REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT on the Functioning of the Schengen Evaluation and Monitoring Mechanism pursuant to Article 22 of Council Regulation (EU) No 1053/2013 First Multiannual Evaluation Programme (2015-2019)
Date: 2020-11-25
Institutions: Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs, European Commission
Subjects: EU Member State, EU police cooperation, EU visa policy, Schengen Agreement, application of EU law, data protection, external border of the EU, internal border of the EU, personal data, return migration

EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION 

Brussels, 25.11.2020  
COM(2020) 779 final 

REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT 

on the Functioning of the Schengen Evaluation and Monitoring Mechanism pursuant to 

Article 22 of Council Regulation (EU) No 1053/2013       

First Multiannual Evaluation Programme (2015-2019) 

{SWD(2020) 327} 

EN 

  EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. 

INTRODUCTION 

On  14  June  1985,  France,  Germany  and  the  three  Benelux  States  signed  the  Schengen 
Agreement  that  removed  internal  border  controls  between  those  Member  States.  Today,  35 
years  later,  the  Schengen  area  is  one  of  the  most  significant  achievements  of  the  European 
Union. It has enhanced the freedom of movement by enabling 400 million EU citizens and non-
EU citizens legally present on the territory, as well as goods and services, to move1 without 
being subject to internal border control, bringing significant social and economic benefits2 to 
our societies. 

A well-functioning Schengen area depends on the correct and efficient implementation of the 
Schengen acquis and on mutual trust among Member States. It requires modern, uniform and 
highly efficient external border management and a number of compensatory measures (such as 
efficient cooperation of law enforcement authorities, effective visa and return policies and a 
comprehensive Schengen Information System) to safeguard citizens’ security, reduce the risk 
of unauthorised movements between Member States and improve synergies between national 
authorities. 

A robust monitoring  system to verify how  countries implement the Schengen acquis  and to 
recommend improvements in its implementation is crucial. For this reason, in 1998, as part of 
the Schengen Convention, the contracting parties set up a Standing Committee with the mandate 
to identify shortcomings in the implementation of Schengen and propose solutions3. Following 
the integration of the Schengen Convention into the EU legal framework, the Council took over 
the coordinating role and evaluations were carried out at regular intervals by teams of Member 
State experts accompanied by a Council’s representative and a Commission’s observer4. 
In 2015, under the new ‘Schengen Evaluation and Monitoring Mechanism’5 the responsibility 
for the coordination and overall organisation of the exercise was transferred to the Commission. 
However, the mechanism remains a shared  responsibility with the Commission carrying out 
evaluations jointly with experts from the Member States. This peer-review element is core to 
Schengen evaluations because it reinforces accountability, ownership of results and trust. The 
Council  is  responsible  for  issuing  recommendations  to  the  evaluated  States,  based  on  a 
Commission proposal, on how to remedy any deficiencies identified during the evaluations. 

The mechanism remains as  relevant  as  ever. Since 2015, the Schengen area has been under 
constant pressure, and today we are confronted with a different reality than at the time of the 
creation of Schengen. Instability in Europe’s neighbourhood and beyond, the consequences of 

1  

2  

3  

4  

5  

Beyond Member States, the Schengen area covers also Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and Liechtenstein 
(so-called ‘Schengen Associated Countries’). Ireland is not part of the Schengen area but it will apply the 
Schengen acquis in part as of 1 January 2021. The United Kingdom was also not part of the Schengen 
area but applying in part the Schengen acquis. Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus and Romania are bound by the 
Schengen acquis, however, internal border controls have not yet been lifted in respect of these Member 
States. The report refers to all these countries as Member States. 
In  2016  it  has  been  estimated  that  the  full  reestablishment  of  internal  border  controls  would  generate 
immediate direct costs between EUR 5 and 18 billion annually, COM(2016) 120 final. 
Decision  of  the  Executive  Committee  of  16  September  1998  setting  up  a  Standing  Committee  on  the 
evaluation and implementation of Schengen (SCH/ Com-ex (98) 26 def.), OJ L 239, 22.09.2000, p 138. 
See Council conclusions of 5 December 2014 on the legacy of Schengen evaluation within the Council 
and its future role and responsibilities under the new mechanism. 
Council Regulation (EU) No 1053/2013, OJ L 295, 6.11.2013, p. 27 (SCH-EVAL Regulation), which 
became operational in 2015. 

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the  very  exceptional  circumstances  of  the  2015  refugee  crisis,  the  COVID-19  crisis  and  the 
terrorist threat require reflection and follow-up. 

Part of a well-functioning Schengen area is the need for having in place a fully effective tool 
for evaluating its functioning and for ensuring that improvements are effectively implemented. 
All pertinent Member States have now been evaluated under the new mechanism in line with 
the first Multiannual Evaluation Programme. In accordance with the reporting obligations under 
the SCH-EVAL Regulation6, this report provides a state of play of the implementation of the 
Schengen acquis, based on the findings of the evaluations and implemented recommendations. 
The  report  also  serves  as  basis  for  the  reflections  needed  in  relation  to  the  review  of  the 
mechanism to ensure that it can achieve its full potential as a tool to evaluate the functioning of 
Schengen and for ensuring that improvements are effectively implemented. 

One of the lessons learnt in the past is that setting up and maintaining the Schengen area requires 
daily combined efforts on the part of Member States and EU institutions to allow all EU citizens 
to take full advantage of the area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers. It 
is  precisely  with  a  view  to  stimulating  concrete  cooperation  on  issues  related  to  Schengen 
among  all  actors  involved  and  rebuilding  trust  that  the  Commission  has  established  the 
Schengen Forum. By providing a state of play on the implementation of the Schengen acquis 
and the functioning of the Schengen Evaluation and Monitoring Mechanism, this report aims 
to offer the necessary foundation for discussions in the First Schengen Forum on 30 November. 

2. 

THE SCHENGEN EVALUATION PROCESS 

2.1.  The Schengen Evaluation Process 

The  Schengen  acquis  includes  a  wide-ranging  and  fast-developing  set  of  rules  as  well  as 
compensatory  measures  to  counterbalance  the  absence  of  internal  border  controls.  The 
Schengen Evaluation and Monitoring Mechanism monitors the implementation of the Schengen 
acquis by the countries that apply the Schengen acquis in part or in full7. It also assesses the 
capacity of those countries where internal border controls have not yet been lifted to implement 
the Schengen acquis in full8. The Schengen Evaluation and Monitoring Mechanism assesses in 
particular, the implementation of measures in the areas of external borders, return, visa policy, 
police cooperation, the Schengen Information System (SIS), data protection, and the absence 
of border control at internal borders. 

The  Commission  carries  out  evaluations  over  a  five-year  cycle  following  multiannual  and 
annual programmes, together with experts from Member States as well as EU agencies that 
participate as observers. Each country is evaluated at least once every five years. Additional 
ad-hoc  evaluations  in  the  form  of  unannounced  evaluations  or  revisits  can  be  organised,  as 
required.  Thematic  evaluations  are  an  additional  tool  for  assessing  the  implementation  of 
specific  parts  of  the  Schengen  acquis  across  several  countries  at  the  same  time.  The  figure 
below illustrates the five-year evaluations process. 

