Opinion of the European Central Bank of 11 January 2021 on the implementation of the recommendations of the convergence reports into the Law on Българска народна банка (Bulgarian National Bank) (CON/2021/2)
Date: 2021-01-11
Institutions: European Central Bank
Subjects: legal basis

EN 

ECB-PUBLIC 

OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 

of 11 January 2021  

on the implementation of the recommendations of the convergence reports into the Law on 

Българска народна банка (Bulgarian National Bank) 

(CON/2021/2) 

Introduction and legal basis 

On 10 December 2020 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Bulgarian Minister 

for Finance for an opinion on a draft law amending the Law on credit institutions and other laws (hereinafter 

the ‘draft law’) 1. 

The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the 

Functioning of the European Union and the third indent of Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC2, as 

the draft law relates to Българска народна банка (BNB, Bulgarian National Bank). In accordance with the 

first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council 

has adopted this opinion. 

1. 

Purpose of the draft law 

As explained in the consultation letter, the draft law aims to address certain issues identified in the 

2020  Convergence  Reports  of  the  ECB  and  the  European  Commission  with  regard  to  the 

independence of BNB and the prohibition of monetary financing under Article 123 of the Treaty. In 

this respect, the draft law proposes to amend the Law on credit institutions 3, the Law on BNB4 and 

the  Law  on  counter-corruption  and  unlawfully  acquired  assets  forfeiture  (hereinafter  the  ‘Law  on 

counter-corruption’) 5 in respect of, inter alia, the matters set out below.  

1.1  Grounds for removal from office in case of a conflict of interest  

The draft law proposes to amend Article 80(1) of the Law on counter-corruption in order to provide 

that the ascertainment of a conflict of interest in accordance with that Law will be a ground for removal 

from office, unless otherwise provided for in the Constitution or the Treaties of the European Union 

and their protocols. 

1  
2  

3  
4  
5  

Закон за изменение и допълнение на Закона за кредитните институции. 

Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998 on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities 
regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42). 

Law on credit institutions (Закон за кредитните институции, обн. ДВ, бр. 59 от 21.07.2006 г.). 
Law on BNB (Закон Българската народна банка, обн. ДВ, 46 от 10.06.1997 г.). 
Law on counter-corruption and unlawfully acquired assets forfeiture (Закон за противодействие на корупцията и за 
отнемане на незаконно придобитото имущество, обн. ДВ, бр. 7 от 19.01.2018 г.). 

 
 
 
 
 
 
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1.2  BNB liability in relation to the central credit register and the bank account register 

The  draft  law  proposes  to  specify  in  the  Law  on  credit  institutions  that  BNB  will  not  be  liable  for 

damages  relating  to  the  information  stored  in  the  central  credit  register 6  and  the  bank  account 

register 7. 

1.3  Cooperation between BNB and the Council of Ministers 

The draft law proposes to repeal the provision of Article 3 of the Law on BNB which currently provides 

that in the formulation of the general outlines of the monetary policy, BNB and the Council of Ministers 

shall inform each other. 

1.4 

Independence of the members of the BNB Governing Council  

The draft law proposes that Article 13(1) of the Law on BNB be amended to provide that the oath to 

be taken  by the Governor, the  Deputy Governors  and the other three  members of the Governing 

Council when entering into office should refer to their contribution to the ‘independent’ performance 

of the BNB functions.  

2. 

General observations 

2.1  The  ECB  welcomes  the  draft  law’s  efforts  to  achieve  the  required  level  of  legal  convergence  by 

reference to the recommendations for Bulgaria contained in the 2020 Convergence Reports of the 

ECB and the Commission. 

2.2  The ECB notes that the compatibility of Bulgarian legislation – including the Law on BNB and the 

Law on counter-corruption – with the Treaties and the Statute of the European System of Central 

Banks and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter the ‘Statute of the ESCB’) will be assessed in 

the ECB’s next convergence report, as required by Article 131 of the Treaty. 

3. 

Specific observations 

3.1  Grounds for removal from office in case of a conflict of interest 

In accordance with Article 12 of the Law on BNB, the Governor and the three Deputy Governors are 

appointed by the National Assembly, while the other three members of BNB’s Governing Council are 

appointed  by  the  President  of  the  Republic.  Article  14(1)  of  the  Law  on  BNB  provides  that  the 

appointing authority may remove a member of the Governing Council from office if one of the grounds 

it lists for removal from office is established. The ECB therefore understands that the competence to 

take a decision to remove a member of BNB’s Governing Council from office is vested solely in the 

appointing authority: either the National Assembly or the President of the Republic. In accordance 

with  Article  14(1)  of  the  Law  on  BNB  the  grounds  for  removal  are  met  where:  (i)  the  member  no 

longer fulfils the conditions required for the performance of his duties or (ii) he has been found guilty 

of serious misconduct.  

6  
7  

Article 56 of the Law on credit institutions. 

Article 56a of the Law on credit institutions. 

