COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE assessing the implementation of Directive 2013/30/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 June 2013 on the safety of offshore oil and gas operations and amending Directive 2004/35/EC
Date: 2020-11-16
Institutions: Directorate-General for Energy, European Commission
Subjects: application of EU law, environmental protection, extraction of oil, hydrocarbon, marine pollution, maritime safety, offshore drilling, offshore oil structure, oil pollution, petroleum exploration

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 16.11.2020  SWD(2020) 269 final/2  CORRIGENDUM: This document corrects document SWD(2020) 269 final of 16.11.2020 Concerns the correction of the title on the cover page. The text shall read as follows: COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT      Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE assessing the implementation of Directive 2013/30/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 June 2013 on the safety of offshore oil and gas operations and amending Directive 2004/35/EC {COM(2020) 732 final}  
 
 
Table of contents 

Executive Summary 

1 
2 
2.1
2.2

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................. 9 
BACKGROUND TO THE INTERVENTION ............................................................................. 11 
Description of the intervention and its objectives ......................................................................... 11 
Baseline and points of comparison ................................................................................................. 14 
  Problems related to industry evolution .................................................................................. 14 
2.2.1
  Problems related to company-specific corporate practice ............................................... 15 
2.2.2
  Problems related to the regulatory framework ................................................................ 16 
2.2.3
  Problems related to the state of risk-based planning ....................................................... 18 
2.2.4
  Problems  related  to  the  integration  of  public  and  industry  emergency  plans  and 
2.2.5

3 
3.1
3.2
4 
4.1

assets ..................................................................................................................................... 19 
  Problems related to clarity and comprehensiveness of liability provisions .................... 20 
2.2.6
  Baseline costs of a major accident ...................................................................................... 22 
2.2.7
METHOD......................................................................................................................................... 23 
Short description of methodology .................................................................................................. 23 
Limitations and robustness of findings .......................................................................................... 25 
STATE OF PLAY AND IMPLEMENTATION ........................................................................... 27 
The offshore oil and gas sector ....................................................................................................... 27 
  Offshore operations and the Green Deal ........................................................................... 27 
4.1.1
  Offshore Safety and COVID-19 ......................................................................................... 27 
4.1.2
  Oil prices, investments and offshore safety ....................................................................... 28 
4.1.3
  The European offshore sector ............................................................................................ 30 
4.1.4
  Incident rates and safety performance .............................................................................. 31 
4.1.5
Implementation of the Directive by Member States ..................................................................... 33 
ACHIEVEMENTS ASSESSED BY THEMES ............................................................................. 34 
  Overview on the themes analysed .................................................................................................. 34 
Applying risk management principles for control of major accidents ....................................... 35 
Public participation in release of new areas for licensing ............................................................ 37 
Assignment of the Competent Authority ....................................................................................... 38 
Functioning of scheme of independent verification for installations and wells.......................... 39 
Safety in operations conducted outside EU ................................................................................... 40 
Arrangements for worker involvement in major accident prevention ....................................... 42 
Transparency concerning reporting of incidents – the Implementing Regulation .................... 44 
Emergency preparedness and response arrangements of operators/ owners ............................ 45 
  Emergency preparedness and response arrangements of Member States ................................. 46 
  Availability of dissuasive penalties for breaches of duty ............................................................. 48 
  Recovery of costs of maintaining the competent authority .......................................................... 50 
  Special theme: Liability, compensation claims and financial security of offshore oil and gas 

4.2
5 
5.1
5.2
5.3
5.4
5.5
5.6
5.7
5.8
5.9
5.10
5.11
5.12
5.13

producers ......................................................................................................................................... 52 
  The framework .................................................................................................................... 52 
5.13.1
  Overview ......................................................................................................................... 52 
5.13.1.1
  Legal provisions of the Directive ................................................................................... 52 
5.13.1.2
  Commission report on liability, compensation and financial security ............................ 54 
5.13.2
  The European Parliament’s resolution on liability and compensation claims .......... 55 
5.13.2.1
5.13.3

  Diversity  of  rules  on  liability,  handling  of  compensation  claims,  and  financial 
security instruments in Member States’ jurisdictions ...................................................... 57 

1 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.13.4
5.13.5
5.13.6
5.13.7

  Implementation by Member States and the effectiveness of rules .................................. 58 
  The Oil Pollution Liability Agreement (OPOL) ............................................................... 60 
  Financial security ................................................................................................................ 62 
  Conclusions .......................................................................................................................... 63 

5.14

  Special theme: Criminal sanctions to breaches of duty to safeguard the environment from 

major accidents ................................................................................................................................ 64 

5.15

  Special  theme:  Post-decommissioning  responsibility  for  ensuring  permanent  sealing  of 

wells, and for determining extent of removal of fixed installations ............................................ 66 
  Overview............................................................................................................................... 66 
5.15.1
  Provisions of the Directive on the decommissioning of installations ............................... 67 
5.15.2
  The requirements for extent of removal of fixed production installations ..................... 69 
5.15.3
  The Offshore Safety Directive ....................................................................................... 69 
5.15.3.1
  Other EU law .................................................................................................................. 70 
5.15.3.2
  International policies ...................................................................................................... 71 
5.15.3.3
  Current practice of decommissioning ........................................................................... 74 
5.15.3.4
  The decommissioning of Brent platforms..................................................................... 75 
5.15.3.5
  Conclusions .......................................................................................................................... 77 
5.15.4
  The permanent sealing of wells .......................................................................................... 79 
5.15.5
  The Offshore Safety Directive ....................................................................................... 79 
5.15.5.1
  Technical challenges and available technologies.......................................................... 79 
5.15.5.2
  Conclusions ..................................................................................................................... 81 
5.15.5.3
  Biogenic methane seepage ................................................................................................... 81 
5.15.6
  Special theme: Mutual recognition of mobile drilling units (MODU) ........................................ 82 
ACHIEVEMENTS ASSESSED BY HORIZONTAL CRITERIA ............................................. 84 
  Overview............................................................................................................................... 84 
6.1.1
  Relevance .............................................................................................................................. 86 
6.1.2
  Coherence ............................................................................................................................. 86 
6.1.3
  Effectiveness ......................................................................................................................... 88 
6.1.4
  Efficiency .............................................................................................................................. 89 
6.1.5
  EU-Added Value .................................................................................................................. 90 
6.1.6
CONCLUSIONS.............................................................................................................................. 91 
Strengths and weaknesses ............................................................................................................... 91 
Areas to follow-up ........................................................................................................................... 92 
  Overall assessment .......................................................................................................................... 93 
ANNEXES TO THE STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT (SWD) ............................................... 95 
ANNEX I: ORGANISATION AND TIMING .............................................................................. 95 
Lead DG & DECIDE planning info ............................................................................................... 95 
  Organization and Timing ............................................................................................................... 95 
Evidence and Sources ...................................................................................................................... 96 
Discussions in the Commission's Inter Service Group ................................................................. 96 
ANNEX II: STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION ...................................................................... 97 
  Consultation scope and objectives ................................................................................................. 97 
  Mapping and participation of stakeholders .................................................................................. 97 
  Selection of consultation activities and their accessibility ............................................................ 98 
  Summary /overview on consultation activities by stakeholder groups and indicative timing .. 98 
  Consultation webpage & communication activities...................................................................... 99 
  Roadmap of the Evaluation ................................................................................................ 99 
  Questionnaire for public consultation ............................................................................... 99 

10.5.1
10.5.2

5.16
6 

7 
7.1
7.2
7.3
8 
9 
9.1
9.2
9.3
9.4
10 
10.1
10.2
10.3
10.4
10.5

2 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10.6

10.7
11 
12 
12.1
12.2

13 

13.1
13.2

13.3
13.4
13.5

13.6
14 

10.5.3

10.6.1
10.6.2
10.6.3
10.6.4
10.6.5
10.6.6

  Position Statements received from Stakeholders .............................................................. 99 
  Synopsis of Consultation Activities .............................................................................................. 100 
  February-March 2018: ...................................................................................................... 100 
  March 2018: ....................................................................................................................... 100 
  03 May 2018 to 31 May 2018: ........................................................................................... 101 
  19 September and 4-5 December 2018: ........................................................................... 101 
  19 September to 21 December 2018: public consultation............................................... 102 
  16 and 17 January 2019: ................................................................................................... 105 
  Stakeholder positions .................................................................................................................... 105 
ANNEX III: MEMBER STATES’ IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DIRECTIVE ................ 107 
ANNEX IV: METHODOLOGY FOR THE ASSESSMENT .................................................... 110 
  Consolidated list of 15 thematic indicators undergoing analysis .............................................. 110 
  Matrix for the detailed assessment .............................................................................................. 118 
  Structure of the assessment matrix .................................................................................. 119 

12.2.1
ANNEX  V:  OTHER  EU  LEGISLATION,  INTERNATIONAL  CONVENTIONS  AND 
PROTOCOLS RELEVANT TO OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS ACTIVITIES ........................ 242 
  Primary law ................................................................................................................................... 242 
  EU Directives ................................................................................................................................. 242 
  Mining and other fossil fuel extraction activities ............................................................ 242 
  Product safety .................................................................................................................... 243 
  Environmental policies ...................................................................................................... 243 
  Health and safety of workers at work .............................................................................. 247 
  Cyber security and external threats ................................................................................. 248 
  Whistle-blower protection ................................................................................................ 249 
  EU Regulations .............................................................................................................................. 249 
  EU Decisions .................................................................................................................................. 250 
International conventions ............................................................................................................. 251 
  Regional seas conventions ................................................................................................. 251 
13.5.1
  International  and  regional  acquis  pertinent  for  claims  for  damages  from  an 
13.5.2
offshore oil or gas incident ................................................................................................ 252 
  Others (e.g. resolutions, agreements etc.) .................................................................................... 254 
ANNEX  VI:  LIABILITY,  FINANCIAL  RESPONSIBILITY  AND  COMPENSATION 
CLAIMS ......................................................................................................................................... 256 

13.2.1
13.2.2
13.2.3
13.2.4
13.2.5
13.2.6

14.1

  Views  from  stakeholders  on  liability,  handling  of  compensation  claims  and  financial 

security ........................................................................................................................................... 256 
  Liability – views from the industry .................................................................................. 256 
14.1.1
  Handling of compensation claims – views from the industry ........................................ 256 
14.1.2
  Financial security – views from the industry .................................................................. 257 
14.1.3
  Views from non-governmental associations (NGOs) ...................................................... 258 
14.1.4
  Views from the insurance sector ...................................................................................... 259 
14.1.5
  Reference documents .................................................................................................................... 261 
ANNEX VII: STATISTICAL BACKGROUND INFORMATION .......................................... 262 
  Oil and gas industry’s activity 2010 – 2020 ................................................................................. 262 
  Accidents and incidents and international benchmarking ........................................................ 263 
  Total running costs of duty holders for implementation of the  Directive ............................... 266 
ANNEX  VIII:  VIEWS  FROM  STAKEHOLDERS  ON  LIABILITY,  HANDLING  OF 
COMPENSATION CLAIMS AND FINANCIAL SECURITY ................................................ 269 
  Liability - views from the industry............................................................................................... 269 
  Handling of compensation claims – views from the industry .................................................... 270 

14.2
15 
15.1
15.2
15.3
16 

16.1
16.2

3 

 
 
 
16.3
16.4
16.5

  Financial security – views from the industry .............................................................................. 271 
  Views from non-governmental associations (NGOs) .................................................................. 272 
  Views from the insurance sector .................................................................................................. 272 

4 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Executive Summary 

The Offshore Safety Directive, applicable for oil and gas operations, addresses control of risk 
of  major  offshore  accidents,  in  addition  to  response  and  recovery  mechanisms,  should 
preventive  measures  fail.  The  Directive  applies  to  all  Member  States  and  predominantly 
affects the 15 Member States who are active or planning offshore oil and gas operations. At 
the  date  of  drafting,  it  applies  to  the  UK  until  31  December  2020  when  transitional 
arrangements expire. The Directive draws on existing international best offshore practices for 
control of risk and improved emergency response. 

The  general  deadline  for  implementation  for  Member  States  was  19  July  2015,  and 
transitional  periods  for  the  industry  applied  until  19  July  2018.  One  year  after  the  latter 
deadline,  in  accordance  with  Article  40  of  the  Directive,  the  Commission  was  obliged  to 
assess the experience of implementing the Directive.  

According to  notifications from  Member States  of their national  transposition  measures, the 
Directive’s  measures  have  been  adequately  implemented.  Crucially,  industry  has  adopted 
clear  duties  for  management  of  risk,  with  each  offshore  installation  having  a  detailed  risk 
report.  Equally,  each  Member  State  has  appointed  an  expert  Competent  Authority  with 
comprehensive powers of oversight. EU annual reports on Union wide safety for offshore oil 
and gas operations have been published for the years 2016, 2017 and 2018. These reports in 
combination with other data enable a risk performance baseline to be developed, although it is 
early to identify trends. 

The  content  of  this  assessment  is  based  on  intensive  stakeholder  engagements,  including 
workshops and public consultation. These data collection methods generated a dense database 
of  primarily  qualitative  information  which  was  complemented  by  Commission  expertise. 
Based  on  Articles  and  Annexes  of  the  Directive,  and  interactions  with  stakeholders,  15 
priority themes were identified, which were analysed.  

The clearest indication of the Directive’s success is that the aims of the intervention are being 
met  through  the  Member  States’  transposition.  Moreover,  the  Directive’s  requirements  are 
being followed by industry and Member States, albeit with some differences in the detail of 
application.  Overall,  the  efforts  of  implementation  appear  in  line  with  the  Commission’s 
forecast.  Most  of  the  emerging  themes  may  be  handled  under  existing  communication 
protocols,  as  in  the  European  Offshore  Authorities  Group  (EUOAG),  whilst  a  few  justify 
further scrutiny.  

In  providing  feedback,  Member  States  and  industry  welcomed  the  introduction  of  the 
Directive.  The  views  of  environmental  non-governmental  organisations  (NGO’s)  are  more 
nuanced, and call for then further tightening of some measures. All stakeholders maintain that 
more time and monitoring is required before considering any changes.  

Additional  analysis  is  presented  on  the  topics  of  liability  and  the  handling  of  compensation 
claims,  the  appropriateness  of  criminal  sanctions,  the  removal  and  detoxification  of  fixed 

5 

 
 
production platforms, and the mutual recognition of mobile drilling units in Member States’ 
different jurisdictions. 

6 

 
 
Glossary 

ACSNI: Advisory Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations  
ALARP:  As  Low  As  Reasonably  Practicable  (principle)  -  Reduction  of  the  risk  of  a  major 
accident  to  the  point  where  the  cost  of  further  risk  reduction  would  be  grossly 
disproportionate to the benefits of such reduction. 
API: American Petroleum Institute 
CEN: European Committee for Standardisation 
CMAPP: Corporate Major Accident Prevention Policy - The corporate level policy by which 
owners,  licensees,  and  operators  responsible  for  offshore  oil  and  gas  operations  establish 
consistent, corporate-wide mechanisms for preventing major accidents (see Annex I  - part 8 
of the Directive). 
ECD: Environmental Crime Directive 
ECI: European Critical Infrastructures - Critical infrastructure located in EU Member States, 
the  disruption  or  destruction  of  which  would  have  a  significant  impact  on  at  least  two  EU 
Member States. 
EEA: European Economic Area 
EERP: External Emergency Response Plan 
EEZ: Exclusive Economic Zone - The offshore zone beyond the territorial waters prescribed 
by the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea which a state has special rights 
regarding the exploration and exploitation of marine, mineral and energy resources, including 
energy production from water and wind. 
EIA: Environmental Impact Assessment 
ELD: Environmental Liability Directive 
EMSA: European Maritime Safety Agency 
EU: European Union 
EUOAG: European Union Offshore Authorities Group 
GIRG: Global Incident Response Group (IOGP) 
HELCOM: Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission - Helsinki Commission - An 
intergovernmental organization and the governing body of the Convention on the Protection 
of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area (Helsinki Convention). HELCOM consists 
of ten members - the nine Baltic Sea countries: Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Russia and Sweden, plus the European Union. 
HPHT:  High  Pressure  High  Temperature  -  Term  referring  to  oil  or  gas  wells  which  exhibit 
characteristics of high temperature and high pressure.  
HSE: Health and Safety Executive (UK) 
IA: Impact Assessment 
IADC: International Association of Drilling Contractors 
IERP:  Internal  Emergency Response Plan  -  Plan at  the level  of the operator or owner of an 
offshore  oil  and  gas  installation,  regarding  their  response  to  emergencies  such  as  oil  spills, 
fire, explosion, vessel collision, or personnel evacuation. 
ILO: International Labour Organization 
IMO: International Maritime Organization 
IMP: Integrated Marine Policy 
IOGP: International Oil and Gas Produces Organization 
IUMI: International Union of Marine Insurance 
KPI: Key Performance Indicator - A measurable value that demonstrates how effectively an 
objective is achieved. 
MODU: Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit 
MS: Member State 

7 

 
 
 
NGO: Non-Governmental Organization 
NIS Directive: Directive 2016/1148/EU on Security of Network and Information Systems 
OPA: Oil Pollution Act 1990 (USA) 
OPEP: Oil Pollution Emergency Plan (Oil & Gas UK) 
OPOL: Offshore Pollution Liability Agreement 
OSD: Offshore Safety Directive (2013/30/EU) 
OSPAR: Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic 
REMPEC: Regional Marine Pollution Emergency Response Centre for the Mediterranean Sea 
RoMH: Report on Major Hazards 
SEA:  Strategic  Environmental  Assessment  -  Assessment  of  the  environmental  impact  of 
certain plans and programmes, in the context of Directive 2001/42/EC.  
SECE:  Safety  and  Environmental  Critical  Element  -  Element  of  an  offshore  oil  and  gas 
installation whose function is critical to safety and environmental protection. 
SEMS:  Safety  and  Environmental  Management  System  -  The  system  of  an  offshore 
installation for managing safety and environmental protection in the context of the Directive 
(see Annex I – part 8 of the Directive) 
SEMS:  Safety  and  Environmental  Management  System  -  The  system  of  an  offshore 
installation for managing safety and environmental protection (a list of its contents is provided 
in the Directive, Annex I – part 8) 
SLIC: Senior Labour Inspectors' Committee (UK) 
SWD: Staff Working Document 
TFEU: Treaty of Functioning of the European Union 
TU: Trade Union 
UK: United Kingdom 
UNCLOS: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
USA: United States of America 
WFD: Waste Framework Directive 

8 

 
 
 
 
 
 
1 

INTRODUCTION 

Between  1980  and  2010  there  were  at  least  eleven  major  accidents  in  offshore  petroleum 
activities which caused significant loss of life and pollution of the sea, as well as economic 
loss to the coastal states. The two most serious incidents occurred on production installations 
in European waters, in the North Sea1. In April 2010 a disaster in the US Gulf of Mexico at a 
drilling  operation  controlled  by  an  EU  based  company2  sparked  worldwide  concerns  as  to 
whether the risks of offshore drilling and production were being adequately managed.  

Subsequent assessments3 of the Gulf of Mexico disaster in the US and Europe concluded that 
the  industry  was  displaying  an  unacceptable  lack  of  operational  integrity,  and  that  major 
accidents  were  occurring  in  situations  that  were  avoidable.  Given  the  offshore  petroleum 
sectors’  high-level  of  maturity,  such  accidents  were  occurring  in  circumstances  that  should 
have been eliminated.  

Imbalances  and  fragmentation  characterised  the  EU  regulatory  systems  for  offshore 
petroleum. Whilst some Member States had offshore regulatory systems considered effective, 
all had room for improvement. No Member State was able to claim that it was making full use 
of best practices available in case of major accidents.  

The  intention  of  the  Offshore  Safety  Directive4  (hereafter,  the  ''Directive'')  was  to  address 
these  shortcomings.  The  Directive  required  all  Member  States  to  adjust  their  regulatory 

1 In 1980 in Norwegian waters a structural failure caused catastrophic collapse of the Alexander Kielland, a 
floating production installation, with the deaths of 123 personnel. In 1988 in UK waters, an oversight of risk 
assessment during maintenance caused a series of explosions of increasing severity leading to the total 
destruction of the Piper Alpha, a fixed production platform, with the deaths of 167 personnel. 
2 The MODU (mobile drilling unit) ‘Deepwater Horizon’ was owned by Transocean Inc the world’s largest 
drilling contractor, operated by BP and attended by the world’s largest and most technically reputable 
contractors such as Schlumberger and Halliburton. The water depth at the well location was 1522m and the well 
itself had drilled through the reservoir to 5486m. The well was extremely valuable and was being temporarily 
abandoned with cement plugs. Numerous changes to plans failed to be assessed systematically by operator BP 
and the owner, Transocean, failed to adequately supervise its abandonment operations. A surge of highly 
pressured reservoir gas overcame the unsuitable cement plug and other barriers, and blew through to the rig. The 
ensuing explosion killed eleven men working in the drilling area and the flow of ultra-high pressure gas 
destroyed the sea floor equipment allowing the well to flow petroleum fluids at 62k barrels/day (9.9kM3/day). 
The MODU sank two days after the explosions and subsequent fires. The well was capped and petroleum flow 
stemmed after 96 days. By this time 4.9m barrels (780kM3) had been spilled across 658k miles2 (180km2) the 
size of Oklahoma. Coastal pollution occurred across 1074 miles 1728km) of the US Gulf States. This was the 
most polluting incident in US history. 
3 For example: Report by the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore 
Drilling, January 2011, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-OILCOMMISSION/pdf/GPO-
OILCOMMISSION.pdf. 
4  Directive 2013/30/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 June 2013 on safety of offshore oil 
and gas operations and amending Directive 2004/35/EC, OJ L 178, 28.6.2013, p. 66–106. 

9 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
systems  to  a  more  robust  and  consistent  level,  deriving  higher  standards  and  greater 
homogeneity of regulation across the Union.  

The  Directive,  establishing  minimum  requirements  for  safety,  environmental  protection  and 
emergency response across the EU, entered into force on 19 July 2013. Member States had to 
transpose  the  Directive  into  national  rules  and  regulations  by  19  July  2015.  The  full 
implementation of the Directive acts upon all duty holders namely regulators, operators, and 
owners  of  production  and  non-production  installations  (e.g.  mobile  drilling  rigs,  mobile 
accommodation  units  and  well  intervention  vessels).  Industry  duty  holders  were  required  to 
fully comply with the Directive, as transposed by Member States, by 19 July 2018.   

The Commission was obliged to formally assess the implementation of the Directive pursuant 
to Article 4 which provides that: “No later than 19 July 2019, the Commission shall, taking 
due account of the efforts and experiences of competent authorities, assess the experience of 
implementing this Directive”. The overall framework of the assessment shall consider that the 
aims of the Directive are consistent with the objective of protection of any coastal state. 

This  assessment  addresses  the  aspects  of  EU  intervention  into  upstream  offshore  petroleum 
activities  foreseen  by  the  Directive.  These  activities  include  searching  for  potential 
underground  or  underwater  crude  oil  and  natural  gas  fields,  drilling  exploratory  wells,  and 
subsequently  drilling  and  operating  the  wells  that  recover  and  bring  the  crude  oil  or  raw 
natural  gas  to  the  surface.  Foremost  is  the  impact  on  risk  of  a  major  accident  occurring, 
including  to  the  environment.  The  assessment  also  includes  an  in-depth  analysis  on  special 
themes  as  for  example  decommissioning  of  installations,  the  mutual  recognition  between 
Member  States  of  certified  mobile  drilling  units,  liability  and  the  handling  of  compensation 
claims by relevant enterprises in the event of a major pollution incident.  

The  States in this assessment, for which we carry out an in-depth analysis, are the coastal EU 
Member  States  with  an  active  offshore  petroleum  sector,  or  a  policy  to  become  active  in 
coming  the  years  (“focal  Member  States”):  Bulgaria,  Croatia,  Cyprus,  Denmark,  France, 
Germany,  Greece,  Ireland,  Italy,  Malta,  Netherlands,  Poland,  Portugal,  Romania,  Spain  and 
the United Kingdom5. The data examined run from 19 July 2015 (deadline for transposition) 
until July 2019.  

Articles  23,  24,  and  25  of  the  Directive  concern  measures  for  EU-wide  reporting  systems, 
under  which  the  Commission  is  obliged  to  make  an  implementing  regulation  for  common 
reporting  parameters  of  accidents.  This  Implementing  Regulation  (1112/2014/EU)6      
provides reporting formats for Member States for annually publishing incident data and other 

5 Despite their legal obligation members of the EEA (Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway) did not implement the 
Directive. 
6 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1112/2014 of 13 October 2014 determining a common format 
for sharing of information on major hazard indicators by the operators and owners of offshore oil and gas 
installations and a common format for the publication of the information on major hazard indicators by the 
Member States, OJ L 302, 22.10.2014, p. 1–25. 

10 

 
 
                                                           
relevant  information.  The  assessment  of  the  Directive  also  includes  the  Implementing 
Regulation.  

Therefore, based on the experience with implementing the Directive, the assessment’s results 
will  provide  help  to  determine  whether  the  Directive  is  fully  adequate  and  whether  it  has 
achieved its objectives. For any identified shortcomings, the assessment will try to present the 
reasons  behind  them.  These  findings  may  contribute  to  possible  future  changes  to  the 
legislation.  

2 

BACKGROUND TO THE INTERVENTION 

2.1

Description of the intervention and its objectives 

Following an assessment  of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill  in the Gulf of Mexico in  2010, 
the  Commission  concluded  that  the  EU’s  own  offshore  drilling  conditions  left  the  Union 
vulnerable to similar incidents7. In response, the Commission launched a policy initiative in 
2011 for a regulation aimed at preventing major offshore petroleum accidents. This regulation 
was  intended  to  include  measures  for  more  stringent  licensing  arrangements  of  operators, 
improved  public  consultation,  clearer  environmental  liability,  and  more  effective  financial 
security provisions. 

Significantly, the form of the instrument was changed from a regulation to a directive during 
negotiations in the Council and “Directive 2013/30/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 12 June 2013 on safety of offshore oil and gas operations and amending Directive 
2004/35/EC” came into effect on 19 July 2013. In contrast to a regulation a directive leaves to 
the Member States discretion as to the form and methods they choose to reach the result of the 
Directive.8 

The  Directive  provides  measures  that  encompass  cumulative  best  global  practice  regarding 
the mitigation of major accidents in offshore drilling and oil and gas production. Furthermore, 
the Directive attempts to improve levels of homogeneity across the sector by applying equal 
standards and ensuring consistent implementation across geographical  areas. Every Member 
State  was  required  to  overhaul  its  regulatory  systems,  and  the  industry  was  required  to 
produce substantial improvements to its control of major accident hazards.  

Furthermore,  the  Directive  specifies  an  entire  regulatory  framework  for  an  intensive  and 
technically  challenging  system  for  the  prevention  of  major  accidents,  including  to  the 

7 Commission Staff Working Paper Impact Assessment, SEC/2011/1293 final, chapter 2.5 “Need of EU action”. 
8 Under the assumption that the regulation had followed the same structure as the Directive does, the advantages 
of a regulation are its speed of application, efficient implementation at the EU level and clarity and consistency 
through direct application. Given the need for EU action to establish a common minimum safety level in the 
precise activity field of offshore oil and gas, the principles laid down in a regulation would have been 
immediately applicable to all actors concerned. 

11 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
environment.  Since  North  Sea  Member  States  and  Italy  had  more  experience  with  offshore 
operations than others, the efforts necessary for adopting new systems and arrangements for 
both Member States and operators were unevenly distributed in the EU.  

The  Directive  was  introduced  to  remedy  the  inadequacy  of  EU  legislation  regarding  the 
prevention of major accidents through offshore petroleum operations in EU waters, including 
environmental concerns. Whereas the North Sea countries had overhauled their legislation in 
the period 1982 to1992, other Member States had relatively undeveloped regulatory systems, 
with the exception of Italy. 

The  Directive  requires  regulators  and  industry  stakeholders  with  duties  relating  to  the 
protection against accidents in offshore petroleum activities to undertake all suitable measures 
to: 

  Prevent  a  major  incident  from  occurring  during  adjacent  offshore  oil  and  gas  activities9 

(relating, in particular, to mechanisms to control major accident hazards); and 

  Provide  affected  coastal  states  with  measures  for  effective  response  to  and  remediation 

from a major emergency, should preventive systems fail. 

The  following  figure  summarizes  the  intervention  logic,  illustrating  how  the  Directive  was 
intended to work. 

9 The term ‘adjacent’ is taken at its widest sense of being within prospect of adverse impact. For example a 
blowout in N Australia in 2009 polluted 6,000km2 of the Timor Sea, extending to Indonesia’s coastal waters. 

12 

 
 
                                                           
 
Figure 1: Intervention logic of the Offshore Safety Directive 

13 

1. Despite availability of means, risks were not sufficiently lowered2. Response measures need improvement3. Liability provisions to be levelled upPreventing major accidents by implementing best practices for major accident prevention and mitigation on the level of the administration (Competent Authorities)Implement fully joined-up emergency preparedness and response in all EU offshore regionsImprove and clarify existing EU liability and compensation provisions(1) Duty to prevent major accidents by requiring formal risk assessment for each installation(2) Corporate policies/management systems to be deployed to ensure risk controls remain effective(3) Independent, expert regulators to operate in each Member State(4) Comprehensive verification of capability and experience to be undertaken at the licensing stage(5) EU-wide information sharing and transparency to be implemented(6) Cross-border intervention equipment to be available; and response assets to be more compatible(7) Establish a new duty to cooperate and share information (8) Scope of environment liability to be extended to the full extent of Member States  Exclusive Economic Zone (9) Financial capacity requirements to be adequate(10) Compensation regimes to be adequatePreventing major accidents by implementing global best  practices in the EU on the level of operators and owners of offshore installationsPrimary drivers of the problemObjectivesTools for measures of attainment of the objectives(key performance indicators) 
 
 
 
Whereas  the  Directive  has  a  unique  focus  on  the  safety  of  offshore  operations  and  the 
avoidance of major accidents a complex web of EU legislation, international conventions and 
protocols regulate and frame the area and the way how the offshore sector operates. Part IV of 
the Annex provides an overview on legislation and conventions applicable.  

2.2

Baseline and points of comparison 

The chapters below summarise the baseline situation, at the time of coming into effect of the 
Directive on 19 July 2013, and the main problems faced at that time. 

2.2.1

 Problems related to industry evolution 

The offshore oil and gas industry in the EU, and globally, had been facing significant changes 
in  its  operational  environment.  These  challenges  persist  and  are  driven  by  three  key  issues. 
Firstly,  ageing  infrastructures  related  to  many  of  the  industries  traditional  operations, 
secondly,  structural  shifts  towards  smaller  specialist  companies,  thirdly,  discoveries  of  new 
hydrocarbon reserves in complex environments.  

 

Ageing infrastructure and maturing industrial environment 

The  industry  was  and  continues  to  be,  increasingly  reliant  on  ageing  installations,  often  in 
service  well  beyond  their  original  design  lifetime.  One  reason  is  that  new  technology  has 
enabled mature installations to continue to access oil reserves that would otherwise have long 
been stranded. 

In the UK, more than half of the fixed platforms had exceeded the original design life of the 
field10. The situation is similar for Italy in the Mediterranean. The consequence of the passage 
of time on the integrity of structures and process equipment is that challenges accrue for the 
maintenance of reliability. The costs of these challenges were compounded by declining profit 
margins as production rates in these fields decline. 

 

Structural shift of the industry towards diversification 

Ageing  platforms  and  declining  reservoirs  often  led  their  primary  owners  to  divest  these 
assets into smaller, specialist oil companies who have low overheads and are in the business 
specifically  for  these  low  yielding  operations.  This  can  lead  to  a  loss  of  corporate  memory 
concerning the operation of the installation, thus posing a potential safety risk. 

This  was  prevalent  in  2011,  but  the  involvement  of  smaller  companies  is,  however,  not 
inherently undesirable as they generally operate with a shorter decision chain for expenditure 
(including safety-related). On the other hand, smaller companies often have limited in-house 
resources  (e.g.  for  well  design),  and  their  emergency  response  capabilities  are  usually  less 

10  Source: http://www.offshore-mag.com/index/article-display/9114015229/articles/offshore/eauipment- 
engineering/north-sea-northwest-europe/2010/08/hse-launches uk platform.html.  

14 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
than those of the larger, original operators who developed the installation. 

 

Shift to "frontier" operations and new technologies 

The scarcity of new discoveries of large, conventional reservoirs had, around the turn of the 
century,  directed  the  industry  to  explore  more  challenging  frontier  environments.  These 
include  high-temperature  and  high-pressure  (HPHT)  reservoirs,  and  reservoirs  in  hostile 
climatic conditions, in deep water, or in geographically remote locations. For example, in the 
North Sea the majority of operations had been at depths of 200 to 300 metres, whereas new 
projects in 2011 were operating as deep as 1,700 metres11. Similarly, in the Mediterranean and 
the Black Sea, there was a trend towards expanding offshore activities into more distant areas, 
partly in deep water. New players were coming into the eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea 
regions. 

2.2.2

  Problems related to company-specific corporate practice 

Besides the drivers that are common to the industry as a whole, level of risks in the offshore 
sector are impacted by the practices and behaviours of individual companies. Two main types 
of  drivers  are  distinguished  here:  one  type  related  to  the  level  of  use  of  best  available 
technology  and  practices,  the  other  reflecting  the  degree  of  compliance  with  the  regulatory 
framework.  The  latter  is  often  related  to  the  existence  of  a  strong  safety  culture  within  a 
company (or absence thereof). These factors are described in the three sections below. 

Inconsistent use of state of the art practices and technology 

 
Inconsistencies  amongst  offshore operators were  identified in  the degree to which operators 
and  owners  focused  on  major  accident  preventive  systems  and  systemic  corporate 
responsibility.  There  was  an  uneven  focus  on  individual  responsibility,  and  occupational 
safety compliance12. Despite progress in this area, greater divergence of practices were to be 
expected in  the absence  of a consistent template  for industry  and regulators. The reason for 
this was that a greater number of players were expected to engage in offshore exploration and 
production, bringing their own corporate approaches. 

  Failures of compliance with rules and standards 
Investigations  of  offshore  incidents  frequently  found  that  whilst  the  planned  measures  were 
indeed  appropriate  to  prevent  critical  events,  operators  did  not  maintain  or  follow  them. 
According  to  available  reports,  this  was  clearly  evident  in  the  Deepwater  Horizon  and 
Montara13  accidents.  Achieving  consistency  between  plans  and  actual  performance  is 
dependent  on  the  degree  of  compliance  with  the  national  regulatory  framework  and  the 

11 There are activities planned in the UK, west of Shetlands at sea depths of up to 1,600 metres, near the Faroe 
Islands at sea depths of 1,100 metres and in Norway at up to 1,700 metres. 
12 Occupational safety, and environmental protection measures are unwanted incidents occurring in day to day 
operations, and are accounted for in risk reduction measures. Examples are slips, trips and falls from heights; and 
accidental noxious emissions and polluting discharges to the sea. Major accidents are a special category of 
events and are entirely unacceptable. 
13 Further explanations see below. 

15 

 
 
                                                           
internal  operating  rules  and  procedures  within  a  company.  These  rules  and  procedures  are 
designed  to  comply  with  the  regulatory  requirements  and  often  go  further  than  is  legally 
necessary.  Nevertheless,  if  they  are  not  properly  adhered  to,  they  cannot  support  the 
prevention of incidents.   

Inadequate safety culture 

 
Within  an  organisation,  the  degree  of  compliance  with  external  and  internal  safety  rules  is 
directly related to the degree to which safety is prioritised as a standalone corporate value and 
an  integral  part  of  the  business  model.  This  is  often  characterised  as  a  strong  "safety 
culture"14. Gaps in safety culture significantly contributed to the Deepwater Horizon incident. 
Reports  by  Member  States  and  professional  bodies  active  in  offshore  operations  in  the  EU 
agreed  that  those  behaviours  were  having  global  impact,  including  in  other  European 
companies. Analysis showed that levels of enforcement in the strongest EU regimes had been 
broadly constant for the previous 10 years15.  

2.2.3

 Problems related to the regulatory framework 

The level  of safety  and  prevalence of  residual risks  in  the offshore sector is  determined not 
only  by  industry  practices  but  also  by  the  quality  of  the  regulatory  environment  and  the 
oversight  enforced  by  the  competent  public  authorities.  Several  aspects  of  the  existing  EU 
regulatory environment were deemed to adversely affect the industry's management of risk in 
offshore oil and gas operations. These are described in three sections below. 

  Uneven technical expertise amongst regulators 
Various Member States responded to the accident at the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig in the 
Gulf  of  Mexico,  which  happened  in  the  Macondo16  area  (Mississippi  Canyon  block  252, 
offshore Louisiana, Gulf of Mexico, USA) by evaluating national regulatory systems17. Their 
initiatives  showed  that  national  regulatory  practices  vary.  While  this  inconsistency  does  not 
necessarily  mean  that  the  regimes  were  per  se  ineffective,  the  variable  degree  to  which 
national  regulators  balanced the  attention  given to  major  hazards and to  occupational  safety 
factors in their assessments and inspections influenced the behaviour of industry accordingly. 

14 The UK HSE’s Advisory Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (ACSNI: HSC, 1993) produced a 
definition of safety culture that has been re-used extensively: ‘The safety culture of an organisation is the product 
of individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies, and patterns of behaviour that determine the 
commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, an organisation’s health and safety management. And: 
'Organisations with a positive safety culture are characterised by communications founded on mutual trust, by 
shared perceptions of the importance of safety and by confidence in the efficacy of preventive measures’ This is 
referred to in the USA Presidential Commission report Ch.8 pp 217. 
15 UK offshore enforcement statistics since 2001/02 (comprising the total number of prosecutions and statutory 
improvement or prohibition notices) are broadly steady over the past 10 years at 49/year. 
16 During the Macondo disaster, which happened in the Gulf of Mexico (US) in April 2020, 4.9 million barrels 
were spilled across 68k miles2 (176k km2) the size of Oklahoma. Coastal pollution occurred across 1,074 miles 
1,728km) of the US Gulf States. This was the most polluting incident in US history. 
17 E.g. of OSPAR countries five (UK, N, NL, DK and D) have evaluated their operations and all have identified 
improvement needs (source: Investigations of Drilling in Extreme Conditions and their Relevance to Potential 
Environmental Impacts - Preliminary report). 

16 

 
 
                                                           
National regulators play a role in verifying that operators correctly account for the safety and 
long  term  integrity  of  their  undertakings.  It  is  the  regulators  that  need  to  provide  adequate 
supervision and guidance to the industry in all relevant EU waters. To achieve this, regulators 
need  to  have  access  to  expertise  to  underpin  their  interventions  and  judgements.  This  was 
determined in 2011 to be problematic, especially in cases where Member States have only a 
handful of offshore installations. 

Suboptimal transparency and sharing of information 

 
Reports on industry performance are most authoritative when prepared by the regulator based 
upon  statutory  submissions  of  the  duty  holder.  Good  initiatives  existed  between  some 
Member  States  and  within  some  regions  for  information  and  experience  sharing  between 
regulators.  However,  there  were  clear  differences  in  the  extent  to  which  key  safety 
information  was  acquired  and  shared  across  EU  borders,  and  to  which  adequate  public 
assurance concerning the integrity of offshore activities was provided. At the time, there were 
no  EU-wide  mechanisms  for  sharing  intelligence  or  for  convening  regulatory  forums, 
including  relevant  adjacent  regions.  Gaps  existed  in  the  quality  of  data  in  terms  of  regional 
coverage  (no  EU-wide/global  data),  in  terms  of  comparability  (different  formats,  indicators 
etc.),  and  in  terms  of  lack  of  precision  (e.g.  data  from  some  industry  databases  were  fully 
anonymised  and  narrowly  focused).  These  shortcomings  were  conspicuous  in  contrast  to 
arrangements in other high risk industries such as aviation or the chemical industry. 

There was also a notable inconsistency in the way relevant information was made accessible 
to the public. Most national regulators make available information concerning breaches of law 
(prosecutions,  the  issue  of  enforcement  notices)  either  through  publishing  lists,  or  having 
registers  that  can  be  viewed  by  the  public.  Such  enforcement  reports  give  an  incomplete 
picture, however, and are not comparable between jurisdictions. At the time of preparing EU-
wide  legislation,  some  regulators  published  annual  reports  of  safety  performance  in  their 
offshore jurisdictions. In view of the EU as a whole, there was no common system to provide 
the  public  with  easily  accessible  and  comparable  information  on  the  offshore  activities  of 
companies and their regulators in all EU regions/ Member States. 

In  summary,  the  benefits  of  transparency  in  encouraging  key  learning  and  continuous 
improvement  across  the  EU  were  being  missed.  Complex  procedures  for  accessing 
information were hindering the development of new research and reducing inter-state pressure 
for the deployment of state of the art safety practices. 

  Fragmented regulatory framework 
International law covering offshore exploration and production is, much less comprehensive 
than  in  maritime  transport,  and  mainly  deals  with  rights  of  access  to  reserves  in  adjacent 
seas18. Therefore wide differences exist in how the sector is regulated around the world. For 
example, some European Member States and some other countries (Canada, Brazil, Australia 
and  New  Zealand)  had  adopted  a  goal  setting  regime,  whilst  other  influential  countries  had 

18 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1964. 

17 

 
 
                                                           
not19.  Some  countries  had  a  more  prescriptive  regulatory  regime  whilst  others  had  no 
discernible safety regulation. 

Discrepancies between different regulatory regimes lead to considerable variations in costs for 
the  industry.  For  example,  in  countries  that  rely  on  self-regulation,  industry  can  decide  to 
deploy  rigs  and  equipment  that  would  not  be  permitted  in  the  North  Sea.  Conversely,  high 
integrity  operators  and  MODU  owners  may  be  inclined  to  maintain  North  Sea  standards 
throughout  their operations, this  was  by no means  universal.  In such  circumstances, the  EU 
had an interest  in  adopting measures to  encourage a  global level  playing  field  with  suitable 
standards  of  performance.  One  clear  example  of  this  interest  is  that  Member  States  can  be 
directly  affected  by  incidents  in  adjacent,  non-EU  waters.  Achieving  a  consistent  EU 
approach to offshore safety and environmental protection would clearly be a great assistance 
for the EU to promote higher standards beyond the Union’s footprint. 

In addition,  no Member  State had developed a holistic, independent,  single offshore regime 
that encompassed major hazards to both humans and the environment, and that took account 
of  civil  and  economic  liabilities.  Whilst  the  risks  arising  from  oil  and  gas  activities  are 
broadly similar everywhere, the national institutions and arrangements in the EU-2820 varied 
considerably. 

2.2.4

 Problems related to the state of risk-based planning 

Whilst  preventing  major  incidents  should  remain  the  primary  focus,  the  risk  can  never  be 
entirely  removed,  and  therefore  provisions  need  to  be  present  to  ensure  a  suitable  and 
sufficient response in the event of a major incident. The factors that make escalation a higher 
risk  than  necessary  are:  inadequate  risk  assessment  in  emergency  plans,  lack  of  joined-up 
responsibility for response (failure to maximise the resources available), and incompatibility 
of physical assets and expertise for intervention in an incident. 

The contemporary regional arrangements for risk based maritime response planning across the 
EU  were  not  optimal,  vis-à-vis  ensuring  oil  and  gas  activity  is  properly  considered.  Both, 
regions such as the Mediterranean and the North Sea were developing a similar approaches. 
At  the  time,  there  were  EU-wide  coordination  schemes  and  EU-level  instruments  like  the 
Civil Protection Mechanism which played an important role in the coordination of emergency 
response,  and  provided  information  on  the  availability  of  public  resources  for  emergency 
response. 

The two underlying drivers for this issue are further highlighted below. 

19 Under this approach, operators are required to identify and assess the major risks case by case and 
demonstrate to the national authorities how these risks would be managed. In certain jurisdictions, 
the document used was called 'safety case' (which became the basis of the Directive’s Report on 
Major Hazards – RoMH). 
20 Croatia had not joined the EU-27 at the launch of the legal negotiations, but had done so at the coming into 
effect of the Directive. 

18 

 
 
                                                           
Inconsistencies in emergency planning between Member States 

 
The external emergency plans (those pertaining to a national emergency) also depend on the 
adequacy  of  the  initial  risk  assessment  by  the  operator.  Therefore,  the  same  concerns  must 
apply to preparedness for a national scale offshore incident as for a localised 'internal' incident 
in  some  regions.  In  addition,  a  national  scale  emergency  will  require  the  deployment  of 
national  assets, coordination by national  representatives, consideration to  adjoining Member 
States  and  others,  and  the  support  of  EU  marine  contingency  organisations  such  as  EMSA 
(European  Maritime  Safety  Agency).  Some  Member  States  were  cooperative  with  their 
neighbours  on  emergency  planning,  particularly  where  risk  based  regimes  facilitated  the 
development of site specific risk based scenario planning. 

It  was  shown  to  be  necessary  to  coordinate  the  essential  environmental  sensitivity  data 
relating to the state of the water column and the seabed so that the correct responses could be 
planned  if  an  emergency  arises.  At  the  time,  this  data  was  not  consistently  collected  and 
collated throughout the EU. 

  Cross-border incompatibility of response assets 
Industry  responded  with  resolve  to  the  Deepwater  Horizon  incident  by  actively  researching 
means  of  dispersing  major  spills  as  well  as  multi-functional  devices  for  capping  damaged 
wellheads.  This  was  commendable  and  encouraged  to  continue.  Nevertheless,  this  incident 
illustrated the scope of the response required to manage a disaster of this scale. Including not 
only the operating company and national civil contingency, but indeed the efforts of the entire 
industry and the combined resources of all adjoining countries.  

On  the  matter  of  compatibility  of  the  response  equipment  and  services,  only  the  immediate 
response  tools  need  be  available  at  the  site  of  the  accident,  or  in  close  proximity.  Other 
necessary equipment may be available at a distance, even if it is in a different continent. The 
identified need was for the rapid transportation of equipment that can be connected to locally 
available equipment and which may be handled using available lifting and transport systems. 
This applied also to human expertise. 

 Problems  related  to  the  integration  of  public  and  industry  emergency  plans 

2.2.5
and assets 

The  maritime  safety  and  response  arrangements  in  the  EU  provided  for  joined  up  planning 
and intervention in a maritime emergency, including for pollution incidents. Compared to this 
benchmark it became clear that the offshore oil and gas sector could attain a greater degree of 
joined up planning between Member States than was evident at the time, taking the EU as a 
whole. This is especially important given that the capacity of the offshore oil and gas sector to 
cause pollution is many times greater than any single shipping incident. Given the specialised 
nature  of  the  offshore  sector  as  a  sea  based  factory  environment  and  not  a  shipping  sector, 
maritime  standards  were  not  fully  adequate  and  therefore  the  risk  of  a  major  incident 
escalating further than necessary remained an issue. The specific drivers for this category are 
discussed below. 

19 

 
 
 
  Lack of information on industry emergency response inventories 
In order for the national emergency response plan to be effective, it was essential that the plan 
account for all emergency response assets and inventories that could be made available at the 
start of and during a major incident. As such, this would ensure the coordination of assets and 
inventories  required  for  the  incident  to  make  effective  and  efficient  use  of  all  available 
resources.  

Before  the  Macondo  incident,  there  were  indications  of  insufficient  coordination  of  assets 
between  industry  and  national  authorities,  often  resulting  in  ad  hoc  responses.  After  the 
Deepwater Horizon incident, the oil and gas industry reviewed and in certain cases extended 
and  increased  their  response  inventories.  National  authorities  dealing  with  emergency 
response  of  some  of  the  Member  States  (mainly  the  countries  around  the  North  Sea)  were 
involved  in  this  process,  which  rectified  the  coordination  deficits  to  some  extent.  However, 
this was seen to be insufficient to remedy similar issues around the Mediterranean and Black 
Seas. 

  Consistency in the quality of company emergency plans 
Analysis of the Deepwater Horizon incident revealed shortcomings in the preparedness of the 
companies involved, both in the initial response and in the race to cap the well and contain the 
spilled  oil.  The  report  of  the  US  Coastguard  was  instructive  that  in  spite  of  the  obvious 
potential scale of the pollution and the challenges of ensuring a good prospect of survival of 
the  personnel,  the  risk  assessments  and  response  plans  were  relatively  modest.  It  was  also 
found that major operators in the Gulf of Mexico were prone to copy-out similar emergency 
response plans rather than develop site specific plans based on proper risk assessments. 

It was noted that the situation in the EU was different from the US, particularly where a risk 
based or  goal setting  regime was deployed such  as the  North  Sea. Also,  the  EU had  a long 
tradition of maritime response against which the provisions for the offshore oil and gas sector 
could  be  tested.  However,  emergency  planning  can  only  be  as  good  as  the  risk  assessment 
undertaken  for  the  activity  as  a  whole.  The  first  responsibility  would  be  to  limit  the 
consequences of an incident once it has occurred to the area under the control of the operator 
(i.e.  the  immediate  vicinity  of  the  rig  or  platform  or  subsea  facility).  Because  such  'internal 
emergency  plans'  are  a  natural  derivative  of  an  effective  risk  assessment  of  the  entire 
undertaking,  and  because  only  some  Member  States  had  a  risk  based  offshore  regulatory 
regime, it followed that emergency planning was, in some regions, inadequate to ensure rapid 
and effective response. 

2.2.6

 Problems related to clarity and comprehensiveness of liability provisions 

The operator of the Macondo license, BP, estimated the final outcome costs of the incident at 
$  63bn.  Very  few  companies  could  then  or  now  accommodate  such  a  sum,  which  would 
therefore leave the host country exposed to unwarranted financial risk. The insurance market 
cannot  furnish  an  instrument  that  guarantees  unlimited  financial  indemnity.  In  order  to 
prevent  liability  transferring  to  the  citizens  of  Member  States  in  which  the  incident  occurs 

20 

 
 
some form of financial instrument would be required. In the UK the OPOL21 scheme is a risk 
pooling instrument amongst licensees, but as the limit is set at $250m the arrangement is not 
sufficient in the extreme situations such as Macondo. However OPOL had evaluated that the 
$250m  safety  net  was  sufficient  for  all  but  the  main  outlying  incidents  This  is  a  complex 
issue, and it is accompanied by the issue of how to make compensation available quickly to 
businesses and communities stricken by the effects of a major offshore incident such that they 
are  prevented  from  failing  (compensation  that  is  paid  too  late  to  a  community  that  is 
permanently  damaged  is  not  reasonable).  The  three  drivers  for  this  problem  are  discussed 
below. 

  Clarity and scope of EU legislation on environmental liability 
The  Environmental  Liability  Directive  (ELD22)  2004  was  not  applicable  beyond  territorial 
waters  (a  distance  of  20km/12miles  from  the  shores).  This  was  in  line  with  the  Waste 
Framework  Directive23  (WFD)  2000.  However,  the  Marine  Strategy  Framework  Directive24 
(MSFD)  2008  extended  protection  to  all  marine  waters  in  Member  States  jurisdiction.  This 
difference  created  an  ambiguity  in  delineating  which  regulation  was  applicable  in  a  given 
circumstance. For example, "water damage" only applied to inner and coastal waters, whereas 
current EU policy was to treat all EU waters as common good. Therefore this issue needed to 
be determined in the light of the review of offshore major incidents in the EU. 

The status  quo would have caused the consequences of a  marine  accident to  continue  to be 
limited to  the Member State, in  contradiction  to  the polluter pays principle. Also, during an 
extreme  emergency  the  prevailing  framework  did  not  make  it  clear  whether  Member  States 
could  enforce  compensation  from  the  polluter  for  the  deployment  of  national  contingency 
assets. 

  Lack of financial capacity guarantees 
It  was  evident  that  not  all  Member  States’  licensing  authorities  fully  accounted  for  the 
capacity  of  applicants,  who  may  be  consortia,  or  joint  ventures,  to  deal  with  the  financial 
challenges  of  responding  to  a  major  incident.  This  was  a  missed  opportunity  to  provide 
assurance  of  capacity  and  to  reinforce  to  operators  that  their  responsibility  for  the  adverse 
consequences of offshore activity is without limitation. 

Inadequate compensation schemes for traditional damages 

 
Even  when  the  financial  capacity  of  an  applicant  has  been  established  by  the  licensing 
authority, there is no assurance that sufficient funds would be made available in time to settle 
third  party  claims.  The  funds  made  available  in  the  event  of  a  major  incident  would  most 

21 http://www.opol.org.uk/downloads/OPOL%20Agreement%20-%2021%20June%202017.pdf.  
22 Directive 2004/35/CE of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on environmental 
liability with regard to the prevention and remedying of environmental damage, OJ L 143, 30.4.2004, p. 56–75. 
23 Directive 2008/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on waste and 
repealing certain Directives (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 312, 22.11.2008, p. 3–30. 
24 Directive 2008/56/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 establishing a 
framework for community action in the field of marine environmental policy (Marine Strategy Framework 
Directive), OJ L 164, 25.6.2008, p. 19–40. 

21 

 
 
                                                           
likely be initially required for this incident itself (e.g. capping and containing the flow from a 
well).  Without  clear  and  unambiguous  provisions  to  swiftly  settle  third  party  claims,  local 
business and communities would suffer unduly the consequences of a major incident entirely 
without control or responsibility.  

2.2.7

 Baseline costs of a major accident 

Injuries or deaths; 

The cost of accidents in the offshore oil and gas industry is related to the extent of undesired 
consequences of these accidents, namely: 
 
  Damage to equipment and facilities; 
  Environmental pollution; 
  Fines due to non-compliance; 
  Lost work time and lost revenues due to installation down time. 

Indirect impacts of accidents include: 
  Legal costs and lawsuits; 
  Effects on oil prices; 
  Damage to offshore industry reputation; 
  Effects on security of energy supply. 

The quantification of all direct and indirect impacts of accidents is a complex undertaking due 
to  the  scarcity  of  comparable  data.  For  this  reason,  the  Commission’s  Impact  Assessment25 
covered only the two largest directly quantifiable categories of cost: infrastructure losses, and 
costs  associated  with  the  clean-up  of  oil  spills.  In  this  respect  the  results  were  considered 
conservative.  

The  annual  cost  of  offshore  accidents  was  estimated  by  the  cost  of  the  damages  caused  by 
such accidents, annualized over their recurrence time. The calculations of recurrence time, or 
of  the  frequency  with  which  these  accidents  occur,  were  performed  based  on  publicly 
available historical data26, with adjustments for trends. A detailed and complete account of the 
calculations can be found in Annex I of the Impact Assessment.  

Two main categories of accidents were identified: 

a)  oil well blowouts; and  
b)  other  major  accidents  (e.g.  releases,  fires  and  explosions,  with  multiple  injuries  or 
fatalities,  total  loss  or  severe  damage  to  offshore  units  and/or  environmental 
pollution). 

25 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52011SC1293&from=EN.  
26 Sources: “Risk Assessment Data Directory – Major Accidents”, Report No. 434-17, March 2010, 
International Association of Oil and Gas Producers; “Risk Assessment Data Directory – Blowout Frequencies”, 
Report No. 434-2, March 2010, International Association of Oil and Gas Producers; “Blowout and Well Release 
Frequencies – Based on SINTEF Offshore Blowout Database, 2005”, 26/06/2006, Scandpower.  

22 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
The cost of an oil well blowout depends on the duration and flow rate of the blowout, i.e. on 
the amount of oil spilt into the sea. The main cost component here is the clean-up of the oil 
spill.  The average per-tonne cost  varied  among different  countries, ranging from Euro 2500 
for UK to Euro 18500 for Norway. This brought the estimated average clean-up cost for an oil 
well blowout lasting for ca. 50 days to Euro 5 billion. This figure was the lower bound of the 
blowout cost, with upper bound being the cost of the accident, which was taken at the time to 
be Euro 30 billion. Therefore, taking note of Macondo accident, the blowout cost  from one 
accident was estimated to be in the range Euro 5-30 billion.  

The calculation of the recurrence period of an oil well blowout was based on historical data, 
which indicated a probability of 0.65 per year for a blowout of any type and duration to occur 
in  European waters. Annualizing the blowout  cost  (Euro 5-30 billion) over the period of 35 
years (dividing them by 35), gives an annual oil well blowout cost in the range of Euro 140-
850 million. Added to this was the annual figure of Euro 65 million in property losses of less 
costly, but more common, major accidents. 

The cost of other major offshore accidents, smaller but more common, reflect mainly loss in 
property. Taking into consideration case histories which indicated a range in costs from tens 
of millions to over Euro 1 billion, it was estimated at an average of Euro 50 million. Historical 
data  from  major  accidents  occurring  in  the  North  Sea  in  the  years  1970-2007  indicated  an 
aggregated  rate  of  2.6  major  accidents  per  year,  with  a  declining  trend  for  the  years 
immediately preceding 2011. Adjusting for this trend, the rate became 1.3 major accidents per 
year.  This  brought  the  annualized  cost  of  major  offshore  accidents  to  Euro  65  million. 
Therefore the total annual direct tangible cost of offshore accidents in Europe was estimated 
at  Euro  205-915  million.  This  was  the  baseline  that  the  implementation  measures  of  the 
Directive were intended to deal with. 

3 

METHOD 

3.1

Short description of methodology 

The baseline scenario described demonstrates  potential  safety concerns and shortcomings in 
the  period  before  the  Directive  came  into  force;  new  legislation  was  supposed  to  address 
them.  With  reference  to  the  experience  of  implementing  the  Directive  and  specifically  with 
regard  to  establishing  adequate  levels  of  safety  for  offshore  oil  and  gas  operations,  and 
environmental protection, by this assessment the Commission has verified whether: 

  The main objectives of the Directive have been achieved and if not, whether the problem 

is one of implementation of the rules or with the rules themselves;   

  Any gaps in legislation exist that have an impact on the level of safety in offshore oil and 

gas operations;    

  Certain  provisions  of  the  Directive  impose  undue  burden  on  Member  States  or  the 

industry;   

23 

 
 
 
 
  The  Directive  has  adequately  harmonised  the  regulatory  structure  and  level  of  safety 
across  the  EU  offshore  operations,  proportionate  to  the  activity  levels  of  the  Member 
States;  

  The  Directive  is  effective,  efficient,  coherent,  relevant,  and  provides  added  value  at  EU 

level. 

The Commission has carried out its’ analysis by using a broad range of information channels. 
To deal with the experiences of the Directive, both experts and the wider public were asked to 
contribute to the knowledge base. With regard to the expert input, the Commission focussed 
on the EUOAG27. Although the UK has left the European Union on 31 January 2020 the UK’s 
experiences  and  contributions  to  the  knowledge  used  for  the  assessment  are  taken  into 
account.  

In a first step, the Commission consulted competent authorities in order to obtain feedback on 
their  technical  and  regulatory  experience  of  implementing  the  Directive.  Secondly,  the 
Commission  consulted  stakeholders  represented  in  the  EUOAG’s  plenary  meetings,  which 
included  industrial  associations,  unions,  and  NGOs.  These  meetings  facilitated  fact  finding 
and thematic discussions on liability, handling of compensation claims, the financial security 
of operators and owners of installations, as well as a further  stakeholder event,  and several 
workshops.  Data  gathering  from  these  diverse  sources  incorporated  input  from  parties 
involved  in  the  practical  implementation  of  the  Directive,  and  the  handling  of  rules  and 
legislation on offshore safety. Details on data collection and consultations are included in the 
annex (part I and II). 

To complete the knowledge base, the Commission carried out a broad public consultation28, 
based  on  a  comprehensive  questionnaire  targeting  both  the  Directive  and  the  Implementing 
Regulation on the reporting of accidents. All interested parties, e.g. private, business, public 
entities, were asked to provide views and comments.  

Within  the  Commission,  the  relevant  services  contributed  to  the  assessment  actively  in  the 
framework of an Inter-Service-Group and a bilateral dialogue with the Directorate-General for 
Energy.  

Both Member States and industrial associations have shared their views on the assessment of 
the  Directive  with  the  Commission,  and  NGOs  actively  contributed  to  the  discussions.  The 
assessment  has  taken  this  information  into  account  in  the  context  and  comparison  with  the 
Directive’s  objectives,  as  established  in  the  Impact  Assessment  from  2011  preceding  the 
adoption  of  the  Directive.  Furthermore,  for  the  years  2016,  2017  and  2018  quantitative 
information on the safety performance of the EU offshore sector as a whole or in individual 

27 Its members are designated by Article 4(1) of the Commission Decision of 2012 concerning the functioning of 
the EUOAG as the responsible authorities (competent authorities) for the regulatory oversight of offshore oil and 
gas activities and related policy issues. 
28 https://ec.europa.eu/info/consultations/public-consultation-on-the-assessment-of-the-offshore-safety-
directive_en. 

24 

 
 
                                                           
Member States is available, in the form of Commission annual reports29. This information in 
combination allowed for conclusions to be drawn on the assessment criteria of effectiveness, 
efficiency, coherency, relevance and value-added. 

Through  this  methodology  the  Commission  attempted  to  incorporate  the  perspectives  of  a 
representative  range  of  stakeholders.  Firstly,  the  assessment  considers  the  experience  of 
Member States with the implementation of this Directive. Secondly, through the stakeholder 
consultation, the experiences of competent authorities enforcing the Directive’s provisions are 
accounted for, in addition to owners and operators of offshore oil installations working within 
the  national  legal  frameworks.  Thirdly,  the  methodology  also  collected  and  analysed  the 
views of parties not directly involved in these activities, for example citizens and NGOs.  

3.2

Limitations and robustness of findings  

Member States were obliged to implement the Directive by 19 July 2015. However, additional 
transitional  periods  for  applying  laws,  regulations  and  administrative  provisions  in  Member 
States, following the implementation of the Directive, ended only on 19 July 2018. Therefore, 
so far the Directive had a full impact on the safety of offshore oil and gas operations only for 
a relatively short period of time.  

Although the Directive requires implementation by Norway – the Directive is EEA relevant - 
Norway  did  not  take  steps  to  comply  with  this  legal  obligation.  The  Commission  could  not 
persuade Norway to change its negative stance; accordingly the EEA committee may work on 
a solution to settle this dispute. 

As a former Member State, after Norway the UK is the most important producer of offshore 
oil and gas. It contributed constructively to the design and drafting of the Directive, which it 
implemented in a very satisfactory manner. Since the assessment and implementation report 
shall analyse the experiences with the Directive and shall cover the years from the adoption of 
the Directive until recent days, and the UK has been a Member State during this period, it was 
included in the assessment. Depending from the final Treaty between the UK and the EU, it is 
unclear whether the UK may apply at least some parts of the Directive’s provisions.  

Despite the loss of more than 70 % of the EU’s indigenous offshore oil and gas production 
due  to  the  departing  UK,  the  Directive  remains  of  outmost  importance  for  the  safety  of 
installations in the North Sear, the Baltic Sea, the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. 

29 (i) REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION Annual Report on the Safety of Offshore Oil and Gas Operations in 
the European Union for the Year 2016, COM/2018/595 final. 

(ii) REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION Annual Report on the Safety of Offshore Oil and Gas Operations in 
the European Union for the Year 2017, COM/2019/358 final 

25 

 
 
 
                                                           
 
 
 
Due  to  consultations  with  stakeholders  concerned,  the  assessment  is  rich  in  qualitative 
information.  This 
includes:  anecdotal  evidence,  commentary  supporting 
assessment of the themes, assisting determination of the efficiency, effectiveness, coherence, 
relevance,  and  EU-added  value  in  implementing  the  Directive  in  the  context  of  the  original 
design intent.  

information 

The  analysis  incorporates  data  to  establish  a  North  Sea  performance  benchmark,  based 
primarily on trend data published by the UK. From international data Europe can be placed as 
a regional performer, but doubts persist as to the completeness of international reporting on a 
voluntary basis. 

The Commission established three reports, for the years 2016, 2017 and 2018, on the safety 
performance  of  the  EU  offshore  sector,  based  on  reporting  templates  of  the  Implementing 
Regulation.  Taking  also  note  of  data  from  the  global  operators’  association  (IOGP)  and  the 
UK the assessment attempts to establish trend data. 

Regarding  the  financial  cost  of  implementation,  it  does  not  appear  that  there  has  been  a 
calculation by operators or regulators of one-off costs of implementation and uplift of running 
costs against which we may compare the estimate in the Commission’s Impact Assessment. 
North Sea Operators and some regulators have claimed, anecdotally, that start-up costs have 
been excessive, but the organisations concerned have not investigated the data to support their 
claims. 

There  is  some  data  from  south-east  Member  States  that  have  introduced  the  regime  as 
virtually  a  starting  point  for  regulation  in  this  area,  providing  no  insight  into  uplift  of  prior 
running  costs,  nor  one-off  costs.  Furthermore,  data  is  provided  by  34  of  the  37  North  Sea 
MODU fleet from which introductory costs can be identified. These are relatively modest, in 
line  with  expectation  that  the  change  in  operational  requirements  are  themselves  relatively 
modest in the North Sea region. 

At this stage there is insufficient data to differentiate incident performance between Member 
States,  and  to  compare  with  the  baseline.  In  the  coming  years  new  data  will  allow  for  the 
establishment of trends in EU offshore safety and to compare them with the situation before 
application of the Directive. 

Currently however, it is not possible to estimate the risk of a major polluting blowout in EU 
waters  following  the  application  of  the  Directive,  nor  to  compare  it  with  the  baseline 
calculation in the Commission’s 2011 impact assessment. 

Not all initial suggestions and proposals required a follow-up. For example, it appeared that 
cyber  security  at  offshore  installations  do  not  require  more  specific  measures  than  other 
industrial sectors, and that horizontal legislations provides the necessary legal frame. 

26 

 
 
 
4 

STATE OF PLAY AND IMPLEMENTATION 

4.1

The offshore oil and gas sector 

4.1.1

 Offshore operations and the Green Deal 

the  European  Commission  published 

End  of  2019, 
the  “European  Green  Deal” 
Communication30,  with  the  objective  to  reset  the  Commission’s  commitment  to  tackling 
climate and environmental-related challenges that is this generation’s defining task …”.It is a 
new growth strategy that aims to transform the EU into a fair and prosperous society, with a 
modern,  resource-efficient  and  competitive  economy  where  there  are  no  net  emissions  of 
greenhouse gases in the year 2050; economic growth shall decouple from the use of resources. 
It also aims to protect, conserve and enhance the EU's natural capital, and protect the health 
and well-being of citizens from environment-related risks and impacts”. The European Green 
Deal  also  introduces the “green oath  to  do no harm” principle.   As part of this strategy, the 
European  Commission  intends  to  assess  EU  legislation  –  that  includes  the  Offshore  Safety 
Directive - to bring it in line with the objectives of the Green Deal. .  

The  offshore  hydrocarbons  industry  has,  by  virtue  of  the  Green  Deal,  a  clear  instruction  to 
further improve its environmental performance within the EU. Operators and Member States 
alike  are  now  expected  to  suggest  and  implement  more  ambitious  means  of  reducing  their 
environmental  footprint.  These  may  include  large-scale  approaches  ranging  from  examples 
such  as  carbon  capture  and  storage  (CCS),  to  facility-specific  measures  like  increasingly 
stringent targets for offshore flaring, as well as other more novel solutions. 

The  Offshore  Safety  Directive  is  concerned  with  the  prevention  and  management  of  major 
accidents, which – if they occur – are typically comprised of both safety and environmental 
aspects.  For  example,  an  accident  that  results  in  injuries  or  fatalities  to  offshore  personnel 
may  also  be  responsible  for  a  release  or  spill  of  hydrocarbons  into  the  environment.    The 
Directive is a tool for nudging operators and Member States, also via industry and EU fora, 
towards more sustainable environmental practices.  

As  the  transition  to  a  low  carbon  economy  occurs,  personnel  safety  will  continue  to  be  a 
priority for society and there is hence little doubt of the continuing relevance of the Offshore 
Safety  Directive  for  Member  States  with  an  upstream  hydrocarbons  industry.  In  an  era  in 
which  operators  strive  to  make  the  most  of  ageing  assets  this  must  certainly  be  the  case. 
However, regardless of the level of activity occurring within the sector at any given moment, 
a  comprehensive,  risk-based  and  functional  Directive  is  considered  a  minimum  requirement 
for ongoing high EU safety performance.   

4.1.2

 Offshore Safety and COVID-19 

The COVID-19 viral pandemic of 2019-2020 brought about unprecedented global change in 
terms  of  societal  adaptation  to  new  health  and  safety  issues,  cross-border  and  domestic 
mobility  restrictions,  and  social  and  cultural  norms.  While  the  long-term  effects  of  this 
pandemic are still being evaluated throughout the EU and elsewhere, and although the scale of 

30 https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/european-green-deal-communication_en.pdf 

27 

 
 
 
                                                           
economic  impact  is  yet  to  be  fully  realized,  a  number  of  immediate  repercussions  within 
specific sectors are clear, including in the offshore hydrocarbons industry.  

One  important  impact  of  the  crisis  on  the  industry  was  that  the  price  of  crude  oil  fell 
significantly  in  a  short  time,  taking  billions  off  the  stock  prices  of  major  oil  and  gas 
companies.  This  left  many  offshore  projects  in  doubt  due  to  their  vulnerability  in  what  is 
typically  a  higher  operating  cost  environment.  For  existing  facilities  this  meant  trying  to 
achieve  required  output  without  adding  new  infrastructure,  while  for  planned  projects 
cancellation or suspension were preferred, pending market stabilization. 

In the early days of the pandemic, understanding the spread of COVID-19 was challenging, 
leading  to  varied  approaches  by  individual  Member  States  and  industry  to  limit  its  spread 
within  their  own  contexts.  For  the  offshore  industry,  an  immediate  concern  was  preventing 
infections  in  a  workforce  with  personnel  commuting  from  a  wide  geography.  This  brought 
with it several implications, not least of which was ensuring personnel could be tested for the 
virus and their health status tracked.  

As offshore facilities have limited space and hence potential for higher infection risk, interim 
strategies  were  adopted  to  try  to  reduce  this  risk.  One  example  was  “minimum  manning” 
whereby  Operators  limit  the  number  of  personnel  offshore  by  temporarily  deferring  non-
essential tasks. On some facilities, workers were also requested to remain offshore for longer 
shifts, to limit the risk of infection brought about by the arrival of any new personnel. Such 
strategies could be considered a stopgap rather than a long-term sustainable strategy.  

In the event of a drawn-out crisis, Member State Competent Authorities have an increasingly 
important  role  in  ensuring  that  offshore  strategies  adopted  by  operators  do  not  compromise 
safety.  Although  the  Offshore  Safety  Directive  was  not  developed  with  a pandemic  such  as 
COVID-19  as  context,  it  is  nevertheless  considered  fit-for-purpose  in  this  situation.  It 
provides  meaningful  steer  on  how  Competent  Authorities  may  adapt  to  ever-changing 
including  a  focus  on  risk  management  approaches,  key  roles  and 
circumstances, 
responsibilities and reporting requirements.  

It  is  to  consider  whether  the  Directive  in  light  of  COVID-19  is  warranted  to  strengthen  its 
remit, or for considering renewed policies relating to different ways of working offshore and 
throughout industry.  With regard to national rules and legislation that are implementing the 
Directive, Member States may identify potential amendments extenuating circumstances as a 
viral pandemic. 

4.1.3

 Oil prices, investments and offshore safety 

The first quarter of 2020 began with a gradual fall in the world crude oil price following the 
outbreak  of  the  COVID-19  virus  in  China.  The  global  market  viewed  the  virus  as  likely  to 
affect  oil  demand,  and  the  Organization  of  Petroleum  Exporting  Countries  (OPEC) 
subsequently  met  to  negotiate  supply  cuts.  Due  to  the  unstable  nature  of  these  negotiations 
against the backdrop of an ongoing pandemic, dramatic price falls ensued leaving parts of the 
hydrocarbons industry facing unsustainable operating costs.  

Fluctuations in oil prices are not uncommon, the most recent substantial falls having occurred 
in  2014, also  because of market  oversupply. The effect  on the offshore industry  at  the time 

28 

 
 
was  similar,  with  many  unviable  projects  cancelled  or  suspended,  and  major  cost-cutting 
exercises implemented amid significant industry consolidation. The lessons from this period 
are  perhaps  useful  in  the  current  crisis,  particularly  with  respect  to  the  challenges  faced  by 
operators of reducing operating costs without compromising safety.  

In  order  to  ensure  high  safety  performance,  close  links  between  company  safety  strategies, 
their implementation,  critical  spending decisions and appropriate performance indicators are 
required.  Previous  surveys  conducted  within  the  offshore  industry  indicate  that  many  feel 
industry cost reductions have an inevitable impact on safety performance. However, it is also 
true  that  major  operators  tend  to  set  high  standards  for  safety  and  have  active  programs  in 
place to embed the values of their Safety Management Systems within workforce culture.  

Going forward, the mandate for applying the Directive as implemented by Member States is 
as  strong  as  ever,  particularly  when  the  global  industry  is  in  a  state  of  flux.  The  Directive 
stands  as  a  benchmark  for  rules  and  legislation  in  Member  States,  which  ultimately  push 
companies towards better safety and environmental performance. Equally clear is the remit of 
the  EU  and  competent  authorities  working  closely  with  operators  to  provide  them  with  the 
best advice and to facilitate continuous improvement in all of their offshore activities. 

Looking back to recent years and summarising the prospects and ambitions of the petroleum 
sector  in  European  waters,  there  was  a  sharp  decline  in  exploration  activity  and  capital 
expenditure  for  the  development  of  production  throughout  the  period  of  implementing  the 
Directive (2014-2018). This change was caused by a fall in crude oil prices from $110 down 
to $30 per barrel. Since 2016 but only until February 2020 when oversupply and the impact of 
the corona virus hit the oil markets, a ‘new normal’ price has stabilised at ca. $65 per barrel. 
The sharp decline of oil prices in the first and second quarter of 2020 threatens the business 
model of EU offshore oil and gas production and may lead to the closure of production sites 
due to the operation’s lack of profitability.  

