  EU 
policies as it allows for a better and swifter implementation of PCIs.  

The creation of a one-stop shop per sea basin for offshore energy would entail significant 
improvements  in  terms  of  effectiveness,  efficiency,  and  coherence  by  enabling  the 
acceleration  of  the  permitting  process  for  infrastructure  related  to  the  deployment  of 
offshore  renewable  generation,  in  particular  if  combined  with  the  establishment  of 
integrated offshore development plans (option B.1.1). A one-stop shop would avoid the 
establishment of up to eight parallel permitting processes for a sea basin. 

On  permitting,  the  combination  of  options  C1.1.  (Use  of  urgent  court  procedures  and 
accelerating  the  permitting  process  (Option  C.1.2,  see  Annex  9))  and  C1.2  (One-stop 
shop  per  sea  basin  for  offshore  renewable  infrastructure  projects)  would  result  in 
significant improvements.  

Regulatory treatment 

As  regards  the  BAU  option,  the  continuation  of  the  current  framework  would  not  be 
effective in ensuring the timely implementation of PCIs. As explained in Section 6, the 
CBCA procedure has so far only been used in the context of a request for CEF grants and 
the national approaches to CBCA decisions are often inconsistent creating uncertainty for 
projects promoters and causing delays in project implementation. Costs related to delays 
in project implementation makes this option less efficient.  

By comparison, the inclusion in full of the investments costs into tariffs in combination 
with clarifying the CBCA provisions, while creating additional administrative burden for 
NRAs  and  the  Commission,  leads  to  a  swifter  implementation  of  projects  and  faster 

67 

 
realisation of their benefits being therefore both  more effective and more efficient. The 
option  is  also  coherent  with  the  EU  policies  pursued  by  the  perspective  PCIs  and  is 
neutral as regards proportionality. In addition, the possibility for smart grids projects to 
obtain  a  CBCA,  the  clarification  of  the  CBCA  provisions  would  make  the  framework 
more effective by facilitating project implementation. Updating investment incentives to 
account  for  the  higher  risks  would  enhance  effectiveness  and  efficiency  in  view  of  the 
expected  benefits.  It  would  also  be  coherent  with  the  overall  policy  objectives  and 
proportionate. 

8  PREFERRED OPTION 

The  options  within  each  group  of  policy  options  (A.1,  A.2,  B.1,  B.2)  are  alternatives 
except for policy option group C.1 (permitting) and D.1 (regulatory treatment) where the 
options are complementary. The options on the scope are independent from the options 
on governance/infrastructure planning. The new  planning  framework will be applicable 
to the scope of the revised TEN-E Regulation and hence cover all eligible infrastructure 
categories not only those that may be affected by this initiative. 

8.1  Package of preferred policy options 

The  assessment  and  the  comparison  of  the  options  shows  that  no  single  option  is 
sufficient  to  meet  the  identified  objectives.  Therefore,  a  package  of  policy  options 
appears as best suited to achieve the specific objectives. The key political choices relate 
to the future scope and the future approach to infrastructure planning. 

Concerning the future scope of TEN-E, the main question is whether to keep natural gas 
infrastructure as eligible infrastructure category or not. Based on the analysis in sections 
6  and  7,  the  exclusion  of  methane  gas  infrastructure  appears  as  the  most  effective  and 
coherent  approach. In that case the future TEN-E would include all those infrastructure 
categories  that  are  needed  to  deliver  on  the  EU’s  energy  and  climate  objectives  in  line 
with the European Green Deal, in particular on the 2030/50 targets.  

As  regards  the  future  approach  to  infrastructure  planning,  a  radical  change  to 
infrastructure planning seems not justified in view of the limited additional benefits and 
the  significant  increase  in  transaction  costs  which  reduce  efficiency  and  may  make  the 
instrument  less  effective  compared  to  strengthening  the  current  approach.  However, 
given the specificities both in terms of the current situation and expected contribution to 
the long-term climate and energy objectives, a more radical change appears justified for 
offshore grids. A package of preferred options is presented in Table 4. 

68 

 
 
 
Table 4: Package of preferred policy options 

Policy option  Description 

Package of 
preferred 
policy options 
Specific objective 1: Enable the identification of the cross-border projects and investments 
across the EU and with its neighbouring countries that are necessary for the energy 
transition and climate targets 
Options A.1. Smart electricity grids and electricity storage 
Option A.1.0 
Option A.1.1   Update of eligibility criteria  

Business as usual 

X 

Sub-option: Non-mechanical storage 

Option A.2.2 

Option A.2 Gas infrastructure, hydrogen networks and power-to-gas 
Option A.2.0 
Option A.2.1 

Business as usual 
Exclude all natural gas infrastructure but include 
hydrogen and P2G 
Exclude natural gas infrastructure but include 
hydrogen, P2G and smart gas grids  
Sub-option: Include natural gas infrastructure for 
renewable and low-carbon gases 
Sub-option: Exceptions for natural gas PCIs at an 
advanced implementation stage 

X 

X 

Business as usual 
Inclusion of projects of mutual interest (PMIs) 

Business as usual 
Integrated offshore development plans 
Regional ISO / JU  

Option A.3 Projects of mutual interest (PMIs) 
Option A.3.0 
Option A.3.1 
Specific objective 2: Improve infrastructure planning for energy system integration and 
offshore grids 
Option B.1 Offshore grids for renewable energy 
Option B.1.0 
Option B.1.1 
Option B.1.2 
Option B.2 Cross-sectoral infrastructure planning 
Business as usual 
Option B.2.0 
Strengthened governance and sustainability  
Option B.2.1 
Option B.2.2 
New governance set-up  
Specific objective 3: Shorten permitting procedures for PCIs to avoid delays in projects 
that facilitate the energy transition 
Option C.1 Permitting  
Option C.1.0 
Option C.1.1.  Accelerating the project implementation 
Option C.1.2 

Business as usual 

One-stop shop per sea basin for offshore renewable 
projects 

X 
X 

X 

X 

Specific objective 4: Ensure the appropriate use of the cost sharing tools and regulatory 
incentives 
Option D.1 Regulatory treatment 
Option D.1.0 
Option D.1.1 

Business as usual 
Inclusion full investment costs 

X 

The  options  pertaining  to  “offshore  grids”  and  “cross-sectoral  infrastructure  planning” 
improve  the  governance  and  the  infrastructure  planning  framework  to  enable  the 
identification  of  projects  necessary  for  the  energy  transition  and  climate  targets.  There 

69 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
are two main improvements: first, the introduction of an integrated network development 
plan for offshore infrastructure on the basis of Member States’ joint commitments to the 
amount of the offshore renewable deployment for each sea basin (top down approach for 
offshore  planning);  second,  adjustments  to  the  roles  of  the  key  actors  involved  in  the 
development  of  the  TYNDP  with  strengthened  oversight  from  the  Commission  and 
ACER on the ENTSOs.  The combined impact  of the preferred options will  ensure that 
future  PCIs  will  contribute  to  the  achievement  of  Green  Deal  objectives  including 
climate neutrality. Sustainability in terms of climate mitigation will be achieved through 
the adjusted scope of the TEN-E Regulation in terms of eligible infrastructure categories 
(removal  of  natural  gas  and  oil  pipelines,  inclusion  of  hydrogen),  integrated  offshore 
development plans, as well as strengthened governance with  a mandatory sustainability 
criterion for all candidate projects.  

Policy  options  concerning  “permitting”  and  “regulatory  treatment”  will  complement 
these  improvements  to  facilitate  the  timely  development  of  the  identified  PCIs:  a)  the 
introduction of a one stop shop for offshore infrastructure per sea basin, b) the access to 
urgent court procedures, where available, and c) the inclusion of full investment costs in 
the  cross-border  cost  allocation.  Apart  from  the  changes  that  are  specific  to  offshore 
grids,  the  changes  will  apply  to  the  scope  of  the  revised  TEN-E  Regulation  and  all 
eligible infrastructure categories. Finally, the above benefits will be extended to projects 
connecting  the  EU  with  third  countries  (PMIs)  given  their  expected  increasing  role  in 
achieving the climate objectives. 

In  addition,  oil  pipelines  and  electricity  highways  will  be  removed  as  infrastructure 
categories and thematic areas. 

In  addition,  the  following  technical  options  (see  Annex  9)  would  be  part  of  the  policy 
package: accelerating the permitting process (option C.1.2.), increasing the transparency 
of  PCIs  (option  C.2.1),  possibility  for  smart  grids  projects  to  obtain  a  CBCA  (option 
D.1.2),  clarifying  CBCA  provisions  (option  D.1.3),  and  updating  investment  incentives 
(option D.1.4). 

The  package  aims  to  “future  proof”  the  TEN-E  Regulation.  The  options  on  the  future 
scope  of  the  Regulation  cover  all  technologies  necessary  for  the  energy  transition  and 
climate  targets.  The  definitions  are  at  the  same  time  specific  and  sufficiently  broad  to 
accommodate  technological  developments  to  the  extent  possible.  The  PCI  selection 
framework  and  the  new  approach  to  cross-sectoral  infrastructure  planning  sets  the  key 
elements in terms of objectives and criteria. The future framework will maintain the role 
of  the  regional  groups  in  the  selection  process  to  further  specify  and  adjust  these 
elements against new policy priorities and technological developments  also considering 
the regional context. 

Removing  the  list  of  eligible  infrastructure  categories  to  provide  for  full  flexibility  in 
future PCI selection processes to take account of new developments such as a changing 
political  context  or  new  technological  developments  would  not  allow  meeting  the 
objectives of the TEN-E Regulation. Pre-defined infrastructure categories are needed for 
the  identification  of  projects  of  common  interest.  The  selection  process  builds  on 
coordinated cross-border infrastructure planning which is only feasible and manageable 
if the scope and selection criteria are defined per infrastructure category. If infrastructure 
categories  are  not  defined  in  the  TEN-E  Regulation,  they  would  need  to  be  defined 
during the implementation of the Regulation, i.e. during the PCI selection process. Given 

70 

 
the political nature of this decision, it seems appropriate to establish these definitions in 
the Regulation by the co-legislators.   

8.2  REFIT (simplification and improved efficiency) 

In order to simplify and improve the efficiency of the TEN-E Regulation the following 
measures  have  been  identified  to  reduce  compliance  and  regulatory  costs.  These  are 
explained in more detail in Annex 10. 

a)  Reduced reporting obligations  

While  annual  reporting  by  project  promoters  needs  to  be  maintained  to  achieve  the 
required  transparency  standards  and  allow  the  Regional  Groups  to  tackle  quickly  any 
implementation  issues  that  the  projects  may  encounter,  the  annual  report  of  the 
competent authorities could be transformed into input or additional information into the 
report  of  the  project  promoters.  This  measure  would  reduce  costs  and  administrative 
burden for the project promoters, but in particular for competent authorities which would 
not need to submit a separate report. The cost saving cannot be estimated as the relevant 
data are not available, but it is a recurrent cost saving. 

b)  Reduced monitoring by ACER to once every two years 

To simplify the reporting by ACER, their report could be issued once every two years, on 
time for the Regional Groups, to take it into account for their assessment of the new PCI 
candidates134.  Since  ACER’s  report  is  actually  used  only  once  every  two  years,  this 
option  could  help  simplify  the  monitoring  obligations  without  any  costs  and  without 
affecting 
implementation.  This  measure  would  reduce  costs  and 
administrative  burden  for  ACER,  for  the  members  of  the  Regional  Groups  and  the 
Commission.  This  measure  could  generate  efficiency  gains  of  approximately  20%  of 
ACER’s workload on reporting, equivalent to annual savings of EUR 60 000 (or 0.4 FTE 
per year). 

the  projects’ 

c)  Pre-consultation to become optional 

in 

The  principles  for  public  participation 
the  Regulation  constitute  minimum 
requirements  to  ensure  early  engagement  with  local  communities  and  stakeholders 
affected by the construction of a PCI and include a pre-consultation process. In practice, 
the obligation to consult ahead of the launch of permitting procedure may be adding to 
existing national procedures. To avoid that two or more consultations are required at an 
early stage, it is suggested to make the pre-consultation optional, if it is already covered 
by  national  rules  under  the  same  or  higher  standards  as  in  the  TEN-E  Regulation.  The 
cost savings which would occur mainly with project promoters cannot be estimated as the 
relevant data are not available, but it is a recurrent cost saving. 

d) Simplified inclusion in TYNDP for existing PCIs 

134 This option corresponds to the input of ACER to the stakeholder consultation. 

71 

 
                                                 
An  electricity  or  gas  candidate  project  can  apply  for  the  inclusion  in  the  Union  list  of 
PCIs only if it is  included in  the latest  available TYNDPs,  developed biennially by the 
ENTSOs.  This  process  requires  a  significant  amount  of  data  and  legal  proofs135. 
Considering  that  existing  PCI  projects  already  delivered  the  necessary  proofs  in  the 
previous  TYNDP  process,  an  automatic  inclusion  in  the  subsequent  TYNDPs  for  such 
projects, as long as their administrative and technical data did not significantly change, is 
recommended.  The  cost  savings  which  would  occur  mainly  with  project  promoters 
cannot be estimated as the relevant data are not available, but it is a recurrent cost saving. 

9  HOW WILL ACTUAL IMPACTS BE MONITORED AND EVALUATED? 

The  actual  impacts  of  the  legislation  will  be  monitored  and  evaluated  against  a  set  of 
indicators tailored to the specific policy objectives to be achieved with the legislation. A 
review  of  the  effectiveness  of  the  new  legislation  could  take  place  in  2026,  when  the 
second PCI selection process under the new framework should have been completed. 

Under the existing TEN-E framework there are already regular reporting and monitoring 
procedures  in  place.  This  well-established  monitoring  system  constitutes  an  important 
basis for monitoring the impacts of the legislation.  

9.1 

Indicators 

Building on the existing monitoring, the following indicators have been identified for the 
specific policy objectives: 

 

Enable 
the 
investments: 

identification  of 

the  necessary  cross-border  projects  and 

o 

o 
o 

o 

the number and types of projects  under the defined priority  corridors /  thematic 
areas (planned, under construction or commissioned); 
the installed capacity per project type and priority corridors / thematic areas; 
the  integration  of  renewable  energy  sources  and  reduced  greenhouse  gas 
emissions; 
the interconnection level between Member States; 

 

Improve  infrastructure  planning  for  energy  system  integration  and  offshore 
grids: 

o 

installed capacities for offshore renewable energy generation; 

 

Shorten permitting procedures for projects of common interest 

o 

o 
o 

the average and maximum total duration of authorisation procedures for projects 
of common interest; 
the average duration of court proceedings for projects of common interest; 
the level of opposition faced by projects of common interest (number of written 
objections during the public consultation, number of legal recourse actions). 

135 ENTSO-E : https://tyndp.entsoe.eu/promoters-corner  
ENTSOG: https://www.entsog.eu/sites/default/files/2019-
05/TYNDP%202020_Practical_Implementation_Document_20190502_0.pdf  

72 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
 

Ensure the appropriate use of the regulatory framework 

o 

o 
o 

the  number  of  projects  of  common  interest  having  reached  a  cost  allocation 
agreement among TSOs and NRAs based on full cost inclusion; 
the average duration for reaching an cost allocation agreement; 
the  number  and  type  of  projects  of  common  interest  having  received  specific 
incentives and/or support by NRAs; 

All  data  will  be  monitored  on  the  basis  of  regular  reports  from  project  promoters  and 
national regulators. 

9.2  Operational objectives  

Based on the policy options, the following operational objectives have been identified: 

  curtailment  of 

Indicators 
Reduced 
renewable  energy; 
doubling  the  number  of  smart  electricity  projects 
compared to current levels by 2026 
At  least  10  PCIs  to  support  the  deployment  of 
offshore renewable energy by 2026  
Integration  of  hydrogen 
the  TYNDP  or 
establishment  of  a  hydrogen  network  development 
plan; at least 5 hydrogen PCIs by 2026 
Share  of  PCIs  that  are  delayed  in  a  given  year 
compared  to  the  initially  planned  commissioning 
date: reduce share compared to current situation 

in 

that 

support 

Operational objectives 
Implementation  of  PCIs 
the 
achievement  of  the  climate  neutrality  objective  by 
enabling RES integration 
Achieve a significant increase in the deployment of 
offshore renewable energy  
European  approach  to  infrastructure  planning  for 
hydrogen networks 

Reduce delays in PCI implementation 

73 

 
 
 
10  GLOSSARY 

Term or acronym 

Meaning or definition 

ACER 

BAU 

CAPEX 

CBCA 

CBA 

DSO 

ENTSO-E 

ENTSOG 

GHG 

ISO 

JU 

LNG 

MS 

OPEX 

P2G 

PCI 

RAB 

RES 

TSO 

Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators 

Business as usual 

Capital expenditure 

Cross-border cost allocation 

Cost-benefit analysis 

Distribution System Operator 

European  Network  of  Transmission  System  Operators 
for Electricity 

European  Network  of  Transmission  System  Operators 
for Gas 

Greenhouse gas emissions 

Independent System Operator 

Joint Undertaking 

Liquefied natural gas 

Member State 

Operating expense 

Power-to-gas 

Project of common interest 

Regulatory Asset Base 

Renewable energy sources 

Transmission System Operator 

TYNDP 

Ten Year Network Development Plan 

74 

 
 
 
ANNEX 1: PROCEDURAL INFORMATION 

Lead DG, Decide Planning/CWP references 

The  Directorate-General  (DG)  for  Energy  was  leading  the  preparation  of  this  initiative 
and  the  work  on  the  Impact  Assessment  in  the  European  Commission.  The  planning 
entry  was  approved  in  Decide  Planning  under  the  reference  PLAN/2020/6566.  It  is 
included  in  the  adjusted  Commission  Work  Programme  2020  COM(2020)  440 
final136under the policy objective A European Green Deal. 

Organisation and timing  

The  planned  adoption  date  (Q4  2020)  included  in  the  Commission  Work  Programme 
adopted on 29 January 2020, remained unchanged in the revised version adopted on 27 
May  2020  following  the  COVID-19  crisis.    An  inter-service  steering  group  (ISG),  was 
established for preparing this initiative composed of the following Commission services: 
Secretariat General (SG), CLIMA, CNECT, GROW, RTD, NEAR, REGIO, ENV, JRC, 
MOVE, DEVCO, COMP, SJ. The  ISG met five times in  the period from  January until 
adoption in December 2020.   

Milestones  
Publication of the inception impact assessment  
Feedback period on inception impact assessment 
Open public consultation and targeted consultation  
Online webinars 
Upstream meeting with Regulatory Scrutiny Board 
Submission to Regulatory Scrutiny Board 
Regulatory Scrutiny Board 
Resubmission to Regulatory Scrutiny Board 

Dates 
11 May 2020 
11 March – 8 June 2020 
18 May - 13 July 2020  
June 2020 
14 July 2020 
25 September 2020 
21 October 2020 
9 November 2020 

Consultation of the RSB 

The  Impact  Assessment  report  was  first  submitted  to  the  Regulatory  Scrutiny  Board 
(RSB)  on  25  September  2020  and  discussed  with  the  Board  on  21  October  2020.  The 
RSB  first  delivered  a  negative  opinion  on  23  October  2020  and  after  examining  the 
resubmitted version (submitted on 9 November 2020) delivered a positive opinion with 
reservations on 1 December 2020. The below tables summarise how the revised Impact 
Assessment report addresses the requested improvements.  

 a) First RSB opinion 

136 
01aa75ed71a1.0006.02/DOC_1&format=PDF  

https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar%3Af1ebd6bf-a0d3-11ea-9d2d-

75 

 
 
 
                                                 
RSB requested improvements 

Changes in the revised report: 

(1) The report should clarify the context 
of  the  revision.  It  should  present  the 
origins  of  the  TEN-E  framework,  its 
current  components  (thematic  areas, 
priority  corridors,  regional  groupings, 
PCI 
and 
financing. It should more clearly set out 
the current governance system for trans-
European network plans. 

selection 

criteria 

etc.) 

the 

elements  of 

Section  1  of  the  report  has  been  thoroughly 
revised to  clarify upfront  the background  and 
key 
current  TEN-E 
Regulation. In addition, more details including 
illustrations  on  the  PCI  selection  process  as 
well as the TYNDP  process  have been added 
in section 3 “Implementation/State of play” of 
Annex 5 (Evaluation report). A new Annex 6 
has  been  added  to  provide  a  more  detailed 
overview  on  the  status  of  PCIs  and  the 
relationship with CEF.  

The key conclusions of the evaluation on the 
successes and shortcomings of the current 
TEN-E Regulation have been added at the 
beginning of section 2 and they have been 
systematically picked up the problem 
definition. The new sub-section 2.4 clarifies 
what elements will remain unchanged and 
which elements are subject for review. 

there 

(2)  Drawing  on  the  evaluation,  the 
problem  analysis  should  present  what 
has  worked  well  under  the  existing 
Regulation 
are 
and  where 
shortcomings.  It  should  detail  which 
institutional 
the  current 
issues  of 
framework  lead  to  non-alignment  with 
objectives 
and 
policy 
European 
requirements 
excessive 
for 
time 
should  explain 
It 
decision-making. 
which  elements  will  remain  unchanged 
in the revised Regulation and which will 
be up for review. 

(3)  The  report  should  elaborate  on  the 
new  policy  needs  emerging  from  the 
Green  Deal.  It  should  clearly  position 
how the TEN-E framework fits into this 
context. It should explain the linkages to 
other  related  policy  initiatives  (adopted 
or being developed), such as the energy 
efficiency 
energy 
directives  and  the  green  taxonomy  for 
investments.  The  report  should  discuss 
the estimated regulatory and investment 
needs  to  establish  the  necessary  energy 
infrastructure  to  reach  the  2030/2050 
climate  targets,  and  the    contribution 
from TEN-E. 

renewable 

and 

The problem definition has been revised and 
restructured to better explain how the TEN-E 
framework fits into the new policy context of 
the Green Deal (section 2), language on 
regulatory and investments needs has been 
strengthened and completed with additional 
references  (section 2.1). The baseline has 
been revised to better explain the linkages to 
other related policy initiatives (adopted or 
being developed), such as the energy 
efficiency and renewable energy directives 
and the green taxonomy for investments and 
how these affect the identified problems 
(sections 2.1 and 2.3). 

(4)  The  report  should  clarify  what  will 
be  the  measures  of  success  of  the 
revised Regulation in contributing to the 
Green Deal and reducing delays. 

Specific success indicators have been added to 
the indicators (section 9.2). 

76 

 
 
 
(5)  The  report  should  clarify  how  the 
revision  intends  to  ensure  technology 
neutrality.  It  should  specify  how  the 
new planning framework will be able to 
accommodate changes in objectives and 
technologies.  It  should  assess  to  what 
extent 
the  sectoral  combinations  of 
options  under  “scope”  are  future  proof, 
given  that  they  would  be  fixed  in  the 
Regulation. 

The issues of technology neutrality and 
“future proof” of the initiative have been 
explicitly addressed in comparison of the 
options (section 7) in terms of the scope and 
the governance, both the planning framework 
and the PCI selection process including the 
assessment methodologies. It has been 
highlighted to what extent certain options 
would be in conflict with making the revsied 
TEN-E Regulation future proof. 

In addition to the added clarifications on the 
TEN-E framework (see point 1) as well as the 
revised problem definition (see point 2), an 
intervention logic diagram (Figure 4) has been 
added to clarify how the objectives and 
options relate to the problems and underlying 
drivers.  

The introduction of a mandatory sustainability 
criterion has been explained in more detail 
(section 5.2.2.2 and new Annex 8).  

The options relegated to an Annex have been 
revised to focus on those options that are of 
technical nature. This has been clarified in the 
report. 

The report has been strengthened to better 
explain why the package of preferred options 
are considered best suited to address the 
identified problems (section 7 and 8, new 
Table 4) and highlights possible alternatives.  

The role of ACER and the Commission has 
been clarified (section 5.2.2). It has been 
clarified that option on accelerated court 
procedures would apply to some Member 
States only (section 6.3.1).  

The assessment of impacts in terms of 
administrative burden has been strengthened 
and cost estimates added (section 6.2). 

and 

timeliness  of 

(6)  The  options  should  link  better  with 
the  identified  problems  and  objectives. 
The  report  should  substantiate  why  it 
does  not  consider  a  more  fundamental 
revision  of  the  TEN-E  approach,  to 
improve  the  alignment  with  political 
objectives 
the 
planning  process.  The  report  should 
explain  how 
introduction  of  a 
mandatory sustainability criterion – next 
to  other  selection  criteria  –  would 
ensure that the projects with the highest 
contribution  to  sustainability  would  be 
selected. The report should better justify 
why  it  relegates  the  discussion  of  some 
options to an annex. 

the 

(with 

(7) The report should better justify why 
the preferred option is the best response 
to  the  identified  problems.  It  should 
explain how the inclusion of the updated 
criteria  can  improve  the  selection  of 
projects  of  common  interest,  if  the 
governance  structure  continues  to  be 
decentralised 
the  European 
Network  of  Transmission  System 
Operators continuing to initiate and lead 
the  award  decisions).  It  should  clarify 
the 
the 
Cooperation  of  Energy  Regulators  in 
this  respect.  It  should  make  clear  that 
the  proposed  solution  for  eliminating 
the delays applies only to some Member 
States.  The  report  should  present  cost 
estimates  for  the  proposed  changes  in 
the governance framework. 

the  Agency 

role  of 

for 

b) Second RSB opinion 

77 

 
 
 
 
 
 
RSB requested improvements 

Changes in the revised report: 

the 

assessing 

(1)  The  report  should  provide  a  better 
justification for creating a separate system 
for 
sustainability  of 
candidate  projects  of  common  interest.  It 
is not clear why the TEN-E sustainability 
assessment  requires  specific  selection 
criteria  or  how  they  would  differ  from 
those of the taxonomy Regulation. While 
the report acknowledges that the details of 
the  sustainability  methodology  would  be 
developed  later  with  the  ENTSOs  and 
ACER,  the  report  should  at  least  provide 
the  minimum  requirements  to  align  the 
PCI selection with EU policy objectives. 

