COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS A Counter-Terrorism Agenda for the EU: Anticipate, Prevent, Protect, Respond
Date: 2020-12-09
Institutions: Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs, European Commission
Subjects: EU programme, European cooperation, European security, exchange of information, external border of the EU, extremism, fight against crime, international cooperation, terrorism, threat to national security

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 9.12.2020  COM(2020) 795 final  COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS A Counter-Terrorism Agenda for the EU: Anticipate, Prevent, Protect, Respond  
 
 
I.  

INTRODUCTION 

The European Union is a unique area of freedom, security and justice, where every person 
must  be  able  to  trust  that  their  freedom  and  security  are  guaranteed  and  well  protected. 
Democracy,  rule  of  law,  respect  for  fundamental  rights  in  particular  the  right  to  privacy, 
freedom of expression, freedom of religion and the respect for diversity are the foundation of 
our Union.  

The recent spate of attacks on European soil have served as a sharp reminder that terrorism 
remains  a  real  and  present  danger.  As  this  threat  evolves,  so  too  must  our  cooperation  to 
counter it. The transnational nature of terrorist networks requires a strong collective approach 
at EU level, one that safeguards and upholds our pluralistic society, our common values and 
our European way of life. Citizens have the right to feel safe in their own homes and streets, 
as well as on the internet. The EU has a key role to play in helping to deliver that security.  

This  is  all the more acute given that  the EU remains on high terrorist alert. The jihadist 
threat from or inspired by Daesh, al-Qaeda and their affiliates persists1. Threats from violent 
right and left-wing extremists are on the rise. The nature of attacks is also shifting. The vast 
majority of recent attacks were carried out  by individuals  acting alone  –  often with  limited 
preparation  and  easily  available  weaponry  –  targeting  densely  crowded  or  highly  symbolic 
spaces. While single actor attacks are likely to remain prevalent, more sophisticated attacks 
cannot  be  excluded.  The  EU  also  needs  to  be  prepared  for  threats  from  new  and  emerging 
technologies, such as malicious use of drones, artificial intelligence and chemical, biological, 
radiological and nuclear material. The spread of radical ideologies and of terrorist guidance 
material accelerates through the use of online propaganda, with the use of social media often 
becoming an integral part of the attack itself.  

Over  the  last  two  decades,  European  cooperation  on  counter-terrorism  has  advanced 
steadily and enhanced the capacity of Member States to ensure the security of their citizens. 
We  have  extensive  information-sharing  networks,  supported  by  increasingly  interoperable 
EU databases as well as enhanced police and judicial cooperation. This helps us connect the 
dots across borders. We have also equipped ourselves with powerful tools to deny terrorists 
the means to act, such as in the areas of firearms, explosives precursors, terrorism financing 
and criminalising travel for terrorist purposes. The state of play of these efforts is set out in 
the Security Union progress report2. However, we need to redouble our collective work, in 
particular  to  counter  the  draw  of  extremist  ideologies  and  better  protect  the  public  spaces 
targeted  by  terrorists.  We  must  also  overcome  the  false  dichotomy  between  online  and  off, 
bringing  the  respective  security  environments  in  line,  and  equipping  law  enforcement  and 
judicial authorities with the means to enforce the law in both. 

This  new  Counter-Terrorism  Agenda,  announced  in  the  EU’s  Security  Union  Strategy3, 
brings  together  existing  and  new  strands  of  work  in  a  joined-up  approach  to  combatting 
terrorism.  This  approach  will  be  brought  forward  in  coordination  with  the  Member  States, 
while working with the European Parliament and the Council4, and also by engaging society 
as  a  whole:  citizens,  communities,  faith  groups,  civil  society,  researchers,  businesses  and 
private partners. The Agenda builds on what has been achieved over the past years and sets 

See EEAS(2020) 1114. 

1  
2   COM(2020) 797. 
3  
4  

Commission Communication on the EU Security Union Strategy, 24.7.2020, COM(2020) 605 final. 
Cf.  most  recently  the  videoconference  of  Home  Affairs  ministers  of  13  November  2020  which  adopted  a  joint 
statement: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/jha/2020/11/13/ 

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out a series of actions to be taken forward at national, EU and international level across four 
fronts: 

Firstly,  we  need  to  be  able  to  better  anticipate  existing  and  emerging  threats  in  Europe. 
Information  sharing  and  a  culture  of  cooperation  that  is  multi-disciplinary  and  multi-level 
remain  key  for  a  solid  threat  assessment  that  can  form  the  basis  of  a  future-proof  counter-
terrorism policy.  

Second,  we  need  to  work  to  prevent  attacks  from  occurring,  by  addressing  and  better 
countering  radicalisation  and  extremist  ideologies  before  they  take  root,  making  clear  that 
respect for the European way of life, its democratic values and all it represents is not optional. 
This  Agenda  sets  out  ways  of  supporting  local  actors  and  building  more  resilient 
communities  as  a  matter  of  priority,  in  close  coordination  with  Member  States,  taking  into 
account  that  some  attacks  have  also  been  carried  out  by  Europeans,  raised  within  our 
societies, who were radicalised without ever having visited a conflict zone.  

Third, to effectively protect Europeans, we need to continue to reduce vulnerabilities, be it in 
public  spaces  or  for  the  critical  infrastructures  that  are  essential  for  the  functioning  of  our 
societies  and  economy.  It  is  essential  to  modernise  the  management  of  the  EU’s  external 
borders  through  new  and  upgraded  large-scale  EU  information  systems,  with  reinforced 
support by Frontex and eu-LISA, and ensure systematic checks at the EU’s external borders. 
This is necessary to close what would otherwise be a security gap when it comes to returning 
foreign terrorist fighters. 

Fourth,  to  respond  to  attacks  when  they  do  occur,  we  need  to  make  the  most  of  the 
operational  support  EU  Agencies,  such  as  Europol  and  Eurojust,  can  provide,  as  well  as 
ensure we have the right legal framework to bring perpetrators to justice and to guarantee that 
victims get the support and protection they need.  

Underpinning  this  approach  is  the  need  to  continue  to  place  a  relentless  emphasis  on 
implementation  and  enforcement.  To  reap  the  benefits  of  EU-wide  harmonisation  and 
cooperation, it is of fundamental importance that there are no gaps or delays in how we apply 
key instruments,  such  as the  Directive on  combating terrorism5, the  Firearms  Directive  and 
legal framework on combating money laundering and terrorist financing6.  

Finally,  international  engagement  across  all  four  pillars  of  this  Agenda,  facilitating 
cooperation and promoting capacity building, is essential to improve security inside the EU.  

II.    A FOUR PILLAR STRATEGY TO COUNTER TERRORISM: ANTICIPATE,  

PREVENT, PROTECT AND RESPOND 

1. ANTICIPATE 

Anticipating  blind  spots  remain  key  means  of  strengthening  Europe’s  counter-terrorism 
response and staying ahead of the curve. 

5  
6  

Directive (EU) 2017/541 of 15 March 2017 on combating terrorism, OJ L 88/6, 31.3.2017. 
Directive (EU) 2018/1673 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on combating  money 
laundering  by  criminal  law,  OJ  L  284,  12.11.2018.  Denmark  and  Ireland  are  not  bound  by  the  Directive.  Directive 
(EU) 2018/843 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 amending Directive (EU) 2015/849 on 
the  prevention  of  the  use  of  the  financial  system  for  the  purposes  of  money  laundering  or  terrorist  financing,  and 
amending Directives 2009/138/EC and 2013/36/EU, OJ L 156/43, 19.6.2018. 

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Strategic intelligence and threat assessment 

Strategic intelligence is of key importance to shape and develop an increasingly threat-based 
EU counter-terrorism policy and legislation, and better anticipate those threats. Future-proof 
counter-terrorism  policy  should  be  based  on  solid  threat  assessments  in  particular  from 
national  security  and  intelligence  services.  In  this  context,  the  role  played  by  the  EU 
Intelligence and Situation Centre (EU INTCEN) and its expertise on the main threats, trends 
and  modus  operandi  related  to  EU  internal  security  is  vital  to  increase  our  situational 
awareness  and  support  our  risk  assessment  capability.  EU  INTCEN  critically  depends  on 
high quality input from Member States, which they should strive to improve. Member States 
should  therefore  ensure  that  EU  INTCEN  can  rely  on  accurate  and  up-to-date  input  and 
sufficient  resources.  The  Commission  and  the  EEAS  will  strive  towards  better  integrating 
strategic  intelligence  in  counter-terrorism  policies.  Further  dialogue,  building  upon  existing 
structures and building on the work of the EU Counter-terrorism Coordinator to enhance the 
cooperation is of key importance.   

Risk assessments and preparedness 

Targeted  risk  assessments  allow  stakeholders  of  different  sectors  to  highlight  existing 
shortcomings and therefore better anticipate possible attacks. The Commission will propose 
new ways to encourage risk assessment and peer review activities of measures aimed at better 
anticipating the terrorist threat. As part of the upcoming proposal on the resilience of critical 
entities,  the  Commission  will  propose  to  set  up  advisory  missions  to  support  host  Member 
States  and  operators  of  critical  infrastructures  of  particular  European  significance  in 
enhancing their resilience to disruptions, including anticipating possible terrorist actions. This 
will  build  upon  the  experience  of  a  pool  of  protective  security  advisors,  who  are  currently 
being trained, and who can be deployed on demand: the  EU Protective Security Advisory 
missions.   

EU aviation security risk assessments will be further developed in order to enhance both the 
response  time  after  incidents  and  the  level  of  exchange  of  information,  including  the 
participation  of  like-minded  third  countries,  notably  the  U.S.,  Australia  and  Canada.  The 
Commission  will  also  launch  a  new  risk  assessment  strand  to  ensure  the  security  of 
transport in the maritime area. Lastly, joint training and exercises will play an important 
part  in  the  efforts  to  strengthen  the  preparedness  and  resilience  of  Member  States,  the  EU 
institutions and bodies, as well as international partners7.  

