COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT EVALUATION of Directive 2008/48/EC on credit agreement for consumers
Date: 2020-11-05
Institutions: Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers, European Commission
Subjects: EU Member State, application of EU law, consumer credit, consumer protection, contract, credit policy, single market

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 5.11.2020  SWD(2020) 254 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT  EVALUATION  of Directive 2008/48/EC on credit agreement for consumers     {COM(2020) 963 final} - {SEC(2020) 371 final} - {SWD(2020) 255 final}  
 
 
Table of contents 

1. 

INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................... 3 

Overview of the Consumer Credit Directive’s provisions ..................................... 3 
Purpose of the Evaluation ....................................................................................... 4 
Scope of the Evaluation .......................................................................................... 5 

2.  BACKGROUND TO THE DIRECTIVE .................................................................... 5 

Context of the EU intervention ............................................................................... 5 
Intervention logic .................................................................................................... 6 
Baseline - the situation before interventions .......................................................... 9 

3. 

IMPLEMENTATION / STATE OF PLAY .............................................................. 12 

The consumer credit sector 2008-2019 ................................................................ 12 

4.  METHOD .................................................................................................................. 17 

Study to support the Directive evaluation ............................................................ 18 
Stakeholder consultations ..................................................................................... 18 
Experience Gained from the European Commission Consumer Financial Services 
Action Plan ........................................................................................................... 20 
Literature review ................................................................................................... 20 
Robustness of the findings .................................................................................... 21 

5.  ANALYSIS AND ANSWERS TO THE EVALUATION QUESTIONS ................ 21 

EFFECTIVENESS ..................................................................................................... 21 

EQ1 – To what extent has the Directive achieved its objectives? Have the scope 
of  application  and  the  definitions  facilitated  or  hindered  the  achievement  of  the 
objectives? What are the main benefits and drawbacks of the Directive? ........... 21 
EQ2 – To what extent has the Directive led to legal clarity? What is the level of 
compliance of businesses and their enforcement? ................................................ 26 
EQ3  –  Is  the  Directive  –  through  advertising  requirements,  pre-contractual 
information (including Standardised European Consumer Credit Information and 
Annual  Percentage  Rate  of  Charge)  and  other  additional  information  –  ensuring 
that consumers are effectively provided with accurate, clear, concise, timely and 
comprehensive information free-of-charge?......................................................... 30 
EQ4 – How have the provisions relating to creditworthiness assessments worked 
in practice? To what extent have the provision of the Annual Percentage Rate of 
Charge  and  the  performance  of  a  creditworthiness  assessments  contributed  to 
helping  consumers  find  the  credit  best  suited  to  their  needs  and  avoid  over-
indebtedness? ........................................................................................................ 34 
EQ5  –  To  what  extent  do  the  conditions  of  access  to  credit  databases  on  cross-
border basis vary across the EU? .......................................................................... 39 
EQ6  –  How  have  the  provisions  relating  to  the  rights  of  withdrawal  and  early 
repayment  worked  in  practice?  How  frequently  are  consumers  making  use  of 
them? .................................................................................................................... 40 

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EQ7  –  Have  the  scope  of  application  and  the  definitions  used  in  the  Directive 
succeeded in ensuring a high level of consumer protection and performance of the 
internal market for consumer credit? .................................................................... 43 

EFFICIENCY ........................................................................................................... 49 

EQ8  –  What  are  the  costs  and  benefits  (including  any  reduction  in  consumer 
detriment)  associated  with  the  Directive  and  what  are  they  influenced  by?  Can 
they be considered proportionate? ........................................................................ 49 
EQ9 – To what extent are the provisions of the Directive cost-effective? Are there 
any provisions particularly hampering the maximisation of the benefits? ........... 54 
EQ10 – Is there scope for simplification and burden reduction? What provisions 
or areas of the Directive could be simplified to reduce the burden on stakeholders 
without undermining the effectiveness of the Directive? ..................................... 55 

COHERENCE ........................................................................................................... 57 

EQ11 - To what extent is the Directive internally coherent? ............................... 57 
EQ12  –  To  what  extent  is  the  Directive  coherent  with  other  national-level 
consumer policy and legislation (including legislation going beyond the scope of 
the Directive, relevant for consumer credit)? ....................................................... 58 
EQ13 – To what extent is the Directive coherent and complementary with other 
relevant EU-level legislation? .............................................................................. 59 
EQ14  -  To  what  extent  are  the  provisions  of  the  Directive  and  their 
implementation  at  national  level  coherent  with  national  and  EU-level  data 
protection legislation? ........................................................................................... 61 

RELEVANCE ........................................................................................................... 63 

EQ15  -  Are  the  objectives  of  the  Directive  still  relevant?  Does  the  Directive 
address  current  and  anticipated  future  needs  and  challenges  (e.g.  market 
developments, consumer behaviour and needs), including those of consumers and 
providers? ............................................................................................................. 63 
EQ16 - How relevant and adapted are the scope, thresholds and definitions in the 
Directive to the current market situation? ............................................................ 68 

EU ADDED VALUE .................................................................................................. 70 

EQ17 - Where does the EU added value of the Directive lie? Would the benefits 
delivered  by  the  Directive  have  been  achieved  in  the  absence  of  EU-level 
intervention? ......................................................................................................... 70 

6.  CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED ....................................................... 73 

ANNEX 1: PROCEDURAL INFORMATION ................................................................ 80 

ANNEX 2: STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION – SYNOPSIS REPORT .................... 84 

ANNEX 3: METHODS AND ANALYTICAL MODELS USED IN PREPARING THE 
EVALUATION ......................................................................................................... 97 

ANNEX 4: KEY CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS  .................................................... 119 

ANNEX 5: OVERVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DIRECTIVE ........ 126 

ANNEX 6: COHERENCE WITH OTHER EU PIECES OF LEGISLATION .............. 127 

ANNEX 7: SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................... 132 

ANNEX 8: EVALUATION QUESTIONS ..................................................................... 145 

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1. 

INTRODUCTION 

Overview of the Consumer Credit Directive’s provisions 

The  Consumer  Credit  Directive  (hereinafter,  “the  Directive”,  or  “CCD”)  addresses 
consumer credit between EUR 200 and EUR 75,000 (and over when the credit is destined 
for  the  renovation  of  a  residential  property)  such  as  loans  granted  for  personal 
consumption, including automotive vehicles, household goods and appliances, travels, as 
well as overdrafts and credit cards. By contrast, overdraft facilities1 to be repaid within a 
month,  interest-free  credits,2  hiring  or  leasing  agreements  without  an  obligation  to 
purchase are among the main types of credits excluded from its scope. 

The most important Directive provisions are the following: 

-  Standard  information  to  be  contained  in  advertising:  advertising  concerning  credit 
agreements3,  which  indicate  an  interest  rate  or  an  element  of  the  cost  of  the  credit, 
have to include standard information about all the cost elements of the credit by way 
of a representative example.  

-  Pre-contractual  information:  for  all  credit  offers,  the  consumer4  will  receive  a 
Standardised European Consumer Credit Information (SECCI5) sheet, to be used by 
all creditors6 at EU level.  It sets out all the essential information the consumer needs 
in a clear, standard way.  

-  Annual  Percentage  Rate  of  Charge  (APR)  -  the  Directive  establishes  an  EU  wide 
method of calculation for the APR, which expresses the total cost of the credit to the 
consumer, expressed as an annual percentage of the total amount of the credit.   

-  Right of withdrawal7 - once consumers have concluded a credit contract, they have 14 

days to withdraw from the credit without having to give any reason   

-  Right of early repayment - the Directive grants to consumers the right to repay early 
at  any  time.  Under  certain  circumstances,  however,  the  creditor  shall  be  entitled  to 

1 Overdraft facility is an explicit credit agreement whereby a creditor makes available to a consumer funds 
which exceed the current balance in the consumer's current account. 
2 See conditions under Article 2(2) (f) of the Directive. 
3 An agreement whereby a creditor grants or promises to grant to a consumer credit in the form of a deferred 
payment,  loan  or  other  similar  financial  accommodation,  except  for  agreements  for  the  provision  on  a 
continuing basis of services or for the supply of goods of the same kind, where the consumer pays for such 
services or goods for the duration of their provision by means of instalments. 
4 A natural person who, in transactions covered by the Directive, is acting for purposes which are outside his 
trade, business or profession. 
5 A standardised form designed to show exactly what a finance agreement contains. The form will include 
key details such as type of credit, Annual Percentage Rate (APR), number and frequency of payments, and 
total amount owed. 
6  A  creditor  is a  natural or  legal  person  who grants or  promises  to  grant  credit  in  the course of his  trade, 
business, or profession. 
7 Consumer's right to terminate a contract without reason within a specified time period, provided certain 
conditions are fulfilled. 

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fair and objectively justified compensation for possible costs directly linked to early 
repayment.  

-  Creditworthiness - the Directive also imposes an obligation on creditors to assess the 
creditworthiness of the consumer prior to granting a credit. Such assessment can be 
done  by  checking  credit  databases,  for  which  the  Directive  imposes  non-
discriminatory conditions in the event of cross-border access to these databases. 

Purpose of the Evaluation 

This  Staff  Working  Document  presents  the  result  of  the  REFIT8  evaluation  of  the 
Directive,  launched  in  20189  and  part  of  the  REFIT  initiatives  annexed  to  the  2019 
Commission Work Programme10. In line with the Better Regulation guidelines11, the main 
purpose of the evaluation is to assess the effectiveness, efficiency (including potential for 
simplification  and  burden  reduction),  relevance,  coherence  and  EU  added  value  of  the 
Directive,  analysing  whether  it  remains  fit  for  purpose  in  today’s  legal,  economic  and 
technological environment. 

The Commission has launched this evaluation in response to a REFIT Platform opinion 
on the Consumer Credit Directive12 adopted  in  September 2017 recommending  that  the 
Commission  assess  the  relevance,  effectiveness  and  efficiency  of  the  standard 
information requirements to be included in advertising, as per Article 4 of the Directive.  

Moreover, Article 27(2) of the Consumer Credit Directive, specifies that the Commission 
“shall  undertake,  every  five  years,  […]  a  review  of  the  thresholds  laid  down  in  [the] 
Directive  […].  The  Commission  shall  also  monitor  the  effect  of  the  existence  of  the 
regulatory choices [therein] [by Member States] on the internal market and consumers”13. 

The  work  performed  under  the  2017  Consumer  Financial  Services  Action  Plan14  - 
following which the Commission undertook to explore ways of facilitating cross-border 
access to consumer credit whilst ensuring a high level of consumer protection, as well as 
to  seek  to  introduce  common  standards  for  creditworthiness  assessment15  and  credit 

8  The  Regulatory  Fitness  and  Performance  Programme,  or  REFIT,  is  the  Commission’s  programme  for 
ensuring that EU legislation remains fit for purpose and delivers the results intended by EU lawmakers. 
9 Evaluation Roadmap, June 2018. 
10 Annex II to Communication COM(2018) 800 final: Commission Work Programme 2019 Delivering what 
we promised and preparing for the future, October 2018. 
11  European  Commission,  Better  Regulation:  Guidelines  and  Toolbox.  https://ec.europa.eu/info/better-
regulation-guidelines-and-toolbox_en  
12 https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/vi4afccd.pdf  
13  A  report  on  the  implementation  of  the  Directive  was  published  in  2014,  confirming  that  all  Member 
States implemented the Directive by the end of 2011, that the Directive had limited impact on the level of 
cross-border  lending  mainly  because  of  external  circumstances,  and  that  there  were  some  problems  with 
the level of compliance from providers and for consumers to exercise their rights. COM(2014) 259 final. 
14  COM(2017)  139  final,  Communication  from  the  Commission  –  Consumer  Financial  Services  Action 
Plan: Better Products, More Choice. 
15 Evaluation of the prospect for the debt obligation resulting from the credit agreement to be met. 

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registers  and  monitor  the  distance  selling  market  of  financial  services  –  also  feeds  into 
the evaluation. 

Scope of the Evaluation 

The evaluation covers developments since the adoption of the Directive (in 2008)  until 
September 2019. The evaluation  covers all EU Member States  (MS),  although in  some 
instances information and data gathering refers only to a limited sample. These instances 
are indicated in the text of the Staff Working Document (SWD). 

2.  BACKGROUND TO THE DIRECTIVE 

Context of the EU intervention 

Origin of EU intervention in the field of consumer credit 

Council Directive 87/102/EEC of 22 December 1986 laid down rules at Community level 
aimed  to  bring  about  “a  certain  degree  of  approximation  of  the  laws”16  concerning 
consumer credit agreements. It covered credit agreements - other than mortgages - longer 
than three months between ECU 200 and 20,000 but with several exemptions (e.g. credits 
to be repaid in maximum four payments in a period up to 12 months, zero interest rate 
loans, etc.). Directive 87/102/EEC introduced the inclusion of an Annual Percentage Rate 
of Charge (APR) and its calculation and communication to the consumer, as well as the 
right for the consumer to  discharge the obligations under a credit agreement before  the 
time fixed by the agreement – with an equitable reduction in the total cost of the credit.  
In  1990,  the  Directive  was  amended  by  Directive    90/88/EEC  concerning  the  APR 
calculation.  

At Member State level, the protection of consumers and the consumer credit market was 
uneven,  as  Directive  87/102/EEC  only  provided  for  minimum  standards  of  consumer 
protection.  This  led  to  Member  States  introducing  additional  provisions  that  covered 
other types of credit and credit agreements not covered by the Directive.17 Differences in 
legislation included, for example, different time limits and procedures in connection with 
the credit agreement, such as ‘cooling off’, ‘withdrawal’ and ‘cancellation’,  as well as 
repayment.  

In  1995  and  1996,  the  Commission  presented  two  reports  on  the  operation  of  the 
Directive,  after  having  consulted  relevant  stakeholders18.  These  reports  revealed 
substantial  differences  between  the  laws  of  the  various  Member  States,  which  used  a 
variety of consumer protection mechanisms in addition to the Directive. Such differences 
in some cases led to distortions of competitions among creditors and created obstacles to 
the internal market.  

16 Council Directive 87/102/EEC. 
17  As  explained in  the  explanatory memorandum  of  the  initial Consumer  Credit Directive  proposal of  the 
Commission, COM (2002) 443 final. 
18 Any individual citizen or an entity impacted, addressed, or otherwise concerned by an EU intervention. 

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Development of the 2008 Consumer Credit Directive 

The  revision  of  Directive  87/102/EEC  was  considered  necessary  to  address  a  series  of 
factors including technical problems in connection with accessing another market, a lack 
of adequate harmonisation as regards national legislation and the changes to the methods 
and styles of credit that had occurred since the 1980's.  

The Commission first presented a proposal –dated 2002– for a revised version of Council 
Directive  87/102/EEC,  which  aimed  at  offering  a  fully  harmonised  set  of  provisions  to 
provide for a higher level of protection to consumers. However, negotiations between the 
European  institutions  on  consumer  protection  standards  were  protracted  and  involved 
substantial changes, leading to revised proposals in October 2004 and again in November 
2005.  In  2008,  the  revised  proposal  was  finally  adopted  and  the  Directive  repealed 
Directive 87/102/EEC.  

Although  modelled  on  Directive  87/102/EEC,  the  Directive  went  significantly  further, 
with  the  introduction  of  a  defined  scope  and  a  right  to  withdraw,  as  well  as    a  better 
defined right to early repayment. 

While the Directive is mainly of full harmonisation nature19, Member States were given a 
certain degree of flexibility in implementing some of the rules.  

Intervention logic 

The Directive has two main objectives, namely to improve consumer protection and to 
foster  the  emergence  of  a  well-functioning  internal  market  for  consumer  credit.  These 
objectives  are  intended  to  be  achieved  by  the  Directive’s  provisions  (indicated  in  the 
graph below as content/inputs).  

The first objective of improving consumer protection includes three specific objectives:  

1)  informing consumers about the costs and conditions of the credit they request,  
2)  providing consumers with rights to terminate their contract, and  
3)  fostering responsible lending among credit providers.  

The  second  main  objective  of  fostering  the  emergence  of  an  internal  market  for  cross-
border credit provision includes two specific objectives:  

1)  facilitating cross-border access to consumer credit offers, and  
2)  ensuring  a  level-playing  field  between  creditors  by  providing  a  harmonised 

framework. 

The objectives of the Directive at the time of its drafting were intended to respond to key  
needs20.  Primarily  the  realisation  that  the  existing  Directive  87/102/EEC  was  not  fully 
responding  to  the  needs  of  consumers  and  this  was  leading  to  reported  consumer 

19 In the case of full harmonisation Member States must implement the EU measures but may not enact or 
retain any rules which depart from them. 
20  See  also  “Consumer  trends  and  issues  faced  around  the  time  of  the  entry  into  force  of  the  Directive  in 
2010”, below in Section 2. 

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dissatisfaction  with  the  quality  of  consumer  protection.  In  addition,  the  absence  of  a 
single  credit  market  meant  sub-optimal  demand  and  offer  of  consumer  credit.  The 
different  levels  of  consumer  protection  standards  across  the  Member  States  had  led  to 
differences  in  legislation  and  lending  practices.  Finally,  the  increase  in  the  number  of 
consumer  credits,  the  development  of  new  types  of  credit  and  the  related  risks  for 
consumers (surcharge, insolvency) needed to be addressed too. 

The  objectives  of  the  Directive  are  linked  to  a  set  of  specific  provisions  (inputs),  that 
correspond to given articles of the Directive. These relate to the provision of information 
at the advertising and pre-contractual phases (Art 4 and 5), the definition of the Annual 
Percentage Rate of Charge and its calculation (Art 19), the rights of withdrawal and early 
repayment (Art 14 and 16), and the obligation on creditors to perform a creditworthiness 
assessment  (CWA)  of  the  consumer  (Art  8),  which  is  accompanied  by  rules  on  credit 
database  access  (Art  9).  These  inputs  in  turn  lead  to  outputs  consisting  in  the 
transposition21,  the  practical  application  and  enforcement  of  the  Directive,  and  other 
effects  (such  as  the  application  to  other  areas  or  elements  outside  the  scope  of  the 
Directive). These outputs are therefore directly measurable in terms of their transposition 
or practical application and functioning in Member States. 

Flowing from these activities, two outcomes can be expected: firstly, enhanced consumer 
awareness  and  empowerment  through  access  to  clear  information:  this  allows  the 
consumer to be able to withdraw from credit agreements and to more easily repay them 
early.  This  information  protects  the  consumer  against  inappropriate  lending  practices. 
Secondly, improved functioning of the internal market for consumer credit through ease 
of access in cross-border credit provision and establishing a level playing field between 
providers.  These  two  outcomes  should  ultimately  result  in  a  high  level  of  consumer 
confidence and protection, and free movement of credit under optimal conditions for both 
consumers and credit providers. 

Finally, there are several external factors outside the remit of the Directive. This includes 
changes  to  the  consumer  credit  market  (the  growth  of  e-commerce)  and  wider 
digitalisation  trends  and  new  developments  in  financial  technology.  In  addition,  the 
harmonisation in the EU following the implementation of the Directive does not impact 
the wider socio-economic differences between Member States and which explain credit 
demand and supply, as well as factors such as interest rates. There are also discrepancies 
in  the  status,  mandate  and  resources/power  of  national  authorities  and  enforcement 
associations.
bodies, 

consumer 

and 

21 Transposition describes the process of incorporating the rights and obligations set out in an EU Directive 
into national legislation, thereby giving legal force to the provisions of the Directive. The Commission may 
take action if a Member State fails to transpose EU legislation and/or to communicate to the Commission 
what  measures  it  has  taken.  In  case  of  no  or  partial  transposition,  the  Commission  can  open  formal 
infringement proceedings and eventually refer the Member State to the Court of Justice of the EU. 

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Figure 1- Intervention logic of Directive 2008/48/EC on credit agreements for consumers 

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Baseline - the situation before interventions 

The  main  baseline  for  the  evaluation  is  the  situation  prior  to  the  adoption  of  the 
Directive. The situation accounted for in 2008, year of adoption of the Consumer Credit 
Directive,  is  considered  as  baseline  for  the  evaluation  of  the  Directive.  An  additional 
point of comparison could be the situation following the 2008 financial crisis. However, 
as  highlighted  by  the  2014  Commission  report  on  the  implementation  of  the  Directive, 
some Member States implemented it after the stipulated deadline and therefore in 2014 it 
was  difficult  to  identify  the  impact  of  the  regulatory  choices  exercised  by  the  Member 
States22. 

The consumer credit sector leading up to 2008-2010 

In  the  early  2000s,  the  consumer  credit  market  in  the  EU  experienced  high  levels  of 
growth23. Household24 debt - which include all types of debt such as personal loans25 and 
mortgages - have shown constant increase from the late 90s until 2010. Household debt 
was  an  important  driver  of  the  economic  growth  during  the  pre-crisis  period.  Stable 
levels of inflation lowered households’ constraints of liquidity and enabled consumers to 
switch from saving to borrowing. However, the credit expansion was also boosted by the 
development  of  the  Single  Market  integration  in  financial  services,  innovative  credit 
products and the overall optimistic outlook of the EU economy26. The positive outlook, 
combined with the still low interest rates over 2003 – 2005 resulted in consumers taking 
more credits.  

The  share  of  household  consumption  financed  by  credit27  and  the  level  of  indebtedness 
remained  relatively  constant  over  the  first  decade  of  the  2000s.  On  average,  12.4%  of 
household  consumption  was  financed  through  consumer  credit.  The  level  of  consumer 
indebtedness28 corresponded on average to 18.3% of their individual income (wages and 
salaries).  

22 COM(2014) 259 final, p. 19. 
23 The highest levels of growth in the consumer credit market were recorded in the new Member States of 
the EU, such as Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia and Hungary, but also some older Member States, like Greece. 
24 Household is considered a group of persons who share the same living accommodation, who pool some, 
or  all,  of  their  income  and  wealth  and  who  consume  certain  types  of  goods  and  services  collectively, 
mainly housing and food. 
25 This Staff Working Document quotes data –where available- on personal loans only. Where this is not the 
case –due to lack of relevant data- this is specified in the text or via a footnote. Personal loans are credit 
granted  to  a  private  person  for  non-commercial  purposes  solely  on  the  basis  of  that  person's 
creditworthiness, income, and financial circumstances. 
26 ECRI, 2013. The bibliography consulted for and quoted in this Staff Working Document can be found in 
Annex 7. 
27  The  share  of  household  consumption  financed  by  credit  =  consumer  credit  outstanding  amount  / 
household expenditure. 
28 Consumer indebtedness = outstanding consumer credit amount / household income. 

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In  2008,  the  average  interest  rate  in  the  Eurozone  for  consumer  credit29  was  8.9%  per 
year. This  interest  rate had been  fairly stable since 2003. Only after the financial crisis 
did the average interest rate slowly go down, to around 6% in 201930.  

In  terms  of  how  common  personal  loans  were  in  the  EU,  there  are  no  hard  data. 
However, it is possible to estimate the share of EU citizens with a personal loan in 2006 
from the 2011 Special Eurobarometer 37331. Incidence rates in 2006 ranged from 2% in 
Italy to 21% in Denmark. 

Figure 2 - Estimated share of EU citizens with a personal loan in 2006 

Source: ICF elaboration of Eurobarometer 373 data  

The same can be done for credit cards32. The 2006 data show large discrepancies in the 
estimated  number  of  citizens  with  a  credit  card  across  the  EU,  ranging  from  5%  in 
Hungary to 69% in Luxembourg. While there is equally no hard data on the total number 
of credit cards available, the wider trend can be seen from the total number of payment 
cards in circulation in the EU, which shows strong growth of the total number of cards 
over the period 2000-201033, also – importantly – influenced by enlargement in 2004 and 
2008.  

On  the  cross-border  dimension  of  financial  services,  results  from  the  2011  Special 
Eurobarometer 37334 revealed that a rounded 1% of consumers acquired a credit card in 
another  Member  State,  as  opposed  to  0%  for  personal  loans.  However,  the  share  of 

29 Excluding revolving loans and overdrafts, convenience and extended credit card debt. 
30 European Central Bank. Statistical Data Warehouse, Interest rates on loans to households. 
31 Which does indicate the share of respondents with a personal loan and how many acquired one in the past 
five years. On that basis it is possible to derive what was the share of respondents that acquired a personal 
loan in the past five years (between 2006 and 2011) and thereby deriving the share that had and did not 
have a personal loan. 
32 A card entitling the owner to use funds from the issuing company up to a certain limit. The holder of a 
credit card may use it to buy a good or service. When one does this, the issuing company effectively gives 
the card holder a loan for the amount of the good or service, which the holder is expected to repay. 
33 ICF elaboration of ECB PSS : Payments and Settlement Systems Statistics. 
34 Special Eurobarometer 373, 2011. 

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respondents that considered acquiring a credit card in another country amounted to 3%, 
and 2% for personal loans. 

Consumer trends and issues faced around the time of the entry into force of the Directive 
in 2010 

The process in the years 2002-2008 leading up to the adoption of the Directive in 2008 
showed a number of issues and developments on the consumer credit market that set the 
2008 baseline, such as35: 

 

 

Increase in the types of credit used by consumers, for instance the overdraft facility 
on current accounts, leading to a wider concept of “consumer credit”; 
Indication  of  there  being  inadequate  protection  of  consumers  by  the  existing 
legislative  framework,  inter  alia  because  of  differences  among  Member  States  in 
banking/financial  practices  (in  2002,  more  than  35%  of  consumers  considered  that 
the legislation was not protecting their rights36); 

  Because of differences in national legislations, distortion of competition as a result of 

different protection levels; 

  Limitations to the acquisition of cross-border credit because of barriers linked both to 

the supply and demand side (see explanation below); 

  Wide difference in transparency of financial services among Member States; 
 

Insufficient available remedies. 

For  instance,  the  2011  Special  Eurobarometer  373  shows  that  a  high  number  of 
respondents  (78%)  who  acquired  a  personal  loan  in  the  five  years  before  2011  had 
received written information about the product. In terms of product comparison, 57% of 
those getting a personal loan had compared several  products before making a decision, 
while  42%  took  the  first  product  outright.  However,  this  masks  substantial  differences 
ranging from 82% of respondents in Bulgaria comparing products to 35% in Cyprus. For 
credit cards on average 46% of respondents compared products, and 52% had not.  

The  acquisition  of  a  consumer  credit  was  predominantly  done  face-to-face  with  the 
provider  (76%  of  consumer  surveyed)  and  through  an  intermediary  or  advisor  (13%). 
Distance means were not common (6% of the credit obtained online and 4% by phone).  

This  survey  sheds  further light  on the  main  barriers  which hampered  the  purchasing  of 
financial  products  cross-border.  This  includes  a  lack  of  demand,  with  consumers 
considering  that  offers  on  the  national  market  were  sufficient  (32%  of  consumers 
surveyed),  that  they  had  a  preference  for  products  from  their  home  country  (23%)  or 
found  the  language  barrier  problematic  (17%).  In  addition,  consumers  felt  that  they 
lacked clear information about offers available (21%), were unaware of their rights in a 
cross-border  context  (18%),  and  were  worried  about  fraud  or  crimes  (15%)  or  about 
lower  levels  of  consumer  protection  in  other  Member  States  (5%).  These  figures  mask 
however  substantial  differences  across  Member  States.  For  instance,  lower  levels  of 

35 COM(2002) 443. 
36 COM(2002) 443. 

11 

 
                                                            
consumer  protection  were  cited  as  a  concern  about  cross-border  purchase  by  15%  of 
those in Sweden and 0% in Estonia, Greece and Poland. 

3. 

IMPLEMENTATION / STATE OF PLAY 

According  to  Article  27(1)  of  the  Directive,  Member  States  were  required  to  transpose 
the Directive before 11 May 2010. All Member States have transposed the Directive by 
the end of 2011 (some of them later that the deadline imposed by the Directive), with no 
infringement proceedings being completed (16 were initiated for failure to communicate 
national  implementing  measures  on  time  while  4  Member  States  failed  to  ensure  its 
timely  entry  into  force  or  effective  application,  but  all  cases  were  closed  soon  after)37. 
Twenty Member States transposed the Directive by adopting new legislation, while the 
rest introduced amendments to pre-existing legislation. No systematic deficiencies in the 
transposition of the Directive by Member States were identified38. 

The Directive was transposed in all Member States with a view to achieving maximum 
harmonisation. Flexibility was nevertheless given to national lawmakers for nine optional 
provisions under Article 27(2) that offer the possibility for Member States to make use of 
particular regulatory choices. For instance, Member States had the legal option to decide 
that the Annual Percentage Rate of Charge would not need to be provided in advertising 
for overdraft agreements, and eight of them made use of this legal option39. 

In  addition,  some  provisions  of  the  Directive  set  clear  objectives  but  do  not  clearly 
specify the result to be achieved. This gave Member States some additional discretionary 
power.. National transposing measures have often gone beyond the requirements of the 
Directive, 
to  further  protect  consumers  (e.g. 
introduction of caps on interest rate). Full details are available in Annex 5.  

laying  down  additional  elements 

The consumer credit sector 2008-2019 

After  almost  a  decade  of  marked  growth  in  the  volume  of  personal  credit  for 
consumption,  the  2008  financial  crisis  began  a  period  of  contraction  that  lasted  until 
2014. The volume of credit for consumption has since recovered, with an average annual 
growth of credit for personal consumption above 4% since 2015.  

37 COM(2014) 259 final 
38 COM(2014) 259 final 
39 Article 4(2)(c). 

12 

 
                                                            
Figure 3 - Average annual growth rate of credit in % for personal consumption in the Eurozone 
(2008–2019) and financing of vehicles for private use (2012–2017) 

Source: ICF (2019), developed with data from the ECB (monthly Economic Bulletin 2015–2019 
and Economic Bulletin 2008–2015) and Eurofinas (Key Facts & Figures 2012-2017). 

Note: No  data  on automotive financing for 2008-2011, 2018, 2019. Data for 2019 on personal 
consumption credit only cover Q1. 

The overall picture of total consumer indebtedness shows decreasing trends until 2014, as 
of which the level of indebtedness is increasing again40.  

At the same time, the problem of loan arrears is common among vulnerable consumers, 
especially  in  some  Member  States,  and  may  be  symptomatic  of  a  risk  of  over-
indebtedness41,42. In 2018, 3.3% of households had arrears on mortgage or rent payments, 
2.1%  on  hire  purchase  instalments  or  other  loan  payments  and  6.6%  on  utility  bills43. 
Many European households continue to find it difficult to make ends meet44.  

40  When  the  crisis  kicked  in,  banks  drastically  reduced  the  amount  of  credit  given.  Thus,  the  outstanding 
amount of credit gradually decreased (as older credit still had to be repaid – and generally was repaid). For 
this reason, the level of indebtedness decreased as well.  
41 Households are considered over-indebted if they are having – on an on-going basis – difficulties meeting 
their commitments, whether these relate to servicing secured or unsecured borrowing or to payment of rent, 
utility  or  other  household  bills,  see  the  2013  Civic  report  on  “The  over-indebtedness  of  European 
households: updated mapping of the situation, nature and causes, effects and initiatives for alleviating its 
impact”. 
42 European Quality of Life Survey 2016, Eurofound. 
43 EU-SILC data. 
44 In the 2016 Eurofound European Quality of Life Survey, 41% of respondents reported ‘some’ to ‘great’ 
difficulty in making ends meet, with large differences between Member States. 

13 

 
 
                                                            
Figure 4 - Share of household consumption financed by credit and consumer indebtedness in the 
euro area economy, post-crisis 

Source:  ICF  elaboration.  Note:  The  share  of  household  consumption  financed  by  credit  = 
consumer  credit  outstanding  amount  /  household  expenditure.  Consumer  indebtedness  = 
outstanding consumer credit amount / household income. 

Consumer  credit  and revolving  credit  interest  rates  have  gradually  dropped  since 2008. 
Low interest rates should result in consumers taking on more credit. 

Figure 5 - Interest rates for consumer credit in the Eurozone, 2008–2019 

Source: ICF, based on ECB data 
[MIR.M.U2.B.A25.I.R.A.2250.EUR.O;MIR.M.U2.B.A2Z1.A.R.A.2250.EUR.N]. Note: data on 
revolving credit and overdrafts not available for 2008-2010. 

There is no comparable data on the number of EU citizens with a personal loan, but in 
2016 the share of EU citizens with a personal loan was around 11%, down from 13% in 
201145.  

45  Elaboration  of  Special  Eurobarometer  446  and  373  data,  support  study  for  the  evaluation  of  Directive 
2008/48/EC, ICF. 

14 

 
 
 
 
                                                            
Figure 6 - Estimated share of EU citizens with a personal loan in 2011 and 2016 

Source: ICF elaboration of Special Eurobarometer 446 and 373 data  

Based on EU population data, it is estimated that in 2018 there were around 59.8 million 
EU citizens with a personal loan,46 and a total number of personal loans in the EU of 71.8 
million47.  

The number of consumers opting for credit cards has increased slightly since 2011, with 
43% of Europeans having a credit card in 2016 (three percentage points (p.p.) higher than 
in 2011), compared to 11% who had a personal loan (two p.p. lower than in 2011)48. The 
share  of  EU  citizens  with  a  credit  card  has  risen  by  3%  over  the  period  2011-2016, 
according  to  Eurobarometer  figures,  ranging  from  11%  in  Hungary  to  84%  in 
Luxembourg49.  

46 Based on the EU population of older than 15 years, and on the assumption that the share of EU citizens 
with a personal loan is still unchanged at 13%.  
47 Based on an estimate of an average of 1.2 loans per EU citizen who has a loan. 
48 London Economics Europe, VVA Consulting, Ipsos NV, ConPolicy and Time.lex, 2019. 
49 ICF elaboration of Eurobarometer 446 and 373 data. 

15 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
Figure 7 - Estimated share of EU citizens with a credit card in 2011 and 2016 

Source: ICF compilation, based on Eurobarometer 446 and 373 data  

The total number of payment cards has gradually increased in the EU, going up from 474 
million  in  2010  to  544  million  in  201850.  Credit  cards  and  revolving  credit  -  a  line  of 
credit where consumers pay a fee to a financial services provider to borrow money if and 
when needed – are covered by the Directive if the amount borrowed falls under its scope 
of application.  

The 2016 Eurobarometer 446 shows no evolution since 2011 on the number of European 
consumers  having  obtained  a  loan  or  a  credit  card  from  a  provider  based  in  another 
Member  State  (still  between  0  and  1%).  However,  consumer  concerns  with  purchasing 
financial  services  from  another  Member  State  have  somewhat  evolved:  the  number  of 
consumers not knowing their rights in case something goes wrong went down from 18% 
to  13%  between  2011 and  2016. Similarly  the importance of the language  barrier went 
down    from  17%  to  12%  over  the  same  period.  Nonetheless,  general  consumer 

50 ICF elaboration of ECB PSS : Payments and Settlement Systems Statistics. 

16 

 
 
                                                            
preferences (finding the offer in the national market sufficient, preferences to buy face-
to-face or from a local provider) have remained stable.  

Finally, an important market development since 2010 has been that of short-term high-
cost  (STHC)  instalment  loans51  -  especially  payday  loans52  –  which  have  warranted 
particular attention in several Member States during the last decade. This type of credit is 
usually  taken  by  consumers  who  are  hard-pressed  to  meet  their  financial  needs53.  The 
credit  amount  is  relatively  small  and  the  initial  duration  short,  although  such  loans  are 
very  likely  to  be  extended  over  time.  Payday  loans  are  a  relatively  small,  high-cost 
instalment loan that has to be repaid over a short term, or until “payday”54. Since 2008, 
the  provision  of  payday  loans55  has  expanded  across  the  EU  and  are  now  available  in 
many Member States, as highlighted by a recent OECD report56.  

Payday  loans  are  often  offered  through  digital  channels.  Digitalisation  has  expanded 
rapidly from 2008 to 2018, as pointed out by various indicators. On the one hand, there 
has  been  a  steady  decline  in  the  number  of  financial  institutions,  in  particular  banks, 
denoting  a  trend  towards  fewer  points  of  sales  and  increased  online  activity.  Similarly, 
the  number  of  bank  branches  decreased  by  27%  from  2008-2018,  while  the  number  of 
bank  employees  reduced  by  14%  over  2009-2018.57  On  the other  hand, online  banking 
penetration in the EU has increased steadily since 2008. In 2018, around half (51%) of 
EU  adults  were  using  internet  banking58.  This  share  is  constantly  increasing  and  has 
nearly doubled since 2008, when it stood at 29%59. 
Limited/no data60 is available on the average amount and duration of consumer loans. 

4.  METHOD 

Main sources of data 

The  evaluation  took  place  between  June  2018  and  October  2019  and  drew  on  the 
following main data sources – in addition to data on infringement cases and complaints 
already at the disposal of the Commission: 

51 High-cost personal loans are a type of instalment credit that is usually unsecured. 
52 A short-term loan expected to be repaid before the consumer's next pay day. 
53 London Economics Europe, VVA Consulting, Ipsos NV, ConPolicy and Time.lex, 2019. 
54 BEUC, 2019.  
55  Payday  loans  have  existed  since  the  1990s,  being  largely  restricted  to  the  Nordic  countries  and  the  US 
until the latter part of the 2000s. 
56 16 EU Member States were captured in a recent OECD report examining the provision of STHC credit in 
a selection of countries, of which 10 reported presence of this type of credit product (AT, CZ, DE, DK, EE, 
LV, NL, RO, SK, UK), while 6 did not (EL, ES, FR, PT, SE, SI); OECD, 2019. 
57 EBF, 2019. 
58 Among EU Member States, internet banking is most common in Denmark (where 90% of people aged 
16  to  74  said  they  were  using  it)  and  the  Netherlands  (89%),  followed  by  the  other  Nordic  countries  - 
Finland (87%) and Sweden (86%).The lowest shares were registered in Bulgaria (5%) and Romania (7%). 
Less than 30% of those between the ages of 16 and 74 use internet banking in Greece (25%) and Cyprus 
(28%). https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/-/DDN-20180115-1  
59 CCD Evaluation supporting study. 
60 Data from the Netherlands shows the average personal loan amount to be €6,400. In the UK this is around 
£7,311  per  household  or  £3,909  per  adult.    It  should  be  noted  that  these  figures  typically  are  calculated 
based on the total outstanding credit and the number of household or adults, and not on the median loan 
taken out. 

17 

 
                                                            
Study to support the Directive evaluation  

The Study61 was outsourced to ICF S.A. in November 2018 to feed into the evaluation of 
the Directive. Its main objective is to provide evidence on whether the current Directive 
framework is still fit for purpose, analyse developments and lessons learned since 2008 
and evaluate the overall functioning of this piece of legislation in relation to its original 
objectives  and  to  those  which  arose  during  its  implementation.  It  focuses  on  in-depth 
consultation  with  stakeholders  but  also  relies  on  other  tasks:  legal  analysis,  literature 
review,  cost  and  benefits  analysis  and  mystery  shopping62  exercises  (both  offline  and 
online).  

Stakeholder consultations63 

The full report of all stakeholder consultation activities undertaken for the evaluation is 
annexed hereto (Annex 2: Stakeholder consultation – Synopsis Report). 

  Online public consultation 

The public consultation on the evaluation of the Consumer Credit Directive ran, on the 
EU  survey  website,  between  14  January  and  8  April  2019.  The  objective  of  this 
consultation  was  to  obtain  the  views  of  citizens  and  relevant  stakeholders  on  the 
functioning  of  the  Directive.  The  public  consultation  questionnaire  was  tailored  to  two 
main categories of stakeholders: the general public (i.e. consumers) and stakeholders who 
are involved in the implementation of the Directive or who have detailed knowledge of 
the  functioning  of  the  different  elements  of  the  Directive  and  their  impact  on  the 
consumer  credit  market.  In  accordance  with  the  Better  Regulation  guidelines,  the 
consultation was available during 12 weeks and respondents could reply in any of the 24 
official  EU-languages.  The  questionnaire  attracted  234  responses.  An  initial  summary 
report64 of the findings was published in May 2019.  

  Online surveys 

As  part  of  the  study,  to  get  a  more  detailed  knowledge  and  reach  a  variety  of 
stakeholders,  the  contractor  launched  and  promoted  online  surveys  for  consumers  and 
creditors. The consumer survey65 ran between 6 and 18 March 2019, targeted consumers 
in  the EU28 and  gathered a total  of 3.886 replies on first-hand experience  in  accessing 

61  ICF  S.A.,  Study  in  Support  of  the  Evaluation  of  Directive  2008/48/EC  on  credit  agreements  for 
consumers (2019).  
62 The activity of pretending to be a normal customer when you are employed by a company to check how 
its products or services are being sold. 
63 Stakeholder consultation is a formal process of collecting input and views from citizens and stakeholders 
on  new  initiatives  or  evaluations/  fitness  checks,  based  on  specific  questions  and/or  consultation 
background  documents  or  Commission  documents  launching  a  consultation  process  or  Green  Papers. 
When consulting, the Commission proactively seeks evidence (facts, views, opinions) on a specific issue. 
64https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-
regulation/initiative/1844/publication/350280/attachment/090166e5c4195d31_en  
65 The survey was performed by Dynata, whose market research is of very high standards. An explanation of 
the number of responses in sub-questions is found in the evaluation supporting study. 

18 

 
                                                            
consumer credit. The creditor survey was launched in February and stayed open until the 
end of April 2019. 51 banks66 and non-banks67,68 replied to it. 

  Stakeholder event 

The Commission organised a stakeholder event in Brussels (“Protecting consumers in the 
digital era: can we do better69”, co-organised with CEPS) on 18 June 2019 to present the 
interim findings of the evaluation and gather feedback from relevant stakeholders. More 
than  140  participants  attended  the  event,  exchanging  on  Directive-related  issues  like 
scope,  pre-contractual  information  and  advertisement,  creditworthiness  assessment  and 
responsible lending. 

  Ad-hoc meetings 

Several  ad-hoc  meetings  with  relevant  stakeholders  (e.g.  consumer  associations  and 
industry  representatives)  took  place  in  the  course  of  2018  and  2019  to  discuss  the 
evaluation of the Directive. 

  Consultation of relevant expert groups 

In evaluating the Directive, the Commission also consulted two relevant expert groups: 
the Expert Group on the Implementation of Directive 2008/48/EC on Consumer Credit70 
and  the  Financial  Services  User  Group  (FSUG)71.  While  the  first  one  met  in  two 
occasions  (January  and  November  2019)  to  provide  input  to  the  Commission  from  the 
different  national  perspectives,  the  FSUG  delivered  in  April  2019  an  opinion72  on  the 
evaluation of the Directive. 

  Contributions received from stakeholders 

While  carrying  out  the  evaluation,  the  Commission  -  often  in  the  context  of  ad-hoc 
meetings - has received several contributions (e.g. position papers, statistics, report etc.) 
from  different  stakeholders,  which  have  all  been  passed  on  to  the  contractor  for  the 
purpose  of  the  study  and/or  analysed  by  the  Commission  itself.  It  is  worth  underlining 
the  Information  Report73  adopted  by  the  European  Economic  and  Social  Committee  in 
July  2019.  It  is  based  on  the  consultations  of  30  Civil  Society  organisations  (CSOs  – 
representing  consumers,  employers  and  workers)  and  national  authorities  in  order  to 

66  A bank is financial institution one of whose principal activities is to take deposits and borrow with the 
objective of lending and investing and which is within the scope of banking or similar legislation. 
67 In general, non-banks are non-monetary financial corporations. More specifically, they include insurance 
corporations and pension funds, financial auxiliaries, and other financial intermediaries. 
68  The  Directive  applies  to  all  credit  providers  (banks  and  non-banks).  In  this  respect,  the  findings 
applicable to how the Directive has impacted consumers and their behaviours  is equally relevant for banks 
and non-banks. In the course of the evaluation, data was sought on credit provision from non-banks. In the 
framework  of  the  supporting  study,  it  became  very  challenging  to  gather  hard  data  on  non-banks  credit 
providers. The creditor survey was also targeting non-banks (269 non-banks were contacted directly), but 
their  response  rate  was  very  low  compared  to  banks  (only  8  complete  responses  from  non-banks  to  the 
creditor survey). 
69 https://www.ceps.eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/06182019-Conference-18-June_draft-agenda-1_.pdf  
70 Code E02180 of the Register of Commission Expert Groups and Other Similar Entities 
71 Code E02594 of the Register of Commission Expert Groups and Other Similar Entities 
72 

https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/business_economy_euro/banking_and_finance/documents/fsug-

opinions-190408-responsible-consumer-credit-lending_en.pdf 
73 https://webapi2016.eesc.europa.eu/v1/documents/eesc-2019-01055-00-00-ri-tra-en.docx/content  

19 

 
                                                            
understand how they experienced and observed the impact and the changes brought about 
by the Directive. 

Experience Gained from the European Commission Consumer Financial Services Action 
Plan  

Under  the  2017  Consumer  Financial  Services  Action  Plan,  the  Commission  undertook 
three  initiatives  in  the  field  of  consumer  credit,  which  delivered  relevant  insights  and 
experiences: 

  exploring  ways  of  facilitating  access  to  loans  across  borders  while  addressing 

consumer over-indebtedness linked to credit activities (Action 7); 

  working with Member States at identifying national approaches and best practices 
to  credit  worthiness  assessment  for  consumer  credit  (an  obligation  under  the 
Directive) and access to credit databases (Action 9); and  

  monitoring  the  distance  selling  market  to  identify  the  potential  consumer  risks 

and business opportunities (Action 12).  

Discussions  have  taken  place  with  stakeholders  (creditors,  authorities,  consumer 
organisations) to understand the barriers faced in the cross-border provisions of consumer 
credit.  These  include  legal  and  technical  barriers  (know-your-customer  requirements  as 
per  anti-money  laundering  requirements,  difficulty  in  checking  the  identity  and 
creditworthiness of consumers), language barriers and questions around applicable law.  

With  the  input  of  the  national  authorities  in  charge  of  enforcing  the  Directive,  the 
Commission  has  developed  a  mapping74  of  national  approaches  to  creditworthiness 
assessment. Results show that Member States are approaching the implementation of this 
provision in very different ways.  

The  Commission  has  also  conducted  a  Behavioural  study  on  the  digitalisation  of  the 
marketing and distance selling of retail financial services75, finding out that digitalisation 
has  given  rise  to  new  market  practices  –often  legally  problematic-,  impacted  providers 
and their business models. It has also analysed how to provide information to consumers 
via behavioural experiments and tested the effectiveness of solutions adopted recently at 
EU level.  

Literature review 

A  number  of  studies  informed  the  evaluation,  including  the  Behavioural  study  on  the 
digitalisation  of  the  marketing  and  distance  selling  of  retail  financial  services  (2019, 
London  Economics  Europe,  VVA  Consulting,  Ipsos  NV,  ConPolicy  and  Time.lex)  and 
the  Study  on  Measuring  Consumer  Detriment  in  the  European  Union  (2017,  Civic 
Consulting). 

The full list of academic and grey literature used for the support study to the evaluation is 
available in Annex 7. 

74 https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/mapping_national_approaches_creditworthiness_assessment.pdf 
75https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/live_work_travel_in_the_eu/consumers/digitalisation_of_financial
_services_-_main_report.pdf 

20 

 
 
                                                            
Limitations and robustness of findings 

Limitations 

The following limitations should be taken into account: 

- 
- 

- 

- 

the data collected to establish the baseline was limited; 
limited  information  was  available  for  short  term  high  cost  loans,  overdrafts,  linked 
credit, and cross-border access to databases; 
it  was  not  possible  to  gather  comprehensive  data  from  complaints  at  national  level 
specifically related to consumer credit; 
in  the  course  of  the  evaluation,  and  in  the  framework  of  the  supporting  study,  data 
was  sought  on  credit  provision  from  non-banks,  but  it  became  very  challenging  to 
gather hard data on non-banks credit providers.  

Whenever quantitative data are lacking, this is counter-balanced  or  complemented with 
qualitative  analysis,  estimates  and  assumptions.  In  addition,  in  order  to  mitigate  these 
limitations,  during  the  evaluation  additional  industry  stakeholders  were  approached  for 
input and further desk research was carried out. The inherent limitations of the findings 
of  public  and  targeted  consultations,  reflecting  the  views  of  a  sample  of  stakeholders, 
should  also  be  taken  into  account.  Nonetheless,  efforts  have  been  made  to  ensure  a 
balanced consultation of all relevant stakeholder groups.  

Robustness of the findings 
The quantitative analysis of the consumer detriment and the contribution of the Directive 
to its reduction, described in Annex 3 as well as in the supporting study, is considered to 
be  robust  as  it  follows  the  detailed  operational  guidance  to  scientifically  sound  and 
resource efficient assessments of personal consumer detriment in markets across the EU 
developed in a 2017 study commissioned by the European Commission76. 

5.  ANALYSIS AND ANSWERS TO THE EVALUATION QUESTIONS 

This  section  presents  the  findings  of  the  evaluation,  based  on  the  triangulation  of 
evidence  collected  through  the  different  means  presented  above.  Findings  are  grouped 
under  each of  the  Better  Regulation  criteria,  contributing to  an  in-depth  analysis  of  the 
functioning of each of the key elements of the Directive. 

EFFECTIVENESS 

The effectiveness analysis considers how successful EU action has been in achieving or 
progressing towards its objectives. 