(2) The  report  should  be  more  specific  
on    how  it  will    ensure    that    the  
mandatory    sustainability  criterion  will 
take  precedence over other criteria in the  
to  ensure 
project  selection  process, 
alignment with  the Green Deal.  It  should 
also  clarify  why  it  proposes  not  to  apply 
the  sustainability  criterion  to  electricity 
projects.  Although  these  automatically 
fulfil 
taxonomy  requirements  for 
climate mitigation, they should also do no 
significant  harm  to  other  environmental 
and social objectives. 

the 

(3)  The  report  should  better  substantiate 
why  the  revised  Regulation  should  keep 
the  list  of  infrastructure  categories.  It 
should  consider  how  it  can  make  the 
initiative more future-proof. It should also 
explain  why  it  does  not  directly  use  the 
the 
taxonomy  Regulation 
alignment of the list with the Green Deal. 

to  ensure 

78 

The  text  has  been  revised  (sections  7)  to 
further  clarify 
the  different  scope  and 
purpose  of  the  TEN-E  Regulation  and  the 
Taxonomy  Regulation.  It  explains  why 
specific  selection  criteria  are  needed  in  the 
TEN-E  Regulation  in  order  to  meet  its 
objectives. It also further clarifies (section 8) 
how the full alignment with the Green Deal 
objectives as key objective of the revision is 
achieved. 

The  revised  report  (section  6.2.2)  explains 
that the mandatory sustainability assessment 
constitutes  as  such  a  minimum  requirement 
but  is  only  one  element  to  align  the  PCI 
selection  with  the  EU  policy  objectives 
(sections 6.2.2 and 8). 

the  adjusted  scope  of 

Text was added (section 8) to clarify that the 
combined  impacts  of  the  proposed  changes, 
i.e. 
the  TEN-E 
Regulation, integrated offshore development 
plans,  as  well  as  strengthened  governance 
with  a  mandatory  sustainability  assessment 
for  all  candidate  projects  will  align  the  PCI 
selection  with  EU  policy  objectives 
including the Green Deal. 

The  revised  report  (section  6.2.2)  explains 
that  sustainability  as  mandatory  selection 
criterion  would  be  applied  to  all  candidate 
projects.  

Text  was  added  (Section  7)  to  clarify  how 
the  assessed  options  would  ensure  that 
projects  do  no  significant  harm  to  the 
environment. 

Text  was  added  (section  8)  to  explain  why 
infrastructure 
the  definition  of  eligible 
the 
categories  are 
consequences would be, if this was not done. 

required  and  what 

The  text  has  been  revised  (section  7)  to 
the  different  scope  and 
further  clarify 
purpose  of  the  TEN-E  Regulation  and  the 
Taxonomy Regulation and why the approach 
under the Taxonomy would not be sufficient 
for the PCI selection process (see also point 

 
1). 

The  revised  text  (sections  2  and  5.2.3) 
clarifies  that  the  evaluation  concludes  that 
national  implementation  and  enforcement  is 
a  key  issue  to  address  permitting  delays.  It 
also  better  explains  (sections  6.3  and  7)  the 
effectiveness of the policy option on ‘use of 
urgent court procedures’. 

(4)  The  evaluation  concludes  that  the 
delays  in  acquiring  the  permits  for  PCIs 
are  largely  influenced  by  national  laws 
and  practices.  The  report  should  be 
clearer  about  the  role  of  the  EU  versus 
national    levels    in    addressing    these  
delays.  In  this  context,  it  should  better 
likely 
inclusion  and 
explain 
effectiveness of the policy option on ‘use 
of  urgent  court  procedures’,  as  it  would 
only  apply  to  Member  States  that  have 
such procedures in place (less than half). 

the 

the 

Evidence, sources and quality 

The  impact  assessment  draws  on  evidence  from  the  evaluation  of  the  Regulation 
347/2013  on  guidelines  for  the  trans-European  energy  networks,  from  the  stakeholder 
input to the extensive consultations carried out in this respect, as well as from the results 
of  a  series  of  topical  studies  on  key  elements  of  the  TEN-E  Regulation,  which  will  be 
presented below. 

The impact assessment references the outcomes of a mid-term evaluation of the TEN-E 
Regulation, as well as evaluations and assessments carried out in the framework of other 
Commission initiatives, such as: 

  Stepping  up  Europe’s  2030  climate  ambition,  Commission  staff  working 

document Impact Assessment, SWD(2020) 176 final; 

  A hydrogen strategy for a climate-neutral Europe, COM(2020) 301 final;  
  Powering  a  climate-neutral  economy:  An  EU  Strategy  for  Energy  System 

Integration, COM(2020) 299 final; 

  EU  Technical  Expert  Group  on  Sustainable  Finance:  Taxonomy,  Technical 

Report (2020); 

  Commission Expert Group  on electricity interconnection targets, Third report of 
the  Public  engagement  and  acceptance  in  the  planning  and  implementation    of 
European electricity interconnectors (2019); 

  A Clean Planet for all - A European long-term strategic vision for a prosperous, 
modern, competitive and climate neutral economy, Commission Communication 
COM(2018) 773; 

Formal  conclusions  adopted  in  the  framework  of  the  Copenhagen  Forum  in  2018  and 
2019  were  also  considered  in  the  analysis.  The  Copenhagen  Forum  gathers  annually 
representatives of the EU institutions, transmission system operators, project promoters, 
regulators,  energy  companies,  NGOs  and  civil  society  and  the  financing  community  to 
discuss the challenges of developing Europe’s energy infrastructure. 

ACER’s  annual  consolidated  monitoring  reports  on  the  progress  of  electricity  and  gas 
PCIs,  incremental  capacity  projects  and  virtual  interconnection  points  as  well  other 

79 

 
 
 
updates  on  the  cross-border  cost  allocation  decisions,  project-specific  risk-based 
incentives were equally considered.  

information  was  gathered 

Further 
through  several  support  studies  previously 
commissioned to  external  contractors to  support the development  of policy  options  and 
assessment on: 

Investment needs in infrastructure and costs of delays 

  Ecofys (2017): Investments needs in trans-European infrastructure up to 2030 and 

beyond Eurelectric (2019) 

  Eurelectric (2019), The Value of the Grid  
  Renewable Grid  Initiative/ ENTSOE (2019): Working Paper on Value of timely 

implementation of “better projects” 

Market and technical data on different technologies  

  Trinomics (2020): Study on Opportunities arising from the inclusion of Hydrogen 

Energy Technologies in the National Energy & Climate Plans 

  Tractebel (2020): Hydrogen generation in Europe 
  Trinomics (2019): Impact of the use of the biomethane and hydrogen potential on 

trans-European infrastructure  
International Energy Agency (2019): The Future of Hydrogen 

 
  Artelys/Trinomics/Enerdata  (2020):  Study  on  energy  storage  –  Contribution  to 

the security of the electricity supply in Europe  
International Energy Agency (2020): Energy Storage Study  

 
  EY/ REKK (2018): Quo vadis EU gas market regulatory framework –Study on a 

Gas Market Design for Europe  

Digitalisation and innovation aspects 

  Ecorys (2019): Do currrent regulatory frameworks in the EU support innovation 

and security of supply in electricity and gas grids? 
International Energy Agency (2017): Digitalisation and Energy, OECD 

 
  ETIP/SNET  (2018):  Digitalisation  of 

the  energy  system  and  customer 
participation Description and  recommendations of Technologies,  Use Cases and 
Cybersecurity 

Sustainability 

  Artelys/  Trinomics  (2020):  Measuring  the  contribution  of  gas  infrastructure 
projects to sustainability as defined in the TEN-E Regulation [to be published] 

Offshore grid development 

  Navigant/SWECO  (2020):  Study  on 
Mediterranean region [to be published] 

the  offshore  grid  potential 

in 

the 

  Roland  Berger  GmbH  (2019):  How  to  reduce  costs  and  space  of  offshore 

development: North Seas offshore energy clusters study  

80 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  COWI (2019): Study on Baltic offshore wind energy cooperation under BEMIP 

Public acceptance and delays in projects implementation 

  Scope  et  al.  (2020)  Innovative  actions  and  strategies  to  boost  public  awareness, 

trust and acceptance of trans-European energy infrastructure projects  

81 

 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX 2: STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION  

In  line  with  the  Better  Regulation  Guidelines  and  Toolbox  notably  for  “back-to-back 
evaluations  and  impact  assessments”,  the  Commission  carried  out  a  comprehensive 
consultation  based  on  a  consultation  strategy  that  included  a  range  of  consultation 
methods  and  tools  that  combined  both  backward  and  forward-looking  elements.  The 
strategy was designed in line with the intervention logic, placing the focus on relevance, 
effectiveness, efficiency, coherence, and EU value-added of the TEN-E Regulation.  

The  consultation  strategy  aimed  to  ensure  that  all  relevant  evidence  were  taken  into 
account,  including  data  about  costs,  about  societal  impact,  and  about  the  potential 
benefits of the initiative. 

In  line  with  the  Better  Regulation  guidelines,  the  goal  of  the  stakeholder  consultation 
was: 

  To  collect  views,  experience  and  concrete  examples  from  stakeholders  that  will 
illustrate  particular  opportunities,  challenges  and  impacts  resulting  from  the 
implementation  of  the  TEN-E  Regulation  with  the  view  to  fill  any  potential 
information/data  gaps,  and  facilitate  the  analysis  of  the  different  evaluation 
criteria;  

  To  solicit  opinions  on  the  extent  to  which  the  TEN-E  Regulation  is  meeting  its 

objectives.  

As  a  crucial  part  of  the  data  collection  strategy  for  the  evaluation  and  the  forward-
looking  elements  in  the  impact  assessment,  a  stakeholder  mapping  exercise  has  been 
carried out in order to identify and group the main stakeholders that are involved in and 
affected  by  TEN-E  Regulation.  The  consultation  targeted  stakeholders  inside  the  EU, 
both at national and European level. In force since 2013, the current TEN-E Regulation 
has  built  an  established  and  well-defined  group  of  stakeholders.  However,  the  exercise 
has been fine-tuned to tailor the identification of those stakeholders that are less known 
or active taking also into account new technological developments or contextual changes 
that  may  have  triggered  increase  interest  amongst  certain  stakeholders  on  the  TEN-E 
Regulation and its revision.  

The  stakeholders  identified  have  different  roles,  intervene  at  different  stages  and  have 
various levels of interest. Their input has therefore been taken into account into different 
parts of the evaluation and the preparation of the Impact Assessment. Table 1 outlines the 
stakeholder categories and includes a brief explanation of the role and relevance of each 
group to the consultation. The list ensures a good coverage of all parties affected by the 
Regulation.  

Table 1: Types of stakeholder and their main role and source of relevance in the TEN-E framework 

Type of 
stakeholder 
EU consumers and 
EU citizens 

Main role and source of relevance in the TEN-E policy area 

EU  consumers  (both  citizens  and  organized  civil  society)  are  key 
stakeholders  for  the  success  of  the  energy  transition  and  the 
enabling  role  of  the  energy  infrastructure  policy.  Aside  from  the 
information  on  direct  benefits  and  costs  resulting  from  the  actual 
implementation of an infrastructure project, citizens and consumers 

82 

 
 
 
 
Non-governmental 
organisations 

Services in the 
European 
Commission and 
agencies 

European 
Parliament 

European Union 
Regulators 

National 
Regulatory 
Authorities 

National 
Competent 
Authorities and 
their local and 
regional 
representatives (i.e. 
Ministries and 
outermost regions) 
European TSO 
(ENTSO-E and 
ENTSO-G)/DSO 
branch 
organisations 

Project promoters, 
including 
Transmission 
System Operators 
Energy producers / 
Industry 

can  offer  insight  on  the  burden  of  the  overall  functioning  of  the 
market  and  specific  expectations  regarding  the  implementation  of 
projects and final energy price for electricity and gas.  
NGOs are relevant representative bodies that, within the context of 
the  TEN-E  Regulation,  generally  provide  additional  views  on 
environmental values and targets. Contact with NGOs will provide a 
better understanding of the environmental impacts and relevance of 
the different policy scenarios. 
DG ENER, DG ENV, DG CLIMA, DG CNECT and DG REGIO as 
well as INEA are main points of contacts for policy initiatives 
directly relevant for the implementation of the TEN-E Regulation. 

In  line  with  Inter-institutional  agreements  and  commitments  made 
by  the  Commission  to  this  end,  the  Parliament  will  be  closely 
informed of the stages of the revision of the TEN-E Regulation. 
The  Agency  for  the  Cooperation  of  Energy  Regulators  (ACER)  is 
responsible  and/or  involved  in  various  tasks  under  the  TEN-E 
Regulation.  
National  regulators  (NRAs)  are  authorised  official  public  bodies 
established  in  most  EU  Member  States  with  a  common  aim  to 
exercise  regulatory  power  on  specific  policy  areas.  Today,  the 
European  Union  has  energy  rules  set  at  the  European  level,  but  in 
practice  it  has  27  national  regulatory  frameworks.  The  relevant 
NRAs  of  each  country  are  found  in  the  Board  of  regulators  of 
ACER.  NRAs  are  significant  stakeholders  in  the  establishment  of 
the  Energy  Union  and  for  the  implementation  of  the  TEN-E 
Regulation. 
The  Ministries  and  outermost  regions  are  the  institutions  and 
agencies competent  for enforcing EU regulations.  In each  Member 
State,  there  is  at  least  one  Ministry  responsible  for  implementing 
and enforcing the TEN-E Regulation.  

National TSOs and DSOs are represented by branch organisations at 
European level, such as ENTSO-E (Electricity), ENSO-G (Gas) and 
DSO  Organisations  (E.DSO  for  Smart  Grids,  Eurelectric,  CEDEC, 
GEODE,  Eurogas).  These  branch  organisations  will  help  gaining 
valuable  insights  concerning  the  implications  and  desires  for  the 
TEN-E Regulation and evaluation. 
National companies operating electricity and gas networks and 
project promoters are responsible for the implementation of PCIs.  

Other important parties that are affected by the TEN-E Regulation 
are energy producers and (large) industry parties, including ICT 
companies as well as the offshore renewable energy sector. This 

83 

 
 
 
Academics and 
thematic experts 

also includes industry and its associations representing the hydrogen 
and CCSU sectors. 
Key contacts for a better understanding of the interconnected 
European energy grid and assessing the different policy scenarios. 
This group also includes legal experts, which are relevant contacts 
for data collection in order to prevent the different policy scenarios 
and get a better understanding of the legal framework of the Energy 
Union scheme.  

The  consultation  strategy  included  a  combination  of  consultation  methods  (i.e. 
open/targeted) and tools to provide well-reasoned responses and generate the information 
and  evidence  necessary  to  respond  to  the  evaluation  questions  and  inform  forward-
looking elements in the policy preparation.  

In  particular,  several  consultation  tools  were  employed  to  generate  a  wealth  of 
information  and  collect  views  on  several  aspects  of  the  TEN-E  Regulation,  its 
implementation, enforcement, and effects. These include:  

  Online Public Consultation; 
  Targeted online survey; 
 
In-depth interviews; 
 
(Four) online stakeholder webinars. 

A  clear  delineation  has  be  established  between  the  various  consultation  tools  to  best 
address the target groups and avoid stakeholder fatigue.  

An  online  public  consultation  (OPC)  open  from  18  May  to  13  July  2020  (midnight 
Brussels  time)  provided  the  opportunity  to  anyone  interested  in  the  evaluation  and 
revision  of  the  TEN-E  Regulation  to  contribute.  EU  Survey  was  used  to  manage  the 
OPC. The questionnaire was available in 23 of the official languages of the EU. It  was 
addressed  to  mainly  to  citizens  and  organisations  (e.g.  NGOs,  local  government,  local 
communities, companies and industry associations) that have no specialist knowledge of 
the  TEN-E  Regulation.  This  was  reflected  in  the  number,  structure  and  wording  of  the 
questionnaire.  The  questions  were  limited,  simple,  easy  to  answer,  and  included 
sufficient  contextual  information  to  guide  the  contributor.  Moreover,  the  questionnaire 
for  the  open  public  consultation  did  not  cover  all  evaluation  criteria,  but  rather  non-
technical  elements  on  which  citizens  and  the  general  public  can  share  their  views.  The 
questions in the open public consultation aimed to identify the relevance of the TEN-E 
regulation  in  terms  of  its  objectives,  infrastructure  categories,  and  the  PCI  features  the 
general  public  deemed  most  important.    Contributors  with  specialist  knowledge  of  the 
TEN-E Regulation (e.g. as a professional for a national competent / regulatory authority, 
TSO, DSO, company project promoter, energy producer, NGO with specific knowledge 
on  the  subject)  were  invited  to  fill  in  a  targeted  survey.  The  online  public  consultation 
was  be  accessible  on  the  Commission's  Have  your  say  website137,  including  links  to 

137 
guidelines-for-trans-European-Energy-infrastructure 

https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/12382-Revision-of-the-

84 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
background documents and to relevant webpages, such as the ones dedicated to the TEN-
E policy and the European Green Deal.  

The  open  public  consultation  was  shortened  from  the  usual  12  weeks  to  8  weeks.  An 
evaluation roadmap of the current TEN-E Regulation was launched already in June 2019, 
setting  the  context  and  scope  of  the  evaluation.  The  nearly  30  replies  from  the  main 
stakeholder  groups,  as  well  as  regular  contacts  with  stakeholders  indicated  that 
stakeholders  are  informed  and  ready  to  engage  in  Commission’s  on-going  work  in  this 
area. An inception impact assessment was equally launched ahead of the OPC on 11 May 
facilitating all interested parties to respond to the public consultation. The availability of 
the  questionnaire  in  all  official  EU  languages  and  the  inclusiveness  of  the  consultation 
tools  ensured  open  access  of  all  parties  to  the  consultation  whilst  secured  evidence 
collection through the targeted consultations (targeted survey, webinars, interviews). 

The overall number of responses to the OPC questionnaire is 103. In addition, 169 emails 
were received via a functional mailbox for the consultation. Most of the contributions to 
the OPC questionnaire were in English (74 contributors chose to respond in English), but 
contributions were also received in French, German, Slovenian, and Spanish. Out of the 
169  received  emails  received  via  the  functional  project  mailbox  129  submissions 
represented  identical  replies  from  citizens,  out  of  which  44  in  Spanish,  Italian,  French, 
German and Portuguese.  

The main category of respondents was EU citizens (28 responses), followed by business 
associations  and  company/business  organisations.  The  following  table  outlines  the 
respondents by each category.  

Type of respondent 
Academic/research institution 
Business association 
Company/business organisation 
Environmental organisation 
EU citizen 
Non-EU citizen 
Non-governmental organisation (NGO) 
Other 
Public authority 
Grand Total 

Number 
2 
25 
22 
2 
28 
2 
12 
5 
5 
103 

Percentage 
2% 
24% 
21% 
2% 
27% 
2% 
12% 
5% 
5% 
100% 

In terms of the distribution of responses by country, most responses were received from 
Belgium (31), followed by Germany (12), and Spain (9).  

85 

 
 
 
 
 
1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  2  2  2  2  2  3  3  3  4  5  6  6 

31 

12 

9 

35

30

25

20

15

10

5

0

A  targeted  consultation  (in  English  only)  was  carried  out  in  parallel,  specifically 
addressing  project  promoters,  public  authorities  (NRAs,  NCAs,  regional  and  local 
governments),  other  actors  of  the  energy  system  (e.g.  DSOs,  energy  suppliers),  civil 
society (e.g. local communities, NGOs) wider industry representatives and academics or 
researchers but was open to everyone.  

The overall number of responses received to the targeted online survey is 112. The main 
category  of  respondents  was  Transmission  System  Operators  (27),  followed  by  “other” 
stakeholders (22) and industry representatives (17): 

Type of respondent 

Number 

Percentage 

National Regulatory Authority 
National Competent Authority 
Transmission system operator 
Distribution system operator 
Energy producer 
Industry 
Telecom company 
Local or regional authority 
Civil society 
Research, academia 
Other  
Total 

4 
10 
27 
10 
10 
17 
0 
0 
11 
1 
22 
112 

4% 
9% 
24% 
9% 
9% 
15% 
0% 
0% 
10% 
1% 
20% 
100% 

In terms of the distribution of responses by country, most responses were received from 
Belgium  (33),  followed  by  Austria,  France  and  Germany  (9  respondents  each).  The 
overrepresentation  of  Belgium  stems  from  the  fact  that  many  of  the  civil  society 
organisations  and  industry  associations  that  provided  their  input  to  the  targeted  survey 
are based in Brussels. 

86 

 
 
 
 
Approximately 46 in-depth interviews were carried out with the support of a consultant 
with  key  stakeholders  of  the  TEN-E  Regulation  to  provide  detailed  information  and 
evidence  on  key  aspects  that  could  not  be  dealt  with  in  length  by  the  targeted 
questionnaire.  The interviews aimed to  collect  more detailed information than could  be 
collected  through  the  targeted  survey  and  online  public  consultation.  As  such,  the 
interviews focused primarily on the effectiveness and implementation of the Regulation, 
but also touched upon its relevance, coherence, and EU added value.  

The interviews were designed to complement the results of the targeted survey. 

Four stakeholder webinars took  place with  the use of online conferencing systems  to 
ensure further outreach to stakeholders and create opportunities for structured feedback. 
Each webinar will be dedicated to key elements of the inception impact assessment. The 
webinars will last between 2.5 and 3 hours and  will include presentations on the topics 
addressed,  as  well  as  moderated  discussions  with  the  online  audience.  Interactive  tools 
such Sli.Do and/or in-built functions helped taking on questions from the audience. 

  The first webinar on ‘TEN-E Infrastructure categories to ensure full consistency 
with  the  climate  neutrality  objectives  of  the  Green  Deal’  took  place  on  02  June 
2020. It was attended by 304 participants and 17 panellists.  

  The second webinar on ‘Selection procedure and criteria for Projects of Common 
Interest  (PCIs)’ took  place  on  04 June  2020.  It  was  attended  by 298 participants 
and 12 panellists.  

  The third webinar on ‘TEN-E Regulatory toolbox and criteria for CEF financial 
assistance’  took  place  on  09 June  2020. It  was  attended  by 284 participants 
and 9 panellists.  

  The fourth and last webinar on ‘PCI Implementation: Permitting, monitoring and 
involvement  of  stakeholders’  took  place  on 11 June  2020.  It  was  attended 
by 211 participants and 8 panellists.  

In  terms  of  the  effectiveness  of  the  TEN-E  Regulation  in  reaching  its  objectives,  the 
replies to the OPC and the targeted survey converged. The majority of respondents of the 
OPC found that the ‘integration of renewable energy sources into the grid’ (92%) is the 

87 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
most  important  objective  for  trans-European  energy  infrastructure  network138.  On  a 
positive scale, the objective to achieve ‘a competitive and properly functioning integrated 
energy  market’  was  also  perceived  as  relevant  by  65%  of  the  contributors.  The 
stakeholders replying to the targeted survey largely confirmed that the TEN-E Regulation 
has  had  a  positive  impact  towards  meeting  its  objectives:  it  has  contributed  to  energy 
market  integration  (88%),  achieved  an  adequate  level  of  security  of  supply  (77%),  and 
contributed  to  competitiveness  in  the  EU  energy  market  (63%).  Less  agreement  was 
indicated  with  the  statement  that  the  Regulation  helped  achieve  the  2020  climate  and 
energy targets, however (47%). There are no clear trends across stakeholder groups.  

OPC  respondents’  contributions  were  more  diverse  when  scoring  the  relevance  of 
infrastructure categories under the TEN-E. Electricity infrastructure (transmission lines 
and  storage)  and  smart  electricity  grids  ranked  first  (87  and  83%,  respectively)  in 
respondents’ choices as relevant. On the other side of the ranking, ‘geological storage of 
CO2, LNG) terminals and CO2 networks (for transporting CO2) were deemed relevant to 
a small extent, mostly justified (via the functional mail) of the consultation by opposition 
from EU citizens to supporting fossil fuel energy infrastructure. 

Whilst  there  is  a  broad  agreement  that  the  infrastructure  categories  on  the  effective 
support  of  current  infrastructure  categories  in  achieving  the  overall  objectives  of  the 
TEN-E Regulation, the input indicate that priority corridors and thematic areas need to be 
updated  to  address  future  challenges  and  incorporate  new  types  of  projects.  The 
stakeholder  consultation  shows  that  stakeholders  generally  agree  on  broadening  the 
technological scope of the TEN-E Regulation to integrate more technologies supporting a 
decarbonised energy system, as well as encouraging innovation. 

Suggestions  included  the  consideration  of  new  infrastructure  categories,  as  well  as 
discarding existing ones. In general, stakeholders called for the reflection of the role of 
decentralised electricity production in the revised TEN-E Regulation and the need for a 
greater cooperation between TSOs and DSOs. Support was received for including cross-
sectoral  projects,  smart  gas  grid  projects  and  hybrid  wind  offshore    in  the  scope  of  the 
TEN-E.    Specifically  on  gas  infrastructure  categories,  there  was  an  agreement  that 
hydrogen  and  green  gases  will  be  required  at  large  scale  with  deployment  centered 
around current industrial hydrogen clusters. Additionally, the position of NGOS and RES 
promoters  focused  on  the  transitional  role  of  green  gases  blending  into  the  current  gas 
pipelines  and  the  need  to  mainstream  the  “do  no  harm  principle”  thus,  calling  for  the 
removal of natural gas infrastructure.  