Looking  forwards  from  2019  and  2020  there  appears  to  be  a  confidence  in  (i)    the  critical 
mass of expertise in the region, (ii) the proximity of the consumer  base for natural  gas, and 
(iii) new petroleum basin prospects. Due to the vast consequences of the spread of the corona 
virus, the expectation is therefore negative for growth, particularly in the North Sea and North 
East  Atlantic,  but  less  negatively  pronounced  for  the  southern  offshore  sectors.  In  the 
Mediterranean  benefits  are  derived  from  the  experience  in  cost  reductions  and  efficiency 
gains achieved in the North, as well as developments in technology that enable more reliable 
identification of petroleum reservoir prospects in southern EU waters.  

Before  the  spread  of  the  coronavirus  and  the  economic  decline,  the  UK,  Netherlands  and 
Denmark were projecting capital expenditure of $20bn, $1.5bn and $1bn respectively in their 
offshore sectors by 2025. Even without the economic downturn that started in the first half of 
2020,  overall,  growth  was  expected  to    remain  slow,  incremental,  and  fragile  due  to  much 
cheaper sources of oil and gas in the Middle East and onshore USA (from shale deposits). 

29 

 
 
4.1.4

 The European offshore sector  

Eight  of  the  ten  largest  European  oil  and  gas  fields  are  in  Norway,  and  two  are  in  the  UK, 
jointly  producing  13.3  billion  tonnes  of  remaining  oil  equivalent.  In  2019,  the  UK  alone 
produced 72 % of EU offshore oil and gas. After the withdrawal of the UK from the EU on 31 
January 2020, both the most important EU producers of offshore oil and gas are Denmark, the 
Netherlands  and  Italy.  The  operators  and  main  co-ventures  comprise  the  super-major  oil 
companies: Exxon Mobil, Shell, BP, Total, Chevron, Equinor, and Conoco Phillips. Large oil 
companies  are  also  present:  Lundin,  Petoro  (100%  owned  by  Norway),  Suncor,  INEOS, 
CNOOC (China), Idemitsu Kosan (Japan), Wintershall DEA, and Eni.  

Third  country  companies  are  purchasing  an  increasing  share  of  European  oil  and  gas 
production  with  Chinese  companies  most  predominant.  The  Italian  Adriatic  is  the  major 
offshore active country outside the North Sea, with Eni predominant, others include: Edison 
and Zorh. 

The following table illustrates the distribution of off-shore oil and gas production in the EU, 
based on the annual Commission report on offshore safety published in 201831.  

REGION 

Baltic Sea 

Black Sea 

Mediterranean 

North Sea and Atlantic 

Country 

Poland 

Bulgaria 

Romania 

Croatia 

Greece 

Italy 

Spain 

Denmark 

Germany 

Ireland 

The Netherlands 

United Kingdom 

Total 

Total production in 2018 in 
ktoe* 

% EU Total 

210.98 
210.98 

1138.87 
4.71 

1134.16 

4139.61 
528.20 

211.01 

3311.00 

89.40 

106727.60 
9589.00 

915.00 

311.17 

11681.00 

84231.43 

112217.06 

0.19% 
0.19% 

1.01% 
0.00% 

1.01% 

3.69% 
0.47% 

0.19% 

2.95% 

0.08% 

95.11% 
8.55% 

0.82% 

0.28% 

10.41% 

75.06% 

100.00% 

Figure  2: Offshore oil and  gas production in the EU in  kilotons of oil equivalent (ktoe), source:  Annual 
Report on the Safety of Offshore Oil and Gas Operations in the European Union for the year 2018. 

* All petroleum: crude oil, condensate; natural gas; kilo tonnes oil equivalent; no offshore production: CY; FR; 
MT; PT 

Of the 112 million tonnes (ktoe) produced in EU countries in 2018, the main contributor is the 
North Sea (UK, Netherlands and Denmark) but Italy is also significant.  

31 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2019:0358:FIN.  

30 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Looking back to decades of EU offshore oil and gas operations, the following table recalls the 
entry  of  operation  of  installations  in  EU  regions  from  1950.  Figures  underline  a  clear 
downward trend in new installations from the year 2010 onwards. 

Year of 
construction 

1950-1959 

1960-1969 

1970-1979 

1980-1989 

1990-1999 

2000-2009 

2010-2019 

2020 

EU Total 

Region 

Baltic Sea 

Black Sea 

Mediterranean 

North Sea and  
Atlantic 

EU Total 

0 

0 

0 

0 

1 

1 

0 

0 

2 

0 

0 

0 

2 

3 

3 

0 

0 

8 

0 

7 

14 

53 

42 

40 

10 

0 

166 

4 

21 

41 

82 

119 

70 

43 

0 

380 

4 

28 

55 

137 

165 

114 

53 

0 

556 

Figure 3: Number of installations present in EU waters, by decade of entry into operation and by region, 
source, Annual Report on the Safety of Offshore Oil and Gas Operations in the European Union for the 
year 2018. 

4.1.5

 Incident rates and safety performance 

The Commission assesses the safety of the EU’s offshore oil and gas operations based on the 
data  provided  by  Member  States  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  the  Implementing 
Regulation on reporting. Accordingly, the accuracy of the Commission’s assessment depends 
on  the  information  submitted  by  Member  States.The  table  below  provides  a  snapshot  of 
incidents by categories in line with the reporting requirments set out in the Directive and its 
Implementing Regulation. 

31 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Number of  
events 

Share of events  
in category 

Share of  
total events 

Annex IX categories 

(a) 

Unintended releases – Total 

Ignited oil/gas releases – Fires 

Ignited oil/gas releases – Explosions 

Not ignited gas releases 

Not ignited oil releases 

Hazardous substances releases 

(b) 

Loss of well – Total 

Blowouts 

Blowout / diverter activation 

Well barrier failure 

(c)  

Failures of SECE 

(d) 

Loss of structural integrity – Total 

Loss of structural integrity 

Loss of stability/buoyancy 

Loss of station keeping 

(e)   Vessel collisions 

(f) 

(g) 

(h) 

(i) 

(j) 

Helicopter accidents 

Fatal accidents(*) 

Serious injuries of 5 or more persons 
in the same accident 

Evacuation of personnel 

Environmental accidents(**) 

99 

1 

0 

56 

31 

11 

17 

0 

8 

9 

2 

2 

0 

0 

2 

0 

0 

0 

0 

2 

2 

Total32 

124 

100.0% 

1,06% 

0.0% 

56,5% 

31,3% 

11,1% 

100.0% 

0.0% 

47.1% 

52.9% 

100.0% 

100.0% 

0.0% 

0.0% 

100.0% 

0.0% 

0.0% 

0.0% 

0.0% 

100.0% 

100.0% 

100.0% 

79,8% 

0,8% 

0.0% 

45,2% 

25,0% 

8,9% 

13,7 % 

0.0% 

6,4% 

7,3% 

1,6% 

1,6% 

0.0% 

0.0% 

1,6% 

0.0% 

0.0% 

0.0% 

0.0% 

1,6% 

1,6% 

100.0% 

(*) Only if related to a major accident 
(**) According to reports of Member States, the major accidents did not qualify as environmental accidents 

Figure 4: Incidents by categories (Annex IX of the Offshore Safety Directive, EU level), source, Annual 
Report on the Safety of Offshore Oil and Gas Operations in the European Union for the year 2018. 

In its report for the year 2018, the Commission concluded: “As in 2016 and 2017, no fatalities 
were  reported  in  2018  but  10  injuries  and  17  serious  injuries  occurred.  According  to  the 
reports of competent authorities, the number of accidents significantly increased in the United 
Kingdom, which requires both an in-depth analysis of causes and follow-up measures by the 
competent  authority.  The  Commission  will  seek  cooperation  with  the  United  Kingdom  to 

32 A single incident may appear more than once, for example: the evacuation of personal linked to the loss of 
well control would count for the total as two points. 

32 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
bring the safety performance level back to that of recent years. Apparently, following a high 
level  of  safety  in  2016  and  2017,  maintaining  an  adequate  performance  of  safety  requires 
additional efforts. 

4.2

Implementation of the Directive by Member States 

The  Commission  has  assessed  the  transposition  of  the  Directive  by  Member  States  and  has 
found that the overall level of transposition was adequate, although the integrity and quality of 
implementation  across  the  Member  States  varies  significantly.  Member  States  presented 
different  approaches  for  the  implementation  of  the  Directive  (either  in  full  or  in  relation  to 
specific  provisions).  Some  Member  States  have  adopted  new  legislation  that  transposes  the 
provisions  of  the  Directive,  whereas  others  have  amended  existing  legislation  and  included 
the  transposition  of  the  Directive’s  different  provisions  into  several  pieces  of  legislation. 
Certain Member States have largely literally included the provisions of the Directive in their 
national law, while others have partly or fully adapted the wording of the Directive with the 
intention to convert it better into their specific legislative culture.  

Drawing attention to specific parts of the Directive, it appears that the implementation of the 
principles  of  risk  management  is  satisfactory.  Furthermore,  most  Member  States  did 
completely and correctly transpose the rules on the submission of major hazard reports. The 
same is true for the provisions on the internal emergency response plans and the schemes for 
independent  verification.  The  overall  level  of  implementation  of  rules  for  co-operation 
between  Member  States  was  very  comprehensive.  Provisions  on  public  participation  and 
involvement  in  planned  offshore  oil  and  gas  operations  were  implemented  in  a  satisfactory 
manner.  The  Directive’s  Article  regarding  the  liability  for  environmental  damages  was 
correctly transposed. 

Almost  all  Member  States  did  correctly  transpose  provisions  on  confidential  reporting  of 
safety  concerns,  for  example  by  workers.  The  same  is  true  for  Articles  on  the  sharing  of 
information  between  owners,  operators  and  competent  authorities,  and  the  establishment  of 
rules for investigations following major accidents.  

In  contrast,  some  Member  States  had  difficulties  in  setting  up  effective  criteria  for  the 
assessment  of  the  technical  and  financial  capability  of  an  applicant  for  a  license.  Denmark 
provides  an  example  of  a  very  good  implementation  of  this  part  of  the  Directive.  In  some 
Member States there are weaknesses of transposition regarding external emergency response 
plans  and  emergency  preparedness.  With  regard  to  the  obligation  of  Member  States  to 
establish effective proportionate and dissuasive penalties applicable to infringements, further 
analysis  is  necessary  to  determine  whether  this  part  of  the  Directive  was  adequately 
implemented.  Despite  the  formal  implementation  it  remains  unclear  whether  penalties  are 
effective, proportionate and dissuasive in the individual social, legal and economic framework 
of Member States that are active in offshore oil and gas production. 

33 

 
 
 
Regarding the set-up of Competent Authorities, Member States did less closely implement the 
provisions  (e.g.  public  availability  of  information,  providing  adequate  human  and  financial 
resources) than expected. The Commission services are in contact with several Member States 
to clarify the rules for the functioning of the Competent Authority. Additional information on 
the  assessment  of  the  Directive’s  implementation  by  Member  States  Article  by  Article 
provides the Staff Working Document in its Annexe IX.  

Annex III includes detailed, additional information on the implementation of the Articles of 
the Directive, which highlights shortcomings. The dialogue with Member States is an ongoing 
process.  If  necessary,  in  order  to  achieve  improvements  and  a  fully  adequate  level  of 
implementation  the  Commission  may  start  infringement  proceedings  in  case  of  severe 
shortcomings. 

Technology  is  constantly  developing,  however,  without  major  technological  pushes. 
Improved  shelter  booths  and  detection  devices,  supported  by  artificial  intelligence,  are 
deployed  on  offshore  installations.  Following  the  Commission’s  analysis  of  safety 
performance as published in the annual reports, offshore safety performance appears adequate 
in all Member States. 

Member  States  with  offshore  waters  that  do  not  have  offshore  oil  and  gas  operations  under 
their  jurisdiction  (e.g.  Belgium,  Estonia,  Finland,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Portugal,  Slovenia, 
Sweden),  and  which  do  not  plan  to  license  such  operations  shall  implement  only  those 
measures,  which are necessary to  ensure compliance with Article 20 (operations outside the 
EU),  Article  32  (transboundary  emergency  preparedness)  and  Article  34  (penalties).  In 
general terms, these Articles were adequately transposed. 

In  line  with  the  provisions  of  the  Directive,  landlocked  Member  States,  e.g.  as  Hungary, 
Austria,  the  Czech  Republic  and  Slovakia,  adequately  implemented  Article  20  of  the 
Directive. 

5 
  Overview on the themes analysed  

5.1

ACHIEVEMENTS ASSESSED BY THEMES 

The assessment  has been  structured around themes that each bring together several Articles 
from the Directive and issues proposed during consultations with stakeholders, the public and 
experts. The majority (10) of themes concern the functionality of the Articles in the Directive. 
The next largest category (3) emerge from stakeholder representation on issues only indirectly 
related to functional Articles. Two themes derive from direct mandated actions in Article 39 
(liability,  compensation  claims,  financial  security  and  criminal  sanctions).  An  assessment 
matrix  served  as  data  and  information  tool  for  analysing  themes  and  for  concluding  on  the 
Directive’s achievements measured by criteria (see annex. Part 4, specifically table 4). 

(1) 

Themes of 

functioning of the Directive 

(2) 
Themes directly 
mandated by the Directive  

(3) 

Themes of 

special interest to 

34 

 
 
Description 

stakeholders 

Article / 
Source 

Applying risk management principles for control of major accidents 

Art.3(1)(3)(4) 

Public participation in release of new areas for licensing 
Assignment of the competent authority 
Functioning of scheme of independent verification for installations and wells 

Safety in operations conducted outside EU 

Arrangements for worker involvement in major accident prevention, (relating to 
protection of whistle-blowers and tripartite consultation mechanisms 

Transparency concerning reporting of incidents 

Emergency preparedness and response arrangements of operators/ owners 

Emergency preparedness and response arrangements of Member States 

Availability of dissuasive penalties for breaches of duty 

Assignment of liability; financial responsibility; and schemes of civil compensation 
Parliament resolution 2015/2352(INI) 

Prospect of extending criminal sanctions to breaches of duty to safeguard the 
environment from major accidents (within the scope of Directive 2008/99/EC) 
Post- decommissioning responsibility for ensuring permanent sealing of wells, and 
for determining extent of removal of fixed installations 
Deepening of the internal market through mutual recognition between Member 
States of mobile installations and of common systems that are not Member States-
specific 
Recovery of costs of maintaining the competent authority 

Art.5 
Art.8,9 
Art.17 

Art.19(8), 20 

Art.22, 6(8) 

Art.23, 24, 25 

Art.14, 28, 29, 30 

Art.28, 29, 30, 31 

Art.34 

Art.4, 7, 39(1)(2) 

Art.39(3) 

Art.12, Annex 
I(6) 

Art.13 

Art.8(5)(7) 

Figure 5: Overview of themes subject to the assessment 

5.2

Applying risk management principles for control of major accidents 

The  foundation  of  risk  assessment  in  major  hazard  sectors  is  the  identification  of  all 
foreseeable  hazards,  and  the  assignment  of  scale  of  harm  or  the  consequence  of  the  hazard 
being realised (see also Article 3 of the Directive).  

Both industry and authorities observed an occasionally inconsistent use of risk assessment by 
both operators and regulators as the precursor to a decision on suitability of control measures 
for  identified  major  hazards.  The  historical  concern  of  risk  assessment  is  that  methodology 
may  be  directed  to  achieve  a  preferred  outcome,  for  example,  deliberately  selecting  a 
statistical assumption in the risk calculus that gives a bias in the result.  

However, there is no statistical evidence that bias is widespread or frequent. The provisions in 
the  Directive  directly  attempt  to  mitigate  bias  in  the  areas  of:  independent  verification  of 
safety,  environmentally  critical  elements,  and  well  plans.  In  addition,  the  expert  and 
independent  competent  authority’s  assessment  of  the  operator’s  or  owner’s  risk  assessment 

35 

 
 
 
 
 
 
report for the installation (Report on Major Hazards or RoMH)33 is a further control against 
bias in risk assessment.  

There  is  a  reported  inconsistency  when  the  condition  of  ‘risks  tolerable  and  as  low  as 
reasonably  practicable  (ALARP)’  is  achieved.  This  may  result  in  disagreement  between  the 
operator or owner of the installation and the Competent Authority, regarding the adequacy of 
the  risk  assessment  presented  in  the  installation  RoMH.  Alternatively,  there  may  be 
agreement  between  the  operator/owner  and  the  competent  authority  where  the  ALARP 
condition  may  not  have  in  fact  been  achieved:  this  can  be  the  case  where  the  competent 
authority fails to undertake a thorough, expert assessment of the RoMH.  

Linked  to  the  matter  of  inconsistency  in  identifying  the  ALARP  threshold  in  complex  risk 
assessment,  are  reports  that  risk  assessment  measures  adopted  by  Member  States  are 
insufficiently  stringent.  This  is  a  generic  concern  that  applies  to  different  forms  of 
intervention, such as the threshold for taking enforcement action. 

Although  there  is  no  statistical  data  that  supports  these  concerns,  it  appears  that  there  is 
inconsistency in applying risk assessment methodologies between Member States. Since the 
legal instrument bringing the measures into effect was a Directive, different approaches were 
anticipated  because  most  of  the  16  focal  Member  States  are  relatively  unfamiliar  with  risk-
based regulation. 

Accordingly, upskilling of Member States unfamiliar with risk-based regulation may provide 
substantial added-value. Joint peer reviews carried out by smaller competent authorities from 
the North Sea and Italy may reveal where weaknesses persist. 

Civil society needs assurance that industry has improved its control of major accident hazards. 
Former North Sea joint audits34, for example from the North Sea Offshore Authorities Forum 
(NSOAF), demonstrated that there is room for improvement. Taking note of their contribution 
to offshore safety, the methodologies deployed in the North Sea joint audits could be usefully 
transferred  to  the  Mediterranean  and  Black  Sea  regions,  and  the  results  published  by  the 
EUOAG. 

According  to  the  views  of  workers  unions,  efforts  may  be  needed  by  employers  to  upskill 
their  field  staff.  Unions  argue  that  worker  representatives  in  particular  should  reserve  more 
input time, to  contribute both  more confidently and more comfortably to  the formulation of 
the installation’s RoMH.  

Finally,  according  to  views  received  from  experts,  risk  assessment  and  management  should 
take note of climate change. Predictions suggest that in the coming years and decades, climate 
change may lead to  extreme heat,  stronger winds, and higher waves. To adequately  address 

33 A RoMH is an ex ante report by the operator or owner of an installation demonstrating that all major hazard 
risks are ALARP. Comments of the workforce are to be taken into account. The competent authority must issue 
an acceptance of the RoMH prior to operations starting. 
34 http://www.hse.gov.uk/offshore/NSOAF-Supervision-report.pdf.  

36 

 
 
                                                           
these  risks,  safety  and  environmental  critical  elements  at  installations  may  require 
adjustments. 

5.3

Public participation in release of new areas for licensing 

Environmental assessment is a procedure that ensures environmental implications of decisions 
are  taken  into  account  before  the  decisions  are  made.  Environmental  assessment  can  be 
undertaken for individual projects, such as a dam, motorway, airport or factory, on the basis 
of Directive 2011/92/EU35 (known as 'Environmental Impact Assessment' – EIA Directive) or 
for public plans or programmes on the basis of Directive 2001/42/EC36 (known as 'Strategic 
Environmental Assessment' – SEA Directive). The common principle of both Directives is to 
ensure  that  plans,  programmes  and  projects  likely  to  have  significant  effects  on  the 
environment  are  made  subject  to  an  environmental  assessment,  to  provide  a  high  level  of 
protection  of  the  environment  and  to  contribute  to  the  integration  of  environmental 
considerations  into  the  preparation  of  such  projects,  plans  and  programmes  with  a  view  to 
reduce their environmental impacts, prior to their approval or authorisation. Consultation with 
the public is a key feature of environmental assessments. 

The  provisions  of  Article  5  of  the  Directive  for  public  participation  apply  to  new  areas  for 
licensing from 19 July 2013. These areas are regions in the sea anticipated to be utilised for 
exploration  and  production.  Article  5  should  prevent  drilling,  including  explorative  drilling 
unless the public was consulted and the results of the assessment accommodated. Paragraph 2 
(a)  to  (f)  describes  minimum  suitable  arrangements  to  achieve  the  aims.  According  to 
information provided for the assessment by NGOs, it appears that Member States have taken 
due note of these aims of the Directive but did not always fully implement these provisions. 
The  environmental  NGO  community  has  raised  certain  concerns,  primarily  directed  at 
licensing and re-licensing in mature basins, which partially have been exploited for decades. 

The practice that the Member States’ licensing authority may re-license a previously licensed 
area  without  recommencing  the  full  SEA  procedures  and  associated  public  participation,  is 
not  transparent.  However,  it  has  not  been  possible  to  collect  data  that  demonstrates  the 
approaches adopted in different Member States under the provisions of the Directive.  

In general, there is limited public awareness of the offshore oil and gas sector in general, with 
its technology and functions scarcely understood. These factors may prevent the public from 
taking  a  deeper  interest  in  consultations.  Most  citizens  may  not  be  aware  of  public 
consultations  or  may  hesitate  to  participate,  due  to  a  perceived  lack  of  expert  knowledge. 
However,  if  stakeholders  as  NGOs,  enterprises,  local  authorities  carry  out  a  campaign 
participation rates can substantially increase. 

35 Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on the assessment 
of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment Text with EEA relevance, OJ L 26, 
28.1.2012, p. 1–21.  
36 Directive 2001/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 2001 on the assessment of the 
effects of certain plans and programmes on the environment, OJ L 197, 21.7.2001, p. 30–3. 

37 

 
 
 
                                                           
Taking note of national rules and legislation regarding public participation in Member States, 
the provisions for stimulating public consultation relating to offshore projects appear suitable. 
However, 
their  practical  application  may  require  additional  efforts  from  national 
administrations. 

Member States may publish citizen’s guidance to facilitate access of citizens to the sector and 
to  encourage  their  informed  participation  in  consultation  exercises.  Furthermore,  NGOs 
would  welcome  arrangements  made  by  the  Member  States  that  ensure  consultees  can  be 
confident that their views are processed effectively in decision making. 

5.4

Assignment of the Competent Authority 

Whenever six or more installations operate in a Member State, according to Articles 8 and 9 
of  the  Directive,  Member  States  shall  establish  a  Competent  Authority  to  assure  structural 
independence  from  economic  interests  (e.g.  maximising  revenues  from  offshore  activities). 
The  upward  reporting  chain,  within  which  the  priorities,  strategies  and  work  plans  of  the 
competent authorities are agreed, should be entirely separated from economic regulation. 

It follows from consultations with stakeholders and NGOs that it is often not entirely clear as 
to  whether  or  not  suitable  and  sufficient  independence  has  been  attained  in  all  competent 
authorities, following the formal implementation of the Directive. 

Some  respondents  and  interviewees  from  the  industry  have  expressed  a  reservation  that  the 
intended  unification  of  environmental  and  safety  oversight  by  regulators  is  insufficiently 
joined-up  compared  to  expectations,  and  that  duplication  of  effort  and  an  additional 
administrative burden results from this. However, even where the competent authority is not 
fully  integrated,  it  seems  that  with  the  Directive,  Member  States  are  in  a  better  position  to 
avoid duplication of interventions and unaligned strategies, which may impact efficiency and 
costs of the sector. 

The  strong  fragmentation  of  regulatory  approaches  around  the  EU,  as  explained  in  the 
Commission’s impact assessment, was a major driver to establish the Directive. It seems that 
systems  and  arrangements  have  been  less  harmonised  than  expected.  This  is  supported  by 
survey’s  respondents  and  workshops.  Therefore,  whilst  Member  States  may  well  have 
implemented  the  Directive  in  an  appropriate  manner,  the  process  of  harmonising  the 
regulatory  playing  field  in  the  EU  remains  incomplete.  Therefore,  the  full  benefits  of  inter 
alia, standardisation, efficiency, benchmarking, and effectiveness are unlikely to be realised, 
compared to the situation of adopting a common Regulation. 

A number of respondents and interviewees, mainly from the industry, have reported that the 
organisational arrangements of some competent authorities remain unstable, and that the full 
depth of skills and expertise is yet to be integrated into the body of the regulator. 

38 

 
 
 
The  Commission  produced  a  report  in  2016  concerning  the  adequacy  of  resources  of  the 
Member  States’  competent  authorities37  to  carry  out  their  functions  under  the  Directive.  It 
noted that Member States were on average 10% under-staffed, recruitment was demonstrably 
difficult and that pay levels were often a root problem. The report called on Member States to 
ensure they provide sufficient resources to attract and train expert staff, relative to the size and 
complexity  of  the  offshore  activity  of  each  Member  State.  It  is  also  important  to  recall  that 
such inconsistency and instability does impose administrative burdens on industry. 

There is a lack of clarity concerning whether or not suitable and sufficient independence has 
been attained in all competent authorities. Given the importance of safety and environmental 
protection in the management of the marine space, the independence of judgement of offshore 
competent authorities is a matter of public interest. There is an ongoing dialogue between the 
Commission and the Member States in the framework of the European Offshore Authorities 
Group.  In  forthcoming  sessions  this  Group  may  discuss  arrangements  for  ensuring  full 
compliance  with  Articles  8(2)  and  9(a)  of  the  Directive  on  independence  from  economic 
regulation, with the objective to provide more information to social partners and civil society. 
Competent  authorities  may  specifically  analyse  the  increased  decommissioning  of  fixed 
installations. 

5.5

Functioning of scheme of independent verification for installations and wells 

Major technical projects of high capital investment will be subject to independent verification 
by the project owner as a safeguard. The danger from not referring to independent verification 
is the adoption of unknown bias into project risk assessments.  

The  Directive  adopted  best  international  regulatory  practice  by  requiring,  in  Article  17,  the 
adoption  of  independent  verification  for  installations  and  well  plans  within  the  safety 
management systems of operators and owners. The main provisions are: 

  The system is to be integral to the operator or owner’s management system rather than a 

stage of compliance or permitting. 
  The arrangements must pass strict tests: 

o  of  independence  of  the  verifier  from  any  connection  to  the  installation  or  well 

project; and  

o  of the integrity of the working environment of the verifier such that their work is 

free of influence from the operator or owner. 

37 REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION on the adequacy of national expert resources for complying with the 
regulatory functions pursuant to Article 27(4) of Directive 2013/30/EU, COM/2016/0318 final.  

39 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
 
  The  scheme  is  applied  to  verification  of  safety  and  environment  critical  elements 
(SECE’s)38 and their continuing effectiveness in practice, and to wells including changes 
to design intent. 

  The  records  are  to  be  retained,  and  made  available  to  the  competent  authorities  on 

demand. 

Most contributors to the assessment express approval of the conceptual system. The Member 
States  active  in  offshore  operations  in  the  North  Sea  area  (UK,  the  Netherlands,  and 
Denmark)  report  a  ‘significant  advantage’  in  their  major  accident  prevention  systems  by 
virtue of the availability of the independent verifiers’ reports. 

In contrast, there are also some concerns and misinterpretations of the various entities. 

  Member States with  decades’ long experience with  offshore oil and  gas  operations (e.g. 
North  Sea  and  Italy)  and  co-located  operators  found  introduction  of  the  scheme  too 
difficult.  This  was  due  to  independent  verifiers’  market  unreadiness,  and  lack  of 
specificity in the requirements allowing numerous options. 

  Some  Member  States’  Competent  Authorities,  and  NGOs  consider  2nd  party  verification 
unsuitable, either on an objection of principle, or because of potential societal aversion. 
  Some  actors  (mainly  from  large  verification-based  vendors)  favoured  strict  3rd  party 
verification  but  only  using  large  players  with  extensive  experience  of  independent 
verifiers’  services.  They  claim  smaller,  niche  companies,  lack  capability  in  depth  and 
become captured by the client. They also claim the Directive spawns an increase of niche 
vendors. 

  The Trade Unions (TU’s) observe that there is insufficient depth of resources with all the 
relevant  expertise and experience to underpin the introduction and proper functioning of 
the schemes. 

  Other actors (the smaller niche vendors) warned of the large verification companies who 
may  encourage  homogeneous  rather  than  independent  approaches.  They  also  warn  of 
profiteering  through  standardisation  of  systems,  irrespective  of  the  individual  nature  of 
production installations. 

  Some  Member  States  consider  that  there  is  a  lack  of  sufficient  clarity  in  Article  17  and 
Annex  V  relating  to  the  operation  of  schemes  for  independent  verification,  and  ask  for 
additional Commission guidelines.  

According to the information obtained, it appears that the scheme of independent verification 
complies with the minimum requirements as set out in the Directive. To facilitate the handling 
of  schemes  in  Member  States,  it  would  be  useful  to  collect  and  disseminate  all  available 
guidance of industry and regulator.  

5.6

Safety in operations conducted outside EU 

Analysis 

38 Safety and environment critical elements (SECE) i.e. parts of an installation including computer programmes, 
the purpose of which is to prevent or limit the consequences of a major accident, or the failure of which could 
cause or contribute substantially to a major accident.  

40 

 
 
 
                                                           
Article 19(8) of the Directive establishes the principle that an operator’s or owner’s CMAPP39 
is  to  be  the  policy  of  the  main  board  of  the  company  and  should  apply  throughout  the 
organisation.  Operators  should  be  able  to  demonstrate  this  without  ambiguity  to  their 
Competent  Authority.  The  measure  is  in  response  to  apparent  and  largely  unexplained 
differences of performance of operators as measured by incident reports in different regions of 
the world.  

Annex  I  Part  8  of  the  Directive  provides  the  minimum  components  to  be  incorporated  in  a 
CMAPP, and these broadly reflect the worldwide standard for a high integrity organisation40. 
The  components  of  the  CMAPP  address  corporate  behaviour  such  as  process  auditing, 
rewarding  desirable  behaviours  for  major  accident  prevention  amongst  staff,  extemporising 
corporate goals, values and capabilities, and requiring high levels of competency throughout 
the organisation. 

There  are  reports  from  duty  holders  regarding  inconsistency  of  requirements  by  Member 
States’ Competent Authorities for the demonstration of the CMAPP in the set of productions 
submitted  for  assessment  alongside  the  installation  RoMH  by  the  duty  holder.  There  are 
further  reports,  also  in  the  framework  of  stakeholder  consultation,  that  the  practical 
application of national laws transposing the Directive, via competent authorities, has included 
additional features that may be out of context of a CMAPP. 

It has not been possible within the assessment of the Directive to verify these reports. In any 
case it would be necessary to take evidence from duty holders, which they may be reluctant to 
give. However, in the context of a CMAPP, there should by definition be only one version per 
company throughout its global operations. Any additional relevant requirements should be an 
addendum to the safety and environmental management system document (SEMS). 

On the subject of the SEMS, it has been reported that some duty holders do not themselves 
identify the difference between the SEMS and the CMAPP. The relevant lists of content in the 
Directive for CMAPP (Annex I Part 8) and SEMS (Annex I Part 9) are distinctively different. 
If  the  distinction  is  not  understood  by  a  duty  holder,  or  duplication  arises  from  a  Member 
State’s approach to the handling of, and the relationship between, the two documents, actors 
may not have fully understood the subject. 

In the framework of the public consultation, the NGO’s have expressed particular concern on 
this point by issuing a joint statement: 

“Companies  registered  in  the  EU  should  be  bound  worldwide  by  all  Directive  obligations 

39 CMAPP: Corporate Major accident prevention policy, i.e. a document setting out the owner’s or operator’s 
corporate policy for the avoidance of major accidents at their installations located anywhere in the world. 
Suitable arrangements to be made for monitoring the effectiveness of the policy which is to apply throughout the 
lifecycle of any installation controlled by the operator or owner, and in the case of an operator to take account of 
their primary responsibility for control of major accident risk. 
39 Formal tripartite consultation is required under auspices of each Member States’ to allow operators, regulators 
and worker representatives to discuss formulation of major accident prevent policy and standards. 
40 A high integrity organisation possesses strong safety culture and conducts itself so as to achieve a high 
probability of safe and continuous operations.  

41 

 
 
                                                           
that can be applied directly to operators. Allowing companies to skip Directive standards in 
developing countries does not sit well with the initial intention of avoiding  a  second  Deepwater 
Horizon…/…  In  addition,  the  obligations  already  applicable  for  extraterritorial  activities 
should be enforced in a consistent and transparent manner. At this point it is not very clear 
whether Member States do in fact ask for accident prevention plans covering extraterritorial 
activities, and even more so if and how they verify that that the plans are applied.”  

Conclusions 

The  Directive  may  not  always  ensure  effective  accident  prevention  outside  of  the  EU. 
However, further research and fact finding appears necessary before being able to draw a firm 
conclusion. Furthermore, the consistency between Member State provisions for assuring EU-
based operators maintain high and equivalent standards in their overseas activities, is a topic 
that  Member  States  might  consider  collaboration  on.  For  example,  in  a  management  audit 
exercise  for  operations  outside  the  EU.  As  a  preliminary  exercise,  Member  States  may 
consider  a  joint  audit  to  examine  the  mechanisms  that  Member  States’  deploy  for  verifying 
operators’  effectiveness  in  examining  joined-up  safety  management  of  their  operators 
throughout their global operations. Safe offshore operations contribute to the protection of the 
environment and the fight against climate change. For example, by preventing large leakages 
of methane. 

5.7

Arrangements for worker involvement in major accident prevention 

Analysis 

The  practice  of  tripartite  consultation  was  already  adopted  by  the  International  Labour 
Organisation  (ILO  144  1976)41  as  the  foundation  of  its  strategy  making  and  policy 
formulation.  The  ILO  has  produced  a  principal  standard  (#144)  for  strategic  consultation 
between representatives of workers, regulators and employers, both generically and related to 
sectors. Despite the maturity of  ILO 144 1976 and the widespread  adoption  of tripartism  in 
the EU, some Member States had no mechanisms for it prior to the Directive.  

Article  6(8)  requires  Member  States  to  establish  mechanisms  for  effective  tripartite 
consultation  between  the  competent  authority,  duty  holders,  and  worker  representatives  in 
formulating standards and policies relating to major accident prevention. 

Aligned  to  the  measure  in  Article  6(8)  is  the  requirement  in  Article  22  for  owners  and 
operators  to  put  in  place  arrangements  for  confidential  reporting  of  concerns  by  staff  on 
installations and for protection of whistle blowers. The arrangements are to be communicated 
to all workers on the installation. Typically information and contact details for the competent 
authority will be posted on notice boards and staff trained on this subject.  

The  competent  authority  is  to  make  compatible  arrangements  for  conducting  investigations 
into confidential reporting, and making authoritative reports, whilst preserving anonymity. 

41 https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C144.  

42 

 
 
 
                                                           
The  Commission  has  examined  how  these  arrangements  are  working  out.  It  found  wide 
approval  of  all  stakeholders  of  the  fundamental  right  bestowed  under  Article  22.  Similarly, 
whilst some Member States have practiced tripartite consultation since the ILO standard, duty 
holders  in  previously  non  participating  Member  States  were  vocal  in  support  to  new 
arrangements  under  which  they  have  a  voice  in  strategy.  Duty  holders  report  significant 
value-added  where  the  scheme  of  tripartite  consultation  was  newly  introduced,  especially 
outside the North Sea region where no specific safety legislation was formerly in place. 

Some Member States reported that their tripartite committees had become somewhat torpid. 
Moreover,  in  some  Member  States  there  are  excellent  tripartite  arrangements  under  the 
auspices of the operators associations attended by top management and leaders from Member 
States  and  TU’s.  An  example  is  the  UK’s  ‘Step  Change  in  Safety’42,  formed  more  than  40 
years ago and probably the most influential standing safety body of its type.   

It  is  a  major  key  performance  indicator  and  a  leading  indicator  for  offshore  major  accident 
prevention,  that  industry  establishes  and  maintains  effective  consultative  forums  under  its 
own auspices. The statutory committees have the added driver of law. Furthermore, it appears 
that the establishment of a level aspect of statutory tripartite consultation throughout the EU 
will of itself will add value in policy terms.   

With  regard  to  the  Directive’s  provisions  on  whistle  blowing43,  there  are  signs  from  the 
Commission’s interactions with stakeholders that Member States take insufficient interest in 
training for workers and managers and in developing the applications of whistle blowing as a 
surrogate to the values of transparency, safety culture, and integrity issues for the sector.  

The  TU’s  consider  the  protection  of  whistle-blowers  is  insufficient  across  the  sector  as  a 
whole,  and  favour  a  link  between  whistleblowing  arrangements  and  tripartite  consultation 
mechanisms relating to policy and standards. No concrete examples of a lack of rigour have 
been  forwarded  to  support  the  TU  assertions,  but  no  doubt  the  position  will  be  kept  under 
review.  

Tripartite consultation may not yet be fully embedded in many Member States, and time and 
encouragement  will  make  the  difference.  However,  we  note  that  at  present,  no  voluntary 
sharing  of  learnings  or  other  information  exists  or  has  been  encouraged  between  tripartite 
committees of Member States (not required by the Directive). 

Conclusions 

Although  taking  note  of  critical  comments,  it  appears  that  in  general  terms  the  confidential 
reporting  mechanisms  for  workers  to  directly  contact  the  competent  authority  in  their  area 
appear  to  be  working,  and  is  welcomed  particularly  in  Member  States  where  no  such 
provisions existed before the Directive. In the future, competent authorities and the EUOAG 

42 https://www.stepchangeinsafety.net/about.  
43Recital 41 of the Directive provides: “To ensure that no relevant safety concerns are overlooked or ignored, it 
is important to establish and encourage adequate means for the confidential reporting of those concerns and the 
protection of whistle-blowers.”.  

43 

 
 
                                                           
may  receive  advice  from  TU’s  and  other  worker  representatives  on  the  functioning  of  the 
arrangements throughout the EU.  

Apparently,  there  is  also  considerable  support  to  the  measures  relating  to  tripartite 
consultation, and that the development of a tripartite culture is improving. 

5.8

Transparency concerning reporting of incidents – the Implementing Regulation 

Articles  23,  24,  and  25  of  the  Directive  concern  measures  for  EU-wide  reporting  systems, 
under  which  the  Commission  is  to  make  an  implementing  regulation  for  common  reporting 
parameters.  This  Implementing  Regulation  (1112/2014/EU)  includes  a  simplified  reporting 
format for Member States’ for publishing incident data and other relevant information.  

The Member States are to make public important information relating to incidents occurring 
in  their  territory  and  to  report  to  the  Commission  annually.  Finally,  the  Commission  is 
required to make annual reports.  

The cycle of reporting to the EU-level is as follows.  

Year 1: Member States’ Competent Authorities receive data from duty holders.  

Year 2: Competent  authorities aggregate data  and carry  out  a quality check. Member States 
send  a  report  in  the  format  of  the  Implementing  Regulation,  to  the  Commission.  The 
Commission undertake a quality check and subsequently transfer all information provided by 
Member States into the Commission’s own data base, in order to assemble an EU-wide report 
(latest 1st of June). 

Year 3. The report is published at the beginning of year 3.  

As  illustrated  by  the  above  timeline,  there  is  a  lag  between  the  focus  year  (of  industry 
reporting  incidents  to  the  Member  States)  and  the  Commission  report.  Already  two  reports 
have been published to date (2019) covering 201644 and 201745. There is now a baseline for 
future trend analysis.    

The scheme is functional; it is the first statutory inter-country reporting system anywhere and 
therefore represents a significant step. Given that there is a widely held public view that the 
oil  industry  and  its  regulators  are  not  transparent,  the  requirement  for  a  common  reporting 
system is key to greater public acceptance.  

Looking  through  the  data  for  the  first  of  the  EU  annual  reports,  there  is  a  disparity  of  data 
reporting  and  handling  between  Member  States  that  suggests  the  system  needs  time  to 
stabilise. 

44 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2018%3A595%3AFIN.  
45 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2019:0358:FIN.  

44 

 
 
 
                                                           
Some  Member  States  believe  the  current  guidance  is  insufficiently  detailed.  This  was  not 
expected as  the expert committee that assisted in  the preparation of the  Commission’s draft 
Regulation assembled a detailed guidance document, including practical examples of how to 
complete and provide information on incidents. 

The work of the expert committee took into account advice and guidance from regulators and 
industry and was a compromise of systems. Nevertheless, some duty holders are dissatisfied 
with some of the incident severity thresholds (e.g. relating to release volumes of hydrocarbon 
escapes) where these are different to standards that are already in use. Consequently, there is 
an  inevitable  disparity  between  the  new  system  and  some  of  the  pre-existing  thresholds  of 
reporting. 

Some Member States active with offshore operations in the North Sea region, specifically the 
UK,  have  claimed  that  the  data  set  to  be  collected  and  published  under  the  Implementing 
Regulation  is  not  a  useful  tool  to  determine  leading  indicators  for  major  accident  risk.  The 
Member  States  concerned  suggest,  notwithstanding  their  representatives  were  on  the  expert 
comitology committee, which agreed on the templates, that significant revision is required to 
allow more meaningful reporting. 

The EU-wide incident reporting system that collates all qualifying incidents, including near-
misses in EU waters, reported under obligation from all actors (duty holders, Member States 
and  the  Commission)  that  this  reporting  initiative  represents  a  significant  advance  in 
transparency of the sector from a global perspective.  

All  of  the  actors  need  to  focus  on  the  efficacy  of  the  system,  specifically  regarding  full, 
prompt and accurate reporting. The EUOAG monitors the system, is the interlocutor to civil 
society, and ensures continual improvement in the system over time. 

Where stakeholders perceive that critical  improvements need to  be made, the EUOAG (and 
the  initiator  of  further  implementing  regulations)  should  be  appropriately  advised  with 
justifications.  However,  it  should  be  underlined  that  not  all  actors  have  experience  with  the 
Implementing Regulation.  

5.9

Emergency preparedness and response arrangements of operators/ owners 

This  particular obligation concerns the  emergency  response  arrangements of the operator or 
owner to contain an incident to the vicinity of the installation, usually taken to mean within 
the 500 meter safety zone surrounding it.  

Articles 14, 28, and 30, with a related obligation under Article 29, concern arrangements of 
the  Member  States,  namely,  national  contingency  plans.  These  should  be  integrated  as 
necessary  with  those  of  adjacent  installations  and  with  national  contingency  plans  of 
neighbouring  Member  States.  The  entire  plan  that  encompasses  procedures,  equipment, 
responsibilities, and contingencies, with the goal of containment of any incident, is referred in 
the Directive as the Internal Emergency Response Plan (IERP). 

45 

 
 
 
Additionally,  the  operators’  or  owners’  relevant  expertise  and  equipment  for  emergency 
response is to be always available, and emergency response exercises are to be conducted by 
Member States, operators, and owners. 

According  to  information  provided  by  Member  States  in  EUOAG  meetings,  installations 
present  in  EU  waters  have  appropriate  emergency  response  plans  (IERP)  in  place.  Some 
Member  States  have  agreed  extensive  procedures  with  their  duty  holders  that  govern  the 
overall  response  within  that  Member  States’  jurisdiction.  Nevertheless,  it  is  not  shown  the 
extent to which internal emergency response plans are harmonised with national contingency 
plans  of  Member  States  throughout  the  EU.  Focused  exercises  with  Member  States’ 
authorities and operators, as for example carried out by the UK, are the most effective means 
to validate the effectiveness of the integrated arrangements.  

The industry’s response to implementing the Directive has been for owners of non-production 
mobile installations (mainly mobile drilling units for exploration of oil and gas (MODUs)) to 
develop fit for purpose response plans that were different from the plans for the operators of 
installations for the production of oil and gas. Prior to the Directive, the requirements varied 
between  Member  States,  and  owners  had  claimed  that  the  plans  required  of  them  by  some 
Member  States  were  more  suited  to  production  installations  with  their  concentrations  of 
hazardous process plant and inventories of flammable substances and less to MODUs. 

Duty holders have also readily acknowledged that the requirements under the Directive have 
added value by improving the integration of installation-based emergency response plans with 
national contingency plans. 

Under the Directive, the IERP is required to consider all relevant emergency scenarios as an 
absolute duty, i.e. the plan will not need to quantify the risk of a potential scenario in order to 
make response arrangements to deal with it. 

There  is  a  significant  uplift  in  confidence  of  the  integration  of  the  modern  sophisticated 
inventories of the industry, and the Member States. The requirements for internal emergency 
response plans by operators and owners appear to be working as intended. 

Requirements  for  internal  emergency  response  plans  by  operators  and  owners  appear  to  be 
working  as  intended.  It  is  anticipated  that  the  regulators  and  social  partners  will  request 
operators  in  particular  to  develop  more  inventive  scenarios  to  exercise  and  test  the 
arrangements  they  have  made.  The  appropriate  regulatory  authorities  in  the  Member  States 
may take a close interest in the effectiveness of installation-based emergency response plans. 

5.10

  Emergency preparedness and response arrangements of Member States 

Analysis 

Articles  29,  30,  and  31  of  the  Directive  apply  to  the  emergency  response  arrangements 
obligated  to  Member  States,  known  as  External  Emergency  Response  Plans  (EERP)  or 

46 

 
 
national  contingency  plans.  Article  28  requires  Member  States  to  ensure  that  the  IERP’s  of 
duty holders are integrated and coherent with the Member States national contingency plans. 

Under  the  measures,  Member  States  must  ensure  EERPs  are  executed  immediately  upon 
report  of  a  major  incident.  Furthermore,  investigations  by  Member  States  into  the 
circumstances  of  the  incident  are  to  be  conducted  without  delay,  giving  due  regard  to  the 
circumstances. Member States should not take actions that may have an adverse impact on the 
emergency response or recovery operations. 

Although  emergency  response  is  initiated  at  the  national  level,  emergency  arrangements 
should ensure that equipment and expertise is compatible and interoperable beyond national 
borders, and also in Member States that do not carry out offshore operations themselves, due 
to potential implication for further Member States. 

In  all  circumstances,  emergency  response  exercises  are  to  be  conducted  by  Member  States, 
operators  and  owners.  The  transboundary  risks  of  pollution  are  to  be  specifically  addressed 
and suitable cooperation is to be arranged including with third countries. 

Member  States  that  do  not  have  active  offshore  oil  and  gas  operations  are  required  under 
Article  32  to  establish  focal  points,  to  cooperate  with  active  Member  States  in  contingency 
planning  and  to  make  their  own  arrangements  for  responding  to  a  major  accident  that 
threatens their marine and coastal environment. Adjacent Member States are also required to 
cooperate  with  a  major  accident  investigation  launched  by  the  Member  States  in  which  the 
accident occurred. 

Duty holders and Member States acknowledge that the requirement for national EERPs to be 
integrated  with  IERPs  has  added  value  by  improving  coherence  between  installation-based 
emergency response plans with national contingency plans.  

Around five Member States and regions were still preparing national contingency emergency 
response  plans  during  the  year  2019.  The  Commission  provided  technical  assistance  at  a 
technical  workshop  in  2017,  attended  by  competent  authorities,  national  intervention 
authorities and agencies, specialist systems providers, IADC, and IOGP. The proceedings of 
the event represent a compendium of the depth of experience and expertise that exists in the 
North Sea/Atlantic region, and the Mediterranean region coordinated by REMPEC (Malta). 

Under Article 10 of the Directive, the EMSA also has obligations. For the most part European 
Maritime  Safety  Agency  (EMSA)  is  required  to  respond  to  requests  by  Member  States  to 
assist in both preparations and interventions. Some arrangements are agreed with EMSA and 
Member  States.  According  to  Article  10(3)  EMSA  may  assist  the  Commission  in  assessing 
the suitability of Member States' EERPs.  

The Commission services carried out a survey on the availability of national plans in 2017. At 
that  time,  data  showed  some  fragmented  approaches  to  consideration  of  transboundary 
pollution.  However,  industry  claims  there  is  an  effective  interoperability  of  expertise  and 
equipment between Member States in contiguous maritime regions, and that harmonisation of 

47 

 
 
expertise and equipment is continually improving. Major inventories or emergency equipment 
maintained by specialist service providers are available on a regional/transnational basis in the 
UK, Norway, and Italy. The Commission continues its co-operation with Member States and 
industry to ensure effective and up-to-date EERPs. 

Conclusions 

1. 
Even though there is collaboration and sharing of expertise, it is not clear whether this 
happens  consistently  across  all  concerned  MS  and  whether  the  efforts  made  are  due  to  the 
Directive.  It  seems  that  the  measures  in  the  Directive  including  the  particulars  on  external 
emergency response plans in Annexes VII and VIII have further stimulated collaboration and 
associated  sharing  of  inventories  and  expertise  of  Member  States’  personnel  throughout  the 
EU. Nevertheless, it remains unclear how far the harmonisation of equipment is adequate to 
react to large scale offshore accidents. 

It would be beneficial to undertake assessments of practical exercises, simulating the response 
to  accidents.  Given the limited information  available and the importance of this topic, there 
might  be  value  in  further  cooperating  with  EMSA  on  evaluating  Member  States'  exercises, 
specifically  related  to  the  effectiveness  of  transboundary  cooperation.  Commission  services 
may be asked to provide assistance in up-grading and up-dating the EERP.  

5.11

  Availability of dissuasive penalties for breaches of duty 

Analysis 

There  is  an  apparent  disparity  between  Member  States’  approaches  to  penalties  for  causing 
accidents and the enforcement of an appropriate follow-up. Article 34 requires Member States 
to  specify  rules  on  penalties  applicable  to  infringements  of  the  national  provisions  adopted 
pursuant  to  the Directive, specifying that those penalties should be “effective, proportionate 
and  dissuasive”.  Article  34  also  requires  Member  States  to  notify  their  provisions  to  the 
Commission by July 2015. Only  few Member States submitted information referring to  this 
duty. 

Member States may apply in the offshore oil and gas sector administrative, as well as criminal 
sanctions. Article 34 of  the Directive does not  specify the type of penalties and so Member 
States  may  choose  whether  to  use  criminal  or  administrative  sanctions.  In  some  cases,  as 
under  the  Directive  2008/99/EC  (Environmental  Crime  Directive46  (ECD)),  Member  States 
are obliged to criminalise certain behaviour. 

Whilst  most  sanctions  applied  by  Member  States  require  the  offence  to  include  both 
negligence  and  harm,  other  Member  States  prosecute  the  breach  of  duty,  not  the  effect.  In 

46 Directive 2008/99/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on the 
protection of the environment through criminal law (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 328, 6.12.2008, p. 
28–37.  

48 

 
 
                                                           
others,  a  near-miss  major  accident  is  treated  as  if  a  major  accident  has  indeed  occurred.  In 
some Member States it is not a criminal offence to spill oil from offshore petroleum activities 
(although it is an offence to spill oil from a tanker). 

It has been clarified in the discussions with the Member States that no consistency between 
their  measures  exists,  both  in  terms  of  powers,  functional  arrangements,  and  enforcement. 
One  Member  State  has  embedded  criminal  enforcement  powers  within  its  Competent 
Authority.  A  number  of  Member  States  prefer  direct-acting  sanctions  which  mandate 
improvements, or prohibit activities, rather than engaging with potentially resource intensive 
enforcement  processes  through  the  courts.  At  the  end  of  court  proceedings,  the  financial 
penalties  are  often  modest  or  insufficient  to  deter  certain  behaviour,  potentially  leading  to 
further accidents. 

Concerning  the  type  of  sanction,  many  Member  States  argue  that  the  publicity  attached  to 
enforcement is of itself a significant sanction, as the impact on corporate reputation is more 
significant than financial penalties themselves. This may be true to an extent, but the level of 
financial penalties applied to the oil and gas sector across the EU is extremely low. It is rare 
for a penalty exceeding 1 million Euro to be levied, which relative to the whole market value 
of  the  operators'  companies  may  not  be  significant.  Substantially  higher  penalties,  as 
appropriate  for  the  case  at  hand,  might  actually  make  more  of  an  impact  on  the  aspect  of 
dissuasion. Certainly, the social partners (TU’s and NGO’s) call for bigger financial penalties 
that are proportionate to the commercial scale of the sector, the high frequency of accidents, 
and their potentially wide-reaching impacts. 

There also appears to be no obvious relationship between offences in the context of a major 
accident hazard, and sanctions under licensing clauses. The Commission services are unaware 
of any license holder that has had its license revoked following a proven gross breach of duty.  

It  seems  that  several  factors  contributed  to  this  situation.  Firstly,  a  licensing  auction  for 
selecting  the  best  candidate  for  exploring  and  exploiting  a  new  offshore  area  tends  to  be  a 
buyer’s market, and Member States may be unwilling to drive out an operator. Secondly, the 
view  is  often  expressed  that  a  major  accident  caused  by  a  breach  of  duty  is  a  retrospective 
indicator.  From  the  industry’s  view,  under  this  argument,  an  operator  having  had  a  major 
accident will invariably become a better operator going forwards. To remove the license from 
an  operator  for  a  past  breach  is  a  severe  penalty.  Finally,  the  forced  disposal  of  assets  to 
another operator, even a member of the joint venture under the license involves commercial 
trading  and  potential  loss  and  denial  of  income.  Most  Member  States  would  avoid  being 
drawn into this difficult area, and perhaps being caught under legal summonses. 

As  mentioned  earlier,  there  has  been  no  major  offshore  accident  with  large  scale  effects  on 
workers  and  the  environment,  occurring  anywhere  in  the  EU  since  the  Directive  came  into 
effect.  Some  Member  States  had  no  experience  of  enforcing  sanctions  previous  to  this 
Directive. 

49 

 
 
 
Conclusions 

There are many different approaches amongst Member States to enforcement and to decisions 
concerning the follow-up to offences and breaches of duty. For offshore oil and gas operations 
no information is available to determine the superiority of either the administrative or criminal 
penalties’ effectiveness. 

However, Member States’ level of financial penalties for breaches of duty does not seem to be 
suitable  to  both  the  need  for  public  interest,  and  the  potential  consequences  of  a  major 
accident in EU waters, irrespective of the level of escalation in the accident concerned. It is 
unlikely that the current penalties will make a significant impact with either investors or the 
public. 

License  authorities  are  already  required,  pursuant  to  the  Directive,  to  take  into  account  the 
major  accident  prevention  performance  of  applicants.  Whilst  there  have  been  no  major 
accidents  with  blow-outs  in  recent  times,  competent  authorities  should  continue  to  pursue 
their right to provide independent expert advice to the licensing authorities with the objective 
to complement the information available for the selection decision. 

5.12

  Recovery of costs of maintaining the competent authority 

Analysis 

Under Article 8(5) of the Directive, Member States may establish mechanisms by which the 
financial  costs  accruing  to  the  competent  authority  in  carrying  out  its  functions  under  the 
Directive, may be recovered from licensees, operators or owners. 

During Commission's workshops, duty holders also raised concerns about the cost of applying 
the existing regulation. All but a very few competent authorities now practice some form of 
cost recovery. Member States that did not recover their costs prior to the Directive now do so. 

Funding levels of the different competent authorities do appear to be proportional to whether 
there is cost recovery, and the level of recovery. Funding has of course direct impact on the 
assurance  of  adequate  performance  of  the  duties  of  the  competent  authority  under  the 
Directive.  

There  are  some  considerations  attached  to  cost  recovery  schemes.  Member  States  have 
discretion  to  recover  their  costs  from  primary  duty  holders  (operators  of  production 
installations, owners of non-production installations). Equally, they may choose not to do so.  

Where  Member  States  choose  to  recover  costs,  they  should  act  in  an  accountable  and 
responsible  manner.  Therefore,  Member  States  may  envisage  to  publish  accounts  to 
demonstrate  that  only  pertinent  costs  are  being  recovered  so  that  duty  holders  are  not 
subsidising expenditures of the state unrelated to functions under the Directive. 

50 

 
 
Duty  holders  point  out  that  where  Member  States  use  a  charge-out  rate  mechanism  (based 
upon  an  hourly  rate  for  competent  authority  staff,  usually  front  line  inspectors47)  they 
sometimes  are  being  overcharged.  For  example,  where  a  meeting  with  the  competent 
authority is attended by a large number of inspectors, all of whom count as a cost under the 
charge-out  system  but  where  some  of  the  attendees  are  unnecessary  to  the  business  under 
discussion.  Duty  holders  also  report  that  where  one  Member  States  may  require  a  single 
RoMH  for  a  production  facility  comprising  several  linked  installations,  another  Member 
States may require a RoMH for each individual installation, increasing costs by Euro1million 
per additional RoMH. Duty holders also claim that competent authorities are not forthcoming 
with estimating charges for the next financial cycle, which complicates financial planning. 

All such situations are likely to be, in the opinion of the Member States concerned, entirely 
necessary  for  the  discharging  of  their  responsibilities.  Therefore,  these  become  matters  of 
reconciliation  between  the  ‘parties’.  However,  the  central  point  is  that  cost  recovery 
introduces an obvious tension in the duty holder – regulator relationship, the management of 
which is primarily the responsibility of the regulator. 

Where the operators' sector of a Member State is fully or partially state owned, cost recovery 
between  the  competent  authority  and  the  duty  holder  may  be  a  public  accounting  exercise. 
However,  there  have  been  calls  from  some  members  of  EUOAG  for  the  recovery  of  costs 
from  duty  holders  to  be  made  an  obligation,  so  as  to  create  a  level  playing  field  for  all 
competent authorities. 

Member States are obligated to ensure that the competent authority has adequate human and 
financial resources to discharge its functions under the Directive (Article 8(5)), as well as to 
review  the  activities  of  the  competent  authority  and  make  necessary  improvements  (Article 
8(9)). If reviews revealed that competent authorities are under-resourced, Member States are 
obligated to make the necessary resources available, in line with the Directive's provisions. 

The  Commission  published  a  report  in  2016,  pursuant  to  Article  27(4),  on  the  adequacy  of 
resources  of  competent  authorities  to  discharge  their  functions48.  This  report  found  that  on 
average  Member  States  had  a  10%  staffing  deficit  for  specialist  experts  in  areas  such  as: 
diving, naval architecture, and environmental engineering. The report also noted a slowdown 
in activity caused by a rapid fall in the oil price from $105 per barrel in 2013 to $40 at the end 
of 2015. It  called on Member States to ensure they recovered  their costs from industry, and 
ensured the competent authorities had appropriate resources to attract and train expert staff. 

In 2016, the Commission  also  asked Member States to  contribute to  a stocktake of national 
arrangements  for  discharging  their  functions  under  the  Directive,  pursuant  to  Article  27(5). 
Regrettably,  only  6  of  the  16  focal  Member  States  mentioned  previously,  provided 
information.  Broadly  speaking,  North  Sea  Member  States  replied  that  their  prior  resource-

47 These vary greatly between Member States’, e.g. €165/hr (RO) and €247/hr (UK/HSE),b UK has joint 
Competent Authority and environmental regulator, OPRED, charges €206/hr.  
48 COM(2016) 318 final Report from the Commission on the adequacy of national expert resources for 
complying with the regulatory functions pursuant to Article 27(4) of Directive 201330/EU. See also the Staff 
Working Document for further details: SWD (2016) 182 final. 

51 

 
 
                                                           
bases  were  adequate,  having  been  improved  by  combining  safety  and  environmental 
regulators  into  a  single  competent  authority.  Smaller  Member  States  indicated  the  nature  of 
their  tentative  arrangements  to  reach  out  to  pools  of  external  expertise,  should  there  be  an 
uptick in activity.  

Conclusions 

Some stakeholders consider it desirable to have all Member States recover the costs of their 
activities  under  the  Directive,  using  responsible  and  accountable  mechanisms.  There  are 
several possible mechanisms for this, including but not limited to: a levy, a charge per activity 
(RoMH assessment;  installation inspection, etc.), or an hourly  charge-out rate per inspector. 
For  these  measures,  the  costs  of  regulation  would  be  entirely  transparent  for  each  Member 
State  and  could  be  an  additional  parameter  in  a  subsequently  revised  taxonomy  of  the 
Commission’s annual reporting. However, since the Directive leaves flexibility for achieving 
certain  goals,  it  does  not  prescribe  procedural  issues  such  as  a  statutory  duty  on  Member 
States to recover costs from industry. 

The requirement at Article 8(9) of the Directive for Member States to review and thereafter 
ensure  the  effectiveness  of  their  competent  authorities  provides  a  future  insight  to  the  key 
point of this theme; that sufficient human and financial resources are available for competent 
authorities to discharge their responsibilities.   

  Special theme: Liability, compensation claims and financial  security of offshore 

5.13
oil and gas producers 

5.13.1
5.13.1.1

  Overview 

The framework 

This part of the assessment presents the: 

  Legal frame of the Directive, 
  A summary of the preceding Commission's report on these subjects,  
  The issues in the context the European Parliament’s resolution, which includes requests 

how to deal with these themes,  

  A  summary  of  rules  and  legislation  in  Member  States,  including  the  quality  of  the 

Directive’s implementation,  

  A summary of the views of stakeholders, received via the public consultation and expert 

consultation (see annexe ….). 

Finally, this assessment presents an approach taken by the UK to ensure financial security in 
the event of a costly accident: the Offshore Pollution Liability Agreement (OPOL). 

5.13.1.2

  Legal provisions of the Directive 

The  themes  of  liability,  the  handling  of  compensation  claims  and  financial  security  of  the 
licensee are closely linked to each other. Article 7 of the Directive, with reference to Directive 
2004/35/EC  (ELD)  concerns  “liability  for  environmental  damage”,  which  establishes 

52 

 
 
 
“financial liability for the prevention and remediation of environmental damage as defined in 
the  Directive”.  Furthermore,  Article  4(3)  of  the  Directive  uses  the  term  “liabilities”, 
apparently  establishing  a  broader  notion.  Regarding  the  financial  capability  of  the  applicant 
for  a  license  authorising  offshore  operations,  the  Directive  requires  the  ability  to  cover 
“potential economic damages where such liability is provided by national law” (Article 4(3c) 
of the Directive). 

The  Offshore  Safety  Directive  frequently  refers  to  the  environmental  liability  regime, 
designed  by  Member  States  when  implementing  the  Environmental  Liability  Directive. 
Member  States  had  to  implement  provisions  on  liability  of  the  Offshore  Safety  Directive 
(Article 4, paragraphs 2 and 3). This assessment uses the term “liability” in reference to “civil 
liability”.  

The Directive attributes liability to the licensee (see recital 58, Articles 4 and 7) and requests 
the  licensing  authority  to  take  into  account  the  financial  security  of  the  applicant  before 
granting a license. However, given that the Directive has merely established a framework, the 
specific rules in each Member State, for example the assessment of the financial strength of 
an applicant, depends on national legislation regarding the implementation of the Directive. 

The  Directive  does  not  establish  procedures  for  dealing  with  financial  claims  under  civil 
liability,  for  example,  regarding  polluted  property,  personal  injury,  or  economic  losses. 
According to Article 4 (paragraph 3, point 4), “Member States shall, as a minimum, establish 
procedures for ensuring prompt and adequate handling of compensation claims including in 
respect  of  compensation  payments  for  trans-boundary  incidents.”  The  Directive  does  not 
provide further details on how such rules should be designed, nor does it provide criteria for 
examining  the  financial  security  of  the  licensee.  Member  States  set  these  rules  themselves 
taking into account its culture on legislation and the particular regional situation. 

The Directive contains further provisions on liability. It recalls “the party responsible should 
always be clearly identifiable before offshore oil and gas operations are commenced” (recital 
9).  It  also  clarifies  “that  holders  of  authorisations  for  offshore  oil  and  gas  operations 
pursuant  to  Directive  94/22/EC49  are  also  the  liable  ‘operators’  within  the  meaning  of 
Directive  2004/35/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  of  21  April  2004  on 
environmental  liability  with  regard  to  the  prevention  and  remedying  of  environmental 
damage,  and  should  not  delegate  their  responsibilities  in  this  regard  to  third  parties 
contracted by them” (recital 11). 

The  Directive  requires  Member  States  to  ensure  that  their  respective  legal  systems  do  not 
allow  the  exclusion  or  limitation  of  the  operator’s  duties  by  entrusting  the  performance  of 
tasks (possibly leading to or contributing to major accidents) to other entities on a contractual 
basis (Article 3(2)).  

49 Directive 94/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 1994 on the conditions for 
granting and using authorizations for the prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbons, OJ L 164, 
30.6.1994, p. 3–8.  

53 

 
 
                                                           
Furthermore,  its  Article  4  (2  c)  on  “safety  and  environmental  considerations  relating  to 
licenses” provides for that already in the phase of granting licenses the authority should take 
into account “the applicant’s financial capabilities, including any financial security, to cover 
liabilities potentially deriving from the offshore oil and gas operations in question including 
liability for potential economic damages where such liability is provided for by national law”. 

Article 4(3) of the Directive obliges Member States to require evidence of licensee’s technical 
and financial  capacity for effective emergency response and subsequent  remediation, and to 
assess  provided  evidence.  It  also  requires  Member  States  to  facilitate  the  deployment  of 
sustainable  financial  instruments  and  other  arrangements  to  assist  prospective  licensees  in 
demonstrating  their  financial  capacity,  as  well  as  to  “establish  procedures  for  ensuring 
prompt and adequate handling of compensation claims”. 

Furthermore, the Directive’s Article 7 on “liability for environmental damage” underlines that 
“Member  States  shall  ensure  that  the  licensee  is  financially  liable  for  the  prevention  and 
remediation of environmental damage as defined in that Directive [ELD], caused by offshore 
oil and gas operations carried out by, or on behalf of, the licensee or the operator.”. 

The Directive sets only a frame for aspects as liability, financial security and the handling of 
compensation  claims.  Furthermore,  it  requires  the  Commission  to  report  on  the  issue  of 
liability.  The  Commission’s  report  published  in  2015  provides  an  assessment  of  the 
effectiveness  of  the  liability  regimes  in  the  Union,  with  respect  to  the  damage  caused  by 
offshore oil and gas operations50. 

5.13.2

  Commission report on liability, compensation and financial security 

At  the  time  of  publication  of  the  requested  report  by  the  Commission,51  on  14  September 
2015,  only  a  few  Member  States  had  implemented  the  Directive  into  national  law. 
Accordingly, the Commission could neither draw final conclusions nor issue recommendation 
on the potential follow up. Instead, its analysis found the following:  

50 REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL on 
liability, compensation and financial security for offshore oil and gas operations pursuant to Article 39 of 
Directive 2013/30/EU, COM/2015/0422 final 
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Liability, Compensation and Financial Security for Offshore 
Accidents in the European Economic Area Accompanying the document Report from the Commission to the 
European Parliament and the Council on liability, compensation and financial security for offshore oil and gas 
operations pursuant to Article 39 of Directive 2013/30/EU, SWD/2015/0167 final.  
51 REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL on 
liability, compensation and financial security for offshore oil and gas operations pursuant to Article 39 of 
Directive 2013/30/EU, COM/2015/0422 final 
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Liability, Compensation and Financial Security for Offshore 
Accidents in the European Economic Area Accompanying the document Report from the Commission to the 
European Parliament and the Council on liability, compensation and financial security for offshore oil and gas 
operations pursuant to Article 39 of Directive 2013/30/EU, SWD/2015/0167 final. 

54 

 
 
                                                           
“Broadening liability provisions through EU legislation does not appear appropriate at this 
point of time. In certain cases, the Brussels I52 and Rome II53 regulations prevent differences 
in  national  regimes  from  disadvantaging  claimants  from  other  EU  Member  States.  In 
addition,  some  Member  States  may  be  reappraising  their  existing  liability  regimes  for 
offshore accidents in tandem with other changes introduced by the Directive.  

However, the Commission will be able to conclude on the need for further steps by the time of 
the Directive’s first implementation report. Notably the Commission can54: 

• Continue to advance liability issues through structured EUOAG discussions;  

• Focus on liability-related provisions in the Directive conformity checks; and  

• Use EUOAG meetings for systematic data gathering covering all liability-related aspects of 
newly transposed laws. 

There is  currently a lack of  uptake of  financial  security instruments  to  fully cover the  more 
infrequent  and  costly  offshore  accidents  in  the  EU.  In  addition,  there  are  just  two 
compensation  mechanisms  currently  in  place  specifically  for  oil  and  gas  accidents  in  the 
Focal States. However, provisions in the Directive should lead to significant improvements in 
both of these areas.  

Should  the  new  national  laws  not  improve  the  availability  of  financial  security  instruments 
and  put  in  place  procedures  for  ensuring  prompt  and  adequate  handling  of  compensation 
claims,  the  Commission  may  reassess  whether  and  what  further  EU  action  could  achieve 
these objectives. 

The Commission encourages Member States to share their experiences on financial security 
instruments, liability, compensation and criminal penalties…” 

The Commission report concludes that “on the basis of this, the Commission should be well 
placed to conclude on the need for further steps. The effects of the Directive, as implemented 
by Member States,  will  show  in  the coming years  whether it is  appropriate to  bring certain 
conduct leading to major offshore accidents within the scope of criminal law for further re-
enforcing  offshore  safety.  When  appropriate,  the  Commission  will  put  forward  a  legislative 
proposal.” 

Taking into account the late transposition of the Directive by Member States, it is considered 
that the report’s conclusions are still valid. 

52 REGULATION (EU) No 1215/2012 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 12 
December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters, OJ of 20 December 2012, L 351, p. 1 – 32. 
53 REGULATION (EC) No 864/2007 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 11 
July 2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II), OJ of 31 July 2007, L 199, p. 40 – 49. 
54 Commission services have dealt with all three work streams. 

55 

 
 
                                                           
5.13.2.1

  The European Parliament’s resolution on liability and compensation claims 

In the  year  following the Commission’s report on liability, the European Parliament  carried 
out an in-depth assessment on “Liability, compensation and financial security for offshore oil 
and  gas  operations”  and  issued  a  resolution  on  this  subject  on  1  December  201655. 
Specifically, with regard to liability, the European Parliament: 

• “Calls on the Commission to assess the appropriateness of introducing further harmonised 
rules on liability, compensation and financial security with a view to preventing any further 
accidents with cross-border implications;” (page 159)  

• “Regrets, in this context, that the Directive does not deal with liability for civil damage to 
either  natural  or  legal  persons,  be  it  bodily  injury,  property  damage  or  economic  loss, 
whether direct or indirect;” (page 160) 

•  “Stresses  that  there  is  no  liability  in  many  of  the  Member  States  with  offshore  and  gas 
activities for most third-party claims for compensation for traditional damage caused by an 
accident;” (page 160) 

• “Is of the opinion that strict civil liability rules should be established for offshore accidents 
in order to facilitate access to justice for victims (both legal and natural persons) of offshore 
accidents, as this can provide an incentive for the offshore operator to properly manage the 
risks of operations; believes that  liability caps should be avoided;” (page 160) 

•  “Emphasises,  therefore,  that  it  is  of  the  utmost  importance  to  update  existing  liability 
systems in the Member States in order to ensure that, should an incident occur in their waters, 
it would not adversely affect the future of the offshore oil and gas operations of the state in 
question, nor that of the EU as a whole were it to occur in an area that is largely dependent 
on tourism for revenue.” (Page 161) 

At  several  occasions,  the  Commission  has  discussed  questions  of  liability,  compensation 
claims  and  financial  security  with  Member  States  in  the  European  Offshore  Authorities 
Group,  also  in  the  context  of  the  European  Parliament’s  resolution.  At  the  same  time,  the 
Commission  has  analysed  and  assessed  to  what  extent  and  depth  Member  States  have 
strengthened  the  notion  of  “liability”  in  legislation  related  to  the  implementation  of  the 
Directive.  Furthermore,  the  Commission  has  asked  Member  States  whether  horizontal 
legislation would be effective and adequate in the absence of specific legislation for offshore 
oil  and  gas  installations.  However,  the  variety  of  positions  and  the  incomplete  set  of 
information  requires  further  analysis  before  conclusions  on  a  potential  follow-up  can  be 
drawn. 

55 Liability, compensation and financial security for offshore oil and gas operations European Parliament 
resolution of 1 December 2016 on liability, compensation and financial security for offshore oil and gas 
operations (2015/2352(INI)), OJ of 27 June 2018, C 224, p 157 – 162. 

56 

 
 
                                                           
  Diversity  of  rules  on  liability,  handling  of  compensation  claims,  and 

5.13.3
financial security instruments in Member States’ jurisdictions 

The  applicable  environmental  liability  regime  under  the  2004/35/EC  ELD  and  the  Offshore 
Safety Directive (Article 7) is a strict liability system for all types of environmental damage if 
caused by certain dangerous activities, among which are also offshore oil and gas operations. 

As mentioned above, all Member States apply the same rules for environmental liability, as 
established  by  Art.  7  of  the  Directive  (with  reference  to  the  definitions  of  the  ELD): 
“…Member  States  shall  ensure  that  the  licensee  is  financially  liable  for  the  prevention  and 
remediation of environmental damage as defined in that Directive, caused by offshore oil and 
gas operations carried out by, or on behalf of, the licensee or the operator.”. In contrast, on 
the matter of civil liability, rules and legislation reflect cultural and historical developments in 
Member States and therefore vary considerably. Liability provisions may have a major impact 
and potentially significant costs on different actors depending how arrangements are operating 
in different jurisdictions.  

With  regard  to  Member  States’  legislation,  it  is  important  to  distinguish  between  strict 
liability and fault based (tort based) liability regimes following a major accident, including to 
the  environment,  as  well  as  within  the  traditional  damage  category  of  ‘economic  losses 
between  consequential  and  pure  economic  loss56.  Strict  liability  means  that  the  identified 
liable  party  will  be  subject  to  liability,  e.g.  by  compensation  payments,  without  the  need  to 
establish  fault  and  even  if  it  properly  applied  all  legal  obligations  and  expected  safety 
measures.  In contrast,  fault based liability may lead to  a  financial  compensation only in  the 
case of negligence or intent leading to the major accident.  

