COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Turkey 2020 Report Accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 2020 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy
Date: 2020-10-06
Institutions: Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations, European Commission
Subjects: Türkiye, accession criteria, accession negotiations, coronavirus disease, epidemic, pre-accession strategy

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 6.10.2020  SWD(2020) 355 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Turkey 2020 Report    Accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions  2020 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy {COM(2020) 660 final} - {SWD(2020) 350 final} - {SWD(2020) 351 final} - {SWD(2020) 352 final} - {SWD(2020) 353 final} - {SWD(2020) 354 final} - {SWD(2020) 356 final}  
 
 
Table of Contents 

1. 

1.1. 

2. 

INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 3 

Context ......................................................................................................................... 3 

FUNDAMENTALS FIRST: POLITICAL CRITERIA AND RULE OF LAW 
CHAPTERS ................................................................................................................ 10 

2.1. 

Functioning of democratic institutions and public administration reform ................. 10 

2.1.1  Democracy .................................................................................................................. 10 

2.1.2.  Public administration reform ...................................................................................... 18 

2.2. 

Rule of law and fundamental rights ............................................................................ 21 

2.2.1.  Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights ............................................................ 21 

2.2.2  Chapter 24: Justice, freedom and security .................................................................. 42 

3. 

3.1. 

3.2. 

4. 

5. 

5.1. 

5.2. 

5.3. 

5.4. 

5.5. 

5.9. 

Fundamentals first: economic development and competitiveness ............................. 53 

The existence of a functioning market economy ........................................................ 54 

The capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union60 

GOOD NEIGHBOURLY RELATIONS AND REGIONAL COOPERATION ....... 63 

ABILITY TO ASSUME THE OBLIGATIONS OF MEMBERSHIP ....................... 67 

Chapter 1: Free movement of goods .......................................................................... 67 

Chapter 2: Freedom of movement for workers .......................................................... 69 

Chapter 3: Right of establishment and freedom to provide services .......................... 69 

Chapter 4: Free movement of capital ......................................................................... 69 

Chapter 5: Public procurement ................................................................................... 71 

Chapter 9: Financial services ...................................................................................... 76 

5.10.  Chapter 10: Information society and media ............................................................... 77 

5.11.  Chapter 11: Agriculture and rural development ......................................................... 79 

5.12.  Chapter 12: Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy ................................... 80 

5.13.  Chapter 13: Fisheries .................................................................................................. 81 

5.14.  Chapter 14: Transport policy ...................................................................................... 82 

5.15.  Chapter 15: Energy ..................................................................................................... 83 

5.16.  Chapter 16: Taxation .................................................................................................. 86 

5.17.  Chapter 17: Economic and monetary policy .............................................................. 87 

5.18.  Chapter 18: Statistics .................................................................................................. 88 

5.19.  Chapter 19: Social policy and employment ................................................................ 89 

5.20.  Chapter 20: Enterprise and industrial policy .............................................................. 92 

5.21.  Chapter 21: Trans-European networks ....................................................................... 94 

5.22.  Chapter 22: Regional policy and the coordination of structural instruments ............. 95 

5.25.  Chapter 25: Science and research ............................................................................... 96 

1 

 
 
5.26.  Chapter 26: Education and culture ............................................................................. 97 

5.27.  Chapter 27: Environment and climate change ............................................................ 99 

5.28.  Chapter 28: Health and consumer protection ........................................................... 102 

5.29.  Chapter 29: Customs Union ..................................................................................... 104 

5.30.  Chapter 30: External relations .................................................................................. 105 

5.31.  Chapter 31: Foreign, security and defence policy .................................................... 106 

5.32.  Chapter 32: Financial control ................................................................................... 110 

5.33.  Chapter 33: Financial and budgetary provisions ...................................................... 112 

Annex I – Relations between the EU and Turkey .................................................................. 114 

2 

 
 
 
 
1. 

INTRODUCTION  

1.1.  Context 

Turkey remains a key partner for the European Union. Turkey has been linked to the EU by an 
Association Agreement since 1964 and a Customs Union was established in 1995. The European 
Council  granted  the  status  of  candidate  country  to  Turkey  in  December  1999  and  accession 
negotiations were opened in October 2005. Within the framework of accession negotiations, 16 
chapters  had  been  opened  and  one  of  these  was  provisionally  closed.  The  General  Affairs 
Council conclusions of June 2019 reiterated the Council’s position of June 2018 that under the 
currently  prevailing  circumstances, Turkey’s  accession  negotiations  have  effectively  come  to  a 
standstill,  no  further  chapters  can  be  considered  for  opening  or  closing  and  no  further  work 
towards  the  modernisation  of  the  Customs  Union  can  be  currently  foreseen1.  The  Turkish 
government’s repeated commitment to the objective of EU accession has not been matched by 
corresponding measures and reforms, and the EU’s serious concerns on continued deterioration 
of democracy, the rule of law, fundamental rights and the independence of the judiciary have not 
been  addressed  with  further  backsliding  in  many  areas.  Following  its  last  meeting  on  9  May 
2019, no further meetings of the inter-ministerial Reform Action Group were held. 

The relations with the EU worsened due to the developments in Syria and Libya.  

In  light  of  the  unauthorised  drilling  activities  of  Turkey  in  the  Eastern  Mediterranean,  in  July 
2019  the  Council  decided  to  suspend  negotiations  with  Turkey  on  the  Comprehensive  Air 
Transport Agreement, not to hold for the time being the EU-Turkey Association Council as well 
as  further  meetings  of  the  EU-Turkey  high-level  dialogues,  to  endorse  the  Commission’s 
proposal to reduce the pre-accession assistance to Turkey for 2020, and to invite the European 
Investment  Bank  to  review  its  lending  activities  in  Turkey,  notably  with  regard  to  sovereign-
backed  lending.  The  EU  further  adopted  a  framework  for  targeted  measures  against  Turkey  in 
November 2019 and decided in February 2020 to add two individuals to the list of designations 
under this  sanctions  framework.  On  1  October 2020,  the  European  Council  agreed  to  launch  a 
positive political EU-Turkey agenda, provided constructive efforts to stop illegal activities vis-à-
vis  Greece  and  Cyprus  are  sustained.  The  EU  has  a  strategic  interest  in  a  stable  and  secure 
environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the development of a cooperative and mutually 
beneficial relationship with Turkey. The European Council also stressed that in case of renewed 
unilateral  actions  or  provocations  in  breach  of  international  law,  the  EU  will  use  all  the 
instruments and the options at its disposal in order to defend its interests and those of its Member 
States. 

Turkey  sustained its outstanding efforts to  host more than 3.6 million registered refugees from 
Syria and around 370,000 registered refugees from other countries, which is the largest refugee 
community in the world. Turkey and the EU further built on the fruitful cooperation under the 
Facility for Refugees in Turkey. The full operational budget of the EU Facility for Refugees in 
Turkey was committed by the end of 2019. Out of a total of EUR 6 billion, EUR 5.1 billion had 
been contracted, out of which EUR 3.8 billion had been disbursed. 

Overall,  the  March  2016  EU-Turkey  Statement  continued  to  deliver  results,  with  both  parties 
renewing  commitment  to  its  effective  implementation.  Early  in  March  2020,  Turkey  however 
actively  encouraged  migrants  and  refugees  to  take  the  land  route  to  Europe  through  Greece. 
Later in March, the Turkish authorities organised transport for migrants and refugees away from 
the  border  area  with  Greece  and  closed  the  borders  with  Greece  and  Bulgaria  except  for 
commercial traffic because of the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. Turkey also called for a 
new agreement to replace the March 2016 Statement. Following the meeting of the President of 
the European Commission and the President of the European Council with the Turkish President 
on 9 March 2020, both sides engaged in a process to take stock of the implementation of the EU-

1 The European Council conclusions of December 2006 remain in force. 

3 

 
                                                            
Turkey  Statement.  The  EU  decided  to  mobilise  additional  EUR  485  million  from  the  2020 
budget  to  ensure  the  continuation  of  flagship  projects  funded  under  the  2016-19  Facility 
providing refugees with basic needs and access to education. Assisting refugees affected by the 
Syrian  crisis  and  their  hosting  countries  will  continue  to  be  needed,  and  the  and  the  recent 
Communication on a new Pact on Asylum and Migration noted that continued and sustained EU 
funding in some form will be essential.2 

The first half of 2020 has been marked by the devastating impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. 
The  EU  redirected  EU  funds  worth  EUR  83  million  to  support  the  COVID-19  response  in 
Turkey,  notably  to  support  the  most  vulnerable  refugees,  and  agreed  to  extend  implementing 
periods for some Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) programmes. In the context of 
the  Facility  for  Refugees  in  Turkey,  the  Commission  immediately  launched  awareness  raising 
activities for the refugee population who are among the most vulnerable people. An agreement 
was  reached  with  the  Turkish  government  to  mobilise  savings  and  contingencies  under  the 
Facility to support the national COVID-19 response. This support will continue. Turkey pledged 
EUR 75 million as its contribution to support the search for a vaccine in the COVID-19 Global 
Response Summit held on 4 May.  

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, in March Turkey set up the Economic Stability Shield 
package worth TRY 100 billion ($15.4 billion; 2.2% of GDP) A quarter of this support goes to 
doubling  the  credit  guarantee  fund's  limit  to  TRY  50  billion  to  provide  SMEs  and  companies 
with  liquidity  needs.  A  number  of  smaller  measures  under  this  package  include  the 
postponement of repayment terms of loans extended by public banks. The scope of SME support 
was  extended  to  the  services  sector,  craftsmen  and  artisans.  A  new  support  scheme  was 
established  for  companies  with  production  capability  of  personal  protective  equipment  and 
disinfectants.  In  order  to  mitigate  the  social  impact,  the  government  enacted  some  short-term 
measures.  It  eased  the  eligibility  criteria  for  short-term  work  benefits  to  workers  and  rules  for 
taking  unpaid  leave.  The  social  security  premium  liabilities  of  employers  are  postponed  by  6 
months, and employers receive a monthly support of TRY 75 to the wage of each worker paid at 
minimum wage level until the end of 2020. A one-off payment of TRY 1,000 was made in April 
to  4.4  million  households,  including  the  2.1  million  households  receiving  regular  social 
assistance. A National Solidarity Fund has been set up to provide further support to families in 
need.  The  measures  are  limited  in  the  light  of  the  impact  of  the  pandemic  on  employment,  in 
particular on informal workers.  

The European Commission recommended that emergency measures taken in the context of the 
COVID-19 pandemic are proportionate, restricted to what is necessary and limited in time so that 
rule of law and democratic and human rights standards are respected.  

1.2 

Summary of the report 

Despite the lifting of the state of emergency in July 2018, the adverse impacts of the two-year 
long emergency ruling continued to significantly impact on democracy
 and fundamental rights.
Certain  legal  provisions  granting  extraordinary  powers  to  the  government  authorities  and 
retaining several restrictive elements of the emergency rule have been integrated into law. Key 
recommendations of the Council of Europe and its bodies are yet to be addressed. Allegations of 
wrongdoing  need  to  be  addressed  through  transparent  procedures  and  on  an  individual  basis. 
Individual  criminal  liability  can  only  be  established  with  full  respect  for  the  separation  of 
powers, the full independence of the judiciary and the right of every individual to a fair trial and 
due process. 

The  constitutional  architecture  continued  centralising  powers  at  the  level  of  the  Presidency 
without ensuring a sound and effective separation of powers between the executive, legislative 
and the judiciary. In the absence of an effective checks and balances mechanism, the democratic 

2 COM(2020) 609 final on a New Pact on Migration and Asylum 

4 

 
 
                                                            
accountability of the executive branch remains limited to elections. Under these conditions, the 
serious  backsliding  of  the  respect  for  democratic  standards,  the  rule  of  law,  and  fundamental 
freedoms  continued.  Political  polarisation  continued  to  prevent  constructive  parliamentary 
dialogue.  Parliamentary  oversight  of  the  executive  remained  weak.  Under  the  presidential 
system, many regulatory authorities and the Central Bank were directly linked to the Presidency, 
undermining their independence. 

The opposition candidate won the re-run of the metropolitan mayoral elections in Istanbul on 23 
June 2019. While the elections were professionally organised, they were characterised by limited 
plurality for democratic media and conditions that were objectively not fair to all political parties 
and candidates in all respects. Turkey needs to take steps to improve the broader environment for 
elections,  ensuring  a  level  playing  field  for  all  candidates  and  protecting  the  integrity  of  the 
election process. The implementation of Venice Commission recommendations is crucial in this 
regard. 

The  situation  in  the  south-east  continued  to  be  very  worrying,  despite  an  improved  security 
environment. The replacement of 47 democratically elected HDP municipal mayors by centrally-
appointed  trustees  in  the  south-east  put  the  results  of  the  democratic  process  of  the  31  March 
2019  local  elections  into  question.  Arrests  and  dismissals  of  elected  mayors  and  party 
representatives  continued  and  seriously  damaged  local  democracy.
  The  Government  continued 
security operations against a background of the recurrent violent acts by the Kurdistan Workers’ 
Party  (PKK),  which  remains  on  the  EU  list  of  persons,  groups  and  entities  involved  in  acts  of 
terrorism. While the government has a legitimate right to fight terrorism, it is also responsible for 
ensuring  this  is  done  in  accordance  with  the  rule  of  law,  human  rights  and  fundamental 
freedoms. Anti-terror measures need to be proportionate. Despite some reconstruction, only few 
internally  displaced  persons  have  received  compensation.  There  were  no  visible  developments 
on the resumption of a credible political process to achieve a peaceful and sustainable solution.  

Civil society came under continuous pressure and their space to operate freely has continued to 
diminish.  The  Gezi  trial  and  the  continued  pre-trial  detention  of  Osman  Kavala,  despite  the 
existence  of  a  ruling  of  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  calling  on  his  release,  had  a 
deterrent  effect.  Administrative  difficulties  for  national  and  international  non-governmental 
organisations  (NGOs)  continued  to  hamper  civil  society  activities.  Civil  society  organisations 
remained excluded from genuine legislative consultation

 processes. 

The  legal  and  institutional  framework  governing  the  security  and  intelligence  sector  remained 
unchanged  with  strengthened  civilian  oversight  of  the  security  forces  under  the  presidential 
system. 

Turkey has some level of preparation/is moderately prepared in public administration reform. 
There  was  backsliding  during  the  reporting  period.  The  major  restructuring  of  public 
administration  and  civil  service  after  the  shift  to  the  presidential  system  in  2018  continued  to 
have  a  negative  impact  on  policy  development,  accountability  of  the  administration  as  well  as 
human  resources  management,  although  policy  coordination  among  central  government 
institutions remained strong
. Changes to the civil service system have increased the politicisation 
of  the  administration.  No  steps  were  taken  to  develop  a  comprehensive  public  administration 
reform  strategy  and  an  overarching  public  financial  management  reform  programme.  An 
effective remedy still needs to be provided for the large-scale dismissals that took place during 
the  state  of  emergency.  There  remained  questions  over  the  extent  to  which  the  Inquiry 
Commission is an effective judicial remedy.  

Turkey’s  judicial  system  is  at  an  early  stage  of  preparation  and  serious  backsliding  continued 
during  the  reporting  period.  Concerns  remained,  in  particular  over  the  systemic  lack  of 
independence of the judiciary. The President announced the Judicial Reform Strategy for 2019-
2023  in  May  2019.  However,  it  falls  short  of  addressing  key  shortcomings  regarding  the 
independence of the judiciary. No measures were announced to remedy the concerns identified 

5 

 
by  the  Council  of  Europe’s  Venice  Commission  and  in  the  European  Commission’s  annual 
country reports. There are concerns that dismissals in the absence of respect for due procedures 
caused self-censorship and intimidation within the judiciary. No measures were taken to change 
the  structure  of,  and  process  for,  the  selection  of  members  of  the  Council  of  Judges  and 
Prosecutors  to  strengthen  its  independence.  Concerns  regarding  the  lack  of  objective,  merit-
based, uniform and pre-established criteria for recruiting and promoting judges and prosecutors 
persisted. No changes were made to the institution of criminal judges of peace so that concerns 
regarding their jurisdiction and practice remained.  

Regarding  the  fight  against  corruption,  Turkey  remained  at  an  early  stage  and  made  no 
progress in the reporting period. The country continued to lack preventive anti-corruption bodies. 
The flaws of the legal framework and institutional architecture allowed undue political influence 
in the investigation and prosecution phases of corruption cases. Accountability and transparency 
of public institutions need to be improved. The absence of an anti-corruption strategy and action 
plan indicated the lack of political will to fight decisively against corruption. Overall, corruption 
is widespread and remains an issue of concern. 

Turkey has some level of preparation in the fight against organised crime and there was limited 
progress. The 2019-2021 national action plan, for the implementation of the 2016-2021 national 
strategy  on the  fight against  organised  crime,  was  adopted  in  May  2019.  Cooperation  between 
Europol and Turkey is based on a Strategic Agreement on Cooperation, which entered into force 
in July 2004. Negotiations concerning an operational cooperation agreement on the exchange of 
personal  data  between  Europol  and  Turkey  were  ongoing,  requiring  Turkey  to  align  its  data 
protection  law  in  line  with  European  standards.  Turkey  should  improve  its  track  record  on 
dismantling criminal networks and confiscating criminal assets. The legal framework regulating 
the  fight  against  money  laundering  and  terrorist  financing  needs  to  be  improved.  Efforts  are 
needed  to  improve  the  legislation  on  cybercrime,  asset  confiscation  and  witness  protection.  A 
cooperation agreement with CEPOL has been in force since 2010. 

The  deterioration  of  human  and  fundamental  rights  continued.  Many  of  the  measures 
introduced  during  the  state  of  emergency  remained  in  force  and  continued  to  have  a  profound 
and devastating impact. The legal framework includes general guarantees of respect for human 
and fundamental rights but the legislation and practice still need to be brought into line with the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and with the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR)  case-law.  The  lack  of  institutional  independence,  lengthy  review  procedures,  the 
absence of sufficiently individualised criteria, and the absence of a proper means of defence cast 
serious  doubt  over  the  Inquiry  Commission  on  the  State  of  Emergency  Measures’  ability  to 
provide  an  effective  remedy  against  dismissals.  Legislation  introduced  immediately  after  the 
lifting  of  the  state  of  emergency  removed  crucial  safeguards  protecting  detainees  from  abuse, 
thereby  increasing  the  risk  of  impunity.  The  enforcement  of  rights  is  hindered  by  the 
fragmentation and limited independence of public institutions responsible for protecting human 
rights  and  freedoms,  and  is  aggravated  by  the  lack  of  an  independent  judiciary.  Restrictions 
imposed on, and surveillance of, the activities of journalists, writers, lawyers, academics, human 
rights  defenders  and  critical  voices  on  a  broad  scale  have  a  negative  effect  on  the  exercise  of 
these  freedoms,  and  lead  to  self-censorship.  Credible  allegations  of  torture  and  ill-treatment 
continued to be reported. In light of the COVID-19 pandemic, a controversial legislative package 
provided for the conditional release of up to 90,000 prisoners. As of July, 65,000 prisoners had 
been released. However, it excluded those held in pre-trial detention for alleged terrorism-related 
offences, including lawyers, journalists, politicians and human rights defenders. 

Serious backsliding continued on freedom of expression.  he disproportionate implementation of 
the  restrictive  measures  continued  to  negatively  affect  the  freedom  of  expression  and 
dissemination of opposition voices. Criminal cases and convictions of journalists, human rights 
defenders,  lawyers,  writers  and  social  media  continued.  The  ban  on  Wikipedia  was  lifted  in 
December 2019, however, the blocking and erasing of online content without a court order on an 

T

6 

 
inappropriately  wide  range  of  grounds  continued.  There  was  further  backsliding  in  the  area  of 
freedom of assembly and association in light of recurrent bans, disproportionate interventions in 
fines  and  prosecutions  against 
peaceful  demonstrations, 
demonstrators on charges of ‘terrorism-related activities’.  

investigations,  administrative 

The rights of the most disadvantaged groups and of persons belonging to minorities need better 
protection. Roma continue to live in very poor housing, often lacking basic  public services and 
relying  on  social  benefits.  The  urban  renewal  projects  continue  to  affect  primarily  their 
settlements, forcing the displacement of entire families. Gender-based violence, discrimination, 
hate  speech  against  minorities,  hate  crime  and  violations  of  human  rights  of  lesbian,  gay, 
bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) persons are still a matter of serious concern.  

In  the  area  of  migration  and  asylum  policy,  Turkey  made  some  progress.  Throughout  2019, 
Turkey was committed to the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement of March 2016 and 
played  a  key  role  in  ensuring  effective  management  of  migratory  flows  along  the  Eastern 
Mediterranean  route
.  Turkey  sustained  its  outstanding  efforts  to  provide  unprecedented 
humanitarian aid and support to more than 3.6 million registered refugees from Syria and around 
370,000 registered refugees from other countries, thus hosting the largest refugee community in 
the world. However, in March 2020, Turkey actively encouraged migrants and refugees to take 
the land route to Europe through Greece. This led to the set-up of an informal camp at one of the 
Greek-Turkish  border  crossing  points  in  Pazarkule,  hosting  close  to  60,000  migrants  and 
refugees  in  dire  conditions.  Later  in  March,  the  Turkish  authorities  organised  transport  for  the 
migrants  and  refugees  away  from  the  border  area  and  closed  the  borders  with  Greece  and 
Bulgaria  except  for  commercial  traffic  because  of  the  outbreak  of  the  COVID-19  pandemic. 
Nevertheless, the Turkish Minister of Interior indicated that this move did not mean a change in 
Turkey’s  policy  to  allow  irregular  migrants’  exits  over  its  borders  and  the  government  had  no 
intention  to  prevent  anyone  who  wishes  to  leave  Turkey.  While  the  EU  acknowledged  the 
increased migratory burden and risks Turkey had been facing on its territory and the substantial 
efforts it was making in hosting refugees, it strongly rejected Turkey's use of migratory pressure 
for  political  purposes.  Overall,  the  number  of  illegal  border  crossings  between  Turkey  and 
Greece still remained significantly lower than prior to the adoption of the EU-Turkey Statement.  

The  prolonged  presence  of  refugees  in  the  country  requires  efficient  integration  measures  to 
avoid  social  tensions.  The  authorities  should  increase  access  to  public  health  for  migrants  and 
refugees  in  the  country.  A  comprehensive  amendment  to  the  Law  on  Foreigners  and 
International  Protection  was  adopted  in  2019.  Turkey  still  did  not  implement  the  EU-Turkey 
Readmission Agreement towards all Member States nor the provisions relating to third-country 
nationals. Despite an announced acceleration of work on visa liberalisation, no outstanding visa 
liberalisation  benchmarks  were  fulfilled  and  amendments  to  the  anti-terror  law  and  data 
protection law are still outstanding. Turkey still needs to further align its legislation with the EU 
acquis on visa policy.  

Turkey’s foreign policy increasingly collided with the EU priorities under the Common Foreign 
and  Security  Policy.  Tensions  in  the  Eastern  Mediterranean  region  further  increased  in  the 
reporting  period  as  a  result  of  Turkey’s  illegal  actions  and  provocative  statements  challenging 
the right of the Republic of Cyprus to exploit hydrocarbon resources in the Exclusive Economic 
Zone  of  the  Republic  of  Cyprus.  Turkey  deployed  two  drilling  and  two  seismic  vessels  in  the 
Exclusive  Economic  Zone  of  the  Republic  of  Cyprus,  including  in  the  areas  that  have  been 
licensed by the Government of Cyprus to European oil and gas companies, as well as in Cypriot 
territorial  sea.  The  Turkish  Armed  Forces  accompanied  the  drilling  and  seismic  ships  during 
their operations, posing a grave threat to the security of the region. Turkey also challenged the 
status of the fenced-off city of Varosha.   

The EU has repeatedly stressed the need to respect the sovereign rights of EU Member States, 
which  include  entering  into  bilateral  agreements  and  exploring  and  exploiting  their  natural 

7 

 
resources in accordance with the EU acquis and international law, including the UN Convention 
on  the  Law  of  the  Sea.  Turkey  needs  to  commit  itself  unequivocally  to  good  neighbourly 
relations, international agreements and the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the 
United  Nations  Charter,  having  recourse,  if  necessary,  to  the  International  Court  of  Justice.  In 
light of the unauthorised drilling activities of Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean, in July 2019 
the  Council  decided  a  number  of  measures,  including  not  to  hold  for  the  time  being  the  EU-
Turkey Association Council as well as further meetings of the EU-Turkey high-level dialogues. 
The EU further  adopted a framework for targeted  measures against  Turkey in  November 2019 
and  decided  in  February  2020  to  add  two  individuals  to  the  list  of  designations  under  this 
sanctions framework.  

On  1  October  2020,  the  European  Council  stated  that,  provided  constructive  efforts  to  stop 
illegal  activities  vis-à-vis  Greece  and  Cyprus  are  sustained,  the  European  Council  agreed  to 
launch a positive political EU-Turkey agenda with a specific emphasis on the modernisation of 
the  Customs  Union  and  trade  facilitation,  people  to  people  contacts,  High  level  dialogues, 
continued  cooperation  on  migration  issues,  in  line  with  the  2016  EU-Turkey  Statement.  The 
European  Council  also  stressed  that  in  case  of  renewed  unilateral  actions  or  provocations  in 
breach  of international law, the EU will use  all the instruments  and the options  at  its disposal, 
including  in  accordance  with  Article  29  TEU  and  Article  215  TFEU,  in  order  to  defend  its 
interests and those of its Member States. 

Turkey has still not fulfilled its obligation to ensure full and non-discriminatory implementation 
of the Additional Protocol to the EU-Turkey Association Agreement and has not removed all the 
obstacles  to  the  free  movement  of  goods,  including  restrictions  on  direct  transport  links  with 
Cyprus. There was no progress on normalising bilateral relations with the Republic of Cyprus. 

The  signing  of  a  bilateral  Memorandum  of  Understanding  on  the  delimitation  of  maritime 
jurisdiction areas between Turkey and the National Accord Government of Libya in November 
2019  increased  tensions  in  the  Eastern  Mediterranean,  as  it  ignored  the  sovereign  rights  of 
Greece’s  islands  in  the  area  concerned.  There  was  a  sharp  increase  in  provocative  actions  by 
Turkey  towards  Greece,  in  particular  Turkish  overflights  of  Greek  inhabited  areas.  In  this 
respect,  the European  Council,  in  December  2019,  unequivocally reaffirmed  its  solidarity  with 
Greece  and  Cyprus  regarding  actions  by  Turkey  in  the  Eastern  Mediterranean  and  the  Aegean 
Sea.  It  stressed  that  the  Memorandum  infringes  upon  the  sovereign  rights  of  third  States,  does 
not comply with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and cannot produce any 
legal  consequences  for  third  States.  In  May  2020,  EU  Foreign  Ministers  reaffirmed  the  EU’s 
position  on  Turkey’s  continued  illegal  activities  in  the  Eastern  Mediterranean  as  well  as  on 
Turkey’s  provocative  and  aggressive  behaviour  in  relation  to  Cyprus  and  Greece,  underlining 
that abstaining from unilateral actions is a basic element to allow dialogue between the EU and 
Turkey  to  advance  and  that  Turkey’s  illegal  actions  have  serious  negative  impact  across  the 
range of EU-Turkey relations. In October 2020, the European Council called on Turkey to accept 
the invitation by Cyprus to engage in dialogue with the objective of settling all maritime-related 
disputes between Turkey and Cyprus.  

The EU condemned Turkey's unilateral military action in north-east Syria and urged Turkey to 
end its military action, withdraw its forces and respect international humanitarian law. The vast 
majority of Member States decided to halt arms export licensing to Turkey. Following airstrikes 
against Turkish troops in the Idlib governorate at the end of February 2020, Turkey launched the 
military operation ‘Spring Shield’ in the area. Turkey and Russia agreed on a ceasefire in March 
2020  that  stabilised  frontlines  in  north-west  Syria,  established  a  new  corridor  along  the  M4 
highway, and created a framework for joint Russian-Turkish military patrols. Turkey maintained 
its military observation posts on the ground, including those situated in territories now controlled 
by  the  Syrian  regime,  and  brought  in  further  reinforcements  to  the  region.  Turkey  further 
significantly increased its military involvement in the conflict in Libya, contributing to a reversal 
of the situation on the ground. 

8 

 
Regarding the economic criteria, the Turkish economy is well advanced, but made no progress 
over  the  reporting  period  and  serious  concerns  persist  over  its  functioning.  The  economy 
rebounded from the summer 2018 sharp currency depreciation and the resulting recession faster 
than  expected,  helped  by  expansionary  policies  and  a  strong  contribution  of  net  exports. 
However,  the  recovery  remained  fragile  given  the  weak  labour  market  and  the  need  to  repair 
corporate  balance  sheets.  As  the  COVID-19  crisis  unfolded,  the  authorities  took  a  number  of 
measures  to  cushion  the  economic  impact  of  the  pandemic,  including  a  significant  monetary 
expansion. These  measures were  constrained, however,  by a  limited policy space, in  particular 
on  the  fiscal  side,  and  institutional  weaknesses.  The  current  account  balance,  which  had 
improved  markedly  since  2017,  started  deteriorating  again  by  the  end  of  2019,  triggering  a 
sizeable increase of import duties and non tariff barriers. Due to high external financing needs, 
Turkey  remained  exposed  to  rapid  changes  in  investor  sentiment,  aggravated  by  the  pandemic 
and rising geopolitical risks. Inflation fell from a very high level but remained elevated and well 
above  target.  Monetary  policy  credibility  weakened  further  because  of  the  dismissal  of  the 
governor  of  the  Central  Bank  of  the  Republic  of  Turkey  (CBRT)  and  recurrent  political 
pressures. Price competitiveness continued to benefit from the weakening of the lira and the real 
effective exchange rate depreciated in 2019, a trend that accelerated further in 2020. 

The  government  continued  to  further  improve  the  regulatory  environment  for  businesses. 
However,  the  informal  sector  remains  large.  State  interventions  in  price  setting  mechanisms 
continued,  and  there  is  a  continued  lack  of  state  aid  implementation  rules,  enforcement, 
transparency  and  institutional  set  up.  The  financial  sector  remained  stable.  However, 
vulnerabilities  increased,  in  particular  due  to  rapid  credit  growth  in  state  owned  banks,  and 
various  regulatory  measures  aimed  at  boosting 
level  of 
unemployment,  in  particular  among  young  people  and  women,  paired  with  declining 
employment, low labour mobility and a high share of undeclared work remain major concerns. 

lending  activity.  The  high 

Turkey has made limited progress and has a good level of preparation in achieving the capacity 
to cope with the competitive pressure and market forces within the EU. Expenditure on research 
and development increased, although remaining well below the Government’s target. Investment 
excesses  and  misallocations  declined.  Progress  was  made  in  the  diversification  of  energy 
supplies but reforms are needed to open up the natural gas market and increase competition on it. 
Significant problems remain in education as regards quality and access. Women face difficulties 
in accessing quality education and the labour market. Although Turkey remains well integrated 
with the EU market in terms of both trade and investment links, the relative share of the EU in 
Turkey’s  foreign  trade  declined  further  amid  a  growing  list  of  deviations  from  Turkey's 
obligations under the EU-Turkey Customs Union.  