EQ1 – To what extent has the Directive achieved its objectives? Have the scope of 
application  and  the  definitions  facilitated  or  hindered  the  achievement  of  the 
objectives? What are the main benefits and drawbacks of the Directive? 

The  Directive  has  two  overarching  objectives:  1)  to  ensure  a  high  level  of  consumer 
protection and 2) to foster the emergence of a well-functioning internal market. 

76 “Study on measuring consumer detriment in the European Union”, CIVIC, 2017. 

21 

 
                                                            
Objective 1: Ensuring a high level of consumer protection 

The  objective  of  ensuring  a  high  level  of  consumer  protection  has  been  partially 
achieved,  with  differences  between  the  various  provisions.  Stakeholders  consider  –
although with some nuances - the provisions of the Directive to be helpful and effective, 
but  point  to  areas  for  improvement.  The  introduction  of  the  Directive  has  enabled  the 
development of a specific legal framework to protect consumers in this sector, which did 
not  exist  in numerous  Member States  at  the time of its introduction. However, several 
Member States have also completed the  Directive provisions with additional elements, 
which would imply that the Directive on its own was not sufficient to reach the highest 
level of protection and that more stringent measures were needed at Member States level 
to afford more protection to consumers and/or address detrimental practices.  

Overall, the Directive has been partially effective in ensuring a higher level of consumer 
protection  than  was  the  case  before  its  adoption.  The  majority  of  stakeholders 
interviewed77  considered  the  Directive  effective  in  ensuring  better  protection  of 
consumers.  Of  the  consumer  associations  interviewed,  only  a  slight  majority  (just  over 
50%)  of  respondents  considered  the  Directive  effective  in  this  respect,  compared  to  a 
substantial  majority  (over  75%)  of  industry  representatives,  Member  States  and 
enforcement  bodies.  A  majority  of  respondents  to  the  Open  Public  Consultation  also 
considered the Directive effective in this respect.78 

The transposition of the  Directive  indeed triggered substantial reforms of the consumer 
credit  environment  in  most  Member  States79.  New  elements  were  introduced  by  the 
Directive, in particular in relation to pre-contractual information Standardised European 
Consumer  Credit  Information  (SECCI)  and  advertisement,  as  well  as  the  right  of 
withdrawal. These elements have, over time, helped to ensure a higher level of consumer 
protection.  These  provisions  are  considered  positive  and  largely  effective  by  most 
national  authorities,  consumer  associations  and  consumers  themselves  (about  their 
practical  working  see  the  specific  sections  -  EQ3,  EQ4  and EQ6).  Other  areas,  such  as 
requirements  on the Annual Percentage Rate  of  Charge  (APR),  already existed prior  to 
the  Directive  but  were  completely  harmonised,  affording  a  high  level  of  consumer 
protection across the EU. 

Studies  from  the  early  2000s  showed  that  consumers  expressed  a  need  for  further 
harmonisation,  and  this  has  generally  been  overcome  by  the  Directive  as  overall 
consumer protection standards have gone up.  

The  ability  of  the  Directive  to  fully  meet  its  objective  of  ensuring  a  high  level  of 
consumer  protection  has  however  been  hampered  by  a  number  of  specific  legal 
developments. The Directive aims at offering a sufficient degree of consumer protection 

77 This includes both those interviewed on the phone and those surveyed. 
78  The  majority  of  the  respondents  to  the  specific  part  of  the  Open  Public  Consultation  (from  different 
stakeholder categories) considered all provisions either very or somewhat effective, with the exception of 
the information to be included in advertising, which was deemed “somewhat/very ineffective” by 72% of 
businesses, 36% of consumer associations and 26% of public authorities.  
79 Legal analysis and stakeholder survey. 

22 

 
 
                                                            
to ensure consumer confidence. An uneven level of consumer protection across the EU 
leads to fragmentation and unequal conditions to access credit products in other Member 
States. Even if cross-border activities concern a small part of credit agreements, they are 
important  because  they  can  increase  competition  and  ultimately  consumer  choice; 
moreover they are expected to increase thanks to digitalisation.  

Some of these legal developments are directly linked to a few provisions of the Directive, 
which have been implemented in various ways by Member States. In addition, Member 
States  have  regulated  differently  various  credit-related  issues  not  covered  by  the 
Directive. As such, even though the Directive has fully harmonised several aspects of the 
provision  of  credit,  the  overall  level  of  consumer  protection  in  this  sector  is  somewhat 
fragmented across the EU.  

It  depended  on  political  choices  made  by  the  co-legislators  to  exclude  several  types  of 
consumer  credit  from  the  scope  of  the  Directive,  which,  depending  on  the  Member 
States,  may  have  then  been  somehow  regulated  by  specific  rules  at  the  national  level. 
This aspect is further analysed under EQ7. 

Another example concerns a few provisions80 of the Directive, which have given rise to 
different implementation and interpretation across Member States (see EQ3, EQ4).  

Furthermore,  in  many  instances81,  Member  States  have  added  elements  to  their  own 
consumer  credit  legislation,  usually  imposing  additional  requirements  on  creditors  and 
affording greater protection to consumers. The fact that Member States have felt the need 
to  add  such  measures  may  indicate  that  the  Directive  was  not  considered  entirely 
sufficient by Member States to ensure a high level of consumer protection, often adapted 
to  national  specificities.  This  is  particularly  relevant  in  relation  to  the  objective  of  the 
Directive  of  ensuring  responsible  lending,  where  Member  States  have  gone  beyond the 
Directive provisions to address specific forms of problematic lending practices (e.g. see 
EQ4 for more details).  

Finally,  the  difference  in  remedies  and  enforcement  structures  (for  more  details,  see 
EQ2) available for consumers across the EU has meant that, while a fairly high level of 
consumer  protection  standards  exists,  its  application  is  uneven  which  somewhat  limits 
the achievement of the objective.  

Objective 2: Facilitating the emergence of a well-functioning internal market 

Consumer credit remains predominantly provided at national level, with a very limited 
cross-border market (0.9% of all loans), and stagnant compared to the baseline. This can 
be explained by a series of barriers, some of which are directly linked to the way some 
of the Directive provisions have been implemented by Member States. However, many 
other barriers relate to aspects beyond the provisions of the Directive, both on the supply 
side – because of general regulatory and market fragmentation, and on the demand side, 
because  of  general  consumer  preferences,  but  also  by  geographically-based 

80 The provision of pre-contractual information ‘in good time’ as per Article 4, and to present it in a ‘clear, 
concise and prominent way’ as per Article 5, and the assessment of the creditworthiness of the consumer 
on the basis of ‘sufficient information’ as per Article 8. 
81 All Member States with the exception of Cyprus and Greece. 

23 

 
                                                            
discrimination  through  geo-blocking  techniques.  The  Directive  has  played  a  positive 
role  in  achieving  this  objective  thanks  to  certain  provisions  that  have  harmonised  key 
aspects of the provision of consumer credit in the EU (Standardised European Consumer 
Credit  Information,  right  of  withdrawal,  …)  ensuring  a  level-playing  field  on  these 
aspects between providers and the same rights for consumers.  

Between  2008  and  2019,  cross-border  household  loans  have  remained  almost 
unchanged82    at  around  0.9%  of  all  outstanding  credit  in  the  eurozone.  The  lack  of 
significant  changes  in  these  figures  suggests  that  the  Directive  has  had  little  noticeable 
impact on cross-border access to credit83. The consumer credit market in the EU remains 
predominantly  national.  With  the  exception  of  consumer  associations  (whose  opinions 
were  divided  on  whether  the  Directive  has  facilitated  cross-border  access  to  credit  and 
resulted  in  increased  competition  at  EU  level),  all  stakeholder  groups  agreed  that  the 
Directive has not triggered a significant increase in cross-border operations or EU-level 
competition.84  Similarly,  while  national  authorities  were  relatively  positive  about  the 
impact  of  the  Directive  on  the  level  of  consumer  protection in  cross-border  operations, 
the Directive is seen by the vast majority of stakeholders as having had little or no impact 
in this respect.85 

The lack of an internal market for consumer credit is due in part to the way some of the 
Directive provisions have been implemented, and mainly to the fact that the Directive, on 
its own cannot  actually achieve  this objective because  of its limited  set  of provisions86, 
and because of external factors influencing offer and demand.  

Perceptions of distortion of competition between creditors in the internal market due to 
different protection levels were largely addressed by the Directive in the form of a more 
level playing field with the same standards applying across the EU. This is particularly 
the  case  in  relation  to  aspects  fully  harmonised  by  the  Directive  such  as  the  Annual 
Percentage Rate of Charge (APR), the rights of withdrawal and early repayment as well 
as the Standardised European Consumer Credit Information (SECCI).  

On  the  demand  side  (as  explained  in  Section  3)  general  consumer  preferences  like 
finding the offer in the national market sufficient, and preferences for obtaining a credit 
locally,  appear  to  have  remained  unchanged  over  the  past 10  years87,88.  Consumers  also 

82 They dropped to 0.8% between 2011 and 2016. 
83  Interviews  of  consumer  associations,  industry,  and  Member  States;  Survey  of  creditors;  Open  Public 
Consultation (specific). 
84  Interviews  with  consumer  associations,  industry,  and  Member  States;  survey  of  creditors;  Open  Public 
Consultation (specific).  
85  Interviews  with  consumer  associations,  industry,  and  Member  States;  survey  of  creditors;  Open  Public 
Consultation (specific); Open Public Consultation (general). 
86  This  is  also  covered  under  EQ11  in  terms  of  the  apparent  incoherence  between  this  objective  and  its 
provisions, and EQ15 in terms of the extent to which this objective can still be considered relevant. 
87 The main barriers to purchasing financial products cross-border suggested a lack of demand, as well as 
rights-related elements, including awareness, perception of complexity, cost, know-how but also language 
barriers. Special Eurobarometer 373, 2011. 
88  The  creditor  survey  pointed  to  obstacles  to  the  functioning  of  the  cross-border  consumer  credit  market 
including language barriers, consumers’ preference for obtaining credit locally. 

24 

 
 
                                                            
lack information about existing cross-border offers of financial products89, 90. In addition, 
the  lack  of  knowledge  among  consumers  of  available  redress  mechanisms91  and  of 
applicable  legislation  in  case  of  cross-border  purchase  deter  consumers  from  obtaining 
credit from another Member State. Indeed, 23% of the consumer surveyed mentioned the 
uncertainty  about  their  rights  abroad  as  the  main  reason  for  not  looking  for  a  credit  in 
another Member State. Lack of language skills was also mentioned as a reason by 14% of 
respondents. 

There  is  however  a  growing  interest  among  consumers  for  cross-border  credit  offers: 
29% of the respondents to the consumer survey said they had looked for a credit from a 
creditor located in another EU country. This compares to only 2% in 201192 who said that 
they  would  potentially  buy  a  personal  loan  in  a  foreign  EU  country93.  However  this 
demand is often unmet as traditional creditors rarely target consumers in other countries. 
Moreover,  access  to  offers  available  in  another  country  is  often  limited  due  to 
geographical  restrictions94.  In  the  digital  realm,  geo-blocking  techniques  are  used  by 
credit  providers  to  re-route  consumers  or  prevent  the  conclusion  of  a  transaction, 
effectively denying access to credit for cross-border consumers.95, 96 

In  2015,  the  European  Commission  echoed  the  then  recently  adopted  Digital  Market 
Strategy  and  anticipated  that  actions  seeking  to  avoid  geo-blocking  and  other  types  of 
geographically-based discrimination would be taken. Although a new Regulation on geo-
blocking was adopted in 2018 (Regulation (EU) 2018/302), financial services have been 
specifically  excluded  from  its  material  scope  for  the  time  being.  The  Geo-blocking 
Regulation is currently under review. 

These  restrictions  may  include  the  requirements  imposed  by  providers  on  consumers 
wishing to obtain a credit from a creditor based in another Member State to provide an 
ID  or  social  security  number,  address,  telephone  number  or  tax  declaration  from  the 
country  where  the  creditor  is  based  as  pre-requisite  for  the  transaction  to  be  accepted. 
This  was  corroborated  by  the  mystery  shopping  exercise  for  this  study  during  which  it 

89 COM (2015) 0603 final. 
90 58% of the consumer surveyed as part of this evaluation did not think it was possible to obtain a credit 
from a creditor based in another Member State. 
91 Open Public Consultation (general); consumer survey. 
92 Special Eurobarometer 373. 
93 Please note that there could be some limitations in the comparison between 2019 and 2011 data, due to 
difference in the size of the sample and in the methodology between the consumer survey performed for 
the  supporting  study  to  the  evaluation  (based  on  3,886  responses  from  the  EU-28)  and  data  from  the 
Special Eurobarometer 373. 
94 Open Public Consultation. 
95 COM (2015) 0603 final; ECRI, 2018a. 
96 Pursuant to Article 9 of the Geo-blocking Regulation and in line with the Commission statement made at 
the  time  of  the  adoption  of  the  Regulation,  the  first  review  of  the  Regulation  due  in  March  2020  shall 
provide inter alia: (1) an assessment of the way the Regulation has been implemented and contributed to 
the  effective  functioning  of  the  internal  market,  and  (2)  a  substantive  analysis  of  the  feasibility  and 
potential  costs  and  benefits  arising  from  any  changes  to  the  scope  of  the  Regulation.  This  includes  the 
possible  elimination  of  any  remaining  unjustified  restrictions  based  on  nationality,  place  of  residence  or 
place  of  establishment  insectors  not  covered  by  the  Regulation,  such  as  services  in  the  field  of  financial 
services.   

25 

 
                                                            
proved  impossible  to  obtain  cross-border  credit97.  Some  creditors  have  a  policy  of 
refusing credits to individuals which they consider do not have sufficient economic and 
personal links with the Member State in which these creditors are established. This can 
even lead to the impossibility in practice for some people to get a credit in any Member 
State.98  This reveals that we are still far from a well-functioning EU internal market for 
credit products. 

These  restrictions  are  the  expression  of  the  barriers  faced  on  the  offer  side,  whereby 
because  of  the  fragmented  regulatory  framework  (uneven  implementation  of  the 
Directive  and  a  lack  of  harmonisation  of  other  rules  relevant  for  creditors  e.g.  tax  and 
civil law, legal framework for debt recovery, and anti-money laundering obligations)99,100 
and differences between markets and consumer preferences (e.g. consumers unaware of 
the possibility of seeking cross-border credits or unsure of their rights in another Member 
State,  or  language  barriers101),  most  creditors  prefer  to  operate  on  a  national  basis102. 
However,  newly  emerged  fintech  companies  offering  unsecured  loans  to  consumers  in 
various  Member  States  –  whose  market  share  is  currently  insignificant  compared  to 
traditional credit providers - could have an impact on the future development of a cross-
border market. 

Regulatory  fragmentation  and  the  consequent  lack  of  exploitation  of  synergies  and 
economies  of  scale in  the  internal market  raise  costs  for  providers  who  want  to  sell  on 
another market (which are then passed on to consumers), reduce the offer available and 
make it more difficult for consumers to know the regime which is applicable in another 
Member State. 

EQ2  –  To  what  extent  has  the  Directive  led  to  legal  clarity?  What  is  the  level  of 
compliance of businesses and their enforcement? 

Issues  of  compliance  have  been  identified  in  relation  to  all  the  key  provisions  of  the 
Directive,  to  varying  degrees.  There  are  considerable  differences  in  enforcement  tools 
and  remedies  used  by  competent  authorities,  which  impact  the  functioning  of  the 
Directive’s provisions in practice.  

Legal clarity, although not for all provisions, has improved as the Directive has provided 
a higher degree of regulatory harmonisation.  

97 Mystery shopping findings. 
98 A problematic issue that was brought to the Commission attention concerns the difficulties in accessing 
credit  encountered  by  intra-EU  mobile  citizens.  For  instance,  a  Dutch  citizen  residing  in  Spain  but 
receiving his income from a Dutch source may encounter problems in getting access to commercial loans 
in  Spain,  based  on  the  argument  that  he  has  no  income  of  Spanish  origin,  while  in  the  Netherlands  this 
access may be refused as well because of the fact that he is not resident in the Netherlands. This problem is 
not directly linked with the Directive, which does not regulate the conditions under which a credit may be 
granted (except the provisions on pre-contractual information and creditworthiness assessment), but reveals 
that we are still far from a well-functioning EU internal market for credit products. 
99 Creditor survey. 
100 See reply to this question for Objective 1, EQ2 and EQ5. 
101 Consumer survey. 
102 Open Public Consultation (general); creditor survey. 

26 

 
                                                            
Consumer  credit  legislation  in  the  EU  remains  very  fragmented,  limiting  the  impact  of 
the  Directive  on legal  clarity. This fragmentation is  due both to  how the  Directive has 
been implemented by Member States103 but also by aspects not covered by the Directive 
which have been regulated differently across the EU (see EQ1, EQ3 and EQ4 for more 
details).  

Nevertheless,  compared  to  the  baseline,  the  Directive  has  managed  to  improve  legal 
clarity in terms of most requirements on the right to withdrawal, right of early repayment, 
Standardised European Consumer Credit Information (SECCI), Annual Percentage Rate 
of  Charge  (APR)  and  advertisement.  More  problematic  is  the  situation  around 
creditworthiness assessment (CWA) (see EQ4). 

As  explained  in  EQ1,  the  Directive  has  partially  achieved  this  objective,  as  it  has 
increased the level of harmonisation in the aspects it covers. Despite these improvements, 
there are indications that legal clarity has not improved in all areas since the adoption of 
the Directive. Very few stakeholders  believe that the  Directive has brought more legal 
clarity104.  Most  credit  providers  stated  that  the  lack  of  clarity  in  respect  to  their 
obligations is the second most important obstacle they face in complying with consumer 
credit legislation105.  

The discretion left to Member States (due to the limited scope of application and the high 
number  of  regulatory  choices),  combined  with  the  vague  wording  of  some  provisions, 
has  limited  the  ability  of  the  Directive  to  achieve  legal  clarity  and  has  led  to  uneven 
implementation and enforcement of the Directive across Member States106,107.  

However, this lack of legal clarity should not be attributed exclusively to the  Directive, 
as  providers  of  consumer  credit  operate  in  a  complex  regulatory  framework  combining 
EU and national rules.  

This  evaluation  generally finds that  compliance is  high,  with Member State authorities 
and enforcement bodies generally agreeing. However, the lack of legal clarity might have 
led to divergent situations in Member States, and hence to fragmentation, despite the high 
compliance of providers with national requirements. 

87% of the respondents to the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) survey 
found  that  the  Directive  had  been  fully  and  effectively  enforced.  However,  some 
stakeholders, in particular consumer associations, enforcement authorities and consumers 
themselves have identified issues in relation to all provisions of the Directive108. The use 
of  information  in  advertising  that  is  not  ‘clear,  concise  and  prominent’  or  does  not 

103  These  differences  are  rooted  in  the  broad  discretion  allowed  by  Article  5(1)  and  Article  8(1),  in 
particular. 
104 Open Public Consultation (specific). 
105 Survey of creditors. 
106  Legal  analysis;  Interviews  of  consumer  associations,  interview  representatives,  Member  States  and 
enforcement authorities. 
107  Examples  of  different  interpretation  or  implementation  of  the  Directive  where  Member  States  have 
decided to impose stricter obligations are further elaborated in EQ3, EQ4 and EQ6. 
108 Stakeholder consultation, interviews with enforcement bodies and Member States. 

27 

 
 
                                                            
include a representative example of the APR are the most commonly identified breaches 
of  the  Directive’s  provisions.  Poor  CWAs  and  the  provision  of  pre-contractual 
information  without  using  the  SECCI  or  without  providing  individualised  information 
were also identified by stakeholders, albeit to a lesser extent109. Stakeholders also noted 
some issues of poor communication of the right of withdrawal and non-compliance with 
the 14-day period110, and the amount to be repaid in compensation to creditors (right of 
early repayment). 

There  is  no  comprehensive  data  on  sector  compliance  itself.  Based  on  the  Consumer 
Market  Scoreboards  from  2010  and  2017,  the  share  of  consumers  who  experienced  at 
least one problem went down from 14% to 8%, which is an indication that the Directive 
has  been  effective  in  increasing  compliance  with  its  provisions.  However,  a  2011 
consumer  credit  sweep111  on  “buying  consumer  credit  online”,  showed  that  across  the 
then EU-27, Norway and Iceland, only around 45% of over 560 websites were deemed to 
be compliant112.  

In  terms of  enforcement  and remedies, there are vast differences in  existing  practices 
across  the  EU.  Judicial  remedies  are  available  to  consumers  in  different  forms.  At  the 
same time, specific sanctions also differ, with Member States applying monetary and/or 
criminal  sanctions,  as  well  as  other  administrative  sanctions,  for  breaches  of  the 
Directive.  

For enforcement, a variety of different authorities are involved. In most Member States, 
the  enforcement  authority  is  either  the  financial  supervisory  authority,  the  consumer 
protection body or the national bank. A small majority of Member States have only one 
enforcement body responsible for compliance with the Directive, while almost half have 
appointed several  bodies113  for ensuring correct implementation  of the different aspects 
of  the  Directive114.  While  the  powers  and  responsibilities  with  which  these  bodies  are 
entrusted  are  generally  very  similar  across  Member  States,  the  enforcement  activities 

109  Survey  with  consumer  association;  Mystery  shopping  (The  mystery  shopping  exercise  is  based  on  a 
restricted sample so the findings should be interpreted with caution).  
110  London  Economics,  2014;  London  Economics,  2013;  EBA,  2019;  Consumer  survey  (20%  of  the 
respondents  who  contracted  a  loan  within  the  past  three  years  did  not  receive  the  SECCI  before  signing 
their contract, and less than 30% were not informed of the value of the APR). 
111 A "sweep" is a concerted investigations of consumer markets through simultaneous coordinated control 
actions  to  check  compliance  with,  or  to  detect  infringements  of,  Union  laws  that  protect  consumers’ 
interests. 
112  European  Commission,  2012.  Problems  were  found  for  61%  of  financial  institutions  covered  and  for 
87% of intermediary websites, with non-compliance among credit intermediaries higher than for traditional 
banks.  For  other  non-traditional  credit  no  hard  data  is  available.  Issues  related  to  advertising  failing  to 
include  standardised  information,  key  information  (such  as  interest  rates  on  repayments)  omitted  and 
misleading information in the presentation of costs. 
 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_12_1251  
113 CZ, EE, EL, ES, FI, HR, IE, IT, PL, PT, SI, SE. 
114 For instance, the  requirements  on  creditworthiness  assessment stemming  from  the  Consumer  Credit 
Directive are  generally enforced by  the  consumer  authority  (for all creditors in BE, EE, EL, FR,  IS,  LV 
and  PL;  for  non-bank    creditors  in    DK,  SE,  SI  and  regional  ES  authorities),  the  financial  supervisory 
authority (for all creditors in EE; FR, NL, PL,UK and for banks in DK and SE) or the  national  central  
bank  (for  all  creditors  in CY, CZ, ES, HU,IE, IT,LT, PT, RO, SK and for  banks    in ES and SI). 

28 

 
                                                            
differ. For instance, annual inspections are carried out in a couple of Member States115, 
with random inspections taking place in others116. 

The  EESC  survey  nonetheless  highlights  that  30%  of  respondents  find  that  supervising 
authorities  do  not  have  sufficient  resources,  staff  and  powers  to  ensure  effective 
enforcement of the Directive. The EESC report also points out that this situation varies 
greatly between Member States. 

The  consumer  is  able to  pursue  remedies  against  the  creditor  when there  are  problems 
with  its  credit  agreement.  The  extent  and  type,  however,  are  determined  by  Member 
States117.  Since  remedies  are  not  harmonised  in  the  Directive,  this  results  in  practice  in 
different levels of consumer protection across the EU in case of non-compliance with the 
Directive. The likelihood of consumers needing or requesting to pursue remedies depend 
on the scale of the problems they encounter. This evaluation’s survey showed that 26% 
of those experiencing any issues did not make any complaint, while 50% took it to the 
creditor,  23%  to  a  third  party118.  These  figures  do  not  seem  to  have  changed  since 
2011119.  

Administrative complaints and alternative dispute resolution mechanisms are available in 
all Member States. Consumers can seek support from institutions such as the consumer 
Ombudsman  and  other  enforcement  bodies  or  consumer  associations.  These  bodies 
receive official consumer complaints and can handle cases outside of courts.  

Criminal  sanctions120  are  found  in  Austria,  Belgium,  Denmark,  Finland,  France, 
Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia and the United 
Kingdom. Monetary sanctions vary considerably121 across Member States, with different 
levels  of  sanctions  applied  for  serious  or  less  serious  infringements  of  the  law.  Six 
Member  States  apply  the  administrative  sanction  of  suspending  creditors  for  a  limited 
period  of  time,  or  permanently  for  repeated  offences122.  One  common  administrative 
sanction is the suspension of the creditor’s activity in case of repeated offenses. There is 
therefore a huge disparity in terms of the types and levels of sanctions used by national 
authorities when enforcing the Directive. The survey carried out by the EESC shows that 

115 BE, RO. 
116 BG, FI, PL, PT, SK. 
117  This  can  include  the  annulation  of  contracts  that  are  not  compliant  with  the  Directive  (Belgium),  the 
reimbursement of consumers for amounts that were wrongly collected (Italy), the loss of the right to the 
interests for the creditor (France) or the suspension of advertising campaigns (Romania). 
118 Consumer survey, 2019. 
119According  to  Eurobarometer  373  (2011),  over  half  of  consumers  reported  their  issue  to  the  product 
provider,  following  by  an  intermediary  or  advisor  (16%),  consumer  rights  protection  association  (7%), 
ADR  body  or  ombudsperson  (4%),  legal  proceedings  (3%),  while  27%  did  not  complain  and  7%  only 
complained to friends or family.119 
120 For example in Belgium the failure to provide consumers with the SECCI can be punished with a one-
year  sentence  to  prison.  In  Croatia,  Latvia  and  Poland  misleading  information  or  advertising  are  seen  as 
criminal offences and in Luxembourg the act of providing credit without the right authorisation to do so as 
well as doorstep selling in spite of consumer’s refusal are punishable with prison time. 
121 The amounts of the fines range from the mildest, 26 € in Belgium, to the harshest in Greece, €1 million  
and Portugal, € 5 million. 
122  The  legal  analysis  for  this  study  found  that  only  Belgium,  Finland,  Greece,  Hungary,  Italy  and  Spain 
suspend creditors in cases of repeated offences. 

29 

 
                                                            
40%  of  respondents  would  be  in  favour  of  the  Directive  harmonising  these  penalties 
(versus 26% who would be against and 33% without opinion) so that they are “effective 
proportionate and dissuasive (…), [and] harmonised as far as possible, so as to avoid a 
dumping  effect  whereby  operators  base  themselves  wherever  controls  are  more  lenient 
and sanctions less severe”.  

The fragmentation of the consumer credit legislation in the EU, which limits the impact 
of  the  Directive  on  legal  clarity,  and  the  considerable  differences  in  enforcement  tools 
and  remedies  used  by  competent  authorities,  present  a  significant  obstacle  to  the 
development of a well-functioning internal market for consumer credit123. 

EQ3  –  Is  the  Directive  –  through  advertising  requirements,  pre-contractual 
information  (including  Standardised  European  Consumer  Credit  Information  and 
Annual  Percentage  Rate  of  Charge)  and  other  additional  information  –  ensuring 
that  consumers  are  effectively  provided  with  accurate,  clear,  concise,  timely  and 
comprehensive information free-of-charge? 

The  practical  implementation  of  both  the  provision  on  pre-contractual  information 
(Article 5) and the provision on advertising (Article 4) varies across Member States but 
also among providers due to the wording of certain parts of these provisions.   

In  relation  to  Article  4,  stakeholder  views  are  split  as  to  the  effectiveness  of  the 
provision  on  advertising.  Evidence  shows  that  its  impact  varies  depending  on  the 
prominence  it  is  given  and  the  media  used.  Moreover,  the  way  in  which  providers 
comply  with  this  provision  can  lead  to  poor  information  and  imprudent  borrowing 
choices for consumers. 

The  pre-contractual  information  provided  to  consumers  under  Article  5  is  considered 
effective  by  a  large  majority  of  stakeholders.  However,  its  degree  of  effectiveness  on 
consumers is impacted by its length, complexity and timing of delivery, as well as the 
way in which it is provided, notably in the online environment.  

Overall, the disclosure of information mandated by the Directive is not entirely adapted 
to  all  the  channels  used  by  providers  to  communicate  with  consumers.  Levels  of 
financial literacy impacts the extent to which consumers understand this information.  

Advertisement 
Member States and creditors’ associations consulted agree that all required information is 
provided at the advertising stage in accordance with Article 4 of the Directive. However 
consumer  associations  consulted  in  the  course  of  this  study  raised  issues  with  the 
provision  and  presentation  of  this  information124.  A  handful  of  stakeholders,  mostly 
representing  consumers  as  well  as  enforcement  bodies,  have  indeed  reported  cases  of 
non-compliance  in  relation  to  incomplete  or  missing  information  in  advertising,  in 

123 See EQ1 for more details. 
124  Surveys  and  interviews  of  key  stakeholders.  For  example,  the  font  size  in  certain  instances  was 
considered  to small  to  be  considered  ‘clear’, while  in others  important  information  was  included  only  in 
footnotes.  Another  issue  that  was  mentioned  is  the  presentation  of  unrealistic  interest  rates,  or  the 
presentation of interest rates as if they were the Annual Percentage Rate of Charge. 

30 

 
                                                            
particular  when  it  comes  to  the  conditions  attached  to  the  credit  agreement  which  are 
either omitted or presented in a misleading way by advertising low or favourable interest 
rates without indicating the conditions attached125.  

Overall, views collected are split as to whether the current requirements are effective to 
inform  consumers:  53%  of  stakeholders  responding  to  the  Open  Public  Consultation 
(mainly  consumer  organisations  and  authorities)  considered  the  provisions  of  Article  4 
somewhat  effective  or  very  effective  whilst  42%  (mainly  business  representatives) 
considered  it  somewhat  or  very  ineffective.  The  survey  carried  out  by  the  European 
Economic and Social Committee shows similar results126. However, the effectiveness of 
the  provision  on  advertising  has  been  somehow  confirmed  in  the  online  environment. 
The  results  of  a  recent  behavioural  study  suggest  that  the  provision  of  the  Annual 
Percentage  Rate  of  Charge  (APR)  and  the  representative  example  in  advertisings 
displayed online is effective in pushing consumers to compare other offers127.  

The clarity and prominence of information included in advertising is debatable in some 
cases, as also hinted by stakeholders. The display of the information in advertising (the 
framing, the colours, the fonts etc.) is recognised as having a strong impact on consumer 
decision-making128.  The  wording  of  Article  4  is  vague  and  does  not  ensure  that  the 
information is provided consistently and presents all the necessary information in a clear 
and understandable way129. Member States have often gone beyond the requirements of 
Article  4,  either  by  mandating  additional  information  that  should  be  provided  to  the 
consumers in advertising or by specifying presentational requirements.  

Issues have also been identified in relation to advertisements about consumer credit aired 
on  television  and  radios,  with  important  information  either  shown  for  a  very  limited 
amount of time or spoken very quickly, not giving consumers enough time to process and 
recall it130. This would suggest the difficulty of Article 4 in being effective consistently 
across all media types, with a consequent risk of information overload for consumers (see 
EQ 9).  

In  addition,  some  compliant  advertising  practices  have  been  mentioned  by  consumer 
associations  as  being  still  potentially  unclear,  incomplete  or  somewhat  misleading  for 
consumers,  together  with  aggressive  marketing  strategies  that  could  lead  consumers  to 
engage  in  imprudent  borrowing131.  Time-limited  offers  may  increase  pressure  on 
consumers  to  make  a  rapid  decision  based  on  relatively  complex  information,  possibly 
leading  to  the  choice  of  a  non-optimal  credit132.  This  is  all  the  more  probable  when 

125 European Commission, 2019; Surveys and interviews of consumer associations and enforcement bodies. 
126  40%  of  respondents  considered  that  the  standard  information  requirements  should  be  presented 
differently to be more effective while 53% of the respondents consider that they were sufficiently clear.   
127 European Commission, 2019b.  
128 UK FCA, 2017. 
129 European Commission, 2019; Surveys and interviews of consumer association and Member States. 
130 Surveys and interviews of Member States, creditors and creditor associations. 
131 Surveys and interviews of consumer associations. These strategies include methods such as time-limited 
offers, dynamic pricing, baiting and teaser rates  and lend themselves well to online sales, which increases 
their relevance in an increasing digital market. 
132 UK FCA, From advert to action: behavioural insights into the advertising of financial products, 2017. 

31 

 
                                                            
considering  that  often  this  type  of  credit  targets  more  vulnerable  consumers,  in  some 
instances  including  targeted  spamming  via  SMS  and  email133.  Several  of  the  online 
mystery shops (17%) revealed advertising that offered products for a limited amount of 
time, with the majority found either on comparison websites or on websites accessed via 
a comparison website.134  
Some  Member  States  have  decided  to  legislate  on  the  topic  and  prohibit  their  use135. 
However,  information  may  still  attract  consumers  and  entice  them  into  making  a 
purchase without properly considering their options even without a time-limit. This is the 
case of ‘baiting rates’ which may attract consumers with an example that is very low and 
not  representative  for  most  consumers.  Doing  so  may  mean  that  the  actual  repayment 
rates will be much higher136, shedding doubt on whether the information provided can be 
considered ‘accurate’. This practice was observed in 40% of online mystery shops. 

Pre-contractual information 

Stakeholders acknowledge that the Standardised European Consumer Credit Information 
(SECCI)  has  had  a  positive  impact  on  consumer  protection  by  providing  them  with 
information in an easily understandable and well-structured format137. Nearly two thirds 
of  respondents  to  the  Open  Public  Consultation  and  85%  of  the  consumers  surveyed 
considered the SECCI to be effective. 

68% of consumers surveyed for this evaluation indicated to have received the SECCI, a 
finding backed up by the mystery shopping where the SECCI was provided in 74% of the 
cases138. The fact that not all consumers indicate that they have received the SECCI could 
be  explained  by  two  factors:  a  lack  of  creditors’  compliance  or  a  lack  of  consumers’ 
awareness about documents received139.  

The provision of the SECCI is considered by all stakeholders to have increased consumer 
awareness  of  their  contracts.  However,  its  length  and  complexity  may  create,  in  some 
instances,  barriers  to  the  proper  understanding  of  the  information  included  therein140. 
Indeed,  Open  Public  Consultation  individual  respondents  are  split  on  whether  they 
understand  the  information  contained  in  the  SECCI:  49%  somewhat  or  totally  agreed 
with information contained in the SECCI being easy to understand while 27% disagreed, 

133 Asociacion General de Consumidores (ASGECO) [ES], 2015b. 
134 The mystery shopping exercise is based on a restricted sample so the findings should be interpreted with 
caution. 
135 As is the case in Belgium and the Netherlands. 
136 A study conducted by Which? In the UK, revealed that rates for repayment were up to 150% higher than 
that initially budgeted. Which? [UK], 2019a. 
137 Open Public Consultation (general): 10% indicated not having received the form with another 26% not 
being sure; Survey of consumers; Interviews and surveys of stakeholders.  
138 The small sample size of the mystery shopping (51), and taking into account non-completed and rejected 
loan requests (7) this should be used as anecdotal evidence only. 
139 The consumer survey for this evaluation showed that 29% of consumers consulted were unaware of the 
existence of the SECCI before signing the credit offer. A similar figure emerges from the individuals who 
responded  to  a  similar  question  in  the  Open  Public  Consultation.  This  lack  of  awareness  of  a  key  right 
granted by  the  Directive  reduces  the  effectiveness of  this  provision  since  this implies  that the  concerned 
consumers do not know that they are entitled to receiving it. 
140 Surveys and interviews of enforcement authorities, Member States, consumer associations and industry 
representatives. 

32 

 
                                                            
and 47% considered it well-presented (while 29% disagreed). Overall, around 70% of the 
respondents to the consumer survey found the SECCI helpful or somewhat helpful. 

The  use  of  excessively  technical  language  may  create  confusion  and  an  inability  to 
properly  grasp  the  details  of  the  contract  that  one  is  about  to  sign.  In  a  recent  study, 
consumers  rated  the  understandability  of  the  information  at  2.91  out  of  10  and  73% 
reported  signing  contracts  they  did not  fully  understand141.  Different  levels  of  financial 
literacy142 among consumers and their ability to understand the information contained in 
the  SECCI  can  also  reduce  its  effectiveness.  Complex  documents  do  not  cater  to 
consumers  with  low  levels  of  financial  literacy143  which,  as  shown  by  behavioural 
studies, have difficulties in understanding key credit information such as interest rates or 
the APR, for example144. Nonetheless, maybe also as a consequence of the Directive, the 
ability of consumers to search and compare products and services in the credit market has 
gone up, since 2010, from 6.6 to nearly 7.2 on a 10-point scale145.  

The  length  and  amount  of  pre-contractual  information  has  also  been  flagged  as 
potentially  problematic.  In  the  Open  Public  Consultation,  opinions  from  individual 
respondent  were  split  on  whether  information  was  concise  (35%  thought  it  was,  36% 
thought it was not), implying that it may not be fully effective146. Beyond the length and 
complexity  of  pre-contractual  information,  the  way  it  is  disclosed  to  consumers  also 
plays a  key role  in  its  effectiveness. Indeed,  while  the  majority  of  creditors147  provides 
this information in full148, the format in  which they do so is not  necessarily facilitating 
consumers  understanding.  This  is  particularly  true  in  the  online  environment,  where 
providers  can  use  certain  techniques  in  the  disclosure  of  information  that  can  impact 
negatively  consumers’  understanding  of  credit  offers,  as  demonstrated  by  behavioural 
research149 .  

Some  stakeholder  representing  both  consumers  and  creditors  found  that  the  format  and 
length  of  the  SECCI  is  not  particularly  adapted  for  mobile  technology.  In  the  online 
environment, it can be provided under a hyperlink, limiting the likelihood for consumers 
to  actually  open  it  and  read  it150.  How  information  is  conveyed  is  important  in  pre-
contractual information, particularly online. 

141 ADICAE [ES], 2013. 
142 The ability to understand basic principles of business and finance. 
143 Interviews and surveys of consumer associations and creditors associations. 
144 London Economics, 2013. 
145 2010 and 2018 Consumer Market Scoreboards, European Commission. 
146 This issue has been raised by several stakeholders responding to the Open Public Consultation, included 
the EESC in its information report. 
147 Instances of non-compliance have indeed been identified and include the failure to provide information 
via  the  SECCI,  the  failure  to  provide  information  on  the  calculation  of  the  APR,  the  use  of  abusive 
contractual terms and the failure to inform consumers of their right to withdraw from the contract. 
148 London Economics, 2014; Interviews and surveys of enforcement authorities, Member States, consumer 
associations and industry representatives. 
149  This  includes  non-transparent  pricing  structures,  with  some  information  placed  where  it  can  be 
overlooked or presented prominently to the detriment of other important elements. See London Economics 
Europe, VVA Europe, Ipsos NV, ConPolicy, Timelex, 2019; EBA, 2019; ECRI, 2015. 
150 European Commission, 2019; Interviews and surveys of creditors associations. 

33 

 
                                                            
Understanding  complex  information  is  not  helped  by  the  fact  that  information  is  not 
always provided sufficiently in advance to allow for a proper review. In fact, research has 
shown  that  most  credit  agreements  could  be  concluded  just  a  few  days  after  being 
requested. Some credits can even be released in a few minutes151. This is also used as a 
marketing tool for enticing consumers to a swift and efficient conclusion of a contract152. 
Indeed,  speed  of  delivery  is  both  a  selling  point  for  creditors  and  an  element  that 
consumers consider when choosing between credit options153. The wording of Article 5 
of the Directive allows for a broad interpretation of the amount of time to be granted to 
consumers  before  they  sign  an  agreement.  The  Open  Public  Consultation  showed  that 
44%  of  individual  respondents  did  not  consider  the  time  available  to  read  and  fully 
understand pre-contractual information as sufficient154. The consumer survey shows that 
40% of respondents received it on the day they signed the contract. Some Member States 
have tried to remedy this by either providing guidance155 or including more details in the 
transposing  legislation156  so  as  to  ensure  that  consumers  have  sufficient  time  to  review 
the SECCI. 

EQ4 – How have the provisions relating to creditworthiness assessments worked in 
practice?  To  what  extent  have  the  provision  of  the  Annual  Percentage  Rate  of 
Charge  and  the  performance  of  a  creditworthiness  assessments  contributed  to 
helping  consumers  find  the  credit  best  suited  to  their  needs  and  avoid  over-
indebtedness? 

The  Annual  Percentage  Rate  of  Charge  is  generally  perceived  as  a  useful  tool  to  help 
consumers find the credit best suited to their needs. However, its potential is hampered 
by a lack of awareness and understanding among consumers.  

The  obligation  on  providers  to  assess  the  creditworthiness  of  consumers  is  applied  in 
various ways across Member States and types of providers. This renders the assessment 
of its effectiveness difficult.  

In  the  face  of  digitalisation,  new  technologies157  and  novel  types  of  data  are  used  by 
providers to assess the creditworthiness of consumers - which raise questions in terms of 
transparency,  relevance,  proportionality  and  fairness,  particularly  as  the  relevant 
provision in the Directive does not specify which data should be used in this process. 

Stakeholder views are split as to whether the two provisions are effective enough to help 
consumers find the credit best suited to their needs and prevent over-indebtedness. The 
fact that several Member States have introduced specific measures to curb problematic 
lending practices would suggest that the two provisions are not sufficient on their own to 
ensure responsible lending. 

151 Mystery shopping. 
152 FSUG, 2019 
153 NIBUD, 2018. 
154 Open Public Consultation, 2019 
155 UK. 
156 PL and RO. 
157 For instance, artificial intelligence to carry out automatic credit scoring. 

34 

 
                                                            
Provision of Annual Percentage Rate of Charge   

The  provision  on  the  Annual  Percentage  Rate  of  Charge  (APR)    was  introduced  to 
provide a numerical and comparable representation of the cost of credit to consumers158, 
though  it  should  be  noted  it  preceded  the  current  Directive  and  existed  already  in  the 
previous  Directive.  Calculation  of  the  APR  is  entirely  harmonised,  with  the  formula 
implemented uniformly.  

The APR is used by consumers to  select their credit offer:  90% of the individuals who 
replied to the  Open Public Consultation  considered the APR as  somewhat important  or 
very  important  in  their  decision.  75%  of  stakeholders  responding  to  the  Open  Public 
Consultation  consider  the  APR  effective,  while  60%  of  respondents  to  the  European 
Economic and Social  Committee survey consider that it enables  consumers to  compare 
credit offers across the market. However, stakeholders (across  all groups) acknowledge 
that the APR, both as a formula and as a tool, is difficult to understand159, especially in 
light  of  low  levels  of  financial  literacy160.  According  to  the  consumer  survey,  40%  of 
consumers either did not know about the APR or did not understand its contents.  

This lack of awareness and understanding by consumers shows an important limitation of 
a  tool  considered  helpful.  Indeed,  when  correctly  conveyed  and  understood,  the  APR 
works  well  as  a  comparison  tool  and  helps  consumers  to  choose  the  credit  most 
appropriate to  their  needs.  This  has  been  established through  observations  of  consumer 
behaviour  and  confirmed  by  stakeholders.161  However,  obstacles  persist  that  limit  its 
effectiveness as a comparison tool for consumers. In addition to those mentioned above, 
it  is  worth  mentioning  how  the  APR  is  presented  in  advertising,  such  as  how  it  is 
displayed (font size, prominence) by providers.  

Difficult understanding of the APR may be exploited to foster cross-selling practices.162 
This is particularly detrimental for consumers in case of tying practices, i.e. the offering 
of a credit agreement in a package with other distinct financial products where the credit 
is  not  made  available  to  the  consumer  separately163.  But  also  if  optional  products  are 
advertised  as  though  they  were  a  compulsory  and  integral  part  of  the  credit.  This 
evaluation  estimates  that  cross-selling  practices  can  affect  up  to  25  million  consumers, 
and is the single most common practice that affects consumers.164 While this is based on 
consumer  self-reporting  and  some  consumers  might  not  remember  having  received  the 
APR (which is possible in view a general level of awareness of only 60% according this 
evaluation’s survey), it does show that there might be a relatively small degree of non-

158 Recital 19 of the Directive.  
159 Interviews and surveys of creditors, consumer associations and enforcement bodies. 
160 London Economics, 2013. 
161 Interviews and surveys with consumer associations. CEPS-ECRI, 2015; London Economics, VVA and 
Ipsos, 2016; European Commission, 2019.  
162 Offering of an investment service together with another service or product as part of a package or as a 
condition for the same agreement or package. 
163  The  Mortgage  Credit  Directive  (2014/17/EU)  prohibits,  as  a  rule,  tying  practices  with  few  exceptions 
(Article 12). 
164 See Annex 3. 

35 

 
 
                                                            
compliance.  Non-compliance  among  credit  providers,  a  lack  of  understanding  among 
consumers, and low levels of financial literacy all reduce the effectiveness of the APR.  

Creditworthiness assessment  

The obligations to ensure that, before the conclusion of the credit agreement, the creditor 
assesses the consumer’s creditworthiness on the basis of  “sufficient information”165 has 
been  implemented  differently  across  the  EU.  Although  Article  8  has  been  fully 
transposed,  its  practical  implementation  varies  significantly  between  Member  States, 
leading to a diverse regulatory landscape, as shown by a mapping of national approaches 
in relation to creditworthiness assessment (CWA) carried out by the Commission.166 The 
majority of Member States defined more detailed information to be taken into account in 
the  CWA.167  In  a  number  of  them  the  consultation  of  databases  is  compulsory  for 
creditors.168 

This  implies, that,  depending  on the Member States,  the amount  and categories  of data 
collected by creditors, as well as the techniques to do so, differ greatly.  

Member  State  authorities  consulted  were  even  split  as  to  whether  the  regulatory 
fragmentation causes problems, while almost two thirds of credit providers agree that this 
does not create problems (possibly a reflection of the current state of the credit market in 
the EU, which remains predominantly national for creditors).  

However,  two  thirds  of  enforcement  bodies  considered  existing  requirements  –  in 
particular the provision of “sufficient information” – to be unclear and problematic and 
two  thirds  of  consumer  associations  held  the  view  that  consumers  are  dissatisfied  with 
current  CWA  practices.  On  the  other  hand,  credit  providers,  when  expressing  their 
opinion  on  this  point,  all  agreed  on  the  usefulness  of  the  provision,  though  a  few 
suggested discretion in how they should be performing this obligation. 

In carrying out CWAs, creditors may choose to rely on information that is specific to the 
individual  consumer  (current  income,  outstanding  financial  commitments,  savings, 
etc.)169  or  to  consumer  type.  In  Denmark,  for  example,  CWAs  are  primarily  based  on 
statistics  rather  than  an  individual  consumer’s  ability  to  repay  or  their  economic 
situation.170 

Stakeholder  views  are  mixed  on  the  effectiveness  of  the  CWA  obligation  in  helping 
consumers finding the credit best suited to their needs and preventing over-indebtedness, 
as  demonstrated  by  the  survey  carried  out  by  the  Economic  and  Social  Committee  and 
the  stakeholders’  replies  received  as  part  of  the  Open  Public  Consultation.  Consumer 

165 Article 8(1) of the Directive. 
166 Mapping of national approaches in relation to creditworthiness assessment under Directive 2008/48/EC 
on credit agreements for consumers, European Commission, 2018. 
 https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/mapping_national_approaches_creditworthiness_assessment.pdf  
167 BE, CY, EE, EL, ES, FI, FR, HR, HU, IE, IT, LT, LU, LV, NL, PL, PT, RO, SI, SK, SE, UK.  
168 BE, BG, CY, EL, FI, FR, HU, IE, IS, LT, MT, NL, PT, RO, SI, SK. 
169 Mapping of national approaches in relation to creditworthiness assessment under Directive 2008/48/EC 
on credit agreements for consumers, European Commission, 2018. 
 https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/mapping_national_approaches_creditworthiness_assessment.pdf  
170 Interviews of enforcement authority. 

36 

 
                                                            
associations  are  evenly  split  as  to  whether  creditors  in  their  Member  State  consistently 
carry out CWAs and whether they currently are sufficient and appropriate. Results from 
the  consumer  survey  and  individual  responses to  the  Open  Public  Consultation  suggest 
nonetheless  that  creditors  check  in  80%  of  the  cases  whether  the  consumer  is  able  to 
repay the credit.  

An  overall  trend  that  has  changed  the  way  CWAs  are  carried  out  is  digitalisation. 
Compared to the baseline, digitalisation has de facto increased the number and categories 
of  data  about  consumers  generated  online.  This  evolution  is  impacting  CWA 
methodologies  which  are  evolving  rapidly,  with  innovations  focusing  on  the  use  of 
unstructured  data  in  CWA  based  on  data-scrubbing,  social  media  and  machine 
learning171. An increasing number of creditors (primarily fintech companies172, including 
peer-to-peer lending) are using such types of assessment.  