Regarding  the  remediation  of  losses  arising  from  a  major  accident,  Member  States  have 
different rules on liability and compensation payments in place, which may lead to different 
financial liabilities for the operators and owners of offshore installations.  

Here is an overview of characteristics of applicable Member States’ legislation: 

General framework: 

  Effects  of  liability  provisions  may  act  offshore  specific  (i.e.  geography),  sector  specific 

(i.e. industry) or as general rules (i.e. national generic provisions). 

  Some Member States did not  establish clear legislation on liability, leaving liability  and 

compensation determinations subject to the judgements of national courts. 

Specific characteristics of liability and compensation are: 

  Liability of the licensee as requested by the Directive at Article 7. 

56 Member States’ legislation distinguishes between pure economic loss and consequential economic loss. Pure 
economic loss occurs independent of any physical damage to the person or property of the victim. Hence, 
liability for consequential economic loss is in general much wider accepted. 

57 

 
 
                                                           
 
  Strict liability versus fault based liability: the majority of Member States operate a strict 
liability regime, meaning that the identified liable party may be subject for compensation 
payments,  even  if  it  applied  all  rules  and  safety  measures  (fault  or  culpa  is  not  a 
condition), but caused nonetheless the damage.  

  Some Member States operate fault-based liability, with  the burden of proof for the fault 
either on the defendant (that would normally be the operator/licensee) or the claimant. 
  Beyond environmental liability established under Directive 2004/35/EC, in most Member 
States,  further  to  compensation  for  bodily  injuries  and  property  damage  and  other 
economic  loss,  an  entity  liable  for  an  accident  (in  the  offshore  sector,  normally  the 
operator) shall also compensate for environmental pollution. 
In certain Member States, only bodily injuries and property damages qualify for financial 
compensation. 

 

In  summary,  the  liability  regimes  applicable  in  Member  States  vary  substantially,  and  each 
Member State applies, a mix of specific and general provisions, some unique to a particular 
Member States. 

According  to  Article  14  of  the  ELD  “Member  States  shall  take  measures  to  encourage  the 
development of financial security instruments and markets by the appropriate economic and 
financial  operators,  including  financial  mechanisms  in  case  of  insolvency,  with  the  aim  of 
enabling  operators  to  use  financial  guarantees  to  cover  their  responsibilities  under  this 
Directive.”.  Since  the  Directive  does  not  provide  additional  legislation,  Member  States  are 
largely free to set rules on the acceptance of financial security instruments. 

5.13.4

Implementation by Member States and the effectiveness of rules 

Article 3(2) of the Directive aims at ensuring that legal systems of focal Member States do not 
allow  the  exclusion  or  limitation  of  the  operator’s  duties  by  entrusting  the  performance  of 
tasks  to  other  entities  on  a  contractual  basis.  Its  application  should  not  be  limited  to 
organisational  aspects  of  offshore  oil  and  gas  operations,  but  should  be  also  reflected  in 
liability regulations related to this type of industrial activity.  

It should be noted that the legal systems of some Member States allow for the limitation of an 
entity’s liability, obliged to take or refrain from a specific action, in case of an assignment of 
this obligation to a contractor (culpa in eligendo). The usual prerequisites of such a limitation 
are  the  professional  character  of  the  contractor  and  a  due  diligence  taken  by  the  assigning 
entity  before  the  assignment.  Application  of  the  rule  in  question  may  lead  to  a  complete 
transfer of a potential liability, arising from non-performance or improper performance of the 
required task, from the initially obliged entity to its contractor. If applied to the relationship 
between the licensee and any of its contractors, the said rule would limit, at least partially, the 
liability  of  the  former  and  transfer  it  to  the  latter  (i.e.  an  entity  usually  of  a  lower  financial 
capacity than the licensee), possibly stopping potential claims from being fully satisfied. Such 
a  result  would  contradict  the  basic  principles  of  the  Directive.  Thus  Article  3(2)  should  be 
implemented  by  the  Member  States  by  putting  into  effect,  if  necessary,  regulations  not 
allowing for the licensee’s liability to be limited in case of contracting of certain obligations, 
arising  from  offshore  oil  and  gas  operations,  to  a  third  party.  Several  Member  States  have 

58 

 
 
 
amended  the  rules  existing  in  their  respective  legal  systems  to  comply  with  the  Directive’s 
provisions. 

It should be added that the accepted protocol in the offshore sector, upheld in all commercial 
legal  instruments  used  in  the  offshore  sector  (usually  English  or  US  commercial  law 
provisions),  is  that  the  operator  is  liable  for  all  financial  damages  from  accidents  involving 
subsurface substances. This protocol has been thoroughly tested right up to the present time as 
operator  BP  has  unsuccessfully  pursued  its  contractors  for  a  contribution  to  the  financial 
liabilities arising from the Deep Waster Horizon (Macondo) disaster in the Gulf of Mexico57.  

Member  States  had  difficulties  demonstrating  adequate  implementation  of  Article  4  of  the 
Directive,  which  includes  provisions  on  safety  and  environmental  considerations  relating  to 
licenses,  specifically  basic  provisions  on  liability,  compensation  claims  and  the  financial 
capabilities of applicants for a license. However, Member States’ existing horizontal national 
legislation frequently provides for the principles of Article 4. In certain Member States where 
this  is  not  the  case,  jurisprudence  by  the  national  courts  may  ensure  that  Article  4  is  in 
principal  applied.  Where  Member  States  do  not  have  adequate  provisions  in  place,  the 
Commission follows up this issue. 

Under  Article  4(3)  of  the  Directive,  Member  States  “shall,  as  a  minimum,  establish 
procedures for ensuring prompt and adequate handling of compensation claims including in 
respect of compensation payments for trans- boundary incidents.” At the current stage, due to 
the absence of major accidents involving considerable damage, the Commission cannot fully 
assess the effectiveness of the implementation of this part of Article 4.  

It  has  been  noted,  however,  that  the  approach  to  this  implementation  varies  significantly. 
Many  Member  States  did  not  amend  their  legislation  to  comply  with  the  Directive’s 
provisions,  considering  that  legal  frameworks  ruling  on  compensation  schemes  in  their 
respective systems are sufficient to handle any compensation claim arising from offshore oil 
and  gas  operations.  Other  Member  States  have  foreseen  some  amendments  leading  to,  inter 
alia, prioritisation of enforcement of such claims or imposition on licensees of an obligation to 
set up internal handling procedures applicable to claims arising from offshore incidents.    

Prompt handling of compensation claims depends significantly on the efficiency of particular 
legal systems, especially expressed in the average length of proceedings58. In Member States 
where  civil  courts  have  jurisdiction  to  handle  claims  arising  from  offshore  oil  and  gas 
operations, and where resolving civil cases takes particularly long, ensuring prompt handling 
of  compensation  claims  may  prove  especially  challenging.  Putting  in  place  specific  rules 
might  help  Member States to  ensure that the compensation claims covered by the  Directive 
are handled within a reasonable timeframe.  

57 See: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-OILCOMMISSION/pdf/GPO-OILCOMMISSION.pdf 
58 See: The 2018 EU Justice Scoreboard - Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Central Bank, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions COM(2018) 364 final.  

59 

 
 
                                                           
For example, in the UK any affected party needs to file the claim in line with national rules 
and legislation (e.g. to an authority, an intermediary or a specialised compensation scheme). If 
the claim is valid and the financial compensation attributed, the liability party shall settle the 
claim. The competent authority requires the liable licensee to take the necessary preventive or 
remedial action to restore the baseline condition of the damaged natural resources (clean-up 
and primary, complementary, or compensatory remediation) and to bear the full liability. 

It  remains  a  political  decision  whether  to  consider  additional  or  reinforced  EU-wide 
harmonisation measures, targeting both the environmental and civil liability regimes.  

According  to  the  Directive,  when  assessing  the  technical  and  financial  capability,  including 
any  financial  security,  of  the  applicant  for  a  license,  due  account  should  be  taken  of  the 
applicants financial capabilities to cover liabilities deriving from offshore operations (Article 
4(2)c). Liabilities apply both for environmental pollution and potential economic liability for 
economic  damages  where  such  liability  is  provided  by  national  law.  However,  despite  the 
importance  of  this  provision,  from  a  total  of  16  Member  States  with  exploration  or 
production, 8 did not fully or not correctly implement paragraph 2 of this Article. 

According to Article 4, paragraph 3, Member States shall ensure that the licensing authority 
does  not  grant  a  licence  unless  it  is  satisfied  with  evidence  from  the  applicant  that  the 
applicant has made or will make adequate provision, to cover liabilities. Six Member States 
did not adequately transpose this part of the Directive. 

In  the  EU  so  far,  enterprises  have  covered  costs  from  accidents  with  their  financial  means. 
However, even the largest  enterprise may  face difficulties to  deal  with  accident costs  at  the 
scale of the Deepwater Horizon case. 

Since  Member  States  had  to  report  accidents  to  the  Commission  (from  2016),  no  major 
accidents  incurring  serious  pollution  or  damage  have  occurred.  As  a  result  neither  practical 
experiences nor examples regarding the appropriateness of operators/owners financial means 
for the effective handling of large scale and numerous compensation claims are available for 
recent years.  

5.13.5

The Oil Pollution Liability Agreement (OPOL) 

The Atlantic region’s Member States are members of the Oil Pollution Liability Agreement. 
This system is operated by a not-for-profit management group, and provides a financial safety 
net wherein members indemnify a liability where the liable entity defaults on their financial 
responsibility. 

License-holders  active  on  the  UK  Continental  Shelf  are  party  to  the  OPOL,  as  are 
licensee/operators of offshore facilities located in the territorial waters of Denmark, Germany, 
France, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Norway (essentially the Atlantic/OSPAR region).  

Under the OPOL Agreement (dated 4 September 1974, as subsequently amended), operating 
companies agree to accept liability for pollution damage and the cost of remedial measures up 

60 

 
 
 
to a maximum of US$250 million per incident, with only certain exceptions. Within this limit 
there may also be included the cost of remedial measures undertaken by the party to OPOL 
involved in the incident. 

The parties must demonstrate:  

  Financial  responsibility  to  meet  claims  arising  under  OPOL  safety  net  (i.e.  qualifying 
incidents)  by  producing  evidence  of  insurance  from  insurers  with  the  financial  credit 
strength rating required by the OPOL rules, and/or,  

  Guarantees from companies with acceptable financial or credit strength rating required by 

the rules and/or,  

  By  demonstrating  with  acceptable  evidence  that  they  qualify  as  a  self-insurer  that  also 

meets the financial or credit strength rating required by the rules.  

They also jointly agree that in the event of a default by one of the parties, each will contribute 
proportionally to meet claims. 

The  responsibility  for  meeting  claims  under  OPOL  rests  solely  with  the  operator.  As  in  all 
joint  ventures,  the  operator  may  wish  to  make  its  own  arrangements  as  to  financial 
responsibility with other participants (known as non-operators) in a venture, but these will not 
involve a submission to or scrutiny by OPOL of any financial documentation concerning non-
operators.  

OPOL initially applied to offshore installations within the jurisdiction of the UK. Membership 
is  a  prequalification  item  for  application  for  a  license  and  must  be  maintained  in  order  to 
continue  to  hold  a  license.  The  OPOL  system  was  later  extended  to  apply  to  offshore 
installations within the jurisdiction of other countries as well, although only the UK requires 
OPOL membership as a license condition.  

To sum up, the OPOL system is set up to: 

  Provide an orderly means for the expeditious settlement of claims arising out of an escape 

or discharge of oil from offshore exploration and production operations; 

  Stimulate immediate remedial action by the parties; 
  Ensure the financial responsibility of the parties to meet their obligations; 
  Provide a mechanism for ensuring that claims are met up to the maximum liability under 

OPOL; 

  Avoid complicated jurisdictional problems. 
Under the OPOL system, each operator agrees that it will reimburse the public authorities the 
costs of remedial damage and pay compensation to third parties for pollution damage arising 
from  a  discharge  of  oil  from  offshore  facilities  up  to  an  aggregate  maximum  of  US$  250 
million per incident.  

OPOL members must submit evidence of financial responsibility for their offshore facilities 
throughout the period of their membership. This must be for an amount not less than US$250 

61 

 
 
million  per  incident  and  US$500  million  in  the  annual  aggregate.  Should  a  member’s 
financial  status  alter  such  that  it  cannot  meet  its  obligations  under  the  Rules,  the  entity’s 
OPOL  membership  will  be  suspended.  In  the  UK  suspension  of  OPOL  membership  would 
automatically suspend the license holding. 

The arrangements for monitoring and enforcement under the rules are robust. In the 45 year 
history  of  OPOL,  during  which  operators  and  owners  have  dealt  with  the  cost  of  major 
accidents, OPOL members have never been called upon to indemnify a loss where the liable 
entity cannot meet its obligations.   

5.13.6

Financial security 

In industry’s estimation, several Member States have brought into effect robust and workable 
financial  responsibility  requirements,  specifically  to  implement  Article  4.  For  example,  the 
2018 publication “Liability Provision Guidelines for Offshore Petroleum Operations” by Oil 
& Gas UK. 

The  UK  licensing  authority  (the  Oil  and  Gas  Authority,  OGA)  has  adopted  guidance  first 
brought  into  effect  by  the  UK  trade  body  (Oil  and  Gas  UK),  a  model  code  of  practice  to 
comply with the Directive, specifically Member States obligation to grant a license pursuant 
to  Article  4(3).  This  has  attracted  wider  interest  as  a  generic  good  practice  guide  for  other 
jurisdictions, including third countries. 

The  Guidelines  (which  have  been  adopted  by  the  UK  government  as  a  suitable  code  of 
practice  for  both  the  licensing  authority  and  the  applicants  for  licenses)  encapsulate  a 
straightforward process to determine the level of financial responsibility to be maintained by 
licensees  for  their  operations.  The  objective  is  to  cover  all  foreseeable  costs,  including: 
bringing  a  well  under  control,  clean-up,  and  potential  third-party  compensation.  It  uses 
information which must in any case be prepared as part of the IERP59.  

The guidelines identify the type of financial instruments necessary to satisfy the required level 
of capacity acceptable to the regulator, as well as the means of verification of security by the 
licensing authority.   

In the UK, licensees can use different forms of financial instruments to demonstrate financial 
responsibility. The level of financial responsibility is based on the results of an oil spill cost 
modelling  performed  by  an  external  consultant.  The  modelling  uses  a  range  of  inputs  to 
determine  the  level  of  exposure  and  subsequent  financial  responsibility.  These  include: 
reservoir characteristics, well fluids, potential direct loss or damage suffered by users of the 
polluted sea areas, as well as the length of coastline impacted and the estimated volume of oil 
that may land on the shoreline and associated clean up and remediation costs thereof.  

59 In the North Sea region the IERP is historically called the Oil Pollution Emergency Plan or OPEP. 

62 

 
 
 
                                                           
The  UK  model  might  help  other  Member  States  shape  financial  responsibility  requirements 
adequate  for  their  environment.  It  is  indeed  possible  that  adequate  requirements  can  be 
stipulated  and  implemented  at  the  level  of  each  Member  State;  however  each  jurisdiction 
would be required to identify their specific criteria. 

5.13.7

  Conclusions  

Several  Member  States  did  not  fully  implement  the  provisions  of  the  Directive  on  liability, 
handling of  compensation claims and financial security of the licensee.  However, in  certain 
Member  States,  existing  horizontal  laws  and  case  law  may  nevertheless  include  adequate 
provisions.  For  clearer  conclusions  an  in-depth  assessment  of  Member  States  legislation, 
specifically their civil code, may provide more detailed information. Such an assessment, to 
be carried out on an individual basis, should take into account data concerning the efficiency 
of  national  justice  systems.  This  assessment  would  aim  to  identify  whether  significant 
differences  in  the  scope  of  liability,  effectiveness,  and  length  of  court  proceedings  can  be 
identified and what consequences these have. 

Views from the industrial associations clearly express satisfaction with the current situation of 
legislation applicable in this context whereas NGOs and the very few citizens who took part 
in the public consultation, express concerns and propose looking more closely at the option of 
a European approach (details please seen in the annex, part VII). This is partly in line with the 
above mentioned resolution of the European Parliament. 

The OPOL may serve as an example of how to deal with liabilities going beyond the financial 
means of the licensee liable for damages, although it has never been used in practice. Clearly, 
the  contribution  of  OPOL  is  limited  (at  $250m)  to  cover  the  most  likely  major  accident 
scenarios in the region but would not be able to cover the extreme major accidents. The UK 
has  produced  guidance  for  industry  and  regulators  on  how  to  comply  with  Article  4  of  the 
Directive,  providing  mechanisms  for  determining  liability  based  upon  risk  (i.e.  the  severity 
levels  of  geographical  locations),  and  for  verifying  financial  guarantees  of  license  holders. 
This  has  been  put  into  effect  by  the  UK  licensing  authority  and  may  serve  as  a  model 
elsewhere.  

Due to the short period of time since the Directive has been implemented and applied for all 
installations,  there  is  a  lack  of  practical  experience.  No  major  accident  leading  to  major 
damages  has  been  reported  in  the  last  decade.  Therefore,  it  is  difficult  to  draw  clear 
conclusions as to the Directive’s effectiveness now. 

Should, however, a major accident occur, the statutory provisions on liability, the handling of 
compensation claims, and the financial status of the liable party are of major significance for 
the Member States, the license holder, entities sustaining consequential loss, and citizens. Due 
to  the  low  level  of  specificity  in  this  area  of  the  Directive,  and  often  not  fully  consistent 
implementation of the relevant parts of the Directive across Member States, national rules and 
procedures differ. Member States adopt systems in line with their culture and specific regional 

63 

 
 
situation. Although the channelling of liability to the licensee by the Directive provides a high 
added-value, the Directive contributes only by setting some basic aims for a broader detailed 
framework  of  legislation  on  compensation  and  financial  security  that  exists  to  a  greater  or 
lesser  extent  in  each  Member  State.  In  Member  States  where  operators  and  owners  are  not 
subject  to  a  strict  liability  regime,  meaning  that  they  were  liable  only  if  negligence  was 
proved, substantial costs caused by accidents may remain with taxpayers and other parties. 

  Special  theme:  Criminal  sanctions  to  breaches  of  duty  to  safeguard  the 

5.14
environment from major accidents 

Introduction 

With  regard  to  the  Offshore  Safety  Directive  the  Commission  addressed  this  matter  in  its 
2015 report to the Parliament and Council60 and concluded:  

“It  is  therefore  too  early  at  present  to  assess  whether  penalties  to  be  devised  by  Member 
States  in  the  context  of  the  OSD  transposition  and  subsequent  implementation  will  provide 
sufficient deterrence consistently across the EU, or whether EU criminal penalties would be 
essential to ensure the fully effective safety of offshore operations”. 

The ECD contains obligations for Member States to establish certain environmental offences 
as criminal offences, if committed intentionally or with serious negligence. To some extent, 
the Directive harmonises sanctions, as it requires that natural persons are subject to criminal 
sanctions  that  are  effective,  proportionate,  and  dissuasive.  In  relation  to  legal  persons,  the 
Directive does not require criminal sanctions. 

Under the ECD, Member States must attach criminal sanctions to certain acts that cause or are 
likely to cause death or serious injury, or substantial damage to the quality of air, the quality 
of  soil,  the  quality  of  water,  or  to  animals  or  plants.  However,  those  acts  are  only  to  be 
criminalised when certain acts of EU legislation that are listed in the Annexes of the ECD are 
infringed.  The  criminalised  acts  include,  the  illegal  discharge  of  hazardous  substances  into 
surface water (if it causes or is likely to cause death or injury to persons or significant damage 
to  the  environment),  the  illegal  shipment  of  waste  from  the  European  Union  (only  if  a 
significant quantity of waste is involved and if there is a clear intention to make a profit out of 
it),  and  the  illegal  export  of  ozone  depleting  substances  to  developing  countries.  However, 
activities covered by the Offshore Safety Directive are not included.  

The current situation in the EU 

As reflected in Article 39(3) of the Directive, this lack of application prompts considerations 
about  the implication of not  having  certain  conduct,  leading to  offshore  accidents under the 
scope  of  criminal  law  through  EU  legislation.  While  criminal  liability  for  offshore  safety 

60 COM (2015) 422 final dated 14 September 2015.   

64 

 
 
                                                           
breaches would not directly affect the remediation of damage caused, in theory it may add a 
separate layer of deterrence beyond environmental civil and administrative liability.  

Offshore safety breaches already fall under the criminal code of some focal Member States. 
For example, the laws of both the UK and Denmark contain provisions criminalising certain 
compliance  failures61.  However,  neither  the  definition  of  the  criminal  offences,  nor  the 
minimum  type  and  level  of  sanctions  are  harmonized  in  the  EU.  There  are  strict  legal 
preconditions that must be fulfilled before considering whether to criminalise offshore safety 
breaches  through  EU  legislation.  Article  83(2)  of  the  Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the 
European  Union  establishes  the  legal  basis  for  creating  minimum  rules  to  define  criminal 
offences and sanctions in a particular EU policy area. This expressly enables EU legislators to 
adopt: "minimum rules with regard to the definition of criminal offences and sanctions in the 
area concerned" if this "proves essential to ensure effective implementation of a Union policy 
in an area which has been subject to harmonisation measures". 

The adoption of EU criminal law measures is therefore subject to the assessment of whether 
they  are  "essential"  to  achieving  effective  policy  implementation.  As  such,  the  decision  to 
include breaches of the Directive under the scope of criminal law can only follow a thorough 
necessity  and  proportionality  test  on  whether  criminal  law  measures  would  be  essential  to 
achieve the stated objective. This cannot be done before more experience with the Directive’s 
effectiveness has been gained62. The Commission is currently doing an ex-post assessment of 
the  ECD,  with  a  view  to  establish  whether  the  Directive  has  achieved  its  objectives  to 
contribute to better protection of the environment. The assessment started in 2019 and will be 
concluded in  the first  half of 2020.  It  will assess results for the time the Directive has been 
applicable  (2011  to  2018)  and  from  all  Member  States.  The  focus  will  be  on  waste  and 
wildlife crimes, as these are the areas that Member States are most concerned with, and where 
most data and information exists in the public domain.  

Considering  major  polluting  offshore  disasters,  the  offshore  petroleum  industry  has  the 
potential to cause more damage than any other maritime activity to the waters of the EU and 
its coastline. The NGO’s have argued strongly for criminalisation of behaviour that recklessly 
or  negligently  causes  a  major  accident  as  defined  by  the  Directive.  In  this  context  the 
Commission received a statement by the NGO Consortium: 

“In the 2015 Commission report on liability [i.e. the original to this report – COM(2015)422 
final,  it  was  stressed  that  it  is  important  that  the  Commission  returns  to  the  subject  of 
criminalisation  in  the  Directive  assessment.  The  undersigned  organisations  hold  that  spills 
caused  by  serious  negligence  should  be  criminalised  by  adding  major  offshore  accidents  to 
the Environmental Crime Directive. As held in the abovementioned 2015 Commission report, 
criminalisation  could  add  a  separate  layer  of  deterrence  beyond  civil  and  environmental 

61 SWD(2015) 167 final ANNEX II.   
62 Communication from the Commission: Towards an EU Criminal Policy: Ensuring the Effective 
Implementation of EU Policies through Criminal Law ', 20 September 2011, COM (2011) 573, 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/criminal/files/act_en.pdf.  

65 

 
 
                                                           
liability, which could improve the protection of the environment and compliance with offshore 
safety legislation. 

It is to highlight that impunity for environmental crimes seriously undermines environmental 
protection.  With  the  financial  muscles  of  some  of  the  major  oil  companies,  liability  with  its 
financial consequences is not always enough of a deterrent. A separate layer is needed, and 
we ask that this is ensured at this juncture.” 

Conclusions 

Article  39  of  the  Directive  requires  the  Commission  to  examine  the  appropriateness  of 
bringing  certain  conduct  leading  to  a  major  accident  within  the  scope  of  the  ECD.  At  this 
point  in  time,  there  has  been  numerous  discussions  with  competent  authorities  under  the 
auspices of the EUOAG. There has also been public consultation on the subject. 

Synthesising  the  majority  of  inputs  gives  the  perspective  that,  in  the  absence  of  major 
accidents  and  concomitant  enforcement  activity  in  the  EU,  it  remains  too  early  to  properly 
assess whether EU criminal law measures would be essential for achieving effective levels of 
offshore safety in the Union. In order to conclude whether certain conduct leading to a major 
accident should be brought under the scope of the ECD, more experience with the Offshore 
Safety Directive’s effectiveness would need to be gained.  

The Commission will continue to exchange views with Member States on this issue.  

  Special  theme:  Post-decommissioning  responsibility  for  ensuring  permanent 

5.15
sealing of wells, and for determining extent of removal of fixed installations 

5.15.1

  Overview 

As  the  North  Sea  Member  States  and  Italy  approach  a  new  era  of  major  decommissioning 
projects,  there  is  heightened  societal  awareness  and  anxiety  for  the  integrity  of  the 
decommissioning  operations.  It  is  to  assess  whether  there  are  gaps  in  the  machinery  of 
existing  requirements  and  standardisation  addressing  the  extent  of  removal  and  how  far  the 
Directive provides rules for the installations’ end of life cycle.  

The Directive does not provide definitions of the terms “decommissioning”, “abandonment” 
and “removal”. To fully understand potential environmental implications of the end of the life 
cycle of an installation we summarize the common understanding of these terms: 

  Decommissioning involves the safe plugging of the hole in the seabed and disposal of the 

equipment used in offshore oil production.  

  An abandoned well is a well that is plugged in permanently due to some technical reasons 
in the drilling process. An oil well is referred to as abandoned if the economic limit of the 
well is reached. Thereafter, the tubing of the well should be removed and sections of the 
wellbore filled with concrete.  

66 

 
 
  Removing  installations  means  first  that  the  topsides  are  taken  apart  and  lifted  onto  the 
derrick  barge.  Topsides  can  be  removed  all  in  one  piece,  in  groups  of  modules,  reverse 
order of installation, or in small pieces. Removing supporting structures is the second step 
in the demolition process and the most costly. First, divers using explosives, mechanical 
means, torches, or abrasive technology make the  bottom  cuts  on the piles 15 feet  below 
the mudline. Then the jacket is removed either in small pieces or as a single lift. 63. 

Alternatively, there is the possibility to reuse the platform or leave the cement structure in the 
sea as an artificial reef. 

Decommissioning activities can be explained in four fundamental stages:   

  The permanent sealing of the wells;   
  The  removal  (and  treatment)  of  any  hazardous  substances  and  waste  including  drilling 

cuttings;   

  The removal (and recycling or reuse) of the installation's structure and equipment; and; 
  The future monitoring and maintenance of the decommissioned site. 
Permanent well sealing is addressed directly under the Directive (Annex I, point 6 (4a)) and is 
discussed in detail below. 

To avoid long term pollution, the removal of all hazardous substances (as such or in waste) is 
to  be  expected:  for  example  chemicals  stored  in  tanks,  petroleum  sludge  and  petroleum 
mixtures  in  the  closed  drain  system  and  storage  cells,  toxic  and  irradiating  materials  and 
deposits  such  as  barium  sulphate  (low  specific  activity  material  which  is  found  in  some 
formation fluids) and the contents of pipelines connected to the installation.  

Following  clean-up,  the  installation's  structure  and  components  would  be  expected  to  be 
removed  and  the  recovered  components  would  ideally  be  reused  or  recycled  onshore.  As  a 
general perspective, all structures would be removed to several meters below the sea floor. In 
addition, here the issue of partial removal is entered, for example where  

  Sections may be too heavy for current lifting technology or capacity;  
  Too  dangerous  to  be  safely  lifted  such  as  very  large  concrete  structures  and  structural 

footings;  

  Parts of the installations were installed with the intention to remain in place.  
Once  removal  is  completed,  with  the  end  of the installation’s  life  cycle,  it  becomes  unclear 
whether the Directive ceases to have effect or whether it requires liable owners of the former 
installation to carry out further monitoring of potential leaks. 

In  the  event  that  certain  parts  of  the  original  structure  remain  in  place,  maintenance  of  the 
remaining structure is necessary to ensure the relict does not pose a risk for navigation and to 
the environment. In practice this means that monitoring is required to assure ongoing integrity 
and to deal adequately with environmental impacts, governed under, inter alia, the conditions 
of the license following relinquishment.  

63 https://petrowiki.org/Offshore_decommissioning.  

67 

 
 
                                                           
5.15.2

Provisions of the Directive on the decommissioning of installations 

Since  the  Directive  covers  the  whole  life  cycle  of  an  installation  it  applies  also  to  the 
decommissioning phase, both to safety and environmental aspects that are directly linked to 
potential incidents from decommissioning.  However, once the decommissioning is finished, 
it does not address future environmental concerns. 

Furthermore, other legislation as for example the amended EIA Directive applies, which if the 
requirements of Art. 2(1) thereof are met, covers the whole life cycle of the project, including 
the  demolition  phase.  Authorities  are  required  to  take  all  relevant  legislation  into  account 
prior to the issuance of a license.  

Subsequent  to  the  interest  in  the  permanent  sealing  of  wells,  public  interest  has  arisen 
concerning the extent of removal of fixed production installations. In such an eventuality, it is 
determined by the Member States that the physical circumstances of fixture are such that it is 
justified  to  leave  some  (possibly  most)  of  the  installation  in  situ.  This  eventuality  is  not 
addressed in the Directive, nonetheless according to the public consultation there is significant 
interest in the matter due to its potential implications for the environment and navigation.   

The legal provisions of the Directive apply to the decommissioning of an installation as part 
of  a  platform’s  lifecycle.  According  to  the  Directive,  the  offshore  safety  regime  covers  the 
whole lifecycle of exploration and production activities from design to decommissioning and 
permanent abandonment (recital 24). It uses the term “decommissioning” in the definition of 
“offshore  oil  and  gas  operations”  which  are  defined  as:  “all  activities  associated  with  an 
installation  or  connected  infrastructure,  including  design,  planning,  construction,  operation 
and  decommissioning  thereof,  relating  to  exploration  and  production  of  oil  or  gas,  but 
excluding conveyance of oil and gas from one coast to another.” (Article 2(3)). 

In order to obtain authorisation for exploring or producing oil and gas offshore, the licensee 
should  submit  a  major  hazard  report  to  the  relevant  competent  authority  and  request  the 
report’s approval (Articles 12 and 13).  

According  to  Annex  III  of  the  Directive  on  “provisions  relating  to  the  appointment  and 
functioning of the competent authority”, in undertaking a thorough assessment of reports on 
major  hazards,  the  competent  authority  should  ensure  that  certain  conditions  are  met.    The 
risk  management  has  to  take  into  consideration  all  relevant  stages  in  the  lifecycle  of  the 
installation  and  anticipate  all  foreseeable  situations,  including  how  the  decommissioning  of 
the  installation  will  be  undertaken  (Annex  III,  point  3  v).  Accordingly,  the  Competent 
Authority  should  assess  the  plan  for  decommissioning  before  it  grants  an  authorisation  for 
starting oil and gas production.  

Furthermore, in the event of a material change or dismantling of an installation, the licensee is 
obliged to prepare an amended report on major hazards for the Competent Authority (Article 
12(5)). The Member States should ensure that the planned modifications are not brought into 
use  nor  any  dismantlement  commenced  until  the  Competent  Authority  has  accepted  the 

68 

 
 
 
amended  report  on  major  hazards  for  the  production  installation  (Article  12(6)).  The  same 
provisions apply for non-production installations (Article 13(4) and 5)).  

For taking a fixed production installation out of use, the amended major hazard report should 
at least include “a description of major hazard risks associated with the decommissioning of 
the  installation  to  workers  and  the  environment,  the  total  exposed  population,  and  the  risk 
control measures” (Annex I Directive, point 6.4 b). Future environmental hazards associated 
with decommissioning should thus be taken into account.  

As  a  consequence,  the  decommissioning  is  subject  to  the  approval  of  Member  States’ 
Competent  Authorities,  which  may  require  measures  and  procedures  to  ensure  a  safe 
decommissioning.  For  example,  the  operator  or  owner  of  an  installation  should  submit  a 
description of major hazard risks associated with  the decommissioning of the installation to 
the authorities (Annex I, point 6). In contrast, the Directive does not stipulate whether, to what 
extent and how the operator/owner should remove the platform.  

5.15.3
5.15.3.1

  The Offshore Safety Directive 

The requirements for extent of removal of fixed production installations  

The RoMH as accepted by the Member States’ competent authority is only valid provided that 
the circumstances on which it was based remain unchanged. Where there is a material change, 
the  RoMH  is  to  be  amended  by  the  licensee/operator  or  owner  (Article  12  (5)  of  the 
Directive). The intended changes may not be put into effect until the RoMH is submitted to 
and accepted by the competent authority. 

Accordingly, for decommissioning any production installation, under the requirements in the 
Directive,  licensees/operators  must  prepare  an  amended  RoMH  addressing  the  planned 
decommissioning  of  fixed  production  installations  on  the  basis  of  risk  of  a  major  accident 
occurring  as  a  result  of  the  decommissioning  operations.  Significant  damage  to  the 
environment that may arise as a result of a major accident during decommissioning operations 
and as a consequence of decommissioning must also be taken into account in the RoMH. 

An amended RoMH for the decommissioning of a production installation does not determine 
the  extent  of  removal  of  the  installation.  It  should  demonstrate  that  the  risks  of  a  major 
accident  from  the  decommissioning  phase  as  planned  by  the  licensee  and  agreed  with  the 
Member  States’  licensing  authority  are  ALARP64.  Nevertheless,  risks  assessments  and 
measures for management of risks could influence the extent of removal.  

Considering  the  above,  it  becomes  clear  that  the  risk-based  mechanisms  required  under  the 
Directive  do  not  pre-determine  the  extent  of  removal  of  a  fixed  production  installation. 
Instead,  it  is  a  mechanism  for  assurance  that  the  risks  of  a  major  accident  from  the 
decommissioning  of  the  installation  (including  the  extent  of  the  planned  removal)  are 
controlled ALARP. 

64 For the definition please refer to http://www.hse.gov.uk/risk/theory/alarpglance.htm.  

69 

 
 
 
                                                           
The Directive leaves the primary responsibility at the licensee/the operator. If under national 
law  the  competent  authority  was  authorised  to  determine  the  extent  of  removal,  the 
responsibility would be shared between the licensee and the competent authority. 

5.15.3.2

  Other EU law 

In general, there is no specific EU legislation regulating the extent of removal of installations 
during decommissioning. Removal is, subject to achieving certain conditions (specifically the 
obligation  to  achieve  good  environmental  status  under  the  Marine  Strategy  Framework 
Directive) a matter of national policy. 

The Marine Strategy Framework Directive (MFD) identifies offshore installations as a human 
activity  affecting  the  marine  environment  (Annex  III  as  revised  through  Directive 
2017/845/EU65).  More  particularly,  the  main  pressures  on  the  marine  environment  from  oil 
and  gas  activities  include  operational  and  accidental  discharges  of  chemicals,  crude  oil  and 
produced  water  but  also  underwater  noise,  marine  litter  including  micro  plastics  and  the 
drilling and placement of installations and pipelines on the seabed. For decommissioning, this 
concerns in particular the contamination of leakage from plugged wells, and disintegration of 
abandoned installations. As a result, the impacts of oil and gas activities and in particular of 
decommissioning  on  the  marine  environment,  are  both  the  responsibility  and  obligation  of 
Member States.    

Abandoned offshore installations that are anchored onto the seabed are not within the scope of 
the  Waste  Framework  Directive  (WFD)66,  given  that  Art  2(1)  (b)  excludes  buildings 
permanently  connected  with  land.  The  notion  of  “land”  in  this  context  covering  also  the 
seabed. However, movable property that the holder discards or intends/ is required to discard, 
such  as  the  contents  of  storage  cells  and  drilling  cuttings,  could  be  subject  to  the  WFD. 
Moreover,  given  the  nature  of  the  contents  of  such  storage  cells  (oil  and  oily  water  and 
residues) these often can be classified as hazardous waste.  

The Ship Recycling Regulation67 addresses floating offshore installations and requires they be 
dismantled  in  EU-listed  yards  if  they  are  flagged  to  an  EU  Member  State.  This  is  a  legal 
obligation since 2019, resulting from the full entry into force of the Regulation.  

The  Environmental  Impact  Assessment  Directive  (EIA)68  applies  to  the  whole  project, 
including  its  dismantling.  For  projects  after  May  2017,  it  requires  the  application  of 

65 Commission Directive (EU) 2017/845 of 17 May 2017 amending Directive 2008/56/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council as regards the indicative lists of elements to be taken into account for the 
preparation of marine strategies, OJ L 125, 18.5.2017, p. 27–33. 
66 Directive (EU) 2018/851 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 amending Directive 
2008/98/EC on waste, OJ L 150, 14.6.2018, p. 109–140; 
Directive 2008/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on waste and 
repealing certain Directives, OJ L 312, 22.11.2008, p. 3–30 
67 Regulation (EU) No 1257/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 November 2013 on ship 
recycling and amending Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006 and Directive 2009/16/EC, OJ L 330, 10.12.2013, p. 1–
20. 

70 

 
 
                                                           
monitoring  measures  for  projects  with  significant  adverse  effects,  applying  therefore  to 
decommissioning  sites,  the  question  here  being  raised  whether  decommissioning  should  be 
considered as a new project, to which this provision applies, or as part of the original project 
(in which case this requirement would not apply).  

Other environmental directives also apply to decommissioning offshore installations including 
the  Environmental  Liability  Directive.  This  Directive  addresses  the  licensee’s  sole  liability, 
and  obliges  them  to  prevent  damage  in  case  of  imminent  threat  (and  remedy  damage  if  it 
occurred already).  The Birds and Habitats Directive69, mandates a step-by step assessment of 
plans and projects (including decommissioning of sites) for their effect on Natura 200070 sites, 
and  compatibility  with  a  favourable  conservation  status  of  habitats  and  species.  In  relevant 
circumstances,  also  the  Strategic  Environmental  Assessment  Directive71  and  the  Maritime 
Spatial Planning Directives72 apply. 

5.15.3.3

  International policies  

All  European  governments’  policies  for  the  extent  of  removal  are  in  alignment  with 
international conventions. These conventions and public expectation call for total removal of 
decommissioned installations as the default condition.  

Not  all  international  conventions,  which  are  further  summarized  below,  are  ratified  or 
equitably enforced throughout the EU. Of the EU Member States’, with offshore oil and gas 
activities  in  their  jurisdiction,  Denmark,  Germany,  Spain,  France,  Ireland,  the  Netherlands, 
and Portugal,   are contracting parties to  the OSPAR Convention73. Germany, Denmark, and 
Poland  are  contracting  parties  to  the  Helsinki  Convention;  only  Croatia  and  Cyprus  have 
ratified individually the Offshore Protocol to the Barcelona Convention, covering all coastal 
states in the Mediterranean area, EU and third countries. However, by virtue of ratification by 
the EU of this protocol, all Member States are legally bound.  

Under the relevant regional seas convention of the Member States, which specifically target 
the protection of the marine environment, the protocol of decommissioning methods presumes 
total  removal  of  the  installation  and  restoration  of  the  sea  bed  and  water  column.  But  more 
explicitly,  the  goals  are  the  protection  of  navigation  and  other  economic  activity  in  parallel 
with  protection  of  the  marine  environment.  These  are  matters  of  policy  pertaining  to  the 

68 Directive 2014/52/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 amending Directive 
2011/92/EU on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment, OJ L 124, 
25.4.2014, p. 1–18. 
69 Directive 2009/147/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2009 on the 
conservation of wild birds, OJ L 20, 26.1.2010, p. 7–25. 
70 Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and 
flora, OJ L 206, 22.7.1992, p. 7–50. 
71 Directive 2001/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 2001 on the assessment of the 
effects of certain plans and programmes on the environment, OJ L 197, 21.7.2001, p. 30–37. 
72 Directive 2014/89/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 establishing a 
framework for maritime spatial planning, OJ L 257, 28.8.2014, p. 135–145. 
73 The UK is also a contracting party of OSPAR. 

71 

 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
restoration of the environment at the end of an episode of industrial use, and not an outcome 
of case-by-case risk assessment.  

Concerning  the  alignment  of  national  policy  with  international  conventions,  the  OSPAR 
convention  and  IMO  guidelines  include  provisions  for  the  post-decommissioning  phase  on 
monitoring. However, obligations under various instruments in the EU environmental acquis 
apply  to  post  decommissioning,  and  indeed  to  matters  that  bear  on  Member  States’  policy 
regarding the extent of decommissioning or removal of fixed structures and detoxification of 
the relicts.  

The  OSPAR  decision  98/374  prohibits  dumping  or  leaving  wholly  or  even  partly  in  place 
installations  that  are  taken  out  of  use.  It  allows  for  derogations  for  certain  categories;  and 
there is a mechanism for considering alternative disposal options. Alternative disposal options 
have been considered for installations defined in Annex I75 of the decision, where justified on 
the basis of an alternative options assessment76. In this case, the contracting party may issue a 
permit  for  such  a  derogation  after  having  first  consulted  OSPAR  contracting  parties  on  the 
decision. If one of them expresses an objection, a mediation shall be organised and eventually 
a  consultative  meeting  shall  be  created  if  required  by  at  least  two  contracting  parties. 
Nonetheless, the final decision is left to the contracting party whether to permit the alternative 
option.  

Regular review of this decision is foreseen by the decision itself every 5 years based on new 
knowledge and technological developments for decommissioning. It was last discussed at the 
2018 Meeting of the OSPAR Offshore Industry Committee (OIC). 

The 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)77 requires safe and sustainable 
removal of all or part of decommissioned installations having regard to safe navigation, other 
users of the sea and protection of the marine environment. Along with sovereign rights over 
exploitation  of  natural  resources,  states  have  obligations  to  protect  and  preserve  the  marine 
environment. 

74 OSPAR Convention for the protection of the marine environment of the North-East Atlantic, OSPAR Decision 
98/3 on the disposal of disused offshore installations. Ministerial meeting of the OSPAR Commission, Sintra, 22 
– 23 July 1998, Annex 33. 
75  The  following  categories  of  disused  offshore  installations,  excluding  their  topsides,  are  identified  for 

derogations :  
a. steel installations weighing more than ten thousand tonnes in air; 
b. gravity based concrete installations; 
c. floating concrete installations; 
d. any concrete anchor-base which results, or is likely to result, in interference with other legitimate uses 

of the sea. 

76  This  option  assessment  should  consider  facility  type,  disposal  methods,  disposal  sites,  and  environmental 
and  social  impact,  including  interference  with  other  sea  users,  impacts  on  safety,  energy  and  raw  material 
consumption, and emissions. 
77 https://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf.  

72 

 
 
                                                           
The  1989  International  Maritime  Organisation  (IMO)  guidelines  and  standards  for  the 
removal of offshore installations78 establishes the general requirement of full removal except 
where  partial  removal  options  are  consistent  with  certain  guidelines  and  standards. 
Importantly, the IMO standard addresses the permanent integrity of any remaining structures, 
i.e. stability and degradation over time in the sea. 

Furthermore, the Convention on the Prevention  of Marine Pollution by  Dumping of Wastes 
and Other Matter 197279, and the 1996 London Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention 
of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (which is  to  replace the 1972 
Convention, subject to ratification) both apply. The 1996 London Protocol reflects the global 
trend towards precaution and prevention and the “polluter pays” principle. It has a general ban 
on  dumping  of  waste,  but  with  exemptions  for  some  specific  categories  of  waste  based  on 
consideration and permitting procedures to be carried out by the national authorities. In order 
to  assist  the  national  authorities  in  such  assessments,  the  London  Protocol  has  developed 
Guidelines for the relevant waste categories.  

Subject to assessment, offshore installations and other man-made structures at sea are among 
the categories that may be considered for dumping into the sea, instead of removal, according 
to  these  Guidelines.  The  London  Protocol  also  has  Guidelines  on  artificial  reefs.  Should 
installations  be  considered  to  be  'reused'  as  an  artificial  reef,  this  would  require  compliance 
with the Guidelines. 

The existing 'Specific Guidelines for assessment of platforms or other man-made structures at 
sea80' were issued in 2010, and were up-dated in 2019.81 The London Protocol itself is not up 
for revision, so the new guidelines cannot appear stricter than the Protocol itself.   

international  agreements  and  conventions  apply 

Other 
the  decommissioning  of 
installations. Leading works are the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf 195882 and 
Basel  Convention  on  Control  of  Transboundary  Movements  of  Hazardous  Wastes  and  their 
Disposal 198983. 

to 

The  1992  Helsinki  Convention  on  the  Protection  of  the  Marine  Environment  in  the  Baltic 
Area84,  requires  zero  discharge  during  decommissioning  and  removal  of  installations  in  an 
environmentally friendly manner. The EU, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,  Lithuania, 
Latvia, Poland Russia and Sweden are contracting parties of this Convention.  

78 https://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/formidable/18/1989-Guidelines-and-Standards-for-the-Removal-of-
Offshore-Installations-and-Structures-on-the-Continental-Shelf-and-in-the-Exclusive-Economic-Zone.pdf.  
79 http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/LCLP/Documents/LC1972.pdf 
80 https://www.gc.noaa.gov/documents/gcil_imo_platwag.pdf.  
81 
http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/LCLP/Publications/wag/Documents/2019%20Revised%20guida
nce%20for%20platforms.pdf 
82 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf 1958.  
83 https://www.basel.int/Portals/4/Basel%20Convention/docs/text/BaselConventionText-e.pdf 
84http://www.helcom.fi/Documents/About%20us/Convention%20and%20commitments/Helsinki%20Convention
/1992_Convention_1108.pdf.  

73 

 
 
                                                           
The  Barcelona  Convention  for  the  Protection  of  the  Mediterranean  Sea  against  Pollution 
197685  has  a  specific  Protocol  on  offshore  exploration  and  exploitation  activities.  This 
Convention  requires  the  removal  of  installations  so  as  to  ensure  safety  of  navigation, 
compliance  with  guidelines  and  standards  of  competent  international  organisations,  and 
regard  for  other  economic  users,  the  marine  environment  and  rights  and  duties  of  other 
contracting parties. There is an obligation to prevent discharges. 

For the removal of installations, countries operating in the North Sea and North Atlantic pay 
full  attention  to  the  OSPAR  convention.  In  the  convention’s  framework  Member  States  are 
bound to consult both in writing and in formal meetings how best to apply OSPAR guidance. 
Currently OSPAR members are working to clarify provisions (e.g. by developing a catalogue 
of criteria) that facilitate the decision making process and enable a consensus on cases where 
installations may remain in situ after the decommissioning.  

5.15.3.4

  Current practice of decommissioning 

The  OSPAR  region  serves  as  an  illustrative  case  for  the  functioning  of  decommissioning 
decisions vis a vis removal. The most problematic installations are legacy designs that would 
not  be  installed  today,  but  for  which  nonetheless,  solutions  must  be  found.  The  OSPAR 
region covers the northern Atlantic of the UK to Portugal, with 1,357 active installations. Of 
these,  22  are  concrete  gravity  based,  and  58  are  steel  jackets  weighing  more  than  10,000 
tonnes in air, potentially covered by the scope of article 3 of OSPAR decision 98/3 defining 
derogations to the principles of complete removal. It appears that all other installations can be 
physically removed. 

Between  2002  and  2014,  170  installations  have  been  decommissioned,  with  9  derogations 
granted  and  a  further  one  in  the  initial  stage.  Of  the  9  installations,  5  are  gravity  concrete 
structures, and 4 are of steel construction.  

On  the  issue  of  safety,  it  is  unlikely  that  thorough  clean-out  becomes  a  major  accident 
potential  hazard86.  However,  the  framework  of  Directive  92/91/EEC87  applies  to  work 
planning  for  worker  safety;  the  specific  measures  in  Part  C  (special  minimum  requirements 
applicable to the offshore sector) notably at sections 1 and 12 ensure continuing protection of 
the safety of workers outside of the major accident envelope of the Directive, in both normal 
and  ‘critical’  conditions.  Directive  92/91/EEC  does  not  address  environmental  factors  that 
need not necessarily be taken into account in these circumstances. 

85 http://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/id/53143/convention_eng.pdf.  
86 For a major accident to the environment to be addressed under the Directive, the initiating event must be a 
major accident. 
87 Council Directive 92/91/EEC of 3 November 1992 concerning the minimum requirements for improving the 
safety and health protection of workers in the mineral- extracting industries through drilling (eleventh individual 
Directive within the meaning of Article 16 (1) of Directive 89/391/EEC), OJ L 348, 28.11.1992, p. 9–24. 

74 

 
 
  
                                                           
On  the  issue  of  technical  capability,  the  EU  environmental  acquis,  and  conventions  such  as 
OSPAR and IMO pay due regard to the stability of the partially removed structure over time, 
and  also  require  keeping  the  technical  capabilities  under  review  and  to  revisit  decisions  on 
decontamination. Whereas it is self-evidently necessary to monitor the relict of the installation 
to  ensure  structural  stability  and  ongoing  containment.  The  EU-level  legislation  and 
international  conventions  do  not  address  whether  or  not  there  must  be  an  effective  interval 
and effectiveness of submarine surveys. 

It  appears  that  in  some  Member  States  the  tax  payer  may  have  to  contribute  to  the  cost  of 
decommissioning.  Accordingly,  on  cost  for  the  removal,  the  independence  of  the  relevant 
authority  of  the  Member  States  in  taking  decisions  that  are  free  of  conflict  of  interest  may 
become a point of discussion. 

With  regard  to  the  OSPAR  convention,  environmental  NGOs  challenge  the  rigour  in  the 
decision  making  processes  for  derogations,  and  challenge  the  thoroughness  applied  to  the 
obligation  to  protect  and  preserve  the  environment  falling  to  Member  States.  The 
methodology  for  evaluating  decommissioning  options  are  discussed  in  OSPAR,  aiming  at 
more harmonised approaches to be applied by the Contracting Parties. 

Particular  concerns  are  raised  concerning  the  dismantling  of  mobile  installations.  The  press 
reported on bad examples of mobile installations being broken up in third countries causing a 
significant  toll  of  human  life  and  environmental  degradation.  There  are  recent  examples  of 
mobile  production  installations  removed  from  the  EU  to  undesignated  breaking  ports, 
potentially not in line with the Ship Recycling Regulation.  

5.15.3.5

  The decommissioning of Brent platforms 

According  to  the  industry  and  the  Competent  Authority  of  the  UK,  Brent  platforms  have  a 
weight  which  does  not  allow  lifting  and  removal  with  currently  available  technologies.  The 
authorities examine which of them may remain in the sea “in situ”. 

The  example  of  the  Brent  platforms  illustrates  the  difficulties  arising  from  the  lack  of  an 
existing  harmonized  legal  framework  at  EU  level  and  the  shortcomings  of  existing 
international legislation. 

As the owner of the Brent platforms Shell prepared the following decommissioning activities: 

  Plugging the 154 wells across the Brent Field; 
  Removing the platform’s topsides; 
  Recovering oil and gas debris from the seabed across the Brent field; 
  Removing the oil – known as ‘attic oil’ – trapped at the top of some of the storage cells;  
  Cutting the upper portion of the Brent Alpha steel jacket;  
  Leaving  in  place  the  Gravity  Base  Structures  (GBS),  Brent  Alpha  footings,  the  drill 

cuttings and GBS cell contents. 

75 

 
 
Pursuant to OSPAR Decision 98/3, Shell informed the UK authorities that, due to the safety 
risks and lack of appropriate technology, they intend to leave in place, inter alia, a significant 
quantity of oil and oily residues in storage cells (around 640 000 m3 of oily water and 40 000 
m3 of sediment containing 11 000 tonnes of crude oil), as well as drill cuttings and concrete 
platform  legs,  after  the  decommissioning  of  the  Brent  field.  The  UK  considers  the  Shell 
request  justified  and  informed  other  OPSAR  Contracting  Parties  of  its  intention  to  grant  a 
derogation under the above-mentioned OSPAR Decision.  

Following  a  formal  objection  from  Germany  to  this  derogation  (based  on  a  report  from 
independent  experts),  a  bilateral  meeting  between  Germany  and  the  UK  took  place  in  June 
2019.  Germany,  supported  by  other  Contracting  Parties,  then  requested  that  a  special 
consultative  meeting  on  the  Shell  Brent  decommissioning  be  arranged88.  The  special 
consultative  meeting  between  UK,  Germany  and  other  interested  Contracting  Parties  took 
place on 18 October 2019.  

insufficient 

Germany’s  concerns  address  procedural  issues  (e.g.  biased  comparative  assessment  of 
to 
options, 
stakeholder concerns), and the plans to leave in situ the oily residues in the storage cells, parts 
of the metallic platform, and the concrete based platforms as well as other residues (such as 
drill cuttings).  

transparency  regarding  documentation, 

inadequate  response 

During  the  OSPAR  consultation  process,  but  also  directly  through  bilateral  exchanges  with 
the  UK  administration,  the  Commission  expressed  concerns  regarding  the  leaving  in  situ  of 
parts of installations. In particular the Commission was concerned about the option proposed 
by Shell to leave in place the content of the storage cells, which could qualify as hazardous 
waste  according  to  EU  law,  as  well  as  the  potential  cumulative  effects  of  decommissioning 
activities in the northeast Atlantic. 

The special consultative meeting of OSPAR on 18 October 2019 highlighted knowledge gaps 
and the need for additional information on the storage cells’ contents and on the availability of 
technologies to extract the residues from the cells.  

With regard to the question of whether there are gaps in coverage and where these are found, 
there  are  numerous  conventions,  guidelines,  and  standards  addressing  safe,  sustainable 
decommissioning  of  production  installations.  This  information  covers  a  diversity  of  issues, 
including: securing the integrity of the marine space for further economic use as well as the 
protection and preservation of the environment. In assessing disposal options it is necessary to 
consider  what  management  measures  might  be  required  to  prevent  or  mitigate  adverse 
consequences of the disposal at sea, and shall indicate the scope and scale of any monitoring 
that would be required after the disposal at sea. 

Member States take different views on whether current provisions are adequate for ensuring 
that installations are removed safely and to the maximum desirable extent, whereas industry 

88 As foreseen by Annex 3 point 5 of OSPAR Decision 98/3. 

76 

 
 
                                                           
clearly does not see the need for additional rules. Less clear is the subject of detoxification of 
remnants of installations subject  to  only partial removal, as demonstrated in  the example of 
the  Brent  case.  Furthermore,  this  case  demonstrates  the  need  to  further  examine  all  risks 
involved  with  emptying  fuel  storage  cells  in  deep  sea,  both  for  the  workers  and  for  the 
environment.  Additional  analysis  may  determine  which  level  of  costs  for  a  thorough 
decontamination may qualify as being prohibitive for to the state and the license holder (e.g. 
risk of bankruptcy). 

5.15.4

  Conclusions 

The example of the Brent platforms demonstrates that international rules are in place but that 
they leave a large margin of discretion on the final decision on the removal of a platform. 

Under  the  Offshore  Directive,  operators  of  fixed  production  installations  (and  the  very  few 
owners of fixed non-production installations) are required to submit an amended RoMH to the 
competent  authority,  addressing  all  aspects  of  decommissioning  (e.g.  wells,  structure, 
hazardous  materials.)  The  operator  is  not  allowed  to  proceed  with  the  intended  operations 
until  the  competent  authority  has  accepted  the  amended  RoMH.  Many  other  consents  and 
authorisations  are  required  from  the  Member  State  prior  to  decommissioning,  due  to  either 
national  legislation  or  international  obligations.  Once  the  decommissioning  is  complete  and 
the structure removed, the Directive ceases to apply as there are no relevant activities under 
the  Directive.  However,  other  conditions  continue  to  apply  regarding  the  operators 
responsibilities  for  seabed  surveys  and  so  on,  pursuant  to  licensing  regulations  and  other 
national and international legislation. 

Whereas OSPAR’s general principle is full removal and partial removal is a derogation from 
the  general  principle, the Directive does not  address  the matter of whether a fixed structure 
should be partially or wholly removed. This is entirely consistent with the Directives aim to 
prevent  major  accidents,  including  to  the  environment,  by  reducing  risks  ALARP.  For 
example, it may be demonstrated that the risks of attempting full removal of a structure are 
intolerable under current knowledge and technical capability, or that the risks are significantly 
higher than partial removal.  

The  decision  on  the  extent  of  removal  is  therefore  remitted  to  other  parts  of  the  Member 
States  legal  framework,  and the Directive will be applied to  ensure the major accident risks 
are ALARP for the selected method (and if not ALARP, a different decommissioning plan is 
to be formulated).  

In  the  context  of  discussions  in  OSPAR,  the  Brent  case  points  to  potential  gaps  in  EU 
legislation. These may create an uneven playing field between EU regions that may be subject 
to different protocols in their respective sea convention. This issue would need to be carefully 
assessed in the future in view of the upcoming decommissioning projects, in particular in the 
North-East  Atlantic.  The  Directive 
to 
decommissioning. At the stage of bringing a new production installation into use, the operator 
is  to  provide  information  concerning  the  decommissioning  of  the  installation  at  the  end  of 
field  life  in  their  RoMH  (Article  12).  The  assumption  is  for  total  removal  under  the  recent 

important  measure  pertinent 

includes  an 

77 

 
 
conventions  and  protocols  and  EU  law.  The  competent  authority,  when  conducting  its 
thorough assessment of the RoMH must, by virtue of the Directive’s Annex III(3)(c)(v), take 
into consideration how the decommissioning of the installation will be undertaken. Whilst the 
decommissioning  plans  cannot  be  known  in  detail  at  the  commissioning  stage,  the  main 
concepts must be made part of the original design intent.  

Above  analysis  takes  into  account  the  whole  framework  of  the  existing  obligations  under 
other relevant legislation, specifically the EIA Directive, which, if the requirements of Article 
2(1) thereof are met, addresses the issues of public consultation, the demolition phase and also 
monitoring. Therefore, the presumption is that no new installations will be accepted for use in 
EU waters where they are not capable of being fully removed at the end of their life. For the 
future,  this  would  secure,  throughout  the  Union,  an  obligation  for  commissioning  new 
installations that are so designed as to be totally removed at the end of the installation’s life. 
However, this does not address the “legacy” issues of older installations that have been built 
in the 1970’s and which must now be decommissioned, such as the Brent installation in the 
OSPAR region.  

Doubts remain as to whether the Directive, also in the context of international conventions, is 
sufficiently  effective  in  setting  adequate  rules  for  decommissioning.  Further  work  appears 
necessary to address remaining questions:  

 

Is there sufficient understanding of the whole of the framework of obligations that exist 
under EU and international law, and is this framework appropriate?  

  The standards that exist, are they capable for protecting the marine environment from the 

after-effects of offshore oil and gas production?  

  Does  the  licensee/operator  community,  and  just  as  critically,  the  Member  States’ 
authorities  for  decisions  on  removal,  embrace  the  entire  framework,  and  are  they 
responsive to evolving expectations?  

  Should  more  clarity  be  provided  regarding  the  frequency  and  effectiveness  of  seabed 
surveys  where  there  is  full  removal,  in  addition  to  surveying  of  the  integrity, 
environmental  impacts  and  environmental  risks  of  partially  removed  installations?  What 
are the obligations for regular monitoring by the licensee and liabilities when installations 
change ownership in future decades? 

The same questions are to be asked regarding the permanent sealing of wells, which remains 
an integral part of decommissioning. In the forthcoming wave of decommissioning, it is vital 
that the public can have full confidence that the competent authority is free from a conflict of 
interest,  when  exercising  its  function  to  accept  risk  assessments  relating  to  the  permanent 
abandonment of production installations and their wells. 

In  addition  to  the  rigour  expected  of  Member  States  in  coming  to  decisions  on  safe  and 
sustainable decommissioning, Member States need to adopt more transparent obligations into 
their legislative policy. 

At the current stage of analysis, there are arguments in favour of creating additional standards 
for the degree of removal of offshore installations that would in effect, reinforce obligations 
that  already  exist  on  license  holders  and  Member  States.  This  would  reduce  potential 

78 

 
 
environmental risks associated with  leaving contaminated residues in  the sea bed as well as 
potentially  damaging  cumulative  effects  of  decommissioning  activities  in  the  marine 
environment. 

5.15.5
5.15.5.1

The permanent sealing of wells 

  The Offshore Safety Directive  

Notwithstanding the current application of the Directive to the dismantling and/or removal of 
production  installations,  there  is  no  specification  for  the  temporal  meaning  of  ‘permanent 
sealing  of  the  wells  from  the  installation  and  the  environment’,  when  wells  on  fixed 
production installations are to be abandoned, as referred to above. 

However, the duty to permanently seal the wells from the environment is stated in these exact 
terms solely in respect of wells connected to a fixed production installation that is to be taken 
out  of  use.  Otherwise  the  permanent  sealing  of  the  wells  is  considered  an  implied  duty 
residing  in  the  term  ‘permanent  abandonment’  (Annex  I  Part  6(4)(a))89.  There  may  be  a 
difference in understanding of the terms ‘permanent abandonment’ and ‘permanent sealing of 
a well’. 

The Directive applies to all petroleum activities carried out on offshore installations, including 
all well abandonments. Leakages from wells or near installations is a clear major hazard, and 
is covered by the Directive. When the MODU leaves location, or the production installation is 
removed, the Directive ceases to apply. Should there be a subsea leak from an abandoned well 
in EU waters requiring a MODU to return to remedy the leakage, then the measures pertinent 
to the Directive re-enter into effect.  

5.15.5.2

  Technical challenges and available technologies 

Well  seepages  (from  reservoirs,  not  shallow  gas  seepages)  and  more  energetic  escapes  of 
reservoir fluids at the sea floor are not identified as an issue of concern by Member States’ or 
by license holders. But,  with what is becoming seen as a ‘wave of plug and abandonments’ 
looming  for  the  North  Sea  region  in  particular,  there  is  a  heightened  societal  interest  in 
decommissioning, coordinated by environmental NGO’s. In order to  ensure the primary aim 
of permanently restoring the environment at the production site the most important element of 
the decommissioning process is to permanently seal the wells. 

Isolating the zones  of flow potential from  each other and ultimately  from  the seabed by the 
placement of permanent barriers in the well bore and the spaces between the well casings, is 
the overall purpose of the plugging and abandonment process. After this process is complete, 
it is intended that no further leakage or seepage would be possible between the zones of flow 
potential or to the sea floor. Should well fluids reach the sea floor they will either be dispersed 
into the water column or, in shallow water or where the seep rate is high, to the sea surface.  

89 Information to be provided to the competent authority: “Means of isolating all hazardous substances and in the 
case of wells connected to the installation, the permanent sealing of the wells from the installation and the 
environment”. 

79 

 
 
 
                                                           
Fluids would induce  a potential contamination  of the marine waters, which would therefore 
have to be monitored in the context of the Marine Strategy Framework Directive (MFD). 

Standards  for  permanent  abandonment  of  wells  have  been  updated  continually  over  the  65-
year  lifetime  of  the  offshore  sector,  in  the  form  of  authoritative  global  standards  and  best 
practices under ISO, API, NORSOK, and the Energy Institute. Additionally, the Directive sets 
international  best  petroleum  practice  through  the  requirement  for  a  scheme  of  independent 
verification of well design, which applies equally to permanent abandonment. 

In  some  Member  States’  jurisdictions,  decisions  and  actions  taken  during  the  plugging  and 
abandonment  are  required  to  be  fully  documented,  and  records  retained.  Changes  to  plans 
must  also  be  referred  to  independent  well  examiners  for  a  second  opinion  concerning 
integrity. 

For  context,  there  are  less  than  1,000  active  onshore  wells  in  Europe,  most  of  them  in  the 
Netherlands,  UK  and  Poland.  It  is  difficult  to  identify  the  number  of  abandoned  wells  in 
Europe, but in the UK and the Netherlands the total is between 5,500 and 6,000. There is not a 
significant  recorded  history  of  leaking  from  permanently  abandoned  wells  in  the  EU.  The 
Netherlands  recently published a report on methane leakage90 where 185  wells of the 1,312 
abandoned wells in the selected areas were studied in detail. The report concluded there is no 
evidence of any leakages from the abandoned wells in the study. Overall, in Europe, there are 
recorded minor incidents of hydrocarbon leaks from abandoned oil and gas wells in the past, 
however,  there  is  no  authoritative  data  on  frequency  or  type.  As  a  result,  no  major 
environmental accident potential has been identified at off or onshore well locations in north 
Western Europe.  

However, the raised and levelled standards for preventing the risks of a major accident from 
wells  by  virtue  of  the  Directive  are  highly  relevant  to  the  increasing  volume  of  well 
abandonments in the offshore waters of the EU. Modern offshore wells are considerably more 
complex in their architecture than the vast number of abandoned older wells in both Europe 
and elsewhere. 

Competent authorities required to assess RoMHs for abandonment of production installations 
should take particular interest in the risk assessments, planned measures, and barrier integrity 
assurance procedures for well sealing as a precursor to permanent abandonment. These issues 
are relevant  for of HPHT wells and all wells of complex design, or where internal  integrity 
problems  are  known  from  the  well’s  history.  The  schemes  for  independent  examination  of 
well plans will need to consider these factors.  

The  so-called  ‘wave  of  plugging  and  abandonments’  upcoming  in  the  North  Sea  region  to 
which  is  referred  to  above,  will  undoubtedly  place  cost  pressures  on  operators.  Where  field 
abandonment costs are defrayed through concessions (wherein the state allows liable parties’ 
revenue  tax  payments  to  be  set  against  abandonment  costs)  a  high  proportion  of  the 

90 https://www.sodm.nl/onderwerpen/methaan/documenten/rapporten/2018/06/05/methaan-emissiemetingen-aan-
buiten-gebruik-gestelde-olie--en-gaswinningsputten.  

80 

 
 
                                                           
abandonment costs will become internalised to  the Member States,  placing pressures  on the 
economic regulator.  

Therefore  two  things  become  apparent.  Firstly,  in  order  to  fully  address  environmental 
concerns,  operators  of  development  wells  may  prepare  convincing  risk  assessments  for 
permanent  sealing  of  the  wells  on  installations  that  are  to  be  decommissioned.  In  a  further 
step, independent experts would then verify the well plans’ risk assessments. At the end of the 
procedure,  the  competent  authority  may  then  issue  a  decision  on  the  risk  assessment 
incorporating the permanent sealing of the wells before any decommissioning work may start.  

Secondly,  it  is  vital  that  the  public  can  have  full  confidence  that  the  competent  authority 
appointed under the Directive is entirely free of influence. This issue principally regards cost 
pressures confronting the operators and the economic regulators of the Member States when 
assessing risk assessments relating to the permanent abandonment of production installations 
and their wells. 

5.15.5.3

  Conclusions 

There is an absolute duty to ensure the well is sealed permanently when abandoned. This is 
one  of  two  absolute  duties  of  the  Directive,  where  the  standard  is  not  qualified  by  the 
‘reasonably  practicable’  condition.  The  other  duty  is  to  rescue  personnel  from  a  stricken 
installation (that would include the immediate sea vicinity) ‘so as to secure a good prospect of 
personal safety and survival’ (Article 28(4)). 

Given  the  potentially  vast  financial  liabilities  accruing  to  parties  involved  with  the 
abandonment (including potentially the state), further research may provide proposals for best 
means.  This  could  help  ensure  that  all  development  wells  are  permanently  sealed  from  the 
environment as a consequence of the removal from use of any production installation. 

5.15.6

Biogenic methane seepage 

Offshore methane seepage mostly happens due to natural processes and geology. With regard 
to  industrial  activities;  explorative  drilling,  as  well  as  oil  and  gas  production  may  have  a 
causal  link  to  methane  seepage  and  increase  the  emitted  volume  of  gas.  This  is  an  issue 
principally  because  methane  breaks  down  ozone  through  a  destructive  chemical  chain 
reaction, contributing to  ozone depletion and subsequently climate change. Furthermore, the 
same as carbon dioxide, methane absorbs the sun’s heat and warms the atmosphere. Recently, 
attention  has  been  drawn  to  shallow  gas  seepages  from  the  central  North  Sea  region  where 
there is a dense cluster of shallow gas pockets. A study conducted offshore by the GEOMAR 
institute91  has  attracted  interest  on  environmental  grounds.  It  observed  seepage  of  biogenic 
gas at locations of abandoned wells in the North Sea, which the study attributes to the well's 
trajectory through shallow gas pockets. In other words, the penetration of the pocket of gas by 

91 “Oil & Gas Wells as a Strong Source of Greenhouse Gases”, 28 August 2017; GEOMAR 
https://www.geomar.de/en/service/kommunikation/singlepm/article/oel-und-gasbohrungen-als-starke-quelle-
von-treibhausgasen/.   

81 

 
 
 
                                                           
the well creates a pathway to the sea floor around the outside of the well. On the occasion of 
the  Geomar  study,  the  three  wells  were  exploration  wells,  however  there  was  a  significant 
eruption of shallow methane under a production platform (the Forties Delta platform (UK)) in 
1983. On this occasion,  the penetration of a shallow pocket  in the  central  North  Sea region 
was  conducted  directly  underneath  the  platform,  causing  a  massive  explosion  and  fire,  in 
which 9 workers were seriously injured. 

A response to the Geomar study made by industry challenges the methodology of the Geomar 
study, claiming it extrapolates. 

Biogenic  methane  accumulations  are  covered  by  the  Directive  should  the  gas  pockets  be  in 
the well trajectory as identified from shallow focussing geophysical surveys, or known to be a 
local  hazard  and  therefore  taken  into  account  in  the  risk  assessment  of  the  well  plan  and 
incorporated into the scheme of independent verification of it. The preferred control method 
(i.e. relevant to the hazard) is to move the well and therefore avoid the shallow gas pocket92.  

Biogenic  methane  seeps  are  not  relevant  under  the  Directive  in  the  post-decommissioning 
period where qualifying installations are not present. Such seeps per se are not major hazard 
events as related to the Directive because there are no qualifying installations stationed at the 
location. However, should the seepages be sufficiently serious as to require the deployment of 
a  qualifying  installation  (a  drilling  MODU  for  example)  to  intervene  then  the  Directive 
returns into effect. There is no recorded event where a biogenic methane seep has caused an 
intervention by a MODU or other qualifying installation. 

Whilst  methane  seeps,  are  unlikely  to  have  the  potential  to  create  a  major  accident  hazard, 
they would potentially be subject  to  environmental  scrutiny under the broad acquis  of other 
EU environmental legislation (e.g. MFD, EIA/SEA and ELD). 

5.16

  Special theme: Mutual recognition of mobile drilling units (MODU) 

Analysis 

As  we  have  seen  in  previous  thematic  discussions,  there  has  been  quite  wide  variation  in 
approach.  For  example,  in  the  contents  of  corporate  major  accident  prevention  plans  and  in 
combining safety and environmental functions in the competent authority.  

The recognition between Member States of a mobile production installation (overwhelmingly 
a MODU) that has a RoMH accepted by another Member State, is a criteria for attaining the 
desired goal of a level regulatory playing field throughout the EU. 

In the Offshore Safety Directive the relevant measure is contained in Article 13 on the “report 
on major hazards for a non-production installation”. As mentioned above, the measure relates 

92 It is most unusual to site a platform over a major shallow gas pocket as in the Forties Delta case, where it 
should be noted the shallow gas was penetrated only by the 23rd well from that platform. 

82 

 
 
                                                           
predominantly  to  drilling  rigs  (MODU’s),  referring  to  a  common  acceptance  approach 
between Member States of compliance with Directive related measures. 

The  principle  of  common  applications  also  applies  to  systems  deployed  by  operators  on 
production installations where such systems are not Member State specific. The information 
received  from  duty  holders  is  that  the  outcome  from  implementation  of  the  Directive  is  the 
opposite to that which was intended: 

 

In  general,  operators/licensees  operating  production  installations  or  well  operations  in 
more than one Member State report additional burdens following the introduction of the 
Directive. 

  Specifically, industry reports that MODU movements between Member States are delayed 
by the authorities of Member States, who conduct thorough assessments of RoMHs after 
each new entry of an MODU into their jurisdiction. 

  MODU’s returning to the same Member States that issued acceptance within the previous 
compliance  interval  (5  years),  are  also  reportedly  subject  to  a  lengthy  re-acceptance 
process.  

  Operators  and  owners  report  CMAPP  (Corporate  Major  Accident  Prevention  Plan) 
requirements  vary  indiscriminately  between  Member  States,  creating  an  administrative 
burden for duty holders working in more than one Member State. 
In  some  contradiction  to  the  preceding  points,  Member  States  report  that  a  procedure  is 
‘type-based’ and fast-tracked for returning, previously accepted MODUs. 

 

  Some Member States suggest  they would  acknowledge other Member States acceptance 
of a RoMH for MODU’s, subject  to  strategic checks and  reviews of additional Member 
States requirements, where these may exist. 

On  the  positive  side  it  appears  that  in  line  with  the  Directive,  all  Member  States  request 
RoMHs’ and associated productions such as the CMAPP. 

Notwithstanding the obvious advantages in resource management, and indeed the higher goals 
under  the  pursuit  of  an  internal  market  (vis  a  vis  TFEU),  it  seems  that  Member  States  are 
reluctant to explore solutions to freer movement of MODU’s.  

It is, on the other hand, clear that there are variations of social requirements between different 
Member  States.  For  example  in  the  arrangements  for  single  cabin  accommodation,  or  in 
requiring  additional  capacity  of  escape  capsules.  However,  we  believe  it  is  necessary  to 
discriminate  between  the  technical  components  in  the  RoMH  and  the  additional  social 
components (single occupancy cabins) and emergency response (escape capsule seats) that a 
Member State may require. 

In the Commission’s discussions with stakeholders, all duty holders support the concept of an 
internal  market  for  MODU’s  and  are  therefore  disappointed  that  the  situation  has  reversed 
since implementation of the Directive. 