Regarding its ability to assume the obligations of membership, Turkey has continued to align 
with the EU acquis, albeit at a very limited pace and in a fragmented manner. There continued to 
be  instances  of  backsliding  regarding  a  number  of  key  aspects  in  the  areas  of  competition  on 
account of an increase in State aid and its lack of transparency, information society and media, 
economic  and  monetary  policy,  customs  union,  external  relations  and  foreign,  security  and 
defence policy. Turkey is well advanced in the areas of company law, trans-European networks 
and  science  and  research,  and  it  has  also  achieved  a  good  level  of  preparation  in  a  number  of 
areas,  including  free  movement  of  goods,  intellectual  property  law,  financial  services,  and 
enterprise  and  industrial  policy.  Turkey  is  moderately  prepared  on  public  procurement  as 
important gaps remain in its alignment. Turkey is also moderately prepared in areas such as free 
movement of capital, transport policy, energy, taxation, economic and monetary union, statistics, 
where  further  significant  efforts  are  needed  across  the  board.  Overall,  in  most  areas  more 
ambitious  and  better  coordinated  policies  still  need  to  be  established  and  implemented.  In  all 
areas, more attention needs to be given to enforce legislation whilst many areas require further 
significant  progress  to  achieve  legislative  alignment  with  the  EU  acquis,  strengthen  the 
independence of regulatory authorities and build the administrative capacities. 

9 

 
FUNDAMENTALS FIRST: POLITICAL CRITERIA AND RULE OF LAW 

2. 
CHAPTERS 

The first half of 2020 has been marked by the devastating impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. 
The  EU  redirected  EU  funds  worth  EUR  83  million  to  support  the  COVID-19  response  in 
Turkey, notably to support the most vulnerable refugees, and extended implementing periods for 
some IPA programmes. In the context of the Facility for Refugees in Turkey, the Commission 
immediately launched awareness raising activities for the refugee population who are among the 
most  vulnerable  people.  An  agreement  was  reached  with  the  Turkish  government  to  mobilise 
savings and contingencies under the Facility to support the national COVID-19 response.  

2.1. 

Functioning of democratic institutions and public administration reform 

Despite the lifting of the state of emergency in July 2018, the adverse impacts of the 2-year long 
emergency  ruling  continued  to  significantly  impact  on  democracy  and  fundamental  rights. 
Certain legal  provisions  granting  extraordinary powers  to  government  authorities  and  retaining 
several  restrictive  elements  of  the  emergency  rule  have  been  integrated  into  law.  Access  to 
justice remained limited for those negatively impacted by the emergency decree-laws, especially 
dismissed  public  servants  and  liquidated  legal  entities.  Considerable  shortcomings,  such  as  the 
lack  of  institutional  and  judicial  independence,  lengthy  review  procedures,  the  absence  of 
sufficiently  individualised  criteria,  and  the  absence  of  a  proper  means  of  defence,  call  into 
question the extent to which the Inquiry Commission on the State of Emergency Measures can 
be  considered  an  effective  remedy.  Several  legal  provisions  still  inhibit  the  full  enjoyment  of 
human  rights  and  fundamental  freedoms,  including  the  freedoms  of  assembly  and  expression, 
enshrined  in  Turkey's  Constitution  and  the  country's  international  commitments.  The  first 
legislative package following the adoption of the Judicial Reform Strategy allowed for the return 
of some 11,000 passports revoked by state of emergency decrees. 

2.1.1  Democracy 

The  executive  presidential  system  and  its  design  as  well  as  implementation  are  yet  to  be 
reviewed in line with the principles of democracy as referred to in the recommendations of the 
2017 Venice Commission of the Council of Europe. The constitutional architecture continued to 
excessively  centralise  powers  to  the  Presidency  without  ensuring  a  sound  and  effective 
separation  of  powers  between  the  executive,  legislative  and  judiciary.  In  the  absence  of  an 
effective  checks  and  balances,  the  democratic  accountability  of  the  executive  branch  remains 
very limited. Under these conditions, the backsliding of the respect for democratic standards, the 
rule of law, and fundamental freedoms continued. In light of the COVID-19 pandemic, no state 
of emergency was declared. 

Elections 

Following the local elections of 31 March 2019, the Supreme Election Council (YSK) decided 
to re-run the metropolitan mayoral election in Istanbul on 23 June. The Congress of Local and 
Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe’s election observation report emphasised that the 
elections  were  professionally  organised  in  the  majority  of  polling  stations,  but  that  there  are 
questions with regards to democratic media plurality and conditions that are objectively fair to 
all  political  parties  and  candidates  in  all  respects.  Turkey  needs  to  take  steps  to  improve  the 
broader  environment  for  elections,  ensuring  a  level  playing  field  for  all  candidates  and 
protecting  the  integrity  of  the  election  process.  Forceful  dismissals  of  elected  mayors  in  the 
south-east and their replacement by government-appointed trustees continued and is a source of 
significant concern as it undermines local democracy. 

The  municipal  elections  held  on  31  March  2019  offered  a  mixed  picture.  Voters  had  a  free 
choice  between  distinct  political  parties,  political  programmes  and  candidates,  but  this  was 

10 

 
 
undermined  by  the  limited  conditions  for  contestants  to  compete  in  a  level  playing  field. 
Following the decision of the Supreme Election Council (YSK) to first annul the mayor-elect’s 
mandate and to schedule a re-run of the Istanbul mayoral elections, the elections took place on 
23 June. Ekrem Imamoğlu, the candidate of the ‘Nation’s Alliance’, composed of the Republican 
People’s  Party  (CHP),  Good  Party  (IYI)  and  Felicity  Party,  won  again,  this  time  with  a 
comfortable margin of 54.2% against 44.9% for Binali Yıldırım, the candidate of the ‘People’s 
Alliance’, comprised of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and Nationalist Action Party 
(MHP). Turnout remained high at 84.4%.  

In  its  final  electoral  observation  report  published  in  October  2019,  the  Congress  of  Local  and 
Regional  Authorities  of  the  Council  of  Europe  stated  that,  while  the  polls  were  conducted  in 
order  and  were  administered  satisfactorily,  with  a  remarkably  high  turnout,  it  is  not  fully 
convinced that Turkey currently has the free and fair electoral environment, which is necessary 
for genuinely democratic elections in line with European values and principles. It noted that the 
ruling AKP enjoyed a notable advantage in the Istanbul re-run, due to an excessive coverage by 
government-affiliated  public  and  private  media.  The  Congress  recommended  the  removal  of 
overly  restrictive  limitations  of  freedoms  of  association,  assembly  and  expression  in  order  to 
establish an environment fully conducive to genuinely democratic elections. 

The Venice Commission, in its opinion from June 2020, held that the YSK’s decisions to deny 
mayoral mandates to HDP candidates who received the highest number of votes at the municipal 
elections  of  March  2019  in  6  municipalities  and  to,  instead,  give  these  mandates  to  second-
placed AKP candidates were not consistent with international norms and standards and should be 
reversed.  It  further  stated  that,  while  the  removal  of  elected  officials  may  exceptionally  be 
justified  by  the  need  to  prevent  them  from  abusing  their  office  to  favour  terrorist  activities, 
replacing elected officials by candidates who lost the election, without repeat elections, cannot 
be justified on this basis. 

Parliament 

The  presidential  system  continued  to  curtail  the  Parliament’s  legislative  and  oversight 
functions. Legislative procedures are not effective. The new presidential system enshrines the 
principle of the primacy of law over presidential decrees as well as delimits the legislative areas 
that  remain  the  prerogative  of  the  Parliament.  However,  the  President  has  issued  decrees 
covering  a  wide  range  of  socio-economic  policy  areas  that  are  in  the  prerogative  of  the 
Parliament. Political polarisation continued to prevent constructive parliamentary dialogue. The 
membership of three members of Parliament was ended in early June 2020. Many members of 
Parliament of the People's Democratic Party (HDP) remain in detention.  

Electoral alliances have been de facto preserved in Parliament in the aftermath of the 2018 and 
2019 elections. The marginalisation of the opposition, particularly the second largest opposition 
party,  HDP,  persisted.  Two  former  co-chairs  Selahattin  Demirtaş  and  Figen  Yüksekdağ  and 
seven  other  elected  HDP  members  of  parliament  remained  in  jail.  The  shortcomings  of  the 
system of parliamentary immunity, which limits freedom of expression of elected office holders 
outside Parliament, remained unaddressed. In early June 2020, 1 member of parliament from the 
CHP and two from the HDP were stripped of their membership in Parliament in light of court 
convictions  against  them,  thus  leaving  their  seats  in  Parliament  empty  for  the  remaining 
parliamentary term. Judicial investigations were launched against the HDP co-chairs and other 
HDP  and  CHP  members  of  parliament  due  to  their  statements  on  the  Peace  Spring  military 
operation in north-east Syria. 

The constitutional overhaul, attributing responsibility for producing draft legislative proposals to 
members of parliament only, rather than to the government, hampered the  legislative process. 
Only drafts sponsored by the ruling AKP passed the legislative procedures. In 2019, Parliament 
adopted  only  37  pieces  of  legislation  out  of  the  2,300  bills  tabled  by  members  of  parliament. 

11 

 
Parliament has not yet made use of the possibility to form specialised legislative committees and 
the mechanisms of inter-party committee work and parliamentary inquiry committees remained 
ineffective.  In  March  2020,  Parliament  adopted  an  omnibus  law  amending  several  pieces  of 
legislation,  particularly  aiming  to  introduce  measures  to  reduce  the  financial  burden  of  the 
COVID-19 pandemic on the economy. However, several amended provisions went beyond this 
scope and had negative effects on fundamental rights and freedoms. Parliament decided to be in 
pandemic-related recess for 10 days, which was followed by a regular one-month recess during 
the month of Ramadan. 

Parliamentary oversight of the executive remained very limited under the presidential system. 
Presidential decrees remained exempt from parliamentary deliberation and control. Members of 
parliament have no right to ask oral questions. Written questions can only be addressed to the 
Vice-President and ministers. The legal framework enshrines the principle of the primacy of law 
over  presidential  decrees  and  preserves  the  legislative  areas  that  remain  the  prerogative  of 
Parliament.  However,  as  of  December  2019,  the  President  had  issued  53  decrees  covering  a 
wide  range  of  socio-economic  policy  areas,  which  are  not  within  the  remit  of  presidential 
decrees. Parliamentary oversight of public spending also needs to be significantly improved.  

The  legal  framework  of  elections  and  political  parties  remains  problematic.  The  10% 
electoral threshold is the highest among Council of Europe members; it is at odds with the case 
law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and reduces the representation of many 
voters. Turkey needs to align with the outstanding recommendations of the recommendations of 
the  Office  for  Democratic  Institutions  and  Human  Rights  and  the  Venice  Commission  on 
addressing gaps in the electoral legal framework. 

Representation of women in Parliament remained low (17.3%).  

Governance 

The presidential system continues to be characterised by a lack of checks and balances and by 
politicisation of the public administration. Recommendations by the Venice Commission in this 
regard remain valid and were not addressed. Most of the key institutions are directly attached to 
the presidency. The President has the power to nominate the heads of the vast majority of the 
public  regulatory  authorities.  In  the  aftermath  of  the  2019  local  elections,  pressure  from  the 
central  level  on  elected  local  authorities  increased  substantially.  Large-scale  arrests  and 
dismissals  of  elected  mayors  and  party  representatives,  observed  since  2017,  continued  and 
undermine local democracy. 

In its current form of implementation, the presidential system remained characterised by a lack 
of the necessary checks and balances required to safeguard against an excessive concentration of 
power in one office and to ensure the independence of the judiciary, as highlighted in the 2017 
opinion of the Venice Commission. The presidential system negatively affected the functioning 
of  the  branches  of  government  and  the  state  administration.  The  President’s  political 
accountability is limited to elections, due to a lack of effective checks and balances.  

Traditional  instruments  of  scrutiny  of  the  executive  by  Parliament,  such  as  a  vote  of 
confidence  and  the  possibility  of  oral  questions  to  the  executive,  are  no  longer  possible;  only 
written questions can be addressed to the Vice-President and ministers. Reforms of the relations 
between the presidency councils, which prepare policy recommendations for the President, and 
line ministries were announced but did not materialise. 

The  civil  service  has  been  politicised,  particularly  through  further  nominations  of  political 
appointees  at  senior  official  level  and  the  lowering  of  professional  requirements  for  office 
holders, even in technical portfolios. Policy coordination among central government institutions 
remained strong. However, the major restructuring of the public administration and civil service 
after the shift to the presidential system in 2018 continued to have a negative impact on policy 

12 

 
development and accountability of the administration. The rate of women in public service was 
38.4%, while the percentage of women in senior managerial positions was only 9.05%.  

The  Ombudsman  has  increased  its  track  record  through  more  active  engagement  in  raising 
awareness  of  its  role.  However,  the  institution  remained  silent  on  politically  critical  issues 
concerning  fundamental  rights.  The  Ombudsman  still  lacks  ex  officio  powers  to  initiate 
investigations and to intervene in cases with legal remedies.  

The  legal  framework  provides  only  limited  protection  to  independent  regulatory  authorities 
from  undue  political  interference.  Under  the  presidential  system,  many  regulatory  authorities 
(such  as  the  Competition  Authority  (see  Chapter  8  –  Competition  policy),  the  Information  and 
Communication  Technologies  Board,  the  Cyber  Security  Council,  the  Radio  and  Television 
Supreme Council (see Chapter 10 – Information Society and Media), the Directorate-General for 
Rail  Regulation  (see  Chapter  14  –  Transport  policy),  the  Regulatory  Body  of  the  Atomic 
Industry  (see  Chapter  15  -  Energy)  and  the  central  bank  (see  Chapter  17  –  Economic  and 
Monetary  Policy)  were  directly  linked  to  the  Presidency.  During  the  reporting  period,  the 
President  dismissed  the  President  of  the  Central  Bank,  paving  the  way  for  a  policy  of  fast 
reduction of interest rates under the new President. 

Local government 

At  local  level,  the  political  landscape  changed  significantly  in  the  aftermath  of  the  2019  local 
elections.  Most  of  Turkey’s  largest  cities  and  11  of  its  30  metropolitan  municipalities  are 
governed  by  the  opposition,  while  three  metropolitan  mayors  were  replaced  by  government-
appointed trustees. The central government’s relations with the municipalities led by opposition 
mayors developed in a conflictual manner on many occasions. In the framework of the COVID-
19 response, the Ministry of Interior launched investigations against the mayors of Istanbul and 
Ankara over municipal aid campaigns. 

A  local  court  decision,  confirmed  by  the  Court of  Appeals,  to  sentence the Istanbul  Provincial 
Chair  of  the  opposition  CHP,  Canan  Kaftancıoğlu,  to  almost  10  years  imprisonment  on  five 
separate  charges  related  to  social  media  posts,  raised  significant  concerns.  The  construction 
project Canal Istanbul caused a heated public debate on the issue of competences at national and 
local level between the President, and the Istanbul municipal mayor and opposition parties. The 
first tender for the project was launched in March 2020. 

Developments  in  south-east  Turkey  put  the  results  of  the  democratic  process  of  the  31  March 
2019  elections  into  question.  The  central  government  removed  47  democratically  elected 
municipal  mayors  in  the  south-east,  all  HDP  members,  –  including  the  mayors  of  Diyarbakır, 
Van  and  Mardin,  mainly  on  the  grounds  that  they  had  alleged  links  to  terrorist  organisations. 
However,  the  candidates  had  been  vetted  prior  to  elections,  making  their  removal  even  less 
justified.  Despite  his  acquittal  in  mid-February  2020,  the  mayor  of  Mardin  was  not  reinstated. 
Centrally appointed trustees suspended municipal assemblies. Hundreds of local politicians and 
elected  office  holders  and  thousands  of  party  members  were  detained  on  terrorism-related 
charges.  In  the  absence  of  an  indictment,  these  measures  ran  counter  to  the  basic  premises  of 
democracy, deprive voters in Turkey of political representation at local level and damaged local 
democracy.  According  to  the  Venice  Commission,  the  respect  of  the  voters’  choice  could  be 
restored either by reinstating the suspended mayors or by other means such as determination of 
replacement  mayors  by  the  elected  municipal  councils  or  by  organising  repeat  elections  in  the 
electoral zones concerned. 

The  legal  framework  regulating  the  Ministry  of  Interior’s  tutelary  powers  over  elected  local 
office holders was not revised in line with Turkey’s commitments under the European Charter of 
Local Self-Government. Governors holding a double function as state agents and chairpersons of 
the  provincial  executive  committees  and  the  state’s  overregulation  and  interventionism  in 
planning decisions of local authorities remain to be revised in line with the Charter and in order 
to ensure a clear delineation of powers. A delegation from the Council of Europe’s Congress of 

13 

 
Local and Regional Authorities carried out a monitoring visit to Turkey in October to assess the 
implementation  of  the  provisions  of  the  European  Charter  of  Local  Self-Government,  which 
Turkey ratified in 1992.  

Municipal law in principle provides for routes for engagement between local public institutions 
and  citizens  as  well  as  civil  society.  However,  in  this  context,  citizens’  assemblies,  aiming  at 
bringing  together  professional  and  civil  society  organisations  and  other  stakeholders  and 
contributing 
in  most 
municipalities. Some municipalities increased their level of transparency and accountability. 

to  municipal  decision-making, 

largely  dysfunctional 

remained 

Following the local elections, representation of women at local level remained low: only 2 of 30 
(6.6%)  metropolitan  mayors  and  38  of  1,272  (3.7%)  mayors,  are  women.  3.7%  of  all  local 
representatives of the central government are women. 

Civil society 

Serious backsliding persisted regarding the environment in which civil society operated. Civil 
society  came  under  continuous  pressure,  notably  in  the  face  of  a  large  number  of  arrests  of 
activists, including human rights defenders The Gezi trial and Osman Kavala’s continued pre-
trial detention had a deterrent effect on their work. Public stigmatisation and a recurrent use of 
bans  of  demonstrations  and  other  types  of  gatherings  further  shrank  the  space  left  for 
organisations working on fundamental rights and freedoms. Organisations operating in the area 
of human rights, which were closed under the state of emergency have still not been offered any 
legal remedy in relation to confiscations. Despite all difficulties, civil society remained active 
and  involved  in  public  life  as  much  as  possible.  Pro-government  organisations  continued  to 
have  more  visible  roles  and  opportunities  for  representation.  Civil  society  organisations 
remained  excluded  from  legislative  consultation  processes  in  parliamentary  committees. 
Systematic  and  inclusive  mechanisms  for  consulting  a  wide  spectrum  of  civil  society 
organisations,  notably  on  new  legislation  and  policies  need  to  be  in  place.  Administrative 
difficulties for national and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) remained in 
place. 

An  empowered  and  diverse  civil society  is  a crucial  component  of  any democratic system  and 
should be recognised and treated as such by the state institutions. Civil society organisations in 
Turkey continued to make crucial contributions on key challenges facing the country, notably in 
the  areas  of  education,  female  workforce  participation,  awareness-raising  regarding  ethnic  and 
social tolerance, hate crimes monitoring and support for refugees.  

Organisations  operating  in  the  area  of  human  rights  constitute  a  small  share  of  civil  society 
organisations  in  Turkey.  They  faced  increased  pressure  in  particular  following  detentions  and 
arrests  of  activists  and  human  rights  defenders.  The  Commissioner  for  Human  Rights,  in  her 
report issued in February 2020, expressed concerns  on the increasingly challenging and hostile 
atmosphere in which human rights defenders and NGOs have to operate in Turkey. 

The  ongoing  court  case  of  prominent  human  rights  defender  Osman  Kavala,  held  in  pre-trial 
detention  since  November  2017  despite  a  judgment  by  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights 
(ECtHR)  calling  for  his  release  is  deeply  worrying.  The  case  is  emblematic  of  the  shrinking 
public  space  for  civil  society  organisations.  Portrayal  in  some  media  outlets  of  some  of  these 
activists as criminals, including for accepting project funds from international donors remains a 
matter of concern. Defamatory rhetoric by public officials casts serious doubt on the respect for 
fair  trial  and  the  presumption  of  innocence.  International  non-governmental  organisations 
(NGOs),  including  those  providing  humanitarian  aid  to  refugees  also  faced  difficulties  in  their 
work in Turkey. No effective domestic remedy was provided for the confiscation of assets from 
civil society organisations closed by emergency decrees. 

In the legal framework regulating the work of civil society organisations, there is a lack of clarity 
in terms of the distribution of responsibilities among public institutions as well as arbitrariness in 

14 

 
implementation  of  the  relevant  legislation.  The  2018  regulation  and  the  amended  legislation 
passed through omnibus law in March 2020 make it compulsory for all associations to register 
all their members, and not only their board members, in the information system of the Ministry 
of Interior. This legal obligation is not in line with the OSCE/Council of Europe guidelines on 
freedom  of  association. The  obligation  to  provide  personal  data  to  the  authorities,  in  a  context 
where the legislation on data protection is not aligned with the EU acquis and where the overly 
broad definition of terrorism has a deterrent effect on civil society, is a concern.  

Other  barriers  to  civil  society  and  freedom  of  association  remain,  notably  cumbersome 
administrative  procedures  and  repetitive  frequent  inspections  and  fines.  Provisions  restricting 
registration, procedures for obtaining required permits and the functioning of associations need 
to  be  revised,  including  facilitating  the  activities  of  international  and  national  NGOs  working 
with refugees and migrants in Turkey.  

The  Law  on  Collection  of  Aid  continues  to  impose  burdensome  requirements  for  permits  that 
discourage fundraising activities by civil society organisations. These include prior notification 
for each fundraising activity and lengthy authorisation processes. Public funds are not distributed 
in a transparent way and the distribution process does not allow for the full involvement of civil 
society organisations and other stakeholders at every stage. The existing tax system impedes the 
functioning and development of foundations and associations. The status of ‘public benefit’ for 
associations  (0.03%  of  the  total  number  of  associations)  and  ‘tax  exemption’  for  foundations 
(5%  of  the  total  number  of  foundations)  is  vaguely  defined  and  granted  by  the  President.  The 
space for foreign donors, which provide financial support to Turkish civil society under current 
Turkish  legislation,  is  increasingly  shrinking.  Some  donors  closed  down  their  offices  after  the 
start of the ‘Gezi Park’ and ‘Büyükada’ cases. 

There is still no comprehensive government strategy or mechanism in place for cooperation with 
civil society or for improving the legal framework. Nor is there any legal framework for public 
consultations.  Civil  society  organisations  are  largely  excluded  from  the  consultations  that  are 
part of policy-making processes and monitoring. It is crucial that the elements on participatory 
democracy contained in the 11th National Development Plan for 2019-2023 provide for genuine 
remedies  in  this  area.  Overall,  the  legal,  financial  and  administrative  environment  needs  to  be 
more conducive to developing civil society in Turkey. 

Civilian oversight of the security forces 

The  legal  and  institutional  framework  governing  the  security  and  intelligence  sector  remained 
unchanged,  with  strengthened  civilian  oversight  of  the  security  forces  under  the  presidential 
system.  Under  the  presidential  system,  broad  powers  over  the  security  forces  lie  within  the 
executive  branch.  The  General  Staff  and  all  force  commands  remained  subordinated  to  the 
Ministry of National Defence. The civilian flank of the Supreme Military Council, which decides 
over military appointments and promotions, continued to outnumber the military members. All 
military hierarchy is accountable to the President, who is legally entitled to give orders directly 
to the Chief of General Staff, force commanders and their subordinates. The scope of the military 
judicial  system  was  reduced.  Civilian  higher  courts  continued  to  review  appeals  against  the 
decisions of military courts. 

However,  the  transparency  and  accountability  of  military,  police  and  intelligence  services  to 
Parliament  continue  to  be  limited.  Security  personnel  continued  to  have  wide-ranging  legal 
protection.  The  track  record  of  the  judicial  and  administrative  examination  of  allegations  of 
human rights violations and of disproportionate use  of  force by security forces  remained  poor. 
The parliamentary law enforcement oversight commission was ineffective. The legal framework 
for overseeing military expenditure has not yet been improved. 

Dismissals and arrests in relation to the coup attempt of July 2016 continued. By June 2020, a 
total of 19,583 military officers were dismissed from the service due to their alleged links to the 

15 

 
Gülen  movement,  some  3,600  in  2019  alone.  Some  6,000  former  military  personnel  were 
arrested on grounds of their alleged involvement in the attempted coup.  

Situation in the east and south-east 

The  situation  in  the  south-east  continued  to  be  very  worrying.  The  government  continued 
domestic  and  cross-border  security  and  military  operations  in  Iraq  and  Syria.  The  security 
situation was more precarious in the border areas with recurrent terrorist acts by the Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party (PKK). The PKK remains on the EU list of persons, groups and entities involved 
in acts of terrorism. While the Government has a legitimate right to fight terrorism, it is essential 
that  this  is  done  in  accordance  with  the  rule  of  law,  human  rights  and  fundamental  freedoms. 
Anti-terror measures need to be proportionate. There were no developments on the resumption of 
a credible political process to achieve a peaceful and sustainable solution.  

The  PKK  continued  to  commit  violent  terrorist  attacks  with  fatal  incidents.  The  EU 
unambiguously  condemned  these  attacks  and  expressed  solidarity  with  the  families  of  the 
victims. In September, explosives planted on the road in Diyarbakır’s Kulp sub-province killed 7 
and  seriously  injured  10  people.  The  incident  was  followed  by  physical  attacks  on  HDP/DBP 
officials. An investigation was launched into the incident. Following the government’s lifting the 
ban on Abdullah Öcalan being visited by his lawyers, family visits were allowed intermittently 
and related hunger strikes were discontinued. Sit-in protests by Kurdish mothers demanding that 
the HDP find their children who were allegedly forced to join the ranks of the PKK took place in 
front of the HDP’s Diyarbakır office.  

Provincial governorates declared recurrent military security zones in rural settlements. A curfew 
in six districts of Diyarbakır's Sur municipality has remained in place since December 2015. The 
Venice  Commission’s  recommendations  in  its  June  2016  opinion  on  the  legal  framework 
governing curfews are yet to be implemented. Investigations into the deaths of civilians in 2015 
during security operations under curfews in towns such as Cizre have not progressed. 

Human  rights  organisations  and  opposition  parties  continued  to  report  serious  violations  of 
human  rights  by  security  forces,  including  alleged  instances  of  torture,  ill-treatment,  arbitrary 
arrests  and  procedural  rights  violations  in  prisons  and  police  and  gendarmerie  establishments. 
The  report  by  the  Office  of  the  UN  High  Commissioner  for  Human  Rights  of  February  2017, 
deploring the lack of effective and independent investigations into the reported killings or other 
serious human rights violations committed between July 2015 and December 2016, still needs to 
be followed up.  

 Eastern  and  south-eastern  provincial  governors  declared  frequent  blanket  bans  on  all 
demonstrations  and  events.  A  very  broad  interpretation  of  the  fight  against  terrorism,  growing 
restrictions  put  in  place  on  the  rights  of  journalists,  the  bar  associations  and  human  rights 
defenders  working  on  the  Kurdish  issue  are  among  issues  raising  repeated  concern.  Other 
associations and Kurdish-language media outlets and cultural rights institutions mostly remained 
closed. 

There  were  numerous  new  detentions  and  arrests  of  elected  representatives  and  mayors, 
municipal  council  members  and  municipal  executives  in  the  east  and  south-east  on  terrorism-
related  charges.  In  47  out  of  the  65  municipalities  won  by  the  HDP  in  the  March  2019  local 
elections,  the  Ministry  of  Interior  replaced  elected  HDP  mayors  with  trustees.  As  of  mid-June 
2020, among these dismissed mayors, 30 were arrested and 18 remain in prison. The government 
further deposed 68 HDP members of municipal assemblies in 2019, 15 of which were arrested. 
In metropolitan municipalities alone, 214 elected municipal assembly members were suspended. 
Some 1,870 HDP  members were arrested and  206 imprisoned  in  2019 alone. These dismissals 
and arrests triggered reactions across the political landscape and civil society, as well as from the 
international  community.  Related  protest  meetings  were  not  allowed  for  one  month.  In 
September,  the  Court  of  Cassation  issued  its  decision  in  the  main  case  against  the  Kurdish 

16 

 
Communities Union, upholding prison sentences for many Kurdish political figures, former and 
present members of parliament.  

Under  a  new  strategic  plan  covering  2019-2023,  the  South-Eastern  Anatolia  Project  (GAP) 
continues to operate with the objective of improving socioeconomic development in the region. 
The  government’s  investment  plan  for  post-conflict  reconstruction  of  damaged  areas  in  the 
south-east,  announced  in  September  2016,  continued  with  the  construction  of  new  dwellings. 
According  to  official  sources,  as  of  July  2019,  more  than  TRY  800  million  (some  EUR  125 
million) has been paid in compensation to more than 50,000 internally displaced persons since 
2017.  

Government-funded  construction  projects  on  cultural,  historical  and  religious  heritage  sites 
damaged  in  2015  and  2016  continued.  Court  cases  against  these  projects  are  ongoing.  There 
were new tensions around culturally and environmentally destructive projects such as the mining 
project  in  Tunceli  Mountains,  which  are  part  of  a  national  park  as  well  as  being  sacred  for 
Alevis.  There  were  protests,  including  by  civil  society,  against  the  filling  of  the  Ilısu  Dam  on 
Tigris River in Hasankeyf, which risks damaging natural habitats, agricultural land and historical 
heritage.  

There was still no comprehensive, consistent approach in place in relation to missing persons, to 
the  exhumation  of  mass  graves  or  to  the  independent  investigation  of  all  alleged  cases  of 
extrajudicial  killing  by  security  and  law  enforcement  officers.  The  February  2017  Council  of 
Europe  report  on  missing  persons  and  victims  of  enforced  disappearance  highlighted  the 
excessive length of trials. Most of the investigations into cases of enforced disappearance from 
the 1990s have faced the 20-year statute of limitations. Out of more than 1,400 cases of missing 
persons, only 16 court cases had been launched. 14 ended in acquittals of the alleged perpetrators 
and two were ongoing. In September 2019, all military officers and village guards charged with 
enforced  disappearance,  murder  and  extrajudicial  execution  were  acquitted  in  the  Kızıltepe 
JITEM  case,  due  to  the  expiry  of  the  20-year  statutory  limitation.  However,  the  UN  Working 
that  enforced 
Group  on  Enforced  or  Involuntary  Disappearances  (WGEID)  assessed 
disappearances  are  not  subject  to  statutes  of  limitation,  thereby  providing  a  guarantee  against 
impunity.  The  2015  recommendations  by  the  UN  Special  Rapporteur  to  tackle  the  lack  of 
prosecutions  over  extrajudicial,  summary  or  arbitrary  executions  remained  unaddressed.  The 
village guard system was still in place. 

Refugees and internally displaced persons 

Turkey  continues  to  host  the  largest  number  of  refugees  worldwide.  According  to  Turkey’s 
Directorate  General  of  Migration,  Turkey  hosts  3,576,370  Syrian  refugees  with  temporary 
protection status, some 100,000 Syrians with legal residency and 93 000 who have been granted 
citizenship.  There  are  an  additional  368,230  asylum  seekers  and  refugees  from  countries 
including Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran and Somalia. In addition, in December 2019, 1,101,030 foreign 
nationals  holding  residency  permits  were  present  in  Turkey,  including  humanitarian  residence 
holders.  

On 28 February 2020, the Turkish government announced it would cease controlling its land and 
sea  borders  with  Europe  and  open  the  passage  for  migrants  wishing  to  cross.  This  led  to  the 
setting up of an informal camp at one of the border crossing points between Turkey and Greece 
and  an  increase  in  asylum  applications  registered  in  Cyprus  in  the  first  quarter  of  2020  (see 
chapter 24).  