6  
7  
8  

Articles 20 and 22 of the SCH-EVAL Regulation. 
Article 1 SCH-EVAL Regulation. 
This  applies  to  Cyprus  and  Croatia.  As  specified  in  recital  28  of  the  SCH-EVAL  Regulation,  the 
evaluation of Bulgaria and Romania has already been completed pursuant to Article 4(2) of the 2005 Act 
of Accession and no evaluation would be carried out under Article 1(b) of the SCH-EVAL Regulation.  

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SCH-EVAL Cycle (5-year) 

Visit to the MS 
(Commission, Member 
States Experts)

MS Reporting

EP 
EP 
Scrutiny 
Scrutiny 

Commission Evaluation 
Report and 
Recommendation 
Proposal

MS Action Plan

Council 
Recommendations

Evaluation reports are presented to the Schengen Committee (in which all Member States are 
represented)  and,  subject  to  its  positive  opinion,  adopted  by  the  Commission9.  Upon  a 
Commission  proposal,  the  Council  adopts  the  recommendations  to  address  any  deficiencies 
identified in the evaluation reports, concluding the first phase of the evaluation. As a follow-
up, the country concerned must submit an action plan listing the remedial actions to implement 
the Council recommendations. The Commission assesses the action plans in cooperation with 
the  relevant  evaluation  experts.  The  evaluated  country  has  an  obligation  to  report  on  the 
progress made every three months. When all remedial actions have been taken, the Commission 
closes the evaluation concluding the second phase. 

9  

Regulation (EU) No 182/2011, OJ L 55, 28.2.2011, p. 13. 

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When  the  evaluation  report concludes  there  are  serious deficiencies, the  Commission has to 
inform the Council without delay and shorter time limits apply to the follow up. The evaluated 
countries  are  required  to  submit  the  action  plan  within  one  month  from  the  Council’s 
recommendation. The Commission can consider a revisit to verify the implementation of the 
measures taken to address the deficiencies identified. Furthermore, where an evaluation report 
concludes that the evaluated country is seriously neglecting its obligations and the Commission 
during  its  monitoring  finds  that  the  situation  persists,  the  Commission  may  trigger  the 
application of the procedure provided for in Article 29 of the Schengen Borders Code which 
could ultimately lead to recommending to reintroduce controls at internal borders, provided all 
the conditions for doing so are fulfilled. 

2.2.  The First Multiannual Evaluation Programme 
Between  2015  and 2019,  over  200  evaluation  visits10 took place both within the Schengen 
area11 and in 27 third countries12, the latter to check the implementation of the visa policy. 29 
unannounced visits and 8 revisits were carried out for 15 countries in all main policy fields with 
the exception of data protection and police cooperation. Two thematic evaluations were carried 
out,  in  2015  and  2019/2020,  respectively  on  local  Schengen  cooperation  in  the  area  of  visa 
policy and on the national strategies for integrated border management.  

Based on these evaluation visits, the Commission has adopted 198 evaluation reports and the 
Council addressed more than 4 500 recommendations to Member States. However, only 45 
evaluations have been closed while a number of evaluation reports and recommendations for 
the evaluations carried out in 2019 are still to be adopted. 

In these first five years, a strong emphasis has been put on developing working methods that 
improve the quality, effectiveness and coherence of the evaluations. Given the central role of 
the national experts,  the main focus  was to  further develop  the  tailored training  already in 
place since the previous evaluation system. At present, trainings for experts in view of their 
participation in evaluation teams are offered by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency 
(Frontex) and the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL) with the 
support of trainers from  the  Commission  and the  Fundamental  Rights Agency  (FRA). They 
include  specific  modules  for  external  borders,  return,  police  cooperation  and  Schengen 
Information  System.  Standardised  checklists  have  also  been  prepared  to  ensure  a  coherent 
assessment. 
EU  agencies13  made  a  significant  contribution  to  the  process  through  the  organisation  of 
trainings, the provision of risk analyses that informed the preparation of the annual programmes 
for the Schengen evaluations, and by participating in the evaluations as observers. In the field 

10  

11  

12  

13  

On four occasions, evaluations were based on stand-alone questionnaires and not on questionnaires and 
on-site  visits,  namely  for  the  evaluation  of  Liechtenstein  in  the  field  of  return  (2015),  Malta  for  SIS 
(2016),  Croatia  in  relation  to  compliance  with  firearms  legislation  (2016)  and  Judicial  cooperation  in 
criminal matters (2017). In the field of external borders evaluations required in most cases more than one 
on-site visit. 
In addition to the 26 States of the Schengen area, the mechanism also assessed the preparedness of Croatia 
to fully apply the Schengen acquis. The evaluation of Cyprus started in 2019 and is ongoing. Ireland and 
the UK were assessed respectively in the fields of data protection and SIS. 
Evaluations in the field of the common visa policy take typically place in third countries due to the fact 
that Schengen visa applications are, as a rule, processed by Member States’ consulates abroad.  
The agencies involved at present are Frontex (external border management, visa and return), Europol and 
CEPOL (police cooperation, SIS), eu-LISA (SIS), and Fundamental Right Agency (FRA) (return). The 
European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) while not an agency also participates as observer.  

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of external border management, an additional quality control tool was adopted in 2016 with the 
implementation  of  vulnerability  assessments  set  out  under  the  European  Border  and  Coast 
Guard (Frontex) Regulation14. These annual vulnerability assessments carried out by Frontex 
complement the Schengen Evaluation and Monitoring Mechanism by offering a snapshot of the 
countries’ operational capacity for managing the external borders. They are taken into account 
when evaluating a particular country. 

Financial  support  under  the  Internal  Security  Funds  and  the  Asylum,  Migration  and 
Integration Fund facilitated the implementation of the recommendations. Member States were 
encouraged to (re)allocate resources under their national programmes to give priority to actions 
remedying deficiencies identified in evaluation reports15. 

3. 

STATE  OF  PLAY  ON  THE  IMPLEMENTATION  OF  THE  SCHENGEN 
ACQUIS 

3.1.  Main  findings  and  progress  made  during  the  First  Multiannual  Evaluation 

Programme  

Based on the findings of the evaluations carried out over the last five years, it can be concluded 
that overall, Member States comply with the essential provisions of the Schengen acquis 
in all policy fields evaluated. However, evaluations showed that there are some recurrent 
deficiencies in Member States and equally divergent practices among Member States due 
to  an  incoherent  implementation  of  the  Schengen  acquis.  These  divergences  undermine  the 
level  of  harmonisation  and  coherence,  and  ultimately  could  have  an  impact  on  the  well-
functioning of the Schengen area.  

Evaluations allowed identifying and addressing numerous recurring deficiencies. Several 
Member  States  have  taken  a  positive  and  pro-active  attitude  towards  remedying  the 
shortcomings identified during the evaluations. In some cases, Member States started working 
on remedial actions even before the Council adopted its recommendations. Furthermore, when 
the report concluded the existence of ‘serious deficiencies’, the revisits showed that Member 
States have taken swift action to address the most serious shortcomings. This confirms that the 
close monitoring of Member States’ obligations and responsibilities and rapid Member State 
action is fundamental for a correct and effective implementation of the Schengen acquis. 

Recurrent Deficiencies and Areas of improvements 

• 

Incomplete  or  non-conform  transposition,  implementation  and  application  of 
pertinent Schengen acquis;  
Insufficient number of staff and inadequate qualification and/or training; 

• 
•  Diverging and inconsistent national practices due to incoherent implementation of 

• 

• 

the Schengen acquis; 
Fragmented administrative structures with insufficient coordination and integration 
of the different authorities; and 
Practical, technological and regulatory barriers to cooperation within the Schengen 
area. 

