COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Slot relief measures in light of the COVID-19 pandemic Accompanying the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the European Council amending Council Regulation (EEC) No 95/93 as regards temporary relief from the slot utilisation rules at Community airports due to the COVID-19 pandemic
Date: 2020-12-16
Institutions: Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport, European Commission
Subjects: air traffic, airport, carrier, common transport policy, coronavirus disease, epidemic, transport capacity, transport planning

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 16.12.2020  SWD(2020) 341 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Slot relief measures in light of the COVID-19 pandemic Accompanying the  Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the European Council amending Council Regulation (EEC) No 95/93 as regards temporary relief from the slot utilisation rules at Community airports due to the COVID-19 pandemic {COM(2020) 818 final}  
 
 
Table of Contents 
1. 

Introduction: Political and legal context ......................................................................................... 2 

2.  Challenges ....................................................................................................................................... 5 

3. 

The need for the EU to act now .................................................................................................... 18 

4.  Objectives pursued ....................................................................................................................... 19 

5.  Proposed way forward .................................................................................................................. 20 

6.  What are the likely consequences of the proposed way forward? .............................................. 27 

7.  Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 30 

1 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This analytical document describes the challenges associated with full application of the 
‘use-it-or-lose-it’ rule under Regulation (EEC) 95/93 on common rules for the allocation 
of  slots  at  Community  airports.  It  proposes  ways  to  overcome  these  challenges  and 
anticipates  the  likely  consequences  of  taking  the  proposed  way  forward.  Given  the 
urgency of the matter, this document does not constitute an impact assessment under the 
Better Regulation rules. 

1. 

INTRODUCTION: POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT 

The  Slot  Regulation1  establishes  a  mechanism  for  allocating  capacity  (slots)  at  congested 
airports in a non-discriminatory and transparent manner.  

The  Regulation  defines  a  slot  as  permission  to  use  the  full  range  of  airport  infrastructure 
necessary to operate an air service at a congested airport on a specific date and time, for the 
purpose of landing or take-off. When airlines request a slot on the same day of the week and 
time of the day for at least five weeks, the slots constitute a ‘series’. Air carriers must use at 
least 80% of a slot series allocated to them and then they are entitled to the same series the 
next equivalent season. This is known as ‘grandfathering’ slots or obtaining ‘historic’ rights 
to  use them. The rule requiring  airlines to  use at least  80% of their  slot  series  is  called the 
‘use-it-or-lose-it’ rule or the 80/20 rule. 

Slots  are  essential  for  airlines  at  congested  or  coordinated  airports.  The  Regulation  defines 
‘coordinated’  airports  as  those  where  demand  exceeds  capacity.  Without  a  slot,  airlines 
cannot operate to or from those airports. The number of slots at those airports is limited and 
therefore demand exceeds capacity, which creates entry barriers. To ensure that the aviation 
sector  remains  competitive,  with  benefits  for  EU  consumers,  it  is  therefore  important  that 
slots  are  allocated  in  a  non-discriminatory  manner  to  the  airlines  that  make  the  best  use  of 
them. The provisions of the Slot Regulation aim to strike a balance between giving airlines 
the  stability  they  need  to  run  their  operations  (grandfathering  rule)  and  ensuring  slots  are 
made available to competitors and/or new entrants if they are not used (use-it-or-lose-it rule). 

Since the beginning of 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic has had a profound negative impact 
on  air  transport  in  Europe  and  worldwide.  In  June  2020,  IATA  announced  that  it  expected 
airlines  to  suffer  an  unprecedented  net  loss  of  approximately  EUR  71.2  billion  (USD  83.4 
billion)  (3.2%  net  margin)  in  2020.2  The  resulting  public  health  protection  measures  and 
travel restrictions brought in by EU Member States and non-EU countries in response to the 
pandemic have heavily depressed consumer demand and confidence, which in turn has led to 
a record and enduring reduction in air traffic in the European Union.3 The number of flights 
operated in European airspace fell by up to 90% in March-April 2020 compared to the same 

1   Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No 95/93  of  18 January  1993  on  common  rules  for  the  allocation  of  slots  at 

Community airports, OJ L 14, 22.1.1993, p. 1. 

2    Economic Performance of the Airline Industry – Jun 2020. 
3        The  World  Health  Organisation  declared  it  a  “Public  Health  Emergency  of  International  Concern”  on  30 
January  and  a  pandemic  on  11  March  https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/30-01-2020-statement-on-the-
second-meeting-of-the-international-health-regulations-(2005)-emergency-committee-regarding-the-outbreak-
of-novel-coronavirus-(2019-ncov)  and  https://www.who.int/dg/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-opening-
remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19---11-march-2020 

2 

 
 
 
                                                           
period in 2019.4 Europe’s airports handled over 5 million passengers on 1 March 2020 but by 
31 March, the volume fell to just 174 000 (down -97.1% compared to the same day in 2019). 

It quickly became apparent that airlines could not be expected to continue business as usual. 
As a response, on 30 March 2020, the EU adopted Regulation (EU) 2020/459 (Slot Waiver) 
amending the Slot Regulation to suspend the application of the use-it-or-lose-it rule until the 
end of the 2020 summer season, which runs until 24 October 2020. The aim of waiving the 
slot  usage  requirement  was  to  allow  airlines  to  make  more  financially  sound  decisions  on 
which flights to operate and avoid the negative environmental impact of operating empty or 
largely  empty  flights  only  in  order  to  maintain  their  airport  slots.  The  amendment  also 
enabled  the  Commission  to  extend  the  duration  of  the  slot  waiver  by  way  of  one  or  more 
delegated acts. This delegation of power ends on 2 April 2021. 

The Commission is obliged under Regulation 2020/459 to monitor the traffic and COVID-19 
situation to determine whether traffic has decreased due to the COVID-19 crisis and to issue 
a report by 15 September 2020. The Commission adopted this report on 14 September 20205. 
Based  on  data  in  the  report,  the  Commission  adopted  a  delegated  act  extending  the  slot 
waiver  under  Article  10a(4)  of  the  Slot  Regulation  until  the  end  of  the  winter  2020/2021 
scheduling  season,  i.e.  until  27 March 20216.  The  Commission  report  also  described  a 
number of shortcomings of the current slot waiver that warrant reflection on the next policy 
steps.  Some  of  these  shortcomings  were  also  raised  by  major  European  airline,  airport  and 
slot-coordination associations in their joint agreement on 7 August 2020 on best practices for 
implementing the slot waiver over the winter 2020/2021 season.  

Industry agreement between A4E, IATA, AIRE, ACI Europe, and EUACA on 
conditions that should be applied to an extension of a slot waiver to the full NW2020 
season7 

  The  waiver  extension  should  apply  to  series  of  slots  held  on  31 August 2020  (the 

historic baseline date8). 

  The waiver should not apply to series of slots newly allocated from the pool for the 
NW209 season. Slots newly allocated from the pool for the NW20 season, which an 
airline does not intend to use should be handed back prior to the historic baseline date. 
  The  waiver  will  not  apply  to  series  of  slots  of  an  airline  that  permanently  ceases 
operations  at  an  airport10.  An  airline  that  ceases  operations  at  an  airport  must 

4    https://www.eurocontrol.int/sites/default/files/2020-04/draft-performance-review-report-prr2019.pdf;  Cargo 
traffic also plummeted: IATA reported a 27.7% decrease in global cargo tonne kilometres between April 2019 
and April 2020 (Alan Dron, Aviation Daily, 4 June 2020). 
5   COM(2020) 558 final. 
6   Commission  Delegated  Regulation  (EU)  2020/1477  of  14  October  2020  amending  Council  Regulation 
(EEC) No 95/93 as regards the temporary extension of exceptional measures to address the consequences 
caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, OJ L 338, 15.10.2020, p. 4. 
7https://www.euaca.org/up/files/NW20%20EU%20Slot%20Waiver%20-
%20Common%20proposal%20airlines%20-%20airports%20-%20slots%20coordinators.pdf.  
8   The  historic  baseline  date  is  the  final  date  for  airlines  to  confirm  which  slots  they  keep  for  the  next 

scheduling season. As of this date, the use-it-or-lose-it rule applies. 

9   NW20 denotes the northern winter 2020/2021 scheduling season. 
10   According to the agreement, an airline with no intention of operating in NW21 following non-use of those 

slots in the NW20 period. 

3 

 
 
 
                                                           
immediately return all the slots allocated to it for the remainder of the season and for 
the next season (if already allocated) and advise the coordinator whether or not it will 
use the slots  in  the future.  If an airline  fails to  provide necessary information on its 
plans for a certain airport by a reasonable deadline date set by the coordinator, then 
the  coordinator  may  withdraw  and  reallocate  the  slots  after  having  heard  the  airline 
concerned. 

  Where an airline does not intend to utilize slots, the series or part of a series, should 
be  returned  as  soon  as  plans  are  known  to  allow  reallocation.  Where  substantial 
changes  to  schedules  are  known,  the  airline  should  inform  the  airport  and  the 
coordinator of its intentions as soon as the waiver is granted and update the slots that 
have been allocated accordingly. 

  An airline which suspends its operations at an airport should immediately return the 
slots  allocated  to  it  for  the  winter  2020/2021  scheduling  season  to  the  slot  pool  for 
reallocation. 

  Airlines must hand back slots not intended for utilization as soon as possible, but not 
later  than  three  weeks  prior  to  planned  operation  for  these  slots  to  be  considered  as 
operated in the context of the waiver. 

  Consideration for alleviation should be given to slots that are returned less than three 
weeks  before  operation  should  circumstances  be  outside  the  airline’s  control  and 
related  to  the  crisis.  Requests  for  alleviation  on  this  basis  should  be  submitted  to 
coordinators as promptly as possible for the coordinator to consider. 

  Slots  newly  allocated  and  operated  as  a  series  may  be  considered  for  historic  status 
only  if  they  meet  the  80%  usage  requirement.  In  the  event  of  newly  allocated  slots 
being within the same capacity relevant time/period where the same carrier has been 
given alleviation against historic slots, that historic status will only be given to newly 
allocated slots where historic slots from W20 SHL within the same capacity relevant 
time/period have also met the 80% usage requirement. 

This staff working analytical document accompanies the Commission proposal to amend the 
Slot Regulation. It sets out the consequences and challenges of applying the use-it-or-lose it 
rule  during  the  COVID-19  pandemic,  provides  information  on  the  operation  of  the  slot 
waiver  since  its  entry  into  force  and  describes  the  shortcomings  and  challenges  that  have 
emerged in the aviation market. In addition, it discusses phasing out the waiver, linked to the 
gradual return of air traffic. It presents a way forward to overcome the challenges identified 
and describes the likely consequences of the proposed action on the market.  