Return and resettlement operations under the EU-Turkey Statement were suspended due to the 
COVID-19 pandemic. The global pandemic negatively affected refugees and internally displaced 
persons  in  Turkey,  especially  children  and  vulnerable  individuals,  such  as  single  women  and 
women-headed households, who were already living in dire economic conditions. The majority 
of refugees in Turkey lost the jobs that they used to hold in the informal sectors of the economy.  

17 

 
In  2019, 
Turkey  granted  international  protection  (refugee  status,  conditional  refugee  status  or 
subsidiary  protection)  to  5,449  applicants  (72,961  in  2018.  The  authorities  rejected  5,212 
applications  compared  with  13,942  in  2018.  Some  61,000  Syrian  nationals  under  temporary 
protection  lived  in  seven  temporary  accommodation  centres  in  south-eastern  Turkey.  Human 
rights organisations, lawyers and media reported individual cases of administrative detention and 
deportation, which raised concerns about access to asylum. Following the reform of the Law on 
Foreigners and Temporary Protection introduced by way of emergency decree in 2016, cases of 
suspension  of  the  temporary  protection  procedures  and  deportations  for  reasons  such  as  public 
order, security and terrorism increased.  

Turkey  made  sustained  significant  efforts  to  provide  support  for  refugees  and  ensure  wider 
access to healthcare and schooling, with 63.27% of Syrian children now in school. Many cities 
provided  municipal  services  to  refugees.  Of  1,082,172  Syrians  of  school  age  in  Turkey  in 
December 2019, 684 728 had access to primary and secondary education, up from 605,000 last 
year.  In  December  2019,  the  number  of  Syrians  who  held  work  permits  stood  at  close  to 
100,000, up from 43,000 in 2018.  

Turkey joined countries hosting Syrian refugees in the region in exchanges with UNHCR on the 
possibility of setting up measures to repatriate Syrian refugees. In parallel, Turkey has publicly 
announced its plan to resettle up to two million Syrian refugees to the so-called “safe zone” in 
north-east  Syria  where  it  launched  military  operations  in  Syria  in  2018  and  2019.  (Please  see 
Chapter 24 - Justice, freedom and security). 

Turkey  needs  to  further  align  its  practice  with  European  standards  in  removal  centres,  in 
particular  with  regard  to  protection  of  human  rights,  including  access  to  legal  counselling  and 
interpreters  and  protection  of  minors.  There  have  been  cases  of  migrants  being  forced  into 
signing voluntary return forms. Many refugees and asylum seekers are exploited in the informal 
economy and their poverty inhibits access to protection.  

There was limited progress on the situation of internally displaced persons (IDPs) resulting from 
the violence in the south-east in the 1990s and in more recent years. The COVID-19 pandemic 
has  exacerbated  economic  exclusion  and  deteriorating  living  conditions  for  IDPs.  (see  section 
above - Situation in the east and south-east). 

2.1.2.  Public administration reform 

Turkey has some level of preparation/is moderately prepared in public administration reform. 
There was backsliding during the reporting period. Turkey has not yet implemented last year’s 
recommendations  from  the  Commission.  Furthermore,  the  major  restructuring  of  public 
administration  and  civil  service  after  the  shift  to  the  presidential  system  in  2018  continued  to 
have a negative impact on policy development, accountability of the administration as well as the 
human resources management. The roles and responsibilities of different institutions remained to 
be  fully  clarified.  The  civil  service  system  continued  to  be  marked  by  partisanship  and 
politicisation.  No  steps  were  taken  to  develop  a  comprehensive  public  administration  reform 
strategy  and  an  overarching  public  financial  management  reform  programme.  An  effective 
remedy still needs to be provided for the large-scale dismissals that took place during the state of 
emergency. Female representation remained limited in the higher echelons of bureaucracy. The 
Commission’s recommendations from previous years remain valid.  

In the coming year, Turkey should in particular:  

→  ensure  that  the  Inquiry  Commission  on  the  State  of  Emergency  Measures  provides  for  an 
effective  remedy,  which  safeguards  the  right  of  every  individual  to  a  fair  administrative 
process;  

→  prepare  changes  to  its  legislation  to  introduce  a  merit-based,  competitive  appointment  and 

promotion system for senior managerial positions in the civil service;  

18 

 
→  review  the  policy-making  process  with  a  view  to  ensuring  inclusive  and  evidence-based 

preparation of policy planning documents and legislative proposals. 

Strategic framework for public administration reform 

Due to the lack of political support, the country still lacks an overarching public administration 
reform strategy. Several planning documents and sectoral policy documents on various aspects 
of public  administration reform exist  but  provide  only  a fragmented framework. Most  of these 
policy  documents  do  not  specify  the  expected  costs  of  reform  measures,  so  the  financial 
sustainability of public sector reforms is not guaranteed (see Chapter 32 – Financial control). 
An administrative unit legally entitled to coordinate, design, and monitor public administration 
reforms  needs  to  be  established.  Such  a  unit  would  need  to  coordinate  with  the  Ministry  of 
Treasury  and  Finance,  to  ensure  coherence  of  strategic  and  fiscal  planning  and  efficiently 
address managerial accountability.   

Policy development and coordination 

The wide-ranging restructuring of the executive branch under the presidential system continued 
to  centralise  the  policy-making  system.  Policy  coordination  among  central  government 
institutions  has  remained  strong,  but  planning,  monitoring  and  reporting  of  government 
performance  remains 
the 
administrative overhaul that accompanied the new presidential system, which has led to delays in 
approving executive decisions. 

inadequate.  Inter-ministerial  coordination 

is  complicated  by 

The  policy  planning  process  within  government  departments  needs  to  be  improved  to  ensure 
greater participation and accountability. Nine presidential policy councils, which have advisory 
and  coordination  functions  over  sectoral  policies,  have  yet  to  produce  positive  results  in 
increasing  inclusion  and  participation  in  policy-planning.  In  particular,  economic  policy 
programmes do not have a systematic link with fiscal planning. In October 2019, the European 
Union  Coordination  Board  (ABEK)  was  established  under  the  chairmanship  of  the  Deputy 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Director for EU Affairs as an internal coordination mechanism 
of the EU policy-making process.  

Legislative development and policy formulation did not pursue an inclusive and evidence-based 
approach. Parliament, which is responsible for preparing draft legislation, lacks the capacity and 
resources to launch, assess and use regulatory impact assessments, which are seldom carried out 
before the introduction of new policies. Public consultations were extremely rare. 

Public financial management 

There  was  no  progress  in  the  development  of  an  overarching  public  financial  management 
reform  programme.  Parliamentary  engagement  and  oversight  of  the  budget  remains  limited. 
Numerous  exceptions  inserted  into  the  public  procurement  law  resulted  in  a  corruption-prone 
area  in  public  finances  (See  also  Chapter  5).  No  independent  fiscal  council  aiming  to  ensure 
fiscal  discipline  has  been  established.  In  the  absence  of  adequate  ex  post  monitoring  and 
reporting, major public investment programmes lack full transparency. There is no clear strategy 
for domestic revenue mobilisation; on the contrary, there have been many instances of ad hoc tax 
increases. In May 2019 the Revenue Administration published a strategy and an action plan for 
the fight against the informal economy (2019-2021) (See also Chapter 16). 

Roles  and  responsibilities  of  the  relevant  institutions  (especially  the  Ministry  of  Finance  and 
Treasury  and  the  Strategy  and  Budget  Directorate  under  the  Presidency)  are  not  yet  clearly 
defined  in  practice,  leading  to  less  transparency  and  weaker  accountability.  The  role  of  the 
Ministry  of  Finance  and  Treasury  was  further  relegated  to  executive  and  regulatory  functions 
only, rather than policy making.  

19 

 
Budget  transparency  needs  to  be  further  improved.  There  was  limited  information  on 
contingent liabilities, notably those stemming from public private partnerships, and fiscal risks. 
Investments and borrowings of the Turkish Wealth Fund should be integrated into the budget. 

Public service and human resources management 

The amendments to the civil service system after the introduction of the presidential system have 
increased partisanship and politicisation within the public bureaucracy, notably through further 
nominations  of  political  appointees  at  senior  official  level  and  the  lowering  of  professional 
requirements for office holders, even in technical portfolios. Serious concerns remained in terms 
of  merit-based  recruitment,  promotion  and  appointment  to  managerial  posts.  The  legal 
framework  provides  uniform  criteria  for  demotion,  dismissals  and  disciplinary  measures,  and 
ensures a possibility for appeal. However, large-scale dismissals during the state of emergency 
remain a matter of serious concern as they did not identify evidence relating to each individual 
dismissal case and lacked minimum procedural safeguards for those who were dismissed. Only a 
very limited number of dismissed officials were reinstated in their positions and compensated for 
damages after a successful appeal. 

The capacity of the Human  Resources office under the Presidency needs to be strengthened to 
ensure  central  coordination  of  human  resources  management  in  the  public  sector.  The  civil 
service remuneration system is not standardised across institutions and lacks transparency. The 
administration lacks sufficient tools to support the professional development of civil servants. 
Ethics  committees  across  line  ministries  and  a  centralised  ethics  board  are  in  place  but  their 
effectiveness remains to be strengthened.  

Accountability of the administration 

In  the  presidential  system,  the  organisation  of  state  administration  follows  centralised  lines  of 
accountability  to  the  Presidency.  Accountability  of  agencies  is  largely  weak,  and  internal 
control and audit do not function effectively. Most executive institutions are formally embedded 
in ministries, although they retain autonomy over day-to-day operational management. The roles 
and responsibilities of different institutions are still not fully clear, which risks having a negative 
impact on efficiency, transparency and accountability.  

Internal  and  external  oversight  arrangements  to  ensure  citizens’  right to  good  administration 
need to be better implemented. The role of oversight institutions such as the Ombudsman needs 
to be further improved. The right of citizens to access public information is regulated by the 
law on the right to information, which does not require proactive disclosure of information and 
provides for broad  exemptions. A  simplified online access system continued to receive a  large 
number of applications for access to information, with over three million applications in 2019. 
The  Board  of  Review  of  Access  to  Information  is  responsible  for  considering  appeals  filed 
against a refusal to provide access to public information. The right of citizens to administrative 
justice  and  their  right  to  seek  compensation  have  continued  to  be  problematic  due  to  the 
backlog of cases. 

The Inquiry Commission on the State of Emergency Measures established in 2017 continued 
to  state  that  it  individually  reviewed  all  complaints  related  to  more  than  150  000  dismissals 
through emergency decrees. As of the end of March 2020, 126,300 applications had been made. 
Of  these,  the  Inquiry  Commission  had  reviewed  105,100  and  only  11,200  had  led  to  a 
reinstatement,  while  93,600  complaints  had  been  rejected.  57  reinstatement  decisions  were 
linked  to  the  re-opening  of  organisations  that  were  closed  after  the  coup  attempt.  There  were 
21,200 applications pending. The rate of processing of applications raises concerns as to whether 
each  case  is  being  examined  individually.  There  are  strong  concerns  with  regard  to  a  lack  of 
respect  for  the  rights  of  defence  of  those  dismissed  and  an  assessment  procedure  in  line  with 
international  standards.  Since  there  were  no  hearings,  there  was  a  general  lack  of  procedural 
rights  for  applicants  and  decisions  were  taken  on  the  basis  of  the  written  files  related  to  the 

20 

 
original dismissal, all of which called into question the extent to which the Inquiry Commission 
is an effective judicial remedy.  

Service delivery to citizens and businesses 

Strong commitment to a user-oriented administration continued. Public services are to a large 
extent  accessible  through  the  e-government  tool  and  continued  to  expand.  The  number  of 
registered users grew to 48.5 million by June 2020, with a constant, significant increase in the 
last  years  (25  million  in  2015).  A  monitoring  system  needs  to  be  set  up  to  reduce  barriers  to 
accessing  services  for  people  with  disabilities.  Simplifying  administrative  procedures  and 
cutting red tape is hindered by the absence of a law on general administrative procedures, which 
is necessary to provide citizens and businesses with greater legal certainty.

2.2.  Rule of law and fundamental rights 

2.2.1.  Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights 

The  EU’s  founding  values  include  the  rule  of  law  and  respect  for  human  rights.  An  effective 
(independent, of quality and efficient) judicial system and effective fight against corruption are 
of paramount importance, as is respect for fundamental rights in law and in practice. 

Turkey maintains an early stage of applying the EU acquis and European standards in this area. 
Serious backsliding continued since the July 2016 coup attempt. Turkey did not implement the 
recommendations  from  the  previous  Commission  reports.  These  remain  valid,  in  particular 
regarding the systemic lack of independence of the judiciary and the urgent need to improve the 
human  rights  situation.  The  negative  effects  of  the  large-scale  dismissals  of  judges  and 
prosecutors since the state of emergency and new recruitments in a fast-track procedure and in a 
non-transparent selection process continued to weigh on the efficiency and professionalism of 
the  judiciary.  Political  pressure  on  judges  and  prosecutors  continued  to  have  a  significant 
negative effect on the independence and the overall quality of the judiciary. 

Corruption  remained  widespread  and  continued  to  be  an  issue  of  concern.  There  was  no 
progress in addressing the many gaps in the Turkish anti-corruption framework, which is 
a sign 
of a lack of will to fight decisively against corruption. The corruption allegations were seldom 
reported and only in a small number of media. 

The absence of an anti-corruption strategy and action plan demonstrate a 
decisively against corruption. 

lack of will to fight 

The  damage  caused  by  the  state  of  emergency  on  the  fundamental  rights  and  the  related 
legislation  adopted  was  not  remedied  and  there  was  further  backsliding  on  the  outstanding 
issues  identified  in  previous  reports,  most  notably  on  the  right  to  a  fair  trial  and  procedural 
rights, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and association, protection of human rights 
defenders, freedom from ill-treatment and torture, especially in prisons. 

Functioning of the judiciary 

Turkey is at an early stage in this area. Serious backsliding observed since the coup attempt of 
July  2016  continued.  The  Commission’s  recommendations  in  previous  country  reports  remain 
valid.  The  negative  impact  of  the  dismissal  and  forced  removal  of  30%  of  Turkish  judges  and 
prosecutor  remained,  both  regarding  independence  and  efficiency.  There  were  concerns  that 
dismissals in the absence of respect for due procedures caused self-censorship and intimidation 
within the judiciary. No measures were taken to change the structure of and process for selection 
of members of the Council of Judges and Prosecutors to strengthen its independence. Concerns 
regarding  the  lack  of  objective,  merit-based,  uniform  and  pre-established  criteria  for  recruiting 
and  promoting  judges  and  prosecutors  persisted.  No  changes  were  made  to  the  institution  of 
criminal judges of peace so that concerns remained regarding their jurisdiction and practice. 

In the coming year, Turkey should: 

21 

 
 
→  create  a  political  and  legal  environment  that  allows  the  judiciary  to  perform  its  duties 
independently  and 
judicial 
responsibilities, with the executive and legislature fully respecting the separation of powers; 
and ensure that lower courts respect judgments by the Constitutional Court, whose decisions 
should follow ECtHR jurisprudence; 

respecting  European  standards;  strengthen 

impartially, 

→  amend  the  structure  and  process  of  selecting  the  members  of  the  CJP  so  that  the  role  and 
influence of the executive is limited, and introduce safeguards against any interference by the 
Council of Judges and Prosecutors or high level officials in judicial proceedings; 

→ provide effective guarantees against transfers of judges against their will; 

→  in  accordance  with  the  guaranteed  judicial  independence  under  the  Constitution,  limit  any 
suspension  of  judges  to  cases  where  there  are  well-founded  suspicions  of  serious 
misbehaviour and take measures to restore the damage inflicted after the coup attempt by the 
dismissals that took place in breach of procedural rules; 

→ revise the system of disciplinary proceedings so that it is guided by objective criteria without 

undue influence from the executive; 

→ 

in relation to the administrative and judicial measures taken against individuals,
 ensure that 
any allegation of wrongdoing or crime is subject to due process, based on concrete evidence, 
in line with fully transparent procedures under the authority of an independent judiciary; 

→ ensure that all judicial proceedings respect fundamental rights, including procedural rights, in 
particular the presumption of innocence, individual criminal responsibility, legal certainty, the 
right to defence, the right to a fair trial, equality of arms and right to an effective appeal. 

Strategic documents 

The  President  announced  the  Judicial  Reform  Strategy  for  2019-2023  in  May  2019.  The 
Strategy consists of nine aims in areas that Turkey identified as key issues, namely: protection 
and improvement of rights and freedoms, improving the judicial independence, impartiality and 
transparency,  improving  the  quality  and  quantity  of  human  resources,  enhancement  of 
performance and productivity, ensuring the effective use of the right to defence, ensuring access 
to  justice  and  enhancing  satisfaction  from  service,  enhancing  the  efficiency  of  the  criminal 
justice system, simplification and enhancement of the efficiency of civil and administrative trials 
and promoting alternative dispute resolution methods. 63 objectives and a total of 256 activities 
were identified to reach the above aims. However, there is no evidence-based assessment of the 
results of previous such strategies and of the current state of play. The Judicial Reform Strategy 
was  subject  to  a  weak  consultation  process  within  Turkey as  it  did  not  take  into  account  all 
stakeholders’  views,  whom  could  not  comment  on  the  draft,  and  did  not  address  the  most 
problematic issues. Comments made by the Council of Europe and the European Commission 
on the most critical aspects of the draft strategy were not taken into account. The Strategy falls 
short of addressing shortcomings regarding the independence of the judiciary. In particular, no 
measures were announced to remedy the concerns identified by the Council of Europe/Venice 
Commission or in the European Commission’s annual country reports, in particular to limit the 
role of the executive in the Council of Judges and Prosecutors and to change the jurisdiction and 
practice  of  criminal  judges  of  peace  which  have  become  a  parallel  system  in  criminal 
proceedings.  However,  implementing  measures  regarding  the  quality  of  justice  could  mean  a 
step  forward  if  fully  implemented.  The  concrete  implementation  of  the  Judicial  Reform 
Strategy,  by  means  of  an  action  plan,  including  a  timeline,  identification  of  the  responsible 
authorities and a budget still remains. 

In  October  2019,  the  first  legislative  package  to  implement  specific  aspects  of  the  Judicial 
Reform  Strategy  was  adopted.  Among  the  15  legislative  changes,  the  package  included  an 
addition to Article 7 (2) of the Anti-Terror Law, according to which statements made within the 
limits  of  providing  information  or  made  with  the  purpose  of  criticism  cannot  be  criminalised. 

22 

 
 
There  is,  however  no  definition  of  the  term  ‘terrorist  propaganda’  and  no  reference  to 
international  standards.  The  package  further  introduced  time  limits  for  pre-trial  detention  for 
different  crimes,  legislating  an  already  existing  practice.  In  July  2020,  the  second  legislative 
package was adopted. The 64-article law addressed many issues related to the simplification and 
increasing the efficiency of civil trials. The law also changed the public nature of hearings as it 
extended  the  scope  of  the  case  that  could  be  held  in  camera.  Members  of  parliament  from  the 
main opposition political party argued that such a provision might be used to bar public access to 
high profile cases related to the actions of persons close to the ruling power. 

In  July  2020,  the  parliament  also  amended  the  Law  on  Lawyers,  which  would  reduce  the 
representation of lawyers from the main cities at the national Union of Turkish Bar Associations 
and provides that in provinces with over 5,000 lawyers, any group of at least 2,000 lawyers can 
set  up  their  own  bar  association.  While  the  government  argued  that  the  creation  of  more  bar 
associations  would  allow  a  more  pluralistic  system,  the  overwhelming  majority  of  bar 
associations  and  lawyers  argued  that  this  law  would  disempower  existing  bar  associations  in 
larger cities, which have regularly criticised the government for violations of human rights and 
the rule of law. 

Management bodies 

Concerns  in  relation  to  the  independence  of  the  Council  of  Judges  and  Prosecutors  from  the 
executive,  in  particular  the  procedure  governing  the  appointment  of  its  members,  continued. 
Since  the  introduction  of  the  presidential  system,  4  members  out  of  13  are  appointed  by  the 
President and 7 members are appointed by Parliament by qualified majority. Although nine of 
these members are judges and prosecutors, none of them are elected by their peers, which is not 
in line with European standards for the judiciary. The remaining 2 seats are attributed ex officio 
to the Minister of Justice and the Deputy Minister, who are also appointed by the President. The 
Council  of  Judges  and  Prosecutors  continued  to  enjoy  autonomy  in  managing  a  budget  of 
EUR12.1 million in 2019 (EUR14 million for 2018). 

Since  December  2016,  the  European  Network  of  Councils  for  the  Judiciary  (ENCJ)  had 
suspended  the  Council  of  Judges  and  Prosecutors’  observer  status  and  excluded  it  from 
participation  in  ENCJ  activities,  given  that  the  Council  of  Judges  and  Prosecutors  did  not 
comply  with  the  ENCJ  statutes  due  to  its  lack  of  independence  from  the  executive  and 
legislature. To restore the Council of Judges and Prosecutors’ credibility and public trust in the 
entire judiciary, the Council should improve its transparency and adherence to procedures, and 
half  or  more  of  its  members  should  be  judges  elected  by  their  peers,  in  line  with  European 
standards. 

Independence and impartiality 

The  Council  of  Judges  and  Prosecutors  continued  to  engage  in  large-scale  transfers  of  judges 
and  prosecutors  without  their  consent  and  no  constitutional  guarantees  were  introduced  to 
prevent  such  transfers,  which,  according  to  European  standards,  can  only  be  justified  where 
courts  are  being  reorganised.  The  Judicial  Reform  Strategy  announced  a  guarantee  of 
geographical  tenure  that  should  be  introduced  for  judges  with  a  certain  professional  seniority 
and based on merits. A day after the announcement of the Strategy, the Council of Judges and 
Prosecutors published a decree through which the posts of 3,358 judges and prosecutors in the 
civil and criminal judiciary and 364 in the administrative judiciary were changed. Overall, 4,027 
judges  and  prosecutors  were  transferred  in  2019.  No  reason  was  given  for  the  transfers  apart 
from requirements of the service. 

In total, 4,399 judges and prosecutors have been dismissed since the attempted coup. In 2019, 
none were reinstated to their positions by the Council of Judges and Prosecutors. No action was 
taken  to  remedy  the  shortcomings  identified  in  the  December  2016  opinion  of  the  Venice 
Commission,  which  stated  that  every  decision  ordering  the  dismissal  of  a  judge  needs  to  be 

23 

 
 
individual  and  reasoned,  must  refer  to  verifiable  evidence,  and  that  the  procedures  before  the 
Council of Judges and Prosecutors must respect at least minimal standards of due process.  

Regarding  the  institution  of  the  criminal  judges  of  peace,  the  influence  of  the  executive  over 
their decisions and their jurisdiction and practice continued to raise serious concerns. Criminal 
judges of peace have extensive powers with possibly very serious consequences for individuals, 
such  as  to  issue  search  warrants,  detain  individuals,  block  websites  or  seize  property.  Despite 
these  powers,  objections  to  their  decisions  are  not  reviewed  by  a  higher  judicial  body  but 
horizontally, by another criminal judge of peace. This damages the credibility of the system and 
weakens  public  trust.  The  recommendations  of  the  Venice  Commission  in  its  March  2017 
opinion on the criminal peace judgeships should be urgently implemented, as stated in previous 
Commission regular reports 

Pluralism in judges’ associations was seriously affected by the chilling effect that closure of a 
number  of  associations  during  the  state  of  emergency  had  on  the  members  of  the  judiciary. 
There  were  reports  that  membership  of  an  association  that  was  perceived  to  be  opposing  the 
government,  was  seen  as  hindering  the  prospect  of  career  advancement.  Turkey’s  biggest 
association,  the  Association  for  Judicial  Unity,  which  reached  around  9,300  members,  was 
perceived as being close to the government. Newly recruited judges and prosecutors are handed 
a membership application to the Association for Judicial Unity automatically upon recruitment. 

Representatives  of  the  executive  and  legislature  continued  to  publicly  comment  on  ongoing 
judicial cases, disregarding the presumption of innocence of the suspects and contravening the 
principle of judicial independence. 

In some cases lower courts did not apply the rulings of the Constitutional Court to cases with 
similar facts, although the Constitutional Court judgments set out a principle, which should be 
implemented by the lower courts in similar cases. 

Business perception of judicial independence increased during the reporting period, but remains 
low.  

Accountability 

Judges and prosecutors are under the obligation to declare their assets every 5 years. However, if 
they  earn  assets  worth  five  times  their  salary,  they  have  to  declare  these  in  that  given  year.  It 
remains important to have a credible and functioning verification system and to ensure that due 
follow-up is given to late or wrong declarations of assets. 

The Judicial Ethics Declaration (JED) of March 2019, a binding document of the CJP, reflects 
universal  principles  in  this  area.  However,  there  are  issues  of  concern  such  as  the  lack  of  an 
explicit  reference  to  ‘sexual  and  gender  orientation’  within  the  prohibited  grounds  for 
discrimination or vaguely formulated rules. The impact of the JED is yet to be assessed, also in 
view of the lack of independence and impartiality of the judiciary.  

Disciplinary procedures are in place for both judges and prosecutors but the current system calls 
into  question  important  guarantees  that  safeguard  the  independence  of  the  judiciary. 
Mechanisms to detect breaches of the integrity rules and enforce disciplinary penalties need to 
be made effective and free from political interference, which has proved challenging given the 
lack  of  independence  of  the  Council  of  Judges  and  Prosecutors  from  the  executive  and 
parliament. In February 2020, the Council of Judges and Prosecutors initiated an investigation 
into the three judges of the Istanbul 30th Heavy Penal Court who acquitted the defendants in the 
Gezi Park trial due to a lack of evidence. 

Professionalism and competence 

Vacancies  continued  to  be  filled  by  allowing  the  majority  of  candidates  to  enter  the  system 
through  a  fast-track  procedure  and  non-transparent  selection  process.  The  Council  of 
Judges and Prosecutors is not independent from the executive and the Ministry of Justice runs 

24 

 
the  selection  boards  for  new  judges  and  prosecutors  and  manages  their  yearly  appraisal. 
Concerns therefore remain over the lack of objective, merit-based, uniform and pre-established 
criteria for recruiting and promoting judges and prosecutors, and hence the politicisation of the 
judiciary.  

In accordance with the amending law of October 2019 as part of the first legislative package to 
implement  the  Judicial  Reform  Strategy,  a  legal  exam  was  introduced  for  prospective  judges, 
lawyers or public notaries to be conducted by the Higher Education Council (YÖK). However, 
no measure was taken to thoroughly revise the legal education system, where there are currently 
around 100 law schools, 5,000 law school students and 100,000 lawyers.  

Quality of justice 

The Justice Academy of Turkey (JAT) was re-established by a Presidential decree published in 
May  2019.  The  newly  established  JAT  carried  out  all  pre-service  training  of  candidate  judges 
and prosecutors as well as in-service trainings. The decree provides that the JAT has scientific, 
administrative and financial autonomy. The newly established JAT has no general assembly or 
board of directors and management is left to its president, who is appointed by the President for 
a 3-year period. This calls into question the independence of the JAT, which affects its capacity 
to  provide  training  programmes  that  meet  the  requirements  of  openness,  competence  and 
impartiality. 

Frequent  transfers  of  judges  and  prosecutors  continued  to  negatively  affect  the  quality  of 
justice.  Serious  concerns  persist  regarding  the  quality  of  judicial  decisions  in  terms  of  legal 
reasoning and factual evidence, particularly in terrorism-related cases. Indictments often reflect 
allegations that are not supported by credible evidence.  The lack of established links between 
the evidence and the alleged crime are some of the many elements that raise serious concerns. In 
some  cases,  evidence  presented  by  the  defence  was  not  included  in  the  court’s  assessment.  In 
many  cases  access  to  justice  and  the  right  of  defence  was  limited  due  to  the  use  of 
confidentiality  decisions.  In  parallel,  details  of  prosecution  files  continued  to  appear  in  the 
media,  which  resulted  in  smear  campaigns  in  some  cases  and  violates  the  presumption  of 
innocence.  

Efficiency 

As part of the measures taken against COVID-19, court hearings were postponed until 16 June 
2020. Periods concerning the enforcement of decisions, objections and appeals also started as of 
16 June 2020. 

Large  parts  of  the  judiciary  continue  to  be  under  severe  pressure  to  handle  cases  in  a  timely 
manner,  as  the  effects  of  the  large-scale  dismissals  are  still  observed.  One  of  the  aims  of  the 
Judicial Reform Strategy is to increase the quality and quantity of human resources; the focus 
of  planned  measures  is  on  legal  training,  admission  to  the  legal  professions  and  training.  The 
budget  for  the  judiciary  was  TRY  18  billion  in  2019  (around  EUR  2.8  billion),  representing 
0.42% of GDP and EUR 34 per inhabitant.  

Efforts  have  begun  to  increase  and  promote  alternative  dispute  resolution  methods  to  help 
reduce  the  burden  on  the  courts.  Over  213,000  cases  were  resolved  by  conciliation  in  2019, 
a slight increase on 2018.

Regarding the backlog of cases, in the high courts the number of pending cases were 47,022 
for the Constitutional Court in October 2019 and 146,495 for the Council of State in December 
2019. In 2019, the Court of Cassation received a total of 891 214 cases (384 756 new cases and 
506  458  cases  transferred  from  2018),  and  dealt  with  494  007  cases,  resulting  in  a  reduced 
backlog of 397 207 cases by the end of 2019. This reduction stems from the creation in 2016 of 
nine  regional  courts  of  appeal.  These  regional  courts  of  appeal  continued  to  operate,  but  for 
both  civil  and  criminal  cases,  their  clearance  rate  remained  below  100%,  leading  to  an 
increasing backlog. 

25 

 
  
As  regards  first  instance  courts,  the  clearance  rate  for  criminal  courts  in  2019  was  53.8% 
compared  to  55.1%  in  2018.  The  total  number  of  cases  finalised  in  2019  was  1,605,130 
(1,615,463  in  2018).  The  total  length  of  proceedings  slightly  went  up  from  276  days  to  278 
days. The clearance rate for civil courts was 55.4% in 2018 (55.2% in 2017). The total number 
of  cases  finalised  in  2018  was  2,050,198  compared  (1,984,974  in  2017).  The  total  length  of 
proceedings increased from 248 days in 2016 to 283 days. Systemic solutions are therefore still 
needed to further address the emerging backlog as well as the excessive length of some trials. 

The Law on Court Experts of November 2016 regulates qualifications and criteria in the process 
of  selection  and  appointment  of  court  experts.  However,  there  remained  concerns  that  not  all 
experts  were  sufficiently  qualified  and  that  the  judges  based  their  verdicts  merely  on  the 
conclusions of the expert reports, instead of checking whether the findings of the expert reports 
corresponded to the information and documentation included in the reports. 

Individual applications to the Constitutional Court increased considerably in 2016, to 80,576 
(up from 20,376 in 2015), in the aftermath of the attempted coup and the measures taken under 
the state of emergency. It took 25,415 decisions in 2019 compared to 35,373 in 2018. As of 31 
March 2020, the Court had received 266,460 applications, out of 220,985 had been concluded. 
50.5% (4,482) of the violation judgments issued by the Court related to the right to a fair trial. 
As of December 2019, there are 17.4 judges and 8.2 prosecutors per 100,000 inhabitants (20,632 
judges and prosecutors in total). According to the European Commission for the Efficiency of 
Justice (CEPEJ) the European average is 21 judges/11 prosecutors per 100,000 inhabitants. 

