The Commission contributes to nuclear safety in the EU, but updates required. Special report No 03, 2020.
Date: 2021-01-06
Institutions: European Court of Auditors
Subjects: EAEC, European Commission, application of EU law, audit, nuclear energy, nuclear law, nuclear policy, nuclear power station, nuclear safety, peaceful use of energy, public safety, report

EN 

2020 

03 

Special Report  The Commission contributes to 

nuclear safety in the EU, but updates 
required 

 
 
 
Contents 

Executive summary 

Introduction 

Audit scope and approach 

Observations 

The Commission made some improvements to its monitoring of 
the transposition of Euratom directives 

The Commission was better prepared for the two newer directives 

The Radioactive Waste and Spent Fuel Directive has not been correctly 
transposed in all Member States 

The Commission takes account of peer review results 

The Commission manages the EU early notification and exchange 
of information arrangements well 

The Commission’s opinions on investment projects contribute to 
enhancing nuclear safety 

Opinions assess investments’ compliance with legal requirements and 
provide suggestions for improvement 

The current legislative framework needs to be updated to reflect recent 
developments in the field of nuclear safety 

The Commission had not put in place a robust procedure to 
prepare its opinions on nuclear investment projects and verify 
the operation of radioactivity monitoring facilities 

Conclusions and recommendations 

2 

Paragraph 

I-X 

01-15 

16-18 

19-73 

19-30 

23-24 

25-28 

29-30 

31-38 

39-58 

43-47 

48-58 

59-73 

74-80 

 
 
3 

Annexes 

Annex I – The Commission’s checks 

Annex II – Examples of non-conformity cases in the transposition 
of the RWD 

Glossary 

Acronyms and abbreviations 

Replies of the Commission 

Timeline 

 
 
 
 
4 

Executive summary 

I The EU defines nuclear safety as the achievement of proper operating conditions, 
prevention of accidents and mitigation of accident consequences, resulting in the 
protection of workers and the general public from dangers arising from ionising 
radiation from nuclear installations. Nuclear installations’ licence holders (operators) 
are primarily responsible for the safety of their installations, under the supervision of 
national regulatory authorities. 

II Within the EU, the peaceful use of nuclear energy is governed by the 1957 Euratom 
Treaty, which established the European Atomic Energy Community and provides the 
legal framework for its competences and activities. Recent Euratom directives set 
requirements for nuclear safety, radioactive waste and spent fuel, as well as basic 
safety standards. 

III Our audit examined how well the Commission used its competencies to contribute 
to nuclear safety in the EU. We assessed how the Commission monitored the 
transposition of Euratom directives into legislation in Member States. We looked at 
the arrangements for early notification and information exchange in the event of a 
radiological emergency, where the Commission’s role is limited to managing the 
system. Finally, we looked at two activities for which the Commission’s role derives 
from the Euratom Treaty: it gives opinions on nuclear investment projects and has a 
right to verify the operation and efficiency of Member States’ facilities for continuous 
monitoring of the level of radioactivity. 

IV We conclude that, overall, the Commission has contributed well to nuclear safety 
in the EU. However, there is scope for the Commission to update the legal framework 
and its internal guidelines.  

V The Commission has improved the way it monitors the transposition of Euratom 
directives. It was better prepared for the two most recent directives (the amended 
Nuclear Safety Directive and the Basic Safety Standards Directive) than for the earlier 
Radioactive Waste and Spent Fuel Directive. 

VI During the period covered by our audit, the Commission used the outcome of the 
peer reviews as an information source when assessing the conformity of a Member 
State with Euratom directives. Once the transposition and conformity checks are 
complete, the Commission will continue to be responsible for monitoring the results of 
the peer reviews. 

 
 
5 

VII We found that the Commission manages well the European Community Urgent 
Radiological Information Exchange (ECURIE) arrangements. It could improve the 
follow-up of lessons learned but has steadily developed the system to ensure that it 
functions well and is technologically up to date. 

VIII The Commission examines nuclear investment projects to assess their 
compatibility with the Euratom Treaty. It issues a non-binding opinion to the Member 
State concerned. We found that the current framework for issuing these opinions is 
not up to date with the latest policy, legislative and technological developments. For 
instance, while many reactors are undergoing long-term operation (LTO) investments 
to prolong operation of nuclear facilities beyond their original design life, the current 
framework is unclear on whether these investments should be subject to mandatory 
notification to the Commission. 

IX Our audit showed some limitations in the procedures the Commission applies to 
prepare the opinions on nuclear investment projects and to verify Member States’ 
facilities for continuous monitoring of the level of radioactivity. The Commission lacks 
robust procedures that would ensure the completeness, consistency and coherence of 
these activities. 

X Based on our conclusions, we make recommendations focusing on the 
Commission’s role in monitoring the transposition of the Euratom directives, the 
framework under which it issues the opinions on nuclear investment projects, and the 
approach it applies when preparing the opinions and carrying out verifications of 
radioactivity monitoring facilities. 

 
 
 
 
6 

Introduction 

01 At the end of 2018, 14 Member States operated a total of 126 nuclear power 
reactors1. Four of these Member States had new reactors under construction (see 
Figure 1). 

Figure 1 – Number of reactors on 31 December 2018 

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

58

7

6

2

4

1

1

7

4

1

2

4

2

1

7

8

15

1

BE

BG

CZ

FI

FR

DE

HU

NL

RO

SK

SI

ES

SE

UK

Operational

Construction

Source: ECA, based on data from the IAEA Nuclear Power Reactors in the World, Reference Data Series 
No. 2, IAEA, Vienna (2019). 

02 Nuclear plants generated around 25 % of the electricity produced in the 
European Union (EU) in 20172. Electricity production from nuclear power plants 
decreased by around 18 % from 2004 to 2017.  

1 

International Atomic Energy Agency, Nuclear Power Reactors in the World, Reference Data 
Series No. 2, IAEA, Vienna (2019). 

2  Eurostat, Nuclear energy statistics. 

 
 
 
                                                      
7 

What is the legal and organisational framework for nuclear safety? 

03 The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the central intergovernmental 
forum for scientific and technical cooperation in the nuclear field at global level. It is 
the depositary of several key international conventions, such as the Convention on 
Nuclear Safety, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the 
Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological 
Emergency3. The IAEA safety standards establish fundamental principles, requirements 
and recommendations to ensure nuclear safety, serving as a global reference. Many 
other organisations contribute to nuclear safety globally and in Europe, e.g. the 
Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA)4, the Western European Nuclear Regulators Association 
(WENRA), the European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG)5 and the World 
Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO). 

04 Nuclear safety is the responsibility of each country using nuclear technology. 
Governments are responsible for regulating nuclear safety, and nuclear facility 
operators are ultimately responsible for the safety of their facility. National 
responsibility for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations is the fundamental 
principle on which nuclear safety legislation has been developed at the international 
level. 

05 Within the EU, the peaceful use of nuclear energy is governed by the 1957 
Euratom Treaty6, which established the Euratom Community (Euratom) and provides 
the legal framework for its competences and activities. Although Euratom has the 
same members as the EU and is governed by the EU institutions, it is a separate legal 
entity. 

3  Most Member States are contracting parties to these and other international conventions 

related to nuclear safety. 

4  The NEA, under the framework of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 

Development (OECD), is an intergovernmental agency that facilitates cooperation among 
countries with advanced nuclear technology infrastructures. 

5  The European Nuclear safety Regulators Group (ENSREG) is an independent, expert 

advisory group, composed of representatives from all Member States and a representative 
from the Commission that attends and participates in debates. The members of the group 
elect their chair (Commission Decision of 17 July 2007). It advises and assists the 
Commission and facilitates consultations, coordination and cooperation among national 
regulatory authorities. 

6  Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community. 

 
 
                                                      
8 

06 The Commission deals with nuclear activities from three angles: nuclear safety, 
nuclear safeguards and nuclear security (see Box 1). 

Box 1 

Nuclear safety, security and safeguards 

Nuclear safety is defined by the EU7 as the achievement of proper operating 
conditions, prevention of accidents and mitigation of accident consequences, 
resulting in the protection of workers and the general public from dangers arising 
from ionising radiation from nuclear installations. 