The findings that result from evaluations have served as a basis for reinforcing EU policy in 
recent years, making an essential contribution to the further development of the Schengen 

14  
15  

OJ L 251, 16.09.2016, p. 1. 
See Article 12 of Regulation (EU) No 515/2014, OJ L 150, 20.5.2014, p. 143. 

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acquis  and  to  ensuring  its  correct  and  more  harmonised  implementation.  The  findings  have 
contributed  to  the  formulation  of  the  Commission  Recommendation  of  7  March  2017  on 
making returns more effective16 and informed the recast Return Directive and the revision of 
the Return Handbook17. They were extensively used for legislative proposals in the field of visa 
policy and to improve the Visa Code Handbook. They were essential for the improvement of 
the Schengen Information System legal framework and to modify the Schengen Borders Code 
introducing  the  obligation  of  systematic  checks.  Furthermore,  the  outcome  of  the  thematic 
evaluation of Member States’ national strategies for integrated border management will support 
setting up the multi-annual European Integrated Border Management Cycle to consolidate the 
strategic approach to border management at the national and EU levels. 

3.2. 

Specific findings per policy field 

3.2.1.  External border management 

A well-functioning area without internal border controls requires common, uniform and highly 
efficient external border management. Deficiencies in the external border management of one 
country can affect all Member States and subsequently put the functioning of the Schengen area 
at  risk.  External  border  management  evaluations  are  thus  a  key  element  of  the  Schengen 
Evaluation and Monitoring Mechanism. 
The main legislative act governing this area is the Schengen Borders Code18. In the last five 
years, as a result of the new challenges faced by the EU, additional initiatives were introduced 
to  reinforce  this  legislative  framework,  including  systematic  checks  of  EU  citizens  against 
relevant databases at external borders19, the adoption of a new Frontex Regulation in 201620 
and its subsequent review in 2019 with the inclusion of the EUROSUR Regulation21, as well 
as the gradual development of an integrated system for managing the EU’s external borders (the 
European integrated border management). 

External border management evaluations cover the following main elements: external border 
checks at sea and airports and land border crossing points, external border surveillance, national 
strategies and concepts for European integrated border management, risk analysis, inter-agency 
and international cooperation, national quality control mechanism, external border management 
capacities (personnel and equipment) and infrastructure. 

Under Articles 21 and 29 of the Schengen Borders Code, the existence of persistent serious 
deficiencies in external border controls identified in a Schengen evaluation report may lead to 
the reintroduction of internal border controls. The provisions have been applied once during 
this first Multiannual Evaluation Programme.  During  the unannounced  visit  to one  Member 
State22 in autumn 2015, serious deficiencies were identified in the external border management, 

16  
17  
18  
19  

20  

21  
22  

Commission Recommandation (EU) 2017/432, OJ L 66, 11.3.2017, p. 15. 
C(2017) 6505. 
Regulation (EU) 2016/399, OJ L 77, 23.3.2016, p. 1, as amended.  
Regulation  (EU)  2017/458,  OJ  L  74,  18.3.2017,  p.  1,  amending  Regulation  2016/399  as  regards  the 
reinforcement of checks against relevant databases at external borders. The systematic checks of the travel 
documents of persons enjoying the right of free movement under EU law against relevant data bases was 
introduced. 
Regulation (EU) 2016/1624, OJ L 251, 16.9.2016, p. 1. Repealed in 2019 by Regulation (EU) 2019/1896, 
OJ L 295, 14.11.2019, p. 1. 
Regulation (EU) 1052/2013, OJ L 295, 6.11.2013, p. 11. 
Greece. 

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which were considered to put the overall functioning of the area without internal border control 
at risk23. As a result, five Member States jointly reintroduced internal border controls24. The 
Council adopted recommendations on the necessary measures to be taken by the Member State 
concerned, which submitted an action plan and progress reports as required by the SCH-EVAL 
Regulation25. The evaluation carried out in 2016 already indicated that the serious deficiencies 
had been addressed. 

Based on the 42 evaluations carried out in relation to external border management, it can be 
concluded that Member States are to a large extent adequately implementing the Schengen 
Borders Code and managing external borders in line with the acquis. Decisive progress has 
also  been  made  to  harmonise  Member  States’  strategic  approaches  towards  external  border 
management by the gradual implementation of an integrated border management system. While 
serious deficiencies were identified in four Member States26, those countries swiftly took the 
necessary measures to address the most important deficiencies. Today, no Member State has 
serious deficiencies in this area, but specific challenges remain in a few countries that still need 
to  be  promptly  addressed.  Despite  these  positive  elements,  Member  States’  external  border 
management does not yet guarantee a uniform level of control at the EU’s external borders, 
given the diverging practices and approaches to external border management on a number of 
issues. 

In this respect, some recurring deficiencies have been identified. In various Member States, 
the  strategic  planning  for  integrated  border  management  is  not  adequate  which  results  in 
reduced inter-institutional cooperation, overlapping of competences between different external 
border  authorities  and  scattered  resource  allocation.  These  deficiencies  could  decrease 
operational efficiency in external border management and response capacity. Member States’ 
conduct of risk analyses, one of the main managerial tools for external border management, 
still  diverges.  Not  all  Member  States  carry  out  a  comprehensive  risk  analysis  based  on  the 
existing harmonised Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model (CIRAM). This model ensures 
all  Member  States  produce  unified  high-standard  risk  analysis  products  for  external  border 
management and return purposes. 

Though the overall quality of controls at the external borders is good, it still varies in and among 
Member States. Most countries face challenges related to resources, training and operational 
planning to ensure uniform and systematic checks at all external border crossing points, and 
efficient  external  border  surveillance.  However,  notwithstanding  such  challenges,  most 
Member States have managed to maintain the overall quality of external border control. Pre-
arrival information generated by the implementation of several information systems, and risk 
analysis  results  are  not  efficiently  integrated  in  external  border  control  procedures.  The 
evaluations  have  also  revealed  recurrent  shortcomings  in  external  border  surveillance  and 
situational awareness. In a number of Member States, surveillance systems do not cover their 
entire  external  border,  and  there  are  limited  exchanges  of  information  between  concerned 
external  border  authorities  and  limited  implementation  of  the  EUROSUR  Regulation27. 

23  
24  
25  
26  

27  

COM(2016) 120. 
Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/1989, OJ L 306, 15.11.2016, p. 13. 
COM(2017) 570. 
In addition to Greece,  serious deficiencies  in external border  management  were identified also by the 
evaluations of Spain, Sweden and Iceland in 2017. Re-visits were carried out in Sweden and in Iceland 
in 2019. 
Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013, OJ L 295, 6.11.2013, p.11. 

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Allegations  of  fundamental  rights  violations  in  some  countries  are  a  cause  for  concern  and 
require close monitoring. 