138 TEN-E objectives, as set out in the survey:  A competitive and properly functioning integrated energy 
market;  Increased  resilience  of  energy  infrastructure  against  technical  failures,  natural  or  man-made 
disasters, and the adverse effects of climate change and threats to its security; Consumer empowerment  - 
making sure consumers' interests are considered in decisions related to energy infrastructure; Secure and 
diversified EU energy supplies, sources, and routes; Integration of renewable energy sources into the grid; 
Increase cross-border interconnections and deepen regional cooperation to transport energy from renewable 
sources where it is most needed; Giving priority to energy efficiency (putting the ‘Energy efficiency first’ 
principle in practice); Achieving the EU’s decarbonisation objectives for 2030 and 2050, including climate 
neutrality under the European Green Deal; Increased digitalisation of the energy infrastructure (e.g. Smart 
Grids);  Energy  system  integration  and  sector  coupling  (integration  of  the  different  energy  sectors  and 
beyond) 

88 

 
 
                                                 
Between  87  and  93  answers  to  the  OPC  qualified  the  facilitation  of  integration  of 
renewable  energy  sources  into  the  grid,  the  contribution  to  greenhouse  gas  emissions 
reduction  and  ensuring  security  of  supply  as  important  features  out  of  all  possible 
features139  listed  for  PCIs.  The  environmentally  sound  implementation  of  PCIs  and 
generation of direct benefits to the local communities were considered equally important 
by  the  contributors  to  the  open  public  consultation.  The  contribution  of  PCIs  towards 
increasing the competition in the market was seen as positive, although ranked lower.  

The replies to the targeted consultation on the PCI selection criteria complemented this 
input. As in the case of the OPC, targeted stakeholders confirmed that the selected PCIs 
are the most relevant projects to fulfil the TEN-E objectives (48% agree, 26% disagree). 
In their view, the cost-benefit assessments for the selection of PCIs would benefit from a 
more  appropriate  methodology  (44%).  In  general,  the  roles  of  different  actors  in  the 
selection procedure was considered adequate, except for a significant wish to weaken the 
role  of  the  ENTSOs  (39%)  and  to  strengthen  the  role  of  DSOs  (53%)  and  other 
stakeholders, such as NGOs (39% - 67% of whom represented industry or civil society). 
With regards to  the  criteria, the  general  criteria  are considered appropriate (48% agree, 
38%  disagree),  whilst  the  views  on  the  appropriateness  of  the  specific  criteria  for 
electricity, gas and CO2 projects were mixed mostly justified by lack of knowledge.  

Mirroring the feedback on the relevance of infrastructure categories, various stakeholders 
indicated that current eligibility criteria do not sufficiently support climate neutrality by 
insufficiently  supporting  network  innovation  and  by  including  traditional,  fossil  fuel 
infrastructure.  Some  of  the  current  selection  criteria  might  be  too  restrictive  for  the 
inclusion of projects at DSO level, in particular: the cross-border impact criteria, and the 
10 kV voltage threshold and 20% RES origin for smart grids. 

In addition to this, several environmental NGOs and industry stakeholders indicated that 
the weak assessment of climate impact is causing projects to be selected that do not have 
a positive effect on the CO2 emissions. A need for revision of the PCI selection criteria 
in light of the sustainability and climate effect is also echoed by some NRAs. TSOs do 
not  indicate  strong  opinions  on  the  sustainability  criterion.  Further  input  from  the 
targeted  stakeholders’  on  the  governance  of  the  selection  process  showed  an 
overwhelming  agreement  among  NRAs,  NCAs  and  TSOs  about  the  role  of  Regional 
Groups  in  enabling  regional  cooperation  (83%).  Equally,  High  Level  Groups  were 
deemed to provide added value through strategic steering and political guidance as well 
as monitoring the PCIs in the priority regions (71%) There is a general agreement among 
all  respondent  groups  that  the  current  reporting  and  monitoring  procedures  on  the  PCI 
progress are sufficient to ensure transparency on PCI development (56% agree), but not 
that  PCIs  implementation  plans  and  the  regular  updates  ensure  timely  project 
implementation (33% agree). 

139  Integration  of  renewable  energy  sources  into  the  grid;  Contribution  to  greenhouse  gas  emissions 
reduction;  Security  of  supply;  Market  integration  (e.g.  to  improve  infrastructure  and  increase  system 
flexibility); Increase competition in the market; Innovation; Contribution to increase the energy efficiency 
of the energy system; Environmentally sound implementation, i.e. compliance with the relevant regulations 
especially in the area of environment; Generation of direct benefits to the local communities 

89 

 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
Several stakeholders pointed to the potential conflicting role of the ENTSOs, as project 
promoters  and  developers  of  the  scenarios  and  CBA  methodology  over  which  projects 
are evaluated, indicated a the perception that the predominant role ENTSOs enjoy in the 
infrastructure  planning  is  not  seen  as  fully  independent.  In  their  view,  the  current 
planning  involves  an  unequal  treatment  of  non-TSO  promoters  and  results  in  a  biased 
nature  of  the  TYNDPs.  The  solutions  put  forward  would  include  the  involvement  and 
scrutiny of an independent organisation which would enable the development of a hybrid 
energy  system  with  a  multimodal  network  design  and  holistic  planning  for  grid 
connection based on a strong scenario-building and a solid cost-benefit analysis (CBA). 

In qualifying the coherence of the TEN-E Regulation Respondents with other policies or 
initiatives  at  EU  level,  stakeholders  indicated    inconsistencies  with  regards  to  the 
European  Green  Deal  /  Long  Term  Strategy  for  Decarbonisation  (74%identified 
inconsistencies,  especially  among  civil  society,  DSOs  and  energy  producers  and 
industry),  the  Paris  Agreement  (65%  identified  inconsistencies,  especially  among  civil 
society,  DSOs  and  TSOs),  and  the  Clean  Energy  Package  /  the  Energy  Union  (55% 
identified inconsistencies, especially among civil society, DSOs and energy producers). 

As  such,  respondents  considered  that  the  TEN-E  Regulation  is  lacking  in  terms  of 
adequately  addressing  key  emerging  issues  such  as  improving  energy  efficiency  and 
mitigating  climate  change  impacts.  According  to  respondents,  the  three  main  (new) 
challenges  to  be  addressed  are  greenhouse  gas  emission  reductions  /  climate  neutrality 
(mentioned  by  54),  integration  of  renewable  energy  sources  (mentioned  by  50)  and 
energy  system  integration  (mentioned  by  47).  The  two  least  important  challenges  are 
energy financing capacity of TSOs (mentioned by 42) and market fragmentation / market 
integration  (mentioned  by  20).  In  view  of  emerging  issues  however,  the  OPC  results 
show that 77% of the respondents agree that the revised TEN-E Regulation can make an 
important contribution to the economic recovery in Europe through a green transition in 
response to the COVID-19 crisis, while 8% disagree with the statement.  

Both the targeted survey and the OPC addressed the effectiveness of the implementation 
provisions, notably as regards public participation and transparency in the process of 
building PCIs.  Regarding public participation, 82% of the OPC respondents declared to 
be  aware  of  Projects  of  Common  Interest  (PCI)  label  and  78%  know  there  is  a  public 
participation process in the frame of PCI implementation. The majority (68%) consider 
the  public  participation  process  as  useful  or  useful  to  a  large  extent,  ranking  project 
websites  as  the  most  useful  communication  channel  for  providing  and  exchanging 
information on PCIs (78% consider it ‘Very useful’ or ‘Useful to a large extent’).  

The  targeted  stakeholders  drew  a  similarly  positive  picture,  with  more  than  half  of  the 
respondents  agreeing  increased  awareness  of  PCI  projects  (51%  agree,  17%  disagree), 
improved public participation (41% agree, 12% disagree) and increased trust (37% agree, 
38% disagree). Despite of perceived improvements in terms of awareness and trust in the 
PCI process, the input indicated a limited impact on increasing public acceptance (22% 
agree, 24% disagree) and on adjustments to  the design of the projects following public 
input  during  consultations  (19%  agree,  26%  disagree).  Nevertheless,  most  respondents 
agreed that the requirement for at least one public consultation is enough for increasing 
transparency  and  participation  (46%  agree,  20%  disagree).  During  the  webinars, 
panellists  called  for  increased  trust  and  transparency  both  in  the  upstream  process  of 
selection of PCIs (TYNDP, PCI process) as well as during project implementation.  

90 

 
 
 
 
 
Further  input  on  implementation,  notably  the  shortening  of  permit  granting  durations, 
indicated mixed views: 20% (completely) agreed, while 36% (completely) disagreed that 
TEN-E  permit  granting  provisions  enabled  an  accelerated  implementation  of  PCIs 
compared to the baseline. Similar differences in views were noted about the effectiveness 
of  the  one-stop-shops.  Limited  feedback  on  the  perceived    reasons  for  delays  include 
notably environmental impact assessments and the statutory permit granting procedure. 

The evaluation showed that TEN-E reduced the average duration of the permit granting 
process for transmission PCIs after 16 November 2013 to less than 3 years compared to 9 
years  prior  to  Regulation  entering  into  force.  However,  there  was  a  general  call  for 
acceleration and simplification of the permitting procedures is needed, whilst maintaining 
the  highest  environmental  standards.  The  close  cooperation  and  interaction  with 
authorities was emphasized as key.  

Stakeholder  views  on  the  effectiveness  of  the  CBCA  decision  processes  in  enabling 
effective investment were mixed, with 25% of the respondents agreeing to the statement, 
17%  disagreeing  and  21%    being  neutral.  A  more  positive  view  was  expressed  as  to 
whether  investment  incentives  enable  effective  investments  in  PCIs,  with  a  slight 
majority (54%) agreeing to the statement.   

The  input  from  stakeholders  indicated  notably  the  need  to  re-think  the  link  between 
CBCA  and  CEF  financing.  The  CBCA  procedures  were  discussed  as  such,  notably  on 
how  to  ease  the  burden  and  ensure  easier  access  to  CEF.  Some  proposals  referred  to 
making  smart  grids  eligible  for  CBCA.  There  were  several  calls  for  clarity  on  cost 
recovery, monetization where possible where relevant and the valorisation of accelerated 
implementation of PCIs in the CBA. For offshore grids specifically, stakeholders called 
for a clear legal framework for cross-border hybrid projects notably on CBA/ CBCA. 

Stakeholders  largely  believe  that  the  benefits  of  the  TEN-E  Regulation  outweigh  the 
costs (53% agree) whilst at the same time indicate that the TEN-E has not reduced such 
(administrative) costs for project  promoters (valid for TSOs  - 81% agree, NCAs  - 60% 
agree  and  NRAs  -  50%  agree).  A  few  suggestion  for  lowering  the  cost  were  provided, 
such  as  fast-tracking  PCI  selection  procedure  for  existing  PCIs,  without  substantiated 
analysis of impacts.  

There  is  widespread  agreement  among  OPC  and  targeted  respondents  that  the  TEN-E 
Regulation has EU added value – the majority believe it achieved more than could have 
been  achieved  at  national/regional  level  (92  %,  79%  respectively  agree)  and  that  the 
issues addressed by the TEN-E Regulation continue to require action at  EU level  (91% 
agree,  0  disagree).  The  main  EU  added  value  identified  by  respondents  is  access  to 
financing  (mentioned  by  99),  followed  by  regional  cooperation  (mentioned  by  84)  and 
the  implementation  of  projects  that  could  not  have  been  implemented  without  TEN-E 
(mentioned by 67).  

91 

 
  
 
 
ANNEX 3: WHO IS AFFECTED AND HOW? 

3.1 Practical implications of the initiative 

As  indicated  in  Annex  2,  the  following  key  target  groups  have  been  identified  for  this 
initiative: 

  European citizens and consumers  
  Non-governmental organisations 
  European Union Regulators  
  National Regulatory Authorities 
  National Competent Authorities and their local  and regional representatives (i.e. 

Ministries and outermost regions) 

  European TSO (ENTSO-E and ENTSO-G) 
  DSO branch organisations 
  Project promoters, including Transmission System Operators 
  Energy producers / Industry 
  Academics and thematic experts 

The  below  table  outlines  the  practical  implications  of  the  initiative  for  all  key  target 
groups identified. 

Type of stakeholder per 
target group 

European 
consumers  

citizens 

and 

Practical implications 

Ensuring the consistency of energy infrastructure planning rules with 
the  climate-neutrality  objective  will  benefit  citizens  by  lowering 
greenhouse  gas  emissions  through  optimal  and  efficient  integrated 
infrastructure planning, fossil fuels substitution by renewable or low-
carbon  gases  and  significant  deployment  of  onshore  and  offshore 
renewable energies.  

An efficient network operation, optimised onshore and offshore grid 
planning, exploitation of demand-response management services and 
enhanced digitalisation will bring a higher overall social welfare than 
the current  rules.  Comprehensive control and monitoring of the grid 
will  reduce  the  need  for  curtailment  of  renewables  and  enable 
competitive and innovative energy services for consumers. 

The digitalisation of the grid will facilitate customer  participation  in  
all    stages    of    the    development    and    expansion    of    the    energy 
system by digital tools such as participative geographical systems and 
would support new energy market arrangements. It will facilitate the 
integration  and  management  of  renewable  energy  produce  locally 
supporting  energy  consumers 
into  energy  producers 
(“prosumers”). 

turning 

Smart  electricity  grids 
the  roll  out  pf  charging 
infrastructure  for  electric  vehicles  would  directly  benefit  users  of 
electric vehicles. 

to  support 

92 

 
 
 
Appropriate rules for project selection and cost allocation in line with 
distributed benefits will stimulate investments in the grid in the most 
efficient  way  and  alleviate  the  burden  on  tariffs  for  consumers.    A 
coordinated  process  for  integrated 
infrastructure  planning  can 
ultimately  reduce  the  overall  need  for  infrastructure  projects  by 
designing the infrastructure in an optimal way. 

local  communities  will  benefit  from 

Citizens  and 
increased 
transparency  in  the  implementation  of  projects  of  common  interest, 
which will create opportunities to understand the value of the energy 
infrastructure  investments  and  become  involved.  An  accelerated 
realization of key procedures in the permitting process will also allow 
for a faster implementation of key project therefore bringing forward 
the  benefits  identified  in  the  cost-benefit  analysis  at  national  and 
regional  level  and  avoiding  high  dispatch  costs  for  consumers 
associated with delays.  

Infrastructure  enabling  the  expansion  of  offshore  renewable  energy 
will have a positive effect on employment across the EU. 

Transmission  system  operators  of  electricity  will  be  required  to 
strengthen  their  coordination  at  transmission  level,  as  well  as  with 
distribution network operators, in view of a European approach to an 
integrated onshore and offshore network planning. TSOs will benefit 
from the increased efficiency in network operations due to measures 
to  broaden  the  scope  of  the  smart  grids,  which  will  enhance  the 
exploitation  of  demand-response  management  services  and  increase 
cross-border data and capacity exchange.  

Project promoters will see a decrease in costs due to the provisions to 
accelerate  permitting  processes,  including  the  clarification  of  cross-
border provisions. The establishment of one-stop shops for sea basins 
would  equally  create  efficiencies  for  promoters,  both  in  terms  of 
reduced  administrative  burden  as  well  as  in  terms  of  access  to 
existing data and studies conducted for the sea basin. 

The  initiative  will  increase  the  cost  visibility  of  a  project,  creating 
regulatory  stability  allowing  project  promoters  to  obtain  financing 
from the market. 

Project  promoters  will  be  equally  impacted  by  the  strengthened 
monitoring and transparency in project implementation.  

The  creation  of  a  European  infrastructure  planning  framework  that 
reflects  the  relevant  needs  will  still  be  based  on  the  TYNDPs  but 
would require higher levels of cooperation and interlinkages between 
the  electricity  and  gas  transmission  networks,  as  a  well  as 
involvement  of  distribution  system  operators  and  non-TSOs  project 
promoters and other stakeholders. ENTSOs will see their role limited 
in  key  phases  of  the  planning  process,  such  as  the  development  of 
scenarios  and  cost-benefit  analysis  methodologies,  due  to  the 

Project 
including 
System Operators 

promoters, 
Transmission 

European TSO (ENTSO-E 
and ENTSO-G) 

93 

 
 
 
strengthened role of the Commission and ACER.  

ENTSO-E’s  role  will  increase  in  view  of  their  new  mandate  to 
develop  offshore  plans  for  time  horizons  2030,  2040  and  2050 
respectively  for  all  the  sea  basins  under  the  Commission’s  steering 
and binding opinion.  

The  initiative  will  entail  higher  cooperation  between  National 
Competent Authorities (NCAs) and possible restructuring of existing 
structures in the context of the development of one-stop shops per sea 
basin. NCAs will have to ensure the clarity and accessibility of cross-
border  provisions.  This  will,  in  turn,  trigger  efficiencies  for  NCAs. 
Measures that aim at an accelerated accomplishment of the permitting 
process through faster court procedures as well as REFIT provisions 
will  have  positive  implications  in  terms  of  reducing  administrative 
burden associated with reporting obligations.  

The  role  of  the  NRAs  will  increase  due  to  the  obligation  to 
thoroughly  assess the investment  requests since  all CBCA decisions 
issued  will  be  final.  The  consideration  and  inclusion  of  the  full 
investment costs in the national tariff and the sequential performance 
of an affordability assessment will increase the administrative burden 
on NRAs. 

ACER  will  have  a  strengthened  role  in  the  approval  of  the 
methodology  to  assess  the  costs  and  benefits  of  projects,  which 
together with the continuous follow-up of the TYNDPs development 
will  entail  a  limited  increase  in  administrative  burden.  ACER  will 
equally be impacted by the simplification of monitoring obligations.  

The role of the distribution network operators will increase thanks to 
their  increased  participation  in  the  planning  process.  Equally,  the 
introduction  of  new  infrastructure  categories  and  the  broadening  of 
existing ones will see a bigger role for DSOs as project promoters of 
PCI projects.  

National 
Competent 
Authorities and their local 
regional 
and 
representatives 
(i.e. 
Ministries  and  outermost 
regions) 

National 
Authorities 

Regulatory 

ACER 

Distribution 
operators 

system 

Energy 
Industry 

producers 

/ 

Broadening the scope to new and innovative infrastructure categories 
will create a market for those specific technologies. 

The hydrogen industry has estimated the impact  of building 40 GW 
electrolyser  capacity  in  Europe  and  40  GW  electrolyser  capacity  in 
neighbouring countries with the aim of exporting green hydrogen into 
Europe.140  This  would  require  total  investments  investment  of  €25-

140 Green Hydrogen for a European Green Deal – A 2x40 GW initiative, Hydrogen Europe, 2020 

94 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
€30 billion, of which over 85% would  be  realised in  the 2025-2030 
timeframe141.  Depending  on  the  scenario,  7.5  billion  or  29  billion 
EUR of value added can be generated annually in the whole EU-28, 
by investment in and operation of hydrogen technologies. Most of the 
value added is  expected  to  be created by building  and operating the 
renewable electricity plants that provide energy to electrolysers. 

Similarly, the establishment of an enabling grid planning framework 
for  offshore  grids  would  open  up  a  significant  market  for  the 
renewable  energy  industry,  in  particular  in  Europe,  and  partially 
compensate  for the slowdown in  renewable development  onshore in 
some regions in Europe.  

3.2 Summary of costs and benefits 

The assessment of the benefits distinguishes between direct and indirect benefits.  

Direct  benefits  of  the  package  of  preferred  policy  options  are  mainly  related  to 
greenhouse  gas  emission  savings  and  efficiency  improvements  at  large  scale  through  a 
more coordinated approach to infrastructure planning at European level and streamlined 
permitting  for  offshore  developments.  These  direct  benefits  encompass  both  social 
benefits,  e.g.  society  at  large  benefits  from  reduced  greenhouse  gas  emissions  and  the 
achievement  of  the  climate  neutrality  objective142,  and  private  benefits,  e.g.  reduced 
administrative costs related to shorter permitting procedures. 

The  simplification  measures,  as  discussed  in  section  8.2,  will  generate  direct  benefits 
through reduced existing recurrent direct costs related to administrative burden as a result 
of reduced monitoring and reporting obligations. These direct benefits are mainly private 
benefits for certain stakeholders such as project promoters. 

Indirect  benefits  include  sectoral  benefits  by  stimulating  market  demand  for  certain 
innovative technologies and in turn contributing to potentially higher employment rates. 

However,  the  net  impact  on  total  welfare  and  the  net  impacts  on  specific  groups  (i.e. 
winners and losers) as well as overall affordability is important to inform policymaking.  

Costs and benefits should usually be based on market prices (reflecting the opportunity 
cost  of  action).  However,  these  are  not  always  available  and  so  other  methods  may  be 
needed  to  express  impacts  in  monetary  terms  or  indeed  sometimes  impacts  cannot  be 
expressed in monetary terms 

The  assessment  of  the  preferred  options  showed  positive  impacts  in  social  welfare  and 
economic  terms  for  different  categories  of  stakeholders.  However,  such  impact  for  the 

141 These are electrolyser investment cost only, the figures do not include the investments in solar and wind 
farms, transport and storage infrastructure, nor end-use applications.   
142  COMMISSION  STAFF  WORKING  DOCUMENT  IMPACT  ASSESSMENT,  Stepping  up  Europe’s 
2030 climate ambition, SWD(2020) 176 final 

95 

 
 
                                                 
package  of  preferred  policy  options  could  not  be  fully  quantified  or  monetised  as  this 
would have required information regarding the deployment rate for future PCIs or market 
upscale for new or emerging infrastructure categories which is not available and  cannot 
be  estimated  with  sufficient  degree  of  robustness.  Ranges  of  impact  in  absolute  or 
relative terms are provided to the extent possible.  

It  is  important  to  underline  that  one  general  selection  criterion  for  each  project  of 
common interest is that its potential overall benefits outweigh its costs, including in the 
longer term.143  

The below table summarises the direct and indirect benefits for the package of preferred 
policy options compared to the baseline providing ranges of possible benefits. 

I. Overview of Benefits (total for all provisions) – Package of preferred options 

Description 

Amount 

Main recipient (stakeholder group) 

A) SCOPE 

  Broadened  scope  to  reflect  technological  developments  for  smart  electricity  grids  (elements  of  Option  A.1.1; 

expanding the category on electricity storage would not be proposed)  

Direct benefits 

Reduced transaction costs 

Not possible to monetise benefit. 

Benefits for project promoters. 

Facilitate  the  integration  of 
renewable  energy  sources  at 
distribution level  

Indirect benefits 

Provision  of  demand-side 
flexibility 
consumer 
by 
connected to the distribution 
grid 

Not possible to monetise benefit. 

Benefits  for  owners  of  renewable  energy 
generation units at distribution level. 

Not possible to monetise benefit. 

Benefits identified for citizens and society as 
a whole, transmission system operators 

Higher  penetration  of  smart  grids  will  allow  for 
120  GW-150  GW  of  flexible  load  available  by 
2045 

Support  in  the  uptake  of 
electric cars  

Not possible to monetise benefit. 

Benefits identified for citizens and society as 
a whole  

Comprehensive  control  and 
monitoring of the grid would 
reduce 
for 
curtailment  of  renewables 
and  enable  competitive  and 
innovative  energy  services 

need 

the 

Not possible to monetise benefit. 

Benefits identified for citizens and society as 
a whole 

According  to  the  IEA,  investments  in  enhanced 
digitalisation would reduce curtailment in Europe 
by 67 TWh by 2040144. 

143 TEN-E Regulation, Art. 4(1)(b) 
144 with demand-response accounting for 22 TWh and storage accounting for 45 TWh - IEA 2016 

96 

 
                                                 
for consumers.  

  Limit scope to new and repurposed hydrogen network / Power-to-Gas installations (Option A.2.1) as well as smart 
gas grids and retrofits of existing natural gas transmission assets for hydrogen admixtures/blends with safeguards in 
place  to  ensure  renewable  and  low-carbon  gases  are  transported  (elements  of  Option  A.2.2;  new  transmission 
pipelines for decarbonised gases and inclusion of advanced natural gas PCIs would not be proposed) 

Direct benefits 

Description  

Amounts 

Comments 

reduction 
GHG  emission 
from 
the  substitution  of 
fossil  fuels  by  renewable  or 
low-carbon hydrogen 

Not possible to monetise benefit. 

Benefits identified for citizens and society as 
a whole 

In  general,  GHG  emission  reduction  potential  in 
the  range  of  20-65  MtCO2/a,  corresponding  to 
1.4%-4.5% of the reduction gap at EU-28 level 

reduction 
the  substitution  of 

GHG  emission 
from 
natural gas with biogas  

Not possible to monetise benefit. 

In  general,  GHG  impact  ranges  from  a  156 
tCO2eq  per TJ  reduction  to  a  17  tCO2eq per TJ 
increase in emissions  

The exact impact will depend on the amount 
of renewable and low carbon gases injected 
into  the  grid  and  on  the  difference  between 
the GHG intensity of the specific renewable 
and low carbon gas and the substituted fuel. 

Benefits identified for citizens and society as 
a whole 

Not possible to monetise benefit. 

Benefits for administrations (NCAs), energy 
producers/ industry 

Up  to  70%  of  additional  demand  for  green 
hydrogen  projected  by  German  TSOs  for  2025 
and 2030 is expected to be covered by imports of 
decarbonised hydrogen from the Netherlands 

In general, depending on the scenario, 7.5 billion 
or  29  billion  EUR  of  value  added  can  be 
generated  annually  in  the  whole  EU-28,  by 
investment 
in  and  operation  of  hydrogen 
technologies. 

Benefits for energy producers/ industry 

Not possible to monetise benefit. 

Benefits identified for citizens and society as 
a whole 

29100–103  100  direct  jobs  (in  production  and 
operations  &  maintenance)  and  contribute  to 
further  74  100–241  150  indirect  jobs  between 
2020 and 2030 

Not possible to monetise benefit. 

Benefits identified for citizens and society as 
a whole 

Between  140,000 
for 
manufacturing  and  maintenance  of  2x40  GW 

and  170,000 

jobs 

interconnected 
Increasingly 
networks  will 
hydrogen 
create an internal market for 
hydrogen  and  offer  benefits 
in  terms  of  competition  and 
security of supply 

Indirect benefits 

Leveraging  investments  in 
hydrogen technologies 

Job  creation  generated  by 
hydrogen-related 
investments and operations  

Job  creation  generated  by 
installed 
of 
renewable 
hydrogen 
electrolysers 

capacity 

97 

 
 
 
 
electrolyser capacity up to 2030. 