Fight against corruption 

influence 

Turkey is at an early stage in the fight against corruption and there was no progress during the 
reporting period. The country has not established preventive anti-corruption bodies in line with 
the  United  Nations  Convention  against  Corruption  to  which  Turkey  is  party.  Outstanding 
legislative  gaps  have  remained  in  several  fields  pertaining  to  the  fight  against  corruption.  The 
legal  framework  and  institutional  architecture  still  need  to  be  improved  to  avoid  any  undue 
political 
investigation  and  prosecution  phases  of  corruption  cases. 
Accountability and transparency of public  institutions need to be improved. The  absence  of an 
anti-corruption  strategy  and  action  plan  demonstrate  a 
lack  of  will  to  fight  decisively  against 
corruption.  Most  of  the  Council  of  Europe’s  Group  of  States  against  Corruption  (GRECO) 
recommendations have not been implemented. Overall, corruption is widespread and remains an 
issue  of  concern.  A  cross-party  strong  political  will  is  needed  to  effectively  fight  against 
corruption as well as robust criminal justice response to high-level corruption. In this regard, the 
Commission’s recommendations of the last years are maintained. 

the 

in 

In the coming year, Turkey should in particular:  

  effectively implement its international obligations in relation to the fight against corruption, 
including  the  United  Nations  Convention  against  Corruption  and  the  Council  of  Europe 
Conventions;  

  ensure  effective  follow-up  to  the  recommendations  issued  by  the  GRECO,  including  by 

adopting the necessary legislation;  

  establish  a  track  record  of  successful  prosecution  of,  and  convictions  for,  high-level 

corruption; 

  adopt  an  anti-corruption  strategy,  reflecting  a  clear  political  will  and  vision  to  effectively 

address corruption, underpinned by a credible and realistic action plan. 

Track record 

There  remained  an  overall  poor  track  record  of  investigation,  prosecution  and  conviction  in 
corruption cases, particularly in relation to high-level corruption cases involving politicians and 

26 

 
public  officials.  Sentences  did  not  have  a  deterrent  effect.  The  cooperation  between  audit  and 
inspection  units  and  prosecution  offices  needs  to  be  improved.  Political  financing,  local 
administration,  land  administration  and  management,  public  procurement,  and  the  construction 
and  transportation  industries,  especially  when  implemented  via  public-private  partnerships, 
remained particularly prone to corruption.  

Institutional framework 

Prevention measures 

The country continued to lack a permanent, functionally independent anti-corruption body. The 
level of coordination between various preventive bodies remained largely inadequate. The State 
Supervisory  Council,  responsible  for  coordinating  preventive  anti-corruption  measures,  lacked 
independence.  The  anti-corruption  legal  framework  also  remained  weak  in  the  private  sector. 
There  were  no  regular  awareness-raising  campaigns  on  transparency  and  the  fight  against 
corruption. 

Law enforcement 

No specialised prosecution services were established to lead corruption investigations or courts 
working on anti-corruption cases. The executive retained undue political influence over judicial 
police,  which  had  an  impact  on  effective  investigations.  Inter-agency  cooperation  and 
information  sharing  between  law  enforcement  and  the  financial  intelligence  unit  need  to  be 
further  developed.  Financial  investigations  were  not  systematically  launched  in  corruption  and 
organised crime cases. Financial control of political parties remained ineffective. 

Legal framework 

Turkey  is  party  to  all  international  anti-corruption  conventions,  including  the  United  Nations 
Convention  against  Corruption,  which  Turkey  still  needs  to  implement  fully.  The  legislative 
amendments  envisaged  in  previous  anti-corruption  strategies,  i.e.  the  Law  on  General 
Administrative Procedure, the Law on Public Procurement, the Code of Ethics for Members of 
Parliament  and  the  Law  on  Whistle-blower  Protection,  were  not  implemented.  The  legal 
framework on whistle-blower protection still needs to be aligned with the new EU acquis on this 
issue. Previous anti-corruption strategies and action plans were not effectively followed up.  

In its Fourth Evaluation Round, GRECO concluded that out of 22 recommendations on the ethics 
and  integrity  of  members  of  parliament,  judges  and  prosecutors,  two  were  considered  to  be 
satisfactorily implemented, and five partially implemented, while  15 recommendations  had not 
been  implemented.  GRECO  recommendations  on  political  financing  were  not  followed  up. 
Turkey  did not  align with  GRECO  recommendations on judicial independence or transparency 
of the legislative process and political financing.  

Shortcomings remained unaddressed in the corruption-related provisions of the Criminal Code, 
which  do  not  meet  the standards  put  in  place by  the  Criminal  Law  Convention  on  Corruption. 
The  definition  of  active  bribery  provided  in  the  Criminal  Code,  is  still  not  in  line  with 
international conventions. The shortcomings concern, in particular, the provisions on bribery in 
the private sector.  

Public procurement legislation is not in line with the EU acquis. The vast and increasing number 
of exemptions inserted into the framework law on public procurement continued to be a matter 
of  growing  concern.  The  legal  privileges  of  public  officials,  such  as  the  requirement  for  prior 
authorisation  from  their  hierarchy  before  an  investigation  can  be  initiated  against  them  for 
alleged wrongdoing, continued to provide legal protection for public officials in anti-corruption 
criminal and administrative investigations. The legal framework on preventing, prosecuting and 
issuing penalties for conflicts of interest as well as on declaring, verifying and disclosing assets 
remained inadequate. Turkey has no legislation governing lobbying. 

Strategic framework 

27 

 
The 2010-2014 as well as 2016-2019 anti-corruption strategies and action plans did not deliver 
on  most  of  their  objectives.  Outstanding  measures  initially  envisaged  in  the  anti-corruption 
action plans were not followed up. Turkey needs to strengthen its overall capacity to coordinate, 
implement  and  monitor  all  anti-corruption  actions  among  the  many  relevant  preventive 
institutions and law enforcement agencies. 

Fundamental rights 

The deterioration of human rights continued. Many of the measures introduced during the state 
of emergency remain in force, and continue to have a profound and devastating impact on people 
in  Turkey.  The  legal  framework  includes  general  guarantees  of  respect  for  human  and 
fundamental  rights  but  the  legislation  and  practice  still  need  to  be  brought  into  line  with  the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and with the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR)  case-law. 
The  lack  of  institutional  independence,  lengthy  review  procedures,  the 
absence  of  sufficiently  individualised  criteria,  and  the  absence  of  a  proper  means  of  defence 
resulted  in  the  failure  by  the  Inquiry  Commission  on  the  State  of  Emergency  Measures  to 
provide an effective recourse against dismissals so far. 

In  February,  the  decision  to  re-arrest  Osman  Kavala  on  allegedly  new  charges  after  a  court 
decided  on  his  acquittal  and  ordered  his  release  despite  the  lack  of  credible  grounds  increased 
concerns  regarding  the  adherence  of  Turkey's  judiciary  to  the  international  and  European 
standards. 

The Council of Europe continued its monitoring of Turkey’s respect for fundamental freedoms. 
Serious backsliding in most areas continued. Legislation introduced immediately after the lifting 
of  the  state  of  emergency  (SoE)  removed  crucial  safeguards  protecting  detainees  from  abuse, 
thereby increasing the risk of impunity. Restrictions imposed on and surveillance of the activities 
of journalists, writers, lawyers, academics, human rights defenders and critical voices on a broad 
scale have a negative effect on the exercise of these freedoms, and lead to self-censorship. The 
enforcement  of  rights  is  hindered  by  the  fragmentation  and  limited  independence  of  public 
institutions responsible for protecting human rights and freedoms, and is aggravated by the lack 
of an independent judiciary.

Turkey should in particular:

→ adopt a credible, comprehensive and meaningful action plan on human rights with a view to 
  and  effectively 

effectively  ensuring  full  respect  for  fundamental  rights  and  freedoms
addressing serious human rights violations  ;

→  align  criminal  and  anti-terror  legislation  and  their  interpretation  with  European  standards, 

ECHR and ECtHR case-law and Venice Commission recommendations;

→ ensure that any allegation of offence is subject to due process, based on concrete evidence and 
fully transparent procedures under the authority of an independent and impartial judiciary, and 
fully  respecting  the  right  to  a  fair  trial  and  relevant  procedural  rights,  in  particular  the 
presumption  of  innocence,  individual  criminal  responsibility,  legal  certainty,  the  right  to 
defence, equality of arms and the right to an effective appeal;

→ ensure the effectiveness of the Inquiry Commission on the State of Emergency Measures as a 

domestic remedy;  

→  ensure  that  all  public-sector  employees  arbitrarily  dismissed  during  the  state  of  emergency 
continue  to  be  re-instated,  and  appropriately  compensated  for  any  harm,  including  loss  of 
earnings.

Respect  for  fundamental  rights  continued  to  be  undermined.  Turkey  is  party  to  most 
international human rights instruments. However, Turkey has not yet signed the International 
Convention  for  the  Protection  of  all  Persons  from  Enforced  Disappearance  and  the  Optional 
Protocol  to  the  International  Covenant  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural  Rights. In  January 

28 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2020,  Turkey  underwent  its  third  Universal  Periodic  Review  (UPR)  before  the  UN  Human 
Rights Council. In the reporting period, high-level officials, including the President, argued that 
the  Council  of  Europe  Convention  on  preventing  and  combating  violence  against  women  and 
domestic  violence,  also  known  as  the  Istanbul  Convention,  poses  a  threat  to  ‘Turkish  family 
values’ and should be revised. 

Following the lifting of the state of emergency, in August 2018 Turkey revoked its derogations 
to  the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights  and  to  the  International  Covenant  on  Civil  and 
Political  Rights  (ICCPR).  However,  the  full  monitoring  procedure  re-opened  by  the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in April 2017 continues.  

In 2019, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) found violations of the ECHR in 97 
cases  (of  113)  relating  mainly  to  freedom  of  expression  (35),  the  right  to  liberty  and  security 
(16), protection of property (14), the right to fair trial (13), inhuman or degrading treatment (12), 
respect for private and family life and right to life (5). During the reporting period, 6,717 new 
applications  were  registered  by  the  ECtHR.  In  January  2020,  the  total  number  of  Turkish 
applications pending before the Court was 7,107. There are currently 677 cases against Turkey in 
the enhanced monitoring procedure. 

In  the  case  of  Demirtas  v.  Turkey  (No 3),  the  ECtHR  unanimously  held  that  there  had  been  a 
violation of Article 10 (freedom of expression) of the ECHR. In the case of Kavala v. Turkey, in 
December 2019, the ECtHR ruled that there had been a violation of Articles 5.1 (right to liberty 
and security), 5.4 (right to a speedy decision on the lawfulness of detention) and 18 (limitation 
on  use  of  restrictions  on  rights)  of  the  ECHR.  The  Court  called  for  the  immediate  release  of 
Osman  Kavala,  a  businessman  and  human-rights  defender  who  has  been  in  detention  since 
September  2017.  The  Court  found  that  the  authorities  were  unable  to  demonstrate  that  the 
applicant’s  initial  and  continued  pre-trial  detention  had  been  justified  by  reasonable  suspicions 
based on an objective assessment of the acts attributed to him. The Court’s ruling became final 
on  12  May  2020  as  it  rejected  the  Turkish  government’s  request  for  referral.  Following  the 
appeal of the ECtHR decision of November 2018 in the case of Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey 
(No.  2),  in  which  the  court  ordered  the  termination  of  the  applicant’s  pre-trial  detention,  the 
ECtHR held a Grand Chamber hearing in September but has not issued its decision yet.  

The implementation of the Cyprus v. Turkey case regarding missing persons and restrictions on 
the  property  rights  of  Greek  Cypriots  displaced  or  living  permanently  in  the  northern  part  of 
Cyprus  is  still  pending,  as  is  the  question  of  ‘just  satisfaction’  (compensation).  In  December 
2019, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe reviewed Cyprus v. Turkey as well as 
Varnava and others. With regard to Cyprus v. Turkey, the access by the Committee of Missing 
Persons in Cyprus to 30 additional suspected burial sites in military areas situated in the northern 
part of Cyprus was a positive development; however, to date, no information has been submitted 
on the payment of the just satisfaction awarded in this case. 

No  progress  was  made  on  the  Varnava  and  others  case.  Regarding  the  implementation  of  the 
Demopoulos v. Turkey decision of 5 March 2010, 6,686 applications from Greek Cypriot owners 
have to date been lodged with the Immovable Property Commission (IPC), 369 of them during 
the reporting period. As of June 2020, 1,193 applications had been concluded through amicable 
settlements  and  33  through  formal  hearings.  Altogether,  the  IPC  has  so  far  paid  out  the 
equivalent  of  EUR  349  million  in  compensation.  Moreover,  it  ruled  for  exchange  and 
compensation in two cases, for restitution in three cases and for restitution and compensation in 
seven cases. In one case, it delivered a decision for restitution after the settlement of the Cyprus 
issue, and in one case, it has ruled for partial restitution. 

On  the  promotion  and  enforcement  of  human  rights,  the  Human  Rights  and  Equality 
Institution  of  Turkey  (HREI)  and  the  Ombudsman,  as  the  main  human  rights  institutions, 
continued  to  receive  complaints.  No  revision  was  made  to  the  mandate  of  the  Ombudsman 
Institution,  which  only  deals  with  complaints  against  the  actions  of  the  public  administration. 

29 

 
The HREI accepts only cases outside the remit of the Ombudsman. Neither of these institutions 
is operationally, structurally or financially independent, and their members are not accredited in 
compliance with the Paris Principles. So far, the  HREI has  not  applied  for  accreditation to the 
Global  Alliance  for  National  Human  Rights  Institutions.  The  speed  and  effectiveness  of  the 
institutions in dealing with applications causes particular concern in light of the high number of 
alleged violations in the aftermath of the attempted coup. Of 1,065 applications received by the 
HREI,  133  are  under  processing  and  investigation.  In  2019,  it  has  visited  37  institutions 
including 14 prisons, 3 police custody centres and a transit zone, 2 removal centres, 3 psychiatric 
hospitals, 4 homes for the elderly, 2 social care homes for the disabled, 2 care homes for children 
and a temporary accommodation centre. It published 23 visit reports. The approach of the HREI 
members  towards  basic  human  rights,  including  gender  equality,  women's  rights  and  LGBTI 
rights, raises serious concerns. They have questioned the Council of Europe Istanbul Convention 
on several occasions arguing that the Convention does not protect Turkish family values. Turkey 
should  urgently  ensure  that  these  bodies  ensure  the  compliance  of  national  laws  and  practices 
with  all  international  human  rights  and  fully  comply  with  the  Paris  Principles  and  the  2018 
European Commission’s Recommendation on Standards for Equality Bodies.  

There was limited implementation of the 2014 action plan on preventing violations of the ECHR. 
The implementation reports were not made public, thus limiting the accountability of institutions 
responsible for its implementation. Turkey needs to adopt its human rights action plan as matter 
of  priority,  which  will  replace  the  one  on  the  prevention  of  ECHR  violations,  with  a  view  to 
ensuring full respect for human rights and in particular to prevent further human rights violations 
following the coup attempt. 

Many  of  the  legislative  changes,  introduced  during  and  after  the  state  of  emergency  and  their 
subsequent  implementation  by  the  authorities  are  not  in  line  with  international  and  European 
standards  and  continue  to  diminish  fundamental  rights,  in  particular  the  rights  to  freedom  of 
expression,  assembly,  fair  trial,  effective  remedy  and  to  protection  of  property.  During  the 
reporting period, Parliament’s Human Rights Inquiry Committee, which is authorised to visit and 
observe  prisons,  visited  five  prisons  and  published  five  reports.  The  Human  Rights  Enquiry 
Committee has held four meetings since April 2019. A total of 1,829 applications were filed to 
the Committee from April to December 2019, and more than 50% of the applications consisted 
of applications from penal execution institutions. 

Human rights defenders (HRD) continue to be subject to intimidation, judicial prosecutions, 
violent  attacks,  threats,  surveillance,  prolonged  arbitrary  detention  and  ill-treatment.  The 
detentions and arrests of civil society representatives, journalists, lawyers, academics and others 
have  led  to  a  further  shrinking  of  the  space  for  civil  society.  During  the  reporting  period,  a 
climate of intimidation, smear campaigns by some media outlets close to the government and an 
aggressive  rhetoric  by  high  government  officials  towards  HRD  narrowed  the  space  for 
dissenting  or  alternative  views.  Lawyers  providing  legal  assistance  to  HRD  and  civil  and 
political activists face considerable obstacles in performing their work and are at risk of arrest, 
detention and prosecution for carrying out their human rights work. In August 2020, a lawyer 
who had been on hunger strike for 238 days demanding a fair trial following her conviction last 
year for an alleged membership of a terrorist organisation, died. The trials continued against the 
group  of  11  human  rights  defenders  in  Büyükada  Island  for  alleged  links  to  a  terrorist 
organisation.  Four  of  them,  including  the  former  director  of  Amnesty  International  Turkey, 
were  convicted  in  July  2020.  In  February  2020,  the  Council  of  Europe’s  Commissioner  for 
Human  Rights  expressed  concerns  about  a  hostile  environment  against  civil  society 
organisations  and  human  rights  defenders  and  a  virulent  and  negative  political  discourse  that 
frequently leads to biased actions by administrative authorities and the judiciary. 

In June 2019, the court hearings started against Osman Kavala and 15 other members of civil 
society  organisations.  While  the  Constitutional  Court  rejected  Osman  Kavala’s  application  to 
end his pre-trial detention in May 2019, the ECtHR ruled in favour of his immediate release in 

30 

 
December  2019. In  February  2020,  the  local  court  acquitted  the  defendants  who  were  not 
abroad and ruled for the release of Osman Kavala. However, only a few hours later, he was re-
arrested in relation to another investigation connected to the 2016 coup attempt despite the lack 
of  credible  grounds.  His  re-arrest  and  continuing  detention,  despite  the  ECtHR  ruling  that 
became  final  in  May  2020,  seriously  call  into  question  the adherence  of  Turkey's  judiciary  to 
international and European standards.  

Concerning the right to life, lack of credible and effective investigations into reported killings 
by  the  security  authorities  continues  to  be  deeply  worrying.  In  February,  the  ECtHR  declared 
two  cases  related  to  events  during  curfews  imposed  in  the  south-east  of  Turkey  in  December 
2015 inadmissible because the applicants had not exhausted domestic remedies. The legislation 
adopted in June 2016, granting judicial privileges to the security forces, has  not been revised, 
leaving  the  environment  of  impunity  in  place  and  raising  concerns  about  the  effectiveness  of 
domestic remedies. Criminal investigation into the killing of the former head of Diyarbakır Bar 
Association Tahir Elçi continued. An indictment was eventually prepared after 5 years at the end 
of March 2020. In many cases, the authorities denied permission to prosecute public servants. In 
total, 15 criminal cases from the 1990s (concerning only 85 of 363 forcibly disappeared persons) 
have been brought to prosecution. Most of these cases brought before justice are not processed in 
due time resulting in annulment or acquittal due to the statute of limitations. Overall, impunity 
remains a serious concern and measures should be taken urgently by the authorities to align the 
legislation adopted in June 2016, which grants judicial privileges to the security forces, and its 
implementation with ECtHR case-law and standards. 

Credible  allegations  of  torture  and  ill-treatment  continued  to  be  reported.  According  to  the 
Ministry of Justice statistics, cases have been initiated against 1,618 people for ill treatment, of 
which only 320 people were convicted in 2019. According to available reports, torture and ill-
treatment, still occur in detention centres and prisons and also in informal places of detention and 
on  the  streets.  Turkish  authorities  have  yet  to  effectively  investigate  the  cases  of  at  least  two 
dozen people allegedly abducted by state agents for many months. The legislation, which allows 
for a maximum police custody period of up to 12 days and is in contravention of ECtHR case 
law (maximum of 4 days) was not revised. Contrary to Turkey’s zero tolerance policy on torture, 
the  authorities  have  not  allowed  the  publication  of  all  the  pending  reports  of  the  Council  of 
Europe’s  Committee  for  the  Prevention  of  Torture  (CPT).  In  August  2020,  the  Turkish 
authorities allowed the publications of two CPT reports in which the Committee recommended 
that a clear and firm message that all forms of ill-treatment of detained persons are illegal and 
will  be  punished  accordingly  be  delivered  to  all  law  enforcement  officials  from  the  highest 
political  level,  namely  the  President  of  the  Republic.  In  the  report  of  its  visit  in  May  2019  to 
examine 
the 
police/gendarmerie,  the  Committee  also  stressed  that  while  the  severity  of  alleged  police  ill-
treatment had diminished, the frequency of allegations remained at a worrying level.  

treatment  and  conditions  of  detention  of  persons  detained  by 

the 

The Human Rights and Equality Institution of Turkey (HREI), which should act as the national 
preventive mechanism,  does  not  meet  the  key requirements  under  the Optional  Protocol  to  the 
UN  Convention  against  Torture  and  other  Cruel,  Inhuman  or  Degrading  Treatment  or 
Punishment  (UN  CAT)  and  is  not  yet  effectively  processing  cases  referred  to  it.  Complaints, 
reports and any indications of torture or ill-treatment need to be investigated swiftly, effectively 
and  impartially;  perpetrators  must  be  prosecuted  and  convicted  in  line  with  the  country’s 
international obligations, in particular with the ECHR and the UN CAT. 

Overcrowding and deteriorating prison conditions continue to be a source of deep concern. As 
of July 2020, the prison population, which comprises convicted and non-convicted inmates, was 
around 249,600 despite capacity of 236,755 in 366 prisons. 2,500 inmates are children, 405 of 
whom  are  staying  with  their  detained  mothers.  Since  the  lifting  of  the  state  of  emergency, 
Turkey  no  longer  publishes  statistics  concerning  the  ratio  of  inmates  on  terrorism-related 
charges compared to the total prison population. According to the Ministry of Justice, 13% of 

31 

 
 
 
 
the total prison population is in prison on terrorism-related charges including many journalists, 
political activists, lawyers and HRDs. There were further allegations of human rights violations 
in prisons, including arbitrary restrictions on the rights of detainees, impunity, denial of access 
to  medical  care  and  the  use  of  torture,  mistreatment,  prevention  of  open  visits,  and  solitary 
confinement.  Inmates  stated  that  most  of  their  complaints  have  not  been  addressed  and  that 
living conditions have not improved. According to available reports, 73 people died in prisons 
from early 2017 to August 2019, of whom 39 were ill inmates. Prison monitoring boards remain 
largely  ineffective,  as  is  HREI,  which  should  be  functioning  as  the  national  preventive 
mechanism. Given that this mechanism is not fully operational, there is no oversight over human 
rights abuses in prisons. In September 2019, the ECtHR ruled that transfers of inmates to prisons 
far away from places where they live is a violation of ‘the obligation to respect for the protection 
of private and family life’.  

Addressing  the  high  risk  of  spread  of  COVID-19  in  overcrowded  prisons,  the  Parliament 
adopted  a  Law  Amending  the  Code  on  Enforcement  of  Sentences in  order  to  release  up  to 
90,000  prisoners.  As  of  July  2020,  65,110  benefited  from  this  new  provision.  However,  it 
excludes  a  very  large  number  of  journalists,  human  rights  defenders,  politicians,  lawyers  and 
others detained pending trial or serving sentences following trials under Turkey’s overly broad 
anti-terrorism laws. Detainees in pre-trial detention should be treated on the same basis as those 
formally sentenced. 

On  the  protection  of  personal  data,  Turkey  has  not  signed  the  2018  Protocol  amending  the 
Convention  for  the  Protection  of  Individuals  with  regard  to  Automatic  Processing  of  Personal 
Data  (Council  of  Europe,  CETS  No  223).  The  Personal  Data  Protection  Authority  (DPA)  is 
operational but no legislative changes were adopted to ensure that the 2016 data protection law 
is harmonised with the EU acquis. Despite repeated requests, Turkey  has still to address inter 
alia  concerns  on  the  exceptions  for  law  enforcement  and  the  independence  of  the  Data 
Protection Authority.  The  lack  of  alignment  with  the  EU  acquis  is  an obstacle  to  the  possible 
cooperation with Eurojust and Europol and specific policy areas. 

On freedom of thought, conscience and religion, freedom of worship continued to be generally 
respected.  However,  the  Venice  Commission  recommendations  on  the  status  of  religious 
communities in Turkey are yet to be implemented. These concerns also the right of the Orthodox 
Patriarch to use the title ‘ecumenical’. Construction works of the second church demanded by the 
Syriac community in Istanbul were launched. Hate speech and hate crimes against Christians and 
Jews  also  continued  to  be  reported  (see  below  -  Minorities).  The  decisions  by  the  Turkish 
authorities to convert Hagia Sophia back into a mosque triggered an international outcry and was 
notably condemned by the Foreign Affairs Council on 13 July . On 29 May 2020, clerics recited 
a call for prayer inside the museum. Several ECtHR judgments regarding conscientious objection 
are yet to be implemented. Turkey did not implement the action plan, submitted in 2016 to the 
Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, relating to ECtHR decisions on Cem Houses and on 
compulsory  religion  classes.  School  textbooks  still  need  to  be  revised  in  order  to  remove  all 
discriminatory elements against all religions and faith groups. No steps were taken to open the 
Halki  (Heybeliada)  Greek  Orthodox  Seminary,  which  remains  closed  since  1971.  The  annual 
sermons  which  were  suspended  for  the  past  5  years  due  to  restoration  works  in  Sumela 
Monastery  were  held  again  as  of  15  August.  Lack  of  legal  personality  of  non-Muslim 
communities remains a serious issue. A comprehensive legal framework in line with European 
standards still needs to be put in place, and appropriate attention must be paid to implementing 
the  ECtHR  judgments  on  compulsory  religion  and  ethics  classes,  indication  of  religious 
affiliation  on  identity  cards  and  Alevi  worship  places.  Alevis  continue  to  face  hate  crimes  but 
investigations have proved to be ineffective so far. The murder of a foreign protestant pastor in 
Diyarbakır  in  November  2019  and  the  deportations  of  60  church  staff  including  protestant 
pastors  over  the  past  2  years  are  of  concern.  The  work  of  the  Religious  Affairs  Presidency 

32 

 
 
(Diyanet)  increased  in  all  spheres  of  public  life  and  its  budget  for  2020  was  increased 
substantially. 

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 

Freedom of expression 

Turkey is at an early stage in this area and the serious backsliding continued over the reporting 
period. The disproportionate implementation of the restrictive measures continued to negatively 
affect  the  freedom  of  expression  and  dissemination  of  opposition  voices.  Legislation  and  its 
to 
implementation,  especially  national  security  and  anti-terrorism  provisions,  continue 
contravene the European Convention on Human Rights and other international standards and to 
diverge from the case law of the ECtHR. Criminal cases and convictions of journalists, human 
rights defenders, lawyers, writers and social media users continued. 

The  Directorate  of  Communication  linked  to  the  Presidency,  in  charge  of  issuing  press 
accreditation,  faces  strong  criticism  as  715  press  cards  were  cancelled  in  2019.  International 
journalists continue to face problems with the renewal of their press cards. 

The  number  of  journalists  held  in  prison  dropped  to  over  120  but  remains  very  high  and  is  of 
very serious concern. 

The  ban  on  Wikipedia  was  lifted  in  December  2019.  However,  the  blocking  and  erasing  of 
online content without a court order on an inappropriately wide range of grounds, based on the 
Internet Law and the general legal framework, continued. The Regulation on Radio, Television 
and  Voluntary  Online  Broadcasts,  entered  into  force  in  August  2019  and  requires  online 
broadcasters  to  obtain  transmission  authorisation  and  a  broadcast  license  from  the  regulator 
RTÜK.  

The 2016, 2018 and 2019 Commission reports’ recommendations were not followed up and are 
therefore restated in this report. In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

  release journalists, human rights defenders, lawyers, writers and academics being held in pre-

trial detention; 

  end the practice exercised by both state and non-state agents, of intimidating, interfering with 

and putting pressure on the media; 

  ensure  a  safe,  plural  and  enabling  environment  for  the  media  to  carry  out  their  work 

independently and without fear of reprisals and dismissals; 

  refrain  from  undue  restrictions  on  freedom  of  expression,  including  those  relating  to 
antiterrorism  offences,  in  line  with  the  Guidelines  of  the  Committee  of  Ministers  of  the 
Council of Europe on protecting freedom of expression and information in times of crisis; 

  ensure  that  existing  legislation,  in  particular  the  Anti-Terror  Law,  the  Criminal  Code,  the 
Data Protection Law and the Internet Law, is revised to comply with European standards and 
is  implemented  in  a  manner  which  does  not  curtail  freedom  of  expression  and  ensures 
proportionality and equality before the law; 

  ensure  that  criminal  law  provisions,  in  particular  articles  on  defamation  and  other  similar 
offences,  are  not  used  as  a  means  of  putting  pressure  on  critical  voices,  by  ensuring  that 
courts apply the European Court of Human Rights case-law and is able to act independently. 

Intimidation of journalists 

Heavy pressure on freedom of expression and intimidation of the media continued as in previous 
years, with arrests, detentions, prosecutions, convictions and dismissals of media staff leading to 
censorship  and  self-censorship  among  media  professionals.  There  were  an  estimated  120 
journalists in prison. Government interference in editorial independence and pressure on media 

33 

 
outlets  to  fire  journalists  critical  of  the  Government  resulted  in  several  media  workers 
(journalists,  engineers,  sound  and  image  technicians)  being  laid  off,  including  for  their  union 
activities. Threats and physical attacks on journalists and media organisations due to their work 
continued  during  the  reporting  period.  In  March  2020,  six  journalists  were  detained  for  their 
reports  on  previously  disclosed  Turkish  casualties  in  Libya.  Three  of  these  journalists  were 
released in June 2020 

There was no reparation for damages incurred by private media companies and their staff by the 
direct  and  indirect  takeover  by  the  state  with  the  appointment  of  trustees  during  and  after  the 
state  of  emergency.  Some  outlets  cannot  access  their  files  to  prepare  their  defence  before  the 
court as their premises remain sealed. While the executives of Hayatın Sesi TV, closed down by 
a decree law  in  2016,  were acquitted,  the properties and  licence of  IMC TV  were  sold by the 
authorities.  There  are  restrictions  on  access  to  the  airwaves,  and  there  have  been  fines  and 
closures of TV and radio channels critical of the government. 

Judicial  cases  against  critical  newspapers,  online  news  sites  and  their  affiliated  journalists 
continued in 2019 and new ones were launched. The procedural rights of journalists, including 
the right to a fair trial and the respect of the principle of the presumption of innocence were not 
always ensured. (Please see above - Judiciary). 

In February 2020, the Court of Cassation ruled for the second time in favour of the acquittal of 
some of the former Cumhuriyet staff. The ruling came after a lower court upheld its conviction 
of  the  journalists,  defying  a  September  2019  decision  issued  by  the  Court  of  Cassation.  The 
appeal  process  for  the  Zaman  case  of  journalists  and  writers  is  still  pending.  In  July  2020,  a 
former Turkey correspondent for the German newspaper Die Welt was convicted in absentia of 
‘making propaganda for a terrorist organisation’ and sentenced to almost 3 years in prison.  

Legislative environment 

The first legislative package related to the Justice Reform Strategy was adopted in October 2019 
and included some minor changes to the anti-terror legislation and the Internet Law, which had 
also  been  amended  in  August  2019.  The  extensive  use  of  the  anti-terror  legislation,  the  very 
wide interpretation given to the notion of terrorism and the general legal framework enable the 
executive to block online content without a court order on a wide range of grounds. The current 
legislation regarding anti-terrorism, the internet, intelligence services and the Criminal Code, all 
impede  freedom  of  expression  and  run  counter  to  European  standards.  In  addition,  criminal 
legislation allows prison sentences for insulting the President and senior officials.  