Considering  that  the  fixed  capabilities  of  the  MODU  for  the  geological  and  geographical 
conditions  are  acceptable  for  the  proposed  location,  it  is  difficult  to  envisage  what  is  the 
added-value of the receiving Member States duplicating a thorough assessment of the MODU 

83 

 
 
under  the  Directive.  It  could  easily  accept  the  RoMH  of  the  MODU  that  has  already  been 
accepted  by  the  Competent  Authority  of  the  dispatching  Member  States  that  has  itself 
conducted  a  thorough  assessment  under  the  Directive.  Given  estimates  for  handling  of  a 
MODU  RoMH  by  duty  holders  is  estimated  around  Euro  200,000,  the  subject  is  valid  for 
consideration. 

Should  there  be  additional  particulars  required  by  the  receiving  Member  State  regarding 
number  of  escape  craft  and  single  occupancy  cabins  and  so  on,  these  matters  could  be 
addressed as an addendum to the accepted RoMH. There ought to be, in any case, a quality 
assurance exercise for the record of the receiving Member States. 

Some  Competent  Authorities  appear  to  merge  the  RoMH  assessment  with  validation  of  the 
well  plan.  An  MODU  rated  to  be  able  to  undertake  the  well  plan  and  having  an  accepted 
RoMH  albeit  accepted  by  another  Member  States’  Competent  Authority,  is  in  effect 
prequalified to execute that well plan. 

Conclusions 

No  technical  case  was  identified  for  a  Member  State  to  undertake  a  full  assessment  of  an 
MODU for the acceptance of a RoMH that has been approved within the previous 5 years by 
another Member State. 

The  current  status  appears  out  of  line  with  the  aims  of  the  internal  market.  Nonetheless,  it 
seems  difficult  to  alter  the  status  quo,  should  Member  States  not  voluntarily  acknowledge 
their mutual authorisations of offshore installations. The pursuit of a level playing field will 
certainly be thwarted if Member States do not reinforce their ambitions in that area.  

There  is  also  an  identified  impact  of  differential  implementation  of  provisions  by  Member 
States, requiring duty holders to amend the intent of certain measures (such as the corporate 
major accident prevention policy) to satisfy additional particulars to those in the Directive’s 
relevant  annex.  Such  differential  measures  ought  to  be  made  transparent  by  the  Member 
States requiring them. 

The  situation  should  be  kept  under  review.  More  information  should  be  gathered  by  the 
Member States which have additional requirements and by industry, which claims to have to 
deal with unnecessary administrative burdens.  

84 

 
 
6  ACHIEVEMENTS ASSESSED BY HORIZONTAL CRITERIA 

6.1.1

 Overview  

Further  to  the  analysis  by  themes,  for  assessing  the  achievements  of  the  Directive,  the 
Commission has used five criteria93: 

Relevance looks at  the relationship  between the  needs and problems relating to  the societal 
segment  targeted,  namely  the  maritime  and  coastal  users  and  the  environment  where  the 
offshore petroleum activities occur, and the objective of the intervention. 

Coherence  is  a  factor  of  the  external  coherence  with  other  EU  legislation  and  policy,  and 
where  relevant,  at  the  Member  State  or  International  level.  It  also  is  an  indicator  of  how 
different components of the Directive, as implemented, operate together to achieve particular 
objectives. 

Effectiveness analysis considers how successful the Directive may have been in achieving or 
progressing  towards  its  objectives.  Where  objectives  may  not  have  been  achieved,  the 
assessment  will  attempt  to  assess  the  extent  to  which  progress  falls  short  and  attempt  to 
explain the shortfall.  

Efficiency is meant as the relationship between the resources required to execute a measure 
and  the  gain  (i.e.  an  assessment  of  costs  and  benefits).  The  cost-benefit  analysis  will  be 
quantified where possible and identify reductions or increases in regulatory burdens. 

EU-added  value  is  a  deduction  of  the  relative  efficacy  between  the  implementation  of  the 
directive,  and  the  Member  States  acting  alone  in  regulating  the  offshore  sector’s  control  of 
major accident risk. 

For the analysis by criteria, the assessment is guided by questions which were addressed for 
each of the themes. The following sets of questions were applied for the different parts of the 
analysis: 

Relevance 

  To what extent is the intervention still relevant?  
  Did  the  change  in  framework  conditions  for  offshore  operation  make  the  Directive  less 

relevant? 

  To  what  extent  have  the  original  objectives  proven  to  have  been  appropriate  for  the 

intervention?   

  How well do the objectives of the intervention correspond to the needs within the EU?  
  How  well  did  the  intervention  reduce  the  risks  for  accidents  and  the  number/quality  of 

offshore accidents? 

93 These criteria have been developped for formal evaluations of EU legislation and are provided by “better 
regulaiton guidelines”.  

85 

 
 
                                                           
  How relevant is the EU intervention to EU citizens? 
Coherence 

  To what extent is the intervention internally coherent?  
  Specifically, how far is the intervention coherent with environmental legislation? 
  To what extent is the intervention coherent with wider EU policy?  
  Specifically, to what extent is the intervention coherent with environmental policy? 
  To what extent is the intervention coherent with international obligations? 
  Specifically, to what extent is the intervention coherent with international conventions of 

offshore operations? 

EU added-value 

  What is the additional value resulting from the EU intervention, compared to what could 
reasonably  have  been  expected  from  Member  States  acting  at  national  and/or  regional 
levels?  

  What  is  the  added  value  from  avoided  accidents,  which  may  have  caused  damage, 

environmental pollution, direct and indirect economic losses? 

  What is the added value from the intervention regarding public acceptance of offshore oil 

and gas operations? 

Effectiveness 

  What have been the effects of the intervention?  
  How far did the intervention contribute to the avoidance of accidents? 
  How far did the intervention reduce the risk of accidents? 
  How did the intervention influence public perception and support for offshore operations? 
  To what extent do the observed effects link to the intervention? Or do you attribute them 

to different causes? 

Efficiency 

  To what extent are the costs associated with the intervention proportionate to the benefits 

it has generated?  

  What  factors  are  influencing  any  particular  discrepancies  (e.g.  regional)  of  the 

intervention’s effectiveness?  

  How do these discrepancies link to the intervention?  
  To what  extent do factors linked to  the intervention  influence the efficiency  with  which 

the observed achievements were attained?  

  What other factors influence the costs and benefits?  

6.1.2

 Relevance 

The intervention has caused a comprehensive overhaul of EU offshore petroleum legislation 
to bring it at least up to the most relevant jurisdictions that practice major accident prevention 
(e.g.  UK,  Denmark,  Italy,  and  Netherlands).  However,  the  intervention  has  not  encouraged 
Member States to make steps towards adjustment of liability provisions.  

86 

 
 
Regarding the aims of the Directive, there is good qualitative and quantitative evidence from 
competent authorities and industry to suggest that the measures in the Directive remain highly 
relevant to introducing global best industry practices in the EU. This is particularly relevant 
for prevention and mitigation measures, introduced to ensure that the risks of a major accident 
in  EU  waters  are  reduced  as  far  as  possible.  The  intervention  has  directly  addressed 
coordinated  national  contingency  planning,  with  industry  emergency  planning  and  response 
systems. 

No information  was  received suggesting that the  best  practice measures under the Directive 
have  been  superseded  or  are  no  longer  relevant.  The  intervention  attempts  to  maintain 
relevance by setting aims and goals, rather than prescribing detailed measures. This provides 
scope for responsiveness to  new knowledge and  technical  innovation,  keeping the Directive 
applicable  as  the  sector  develops.  Moreover,  transparency  provisions  open  the  sector  to 
greater visibility and scrutiny by civil society in the EU.  

6.1.3

 Coherence 

The intervention is aligned with wider EU legislation for the safety of workers, assignment of 
liability, and protection of the environment. The implemented measures co-exist comfortably 
with occupational safety and environmental protections under EU law.  

The Directive strictly focuses on preventing major accidents. Occupational safety and day-to-
day  environmental  protection  are  adequately  provided  for  in  other  legislation.  The 
intervention’s  measures  are  consistently  adapted  from  global  best  international  offshore 
petroleum practices for industry and regulators, enabling verifiable tests of these measures.   

Furthermore,  levels  of  coherence  with  related  EU  legislation  were  evaluated.  Concerning 
worker protection from a major accident (i.e. an accident with multiple serious injuries and/or 
fatalities),  the  intervention  has  prompted  Member  States  to  replace  the  Safety  and  Health 
Document  previously  required  under  Directive  92/91  EEC  (Mineral  Extraction  Through 
Drilling Directive94). This has been superseded by an ex ante risk report for each installation, 
to  be  verified  by  the  competent  authority  prior  to  commencement  of  activities  on  the 
installation.  

The EU intervention has compelled Member States to extend liability for water damage to the 
extent of the exclusive economic zone95 (previously limited to territorial waters). This change 
has  established  an  unambiguous  coherence  with  the  functioning  of  the  Environmental 
Liability Directive in other sectors.  

Regarding coherence with wider EU policy, the intervention’s requirements to implement best 
international  practices  for  regulators  and  industry  ascribes  responsibilities  to  entities  that 

94 Council Directive 92/91/EEC of 3 November 1992 concerning the minimum requirements for improving the 
safety and health protection of workers in the mineral- extracting industries through drilling (eleventh individual 
Directive within the meaning of Article 16 (1) of Directive 89/391/EEC), OJ L 348, 28.11.1992, p. 9–24.  
95 In most cases, the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) may comprise an area from 3 to 12 nautical miles, up to 
200 nautical miles (370 kilometres) off the coast. 

87 

 
 
                                                           
control  the  risks  of  major  accidents,  and  for  the  assurance  that  major  accidents  will  be 
prevented.  This  is  in  line  with  the  integrated  maritime  policy  to  create  a  level  regulatory 
playing field for petroleum activities in all EU offshore waters, and requires good governance 
jointly with maritime spatial planning. 

Under  the  broad  generic  framework  of  EU  environmental  legislation,  there  is  intentional 
coherence of the Directive’s responsibilities on owners and operators with the Environmental 
Impact  Assessment  Directive  relating  both  to  preventive  measures  and  emergency 
preparedness and response. 

Regarding  coherence  with  international  obligations,  the  intervention  allows  application  of 
external  protocols  and  obligations  relevant  to  the  sector.  These,  least  effect  day  to  day 
operations,  and  most  effect  navigation  of  mobile  installations,  emergency  preparedness  and 
response,  cross-boundary  pollution  prevention,  and  decommissioning  of  installations 
including detoxification  of partly removed structures. For example, in  the context  of safety, 
the  Directive’s  internal  coherence  means  that  it  does  not  regulate  the  extent  of 
decommissioning,  which  usually  does  not  directly  affect  safety,  but  it  does  regulate  for 
control  of  risks  of  a  major  accident  during  the  activity.  The  issue  is  pertinent  as  a  wave  of 
decommissioning  is  underway  and  key  standards,  e.g.  the  1996  London  Protocol  to  the 
Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter96, 
are being updated. 

6.1.4

 Effectiveness 

The effectiveness of the EU intervention has been in securing a levelled regime that takes into 
account  global  best  offshore  petroleum  practices  for  industry  and  regulators  for  preventing 
accidents. The Directive has set the necessary conditions to reduce the likelihood of a major 
offshore  petroleum  accident  in  EU  waters.  Despite  the  largely  adequate  quality  of 
implementation  by  Member  States,  overall  implementation  has  not  always  been  fully 
consistent. The Commission services are engaged in a formal dialogue with Member States to 
address these concerns.  

The Directive has clear, direct effects for a number of reasons. Firstly, the intervention creates 
explicit  responsibilities  and  liabilities  for  the  license  holder,  operator,  mobile  installation 
owner,  and  contractors.  Secondly,  it  mandates  the  assignment  of  a  Competent  Authority  to 
conduct  oversight  functions,  and  finally,  the  Directive  introduces  a  verified  risk  report  for 
every installation. These are the most fundamental elements by which a major accident will be 
prevented in EU waters. 

Public  consultation  and  expert  meetings  undertaken  in  this  assessment  suggest  that  more 
effective  integration  and  interfaces  have  been  built  amongst  and  between  duty  holders  in 
industry  and  regulators,  as  a  direct  result  of  the  Directive.  These  qualitative  findings  are 
complemented by quantitative date from the first two annual EU-wide reports of incidents in 
the offshore petroleum sector. For the first time at EU level, they provide new statistical data 

96 http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/LCLP/Documents/PROTOCOLAmended2006.pdf.  

88 

 
 
                                                           
on accident risk, thanks to the Directive and its Implementing Regulation. At the current stage 
of analysis, drawing on the data from these two annual reports, the safety level of EU offshore 
petroleum sector appears adequate. 

Furthermore, the Directive has had extended effects on regulation and reporting. It is apparent 
that  a  strong  legal  hierarchy  of  duty,  an  expert  regulator,  and  the  obligation  to  undertake  a 
verified risk report for each offshore installation, forms an effective template for risk control 
across the EU.  

The  intervention  has  led  to  a  horizontal  adoption  of  best  international  practices  by 
operators/owners  and  competent  authorities  within  key  areas.  For  example,  in  safety  and 
environmental  management  systems  based  on  risk  control,  as  well  as  the  incorporation  of 
independent verification of critical control systems and well drilling plans. The Directive also 
impacts duty holders, obliging them to report on major accidents in the EU. Moreover, it is 
evident  from  this  assessment  that  corporate  policy  amongst  duty  holders  at  the  EU  level  is 
often  mirrored  in  their  operations  at  a  global  level,  improving  global  standards  of  incident 
reporting,  for  example.  The  implementation  of  the  Directive  occurred  over  a  period  where 
price  of  oil  dropped  dramatically  to  a  steady  low  level.  In  absence  of  the  Directive,  the 
resulting cost squeeze may have risked compromising the high level of risk control.  

Following  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  disaster  that  triggered  this  EU  intervention,  there  was  an 
unprecedented  wave  of  industry  initiatives  in  technical  equipment  and  in  measurement  that 
focused  on  major  accident  prevention  and  response.  Through  creating  transparency  of 
regulation and levelling standards, the Directive has undoubtedly contributed to sustaining the 
industry’s progressive initiatives.   

More directly, the integration of environmental protection and mitigation into installation risk 
reports significantly reduces major accident risk in the Union. The integration of installation 
based emergency response plans with national contingency plans is a further major advance. 
One  Member  State  (UK)  has  produced  a  new  best  practice  for  liability  and  financial 
responsibility in direct response to the Directive that may provoke more effective mechanisms 
elsewhere. Beyond preliminary reports on the overall implementation of the Directive, other 
Member  States  have  yet  to  conduct  surveys  and  assessments  on  the  effectiveness  of  the 
intervention and how their workers perceive the situation.  

The Directive has set a framework that allows Member States to establish national legislation 
in  line  with  their  specific  requirements.  Accordingly,  the  functioning  of  the  internal  market 
has been inhibited by wide-ranging interpretations of both technical goals (e.g. standards for 
installation risk reports)  and processes. There is  no evidence of insufficient  measures  in  the 
Directive,  however,  national  policy  and  cultural  objectives  contribute 
to  differing 
implementations, as far as compatible with the Directive. 

89 

 
 
6.1.5

 Efficiency 

Financial  and  practical  efficiency  gains  for  industry  duty  holders  and  regulators  may  also 
benefit  social  partners,  particularly  in  developing  a  more  consistent  approach  towards 
Member States’ implementation of the Directive. 

Certain  aspects  of  the  cost-effectiveness  of  the  intervention  have  been  examined.  The 
arrangements brought into effect by industry to  acquire and maintain interoperable response 
equipment and expertise in accessible locations in EU waters, and to integrate those resources 
with national contingency plans, is a major efficiency gain as well as a highly effective step. It 
considerably increases  the resources available to react  in  the  event  of  a  major accident,  and 
limit the potential pollution from oil contamination. 

The costs of introducing the formulation of risk assessment into the management systems, and 
the costs of demonstrating compliance to the regulator, are not unjustifiably excessive. So far, 
neither  industry  nor  Member  States  have  suggested  the  running  costs  of  the  intervention’s 
requirements  are unjustified (see also in the annex, part VII). The cost of introducing a risk 
based  control  system  that  is  installation-centred  is  a  relatively  small  component  of  the 
estimated  benefit  for  significantly  reducing  the  annualised  cost  of  a  major  accident  in  EU 
waters  (the  total  cost  for  BP  are  estimated  at  $65  billion).  This  assumption  is  based  on  the 
available information from industry and competent authorities’ data. 

Other factors are influencing efficiency. The south Mediterranean region (outside the EU) has 
experienced some of the world’s worst major accidents and blowouts. No region in the world 
has  escaped  the  consequences  of  a  major  accident,  and  the  southern  EU  Member  States,  as 
they enter offshore petroleum operations, are not exempt from the hazards. There is no data to 
make  meaningful  assessment  of  risk  trends  outside  of  the  North  Sea  area,  however  the  risk 
management approach of the intervention is demonstrably effective wherever it is deployed, 
globally. Feedback from Competent Authorities and duty holders outside the North Sea region 
is  strongly  in  favour  of  the  intervention.  Industry  however,  has  challenged  some  of  the 
administrative cost burdens applied by some new entrant Competent Authorities.  

that 

it  appears 

the  cost  burden  on 

Regarding  proportionality, 
industry  (including 
administrative  costs  paid  to  competent  authorities)  has  been  accepted  as  necessary  in  the 
North  Sea  region,  where  the  historical  major  accident  record  has  been  particularly  high.  It 
remains unclear whether the same proportionality applies to the southern seas where the major 
accident record is  reportedly light  (relative to  the number of installations). The value in the 
goal-setting  nature  of  the  Directive  is  that  Member  States  are  facilitated  to  develop  their 
specific  regimes  on  an  individual,  fit  for  purpose  capacity  basis.  Crucially,  the  intervention 
also enables Member States to recover the associated costs of this development from the duty 
holders, whose activities create the major hazard risks the intervention aims to prevent. 

Industry  leading  representatives,  IADC  (drillers)  and  IOGP  (producers)  continue  their 
development  of  guidance  and  standards  for  best  offshore  practices  in  risk  control.  The 
intervention  requirements  for  risk  reporting  and  risk  management  encourage  industry  to 

90 

 
 
improve,  and  are  inherently  economically  efficient.  These  obligations  help  form  the  bridge 
between the stated aim of the industry and what actually happens on the installation. 

Elements of the risk management systems required by the intervention identified by industry 
as causing unwarranted administrative burdens, are typically related to the functioning of the 
competent  authority.  In  contrast,  the  competent  authorities  believe  their  systems  to  be  cost 
efficient. 

6.1.6

 EU-Added Value 

The  Directive’s  measures  have  brought  EU-added  value  to  Member  States  by  introducing 
improved offshore regulation and response from industry. Such a comprehensive overhaul of 
EU practices would not have occurred without the Directive. 

According to  the most consistently expressed views of  Member States’ regulators, industry, 
NGO’s,  and  TU’s,  the  Directive  has  added  value  compared  with  Member  States’  acting 
without EU intervention. The regulators and industry have taken positive views, whilst those 
of NGO’s and TU’s are more nuanced.  Nevertheless, it can be said with some confidence that 
even  the  most  advanced  regimes  have  adopted  measures  that  add  value  to  their  regulatory 
oversight that would not have occurred without the Directive coming into effect.  
There are specific example of added value that can be attributed to the intervention. Firstly, 
amongst the new entrant risk-based regimes (outside the North Sea and Italy), both industry 
and competent authorities note new and better interfaces where there were previously few, or 
none.  Secondly,  the  intervention  established  an  EU  expert  group  (EUOAG)  based  on  a 
Commission  decision97,  thereby  establishing  the  conditions  for  continuous  improvement  of 
Competent  Authorities.  Thirdly,  the  Directive  created  a  consistent  standard  for  all  EU 
regulators.  Fourthly,  the  EU-wide  incident  reporting  system  is  the  world’s  first  statutory 
international  database.  Finally,  the  integration  of  national  contingency  plans  with  industry 
arrangements, and the sharing of response resources, represent significant tools for mitigating 
the  consequences  of  a  major  accident  anywhere  in  EU  waters.  Moreover,  the  public 
consultation revealed that social stakeholders believe offshore petroleum operations in the EU 
would be less safe had the intervention not been made. 

It is especially clear that those Member States that previously did not have risk based regimes 
would not have adopted such practices without EU intervention. But even the most advanced 
regimes have adopted measures that have added value to their region that would not, by direct 
admission, have occurred in the absence of the intervention. 

97 Commission Decision of 19 January 2012 on setting up of the European Union Offshore Oil and Gas 
Authorities Group, OJ C 18, 21.1.2012, p. 8–10.  

91 

 
 
                                                           
 
7.1

Strengths and weaknesses 

7 

CONCLUSIONS 

The  decision  by  the  Commission,  as  accepted  by  both  the  Council  and  Parliament,  was  to 
focus  on  the  prevention  and  mitigation  of  major  accidents  based  on  risk  management. 
Therefore  the  Directive  overlooks  measures  that  do  not  specifically  address  major  accident 
prevention, most notably occupational safety and health, as well as day to day discharges and 
emissions.  Furthermore,  the  intervention  does  not  prescribe  detailed  arrangements  to  be 
followed,  but  instead  establishes  aims  to  be  achieved.  This  approach  has  undoubtedly 
provided clarity of intent which has been reflected in the implementation. 

Furthermore,  the  strategy  of  proliferating  existing  best  practices  rather  than  experimenting 
with  unpractised  solutions,  has  been  very  effective.  As  a  consequence,  for  every  measure 
there is an analogue already in place, usually in one or more Member States. Taking such an 
approach  has  assisted  in  rapidly  upskilling  new  entrant  Competent  Authorities,  as  well  as 
catalysing  the  comprehension  of  risk-based  management  practises  for  duty  holders 
inexperienced in this area. 

The  nature  of  the  intervention’s  approach  also  has  inherent  limitations,  namely  diluting  the 
degree  of  regulatory  overlap  across  Member  States  by  permitting  discrepancies  in 
implementation.  This  outcome  is  the  result  of  the  decision  to  opt  for  the  creation  of  a 
Directive  rather  than  a  Regulation,  as  originally  planned.  Consequently,  the  benefits  of 
standardisation,  efficiency,  benchmarking,  and  effectiveness  through  shared  applications  are 
less pronounced than initially intended.  

A  comprehensive  vertical  sector-based  regime  such  as  that  introduced  by  the  Directive 
requires significant supporting clarification and guidance. In particular, because the Directive 
sets goals to be attained rather than detailed steps to be followed. Duty holders and Member 
States  have  extensive  discretion  on  how  to  implement  and  apply  the  Directive  whilst 
remaining in compliance with its provisions. Some Member States prioritise the development 
of such material for themselves and their duty holders, whilst others do not. Under the loose 
parameters  of  this  Directive,  Member  States  are  not  strongly  incentivised  to  follow  the 
guidance published by other Member States.   

Another associated limitation is that Member States are less likely to collaborate at their own 
cost to the production of EU-level guidance, despite the fact that guidance and model practise 
at the EU-level makes a very beneficial contribution to efficacy of the measures. 

Since no disastrous accident has occurred in the EU since the Directive has come into effect, 
some themes analysed in the SWD lack a practical test. 

7.2

Areas to follow-up 

With  regard  to  liability,  financial  security  and  the  handling  of  compensation  claims,  it  is 
evident from this assessment that rules in Member States differ substantially. This is true for 
offshore installations, but also on an upper horizontal level regarding civil code. Owing to the 

92 

 
 
 
 
avoidance of catastrophic accidents in recent years, it remains unknown how Member States’ 
national rules and regulation would work in practice.  

According to the Directive, the decommissioning of installations is an inherent element of the 
installations’  life  cycle.  Powers  to  deal  with  this  aspect  have  been  delegated  to  Member 
States’  Competent  Authorities,  which  request  and  assess  a  major  hazard  report  before 
authorisation. These reports shall include provisions for the end of the installation’s lifetime, 
including  environmental  risks.  As  soon  as  decommissioning  is  envisaged,  competent 
authorities shall assess an up-dated major hazard report. 

The Directive does not include provisions going beyond the requirement to decommission in a 
safe  manner,  including  environmental  concerns.  At  the  same  time,  it  neither  prescribes  nor 
recommends certain processes or guides on when and how to dismantle an installation or the 
criteria for leaving an installation exceptionally “in situ”. Furthermore, the Directive does not 
address follow-up monitoring of the site and the sealed wells. The question remains whether 
the Directive requires an update to deal with these subjects. 

On  Mutual  recognition  between  Member  States  of  mobile  drilling  units  regarding  the 
authorisation  process,  Member  States  and  stakeholders  took  completely  different  views  on 
this  matter.  Member  States  insisted  on  the  need  to  re-assess  the  major  hazards  of  an 
installation,  even  if  already  assessed  (e.g.  by  a  neighbouring  Member  State).  Conversely, 
industrial stakeholders called for the abandonment of this procedure, arguing that it creates an 
unnecessary  administrative  burden,  which  both  delays  operations  and  leads  to  substantial 
additional costs.  

In an effort to resolve this issue, this practice of not recognizing the authorisation issued by a 
different  Member  State  should  be  cross-referenced  with  existing  legislation  on  the  internal 
market.  

7.3

  Overall assessment 

The Commission carried out an in-depth assessment of the Directive’s application in practice. 
It was structured by bundling articles from the Directive into a number of overarching themes. 
These themes were drawn from stakeholder consultations, public consultation, the work of the 
Commission’s Inter-Service-Group, and a European Parliament report on liability.  

The  assessment  examined  how  Member  States  implemented  the  Directive,  reaching 
conclusions  on  the  strengths,  weaknesses,  options,  and  challenges  of  this  process.  Overall, 
transposition was carried out to an adequate quality, nevertheless, the Commission follows-up 
certain  weaknesses  with  Member  States  individually.  Both  in  terms  of  implementation  and 
practical application, there has been a comprehensive adoption of the Directive throughout the 
EU.  here  is  firm  evidence  that  the  measures  in  the  Directive,  as  implemented  by  Member 
States  and  responded  to  by  industry,  are  relevant  to  ensuring  best  industry  and  regulatory 
practices  for  major  accident  prevention  and  mitigation,  in  the  EU  as  well  as  globally.  Best 

93 

 
 
practise can subsequently contribute to the aim of mitigating unacceptably high risks of major 
accidents in EU waters. 

The intervention of the Directive caused a comprehensive overhaul of EU offshore petroleum 
regulation,  including  all  relevant  jurisdictions  and  regions  for  major  accident  prevention. 
Furthermore, the Directive successfully ascribed  primary duties to  operators and owners for 
the prevention of major accidents on their installations, as well as the mitigation of the effects 
thereof. As such, the primary objective of the intervention was achieved.  

The  Directive  has  clearly  established  a  hierarchy  of  control,  including  the  license  holder, 
operator and owner, in addition to the assignment of an independent expert regulator. These 
are the most critical and fundamental aims of the Directive because they form the foundation 
of risk control and major accident mitigation. Effective control and regulation are at the core 
of a wider, common objective to reduce the risk of major accidents to a level where they are 
unlikely to occur again in EU waters. Other key measures in the Directive address: means by 
which responsible actors are effective, mitigation measures in the event of a major accident, 
as well as the issue of raising overall standards throughout the Union and in third countries. 

On  the  basis  of  available  data,  the  cost  of  introducing  the  risk  based  system  is  a  relatively 
small  component  of  the  estimated  benefit  of  significantly  reducing  the  annualised  cost  of  a 
major accident in EU waters. 

The  Directive’s  measures  have  brought  EU-added  value  to  all  Member  States  through 
introducing more robust offshore regulation and a concomitant response from industry. Such a 
comprehensive overhaul of EU practices would not have occurred without the Directive. 

Amongst the new risk-based regimes, industry has reported the development of constructive 
relationships  with  regulators,  where  previously  there  were  none.  The  public  consultation, 
though nuanced in its affirmation of the Directive in other areas, was decisively in support of 
the  position  that  offshore  petroleum  operations  in  the  EU  would  be  less  safe  without  the 
implementation of the Directive. 

Environmental NGO’s call for stronger protection of the environment and stronger financial 
responsibility  mechanisms,  whilst  broadly  aligning  themselves  with  the  positive  indicators 
from  the  implementation  experience.  Regulators  and  primary  duty  holders  express  that  the 
new  regulatory  measures  and  subjective  industry  arrangements  need  to  stabilise  before  any 
consideration  can  be  given  to  further  legal  intervention.  Further  incident  and  information 
reports at the EU-level will indeed consolidate the baseline of EU performance indicators and 
identify critical trends in the major accident risk levels in the EU. 

Regarding  stakeholders  that  use  the  Directive  in  practice,  both  Member  States’  Competent 
Authorities  and  operators/owners  seem  to  be  largely  satisfied  with  the  functioning  of  the 
Directive, as implemented by Member States. They feel that potential benefits (derived from 
avoided accidents) largely outweigh the costs of implementation and the adjustments required 
at the level of offshore installations. 

94 

 
 
The experience of implementing the Directive has been broadly positive, with the majority of 
measures successfully in place. Although further interventions at the EU-level are sometimes 
unwarranted,  issues  of  concern  or  thematic  indicators  have  been  mapped  across  the 
Commission’s  standard  assessment  questions.  Where  these  grievances  are  found  to  have  a 
reasonable foundation, they can broadly be handled at the administrative level. This kind of 
response  is  facilitated  by  increasing  levels  of  maturity  and  stability  across  Member  States’ 
regimes.  

The  preceding  analysis  illustrates  a  clearly  positive  trajectory  of  development  within  the 
industrial safety culture  of the EU as a whole. This  includes the establishment of regulators 
and duty holders who share clear, mutual objectives in a common pursuit of major accident 
prevention, including with regard to the environment. 

Through  the  assessment  process  three  key  issues  were  particularly  prevalent,  they  may 
therefore  warrant  a  thorough  follow  up:  (i)  liability,  financial  security  and  the  handling  of 
compensation  claims,  (ii)  the  decommissioning  of  installations  including  questions  on 
removal  or  leaving  in  situ,  as  well  as  the  follow  up  after  decommissioning  (including  the 
monitoring  of  sealed  wells  and  (iii)  the  mutual  recognition  of  mobile  drilling  installation  in 
the EU.  

95 

 
 
 
 
8  ANNEXES TO THE STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT (SWD) 

9  ANNEX I: ORGANISATION AND TIMING 

  Lead DG & DECIDE planning info 

9.1
Lead DG: DG Energy 

DECIDE PLAN 

9.2

  Organization and Timing 

20-21 September 2017  Meeting with Commission expert committee (EUOAG) and 
industry stakeholders to initiate engagement with the project 

21 November 2017 

First meeting of the inter-services group (ISG) on the assessment 
of the OSD.  

21-22 March 2018 

Meetings with expert committee (EUOAG) and industry experts 
to generate first responses to project background.  

3 May 2018 

Publication of the Evaluation's roadmap and background 
document. Invitation for comments by stakeholders98. 

May – June 2018 

Analysis of comments 

19 July 2018 

24 July 2018 

Deadline for full compliance with the Directive by industry  

Publication of draft assessment strategy and preliminary meeting 
of Regulatory Scrutiny Board 

July–September 2018 

Preparation of public consultation questionnaire and organisation 
of stakeholder workshop 

19 September 2018 

Stakeholder workshop. Launch of public consultation 

4-6 December 2018 

Interviews with stakeholder groups 

21 December 2018 

Close of public consultation 

16-17 January 2019   Workshops with EUOAG and stakeholder experts. Release of 

analysis of public consultation 

31 January 2019 

Second ISG Meeting on the assessment of the OSD  

22 March 2019 

Interviews with North Sea Regulators forum members 

7 May 2019 

Commission ISG meeting with expert committee on platform 
decommissioning  

25 October 2019 

Third ISG Meeting on the assessment of the OSD 

27 November 2019 
12 March 2020 

Fourth ISG Meeting on the assessment of the OSD 
Meeting with the Regulatory Scrutiny Board and proposal to draft 
an assessment on the experiences with the implementation of the 
Directive 

98 https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/initiatives/ares-2018-2361494_en 

96 

 
 
 
                                                           
  Evidence and Sources 

9.3
The assessment was based on the following evidence and sources of information: 

  Data collected from Stakeholders 
  Data collected from Member States 
  Information exchanged during stakeholder consultation meetings and workshops 
  Information gathered from the public consultation process 
  Information exchanged during the proceedings of the EU Offshore Authorities Group 
  Information collected from experts in the sector 
  Various relevant reports and legislation.  

  Discussions in the Commission's Inter Service Group 

9.4
DG ENER has set up an Inter Service Group with representatives from various relevant DGs 
specifically for the purposes of the assessment of the OSD, which was consulted on a regular 
basis.  The  DGs  participating  in  this  group  were:  CLIMA,  COMP,  ENV,  FISMA,  GROW, 
HOME, JRC, JUST, MARE, NEAR, MOVE, SG, SJ and EMPL. On its meeting on the 31st of 
January 2019, the ISG has discussed the results of the stakeholder and public consultations. In 
addition, bilateral meetings were held with several DGs for more technical follow-up. During 
its meeting on 25th of October 2019 the ISG has further refined the assessment SWD and its 
Annexes. 

97 

 
 
 
 
10  ANNEX II: STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION 

  Consultation scope and objectives 

10.1
In  assessing the effectiveness  of the  Offshore Safety  Directive with  regard to  its objectives, 
for  example  the  implementation  of  adequate  levels  of  safety  and  environmental  protection 
across the EU, the review aims to verify whether:  

 

the  main  objectives  of  the  Directive  have  been  achieved  and  if  not,  whether  an 
amendment of the Directive or other legislation is appropriate.  

  any gaps in legislation exist which need to be covered for improving the level of safety 

and environmental protection in offshore oil and gas operations.   

  certain  provisions  of  the  Directive  impose  undue  burden  on  Member  States  or  the 

industry and whether their removal should be considered.  
the  Directive  has  adequately  harmonised  the  regulatory  structure  and  level  of  safety 
and environmental protection across the EU offshore operations, proportionately to the 
activity levels of the Member States. 
the Directive is effective and proportionate with regard to the objectives set. 

 

 

The  European  Commission  involved  in  this  task  several  Directorates-General  with  DG 
Energy in the lead. These Directorates-General co-operate in the framework of a formal Inter-
Service-Group  to  gather  and  analyse  information  for  addressing  the  review  and  report.  The 
Directorate-General  for  Energy  informed  the  members  of  the  EUOAG  (Competent 
Authorities of Member States, associations and unions) on its intention to evaluate and review 
the Directive, in September 2017.  

The  consultation  process  has  opened  the  discussion  on  all  relevant  topics,  including  (non-
exhaustive list):  

  Liability, compensation claims, financial security and criminal law – also with regard 
to  Resolution  2015/2352(INI)  of  December  1st  2016  of  the  European  Parliament  on 
liability, compensation and financial security for offshore oil and gas operations: 

  Decommissioning and abandonment of installations and wells; 
  External  threats  (e.g.  cyber  security;  sabotage,  terrorist  and  criminal  attacks,  hybrid 

attacks); 
Independent verification; 

 
  Mutual recognition of Mobile Offshore Drilling Units in Member States' jurisdictions; 
 
Inconsistencies, shortcomings or unclear wording of the Offshore Safety Directive. 

Participants  of  the  consultation  are  expected  to  provide  their  opinion,  experience  and 
proposals preferentially supported by facts and figures. 

  Mapping and participation of stakeholders 

10.2
Article 4(1) of the European Commission Decision of 2012 concerning the functioning of the 
EU  Offshore  Authorities  Group  (EUOAG)  designates  the  Member  States’  Competent 
Authorities  responsible  for  the  regulatory  oversight  of  offshore  oil  and  gas  activities  and 
related policy issues as the members of the Group.  

In a first step, the Commission has consulted these competent authorities to get feedback on 
their technical and regulatory experience of implementing the Directive. 

98 

 
 
Secondly,  the  Commission  has  consulted  stakeholders  represented  in  the  EUOAG’s  plenary 
meetings.  These  were  the  European  Community  Shipowners'  Association,  the  International 
Association  of  Drilling  Contractors,  the  International  Marine  Contractors  Association,  the 
International Association of Oil and Gas Producers and the IndustriAll trade union. 

Thirdly,  the  Commission  has  contacted  regional  groups  and  conventions.  These  were  the 
OSPAR Convention, the Barcelona Convention, REMPEC, the Commission on the Protection 
of  the  Black  Sea  against  Pollution,  the  International  Maritime  Organization  and  the 
International Labour Organization. 

Fourthly,  further  consultation  of  an  enlarged  circle  of  stakeholders  and  Non-Governmental 
Organizations took place from international, European and national level. Stakeholders were 
asked to provide the Commission with the information necessary for an in-depth assessment 
of  the  Directive’s  effectiveness,  as  well  as  their  opinion  on  related  matters.  Numerous 
organizations  were  contacted  and  response  /  involvement  was  received  by  Sea  Shepherd 
Global, the Bellona Foundation, World Wildlife Fund, the Nature Conservancy and Surfrider 
Foundation Europe.     

Finally, all other interested parties, e.g. private, business, public entities, have provided views 
and comments via a public consultation carried out by the European Commission.  

  Selection of consultation activities and their accessibility 
10.3
The Commission has carried out the following consultation activities: 

February-March  2018:  Contributions  from  external  experts  with  specific  expertise  in  safety 
legislation, including health and safety at work and protection of the environment; 

March  2018:  Start  of  consultation  with  the  experts  and  key  stakeholders  through  the  EU 
Offshore Oil and Gas Authorities Group;  

September  2018:  Stakeholders’  Workshop  organised  by  the  Commission  in  Brussels.  The 
Commission  invited  participants  from  organized  European  groups  relevant  to  the  offshore 
sector.  Range  and  extent  of  participants  invited  took  into  account  contributions  and  interest 
expressed during the public consultation.  
September - December 2018: 12-week long public consultation99;  

January 2019: Additional Stakeholder's Workshop 

10.4

  Summary  /overview  on  consultation  activities  by  stakeholder  groups  and 

indicative timing 

Table 1: Overview of consultation activities 

99 Published on Europa Public Consultations Page at https://ec.europa.eu/info/consultations_en  

99 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Consultation Activity 

EUOAG 

EUOAG 

Indicative Planning  19/09/2017  21/03/2018 

Public 
Consultation  Workshop 

Workshop 

Sept-Dec 
2018 

Sept-18 

Jan-19 

Targeted Stakeholders 

Member States 
Authorities 

x 

Industry Associations 

Regional Groups and 
Regional Sea 
Conventions 

Worker Union 
Associations 

Relevant Third 
Countries 

Relevant EU Agencies 

NGOs 

Citizens 

Research bodies 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

10.5

  Consultation webpage & communication activities  

The  Commission  has  published  the  roadmap  document  on  the  consultation  webpage 
specifically  created  for  this  assessment.  Announcements  at  the  webpage  of  the 
Directorate-General  for  Energy  have  further  informed  the  public  on  this  review  and 
provided the link to the webpage for the public consultation. 

10.5.1

  Roadmap of the Evaluation 

The  Roadmap  document,  published  in  plain  language,  explains  the  context  of  the 
Directive and its assessment. It clearly sets out the purpose, scope and methodology of 
the assessment process. Full text of roadmap attached as pdf document.  

10.5.2

  Questionnaire for public consultation 

Text of questionnaire is separately attached as pdf document. 

10.5.3

  Position Statements received from Stakeholders  

Official statements were received by the following organizations:  

- 

Irish Offshore Operators' Association 

100 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
-  European Community Shipowners' Association, International Association of Drilling 

Contractors and International Marine Contractors Association (joint statement) 

-  LUKOIL 
- 
-  The Bellona Foundation, World Wildlife Fund, Friends of the Earth Europe, Surfrider 

International Association of Oil and Gas Producers  

Foundation Europe, Young Friends of the Earth Norway (joint statement) 

-  World Wildlife Fund Greece 

10.6

  Synopsis of Consultation Activities 
  February-March 2018:  
10.6.1

Contributions from external experts with specific expertise pursuant to the scope of the OSD 

The first  step of the consultation strategy aimed  at  collecting information to  consolidate the 
Commission’s  knowledge-base  on  the  evolution  of  offshore  safety  systems  since  the  entry 
into force of the OSD.  

The  consultation  involved  independent  national  experts,  representatives  from  EU  countries 
and groups from the offshore industry affected by the OSD. Other General Directions of the 
Commission (e.g. DG ENV and JUST) were also consulted. 

Five  topics  previously  identified  as  “specific  areas  for  an  in-depth  assessment”  were 

addressed through a questionnaire previously sent to participants: 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

Liability,  compensation  claims, 
prosecution 

financial  security 

instruments  and  criminal 

Decommissioning of offshore installations and abandoning of wells 

External Threats and Cyber Security 

Independent Verification 

Mutual recognition of Mobile Offshore Drilling Units in MS jurisdictions 

The result of the first step led to the drafting of an “issue paper”, which was presented to the 
EU Offshore Authorities Group (EUAOG) ahead of the meeting of 21 March 2018. 

10.6.2

  March 2018:  

Consultation with external experts and key stakeholders through the EU Offshore Authorities 
Group 

Article 4(1) of the European Commission Decision of 2012 concerning the functioning of the 
EU  Offshore  Authorities  Group  (EUOAG)  designates  the  Member  States’  Competent 
Authorities  responsible  for  the  regulatory  oversight  of  offshore  oil  and  gas  activities  and 
related policy issues as the members of the Group.  

In  a  second  step,  the  Commission  consulted  these  competent  authorities  to  get  feedback  on 
their technical  and  regulatory  experience of implementing the OSD. This approach went  on 

101 

 
 
  
throughout  the  whole  assessment  process  along  succeeding  EUOAG  meetings  from 
September 2017 to January 2019. 

Members  of  the  EUOAG’s  plenary  and  ordinary  sessions  had  been  already  informed  of  the 
procedures  and  time  line  of  the  assessment  process  at  their  previous  meeting  of  September 
2017. The discussion also recalled the Resolution of the European Parliament of 1 December 
2016  on  liability,  compensation  and  financial  security  for  offshore  oil  and  gas  operations 
which calls the Commission to take new initiatives in this field. 

Most  of  the  agenda  of  the  ordinary  session  of  the  EUOAG  meeting  of  21  March  2018  was 
dedicated  to  the  consultation  of  the  EUOAG  on  the  review  and  assessment  of  the  Offshore 
Safety  Directive.  The  consultation  aimed  at  identifying  best  practices  in  selected  areas  and 
collect regulators’ views. The Commission announced the upcoming public consultation and 
future workshops back-to-back with the 16th EUOAG. 

The  following  technical  issues  were  discussed  both  in  ordinary  and  plenary  settings  of  the 

EUOAG:  

EU cross-sector legislation for environmental liability; 

Liability, financial security and handling of compensation claims; 

National and international rules applicable for decommissioning; 

Cyber Security: specific threats for industrial installations (other sectors); 

Experiences with the mutual recognition of platforms while crossing borders. 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

10.6.3

  03 May 2018 to 31 May 2018:  

Feedback period on the consultation roadmap 

Following the publication of the consultation roadmap, the broader public had the chance to 
give comments. Four contributions were received from business associations and one from the 
Polish  national  oil  and  gas  company  PGiNG.  All  comments  are  publically  available  on  the 
consultation webpage.  

None  of  the  received  comments  let  to  identify  new  areas  for  an  in-depth  assessment. 
Therefore, there has been no change in the Commission’s approach in evaluating the OSD at 
this stage, or in the drafting of the questionnaire for public consultation. 

10.6.4

  19 September and 4-5 December 2018:  

Stakeholder  consultation  meeting  in  Brussels,  completed  by  face  to  face  interviews  with 
targeted stakeholders  

The primary purpose of the workshop held on 19 September 2019 was to launch the project to 
the  broad  base  of  stakeholders  and  add  to  the  consultation  which  took  place  between  the 

102 

 
 
 
 
 
Commission and the primary duty holders (regulators and industry). This resulted in further 
broadening the interest to the European community, namely the NGOs. At the workshop, the 
Commission  announced  the  launch  of  the  public  consultation  and  encouraged  delegates  to 
participate in it.  

A  total  of  82  delegates  have  participated  in  the  event.  Participation  from  regulators  and 
industry was considerably larger in comparison to that of non-governmental organisations (3 
NGO’s,  one  phone-in  and  trades  unions  (2).  Despite  the  Commission’s  efforts,  it  was  not 
possible to attract representatives of the marine economy or coastal communities to the event. 

The  duty  holders  were  balanced  by  social  partners,  speakers  from  NGOs  and  trade  union 
sectors,  whom  reflected  on  the  extent  to  which  the  Directive  had  met  the  ambitions  of  the 
environmental  activists  and  offshore  workers.  The  final  item  was  an  introduction  to  the 
liabilities  and  financial  indemnities  subject  from  subject  matter  experts,  joined  with 
commentary from NGO’s and academia.  

Prior to the workshop, the Commission had identified 15 elements of particular interest that 
were  notified  to  speakers  to  guide  their  preparations  for  the  workshop.  The  workshop  itself 
prompted  discussions  around  twelve  major  topics,  five  of  which  were  not  amongst  the 
elements previously identified by the Commission.  

The workshop’s discussion broadly showed the value of the OSD among  groups affected by 
it.    However,  many  of  them  pointed  out  a  fragmented  implementation  of  the  Directive  by 
Regulators. Regulators pointed to slow reaction of some duty holders in taking the necessary 
steps  to  implement  the  OSD  requirements,  especially  operators  active  in  the  southern 
maritime regions. All stakeholders pointed to a lack of maturity in the implementation of the 
OSD.  Except  for  the  operators  and  NGOs,  the  audience  showed  a  generally  low  level  of 
understanding of the topic “financial responsibility”. The  commission’s services also  note a 
general low strategic positioning of trade-unions in the discussion. 

In  order  to  complete  the  input  received  form  stakeholders  and  in  anticipation  of  the  next 
workshops of January 2019, four face to face interviews between targeted stakeholders with 
both  the  industry  and  the  civil  society  were  conducted  on  4  and  5  December  2018  by  the 
independent expert supporting the Commission’s services in the assessment of the OSD. The 
interviews involved respectively the  International Marine Contractors’ Association (IMCA), 
the  European  Community  Shipowners’  Associations  (ECSA)  and 
the  International 
Association  of  Drilling  Contractors  (IADC),  the  Bellona  foundation,  the  international 
organization  of  oil  and  gas  producers  (IOGP)  and  finally  the  Offshore  Pollution  Liability 
Association  (OPOL)  and  other  insurers  also  supported  by  IOGP.  These  interview  help  to 
better clarify each duty-holder’s positioning vis-à-vis the OSD’s implementation.  

10.6.5

  19 September to 21 December 2018: public consultation 

The  public  consultation  took  place  from  19  September  to  21  December  2018.  The 
questionnaire comprised 102 questions, broken down into 17 chapters. Fifty-one replies were 
submitted  to  the  survey  portal.  Additionally,  eleven  open  letters  from  National  authorities, 

103 

 
 
 
 
business associations and oil and gas companies. About 60% of the contributions were public. 
Out of the 51 answers received, 16 were submitted by entities registered in the transparency 
register. Only few national regulators used the public consultation to provide their feedbacks 
on the implementation of the OSD.  It is noteworthy that 200 draft replies to the questionnaire 
remained after closure of the consultation period. No technical issue was reported nor could 
be  identified  subsequently  that  could  explain  this  rate.  While  business  and  business 
associations authored one-third of all contributions, individual citizens constitute the biggest 
single contributor group.  

Regarding the effectiveness of the Directive in reaching its objective to reduce risks of major 
accidents  on  offshore  installations,  the  assessment  shows  an  overall  satisfaction  across  all 
contributor groups, except for civil society organisations who showed a mitigated view of the 
topic.  Yet,  one  third  of  all  contributors  believe  that  the  Directives’  provisions  needs  to  be 
adjusted. Businesses and business associations disapprove this statement largely. The majority 
of contributors believe that EU countries’ transposition of the OSD should be improved. 

The detailed assessment of the fulfilment of the OSD’s specific objectives reflects the overall 
satisfaction  across  all  contributor  groups.  Nevertheless,  all  contributors  agree,  also  within 
each group, that the application of the OSD is not consistent across all EU Member States. 

The general assessment of the results of the public consultation confirms the relevance of the 
OSD. However, the businesses and business associations overly believe that some provisions 
of the OSD can be simplified without compromising their objectives. The contributors believe 
that the safety environment of offshore oil and gas operations would be worst, would the OSD 
not have been adopted.  

Comments  to  the  general  section  pointed  out  that  the  review  is  happening  too  soon.  The 
general  view  of  the  industry  is  that  no  changes  or  additions  should  be  made  to  the  OSD’s 
scope and content. Finally, a recurrent shortcoming of the OSD according to the industry is 
the lack of mutual and automatic recognition of safety cases between EU member states that 
leads to increased difficulties and costs when moving rigs between countries.  

NGOs  called  for  the  OSD  to  be  made  fully  consistent  with  the  EU  oceans  and  climate 
policies,  targets  and  objectives  also  with  regards  to  the  impacts  of  offshore  drilling  and  oil 
spills on the marine ecosystems. 

The  public  consultation  confirmed  the  offshore  industry’s  position  on  liability,  financial 
security,  financial  instruments  and  the  handling  of  compensation  claims.  The  clear  and 
suitable  assignment  of  responsibilities  of  risk  management  between  licensees,  operators, 
owners and third party contractors is also confirmed. 

It  is  noteworthy  that  individual  contributors  do  not  consider  that  public  participation  in 
strategic  decisions  concerning  the  effects  of  oil  and  gas  operations  is  assured  and  adequate 
and  effective.  This  is  mostly  attributed  to  the  practical  application  or  enforcement  of  the 
overall legal framework.  

The offshore safety duty-holders strongly believe that the information requested in annex IX 
OSD  is  sufficient  to  portray  the  safety  performance  levels  of  oil  and  gas.  However, 
international organisation and civil society organisation doubt that the operators and owners 
provide to the competent authorities the requested information correctly and in a manner that 
reflects reality or that the interested public has easy access to it. 

104 

 
 
On the topic of internal and external emergency plans, individuals and civil society would like 
measures  to  be  carried  out  by  the  Member  States  instead  of  the  operators  and  owners.  The 
consultation shows a certain degree of uncertainty of contributors regarding the adequacy of 
external  emergency  plans  in  successfully  dealing  with  transboundary  effects.  Finally,  civil 
society  contributors  voiced  concerns  for  inadequate  transparency  towards  the  public 
concerning  emergency  incidents.  In  addition,  individual  contributors  doubt  that  financial 
penalties  are  really  applied  or  even  an  effective,  proportionate  and  dissuasive  tools  for 
preventing violation of the OSD standards. 

No clear patterns emerged from the question whether the application of criminal law to gross 
breaches  of  duty  leading  to  a  major  accident,  or  a  near-miss,  or  a  major  environmental 
incident, consistently and across the EU, would enhance the performance of industry in risk 
management and reduction. 

A vast majority of contributors agree that the OSD provisions are adequate for major accident 
prevention  and  environmental  protection  during  the  decommissioning  process  and  for 
providing  long  term  environmental  protection  after  decommissioning.  Yet,  many  responses 
(businesses,  civil  society  and  individuals)  support  the  need  for  additional  provisions  and/or 
financial  schemes  for  post  decommissioning  environmental  protection  and  liability  and  call 
for  additional  technical  guidelines  for  decommissioning  and  plugging  and  abandonment. 
IOGP submitted a statement on the subject with arguments in favour of the current regulatory 
setup, which they see as adequate. 

One third of all contributors consider that additional, sector-specific measures are necessary to 
adequately protect offshore oil and gas installations from external threats, sabotage and cyber 
security threats. The business sector disagrees with this statement. 

Businesses and their associations do not consider that there is adequate mutual recognition of 
Mobile  Offshore  Drilling  Units  across  borders  between  Member  States,  without  undue 
restrictions and undue administrative burden. Some propose to regulate mutual recognition at 
EU level (via a regulation), other argue that bilateral consultation at national level can solve 
the issue.  

Finally, throughout the replies to the public consultation, the offshore industry challenged the 
meaningfulness  of  the  Corporate  Major  Accident  Prevention  Policy  (CMAPP),  while  at  the 
same  time,  individual  contributors  called  for  safety  cases  to  be  made  part  of  the  public 
domain. It must be noted that on some questions related to specific articles of the OSD and on 
specific areas of the review, business associations representing different level of the offshore 
industry life chain submitted coordinated replies, or referred to the contribution of the IOGP.  

Preliminary  results  of  the  public  consultation  were  presented  to  the  stakeholders  in  the 
EUOAG  ordinary  and  plenary  meetings  on  16  and  17  January  2019  and  were  positively 
received. The Commission’s services explained that the results do not prejudge any outcomes 
of  the  assessment  regarding  a  potential  revision  of  the  OSD,  but  were  going  to  be  used  to 
strengthen the knowledge base. 

105 

 
 
 
 
10.6.6

  16 and 17 January 2019:  

Two additional workshops with regulators and stakeholders in Brussels. 

An  additional  round  of  consultation  with  stakeholder  (not  announced  in  the  consultation 
roadmap)  took  place  in  the  form  of  two  workshops  on  the  side-line  of  the  ordinary  and 
plenary meetings of the EUOAG in Brussels on 16 and 17 January 2019. The first workshop 
was opened only for national regulators; the latter was addressing all stakeholders. 

They  served  the  purpose  to  stabilise  the  confidence  in  the  Commission’s  assessment  work, 
keep on building the community of purpose between all groups impacted by the OSD, re-visit 
key underlying risk drivers of the Directive and intensify the discussion around key areas for 
an in-depth assessment. Additionally, the workshop served to secure the stakeholders support 
in accessing key data for the assessment.  

The two workshops were considered successful. No new theme emerged from the discussion. 
The  fault  lines  between  stakeholders  emerged  more  precisely  along  the  discussions  on  the 
outcomes of the public consultation and the thematic indicators of the assessment. 

Replies to the Commission’s request for data arrived in March and April 2019, and allowed 
the  Commission’s  service  to  strengthen  and  refine  its  assessments  on  key  aspects  of  the 
OSD’s assessment. 

  Stakeholder positions 

10.7
Throughout the consultation process, various arguments were expressed. On certain subjects, 
there were clear, distinct positions amongst the various stakeholder groups with regard to the 
themes and subjects analysed in the discussions. The text below gives a synopsis were such 
convergence was evident.  

On  the  subject  of  decommissioning,  the  industry  has  strongly  advocated  that  all 
decommissioning  activities,  including  the  plugging  and  abandonment  of  wells,  take  place 
according to safety and environmental legislation and that wells are fully sealed at the end of 
operations. Some MS have supported the above, adding that the industry is liable to perpetuity 
for any need of intervention. Other MS however, expressed doubt about the sealing of wells. 
NGOs  have  expressed  concern  about  certain  derogations  granted  to  decommissioning 
projects, which involve leaving in place amounts of oil or harmful substances. 

With regard to the mutual recognition of mobile drilling units, the industry has made a strong 
plea for harmonizing the assessment of the RoMH and other documentation within EU MS, in 
order  to  simplify  and  expedite  the  process  of  transferring  the  units  between  various 
jurisdictions. However, MS have strongly opposed such approach, which they consider both 
risky in terms of the responsibility of the competent authorities, as well as unnecessary due to 
the low occurrence of such transfers entailing 'first entry' of a unit. According to MS views, 
the assessment of safety documentation is adequately fast. 

On  matters  involving  financial  liability  and  the  capacity  to  cover  any  environmental  or 
property  damage  caused  by  potential  accidents,  there  was  a  clear  discrepancy  between  the 
views of MS and industry on the one hand and NGOs on the other. The first consider that the 
systems in place are adequate to cover any potential damages caused, while the latter express 
serious doubts.   

106 

 
 
Overall,  both  MS  and  industry  consider  that  the  Directive  is  fit  for  purpose.  In  some 
occasions, the public has expressed concern about important small incidents and leakages not 
being  reported,  as  well  as  the  effectiveness  of  the  internal,  external  and  transboundary 
emergency response systems in place.   

107 

 
 
 
 
11   ANNEX III: MEMBER STATES’ IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DIRECTIVE 

The  assessment  conducted  by  the  Commission  has  shown  that  the  overall  level  of  the 
transposition  of  the  Directive  in  the  Member  States  is  adequate,  although  the  integrity  and 
quality  of  implementation  across  the  Member  States  varies  significantly.  Member  States 
presented  different  approaches  for  the  implementation  of  the  Directive  (either  in  full  or  in 
relation  to  specific  provisions).  Some  Member  States  have  adopted  new  legislation  that 
transposes the provisions of the Directive, whereas others have amended existing legislation 
and  included  the  transposition  of  the  Directive’s  different  provisions  into  several  pieces  of 
legislation.  

Certain Member States have largely literally included the provisions of the Directive in their 
national law, while others have partly or fully adapted the wording of the Directive with the 
intention  to  convert  it  better  into  their  specific  legislative  culture.  The  assessment  puts  the 
focus on the most important provisions of the Directive, having the largest impact on offshore 
safety.  It  follows  a  summary  from  the  assessment  of  the  quality  of  Member  States’ 
implementation: 

  The overall implementation of Article 3 of the Directive, containing general principles 
of  risk  management  in  offshore  oil  and  gas  operations  and  describing  fundamental 
scope of  responsibility of operators under the Directive, is considered satisfactory. It 
should  be  noted  however  that  several  Member  States  had  difficulties  with  the 
transposition  of  its  second  paragraph,  dealing  with  the  exclusion  or  limitation  of  the 
operator’s duties. 

  Article 4 of the Directive deals with safety and environmental considerations relating 
to  licences.  It  underlines  the  Directive’s  objective  to  ensure  the  protection  of  the 
environment  by  avoiding  offshore  accidents.  Some  Member  States  had  difficulties 
appropriately  implementing  the  Article’s  second,  third,  and  fifth  paragraphs.  These 
paragraphs respectively include: criteria for the assessment of technical and financial 
capability of an applicant, licensee's liabilities, and the availability and assessment of 
information  collected  as  a  result  of  exploration.  The  transposition  assessment 
conducted  by  the  Commission,  followed-up  by  an  individual  dialogue  with  Member 
States, has also shown room for improvement in respect of the fourth paragraph. This 
paragraph  relates  to  the  appointment  of  an  operator  by  a  licensee  or  the  licensing 
authority  (e.g.  rules  of  procedure  for  co-operation  between  licensing  authority  and 
competent authority). 

  Article 5 of the Directive covers fundamental rules for public participation on the issue 
of  environmental  impacts  associated  with  planned  offshore  oil  and  gas  exploration. 
The implementation of the first paragraph (no drilling without public participation) is 
considered  satisfactory.  However,  Member  States  did  not  always  fully  implement 
applicable rules for when public participation is not undertaken, covered in paragraph 
2. 

  The  Commission  has  identified  a  good  level  of  implementation  for  Article  6  of  the 
Offshore  Safety  Directive,  setting  out  rules  applicable  to  offshore  oil  and  gas 
operations  within  licensed  areas.  However,  transposition  of  its  sixth  and  eighth 
paragraphs  has  proven  challenging  for  some  Member  States.  Paragraph  6  covers  the 
obligation  to  submit  a  notification  of  well  operations  or  a  notification  of  combined 
operation.  Paragraph  8  covers  the  obligation  to  undertake  tripartite  consultation 
between the competent authority, operators and owners, and workers’ representatives 

108 

 
 
in the formulation of standards and policies dealing with major accident prevention. It 
should  also  be  noted  that  the  definitions  provided  in  Article  2,  points  21  Directive 
('connected infrastructure') and 22 Directive ('acceptance') of the Directive, referred to 
in  the  Article  in  question,  have  not  been  correctly  and  completely  implemented  by 
several Member States. 

  Article  7  of 

the  Directive,  concerning 

liability  for 
environmental  damages,  has  been  completely  and  correctly  transposed  by  almost  all 
Member States. 

licensee’s  potential 

the 

  Article 8 of the Directive concerns the appointment of a national competent authority. 
Implementation  of  its  second  and  fourth  paragraphs  has  posed  difficulties  for  many 
Member States. These paragraphs refer to rules relating to the design of the competent 
authority,  as  well as public availability of the information  on the organisation of the 
competent  authority,  respectively.    Some  Member  States  have  also  experienced 
problems  with  the  transposition  of  the  first  and  fifth  paragraphs.  These  paragraphs 
address  regulatory  functions  of  the  competent  authorities,  and  the  provision  of 
adequate human and financial resources to competent authorities, respectively.  

  For Article 9 of the Directive, which sets  out  rules for  functioning  of the competent 
authority,  the  Commission  services  are  in  contact  with  several  Member  States  to 
obtain additional information. 

  The  vast  majority  of  Member  States  have  also  completely  and  correctly  transposed 
Article 12 of the Directive, setting out detailed rules for the submission of the report 
on major hazards related to production installations. It should be noted, however, that 
implementation  of  the  definition  of  'major  hazard',  referred  to  in  Article  12  of  the 
Directive, has proven challenging for some Member States. 

  A good level of implementation of Article 13 of the Directive was identified, setting 
out  detailed  rules  for  the  submission  of  the  report  on  major  hazards  for  the  non-
production installations.  

  Article 14 of the Directive deals in its entirety with internal emergency response plans. 

 

It has been adequately implemented by the Member States.   
Implementation  of  Article  17  of  the  Directive  was  overall  successful,  setting  out 
requirements  for  schemes  for  independent  verification  prepared  by  operators  and 
owners. However, transposition of its second paragraph has posed certain challenges 
for  some  Member  States.  This  paragraph  states  that  the  results  of  the  independent 
verification  should  be  without  prejudice  to  the  responsibility  of  the  operator  (or  the 
owner)  for  the  correct  and  safe  functioning  of  the  equipment  and  systems  under 
verification. A few Member States also experienced problems with the implementation 
of  the  definition  of  'independent  verification',  referred  to,  inter  alia,  in  Article  17  of 
the Directive.  

  Article  18  of  the  Directive  sets  out  powers  of  the  competent  authority  regarding 
operations  on  installations.  The  national  transposition  measures  of  a  number  of 
Member  States  require  improvement  (e.g.  independence  of  the  authority,  unclear 
mandate, or rules of procedure).  

  Article 19 of the Directive, setting out detailed rules for major accident prevention by 
operators  and  owners,  has  been  correctly  and  completely  implemented  by  Member 
States. However, the fourth paragraph (concerning tripartite consultation) and seventh 
paragraph (dealing with the obligation to prepare and revise standards and guidance on 
best practice in relation to the control of major hazards) have proven challenging for 
several Member States.  

  Article  20  of  the  Directive  concerns  the  offshore  oil  and  gas  operations  conducted 
outside  the  Union,  and  should  have  been  transposed  by  all  Member  States.  This 

109 

 
 
includes landlocked Member States  and Member States with  offshore waters that do 
not have offshore oil and gas operations under their jurisdiction and that do not plan to 
licence such operations. Implementation of its first paragraph, obliging companies to 
report the circumstances of any major accident they have been involved in globally to 
the  Member  State  where  they  are  registered,  requires  further  improvement  by  a 
significant number of Member States. Particularly regarding the empowerment of the 
competent authority to request adequate documentation and enforce its submission. 
  Almost  all  Member  States  have  fully  and  correctly  transposed  Article  22  of  the 
Directive,  providing  the  foundations  for  confidential  reporting  of  safety  concerns. 
Nevertheless,  improvements  to  the national  transposition measures notified by  a few 
Member States are still necessary. 

  Article  23  of  the  Directive  concerns  the  obligation  to  share  information  between 
owners,  operators,  and  competent  authorities,  Article  24  deals  with  transparency, 
Article 25 relates to reporting on safety and environmental impact, and Article 26 sets 
out rules for investigation following a major accident. All of these Articles have been 
overall well implemented by the Member States. 

  The overall level of implementation of Article 27 of the Directive, setting out rules for 
cooperation between Member States, is  also  highly satisfactory. Only its  final  (fifth) 
paragraph  has  posed  some  difficulties  for  several  Member  States.  It  should  also  be 
noted that implementation of the definition of 'industry' provided for by Article 2(35) 
of the Directive, and referred to in many provisions thereof (including Article 27), has 
proven challenging for some Member States. 

  Article  28  of  the  Directive,  providing  the  requirements  for  internal  emergency 
response plans, has been correctly and completely implemented by the vast majority of 
Member States. 

  The overall level of implementation of Article 29 of the Directive, concerning external 
emergency  response  plans  and  emergency  preparedness,  is  satisfactory.  However, 
there  are  still  some  weaknesses  in  national  transposition  measures  in  a  few  Member 
States. 

  Article 30 of the Directive deals  with  emergency response, and has been completely 
and correctly transposed by almost all Member States. Only the Article’s final (third) 
paragraph, obliging Member States to collect the information necessary for thorough 
investigation, has proven problematic for some Member States. 

  The  large  majority  of  Member  States  have  adequately  transposed  Article  31  of  the 
Directive,  concerning  the  transboundary  emergency  preparedness  and  response  of 
Member States with offshore oil and gas operations under their jurisdiction. In several 
Member  States  there  are  weaknesses  regarding  the  second,  fourth,  and  sixth 
paragraphs.  These  respectively  include:  major  hazards  in  internal  and  external 
emergency  response  plans,  coordination  of  measures  outside  of  the  EU,  and 
information obligations. 

  Article  34  of  the  Directive  obliges  Member  States  to  specify  rules  on  effective, 
proportionate,  and  dissuasive  penalties  applicable  to  infringements  of  national 
provisions and to ensure that such penalties are enforced. Further analysis is required 
to assess whether the rules enforced by Member States are effective, proportional and 
dissuasive. 

The  dialogue  with  Member  States  is  being  continued  to  achieve  improvements  and  a  fully 
adequate  level  of  implementation.  If  necessary  the  Commission  may  start  infringement 
proceedings in case of severe shortcomings.  Following the Commission’s analysis of safety 

110 

 
 
performance as published in the annual reports, offshore safety performance appears adequate 
in all Member States. 

111 

 
 
 
 
12  ANNEX IV: METHODOLOGY FOR THE ASSESSMENT 

12.1

  Consolidated list of 15 thematic indicators undergoing analysis 

Table 2: Thematic Indicators 

Description 

Article / 
Source 

Components 

Ref 

Experience of Stakeholders in implementation:  
(+): overall positive, (-): overall negative, (~) 
overall neutral but commented 

1. OSD-embedded elements 

1.1  Applying risk 
management 
principles for 
control of major 
accidents  

Art.3(1)(
3)(4) 

Art.5 

1.2 

Public 
participation in 
release of new 
areas for 
licensing 

  Operators to take 
‘all suitable’ 
measures to prevent 
major accidents 

  Operators to take 
‘all suitable’ 
measures to limit 
consequences 
  All operations c/o 

on basis of 
systematic risk 
assessment to 
achieve major risks 
‘ALARP’  

  No new licensing 
without previous 
public consultation 

  MS’ to make 
suitable and 
sufficient 
arrangements for 
consultation and 
transparency 

1.3  Assignment of 
the competent 
authority 

Art.8,9 

  MS’ to assure 
structural 
independence from 
conflicts of interest 
with economic 

 

 

 

 

 

(+) General principle of control of major accident 
hazards through management of risk is broadly 
welcomed 
(~) Inconsistent use of risk assessment by both 
operators and regulators as precursor to a decision 
(-) Reported inconsistency when the condition of ‘risks 
ALARP’ is achieved 
(-) Risk assessment measures adopted by Member 
States insufficiently stringent (generic – applies to 
different forms of intervention) 
(-) Lack of support to worker involvement in Reports 
of Major Hazards100 (related to risk assessment, above) 

o  Too tight time frames for assessment – 
insufficient time given by employer 

o  Workers not prepared/trained 

  Suggestion to incorporate into tripartite consultation 

mechanisms 

 
 

 

 

 

 

(+) Broad appreciation that the measure is important 

(-) Inconsistent application of MS ‘to dormant 
licensing 
(-) Inconsistent regard to changes in sea conditions 
over recent time (10 years) 
(-) Some licensing authorities avoid full application of 
EIA and PP requirements in previously licensed areas 
that have nonetheless been inactive for a number of 
years 

o 

(~) COM invited to consider relinquishment of 
licenses as a matter of public information and 
comment 

(+) Consensus of approval to principle of independent 
CA for safety and environment 

(~) Duty holders concerned that some CA’s have yet to 
stabilise and to acquire all relevant skills and expertise 

100 a RoMH is an ex ante report by the operator or owner of an installation demonstrating that all major hazard risks are 
ALARP. Comments of the workforce are to be taken into account. The competent authority must issue an acceptance of the 
RoMH prior to operations starting. 

112 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Description 

Article / 
Source 

Components 

Ref 

Experience of Stakeholders in implementation:  
(+): overall positive, (-): overall negative, (~) 
overall neutral but commented 

 

 

 

(-) Observed difference of assignment in each 
jurisdiction  fragmentary approach to transposition 
of OSD and different regulatory approaches 
(-) Doubtful separation of CA from economic 
regulation in some jurisdictions  
(-) Perceived duplication of safety and environmental 
regulation leading to increased regulatory burdens 

regulation 
  Functional 
separation 
acceptable where 
the number of 
installations <6.  

  MS’ to ensure 
integration of 
safety & 
environment 
functions 

  CA may appoint 

external experts to 
support its 
functions 

  Where CA 

comprises 2+ 
bodies, duplication 
to be avoided: lead 
body may be 
appointed 
  CA to publish 
policies and 
procedures 

1.4 

Functioning of 
scheme of 
independent 
verification for 
installations and 
wells 

Art.17 

 

Integral to the 
operator/ owner 
SEMS, equivalent 
to “2nd pair of eyes” 

  Requires 

conformance to 
tests of 
independence of 
verifiers and 
integrity of work 
system 
  Applies to 

verification of 
SECE101 and to 
wells including 
changes to design 
intent 

  2nd  or 3rd party 
verification 
permitted strictly 
where standards for 
independence are 

 
 

 

 

 

 

(+) Most MS’ express approval of the system 

(+) Advanced N Sea MS reports finding significant 
advantage to major accident risk control once scheme 
had stabilised 

(~) Advanced MS’ found introduction of scheme 
difficult – market unready and numerous design 
options for IV schemes  

(~) Some MS express reluctance to accept 2PV (cross-
verification) as completely independent. – interest in 
making 3PV mandatory, but capacity must be ensured 

o 

o 

(-) Some approaches expressed by MS’ as possible 
approaches in applying the OSD provisions:  
In prescribing mandatory third party 
verification 
In prescribing or approving the independent 
verification body 
(Latter could be considered contrary to goal-
setting, outcome-based design intent of OSD) 
(-) MS’ claim lack of clarity of Article 17 & Annex V 
relating to operation of independent verification 
schemes – expressed need for COM guidelines 

o 

101 Safety and environment critical elements (SECE) i.e. parts of an installation including computer programmes, the purpose 
of which is to prevent or limit the consequences of a major accident, or the failure of which could cause or contribute 
substantially to a major accident 

113 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Description 

Article / 
Source 

Components 

Ref 

Experience of Stakeholders in implementation:  
(+): overall positive, (-): overall negative, (~) 
overall neutral but commented 

1.5 

Safety in 
operations 
conducted 
outside EU 

Art.19(8) 
Art.20 

Art.22 
Art.6(8) 

1.6  Arrangements 

for worker 
involvement in 
major accident 
prevention, 
(relating to 
protection of 
whistle-blowers 
and tripartite 
consultation 
mechanisms) 

met 

  Corporate MAPP102 
to apply even to 
operations outside 
the Union 
  Operators’ 

registered in a MS 
to report on 
incidents occurring 
outside the Union 

  CA to make 

arrangements for 
reports and to 
preserve anonymity 
  Operators/owners’ 
to communicate 
their arrangements 
to workers 

  Operators/owners’ 
to include training 

  Tripartite 

mechanisms to be 
established by MS’ 
for consulting on 
major accident 
prevention policy 
and standards 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(~) Independent verification bodies (i.e. companies 
who specialise in IV on a global scale) claim smaller 
niche companies lack capability and become captive to 
the client 

(~) IVB’s also claim OSD spawns growth of 
inexperienced small niche IV providers     

(-) Apparent fragmentary approach to implementation 
by MS’ with some adding rules of tenuous relationship 
into the generic measure  
(-) Inconsistency reported in MS’ requirements for 
duty holders demonstration of CMAPP, and for MS’ 
verification of it 
(~) Unknown whether a major accident in  a 3rd 
country occurred that would trigger a report by a EU-
registered corporation to its MS 

(-) Some duty holders unclear of distinction between 
CMAPP and SEMS and report duplication 

(+) Wide approval of all stakeholders of fundamental 
right bestowed under Article 22 
(~) Signs that MS’ take insufficient interest in training 
for workers and managers and in relationship of 
whistle blowing to transparency, culture and integrity 
issues for the sector 
(-) TU’s report protection of whistle-blowers 
insufficient taken as a whole, and favour a link to 
tripartite103 consultation mechanisms relating to policy 
and standards  
(+) Duty holders report significant value-added where 
scheme of tripartite consultation first introduced (esp. 
outside N Sea region) 

(~) Tripartite consultation not yet fully embedded in 
many Member States 
(~) At present, no sharing of learnings or other 
information exists between tripartite committees of 
MS’ 

1.7  Transparency 

Art.23 

  Commission to 

 

(+) Scheme is functional (but not fully mature). Is the 

concerning 

102 CMAPP: Corporate Major accident prevention policy, i.e. a document setting out the owner’s or operator’s corporate 
policy for the avoidance of major accidents at their installations located anywhere in the world. Suitable arrangements to be 
made for monitoring the effectiveness of the policy which is to apply throughout the lifecycle of any installation controlled 
by the operator or owner, and in the case of an operator to take account of their primary responsibility for control of major 
accident risk (see element #1.1) 
103 Formal tripartite consultation is required under auspices of each MS’ to allow operators, regulators and worker 
representatives to discuss formulation of major accident prevent policy and standards. 