Due to the need to act quickly, and since the measures to provide further relief from the slot 
rules during the COVID-19 pandemic will be temporary, no impact  assessment was carried 
out. However, the Commission has been in close contact with the main stakeholder groups, in 
particular  airlines,  airports  and  slot  coordinators,  to  monitor  implementation  of  the  slot 
waiver  adopted  in  March  2020.  It  published  a  roadmap  for  feedback  and  ran  a  public 
consultation  from  1 September  until  28 September 2020.  The  Commission  received  18 
replies  to  the  roadmap,  71  replies  to  the  public consultation  (from  47  airlines,  9  airports,  8 
slot coordinators and 7 other), and 42 replies to the targeted consultation (from 17 airlines, 13 
airports and 12 slot coordinators). This working document draws on the information provided 
in response to the consultation, available air traffic data (Eurocontrol), market monitoring and 
experience to present the Commission’s findings. 

4 

 
 
2.  CHALLENGES 

The  challenges  below  are  grouped  under  two  headings:  (A)  challenges  related  to  full 
application  of  the  use-it-or-lose-it  rule  during  the  COVID-19  pandemic  and  (B)  challenges 
with the current slot waiver. 

Figure 2.1 Intervention logic  

A.  Challenges related to full application of the use-it-or-lose-it principle  

The  volume  of  air  traffic  in  autumn  2020  remains  at  historically  low  levels.  The  period  of 
severely depressed demand for air transport is lasting longer than previous crises affecting air 
traffic levels. Although April to August 2020 saw a steady increase, air traffic in Europe was 
still down 47% in August,  year-on-year. The new restrictions brought in by Member States 
amid a resurgence in the pandemic since August 2020 resulted in the slow recovery stalling, 
with  traffic  once  again  falling  below  50%  of  pre-pandemic  levels.  In  week  47  (starting  16 
November 2020) air traffic levels were down 65% compared to the same week in 2019. 

Figure 2. 2 Number of flights in a given week of 2020 compared to 2019 (source: Eurocontrol) 

5 

 DRIVERSCHALLENGESCONSEQUENCESSPECIFIC OBJECTIVESGENERAL OBJECTIVEDriver 2Late-handback of slotsSpecific Objective 3 Ensure efficientuse of airport capacity Challenge 3Current waiver rules riskinefficient and poorly planned airport operationsChallenge4Current waiver risks increasing barriers to entry leading to distortions of competitionDriver 1Slot Regulation -use-it-or-lose it rule applies in fullunless there is a waiver in placeChallenge 1Risk of airlines operating environmentallyharmfulflights withvery low load factorsto protect their historicslotsChallenges 2Risk of inefficiencies compromisingairlines' financial positiondueto the need to operate largely empty flights just to keep their historic slotsUnnecessarynegative impacts on environmentLoss of services and efficienciesRisk of higher prices and less qualitySpecific Objective 1Minimise harmful effects on the environmentUnnecessaryexpenditure for airlinesA.Challenges related to the full application of the use-it-or-lose-it principle B.Challenges related to the continuing applicationof the slot waiver rules in their current formDriver 5Current slot waiver also covers newly requested slots (even if requested by airlines exiting the airport)Driver 6Risk of airlines engaging in secondary trading to benefitfrom the slot waiverDriver 4Current slot waiver does not address reduced airport capacity due to health and safety measuresDriver 3Current waiveris binary and does not take into account differences in air trafficGeneral Objective Contributeto the well-functioning of the internal aviation market during the COVID-19 pandemic along the entire aviation value chain and to ensure the welfare of the travelling publicSpecific Objective 2Ensure airlines can  operate efficiently 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EEA traffic 2019 vs 2020 

200.000

150.000

100.000

50.000

0

1

3

5

7

9

11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47

2019

2020

The timing  and strength of the  recovery  for the  aviation  sector is  uncertain.  It  will depend, 
among other factors, on the success of the response to the COVID-19 pandemic, on changes 
to restrictions on air transport and on the degree of passenger confidence, both in terms of air 
travel as a safe mode of travel, and in the economy. The economy will affect business travel 
in  particular.  Air  traffic  will  not  recover  to  the  2019  levels  before  the  end  of  the  winter 
2020/2021 scheduling period. Eurocontrol’s forecast of 14 September 2020 predicts that by 
February 2021, traffic will still be 50% lower than it was in  February 202011, worse than a 
previous forecast that estimated only a 15% decrease in February 2021.  

Figure 2. 3 Eurocontrol draft traffic scenarios (source: Eurocontrol) 

A  more  recent  Eurocontrol  forecast  of  4  November  2020  spans  several  years  and  shows 
scenarios. 

11   For  the  purposes  of  year-on-year  comparisons,  February  2020  is  the  last  month  for  which  air  traffic  in 
Europe was largely unaffected by the COVID-19 crisis. For this reason, comparisons beyond March 2021 
would need to be made in reference to March 2019 in order to gauge the impact of COVID-19 on air traffic. 

6 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Figure 2. 4 Eurocontrol draft traffic scenarios (source: Eurocontrol) 

Given the actual and the forecast level of air traffic linked to COVID-1912, the Commission 
extended  the  period  of  application  of  the  slot  waiver  until  the  end  of  the  winter  2020/2021 
scheduling season (i.e. 27 March 2021) by issuing a delegated act on 14 October 2020.  

Looking ahead to after the winter 2020/2021 scheduling season, the industry (IATA and ACI 
Europe)  predicts  that  the  sector  will  need  at  least  until  2024/25  to  recover  to  2019  levels.  
However,  despite  such  forecasts  there  is  no  Eurocontrol  or  scientific  data  available  for  the 
Commission to extend the slot waiver to cover this timeframe by the time the Commission’s 
delegated  power  to  extend  the  slot  waiver  expires  on  2 April 2021.  This  is  because  more 
robust  actual  traffic  data  would  be  necessary  to  extend  the  waiver,  rather  than  forecasts 
spanning several years. Once the Commission’s delegated power ends on 2 April 2021, it will 
not be able to react quickly to extend the waiver beyond what is justified by the data available 
at that time.  

Challenge  1:  Risk  of  some  airlines  operating  environmentally  harmful  flights  at  very 
low load factors to protect their historic slots 

12   Paragraph  4  of  Article  10a  of  the  Slot  regulation  states:  Where  the  Commission  finds,  on  the  basis  of 
figures published by Eurocontrol, which is the network manager for the air traffic network functions of the 
single  European  sky,  that  the  reduction  in  the  level  of  air  traffic  as  compared  to  the  level  in  the 
corresponding period in the previous year is persisting and is likely to persist, and also finds, on the basis of 
the best available scientific data, that this situation is the result of the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, 
the Commission shall adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 12a to amend the period specified in 
paragraph 1 accordingly. 

7 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
Airport slots are essential, valuable assets for airlines, particularly slots at heavily congested 
hubs. Despite the heavily depressed demand, and if no relief protects airlines’ historic rights 
over slots, air carriers may operate empty or largely empty planes just to maintain their slot 
portfolio. Such flights, flown predominantly to avoid the consequences of the use-it-or-lose it 
principle, would generate unnecessary and avoidable emissions of carbon dioxide and other 
pollutants.  The  data  submitted  to  the  Commission  indicates  that,  in  the  early  weeks  of  the 
pandemic and before the slot waiver was granted, airlines continued to operate flights despite 
the load factor dropping from 80% to 38% (weeks 9-13 of 2020)13. Many flights were only 
cancelled  after  the  waiver  had  been  put  in  place  and  airlines  had  legal  certainty  regarding 
their historic rights in slots. 

Stakeholder views. 63 out of 70 respondents to the public consultation (including IATA and 
the  vast  majority  of  airlines)  replied  that  EU  action  is  necessary  to  avoid  negative 
environmental  impacts  of  operating  empty  or  largely  empty  flights  for  the  sole  purpose  of 
maintaining  their  airport  slots.  As  a  result,  IATA  estimates  27  million  additional  tonnes  of 
carbon  dioxide  could  be  avoided  by  extending  the  waiver  to  cover  the  winter  2020/2021 
scheduling  season.  However,  two  stakeholders  (one  airline  and  one  consumer  organisation) 
questioned  whether  airlines  would  be  in  a  financial  position  to  operate  empty  or  largely 
empty flights.  

Challenge 2: Risk of inefficiencies compromising airlines’ financial position due to the 
need for airlines to operate largely empty flights solely to maintain their historic slots 

Slots  are  essential  to  operate  to/from  congested  airports  and  important  for  air  carriers  to 
maintain their networks. Large hub carriers such as Lufthansa, Air France/KLM, Iberia, LOT 
Polish airlines to name a few have taken years to develop their networks and acquire slots for 
intra-European,  intra-continental  and  feeder  traffic.  Losing  these  slots  or  significantly 
reducing their network could interfere with these airlines’ business models of providing inter-
continental services. The same applies to other airline business models where an airline has 
worked for years to build a significant market presence at specific congested airports.  

In  addition,  interference  with  airlines’  slots  is  highly  contested  due  to  the  impact  slots  at 
congested airports have on the airline company’s value as a result of the business opportunity 
these  slots  represent..  Financial  compensation  for  slot  exchanges  can  be  significant,  even 
though  only  the  UK  has  a  transparent  market  for  slots14.  Other  ways  in  which  air  carriers 
monetise their slots, which gives an indication of their value, is to declare them as intangible 
assets on their balance sheets15. Slots are also used as securities16 against loans.  

13   Data  gathered  for  Commission’s  summary  report  pursuant  to  paragraph  4  or  Article  10a  of  Regulation 

2020/459 of 14 September 2020, COM(2020) 558 final. 

14   For example, one of the most expensive publically known deals reported in the media was the exchange in 
2016  of  a  pair  of  slots  at  London  Heathrow  airport  between  Oman  Air  and  Air  France-KLM.  The  deal 
included financial compensation of US$75 million from Oman Air. https://simpleflying.com/inside-airport-
slots/ 

15   For example, the 2018 financial report for Lufthansa indicates slots as intangible assets at a value of EUR 

112 million, and Ryanair’s 2019 annual report indicates slots valued at EUR 146.4 million. 

16   In  2015,  Virgin  Atlantic  used  its  Heathrow  slots  to  raise  £220m.  In  September  2019,  Norwegian 
successfully used its slot portfolio at Gatwick airport as part of an exchange package to delay repayment of 
unsecured  bonds.  Norwegian  stated  that  the  value  of  its  Gatwick  slot  portfolio  exceeded  the  US$ 380m 
nominal value of the bonds. 

8 

 
 
 
                                                           
Since  slots  are  essential  to  maintain  air  carriers’  networks  and  are  an  asset  with  intrinsic 
economic value, airlines have a high incentive to operate their slots, even with low demand. It 
is therefore reasonable to assume that airlines will try to maintain their slot portfolio despite 
high operating costs.  

Given the persistent, heavily supressed demand due to COVID-19, airlines’ operational costs 
are  not  offset  by  revenue  from  the  sale  of  tickets  and  cargo  services17.  The  financial  strain 
that airlines are under is evident from  the  high number of  requests received for State  aid18. 
Three airlines have already gone bankrupt since the beginning of the pandemic (Flybe, Level 
Europe,  and  German  airways)  and,  according  to  IATA,  more  will  follow19.  In  this  context, 
full  application  of  the  use-it-or-lose-it  principle  may  be  an  additional  financial  factor 
jeopardising the financial fitness of some airlines, to the detriment of their employees (risk of 
permanent job loss), passengers (less choice) and connectivity (permanently closed routes).  