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However, the Law on counter-corruption also applies to the Governor, the Deputy Governors and 

the other members of the Governing Council of BNB as senior public office holders8. This Law on 

counter-corruption provides that the Counter-Corruption and Unlawfully Acquired Assets Forfeiture 

Commission may establish by means of a decision the existence of a conflict of interest with regard 

to senior public office holders9. As a consequence of such a decision10, the respective senior public 

office holder may be removed from office in accordance with Article 80(1) of the Law on counter-

corruption. Against this background, the Law on counter-corruption establishes a ground for relieving 

from office that is in addition to the two grounds contained in Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB. 

Therefore,  the  ECB  has  noted  in  its  Convergence  Report  that  the  Law  on  counter-corruption  is 

incompatible  with  the  Treaty  and  the  Statute  of  the  ESCB  and  needs  to  be  brought  into  line  with 

them 11. According to Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB, a Governor may only be relieved from 

office on either of the two grounds contained in that Article12. As regards the other members of the 

decision-making bodies of national central banks (NCBs), the same rules for the security of tenure 

and grounds for relieving Governors from office also apply, safeguarding the personal independence 

of those persons. The provisions of Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB are not restricted to the 

security of tenure of Governors, and Article 130 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB 

refer to ‘members of the decision-making bodies’ of NCBs rather than to Governors specifically. This 

is  legally  required,  in  particular,  when  a  Governor  is  a  ‘first  among  equals’  with  colleagues  with 

equivalent voting rights or  where such  other members are  involved in the  performance  of ESCB-

related tasks 13.  

Against this backdrop, the ECB understands that the intention of the proposed amendment to Article 

80(1) of the Law on counter-corruption is to ensure that the ascertainment of a conflict of interest in 

accordance with that Law would not be a ground for removal from office of the Governor and the 

other members of the Governing Council of BNB, because this would be contrary to the Treaty and 

the Statute of the ESCB. However, for the sake of ensuring legal certainty and transparency, it is 

suggested to explicitly clarify that the provision of Article 80(1) of the Law on counter-corruption shall 

not apply to the Governor, the Deputy Governors and the other members of the Governing Council 

of BNB, instead of implicitly reaching this result by means of a general cross-reference to the EU 

Treaties and their protocols. 

3.2  BNB liability in relation to the central credit register and the bank account register 

The ECB welcomes the waiver of liability for BNB in relation to the operation of the central credit 

register and the bank account register. The ECB understands that, instead of BNB, the State would 

be liable for damages resulting from the operation of the two registers in accordance with the general 

regime for State liability. 

3.3  Cooperation between BNB and the Council of Ministers 

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10  
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12  

13  

Point 12 of Article 6(1) of the Law on counter-corruption. 

Article 74 of the Law on counter-corruption. 
See Chapter 8, Section VI of Law on counter-corruption, titled ‘Consequences upon Conflict of Interest Ascertainment’. 

ECB’s Convergence Report 2020, paragraph 7.1.2. 
This  was  confirmed  by  the  Court  of  Justice  in  its  judgment  of  26 February  2019,  Rimšēvičs  v  Latvia,  joined  cases 
C-202/18 and C-238/18, ECLI:EU:C:2019:139, paragraphs 88 and 89. 

ECB’s Convergence Report 2020, paragraph 2.2. 

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The ECB notes that the consulting authority proposes to repeal the provision of Article 3 of the Law 

on  BNB,  which  currently  provides  that  in  the  formulation  of  the  general  outlines  of  the  monetary 

policy,  BNB  and  the  Council  of  Ministers  shall  inform  each  other.  The  ECB  understands  that  this 

proposal aims to implement the recommendations of the Commission’s Convergence Report with 

regard  to  central  bank  independence14.  For  its  part,  however,  the  ECB  would  not  object  to 

maintaining Article 3 of the Law on BNB even if in a revised form, in order to implement the necessary 

safeguards for central bank independence. Dialogue between an NCB and third parties including the 

Government, even when based on statutory obligations to provide information and exchange views, 

is  indeed  compatible  with  central  bank  independence,  provided  that  (i)  this  does  not  result  in 

interference with the independence of the members of the NCB’s decision-making bodies; (ii) the 

special status of Governors in their capacity as members of the ECB’s decision-making bodies is 

fully  respected;  and  (iii)  confidentiality  requirements  resulting  from  the  Statute  of  the  ESCB  are 

respected15. 

3.4 

Independence of the members of the BNB Governing Council 

The  ECB understands that the proposed amendment to  Article  13(1) of the  Law on  BNB  aims to 

implement  the recommendations of the Commission’s Convergence Report with  regard to central 

bank  independence,  henceforth  requiring  that  the  oath  to  be  sworn  by  the  Governor,  Deputy 

Governors and other members of the Governing Council of BNB before the National Assembly and 

the President would make reference to their contribution to the independent performance of BNB’s 

functions 16. The ECB welcomes this clarification.  

This opinion will be published on EUR-Lex. 

Done at Frankfurt am Main, 11 January 2021. 

[signed] 

The President of the ECB 

Christine LAGARDE 

14  
15  
16  

Commission’s Convergence Report 2020, paragraph 2.1.2. 
ECB’s Convergence Report 2020, paragraph 2.2.3. 

Commission’s Convergence Report 2020, paragraph 2.1.2. 

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