Nuclear safeguards (where the Commission has sole competence) are measures 
established to guarantee that nuclear materials are not diverted to purposes other 
than those for which they were originally declared. Users and holders of nuclear 
material in the EU are obliged to keep records and to declare all flows of these 
materials to the Commission. 

Nuclear security (primarily a national responsibility) is defined by the IAEA as the 
prevention and detection of, and response to, criminal or intentional unauthorised 
acts involving nuclear material, other radioactive material, associated facilities or 
associated activities8. The physical protection of nuclear installations and 
radioactive materials is related to countries' security and defence policies and is 
mostly within their competence.  

07 In the EU, Member States are responsible for establishing and maintaining a 
national legislative, regulatory and organisational framework for nuclear safety. 
Nuclear installations’ licence holders (operators) are primarily responsible for the 
safety of their installations, under the supervision of national regulatory authorities. 

08 The Commission’s main role in nuclear safety is to make proposals to develop the 
Euratom legal framework and oversee the transposition of legal instruments into 
national legislation in Member States. When the Commission, in its role as “Guardian 
of the Treaties”, considers that a Member State is infringing the provisions of Euratom 
legislation, it may launch an infringement procedure. 

7  Council Directive 2009/71/Euratom of 25 June 2009 establishing a Community framework 

for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations, amended by Council Directive 
2014/87/Euratom. 

8 

IAEA Safety Glossary, 2018 Edition, © IAEA, 2019. 

 
 
                                                      
9 

09 The Commission also has rights and responsibilities relating to nuclear safety and 
radiation protection derived from the Euratom Treaty. Under Article 35 of the Euratom 
Treaty, the Commission has a right to verify the operation and efficiency of Member 
States’ facilities for continuous monitoring of the level of radioactivity in the air, water 
and soil. The Commission consolidates the information sent by Member States on 
environmental radioactivity levels on their territory9. 

10 The Commission examines nuclear investment projects planned in the Member 
States to check their compatibility with the Euratom Treaty. According to the 
procedure set out in Articles 41 to 44 of this Treaty, investors must communicate 
investment projects in the nuclear industry to the Commission10. The Commission then 
communicates its opinion on the project (or “view”, according to Article 43 of the 
Euratom Treaty) to the Member State concerned, presenting an analysis of the 
investment. 

11 While the provision of emergency preparedness and response arrangements 
remains a national responsibility, the Commission operates, manages and develops the 
European Community Urgent Radiological Information Exchange (ECURIE) system, 
created in the wake of the 1986 Chernobyl accident11. 

12 In addition to the role derived from the legal framework, the Commission 
facilitates dialogue and cooperation with Member States through, for instance, the 
European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG). It cooperates with non-EU 
countries operating or constructing nuclear power plants and concludes agreements 
with third countries in the field of nuclear cooperation. The Commission also 
cooperates with international organisations, such as the IAEA and the NEA. 

9  Article 36 of the Euratom Treaty. 

10  Related to the industrial activities listed in Annex II to the Euratom Treaty. 

11  Council Decision 87/600/Euratom on Community arrangements for the early exchange of 

information in the event of a radiological emergency. 

 
 
                                                      
10 

Euratom directives form a legally binding framework for nuclear safety 

13 The Euratom Treaty empowers Euratom to establish and enforce safety standards 
to protect the health of workers and the general public12. The basic standards are 
adopted by the Council of the European Union after consultation with the European 
Parliament, on the basis of a proposal from the Commission13. 

14 Since 1959, shortly after it was created, Euratom has laid down, in directives, the 
basic standards to protect the health of workers and the general public against the 
dangers arising from ionising radiation. Following a 2002 judgment of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU)14 that recognised and clarified Euratom's shared 
competence with the Member States in the area of nuclear safety, the Council adopted 
legislation in the areas of nuclear safety15 in 2009, and radioactive waste management 
and spent fuel16 in 2011. The basic safety standards directive has been updated 
regularly, with the latest update also incorporating the provisions of several former 
directives17. 

12  Article 2(b) and Title II, Chapter 3 (“Health and Safety”) of the Euratom Treaty. 

13  Articles 30 and 31 of the Euratom Treaty. 

14  CJEU judgment of 10 December 2002, case C-29/99, Commission v Council, ECR I-11221. 

15  Council Directive 2009/71/ Euratom of 25 June 2009 establishing a Community framework 
for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations, amended by Council Directive 2014/87/ 
Euratom of 8 July 2014. 

16  Council Directive 2011/70/EURATOM of 19 July 2011 establishing a Community framework 

for the responsible and safe management of spent fuel and radioactive waste. 

17  Council Directive 2013/59/EURATOM of 5 December 2013 laying down basic safety 

standards for protection against the dangers arising from exposure to ionising radiation and 
repealing Directives 89/618/Euratom, 90/641/Euratom, 96/29/Euratom, 97/43/Euratom 
and 2003/122/Euratom. 

 
 
                                                      
11 

Table 1 – Recent Euratom directives. 

Radioactive Waste and 
Spent Fuel Directive 
(RWD) 
2011 

Basic Safety Standards 
Directive 
(BSSD) 
2013 

The radioactive waste and spent 
fuel directive (RWD) requires that 
Member States have a national 
policy that describes how they 
intend to manage radioactive 
waste and spent fuel from civilian 
nuclear activities. Member States 
have to establish national 
programmes, which translate the 
national policies into concrete 
plans of action. They also have to 
put in place a national legislative, 
regulatory and organisational 
framework (‘national framework’), 
and a competent and independent 
regulatory body. 

The 2013 basic safety standards 
directive (BSSD) establishes the 
basic safety standards for radiation 
protection of workers, patients and 
the general public and sets limits 
on the maximum radiation dose 
covering all exposure situations 
(planned, existing and emergency). 
The new directive updated and 
incorporated the provisions of 
several former directives and 
added new provisions, including 
those on emergency preparedness 
and response incorporating some 
of the lessons learnt from the 2011 
Fukushima accident. 

Nuclear Safety Directive 
(NSD) 
2009, amended 2014 

The nuclear safety directive (NSD) 
is built upon the nuclear safety 
requirements of the Convention on 
Nuclear Safety and of the Safety 
Fundamentals established by the 
IAEA. The directive was amended 
in July 2014 in the light of the 
lessons learned from the 2011 
Fukushima nuclear accident and 
the findings of the risk and safety 
assessments of EU nuclear power 
plants, the so-called ‘stress tests’. 
The amended directive 
strengthens the power and 
independence of the national 
regulatory authorities. It 
introduces a high-level EU-wide 
safety objective to prevent 
accidents and, should an accident 
occur, mitigate its consequences 
and avoid early and large 
radioactive releases 

Source: ECA. 

15 The Nuclear Safety Directive (NSD)18 and the Radioactive Waste and Spent Fuel 
Directive (RWD)19 set requirements to carry out three types of regular peer reviews 
(see Box 2). The international peer reviews are an opportunity to exchange 
professional experience and to share lessons learned and good practices through 
advice from peers, with the aim of continuously improving nuclear safety. 

18  Article 8e of the NSD. 

19  Article 14(3) of the RWD. 

 
 
                                                      
12 

Box 2 

Peer reviews 

The Euratom directives set requirements for three types of regular peer reviews: 

o 

o 

o 

The amended NSD introduced a European system of topical peer reviews that 
focus on a specific safety issue every six years. The first topical peer review, 
conducted in 2017-2018, was dedicated to the ageing management 
programmes of nuclear installations. The Nuclear Safety Regulators Group 
(ENSREG) prepared the peer review with the support of the Western 
European Nuclear Regulators Association (WENRA) in coordination with the 
Commission. 

The NSD requires Member States to also conduct periodic self-assessments of 
their national framework and competent regulatory authorities at least every 
ten years, and to request an international peer review of relevant segments 
of their national framework and competent regulatory authorities. Member 
States use the IAEA Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) to comply 
with these peer review requirements. The Commission has provided financial 
support for the IRRS mission programme. 

The RWD requires that Member States carry out self-assessments and 
request international peer reviews of their national framework, competent 
regulatory authority, national programme and its implementation at least 
every 10 years. Member States use the IAEA peer review services to meet 
these requirements. 