Stakeholder views. In its submission to the public consultation, IATA estimated that, in the 
absence of a waiver, global airlines could incur additional operating costs of EUR 10.6 billion 
(USD 12.6  billion)  over  the  winter  2020/2021  season  by  operating  flights  they  would  not 
have otherwise operated. In this context and with lower passenger demand, revenue would be 
negligible  and  airlines  would  quickly  burn  through  any  government  aid  they  received.  By 
contrast,  as  for  challenge  1,  2  some  stakeholders  argued  that  airlines  would  not  be  in  a 
financial position to operate inefficient flights.  

B.  Challenges related to the application of the current slot waiver rules 

Challenge 3: There is a risk that the current waiver rules lead to inefficient and poorly 
planned airport operations.  

The  current  waiver  suspending 
the  use-it-or-lose-it  rule  until 
the  application  of 
24 October 2020  has  brought  in  inefficiencies  and  contributed  to  poor  planning  of  airport 
operations.  

In  the  short  term,  due  to  the  late  hand-back  of  slots  (driver  2),  airports,  airport  service 
providers and competing airlines cannot always plan operations in an effective and efficient 
way.  Regulation  (EU)  2020/459  states  that,  to  benefit  from  the  waiver,  airlines  must  hand 
back the unused slots to the pool without delay. The aim is to make unused slots available to 
other  operators  who  may  be  able  to  use  them.  With  airlines  not  always  handing  back  slots 
sufficiently  in  advance,  other  operators  do  not  have  sufficient  visibility  on  which  slots  are 
available  to  determine  whether  they  can  set  up  operations.  The  consultation  revealed  that 
there is demand for these slots. Out of the 20 airlines that responded to specific questions on 
whether  they  have  made  use  of  the  slots  handed  back  to  the  pool,  15  stated  that  they  had, 
either  to  operate  new  services  or  to  obtain  better/different  timings.  At  the  beginning  of  the 
pandemic, especially cargo operations made use of these slots, particularly important in the 

17      In  early  October  2020,  the  IATA  warned  that  the  world's  airlines  were  haemorrhaging  cash  at  a  rate  of 
around  $300,000  per  minute  or  $13  billion  per  month,  which  could  force  large  swathes  of  the  industry  into 
bankruptcy within months.  
18   The  Commission  has  received  over  10  notifications  from  Member  State  since  bringing  in  the  temporary 
framework for State aid measures to support the economy during the COVID-19 outbreak. The purpose of 
the notifications was to seek approval of rescue packages for airlines. 

19   https://www.flightglobal.com/airlines/iata-warns-of-imminent-airline-bankruptcies/140493.article  

9 

 
 
 
                                                           
context of this crisis for the transport of essential goods, medicines and medical equipment. 
Cargo operations are more flexible than passenger operations and all-cargo operations can be 
set  up  faster  than  passenger  operations20.    Several  airlines  were  able  to  operate  new  routes 
due  to  the  slots  that  became  available.  Amidst  an  increase  in  demand  in  the  leisure  traffic 
segment over the summer season, at least three carriers used new slots to holiday destination 
routes, for example, to the Greek islands, Italy and Spain.   

Under the current rules, the slot waiver operates on a binary basis (driver 1). It can be either 
extended in full, therefore completely suspending the use-it-or-lose-it principle, or it can be 
removed  and  the  principle  will  start  reapplying  in  full  (with  the  potentially  detrimental 
consequences given the feeble recovery of air traffic levels). This risks that airlines are over-
protected  in  relation  to  their  slot  portfolios,  able  to  not  use  their  slots  without  any 
consequences,  and  thus  preventing  other  airlines  from  using  them  (link  to  challenge  4  and 
driver 4). This in turn prevents airports,  ground-handling companies and competing airlines 
from  optimising their operations and  from  making longer-term plans. This  jeopardises their 
finances  and  staffing  situation.  This  lack  of  efficiency  can  in  turn  be  detrimental  to 
consumers (uncertain flight schedules, higher prices and reduced connectivity). 

Stakeholder  views.  The  agreement  reached  by  the  industry  (airlines,  airports  and  slot 
coordinators),  which  aims  to  ensure  the  efficient  use  of  airport  capacity,  shows  that  the 
stakeholders recognise the identified challenge (although they differ in terms of the drivers). 
However,  in  reply  to  the  public  consultation,  although  airline  stakeholders  recognised  the 
problem did exist in the first place, they considered it sufficiently addressed by the industry-
led agreement. However, airports and slot coordinators pointed out that the agreement is not 
legally enforceable under the Slot Regulation. Not all slot coordinators consider they have a 
legal basis to enforce the condition, which may lead to distortions in competition. 

The airports that provided feedback to the Commission argued that the closer to the planned 
date of operations slots are returned, the more difficult and costly it is for them to plan their 
operations.  Airports  Council  International  Europe  (ACI  Europe)21  pointed  out  during  the 
consultation  that  airports  are  not  sufficiently  informed  of  airlines’  planned  operations, 
cancellations  or  the  slots  handed  back.  Planning  involves  considerations  about  staff, 
including  bringing  staff  out  of  furlough,  opening  infrastructure  and  related  services  (e.g. 
security  equipment  and  staff,  terminal  capacity,  air  bridge  operations,  cleaning  staff, 
electricity, IT systems). Unexpected lower traffic volumes due to a lack of adequate planning 
will result in unnecessary costs for airports, while higher traffic volumes at short notice may 
result  in  understaffing,  bottlenecks  and  difficulty  in  planning  social  distancing  and  sanitary 
measures.  Both  outcomes  result  in  significant  costs  and/or  airports  missing  business 
opportunities.  

Airlines  represented  by  IATA22  stated  that  passenger  booking  behaviour  has  changed,  and 
passenger decisions on whether to buy a flight ticket are made only a few weeks or days in 
advance  of  the  scheduled  flight23.  Airlines  also  pointed  out  the  lack  of  predictability  of 

20   One cargo association pointed out that this applies to all-cargo operations, except to those where cargo was 

planned to be carried in the belly of passenger flights. 

21   As well as Royal Schiphol Group, Fraport, VINCI, and Gatwick.  
22   IATA’s reply to the consultation. 
23   IATA stated in it response to the public consultation that 41% of travellers buy tickets zero to three days in 

advance of travel. 

10 

 
 
                                                           
external  conditions  and  requirements  such  as  government  restrictions,  which  determine 
whether  flights  can  be  operated  or  not,  making  it  difficult  for  airlines  to  offer  certain 
schedules long in advance.  

The industry agreement, settling on a three-week deadline for handing back slots in advance 
of  their  intended  date  of  operations  represents  a  compromise  of  a  large  number  of 
stakeholders on this agreement. 

Challenge 4: Current waiver risks increasing barriers to entry leading to distortions of 
competition.  

The  waiver  currently  applies  to  all  slots  allocated  to  airlines.  This  means  that  if  airlines 
request  more  slots  than  they  have  grandfather  rights  in,  they  will  manage  to  increase  their 
presence  at  an  airport  without  necessarily  using  the  slots.  This  blocks  airport  capacity  and 
makes  new  entry  of  airlines  more  difficult.  The  Commission  asked  slot  coordinators  to 
submit data on (i) the number of historic slots airlines are entitled to, (ii) how many slots they 
requested,  (iii)  how  many  slots  were  received,  and  (iv)  how  many  slots  were  handed  back 
before the historic baseline date24 for the winter 2019/2020 and winter 2020/2021 season. The 
Commission  received  data  from  12  coordinators25  for  63  coordinated  airports.  The  data 
submitted shows that many airlines asked for more than their historic slots at all airports and 
received more than their historic rights at most of them. Airlines26 stated that this is not a sign 
of  ‘gaming’  the  system  with  the  awareness  that  the  waiver  may  be  extended.  Airlines 
explained that any increased slot requests are partly a function of normal activities during the 
slot coordination process, in which airlines make the most requests at the initial submission in 
May 2020. They are then reduced by the slot return deadline27 in mid-August and the historic 
baseline date28 at the end of August, as schedules are refined and finalised. It is also partly a 
response made at the own commercial risk of airlines in market circumstances of continued 
uncertainty. In this context, these commercial decisions cannot be considered as speculative. 

Indeed, the data of slot coordinators shows that airlines typically request more slots than they 
have historic rights in (data submitted for the winter 2019/2020 and summer 2020 season, for 
which slots were allocated before the outbreak of COVID-19 in the EU). Many airlines also 
handed back a substantial number of slots by the historic baseline date. There are also airlines 
that requested fewer than the number of historic slots to which they are entitled.  

However,  the  data  also  shows  that  a  number  of  airlines  received  more  slots  than  they  had 
historic  rights  in  and  did  not  hand  back  any  or  very  few  by  the  historic  baseline  date.  For 
example, at one airport, an airline gained 4 257 additional slots. With the current waiver, all 
these slots will be counted as having been operated and the airline will be entitled to them in 
the winter 2021/2022 season. At this airport, 15.5% of total slots will be grandfathered in this 
way. This is especially problematic where airlines had announced that they did not intend to 

24   Date as of which the use-it-or-lose-it rule start to apply. Any slot series held at this date must be used 80% 

or will be lost, unless an exception applies. 

25   AT, CH, DE, EL, ES, FR, HU, IT, NL, PL, PT, UK. 
26   IATA, EasyJet, Lufthansa, British Airways. 
27   Date by when airlines should hand back the slots they will not be using in the next scheduling season. 
28   Date as of which the use-it-or-lose-it rule start to apply. Any slot series held at this date must be used 80% 

or will be lost, unless an exception applies. 

11 

 
 
                                                           
operate the slots or cannot any longer operate them due to a decision to permanently reduce 
the fleet and staff.  

In the replies to the Commission’s targeted consultation, respondents reported that at least 15 
air  carriers  had  announced  the  reduction  of  their  schedules  by  around  50%  over  the  first 
months  of  the  winter  season.  This  reduction  is  not  always  reflected  in  the  number  of  slots 
these airlines maintain at airports after the historic baseline date.  

Whether this is due to a commercial strategy to circumvent the slot allocation system or due 
to  the  complexity  of  schedule  planning,  the  result  is  the  same:  airlines    can  increase  their 
market share through these means to the detriment of new entrants. This should be avoided, 
also in the interest of providing consumer choice and maintaining connectivity.  

Stakeholder views: Similarly to challenge 3, airline stakeholders recognised the problem in 
the  first  place  but  considered  that  it  is  sufficiently  addressed  by  the  industry-led  agreement 
with the condition to exclude newly allocated slots to which a carrier was not entitled due to 
grandfather  rights  before,  from  the  application  of  the  waiver.  Some  airports  and  slot 
coordinators stated that the agreement is not legally enforceable under the Slot Regulation.   

Airports represented by the ACI and slot coordinators also pointed out that some slots have 
been blocked by airlines that have permanently ceased operations at an airport.  

C.  Specific concerns identified by stakeholders during the public consultation 

  Changes to the status of coordinated airports:  

The  Member  State  expert  group  meeting  on  the  extension  of  the  delegated  act,  which  was 
adopted on 14 October 2020, discussed whether the coordination status of airports should be 
changed.  