A substantial number  of the deficiencies identified have been successfully  addressed  in 
these  past  five  years  and  the  Commission  encouraged  the  use  of  police  checks  or  law 
enforcement authorities’ cooperation within the Schengen area, as an effective alternative to 
internal border controls28. Nevertheless and despite this progress, internal border controls have 
been  reintroduced  repeatedly  by  Member  States  using  Articles  25  and  28  of  the  Schengen 
Borders Code, which allow immediately restoring internal border controls on the grounds of a 
serious threat to public policy or internal security. More recently, the Schengen area was put 
again to the test because of the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. Against this backdrop, 
the Commission intervened to provide together with Member States a coordinated response to 
the  crisis  by,  among  others,  organising  videoconferences  with  Ministers  of  the  Interior,  the 
meetings  of  the  COVID-19  Information  Group  on  Home  Affairs  as  well  as  publishing 
guidelines29 on border management measures, green lanes, facilitation of frontier workers and 
by putting forward a proposal for a Council recommendation on a temporary restriction on non-
essential travel to the  EU  from third  countries30. These recent  events have re-confirmed the 
importance  of  a  more  resilient  and  efficient  Schengen,  which  should  also  include  a  more 
effective governance. 

3.2.2.  Common visa policy 

Inherently associated with external border management, the common visa policy has two main 
objectives.  First,  it  enables  Member  States  to  conduct  a  thorough  migratory  and  security 
assessment of third-country nationals who require a visa to travel to the Schengen area for short 
stays  (up  to  90  days  in  any  180-day  period).  Second,  it  also  provides  legal  guarantees  for 
applicants to ensure an efficient and fair visa procedure, with the aim of facilitating legitimate 
travel and people-to-people contact. 
The main legislative acts governing this policy field are the Visa Code31, providing common 
and harmonised rules for visa processing, the Visa Information System (VIS) Regulation32 and 
the Visa Regulation (EU) 2018/180633. 

Based on the 29 evaluations carried out in relation to common visa policy, it can be concluded 
that Member States to a large extent adequately implement the common visa policy with 
decisions that, overall, are well justified on whether visas should be issued or refused. 
However,  serious  deficiencies  were  identified  recently  in  two  Member  States34.  Moreover 
despite a common regulatory framework, Member States’ visa-issuing practices still diverge in 
several  aspects.  Consular  staff  sometimes  still  view  Schengen  visas  as  ‘national’  visas. 
Competition  between  States  in  ‘attractive  markets’  as  well  as  ‘visa-shopping’  weakens  the 
perception of Schengen as a common travel area. 

In this sense, recurring deficiencies have been identified. Member States practices still diverge 
when determining the  validity  of visas or  the supporting  documents to be requested,  despite 

28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  

C(2017) 3349. 
C(2020) 1753. 
COM(2020) 115. 
Regulation (EC) No 810/2009, OJ L 243, 15.9.2009, p. 1. 
Regulation (EC) No 767/2008, OJ L 218, 13.8.2008, p. 60. 
OJ L 303, 28.11.2018, p. 39 
Serious deficiencies emerged during the 2018 evaluation of Finland and the 2019 unannounced evaluation 
of the Netherlands.  

8 

 
 
                                                           
legally binding harmonised lists adopted by the Commission. The examination of applications 
has not been found to be sufficiently thorough in all instances, particularly in case of centralised 
decision-making.  Insufficient staff  training and staff shortages have been observed in many 
consulates and this has led that in some locations, consulates are not able to meet the deadlines 
set out in the Visa Code. The use of external service providers (ESP) is widespread, but the 
monitoring  of  their  activities  was  not  always  adequate  and  contracts  and  practices  did  not 
always  comply  with  legal  requirements.  Another  recurrent  shortcoming  was  the  systematic 
collection of fingerprints even if applicants have given fingerprints in the previous five years. 
Information made available to the public on conditions and procedures has also been found to 
be incomplete or outdated in certain cases. 

The introduction of the Visa Information System (VIS) – a database supporting the exchange of 
data related to visa applications - constitutes considerable progress for the visa procedure. The 
full potential of the system is undermined, however, by the sometimes inadequate quality of the 
data entered into the Visa Information System, the fact that the national case handling systems 
are not always adapted to the Visa Code and Visa Information System workflow, the lack of 
adequate IT training, and the limited awareness of certain functionalities of the system. 

A substantial number  of the deficiencies identified have been  successfully addressed in 
these past five years. In addition, the amendments to the Visa Code that became applicable 
in  202035  seek  to  address  several  of  these  issues  and  to  strengthen  the  harmonised 
implementation of the common visa policy by providing faster and clearer procedures for 
legitimate travellers36. 

3.2.3.  Return 

A  fair  and  efficient  system  to  return  illegally  staying  third-country  nationals  is  an  essential 
component of a well-functioning European asylum and migration management system.  
The Return Directive37 is the main legislative act governing return, which sets the common 
standards  and  procedures  for  an  effective  and  fair  return  of  illegally  staying  third-country 
nationals. The Directive leaves significant flexibility to the Member States as to the concrete 
measures  to  be  taken  at  national  level  to  implement  it,  resulting  in  different  systems  and 
approaches being taken by Member States. 

The Return Directive is a ‘hybrid instrument’, as it applies both to cases  of presence on the 
territory of a Member State of a third-country national who does not fulfil, or no longer fulfils 
the conditions of entry as set out in the Schengen Borders Code, and to cases in which other 
conditions for entry, stay or residence in that Member State are not complied with. To the extent 
that it applies to third-country nationals who do not fulfil or who no longer fulfil the conditions 
of  entry  in  accordance  with  the  Schengen  Borders  Code,  the  Return  Directive  constitutes  a 
development of the provisions of the Schengen acquis38. 

This is why the new Schengen Evaluation and Monitoring Mechanism introduced evaluations 
also  in  the  field  of  return  to  ensure  that  the  rules  of  the  Return  Directive  are  correctly 

35  
36  

37  
38  

Regulation (EU) 2019/1155, OJ L 188, 12.7.2019, p. 25. 
In particular by allowing for applications to be lodged up to 6 months, and no later than 15 days, before 
the  trip;  providing  for  the  possibility  of  the  application  form  to  be  filled  in  and  signed  electronically; 
introducing  a  harmonised  approach  to  the  issuing  of  multiple  entry  visas  to  regular  travellers  with  a 
positive visa history for a period which increases gradually from 1 to 5 years. 
Directive 2008/115/EC, OJ L 348, 24.12.2008, p. 98. 
See recitals 25-30. 

9 

 
 
                                                           
implemented by the Member States39. 

Based on the 31 evaluations carried out in relation to return, it can be concluded that the return 
systems  of  the  Member  States  are  in  general  compliant  with  the  Return  Directive.  No 
serious deficiencies have been identified. However, in some countries practical and normative 
obstacles exist which negatively affect the enforcement of returns. Moreover, the evaluations 
have brought to light specific shortcomings and structural weaknesses in the return systems of 
the evaluated Member States that have been faced with important challenges due to the large 
numbers of third-country nationals entering and staying illegally. 

A number of recurrent deficiencies have been identified. A major problem is the general lack 
of  reliable  statistical  information  on  return-related  activities,  which  makes  assessing  the 
effectiveness  of  national  return  systems  more  difficult.  However,  the  amendment  to  the 
Migration  Statistics  Regulation40  and  the  entry  into  operation  of  the  Schengen  Information 
System for return41 will contribute to addressing this issue. 

There are also divergent approaches when it comes to issuing return decisions. Not all Member 
States  systematically  issue  return  decisions  to  illegally  staying  third-country  nationals, 
following a negative decision on asylum applications. In addition, certain return decisions do 
not specify clearly that the third-country national should not only leave the Member State in 
question,  but  the  EU  and  the  Schengen  area.  This  ambiguity  leads  to  possible  unauthorised 
movements from one Member State to another. Similar divergent practices exist regarding entry 
bans which are not systematically issued when third-country nationals do not comply with the 
obligation  to  return  within  the  period  for  voluntary  departure  as  required  by  the  Return 
Directive. 