Reinforcing early detection capacity 

The crucial role that modern technology can play in committing terror was illustrated by the 
extreme  right-wing  terrorist  attack  on  a  synagogue  in  Halle,  Germany,  in  2019,  where  the 
attacker  constructed  several  guns  using  3D  printing.  We  need  to  better  anticipate  how 
technologies impact the terrorist threat in order to equip law enforcement authorities with the 
right tools.  

EU  security  research  will  focus  on  addressing  different  modi  operandi,  building  on 
initiatives  intended  to  enhance  the  capacity  of  law  enforcement  authorities  as  regards 

7  

In the framework of the pilot project for Parallel and Coordinated Exercises (PACE) agreed with NATO, two sets of 
exercises  have  already  been  organised  in 2017  and 2018.  Efforts  are  currently  focused  on implementing  the  lessons 
identified during those exercises. The EU and NATO have agreed to extend the PACE concept for the period 2022-
2023. As a long-term objective, the EU supports a more ambitious approach on PACE exercises, including the active 
participation of EU Member States and NATO allies in their conduct phase. 

3 

 
                                                           
analytical  solutions  and  dealing  with  large  amounts  of  online  content8.  EU-funded  security 
research  will  also  strengthen  the  early  detection  capacity  of  potential  terrorist  threats, 
notably by exploring the use of Artificial Intelligence to allow for more efficient and accurate 
processing of large amounts of data, adding on projects like RED-Alert9 and PREVISION10. 
It can also help to find new ways to address radicalisation. 

Lastly,  under  the  future  Research  Programme  Horizon  Europe,  research  will  be  further 
integrated  within  the  security  policy  cycle  to  ensure  an  even  more  impact-oriented  output, 
responding to the identified law enforcement needs. With its proposed strengthened mandate, 
Europol  could  assist  the  Commission  in  identifying  key  research  themes,  drawing  up  and 
implementing the EU framework programmes for research and innovation that are relevant 
for law enforcement. 

Staying ahead of the curve: the role of new technologies 

Threat  detection  technologies  can  detect  objects  and  substances  of  concern,  for  example 
bombs  or  bomb-making  materials.  The  Commission  is  working  together  with  the  private 
sector to improve the performance of such detection technologies outside aviation11 with a 
view  to  support  the  possible  development  of  voluntary  EU  requirements  for  detection 
technologies  to  ensure  that  they  detect  the  threats  they  need  to  detect  while  preserving  the 
mobility  of  people.  In  addition,  in  2019,  the  EU  Rail  Security  Platform  adopted  a  good 
practices’ document on security technologies adapted to railways, proposing solutions such as 
random or targeted checks relying on mobile detection equipment.   

New technologies can contribute to the protection of public spaces if they are used in a well-
defined, targeted and proportionate manner. In case of high terrorist threat alert12, the possible 
role  of  facial  identification  technologies  capable  of  detecting  terrorists  on  the  move  by 
comparing  their  facial  image  with  a  reference  database  holds  security  potential.  Moreover, 
identification  of  certain  categories  of  objects  (e.g.  abandoned  luggage)  or  suspicious 
behaviour  can  be  highly  useful  to  detect  threats.  Artificial  Intelligence  plays  a  key  role  in 
delivering tools  that allow for  precise and targeted identification  of potential  threats.  In the 
reflections that the Commission is undertaking on the use of Artificial Intelligence,13 security 
considerations will therefore be taken into account, subject to compliance with fundamental 
rights.  The  Commission  is  ready  to  fund  projects  to  develop  new  technologies  under  the 
Urban  Agenda  for  the  EU,  and  supports  the  exchange  of  best  practices  in  this  area  in 

8  

9  

10  

11  

Following  up  on  successful  initiatives  such  as  projects  DANTE  and  TENSOR.  The  DANTE  project  has  delivered 
effective, efficient, automated data mining and analytics solutions and an integrated system to detect, retrieve, collect 
and  analyse  huge  amounts  of  heterogeneous  and  complex  multimedia  and  multi-language  terrorist-related  contents, 
from the surface, deep web and dark nets. (https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/700367). TENSOR has had an approach 
complementary to DANTE and developed a platform that provides police authorities with tools necessary to enhance 
their  capacity  for  dealing  with  huge  amounts  of  online  content  in  the  early  detection  of  online  terrorist  organised 
activities, radicalisation and recruitment. (https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/700024) 
RED-Alert uses advanced analytics techniques, such as natural language social network analysis, artificial intelligence 
and complex event processing, to tackle law enforcement needs in terms of prevention and action regarding terrorist 
social media online activity. (https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/740688) 
PREVISION is an on-going project the objectives of which are to provide law enforcement with the capabilities of 
analysing and jointly exploiting multiple massive data streams, semantically integrating them into dynamic knowledge 
graphs as well as predicting abnormal or deviant 
behaviour and radicalisation risks. (https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/833115) 
In  the  area  of  civil  aviation,  a  legal  framework  sets  out  performance  standards  for  detection  equipment.  This 
framework only applies to aviation security and not, for example, for detection equipment used to protect other public 
spaces.  

12   Terrorist alert level as defined by national authorities, in line with their national law. 
13   White Paper on Artificial Intelligence: A European approach to excellence and trust (COM(2020) 65 final, 19.2.2020). 

4 

 
 
                                                           
accordance with EU law.  
Developments in Artificial Intelligence (AI) are set to have a profound impact on the ability 
of law enforcement authorities to respond to terrorist threats. Law enforcement authorities are 
already  developing  innovative  solutions  based  on  AI  technology,  for  example  to  identify 
terrorist content  online and stop  its  dissemination,  to  prevent  the creation of new terrorists’ 
accounts on social media, and detect symbols. One key aspect to developing trustworthy AI 
applications is ensuring that the data used to train algorithms is relevant, verifiable, of good 
quality and available in high variety to minimise bias for instance towards gender or race. AI 
applications should be developed and used with proper safeguards for right and freedoms, in 
compliance with relevant legislation and  adequately documented to ascertain the legality of 
their use. The Commission will look into how law enforcement and judicial authorities may 
harvest the benefits of AI in full conformity with EU law. 
Staying ahead of the curve also means addressing emerging threats that may be posed by new 
technologies.  Drones  (Unmanned  aircraft  systems)  can  be  misused  to  target  public  spaces, 
individuals and critical infrastructure. While the EU has made it more difficult to use certain 
types  of  drones  for  malicious  purposes14,  the  rapid  pace  of  innovation  and  easy  access  to 
drones  means  that  the  threat  is  likely  to  grow.  To  confront  this  challenge,  the  Commission 
will look into the possibility of releasing in 2021 an EU handbook for securing cities from 
non-cooperative drones.  

Protecting  from  malicious  drones  also  requires  access  to  reliable  counter-measure 
technologies.  The  “European  Programme  for  counter-UAS  systems  testing”  will  create  a 
common  methodology  to  evaluate  different  systems  that  can  be  used  by  police  and  other 
security actors to detect, track and identify potentially malicious drones. The outcomes of 
these tests will be shared EU-wide. 

Integrating foresight in the policy cycle 

Protecting citizens starts with a better understanding of future threats. To that end, foresight 
needs  to  be  structurally  integrated  in  the  development  of  counter-terrorism  policy.  The 
Commission will work towards creating a dialogue between senior counter-terrorism experts 
from law enforcement, intelligence and academia on a regular basis to identify new risks and 
highlight areas where the European Union and its Member States need to bolster their action. 
The Commission will use existing structures for this purpose with the close involvement of 
Europol, Eurojust, and the EEAS including EU INTCEN15. The result of this dialogue could 
then feed into policy discussions, including the Justice and Home Affairs Council discussions 
on internal security. 

14   Through  the  new  European  drone  regulations  and  the  prospect  of  a  European  unmanned  traffic  management 
framework  (the  U-Space).  Recent  EU  legislation  in  this  area  will  contribute  to  the  security  of  drone  operations  by 
requiring  most  drones  to  be  equipped  with  remote  identification  and  geo-awareness  functions.  From  January  2021, 
drone operators will also be required to register with national authorities. This is complemented by a proposal from the 
Commission  on  a  regulatory  framework  for  the  U-space,  Europe’s  unmanned  traffic  management  system14,  to 
ensure the safe and secure operations of drones. 
Cf. Council Conclusions on EU External Action on Counter-terrorism of 19 June 2017. 

15 

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KEY ACTIONS 

The Commission will: 

  Develop  risk  assessment  and  peer  review  activities,  including  the  on-demand 

deployment of EU Protective Security Advisors. 

  Fund  EU-security  research  to  strengthen  early  detection  capacity  and  develop 

new technologies under the Urban Agenda for the EU. 

  Explore  how  new  technologies  can  contribute  to  security.  Better  integrate 
strategic intelligence and threat assessments to support forward looking policy. 

Member States are urged to: 

  Continue providing EU INTCEN with necessary resources and high quality input. 

2. PREVENT  

The European Union is founded on a strong set of values. Our education, health and welfare 
systems are inclusive by nature but they come part and parcel with acceptance of the values 
that underpin them. Our European way of life – emblematic of inclusive and tolerant societies 
– is not optional and we must do all in our power to prevent those that seek to undermine it – 
from within or without.  

Countering extremist ideologies online 

Terrorists  and  violent  extremists  increasingly  make  use  of  the  internet  to  disseminate  their 
extremist  ideologies,  including  by  live  streaming  and  glorifying  terrorist  attacks.  The 
response must come from all actors – national authorities, industry and civil society – and at 
all  levels  (national,  European  and  international).  The  adoption  and  implementation  of  the 
proposed  Regulation  on  addressing  the  dissemination  of  terrorist  content  online  would 
allow Member States to ensure the swift removal of such content and require companies to be 
more responsive in preventing the abuse of their platforms for the dissemination of terrorist 
content.  Adoption  by  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  is  therefore  a  matter  of 
urgency.  Once  adopted,  the  Commission  will  support  online  service  providers  and  national 
authorities in the effective application of the Regulation.  