Due  to  the  current  lack  of  demand  for  air  traffic,  it  could  be  argued  that  airports  should 
change their status from coordinated to schedule-facilitated. However, this would lead to the 
drastic  consequence  of  terminating  all  historic  rights.  Under  Article  3(3)  of  the  Slots 
Regulation, a Member State must ensure that the capacity analysis at a coordinated airport is 
updated  “when  there  are  changes  at  the  airport  influencing  significantly  its  capacity  and 
capacity usage”. Moreover, Article 3(7) states that “when a capacity sufficient to meet actual 
or  planned  operations  is  provided  at  a  coordinated  airport,  its  designation  as  a  fully 
coordinated  airport  shall  be  lifted”.  There  is  little  precedent  for  airports  having  their 
designation  changed  from  coordinated to  schedule-facilitated or non-coordinated as a  result 
of  changes  in  demand.  Changes  to  airport  designation  have  typically,  occurred  due  to  new 
capacity  becoming  available.  The  effect  of  removing  the  coordination  status  of  an  airport 
would  be  to  ‘reset’  the  allocation  of  airport  capacity  among  airlines.  Under  this  scenario, 
initially capacity would be allocated on the basis of real utilisation requests as expressed by 
airlines rather than previously grandfathered slots.  

IATA raised another issue regarding changes to airport designation. Changes could be made 
where capacity restrictions at schedule-facilitated airports suddenly become congested due to 
health measures. In that case, it may be necessary to quickly change the coordination status 
from ‘schedule-facilitated’ to ‘coordinated’ airport. 

12 

 
 
 
2.1.

  What are the drivers for the challenges? 

The  problems  and  the  drivers  described  in  this  document  are  rooted  in  the  COVID-19 
pandemic and the resulting negative impact on air traffic demand and levels. Member States 
have responded and continue to respond to the evolving number of cases by imposing flight, 
passenger and/or border restrictions. In addition, even where travelling is possible, passengers 
may be required to quarantine at their destination, which defeats the purpose of travelling for 
holidays or business. 

As a result, consumers are deterred from flying because it is either considered unsafe and/or 
because they are not able to spend their time at their destination as planned given the current 
uncertainty. According to a survey carried out by the IATA in June, 55% of respondents did 
not intend to travel in 2020. Were it not for the COVID-19 pandemic and the reduction in air 
traffic,  it  would  not  be  necessary  to  suspend  the  use-it-or-lose-it  rule  or  address  the 
corresponding shortcomings of doing so. 

Driver 1: Slot Regulation: use-it-or-lose it rule applies in full unless slot relief applies 

The Slot Regulation does not cater for periods of significantly depressed demand. This is why 
the  EU  has  amended  it  on  several  occasions  during  previous  crises  affecting  the  aviation 
sector29.  

In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, facing the dramatic reduction in air traffic levels, 
airlines could not be expected to continue operating their full schedules as planned, since this 
would  have  led  to  flights  at  very  low  load  factors  with  harmful  environmental  effects 
(challenge 1) and the risk of further deterioration of already weakened finances (challenge 2). 

Driver 2: Late hand-back of slots 

Article  10a(3)  of  the  Slot  Regulation  in  Regulation  (EU)  2020/459  makes  the  waiver 
conditional on the air carrier concerned making unused slots available to the coordinator, for 
reallocation  to  other  carriers.  Although  recital  7  refers  to  the  concept  of  carriers  acting 
‘without  delay’,  Article  10a(3)  sets  no  specific  time  limit.  By  letter  of  16 April 2020  to 
airlines, airports and slot coordinators, the Commission strongly encouraged carriers to hand 
back slots at least two weeks before the originally planned day of operation. The aim was to 
fully  meet  the  objective  of  the  waiver,  while  optimising  the  use  of  airport  capacity  where 
possible. This is important in terms of giving airlines, airports and airport service providers 
sufficient visibility to plan their operations. 

The European Airport Coordinators Association (EUACA) monitored the practice and timing 
of handing back slots at  a number of airports.30 The data shows that very late cancellations 
and  hand-backs,  less  than  one  week  in  advance,  were  made  predominantly  by  airlines  for 
flights  scheduled  in  March.  Gradually  air  carriers  started  to  hand  back  slots  earlier,  and  by 
mid-June 2020, most slots at the selected airports had been handed back three weeks before 

29 This was also done in previous crises affecting air traffic levels, including the 2002 terrorist attacks, the Iraq 

war and the SARS outbreak in 2003, and the financial crisis in 2009. 

30  Data  was  collected  by  EUACA  from  the  following  airports:  Amsterdam  (NL);  Stockholm  Arlanda  (SE); 
Barcelona, Palma de Mallorca, Madrid, Las Palmas (ES); Brussels (BE); Paris Charles de Gaulle. Lyon, Nice, 
Nantes (FR); Dusseldorf, Frankfurt (DE);  Faro, Funchal,  Lisbon, Porto, Ponta Delgada (PT); Graz Innsbruck, 
Klagenfurt, Linz, Vienna, Salzburg (AT); Helsinki (FI); Heraklion (EL); Krakow, Warsaw (PL); Larnaca (CY); 
London Heathrow, London Stansted (UK); Oslo (NO); Prague (CZ); Sofia (BG). 

13 

 
 
                                                           
the  scheduled  date  of  operations  or  earlier.  Nevertheless,  a  significant  portion  (34.6%)  was 
handed  back  later  (less  than  three  weeks  in  advance).  In  early  September,  the  number 
decreased to 12%.31 During the public consultation, a number of airlines and the IATA stated 
that  the  sudden  drop  in  demand  and  resulting  changes  to  schedules  led  to  backlogs  in 
processing data and system updates for schedule planning. As a result, at the early stages of 
the pandemic, most flights were cancelled at short notice. This situation has changed and it is 
now more stable. This scenario was correlated by data from airports and slot coordinators.  

Airlines also pointed out that external factors such as flight bans, travel restrictions and crew 
restrictions  had  an  impact  on  their  ability  to  fly.  Therefore,  it  is  inevitable  that  some 
cancellations  are  made  less  than  three  weeks  in  advance  due  to  circumstances  outside 
airlines’ control.  

Figure 1.5 shows that mainly airlines disagreed with the issue of the late handback of slots, 
arguing that most slots are handed back more than three weeks in advance and industry best 
practice  resolved  the  problem.  Indeed,  the  data  shows  that  airline  behaviour  became  more 
disciplined.  However,  industry  best  practice  on  its  own  may  not  be  sufficient  to  ensure 
enforcement by all airlines. Not all EU airlines are part of the agreement on best practices and 
feel  the  requirement  to  comply  with  it.  As  explained  in  Section  1,  not  all  coordinators  feel 
confident to enforce the hand-back deadline, which creates distortion in competition. 

Figure 2.4 Replies to the public consultation – Do you agree that the late hand-back of slots is a 
problem? 

Late hand-back of slots 

40

30

20

10

0

Yes

No

No Opinion

Airline

Airport

Slot-coordinator

Other

Source: Public consultation on the proposal to amend the Slot Regulation32 

Driver  3:  The  current  slot  waiver  does  not  take  into  account  variations  in  overall  air 
traffic levels (binary waiver) 

The current slot waiver is rigid in its application. Either the use-it-or-lose it rule is suspended 
and all slots  are  handed  back to  the pool  are  covered by  it, or none are.  In the first  half of 
2020, the effects of the pandemic on air traffic were sudden and extreme and the application 

31 https://www.euaca.org/FNewsDetail.aspx?id=388&popup=1  
32   Many any airlines did not agree with the problem as they consider it to have been addressed by the industry 
agreement.  Although the agreement  will indeed  mitigate  the  risks leading to the identified problems, it is 
not yet legally enforceable. 

14 

 
 
 
                                                           
 
of the waiver was justified. It should be recalled that the objective of the use-it-or-lose-it rule 
is to ensure the most efficient use of airport capacity to maximise the benefit to the greatest 
number of users and allow passengers to reap the benefits of a competitive aviation market. 
Account should be taken of the negative impact of extending the slot relief. The effect of the 
waiver is  to  freeze competition at  2019 levels  without any requirement to use that capacity 
efficiently and without making it available to other airlines that may make more efficient use 
of  it.  After  over  a  year  of  fully  suspending  the  use-it-or-lose-it  rules  (1 February 2020  to 
27 March 2021),  which  preserves  carriers’  2019  slot  holdings  until  the  end  of  the  winter 
2021/2022  scheduling  season,  a  process  of  returning  to  normal  application  of  the  use-it-or-
lose-it rule should be envisaged. Furthermore, as traffic may begin to slowly recover, it may 
no longer be justified to apply the current waiver. However, an immediate return to the use-it-
or-lose-it rule may have negative consequences for air carriers, and put a significant number 
of  their  slots  at  risk.  Air  carriers  suddenly  losing  large  volumes  of  their  market  presence 
would  also  destabilise  the  market  and  have  a  negative  impact  on  connectivity  and  for 
consumers. 

The  current  rules  do  not  allow  for  a  middle  ground  to  strike  an  adequate  balance  between 
protecting air carrier networks where they genuinely wish to operate but passenger demand 
falls short, and allowing new entrants to come in if they can make better use of the slots. The 
current rules only allow the Commission to extend the period of application of the waiver but 
not  to  attach  any  conditions  or  modulate  the  use-it-or-lose-it  principle  that  could  make  the 
waiver more proportionate to the circumstances.  

An assessment of the situation should also address the risk that next seasons may also witness 
a structural reduction of airline capacity placed on the market. This may be a consequence of 
retiring  aircrafts  or  as  a  result  of  market  exit(s).  The  market  may  stabilise  at  a  lower  level 
than  2019  levels,  which  raises  the  question  of  at  what  point  should  airlines  be  required  to 
adapt to the reduced traffic situation caused by the pandemic. Industry projections33 indicate 
that air traffic may not recover before at least 2023/24. However, continued application of an 
unconditional waiver will effectively freeze 2019 airlines’ market shares and risk excluding 
new entrants  or preventing air carriers that are able to  operate from  growing. This  scenario 
was raised by airports and slot coordinators34.  

Driver  4:  The  current  slot  waiver  does  not  address  reduced  airport  capacity  due  to 
health and safety measures 

During  the  public  consultation,  slot  coordinators  and  airlines  also  highlighted  the  need  to 
address the situation where, as a consequence of new or reduced coordination parameters due 
to specific sanitary measures, airports might be unable to handle all historic slots, which air 
carriers intend to operate.  

IATA states that a recent Eurocontrol and ACI Europe study35 highlighted that airports may 
need to reduce their declared capacity by up to 40% of previous capacity levels, which would 
devastate  slot  history  and  hinder  their  recovery.  The  report  found  that  “for  those  airports 

33   https://www.iata.org/en/pressroom/pr/2020-07-28-02/  
34   VINCI airports, ACL (UK, IE and PL slot-coordinator), Gatwick airport. 
35   Eurocontrol, Impact assessment of COVID-19 measures on airport performance – 29.08.2020. 

https://www.eurocontrol.int/sites/default/files/2020-09/eurocontrol-impact-assessment-covid-19-airport-
performance-2020.pdf  

15 

 
 
                                                           
already  saturated  before  COVID-19,  the  general  saturation  capacity  with  COVID-19 
measures  is  expected  to  be  in  the  range  of  60-75%  of  their  pre-COVID-19  traffic  volume, 
during peaks.”  

