Opinion of the European Central Bank of 30 November 2020 on amendments to the Law on Parliament (CON/2020/30)
Date: 2020-11-30
Institutions: European Central Bank
Subjects: legal basis

EN 

ECB-PUBLIC 

OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 

of 30 November 2020 

on amendments to the Law on Parliament 

(CON/2020/30) 

Introduction and legal basis 

On 19 October 2020, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Swedish Parliament 

(hereinafter  the  ‘Parliament’)  for  an  opinion  on  a  draft  law  amending,  inter  alia,  the  Instrument  of 
Government1 (which forms part of the Swedish Constitution) and the Law on Parliament2, as far as they 

concern issues regarding the functioning of the Parliament which have implications for authorities such as 

Sveriges Riksbank, (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The draft law forms part of an inquiry report on the 2019 
Overview  of  the  Riksdag3  (hereinafter  the  ‘Report’)  by  the  Committee  for  the  2019  Overview  of  the 

Riksdag (hereinafter the ‘Committee’). 

The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union and the third indent of Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC4, as 

the draft law concerns Sveriges Riksbank. 

1.  

Purpose of the draft law 

1.1  Composition of General Council of Sveriges Riksbank 

The draft law states that if a member of the Parliament ceases for any reason to be a member of a 

political party represented in the Parliament, that member of the Parliament shall also cease to be 

a  member  of  the  committees  and  other  parliamentary  bodies  and  delegations  –  including  the 

General  Council  of  Sveriges  Riksbank  –  to  which  that  member  of  the  Parliament  has  been 
appointed on the basis of their membership of that political party5. According to the Committee, the 

main reason for this element of the  draft law is to ensure that  the composition  of the committees 
and  other  parliamentary  bodies  and  delegations  reflects  the  political  majority  in  the  Parliament6. 

Although,  under the current law, membership of a political party  is required  in  order to become a 
member  of  the  Parliament7,  membership  of  the  Parliament  is  a  personal  position  which,  as  a 

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Kungörelse (1974:152) om beslutad ny regeringsform. 
Riksdagsordningen (2014:801). 
2020/21:URF1 2019 års Riksdagsöversyn. Available at www.riksdagen.se/. 
Council  Decision  98/415/EC  of  29 June  1998  on  the  consultation  of  the  European  Central  Bank  by  national 
authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42). 
See Chapter 12, Section 13 second paragraph and supplementary provision 12.13.1 of the draft law. 
See Chapter 9.7 of the Report. 
See Chapter 3, Section 1 of Instrument of Government. See also pages 107 to 108 of the Report. 

  
 
 
 
                                                 
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general rule, a person cannot be forced to give up. However, membership of a committee or other 

parliamentary body or delegation is not a personal position, but one to which a person is appointed 
on the basis of membership of a political party represented in the Parliament8.  

1.2  Preparatory requirements  for submissions  made to  Parliament by General Council and  Executive 

Board of Sveriges Riksbank 

The draft law states that parliamentary bodies and delegations – including the General Council and 

the  Executive  Board  of  Sveriges  Riksbank  –  shall,  before making  submissions  to  the  Parliament, 
obtain  the  necessary  information  and  opinions 9.  According  to  the  Committee,  the  reason  for  this 

element  of  the  draft  law  is  to  align  the  preparatory  requirements  for  submissions  made  to  the 

Parliament  by  parliamentary  bodies  and  delegations  –  such  as  the  General  Council  and  the 

Executive  Board  of  Sveriges  Riksbank  –  with  the  preparatory  requirements  which  apply  to 
legislative proposals made to the Parliament by the Swedish Government10. However, the draft law 

also  states  that  the  Rikdagsstyrelsen  (the  Riksdag  Board)  rather  than  General  Council  and  the 

Executive  Board  of  Sveriges  Riksbank  is  required  to  obtain  opinions  from  Lagrådet  (the  Swedish 
Council on Legislation) 11. According to the Committee, another reason for not requiring the General 

Council and the Executive Board of Sveriges Riksbank to obtain the opinion of the Swedish Council 

on  Legislation  is  that  the  right  of  the  General  Council  and  of  the  Executive  Board  of  Sveriges 