114 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Description 

Article / 
Source 

Components 

Ref 

Experience of Stakeholders in implementation:  
(+): overall positive, (-): overall negative, (~) 
overall neutral but commented 

first statutory inter-State reporting system anywhere 
(~) There is a widely held public view that oil industry 
and regulators are not transparent and industry/MS’ 
not forthcoming during preparation of directive 
(-) Remains a disparity of data reporting and handling 
between MS’ (and globally) 

(~) Some MS’ believe current guidance is 
insufficiently detailed 

(~) Some duty holders dissatisfied with some incident 
severity thresholds (e.g. relating to release volumes of 
hydrocarbon escapes) 

(+) All installations present in EU waters have 
appropriate plans. Some MS’ have agreed extensive 
procedures with duty holders 
(~) some doubts as to extent to which internal 
emergency response plans are harmonised with 
national contingency plans of MS? 

(+) Duty holders acknowledge the requirement has 
added value by improving integration of installation-
based emergency response plans with national 
contingency plans (see #1.9) 

reporting of 
inciden 

Art.24 
Art.25 

1.8  Emergency 

preparedness and 
response 
arrangements of 
operators/ 
owners’ 

Art.14 
Art.28 
Art.29 
Art.30 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

make implementing 
regulation104 for 
common reporting 
parameters 
  Commission to 

publish simplified 
reporting format 
  MS’ to make public 
information relating 
to incidents 

  MS’ to report to the 

Commission 
  Commission to 
make annual 
reports 

  Operators/owners’ 
to make relevant 
internal emergency 
response plans for 
containment of 
incidental releases 

 

 

IERP’s to be 
integrated as 
necessary e.g. with 
those of adjacent 
installations and 
with national 
contingency plans 
of the MS 

IERP relevant 
expertise and 
equipment to be 
always available 

  Emergency 

response exercises 
to be conducted by 
MS’, operators and 
owners 

1.9  Emergency 

preparedness and 
response 
arrangements of 

Art.28 
Art.29 
Art.30 

  MS’ to prepare 
external ERP 
coherent with 
IERP’s 

 

(+) Duty holders and MS’ acknowledge the 
requirement has added value by improving integration 
of installation-based emergency response plans with 
national contingency plans (see #1.8)105 

104 Comitology committee of experts chaired by Inspector General of NL regulator. Work on common reporting format 
completed with publication of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 1112/2014:  
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2014/1112/oj   
105 Since 2018, a number of devices – capping stacks – have been strategically deployed to be used to seal a subsea well 
blowout. These large devices may be lowered over the spewing wellhead on the sea floor and are designed to effect a seal and 
stem the flow. The equipment is stored in component form and deployable anywhere by large commercial aircraft such and 

115 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Description 

Article / 
Source 

Components 

Ref 

Experience of Stakeholders in implementation:  
(+): overall positive, (-): overall negative, (~) 
overall neutral but commented 

MS’ 

Art.31 

  MS’ to ensure plans 

  Certain MS’ and regions continue to prepare 

executed and 
investigations 
conducted without 
delay 

  Equipment to be 
compatible and 
interoperable 
between adjacent 
MS’ 

  Emergency 

response exercises 
to be conducted by 
MS’, operators and 
owners 

  Transboundary 

risks of pollution to 
be addressed and 
suitable 
cooperation to be 
arranged with 3rd 
countries 

  To be: effective; 
proportionate; 
dissuasive 
  MS’ to advise 

Commission of 
penalties by July 
2015 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

emergency response plans (Commission JRC has 
provided technical assistance)   
(-) Fragmented approach to consideration of 
transboundary pollution effects (including 3rd 
countries) 

(~) The extent of harmonisation of arrangements 
across state boundaries unclear 

(+) Industry claims effective interoperability of 
expertise and equipment between MS’ in contiguous 
maritime regions 

(~) Apparent wide disparity in approach between MS’ 
in powers, sanctions and enforcement 
(+) MS’ and duty holders claim transparency of 
enforcement is significant sanction (i.e. impact on 
corporate reputation more significant than financial 
penalties) 
(-) Lack of harmonisation between MS’ in relationship 
between criminal sanctions and licensing conditions 

(~) Social partners (TU’s, NGO’s) call for bigger 
financial penalties to reflect commercial scale of duty 
holders 

1.1
0 

Availability of 
dissuasive 
penalties for 
breaches of duty 

Art.34 

 

(~) July 2015 report? 

2. Arms-length elements 

2.1  Assignment of 
liability; 
financial 
responsibility; 
and schemes of 
civil 

Art.4 
Art.7 
Art.39(1
)(2) 
Europea

  Financial capability 

to meet all 
liabilities to be 
assessed during 
licensing 
  Ongoing 

 

 

(+) Article 7 imposes strict liability on license holder, 
without exception.  
(+) Two MS’ have produced specific detailed guidance 
for both regulators and license holders / applicants for 
compliance with financial responsibility guidelines 
provisions of Article 4106 

then to be assembled and transported to location by ship within 24 hours of demand. To meet the 24 hours demand time, 
devices are located in the Gulf of Mexico, UK, Norway, Italy, Angola, Brazil and Singapore. 
106 Potential exemplar provisions are in Oil & Gas UK publication specifically drafted in pursuit of Article 4 compliance: 
“Liability Provision Guidelines for Offshore Petroleum Operations” OGUK, 2018. Provides a ready reckoner for 
compensating potential clean-up costs and economic losses in all regions (modest to harsh; mechanisms for financial security 
and verification methods are provided. Regional spread of financial responsibility for a major petroleum release accident to 
the environment is US$250m – 1.5bn 

116 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Description 

Article / 
Source 

Components 

Ref 

compensation 

n 
Parliame
nt 
resolutio
n 
Decemb
er 2016 
(2015/23
52(INI)) 

commitment to 
maintain capability 
  All relevant marine 
environmental 
factors to be 
incorporated 
  Liability for 

petroleum pollution 
ascribed to license 
holders 

  Availability of 
financial 
responsibility and 
compensation 
schemes to be 
reported to 
Parliament/Council 
by 2014 

  Commission to 
report on 
effectiveness of 
liability regimes 
and whether to 
broaden EU 
measures 
Parliament requires 
Commission to make a 
report and 
recommendations 
taking account of all 
factors to be submitted 
July 2019 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Experience of Stakeholders in implementation:  
(+): overall positive, (-): overall negative, (~) 
overall neutral but commented 

(+) Broad preference of industry to maintain exposure-
based approach over ‘blanket’ universal tariff liability 
provision 
(+) Data exists on EU claims and pay-outs (to be 
provided to COM) 
(+) NGO’s direct COM interest to International Oil 
Pollution Compensation Fund (IOPC)107 
(-) Clear that liability and financial responsibility 
regimes in MS’ are equally fragmented as prior to 
OSD 
(-) NGO’s108 claim liabilities and financial 
responsibility models are based on outdated sea models 
– backward looking to pre 2010 and do not account for 
rapidly increasing fragility of the marine environment 
due to human and climate effects 
(~) Influx of smaller less financially capable operators 
in some regions, including frontier harsh environments, 
is more prevalent than 2010 
(~) NGO’s point out that where pure economic loss 
where applied in other jurisdictions (particularly in 
USA and NO fishing sector) it has ‘not opened flood 
gates’ 
(~) Industry point out where pure economic loss 
models are applied, limited liability and/or exclusions 
also apply 
(~) Broad debate between operators and NGO’s on 
what does the assessment for Parliament aim to solve 
regarding financial responsibility and liability? 
(~) Would EU legislation apply vertically (by sub-
sector, in this case offshore upstream petroleum sector) 
or horizontally (to level up all civil liability law in 
MS’)  
(~) Operators challenge whether OSD is the relevant 
instrument in the EU acquis for intervention in MS’ 
civil liability legislation 

(~) Any change in EU legislation spawns the question of 
who drives the liabilities and compensation market (EU, 
MS, or Industry) Unlimited losses are currently not 
insurable above US$1.5bn 

2.2 

Prospect of 
extending 
criminal 
sanctions to 

Art.39(3 
(within 
the scope 
of 

  Commission to 

report in December 
2014 

  Commission to 

 
 
 

(+) Criminal sanction applies in certain MS’ 
(+) Unlikely to be strongly opposed by sector 

(~) Some new civil legislation in MS’ imposes 
stronger civil financial penalty than criminal courts 

107 IOPC Fund is based on the oil tanker sector following a series of major European spills (Torrey Canyon, Erika …). 
Transferrable elements are: strict liability – polluter (tanker owner) pays; liability cap per tanker size (<US$285m) but which 
includes any compensation paid out under Civil Liability Convention (current maximum US$125m); based on levy of 
members (receivers of the cargo); only applies to MS’ signatory to the fund.    
108 Notwithstanding at least one CA is arbiter of financial responsibility provisions pursuant to Art.4, the discourse on this 
critical topic is entirely between industry associations represented by IOGP and NGO’s 

117 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Description 

Article / 
Source 

Components 

Ref 

Experience of Stakeholders in implementation:  
(+): overall positive, (-): overall negative, (~) 
overall neutral but commented 

breaches of duty 
to safeguard the 
environment 
from major 
accidents 

Directive 
2008/99/
EC) 

consider legislative 
proposals 
  MS’ to make 
relevant 
information 
available to the 
Commission 

 

 

 

and can be straightforward to enforce penalties 
(-) Criminal proceedings are time consuming and 
costly to MS’ with typically insignificant fines 
(~) Damage to corporate reputation cited as 1ry 
aversion factor under criminal action 
(-) Requires new legislation – presents legal 
timetabling issues 2019/20 

Art.12 
Annex 
I(6) 

3.1  Post 

decommissioning 
responsibility for 
ensuring 
permanent 
sealing of wells, 
and for 
determining 
extent of removal 
of fixed 
installations 

3. Additional elements 

  All OSD measures 
apply where 
installation is 
stationed in a 
licensed area, 
including scrutiny 
of 
decommissioning 
wells and physical 
structures 
  OSD ceases to 

apply where field 
has been 
decommissioned 
and the license has 
been relinquished 
  OSD is reactivated 

should an 
installation be 
stationed again in 
the area 

  Currently, regional 
seas conventions 
(e.g. OSPAR, 
Barcelona) require 
total removal of 
fixed installations 
at end of field life. 
Derogations may 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(+) All regional seas have governing marine 
conventions that addresses decommissioning 
(~) Post decommissioning surveying (for a limited 
time) for hydrocarbon emissions109 may be a 
requirement of MS’ licensing arrangements, (before 
operators are released from responsibility on the site). 
It doesn't currently take place before handover of site 
and responsibility to state. Post-decommissioning 
liability provisions do not exist under EU law.  
(~) Surveying is not required under EU Hydrocarbons 
Licensing Directive 94/22/EC 
(~) Industry favours all regional seas conventions be 
aligned with OSPAR with no additional intervention 
via the Directive/ However, recent practice suggest that 
Conventions offer a large degree of derogation to 
Contracting Parties. It should also be noted that EU 
MS are bound by conventions where EU is a signatory, 
such as the Barcelona Convention and the Offshore 
Protocol thereto.  
(~) Ongoing technical debate on how many abandoned 
wells facilitate gas seeps in North Sea110 and their 
consequences 
(+) Industry contends there is no history of 
environmental harm from gas seepages around 
abandoned wells and no change to legislation 
necessary 
(-) Surveys suggest seepage of gas from shallow 
geological pockets disturbed by exploration wells now 
abandoned in the North Sea. No surveys could be 
conducted on seabed of abandoned production wells as 

109 Seepages of oil at abandoned production locations would normally indicate a failure to isolate the oil-bearing residues 
from the wells, causing migration and leakage over time. It is not known whether there are oil leaks from abandoned 
production sites. Gas and condensate seepages may come from shallow methane bearing gas pockets that have been disturbed 
by the making of the wells causing migration along the outside casings of the well (‘biogenic’ gas). gas from deep reservoirs 
insufficiently sealed during abandonment, may leak directly from the well or outside casing (‘thermogenic gas’).  
110 Report: “Shallow Gas Migration along Hydrocarbon Wells – An Unconsidered, Anthropogenic Source of Biogenic 
Methane in the North Sea” by GEOMAR Helmholtz Centre for Ocean Research Kiel, 24148 Kiel, Germany, 2017; response: 
“Biogenic methane seepage - background information on the natural methane seepage landscape and a critical 
review/response to/of the Geomar report…/… (2017)” a Position Paper by IOGP, January 2019. 

118 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
 
Description 

Article / 
Source 

Components 

Ref 

Experience of Stakeholders in implementation:  
(+): overall positive, (-): overall negative, (~) 
overall neutral but commented 

be sought on 
technical safety 
grounds 

  Relates mainly to 
drilling rigs 
(MODU’s) 

  Refers to common 

acceptance between 
MS’ of compliance 
with OSD-related 
measures 

  Article 13 creates a 
level playing field 
and in the absence 
of further and 
higher standards for 
control of major 
accident risks 
applying, a RoMH 
accepted in a MS 
should be 
acceptable in all 
MS’ 

Also applies to systems 
deployed by operators 
on production 
installations where such 
systems are common 
i.e. not MS-specific 

119 

3.2  Deepening of the 

Art.13 

internal market 
through mutual 
recognition 
between Member 
States of mobile 
non production 
installations and 
of common 
systems that are 
not MS-specific  

they fall under no-access areas. 

 

 

  Surveys conducted around on-shore abandoned wells 
in Canada confirm unexpected leakage/seepage. Some 
examples in EU also exist.  
(~) Mature basins (N Sea, Italy) preparing for new era 
of intense physical decommissioning of production 
installations, fixed and mobile. OSD regulates major 
accident prevention during decommissioning – wells 
and physical structures.  
(~) By design, OSD does not prescribe extent of 
physical removal –  leave in place, partial or complete 
removal – but regulates major accident prevention 
relating to the operation on whatever physical removal 
is agreed between licensee and MS 
(-) CA obligated to avoid conflict of interest with MS’ 
authorising authority for granting exemption from total 
removal, however current practice in UK and NL 
shows that decommissioning projects are co-financed 
and co-managed by State (sometimes CA) and 
operators/licensees.  

 

 

 

(~) Procedures of OSPAR are under current examination 
regarding efficacy of measures to enable other Contracting 
Parties (e.g. EU) to scrutinise derogation applications.  
 
(+) All MS’ implement the requirement to receive 
submissions of RoHMs and associated productions 
(CMAPP, SEMS etc.), and to undertake acceptance 
measures 
(-) Industry reports mobile installations movements 
between MS’s are inhibited by OSD measures in 
operations in MS’ whereby MS’ conduct  
(-)Operators/licensees operating production 
installations or drilling operations in several MS’ also 
report additional burdens following introduction of 
OSD 
(-)MODU’s returning to same MS that issued 
acceptance within previous 5 years, are also subject to 
lengthy approval process as suggested by industry. 
Worth noting that MS support that procedure is 
"typical" and fast for returning, previously approved 
MODUs 
(-) Operators and owners report Corporate Major 
Accident Prevention Plan requirements vary 
indiscriminately between Member States:  

 

 

o  Creates an administrative burden for duty 

holders working in more than one Member 
State because CMAPP, by requirement, may 
not be subject to change in different 
jurisdictions 

o  Possible advantage taken of the requirement 

by MS’ to add further requirements, leading to 
differences across MS’ 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Description 

Article / 
Source 

Components 

Ref 

Experience of Stakeholders in implementation:  
(+): overall positive, (-): overall negative, (~) 
overall neutral but commented 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(~) Some MS’ suggest they would acknowledge other 
MS’ acceptance of a RoMH for MODU’s, subject to 
strategic checks and any necessary reviews of 
additional requirements 
(-) Some MS’ appear to misconstrue requirements for 
acceptance of RoMH’s – e.g. that there is an 
incontrovertible requirement for thorough review prior 
to acceptance of RoMH’s.  
(-) Apparent lack of interest in MS’ to explore 
solutions to freer movement of RoMH’s. Also due to 
the variation of environmental conditions, operating 
conditions, labour laws etc. 

(+) Most MS’ took advantage of cost recovery 
measure in Art.8 to argue for funding via industry 
(~) Relates to the issue of levels of MS’ funding of 
their CA’s - see also #1.4 relating to adequate funding 
by MS’ of CA’s to enable adequate performance of 
duties under OSD 
(~) Some MS’ argue for a mandatory requirement to 
recover costs 
(+) In keeping with goal-setting nature of OSD, MS’ 
adopt different recovery mechanisms; charge-out rate; 
fees for service; levy 

3.3  Recovery of 
costs of 
maintaining the 
competent 
authority 

Art.8(5),
(7) 

  MS’ may establish 
mechanisms 
according to which 
the financial costs 
to the CA in 
carrying out its 
duties may be 
recovered from 
licensees, operators 
or owners 

12.2

  Matrix for the detailed assessment 

Actions required of the commission pursuant to the directive  

(To include recommendations as appropriate) 

  Action 1 (Article 40): To assess the experience of implementing the directive; 
  Action  2  (Article  39(3)  (Within  the  scope  of  Directive  2008/99/EC)):  To  assess  the 
appropriateness  of  applying  criminal  law  to  certain  breaches  of  environmental  duty; 
and 

  Action 3 (Article 39(1)(2) & EP Resolution 2015/2352(INI)): To report on the status 

of liabilities for damages and compensation mechanisms 

Primary objectives of the directive by which actions are to be evaluated  

(Being the principal objectives underpinning the directive)  

  Objective  1:  That  the  significant  and  unacceptably  high  risks  of  a  major  accident  in 
EU  waters  be  lowered.  The  sub-objectives  being  to  attain  global  best  industry 
practices  in  the  EU;  and  to  implement  global  best  regulatory  practices  for  major 
accident prevention and mitigation. 

120 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Objective 2: That the insufficient arrangements for responding to a major accident in 
EU  waters  be  improved.  The  sub-objective  being  to  implement  fully  joined-up 
emergency preparedness and response in all EU offshore regions.   

  Objective  3:  That  the  arrangements  for  discharging  financial  liabilities  and  civil 
compensation  for  economic  loss  be  more  consistently  effective  in  the  EU 
(Subsequently updated by the European Parliament in 2015). The sub-objective being 
to improve and clarify existing EU liability and compensation provisions. 

12.2.1

  Structure of the assessment matrix 

Action 1 to capture Objectives 1 and 2 

Pursuant  to  Article  40,  the  Commission  will  evaluate  whether  and  to  what  extent  the 

experience of implementing the directive by MS’ has: 

(i) 

(ii) 

lowered the risks of a major accident in EU waters (and the degree of significance and 
level of residual risk) 

improved the arrangements for responding to a major accident in EU waters (and the 
degree of sufficiency attained) 

Action 2 (stand-alone) 

Pursuant  to  Article  39(3)  and  within  the  scope  of  Directive  2008/99/EC  -  The 
Environmental  Crime  Directive  -  to  assess  the  appropriateness  of  applying  criminal 
law to certain breaches of environmental duty 

Action 3 to capture Objective 3 

Pursuant  to  Article  39(1)  &  (2)  and  Parliament  resolution  of  1  December  2016  -  on 
liability,  compensation  and  financial  security  for  offshore  oil  and  gas  operations 
(2015/2352(INI)) – to report on the status of MS’ with regard to the consistency and 
effectiveness of schemes for financial liability and compensation for economic loss 

Brief summary of how assessment guidelines are to be applied to the assessment matrix. 

The assessment aims to consider progress in relation to how things were expected to 
happen i.e. referring to the intervention logic behind the directive, and changes against 
the  assessment  baseline,  and  other  relevant  points  of  comparison.  The  criteria 
conventionally  adopted  by  the  Commission  are:  relevance;  coherence;  effectiveness; 
efficiency; and EU-added value.  

The assessment also describes the extent to which the practical aims of the Offshore 
Directive  2013/30/EU  have  been  attained  at  a  substantial  factor.  The  Directive  was 
intended  to  introduce  a  substantially  complete  physical  system  of  primary  measures 
for  MS’  regulators  and  petroleum  license  holders  and  installation  owners  and 
operators  and  an  assessment  of  whether  the  practical  aims  of  the  measures  are 
physically  in  effect,  i.e.  attained,  is  required  before  the  assessments  of  efficiency, 
coherence achieved by such measures are made.  

The assessment will also attempt to explore the potential for simplification and burden 
reduction as an implicit factor. 

121 

 
 
 
Assessment criteria 

Relevance: looks at the relationship between the needs and problems relating to the targeted 
societal  segment,  namely  the  maritime  and  coastal  users  and  the  environment  where 
the offshore petroleum activities occur, and the objective of the intervention.  

Coherence:  is  a  factor  of  the  external  coherence  with  other  EU  legislation  and  policy  and 
where  relevant,  at  the  Member  State  or  International  level.  It  also  is  an  indicator  of 
how  different  components  of  the  directive,  as  implemented,  operate  together  to 
achieve particular objectives. 

Effectiveness:  considers  how  successful  the  directive  may  have  been  in  achieving  or 
progressing towards its objectives. Where objectives may not have been achieved, the 
assessment will attempt to assess the extent to which progress falls short and attempt 
to explain the shortfall.  

Efficiency: meant as the relationship between the resources required to execute a measure and 
the gain  attained (i.e.  an assessment of  costs and benefits). The cost-benefit analysis 
will  be  quantified  where  possible  and  identify  reductions  or  increases  in  regulatory 
burdens  (Where  useful,  potential  (future)  savings  identified  from  the  assessment 
findings will be estimated) 

EU-added  value:  a  deduction  of  the  relative  efficacy  between  the  implementation  of  the 
directive,  and  the  Member  States  acting  alone  in  regulating  the  offshore  sector’s 
control of major accident risk. 

Note on the hierarchy of the assessment  factors:  Relevance and coherence were intensively 
processed  in  the  impact  assessment  accompanying  the  draft  directive  (originally  a 
draft regulation) and the assessment of these factors in the assessment has therefore, a 
substantial focus on validation of the original design intent. Conversely, the efficiency 
and  effectiveness  factors  are  the  key  determinants  of  the  extent  and  degree  of 
attainment of the directive’s objectives, namely, reducing the risk of a major accident 
occurring, and mitigating the impact should a major accident nonetheless occur. EU-
added value will be a deduction based upon some permutation of the efficacy factors 
processed in the assessment. 

122 

 
 
 
 
Table 4: Assessment Matrix 

Colour key: 

Measures that secure best 

industry 
practices in 
major accident 
prevention & 
mitigation 

Measures that implement 
best regulatory 
practices in 
major accident 
prevention & 
mitigation 

Measures that improve 
emergency 
preparedness & 
response in all 
EU waters 

Measures that improve 

and clarify 
existing EU 
liability  & 
compensation 
provisions 

EXTENT OF 
EU 
INTE
R-
VEN
TIO
N 

PRIMARY 

AIMS 
OF THE 
INTERV
ENT-
ION 

expressed as 

question
s 

SUBSIDIARY 
AIMS 

expressed as 

questions 

Full heading 

PERFORMANCE INDICATORS OF 

EFFECTS OF 1ry and 2ry AIMS 

(answers to questions) 

Quantitative 

Qualitative 

Abbreviated heading 

DATA SOURCES & 
RELIABILIT
Y 

CONCLUSIONS TO 
BE DRAWN 

Inc. further steps to be 

suggested 

Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

ACTION 1 

Pursuant to Article 40, the Commission will evaluate whether and to what extent the experience of implementing the directive by MS’ has: 

(i) 

lowered the risks of a major accident in EU waters (and the degree of significance and level of residual risk) 

(ii) 

improved the arrangements for responding to a major accident in EU waters (and the degree of sufficiency attained) 

123 

 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

OBJECTIVE 1 

That the significant and unacceptably high risks of a major accident in EU waters be lowered. 

The sub-objectives being to attain global best industry practices in the EU; and to implement global best regulatory practices for major accident prevention 

and mitigation. 

(1) Duty to prevent major accidents to be made to rest with industry, requiring formal risk assessment for each installation 

Attainment 

Is  a  clear  duty  to 

(i)  Is  control  of 

prevent 
major 
accidents 
ascribed 
and 
to 
accepted 
by 
industry, 
requiring 
formal 
risk 
assessme
for 
nt 
each 
installati
on? 

major 
accident 
hazards 
based 
upon 
holistic 
risk 
assessment
with 
, 
directly 
related 
principal 
duties 
assigned 
to 
holders 
and 
operators?  

license 

(i)  #  MS’ 

(as  a 
percentage  of 
the  16  focal 
MS’) 
transposing 
the 
articles;  

relevant 

# 

industry 

duty 

holders111 
implementing 
the  hierarchy 
of 
risk 
management 
controls  as  a 
percentage  of 
the 
sector 
population. 

(i) 

Positive 

and 

inferred 
evidence 
regarding: 

 Operators 

and 
arrangements 
contractor  oversight 
can  manage 
risks 
ALARP112; 
roles 
of 
between  key  actors 
in 
hazard 
high 
functions; 

 clarity 

taken 

 all  suitable  measures 
to 
being 
prevent 
major 
accidents  and  limit 
their consequences; 

 overarching 

responsibility 
accepted  by  license 

(i)  Article  3  ascribes 
relevant 

the 
duties. 

Reliable 

evidence 
derives from: 

2016 

consultant’s 
to 

report 
Commission 
on  degree  of 
transposition 
the 
of 
Directive  by 
MS’; 

Workshops 

and 

interviews 
with 
stakeholders; 

(i) 

Is 

it 

to 

be 

considered 
whether 
the 
scope  of  the 
intervention 
should 
widened 
encompass 
cyber  security 
and  counter-
terrorism 
measures? 

be 
to 

Are  the  principles  of 
control 
of 
major  hazards 
risk 
by 
assessment 
broadly 

111 Scope of the ‘industry duty holders’ under the Directive is: license holders, operators of production installations, and owners of non production installations. 
112 ALARP is the globally accepted condition of risks reduced as low as reasonably practicable. In the field of reduction in occurrence of an accident, the ALARP condition is achieved where the 

risk is both tolerable in societal terms and where further expenditure in terms of financial cost, time and trouble does not achieve an appreciable reduction in the risk 

124 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

Are 

significant 
duties 
coherently 
assigned 
to  owners 
of 
non-
production 
installation
s? 

holder 

 high 

operations 
conducted 
systematic 
continuous 
assessments  

hazard 
being 
under 

risk 

(ii) 

and 

Positive 
inferred 
evidence 
including 
from  primary 
stakeholders
113  pertaining 
to 
changes 
evident 
regarding: 

and 

Observed  experience 
raising  issues 
of concerns; 

Subjective 

evidence 
derives from:  

Data submissions from 

stakeholders; 

Reports 

from 

EUOAG114 

Public consultations; 

Unsolicited 

written 

submissions; 

welcomed and 
adopted? 

Is 

there  discernible 
drift  by  MS’ 
from  the  core 
intent  of  the 
interevention? 

Is  the  application  of 
risk 
assessment 
universally 
accessible  eg 
to  workers, 
citizens? 

 formal  engagement 
between  operators/ 
and 
owners 
competent 
authorities 
considering 
options 
installations; 

design 
for 

(ii) Article 11 ascribes 
relevant 
duties to MS’. 

(ii) 

Reliable 

evidence 

(ii) 

# 

of 

reports 

Have 
assessment 
reports 
defined 

risk 

re-
the 

113 Scope of the ‘primary stakeholders’ under the Directive is: MS’ regulators, including economic regulators where appropriate, industry duty holders (footnote 1), Trades Union, representatives 

of coastal and marine economies, and environmental NGO’s 

114 EUOAG: EU offshore oil and gas authorities group being a formally convened group pursuant to Commission Decision 19 January 2012/C 18/07. It has been established to serve primarily as 

a forum for the exchange of experiences and expertise between national authorities and the Commission. It has met 16 times 

125 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

the 

(ii)  Are  competent 
risk 
assessment 
reports 
prepared 
by 
relevant 
duty 
holders? 
Are 
submitted 
to 
the 
competent 
authority 
of the MS? 

they 

to 

submitted 
regulators 
competent 
authorities  as 
a  percentage 
of  the  number 
of  qualifying 
installations, 
classified 
production, 
and 
production, 
installations; 

non 

as 

 optimistaion 

of 
major  accident  risk 
reduction 
in  high 
hazard  operations on 
installations 
and 
relating  to  all  well 
operations; 
 management 

of 

change in risk 

 enhanced 
making 
removal  of 
installations  

decision 
regarding 
fixed 

#  MS’ 

transposing 

relevant 
articles; 

#  of  reports  accepted 
by  Competent 
Authorities 

126 

2016 

derives from: 

consultant’s 
to 

report 
Commission 
on  degree  of 
transposition 
of 
the 
Directive  by 
MS’; 

Workshops 

and 

interviews 
with 
stakeholders;  

Factual  data  openly 
available; and 

Observed  experience 
raising  issues 
of concerns; 

Subjective 

evidence 
derives from:  

Data submissions from 

stakeholders; 

Reports 

from 
EUOAG; and 

Public consultations. 

relationship 
between  MS’ 
duty 
and 
Is 
holders? 
there 
a 
distinct 
upwards 
trajectory 
the 
safety 
culture? 

in 
industrial 

Is 

there  a 

lifecycle 
to 

approach 
risk 
assessment 
for  preventing 
major 
accidents  on 
all  petroleum 
installations, 
namely: 
design: 
commissionin
g 
and 
operation; 
modification; 
relocation; 
and 
permanent 

 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

abandonment 
and  removal? 
Are  all  well 
operations 
integrated into 
risk 
the 
assessment 
framework? 

What  more  may  be 
to 
done 
enhance 
the 
direct 
relevance 
lowering 
major 
accident risk? 

to 
of 

Reliable 

evidence 
derives from: 

MS’ 

to 

reports 
Commission 
the 
under 
implementing 
regulation115 
and 
EUOAG; 

via 

formally 

authorised 

Are 

and 

technical 
reports; 
observed 
experience 
raising  issues 
of concerns; 

workshops 

and 

interviews 
with 

additional 

measures 
required at the 
EU-  level?  In 
the  form  of 
guidance 
and/or 
clarification? 

Relevance 

Do  aims  1,(i)-(ii)  directly  address 
lowering  of  major  accident 
risks? 

Are  adverse  effects  of  major  accidents 
to  the  environment  on  coastal 
communities  and  the  marine 
habitats  and  economic  users 
likely to be mitigated? 

#  of  reports  submitted 
regulators 

to 
competent 
authorities  as 
a  percentage 
of  the  number 
of  qualifying 
installations; 

Operational 

density 

# 

criteria 
(production 
volumes; 
offshore 
workers; 
# 
wells  drilled; 
# 
installations; 
etc) as trends; 

Trending  deployments 

Is  there  evidence  that 
risk 

the 
management 
measures 
the 
under 
Directive  no 
longer 
represent 
international 
best 
practices? 

Does 

shortfall 
any 
derive 
from 
evolution  of 
best  practices 
elsewhere?  or 
failure 
of 
effective 

115 Implementing regulation No. 1112/2014 on common reporting format for offshore petroleum activities 

127 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

of 
major 
capital  mobile 
assets  (IADC 
/ 
/ 
IMCA 
ECSA) 
& 
Europe 
global, 2008 – 
present; 

BOP reliability reports 
from 
JIP 
failure 
trend-
summaries 

implementatio
the 
of 
n 
measures? 

stakeholders 

Or 

in 

the  form  of 
revised 
measures?  

Subjective 

evidence 
derives from:  

suggested  experiences 
raising  issues 
of concerns; 

public 

consultations; 
and 

Unsolicited 

written 

submissions; 

further 

Are  the  provisions  in 
the  Directive 
capable 
of 
ensuring 
protection 
from 
hazards 
related 
operations 
after 
installations 
are 
and 
license 
relinquished? 

removed 
the 

the 

to 

Coherence 

What  correlation  exists  between  the 
aims  and  EU  legislation  when 
addressing  reduction  in  major 
accident risks? 

Is 

it 

Is 

that 

shown 
duplication 
occurs 
the 
between 
Directive  and 
other  specific 
EU 
legal 
measures 
relating  both 
to  the  sector 

Is 

in 

the  Directive 
alignment 
with  Articles 
194, 
153(1)&(2), 
and  191(2)  of 
TFEU?  (This 
a 
describes 
generic 
question) 

The  duties  ascribed  to 
primary  duty 
holders 
are 
required 
under  Article 
3;  Article  11 
requires 
for 
measures 
preparing  risk 
assessment 

additional 

coherence 
required 
the 
between 
effects  of  the 
Directive  and 
other 
elements 
the 
acquis?  

of 
EU 

128 

 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

Is 

it 

and relating to 
risk  reduction 
and 
preparation  of 
reports? 

that 
of 

shown 
conflict 
legislative 
intent  occurs 
between 
the 
Directive  and 
other  specific 
EU 
legal 
measures 
relating  both 
to  the  sector 
and relating to 
risk  reduction 
and 
preparation  of 
reports? 

How numerous are the 

duplicative 

Equally, 

there 

is 
alignment 
with  the  EU’s 
Integrated 
Maritime 
Policy  (IMP) 
and 
related 
management 
tools/instrume
nts  such  as 
Maritme 
Spacial 
Planning 
(MSP) 
Marine 
Knowledge 
2020116  

and 

Is 

coherence 
maintained  in 
practice 
the 
between 
Directive  and 
the 
related 
Council 
Directives 
89/391/EEC 
and 

116 See COM(2008) 791 final of 25.11.2008 and COM(2010) 771 of 17.12.2010 and COM(2010) 461 final of 8.9.2010 

117 Implementing regulation No. 1112/2014 on common reporting format for offshore petroleum activities 

129 

for 

reports 
installations 
and wells. 

Reliable 

evidence 
derives from: 

Is the Directive shown 
in  practice  to 
be 
internally 
coherent? 

2016 

If 

consultant’s 
to 

report 
Commission 
on  degree  of 
transposition 
the 
of 
Directive  by 
MS’; 

Conflicts  with  other 

requirements 
(eg 
under 
92/91/EEC) in 
reports 
MS’ 
to 
Commission 
under 
the 
implementing 
regulation117 
and 

via 

the 

further 
consideration 
at 
the  EU 
level  is  to  be 
suggested, 
should 
internal 
coherence  of 
the  Directive 
be  preserved 
(i.e. 
an 
as 
instrument  for 
the prevention 
major 
of 
accidents 
including 
the 
environment 
occurring  as  a 
of 
result 

to 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

and 
conflicting 
elements? 

118 Note this is a generic question that applies throughout the assessment  

130 

92/91/EEC? 
Is  a  conflict 
observed 
between 
Annex  C  of 
92/91/EEC 
(referring 
offshore 
petroleum 
operations) 
and 
Directive? 

the 

to 

EUOAG; 

Observed  experience 
raising  issues 
of 
concerns; 
and 

offshore 
petroleum 
operations)?
118  

Workshops 

and 

Is 

there 

improved 

coherence 
between 
the 
EU  petroleum 
sector 
and 
other 
advanced 
jurisdictions; 
and  does  this 
signify  a  shift 
a 
towards 
more 
level 
international 
playing 
field 
as  anticipated 
by the TFEU? 

interviews 
with 
stakeholders 

Subjective 

evidence 
derives from:  

Data submissions from 

stakeholders; 

Subjective 

technical 

reports; 

Suggested  experiences 
raising  issues 
of concerns; 

Public  consultations; 
and 
unsolicited 
written 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

Effectiveness  How 

is 

that 
to 

it  demonstrated 
leads 

the 
intervention 
a 
reduction  in  the  risk  of  an 
offshore  major  accident?  Is  it 
clear  that  the  required  efforts 
are  manifestly  good  offshore 
petroleum practices. 

Major  accident 

risk 
trends 
as 
formulated  by 
advanced 
regulatory 
regimes 
(annualised 
reports); 

of 

Diversification 
license 
holders; 
population 
trends 
towards 
smaller,  niche 
companies; 

Well  control  incident 
report 
trend-
summaries; 

BOP reliability reports 
from 
JIP 
failure 
trend-
summaries; 

Major  accidents  as 
to 

compared 
global data 

Major  accidents  to  the 

environment 
as  compared 
to global data 

Risk 

assessment 
for 

reports 
installations 

Industry 

initiatives 
adopted 
by 
operators  and 
contractors 
for continuous 
improvements 
in 
perfomance; 

Availability  of  KPI’s 
and 
other 
statistical 
publications 
bearing 
on 
risk  trends  to 
major 
accident  risk, 
occupational 
& 
health 
safety 
and 
environmental 

131 

submissions. 

Reliable 

evidence 
derives from: 

MS’ 

to 

reports 
Commission 
under 
the 
implementing 
regulation and 
via EUOAG; 

Formally 

authorised 

technical 
reports; 

Observed  experience 
raising  issues 
of concerns; 

Workshops 

and 

interviews 
with 
stakeholders; 
and 

Is 

it 

becoming 
that 

apparent 
industry 
license 
holders  have 
overarching 
responsibility 
for  reduction 
in  risk  from 
major 
accidents? 

Are  there  indications 
of weaknesses 
in 
management 
of 
industry? 

risk  by 

Factual  data  openly 

Are 

available; 

Subjective 

evidence 
derives from:  

Data submissions from 

further 
to 

there 
means 
increase 
effectiveness 
of 
management 
in 
petroleum 

offshore 

risk 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

protection; 

stakeholders; 

operations? 

as  a  %  of 
production 
installations 
in operation 

Risk 

assessment 

for 

reports 
accepted 
installations 
as  a  %  of 
MODU’s 
in 
operation; 

Efficiency 

formal 

What  are  the  costs  associated  with  the 
introduction  of 
risk 
assessment  systems  and  the 
promulgation 
of 
comprehensive risk  assessment 
reports  by  duty  holders 
in 
relation to the estimated cost of 
a major accident occurring? 

Compliance  costs  for 
offshore 
operators/ 
MODU 
owners 
(€ 
opex; 
€ 
€ 
capex; 
administrative 
burdens costs; 

Significance  of  aging 
infrastructure, 
including 
MODU’s:  age 
of 
profile 
fixed 
and 
mobile 
installations; 

 Averaged  cost  of 
risk 
report 

producing 
assessment 

a 

Operational 

density 

criteria 

MS’ 

reports 

to 

132 

Subjective 

technical 

reports; 

Suggested  experiences 
raising  issues 
of concerns; 

Public  consultations; 
and 

Unsolicited 

written 

submissions; 

Reliable 

evidence 
derives from: 

2016 

consultant’s 
to 

report 
Commission 
on  degree  of 
transposition 
of 
the 
Directive  by 
MS’; 

Is  there  a  sufficient 
record 
of 
attainment 
and  effect  for 
consideration 
of 
further 
intervention at 
the EU-level. 

Is 

overall 
the 
trajectory  of 
industry 
suitable 
sufficient?  

and 

Can  it  be  established 
that  the  costs 
of  introducing 
the 
formulation of 
risk 
assessment 
into 
management 
systems 
compliance 
demonstration

and 

the 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

for: MODU; 

 production 

installation  -    mid 
water depth oil; 

 fixed 

production 
installation  - shallow 
water gas; 

Availability  of  KPI’s 
and 
other 
statistical 
markers 
bearing 
on 
risk  trends  to 
major 
accident  risk, 
and 
environmental 
protection 

Cumulative  elements 
cost 
of 
derived  from 
the 
implementatio
the 
of 
n 
Directive  set 
against 
the 
perceived 
annualised 
costs of major 

# 

(production 
volumes; 
offshore 
workers; 
# 
wells  drilled; 
# 
installations; 
etc) as trends; 

Trending  deployments 
of 
major 
capital  mobile 
assets  (IADC 
/ 
/ 
IMCA 
ECSA) 
& 
Europe 
global, 2008 – 
present; 

Oil price trends 

Industry 

initiatives 
adopted 
by 
operators  and 
contractors 
for continuous 
improvements 
in 

133 

Commission 
the 
under 
implementing 
regulation and 
via  EUOAG; 
and 

s  of  primary 
duty  holders 
were 
unjustifiably 
excessive? 

Workshops 

and 

interviews 
with 
stakeholders 

Is 

Subjective 

evidence 
derives from:  

Data submissions from 

stakeholders; 

Suggested  experiences 
raising  issues 
of 
concerns; 
public 
and 
consultations  

industry  able 

to 
that 
establish 
ongoing 
the 
or 
running 
costs of  a risk 
based  system 
the 
for 
prevention  of 
major 
accidents  are 
excessive? 
Can  elements 
of 
risk 
the 
management 
systems 
discretely 
identified 
causing 
unwarranted 
administrative 
burdens? 

be 

as 

Is  it  possible to  derive 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

a  cost  versus 
term 
benefit 
for 
this 
requirement 
of 
Directive? 

the 

to 

accidents, 
including 
the 
environment, 
from  offshore 
petroleum 
operations. 

performance; 

Availability  of  KPI’s 
and 
other 
statistical 
publications 
bearing 
on 
risk  trends  to 
major 
accident  risk, 
occupational 
health 
& 
and 
safety 
environmental 
protection 

EU-value 

adde
d 

Is  it  likely  that  the  intervention  has 
increased  the  adoption  of  such  
good  practices  across  the  EU 
where  otherwise  would  not 
have been the case? 

be 
to 

Indicators  may 
integrated 
derive 
cost/benefit 
terms from: 

 Well control incident 
trend-

report 
summaries 

 BOP 

reports 

reliability 
JIP 

from 

Major  accident 

risk 
trends 
as 
formulated  by 
advanced 
regulatory 
regimes 
(annualised 
reports 

Reliable 

evidence 
derives from: 

2016 

consultant’s 
to 

report 
Commission 
on  degree  of 
transposition 
of 
the 
Directive  by 

What  are 

the  most 

frequently 
expressed 
views of: 

 MS’ regulators 
 Operators 

license holders 
on 

 Owners 

production 
installations 

and 

non 

134 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

trend-

Aging 

wells 

failure 
summaries 
 Exploration 

drilled 
 Trending 

deployments 
of 
major  capital  mobile 
(IADC 
assets 
/ 
IMCA 
/  ECSA) 
Europe  &  global, 
2008 – present; and 

 Oil price trends 

MS’ 

infrastructure, 
including 
MODU’s. 
Age profile of 
fixed 
and 
mobile 
installations 

MS’; 

to 

reports 
Commission 
under 
the 
implementing 
regulation119 
and 
via 
EUOAG; and 

of 

Diversification 
license 
holders; 
population 
trends 
towards 
smaller,  niche 
companies 

Operational 

density 

# 

criteria 
(production 
volumes; 
offshore 
workers; 
# 
wells  drilled; 
# 
installations; 
etc) as trends 

Workshops 

and 

interviews 
with 
stakeholders; 

Subjective 

evidence 
derives from:  

Data submissions from 

stakeholders; 

Subjective 

technical 

reports; 

Suggested  experiences 
raising  issues 
of concerns; 

Public  consultations; 

 NGO’s 
 Trades Union 
whether  the  Directive 
se 
value 

has  per 
added 
compared 
with 
MS’ 
acting without 
EU 
intervention? 

Is 

there 

a  more 

to 

levelled-
upwards 
approach 
risk 
management 
comparing 
EU  MS’  with 
and 
IRF 
NSOAF 
states?120 

Is  it  conceivable  that 

119 Implementing regulation No. 1112/2014 on common reporting format for offshore petroleum activities 
120 IRF = International Regulators Forum (of offshore petroleum operating countries) comprising: Australia; Brazil; Canada (Nova Scotia, Newfoundland, and Federal Governments); Denmark; 
Mexico; Netherlands; New Zealand; Norway; UK; and USA. NSOAF = North Sea Offshore Authorities Forum, comprising: Denmark; France; Germany; Iceland; Ireland; Netherlands; Norway; 
and UK 

135 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

Post  2010 

Industry 

and 

Unsolicited 

written 

submissions; 

initiatives 
adopted 
by 
operators  and 
contractors 
for continuous 
improvements 
in 
performance 

Attainment 

Are 

(2) Corporate policies/ management systems to be deployed to ensure risk controls remain effective 

there 
corporate 
policies/ 
manage
ment 
systems 
deployed 
by 
operators 
and 
owners 
which 
ensure 
risk 
controls 
remain 
effective 
on  every 
applicabl

(i) 

Have 

operators/
owners 
developed 
a 
comprehen
sive 
risk 
manageme
nt  model 
extending 
from 
the 
main 
board 
the 
offshore 
front line?  

to 

(i)  #  MS’ 

(as  a 
percentage  of 
the  16  focal 
MS’) 
transposing 
relevant 
the 
article  and  its 
relatives; 

# industry duty holders 
implementing 
the 
management 
model  as  a 
percentage  of 
sector 
the 
population. 

Is  there  provision 

Positive  and  inferred 

evidence 
including 
from  primary 
stakeholders 
pertaining 
changes 
evident 
regarding: 

to 

for 

(i) Article 19 describes 
relevant 
duties 
corporate 
policy; Article 
requires 
17 
integration  of 
independent  

 overarching 

responsibility 
accepted  by  license 
holder 

 high 

operations 
conducted 
systematic 
continuous 
assessments 

hazard 
being 
under 

risk 

 clarity that policy for 

Reliable 

evidence 
derives from: 

Formally 

authorised 

technical 
reports; 

Major  accident  reports 
published  by 
MS’; 

136 

MS’  without 
risk 
prior 
assessment 
regimes 
would 
adopted 
practice 
without  EU 
intervention? 

have 
this 

(i)  Is  there  a  clear 

/ 

relationship 
between 
license 
holders 
operators, 
their 
workforce and 
contractors 
based 
corporate 
level 
policy 
for  preventing 
major 
accidents?  

upon 

Is 

the 

scheme  of 

independent 
verification 
for 

 
 
 
 
  
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

Schemes 

of 

independent 
verification  in 
place  as  %  of 
installations 

(NB 

qualitative 

indicators 
likely 
to  be 
counted in the 
ie 
breach 
where  action 
taken 
by 
regulators  for 
non 
compliance.) 

(aims) 

(aims) 

e 
installati
on,  and 
relating 
to 
emergen
cy 
intervent
ions? 

for 
continuous 
improvem
ent 
and 
preservatio
of 
n 
critical 
data 
sustain 
corporate 
memory? 

to 

Have all operators / 

owners 
established 
schemes 
of 
independe
nt 
verificatio
n  within 
their 
SEMS121 
their 
for 
installation

prevention  of  major 
applies 
accidents 
globally and emantes 
directly 
from 
governing board 

 reported  failures  of 
via 

SECE’s12 
implementing 
regulation. 

Observed  experience 
raising  issues 
of 
concerns; 
and 

Workshops 

and 

interviews 
with 
stakeholders;  

Subjective 

evidence 
derives from:  

Major  accident  reports 
issued by duty 
holders; 

Suggested  experiences 
raising  issues 
of concerns; 

Public  consultations; 
and 

and 

Unsolicited 

written 

submissions; 

(ii) 

Positive 
inferred 
evidence 
including 

wells 

installations 
and 
consistently 
applied  in  all 
focal MS’? 

Is  the  control  of  risk 

to 
entire 
of 

vertically 
applicable 
the 
lifecycle 
installations 
from 
to 
abandonment
? 

design 

Is  it  also  horizontally 
to 
and 
of 

applicable 
safety 
health 
workers, 
environmental 
protection, 
and protection 
major 
of 
capital  assets, 

121 SEMS = safety and environment management system, a component of the overall management system of an installation, encompassing policy through execution. All industrial sectors’ 
SEMS are addressed in authoritative standards, such as ISO and BS. 

137 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

s’ 
SECE’s122, 
and 
for 
well 
plans? 

(ii) 

previous 
As 
– 
element 
to  be 
likely 
in 
honoured 
the  breach  -  # 
of 
non-
compliances 
monitored  by 
regulators 
(competent 
authorities  for 
and 
safety 
environment); 

(ii)  Have  EU-
registered 
operators 
incorporat
ed 
a 
function in 
their 

from  primary 
stakeholders 
pertaining 
changes 
evident 
regarding: 

to 

 elevation  of  accident 
preventive  policies 
to the corporate level 
of duty holders; 

 management 

of 
change  in  risk  of  a 
major 
accident 
occurring; 

 all  suitable  measures 
being  taken  to  limit 
the  consequences  of 
major acidents to the 
environment 

(iii)  Positive  evidence 
can  be  seen 
which denotes 
positive 
change 
regarding: 

including 
petroleum 
reserves?  

their 

sufficient 
elapsed 
time 
for  objective 
conclusions 
regarding 
further 
enhancement 

their 

(ii)  Is it perceived that 
the  main  duty 
holders 
conduct 
operations 
to 
overseas 
same 
the 
standards 
as 
in EU waters?  

Is it seen that the main 
duty  holders 
are, upon their 

(ii) Article 20 ascribes 
relevant 
duties.  

Is 

Reliable 

evidence 
derives from: 

2016 

consultant’s 
to 

report 
Commission 
on  degree  of 
transposition 
of 
the 
Directive  by 
MS’; 

Major  accident  reports 
by 
issued 
MS’; and 

interviews 

with 

stakeholders 

Subjective 

evidence 

122 SECE = safety and environmentally critical element, and means any part of an installation, including computer programmes, the purpose of which is to prevent or limit the consequences of a 
major accident, or the failure of which could cause or contribute substantially to a major accident; 

138 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

#  overseas 

incidents  
by 
reported 
operators 
to 
the  competent 
authority 

# 

MODU 

of 
emergency 
response 
plans 
production 
installation 
OPEP’s123 
submitted 
competent 
authorities? 

and 

to 

manageme
nt  systems 
to report to 
their  MS 
the 
circumstan
ces of their 
overseas 
major 
accidents? 

Have operators and 

owners 
deployed 
effective 
measures 
to  contain 
emergenci
es  within 
the  area  of 
control  of 
their 
installation
?  

own 
initiatives, 
adopting  and 
promoting 
new 
knowledge 
and  technical 
invention? 

 formal  engagement 
between  operators/ 
owners 
and 
competent 
authorities 
considering 
integration 
response assets; 

of 

 Availability of cross-
EU well capping and 
ER 
transferable 
equipment 
and 
expertise 

derives from:  

Suggested  experiences 
raising  issues 
of concerns; 

Major  accident  reports 
issued 
by 
operator/owne
r 

Public  consultations; 
and 

Unsolicited 

written 

submissions 

(iii) 

28 
the 

Article 
describes 
relevant 
requirements. 

Reliable 

evidence 
derives from: 

Formally 

authorised 

technical 
reports; 

Observed  experience 
raising  issues 

123 OPEP = oil pollution emegency plan which relates to the collection of all measures available on a production installation – fixed or floating – to contain a major accident and prevent its 
escalation beyond the 500m ‘safety zone’ circumscribing the installation 

139 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

of concerns; 

(iii)  Is  it  seen  that 

(iii)  #  MS’ 

(as  a 
percentage  of 
the  16  focal 
MS’) 
transposing 
the 
relevant 
article  and  its 
relatives; 

#  of  cross-EU  well 
and 
capping 
transferable 
ER equipment 
and  expertise 
in 
available 
EU 
and 
Norwegian 
ports; 

#  %  of  petroleum 
that 
spills 
result 
in 
major 
accident 
the 
environment 
and 
deployment of 
national 

to 

140 

(iii) Have operators 
and 
owners 
made 
appropriat
e 
arrangeme
nts 
to 
make 
emergency 
response 
equipment 
available 
on demand 
to  the  MS 
where they 
operate? 

Major  accident  reports 
issued by MS’ 

Workshops 

and 

interviews 
with 
stakeholders;  

Subjective 

evidence 
derives from:  

Data submissions from 

stakeholders; 

Subjective 

technical 

reports; 

Suggested  experiences 
raising  issues 
of concerns; 

Major  accident  reports 
issued 
by 
operator/owne
r 

Public  consultations; 
and 

Unsolicited 

written 

submissions 

installation-
based 
emergency 
plans 
integrated 
with  national 
contingency 
plans? 

are 

Does  industry  appear 
a 
and 

to  make 
suitable 
sufficient 
contribution 
the 
to 
inventory  of 
response 
assets 
available 
across 
waters?  

EU 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

Relevance 

Do  aims  2(i)-(iii)  directly  address 
lowering  of  major  accident 
risks  by  licensees,  operators 
and  owners  of  non  production 
installations?  

contingency 
plans 

Relevance  may  be 
deduced from, 
inter alia: 

 environmental 

performance data for 
EU cf global trends; 
 Major  accident  risk 
control 
(process 
safety)  performance 
data for EU cf global 
trends 

 Operational  density 
criteria 
(production 
volumes;  #  offshore 
workers;  #  wells 
drilled; 
# 
installations;  etc)  as 
trends; 

 Incident  reporting  as 
requirement 
%  of 
under  Implementing 
Act 

Indications 

of 
relevance may 
deduced, 
be 
alia, 
inter 
from:   

 Industry 

initiatives 
adopted by operators 
and  contractors  for 
continuous 
improvements 
performance 

in 

risk 

trends 

 Availability of KPI’s 
and  other  statistical 
publications  bearing 
to 
on 
major  accident  risk, 
occupational  health 
& 
and 
safety 
environmental 
protection 

Reliable 

evidence 
derives from: 

MS’ 

to 

reports 
Commission 
under 
the 
implementing 
regulation and 
via  EUOAG; 
and 

observed 

experience 
raising  issues 
of concerns; 

workshops 

and 

interviews 
with 
stakeholders 

Is  there  evidence  that 
the  corporate 
policy 
measures 
under 
the 
Directive  no 
longer 
represent 
international 
best 
practices? 

Does 

shortfall 
any 
derive 
from 
evolution  of 
best  practices 
elsewhere? Or 
failure 
of 
effective 
implementatio
n 
the 
of 
measures?  

enhancements 
required at the 
EU-  level?  In 
the  form  of 
guidance 

Subjective 

evidence 
derives from:  

suggested  experiences 
raising  issues 
of concerns; 

Are 

public 

consultations; 

141 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

and 

Unsolicited 

written 

submissions; 

Or 

in 

and/or 
clarification? 

the  form  of 
revised 
measures?  

Coherence 

What  correlation  exists  between  the 
aims (i)-(iii) and EU legislation 
when  addressing  reduction  in 
major  accident  risks,  including 
to the environment? 

Does 

Is 

duplication 
occur between 
the  Directive 
other 
and 
specific  EU 
legal 
measures 
relating  both 
to  the  sector 
and relating to 
risk  reduction 
and 
preparation  of 
reports? 

Is 

there  conflict  of 
legislative 
intent  occurs 
between 
the 
Directive  and 
other  specific 
legal 
EU 
measures 
relating  both 

142 

coherence 
maintained  in 
practice 
the 
between 
Directive  and 
the 
related 
Council 
Directives 
89/391/EEC 
and 
92/91/EEC? 
Is  a  conflict 
observed 
between 
Annex  C  of 
92/91/EEC 
(referring 
specifically  to 
offshore 
petroleum 
operations) 
and 
Directive? 

the 

corporate 

The  duties  ascribed  to 
primary  duty 
holders 
for 
maintenance 
of 
major 
accident 
prevention 
policies  are  at 
19. 
Article 
20 
Article 
requires 
measures 
for 
preparing  risk 
assessment 
reports 
installations 
and wells. 

for 

Can it be demonstrated 
that 
intervention is 
to 
required 
provide 
additional 
coherence 
the 
between 
effects  of  the 
Directive  and 
other 
elements 
the 
acquis?  

of 
EU 

Is the Directive shown 
in  practice  to 
internally 
be 
coherent? 

Reliable 

evidence 
derives from: 

2016 

consultant’s 
to 

report 

If 

further 
consideration 
the  EU 
at 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

to  the  sector 
and relating to 
risk  reduction 
and 
preparation  of 
reports? 

How numerous are the 

duplicative 
and 
conflicting 
elements 

Is 

there 

alignment 

the 

with 
provisions 
under 
various 
machinery 
and 
equipment 
legislation? 
Namely, 
Machinery 
Directive,  the 
Pressurised 
Equipment 
Directive,  and 
the 
ATEX 
Directive?124 

the 

level  is  to  be 
given,  should 
the 
internal 
coherence  of 
the  Directive 
be  a  priority 
aim (i.e. as an 
instrument  for 
the prevention 
major 
of 
accidents 
including 
the 
environment 
occurring  as  a 
result 
of 
offshore 
petroleum 
operations)? 

to 

Commission 
on  degree  of 
transposition 
of 
the 
Directive  by 
MS’; 

Conflicts  with  other 

requirements 
under 
(eg 
92/91/EEC) in 
MS’ 
reports 
to 
Commission 
under 
the 
implementing 
regulation125 
and 
EUOAG; 

via 

Observed  experience 
raising  issues 
of 
concerns; 
and 

Workshops 

and 

interviews 

124 Refer to Directive 2006/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2006 on machinery, and amending Directive 95/16/EC (Machinery Directive), Directive 97/23/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 May 1997 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States concerning pressure equipment (Pressure Equipment Directive) and 
Directive 94/9/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 23 March 1994 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States concerning equipment and protective systems 
intended for use in potentially explosive atmospheres  (ATEX Directive). 
125 Implementing regulation No. 1112/2014 on common reporting format for offshore petroleum activities 

143 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

with 
stakeholders 

Subjective 

evidence 
derives from:  

Data submissions from 

stakeholders; 

Subjective 

technical 

reports; 

Suggested  experiences 
raising  issues 
of concerns; 

Public  consultations; 
and 
unsolicited 
written 
submissions 

Reliable 

evidence 
derives from: 

MS’ 

to 

reports 
Commission 
under 
the 
implementing 
regulation and 
via EUOAG; 

Formally 

authorised 

technical 
reports; 

Are 

further 

efforts 
at 
to 

necessary 
EU-level 
increase 
overall 
effectiveness 
of 
policy 
management 
systems 
offshore 
petroleum 

industry 
and 

in 

Effectiveness  Do the aims (i)-(iii) as implemented by 
to  by 
MS’  and  responded 
industry  attain  global  best 
industry  practices  in  the  EU 
through their corporate policies 
and management systems?  

Are  adverse  effects  of  major  accidents 
to  the  environment  on  coastal 
communities  and  the  marine 
habitats  and  economic  users 
likely to be mitigated?  

Major  accident 

risk 
as 
trends 
formulated  by 
advanced 
regulatory 
regimes 
(annualised 
reports); 

of 

Diversification 
license 
holders; 
population 
trends 
towards 
smaller,  niche 
companies; 

Well  control  incident 
report 
trend-
summaries; 

Industry 

initiatives 
by 

adopted 

144 

 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

BOP reliability reports 
JIP 
from 
failure 
trend-
summaries; 

Major  accidents  as 
to 

compared 
global data 

Major  accidents  to  the 

environment 
as  compared 
to global data 

Schemes 

of 

independent 
verification  in 
place  as  %  of 
installations 

operators  and 
contractors 
for continuous 
improvements 
in 
perfomance; 

Availability  of  KPI’s 
other 
and 
statistical 
publications 
bearing 
on 
risk  trends  to 
major 
accident  risk, 
occupational 
& 
health 
safety 
and 
environmental 
protection; 

145 

Observed  experience 
raising  issues 
of concerns; 

Workshops 

and 

interviews 
with 
stakeholders; 
and 

in 

risk 

operations 
reducing 
major 
accident 
and 
emergency 
response? 

Factual  data  openly 

Can  the  schemes  of 

available; 

Subjective 

evidence 
derives from:  

Data submissions from 

stakeholders; 

Subjective 

technical 

reports; 

Are 

Suggested  experiences 
raising  issues 
of concern; 

Public  consultations; 
and 

Unsolicited 

written 

submissions; 

independent 
verification 
for 
installations 
and/or  wells 
be made more 
effective? 

there 
further 
enhancements 
necessary 
to 
increase 
availability  of 
shared 
industry 
expertise  and 
assets 
for 
emergency 
response?  

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

Efficiency 

formal 

What  are  the  costs  associated  with  the 
introduction  of 
risk 
assessment  systems  and  the 
promulgation 
of 
comprehensive risk assessment 
reports  by  duty  holders 
in 
relation to the estimated cost of 
a major accident occurring? 

Compliance  costs  for 
offshore 
operators/ 
MODU 
owners 
(€ 
opex; 
€ 
€ 
capex; 
administrative 
burdens  costs 
in 
operation 
of:  

 schemes 

independent 
verification; 

of 

 internal  emergency 

response plans; 

Cumulative  elements 
of 
cost 
derived  from 
the 
implementatio
n 
the 
of 
Directive  set 
against 
the 
perceived 

Demographic trends in 
aging 
infrastructure, 
including 
MODU’s:  age 
of 
profile 
and 
fixed 
mobile 
installations; 

Operational 

density 

MS’ 

# 

criteria 
(production 
volumes; 
offshore 
workers; 
# 
wells  drilled; 
# 
installations; 
etc) as trends; 

Reliable 

evidence 
derives from: 

2016 

consultant’s 
to 

report 
Commission 
on  degree  of 
transposition 
of 
the 
Directive  by 
MS’; 

to 

reports 
Commission 
the 
under 
implementing 
regulation and 
via  EUOAG; 
and 

Workshops 

and 

interviews 
with 
stakeholders 

Trending  deployments 
of 
major 
capital  mobile 
assets  (IADC 
/ 
IMCA 
/ 

Subjective 

evidence 
derives from:  

Data submissions from 

146 

Can  it  be  established 
that  the  costs 
of  introducing 
the 
formulation of 
risk 
assessment 
into 
management 
systems 
compliance 
demonstration
s  of  primary 
duty  holders 
were 
unjustifiably 
excessive? 

and 

the 

Is 

industry  able 

to 
that 
establish 
ongoing 
the 
or 
running 
costs of  a risk 
based  system 
the 
for 
prevention  of 
major 

 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

ECSA) 
& 
Europe 
global, 2008 – 
present; 

Oil price trends 

stakeholders; 

Suggested  experiences 
raising  issues 
concerns; 
of 
and 
public 
consultations  

to 

annualised 
costs of major 
accidents, 
including 
the 
environment, 
from  offshore 
petroleum 
operations. 

Availability  of  KPI’s 
and 
other 
statistical 
publications 
bearing 
on 
risk  trends  to 
major 
accident  risk, 
occupational 
health 
& 
and 
safety 
environmental 
protection 

accidents  are 
excessive? 
Can  elements 
of 
risk 
the 
management 
systems 
discretely 
identified 
causing 
unwarranted 
administrative 
burdens? 

be 

as 

Is  it  possible to  derive 
a  cost  versus 
term 
benefit 
for 
this 
requirement 
of 
Directive? 

the 

EU-value 

adde

Is  it  likely  that  the  intervention  has 
increased  the  adoption  of  such  
good  practices  across  the  EU 

Indicators  may 
integrated 
derive 

be 
to 

Deriving  context  of 
SEMS 
and 
overarching 

Reliable 

evidence 
derives from: 

What  are 

the  most 

frequently 
expressed 

147 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

d 

where  otherwise  would  not 
have been the case? 

cost/benefit 
terms from: 

 Well control incident 
trend-

report 
summaries: 

 BOP 

reports 
failure 
summaries 

from 

reliability 
JIP 
trend-

 Failure  reports  from 
of 

schemes 
independent 
verification 
 Exploration 

drilled 
 Trending 

wells 

policies via: 

2016 

 Major  accident  risk 
trends  as  formulated 
advanced 
by 
regulatory 
regimes 
(annualised reports 

MS’ 

 Demographic 

of 
aging  infrastructure, 
including  MODU’s 
fixed 
and 
installations 
 Diversification 

of 
holders; 
trends 
smaller, 

license 
population 
towards 
niche companies 

consultant’s 
to 

report 
Commission 
on  degree  of 
transposition 
the 
of 
Directive  by 
MS’; 

to 

reports 
Commission 
under 
the 
implementing 
regulation and 
via  EUOAG; 
and 

deployments 
of 
major  capital  mobile 
(IADC 
assets 
/ 
IMCA 
/  ECSA) 
Europe  &  global, 
2008 – present; and 

 Oil price trends 

 Operational  density 
(production 
criteria 
volumes;  #  offshore 
workers;  #  wells 
drilled; 
# 
installations;  etc)  as 
trends 

Post  2010 

Industry 

initiatives 
adopted 
by 
operators  and 
contractors 
for continuous 
improvements 
in 

148 

Workshops 

and 

interviews 
with 
stakeholders; 

Subjective 

evidence 
derives from:  

Data submissions from 

stakeholders; 

Subjective 

technical 

reports; 

Suggested  experiences 
raising  issues 

views of: 

 MS’ regulators 
 Operators 

license holders 
on 

 Owners 

production 
installations 

and 

non 

 NGO’s 
 Trades Union 
whether  the  Directive 
se 
value 

has  per 
added 
compared 
MS’ 
with 
acting without 
EU 
intervention? 

Is 

there 

a  more 

to 

levelled-
upwards 
approach 
risk 
management 
comparing 
EU  MS’  with 
IRF 
and 
NSOAF 
states? 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

performance 

of concerns; 

Public  consultations; 
and 

Unsolicited 

written 

submissions; 

(3) Independent, expert regulators to operate in each Member State 

the 
in 

What  has  been 
increase 
corporate 
accident 
prevention 
policies, 
SEMS, 
schemes 
independent 
verification 
caused  by  the 
Directive? 

and 
of 

Attainment 

Are  independent, 

(i) 

Is 

expert 
regulator
s 
appointe
d 
operate 
in 
each 
Member 
State 

to 

to 

a 
there 
competent 
authority 
(CA) 
perform 
functions 
relating  to 
major 
accident 
prevention
? 
Including 
major 
accidents 
to 

the 

(i)  Functioning  of  the 
CA  deduced 
from:  

 Completeness 

of 
responses to COM re 
current 
assessment 
project (by # MS) 

of 
 Allocation 
by 
resources 
technical  discipline 
(technical 
per  MS 
and 
environment; 
assessment; 
inspection  &  audit; 
enforcement) 

Has  each  MS  notified 

(i)  Article  8  specifies 

(i)  Has  the  experience 

appointment 
of  a  unitary 
CA  for  both 
safety  and  for 
environmental 
protection 
from  a  major 
accident? 

the 
arrangements 
and 
empowerment 
of the CA. 

Reliable 

evidence 
derives from: 

2016 

Are 

penalties 

and 

sanctions 
made 
available  (and 

consultant’s 
to 

report 
Commission 
on  degree  of 
transposition 
of 

the 

of 
implementing 
the  Directive 
the 
secured 
goal  of  best 
offshore 
petroleum 
regulation 
practice 
preventing 
major 
accidents 
consistently 
across 

the 

for 

149 

 
 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

reported 
COM)? 

to 

Directive  by 
MS’; 

EU? 

Is 

environme
nt  arising 
out  of  a 
major 
accident 
the 
on 
installation
? 

of 

the 
CA 
established 
to  ensure 
independe
nce 
conflicts 
of  interest 
with 
economic 
regulation
?  

 Penalties 

and 
sanctions  applied  by 
CA’s 
 Major 

accident 

investigations 
launched 
 Prosecutions 
launched 
CA’s/MS’ 
prosecuting 
authorities 

by 

Do procedures address 
decommission
ing 
of 
installations 
and 
permanent 
sealing 
wells? 

of 

Are  there  indications 
of  duplication 
between 
safety 
and 
environmental 
regulation 
between  joint 
agencies? 

Are  there  observed  or 

of 

potential 
conflicts 
interest 
the 
between 
functions  of 
the  CA  and 

(ii)  For  context  of 
and 
scale 
organisation 
of the CA: 

 Taxonomy: 

aging 

infrastructure, 
including  MODU’s. 

150 

Observed  experience 
raising  issues 
of 
concerns; 
and 

Workshops 

and 

interviews 
with 
stakeholders;  

Subjective 

evidence 
derives from:  

Data submissions from 

stakeholders; 

Is  there  a  perceptible 
broad 
level 
relationship in 
EU 
the 
the 
between 
CA 
and 
operators  and 
owners 
and 
based  on  the 
control 
of 
major 
accident risk. 

Suggested  experiences 
raising  issues 
of concern; 

Is 

Public  consultations; 
and 
unsolicited 
written 
submissions 

further 
consideration 
EU-level 
at 
to 
necessary 
enhance 
the 
independence 
of 
the  CA 
from 
economic 
regulation? 

Is 

further 
consideration 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

Age  profile  of  fixed 
mobile 
and 
installations 

 Operational  density 
criteria 
(production 
volumes;  #  offshore 
workers;  #  wells 
drilled; 
# 
installations;  etc)  as 
trends 
 Trending 

deployments 
of 
major  capital  mobile 
assets 
/ 
(IADC 
/  ECSA) 
IMCA 
Europe  &  global, 
2008 – present 

 MS  staff  resources 
applied to  CA cf  pre 
OSD 

 Operating budgets of 
CA per active well cf 
pre OSD 

 Operating budgets of 
CA  per  installation 
cf pre OSD 

(ii) 

Is 

(ii) 

Is 

the  CA 

sufficientl
y 
resourced?
. 

Is  the  CA  enabled 
to 
act 
transparent
ly? 
Specificall
y,  has  the 
CA 
developed, 
is 
or 

economic 
regulation 
functions? 

the 

and 

Have 
MS’/CA’s 
published 
policies 
procedures? 
(Broadly 
speaking) 

there 

observed 
levelling 
of 
the  regulatory 
in 
baseline 
EU  waters  so 
as 
to 
potentially 
deepen 
internal 
market 
human 

in 
and 

the 

EU-level 
at 
to 
necessary 
enhance 
the 
integration  of 
process 
safety126  and 
major 
environmental 
risk? 

(ii)  Has 

for 

their  been 
to 

change 
funding 
systems 
CA’s 
following  the 
implementatio
n 
the 
of 
Directive? 
And is there a 
concensus 
amongst CA’s 
regarding  cost 
recovery  from 
industry? 

Has 

the 

(ii)  Article  9  specifies 
the  functions 
of 
the  CA 
(and  Annex 
and 
III) 
8 
Article 
provides 
for 
recoverey  of 
costs from the 
industry. 

Reliable 

evidence 
derives from: 

MS’ 

to 

reports 
Commission 
under 
the 
implementing 
regulation and 
via EUOAG; 

Observed  experience 
raising  issues 
of concerns; 

Workshops 

and 

126 Process safety is the conventionally applied term to the practice of control of major accident risk in high hazard sectors such as offshore petroleum, refining, toxic chemicals production and 
so on. Reducing risks ALARP in high hazard processes requires the application of complex probabilistic risk assessments throughout from initial design 

151 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

developing 
effective 
policies 
for  major 
accident 
prevention 
and 
making 
them 
available 
to 
holders 
and 
public? 

duty 

the 

physical 
assets? 

Is  sufficient  guidance 
to 
available 
duty  holders 
to  make  clear 
the 
requirements 
of 
regulations? 

Do 

CA’s 

any 
internalise 
their  costs  (ie 
recover 
not 
costs 
their 
from 
the 
industry)   

interviews 
with 
stakeholders; 
and 

Factual  data  openly 

available; 

Subjective 

evidence 
derives from:  

Data submissions from 

stakeholders; 

Subjective 

technical 

reports; 

Suggested  experiences 
raising  issues 
of concerns; 

Public  consultations; 
and 
unsolicited 
written 
submissions 

implementatio
the 
of 
n 
Directive 
led 
to  calls  from 
industry 
and/or 
primary 
stakeholders3 
for 
further 
clarification 
or  guidance? 
At 
what 
level? 
(EUOAG, 
COM, EU?) 

What is the experience 
regarding  the 
free 
movement  of 
expertise, 
installations 
and 
equipment 
between 
jurisdictions 
as  a  result  of 
implementing 
the Directive? 

major 

152 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

Relevance 

Do  aims 

(i)-(ii)  directly  address 
lowering  of  major  accident 
risks by duty holders under the 
oversight 
unitary 
Competent  Authorities  of  the 
MS’? 

the 

of 

Is 

their 

sufficient 
elapsed 
time 
for  objective 
conclusions 
regarding 
further 
enhancement? 

Is  the  experience  of 
implementing 
the  Directive 
regarding  the 
appointment 
and 
functioning  of 
CA’s 
the 
broadly 
approved  by 
MS’ CA’s? 

Are 

there 

regional 
differences  of 
view? 

Has  the  experience  of 
establishing  a 
baseline 
of 
best 

For context: 

 Aging  infrastructure, 
including  MODU’s. 
Age  profile  of  fixed 
and 
mobile 
installations 
 Environmental 

performance data for 
EU cf global trends 
 Major  accident  risk 
control 
(process 
safety)  performance 
data for EU cf global 
trends 

 Major  accidents  as 
compared  to  global 
data 

 Major  accidents  to 
the  environment  as 
compared  to  global 
data 
Direct 

indicators  as 
follows 

Is there publication by 
MS’ of: 

 Hydrocarbon 

from 

releases 
permamently 
abandoned  platform 
wells 

 Hydrocarbon 

detected 
releases 
from 
subsea 
locations  attributed 
to  decommissioned 
facility 
production 
(platform or subsea) 
indicative 

Can  key 

performance 
data 
retrieved, 
such as: 

be 

For 

relevance, 

2016 

MS’ 

Reliable 
evidence 
derives from: 

consultant’s 
to 

report 
Commission 
on  degree  of 
transposition 
of 
the 
Directive  by 
MS’; 

to 

reports 
Commission 
the 
under 
implementing 
regulation and 
via EUOAG; 

 Environmental 

performance data for 
offshore  petroleum 

Observed  experience 
raising  issues 

153 

 
 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

for  EU  cf  global 
trends 

 Major  accident  risk 
control 
(process 
safety)  performance 
data 
for  offshore 
petroleum  for  EU  cf 
global trends 

 Occupationalv safety 
performance data for 
EU cf global trends 

 Is  a  unitary  CA 
established  for  both 
safety 
and 
environment 

 # 

schemes 

of 

 Completeness 

independent 
verification  in  place 
as % of installations 
of 
incident 
reports 
and 
collected 
reported  publicly/to 
(as  %  of 
COM 
required 
reporting 
system) 

of concerns; 

Major  accident  reports 
issued by MS’ 

Workshops 

and 

interviews 
with 
stakeholders; 
and 

Factual  data  publicly 

available.