More broadly, the Commission will propose a Digital Services Act which will upgrade the 
horizontal rules to ensure digital services act responsibly and that users have effective means 
to  notify  illegal  content.  Recognising  the  increasing  societal  role  of  very  large  online 
platforms, the proposal will include obligations to assess the risks their systems pose not only 
as  regards  illegal  content  and  products,  but  also  systemic  risks  to  the  protection  of  public 
interests,  such  as  public  health  and  public  security,  and  fundamental  rights,  also  against 
manipulative techniques. 

The EU Internet Forum will develop guidance on moderation for publicly available content 
for extremist material online and further disseminate knowledge in that area. The EU Internet 
Forum  developed  the  EU  Crisis  Response  Protocol,  a  voluntary  mechanism  to  help 
coordinate  a  rapid,  collective  and  cross-border  response  to  the  viral  spread  of  terrorist  and 

6 

 
 
 
violent extremist content online16. It is essential that industry partners fully operationalise this 
protocol.  The  Commission,  in  cooperation  with  Europol,  will  support  the  development  of 
further guidance for the implementation of the EU Crisis Protocol to tackle a viral spread of 
terrorist and violent extremist content online. Europol’s Internet Referral Unit’s resources 
and capacity should be reinforced to monitor and refer all types of terrorist content to online 
platforms with a 24/7 availability.  

Terrorist content originates and spreads from all over the world. This is why the Commission 
will  increase  its  engagement  with  international  partners,  in  particular  with  the  Global 
Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT) for a global operational response, as well 
as  with  partner  governments,  in  line  with  the  Christchurch  Call  for  Action17  to  strive 
towards minimum standards globally, including on transparency.  

To  respond  to  the  proliferation  of  racist  and  xenophobic  hate  speech  on  the  internet,  the 
Commission encouraged the signing of the EU Code of Conduct on countering illegal hate 
speech online in 201618. The Commission will present an initiative in 2021 to extend the list 
of  EU-level  crimes  under  Article  83(1)  of  the  Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the  EU  to  hate 
crime  and  hate  speech,  whether  based  on  race,  ethnicity,  religion,  gender  or  sexuality. 
Member States  should step up their efforts  to  fully implement  the new Audio-visual Media 
Services Directive provisions on hate speech on online video-sharing platforms. 

The  Commission  will  support  Member  States  to  develop  their  strategic  communication 
capabilities  for  post-attack  responses  through  exchange  of  expertise  at  local  and  national 
level.  This  is  necessary  not  only  in  the  aftermath  of  a  terrorist  attack,  but  it  should  be  an 
ongoing  governmental  preventive  effort.  The  Commission  will  therefore  support  Member 
States to address these challenges and increase the dissemination of counter- and alternative 
narratives  developed  by  civil  society  and  support  similar  efforts  at  national  level.  The 
Commission’s  Civil  Society  Empowerment  Programme  will  be  evaluated  in  2022  to 
provide lessons learnt. 

At the same time, both the EU and its Member States must continuously ensure that projects 
which  are  incompatible  with  European  values  or  pursue  an  illegal  agenda,  do  not  receive 
support from government and European funds.  

Supporting local actors for more resilient communities 

Our  cities  need  to  have  better  access  to  funding,  guidance  and  training  to  address  current 
challenges  and  to  increase  their  resilience.  The  Commission  is  supporting  local  prevent 
coordinators  through  the  Radicalisation  Awareness  Network.  Furthermore,  under  the 
initiative “EU Cities against Radicalisation”, the Commission is fostering strategic dialogues 
among  cities.  To  increase  resilience,  it  is  also  important  to  engage  with  communities  and 
empower them through a bottom-up approach, in close coordination with Member States. The 

16  

https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-
security/20191007_agenda-security-factsheet-eu-crisis-protocol_en.pdf 
https://www.christchurchcall.com/call.html 

17  
18   The  results  are  overall  positive  with  IT  companies  assessing  90%  of  flagged  content  within  24 hours  and removing 
71%  of  the  content  deemed  to  be  illegal  hate  speech.  https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-
rights/combatting-discrimination/racism-and-xenophobia/eu-code-conduct-countering-illegal-hate-speech-online_en. 

7 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Radicalisation  Awareness  Network  will  identify  best  practices  and  foster  approaches  of 
community policing19 and engagement to build trust with and among communities. 

Promoting inclusion and providing opportunities for young people at risk through education, 
culture,  youth  and  sports  can  further  contribute  to  the  prevention  of  radicalisation,  and 
cohesion  inside  the  EU.  The  Commission  will  reinforce  its  support  to  Member  States  and 
other  stakeholders’  efforts  in  the  field  of  integration  and  social  inclusion  through  the 
measures included in the Action Plan on integration and inclusion20.  

ideologies, 

Given  the  important  role  of  non-formal  education  in  radicalisation  and  possible  links  to 
extremist 
the  Commission  will  facilitate  collaboration  among  schools, 
communities  (including  faith  groups),  youth  workers,  social  workers  and  civil  society 
organisations. The Commission will also support Member States in sharing experiences and 
good  practices  with  regard  to  exchanges  among  religious  and  community  leaders  on  the 
prevention of radicalisation, including those active in schools and prisons.  

Real  or  perceived  social  exclusion,  discrimination  and  marginalisation  can  reinforce 
vulnerability to radical discourses and further threaten social cohesion. The Commission will 
therefore also continue its action set out in its anti-racism action plan.21  

Prisons, rehabilitation and reintegration  

Radicalisation  processes  need  to  be  spotted  as  early  as  possible  so  that  disengagement 
activities  can  be  implemented  timely.  We  will  strengthen  EU  action  on  three  key  areas: 
prisons,  rehabilitation  and  reintegration.  First,  by  identifying  best  approaches  regarding 
management and risk assessment  of radicalised inmates and terrorist offenders22, as well as 
supporting  training  of  professionals  involved  in  this  field23.  Second,  by  building  on  the 
insights of the Radicalisation Awareness Network Rehabilitation Manual,24 the Commission 
will  support  Member  States  to  provide  more  tailored  guidance  on  rehabilitation  and 
reintegration  of  radical  inmates,  including  after  release.  Thirdly,  by  developing  a 
methodology  with  common  standards  and  indicators  for  evaluating  the  effectiveness  of 
reintegration  programmes25.  Any  efforts  with  regard  to  rehabilitation  and  reintegration  of 
children need to take into account their specific needs and rights26. 

Foreign terrorist fighters and their family members, including those currently located in 
detention  centres  and  camps  in  North  East  Syria,  raise  specific  and  complex  challenges, 
which require coordination of stakeholders at all levels.  The Commission will further support 

19  

In this context, community policing is a collaborative effort between law enforcement and communities to prevent and 
counter challenges related to violent radicalisation. 

20   COM(2020) 758 final. 
21 
22   The Commission  will also work on the issue of pre-trial detention, keeping in mind that long periods of pre-trial 

A Union of equality: EU anti-racism action plan 2020-2025 (COM(2020) 565 final, 18.9.2020). 

detention may enhance the risk of radicalisation. 

23   This  includes  prison  and  probation  staff,  as  well  as  other  professionals  working  in  prisons  and  after  release  (e.g. 

24  

chaplains, psychologists, social workers, NGOs, etc.). 
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-
papers/docs/ran_rehab_manual_en.pdf 

25   Responses  on  collaboration  models  and  protocols  for  disengagement  and  reintegration,  as  well  as  preparedness  of 
stakeholders will be provided by projects under a dedicated Internal Security Fund  call of 4 MIO EUR. The projects 
will address disengagement and reintegration of extremist offenders and radicalised individuals related to violent right 
wing and Islamist extremism, including returning foreign terrorist fighters and their families. 

26   Directive  (EU)  2016/800  on  procedural  safeguards  for  children  who  are  suspects  or  accused  persons  in  criminal 
proceedings,  OJ  L  132/1  of  21.5.2016.  See  Recital  9:  “Children  who  are  suspects  or  accused  persons  in  criminal 
proceedings should be given particular attention in order to preserve their potential for development and reintegration 
into society. 

8 

 
                                                           
Member  States  to  share  best  practices  and  will  also  increase  support  to  the  training  of 
practitioners, and to knowledge and information sharing in this area, taking into account the 
specific needs and rights of children of foreign terrorist fighters. In addition, the Commission 
will  also  support  Member  States  to  step  up  efforts  towards  ensuring  the  prosecution  of 
foreign terrorist fighters by supporting work to that end at local, national and international. 

Consolidating knowledge and support 

For  more  coordinated  action  and  structured  outreach  at  national  level,  in  a  first  phase  the 
Commission  will  support  the  creation  and  further  development  of  national  networks  of 
relevant  actors,  including  practitioners  and  national  centres  of  expertise27.  In  a  second 
phase,  the  Commission  will  propose  setting  up  an  EU  Knowledge  Hub  on  prevention  of 
radicalisation  for  policy  makers,  practitioners  and  researchers.  The  EU  Knowledge  Hub 
would  disseminate  knowledge  and  expertise  and  also  promote  the  full  use  of  funding 
possibilities  under  the  various  EU  programmes28,  evaluate  interventions,  certify  best 
practices and offer targeted support to stakeholders at national and local level.  It could also 
possibly integrate a future EU centre for victims of terrorism to offer expertise and support to 
national  authorities  and  victims  support  organisations29.  Other  relevant  areas  include 
research, provision of information  about  radical  ideologies, organisations  and networks  and 
the  dissemination  of  counter-  and  alternative  narratives,  as  well  as  cooperation  with 
community and religious leaders. 

Finally, building on research, the Commission will develop guidance for Member States and 
other stakeholders regarding lone actors including risk assessments and possible responses to 
this phenomenon. 

27  
28 

29  

Possibly co-financed through the national programmes of the Internal Security Fund. 
In particular the funding under the Internal Security Fund, the Citizenship, Equality, Rights and Values Programme, 
the Justice Programme, the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus and Erasmus+. 
Such  a  future  Centre  could  build  on  the  work  of  the  two-year  pilot  project  EU  Centre  of  Expertise  for  victims  of 
terrorism  and  ensure  close  cooperation  with  existing  networks  in  the  area  of  victims’  rights  such  as  the  European 
Network on Victims’ Rights and the Single contact points for victims of terrorism. 