Reduction of up to 90% compared to new build  Benefits for administrations (NCAs), energy 

producers/ industry 

Avoidance of stranded assets 
through  the  conversion  of 
existing  natural  gas  assets 
hydrogen 
into 
pipelines 

dedicated 

B) GOVERNANCE / INFRASTRUCTURE PLANNING 

 

Integrated  offshore  renewable  development  plans  per  each  sea  basin  for  better  infrastructure  planning  and  project 
implementation (Option B.1.1); strengthened governance of the TYNDP planning and preparation and sustainability 
of the gas infrastructure categories as proposed under the preferred option on “Scope” (Option B.2.1) 

Direct benefits 

Deployment cost savings 

reduction 
the  substitution  of 
fuels  by  offshore 

GHG  emission 
from 
fossil 
renewable energy. 

Indirect benefits 

10 percent in cost savings, equivalent to between 
EUR 300 million and EUR 2500 million for five 
projects  alone,  depending  of  the  size  of  the 
comparable conventional projects 

Benefits identified for citizens and society as 
(including 
a  whole,  project  promoters 
operators), 
transmission 
administrations (NCAs) 

system 

Not possible to monetise benefit. 

Benefits identified for citizens and society as 
a whole 

Given  the  expected  deployment  the  emissions 
reductions can be considered significant in a mid-
term  perspective.  These  would  depend  on  the 
actual  deployment  rate  and  the  greenhouse  gas 
intensity  of  the  electricity  it  replaces.  This  is 
influenced  by  various  factors  including  demand 
and 
sensitivities, 
localisations, grid congestions 

patterns, 

supply 

price 

Job creation in offshore RES 
sectors  (wind,  wave,  tidal, 
floating solar) 

Not possible to monetise benefit. 

Approx. 520 000 jobs, as follows: 

Benefits identified for citizens and society as 
a whole 

- 

- 

Increase  from  current  77,000  jobs  in 
offshore  wind  to  more  than  200,000 
jobs. 
400,000 jobs in the ocean energy sector 
(e.g. wave, tidal, floating solar)  by 2050 

C) PERMITTING AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION 

  Accelerating the completion of the permitting process though proposing to use preferential treatment for the PCIs on 
court proceedings (Option C.1.1. without sub-option on shortening of the time limit for the permitting process); one-
stop shop per sea basin for offshore renewable projects (Option C.1.2) 

Direct benefits 

98 

 
Avoidance  of  delay  costs 
due to court proceedings 

A  delay  of  2  years  due  to  an  average  court 
procedure was estimated at a cost of 150 million 
€145. 

for  project  promoters 

Benefits  identified  for  society  at  large,  but 
(including 
also 
operators), 
transmission 
administrations (NCAs) 

system 

For  assessing  the  costs  of  the  package  of  preferred  policy  options,  the  analysis 
distinguishes between direct costs and indirect costs.146  

The TEN-E Regulation  does not  introduce  any regulatory charges, such  as fees, levies, 
taxes,  etc.  The  package  of  preferred  policy  options  results  in  direct  costs  in  terms  of 
compliance  costs  and  administrative  burden  for  businesses  (mainly  project  promoters) 
and  administrations  (national  competent  authorities,  national  regulatory  authorities,  the 
Commission,  and  ACER)  in  order  to  comply  with  substantive  obligations  or 
requirements  contained  therein.  The  application  of  the  package  of  preferred  options 
results  in  indirect  costs  for  citizens/consumers,  businesses  and  administrations  through 
an increase in network tariffs to finance investments in the regulatory asset base (RAB). 
However, CEF financial assistance can alleviate the impact on network tariffs in case a 
PCI  shows  significant  externalities  in  terms  of  security  of  supply,  solidarity,  or 
innovation. 

The below table summarises the direct and indirect costs for those actions of the package 
of preferred policy  for  which costs have been identified compared to the baseline.  It  is 
not possible to estimate these costs for all actions at this stage but they are considered as 
non-significant.  The  additional  costs  would  be  marginal  compared  to  the  current  costs 
which have been evaluated to  be in  the range of  EUR 25 to  50 million  and considered 
low when compared to the benefits.147  

Additional  enforcement  costs  at  national  and  EU 
implementation.  

level  will  depend  on 

the 

II. Overview of costs – Package of preferred options 

Citizens/Consumers  

Businesses 

Administrations 

One-off 

Recurrent 

One-off 

Recurrent 

One-off 

Recurrent 

Working 

145  Renewable  Grid  Initiative  and  ENTSOE,  Value  of  timely  implementation  of  “better  projects”,  May 
2019, 
https://eepublicdownloads.azureedge.net/clean-
documents/Publications/Position%20papers%20and%20reports/20190517_RGI_ENTSOE_working_paper
_better_projects.pdf  
146 Better Regulation Guidelines, TOOL #58. TYPOLOGY OF COSTS AND BENEFITS 
147 Ecorys et al. (2020) Support to the evaluation of Regulation (EU) No 347/2013 on guidelines for trans-
European energy infrastructure, Draft final report, p. 122 

Paper 

99 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
Administrative 
burden  (project 
promoters):  
participation  in 
regional  group 
meetings, 
collection  and 
submission  of 
information 
required 
network 
planning, 
monitoring  and 
reporting 

for 

Potential 
increase 
network  

of 

Potential 
increase 
network tariffs 

of 

(mainly 
/  

Administrative 
costs 
TSOs 
ENTSOs): 
participation  in 
regional  group 
meetings, 
collection  and 
submission  of 
information 
required 
network 
planning 

for 

burden: 

regional 

Administrativ
e 
participation 
in 
group 
meetings 
(NRAs), 
organisation 
of 
group 
meetings, 
monitoring  

regional 

Potential 
increase 
network 
tariffs  

of 

burden: 

regional 

Administrativ
e 
participation 
in 
group 
meetings 
(NRAs, 
ACER), 
organisation 
of 
group 
meetings, 
monitoring 
(Commission, 
ACER) 

regional 

Potential 
increase 
network tariffs 

of 

Potential 
increase 
network tariffs 

of 

Administrative 
costs related to 
the 
coordinated 
approach 
(mainly  TSOs, 
and 
DSOs 
ENTSOs): 
data 
collection, 
participation 
in meetings 

Potential 
increase 
network 
tariffs 

of 

Administrati
ve 
costs 
related to the 
increased 
oversight  for 
the 
Commission 
and  ACER 
(between 
EUR  80  000 
and 150 000, 
one 
additional 
FTE) 

Direct costs 

Action  (a)  
Broadened 
scope 
for 
regulated 
assets 
(smart 
grids) 

Indirect costs 

Action  (b)  
Establish
of 
ment 
integrated 
offshore 
developme
nt plans 

Direct costs 

Indirect costs 

Direct costs 

Action 
(c) 
Integrate
d 
infrastruc
ture 
plans 

Indirect costs 

100 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Action 
(d)  One-
stop shop 
per 
sea 
basin  for 
offshore 
renewabl
e projects 

Direct costs 

Indirect costs 

Action e) 

Direct costs 

Inclusion 
full 
investme
nt costs 

Administra
tive  costs 
to establish 
the 
one 
stop shop 

Administrati
ve 
costs 
related to the 
strengthened 
obligation 
on NRAs  

101 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX 4: ANALYTICAL METHODS 

In order to quantify the benefits stemming from the implementation of the current TEN-E 
regulation,  in  the  field  of  electricity  and  gas,  from  its  entering  into  force  until  the  full 
implementation of the latest PCI list (4th list), the Commission used the REKK model and 
cross-checked the key outcomes with the internal METIS model run by JRC. Emphasis 
was  given  on  attaining  comparable  modelling  output,  and  hence  REKK  and  the  JRC 
worked  closely  to  align  to  the  extent  possible  the  input  assumptions  feeding  into  their 
models. 

Tools used 

REKK used, for this impact assessment two models, one specific for each sector, EEMM 
(electricity) and EGMM (gas).  

The  EEMM  is  a  partial  equilibrium  microeconomic  model.  It  assumes  fully  liberalised 
and perfectly competitive electricity markets. 44 markets are modelled, including almost 
all  members  of  ENTSO-E148.  Production  and  trade  are  constrained  by  the  available 
installed  capacity  of  power  plants  and  net  transfer  capacity  (NTC)  of  cross-border 
transmission lines. In the model one country is  one node (with a few exceptions, e.g. it 
models two markets  in  Denmark and  Ukraine),  thus  no internal  congestion is  assumed. 
The  model  has  an  hourly  time  step,  modelling  90  representative  hours  with  respect  to 
load, covering all four seasons and all daily variations in electricity demand. The model 
used  as  main  inputs  for  the  2030  the  EUCO  32,32.5,  the  NTC  from  ENTSOs  capacity 
maps the PCIs data and for the current situation input from the TSOs, NRAs and reports 
of  industry  organisations  (such  as  EWEA  and  Solar  Power  Europe).  For  natural  gas 
prices,  REKK  used  its  own  forecast,  prepared  by  the  EGMM  model  of  REKK, 
differentiated country by country and year by year. 
The  EGMM  is  a  competitive,  dynamic,  multi-market  equilibrium  model  that  simulates 
the  operation  of  the  wholesale  natural  gas  market  across  Europe.  It  includes  a  supply-
demand  representation  of  European  countries,  including  gas  storage  and  transportation 
linkages.  Large  external  markets,  including  Russia,  Turkey,  Libya,  Algeria  and  LNG 
exporters  are  represented  exogenously  with  market  prices,  long-term  supply  contracts 
and physical connections to Europe. The timeframe of the model covers 12 consecutive 
months,  starting  in  April.  Market  participants  have  perfect  foresight  over  this  period. 
Dynamic  connections  between  months  are  introduced  by  the  operation  of  gas  storages 
and  take-or-play  constraints  of  long-term  contracts.  Given  the  input  data,  the  model 
calculates a dynamic competitive market  equilibrium for the modelled countries, where 
all arbitrage opportunities across time and space are therefore exhausted to the extent that 
storage  facilities,  transportation,  infrastructure,  and  contractual  conditions  permit.  As  a 
result, the competitive equilibrium yields an eﬃcient, welfare-maximizing outcome. The 
model  used  as  main  inputs  for  the  2030  the  EUCO  32,32.5,  the  NTC  from  ENTSOs 
capacity  maps  the  PCIs  data  and  for  the  current  situation  mainly  input  from  the  TSOs, 
and NRAs. 

As mentioned above, the crosscheck of the main REKK results was performed using the 
Commission  METIS  model  run  by  JRC.  The  Metis  model  is  a  modelling  tool  that  can 

148Cyprus and Malta are not modelled in EEMM. 

102 

 
 
                                                 
quickly  provide  robust  insights  on  complex  energy  related  questions,  focusing  on  the 
short term operation of the energy system and markets.  

In  METIS, the  European power system is modelled with an hourly temporal resolution. 
The  power  plants  are  represented  as  fleets  of  similar  technological  characteristics.  In 
METIS,  units  of  the  same  technology  or  using  the  same  fuel  in  each  zone  are  bundled 
together into the same asset in a cluster model which simulates the dynamic constraints 
and starting costs in a relaxed (LP) unit commitment, without using binary variables. The 
gas system/market is modelled on a daily time step. The main parameters and constraints 
describing  the  market/technological  components  concern:  gas  production,  pipelines, 
storages, LNG (both regasification and liquefaction facilities), underground gas storages, 
gas demands. The main input data are the same as the ones used for in the REKK models. 

Baseline cases 

The  assessment  aimed  to  answer  three  questions:  What  did  the  TEN-E  Regulation  has 
the  PCIs  already 
achieved  until  now?, 
commissioned; What did the TEN-E Regulation achieved overall?, covering therefore the 
PCI already completed and the ones from the fourth PCI list; and What are the benefits of 
the fourth PCI list?  

the  benefits  stemming  from 

targeting 

In line with these questions, the REKK and the JRC has developed two baselines for year 
2020 and 2030 from which they took out/added the relevant group of PCIs: 

The  Baseline  serves  as  the  basis  for  comparison:  this  scenario  shows  what  would  have 
been  the  situation  on  the  electricity  markets  of  Europe  without  any  PCI  projects  being 
implemented. For 2020, the Baseline scenario includes the present situation without the 
PCI projects – thus, interconnector capacities are lower than as of today, capacities of the 
twelve  already  commissioned  projects  are  deducted.  Similarly,  in  2030  the  most  likely 
future  outcome  is  included,  but  same  capacities  are  deducted,  and  none  of  the  projects 
from the 4th PCI list are assumed to be commissioned. 

In the TEN-E baseline, the possible effect  of the already commissioned PCI projects  is 
calculated. For 2020, the present situation is used – meaning the difference between the 
Baseline and the TEN-E scenarios is exactly the commissioning of the existing PCIs. The 
same applies to 2030 –REKK and the JRC took the most likely future market situation, 
including  the  already  commissioned  PCIs,  but  did  not  include  any  project  from  the  4th 
list. 

In the Future baseline, the effect of the commissioning of all projects from the 4th list are 
modelled. This means, that the only relevant modelling year is 2030, as the first year of 
commissioning  from  these  projects  is  assumed  to  be  2021.  For  building  up  the  Future 
scenario  in  2030  REKK  and  the  JRC  used  the  TEN-E  scenario  as  a  starting  point,  and 
then included all projects from the 4th list to see how they would affect market outcomes 
in 2030. When results are compared to the TEN-E Scenario, then the effect of the PCIs 
from the 4th list can be quantified. While comparing Future and Baseline shows the effect 
of all – already commissioned and to be commissioned in the future. 

103 

 
  
ANNEX 5: EVALUATION REPORT 

Since its establishment in 2013, the Regulation on trans-European energy networks laid 
down rules for the timely development and implementation of key energy infrastructure 
projects  that  interconnect  Member  States,  whilst  contributing  to  market  integration, 
security of supply, competitiveness and further integration of renewables. 

In  March  2019,  as  part  of  the  partial  political  agreement  between  the  European 
Parliament and the Council on the Connecting Europe Facility for the period 2021-2027, 
the co-legislators agreed on the need to evaluate the effectiveness and policy coherence 
of  the  Regulation  347/2013  on  the  guidelines  for  trans-European  energy  infrastructure 
(TEN-E  Regulation)  by  31  December  2020149.  In  December  2019  the  European 
Commission  published  the  European  Green  Deal  with  an  aim  to  include  the  climate 
the  proposed  European  Climate  Law.  The 
neutrality  objective 
communication  of  the  European  Commission  (COM(2019)  640)1  (the  European  Green 
Deal)  explicitly  refers  to  the  need  for  a  review  of  the  TEN-E  Regulation  to  ensure 
consistency with climate neutrality objectives. 

in  2050 

into 

In  view  of  the  timeline  for  the  evaluation  and  revision  of  the  TEN-E  Regulation,  the 
Commission  opted  for  a  “back-to-back  evaluation  and  impact  assessment”.  The 
evaluation  of  the  TEN-E  Regulation  was  carried  out  between  January  2019  and 
September 2020. The evaluation was supported by a study “Support to the evaluation of 
Regulation  (EU)  No  347/2013  on  guidelines  for  trans-European  energy  infrastructure” 
commissioned  to  an  external  contractor  which  helped  gather,  quantify  and  assess 
evidence drawn from a range of sources on the performance of the TEN-E instrument to 
date. The evaluation  assessed in  a retrospective  manner the extent to  which the TEN-E 
Regulation has performed so far in achieving its stated objectives, identifying factors that 
helped  or  hindered  their  achievement.  Specifically,  it  assessed  the  effectiveness  of  the 
Regulation compared to a baseline (i.e. the situation without the Regulation), to appraise 
whether or not it has had a significant impact and added value.  

In short, the evaluation looked at: 

• How and why the current TEN-E Regulation has worked well or not so well, and 
which factors have helped or hampered the achievement of its objectives; 
• The impact of the Regulation, particularly in terms of progress towards achieving 
its objectives. 

The  “back  to  back”  approach  ensured  that  formative  element  are  drawn  from  the 
outcomes of the evaluation to conclude on the extent to which the Regulation will remain 
fit-for-purpose  and  relevant  in  the  future  in  view  of  the  adopted  or  planned  policy 
initiatives  (the  climate  target  plan,  the  revision  of  the  Energy  Efficiency  Directive,  the 
Renewable  Energy  Directive,  and  the  gas  package)  which  will  accelerate  the  mid-  and 
long-term decarbonisation. The forward-looking elements will looked into how to ensure 
that enabling energy infrastructure is in place to match the increased decarbonisation and 
renewable energy deployment ambitions and indicate areas of intervention.    

149 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/38507/st07207-re01-en19.pdf 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2019-0420_EN.pdf  

 
 
                                                 
to 

seek 

the  evaluation  questions 

In line with the scope and applicability of the TEN-E Regulation, the evaluation covers 
all  Member  States.  In  terms  of  legal  acts  covered  as  part  of  the  evaluation,  it  does  not 
specifically cover the European Union's funding through the Connecting Europe Facility 
(CEF)  although 
synergies  and 
complementarities  with  CEF.  Due  to  its  timing  but  also  its  wider  scope,  the  evaluation 
does not fully assess the coherence with the sustainable finance framework (taxonomy) 
but  rather indicate increasing incoherence with  the current  TEN-E Regulation and CEF 
financial assistance. The work on two Delegated Acts is currently ongoing with a view to 
establish by end of 2020 a list of environmentally sustainable economic activities on the 
basis  of  technical  screening  criteria  for  climate  change  mitigation  and  adaptation. 
Contrary  to  the  scope  of  the  TEN-E  regulation  which  established  a  method  for  multi-
criteria  project  selection,  the  taxonomy  Regulation  classifies  and  qualifies  economic 
activities as environmentally sustainable for the purposes of establishing whether or not 
associated investments are environmentally sustainable.  

identify 

Five  core  evaluation  criteria  were  applied  to  evaluate  the  performance  of  the  TEN-E 
Regulation: effectiveness, efficiency, relevance, coherence, and EU added value. Section 
4 further describes  the  method for the  evaluation, including the rationale and questions 
underpinning each of the criteria.  

1  BACKGROUND TO THE INTERVENTION  

Energy infrastructure is  crucial for reaching wider EU energy and climate goals, whilst 
ensuring  access  to safe,  reliable,  affordable  and  sustainable energy  for  all Europeans.  
The  TEN-E  Regulation  is  part  of  a  larger  regulatory  framework  adopted  to  tackle  a 
number  of  barriers  to  the  implementation  of  European  energy  infrastructure  and 
integrated energy networks. In line with the energy policy objectives of the Treaty on the 
Functioning  of  the  European  Union  (TFEU),  the  TEN-E  Regulation  aims  to  ensure  the 
functioning of the internal  energy market  and security of supply in  the Union, promote 
energy efficiency and energy savings and support the development of new and renewable 
forms of energy the interconnecting energy networks.  

The TEN-E Regulation is based on Article 172 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European  Union.  According  to  Article  171(1),  “the  Union  shall  establish  a  series  of 
guidelines covering the objectives, priorities and broad lines of measures envisaged in the 
sphere  of  trans-European  networks;  these  guidelines  shall  identify  projects  of  common 
interest”. The goals of the Regulation are the following:  

•  To ensure the functioning of the internal energy market and security of supply in 

the Union; 

•  To  promote  the  development  of  new  and  renewable  forms  of  energy,  energy 

efficiency, and energy savings; and 

•  To promote the interconnection of energy networks. 

To  achieve  these  objectives,  the  TEN-E  defines  infrastructure  priority  corridors  and 
priority  thematic  areas,  lays  down  criteria  for  the  identification  of  key  energy 
infrastructure projects and builds on regional cooperation to identify and select necessary 
PCIs in Union-wide lists. The TEN-E Regulation sets out guidelines for streamlining the 
permitting processes for PCIs as well as increases cooperation and transparency towards 
the  public  and  wider  stakeholder  community.  Aside  from  accelerated  permitting,  PCIs 

105 

 
 
benefit from improved regulatory conditions, cost-allocation and eligibility for financial 
support from the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF).         

The  intervention  logic,  presented  in  Figure  1,  links  the  objectives  of  the  TEN-E 
Regulation and input/actions to its outputs, results and impacts. It also visualizes some of 
the relevant external factors to this regulation.  

Figure 1: Intervention logic of current TEN-E framework 

The Regulation lays down rules for the timely development and interoperability of Trans-
European Energy networks, by providing the following inputs:  

1.  The  identification  of  PCIs  necessary  to  implement  priority  corridors  and  areas 
falling under the energy infrastructure categories in electricity, gas, oil, smart grid 
and CO2 (Chapter II of the Regulation). Specifically, the Regulation: sets out the 
criteria  which  PCIs  should  meet,  ensures  the  adoption  every  two  years  by  the 
Commission  of  a  Union  list  of  the  proposed  PCIs  and  ensures  that  a  plan  is  in 
place  to  implement  the  PCI  as  well  as  procedures  to  monitor  progress  of  the 
project.  

2.  Provisions  to  facilitate  the  timely  implementation  of  PCIs  by  streamlining, 
closely  coordinating,  accelerating  permit  granting  processes,  and  enhancing 
public  participation  (Chapter  III).  The  Regulation    assigns  the  highest  national 
priority status to the PCIs and requires that they are included in national network 
development  plans,  requires  Member  States  to  designate  a  national  competent 
authority responsible for facilitating and coordinating the permit granting process 
for PCIs, requires that the competent authority publishes a manual of procedures 

106 

ObjectivesInputOutputResults/OutcomesImpactsStreamline permit granting procedures & increase public acceptance and involvement for PCIs Union list of PCIs Framework to promote efficient and transparent national permit granting procedures, including at least one public consultation at national levelAppropriate regulatory incentives for PCIsTimely construction of projects which interconnect the energy markets across EuropeImproved sustainability  and meet EU’s energy and climate goalsNeed analysis: Tackle key barriers to implementation of energy infrastructure projects that better integrate energy networks•Extensive time required for projects to acquire building permits•Public opposition to projects•Regulatory challenges involved in building projects across more than one country (challenge of imbalanced costs and benefits across borders)•Lack of commercial viability of some projects that were identified as important for market integration or security of supply ActivitiesAssessment and selection of PCIs by Regional GroupsMonitoring Set up 12 Regional Groups to assess infrastructure needs and PCI candidates against criteriaENTSOs setup CBACBCA methodologiesMSs set up their own competent authority/ ‘one stop shop’ for permittingSelection criteria of PCIs to implement priority corridors and areas including conditions for eligibility for Union financial assistance (i.e. CEF)Provisions to facilitate the timely implementation of PCIs by streamlining, coordinating more closely, accelerating permit granting processes and enhancing public consultationProviding rule and guidance for CBCA and risk related incentives for PCIsEffectivenessExternal factors-Critical infrastructure-MS pressures/ requirements on project promoters-Public opposition Other EU policies-CEF, EEPR, ESIF-Clean Energy for all Europeans-Energy security packages-The European Green DealEnsure implementation of PCIS by providing market-based and direct EU financial supportPCIs implemented in a timely mannerFacilitate the regulatory treatment of PCIsIncrease in electricity & gas interconnection (capacity and use)  Reduced public oppositionPCIs with CBCA decisionInvolvement of stakeholders in identification and monitoring of PCISPCI status reduces admin costs for project promotersPCIs receiving specific incentivesBetter security of supplyImproved competition within markets that keeps energy prices in check MSs/NRAs set up incentives to address PCIs’ risksMSs publish permitting procedure manual, including public participation routesEU added valueEfficiencyCoherenceRelevanceAssign European Coordinators  
 
 
 
for the permit granting process applicable to PCIs, requires the project promoter 
to  draw  up  and  submit  a  concept  for  public  participation  to  the  competent 
authority, and ensure the necessary public consultation is conducted; and sets out 
a  maximum  time-limit  of  3.5  years  for  the  pre-application  and  permit-granting 
procedure combined. 

3.  Providing  rules  and  guidance  for  the  cross-border  allocation  of  costs  and  risk 
related incentives for PCIs. The Regulation  requires member States and National 
Regulatory Authorities to set up incentives to address PCIs’ risks; establishes the 
use of cost-benefit methodologies for PCIs for an energy system-wide analysis, in 
line with the principles laid out in Annex V of the Regulation and consistent with 
the rules and indicators set out in Annex IV; and ensures that PCIs benefit from 
cross-border cost allocation (CBCA) decisions, which assist the sharing of project 
costs among countries in line with their expected benefits.  

The  outputs  of  the  Regulation  are,  therefore,  closely  linked  to  each  set  of  activities 
described above:  

1.  establishment of relevant cross-border projects within priority corridors and areas 

and energy infrastructure categories; 

2.  a  framework  to  promote  efficient  and  transparent  national  permit  granting 

procedures; 

3.  appropriate  regulatory  incentives  for  PCIs  and  long-term  signals  to  meet  EU 

priorities; 

4.  involvement of stakeholders in identification and monitoring of PCIs.  

The  overall  outcome  is  the  timely  construction  of  PCIs,  which  interconnect  the  energy 
markets across Europe. More specifically:  

1.  PCIs receive permits more rapidly ensuring they are timely implemented;  

2.  PCIs status reduces administrative costs for the project promoters;  

3.  There is an increase in electricity and gas interconnection (capacity and use);  

4.  There is an increased public participation;  

5.  PCIs receive specific incentives; and  

6.  PCIs could receive a cross-border cost allocation decision.  

As section 3 will further detail, the TEN-E Regulation has been effective in accelerating 
the  refurbishment  of  the  existing  energy  grid  and  in  deploying  new  projects  to  achieve 
the Union’s energy and climate policy objectives. Thanks to a process for identification 
of  infrastructure  needs  and  selection  of  projects,  the  TEN-E  Regulation  has  shifted  the 
focus from national priorities to a regional and cross-border approach thus ensuring that 
infrastructure  is  built  where  it  is  most  needed.  TEN-E  introduced  regulatory  tools  to 
speed  up 
investments  by  addressing  existing 
asymmetries between the costs and benefits of projects and by providing targeted support 
to  selected  projects  as  last-resort.  Under  the  TEN-E  Regulation,  four  Union  lists  of 
Projects of Common Interest formally adopted in 12 Regional Groups were established, 

implementation  by 

incentivising 

107 

 
 
allowing  for  the  implementation  of  40  PCIs  to  date  with  75  more  expected  to  be 
implemented  by  2022.  The  TEN-E  Regulation  ensured  that  projects  with  the  greatest 
contribution  towards  set  criteria  would  benefit  from  the  utmost  cooperation  and 
transparency between key stakeholders on the ground. 