Such novel techniques are presented by the industry as a way to help consumers with a 
thin  credit  profile  to  obtain  a  loan  which  they  would,  under  more  traditional  CWA 
practices,  not  be able  to  receive.  However,  they  raise  questions  in  terms  of  their actual 
added  value  compared  to  more  traditional  techniques.  These  practices,  which  are  often 
directed  at  vulnerable  consumers,    can  indeed  circumvent  the  need  for  a  solid  credit 
history and sound financial situation173 but it is unclear their accuracy and robustness on 
the  assessment  of  the  ability  of  the  consumers  to  reimburse  the  credit.  They  also  raise 
questions in terms of respect of data protection legislation,in particular the principles  of 
transparency,  fairness,  data  minimisation  and  purpose  limitation.174.  There  are  also 
concerns  about  the  algorithms  used  to  calculate  consumers’  credit  scoring  for  the 
purposes  of  a  creditworthiness  assessment,  especially  with  regard  to  their  logic,  data 
sources used, significance and envisaged consequences for the consumer, which entail a 
number  of  potential  risks,  such  as  opaque  decision-making,  race/gender-based  or  other 
kinds of discrimination.175.  

Similarly, the Directive does not provide guidance on the approach to be taken based on 
the  outcome  of  the  assessment,  i.e.  whether  the  credit  should  be  granted  or  rejected, 
depending on whether the CWA outcome was positive or negative. Providers might grant 
credit to consumers with negative creditworthiness assessment because of a long-lasting 
relationship  with  them  and  awareness  of  temporary  economic  difficulties.  However, 
some providers’ business model is actually based on high interest rates for all consumers 
to cover the risk of default of some of them (see EQ 7). 

While  rejecting  a  credit  application  in  case  of  negative  creditworthiness  assessment 
outcome is not required by the Directive, it has been interpreted by the Court of Justice of 

171 European Commission, 2016c, p. 128. 
172  Technologically  enabled  financial  innovation  that  could  result  in  new  business  models,  applications, 
processes,  or  products  with  an  associated  material  effect  on  financial  markets  and  institutions  and  the 
provision of financial services. 
173 European Commission, 2016c, p. 130. 
174 ECRI, 2018; ECRI, 2019; Interviews of consumer associations. 
175 European Parliament, 2019. EESC, 2019 

37 

 
                                                            
the  European  Union  (CJEU)176  that  it  does  not  preclude  Member  States  from  adopting 
such an approach.  
CWAs to an extent aim to foster responsible lending177 (see EQ 15 for more details) and 
thus to help reduce over-indebtedness. The CJEU178 has confirmed that creditworthiness 
assessments as per Article 8 of the Directive are “intended to protect consumers against 
the  risks  of  over-indebtedness  and  bankruptcy”.  Consumer  credit,  especially  when  it  is 
provided  at  high  interest  rates,  can  be  an  important  source  of  financial  difficulties  of 
households179.  Less  financially  stable  households  are  among  those  which  will  have 
greater difficulty in passing a CWA, making them more likely to turn to short-term and 
high-cost-type  credit.  Lower  levels  of  compliance  with  the  CWA  obligation  have  been 
identified among this type of credit180. In certain cases, poor performance in repayment is 
considered to be part of the creditor’s business model, compensated by very high interest 
rates.  

Stakeholders differ in their opinions on how CWA should be performed and there is no 
consensus  as  to  whether  the  methodology  should  be  harmonised  at  EU  level181.  These 
different approaches may present an obstacle to the facilitation of an internal market, as 
they do not help to create a level playing field for creditors.  

Overall,  the  open-ended  character  of  the  provision  of  the  Directive  on  how  to  perform 
credit-worthiness  assessment  did  not  impact  the  regulatory  and  practical  divergence  of 
national approaches preceding the Directive. Lack of harmonisation in how CWA should 
be performed was also raised by several stakeholders as a reason hampering cross-border 
credit.  In  May  2020,  the  European  Banking  Authority  published  Guidelines  on  loan 
origination and monitoring providing requirements for CWAs in relation to secured and 
unsecured lending182, which should lead to more convergence in how CWA is carried out 
across the EU. The guidelines will apply as of 30 June 2021. 

The  role  of  creditworthiness  assessment  (CWA)  and  Annual  Percentage  Rate  of 
Charge (APR) in protecting consumers from inappropriate lending and practices 

Several Member States have put in place specific “product governance” measures  – not 
foreseen  in  the  Directive  -  either  aimed  at  banning  certain  credit  products,  capping 
interest  rates  or  at  regulating  specific  credit  product  characteristics  as  these  were 
considered  as  potentially  too  costly/harmful  for  consumers.  This  would  imply  that,  on 
their  own,  CWA  and  the  provision  of  the  APR  are  not  perceived  as  being  effective 
enough to protect consumers from bad loan decisions and that more stringent measures 
were  deemed  necessary  by  Member  States  to  protect  consumers  from  certain  credit 
products.  

176 Judgment of the Court of 6 June 2019, Schyns, C-58/18, EU:C:2019:467. 
177 Recital 26 of the Directive. 
178 Judgment of the Court, 27 March 2014, LCL Le Crédit Lyonnais SA,C-565/12, EU:C:2014:190. 
179 CIVIC, 2013.  
180 Interviews of enforcement bodies. 
181 The Open Public Consultation in particular revealed that harmonisation was viewed positively mostly by 
(but not limited to) consumer associations. 
182 https://eba.europa.eu/regulation-and-policy/credit-risk/guidelines-on-loan-origination-and-monitoring  

38 

 
                                                            
This is confirmed by the results of the Open Public Consultation and stakeholder survey: 
two thirds of Member State authorities did not consider the provision of the APR and the 
CWA  obligation  as  sufficiently  effective  to  protect  consumers  and  argued  for  various 
additional  measures,  including  stricter  requirements  and  alignment  with  the  Mortgage 
Credit Directive on responsible lending standards (see section on coherence). Similarly, 
the survey of the Economic and Social Committee shows that 47% of stakeholders that 
answered  find  that  the  CWA  obligation  is  not  sufficient  to  help  prevent  situations  of 
over-indebtedness.   

EQ5  –  To  what  extent  do  the  conditions  of  access  to  credit  databases  on  cross-
border basis vary across the EU? 

Credit  databases  have  been  established  in  all  Member  States,  with  the  exception  of 
Luxembourg. However, the nature of the credit database (private or public), as well as 
the type and quality of the data they contain, varies between countries. The conditions of 
access  to  credit  databases  on  a  cross-border  basis  also  differ  significantly.  These 
differences hinder the cross-border exchange of information between creditors. 

As  such,  the  provision  in  the  Directive  on  access  to  credit  databases  has  had  limited 
impact on fostering the emergence of cross-border access to credit offers. 

Articles 8 of the Directive states that the creditworthiness assessment can be made on the 
basis  of  consultation  of  the  relevant  database  and  that  Member  States  who  require 
creditors  to  check  such  databases  can  retain  this  requirement.  Article  9(1)  further 
establishes that access to such databases shall be granted to credit providers from other 
Member States on a non-discriminatory basis. 16 Member States impose the obligation to 
consult a database in order to assess creditworthiness183.  

The consultation of credit databases at national level appears to be functioning generally 
well, although a number of issues have been reported by a few credit providers consulted 
for this evaluation. In some cases, explicit restrictions are allegedly imposed on certain 
credit providers184. Issues reported also relate to the quality and depth of the information 
contained, or to the retention period of such information. Although only a few Member 
States  reported  different  requirements  for  foreign  providers,  industry  representatives 
specifically  referenced  the  different  requirements  to  access  credit  databases  in  other 
Member  States  or  the  differences  in  the  content  of  such  databases  as  one  of  the  main 
obstacles to accessing the information needed to conduct creditworthiness asessments for 
foreign consumers185.  

Since the Directive did not establish the nature, coverage, type186 and breadth of the data 
contained in the databases, these differ extensively between Member States, obstructing 
the effective exchange of data across Member States. This lack of uniformity in the data 

183 Supporting study legal analysis. 
184 For instance, in Romania some creditors claim not to have access to relevant credit databases. 
185 European Commission, 2015; Interviews of industry representatives and Member States. 
186 For instance. the definition of default varies across credit registers. 

39 

 
                                                            
can also give a incomplete picture of the consumer that can prevent credit providers from 
carrying out a sound creditworthiness assessment187. 

Indeed  these  databases  can    include  only  negative    data  (such  as  in  France,  where  the 
public register only includes data about arrears on repayment or application to the over-
indebtedness  commissions)  or,  most  frequently,  both  negative    and    positive  (such  as 
ongoing financial commitments) data188.  

There is also a growing push from certain credit providers and credit registers to include 
“non-traditional  data”  (such  as  data  from  GPS,  social  media,  web-browsing)  in  these 
database. However the added value of such data, its proportionality and compliance with 
data protection rules is challenged, for instance by consumer organisations189 (see EQ4). 
Data  protection  authorities  are  looking  into  the  functioning  and  content  of  credit 
databases, as demonstrated by the recent Code of Conduct approved by the Italian Data 
Protection authority, and which notably frames the use of peer-to-peer lending data190. 

Along with these explicit limitations, the principle of reciprocity plays a significant role 
in the limitation of access to credit databases in a cross-border context. It requires credit 
providers  to  supply  the  same  type  of  data  that  they  wish  to  access  through  the  credit 
database, but the lack of standardisation in the data to be collected and reported limits the 
exchange of information between Member States. Moreover certain national legislations 
impose limits on the categories of data that can be processed (and shared) by databases 
for creditworthiness assessment purposes.  

Private  credit  databases  have  nonetheless  tried  to  develop  bilateral  reciprocity 
agreements  to  facilitate  cross-border  data  access  to  credit  databases191.  Most  Member 
States authorities consulted indicated that conditions of access do not differ based on the 
location of the creditor while many did not know and only a few thought they did differ. 
Between half and two thirds considered the conditions of access to work well in practice, 
while around 10% disagreed, arguing for harmonisation of its contents192. 

In  the  EU,  the  most  common  institutional  design  relies  exclusively  on  private  credit 
databases193, followed by a dual system combining both public and private databases194. 
Five Member States have an exclusively public credit register195, while Luxembourg has 
not set up any credit database.  

There are no exact figures available on cross-border access to database.  

187 ACCIS, 2017; ACCIS, 2018d; Experian, 2017; Interviews of industry representatives. 
188 ACCIS, 2017; BEUC, 2017; ACCIS, 2018a; Interviews of industry representatives and Member States. 
189 ECRI/University of Edinburgh, 2019. 
190  EDPB,  2019.  See:  https://edpb.europa.eu/news/national-news/2019/new-rules-credit-reporting-systems-
digital-economy_en  
191 In the private sphere, ACCIS has promoted a cross-border data exchange model allowing its members to 
sign bilateral agreements with credit bureaus in other Member States.  
192 Stakeholder interviews. 
193 CY, DK, EE, EL, FI, HR, HU, NL, PO, SE, UK. 
194  CZ, DE, ES, IE, IT, LT, LV, PT, SK. 
195  BE, BG, FR, MT, SI. 

40 

 
                                                            
EQ6  –  How  have  the  provisions  relating  to  the  rights  of  withdrawal  and  early 
repayment worked in practice? How frequently are consumers making use of them? 

Both  the  right  of  withdrawal  and  the  right  of  early  repayment  are  working  well,  with 
creditors generally compliant. Overall, more than 70% of consumers are well-informed 
about both rights. Only around 1% of consumers make use of the right of withdrawal, 
while  the  right  of  early  repayment  is  more  commonly  used,  with  around  25%  of 
consumers  repaying  their  loan  early,  partially  or  in  full.  Issues  with  the  right  of 
withdrawal  primarily  relate  to  linked  credit  agreements.  For  the  right  of  early 
repayment, key problems relate to the calculation of compensation for creditors.  

Stakeholders  generally  considered  the  right  of  withdrawal  to  work  well.  Over  80%  of 
organisations responding to the Open Public Consultation rated both rights as effective. 

Article 14 of the Directive defines the right of withdrawal and sets a 14-day period for 
withdrawal  from  the  contract.  Such  right  of  withdrawal  applies  also  to  ancillary 
services.196 and to linked credit agreements197 covering contracts for the supply of goods 
or  services  for  which  the  consumer  excercises  a  right  of  withdrawal.  Article  16  of  the 
Directive  establishes  the  right  of  early  repayment,  which  allows  the  consumer  to  repay 
their credit, partially or in full, before the end date of the agreement.  

Right of withdrawal 

Most stakeholder groups believe that the right of withdrawal is functioning well. Industry 
representatives were unanimous in stating that the right of withdrawal is respected, while 
the  majority  of  enforcement  bodies,  Member  State  ministries  and  regulators,  and 
consumer  associations  believe  it  to  be  working  well.  80%  of  respondents  to  the  Open 
Public Consultation  found the right of  withdrawal  effective,  making it the second most 
effective provision of the Directive, according to respondents. There are no indications of 
significant problems in the functioning of the right of withdrawal. 

The  number  of  consumers  withdrawing  from  credit  agreements  is  very  low  across  
Member  States,  around  1%  on  average.  Consumers  are  highly  aware  of  the  right  of 
withdrawal198. The majority were aware (72%) and informed of their right by the credit 
provider  (75%),  before  signing  a  credit  agreement.  There  seem  to  be  potential 
compliance issues in some cases, however, as 15% of the consumers surveyed were not 
informed of their right prior to signing the contract. Other stakeholders also noted small 
compliance  issues,  where  credit  providers  refused  to  apply  the  right  of  withdrawal  on 

196 Means a service (e.g. insurance) offered to the consumer in conjunction with the credit agreement. 
197 A credit agreement where: 1) the credit in question serves exclusively to finance an agreement for the 
supply of specific goods or the provision of a specific serviceand 2) those two agreements form, from an 
objective point of view, a commercial unit; a commercial unit shall be deemed to exist where the supplier 
or service provider himself finances the credit for the consumer or, if it is financed by a third party, where 
the  creditor  uses  the  services  of  the  supplier  or  service  provider  in  connection  with  the  conclusion  or 
preparation of the credit agreement, or where the specific goods or the provision of a specific service are 
explicitly  specified  in  the  credit  agreement  (see.  Article  3(n)  of  the  Directive).  The  purchasing  of  white 
goods is often financed through linked credit agreements. 
198 Consumer Survey. 

41 

 
                                                            
consumer  request.  The  extent  to  which  this  is  the  case  cannot  be  ascertained  from  the 
data available.  

Recurring  issues  with  the  right  of  withdrawal  mainly  relate  to  a  lack  of  clarity  on  its 
application  to  linked  credit  agreements.  Specific  issues  raised  were  cases  where  the 
financed object was not mentioned in a linked credit agreement, or where the consumer 
terminated  a  credit  agreement  in  accordance  with  Article  15(1)  for  a  contract  for  the 
supply of goods or services, but the seller refused to take back the goods, or where the 
service provider went bankrupt and the consumer had nowhere to apply for a service or 
goods  return.  Another  issue  with  linked  credit  agreements  is  the  joint  liability  of  the 
creditor  under  Article  15(3),  as  it  is  not  clear  whether  the  creditor  is  responsible  for 
goods that have not been supplied when the seller disappears or goes bankrupt.   

Other problems included lack of awareness of the right of withdrawal in some Member 
States  and  difficulties  with  creditors  respecting  consumers’  right  of  withdrawal  (with 
some refusals noted199). A significant minority200 of consumers had experienced creditors 
making it difficult for them to exercise their right of withdrawal. Consumer associations 
generally held that the right to withdrawal is well-respected, but a few issues were raised 
about awareness of the 14-day withdrawal period and delivery of the notice in time.  

German Courts held consumers had a perpetual right of withdrawal where the consumer 
does  not  receive  all  of  the  correct  pre-contractual  information  or  is  given  incorrect 
information,  meaning  that  –under  specific  conditions-  they  could  withdraw  from  the 
credit agreement for an unlimited period of time. Slovakia also has a perpetual right of 
withdrawal but reported no associated problems.   

Right of early repayment  

All  industry  representatives  stated  that  the  right  of  early  repayment  is  respected,  while 
the  majority  of  other  stakeholders  agreed  that  it  functions well.  According  to  the  Open 
Public  Consultation,  80%  of  respondents  believe  the  right  of  early  repayment  to  be 
effective. In fact, they consider it the most effective provision of the  Directive. Despite 
this,  a  fairly  large  number  of  consumers  reported  experiencing  issues  with  the  right  of 
early repayment.   

A significant majority of consumers are aware of the right of early repayment, with 75% 
informed  by  the  creditor  about  their  right  before  contracting  the  credit.  The  number  of 
consumers  making  use  of  early  repayment  is  quite  high,  with  around  one-quarter  of 
consumers making early payments to pay off their credit. This increased slightly between 
2013  (22%)  and  2019  (27%)201.  There  is  no  data  available  on  the  average  cost  of  early 

199 Consumer survey. 
200  31%  of  consumers.  For  this  question,  the  options  were  ‘Strongly  agree’,  ‘Agree’,  ‘Disagree’  and 
‘Strongly disagree’. There was no option for ‘non applicable’. As a result, all survey respondents answered 
this  question  (n=3,886).  While  only  some  consumers  will  have  tried  to  withdraw  from  their  credit 
agreement, it seems logical that only those really encountering problems would say so, which supports the 
validity  of  31%  having  experienced  difficulties.  The  consumer  survey  did  not  contain  a  question  on 
whether consumers had attempted to withdraw from the contract. No other data were available to support 
this high number of persons experiencing difficulties. 
201 London Economics, 2013. 

42 

 
                                                            
repayments  made  by  consumers.  Consumers  nevertheless  face  some  problems  which 
primarily relate to the calculation of the compensation to be paid to the creditors, as the 
compensation  was  reported  to  be  calculated  incorrectly  (whether  deliberately  or  not)  at 
times. Several stakeholders also referred to cases of disproportionate compensation fees.  
It is not possible to ascertain either the extent of the issue or the deliberate nature of any 
incorrect calculations. Calculation of the fee to be paid in cases of early repayment was 
more  difficult  for  short-term  loans  that  had  to  be  paid  back  within  one  month,  for 
example.  Creditors’ concerns centred on their ability to recover the costs of such loans, 
as Article 16(2) of the Directive stipulates that ‘if the period does not exceed one year, 
the compensation may not exceed 0.5% of the amount of credit repaid early’.  

Not all Member States impose a compensation fee for early repayment. Article 16(4)(a) 
offers  Member  States  the  regulatory  choice  to  only  apply  the  obligation  to  pay  a 
compensation fee to the creditor where the amount repaid exceeds a national threshold202, 
which  must  not  exceed  EUR  10,000.  Eighteen  Member  States  have  opted  to  use  this 
regulatory choice, thus consumers are not required to pay compensation to the creditor, 
unless the amount they repay is higher than the national threshold.   

Other issues reported with the right of early repayment include consumers being charged 
the  entirety  of  the  interest  they  would  have  had  to  pay  for  the  loan  and  consumers  not 
receiving all of the necessary information about their right of early repayment. In a recent 
judgment on these issues, the Court clarified that Article 16(1) of Directive 2008/48 gave 
concrete expression to the right of the consumer to a reduction in the cost of the credit in 
the event of early repayment by replacing the general concept of ‘an equitable reduction’ 
with  the  more  specific  concept  of  ‘a  reduction  in  the  total  cost  of  the  credit’  and  by 
adding that therefore, the reduction must also cover ‘the interest and the costs’203. 

In  some  cases,  consumers  were  denied  the  right  of  early  repayment  altogether,  or 
creditors  included  clauses  in  the  general  conditions  that  obliged  the  consumer  to 
renounce their right.  The consumer survey found that more than one-third of respondents 
had  experience  of  the  creditor  making  it  difficult  for  them  to  use  their  right  of  early 
repayment, pointing to a relatively high number of compliance issues. Similarly, a 2013 
London Economics survey found that while close to one-quarter of consumers attempted 
to repay early, only 86% were successful in doing so.   

EQ7  –  Have  the  scope  of  application  and  the  definitions  used  in  the  Directive 
succeeded in ensuring a high level of consumer protection  and performance of the 
internal market for consumer credit? 

The  scope  of  application  of  the  Directive  has  impacted  the  ability  of  the  Directive  to 
meet  its  objectives  in  some  cases.  For  example,  the  obligation  to  assess  the 
creditworthiness of the consumer and mandatory rules on pre-contractual information do 

202Moreover,  the  compensation  to  be  paid  is  limited  to  1%  of  the  amount  repaid  ‘if  the  period  of  time 
between the early repayment and the agreed termination of the credit agreement exceeds one year. If the 
period does not exceed one year, the compensation may not exceed 0.5% of the amount of credit repaid 
early’. 
203 Judgment of 11 September 2019, Lexitor,  C-383/18, EU:C:2019:702. 

43 

 
                                                            
not apply to loans below EUR 200. As a consequence, in many cases consumers have 
subscribed  to  very  expensive  small  value  loans  without  the necessary  creditworthiness 
assessment    and  the  adequate  information.  In  some  cases,  these  expensive  loans  have 
contributed  to  increase  households’  over-indebtedness.  As  a  result,  there  are  serious 
stakeholder  concerns  about  the  adequacy  of  the  lower  threshold  of  EUR  200.  Many 
Member States extended the scope of application of the Directive to consumer credit not 
covered by it, hence the regulatory framework continues to be somewhat fragmented. 

The wording of the definitions has proved effective, although some ambiguity remains 
about whether the Directive covers certain types of credits not explicitly referred to in 
the Directive.   

Article  2  of  the  Directive  excludes  from  the  Directive’s  scope  credit  agreements 
involving a total amount of credit less than EUR 200 or more than EUR 75,000, with the 
exceptions  of  renovations  of  immovable  property  following  the  entry  into  force  of  the 
Mortgage  Credit  Directive204.  The  list  of  exemptions  in  Article  2(2)  is  extensive  and 
encompasses many widely used loans, most of which were included within the scope of 
the Commission’s first proposal for a Directive concerning credit for consumers205. The 
limitation of the scope of the  Directive  means that Member States have the freedom to 
regulate credit agreements above or below the thresholds.  

Nearly  all  consumer  associations  (over  90%)  argued  that  the  current  thresholds  are  no 
longer adequate, while slightly fewer (80%) Member State authorities considering them 
inadequate.  Among  credit  providers  30%  considered  the  scope  inadequate206.  In 
particular,  the  lower  thresholdwas  cited  as  a  problem.  The  upper  threshold  of  the 
Directive did not generate as much concern as the lower limit, especially following the 
amendment  to  the  Directive  following  the  entry  into  force  of  the  Mortgage  Credit 
Directive (MCD).  

Except  for  Cyprus  and  Greece,  all  Member  States  have  adopted  transposing  measures 
that go beyond the requirements of the Directive. Some extend the scope of application 
of  the  Directive  (or  certain  of  its  provisions)  to  consumer  credit  not  covered  or  not 
entirely covered by the Directive207, either below EUR 200208, above EUR 75,000209 or to 
leasing  agreements210,  overdraft  facilities211,  revolving  credit212,  mortgages213,  credit 
agreements granted free of interest and without anyother charges (i.e. ‘zero-interest rate’ 

204 Unsecured credit agreements the purpose of which is the renovation of a residential immovable property 
are covered by the Directive even in the event that they are worth more than EUR 75,000 as per article 46 
of  Directive  2014/17/EU  on  credit  agreements  for  consumers  relating  to  residential  immovable  property 
(Article 2(2a) of the Directive). 
205 COM (2002) 443 final. 
206 While 2 out of 10 did not know. 
207 Legal analysis; Interviews of consumer associations, industry representatives and Member States. 
208 BE, BG, CZ, DK, EE, FI, HU, IT, LV, PT, SK. 
209 DE, DK, CZ, EE, ES, FI, FR, HU, PT, RO. 
210 AT, EE, HU, IT, FI, FR, PT, UK. 
211 AT, BE, FI, PT, FR. 
212 FI, NL, FR, IT. 
213 BG, CZ, HR, HU, RO, SI, SK. 

44 

 
                                                            
credits214) and credit agreements upon the conclusion of which the consumer is requested 
to deposit an item as security215 (e.g. credit agreements with pawnshops216). 

The  growth  of  consumer  credit  –  in  both  volume  and  value  –  due,  inter  alia,  to 
digitalisation  and  fall  of  interest  rates,  has  facilitated  access  to  credit  for  consumers, 
while  bringing  new  challenges  and  risks  in  respect  to  some  aspects  falling  outside  the 
Directive  scope.  These  include  zero  interest  rate  loans217,  short-term  high-cost  (STHC) 
credit218, and credit for leasing and hire purchase.  

By  setting  the  bar  for  entry  within  the  scope  of  the  Directive  at  EUR  200,  potentially 
detrimental  types  of  credit  are  excluded  from  its  protection.  These  include  the  STHC-
type credit that is more appealing to vulnerable consumers who struggle to access other 
types of credit due to their existing creditworthiness assessments (CWAs)219, as well as 
zero-interest  rate  loans.  STHC  loans  are  offered  in  many  EU  Member  States,  although 
the  extent  to  which  they  are  used  varies  between  countries220.  Under  the  right 
circumstances  (i.e.  properly  supervised  by  the  relevant  authorities  and  undertaken  by 
consumers  with  a  good  level  of  financial  literacy),  these  types  of  credit  could  help  to 
increase  the  financial  inclusion  of  consumers  with  little  or  no  credit  history,  thereby 
possibly also preventing them from having recourse to illegal creditors221. However, the 
high cost of such credit represents a risk in itself, particularly as most of the consumers of 
STHC credit are categorised as risky consumers, meaning that credit providers increase 
the interest rates to cover the risk of default, which, in turn, makes it more difficult for 
the  consumer  to  repay.  STHC  credit  also  tends  to  become  more  expensive  over  time, 
worsening  the  consumer’s  financial  situation  as  he  or  she  is  forced  to  either  use  the 
rollover option or take up more credit to repay the initial debt.222 These risks are further 
exacerbated  by  a  widespread  lack  of  transparency  and  insufficient  disclosure  of 
information  to  the consumer which,  together with the low level of financial and digital 
literacy among consumers of this credit product, results in a lack of consumer awareness 

214 BE and UK. 
215 Where the item is kept in the creditor's safe-keeping and the liability of the consumer is strictly limited to 
that pledged item. 
216 BE. 
217  Credit  agreements  where  the  credit  is  granted  free  of  interest  and  without  any  other  charges  or  zero 
interest  rate  loans  are  commonly  used  in  the  EU,  especially  when  financing  the  purchase  of  certain 
products, such as electronic devices. These loans are very often concluded via retailers, who act either as 
credit  providers  or  credit  intermediaries.  They  may  fall  outside  of  the  scope  of  the  Directive  (Article 
(2)(f)), but even if they may appear to be very advantageous credit products, they have the potential to be 
detrimental to the consumer. This is because, despite the 0% interest rate, which could assimilate them to a 
deferred payment of invoices, they can provide for very high fees for late or missed payments, conditions 
of  which  the  consumer  is  often  unaware.  Some  countries  (e.g.  Germany)  have  decided  to  apply  some 
Directive  provisions  (i.e.  right  of  withdrawal)  to  all  consumer  credit,  irrespective  of  whether  or  not  an 
interest rate is charged. 
218 16 EU Member States were captured in a recent OECD report examining the provision of STHC credit 
in a selection of countries, of which 10 reported presence of this type of credit product (AT, CZ, DE, DK, 
EE, LV, NL, RO, SK, UK), while 6 did not (EL, ES, FR, PT, SE, SI); OECD, 2019. 
219 BEUC, 2019; European Parliament, 2018; European Commission, 2019. 
220 A 2019 London Economics study noted that payday loans are especially widespread in Lithuania and the 
UK, where 37% of low-income households have resorted to this type of credit.220 
221 OECD, 2019, p 28. 
222 European Parliament, 2018; EBA, 2019; FSUG, 2019; FinCoNet, 2017. 

45 

 
                                                            
of the true cost of the credit. Significantly, the accessibility of this type of loan favours 
impulsive  decisions  (especially  as  typical  payday  loan  marketing  strategies  tend  to 
emphasise the benefits of obtaining a loan instantly), further heightening the risk of over-
indebtedness.223 

To offset the potential for detrimental effects, some Member States have sought to bring 
them within the scope of the Directive, regardless of the loan amount224, which is often 
below  the  lower  Directive  threshold  of  EUR  200.  The  European  Economic  and  Social 
Committee  (EESC)  also  argued that  the  minimum  threshold  does  not  take  into  account 
the  differences  in  the  average  income  across  the  EU.225  The  stakeholder  consultation 
exercise  suggests  that  there  is  an  appetite  to  abolish  (or  at  least  lower)  the  minimum 
threshold  of  the  Directive,  especially  among  consumer  organisations  and  Member 
States.226 It is to be noted, however, that stakeholders did not comment on the extent to 
which  it  could  be  expected  for  the  Directive  to  address  these  types  of  products  if  they 
were included in its scope. Indeed, even if covered by the Directive, most of these credit 
products could still have a very elevated Annual Percentage Rate of Charge (APR) even 
if  fully  compliant.  It  does  not  therefore  automatically  address  the  main  problems 
especially for more vulnerable consumers. 

Credit cards227  and  revolving credits228 can present similar issues  for consumers and the 
extent to which they are covered by the Directive will depend on the amount borrowed 
(the Directive covers credits above 200 EUR and below 75,000 EUR). For instance, the 
extended use of credit cards can play to the disadvantage of consumers, since it rests on 
several behavioural biases likely to lead consumers to accumulate debt over a long period 
of  time229.  Consumers  may  consequently  end  up  in  situations  where  they  are  making 
minimum repayments that simply cover the interest and fees, without ever reducing the 
debt (i.e. persistent debt)230. This is highly profitable for credit providers231, particularly 
given  the  very  high  cost  of  a  credit  card.  Issues  of  lack  of  information  and  choice 
between  credit  options  were  also  reported  by  Member  States  in  relation  to  revolving 

223 FinCoNet, 2017; European Commission, 2019. 
224 BG, ES, FR, HR, PT, SE, SI, SK. 
225  As  pointed  out  by  the  European  Economic  and  Social  Committee,  EUR  200  corresponds  to 
approximately  50%  of  the  average  monthly  wage  and  75%  of  the  average  monthly  pension  in  some 
European countries.  
226  Interviews  of  consumer  organisations,  industry  representatives,  Member  States  and  enforcement 
authorities; Open Public Consultation (specific). 
227 Credit cards are defined here as a type of non-instalment credit product that allows the consumer to make 
use  of  a  credit  reserve  within  an  agreed  limit  and  time-period,  without  having  to  repay  the  outstanding 
amount in a fixed number of payments 
228 Revolving credit is defined as a line of credit where consumers pay a fee to a financial services provider 
to  borrow  money  if  and  when  needed,  with  the  exact  borrowing  amount  dependent  on  their  specific 
monthly needs. 
229  These  behavioural  biases  are:  over-optimism:  overestimating  one’s  ability  to  maintain  a  zero  balance; 
myopia: overvaluing the short-term benefits of a credit transaction and neglecting the future impact;  and 
cumulative cost neglect: dismissing the cumulative effect of a large number of small credit options. 
230 According to the UK Financial Conduct Authority, a persistent debt is defined as a situation where, over 
a period of 18 months, a consumer pays more in interest, fees and charges than on the principal of the debt. 
231 European Parliament, 2018; BEUC, 2019. 

46 

 
                                                            
credits  232.  Some  Member  State  regulators  have  acted  to  curb  revolving  credit,  most 
notably in France233, and Netherlands234.Some stakeholders see the need to cover specific 
products currently exempted from the scope of application of the Directive or benefitting 
from a lighter regime, like those listed below. They claimed that reducing the number of 
exceptions  would  also  contribute  to  legal  clarity,  limiting  risks  of  circumventing 
Directive rules. 

Overdraft facilities are credit agreements that allow consumers to become overdrawn up 
to  a  certain  limit  at  a  set  interest  rate,  effectively  acting  as  pre-approved  credit.235 
Overrunning236, on the other hand, are not pre-agreed and usually entail very high interest 
rates  and  additional  fees  for  the  consumer.  Although  there  is  no  EU-wide  data  on  the 
extent to which overdraft facilities are used by consumers, national data from France and 
Germany suggest that they are increasingly used in some Member States as alternatives 
to payday loans and revolving credit.237 One of the main advantages of overdraft facilities 
is that they constitute a useful tool to cover small and sudden financing needs. However, 
like  credit  cards,  they  are  a  very  expensive  credit  product  compared  to  instalment 
consumer  credit,  and  in  some  cases  even  compared  to  payday  loans.238  The  use  of 
overdraft facilities also entails similar risks to those linked to credit cards239. In addition, 
consumers  risk  misunderstanding  the  conditions  applicable  to  the  overdraft  facility  in 
terms of costs, limits, etc. While the Directive covers overdraft facilities that do not need 
to  be  repaid  within  one  month,  some  ambiguities  remain  regarding  those  to  be  repaid 
within one month. Overrunning are only subject to a ‘light regime’ under Article 2(4). As 
a  result,  some  countries  (e.g.  France)  have  noted  that  credit  providers  are  encouraging 
consumers to turn to types of products that are slightly less controlled.240 

Zero-interest rate loans (i.e. loans with an interest rate of 0%) are commonly used in the 
EU,  especially  when  financing  the  purchase  of  certain  products,  such  as  electronic 
devices.  These  loans  are  very  often  concluded  via  retailers,  who  act  either  as  credit 

232  Belgium  noted  the  issue  of  offering  consumers  the  choice  between  revolving  credit  or  payment  in 
instalments, rather than making the former the default option. In the UK, Citizens Advice found that three-
quarters of consumers with a revolving credit line had seen their credit ceiling raised without their explicit 
request. 
233 Where, according to BEUC 2019, p.10, consumers must be offered the choice between revolving credit 
and payment in instalments when sold products in shops. 
234  According  to  VFN  2018,  in  May  2019,  in  conjunction  with  the  AFM,  the  Dutch  credit  institutions 
association  agreed  on  stricter  rules  on  revolving  credit,  including  maximum  withdrawals,  more  frequent 
CWAs (with credit refused where the outcome is negative), and a maximum revolving credit duration of 15 
years . 
235  Overdraft facility means an explicit credit agreement whereby a creditor makes available to a consumer 
funds which exceed the current balance in the consumer's current account (Article 3(d) of the Directive). 
236  Means  a  tacitly  accepted  overdraft  whereby  a  creditor  makes  available  to  a  consumer  funds  which 
exceed the current balance in the consumer's current account or the agreed overdraft facility (Article 3(e) of 
the Directive). 
237 Que Choisir [FR], 2019c; Finance Watch, 2018 and 2019. 
238 BEUC, 2019. 
239 Namely over-optimism (i.e. the consumer wrongly assumes that he or she will not become overdrawn) 
and  myopia  (i.e.  the  consumer  over-values  the  benefits  of  the  present  transaction  while  dismissing  the 
impact on his or her financial situation). 
240 Que Choisir [FR], 2019c. 

47 

 
                                                            
providers or credit intermediaries241. They may fall outside of the scope of the Directive242 
,  and  even  if  they  may  appear  to  be  very  advantageous  credit  products,  they  have  the 
potential to be detrimental to the consumer. This is because despite the lack of interest, 
they  generally  foresee  very  high  fees  for  late  or  missed  payments,  conditions  of  which 
the  consumer  is  often  unaware243.  For  this  reason,  some  countries  (e.g.  Germany)  have 
decided  to  apply  some  Directive  provisions  (i.e.  right  of  withdrawal)  to  all  consumer 
credit, irrespective of whether an interest rate is charged244. 

Leasing agreements have seen rapid growth in the EU in recent years. The Directive only 
covers leasing agreements in so far as these oblige the consumer to acquire the good(s) 
upon  expiration  of  the  contract,  which  means  that  most  of  the  leasing  agreements 
concluded  are  not  bound  by  Directive  obligations.  Consumers  entering  into  leasing 
agreements  may  therefore  be  exposed  to  risks  that  could  be  addressed  if  the  Directive 
was  extended  to  these  agreements.  One  consumer  organisation  in  France,  for  instance, 
noted that consumers often lack sufficient information to make an informed decision245. 

In relation to credit agreements for which the consumer is requested to deposit an item as 
security and where the liability of the consumer is strictly limited to that pledged item i.e. 
credit  agreements  with  pawnshops,  one  consumer  association  pointed  out  that  they 
should be bound by information requirements, as in many cases the fees applied are very 
high. 

Various articles of the Directive provide for regulatory choices that allow Member States 
to  make  specific  exclusions  to  the  Directive.  Member  States’  use  of  regulatory  choices 
varies significantly: all of them have made use of the one in Article 10(1), many of the 
one  in  Article  2(6)  and  16(4)(a)  and  less  than  a  half  having  made  use  of  the  others  in 
Article 2(5), Article 4(1) and 4(2)(c), Article 6, Article 10(5), Article 14(2) and Article 
16(4)(b)246. 

In terms of definitions, Article 3 is generally considered to be effective and successful by 
all  stakeholders247.  Clarifications  have  been  suggested,  particularly  to  ensure  that  the 
Directive  covers  the  new  market  players  that  have  emerged  with  the  increase  in 
digitalisation  (e.g.  peer-to-peer  lending248).  Aside  from  the  risks249  and  potential  to  be 

241 Credit intermediary is a natural or legal person who is not acting as a creditor and who, in the course of 
his trade, business or profession, for a fee, which may take a pecuniary form or any other agreed form of 
financial consideration:  
- presents or offers credit agreements to consumers; 
- assists consumers by undertaking preparatory work in respect of credit agreements other than as referred to 
in; 
- concludes credit agreements with consumers on behalf of the creditor (Article 3(f) of the Directive). 
242 “This Directive shall not apply to the following: […] credit agreements where the credit is granted free 
of interest and without any other charges and credit agreements under the terms of which the credit has to 
be repaid within three months and only insignificant charges are payable;” Article (2)(f). 
243 House of Lords, 2006; EBA, 2019. 
244 Finance Watch, 2018 and 2019; Legal analysis. 
245 Que Choisir [FR], 2019a. 
246 For more details, see Legal Analysis. 
247 Stakeholder interviews.   
248 Which consists of the use of an electronic platform to match lenders/investors with borrowers/issuers to 
provide unsecured loans, including consumer credit. 

48 

 
                                                            
detrimental to the consumer, the uncertainty as to whether these platforms are bound by 
the  same  rules  as  traditional  credit  providers,  and  the  differences  in  Member  States’ 
regulation, appears to be one of the key obstacles to ensuring a level-playing field for all 
credit providers, regardless of their nature.  

Peer-to-peer  lending250  is  not  included  in  the  list  of  exemptions  in  Article  2(2)  of  the 
Directive  and  is  thus  not  explicitly  excluded  from  its  scope  of  application.  However, 
there is little clarity (either in the literature or among the stakeholders) on whether it is 
covered by the Directive. This is because the Directive has defined ‘creditor’ as ‘a person 
who grants or promises to grant credit in the course of his trade, business or profession’ 
(Article 3(b) of the Directive). Given that the lenders in peer-to-peer lending are usually 
private  individuals,  many  stakeholders  consider  them  to  fall  outside  the  scope  of  the 
Directive,  an  argument  that  is  also  reflected  in  recent  studies.  In  some  countries  (e.g. 
Denmark),  the  national  legislator  has  explicitly  placed  private  lenders  under  the 
obligations of consumer credit251.  However, whether it would fall inside the scope would 
also depend on the potential role of the P2P platform. 

EFFICIENCY  

Efficiency considers the relationship between the resources used by an intervention and 
the changes generated by the intervention. 

EQ8  –  What  are  the  costs  and  benefits  (including  any  reduction  in  consumer 
detriment) associated with the Directive and what are they influenced by? Can they 
be considered proportionate? 

Overall,  the  benefits  of  applying  the  Directive,  especially  in  terms  of  reduction  in 
consumer detriment252, outweigh the costs.  

Several  stakeholder  categories,  namely  consumers,  national  authorities  and  consumer 
organisations agree that costs and benefits of the Directive are proportionate. However, 
some  industry  representatives  stress  that  –  in  relation  to  specific  provisions  -  costs  for 
the implementation of the Directive outweighed the benefits. 

Quantification253 
Costs  associated  with  the  Directive  encompass  direct  compliance  costs  (including 

249  According  to  ECRI  2018,  a  lot  of  consumers  using  these  platforms  lack  sufficient  knowledge  of  their 
functioning.  For  instance,  many  of  the  complaints  involving  peer-to-peer  lending  in  the  UK  are  from 
consumers who were not aware that they were borrowing from a peer-to-peer lending facility, while others 
had doubts about their recourse from the lender, compared to other forms of credit. 
250 For more details, see annexed study to support the evaluation, outsourced to ICF. 
251  This discussion  culminated  in Order  of  23  October 2015,  TrustBuddy  AB,  C-311/15, EU:C:2015:759, 
where the Finnish Supreme Court brought the issue before the CJEU. TrustBuddy, however, went bankrupt 
and no judgment followed. 
252 A measure of harm that consumers may experience when market outcomes fall short of their potential.  
253  The  quantitative  analysis  is  based  on  the  “Study  on  measuring  consumer  detriment  in  the  European 
Union” published in 2017, which developed a detailed step-by-step operational guidance to scientifically 
sound  and  resource  efficient  assessments  of  personal  consumer  detriment  in  markets  across the  EU. The 
developed methodology was applied in six selected markets (mobile telephone services; clothing, footwear 
and bags; train services; large household appliances; electricity services; and loans, credit and credit cards) 

49 

 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
administrative burden)  254 and consumer hassle costs. Indirect costs include reduction in 
available  credit  (costs  passed  on  to  the  consumer),  lower  consumer  spending  and  an 
associated  reduction  in  GDP.  The  benefits  can  be  direct,  for  example  higher  levels  of 
consumer protection (and lower consumer detriment), development of the single market 
through  cross-border  activity  and  increased  level  playing  field,  and  associated  welfare 
gains and increased consumer choice. Indirect benefits include consumer awareness and 
behaviour, and improved consumer trust in banks regarding their loans, credit and credit 
cards, which has risen steadily since the 2010. 

Overall the evaluation finds that benefits outweigh the costs of applying the Directive, as 
shown below, though the results reported should be treated with caution. Full details of 
the quantification approach are shown in Annex 3.  

For public administration, initial set-up costs for the Directive are estimated to have been 
up  to  EUR  6  million  for  the  EU-28  in  transposing  EU  legislation  in  national  law,  and 
recurrent  costs  at  around  EUR  300,000  per  year  for  the  EU-28,  mostly  in  monitoring 
compliance and enforcement costs (sweeps, investigations).  

For the industry, calculated on the basis of the roughly 7,400 banks in the EU in 2010 (as 
opposed  to  5,100  in  2018),  set-up  costs  included:  familiarisation  with  the  Directive; 
adapting  IT  systems  for  pre-contractual  and  Standardised  European  Consumer  Credit 
Information  (SECCI)  requirements,  creditworthiness  assessment  (CWA)  and  Annual 
Percentage  Rate  of  Charge  (APR);  internal  communications  and  staff  training  on 
advertisement, pre-contractual information and APR; updating the website and adapting 
contractual documentation. These are estimated to be in the order of EUR 340 million in 
the period 2008/2010 or EUR 46,000 on average per bank. Recurring costs are estimated 
to  be  between  EUR  160  and  200  million  per  year  for  additional  costs255  in  complying 
with  advertisement  requirements,  for  staff  to  provide  pre-contractual  information  and 
SECCI forms and the APR, and carrying out CWAs. While there are also other industry 
players, including non-banks, credit intermediaries and those involved in advertising, it is 
not  possible  to  estimate  costs,  on  the  basis  of  the  information  available,  for  these 
stakeholders. Their approximate number is not known. 

Benefits in terms of a reduction in consumer detriment since 2008 are estimated at EUR 
2.6  billion,  of  which  EUR  1.55  billion  in  reduced  financial  detriment  and  EUR  1.05 
billion  in  reduced  time  losses  due  to  the  Directive.  The  annual  reduction  of  consumer 
personal detriment is equal to the consumer detriment in each year minus the consumer 
detriment  in  the  baseline  year  (2010).  The  total  reduction  of  the  consumer  personal 

and  four  countries  (France,  Italy,  Poland  and  the  UK).  This  allowed  the  methodology  to  be  tested  in  a 
geographically balanced sample of countries, selected also to allow results to be extrapolated to all twenty-
eight EU Member States. For more information on the quantification method, see Annex 3. 
254  Following  the  “Better  Regulation  Guidelines”,  compliance  costs  include  the  following  sub-costs: 
administrative costs and substantive compliance costs. Unfortunately, the data available does not allow us 
to estimate each type of sub-costs. 
255 Pre-contractual information and other relevant information would also still be provided in the absence of 
the Directive, and this has been taken into account for the estimates on recurring costs. The recurring costs 
therefore  reflect  the  action  needed  on  behalf  of  credit  providers  to  prepare  and  make  such  information 
available. However, only part of these costs are made explicitly because of the Directive. 

50 

 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
detriment  is  the  net  present  value  of  all  the  annual  reductions  of  consumer  personal 
detriment in the period 2011-2018. The annual consumer personal detriment is calculated 
by  multiplying  the  number  of  problems  experienced  by  consumers  with  credits  in  that 
year  (obtained  based  on  data  from  the  Consumer  Market  Scoreboards)  by  a)  the  post-
redress financial costs (i.e., magnitude of a problem) experienced by a consumer due to 
having  had  one  problem  with  his/her  credits  and  b)  the  monetised  time  losses  that  the 
consumer had in order to try to solve one problem (and or get redress) 256. 

The attribution to the Directive is tentatively estimated at between 20 and 25%, though it 
is  important  to  point  out  that  there  is  no  data  as  such  that  enable  an  assessment  of 
attribution. Please note this is based on expert judgement and reasoning of other factors 
involved257.  Other  factors  influencing  a  reduction  in  consumer  detriment  include  the 
development  of  the  credit  sector  itself,  more  stringent  legislation  in  certain  Member 
States,  a  possibly  uptake  in  overall  sector  compliance  due  to  familiarity  with  the 
Directive, and increases in consumer awareness over time, as well as the impacts of other 
legislation and other factors not taken into account.  

Figure 8 - Overview of estimated direct costs (PA and industry) and benefits in millions of euro 
for the period 2010-2018 (2010 prices). 

256 The data from CIVIC study on magnitude and time losses for the year 2015 was extrapolated to the other 
years considering the evolution of the number of complains (used as a proxy for the size of the problems 
experienced by the consumers) from the Consumer Markets Scoreboards.  
257 This is explained in Annex 7 of the study supporting the evaluation. 

51 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
Source: ICF elaboration on existing data and assumptions (for more details see Annex 7 of the 
study supporting the evaluation). 

This  suggests  that  developments  in  the  market,  EU  and  national  level  legislation,  and 
other factors came together to substantially reduce consumer detriment. This figure has 
risen from 2014 onwards, showing increased detriment reductions in later years. A share 
of  consumer  detriment  savings  are  due  to  developments  in  the  credit  market  (more 
competition,  lower  prices),  with  some  part  attributable  to  the  Directive,  although  most 
related to external factors (such as lower interest rates in the current economic climate). 
Other developments include national practices and policies, such as changes in national 
legislation and their application, and enforcement and monitoring.  

The benefits to consumers of the Directive can also be measured by looking at consumer 
trust levels. Consumer trust258 in banks regarding their loans, credit and credit cards has 
risen steadily since the 2010 baseline, from 6.2 to 7 on a scale from 0 to 10. While this 
figure  cannot  be  directly  linked  to  the  Directive  itself  as  it  is  also  influenced  by  the 
economic  upturn  after  the  financial  crisis  from  2007-2008  (and  the  effects  in  the  years 
thereafter) and  wider  trends  in  satisfaction,  gradual  increases  in  trust  levels  do  point  to 
overall  satisfaction  of  consumers  with  their  loans  to  which  the  Directive  will  have 
contributed (as with detriment).   

The  share259  of  consumers  affected  by  consumer  credit-related  issues  is  expected  to  be 
substantially  lower  than  before  the  entry  into  force  of  the  Directive260.    Not  all  of  the 

258 ICF elaboration of Consumer Market Scoreboard data. 
259  It  should  be  pointed  out  that  the  number  of  consumers  affected  is  based  on  the  views  expressed  by  a 
representative number of EU-28 consumers in surveys, and subsequently extrapolated for all consumers in 
the  entire  EU-28  (based  on  the  EU  population  of  18  years  and  older).  As  the  findings  from  different 
surveys vary and there are no exact figures, it is in any case best to express estimates in terms of overall 
ranges.  These  provide  an  indication  of  the  order  of  magnitude  and  scale  of  the  problem  (numbers  of 
consumers affected) for each element, without pinpointing an exact number. 
260 The total number of consumers affected cannot easily be compared given that the consumer credit market 
was smaller. 

52 

 
 
                                                            
problems that consumers are facing could be addressed through the Directive, however. 
Some  are  related  to  consumer  awareness,  national  application  and  enforcement  of 
legislation, and new market developments, and are beyond the ability of the Directive to 
be addressed directly.   