Subjective 

evidence 
derives from:  

Data submissions from 

stakeholders; 

Subjective 

technical 

reports; 

Suggested  experiences 
raising  issues 
of concerns; 

Major  accident  reports 
issued 
by 
operator/owne
r 

Public 

consultations 

and 
unsolicited 

regulatory 
practices 
across  the  EU 
highlighted  a 
of 
lack 
in 
specifity 
provisions. 
For  example 
in  removal  of 
installations, 
and 
hydrocarbon 
releases 
following 
field  or  well 
abandonments
? 

Has  the  creation  of 
CA 
similar 
arrangements 
in  each  MS 
a 
led 
to 
up 
levelling 
of  consistent 
requirements 
as  perceived 
duty 
by 
holders?  

154 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

Coherence 

What  correlation  exists  between  the 
aims  and  EU  legislation  when 
addressing  reduction  in  major 
accident  risks  by  duty  holders 
under 
the 
unitary  Competent  Authorities 
of the MS’? 

the  oversight  of 

What  has  been  the  % 
completeness 
responses 
of 
to 
COM 
regarding  this 
assessment 
project 
MS’? 

by 

As  generic  point,  is 
the  Directive 
in  alignment 
with  Articles 
194, 
153(1)&(2), 
and  191(2)  of 
TFEU? 

Is 

Coherence  with  broad 
generic 
legislative 
intent  can  be 
deduced 
as 
follows: 

 Penalties 

and 
sanctions  applied  by 
CA’s 

 Prosecutions 
launched 
CA’s/MS’ 
prosecuting 
authorities 

by 

 Major 

accident 

investigations 
launched 

155 

the 

coherence 
maintained  in 
practice 
between 
measures 
relating  to  the 
arrangements 
and  functions 
of  the  CA  in 
the  Directive 
the 
and 
related 
Council 
Directives 
89/391/EEC 
and 
92/91/EEC? 

written 
submissions 

Article  8  specifies  the 
arrangements 
and 
empowerment 
of 
the  CA, 
including  cost 
recovery. 

Article  9  specifies  the 
of 
functions 
the  CA  (and 
Annex III) 

Reliable 

evidence 
derives from: 

2016 

MS’ 

consultant’s 
to 

report 
Commission 
on  degree  of 
transposition 
of 
the 
Directive  by 
MS’; 

to 

reports 
Commission 
under 
the 
implementing 

Is 

there 

EU 

sufficient 
time 
elapsed 
for  objective 
conclusions 
regarding 
further 
interventions 
for 
coherence 
the 
between 
Directive  and 
the 
relevant 
EU 
legislation? 

greater 

Given 

the 

draft 

a 

instrument 
was 
for 
regulation, 
the 
has 
implementatio
n 
the 
of 
Directive  by 
been 
MS’ 
consistently 
implemented 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

 Hydrocarbon 

from 

releases 
permamently 
abandoned  platform 
wells 

 Hydrocarbon 

detected 
releases 
from 
subsea 
locations  attributed 
to  decommissioned 
facility 
production 
(platform or subsea) 

 Environmental 

performance data for 
EU cf global trends 
 Major  accident  risk 
control 
(process 
safety)  performance 
data for EU cf global 
trends 

 Occupationalv  safety 
performance data for 
EU cf global trends 

Does 

Is  a  conflict 
observed 
between 
Annex  C  of 
92/91/EEC 
(referring 
specifically  to 
offshore 
petroleum 
operations) 
and 
Directive? 

the 

regulation and 
via EUOAG; 

Formally 

authorised 

technical 
reports; 

Observed  experience 
raising  issues 
of concerns; 

Major  accident  reports 
issued by MS’ 

Workshops 

and 

by focal MS’? 

the 

any 
inconsistency 
the 
with 
Directive 
amongst 
appointed 
CA’s 
introduce 
differential 
coherence 
with 
legislation? 

other 

And  maintained  with 
the  Seveso  III 
Directive127  

Does 

the 
implementatio
n 
the 
of 
Directive 
infringe 
the 
broad  generic 
principles 
enshrined 
the 
legislation, 

in 
primary 

interviews 
with 
stakeholders; 
and 

Factual  data  publicly 

available;

Subjective 

evidence 
derives from:  

Data submissions from 

stakeholders; 

Are  the  penalties  and 

sanctions 
available 
to 
CA’s pursuant 
ot 
the 
Directive 
broadly 
consistent 
with 
principles 

the 
in 

127 Directive 2012/18/EU, the Seveso III Directive (full title: Directive 2012/18/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on the control of major-accident hazards 
involving dangerous substances, amending and subsequently repealing Council Directive 96/82/EC Text with EEA relevance) is a European Union directive aimed at controlling major chemical 
accident and explosion hazards. 

156 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

and 
TFEU 
closely 
with 
related  HSE 
regulation129? 

mainly  of  the 
IPPC 
Directive128 

Subjective 

technical 

reports; 

Suggested  experiences 
raising  issues 
of concerns; 

Major  accident  reports 
issued 
by 
operator/owne
r 

Public 

consultations 

and 
unsolicited 
written 
submissions 

Effectiveness  Do  the  aims  (i)-(ii)  as  implemented  by 
MS’  for  appointing  competent 
authorities  attain  global  best 
regulatory practices in the EU?  

Are  adverse  effects  of  major  accidents 
to  the  environment  on  coastal 
communities  and  the  marine 
habitats  and  economic  users 

indicators 
Contextual 
of 
scale  of 
industrial  risk 
to 
be 
addressed: 

 Operational  density 
criteria 
(production 
volumes;  #  offshore 
workers;  #  wells 
# 
drilled; 

Practical 

qualitative 
indicators  of 
effectiveness 
are: 

 penalties 

and 
sanctions  applied  by 
CA’s 

 Prosecutions 
launched 
CA’s/MS’ 
prosecuting 

by 

Reliable 

evidence 
derives from: 

Is 

2016 

consultant’s 
to 

report 
Commission 
on  degree  of 
transposition 
of 
the 
Directive  by 

there 

sufficient 
elapsed 
time 
for  objective 
conclusions 
regarding 
further 
interventions 
in 
regulatory 
effectiveness? 

EU 

128 Directive 2008/1/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 January 2008 concerning integrated pollution prevention and control (IPPC Directive) and Council Directive 

85/337/EEC of 27 June 1985 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment (Environmental Impact Assessment Directive), as amended by 
Directive 97/11/EC, 2003/35/EC and 2009/31/EC? 

129 HSE is a globally accepted acronym for the term ‘health, safety and enviroonment’. 

157 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

likely to be mitigated?  

installations;  etc)  as 
trends 
 Trending 

deployments 
of 
major  capital  mobile 
assets 
/ 
(IADC 
/  ECSA) 
IMCA 
Europe  &  global, 
2008 – present 

Practical indications of 

authorities 

 Major 

accident 

investigations 
launched 
 Intensity 

of 
inspections of CA as 
annualised inputs 

 Preventive 

programmes 
planned/executed  by 
CA’s 

unitary  CA 
established 
both 
for 
safety 
and 
environment? 

effectiveness 
of the CA’s: 

Is 

a 

 Completeness 

of 
reports 
incident 
collected 
and 
reported  publicly/to 
(as  %  of 
COM 
required 
reporting 
system) 

 RoMH’s assessed by 
the  CA  as  %  of 
number of MODU’s; 
and # accepted 

 RoMH’s assessed by 
the  CA  as  %  of 
number 
of 
production 
installations;  and  # 
accepted 

158 

MS’ 

MS’; 

to 

reports 
Commission 
under 
the 
implementing 
regulation and 
via EUOAG; 

Formally 

authorised 

technical 
reports; 

Observed  experience 
raising  issues 
of concerns; 

Major  accident  reports 
by 
issued 
MS’; 

Workshops 

and 

for 

What  are  the  sources 
and 
significance 
of  calls 
further 
clarification 
and guidance? 
there 
Is 
verification 
available? 

Where  the  CA  is  a 
rather 
joint 
than 
unitary 
body, are lead 
entities 
appointed? 

interviews 
with 
stakeholders; 
and 

Is 

Factual  data  publicly 

available;

Subjective 

evidence 
derives from:  

there  consistency 
across  the  EU 
the 
in 
to 
approach 
enforcement 
against 
breaches 
duty 
industry? 

of 
by 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

Suggested  experiences 
raising  issues 
of concerns; 

Major  accident  reports 
issued 
by 
operator/owne
r 

Public 

consultations 

and 
unsolicited 
written 
submissions 

Efficiency 

of 
authorities 

What  are  the  costs  associated  with  the 
appointing 
introduction 
competent 
in 
relation  to  the  estimated  cost 
reduction  of  a  major  accident 
occurring  through  reduction  in 
risk? 

Principal  quantitative 
contexts 
for 
the  scale  of 
sector 
the 
requiring 
a 
CA 
response 
are: 

 Operational  density 
criteria 
(production 
volumes;  #  offshore 
workers;  #  wells 
# 
drilled; 
installations;  etc)  as 
trends 

Is 

a 

unitary  CA 
established 
both 
for 
and 
safety 
environment? 

What 

different 

charging 
provisions  are 
put into effect 
by MS? 

Reliable 

evidence 
derives from: 

MS’ 

to 

reports 
Commission 
under 
the 
implementing 
regulation and 
via EUOAG; 

Observed  experience 
raising  issues 
concerns; 
of 
and 

159 

and 

Are  there  conclusions 
to be drawn of 
efficacy 
comparing 
civil 
criminal 
penalties  (for 
example 
between  high 
civil  penalty 
fines (€multi -
millions)  and 
criminal 
financial 
penalties? 

Is 

there 

a  more 

to 

levelled-
upwards 
approach 
risk 
management 
comparing 
EU  MS’  with 
IRF 
and 
NSOAF 
countries?  

Can it be seen that the 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

Factual  data  publicly 

available;

Subjective 

evidence 
derives from:  

Data submissions from 

stakeholders; 

Subjective 

technical 

reports; 

Suggested  experiences 
raising  issues 
of concerns; 

Public 

consultations 

and 
unsolicited 
written 
submissions 

establishment 
of a consistent 
cohort  of  EU 
offshore 
petroleum 
CA’s 
promotes 
the 
efficiency  of 
individual 
MS’? And the 
industry 
sector? 

How  are  the  running 
costs  of  CA’s 
shared  with 
as 
industry 
viewed 
from 
the 
perspective 
‘whom 
of: 
the 
creates 
risk 
and 
benefits  from 
the subsurface 
treasure’? 

 Trending 

of 
deployments 
major  capital  mobile 
(IADC 
assets 
/ 
IMCA 
/  ECSA) 
Europe  &  global, 
2008 – present 

Practical 

indicators 

are: 

 MS  staff  resources 
applied to  CA cf  pre 
OSD 

 Operating budgets of 
CA per active well cf 
pre OSD 

 Operating budgets of 
CA  per  installation 
cf pre OSD 
of 
 Allocation 
resources 
by 
technical  discipline 
(technical 
per  MS 
and 
environment; 
assessment; 
inspection  &  audit; 
enforcement) 

 Cost  of  handling  a 
for  mobile 

RoMH 
NPI 

 Cost  of  handling 
RoMH 

operations 

What is the proportion 
aging 
of 
infrastructure, 
including 
MODU’s 
in 
EU  offshore 
regions 
including  age 
of 
profile 
and 
fixed 
mobile 
installations 

What  are  oil  price 
trends and the 
general 
direction 
the 
economy? 

of 
sector’s 

What  are  the  relative 
efforts 
between 
established 
advanced 
CA’s and new 
jurisdictions 
in  setting  up 

160 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

for PI 

their CA’s? 

What  dependency  on 

technical 
consultancies 
is, on average, 
required 
by 
emerging  and 
new CA’s? 

Have  MS’  generally 
avoided 
duplication  of 
HSE19 
functions 
between 
separate 
agencies? 

EU-value 

adde
d 

Is  it  likely  that  the  intervention  has 
increased  the  adoption  of  such 
regulatory  practices  across  the 
EU where otherwise would not 
have been the case? 

be 
to 

Indicators  may 
integrated 
derive 
cost/benefit 
terms from: 

 Well control incident 
trend-

report 

Deriving  context  of 
and 
SEMS 
overarching 
policies via: 

 Major  accident  risk 
trends  as  formulated 
advanced 
by 

Reliable 

evidence 
derives from: 

2016 

consultant’s 
to 

report 
Commission 
on  degree  of 

What is deduced of the 
experience  of 
implementing 
the  Directive 
in  relation  to 
establishing  a 
coherent  EU 

161 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

summaries: 

 BOP 

reports 
failure 
summaries 

from 

reliability 
JIP 
trend-

 Failure  reports  from 
of 

schemes 
independent 
verification 
 Exploration 

drilled 
 Trending 

wells 

regulatory 
(annualised reports 

regimes 

 Demographic 

of 
aging  infrastructure, 
including  MODU’s 
and 
fixed 
installations 
 Diversification 

of 
holders; 
trends 
smaller, 

license 
population 
towards 
niche companies 

deployments 
of 
major  capital  mobile 
/ 
(IADC 
assets 
IMCA 
/  ECSA) 
Europe  &  global, 
2008 – present; and 

 Oil price trends 

 Operational  density 
criteria 
(production 
volumes;  #  offshore 
workers;  #  wells 
drilled; 
# 
installations;  etc)  as 
trends 

Are  there  post  2010 
Industry 
initiatives 
adopted 
by 
operators  and 
contractors 
for continuous 
improvements 
in 
performance? 

162 

MS’ 

transposition 
the 
of 
Directive  by 
MS’; 

to 

reports 
Commission 
under 
the 
implementing 
regulation and 
via EUOAG; 

Formally 

authorised 

technical 
reports; 

Observed  experience 
raising  issues 
concerns 
of 
and/or 
approval; and 

Workshops 

and 

interviews 
with 
stakeholders. 

Subjective 

evidence 
derives from:  

Data submissions from 

stakeholders; 

for 
from 

regime 
CA’s 
perspective 
of: 

 NSOAF10  MS’  and 

Italy? 

 Southern EU MS’? 
What  are  the  broadly 

expressed 
of 
views 
primary  duty 
holders 

What  can  be  deduced 
of 
the 
establishment 
of 
the 
EUOAG4  
regarding EU-
added  value? 
Would  such  a 
forum 
be 
extant without 
the 
intervention 
of 
Directive? 

the 

Is 

there 

sufficient 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

elapsed 
time 
for  objective 
conclusions 
regarding 
further 
EU 
interventions? 

Subjective 

technical 

reports; 

Suggested  experiences 
raising  issues 
of 
concerns 
and/or 
approval; and 

Public 

consultations 

and 
unsolicited 
written 
submissions 

(4) Comprehensive verification of capability and experience to be undertaken at the licensing stage 

Attainment 

Is 

there 

and 

compreh
ensive 
verificati
on 
of 
capabilit
y 
experien
ce 
of 
applicant
s 
undertak
en  at  the 

(i)  Are 

licenses 
awarded in 
considerati
on 
of 
technical 
capability
130  for  the 
planned 
operations 
and 
emergency 
response? 

Quantitative 

deductions  on 
the 
application  of 
technical 
capability 
assessment 
may 
available 
from: 

be 

For  context  to  scale 
and  nature  of 
licensing  and 
licensed 
areas, 
following 
indicators 
apply: 

the 

 Exploration 

wells 

drilled 

 #    and  frequency  of 
rounds 

licensing 
since July 2013? 

 Frontier  areas  under, 
for, 
available 

or 
license 

Article  4  describes 

of 

the 

requirements 
for 
assessment 
and 
technical 
capability  of 
applicants 
to 
be  considered 
the  MS; 
by 
also 
the 
requirements 
for 

Has  the  experience  of 
the  Directive 
been  to  create 
consistent 
technical 
capability 
assessments 
of  applicants 
for licenses? 

Is  it  noted  that  the 
CA’s 

130 Element (4) relates to the technical capability of the applicant for a license. The CA performs a significant role in the assessment of this aspect of the application. Element 9 evaluates 
financial capability measures in the Directive (also provided for in Article 4). 

163 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

licensing 
stage? 

Are 

there 
provisions 
for  MS’  to 
ensure 
licensees 
maintain 
capability 
and 
complianc
e 
operations
? 

during 

 CA  participation  in 
licensing  as  %  of 
licenses 
awarded 
since 2016 

 # 

 #  National  Oil 
Companies  (NOC’s) 
acting  as  Operators 
in licensed areas 
licensed 

areas 
where 
no 
oil 
independent 
company  IOC)  is  a 
venturer? 

(ii) Relevant data are 

 # 

public 
on 
consultations 
be 
areas 
to 
for 
considered 
licensing  since  July 
2013? 

 Oil price trends 
 Diversification 

of 
holders; 
trends 
smaller, 

license 
population 
towards 
niche companies 

monitoring  of 
maintenance 
of 
capability. 

suitable 

(Article  6 

contains 

Is  a  unitary  CA  for 
HSE 
appointed 
each 
MS? 

in 
focal 

Are  there  procedures 
published  as 
technical 
to 
requirements 
in each MS’ 

Article 

general 
provisions  for 
assurance  of 
best 
international 
practices 
by 
operators  and 
well  operators 
in 
licensed 
areas) 

requires 

5 
public 
participation 
in 
seleciton 
areas 
planned 
exploration 
operations. 

the 
of 
for 

(ii) 

there 

Are 
independent 
licensing 
authorities  in 

Reliable 

evidence 
derives from: 

164 

appointed 
to 
pursuant 
the  Directive 
do  participate 
in 
the 
assessments 
of 
capability? 

technical 

Is  the  number  of  new 
licenses 
awarded  since 
2016 
sufficient  for 
an  objective 
assessment  of 
any 
improvement 
in 
capability 
assessments? 

technical 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

 Number  of  EIA’s131 
by 
required 
intervention  of 
the 
licensing  body  or 
Minister  in  areas  of 
special 
environmental 
sensitivity? 
(i.e 
where  not  otherwise 
mandated) 

each MS? 

2016 

What  general  level  of 
diversification 
of  the  marine 
spaces is there 
in 
EU 
offshore 
regions? 

MS’ 

Do 

licenses 
dormant 
significant 
periods 
time? 

lie 
for 

of 

Formal 

consultant’s 
to 

report 
Commission 
on  degree  of 
transposition 
the 
of 
Directive  by 
MS’; 

to 

reports 
Commission 
under 
the 
implementing 
regulation and 
via EUOAG; 

of 

notices 
licensing 
rounds in OJ; 

Formal calls for public 

participation 
in selection of 
areas 
for 
licensing; 

Observed  experience 
raising  issues 
of 
concerns; 
and 

ii)  Is    exploration 

to 

limited 
solely 
areas 
where 
there  has 
been 
public 
consultatio
n? 

there 
arrangeme
nts  in  MS’ 
that 
encourage 
active 
public 
participati
on? 

Are 

131 Environmental impact assessments arerquired under Directive 85/337/EEC and amendments. MS’ may require operators to conduct full EIA’s prior to exploration drilling but normally an 
EIA is required at the stage of considering consent to installing a production facility. 

165 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

Factual  data  publicly 

available;

Subjective 

evidence 
derives from:  

Data submissions from 

stakeholders; 

Subjective 

technical 

reports; 

Suggested  experiences 
raising  issues 
of concerns; 

Public 

consultations 

and 
unsolicited 
written 
submissions 

Relevance 

Do  aims  4,  and  (i)-(ii)  directly  address 
lowering  of  major  accident 
risks  by  actively  promoting 
public  participation    and  by 
evaluating 
consistently 
technical  capability  of  license 
holders 
and  operators  by 
competent authorities? 

Suitable statistical data 
include 
(all 
from  the  date 
baseline  July 
2013): 

 #    and  frequency  of 
licensing rounds? 

 # 

consultations 
areas 
to 
considered 

public 
on 
be 
for 

For  context  to  scale 
and  nature  of 
licensing  and 
licensed 
areas, 
following 
indicators 
apply: 

the 

 Exploration 

wells 

drilled 

 Frontier  areas  under, 

Reliable 

evidence 
derives from: 

MS’ 

to 

reports 
Commission 
the 
under 
implementing 
regulation and 
via EUOAG; 

Formal 

notices 
licensing 

of 

Is  the  experience  of 
implementing 
the  Directive 
regarding  the 
licensing 
requirements 
broadly 
approved  by 
MS’ CA’s? 

166 

 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

licensing? 

 Number  of  EIA’s 

conducted? 

 #  exploration  wells 

spudded? 

 #  licenses  formally 

relinquished 

available 

or 
license 

 Diversification 

of 
holders; 
trends 
smaller, 

license 
population 
towards 
niche companies 

for, 

rounds in OJ; 

Are 

Formal calls for public 

participation 
in selection of 
areas 
for 
licensing; 

Observed  experience 
raising  issues 
concerns; 
of 
and 

Workshops 

and 

interviews 
with 
stakeholders;

Subjective 

evidence 
derives from:  

Data submissions from 

stakeholders; 

Subjective 

technical 

reports; 

Suggested  experiences 
raising  issues 
of 
concerns; 
and 

Public 

consultations 

and 

there 

regional 
differences  of 
view? 

Has  the  experience  of 
establishing  a 
baseline 
of 
best 
regulatory 
practices 
across  the  EU 
highlighted  a 
of 
lack 
specifity 
in 
provisions. 
For  example 
in retention of 
license 
approvals 
dormant 
licensing;  and 
in 
carrying 
forward 
environmental 
assessments 
in 
licenses? 

dormant 

in 

Also  does  it  raise  a 
question  over 

Are  there  indications 
that Articles 4 
and 
no 
6 
longer 
represent  best 
international 
regulatory 
practice 
technical 
capability 
assurance  of 
license 
holders? 

in 

What  are  oil  price 
trends and the 
general 
direction 
the 
economy? 

of 
sector’s 

167 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

unsolicited 
written 
submissions 

CA’s 
technical 
involvement 
at 
relinquishmen
t  of  licenses 
where  wells 
have 
been 
drilled? 

Coherence 

What  correlation  exists  between  the 
aims  and  EU  legislation  when 
addressing  reduction  in  major 
through 
risks 
accident 
promoting 
public 
active 
participation  in  new  licensing 
and 
technical 
assessing 
capability during licensing? 

Is 

Suitable statistical data 
may 
be 
integrated 
from: 

 Hydrocarbon 

from 

releases 
permamently 
abandoned  platform 
wells 

 Hydrocarbon 

releases 
detected 
subsea 
from 
locations  attributed 
to  decommissioned 
production 
facility 
(platform or subsea) 

the 

coherence 
maintained  in 
practice 
between 
measures 
relating  to  the 
Directive 
in 
the 
hydrocarbons 
licensing 
directive132 ? 

And  in  respect  of  EU 

the 

legislation 
under 
Aarhus 
convention 
relating 

Article  4  describes 

Is 

there 

EU 

sufficient 
elapsed 
time 
for  objective 
conclusions 
regarding 
further 
interventions 
for 
coherence 
between 
the 
Directive  and 
relevant 
the 
EU 
legislation? 

greater 

of 

the 

requirements 
for 
assessment 
and 
technical 
capability  of 
to 
applicants 
be  considered 
the  MS; 
by 
also 
the 
requirements 
for 
monitoring  of 
maintenance 
of 
capability. 

suitable 

(Article  6 

contains 

to 

Is it perceived that the 
Directive  has 
increased 

132 Directive 94/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 1994 on the conditions for granting and using authorizations for the prospection, exploration and production of 
hydrocarbons 

168 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

public 
participation 
in 
environmental 
matters133? 

national 

transparency 
in 
licensing 
arrangements
? 

general 
provisions  for 
assurance  of 
best 
international 
by 
practices 
operators  and 
well  operators 
in 
licensed 
areas) 

Effectiveness  Do  the  aims  (i)-(ii)  as  implemented  by 
to  by 
MS’  and  responded 
industry  attain  global  best 
industry  practices  in  the  EU 
through  public  participation  in 
selecting  new  licensing  areas 
the  appointment  of 
and 
and 
technically 
license 
suitably 
holders and operators?  

competent 

resourced 

in 

Are  adverse  effects  of  major  accidents 

The 

following 

indicators 
may apply: 

 #  Exploration  wells 

drilled 

Is  a  unitary  CA  for 
HSE 
appointed 
each 
MS? 

in 
focal 

 # 

Frontier 

areas 
under,  or  available 
for, license 

 #    and  frequency  of 
rounds 

licensing 
since July 2013? 

 CA  participation  in 

Are  there  procedures 
published  as 
to 
technical 
requirements 

Reliable 

evidence 
derives from: 

MS’ 

to 

reports 
Commission 
the 
under 
implementing 
regulation and 
via EUOAG; 

Observed  experience 
raising  issues 
concerns; 
of 

Has  the  experience  of 
the  Directive 
been  to  create 
consistent 
technical 
capability 
assessments 
of  applicants 
for licenses? 

Is  it  noted  that  the 

133 Directive 2003/04/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on public access to environmental information and repealing Council Directive 90/313/EEC; 
Directive 2003/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 May 2003 providing for public participation in respect of the drawing up of certain plans and programmes relating to 
the environment and amending with regard to public participation and access to justice Council Directives 85/337/EEC and 96/61/EC. Provisions for public participation in environmental 
decision-making are furthermore to be found in a number of other environmental directives, such as Directive 2001/42/EC of 27 June 2001 on the assessment of certain plans and 
programmes on the environment  

169 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

to  the  environment  on  coastal 
communities  and  the  marine 
habitats  and  economic  users 
likely to be mitigated?  

licensing  as  %  of 
awarded 
licenses 
since 2016 

 # 

 #  National  Oil 
Companies  (NOC’s) 
acting  as  Operators 
in licensed areas 
licensed 

areas 
no 
where 
independent 
oil 
company  IOC)  is  a 
venturer? 

in each MS’? 

and 

Workshops 

and 

interviews 
with 
stakeholders;

Subjective 

evidence 
derives from:  

Data submissions from 

stakeholders; 

Subjective 

technical 

reports; 

Suggested  experiences 
raising  issues 
concerns; 
of 
and 

Public 

consultations 

and 
unsolicited 
written 
submissions 

Are  there  indications 
that Articles 4 
no 
6 
and 
longer 
represent  best 
international 
regulatory 
practice 
technical 
capability 
assurance  of 
license 
holders? 

in 

For  context  to  scale 
and  nature  of 
licensing  and 
licensed 
areas: 

 Oil price trends 
 Diversification 

of 
holders; 
trends 
smaller, 

license 
population 
towards 
niche companies 

CA’s 
appointed 
pursuant 
to 
the  Directive 
do  participate 
the 
in 
assessments 
of 
capability? 

technical 

Is  the  number  of  new 
licenses 
awarded  since 
2016 
sufficient  for 
an  objective 
assessment  of 
any 
improvement 
in 
capability 
assessments? 

technical 

Does the integration of 
the  CVA  as  a 
formal 
consultee 
introduce 
further 

170 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

Efficiency 

of 

What  are  the  costs  associated  with  the 
introduction 
formal 
procedures  to  promote  public 
participation  in  licensing  new 
areas,  and  in  CA  participation 
technical  assessments  of 
in 
these 
applicants?  How  do 
relate 
estimated 
the 
annualised  cost  of  a  major 
accident occurring? 

to 

considerations 
licensing 
of 
aspects, 
eg 
consultation 
on 
of 
relinquishmen
t? 

standards 

Cumulative  elements 
of 
cost 
derived  from 
the 
implementatio
the 
n 
of 
Directive 
at 
Articles  4,  5, 
set 
as 
6 
against 
the 
perceived 
annualised 
costs of major 
accidents, 
including 
the 
environment, 
from  offshore 
petroleum 
operations. 

to 

Can  costs  of  CA 

participation 
licensing 
in 
be 
teased 
from  overall 
set up costs? 

And running costs? 

Is 

it  assumed 

that 
Article  5  acts 
the 
in 
affirmative 
rather 
than 
creates  a  new 
to 
duty 
conduct 
public 
participation?  

Reliable 

evidence 
derives from: 

Formal 

of 

notices 
licensing 
rounds in OJ; 

Formal calls for public 

participation 
in selection of 
areas 
for 
licensing; 

Observed  experience 
raising  issues 
of 
concerns; 
and 

Workshops 

and 

interviews 
with 
stakeholders; 

Subjective 

evidence 

Are  the  measures  in 
the  Directive 
licensing 
for 
and 
public 
participation 
broadly 
welcomed  by 
principal 
stakeholders? 

Do 

social  partners 
with  access  to 
CA’s  identify 
new  matters 
interest 
of 
connected 
to 
technical 
competence in 
licensing  and 
related  public 
participation?  

171 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

derives from:  

Data submissions from 

stakeholders; 

Suggested  experiences 
raising  issues 
of 
concerns; 
and 

Public 

consultations 

and 
unsolicited 
written 
submission 

Feedback  of  principal 

stakeholders: 

Reliable 

evidence 
derives from: 

 affirming  the  value 
new 
the 
in 
the 
of 

of 
arrangements 
securing 
objectives 
reducing 
majoraccident 
and 

risk; 

 identifying  areas  of 
other 
interventions 
to further imrove the 
relationship 
of 
regulators  and  civil 
society  with  sensible 
licensing 

Formally 

authorised 

technical 
reports; 

Formal 

of 

notices 
licensing 
rounds in OJ; 

Formal calls for public 

participation 
in selection of 
areas 
for 
licensing; 

Observed  experience 
raising  issues 

What  are 

the  most 

frequently 
expressed 
views of: 

 MS’ regulators 
 Operators 

license holders 
on 

 Owners 

production 
installations 

and 

non 

 NGO’s 
 Trades Union 
whether  the  Directive 
se 
has  per 
value 
added 
to 
technical 
licensing  and 

EU-value 

adde
d 

Is  it  likely  that  the  intervention  has 
increased the adoption of good 
licensing  and 
practices 
public  participation  across  the 
EU where otherwise would not 
have been the case? 

in 

Relevance 

of  EU-
added 
value 
contextualised 
by: 

 #  Exploration  wells 

drilled 
 Trending 

deployments 
of 
major  capital  mobile 
(IADC 
assets 
/ 
/  ECSA) 
IMCA 
Europe  &  global, 
2008 – present; and 
 oil  price  trends  and 
the  general  direction 
of 
sector’s 
the 
economy? 

172 

 
 
 
  
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

concern; 

of 
and 

Workshops 

and 

interviews 
with 
stakeholders. 

Subjective 

evidence 
derives from:  

Data submissions from 

stakeholders; 

Suggested  experiences 
raising  issues 
of concerns; 

Also 

affirmatory 
feedback; and 

Public 

consultations 

and 
unsolicited 
written 
submissions 

concomitant 
public 
participation 
compared 
with 
MS’ 
acting without 
EU 
intervention? 

Keeping  in  mind  MS’ 
right 
for 
determining 
offshore 
petroleum 
licensing 
and 
policy, 
the 
original 
intent  of  a 
regulation, 
has 
Directive 
a 
achieved 
more 
level 
and  upgraded 
to 
approach 
technical 
licensing  and 
public 
participation? 

the 

173 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

(5) EU-wide information sharing and transparency to be implemented 

Attainment 

Is  there  EU-wide 
informati
on 
sharing 
and 
transpare
ncy 
relating 
to  sector 
performa
nce 
in 
major 
accident 
preventio
n? 

(i)  Does  industry 

(i) 

to 
in 

make 
reports 
CA’s 
accordanc
e 
with 
implement
ing 
regulation 
# 
1112/2014
? 

incident 

reports 
to 
provided 
MS’ 
by 
operators  and 
owners  under 
reg.1112/2014 
as  % 
of 
qualifying 
incidents  

Other 

as 
reports 
by 
required 
MS 
or 
regional  seas 
conventions 

(i) 

other 

reports 
available from 
industry 
include 
corporate 
annual 
reports; also  

industry 

trade 

association 
reports134: 

• Well control incident 
trend-

report 
summaries 

• BOP 

reports 
failure 
summaries 

from 

reliability 
JIP 
trend-

• Availability of KPI’s 
and  other  statistical 
publications  bearing 
on risk trends  
• Environmental 

performance data for 
EU cf global trends 
• Major  accident  risk 
(process 

control 

Can  it  be  seen  that  a 
new system of 
EU-wide 
of 
reporting 
incidents  is  in 
place? 

Is 

system 

the 
sufficiently 
mature 
consider 
adaptations? 

to 

Is  action  required  to 

stimulate 
complete 
reporting? 

Article  23  provides 
for 

measures 
industry 
and 
reports, 
the  making  of 
regulation 
a 
by 
the 
Commission 
for  a common 
reporting 
format. 

Article  24  describes 
duties  of  MS’ 
publish 
to 
incidents  and 
for 
Commission 
to 
providea 
format  for  an 
EU 
annual 
report. 

Article  25  describes 

134 Main Trade Associations contributing to the assessment are: IOGP International Association of Oil & Gas Producers (London) – Operators and Licensees; IADC International Association of 
Drilling Contractors (Houston, USA – Owners of MODU’s;  ECSA European Commercial Ship Owners Association (Brussels) – Owners of commercial vessels which includes those servicing 
the petroleum sector; IMCA International Marine Contractors Association (London) – owners of specialised service vessels for the petroleum sector  

174 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

safety)  performance 
data for EU cf global 
trends 

(ii) 

Indicators 

of 

transparency 
for 
include: 

MS’ 

• Collection 

of 
incident  data  using 
10  point  taxonomy 
of the regulation; 
• Reports  of  major 

accident 
investigations  made 
public 
• Reports 

of 
spills 

hydrocarbon 
made public 

• Publish  annual  fatal 

injury rate 

(iii)  Is  guidance  made 
available  by 
Commission 
to  MS’  and 
primary  duty 
holders? 

duties  of  MS’ 
report 
to 
annually 
to 
the 
Commission 
and 
Commission 
make 
to 
annual 
EU-
level reports. 

the 

for 

Reliable 

evidence 
derives from: 

MS’ 

to 

reports 
Commission 
under 
the 
implementing 
regulation and 
via EUOAG; 

Formally 

authorised 

technical 
reports; 

Observed  experience 
raising  issues 
of concerns; 

Major  accident  reports 
by 
issued 
MS’; 

Whether  Commission 

Workshops 

and 

(ii)  Do  MS’  report 
data 
pertinent 
to  major 
accident 
risk 
annually 
to 
Commissi
on? 

the 

(ii) 

# 

completed 
annual  reports 
from  MS’  to 
Commission 
as  %  of  focal 
MS’, 
since 
2016 

# MS’ that publish risk 

trend reports 

#  MS’  that  contribute 
IRF  and 

to 

175 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

NSOAF10 
reporting 
systems 

reporting 
system 
duplicates 
existing 
systems 
MS’? 

interviews 
with 
stakeholders; 
and 

in 

Factual  data  publicly 

available;

(iii)  #  annual  reports 
under 
the 
implementing 
regulation 
published  by 
Commission 
since 2017 

Subjective 

evidence 
derives from:  

Data submissions from 

stakeholders; 

Suggested  experiences 
raising  issues 
of concerns; 

Major  accident  reports 
issued 
by 
operator/ 
owner; and 

Public 

consultations 

and 
unsolicited 
written 
submission 

(iii)  Are 

reports 

the 

in  a 

published 
by 
Commissi
on 
common 
format 
produced 
an 
under 
implement
ing act? 

Relevance 

Do  aims  5  and  (i)-(iii)  directly  address 
lowering  of  major  accident 

Relevance  may  be 
deduced from, 

Indications 

of 
relevance may 

Reliable 

evidence 

Is 

it  seen 

the 
that 
taxonomy  of 

176 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

through 

risks 
improved 
transparency  of  industry,  the 
MS’ and Commission? 

inter alia: 

 environmental 

performance data for 
EU cf global trends; 
 Major  accident  risk 
(process 
control 
safety)  performance 
data for EU cf global 
trends 

 Operational  density 
criteria 
(production 
volumes;  #  offshore 
workers;  #  wells 
# 
drilled; 
installations;  etc)  as 
trends; and 

 Incident  reporting  as 
requirement 
%  of 
under  Implementing 
Regulation 

deduced, 
alia, 

be 
inter 
from:   

MS’ 

derives from: 

to 

reports 
Commission 
under 
the 
implementing 
regulation and 
via EUOAG; 

Formally 

authorised 

technical 
reports; 

Observed  experience 
raising  issues 
of concerns; 

Major  accident  reports 
by 
issued 
MS’; 

Workshops 

and 

interviews 
with 
stakeholders;  

reporting 

the 
system 
reflects 
international 
best  practices 
offshore 
for 
petroleum 
incident 
reporting? 

Is  the  system  mature 
enough 
to 
make 
objecvtive 
considerations 
the 
on 
of 
question 
relevance 
to 
major 
accident 
prevention? 

Subjective 

evidence 
derives from:  

Are 

Data submissions from 

stakeholders; 

Subjective 

technical 

reports; 

Suggested  experiences 

that 

other 

there 
international 
systems 
focus 
especially  on 
major 
accident 

 Industry 

initiatives 
adopted by operators 
and  contractors  for 
continuous 
improvements 
reporting 
performance 

in 
of 

risk 

trends 

 Availability of KPI’s 
and  other  statistical 
publications  bearing 
to 
on 
major  accident  risk, 
occupational  health 
& 
and 
safety 
environmental 
protection 

Is 

there  clarity  of 
primary 
dutyholders 
compliance 
with 
system? 

the 

Is  there  availability  of 
formal 
guidance? 

177 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

raising  issues 
concerns; 
of 
and 

Suggested  experiences 
giving 
affirmation 
feedback; 

Major  accident  reports 
by 
issued 
operator/owne
r; and 

Is 

Public 

consultations 

and 
unsolicited 
written 
submissions 

to 

prevention, 
including 
the 
environment 
that 
serve 
benchmark? 

as 

may 
a 

the  quality  and 
completeness 
of 
reporting 
different 
between 
mature 
regimes 
Sea, 
(North 
Italy)  and  the 
less mature? 

the 

Coherence 

Does 

What  correlation  exists  between  the 
aims  and  EU  legislation  when 
transparency  of 
addressing 
incidents  and 
reporting  of 
the  offshore 
in 
accidents 
petroleum sector? 

Is 

duplication 
occur between 
the  Directive 
and 
other 
specific  EU 
legal 
measures 
relating  both 
to  the  sector 
and relating to 
risk  reduction 

178 

the 

coherence 
maintained  in 
practice 
between 
Directive’s 
measures  for 
transparency 
of 
performance 
ansd  and  the 
related 

industry 

What 

Article  23  provides 
for 

measures 
industry 
reports, 
and 
the  making  of 
regulation 
a 
by 
the 
Commission 
for  a common 
reporting 
format. 

be 

may 
primarily 
concluded 
from 
implementatio
and 
n 
adoption 
of 
the 
transparency 
arrangements 
regarding 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

Is 

and 
preparation  of 
reports? 

there  conflict  of 
legislative 
intent  occurs 
between 
the 
Directive  and 
other  specific 
EU 
legal 
measures 
relating  both 
to  the  sector 
and relating to 
risk  reduction 
and 
preparation  of 
reports? 

And 

Council 
Directives  on 
industry 
sector  major 
accident 
prevention 
performance
135?  And 
in 
respect 
of 
environmental 
liability 
and 
remedy136?  

major 
for 
accident  sites 
(onshore),  the 
Seveso 
III 
Directive137?  

Article  24  describes 
duties  of  MS’ 
to 
publish 
incidents  and 
for 
Commission 
to 
providea 
format  for  an 
EU 
annual 
report. 

Has 

Article  25  describes 
duties  of  MS’ 
report 
to 
annually 
to 
the 
Commission 
and 
Commission 
make 
to 
annual 
EU-
level reports. 

the 

for 

duplication 
with 
reporting 
systems? 

other 

such 

any 
duplication 
led  to  conflict 
of 
transparency 
arrangements 
that  need 
to 
be avoided? 

How numerous are the 

Reliable 

evidence 

135 89/391/EEC (Framework Directive) and 92/91/EEC esp Annex C referring specifically to offshore petroleum operations (Safety in mineral extraction through drilling Directive) 
136 Directive 2008/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on waste and repealing certain Directives (Waste Framework Directive) and in Directive 
2004/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on environmental liability with regard to the prevention and remedying of environmental damage (Environmental 
Liability Directive) 
137 Directive 2012/18/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on the control of major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances, repealing Directive 96/82/EC 
for controlling non nuclear major chemical accident and explosion hazards. 

179 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

duplicative 
and 
conflicting 
elements 

MS’ 

derives from: 

to 

reports 
Commission 
under 
the 
implementing 
regulation and 
via EUOAG; 

Workshops 

and 

interviews 
with 
stakeholders; 
an 

Subjective 

evidence 
derives from:  

Data submissions from 

stakeholders; 
and 

Public 

consultations 

and 
unsolicited 
written 
submissions 

Effectiveness  Do 

the  aims  5  and 

(i)-(iii)  as 
implemented  by  MS’  and 
responded to by industry attain 
full  transparency  in  the  EU 

Contextual 

data 

For  context  of 

the 

indicating 
baseline 
levels 

of 

current 
performance 
of the sector: 

Reliable 

evidence 
derives from: 

MS’ 

reports 
Commission 

to 

Can it be seen that the 
system 
provides 
effective 

180 

 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

thereby 
a 
contributing 
redeuction  in  offshore  major 
accident rik?  

to 

Are  adverse  effects  of  major  accidents 
to  the  environment  on  coastal 
communities  and  the  marine 
habitats  and  economic  users 
likely to be mitigated?  

industry 
performance: 

• # incidents occurring 
10-point 
(using 
taxonomy 
of 
Implementing  Act; 
e.g. 
collisions, 
breaches  of  500m 
zone; 
hydrocarbon 
releases; etc) 
• Environmental 

performance data for 
EU cf global trends 
• Major  accident  risk 
control 
(process 
safety)  performance 
data for EU cf global 
trends 

• Occupationalv  safety 
performance data for 
EU cf global trends 

• Major  accident  risk 
trends  as  formulated 
advanced 
by 
regulatory 
regimes 
(annualised reports) 
• Well control incident 
trend-

report 
summaries 

• BOP 

reports 
failure 
summaries 

from 

reliability 
JIP 
trend-

As 

indicators 

of 

effectiveness 
of 
Directive: 

the 

• Transparent 

collection of incident 
data 
(per 
Implementing 
regulation 
• Completeness 

of 
reports 
incident 
collected 
and 
reported  publicly/to 
(as  %  of 
COM 
required 
reporting 
system) 

• Reports  of  major 

accident 
investigations  made 

under 
the 
implementing 
regulation and 
via EUOAG; 

Formally 

authorised 

technical 
reports; 

Observed  experience 
raising  issues 
of concerns; 

Major  accident  reports 
by 
issued 
MS’; 

Workshops 

and 

interviews 
with 
stakeholders;  

Subjective 

evidence 
derives from:  

Data submissions from 

stakeholders; 

Subjective 

technical 

reports; 

Suggested  experiences 
raising  issues 
of 
concerns; 
and 

of 

overview 
major 
acvcident  risk 
trends  across 
the EU? 

Is  the  effectiveness  of 

the 
transparency 
system 
broadly 
welcomed  by 
primary  duty 
holders? 

Are  there  discussions 
EUOAG 

at 
concerning 
EU-level 
performance 
data? 

Is 

there 

sufficient 
elapsed 
time 
for  objective 
conclusions 
regarding 
further 

EU 

181 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

public 
• Reports 

hydrocarbon 
made public 

of 
spills 

Context of the level of 
industry 
performance 
are seen in: 

risk 

trends 

• Availability of KPI’s 
and  other  statistical 
publications  bearing 
on 
to 
major  accident  risk, 
occupational  health 
and 
safety 
& 
environmental 
protection 

• Environmental 

performance data for 
EU cf global trends 
• Major  accident  risk 

Efficiency 

of 

What  are  the  costs  associated  with  the 
introduction 
formal 
reporting systems up to the EU 
level;  and  in  relation  to  the 
estimated 
annualised 
reductions  in  cost  of  a  major 
accident occurring? 

Indicators of cost are: 

• Cost  of  making  the 

implementing 
regulation by MS’ 
• and  as  above  by 

industry 

• running costs to MS’ 
of  operating  the new 
system 

• as above for industry 

• Indicators  of  benefit 
are deduced from the 
relative  level  of  EU 
MS’ performance: 

• Completeness 

incident 

of 
reports 

182 

interventions 
on 
effectiveness? 

Suggested  experiences 
giving 
affirmation 
feedback; 

Major  accident  reports 
by 
issued 
operator/owne
r; and 

Public 

consultations 

and 
unsolicited 
written 
submissions 

Reliable 

evidence 
derives from: 

MS’ 

to 

reports 
Commission 
under 
the 
implementing 
regulation and 
via EUOAG; 

Is  the  availability  of 
the  EU-level 
report 
sufficiently 
known  to  the 
public 
and 
social 
partners? 

Formally 

authorised 

technical 
reports; 

Are 

Observed  experience 
raising  issues 
of concerns; 

for 

there  calls 
further 
guidance  by 
duty holders? 

(And 

are 

these 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

collected 
and 
reported  publicly/to 
(as  %  of 
COM 
required 
reporting 
system) 

• #Incidents  occurring 
10-point 
(using 
taxonomy 
of 
Implementing  Act; 
e.g. 
collisions, 
breaches  of  500m 
zone; 
hydrocarbon 
releases; etc) 

control 
(process 
safety)  performance 
data for EU cf global 
trends 

Occupational 

safety 

performance 
data for EU cf 
global trends 

Negative  costs  are  to 
be 
inferred 
from feedback 
from  industry 
and  MS’  on 
duplication 
with 
statutory 
reporting 
systems 

other 

Workshops 

and 

justified?) 

interviews 
with 
stakeholders.

Subjective 

evidence 
derives from:  

Data submissions from 

stakeholders; 

Suggested  experiences 
raising  issues 
of concerns; 

Suggested  experiences 
giving 
affirmation 
feedback; and 

Public 

consultations 

and 
unsolicited 
written 
submissions 

Can  it  be  established 
that  the  costs 
of  introducing 
the 
transparency 
system 
to 
to 
MS’  and 
primary  duty 
holders  were 
unjustifiably 
excessive? 

(And running costs?) 

Is  it  possible to  derive 
a  cost  versus 
term 
benefit 
this 
for 
requirement 
of 
Directive? 

the 

183 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

EU-value 

adde
d 

Is  it  likely  that  the  intervention  has 
increased 
the  adoption  of 
transparency  of  performance 
across the EU where otherwise 
would not have been the case? 

Quantitative data since 
2016/17  may 
only  establish 
a  baseline  for 
further 
scrutiny 
EU-added 
value: 

of 

 

of 

incidents 
(using 

 # 
occurring 
10-point 
taxonomy 
Implementing 
Act; 
collisions, 
breaches  of  500m 
zone; hydrocarbon 
releases; etc) 
Practical  indicators  of 
are 
change 
revealed in: 

e.g. 

Contextual 

data 

establishing 
baseline 
levels 
industry 
performance : 

of 

• Environmental 

performance data for 
EU cf global trends 
• Major  accident  risk 
control 
(process 
safety)  performance 
data for EU cf global 
trends; 

• Occupational  safety 
performance data for 
EU cf global trends 

  Reports  made  to 
under 

COM 
Implementing 
regulation 

  Completeness  of 
reports 
and 

incident 
collected 
reported 
publicly/to  COM 

184 

Reliable 

evidence 
derives from: 

Based 

Compliance  with  the 
Implementing 
Regulation 
2014; 

MS’ 

to 

reports 
Commission 
under 
the 
implementing 
regulation and 
via EUOAG; 

Workshops 

and 

interviews 
with 
stakeholders;  

Subjective 

evidence 
derives from:  

Data submissions from 

stakeholders; 

Suggested  experiences 
raising  issues 
of concerns; 

Suggested  experiences 
giving 
affirmation 

upon 

the 
experience  of 
implementing 
the  Directive, 
what  are  the 
positions of: 

 MS’ regulators 
 Operators 

license holders 
on 

 Owners 

production 
installations 

and 

non 

 NGO’s 
 Trades Union 
whether  the  Directive 
se 
has  per 
added 
value 
in  providing 
enhanced 
understanding 
of  sector  risk 
compared 
to 
the  status  quo 
EU 
ante 
intervention? 

Is  there  now  a  more 
levelled-
upwards 

 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

 

(as  %  of  required 
reporting system) 
Intensity 
of 
inspections  of  CA 
as 
annualised 
inputs 

OBJECTIVE 2 

feedback; and 

Public 

consultations 

and 
unsolicited 
written 
submissions 

approach 
to 
risk  reporting 
comparing 
EU  MS’  with 
IRF 
and 
NSOAF 
states10 

That the insufficient arrangements for responding to a major accident in EU waters be improved 

The sub-objective being to implement fully joined-up emergency preparedness and response in all EU offshore regions 

(6) Cross-border intervention equipment to be available; and response assets to be more compatible 

Attainment 

Is  national  and 
industry-
owned 
intervent
ion 
equipme
nt 
available 
across 
MS’ 
borders?  

And,  pertinent  to 

such 
availabili
are 
ty, 

(i)  Have  MS’ 

prepared 
for 
effective 
emergency 
response 
to  major 
offshore 
accidents? 

MS’ 
emergency 
reponse 
agencies 
made 

Have 

(i)  The  context  for  the 
risks  of  major 
accidents 
occurring 
EU 
are: 

in 
waters 

• Major  accident  risk 
trends  as  formulated 
advanced 
by 
regimes 
regulatory 
(annualised reports) 
• Well control incident 
trend-

report 
summaries 

• BOP 

reports 

reliability 
JIP 

from 

(i)  The 

qualitative 

contextual 
indicators  of 
the 
requirement 
for emergency 
preparedness 
at 
level are: 

the  MS 

• Well control incident 
trend-

report 
summaries 

• BOP 

reports 
failure 
summaries 

from 

reliability 
JIP 
trend-

Article  29  provides 
for 
measures 
MS’  planning 
and 
preparedness 
for 
accident 
response. 

major 

(Article  30  describes 

measuresnece
ssary 
for 
triggering  an 
immediate 
response 
by 
operators  and 

Is  it  apparent  that  the 
of 
aims 
integrating 
emergency 
response 
and 
assets 
expertise  and 
coordinating 
arrangements 
across 
boundaries 
are attained?  

For example:   

185 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

response 
assets 
being 
systemati
cally 
becomin
g    more 
compatib
le 
between 
MS’? 

Have 

arrangeme
to 
nts 
ensure 
cross-
border 
availabilit
y 
and 
compatibil
ity 
of 
interventio
n assets?  

operators, 
owners, 
MS’ 
conducted 
relevant 
exercises? 

failure 
summaries 

trend-

Indicators  from  which 
the  readiness 
of  emergency 
preparedness 
and  response 
arrangements 
may 
be 
deduced are: 

• # 

of 

emergency 
response focal points 
as  %  of  #  of  coastal 
MS; 

• #  of  cross-EU  well 
equipment 

capping 
available; 
• Precursor 
accident 
reported 
aas 
implementing 
regulation 

major 
events 
per 

• Aging  infrastructure, 
including  MODU’s. 
Age  profile  of  fixed 
and 
mobile 
installations 

• Operational  density 
(production 
criteria 
volumes;  #  offshore 
workers;  #  wells 
drilled; 
# 
installations;  etc)  as 
trends 
• Trending 

deployments 
of 
major  capital  mobile 
assets 2008 - present 
• Oil price trends as an 
the 
trajectory; 

indicator 
sector’s 
and 

of 

• Efforts  ongoing  for 
harmonisation  of  ER 
in  and 
equipment 
between MS 

owners)  

Do 

Article  31  ascribes 
responsibilitie
s  to  MS’  with 
active 
petroleum 
operations  for 
transboundary 
interventions. 

Article  32  ascribes 

national 

the 

contingency 
plans 
integrate 
internal 
emergency 
response 
plans 
of 
operators  and 
owners?  

emergency 
response 
to 
functions 
neighbouring 
MS’  who  do 
have 
not 
offshore 
petroleum 
operations. 

Are efforts in hand for 
making  more 
transferable 
and 
interoperable 
the 
equipment 
and  expertise 
between MS’? 

ER 

Reliable 

evidence 
derives from: 

Is 

2016 

• # 

national 
emergency  response 
exercises  conducted 
at MS-level; 

• #  cross-border  MS’ 

emergency 
intervention 

186 

consultant’s 
to 

report 
Commission 
on  degree  of 
transposition 
of 

the 

there 

sufficient 
time 
elapsed 
for  objective 
conclusions 
regarding  the 
of 
extent 
attainment 
and  whether 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

system 

the 
requires 
further 
maturity? 

interest 
by 

Is  sufficient 
paid 
inactive 
neighbouring 
MS’ 
to 
interaction 
with 
neighbours? 

active 

exercises conducted 

(ii) 

Quantitative 
indicators  of 
transboundary 
preparedness 
are 
from:  

derived 

• # 

reports 

shared 

between 
neighbouring  MS’, 
(including 
inactive 
MS’ 

• # 

emergency 
exercises 
across 

response 
conducted 
MS’ boundaries 

• #  non-active  MS’ 
that  have  established 
emergency  response 
focal points  

(ii) 

Do 
operationa
lly  active 
MS’ 
prepare for 
and deploy 

(ii)  The  qualitative 

MS’ 

contextual 
indicators  of 
the 
requirement 
for emergency 
preparedness 
at 
level are: 

the  MS 

• Aging  infrastructure, 
including  MODU’s. 
Age  profile  of  fixed 
and 
mobile 
installations 

• Operational  density 
criteria 
(production 
volumes;  #  offshore 
workers;  #  wells 
# 
drilled; 
installations;  etc)  as 
trends 
• Trending 

of 
deployments 
major  capital  mobile 
assets 2008 - present 

Directive  by 
MS’; 

to 

reports 
Commission 
under 
the 
implementing 
regulation and 
via EUOAG; 

Observed  experience 
raising  issues 
of concerns; 

Workshops 

and 

interviews 
with 
stakeholders;  

Subjective 

evidence 
derives from:  

Data submissions from 

stakeholders; 

Suggested  experiences 
raising  issues 
of concerns; 

Suggested  experiences 
giving 
affirmation 
feedback; and 

Public 

consultations 

187 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

and 
unsolicited 
written 
submissions 

preventive 
and 
recovery 
measures 
where  any 
of 
risk 
transbound
ary  effects 
are likely? 

Do  MS’  facilitate 
emergency 
response 
collaborati
ons  with 
neighbours
? 

Have 

inactive 

coastal 
MS’ 
appointed 
focal 
in 
points 
order 
to 
collaborate 
effectively 
with 
operationa

188 

 
 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

lly  active 
neighbours
? 

Relevance 

Do  aims  6  and 

(i)-(ii)  directly 
encourage  a  significant  uplift 
accident 
in 
preparedeness  and  response  to 
a major accident in EU waters? 

major 

Relevance  may  be 
deduced  from 
data  inter  alia 
as follows: 

BOP reliability reports 
JIP 
from 
failure 
trend-
summaries: 

• # 

of 

emergency 
response focal points 
as  %  of  all  coastal 
MS’ 

• # 

emergency 

response exercises  

Indicators 

of 

connectivity 
between 
primary  duty 
holders 
and 
MS’  licensing 
authorities 
and CA’s: 

• #  wells drilled 
• Completeness 

incident 

of 
reports 

Contextual indicators  

the 
to 

of  relevance  of 
measures 
raising 
standards 
in 
line  with  risk 
of 
major 
accident: 

• Aging  infrastructure, 
including  MODU’s. 
Age  profile  of  fixed 
and 
mobile 
installations 
• Exploration 

wells 

drilled 
• Frontier 
licensed 
• Trending 

areas 

deployments 
of 
major  capital  mobile 
assets  

• Efforts  ongoing  for 
harmonisation  of  ER 
equipment 
in  and 
between MS 

• Unitary 

CA 
established  for  both 
and 
safety 

Is  the  system  mature 
enough 
to 
make 
objective 
considerations 
relevance 
of 
of 
new 
emergency 
response 
arrangements 
to 
major 
accident 
prevention? 

What is the experience 

of 
implementing 
the  Directive 
in the inactive 
coastal MS’? 

Reliable 

evidence 
derives from: 

2016 

MS’ 

consultant’s 
to 

report 
Commission 
on  degree  of 
transposition 
of 
the 
Directive  by 
MS’; 

to 

reports 
Commission 
the 
under 
implementing 
regulation and 
via EUOAG; 

Formally 

authorised 

technical 
reports; 

Observed  experience 
raising  issues 
of concerns; 

Workshops 

and 

Does 

interviews 
with 

the 
implementatio
the 
of 
n 

189 

 
 
 
 
 
  
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

for 

Directive 
measures 
emergency 
response 
distinguish 
effectively 
between 
mobile 
fixed 
installations? 

and 

collected 
and 
reported  publicly/to 
(as  %  of 
COM 
required 
reporting 
system 
• RoMH’s 

accepted 
for  installations  as  a 
production 
% 
of 
installations 
in 
operation 
• RoMH’s 

accepted 
for  installations  as  a 
%  of  MODU’s  in 
operation 

environment 

• CA  Participation  in 

licensing 

• Availability of cross-
EU well capping and 
ER 
transferable 
and 
equipment 
expertise 

stakeholders; 
and 

Factual  data  publicly 

available;

Subjective 

evidence 
derives from:  

Data submissions from 

stakeholders; 

Suggested  experiences 
raising  issues 
of concerns or 
affirmative 
feedback; and 

Public 

consultations 

and 
unsolicited 
written 
submissions 

Coherence 

What  correlation  exists  between  the 
aims  and  EU  legislation  when 
in 
addressing 
major  accident  preparedeness 
and 
to  a  major 
response 
accident in EU waters? 

improvement 

Indicators 

of 

Are  the  measures  for 

correlation 
between 
primary  duty 
holders 
and 
MS’ 
emergency 
response 
agencies  and 

190 

emergency 
at 
response 
the  MS  level 
coherent  with 
other  relevant 
risk-
sector 
based 
systems, 

Article  29  provides 
measures 
for 
MS’  planning 
and 
preparedness 
for 
accident 
response. 

major 

Has  the  experience  of 
implementing 
the  Directive 
introduced 
correlations 
between 
national 
contingency 
programmes 

 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

CA’s: 

• #  Exploration  wells 

drilled 

• Completeness 

of 
reports 
incident 
and 
collected 
reported  publicly/to 
(as  %  of 
COM 
required 
reporting 
system 
• RoMH’s 

accepted 
for  installations  as  a 
production 
% 
of 
in 
installations 
operation 

RoMH’s  accepted  for 

installations 
as  a  %  of 
MODU’s 
in 
operation 

related 

particularly 
the 
Council 
Directives  for 
safety 
in 
hazardous 
industries 
89/391/EEC 
and 
92/91/EECan
d 
Directive?  

the 

- 

And  maintained  with 
the  Seveso  III 
Directive10  in 
relation 
to 
preparedness 
of 
where 
incident 
escalates 
beyond 
site? 

the  MS 
the 

the 

Is 

there 

a 

broad 

the 

coherencewit
h 
Community 
Civil 
Protection 
Mechanism 

191 

for emergency 
by 
response 
MS’ 
and 
arrangements 
operators 
of 
owners 
and 
for 
internal 
emergency 
response 
plans? 

Have the provisions of 
implementatio
n 
by  MS’ 
introduced 
unforeseen 
conflicts 
duplications 
in  emergency 
response 
arrangements
? 

or 

(Article  30  describes 

measuresnece
ssary 
for 
triggering  an 
immediate 
by 
response 
operators  and 
owners)  

Article  31  ascribes 
responsibilitie
s  to  MS’  with 
active 
petroleum 
operations  for 
transboundary 
interventions. 

Article  32  ascribes 

emergency 
response 
to 
functions 
neighbouring 
MS’  who  do 
not 
have 
offshore 
petroleum 
operations. 

 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

established  by 
Council 
Decision 
2001I792IEC 
establishing  a 
Community 
mechanism  to 
facilitate 
reinforced 
cooperation in 
emergency 
response? 

Indicators  of  effective 

Qualitative 

and 

connection 
between 
emergency 
response 
arrangements 
by 
MS’ 
emergency 
responders 
and CA’s, and 
risk 
assessments 
by  operators 
and 
owners 
are: 

#  Exploration  wells 
drilled 

contextual 
indicators  of 
effectiveness 
of 
emergency 
response 
provisions 
are: 

the 

Major  accident 

risk 
trends 
as 
formulated  by 
advanced 
regulatory 
regimes 
(annualised 
reports) 

Reliable 

evidence 
derives from: 

2016 

MS’ 

consultant’s 
to 

report 
Commission 
on  degree  of 
transposition 
the 
of 
Directive  by 
MS’; 

to 

reports 
Commission 
under 
the 
implementing 
regulation and 
via EUOAG; 

Has  the  experience  of 
implementing 
the  Directive 
created 
a 
holistic 
framework  of 
emergency 
response 
plans namely:  

arrangements 

and 
provisions  by 
operators  and 
owners 
for 
preventing 
major 
accidents;  

Formally 

authorised 

arrangements 

for4 

192 

Effectiveness  Do 

the  aims  6  and 

(i)-(ii)  as 
implemented  by  MS’  and 
responded 
industry 
to  by 
encourage  a  significant  uplift 
accident 
in 
preparedeness  and  response  to 
a  major  accident  in  EU  waters 
thereby 
a 
contributing 
redeuction  in  offshore  major 
accident rik?  

major 

to 

Are  adverse  effects  of  major  accidents 
to  the  environment  on  coastal 
communities  and  the  marine 
habitats  and  economic  users 
likely to be mitigated?  

 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

• % 

availability  of 
internal  emergency 
response 
plans 
prepared  by  owners 
of  non  production 
installations 

• % 

availability  of 
internal  emergency 
plans 
response 
by 
prepared 
of 
operators 
production 
installations 

• RoMH’s 

accepted 
for  installations  as  a 
production 
% 
of 
installations 
in 
operation 
• RoMH’s 

accepted 
for  installations  as  a 
%  of  MODU’s  in 
operation 

Well  control  incident 
trend-
report 
summaries 

BOP reliability reports 
from 
JIP 
failure  trend-
summaries 

of 

Diversification 
license 
holders; 
population 
trends 
towards 
smaller,  niche 
companies 

• Trending 

deployments 
of 
major  capital  mobile 
(IADC 
assets 
/ 
/  ECSA) 
IMCA 
Europe  &  global, 
2008 – present 
Efforts  ongoing 

for 
harmonisation 
of 
ER 
equipment  in 
and  between 
MS 

Establishment 

of 

technical 
reports; 

Observed  experience 
raising  issues 
of concerns; 

Major  accident  reports 
issued 
by 
MS’; 

Workshops 

and 

interviews 
with 
stakeholders

Subjective 

evidence 
derives from:  

Suggested  experiences 
raising  issues 
of concerns; 

Suggested  experiences 
giving 
affirmation 
feedback; 

Major  accident  reports 
issued 
by 
operator/owne
r; and 

containment 
of  escalation 
beyond 
the 
installation by 
operators  and 
owners;  

itegration  of  internal 
plans 
with 
national 
contingency 
arrangements
; 

sharing  of  response 
assets;  

ongoing 

and 

harmonisatio
n 
interoperabili
ty  of  response 
assets; and  

proactive  liaison  and 
sharing 
of 
information 
with  adjacent 
MS’  and  3rd 
countries? 

Public 

consultations 

Is  the  system  mature 

193 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

emergency 
response focal 
points  in  each 
MS 

and 
unsolicited 
written 
submissions 

•  

to 

enough 
make 
objective 
considerations 
relevance 
of 
new 
of 
emergency 
response 
arrangements 
major 
to 
accident 
prevention? 

Efficiency 

of 

What  are  the  costs  associated  with  the 
introduction 
new 
arrangements  for  emergency 
response; and in relation to the 
annualised 
estimated 
reductions  in  cost  of  a  major 
accident occurring? 

of 
up 

Quantitative  indicators 
depend  upon 
extracting 
costs 
setting 
revised 
emergency 
response 
arrangements 
and associated 
running  costs 
the 
from 
overall  costs 
of  set  up  and 
operation  by 
MS’ 

Qualitative 

and 

contextual 
indicators  of 
efficiency 
– 
cost 
effectiveness - 
of 
the 
emergency 
response 
provisions 
are: 

infrastructure, 
including 
MODU’s. 
Age profile of 
and 
fixed 
mobile 

Aging 

Reliable 

evidence 
derives from: 

2016 

consultant’s 
to 

report 
Commission 
on  degree  of 
transposition 
the 
of 
Directive  by 
MS’; 

Observed  experience 
raising  issues 
of concerns; 

Major  accident  reports 
by 
issued 
MS’; 

194 

Can  it  be  evaluated 
from 
the 
experience  – 
so  far  –  of 
implementing 
the  Directive, 
that 
the 
benefits 
achieved 
emergency 
response 
MS/EU-level 
outweigh 
the 
costs of set-up 
and 
operation? 

in 

at 

 
 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

installations 

Workshops 

and 

Have 

the 
revised 
arrangements 
created 
a 
more 
levellised, 
joined-up 
system  across 
the  EU  ergo 
more  efficient 
than 
heretofore? 

Is 

there 

sufficient 
elapsed 
time 
for  objective 
conclusions 
regarding 
further 
EU 
interventions? 

Operational 

density 

# 

criteria 
(production 
volumes; 
offshore 
workers; 
# 
wells  drilled; 
# 
installations; 
etc) as trends 

Trending  deployments 
major 
of 
capital  mobile 
assets  (IADC 
/ 
IMCA 
/ 
ECSA) 
Europe 
& 
global,  2008  - 
present 

Oil price trends 

Availability  of  cross-
well 
EU 
capping 
and 
transferable 
ER equipment 
and expertise 

interviews 
with 
stakeholders; 
and 

Factual  data  publicly 

available;

Subjective 

evidence 
derives from:  

Data submissions from 

stakeholders; 

Suggested  experiences 
raising  issues 
of concerns; 

Suggested  experiences 
giving 
affirmation 
feedback;and 

Public 

consultations 

and 
unsolicited 
written 
submissions 

Compliance  costs  for 
offshore 
operators/ 
MODU 
(€ 
owners 
€ 
opex; 
capex; 
€ 
administrative 
burdens costs 

Compliance  costs  for 
offshore 
operators/ 
MODU 
(€ 
owners 
€ 
opex; 
capex; 
€ 
administrative 
burdens costs 

Averaged 

cost 

producing 
RoMH 
MODU) 

of 
a 
(for 

Averaged 

cost 

of 
a 
for 
mid 

producing 
RoMH 
(FPI 
water oil) 

Averaged 

cost 

producing 

of 
a 

195 

 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

EU-value 

adde
d 

efficacy 

Is  it  likely  that  the  intervention  has 
of 
increased 
emergency 
response 
arrangements  across  the  EU 
where  otherwise  would  not 
have been the case? 

RoMH 
(shallow 
water gas) 

Quantitative data since 
2016/17  may 
a 
establish 
baseline 
for 
further 
scrutiny 
EU-added 
value: 

of 

 

 

incidents 
 # 
occurring 
under 
the  implementing 
regulation; 
e.g. 
collisions, 
breaches  of  500m 
zone; hydrocarbon 
releases; etc) 
# Reports made to 
COM 
under 
Implementing 
regulation 

  RoMH’s  assessed 
and  accepted  by 
CA’s 
Intensity 

of 

 

Feedback  of  principal 

stakeholders: 

 affirming  the  value 
new 
the 
in 
the 
of 
major 

of 
arrangements 
securing 
objectives 
reducing 
accident risk; and 

 

identifying  areas 
other 
of 
interventions 
to 
further  imrove  the 
of 
relationship 
regulators 
and 
civil  society  with 
sensible licensing 

  Other  qualitative 

indicators: 
Completeness  of 
reports 
incident 
collected 
and 
reported  publicly 

Based 

upon 

the 
experience  of 
implementing 
the  Directive, 
what  are  the 
positions of: 

 MS’ regulators 
 Operators 

license holders 
on 

 Owners 

production 
installations 

and 

non 

 NGO’s 
 Trades Union 
whether  the  Directive 
se 
has  per 
value 
added 
in  providing 
enhanced 
understanding 
in 
risk 
of 
emergency 
response  

196 

 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

inspections  of  CA 
annualised 
as 
inputs 

to  COM  (as  %  of 
required  reporting 
system) 

(7) Establish a new duty to cooperate and share information 

planning 

to 
based 

Is  there  now  a  more 
levelled-
upwards 
approach 
risk 
emergency 
response 
planning 
comparing 
EU  MS’  with 
and 
IRF 
NSOAF 
states10 

Attainment 

(7) Is there a new 
to 

duty 
cooperat
e 
share 

and 

information 

beween 
MS’? 

(i)  Have  MS’ 
established 
platforms 
for 
regulatory 
dialogue, 
including 
with 
EUOAG   f
or 
comprehen
sive 

(i) 

Quantitative 
indicators  of 
attainment  of 
enhanced 
dialogue 
arrangements 
are: 

• # 

meetings 

of 

EUOAG 

• #  Workshops 

sharing 
expertise 

for 
skills  and 
between 

(i) 

Qualitative 
indicators  of 
enhanced 
dialogue 
between 
parties are: 

the 

Article  27  sets  out 
and 
dutyies 
for 
measures 
Commission 
and  primary 
stakeholders 

• Formal  and  ad  hoc 
engagements  with 
main  duty  holders, 
Trades  Union  and 
environmental 
NGO’s 

(Articles  6/19  make 
provision  for 
tripartite 
forums 
each MS) 

in 

Has  the  experience  of 
implementing 
the  Directive 
clearly  raised 
the 
level  of 
collaboration 
and 
facilitation 
between 
stakeholders 
in  EU  and 
Norway? 

all 

197 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

informatio
n  sharing 
including 
in 
emergency 
response?  

Have  industry  and 
MS’ 
collaborate
d 
on 
priorities 
for 
improving 
standards 
jointly 
between 
MS’ 
and 
internation
ally. 

CA’s 

• Completeness 

of 
reports 
incident 
collected 
and 
reported  publicly  to 
the  Commission  (as 
required 
of 
% 
reporting system) 
• Publications  by  MS’ 
setting  out  guidance 
for 
standards 
on 
compliance  with  the 
Directive 

(ii) 

Quantitative 
indicators  for 
effective 
collaboration 
3rd 
with 
countries  and 
other 
international 
players are: 

•  #  DG.Ener/B4  as 
Unit, 
in 

sponsoring 
participation 
standards 
workgroups 
duty holders 

with 

• #  forums  with  3rd 
countries  organised 
Commission 
by 

(ii) 

Has 

the 

• Formation 

of 
tripartite  forums  in 
each MS 

• Global 

  and  EU 
industry 
initiatives 
adopted by operators 
and  contractors  for 
continuous 
improvements 
performance 

in 

(ii) 

Qualitative 

on 

performance 
indicators 
bearing 
enhanced 
international 
outreach 
sharing 
information 
and 
improving 
standards are: 

for 

• institutionalised 

meetings  with  other 

Article 33 commits all 

Has 

stakeholders 
to 
cooperate 
and  facilitate 
continuous 
improvement 
in 
accident 
prevention 
standards. 

major 

Reliable 

evidence 
derives from: 

the 
implementatio
the 
n 
of 
Directive 
led 
to  sharing  of 
expertise  and 
experience 
between  MS’ 
in 
different 
jurisdictions 

2016 

MS’ 

consultant’s 
to 

report 
Commission 
on  degree  of 
transposition 
of 
the 
Directive  by 
MS’; 

to 

reports 
Commission 
the 
under 
implementing 
regulation and 
via EUOAG; 

Are  there  clear  signs 
of 
levelling 
up  of  skills 
and 
effectiveness 
between 
mature 
petroleum 
regulation 
regimes 
less 
developed 
regimes? 

and 

Formally 

authorised 

technical 
reports 

and 

Is  the  implementation 
the 

of 

198 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

and 

Commissi
on 
MS’ 
systematic
ally 
promoted 
sharing  of 
informatio
n 
and 
continuous 
improvem
ent 
standards 
at 
internation
al level? 

in 

(Ener/B4) 
• International 

control 
report 
summaries 

well 
incident 
trend-

• International  BOP 
reports 
failure 

reliability 
from 
trend-summaries 

JIP 

(3rd 
key 
groups 
countries,  NSOAF, 
industry etc) 
• Availability 

risk 

of 
international  KPI’s 
and  other  statistical 
publications  bearing 
on 
to 
major  accident  risk, 
occupational  health 
and 
safety 
& 
environmental 
protection  

trends 

• Availability of major 
accident  risk  trends 
national 
in 
jurisdictions 
and 
with  IRF/NSOAF  as 
by 
formulated 
advanced  regulatory 
regimes  (annualised 
reports) 

199 

to 

Directive 
mature 
enough 
make 
objective 
considerations 
of  attainment 
of 
collaboration 
and 
cooperation 
arrangements 
so 
to 
as 
improve 
major 
accident 
prevention? 

training 
courses; 

Observed  experience 
raising  issues 
of concern; 

Workshops 

and 

interviews 
with 
stakeholders;  

Subjective 

evidence 
derives from:  

Data submissions from 

stakeholders; 

Suggested  experiences 
raising  issues 
of concerns or 
affirmation; 

Major  incident  reports 
issued 
by 
operator/owne
r; and 

Public 

consultations 

and 
unsolicited 
written 
submissions 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

Relevance 

(aims) 

(aims) 

improvement 

Do aims 7 and (i)-(ii) directly address a 
in 
significant 
collaboration  and  cooperation 
between  all  stakeholders 
to 
reduce 
risks  of  a  major 
accident in EU waters? 