On  voluntary  return  assistance,  evaluations  showed  that  there  is  scope  for  improving  the 
support provided to irregular migrants willing to depart voluntarily, notably by ensuring that 
the assisted voluntary return and reintegration programmes have a wider scope (e.g. not limited 
only to rejected asylum seekers or third-country nationals who lost a right to stay in the EU). 

Several  Member  States  do  not  take  sufficient  measures  to  ensure  the  enforcement  of  return 
decisions. In some countries, there is no mechanism in place to ensure the systematic follow-
up of return operations or the mechanism is not fit for purpose. Measures to locate returnees 
systematically in order to prevent absconding and to ensure that decisions are complied with, 
are often lacking. Effective forced-return monitoring systems have not been established in all 
Member States. 

The  approach  towards  unaccompanied  minors  is  different  among  Member  States.  The 
identification  of  durable  solutions,  looking  at  all  available  options,  including  return  to  the 
country  of  origin  and  reunification  with  family  members  in  a  third  country,  is  an  essential 
component of the best interests of the child determination, which however is not carried out by 

39  

40  

41  

All Member States are bound by the Return Directive, with the exception of Ireland by virtue of Protocol 
19 on the Schengen acquis integrated in the framework of the European Union and Protocol 21 on the 
position of the United Kingdom and Ireland in respect of the area of freedom, security and justice, annexed 
to the Treaties. To the extent that the Directive applies to third-country nationals who do not fulfil or who 
no longer fulfil the conditions of entry in accordance with the Schengen Borders Code, Denmark takes 
part to it by virtue of Article 4 of Protocol 22 annexed to the Treaties and  Iceland, Norway, Switzerland 
and  Liechtenstein  are  bound  by  it  based  on  the  respective  agreements  associating  them  with  the 
implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis. 
Regulation (EU) 2020/851, OJ L 198, 22.6.2020, p. 1, amending Regulation (EC) 862/2007, OJ L 199, 
31.7.2007, p. 23. 
Regulation (EU) 2018/1860, OJ L 312, 7.12.2018, p. 1. 

10 

 
 
                                                           
all Member States. This results in ‘return’ not being assessed as a possibility when conducting 
the individual assessment of the best interests of the child. 

In relation to detention, several issues have been identified. The availability and use of effective 
alternatives to detention is uneven across Member States. Insufficient detention capacity and 
the fact that some Member States do not use all the possibilities in the Directive regarding the 
length  of  detention  contribute  to  an  increase  in  the  risk  of  absconding,  affecting  the 
effectiveness  of  the  return  system.  Issues  with  ensuring  adequate  material  conditions  in 
detention centres are recurrent and include inter alia a lack of adequate privacy for detainees 
and a prison environment of detention centres which does not fully reflect the administrative 
nature of the deprivation of liberty. 

Implementation  of  recommendations  has  been  slow.  In  2018,  the  Commission  tabled  a 
proposal for a recast Return Directive42, which consists of targeted amendments aimed at 
maximising the effectiveness of the EU return policy while safeguarding the fundamental 
rights of irregular migrants and ensuring the respect of the principle of non-refoulement. The 
proposed recast relies on the information collected during the evaluations and addresses several 
of  the  aforementioned  shortcomings,  such  as  setting  an  obligation  for  Member  States  to 
establish  assisted  voluntary  return  programmes  and  introducing  a  common  list  of  objective 
criteria to determine the existence of a risk of absconding. Furthermore, the amended proposal 
for a Regulation establishing a common procedure for international protection43 requires that a 
return decision is immediately issued to an asylum seeker whose application is rejected44. 

3.2.4.  Police Cooperation 

The 1990 Schengen Convention introduced provisions to increase cooperation and information 
exchange  between  the  police  forces  of  Member  States  as  a  compensatory  measure  to  the 
abolition of internal border controls. Those provisions cover cooperation to prevent and detect 
crime;  operational  cooperation,  e.g.  the  possibility  to  extend  surveillance  or  continuing  the 
pursuit  of  criminals  across  internal  borders  (so-called  ‘hot  pursuit’),  and  the  sharing  of 
information for the prevention and repression of crime or threats to public order and safety. 

However,  the  legislative  framework  for  Schengen  police  cooperation  remains  more 
fragmented than other components of the Schengen acquis and leaves great flexibility to the 
parties in the way they choose to implement it. A significant part of the cooperation framework 
is based upon Council non-binding documents such as good practices (‘Schengen Catalogue’) 
and  guidelines.  Furthermore,  the  core  provisions  of  the  Schengen  Convention  are  mainly 
implemented  through  bilateral  or  multilateral  agreements  concluded  by  the  Member  States. 
Since 1990, the EU framework on information exchange and data access for law enforcement 
purposes  has  continuously  developed.  While  a  part  of  it  does  not  formally  belong  to  the 
Schengen acquis, it  is closely  related to  it.  For  this reason, the implementation of the  Prüm 
Decisions, the Europol Regulation and other non-Schengen legal instruments is also considered 
during  the  evaluations.  This  contributes  to  assessing  how  Member  States  cope  with  general 
information exchange requirements provided by the Schengen Convention. 

Based on the 27 evaluations carried out in relation to police cooperation, it can be concluded 
that Member States are generally compliant with the Schengen acquis in the field of police 
cooperation. No serious deficiencies were identified and only a few non-compliant findings 

42  
43  
44  

COM(2018) 634. 
COM(2020) 611. 
See recital (31a) and Article 35a. 

11 

 
 
                                                           
were  made,  mainly  in  the  area  of  information  exchange  and  especially  access  to  the  Visa 
Information System for law enforcement purposes. 

However, a number of recurrent deficiencies prevent reaching the full potential of some of the 
existing police cooperation and information exchange tools. The most necessary improvements 
identified concerned strengthening law enforcement information exchange in particular with 
regard to the functioning of the Single Points of Contact (SPOC)45 of Member States and the 
mobile  access  to  police  databases  of  street-level  police  officers.  Other  important  areas  for 
improvement concerned the development and sharing of strategic crime threat assessments and 
risk analyses to allow a better joint response to cross-border crime and revising the bilateral or 
multilateral  agreements  concluded  by  the  Member  States  to  extend  and  facilitate  the 
possibilities  for  operational  cross-border  cooperation  (in  particular  cross-border  surveillance 
and ‘hot pursuits’). 

3.2.5.  Schengen Information System (SIS) 

The Schengen Information System is a key compensatory measure for the abolition of internal 
border controls as it offers essential support to security policy across the Schengen area. SIS is 
a large-scale IT system that provides alerts on persons or objects of interest for security reasons. 
It also supports checks at the external borders, and law enforcement and judicial cooperation 
across Europe. 

Its  scope  is  defined  in  three  legal  instruments  concerning  border  control  cooperation,  law 
enforcement cooperation and cooperation on vehicles registration46. The second generation of 
SIS became operational on 9 April 2013 in 28 Member States and at present 30 Member States 
are connected to it47. On 28 November 2018, the European Parliament and the Council adopted 
three  new  Regulations  that  will  further  widen  the  scope  and  functionalities  of  SIS  to  be 
implemented in three phases by 2021. Each Member State using SIS is responsible for setting 
up, operating and maintaining its national system and designating a national SIRENE48 Bureau, 
which ensures the exchange of all supplementary information related to SIS alerts. The EU-
Agency for large-scale IT systems (eu-LISA) is responsible for the operational management of 
the central system and the communication infrastructure. 