The adoption of the Green Deal and its climate-neutrality target has triggered a paradigm 
shift  in  Union  energy  and  climate  objectives.  Together  with  a  number  of  adjacent 
priorities that support Union’s increased climate ambitions (identified in the intervention 
logic), the Green Deal became of one the main drivers the evaluation and revision of the 
TEN-E  Regulation  in  view  of  its  inconsistencies  with  the  climate  neutrality  objective 
mostly due to the priorities at the time of its enactment. The evaluation showed that the 
inconsistencies of the TEN-E Regulation with the Green Deal are twofold: on one hand, 
the  scope  of  the  energy  infrastructure  categories,  criteria  and  the  governance  of  the 
selection process is not aligned with the Green Deal objectives and latest developments 
in  innovation  and technologies. On the other, delays in  the implementation  of PCIs are 
still observed, triggering as such the non-delivery of their intended benefits. 

The  methodology  for  evaluating  the  performance  of  the  TEN-E  Regulation  has  been 
developed  to  fit  the  intervention  logic.  As  further  detailed  in  section  4  on  Method,  an 
evaluation matrix comprising of a set of evaluation questions and sub-questions per each 
evaluation  criteria  was  used  to  guide  the  evaluation  process  and  define  the  manner  in 
which questions will be answered and presented.  

The evaluation baseline captures the point of comparison for the evaluation, i.e. had the 
2013 TEN-E Regulation not been introduced (a business-as-usual scenario). The baseline 
has been used in the assessment of the replies to the evaluation questions (primarily on 
effectiveness  and  efficiency),  and  in  the  modelling,  which  further  informs  the 
assessment. The baseline for this evaluation is largely based on the baseline scenario in 
the  2011  Impact  Assessment  of  the  TEN-E  regulation.  The  baseline  consists  of  four 
components:  1.  permit  granting  procedures  in  Member  States;  2.  financing;  3. 
administrative  cost  estimates;  and  4.  infrastructure  assessment.  The  baseline  from  the 
2011 Impact Assessment was used for the analysis of the permit granting procedures in 
Member  States,  financing,  and  administrative  cost  estimates.  For  the  infrastructure 
assessment,  a  different  baseline  than  the  one  in  the  2011  Impact  Assessment  was 
considered due to the changes in the market an technological landscape.  

The  evaluation  draws  on  evidence  from  the  stakeholder  input  to  the  extensive 
consultations carried out in this respect, PCI portfolio and case study analysis and related 
monitoring reports, modelling, the results of a series of topical studies on key elements of 
the  TEN-E  Regulation,  as  well  as  conclusions  and  work  stemming  from  dedicated 
stakeholder Fora (e.g. Copenhagen Forum). 

2 

IMPLEMENTATION/STATE OF PLAY  

This section outlines how the TEN-E Regulation was implemented to date. In particular, 
four  main  activities  are  considered:  the  PCI  process,  permit  granting  and  public 
participation, regulatory treatment and financing.  

108 

 
 
 
The PCI process  

(NCAs),  national 

Article  3  of  the  TEN-E  Regulation  also  defines  the  process  for  the  PCI  selection.  The 
TEN-E  Regulation  distinguishes  and  targets  specific  projects  that  are  identified  as  PCI 
from  an internal  energy  market  perspective.  The  process  of selection and implement  of 
PCIs involves various stakeholders, both at national and European level. Representatives 
from  national  competent  authorities 
regulatory  authorities 
(NRAs)project  promoters,  including  transmission  system  operators  (TSOs),  and  their 
European  association  and  agencies  (ENTSOs  and  ACER)  are  members  of  regional 
groups  established  by  the  Regulation.  The  membership  of  each  group  is  based  on  a 
priority  corridor  or  thematic  areas  and  reflects  the  respective  geographical  coverage. 
These  regional  groups  facilitate  the  cooperation  and  coordination  amongst  the 
stakeholders.  They  are  responsible  for  the  assessment  of  candidate  projects  that  are 
proposed by the project promoters, but also for monitoring the execution of PCIs, and for 
making  recommendations  to  facilitate  their  implementation.  The  final  decision-making 
powers are restricted to Member States and the Commission (the Decision-Making Body 
or DMB). Furthermore, to foster high-level (international) political commitment, support 
in  reaching  consensus  on  regional  actions  plans  and  promote  a  specific  goal  regarding 
EU energy network integration, Member States can establish High Level Groups. These 
groups aim to  pursue a  specific long-term  strategy and their organisation is  not  outside 
the scope of  the Regulation. 

The PCI selection process is based on the National Development  Plans (NDPs) and the 
Ten-Year National Development Plans in electricity and gas (TYNDPs) prepared by the 
ENTSOs.  To  ensure  consensus,  the  PCI  process  involves  consultation  with  multiple 
stakeholders within the regional groups and via a public consultation. Figure 5 illustrates 
the PCI selection process and the roles of the various stakeholders in this process. 

109 

 
 
 
Figure 5: PCI selection process 

To  become  eligible  for  the  PCI  status,  a  candidate  project  is  required  to  meet  the 
following general criteria: 

 

 

 

the  project  is  considered  necessary  for  at  least  one  of  the  infrastructure  priority 
corridors and thematic areas;  
the  potential  benefits  of  the  project  outweigh  its  cost,  including  in  the  longer 
term;  
the project significantly involves EU Member States, indicated by: - involving at 
least two Member States by directly crossing the border of two or more Member 
States; - being located in one Member State and having a significant cross-border 
impact;  -  crossing  the  border  of  at  least  one  Member  State  and  a  European 
Economic Area country.  

In  addition  to  those,  there  are  specific  criteria  that  apply  to  PCIs  depending  on  their 
infrastructure category.  

Table 1: Specific PCI criteria per infrastructure category 
Energy 
infrastructure 
category 

Specific criteria 

Electricity 

Gas 

Smart grids 

Market integration 
Sustainability 
Security of supply 
Market integration 
Security of supply 
Competition 
Sustainability 
Integration and involvement of network users with regard to 
supply and demand 

110 

 
 
 
 
Energy 
infrastructure 
category 

Specific criteria 

Efficiency and interoperability in day-to-day network 
operation 
Network security, system control and quality of supply 
Optimised planning of future cost-efficient network 
investments 
Market functioning and customer services 
Involvement of users in the management of their energy 
usage 
Security of supply 
Efficient and sustainable use of resources 
Interoperability 
Avoidance of carbon dioxide emissions while maintaining 
security of energy supply 
Increasing resilience and security of CO2 transport 
Efficient use of resources and Minimising environmental 
burden and risks 

Oil 

CO2 

Source: Regulation (EU) No 347/2013 Article 4 

The TEN-E Regulation requires that ENTSO-E and ENTSO-G draft a methodology for 
the  Cost  Benefit  Analysis  (CBA  methodology)  to  assess  the  projects  included  in  the 
TYNDPs for electricity and gas projects respectively. According to the Regulation, to be 
eligible for the PCI status, gas and electricity transmission and storage projects shall be 
part of the TYNDP. To become a PCI, the project must apply for it in line with the rules 
and  timeline  of  the  PCI  selection  process.  The  interlinkage  between  the  process  for 
establishing the PCI list and the TYNDP can be summarised as shown on Figure 3.  

111 

 
 
 
Figure 3: TYNDP and PCI list process 

The  TYNDP-related  approach  does  not  apply  to  carbon  dioxide  network,  smart  grid  or 
oil PCIs. For smart grids, an updated methodology was published by the Joint Research 
Centre (JRC) in 2017. 

The 1st list of PCIs was adopted in October 2013 and contained 248 projects. The 2nd, 
3rd and 4th PCI lists contained 195, 173 and 149 projects, respectively. Excluding PCIs 
that appeared in several lists, the lists comprise 437 unique projects.  

Amongst  Member  States,  Poland  is  most  frequently  represented  in  the  4th  list  with  18 
PCIs listed, followed by Lithuania, Germany and Estonia with respectively 15, 12 and 12 
PCIs.  Outside  of  the  EU,  the  United  Kingdom  is  most  frequently  represented  with  16 
PCIs.  Electricity  projects  are  most  frequently  hosted  by  the  UK  (14  PCIs)  followed  by 
Lithuania (12 PCIs), gas PCIs are most frequently hosted by Greece (6 PCIs), and Poland 
is the most dominant host of oil projects (3 PCIs). 

Permit granting and public participation  

A  key  objective  of  the  Regulation  is  to  streamline  the  permit  granting  process,  while 
ensuring sufficient public participation. 

The Regulation  allocates  a ‘priority status’  for a  project,  once selected for the PCI list. 
PCIs  are  granted  the  status  of  the  highest  national  significance  possible  in  the  relevant 
Member State for  consideration especially during permit  granting processes. The TEN-
Regulation defines and sets out a variety of activities that contribute to the  streamlining 
of  the  permit  granting  process.  Member  States  are  required  to  designate  a  “one-stop 
shop’  (NCA),  which  shall  be  responsible  for  facilitating  and  coordinating  the  permit 
granting process for PCIs and which all Member States have established by 16 November 
2013 at the latest. The NCA is the sole point of contact  for the project  promoter in the 
process  leading  to  a  comprehensive  decision  for  a  given  PCI,  and  coordinates  the 
submission of all relevant documents and information. 

Member States are required to additionally implement a two-stage permitting process. It 
consists of a pre-application procedure and a statutory permit granting procedure. It also 
sets  time  limits  for  each  stage.  The  pre-application  procedure  should  take  place  within 

112 

 
 
 
one year and six months. The combined process should not take more than 3.5 years, but 
can be extended by a maximum of nine months on a case-by-case basis. 

The progress of PCI implementation is monitored every  year by ACER and reported to 
the  Commission  and  regional  groups.  Additionally,  NCAs  from  associated  Member 
States report to the regional group on permit granting delays.  

Monitoring  data,  as  shown  in  figure  4,  indicates  that  permit  granting  procedures  have 
shortened since the entry into force of the TEN-E Regulation. Current the EU average of 
4  and  3.1  years  for  electricity  and  gas  projects,  respectively  show  significant  progress 
compared to baseline national averages of up to 10 years in 2011. As a central element of 
the TEN-E Regulation, the establishment of one-stop shops is appraised as an instrument 
to reduce the complexity and duration of permitting procedures.  

Figure 4: PCI implementation progress to date 

100%

90%

80%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

Delayed

Rescheduled

On time

Ahead of schedule

2015

2016

2017

2018

2015

2016

2017

2018

Electricity

Gas

Source:  Underlying  data  of  the  ACER  monitoring  reports.  No  reliable  data  available  for  2019  since  the 
question was not part of the monitoring format or it was limited to the cases where there was a difference 
compared to 2018 only. 

As  section  5  will  describe,  the  effectiveness  of  permit  granting  procedures  strongly 
depends on national implementation; experiences of project promoters vary substantially 
because  of  national  differences  in  the  way  TEN-E  provisions  have  been  implemented 
(e.g. as regards the responsibilities of authorities in the permit granting process. The table 
below  outlines  the  permitting  schemes  as  chosen  by  Member  States  to  facilitate  and 
coordinate the permit granting process for PCIs. 

113 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Overview of schemes adopted by Member States 

Integrated 

Coordinated 

Collaborative 

BE 

BG 

CY 

CZ 

DE 

DK 
EE 

EL 

ES 

FI 

FR 

HR 

HU 

IE 

IT 

LT 

LU 

LV 

MT 

NL 

PL 

PT 

RO 

SI 

SK 

SE 

UK 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 
X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

Source: Milieu (2016) Analysis of the manuals of procedures for the permit granting process applicable to 
projects  of  common  interest  prepared  under  Art.9  Regulation  No  347/2013.  Based  on  the  stakeholder 
consultation,  the  implemented  permitting  scheme  in  Portugal  was  updated  to  “integrated”  and  for 
Slovenia – to “integrated” and “collaborative”. 

In  spite  of  the  introduction  of  targeted  provisions,  longer  permitting  durations  in  the 
implementation of key projects of common interest are still experienced. 

The  TEN-E  Regulation  sets  out  specific  requirements  on  transparency  and  public 
participation.  The  purpose  of  the  requirements  is  to  improve  public  engagement  and  to 
increase  public  acceptance  of  the  implementation  of  PCIs.  Project  promoters,  Member 
States,  NCAs  and  other  involved  parties  are  required  to  comply  with  the  requirements 
before  submitting  the  application.  As  one  of  the  central  challenges  to  energy 
infrastructure  projects  in  2011  was  the  opposition  from  affected  citizens,  the  TEN-E 
Regulation introduced an additional public consultation during the permitting process to 
ensure early consultation of local communities and stakeholders and ultimately improve 
public  acceptance  of  such  projects.  Other  key  transparency  provisions  include  the 

114 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
creation of a dedicated PCI website by project promoters that displays updated relevant 
information  about  the  project  and  the  publication  of  a  manual  of  procedures  by  NCAs 
that groups all required permitting provisions.  

The  most  recent  data  on  the  implementation  of  the  transparency  and  participation 
provisions  indicated  that  Belgium,  France  and  Latvia  are  the  only  Member  States  that 
have adopted specific legislation related to the Regulation on permit granting and public 
participation.  A  study  by  Milieu  (2016)  show  that  only  four  Member  States  apply  the 
obligation for project promoters to draw up public participation concepts and only eight 
have held public participation procedures in addition to the one envisaged in the EIA150. 
Although  in  place,  the  information  available  on  the  dedicated  PCI  websites  vary 
considerably in terms of detail, scope and accuracy151. 

Regulatory treatment  

The  Regulation  applies  to  the  regulatory  treatment  of  PCIs  by  setting  out  rules  for 
establishing  methodologies  for  cost-benefit  analysis,  guidelines  on  cost  allocations  and 
risk-related incentives. 

When  at  least  one  Member  State,  affected  by  a  PCI,  estimates  net  negative  impacts,  it 
raises  an  important  barrier  for  the  project  promoter(s)  to  invest  in  that  PCI.  The 
Regulation aims to eliminate this barrier and thereby facilitate investments. This is done 
by incorporating decisions on the allocation of the costs of such projects across borders 
by  National  Regulatory  Authorities  (NRAs)  and  by  the  Agency  for  the  Cooperation  of 
Energy Regulators (ACER) if project promoters submit an investment request, including 
a  request  for  Cross-Border  Cost  Allocation  (CBCA).  This  mechanism  has  also  been 
effective  to  varying  extents.  Currently  42  CBCA  decisions  were  made,  of  which 
respectively  37  and  30  were  reported  in  ACER’s  2019  list  of  CBCA  decisions  and 
ACER’s  2018  CBCA  monitoring  report.  Two  of  the  total  of  42  CBCA  decisions  were 
taken  by  ACER,  where  for  the  remaining  40  were  coordinated  decisions  by  NRAs. 
ACER indicated in their latest summary report152 on the CBCA decisions that 70% of all 
CBCA decisions (21 out of 30) concluded before March 2018 concerned projects where 
the project was built on the territory of one country and the costs were allocated to that 
same country only. Despite showing a strong decrease in in the latest period from 2018-
2020, a relatively large share of these PCIs in one country with one cost carrier remained 
as of March 2020 (24 out  of 42 cases). These PCIs  mostly involved internal  lines with 
cross-border impact.  Another 30% of CBCA decisions taken until March 2018 (9 out of 
30)  concerned  projects  with  multiple  Member  States  involved.  For  5  out  of  9  cross-
border PCIs with CBCA decisions, the territorial principle (each country pays the part of 
the  project  on  its  territory)  is  relevant  for  the  project  crossing  two  countries  without 

150 Milieu et al. 2016. Analysis of the manuals of procedures for the permit granting process applicable to 
projects of common interest prepared under Art.9 Regulation No 347/2013 
151  Websites 
Interactive  map, 
accessed 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/infrastructure/transparency_platform/map-viewer/main.html  
152  ACER  (2018),  Third  Edition  of  the  Agency's  Summary  Report  on  Cross-Border  Cost  Allocation 
Decisions - Status update as of March 2018. 

available 

through 

PCI 

can 

the 

be 

at 

115 

 
 
                                                 
offshore  sections.  For  2  of  these  cases  all  involved  countries  were  estimated  to  be  net 
beneficiaries, thus the territorial principle was applied to formalise the cost division and 
to clarify on the costs to be covered by each country’s national system tariffs.  

Financing 

The TEN-E Regulation is based on a three-step logic: 

1.  As  a  principle,  infrastructure  should  be  paid  for  through  congestion  rents.  If 
costs  are  covered  through  congestion  rents  a  project  can  be  considered 
sufficiently  commercially  viable  and  therefore  no  further  provisions  are 
applicable; 

2.  If  a  network  operator  is  not  able  to  recover  the  costs  of  the  network  through 
congestion rents, the Regulation establishes the principle that it should be paid 
for by network users through tariffs for network access. The Cross-Border Cost 
Allocation (CBCA) provision allows for a (re)allocation of project costs across 
borders to Members States, where the project has a net positive impact; 

3.  Finally, if reallocation of costs through CBCA is still not sufficient and a project 
remains commercially non-viable, PCIs can, under certain conditions, apply for 
Union financial assistance in the form of grants for studies and grants for works. 

The  share  of  congestion  revenue  effectively  spent  on  maintaining  or  increasing 
interconnection capacity increased between 2011 and 2015 (from 18% to 40%)153. 

CEF has provided EUR 4.7 billion to PCIs for 149 actions. A large share of the funding 
provided has been used for works, and electricity projects have received more grants than 
gas  projects.  Smart  grid  and  CO2  infrastructure  –  which  represent  smaller  numbers  of 
PCIs that also are less mature than electricity or gas transmission projects – only account 
for marginal shares of CEF grants provided. As indicated in the most recent CEF-Energy 
Report154, transmission infrastructure projects attract the largest share of funding. 

3  METHOD 

This evaluation was supported by a study “Support to the evaluation of Regulation (EU) 
No  347/2013  on  guidelines  for  trans-European  energy  infrastructure”  commissioned  to 
an external  contractor which helped gather, quantify and assess evidence  drawn from  a 
range of sources on the performance of the TEN-E instrument to date. 

To provide relevant evidence on the implementation of the TEN-E Regulation, a number 
of  methods  were  employed  to  collect  primary  and  secondary  data.  The  data  collection 
included desk research, portfolio analysis, case study analysis, modelling and expert and 
stakeholder  consultations.  As  mentioned  under  section  2,  the  data  was  collected  from 
literature  research,  stakeholder  input  to  the  extensive  consultations  carried  out  in  this 
respect (notably expert interviews, 4 webinars and 2 stakeholder surveys), PCI portfolio 
and case study analysis and related monitoring reports and modelling. 

153 Consolidated data is not available for 2016-2019 
154 INEA (2020). Connecting Europe Facility Energy. Supported Actions – May 2020 

116 

 
 
                                                 
The evaluation questions were drafted with a strong focus on how the ‘activities’ of the 
TEN-E Regulation perform (as listed in the intervention logic) and how they contribute 
to  its  output  and  objectives.  Each  question  has  been  further  ramified  into  a  set  of  sub-
questions.  

The evaluation matrix included each set of questions and their sub-questions, as well as  
assessment criteria; indicators which inform the assessment, data sources and collection 
methods,  analysis  and  approaches  and  ability  to  answer  the  evaluation  question  and 
limitations.  

The  evaluation  questions  and  sub-questions  per  each  evaluation  criteria  as  used  in  the 
evaluation are outlined in the table below.  

The  main  (implementation)  provisions  of  the  TEN-E  Regulation  have  been  further 
looked into more detail and a set  of questions directly assessing their effectiveness  has 
been developed in order to  gather specific evidence on i) the PCI selection process; ii) 
permit  granting  and  public  participation;  iii)  monitoring  and  iv)  regulatory  incentives 
and  CBCA.  The  replies  to  this  set  of  implementation  questions  have  been  analysed 
together with the evidence under the effectiveness criteria.  

In the process of data collection and analysis the  several challenges and limitations were 
identified. These  are presented below, together  with   the impact  they may  have had on 
the evaluation itself and the corresponding mitigation measures.   

Issue or limitation  

Impact  Mitigation measure  

Limited information 
available as part of the desk 
research  

Low  

The available information was gathered 
against the evaluation matrix at an early stage 
of the evaluation. Therefore, the gaps were 
identified at earlier stages and missing topics 
were included in the questionnaires for the 
targeted survey and open public consultation 
In addition, further gaps have been identified 
and addressed as part of the interviewing 
process.  

Fragmented quantitative 
information on specific PCI 
technical data  

Medium   Desk research revealed that quantitative 

information on PCIs is fragmented or 
somewhat difficult to access. Specifically 
combining monitoring data with CEF funding 
and historical PCI data is problematic due to 
inconsistencies in formats and a lack of 
centralised accessibility. This is why special 
attention to this information was paid when 
drafting the questionnaires for the OPC and 
targeted survey.  

Meaningful cost estimates 
to answer the evaluation 

Medium   The questionnaires for the targeted survey and 
OPC were composed in such a way to address 

117 

 
 
questions on efficiency  

Divergence from initially 
planned distribution of 
interviewees  

Data on permitting schemes 
is potentially outdated. 
Current information is 
dispersed and difficult to 
access.  

Data quality issues project 
monitoring data  

Low  

this issue and include questions on the 
estimates of FTE’s and cost drivers for cost 
items which are considered ‘high’ or ‘too high’ 
according to stakeholders.  Further information 
was requested in the interviews. Results were 
triangulated between different types of 
stakeholders.  

Medium  The differences in representation of types of 

stakeholders in comparison to the initially 
planned representation are taken into account 
in the qualitative analysis and presented in a 
way that reflects the share of interviews 
conducted with the different stakeholder 
categories.  

Medium   The latest study on permitting schemes 

adopted in Member States dates from 2016. As 
such, NCAs were further contacted for clarity, 
and additional information on the schemes 
currently in place.  

Project monitoring data from ACER was used 
for the analysis of the portfolio of electricity 
and gas projects. Several data quality issues 
were identified, as a result not all data could be 
used (data quality of recent years improved). 
Monitoring data is only used when complete 
and accurate.  

Fragmented quantitative 
information on specific PCI 
technical data  

Lack of cost estimates to 
answer all the evaluation 
questions on efficiency  

Medium   Desk research revealed that quantitative 

information on PCIs is fragmented or 
somewhat difficult to access. The available 
and consistent data was filtered where possible 
, checked against insights from stakeholder 
interviews and complemented with ACER 
monitoring data...  

Medium   A more qualitative assessment of 

Modelling: not all benefits 
can be quantified  

Low  

administrative costs was carried out, whilst 
aiming at the provision of quantitative results 
to the extent possible.  

In the modelling, socio-economic benefits are 
quantified but estimates do not reflect all 
benefits. This has been addressed by 
explaining socio-economic benefits in the 

118 

 
 
 
annex with the modelling results.  

4  ANALYSIS AND ANSWERS TO THE EVALUATION QUESTIONS 

This section presents the answers to each set of evaluation questions per criterion in an 
aggregated  manner.  The  questions,  as  well  as  the  findings  are  mentioned  under  each 
subsection 

Effectiveness   

Three  main  questions  have  guided  the  assessment  of  the  effectiveness  of  the  TEN-E 
Regulation, as presented below: 

  How effective has the regulatory approach of the TEN-E Regulation been both in 
terms  of  scope  and  main  provisions  in  contributing  to  the  goals  of  market 
integration, security of supply, competitiveness and the climate and energy targets 
for 2020?   

  To  what  extent  has  the  Regulation’  main  provisions  addressed  the  needs 
identified  in  the  Impact  Assessment  accompanying  the  Commission  proposal  in 
2011?   

  What  unintended  or  unexpected  positive  and  negative  effects,  if  any,  have  been 
produced  by  the  TEN-E  Regulation?  (e.g.  in  terms  of  human  health,  use  of 
resources, and natural ecosystems)? 

In  terms  of  the  overall  goals,  the  TEN-E  Regulation  has  effectively  improved  market 
integration and competitiveness, as shown in the evidence on interconnection targets and 
energy  prices  and  their  convergence  across  the  EU  and  thus  contributed  to  the  overall 
development  towards  achieving  them.  42  PCIs  have  been  commissioned  to  date  and 
contributed to this development by creating the interconnection capacities. 

As a main  contextual driver to  the design of the TEN-E Regulation,  security of supply 
has  also  been  improved,  to  which  PCIs  in  electricity,  gas  and  oil  have  strongly 
contributed. For gas, the infrastructure and supply resilience has improved substantially 
since 2013. Member States are  almost  exclusively  compliant with  the N-1 rule  and the 
infrastructure  resilient  to  disruption  scenarios.  The  focus  on  cross-border  projects  that 
increase  the  interconnection  is  found  to  have  been  an  effective  contribution  to  these 
goals.  Modelling  indicates  strong  socio-economic  benefits  in  gas  security  of  supply 
arising  from  implemented  PCIs  (118  m€/yr  in  2020  market  situation,  which  was  even 
more substantial in a 2013 market situation scenario (193 m€/yr)). Security of supply of 
electricity  is  increased  through  enhanced  interconnectivity  with  19  Member  States 
reaching or going beyond the 10% interconnection target for 2020. Modelling shows that 
electricity  PCIs  commissioned  already  deliver  substantial  benefits  that  might  even 
increase in the future. 

The  organisation  of  PCI  selection  in  Regional  Groups  under  the  coordination  of  the 
Commission  is  found  to  be  an  important  factor,  as  well  as  the  approach  to  share  costs 
between  Member  States  to  enable  projects  with  benefits  across  borders.  The  financing 
support provided by CEF also contributed to this. 4.7 billion EUR in CEF co-financing 

119 

 
 
 
have been allocated to 149 actions in relation to 95 PCIs. The grants for studies helped 
projects  to  reduce  risks  in  the  early  stages  while  grants  for  works  supported  projects 
addressing key bottlenecks.  