New temporary capacity declarations are likely to be unpredictable and declared outside the 
slot  coordination  timeframes,  whereby  capacity  must  be  declared  by  October  for  summer 
2021  and  by  May  for  winter  2021/2022.  How  the  pandemic  develops  and  the  measures 
governments take to prevent its spread have an impact on the visibility of available capacity. 
They also contribute to the difficulties airlines, airports and airport service providers face in 
planning  ahead  (challenge  3).  The  reduction  in  airport  capacity  will  increase  entry  barriers 
and  re-timing  grandfathered  slots  can  lead  to  competition  distortions  (challenge  4)  if 
measures  are  not  taken  to  ensure  it  is  carried  out  according  to  clear,  objective  and  non-
discriminatory criteria. 

Driver 5: The current slot waiver also covers newly requested slots (even if requested by 
an airline exiting the airport) 

The current waiver covers all slots and assumes that airlines operate all the slots it holds for 
the  season  (until  the  end  of  the  waiver’s  application).  As  a  result,  airlines  will  obtain  the 
historic  rights  attached  to  those  slots  regardless  of  the  decisions  made  to  acquire  them, 
whether they intended to operate them or to increase the airlines’ market share by flouting the 
purpose of the slot waiver. Nevertheless, as described under challenge 4, airlines may have a 
genuine interest in requesting more slots than they are historically entitled to, despite reduced 
air traffic levels. However, the end result is an increased slot portfolio that may not be used, 
and that is detrimental to new entrants.  

Driver 6: Risk of airlines engaging in secondary trading to benefit from the current slot 
waiver 

Slot  coordinators36  pointed  out  that  there  is  a  risk  that  trading  and  leasing  slots  in  the 
knowledge  that  the  current  waiver  applies  will  also  distort  competition  and  block  capacity 
where  slots  are  not  used  afterwards.  The  Slot  Regulation  includes  rules  on  slot  mobility.  It 
allows  slots  to  be  exchanged  one-for-one  among  air  carriers  and  it  allows  slots  to  be 
transferred within airline groups. At a number of airports, slots have been traded among air 
carriers. This involves exchanging a valuable slot against a slot of no value (due to its time of 
the day or night), accompanied by a financial payment. Alternatively, the compensation could 
take the form of a commercial arrangement. Slot trades  may  also be of temporary duration, 
with a contractual obligation both for the ‘purchasing’ carrier to return the slot at some point 
in the future and to operate the slot under the current slot utilisation rules. This is known as 
‘slot leases’. 

Given that such slot transactions form part of the current system, it is also necessary to clarify 
under  which  conditions  the  relief  continues  to  apply  to  slots  that  have  been  exchanged  or 
transferred between different air carriers. The aim of slot relief, from the perspective of slot 
utilisation  rules,  is  to  assist  air  carriers  as  they  adapt  their  operations  in  the  light  of  the 
unprecedented fall in demand for air transport. It would not, however, be appropriate to allow 
an air carrier to benefit from this protection if it has no intention of operating the slot itself. 
Even if the likelihood of slot trades occurring at the current time is low, this could change as 

36   ACL, EUACA. 

16 

 
 
                                                           
demand and air traffic picks up and the COVID-19 pandemic recedes. Allowing traded slots 
to be eligible for relief could also constitute a barrier to an airline exiting the market and  it 
could  distort  competition,  as  this  enables  airlines  to  expand  their  slot  portfolio  without  the 
need to subsequently operate the slots.  

For  air carriers under  group  ownership, it would  seem  reasonable to  allow slots transferred 
within the group to be eligible for relief, since this might facilitate the most effective use of 
an airline group’s resources during the current difficult circumstances. Likewise, when slots 
are  exchanged  without  financial  compensation,  i.e.  secondary  trading,  (for  example 
exchanges  among  air  carriers  to  provide  mutual  improvements  to  schedules)  slots  could  be 
exchanged with the slot waiver still to be applied. 

2.2.

 What will happen if the challenges are not addressed? 

The Commission’s empowerment to extend the waiver expires on 2 April 2021. As described 
in Section 2.1, the latest Eurocontrol forecasts indicate that air traffic in February 2021 will 
still  be  only  50%  of  February  2019  levels.  Thereafter,  it  is  assumed  that  traffic  will  only 
resume  slowly.  As  pointed  out  previously,  the  IATA  and  ACI  predict  that  air  traffic  levels 
will remain significantly lower than in 2019 at least until 2024/2025. Hence, it seems possible 
that  the  Commission  could  use  its  delegated  power  to  extend  the  waiver  to  the  summer  21 
scheduling  season,  but  by  2  April  2021  no  sufficiently  robust  data  would  be  available  to 
extend the waiver beyond that. 

Regarding  challenges  1  and  2,  this  would  mean  that  in  summer  2021,  airlines  would  not 
operate environmentally harmful and financially inefficient flights with very low load factors 
as their historic slots would be protected. For the winter 2021/2022 scheduling season, it will 
depend on the level of recovery. If demand and air traffic levels keep increasing, the risk of 
inefficient  largely  empty  flights  decreases.  If  there  is  another  shock  and  demand  decreases 
and no slot relief is in place, then the incentive for airlines to operate largely empty or empty 
flights  increases.  Ultimately,  it  will  also  depend  on  airlines’  financial  situation  and  the 
prospect of recovery or further financial aid at that time.  

Regarding  challenge  3,  improving  the  planning  of  airport,  airport  service  providers  and 
airline operations will continue to depend on the goodwill of airlines to hand back the slots 
they do not use sufficiently in advance. A substantial volume of slots are already handed back 
three  weeks  and  longer  in  advance  of  the  scheduled  date  of  operation.  The  industry 
agreement  may  have  helped  improve  this  practice.  However,  as  mentioned  above,  the 
conditions agreed are not legally enforceable and some coordinators have said they would not 
withdraw  historic  rights  of  airlines  in  slots  they  do  not  hand  back  three  weeks  or  more  in 
advance. This will lead to competition distortions if some airlines hand back their slots later. 
Airports and airport services providers would continue to incur the cost of making too much 
capacity available or forego revenue where they did not plan for enough capacity and staff to 
match  actual  airline  schedules.  Airlines  continue  to  lack  full  visibility  of  available  airport 
slots sufficiently in advance to be able to offer the best services to passengers. After summer 
2021, when no more slot relief would be granted and the original slot allocation rules apply, 
planning could become more certain again. 

Regarding  challenge  4,  airlines  that  requested  more  than  their  historic  slots  gain  historic 
rights in new slots as long as a waiver remains in place and can increase their slot portfolio, 

17 

 
 
 
blocking new entrants. The same applies to airlines that do not use their slots, despite having 
ceased  operations  at  an  airport.  The  industry  agreement  contains  conditions  to  prevent  this 
outcome  but  they  are  contrary  to  the  current  rules  of  the  Slot  Regulation  and  cannot  be 
enforced by slot coordinators. It will be up to airlines to decide whether to apply for the new 
slots they received in winter 2020/2021 scheduling season for the winter 2021/2022 season. 
Airlines that do not comply with the agreement will gain a competitive advantage and there 
will be no legally enforceable mechanism to maintain a competitive level playing field. 

Airlines may also block capacity and thereby exclude competition by obtaining slots through 
secondary trading, thereby building up their slot portfolio without having to operate the slots.  

Unless  the  Commission  can  ensure  that  slot  relief  can  be  extended  relatively  quickly  if 
necessary, airlines will be faced with the application of the use-it-or-lose it rule again, once 
the  Commission’s  delegated  powers  expire.  If  the  impact  of  COVID-19  on  air  traffic  still 
persists  at  that  time,  airlines  will  feel  the  need  to  operate  commercially  unviable  flights  to 
maintain their slots.  Such unviable flights  would have unnecessary  negative impacts  on the 
environment and lead to extra expenditure for airlines in an already financially fragile state 
and a weakened economy, with risks of further bankruptcies. Airlines are also likely to focus 
their operations on their most valuable slots and routes, which will have a negative impact on 
the number of flights and the level of connectivity for EU citizens in certain regions. 

At the same time under a full waiver air carriers are not rquired to use their slots at all. Thus, 
unless changes are made to be able to adjust the current slot waiver to  actual  market needs 
and make it subject to conditions that encourage competition, there is a potential risk of loss 
of  service,  with  negative  consequences  for  consumers,  workers,  airlines  and  airports. 
Reduced competition can in the long term lead to higher prices of flight tickets and reduced 
quality of service. 

The  airlines,  airports  and  airport  coordinators  associations  representing  the  majority  of  EU 
airlines,  EU  airports  and  all  EU  slot  coordinators  have  come  together  and  agreed  on  the 
conditions  that,  in  their  view,  should  apply  to  the  slots  waiver,  from  the  beginning  of  the 
winter 2020/2021 scheduling period. These conditions are described in detail in Section 1. 

The conditions are designed to remedy the late hand-back of slots, and the blocking of airport 
capacity  by  excluding  newly  allocated  slots  and  slots  of  airlines  ceasing  operations  at  an 
airport.  However, they  are not  legally enforceable by slot coordinators or regulators, which 
may compromise the effectiveness of the proposed action to prevent these shortcomings. 

3.  THE NEED FOR THE EU TO ACT NOW 

COVID-19 continues to have an impact on passenger confidence and air traffic levels. Relief 
for airlines from the slot usage requirements remains justified. The future impact of COVID-
19 on air traffic and how it will develop is highly unpredictable. It is possible that relief from 
the  use-it-or-lose-it  rule  may  still  need  to  be  granted  beyond  what  can  be  predicted  by 
2 April 2021. It is important for the aviation sector that action is taken to extend the waiver 
sufficiently in advance to enable the sector to plan ahead realistically, but through a process 
that allows rules to be put in place quickly and target them to the actual market needs.  

Figure 1.6 shows that most stakeholders see a clear need for EU action to grant relief from 
the use-it-or-lose-it rule and to avoid negative environmental impacts from applying the slot 

18 

 
 
rules. Stakeholder opinions on the other issues identified were more divided. As explained, 
many  airlines  did  not  agree  with  the  description  of  the  issues  because  they  consider  them 
sufficiently addressed through industry best practice, which lacks legal enforceability.  

Figure 3.1 Replies from the public consultation – is further EU action necessary? 

Is further EU action necessary? 

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

Relief from the
use-it-or-lose-it
rule

Efficient use of
airport capacity

Early hand-back of
slots

Better planning of
operations for
airports and
groundhandling
services

Reduce risks of
competition
distortion

Avoid negative
environmental
impact

Yes

No

No opinion

Due  to  the  inherent  cross-border  nature  of  both  aviation  and  the  COVID-19  pandemic,  the 
issue cannot be dealt with at national level and requires joint action at EU and international 
level. Leaving Member States to take action at national level would result in a patchwork of 
national measures that would result in market fragmentation and distortions of competition.  