 
 
 
 
13 

Audit scope and approach 

16 Our audit assessed how well the Commission used its competencies to contribute 
to nuclear safety in the EU. We examined how the Commission has: 

(a)  monitored the transposition of the three most recent Euratom directives into 

Member State legislation; 

(b)  managed the mechanisms for early notification and the exchange of information 

in the event of a radiological emergency; 

(c)  contributed to enhancing nuclear safety through its opinions on investment 

projects; 

(d)  prepared its opinions on investments and verified the operation of radioactivity 

monitoring facilities. 

17 We focused on the Commission’s activities, based on its assigned competences 
and responsibilities. We did not seek to examine the international nuclear safety 
framework or its application in Member States, nor did we look at the technical 
aspects of nuclear safety. We did not cover emergency preparedness and response, 
apart from looking at the Commission’s role in managing the EU early notification 
system ECURIE. Nuclear security and nuclear safeguards were beyond the scope of our 
audit. The period covered by our audit runs until the end of July 2019. 

18 We reviewed the legal framework and relevant policies, strategies, standards and 
conventions. We examined the Commission’s procedures, internal strategies and 
guidelines, guidance provided to Member States, tools, working papers, information 
exchanges, correspondence and meeting minutes. We reviewed reports, studies, 
internal and external assessments and other relevant documents. We examined four 
Commission opinions on nuclear investment projects. We carried out interviews with 
the Commission (Directorate-General Energy and Joint Research Centre – JRC), and 
discussed nuclear safety questions with experts in international organisations. 

 
 
 
 
14 

Observations 

The Commission made some improvements to its monitoring of 
the transposition of Euratom directives 

19 The Commission is responsible for overseeing the implementation and 
application of Euratom directives and for taking action to promote and enforce 
compliance. In order to do so, the Commission performs transposition and conformity 
checks (see Figure 2). 

Figure 2 – The Commission compliance checking process 

Source: ECA based on Commission, Better Regulation Tool Box 37. 

20 Cases of non-compliance detected in transposition and conformity checks may 
lead to enforcement through the infringement procedure explained in Figure 3. 

 
 
 
15 

Figure 3 – The infringement procedure 

The 
Commi ssion 
s ends a letter 
of formal 
notice  (LFN) to 
the Member 
Sta te (MS) 
requesting a n 
expl anation 
wi thin a given 
ti me l imit.

If the MS does 
not repl y 
s a tisfactorily, 
the 
Commi ssion 
i s sues a  
reasoned 
opinion  (RO)
a s king the MS 
to compl y 
wi thin a given 
ti me l imit.

If the MS does 
not comply 
wi th the RO, 
the 
Commi ssion 
ma y deci de on 
a  referral to 
the CJEU.

If the CJEU 
fi nds the MS to 
ha ve breached 
i ts  obligations, 
i t orders the 
MS to take the 
necessary 
action to 
compl y a nd the 
Commi ssion 
checks  the MS 
compl iance 
wi th the ruling 
of the CJEU.

If the MS does 
not ta ke the 
necessary s teps 
to compl y, the 
Commi ssion 
ma y conti nue 
the 
i nfri ngement 
proceeding by 
s ending a LFN 
to the MS a nd 
referring the 
case ba ck to 
the CJEU.

Pre-litigation  phase

Litigation  phase

Source: ECA based on Article 258 of the TFEU. 

21 We looked at the transposition and conformity checks performed by the 
Commission on the three recent Euratom directives20, in order to assess how it 
monitored their transposition. We examined whether the Commission facilitated, 
coordinated and supervised the process, conducted these checks in a timely manner, 
followed up non-compliance cases and initiated action. 

22 Given the different dates of entry into force and deadlines for transposition set in 
each directive, the Commission’s checks occurred at different stages at the time of our 
audit(see Figure 4). 

20  RWD 2011, NSD 2014, BSSD 2013. 

 
 
 
 
                                                      
16 

Figure 4 – Status of the compliance checks at the time of the audit. 

RADIOACTIVE  WASTE 
DIRECTIVE

Deadline: 23/08/2013

NUCLEAR SAFETY 
DIRECTIVE

Deadline: 15/08/2017

BASIC SAFETY 
STANDARDS  DIRECTIVE

Deadline: 06/02/2018

Transposition check: 
FINALISED

Infringements: 
FINALISED

Conformity check: 
FINALISED

Infringements: 
ONGOING

Transposition check: 
FINALISED

Infringements: 
ONGOING

Conformity check: 
ONGOING

Infringements: 
ONGOING

Transposition check: 
ONGOING

Infringements: 
ONGOING

Conformity check: 
NOT YET STARTED

Source: ECA based on information received from the Commission. 

The Commission was better prepared for the two newer directives 

23 In addition to monitoring and enforcement, the Commission may develop other 
tools to facilitate Member States’ transposition of the directives in a correct and timely 
manner. The number of Member States that notified their transposing measures by 
the deadline was higher for the two newer directives (BSSD and amended NSD), 
compared to the RWD (see Table 2). 

Table 2 – Number of Member States that transposed the directives by 
the deadline. 

Radioactive 
Waste 
Directive 
(RWD) 

Nuclear Safety 
Directive 
(NSD) 

Basic Safety 
Standards 
Directive 
(BSSD) 

Transposition deadline 

23/08/2013 

15/08/2017 

06/02/2018 

Notifications submitted by the deadline or 
before the launch of non-communication 
infringements 

17 

24 

21 

Source: ECA, based on information received from the Commission. 

 
 
 
 
17 

24 We found that three factors contributed to the faster transposition of the NSD 
and BSSD: the transposition risk evaluations, the reminders sent to the Member States, 
and the key strategic documents that were approved earlier compared to the previous 
directive. Commission’s services: 

o 

o 

o 

prepared the transposition risk evaluations of the NSD and BSSD respectively one 
year and two years ahead of the transposition deadline (see Figure 5), whereas, 
for the RWD, the Commission did not prepare a risk assessment anticipating 
potential transposition issues; 

about one year before the transposition deadline (see Figure 5), sent letters to 
Member States to remind them of the obligation to communicate their measures 
on time. The Commission did not send a reminder for the RWD; 

approved the key strategic documents of the NSD and BSSD between 4 months 
and 1 year ahead of the transposition deadline (see Figure 5). The strategies for 
the evaluation of the transposition and implementation of the two directives 
provide the actions planned for the review of the transposition of the directives. 
The strategies helped to anticipate and solve problems with the implementation 
of the directives and laid down a comprehensive array of compliance promoting 
tools that helped Member States apply them correctly and in a timely manner 
(details in Table 3). The interpretative guidance supported the Commission in 
promoting and documenting its transposition and conformity verification 
processes. In the case of the RWD, the Commission made the internal strategy 
available only two years after the transposition deadline, and the interpretative 
guidance four years after. 

 
 
Figure 5 – Timeline for approval of the strategic documents.  

18 

Source: ECA based on information received from the Commission. 

 
 
 
19 

Table 3 – Compliance promoting tools used to facilitate transposition. 

Radioactive Waste and 
Spent Fuel Directive 
(RWD) 

Nuclear Safety Directive 
(NSD) 

o 

o 

One pre-transposition 
workshop 
Videoconferences with 
Member States (MS) 

o  Meetings with MS 
o 

EU Pilots 

o 

o 

o 

o 

Dialogues with MS on 
transposition and 
implementation 
Pre-transposition 
workshops and bilateral 
meetings 
Cooperation with 
stakeholders, including 
national authorities and 
civil society groups 
Discussions at ENSREG 

Source: ECA based on information received from the Commission. 

Basic Safety Standards 
Directive 
(BSSD) 

o 

o 

o 

o 

Dialogues with MS on 
transposition and 
implementation 
Pre-transposition 
workshops and bilateral 
meetings 
Commission's analysis of 
MS' transposition 
strategies ahead of the 
transposition deadline 
Roundtables and 
seminars 

The Radioactive Waste and Spent Fuel Directive has not been correctly 
transposed in all Member States 

25 The Commission spent 57 months completing the conformity check on the RWD 
(Annex I, Table 2) – significantly longer than the 16 to 24-month benchmark set in the 
Commission Better Regulation21. This is partially explained by the delays with which 
the Member States transposed the Directive and the incompleteness of the 
transposing measures. 