There is further potential for improving the efficiency of the Directive by solving some 
compliance  issues  through  better  enforcement.  The  number  of  consumers  negatively 
affected by issues linked to the respect to the right of withdrawal is comparatively small. 
The rate is higher for the right of early repayment, although still relatively insignificant 
as  a  share  of  all  loans  and  compared  to  other  areas.  In  the  area  of  pre-contractual 
information,  many  more  consumers  are  affected  by  imperfect  information  in  respect  of 
the  APR  and  the  SECCI  form,  although  not  all  of  the  consumers  impacted  will  have 
suffered  specific  problems  or  detriment  as  a  result.  For  the  CWA,  the  number  of 
consumers  affected  by  creditors  not  having  asked  for  their  ability  to  pay  is  substantial. 
There are many other problems, however, that could not be assessed, such as consumers 
affected by incorrectly having been granted a loan (and possibly indebting themselves) or 
where procedures were not followed correctly, though such estimates could be made. 25 
million  consumers  are  estimated  to  be  affected  because  of  issues  with  revolving  credit 
and as many because of cross-selling practices. No reliable estimates could be made in 
regards  to  cross-border  detriment  as  there  is  no  comprehensive  data  on  how  many 
consumers  could  not  obtain  a  loan  even  if  they  wished  to  do  so.  However,  the 
evaluation’s  mystery  shopping  exercise  showed  that  there  were  obstacles  in  all  cases 
where  cross-border  shopping  for  consumer  credit  was  attempted.  While  representing 
anecdotal  evidence  only,  it  is  nonetheless  reasonable  to  assume  that  the  practical 
obstacles  to  cross-border  shopping  would  affect  many  consumers.  According  to 
Eurobarometer 443 less than 0.5% (3 million consumers) have purchased a personal loan 
in  another  Member  States  and  that  contrasts  with  29%  who  looked  for  one  (17  million 
consumers). It means that up to 14 million consumers are impacted by the impossibility 
to obtain a loan from another Member State. For many there were personal reasons not to 
proceed,  but  a  subset  will  be  due  to  the  inability  to  do  so.  There  are  also  cases  of 
consumers who did not look for cross-border loans because the conditions were not right. 
Overall,  the  evaluation  therefore  estimates  that  the  number  of  consumers  affected  by  a 
sub-optimally  functioning  cross-border  market 
is  substantial.  Furthermore,  with 
increasing digitalisation it can be assumed that more and more consumers will look for 
cross-border credit. 

Figure  9  -  Estimated  number  of  consumers  potentially  negatively  affected  per  Directive 
provision/area, in millions of consumers for the year 2018 (range). 

53 

 
 
Source: ICF elaboration (for more details see Annex 7 of the study supporting the evaluation). 

Views from stakeholders 

Numerous  consumers  generally  agreed  that  costs  generated  by  the  Directive  are 
proportionate  to  the  benefits,  a  view  shared  by  the  national  authorities  and  consumer 
organisations consulted. The results from the Open Public Consultation also revealed that 
66% of respondents considered benefits to outweigh the costs, overall. Dissenting views 
mostly came from industry representatives, as half of them (54%) pointed to the fact that 
the implementation of the Directive implied additional costs that were not matched by its 
benefits.  However,  as  the  evaluation  also  finds  that  the  regulatory  landscape  is 
fragmented  due  to  Member  States  going  beyond  the  Directive,  differences  in 
enforcement  levels  and  specific  national  contextual  factors  influencing  demand  and 
supply,  these  statements  require  nuance.  Indeed,  stakeholders  commented  on  the 
implementation  of  the  national  legislation  and  not  the  Directive  as  such.  The  extent  to 
which  the  costs  of  implementation  can  be  attributed  to  the  Directive  itself  cannot 
therefore be reliably estimated.  

Over half of the respondents to the Open Public Consultation considered the benefits to 
outweigh  costs,  and  a  quarter  argued  the  opposite,  with  the  remainder  being  unsure. 
Almost one in six representative of creditors considered benefits not to be proportionate 
to  its  costs.  Industry  stakeholders  noted,  in  particular,  administrative  burden  and  the 
compliance costs of elements such as information requirements, the right of withdrawal, 
the right of early repayment and CWA. At the same time, half of the respondents to the 
survey of creditors did not have an opinion on whether costs outweigh the benefits of the 
Directive.  This  evaluation  estimates  that  there  were  initial  start-up  costs  for  businesses 

54 

 
 
but that ongoing costs do not exceed benefits to creditors in view of the increase in the 
number of loans, and the volume of outstanding loans. 

Advertisement requirements were argued to be very costly (to the extent that some credit 
providers  have  stopped  advertising  on  certain  channels)  and  not  efficient  by  industry 
representatives (see EQ9).  

Overall,  in  spite  of  claiming  that  the  Directive  is  imposing  a  heavy  burden  on  them, 
creditors failed to substantiate the costs incurred for complying with the Directive and to 
disentangle them from those  stemming from national rules going  beyond the Directive, 
casting doubts on their magnitude.  

EQ9  – To what  extent are  the provisions of the  Directive cost-effective? Are there 
any provisions particularly hampering the maximisation of the benefits? 

The  overall  costs  of  the  Directive  provisions  to  industry,  public  administrations  and 
consumers  are  estimated  above  to  be  lower  than  the  reduction  in  consumer  detriment, 
and  thus  to  render  them  generally  cost-effective.  There  are  no  indications  of  certain 
provisions  significantly  hampering  the  maximisation  of  benefits.  However,  it  appears 
that  the  cost-effectiveness  of  certain  provisions,  notably  the  one  on  advertising,  varies 
greatly depending on the medium used to reach the consumer. 

Overall,  the  evaluation  concludes  that  the  provisions  of  the  Directive  are  largely  cost-
effective, although data limitations (see EQ8) warrant a cautious approach. 

While provisions such as the right of withdrawal and right to early repayment, as well as 
provision  of  the  Annual  Percentage  Rate  of  Charge  (APR)  and  Standardised  European 
Consumer  Credit  Information  (SECCI),  hinder  the  maximisation  of  benefits  to  some 
extent,  given  that  some  consumers  are  still  affected  by  problems  in  exercising  their 
rights, this seems to be due to enforcement issues rather than the Directive itself.  

Two  thirds  of  industry  representatives  indicated  that  certain  provisions  are  particularly 
costly  or  burdensome,  with  the  obligations  stemming  from  providing  pre-contractual 
information most often mentioned as being burdensome and cost-ineffective especially in 
view  of  their  length  and  perceived  inadequacy  in  digital  contexts.  Member  States’ 
representatives  overwhelmingly  did  not  consider  costs  to  be  particularly  problematic, 
though  one  Member  State  authority  pointed  to  current  requirements  in  pre-contractual 
information  and  advertisement  to  be  too  prescriptive  and  to  the  Directive  lacking  in 
flexibility. Consumers associations considered provisions to be generally cost-effective, 
though  one  argued  that  current  pre-contractual  requirements  are  too  complex  for 
consumers and thereby cost-ineffective. 

An  area  which  is  not  considered  particularly  cost-effective  is  advertising.  Several 
industry stakeholders publicly pointed to the cost of advertisement261,262. This seems less 

261  Such  as  Eurofinas  2018b  and  2018c  and  AER  2018.  See  also  the  five  submissions  by  business 
organisations  on  the  perceived  burden  caused  by  standard  information  that  has  to  be  provided  when 
advertising  consumer  credit  agreements  in  particular  on  radio  considered  by  the  2017  REFIT  Platform 
Opinion on the Directive https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/vi4afccd.pdf.  

55 

 
                                                            
of a problem linked to the application of existing rules at the point-of-sale, on websites of 
credit  intermediaries  or  directly  on  websites  of  the  creditor,  but  rather  for  specific 
contexts such as radio and possibly TV. For mobile devices and in social media contexts 
current  rules  are  also  contested  by  some  industry  representatives.  This  evaluation 
estimates  the  costs  to  industry  derived  from  continued  compliance  with  advertisement 
requirements at several thousand of euros a year per bank and while there are no data for 
other channels, the joint cost to industry would seem to be considerable.  

The issue, however, lies not only in the burden and cost itself, but rather in the fact that 
for  some  channels  –  such  as  radio  –  credit  information  messages  (representative 
examples, warning) have an impact on a tiny fraction of consumers, rendering them both 
possibly redundant and, therefore, cost-ineffective (see further explanations below under 
EQ10). At the same time, a 2019 Commission study pointed out that the provision of the 
representative  example  in  advertising  does  help  consumers  in  making  better  choices  in 
the  online  environment.  Whether  that  ultimately  makes  them  sufficiently  cost-effective 
cannot be ascertained. 

It  is  estimated  that  benefits  to  consumers  could  be  larger  for  credit  products  currently 
either  partially  regulated  or  outside  the  Directive’s  scope,  and  that  affect  a  potentially 
significant number of people, such as shown in EQ7 and EQ8. However, as pointed out 
throughout  this  report,  inclusion  in  scope  is  not  the  only  driver  of  a  reduction  in 
consumer detriment as this would also depend on current national legislation and levels 
of enforcement. 

EQ10 – Is there scope for simplification and burden reduction? What provisions or 
areas  of  the  Directive  could  be  simplified  to  reduce  the  burden  on  stakeholders 
without undermining the effectiveness of the Directive? 

The  evaluation  finds  that  there  could  be  some  scope  for  regulatory  burden  reduction 
(e.g.  on  the  provision  of  information),  but  doing  so  could  risk  to  undermine  the 
effectiveness of the Directive and to lower the level of consumer protection. Hence it it 
not clear whether the Directive could be simplified without harming its objectives263. 

Opinions on whether the Directive could - or should - be simplified were divided among 
consumer  organisations.  Some  argued  that  simplification  of  legislation  (particularly  the 
provision  of  information)  would  enable  better  consumer  understanding  of  the 
information, as well as their rights. However, others linked simplification to a potential 
narrowing of consumer protection standards.  

A  considerable  share  of  industry  stakeholders  pointed  to  administrative  burden  and 
compliance  costs  as  a  recurring  issue  (even  if  they  could  not  qualify  that  burden  with 
relevant  data).  On  the  other  hand,  several  industry  representatives  highlighted  that  any 

262 As stressed in the 2017 REFIT Platform opinion. 
263  According  to  Better  Regulation  principles,  initiatives  to  change  existing  EU  legislation  should  aim  to 
simplify and deliver the policy objectives more efficiently (i.e. by reducing unnecessary regulatory costs). 
However, opportunities to reduce regulatory costs and to simplify the existing legislation should not affect 
negatively the achievement of the underlying policy goals.   

56 

 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
change to the Directive – even a reduction in administrative burden  – also implies new 
compliance  costs,  thereby  partially  undoing  some  of  the  intended  gains.    To  strike  a 
better balance  between costs and benefits, the creditors surveyed suggested simplifying 
the rules on the provision of information and minimising legal disparities by ensuring a 
higher  degree  of  harmonisation.  As  explained  above,  pre-contractual  information 
(including the  Standardised European Consumer Credit Information) and advertisement 
information are considered by industry to imply significant costs and are argued to have 
sub-optimal  effects  in  their  main  objective  (informing  consumers).  At  the  same  time, 
having been in place for around a decade, the initial costs for providing pre-contractual 
information  are  now  sunk  costs,  and  there  are  few  indications  of  substantial  ongoing 
compliance  costs  (with  existing  systems  increasingly  automated).  In  the  area  of 
advertising, some industry representatives considered there to be substantial continuous 
costs and pointed to scope for burden reduction264.  

A  majority  of  Open  Public  Consultation  respondents  argued  that  there  are  areas  in  the 
Directive where there is room either for simplification or reduction of costs, but they did 
not  provide  detailed  explanations.  Most  of  the  national  authorities  interviewed  believe 
that the Directive has not created any unnecessary burden and that there is no need for 
further  simplification  of  the  legislation.  However,  a  quarter  of  them  held  the  opposite 
view, arguing that the information duties impose a burden on both creditors, who have to 
prepare and provide the information, and consumers, who are expected to read and fully 
understand the documents. 

The potential for burden reduction identified by some stakeholders should, however, not 
lead to a reduction in the protection of consumers.  

COHERENCE 

The evaluation of coherence involves looking at how well or not different actions –both 
at EU and national level- work together. 

EQ11 - To what extent is the Directive internally coherent? 

The  Directive  and  its  implementation  at  Member  State  level  shows  a  fair  degree  of 
internal coherence, overall, particularly when it comes to ensuring consumer protection. 
The main issue, however, is that Directive provisions are not particularly coherent with 
its  objective  of  facilitating  the  emergence  of  a  well-functioning  internal  market,  as  it 
cannot be achieved by relying only on the Directive’s provisions (see Relevance section 
and specifically EQ15). 

Stakeholders  did  not  express  themselves  specifically  on  the  Directive’s  internal 

264 The Association of European Radios (AER) argued that the existing regulatory framework is particularly 
burdensome  on  radio  ads  given  the  specific  form  (and  short  duration  of  ads),  and  argued  that  credit 
warning  messages  should  rather  be  provided  at  the  point-of-sale.    As  only  a  tiny  share  of  3  to  4%  of 
consumers surveyed in the UK and France were able to recall the exact credit amount mentioned in a radio 
ad,  it  is  argued  to  be  ineffective  in  protecting  consumers  and  thereby  an  unnecessary  burden  on  radio 
operators.  Eurofinas  pointed  out that simplification  is possible in  the  social  media  domain,  with  existing 
information  requirements  in  the  Directive  not  being  adapted  to  the  space  and  time  requirements  in  the 
digital age.   

57 

 
                                                            
coherence. 

The  Directive  provisions  work  well  together  and  have  contributed  to  achieve  the 
objective of improving consumer protection: these include the obligation to provide pre-
contractual  information,  information  to  be  included  in  advertising,  the  obligation  to 
assess consumers’ creditworthiness, as well as the possibility to withdraw from a credit 
agreement and/or to repay the credit earlier than agreed at contractual stage.  

On the other hand, the scope of the Directive and its exemptions contradict somehow the 
objective  of  ensuring  consumer  protection,  as  they  exclude  several  consumer  credit 
products frequently used by consumers (see EQ7). As explained in EQ4, the provisions 
of the Directive are somehow insufficient to fully protect consumers from irresponsible 
lending practices and inappropriate decisions.  

There  is  also  a  degree  of  incoherence  when  it  comes  to  the  second  objective  of  the 
Directive, i.e. fostering the EU internal market for consumer credit, as the objective itself 
cannot be (fully) expected to be address by the Directive. The vague wording of certain 
provisions  (e.g.  Article  8  on  creditworthiness  assessment)  has  led  to  their  diverse 
application across Member States.  

In  addition, the  Directive  does  not, and is mostly not  set up to,  address certain barriers 
that  have  been  identified  by  stakeholders  and  which  prevent  the  creation  of  an  internal 
market for consumer credit (see EQ1, EQ2 and EQ5). These barriers include consumer 
preferences, language and cultural barriers, conduct of business rules, authorisation and 
supervisory requirements, uncertainty over enforcement etc.  

It must also be noted that the discrepancy between the general objectives and the specific 
provisions  of  the  Directive  is  partly  attributable  to  the  negotiation  process  between  the 
co-legislators, whereby several elements of the Commission’s proposal were not included 
in  the  final  text,  which  included,  for  instance,  more  specific  provisions  on  responsible 
lending or credit databases. 

EQ12 – To what extent is the Directive coherent with other national-level consumer 
policy and legislation (including legislation going beyond the scope of the Directive, 
relevant for consumer credit)? 

Overall, Member States’ transposition of the Directive offers a high level of coherence 
between  national  legislation  and  the  provisions  of  the  Directive.  However,  several 
Member  States  have  implemented  some  provisions  of  the  Directive  in  very  different 
ways  and/or  have  introduced  provisions  going  beyond  those  foreseen  in  the  Directive, 
thereby leading to legal fragmentation and undermining the internal market objective of 
the Directive.  

Most of the national transposing measures are largely coherent with the Directive. A few 
Member  States,  however,  transposed  several  EU  Directives  in  a  single  piece  of 
legislation,  which  has  reduced  clarity  in  some  cases.  Only  Cyprus  and  Greece  did  not 
adopt  measures  beyond  the  requirements  of  the  Directive,  instead  opting  for  a  literal 
transposition of the Directive. 

58 

 
Overall, 40% of the respondents to the Open Public Consultation considered there to be a 
degree  of  incoherence  of  the  Directive  with  national-level  legislation.  This  evaluation 
finds that, on the basis of research conducted, this mainly relates to specific choices made 
upon transposition or much after its implementation. 

Going beyond the provisions of the Directive when transposing is ultimately a choice of 
the national legislators, that can make use of different regulatory choices where there are 
provisions which are not harmonised in the Directive.  

Moreover, several Member States have legislated on areas outside the harmonized scope 
of the Directive introducing requirements on issues not explicitly covered - although very 
much linked to - some of the Directive’s provisions (by way of product governance rules 
and interest caps265,  266  to limit the cost of short-term high-cost loans or revolving credit, 
for instance).  

Indeed,  several  Member  States  used  the  opportunity  to  introduce  more  stringent  rules 
when  transposing  the  provisions  of  the  Directive  into  their  national  laws.  Market 
developments  (such  as  the  growing  use  of  pay-day  loans)  have  also  forced  Member 
States to take action in more recent years. As explained in EQ1 and EQ2, this situation 
has contributed to a legal fragmentation within the internal market.  

For instance, and as seen in EQ4, Member States have implemented the creditworthiness 
assessment (CWA) obligation in different ways, often specifying how the assessment is 
to be conducted and the documents that must be consulted. 

In  addition,  some  Member  States’  transposition  of  the  Directive  may  create  confusion 
and potentially lead to obstacles in ensuring the free movement of credit offers. One such 
example  is  the  perpetual  right  to  withdrawal  in  Germany  and  Slovakia267  (see  EQ6). 
Moreover,  several  Member  States  transposed  the  Directive  and  the  Mortgage  Credit 
Directive (MCD) into a single Consumer Code, or broadened the scope of application of 
MCD  provisions  on  consumer  protection.  This,  in  certain  instances,  led  to  a  lack  of 
harmonised  framework  and  to  some  inconsistencies  and  overlap  in  the  transposition  of 
EU credit legislation268, which has come under the scrutiny of the Court of Justice of the 
EU269.  

265 See Annex 5. 
266  In  Italy,  for  example,  the  cost  of  the  loan  cannot  be  higher  than  the  ‘usury’  ceiling  calculated  as  a 
coefficient of the average credit market price, above which it becomes illegal. Banca d’Italia [IT]. 
267  See  case  study  3  in  the  study  supporting  the  evaluation  (Right  of  withdrawal)  for  further  details.  In 
Germany, in cases where the consumer did not receive all of the pre-contractual information or where the 
information  received  was  incorrect,  they  have  the  right  to  withdraw  from  the  credit  agreement  for  an 
unlimited period of time. In Slovakia, the right to withdrawal is perpetual, with immediate effect and free 
of charge, if the contracting parties have not agreed a termination notice period. This can be problematic 
for creditors as it creates a level of uncertainty regarding revenue. 
268 In Czech Republic and Hungary, for example, the MCD and the Directive were jointly transposed, thus 
the  transposing  measures  apply  to  consumer  credit  over  EUR  75,000  and  are  not  necessarily  aimed  at 
renovation  works  on  a  residential  immovable  property  (such  as  foreseen  by  Article  46  of  the  MCD 
amending  Article  2  of  the  Directive).  In  Germany,  national  laws  transposing  the  Directive  also  apply  to 
credit above EUR 75,000, making it more coherent with mortgages. The Directive also applies to mortgage 
credit in Croatia, although without combining the MCD and Directive provisions in the same transposing 

59 

 
                                                            
 
Some of the national transpositions may thus be seen as incoherent with the Directive, as 
they  impede  the  creation  of  a  cross-border  credit  market  in  the  EU  to  a  certain  extent, 
mainly due to a lack of harmonisation of the Directive across Member States.  

EQ13  –  To  what  extent  is  the  Directive  coherent  and  complementary  with  other 
relevant EU-level legislation? 

The  Directive is  generally coherent and complementary with  other  EU-level consumer 
policy  and  legislation.  There  is  some  degree  of  discrepancy  with  the  Mortgage  Credit 
Directive,  which  lays  down  some  more  detailed  obligations.  Some  minor  room  for 
further  alignment  or  synergies  with  other  relevant  EU  pieces  of  legislation  was 
identified  in  several  instances.  A  majority  of  respondents  to  the  Open  Public 
Consulation found the Directive to be consistent with other EU-level legislation. 

Several  EU-level  legislative  instruments  touch  upon  aspects  that  are  covered  by  the 
Directive  or  are  potentially  relevant  for  the  provision  of  consumer  credit.  Some  were 
adopted  prior  to  the  Directive  (e.g.  the  Distance  Marketing  of  Financial  Services 
Directive  (2002/65/EC,  ‘DMFSD’), 
the  Unfair  Commercial  Practices  Directive 
(2005/29/EC,  ‘UCPD’),  the  Unfair  Contract  Terms  Directive  (93/13/EEC,  ‘UCTD’)270), 
while  others  entered  into  force  after  2008  (e.g.  the  Mortgage  Credit  Directive 
(2014/17/EU, ‘MCD’), the Anti-Money Laundering Directive ((EU) 2018/843, ‘AMLD’) 
and the revised Payment Services Directive ((EU) 2015/2366, ‘PSD2’)).  

A majority of the respondents to the Open Public Consultation considered the Directive 
to  be  consistent  with  other  relevant  legislation  at  EU-level.  Between  57%  and  65%  of 
respondents  thought  this  to  be  the  case  for  the  MCD,  UCPD,  PSD2,  General  Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR), UCTD and DMFSD.  

The  most  common  examples  of  incoherence  mentioned  by  Member  State  authorities 
concerned  the  MCD  and  its  requirements  for  responsible  lending  and  creditworthiness 
assessments  (CWAs),  the  reflection  period  and  right  of  withdrawal,  its  definitions,  and 
the level of harmonisation. In fact, while the MCD – adopted in 2014- differs in scope to 
the  Directive271,  both  Directives  aim  to  provide  a  harmonised  framework  in  relation  to 
certain  aspects  of  credit  agreements,  most  of  which  are  covered  in  both  pieces  of 
legislation. The MCD, which on average covers higher value and more legally complex 
credit  agreements,  provides  a  higher  level  of  consumer  protection  against  over-

act. In Sweden on the other hand, only parts of the MCD relating to consumer protection were introduced 
in the Directive transposing measures, thereby offering a higher standard of consumer protection. 
269 Judgment of 14 February 2019, Milivojević,  C-630/17, EU:C:2019:123. 
270 UCPD and UCTD take an horizontal approach as their rules apply to all types of products and services 
and  to  all  methods  of  marketing  and  selling.  They  have  been  recently  amended  by  the  Directive  (EU) 
2019/2161. on better enforcement and modernisation of EU consumer protection. 
271  Article  1  of  the  MCD  establishes  that  it  covers  credit  agreements  that  are  secured  by  a  mortgage  or 
another comparable security used on residential immovable property and those whose purpose is to acquire 
or retain property rights in land or in an existing project building (explicitly excluded from the Directive as 
per Article 2(a) and (b)). 

60 

 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
indebtedness  and  irresponsible  lending.272  The  tools  provided  by  the  Consumer  Credit 
Directive  to  promote  responsible  lending  and  avoid  over-indebtedness  (e.g.  CWA  and 
information duties) rely on the assumption that consumers will act rationally if they are 
provided with the correct information (see EQ15). By contrast, the MCD has transferred 
a  significant  part  of  the  duty  to  ensure  that  consumers  are  borrowing  responsibly  onto 
credit providers notably by ensuring that credit can only be granted where the results of 
CWA  indicate  the  consumer  ability  to  repay  the  loan.  The  additional  obligations  in 
respect  of  explanations,  information  (in  particular  in  case  the  credit  application  is 
rejected), advice and CWA (e.g definition of amount and categories of data to be used) 
are intended to ensure that consumers are not sold products that are unsuitable for them. 
The  introduction  of  conduct  of  business  rules  governing  the  design,  manufacturing  and 
sale  of  credit  products  also  plays  a  key  role  in  protecting  consumers  against  over-
indebtedness,  complemented  by  the  obligation  for  Member  States  to  promote  financial 
education. 

Despite  the  different  approach  to  responsible  lending,  apart  from  Member  States 
authorities, very few stakeholders raised concerns about coherence between the Directive 
and  the  MCD273.  This  may  be  because  the  obligations  imposed  by  the  two  Directives 
govern  different  types  of  credit,  thus  do  not  hinder  credit  providers  in  complying  with 
both. However, better alignment of the provisions could improve the implementation of 
both Directives, as it would improve legal clarity for Member States and credit providers 
and ensure a consistent approach to protection of consumers against over-indebtedness274. 
This  was  noted  by  several  stakeholders  representing  consumer  associations,  industry 
representatives  and  national  authorities,  who  identified  room  for  greater  consistency 
between  both  texts.  National  authorities  were  particularly  keen  to  see  the  Directive 
provisions on CWA aligned with those in the MCD275. Several also suggested introducing 
other MCD provisions to ensure more coherence, such as the conduct of business rules or 
the prohibition of tying practices276,277. Some stakeholders referred to the need to achieve 
better alignment of the definitions included in Article 3 of the Directive and Article 4 of 
the  MCD  and  the  terms  used  throughout  the  texts.  An  example  is  the  definition  of  the 
APRC278, which in the MCD includes a reference to the costs that need to be included and 
the present value of all future or existing commitments279. 

272 The MCD also includes provisions addressing the conduct of businesses, remuneration policies, as well 
as tying and bundling practices. 
273  Interviews  with  consumer  associations,  industry  representatives  and  Member  States;  Open  Public 
Consultation (specific). 
274  The need to improve consumer protection against over-indebtedness was identified as one of the main 
shortcomings of the Directive (see EQ15). 
275 Interviews with industry representatives and Member States. 
276 The offering or the selling of a credit agreement in a package with other distinct financial products or 
services where the credit agreement is not made available to the consumer separately. 
277 Interviews with Member States. 
278 As defined by Article 4(15) of the MCD, the APRC “includes the costs referred to in Article 17(2) and 
equates,  on  an  annual  basis,  to  the  present  value  of  all  future  of  existing  commitments  (drawdowns, 
repayments and charges) agreed by the creditor and the consumer”.   
279 Article 4(15) MCD. 

61 

 
                                                            
No  major  inconsistencies were  identified  between the  Directive  and  other relevant EU-
level  legislation,  although  room  for  further  alignment  or  synergies  were  identified  in 
several instances. This is in line with the feedback from key stakeholders, most of whom 
believed  that  the  Directive  was  coherent  with  other  EU-level  legislation,  including  the 
PSD2, the UCPD, the GDPR and the DMFSD280, while other key stakeholders pointed to 
the  e-Privacy  Directive,  the  e-Commerce  Directive,  the  Benchmark  Regulation,  the 
Insurance Distribution Directive (IDD) and the AMLD281. Please see the relevant Annex 
for more details. 

EQ14 - To what extent are the provisions of the Directive and their implementation 
at national level coherent with national and EU-level data protection legislation? 

There are several provisions of the Directive that are directly impacted by the General 
Data  Protection  Regulation.  In  this  respect,  more  clarity  could  be  achieved  through 
better  referencing  in  the  Directive  the  relevant  aspects  of  the  General  Data  Protection 
Regulation. The Directive does not specify the amount and categories of data that can be 
used –or not- in the creditworthiness assessment process and does not tackle automated 
decision making in creditworthiness assessments.  

There are no inconsistencies between the Directive and the the General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR) as such. Creditworthiness assessment (CWA) must be carried out in 
full  compliance  with  the  GDPR,  including  the  processing  of  data  obtained  from  credit 
databases. Better alignment could be ensured by explicitly indicating that credit providers 
are  bound  by  GDPR  obligations  and  relevant  national  data  protection  legislation  when 
collecting, sharing and storing consumer data.282 A specification of the categories of data 
that  can  be  used  for  CWA  along  the  lines  of  the  Mortgage  Credit  Directive  (MCD), 
together with a reference, in particular, to the data minimisation principle would improve 
legal certainty.  

The vast majority of stakeholders consulted for this evaluation argued that the application 
of the Directive is done in full compliance with EU personal data protection laws (mostly 
about  the  use  of  credit  databases  that  provide  data  to  assess  the  credit-worthiness  of 
consumers).  However,  a  number  of  risks  were  highlighted  by  a  few  stakeholders.  The 
European  Consumer  Organisation  BEUC283  and  the  Financial  Services  User  Group 

280 Open Public Consultation (general). 
281 Interviews with consumer associations and industry representatives; Open Public Consultation (specific). 
282 GDPR sets out seven key principles, including: lawfulness, fairness and transparency; purpose limitation; 
and  data  minimisation.  When  data  is  collected,    data  controllers  must  be  clear  about  why  it  is  being 
collected  and  how  it  is  going  to  be  used.  In  addition,  data  controllers  should  only  process  the  minimum 
amount of data required for their purposes. Personal data is required to be accurate, fit for purpose and up 
to date. When personal data are not needed anymore for the purpose for which it was collected, they should 
be  deleted or destroyed unless  there  are other grounds  for  retaining  it.  GDPR states  that  data  controllers 
should have the appropriate levels of security in place to address the risks presented by their process. Data 
controllers must take responsibility for the data they hold and demonstrate compliance with the other data 
protection  principles.  In  addition  to  these  principles,  the  article  on  automated  decision-making  and  its 
guidance, as well as the provisions on the rights of information and data access  are relevant for creditors in 
the way CWAs are carried out and credit databases are used . 
283 BEUC, 2017. 

62 

 
                                                            
(FSUG),284  for  instance,  have  expressed  concerns  about  the  new  types  of  personal  data 
(e.g. digital footprints or social network data) collected online (notably by new types of 
providers  such  as  certain  fintech  providing  online  credit  or  crowdfunding  platforms285) 
for  verifying  the  creditworthiness  of  consumers  and  the  impact  this  could  have  on 
vulnerable  consumers  in  particular  and  their  access  to  credit.  These  stakeholders  argue 
that limited or no rigorous scrutiny of consumers’ ability to pay (creditworthiness) can in 
fact  lead  to  higher  risks  of  default  and  indebtedness,  with  vulnerable  consumers 
accessing loans they cannot repay.  

While only 13% of respondents to the Open Public Consultation reported that the GDPR 
is  incoherent  with  the  Directive,  there  is  uncertainty  as  to  the  practical  implications  of 
requirements  on the identification, collection, sharing  and use  of data of consumers for 
the  purposes  of  the  CWA.  Recent  work  by  national  data  protection  authorities  is  thus 
helpful in providing guidance on how the GDPR impacts the functioning of the Directive 
provisions286.  

GDPR clarifies that data subjects have the right to ask for human intervention in case of 
decisions  based  solely  on  automated  processing  which  significantly  affect  them  e.g. 
automatic refusal of an online credit application. In addition, data subjects have the right, 
in  case  of  automated  decision-making,  including  profiling,  to  receive  meaningful 
information  about  the  logic  involved,  as  well  as  the  significance  and  the  envisaged 
consequences of such processing.  However, the fact that the Directive does not specify 
which categories of data can be used – or not- nor their amount in the CWA process is a 
gap  that  the  GDPR  cannot  fill  on  its  own  effectively,  particularly  considering  the 
objective  of  the  CWA  obligation  to  ensure  consumers  are  provided  with  loans  that  are 
appropriate to their financial situation (see also EQ15 on the relevance of the  Directive 
provisions in light of digitalisation).  

Beyond  CWA,  compliance  with  GDPR  is  also  key  when  it  comes  to  advertising 
practices, in case of prices determined in an automated manner287 or lack of information 
on the pricing structure288. These practices have significant consequences for consumers, 

in 

and 

punctuality 

284 FSUG, 2019. 
285 Crowdfunding is the practice of funding a project or venture by raising monetary contributions from a 
large  number  of  people.  It  is  often  performed  via  internet-mediated  registries  that  facilitate  money 
collection for the borrower (lending) or issuer (equity). 
286 In October, the Italian Data Protection Authority (Garante per la protezione dei dati personali) approved a 
new Code of conduct for credit reporting systems operated by private entities regarding consumer credit, 
creditworthiness 
associations: 
payments, 
https://edpb.europa.eu/news/national-news/2019/new-rules-credit-reporting-systems-digital-economy_fr  
287 Article 22 of the GDPR may be triggered, leading to heightened information requirements. The European 
Data  Protection  Board/WP29  Guidelines  on  automated  individual  decision-making  and  profiling  for  the 
purposes  of  Regulation  2016/679  specify  that  “Automated  decision-making  that  results  in  differential 
pricing  based  on  personal  data  or  personal  characteristics  could  also  have  a  significant  effect  if,  for 
example, prohibitively high prices effectively bar someone from certain goods or services.” 
288  The  lack  of  transparency  in  advertising  practices  can  be  considered  a  misleading  omission  (UCPD 
Article  7  (4)(c)).  In  addition,  the  lack  of  transparency  when  processing  personal  data  for  advertising 
purposes may also lead to possible violation of a number of GDPR provision, in particular Article 5(1)(a), 
Article 13, 14 and Article 22 if automated decision making is employed.  The processing of personal data 
may  also  be  used  for  price  discrimination  purposes;  while,    the  practice  of  price  discrimination  is  not 
expressly illegal,  its uses may lead to problems, such as excluding certain segments of society or providing 

proposed 

trade 

the 

by 

63 

 
                                                            
 
as  they  limit  their  access  to  certain  financial  services.  Consumers,  according  to  the 
GDPR, can also prevent the processing of their personal data for marketing purposes at 
any time, by withdrawing any consent previously provided, or objecting to the processing 
of their personal data for marketing purposes. 

RELEVANCE 

Relevance  looks  at  the  relationship  between  the  needs  and  problems  in  society  and  the 
objectives of the intervention and hence touches on aspects of design.  

EQ15 - Are the objectives of the Directive still relevant? Does the Directive address 
current  and  anticipated  future  needs  and  challenges  (e.g.  market  developments, 
consumer behaviour and needs), including those of consumers and providers?  

Considering  the  developments  explained  in  section  3  and  the  above  analysis,  while  the 
objectives  of  the  Directive  remain  relevant,  certain  shortcomings  prevent  it  from 
addressing  the  current  and  anticipated  future  needs  and  challenges  of  consumers  and 
credit providers, particularly in relation to issues linked to digitalisation and responsible 
lending. 

The Directive was intended to establish a well-functioning internal market in the field of 
consumer credit and to ensure a high level of consumer protection. Despite the fact that 
both these objectives are also pursued, directly or indirectly, by other relevant EU-level 
legislation (e.g. Mortgage Credit Directive (MCD)), the evidence gathered suggests that 
the Directive is still considered relevant, as it provides a specialised framework that takes 
account of the functioning and specific issues related to consumer credit. 

More  than  10  years  later,  however,  needs  have  evolved,  especially  considering  the 
changes brought by digitalisation and the challenges the EU is facing to fully engage in 
the transition towards a green economy including the uptake of energy efficient loans289.  

Objective 1: Ensuring a high level of consumer protection 

The need to ensure a high level of consumer protection is readily acknowledged by all 
stakeholders, and the Directive provisions have enhanced consumer protection since the 
introduction  of  the  Directive.  However,  the  relevance  of  the  Directive  provisions  in 
ensuring  consumer  protection  in  light  of  the  changes  in  the  credit  market  and  in 
consumer behaviour is less evident.  

The  relevance  of  this  objective  is  reflected  in  the  way  that  most  Member  States  have 
transposed and implemented the Directive, in most cases going beyond the requirements 

a higher price to determined categories of people based on certain categories of personal data (for instance, 
based on the home addresses of the consumer, the price might be higher or lower).   
289 In her “Political Guidelines For The Next European Commission 2019-2024”, President of the European 
Commission Ursula von der Leyen stressed that “Europe must lead the transition to a healthy planet and a 
new digital world”. 

64 

 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
laid down by the Directive to ensure better consumer protection290. The extent to which 
the  provisions  of  the  Directive  are  aligned  with  the  needs  of  consumers  in  practice  is 
subject  to  debate.  Several  provisions  of  the  Directive  proved  particularly  relevant  to 
address  issues  that  consumers  faced  a  decade  ago.  The  extension  of  the  right  of 
withdrawal  as  well  as  the  harmonisation  and  establishment  of  a  common  formula  to 
calculate  the  Annual  Percentage  Rate  of  Charge  (APR)  all  proved  useful  for 
consumers291. 
Ten years on, the Directive covers some – but not all - of the current consumer needs292. 
The last decade has seen important changes in consumer behaviour that are not reflected 
in the provisions of the Directive. Consumers’ decision-making processes in deciding to 
take  up  credit  have  changed  as  a  result  of  digitalisation  and  the  transformation  of 
consumption habits. Over 90% of the Open Public Consultation respondents agreed that 
digitalisation  has  changed  the  credit  market  over  the  past  ten  years.  For  instance, 
consumers  are  slightly  less  concerned  with  the  location  of  the  provider,  instead  getting 
used to smoother and faster processes, also as a result of the industry’s push for quicker 
processes. The approach to consumer protection adopted by the Directive is anchored in 
the ‘information paradigm’, whereby the ‘average consumer’ is  assumed to make good 
decisions  based  on  the  information  received293.  This  is  a  somewhat  outdated  paradigm, 
however294.  

Whilst the general feedback collected in the Open Public Consultation show that a large 
majority  of  stakeholders  consider  the  Directive  provisions  relating  to  consumer 
information  as  relevant,  the  details  contained  in  their  contributions  as  well  as  the 
evidence  collected  as  part  of  this  study  show  a  more  nuanced  landscape.  Indeed,  the 
provisions  of  the  Directive  are  not  entirely  adapted  to  current  consumer  behaviour  and 
the  way  information  is  displayed  online  as  the  Directive  does  not  specify  how 
information should be presented to consumers specifically in a digital environment where 
different  dynamics  (in  terms  of  speed  of  information  and  consumer  experience)  apply. 
Indeed, consumers are unlikely to read and process large amounts of information (which 
only in part derives from the Directive and, on the contrary, is sometimes used to exploit 

290 Examples of these additional steps are: the extension of the scope of the Directive to other credit; caps on 
interest rates; authorisation regimes; stricter CWA obligations; strengthened supervision and enforcement 
measures; further requirements with respect to advertising. 
291 Interviews with consumer organisations and Member States. 
292  Interviews  with  consumer  organisations,  Member  States  and  enforcement  authorities;  FSUG,  2019. 
Although opinions on whether the Directive addresses current needs were evenly divided among national 
authorities and industry representatives, all consumers organisations stated that it meets consumer needs in 
their Member State. It should be noted, however, that most consumer complaints concern the level of fees, 
pre-contractual  and  contractual  information,  debts  and  debt  collection,  levels  of  interest  rates  and 
management issues, meaning that some of consumers’ main issues are not addressed by the Directive. 
293  For  more  information  see  Sibony  Anne-Lise  &  Helleringer  Geneviève,  ‘EU  Consumer  Protection  and 
Behavioural  Sciences’  in  Sibony  Anne-Lise  &  Alemanno  Alberto  ‘Nudge  and  the  Law:  A  European 
Perspective’, Hart Publishing, 2015. 
294 BEUC, 2017; European Parliament, 2018; Interviews with industry representatives. 

65 

 
                                                            
behavioural  biases),  and  often  sign  without  understanding  the  conditions  of  the 
agreement, especially when undertaking credit online295.  

Another shortcoming  relates  to the  Directive’s limited coverage  of responsible lending. 
While  the  early  versions  of  the  Directive  proposed  by  the  Commission  spelled  out  the 
objective  of  avoiding  consumers’  over-indebtedness  and  included  specific  obligations 
seeking  to  ensure  responsible  lending296,  the  final  version  after  negotiations  did  not 
establish  such  a  clear  duty297.  Some  of  the  Directive  tools  -especially  the  obligation  to 
to  provide  adequate  and 
perform  a  creditworthiness  assessment  (CWA)  and 
comprehensive  information-  are  underdeveloped  to  effectively  ensure  responsible 
lending and avoid over-indebtedness.  

From  the  perspective  of  credit  providers,  responsible  lending  requires  them  to  design 
credit  products  responsibly  and  to  establish  business  practices  that  ensure  that  these 
products are sold to consumers who can reasonably fulfil their obligations. The Directive 
fails  to  address  product  design  issues,  with  many  of  the  problematic  products  falling 
outside the scope of the Directive (see EQ16). From a consumer perspective, responsible 
lending focuses on their ability to understand their options, the conditions applicable, and 
the  potential  risks.  Even  where  they  are  covered,  the  Directive  does  not  contain  any 
provision to mitigate their risks. Responsible lending concerns were highlighted by 20% 
of  consumer  associations,  while  also  a  few  industry  representatives  argued  that 
responsible  lending  requirements  can  reduce  consumer  detriment  and  costs  for  credit 
providers.  As  discussed  previously,  some  Member  States  have  adopted  specific 
provisions to address problematic lending practices. 

Several  irresponsible  lending  practices  have  been  observed  in  the  consumer  credit 
market.  Chief  among  these  are  the  cross-selling  of  products  like  insurance  policies  (in 
many  cases  to  unsuitable  consumers),  the  targeting  of  vulnerable  consumers  by 
promoting  easy  and  quick  access  to  some  of  the  most  potentially  dangerous  credit 
products  (e.g.  short-term  high-cost  credit)  and  failing  to  support  consumers  who  are 
struggling  to  repay  on  time.  A  number  of  shortcomings  prevent  the  Directive  from 
tackling these issues: 

 

 
 

the Directive does not specify explicitely that CWAs should be borrower-focused (i.e. 
focused on whether this can be done without incurring substantial financial harm), as 
confirmed by the case law of the Court of Justice of the EU ; 
it does not establish the consequences of a negative CWA298; 
it does not impose any restrictions on cross-selling;  

295 Interviews with consumer associations, Member States and industry representatives; Survey of creditors; 
FinCoNet, 2017; Danish Competition and Consumer Authority, 2018; European Commission, 2016d; See 
case study 1 in the study supporting the evaluation (Pre-contractual information) for further details.  
296 For instance by avoiding unreasonable credit contracts, introducing duties of credit providers to assess 
and advise on the risks of default and holding them responsible during all phases 
297 BEUC, 2017. 
298 This aspect may be clarified, to a certain extent, through Judgment of the Court of 6 June 2019, Schyns, 
C-58/18,  EU:C:2019:467  as  the  CJEU  noted  that  the  obligation  to  perform  a  CWA  seeks  to  protect 
consumers against the risks of over-indebtedness and insolvency. 

66 

 
                                                            
 

 

 

it does not require Member States to provide for a general obligation on creditors to 
offer consumers the most suitable credit; 
it does not impose on credit providers an explicit duty to recommend suitable credit 
agreements  to  consumers  ,  but  only  an  obligation  for  Member  States  to  ensure  that 
creditors and intermediaries provide adequate explanations to consumers. Moreover, 
it does include standards on advisory services; 
it does not establish any obligation of fair treatment of consumers at risk of default or 
that have defaulted. 

Some  Member  States  have  gone  beyond  the  requirements  of  the  Directive  to  mitigate 
these risks. Measures taken include establishing further requirements in advertising, e.g. 
obliging credit providers to include messages warning consumers that borrowing money 
costs  money.299  With  respect  to  standard  information  requirements  to  be  included  in 
advertising,  most  Member  States  went  beyond  the  requirements  laid  down  by  the 
Directive to ensure better consumer protection.300 

The  stakeholder  consultation  reveals  a  perceived  need  –  particularly  among  consumer 
associations  and  national  authorities  -  for  the  Directive  to  further  promote  responsible 
lending  and  increase  consumer  protection  against  over-indebtedness.  Other  than  the 
adaptation of information requirements, there were no suggestions for specific supporting 
measures  apart  from  a  reference  to  the  need  of  further  promoting  financial  education 
(both  among  credit  providers’  employees  and  consumers)301.  However,  the  Financial 
Services User Group (FSUG) recently put forward several suggestions302, including the 
introduction  of  conduct  of  business  rules,  rules  on  product  oversight303  and  EU-level 
interest rate caps304.  

Finally,  some  consumer  associations  highlighted  that  better  protection  of  consumers 
could  be  achieved  by  strengthening  enforcement  of  credit  providers’  obligations305.  A 
small  number  of  stakeholders  argued  that  the  Directive  could  potentially  contribute  to 
better enforcement by harmonising sanctions across the EU306. 

The Directive does not address the issue of financing sustainable consumption. However, 
the  Commission  has  recently  launched  an  EU  Green  Deal  and  the  issue  is  likely  to 
become relevant for consumer credit as well in the near future 307. 

299 Legal analysis and supporting study’s case study 2 (Advertising and Marketing) and case study 6 (Credit 
worthiness assessment) for further details. 
300 Legal analysis; interviews with Member States. See case study 8 in the study supporting the evaluation 
(Thresholds and scope) for further details. 
301 EESC, 2019; Interviews with industry representatives. 
302 FSUG, 2019. 
303 Similar to the 2016 EBA Guidelines on product oversight and governance. 
304  Based  on  good  national  practices  and  defining  an  acceptable  default  rate  within  a  risk  pool  for  all 
creditors.  Alternatively,  EU-level  legislation  could  provide  that  Member  States  shall  impose  a  cap  on 
interest  rates.  An  interest  rate  cap  is  the  maximum  interest  rate  that  may  be  charged  on  a  contract  or 
agreement. 
305 Interviews with consumer associations. 
306 Interviews with Member States, EESC. 
307 The third phase of Energy Efficiency Financial Institutions Group (EEFIG) - established by the European 
Commission  and  United  Nations  Environment  Program  Finance  Initiative  -  was  launched  in  November 

67 

 
                                                            
 
Objective 2: Facilitating the emergence of a well-functioning internal market 

Stakeholders acknowledge the importance of having a harmonised framework to ensure a 
level-playing  field  between  creditors  even  though  they  do  not  seem  to  consider  cross-
border  access  as  an  important  need.  This  is  also  due  to  external  regulatory  and  natural 
obstacles  that  hamper  cross-border  offer  of  credit  (see  EQ1).  However,  cross-border 
demand is expected to raise because of increased digitalisation in the sector and changes 
in  consumer  behaviour.  The  transformations  linked  to  digitalisation  might  not  be 
adequately captured by the provisions of the Directive.  

Stakeholders  across  all  groups  –  especially  industry  representatives  and  national 
authorities - acknowledge the relevance of a legal framework that allows a level-playing 
field  for  all  credit  providers  (regardless  of  their  nature  and  location)  in  ensuring  the 
functioning  of  the  internal  market.  Regulatory  fragmentation  raises  costs  for  providers 
who  want  to  sell  on  another  market,  creates  an  unlevel  playing  field  for  creditors,  and 
reduces  the  offer  available  for  consumers,  hampering  the  achievement  of  a  well 
functioning internal market (see EQ1). 

Neither  consumers  nor  credit  providers  see  achieving  an  effective  cross-border  market 
for  consumer  credit  as  the  most  pressing  need.  However,  while  cross-border  credit  is 
insignificant  as  a  whole308,  still  nearly  30%  of  consumers  in  this  evaluation’s  survey 
indicated  to  have  looked  for  loans  in  other  countries,  showing  there  to  be  a  demand 
potential309. Although several obstacles play a role in this, the low levels of demand are 
also  explained  by  a  lack  of  interest,  as  consumers  are  satisfied  with  the  national  offer 
(especially  in  large  economies)  or  prefer  to  purchase  products  in  their  own  country310. 
From the perspective of the offer, the low demand for cross-border credit and the legal 
fragmentation  result  in  a  lack  of  incentives  for  credit  providers,  especially  traditional 
providers311  -  which  usually  set  up  a  local  branch  and  provide  credit  from  there.  There 
are indications, however, that the cross-border market may develop in the future, due to 
the digitalisation of business processes and changes in consumer behaviour, raising new 
issues for consumers and credit providers312. Against this background, achieving a well-
functioning internal market is likely to become increasingly relevant. 

The adoption of the Directive led to a certain degree of legal harmonisation (as discussed 
in  EQ1),  but  did  not  achieve  the  intended  degree  of  uniformity  for  all  rules  across  the 

2018  (until  2022)  with  the  aim  to  act  as  an  action-oriented  platform,  to  collect,  develop,  implement  and 
disseminate  innovative  ideas  to  accelerate  finance  for  energy  efficiency  in  Europe.  One  of  its  working 
groups is thus currently working on the financial performance of loans to improve the energy efficiency of 
housing (www.eefig.eu). 
308 European Commission, 2016b; Consumer survey; Open Public Consultation (general). 
309 Consumer survey. 
310  European  Commission,  2016b;  ECRI,  2018a;  Open  Public  Consultation  (general);  Interviews  with 
Member States, consumer associations and industry representatives. 
311  Due  to  the  digital  environment  in  which  they  operate,  fintech  companies  are  less  constrained  by 
geographical barriers. 
312  The  expected  increase  in  cross-border  demand  could  lead  to  an  augmentation  of  credit  agreements 
relating  to  foreign  currency  loans,  with  the  attached  significant  exchange  rate  risks,  which  could  lead  to 
substantial  consumer  detriment.  To  limit  those  risks,  for  example,  the  Mortgage  Credit  Directive 
(2014/17/EU) introduced specific requirements for foreign currency loans of the MCD. 

68 

 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
EU.  Similarly,  credit  providers  believe  that  the  new  framework  did  not  significantly 
improve legal clarity. The limited impact of the Directive may be an indication that the 
provisions  of  the  Directive  were  not  entirely  in  line  with  the  objectives  pursued  by  the 
Directive  (see  EQ11).A  decade  after  the  adoption  of  the  Directive,  important 
shortcomings  have  been  identified  that  suggest  that  the  Directive  is  ill-equipped  to 
address several current and future needs313.  

Digitalisation has triggered the emergence of new players (e.g. fintech companies such as 
peer-to-peer lending and online banks). As discussed under EQ16, it is unclear whether 
these new players are bound by the Directive obligations, which in turn raises questions 
in terms of level-playing field with traditional providers.  