In  July  2020,  the  Parliament  adopted  a  law  on  the  ‘Arrangement  of  Internet  Publication  and 
Combating Crimes Committed through These Publication’. This law triggered controversy as it 
places  new  obligations  on  social  media  providers,  which  would  lead  to  heavy  fines  and 
restricted  bandwidth  if  they  fail  to  comply  with  these  new  requirements,  and  gives  the 
government sweeping new powers to regulate social media content. 

Implementation/institutions 

During  the  reporting  period,  the  criminal  justice  system  continued  to  allow  journalists  to  be 
prosecuted and imprisoned on extensive charges of terrorism (see - Judiciary), insulting public 
officials, and/or allegedly committing crimes against the state and the government. Indictments 
often  failed  to  establish  direct  and  credible  links  with  the  alleged  offence  and,  in  some  high-
profile cases, the arguments provided by the defendants were not taken into consideration by the 
court.  Exercising  basic  human  rights  such  as  participating  in  demonstrations,  making  press 
statements,  participating  in  trade  union  activities  can  be  considered  as  elements  of  a  crime. 
Attendance at a funeral of convicted terrorists is often considered evidence of affiliation with a 
terrorist  organisation  in  indictments  despite  an  ECtHR  judgment  ruling  finding  this 
interpretation a violation of the Convention. 

The  lack  of credible  grounds  for  the  re-arrest  of  Ahmet  Altan  and  his  renewed  imprisonment, 

34 

 
 
 
reversing the court’s initial decision to release him, further damaged the credibility of Turkey’s 
judiciary in particular due to the high level of political interference. 

Criminal  convictions  and  fines  imposed  on  human  rights  defenders  for  their  press  statements 
continued to further limit the space for civil society organisations. In some cities, human rights 
defenders and associations were forced to sign a document by the authorities indicating that they 
would avoid certain  words and expressions such as war, trustee,  right  to  election and  elect in 
their  press  statements.  Lawsuits  with  high  fines  are  often  used  to  intimidate  newspapers  and 
silence  critical  journalists  through  judicial  means  and  politically-inspired  court  decisions 
ordering fines on the remaining opposition media outlets. Pressure on Kurdish-language media 
and those reporting on the Kurdish issue continued. 

There  were  numerous  protest  bans  and  further  pressure  on  the  media  in  this  context. 
Investigations  against  the  opposition  media  and  politicians  gained  momentum.  The  Istanbul 
Chief  Prosecutor  and  RTÜK  issued  statements  warning  that  they  will  launch  investigation 
against those who report and  broadcast  news against the military operation launched in north-
east  Syria.  Judicial  investigations  were  launched  against  the  HDP  co-chairs  and  members  of 
parliament from HDP and CHP.  

Investigations, arrests and prosecutions of politicians, journalists, writers and social media users 
(including  children),  for  insulting  the  President,  continued.  Cases  were  also  launched  for 
insulting the memory of Atatürk, or for trying to undermine Turkey's economic stability in the 
context of reporting on the 2018 currency crisis.  

Turkey ranked again 154th of 180 countries in the 2020 World Press Freedom Index prepared 
by Reporters without Borders (RSF). In May 2020, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the 
Media called on the Turkish authorities to urgently address and reverse current media freedom 
violations and pressure that journalists face.  

A report by the SETA Foundation listing and targeting foreign and local journalists working for 
international  media  caused  serious  concern.  Independent  journalists  and  international  media 
reacted strongly to the report calling it a ‘profiling’ effort, which contributes to a climate of self-
censorship and fear. 

Legislation  on  hate  speech  and  its  implementation  need  to  be  improved  as  it  disregards  hate 
speech  against  religions  other  than  Islam,  and  does  not  protect  non-Muslim  minorities  or 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons, and is not in line with ECtHR case law. 

Following a March 2018 amendment, the regulation on broadcasting performed by RTÜK was 
extended  to  any  online  media  service  providers  and  platform  operators,  including  those 
operating  from  abroad.  The  relevant  RTÜK  regulation  was  published  in  August  2019  and 
RTÜK officially began to control online broadcasts as of September 2019. This raised serious 
concerns about the media freedom of the remaining independent online broadcasting outlets due 
to general concerns about the lack of independence of RTÜK.  

The decree law transferring the power to issue press cards to the Communications Directorate 
linked  to  the  Presidency,  was  brought  before  the  Council  of  State  for  its  annulment.  The  new 
Press Cards Regulation published in December 2018 had changed accreditation criteria, making 
state press cards harder to obtain and making it easier to cancel them. The Vice-President stated 
that  the  press  cards  of  3,804  journalists  have  been  cancelled  since  2015.  715  cards  were 
cancelled in 2019. The accreditation of journalists and the system of issuing press cards needs to 
be reformed. The removal of hundreds of press cards on security grounds has a deterrent effect 
on the work of foreign correspondents in Turkey. 

The Constitutional Court made several judgements in individual applications regarding freedom 
of  expression.  The  Constitutional  Court  ruled  in  favour  of  journalists  who  were  detained 
pending trial in the absence of sufficient evidence. It has also ruled that four orders of broadcast 
and  publication  bans  on  the  police  operation  against  several  ministers  in  2013,  known  as  the 

35 

 
‘December  17-25’  operations  violated  freedom  of  expression  and  freedom  of  the  press.  The 
Court  decided  that  there  was  a  violation  of  freedom  of  expression  in  the  case  of  an  HDP 
Member of Parliament, who was subsequently released from prison.  

The non-compliance with Constitutional Court judgments by lower courts, including in relation 
to freedom of expression, is of concern. As of June 2020, only 602 out of 822 individuals known 
as ‘Peace Academics’ were acquitted at trial, in spite of a Constitutional Court decision of July 
2019.  Despite  their  acquittal,  the  number  of  academics  who  were  reinstated  and  received 
compensation  was  negligible.    Moreover,  in  mid-April  2020,  the  Turkish  Higher  Education 
Council Law was amended and entered into force. The amendments introduce sanctions against 
academics in relation to terrorism charges that are likely to have a negative impact on academic 
freedom, and therefore freedom of expression. The Şehir University in Istanbul was closed by a 
presidential  decree  of  30  June  2020.  In  December  2019,  trustees  had  been  appointed  to  the 
Foundation  for  Sciences  and  Arts,  which  had  established  the  university  in  2018  and  was  co-
founded by former Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu. 

Regarding  the  internet  and  the  implementation  of  the  Internet  Law,  Twitter  Transparency 
reported that 230 tweets and 264 accounts were withheld, while the Turkish authorities asked for 
the removal of 8,993 specific accounts in the first half of 2019. As of end of July 2020, access to 
408,494  websites  is  currently  blocked  by  Turkey.  Only  21,087  of  these  were  blocked  on  the 
order of criminal peace judges, public prosecutors’ offices or by a court decisions. The rest were 
blocked by other state institutions. There are no official statistics on banned websites to show the 
scale  of  judicial  control  of  requests  relating  to  content  takedowns,  or  the  blockage  of  content 
based  on  decisions  of  criminal  judges  of  peace.  In  May  2020,  Turkey's  Constitutional  Court 
ruled  that  a  prior  decision  to  block  access  to  an  entire  news  website  violated  the  freedom  of 
speech  and  the  press.  Access  to  Wikipedia  in  Turkey,  blocked  since  April  2017,  was  lifted  in 
December.  

Public service broadcasters 

RTÜK’s independence and neutrality is increasingly subject to criticism, as members continue 
to  be  elected  by  Parliament  without  consultation  of  civil  society  or  professional  media 
organisations.  

The  Turkish  Radio  and  Television  Corporation  (TRT)  is  affiliated  with  the  Presidential 
Communication Authority and RTÜK with the Ministry of Culture and Tourism. The editorial 
policy  of  the  public  service  broadcaster  TRT  closely  reflects  the  government’s  official  lines. 
RTÜK  continued  to  suspend  and  fine  channels  for  their  broadcasting  content  on  the  vague 
grounds that it is ‘contrary to the national and moral values of society, general morality and the 
principle  of  family  protection’.  It  also  imposed  several  bans  and  fines  on  media  outlets 
following the COVID-19 outbreak, arguing that these media had unfairly targeted the authorities 
in relation to issues on the pandemic. 

Economic factors 

There  has  been  no  change  in  the  media  ownership  structure  and  its  lack  of  transparency 
continues to cast doubt on the independence of editorial policies. Turkish media outlets are in the 
hands of a few holding groups with strong ties to the government. State-sponsored advertising is 
not fairly and transparently distributed. This further distorts the market and adds to the economic 
pressure  on  some  media  outlets  from  major  customers,  including  the  state.  One  independent 
newspapers critical of the government still faces an indefinite ban from the agency responsible 
for  the  distribution  of  the  state  advertising  budget.  This  agency  does  not  publish  its  annual 
reports,  reducing  its  accountability  and  transparency.  Independent  and  sustainable  financing  of 
the  public  service  broadcaster  is  not  ensured.  The  Broadcasting  Law  does  not  ensure  fair 
competition, as it does not prevent monopolisation.  

Professional organisations and working conditions 

36 

 
The  representation  of  journalists  continues  to  be  divided  between  the  professional  journalists’ 
associations  and  the  pro-government  union.  Journalism  in  Turkey  is  a  precarious  profession, 
with  low  wages,  a  high  risk  of  judicial  harassment  and  a  lack  of  job  security.  Working 
conditions,  insufficient  trade  union  rights  and  application  of  labour  legislation,  difficulty  in 
obtaining  a  press  card  and  arbitrary  accreditations  remain  major  concerns.  Editorial  pressure, 
self-censorship  and  judicial  harassment  for  investigative  journalism,  especially  on  politically 
sensitive  issues  have  become  a  norm.  In  October  2019,  the  Hürriyet  newspaper  fired  45 
journalists  with  no  compensation,  43  of  whom  were  dismissed  for  their  trade  union  activities. 
(See also Chapter 10 - Information society and media) 

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 

There  was  further  backsliding  in  the  area  of  freedom  of  assembly  and  association  where 
legislation  and  its  implementation  are  not  in  line  with  the  Turkish  Constitution,  European 
standards, and international conventions that Turkey is party to. Recurrent bans, disproportionate 
interventions  and  excessive  use  of  force 
investigations, 
administrative  fines  and  prosecutions  against  demonstrators  on  charges  of  ‘terrorism-related 
activities’  continued  to  be  reported.  The  applicable  ECtHR  case-law  on  freedom  of  assembly 
needs  to  be  implemented  without  delay  and  relevant  national  laws  need  to  be  revised 
accordingly. 

in  peaceful  demonstrations, 

The  application  by  the  Human  Rights  Association  to  cancel  the  regulation  adopted  in  October 
2018, which obliges associations to disclose all their members to authorities, was rejected by the 
Council of State. The appeal process continues. In 2019, the Constitutional Court handed down 
verdicts  on  freedom  of  assembly  in  37  individual  applications  where  it  ruled  that  there  was  a 
violation  in  19  of  these  applications  and  no  violation  in  7  of  them.  In  September,  the 
Constitutional  Court  concluded  in  its  judgement  on  the  2009  May  Day  demonstration  that  the 
demonstrators’ freedom of assembly was violated. This is the first domestic high court ruling on 
arbitrary prevention of the 1 May Day commemorations. The ECtHR ruled violation of freedom 
of  assembly  in  its  judgement  Zülküf  Murat  Kahraman  v.  Turkey.  In  October  2019,  the 
Constitutional  Court  found  a  violation  of  rights  in  the  prohibition  of  demonstrations  under  the 
state of emergency in a case against a member of the Education Union. In June, representatives 
of bar associations marching to Ankara were stopped by the police from entering the city.    

Several  projects  considered  environmentally  hazardous  by  the  public  led  to  heated  debates. 
Thousands  of  people  peacefully  protested  against  the  gold  mine  project  in  the  Kaz  Mountains 
(Mount Ida), while several environmental protests were banned by the authorities. A conference 
organised by the Hrant  Dink Foundation  was banned by  the Kayseri  and Istanbul governorate, 
without  any  justification.  According  to  independent  monitoring  data  between  April  2019  and 
December  2019,  security  forces  intervened  in  at  least  1,138  peaceful  meetings  and 
demonstrations, during which at least  2,851  persons were detained. Events and demonstrations 
relating  to  the  Kurdish  issue,  Turkey's  military  operation  in  Syria,  protests  against  the 
appointment of trustees or organised by opposition groups were prohibited on security grounds. 
Several  provincial  governors,  especially  in  the  east  and  south-east,  continued  to  use 
extraordinary  powers  contained  in  a  law  introduced  after  the  end  of  the  state  of  emergency  to 
restrict the right to peaceful assembly, including through the imposition of blanket bans.  

Politicians, trade unions and workers across Turkey celebrated 1 May peacefully. The peaceful 
gatherings  of  the  ‘Saturday  Mothers’  who  held  weekly  meetings  in  Galatasaray  Square  in 
Istanbul,  have  remained  banned,  forcing  the  gathering  to  take  place  in  a  side  street.  A  blanket 
ban remains imposed on all protests in the square. In May 2019, the Ankara governorate banned 
the commemoration of the centenary of the killing of the Pontic population in Turkey. Following 
the  lifting  in  April  of  a  blanket  ban  on  all  LGBTI  events imposed  by  the  Ankara  governorate, 
LGBTI  events  were  banned  individually.  Blanket  bans  were  issued  by  the  Izmir,  Antalya  and 

37 

 
Mersin governorates in June 2019 to prevent Pride week events taking place. The Istanbul Pride 
march was banned for the fifth year in a row without credible justification.  

Issues of labour and trade union rights are further covered in Chapter 19 - Social policy and 
employment. 

On property rights, there continues to be a lack of effective domestic remedy for confiscations, 
since the Inquiry Commission on the State of Emergency Measures is slow to issue decisions and 
lacks  transparency.  In  the  south-east,  restoration  of  cultural  and  religious  heritage  and  urban 
housing construction continues, as well as court cases regarding the 2016 expropriations in Sur. 
Regarding the implementation of the Law on Foundations to minority communities, most of the 
appeals regarding rejected claims for the restitution of property are pending either before a local 
court  or  at  the  ECtHR.  In  May  2019,  the  ECtHR  rejected  the  application  of  the  Mor  Gabriel 
Monastery Syriac Orthodox Church Foundation regarding the forestry land, which is within the 
walls of the Monastery. The Monastery Foundation appealed against this decision to the ECtHR 
Grand  Chamber.  Other  cases  in  relation  to  the  ownership  of  the  land  of  the  Mor  Gabriel 
Monastery are ongoing. Specific concerns regarding Christians and Jews in Antakya who are not 
covered  by  the  Foundations  Law,  which  provides  compensation  for  the  violation  of  property 
rights  of  non-Muslim  foundations,  have  not  been  addressed.  The  Council  of  Europe’s 
recommendations  on  protecting  property  rights  and  education  rights  still  need  to  be  fully 
implemented.  The  Council  of  Europe  Resolution  1625  (2008)  regarding  property  rights  on  the 
islands of Gökçeada (Imbros) and Bozcaada (Tenedos) needs to be fully implemented. Relevant 
legislation on the issue of property rights of non-Muslim minorities and legislation covering all 
issues of property rights still need to be revised. 

In the field of non-discrimination, legislation is not in line with European standards and is not 
protected by law or enforced fully in practice. The HREI,  which is in charge of applying non-
antidiscrimination  legislation,  only  finalised  18  decisions  of  70  received  applications  on 
antidiscrimination  charges  by  January  2020.  School  textbooks  need  to  be  revised,  especially 
regarding  some  content  on  secularism,  religion  and  gender  inequality.  As  stated  in  previous 
Commission recommendations, Turkey should urgently adopt a law on combating discrimination 
in line with the EU acquis as well as the ECHR, including sexual orientation and gender identity. 
Turkey  should  also  ratify  Protocol  12  of  the  Convention,  which  provides  for  the  general 
prohibition  of  discrimination,  and  implement  the  recommendations  of  the  Council  of  Europe’s 
European Commission against Racism and Intolerance. Hate crime legislation is not in line with 
international  standards  and  does  not  cover  hate offences  based  on  sexual  orientation  or  gender 
identity.  Ratification  of  the  Additional  Protocol  to  the  Convention  on  Cybercrime,  concerning 
the  criminalisation  of  acts  of  a  racist  and  xenophobic  nature  committed  through  computer 
systems was still pending.  

Equality  between  men  and  women  is  in  place  in  the  legislative  and  institutional  framework. 
However, due to continued weak implementation, lack of coordination between institutions and 
lack of awareness and commitment of law enforcement officials on how to address gender based 
violence, gender disparity and violence against women remain of serious concern. In the Civek v. 
Turkey judgement of February 2016, the ECHR condemned Turkey for the second time for the 
inadequate response of the duty bearers in protecting the victims of violence against women. No 
recent  reliable  official  data  exists  on  the  prevalence  of  femicides.  According  to  reports,  more 
than 2,600 women have been murdered in Turkey since 2010, with 474 women killed in 2019. 
Turkey needs to introduce a comprehensive data collection system in this area to assess the scale 
and nature of the issue in order to guide future planning, policy making and monitoring. Services 
for  women  survivors  of  violence  continued  to  be  very  limited  and  the  number  of  centres  to 
provide  such  services  remains  inadequate.  As  of  December  2019,  there  were  146  women’s 
shelters. 

38 

 
Child, early and forced marriages remain a source of concern, as does discretionary mitigation in 
court cases of violence against women, possibly mirroring sexist prejudice and victim blaming. 
Incest  is  reported  by  civil  society  to  be  increasing  but  there  is  no  policy  action  or 
acknowledgement of this by the authorities. Overall, there is a lack of political commitment to 
address  gender  equality  issues,  and  a  growing  reluctance  to  use  the  term  ‘gender  equality’  in 
official  documents.  The  most  recently  published  national  action  plan  on  gender  equality  was 
published  for  2008-2013  and  has  not  been  renewed  since.  Instead,  a  women’s  empowerment 
strategy  document  covering  2018-2023  was  issued.  The  national  action  plan  on  combating 
violence against women (2016-2020) remains in place. 

Independent  women’s  rights  organisations  have  been  largely  excluded  from  the  process  of 
drafting  laws  and  developing  policies  and  regulations  regarding  women’s  issues  while  pro-
government and more conservative organisations are being consulted. Public statements by high-
level  policymakers  and  influential  politicians  emphasising  traditional  gender  stereotypes  is  a 
concern,  as  this  discriminates  against  women  and  hampers  the  effective  and  efficient 
implementation  of  international  conventions.  No  concrete  steps  to  harmonise  the  domestic 
legislation with the Istanbul Convention have taken place. Authorities, including the HREI, have 
increasingly argued  against  the Convention on  the Elimination of All Forms of  Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW) and the Istanbul Convention as they allegedly contradict  ‘Turkish 
family values’.Turkey has continued to make considerable efforts to uphold the rights of refugee, 
migrant,  and  asylum-seeker  children  to  education,  health  and  protection  (see  Chapter  24). 
However, there was overall limited progress on the rights of the child. The 2013-2017 national 
children’s rights strategy and its action plan, as well as the national strategy to prevent violence 
against  children  have  yet  to  be  updated.  The  third  judicial  reform  strategy  sets  out  several 
activities  under  its  objective  dedicated  to  the  juvenile  justice  system.  Areas  of  continuing 
concern  include:  early  and  forced  child  marriage,  child  poverty,  child  labour,  violence  against 
children  and  children  with  disabilities.  Gaps  remain  regarding  access  to  quality  inclusive 
education  and  in  upholding  the  rights  of  children  in  the  justice  system  and  protection  from 
violence and abuse, particularly for most vulnerable groups, including Roma. In addition, there 
are  limited  child  protection  mechanisms  and  services.  Juveniles  continued  to  face  arrest  and 
detention  on  charges  of  membership  of  terrorist  organisation and  significant  numbers  of 
children  continue  to  be  detained  and  imprisoned,  mostly  in  pre-trial  detention,  often  for  long 
periods  and  not  always  in  institutions  specifically  for  children.  The  quality  of  legal  aid  for 
juveniles and rehabilitation activities in prisons is a matter of concern.  

s 

Concerning the rights of people with disabilities, in 2019, the UN Committee on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities expressed concern about the prevalence of the medical, charitable and 
paternalistic  approaches  to  disability,  exemplified  by  disability  assessments  based  on  medical 
reports, which  reduce those with disabilities to their impairments and health  condition.  Turkey 
needs  to  revise  its  legislation  and  policies  to  harmonise  them  with  the  principles  of  dignity, 
individual autonomy and equality of people with disabilities in all areas of life. A national action 
plan  on  the  rights  of  people  with  disabilities  needs  to  be  adopted  involving  organisations  of 
persons  with  disabilities.  Discriminatory  provisions,  which  are  not  compatible  with  EU  acquis 
provisions,  remain  in  legislation,  such  as  restricting  access  to  certain  public  professions  (i.e. 
diplomat,  judge,  governor  and  prosecutor)  and  the  penal  code  requiring  proof  of  hatred 
motivation for disability-based discrimination.  

The  framework  for  monitoring  the  implementation  of  the  UN  Convention  on  the  Rights  of 
Persons with Disabilities lacks independence and does not comply with the principles relating to 
the  status  of  national  institutions  for  the  promotion  and  protection  of  human  rights  (the  Paris 
Principles).  In  relation  to  the  implementation  of  the  Convention,  there  is  limited  inclusion  of 
organisations representing persons with disabilities in legislative, policy-making and monitoring 
processes.  Accessibility  to  buildings  and  public  services,  as  well  as  the  data  collection  system 
need to be improved and accessibility standards need to be enforced. However, public awareness 

39 

 
 
on accessibility of urban transport and other services is increasing thanks to public and private 
initiatives. Effectiveness of the accessibility monitoring and inspection commissions established 
at provincial level need to be increased and their decisions should be implemented. With regard 
to equal recognition of legal capacity, the current guardianship regime needs to be reviewed and 
supported  and  decision-making  mechanisms  should  be  promoted,  particularly  concerning  the 
right to marry and the right to vote. The introduction of mobile ballot boxes, which are brought 
directly to those with disabilities, allowed 78% of all voters with disabilities to cast their vote in 
the general elections of June 2018. 

There  are  no  specific  measures  in  national  policy  documents  to  address  cases  of  multiple 
discrimination  or  vulnerabilities,  such  as  disabled  women  or  disabled  Roma.  Parliament  has 
established an inquiry commission on the situation of people with Down syndrome, autism and 
other developmental disorders. The first national autism action plan expired in December 2019 
and has not been renewed yet. Its implementation has been very limited. Turkey has no mental 
health  legislation.  Children  with  disabilities  benefit  from  public  health  care,  aids  and 
rehabilitation  and  physiotherapy  services,  regular  allowances,  carer  benefits  and  free  school 
transport.  However,  according  to  the  UN,  children  with  disabilities  in  Turkey  are  unable  to 
develop  to  their  full  potential,  and  experience  exclusion  from  social  life,  as  a  result  of 
shortcomings  in  their  physical  environments,  insufficiencies  in  the  support  and  services  they 
receive,  and  various  forms  of  active  or  passive  discrimination.  The  Ministry  of  National 
Education is conducting programmes to promote inclusive education and in-service trainings for 
school  teachers  of  children  with  special  needs.  However,  school  participation  of  children  with 
disabilities remains low. 

There  are  serious  concerns  regarding  the  fundamental  rights  of  lesbian,  gay,  bisexual, 
transgender  and  intersex  (LGBTI)  people.  No  changes  have  been  introduced  to  the  military 
disciplinary system or to the medical regulations which define homosexuality as a ‘psychosexual 
disorder/illness’. The implementation of the law on disciplinary provisions for the security forces 
stipulating  dismissal  for  all  security  personnel  for  ‘abnormal/pervert’  actions  needs  to  be 
monitored. Freedom of assembly and association and freedom of expression for LGBTI NGOs 
continues to be restricted. Smear campaigns in pro-government media and hate speech by high-
level  government  officials,  including  the  President  of  the  Directorate  of  Religious  Affairs 
(Diyanet), the Human Rights and Equality Institution of Turkey and the Ombudsman Institution 
and  the  chair  of  the  Red  Crescent  Society  of  Turkey  reflect  the  government's  discriminatory 
stance  against  the  LGBTI  community/rights.  Hate  speech  against  LGBTI  people  is  not 
effectively prosecuted and the government is reluctant to prevent and take action to punish and 
end discriminative practices and incidents against LGBTI people. Turkey is among the countries 
with the highest murder rate of transgender persons. There is no specific legislation to address 
these crimes. There is limited protection of LGBTI organisations, which have been threatened.  

On procedural rights, the strategy plan for restructuring the system of legal aid, accompanied 
by  an  action  plan  for  2018-2021  is  in  place.  No  concrete  steps  were  taken  to  further  align 
legislation  with  European  standards,  some  aspects  of  which  are  guaranteed  by  law,  including 
legal  aid  and  the  right  to  translation  and  interpretation  in  criminal  matters.  Turkey  has  been 
repeatedly  criticised  by  the  ECtHR  for  violating  the  right  to  a  fair  trial  and  presumption  of 
innocence, notably due to its failure to respect procedural rules. The maximum detention period 
of  up  to  12  days  before  the  detainee  is  brought  before  a  judge  is  still  in  place  and  the  ban  on 
access  to  defence  during  the  first  24  hours  of  police  custody  is  still  allowed  under  the  Anti-
Terror Law. Law officials (judges, prosecutors and other civil servants) suspended from the civil 
service by state of emergency decrees continued to be barred from acting as lawyers, since the 
Ministry of Justice's appeals against restoring their licences have so far always been accepted by 
the judiciary. 

Hate speech and threats directed against minorities remain a serious problem. This includes hate 
speech  in  the  media  targeting  national,  ethnic  and  religious  groups.  Furthermore,  school 

40 

 
Aktaş v. Turkey

textbooks need to be revised to delete remnants of discriminatory references. Attacks or acts of 
vandalism  on  minority  worship  places  continue  and  need  to  be  investigated.  In  June  2019,  the 
, regarding an acquisition of a 
ECtHR found a violation of Article 8 in the case of 
Syriac surname. On minority foundations, no new regulation on the election procedures for non-
Muslim  foundations  has  been  published  since  2013.  In  the  absence  of  such  regulation,  these 
foundations are unable to hold elections for their board members and exercise their rights to elect 
and  be  elected.  The  Ministry  of  Interior  continued  interfering  in  the  election  process  of  the 
Armenian Patriarch and changed the election regulation, which led to strong negative reactions 
within the Armenian community. In July 2019, the Constitutional Court published its decision in 
an  application  regarding  interventions  in  the  Armenian  Church’s  patriarchal  election  process, 
and  underlined  that  the  administration  had  no  legal  basis  for  intervening  in  the  patriarchal 
elections  and  thus  the  state  had  violated  religious  freedom  by  interfering  in  and  blocking  the 
election  of  the  Armenian  Patriarch  in  recent  years.  A  new  Armenian  patriarch  was  elected  in 
December  2019.  The  construction  of  the  Mor  Ephrem  Syriac  Orthodox  Church  in  Istanbul 
started in August after more than 10 years of bureaucratic procedures. In January 2020, 3 Syriac 
Christians,  including  a  priest,  were  detained  in  Mardin  under  charges  of  aiding  and  abetting  a 
terror organisation. State subsidies for minority schools have decreased and are not regular. The 
Press Advertising Authority (BİK) decided to increase the current funding to newspapers run by 
members  of  the  Armenian,  Greek,  and  Jewish  communities.  The  court  case  against  public 
officials on the killing of Armenian journalist Hrant Dink continued. Regarding minorities, full 
respect  for  and  protection  of  language,  religion,  culture  and  fundamental  rights  in  accordance 
with  European  standards  have  yet  to  be  fully  achieved.  The  issue  of  property  rights  of  non-
Muslim  minorities  and  the  need  for  a  revision  of  legislation  covering  all  issues  regarding 
property  rights  is  pending.  As  the  Venice  Commission  underlined  in  2010,  Turkey  should 
continue  the  reform  process  and  introduce  legislation,  which  makes  it  possible  for  all  non-
Muslim religious communities to acquire legal personality. 

Concerning  Roma,  in  December  2019  Turkey  adopted  the  second  action  plan  (2019-2021)  to 
implement  its  national  strategy  (2016-2021)  for  Roma.  The  monitoring  and  evaluation 
mechanism  of  this  comprehensive  action  plan,  however,  needs  to  become  effective  and  more 
NGO inclusive and the measures in it need to be gender mainstreamed. Local authorities need to 
be  properly  involved  for  effective  implementation  of  the  strategy  and  should  secure  financial 
resources for its implementation. The anti- discrimination component of the strategy needs to be 
further strengthened by including concrete commitments to eliminate all forms of discrimination 
against  Roma.  Unemployment  in  Roma-populated  districts  was  reportedly  very  high  in  the 
absence  of  holistic  active  employment  measures,  with  the  exception  of  community  work 
programmes, which offer a temporary solution. Roma children suffered from significant levels of 
deprivation  and  relative  poverty.  Public  schools  in  Roma  neighbourhoods  were  reportedly 
understaffed  and  were  often  poorly  resourced,  contributing  to  a  high  level  of  school  drop  out 
among Roma children. Many young Roma children received fake mental disability reports and 
attend  "special  education  centres"  for  slow  learners,  hampering  their  prospects  of  proper 
education  and  future  employment.  Efforts  to  protect  Roma  children  and  youngsters  from  drug 
abuse  should  be  stepped  up  via  preventive  social  services  and  enhanced  educational 
opportunities. Health services were accessible to all Roma, but affordability of curative services 
was  compromised  due  to  increased  medical  costs  and  transport  costs  to  city  hospitals  located 
outside large cities.  Early  and  forced  marriages are common among  Roma.  The urban renewal 
projects  continued  to  affect  densely  Roma-populated  neighbourhoods.  In  the  absence  of  title 
deeds  in  most  cases,  Roma  families  were  negatively  affected  and  displaced  without 
compensation. The national Roma strategy does not cover Syrian Dom communities. No fully-
fledged EU-Turkey Joint Roma Seminar has been held so far. In June 2020, hundreds of Roma 
were  forcibly  evicted  by  the  municipality  of  Izmir  from  the  tents  and  barracks  they  had  been 
living in for years. 

41 

 
 
On  cultural  rights,  the  Government  did  not  legalise  the  provision  of  public  services  in 
languages  other  than  Turkish.  Legal  restrictions  on  mother-tongue  education  in  primary  and 
secondary  schools  remain.  Optional  courses  in  Kurdish  continue  in  public  state  schools,  as  do 
university  programmes  in  Kurdish,  Arabic,  Syriac  and  Zaza.  The  increased  powers  of  the 
governors, which increased arbitrary censorship had negative impact on the arts and culture field. 
Following a second round  of  appointment of trustees,  mostly in HDP  municipalities, efforts to 
promote  the  creation  of  language  and  culture  institutions  in  these  provinces  were  further 
undermined. The closure of Kurdish cultural and language institutions and Kurdish media outlets 
and numerous art spaces in the aftermath of the coup attempt of 2016 continued to lead to further 
shrinking of cultural rights. The Supporting, Evaluation and Classification of Cinema Films law, 
published in January, raised concerns of further censorship in filmmaking. (See also Chapter 26 
- Education and Culture).  

2.2.2  Chapter 24: Justice, freedom and security  

The EU has common rules for border control, visas, external migration and asylum. Schengen 
cooperation  entails  the  lifting  of  border  controls  within  the  EU.  EU  Member  States  also 
cooperate with Turkey in the fight against organised crime and terrorism, and in judicial, police 
and custom matters and are supported by the EU Justice and Home Affairs Agencies. 