Quantitative  indicators 
good 

the 

of 
relevance 
between 
cooperation 
measures  and 
major 
accident 
reduction are: 

• Completeness 

of 
reports 
incident 
collected 
and 
reported  publicly/to 
(as  %  of 
COM 
required 
reporting 
system) 

• BOP 

reports 
failure 
summaries 

from 

reliability 
JIP 
trend-

• Incidents  occurring 
e.g. 
(using  Act; 
collisions,  breaches 
of 
zone; 
500m 
hydrocarbon 
releases; etc) 
• Environmental 

performance data for 
EU cf global trends 
• Major  accident  risk 
control 
(process 
safety)  performance 

200 

Qualitative 
of 
are: 

indicators 
relevance 

Reliable 

evidence 
derives from: 

• Tripartite 

established 
active per MS 

forum 
and 

• Industry 

initiatives 
adopted by operators 
and  contractors  for 
continuous 
improvements 
performance 

in 

risk 

trends 

• Availability of KPI’s 
and  other  statistical 
publications  bearing 
on 
to 
major  accident  risk, 
occupational  health 
& 
and 
safety 
environmental 
protection 

2016 

MS’ 

consultant’s 
to 

report 
Commission 
on  degree  of 
transposition 
of 
the 
Directive  by 
MS’; 

to 

reports 
Commission 
the 
under 
implementing 
regulation and 
via EUOAG; 

Incident  reports issued 
by MS’; 

Workshops 

and 

interviews 
with 
stakeholders;

Subjective 

evidence 
derives from:  

Data submissions from 

stakeholders; 

Is  the  system  mature 
enough 
to 
make 
objecvtive 
considerations 
the 
on 
of 
question 
to 
relevance 
major 
accident 
prevention? 

Has  the  creation  of 
similar 
CA 
arrangements 
in  each  MS 
a 
led 
to 
levelling 
up 
of  consistent 
requirements 
as  perceived 
duty 
by 
holders?  

Are 

there 

regional 
differences  of 
view? 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

data for EU cf global 
trends 

Coherence 

What  correlation  exists  between  the 
aims  of  improved  cooperation 
between all the actors and other 
relevant  EU  legislation  when 
addressing  reductions  in  major 
accident risk in EU waters? 

Quantitative 

Are  the  measures  for 

‘coherence’ 
indicators 
include: 

• the  %  of 

incident 
reports  submitted  to 
the  Commission  by 
MS’ 

• Equally  the  number 
of  reports  on  EU 
incidents  and  sector 
information 
published  by 
Commission 

the 

• The 

of 
number 
EUOAG  meetings 
convened  by 
the 
Commission 

201 

enhanced 
cooperation 
coherent  with 
other  relevant 
sector 
risk-
based 
systems, 
particularly 
the 
Council 
Directives  for 
safety 
in 
hazardous 
industries 
89/391/EEC 
and 

related 

- 

Suggested  experiences 
raising  issues 
of 
concern 
and/or 
affirmation; 
and 

Public 

consultations 

and 
unsolicited 
written 
submissions 

Article  27  sets  out 
and 
duties 
measures 
for 
Commission 
and  primary 
stakeholders 

(Also,  Articles  6/19 
make 
provision  for 
tripartite 
forums 
each MS) 

in 

Article 33 commits all 

stakeholders 
to 
cooperate 
and  facilitate 

Has  the  experience  of 
implementing 
the  Directive 
intrtoduced  a 
coherence 
in 
the  culture  of 
cooperation 
for 
offshore 
sector 
alignment 
with 
Seveso 
Drective 
onshore? 

the 
III 

the 

in 

 
 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

• The 

number 

of 
body 
standards 
projects  attended  by 
the  actors,  including 
the  sponsor  Unit  of 
the 
Commission, 
since 2013 

92/91/EEC 
and 
Directive?  

the 

And  maintained  with 
the  Seveso  III 
Directive10  in 
relation 
to 
preparedness 
of 
where 
incident 
escalates 
beyond 
site? 

the  MS 
the 

the 

Is 

there 

the 

broad 

a 
coherence 
with 
requirements 
of 
transboundary 
cooperation in 
developing 
strategic 
environmental 
assessments 
(SEA 
Directive 
/ 
2001/42/EC)? 

major 

continuous 
improvement 
in 
accident 
prevention 
standards. 

In  particular,  has  the 
implementatio
n 
the 
of 
Directive 
introduced 
environmental 
considerations 
more  robustly 
into 
the 
cooperation 
agendas 
alignment 
with  Seveso 
for 
III  and 
example 
coherent  with 
the  principles 
of 
the  SEA 
Directive  and 
associated 
legislation 

in 

(and  the  UN  ‘Espoo’ 

convention) 

Effectiveness  Do 

the  aims  5  and 

(i)-(iii)  as  Quantitative  indicators  Qualitative 

The  operation 

and 

Is 

it 

clear 

that 

202 

 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

implemented  by  MS’  and 
responded to by industry attain 
greater  cooperation  amongst 
the 
petroleum 
stakeholders in the EU thereby 
contributing  to  a  reduction  in 
offshore major accident risk?  

offshore 

Are  adverse  effects  of  major  accidents 
to  the  environment  on  coastal 
communities  and  the  marine 
habitats  and  economic  users 
likely to be mitigated?  

of 
effectiveness 
are: 

• # 

meetings 

of 

EUOAG 

• #  Workshops 

for 
skills  and 
between 

sharing 
expertise 
CA’s 

• Completeness 

of 
reports 
incident 
collected 
and 
reported  publicly  to 
the  Commission  (as 
% 
required 
of 
reporting system) 
• #  participations 

in 

standards 
workgroups 
stakeholders 

with 

• #  focal  forums  with 
countries 
by 

3rd 
organised 
Commission 
(Ener/B4) 

effectiveness 
indicators are: 

• Publications  by  MS’ 
setting  out  guidance 
on 
for 
standards 
compliance  with  the 
Directive 
• International 

well 
incident 
trend-

control 
report 
summaries 

• International  BOP 
reports 
failure 

reliability 
from 
trend-summaries 

JIP 

Contextual 

indicators 

the 

outputs  of  the 
main 
cooperation 
forums 
established 
under 
Directive 
provide  much 
the 
of 
of 
evidence 
effectiveness 
(EUOAG, 
tripartite 
forums and so 
on) 

of scale are: 

Other 

reliable 

• Major  accident  risk 
trends  as  formulated 
advanced 
by 
regulatory 
regimes 
(annualised reports) 
• Well control incident 
trend-

report 
summaries 

MS’ 

evidence 
derives from: 

to 

reports 
Commission 
under 
the 
implementing 
regulation; 

Formally 

authorised 

technical 
reports; 

implementatio
the 
of 
n 
Directive  has 
led 
to 
cooperation in 
significant 
areas  of  risk 
management? 

formal 

Is  it  seen  from  the 
wider  base  of 
competent 
authorities 
and 
cooperation 
mechanisms 
that  there  is  a 
clear 
trajectory 
towards 
cooperation 
and sharing of 
information 
between all of 
the actors? 

Observed  experience 
raising  issues 

Has  the  experience  of 
implementing 
the  directive 

203 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

of concerns; 

Workshops 

and 

interviews 
with 
stakeholders 

Subjective 

evidence 
derives from:  

Data submissions from 

stakeholders; 

Suggested  experiences 
raising  issues 
concerns 
of 
and 
affirmation; 
and 

Public 

consultations 

and 
unsolicited 
written 
submissions 

How 

to 

been 
expose 
differentiation 
in 
the 
competency 
requirements 
for  regulation 
goal 
of 
setting, 
risk 
based 
systems? 

effective  has 
been  the  shift 
from 
subjective, 
prescriptive 
regulation? 
For  example 
in  producing 
guidance  on 
good  practice, 
and  clarifying 
requirements 
to 
holders? 

duty 

Efficiency 

What  are  the  costs  associated  with  the 
introduction  of  formal  systems 
of cooperation and information 

Quantitative  indicators 
depend  upon 
extracting 

Qualitative 

and 

contextual 
indicators  of  

Reliable 

evidence 
derives from: 

2016 

consultant’s 

Is  the  implementation 
the 

of 
Directive 

204 

 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

sharing up to the EU level; and 
in  relation  to  the  estimated 
annualised reductions in cost of 
a major accident occurring? 

of 
up 

costs 
setting 
cooperation 
and 
sharing 
arrangements 
and associated 
running  costs 
from 
the 
overall  costs 
of  set  up  and 
operation  by 
MS’ 

• For 

example 

the 
in 
costs  embedded 
compliance 
for 
offshore  operators/ 
MODU  owners  (€ 
opex;  €  capex;  € 
administrative 
burdens costs 

• Compliance costs for 
offshore  operators/ 
MODU  owners  (€ 
opex;  €  capex;  € 
administrative 
burdens costs 

• running costs to MS’ 
of  operating  the new 
system 

• as above for industry 

the 

cost 
effectiveness 
of 
cooperation 
and 
information 
sharing 
provisions 
are: 

MS’ 

• Aging  infrastructure, 
including  MODU’s. 
Age  profile  of  fixed 
mobile 
and 
installations 

• Operational  density 
criteria 
(production 
volumes;  #  offshore 
workers;  #  wells 
drilled; 
# 
installations;  etc)  as 
trends 
• Trending 

deployments 
of 
major  capital  mobile 
assets  Europe  & 
- 
global, 
present 

2008 

• Oil price trends 
• Availability of cross-
EU well capping and 
ER 
transferable 
and 
equipment 

205 

to 

report 
Commission 
on  degree  of 
transposition 
of 
the 
Directive  by 
MS’; 

to 

reports 
Commission 
under 
the 
implementing 
regulation and 
via EUOAG; 

Observed  experience 
raising  issues 
of concerns; 

Workshops 

and 

interviews 
with 
stakeholders;

Subjective 

evidence 
derives from:  

Data submissions from 

stakeholders; 

Subjective 

technical 

reports 
commissioned 

to 

mature 
enough 
make 
objective 
considerations 
of  attainment 
of 
collaboration 
and 
cooperation 
arrangements 
so 
to 
as 
improve 
major 
accident 
prevention? 

Is  it  the  experience  of 
implementing 
the  Directive 
that 
workforce 
participation 
in 
accident 
management 
has 
significantly 
enhanced? 
For  example, 

major 
risk 

been 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

expertise 

by EUOAG; 

Suggested  experiences 
raising  issues 
of 
concerns 
and 
affirmation; 
and 

Public 

consultations 

and 
unsolicited 
written 
submissions 

Feedback  of  principal 

stakeholders: 

Reliable 

evidence 
derives from: 

Based 

risk 

participation 
in 
assessment, 
whistle-
blowing,  and 
tripartite 
in 
consultations? 

upon 

the 
experience  of 
implementing 
the  Directive, 
what  are  the 
positions of: 

EU-value 

adde
d 

Is  it  likely  that  the  intervention  has 
the  adoption  of 
increased 
cooperation  and 
information 
sharing  across  the  EU  where 
otherwise would not have been 
the case? 

Quantitative data since 
2016/17  may 
a 
establish 
baseline 
for 
further 
scrutiny 
EU-added 
value: 

of 

 

 # 
incidents 
under 
occurring 
the  implementing 
regulation; 
(e.g. 
collisions, 
breaches  of  500m 
zone; hydrocarbon 
releases; etc) 

 affirming  the  value 
new 
the 
in 
the 
of 
major 

of 
arrangements 
securing 
objectives 
reducing 
accident risk; and 

 

identifying  areas 
other 
of 
interventions 
to 
further  imrove  the 
of 
relationship 
regulators 
and 
civil  society  with 
sensible licensing 

MS’ 

to 

reports 
Commission 
under 
the 
implementing 
regulation and 
via EUOAG; 

Formally 

authorised 

technical 
reports; 

Observed  experience 
raising  issues 
of concerns; 

 MS’ regulators 
 Operators 

license holders 
on 

 Owners 

production 
installations 

and 

non 

 NGO’s 
 Trades Union 
whether  the  Directive 
se 

has  per 

206 

 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

 

# Reports made to 
under 
COM 
Implementing 
regulation 

 

 

  RoMH’s  assessed 
and  accepted  by 
CA’s 
Intensity 
of 
inspections  of  CA 
as 
annualised 
inputs 
# 
meetings 
convened  by  the 
Commission 
#  training  events 
for 
new  CA’s 
organised  by  the 
Commission 
(JRC) 

EUOAG 

 

  Other  qualitative 

indicators: 
Completeness  of 
reports 
incident 
and 
collected 
reported  publicly 
to  COM  (as  %  of 
required  reporting 
system) 

  Setting  up  and 
operating tripartite 
forums  where  noe 
previously existed 

Workshops 

and 

interviews 
with 
stakeholders; 
and 

Factual  data  publicly 

available;

Subjective 

evidence 
derives from:  

Data submissions from 

stakeholders; 

Has 

Subjective 

technical 

reports; 

Suggested  experiences 
raising  issues 
of 
concerns 
and/or 
affirmation; 
and 

Public 

consultations 

and 
unsolicited 
written 
submissions 

added 
value 
in  providing 
enhanced 
discussion, 
cooperation 
and sharing of 
information 
compared 
before 
Directive? 

to 
the 

sharing 
or 
the 
of 

the  culture  of 
cooperation 
and 
met 
exceeded 
levels 
cooperation 
between 
countries  and 
actors  that  is 
seen 
elsewhere?  

207 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

ACTION 2* 

Pursuant to Article 39(3) and within the scope of Directive 2008/99/EC - The Environmental Crime Directive - to assess the appropriateness of applying 

criminal law to certain breaches of environmental duty 

Actions taken 

Relevance 

Coherence 

Effectiveness 

Efficiency 

EU-value 

adde
d 

ACTION 3 

Pursuant to Article 39(1) & (2) and Parliament resolution of 1 December 2016 - on liability, compensation and financial security for offshore oil and gas 
operations (2015/2352(INI)) – to report on the status of MS’ with regard to the consistency and effectiveness of schemes for financial liability and 
compensation for economic loss 

That the arrangements for discharging financial liabilities and civil compensation for economic loss be more consistently effective in the EU 

OBJECTIVE 3 

The sub-objective being to improve and clarify existing EU liability and compensation provisions 

(8) Scope of environment liability to be extended to the full extent of MS’ exclusive economic zone 

Attainment 

Has  the  scope  of 

(i) 

Is 

it  clearly 

(i) 

The 

primary 

(i)  The 

qualitative  Article  7  ascribes  full  What  is  the  degree  of 

208 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

environ
ment 
liability 
been 
extended 
the 
to 
full 
extent  of 
MS’ 
EEZ? 

established 
the 
that 
scope 
of 
environme
ntal 
liability 
resides 
entirely 
with 
licensee? 

the 

from 

quantitaive 
indication 
arises 
declared 
of 
adoption 
specific 
the 
measure 
in 
the  Directive 
by  each  focal 
MS 

indicator 
of 
the  degree  of 
attainment  of 
clear  liability 
for 
environmental 
damage  will 
depend on the 
extent 
to 
focal 
which 
MS’  have  in 
practical 
terms  made 
amendment  to 
codes 
legal 
model 
and 
to 
clauses 
to 
licenses 
this 
make 
effective 
to 
licensing 
terms 

(ii)  Has  protection 
of 
the 
marine 

(ii) 

Quantitative 

indication 
arises 

from 

(ii) 

Qualitative 

indications 

138 ELD means the environmental liability directive (2004/35/EC) 

209 

liability  under 
the  ELD138  to 
the ‘licensee’ 

Article  38  provides 

of 
adoption 
to 
changes 
liability  under 
ELD by MS’? 

particular 
directions  for 
modifying  the 
ELD 
to 
extend  water 
damage 
liability  to  the 
full  extent  of 
the EEZ. 

of 

sources 
reliable 
evidence 
derives from: 

consultant’s 
to 

report 
Commission 
on  degree  of 
transposition 
of the liability 
provisions 

What  is  the  extent  of 
adaptation  of 
national  legal 
codes, 
including 
license  terms, 
giving 
practical 
effect  of  the 
liability 
measure? 

What  further  measure 
if  any  may  be 
to 
necessary 
ensure 
full 
adoption? 

Is  the  implementation 

Other 

2015 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
 
   
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

of 
the 
Directive  and 
particularly 
Articles  7  and 
mature 
38 
to 
enough 
make 
objective 
considerations 
full 
the 
of 
attainment  of 
liability 
and 
extending 
ELD 
arrangements 
so 
to 
as 
harmonise  the 
legal 
provisions 
across  the  EU 
focal 
(16 
MS’)? 

confirmation 
by  MS’  of 
amendment  to 
implementing 
legislation 
pusuant 
Directive 
2004/35/EC 
Article 
2(1)(b)(i)-(ii) 

to 

environme
nt 
including 
water 
damage 
been 
extended 
from 
territorial 
sea  of  the 
MS’ to the 
exclusive 
economic 
zone of the 
MS? 

the 

MS’ 

are 
be 
to 
deduced  from 
the  extent  of 
alterations 
to 
processes  and 
arrangements 
that  take  the 
changes 
into 
account: 

(Commission 
report to EP); 

to 

reports 
Commission 
under 
the 
implementing 
regulation and 
via EUOAG; 

Formally 

authorised 

technical 
reports 
Bio 
Deloitte); 

(eg 
by 

Workshops 

and 

interviews 
with 
stakeholders;  

Subjective 

evidence 
derives from:  

Data submissions from 

stakeholders; 
and 

Public 

consultations 

and 
unsolicited 
written 
submissions. 

• Effects  on  licensing 
of 
as 

and 
licensee 
responsible party 

adoption 

• Evaluations 

of 

environmental 
parameters 
variations 
environmental 
impact 
protocols 
• Interpretative 

and 
of 

assessment 

guidance  issued  by 
MS’ 

210 

 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

Relevance 

Do  aims  8  and 

offshore 

(i)-(ii)  directly 
implement a significant change 
in 
liability 
arrangements 
in  EU  waters 
outside  of  the  territorial  seas 
from 
line  of  MS’ 
coasts)? 

(20km 

zonal 
of 
are 

Is  it  likely  that  the 
in 
measures 
the  Directive 
bearing 
on 
allocation, 
and 
extent, 
liability 
directly 
to 
relevant 
improving  the 
prevention  of 
major 
offshore 
petroleum 
in 
accidents 
waters 
EU 
and mitigating 
the effects. 

(ii)  As  above, 

the 

(ii) 

quantitative 
indicators  fall 
to  #  focal  MS 
implementing 
both measures 
the 
in 
Directive 
(ie 
the 
liable 
entity; and the 
extent 
zonal 
of 
the 
liability) 

Qualitative 
indicators  of 
relevance 
include: 

• Exploration 

wells 

drilled 
• Frontier 
licensed 

areas 

• Operational  density 
(production 
criteria 
volumes;  #  offshore 
workers;  #  wells 
drilled; 
# 
installations;  etc)  as 
trends 

• Hydrocarbon 

Reliable 

evidence 
derives from: 

2015 

to 

2016 

and 
consultants 
reports 
Commission 
on  degree  of 
transposition 
the 
of 
Directive  by 
MS’; 

Observed  experience 
raising  issues 
of concerns; 

releases from wells 

Workshops 

and 

• Hydrocarbon 

detected 
production 

releases 
from 
installations 
(platform or subsea) 

interviews 
with 
stakeholders;  

Subjective 

evidence 
derives from:  

Data submissions from 

stakeholders; 
and 

Public 

consultations 

and 
unsolicited 
written 

211 

 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

Coherence 

What  correlation  exists  between  the 
aims  and  EU  legislation  when 
addressing 
in 
major  accident  preparedeness 
to  a  major 
response 
and 
accident in EU waters? 

improvement 

The 

Quantitative  indicators 
of  coherence 
relate  to  the 
of 
numbers 
MS’ 
focal 
directly 
amending 
their  relevant 
national 
provisions: 

• Amending  the  ELD 
zonal 

regarding 
liabilities; 

• Amending  the  liable 
within 
licensing 

entities 
relevant 
provisions 

212 

liable 
and 

qualitative 
indicators  of 
coherence 
relate  to  the 
legislation  on 
environmental 
liabilities. 
Therefore,  are 
the 
amendments 
on 
entities 
zonal 
application 
coherent  with 
EU provisions 
on  waste  and 
on 
environmental 
In 
liability? 
particular  do 
they 
clarify 
the  ‘polluter’ 
and 
entity 
ascribe  strict 
on 
liability 

submissions 

Has 

Article  7  ascribes  full 
liability  under 
the  ELD 
to 
the ‘licensee’ 

Article  38  provides 

particular 
directions  for 
modifying  the 
to 
ELD 
extend  water 
damage 
liability  to  the 
full  extent  of 
the EEZ. 

of 

sources 
reliable 
evidence 
derives from: 

consultant’s 
to 

report 
Commission 
on  degree  of 
transposition 
of the liability 
provisions 

Other 

2015 

the 
implementatio
n 
the 
of 
Directive 
introduced 
environmental 
considerations 
more  robustly 
the 
into 
licensing 
agendas 
alignment 
all 
with 
related 
EU 
legislation  for 
example 
coherent  with 
the  principles 
of 
the  SEA 
Directive  and 
associated 
legislation? 

in 

Is  the  implementation 
the 

of 

 
 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

an 
Is 
clear 

such 
entity? 
there 
alignment 
with 
Water 
Framework 
Directive  and 
ELD139 

the 

(Commission 
report to EP); 

technical  reports  (eg 
Bio 
by 
Deloitte); 

Workshops 

and 

interviews 
with 
stakeholders;  

Subjective 

evidence 
derives from:  

Data submissions from 

stakeholders; 
and 

Public 

consultations 

and 
unsolicited 
written 
submissions. 

Directive  and 
particularly 
Articles  7  and 
mature 
38 
enough 
to 
make 
objective 
considerations 
of 
full 
the 
attainment  of 
liability 
and 
extending 
ELD 
arrangements 
so 
to 
as 
harmonise  the 
legal 
provisions 
across  the  EU 
(16 
focal 
MS’)? 

Have  guidance  notes 
issued 
been 
by MS’ 

139 The principle of strict liability for the polluter entity (“polluter  pays”) is reflected in  secondary  legislation  that also applies to offshore accidents, mainly in Directive 2008/98/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on waste and repealing certain Directives (Waste Framework Directive) and in Directive 2004/35/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on environmental liability with regard to the prevention and remedying of environmental damage (Environmental Liability Directive). 

213 

 
 
 
                                                           
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

Effectiveness  Do 

the  aims  8  and 

(i)-(ii)  as 
implemented  by  MS’  and 
industry 
to  by 
responded 
secure  full  compliance  in  the 
EU 
thereby  protecting  all 
waters and habitats equally?  

Are  adverse  effects  of  major  accidents 
to  the  environment  on  coastal 
communities  and  the  marine 
habitats  and  economic  users 
likely to be mitigated?  

Quantitative  indicators 

of 
effectiveness 
in  addition  to 
full 
transposition 
(as 
are: 

above) 

• Insurance  payments 
asset 
for 

made 
damages 

• Compensation 

payments 
operators 
3rd parties 

from 
to 

Qualitative 
are: 

indicators 

Reliable 

evidence 
derives from: 

2015 

• Effects  on  licensing 
of 
as 

and 
licensee 
responsible party 

adoption 

• Evaluations 

of 

to 

2016 

and 
consultants 
reports 
Commission 
on  degree  of 
transposition 
of 
the 
Directive  by 
MS’; 

Observed  experience 
raising  issues 
of concerns; 

Workshops 

and 

interviews 
with 
stakeholders;  

Subjective 

evidence 
derives from:  

Data submissions from 

stakeholders; 
and 

Public 

consultations 

and 

Is  the  implementation 
of 
two 
the 
themes  of  the 
Directive 
to 
likely 
achieve 
a 
levellised  and 
uplifted 
degree 
of 
protection  of 
waters 
EU 
from 
petroleum 
activities? 

Also, 

is 

the 
implementatio
n 
the 
of 
Directive  and 
particularly 
Articles  7  and 
mature 
38 
enough 
to 
make 
objective 
considerations 
full 
the 
of 

environmental 
parameters 
variations 
environmental 
impact 
protocols 
• Interpretative 

and 
of 

assessment 

guidance  issued  by 
MS’ 

• Major  accidents  to 
the  environment  as 
compared  to  global 
data 

• Hydrocarbon 

releases from wells 

• Hydrocarbon 

from 

releases 
production 
installations 
(platform or subsea) 

214 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

unsolicited 
written 
submissions 

attainment  of 
and 
liability 
extending 
ELD 
arrangements 
to 
as 
so 
harmonise  the 
legal 
provisions 
across  the  EU 
(16 
focal 
MS’)?  

Efficiency 

What  are  the  costs  associated  with  the 
intervention  at  the  EU  level; 
and in relation to the estimated 
annualised reductions in cost of 
a major accident occurring? 

of 

Quantitative  indicators 
depend  upon 
extracting 
costs 
adapting 
liability 
arrangements 
and associated 
running  costs 
from 
the 
overall  costs 
of  set  up  and 
operation  by 
MS’ 

• For 

example 

costs  embedded 
compliance 

the 
in 
for 

Qualitative 

and 

contextual 
indicators  of 
cost 
effectiveness 
of 
amended 
liability 
provisions 
are: 

the 

• Aging  infrastructure, 
including  MODU’s. 
Age  profile  of  fixed 
and 
mobile 
installations 

• Operational  density 
criteria 
(production 
volumes;  #  offshore 
workers;  #  wells 

215 

Reliable 

evidence 
derives from: 

How 

2016 

MS’ 

consultant’s 
to 

report 
Commission 
on  degree  of 
transposition 
the 
of 
Directive  by 
MS’; 

to 

reports 
Commission 
under 
the 
implementing 
regulation and 
via EUOAG; 

Workshops 

and 

does 

liability 

the 
experience  of 
implementing 
the  Directive, 
particularly 
the 
themes, 
enhance 
the 
efficiency  of 
controlling 
major 
accident  risks 
in EU waters? 

Are  there  indications 
that 
the 
implementatio

 
 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

licensees (€ capex; € 
administrative 
burdens costs) 

• Compliance costs for 
licensing  authorities 
and 
legal 
administrators 

• running costs to MS’ 
of  operating  the new 
system 

• as above for industry 
• #  of  pollution  events 

in EU waters 

drilled; 
# 
installations;  etc)  as 
trends 
• Trending 

deployments 
of 
major  capital  mobile 
assets  

• Oil  price  trends  and 
likely  investment  in 
new 
by 
licenses 
industry 

interviews 
with 
stakeholders; 
and 

Factual  data  publicly 

available;

Subjective 

evidence 
derives from:  

Data submissions from 

stakeholders; 
and 

Public 

consultations 

and 
unsolicited 
written 
submissions 

n 
the 
of 
Directive  has 
reduced 
liability-
related 
running  costs 
for 
all 
sdtakeholders, 
excepting  the 
licensing 
entity 
nominated  as 
“polluter”? 

And  have  MS’  and/or 

operator/licen
sees identified 
a 
of 
lack 
clarity  in  the 
measures? 
(and  what  are 
they?) 

upon 

the 
experience  of 
implementing 
the  Directive, 
what  are  the 
positions of: 

EU-value 

adde
d 

Is  it  likely  that  the  intervention  has 
increased 
the  protection  of 
offshore  waters  and  habitats 
across the EU where otherwise 
would not have been the case? 

Quantitative data since 
2016/17  may 
a 
establish 
baseline 
for 
further 
scrutiny 
EU-added 

of 

Qualitative 

indicators 
may 
be 
deduced  from 
feedback 
of 
principal 
stakeholders: 

Reliable evidence  

Based 

MS’ 

to 

reports 
Commission 
under 
the 
implementing 
regulation and 

 affirming  the  value 

 MS’ regulators 

216 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

via EUOAG; 

 Operators 

and 

non 

license holders 
on 

 Owners 

production 
installations 

 NGO’s 
 Trades Union 
whether  the  Directive 
se 
has  per 
value 
added 
in  providing 
clarity 
of 
liability,  and 
extended 
liability 
zoning 
compared 
before 
Directive? 

to 
the 

the 

of 
arrangements 
securing 
objectives 
reducing 
accident risk; and 

new 
in 
the 
of 
major 

 

identifying  areas 
of  interest  in  the 
revised 
relationship 
of 
and 
regulators 
civil  society  with 
liable 
nominated 
entities 
(the 
licensee) 

 

 

 

value: 

incidents 
 # 
occurring 
under 
the  implementing 
regulation; 
(e.g. 
collisions, 
breaches  of  500m 
zone; hydrocarbon 
releases; etc) 
# Reports made to 
COM 
under 
Implementing 
regulation 
Insurance 
payments  made 
for asset damages 

  Compensation 
payments 
operators 
3rd parties 

from 
to 

(9) Financial capacity requirements to be consistent 

217 

Formally 

authorised 

technical 
reports; 

Workshops 

and 

interviews 
with 
stakeholders;  

Subjective 

evidence 
derives from:  

Data submissions from 

stakeholders; 

Subjective 

technical 

reports; 

Major  accident  reports 
issued 
by 
operator/owne
r; and 

Public 

consultations 

and 
unsolicited 
written 
submissions 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

Attainment 

To  what  extent  

have 
financial 
capacity 
requirem
for 
ents 
license 
holders 
bcome 
more 
consisten
t 
between 
active 
MS’? 

(i)  To  what  extent 
have  MS’ 
facilitated 
the 
deploymen
of 
t 
sustainable 
financial 
instrument
s and other 
arrangeme
nts 
to 
assist 
applicants 
for 
licenses  in 
demonstrat
ing 
their 
financial 
capacity140
? 

Quantitative  indicators 
of  attainment 
of  sustainable 
financial 
instruments 
are: 

 

 

 

 

of 

for 

liable 

financial 

#  systems  adapted 
to 
by  MS’ 
implement 
the 
enhanced 
requirements 
financial 
responsibility 
(FR) 
entities 
#  new 
instruments 
to 
introduced 
support  new  FR 
arrangements 
incidents 
# 
under 
occurring 
the  implementing 
regulation; 
(e.g. 
collisions, 
breaches  of  500m 
zone; hydrocarbon 
releases; etc) 
# Reports made to 
under 
COM 

Article 

Qualitative  indications 
be 
to 
are 
deduced  from 
the  extent  of 
alterations 
to 
processes  and 
arrangements 
that 
implement the 
FR 
requirements: 

• Effects  on  licensing 
considerations 
and 
of  FR  of  licensee  as 
wholly 
responsible 
party 
• Changes 

assessments 
environmental 
parameters 
variations 
environmental 
impact 
protocols 
• Interpretative 

assessment 

to 
of 

and 
of 

guidance  issued  by 
MS’ 

4(3) 

is 
relevant.  The 
broad 
requirements 
the 
are 
for 
to 
applicant 
be  scrutinised 
against 
consistent  and 
transparent 
requirements 
for FR subject 
to 
environmental 
aspects  of  the 
area;  and  for 
deployment of 
suitable 
financial 
instruments; 
and 
maintenance 
of 
provisions 
the 
during 
lifetime of the 
license. 

FR 

for 

What can be said from 
reports  of  the 
degree 
of 
attainment  of 
consistent  FR 
requirements 
at 
licensing 
stage 
during 
operations  on 
the license? 

and 

the 

Have 

new 

any 
financial 
instruments 
been 
developed 
consistent 
with  new  FR 
measures? 

Overall,  what  is  noted 
of 
the 
consistency of 
of 
adoption 

140 The first subparagraph Article 4(3) requires MS’ to grant licenses only where applicant conforms to arrangements decided by the MS, and to provide evidence on a continuing basis during 
the licensed activities 

218 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

holistic 
measures 
across 
MS’? 

FR 

focal 

Has  the  status  of  FR 
/ 

provisions 
financial 
instruments 
changed  since 
the 
publication  of 
12/2016 
the 
resolution  of 
the 
Parliament141 

 

Implementing 
regulation 
Insurance 
payments  made 
for asset damages 

  Compensation 
payments 
operators 
3rd parties 

from 
to 

Other 

reliable 

evidence 
derives from: 

2015/2016  consultants 
report 
to 
Commission 
on  degree  of 
transposition 
the  
of 
Directive  and 
FR  indicators 
in MS’; 

MS’ 

to 

reports 
Commission 
under 
the 
implementing 
regulation and 
via EUOAG; 

Observed  experience 
raising  issues 
of concerns; 

Workshops 

and 

interviews 
with 
stakeholders; 
and 

141 Parliament resolution of 1 December 2016 - on liability, compensation and financial security for offshore oil and gas operations (2015/2352(INI)) – to report on the status of MS’ with regard 
to the consistency and effectiveness of schemes for financial liability and compensation for economic loss 

219 

 
 
 
                                                           
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

Factual  data  publicly 
available  on 
environmental 
impacts;

Subjective 

evidence 
derives from:  

Data submissions from 

stakeholders; 

Subjective 

technical 

reports; 

Suggested  experiences 
raising  issues 
concerns 
of 
and/or 
affirmation; 
and 

Public 

consultations 

and 
unsolicited 
written 
submissions 

Quantitative  indicators 
of 
relevance 
are  the  degree 
of adoption of 
FR 

Qualitative 

indicators 
of context and 
scale  can  be 
deduced  from 
leading 

Reliable 

evidence 
derives from: 

The  2015  and  2016 

consultancy 

In  the  circumstances 
the  scale 
risk  of 

of 
and 
major 
accidents 

220 

Relevance 

Do  aims  9  and  (i)  directly  address  a 
significant 
in 
and 
financial 
capacity to remedy damage and 
economic losses in response to 

responsibility 

improvement 

 
 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

a major accident in EU waters? 

arrangements 
in  MS’  and 
associated 
financial 
instruments  in 
private 
the 
sector 
and 
also: 

• #hydrocarbon 

releases  reported  to 
MS’ 
the 
under 
implementing 
regulation 
production 
installations 

from 

• Insurance  payments 
asset 
for 

made 
damages 

• As  above,  for  3rd 
economic 

party 
losses 

• Averaged  marine  oil 
spill clean-up costs 
• #  major  incidents  in 
since 

EU  waters 
2016 

indicators  of 
risk trends: 

• Major  accident  risk 
trends 
from 
advanced  regulatory 
(eg  UK, 
regimes 
NO, AU) 
• Reliability 

trends 
from 
major 
associations  (IOGP, 
IADC) 

• Diversification 

of 
holders; 
trends 
smaller, 

license 
population 
towards 
niche companies 

• Exploration 

wells 

drilled 
• Frontier 
licensed 
• Trending 

areas 

of 
deployments 
major  capital  mobile 
(IADC 
assets 
/ 
IMCA 
/  ECSA) 
Europe  &  global, 
2008 - present 

• Availability 

of 
financial  instruments 
on the market 

to 

report 
Commission 
on  degree  of 
to 
response 
the 
FR 
requirements, 
and 
transposition 
of 
the 
Directive  by 
MS’; 

to 

reports 
Commission 
under 
the 
implementing 
regulation and 
via EUOAG; 

MS’ 

Observed  experience 
raising  issues 
of concerns; 

Major  accident  reports 
issued 
by 
MS’; 

Workshops 

and 

interviews 
with 
stakeholders

occurring 
in 
EU waters, do 
the  measures 
for  FR  and 
financial 
instruments 
continue 
relevant? 

to 

Is  it  relevant  to  apply 
specific  civil 
liability 
measures 
vertically 
within 
single 
industrial 
sector  in  the 
EU? 

a 

Are  measures  for  FR 
and 
development 
of 
market-
based 
instruments 
relevant 
provisions  for 
an 

221 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

operationally 
focussed 
instrument? 

Subjective 

evidence 
derives from:  

Data submissions from 

stakeholders; 

Subjective 

technical 

reports; 

Suggested  experiences 
raising  issues 
of 
concerns 
and/or 
affirmation; 
and 

Public 

consultations 

and 
unsolicited 
written 
submissions 

Coherence 

What  correlation  exists  between  the 
aims  and  EU  legislation  when 
addressing 
in 
major  accident  preparedeness 
and 
to  a  major 
response 
accident in EU waters? 

improvement 

Quantitative  indicators 
of  attainment 
of 
suitable 
and  equitable 
compensation 
regimes are: 

 #  MS’ 
adapted 

that  have 
legal 
their 

Qualitative  alignment 

Article 

indicators 
with  existing 
provisions  are 
in 
level 
a 
compensation 
platform 
in 
EU  (not  DK) 

4(3) 

is 
relevant.  The 
broad 
requirements
143  are  for  the 
applicant 
to 
be  scrutinised 
against 

Is  the  experience  of 
implementing 
the 
Directive’s 
aspects  of  FR 
and  financial 
provisions 
internally 

143 Excepting Article 4(3) sub para 4, which addresses civil compensation mechanisms and is dealt with in its own account under Aim 10, below 

222 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
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2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

codes  to  implement 
enhanced 
the 
requirements 
for 
revised 
compensation 
regimes 
 #  MS’ 

introducing 
safety net  or pooling 
to 
mechanisms 
support 
new 
the 
compensation 
arrangements 

 upper  level  of  US$ 
liability protection in 
market 
current 
instruments 

 #MS’  applying  strict 
rules 

liability 
without upper limit 

victims 

to 
protect 
compensation 
disparities 
experienced 
by 
between 
jurisdictions 
are  Brussels  I 
and  Rome  II 
regulations142 

Otherwise:  

• Parliament’s 

for: 

resolution of 1/12/16 
to 
provides 
the 
assess 
appropriateness 
of 
further 
introducing 
harmonised  rules  on 
liability, 
compensation 
financial 
with 
preventing 
further 

and 
security 
to 
any 
accidents 

a  view 

consistent  and 
transparent 
requirements 
for FR subject 
to 
environmental 
aspects  of  the 
area;  and  for 
deployment of 
suitable 
financial 
instruments; 
and 
maintenance 
of 
provisions 
the 
during 
lifetime of the 
license. 

FR 

for 

Is 

the 

coherent  with 
broad 
the 
generic 
framework  of 
the Directive? 

in 

interest 
establishing 
levellised 
provisions  for 
FR 
and 
financial 
provisions 
universally 
evident  across 
focal 
the 
MS’? 

Otherwise 

reliable 

evidence 
derives from: 

The  2015  and  2016 

Is  the  implementation 
of 
the 
Directive  and 
particularly 

142 Regulation EU 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters(5) (the recast Brussels I Regulation) The recast Brussels I regulation seeks to facilitate access to justice, in particular by providing the rules on the jurisdiction of the courts and 
the rules on a rapid and simple recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters given in the Member States. 

Regulation EU 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations. The Rome II regulations  Rome II lays down 
uniform rules to determine which national law should apply to issues in cases with an international dimension where the claim is brought to enforce a non-contractual obligation. It concerns 
private international law 

223 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
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2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

4 

to 

Article 
sufficiently 
mature 
make 
objective 
considerations 
of 
full 
the 
attainment  of 
FR 
and 
financial 
arrangements 
so 
to 
as 
harmonise  the 
legal 
provisions 
across  the  EU 
focal 
(16 
MS’)? 

with 
implications;  

cross-border 

• considers  that  strict 
liability  rules 
be 
for 

civil 
should 
established 
offshore accidents  

• Emphasises, 

to 
update 
existing 
liability  systems  in 
the Member States  

to 

consultancy 
reports 
Commission 
on  degree  of 
to 
response 
FR 
the 
requirements, 
and 
transposition 
the 
of 
Directive  by 
MS’; 

to 

reports 
Commission 
under 
the 
implementing 
regulation and 
via EUOAG; 

MS’ 

Formally 

authorised 

technical 
reports; 

Workshops 

and 

interviews 
with 
stakeholders;  

Subjective 

evidence 
derives from:  

Data submissions from 

224 

 
 
 
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2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

stakeholders; 

Subjective 

technical 

reports; 

Public 

consultations 

and 
unsolicited 
written 
submissions 

Reliable 

evidence 
derives from: 

Is 

The  2015  and  2016 

The 

Effectiveness  Do  the  aims  9  and  (i)  insofar  as 
sufficiently 
implemented  by 
to  by 
MS’  and  responded 
industry,  attain  full  financial 
responsibility 
financial 
capacity  in  the  EU  thereby 
contributing  to  a  reduction  in 
offshore  major  accident  risk 
and especially mitigation?  

and 

Are  adverse  effects  of  major  accidents 
to  the  environment  on  coastal 
communities  and  the  marine 
habitats  and  economic  users 
likely to be mitigated?  

quantitative 
indicators  of 
effectiveness 
of  the  FR  and 
financial 
instrument 
provisions  are 
subject  to  the 
degree 
of 
adaptation  by 
MS’  and  the 
financial 
liability 
market, 
namely: 

to 

• # systems adapted by 
implement 
enhanced 
for 

MS’ 
the 
requirements 
financial 

The 

and 

qualitative 
indicators  of 
effectiveness 
of  FR 
financial 
provisions  are 
consistent 
with 
transposition 
by  MS 
Article 4. 

the 

of 

The  context  in  which 
the  measures 
attained 
if 
be 
may 
effective 
in 
the  reduction 
of 
major 
accident  risk, 

MS’ 

to 

consultancy 
reports 
Commission 
on  degree  of 
to 
response 
the 
FR 
requirements, 
and 
transposition 
of 
the 
Directive  by 
MS’; 

to 

reports 
Commission 
under 
the 
implementing 

there  a  detected 
concensus 
between  MS’ 
regulators  and 
stakeholders 
namely: 

 Operators 

license holders 
on 

 Owners 

and 

non 

production 
installations 

 NGO’s 
 Trades Union and 
 MS’ CA’s 
on 

whether 

the 
measures  are 
broadly 
necessary? 

225 

 
 
 
 
 
 
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2ry questions 

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KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

• # 

(FR) 

financial 

responsibility 
of liable entities 
new 
instruments 
introduced to support 
new 
FR 
arrangements 

• #  incidents  reported 
with  a  bearing  on 
liability 
• #  MS’ 

introducing 
safety net  or pooling 
mechanisms 
to 
support  the  new  FR/ 
security 
financial 
arrangements 

• #MS’  applying  strict 
rules 

liability 
without upper limit 

and mitigation 
be 
may 
deduced  inter 
alia from: 

• availability 

of 
current  schemes  for 
liability  

• Diversification 

of 
holders; 
trends 
smaller, 

license 
population 
towards 
niche companies 

• Exploration 

wells 

drilled 
• Frontier 
licensed 

areas 

• Oil price trends 
• Major  accidents  as 
compared  to  global 
data 

• Major  accidents  to 
the  environment  as 
compared  to  global 
data 

regulation and 
via EUOAG; 

And what form should 

they take? 

Formally 

authorised 

technical 
reports; 

Observed  experience 
raising  issues 
of concern; 

Workshops 

and 

interviews 
with 
stakeholders 

Subjective 

evidence 
derives from:  

Data submissions from 

stakeholders; 

Subjective 

technical 

reports; 

Suggested  experiences 
raising  issues 
of 
concerns 
and/or 
affirmation; 
and 

Public 

consultations 

and 
unsolicited 

Should  the  adaptation 
national 

of 
systems 
continue to be 
low 
scale, 
the 
is 
what 
cause  of  the 
stasis? 

4 

to 

Is  the  implementation 
of 
the 
Directive  and 
particularly 
Article 
sufficiently 
mature 
make 
objective 
considerations 
full 
the 
of 
attainment  of 
FR 
and 
financial 
arrangements
? 

226 

 
 
 
 
 
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1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

Efficiency 

of 

What  are  the  costs  associated  with  the 
introduction 
enhanced 
compensation  arrangements  at 
the MS level; and in relation to 
the 
annualised 
reductions  in  cost  of  a  major 
accident occurring? 

estimated 

The 

quantitative 
of 
markers 
cost 
are 
subject  to  the 
degree 
of 
implementatio
n  by  MS’  of 
the 
requirements 
of  the  Article. 
Therefore,  as 
before, 
the 
indicators  that 
require  to  be 
costed are: 

for 

• #  cost  of  systems 
adapted  by  MS’  to 
the 
implement 
enhanced 
requirements 
financial 
responsibility 
of liable entities 
new 
instruments 
introduced to support 
compensation 
new 
regime arrangements 
• #  incidents  reported 

financial 

(FR) 

• # 

The  benefits  arising 
from the costs 
insofar 
as 
they  may  be 
quantified 
(see  left)  may 
be  calculated 
based  on  the 
arrangements 
as 
they 
become 
known. 

The  inferred  benefits 
the 
from 
Directive  and 
the Parliament 
resolution on: 

• further  harmonised 
for  FR  and 

rules 
financial security;  

• strict  civil 
rules; and  

liability 

in 

• updated 
liability 
systems 
the 
MS’apply only where 
the  measures  have 
been put in place. 

written 
submissions 

Reliable 

evidence 
derives from: 

The  2015  and  2016 

to 

consultancy 
reports 
Commission 
on  degree  of 
to 
response 
the 
FR 
requirements, 
and 
transposition 
of 
the 
Directive  by 
MS’; 

to 

reports 
Commission 
the 
under 
implementing 
regulation and 
via EUOAG; 

MS’ 

How  are  the  measures 
the 

in 
Directive 
evaluated  by 
the  insurance 
market? 

And by NGO’s? 

Given 

progress 
to 
date,  what  are 
the  efficiency 
grounds 
for 
pursuing  EU-
level 
civil 
financial 
liability 
provisions 
applied 
national 
jurisdictions?  

to 

Formally 

authorised 

technical 
reports 

Observed  experience 
raising  issues 

Equally,  what 

are 
considered the 
prospects  of 
achieving 
similar  levels 

227 

 
 
 
 
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2ry questions 

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KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

with  a  bearing  on 
for 
liability 
environmental 
damage 

• #overall  actors  as 
liable  entities  in  the 
sector (for likely risk 
versus  value  to  the 
insurance 
market 
place) 

Otherwise: 

of concern; 

• MS’ 

that  may  be 
considered  to  have 
exemplar provisions; 
• Independent  pooling 
net 
safety 
or 
providers  where  the 
provisions  may  be 
to  other 
exported 
including 
regions, 
for  the  protection  of 
neighbouring 
countries 

Workshops 

and 

interviews 
with 
stakeholders; 
and 

Factual  data  publicly 

available; 

Subjective 

evidence 
derives from:  

Data submissions from 

stakeholders; 

Major  accident  reports 
issued 
by 
operator/owne
r; and 

Public 

consultations 

and 
unsolicited 
written 
submissions 

of  FR  and  of 
reasonable 
financial 
security 
through  EU-
intervention? 

Is  the  relatively  small 
the 
an 
to 

size  of 
sector 
inhibitor 
developing 
vertical 
arrangements
?  And  what 
be 
can 
considered the 
way 
forward 
for  horizontal 
application  of 
FR/security  in 
the EU? 

EU-value 

adde
d 

Is  it  likely  that  the  intervention  has  or 
shall  increase  the  adoption  of 
sufficient  FR 
suitable  and 
financial 
and 
arrangements 

Given the status of the 
in 
measures 
the  Directive 
to 
are 

The  qualitative  value-
added  arising 
from 
the 
arrangements 

The  2  key  sources  of 

evidence 
come 
from 
the  progress, 

What are the positions 
the  key 

of 
stakeholders 

 MS’ regulators 

228 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

provisions across the EU where 
otherwise would not have been 
the case? 

a 
the 

‘encourage’, 
not 
mandate, 
quantitative 
of 
markers 
are 
efficacy 
subjective 
to 
the  degree  of 
implementatio
n  by  MS’  of 
the 
requirements 
of  the  Article. 
Therefore,  as 
before, 
the 
indicators are: 

to 

• # systems adapted by 
implement 
enhanced 
for 

MS’ 
the 
requirements 
financial 
responsibility 
of liable entities 
new 
instruments 
introduced to support 
new 
FR 
arrangements 

financial 

(FR) 

• # 

• #  incidents  reported 
with  a  bearing  on 
liability 

etc 
of  FR 
as 
insofar 
they  may  be 
quantified 
(see  left)  may 
be  calculated 
based  on  the 
arrangements 
as they are put 
effect 
into 
and  may  be 
compared 
to 
pre-existing 
systems: 

• Offshore  Pollution 
Liability  Association 
(scheme) 
• International 
Pollution 
Compensation 
(IOPC) Funds 

Oil 

The 

primary 
requirement is 
to  understand 
the  degree  of 
movement  in 
towards 
MS’ 
the EU goal. 

229 

if any, of MS’ 
industry 
and 
in meeting the 
objectives  of 
Article  4;  and 
inputs 
the 
from 
the 
specialist  FR 
sector  as 
to 
what  may  be 
achieved 
through 
market. 

the 

Hence 

reliable 

evidence 
derives from: 

The  2015  and  2016 

 Operators 

license holders 
on 

 Owners 

and 

non 

production 
installations 

 NGO’s 
 Trades Union 
towards 

widening 

existing 
approaches  to 
liability 
coverage 
– 
OPOL,  IOPC 
-  compared  to 
developing 
new 
initiatives? 
Where lies the 
greater 
EU 
added-value? 

sector 

to 

possible 
achieve 
economic 
equilibrium 
with 
liability 
pure 
economic  loss 
without 

strict 
and 

Is 

it 

to 

consultancy 
reports 
Commission 
on  degree  of 
to 
response 
the 
FR 
requirements, 
and 
transposition 
of 
the 
Directive  by 
MS’; 

 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

applying 
a 
liability cap?  

Observed  experience 
raising  issues 
of 
concerns; 
and 

Workshops 

and 

interviews 
with 
stakeholders;  

Subjective 

evidence 
derives from:  

Data submissions from 

stakeholders; 

Subjective 

technical 

reports;  and 

Public 

consultations 

and 
unsolicited 
written 
submissions 

Attainment 

To  what  extent 

have  
compens
ation 
regimes 
for 
damages 

(10) Compensation regimes to be consistent 

(i)  To  what  extent 
have  MS’ 
established 
procedures 
for  prompt 
and 
adequate 

Quantitative  measures 
of  attainment 
of 
fair  and 
level 
compensation 
systems 
are 
derived  from 

The qualitative drivers 
of  consistent 
and  equitable 
compensation 
regimes 
across  the  EU 
are: 

230 

Article 4(3)(sp4) is the 
relevant 
Article 
requiring 
measures 
efficient 
handling 

for 

of 

What,  overall,  has  the 
response  been 
of  MS’ 
to 
enhancing 
their 
compensation 
regimes? 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

arising 
from 
offshore 
petroleu
m 
activities 
become 
consisten
t  across 
the EU? 

Do 

handling 
of 
compensat
ion  claims 
for 
economic 
losses? 

MS’ 
compensat
ion 
arrangeme
nts  apply 
across 
MS’ 
boundaries
? 

the 
performance 
of 
MS’: 

individual 

• #  MS  who  have 
new 
introduced 
measures  into  their 
civil 
for 
code 
handling  claims  by 
3rd  parties  against 
economic  loss  from 
major accidents 

• and  who 

assure 

transboundary 
claims 

• #MS’  who  rely  on 
traditional  horizontal 
and 
instruments 
systems  for  handling 
compensation claims 
• #MS’  who  do  not 
any 
have 
arrangements 
for 
handling  3rd  party 
compensation  claims 
industry 
against 
sectors 

• the  overall  level  of 
major  accident  risk 
derived  from  trend 
analysis of  advanced 
MS’ 
(primarily 
North Sea) 

• and  the  reduction  in 
risk derived from the 
implementation 
of 
the whole Directive 

• the 

of 
degree 
fragmentation  of  the 
compensation 
regimes  across 
EU 

the 

• the  legal  basis  for 
in  a 

compensation 
transboundary 
context 

• the  role  of  MS’  in 
responding 
to  and 
containing  a  major 
the 
accident 
environment 
(in 
liability terms) 

to 

231 

claims and for 
protection  of 
adjacent  MS’ 
3rd 
and 
countries. 

Reliable  evidence  of 
degree 
of 
attainment 
derives from: 

The  2015  and  2016 

Are  there  significant 

difference 
between 
mature 
regimes 
the 
entrants 
risk-based 
regulation? 

the 

and 
new 
to 

Is 

there 

enough 
experience  to 
detect 
whether 
at 
solutions 
MS’ level will 
be 
forthcoming 
without 
further 
intervention? 

Equally, 

is 

further 

intervention 
valid? 

to 

consultancy 
reports 
Commission 
on  degree  of 
to 
response 
the  
compensation 
scheme 
requirements, 
and 
transposition 
the 
of 
Directive  by 
MS’; 

to 

reports 
Commission 
under 
the 
implementing 

MS’ 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

the  extension  or 
adaptation    of 
existing  best 
practices 
organised  by 
sector 
the 
(OPOL, 
IOPC) 
the 
most 
likely 
of 
means 
developing  a 
level  playing 
EU 
playing 
field?  

regulation and 
via EUOAG; 

Is 

Formally 

authorised 

technical 
reports; 

Workshops 

and 

interviews 
with 
stakeholders; 
and 

Factual  data  publicly 

available.

Subjective  evidence  of 

attainment 
derives from:  

Data submissions from 

stakeholders; 

Subjective 

technical 

reports;  and 

Public 

consultations 

and 
unsolicited 
written 
submissions 

232 

 
 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

Relevance 

improvement 

Do  aims  10  and  (i)  directly  address  a 
significant 
in 
major  accident  preparedeness 
and 
financial 
mitigation  to  a  major  accident 
in EU waters? 

especially 

Quantitative  measures 
of  relevance, 
if  any  so  far 
available, are: 

• # 

EU 

major 
accidents as quantum 
of 
likelihood 
compared  to  global 
data 

to 

• #  as  above  major 
the 
accidents 
as 
environment 
compared  to  global 
data 

• Value  of  Insurance 
payments  made  for 
asset damages 

• Averaged  marine  oil 
spill clean-up costs 

• # 

and  value  of 

compensation 
payments 
operators 
3rd parties 

from 
to 

• Environmental 

risk 
performance data for 
EU cf global trends 

The  relevance  of  the 
aims  derives 
from 
the 
availability  of 
economic 
damages  that 
repairs 
the 
environmental 
loss 
and 
provides 
economic 
remedy 
restores 
status 
ante 
to 
victim)? 

(ie 
the 
quo 
the 

The  original  driver  to 
the  Directive 
included 
fragmentation 
of 
compensation 
regimes. 
Hence 
qualitative 
indicators are: 

• the  overall  level  of 
major  accident  risk 
derived  from  trend 

Reliable  evidence  of 
whether 
the 
measures 
the 
retain 
as 
relevance 
in 
calculated 
the 
design 
model  derive 
the 
from 
extent 
of 
implementatio
the 
of 
n 
measures, 
plus 
observed 
effects. 

any 

Hence, 

reliable 
of 
evidence 
impact 
direct 
of 
improved 
availability  of 
compensation 
derives from: 

The  2015  and  2016 

consultancy 
reports 
Commission 
on  degree  of 

to 

What 

objective 
considerations 
be 
may 
applied 
to 
the 
reaffirm 
relevance  of 
the  measure 
in the absence 
of  a  major 
accident 
occurring 
EU waters? 

in 

Is  evidence  emerging 

the 
risk 
for  a 

to 
demonstrate 
whether 
highest 
areas 
major 
accident 
occurring 
have 
highest 
of 
compensation 
arrangements
? 

the 
level 

233 

 
 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

analysis of  advanced 
(primarily 
MS’ 
North Sea) 

• and  the  reduction  in 
risk derived from the 
implementation 
of 
the whole Directive 

• the 

of 
degree 
fragmentation  of  the 
compensation 
regimes  across 
EU 
compared 
2013 

the 
to 

Is  it  apparent  whether 
further 
interventions 
are 
be 
to 
predicated  on 
risk?  Or 
in 
pursuing 
consistency144 

to 

response 
the 
compensation 
scheme 
requirements, 
and 
transposition 
of 
the 
Directive  by 
MS’; 

to 

reports 
Commission 
the 
under 
implementing 
regulation 
(risk)  and  via 
EUOAG; 

MS’ 

Formally 

authorised 

technical 
reports; 

Workshops 

and 

interviews 
with 
stakeholders;

Subjective 

evidence 

144 Subjective interventions by the Commission and other mechanisms to enforce compliance of individual MS’ as necessary are outwith the scope of the assessment 

234 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

derives from:  

Data submissions from 

stakeholders; 

Subjective 

technical 

reports; and 

Public 

consultations 

and 
unsolicited 
written 
submissions 

The 

relevant 

instruments 
for  coherence 
in 
are 
Brussels I and 
Rome 
II 
regulations 

Otherwise,  as  above, 

Parliament’s 
resolution  of 
1/12/16 
provides for:  

• assessing 

further 

harmonised rules;  

• considering 

strict 

civil liability;  

• updating 

existing 

for 

Article 4(3)(sp4) is the 
relevant 
Article 
requiring 
measures 
efficient 
handling 
of 
claims and for 
protection  of 
adjacent  MS’ 
3rd 
and 
countries. 

Reliable 

evidence 
derives from: 

The  2015  and  2016 

consultancy 

As  a  risk-management 
instrument  for 
preventing 
major 
accidents  and 
limiting 
their 
consequences, 
should 
how 
the  approach 
to 
the 
compensation 
be 
regime 
most 
internally 
coherent  with 
the  Directive? 
For  example, 

Coherence 

What  correlation  exists  between  the 
aims  and  EU  legislation  when 
and 
addressing 
to 
sufficient 
environmental  and  economic 
loss  from  a  major  accident  in 
EU waters? 

suitable 
mitigation 

Quantitative  indicators 
of  coherence 
of 
compensation 
regimes  with 
the 
relevant 
existing  EU 
legislation  are 
are  as  above, 
namely: 

to 

 # systems adapted by 
implement 
enhanced 
for 

MS’ 
the 
compensation 
financial 
responsibility 
of liable entities 
new 

financial 

(FR) 

 # 

235 

 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

instruments 
introduced to support 
new 
FR 
arrangements 

 #MS’  who  accept 
financial 

limit  of 
liability – a cap 

 #MS’  who  do  not 
impose strict liability 
there 
are  no  FR  schemes 
operating 

 #MS’  where 

liability systems 

Therefore,  qualitative 
indicators  of 
coherence 
reside  in  the 
of 
degree 
fragmentation 
of 
the 
compensation 
regimes 
across  the  EU 
focal  MS’ 
compared 
to 
2013.  

the 

Also  as  in  degree  of 
attainment  of 
(8)  on 
Aim 
environmental 
liabilities, 
namely, 
Water 
Framework 
Directive  and 
ELD29.  And 
whether  any 
steps 
are 
being taken to 
ensure 
compensation 
systems  apply 

236 

to 

reports 
Commission 
on  degree  of 
response 
to 
the 
compensation 
scheme 
requirements, 
and 
transposition 
of 
the 
Directive  by 
MS’; 

to 

reports 
Commission 
under 
the 
implementing 
regulation; 

MS’ 

Formally 

authorised 

technical 
reports;  

Workshops 

and 

interviews 
with 
stakeholders 

Are 

Subjective 

evidence 
derives from:  

Data submissions from 

adaptation  of 
legal 
civil 
mechanisms 
in MS’? Or an 
operator 
/ 
insurance 
market 
approach 
based on risk?  

Is  the  application  of  a 

risk-based 
monetary  cap 
on 
liability 
coherent  with 
unlimited 
liability 
inherent 
EU 
environmental 
liability 
principles? 

to 

more 

there 
practical 
alternatives  to 
unlimited 
financial 
security  cover 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

to 
neighbouring 
countries 

stakeholders; 

Subjective 

technical 

reports; and 

Public 

consultations 

the 

(given 
insurance 
market)? 

The 

Effectiveness  Do  the  aims  10  and  (i)  insofar  as 
implemented  by  MS’  and 
responded to by industry attain 
full  transparency  in  financial 
liability  and  compensation  in 
the  EU  thereby  contributing  to 
a  reduction  in  offshore  major 
particularly 
accident 
consequential loss?  

risk, 

Are  adverse  effects  of  major  accidents 
to  the  environment  on  coastal 
communities  and  the  marine 
habitats  and  economic  users 
likely to be fully mitigated?  

The 

The 

quantitative 
markers 
of 
effectiveness  
are  subject  to 
the  degree  of 
implementatio
n  by  MS’  of 
enhanced 
compensation 
arrangements. 
Therefore,  as 
the 
before, 
efficacy 
indicators are: 

qualitative 
indicators  are 
based  on  the 
effect  of  any 
new 
arrangements 
as 
they 
become 
known. 

inferred 

effectiveness 
of  Directive 
and 
the 
Parliament 
resolution on: 

• #  of  MS’  with 

to 
more 

arrangements 
adapted 
implement 
effective 
compensation 
outcomes,  including 
adjacent 
for 

237 

• further  harmonised 

rules;  

• strict  civil  liability; 

MS’ 

and  
• updated 
systems 

liability 

and 
unsolicited 
written 
submissions 

Reliable 

evidence 
derives from: 

The  2015  and  2016 

Can  the  assessment  of 

effectiveness 
the 
of 
for 
measures 
consistent  and 
fair 
compensation 
be 
schemes 
undertaken 
given 
the 
level 
of 
to 
adoption, 
date, of MS’? 

Is 

there 

enough 
experience  to 
detect 
whether 
solutions 
at 
MS’ level will 

to 

consultancy 
reports 
Commission 
on  degree  of 
response 
to 
the 
compensation 
requirements, 
and 
transposition 
of 
the 
Directive  by 
MS’; 

to 

reports 
Commission 
under 
the 
implementing 

 
 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

• # 

financial 

countries 
new 
instruments 
introduced to support 
new 
compensation 
regime arrangements 
• #  incidents  reported 
with  a  bearing  on 
liability 
for 
environmental 
damage 

• #overall  actors  as 
liable  entities  in  the 
sector  

apply  only  where  the 

measures 
have  been  put 
in place. 

Other indicators are: 

• MS’ 

that  may  be 
considered  to  have 
exemplar  provisions 
the 
including 
protection 
of 
neighbouring 
countries 

for 

• Independent  pooling 
or 
net 
safety 
providers  where  the 
provisions  may  be 
to  other 
exported 
regions,  

238 

regulation and 
via  EUOAG;

be 
effective 
without  wider 
adoption? 

Observed  experience 
raising  issues 
of concern; 

Workshops 

and 

interviews 
with 
stakeholders; 

Subjective 

evidence 
derives from:  

Data submissions from 

stakeholders; 

Subjective 

technical 

reports; and 

Public 

consultations 

and 
unsolicited 
written 
submissions 

Equally, 

the 
is 
implementatio
n 
the 
of 
Directive  and 
particularly 
Article 
4(3)(sp3) 
sufficiently 
robust 
objectively 
consider 
likely 
effectiveness 
of 
measures. 

the 

the 

to 

Can strict liability plus 

unlimited 
financial 
security  work 
in 
practice? 
Therefore is it 
to 
possible 
guarantee 
adequate  and 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

Efficiency 

What  are the costs in  time,  trouble and 
money, that are associated with 
of 
introduction 
the 
compensation  regimes  up  to 
the EU level; and in relation to 
annualised 
the 
reductions  in  cost  of  a  major 
accident occurring? 

estimated 

a 
the 

Given the status of the 
measures 
in 
the  Directive 
are 
to 
‘encourage’, 
not 
mandate, 
quantitative 
of 
markers 
are 
efficacy 
subject  to  the 
degree 
of 
implementatio
n  by  MS’  of 
the 
requirements. 
Therefore,  as 
the 
before, 
indicators  for 
efficiency  of 
new 
compensation 
regimes 
are 
costs 
associated 
with: 

• # systems adapted by 

The  benefits  arising 
from the costs 
as 
insofar 
they  may  be 
quantified 
(see  left)  may 
be  calculated 
from 
the 
arrangements 
they 
as 
become 
known. 

The  inferred  benefits 
from 
the 
Directive  and 
the Parliament 
resolution on: 

• further  harmonised 
for 

rules 
compensation 
handling;  
• strict  civil 
rules; and  

liability 

• updated  systems  for 

compensating 
neighbouring 
countries  

239 

prompt 
compensation 
for all? 

the  compensation 
and  liabilities 
market 
solution 
capable 
of 
being  driven 
by  EU,  MS’ 
or operators? 

If by operators, is state 
oversight  best 
exercised? 
Through  thee 
license? 

Does  the  goal  of  EU-
wide 
consistency 
between 
compensation 
that 
regimes 
are 
efficient 
and  effective 
(Brussels 
I 
and  Rome  II) 
the 
outweigh 
and 
effort 

Reliable  evidence 

is 

Is 

predominantl
to 
y  related 
the  degree  of 
change; 
the 
adequacy  of 
existing 
regimes, 
any; 
experience. 
Otherwise 
reliable 
evidence 
derives from: 

if 
and 

The  2015  and  2016 

to 

consultancy 
reports 
Commission 
on  degree  of 
response 
to 
the 
compensation 
scheme 
requirements, 
and 
transposition 
of 

the 

 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

• # 

to 

implement 
enhanced 

MS’ 
the 
compensation 
regimes 
new 
instruments 
introduced to support 
enhanced 
compensation 
regimes 

financial 

• #  cost  of  producing 
for 
and 

guidance 
claimants 
defendents 

• #  incidents  reported 
with  a  bearing  on 
liability 

difficulty 
bringing 
about? 

in 
this 

in  the  MS’apply  only 
the 
where 
measures 
have  been  put 
in place. 

Otherwise  deductions 
may  be  taken 
from: 

• MS’ 

that  may  be 
considered  to  have 
exemplar provisions; 
• Independent  pooling 
net 
safety 
or 
providers  where  the 
provisions  may  be 
to  other 
exported 
including 
regions, 
for  the  protection  of 
neighbouring 
countries 

MS’ 

Directive  by 
MS’; 

to 

reports 
Commission 
under 
the 
implementing 
regulation and  

Workshops 

and 

interviews 
with 
stakeholders. 

Subjective 

evidence 
derives from:  

Data submissions from 

stakeholders; 

Subjective 

technical 

reports  and 

Public 

consultations 

and 
unsolicited 
written 
submissions 

EU-value 

adde
d 

Is  it  likely  that  the  intervention  has 
the  adoption  of 
increased 
transparency of performance of 
regimes 
the 

compensation 

Given the status of the 
implementatio
n, 
the 
quantitative 

The 

qualitative 
indicators  of 
EU-added 
value  rely  on 

EU-added  value  is  a 
of 
function 
changes 
versus 

the 

What  is  the  extent  of 

EU-added 
value 
in 
Parliament’s 

the 

240 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

across the EU where otherwise 
would not have been the case? 

markers 
efficacy 
limited to: 

of 
are 

the  degree  of 
change  in  the 
MS’ 

• #  systems  adapted 
by MS’ to implement 
enhanced 
the 
requirements 
for 
financial 
responsibility  (FR)  of 
liable entities 
new 
instruments 
introduced to support 
FR 
new 
arrangements 

financial 

• # 

Therefore indicators of 

coherence 
reside  in  the 
degree 
of 
fragmentation 
the 
of 
compensation 
regimes 
across  the  EU 
focal  MS’ 
compared 
to 
2013.  

the 

Also  as  in  the  degree 
of  attainment 
of Aim (8) on 
environmental 
liabilities, 
namely, 
Water 
Framework 
Directive  and 
ELD29.  And 
whether  any 
steps 
are 
being taken to 
ensure 
compensation 

241 

status 
ante 

quo 

Reliable 

evidence 
derives from: 

The  2015  and  2016 

to 

consultancy 
reports 
Commission 
on  degree  of 
response 
to 
the 
compensation 
scheme 
requirements, 
and 
transposition 
of 
the 
Directive  by 
MS’; 

Formally 

authorised 

technical 
reports; 

Workshops 

and 

interviews 
with 
stakeholders 

Subjective 

evidence 

for 
security 

focus  on  the 
fragmented 
regimes 
FR, 
and 
compensation 
arrangements
? 

Has  raising  the  issue 
MS’ 

of 
compliance 
with  access  to 
justice  across 
the  EU  been 
effective  as  a 
thing 
of 
itself? 

Based 

upon 

experience 
with 
the 
Directive  and 
subsequent 
studies 
is 
reasonably 
practicable  to: 
the 
resolve 
of 
applying 

it 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

systems  apply 
to 
neighbouring 
countries 

derives from:  

Data submissions from 

stakeholders; 

Subjective 

technical 

reports; and 

Public 

consultations 

and 
unsolicited 
written 
submissions 

242 

to 

on 

the 
of 

risk 
financial 
security 
(capping); 
resolve 
principle 
unlimited 
environmental 
liability  under 
ELD  with  the 
practicable 
limits 
financial 
security in the 
insurance 
sector; 
and 
secure  and/or 
complete  EU 
intervention 
in 
legal 
provisions  of 
MS’ 
for 
consistent 
compensation 
out 
of 
industrial 
major 
accidents 
either 
vertically,  or 

the  civil 

 
 
 
 
Extent 

1ry questions 

2ry questions 

KPI (quantitative) 

KPI (qualitative) 

Provenance 

Conclusions 

(aims) 

(aims) 

horizontally? 

243 

 
 
 
13  ANNEX V: OTHER EU LEGISLATION, INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS AND 

PROTOCOLS RELEVANT TO OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS ACTIVITIES  

  Primary law 

13.1
The  provisions  and  scope  of  the  OSD  and  its  existing  legislative  environment  rely  on  and 

refer to the following provisions of the primary law of the Union: 

  Regarding the environmental liability, it is noteworthy that article 192.2(c) Treaty on 
the  Functioning  of  the  European  Union  grants  the  Council  the  right  to  adopt 
unanimously in accordance with a special legislative procedure measures significantly 
affecting  a  Member  State's  choice  between  different  energy  sources  and  the  general 
structure of its energy supply. 

  Regarding criminal liability, article 83.2 TFEU provides that directives may establish 
minimum rules with regard to the definition of criminal offences and sanctions in the 
area  concerned  if  this  is  deemed  necessary  in  order  to  ensure  the  effective 
implementation of a Union policy by ensuring the approximation of criminal laws and 
regulations of the Member States. 

  Regarding occupational Safety and Health, article 151 TFEU lays the foundation of 
the European Union’s action in the field of social policy. Article 154 TFEU sets the 
conditions for the consultation of management and labour at Union level. 

13.2

  EU Directives 
13.2.1

  Mining and other fossil fuel extraction activities 

  Council  Directive  92/91/EEC145  concerning  the  minimum  requirements  for 
improving the safety and health protection of workers in the mineral- extracting 
industries through drilling  

(4) 
Lays down the minimum requirements for improving the safety and health protection 
of  workers  in  the  mineral-extracting  industries  through  drilling  (onshore  and  offshore). 
Employers  must  draw  up  and  keep  up  to  date  a  safety  and  health  document  demonstrating 
that:  (i)  risks  to  workers’  health  and  safety  in  the  workplace  have  been  determined  and 
assessed, (ii) adequate measures will be taken to meet the requirements of this Directive, and 
(iii) the design, use and maintenance of the workplace and equipment are safe. 

  Directive  94/22/EC146  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  the 
conditions  for  granting  and  using  authorizations  for  the  prospection,  exploration 
and production of hydrocarbons 

Provides that oil and gas licensing must be open to all interested companies and EU 
countries must grant licenses in a fair, competitive, and unbiased way. When granting 
licenses,  EU  countries  can  take  into  account  issues  such  as  national  security,  public 
safety,  public  health,  security  of  transport,  the  protection  of  the  environment,  the 
protection  of  biological  resources,  or  the  planned  management  of  hydrocarbon 
resources.  Regarding  liability,  this  directive  introduces  the  requirement  to  use 
technical  and  financial  capacity  of  an  applicant  as  selection  criteria  in  procurement 
process.  

145 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A31992L0091 
146 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A31994L0022 

244 

 
 
                                                           
  Directive  (EU)  2015/1535147  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council 
laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical 
regulations and of rules on Information Society services 

Establishes  a  notification  procedure  conceived  as  a  tool  for  information,  prevention 
and dialogue in the field of technical regulations on products and Information Society 
services.  It helps aims  at anticipating and preventing the creation of  barriers to trade 
likely to affect the smooth functioning of the internal market. 

13.2.2

  Product safety 

  Directive  2006/42/EC148  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on 

machinery 

One of the main legislations governing the harmonisation of essential health and safety 
requirements for machinery at EU level. It promotes the free movement of machinery 
within the Single Market and guarantees a high level of protection for EU workers and 
citizens. The Machinery Directive only applies to products that are to be placed on the 
EU market for the first time. 

  Directive  2014/34/EU149  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  the 
harmonisation  of  laws  of  the  Member  States  relating  to  equipment  and  protective 
systems intended for use in potentially explosive atmospheres 

The  “ATEX  Directive”  defines  the  essential  health  and  safety  requirements  and 
conformity assessment procedures, to be applied before products are placed on the EU 
market.  It  covers  equipment  and  protective  systems  intended  for  use  in  potentially 
explosive atmospheres. 

  Directive  2014/68/EU150  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  the 
harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to the making available on 
the market of pressure equipment 

The  “Pressure  Equipment  Directive”  applies  to  the  design,  manufacture  and 
conformity  assessment  of  stationary  pressure  equipment  with  a  maximum  allowable 
pressure  greater than 0,5 bar. The Directive aims to  guarantee free movement of the 
products in its scope while ensuring a high level of safety. 

13.2.3

  Environmental policies 

  Council  Directive  92/43/EEC151  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council 

on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora 

147 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32015L1535 
148 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1542297771931&uri=CELEX:32006L0042 
149 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32014L0034 
150 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32014L0068 
151 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:31992L0043 

245 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
The Habitats Directive ensures the conservation of a wide range of rare, threatened or 
endemic animal and plant species. Some 200 rare and characteristic habitat types are 
also targeted for conservation in their own right.  