Analysed data on TEN-E’s performance shows a contribution towards EU’s energy and 
climate  targets,  albeit  less  significant  than  compared  to  the  other  internal  market 
objectives  (market  integration,  security  of  supply,  competitiveness)    due  to  the  historic 
priorities of the policy and difficulty in devising a robust sustainability assessment of gas 
PCIs155.  Electricity  interconnection  PCIs  are  key  elements  for  the  integration  of 
renewable  energy  sources  into  the  European  market.  Although  quantitative  data  on  the 
effect  of  the  TEN-E  Regulation  in  this  field  is  more  limited,  the  modelling  shows  a 
reduction of CO2 emissions of 2804 kilotons across EU (or 0.4% decrease) for the year 
2020  compared  to  the  baseline  resulting  from  the  implementation  of  electricity 
interconnection  PCIs.  Quantified  impact  of  gas  PCIs  on  CO2  reduction  is  rather 
negligible.  A  positive  contribution  has  been  qualitatively  described  during  the 
consultation by TSOs, NCAs Eastern Europe. 

The regulation addressed the needs identified in the 2011 Impact Assessment, as regards 
the lengthy  and ineffective permit  granting procedures, regulatory challenges  for cross-
border  projects  and  difficulties  in  financing  such  large  infrastructure  projects.  The 
specific objectives of reducing permit duration and complexity, advancing the regulatory 
framework and improving the financing conditions of energy infrastructure projects in a 
cross-border context have overall been improved since the Regulation entered into force 
in  2013.  However,  the  positive  picture  at  the  level  of  overall  improvement  also  faces 
challenges in the specific implementation of the main provisions.  

As  already  indicated  under  section  3,  the  duration  of  permit  granting  processes  in  the 
Member States has shortened compared to the baseline situation. Looking at the overall 

155  For  the  calculation  of  sustainability  benefits,  the  information  provided  by  candidate  projects  in  their 
project  fiches  includes  CO2  emissions  and  benefits  deriving  from  fuel  switch,  used  as  input  in  the  CBA 
methodology.  However,  the  current  underlying  assumption  in  the  CBA  is  that  all  gas  projects  would 
automatically  show  only  positive  benefits  towards  CO2  mitigation,  with  no  negative  impact  (such  as 
possible  increase  in  CO2  emissions).  By  only  using  CO2  savings  from  fuel-switches  from  coal  to  gas 
without carrying out a detailed analysis of the different situations in the individual countries, other possible 
sustainability benefits remain invisible and unquantifiable, hampering the robustness of the results of the 
assessment  of  such  benefits.  This  was  also  acknowledged  by  the  Agency  for  the  Cooperation  of  Energy 
Regulators (ACER) in its Opinion No 19/2019 of the European Union of 25 September 2019 on the draft 
regional lists of proposed gas projects of common interest 2019. In this opinion, ACER notes that ‘(28) the 
contribution of the PCI candidate projects to sustainability in general and to meeting the  climate change 
policy goals of the European Union in particular, is not quite clear. ACER believes that the preliminary 
assessment  provided  by  ENTSOG,  which  assigned  a  positive  sustainability  benefit  to  each  and  every 
candidate  project,  is  tenable  only  under  the  specific  assumptions  that  gas  will  be  a  substitute  of  more 
polluting fuels in the European Union’s primary energy mix, and also that the total volume of consumed 
gas will be within a range that ensures that overall greenhouse gas emissions resulting from gas use will 
stay below the European Union’s policy targets. Therefore, the lack of detailed data and consistency, did 
not allow to properly calculate the sustainability benefits.  

120 

 
 
                                                 
 
picture,  monitoring  reports  indicate  an  average  duration  of  4  years  for  electricity  PCIs 
and 3.1 years for gas PCIs. 

Figure 5: Duration of the permit granting process for electricity PCIs 

Source: adapted from ACER 2019 (Consolidated Progress Report). 

Figure 6: Duration of the expected permit granting process for gas PCIs 

s
t
c
e
j
o
r
p
f
o
r
e
b
m
u
N

25

20

15

10

5

0

25 

22 

13 

11 

6 

3 

2 

3 

3 

2 

5 

Source: adapted from ACER 2019 (Consolidated Progress Report). 

The permitting process constitutes one of the main causes for delays for both electricity 
and gas PCIs. For instance, 25% of electricity PCIs were reported as delayed in the 2019 
ACER report. Of these, 46% encountered delays specifically during the permit granting 
process.  These  numbers  are  similar  to  those  provided  in  the  2018  report  but  slightly 
lower than those in the 2017 report, suggesting a slight improvement. For gas PCIs, the 
picture  looks  similar  -  12  PCIs  have  been  delayed  (i.e.  28%  of  gas  PCIs),  of  which  7 
(58%) report the permitting stage as the cause. These results are similar to those reported 
in 2018.  

121 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Reasons for electricity and gas PCI delays 

However, longer permitting durations are still observed, including PCIs needing up to 9 
years  before  obtaining  the  permit  according  to  ACER’s  latest  progress  report,  which 
indicates a high difference in permit granting duration between individual projects. The 
finding  of  differing  permitting  durations  is  strongly  supported  by  the  results  of  the 
stakeholder  consultation  which  indicate  that  the  effectiveness  of  permit  granting 
procedures  strongly  depends  on  national  implementation.  Experiences  of  project 
promoters  vary  substantially  because  of  differences  in  applying  TEN-E  permitting 
requirements  such  as  the  responsibilities  of  authorities  in  the  permit  granting  process. 
Project characteristics have a substantial influence on the requirements of the permitting 
process.  The  nature  of  PCIs  as  large  projects  with  cross-border  impacts  creates  strong 
needs for impact  assessment and complex planning documentation according to  project 
promoters. In section 3 we have outlined the permitting schemes as chosen by Member 
States to facilitate and coordinate the permit granting process for PCIs. 

In  terms  of  the  effectiveness  of  the  permitting  scheme  employed,  the  2016  ACER 
progress report156 estimated the duration of permit granting per scheme, which is shown 
for electricity PCIs in the figure below. This report found that coordinated schemes had 
the  shortest  duration  for  permit  granting,  followed  by  a  similar  duration  for  integrated, 
collaborative  and  multiple  schemes157.  The  table  also  shows  that  coordinated  schemes 
were compliant with the 3.5-year time limit, whereas the other types of schemes resulted 
in durations of the permitting stage slightly above the limit established in Art. 10(2).  

156  
projects of common interest for the year 2015. 
157  
of the duration (ACER 2016).  

ACER  (2016).  Consolidated  report  on  the  progress  of  electricity  and  gas 

Sample size  for integrated scheme is too small to provide a robust indication 

122 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
Table  3:  Distribution  of  permitting  schemes  for  electricity  PCIs  and  expected 
duration of permit granting depending on the scheme 

Permitting scheme 

applying the scheme (in 

Number of PCIs (in 2016) 

permit granting (years, in 

Number of Member States 

Average expected duration of 

Integrated  

Coordinated 

Collaborative 

Multiple schemes 
Source: ACER 2016, Milieu 2016. 

2016) 

1 

9 

15 

2 

4 

24 

47 

21 

2016) 

3.8 

2.8 

3.6 

3.7 

However, the evaluation indicated that the underlying reasons for delays fall outside the 
direct  scope  of  the  TEN-E  Regulation  and  cannot  be  addressed  by  the  Regulation 
specifically.  While  continuously  complex  national  procedures  are  one  cause  for  this, 
environmental  procedures  of  PCIs  and  public  opposition  causing  lengthy  court  cases 
against  the  projects  are  other  reasons  for  extended  permitting  times.  However,  in  this 
case,  it  is  worth  highlighting  the  procedural  dimension  of  environmental  obligation  as 
opposed  to  issues  that  relate  to  the  substantial  provision  of  the  EU  environmental 
legislation.  These  environmental  procedures  that  were  found  as  reasons  for  delay  are 
often  linked  to  the  need  for  re-assessment  of  the  project  due  to  its  re-routing.  The 
evaluation  based  on  stakeholder  input  showed  that  the  positive  aspects  of  the  projects’ 
compliance  with  the  environmental  acquis  has  been  highlighted  as  mitigating  possible 
environmental  and  biodiversity  impact.  This  in  turn,  substantiates  the  need  for  early 
public  consultations  in  timely  implementation  of  any  necessary  re-assessment  and 
adjustment  of  projects.  At  the  same  time,  the  delays  caused  by  lengthy  court  cases  do 
show that the provisions on public participation have increased and ensured opportunities 
for  the  public  to  be  involved  in  the  permitting  stages  of  a  project,  but  have  not  been 
effective in reducing public opposition to many PCIs.  

As  regards  the  effectiveness  of  the  TEN-E  Regulation  provisions  for  cross-border  cost 
allocation  (CBCA),  the  evaluation  showed  varying  extents  as  already  referred  to  under 
section 3. 

There are three ways through which CBCA decisions can support investment decisions:  

•  By allocating overall project costs to specifically compensate net negative impact 
for  at  least  one  involved  party,  reducing  the  barrier  to  invest  for  these  specific 
parties;  

•  By  providing  clarity  on  the  acceptance  of  the  relevant  costs  to  be  covered  by 

national system tariffs in each concerned Member State; and  

•  By  Providing  access  to  (additional)  financial  support  through  CEF  grants  for 

works. 

While the approach taken to share costs between Member States in relation to benefits is 
largely appraised, the details of the mechanism like time and data requirements as well as 
its complexity reduce its attractiveness. Therefore, CBCAs prove to be effective in some 

123 

 
 
 
cases  while  a  question  on  the  valuation  of  the  mechanism  remains  as  it  is  a  step  to  an 
application for CEF grants. The complexity of obtaining data, the additional time until an 
investment  decision  can  be  made  and  the  lack  of  unambiguous  results  to  base  the 
decision on are factors reducing the satisfaction of stakeholders with the process. At the 
same time, the concept is appreciated in enabling the understanding of the benefits of a 
project.  

The  evaluation  showed  that  CBCAs  are  beneficial  in  some  cases  but  less  effective  in 
others.  CBCA  processes  are  often  triggered  to  obtain  access  to  CEF  funding  and  are 
regularly  concluded  with  no  costs  allocated  across  borders.  The  analysis  of  the  most 
recent  ACER  data158  on  CBCA  decisions  (triangulated  with  data  on  the  CEF  funding) 
show  that  these  are  rarely  used  to  provide  additional  clarity  on  the  acceptance  of  the 
relevant costs to be covered by national system tariffs in concerned Member States. 70% 
of all CBCA decisions (21 out of 30) taken until March 2018 concerned projects where 
the project was built on the territory of one country and the costs were allocated to that 
same country only. Despite showing a strong decrease in in the latest period from 2018-
2020,  still  a  relatively  large  share  of  these  PCIs  in  one  country  with  one  cost  carrier 
remained as of March 2020 (24 out  of 42 cases), potentially anticipating CEF-E  grants 
and not necessarily seeking a decision on cost allocation. 

Moreover, the results showed that CBCA decisions are rarely used to reallocate costs to 
compensate  net  negative  impact  for  at  least  one  involved  party,  reducing  the  barrier  to 
invest for these specific parties. With the exception of four cases in 2014 (all gas PCIs), 
none of the CBCA decisions allocated costs to non-hosting countries. This indicates that 
almost half of all cases (20 out of 42) involve situations where CBCA decisions did not 
provide compensation of net negative impact for the hosting country through allocation 
of  overall  project  costs.  Since  these  projects  were  internal  project  with  benefits  for  the 
one involved party, it can be concluded that for 48% of all cases the only intention for 
project  promoters  to  have  requested  a  CBCA  decision  was  to  gain  access  to  CEF 
funding. 

Ineffectiveness of the CBCA process can result in projects that are not realised due to a 
lack  of  funding  or  may  lead  to  the  ‘disproportionate’  use  of  EU  funding  where 
insufficient consideration was given to funding from tariffs in Member States. Due to its 
ineffectiveness,  project  promoters,  NRAs  and  ACER  consider  CBCAs  as  an 
administrative burden with, in many cases, little to no direct benefits159. 

The availability of CEF funding has had the most significant influence on the financing 
of  energy  infrastructure  projects  addressing  the  third  need  as  identified  in  the  2011 
impact  assessment.  The  funding  support  offered  in  the  form  of  grants  by  the  CEF  has 

158  ACER  (2018),  Third  Edition  of  the  Agency's  Summary  Report  on  Cross-Border  Cost  Allocation 
Decisions - Status update as of March 2018. 
159  Also confirmed by  Roland  Berger (2016). Cost-Effective Financing  Structures for Mature  Projects of 
Common Interest (PCIs) in Energy and Trinomics et al. (2018) 

124 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
been  found  important  for  improving  the  financing  conditions  for  PCIs160.  Public  grants 
are described to enable private investment in energy infrastructure by absorbing risks and 
therefore  effectively  advancing  PCIs.  By  providing  support  in  early  stages,  the  grants 
offered  for  studies  contribute  to  de-risk  project  development.  This,  on  the  one  hand, 
helped  to  improve  project  realisation  according  to  project  promoters  and  national 
authorities, and also contributed to attracting investors. The visibility of the project due to 
its  PCI  label  and  the  political  support  that  has  been  experienced  by  many  project 
promoters also supports the attractiveness of PCIs to investors. CEF grants for works can 
also support projects that would not be economically viable otherwise and prevent high 
increases  in  tariffs.  The  additional  mechanism  of  risk-based  incentives  has  been  rarely 
used161  mostly  due  to  the  assumptions  from  project  promoters  that  NRA  do  not  see 
higher risks for PCIs or that the regulatory framework allows coping with the risks. As 
such, I it has not had an effect to improve the financing situation of PCIs so far.  

As  regards  selection  criteria,  selected  PCI  projects  demonstrated  to  help  fulfilling  the 
current objectives of the TEN-E Regulation as it was conceived in 2013. The evaluation 
indicates  that  sustainability  benefits  were  realised  to  a  lesser  extent  than  the  other 
benefits mostly due to the difficulty in devising a robust methodology for assessment of 
sustainability impacts of gas projects. Some of the current selection criteria might be too 
restrictive  for  the  inclusion  of  projects  at  DSO  level,  in  particular:  the  cross-border 
impact criteria, and the 10 kV voltage threshold and 20% RES origin for smart grids. A 
more flexible definition of the cross-border impact may allow to include relevant projects 
in  one  Member  State  with  significant  and  quantifiable  benefits  in  other  Member  States 
(or outermost regions) with regards to the objectives of the TEN-E regulation.  

The  electricity  and  gas  network  planning  exercises  are  eminently  related  to  the  PCI 
selection  process.  Energy  infrastructure  needs  are  identified  in  the  network  planning 
process and potential projects addressing those needs must be evaluated according to the 
general  objectives  of  the  TEN-E  Regulation  (security  of  supply,  market  integration, 
competition and sustainability). A cost-benefit analysis methodology must be developed 
by the ENTSOs to assess the projects they shall include in the TYNDP. This CBA is also 
the basis to evaluate the candidate projects for PCI. In the network planning process, the 
models  of  the  electricity  and  gas  systems  are  currently  independent,  not  allowing 
sufficient  consideration  of  interdependencies  between  systems.  However,  the  ENTSOs 
are  currently  developing  an  interlinked  model  with  view  to  develop  in  the  future  the 
network  planning  process  to  a  “system  of  systems”  approach,  including  all  energy 
vectors and demand sectors. CBA methodologies are not aligned between electricity and 
gas, which does not allow a fair comparison between electricity and gas projects, since 
they can potentially compete to address system needs.  

The evaluation  brought  forward a series  of insights  that relate to  the governance of the 
network planning exercise. The main finding concerns the lack of adequacy of roles of 

160  Roland  Berger  (2016).  Cost-Effective  Financing  Structures  for  Mature  Projects  of  Common  Interest 
(PCIs) in Energy. 
161 ACER reports indicate that two requests for such incentives have been made for electricity and four for 
gas PCIs. In four cases overall (one electricity, three gas), risk-based incentives have been granted 

125 

 
 
                                                 
the  different  agents  in  the  PCI  process.  The  role  of  the  ENTSOs  has  been  found  as 
conflicting with their interests as project promoters. Whilst the evaluation acknowledged 
that the ENTSOs, as TSO operators, enjoy the necessary expertise and access to system 
and planning data, a higher degree of stakeholder consultation and validation of ENTSOs 
underlying planning assumptions (in scenarios and modelling) and CBA methodologies 
developed  may  be  needed  to  ensure  an  energy  integrated  system  approach,  where  all 
energy  carriers’  interdependencies  can  be  captured  when  evaluating  the  benefits  of 
projects.  

Whilst  certain  stakeholders  indicated  that  the  biennial  periodicity  of  the  PCI  lists  is 
unnecessarily burdensome and potentially carrying risks for  investors in case of loss of 
the PCI label, the evaluation has not found conclusive data to support the claims. There is 
no evidence that the specificities of their business models in the case of smart grids and 
CO2 infrastructure categories would qualify  them for a streamlined reassessment in the 
PCI process and serve as a derogation from the biennial process. Moreover, twos-speed 
PCI  processes  for  different  types  of  infrastructure  categories  has  been  found 
unmanageable and not serving the scope of the Regulation. 

The evaluation concluded that priority corridors and thematic areas need to be updated to 
address future challenges and incorporate new types of projects. As such, new categories 
could  be  considered  such  as  cross-sectoral  projects,  joint  gas-electricity-hydrogen 
corridors,  sector  coupling  projects,  smart  gas  grid  projects,  hydrogen,  clean  gases, 
digitalization,  distribution  projects,  energy  storage,  hybrid  wind  offshore,  hybrid 
solutions, electric priority corridor to South Mediterranean/North Africa, decarbonisation 
of  islands,  smart  sector  integration,  electrification  of  heating  and  cooling  systems, 
peripheral countries, sector integration technologies and solutions, renewable heating and 
cooling  infrastructures.  On  the  other  spectrum,  electricity  highways  and  oil  priority 
corridor have been appraised as non-effective.  

As for the effectiveness of reporting and monitoring, the evaluation found that ACER’s 
annual monitoring report could be done biennially with every PCI list by only focusing 
on relevant  changes  and tackling inefficiencies. The transparency platform  and the PCI 
interaction map are positively valued.  

Efficiency  

Two  main  questions  have  guided  the  assessment  of  the  efficiency  of  the  TEN-E 
Regulation, as presented below: 

  To  what  extent  are  the  costs  resulting  from  the  implementation  of  the  TEN-E 
Regulation  proportionate  to  the  benefits  that  have  been  achieved?  What  are  the 
major sources of inefficiencies?  

  To what extent do the different types of costs resulting from the implementation 
of  the  TEN-E  Regulation  vary  based  on  the  approach  taken  to  implement  the 
legislation  (while  achieving  the  same  results)?  Which  approach  was  most 
efficient?   

Although lack of sufficient data impeded the full and harmonised quantification of all the 
benefits and costs, it is likely that benefits of the Regulation outweigh the costs. Benefits 
include socio-economic net benefits and market efficiency. The analysis of effectiveness 

126 

 
 
shows that socio-economic net benefits were realised through an increase in security of 
supply,  competition  and  integration  of  markets  and  to  a  lesser  extent  sustainability. 
Modelling shows that net benefits of electricity PCIs increase in scenarios with a higher 
CO2 price, which in turn shows these projects have benefits in the context of the Green 
Deal.  The  market  efficiency  benefits  refer  to  benefits  that  improve  information 
availability, increase cost savings, and ensure that a wider range of products or services 
are provided. The Regulation has resulted in improved transparency. The evidence on the 
extent to which the Regulation resulted in improved processes and timely construction of 
projects  is,  however,  mixed  and  it  is  strongly  linked  to  the  various  performance  of  the 
different provisions due to national implementation.  

The  main  cost  drivers  are  the  PCI  selection  process  and  monitoring,  the  permitting 
process,  stakeholder  consultation  and  costs  associated  with  decisions  on  CBCA  and 
regulatory  incentives.  In  general,  stakeholders  view  the  costs  associated  with  the 
Regulation to be justified. Opportunities to improve the efficiency of the Regulation are 
limited but there is potential to reduce the administrative burden for project promoters in 
the  CBCA  process,  the  PCI  application  process  and  monitoring.  CBCA  decisions  are 
considered too burdensome when they are mainly used as a stepping stone for access to 
CEF grants. Costs for re-application of a project for a new PCI lists and monitoring costs 
are  considered  too  high  by  some  stakeholders  mainly  because  data  requests  are 
considered inefficient. The total impact on costs of any changes to the CBCA process and 
application/monitoring processes is limited compared to the total benefits and costs of the 
Regulation  and  changes  can  have  a  negative  impact  on  other  objectives  of  the 
Regulation. 

Relevance  

Three  main  questions  have  guided  the  assessment  of  the  relevance  of  the  TEN-E 
Regulation, as presented below: 

•  To  what  extent  do  the  objectives  of  the  TEN-E  Regulation  still  respond  to  the 

needs of the EU in relation to energy infrastructure? 

•  To what extent are the 12 priority corridors still relevant? Do they address current 
and arising challenges for TEN-E networks (e.g. sector coupling, hydrogen)?   

•  To  what  extent  are  the  provisions  of  the  TEN-E  Regulation  able  to  respond  to 
new or emerging issues such as the energy and climate targets for 2030, the EU 
long-term  decarbonisation  commitment  towards  carbon  neutrality,  the  energy 
efficiency first principle, and EU readiness for the digital age? 

The Paris Agreement and the European Green Deal involve a significant transformation 
of the current energy infrastructures into a fully carbon-neutral energy integrated system 
by 2050. While the initial objectives of the TEN-E Regulation -security of supply, market 
integration,  competition  and  sustainability-  are  still  relevant,  the  changes  needed  in  the 
way we develop energy infrastructure claim for a rebalance of the objectives in order to 
fulfil  the  decarbonisation  targets  and  be  aligned  with  the  climate-neutrality  objectives. 
Along the pathway towards a decarbonised economy in 2050, energy infrastructure needs 
will  gradually  evolve  as  emerging  technologies  are  deployed  and  the  sectors  gradually 

127 

 
 
interlink  and  switch  to  sustainable  sources.  There  must  be  a  realistic  planning  of  the 
network from its current state to the targets in 2050. In the analysis performed based on 
desk  review  and  the  stakeholder’s  consultation,  many  emerging  technologies  were 
identified to be necessary in the future energy infrastructure. The following technologies 
are currently not specifically addressed by the TEN-E regulation: decarbonisation of gas 
– hydrogen, green gas infrastructures, retrofitting of existing gas networks, bidirectional 
gas  flow  projects,  energy  system  integration  –  power-to-gas,  smart  system  integration, 
gas smart grids, digitalization, electric vehicle charging infrastructures, decarbonisation – 
carbon  storage,  RES  deployment  and  integration  –  hybrid  offshore  wind,  meshed  wind 
hubs.  

In view of increasing its relevance, sustainability will need to be prioritised amongst the 
objectives  of  the  TEN-E  Regulation.  In  view  of  the  necessary  growing  shares  of 
intermittent  renewable  energy  generation,  their  integration  whilst  ensuring  security  of 
supply  is  becoming  increasingly  more  relevant.  Moreover,  further  alignment  of 
sustainability  aspects  of  energy  infrastructure  projects  would  have  to  be  explored  with 
the sustainable finance framework, once completed. The flexibility needs of the system 
can  also  be  addressed  by  energy  system  integration,  potentially  an  additional  objective 
per se in the regulation.  

Some TEN-E provisions do not facilitate the deployment of emerging technologies that 
are necessary in the context of the European Green Deal and which will inevitably gain 
predominance  in  the  future  energy  infrastructure  investments  in  Europe  in  the  next 
decades. The methodologies developed by the ENTSOs, including scenario development, 
modelling and CBA assessment, as the basis of the PCI selection process, are currently 
undergoing major changes towards coordinated multi-sectorial planning and smart sector 
coordination  approach.  The  methodologies  need  to  be  adapted  to  include  all  new 
emerging  technologies  and  have  a  holistic  view  of  the  energy  system.  Some  PCI 
selection criteria may hinder deployment  of emerging technologies.  In particular, smart 
grid projects, according to Annex IV.1.e of the Regulation, have a voltage threshold of 
10  kV  that  leaves  out  essential  installations  of  these  projects.  Additionally,  the  20% 
requirement of RES generations in the network can limit the deployment of smart grids 
in  regions  with  lower  penetration  of  RES  capacity.  The  permit  granting  process,  as 
conceived  by  the  TEN-E  regulation,  seems  to  be  only  effective  for  large  transmission 
infrastructure projects. Concepts such as the one-stop-shop and provisions in Article 10 
related  to  the  duration  and  implementation  of  the  permit  granting  process  cannot  be 
adequately  applied  to  smart  grid  projects,  as  it  has  been  confirmed  by  all  smart  grid 
project promoters who took part in the stakeholder consultation.  

Coherence  

Four  main  questions  have  guided  the  assessment  of  the  coherence  of  the  TEN-E 
Regulation, as presented below: 

•  Three main questions have guided the assessment of the coherence of the TEN-E 

Regulation, as presented below: 

•  Are  the  measures  set  out  within  the  TEN-E  Regulation  mutually  reinforcing  or 
are there any overlaps, inconsistencies, or incoherencies (when read in isolation)? 

128 

 
 
•  How does the legislation interact with other EU/ national/ international initiatives 
(e.g.  actions  in  the  field  of  environment,  single  market,  climate  action)  which 
have similar objectives? 

•  How  well  does  the  legislation  fit  with  and  complement  other  EU  policies  (e.g. 
Regional Policy, Research and Innovation, Environment) but also other elements 
of  EU  energy  policy  (e.g.  internal  market  design,  renewable  energy  framework, 
energy  efficiency first  principle, Union energy and climate targets  for 2030, the 
EU long-term decarbonisation commitment, European Green Deal)? 

Evidence obtained during the evaluation  process identified limited concerns around the 
internal  coherence  of  the  TEN-E  Regulation  although  a  number  of  points  have  been 
identified  concerning  the  implementation  of  certain  elements  such  as  insufficient 
flexibility to adapt to rapidly evolving policy areas, potential conflicts on legal drafting 
around cost  allocation, insufficient  precision on the definition of ‘maturity’  and limited 
clarity on the process for the Commission’s publication of TYNDP Guideline updates.  