9 

 
                                                           
KEY ACTIONS 

The Commission will: 

  Propose a Digital Services Act.  

 

In  cooperation  with  Europol,  provide  guidance  for  the  implementation  of  the  EU 
Crisis Protocol  

  Support Member States to develop strategic communication and increase the 

dissemination of counter- and alternative narratives. 

  Provide  guidance  on  management  and  risk  assessments  in  prison  and  on  early 

rehabilitation and reintegration. 

  Foster  best  practices  sharing  between  Member  States  to  manage  returning  foreign 

terrorist fighters and their family members.  

  Propose  setting  up  an  EU  Knowledge  Hub  on  the  prevention  of  radicalisation  and 

support national networks of stakeholders and national centres. 

The European Parliament and the Council are urged to: 

  Adopt,  as  a  matter  of  urgency,  the  Regulation  addressing  the  dissemination  of 

terrorist content online. 

The Commission and the Member States will:  

  Ensure that projects which are incompatible with European values or pursue an illegal 
agenda do not receive support from public funds. Build community resilience through 
the measures included in the Action Plan on integration and inclusion. 

3. PROTECT 

Strengthening  the  counter-terrorism  response  must  include  reducing  vulnerabilities  that  can 
be exploited or targeted by terrorists. By better protecting our borders and denying terrorists 
the means used to carry out terrorist acts, we can protect against potential attacks. 

Protecting people in public spaces 

Terrorist attacks have overwhelmingly targeted people in public spaces, which are especially 
vulnerable due to their open and accessible nature. We need to safeguard the open nature of 
these  spaces  while  at  the  same  time  making  them  more  secure  through  stronger  physical 
protection measures that do not create fortresses30 and still allow people to walk about freely 
and safely. This is why the Commission will increase efforts at EU level to promote security-
by-design  solutions,  which  build  security  into  public  spaces  (buildings  and  infrastructures) 
from the beginning of the design and urban planning processes. The Commission will issue a 
virtual architectural book on urban design, which can serve as inspiration for authorities to 
incorporate  security  aspects  in  the  design  of  future  and  the  renovation  of  existing  public 
spaces.  

30   The Commission has issued guidance material how to physically protect public spaces, e.g. 

https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/publication/guideline-building-perimeter-protection 

10 

 
 
                                                           
The  EU  Forum  on  the  protection  of  public  spaces  has  brought  together  a  wide  group  of 
people  with  responsibility  over  the  security  of  public  spaces.  These  include  EU  Member 
States’ authorities, and private operators, e.g. those responsible for shopping malls, transport 
services, or venues for hospitality. There is much to be learned from different experiences in 
protecting  public  spaces31.  The  Commission  is  committed  to  enhancing  this  forum,  which 
should collect, consolidate and disseminate knowledge, as well as support the EU Pledge on 
Urban Security and Resilience, and to use targeted funding to help improving the protection 
of  public  spaces32.  The  Commission  will  also  explore  the  possibility  of  setting  minimum 
obligations  for  those  that  are  responsible  for  guaranteeing  the  security  of  public  spaces  to 
clarify what can be expected from the operators of public spaces. 

Places of worship hold a particularly high symbolic value and have frequently been targeted 
by  terrorists.  We  must  better  protect  churches,  mosques  and  synagogues  as  well  as  other 
religious  sites across the EU. We should also  foster cooperation between the different  faith 
communities  and  the  relevant  national  authorities  as  they  exchange  experiences.  As  from 
2021, the Commission aims to support projects that enhance the physical protection of places 
of worship in close coordination with Member States. 

Cities as the backbone of urban security  

Local and regional authorities play a key role both in the protection of public spaces and the 
prevention of radicalisation. In cooperation with the Urban Agenda for the EU Partnership for 
Security  in  Public  Spaces  and  building  on  the  successful  initiative  EU  Cities  against 
Radicalisation,  the  Commission  will  propose  an  EU  Pledge  on  Urban  Security  and 
Resilience, setting out basic principles and objectives for local authorities in these areas, and 
will  call  upon  interested  cities  to  sign  up  to  a  positive  agenda  to  prevent  and  counter 
radicalisation and reduce vulnerabilities in public spaces. Cities which take part in the Pledge 
will become part of an EU-wide initiative of Cities against Radicalisation and Terrorism, 
through  which  the  Commission  will  facilitate  the  sharing  of  good  practices  and  support 
projects  led  by  cities  and  peer-to-peer  advisory  efforts.  The  Commission  will  mobilise  all 
available funding instruments to support the implementation of the Pledge. 

resilience 

In  addition  to  the  Internal  Security  Fund,  EU  Cohesion  policy  funds  can  be  used  for 
increasing  public  security  in  cities  through  investments  aimed  at  enhancing  their  social 
cohesion, integration  and 
radicalisation  and  upgrade  public 
to  prevent 
infrastructure.  The  Commission  will  work  with  Member  States  to  increase  the  awareness 
regarding the available funding opportunities and calls upon Member States to make full use 
of the EU Cohesion policy funds to include such investments in their post-2020 programmes. 
The  investments  derived  from  integrated  sustainable  urban  development  strategies  will 
account,  as  proposed  by  the  Commission,  for  more  than  6%  of the  European  Regional 
Development Fund allocation.     

Making critical infrastructure more resilient  

Critical infrastructure, including transport hubs, power stations, health care infrastructures 

31  

See also Commission Staff Working Document – Good practices to support the protection of public spaces, 20.3.2019, 
SWD (2019) 140 final. 

32   Under the Internal Security Fund – Police, the Commission has issued calls for projects that improve the protection of 
public spaces in 2017, 2019, and 2020 worth over 40 million EUR to stakeholder-led initiatives. The Fund has also 
supported the trainings and exercises of various law enforcement networks that protect public spaces against terrorism, 
such as the ATLAS network of special interventions unit, and the launch of the Protective Security Advisory activities. 

11 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
and  water  treatment  facilities,  run  the  risk  of  being  potential  terrorist  targets.  Critical 
infrastructure  operators  are  responsible  for  providing  services  that  are  essential  in  meeting 
vital  societal  needs.  At  the  same  time,  these  operators  continue  to  grow  increasingly 
dependent  on  one  another  and  face  an  ever  more  complex  risk  environment.  Such  risks 
include  terror  attacks,  natural  disasters,  accidents,  and  malicious  threats.  In  order  to  ensure 
the dependable provision of essential services across the EU and the reliable functioning of 
the  internal  market,  it  is  vital  to  ensure  that  critical  operators  of  essential  services  are 
resilient,  i.e.  sufficiently  prepared  to  prevent,  mitigate,  and  recover  from  disruptions.  The 
Commission will adopt a set of measures aimed at enhancing the resilience of operators in 
the face of both physical and digital risks.  

Border security 

Foreign  terrorist  fighters  who  had  returned  clandestinely  from  Syria  were  involved  in  the 
deadly attack in Paris on 13 November 2015. This highlighted the devastating consequences 
of failures in border security33. It is estimated that 50 000 persons have travelled to Syria and 
Iraq  to  join  jihadist  groups,  including  5 000  individuals  from  the  EU,  of  which  around  one 
third  are  still  located  in  the  area.  To  guarantee  the  security  of  our  citizens,  it  is  of  crucial 
importance  that  law  enforcement  authorities  can  detect  both  EU  and  non-EU  citizens 
suspected of terrorism at the external borders. Europol, Frontex and eu-Lisa will continue to 
support Member States on border security.  

It  is  necessary  to  strengthen  the  functioning  of  the  Schengen  area  without  internal  borders. 
On  30  November  2020,  the  Commission  held  a  Schengen  Forum  to  launch  an  inclusive 
political debate towards building a stronger Schengen based on mutual trust. This  will feed 
into the Schengen Strategy which the Commission plans to present in 2021, and where it will 
propose ways to review the Schengen Borders Code, to improve the mechanism of evaluation 
and  enhance  the  Schengen  governance,  to  enhance  police  cooperation  and  information 
exchange and reinforce the external borders.  

At  the  same  time,  Member  States  should  urgently  complete  the  modernisation  of  external 
border  management  within  the  agreed  roadmaps,  with  the  ambition  of  developing  the  most 
modern  border  management  system34.  Despite  the  progress  made,  more  work  is  needed. 
While  Member  States  may  apply  derogations  under  certain  conditions,  it  is  important  that 
they  rapidly  meet  the  objective  of  systematic  checks  of  all  travellers  against  relevant 
databases  at  the  external  borders.  In  mid-2021,  the  Commission  will  prepare  guidance,  in 
collaboration  with  Member  States,  to  ensure  that  any  derogations  are  used  in  a  limited 
manner and meet the highest security standards. 

The  effectiveness  of  systematic  checks  depends  on  the  quality  and  interoperability  of  EU 
information  systems35.  New  and  upgraded  large-scale  EU  information  systems36  will 

33  

34  

35  

Perpetrators  of  the  November  Paris  attacks  were  members  of  IS  in  Syria  or  Iraq.  [...]  In  previous years  it  had  been 
reported that the majority of FTFs use their own genuine documents to travel. However, use of false documentation 
clearly  does  occur,  as  was  the  case  with  a  number  of  individuals  involved  in  the  November  Paris  attacks  (Europol, 
European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report, 2016). 
Implementation of  the  new  IT-architecture  and  interoperability,  implementation of  EBCG  2.0,  swift  adoption  of  the 
Screening proposal. 
https://www.eulisa.europa.eu/Activities/Interoperability. In accordance with the European Interoperability Framework: 
https://ec.europa.eu/isa2/eif_en ; See COM(2017)134 final. 

36   The  Schengen  Information  System,  the  Entry/Exit  System,  the  Visa  Information  System,  Eurodac,  the  European 

Criminal Records Information System (its part related to third country nationals and stateless persons). 