Digitalisation  has  also  transformed  the  way  that  credit  providers  communicate  and 
engage with consumers. It has changed the way in which consumer data are processed, 
both  for  marketing  and  creditworthiness  assessment  (CWA)  purposes.  Business 
processes have also been significantly impacted as a majority of consumer credit is now 
sold  using  a  combination  of  online  and  offline  processes,  and  credit  providers  are 
increasingly using – in the absence of detailed requirements - alternative information in 
CWA (see EQ4) as well as automated decision-making processes.  

The inability of the  Directive  to  fully  adapt to these trends is  highlighted as  one  of the 
main  issues  limiting  its relevance today314.  This  limitation  was  noted  by  all  stakeholder 
groups  consulted  for  this  study,  especially  industry  representatives  and  national 
authorities315.  However,  these  transformations  show  that  pursuing  the  objective  of 
facilitating  the  emergence  of  a  well-functioning  internal  market  remains  relevant,  not 
only  because  of  the  need  to  guarantee  a  level-playing  field  between  creditors 
independently  of  their  type  or  the  practices  they  use,  but  also  in  the  light  of  increased 
digitalisation which is likely to foster cross-border market. 

EQ16  - How relevant  and adapted are  the  scope, thresholds  and definitions in the 
Directive to the current market situation? 

The  scope  of  application  of  the  Directive  seems  partly  inadequate  to  ensure  sufficient 
consumer  protection in  relation to  certain  credit  products.  The  main  issues  include the 
EUR 200 threshold, particularly in case of high-cost credit, and the exclusion of specific 
products.  The  definitions  of  creditor  and  credit  intermediaries  are  not  completely 
relevant to ensure the Directive is adapted to the digital era. 

While  three  quarters  of  respondents  to  the  Open  Public  Consultation  argued  that  the 
scope of Directive is relevant, the minimum and maximum thresholds of Article 2(2)(c) 
are generally perceived as only partially relevant, as they establish an artificial distinction 
between  credit,  based  on  the  amount  rather  than  the  nature  of  the  credit.  Only  10%  of 
consumer associations and 20% of Member State authorities did consider the scope to be 
adequate, as opposed to half of industry representatives. 

313  European  Parliament,  2018;  EESC,  2019;  Interviews  with  consumer  organisations, 
representatives, Member States and enforcement authorities. 
314 ECRI, 2018a; EESC, 2019.  
315 Interviews with consumer organisations, industry representatives and Member States. 

industry 

69 

 
                                                            
As explained under EQ7, the EUR 200 minimum threshold is particularly problematic, as 
it  prevents  the  Directive  from  tackling  some  of  the  issues  linked  to  high-cost  and 
revolving credit. These types of credit may result in high levels of consumer detriment, 
as they tend to be very expensive and are typically used by vulnerable consumers with 
limited access  to  other  types  of consumer credit, often leading to  over-indebtedness. In 
relation  to  credits  above  EUR  75,000  threshold,  it  can  be  argued  that  there  is  a  gap  in 
legislation,  as  only  those  for  the  purposes  of  renovating  an  immovable  property  are 
covered by the   Directive. However, as they are less common (in total numbers,  not  in 
total value), stakeholders have much less frequently pointed to the higher threshold as a 
potential problem.  

The list of products exempted under Article 2(2), or of products only partially covered by 
the current Directive, also raises several concerns, as highlighted under EQ7. Four main 
products  are  perceived  as  particularly  risky:  zero-interest  loans  (they  can  have  high 
penalties for running late for periodic instalments), overdraft facilities (they can be raised 
to  higher  ceilings  without  consumers  being  aware),  leasing  agreements  (that  do  not 
impose an obligation to purchase the good in terms of the ability to exercise rights) and 
agreements with pawnshops (equally for exercising rights). Although the extent to which 
these  credit  products  are  used  by  consumers  varies,  some  Member  States  nevertheless 
highlighted  their  increasing  importance  in  the  field  of  consumer  credit  and  the  need  to 
minimise the risks for consumers.  

Most  of  the  Article  3  definitions  remain  relevant  to  the  current  market  situation,  with 
only  a  slight  revision  or  clarification  of  the  definition  of  ‘creditor’  and  ‘credit 
intermediary’ suggested as necessary to ensure that the Directive covers the new players 
in  the  market  since  2008.  Stakeholders  pay  particular  attention  to  this  point  because  of 
the  emergence  of  peer-to-peer  lending  (P2PL)316  platforms,  which  pose  risks  for  both 
lenders  and  borrowers.  Although  P2PL  platforms  are  not  one  of  the  exemptions  of 
Article 2(2), there is little clarity on whether they are covered by the Directive, thereby 
diminishing  the  relevance  of  the  Directive  and  degree  to  which  it  is  adapted  to  current 
trends.  Lenders  on  such  platforms  are  usually  private  individuals  and  it  is  somewhat 
unclear, in such case, if they fall strictly within the definition of ‘creditor’, as they may  
not necessarily provide credit ‘in the course of […] trade, business or profession’. 

The uncertainty around the scope of application of the Directive has allowed some types 
of credit products to remain partially or not at all covered by the Directive, and has also 
resulted  in  a  very  fragmented  legal  framework  across  the  EU  and  different  degrees  of 
consumer protection standards and enforcement rules (potentially creating incentives for 
regulatory  arbitrage).  As  Member  States  are  free  to  regulate  credit  agreements  not 
covered  by  the  Directive,  they  have  opted  to  tackle  their  own  most  pressing  issues  in 
diverse ways.  

Overall,  a majority  of  stakeholders  across  all  groups  therefore  argued  that  the scope  of 
application of the  Directive should be revised. Industry representatives pointed out that 

316 Enables individuals to obtain loans directly from other individuals, cutting out the financial institution as 
the middleman. P2P lending is also known as social lending or crowdlending. 

70 

 
                                                            
all  consumer  credit  providers  should  be  bound  by  the  same  rules  (even  if  enforcement 
standards  might  currently  be  different  for  banks  and  non-banks317),  while  national 
authorities and consumer organisations would like to see certain credit products brought 
within the scope of the Directive to enhance its overall effectiveness.  

EU ADDED VALUE 

EU added value looks for changes which it can reasonably be argued are due to the EU 
intervention  over  and  above  what  could  reasonably  have  been  expected  from  national 
actions by Member States. 

EQ17  -  Where  does  the  EU  added  value  of  the  Directive  lie?  Would  the  benefits 
delivered  by  the  Directive  have  been  achieved  in  the  absence  of  EU-level 
intervention? 

The  added  value  of  the  Directive  is  widely  recognised  by  all  stakeholders,  with 
overwhelming  agreement  that  all  its  provisions  should  remain  regulated  at  EU  level.  
The  EU  added  value  lies  in  the  Directive’s  contribution  to  increasing  consumer 
protection and, to a lesser extent, harmonising the provisions governing consumer credit 
in the EU. 

Stakeholders agree that consumer credit - and consumer protection, in particular - benefit 
from  EU-level  action  and  a  harmonised  approach.  83%  of  the  respondents  to  the 
European Economic and Social Committee survey found that the Directive had increased 
transparency  and  fairness  in  credit  agreements  between  creditors  and  consumers.  All 
stakeholder groups acknowledge the importance of a harmonised framework allowing for 
a level-playing field for all credit providers318. Between 88% and 93% of respondents to 
the Open Public Consultation considered all provisions to have added value at EU-level, 
with  only  creditworthiness  assessment  (CWA)  somewhat  a  bit  lower  at  74%  (probably 
because of the various ways it has been implemented at national level).  

In  order  to  meet  the  Directive’s  objectives  to  guarantee  a  high  level  of  consumer 
protection  across  borders  and  to  facilitate  the  emergence  of  an  internal  market  for 
consumer credit, the role of the EU in ensuring a even level of protection for consumers 
and a level-playing field for providers is key. Moreover, considering that the provision of 
cross-border credit is expected to increase with the developments linked to digitalisation, 
an  EU  framework  will  be  all  the  more  necessary.  Overall,  the  findings  of  this  study 
present a rather fragmented regulatory landscape across the EU, with some elements of 
the Directive more harmonised than others, which is an indication that the Directive has 
partially  achieved  its  potential  in  terms  of  adding  EU  value.  The  Directive  managed  to 
create  a  level-playing  field  on  certain  provision,  which  is  partially  hampered  by  vast 

317  In  several  Member  States,  different  authorities  supervise  banks  and  non-bank  creditors.  Traditionally, 
banks are supervised by Central Banks or National Financial Authorities  whilst non-banks are supervised 
by Consumer Protection Authorities. 
318  Interviews  of  consumer  organisations,  industry  representatives,  Member  States  and  enforcement 
authorities. 

71 

 
                                                            
differences in application of the Directive, enforcement, and contextual differences in the 
demand and supply of the credit market. At the same time, key benefits of the Directive 
would  likely  have  been  only  partially  achieved  –  in  their  reach  or  in  the  number  of 
Member States – in the absence of EU-level intervention. 

As  described  above,  specific  benefits  relate  primarily  to  individual  provisions,  the 
Directive as a whole, or its wider effects. The benefits stemming from the Directive vary 
significantly  between  Member  States,  mostly  based  on  whether  relevant  national 
predecessors existed to the Directive. Some of the provisions introduced by the Directive 
were  entirely  novel  for  some  Member  States  and  as  such  had  a  unique  impact319.  This 
points  to  clear  added  value  of  the  Directive  in  ensuring  certain  consumer  protection 
standards. As discussed in EQ1 and EQ2, the introduction of standardised formats such 
as  the  Standardised  European  Consumer  Credit  Information  (SECCI)  and  the  Annual 
Percentage Rate of Charge (APR) clearly has  reduced fragmentation across the EU and 
minimised  disparities  in  consumer  protection  between  Member  States.  Similarly,  the 
right  of  withdrawal  and  of  early  repayment  help  creating  EU-wide  minimum  levels  of 
consumer protection. 

What remains unclear, however, is whether such provisions would have been developed 
by Member States in the absence of the Directive and thus whether the same result would 
have been achieved. While, in some Member States320, transposition of the Directive had 
little  impact  on  the  national  framework  regulating  consumer  protection321,  making  it 
difficult to establish whether the impact would otherwise have been delivered, in others 
the Directive definitely added value to the national framework322. In most cases, Member 
States have implemented significant changes to national legislation in order to transpose 
and  implement  the  Directive.  It  could  thus  be  assumed  that  the  introduction  of  the 
Directive’s  provisions  had  a  positive  impact  on  the  national  framework  that  may  not 
otherwise  have  happened323.  The  introduction  of  the  Directive  also  avoided  fostering 
greater  national  disparity  as  some  Member  States  refrained  at  the  time  from  modifying 
their national legislation before the Directive adoption, which prevented the creation of 
much bigger differences than those preceding the adoption of the Directive. This in turn 
reduced  the  risk  of  regulatory  arbitrage  and  of  legal  loopholes  exploitation  to  achieve 
competitive advantages, while also diminishing further challenges to enforcement.  

The evaluation finds that most Member States have gone beyond the requirements of the 
Directive  and  implemented  additional  measures  at  national  level.  These  additional 
measures  focus  almost  exclusively  on  raising  consumer  protection  standards.  This  may 
be  an  indication  that  the  Directive’s  provisions  alone  were  not  entirely  sufficient  to 

319 For example, several Member States had no standardised information sheet prior to the introduction of 
the SECCI. 
320 Belgium is one such example. 
321  Legal  analysis  in  the  study  supporting  the  evaluation;  Interviews  of  Member  States  and  consumer 
associations. 
322  For  instance,  Slovenia  mentioned  that  in  the  absence  of  the  Directive  there  might  be  little  or  no 
regulation  in  the  field  of  consumer  credit,  which  would  seem  to  indicate  that  the  Directive  played  a 
fundamental role in the regulation of that sector. 
323 Legal analysis in the study supporting the evaluation. 

72 

 
                                                            
protect  consumers  to  a  level  required  by  those  Member  States,  which  decided  to  adopt 
stricter  measures  as  part  of  the  transposition.  However,  in  certain  cases,  some  Member 
States adopted additional measures much after 2008-2010 as a response to very particular 
issues324.  

Regulatory fragmentation and national differences in consumer protection standards were 
identified as leading to distortions of competition among creditors in the EU and creating 
obstacles to the internal market before the introduction of the Directive325. These barriers 
have  not  been  entirely  eliminated  with  the  entry  into  force  of  the  Directive.  However, 
many external factors (e.g. Member States going beyond the Directive and several credit-
related aspects falling outside of the scope of the Directive) are responsible for this and 
therefore the Directive alone cannot reasonably have been expected to boost cross-border 
activity. While the added value of the Directive to facilitate the development of a more 
transparent and efficient credit market benefitting both businesses and consumers so far 
is clear, its current form runs the risk of diminishing in value as areas not foreseen at the 
time  of  its  drafting  become  more  prevalent.  The  added  value  of  the  Directive  in  its 
current  form  may  thus  decrease  in  the  future  given  that  it  is  not  entirely  adapted  to 
market changes (changing consumption patterns, unfair lending, new market players etc 
– see EQ15) that are likely to intensify because of digitalisation. 

EQ18 – What would be the most likely consequence of withdrawing the Directive? 
In  the  absence  of  EU-level  action,  to  what  extent  would  Member  States  have  the 
ability or possibility to enact appropriate measures? 

If  the  Directive  were  to  be  withdrawn  now,  Member  States  may,  over  time,  legislate 
(differently) on those elements of consumer credit that are currently harmonised by the 
Directive,  entrenching the already fragmented landscape that governs consumer credit. 
This would likely lead to vastly different levels of consumer protection across the EU, 
also impacting the level-playing field between creditors and the cross-border provision 
of credit – likely to increase in the years to come due to digitalisation. 

The  lack  of  a  harmonised  framework  may  prove  detrimental,  especially  as  the  market 
evolves.  Fragmentation  would  increase  as  some  Member  States  are  likely  to  opt  for 
further  regulatory  action  while  unequal  levels  of  enforcement  also  raises  the  risks  of 
regulatory arbitrage.  

A  withdrawal  of  the  Directive  could  indeed  result  in  Member  States  having  different 
formulas for the calculation of the Annual Percentage Rate of Charge (APR) or requiring 
creditors to provide different types of pre-contractual information and advertisement and 
in various formats. Consolidated rights, such as the right of withdrawal and the right of 
early repayment, could be amended, making them subject to different timeframes in the 
Member States. Differences in the market, such as the prominence of short-term loans in 

324 This is the case for interest rate caps, which in many cases were put into place following specific issues 
(such as the emergence of payday loans) that were less common and not widespread throughout the EU at 
the  time  of  transposition  and  for  which  a  general  provision  in  the  Directive  might  have  been 
disproportionate. 
325 Council of the European Union, 2007. 9948/2/07 REV 2. 

73 

 
                                                            
a  given  Member  State  could  lead  to  a  different  APR  calculation  methodology  that  is 
more favourable to certain types of credit. Creditworthiness assessments and the use of 
credit  databases  are  another  area  where  undoubtedly  differences  may  widen.  Member 
States  could  opt  for  different  approaches  on  automatic  credit  scoring  carried  out  by 
artificial intelligence. Equally, they may authorise creditors to use certain new forms of 
data  which  would  currently  not  be  considered  appropriate  or  proportionate  for 
creditworthiness assessments (CWAs).  

Such  changes  at  national  level  would  not  necessarily  damage  the  interests  of  other 
Member  States,  though  differences  in  standards  could  affect  neighbouring  countries.  It 
would,  however,  most  probably  lead  to  greater  differences  in  the  levels  of  consumer 
protection across the EU than those visible today. 

In  terms  of  impacts  on  creditors,  changes  to  the  type  and  format  of  pre-contractual 
information, for example, or the information to be included in advertising, and the length 
of  the  right  of  withdrawal  and  caps  on  repayment  charges  would  require  costly  and 
burdensome  adaptations  to  business  practices  across  Member  States.  This  would  also 
hamper the level-playing field between creditors.  

As a result of the above, reduction in the harmonisation of the provisions governed by the 
Directive would invariably also have a negative impact on cross-border access to credit. 
Greater  differences between  Member States would lead to greater difficulties and costs 
for creditors to comply with the different regulations, possibly hindering the emergence 
of  an  internal  market  in  consumer  credit,  at  a  moment  when  digitalisation  could  help 
overcome  certain  practical  barriers  in  the  provision  of  credit  and  as  consumers  appear 
increasingly interested in cross-border credit offers326.  

6.  CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED 

The  evaluation  results  will  feed  into  the  review  of  the  Directive,  which  was  included 
among  the  REFIT  initatives  of  the  Commission  Work  Programme  2020.  Based  on  the 
outcome  of  the  present  evaluation,  the  review  will  assess  potential  options  to  ensure 
better consumer information, taking into account the impact of digitalisation, as well as 
strengthened consumer protection from irresponsible lending practices, particularly those 
spread online. 

Effectiveness 

The  Directive’s  objectives  of  ensuring  a  high  level  of  consumer  protection  and 
facilitating  the  emergence  of  a  well-functioning  internal  market  have  been  partially 
achieved.  The  evaluation  found  a  number  of  limitations  and  shortcomings.  Although 
partly due to the Directive itself, these stem mainly from the practical application of the 
Directive in the Member States, its enforcement, aspects not covered by the Directive and 
the development of overall credit supply and demand. 

326 Consumer survey question 6a - thirty percent of consumers appear interested in cross-border offers for 
consumer credit. 

74 

 
                                                            
As  regards  the  first  objective,  the  introduction  of  the  Directive  has  enabled  the 
development  of  a  specific  legal  framework  to  protect  consumers  concluding  a  credit 
agreement,  which  is  key  to  ensure  consumer  confidence.  However,  several  Member 
States  have  introduced  additional  elements,  probably  because  further  measures  were 
needed to address detrimental practices. Uneven consumer protection across the EU leads 
to fragmentation, different rights for consumers and unequal conditions for cross-border 
access to credit products. Even if currently limited (around 1% of all loans), cross-border 
credit activities already impact some EU consumers and are expected to increase thanks 
to digitalisation.  

Concerning  the  second  objective,  there  are  two  aspects  to  be  considered.  On  the  one 
hand, cross-border credit provision, whose small size can be mostly explained by a series 
of barriers, most of which relate to aspects beyond the provisions of the Directive, both 
on  the  supply  and  on  the  demand  side  (regulatory  and  market  fragmentation,  general 
consumer  preferences,  geographically-based  discrimination 
through  geo-blocking 
techniques…). However, certain barriers to cross-border credit provision are linked to the 
way  some  of  the  Directive  provisions  have  been  implemented  by  Member  States  (e.g. 
adding  elements  to  their  own  consumer  credit  legislation,  usually  imposing  additional 
requirements on creditors and affording greater protection to consumers). An increase in 
cross-border  credit  provision  could  foster  competition  and  ultimately  benefit  consumer 
choice. On the other hand, ensuring a level-playing field between creditors by providing 
a  harmonised  framework.    The  Directive  has  played  a  positive  role  in  achieving  this, 
thanks to harmonisation of certain key aspects (Standardised European Consumer Credit 
Information,  right  of  withdrawal,  …)  ensuring  that  providers  have  to  comply  with  the 
same  obligations  across  Member  States.  Hence,  even  though  cross-border  transactions 
remain very limited, the aim to achieve a better functioning internal market for consumer 
credit  was  partially  met.  Nonetheless,  further  reduced  regulatory  fragmentation  would 
lead  to  exploitation  of  synergies  and  economies  of  scale  in  the  internal  market,  lower 
costs for providers (and consequently for consumers) who want to sell on another market 
and increased offer. 

Despite  regulatory  fragmentation,  legal  clarity  has  improved  as  the  Directive  has 
provided  a  higher  degree  of  regulatory  harmonisation  (although  not  for  all  provisions). 
However, different approaches to enforcement (including sanctions as well as remedies 
available  to  consumers  in  case  of  lack  of  compliance)  at  national  level  resulted  in 
different levels of consumer protection across the EU.  

The  effectiveness  of  the  Directive’s  provisions  has  been  assessed  taking  into  account 
market  developments  since  its  adoption,  like  the  emergence  of  new  providers,  new 
products and new channels (i.e. digital tools). Current and future needs of consumers and 
credit  providers  could  be  addressed  more  effectively,  particularly  in  relation  to  issues 
linked to digitalisation and irresponsible lending.  

 

Information  disclosure:  the  effectiveness  of  both  the  provisions  on  advertising 
and  pre-contractual  information  has  been  hindered  by  the  way  the  required 
information  is  provided  in  online  environment  and  on  certain  media,  which  can 
lead  to  information  overload.  The  amount  and  complexity  of  the  information 

75 

 
provided in the Standardised European Consumer Credit Information reduces the 
form’s  effectiveness,  particularly  on  digital  tools.  As  regards  the  provision  on 
advertising327, evidence shows that its impact varies depending on the prominence 
it is given and the media used. How information is provided is key: information 
provided  in  a  timely,  clear  and  salient  way,  could  improve  consumer 
understanding.  

  Annual  Percentage  Rate  of  Charge:  it  provides  a  coherent  formula  and  a 
comprehensive  comparison  tool  across  all  Member  States.  When  correctly 
conveyed  and  understood,  it  helps  consumers  to  choose  the  credit  most 
appropriate to their needs. 

  Creditworthiness 

of 

interpretations 

assessment:  Member  State 

the 
creditworthiness  assessment  provisions  of  the  Directive  vary,  and  this  creates  a 
diverse  landscape  as  regards  the  requirements  for  such  assessment,  potentially 
hampering 
the  provision  of  cross-border  credit.  Properly  performed 
creditworthiness  assessments  are  indispensable  in  protecting  consumers  from 
over-indebtedness, and poorly performed creditworthiness assessments are often 
identified  for  those  types  of  credit  that  are  most  appealing  to  consumers  with 
limited  credit  histories,  such  as  short-term,  high-cost  loans.  There  are  concerns 
about  data  protection,  and  particularly  about 
relevance, 
proportionality and fairness, as regards the use of new techonologies and novel or 
alternative types of data. There are also concerns about granting of loans despite a 
negative creditworthiness assessment. These elements hinder the effectiveness of 
the  provision,  especially  for  more  vulnerable  consumers  and  in  the  light  of  the 
expected increase in the digitalisation of the consumer credit market.  

transparency, 

  Credit databases: they have been established in all Member States, although their 
nature (private or public), as well as the type and quality of the data they contain, 
varies  between  countries,  with  associated  differences  in  how  they  function  in 
practice. Along with these explicit limitations, the principle of reciprocity plays a 
significant  role  in  the  limitation  of  access  to  credit  databases  in  a  cross-border 
context, since the lack of standardisation in the data to be collected and reported 
limits  the  exchange  of  information  between  Member  States.  The  Directive’s 
provision  on  access  to  credit  databases  has  had  limited  impact  on  fostering  the 
emergence of cross-border access to credit offers. 

  Rights  of  withdrawal  and  early  repayment:  they  are  widely  considered  as 
important  in  offering  high  levels  of  protection  to  consumers.  The  evaluation 
found  that  a  majority  of  consumers  are  aware  of  both  rights,  with  the  right  of 
withdrawal far less frequently used than the right of early repayment. Relatively 
few consumers experience problems in exercising their right of withdrawal, with 
slightly more facing issues with early repayment. A recurring issue with the right 

327 As requested by the 2017 REFIT Platform opinion on the Directive, the effectiveness of the standard 
information  requirements  to  be  included  in  advertising  was  assessed.  However,  the  potential  for 
simplification  of  the  advertisement  without  harming  the  consumer  protection  objective  of  the  Directive 
could not be ascertained, see EQ9 and EQ10.  

76 

 
                                                            
of  withdrawal  relates  to  a  lack  of  clarity  on  its  application  to  linked  credit 
agreements. Issues with the right of early repayment primarily relate to incorrect 
calculation of the compensation to be paid to the creditors. 

  Definitions:  the  wording  of  the  definitions  has  proved  effective,  although  some 
ambiguity  remains  about  whether  the  Directive  covers  certain  new  forms  of 
lending that have appeared online (e.g. peer-to-peer lending). 

  Scope:  the  scope  of  application  of  the  Directive  has  not  generally  impacted  the 
ability of the Directive to meet its objectives, though there is serious stakeholder 
concerns  about  adequacy  of  the  lower  threshold  of  EUR  200.  Many  Member 
States extended the scope of application of the Directive to consumer credit not 
covered by it, contributing to the fragmentation of the regulatory framework. 

Efficiency and scope for burden reduction and simplification 

The evaluation found that the costs of the Directive are proportionate to its benefits, and 
estimates that those benefits outweigh the costs. The chief benefit of the Directive is the 
reduction in consumer detriment. Other factors contributing to  a reduction in  consumer 
detriment include the development of the credit sector itself, more stringent legislation in 
certain Member States, a possible uptake in overall sector compliance due to familiarity 
with the Directive, and increased consumer awareness.  

Costs associated with the Directive include direct compliance costs, such as initial set-up 
costs.  For  public  entities,  this  includes  transposition  of  legislation,  while  private 
companies  incur  staff  training  and  adaptation  of  IT  systems  costs.  Public  entities  also 
have  the  recurring  costs  of  monitoring,  compliance  and  enforcement.  While  the  2008-
2010  implementation  period  saw  initial  start-up  costs  for  businesses  -  and  for  public 
administrations, to a lesser extent – ongoing and recurring costs are relatively limited for 
most provisions. Consumer detriment in consumer credit is estimated to have decreased 
over 2010-2018, with 20-25% of that reduction attributed to the Directive.  

The evaluation estimates that many consumers may be affected by cross-selling practices 
where  creditors  try  to  push  additional  products  by  making  them  conditional  on  loan 
offers, unrequested extensions of the credit line328 on revolving credit, asking for advance 
(down) payments, and - to a lesser extent – non-verification of the ability to pay (as part 
of  creditworthiness  assessments)  and  non-receipt  of  the  Annual  Percentage  Rate  of 
Charge  or  Standardised  European  Consumer  Credit  Information.  Consumers’  lack  of 
awareness of their rights under the Directive may impede their exercise of those rights, in 
particular  the  right  of  withdrawal  and  understanding  the  Annual  Percentage  Rate  of 
Charge. 

The  evaluation  concludes  that  the  provisions  of  the  Directive  are  cost-effective.  While 
some  of  the  costs  of  implementing  these  provisions  weigh  on  creditors,  some  (in 
particular creditworthiness assessment) costs would also be incurred in their absence in 
order to mitigate against the risks of defaulting customers.  

328  A  fixed  amount  or  limit of  credit  which  is  established for  a  consumer  by  a  business or bank. It  is the 
amount of outstanding credit which may not be exceeded at any time. 

77 

 
                                                            
There is further potential for improving the efficiency of the Directive by solving some 
compliance issues through better enforcement. 

In  the  wake  of  the  2017  REFIT  platform  opinion,  the  evaluation  also  identified  some 
scope  for  burden  reduction  and  potential  simplification,  essentially  for  those  elements 
that  are  costly  yet  without  sufficient  benefit  to  consumers,  e.g.  requirements  for  radio 
(and possibly TV) ads. However, such process runs the risk of potentially undermining 
consumer  protection  standards,  hence  it  is  not  clear  whether  the  Directive  could  be 
simplified without harming its consumer protection objective. 

Coherence 

The  Directive  and  its  implementation  at  Member  State  level  shows  a  fair  degree  of 
internal coherence, overall. The Directive provisions work well together, offering a good 
standard of consumer protection. There is, however, a degree of incoherence with respect 
to the second objective of the Directive, i.e. fostering an internal credit market in the EU. 
As a broad-scope objective, it is difficult for the Directive to achieve it on its own merits. 
In  addition,  the  breadth  of  certain  provisions  has  indeed  contributed  to  their  diverse 
application across Member States. 

Overall,  Member  States’  transposition  of  the  Directive  is  coherent  with  the  obligations 
stemming  from  the  Directive.  Nevertheless,  several  Member  States  have  implemented 
some  provisions  of  the  Directive  in  very  different  ways  making  use  of  different 
regulatory choices (as allowed by the Directive) and/or have introduced provisions going 
beyond those foreseen in the Directive – typically to address specific national problems. 
This  legal  fragmentation  has  led  to  a  lack  of  harmonisation  and  has  undermined  the 
internal market objective of the Directive.  

The  Directive  is  largely  coherent  and  complementary  with  other  EU-level  consumer 
policy and legislation, although some elements could be better aligned. Greater alignment 
e.g.  as  regards  approaches  to  responsible  lending  with  the  Mortgage  Credit  Directive 
(2014/17/EU), which however covers on average higher value and more legally complex 
credit agreements, would foster legal clarity for Member States and credit providers and 
ensure  a  consistent  approach  in  protecting  consumers  against  over-indebtedness.  The 
provisions  of  the  Directive  and  their  implementation  at  national  level  are  generally 
coherent  and  compatible  with  the  General  Data  Protection  Regulation,  however  better 
clarity could be achieved in relation to  the amount and categories of data data to be used 
for the creditworthiness assessment.   

Relevance 

The evaluation clearly showed the continued relevance of the objective to achieve higher 
consumer  protection  standards.  This  is  reflected,  for  instance,  in  the  way  that  most 
Member States have transposed and implemented the Directive, often going beyond the 
requirements  laid  down  by  the  Directive  to  ensure  better  consumer  protection  (e.g. 
standard information requirements to be included in advertising).  

Ten  years  on,  the  Directive  covers  some  of  the  current  consumer  needs,  although  this 
evaluation suggests that the Directive is not sufficiently addressing irresponsible lending. 
Digitalisation has modified the decision-making process and overall habits of consumers, 

78 

 
whose  behaviours  and  preferences  have  evolved,  as  shown  by  recent  studies329.  These 
aspects  are  not  necessarily  reflected  in  the  Directive,  which  is  still  anchored  to  the  old 
pre-contractual ‘information paradigm’.  

The  objective  on  the  fostering  the  internal  market  for  consumer  credit  also  remains 
relevant,  although  the  Directive  provisions  only  partially  support  its  achievement.  The 
adoption of the Directive has led to a certain degree of legal harmonisation, and as such a 
certain  level  playing  field  for  providers.  While  the  expected  level  of  overall 
harmonisation did  not  materialise, the evaluation pointed to the ongoing  relevance of a 
specialised  framework  that  takes  account  of  the  functioning  of  consumer  credit.  As 
regards the cross-border credit market, still limited mostly because of external regulatory 
and natural barriers, there are indications that it may develop in the future.  

The scope and thresholds of the Directive appear to be somewhat unadjusted with respect 
to  the  objectives  and  current  context  of  the  Directive.  For  example,  the  Directive 
excludes certain specific products, some of which have generated concern, such as some 
zero-interest  loans,  some  overdraft  facilities,  leasing  agreements  that  do  not  impose  an 
obligation to purchase, and agreements with pawnshops. The thresholds (from EUR 200 
to  EUR  75,000)  are  noted  as  only  partially  relevant  to  the  Directive’s  objectives.  The 
distinction between credit based on amount rather than on typology is artificial in light of 
the findings of the evaluation, in so far as it does not consider the risks linked to high-
cost,  short-term  loans  and  revolving  credit.  Finally,  most  of  the  definitions  in  the 
Directive  remain  relevant  to  the  current  market  situation.  However,  there  are 
uncertainties as to whether the relevant definitions are entirely fit for purpose to address 
new forms of lending (e.g. peer-to-peer lending). 

EU added value 

The added value of the Directive emerged clearly from the evaluation and primarily lies 
in  its  contribution  to  increasing  consumer  protection.  The  introduction  of  harmonised 
provisions  clearly  contributes  to  a  high  level  of  consumer  protection  across  the  EU.  In 
some Member States, a framework for the protection of consumers was already in place 
at the time of transposition, while for others it represented a significant change to their 
regulatory landscape. Variations between Member States have been observed not only in 
the  impact  of  the  Directive  but  also  in  how  it  was  transposed.  In  some  instances, 
transposition  went  beyond  the  requirements  of  the  Directive,  contributing  to  the 
fragmented landscape of consumer credit regulation in the EU. Were the Directive to be 
withdrawn, however,  further  fragmentation  would  be likely,  which  could  lead  to  vastly 
different  standards  of  protection  over  time  and  negatively  impact  consumers  in  those 
jurisdictions where standards would likely fall.  

The  lending  sector  is  progressively  getting  digitalised  with  an  increasing  number  of 
consumer credit contracted online. This digitalisation could help breaking down certain 
practical  barriers  to  the  cross-border  provision  of  credit,  thus  increasing  the  number  of 
consumers obtaining credit in another Member State. There is indeed a growing interest 

329 See London Economics, “Behavioural study on the digitalisation of the marketing and distance selling of 
retail financial services”, 2019. 

79 

 
                                                            
among consumers for cross-border credit offers: 29% of the respondents to the consumer 
survey  conducted  for  the  evaluation  supporting  study  said  they  had  sought  for  a  credit 
from a creditor located in another EU country. In such a context, the EU added value of 
the  Directive  is  likely  to increase, given that  the Directive provides  for a similar set of 
rights  and  obligations  for  consumers  and  creditors  across  the  EU.  A  harmonised 
regulatory framework at EU level facilitating the development of a more transparent and 
efficient  credit  market  can  benefit  both  businesses  and  consumers.  On  the  one  hand, 
industry does not need to face high compliance costs to meet different national rules and 
can  offer  more  products  to  more  people,  possibly  at  better  conditions,  through  the 
achievement of economies of scale.  On the other hand, increased competition leads to a 
wider  and  cheaper  selection  of  credit  products  for  consumers.  However,  the  Directive 
needs to be adapted to market changes (changing consumption patterns, unfair lending, 
new market players – see EQ15) that are likely to intensify because of digitalisation. 

80 

 
 
 
Annex 1: Procedural information 

LEAD DG, DECIDE PLANNING/CWP REFERENCES 

-  LEAD DG: DG JUSTICE AND CONSUMERS 
-  DeCIDE PLANNING: PLAN/2018/3118 
-  CWP 2019 – ANNEX II (REFIT INITIATIVE N.10)330 

ORGANISATION AND TIMING 

The evaluation took place between June 2018 and November 2019 and was announced in 
the 2019 Commission Work Programme, also following the commitment established in 
the  2017  REFIT  Platform  Opinion  on  Article  4  of  the  Directive.  The  evaluation  also 
arises from Article 27(2) of the Directive, which specifies that the Commission should in 
particular review periodically certain thresholds and monitor the effect of the existence of 
the regulatory choices therein on the internal market and consumers.  

The evaluation was carried out by Unit E1 "Consumer Policy" of the Commission, DG 
Justice and Consumers.  

Representatives from the Secretariat General, the Legal Service, DG Financial Stability, 
Financial Services and Capital Markets Union (FISMA), DG Competition (COMP), DG 
Internal  Market, 
(GROW)  and  DG 
Communications  Networks,  Content  and  Technology  (CNECT)  were  appointed  to  the 
Steering Group.   

Industry,  Entrepreneurship  and  SMEs 

The Inter-Service Steering Group met 7 times between July 2018 and December 2019. 

EXCEPTIONS TO THE BETTER REGULATION GUIDELINES 

The Better Regulation Guidelines and Tools were followed without any exception. 

CONSULTATION OF THE REGULATORY SCRUTINY BOARD 

The evaluation was selected for scrutiny by the Regulatory Scrutiny Board (‘the Board’). 
The  RSB  received  the  draft  version  of  the  evaluation  Staff  Working  Document  on  20 
December 2019. Following the hearing which took place on 29 January 2020, the Board 
issued a positive opinion on the Evaluation.  

In its opinion, the Board finds the Evaluation report (i.e. the Staff Working Document) to 
be  comprehensive,  informative  and  reader-friendly.  Nonetheless  it  considers  that  it 
should further improve with respect to several aspects.  

The  evaluation  Staff  Working  Document  was  modified  to  address  the  Board’s 
recommendations. The main conclusions have been redrafted to draw lessons that emerge 
from the analysis. Limitations, including those linked to data collection, and uncertainties 
of  the  analysis  have  been  better  explained.  Moreover,  the  significance  of  low  levels  of 
cross  border  consumer  credits  and  obstacles  for  the  internal  market  have  been  better 
explained, as well as the need for EU level measures. 

For 

more 

details, 

see 

the 

below 

table. 

330 https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/cwp_2019_publication_en_0.pdf   

81 

 
                                                            
Recommendations of the Board  

1.  The  conclusions  and  executive  summary  should  better 
bring  out  key  insights  and  lessons  learned  from  the 
evaluation exercise. The report (i.e. the  Staff Working 
Document)  should  focus  attention  on  core  elements  of 
the  Directive  and  on  areas  where  findings  raise  issues 
for policy makers and future political choices. It should 
draw clearer conclusions with regard to issues raised in 
the  REFIT  platform  opinion.  The  report  could  also 
conclude  more  prominently  on 
findings  on 
creditworthiness  assessments. 
It  could  be  more 
consistent  in  evaluating  its  double  role  in  providing 
access 
to  foreign  credit  markets  and  protecting 
consumers from over-borrowing. 

its 

2.  The  evaluation  provides  evidence  that  there  has  been 
little  progress  towards  achieving  the  internal  market 
objective.  It  attributes  this  failure  to  obstacles  outside 
the  scope  of  the  Directive.  The  report  should  more 
clearly  set  out  the  problems  that  the  absence  of  an 
internal market in consumer credit causes, and why EU 
action  is  more  appropriate  than  national  regulation  to 

How the recommendations were reflected in the Staff Working 
Document 

Both the conclusions (Section 6) and the executive summary (standalone 
document)  have  been  redrafted  in  order  to  show  and  highlight  the  key 
issues identified, that will possibly need addressing in the context of the 
Directive’s review. 

-  The  conclusions  (section  6)  now  focus  on  the  areas  where  the 
Consumer Credit Directive (CCD) is still fit for purpose and areas 
which    where  findings  raise  issues  for  future  political  choices, 
including  with  regards  to  issues  raised  in  the  REFIT  platform 
opinion and creditworthiness assessment. 

-  The  executive  summary  (standalone  document)  was  restructured 
in order to present the main findings of the evaluation in a simple 
manner, bringing out lessons learned on different issues. 

The  text  was  redrafted  in  various  parts,  so  as  to  illustrate  the  little 
progress  towards  a  cross-border  market  for  consumer  credit  and  the 
partial  achievement  of  a  level  playing  field.  The  appropriateness  of  EU 
action have now been more elaborated upon.  

In particular, see under: 

-  EQ1  on  facilitating  the  emergence  of  a  well-functioning  internal 

market; 

82 

 
 
 
address these problems. 

-  EQ2 on legal clarity; 

3.  The report should better describe the current state of the 
market  for  consumer  credit  in  different  EU  Member 
States.  It  could  also  distinguish  more  clearly  between 
banks and non-bank providers. The report would benefit 
from more data (on types of products, market volumes, 
interest  rates,  consumer  complaints,  etc.)  at  Member 
State  level  to  improve  the  market  description  and  to 
qualify  findings,  including  on  the  potential  for  cross 
border credit. 

4.  The report should be more transparent about limitations 
and  uncertainties  of  the  data  and  analysis.  It  should 
better explain how it arrived at quantitative estimates of 
the  benefits,  and  indicate  how  reliable  those  estimates 
are. 

-  EQ15 on the relevance of the CCD’s objectives; 

-  EQ17 & EQ 18 on the EU added value of the CCD; 

-  The conclusions. 

We  recognise  fully  the  merit  of  this  recommendation  of  the  Regulatory 
Scrutiny  Board.  While  we  attempted  to  collect  more  data  on  various 
issues  throughout  the  evaluation  stage,  it  proved  very  difficult  to  gather 
some of them (as explained in the section on ‘limitations’).  

It  proved  particularly  hard  to  collect  systematic  and  verifiable  data  on 
credit  provision  from  non-banks:  in  the  framework  of  the  supporting 
study, data on non-bank credit providers were not available as readily as 
on banks (e.g. from banking supervisory authorities); the creditor survey 
was also targeting non-banks, but their response rate was very low.  

We attempted to gather other data e.g. on complaints and enforcement at 
Member  State  level  too,  through  the  consultants  performing  the 
supporting  study,  but  the  evaluation  did  not  obtain  comprehensive 
evidence.  

The  Staff  Working  Document  now  clearly  refers  to  its  limitations  and 
uncertainties of its data and analysis in multiple parts, namely under: 

-  Section 4 “Method / Limitations and Robustness of findings”; 

-  EQ8 on the costs and benefits;  

-  Annex 3 on methods and analytical models used in preparing the 

evaluation.  

With regard to the reliability of the estimates referred to in the evaluation, 

83 

 
 
 
 
the    Staff    Working  Document  now  clearly  mentions  the  source  of  the 
quantitative analysis, explains the developed methodology and how it was 
tested in a geographically balanced sample of countries. 

84 

 
Annex 2: Stakeholder consultation – Synopsis Report  

INTRODUCTION & CONSULTATION STRATEGY 

The goal of the consultation strategy was to  ensure that, across a series of consultation 
activities, all relevant stakeholders were given an opportunity to express their views on 
the  functioning  of  the  Consumer  Credit  Directive  (hereinafter,  the  “Directive”,  or 
“CCD”). 

The  primary  stakeholders  of  the  Directive  are  consumers  and  creditors  across  the  EU. 
However,  besides  these  two,  other  stakeholders  are  indirectly  or  potentially  impacted, 
alongside  actors  in  charge  of  implementing  these  provisions.  As  such,  the  following 
stakeholder categories were targeted as part of the consultation strategy: 

  Consumers; 
  Creditors/Providers (be it “banks” or “non-banks”); 
  Credit  intermediaries  (who  act  as  intermediaries  between  the  consumers  and  the 

creditors, this could include brokers, comparison website etc); 
information 

  Credit  registers  (who  collect  and  provide 

to  creditors  on 

the 

creditworthiness of consumers); 

  Trade,  business  and  other  professional  associations  representing  credit  providers, 

credit registers and intermediaries; 

  Consumer organisations; 
  Non-governmental associations, platforms and networks; 
  Research and academia; 
  National  public  authorities,  in  charge  of  supervising  and  enforcing  consumer  credit 

rules; 

  EU-level supervisory authorities and international organisations; 
  Commission expert groups. 

The consultation strategy relied on a mix of methods and tools to ensure a comprehensive 
and  representative  collection  of  views  and  experience  with  the  functioning  of  the 
Directive.  

CONSULTATION ACTIVITIES AND TOOLS 

The  following  table  summarises  the  range  of  stakeholders  consulted  as  part  of  the 
evaluation, in line with the consultation strategy. 

Table 1. Summary interviews and surveys (planned and conducted) 

Stakeholder type  Data collection method 

Consultations 
the 
through 
supporting 
study 

Replies  to  the 
Open  Public 
Consultation 

Member States 

Interview  or  survey  and  Open 
Public Consultation 

19 

24 

85 

 
 
Enforcement bodies  Interview  or  survey  and  Open 

24 

Public Consultation 

National  and  EU-
level 
consumer 
associations 

Interview  or  survey  (national) 
and  interview  (EU)  and  Open 
Public Consultation 

17 

National  and  EU-
level 
industry 
representatives 

Interview  or  survey  (national) 
and  interview  (EU)  and  Open 
Public Consultation 

33 

Creditors/businesses  Creditor survey and Open Public 
Consultation 

51 

12 

37 

35 

Consumers/Citizens  Consumer  survey  and  Open 

3,886 

108 

Others 

Total 

Public Consultation 

Interviews  and  Open  Public 
Consultation 

2 

18 

4,032 

234 

  The Open  Public Consultation  ran from January 2019 until  early April 2019. The 
questionnaire was tailored to two main categories of stakeholders, with a 1st section 
aimed  at  the  general  public  (i.e.  consumers)  and  a  2nd  section  geared  towards 
stakeholders  who  are  involved  in  the  implementation  of  the  Directive  or  who  have 
detailed knowledge of the functioning of the consumer credit market. 

  The  survey  and  interviews  carried  out  by  the  contractor  lasted  from  February  to 
May  2019  on  the  basis  of  targeted  questionnaires.  Specific  follow-up  consultations 
took place over the period June-August. 

  The  consumer  survey  received  3,886  responses  from  the  EU-28.  To  ensure  a 
representative  sample  of  EU  consumers,  the  survey  response  rates  are based  on  the 
size  of  the  Member  State  and  the  incidence  rate  of  consumer  credit  in  a  given 
Member State. Consumers were surveyed in 24 official languages. The results of the 
consumer  survey  were  weighted  according  to  the  population  size  of  the  Member 
States. 

  The online creditors’ survey received responses from 51 financial service providers, 
out  of a  total reach of approximately 900 to  1000 creditors which  were approached 
via different channels331. 

331  Around  600  creditors  were  contacted  directly,  others  were  reached  via  European  and  national 
representatives,  such  as  national  banking  associations  and  other  stakeholders  who  were  in  a  position  to 
contact their members. 

86 

 
 
 
 
                                                            
  A  full-day  conference  “Protecting  consumers  taking  credit  in  the  digital  era”  was 
organised by the Commission in collaboration with the think-tank CEPS on Tuesday 
18 June 2019. It comprised panels on a) the role of consumer credit in the economy; 
b)  the  scope  of  application  of  existing  rules;  c)  the  effectiveness  of  information 
disclosure;  and  d)  the  model  of  responsible  lending  in  the  digital  era.  The  event 
gathered  a  wide  range  of  140  relevant  stakeholders,  such  as  EU  and  national  high-
level  officials,  senior  practitioners,  academics  and  research  organisations,  and 
representatives of consumer associations and banks.  

  The  European  Economic  and  Social  Committee  (EESC)  contributed  to  the 
evaluation of the Directive by way of an information report in July 2019. The report 
is  based  on  consultations  with  30  civil  society  organisations  (CSOs)  and  national 
institutions.  Data  was  collected  through  fact-finding  missions,  a  questionnaire, 
position papers and an extended study group. 

  The contractor of the evaluation also made use of the outcomes and position papers 
produced  by  relevant  Commission  expert  groups,  most  notably  the  Financial 
Services  User  Group  (FSUG)  and  the  Member  State  experts’  group  on  the 
implementation of the CCD.   

  Other inputs were received by way of specific ad-hoc reports, data and contributions 

from consumer associations, industry representatives and researchers. 

The  evidence  collection  for  the  Staff  Working  Document  (SWD)  is  also  based  on  the 
Commission’s experience in monitoring and implementing the Directive. 

The evidence findings of an external support study prepared by ICF (Support study for 
the  evaluation  of  Directive  2008/48/EC)  fed  into  the  analysis  of  this  SWD.  The  study 
was  carried  out  under  close  guidance  of  DG  JUST.  As  such,  the  content  of  this  SWD 
does not deviate from the support study but only synthetize its main findings to fit with 
the length requirements of evaluation SWDs.  

EVIDENCE, SOURCES AND QUALITY 

The roadmap on the CCD Evaluation was published on the Commission’s website on 30 
June 2018 for a 4-week consultation period. It gathered 21 replies, coming from citizens 
(2), consumer associations (4), Member States (3), industry representatives (7) and other 
entities (5). 

Methodology and tools used to process the data 

The  surveys  of  creditors  and  consumers  were  carried  out  on  an  anonymous  basis  and 
their  results  were  processed  and  comprehensively  analysed.  The  stakeholder  interviews 
and  surveys  were  organised  on  the  basis  of  specifically  drafted  semi-structured 
questionnaires  (interviews)  and  an  online  questionnaire  (survey).  Stakeholders  were 
selected  based  on  their  role  and  relevance  to  the  evaluation  as  per  the  consultation 
strategy.  Careful  attention  was  given  to  ensure  a  balanced  representation  between 
(consumer 
Member  States 

represented  and  between 

stakeholder  categories 

87 

 
 
representatives,  creditors  and  other  relevant  business  representatives,  Member  States 
authorities).  EU-level  consumer  and  creditor  associations  were  also  asked  for  input  as 
well as assistance in reaching out to their members. Follow-up interviews were carried to 
clarify some input received through the stakeholder surveys. Replies to the Open Public 
Consultation were analysed separately and a separate report was published as a result332, 
however both the quantitative and qualitative dimension of the Open Public Consultation 
replies were taken into account in the overall evaluation.  

Main stakeholder feedback  

The  results  of  the  consultation  activities  were  used  according  to  the  evaluation 
framework.  For  each  of  the  evaluation  questions,  the  evaluation  framework  clarified 
which  of  the  consultation  activities  would  be  relevant  for  data  collection.  Main 
stakeholder  feedback  results  are  presented  below  by  consultation  strands,  concisely 
describing how they fed into the evaluation. The feeding of the consultation results into 
the  evaluation  is  then  presented  in  greater  detail  in  part  1.4  of  the  present  Synopsis 
Report,  depending  on  the  evaluation  criteria  (effectiveness,  efficiency,  relevance, 
coherence and EU added value): 

Open Public Consultation 

Almost  all  individual  respondents  had  obtained  credit  in  the  Member  State  where  they 
reside and had not tried to obtain credit in a different Member State. Contribution from 
individuals  showed  a  rather  high  level  of  familiarity  with  the  main  provisions  of  the 
Directive.  