Based on the 32 evaluations carried out in relation the Schengen Information System, it can be 
concluded that Member States have generally implemented and used SIS effectively and in 
a uniform manner. Although serious deficiencies in the implementation of SIS were identified 
in  four  Member  States49,  these  countries  have  been  actively  working  on  remedying  the 
deficiencies. However, in one of the cases the situation has not improved. 

45  

46  

47  

48  
49  

The SPOC is the national ‘one stop shop’ for international law enforcement cooperation: It has one phone 
number and one e-mail address for all international law enforcement cooperation requests dealt with at 
national level. It gathers under the same management structure the different national offices or contact 
points for the different cooperation channels with representatives from all law enforcement agencies of 
the country. Ref. Single Points of Contact (SPOC) Guidelines (Council Doc. 10492/14, 13 June 2014)  
Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006, OJ L 381, 28.12.2006, p. 4; Council Decision 2007/533/JHA, OJ L 205, 
7.8.2007, p. 63, and Regulation (EC) No 1986/2006, OJ L 381, 28.12.2006, p. 1. 
In addition to the 26 countries of the Schengen area, Bulgaria, Romania, the UK and Croatia are connected 
to SIS though the two latter still subject to certain restrictions regarding its use of Schengen-wide SIS 
alerts for the purposes of refusing entry into or stay in the Schengen area. 
SIRENE stands for Supplementary Information Request at the National Entries. 
Serious deficiencies emerged in the evaluations of Belgium in 2015, of France and Spain in 2016 as well 
as in the UK in 2017. Re-visits were carried out in Belgium in 2016 and in France in 2019. It is considered 
that Belgium, France and Spain have addressed all serious deficiencies. 

12 

 
 
                                                           
Certain recurrent deficiencies emerged during evaluations, such as the lack of technical tools 
or mandatory procedures at the country level to upload fingerprints and photographs to SIS 
alerts even when they have them available. Another recurrent finding relates to some of the 
functionalities introduced in 2013 by the second generation of SIS, in particular, that not all 
information  included  in  SIS  alerts  is  displayed  to  the  end-users.  It  was  also  found  that  the 
increased exchange of the supplementary information due to the extensive use of the system 
often brings the SIRENE Bureaux to the limits of their capacity. The SIRENE Bureaux do not 
always have sufficient personnel and technical resources, including automated and integrated 
workflow tools, to enable them to exchange this information effectively. A substantial number 
of the deficiencies identified have been successfully addressed in these past five years. 

3.2.6.  Data Protection 

A further important part of the Schengen acquis are the rules on the protection of personal data. 
A significant reform of the EU data protection legal framework took place in 2016 to strengthen 
the rights of citizens in the digital era. The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)50 and 
the Data Protection Law Enforcement Directive51 are the main legislative acts applicable in 
this  area  in  combination  with  the  specific  data  protection  provisions  in  the  Schengen 
Information System (SIS) and Visa Information System (VIS) acquis. 

These evaluations assess how the Member States implement and apply the Schengen acquis, in 
particular in relation to the SIS and VIS against the background of data protection requirements. 
They also include the role of the Data Protection Authorities (DPAs) as regards the supervision 
of the authorities managing and using the SIS and the VIS. 

Based on the 29 evaluations carried out in relation to data protection, it can be concluded that 
Member States generally implement and apply the relevant provisions on the SIS and the 
VIS  in  compliance  with  data  protection  requirements.  Although  no  serious  deficiencies 
were identified, there are still a number of recurrent issues that need to be addressed/are being 
addressed. 

Evaluations carried out after May 2018 (date of entry into application of the new data protection 
framework) indicated in some countries delays in implementing the GDPR and/or transposing 
the  Data  Protection  Law  Enforcement  Directive  into  national  law  as  well  as  adapting  the 
national SIS and VIS related legislation accordingly. 

In some Member States, there are shortcomings concerning the complete independence of the 
DPAs which lead to direct or indirect influence by the Government on the work of the DPA. 
Some of those issues have been solved in the follow-up to the Schengen evaluations and during 
the reform of the national data protection legislation to implement the GDPR and transpose the 
Data  Protection  Law  Enforcement  Directive.  Some  DPAs  also  lack  sufficient  human  and 
financial resources to carry out all their SIS and VIS related tasks. 

In a number of Member States more frequent and comprehensive inspections by the DPAs were 
deemed  necessary  in  order  for  them  to  fulfil  their  task  of  monitoring  the  lawfulness  of  the 
processing of SIS II and VIS data. In some cases, the deadlines for carrying out the first audit 
of the data processing operations in the SIS and VIS system have not been met. 

In the field of data subject rights in relation to SIS and VIS, a lack of proper information was 
found to constitute a constraint for the effective exercise of those rights. 

50  
51  

Regulation (EU) 2016/679, OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1. 
Directive (EU) 2016/680, OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 89. 

13 

 
 
                                                           
The period of keeping of logs for SIS and VIS queries was, in some cases, not in line with the 
Schengen  acquis.  Frequently  there  was  no  pro-active  self-auditing  on  data  protection 
compliance by data controllers, including no regular review of logs. Furthermore, there is often 
a lack of clarity on the tasks and allocation of responsibilities for the processing of personal 
data  amongst  different  authorities  involved  in  the  visa  issuing  procedure  and  processing  of 
related data. Some improvements are still necessary in relation to physical, organisational and 
IT security measures in respect of VIS data. The Data Protection Officers should in some cases 
be  more  involved  in  overseeing  the  processing  of  personal  data  in  the  Schengen  specific 
context. There was often no regular and continuous training on data protection and data security 
for all operational staff having access to SIS II. 

Member  States  are  in  general  taking  the  necessary  steps  in  order  to  follow-up  on  the 
findings and recommendations. While overall some progress has been made to address 
the deficiencies, implementing the recommendations has been slow. 

4. 

THE  FUNCTIONING  OF  THE  SCHENGEN  EVALUATION  AND 
MONITORING  MECHANISM 
FIRST  MULTIANNUAL 
PROGRAMME 

IN  THE 

4.1. 

Shortcomings identified 

In the last five years, the Schengen Evaluation and Monitoring Mechanism has led to substantial 
improvements in implementing the Schengen acquis in the EU and has already proven its added 
value in ensuring the efficient functioning of the Schengen area. Nevertheless, the experience 
gained  during  the  first  Multiannual  Evaluation  Programme  (2015-2019)  showed  a  series  of 
shortcomings  that  have  weakened  the  full  potential  of  the  mechanism.  Both  the  European 
Parliament in its Report from 201752 and the Member States, through the consultation launched 
by the Finnish Presidency of the Council in 201953, have noted the need to reconsider certain 
aspects of the mechanism. It is important therefore to use the experience gathered during the 
first  Multiannual  Evaluation  Programme  to  evaluate  how  the  Schengen  Evaluation  and 
Monitoring Mechanism could be conducted in a more efficient way, including from a resource 
point of view. 