12 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
improve  security  and  make  external  border  controls  more  effective  and  efficient. 
Interoperability  will  make  the  necessary  information  instantly  available  to  those  police 
officers  and  border  guards  with  a  need  to  know.  Of  crucial  importance  is  the  Entry/Exit 
System (EES)37, which is an automated system for registering travelers from third countries. 
This will help identify all third-country nationals entering the territory of Member States and 
detect identity fraud.  

The  European  Travel  Information  and  Authorisation  System  (ETIAS)38,  a  pre-travel 
authorisation  system  for  visa-exempt  travelers,  is  equally  important.  A  dedicated  ETIAS 
watchlist will enable better use of information on persons suspected of or linked to terrorist 
activities, allowing Member States to  consider that information  when issuing authorisations 
to travel. Additionally, the checks against the future centralised system for the identification 
of  Member  States  holding  conviction  information  on  third-country  nationals  and  stateless 
person (ECRIS-TCN)39 will allow for verification whether a certain third-country national or 
dual EU/third-country national had been previously convicted of serious crime in the EU and 
in which Member State. Interoperability between EES, ETIAS and ECRIS-TCN will lead to 
more  systematic  information  for  law  enforcement  officers,  border  guards  and  migration 
officials,  and  will  contribute  to  fighting  identity  fraud.  Member  States  should  therefore 
swiftly and completely implement these systems and allow for their interoperability.  

The  three  new  Schengen  Information  System  (SIS)  Regulations  that  entered  into  force  in 
December  201840,  introduced  a  number  of  measures  to  improve  the  information  exchange 
including  on  terrorist  suspects.  It  is  crucial  that  Member  States  implement  all  new  SIS 
functionalities as soon as possible. In particular, Member States should urgently roll out the 
fingerprint  search  functionality  in  the  SIS  Automated  Fingerprint  Identification  System 
(AFIS) to their officers, in particular at the external borders. 

It is also essential that third-country information on foreign terrorist fighters, provided by 
trusted  third  countries,  is  entered  into  SIS.  Together  with  this  Communication,  the 
Commission  is  presenting  a  strengthened  Europol  mandate  and  an  amendment  to  the 
Regulation  on  the  establishment,  operation  and  use  of  the  Schengen  Information  System 
(SIS) that would allow Europol to create dedicated alerts in SIS, in consultation with Member 
States. It is urgent that the voluntary procedure to process pending and future data provided 
by third countries discussed among Member States is put in place. In parallel, Member States 
should be encouraged to make Interpol’s notices related to terrorist suspects available at the 
first line border checks.  

Moreover, under the new rules, in addition to issuing entry bans, of up to 5 years, as part of 
a  return  decision41,  Member  States  should  enter  alerts  in  SIS  on  third-country  nationals 
subject to a return decision (as of 2022), and on refusals of entry and stay. This would make 
return decisions and the prohibitions of entry and stay visible to all authorities having access 
to SIS. Member States should ensure that such alerts also contain information concerning the 

37   As established by Regulation (EU) 2017/2226, 9.12.2017, OJ L 327. 
38   As established by Regulation (EU) 2018/1240, 19.9.2018, OJ L 236/1. 
39   As established by Regulation (EU) 2019/816, 22.5.2019, OJ L 135/1. 
40   Regulation (EU) 2018/1860, Regulation (EU) 2018/1861 and Regulation (EU) 2018/1862. 
41   Directive  2008/115/EC.  The  length  of  an  entry  ban  may  exceed  5  years  if  the  third-country  national  concerned 
represents a serious threat to public policy, public security or national security. In addition, Member States remain free 
to adopt measures to prohibit entry into and stay against third-country nationals staying in a third country. 

13 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
fact that the third-country national poses a serious threat to security, and whether the person 
was involved in terrorism-related activities. 

The  processing  of  Advance  Passenger  Information  (API)  and  Passenger  Name  Record 
(PNR)  data  plays  a  vital  role  in  identifying,  preventing,  detecting,  and  disrupting  terrorism 
and  other  serious  crimes.  With  a  view  to  streamlining  the  use  of  API  data,  including  for 
countering terrorism,  the Commission will make a proposal  to  revise the API Directive in 
2021 and consider providing for the use of this data for countering serious crime, improve the 
effectiveness  in  the  use  of  API  data  and  the  coherence  with  other  instruments  such  as  the 
Entry/Exit System, the European Travel Information and Authorisation System, and the PNR 
system.  

The use and analysis of PNR data is an essential tool to fight terrorism and organised crime, 
both  in  the  EU  and  globally.  The  analysis  of  retained  PNR  data  enables  identification  of 
previously  unknown  threats  and  provides  law  enforcement  authorities  with  criminal 
intelligence leads, allowing them to  detect  suspicious  travel  patterns and identify associates 
of terrorists and criminals. The Commission urges Member States that do not do so already to 
also collect PNR Data for intra-EU flights. The Commission will continue to engage in the 
process of facilitating transfers of PNR data in full compatibility with EU legal requirements 
as  clarified  by  the  Court  in  the  framework  of  the  new  PNR  standards  adopted  by  the 
International  Civil  Aviation  Organisation  (ICAO).  The  full  implementation  of  the  current 
PNR framework and the existing bilateral cooperation with third countries, such as the U.S. 
and Australia, remain key. At the same time, global trends and new realities42 have emerged 
since  2010,  when  the  Commission  last  updated  its  external  PNR  policy,  which  will  be 
reflected in next year’s review of the EU external strategy towards PNR transfers.  

In light of the terrorist threat to aviation, efforts need to continue to step up aviation security. 
The Commission will explore options to create and implement a European legal framework 
for the deployment of security officers to be present on flights (air-marshals).   

Denying terrorists the means to attack 

In  order  to  close  an  existing  loophole,  the  Commission  will  adopt  an  implementing 
regulation under the Firearms Directive, establishing a system for exchange of information 
amongst Member States on refusals to grant authorisations for acquiring a firearm. This will 
ensure that a person who has been denied a firearm on security grounds in one Member State, 
cannot lodge a similar request in another Member State. This work is complemented by the 
EU  action  plan  on  firearms  trafficking.43  National  Firearms  Focal  Points  are  essential  to 
developing  a  genuine  knowledge  of  the  firearms-related  threat  by  ensuring  cross-
departmental  cooperation  and  cross-border44  exchanges  of  information  and  intelligence. 
Within the “firearms” priority of the European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal 
Threats  (EMPACT),  in  2021  the  Commission  will  publish  a  scoreboard  displaying  how 
advanced Member States are with establishing such focal points.  

Such as the existence of the PNR Directive and EU data protection instruments. 

42  
43   COM(2020) 608. 
44  

“cross-border” means “across any border”, while also specifically meaning “issues impacting specifically on regions 
on both sides of a shared internal or external border”. 

14 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
The  threat  from  homemade  explosives  remains  high,  as  exemplified  by  multiple  attacks 
throughout  the  EU45.  The  EU  has  developed  the  most  advanced  legislation  in  the  world  to 
restrict access to explosives precursors46 and detect suspicious transactions that could lead to 
terrorists  building  homemade  explosives.  It  is  therefore  crucial  that  Member  States  fully 
implement and enforce the new rules, which will come into effect on 1 February 2021. This 
includes ensuring that people cannot by-pass controls by buying explosives precursors online.  

The risk from chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) materials remains a 
concern47. In 2017, terrorists plotted to detonate a bomb on an Australian plane and to build a 
chemical  weapon,  following  instructions  from  Daesh48.  In  2018,  a  terrorist  attempted  to 
create the highly poisonous ricin toxin in Germany49. The potential damage of a CBRN attack 
is extremely high. The Commission prioritises in particular the threat from chemical agents. 
Taking  inspiration  from  the  approach  used  to  regulate  access  to  explosives  precursors,  the 
Commission is studying the feasibility of restricting access to certain dangerous chemicals, to 
be  finalised  in  2021.  In  2020,  the  Commission  made  available  various  instruments50  to 
Member  States  that  can  be  used  to  enhance  biosecurity,  and  will  explore  how  to  improve 
cooperation  against  biological  threats  at  EU  level. Starting  early  2021,  the  Commission  is 
also  supporting  a  joint  action  with  18  countries  to  strengthen  health  preparedness  and 
response  to  biological  and  chemical  terror  attacks,  and  to  strengthen  cross-sectoral 
cooperation (health, security and civil protection).   

Existing  counter-terrorism  restrictive  measures  (“sanctions”)  consist  of  a  travel  ban  on 
natural  persons  and  an  assets  freeze,  and  prohibition  from  making  funds  and  economic 
resources  available  to  natural  persons  and  entities.  The  EU  implements  counter-terrorism 
sanctions  adopted  at  UN  level,  and  has  adopted  sanctions  of  its  own  to  support  the  fight 
against  terrorism51.  As  such,  counter-terrorism  sanctions  are  a  powerful  precautionary 
instrument to deny terrorists resources and mobility. The existing sanctions regimes available 
to  the  EU  should  therefore  be  used  to  their  fullest  extent,  including  through  robust 
enforcement.  

45    Some  examples  of  such  devastating  attacks  include  attacks  in  Oslo  (2011),  Paris  (2015),  Brussels  (2016),  and 

Manchester (2017). An attack with a homemade explosive in Lyon (2019) wounded 13 people. 

46   Chemicals  that  could  be  misused  to  manufacture  homemade  explosives.  These  are  regulated  in  Regulation  (EU) 

2019/1148 2019 on the marketing and use of explosives precursors, which will apply as of 1 February 2021. 

47   Europol reported that in 2019, the intention to carry out terrorist attacks using CBRN materials continued to appear on 
terrorist online forums and social media. Closed online forums were used to discuss possible modi operandi and share 
knowledge  via handbooks, manuals, posters and infographics containing recipes to produce and disseminate  various 
agents (Europol, European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report, 2020). 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-australia-49764450  
https://www.dw.com/en/cologne-ricin-plot-bigger-than-initially-suspected/a-44319328  
Such as the Biosecurity Resource Toolbox, the creation of which the Commission funded. It was made available to 
Member States on 19 October 2020 during a meeting of the CBRN Advisory Group. 