Turkey  is  moderately  prepared  in  the  area  of  justice,  freedom  and  security.  There  was  some 
progress,  in  particular  in  the  area  of  migration  and  asylum  policy.  Turkey  continued  to  make 
significant  efforts  in  hosting  and  addressing  the  needs  of  almost  four  million  refugees,  and  in 
preventing  illegal  crossings  towards  the  EU.  Throughout  2019,  Turkey  was  committed  to  the 
implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement of March 2016 and played a key role in addressing 
the challenges of migratory flows along the Eastern Mediterranean route, but as of late February 
2020, encouraged crossings to the EU and called for a new agreement replacing the March 2016 
Statement. A comprehensive amendment to the Law on Foreigners and International Protection 
was adopted in  December with implications  on irregular  migration and asylum that need  to  be 
followed up with  implementing  legislation. There was some progress in the implementation  of 
the recommendations of last year’s report. However, Turkey is not implementing the provisions 
relating  to  third-country  nationals  in  the  EU-Turkey  readmission  agreement,  despite  these 
entering into force in October 2017. Turkey still needs to align its legislation on data protection 
with European standards, which is a precondition for an international agreement with the EU on 
the exchange of personal data between Europol and Turkey, currently being negotiated. Most of 
the recommendations remain valid. In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

  continue  implementing  the  EU-Turkey  Statement  of  March  2016  and  implement  all  the 

provisions of the EU-Turkey readmission agreement towards all EU Member States; 

  align  legislation  on  personal  data  protection  with  European  standards,  to  allow  for  the 
conclusion  of  an  EU-Turkey  international  agreement  for  the  exchange  of  personal  data 
between Europol and Turkey; 

  revise legislation and practices on terrorism in line with the European Convention on Human 
Rights,  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  case-law  and  the  EU  acquis  and  practices.  The 
proportionality principle should be observed in practice. 

Fight against organised crime 

Turkey has some level of preparation in the fight against organised crime. There was limited 
progress overall. The majority of the recommendations from last year remain to be addressed. 
The 2019-2021 national action plan for the implementation of the 2016-2021 national strategy 
on the fight against organised crime, was adopted in May 2019. 

In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

42 

 
  collect  and  use  aggregate  statistics  to  facilitate  threat  assessment,  policy  development  and 
implementation  and  improve  the  track  record  on  dismantling  criminal  networks  and 
confiscating criminal assets; 

  improve  the  legal  framework  regulating  the  fight  against  money  laundering  and  terrorist 
financing  further  to  the  2019  Financial  Action  Task  Force  (FATF)  Mutual  Evaluation 
Report; 

  improve its legislation on cybercrime, asset confiscation and witness protection; 

  amend the data protection law to bring it in line with European standards in order to allow 

for intensified cooperation with Europol; 

  establish an Asset Recovery Office in line with the EU acquis. 

Institutional set-up and legal alignment 

There are a number of specialised departments dealing with various forms of organised crime, 
under  two  main  law  enforcement  agencies,  namely  the  gendarmerie  and  the  police  under  the 
Ministry  of the Interior. Operational capacity, which was affected  by the measures  taken after 
the coup attempt, was strengthened. Training of new staff continued.  

The  legal framework  for the fight against  organised  crime and police cooperation is partially 
aligned with the EU acquis. No new structure has been established following the abolition of the 
Cyber Security Council. An Asset Recovery Office, as a designated agency to identify and trace 
criminal assets, has still not been established. The central authority for the international recovery 
of  assets  remains  the  Centre  for  Recovery  of  Proceeds  from  Crime,  located  in  the  General 
Directorate  of  International  Law  and  Foreign  Relations  of  the  Ministry  of  Justice.  Legal 
provisions  on  extended  confiscation,  third-party  confiscation,  and  precautionary  freezing  of 
assets need to be aligned with the EU acquis. The scope of the law on witness protection needs 
to  be  expanded  to  include  all  types  of  serious  crime,  while  its  procedural  rules  also  need 
improvement. 

The  Ministry  of  the  Interior  continues  to  coordinate  the  implementation  of  the  2016-2021 
strategy for combating organised crime. An action plan for the implementation of this strategy 
covering  2019-2021  was  adopted  in  May  2019.  It  sets  out  actions  to  reach  the  overall  aims, 
including an effective institutional cooperation and coordination as well as stronger international 
cooperation. 

Implementation and enforcement capacity 

In 2019, of 1,544 cases of organised crime, 2,374 people were convicted (there were 972 cases 
in  2018  with  1,744  convictions).  In  the  fight  against  smuggling  (fuel,  cigarettes,  historical 
works,  commodities  etc.),  in  2019,  19,111  persons  were  convicted  in  21,678  cases,  while  in 
2018, 569 suspects were arrested of 20,187 people in 13,047 cases. 

The measures taken after the attempted coup of July 2016 continued to affect the professional 
capacity of the law enforcement agencies. In 2019, 104 personnel (officers, non-commissioned 
officers,  civil  servants)  from  the  Coast  Guard  Command  were  dismissed  (192  in  2018) as  a 
result of terrorism related investigations. In 2019, 2,304 personnel (officers, non-commissioned 
officers and  gendarmerie  specialised  sergeants)  from  the  gendarmerie  were  dismissed.  This 
number  includes  the  dismissals  based  on  terrorism  related  charges  as  well  as  others,  such  as 
disciplinary investigations. The number was 689 in 2018. 4,724 new personnel were recruited in 
2019 by the Gendarmerie and 294 by the Coast Guard Command. 

Cooperation  between  Europol  and  Turkey  is  based  on  a  Strategic  Agreement  on  Cooperation, 
which entered into force in July 2004. While excluding the possibility of sharing personal data, 
it  facilitates  cooperation  in  a  range  of  areas.  An  operational  agreement  on  the  exchange  of 
personal data between Europol and the Turkish authorities competent for fighting serious crime 

43 

 
 
 
 
and terrorism was negotiated between the EU and Turkey, but has not been signed, given that 
Turkey first needs to align its data protection law with European standards.  

The establishment of the Turkish Liaison Office at Europol (May 2016) exceptionally under the 
Strategic  Agreement  confirmed  the  importance  Europol  and  Member  States  attach  to 
cooperation with Turkey. However, Turkey did not participate in any Operational Action Plans 
(OAPs) in 2018, 2019 nor 2020. Turkey’s cooperation with the EU agencies on organised crime, 
on  money  laundering  and  on  trafficking  of  drugs  should  be  increased,  particularly  given 
Turkey’s  position  as  a  major  trans-shipment  point  for  heroin  entering  Europe  and  for  the 
smuggling  of  precursors.  Turkey  is  connected  and  configured  for  the  full  use  of  Europol’s 
Secure Information Exchange Network Application (SIENA) with third parties and EU Member 
States.  Information  exchange  with  Turkey  via  SIENA  is  at  a  low  level  and  so  far  in  2020 
presents  a  decreasing  trend  both  in  terms  of  SIENA  messages  exchanged  and  SIENA  cases 
initiated  by  Turkey.  Information  transmitted  to  Europol  about  smugglers  and  criminal  groups 
operating in Turkey or linked to Turkey, are facilitated mainly by operational partners, based on 
migrants voluntary statements and investigative activities. 

A  Cooperation  Agreement  with  the  European  Union  Agency  for  Law  Enforcement  Training 
(CEPOL)  has  been  in  place  since  2010  and  cooperation  continued  between  CEPOL  and  the 
Turkish National Police Academy.  

Overall, Turkey signed 47 cooperation agreements in relation to the fight against terrorism and 
crime  with  22  Member  States,  with  a  view  to  sharing  information  and  conducting  joint 
operations. In total, 180 security cooperation agreements are in place with 106 countries. 

The  number  of  suspicious  transaction  reports  submitted  to  the  Financial  Crimes  Investigation 
 in 2019 (222,743 in 2018. The number of files that were 
Board (MASAK) decreased to 
analysed and evaluated by MASAK also decreased, from 23,893 in 2018 to 19,016 in 2019. 9 
people  were  convicted  for  money  laundering  in  2019  compared  with  9  in  2018.  (See  also 
Chapter 4: Free movement of capital) 

203,786 

Turkey should develop and implement a more comprehensive and coherent legal framework for 
the confiscation of the proceeds of crime. Financial investigations into a person’s assets should 
be  allowed  to  continue  (for  years  if  needed)  after  a  criminal  conviction  in  order  to  fully  and 
effectively  implement  a  previously  issued  confiscation  order.  Turkey  should  urgently  improve 
its  capacity  to  manage  frozen  or  confiscated  assets  so  that  they  do  not  lose  economic  value 
(asset management). 

Turkey  continues to  be an important  transit and destination country  for  trafficking in human 
beings. By the end of 2019, the number of victims identified by Turkish authorities was 215, of 
which 59 were women. This represented an increase compared with 2018 when the number was 
134,  yet  in  sharp  contrast  to  the  high  number  of  vulnerable  refugees  and  irregularly  staying 
migrants  in  the  country.  By  9  April  2020,  the  number  of  victims  identified  by  Turkish 
authorities stood at 46. 

The  Council  of  Europe’s  Group  of  Experts  on  Action  against  Trafficking  in  Human  Beings 
(GRETA)  published  its  first  report  on  Turkey's  implementation  of  the  Council  of  Europe 
Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings in October 2019. The report calls 
on  Turkey  to  adopt  a  new  action  plan  together  with  a  mechanism  for  monitoring  its 
implementation.  The  action  plan  should  address  all  victims  of  trafficking,  including  Turkish 
nationals, and all forms of exploitation, taking into account the gender dimension of trafficking 
and the particular vulnerability of children. Turkey should improve the identification of victims. 
The report also underlines the importance of involving specialised NGOs and further developing 
coordination at national and provincial levels, using a comprehensive multidisciplinary, victim-
focused approach. Another key finding of the GRETA report is the need for Turkish authorities 
to  strengthen  the  effectiveness  of  investigations  and  prosecutions  with  a  view  to  securing 
proportionate and dissuasive convictions for trafficking in human beings offences for all types 

44 

 
of exploitation. Generally, the cooperation between Turkey and Member States with the support 
of Europol and Eurojust to combat smuggling of migrants and goods was successful, with joint 
investigation  teams  performing  simultaneous  actions  against  organised  criminal  groups 
smuggling migrants from the Middle East. In the first half of 2019, Turkish authorities arrested 
3,776  smugglers,  including  in  one  incident  in  May  where  they  arrested  20  members  of  an 
international smuggling operation. The smuggling operations at the border between Turkey and 
Greece continue, and increased during the month of March 2020, following public declarations 
on the borders to the EU being ‘open’ for migrants and refugees. 

Following  the  amendments  to  the  Law  on  Foreigners  and  Temporary  Protection,  individuals 
suspected to be involved in facilitating trafficking in human beings and migrants’ smuggling can 
now be arrested without a warrant. 

Turkey has strong standards preventing the sale of blank-firing, gas and alarm weapons that can 
be  converted  into  live-firing  guns.  Since  December  2019,  these  standards  also  apply  to  the 
manufacture  of  such  weapons  for  export.  Consequently,  Turkey  addressed  the  legal  loopholes 
that  previously  enabled  the  export  of  blank-firing,  gas  and  alarm  weapons,  which  did  not 
comply with EU standards and were one of the main current sources of firearms trafficking.  

Proactively  fighting  organised  crime  and  corruption  remains  fundamental  to  countering  the 
illicit influence of criminal groups on the political, legal and economic systems. 

Cooperation in the field of drugs 

Institutional set-up and legal alignment 

The High Council for the Fight against  Drugs is  responsible  for interinstitutional coordination 
and monitoring. It includes ministers involved in delivering the objectives of the national anti-
drug  strategy  for  2018-2023.  The  Board  for  the  Fight  against  Drugs  supports  the  work  of  the 
High  Council,  and  the  Ministry  of  Health  provides  the  secretariat.  The  research  committee 
conducts  research  on  drug  addiction  and  new  types  of  addiction.  A  separate  scientific 
committee,  composed  of  academics,  is  tasked  with  making  scientific  recommendations  for 
studies and training on drug abuse. This committee is established within the Turkish Monitoring 
Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction under the counter narcotics department of the police. The 
National  Early  Warning  System  on  new  psychoactive  substances  is  managed  by  the  same 
Centre.

Implementation and enforcement capacity 

Turkey  remains  a  transit  route  for  drugs  between  Asia  and  Europe.  In  2019,  Turkish  law 
enforcement bodies conducted operations that resulted in the seizure of 80,707 kg of cannabis, 
1,509  kg  of  cocaine,  18,531  kg  of  heroin,  8,909,892  ecstasy  tablets  and  22,738,579  captagon 
tablets.  

Since 2008, a total of 861 new psychoactive substances have been included in legislation as a 
result of the activities of the National Early Warning System. The number of sniffer dogs used 
by the police increased to 441 from 431 in 2019. Narcotics teams specialised in fighting drugs 
operate  now  in  all  81  provinces,  to  focus  especially  on  high-risk  locations  such  as  schools. 
Turkey  continued to  report to  the  European  Monitoring  Centre  for  Drugs  and  Drug  Addiction 
(EMCDDA).  The  quality  and  quantity  of  data  Turkey  provides  has  been  improving  in  recent 
years. Rehabilitation and treatment capacity in the country needs to be further increased, despite 
the increase in the number of treatment centres. 

Turkey’s  capacity  for  data  collection  and  analysis  was  strengthened.  The  Turkish  Monitoring 
Centre  for  Drugs  and  Drug  Addiction  worked  on  a  dynamic  system  for  an  instant  data  flow 
concerning the fight against drugs, which should be fully operational in November 2020. 

Fight against terrorism 

45 

 
 
Turkish  efforts  to  tackle  terrorism  resulted  in  an  improved  security  climate,  but  Turkey  still 
faces  threats  from  terrorist  groups.  The  EU  has  condemned  all  acts  of  terrorist  violence 
perpetrated  in  Turkey.  The  Government  has  a  legitimate  right  and  responsibility  to  fight 
terrorism, but  efforts  need  to  be undertaken in  accordance  with  the rule of law, human rights, 
and  fundamental  freedoms.  Amending  the  Anti-Terror  Law  and  practices  in  line  with  EU 
standards and the EU acquis remains an essential step. 

In its threat perception, Turkey has prioritised the fight against the PKK and the dismantling of 
the  Gülen  movement,  nationally  designated  as  a  terror  organisation  in  May  2016.  The  PKK 
remains on the EU’s list of persons, groups and entities involved in acts of terrorism.  

Institutional set-up and legal alignment 

The  General  Directorate  of  Security  has a  specialised  police  unit  responsible  for  counter-
terrorism. The institutional capabilities are well-developed. While maintaining the effectiveness 
of  its  fight  against  terrorist  threats,  Turkey  needs  to  bring  its  legislation  on  terrorism  and 
corresponding practices into line with European standards. 

The country is party to the Council of Europe’s Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and 
Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism. In December, the 
Mutual  Evaluation  Report  was  published,  further  to  the  fourth  round  of  the  Financial  Action 
Task Force mutual evaluations. (See Chapter 4 – Free movement of capital) 

Implementation and enforcement capacity 

Turkey  continued  its  efforts  to  fight  home-grown  and  foreign  terrorist  fighter  (FTF)  cells. 
Cooperation continued with EU Member States on detecting and repatriating FTFs, which is one 
of  the  key  areas  of  joint  interest.  Since  2011,  Turkey  issued  entry  bans  for  more  than  96,000 
foreigners and deported 7,973 FTFs or suspected FTFs, of which 734 in 2019.  However, police 
and  judicial  cooperation  with  EU  Member  States  and  EU  agencies  in  combating  terrorism 
remained  limited  due  to  the  absence  of  a  personal  data  protection  law  in  line  with  European 
standards and the EU  acquis, and  differences over the definition of, and  penalties for,  terrorist 
offences.  Turkey  should  continue  its  efforts  to  effectively  prevent  and  counter  radicalisation 
leading to violent extremism and terrorism, in full compliance with fundamental rights. 

Legal and irregular migration  

Institutional set-up and legal alignment 

The  Ministry  of  the  Interior’s  Directorate-General  of  Migration  Management  (DGMM)  is  the 
key  institution  for  managing  migration  in  Turkey.  Apart  from  contact  points  appointed  to 
Afghanistan  and  Pakistan,  the  DGMM  also  appointed  liaison  officers  to  the  Greek  islands  to 
facilitate  the  implementation  of  the  EU-Turkey  Statement  of  18  March  2016.  The  DGMM 
employs only a limited number of psychologists, social workers, interpreters, and lawyers.  This 
should  be  expanded  considering  the  wide  range  of  services  provided  by  the  institution 
throughout the country and in view of the increased migratory pressure the country is facing.  

The DGMM finalised a strategy and action plan on the fight against irregular migration to cover 
the  period  2019-2023  but  these  are  yet  to  be  endorsed  by  the  Migration  Board,  an  inter-
ministerial coordination body established by presidential decree in September 2018. 

At  the  law  enforcement  level,  the  Anti-Migrant  Smuggling  and  the  Border  Gates  units  of  the 
Turkish  National  Police  merged    in  March  20203.  This  can  contribute  to  better  coordination 
between border checks and investigative capacities in the area of migrants smuggling. 

Turkey did not sign any additional bilateral readmission agreements. In October, Turkey signed 
a  Security  Cooperation  Agreement  with  Serbia,  which  includes  intensified  cooperation  on 
migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings.  

46 

 
 
                                                            
 
The legislation in this area is partially aligned with the EU acquis. A comprehensive amendment 
to  the  Law  on  Foreigners  and  International  Protection  was  adopted  in  December  2019.  It 
reinstated automatic suspensive effect for all appeals against removal decisions, including those 
issued  for  reasons  of  public  order,  public  health  or  involvement  with  a  terrorist  organisation, 
bringing the legislation into line with the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court on this issue. 
The amendment also introduced alternatives to administrative detention, which still have to be 
specified  in  the  implementing  legislation,  shortened  the  period  of  appeal  against  deportation 
orders from 15 to 7 days, expanded the scope of execution of entry bans and deportation orders, 
limited  access  to  healthcare  to  1  year  after  the  application  for  asylum  is  submitted,  and 
centralised  the  management  of  temporary  accommodation  centres  from  the  governorates  to 
DGMM. An amendment to the Penal Code in December 2019 resulted in increased penalties for 
those convicted of trafficking in human beings, up to two times higher in cases where the crime 
is  committed  through  a  criminal  organisation.  Moreover,  the  Criminal  Procedures  Code  now 
includes the possibility of pre-trial detention for individuals suspected of migrant smuggling and 
trafficking in human beings.  

In June, a joint declaration signed by the DGMM, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Turkish 
Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) and the Red Crescent announced the intention to 
set up a National Assisted Voluntary Return mechanism.  

Implementation and enforcement capacity 

Turkey reiterated its commitment to the effective implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement 
of 18 March 2016. However, 
on 28 February 2020, the Turkish government announced it would 
cease  controlling  its  land  and  sea  borders  with  Europe  and  open  the  passage  for  migrants 
wishing to cross.  This led to  the setting  up of an informal  camp at one of the border crossing 
points between Turkey and Greece in Pazarkule Edirne, which ended up hosting close to 25 000 
migrants and refugees in dire conditions.  

In the extraordinary Council meetings of EU Ministers of Home Affairs on 4 March 2020, and 
of EU Ministers of Foreign Affairs on 6 March 2020, the EU reiterated the need for Turkey to 
abide  by  the  EU-Turkey  Statement  of  18  March  2016.  While  the  EU  acknowledged  the 
increased migratory burden and risks Turkey is facing on its territory and the substantial efforts 
it has made in hosting close to four million refugees, it strongly rejected Turkey using migratory 
pressure for political purposes. The EU also called on the Turkish government and all actors and 
organisations  on  the  ground  to  counter  the  dissemination  of  false  information.  Following  the 
meeting  between  the  Presidents  of  the  Council  and  the  Commission  with  the  President  of 
Turkey  on  9  March  2020  in  Brussels,  the  High  Representative/Vice-President  of  the 
Commission  was  tasked,  to  take  stock  of  the  implementation  of  the  EU-Turkey  Statement  in 
cooperation with his Turkish counterpart. 

Starting on 30 March, the Turkish authorities organised transport for the migrants and refugees 
out of the border area in Pazarkule and closed the border with Greece and Bulgaria except for 
commercial traffic because of the COVID-19. the Turkish Minister of Interior indicated that the 
authorities acted in the framework of the current public health precautions in place, and that this 
move  did  not  mean  a  change  in  Turkey's  policy  to  allow  irregular  migrants’  exits  over  its 
borders: migrants would be free to approach the Greek border once the COVID-19 precautions 
were lifted, as the government had no intention to prevent anyone who wishes to leave Turkey. 

According to the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), the number of lives lost in the 
Eastern  Mediterranean  during  irregular  crossing  attempts  stood  at  66  in  2019  and  71  in  2020, 
compared  with  156  in  2018,  62  in  2017  and  434  in  2016.  The  total  number  of  arrivals  from 
Turkey to the EU in 2019 was 76,040 with the main three nationalities being Afghans, Syrians 
and Iraqis. In terms of arrivals to Greece, in 2019, Afghans were the main nationality arriving by 
sea (43%), while Turkish nationals were the largest group arriving by land (78%). In spite of the 
increase  in  irregular  migration  in  2019  from  Turkey  to  the  EU,  the  figures  continue  to  be  far 

47 

 
below those recorded prior to the EU-Turkey Statement. The daily average of irregular arrivals 
from  Turkey  to  the  Aegean  islands  was  161  in  the  year  up  to  1  December,  against  a  daily 
average  of  1,794  recorded  before  the  activation  of  the  Statement.  Several  actions  taken  by 
Turkey’s law enforcement agencies prevented cases of illegal entry both from coastal areas and 
over  the  land  border  with  Greece.  In  2019,  12,917  new  applicants  for  international  protection 
were  registered  in  Cyprus,  compared  to  7,761  in  2018.
  Between  January  2020  and  mid-June 
2020, a total of 3,228 applications for international protection have been lodged in Cyprus, of 
which 2,955 by March 2020. The majority of these applications were filed by irregular migrants 
departing from Turkey. 

Turkey  continued  to  implement  the  ‘One-for-One’  resettlement  scheme  under  the  EU-Turkey 
Statement, in cooperation with the EU Member States and the relevant UN agencies in Turkey. 
Between April 2016 and June 2020, 26,835 Syrian refugees were resettled from Turkey to the 
EU, of whom more than 7,000 in 2019.  

Resettlement  operations  worldwide  have  been  temporarily  suspended  in  April  and  May  2020, 
due to the COVID-19 health crisis, in line with a joint statement released by UNHCR and IOM. 
Returns from Greece to Turkey under the EU-Turkey Statement remained slow. In 2019, Turkey 
accepted 163 returnees from the Greek islands, including 22 Syrians, with the total number of 
returnees  since  2016  reaching  1,968,  including  367  Syrians.  139  migrants  were  returned  from 
Greece to Turkey under the EU-Turkey Statement in 2020, as of 26 April. On 16 March to June 
2020, the Turkish authorities suspended return operations due to the COVID-19 pandemic until 
further  notice.  In  June,  the  Hellenic  Police  sent  two  request  to  the  Turkish  authorities,  asking 
when the return operations under the EU-Turkey statement are expected to resume. To date, the 
Turkish  side has  not replied. Resettlement from  the Republic of Cyprus  has  not  been possible 
due  to  the  absence  of  cooperation  between  Cyprus  and  Turkey,  notably  when  it  comes  to 
transferring applicants to Cyprus. 

Migratory  pressure  on  Turkey  continued  to  increase  significantly  throughout  2019.  Turkey 
registered 268,003 apprehensions of irregular migrants within its territories in 2018, a number 
which  increased  to  454,663  in  2019.  Apprehensions  of  irregular  migrants  in  2020  reached 
62,368 as of 24 June 2020. The country-wide confinement from mid-April to June restricted the 
movement  of  irregular  migrants  to,  from  and  within  Turkey.  Irregular  migrants  from 
Afghanistan, Pakistan and Syria were the three most frequently apprehended nationalities. The 
number  of  human  smugglers  apprehended  almost  doubled  and  reached  8  996  by  the  end  of 
2019. A further 1,649 apprehensions of human smugglers took place in 2020 as of 24 June 2020. 
The government did not report the number of investigations for trafficking in human beings in 
2018 or 2019, nor did it designate specialised prosecutors for trafficking cases. 

In January 2020, a Cooperation Plan for 2020-2022  was signed between Turkey and Frontex, 
which foresees an enhanced cooperation in the area of risk analysis, an increased exchange of 
observers in operational activities, the joint organisation of a workshop in Turkey (possibly at 
Istanbul  Airport  on  false  documents)  and  the  deployment  of  a  Turkish  Liaison  officer  at  the 
Turkish Embassy in Warsaw. 

The number of removal centres increased by 10 to 28 centres with a total capacity of 20,000 
people. In October 2019, the ECtHR underlined in its judgment  G.B. and others v. Turkey the 
importance  of  effective  and  speedy  review  of  the  lawfulness  of  such  detentions,  in  particular 
detention  conditions  of  families  with  children.  Turkey  should  strengthen  certain  procedural 
safeguards  enabling  effective  access  to  legal  mechanisms  to  challenge  the  conditions  of 
detention in removal centres. 

Turkey  returned  96,201  irregular  migrants  throughout  2019,  among  them  reportedly  around 
55,000 migrants to Afghanistan. In 2019, 2,344 people were returned from Turkey through the 
IOM’s assisted voluntary return and reintegration programmes. 

48 

 
Implementation  of  the  EU-Turkey  readmission  agreement  remained  unsatisfactory.  Provisions 
of  the  agreement  that  apply  to  Turkish  nationals  were  not  implemented  consistently  by  all 
Turkish  diplomatic  missions  in  the  EU  and  the  agreement  was  not  implemented  vis-à-vis  all 
Member  States.  In  relation  to  third-country  nationals,  Turkey  maintained  its  position  that  it 
would  not  implement  the  provisions  that  entered  into  force  in  October  2017  until  the  visa 
requirement for Turkish citizens travelling to the Schengen Area for a short stay was lifted. The 
Bilateral Readmission Protocol between Greece and Turkey remained suspended. Turkey does 
not  apply  the  EU-Turkey  Readmission  Agreement  towards  Cyprus.  Turkey  did  not  readmit 
third-country  nationals  from  Bulgaria  under  either  the  bilateral  border  agreement  or  the  EU-
Turkey Readmission Agreement. 

Turkey  continued  to  attract  migrants  from  many  countries.  The  number  of  foreigners  legally 
residing in Turkey reached 1,101,030 at the end of 2019, up from 856,740 in December 2018. 
Iraq, Syria, and Turkmenistan were the primary countries of origin. Following the reintroduction 
in September 2018 of the lowered minimum amount of investment required to apply for Turkish 
investor  citizenship  scheme,  some  9,000  foreign  investors  received  Turkish  citizenship.  Such 
schemes  pose  risks  as  regards  security,  money  laundering,  tax  evasion,  terrorist  financing, 
corruption  and  infiltration  by  organised  crime.  As  a  candidate  country,  Turkey  should  refrain 
from  any  measure  that  could  jeopardise  the  attainment  of  the  EU’s  objectives  when  using  its 
prerogatives to award nationality. Although seasonal migrant workers had legal status in Turkey 
since 2016, there was no official data regarding their number. Informal employment of migrants 
and  refugees  remained  of  concern.  Although  the  legislation  for  issuing  “Turquoise  Cards”  to 
highly  qualified  foreigners  and  investors  has  been  in  place  since  2017,  Turkey  did  not 
implement it and has not issued any such card yet.  

Asylum  

Institutional set-up and legal alignment 

The  DGMM  is  the  main  institution  responsible  for  all  asylum-related  issues.  In  an  effort  to 
further  harmonise  status  determination  processes  across  provincial  directorates  of  migration 
management  (PDMMs),  and  reduce  the  backlog  of  international  protection  applications,  the 
DGMM has an International Protection Bureau (Decision Centre) in Ankara and one in Istanbul. 
In 2019, these Decision Centres processed more than 8,000 international protection applications. 
In  addition  to  these  centres,  the  DGMM  established  so-called  ‘mobile  units’  composed  of 
migration  experts  and  interpreters,  who  were  dispatched  to  assist  with  case  processing  in 
PDMMs with the largest backlog of international protection applications. The Strategy and the 
Action  Plan  on  Harmonisation  was  published  in  December  2019,  aiming  to  increase  social 
cohesion between refugees, migrants and host communities in Turkey.  

Legislation  in  this  area  is  partially  aligned  with  the  EU  acquis.  The  Law  on  Foreigners  and 
International  Protection  maintains  the  reservation  (geographical  limitation)  expressed  in  the 
New  York  Protocol  of  the  1951  Geneva  Convention,  according  to  which  the  vast  majority  of 
persons seeking international protection in Turkey cannot apply for fully-fledged refugee status 
but  for  ‘conditional  refugee’  status  and  subsidiary  protection  only.  Conditional  refugee  status 
limits the stay in the country ‘until the moment a recognised conditional refugee is resettled to a 
third  country’.  Syrian  refugees  are  granted  a  specific  refugee  status  under  the  Temporary 
Protection Regulation. 

Implementation and Enforcement Capacity 

Turkey  continued  to  provide  generous  assistance  to  refugees,  hosting  the  largest  refugee 
community  in  the  world,  with  3.6  million  Syrians  under  temporary  protection  and  around 
370,000  non-Syrians  registered  under  international  protection.  The  number  of  asylum  seekers 
declined over the reporting period; 56,417 international protection applications were lodged in 
2019, down from 114,537 in 2018. Of these, 35,042 were Afghans and 15,532 were Iraqis.  In 
2019,  Turkey  granted  international  protection  (refugee  status,  conditional  refugee  status  or 

49 

 
subsidiary  protection)  to  5,449  applicants,  compared  with  72,961  in  2018.  The  authorities 
rejected 5,212 applications compared with 13,942 in 2018. At the end of December 2019, a total 
of  56,417  asylum  seekers  and  refugees  from  countries  other  than  Syria  were  registered  in 
Turkey; of these, 35,042 were Afghans and 15,532 were Iraqis. The backlog stood at 328,608 
cases of international protection. Despite the DGMM's efforts, long waiting times for registering 
for  international  protection  status  continue  in  some  provinces.  As  part  of  COVID-19  related 
measures,  asylum  procedures  have  been  temporarily  suspended  in  March  2020,  except  for 
persons with special needs.   

The  DGMM  issues  ID  cards  for  international  protection  applicants  once  their  registration  is 
completed.  An  ID  card  legalises  an  applicant’s  stay  in  Turkey  and  provides  access  to  the 
national  health  insurance  scheme,  public  schools,  free  interpretation  services  and  other  social 
assistance.  Interpretation  is  available  at  PDMMs  and  Decision  Centres  particularly  for  status 
determination interviews. The availability of interpretation services should be further improved.   

In  2019,  the  DGMM  continued  to  close  down  the  temporary  accommodation  centres,  by 
referring  Syrians  in  such  centres  to  designated  provinces  for  registration  and  residence.  There 
are  currently  seven  temporary  accommodation  centres,  with  a  total  of  63,518  residents,  down 
from  13  centres  with  144,036  residents  in  2018.  Apart  from  the  temporary  accommodation 
centres,  the  DGMM  operates  one  reception  centre  in  Yozgat  with  a  capacity  of  100  people, 
where  the  most  vulnerable  asylum  seekers  are  temporarily  accommodated.  Unaccompanied 
minors are referred to childcare facilities managed by the Ministry of Family, Labour and Social 
Services. 