One of the main  shortcomings is  the  excessive length  of the first phase of the evaluation 
process  (adoption  of  report  and  recommendations)  which  had  a  significant  impact  in 
addressing deficiencies swiftly and effectively. In 25% of cases, this phase took over a year, 
and in twelve cases, more than 18 months, taking particularly long when the evaluation team 
identified ‘serious deficiencies’ (a finding that, in principle, should lead to a faster follow-up). 
On average, the Commission needed around 10 months to adopt an evaluation report and the 
Council  needed  an  additional  two  months  and  a  half  to  adopt  recommendations,  which 
determine the starting date for countries to present an action plan to remedy the deficiencies. 

Member States’ contributions of experts have not always matched the needs. The number 
of available experts was occasionally insufficient to meet the needs of ongoing evaluations. In 
evaluations concerning data protection and visa policy, teams were sometimes made up of only 
4  or  5  experts  (the  optimal  number  is  8)  because  of  a  lack  of  nominations  by  countries. 
Furthermore, experts did not always have the required profile or sufficient experience in the 

52  
53  

Report on the annual report on the functioning of the Schengen area (2017/2256(INI)). 
Council doc. 13244/2019. 

14 

 
 
                                                           
relevant policy fields. There was also a notable geographical imbalance. Over the five years, a 
third of the experts were designated by only five countries. 

Unannounced visits did not prove as effective as originally conceived. At present, the annual 
evaluation programme for unannounced visits is set the year before visits are carried out, based 
on a risk analysis concluded one year before the visit takes place. This set-up did not allow for 
adapting quickly to new challenges. Furthermore, the call for designating experts two weeks 
prior  to  the  visit  and  the  obligation  to  give  24  hour  advance  notice  to  the  Member  State  in 
question, while facilitating a smooth organisation of the evaluation, weakened the purpose as 
such of the unannounced visits. 

The  follow-up  and  implementation  of  the  action  plans  was  generally  slow  and  the 
monitoring has not generally been comprehensive and consistent. Since 2015, about 201 
evaluations have been  carried out and, despite significant progress, about 25% of the action 
plans have been closed on average after 2.25 years. Generally, evaluations did not focus on the 
effective and consistent implementation of the key elements in each specific policy field of the 
Schengen  acquis  across  Member  States  that  are  crucial  for  ensuring  a  well-functioning 
Schengen area. Therefore, recommendations focused too much on very specific and numerous 
details rather than the core elements of the Schengen acquis and with no clear timeline indicated 
for  their  implementation.  Furthermore,  insufficient  use  has  been  made  of  thematic 
evaluations that would allow evaluating several or all Member States at once in a particular 
Schengen-relevant  aspect  and  identifying  trends  and  common  shortcomings  as  well  as  best 
practices.  In  addition,  current  SCH-EVAL  reporting  obligations  generate  a  significant 
administrative burden both on the Commission and on the Member States. The combination 
of  all  these  elements  did  not  allow  comprehensive  and  consistent  monitoring  of  the 
implementation of the action plans. 

The recommendations have  not  proved to  be a sufficiently effective  tool to  ensure  that 
Member States take rapid action. Generally, there has been little discussion in the Schengen 
Committee  on  the  evaluation  findings  and  the  related  recommendations  proposed  by  the 
Commission, partly due to the too detailed and specific nature of the evaluations. Ultimately, 
the fact that the recommendations are  adopted by the Council did not generate the expected 
peer-to-peer  pressure  to  ensure  a  high  standard  in  implementing  the  Schengen  acquis.  The 
system did not ensure otherwise proper political discussions on the state of Schengen in 
other relevant fora, and the involvement of the European Parliament was also not very regular. 

The assessment of the respect for fundamental rights in the implementation of the Schengen 
acquis was not sufficiently integrated in the evaluation mechanism. 

4.2.  Potential  operational  measures  for  improving  the  functioning  of  the  Schengen 

Evaluation and Monitoring Mechanism  

4.2.1.  Making evaluations faster, more targeted and strategic 

All  actors  must  devote  sufficient  financial  and  human  resources  and  adopt  the  appropriate 
measures  to  swiftly  accomplish  their  respective  tasks  during  the  evaluation  process. 
Simplification of internal workflows combined with benchmarks should help reduce the time 
it takes to carry out evaluations. 

The completion of the first Multiannual Evaluation Programme has given the Commission and 
the Council a good overview of the situation in all Member States. Without compromising the 
quality of the current procedure, evaluations could be made more relevant to needs based on 
the outcome of previous evaluations. As stressed  by  Member States,  room  for  improvement 
remains regarding the quality of reports and recommendations as well as regarding increased 

15 

 
 
coherence of evaluations across different policy fields. Deficiencies exist both across countries 
and within policy fields. The check-lists currently used to carry out evaluations could be revised 
to focus on the main elements that may affect the Schengen area as a whole. 

More  strategic  and  rational  use  of  available  analytical  tools  is  necessary.  Thematic 
evaluations could be used in a systematic way to assess the implementation of major legislative 
changes  as  they  enter  into  force.  It  is  also  essential  to  allow  the  swift  organisation  of 
unannounced visits when required. Improving synergies and cooperation with other actors 
and evaluation mechanisms is crucial. In particular, the role played by EU agencies (Frontex, 
eu-LISA, FRA, Europol), the European Data Protection Supervisor and national quality control 
mechanisms should be reinforced. This could be achieved with wider participation of agencies 
in the evaluations and by establishing a more regular and systematic exchange of information 
between  them  and  the  Commission.  It  is  particularly  important  to  increase  synergies  with 
Frontex vulnerability assessments and for the FRA and Europol to develop more targeted risk 
analyses that would help designing better evaluations. 

It  is  also  important  to  ensure  Member  States  designate  a  sufficient  number  of  qualified 
experts covering all policy fields. Consideration should be given to setting up a mechanism to 
better coordinate the nomination of experts for all Schengen evaluations. The Commission will 
update the existing training curricula and provide for trainings on visa policy. Regular refresher 
training could also be made available. 

Finally,  during  the  evaluation  and  follow-up,  the  respect  for  fundamental  rights  in  the 
implementation of the Schengen acquis needs particular attention. It is important to reflect on 
how to better integrate fundamental rights in the assessment. Update of current check-lists to 
better  incorporate  fundamental  rights  issues,  wider  participation  of  the  Fundamental  Rights 
Agency in the evaluations and broader use of its guidelines could be beneficial in this regard. 

4.2.2.  Making implementation of recommendations faster and more efficient 

Streamlining the recommendations would facilitate the development of effective action plans 
and their swift implementation. Schengen catalogues and handbooks in the relevant policy 
fields represent an important tool Member States should take into account when implementing 
the specific SCH-EVAL recommendations. They will need to be regularly updated and further 
improved. Best practices referred to in the evaluation reports should be shared among Member 
States and used in the implementation of the recommendations. Following the Court of Auditor 
recommendations54,  the  possibility  to  set  time-limits  for  the  implementation  of  the 
recommendations could be considered. 

Another important way to facilitate swift implementation of recommendations is the provision 
of the necessary financial support. Under the proposed Multiannual Financial Framework55 
and Border Management and Visa Instrument56, the link between the  evaluation mechanism 
and  defining  national  priorities  has  been  maintained.  The  reinforced  thematic  component 
proposed  opens  more  flexibility  in  responding  to  deficiencies  that  need  to  be  urgently 
addressed,  in  particular  priority  actions  for  immediate  implementation.  To  further  ease  re-
programming and scoping of possible additional funding needs, countries could systematically 
detail in the action plans their assessment of the financial impact of the remedial measures. 