The TEN-E Regulation is largely consistent with the legislative and policy environment 
that  was  in  place  at  the  time  of  its  introduction.  However,  the  current  TEN-E  is  not 
consistent with the current legislative and policy environment, which has been triggered 
by  the  various  changes  under  the  Clean  Energy  Package.  Inconsistencies  include 
“mechanistic”  examples  (such  as  alignment  with  renewable  energy  and  interconnector 
targets),  but  also  more  nuanced  examples  such  as  PCI  selection  which  is  not  currently 
aligned with the intended policy goals behind the Clean Energy Package (such as greater 
roles for DNOs).  

The TEN-E Regulation requires substantial revision to bring the Regulation into line with 
the priorities within the European Green Deal, and to bring greater synergies with other 
sectoral instruments such as the TEN-T Regulation to drive decarbonisation by fostering 
a  more  cross-sectoral  approach.  Evaluation  findings  as  well  as  evidence  drawn  from 
stakeholder  consultations  strongly  support  an  ambitious,  long-term  approach  when 
redefining the scope of the TEN-E Regulation.  

Some  inconsistencies  with  national-level  legal  frameworks  were  identified.  This  seems 
mainly related to  national-level  implementation  and compliance in  a limited number of 
member states which have reported difficulties in their national-level legal frameworks as 
opposed to a systemic issue with the TEN-E Regulation. 

EU added value  

The  evaluation  concluded  that  the  TEN-E  Regulation  has  provided  added  value 
compared to what could have been achieved at national or regional level. The benefits of 
the  TEN-E  Regulation,  already  referred  to  under  the  assessment  of  effectiveness  and 
efficiency, backed by input from stakeholders confirmed the added value arising from an 
increase in security of supply, more competitive markets and more interconnected energy 
networks. 

The  implementation  of  over  40  key  energy  infrastructure  projects  since  its  enactment 
helped most Member States reach the 10% interconnection target for 2020 and achieve a 

129 

 
 
well-interconnected and shock-resilient gas grid. As such, the EU energy market is more 
integrated and competitive than it was in 2013 and the Union’s energy security improved. 
Access  to  targeted  financing  under  CEF  enabled  the  implementation  of  95  PCIs  which 
have had otherwise difficulties in accessing financing under market rules.   

Various  stakeholders  confirmed  the  added  value  of  the  TEN-E  Regulation,  pointing  to 
the 
implementing  cross-border  projects, 
transparency regulatory certainty and access to financing. 

importance  of  regional  cooperation 

in 

Figure  8:  The  EU  added  value  of  the  TEN-E  Regulation  as  indicated  by 
stakeholders 

The TEN-E Regulation fosters the development of cross-border energy infrastructure in 
the  EU.  Thus,  it  promoted  cooperation  among  Member  States,  which  might  not  have 
occurred  without  the  coordinated  action  at  the  EU  level.  The  common  approach  of 
benchmarking  projects  to  one  another  were  instrumental  in  enabling  cooperation  and 
transparency.  In  addition,  national  and  regional  level  legislation  covering  cross-border 
cooperation in the EU assists projects that have cross-border relevance. 

5  CONCLUSIONS 

Since  2013,  energy  interconnections  have  increased  across  the  EU  as  a  result  of  the 
in  all  regions.  Increased 
implementation  of 
interconnection effectively improved the integration of Member States’ networks, which 
in turned made the EU energy market more integrated and competitive than it was before 
the application of the TEN-E Regulation. Wholesale prices for electricity decreased and 

the  TEN-E  Regulation  and  PCIs 

130 

88%75%60%54%52%35%32%20%15%4%Access to financing (e.g. CEF)Regional cooperationCertain projects could not havebeen implemented otherwiseIncreased transparencyCooperation gainsImproved regulatory certaintyIncreased acceptance ofenergy infrastructure projectsGreater speed and/or effectivenessof delivery of projectsEnhanced compliance withenvironmental requirementsOther 
 
 
 
converged  in  almost  all  Member  States.  Gas  prices  also  converged.  An  increase  in 
security  of  gas  supply  has  been  achieved  substantially  since  2013  through  new 
interconnections  and  LNG  terminals.  PCIs  have  demonstrated  to  help  fulfilling  the 
current objectives of the TEN-E Regulation as it was conceived in 2013. However, the do 
not  reflect  the  renewed  climate  ambitions  and  the  climate  neutrality  objective  nor  the 
latest  technological  developments.  This  progress  should  be  taken  into  account  in  the 
infrastructure categories covered by the Regulation, the PCI selection criteria as well as 
the priority corridors and thematic areas. 

The PCI identification and selection process within the Regional Groups has been found 
effective in improving cooperation and enabling decisions on cross-border projects on the 
basis of a regional and European approach. The TYNDP process has proven effective as 
a first step for the identification of PCIs. However, while the ENTSOs and TSOs have an 
important role to play in the process, there is a need for more inclusiveness and scrutiny 
of the main inputs and assumptions to enhance trust in the process. 

The  cross-border  cost  allocation  mechanism  is  an  important  enabler  for  project 
implementation.  However, in  many cases the cross-border cost  allocation did  not result 
reducing the financing gap of the project, as intended. 

While permitting procedures have been shortened, long permitting procedures persist in 
some  cases.  However, 
to  national 
implementation and outside the scope of the TEN-E Regulation. 

the  underlying  reasons  are  mainly  related 

CEF  financial  assistance  granted  to  95  projects  were  an  effective  enable  of  their 
implementation. Grants for studies helped projects to reduce risks in the early stages of 
development  while  grants  for  works  supported  projects  addressing  key  bottlenecks  that 
market finance could not sufficiently address. 

The evaluation  found that  the benefits  of the Regulation  outweigh the costs proving its 
efficiency.  TEN-E  Regulation  brought  socio-economic  benefits  through  an  increase  in 
security of supply and more integrated and competitive energy markets. The Regulation 
also contributed to improved information availability, coordination and transparency. 

The  initial  objectives  of  the  TEN-E  Regulation  -security  of  supply,  market  integration, 
competition  and  sustainability-  remain  relevant.  However,  the  increased  climate 
ambitions under the Paris Agreement and the European Green Deal call for a rebalancing 
of the objectives in order to fulfil the decarbonisation targets and contribute to climate-
neutrality. 

The evaluation showed limited evidence as to concerns around the internal coherence of 
the TEN-E Regulation, other than potential mechanistic changes and a lack of flexibility 
in adapting to rapidly evolving policy areas.  

The TEN-E Regulation delivered results which could have not otherwise been achieved 
by action at Member State level, proving EU added value.  

131 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX 6: PCIS AND CEF FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE 

Projects of common interest (completed): 

PCI number   Regional 

Name of the PCI 

group/ 
sematic 
area 

1.1.1 

NSOG 

1.1.1 Interconnection between Gezelle (BE) and the vicinity of 
Richborough (UK) 

1.1.2 

NSOG 

1.1.2  Internal  line  between  the  vicinity  of  Richborough  and 
Canterbury (UK) 

1.1.3 

NSOG 

1.1.3  Internal  line  between  Dungeness  to  Sellindge  and 
Sellindge to Canterbury (UK) 

1.3.2 

1.4.2 

1.4.3 

1.5 

NSOG 

1.3.2 Internal line between Niebüll and Brunsbüttel (DE) 

NSOG 

1.4.2 Internal line between Audorf and Hamburg/Nord (DE) 

NSOG 

1.4.3 Internal line between Hamburg/Nord and Dollern (DE) 

NSOG 

Denmark — Netherlands interconnection between Endrup (DK) 
and Eemshaven (NL) [currently known as “COBRAcable”] 

1.7.3 

NSOG 

1.7.3  Interconnection  between  Coquelles  (FR)  and  Folkestone 
(UK) [currently known as "ElecLink"]  

2.2.2 

2.2.3 

2.3.1 

2.5.1 

2.5.2 

2.6 

NSI  West 
Electricity 

NSI  West 
Electricity 

2.2.2 Internal line between Lixhe and Herderen (BE) 

2.2.3 New substation in Zutendaal (BE) 

NSI  West 
Electricity 

2.3.1  Coordinated  installation  and  operation  of  a  phase-shift 
transformer in Schifflange(LU) 

NSI  West 
Electricity 

2.5.1  Interconnection  between  Grande  Ile  (FR)  and  Piossasco 
(IT) [currently known as “Savoie-Piemont” project] 

NSI  West 
Electricity 

NSI  West 
Electricity 

2.5.2 Internal line between Trino and Lacchiarella (IT) 

PCI  Spain  internal  line  between  Santa  Llogaia  and  Bescanó 
(ES) 
the 
interconnection between Bescanó (ES) and Baixas (FR) 

capacity 

increase 

of 

to 

132 

 
 
2.8 

2.12 

2.16.2 

2.24 

2.25.1 

2.25.2  

3.1.3 

3.11.5 

3.13 

3.15.1 

3.15.2 

3.19.1 

3.22.5 

4.1 

NSI  West 
Electricity 

Coordinated 
transformer 
interconnection between Argia (FR) and Arkale (ES) 

installation  and  operation  of  a  phase-shift 
the 
in  Arkale  (ES) 

increase  capacity  of 

to 

NSI  West 
Electricity 

Germany  —  Netherlands  interconnection  between  Niederrhein 
(DE) and Doetinchem (NL) 

NSI  West 
Electricity 

NSI  West 
Electricity 

2.16.2 Internal line between Pedralva and Vila Fria B (PT) 

Internal line between Horta-Mercator (BE) 

NSI  West 
Electricity 

2.25.1  Internal  lines  Mudejar  —  Morella  (ES)  and  Mezquite-
Morella (ES), including a substation in Mudejar (ES) 

NSI  West 
Electricity 

NSI  East 
Electricity 

NSI  East 
Electricity 

2.25.2 Internal line Morella-La Plana (ES) 

3.1.3 Internal line between St. Peter and Ernsthofen (AT) 

3.11.5 Internal line between Mirovka and Cebin (CZ) 

NSI  East 
Electricity 

Internal  line  in  Germany  between  Halle/Saale  and  Schweinfurt 
to increase capacity in the North-South Corridor East 

NSI  East 
Electricity 

3.15.1  Interconnection  between  Vierraden  (DE)  and  Krajnik 
(PL) 

NSI  East 
Electricity 

3.15.2  Installation  of  phase  shifting  transformers  on  the 
interconnection  lines  between  Krajnik  (PL)  —  Vierraden  (DE) 
and  coordinated  operation  with  the  PST  on  the  interconnector 
Mikułowa (PL) — Hagenwerder (DE) 

NSI  East 
Electricity 

NSI  East 
Electricity 

BEMIP 
Electricity 

3.19.1 Interconnection between Villanova (IT) and Lastva (ME) 

3.22.5 Interconnection between Villanova (IT) and Lastva (ME) 

Denmark  —  Germany 
Ishøj/ 
Bjæverskov  (DK)  and  Bentwisch  (DE)  via  offshore  windparks 
Kriegers Flak (DK) and Baltic 1 and 2 (DE) [currently known as 
"Kriegers Flak Combined Grid Solution"] 

interconnection  between 

4.4.1 

BEMIP 
Electricity 

4.4.1 Internal line between Ventspils, Tume and Imanta (LV) 

133 

 
 
4.5.1 

4.5.5 

5.2 

5.7.1 

5.7.2 

5.11 

5.13 

5.14 

5.16 

6.3 

6.5.5 

8.1.1 

8.2.3 

BEMIP 
Electricity 

4.5.1  LT  part  of  interconnection  between  Alytus  (LT)  and 
LT/PL border 

BEMIP 
Electricity 

NSI  West 
Gas 

NSI  West 
Gas 

NSI  West 
Gas 

4.5.5 Internal line between Kruonis and Alytus (LT) 

PCI  Twinning  of  Southwest  Scotland  onshore  system  between 
Cluden 
Bay. 
(United Kingdom) 

Brighouse 

and 

5.7.1 Val de Saône pipeline between Etrez and Voisines (FR) 

5.7.2 Gascogne-Midi pipeline (FR) 

NSI  West 
Gas 

Reverse  flow  interconnection  between  Italy  and  Switzerland  at 
Passo Gries interconnection point 

NSI  West 
Gas 

NSI  West 
Gas 

NSI  West 
Gas 

NSI  East 
Gas 

PCI  New 
Maldegem (Belgium) 

interconnection  between  Pitgam  (France)  and 

PCI Reinforcement of the French network from South to North 
on 
pipeline 
Dierrey 
de 
between Cuvilly, Dierrey and Voisines (France) 

Arc 

the 

PCI Extension of the Zeebrugge LNG terminal. 

PCI  Slovakia  –  Hungary  Gas  Interconnection  between  Vel’ké 
Zlievce 
Balassagyarmat 
border (SK/HU ) - Vecsés (HU) 

(SK) 

– 

NSI  East 
Gas 

6.5.5  "Compressor  station  1"  at  the  Croatian  gas  transmission 
system 

BEMIP 
Gas 

8.1.1 
"Balticconnector", 

Interconnector 

between  Estonia 

and 

Finland 

BEMIP 
Gas 

8.2.3  Capacity  enhancement  of  Klaipeda-Kiemenai  pipeline  in 
Lithuania 

Additional information on on-going PCIs and their status of implementation can be found 
on the PCI Transparency Platform: 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/infrastructure/transparency_platform/map-viewer/main.html. 

134 

 
 
 
More details concerning PCIs included on the current 4th PCI list can be found in the 
technical document published alongside the 4th PCI list: 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/technical_document_4th_pci_list.pdf.  

Projects of common interest and CEF financial assistance 

The  status  of  project  of  common  interest  is  awarded  to  projects  that  provide  highest 
European added value and that contribute the most to the implementation of the strategic 
energy infrastructure priority corridors and areas. The majority of the PCIs are expected 
to  be  commercially  viable  and  financed  through  network  tariffs.  CEF  support  is 
exceptional because most CEF funding for works is considered as ‘last resort option’ for 
the financing of PCIs. A three-step logic applies to investments in PCIs. First, the market 
should  have  the  priority  to  invest.  Second,  if  investments  are  not  made  by  the  market, 
regulatory solutions should be explored, if necessary the relevant regulatory framework 
should  be  adjusted,  and  the  correct  application  of  the  relevant  regulatory  framework 
should  be  ensured.  Third,  where  the  first  two  steps  are  not  sufficient  to  deliver  the 
necessary  investments  in  projects  of  common  interest,  Union  financial  assistance  could 
be granted if the project of common interest fulfils the applicable eligibility criteria 

CEF  support  may  be  awarded  to  those  PCIs  which  are  not  viable  under  the  existing 
regulatory  framework  and  market  conditions  and  provide  significant  externalities  (such 
as  security  of  supply,  innovation  and  solidarity).  CEF  promotes  cooperation  between 
countries  to  develop  and  implement  energy  interconnection  PCIs  that  otherwise  would 
not happen. This is especially the case for cross-border projects located in countries with 
smaller population sizes or in a more remote location, where energy tariffs would need to 
be increased substantially to cover the investment needs. 

The selection process for CEF funding is independent from the selection process for PCI 
status.  PCI  status  is  a  pre-condition  for  applying  for  CEF  (with  exception  of  the  new 
window  for  cross-border  renewable  projects)  and  some  elements  of  the  PCI  selection 
process such as the project specific CBA and the cross-border cost allocation decision are 
part of the CEF evaluation process. However, the selection process for CEF is based on 
an evaluation with external experts against award criteria as set out in the relevant work 
programme  and  call  for  proposals.  CEF  was  subject  to  separate  evaluation  and  impact 
assessment in preparation of CEF proposals for the MFF2021-2027. 

Since 2014, CEF has provided financing to 149 actions of which 114 (EUR 519 million) 
for studies and 35 (EUR 4.2 billion) for works. Of total budget of EUR 4.7 billion, EUR 
1.5 billion were allocated to gas projects and EUR 2.8 billion to electricity projects. So 
far, around one fifth of all PCIs have received CEF financial assistance for studies and/or 
works.  This is illustrated in the below figures. 

135 

 
 
 
 
Figures 1 and 2: CEF financial assistance per sector (201-2020) 

136 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX 7: ADDITIONAL DISCARDED OPTIONS 

  Breaking the link between the CBCA and CEF financing 

Different stakeholder groups mentioned that the requirement to submit a CBCA decision 
should no longer be mandatory for obtaining CEF financial assistance for works as it was 
perceived  as  an  unnecessary  burden.  ACER  considers  that  the  CBCA  could  still  be  a 
mandatory  step  before  a  CEF  application  if  the  project  has  benefits  widely  spread 
between  many  Member  States,  but  not  in  case  CEF  grants  would  be  requested  for 
affordability reasons. In such case, ACER considers that a simple confirmation from the 
national NRA would suffice. 

However,  this  option  was  expressed  by  stakeholders  wishing  to  have  easier  access  to 
CEF  financing,  and  does  not  take  into  account  the  aim  and  the  limited  nature  of  EU 
funds.  As  mentioned  in  the  Preamble  of  the  CEF  Regulation,  CEF  financing  is  a  last 
resort  measure  and  projects  should  be  realised  primarily  on  the  basis  of  the  regulatory 
environment and, secondly, seek financing from the market. The CBCA decision ensures 
that  the  regulatory  path  has  been  explored  for  the  projects  which  may  by  itself  alone 
ensure the realisation of the projects. 

Moreover, the CBCA decisions ensure that possible CEF beneficiaries will be developed 
under a stable regulatory regime leading to their successful realization. This is necessary 
before  the  projects  apply  for  any  CEF  financing.  Furthermore,  the  CBCA  decision 
ensures  that  the  project  CBA  and  its  results  have  been  checked  and  coordinated  with 
TSOs and NRAs in Member States where the project shows benefits. This helps to make 
the  data  reliable  also  for  the  purposes  of  the  evaluation  of  a  possible  CEF  financial 
application. Therefore, the CBCA decisions are necessary to have been obtained before 
any project applies for Union financing from CEF Energy.  

  Conditional CBCA decisions 

A series of stakeholders, particularly NRAs and ACER, mentioned that it is very difficult 
to  assess  the  investment  requests  submitted  by  the  project  promoters  and  decide  in  a 
definitive  manner  as  regards  cross-border  cost  allocation  and  the  inclusion  of  the 
investment costs of the project in the tariffs. This is due to that fact that they do not know 
what amount of Union financing the project will receive, if any. Therefore, they propose 
to  introduce  the  possibility  for  CBCA  decisions  to  be  drafted  as  conditional  decisions 
that  can  be  amended,  adapted  or  revoked  altogether  after  the  results  of  the  request  for 
CEF financing.  

This  is  already  happening  as  some  CBCA  decisions  were  prepared  considering  the 
possible  aspects  of  the    CEF  financing.  However,  conditional  CBCA  decisions  pose  a 
risk for the allocation of Union financing as the projects might ultimately not be realised 
if the NRAs change their mind or consider the financing awarded too low. This creates 
regulatory instability for the projects rendering them completely dependent on a certain 
percentage of Union financing and unable to seek resources on the financial market. This 
goes  against  the  principle  that  CEF  financing  is  a  last  resort  option.  CBCA  decisions 
need to be final in order to provide sufficient legal and economic clarity and certainty on 

137 

 
 
the investment conditions and expected costs to be borne for the project promoters and 
Member States.  

  Easing environmental and location approvals for PCIs 

When providing input on the permitting procedures in the TEN-E Regulation a series of 
project  promoters  mentioned  that  the  permitting  of  PCIs  will  not  be  accelerated  while 
they  are  required  to  obtain  the  same  environmental  and  location  permits  at  the  same 
standards with other similar projects that are not PCIs. They, therefore, request that some 
of the requirements for environmental and location permitting are removed or eased for 
PCIs. 

However,  NGOs,  citizens  and  local  communities  point  out  that  public  acceptance  is 
closely  linked  to  their  effect  on  the  environment  and  climate  impact.  Easing  the 
requirements  for  such  permits  is  both  outside  the  scope  of  the  TEN-E  Regulation  and 
would not  ensure that these projects  duly comply  with  environmental requirements and 
the  conditions  for  establishing  the  optimal  location.  This  could  also  create  public 
opposition and, ultimately, delay the permitting process. 

The  TEN-E  Regulation  already  provides  for  the  streamlining  of  the  environmental 
assessment  procedures  and  for  ensuring  the  coherent  application  of  environmental 
assessment procedures required under Union law for PCIs. The Commission issued non- 
binding guidance162 to support Member States in defining adequate legislative and non-
legislative measures to this end and they had the obligation to assess, on the basis of the 
non-binding guidance, what measures to take.  

162 https://ec.europa.eu/environment/eia/pdf/PCI_guidance.pdf  

138 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
ANNEX 8: INTRODUCTION OF A MANDATORY SUSTAINABILITY CRITERION 

Under  the  current  TEN-E  framework,  the  gas  and  electricity  PCI  candidates  must 
contribute to at least one of the following specific criteria: market integration, security of 
supply, competition (only for gas) and sustainability. 

Options  B2.1  and  B.2.2  provide  for  the  upgrade  of  the  sustainability  criterion  from  an 
optional  in  the  current  TEN-E  framework  to  a  mandatory  criterion.  This  change  will 
result  in  automatic  inclusion  of  the  sustainability  criteria  in  the  PCIs  assessment 
methodology and will as such affect the ranking of the candidate PCI projects. The actual 
impact of the mandatory sustainability criterion on the final ranking will depend on the 
methodologies  used  in  the  assessment  process.  These  methodologies  are  developed  for 
each PCI selection process considering inter alia data availability and the needs identified 
for  each  region  in  the  Regional  Groups  as  under  the  current  framework.  The  full 
assessment  methodology  of  the  last  PCI  selection  process  is  publicly  available  on  EC 
CIRCABC platform163. 

The  Commission  seeks  to  have  the  same  methodologies  across  the  RGs  within  each 
category of infrastructure e.g. one methodology for all the electricity RGs and one for all 
the gas RGs. In this process the initial draft of the methodologies are developed within 
the  framework  of  the  Cooperation  Platform,  which  consists  of  representatives  of  the 
European  Commission  (DG  Energy),  the  Agency  for  the  Cooperation  of  the  Energy 
Regulators  (ACER)  and  the  European  Network  of  Transmission  System  Operators 
(ENTSOs).  The  Cooperation  Platform  provides  technical  support  to  the  work  of  the 
Regional Groups. The final assessment methodologies to be used for the ranking of the 
candidate PCI projects must be validated by the RGs members (Member States, National 
Regulators, ENTSOs and the Commission), in line with the roles and responsibility each 
party has in the process. 

163  
Electricity 4th PCI assessment methodology: https://circabc.europa.eu/ui/group/3ba59f7e-2e01-46d0-9683-
a72b39b6decf/library/c1b40471-8605-45c3-8540-04451ed31094?p=1&n=10&sort=modified_DESC 

Gas  4th  PCI  assessment  methodology:  https://circabc.europa.eu/ui/group/3ba59f7e-2e01-46d0-9683-
a72b39b6decf/library/563f3273-e6a7-4d2f-b157-76a6514cf4ee?p=1&n=10&sort=modified_DESC  

139 

 
 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                 
 
ANNEX 9: ASSESSMENT OF ADDITIONAL POLICY OPTIONS 

This  Annex  sets  out  additional  policy  options  of  technical  nature  which  relate  to 
permitting and public participation (C) and Regulation (D) as follows: 

C) Permitting and public participation 
C.1.2. Accelerating the permitting process 
C.2 Public participation 
C.2.0 Business as usual 
C.2.1 Increasing the transparency of PCIs 
D) Regulatory treatment 
D.1.2 Possibility for smart grids projects to obtain a CBCA 
D.1.3 Clarifying CBCA provisions 
D.1.4 Updating investment incentives  

These options are explained in more detail below followed by a short assessment of their 
potential impacts. 

Permitting 

Option C.1.1: Accelerating the permitting process:  

This option would include the following sub-options: 

a)  Clarifying the applicable procedure for projects falling between legal regimes 

The  transitional  provisions  regarding  the  permitting  process  meaning  that  all  PCIs  can 
benefit  from  maximum  time-limit  of  3.5  years  and  from  the  one-stop  shop  would  be 
removed. Moreover, any permits already obtained would remain valid and be integrated 
in the procedure. The provisions on 'priority status', where such status exists in national 
law, would apply to all PCIs regardless of when they started permitting.  

b)  Acceleration of permit granting  

The  permitting  provisions  and  the  two  permitting  phases  would  have  enough  built  in 
flexibility to cater also for the acceleration of the permitting process for projects that do 
not  require  all  the  permits  of  large  infrastructure  projects  such  as  smart  grids  projects 
which often do not require an EIA or a building permit. 

The  outcome  of  a  completed  permitting  process  under  the  TEN-E  Regulation  is  the 
issuance  of  a  comprehensive  decision164  for  the  project.  Member  States  would  have  to 

164 According to Article 2(2) of the TEN-E Regulation, the comprehensive decision is defined as follows: 
the decision or set of decisions taken by a Member State authority or authorities not including courts or 
tribunals,  that  determines  whether  or  not  a  project  promoter  is  to  be  granted  authorisation  to  build  the 

140 

 
 
 
                                                 
 
ensure that any additional requirements or legislative amendments introduced during the 
permit  granting  process  would  not  affect  the  length  of  the  permitting  process  started 
before  the  amendments  of  the  legislation.  In  view  of  ensuring  a  consistent  application, 
the  revised  TEN-E  Regulation  would  also  adapt  the  definition  of  the  comprehensive 
decision to clarify that the issuing of this decision means that the project is ready to begin 
procurement  procedures  and  construction  in  the  respective  Member  States.  This  would 
ensure  that  no  additional  requirements  are  added  on  top  of  and  outside  the  permitting 
process. 

c)  Making procedures accessible cross-border 

Competent  authorities  would  be  obliged  to  coordinate  and  find  synergies  with 
neighbouring  countries  in  developing  their  manual  of  procedures  and  in  the  permit 
granting  procedures  of  individual  PCIs  without  exceeding  the  3.5  years  time-limit.  In 
addition,  the competent  authorities would have to  make available, as much as possible, 
the manuals in all languages of the neighbouring Member States.  