48  
49  
50  

51   Common Position 2001/931/CFSP and Council Regulation (EC) 2580/2001; Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/1693 and 

Council Regulation (EC) 881/2002 and Council Regulation (EU) 2016/1686. 

15 

 
 
 
                                                           
KEY ACTIONS: 

The Commission will:  

  Propose a Schengen Strategy in 2021.  
  Propose an EU Pledge on Urban Security and Resilience, to prevent and counter 

radicalisation and reduce vulnerabilities in public spaces.  

  Help  enhance the physical  protection of places of worship, in  close  coordination 

with Member States. 

  Propose measures to enhance the resilience of critical infrastructure.  
  Propose to revise the Advance Passenger Information Directive. 
  Establish  an  information  exchange  system  on  refusals  to  grant  authorisations  for 

firearms. 

  Follow-up with Member States on the implementation of relevant legislation and 

take further steps in infringement proceedings, as appropriate 

The Member States are urged to: 

  Swiftly address gaps and shortcomings in implementation of relevant legislation.  
  Ensure systematic checks of all travellers against relevant databases at the external 

borders. 
Issue alerts in SIS on suspected foreign terrorist fighters. 

 
  Urgently  roll  out  the  fingerprint  search  functionality  in  the  SIS  Automated 

Fingerprint Identification System. 

  Swiftly 

implement  EES,  ETIAS  and  ECRIS-TCN  and  allow  for 

their 

interoperability. 

  Strengthen chemical and bio-security. 

4. RESPOND 

After a terrorist attack has occurred, urgent action is needed to minimise its impact and allow 
for the swift investigation and prosecution of the perpetrators. No Member State can do it on 
its own. Cooperation is needed both at the European level and internationally. 

Operational support: strengthening Europol 

Europol  and  its  European  Counter-Terrorism  Centre  (ECTC)  are  key  to  EU  action  on 
counter-terrorism and its operational  support has  increased fivefold over recent  years (from 
127  operational  cases  supported  in  2016  to  632  cases  in  2019).  The  ECTC  is  now  part  of 
every major counter-terrorism investigation in the EU.  As part of the legislative initiative to 
strengthen the Europol mandate, we need to enable Europol to cooperate effectively with 
private parties. Terrorists abuse cross-border services of companies to recruit followers, to 
plan  and  carry  out  attacks,  and  to  disseminate  propaganda  inciting  further  attacks.  Many 
companies  want  to  share  data,  but  may  not  know  with  whom  as  it  may  be  unclear  which 
Member  States  have  jurisdiction  to  prosecute  the  specific  crime.  Europol  is  best  placed  to 

16 

 
 
 
 
 
 
close  this  gap  and  be  a  first  contact  to  identify  and  transmit  the  relevant  evidence  to  the 
authorities of the Member States concerned.  

Europol  must  also  be  able  to  support  national  counter-terrorism  investigations  with  the 
analysis of large and complex datasets (‘big data’). This will build on the successful work 
of  Europol  with  Task  Force  Fraternité  to  support  French  and  Belgian  authorities  in  the 
investigation  of  the  November  2015  Paris  attacks  and  the  March  2016  Brussels  attacks.52 
Strengthening  Europol’s  role  in  research  and  innovation  will  help  national  authorities  in 
using modern technologies to  counter the threat  of terrorism. Terrorists mask their identity, 
hide the content of their communications, and secretly transfer illicit goods and resources by 
exploiting new technologies. Therefore, we need to step up Europol’s operational support on 
decryption in full respect of EU law. 

Law enforcement cooperation 

To  enhance  cross-border  cooperation,  the  Commission  will  propose  an  EU  ‘police 
cooperation code’ at the end of 2021. This will streamline the different  EU instruments of 
operational law enforcement cooperation into a coherent and modern consolidated EU legal 
regime, thereby also facilitating cross-border cooperation in the fight against terrorism. This 
proposal  will  also  take  stock  of  existing  Council  guidelines  and  of  the  most  advanced 
bilateral or multilateral agreements in force between Member States53. 

The  Commission  will  continue  to  support  the  activities  of  various  law  enforcement 
networks.  These  activities  include,  for  example,  joint  trainings  and  exercises,  developing 
channels and capabilities for cross-border communication and operations, and improving the 
pooling of resources that can be mobilised during incidents. The Commission will continue 
supporting  and  ensuring  the  sustainability  of  the  ATLAS  network  of  special  intervention 
units  of  the  EU  Member  States,  which  aims  to  improve  police  response  in  cross-border 
counter-terrorism operations.  

the  European  Regional 
Within  Interreg  cross-border  cooperation  programmes, 
Development  Fund  (ERDF)  has  supported  cooperation  between  police  and  other  security 
services  in  internal  border  regions.  Under  the  2021-2027  programming  period,  while  such 
support may continue, the ERDF may  also  contribute to  actions in  the  fields of border  and 
migration  management,  such  as  for  the  economic  and  social  integration  of  third-country 
nationals, including beneficiaries of international protection. 

The  Commission  will  also  encourage  cross-sectoral  cooperation  with  other  crucial  first 
response  actors,  such  as  those  deployed  under  the  Union  Civil  Protection  Mechanism, 
which can play a crucial role in response to major incidents with the capacity to overwhelm 
national  capacities,  such  as  terrorist  attacks  or  chemical,  biological,  radiological  or  nuclear 
incidents. 

Strengthening information exchange 

52   Task Force Fraternité analysed 19 terabytes of information to investigate further the international connections of the 
terrorists  by  analysing  communication,  financial,  internet  and  forensic  records.  Europol’s  processing  of  large  and 
complex data resulted in 799 intelligence leads. 

53   The proposal will be accompanied by an impact assessment and consultation of Member States, Schengen associated 

countries and relevant EU bodies. 

17 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
In  order  to  prevent,  investigate  and  prosecute  terrorist  and  other  criminal  offences,  law 
enforcement authorities need access to the relevant information at the right time. The existing 
Prüm  Decisions54  have  been  instrumental  in  allowing  Member  States  to  exchange 
fingerprints,  DNA  and  certain  vehicle  registration  data.  However,  in  light  of  technical, 
forensic,  operational  and  data  protection  developments,  the  Prüm  Decisions  should  be 
updated and could be further extended to better support Member States in their criminal and 
terrorist  investigations.  The  Commission  will  propose  in  2021  a  revision  of  the  Prüm 
Decisions  to  assess  how  they  can  be  adapted  to  make  them  fit  for  the  current  and  future 
operational  needs  of  law  enforcement  authorities  and  to  align  those  decisions  with  the  EU 
data protection legal framework. 

Justice  and  Home  Affairs  Agencies  (such  as  Europol,  Eurojust  and  Frontex)  will  need  to 
strengthen their coordination in order to combat terrorism. Together with Member States, and 
given  their  respective  responsibilities,  connecting  factors  should  be  identified  and  solutions 
implemented  in  view  of  an  efficient  approach  at  the  EU  level.  The  Commission  will  make 
specific  proposals  to  that  effect,  in  particular  to  establish  an  efficient  mechanism  of 
information exchange in counter-terrorism cases, which should include a digital collaboration 
platform for Joint Investigation Teams, and step up the implementation of a hit/no-hit system 
between  Europol  and  Eurojust  to  detect  links  between  their  data.  The  Commission  is  also 
proposing  as  part  of  the  reinforced  mandate  of  Europol  to  establishing  a  hit/no-system 
between Europol and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO). In addition, it remains 
an  objective  to  extend  the  mandate  of  the  European  Public  Prosecutor’s  Office  to  cross-
border terrorist crimes. 

The  recent  series  of  attacks  have  highlighted  the  importance  of  a  reliable  analysis  of  the 
threat  posed  by  persons  regarded  as  terrorists  or  violent  extremists.  The  Commission 
supports the work set out recently by the Council55. There is a need for more regular strategic 
discussions  on  this  pertinent  topic,  better  mutual  understanding  and  awareness  of  national 
concepts, as well as facilitation of information exchange when it comes to entering relevant 
information  into  the  EU’s  information  systems.  The  regular  strategic  exchange  should 
include exchanges on practical tools, such as risk assessments, and their evaluation. 

While increased information exchange among EU Member States is an absolute necessity, it 
is  not  always  sufficient  to  effectively  address  global  threats.  This  is  why,  international 
cooperation is a key component to an effective response to threats. Bilateral agreements with 
key  partners  play  an  important  role  in  exchanging  information,  securing  evidence  and 
investigative  leads  from  jurisdictions  outside  the  EU.  In  that  regard,  Interpol,  the 
international criminal police organisation, fulfils an important role. Despite the long-standing 
cooperation  between  the  EU  and  Interpol,  there  are  areas  where  cooperation  should  be 
established or reinforced. Interpol is a key partner on counter-terrorism, for example due to 
their  expertise  on  foreign  terrorist  fighters.  This  includes,  for  instance,  their  work  on  the 
collection  of  battlefield  information  and  the  prevention  of  undetected  border-crossings. 
Several EU bodies are faced with the operational need to have access to Interpol databases to 
perform their tasks. In order to enable such access in accordance with the requirements of EU 
legislation,  the  Commission  is  preparing  the  appropriate  instruments  to  negotiate  a 
cooperation agreement between the EU and Interpol. 

54   Council Decision 2008/615/JHA on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism 
and cross-border crime and Council Decision 2008/616/JHA on the implementation of Decision 2008/615/JHA. 
In the respective part of the Council Conclusions on Internal Security as adopted by the JHA Council on 4 December 
and the detailed Conclusions agreed by the Terrorism Working Party and endorsed by COSI on 19 November. 

55  

18 

 
                                                           
Supporting investigations and prosecution 

Financial Intelligence Units have an essential role in detecting financing of terrorism as they 
receive  suspicious  transaction  reports  from  a  wide  range  of  financial  and  non-financial 
institutions,  which  they  analyse  with  other  relevant  information  before  disseminating  the 
results of their analysis to law enforcement authorities or prosecutors. The Commission will 
consider  how  to  improve  their  analytic  capacity  through  the  establishment  of  an  EU 
Coordination and Support Mechanism for Financial intelligence units56.  