International  protection  applicants  and  status  holders  are  required  to  register  and  reside  in  62 
‘satellite  cities’  across  Turkey.  While  Syrians  may  apply  for  registration  in  80  provinces, 
registration in 15 provinces is conditional upon certain circumstances, including work, education 
or medical purposes. Syrians who do not fulfil those conditions are referred to other provinces 
where  they  are  required  to  register  and  reside.  In  2019,  Turkish  authorities  have  stepped  up 
efforts to enforce this rule, most notably in Istanbul, from where 97,255 Syrians were relocated 
to  provinces  where  they  are  registered.  Syrians  who  were  not  registered  were  taken  to  the 
Öncüpınar  temporary  accommodation  centre,  where  they  were  given  the  option  to  register  or 
voluntarily return to Syria. Additionally, as part of the intensified law enforcement measures in 
Istanbul, 90,000 non-Syrian irregular migrants were apprehended and placed in removal centres. 
In  this  context,  there  were  many  allegations  of  Syrians  forcibly  returned  to  Syria,  as  well  as 
migrants of other nationalities in removal centres being coerced to sign voluntary return forms. 
Authorities denied that this was a systematic policy.  

The DGMM uses GöçNet, a government database containing data on applicants for temporary 
and international protection, including biometric data in the form of photos and fingerprints. The 
police and gendarmerie have access to GöçNet. 

Cooperation  between  the  DGMM  and  the  European  Asylum  Support  Office  (EASO)  further 
improved  in  2019  with  the  adoption  of  the  EASO-DGMM  Cooperation  Roadmap  2019-2021, 
which  aims  to  support  the  DGMM  in  areas  relating  to  country  of  origin  information,  training 
system,  decision  centres  and  mobile  units,  information  management  and  analysis,  people  with 
special needs and contingency planning. 

Throughout  2019,  the  DGMM  continued  the  verification  of  data  of  Syrians  under  temporary 
protection, updating and completing the information gathered during their original registration. 
By December 2019, the data of 2.7 million Syrians had been verified. This will provide updated 
data to design evidence-based programmes for targeted assistance, and should be made available 
to policymakers across relevant government bodies. 

The  Turkish  authorities  increased  efforts  to  facilitate  entrance  to  the  labour  market  and 
encourage legal employment. Applicants for international protection, conditional refugee status 
holders and people under temporary protection (Syrians) can apply for work permits. According 

50 

 
to the Turkish authorities, the number of work permits issued to Syrians was close to 100,000 in 
2019 compared with 38,289 at the end of 2018. This increase is attributed to the information and 
integration activities carried out by the government and to reduced administrative fees for work 
permits.  The  Turkish  authorities  increased  efforts  against  illegal  employment,  within  the 
framework of the intensified law enforcement measures in Istanbul and were working to reduce 
the  school  dropout  rates  by  offering  alternative  vocational  education.  However,  in  the  context 
where the majority of refugees and migrants in Turkey continue to be employed in the informal 
sector, NGOs and media report an increased number of migrant and refugee minors at risk of, or 
involved  in,  child  labour.  The  COVID-19  pandemic  increased  the  unemployment  rate  among 
refugees by 88% since March 2020, with 63% of them being food insecure, according to recent 
NGO reports. 

During  2019,  implementation  of  the  first  tranche  (EUR  3  billion)  of  the  EU  Facility  for 
Refugees  in  Turkey  continued,  while  programming  of  the  second  tranche  (EUR  3  billion) 
accelerated. The full operational budget of the Facility was committed by the end of 2019. Of a 
total of EUR 6 billion, EUR 5.1 billion had been contracted, out of which EUR 3.8 billion had 
been  disbursed.  The  Facility  mobilises  both  humanitarian  and  development  assistance  for 
refugees  and  host  communities  in  Turkey.  It  is  helping  1.7  million  refugees  meet  their  basic 
needs,  helping  685,000  refugee  children  go  to  school  and  has  facilitated  the  training  of  over 
170,000 educational staff. It is also supporting the building of 320 schools and access for over 
80,000 children to back-up and catch-up classes and for 42,000 children to school transport. In 
addition,  over  3,000  health  workers  are  employed  in  health  care  centres  for  migrants  and 
refugees,  two  hospitals  are  being  built,  close  to  12  million  primary  health  care  consultations 
have  been  delivered  and  over  3.5  million  vaccination  doses  have  been  provided  to  refugee 
infants and pregnant women. The Facility is also providing support on registration of refugees 
and civil documentation.
 The EU decided to mobilise additional EUR 485 million from the 2020 
budget  to  ensure  the  continuation  of  flagship  projects  funded  under  the  2016-19  Facility 
providing refugees with basic needs and access to education. Assisting refugees affected by the 
Syrian  crisis  and  their  hosting  countries  will  continue  to  be  needed,  and  the  recent 
Communication on a new Pact on Asylum and Migration noted that continued and sustained EU 
funding in some form will be essential.4 

Visa policy 

Regarding the EU-Turkey visa liberalisation dialogue, a presidential circular of May 2019 called 
for  the  acceleration  of  work  to  fulfil  the  six  outstanding  benchmarks  of  the  visa  liberalisation 
roadmap, namely the fight against corruption, judicial cooperation in criminal  matters with all 
EU  Member  States,  intensified  cooperation  with  Europol,  amendments  to  the  data  protection 
and anti-terror legislation, and implementation of the EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement in all 
its  provisions  and  towards  all  Member  States.  However,  little  progress  in  terms  of 
implementation has been noted. In October 2019, Turkey amended its Anti-Terror Law but the 
changes do not satisfy the fulfilment of the roadmap benchmark on anti-terror legislation. The 
negotiations  on  an  agreement  on  the  exchange  of  personal  data  between  Europol  and  Turkey 
continued also requiring Turkey to fulfil the European Data Protection requirements (see under 
Chapter 23). 

Turkey  also  needs  to  further  align  its  legislation  with  the  EU  acquis  on  visa.  This  includes 
aligning  visa  requirements  with  the  EU  lists  of  visa-free  and  visa-required  countries,  full 
phasing-out of issuing of visas at borders and of e-visas, and ensuring that the issuing of visas at 
consulates is carried out in line with the conditions and procedures set out in the EU Visa Code. 
Turkey lifted its visa restrictions towards five EU Member States in February and March 2020 
(Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Poland and Spain). 

Schengen and external borders  

4 COM(2020) 609 final on a New Pact on Migration and Asylum 

51 

 
                                                            
Institutional set-up and legal alignment 

During the reporting period, no new legislation in the area of border management was adopted. 
Cooperation between the different agencies involved in border management matters is formally 
coordinated by the Directorate-General of Provincial Administration under the Ministry of the 
Interior.  Coordination  remained  weak,  not  least  because  of  the  high  number  of  state  bodies 
dealing with border management issues, including the Ministry of Defence, which is in charge 
of border surveillance at the ‘green’ border. 

A National Coordination and Joint Risk Analysis Centre (NACORAC) in Ankara was formally 
established  in  2016.  It  is  not  yet  operational.  Among  other  things,  the  Centre  will  provide  a 
platform for collecting, exchanging and processing data on border  security and  carry out  joint 
risk analysis among the different border authorities.  

In  order  to  bring  the  country’s  border  management  system  closer  in  line  with  the  EU  acquis, 
Turkey should improve inter-service cooperation, and adopt an Integrated Border Management 
(IBM) strategy. It also needs to enact new legislation to set up a non-military and professional 
border management body in charge of border checks of people at border crossing points as well 
as border surveillance at the ‘green’ and ‘blue’ borders, the green borders being patrolled by the 
Land Forces. 

Implementation and enforcement capacity 

After finalisation of the construction of a wall and a barbed-wire fence along the Syrian border, 
similar  works  continued  at  the  Iranian  border.  The  government’s  goal  is  to  reduce  smuggling 
activities,  terrorist  attacks,  and  irregular  migration  flows  in  the  east  of  the  country.  The 
construction of a wall, together with the installation of modern communication and surveillance 
equipment, was complemented by efforts to remove all anti-personnel landmines by December 
2022,  to  which  Turkey  committed  under  its  Ottawa  Treaty  obligations.  Turkey  needs  to 
substantially increase national investment to make faster progress towards this commitment. 

Cooperation with neighbouring Greece and Bulgaria in the framework of a trilateral Police and 
Customs  Co-operation  Centre  at  the  Bulgarian-Turkish  border  crossing  point  Kapitan 
Andreevo/Kapıkule continued. 

Judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters 

Judicial  cooperation  in  civil  matters  is  regulated  by  the  Law  on  International  Civil  Law  and 
Procedural  Law,  circulars  and  international  conventions.  Turkey  is  a  party  to  most  of  these 
international conventions. In 2019, within the scope of the Convention on Civil Procedure, 10 
judicial legal assistance were requested by EU Member States, 128 requested by Turkey. Within 
the scope of the Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, 
119  judicial  legal  assistance  were  requested  by  EU  Member  States  and  1,175  requests  by 
Turkey. 

However,  Turkey  has  not  acceded  to  relevant  international  conventions  in  the  area  of  civil 
justice, many of which were drawn up by the Hague Conference on Private International Law, 
including  in  particular  the  Hague  Convention  of  30  June  2005  on  the  Choice  of  Court 
Agreements. Turkey has not ratified the European Convention on the Compensation of Victims 
and the Protocol of 23 November 2007 on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations. 

Turkey  should  take  effective  measures  to  ensure  an  acceptable  reduction  in  delays  to 
proceedings  resulting  from  the  1980  Hague  Convention  on  civil  aspects  of  international  child 
abduction and to foster the use of international mediation in such cases. The establishment of the 
appeal  court  system  in  2016  aims  for  an  accelerated  conclusion  of  child  abduction  cases. 
However,  Turkey  should  take  more  effective  measures  to  ensure  an  acceptable  reduction  in 
delays  to  proceedings  resulting  from  the  1980  Hague  Convention  and  to  foster  the  use  of 
international  mediation  in  such  cases.  Following  the  entry  into  force  of  the  1996  Hague 

52 

 
Convention  on  Jurisdiction,  Applicable  Law,  Recognition,  Enforcement  and  Co-operation  in 
Respect  of  Parental  Responsibility  and  Measures  for  the  Protection  of  Children,  coordination 
was established between the Central Authority and the Ministry of Family, Labour and Social 
Services. The latter is providing a detailed social investigation report on the child and measures 
are being taken to protect the child. 

The  main  legislation  governing  judicial  cooperation  in  criminal  matters  is  in  place since  2016 
and  Turkey  has  acceded  to  most  of  the  international  conventions.  The  legislation  provides  for 
mechanisms to speed up international judicial cooperation in criminal matters, which has started 
to  yield  positive  results.  As  for  the  transfer  of  convicted  criminals,  the  introduction  of  the 
procedure of ‘exact execution’ paved the way to the removal of the obligation of local courts to 
comply with domestic legislation. However, the independence and accountability of the justice 
system have to be substantially strengthened for a smooth application of the principle of mutual 
recognition of judgments and court decisions in criminal matters. 

In  2019,  EU  Member  States  accepted  12  extradition  requests  from  Turkey  while  22  were 
rejected  and  208  are  pending.  There  were  9  extradition  requests  from  EU  Member  States,  of 
which 7 are pending. EU Member States accepted 10 transfers of convicts to Turkey and Turkey 
accepted  3  transfers  to  an  EU  Member  State.  Turkey  still  does  not  cooperate  with  all  EU 
Member States in these matters. Six contact persons have been assigned by Turkey to coordinate 
and follow up judicial cooperation with Eurojust. In 2019, Turkey was involved in 12 Eurojust 
cases on terrorism, the same number as in 2018.  

3. 

Fundamentals first: economic development and competitiveness 

53 

Table :201720182019Turkey - Key economic figuresGDP per capita (% of EU-28 in PPS)1)61.765.064.060.0Real GDP growth 6.57.53.00.9Economic activity rate of the population aged 15-64 (%), total1)54.857.958.558.4      female33.537.538.338.7      male76.278.278.578.1Unemployment rate (%), total1)9.611.111.114.0      female11.614.214.016.8      male8.89.69.712.7Employment (annual growth %)1)2.42)3.51.8-2.4Nominal wages (annual growth %)13.010.220.624.0Consumer price index (annual growth %)7.911.116.315.2Exchange rate against EUR2.754.155.686.35Current account balance (% of GDP)-5.6-4.8-2.71.2Net foreign direct investment, FDI (% of GDP)1.21.01.20.8General government balance (% of GDP)1)-0.2-2.8-2.8-3.0General government debt (% of GDP)30.628.030.232.53)Notes: 1) Eurostat2) 2015-20163) State governmentSource: national sources2011-16 average 
 
In line with the conclusions of the European Council in Copenhagen in June 1993, EU accession 
requires  the  existence  of  a  functioning  market  economy  and  the  capacity  to  cope  with 
competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. 

Economic  governance  has  become  even  more  central  in  the  accession  process  in  recent  years. 
The Commission's  monitoring takes place in two processes: the Economic Reform Programme 
exercise  and  the  assessment  of  compliance  with  the  economic  criteria  for  accession.  Each 
enlargement country prepares an annual Economic Reform Programme (ERP), which sets out a 
medium-term  macro-fiscal policy framework and  a structural  reform agenda  aimed at ensuring 
competitiveness  and  inclusive  growth.  The  ERPs  are  the  basis  for  country-specific  policy 
guidance jointly adopted by the EU and the Western Balkans and Turkey at ministerial level in 
May each year. 

3.1.  The existence of a functioning market economy 

The  Turkish  economy  is  well  advanced,  but  made  no  progress  over  the  reporting  period  and 
serious concerns persist over its functioning. 

The  economy  rebounded  from  the  summer  2018  sharp  currency  depreciation  and  the  resulting 
recession faster than expected, helped by expansionary policies and a strong contribution of net 
exports. However, the recovery remained fragile given the weak labour market and the need to 
repair corporate balance sheets. As the COVID-19 crisis unfolded, the authorities took a number 
of measures to cushion the economic impact of the pandemic, including a significant monetary 
expansion. These  measures were  constrained, however,  by a  limited policy space, in  particular 
on  the  fiscal  side,  and  institutional  weaknesses.  The  current  account  balance,  which  had 
improved  markedly  since  2017,  started  deteriorating  again  by  the  end  of  2019,  triggering  a 
sizeable increase of import duties and non-tariff barriers. Due to high external financing needs, 
Turkey  remained  exposed  to  rapid  changes  in  investor  sentiment,  aggravated  by  the  pandemic 
and rising geopolitical risks. Inflation fell from a very high level but remained elevated and well 
above  target.  Monetary  policy  credibility  weakened  further  because  of  the  dismissal  of  the 
governor  of  the  Central  Bank  of  the  Republic  of  Turkey  (CBRT)  and  recurrent  political 
pressures. Price competitiveness continued to benefit from the weakening of the lira and the real 
effective exchange rate depreciated in 2019, a trend that accelerated further in 2020. 

The  government  continued  to  further  improve  the  regulatory  environment  for  businesses. 
However,  the  informal  sector  remains  large.  State  interventions  in  price  setting  mechanisms 
continued,  and  there  is  a  continued  lack  of  state  aid  implementation  rules,  enforcement  and 
transparency,  while  the  institutional  set  up  remains  incomplete.  The  financial  sector  remained 
stable. However, vulnerabilities increased, in particular due to rapid credit growth in state-owned 
banks,  and  various  regulatory  measures  aimed  at  boosting  lending  activity.  The  high  level  of 
unemployment,  in  particular  among  young  people  and  women,  paired  with  declining 
employment, low labour mobility and a high share of undeclared work remain major concerns. 

In order to improve the functioning of the market economy Turkey should in particular: 

  increase growth-enhancing public expenditure, improve budget transparency and prepare an 
exit strategy to lower the use of one-off and temporary measures over the medium term; 

  conduct  monetary  policy  with  the  view  of  achieving  price  stability,  anchoring  inflation 

expectations, and increasing the trust in the lira; 

  further  strengthen  the  business  environment,  reduce  state  interference  in  price  setting  and 

enhance the transparency and control of state aid; 

  increase labour market flexibility and step up active labour market policies. 

Economic governance 

Economic governance is hampered by a weakening institutional environment and reduced 

54 

 
policy credibility.  Prior to  the COVID-19 crisis,  in  a still difficult economic environment, the 
authorities resorted to ad hoc policy measures mainly focused on boosting short-term economic 
growth. As the crisis began to unfold in March 2020, they took a number of additional measures 
to  cushion  the  economic  impact  of  the  pandemic  that  were  constrained,  however,  by  a  limited 
policy space. Following the introduction of a presidential executive system in mid-2018, the way 
economic policy is planned and implemented is not yet fully settled. In the autumn of 2019, the 
government  adopted  new  medium-term  development  and  strategic  documents  with  very 
ambitious, but partly inconsistent targets, which have become obsolete in view of the COVID-19 
crisis. Previous targets, set after the 2018 depreciation of the lira, have been mostly missed. The 
institutional  environment  weakened,  and  the  dismissal  in  2019  of  the  governor  of  the  Central 
Bank and the recurrent pressure by the authorities on monetary policy decision-makers remain a 
concern. The appointment of a banker convicted for bank fraud in the US as the chairperson of 
the Istanbul Stock Exchange is also problematic. The policy guidance jointly agreed at the May 
2019  Economic  and  Financial  Dialogue  between  the  EU  and  the  Western  Balkans  and  Turkey 
has been implemented to a limited extent. 

Macroeconomic stability 

in 

purchasing 

The Turkish economy had not yet fully recovered from the dislocations caused by the 2018 
recession  when  the  COVID-19  pandemic  disrupted  the  global  economy.  Preliminary  data 
indicate  that  real  GDP  growth  reached  0.9%  in  2019.  Following  nearly  two  decades  of 
impressive  catching  up,  economic 
convergence  has  reversed  in  the  last 
few  years.  In  2019,  per  capita  GDP 
(measured 
power 
standards)  stood  at  60%  of  the  EU 
average, falling from a peak of 67% in 
2015.  Economic  performance  was 
volatile and the economy went through 
a short but intense recession at the end 
of 2018, triggered by a loss of investor 
confidence  amid  high  external  and 
resulting 
imbalances.  The 
internal 
sharp  fall  in  domestic  demand,  investment  in  particular,  led  to  a  strong  import  retrenchment. 
Fiscal  expansion and increased credit activity by state-owned banks  softened the effects of the 
recession.  Monetary  policy  reacted  to  the  strong  depreciation  of  the  lira  with  a  significant 
tightening, but monetary conditions became more supportive to growth from the second half of 
2019, with a fast and sizeable reduction in interest rates. The investment decline and the slump in 
the construction sector, however, extended into 2020, as large excesses from previous years have 
taken  more  time  to  correct.  Although  economic  growth  accelerated  at  the  turn  of  2019,  the 
economy was exposed to the fallout from the pandemic due to its high integration in global value 
chains and dependence on tourism and transport – two of the most heavily affected sectors. The 
first  effects  of  the  crisis  were  already  visible  by  the  end  of  the  first  quarter  of  2020  when 
economic activity fell precipitously, while in the second quarter GDP contracted by 9.9% y/y.  

to 

led 

The  recession  and  rapid  fall  in  domestic  demand  had  led  to  a  marked  turnaround  and 
closing  of  the  current  account  deficit  before  it  started  deteriorating  again  by  the  end  of 
2019. Turkey has developed its tradable sector steadily over the years. However, strong imports 
had 
external 
imbalances,  which  were  a  major 
vulnerability  in  the  past  two  decades. 
lira 
Following 
the  2018 
depreciation, 
declined 
strongly,  leading  to  a  reversal  of  the 

persistent 

imports 

sharp 

55 

-6-30320152016201720182019Graph : Turkey -Current account selected components and FDIGoods and services trade balance Workers' Remittances balanceCurrent account balanceNet FDI% of GDPSource: IMF and Central Bank of Turkey-10-8-6-4-20246810201420152016201720182019Graph : Turkey -Real GDP growth and contributionsPriv. cons.Gov. cons.GFCFStocksNet exportsreal GDP growthSource: Macrobond, own calculations% y-o-y 
current  account  from  an  annualised  deficit  of  more  than  6%  of  GDP  in  mid-2018  to  a  small 
surplus  in  2019  –  the  first  since  late  2002.  Exports,  including  a  strong  2019  tourism  season, 
helped  as  well.  Exports  reached  above  30%  of  GDP  in  2019,  covering  106%  of  the  import  of 
goods and services. Improved price competitiveness aided this export boom as the real effective 
exchange rate depreciated tangibly. However, by the end of 2019, the factors that have led to the 
strengthening  of  the  external  position  weakened  and,  along  with  the  recovery  of  domestic 
demand,  the  current  account  started  to  deteriorate  again.  The  first  COVID-19  effects  on  trade 
became visible in March and external trade activity, foremost exports, decelerated strongly in the 
spring. 

Despite  reduced  pressures  on  its  current  account,  Turkey  remains  exposed  to  rapid 
changes  in  investor  sentiment,  aggravated  by  COVID-19  and  geopolitical  risks.  Net 
portfolio investment, which for years has been a major source of external financing, has nearly 
dried up since the sharp depreciation of the lira in the summer of 2018. There was also a reversal 
in other investment, driven mainly by continuing bank deleveraging. Net capital outflows were 
softened by an inflow of net foreign direct investment (0.7% of GDP in 2019), which, however, 
has been much lower than in previous years. Balance-of-payment developments, including some 
unconventional  instruments  used  by  the  central  bank,  like  the  repayment  of  export  credits  in 
foreign  currency,  led  to  an  increase  in  gross  official  reserves  in  2019.  However,  reserves 
declined  strongly  in  2020  as  the  central  bank  tried  to  slow  down  the  depreciation  trend  of  the 
lira.  Increased  financial  market  stress  was  also  evident  in  rising  credit  default  swaps,  which 
nearly  tripled  since  the  beginning  of  the  year  to  above  600  before  retracting  to  a  still  elevated 
level. The depreciation of the lira drove Turkey’s gross external debt up to 58% of GDP in 2019. 
Turkey’s  external  position  is  very  vulnerable  due  to  large  external  financing  needs,  volatile 
capital flows, uncertainty related to geopolitical developments, a high country risk premium, and 
the need to rebuild foreign reserves. 

Although  inflation  fell  from  a  very  high  level,  it  remains  elevated  and  well  above  target, 
while monetary policy eased significantly amidst a persistent credibility gap. In the course 
of 2019, inflationary pressures subsided due to weak demand, strong base effects and the relative 
stabilisation  of  the  lira.  However,  exchange  rate  volatility  resumed  by  the  end  of  the  year, 
triggered by geopolitical factors and sanction threats. The pressure on the lira intensified in 2020 
and it lost more than 15% against the U.S. dollar in the first half of the year. Inflation remained 
elevated at double-digit levels. The central bank has missed its inflation target of 5% for many 
years,  entrenching  high  inflation  expectations.  Monetary  policy  credibility  weakened  further 
because  of  the  abrupt  dismissal  of  the  central  bank’s  governor  in  June  2019.  Under  the  new 
central  bank  leadership,  the  key  policy  rate  was  cut  from  24%  in  mid-2019  to  8.25%  in  May 
2020.  Underlying  monetary  conditions  eased  even  more  as  the  authorities  adopted  a  series  of 
macro-prudential  measures  to  support  credit  growth.  The  policy  reaction  to  the  economic 
repercussions  of  COVID-19  included  measures  to  provide  commercial  banks  with  liquidity 
support, including in foreign currency, and supporting credit to the corporate sector, exporters, 
and the government. 

Fiscal  space  has  become  more  constrained,  alongside  with  a  rising  budget  deficit. 
Maintaining  fiscal  discipline  was  a  major  asset  of  economic  policy  in  Turkey  until  2017.  In 
2019,  the  authorities  used  fiscal  policy  in 
a 
counter-cyclical  way,  mostly  by 
accommodating  the  recession’s  negative 
impact  on  tax  revenue  and  increasing 
spending  on  wages  and  current  transfers. 
Capital outlays were curtailed, in line with 
the stated intention to freeze infrastructure 
investments. The central government cash 
to  30% 
deficit  expanded  by  close 

56 

 
year-on-year in real terms to 2.9% of GDP. However, the underlying deficit, net of one-off and 
other  temporary  measures  (including  exceptional  receipts  from  the  central  bank),  approached 
nearly 6% of GDP. Government debt rose as well, staying firmly above 30% of GDP, triggering 
a  significant  increase  in  interest  payments.  Even  though  the  level  of  government  debt  is  still 
modest, the high underlying budget deficit, costly financing options, and significant uncertainties 
from the international environment severely constrain fiscal space. Refinancing risks for the state 
increased in view also of the issuing of shorter-maturity debt, while state-owned banks increased 
their exposure to the government. The initial fiscal policy reaction to the COVID-19 crisis has 
been cautious and limited. In addition to the general uncertainty about the extent and duration of 
the  pandemic,  the  main  reason  for  the  restrained  discretionary  fiscal  response  was  that  Turkey 
entered  the  crisis  with  an  already  high  fiscal  imbalance  and  faced  a  steep  increase  in  its 
sovereign risk premium since mid-February 2020. Nevertheless, the fiscal cost of the crisis will 
be significant mainly because of revenue losses due to the work of automatic stabilisers. 

The macroeconomic policy mix turned expansionary. Fiscal policy played an important role 
in cushioning the effects of the recession in early 2019, with monetary policy also contributing 
from  mid-2019,  helped  by  a  more  favourable  external  financial  environment.  The  policy  mix 
became  even  more  expansionary,  with  a  strong  prevalence  of  monetary  policy  measures,  in 
reaction  to  the  pandemic.  However,  institutional  weaknesses,  weak  credibility  linked  to  the 
repeated  failure  to  achieve  targets  and  the  absence  of  strong  policy  anchors,  and  heightened 
uncertainty related to geopolitical factors undermined the effectiveness of the policy mix. 

Functioning of product markets 

Business environment 

The government made progress in improving the regulatory business environment. Turkey 
increased its ranking to 33 in the 2020 Doing Business Index, moving up 27 places in the space 
of 2 years, based on a range of improvements across different areas in 2019 and some specific 
improvements  in  2020  in  registering  a  property  and  paying  taxes.  Because  of  the  difficult 
economic environment, the number of newly created businesses fell by 1.4% in 2019, while the 
number of liquidated ones increased by 4.7%. In 2019, the level of investments reached a multi-
year  low.  The  large  size  of  the  informal  economy  points  to  continuing  challenges  in  the 
regulatory  environment.  Starting  a  business  is  relatively  cumbersome,  while  market  exit  has 
remained  costly  and  time-consuming.  Turkey’s  performance  in  resolving  insolvency  has 
deteriorated,  with  procedures  still  lasting  an  average  of  5  years  and  the  recovery  rate  falling 
slightly in 2019. Public-private consultations are not formally required, and most new legislation 
is adopted without such consultations. 

There has been serious backsliding in recent years with regard to the judicial system, while 
the protection of property rights improved. Turkey ranked 104th of 141 countries with regard 
to judicial independence in the World Economic Forum’s 2019 Global Competitiveness Report. 
Turkey,  however,  improved  its  performance  in  the  area  of  property  right  index  (rank  78)  and 
intellectual  property  protection  (87) in  2019.  Turkey  scored poorly  in  the  area  of  efficiency  of 
the legal framework in settling disputes, ranking 111. It also ranked only 109 of 126 in the Rule 
of  Law  Index  of  the  World  Justice  Project  in  2019.  The  government  adopted  a  new  judicial 
reform  strategy  in  May  2019,  covering  2019-2023.  The  strategy  falls  short  of  addressing 
concerns regarding the independence of the judiciary (see Chapter 23 for more details). Turkey is 
not  taking  meaningful  steps  in  the  fight  against  corruption,  which  continues  to  undermine  the 
existence  of  a  level  playing  field  in  the  economy  (see  Chapter  23).  Turkey’s  performance  in 
enforcing  commercial  contracts  deteriorated  further,  remaining  a  lengthy  process  taking  an 
average  of  623  days  in  2019.  As  of  early  February  2020,  the  management  of  815  companies 
based in 37 provinces across Turkey with a total asset value of TRY 60.9 billion (EUR 9 billion), 
and  with  a  total  of  40,681  employees,  remains  under  the  trusteeship  of  the  Savings  Deposit 
Insurance Fund. 

57 

 
The  informal  sector  remains  large,  and  its  share  has  increased  during  2019  due  to  the 
economic slowdown and the drop in formal employment opportunities. At close to 30% of 
GDP,  the  informal  sector  represents  a  considerable  share  of  economic  activity  in  Turkey,  well 
above the OECD average. The rate of unregistered employment increased from an already high 
level. In May 2019, the Revenue Administration published an action plan and a strategy for the 
fight  against  the  informal  economy  for  2019-2021,  aiming  to  increase  the  level  of  voluntary 
compliance, strengthen audit capacity, review and regulate the legislation, enhance inter-agency 
data  sharing  and  increase  awareness.  However,  the  new  action  plan  does  not  present  concrete 
performance  indicators.  There  are  plans  to  simplify  business  registration  procedures  via  the 
introduction  of  a  centralised  system  for  business  licence  applications.  Turkey  hosts  the  largest 
refugees population in the world (close to four million, with over two million at working age), 
increasing the pressure on informal employment While efforts were made to increase the number 
of  official  work  permits,  most  of  working  refuges  are  informally  employed  with  no  social 
protection and very poor working conditions. 

State influence on product markets 

The  state  has  increased  its  interventions  in  the  price-setting  mechanism  in  key  sectors. 
More  than  a  quarter  of  the  consumer  price  inflation  basket  in  Turkey  is  composed  of  goods 
whose  prices  are  set  or  heavily  influenced  by  public  authorities,  either  directly  or  indirectly 
(price limits, tax rate adjustments). In 2019, with the aim of containing food price fluctuations, 
the  Ministry  of  Agriculture  and  Forestry  introduced  subsidies  for  raw  milk  and  put  in  place 
regulatory  measures  for  raw  milk  and  meat  markets.  There  were  some  instances  of  ad  hoc 
reductions  in  value  added  tax  rates  with  the  same  objective  of  reducing  prices  (temporary  tax 
cuts in durable goods, including automobiles, furniture and white goods). The government also 
decided  to  postpone  the  regular  adjustment  of  tobacco  and  alcohol  taxes  in  the  beginning  of 
2020. 

There  was  backsliding  in  State  aid  transparency  and  control.  Legislation  to  implement  the 
State aid law, originally scheduled to be passed by September 2011, has still not been adopted. 
Turkey has not formally set up a comprehensive State aid inventory or adopted an action plan to 
align  all  State  aid  schemes  with  the  EU  acquis.  Additionally,  Turkey  has  abolished  the 
administrative structure responsible for implementing State aid legislation, while transferring its 
mandate  to  the  Economic  Policies  Council.  The  Directorate-General  Economic  Programs  and 
Research, established in 2019 under the Ministry of Treasury and Finance, was assigned the role 
of  coordinating  State  aid.  The  current  structure  of  state  aid  control  is  considered  neither 
independent  nor  operational.  The  government  announced  support  for  priority  investments 
(including national automobile factory) worth TRY 36.5 billion under a generous, project-based 
incentive  scheme.  Small  and  medium  enterprises  (SMEs)  benefit  from  numerous  support 
measures and initiatives, for which there is a lack of systematic monitoring and evaluation are at 
an early stage. 