26 After having finalised the conformity check, the Commission opened 15 
infringement proceedings (examples of the RWD provisions which Member States 
most frequently failed to transpose correctly can be found in Annex II). By the time of 
our audit, 13 months after the launch of these proceedings, only two of them had 
been closed. Hence, almost six years after the transposition deadline, 13 Member 
States had not yet correctly transposed the RWD (see Annex I, Table 2). Similarly, 
almost four years after the deadline to adopt a national programme (see Annex I, 
Table 3 one Member State had not done so and other 17 had adopted programmes 
that the Commission considered non-compliant with the Directive. 

21   Commission, Better Regulation Toolbox 37. 

 
 
                                                      
20 

27 The Commission uses its discretion in the opening of an infringement proceeding 
against a Member State and in the pursuit of an open case22. However, it has identified 
a list of “priority infringement cases” and set benchmarks for processing these cases in 
a timely manner23. The Commission prioritises, among others, cases where Member 
States have failed to communicate transposition measures or where those measures 
have incorrectly transposed directives. The Commission has set itself a 12-month 
benchmark to either close or refer to the case of non-communication to the CJEU24. 
This benchmark is calculated from the sending of the letter of formal notice. 

28 In the context of the RWD, we found that in 5 of the 13 infringement procedures 
launched, the Commission went beyond this 12-month benchmark when treating cases 
of non-communication. As illustrated in Annex I, Table 1, the Commission took more 
than two years to proceed further in the pre-litigation phase (Letter of Formal Notice 
to Reasoned Opinion) for the two cases where it issued a Reasoned Opinion. 

The Commission takes account of peer review results  

29 During the period covered by our audit, the Commission used the outcome of the 
peer reviews as an information source when assessing the conformity of a Member 
State with Euratom directives. For example, the NSD Strategy for the transposition and 
implementation of the directive refers to the results of the peer reviews, and the NSD 
Interpretative Guidelines explain the role of the peer review reports when assessing 
compliance. 

30 The Commission may participate as an observer in peer review missions and has 
occasionally done so. It also contributes to the follow-up of the peer reviews in its role 
as a member of ENSREG. Once the transposition and conformity checks are complete; 
the Commission will continue to be responsible for monitoring the results of the peer 
reviews. 

22   Case C-247/87 Star Fruit v. Commission. 

23   Communication from the Commission “EU law: Better Results through Better Application”, 

C(2016) 8600 final of 21 December 2016. 

24   Communication from the Commission – A Europe of results – applying Community law, 

COM(2007) 502 final. 

 
 
                                                      
21 

The Commission manages the EU early notification and 
exchange of information arrangements well 

31 The Commission manages, operates and develops the ECURIE system, a tool used 
to implement the Council Decision25 on EU arrangements for early notification and the 
exchange of information in the event of a radiological emergency. We assessed how 
well the Commission manages these arrangements by examining whether it ensures 
that the system meets expectations (namely whether it satisfies the obligations arising 
from the Council Decision), regularly assesses the processes, identifies 
weaknesses/potential weaknesses and adequately monitors them and tests the 
systems at regular intervals. 

32 The Council Decision requires Member States to promptly notify the Commission 
and all other Member States potentially affected by an incident by issuing an alert 
notification in the ECURIE system26. Likewise, the Commission must forward to all 
Member States any information it receives on significant increases in the level of 
radioactivity or on nuclear accidents in non-EU countries27. Member States can also 
send voluntary urgent notifications to share information. The Commission makes 
information transmitted via the ECURIE system available on a 24/7 basis to all ECURIE 
contact points.  

25  Council Decision 87/600/Euratom on Community arrangements for the early exchange of 

information in the event of a radiological emergency. 

26   The formal notification threshold for an ECURIE alert message is set in Article 1 of the 

Council Decision. In summary, the article states that the participating states are required to 
issue an ECURIE alert if: 

(1) the state has a radiological emergency and therefore decides to implement 

widespread countermeasures to protect its population, or 

(2) the state detects abnormal levels of radiation in the environment and therefore 
decides to implement widespread countermeasures to protect its population. 

27  Article 5 of Council Decision 87/600/Euratom. 

 
 
                                                      
22 

33 While the provision of emergency preparedness and response arrangements 
remains a national responsibility, all Member States are required to participate in 
ECURIE, while third countries may request ECURIE membership on a voluntary basis28. 
The requirements on EU arrangements do not preclude Member States from having 
their own additional arrangements, such as national, bilateral or multilateral 
emergency information exchange and cooperation agreements. 

34 Once a participating state sends an ECURIE alert notification, the Commission 
verifies its authenticity, and transmits it to all ECURIE countries. Following the first 
notification, Member States are required to notify the Commission at appropriate 
intervals of the measures they intend to take and the radioactivity levels they have 
measured. The Commission does not assess the content of the notification or decide 
whether an emergency notification should be issued, as it is Member States’ 
responsibility. The Commission is responsible for ensuring the timely sharing of the 
information29. 

35 The Commission has complemented ECURIE with the European Radiological Data 
Exchange Platform (EURDEP), a web-based platform that makes radiological 
monitoring data available for authorities almost in real-time. EURDEP is a tool used 
within the ECURIE framework to facilitate the provision of some information30. 
EURDEP also benefits from existing national infrastructure, in the form of the national 
monitoring stations and network. EU Member States participation is mandatory, while 
non-EU countries participate on a voluntary basis. A freely accessible website allows 
the public to view graphical information on radioactivity levels over the EURDEP area. 

28  At the time of this audit, there were four non-EU countries participating: Switzerland, 

Norway, Montenegro and North Macedonia. 

29  Article 5(1) of Council Decision 87/600/Euratom: “Upon receipt of the information referred 
to in Articles 2, 3 and 4, the Commission shall, subject to Article 6, immediately forward it 
to the competent authorities of all other Member States. […]”. 

30  Member States have to continue to inform the Commission at appropriate intervals of the 
levels of radioactivity: Article 3(1e, 1f, 3) and 4(b) of the Council Decision 87/600/Euratom. 

 
 
                                                      
23 

36 ECURIE arrangements are agreed, discussed and reviewed at the meetings 
between the Member States’ Competent Authorities31. The Commission has convened 
these meetings on average every two years. These meetings also deal with lessons 
learned and issues identified. The changes agreed are documented in the ECURIE 
Communication Instruction, which sets out the procedures agreed between the 
Commission and Member States32. 

37 We found that the Commission has steadily developed the ECURIE system to 
ensure that it functions well and is technologically up to date. The Commission has 
agreed processes and provides instructions for users. It regularly organises exercises to 
test the arrangements33. It has carried out or ordered reviews on the ECURIE system to 
assess and improve it. The Commission has developed ECURIE in coordination with the 
IAEA’s Unified System for Information Exchange in Incidents and Emergencies (USIE). 
ECURIE has also proved to be technically operational in real cases when Member 
States have sent alerts34. 

38 However, we found that the Commission did not follow up on certain key areas 
for improvement that it had identified when assessing the arrangements. For example, 
lessons learned from real ECURIE alerts have shown the importance of public 
communication and that it should form part of ECURIE exercises. The Commission has 
also identified the need to develop a regular ECURIE training programme for national 
authorities and its own staff. We found that the Commission had made little progress 
in remedying these issues, even though it considers them important.  

31   Article 5(2) of Council Decision 87/600/Euratom requires that the Commission and the 

competent authorities of the Member States agree on detailed procedures for the early 
exchange of information in the event of a radiological emergency. 

32  In line with article 5.2 of the Council Decision 87/600. 

33   Article 5(2) of Council Decision 87/600/Euratom. 

34  By the time of our audit, ECURIE alerts had been used twice, both in 2008: for Slovenia 

(Krsko) incident on 4 June 2008 and an incident at IRE radioisotope production facility at 
Fleurus, Belgium on 28 August 2008. 

 
 
                                                      
24 

The Commission’s opinions on investment projects contribute 
to enhancing nuclear safety 

39 People and undertakings (investors) are required to notify the Commission of 
investment projects in the nuclear industry relating to new installations, replacements 
or conversions no later than three months before concluding the first contracts with 
suppliers. If the work is to be carried out by the investor, the deadline for 
communication is three months before the work begins. 