Financial  investigations  following  the  money  trail  and  identifying  previously  unknown 
associates  are  crucial.  New  structures  are  needed  to  support  financial  investigators,  to 
facilitate their cross-border work and reinforce the effectiveness of financial investigations in 
terrorism  cases.  The  Commission  proposes  to  establish  a  network  of  counter-terrorism 
financial  investigators.  Such  a  network  would  support  the  exchange  of  investigation 
techniques and experiences on financial investigations, taking into account the work done by 
national  Financial  Intelligence  Units.  It  should  involve  Europol  and  its  European  Financial 
and  Economic  Crime  Centre,  cooperate  with  the  Network  of  Asset  Recovery  Offices,  and 
contribute to improve investigators’ analysis, understanding of trends and emerging risks, and 
strengthen their capacity. 

To  investigate  terrorist  financing  and  wider  terrorist  networks,  investigators  need  access  to 
bank  account  information.  The  Commission  has  highlighted  the  need  for  Financial 
Intelligence  Units  and  law  enforcement  to  have  swift  cross-border  access  to  national  bank 
account  information  in  other  Member  States57.  This  could  be  achieved  by  means  of  an 
interconnection  of  central  bank  account  registries,  which  the  Commission  deems  feasible58. 
This would also respond to the Council’s call on the Commission to consider enhancing the 
legal framework to interconnect national centralised mechanisms59. In 2021, the Commission 
intends to propose legislation to achieve this interconnection and create interconnected bank 
account  registers.  The  Commission  will  consider  enabling  access  to  such  register  by  law 
enforcement authorities and asset recovery offices, subject to an impact assessment including 
on fundamental rights and in full respect of principles of proportionality60. This will enhance 
cross-border  cooperation.  In  2021,  the  Commission  will  also  reassess  the  threats  and 
vulnerabilities related to the foreign financing of terrorism and the collection and transfers of 
funds  through  non-profit  organisations61,  taking  into  account  recent  developments  in  this 
area.  

The  Terrorist  Finance  Tracking  Programme62  (TFTP)  has  generated  significant 
intelligence  that  has  helped  investigate  and  detect  terrorist  plots  and  trace  those  behind 
them63. The EU-US TFTP Agreement on the exchange of financial information gives the US 
and  EU  law  enforcement  authorities  a  powerful  tool  in  the  fight  against  terrorism  and  has 
safeguards  that  ensure  the  protection  of  EU  citizens’  privacy.  The  next  joint  review  of  the 

56   As suggested in the Anti-Money-laundering Action Plan of 7 May 2020, C(2020) 2800 final. 
57   The Anti-Money-laundering Action Plan of 7 May 2020, C(2020) 2800 final. 
58   COM(2019) 273 final. 
59  
60  
61 

June 2020 Council Conclusions on enhancing financial investigations, Council doc. 8927/20. 
See also COM(2020)605 final. 
Previous assessments were made in the Commission’s 2019 Supranational Risk Assessment, COM(2019) 370 and in 
the Commission’s Communication on the prevention of and fight against terrorist financing through enhanced national 
level coordination and greater transparency of the non-profit sector, COM(2005) 620. 

62   OJ L 195, 27.7.2010, p. 5. 
63   COM(2013) 843 final. 

19 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
agreement will take place in 2021. 

Today, a substantial part of  investigations against all forms of crime and terrorism involve 
encrypted information. Encryption is essential to the digital world, securing digital systems 
and transactions. It is an important tool for the protection of cybersecurity and fundamental 
rights, including freedom of expression, privacy and data protection.  At the same time, it can 
also be used as a secure channel for perpetrators where they can hide their actions from law 
enforcement  and  the  judiciary.  The  Commission  will  work  with  Member  States  to  identify 
possible  legal,  operational,  and  technical  solutions  for  lawful  access  and  promote  an 
approach  which  both  maintains  the  effectiveness  of  encryption  in  protecting  privacy  and 
security of communications, while providing an effective response to crime and terrorism. 

As recognised by EU Ministers in their joint Statement of 13 November 202064, availability 
of and access to digital evidence is of the essence. A clear and robust framework for timely 
cross-border access to electronic evidence and investigative leads is required since digital 
evidence is needed in about 85% of all criminal investigations. The Commission calls on the 
co-legislators to ensure speedy and reliable access to e-evidence for authorities, by urgently 
adopting  the  e-evidence  proposals.  In  addition,  it  is  important  that  all  Member  States 
establish a connection to the -Evidence Digital Exchange System (eEDES) without undue 
delay.  The  Commission  intends  to  lay  down  the  future  scope  of  eEDES  in  a  legislative 
proposal on the digitalisation of judicial cooperation procedures65. 

The EU also needs strong rules for cooperation with our international partners in digital 
investigations.  The  Budapest  Convention  on  Cybercrime  is  the  international  framework  for 
such cooperation. The Commission will do its utmost for the finalisation of the negotiations 
in  early  2021  on  an  updated  framework  (second  additional  protocol),  which  addresses  the 
challenges of today’s cyber-enabled crimes, including terrorism, through new and reinforced 
cooperation tools with the requisite safeguards for the protection of fundamental rights. The 
Commission will advance the negotiations on an EU-U.S. agreement on cross border access 
to  electronic  evidence  as  swiftly  as  possible,  while  ensuring  that  the  outcome  of  the 
negotiations is compatible with the Union’s internal rules on electronic evidence. 

Furthermore, battlefield evidence, namely information uncovered and collected by military 
forces during battlefield operations or by private parties in a conflict zone, is paramount for 
prosecution.  The  Commission  will  continue  to  support  Member  States  to  use  battlefield 
information to identify, detect and prosecute returning foreign terrorists fighters through the 
establishment  of  best  practices66,  the  exchange  of  information  as  well  as  possible  project 
financing.  In  particular,  the  Commission  and  the  European  External  Action  Service  will 
continue  to  support  and  strengthen  the  cooperation  with  key  third  countries  such  as  the 
United  States,  including  the  exchange  of  information  and  ensuring  the  integration  of 
battlefield information in the European security architecture and networks. 

In order to ensure access to digital evidence and investigative leads, Member States rely on 
data  retention  frameworks  to  safeguard  national  and  public  security  and  in  conducting 

64  

https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2020/11/13/joint-statement-by-the-eu-home-affairs-ministers-
on-the-recent-terrorist-attacks-in-europe/ 
65   Cf. Commission Work Programme 2021. 
66   Eurojust’s  2020  Memorandum  on  Battlefield  Evidence:  https://www.eurojust.europa.eu/battlefield-evidence-

increasingly-used-prosecute-foreign-terrorist-fighters-eu. 

20 

 
 
 
                                                           
criminal  investigations.  The  Court  of  Justice’s  recent  rulings  on  data  retention67,  while 
confirming that EU law precludes general and indiscriminate data retention, identified certain 
situations where retention is permissible, based on clear and proportionate obligations laid 
down in law and subject to strict substantive and procedural safeguards.68 In their recent joint 
statement69,  EU  Home  Affairs  Ministers  underlined  the  importance  of  devising  a  way 
forward on data retention for crime fighting purposes. The Commission will assess available 
options  to  ensure  that  terrorists  and  other  criminals  can  be  identified  and  traced,  while 
respecting EU law as interpreted by the Court of Justice. 

Enhancing  Member  States’  capabilities  for  investigation  and  evidence  gathering  is  an 
important  aspect  of  the  criminal  justice  response  to  terrorism.  The  Commission  will  also 
assess  the  need  for  rules  on  the  cross-border  use  of  evidence  in  criminal  proceedings. 
Moreover,  there  is  a  need  to  identify  potential  links  between  judicial  proceedings 
(investigations  and  prosecutions)  in  terrorism  cases  in  Member  States.  For  this  purpose, 
Eurojust has set up the Counter-Terrorism Register in 2019. The Register should become a 
judicial  counter-terrorism 
proactive 
proceedings and Eurojust be adequately resourced. To this end, in 2021, the Commission will 
adopt  a  legislative  proposal  to  improve  information  exchange  and  coordination  in 
judicial proceedings in cross-border terrorism cases, so as to make this exchange secure 
and efficient and enable Eurojust to react to it in a timely manner. 

tool  for  ensuring  coordination 

in  cross-border 

Strengthened support to victims of terrorism 
Ensuring that victims of terrorism receive the necessary support, protection and recognition is 
a crucial part of responding to terrorism. The EU has adopted a robust set of rules on support 
and protection of victims’ rights, including victims of terrorism70. In addition, the 2004 
Compensation Directive71 requires that Member States have in place national compensation 
schemes, including for victims of terrorism.   

In  January  2020,  the  Commission  set  up  an  EU  Centre  of  Expertise  for  victims  of 
terrorism as a two-year pilot project72. The Centre assists Member States and national victim 
support  organisations  with  the  application  of  EU  rules,  by  providing  guidelines,  training 
activities and acting as a hub of expertise. The need for its continuation will be assessed by 
the  end  of  2021.  A  possible  integration  into  a  future  EU  Knowledge  Hub  on  prevention  of 
radicalisation  will  be  explored  as  well.  In  June  2020,  the  Commission  adopted  its  first  EU 
Strategy on victims’  rights (2020-2025)73. The Strategy pays special attention to  the most 
vulnerable victims, including victims of terrorism. To improve cooperation and coordination 
for  victims  of  terrorism,  Member  States  should  set  up  national  single  contact  points  for 

67  

68  

69  

Judgments in C-623/17, Privacy International and Joined Cases C-511/18, C-512/18 and C-520/18 Quadrature du Net 
a.o. of 6 October 2020. 
Ibid. These include possibilities for the general retention of traffic and location data to safeguard against serious threats 
to  national  security  that  are  genuine  and  present  and  foreseeable,  the  targeted  retention  of  traffic  and  location  data, 
based  on  persons  and  geographical  criteria,  for  the  purpose  of  combatting  serious  crime  and  prevention  of  serious 
threats to public safety, the general retention of IP addresses assigned to the source of a communication for a limited 
period of time and for the purposes of combating serious crimes, and the general retention of so-called civil identity 
data for the purposes of combatting crime in general.   
Joint 
in  Europe, 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2020/11/13/joint-statement-by-the-eu-home-affairs-ministers-
on-the-recent-terrorist-attacks-in-europe/ 

the  EU  home  affairs  ministers  on 

terrorist  attacks 

statement  by 

recent 

the 

70   These  include  Victims’  Rights  Directive  2012/29/EU  with  rights  for  all  victims  of  all  crimes,  and  Directive  (EU) 

2017/541 on combating terrorism that responds more directly to the specific needs of victims of terrorism. 