Assessment: 

Amending key provisions aimed at accelerating the permitting process in its current set-
up  would  allow  keeping  the  necessary  balance  between  the  rule  of  law  in  the  Member 
States  and  their  sovereignty  and  the  acceleration  of  the  implementation  of  PCIs. 
Permitting is a process that is to a large extent national or even local in nature.  

The environmental assessment of PCIs is unaffected by the permitting provisions of the 
TEN-E Regulation because this is out of the scope of the Regulation.  

The suggested amendments in this option entail a better coordination between competent 
authorities  for  projects  crossing  the  border  of  more  Member  States  as  well  as  a 
facilitation  of  the  permitting  process  cross-border.  This  coordination  will  allow  also  a 
better  coordination  of  the  assessment  of  the  environmental  impacts  of  the  projects 
leading to  improved measures to  tackle any environmental concerns that may be cross-
cutting issues in more Member States. 

Permit  granting  procedures  have  shortened  for  PCIs  compared  to  the  pre-TEN-E 
situation.  The  average  duration  is  4  years  for  electricity  and  3.1  years  for  gas  PCIs 
compared to durations of more than 6 years in some Member States prior to the entry into 
force  of  the  TEN-E  Regulation.  The  introduction  of  a  one-stop  shop  provides  a  good 
approach  to  reducing  the  complexity  of  the  permitting  process,  but  the  effectiveness 
depends strongly on the national implementation and existing permitting requirements in 
the Member States.  

As  regards  electricity  projects,  delays  in  project  implementation  have  two  direct 
consequences for the EU achieving its carbon reduction targets: the missing grid capacity 

energy  infrastructure  to  realise  a  project  without  prejudice  to  any  decision  taken  in  the  context  of  an 
administrative appeal procedure. 

141 

 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
hinders  the  further  growth  and  integration  of  RES,  while  the  resulting  grid  congestion 
must be resolved by expensive and CO2 intensive redispatch measures. 

The longer and more complicated the permitting process of a PCI is, the higher the costs 
are incurred by the project promoter and the national competent authorities. Currently, an 
estimated  0.5  FTE  per  year  is  given  for  the  administrative  costs  for  reporting  and 
compliance  to  the  PCI  monitoring  procedure.  The  stakeholder  consultation  concluded 
that the permitting process and the organisation of stakeholder consultation are amongst 
the main cost drivers that provide unacceptable costs for project promoters. However, the 
high administrative burden of the permitting process is considered not to be due to TEN-
E, but rather relate to issues on a national level, although three TSOs specifically pointed 
out that the requirements of the Regulation add another bureaucratic layer on top of the 
national system.  

An  accelerated  permitting  process  decreases  costs  for  both  project  promoters  and 
competent  authorities.  An  accelerated  permitting  process  also  allows  for  a  faster 
implementation  of  the  project  therefore  bringing  forward  the  benefits  identified  in  the 
CBA. This  will have a significant  economic impact  on regional  energy  markets,  if not, 
even a European wide impact. The economic impact could be determined on the basis of 
the CBAs of the projects impacted by the accelerated procedures. No data is available at 
the moment for calculating fully the impact, but the example described in rthe assessment 
of option C.1.1. remains valid.  

The  permitting  process  and  the  provisions  regarding  public  participation  have  a  dual 
social impact. On the one hand, society and citizens benefit from the implementation of 
PCIs which increase competition, security of supply and market integration. On the other 
hand,  the  construction  of  large  infrastructure  projects  affect  local  communities  by 
changing the landscape, affecting tourist areas, affecting crops etc.  

In  a  similar  manner  as  the  economic  impact,  an  accelerated  permitting  process  also 
allows for a faster implementation of the project therefore bringing forward the benefits 
to society identified in the CBA. 

Public participation  

Option C.2.0: Business as usual 

Under  the  current  provisions  of  the  TEN-E  Regulation,  the  project  promoter  or 
competent authority is obliged to establish and regularly update the projects website with 
relevant information about the PCI under its competence. 

Option C.2.1: Increasing the transparency of PCIs 

This option would introduce an obligation on the project promoters, as the owner of the 
information  regarding  the  implementation  of  the  PCIs  to  publish  and  update  dedicated 
webpages in all languages of the Member States crossed or impacted by the PCIs. This 
will affect  their subsequent  applications to  become PCIs as the powers  of the Regional 
Groups as  regards the monitoring of the implementation  of PCIs are increased  (see the 
REFIT  option  of  adding  a  criteria  for  the  PCI  selection  process  in  this  regard).  The 

142 

 
 
 
 
minimum information to be included in the project websites would continue to be listed 
in an annex of the TEN-E Regulation. 

Stakeholder views:  Stakeholder generally agreed that the transparency and participation 
provisions introduced for PCIs are perceived to have increased public awareness of PCIs 
and trust in the process. All communication tools employed by project promoters during 
PCI implementation (project websites, information leaflets, meetings to discuss PCIs and 
provision  of  information  in  writing)  were  considered  useful.  More  specifically, 
stakeholders considered PCI websites as important for ensuring transparency. 

Assessment: 

Public participation 

Option C.2.0: Business as usual 

Opting for business as usual would indicate that current provisions on transparency and 
participation would still apply with no further scrutiny nor monitoring discretion of the 
Regional Groups. Only 14% of the respondents to the open public consultation consider 
that  current  TEN-E  provisions  triggered  an  improvement  in  the  transparency  of  the 
planning and building process of any PCIs in comparison to other energy infrastructure 
projects. Most respondents (54%) could not answer if such improvements existed, whilst 
28%  of 
the  respondents  (company/business  organisations,  EU  citizens,  NGOs) 
considered  that  there  is  no  improvement,  or  there  is  an  improvement  only  to  a  small 
extent.  

Options C.2.1 Increasing the transparency of PCIs 

The implementation of key PCIs can be faced with opposition during the permit granting 
process  from  local  communities,  landowners  and  citizens  living  in  the  proximity  of 
installations and routing of PCIs.  

Article  9  and  Annex  VI  of  the  TEN-E  Regulation  introduced  the  obligation  for  project 
promoters to conduct at least one public consultation to inform stakeholders and help to 
identify the most suitable location or routing for the project. The provisions further called 
on  project  promoters  to  establish  and  regularly  update  a  website  with  relevant 
information  regarding  project’s  consultation  planning,  status  of  the  implementation 
progress  and  contact  details  in  view  of  conveying  comments  and  possible  objections. 
Open  access  to  information  such  as  the  economic  and  social  benefits,  costs  or 
environmental impact of projects and early consultation of those affected was sought to 
address concerns and increase acceptance of the PCIs.  

Whilst  the  majority  of  stakeholders’  confirmed  the  increased  awareness  of  the  projects 
thanks to the provisions introduced by the Regulation, they did not consider that it would 
necessarily lead to public acceptance. It was also reported that the websites of some PCIs 
provide limited or outdated information and are often unclear whether or to which extent 
the  input  from  the  local  community  was  taken  into  account.  While  the  consulting  the 
public is considered to be an important and necessary tool, there is a considerable room 
for improvement in order to ensure the transparency and legitimacy of the process.   

143 

 
 
 
  
By  increasing  oversight  of  the  obligation  to  ensure  transparency  of  PCIs  through 
monitoring within the Regional Groups, the project promoters are incentivized to provide 
open  access  to  updated  and  transparent  information  on  the  key  aspects  of  PCI 
implementation.   

 Recent studies165166 found an important connection between the early involvement of the 
public in  energy infrastructure planning and lower opposition to  projects  because of an 
improved  understanding  of  the  infrastructure  needs.  Transparent  and  accessible 
information  about  the  need  for  new  energy  infrastructure  at  a  European  grid  level  can 
contribute to reducing public opposition167. 

In  their  third  report  on  “Public  engagement  and  acceptance  in  the  planning  and 
implementation  of  European  electricity  interconnectors”168  the  Commission  Expert 
Group  on  electricity  interconnection  targets  found  that  early  engagement  could  turn 
opposition into an opportunity for transparency and information over costs and benefits 
of  different  alternatives.  Coupled  with  a  two-way  dialogue  on  what  technical  solutions 
can be accepted at the local level and promoter's flexibility for adjustments, stakeholder 
participation  can  be  turned  into  an  active  process  delivering  better  and  more  accepted 
project. Best practices show that full transparency and involvement of local communities, 
activists and non-governmental associations deliver collaborative solutions on the ground 
that mitigate the environmental impacts of projects. 

Opposition  from  local  communities  affected  by  PCIs  hinders  the  delivery  of  their 
intended economic and market efficiency benefits to society. 

The results of the evaluation confirmed stakeholders’ opinion that the transparency and 
public participation provisions of the Regulation proved to be a valuable instrument for 
building  connections  with  local  communities  and  potentially  affected  groups  and 
increased  the  opportunities  for  the  public  to  be  informed  and  participate  in  the  PCI 
permitting  process.  Increased  transparency  of  decision-making  processes  coupled  with 
meaningful  consultations  create  new  opportunities  for  stakeholder  engagement  that 
carefully  consider  and  address  opinions,  concerns  and  needs  of  citizens  and  impacted 
communities. Administrative burden 

The policy option would not add to the existing administrative burden associated with the 
TEN-E  compliance  for  project  promoters,  estimated  at  1.5  FTE  based  on  the  available 
information from the evaluation and stakeholder contributions.  

165  Ecorys  et  al.  (2019),  Do  current  regulatory  frameworks  in  the  EU  support  innovation  and  security  of 
supply in electricity and gas infrastructure? 
166 Scope et al. (2020) Innovative actions and strategies to boost public awareness, trust and acceptance of 
trans-European energy infrastructure projects. Draft Revised Interim Report. Provided by DG ENER. 
167 Trinomics (2018). Evaluation of the TEN-E Regulation and Assessing the Impacts of Alternative Policy 
Scenarios. Final Report. 
168 https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/3rd_report_on_public_acceptance_b5.pdf 

144 

 
 
 
                                                 
As  a  general  note,  the  majority  of  stakeholders  consider  the  cost  associated  with  the 
organisation of public participation activities as acceptable.  

Regulation 

Option D.1.2: Possibility for smart grids projects to obtain a CBCA 

This  option  would  introduce  the  possibility  to  obtain  a  CBCA  for  smart  grids  projects. 
Such a provision was supported by stakeholders as it would help smart grid projects that 
encounter issues with splitting costs across borders.  

Assessment: 

Option D.1.2: Possibility for smart grids projects to obtain a CBCA 

This  option  will  benefit  smart  grids  projects  that  may  have  an  issue  in  splitting  costs 
across  borders  and  where  this  would  be  necessary.  However,  due  to  the  nature  of  such 
projects, there are not many smart grids projects that will encounter this issue and might 
require a CBCA, therefore the impact of the option is not so high overall. The option will 
enable and accelerate the implementation of some smart grids projects, but there are no 
data  to  assess  how  many  these  would  be.  The  option,  nevertheless,  could  be  easily 
implemented and does not bring any costs or administrative burden, being therefore a no 
regret option. 

Option D.1.3. Clarifying CBCA provisions  

This  option  aims  at  the  clarification  and  clarification  of  the  CBCA  procedure  with  the 
aim of ensuring consistency between CBCA decision and their more extensive use. The 
following elements are proposed to be implemented: 

Clarify the notions that are currently either not defined in the TEN-E Regulation 

i. 
or that have led to differences in interpretation169,  

ii. 
Require  that  the  project  promoters  use  the  same  scenario  for  their  CBA  part  of 
investment request as the one used in the PCI selection process and that they update the 
CBA with the latest developments regarding the project.  

iii.  Moreover, in the context of the offshore renewable energy development, the need 
to  coordinate  the  CBCA  for  the  infrastructure  projects  with  the  financing,  market  and 
political  arrangements  of  the  generation  projects  was  discussed  extensively  by 
stakeholders  as well as  Member States.  In order to  address  this, the Commission  could 
issue a binding guidance in the form of an implementing regulation on how the CBCA 

169 Clarify the procedure to be followed for submitting the investment request and requirements, maturity, 
“concerned  NRA”,  “significant  net  positive  impact”,  “The  national  regulatory  authorities  may  decide  to 
allocate  only  part  of  the  costs,  or  may  decide  to  allocate  costs  among  a  package  of  several  projects  of 
common interest.”; “relevant NRA”, the content and minimum information that the CBCA decision needs 
to contain. 

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process could be coordinated with the development of the generation projects. As part of 
this  guidance,  the  Commission  could  also  include  detailed  rules  as  regards  the  CBCA 
procedure  in  general  (similar  as  the  current  ACER  Guidelines).  This  would  end  the 
discussion  on  the  selective  application  of  these  Guidelines,  which  are  currently  not 
legally binding.  

Assessment:  

Environmental impacts  

CBCA  procedure  enables  the  implementation  of  PCIs,  which  have  benefits  across-
borders.  In  principle,  clarifying  the  CBCA  provisions  should  not  have  direct 
environmental impacts. 

Economic and financial impacts 

The  clarification  of  the  provisions  regarding  the  CBCA  procedure  will  enable  a  more 
extensive and enhanced use of the CBCA procedure for allocating costs across borders. 
This will enable the swifter implementation of projects, which will bring benefits sooner. 

The impact of a Commission guidance on how the CBCA process could be coordinated 
with the development of the generation projects in an offshore context that would include 
also  detailed  rules  as  regards  the  CBCA  procedure  in  general  (similar  as  the  current 
ACER  Guidelines)  is  two-fold.  One  type  of  impact  refers  to  bringing  clarity  and 
simplifying  the  CBCA  procedure  by  making  binding  certain  rules  that  have  been 
selectively  applied  so  far.  The  second  type  of  impact  regards  the  clarification  of  the 
complex  process  for  the  development  of  offshore  hybrid  assets  which  comprise 
interconnectors and generation parks connected to such interconnectors. While the assets 
themselves are subject to different types of legal regimes and manner of functioning, all 
their afferent regulatory, financial and market aspects are deeply interrelated. Therefore, 
clarity is necessary on how to deal with overlapping benefits and costs for the two types 
of assets in order to ensure the creation of a net benefit for the various involved parties 
and  to  advance  their  development.  The  elaboration  and  issuing  of  the  guidance  brings 
administrative  burden  for  the  Commission,  but  helps  ease  considerably  the  burden  on 
project promoters, RES generation developers and Member States, while also helping to 
reach the offshore RES potential of the EU. 

Social impacts 

The CBCA will enable the realization of PCIs and, in turn, the benefits of such projects 
as  identified  in  the  CBA.  This  would  also  be  taken  into  account  for  possible  CEF 
financial assistance. The full extent of such benefits cannot be estimated as there are no 

146 

 
 
data  available,  however,  the  example  of  costs  of  delay,  as  described  above  in  the 
assessment of Option C.1.1, remains a good indication.170 

Administrative burden  

According to the stakeholder consultation, the costs for NRAs as a result of TEN-E are 
low  the  main  cost  driver  is  the  CBCA  process.  For  most  NRAs  less  than  1  FTE  is 
estimated to be currently involved171. 

This option increases the administrative burden for project promoters as they will have to 
update their CBA, but decreases the administrative burden for NRAs who will have more 
straightforward procedures to follow. 

Option D.1.4. Updating investment incentives   

In  order  to  increase  the  impact  of  the  investment  incentives  provisions  and  make  them 
more operational, in particular for offshore wind related infrastructure projects, a specific 
reference could be included in the legislation mentioning hybrid offshore infrastructure, 
(which is likely to incur the highest risks, compared to the radial connection or internal 
lines) as high risk projects. In addition, an obligation for NRAs to update their manual on 
investment incentives and include a specific chapter for offshore assets could be inserted 
(minimum requirements for such a manual could be included in an Annex to the revised 
TEN-E)  as  well  as  an  obligation  to  update  the  manual  as  regards  OPEX  intensive 
projects. 

Assessment:  

A stable regulatory environment created for a project with full regulatory coverage is a 
pre-requisite172  for  any  project  in  order  for  it  to  have  explored  both  market  based 
financing  solutions  and  regulatory  solutions.  The  use  of  investment  incentives  is  very 
relevant  in  this  context  as  they  could  assist  with  the  adjustment  of  the  regulatory 
framework necessary for the development of certain higher risk projects. 

170  The  CBCA  enables  the  timely  implementation  of  PCIs  and  hence  avoids  delays  in  project 
implementation. The benefits of a PCI are therefore realised earlier.  
171 TEN-E Evaluation Report, page 116 
172  The  CEF  Regulation  provides  that:  “First,  the  market  should  have  the  priority  to  invest.  Second,  if 
investments are not made by the market, regulatory solutions should be explored, if necessary the relevant 
regulatory framework should be adjusted, and the correct application of the relevant regulatory framework 
should be ensured. Third, where the first two steps are not sufficient to deliver the necessary investment in 
projects of common interest, Union financial assistance could be granted if the project of common interest 
fulfils the applicable eligibility criteria” 

147 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
ANNEX 10: REFIT (SIMPLIFICATION AND IMPROVED EFFICIENCY)  

In order to simplify and improve the efficiency of the TEN-E Regulation the following 
measures have been identified to reduce compliance and regulatory costs. 

a)  Reduced reporting obligations  

Reporting  and  monitoring  serve  to  identify  and  tackle  delays  in  the  implementation  of 
PCIs.  Monitoring  also  allows  the  identification  of  the  projects  that  are  stalling  without 
justified reasons and the projects do not comply with EU law or in relation to which false 
information was provided. At the same time, monitoring and reporting serves to ensure 
transparency of the projects’ concept and development by also allowing the Commission 
maintained Transparency Platform to be regularly updated. 

However,  some  stakeholders  were  critical  of  the  monitoring  and  reporting  mechanism 
under the TEN-E Regulation. On the one hand NGOs and the public mentioned that there 
is not enough transparency because the Transparency Platform is not always up to date 
regarding the status of the PCIs and PCI websites sometimes do not exist, are not updated 
or  do  not  contain  all  the  information  required  by  the  TEN-E  Regulation.  On  the  other 
hand,  project  promoters  and  competent  authorities  mentioned  that  the  reporting 
obligations are too burdensome, as they have to report annually, maintain their websites 
continuously  updated,  but  also  answer  constant  requests  for  information  from  the 
Commission or ACER.  

While  annual  reporting  by  project  promoters  needs  to  be  maintained  to  achieve  the 
required  transparency  standards  and  allow  the  Regional  Groups  to  tackle  quickly  any 
implementation  issues  that  the  projects  may  encounter,  the  annual  report  of  the 
competent authorities could be transformed into input or additional information into the 
report  of  the  project  promoters.  In  practice,  the  project  promoters  would  draft  their 
report,  submit  it  to  the  relevant  competent  authorities  in  the  Member  States  where  the 
project is located. The competent authorities, would then add, without the possibility to 
amend, any relevant information they hold as regards the on the progress or delays in the 
implementation  of  the  PCI  and  the  reasons  for  such  delays.  The  competent  authorities 
would  then  transmit  the  report  at  the  same  time  to  ACER,  the  Regional  Group  and 
Commission.  

The  Commission  can  use  the  information  in  the  report  to  update  the  Transparency 
Platform.  The  Transparency  Platform  would  also  be  regularly  updated  throughout  the 
year by retrieving information from the project websites which (in line with the Option 
C.2.1  regarding  public  participation)  the  project  promoters  would  be  obliged  to  keep 
continuously updated. The Transparency Platform  could also have a feature that allows 
retrieving  information  on  the  status  of  the  project  at  a  certain  point  in  time.  This  will 
allow the possibility to compare and assess the progress of the projects.  

Pursuing  this  measure  would  reduce  costs  and  administrative  burden  for  the  project 
promoters, but in particular for competent authorities would not need to submit a separate 
report. The cost saving cannot be estimated as the relevant data are not available, but it is 
a recurrent cost saving. 

148 

 
 
b)  Reduced monitoring by ACER to once every two years 

According  to  the  TEN-E  Regulation,  on  the  basis  of  the  monitoring  reports  that  the 
project  promoters  submit  every  year  to  ACER,  it  has  to  issue  a  monitoring  report 
evaluating the progress achieved and make, where appropriate, recommendations on how 
to overcome the delays and difficulties encountered. However, these monitoring reports 
are used only once every two years with the occasion of the elaboration of the Union list 
of  PCIs  for  evaluating  their  progress  since  the  last  Union  list.  PCIs  that  have  not 
progressed and cannot objectively justify the lack of progress may not be included in the 
next  Union  list.  Therefore,  to  simplify  the  reporting  by  ACER,  their  report  could  be 
issued once every two years, just in time for the Regional Groups, to take it into account 
for their assessment of the new PCI candidates173. Since ACER’s report is actually used 
only  once  every  two  years,  this  option  could  help  simplify  the  monitoring  obligations 
without  any  costs  and  without  affecting  the  projects’  implementation.  Moreover, 
pursuing this measure would reduce costs and administrative burden for ACER, for the 
members  of  the  Regional  Groups  and  the  Commission.  The  cost  saving  has  been 
estimated at 0.4 FTE per year. 

c)  Stronger  role  of  monitoring  and  reporting  obligations  in  the  PCI  selection 

process 

In  order  to  ensure  that  projects  are  developing  according  to  their  implementation  plan 
without  any  undue  delays  and  in  full  compliance  with  national  and  EU  law  and  that 
project  promoters  duly  abide  by  their  reporting    and  transparency  obligations174  these 
elements could be included as a selection criterion in the TEN-E Regulation to be applied 
for  the  subsequent  PCI  lists  where  the  projects  apply.  Abiding  by  reporting  and 
transparency obligations and the progress of the project from one Union list to the next 
could  be  added  as  one  of  the  additional  criteria  that  each  Regional  Group  has  to  give 
consideration to (under Article 4(4) of the TEN-E Regulation). 

This  option does  not  have any budgetary or administrative implications, but  aids in  the 
implementation  in  practice  of  the  measures  described  under  b)  and  c)  above  which  do 
have  administrative  and  budgetary  implications.  In  addition,  this  option  allows  a 
thorough  monitoring  by  the  Regional  Groups  as  to  how  projects  implement  EU  law 
provisions,  in  particular  environmental  law  and  public  procurement,  therefore  avoiding 
any breaches and public opposition. 

d)  Pre-consultation to become optional 

The  principles  for  public  participation  set  out  in  the  Regulation  constitute  minimum 
requirements  to  ensure  early  engagement  with  local  communities  and  stakeholders 
affected  by  the  construction  of  a  PCI  and  include  a  pre-consultation  of  relevant 
stakeholders.  In  practice,  the  obligation  to  consult  ahead  of  the  launch  of  permitting 
procedure may be adding to existing national procedures.  

173 This option corresponds to the input of ACER to the stakeholder consultation. 
174 Including their obligation to maintain a constantly updated website with all necessary data. 

149 

 
 
                                                 
This is confirmed by the results of the consultation, where a large proportion of survey 
respondents  (46%)  agreed  that  one  public  consultation  is  sufficient  for  increasing 
transparency  and  participation.  This  opinion  was  particularly  popular  among  TSOs, 
industry  representatives  and  NCAs.  A  fifth  of  the  respondents,  primarily  comprised  of 
civil  society  representatives  and  energy  producers,  disagreed  with  this  opinion.  It  is 
noteworthy  to  add  that  several  respondents  explained  that  the  public  consultation 
provision  under  the  Regulation  was,  in  their  opinion,  redundant  as  the  national  legal 
frameworks of their Member States as well as the public participation requirements of the 
environmental  impact  assessments  carried  out  in  the  permitting  process  already  made 
public consultations obligatory. As such, this provision was seen by  some as  adding  to 
the complexity of the permit granting procedure as shown on below 

To address this and avoid that two or more consultations are required for the purposes of 
informing stakeholders about the project at an early stage, identifying the most suitable 
location or trajectory and the relevant issues to be addressed in the application file, it is 
suggest to make the pre-consultation optional if it is already covered by the national rules 
under  the  same  or  higher  standards  as  in  the  TEN-E  Regulation.  However,  the  project 
promoter  should  be  obliged  to  take  into  account  the  opinions  expressed  in  the 
consultation  and  demonstrate  how  it  has  done  so.  The  cost  savings  which  would  occur 
mainly with project promoters cannot be estimated as the relevant data are not available, 
but it is a recurrent cost saving. 

e) Simplified inclusion in TYNDP for existing PCIs 

 An electricity or gas candidate project can apply for the inclusion in the Union list only 
if  is  included  in  the  latest  available  TYNDPs,  developed  biennially  by  the  ENTSOs. 
Therefore, a project promoter, must submit or resubmit (in case it already is included in 
the  PCI  list)  every  two  years  its  project  to  both  TYNDP  and  PCI  processes.  While  the  
submission  process  for  candidate  projects  for  the  PCI  selection  process  was  already 
simplified  by  having  all  the  necessary  data  for  the  PCI  process  being  delivered  to  the 
Commission  directly  by  the  ENTSOs,  there  is  scope  for  further  simplification  for  the 
TYNDP process.  

In  contrast  to  the  PCI  selection  process,  which  is  run  by  the  Commission,  the  TYNDP 
processes  are  run  by  the  ENTSOs,  which  set  administrative  and  technical  criteria  for 
inclusion of projects in the TYNDPs. This process requires a significant amount of data 
and  legal  proofs175.  Considering  that  existing  PCI  projects  already  delivered  the 
necessary  proofs  in  the  previous  TYNDP  processes,  an  automatic  inclusion  in  the 
subsequent TYNDPs for such projects, as long as their administrative and technical data 
did  not  significantly  change,  is  recommended.  This  would  reduce  the  burden  on  the 
project  promoters  and  also  on  the  ENTSOs  having  in  mind  that  around  56%  of  2018 
TYNDP electricity projects became part of the 4th PCI list. The cost savings which would 

175 ENTSO-E : https://tyndp.entsoe.eu/promoters-corner  
ENTSOG: https://www.entsog.eu/sites/default/files/2019-
05/TYNDP%202020_Practical_Implementation_Document_20190502_0.pdf  

150 

 
 
                                                 
occur  mainly  with  project  promoters  cannot  be  estimated  as  the  relevant  data  are  not 
available, but it is a recurrent cost saving. 

151