40 Two Euratom regulations define the types of investment and the information 
investors have to provide. Council Regulation 2587/1999 details the types of project 
that have to be notified to the Commission, as well as the expenditure thresholds for 
each type of project that requires a mandatory notification. Commission Regulation 
1209/2000 specifies the content of the notification. 

41 Article 43 of the Euratom Treaty requires the Commission to discuss with the 
investors “all aspects” of the investment projects which relate to the objectives of the 
Treaty. Following this discussion, the Commission communicates its opinions to the 
Member State concerned. Neither the Euratom Treaty nor its secondary legislation set 
time limits for the Commission's analysis of the project. 

42 The Commission’s opinions on nuclear investment projects are not legally 
binding35. However, only a project with a “favourable” opinion is eligible for a Euratom 
loan36. 

35  Article 288 TFEU: Recommendations and opinions shall have no binding force. 

36  Pursuant to Council Decision 94/179/Euratom, a favourable opinion from the Commission 
“in technical and economic terms” is required for Euratom loans for investment projects 
relating to the industrial production of electricity in nuclear power stations implemented in 
member states and eligible non-member states. 

 
 
                                                      
25 

Opinions assess investments’ compliance with legal requirements and 
provide suggestions for improvement 

43 For the period 2000-2018, the Commission adopted 75 opinions. All opinions 
given by the Commission concluded that the investments fulfilled the objectives of the 
Treaty, in some cases under certain conditions explained in the opinion. 

44 We examined four opinions issued by the Commission on investment projects in 
the nuclear industry, to assess whether the Commission follows the procedure 
provided for in the Euratom Treaty37 and its secondary legislation38, and whether it 
assesses compliance of the project with all relevant Euratom Treaty obligations in 
relation to nuclear safety. We selected the latest Commission’s opinions, taking into 
account the relevance (type) and materiality of the investment project. 

45 In all four opinions, we found that the Commission had assessed project 
compliance with all relevant Euratom Treaty obligations in terms of nuclear safety. The 
Commission ascertains whether the investment project ensures and guarantees 
respect of the nuclear safety objectives from its very early stages. The opinions are 
backed by scientific evidence that supports the proposed recommendations, which are 
discussed with the investor. 

37   Art. 41-43. 

38  Council Regulation (EURATOM) No 2587/1999 of 2 December 1999 defining the investment 
projects to be communicated to the Commission in accordance with Article 41 of the Treaty 
establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (OJ L 315, 9.12.1999, pp. 1-3), and 

Commission Regulation (EC) No 1209/2000 of 8 June 2000 determining procedures for 
effecting the communications prescribed under Article 41 of the Treaty establishing the 
European Atomic Energy Community (OJ L 138, 9.6.2000, pp. 12-14). 

 
 
                                                      
26 

46 For example, two of the Commission’s opinions 39 refer to: 

o 

o 

o 

o 

o 

the positive opinion of the Scientific Council for Ionising Radiation on the 
evaluation of the investor’s project; 

the actions and investments needed to ensure the safe long-term operation of 
the plant; 

the plans for continuous improvement of nuclear safety; 

the action plan following stress tests; and 

the peer reviews and subsequent action taken by the investor. 

47 These two opinions also call for: 

o 

o 

o 

o 

the complete and timely implementation of all the stress test results and 
recommendations; 

the complete and timely implementation of all the peer reviews’ results and 
recommendations; 

the timely implementation of safety improvements; and 

planning and implementing in the nuclear plant a solution for the disposal of 
spent fuel and radioactive waste. 

39   Published on the investor’s website on 23 March 2017. 

 
 
                                                      
27 

The current legislative framework needs to be updated to reflect recent 
developments in the field of nuclear safety 

48 Regulations 2587/1999 and 1209/2000 were adopted two decades ago. They 
predate the latest policy and legislative developments in the field of nuclear safety and 
radioactive waste management: the European energy strategies of 2014 and of 201540, 
laying down the EU goals in this area, and the most recent Euratom directives (the 
RWD of 2011, the BSSD of 2013, and the updated NSD of 2014). 

49 In order to be able to discuss “all aspects” of the investment projects which relate 
to the objectives of the Treaty41, the Commission requires extensive information from 
the investor. Article 3 of Regulation 2587/1999 stipulates that communications of 
projects “shall be limited to details required for the discussion and in particular all the 
information relating to”, inter alia, the types of products and activity and the 
production or storage capacity. Regulation 1209/2000 defines the scope of the 
information the investor is required to communicate. 

50 These two regulations are outdated with respect to the types of investments that 
should be notified, as they do not reflect the latest developments in the nuclear 
industry. 

51 We found one notification of an investment in a new technology for which the 
Commission had to request additional information to clarify which industrial activity 
the project concerned, as the notified activity did not fall into any of the categories 
listed in Regulation 2587/1999. In this case, the investor agreed to provide the 
additional information requested by the Commission. However, we found another case 
of a long-term operation (LTO) investment which the investor refused to notify to the 
Commission, arguing that LTOs are not an investment per se, but a continuous process 
of upgrading and modernising a reactor, which does not need to be notified. As 
Regulation 2587/1999 does not specify whether the Commission should be notified of 
these types of investment, notifying such projects depends on the good will of 
investors. 

40  European Energy Security Strategy. COM(2014)330. Communication on a Framework 
Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-looking Climate Change Policy. 
COM(2015)80. 

41   As set in Article 43 of the Euratom Treaty. 

 
 
                                                      
28 

52 The lack of clarity surrounding whether LTOs should be subject to mandatory 
notification is of particular relevance as the average age of European reactors is 
approaching 30 years. Many reactors are undergoing LTO investments to prolong 
operation of nuclear facilities beyond their original design life. The Commission 
expects that, in the coming years, LTOs will represent the majority of nuclear 
investments in the short to medium term42 (see Figure 6). 

Figure 6 – Projection of nuclear installed capacity including LTO, EU-28. 

)

W
G

(

y
t
i
c
a
p
a
C

d
e

l
l

a
t
s
n

I

140

120

100

80

60

40

20

0

50 %

45 %

40 %

35 %

30 %

25 %

20 %

15 %

10 %

5 %

0 %

)

%

(
y
g
r
e
n
e

r
a
e
l
c
u
n
m
o
r
f

d
e
c
u
d
o
r
p

y
t
i
c
i
r
t
c
e

l

e

s
s
o
r
G

2015

2020

2025

2030

2035

2040

2045

2050

Existing reactors operating without LTO

Reactors built after 2015

Reactors operating in LTO

Shut-downs of the period

Nuclear electricity as a % of the total generation  (right axis)

Source: ECA based on a chart provided by the Commission. 

53 We also noticed that the investment thresholds (expenditure amounts) set in 
Regulation 2587/1999 are not clear on what needs to be taken into account to 
calculate the total cost of the investment (e.g. timeframe of the investment, type of 
investment, etc.). 

54 In 2015-2018, the Commission sent five letters to investors to remind them of 
their notification obligations. We examined all five cases. In one case, the investor did 
not reply to the Commission. In another case, the investor refused to notify an 
investment, arguing that it did not meet the expenditure threshold set in Regulation 
2587/1999. According to the investor, the requirement only applies to individual 
components exceeding the defined threshold, and not to the project as a whole. 

42  SWD(2017) 158 final: “Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the document 
Communication from the Commission Nuclear Illustrative Programme Presented under 
Article 40 of the Euratom Treaty”. 

 
 
 
                                                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29 

55 In none of these five cases did the Commission apply procedures to pursue cases 
of non-compliance. If the Commission considers that an investor did not comply with 
the obligation to notify an investment project, it could consider initiating a pre-
infringement procedure against the concerned Member State (further exchanges of 
information and meetings with the investor and/or the Member State), which may be 
followed by an infringement proceeding. At the time of our audit, the Commission had 
not taken any further steps to enforce the obligation to notify projects. The 
Commission’s reasoning for not pursuing these cases was that the legislation was 
unclear on the type and size of the projects for which a notification was mandatory. 

56 The Commission’s 2015 Energy Union Package commits to update and enhance 
the requirements on the information to be provided on nuclear installation projects, 
undertaking to further specify the information to be communicated by investors43. It 
sets 2015 as the deadline for a Council Regulation updating the requirements to notify 
nuclear investments. 