71   Council Directive 2004/80/EC of 29 April 2004 relating to compensation to crime victims. 
72  

https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/criminal-justice/eu-centre-expertise-victims-
terrorism_en.  
73   COM(2020) 258 final. 

21 

 
                                                           
victims of terrorism74. Under the Strategy, the Commission will assess the existing EU rules 
on victims’ rights  and, if necessary, propose legislative changes by  2022. The Commission 
will  also  assess  how  victims’  access  to  compensation  could  be  improved,  including  with 
regard to victims of terrorism in cross-border situations, who are residents of another Member 
State than that where the terrorist attack occurred.  The Commission commemorates victims 
annually during the European Remembrance Day for victims of terrorism, to show unity and 
resilience against terrorism within our society. 

KEY ACTIONS 

The Commission will:  

  Propose to revise the Prüm Decisions. 
  Create  a  network  of  counter-terrorism  financial  investigators  to  improve  cross-

border financial investigations. 

  Support  Member  States  to  use  battlefield  information  to  identify,  detect  and 

prosecute returning Foreign Terrorists Fighters. 

  Propose  a  mandate  to  negotiate  a  cooperation  agreement  between  the  EU  and 

Interpol. 

  Support  victims  of  terrorism,  including  through  the  EU  Centre  of  Expertise  for 

victims of terrorism. 

The European Parliament and Council are urged to: 

  Urgently adopt the e-evidence proposals to ensure speedy and reliable access to e-

evidence for authorities. 

  Examine the proposal to revise Europol’s mandate. 

5.  REINFORCING  INTERNATIONAL  COOPERATION  ACROSS  ALL  FOUR 
PILLARS 

Counter-terrorism  partnerships,  including  close  cooperation  with  countries  in  the  EU’s 
neighbourhood, are essential  to  improve security inside the EU. The Council has called  for 
further strengthening of the EU’s external counter-terrorism engagement with a focus on the 
Western Balkans, North Africa and the Middle East, the Sahel region, the Horn of Africa, in 
other African  countries  where terrorist  activities are increasing,  and in  key  regions  in  Asia. 
Such engagement can help Member States in their work to close off terrorist activity, as well 
as working at a global level to combat terrorist organisations. In this regard, support from the 
CT/Security  experts’  network  in  EU  Delegations  in  facilitating  cooperation  and  promoting 
capacity building remains essential. 

Cooperation  with  Western  Balkan  partners  on  counter-terrorism,  including  through 
relevant  EU  agencies,  remains  key.  Fully  implementing  the  Joint  Action  Plan  on  Counter-

74  

In line with the Council Conclusions on Victims of Terrorism, 4 June 2018 (9719/18). 

22 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
 
terrorism for the Western Balkans75, including integrating further the region into the activities 
of  the  Radicalisation  Awareness  Network  is  essential.  The  Commission  will  continue  to 
prioritise  cooperation  in  the  area  of  police  and  judicial  cooperation.  Countering  terrorism 
financing  and  protection  of  citizens  and  infrastructure  is  also  key76.  Cooperation  with 
Western Balkan partners in the area of firearms will be stepped up in the coming years with 
their  increased  involvement  in  the  Firearms  priority  of  the  European  Multidisciplinary 
Platform  Against  Criminal  Threats  (EMPACT).  The  Commission  will  also  continue  to 
the 
support  financially 
implementation of the EU action plan on firearms trafficking.  

the  Western  Balkan  partners,  Ukraine  and  Moldova  with 

Cooperation  with  priority  countries  in  the  Southern  Neighbourhood  should  be  further 
strengthened  to  reinforce  measures  to  prevent  and  fight  terrorism,  including  money 
laundering  and  terrorist  financing,  as  well  as  the  protection  of  public  spaces  and 
strengthening the rule of law. Southern Mediterranean countries are also a priority for the EU 
for developing police cooperation, considering their geographical proximity and the common 
security  threats.  The  Commission  has  a  mandate  to  negotiate  international  agreements  with 
Algeria,  Egypt,  Israel,  Jordan,  Tunisia,  Morocco,  and  Lebanon  to  exchange  personal  data 
with  Europol  in  the  framework  of  terrorism  and  serious  organised  crime.  In  addition,  the 
Commission  is  currently  seeking  authorisation  from  the  Council  to  open  negotiations  with 
ten77  third  countries  on  cooperation  between  Eurojust  and  those  third  countries  in  order  to 
respond effectively to terrorism. Further afield, the Commission will increase cooperation in 
key countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia on key areas across the strategy. 

In  particular,  the  EU  should  increase  its  engagement  with  relevant  UN  bodies  such  as  the 
United  Nations  Office  of  Counter-Terrorism  (UNOCT)  as  well  as  with  other  organisations 
like the OSCE or the Council of Europe on terrorism-related issues. 

The  Commission  and  the  EEAS  will  also  step  up  their  engagement  with  international 
organisations such as NATO, Interpol, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), as well as 
the  Global  Counterterrorism  Forum,  and  with  key  strategic  partners  like  the  United  States, 
Canada  and  New  Zealand  as  well  as  the  Global  Coalition  against  Da’esh,  to  share 
experiences, foster  closer cooperation, including  with  exchanges on the role of internet  and 
social media, and enhance prevent-related research capacities. Globally, the EU will continue 
to  empower  civil  society,  grass-root  and  community  actors  in  developing  responses  to 
address vulnerable individuals and support resilient societies. 

The  EU’s  approach  to  external  security  within  the  framework  of  the  common  Foreign  and 
Security Policy  (CFSP) and the Common  Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) will remain 
an essential component of EU efforts to countering terrorism and violent extremism in order 
to strengthen stability and protect European security interests. The High Representative/Vice-
President, supported by the EEAS will continue to play a key role in enhancing strategic and 
operational  cooperation  with  third  countries  and  international  organisations,  by  making  full 
use of its external tools, such as the High Level Counter-Terrorism Dialogues, the network of 
Counter-Terrorism/Security experts in EU Delegations and, where relevant, CSDP missions 
and operations. 

75  

Joint  Action  Plan  on  Counter-Terrorism  for 
affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/news/docs/20181005_joint-action-plan-counter-terrorism-western-balkans.pdf 

the  Western  Balkans,  05.10.2018,  https://ec.europa.eu/home-

76   Communication on a credible enlargement perspective for and enhanced EU engagement with the Western Balkans. 
COM  (2018)65.  p  10;  https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2020/10/23/joint-press-statement-eu-
https://ec.europa.eu/home-
western-balkans-ministerial-forum-on-justice-and-home-affairs/ 
affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/news/docs/20181005_joint-action-plan-counter-terrorism-western-balkans.pdf 
77   Algeria, Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey. 

also 

and 

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KEY ACTIONS: 

The Commission and the High Representative/Vice-President, as appropriate, will:  

  Step up cooperation with Western Balkan partners in the area of firearms 
  Negotiate  international  agreements  with  Southern  Neighbourhood  countries  to 

exchange personal data with Europol. 

  Reinforce engagement with international organisations. 
  Enhance strategic and operational cooperation with other regions such as the Sahel 
region, the Horn of Africa, with other African countries and key regions in Asia. 

The European Parliament and Council are urged to: 

  Authorise the opening of negotiations with Southern Neighbourhood countries to 

allow cooperation with Eurojust. 

CONCLUSIONS 

The  threat  from  terrorism  is  real,  dangerous,  and,  unfortunately,  enduring.  This  calls  for  a 
renewed  and  sustained  commitment  to  working  together  to  counter  the  threat.  It  calls  for 
unity in face of terrorism, which seeks to divide. This Counter-Terrorism Agenda for the EU 
sets out the way forward.  

To  pursue  and  coordinate  this  work,  the  Commission  will  appoint  a  Counter-Terrorism 
Coordinator, whose task will be to coordinate the various strands of EU policy and funding 
in  the  area  of  counter-terrorism  within  the  Commission,  including  cooperation  and 
coordination with Member States, in collaboration with the Council’s EU Counter-Terrorism 
Coordinator, as well as the relevant EU Agencies, and the European Parliament. 

The inclusive and rights-based foundations of our Union are our strongest protection against 
the threat of terrorism. An inclusive and welcoming society fully respectful of the rights of all 
is  a  society  where  terrorists  will  find  it  more  difficult  to  radicalise  and  recruit.  We  must 
collectively  uphold,  reinforce  and  defend  our  democratic  and  fundamental  values  against 
those that seek to undermine them. For this, we need to invest in social cohesion, education 
and  inclusive  societies  where  everybody  feels  that  his  or  her  identity  is  respected  and  that 
they fully belong to the community as a whole. 

This  Counter-Terrorism  Agenda for the EU  builds on existing policies and instruments  and 
will  strengthen  the  EU’s  framework  to  further  improve  on  anticipating  threats  and  risks, 
preventing  radicalisation  and  violent  extremism,  protecting  people  and  infrastructures, 
including through external border security, and responding effectively after attacks.  

Whilst  this  Agenda  announces  a  series  of  new  measures,  implementation  and  enforcement 
remain  key  and  there  must  be  a  common  effort  to  ensure  this,  from  swift  adoption  and 
application of the legal framework to speeding up the impact of measures on the ground. The 
Commission will work with Member States and keep the European Parliament, the Council 
and  stakeholders  informed  and  engaged  in  all  relevant  actions  to  implement  the  Counter-
Terrorism Agenda for the EU.  

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