Overall, a majority of respondents (among both individuals and stakeholders responding 
to the Open Public Consultation) considered the Directive to be effective in relation to its 
main  features.They  were  overall  very  positive  about  the  different  provisions  of  the 
Directive,  with  the  vast  majority  finding  the  provisions  of  the  Directive  somewhat 
beneficial or even very beneficial 

A great majority of respondents assessed positively the relevance of the Directive, albeit 
with  certain  nuances  (the  scope  of  the  Directive  and  the  provisions  dealing  with 
information disclosure were considered somewhat a bit less relevant than the others).  

The main benefits of the Directive highlighted by stakeholders are the higher standard of 
consumer protection it introduced in key areas (rights of early repayment and withdrawal 
for instance). Respondents in majority thought that benefits of the Directive outweighed 
the costs. 

The Directive perceived as coherent with the main relevant pieces of EU legislation by a 
majority of stakeholders.  

The overall perception of stakeholders is that the added value of the Directive lies in the 
increase of the level of consumer protection and should remain regulated at EU-level. 

332See: https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/initiatives/ares-2018-3472049/public-consultation_en  

88 

 
 
                                                            
“Protecting consumers taking credit in the digital era” 18th June 2019 event 

The  Directive  event  highlighted  a  number  of  different  views,  though  the  Directive  is 
perceived  as  relevant  and  that  consumers  need  a  high  level  of  protection.  There  was 
discussion  on  the  scope  of  the  Directive  and  the  fact  that  it  did  not  cover  certain 
problematic  credits.  Stakeholders  stressed  the  need  to  apply  the  same  regulation  to  the 
same  activity,  since  banks  and  non-banks  are  often  supervised  differently  in  Member 
States.  

The effectiveness of the Directive’s provisions on information disclosure was challenged: 
they  are  perceived  by  the  industry  as  a  burden  for  creditors  (especially  in  the  case  of 
advertising) whilst for consumers, they are considered to focus too much on the quantity 
rather than the quality of the information. They also do not sufficiently take into account 
the impact of digitalisation.  

Concerning responsible lending, some speakers stressed the need to ban certain products 
(particularly  pay-day  loans)  that  are  considered  toxic,  whereas  some  other  stakeholders 
(creditors,  credit  registers)  advocated  for  some  flexibility  in  how  creditworthiness 
assessment should be carried out. From their side, consumer representatives stressed that 
this exercise should be more “borrower-focused” and therefore more clearly spelled-out 
in the Directive. 

Targeted stakeholder consultations 

Consumer  associations  were  most  critical  of  creditworthiness  assessment  (CWA)  and 
Annual Percentage Rate of charge (APR). Their suggestions for improving the Directive 
effectiveness mainly were to cap interest rates, removing the EUR 200 threshold to also 
cover lower credits and peer-to-peer lending. Tighter rules or banning were put forward 
on  the  provision  of  credits  in  spite  of  a  negative  CWA,  revolving  credit  and  selling  of 
credit products to vulnerable consumers. Better enforcement, harmonising sanctions and 
clearer rules on advertising and pre-contractual information were also suggested as action 
points. 

Industry  representatives  considered  the  Directive  effective  in  protecting  consumers, 
although  they  believed  the  advertising  rules  to  be  ineffective,  due  to  information 
overload.  

A majority of national authorities (and enforcement bodies) argued that the Directive has 
been effective in ensuring a high level of consumer protection. While most provisions of 
the Directive were deemed effective, CWA generated some concerns.  

A  large  majority  of  respondents  across  the  board  also  praised  the  introduction  of  the 
Directive  as  it  resolved  issues  thanks  to  new  provisions/standards.  Several  respondents 
criticised the room given for Member State interpretation of Directive provisions.  

EESC information report 

This report concluded that the directive’s implementation and enforcement is considered 
to  be  insufficient,  also  because  of  the  fact  that  national  supervisory  authorities  lack 
sufficient resources and have ineffective sanctions. The report supported the expansion of 

89 

 
 
the  scope  of  the  Directive  to  credits  below  EUR  200,  coupled  with  the  inclusion  of  all 
types of credit and new forms of credit. Concerns were expressed about the Directive not 
ensuring a level playing field, due to consumer credit activities being confined to national 
borders  and  digitalisation  having  a  limited  impact  on  the  way  consumer  credit  is 
currently provided. Regarding pre-contractual information and advertising provisions, it 
was  noted  that  information  given  to  consumers  often  lacks  clarity,  with  consumers 
finding  it  too  complex  or  long.  Also  according  to  the  report,  CWAs  are  not  always 
properly  conducted  because  data  used  to  assess  the  consumer's  creditworthiness  is 
sometimes  irrelevant,  outdated,  or  comes  from  unreliable  providers.  Moreover,  the 
assessment  criteria  were  found  not  to  be  transparent  or  uniform  and,  at  times,  to  be 
discriminatory.  Finally,  it  was  noted  that  more  should  be  done  from  Member  States  in 
terms of financial education. 

FSUG opinion and recommendations 

The  FSUG  recommendations  are  along  the  lines  of  establishing  a  well-functioning  EU 
consumer  credit  market  in  which  creditors  and  intermediaries  act  responsibly  and  treat 
consumers fairly, and preventing excessive debt levels and over-indebtedness. Regarding 
the scope of the Directive, the FSUG supports its extension to credits below EUR 200. A 
review  of  the  list  of  credit  products  which  are  currently  exempted  from  the  Directive 
scope is deemed necessary, so as to ensure that there are as few exemptions as possible. 
Peer-to-peer  lending  should  be  included  in  the  scope  of  the  directive.  Other 
recommendations include: the introduction of rules on product oversight and governance 
for credit manufacturers and distributors; to ensure that credit advertising are effective; to 
align  the  Directive  rules  related  to  assessment  of  the  consumer’s  creditworthiness  with 
provisions  of  the  Mortgage  Credit  Directive;  to  introduce  obligations  for  creditors  to 
detect vulnerable consumers as early as possible; to define what is an acceptable default 
rate  within  a  risk  pool  for  all  credit  providers  and  to  ensure  that  national  competent 
authorities are well-equipped. 

Roadmap 

Attention  was  drawn  to  the  fact  that  an  increasingly  digitalised  market  undergoing 
continuous innovation creates both opportunities and risks for creditors and consumers. 
In this context, it was deemed necessary to evaluate whether the Directive rules are fit for 
purpose.  Replies  received  from  stakeholders  included  a  good  mix  of  consumers  & 
consumer associations, industry representatives and Member States. Stakeholders mainly 
provided  their  opinion  in  relation  to  three  aspects  covered  by  the  Evaluation  of  the 
Directive: scope, pre-contractual information and creditworthiness.  

FEEDING THE CONSULTATION RESULTS INTO THE EVALUATION BY APPLIED CRITERIA 

Effectiveness 

Consumer  associations  consider  the  APR  a  well-known  tool,  useful  for  comparison 
purposes. The majority of consumers surveyed are aware of the APR and its implications 
and  have  found  it  either  helpful  or  very  helpful  when  choosing  their  credit.  However, 

90 

 
 
consumers  struggle  to  understand  what  it  includes  under  the  ‘final  cost’  element.  Most 
associations  argued  that  the  way  in  which  the  APR  is  presented  by  some  creditors 
prevents  effective  comparison.  They  pointed  to  advertising  in  which  consumers  are 
misled  about  the  final  price,  or  when  ‘representative  examples’  are  calculated  in  an 
‘optimistic’ way.  

Industry  representatives  argued  that  the  definition  of  the  APR  is  confusing  for  both 
consumers and creditors. They pointed out that the formula is based on a yearly period, 
thus does not apply very well to short-term loans and can be difficult to interpret. Finally, 
the APR does not include default charges.  

Enforcement  bodies  similarly  agreed  on  the  complexity  of  APR  calculation  for 
consumers. A majority of national authorities argued that the introduction of the APR has 
facilitated  consumers’  understanding  of  the  offers  and  allowed  for  easier  comparisons. 
They did, however, agree that certain areas could be improved, in particular the exclusion 
of ancillary services and consumer understanding of what the APR includes.  

Consumer  associations  stated  that  credit  providers  are  -  generally  -  providing  the 
standard information required by the Directive. They identified several issues, however. 
For advertising, the main concerns are: information not provided in a clear and prominent 
way, standard information (e.g. total amount or duration) missing and information (e.g. 
representative  example)  presented 
in  a  misleading  manner.  Several  consumer 
associations  also  pointed  out  that  credit  advertisements  are  increasingly  targeted  at 
vulnerable consumers, thus promoting overall consumption while neglecting the possible 
impact  of  such  products.  For  pre-contractual  information,  the  main  issues  are:  late 
provision of the information (at the moment of signing or right before) and information 
not clear or concise enough to maximise understanding of the most relevant conditions.  

The adoption of the Directive is seen by consumer associations as having increased the 
amount  of  information  provided  in  advertisements  across  the  EU  (especially  the  APR) 
and  established  the  obligation  to  provide  standard  pre-contractual  information  through 
the  Standard  European  Consumer  Credit  Information  (SECCI),  which  did  not  exist  in 
some countries. The effectiveness of the relevant consumer protection obligations of the 
Directive is considered questionable, especially in relation to pre-contractual information. 
Even those who believe it has been effective agree that there is room for improvement. 
Consumer  associations  argued  that  there  is  a  need  to  ensure  clearer  information, 
presented in a more reader-friendly way (including by focusing only on the most relevant 
information), and clearer explanations by the credit provider. Limiting advertisements of 
consumer credit is also seen as necessary by some consumer associations. 

that  credit  providers  generally  comply  with 

the 
Industry  stakeholders  argued 
requirements  established  by  the  Directive.  However,  many  noted  that  advertising 
requirements  are  not  adapted  to  some  media  channels  and  pre-contractual  information 
requirements are similarly ill-suited to the digital era. Excessive information is, according 
to  them,  provided  at  both  advertising  and  pre-contractual  stage,  which  does  not  allow 
consumers  to  identify  and  retain  the  key  relevant  aspects.  Lack  of  flexibility  of  the 

91 

 
 
overall framework, imposing the same obligations on most consumer credit, regardless of 
the type and amount (and thus risk) was also flagged as an issue. The creditors’ survey 
revealed  that  around  70%  of  the  respondents  were  provided  the  standard  information 
required by the Directive at the advertisement stage. Over half of the creditors reported 
having increased the information provided to consumers in their advertising since 2008, 
namely the APR and total costs. Around 40% of the creditors reported facing obstacles in 
complying with the obligation to provide the standard information.  

Enforcement  authorities  reported  issues  of  compliance  with  the  obligations  to  provide 
information, especially in advertising and marketing. The main issue relates to the failure 
to provide the standard information in a clear and prominent manner in advertisements, 
especially  in  the  representative  examples.  Issues  with  the  provision  of  pre-contractual 
information  vary,  with  some  enforcement  bodies  reporting  that  information  is  not 
provided in a timely manner, while others complain about the failure of credit providers 
to provide adequate explanations, or to provide such information at all. Overall, national 
authorities  held  that  credit  providers  are  generally  complying  with  their  obligation  to 
provide  standard  information  at  advertising  and  pre-contractual  stage.  However,  many 
mentioned  that  key  information  is  often  not  prominently  displayed,  resulting  in 
misleading  advertisements,  especially  in  relation  to  fees  and  charges  applied.  Pre-
contractual  information  is  often  not  provided  in  a  timely  manner.  Pre-contractual 
information  is  also,  in  their  opinion,  not  sufficiently  clear  to  ensure  that  consumers 
understand  the  key  elements  and  conditions,  especially  in  relation  to  fees  and  risks. 
Opinions are divided on whether the provision of pre-contractual information is always 
the  adequate  tool  to  protect  consumers.  Many  called  for  a  reduction  in  the  amount  of 
information and more reader-friendly presentation. Some national authorities also called 
for stricter rules on targeted advertising. 

In the consumer survey, respondents had a positive overall opinion about the information 
provided at the advertising and pre-contractual stage. They reported that advertisements 
mostly  correspond  to  the  offer  and  that  the  information  provided  before  signing  the 
contract  is  useful,  timely  and  easy  to  understand,  allowing  them  to  compare  different 
credit  offers.  However,  awareness  of  the  SECCI  is  low  among  consumers  (33%).  The 
majority  of  those  who  are  aware  of  its  existence  were  provided  with  the  form  before 
signing the contract, but in most cases, this was done either the day before or on the day 
of the signing. Nevertheless, SECCI is seen as a useful tool to inform their choice. There 
is a low level of satisfaction with the information provided in advertisements, with only 
one-quarter believing it to be sufficient. 

Most consumer associations found that the right of withdrawal is nearly always or often 
respected  in  their  Member  State.  A  large  majority  of  industry  representatives  agreed. 
National authorities and enforcement bodies reported few issues, with some noting that 
the  right  of  withdrawal  from  linked  credit  agreements  was  unclear.  According  to  the 
majority  of  creditors,  less  than  1%  of  consumers  make  use  of  the  right  of  withdrawal. 
This is confirmed by the findings of the consumer survey. Most were aware of their right 

92 

 
 
of  withdrawal  and  were  informed  by  the  creditor  before  signing  the  credit  contract, 
although less than half knew that the deadline for withdrawal was 14 days. The majority 
of consumers did not report any issues in exercising their right of withdrawal, although 
approximately  one-third  of  those  who  tried  to  withdraw  the  contract  indicated  that  the 
creditor had made it difficult for them to withdraw from the contract. 

Similarly, the majority of consumer associations found that the right of early repayment 
was  always  or  very  often  respected  by  creditors  in  their  Member  State.  According  to 
several  industry  representatives,  all  aspects  need  to  be  considered  when  calculating  the 
maximum  level  of  early  repayment  fees,  and  they  noted  particular  difficulties  with  re-
financing.  Several  stakeholders  argued  that  more  proportionality  is  needed  in  early 
repayment fees, due to the large scope of the Directive. Enforcement bodies argued that 
undue  fees  were  charged  for  early  repayment,  or  that  the  fees  charged  were  excessive. 
For national authorities, the right of early repayment was found to function well across 
Member  States,  apart  from  some  issues  with  the  correct  calculation  of  the  fees.  The 
consumer  survey  pointed  out  that  around  one-quarter  of  consumers  had  tried  to  repay 
their  credit  early.  Consumers  are  highly  aware  of  their  right  of  early  repayment,  with 
most receiving relevant information before contracting the credit. In around one-third of 
cases, consumers indicated that their current loan had a penalty fee for repaying the loan 
earlier  than  agreed.  However,  close  to  half  stated  that  there  was  no  penalty  fee.  In  the 
majority of cases, consumers did not encounter any difficulties when trying to exercise 
their right of early repayment. 

Most  consumer  associations  were  doubtful  that  credit  providers  in  their  country 
consistently carry out creditworthiness assessment before concluding a credit agreement. 
Although they believe that CWA is effective in providing consumers with the credit most 
appropriate  for  them  and  combating  irresponsible  lending  and  over-indebtedness, 
consumers are often dissatisfied with the way CWA is performed. Key issues are the lack 
of  transparency  in  scoring  systems  and  the  data  they  are  based  on,  the  lack  of  both 
positive  and  negative  databases,  and  their  poor  quality.  In  their  opinion,  the  Directive 
would need to include more detail on how CWA should be performed and the data that 
should be used, as well as imposing an obligation to refuse credit to consumers scoring 
poorly.  

Industry representatives had mixed views on the CWA. Roughly half of respondents did 
not see any issues with the need to perform CWA, and the majority did not consider the 
differences  in  approach  between  Member  States  to  be  an  issue  -  in  fact,  they  saw  this 
flexibility as a positive element. Those that took issue with these differences mentioned 
difficulties in enforcing the provision, establishing jurisdiction in case of complaints, the 
purpose  of  databases  in  different  Member  States  (i.e.  the  use  of  either  ‘positive’  or 
‘negative’  data),  variation  in  the  type  of  information  used  in  such  databases,  and 
difficulties in accessing this information from other Member States.  

The majority of enforcement bodies identified issues with CWAs. They noted the lack of 
(or  limited)  compliance  with  the  requirement  to  collect  ‘sufficient  information’ 

93 

 
 
 
 
(including relying on publicly available information as opposed to information provided 
directly by the consumer) and the focus on assessing ability to repay ongoing costs rather 
than the total amount borrowed. According to them, the wording of the relevant Directive 
provision has created a lack of clarity with respect to CWA.  

National  authorities  were  evenly  divided,  with  half  arguing  that  the  obligation  to  carry 
out a CWA is in itself effective in ensuring that consumers obtain appropriate credit and 
another half highlighting as an issue the different approaches to CWA.    

Most  of  the  creditors  surveyed  underlined  that  creditworthiness  was  checked  by  the 
creditor  and  this  was  further  confirmed  by  the  consumer  survey.  Creditworthiness  was 
checked  mainly  through  income,  professional  status  and  household  composition.  More 
rarely,  it  was  checked  through  outstanding  household  credits,  household  expenses  and 
spouse’s income.  

Stakeholder opinions varied considerably on the functioning of the cross-border market. 
Opinions  on  whether  the  Directive  has  facilitated  cross-border  access  to  credit  are 
divided. Some argue that it has indeed facilitated access, claiming that it allows for easier 
comparison  of  offers.  Others  disagree,  stating  that  the  consumer  credit  market  remains 
markedly local and that the Directive has not managed to harmonise legal disparities. 

According to consumer associations, the main obstacles to the functioning of the cross-
border  consumer  credit  market  are  language  barriers,  lack  of  harmonisation  of 
insolvency/settlement  rules,  the  requirements  imposed  by  creditors  (e.g.  residence, 
documentation, employment) and the fact that the local offer is often sufficient. Industry 
representatives  often  argued  that  the  cross-border  market  for  consumer  credit  is  not 
sufficiently  developed.  The  fragmentation  of  legislation  across  the  EU  was  blamed  for 
preventing creditors from providing credit cross-border, with uneven implementation of 
the Directive and a lack of harmonisation of other rules relevant for creditors (e.g. fiscal 
and civil law, CWA rules, legal framework for debt recovery, and anti-money laundering 
obligations).  Other  important  obstacles  highlighted  were  difficulties  in  assessing  the 
creditworthiness  of  foreign  consumers  (due  to  data  access  challenges),  different 
consumption habits, lack of demand for cross-border credit, the need to acquire licences 
in  every  Member  State,  and  language  barriers.  Responses  from  the  creditor  survey 
pointed at the same obstacles. 

Two  enforcement  authorities  highlighted  issues  with  the  provision  of  credit  online, 
although  these  were  not  exclusively  related  to  credit  providers  established  in  another 
Member State (i.e. national or international credit providers were also implicated). Only 
three Member State authorities considered there to have been an increase in the number 
of  cross-border  operations  (or  increased  appetite  for  them)  since  the  adoption  of  the 
Directive.  Language  barriers  and  a  lack  of  harmonisation    were  the  main  obstacles 
highlighted.  A  lack  of  incentives  to  provide  credit  cross-border  (due  to  a  low  demand) 
was also mentioned.  

The consumer survey pointed out that the majority of consumers do not look for credit 
abroad. 

94 

 
 
 
Consumer associations argue that the Directive has contributed to increasing competition 
in the consumer credit market at national, with a smaller majority observing an impact at 
EU level. There were very limited views expressed on whether increased competition had 
led  to  improved  consumer  welfare,  with  only  one  noting  lower  prices.  By  contrast, 
another  stakeholder  mentioned  an  increase  in  aggressive  marketing  as  a  negative  result 
for  consumers.  A  small  majority  of  industry  stakeholders  argued  that  the  Directive  has 
had  no  impact  on  competition  at  national  level,  while  a  much  bigger  majority  believes 
that impact at EU level is positive. A majority of respondents believe that the Directive 
has had an impact on the credit market, particularly in respect of increased competition, 
greater supervision and greater cost transparency. 

Efficiency 

Consumers  associations  generally  argued  that  the  costs  generated  by  the  Directive  are 
proportionate to the benefits or that benefits outweighed costs, a view shared by national 
authorities. Both categories of stakeholders did not, however, express views on specific 
benefits or costs on each of the provisions. Industry stakeholders pointed to the fact that 
the  implementation  of  the  Directive  implied  additional  costs  (administrative  burden, 
compliance costs of elements such as information requirements, the right of withdrawal, 
the right of early repayment and the CWA) for them. Most industry stakeholders argued 
that the information requirements have added substantial costs to advertisements  to no 
effect, as they overloaded consumers which excessive information in certain sectors.  

Over half of the creditors responding to the survey did not have an opinion on whether 
the costs outweigh the benefits of the Directive. Those with an opinion, however, tended 
to believe that the costs are greater than the benefits. However, no evidence was provided 
as part of these consultations as to the extent of the costs incurred, or whether they were 
directly linked with the implementation of the Directive itself. 

Consumer  organisations’  opinions  on  whether  the  Directive  should  be  simplified  were 
divided.  Some  argued  that  a  simplification  of  the  legislation  (particularly  in  relation  to 
the  provision  of  information)  would  enable  consumers  to  better  understand  the 
information, as well as their rights. Others do not believe this is necessary and warn that 
any simplification should be careful not to lower consumer protection standards. Room 
for simplification was identified by most industry representatives interviewed. Examples 
related to further harmonisation of rules to avoid legal fragmentation across the EU and 
introducing a proportionality element allowing the level of detail of the information to be 
adapted  to  the  potential  risks  of  the  credit  product  at  hand.  Most  national  authorities 
believe  that  the  Directive  has  not  created  any  unnecessary  burden  and  that  there  is  no 
need for further simplification of the legislation.  

Coherence 

Relatively few views were expressed by interviewed stakeholders in regard to coherence 
of the Directive with its provisions and objectives, and in regards to other legislation. A 
few stakeholders (mainly national authorities and consumer associations) pointed out at 
the  different  wording  and  standards  in  the  Directive  compared  to  other  legislation,  in 

95 

 
 
particular  the  MCD.  They  pointed  out  that  better  alignment  of  the  provisions  could 
improve  the  implementation  of  both  Directives,  as  it  would  improve  legal  clarity  for 
Member  States  and  credit  providers  and  ensure  a  consistent  approach  to  protection  of 
consumers  against  over-indebtedness.  Some 
respondents,  essentially  consumer 
associations, also argued that  adding data  to  credit  databases is  not  done in  accordance 
with the GDPR and the equivalent transposition measure in that Member State. Internal 
coherence  issues  were  mentioned  by  several  enforcement  bodies.  One  pointed  to  risks 
with overrunning in overdrafts compared to revolving credit, arguing that overdrafts are 
subject to a light regime under the Directive, whereas revolving credit is not.  

Relevance 

Overall,  consumer  associations  believe  that  the  Directive  is  not  entirely  adapted  to 
current  market  needs.  They  made  particular  mention  of  the  Directive  thresholds, 
especially  the  minimum  one  (EUR  200)  as  inadequate.  Consumer  associations  also 
underlined  the  need  to  cover  new  market  players  (such  as  fintech  companies,  P2PL 
platforms  etc.),  leasing  contracts,  overdrafts  and  agreements  with  pawnshops.  They 
frequently criticised exemptions, in particular some types of credit falling outside of the 
scope of the Directive (i.e. zero-interest loans and overdraft facilities). In addition, they 
argued that credit intermediaries should be bound by the same rules as credit providers, at 
least  as  far  as  pre-contractual  information  and  data  collection  is  concerned.  They  also 
noted the need to adapt to the changes in consumer behaviour.  

Feedback  on  the  relevance  of  the  Directive  is  more  positive  among  industry 
representatives than among other stakeholder groups. Most negative views stem from the 
belief that the scope and definitions should be updated to ensure that all credit providers 
are  subject  to  the  same  rules,  including  the  newly  emerged  players  (e.g.  P2PL,  payday 
loan providers). Opinions of industry representatives on whether the Directive addresses 
current  needs  are  divided,  although  there  is  overall  consensus  that  it  is  not  adapted  to 
future  challenges  and  needs  (e.g.  emergence  of  new  business  practices  and  market 
players, changes in consumer behaviour).  

The only enforcement authorities to comment on the scope of application advocated for a 
broader scope to cover zero-interest rate loans, short-term credit and P2PL platforms and 
wider digital solutions, and potentially other credits that do not exist yet. Most national 
authorities  believe  that  the  scope  of  the  Directive  is  not  adapted  to  current  needs, 
especially the minimum threshold. Issues were identified in relation to the cross-selling 
of  a  payment  protection  insurance  (PPI),  with  consumers  often  nudged  to  purchase  it 
when obtaining credit. PPIs can entail disguised high costs which are not included in the 
calculation  of  the  APR.  One  group  of  national  authorities  advocated  for  an  overall 
revision  of  the  scope  to  ensure  that  only  justifiable  exemptions  apply.  The  majority  of 
national authorities believe that the Directive addresses current but not future challenges. 
The main shortcomings highlighted relate to the developments in the market as a result of 
digitalisation. Other issues to address in the future concern the establishment of stricter 
rules on CWA and the APR. 

96 

 
 
Specifically  in  terms  of  definitions,  consumer  associations  deemed  the  definitions  of 
credit,  credit  agreement,  credit  intermediary  and  total  amount  of  credit  to  be  relevant. 
However, some associations believe that the definition of creditor and credit intermediary 
should be broadened to include entities not currently explicitly covered by the Directive. 
Similar  to  the  consumer  associations,  most  industry  representatives  consider  the 
definitions  to  be  relevant  and  sufficient,  with  a  small  group  pointed  out  that  the 
definitions of creditor and credit intermediaries should be slightly modified or clarified. 
For  most  national  authorities,  the  definitions  of  creditor,  credit  agreement,  credit 
intermediary and total amount of credit were argued to be relevant and adapted to current 
needs.  A  few  national  authorities  also  indicated  that  the  definition  of  ‘total  cost  of  the 
credit to the consumer’ does not clearly stipulate the charges that need to be taken into 
account.  Further  clarification  of  other  terms  were  requested  by  individual  national 
authorities,  such  as  ‘linked  credit  agreement’,  ‘free  of  charge’,  ‘overdraft  facility  or 
overrunning’,  ‘in  good  time’,  ‘means  of  distant  communication’,  ‘consumer’,  ‘goods-
linked credit’, and ‘ancillary services’. 

EU added value 

Most  consumer  associations  agreed  that  taking  EU-level  action  has  contributed  to 
creating  a  level  playing  field  among  EU  Member  States  as  it  harmonised  rules  for 
consumers  and  creditors,  which,  in  turn,  reduced  the  disparities  between  countries.  A 
lack of equally effective supervision was mentioned as one of the reasons behind the lack 
of  harmonisation  across  the  EU.  Nearly  all  consumer  associations  agreed  that,  overall, 
there  was  added  value  in  enacting  EU-level  legislation  in  the  field  of  consumer  credit. 
This added value was identified as stronger consumer protection, a varied credit offer and 
a (more) harmonised market. Industry representatives likewise generally agreed that there 
is  added  value  in  adopting  legislation  at  EU  level,  citing  harmonised  procedures  and 
rules, establishing a level playing field, greater consumer protection, a possible increase 
in cross-border trade and more transparency for consumers. 

A  majority  of  industry  stakeholders  did  not  give  an  opinion  on  whether  EU  level 
legislation has helped to create a level playing field. Those that argued for the absence of 
a  level  playing  field  pointed  to  the  lack  of  harmonisation  in  civil  law,  lack  of  a  cross-
border market, and room for interpretation in implementing the Directive.  

Almost all enforcement bodies agreed that EU-level action contributes to a level playing 
field  because  companies  are  required  to  comply  with  the  same  basic  requirements. 
Similarly,  the  majority  of  national  authorities  held  that  taking  EU-level  action 
contributed  to  creating  a  level  playing  field  among  EU  Member  States  in  the  field  of 
consumer  credit  either  to  a  great  or  to  some  extent.  A  small  number  of  respondents 
identified  better  functioning  of  the  internal  market  as  an  added  value  delivered  by  the 
Directive.  The  majority  of  enforcement  bodies  argued  there  is  added  value  in  enacting 
legislation in this area as it helps to provide redress to consumers who, ultimately, face 
similar  issues  across  the  EU.  They  went  on  to  argue  that  harmonised  rules  foster 
competition  and  close  legislative  gaps  in  certain  Member  States.  Most  national 

97 

 
 
 
authorities agreed that there is added value in adopting EU-level legislation in the area of 
consumer credit, citing better consumer protection and improved competition.  

98 

 
 
 
 
Annex 3: Methods and Analytical models used in preparing the evaluation 

This annex provides a description of the approach followed to quantify the main benefits 
and costs to consumers, financial providers and public authorities that can be attributed to 
the Consumer Credit Directive (‘CCD’ or ‘the Directive’) since its introduction in 2008. 

Benefits 

According to its two main objectives the Directive should bring the following benefits: 

  Ensure  a  better  protection  of  the  EU  consumers  which  in  turn  leads  to  a  lower 
consumer detriment (possible due to a lower incidence rate of problems and a lower 
magnitude) and to an increase in demand for consumer credit; 

  Enhancing  a  level  playing  field  potentially  leading  to  an  increase  in  cross-border 

transaction of consumer credit. 

Our research shows that the Directive had an impact on increasing consumer protection. 
On the other hand, the evaluation did not find hard evidence that changes in the demand 
or supply of consumer credit products can be directly attributed to Directive (including 
cross-border activities). Consequently, only the impact of the Directive on the reduction 
of consumer personal detriment was quantified. 

Reduction of personal detriment 

Personal detriment refers to loss of welfare experienced by individuals due to problems 
that  occur  after  the  purchase  and  that  were  not  expected  (based  on  reasonable 
expectations).  Personal  detriment  includes  financial  and  non-financial  losses  (e.g.,  time 
losses, psychological detriment). 

Due  to  various  factors,  the  consumer  detriment  was  reduced  in  most  of  the  EU28 
Member States since 2010. It is assumed, based on deductive reasoning with the team of 
internal experts, that 22.5% of that change was due to Directive (i.e., incremental effect 
of Directive). This is done by taking into account the key factors that have played a role 
in reducing consumer detriment since 2008 and considering their weight: 

  Development and trends of the credit sector itself: 25% 

  More  stringent  legislation  in  some  MS,  and  improved  enforcement  (so 

 

 

 

government-induced): 15% 

Increase in sector compliance over time: 10% 

Increase in financial literacy among consumers: 5% 

Increase in consumer awareness of APR, SECCI and contractual terms in terms of 
consumer credit (as unchanged for 10 years now): 10% 

  National-level campaigns in boosting consumer awareness: 5% 

  Other legislation and other factors: 7.5% 

99 

 
 
 
There  were  no  indications  of  the  weight  of  the  Directive  in  the  reduction  of  personal 
detriment  (the  benefit).  The  results  have  been  based  on  expert  judgement,  and 
considering the likely weight of different factors in the reduction of personal detriment. 
The  figures  for  calculating  personal  detriment  are  based  on  the  CIVIC  study333  (see 
below)  and  are  very  robust.  The  estimate  of  the  detriment  that  can  be  attributed  to  the 
Directive  is,  as  indicated,  based  on  deduction  and  in  itself  moderately  robust.  The  first 
element in assessing the weight included listing the factors that played a role in reducing 
detriment. The second element was a qualitative assessment (narrative, description) and 
quantitative  assessment  (rating)  of  its  importance.  On  this  basis,  the  above  percentages 
were  derived  by  ranking  these  factors.  The  data  is,  nonetheless,  moderately  robust 
because there is a fairly high probability that a Directive in a policy area is never the only 
or  deciding  factor  for  attribution  of  change,  and  therefore  the  weighting  would  not  be 
considered  to  exceed  30-40%.  At  the  same  time,  the  pace  of  changes  in  the  sector 
(supply)  and  demand-driven  changes  have  further  reduced  the  unique  role  of  the 
Directive.  It  was  also  derived  to  be  unlikely  for  the  value  of  the  attribution  to  the 
Directive  to  be  below  10-15%  following  the  qualitative  and  quantitative  assessment  of 
the  key  elements  above  (and  confirmed  by  stakeholder  consultations,  which  led  to  the 
conclusion that the Directive has a non-negligible attribution, rated to be above 15-20% 
as a result). In any case, any attribution of 20% to 30% all generated positive consumer 
detriment. The initial consideration of a range of benefit of 20% to 30% show this. For 
the Final Report this was specified to be a conservative estimate of 22.5% (at the lower 
end of this range), consistently showing benefits to be similar to or outweigh costs across 
the entire range of 20-30%.  

Below  the  approach  followed  to  calculate  the  variation  in  consumer  detriment  and  the 
incremental  effect  of  the  Directive  (assuming  beginning  of  2010  as  baseline)  since  its 
transposition is described. 

Step 1. Estimate the average magnitude of consumer personal financial detriment per problem. 

The estimation of the average magnitude of the consumer of personal financial  detriment 
suffered  by  an  individual  due  to  a  problem  (i.e.,  magnitude  of  the  financial  detriment) 
considered the data reported in the CIVIC (2017) for the consumer detriment for “Loans, 
credit and credit cards” in the year 2017 for the following countries: UK, Poland, France 
and Italy. This was extrapolated for each of the other EU28 countries as described below. 

Table 1 - Magnitude of financial detriment  

Country 

Magnitude 

(post- redress,  

€, prices 2017) 

Used to estimate EU 
countries in the following 
regions 

France 

108 

Western Europe 

333  Civic  Consulting  (for  the  European  Commission),  “Study  on  Measuring  Consumer  Detriment  in  the 

European Union”, 2017. 

100 

 
 
                                                            
Italy 

Poland 

UK 

187 

176 

144 

Southern Europe 

Eastern Europe 

Northern Europe 

The magnitude of the financial detriment in the period 2010-2018 was adjusted based on 
the  Consumer  Markets  Scoreboard  data  on  “Extent  of  detriment  suffered  as  a  result  of 
problems experienced with products/services or supplier/retailer”334. 

Table  2  -  Severity  of  consumer  problems  in  the  period  2010-2017  (scale  0-10,  where  0  is  low 
severity and 10 high severity) 

2010 

2011 

2012 

2013 

2014 

2015 

2016 

2017 

2018 

 Austria  

 Belgium  

 Bulgaria  

 Croatia  

9.37 

9.20 

5.33 

6.71 

8.60 

8.46 

5.50 

6.54 

 Cyprus  

10.94 

10.09 

 Czech 
Republic  

 Denmark  

7.64 

7.00 

7.35 

6.62 

7.88 

7.77 

5.66 

6.38 

9.32 

7.07 

6.27 

 Estonia  

24.31 

17.72 

12.91 

 Finland  

 France  

 Germany  

 Greece  

 Hungary  

 Ireland  

 Italy  

 Latvia  

3.71 

8.30 

9.76 

9.88 

7.18 

6.47 

4.06 

6.93 

 Lithuania  

2.12 

Luxembourg   10.43 

 Malta  

2.16 

 Netherlands   3.73 

 Poland  

 Portugal  

 Romania  

6.55 

8.34 

4.78 

 Slovakia  

10.30 

 Slovenia  

7.75 

3.70 

8.00 

9.09 

9.22 

7.01 

6.20 

4.22 

6.78 

2.49 

9.76 

2.58 

3.81 

6.42 

7.90 

5.02 

9.16 

7.31 

3.70 

7.71 

8.46 

8.60 

6.85 

5.94 

4.39 

6.63 

2.91 

9.13 

3.09 

3.89 

6.30 

7.48 

5.29 

8.15 

6.90 

7.23 

7.14 

5.83 

6.22 

8.60 

6.80 

5.94 

9.41 

3.69 

7.43 

7.87 

8.02 

6.69 

5.69 

4.56 

6.48 

3.42 

8.54 

3.69 

3.98 

6.17 

7.09 

5.56 

7.25 

6.51 

6.63 

6.56 

6.01 

6.06 

7.93 

6.54 

5.62 

6.85 

3.68 

7.16 

7.33 

7.49 

6.54 

5.45 

4.74 

6.34 

4.00 

7.99 

4.42 

4.06 

6.05 

6.72 

5.85 

6.45 

6.15 

6.07 

6.03 

6.19 

5.91 

7.32 

6.30 

5.33 

5.00 

3.68 

6.90 

6.82 

6.98 

6.39 

5.22 

4.93 

6.20 

4.69 

7.47 

5.29 

4.15 

5.93 

6.36 

6.15 

5.73 

5.80 

5.57 

5.54 

6.38 

5.77 

6.76 

6.06 

5.04 

3.64 

3.67 

6.64 

6.35 

6.52 

6.24 

5.00 

5.13 

6.06 

5.50 

6.99 

6.33 

4.24 

5.82 

6.03 

6.47 

5.10 

5.48 

5.07 

5.05 

6.57 

5.62 

6.19 

5.82 

4.76 

2.28 

3.66 

6.39 

5.87 

6.05 

6.09 

4.78 

5.32 

5.92 

6.31 

6.51 

7.36 

4.33 

5.70 

5.69 

6.79 

4.47 

5.15 

4.61 

4.61 

6.76 

5.48 

5.68 

5.59 

4.49 

1.43 

3.65 

6.15 

5.44 

5.61 

5.95 

4.56 

5.52 

5.79 

7.24 

6.06 

8.57 

4.42 

5.58 

5.38 

7.13 

3.91 

4.85 

334 By assuming that the magnitude changed proportionally to the extent of detriment 

101 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
 Spain  

 Sweden  

 United 
Kingdom  

6.22 

0.88 

6.25 

1.06 

6.27 

1.28 

6.29 

1.55 

6.32 

1.87 

6.34 

2.26 

6.37 

2.74 

6.39 

3.21 

6.42 

3.76 

5.69 

5.61 

5.54 

5.46 

5.39 

5.31 

5.24 

5.17 

5.10 

Source: extrapolation based on Consumer Markets Scoreboard - *a liner regression was used to 
estimate the value for 2018, as the data for 2017 is the latest available  

The magnitude of the financial detriment for each EU MS is presented below.  

Table 3 - Magnitude of financial detriment 2010-2018 (euros at prices 2017) 

2010 

2011 

2012 

2013 

2014 

2015 

2016 

2017 

2018 

 Austria  

122.82 

119.68 

116.62 

113.64 

110.73 

107.90 

105.14 

102.38 

99.70 

 Belgium  

166.50 

152.67 

139.98 

128.35 

117.68 

107.90 

98.93 

89.97 

81.81 

 Bulgaria  

269.04 

247.24 

227.19 

208.78 

191.85 

176.30 

162.01 

147.72 

134.69 

 Croatia  

160.96 

165.85 

170.88 

176.06 

181.40 

186.90 

192.57 

198.24 

204.07 

 Cyprus  

211.89 

206.64 

201.52 

196.52 

191.65 

186.90 

182.27 

177.63 

173.12 

 Czech 
Republic  

263.33 

243.02 

224.29 

206.99 

191.03 

176.30 

162.71 

149.11 

136.65 

 Denmark  

175.32 

168.64 

162.23 

156.05 

150.11 

144.40 

138.90 

133.41 

128.13 

 Estonia  

189.69 

179.62 

170.08 

161.05 

152.50 

144.40 

136.73 

129.07 

121.83 

 Finland  

702.78 

512.12 

373.18 

271.94 

198.16 

144.40 

105.22 

66.05 

41.46 

 France  

108.93 

108.72 

108.51 

108.31 

108.10 

107.90 

107.70 

107.49 

107.29 

 Germany  

129.85 

125.13 

120.58 

116.20 

111.97 

107.90 

103.98 

100.05 

96.28 

 Greece  

267.58 

249.05 

231.80 

215.75 

200.81 

186.90 

173.96 

161.01 

149.03 

 Hungary  

249.36 

232.66 

217.07 

202.53 

188.96 

176.30 

164.49 

152.68 

141.71 

 Ireland  

162.32 

158.57 

154.90 

151.32 

147.82 

144.40 

141.06 

137.72 

134.46 

 Italy  

231.92 

222.12 

212.74 

203.75 

195.14 

186.90 

179.00 

171.11 

163.56 

 Latvia  

118.83 

123.55 

128.46 

133.57 

138.88 

144.40 

150.14 

155.88 

161.84 

 Lithuania  

161.48 

157.91 

154.42 

151.00 

147.66 

144.40 

141.21 

138.02 

134.90 

Luxembourg  48.75 

57.14 

66.98 

78.52 

92.05 

107.90 

126.49 

145.07 

166.39 

 Malta  

260.76 

243.95 

228.24 

213.53 

199.77 

186.90 

174.86 

162.82 

151.60 

 Netherlands   44.02 

52.66 

63.01 

75.38 

90.19 

107.90 

129.09 

150.28 

174.96 

 Poland  

158.30 

161.74 

165.27 

168.87 

172.54 

176.30 

180.14 

183.98 

187.90 

 Portugal  

206.46 

202.39 

198.40 

194.49 

190.66 

186.90 

183.22 

179.53 

175.92 

 Romania  

230.95 

218.81 

207.31 

196.41 

186.08 

176.30 

167.03 

157.76 

149.01 

 Slovakia  

136.80 

143.92 

151.41 

159.29 

167.58 

176.30 

185.48 

194.65 

204.28 

 Slovenia  

335.61 

298.53 

265.55 

236.21 

210.11 

186.90 

166.25 

145.60 

127.52 

 Spain  

249.47 

235.47 

222.26 

209.79 

198.01 

186.90 

176.41 

165.92 

156.06 

 Sweden  

141.69 

142.23 

142.77 

143.31 

143.85 

144.40 

144.95 

145.50 

146.05 

 United 

55.87 

67.55 

81.68 

98.76 

119.42 

144.40 

174.60 

204.81 

240.23 

102 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Kingdom  

Source: own calculations based on MMS and Civic (2017) 

Step 2. Estimate the average time loss per problem 

The  estimation  of  the  time  loss  per  problem  (see  below)  was  done  based  on  the  data 
reported  in  CIVIC  (2017).  The  number  of  hours  for  the  period  2010-2018  was 
extrapolated using the data from Consumer Markets Scoreboard on “Extent of detriment 
suffered  as  a 
result  of  problems  experienced  with  products/services  or 
supplier/retailer”335. 

The estimation of time losses and the monetisation of time losses (i.e., by using hourly 
earnings for monetising time losses) followed the methodology for measuring consumer 
detriment  developed  by  CIVIC  (2017)  for  DG  JUST  –  “(…)  a  detailed  step-by-step 
operational guidance to guide scientifically sound and resource efficient assessments of 
personal  consumer  detriment  in  markets  across  the  EU”.  The  methodologies  covers 
financial detriment, time loss and psychological detriment. 

According to the CIVIC study, time losses for 2016 were estimated based on statements 
from  consumers  collected  through  surveys  to  consumers.  In  the  Consumer  Credit 
Directive evaluation supporting study, those time losses were extrapolated to other years 
based  on  the  data  on  incidence  rates  of  consumer  complaints  from  the  “markets 
scoreboards”.  The  underlying  assumption  was  that  time  losses  are  proportional  to  the 
incidence rate of problems. 

There  are  alternative  ways  to  monetise  the  “value  of  time”  (e.g.,  using  stated 
preferences”),  all  with  limitations.  The  CIVIC  study  discusses  those  approaches  and 
respective  limitations  thoroughly  and  ends  up  proposing  the  use  of  average  earnings 
(highlighting  that,  for  example,  one  limitation  might  be  that  people  may  value  their 
leisure time and working time differently).  

Table 4 - Time losses 2010-2018 (number of hours per problem) 

2010 

2011 

2012 

2013 

2014 

2015 

2016 

2017 

 EU28 

 Austria  

 Belgium  

 Bulgaria  

 Croatia  

7.42 

9.46 

9.29 

5.39 

6.77 

6.94 

8.68 

8.54 

5.55 

6.60 

 Cyprus  

11.04 

10.19 

6.55 

7.96 

7.85 

5.72 

6.44 

9.40 

6.24 

7.29 

7.21 

5.89 

6.28 

8.68 

5.99 

6.69 

6.63 

6.07 

6.12 

8.01 

5.80 

6.13 

6.09 

6.25 

5.97 

7.39 

5.65 

5.62 

5.59 

6.44 

5.82 

6.82 

5.5 

5.1 

5.1 

6.6 

5.7 

6.3 

 Czech 
Republic  

7.72 

7.42 

7.14 

6.87 

6.61 

6.36 

6.11 

5.9 

2018 

5.40 

4.6 

4.7 

6.8 

5.5 

5.7 

5.6 

335 By assuming that the time losses changed proportionally to the extent of detriment. 

103 

 
 
 
 
                                                            
 Denmark  

7.06 

6.69 

6.33 

 Estonia  

24.54 

17.88 

13.03 

 Finland  

 France  

3.75 

8.38 

 Germany  

9.86 

 Greece  

 Hungary  

 Ireland  

 Italy  

 Latvia  

9.97 

7.25 

6.53 

4.09 

7.00 

 Lithuania  

2.14 

Luxembourg   10.53 

 Malta  

2.18 

 Netherlands   3.76 

 Poland  

 Portugal  

 Romania  

6.62 

8.41 

4.82 

 Slovakia  

10.39 

7.82 

6.28 

0.88 

 Slovenia  

 Spain  

 Sweden  

 United 
Kingdom  

3.74 

8.07 

9.17 

9.31 

7.08 

6.26 

4.26 

6.84 

2.51 

9.85 

2.61 

3.84 

6.49 

7.97 

5.07 

9.25 

7.38 

6.31 

1.07 

3.73 

7.78 

8.54 

8.68 

6.91 

5.99 

4.43 

6.69 

2.94 

9.21 

3.12 

3.93 

6.36 

7.55 

5.34 

8.22 

6.97 

6.33 

1.29 

6.00 

9.50 

3.72 

7.50 

7.95 

8.10 

6.75 

5.74 

4.60 

6.54 

3.45 

8.62 

3.73 

4.01 

6.23 

7.16 

5.61 

7.32 

6.58 

6.35 

1.56 

5.68 

6.92 

3.72 

7.22 

7.40 

7.56 

6.60 

5.50 

4.79 

6.40 

4.04 

8.07 

4.46 

4.10 

6.11 

6.78 

5.91 

6.51 

6.21 

6.38 

1.89 

5.38 

5.04 

3.71 

6.96 

6.88 

7.05 

6.45 

5.27 

4.98 

6.26 

4.74 

7.55 

5.34 

4.19 

5.99 

6.42 

6.21 

5.79 

5.86 

6.40 

2.28 

5.09 

3.67 

3.70 

6.71 

6.41 

6.58 

6.30 

5.04 

5.17 

6.12 

5.56 

7.06 

6.39 

4.28 

5.87 

6.09 

6.54 

5.15 

5.53 

6.43 

2.76 

4.8 

2.3 

3.7 

6.5 

5.9 

6.1 

6.1 

4.8 

5.4 

6.0 

6.4 

6.6 

7.4 

4.4 

5.8 

5.7 

6.9 

4.5 

5.2 

6.5 

3.2 

4.5 

1.4 

3.7 

6.2 

5.5 

5.7 

6.0 

4.6 

5.6 

5.8 

7.3 

6.1 

8.7 

4.5 

5.6 

5.4 

7.2 

3.9 

4.9 

6.5 

3.8 

5.1 

5.74 

5.66 

5.59 

5.51 

5.44 

5.36 

5.29 

5.2 

The consumer detriment resulting from time losses was monetised using the mean hourly 
earnings for each country in 2010336 (see below).  

Table 5 - Monetised time losses per country (million of euros, 2010 prices) 

MS 

 EU  

2010 

69.58 

2011 

65.72 

2012 

62.39 

2013 

59.53 

 Austria  

122.65 

112.45 

103.11 

94.54 

2014 

57.07 

86.68 

2015 

54.98 

79.48 

 Belgium  

152.55 

140.19 

128.82 

118.38 

108.78 

99.96 

 Bulgaria  

8.19 

8.43 

 Croatia  

32.90 

32.08 

 Cyprus  

101.47 

93.64 

8.69 

31.29 

86.42 

8.95 

30.51 

79.76 

9.22 

29.76 

73.61 

9.50 

29.02 

67.93 

2016 

53.24 

72.87 

91.86 

9.79 

28.30 

62.69 

2017 

51.50 

66.27 

83.76 

10.08 

27.58 

57.46 

2018 

50.11 

60.26 

76.37 

10.38 

26.88 

52.66 

336 Eurostat dataset: earn_ses_pub2s. 

104 

 
 
 
 
                                                            
 Czech 
Republic  

35.42 

34.07 

32.77 

31.53 

30.33 

29.17 

28.06 

26.95 

25.89 

 Denmark  

174.52 

165.25 

156.48 

148.17 

140.30 

132.85 

125.80 

118.74 

112.08 

 Estonia  

100.38 

73.15 

 Finland  

59.79 

59.67 

53.30 

59.56 

38.84 

59.45 

28.30 

59.34 

 France  

115.10 

110.91 

106.88 

102.99 

99.25 

20.62 

59.22 

95.64 

15.03 

59.11 

92.16 

 Germany  

151.69 

141.18 

131.40 

122.30 

113.83 

105.95 

98.61 

 Greece  

90.36 

 Hungary  

24.35 

84.31 

23.78 

78.66 

23.23 

73.39 

22.70 

68.47 

22.17 

63.88 

21.66 

 Ireland  

119.25 

114.21 

109.39 

104.77 

100.34 

96.10 

 Italy  

 Latvia  

48.61 

19.94 

 Lithuania  

5.76 

50.54 

19.50 

6.75 

52.55 

19.07 

7.91 

54.64 

18.65 

9.28 

56.81 

18.24 

10.88 

59.07 

17.83 

12.75 

59.60 

21.16 

92.04 

61.41 

17.44 

14.95 

9.43 

59.00 

88.69 

91.27 

55.33 

20.66 

87.98 

63.76 

17.04 

17.14 

5.92 

58.89 

85.34 

84.48 

51.35 

20.17 

84.10 

66.20 

16.66 

19.66 

Luxembourg   187.70 

175.60 

164.29 

153.70 

143.80 

134.53 

125.87 

117.20 

109.13 

 Malta  

16.25 

 Netherlands   58.06 

 Poland  

26.60 

 Portugal  

42.58 

 Romania  

9.35 

 Slovakia  

40.85 

 Slovenia  

56.30 

59.12 

14.08 

 Spain  

 Sweden  

 United 
Kingdom  

19.44 

59.32 

26.07 

40.34 

9.84 

36.34 

53.14 

59.35 

17.03 

23.25 

60.61 

25.56 

38.22 

10.35 

32.32 

50.16 

59.57 

20.59 

27.82 

61.93 

25.05 

36.21 

10.89 

28.75 

47.34 

59.80 

24.90 

33.28 

63.28 

24.56 

34.31 

11.46 

25.57 

44.69 

60.03 

30.10 

39.82 

64.66 

24.08 

32.50 

12.05 

22.75 

42.18 

60.25 

36.40 

47.64 

66.07 

23.60 

30.79 

12.68 

20.24 

39.81 

60.48 

44.01 

55.46 

67.47 

23.13 

29.08 

13.31 

17.72 

37.45 

60.71 

51.63 

64.57 

68.91 

22.66 

27.47 

13.97 

15.52 

35.22 

60.94 

60.56 

74.59 

73.58 

72.58 

71.60 

70.64 

69.68 

68.74 

67.80 

66.87 

Step 3. Estimate rate of problems per purchase 

The calculation of the problem rate was based on the Consumer Markets Scoreboard data 
on  “Percentage  of  people  who  experienced  at  least  one  problem”  for  the  period  2010-
2017.  The  extrapolation  for  2018  was  done  based  on  a  linear  regression.  See  results 
below. 