57 In 2015 the Commission presented the Inception Impact Assessment for the 
updated regulation, further specifying the type of investments subject to mandatory 
notification and the information to be provided by the investor. It was followed by a 
public consultation44, to which 40 stakeholders replied (potential investors, industry 
associations, public administrations, regulators, NGOs and private citizens). Although 
their proposed solutions differed, they all agreed that the procedure leading to the 
adoption of the Commission's opinion could be made more effective. 

58 The Commission’s agenda indicates the 2nd quarter of 2020 as the planned 
adoption date for an updated regulation. By the time of our audit, the Commission had 
not yet finalised the assessment of the 2016 public consultation feedback, and had not 
yet prepared the inception report (next step in the process45). The Commission did not 
explain the reasons for the delay in updating the framework. 

43  COM(2015) 80 final (Energy Union Package). 

44  Public Consultation on “Revision of the information and procedural requirements under 

Articles 41 to 44 of the Euratom Treaty”. 

45  2017 Better Regulation Guidelines – Better Regulation in the Commission, Chapter III 

Guidelines on impact assessment. 

 
 
                                                      
30 

The Commission had not put in place a robust procedure to 
prepare its opinions on nuclear investment projects and verify 
the operation of radioactivity monitoring facilities 

59 We assessed how the Commission is preparing its opinions on nuclear investment 
projects and how it has organised the verifications it carries out on Member States’ 
facilities for continuous monitoring of the level of radioactivity in the air, water and 
soil. 

Preparation of opinions 

60 For the four opinions selected, we examined whether the Commission’s 
procedures to prepare its opinions ensured a complete, consistent and coherent 
assessment of nuclear investments. 

61 When preparing its assessment, the Commission follows the framework 
procedure provided for in: Article 41-44 Euratom Treaty (see paragraph 39); 
Regulation 2587/1999 and Regulation 1209/2000 (see paragraph 40); a 2002 
empowerment act46 and the process verbal47applied by the Commission’s services. 

62 The Directorate-General for Energy coordinates the opinion-issuing process, 
which includes consultation of twelve other Commission’s services. The coordinating 
Directorate-General is responsible for collecting the feedback from the other services 
and for discussing any concerns with the investor. The Commission’s opinions follow a 
standard template. After an internal validation process, the Commissioner for Energy, 
on behalf of the Commission, adopts the opinions on nuclear investment projects.  

63 We identified a number of limitations in the Commission’s framework procedure: 

o 

the Commission has not defined the scope of the assessment by type of project, 
the criteria to ensure that it covers all relevant aspects, or how to use other 
nuclear safety information when preparing the opinions, such as stress tests, peer 
reviews and results of the transposition of directives. Instead, the Commission 
defines “areas of assessment” on a case-by-case basis, depending on the features 
of the project notified. 

46   SEC(2002) 583. 

47   PV(2002)1569 final. 

 
 
                                                      
31 

o 

for projects considered complex and highly technical, the Commission might 
produce technical reports, and internal documentation summarising the work 
that led to the opinion. However, there are no criteria defining when a project is 
considered complex and when such documentation should be compiled. 

64 We consider that the framework procedure in place does not ensure coherence, 
completeness and consistency in the Commission’s opinions. For example, we found 
that in one opinion, contrary to other opinions we looked at, the Commission does not 
cover aspects such as compliance with the legal framework on nuclear safety and 
radiation protection, security of fuel supply, spent fuel and radioactive waste 
management/decommissioning, or nuclear safeguards. 

65 The Commission recognised the need to improve its procedures and prepared a 
draft document in 2017. However, at the time of our audit, the Commission had not 
yet approved this draft. 

Verification of radioactivity monitoring facilities 

66 Article 35 of the Euratom Treaty requires each Member State to establish the 
facilities necessary to carry out continuous monitoring of the level of radioactivity in 
the air, water and soil, and to ensure compliance with the basic standards. Under the 
terms of the same article, the Commission has right to verify their operation and 
efficiency. 

67 The overall objective of the verifications under Article 35 is to check if facilities for 
continuous monitoring are in place and operable, and if monitoring is performed 
efficiently48. The Commission checks both the operation and efficiency of the facilities 
(including analytical laboratories, mobile monitoring equipment, and so on) together 
with the adequacy of the environmental monitoring system. 

68 We assessed whether the Commission had used its right to verify these facilities 
by carrying out verifications at regular intervals, using coherent and clear methodology 
and adequately reporting and following up the findings. 

48  SWD(2013) 226 final. 

 
 
                                                      
32 

69 A Commission communication49 outlines the arrangements for the conduct of 
verification visits and provides a general description of the scope, objective, principles 
for selecting the facilities to be verified, planning of the visits and reporting.  

70 The Commission performs its checks on the basis of a three-year rolling 
programme50, updated every six months. Territorial coverage and experience of past 
verifications as well as public interest are the main criteria for selecting the facilities 
for verification. For planning purposes, the Commission keeps track of territorial 
coverage i.e. the number of verifications in each Member State. By the time of our 
audit, the Commission was carrying out on average about 5-6 verifications per year. 

71 The Commission's normal practice is to publish its main findings and a technical 
report, together with the Member State’s comments. In the verification report, it may 
issue recommendations and suggestions or commend a particularly good practice or 
equipment. The Commission follows up its findings case-by-case, taking into account 
the specificity of the verification and the significance of the recommendations. If 
recommendations are given, it requests the Member State to report on the actions 
taken. It may also carry out a re-verification visit to check that previous 
recommendations have been given due attention. 

72 As regards the methodology for carrying out the verifications, we found similar 
flaws as the ones we identified in the Commission’s opinions on nuclear investment 
projects. The Commission had neither guidance on specific methodology for 
conducting the verifications, nor criteria for assessing the operation and efficiency of 
the facilities or the adequacy of the environmental monitoring programme. There was 
no agreed guidance on the follow-up procedure defining cases in which the 
Commission should conduct a re-verification visit.  

73 In recent years, the Commission has run an internal project to develop guidance 
for the conduct of verifications including a clear methodology and established criteria. 
However, at the time of our audit, they had not reached an internal agreement on this 
guidance. 

49   Verification of environmental radioactivity monitoring facilities under the terms of 

Article 35 of the Euratom Treaty – Practical arrangements for the conduct of verification 
visits in Member States (2006/C 155/02) of 4 July 2006. 

50  According to Communication 2006/C 155/02 of 4 July 2006, (15), verifications are generally 

performed in accordance with an annual programme set up by the Commission. 

 
 
                                                      
33 

Conclusions and recommendations 

74 We conclude that, overall, the Commission has contributed well to nuclear safety 
in the EU. However, there is scope for the Commission to update the legal framework 
and its internal guidelines. 

75 With regard to the Commission’s role in monitoring the transposition of Euratom 
directives into national legislation, we found that the Commission was better prepared 
for the two most recent directives, the amended Nuclear Safety Directive (NSD) and 
the Basic Safety Standards Directive (BSSD), than for the earlier Radioactive Waste and 
Spent Fuel Directive (RWD) (paragraphs 23 to 24). Commission services approved the 
key strategic documents before the transposition deadlines and made use of more 
compliance promoting tools for the NSD and BSSD than for the RWD. 

76 For the RWD, 13 infringement proceedings for non-conformity were still ongoing 
almost six years after the transposition deadline (paragraphs 25 to 26). Similarly, 
infringement proceedings were still ongoing in the majority of Member States for the 
non-compliance of national programmes required by the RWD, four years after the 
deadline. We noted that infringement proceedings sometimes moved slowly 
(paragraphs 26 to 28). 

Recommendation 1 – Updating the approach to monitoring 
transposition of Euratom Directives 

In order to more effectively facilitate and monitor Member States’ timely, complete 
and accurate transposition of future Euratom directives, the Commission should define 
guidelines that provide for a risk assessment as well as the approval of a strategy and 
interpretative guidance at least one year ahead of the transposition deadline. The 
strategy should stipulate the use of compliance-promoting tools as of the pre-
transposition phase. 

Target implementation date: Directives adopted after 2020 

77 The Commission’s role in the cross-border approach in the event of a radiological 
emergency is largely limited to maintaining a technical tool, because the provision of 
emergency preparedness and response arrangements is a national responsibility. The 
Commission manages the ECURIE arrangements well to satisfy the obligations arising 
from Council Decision 87/600 (paragraphs 31 to 36), although it could improve the 
follow-up of lessons learned and issues it has determined as needing improvement. 