As  presented  in  the  summary  report  to  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  on 
14 September 2020,  there  are  certain  shortcomings  in  operating  the  current  waiver.  The 
industry  indirectly  recognised  the  urgent  need  to  address  these  shortcomings  and  reached  a 
voluntary agreement to improve the efficiency of airport capacity use. However, as explained 
above,  the  industry-led  agreement  is  not  fully  enforceable  given  the  provisions  of  the  Slot 
Regulation.  In  addition,  the  Commission’s  own  market  assessment,  including  the  results  of 
the open public consultation, indicates that there is a need for other conditions to ensure the 
most efficient use of airport capacity. Although airlines will be eligible for the full slot waiver 
for the full winter 2020/2021  scheduling season, new conditions  attached to  any future slot 
relief are considered necessary, starting from the summer 2021 scheduling season. While air 
traffic is  still supressed compared to  the 2019 level,  it is also  necessary to plan the gradual 
phase-out  of slot relief and work towards restoring the use-it-or-lose-it principle. To ensure 
that all market players are given sufficient notice, it is necessary to act without delay.   

4.  OBJECTIVES PURSUED 

4.1.

  General objectives 

Until  27  March  2021,  the  sector  benefits  from  full  season  waivers.  As  described  in  the 
previous sections a full season waiver led to certain shortcomings and challenges. Therefore, 
this initiative aims to promote the proper functioning of the internal aviation market during 

19 

 
 
 
the COVID-19 pandemic along the entire aviation value chain  and to  ensure the welfare of 
the travelling public, while also aiming to encourage competition and facilitate a phase-out of 
slot relief by making it more flexible and targeted to the evolving impact of COVID-19 on air 
traffic levels. 

4.2.

Specific objectives 

The  specific  objectives  of  this  initiative  are  to  i)  minimise  the  harmful  effects  on  the 
environment caused by operating flights with very low load factors ii) ensuring airlines can 
operate efficiently and iii) ensuring the efficient use of airport capacity.  

5.  PROPOSED WAY FORWARD 

To address the challenges identified in Section 2, the Commission proposes to amend the Slot 
Regulation  for  a  limited  duration.  The  main  changes  concern  the  conditions  required  to 
remedy the identified shortcomings while slot relief is  in  place.  They were modelled on  (i) 
industry-agreed conditions, (ii) conditions suggested by stakeholders in the consultation and 
(iii)  the  conditions  deemed  necessary  by  the  Commission  to  ensure  that  the  general  and 
specific objectives set for this intervention are met. 

The  proposal  for  an  amendment  includes  extending  slot  relief  to  cover  the  summer  2021 
scheduling season, subject to conditions necessary to minimise the undesirable side effects of 
the current waiver. These conditions include the following conditions agreed by industry: 

  The slot relief would not apply to series of slots newly allocated from the pool. Only 
slots  in  which  the  airline  had  historic  rights  during  the  previous  respective  season 
would be eligible for slot relief. 

  The slot relief would not apply to series of slots held by an airline that permanently 
ceases operations at an airport. If an airline fails to provide necessary information on 
its plans for a certain airport by a reasonable deadline date set by the coordinator, and 
after having heard the airline concerned, the coordinator may withdraw and reallocate 
the slots. 

  Airlines must hand back any slots they do not intend to use as soon as possible and no 

later than three weeks prior to the date of planned operation. 

During  the  public  consultation,  stakeholders  were  asked  open  questions  about  any  further 
conditions or measures that should be brought in, in addition to slot relief. Based on the input 
received  and  the  Commission’s  own  assessment  of  the  market  conditions,  the  Commission 
considers  that  it  would  be  desirable  to  include  some  additional  aspects  when  amending  the 
Slot  Regulation.  These  would  be  included  in  the  proposal  to  ensure  that  the  relief  is  fit  for 
purpose for the entire period of severely depressed demand. It would provide a framework to 
tailor the relief once demand picks up again, with the ultimate goal of phasing out relief once 
air traffic either reaches 2019 levels or stabilises at a new market level, based on a list of set 
indicators.  The  aim  is  also  to  avoid,  if  possible,  having  to  legislate  to  amend  the  Slot 
Regulation again over this period.   

  A  return  to  normal  operations  would  be  facilitated  by  granting  the  coordinator  the 
authority  to  match  capacity  closely  to  slot  requests.  In  many  cases,  airport 
infrastructure has been taken offline over the period marked by COVID-19 and it is 
possible that there will  be periods during the recovery where bringing infrastructure 

20 

 
 
 
back online (for example, in the form of temporarily closed airport terminals) does not 
keep  pace  with  an  uptick  in  demand  for  slots.  In  addition,  certain  health  and  safety 
measures imposed to limit the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic may have an effect 
on  the  capacity  airports  can  offer.  Rules  should  be  put  in  place  (for  example  local 
rules  or  industry  guidelines)  to  address  the  situation  where  a  reduction  in  airport 
capacity leads to the cancellation of some historic slots.  

  The proposal would exclude traded or leased slots from the scope of the relief. Only 
slot  exchanges  accompanied  by  financial  recompense  would  be  excluded  from  the 
scope  of  the  slot  relief  measures.  If  an  airline  is  able  to  increase  their  slot  portfolio 
during a period of depressed demand, it should be expected to use the acquired slots. 
  The proposal would temporarily amend the new entry definition in order to increase 

the number of airlines that can qualify as new entrants.  

  Recognising the benefit for consumers of air carriers operating air services using slots 
handed back for temporary re allocation, such air carriers would be given priority to 
those  slots  in  the  next  equivalent  season,  if  the  carrier  originally  holding 
grandfathered rights to them does not request them. 

  The  proposal  would  be  the  occasion  to  anticipate  a  potential  scenario  in  which 
demand recovers to some extent but not sufficiently to justify applying the 80/20 rule. 
It  would  seem  beneficial  to  plan  for  this  scenario  by  varying  the  80/20  rule  as  a 
function of the level of air traffic and impose an appropriate degree of discipline on 
slot  operation  in  this  scenario.  The  usage  rate  should  be  set  to  a  level  that  provides 
airlines with relief and prevents unnecessary negative environmental impacts caused 
by  operating  largely  empty  flights  but  also  encourages  the  efficient  use  of  slots  or 
release of capacity where airlines can no longer sustain their slot portfolio. The latest 
Eurocontrol forecasts indicate that air traffic in February 2021 is expected to be only 
half the level it was in February 2020. What will happen beyond that is uncertain, but 
there  are  no  indications  that  demand  will  return  in  the  summer  2021  season  to  the 
level  of  recent  years,  which  may  warrant  further  slot  relief  measures.  At  the  same 
time,  the  objective  of  the  use-it-or-lose-it  rule  is  to  ensure  the  most  efficient  use  of 
airport  capacity  to  maximise  the  benefit  to  the  greatest  number  of  users  and  allow 
passengers to reap the benefits of a competitive aviation market and connectivity. The 
operation  of  the  slot  waiver  has  indeed  provided  relief  to  air  carriers  in  the  current 
unprecedented  period  of  impacted  demand  and  restrictions  on  air  travel.  However, 
account  should  be  taken  of  the  negative  impact  of  extending  the  slot  waiver.  The 
effect  of  the  current  waiver  is  to  freeze  competition  at  2019  levels  without  any 
requirement to use capacity efficiently and without making it fully available to other 
airlines that may make more efficient use of it, thereby also increasing connectivity. 
After more than a year of fully suspending the use-it-or-lose-it rules (1 February 2020 
to  27 March 2021),  which  preserves  air  carriers’  2019  slot  holdings  until  the  end  of 
the winter 2021/2022 scheduling season, it is time to start the process of returning to a 
normal application of the use-it-or-lose-it rule. The return to normal should not come 
in a sudden manner that would destabilise the aviation market to the detriment of air 
carriers,  connectivity  and  EU  consumers.  For  example,  while  EEA  air  traffic  levels 
are below 40-45% of 2019 levels, a full waiver should be in place, as the application 
for  the  80/20  rule  would  have  such  a  dramatic  effect  on  airline  slot  portfolios  and 
networks  that  could  disrupt  connectivity  for  EU  passengers.  This  is  especially 
important for intercontinental traffic, which is particularly affected at the moment and 

21 

 
 
which requires considerable resources and planning to be set up and operated. Once 
air traffic levels rise above that level, and given that airlines will have had more than a 
year to restructure and adapt to the new situation, the use ratio should be increased in 
line with rising air traffic levels (or decreased if air traffic decreases again). Given the 
Eurocontrol  forecast  of  14  September  2020  (Figure  2.3)  which  predicts  that  by 
February 2021 traffic levels would be down 50% compared with the previous year the 
utilisation threshold should be set at 40% for the summer 2021 scheduling period as 
this  seems  to  strike  the  right  balance  between  to  need  to  relieve  the  industry  while 
encouraging the operation of the slots to re-establish connectivity and competition. 
  Modulating  relief  in  this  way  should  be  possible  until  either  traffic  levels  reach 
similar  levels  of  the  corresponding  period  in  2019,  or  when  traffic  levels  have 
stabilised  to  a  ‘new  normal’  situation37,  whichever  comes  first.  This  ‘new  normal’ 
market equilibrium will be assessed based on a number of set indicators such as the 
development  and  stability  over  time  of  actual  and  forecast  air  traffic  data,  fleet  size 
and  fleet  utilisation  rate38.  Ex  ante  modulation  should  be  incorporated  in  the 
legislative amendment for the summer season 2021 with the delegated powers given 
to  the  Commission  to  further  extend  the  slot  relief  and  to  modulate  the  80/20  rule 
based on actual and forecast air traffic data and the impact of COVID-19. 

  The proposal would anticipate a potential scenario in which the speed of recovery is 
markedly  uneven,  potentially  differing  widely  by  region.  For  example,  air  traffic 
within  the  European  Union  may  recover  to  close  to  historic  levels,  meaning  that  it 
would be appropriate for the slot utilisation criteria to be applied once again to intra-
European flights. However, there might be continuing prevalence of COVID-19 in a 
specific country, giving rise to travel restrictions that continue to affect demand for air 
travel  to  and  from  that  country  significantly.  In  such  cases,  the  proposal  would 
include a provision whereby airlines would ask coordinators that slots used for such 
air services not be taken into account for the purposes of establishing compliance with 
the 80/20 rule, carried out ex post at the end of each season. The Regulation already 
provides,  in  Article  10(4),  for  non-operation  of  specific  flights  to  be  excluded  in 
certain cases. 

Modulating the slot use rate and giving airlines the possibility to justify the non-use of slots 
should have the effect of encouraging airlines to use slots for routes where there is demand, 
while protecting them in the event of sudden measures affecting air travel on certain routes, 
outside the airlines’ control. At the same time, the modulation would also result in capacity 
being released for reallocation and allowing competitors to gain historic rights in the released 
slot. 

37   It is possible that the long-term impact of the COVID-19 pandemic leads to structural changes in the market 
to which the industry will have to adapt. The industry projects that traffic will not reach 2019 levels before 
2023/2024. It is difficult to justify that historic slots and airline market shares should necessarily be frozen 
at 2019 levels if demand does not keep pace, and has negative effects on competition and new entrants.  
38   With  some  airlines  announcing  a  reduction  in  their  fleet,  it  may  well  be  that  they  will  reach  a  fleet 

utilisation rate similar to 2019 levels despite an overall drop in air traffic. 