Table 6 - Rate of problems 2010-2018 

2010 

2011 

2012 

2013 

2014 

2015 

2016 

2017 

2018 

Austria 

Belgium 

Bulgaria 

Croatia 

16% 

13% 

20% 

18% 

11% 

11% 

20% 

18% 

11% 

10% 

21% 

18% 

7% 

8% 

19% 

18% 

105 

6% 

7% 

17% 

16% 

4% 

6% 

15% 

14% 

4% 

6% 

15% 

12% 

5% 

7% 

15% 

10% 

5% 

7% 

14% 

8% 

 
 
 
 
 
Cyprus 

9% 

2% 

-2% 

5% 

8% 

12% 

12% 

12% 

13% 

Czech 
Republic 

Denmark 

Estonia 

Finland 

France 

Germany 

Greece 

Hungary 

Ireland 

Italy 

Latvia 

Lithuania 

14% 

11% 

11% 

10% 

8% 

10% 

19% 

42% 

28% 

11% 

11% 

24% 

Luxembourg  10% 

Malta 

4% 

Netherlands  15% 

23% 

17% 

28% 

15% 

11% 

25% 

6% 

Poland 

Portugal 

Romania 

Slovakia 

Slovenia 

Spain 

Sweden 

United 
Kingdom 

13% 

9% 

10% 

5% 

11% 

12% 

22% 

40% 

15% 

11% 

10% 

26% 

8% 

-3% 

9% 

20% 

17% 

24% 

12% 

13% 

26% 

5% 

15% 

12% 

12% 

11% 

13% 

14% 

16% 

8% 

9% 

4% 

9% 

13% 

17% 

44% 

18% 

8% 

5% 

22% 

9% 

-4% 

11% 

22% 

23% 

24% 

9% 

13% 

30% 

5% 

8% 

7% 

7% 

6% 

9% 

12% 

33% 

16% 

7% 

8% 

8% 

5% 

6% 

4% 

7% 

10% 

24% 

13% 

7% 

8% 

16% 

12% 

8% 

3% 

8% 

19% 

13% 

19% 

10% 

9% 

26% 

6% 

7% 

6% 

6% 

16% 

10% 

15% 

11% 

7% 

24% 

6% 

8% 

3% 

6% 

2% 

5% 

8% 

14% 

11% 

7% 

8% 

8% 

5% 

8% 

4% 

13% 

7% 

12% 

12% 

5% 

22% 

6% 

8% 

2% 

5% 

2% 

4% 

9% 

11% 

9% 

7% 

6% 

7% 

4% 

8% 

4% 

12% 

8% 

12% 

12% 

4% 

21% 

6% 

8% 

1% 

4% 

2% 

4% 

8% 

0% 

3% 

2% 

3% 

10% 

11% 

7% 

7% 

7% 

5% 

6% 

3% 

7% 

4% 

11% 

9% 

12% 

12% 

4% 

20% 

6% 

5% 

6% 

7% 

4% 

5% 

2% 

7% 

3% 

9% 

11% 

11% 

12% 

3% 

18% 

5% 

35% 

19% 

17% 

13% 

10% 

8% 

7% 

7% 

7% 

Step 4. Estimate the market penetration. 

The  number  of  purchases  of  consumer  credit  products  was  estimated  based  on  the 
Eurobarometer  data  (2003,  2011,  2016)  on  the  percentage  of  respondents  that  have 
purchased at least one loan, credit or credit card (see below). 

Table 7 - Market penetration of consumer credit 2010-2018 

2010 

2011 

2012 

2013 

2014 

2015 

2016 

2017 

2018 

 Austria  

 Belgium  

 Bulgaria  

 Croatia  

 Cyprus  

40% 

31% 

25% 

38% 

39% 

40% 

31% 

25% 

38% 

39% 

40% 

31% 

25% 

38% 

39% 

40% 

31% 

25% 

38% 

39% 

106 

56% 

34% 

29% 

36% 

42% 

72% 

37% 

33% 

33% 

45% 

66% 

33% 

29% 

33% 

38% 

60% 

28% 

25% 

33% 

30% 

55% 

25% 

22% 

33% 

25% 

 
 
 
 
 Czech 
Republic  

20% 

 Denmark  

34% 

 Estonia  

 Finland  

 France  

29% 

42% 

40% 

 Germany  

47% 

 Greece  

 Hungary  

 Ireland  

 Italy  

 Latvia  

29% 

18% 

38% 

33% 

26% 

 Lithuania  

26% 

Luxembourg   56% 

 Malta  

43% 

Netherlands   25% 

26% 

23% 

26% 

25% 

26% 

25% 

33% 

 Poland  

 Portugal  

 Romania  

 Slovakia  

 Slovenia  

 Spain  

 Sweden  

 United 
Kingdom  

20% 

34% 

29% 

42% 

40% 

47% 

29% 

18% 

38% 

33% 

26% 

26% 

56% 

43% 

25% 

26% 

23% 

26% 

25% 

26% 

25% 

33% 

20% 

34% 

29% 

42% 

40% 

47% 

29% 

18% 

38% 

33% 

26% 

26% 

56% 

43% 

25% 

26% 

23% 

26% 

25% 

26% 

25% 

33% 

20% 

34% 

29% 

42% 

40% 

47% 

29% 

18% 

38% 

33% 

26% 

26% 

56% 

43% 

25% 

26% 

23% 

26% 

25% 

26% 

25% 

33% 

33% 

33% 

33% 

47% 

53% 

58% 

28% 

19% 

43% 

37% 

29% 

28% 

65% 

35% 

34% 

30% 

26% 

31% 

30% 

30% 

30% 

43% 

45% 

31% 

37% 

52% 

66% 

68% 

27% 

20% 

48% 

41% 

31% 

30% 

73% 

26% 

43% 

34% 

28% 

35% 

34% 

33% 

34% 

52% 

36% 

29% 

35% 

42% 

66% 

63% 

29% 

19% 

39% 

38% 

31% 

26% 

66% 

27% 

37% 

28% 

26% 

31% 

29% 

29% 

30% 

43% 

27% 

27% 

33% 

32% 

66% 

58% 

31% 

17% 

30% 

35% 

30% 

22% 

58% 

27% 

30% 

22% 

23% 

27% 

24% 

24% 

25% 

33% 

22% 

25% 

31% 

26% 

66% 

54% 

33% 

16% 

24% 

32% 

30% 

19% 

52% 

28% 

25% 

18% 

21% 

24% 

20% 

21% 

22% 

27% 

31% 

31% 

31% 

31% 

37% 

42% 

38% 

33% 

29% 

The  total  number  of  purchases  of  consumer  credit  per  country  was  obtained  by 
multiplying the market penetration by the population of each EU28 country. 

Step 5. Calculate the personal consumer detriment (financial and time loss) for the period 2010-
2018 

To calculate the financial consumer detriment, the rate of problems was multiplied by the 
total  number  of  purchases  and  by  the  magnitude  of  a  problem  for  each  country.  The 
results are presented below. 

Table 8 - Consumer financial detriment (million euros, 2010 prices) 

EU-28 

 Austria  

2010 

2011 

2012 

2013 

2014 

2015 

2016 

2017 

2018 

3,116 

2,891 

2,805 

2,206 

2,166 

2,011 

1,702 

1,420 

1,236 

46 

31 

32 

21 

22 

20 

19 

18 

17 

107 

 
 
 
 
 Belgium  

 Bulgaria  

 Croatia  

 Cyprus  

50 

81 

36 

5 

 Czech Republic   58 

 Denmark  

 Estonia  

 Finland  

 France  

 Germany  

 Greece  

 Hungary  

 Ireland  

 Italy  

 Latvia  

 Lithuania  

 Luxembourg  

 Malta  

 Netherlands  

 Poland  

 Portugal  

 Romania  

 Slovakia  

 Slovenia  

 Spain  

 Sweden  

25 

5 

109 

159 

392 

127 

128 

57 

382 

6 

24 

1 

1 

19 

262 

65 

227 

20 

14 

546 

20 

 United Kingdom   251 

42 

73 

37 

1 

51 

21 

5 

45 

225 

433 

137 

113 

30 

349 

5 

24 

1 

0 

14 

232 

64 

187 

17 

16 

553 

17 

168 

35 

70 

37 

0 

55 

17 

4 

25 

180 

443 

100 

119 

36 

260 

2 

20 

1 

0 

20 

271 

82 

176 

13 

14 

590 

16 

187 

24 

56 

38 

2 

40 

17 

3 

29 

116 

313 

62 

83 

31 

21 

54 

33 

4 

59 

15 

2 

23 

107 

278 

47 

59 

29 

19 

51 

28 

6 

74 

14 

1 

19 

74 

212 

35 

35 

25 

16 

40 

24 

5 

61 

13 

1 

9 

74 

171 

39 

23 

17 

14 

31 

20 

4 

46 

12 

0 

3 

74 

134 

42 

13 

11 

12 

24 

17 

4 

37 

10 

0 

1 

75 

106 

47 

8 

7 

220 

235 

243 

221 

200 

181 

4 

14 

1 

1 

17 

239 

46 

129 

16 

9 

490 

19 

166 

5 

11 

2 

1 

22 

239 

38 

118 

22 

7 

496 

26 

191 

6 

8 

2 

1 

23 

228 

28 

102 

28 

5 

488 

34 

202 

4 

5 

1 

1 

23 

172 

30 

82 

26 

3 

379 

27 

216 

3 

4 

1 

1 

21 

122 

30 

66 

22 

2 

286 

20 

220 

3 

3 

1 

1 

20 

91 

31 

53 

20 

1 

222 

16 

228 

To calculate the total cost with time losses the monetised time losses were multiplied per 
problem by the total number of problems (i.e., rate of problems by the  total  number of 
purchases) for each country (see below) 

Table 9 - Total time losses (million euros, prices 2010) 

2010 

2011 

2012 

2013 

2014 

2015 

2016 

2017 

2018 

 EU  

1,685  1,537 

1,447 

1,061 

999 

863 

732 

613 

527 

 Austria  

52.10  32.89 

32.67 

19.57 

19.61 

16.54 

14.96 

13.19 

11.70 

 Belgium  

51.49  43.20 

36.89 

24.68 

22.30 

19.73 

17.16 

14.42 

12.36 

108 

 
 
 
 
1.92 

2.38 

1.15 

7.52 

9.85 

0.00 

2.14 

0.27 

0.40 

0.53 

0.50 

8.46 

 Bulgaria  

2.58 

2.62 

 Croatia  

 Cyprus  

7.94 

7.72 

2.32 

0.47 

0 

2.82 

7.38 

 Czech Republic   8.38 

7.62 

8.59 

2.53 

7.24 

0.98 

6.46 

2.75 

5.96 

1.72 

9.92 

2.91 

4.72 

2.41 

2.55 

3.85 

1.91 

13.01 

11.16 

2.19 

3.04 

1.45 

8.87 

 Denmark  

27.13  21.96 

17.72 

17.27 

15.70 

14.25 

12.67 

11.15 

 Estonia  

 Finland  

 France  

 Germany  

 Ireland  

 Italy  

 Latvia  

3.39 

2.24 

10.38  5.83 

1.45 

4.57 

0.87 

7.07 

0.51 

7.89 

0.25 

8.70 

0.10 

5.75 

0.02 

3.41 

182.2
2 

497.3
3 

249.62  192.86  119.66 

106.43 

71.00 

68.80 

66.61 

64.48 

529.97  523.41  357.42 

306.38 

226.08 

176.38 

133.00 

100.9
2 

 Greece  

45.12  48.85 

35.82 

22.42 

17.00 

12.47 

13.95 

15.33 

16.91 

 Hungary  

14.70  13.59 

15.03 

10.89 

8.10 

5.05 

3.45 

43.01  22.24 

26.14 

22.12 

19.98 

17.10 

11.44 

2.09 

7.02 

1.28 

4.54 

87.74  87.01 

70.44 

64.83 

75.07 

84.35 

83.25 

81.59 

80.43 

1.04 

0.90 

 Lithuania  

0.93 

1.12 

 Luxembourg  

4.14 

3.18 

 Malta  

0.09 

0 

0.38 

1.12 

3.28 

0 

0.67 

0.96 

2.99 

0.12 

0.70 

0.90 

2.69 

0.23 

0.73 

0.75 

2.26 

0.31 

0.55 

0.64 

1.50 

0.37 

0.39 

0.50 

0.89 

0.43 

 Netherlands  

28.09  17.54 

21.45 

15.69 

16.89 

15.43 

12.78 

10.23 

 Poland  

48.59  41.28 

46.30 

39.21 

37.65 

34.37 

24.89 

16.97 

12.11 

 Portugal  

14.58  14.02 

17.23 

9.47 

 Romania  

10.98  10.04 

10.52 

8.54 

 Slovakia  

 Slovenia  

6.67 

4.71 

2.62 

3.08 

3.13 

2.91 

3.17 

1.95 

7.50 

8.72 

3.62 

1.57 

5.28 

8.32 

4.01 

1.11 

5.43 

7.49 

3.05 

0.81 

5.36 

6.61 

2.21 

0.57 

5.36 

5.93 

1.66 

0.41 

 Spain  

139.8
9 

150.66  170.82  151.00 

162.61 

170.10 

140.47 

113.20 

93.54 

 Sweden  

2.12 

2.16 

2.39 

3.60 

5.90 

9.17 

8.71 

7.63 

7.03 

 United Kingdom  

389.6
9 

213.00  192.81  139.72 

131.21 

113.26 

98.74 

84.68 

73.64 

Step 6. Calculate the net benefit of the Directive  in terms of personal consumer detriment. 

The net benefit of the Directive in a given year was considered to be 22.5% of the difference 
between the financial detriment on that year and the financial detriment at the baseline (beginning 
of 2010)337. See below. 

337  The  impact  of  the  Directive  was  assumed  to  be  zero  if  the  consumer  detriment  increased  (instead  of 
decreasing). This is reasonable as evidence does show that the Directive did not have a negative impact in 
the consumer detriment. 

109 

 
 
 
                                                            
Table 10 - Reduction of financial consumer detriment due to the Directive 2011-2018 (million 
euros, prices 2017) 

2011 

2012 

2013 

2014 

2015 

2016 

2017 

2018 

(@4%) 

Total EU28 

80 

102 

205 

216 

258 

322 

382 

424 

1,542 

NPV 

 Austria  

 Belgium  

 Bulgaria  

 Croatia  

 Cyprus  

3 

2 

2 

0 

1 

 Czech Republic   2 

1 

0 

14 

0 

0 

0 

3 

6 

7 

0 

0 

0 

1 

1 

7 

0 

9 

1 

0 

0 

1 

 Denmark  

 Estonia  

 Finland  

 France  

 Germany  

 Greece  

 Hungary  

 Ireland  

 Italy  

 Latvia  

 Lithuania  

 Luxembourg  

 Malta  

 Netherlands  

 Poland  

 Portugal  

 Romania  

 Slovakia  

 Slovenia  

 Spain  

 Sweden  

 United 
Kingdom  

3 

3 

2 

0 

1 

1 

2 

0 

19 

0 

0 

6 

2 

5 

27 

1 

1 

0 

1 

0 

0 

0 

11 

2 

0 

0 

1 

6 

6 

6 

0 

1 

4 

2 

1 

18 

10 

18 

14 

10 

6 

36 

0 

2 

0 

0 

0 

5 

4 

22 

1 

1 

13 

0 

19 

5 

6 

6 

1 

0 

0 

2 

1 

19 

12 

26 

18 

16 

6 

33 

0 

3 

0 

0 

0 

5 

6 

24 

0 

2 

11 

0 

14 

6 

7 

7 

2 

0 

0 

2 

1 

20 

19 

41 

21 

21 

7 

31 

0 

4 

0 

0 

0 

8 

8 

28 

0 

2 

13 

0 

11 

6 

8 

9 

3 

0 

0 

3 

1 

22 

19 

50 

20 

24 

9 

36 

0 

4 

0 

0 

0 

20 

8 

32 

0 

3 

38 

0 

8 

6 

8 

11 

4 

0 

3 

3 

1 

24 

19 

58 

19 

26 

10 

41 

1 

4 

0 

0 

0 

31 

8 

36 

0 

3 

58 

0 

7 

6 

9 

13 

4 

0 

5 

3 

1 

24 

19 

64 

18 

27 

11 

45 

1 

5 

0 

0 

0 

38 

7 

39 

0 

3 

73 

1 

5 

33 

38 

43 

9 

3 

11 

15 

5 

128 

75 

194 

90 

99 

48 

203 

2 

17 

0 

1 

1 

86 

32 

158 

3 

10 

153 

2 

81 

19 

15 

The net benefits of the Directive in terms of savings in time losses was considered to be 
22.5%  reduction  of  the  total  monetised  time  losses  (i.e.,  monetised  time  losses  per 

110 

 
 
 
 
problem multiplied by the number of problems) in the period 2011-2018 (i.e., difference 
between the values for a given year and the baseline). See below. 

Table 11 - Total savings in time losses (million euros, prices 2010) 

2011 

2012 

2013 

2014 

2015 

2016 

2017 

2018 

NPV 
@4% 

59 

70 

143 

161 

194 

217 

243 

262 

1051 

 EU  

 Austria  

 Belgium  

 Bulgaria  

 Croatia  

 Cyprus  

 Czech Republic  

 Denmark  

 Estonia  

 Finland  

 France  

 Germany  

 Greece  

 Hungary  

 Ireland  

 Italy  

 Latvia  

 Lithuania  

 Luxembourg  

 Malta  

 Netherlands  

 Poland  

 Portugal  

 Romania  

 Slovakia  

 Slovenia  

 Spain  

 Sweden  

4 

2 

0 

0 

0 

0 

1 

0 

1 

0 

0 

0 

0 

5 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

2 

2 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

4 

3 

0 

0 

1 

0 

2 

0 

1 

0 

0 

2 

0 

4 

4 

0 

0 

0 

0 

1 

1 

0 

0 

1 

0 

0 

0 

7 

6 

0 

0 

0 

0 

2 

1 

1 

7 

7 

0 

0 

0 

0 

3 

1 

1 

8 

7 

0 

1 

0 

0 

3 

1 

0 

8 

8 

0 

1 

0 

0 

3 

1 

1 

9 

8 

0 

1 

0 

0 

4 

1 

2 

9 

9 

0 

1 

0 

0 

4 

1 

2 

14 

31 

17 

43 

25 

61 

26 

72 

26 

82 

26 

89 

5 

1 

5 

5 

0 

0 

0 

0 

3 

2 

1 

1 

1 

0 

0 

0 

6 

1 

5 

3 

0 

0 

0 

0 

3 

2 

2 

1 

1 

0 

0 

0 

7 

2 

6 

1 

0 

0 

0 

0 

3 

3 

2 

1 

1 

0 

0 

0 

7 

3 

7 

1 

0 

0 

1 

0 

3 

5 

2 

1 

1 

0 

0 

0 

7 

3 

8 

1 

0 

0 

1 

0 

4 

7 

2 

1 

1 

0 

6 

0 

6 

3 

9 

2 

0 

0 

1 

0 

4 

8 

2 

1 

1 

0 

46 

39 

0 

4 

2 

1 

17 

4 

7 

103 

288 

32 

10 

38 

14 

1 

0 

3 

0 

19 

23 

9 

4 

5 

2 

10 

0 

71 

12 

0 

371 

United Kingdom 

40 

44 

56 

58 

62 

65 

69 

111 

 
 
 
 
The total benefits of the Directive in terms of reduction of consumer detriment (financial 
and  non-financial)  are  summarised  below.  The  net  present  value  of  the  savings  in 
consumer detriment due to the introduction of the Directive are € 2.593 millions (prices 
of 2010). 

Table 12 - Net benefits of the Directive 2011-2018 (million euros, prices 2010) 

c 

2011 

2012 

2013 

2014 

2015 

2016 

2017 

2018 

NPV 
@4% 

Consumer financial 
detriment 

Time losses 
(monetised) 

80  

102  

205  

216  

258  

322  

382  

        424  

1,542  

59  

70  

143  

161  

194  

217  

243  

        262  

1,051  

Total EU28 

139  

172  

348  

376  

453  

539  

625  

        685  

2,593  

Costs 

The  costs  of  the  Directive  for  providers  and  public  administrators  are  related  to 
compliance,  monitoring  and  enforcement  and  can  be  subdivided  into  one-off  costs  and 
ongoing  costs.  The  one-off  costs  relate  to  costs  that  credit  providers  and  public 
administrators  had  when  the  Directive  was  implemented  but  that  are  not  recurrent. 
Ongoing costs are cost that providers and public administrators have recurrently. 

The methodology proposed to estimate the costs for providers and public administrators 
was based on the Economics (2007)338. 

Costs for public administrations 

The one-off costs of public administrations related to the implementation of the Directive 
were related to the need to transpose the Directive into national law.  

Table 13 - Approach to calculate one-off costs for public administrations  

Methodology 

Assumptions 

Unit cost = No. of days per person X Average daily wages for the 
public sector X No. of persons involved 

Total cost = Unit cost X 28 Member States 

  2 officials per Member State 
  5-10 days per month during 6 

months 

  Average daily wage for the 

public sector per country from 
Eurostat 

The  recurrent  costs  of  public  administrations  related  to  the  implementation  of  the 
Directive  are  related  to  the  monitoring  of  compliance  of  credit  providers  with  the 

338  Economics,  E.,  2007.  An  analysis  of  the  issue  of  consumer  detriment  and  the  most  appropriate 
methodologies 
europa. 
eu/consumers/strategy/docs/study_consumer_detriment. pdf. 

SANCO. 

http://ec. 

estimate 

URL: 

DG 

it. 

to 

112 

 
 
                
              
              
              
              
              
              
           
                
                
              
              
              
              
              
           
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
           
 
                                                            
Directive, reporting the EU and enforcing the Directive (e.g. sweeps, investigations). The 
methodology and assumptions followed to calculate these costs are summarised below. 

Table 14 - Approach to recurrent costs of public administrations 

Recurrent cost 

Monitoring 

Enforcement 

Reporting 

Maintaining database 

Methodology 

Assumptions 

Unit cost = No. of days per person 
X Average daily wages for the 
public sector X No. of persons 
involved 

Total cost = Unit cost X 28 
Member States 

Total cost = Unit cost X 28 
Member States 

Unit cost = No. of days per person 
X Average daily wages for the 
public sector X No. of persons 
involved 

Total cost = Unit cost X 28 
Member States 

Unit cost = No. of days per person 
X Average daily wages for the 
public sector X No. of persons 
involved 

Total cost = Unit cost X 28 
Member States 

Unit cost = No. of days per person 
X Average daily wages for the 
public sector X No. of persons 
involved 

Total cost = Unit cost X 28 
Member States 

  1 official per MS 
  1 to 2 days per official per 

month to monitor 
compliance (e.g. scanning 
websites of banks) 

  Average daily wage for the 
public sector per country 
from Eurostat 

  2 official per MS 
  1 to 2 days per official per 

month 

  Average daily wage for the 
public sector per country 
from Eurostat 

  1 official per MS 
  2 to 3 days per official per 

year 

  Average daily wage for the 
public sector per country 
from Eurostat 

  1 official per MS 
  1 to 2 days per month 
  Average daily wage for the 
public sector per country 
from Eurostat 

Costs for financial providers 

The one-off cost of credit providers related to the implementation of the Directive were 
considered to be the following: 

  Time  spent  by  legal  department  to  familiarise  with  new  legislative  requirements 

(including time to understand the exemptions, concepts, etc.) 

  Cost of updating/adapting internal IT systems to the following key requirements 

of the Directive: 

-  Pre-contractual information/SECCI requirements 
-  Credit worthiness assessment requirements 
-  Calculation of the APR 

113 

 
 
 
 

Internal communications/ initial staff training on the following key requirements 
of the Directive: 

 Advertisement requirements 

- 
-  Pre-contractual information/SECCI requirements 
-  Calculation of the APR 

  Updating website with required information and functionalities  
  Time spent by legal department to adapt contractual documentation 
  The methodology and assumptions followed to calculate these costs are described 
below. It is important to highlight that, similarly to the approached followed in the 
quantification of the benefits,  some on-off costs of credit providers were adjusted 
considering what can be attributed to the implementation of the Directive (per key 
provision) and the level of compliance with the Directive (per key provision). 

Table 15 - Approach to one-off costs of credit providers 

One-off cost 

Methodology 

Assumptions 

Familiarisation with the Directive  Unit cost = No. of days per person 

Cost of updating/adapting IT 
systems to pre-contractual 
information requirements 

Cost of updating/adapting IT 
systems to Credit worthiness 
assessment requirements 

X Average daily wages for the 
financial 

sector X No. of persons involved 

Total cost = Unit cost X No. of 
credit institutions undertaking 
activity 

Unit cost X No. of credit 
institutions 

Total cost = Unit cost X Number 
of Financial Institutions X Share 
of Financial Institutions that 
adapted their systems to this 
requirement 

Unit cost = Average cost of 
updating/adapting one IT system 

Total cost = Unit cost X Number 
of Financial Institutions X Share 
of Financial Institutions that 
adapted their systems to this 
requirement 

Cost of updating/adapting IT 
systems to Calculation of the APR 

Unit cost = Average cost of 
updating/adapting one IT system 

Total cost = Unit cost X Number 
of Financial Institutions X Share 
of Financial Institutions that 

114 

  2 staff member per credit 
institution would be 
involved in this exercise 
  S/he will devote 5 to 7 days 

  € 10,000 to €15,000 per 

institution 

  Number of financial 

institutions form ECB 
  Values for attribution and 

compliance estimated based 
on expert judgment 

  € 10,000 to €15,000 per 

institution 

  Number of financial 

institutions form ECB 
  Values for attribution and 

compliance estimated based 
on expert judgment 

  € 10,000 to €15,000 per 

institution 

  Number of financial 

institutions form ECB 
  Values for attribution and 

compliance estimated based 

 
 
 
 
Staff training on pre-contractual 
information 

Staff training on Advertisement 
requirements 

Staff training on Calculation of the 
APR 

adapted their systems to this 
requirement 

Unit cost = No. of people involved 
X No. of days per person X 
Average daily wages for the 
financial sector 

Total cost = Unit cost X Number 
of Financial Institutions X Share 
of Financial Institutions that 
needed to adapt to this 
requirement 

Unit cost = No. of people involved 
X No. of days per person X 
Average daily wages for the 
financial sector 

Total cost = Unit cost X Number 
of Financial Institutions X Share 
of Financial Institutions that 
needed to adapt to this 
requirement 

Unit cost = No. of people involved 
X No. of days per person X 
Average daily wages for the 
financial sector 

Total cost = Unit cost X Number 
of Financial Institutions X Share 
of Financial Institutions that 
needed to adapt to this 
requirement 

115 

on expert judgment 

  0.125 to 0.25 days per 

person 

  All front office employees 
will have to spend some 
time on familiarising 
themselves with new 
requirements – 
  assumed to be 20% of 

workforce 

  Average daily wage for the 
financial sector per country 
from Eurostat 
  Number of financial 

institutions form ECB 
  Values for attribution and 

compliance estimated based 
on expert judgment 

  0.125 to 0.25 days per 

person 

  All marketing employees 
will have to spend some 
time on familiarising 
themselves with new 
requirements – 
  assumed to be 5% of 

workforce 

  Average daily wage for the 
financial sector per country 
from Eurostat 
  Number of financial 

institutions form ECB 
  Values for attribution and 

compliance estimated based 
on expert judgment 

  0.075 to 0.125 days per 

person 

  All front office employees 
will have to spend some 
time on familiarising 
themselves with new 
requirements – 
  assumed to be 20% of 

workforce 

  Average daily wage for the 

 
 
 
 
 
Updating the website 

Unit cost = Average cost of 
updating website 

Updating contractual 
documentation 

Total cost = Unit cost X Number 
of Financial Institutions X Share 
of Financial Institutions that 
adapted their websites 

Unit cost = No. of people involved 
X No. of days per person X 
Average daily wages for the 
financial sector 

Total cost = Unit cost X Number 
of Financial Institutions X Share 
of Financial Institutions that 
needed to adapt to this 
requirement 

financial sector per country 
from Eurostat 
  Number of financial 

institutions form ECB 
  Values for attribution and 

compliance estimated based 
on expert judgment 

  Unit cost = € 400 to €600 
per bankNumber of 
financial institutions form 
ECB 

  Values for attribution and 

compliance estimated based 
on expert judgment 
  Values for attribution and 

compliance estimated based 
on expert judgment 

 

 member of the legal team 
per bank 

  1 to 2 day per person 
  Average daily wage for the 
financial sector per country 
from Eurostat 
  Number of financial 

institutions form ECB 
  Values for attribution and 

compliance estimated based 
on expert judgment 

The  recurrent  costs  of  the  financial  providers  related  to  the  need  to  comply  with  the 
Directive depend on their level of compliance with the Directive and their need to adjust 
their  operations  to  the  Directive  (which  in  some  cases  was  not  necessary  as  the  credit 
providers were already operating in line with the key requirements of the Directive). See 
below for a description of the approach followed to calculate these costs. 

Table 16 - Approach to calculate recurrent costs of financial providers 

Recurrent cost 

Methodology 

Assumptions 

Compliance with advertisement 
requirements 

Compliance with Pre-contractual 
information/SECCI requirements 

Unit cost = Extra cost of 
advertisement x number of 
advertisements per year 

Total costs = Unit cost x Number 
of credit institutions 

Unit cost = No. of days per person 
X Average daily wages for the 
financial 

sector X No. of persons involved 

116 

  Extra cost per 

advertisement  = €5 - €10 
  Number of advertisements 

per year = 365 

  1 member of the front desk 
  0.1 hours per person 

 
 
 
 
Compliance with credit worthiness 
assessment requirements 

Total cost = Unit cost X No. of 
credit requests X percentage of 
credit request done in person 

Unit costs = No. of days per 
person X Average daily wages for 
the financial 

sector X No. of persons involved 
(the unit cost depends on the level 
of burden) 

Total cost = Unit cost X No. of 
credit requests for which a credit 
worthiness would not been done in 
the absence of CCD 

  For 15% of the credit 

request a creditworthiness 
was not done before CCD 
and due to CCD this was 
reduced to 10% 
  1 staff member 
  0.05-0.10 days per request 
in countries depending on 
their level of burden 

Consumers affected 

Table 17 - Overview of the number of consumers affected 

Provision 

Types of credit 

Rationale 

Consumers 
affected in given 
year 2010-2018 

Linked credit: number of 
consumers affected 

Up to 20 
thousand 

Based on 1% of consumers exercising their right of 
withdrawal, maximum 50% of new agreements 
being linked credit, 16% of those consumers 
reporting problems, of which 41% are major 
problems  

Revolving credit: number of 
consumers affected facing 
problems with their credit card in 
terms of unrequested extensions 
of the credit line 

Credit intermediaries: 
Estimated number of consumers 
experiencing problems with 
credit intermediaries 

Understanding credit offers 
and information provision 

Understanding of credit offers: 
estimated number of consumers 
that considered credit offers 
complicated or very complicated 
to understand 

Up to 25 million  Based on estimated 44% share of consumers with a 
credit card (2018),339 12% share of consumers with 
problems340 

Between 600,000 
and 4.3 million 

Based on share of consumers taking out a loan 
through a credit intermediary at 11% (ICF survey) 
and 1.5% (OPC survey), and a problem incidence 
rate of 65% (2013 Commission study). 

11.4 million 

Based on share of consumers marking 
understanding as complicated or very complicated 
in ICF survey (19%). 

339 Eurobarometer 443 figures at 43%, indexed for 2018. 
340 Based on UK figures and extrapolated for the EU. 

117 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
APR: number of consumers 
where credit institution did not 
inform consumer of the value of 
the APR 

APR: consumers who have not 
heard about the APR 

APR: estimated number of 
consumers who have heard about 
the APR but do not know the 
annual rate of charge 

Up to 6 million 

Based on 10% of consumers not having been 
informed341 

Up to 5.4 million  Based on ICF survey 

Up to 19 million  Based on ICF survey 

Right of withdrawal: consumers 
unaware of the right to withdraw 

Between 17 and 
24 million 

Based on between 28% and 40% of consumers 
reporting not aware of this right based on ICF 
survey 

Right of early repayment: 
consumers unaware of the right 
to repay early 

Between 9 and 11 
million 

Based on between 12% and 15% of consumers 
reporting not aware of this right based on ICF 
survey 

SECCI: number of consumers 
that did not receive SECCI 

Up to 11 million  Based on 18% of consumers reporting not having 
been provided with SECCI342 

SECCI: number of consumers 
that found SECCI unhelpful or 
very unhelpful 

Understanding offer: estimated 
number of consumers that 
disagreed or strongly disagreed 
with understanding the offer 

Key rights 

Up to 3 million 

Up to 9 million 

Based on share of consumers finding SECCI 
unhelpful (4%) or very unhelpful (1%) based on 
ICF survey 

Based on ICF consumer survey with 15% that 
disagreed or strongly disagreed that offer was easy 
to understand. 

Down payments: consumers 
asked to pay a down payments 

Up to 16 million  Based on share of consumers asked to pay a down 
payment (27%) in ICF survey. 

Right of withdrawal: estimated 
number of consumers facing 
difficulty in exercising the right 

Up to 238,000 

Based on 1% of consumers exercising their right of 
withdrawal, and 56.5% being unsuccessful, of 
which a subset was aware of the correct 
timeframe343 

Right of early repayment: 
estimated number of consumers 
facing difficulty in exercising the 
right 

Cross-selling:  
estimated number of consumers 
affected by lender trying to sell 
additional products 

Up to 2.5 million  Based on 25% seeking to repay early, 14% that 

were not successful344 

Up to 25 million  Based on 42% of consumers whom indicated this 

been asked them in writing or orally when 
purchasing a loan.345 Note: low sample size. 

341 ICF survey, Q10a. 
342 ICF survey, Q13 
343 London Economics, 2013; consumer survey. 
344 London Economics, 2013. 
345 London Economics, 2013. 

118 

 
 
 
 
                                                            
Creditworthiness assessment: 
consumers whose ability to pay 
was not verified 

Advertisement: share of 
consumers that considered 
advertisement not to match actual 
offer 

Up to 6 million 

Based on 10% of consumers who indicated that 
their ability to pay was not verified in ICF survey. 

Between 8 and 11 
million 

Based on weighted and unweighted share of 14% 
and 18% of consumers that considered 
advertisement not to match loan offer, ICF survey 

Consumer perceptions: elements not part of the credit offer 

Monthly instalments 

Total amount of credit 

Borrowing rates 

Duration of credit agreement 

Type of credit 

APR 

Other conditions set 

Rights as a consumer 

 Up to 20 million   Based on shares indicated in ICF survey 

Up to 22 million   Based on shares indicated in ICF survey 

 Up to 23 million   Based on shares indicated in ICF survey 

 Up to 25 million   Based on shares indicated in ICF survey 

 Up to 27 million   Based on shares indicated in ICF survey 

 Up to 29 million   Based on shares indicated in ICF survey 

Up to 43 million   Based on shares indicated in ICF survey 

 Up to 45 million   Based on shares indicated in ICF survey 

None of the above 

 Up to 59 million   Based on shares indicated in ICF survey 

119 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex 4: Key concepts and definitions  

Ancillary service - means a service offered to the consumer in conjunction with the credit 
agreement.346 

Annual  percentage  rate  of  charge  (APR)  -  the  total  cost  of  the  credit  to  the  consumer, 
expressed  as  an  annual  percentage  of  the  total  amount  of  credit,  where  applicable 
including the costs referred to in Article 19(2) of the Directive;347 

Automated  decision-making  -  the  process  of  making  a  decision  by  automated  means 
without any human involvement. These decisions can be based on factual data, as well as 
on digitally created profiles or inferred data.348 

Bank  -  A  financial  institution  one  of  whose  principal  activities  is  to  take  deposits  and 
borrow  with  the  objective  of  lending  and  investing  and  which  is  within  the  scope  of 
banking or similar legislation.349 

Borrower  -  a  person,  firm  or  institution  that  obtains  a  loan  from  a  lender  in  order  to 
finance consumption or investment.350  

Borrowing rate - the interest rate expressed as a fixed or variable percentage applied on 
an annual basis to the amount of credit drawn down;351 

Consumer - a natural person who, in transactions covered by the Directive, is acting for 
purposes which are outside his trade, business or profession;352 

Consumer detriment  -  a  measure of harm that  consumers  may experience  when market 
outcomes fall short of their potential, resultin in welfare losses for consumers. Consumer 
detriment can be structural or personal353. 

346  Directive  2014/17/EU  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  4  February  2014  on  credit 
agreements for consumers relating to residential immovable property, Article 4(4). 
347 Consumer Credit Directive, Article 19. 
348  ICO,  Guide  to  the  General  Data  Protection  Regulation  (GDPR)  -  Automated  decision-making  and 
profiling 
349 IASCF, Key term list; Commission Regulation (EC) No 1126/2008 (international accounting standards) 
350 Collins Dictionary of Economics, 4th ed. 2005.  
351 Consumer Credit Directive, Article 3(j). 
352 Consumer Credit Directive, Article 3(a). 
353 See definition in European Commission Study on measuring consumer detriment in the European Union 
(COVID, 2017). 

120 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
Creditor - a natural or legal person who grants or promises to grant credit in the course of 
his trade, business, or profession;354 

Credit  Agreement  -  an  agreement  whereby  a  creditor  grants  or  promises  to  grant  to  a 
consumer  credit  in  the  form  of  a  deferred  payment,  loan  or  other  similar  financial 
accommodation, except for agreements for the provision on a continuing basis of services 
or for the supply of goods of the same kind, where the consumer pays for such services 
or goods for the duration of their provision by means of instalments;355 

Credit Card - A card entitling the owner to use funds from the issuing company up to a 
certain limit. The holder of a credit card may use it to buy a good or service. When one 
does this, the issuing company effectively gives the card holder a loan for the amount of 
the good or service, which the holder is expected to repay. 356 

Credit intermediary - a natural or legal person who is not acting as a creditor and who, in 
the  course  of  his  trade,  business  or  profession,  for  a  fee,  which  may  take  a  pecuniary 
form or any other agreed form of financial consideration:  

-  presents or offers credit agreements to consumers; 

-  assists  consumers  by  undertaking  preparatory  work  in  respect  of  credit 

agreements other than as referred to in (I); or 

-  concludes credit agreements with consumers on behalf of the creditor;357 

Credit  institution  -  an  undertaking  the  business  of  which  is  to  take  deposits  or  other 
repayable funds from the public and to grant credits for its own account;358 

Credit line - a fixed amount or limit of credit which is established for a consumer by a 
business  or  bank.  It  is  the  amount  of  outstanding  credit  which  may  not  be  exceeded  at 
any time;359 

Credit provider – see Lender 

Creditworthiness assessment - evaluation of the prospect for the debt obligation resulting 
from the credit agreement to be met360 

354 Consumer Credit Directive, Article 3(b). 
355 Consumer Credit Directive, Article 3 (c). 
356 Farlex Financial Dictionary, 2012 
357 Consumer Credit Directive, Article 3(f). 
358  Regulation  (EU)  no  575/2013  of  the  European  parliament  and  of  the  council  of  26  June  2013  on 
prudential  requirements  for  credit  institutions  and  investment  firms  and  amending  Regulation  (EU)  No 
648/2012 
359 Webster; Collin & Joliffe, Dict. of Accounting, Collin Publ., 1992 
360  Directive  2014/17/EU  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  4  February  2014  on  credit 
agreements for consumers relating to residential immovable property 

121 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
Credit rollover – extending the loan’s due date by paying an additional fee. Loan rollover 
is common with short-term payday loans. 

Cross-selling practice - offering of an investment service together with another service or 
product as part of a package or as a condition for the same agreement or package.361 

Crowdfunding service - means the matching of business funding interest of investors and 
project owners through the use of a crowdfunding platform and which consist of any of 
the  following:  (i)  the  facilitation  of  granting  of  loans;  (ii)  the  placing  without  firm 
commitment, as referred to in point 7 of Section A of Annex I to Directive 2014/65/EU, 
of transferable securities issued by project owners and the reception and transmission of 
client orders, as referred to in point 1 of Section A to Annex I to Directive 2014/65, with 
regard to those transferable securities.362 
Crowdfunding platform - means an electronic information system operated or managed 
by a crowdfunding service provider.363 

Dynamic  pricing  -  a  customer  or  user  billing  mode  in  which  the  price  for  a  product 
frequently rotates based on market demand, growth, and other trends.364 

Durable  medium  -  any  instrument  which  enables  the  consumer  to  store  information 
addressed personally to him in a way accessible for future reference for a period of time 
adequate  for  the  purposes  of  the  information  and  which  allows  the  unchanged 
reproduction of the information stored;365 

Financial literacy - a combination of awareness, knowledge, skill, attitude and behaviour 
necessary to make sound financial decisions and ultimately achieve individual financial 
wellbeing366. 

Fintech - technologically enabled financial innovation  that could result in new business 
models,  applications,  processes,  or  products  with  an  associated  material  effect  on 
financial markets and institutions and the provision of financial services.367 

361  Directive  2014/65/EU  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  15  May  2014  on  markets  in 
financial instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU  
362  Definition  in  Proposal  for  a  Regulation  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  European 
Crowdfunding  Service  Providers  (ECSP)  for  Business,  COM(2018)  113  final,  2018/0048  (COD).  This 
proposal does not apply to those services provided to project owners qualifying as consumers as defined in 
Article 3(a) of Directive 2008/48/EC. 
363 Ibid. 
364 Techopedia Dictionary, https://www.techopedia.com/definition/29600/dynamic-pricing  
365 Consumer Credit Directive, Article 3(m). 
366  See  in  Atkinson,  A.  and  F.  Messy  (2012),  "Measuring  Financial  Literacy:  Results  of  the  OECD  / 
International  Network  on  Financial  Education  (INFE)  Pilot  Study",  OECD  Working  Papers  on  Finance, 
Insurance and Private Pensions, No. 15, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/5k9csfs90fr4-en  
367 European Banking Authority, Glossary for financial innovation 

122 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
Full  harmonisation  (maximum  harmonisation)  -  In  the  case  of  full  harmonisation 
Member States must implement the EU measures but may not enact or retain any rules 
which depart from them.368,369 

Household  -  group  of  persons  who  share  the  same  living  accommodation,  who  pool 
some,  or  all,  of  their  income  and  wealth  and  who  consume  certain  types  of  goods  and 
services collectively, mainly housing and food.370 

Implementation - the process of making sure that the provisions of EU legislation can be 
fully  applied.  For  EU  Directives,  this  is  done  via  transposition  of  its  requirements  into 
national law, for other EU interventions such as Regulations or Decisions other measures 
may  be  necessary  (e.g.  in  the  case  of  Regulations,  aligning  other  legislation  that  is  not 
directly touched upon but affected indirectly by the Regulation with the definitions and 
requirement  of  the  Regulation).  Whilst  EU  legislation  must  be  transposed  correctly  it 
must also be applied appropriately to deliver the desired policy objectives.371 

Interest  rate  cap  or  Ceiling  -  The  maximum  interest  rate  that  may  be  charged  on  a 
contract or agreement.372 

Lender  -  individual,  group  or  financial  institution  that  makes  funds  or  other  assets 
available  to  another  with  the  expectation  that  they  will  be  returned,  in  addition  to  any 
interest and/or fees.373 

Linked credit agreement - a credit agreement where 

- 

- 

the credit in question serves exclusively to finance an agreement for the supply of 
specific goods or the provision of a specific service, and 

those two agreements form, from an objective point of view, a commercial unit; a 
commercial unit shall be deemed to exist where the supplier or service provider 
himself finances the credit for the consumer or, if it is financed by a third party, 
where  the  creditor  uses  the  services  of  the  supplier  or  service  provider  in 

368 European Parliamentary Research Service, 2015, Competence in private law - The Treaty framework for 
a European private law and challenges for coherence 
369  “the  objective  pursued  [by  Directive  2008/48],  which,  as  can  be  seen  from  recitals  7  and  9  to  that 
directive, consists in providing, as regards consumer credit, full and mandatory harmonisation in a number 
of key areas, which is regarded as necessary in order to ensure that all consumers in the European Union 
enjoy a high and equivalent level of protection of their interests and to facilitate the emergence of a well-
functioning  internal  market  in  consumer  credit.”  Judgment  of  the  Court  of  21  April  2016,  Radlinger,  C-
377/14, EU:C:2016:283. 
370 Eurostat's Concepts and Definitions Database (CODED) 
371 European Commission (2017), Better Regulation Guidelines, Glossary 
372 Farlex Financial Dictionary, 2012  
373 Investopedia, 2019, Adam Barone, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/lender.asp 

123 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
connection with the conclusion or preparation of the credit agreement, or where 
the specific goods or the provision of a specific service are explicitly specified in 
the credit agreement.374 

Mortgage  loan  -    –  a  credit  agreement  which  is  secured  either  by  a  mortgage  or  by 
another  comparable  security  commonly  used  in  a  Member  State  on  residential 
immovable property or secured by a right related to residential immovable property, or 
credit agreements the purpose of which is to acquire or retain property rights in land or in 
an existing or projected building. 

Mystery  shopping  -  the  activity  of  pretending  to  be  a  normal  customer  when  you  are 
employed by a company to check how its products or services are being sold.375 

Non-banks  –  in  general,  these  are  non-monetary  financial  corporations.  More 
specifically, they include insurance corporations and pension funds, financial auxiliaries, 
and other financial intermediaries.376 

Non-credit institution - any creditor that is not a credit institution.377 

Overdraft facility - an explicit credit agreement whereby a creditor makes available to a 
consumer funds which exceed the current balance in the consumer's current account.378 

Overrunning - means a tacitly accepted overdraft whereby a creditor makes available to a 
consumer  funds  which  exceed  the  current  balance  in  the consumer's  current  account  or 
the agreed overdraft facility;379 

P2P lending - enables individuals to obtain loans directly from other individuals, cutting 
out  the  financial  institution  as  the  middleman.  P2P  lending  is  also  known  as  social 
lending or crowdlending.380 

Payday  loan  -  A  short-term  loan  expected  to  be  repaid  before  the  consumer's  next  pay 
day.381 

Payment Protection Insurance (PPI) - An insurance policy that makes loan payments on 
behalf of the policyholder in the event of financial hardship.382 

374 Consumer Credit Directive 
375 Cambridge Business English Dictionary, 2011 
376 European Central Bank, 2016, Bank lending survey for the euro area, Glossary  
377  Directive  2014/17/EU  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  4  February  2014  on  credit 
agreements for consumers relating to residential immovable property 
378 Consumer Credit Directive, Article 3(d). 
379 Consumer Credit Directive, Article 3(e). 
380 Investopedia, 2019, Julia Kagan, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/peer-to-peer-lending.asp  
381 Farlex Financial Dictionary, 2012  

124 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
Personal loan - credit granted to a private person for non-commercial purposes solely on 
the basis of that person's creditworthiness, income, and financial circumstances.383 

Product bundling or Bundling practice - the offering or the selling of a credit agreement 
in a package with other distinct financial products or services where the credit agreement 
is also made available to the consumer separately but not necessarily on the same terms 
or conditions as when offered bundled with the ancillary services.384 

Revolving credit - credit that is automatically renewed as debts are paid off.385 

Right  of  withdrawal  -  consumer's  right  to  terminate  a  contract  without  reason  within  a 
specified time period, provided certain conditions are fulfilled.386 

SECCI (Standard  European  Consumer  Credit  Information)  -  a  standardised  form 
designed to show exactly what a finance agreement contains. The form will include key 
details such as type of credit, Annual Percentage Rate (APR), number and frequency of 
payments, and total amount owed.387 

Stakeholder  -  any  individual  citizen  or  an  entity  impacted,  addressed,  or  otherwise 
concerned by an EU intervention.388 

Stakeholder consultation  - a formal process of collecting input  and views from citizens 
and  stakeholders  on  new  initiatives  or  evaluations/  fitness  checks,  based  on  specific 
questions  and/or  consultation  background  documents  or  Commission  documents 
launching  a  consultation  process  or  Green  Papers.  When  consulting,  the  Commission 
proactively seeks evidence (facts, views, opinions) on a specific issue. 389 

Sweeps  -  –  means  concerted  investigations  of  consumer  markets  through  simultaneous 
coordinated  control  actions  to  check  compliance  with,  or  to  detect  infringements  of, 
Union laws that protect consumers’ interests.390  

382 Farlex Financial Dictionary, 2012 
383 Dictionary of Banking, UBS 1998 - 2019 
384  Directive  2014/17/EU  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  4  February  2014  on  credit 
agreements for consumers relating to residential immovable property 
385 Oxford Dictionary of English, Oxford University Press 2018 
386  IATE  EU  terminology database,  COM-Terminology Coordination, based  on: European  Commission  > 
Rights & principles applicable when you buy goods or services online 
387 Credit Plus, 2019, Glossary, available at https://www.creditplus.co.uk/car-finance-glossary/secci/  
388 European Commission (2017), Better Regulation Guidelines, Glossary 
389 European Commission (2017), Better Regulation Guidelines, Glossary 
390 See Article 3(16) of Regulation (EU) 2017/2394 on cooperation between national authorities responsible 
for the enforcement of consumer protection laws and repealing Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 (the CPC 
Regulation). 