Riksbank  to  put  forward  a  submission  is  more  limited  than  the  right  of  the  Riksdag  Board  to  do 
so12. The General Council and the Executive Board of Sveriges Riksbank do not, as a general rule, 

propose  legislation  to  the  Parliament,  and  it  is  very  rare  that  a  legislative  proposal  made  by  the 

General Council or the Executive Board of Sveriges Riksbank is referred to the Swedish Council on 

Legislation  for  consultation.  In  any  case,  if  an  opinion  from  the  Swedish  Council  on  Legislation 

were  needed  on  a  submission  from  the  General  Council  or  the  Executive  Board  of  Sveriges 
Riksbank, such an opinion could be obtained during the preparation of the relevant submission13. 

2.   General observations  

2.1  Composition of General Council of Sveriges Riksbank 

2.1.1  The  ECB  understands  that  the  Executive  Board  of  Sveriges  Riksbank  is  responsible  for  the 
operations  of  Sveriges  Riksbank 14,  and  that  it  is  the  decision-making  body  of  Sveriges  Riksbank 

responsible for the performance of Sveriges Riksbank’s ESCB-related tasks. The General Council 

is responsible for, inter alia, the appointment of the Executive Board and the Governor and Deputy 
Governors  of  Sveriges  Riksbank 15,  the  determination  of  the  remuneration  of  the  members  of  the 

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See Chapter 9.7 of the Report. 
See Chapter 9, Section 17a of the draft law. 
See Chapter 19.9.2 of the Report. 
See Chapter 9, Section 17b first paragraph of the draft law. 
See Chapter 19.9.2 of the Report. 
See Chapter 19.9.2 of the Report. 
See Chapter 9, Section 1a of the Law on Sveriges Riksbank (Lag (1988:1385) om Sveriges Riksbank). 
See Chapter 1, Section 4 of the Law on Sveriges Riksbank. 

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Executive Board16, the removal of the members of the Executive Board on specified grounds 17, the 
supervision  of  the  Executive  Board’s  work 18,  the  audit  function  in  relation  to  the  review  of  the 
Executive Board’s work 19, proposals in relation to Sveriges Riksbank’s distributions from the profit 
and loss account20, and the design of banknotes and coins issued by Sveriges Riksbank21. While 

the distribution of competences between the Executive Board and the General Council of Sveriges 

Riksbank  lies  beyond  the  scope  of  this  opinion,  the  ECB  wishes  to  reiterate  that,  having  regard 

both to the structure of the General Council, as a constituent part of Sveriges Riksbank, and to its 

tasks,  the  General  Council  may  not  seek  to  influence  the  Executive  Board  in  its  capacity  as 

Sveriges Riksbank’s decision-making body responsible for the performance of Sveriges Riksbank’s 
ESCB-related tasks22. 

2.1.2  The  ECB  understands  that  the  General  Council  of  Sveriges  Riksbank  consists  of  11  members 
appointed  by  the  Parliament23.  The  members  of  the  General  Council  are  appointed  by  the 
Riksdagens valberedning (Nominations Committee of the Parliament)24 for the same term of office 

as the members of the Parliament; such appointment occurs as soon as possible after the relevant 
general election has been held25. As a general rule, the Nominations Committee of the Parliament 

provides  a  proposed  list  of  members  of  the  General  Council,  based  on  the  proportional 

representation  of  the  political  parties  represented  in  the  Parliament,  for  the  Parliament  to  decide 
on26.  The  ECB  understands  that  currently,  six  of  the  11  members  of  the  General  Council  of 

Sveriges Riksbank are members of the Parliament and all 11 are members of political parties that 
are  represented  in  the  Parliament27.  However,  there  is  no  requirement  that  a  member  of  the 

General Council of Sveriges Riksbank must be a member of the Parliament or of a political party 
represented in the Parliament28. 

2.1.3  The  ECB  understands  that  under  the  existing  law,  if  a  person  ceases  to  be  a  member  of  the 

Parliament, they also cease to be a member of the committees and other parliamentary bodies and 
delegations  of  which  they  are  a  member  on  the  basis  of  their  membership  of  the  Parliament29. 