54  

55  
56  

‘EU information systems supporting border control - a strong tool, but more focus needed on timely and 
complete data’, Special Report No 20/2019. 
COM(2018) 472. 
COM(2018) 473. 

16 

 
 
                                                           
Increasing  peer-to-peer  pressure  also  requires  that  the  identified  deficiencies  be  sufficiently 
communicated at the political level. The current Regulation provides for yearly reports by the 
Commission, which offer an opportunity to present the state of the Schengen area, disseminate 
best practices and increase political awareness by allowing discussion on common challenges 
at the political level. 

Effective and timely follow-up to remedy the deficiencies identified by the mechanism is key 
to  the  credibility  of  the  whole  evaluation  and  monitoring  process  and  for  it  to  reach  its  full 
potential.  This  is  crucial,  in  the  end,  to  ensure  the  well-functioning  of  the  Schengen  area. 
Practice has demonstrated that in some cases some Member States have persistently failed to 
implement the Council recommendations and address the deficiencies identified. In such cases, 
more systematic Commission monitoring, including through infringement procedures, will 
be considered. 

Potential operational  measures  to improve the Schengen  Evaluation and Monitoring 
Mechanism: 

Simplify internal workflows and set benchmarks to reduce the length; 

• 
•  Develop new trainings in the area of visa policy and reinforce the existing ones to 

promote and enhance participation; 

•  Update checklists to focus on the main elements that may affect the Schengen area 

as a whole;  

•  Make more strategic use of unannounced evaluations and thematic evaluations; 
• 

Improve synergies and cooperation with EU agencies and national quality control 
mechanisms; 
• 
Further simplify reports and refocus recommendations; 
•  Elaborate and up-date catalogues with best practices; and 
•  Adopt the annual report to facilitate political discussion. 

Finally, it has also became apparent  that for the mechanism to work fully  effectively  in the 
future  it  is  essential  to  complement  the  operational  improvements  with  legislative  changes 
needed to bring clarity and reinforce existing rules and procedures. These elements will be part 
of the  reflection  process that will  start  with the  first  Schengen  Forum  on 30  November  and 
result in the proposal for the revision of the mechanism that the Commission intends to present 
next year. 

5. 

CONCLUSION 

The development  of the  Schengen  area is one of the key  means that  has  enhanced  citizens’ 
freedoms  and  through  which  the  internal  market  prospers  and  develops.  Since  2015,  the 
Schengen area has been under pressure. Several terrorist attacks, the arrival of elevated numbers 
of irregular migrants at the EU’s external borders as a consequence of the 2015 refugee crisis 
and more recently the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic have led to the reintroduction of 
internal border controls some of which are still in place today. Since 2016, the Commission has 
consistently maintained that internal border controls would not solve present challenges, while 
entailing important economic, political and social costs for the EU and the individual Member 
States. 

The Schengen acquis includes a significant body of measures that compensate for the absence 
of  internal  border  controls  and  effectively  ensure  a  high  degree  of  security.  External  border 
management,  compensatory  measures  (such  as  efficient  cooperation  of  law  enforcement 
authorities,  effective  visa  and  return  policies  and  a  comprehensive  Schengen  Information 

17 

 
 
System), as well as a robust monitoring mechanism are the three essential pillars of Schengen. 
The stability of this complex architecture depends on the strength of each individual pillar and 
on their coherence and cohesion. 

The challenges faced since 2015 have put the spotlight on Member States’ fragile trust in the 
Schengen system and confirmed the importance  of  strong coordination  within the Schengen 
area and the need for strengthening its governance to address these challenges effectively. 

An efficient Schengen Evaluation and Monitoring Mechanism is instrumental to regaining trust 
and  to  guaranteeing  a  better  and  coherent  implementation  of  the  Schengen  acquis  and 
consequently a well-functioning Schengen area. The added-value and necessity of having an 
evaluation and  monitoring mechanism of  the Schengen acquis is recognised by the  Council 
which considered that ‘[w]hile fulfilling its core role of monitoring the proper application of 
the  Schengen  acquis,  the  evaluation  process  has  brought  further  benefits  in  most  Member 
States, including by strengthening national coordination, increasing expertise and exchanges 
via  the  experts  participating  in  the  evaluations, and  feeding  recommendations  into  national 
plans and strategies.’57 The European Parliament also stressed the ‘great value [of] the renewed 
Schengen evaluation mechanism as it promotes transparency, mutual trust and accountability 
between the Member States by scrutinising the way they implement the different fields of the 
Schengen acquis’.58 

The mechanism has already brought about tangible improvements. Based on the findings of the 
evaluations carried out in practice over the last five years by Commission and Member States’ 
experts, it can be concluded that serious deficiencies have been promptly addressed. Member 
States  are,  overall,  implementing  the  Schengen  acquis  adequately.  However,  there  are  still 
shortcomings in Member States and many divergent practices which ultimately could have an 
impact  on  the  integrity  and  functioning  of  the  Schengen  area.  Ensuring  a  higher  level  of 
harmonisation in the coming years will be key for the Schengen area to function properly. 

The Schengen Evaluation and Monitoring Mechanism will continue to have an important role 
in  that  regard.  Nevertheless,  the  experience  gathered  in  the  first  Multiannual  Evaluation 
Programme has revealed a number of shortcomings that prevent the mechanism from working 
as effectively as it could and should. In light of the importance of the Schengen Evaluation and 
Monitoring Mechanism in the architecture of Schengen governance, it is essential to take action 
to address the shortcomings identified above and enhance the effectiveness of the mechanism. 
Some shortcomings could be already addressed at operational level, some others will require 
also legislative changes. 

A more regular and structured political dialogue among the actors involved in the functioning 
of the Schengen area is also essential. The Commission has established the Schengen Forum to 
stimulate  more  concrete  cooperation  on  the  ways  to  make  a  stronger  and  more  resilient 
Schengen  area  through  increased  political  dialogue  on  the  responses  needed  to  current 
challenges.  Increasing  the  dissemination  of  information  on  evaluation  results  and  the 
implementation of recommendations would facilitate this political discussion. 

As stressed in the Joint Statement by the EU Home Affairs Ministers of 13 November 2020, a 
well-functioning  Schengen  area  requires  a  modern  and  efficient  management  of  its  external 
borders as well as solid compensatory measures to ensure a high level of security. It is therefore 
crucial  that  political  discussion  covers  comprehensively  all  elements  of  the  complex 
architecture supporting the proper functioning of the Schengen area. Deficiencies should not be 
looked at in isolation, but in their interplay with other areas covered by the Schengen Evaluation 

57  
58  

Council doc. 13244/2019, paragraph 1.7. 
Report on the annual report on the functioning of the Schengen area (2017/2256(INI)), paragraph 7. 

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and Monitoring Mechanism and their potential to damage the Schengen area as a whole. 

This report presents possible operational measures for addressing the shortcomings identified 
and underlines the need for equally assessing the legislative changes that are needed to make 
the evaluation mechanism fully fit for purpose. The discussions in the Schengen Forum on 30 
November 2020 should feed into a Schengen Strategy that the Commission intends to adopt in 
2021. The Strategy will also revisit the Schengen Evaluation Mechanism to ensure that it can 
achieve its full potential as a tool to evaluate the functioning of Schengen and to ensure that 
improvements are effectively implemented. 

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