 
 
34 

78 As regards the Commission’s opinions on investment projects, we found that the 
current framework is not up-to-date with the latest policy, legislative and technological 
developments in the field of nuclear safety (paragraphs 48 to 55). It does not ensure 
that the Commission obtains the information it needs to discuss “all aspects” of the 
investment projects which relate to the objectives of the Treaty51. By the time of our 
audit, the Commission had not taken further steps since 2016 in the process to 
propose an update to the legislation (paragraphs 56 to 58). 
79 The Commission uses the peer review results as an information source when 
assessing the transposition and implementation of the directives (paragraph 29), and 
when preparing its opinions on investment projects (paragraph 46 to 47). Once the 
transposition and conformity checks are complete, the Commission will continue to be 
responsible for monitoring the results of the peer reviews. 

Recommendation 2 – Updating the legislative framework  

When, in line with the 2015 energy union package, the Commission presents a 
legislative proposal for an updated framework covering nuclear investment projects, it 
should take into account: 

o 

o 

the latest legislative and policy developments in the field of nuclear safety and 
the most recent Euratom directives; 

the latest changes in the nature of nuclear investment projects, notably new 
technologies and LTOs; 

o 

the experience of its participation as an observer in the peer reviews. 

Target implementation date: 2022 

51   As set in Article 43 of the Euratom Treaty. 

 
 
 
                                                      
35 

80 The Commission contributes to improving nuclear safety and radiation protection 
in the EU by giving opinions on nuclear investment projects and verifying Member 
States’ facilities for continuous monitoring of the level of radioactivity. However, our 
audit showed some limitations that may reduce the added value of the Commission’s 
activities. We found that the Commission does not have robust procedures to prepare 
the opinions on nuclear investments (paragraphs 60 to 65) and to verify Member 
States’ facilities for monitoring radioactivity (paragraphs 66 to 73). The lack of 
approved methodologies leaves high levels of discretion to the Commission, which 
compromises the completeness, consistency and coherence of these activities.  

Recommendation 3 – Updating procedures 

In order to ensure a consistent and coherent approach to check radioactivity 
monitoring facilities and to prepare opinions on nuclear investments, the Commission 
should establish internal procedures to ensure that the work is consistently performed, 
documented and reviewed. 

Target implementation date: 2022 

This Report was adopted by Chamber I, headed by Mr Joao Figueiredo, Member of the 
Court of Auditors, in Luxembourg at its meeting of 8 January 2020. 

For the Court of Auditors 

Klaus-Heiner Lehne 
President 

 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
36 

Annexes 

Annex I – The Commission’s checks 

Table 1 – Transposition checks 

RWD 

NSD 

BSSD 

Transposition deadline 

23/08/2013 

15/08/2017 

06/02/2018 

Notifications submitted by the deadline or before the 
launch of non-communication infringements 

End of check on Member States (MS) that notified their 
transposing measures before the launch of non-
communication infringements 

Duration of the check on MS that notified their transposing 
measures before the launch of infringement proceedings 
(months) – target: 6 months53 

Number of MS that have not notified complete 
transposition at the time of this audit (July 2019) 

Number of non-communication and non-completeness 
infringement proceedings launched 

17 

24 

21 

11/2013 

06/2018 

ongoing52 

3 

0 

13 

10 

ongoing 

1 

7 

8 

9 

Time between LFNs and ROs (months) 

24 to 29 

6 to 9 

8 to 10 

Overall duration of infringement proceedings (months) 

5054 

ongoing 

ongoing 

52  The Commission expects to finalise the checks in the first quarter of 2020; expected 

duration: 23/25 months. 

53  Commission, Better Regulation Toolbox 37. 

54  Duration of the longest infringement procedure. 

 
 
 
 
                                                      
37 

Table 2 – Conformity checks 

Start of the check 

End of the check 

Overall duration of the check (months) – target: 
16/24 months55 

Number of checks (= MS) completed at the time of this audit 

Number of infringements launched 

Number of infringements open at the time of this audit 

Table 3 – RWD National Programmes 

RWD 

NSD 

24/08/2013 

01/06/2018 

06/2018 

ongoing 

57 

28 

15 

13 

ongoing 

14 

0 

0 

BSSD 

Not yet 
started 

Not yet 
started 

Not yet 
started 

Not yet 
started 

Not yet 
started 

Not yet 
started 

Start of the check 

End of the check 

Non-communication  Non-compliance 

23/08/2015 

11/2015 

23/08/2015 

05/2018 

Overall duration of the check (months) 

Number of infringements launched 

Number of infringements open at the time of this 
audit 

3 

9 

1 

33 

17 

17 

55  Commission, Better Regulation Toolbox 37. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
38 

Annex II – Examples of non-conformity cases in the 
transposition of the RWD 

RWD 
Article 

Requirement 

Non - conformity 

5(1)(c)  Member States are required to set up a 

national framework that includes a 
licensing system for spent fuel and 
radioactive waste management activities 
and/or facilities. 

The licensing system set up by some 
Member States did not include all activities 
related to the management of spent fuel or 
radioactive waste, such as disposal of the 
waste as well as siting, design, construction, 
and closure of the facilities. 

6(3) 

7(3) 

7(5) 

8 

Member States must ensure that the 
competent regulatory authority is given 
the legal powers and human and financial 
resources to fulfil its obligations under the 
RWD. 

Member States are required to ensure 
that the licensing requirements include a 
safety demonstration covering the 
development and operation of nuclear 
activities, and the development, operation 
and decommissioning or closure of nuclear 
facilities, including the post-closure phase 
in the case of disposal facilities. 

The national frameworks are required to 
include an obligation for licence holders to 
ensure adequate financial and human 
resources. 

The national frameworks are required to 
include an obligation for all parties to 
make arrangements for the education and 
training for their staff, as well as research 
and development activities to cover the 
needs of the National Plans. 

Some Member States failed to demonstrate 
that their regulatory authority were given 
the necessary resources to fulfil its 
obligations under the RWD. 

Some Member States failed to ensure that 
the safety demonstration requirements 
covered all aspects. 

Some Member States failed to make any 
reference to adequate human resources. 

Some Member States failed to ensure that 
all parties, including generators, licensees, 
the competent regulatory authorities and 
other authorities, were obliged to make the 
arrangements for education and training for 
their staff. The transposing measures of 
some Member States do not make any 
reference to research and development 
activities. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
39 

Glossary 

Accident: Any unintended event which has, or may have, significant consequences 
from a radioactivity or nuclear safety perspective. 

Added value: the value generated by EU action which is additional to the value that 
would have been created by Member State action alone. 

Commission’s opinions: Commission’s opinions on nuclear investment projects given 
pursuant to the procedure set out in Articles 41 to 44 of the Euratom Treaty. 

Emergency: An unexpected radiation or nuclear situation requiring immediate action 
to avert or mitigate serious adverse consequences. 

Emergency preparedness: The state of readiness to take action that will mitigate the 
consequences of an emergency. 

Emergency response: The performance of action to mitigate the consequences of an 
emergency. 

EU Pilot: An informal dialogue between the Commission and a Member State on 
potential non-compliance with EU law, prior to the launch of a formal infringement 
procedure. 

Incident: Any unintended event, the consequences or potential consequences of which 
are not negligible from the point of view of radiation protection or nuclear safety. 

Ionising radiation: Energy transferred in the form of particles or electromagnetic 
waves, capable of directly or indirectly producing ions, i.e. atoms or molecules with an 
electric charge. 

Irradiation: Exposure to radiation. 

Licence: A legal document granting authorisation to carry out certain activities relating 
to the management of spent fuel or radioactive waste, or conferring responsibility for 
siting, designing, constructing, commissioning, operating, decommissioning or closing a 
spent fuel management or radioactive waste management facility or nuclear 
installation. 

Long-term operation: Operation of a nuclear power plant beyond the time frame 
established in the licence, standards or regulations, provided it continues to meet 
licensing requirements. 

Nuclear: Relating to or using energy released in nuclear fission or fusion. 