22 

 
 
                                                           
5.1.

Stakeholders’ views  

The  open  public  consultation  generated  71  replies  (from  47  airlines,  9  airports,  8  slot 
coordinators, and 7 other respondents) from a broad range of stakeholders (airlines, airports, 
associations, slot coordinators, consumer organisations, trade unions, and public authorities). 

Stakeholders  were  consulted  on  three  specific  scenarios:  a)  stopping  application  of  the 
waiver,  b)  extending  the  waiver  by  delegated  act  without  any  additional  conditions,  and  c) 
extending  the  waiver  subject  to  certain  conditions.  As  mentioned  above,  stakeholders  were 
also  asked  whether  further  measures  could  be  taken  to  address  the  identified  challenges. 
When commenting on the options during the public consultation, stakeholders assumed that 
the conditions attached to any future slot relief were those made in the industry agreement.    

Figure 5.1 Replies to the open public consultation – Would the option to “stop application of the 
waiver” address the identified shortcomings? 

Stop application of the waiver 

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

Not at all

Yes, partly

Yes, fully

No opinion

Airline

Airport

Slot-coordinator

Other

A  small  minority  of  respondents  (consumer  organisations,  two  airlines  and  one  airport 
respondent) preferred not to extend the current slot waiver at all. The respondents argued that 
suspending the use-it-or-lose-it principle in the current form protects incumbent airlines that 
already received substantial State aid and prevents new entrants from using the slots. The vast 
majority of respondents argued that, given the COVID-19 pandemic, it is impossible for any 
operator to comply with the use-it-or-lose-it principle without flying empty or largely empty 
planes.  Many  respondents  pointed  out  that  airlines  would  go  bankrupt  if  the  rule  is  not 
suspended.  Stakeholders  also  pointed  out  that,  in  the  absence  of  the  slot  waiver,  airlines 
would be wrongly incentivised to operate empty or largely empty flights to the detriment of 
the  environment  and  their  already  often  fragile  economic  situation  as  a  result  of  the 
pandemic.  

Figure 5.2 Replies to the open public consultation – Would the option to “Extend the current waiver 
by delegated act” address the identified shortcomings? 

23 

 
 
 
 
Extend the waiver by delegated act 

50

40

30

20

10

0

Not at all

Yes, partly

Yes, fully

No opinion

Airline

Airport

Slot-coordinator

Other

Stakeholder views were more split in response to the option to extend the blanket waiver to 
further  seasons.  The  consultation  question  referred  to  the  winter  season  2020/2021.  The 
Commission considers the replies of airline stakeholders also indicative of their views for the 
summer 2021 scheduling season, as Commission departments have been informally asked by 
airline associations to extend the waiver to the summer 2021 scheduling season. 

The  majority  of  airlines  indicated  that  extending  the  blank  waiver  by  delegated  act  would 
fully address the challenges identified. The responding airlines referred to the industry-agreed 
conditions  as  a  way  to  remedy  the  shortcomings  in  operating  the  current  waiver.  The 
responding  slot  coordinators,  however,  stressed  that,  although  they  fully  supported  the 
industry-agreed conditions, the need for predictability and enforceability of the rules requires 
a  formal  amendment  to  the  Slots  Regulation.  Thus,  extending  a  blanket  waiver  is  not 
sufficient. 

The slot-coordinator and airport respondents noted that their views on the need to extend the 
waiver apply to the winter 2020/2021 season only.  

Figure 5.3 Replies to the open public consultation – Would the option to “Amend the Slot Regulation” 
address the identified shortcomings? 

24 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Amend the Slot Regulation 

50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0

Not at all

Yes, partly

Yes, fully

No opinion

Airline

Airport

Slot-coordinator

Other

The  respondents  were  generally  in  favour  of  the  amendment  to  the  Slots  Regulation  that 
would  remedy  the  shortcomings  in  operating  the  current  slot  waiver.  During  the  public 
consultation, the respondents had only received the industry-agreed conditions (presented to 
them) but not all other conditions that resulted from the consultation and the Commission’s 
subsequent assessment. 

The  vast  majority  of  stakeholders  in  all  categories  considered  that  amending  the  Slot 
Regulation  to  include  the  industry  conditions  would  address  the  problems  either  fully  or 
partly.  These  respondents  (predominantly  airlines)  argued  that  any  amendment  should  be 
limited to putting the industry-driven conditions into a formal legislative basis. 

A  minority  of  respondents  were  opposed  to  the  amendment.  One  airline  argued  that  the 
existing  use-it-or-lose-it  rule  could  be  waived  based  on  the  existing  Slots  Regulation  if  it 
included  force  majeure.  The  airline  argued  that  there  are  differences  in  the  way  that  slot 
coordinators  interpret  this  provision.  It  argued  that  it  would  therefore  be  sufficient  for  the 
Commission  to  adopt  interpretative  guidelines  rather  than  to  amend  the  legislation,  which 
would add further complexity. A trade union respondent argued that any amendment to the 
Slots  Regulation  should  take  into  full  account  other  provisions  applicable  to  aviation 
employees. 

In  addition,  some  stakeholders  (in  particular  slot  coordinators)  flagged  the  need  for  the 
Commission  to  look  into  alternatives  to  waivers  as  a  way  to  gradually  phase  out  relief  and 
encourage  more  use  of  capacity  when  demand  returns.  In  this  context,  some  airport 
respondents suggested that the return of air traffic should not be measured against 2019 levels 
but should recognise a broader and longer-lasting change in the aviation market. Airports also 
pointed  out  that  modulating  the  usage  threshold  should  take  into  account  the  practice  of 
‘double dipping’ that airlines sometimes engage in. Air carriers can cancel up to 20% of slots 
allocated to them  before the start  of the season and subsequently, under  normal  rules, 20% 
during the season and still receive the whole series initially allocated to them, despite having 
only operated 64% of their slot series. This will apply also to the new threshold set, meaning 
that the rate proposed in the Regulation will in reality result in a lower rate.  

A minority of respondents claimed that any amendment should also be backed up by financial 
penalties imposed on non-compliant parties. 

25 

 
 
 
After having assessed the replies to the consultation, the Commission decided to go forward 
with  measures  that  would  phase  out  the  waiver  and  pave  the  way  for  a  return  to  normal 
application of the use-it-or-lose-it rule. The Commission also decided to exclude traded and 
leased slots from further slot relief. Commission services contacted certain stakeholders (the 
IATA, A4E, ACI, EUACA, Ryanair and Wizz Air) to obtain their views on a framework of 
measures that would allow the Commission to modulate the 80/20 usage rate according to the 
level  of  air  traffic  set  before  the  start  of  the  season.  They  also  sought  their  views  on  the 
option to justify the non-use of slots at the end of the season where airlines planned to use the 
slots  on  routes  that  were  significantly  affected  by  COVID-19  measures,  such  as  travel 
restrictions. 

Airlines  did  not  support  the  proposal  to  exclude  traded  and  leased  slots  from  the  scope  of 
further slot relief. They claimed that first, secondary trading occurs mainly in the UK, which 
would no longer be subject to the EU Slot Regulation by the time the amendment enters into 
force.  Secondary  trading  of  slots  and  leasing  is  an  important  aspect  of  the  schedule 
optimisation process for airlines, and excluding these slots from relief measures would reduce 
slot mobility and the efficient use of slots. 

The  associations  lacked  an  official  position  supported  by  their  members,  but  they  did  not 
reject the proposed measures to phase out the waiver. Regarding the precise usage rate to be 
set for the summer 2021 scheduling season, airports seemed to prefer a ratio of around 60/40, 
while airlines would support a ratio of 20/80 or 30/70. The EUACA did not comment on the 
appropriate threshold but did not raise any technical objections to modulating the ratio. Wizz 
Air  and  Ryanair,  by  contrast,  opposed  further  slot  relief  for  2021,  stating  that  competition 
should  be  opened  again,  and  airlines  able  to  enter  new  markets  or  to  expand  should  be 
entitled  to  gain  historic  rights  in  new  slots.  All  stakeholder  groups  stressed  the  need  to  put 
rules  in  place  well  before  the  start  of  the  scheduling  season,  preferably  at  or  before  the 
historic  baseline  date  (usually  around  2-3  months  before  the  start  of  the  season)  when 
allocation for the coming season is finalised. 

On 26 November 2020, the Worldwide Airport Slot Board composed of airlines, airports and 
slot-coordinators announced having reached an agreement on recommendations for slot relief 
for the summer 2021 scheduling season.39 The recommendation is supported by IATA, A4E 
(except  Ryanair),  ACI-Europe  and  EUACA.  It  shows  that  stakeholders  agree  that  a  full 
season waiver covering all slots is no longer justified for the summer 2021 scheduling season. 
The  recommendation  includes,  among  other,  a  provision  granting  airlines  a  full  waiver  for 
slot  series  that  are  returned  to  the  pool  within  a  specified  timeframe  before  the  start  of  the 
season. For slot series airlines retain, a utilisation threshold is set at 50%. Airlines will have 
an  incentive  to  return  slot  series,  which  will  free  capacity  for  the  summer  2021  well  in 
advance of the season, allowing competing carriers to adequately plan operations they wish to 
set  up.  However,  it  would  still  largely  freeze  the  2019  market  position  of  carriers  into 
summer 2022 despite air carriers having announced structural reductions in their operations. 

39https://www.iata.org/contentassets/4820c05b19f148e2855db91f2a579369/wasb-northern-summer-21-

recommendation-for-slot-use-relief.pdf 

26 

 
 
                                                           
6.  WHAT ARE THE LIKELY CONSEQUENCES OF THE PROPOSED WAY FORWARD? 

This  section  summarises  the  main  expected  economic,  air  traffic,  social  and  environmental 
consequences of the proposed way forward over the next few years when the expectation is 
that  the  COVID-19  pandemic  (or  its  economic  aftermath)  will  continue  having  impact  on 
demand for air travel and air traffic. Given the urgency of this initiative and the aim to ensure 
the  efficient  use  of  airport  capacity  during  the  pandemic,  the  consequences  set  out  in  this 
document have not been quantified but are presented in a qualitative manner only. They are 
based  on  the  results  of  open  public  and  targeted  consultations,  ongoing  dialogue  with 
stakeholders  and  the  Commission’s  own  market  monitoring  and  assessment.  An  important 
limitation to the analysis is the scarcity and incompleteness of relevant data, also due to the 
rapidly  changing  situation  and  forecasts  estimating  the  length  and  extent  of  the  pandemic. 
Again,  the  stakeholders’  views  on  the  consequences  of  the  proposed  way  forward  were 
presented with the assumption that the amendment to the Slot Regulation would extend the 
waiver and contain only the conditions of the industry agreement. 

6.1.