Further,  if  a  person  ceases  to  be  a  member  of  a  committee  or  other  parliamentary  body  or 

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See Chapter 4, Section 5 of the Law on Sveriges Riksbank. 
See Chapter 9, Section 13 of the Instrument of Government. 
This is the case although it is not expressly stated in the Law on Sverige Riksbank (see, e.g., pages 1370 to 1371 of 
the Swedish Government Official Report 2019:46: A new Law on Sveriges Riksbank). 
See Chapter 9, Section 2 and 2a of the Law on Sveriges Riksbank. 
See Chapter 10, Section 3 of the Law on Sveriges Riksbank. 
See Chapter 5, Section 1 of the Law on Sveriges Riksbank. 
See  paragraph  14.2.4  of  Opinion  CON/2020/13.  See  also  paragraph  6  of  Opinion  CON/2002/16,  paragraph  2.3  of 
Opinion CON/2019/12 and paragraph 2.1 of Opinion CON/2020/7. 
See Chapter 9, Section 13 of the Instrument of Government. 
See Chapter 12, Section 2 of the Law on Parliament. 
See Chapter 13, Section 21 and Chapter 12, Section 5 of the Law on Parliament. 
See Chapter 12, Sections 7to 8 of the Law on Parliament and Chapter 9.3.1. of the Report. 
The Estonian central bank (Eesti Pank) is an example of another national central bank in the  European System of 
Central  Banks  which  has  a  supervisory  board  with  functions  comparable  to  the  General  Council  of  Sveriges 
Riksbank,  whose  membership  is  partly  composed  of  members  of  the  national  parliament  representing  political 
factions in the parliament. See paragraphs 1.6 and 2.1 of Opinion CON/2020/7. 
See  supplementary  provision  (tilläggsbestämmelse)  13.21.1  of  the  Law  on  Parliament,  relating  to  Chapter  13, 
Section 21 of the Law on Parliament. 
See Chapter 12, Section 13 of the Law on Parliament. 

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delegation – such as the General Council of Sveriges Riksbank – the political party by which that 

person  was  appointed  nominates  their  replacement  and  informs  the  speaker  of  the  Parliament 
accordingly, who then declares the nominee elected 30. However, there is currently no requirement 

that a member of the Parliament who ceases to be a member of a political party represented in the 

Parliament  must  cease  to  be  a  member  of  the  committees  and  other  parliamentary  bodies  and 

delegations  (including  the  General  Council  of  Sveriges  Riksbank)  of  which  they  have  become  a 
member  on  the  basis  of  their  membership  of  that  political  party31.  The  ECB  understands  that  the 

situation  where  a  member  of  the  Parliament  ceases  to  be  a  member  of  a  political  party  occurs 
relatively  frequently32.  Against  this  backdrop,  the  ECB  further  understands  that  the  proposed 

amendment regarding the  composition of the General Council of Sveriges Riksbank constitutes a 

limited  change  to  ensure  that  the  composition  of  the  committees  and  other  parliamentary  bodies 

and delegations reflects the political majority in the Parliament to the greatest extent possible. 

2.2  Preparatory requirements  for submissions  made to  Parliament by General Council and  Executive 

Board of Sveriges Riksbank 

The  ECB  understands  that  the  General  Council  and  the  Executive  Board  of  Sveriges  Riksbank 

each  have  the  right  to  make  submissions  to  the  Parliament  (i)  regarding  matters  concerning 
Sveriges Riksbank’s competence, organisation, personnel and forms of operation33, and (ii) within 
their own areas of responsibility34. In this regard, the ECB also understands that such submissions 

can include  not  only  legislative proposals, but  also  other forms of legal  acts and documents. The 

ECB welcomes the proposed preparatory requirements for submissions made to the Parliament, as 

they may enhance the legislative process and the quality of legal acts adopted by the Parliament. 

This opinion will be published on EUR-Lex.  

Done at Frankfurt am Main, 30 November 2020. 

[signed] 

The President of the ECB 

Christine LAGARDE 

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See Chapter 12, Section 14 of the Law on Parliament. 
See Chapter 9.1 of the Report. 
See Chapter 9.4 of the Report. 
See Chapter 9, Section 17 of the Law on Parliament. 
See  supplementary  provision  9.17.4  of  the  Law  on  Parliament,  relating  to  Chapter  9,  Section  17  of  the  Law  on 
Parliament. 

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