  Directive  2000/60/EC152  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council 

establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy 

The Water Framework Directive establishes a legal framework to protect and restore 
clean  water  across  Europe  and  ensure  its  long-term,  sustainable  use.  The  directive 
addresses  also  coastal  waters  and  it  establishes  innovative  principles  for  water 
management.  

  Directive  2001/42/EC153  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  the 
assessment of the effects of certain plans and programmes on the environment  

The  “SEA  Directive”  applies  to  a  wide  range  of  public  plans  and  programs  (e.g.  on 
land use, transport, energy, waste, agriculture, etc.). Plans and programs  in the sense 
of  the  SEA  Directive  must  be  prepared  or  adopted  by  an  authority  (at  national, 
regional  or  local  level).  Legislative,  regulatory  or  administrative  provisions  are 
prepared for (among others) energy, industry, waste/ water management, and land use 
and which set the framework for future development consent of projects listed in the 
EIA Directive. 

  Directive 2003/4/EC154 of the European Parliament and of the Council on public 

access to environmental information 

Guarantees the right of access to environmental information and specifies its exercise, 
and  to  ensure  that  environmental  information  is  progressively  made  available  and 
disseminated  to  the  public  to  the  widest  possible  scope,  promoting,  where  available, 
the use of computer telecommunication and/or electronic technology. 

  Directive 2003/35/EC155 of the European Parliament and of the Council providing 
for  public  participation  in  respect  of  the  drawing  up  of  certain  plans  and 
programmes relating to the environment 
Contributes  to  the  implementation  of  the  obligations  arising  under  the  Aarhus 
Convention,  in  particular  by:  (a)  providing  for  public  participation  in  drawing  up 
certain  plans  and  programs  related  to  the  environment  and  improving  the  public 
participation and (b) providing for access to justice. 

  Directive  2004/35/CE156  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on 
environmental  liability  with  regard  to  the  prevention  and  remedying  of 
environmental damage 

The  “Environmental  Liability  Directive”  (ELD)  established  a  system  of 
public/administrative  liability  at  EU  level.  It  establishes  a  framework  based  on  the 
polluter  pays  principle  to  prevent  and  remedy  environmental  damage.  It  is  based  on 
the powers and duties of public authorities ("administrative approach"). The Directive 

152 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/FR/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32000L0060 
153 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32001L0042 
154 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32003L0004 
155 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32003L0035 
156 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32004L0035 

246 

 
 
                                                           
defines "environmental damage" as damage to protected species and natural habitats, 
damage to water and damage to soil. Operators carrying out dangerous activities listed 
in  Annex  III  of  the  Directive  fall  under  strict  liability  (no  need  to  prove  fault).  The 
ELD was amended four times, which broadened the scope of strict liability by adding 
the "management of extractive waste" and the "operation of storage sites pursuant to 
Directive 2009/31/EC" to the list of dangerous occupational activities in Annex III of 
the  ELD.  Further,  it  extended  the  scope  of  damage  to  water  by  broadening  the 
geographical  scope  of  marine  waters  beyond  the  territorial  sea  to  include  also  the 
exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf, where applicable, through Article 
38 of the Offshore Safety Directive, and adapted the reporting requirements 

  Directive  2008/56/EC157  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council 
establishing  a  framework  for  community  action  in  the  field  of  marine 
environmental policy (Marine Strategy Framework Directive) 

the  marine  environment, 

its 
Requires  protecting  and  preserving 
deterioration, and to prevent and reduce inputs in the marine environment, with a view 
to phasing out pollution, to ensure that there are no significant impacts on or risks to 
marine biodiversity, marine ecosystems, human health or legitimate uses of the sea. It 
also identifies the four marine regions around which the OSD’s framework is defined: 
the  Baltic  Sea,  the  North-east  Atlantic  Ocean,  the  Mediterranean  Sea  and  the  Black 
Sea. 

to  prevent 

Offshore  activities  are  covered  by  the  Member  states  duties  to  (i)  make  an  initial 
assessment  of  their  marine  waters  (article  8),  (ii)  establish  environmental  targets 
(article 10), and (iii) identify the measures to be taken in order to achieve or maintain 
“good  environmental  status”  (article  13).  Furthermore,  Article  9  (determination  of 
good environmental  status) and Article 11 (monitoring programmes) are relevant  for 
offshore safety.  

  Directive 2008/98/EC158 of the European Parliament and of the Council on waste 

Introduces the "polluter pays principle" and the "extended producer responsibility". It 
incorporates provisions on hazardous waste and waste oils. Later jurisprudence from 
the Court of Justice of the EU (C-188/07, Commune de Mesquer v Total, judgment of 
24 June 2008) instituted that oil spilled in the sea becomes waste under the scope of 
the Waste Framework Directive 2008/98/EC. As a result, the operator is regarded as 
the  producer  or  holder  of  waste  and  would,  in  accordance  with  the  polluter  pays 
principle, bear the costs of waste management. Liability extends to parent companies, 
which are not able to abrogate liability towards subcontractors. 

  Directive  2008/99/EC159  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  the 

protection of the environment through criminal law 

(5) 
The  “Environmental  Crime  Directive”  sets  minimum  requirements  to  be 
implemented in national criminal laws.  It lays down  a list of environmental offences 
that  must  be  considered  criminal,  set  a  duty  to  Member  states  to  ensure  that  legal 

157 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1540906597341&uri=CELEX:32008L0056 
158 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32008L0098 
159 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1540905636130&uri=CELEX:32008L0099 

247 

 
 
                                                           
persons  can  be  held  liable  for  offences  committed  for  their  benefit  and  that  the 
commission  of  the  offences  is  subject  to  effective,  proportionate  and  dissuasive 
criminal  sanctions.  It  does  not  touch  upon  the  powers  of  prosecutors  and  judges. 
Annex  A  of  the  Environmental  Crime  Directive  lists  Community  legislation 
adopted  pursuant  to  the  EC  Treaty,  the  infringement  of  which  constitutes 
unlawful conduct pursuant to Article 2(a)(i) of this Directive. 

  Directive 2009/147/EC160 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 

conservation of wild birds (Birds Directive) 

The  Birds  Directive  covers  the  protection,  management  and  control  of  all  species  of 
naturally  occurring  birds  in  the  wild  state  in  the  EU  Member  States.  The  Directive 
therefore  places  great  emphasis  on  the  protection  of  habitats  for  endangered  and 
migratory  species.  It  establishes  a  network  of  Special  Protection  Areas  (SPAs) 
including all the most suitable territories for these species. The OSD stress the need to 
pay  special  attention  to  environmentally  sensitive  marine  and  coastal  environments 
and their ecosystems. 

  Directive  2010/75/EU161  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on 

industrial emissions  

The main EU instrument regulating pollutant emissions (emissions into air, water and 
land)  from  industrial  installations.  The  directive  aims  to  achieve  a  high  level  of 
protection of human health and the environment taken as a whole by reducing harmful 
industrial  emissions  across  the  EU,  in  particular  through  better  application  of  Best 
Available Techniques (BAT).  

  Directive  2012/18/EU162  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  the 
control  of  major-accident  hazards  involving  dangerous  substances  ("Seveso 
Directive") 

(6) 
The  “Seveso  Directive”  aims  at  the  prevention  of  major  accidents  involving 
dangerous substances and at limiting the consequences of such accidents not only for 
human health but also for the environment.Since its third revision in 2012, the scope 
of  the  Seveso  Directive  covers  offshore  exploration  and  exploitation  of  minerals, 
including hydrocarbons and the storage of gas at underground offshore. Other aspect 
of  the  Directive  relevant  also  for  offshore  are  requirement  for  industry  practices  in 
major hazards risk control, joint regulation of safety and environment of major hazard 
sites, and emergency preparedness.  

  Directive  2014/52/EU163  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  the 
assessment  of  the  effects  of  certain  public  and  private  projects  on  the 
environment  

The Revised Environmental  Impact  Assessment  Directive  applies  to  a wide range of 
defined  public  and  private  projects.  All  projects  listed  in  Annex  I  are  considered  as 
having significant effects on the environment and require an EIA. For projects listed in 
Annex II, the national authorities have to decide whether an EIA is needed following 
the  done  by  the  "screening  procedure”.  Offshore  petroleum  production  activities  fall 

160 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32009L0147 
161 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1540984841223&uri=CELEX:32010L0075 
162 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32012L0018 
163 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32014L0052 

248 

 
 
                                                           
under  the  scope  of  this  directive  (Art  1.a  and  Annex  II  2.e).  However,  it  is 
discretionary for some drilling operations – e.g. for transient exploration well projects. 

  Directive  2014/89/EU164  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council 

establishing a framework for maritime spatial planning 

Maritime  spatial  planning  (MSP)  aims  at  reducing  conflict,  encouraging  investment, 
increasing  cross-border  cooperation,  and  protecting 
is 
implemented  by  Member  States  by  means  of  Maritime  Spatial  Plans,  with  the  EU 
(Commission) providing technical support and funding of MSP cross-border projects. 

the  environment. 

It 

13.2.4

  Health and safety of workers at work 

  Council  Directive  89/391/EEC165  on  the  introduction  of  measures  to  encourage 

improvements in the safety and health of workers at work 

The  basic  safety  and  health  legal  act  (called  a  “Framework  Directive”),  which  lays 
down general principles concerning the prevention and protection of workers against 
occupational  accidents  and  diseases.  It  applies  to  all  sectors  of  activity,  both  public 
(with exceptions) and private. 

  Council Directive 90/269/EEC166 on the minimum health and safety requirements 
for the manual handling of loads where there is a risk particularly of back injury 
to workers 

Where the need for the manual handling of loads by workers cannot be avoided, the 
employer  must  ensure  minimum  health  and  safety  requirements  for  the  manual 
handling  of  loads,  especially  where  there  is  a  risk  particularly  of  back  injury  to 
workers. 

  Directive  92/91/EEC167  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  setting 
requirement  for  a  safety  and  health  document  in  the  Drilling  Extractive 
Industries.  

Aims  firstly  at  preventing  all  risks  for  workers,  both  major  and  minor.  It  contains 
further  minimum  requirements  applicable  to  the  offshore  sector  as  regards  risk 
assessment, protection from fire and explosions escape and rescue. The major hazards 
report (MHR) amplified  the minimum  requirements of Directive 92/91/EEC  towards 
prevention  of  offshore  major  hazards,  for  example  marine  well  control,  structural 
integrity of offshore platforms, and survival of personnel in an emergency. 

  Directive  2002/44/EC168  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  the 
minimum  health  and  safety  requirements  regarding  the  exposure  of  workers  to 
the risks arising from physical agents 

Aims at ensuring health and safety of each worker and at creating a minimum basis of 
protection  by  timely  detection  of  adverse  health  effects  of  exposure  to  mechanical 

164 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32014L0089 
165 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1542296947551&uri=CELEX:31989L0391 
166 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1542296724403&uri=CELEX:31990L0269 
167 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1540982062305&uri=CELEX:31992L0091 
168 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1542296683148&uri=CELEX:32002L0044 

249 

 
 
                                                           
vibration,  It  defines  exposure  limit  values  for  hand-arm-vibrations  and  whole-body-
vibrations,  respectively  on  basis  of  a  standardized  eight  hour  reference  period, 
simulating a work day.  

  Directive  2003/10/EC169  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  the 
minimum  health  and  safety  requirements  regarding  the  exposure  of  workers  to 
the risks arising from physical agents 

Lays  down  minimum  requirements  for  the  protection  of  workers  from  risks  to  their 
health and safety arising or likely to arise from exposure to peak sound pressure, daily 
noise  exposure  level  and  weekly  noise  exposure  level  and  in  particular,  the  risk  to 
hearing. 

  Directive  2009/104/EC170  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council 
concerning  the  minimum  safety  and  health  requirements  for  the  use  of  work 
equipment by workers at work 

Lays down minimum safety and health requirements for the use of work equipment by 
workers at work. 

13.2.5

  Cyber security and external threats 

  Directive 2008/114/EC171  of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
identification  and  designation  of  European  critical  infrastructure  and  the 
assessment of the need to improve their protection 

for 

Establishes  a  procedure 
identifying  and  designating  European  Critical 
Infrastructures (ECI) and a common approach for assessing the need to improve their 
protection.  It  applies  only  to  the  energy  and  transport  sectors.  The  Directive  also 
requires  owners/operators  of  designated  ECI  to  prepare  Operator  Security  Plans  and 
nominate  Security  Liaison  Officer.  Offshore  oil  and  gas  installations,  pipelines  and 
other relevant infrastructure are classified as critical infrastructure.  

  Directive  2016/1148/EU172    of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on 

Security of Network and Information Systems 

The  NIS  Directive  is  the  first  piece  of  EU-wide  legislation  on  cybersecurity.  It 
provides legal measures to boost the overall level of cybersecurity in the EU. It sets a 
notification  requirement  for  operators  of  essential  services  (OES)  in  various  sectors 
(including energy).  

169 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32003L0010 
170 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1542297208196&uri=CELEX:32009L0104 
171 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32008L0114 
172 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1540907629895&uri=CELEX:32016L1148 

250 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
13.2.6

  Whistle-blower protection 

  Directive (EU) 2019/1937173 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 
October 2019 on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law 
The Directive aims at strengthening the protection of persons reporting on breaches of 
Union law (whistle-blowers). It requires that Member States ensure the protection of 
reporting  persons  through  various  measures  such  as  offering  free  and  public 
independent  information  and  advice,  exempting  reporting  persons  from  liability, 
reversal  of  the  burden  of  proof,  as  well  as  ensuring  remedial  measures  against 
retaliation. 

13.3

  EU Regulations 

  Regulation (EC) No 864/2007174  of the European Parliament and of the Council 

on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations 

The  Rome  II  regulations  lays  down  uniform  rules  to  determine  which  national  law 
should  apply  to  settle  private  disputes  with  an  international  dimension  in  case  of 
claims related to non-contractual obligation. 

  Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012175 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on  jurisdiction  and  the  recognition  and  enforcement  of  judgments  in  civil  and 
commercial matters 

The recast Brussels I regulation seeks to facilitate access to justice, in particular by 
providing the rules on the jurisdiction of the courts and the rules on a rapid and simple 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters given in 
the Member States. 

  Regulation (EU) No 1257/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council on 

ship recycling 

Aims to reduce the negative impacts linked to the recycling of ships flying the flag of 
Member States of the Union. It lays down requirements that ships and recycling 
facilities have to fulfil in order to make sure that ship recycling takes place in an 
environment sound and safe manner. 

  Commission  Implementing  Regulation  (EU)  No  1112/2014176  determining  a 
common  format  for  sharing  of  information  on  major  hazard  indicators  by  the 
operators and owners of offshore oil and gas installations and a common format 
for the publication of the information on major hazard indicators by the Member 
States 

This  Regulation  specifies  common  formats  in  relation  to  reports  from  operators  and 
owners of offshore oil and gas installations to competent authorities of Member States 
(Art 23 OSD) and publication of information by Member States (Art 24 OSD). 

173 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32019L1937 
174 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32007R0864 
175 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=celex%3A32012R1215 
176 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1540983357254&uri=CELEX:32014R1112 

251 

 
 
 
                                                           
  Regulation  (EU)  2016/425177  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on 

personal protective equipment 

Ensures  common  standards  for  personal  protective  equipment  (PPE)  in  all  Member 
States in terms of protection of health and the safety of users, while enabling the free 
movement of PPE within the Union. 

13.4

  EU Decisions 

  Commission Decision of 2008/823/EC178 amending Decision 95/319/EC setting up 

a Committee of Senior Labour Inspectors 

The  Senior  Labour  Inspectors’  Committee  (SLIC)  (created  in  1982,  formally 
mandated in 1995) gives its opinion to be Commission on all problems relating to the 
enforcement by the Member States of Community law on health and safety at work. 

  Commission  Decision  2012/C  18/07179  on  “Setting  up  of  the  European  Union 

Offshore Oil and Gas Authorities Group” 

Creates  a  forum  for  the  exchange  of  information  and  expertise  between  National 
Authorities,  Third  Countries,  Industrial  Associations,  the  European  Commission  and 
other stakeholders on all issues relating to major accident prevention and response in 
offshore oil and gas operations. 

  Decision No 1313/2013/EU180 of the European Parliament and of the Council on a 

Union Civil Protection Mechanism 

The EU Civil Protection Mechanism was set up to enable coordinated assistance from 
the  participating  states  to  victims  of  natural  and  man-made  disasters  in  Europe  and 
elsewhere. The European Commission supports and complements the prevention and 
preparedness  efforts  of  participating  states  by  improving  the  quality  of  and 
accessibility  to  disaster  information,  encouraging  research  to  promote  disaster 
resilience, and reinforcing early warning tools. 

  Commission  Decision  2017/848181  laying  down  criteria  and  methodological 
standards on good environmental status of marine waters and specifications and 
standardized methods for monitoring and assessment 

Following Directive 2008/56/EC, this Decision lays down criteria and methodological 
standards  for  determining  “Good  Environmental  Status”  (GES).  Offshore  activities 
have to be taken into account by the MS when defining its GES because of the specific 
pressures they impose on the maritime environment. 

  Commission  Implementing  Decision  (EU)  2018/1906  of  30  November  2018  to 
update  the  European  List  of  ship  recycling  facilities  established  pursuant  to 
Regulation (EU) No 1257/2013 

177 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1542296783607&uri=CELEX:32016R0425 
178 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32008D0823 
179 https://euoag.jrc.ec.europa.eu/files/attachments/commission_decision_setting_up_euoag.pdf 
180 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1542299171864&uri=CELEX:32013D1313 
181 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1540902589365&uri=CELEX:32017D0848 

252 

 
 
 
                                                           
From 31 December 2018, large commercial seagoing vessels flying the flag of an EU 
Member  State  may  be  recycled  only  in  safe  ship  recycling  facilities  included  in  the 
European List of ship recycling facilities. 

13.5

  International conventions 
13.5.1

  Regional seas conventions  

 

International  Convention  for  the  Prevention  of  Pollution  from  Ships  1973  as 
modified by the Protocol, 1978 (MARPOL 73/78)182 

Aims at preserving the marine environment in an attempt to eliminate pollution by oil 
and other harmful substances and to minimize accidental spillage of such substances. 
All ships flagged under countries that are signatories to MARPOL are subject to the 
requirements of its six annexes, each of which deals with the regulation of a particular 
group of ship emissions. 
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS)183, 1974 

 

Sets  minimum  safety  standards  in  the  construction,  equipment  and  operation  of 
merchant ships.  

  Nordic  Environmental  Protection  Convention184  between  Denmark,  Finland, 

Norway and Sweden, 1974 

The conventions aims at safeguarding environmental interests in the case of nuisances 
arising  from  environmentally  harmful  activities  implemented  in  other  Contracting 
States. 

  Barcelona Convention185 for the  Protection  of the Marine Environment and the 

Coastal Region of the Mediterranean, 1976  

The  22  Contracting  Parties,  under  UNEP's  umbrella  are  working  to  protect  the 
Mediterranean  marine  and  coastal  environment  while  boosting  regional  and  national 
plans to achieve sustainable development. 

  Basel  Convention  on  the  Control  of  Transboundary  Movements  of  Hazardous 

Wastes and their Disposal, 1989 
The  Basel  Convention  is  relevant  for  ship  dismantling,  as  a  ship  that  is  sent  for 
scrapping  usually  contains  hazardous  materials  and  may  be  (hazardous)  waste.  The 
Conferences  of  the  Parties  (COPs)  of  the  Basel  Convention  have  adopted  Technical 
Guidelines and various decisions on this issue. 

  Helsinki Convention186, on the protection of the marine environment of the Baltic 

sea area, 1992  

182 http://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/International-Convention-for-the-
Prevention-of-Pollution-from-Ships-(MARPOL).aspx 
183 http://www.imo.org/en/about/conventions/listofconventions/pages/international-convention-for-the-safety-of-
life-at-sea-(solas),-1974.aspx 
184 https://www.ecolex.org/details/treaty/nordic-environmental-protection-convention-tre-000491/ 
185 http://www.ypeka.gr/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=30r%2b7BeaSOo%3d&tabid=406 

253 

 
 
                                                           
Covers the entire Baltic Sea area, including inland waters as well as the water of the 
sea itself and the seabed. Measures are also taken in the entire catchment area of the 
Baltic Sea to reduce land-based pollution. 

  Bucharest  convention187  on  the  Protection  of  the  Black  Sea  against  Pollution, 

1992 

The basic legal framework for regional cooperation to protect the coastal and marine. 
The European Commission supports financially projects related to marine and coastal 
environmental  monitoring  in  the  Black  Sea.  The  EU  is  negotiating  since  2009  its 
accession to the Convention. 

  “Offshore  Protocol”188  for  the  Protection  of  the  Mediterranean  Sea  against 
Pollution  Resulting  from  Exploration  and  Exploitation  of  the  Continental  Shelf 
and the Seabed and its Subsoil, 1994 ( and Council Decision of 17 December 2012 
on the accession of the European Union [to the Offshore Protocol]) 

Protocol  of the  United Nations Environment Programme whose parties  agree to  take 
all  appropriate  measures  to  prevent,  abate,  combat  and  control  pollution  in  the 
Protocol Area resulting from activities concerning exploration and exploitation of the 
resources 

  OSPAR decision 98/3189 on disposal of disused offshore facilities, 1998  

Prohibits  the  dumping,  leaving  wholly  or  partly  in  place  of  disused  offshore 
installations. 

13.5.2

  International and regional acquis pertinent for claims for damages  from an 
offshore oil or gas incident 

  International  Convention  on  Civil  Liability  for  Oil  Pollution  Damage190  (Civil 

Liability Convention), 1992 

The  registered  ship-owner  has  strict  liability  for  pollution  damage  caused  by  the 
escape or discharge of persistent oil from his ship. This means that he is liable even in 
the absence of fault on his part (with exceptions). The ship-owner is normally entitled 
to limit his liability to an amount determined by the size of the ship. 

  International  Convention  on  the  Establishment  of  an  International  Fund  for 

Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage191 (Fund Convention), 1992 

186 
http://www.helcom.fi/Documents/About%20us/Convention%20and%20commitments/Helsinki%20Convention/
Helsinki%20Convention_July%202014.pdf 
187 http://www.blacksea-commission.org/_convention-fulltext.asp 
188 https://wedocs.unep.org/rest/bitstreams/2336/retrieve 
189https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=2ahUKEwi4g97tgPTlAhWQ
DuwKHR6nD54QFjAAegQIBRAI&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.ospar.org%2Fdocuments%3Fv%3D6875&us
g=AOvVaw3wlKkLy5ub3yrRwGVf7COm 
190 https://www.iopcfunds.org/about-us/legal-framework/1992-civil-liability-convention/ 

254 

 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Establishes  a  regime  for  compensating  victims  when  compensation  under  the  1992 
CLC is  not  available or is  inadequate.  It  sets  up the 1992  International Oil Pollution 
Compensation Fund, which pays compensation when the damage exceeds the limit of 
the  ship  owners’  liability  under  the  1992  CLC,  the  ship-owner  is  exempted  from 
liability under the 1992 CLC, or the ship-owner is financially incapable of meeting his 
obligations. 

  Offshore Protocol to the Barcelona Convention for the protection of the marine 
environment  and  the  coastal  region  of  the  Mediterranean192  (Offshore 
Protocol), 1994 

Sets  criteria  for  the  Protection  of  the  Mediterranean  Sea  against  Pollution  Resulting 
from  Exploration  and  Exploitation  of  the  Continental  Shelf  and  the  Seabed  and  its 
Subsoil.  The  parties  must  ensure  that  the  best  available  techniques,  environmentally 
effective  and  economically  appropriate,  are  used  so  that  offshore  activities  do  not 
cause pollution. It has not yet entered into force. 

  International  Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil  Pollution  Damage193 

(Bunker Oil Pollution Convention), 2001 

Ensures that adequate, prompt, and effective compensation is available to persons who 
suffer  damage  caused  by  spills  of  oil,  when  carried  as  fuel  in  ships'  bunkers.  The 
Convention applies to damage caused on the territory, including the territorial sea, and 
in exclusive economic zones of States Parties.  

  Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in 

civil and commercial matters194 (Lugano Convention), 2007 

Concerns issues of jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments between the European 
Union  member  states  and  Iceland,  Switzerland  and  Norway  according  to  the  same 
principles as set by the 2001 Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement 
of judgments in civil and commercial matters. 

  Hong  Kong  Convention  for  the  Safe  and  Environmentally  Sound  Recycling  of 

Ships, 2009 
Adopted  by  the  International  Maritime  Organisation,  this  convention  has  not  yet 
entered  into  force.  The  Convention  takes  a  “cradle  to  grave  approach”  and  will 
regulate  all aspects  of the life  cycle of ships  with the aim to  facilitate their safe and 
environmentally sound recycling. 

  International  Maritime  Organization’s  Code 

the  Construction  and 
Equipment of Mobile Offshore Drilling Units195 (MODU Code), 2009 as amended 
by Resolution MSC.359(92) of 21 June 2013 

for 

191http://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/International-Convention-on-the-
Establishment-of-an-International-Fund-for-Compensation-for-Oil-Pollution-Damage-(FUND).aspx 
192 https://www.informea.org/en/treaties/offshore-protocol/text 
193http://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/International-Convention-on-Civil-
Liability-for-Bunker-Oil-Pollution-Damage-%28BUNKER%29.aspx 
194 http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/downloadFile.do?fullText=yes&treatyTransId=13041 
195 http://www.imo.org/en/Publications/Documents/Supplements%20and%20CDs/English/I810E_122014.pdf 

255 

 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
(7) 
The  code  applies  to  mobile  offshore  units  constructed  on  or  after  1  January 
2012 and details recommended design criteria, construction standards and other safety 
measures for mobile offshore drilling units so as to minimize the risk to such units, to 
the personnel on board and to the environment. 

13.6

  Others (e.g. resolutions, agreements etc.) 

  Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 13 September 2005,  Commission of 
the  European  Communities  v  Council  of  the  European  Union,196  Case  C-176/03 
(ECLI:EU:C:2005:542) 

Ruled that the Community legislature can provide for criminal-law measures when the 
application  of  effective,  proportionate  and  dissuasive  criminal  penalties  by  the 
competent  national  authorities  is  an  essential  measure  for  combating  serious 
environmental offences. 

  European Parliament resolution on facing the challenges of the safety of offshore 

oil and gas activities197 (2011/2072(INI)) 

Stresses that all Member States' legislative and regulatory frameworks should adopt a 
robust  regime  in  line  with  the  current  best  practice  where  all  drilling  proposals  are 
accompanied by a safety case, which must be approved before operations can begin. 

  Report  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  on 
liability, compensation and financial security for  offshore oil and gas operations 
pursuant to Article 39 of Directive 2013/30/EU198  

An  overview  of  how  liability  for  damage  from  offshore  accidents  in  oil  and  gas 
prospection, exploration and production is addressed in the EU: who is liable for what 
kinds  of  damage  and  loss  to  whom;  second,  how  to  ensure  that  liable  parties  have 
sufficient  financial  capacity  and  third,  how  compensation  should  be  most  efficiently 
disbursed. 

  Commission  staff  working  document  on  Liability,  Compensation  and  Financial 

Security for Offshore Accidents in the European Economic Area199  

This  document,  and  the  Report  to  the  European  Parliament  and  Council  it 
accompanies, aim to present an overview of these issues and propose ways in which 
the European Union (EU) could address any shortcomings that may exist in the current 
legal  frameworks  for  liability  for  civil  damage  resulting  from  offshore  oil  and  gas 
operations. 

  European Parliament resolution on liability, compensation and financial security 

for offshore oil and gas operations (2015/2352(INI))200  

196 http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-176/03 
197http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2011-
0366+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN 
198 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52015DC0422 
199 https://euoag.jrc.ec.europa.eu/files/attachments/celex_52015sc0167_en_txt.pdf 
200 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2016-0478_EN.html?redirect 

256 

 
 
                                                           
Parliament  stresses  that  the  effective  application  of  the  ‘polluter  pays’  principle  to 
offshore oil and gas operations should extend not only to the costs of preventing and 
remedying  environmental  damage,  but  also  to  the  costs  of  remedying  traditional 
damage  claims,  in  line  with  the  precautionary  principle  and  the  principle  of 
sustainable development. 

  European  Parliament 
(2017/2055(INI))201 

resolution  on 

International  ocean  governance 

The European Parliament adopted by 558 votes to 25, with 83 abstentions, a resolution 
on  international  ocean  governance:  an  agenda  for  the  future  of  our  oceans,  in  the 
context of SDG 14 of the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. 

  Best  Available  Techniques  Guidance  Document  on  upstream  hydrocarbon 

exploration and production Techniques202   

The  Hydrocarbons  Guidance  Document  addresses  13  onshore  and  10  offshore 
activities of the oil and gas-extracting sector that have the potentially highest impact 
on  the  environment  and  human  health.  These  include  handling  of  drill  cuttings, 
chemicals and hydrocarbons or management of fugitive emissions. 

The  identified  best  practices  in  the  document  are  intended  to  serve  as  guidance  for 
organisations  engaged  in  hydrocarbons  activities  and  for  the  regulatory/permitting 
authorities to draw upon when planning new facilities or carrying out modifications to 
existing facilities, planning changes and investments, as well as in permitting activities 
across the European Union 

201 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2018-0004_EN.html?redirect 
202 https://ec.europa.eu/info/news/new-commission-guidance-how-consider-environment-hydrocarbon-
extraction-2019-apr-09_en 

257 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
14  ANNEX VI: LIABILITY, FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND COMPENSATION CLAIMS 

14.1

  Views  from  stakeholders  on  liability,  handling  of  compensation  claims  and 

financial security 

14.1.1

  Liability – views from the industry 

The  oil  company  trade  association,  IOGP,  has  consulted  with  its  representative 
associations  around  the  EU  and  EEA,  and  submitted  a  consultative  paper  on  the 
subject for the EU-wide industry sector as a whole. The operators believe that existing 
liability regimes in the Member States are adequate and aligned with the polluter pays 
principle. Whilst there are differences in the way Member States approach liability for 
offshore  accidents  there  is  no  evidence  that  any  of  the  existing  liability  regimes  are 
less effective in dealing with possible claims arising from offshore incidents. 

Regarding  pure  economic  loss,  the  industry  position  is  that  excessive  and 
disproportionate  liability  should  be  avoided  to  prevent  an  unreasonable  burden  on 
economic  actors.  In  those  limited  national  arrangements  of  strict  liability  for  pure 
economic  losses,  the  liability  is  limited  to  a  financial  cap,  or  by  the  nature  of  the 
claims which are accepted e.g. the Oil Pollution Act 1990 (OPA 90)203, applicable to 
oil spills in the Gulf of Mexico. It stipulates strict liability, but such liability is limited 
to US$133.65 million. 

In  the  opinion  of  industry,  legal  traditions  determine  how  the  justice  systems  of 
Member  States  distinguish  between  legitimate  claims  and  ordinary  risks  faced  by 
participants in the economy. The ability to address recovery of pure economic loss is 
currently  within  the  power  of  Member  States  and  should  remain  there.  In  industry’s 
view, each Member State is best placed to assess potential “gaps” in its current legal 
and  regulatory  framework  and  implement  appropriate  measures  to  comply  with  the 
already  existing  obligations  in  the  Directive  (Article  4).  Furthermore,  the  Brussels  I 
and  the  Rome  II  Regulations  help  prevent  potential  differences  in  national  regimes 
from disadvantaging claimants in different Member States. 

According  to  the  views  from  industrial  associations,  any  harmonisation  of  civil 
liability  regimes  would  also  run  counter  to  the  key  goal-setting  principles  in  the 
Directive,  which  establish  performance  and  legal  objectives  to  be  achieved,  while 
giving  operators  and  competent  authorities  the  flexibility  to  decide  on  the  most 
appropriate tool to achieve such objectives. 

14.1.2

  Handling of compensation claims – views from the industry 

The operators point out that national systems have worked well thus far and there are 
no indications that historic offshore pollution incidents from oil and gas operations in 
Europe were not adequately handled.  They were not aware of any example where a 
large group of claimants that were directly impacted by a pollution event from oil and 

203 https://legcounsel.house.gov/Comps/Oil%20Pollution%20Act%20Of%201990.pdf 

258 

 
 
 
                                                           
gas operations,  did  not  receive  adequate protection. The fact  that OPOL  (see below) 
has never needed to be invoked since its formation in 1974 is also an indicator of the 
adequacy of handling previous incidents. It is also repeated that the Brussels I and the 
Rome  II  Regulations  aim  to  prevent  potential  differences  in  national  regimes  from 
disadvantaging claimants in different EU Member States.   

Industry agrees that all licensees should have arrangements in place for the prompt and 
adequate  handling  of  valid  compensation  claims  as  required  by  the  Directive.  For 
example, the UK requires each licensee to  have  and maintain membership of OPOL 
plus  any  additional  financial  capacity  determined  as  necessary  by  the  licensing 
authority and to  assure this status  at all times  whilst  the licensee has an interest  in  a 
license. One of the conditions of OPOL membership is an obligation of transparency 
of financial status. 

IOGP members are particularly concerned about the repeated calls to introduce strict, 
broad  and  unlimited  liability  for  pure  economic  loss.  Given  there  is  no  history  of 
inadequate  compensation  or  handling  of  offshore  pollution  claims  in  Europe,  they 
believe  there  is  no  compelling  case  to  overturn  centuries  of  case  law  and  legal 
principles developed in every one of the Member States without having considered the 
cost impacts on the sector and the potential knock-on effect on security of supply in 
the EU. I their view, such actions require clear policy reasons for doing so that have 
not been identified let alone demonstrated to exist. 

14.1.3

  Financial security – views from the industry 

In  IOGP’s  views  there  are  regulators  in  the  EU  who  have  implemented  financial 
responsibility  requirements,  which  are  robust  and  workable.  An  example  of  this  are 
the  “Liability  Provision  Guidelines  for  Offshore  Petroleum  Operations”204  published 
by Oil  & Gas  UK in 2018. The Guidelines contain a simple yet objective method to 
determine the level of financial responsibility to  be maintained by licensees for their 
operations  to  cover  the  costs  of  bringing  a  well  under  control,  clean-up  costs  and 
potential third-party compensation. It uses data which in any case must be prepared as 
part of the OPEP (Oil Pollution Emergency plan).   

The guidelines also clearly identify the type of financial instruments acceptable to the 
regulator to satisfy the regulatory requirements.   

In  the  UK  licensees  can  use  different  financial  instruments  to  demonstrate  financial 
responsibility.  The  levels  of  financial  responsibility  to  be  maintained  were  set  based 
on  the  results  of  an  oil  spill  cost  modelling  performed  by  an  external  consultant  to 
provide assurance that these are adequate. They vary based on the assessed exposure 
which  is  mainly  influenced  by  reservoir  characteristics,  well  fluids,  potential  direct 
loss or damage suffered by users of the polluted sea areas including fishermen, length 
of coastline impacted and the estimated volume of oil that may land on the shoreline 
and associated clean up and remediation costs.  

204 https://oilandgasuk.co.uk/product/liability-provision-guidelines-for-offshore-petroleum-operations/ 

259 

 
 
                                                           
For  higher  exposure  wells  licensees  may  be  required  to  demonstrate  financial 
responsibility up to approximately USD 1.5 bn – between USD 100 mln to USD 300 
mln for well control and up to USD 1.2b n for clean-up and third-party compensation 
costs.  The  Oil  Spill  cost  study  however  concluded  that  for  most  wells  on  the  UK’s 
continental shelf USD 250 mln should be sufficient to cover clean-up and third-party 
compensation costs. For high exposure wells the levels of financial responsibility to be 
maintained and demonstrated is in excess of the compensation available for spills from 
oil vessels.  In this  context  it  is  interesting to  note that the historic oil spills  from  oil 
tanker  accidents  were  generally  worse  in  terms  of  volume  of  oil  released  from  well 
blow-outs (except for a handful of other well incidents).  

The  UK  model  has  since  informed  requirements  in  other  jurisdictions  inside  and 
outside  the  EU  (e.g.  Denmark,  Ireland,  Cyprus,  Italy,  Australia  and  New  Zealand) 
which stipulate exposure based financial responsibility requirements and allow the use 
of different financial instruments (including insurance, guarantees and self-insurance) 
to  demonstrate compliance. Hence,  IOGP believes  the UK model provides sufficient 
guidelines  to  help  other  Member  States  shape  financial  responsibility  requirements 
adequate  for  their  environment.  They  consider  it  demonstrates  that  adequate 
requirements can be stipulated and implemented at the level of each Member State. 

14.1.4

  Views from non-governmental associations (NGOs) 

The  Bellona  Foundation  joined  the  September  2018  workshop  on  the  assessment. 
Subsequently  Bellona  drew  together  a  small  corps  of  colleague  organisations  that 
made  representations  on  liability  matters.  The  group  comprised  Bellona,  Surfrider 
Foundation Europe, Friends of the Earth Europe, Nature and Youth, Young Friends of 
the  Earth,  and  WWF.  A  separate  submission  was  initially  made  by  Surfrider  that 
coincided  with  the  public  consultation.    It  called  for  a  financial  and  liability 
mechanism similar to the International Oil Pollution Compensation fund (IOPC) with 
start-up funds to be put in place.  

In March 2019, the corps of NGO has made a group submission, going further but also 
echoing  Surfrider’s  earlier  paper  calling  for  a  moratorium  on  offshore  activities  in 
marine protected areas and other sensitive areas.  

The  notable  contributions  on  liability  and  financial  responsibility  asked  that  the 
Commission’s 2015 report and the Parliament’s Resolution of 2016 be taken forward 
to a clear conclusion with concomitant requests that “…civil liability schemes now be 
uplifted  in  all  Member  States  to  global  best  practice  levels.  This  must  also  include 
some recognition of pure economic loss”. The group draws attention to its view that 
vast  economic  losses  can  currently  be  inflicted  upon  marine  and  coastal  economies 
that may go largely uncompensated, and which situation must be remedied. 

The group calls for  a strong obligation for adequate financial  capacity of the license 
holder  to  be  maintained  in  all  situations,  including  insolvency,  where  currently  such 
matters are merely ‘to be taken into account’. 

260 

 
 
14.1.5

  Views from the insurance sector 

Damage to bio diversity offshore is complex to assess and quantify and many insurers 
do  not  insure  them.  Furthermore,  according  to  the  International  Union  of  Marine 
Insurance  (IUMI)  the  insurance  market  for  offshore  operations  is  complex  and  may 
involve  several  parties  insuring  the  risk  of  one  operator.  Although  the  insurance 
market  is  global  its  financial  capacity  is  nevertheless  limited:  there  is  in  effect  an 
overall pot of money for insuring all risks everywhere. This means that insurers may 
not be ready to divert part of the fund to provide cover in the offshore sector, if faced 
with  disproportionate  exposure  or  a  client  base  unwilling  or  unable  to  pay  for  that 
insurance.  Since  rules  on  litigation  and  liability  vary  substantially  between 
jurisdictions, barriers for involvement in this business are high.  

Overall, it is  not  felt that  sufficient  time  elapsed since the introduction of the  “well-
intentioned”  Directive  to  allow  it  to  have  had  discernible  or  measurable  effect.    The 
requirement was for all EU Member States’ to transpose the Directive by 19 July 2015 
but several Member States were late. Equally, the Directive has only been applied to 
existing  installations  since  July  2018.  Overall,  it  would  appear  premature  for  any 
modification to be made, which would lead to more legal uncertainty and change. 

According to Insurance Europe, Member States’ liability regimes reflect long-standing 
cultural  and  societal  choices  concerning  legal  responsibility  and  obligations  to 
compensate  for  harm  caused,  and  have  usually  been  confirmed  by  national 
democratically  elected  legislatures.  They  are  well  established  and  predictable, 
facilitating the availability of legal liability insurance and other financial instruments 
to cover such liabilities.  

There is considerable wariness over suggestions that an EU-wide liability regime for 
offshore  activities  could  be  overlain  on  Member  States’  existing  laws.  Insurance 
stakeholders consider that there is no certainty over how such a novel system would 
work  in  practice  and  whether  it  would  work  to  the  advantage  of  claimants.  National 
courts would retain discretion over the application of the regime and could interpret it 
in  different  ways,  removing  any  prospect  of  a  harmonised  European  approach.  The 
outcomes  of  such  a  regime  would  be  unpredictable,  reducing  the  insurability  of 
operators’ liability risk because the pricing of cover would be difficult. It is probable 
that  any  such  regime  would  therefore  lead  to  a  reduction  in  the  availability  of 
insurance and other financial instruments to operators.  

Insurance  Europe  does  not  see  advantages  in  legislating  to  handle  compensation 
claims  at  EU  rather  than  Member  States  level.  This  would  shift  responsibility  for 
dealing with offshore incidents causing injury and damage from member states to the 
EU.  Such  incidents  are  not  necessarily  straightforward  and  any  problems,  such  as 
delays  in  providing  compensation  to  claimants,  could  cause  the  EU  serious 
reputational harm. Responsibility for the handling of compensation claims should be 
at  Member  States  level,  alongside  responsibility  for  regulating  the  offshore  energy 
industry: there is no evidence that compensation could be more effectively handled at 
the EU-level. 

261 

 
 
International  Underwriting 
The  organisation  Lloyd's  Market  Association  & 
Association of London agrees fully with IUMI that sufficient time has not yet elapsed 
since  the  introduction  of  the  Directive  to  allow  it  to  have  had  discernible  or 
measurable effect. 

Lloyd’s  emphasises  the  insurance  market  for  energy  risks  is  complex.  Typically,  a 
panel  of  underwriters  are  involved  in  providing  risk  transfer  capacity  in  respect  of 
individual policies. An individual policy will usually insure the interest and liability of 
a single entity/assured. It is very common for a number of entities to be involved as 
co-ventures in the drilling of a well. Thus, several insurance policies may be required 
in order to ensure that the 100% venture interest is insured. Furthermore, a policy will 
typically provide coverage in  respect of the asset and expenses and liabilities arising 
therefrom. Thus, a policy may provide multi-coverages such as physical damage, well 
control, clean-up and containment and legal liabilities. 

In  addition  to  insurers  operating  in  the  commercial  insurance  markets,  some  oil  and 
gas  companies  make  use  of  mutual  (re)insurance  mechanisms  and  captive  insurance 
companies.  It  is  possible  that  use  of  such  mechanisms  could  increase  in  order  to 
mitigate  the  impact  of  increased  compulsory  insurance.  These  (re)insurers  may  be 
subject to a different regulatory regime than commercial market insurers.  

There  has  not  been  a  major  oil  pollution  incident  from  offshore  activity  since  the 
Macondo  incident.  Whilst  Macondo  reportedly  cost  BP  and  co-liable  entities  US$72 
billion,  there  is  no  reliable  estimation  to  what  a  big  incident  in  Europe  might  cost. 
Such an event would be definitive in identifying how far insurance can help. 

The  insurance  industry  is  providing  up  to  $750  million  of  insured  indemnity  for  a 
limited number of insured parties. From the Willis Towers Watson loss database205, a 
data  base  of  energy  losses  in  the  world,  it  is  noted  that  a  ‘blowout  without  fire’, 
occurring in the UK in 2012, settled for a total of c. US$469m (€418m). The top event 
is Macondo (2010) where the pay-out is listed at US$2.56bn (€2.28) – presumably the 
liable  entity  was  not  BP  for  these  losses.  The  second  event  is  for  platform  damage 
during  Hurricane  Katrina  (2005),  where  the  total  pay-out  is  listed  as  US$1.4bn 
(€1.25bn).  

However, if it is the case that the market can provide a maximum of US$1-3 billion 
liability cover, as has been suggested by experts, then that gives a pointer as to where 
legal  limits  of  liability  on  an  operator  might  be  set.  These  boundaries  appear  within 
reach  of  liabilities  for  the  Macondo,  Katrina  and  Elgin  Franklin  major  incidents 
appearing  on  the  Willis  Loss  database.  However,  the  major  operators  concerned  in 
those disasters hold a significant amount of self-insurance so the database points only 
to  the  market  coverage.  Nevertheless,  it  might  be  possible  in  the  future  to  increase 
capacity  and  insurance  limits  but  that  would  only  be  possible  with  substantial 
increases of premium. 

It I appears that there is no need to modify the Directive due to the limited time that 
has  lapsed  since  its  introduction  and  the  absence  of  incidents.    There  can  be  no 
guarantee that the insurance industry will be ready, willing and able to provide cover 

205https://www.willis.com/Documents/Publications/Industries/Energy/2155_energy%20_loss_database.pdf 

262 

 
 
                                                           
to protect participants engaged in offshore exploration for oil and gas in the EU if they 
are faced with disproportionate exposures, restricted terms and a client base unwilling 
or unable to pay for it. They will seek to deploy their capital elsewhere. 

The insurance sector summarises some key points to be considered as follows: 

• 

• 

• 

In  any  offshore  operation  there  are  many  different  players,  ranging  from  major  oil 
companies to vessel operators, drilling contractors to catering subcontractors and soil 
analysts.  Offshore  oil  activity  is  not  like  an  onshore  factory  where  the  operation  is 
controlled entirely by the owner. 

The  operator’s  legal  responsibilities  both  to  third  parties  and  to  each  other  are  very 
complex and are generally regulated by  contract  with  "knock for knock"  agreements 
and indemnities inter se. The terms of those contacts and the limits within them reflect 
the appetite for risk of the parties and, to some extent, their ability to insure. 

It  would  be  wrong  to  assume  that  everyone  in  the  energy  industry  is  a  substantial 
company  well  able  to  meet  any  claim  from  its  own  resources  (although  the  biggest 
can) or that they can necessarily buy insurance to protect themselves.   

Where there is currently little or no legislation within a Member State, Lloyd's Market 
Association & International Underwriting Association would support the introduction 
of a uniform approach to offshore safety.  The association’s committees are unsure of 
the  current  status  of  the  Directive’s  integration  into  individual  Member  States’ 
legislature and see no reason to modify the Directive now, when taking into account 
the limited time that has elapsed since its introduction. 

14.2

  Reference documents 

The following documents are relevant to the subject of Liability, Financial Responsibility and 
Compensation Claims in the sector of offshore oil and gas activities.  

  European Parliament Resolution of 1 December 2016 on Liability, Compensation and 

Financial Security for Offshore oil and gas operations (2015/2352(INI))206. 

  REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND 
THE COUNCIL on liability, compensation and financial security for offshore oil and 
gas  operations  pursuant  to  Article  39  of  Directive  2013/30/EU  {SWD(2015)  167 
final}207 

  Commission  Staff  Working  Document  on  Liability,  Compensation  and  Financial 

Security for Offshore Accidents in the European Economic Area208 

206 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+TA+P8-TA-2016-
0478+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN 
207 https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2015/EN/1-2015-422-EN-F1-1.PDF 
208 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52015SC0167&from=EN 

263 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
15 

ANNEX VII: STATISTICAL BACKGROUND INFORMATION 

15.1

  Oil and gas industry’s activity 2010 – 2020 

Figure 1: 10-year trend of Brent Crude price (US$/barrel) 

(Year high: 2012 $128.14; Year low: 2020 $14.85) 

 Source: Macrotrends209 

209 Marcotrends, 2020. Brent Crude Oil Prices – 10 Year Daily Chart, Retrieved from:  
https://www.macrotrends.net/2480/brent-crude-oil-prices-10-year-daily-chart.  

264 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
15.2

  Accidents and incidents and international benchmarking 

Table 1: Total recordable injury rate by region (2014-2018) 

Source: IOGP210 

Table 2: Fatal accident rate by region (2014-2018) 

Source: IOGP211 

210 IOGP, (2019). Safety performance indicators –2018 data,  Retrieved from: 
file:///C:/Users/kneebja/Downloads/2018s.pdf.   
211 IOGP, (2019). Safety performance indicators –2018 data,  Retrieved from: 
file:///C:/Users/kneebja/Downloads/2018s.pdf.   

265 

 
 
 
 
   
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Figure 2: Lost time injury frequency by region (2014/2018) 

Source: IOGP212 

Table 3: Total recorded injury rate – European countries (2016-2018) 

(Not all MS’ report to this database) 

Source: IOGP213 

212 IOGP, (2019). Safety performance indicators –2018 data,  Retrieved from: 
file:///C:/Users/kneebja/Downloads/2018s.pdf.   
213 IOGP, (2019). Safety performance indicators –2018 data,  Retrieved from: 
file:///C:/Users/kneebja/Downloads/2018s.pdf.   

266 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Table 4: Worst blowout spills 1977 – 2012 

Key: 

EU / Norway blowouts 

IRF (non EU) blowouts 

Installation/Field 

Year 

Country/Area 

Loss (upper) 

Ekofisk Bravo 

1977 

Norway/North Sea 

Sedco 135F/Ixtoc 

1979 

Mexico/Campeche Bay 

28kT 

480kT 

Ron  Tappmeyer/  Hasba 
Well #6 

1980 

Iran/Iranian Gulf 

19 souls / 260kT 

Funiwa #5 

1980 

Nigeria/Niger Delta 

Nowruz Platform 

1983 

Iran/Iranian Gulf 

27kT 

267kT 

Ocean Odyssey 

1988 

UK North Sea 

NA (ignited condensate) 

Timbalier Bay 

1992 

USA/Gulf of Mexico 

38kT 

Temsah Platform 

2004 

Egypt / S Mediterranean 

NA (ignited gas) 

Mississippi 

Canyon 

platform* 

2004-now  USA/Gulf of Mexico 

Seadrill/Montara 

2009 

Australia/East Timor Sea 

Deepwater 

Horizon/ 

Macondo 

2010 

USA / Gulf of Mexico 

Elgin Franklin 

2012 

UK / North Sea 

1-490kT 

30kT 

654kT 

6kT 

* Platform destroyed by Hurricane Ivan in 2004. Production wells appear to continue to leak following removal 

of structure. Extent of spill is disputed between company (Taylor Energy, who claim no more can be 
done, and seeps, if any, are unrelated) and US regulators / NGO’s 

Source: European Commission214 

Between 1977 and 2012 there are data available on 12 major offshore blowouts, three 
of which took place in the North Sea. Therefore, the baseline rate of a major blowout 
occurring since 1977 was 1 incident  in  3  years for all countries;  1 in  4  years in  IRF 

214 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A52011PC0688  

267 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
countries; and 1 in 12 years North Sea until 2012. There do not appear to have been 
any blowouts causing major spills since 2012. 

There  is  no  established  trend  in  any  of  the  quantitative  indicators  of  major  accident 
prevention performance, given the lack of maturity in this regime that came fully into 
effect just recently in July2018.  

Figures  below  show  the  number  of  oil  spills  normalised  per  unit  hydrocarbon 
production by region. Rates for 2017 varied from 0.1 to 1.8 spills per million tonnes of 
production.  The  notable  reduction  in  the  number  of  spills  and  quantity  released 
onshore  in  the  Russia  &  Central  Asia  region  in  2016  is  due  to  a  change  in  the 
companies participating.  

It's  evident  that  Europe  has  below  average  accidental  spills  of  oil  from  petroleum 
operations, but it should always be noted that land spills are more frequent, in global 
terms  and  that  Europe’s  production  is  primarily  offshore.  Other  data  used  by  IOGP 
indicates  that  the  reporting  of  spills  to  the  statutory  agency  is  higher  in  Europe  than 
elsewhere (probably except Australia and Canada, which states are included in a much 
wider region. 

15.3

  Total running costs of duty holders for implementation of the  Directive 

Table 5: MODU running costs in Euro (in thousands) – North Sea fleet 

All sums €000 

Max/Rig  

Min/Rig 

Average/rig 

Totals for 37 rigs 

3.62 

4.48 

16.48 

0.448 

4.40 

n/a 

Internal* 

External 

26.88 

291.20 

OSDR - Review 

84.00 

Oil Spill Plans 

Other Costs** 

11.2 

22.42 

n/a 

Other running 

costs 

Total 

Annual running costs after discounting for RoMH ***  

*calculated at €67.20/hr 

** e.g. supporting rigs working in other EU MS’ 

11.42 

54.92 

36.9 

3.57 

9.55 

116.36 

117.60 

233.96 

208.13 

422.69 

2,032.03 

1,365.08 

132.12 

353.46 

4,305.38 

4,351.20 

8,656.58 

7,700.81 

*** allowing for 5 year acceptance cycle of MODU’s -€25.83k/MODU 

Source: IADC 

268 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This  part  attempts  to  calculate  the  one-off  costs  for  duty  holders  and  the  annualised 
running costs for complying with the Directive. The table was generated from a data 
sample of 34 rigs from the North Sea fleet of 37 rigs. For the operator community, no 
data is available from the UK North Sea, either from operators or regulators. It does 
not appear that any detailed calculations were made of uplift in running costs or one-
off implementation costs that support claims by some North Sea operators that costs of 
introducing the Directive have been excessive.  

UK  has  supplied  an  impact  assessment  (Figure  below,  expressed  in  £  sterling)  for 
introducing the Directive which  accompanied the regulator’s application to  legislate. 
The UK has 55% of EU North Sea installations, and 76% of North Sea production. We 
assume that the UK carries 66% of the North Sea costs. 

From  the  figure  below  we  take  the  UK  estimate  of  €119,758k  (i.e.  converted  from 
£sterling)  in  costs  relating  to  introducing  and  running  the  changed  legislation 
introduced  by  the  safety  regulator,  HSE.  We  obtained  further  particulars  that 
accumulated  additional  costs  of  €  48,638k  from  legislation  introduced  by  the 
environmental regulator of the joint CA, and some additional CA surveys. Therefore, 
we use an estimated 10-year present value of € 163,309k for costs to industry. 

From  the  impact  assessment,  we  also  note  costs  to  government  of  €3,287  and  €202 
giving a total cost of €166,798. Note that this is a 10-year present value sum. 

Of this sum, the annual uplifted running costs are estimated at €15.53m, and the one-
off (transitional) costs are €65,025. 

Therefore, in the circumstances  of having no  current  data provided by  industry, it is 
preferred to use the UK 2014 impact assessment made prior to the national legislation 
coming  into  effect.  From  this  a  further  estimation  of  North  Sea  equivalent  costs  is 
made. 

Table 6: Cost summary for MODUs for implementing the Offshore Safety Directive 

One-off costs (over 4 years transition) 

€65,025k 

UK 

North Sea 

€98,523k 

Annual running costs uplift 

€15,530k/yr 

€23,530k/yr 

Total transition + year 1 running cost 

€80,555 

Total (10 year present value) 

€166,798k 

€122,053 

€252,724k 

Not including the directly incurred operating expenditure, operators and owners will, 
in  most  MS’,  be  required  to  reimburse  the  competent  authority  their  administrative 
costs.  Those  costs  are  highly  variable  for  reasons  such  as  the  quality  of  the  initially 
submitted RoMH, the findings of inspections, and investigations etc. Estimates from 
some individual owners suggests a MODU assessment of a RoMH is billed on average 

269 

 
 
 
 
 
 
at €56.0k – 60k/MODU. An average value for the North Sea fleet of €36.90k/MODU 
or €1,356k for the fleet (of 37 installations), was used. 

270 

 
 
 
Table 7: Summary of costs to industry from implementing the Offshore Safety Directive in the UK 

Source: IOGP/UK HSE 

Southern seas 

It is estimated that the owners of the 7 MODU’s operating in the southern seas incur 
costs that are pro rata with the 37 analogues in the North Sea, namely, €1,456.91/yr. 

It's noted that the one-off costs for owners in the North Sea appear to come to €3,108k 
and assume similar pro rata costs for the 7 MODU’s in the southern seas therefore are 
€588.00k. 

Some  very  limited  data  were  obtained  from  the  southern  seas  region  that  we  are 
unable to post in this report as it was received on a Commercial in Confidence basis. 
Nevertheless,  this  data  was  used  to  calculate  a  figure  for  industry  costs  comprising 
one-off and first year running costs total of €83,614-88,642k.  

This calculation has a large error range by virtue of the limited data that we were able 
to  source.  It  is  also  noted  that  the  southern  seas  region  has  30%  of  the  production 
installations  and  related  installations  of  the  EU  (excluding  Norway)  and  6%  of  EU 
production. The installations are generally smaller and less complex than in the North 
Sea.  On  the  other  hand  there  have  been  considerable  start-up  costs  to  introduce  the 
measures in the Directive outside of the North Sea region. 

Table 8: Summary of costs per installation and per region for implementing the Offshore Safety Directive 

271 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
North Sea/Atlantic 

One-off costs MODU owners 

Annualised costs MODU owners 

One-off costs Operators 

Annualised costs Operators 

Sub total 

Southern seas 

One-off costs MODU’s 

Annualised costs MODU’s 

One-off + annualised costs Operators 

Sub total 

Total one-off & annualised costs in year one. (1 + 2) 

Mean one-off + annualised additional costs estimated in the IA 

IA estimates updated to 2019 prices (EU Central Bank data) 

Difference IA and our estimated actual (4 – 3) 

Annual Impact Assessment estimated reduction in cost baseline 

Based on reduced blow-out frequency (2019 prices) Mean value 

€3,108k 

€7,701k 

€98,523k 

€23,530k/yr 

€132,862k (1) 

€588k 

€1,457k 

€86,128k (mean) 

€88,173k (2) 

€221,035k (3) 

€167,240k 

€177,844k (4) 

(€43,191k) 

€295,938k 

16  ANNEX VIII: VIEWS FROM STAKEHOLDERS ON LIABILITY, HANDLING OF 

COMPENSATION CLAIMS AND FINANCIAL SECURITY 

16.1

  Liability - views from the industry 

The  oil  company  trade  association,  IOGP,  has  consulted  with  its  representative 
associations around the  EU and EEA,  and submitted a consultative paper on the EU 
offshore  petroleum  sector.  The  operators  believe  that  existing  liability  regimes  in 
Member States are adequate and aligned with the polluter pays principle. Whilst there 
are  differences  in  the  way  Member  States  approach  liability  for  offshore  accidents, 
there  is  no  evidence  that  any  of  the  existing  liability  regimes  are  less  effective  at 
dealing  with  possible  claims  arising  from  offshore  incidents  than  the  ones  in  other 
Member States. 

Regarding  pure  economic  loss,  the  industry  position  is  that  excessive  and 
disproportionate  liability  should  be  avoided  to  prevent  an  unreasonable  burden  on 
economic  actors.  In  those  limited  national  arrangements  of  strict  liability  for  pure 
economic  losses,  the  liability  is  limited  to  a  financial  cap,  or  by  the  nature  of  the 
claims  which  are  accepted.  For  example,  the  Oil  Pollution  Act  1990  (OPA  90)215 

215 https://legcounsel.house.gov/Comps/Oil%20Pollution%20Act%20Of%201990.pdf.  

272 

 
 
 
  
                                                           
applicable  to  oil  spills  in  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  stipulates  strict  liability,  however,  this 
liability is capped at US$133.65 million. 

According to industry, legal traditions determine how the justice systems of Member 
States distinguish between legitimate claims and ordinary risks faced by participants in 
the  economy.  Moreover,  industry  argues  that  the  ability  to  address  recovery  of  pure 
economic loss should remain within the power of Member States. In industry’s view, 
each  Member  State  is  best  placed  to  assess  potential  “gaps”  in  its  current  legal  and 
regulatory framework and implement appropriate measures to comply with the already 
existing obligations in the Directive (Article 4). Furthermore, the Brussels I and Rome 
in  national  regimes  from 
II  Regulations  help  prevent  potential  differences 
disadvantaging claimants in different Member States. 

According to the views of industrial associations, any harmonisation of civil liability 
regimes would also run counter to the goal-setting principles of the Directive. These 
principles  establish  performance  and  legal  objectives  to  be  achieved,  while  giving 
operators and Competent Authorities the flexibility to decide on the most appropriate 
tool to achieve such objectives. 

16.2

  Handling of compensation claims – views from the industry 

The operators point out that national systems have worked well thus far and there are 
no indications that historic offshore pollution incidents from oil and gas operations in 
Europe were not adequately handled.  They were not aware of any example where a 
large group of claimants that were directly impacted by a pollution event from oil and 
gas operations,  did  not  receive  adequate protection. The fact  that OPOL  (see below) 
has never needed to be invoked since its formation in 1974 is also an indicator of the 
adequacy of handling previous incidents. It is also repeated that the Brussels I and the 
Rome  II  Regulations  aim  to  prevent  potential  differences  in  national  regimes  from 
disadvantaging claimants in different EU Member States.   

Industry agrees that all licensees should have arrangements in place for the prompt and 
adequate  handling  of  valid  compensation  claims  as  required  by  the  Directive.  For 
example, the UK requires each licensee to  have  and maintain membership of OPOL 
plus  any  additional  financial  capacity  determined  as  necessary  by  the  licensing 
authority and to  assure this status  at all times  whilst  the licensee has an interest  in  a 
license. One of the conditions of OPOL membership is an obligation of transparency 
of financial status. 

IOGP members are particularly concerned about the repeated calls to introduce strict, 
broad  and  unlimited  liability  for  pure  economic  loss.  Given  there  is  no  history  of 
inadequate  compensation  or  handling  of  offshore  pollution  claims  in  Europe,  they 
believe  there  is  no  compelling  case  to  overturn  centuries  of  case  law  and  legal 
principles developed in every one of the Member States without having considered the 
cost impacts on the sector and the potential knock-on effect on security of supply in 

273 

 
 
the EU. I their view, such actions require clear policy reasons for doing so that have 
not been identified let alone demonstrated to exist. 

16.3

  Financial security – views from the industry 

In  IOGP’s  views  there  are  regulators  in  the  EU  who  have  implemented  financial 
responsibility  requirements,  which  are  robust  and  workable.  An  example  of  this  are 
the  “Liability  Provision  Guidelines  for  Offshore  Petroleum  Operations”216  published 
by Oil  & Gas  UK in 2018. The Guidelines contain a simple yet objective method to 
determine the level of financial responsibility to  be maintained by licensees for their 
operations  to  cover  the  costs  of  bringing  a  well  under  control,  clean-up  costs  and 
potential third-party compensation. It uses data which in any case must be prepared as 
part of the OPEP (Oil Pollution Emergency plan).   

The guidelines also clearly identify the type of financial instruments acceptable to the 
regulator to satisfy the regulatory requirements.   

In  the  UK  licensees  can  use  different  financial  instruments  to  demonstrate  financial 
responsibility.  The  levels  of  financial  responsibility  to  be  maintained  were  set  based 
on  the  results  of  an  oil  spill  cost  modelling  performed  by  an  external  consultant  to 
provide assurance that these are adequate. They vary based on the assessed exposure 
which  is  mainly  influenced  by  reservoir  characteristics,  well  fluids,  potential  direct 
loss or damage suffered by users of the polluted sea areas including fishermen, length 
of coastline impacted and the estimated volume of oil that may land on the shoreline 
and associated clean up and remediation costs.  

For  higher  exposure  wells  licensees  may  be  required  to  demonstrate  financial 
responsibility up to approximately USD 1.5 bn – between USD 100 mln to USD 300 
mln for well control and up to USD 1.2b n for clean-up and third-party compensation 
costs.  The  Oil  Spill  cost  study  however  concluded  that  for  most  wells  on  the  UK’s 
continental shelf USD 250 mln should be sufficient to cover clean-up and third-party 
compensation costs. For high exposure wells the levels of financial responsibility to be 
maintained and demonstrated is in excess of the compensation available for spills from 
oil vessels.  In this  context  it  is  interesting to  note that the historic oil spills  from  oil 
tanker  accidents  were  generally  worse  in  terms  of  volume  of  oil  released  from  well 
blow-outs (except for a handful of other well incidents).  

The  UK  model  has  since  informed  requirements  in  other  jurisdictions  inside  and 
outside  the  EU  (e.g.  Denmark,  Ireland,  Cyprus,  Italy,  Australia  and  New  Zealand) 
which stipulate exposure based financial responsibility requirements and allow the use 
of different financial instruments (including insurance, guarantees and self-insurance) 
to  demonstrate compliance. Hence,  IOGP believes  the UK model provides sufficient 
guidelines  to  help  other  Member  States  shape  financial  responsibility  requirements 

216 https://oilandgasuk.co.uk/product/liability-provision-guidelines-for-offshore-petroleum-operations/.  

274 

 
 
                                                           
adequate  for  their  environment.  They  consider  it  demonstrates  that  adequate 
requirements can be stipulated and implemented at the level of each Member State. 

16.4

  Views from non-governmental associations (NGOs) 

The  Bellona  Foundation  joined  the  September  2018  workshop  on  the  assessment. 
Subsequently  Bellona  drew  together  a  small  corps  of  colleague  organisations  that 
made  representations  on  liability  matters.  The  group  comprised  Bellona,  Surfrider 
Foundation Europe, Friends of the Earth Europe, Nature and Youth, Young Friends of 
the  Earth,  and  WWF.  A  separate  submission  was  initially  made  by  Surfrider  that 
coincided  with  the  public  consultation.    It  called  for  a  financial  and  liability 
mechanism similar to the International Oil Pollution Compensation fund (IOPC) with 
start-up funds to be put in place.  

In March 2019, the corps of NGO has made a group submission, going further but also 
echoing  Surfrider’s  earlier  paper  calling  for  a  moratorium  on  offshore  activities  in 
marine protected areas and other sensitive areas.  

The  notable  contributions  on  liability  and  financial  responsibility  asked  that  the 
Commission’s 2015 report and the Parliament’s Resolution of 2016 be taken forward 
to a clear conclusion with concomitant requests that “…civil liability schemes now be 
uplifted  in  all  Member  States  to  global  best  practice  levels.  This  must  also  include 
some recognition of pure economic loss”. The group draws attention to its view that 
vast  economic  losses  can  currently  be  inflicted  upon  marine  and  coastal  economies 
that may go largely uncompensated, and which situation must be remedied. 

The group calls for  a strong obligation for adequate financial  capacity of the license 
holder  to  be  maintained  in  all  situations,  including  insolvency,  where  currently  such 
matters are merely ‘to be taken into account’. 

16.5

  Views from the insurance sector 

Damage  to  bio  diversity  offshore  are  complex  to  assess  and  quantify  and  many 
insurers  do  not  insure  them.  Furthermore,  according  to  the  International  Union  of 
Marine Insurance (IUMI) the insurance market for offshore operations is complex and 
may involve several parties insuring the risk of one operator. Although the insurance 
market  is  global  its  financial  capacity  is  nevertheless  limited:  there  is  in  effect  an 
overall pot of money for insuring all risks everywhere. This means that insurers may 
not be ready to divert part of the fund to provide cover in the offshore sector, if faced 
with  disproportionate  exposure  or  a  client  base  unwilling  or  unable  to  pay  for  that 
insurance.  Since  rules  on  litigation  and  liability  vary  substantially  between 
jurisdictions, barriers for involvement in this business are high.  

Overall, it is  not  felt that  sufficient  time  elapsed since the introduction of the  “well-
intentioned”  Directive  to  allow  it  to  have  had  discernible  or  measurable  effect.    The 

275 

 
 
requirement was for all EU Member States’ to transpose the Directive by 19 July 2015 
but several Member States were late. Equally, the Directive has only been applied to 
existing  installations  since  July  2018.  Overall,  it  would  appear  premature  for  any 
modification to be made, which would lead to more legal uncertainty and change. 

According to Insurance Europe, Member States’ liability regimes reflect long-standing 
cultural  and  societal  choices  concerning  legal  responsibility  and  obligations  to 
compensate  for  harm  caused,  and  have  usually  been  confirmed  by  national 
democratically  elected  legislatures.  They  are  well  established  and  predictable, 
facilitating the availability of legal liability insurance and other financial instruments 
to cover such liabilities.  

There is considerable wariness over suggestions that an EU-wide liability regime for 
offshore  activities  could  be  overlain  on  Member  States’  existing  laws.  Insurance 
stakeholders consider that there is no certainty over how such a novel system would 
work  in  practice  and  whether  it  would  work  to  the  advantage  of  claimants.  National 
courts would retain discretion over the application of the regime and could interpret it 
in  different  ways,  removing  any  prospect  of  a  harmonised  European  approach.  The 
outcomes  of  such  a  regime  would  be  unpredictable,  reducing  the  insurability  of 
operators’ liability risk because the pricing of cover would be difficult. It is probable 
that  any  such  regime  would  therefore  lead  to  a  reduction  in  the  availability  of 
insurance and other financial instruments to operators.  

Insurance  Europe  does  not  see  advantages  in  legislating  to  handle  compensation 
claims  at  EU  rather  than  Member  States  level.  This  would  shift  responsibility  for 
dealing with offshore incidents causing injury and damage from member states to the 
EU.  Such  incidents  are  not  necessarily  straightforward  and  any  problems,  such  as 
delays  in  providing  compensation  to  claimants,  could  cause  the  EU  serious 
reputational harm. Responsibility for the handling of compensation claims should be 
at  Member  States  level,  alongside  responsibility  for  regulating  the  offshore  energy 
industry: there is no evidence that compensation could be more effectively handled at 
the EU-level. 

International  Underwriting 
The  organisation  Lloyd's  Market  Association  & 
Association of London agrees fully with IUMI that sufficient time has not yet elapsed 
since  the  introduction  of  the  Directive  to  allow  it  to  have  had  discernible  or 
measurable effect. 

Lloyd’s  emphasises  the  insurance  market  for  energy  risks  is  complex.  Typically,  a 
panel  of  underwriters  are  involved  in  providing  risk  transfer  capacity  in  respect  of 
individual policies. An individual policy will usually insure the interest and liability of 
a single entity/assured. It is very common for a number of entities to be involved as 
co-ventures in the drilling of a well. Thus, several insurance policies may be required 
in order to ensure that the 100% venture interest is insured. Furthermore, a policy will 
typically provide coverage in  respect of the asset and expenses and liabilities arising 

276 

 
 
therefrom. Thus, a policy may provide multi-coverages such as physical damage, well 
control, clean-up and containment and legal liabilities. 

In  addition  to  insurers  operating  in  the  commercial  insurance  markets,  some  oil  and 
gas  companies  make  use  of  mutual  (re)insurance  mechanisms  and  captive  insurance 
companies.  It  is  possible  that  use  of  such  mechanisms  could  increase  in  order  to 
mitigate against the impact of increased compulsory insurance. These (re)insurers may 
be subject to a different regulatory regime than commercial market insurers.  

There  has  not  been  a  major  oil  pollution  incident  from  offshore  activity  since  the 
Macondo  incident.  Whilst  Macondo  reportedly  cost  BP  and  co-liable  entities  US$72 
billion,  there  is  no  reliable  estimation  to  what  a  big  incident  in  Europe  might  cost. 
Such an event would be definitive in identifying how far insurance can help. 

The  insurance  industry  is  only  now  in  the  early  stages  of  providing  $750  million  of 
insured  limit  of  indemnity  for  a  limited  number  of  insured  parties.  From  the  Willis 
Towers  Watson  loss  database217,  a  data  base  of  energy  losses  in  the  world,  we  note 
that  a  ‘blowout  without  fire’,  occurring  in  the  UK  in  2012,  settled  for  a  total  of  c. 
US$469m (Euro 418m). The top event is Macondo (2010) where the pay-out is listed 
at US$2.56bn (Euro 2.28) – presumably the liable entity was not BP for these losses. 
The second event is for platform damage during Hurricane Katrina (2005), where the 
total pay-out is listed as US$1.4bn (Euro 1.25bn).  

However, if it is the case that the market can provide a maximum of US$1-3 billion 
liability cover, as has been suggested by experts, then that gives a pointer as to where 
legal  limits  of  liability  on  an  operator  might  be  set.  These  boundaries  appear  within 
reach  of  liabilities  for  the  Macondo,  Katrina  and  Elgin  Franklin  major  incidents 
appearing  on  the  Willis  Loss  database.  However,  the  major  operators  concerned  in 
those disasters hold a significant amount of self-insurance so the database points only 
to  the  market  coverage.  Nevertheless,  it  might  be  possible  in  the  future  to  increase 
capacity  and  insurance  limits  but  that  would  only  be  possible  with  substantial 
increases of premium. 

It I appears that there is no need to modify the Directive due to the limited time  that 
has  lapsed  since  its  introduction  and  the  absence  of  incidents.    There  can  be  no 
guarantee that the insurance industry will be ready, willing and able to provide cover 
to protect participants engaged in offshore exploration for oil and gas in the EU if they 
are faced with disproportionate exposures, restricted terms and a client base unwilling 
or unable to pay for it. They will seek to deploy their capital elsewhere. 

The insurance sector summarises some key points to be considered as follows: 

 

In  any  offshore  operation  there  are  many  different  players,  ranging  from  major  oil 
companies  to  vessel  operators,  drilling  contractors  to  catering  subcontractors  and  soil 

217 https://www.willis.com/Documents/Publications/Industries/Energy/2155_energy%20_loss_database.pdf 

277 

 
 
                                                           
analysts.  Offshore  oil  activity  is  not  like  an  onshore  factory  where  the  operation  is 
controlled entirely by the owner. 

  The  operator’s  legal  responsibilities  both  to  third  parties  and  to  each  other  are  very 
complex and are generally regulated by contract with "knock for knock" agreements and 
indemnities  inter  se.  The  terms  of  those  contacts  and  the  limits  within  them  reflect  the 
appetite for risk of the parties and, to some extent, their ability to insure. 
It would be wrong to assume that everyone in the energy industry is a substantial company 
well able to meet any claim from its own resources (although the biggest can) or that they 
can necessarily buy insurance to protect themselves.  

 

  Where  there  is  currently  little  or  no  legislation  within  a  Member  State,  Lloyd's  Market 
Association & International Underwriting Association would support the introduction of a 
uniform  approach  to  offshore  safety.    The  association’s  committees  are  unsure  of  the 
current status of the Directive’s integration into individual Member States’ legislature and 
see no reason to modify the Directive now, when taking into account the limited time that 
has elapsed since its introduction. 

278