 
 
40 

Nuclear installation: A nuclear power plant, enrichment plant, nuclear fuel fabrication 
plant, reprocessing plant, research reactor facility, spent fuel Storage facility; and 
storage facilities for radioactive waste that are on the same site. 

Radioactivity: The phenomenon whereby atoms undergo spontaneous random 
disintegration, usually accompanied by the emission of radiation. 

Spent fuel: Nuclear fuel that has been removed from a reactor core following 
irradiation. It may be reprocessed, or disposed of if considered radioactive waste. 

Stress test: Risk and safety assessments carried out on all EU nuclear power plants to 
measure their ability to withstand hazards such as earthquakes, flooding, terrorist 
attacks and aircraft collisions. 

Undertaking: A natural or legal person with responsibility under national law for a 
radiation source or for performing an activity that can increase individuals’ exposure to 
radiation from a radiation source. 

 
 
 
 
41 

Acronyms and abbreviations 

BSSD: Basic Safety Standards Directive 

CJEU: Court of Justice of the European Union 

ECURIE: European Community Urgent Radiological Information Exchange 

ENSREG: European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group 

EP&R: Emergency Preparedness and Response 

EURDEP: European Radiological Data Exchange Platform 

IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency 

JRC: Joint Research Centre 

LFN: Letter of Formal Notice 

LTO: Long Term Operation 

NEA: Nuclear Energy Agency 

NSD: Nuclear Safety Directive 

RO: Reasoned Opinion 

RWD: Radioactive Waste and Spent Fuel Directive 

TFEU: Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 

USIE: Unified System for Information Exchange in Incidents and Emergencies 

WANO: World Association of Nuclear Operators 

WENRA: Western European Nuclear Regulators' Association 

 
 
 
 
REPLIES OF THE COMMISSION TO THE SPECIAL REPORT OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF 
AUDITORS 

“THE COMMISSION CONTRIBUTES TO NUCLEAR SAFETY IN THE EU, BUT UPDATES 
REQUIRED” 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

I.  Nuclear  safety  is  a  priority  for  the  European  Commission.  The  EU  approach  to  nuclear  safety  is 
based on the principles of meeting the highest safety levels and aiming for continuous improvement, 
in order to protect people, to control hazards, to prevent and respond to emergencies and to mitigate 
any harmful consequences. 

To this end, the EU has set up an advanced, legally binding, enforceable legal framework on nuclear 
safety,  radiation  protection,  emergency  preparedness  and  response,  and  radioactive  waste  and  spent 
fuel management, anchored on the worldwide-shared principles of the international conventions and 
strengthened in the light of the lessons learned from the Fukushima nuclear accident and of the latest 
scientific developments. 

IV.  The  European  Commission  has  been  given  by  the  Treaties,  as  a  rule,  the  right  of  initiative  to 
propose new EU / Euratom legislation. However, it cannot itself adopt the proposed legislation; this is 
the prerogative of the two decision-making institutions, the European Parliament and/or the Council. 

IX. See Commission replies to paragraphs 63 and 72. 

OBSERVATIONS 

25. The Commission strives to complete the conformity check within the 16 to 24-month benchmark, 
which  is  not  a  legal  deadline  and  is  calculated  from  the  date  of  the  communication  of  the  national 
transposition measures. Thus, the check depends indeed on the communication of those measures by 
the Member States. 

The Commission agrees with the statement by the ECA and notes that the delay could be explained by 
the  fact  that  the  Member  States  had  to  adopt  a  national  programme  for  spent  fuel  and  radioactive 
waste management for the first time by 23 August 2015. 

38.  Public  communication  in  case  of  an  emergency  primarily  falls  under  the  remit  of  the  Member 
States, in line with Article 3(1)(h) of Council Decision 87/600/Euratom. However, the Commission 
services prepare press releases and communicates these to the Commission’s Spokesperson, as part of 
the ECURIE exercises. 

As regards the training of national experts, the Commission organises, whenever needed, trainings for 
national competent authorities on ECURIE and EURDEP, in particular when there are changes to the 
system.  The  need  for  such  training  programmes  is  discussed  and  agreed  during  the  ECURIE 
Competent Authorities meetings. 

63. As regards the opinions on nuclear investment projects, to date, the Commission has used internal 
procedures  based  on  the  wording  of  the  Euratom  Treaty  and  the  existing  Regulations  in  force,  i.e. 
Council Regulation (EURATOM) No 2587/1999 of 2 December 1999 defining the investment projects 
to be communicated to the Commission in accordance with Article 41 of the Treaty establishing the 
European Atomic Energy Community (OJ L 315, 9.12.1999, p. 1-3), and Commission Regulation (EC) 
No  1209/2000  of  8  June  2000  determining  procedures  for  effecting  the  communications  prescribed 
under  Article  41  of  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European  Atomic  Energy  Community  (OJ  L  138, 
9.6.2000, p. 12-14). 

EN 

1 

  EN 

 
 
 
 
64.  The  case  described  in  this  paragraph  by  ECA  was  a  voluntary  notification  (i.e.  project  for  an 
investment amount below the threshold defined by the legal framework) that falls under Article 1(4) 
of Council Regulation 2587/1999. 

72. The verifications are based on the Verification of environmental radioactivity monitoring facilities 
under  the  terms  of  Article  35  of  the  Euratom  Treaty  —  Practical  arrangements  for  the  conduct  of 
verification visits in Member States (OJ C 155, 4.7.2006, p. 2–5), the verification team’s expertise and 
a comparison with arrangements in other Member States. 

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

74.  The  European  Commission  has  been  given  by  the  Treaties,  as  a  rule,  the  right  of  initiative  to 
propose new EU / Euratom legislation. However, it cannot itself adopt the proposed legislation; this is 
the prerogative of the two decision-making institutions, the European Parliament and/or the Council. 

Recommendation 1 – Updating the approach to monitoring transposition of Euratom Directives 

The Commission  accepts the recommendation. 

The Commission accepts to define the necessary guidelines– to be established by internal decision of 
the  responsible  Commission  service  -  that  provide  for  a  transposition  risk  assessment  for  future 
Euratom directives. This risk assessment will evaluate the key areas of these Directives, and the need 
to develop more detailed internal interpretative guidance and / or strategy to support the Commission 
staff in carrying out the compliance checks. 

Recommendation 2 – Updating the legislative framework 

The Commission accepts the recommendation. 

80. See Commission replies to paragraph 63 and 72. 

Recommendation 3 – Updating procedures 

The Commission accepts the recommendation. 

The  Commission  is  prepared  to  establish  –  by  decision  of  the  responsible  Commission  service  – 
appropriate internal procedures to ensure that the work of checking radioactivity monitoring facilities 
is consistently performed, documented and reviewed. 

EN 

2 

  EN 

 
 
 
 
 
Timeline 

Event 

Date 

Adoption of Audit Planning Memorandum (APM) / Start of audit 

12.12.2018 

Official sending of draft report to Commission  
(or other auditee) 

21.11.2019 

Adoption of the final report after the adversarial procedure 

8.1.2020 

Commission’s (or other auditee’s) official replies received in all 
languages 

4.2.2020 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
COPYRIGHT 

© European Union, 2020. 

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PDF 
HTML 

ISBN: 978-92-847-4313-1 
ISBN: 978-92-847-4289-9 

ISSN: 1977-5679 
ISSN: 1977-5679 

doi: 10.2865/45256  QJ-AB-20-002-EN-N 
doi: 10.2865/694224  QJ-AB-20-002-EN-Q 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 

The primary responsibility for nuclear safety lies with nuclear 
installations’ licence holders and national authorities. The 
specific responsibilities of the Commission in this area are to 
develop the Euratom legal framework and oversee its 
transposition in Member States; to verify Member States’ 
radioactivity monitoring facilities; and to check the 
compatibility of nuclear investments with the Euratom Treaty.  
We conclude that overall the Commission used these 
competences well and contributed to nuclear safety in the EU. 
Our recommendations focus on the Commission’s role in 
monitoring the transposition of Euratom directives, the 
framework under which it issues the opinions on nuclear 
investments, and the approach it applies when preparing the 
opinions and carrying out verifications of radioactivity 
monitoring facilities.  

ECA special report pursuant to Article 287(4), second 
subparagraph, TFEU.