125 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Transposition - describes the process of incorporating the rights and obligations set out in 
an EU Directive into national legislation, thereby giving legal force to the provisions of 
the Directive. The Commission may take action if a Member State fails to transpose EU 
legislation and/or to communicate to the Commission what measures it has taken. In case 
of no or partial transposition, the Commission can open formal infringement proceedings 
and eventually refer the Member State to the Court of Justice of the EU.391 

Tying practice - the offering or the selling of a credit agreement in a package with other 
distinct financial products or services where the credit agreement is not made available to 
separately.392
the 

consumer 

391 European Commission (2017), Better Regulation Guidelines, Glossary 
392  Directive  2014/17/EU  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  4  February  2014  on  credit 
agreements for consumers relating to residential immovable property 

126 

 
 
 
 
                                                            
 
Annex 5: Overview of the implementation of the Directive 

The Directive has been fully transposed in all Member States, with differences emerging from 
the use of regulatory choices. The support study for the evaluation of the Directive analysed 
the state of transposition (p. 38), including whether Member States went beyond the Directive 
by  applying  more  stringent  measures  in  certain areas  or  made  use  of  the  regulatory  choices 
foreseen in several articles. 
The 2014 implementation report showed that a sizeable number of Member States (16)393 did 
not meet the deadline of complying with the Directive and notifying the Commission by 11 
June 2010, leading to infringement proceedings. Four Member States initially failed to ensure 
timely entry into force of the legislation. In the years thereafter all Member States complied 
and infringements cases were closed.  

The analysis of both the transposition and the implementation of the Directive shows that the 
Directive  triggered  substantial  reform  of  the  consumer  credit  environment  in  most  Member 
States. Irrespective of whether or not Member States have had to develop and set up an entire 
legal framework applicable to the credit market or simply amend their existing legislation, all 
countries  have  undergone  significant  changes  to  successfully  transpose  and  implement  the 
Directive.  

As a full harmonisation Directive, the Directive was transposed (in due course or with delay, 
depending  on  the  country)  in  all  Member  States,  with  a  view  to  achieving  maximum 
harmonisation.  Cyprus,  Estonia  and  Greece  appear  to  have  opted  for  a  rather  literal 
transposition  of  the  Directive,  applying  every  single  provision  verbatim.  In  other  cases, 
Member States transposed them in an array of substantially different ways394. 

As per the specificities of a  full harmonisation Directive, Member States had to maintain or 
lay down provisions that could not be more or less restrictive than those of the Directive in 
the fully harmonised areas. In other words, as the principle of full harmonisation pertains to 
the whole Directive, Member States were left with little room for manoeuvre to transpose the 
EU  instrument.  Flexibility  was  nevertheless  given  to  national  lawmakers  for  nine  optional 
provisions  under  Article  27(2),  offering  the  possibility  for  Member  States  to  make  use  of 
particular regulatory choices. In addition, some provisions of the Directive set clear objectives 
but do not clearly specify the result to be achieved. This gave Member States some additional 
discretionary power. 
In  addition  to  making  use  of  regulatory  choices,  some  Member  States395  went  beyond  the 
Directive in areas not covered by the Directive (and where the restrictions in respect of a full 
harmonisation Directive do not apply). This mainly includes interest rate caps in at least 23 
Member States.396  

393 BE; CY; DK; EE; ES; FI; FR; IT; LT; LU; LV; NL; PL; SI; SE and UK. 
394 See Annex 5 of the study supporting the evaluation for more details. 
395 AT, BE, BG, CZ, DK, DE, EE, ES, FI, FR, HR, HU, IE, IT, LV, LT, LU, MT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SI, SK, SE, 
UK 
396 BE, BG, CY, CZ, DE, DK, EE, EL, ES, FI, HR, HU, FR, IE, IT, LT, MT, NL, PT, SE, SI, SK, UK.  

127 

 
 
                                                            
Annex 6: Coherence with other EU pieces of legislation 

Table 1 - Regulation of the key aspects covered by the Consumer Credit Directive (CCD) and the 
Mortgage Credit Directive (MCD) 

Key aspect 

Furthest reaching 
Directive  

Advertising 

MCD 

Pre-contractual 
information 

MCD 

Explanations and 
standards for 
advisory services 

MCD 

Knowledge and 
competence 
requirements for 
staff 

APR 

CWA 

MCD 

Same 

MCD 

Access to databases  Same 

Right of 
withdrawal 

CCD 

Right of early 
repayment 

Conduct of 
business rules 

Same 

MCD* 

Financial education  MCD* 

Regulation under the CCD and MCD 

Both  Directives  establish  similar  standard  information  to  be  included  in  advertising 
(Article  4  CCD  and  Article  11  MCD).  The  MCD  also  provides  that  any  advertising 
and  marketing  communication  must  be  “fair,  clear  and  not  misleading”  (Article  2), 
prohibiting the use of wording that may create false expectations (Article 10). 

The standard information to be disclosed by credit providers is relatively similar under 
the  CCD  (Article  5)  and  the  MCD  (Article  14).  The  MCD  also  includes  specific 
information  duties  for  credit  intermediaries,  who  are  obliged  to  disclose  at  least  the 
general information contained in Article 15.  

Both Directives establish the obligation for credit providers and credit intermediaries 
to  provide  adequate  explanations  to  consumers  (Article  5(6)  CCD  and  Article  16 
MCD).  The  MCD  further  includes  the  minimum  explanations  to  be  provided.  It also 
establishes  the  obligation  for  credit  providers  to  inform  the  consumer  if  advisory 
services can be provided and lays down certain standards for such services, including 
the obligation to recommend a suitable credit agreement and conditions on the use of 
the term ‘independent advice’ (Article 22 MCD).  

The  MCD  includes  an  obligation  for  credit  providers  and  intermediaries  to  ensure  an 
appropriate knowledge  and  competence  in  relation  to  the  manufacturing,  offering  and 
grantinf  of  credit  agreements  among  their  staff  members  (Article  9  and  Annex  III 
MCD). 

Both  Directives  establish  a  common  formula  for  the  calculation  of  the  APR(C) 
(Article 19 CCD and Article 17 MCD). 

The CCD and the MCD establish that credit providers must conduct CWAs based on 
sufficient  information  (Article  8  CCD  and  Article  18  MCD).  The  MCD  further 
specifies  the  type  of  information  that  shall  be  considered  (Article  20  MCD)  and  the 
obligation for credit providers to reject the credit application where the outcome of the 
CWA is negative (Article 18 MCD).  

Both  Directives  provide  that  Member  States  shall  ensure  access  to  the  national 
databases  for  credit  providers  from  other  Member  States  and  that  the  conditions  of 
access to credit databases shall be non-discriminatory (Article 9 CCD and Article 21 
MCD). 

The  right  of  withdrawal  is  mandatory  under  the  CCD  (Article  14),  while  the  MCD 
leaves this to the discretion of Member States to provide either a right of withdrawal, a 
reflection  period  or  a  combination  of  the  two  before  the  conclusion  of  the  credit 
agreement (Article 14 ). 

Both  Directives  set  out  the  right  of  consumers  to  repay  their  debt  early  (Article  16 
CCD and Article 25 MCD). 

The CCD does not establish any conduct of business obligations for credit providers, 
while the MCD requires them to act honestly, fairly, transparently and professionally 
when designing, manufacturing and selling credit products (Article 7). The MCD also 
prohibits tying practices (Article 12). 

The  CCD  does  not  include  any  provision  on  financial  education,  while  the  MCD 
requires Member States to promote measures that support the education of consumers 
in  relation  to  responsible  borrowing  and  debt  management,  especially  in  relation  to 
mortgage and credit agreements (Article 6). 

Arrears and 
foreclosure 

MCD* 

The  CCD  does  not  include  any  provisions  on  arrears  and  foreclosure.  The  MCD 
foresees several measures  in the event of arrears and foreclosures (Article 28).  

128 

 
 
 
 
Foreign currencies 
and variable rate 
credits 

MCD 

The CCD does not include any provision on these aspects. The MCD requires that any 
indexes  or  reference  rate  used  to  calculate  the  borrowing  rate  be  clear,  accessible, 
objective and verifiable by the parties and competent authorities. Historical records of 
these  indexes  must  also  be  kept  (Article  24).  It  also  lays  down  certain  rights  for 
consumers of loans in foreign currencies (Article 23). 

* This aspect is only regulated in the Mortgage Credit Directive. 

Table 2 - Coherence and complementarity between the CCD and other key pieces of legislation 

Legislation 

CCD key aspects 

Interactions 

Potential inconsistencies, gaps, synergies 

Unfair  Contract 
Directive (UCTD)397 

Terms 

Contractual 
information, 
right  of  early  repayment, 
right of withdrawal 

The  UCTD  applies 
to  all  business-to-
consumer  contracts  and  concerns  contractual 
individually 
terms 
negotiated in advance (e.g. general conditions 
of the credit agreement).  

that  have  not  been 

Credit  providers  are  bound  by  the  UCTD. 
Unfair  credit  agreement  terms  are  therefore 
not  binding  on  consumers.  The  UCTD 
complements  the  CCD,  as  the  latter  does  not 
cover unfair contract terms.  

There is extensive CJEU jurisprudence on the 
fairness  of  the  terms  in  financial  service 
business-to-consumer  contracts.    The  issue  of 
lack  of 
transparency  (e.g.  not  providing 
sufficient information to the consumer) is also 
covered by UCTD (Articles 4(2) and 5). Major 
issues  referenced  payment  acceleration  and 
terms  that  fixed  the  interest  payable  upon 
default.  

Note  that  guidance  on  the  interpretation  and 
application  of  UCTD  was  published  in  July 
2019.398 

e-Commerce 
(ECD)399 

Directive 

Precontractual 
cross-border market 

information, 

introduced 

The  ECD  was 
to  promote 
eCommerce across EEA countries and remove 
barriers  to  trade  by  setting  up  a  “Country  of 
to  services 
Origin”  principle.  It  applies 
provided  at  a  distance  by  electronic  means. 
Credit  providers  are  not  explicitly  excluded 
from  its  scope  of  application,  meaning  that  it 
covers  in  principle  credit  providers  selling 
credit online. 

Together  with  the  DMFSD,  it  contributed  to 
creating  a  legal  framework  for  the  online 
provision of financial services. 

397 European Council, 2011. 
398 C(2019) 5325 final. 
399 Directive 2000/31/EC. 

129 

regulates 
the 

the  provision  of 
The  ECD 
information  on 
identity,  geographical 
address and details of the service provider, as 
well  as  information  on  public  registers.  The 
CCD regulates aspects of advertising and pre-
contractual information with specific reference 
to pre-contractual and contractual information 
to  be  provided  to  the  consumer,  while  the 
ECD provides for more general provisions on 
unsolicited 
communications 
(Article  7)  and  on  the  compliance  with  the 
consumer  protection  legislation  including  the 
CCD,  as  mentioned  by  Article  1(3)  and 
Recital 11 ECD. 

commercial 

There  is  no  evidence  of  overlap  between  the 
ECD and CCD. 

Article  3(3),  read  in  conjunction  with  the 
Annex,  of  the  ECD    expressly  provides  that 
Article  3(1)  and  (2)  do  not  apply  to  the 
emission of electronic money by institutions in 
respect of which Member States have applied 
one of the derogations provided for in Article 
8(1)  of  Directive  2000/46/EC  (3),  which 
concerns  issuers  of  electronic  money.  In 

 
 
 
 
                                                            
addition,  Article  20  CCD  provides  for  the 
supervision  of  creditors  by  a  supervisory 
non-banking 
they 
authority  when 
institutions 
the 
competent supervisory authority. 

supervised  by 

already 

are 

No  major  discrepancies  were  found  between 
the two Directives.  

There are no major discrepancies between the 
CCD  and  the  DMFSD,  although  there  are 
some small differences.  

The  pre-contractual  information  required  by 
the  DMFSD  is  more  general  than  that  in  the 
product-specific  CCD,  as  it  applies  to  all 
financial  services  in  general.  CCD  is  specific 
and  it  constitutes  a  lex  specialis  applicable  to 
consumer  credit  contracts.  The  DMFSD 
foresees  the  provision  of  information  on 
redress  at  pre-contractual  stage,  which  under 
the CCD is only provided at contract stage. 

The  conditions 
the  right  of 
to  exercise 
withdrawal under the CCD are mostly aligned 
with  those  in  the  DMFSD,  although  the 
DMFSD  foresees  a  reinforced  protection  of 
consumers  by  establishing  that  the  supplier 
may  not  require  the  consumer  to  pay  any 
the 
amount  unless 
consumer  was  duly  informed.  Moreover,  the 
DMFSD explicitly provides that “The right of 
withdrawal  shall  not  apply 
to:  […]  (c) 
contracts  whose  performance  has  been  fully 
completed  by  both  parties  at  the  consumer’s 
express request before the consumer exercises 
his right of withdrawal” (Article 6(2)).  

they  can  prove 

that 

There are no inconsistencies between the CCD 
and  the  EPD.  Better  alignment  could  be 
ensured  by  explicitly  indicating  that  credit 
providers  may  be  bound  by  the  EPD  (or  the 
future  ePrivacy  Regulation)  when  collecting, 
sharing, processing and storing consumer data 
electronically.  

As explained by the Guidance to UCPD, since 
a  robust  set  of  EU  sector-specific  legislation 
exists  in  this  sector,  the  ‘safety  net’  character 
of the UCPD is particularly apparent, ensuring 
that  a  high  common 
level  of  consumer 
protection against unfair commercial practices 
in  all  sectors.  The 
can  be  maintained 
provisions  of  the  CCD  on  information  to  be 

Distance  Marketing 
Consumer 
Services 
(DMFSD)400 

of 
Financial 
Directive 

Pre-contractual  information, 
right  of  withdrawal,  cross-
of 
border  market, 
unsolicited 
and 
communications  

services 

ban 

the 

to  ensure 

The  DMFSD  aims 
free 
movement  of  financial  services  in  the  single 
market  by  harmonising  consumer  protection 
rules.  The  Directive  sets  out  a 
list  of 
information  concerning  the  financial  service 
and  its  provider  that  the  consumer  should 
receive  before 
is 
concluded.  It  also  establishes  the  right  of 
consumers  to  withdraw  from  the  contract 
within a 14-day period. 

the  distance  contract 

e-Privacy Directive (EPD)401  Advertising  of  consumer 
pre-contractual 

credit, 
information, CWA 

Unfair Commercial Practices 
Directive (UCPD)403 

Advertising  of  consumer 
credit, 
pre-contractual 
information 

to 

respect 

The EPD seeks to protect the right to privacy 
the 
and  confidentiality  with 
processing  of  personal  data  in  the  electronic 
communication  sector  and  to  ensure  free 
movement of such data. It can be relevant, for 
instance,  where  consumers  are  targeted  by 
online 
where 
communications between credit providers and 
consumers are made electronically.  

advertisements 

or 

The  Directive  is  under  revision  to  be  aligned 
with the GDPR.402 

contrary 

The UCPD protects consumers against unfair, 
misleading or aggressive advertising practices, 
the 
prohibiting  behaviours 
requirements  of  professional  diligence  that 
materially  distort  (or  are 
the 
economic behaviour with regard to the product 
of the average consumer it reaches or to whom 
it  is  addressed.  The  CCD  contains  specific 

likely 

to) 

to 

400 Directive 2002/65/EC. 
401 Directive 2002/58/EC. 
402 COM/2017/010 final - 2017/03 (COD). 
403 Directive 2005/29/EC. 

130 

 
 
 
 
                                                            
provisions  on 
the  advertising  of  credit 
agreements  and  standardises  the  information 
to be provided. 

Anti-Money 
Directive (AMLD)404  

Laundering 

CWA, cross-border market 

The CCD only requires that CWAs be carried 
out.  The  AMLD  obliges  entities  to  apply 
customer  due  diligence  requirements  when 
entering  into  a  business  relationship  (i.e. 
identify  and  verify  the  identity  of  clients, 
monitor transactions and report).  

Payment  Services  Directive 
(PSD2)405 

Scope of application 

Benchmark Regulation406 

Pre-contractual  information, 
the APR 

to 

aims 

drive 

The  PSD2 
increased 
competition,  innovation  and  transparency  in 
the  internal  payments  market.  It  also  foresees 
the  possibility  for  payment  institutions  to 
grant  credit,  namely  the  granting  of  credit 
lines  and  the  issuing  of  credit  cards,  only 
where it is closely linked to payment services 
(Article 18(4). 

The  Benchmark  Regulation  introduced  rules 
to ensure the accuracy and integrity of indices 
used  as  benchmarks  in  financial  instruments 
financial  contracts.  The  Regulation 
and 
amended  Article  5  of 
(pre-
contractual information) to ensure that when a 
benchmark 
the  credit 
referenced 
agreement,  adequate  information  is  provided 
by  creditors  or  credit  intermediaries  at  pre-
contractual stage (in an annex to the SECCI).  

the  CCD 

in 

is 

Insurance Distribution 
Directive407 

Cross-selling of insurance 
policies 

The IDD lays down rules concerning the 
taking up and poursuit of activities of insrance 

404 Directive (EU) 2015/849. 
405 Directive (EU) 2015/2366. 
406 Regulation (EU) 2016/1011. 
407 Directive (EU) 2016/97.  

131 

provided  to  consumers  are  to  be  regard  as 
“material” under Article 7(5) UCPD. 

In 2016, the European Commission issued 
guidance on the application of the UCPD.  
According to Article 3(4) UCPD,f  provisions 
of sector-specific EU law apply and conflict 
with provisions of the UCPD, the provisions 
of the lex specialis prevail. The UCPD 
continues nonetheless to remain relevant to 
assess other possible aspects of the 
commercial practice not covered by the sector-
specific provisions. 

Credit  providers  are  bound  by  AMLD 
requirements.  There  are  no  inconsistencies 
between  the  CCD  and  the  AMLD,  but  some 
Member  States  have  imposed  specific  anti-
requirements  when 
money 
transposing  the  Directive  that  may  constitute 
an obstacle to cross-border activity (e.g. face-
to-face ID verification), despite the  European 
Union’s  Electronic  Identification  and  Trust 
Services Regulation (eIDAS) Regulation.  

laundering 

Although  there  is  some  overlap  between  the 
two  Directives  in  relation  to  payment  service 
providers  granting  credit, 
regulate 
different aspects.  

they 

The  definition  of  “credit  agreement”  should 
clarify whether certain payment instruments are 
included  in  the  CCD.  According  to  Article 
18(4)(b)  PSD2  credit  lines  can  be  provided  by 
payment  service  provider  only  if  they  are 
granted in connection with a payment and shall 
be repaid within a short period which shall in no 
case exceed 12 months. 

inconsistencies  between 

There  are  no 
the 
Benchmark  Regulation  and  the  CCD.  The 
Benchmark Regulation acknowledges that while 
consumers are able to enter into consumer credit 
contracts  that  refer  to  benchmarks,  the  unequal 
bargaining  power  and  use  of  standard  terms 
mean  that  they  have  a  limited  choice  about  the 
benchmark  used  (Recital  71).  It 
therefore 
amended the CCD to ensure that consumers are 
correctly informed in these cases.  

The  Regulation  also  refers  to  the  CCD  in 
several  instances  when  defining  terms  used, 
ensuring  consistency  of  terms  between  both 
texts. 

Credit providers that sell insurance policies to 
consumers as part of a package are acting as 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
Geo-blocking Regulation408  Cross-border market 

and reisnsurance distribution. It establishes 
conduct of business and transparency rules, 
procedures and rules for cross-border activity, 
and rules for supervision and administrative 
sanctions or other measures applicable to 
infringements  of the national provisions 
implementing the IDD. 

insurance distributors within the meaning of the 
IDD and are bound by IDD requirements. This 
includes Article 24(3) IDD, which obliges 
insurance distributors selling insurance policies 
ancillary to consumer credit (as part of the same 
package) to offer the consumer the possibility to 
acquire the credit and the insurance separately, 
even if the insurance policy is mandatory. 

The Geo-blocking Regulation prohibits 
discrimination against customers based on 
their nationality, place of residence or 
establishment when they buy goods or 
services. However, there is no interaction 
between the CCD and this Regulation, as 
financial services are excluded from the 
Regulation. 

No specific issues were identified because 
financial services do not fall under the scope of 
the Geo-blocking Regulation.  The Regulation  
addresses certain unjustified on line sales 
discrimination based on customers' nationality, 
place of residence or place of establishment 
within the internal market. Geoblocking is 
mainly relevant for e-commerce and for 
removing barriers to use of electronic payment 
systems cross-border. However, it does not 
directly relate to consumer credit. 

408 Regulation (EU) 2018/302.  

132 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
Annex 7: Selected bibliography  

Author 

Year 

Title 

Reference 

Legislative and policy documents 

Council of the European 
Union 

Council of the European 
Union 

European 
Parliament/Council 

1986 

2011 

1998 

European 
Parliament/Council 

2000 

European 
Parliament/Council 

2002 

European 
Parliament/Council 

2002 

European 
Parliament/Council 

2003 

European Commission 

2002 

European Parliament 

2003 

European Parliament 

2004 

European Commission 

2004 

Council Directive of 22 December 1986 for the 
approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions of the Member States concerning consumer credit 

Council 
Directive 87/102/EEC 

Directive on unfair terms in consumer contracts - Council 
Directive 93/13/EEC 

Council, 2011 

Directive 98/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 16 February 1998 amending Directive 
87/102/EEC for the approximation of the laws, regulations 
and administrative provisions of the Member States 
concerning consumer credit 

Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of 
information society services, in particular electronic 
commerce, in the Internal Market ('Directive on electronic 
commerce') 

Directive 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 23 September 2002 concerning the distance 
marketing of consumer financial services and amending 
Council Directive 90/619/EEC and Directives 97/7/EC and 
98/27/EC 

Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of 
personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic 
communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic 
communications) 

Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of 
information society services, in particular electronic 
commerce, in the Internal Market ('Directive on electronic 
commerce') 

Directive 98/7/EC  

Directive 2000/31/EC  

Directive 2002/65/EC  

Directive 2002/58/EC 

Directive 2000/31/EC  

Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on the harmonisation of the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions of the Member States concerning 
credit for consumers (COM (2002) 443 final) 

COM (2002) 443 
final 

Draft report on the proposal for a European Parliament and 
Council directive on the harmonisation of the laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions of the Member 
States concerning credit for consumers (COM (2002) 443 – 
C5‑ 0420/2002 – 2002/0222 (COD)) 

Second report on the proposal for a European Parliament and 
Council directive on the harmonisation of the laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions of the Member 
States concerning credit for consumers (COM (2002) 0443 – 
C5-0420/2002 – 2002/0222(COD))  

Amended proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament on the harmonisation of the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions of the Member States concerning 
credit for consumers repealing Directive 87/102/EC and 
modifying Directive 93/13/EC (COM (2004)747 final) 

European Parliament 
(A5-0310/2003) 

European Parliament 
(A5-0224/2004) 

COM (2004)747 final 

European Commission 

2005 

Amended proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on credit agreements for 

COM (2005) 483 
final/2 

133 

 
 
 
European 
Parliament/Council 

European 
Parliament/Council 

2005 

2008 

European Commission 

2008 

European Commission 

2011 

European Commission 

2019 

European 
Parliament/Council 

2014 

European 
Parliament/Council 

European 
Parliament/Council 

2014 

2015 

European 
Parliament/Council 

2015 

European 
Parliament/Council 

2015 

European 
Parliament/Council 

2016 

consumers amending Council Directive 93/13/EC (COM 
(2005) 483 final/2) 

Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 11 May 2005 ('Unfair Commercial Practices 
Directive'). 

Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 23 April 2008 on credit agreements for consumers 
and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC 

European Commission’s Green Paper on retail financial 
services: better products, more choice, and greater 
opportunities for consumers and businesses 
(COM/2015/0630 final) 

Commission Directive 2011/90/EU of 14 November 2011 
amending Part II of Annex I to Directive 2008/48/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council providing additional 
assumptions for the calculation of the annual percentage rate 
of charge 

Guidance on the interpretation and application of Council 
Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair contract 
terms in consumer contracts 

Directive 2014/17/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 4 February 2014 on credit agreements for 
consumers relating to residential immovable property and 
amending Directives 2008/48/EC and 2013/36/EU and 
Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 

Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on electronic 
identification and trust services for electronic transactions in 
the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC.  

Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 25 November 2015 on payment services in the 
internal market, amending Directives 2002/65/EC, 
2009/110/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 
1093/2010, and repealing Directive 2007/64/EC (Text with 
EEA relevance) 

Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 20 May 2015 on the prevention of the use of 
the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or 
terrorist financing, amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 
of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing 
Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council and Commission Directive 2006/70/EC (Text with 
EEA relevance) 

Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 25 November 2015 on payment services in the 
internal market, amending Directives 2002/65/EC, 
2009/110/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 
1093/2010, and repealing Directive 2007/64/EC (Text with 
EEA relevance) 

Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural 
persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on 
the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 
95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation). 

Directive 2005/29/EC  

Directive 2008/48/EC  

COM (2015) 0603 
final 

Directive 2011/90/EU  

C(2019) 5325 final 

Directive 2014/17/EU  

Regulation (EU) No 
910/2014  

Directive (EU) 
2015/2366  

Directive (EU) 
2015/849  

Directive (EU) 
2015/2366  

Regulation (EU) 
2016/679  

European 
Parliament/Council 

2016 

Directive (EU) 2016/97 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 20 January 2016 on insurance distribution 
(recast)Text with EEA relevance 

Directive (EU) 
2016/97  

134 

 
 
European 
Parliament/Council 

2016 

European 
Parliament/Council 

2017 

European 
Parliament/Council 

2018 

Reports, studies and surveys 

Authority for the Financial 
Markets [NL] (AFM) 

Authority for the Financial 
Markets [NL] (AFM) 

2016 

2016 

Regulation (EU) 2016/1011 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 8 June 2016 on indices used as benchmarks 
in financial instruments and financial contracts or to measure 
the performance of investment funds and amending 
Directives 2008/48/EC and 2014/17/EU and Regulation (EU) 
No 596/2014 (Text with EEA relevance) 

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of 
the Council concerning the respect for private life and the 
protection of personal data in electronic communications and 
repealing Directive 2002/58/EC (Regulation on Privacy and 
Electronic Communications) (COM(2017) 10 final). 

Regulation (EU) 2018/302 of The European Parliament and 
of the Council of 28 February 2018 on addressing unjustified 
geo-blocking and other forms of discrimination based on 
customers' nationality, place of residence or place of 
establishment within the internal market and amending 
Regulations (EC) No 2006/2004 and (EU) 2017/2394 and 
Directive 2009/22/EC 

Regulation (EU) 
2016/1011 

COM/2017/010 final 
- 2017/03 (COD) 

Regulation (EU) 
2018/302  

Caution! Borrowing money costs money: A study of the 
effectiveness of a warning in credit advertisements 

Applying behavioural insights to promote better credit 
decisions. Impact of the choice architecture on decision-
making 

AFM, 2016 

AFM, 2016b 

Altman Morris 

2013 

What Behavioural Economics Has to Say about Financial 
Literacy 

Altman, 2013 

Article 29 Working Party 
(Art. 29 WP) 

Article 29 Working Party 
(Art. 29 WP) 

Article 29 Working Party 
(Art. 29 WP) 

Association of Consumer 
Credit Information Suppliers 
(ACCIS) 

Association of Consumer 
Credit Information Suppliers 
(ACCIS) 

Association of Consumer 
Credit Information Suppliers 
(ACCIS) 

2017 

2018 

Guidelines on Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) 
and determining whether processing is “likely to result in a 
high risk” for the purposes of Regulation 2016/679 

Art. 29 WP, 2017 

Guidelines on Automated individual decision-making and 
Profiling for the purposes of Regulation 2016/679 

Art. 29 WP, 2018a 

2018 

Guidelines on transparency under Regulation 2016/679 

Art. 29 WP, 2018b 

2017 

Survey of Members. Analysis of Credit Reporting in Europe  ACCIS, 2017 

2018 

Principles on Creditworthiness Assessments  

ACCIS, 2018a 

2018 

Survey of Members. Analysis of Credit Reporting in Europe   ACCIS, 2018b 

Attaité, Monika 

2015 

Balluguera Gómez, C. 

2016 

Pay-day lenders: why can we consider them as being bad 
players on the credit market? 

Attaité, M., 2015 

Los intereses en el crédito al consumo tienen un límite 
máximo 

Balluguera, 2016 

Busch, C. and Mak, V. 

2016 

'Peer-to-peer lending in the European Union' 

Busch, C. and Mak, 
V., 2016 

Centre for European Policy 
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Centre for European Policy 
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Civic Consulting (for the 
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Civic Consulting (for the 
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Biannual Survey 2018 

2016 Consumer Trends Report 

EUROFINAS, 2018a 

EBA, 2016a 

European Banking Authority 
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European Banking Authority 
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EBA, 2017 

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2018/2019 Consumer Trends Report 

EBA, 2019 

European Banking Authority 
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EBA consults on draft Guidelines on loan origination and 
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European Central Bank 
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European Central Bank 
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European Central Bank 
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European Central Bank 
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ECB, 2015 

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ECB, 2017a 

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ECB, 2017b 

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European Central Bank 
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European Central Bank 
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ECB, 2018 

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European Commission 

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European Commission 

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European 
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European 
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European 
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European Commission 

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EU investigates consumer credit websites – a market 
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Study on the coverage, functioning and consumer use of 
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European 
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European 
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European 
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European Commission 

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European 
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European Commission  

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European 
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European Commission 

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European 
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Financial Products and Services – Special Eurobarometer 
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European Commission 

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Study on the role of digitalisation and innovation in creating 
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European 
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European Commission 

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Study on consumers’ attitudes towards Terms and Conditions 
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European 
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European Commission 

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Consumer Credit Rights Campaign: Campaign Results and 
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European Commission 

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Revised rules for payment services in the EU. Summary of: 
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European 
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European 
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European Commission 

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Identifying market and regulatory obstacles to cross-border 
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European 
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European Commission 

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Mapping of national approaches in relation to 
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European 
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European Commission 

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Commission proposal for a regulation on European 
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European 
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European Commission 

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Behavioural study on the digitalisation of the marketing and 
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European 
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European Commission 

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Evaluation of the Consumer Credit Directive (Directive 
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European 
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European Commission 

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European Credit Research 
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European Credit Research 
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European Credit Research 
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European Credit Research 
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European Credit Research 
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European Credit Research 
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European Credit Research 
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Household Debt and the European Crisis 

ECRI, 2013 

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2018 

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The Trend Reversal of the Private Credit Market in the EU - 
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ECRI, 2016 

Consumer Credit, Digitalisation and Behavioural Economics. 
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ECRI, 2017 

Consumer credit, digitalisation and behavioural economics: 
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ECRI, 2018b 

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Price rules in consumer credit: should the EU act? 

ECRI, 2019 

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Data sharing in credit markets: Does comprehensiveness 
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ECRI/University of 
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European Data Protection 
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New Rules for Credit Reporting Systems in the Digital 
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EDPB, 2019 

European Retail Financial 
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ERFF, 2018 

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Study on Credit Intermediaries in the Internal Market 

European Parliament 

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Implementation of the Consumer Credit Directive 

European Parliament 

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Misleading Packaging Practices 

European Parliament 

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Consumer Protection Aspects of Financial Services 

European Parliament 

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Gold-plating' in the EAFRD to what extent do national rules 
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European Parliament 

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Consumer Credit: Mis-selling of Financial Products 

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European Parliament, 
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European Parliament, 
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European Parliament, 
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European Parliament, 
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European Parliament 

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A governance framework for algorithmic accountability and 
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European Parliament, 
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Financial Conduct Authority 
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Financial Services User 
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Financial Services User 
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The FCA’s regulatory approach to crowdfunding over the 
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Assessment of current and future impact of Big Data on 
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Opinion on responsible consumer credit lending. Opinion 
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FAC, 2014 

FSUG, 2016 

FSUG, 2019 

Finance Watch 

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Consumer Protection Must Come before Financial 
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Finance Watch, 2017 

Finance Watch Germany 

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Rating Faire Kreditvergabe 

German Federal Financial 
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Ergebnisbericht zur Marktuntersuchung 
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Finance Watch 
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BaFin, 2017 

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Global Partnership for 
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House of Lords, EU 
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International Financial 
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Ing  

Intrum 

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Unfair contract terms and misleading trading practices in 
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Report on the Digitalisation of Short-term, High-Cost 
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View on Consumer Lending trends in Europe  

European Consumer Payment Report 2018 

Peer-to-Peer Lending – A New Digital Intermediary. New 
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Blurred Lines: Between Formal and Substantive 
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Transparency of (pre-)contractual Information in consumer 
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Intrum, 2018 

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Biannual Survey 2018 

Lefevre, A. and M. Chapman  2017 

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OECD Working Papers on Finance, Insurance and Private 
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Lefevre and 
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Study on The Functioning of the Consumer Credit Market in 
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London Economics, 
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London Economics 

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Study on The Functioning of the Consumer Credit Market in 
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Consumer Vulnerability across Key Markets in the European 
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London Economics, 
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London Economics, VVA 
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London Economics Europe, 
VVA Consulting, Ipsos NV, 
ConPolicy and Time.lex 

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Multistakeholder expert 
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Behavioural study on the digitalisation of the marketing and 
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Contribution from the Multistakeholder Expert Group to the 
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NIBUD, 2018 

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Office of Fair Trading (OFT)  2013 

Payday Lending – Compliance Review Final Report 

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Organisation for Economic 
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Organisation for Economic 
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Oxera 

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2009 

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Facilitating access to finance – Discussion paper on Credit 
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Short-term consumer credit: provision, regulatory coverage 
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What Is the Impact of the Proposed Consumer Credit 
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Comparison websites often mislead on flight and hotel 
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BEUC Response to the Commission’s Call for Evidence 

BEUC, 2016 

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The Never-Ending European Credit Data Mess 

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Zentrum für europäischen 
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BE - Financial Law Institute 
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BE - Financial Services and 
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DE - Centre Européen de la 
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2011 

2019 

2017 

2011 

DE - Bundesanstalt für  
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DE - EOS Holding GmbH  

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DE - Verbraucherzentrale 

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Umfrage der Verbraucherzentrale Nordrhein-Westfalen zum 
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Verbraucherzentrale 
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der Kreditwürdigkeitsprüfung bei Aufnahme eines 
Verbraucherdarlehens 

DE – SCHUFA. Kredit-
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Empirische Untersuchung der privaten Kreditaufnahme in 
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SCHUFA [DE], 2017 

DE - Verbraucherzentrale 

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Verbraucherzentrale 
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DE - Verbraucherzentrale 

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Accompanying document to the consultation of the 
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DE - Verbraucherzentrale 

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Verantwortliche Verbraucherkredite. 

Begleitendes Forderungspapier zur Konsultation der 
Verbraucherkreditrichtlinie II  

2019 

Faire Kreditvergabe 

2018 

Competitive markets and consumer welfare 

DE - Finance Watch 
Germany 

DK – Danish Competition 
and Consumer Authority  

ES - Banco de España 

2008 

Memoria del servicio de reclamaciones 

Verbraucherzentrale 
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Verbraucherzentrale 
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Finance Watch 
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Danish Competition 
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Banco de España 
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ES - Consejo de 
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2009 

La situación de endeudamiento y sobreendeudamiento 
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Consejo de 
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ES - Asociacion de Usuarios 
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ES – Asociacion General de 
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ES – Boletín Oficial Del 
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Disposiciones generales jefatura del Estado - Ley 5/2015, de 
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ES – Banco de España - 
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ES – Banco de España - 
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ES – Banco de España - 
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ES – Banco de España - 
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FI – Office of the data 
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Memoria De Reclamaciones 

2018 

Memoria De Reclamaciones 

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2019 

Encuesta sobre Préstamos Bancarios en España: abril de 
2018  

Banco de España 
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Encuesta sobre Préstamos Bancarios en España: Julio de 
2019  

Banco de España 
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Informe De Estabilidad Financiera  

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The Data Protection Ombudsman ordered Svea Ekonomi to 
correct its practices in the processing of personal data 

ASGECO [ES], 
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ASGECO [ES], 
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BOE, 2015 

Banco de España 
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Banco de España 
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Banco de España [es], 
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Directive crédit à la consommation 

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FR - Economie 

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Rapport Annuel 2016 (Direction Générale De L’inspection 
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Rapport Annuel 2017 (Direction Générale De L’inspection 
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Crédit à la consommation : loyauté de l’information 
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FR – Eurogroup Consulting   2018 

Etude Crédit Consommation France  

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FR - Autorité de contrôle 
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2019 

Financement participatif 

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IT - Università degli Studi di 
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Il collegamento negoziale nel credito al consumo alla luce 
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Università degli Studi 
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NL - Netherlands Authority 
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NL - Vereniging van 
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2010 

2011 

2011 

2011 

2014 

2017 

2017 

 2018 

UK - Department for 
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(BIS) 

UK - Department for 
Business Innovation & Skills 
(BIS) 

UK - Department for 
Business Innovation & Skills 
(BIS) 

UK - Financial Conduct 
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UK - Consumer Credit 
Association (CCA) 

UK - Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA) 

UK - Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA) 

UK - Financial Conduct 
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Guidance on the Regulations Implementing the Consumer 
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BIS [UK], 2010 

2011/90/EU (Effective 1 January 2013) 

A New Approach to Financial Regulation: Summary of 
Responses to Consultation on Reforming the Consumer 
Credit Regime 

UK BIS, 2011a 

Consumer Credit and Personal Insolvency Review: Formal 
Response on Consumer Credit 

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Consumer Credit and Personal Insolvency Review: Summary 
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Consumer Credit and Consumers in Vulnerable 
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UK FCA, 2014 

Response to the European Commission’s Green Paper on 
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CCA [UK], 2017 

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Credit Information Market Study 

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Feedback on the European Commission’s Evaluation Roadmap of the Consumer Credit Directive 

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Feedback from the Autorité de régulation professionnelle de 
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(ACCIS) 

Evaluation Roadmap of the Consumer Credit Directive 

Association of European 
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Association of Sparda-Banks  2018 

Feedback from the Association of European Radios (BE) on 
the European Commission's Evaluation Roadmap of the 
Consumer Credit Directive 

AER, 2018 

Feedback from the Association of Sparda-Banks on the 
European Commission's Evaluation Roadmap of the 
Consumer Credit Directive 

Association of 
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European Banking 
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2018 

Feedback from the European Banking Federation (BE) on 
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Consumer Credit Directive 

EBF, 2018 

2019 

INT/884 Consumer Credit Directive (evaluation) 

EESC, 2019 

European Economic and 
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European Federation of 
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Eurofinas 

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Finance Watch 

2018 

2018 

2018 

2018 

Finance Watch 

2019 

Feedback from BIPAR (BE) on the European Commission's 
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Feedback from Eurofinas (BE) on the European 
Commission's Evaluation Roadmap of the Consumer Credit 
Directive 

Eurofinas, 2018b 

Eurofinas response to the European Commission’s public 
consultation on the Consumer Credit Directive  

Eurofinas, 2018c 

Feedback from Finance Watch (BE) on the European 
Commission's Evaluation Roadmap of the Consumer Credit 
Directive  

Feedback from Finance Watch (BE) on the European 
Commission's Evaluation Roadmap of the Consumer Credit 
Directive  

Finance Watch, 2018 

Finance Watch, 2019 

Financial Conduct Authority 
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2018 

High-Cost Credit Review: Overdrafts consultation paper and 
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Financial Services User 
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2019 

What makes credit so risky? A consumer perspective  

FUSG, 2019 

German Banking Industry 
Committee (GBIC) 

2018 

Verbraucherzentrale 
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2018 

Feedback from the German Banking Industry Committee 
(GBIC) (DE) on the European Commission's Evaluation 
Roadmap of the Consumer Credit Directive  

GBIC, 2018 

Feedback from Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband (vzbv) 
(DE) on the European Commission's Evaluation Roadmap of 
the Consumer Credit Directive  

Vzbz, 2018 

Other feedback 

Eurofinas 

Eurofinas 

2009 

2015 

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Consultation on Responsible Lending and Borrowing in The 
EU 

Eurofinas, 2009 

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Draft Guidelines on Creditworthiness Assessment Draft 
Guidelines on Arrears and Foreclosure 

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European Association of Co-
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2013 

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Consulting Study on Over-Indebtedness (OI) Of European 
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European Banking Industry 
Committee (EBIC) 

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Other sources of information  

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EBIC Comments on The CCD Benchmark Study 

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2019 

Review of the Consumer Credit Directive – BEUC Position  BEUC, 2019 

DE – Spiegel online 

2019 

So schützen Sie sich vor den Tricks der Vergleichsportale 

Spiegel [DE], 2019 

143 

 
 
 
 
ES- El Confidencial  

 2018 

Bancos españoles - El crédito al consumo es un 70% más 
caro en España que en Europa 

El Confidencial [ES], 
2018 

ES- El Economistas  

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Los préstamos al consumo son una herramienta clave para la 
economía 

El Economistas [ES], 
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ES- El Pais - Economia  

ES- Expansion  

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La usura de las tarjetas ‘revolving’ estalla en los tribunales 

El Pais [ES], 2019 

Vuelve el préstamo irresponsable, pero ahora al consumo  

Expansion [ES], 2018 

ES- Observatorio Cetelem  

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Ecommerce Report: La Revolucion de la tienda online 

Observatorio Cetelem 
[ES], 2018 

ES - Organización de 
Consumidores y Usuarios 
(OCU)  

ES - Organización de 
Consumidores y Usuarios 
(OCU)  

ES - Organización de 
Consumidores y Usuarios 
(OCU)  

ES - Organización de 
Consumidores y Usuarios 
(OCU)  

ES - Organización de 
Consumidores y Usuarios 
(OCU)  

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Los españoles pagan caro el crédito al consumo 

OCU [ES], 2019a 

 2019 

Crowdfunding: colaborando con micromecenazgo 

OCU [ES], 2019b 

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Deudas y morosos al mejor postor 

OCU [ES], 2019c 

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Minicréditos = maxiabusos 

OCU [ES], 2019d 

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Qué hacer si necesitas dinero 

OCU [ES], 2019e 

FR – Que choisir   

2011 

 Crédit conso. Nouvelle protection en demi-teinte 

Le crédit à la consommation 

Perception des mentions légales à la radio 

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2016 

2015 

2018 

Financement participatif. Face aux dérives persistantes, une 
regulation s'impose! 

Que choisir [FR], 
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Que choisir [FR], 
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Economie [FR], 2015 

IFOP [FR], 2016 

Que choisir [FR], 
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2019 

Leasing, a Massive Degradation of Borrowers Rights 

2019 

Loa/Lld: Une Degradation Massive Des Droits Des 
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2019 

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Que Choisir [FR], 
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Que Choisir [FR], 
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Que Choisir [FR], 
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2019 

 Le découvert bancaire: les excès, la norme. Des Crédits 
Excessivement Chers 

Que Choisir [FR], 
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FR – Que choisir   

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Plafonnement des sanctions en cas d’erreur ou de défaut de 
TAEG 

Que choisir [FR], 
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IT – Banca d’Italia 

IT - Crowd-funding 

- 

- 

IT - ResearchGate  

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IT - Opinioni. Credito al 
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NL - Autoriteit Financiële 
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Nederlanders betalen flinke rentes over hun leningen 

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144 

FR- Economie (France) 

FR – IFOP 

FR – Que choisir   

FR - UFC-Que Choisir, 
Service des   études 

FR - UFC-Que Choisir, 
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FR - UFC-Que Choisir, 
Service des    études 

FR - UFC-Que Choisir, 
Service des   études 

FR - UFC-Que Choisir, 
Service des   études 

 
 
 
[https://www.pricewise.nl/blog/onderzoek-rentepercentages-
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Credit card companies pushing credit on millions of people 
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Big And Small Differences In Payday Loans In Europe 

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2018 

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Behavioural Insights Team 

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BIS 

DGCCRF 

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Which?  

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2018 

2018 

2012 

2013 

2014 

2015 

2017 

2017 

2019 

2014 

2019 

2016 

2019 

2018 

2019 

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FinTechs Continue to Drive Personal Loan Growth 

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Borrowers face early-repayment charges on half of all 
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[https://www.which.co.uk/news/2019/02/borrowers-face-
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Which?] 

Which? [UK], 2019b 

145 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex 8: Evaluation Questions 

Effectiveness 

  EQ1 -  To what extent  has  the  Directive  achieved its objectives? What are the main 

benefits and drawbacks of the Directive?  

  EQ2  -  To  what  extent  has  the  Directive  led  to  legal  clarity?  What  is  the  level  of 

compliance of businesses and their enforcement?  

  EQ3  -  Is  the  Directive  –  through  advertising  requirements,  pre-contractual 
information  (including  Standardised  European  Consumer  Credit  Information 
“SECCI”  and  Annual  Percentage  Rate  of  Charge  “APR”)  and  other  additional 
information – ensuring that consumers are effectively provided with accurate, clear, 
concise, timely and comprehensive information free-of-charge? 

  EQ4  -  How  have  the  provisions  relating  to  creditworthiness  assessments  (CWA) 
worked in practice? To what extent have the provision of the Annual Percentage Rate 
of Charge (APR) and the performance of a CWA contributed to helping consumers 
find the credit best suited to their needs and avoid over-indebtedness? 

  EQ5 - To what extent do the conditions of access to credit databases on cross-border 

basis vary across the EU?  

  EQ6  -  How  have  the  provisions  relating  to  the  rights  of  withdrawal  and  early 
repayment worked in practice? How frequently are consumers making use of them? 
  EQ7  -  Have  the  scope  of  application  and  the  definitions  used  in  the  Directive 
succeeded  in  ensuring  a  high  level  of  consumer  protection  and  performance  of  the 
internal market for consumer credit? 

Efficiency  

  EQ8  -  What  are  the  costs  and  benefits  (including  any  reduction  in  consumer 
detriment) associated with the Directive and what are they influenced by? Can they 
be considered proportionate? 

  EQ9 - To what extent are the provisions of the Directive cost-effective? Are there any 

provisions particularly hampering the maximisation of the benefits? 

  EQ10  -  Is  there  scope  for  simplification  and  burden  reduction?  What  provisions  or 
areas  of  the  Directive  could  be  simplified  to  reduce  the  burden  on  stakeholders 
without undermining the effectiveness of the Directive? 

Coherence 

  EQ11 - To what extent is the Directive internally coherent? 
  EQ12 - To what extent is the Directive coherent with other national-level consumer 
policy and legislation (including legislation going beyond the scope of the Directive 
or relevant for consumer credit)? 

146 

 
 
 
  
 
  EQ13  -  To  what  extent  is  the  Directive  coherent  and  complementary  with  other 

relevant EU-level legislation? 

  EQ14 - To what extent are the provisions of the Directive and their implementation at 

national level coherent with national and EU-level data protection legislation? 

Relevance 

  EQ15 - Are the objectives of the Directive still relevant? Does the Directive address 
current  and  anticipated  future  needs  and  challenges  (e.g.  market  developments, 
consumer behaviour and needs), including those of consumers and providers?  

  EQ16  -  How  relevant  and  adapted  are  the  scope,  thresholds  and  definitions  in  the 

Directive to the current market situation? 

EU added value 

  EQ17  -  Where  does  the  EU  added  value  of  the  Directive  lie?  Would  the  benefits 
delivered  by  the  Directive  have  been  achieved  in  the  absence  of  EU-level 
intervention? 

  EQ18 - What would be the most likely consequence of withdrawing the Directive? In 
the absence of EU-level action, to what extent would Member States have the ability 
or possibility to enact appropriate measures? 

147