  Economic consequences 

Amending  the  current  slot  waiver  rules  is  expected  to  benefit  airlines  whose  historic  rights 
will be protected in proportion to the actual and forecast level of air traffic. In addition, slots 
these airlines cannot use will be returned to the pool sufficiently in  advance so they can be 
used by other carriers, allowing competition to return. This in turn will also benefit airports 
and  ground-handling  companies,  who  can  improve  operational  efficiency  and  generate 
revenue or at least avoid incurring unnecessary costs due to inaccurate resource planning.  

Without slot relief, airlines would have an incentive to operate flights to protect key slots for 
their  business.  In  the  long  term,  this  would  come  at  a  high  financial  loss  to  a  majority  of 
airlines and would not be driven by renewed demand for air travel. Such losses may threaten 
the  economic  survival  of  some  airlines  that  would  be  able  to  survive  under  normal  market 
conditions and compete on the market, with benefits to EU consumers and connectivity. The 
economic impact has not been quantified. However, over 25 airline respondents, 6/8 airport 
respondents  and  one  other  service  providers  are  of  the  opinion  that  they  would  incur 
significant  additional  costs  if  no  action  is  taken.  As  mentioned  in  Section  2.1,  the  IATA 
estimated that in the absence of a waiver, worldwide airlines could incur additional operating 
costs of USD 12.6 billion during the winter 2020/2021 season by operating flights they would 
not  have  otherwise  operated.  Although  the  data  provided  by  IATA  refers  to  the  winter 
2020/2021  scheduling  season,  it  could  be  assumed  that  airlines  will  continue  incurring 
financial  losses  of  a  similar  magnitude  unless  slot  relief  is  extended  into  the  summer  2021 
scheduling season (and possibility beyond). One respondent stated that stopping application 
of the current waiver was the only way forward with positive consequences on costs for their 
business, as they would be allowed to operate and enter new airports they can currently not 
access.  

Therefore, it can be concluded that the economic consequences of the proposed way forward 
would have economic benefits for stakeholders in the form of preventing further losses. As 
shown in figure 6.3, the majority of stakeholders considers that extending slot relief with pro-
competitive measures would generate positive effects on the costs for their business. 

27 

 
 
  
Figure 6.1 – Stakeholder views on amending the Regulation 

COSTS FOR YOUR BUSINESS  - AMEND THE 
SLOT REGULATION 

Airline

Airport

Slot-coordinator

Other

2
3

7

6

2

2

0

0

1

4

2

2

1

6

0

0

2

P O S I T I V E  

N E G A T I V E  

N E U T R A L  

N O   O P I N I O N  

6.2.

  Consequences for air traffic levels 

It is expected that the amendment that will, on the one hand, provide relief from the use-it-or-
lose-it principle and, on the other hand, include a number of pro-competitive conditions with 
the aim of ensuring the  efficient  use of  airport  capacity and increase  air  traffic in  line  with 
growing  demand  for  air  travel.  In  addition,  the  aim  of  phasing  out  the  current  waiver  is  to 
increase  air  traffic  levels  by  encouraging  airlines  to  operate  slots.  It  also  aims  to  stabilise 
schedules as the number of flights that can be cancelled and slots that can be handed back at 
short notice decreases. The lower usage requirement and ex post justification of non-use of 
slots  could  result  in  airlines  serving  routes  and  markets  that  they  would  have  otherwise 
abandoned, while also ensuring a continuous, albeit possibly reduced, frequency of service to 
the benefit of consumers. 

Figure 6.2 – Stakeholder views on the effects of different options on air traffic levels 

EFFECTS ON AIR TRAFFIC LEVELS  

Stop application of the waiver

Extend the waiver by Delegated Act

Amend the Slot Regulation

6
5

1
5

6
5

2

7

4

4

6

5

4

2

3

P O S I T I V E  

N E G A T I V E  

N E U T R A L  

N O   O P I N I O N  

Overall, the majority of airlines replied that further slot relief is essential to restore air traffic 
levels in the long term. This is because slots are at the core of airline operations and business. 
In  particular,  an  airline  noted  that  by  protecting  slots  and  extending  the  current  slot  waiver 
through  a  delegated  act,  airlines  can  maintain  their  slots  for  long-haul  travel,  mainly 

28 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
international flights, which are lagging behind in terms of air traffic, for  the recovery. A4E 
replied  that  extending  the  current  waiver  would  have  a  positive  effect  on  the  level  of  air 
services in the EU by preserving connectivity and consumer choice, while allowing airlines to 
rebuild schedules in response to fluctuations in demand. The same reasoning can be extended 
to measures that would extend slot relief even if they do not amount to a full waiver as slots 
on certain strategic routes can still be protected and future connectivity maintained, especially 
if  those  routes  continue  to  be  affected  by  measures  such  as  flight  bans  or  passenger 
restrictions.  

ACI  replied  that  discontinuing  slot  relief  could  have  positive  effects  for  passengers  and 
airports  in  the  short  term,  as  airlines  would  be  required  to  operate  more  flights.  However, 
there could be negative consequences in the long term as the recovery will be impacted by the 
loss of historic slots. In ACI’s view, extending the current waiver would lead to fewer flights, 
due to the protection offered by waiving the 80/20 rule, but if the conditions of the waiver are 
implemented, then it would ensure stability in the schedule and reallocation of unused slots. 

6.3.

Social consequences 

It is expected that the amended slot relief will result in airlines making better use of airport 
capacity.  Due  to  pro-competitive  conditions  and  a  closer  link  between  slot  relief  and  air 
traffic,  both  airlines,  airports  and  ground-handling  companies  will  be  able  to  improve  their 
operational  efficiency.  This  in  turn  is  expected  to  lead  to  greater  job  security  for  aviation 
sector employees.  

Airline associations (the IATA and A4E) stated that, in the absence of slot relief, the cost of 
operating  a  full  schedule  against  unprecedented  low  demand  could  irreversibly  affect  the 
viability  and  continuity  of  airlines,  with  knock-on  effects  on  employment  in  aviation,  both 
directly and indirectly.  

The European Transport Workers’ Federation expressed the view that relaxing the slot rules 
is  important  to  ensure  the  stability  of  the  airline  industry  in  Europe.  However,  if  done  in 
isolation,  it  would  fail  to  address  the  social  costs  suffered  by  civil  aviation  employees. 
According  to  the  trade  union,  in  parallel  to  a  second  extension  of  the  waiver,  EU  Member 
States need to protect employees whose jobs are at risk and therefore bring in aviation sector-
specific  measures  to  prevent  job  loss  and  worsening  of  job  conditions.  However,  this  is 
outside the scope of the current initiative. 

The European Transport Workers’ Federation also noted that not all airlines would access the 
slot waiver extension on equal conditions because some air carriers will be better positioned 
to  continue  operations  over  the  winter  since  they  have  received  State  aid  rescue  packages. 
Overall,  a  cautious  approach  is  warranted  to  ensure  that  any  action  does  not  lead  to  social 
dumping or to worsening labour standards and social standards in the aviation sector.  

At the same time reintroducing a utilisation threshold, which would encourage a certain level 
of air services would also benefit aviation sector employees. 

6.4.

  Environmental consequences 

The Commission expects that the proposed way forward will largely prevent flights operating 
at very low load factors and hence avoid negative environmental and climate consequences.  

29 

 
 
 
In reply to the consultation, the IATA stated that, without an extension of the waiver for the 
full winter 2020/2021 season, an estimated 27 million more tonnes of CO2 would be emitted. 
The  Commission  could  not  independently  verify  this  estimate.  These  emissions  would  be 
mainly due to flights with very low load factors operated to maintain airlines’ historic rights. 
Respondents  to  the  public  consultation  were  of  the  view  that  the  negative  environmental 
consequences could be avoided by amending the Slots Regulation to ensure a more efficient 
use of airport capacity.  However, one  airline argued that both  extending the current  waiver 
and  amending  the  Slots  Regulation  would  distort  competition  on  the  market  and  would 
therefore reduce the incentive for airlines to renew their fleet. 

Figure 6.3 Stakeholder views on the environmental consequences 

 EFFECTS ON THE ENVIRONMENT (CO2 
EMISSIONS, LOCAL AIR QUALITY, NOISE, ETC.)  

Stop application of the waiver

Extend the waiver by Delegated Act

Amend the Slot Regulation

5
5

6
5

6
5

1

3

2

3

2

3

7

8

9

P O S I T I V E  

N E G A T I V E  

N E U T R A L  

N O   O P I N I O N  

7.  CONCLUSION 

At this stage, it seems premature to stop granting airlines relief from the use-it-or-lose it rule 
beyond  the  winter  2020/2021  scheduling  season,  as  suggested  by  some  stakeholders.  It  is 
highly uncertain  what will happen to air traffic levels and demand over the coming  year.  It 
may  be  possible  that  the  discovery  of  a  vaccine  will  pave  the  way  to  a  fast  recovery. 
However,  if  depressed  demand  persists,  it  should  be  possible  for  the  Commission  to  react 
quickly to  extend relief as the impact  on the market  of applying the use-it-or-lose-it rule in 
full would otherwise be devastating for airlines and disruptive for consumers. 

Although  a  further  extension  of  a  blank  waiver  by  delegated  acts  would  support  airlines  in 
their recovery, the current problems experienced as side effects of the waiver would continue 
until  the waiver expires.  It  will not  be possible to ensure, with  legal  certainty based on the 
Slot Regulation,  that slots  are handed back promptly or to  prevent  speculative slot requests 
during the period of the waiver and the knock-on risks to competition at congested airports. 
Such effects could have an impact that would continue to be felt after the COVID-19 crisis 
has passed. 

The proposed way forward to amend the Slot Regulation provides relief to air carriers during 
the  COVID-19  pandemic,  as  they  will  have  a  longer  period  of  certainty  during  which  they 

30 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
can  manage  their  slot  holdings  in  a  way  that  allows  them  to  adapt  to  ongoing  changes  in 
travel patterns. In addition, it would aim to: 

  ensure that airlines operate their historic slots to the maximum extent possible in line 
with  the  recovery  and  stabilisation  of  air  traffic.  This  would  be  achieved  by 
modulating the current use-it-or-lose-it principle so that airlines are obliged to use a 
certain percentage of their historic slots to keep their entire portfolio of historic rights 
for the corresponding next season;  

  ensure  that  extended  slot  relief  does  not  interfere  unduly  with  market  dynamics  by 
facilitating the exit of airlines from airport markets where necessary, and encouraging 
new entry; 

  provide  a  degree  of  visibility  and  operational  certainty  to  airports  and  other  service 
providers of air carriers for future operations, by ensuring that slots are handed back 
to the coordinator promptly when they are not required; 

  ensure that slot relief protects the historic rights of air carriers that intend to operate 

their slots during subsequent scheduling seasons;  

  ensure that slots affected by sudden measures adopted by public authorities affecting 
the ability of passengers to travel during a substantial part of the season are protected 
as these circumstances would be considered outside the airlines’ control; and 

  provide  a  degree  of  flexibility  to  extend  the  slot  waiver  again  by  way  of  a  further 
delegated  act  after  the  beginning  of  2021,  subject  to  need  and  in  a  proportionate 
manner. This  includes  the option to  further modulate the use-it-or-lose-it thresholds 
to ensure that airlines still have an incentive to use their slots to the maximum extent 
possible or return them to the pool of slots for distribution to other airport users. 

31