Privatisation and restructuring 

The  process  of  privatisation  has  nearly  come  to  a  standstill.  Privatisation  receipts  declined 
from USD 1.4 billion in 2018 to  USD 0.1 billion in  2019. Privatisation of hydroelectric power 
plants  continued  in  2019  and  the  rest  of  the  privatisation  portfolio  has  mainly  consisted  of  the 
sale of immovable assets such as land and buildings. Government assets within the scope of the 
Turkish  Sovereign  Wealth  Fund  (TWF)  appear  to  be ring-fenced  from  privatisation.  The  TWF 
holds  shares  in  major  companies  in  the  financial,  telecommunications,  petrochemicals,  real 
estate,  and 
in 
telecommunications  and  financial  sectors.  It  is  a  member  of  the  International  Forum  of 
Sovereign  Wealth  Funds  and  is  committed  to  applying  the  Santiago  principles  on  professional 
management,  transparency,  performance,  sustainability,  risk  management  and  accountability. 
However, concerns over auditing of the TWF have still not been addressed. Under a broader set 

transport  sectors. 

In  early  2020, 

its  presence 

increased 

further 

it 

58 

 
of measures to react to COVID-19, the TWF was exempted from some rules mostly related to 
(publicly held) corporations’ transactions, merger and acquisition, unlawful exercise of control, 
and  shareholders’  rights.  Practically,  the  fund  has  been  allowed  to  inject  cash  or  acquire 
controlling stakes of private companies considered to be of strategic importance and in distress 
due to the coronavirus outbreak. In February 2019, the Government has established a joint stock 
company  called  International  Health  Services  (UHSAŞ),  under  the  Ministry  of  Finance  and 
Treasury and affiliated to the Ministry of Health, which is mainly engaged in the promotion of 
health tourism. The company is also authorised to carry out public procurement of medicines and 
medical devices and  was  active  after  the COVID-19 outbreak  with the purchase and supply of 
personal protective equipment. 

Functioning of the financial market 

Financial stability 

The  financial  sector  remained  stable,  although  it  is  still  experiencing  the  fallout  from  the 
2018  recession.  Commercial  banks,  dominating  the  financial  sector,  continued  their  solid 
performance  despite  the  difficult  economic  environment.  The  capital  adequacy  ratio  increased 
from 17.3% at end-2018 to 19.5% in the first half of 2020. The TWF swapped government debt 
for subordinated debt issued by state-owned banks in order to strengthen their capital. The 2018 
recession,  however,  has  taken  its  toll,  and  non-performing  loans  (NPLs)  increased  from  below 
3% in 2017 to 5.4% by the end of 2019, along with rising stage 2 loans (loans for which the risk 
of  non-payment  has  increased  significantly).  By  June  2020,  NPLs  declined  because  of  the 
significant  credit  expansion.  NPLs  in  state-owned  banks  remained  below  the  average  level  for 
the  whole  banking  system,  although  loan  restructurings  and  discretion  in  recognising 
impairments  may  be  clouding  proper  assessment.  The  Banking  Regulation  and  Supervision 
Agency took several steps to address the rising NPLs, inviting banks to reclassify TRY 46 billion 
in  loans,  mostly  in  the  construction  and  energy  sectors,  as  NPLs,  and  to  prepare  roadmaps  to 
reduce  NPL  ratios  by  the  end  of  2020.  The  dollarisation  of  the  system  remained  high,  with 
foreign  exchange  deposits  accounting  about  half  of  all  deposits.  Banking  sector  profitability 
declined in 2019. The decline was more pronounced in state-owned banks, largely because of the 
authorities’ use of these banks to boost lending. The authorities intervened frequently in defence 
of  the  lira,  relying  on  foreign  exchange  swap  operations  with  domestic  banks  and  heavily 
disrupting  the  offshore  currency  swap  market.  In  December,  the  Financial  Action  Task  Force 
assessed  Turkey’s  anti-money 
terrorist  financing  system  and 
laundering  and  counter 
recommended  Turkey  to swiftly  address the gaps  identified in  the report  (see also chapter  4  – 
Free movement of capital). 

Access to finance 

Supported by strong regulatory measures, bank lending  recovered from the sharp fall in 
the  aftermath  of  the  2018  lira  depreciation.  Commercial  bank  credit  was  a  major  engine  of 
growth  in  the  period  leading  up  to  the  2018  currency  turbulence  but  contracted  sharply 
afterwards. After falling throughout most of 2019, total bank assets have started increasing again 
since the last quarter of the year and accelerated strongly in 2020 to reach 120% of GDP in June. 
Real  credit  had  declined  both  in  the  corporate  and  households  segments  but,  driven  by  base 
effects  and  monetary  policy  and  macro-prudential  decisions,  it  rebounded  strongly  in  the  last 
quarter  of  2019.  However,  while  lending  to  households  turned  to  growth,  corporate  lending 
lagged behind. Aggressive credit expansion by state-owned banks allowed them to gain market 
share  at 
the  cost  of  growing  risk 
exposure.  State-owned  banks  have  also 
significantly  increased  their  exposure  to 
the  government.  The  trends  of  growing 
state banks activity and expanding credit 
accelerated  in  2020,  as  the  authorities 

59 

35404550556001020302013201420152016201720182019Graph : Turkey -Labour market trends(15-64 age group)Unemployment rate (lhs)Participation rate (rhs)Employment rate (rhs)Source: Eurostat 
took, in a rapid succession, numerous regulatory measures to soften the economic repercussions 
of  the  pandemic.  Interest  rate  spreads  between  commercial  loans  and  deposits  in  USD  have 
increased  from  their  long-term  average  of  around  2.2%  to  close  to  3%  in  2019.  The  spreads 
between consumer and commercial loans and deposits in lira have reached historic highs during 
the  2018  financial  market  turbulence  and  have  been  very  volatile  since  then,  despite  declining 
significantly to new lows in the spring of 2020. 

Functioning of the labour market 

The decline in employment, paired with high level of unemployment, in particular among 
young people and women, low labour mobility and a high share of undeclared work remain 
major  concerns.  Labour  market  indicators  worsened  following  the  2018  recession.  The 
unemployment  rate  for  15-64  year-olds  peaked  at  a  multiyear  high  of  15%  in  early  2019  and 
stood  at  14%  on  average  for  the  year.  The  continuing  sharp  decline  in  investment  undermined 
employment creation and average employment fell by 658,000 or 2.4% in 2019. Strong increases 
in  public  sector  employment  mitigated  the  strong  decline  in  overall  employment.  The  average 
unemployment rate for women (16.8%) remained persistently higher than that for men (12.7%). 
Steady population growth and an influx of Syrian refugees under temporary protection continued 
to exert pressure on the labour market. The labour force increased further while the participation 
rate  (58.5%  on  average)  stood  unchanged.  The  problem  of  youth  unemployment  (15-24  years) 
worsened, and the youth unemployment rate rose by 5.1 pps to 25.4% on average in 2019. The 
rate  of  youth  not  in  employment,  education  or  training  topped  30%  for  the  first  time  ever  in 
August 2019, and was 26.0% on average in 2019, showing the grave economic situation young 
people  face.  There  are  significant  regional  disparities  in  labour  market  indicators,  which 
increased  further  in  2019,  with  unemployment  levels  ranging  from  7.6%  to  30.9%.  Labour 
mobility is constrained by rigidities in labour regulation, in particular on severance pay and non-
transferable rights. Undeclared work has increased and needs to be further addressed. The share 
of  people  not  registered  with  any  social  security  institution  rose  to  36.1%  in  August  2019  –  a 
level not seen since 2014, and remained high afterwards. Since mid-March, when Turkey started 
implementing containment measures, the number of people who requested a short-term working 
allowance  (a  scheme  providing  temporary  income  support  to  workers  in  workplaces  that 
suspended their activities) has reached more than 3 million or around 10% of the labour force. 

3.2.  The capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union 

Turkey  has  made  limited  progress  and  has  a  good  level  of  preparation  in  achieving  the 
capacity to cope with the competitive pressure and market forces within the EU. Expenditure 
on  research  and  development  increased,  although  remaining  well  below  the  Government’s 
target.  Investment  excesses  and  misallocations  declined.  Progress  was  made  in  the 
diversification of energy supplies but reforms are needed to open up the natural gas market and 
increase  competition  on  it.  Significant  problems  remain  in  education  as  regards  quality  and 
access.  Women  face  difficulties  in  accessing  quality  education  and  the  labour  market. 
Although  Turkey  remains  well  integrated  with  the  EU  market  in  terms  of  both  trade  and 
investment links, the relative share of the EU in Turkey’s foreign trade declined further amid a 
growing list of deviations from Turkey's obligations under the EU-Turkey Customs Union. 

In  order  to  improve  competitiveness  and  support  long-term  growth,  Turkey  should  in 
particular: 

  continue increasing enrolment in education and step up VET training; 

  improve  capital  allocation  by  basing  public  investment  decisions  on  sound  cost-benefit 

analysis, taking into account environmental and social concerns. 

Education and innovation 

Despite  some  improvements,  significant  problems  remain  in  education  in  terms  of  both 
quality  and  access.  Turkey  continues  to  score  poorly  in  educational  attainment  in  the  Gender 

60 

 
Gap Index calculated by the World Economic Forum, ranking  113th  of 144 countries  in  2020. 
Total expenditure on education was TRY 214.6 billion (5.8% of GDP) in 2018, representing an 
increase  of  21.6%  year-on-year.  The  net  enrolment  rate  for  pre-school  education  for  the  age 
group of 5 increased from 66.9% to 68.3% between 2018 and 2019. For the same period, the net 
enrolment  rates  in  primary  school  (first  4  years)  increased  from  91.5%  to  91.9%,  but  fell  for 
lower secondary school (second 4 years) from 94.5% to 93.3%. In secondary education (final 4 
years),  the  net  enrolment  rate  increased  from  83.6%  to  84.2%  between  2018  and  2019.  A 
mismatch  continues  to  exist  between  the  requirements  of  the  labour  market  and  the  skills 
produced  by  the  education  system.  However,  as  part  of  its  national  employment  strategy  and 
action  plan  2017-2019,  Turkey  has  taken  some  steps  to  align  the  education  system  with  the 
requirements  of  the  labour  market,  such  as  the  Initial  Vocational  and  Technical  Education  E-
Graduate Tracking System and various active labour market programmes. Turkey’s scores in the 
2018  OECD  PISA  (Programme  for  International  Student  Assessment)  test  improved,  but  still 
remain  relatively  low  in  comparison  with  the  OECD  average  in  reading,  mathematics  and 
science. 

Research and development expenditure increased from 0.86% of GDP in 2014 to 1.03% in 2018, 
but remained well below the government’s target of 1.8% by 2023. This is also well below the 
EU  average.  About  half  of  this  investment  came  from  the  private  sector.  Cooperation  between 
research  institutions  and  the  private  sector  still  needs  to  be  further  strengthened.  In  the  Global 
Innovation Index, Turkey continued to receive high scores on intellectual property filing activity, 
but its overall innovation index still remains low (ranked 49th) despite a slight improvement in 
2019. 

Physical capital and quality of infrastructure 

High investment activity in the years before the 2018 recession led to the accumulation of 
imbalances  and  the  misallocation  of  capital.  Total  investment  was  high,  at  close  to  30%  of 
GDP  over  2013-2018  but  declined  strongly,  following  the  2018  lira  depreciation,  to  26.1%  of 
GDP  in  2019.  The  share  of  construction  in  total  investment  went  up  from  around  50%  in  the 
beginning of the decade to an average of 57% after 2013, indicating investment misallocations. 
In parallel, the share of investment in machinery and equipment fell from close to 40% to around 
35%. The strong decline of construction activity in 2019 has led to a rebalancing of the share of 
investment to its level at the beginning of the decade. Government investment averaged around 
3.4%  of  GDP  in  the  years  before  2016.  As  part  of  the  authorities’  response  to  domestic  and 
external  challenges,  it  picked  up  to  4.1%  of  GDP  in  2017  and  4.5%  in  2018.  However,  the 
suspension of a number of investment projects in  the second half of 2018 has  led to a marked 
decline  in  government  investment  expenditure  in  2019.  The  government  has  advanced  the 
preparation of and held its first tender for the Istanbul Canal project, connecting the Black Sea to 
the Sea of Marmara, despite strong domestic opposition, environmental and social concerns, and 
unclear financing and economic returns. 

Some  progress  was  made  in  the  energy  sector.  The  volume  of  spot  market  transactions  in 
natural  gas  in  Turkey’s  natural  gas  spot  trading  platforms,  operated  by  the  Energy  Exchange 
Istanbul  (EXIST)  has  increased  in  2019.  Reforms  are  needed,  however,  to  open  up  the  natural 
gas market and increase competition on it. The state-owned and vertically integrated enterprise 
BOTAŞ continues to dominate the market, which does not allow for real viability of the energy 
exchange.  The  Turkish  electricity  Transmission  System  Operator’s  (TEIAŞ)  application  to 
extend its observer membership of the European Network of Transmission System Operators for 
Electricity  (ENTSO-E)  was  not  approved  but  Turkey  continued  to  participate  in  technical 
discussions. Progress was made in the diversification of energy supplies, through the completion 
of works and start of operations of the TANAP and Turkstream pipelines. The renewable energy 
sector of Turkey is advanced, with generous feed-in-tariffs and incentive schemes, which expire 
by the end of 2020. Local-content requirements in big renewable energy tenders in Turkey limit 
access by EU and other international companies to tenders in that sector. 

61 

 
In  telecommunications,  the  number  of  broadband  internet  subscribers  reached  76.6  million  in 
2019.  Mobile  broadband  penetration  slightly  increased,  though  it  is  still  below  the  OECD 
average. The share of households with access to internet at home grew from 83.8% in 2018 to 
90.7% in the first quarter of 2020. Over the same period, internet usage by individuals aged 16-
74 increased from 72.9% to 79.0%. The number of 4.5G subscribers reached 75.4 million in the 
first quarter of 2020. 

Sectoral and enterprise structure 

The sectoral breakdown of employment shows a continued shift towards the services sector 
(including construction),  while  industry’s  share  of  GDP  has  increased  lately.  The  share  of 
employment  in  services  and  construction  increased  from  58.1%  in  2013  to  62.0%  of  total 
employment  in  2019.  The  share  of  these  two  sectors  in  GDP,  however,  remained  broadly 
unchanged over the same period and accounted for 61.3% of GDP in 2019. Industry accounted 
for 19.8% of employment in 2019, down by 0.9pp from its 2013 level. It increased its share of 
GDP from below 20% in 2013 to 22.3% of GDP in 2019. Although representing only 6.4% of 
GDP in 2019, agriculture remained an important sector, employing 18.2% of the workforce.  

SMEs employ around three quarters of Turkey’s workforce and generate more than half of 
the  economy’s  total  value  added.  Turkey  continued  to  implement  various  corporate  support 
schemes,  mostly  targeting  SMEs.  A  new  economic  incentive  package  worth  EUR  4.5  billion, 
entitled IVME, was announced in May 2019, providing advantageous loans through three public 
banks.  In  response  to  the  COVID-19  outbreak,  the  Credit  Guarantee  Fund’s  limits  were 
increased and repayments of SME loans were postponed by three months. Five new investment 
funds of a total of EUR 105 million  for techno-entrepreneurs and start-ups were established in 
cooperation with 12 research universities in Turkey. Access to long-term financing still remains 
a challenge for SMEs, however. Several technical assistance and financing schemes run by the 
SME  support  administration  (KOSGEB)  are  operational.  KOSGEB  signed  protocols  with  the 
Turkish Exporters Assembly and the Foreign Economic Relations Board in order to increase the 
export  performance and internationalisation of SMEs. Following the COVID-19 pandemic, the 
scope of KOSGEB supports was extended to include the services sector, craftsmen and artisans. 
A  new  support  scheme  was  established  for  companies  with  production  capability  of  personal 
protective equipment and disinfectants. 

Economic integration with the EU and price competitiveness  

62 

 
Although Turkey’s trade integration with the EU remained high, it declined further on the 
import side, amid challenging trade relations. Driven mainly by a strong increase in exports, 
trade openness increased from 55.8% of GDP in 2017 to 62.5% of GDP in 2018. It rose further 
to 62.7% of GDP in 2019, with the level of exports of goods and services surpassing imports for 
the first time in decades. Price competitiveness continued to benefit from the weakening of the 
lira  and  the  real  effective  exchange  rate  depreciated  on  average  by  1.4%  in  2019,  a  trend  that 
accelerated further in 2020. In 2019, Turkey has been the EU’s sixth largest trading partner and 

the EU remains by far Turkey’s largest trading partner. However, the share of Turkish exports of 
goods going to the EU fell from a high of 50.2% in 2018 to 48.7% in 2019, while the share of 
Turkish imports coming from the EU declined from 36.6% to 35.0%. The EU share of Turkish 
imports fell from close to 40% a decade ago, displaced by a more active trade by Turkey with 
some Middle Eastern countries and India. The EU remained the largest source of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in Turkey, although its share in the overall stock of FDI declined from 72% in 
2013 to 58% in 2019. The EU-Turkey Customs Union, in force since 1996, remained the basis of 
bilateral  trade  relations  for  industrial  goods.  However,  Turkey  continued  the  practice  of 
introducing  new  tariff  increases  on  certain  products  of  non-EU  origin  circulating  freely  within 
the Customs Union and the forced localisation policy in the pharmaceutical sector, which the EU 
has challenged at the World Trade Organisation. Protectionist measures intensified in the wake 
of the pandemic and in view of restraining a widening trade imbalance; the authorities increased 
significantly  the  scope  and  rate  of  the  additional  duties  on  goods  of  non-EU  origin,  while 
intensifying non-tariff barriers like import surveillance and customs checks. 

4. 

GOOD NEIGHBOURLY RELATIONS AND REGIONAL COOPERATION  

Cyprus 

Tensions in the region further increased in the reporting period as a result of Turkey’s actions 
and statements challenging the right of the Republic of Cyprus to exploit hydrocarbon resources 
in Cyprus’ Exclusive Economic Zone.  

Turkey deployed two drilling and two seismic vessels in the Cypriot Exclusive Economic Zone, 
including in the areas that have been licensed by the Government of Cyprus to European oil and 
gas companies, as well as in Cypriot territorial sea. Despite repeated calls from the EU to cease 
its  illegal  activities,  Turkey  launched  six  new  drilling  sessions  since  May  2019.  The  Turkish 
Armed  Forces  accompanied  the  drilling  ships  during  their  operations.  Cyprus  also  reported  a 
dramatic  increase  in  the  number  of  Turkish  military  exercises  within  its  Exclusive  Economic 
Zone.  

The  EU  reiterated  on  several  occasions  that  Turkey  needs  to  commit  itself  unequivocally  to 
good neighbourly relations, international agreements and the peaceful settlement of disputes in 
accordance with the United Nations Charter, having recourse, if necessary, to the International 
Court  of  Justice.  In  July  2019,  in  light  of  the  unauthorised  drilling  activities  of  Turkey  in  the 
Eastern  Mediterranean,  the  Council  decided  to  suspend  negotiations  with  Turkey  on  the 
Comprehensive  Air  Transport  Agreement,  not  to  hold  for  the  time  being  the  EU-Turkey 
Association Council or any further meetings of the EU-Turkey high-level dialogues, to endorse 
the  Commission’s  proposal  to  reduce  the  pre-accession  assistance  to  Turkey  for  2020,  and  to 

63 

0102030201120122013201420152016201720182019Graph : Turkey -Exports of goodsEUCEFTAOtherSource: WiiW% ofGDP0102030201120122013201420152016201720182019Graph : Turkey -Imports of goodsEUCEFTAOtherSource: WiiW% ofGDP 
invite  the  European  Investment  Bank  to  review  its  lending  activities  in  Turkey,  notably  with 
regard to sovereign-backed lending. In reaction to Turkey’s unauthorised drilling activities, tThe 
EU further adopted a framework for targeted measures against Turkey in November 2019 and 
decided in February 2020 to add two individuals to the list of designations under this sanctions 
framework.   

Turkey stressed that it would not accept negotiating with the Republic of Cyprus for delimiting 
maritime  zones  in  the Eastern Mediterranean  –  as  Turkey  continues  to refuse to  recognise  the 
Republic  of  Cyprus.  In  July  2019,  Turkey  supported  the  cooperation  proposal  of  the  Turkish 
Cypriot  leader  to  the  President  of  the  Republic  of  Cyprus  concerning  the  exploration  and 
exploitation  of  hydrocarbon  resources  around  Cyprus.  It  further  stated  that,  while  it  would  be 
ready to discuss with other parties the issue of maritime delimitation, talks with the Republic of 
Cyprus to delimit maritime zones could only start after a settlement of the Cyprus issue. Cyprus 
has announced that it is in the process of seeking recourse at the International Court of Justice in 
The Hague. 

in 

In its conclusions of 1 October 2020, the European Council strongly condemned violations of the 
sovereign rights of the Republic of Cyprus, which must stop. The European Council stressed that 
the EU has a strategic interest in a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean 
and 
the  development  of  a  cooperative  and  mutually  beneficial  relationship  with 
Turkey.Pursuing  dialogue  in  good  faith  and  abstaining  from  unilateral  actions  which  run 
counter to the EU interests and violate international law and the sovereign rights of EU Member 
States  is  an  absolute  requirement  in  this  regard.  All  differences  must  be  resolved  through 
peaceful dialogue and in accordance with international law.  

In September 2019, Turkey announced its intention to open the fenced area of Varosha and to 
open  a  consulate  general  in  Famagusta.  Several  representatives  of  the  Turkish  government, 
including the Vice President, visited Varosha. The status of the area is laid down in UN Security 
Council resolutions, which state that attempts to settle any part of Varosha by people other than 
its  inhabitants  are  inadmissible.  Turkey  has  announced  the  deployment  of  Unmanned  Aerial 
Vehicles and increased its military activities within the maritime zones of Cyprus as well as in 
areas where the Republic of Cyprus does not exercise effective control. The senior UN official 
conducting consultations on behalf of the UN Secretary-General continued her engagement with 
the  parties  to  the  Conference  on  Cyprus,  as  part  of  the  efforts  to  facilitate  agreement  on  the 
terms  of  reference  for  resuming  negotiations  on  the  Cyprus  issue.  Informal  discussions  of  the 
UN Secretary-General with both Cypriot leaders took place in Berlin in November 2019, upon 
the  invitation  of  the  UN  Secretary  General.  Both  leaders  reaffirmed  their  commitment  and 
determination  to  achieve  a  settlement,  based  on  a  bi-communal  and  bi-zonal  federation  with 
political  equality  as  set  out  in  the  relevant  United  Nations  Security  Council  resolutions.  As 
emphasised  in  the  Negotiating  Framework  and  Council  declarations,  Turkey  is  expected  to 
actively support the negotiations on a fair, comprehensive and viable settlement of the Cyprus 
issue  within  the  UN  framework,  in  accordance  with  the  relevant  UN  Security  Council 
resolutions and in line with the principles, on which the EU is founded and the EU acquis. It is 
important  to  preserve  the  progress  made  so  far  and  to  pursue  preparations  for  a  fair, 
comprehensive  and  viable  settlement,  including  in  its  external  aspects.  Turkey’s  commitment 
and contribution in concrete terms to this comprehensive settlement remains crucial.  

In its conclusions of 1 October 2020, the European Council stressed that it support the speedy 
resumption  of  negotiations,  under  the  auspices  of  the  UN,  and  remains  fully  committed  to  a 
comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem within the UN framework and in accordance 
with the relevant UNSC resolutions, including UNSC resolutions 550 and 789, and in line with 
the principles on which the EU is founded. It expects the same of Turkey. The EU stands ready 

64 

 
 
to play an active role in supporting the negotiations, including by appointing, upon resumption, 
a representative to the UN Good Offices Mission. 

The process of granting the Committee on Missing Persons full access to all relevant archives 
and military areas has seen welcome developments, which need to be followed up by concrete 
actions and further expedited. 

Despite repeated calls by the Council and the Commission, Turkey has still not complied with 
its obligations as outlined in the Declaration of the European Community and its Member States 
of  21  September  2005  and  in  Council  Conclusions,  including  those  of  December  2006  and 
December  2015.  Turkey  has  not  fulfilled  its  obligation  to  ensure  full  and  non-discriminatory 
implementation of the Additional Protocol to the Association Agreement and has not removed 
all obstacles to the free movement of goods, including restrictions on direct transport links with 
the Republic of Cyprus. 

Turkey  continued  to  veto  applications  by  the  Republic  of  Cyprus  to  join  several  international 
organisations, including the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 
In  January  2020,  Turkey  blocked  the  Republic  of  Cyprus'  participation  as  an  observer  at  the 
United Nations Conference on Disarmament. 

Peaceful settlement of border disputes  

In  September  2020,  Greece  and  Turkey  agreed  to  re-launch  bilateral  exploratory  talks,  which 
should remain a valuable channel of communication between both sides to find common ground 
for the start of negotiations on the delimitation of the continental shelf.  The EU welcomed the 
confidence  building  steps  by  Greece  and  Turkey,  as  well  as  the  announcement  that  they  will 
resume  their  direct  exploratory  talks  aiming  at  the  delimitation  of  the  Continental  Shelf  and 
Exclusive Economic Zone of the two countries.These efforts should be sustained and broadened.  

The  signing  of  a  bilateral  Memorandum  of  Understanding  on  the  delimitation  of  maritime 
jurisdiction areas between Turkey and the National Accord Government of Libya in November 
2019  increased  tensions  in  the  Eastern  Mediterranean,  as  it  ignored  the  sovereign  rights  of 
Greece’s  islands  in  the  area  concerned.  In  this  respect,  the  European  Council,  in  December 
2019,  unequivocally  reaffirmed  its  solidarity  with  Greece  and  Cyprus  regarding  actions  by 
Turkey  in  the  Eastern  Mediterranean  and  the  Aegean  Sea.  It  stressed  that  the  Memorandum 
infringes  upon  the  sovereign  rights  of  third  States,  does  not  comply  with  the  United  Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea and cannot produce any legal consequences for third States. 
Furthermore, the EU stated that the sovereignty and sovereign rights over the maritime zones of 
all neighbouring coastal states, including those generated by their islands, need to be respected. 
The delimitation of exclusive economic zones and continental shelf should be addressed through 
dialogue.  In  May  2020,  EU  Foreign  Ministers  reaffirmed  the  EU’s  position  on  the  Eastern 
Mediterranean drillings as well as Turkey’s provocative and aggressive behaviour in relation to 
Cyprus  and  Greece,  underlining  that  abstaining  from  unilateral  actions  is  a  basic  element  to 
allow  dialogue  between  the  EU  and  Turkey  to  advance  and  that  Turkey’s  illegal  actions  have 
serious negative impact across the range of EU-Turkey relations.  

The  launch  of  a  tender  for  offshore  oil  and  gas  exploration,  including  part  of  the  continental 
shelf  off  the  Greek  island  of  Castellorizo,  continued  to  be  objected  by  Greece.  Aiming  at 
emphasising  its  territorial  claims,  Turkey  unilaterally  deployed  in  August  and  up  until  12 
September  2020  a  survey  and  military  ships  in  the  continental  shelf  off  Castellorizo.  In  May 
2020, the Turkish Petroleum Corporation submitted applications to the Turkish Government for 
the granting of exploration and exploitation permits south and south-east of four Greek islands.   

The  threat  of  casus  belli  in  relation  to  the  possible  extension  of  Greek  territorial  sea  to  12 
nautical  miles,  as  set  out  in  a  1995  Turkish  Grand  National  Assembly  resolution,  still  stands, 
and  was  reiterated  in  relation  to  the  possible  extension  of  the  Greek  territorial  waters  in  the 

65 

 
 
Aegean  Sea.  The  reconfirmation  of  the  2017  agreement  to  ease  increasing  tensions  in  the 
Aegean Sea reached during a meeting at the margins of the UN General Assembly in New York 
in  September  between  the  Greek  Prime  Minister  and  the  Turkish  President,  has  not  been 
followed up in practice. Greece and Cyprus continue to complain about repeated and increased 
violations  and  an  increasing  militarisation  of  their  territorial  waters  and  airspace  by  Turkey. 
Flights  over  Greek  inhabited  areas  increased  significantly,  in  violation  of  international  law. 
Overflights  of  Greek  mainland  in  the  Evros  river  border  region  were  also  reported.  As 
highlighted  by  the  Council  conclusions  of  July  and  October  2019,  and  stemming  from 
obligations under the  Negotiating Framework, Turkey  is expected to  unequivocally commit to 
good  neighbourly  relations,  international  agreements  and  the  peaceful  settlement  of  disputes 
having  recourse,  if  necessary,  to  the  International  Court  of  Justice.  Turkey  must  avoid  threats 
and actions that damage good neighbourly relations, normalise its relations with the Republic of 
Cyprus  and  respect  the  sovereignty  of  all  EU  Member  States  over  their  territorial  sea  and 
airspace as well as all their sovereign rights, including inter alia the right to explore and exploit 
natural resources, in accordance with EU and international law, in particular the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Accordingly, Turkey is expected to refrain from 
any drilling activities of hydrocarbons in the maritime zones of other states.  

Regional cooperation 

Good  neighbourly  relations  form  an  essential  part  of  Turkey’s  process  of  moving  towards  the 
EU. Bilateral relations with other enlargement countries were generally good, but have become 
increasingly challenging with neighbouring EU Member States, particularly Greece and Cyprus. 
Operational  cooperation  with  Greece  on  migration  continued  until  the  end  of  February  2020, 
when  Turkey  announced  a  change  its  migration  policy  and  declared  its  borders  with  EU 
Member  States  open.  This  action  led  to  considerable  tensions  with  Greece  (see  chapter  24). 
From  30  March,  the  Turkish  authorities  organised  transport  for  migrants  and  refugees  away 
from  the  border  area  with  Greece  and  closed  the  borders  with  Greece  and  Bulgaria  except  to 
commercial traffic because of the COVID-19 outbreak. Furthermore, tensions in the Aegean Sea 
and Eastern Mediterranean  were  not  conducive to  good neighbourly relations  and undermined 
regional stability and security.  

Turkey continued to conduct a proactive foreign and economic policy with the Western Balkans 
and  supported  the  countries  of  the  region  in  their  respective  efforts  in  joining  NATO  and  the 
EU. Turkey also improved its relations in the fields of culture and security. Turkey attended the 
South  East  European  Cooperation  Process  (SEECP)  Summit  in  July  2019  and  assumed  the 
Chairmanship-in-office in June 2020 for 2020-2021. The Turkish authorities continued to exert 
pressure  on  authorities  in  the  Western  Balkans  to  locally  prosecute  and  extradite  alleged 
members  of  the  Gülen  movement,  leading  to  the  expulsion  of  one  individual  from  Albania  to 
Turkey. Turkey provided equipment to individual partners in the Western Balkans in their fight 
against the COVID-19 pandemic. 

Turkey's relations with Albania continued to be good and Turkey was among the first countries 
to  provide  rescue  teams  and  medical  aid  to  Albania  following  November’s  deadly  earthquake 
and  pledged  almost  EUR45  million  at  the  International  Donors’  Conference  ‘Together  for 
Albania’. Turkey’s relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina remained positive. Turkey supported 
the  forming  of  a  government  at  the  state  level.  Turkey  continued  to  support  the  Office  of  the 
High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Turkey's relations with Kosovo remain good. 

Turkey  and  Montenegro  continued  to  have  friendly  and  comprehensive  relations.  High-level 
visits took place in October. Turkey ratified the protocol for North Macedonia’s membership of 
NATO in July. Political consultations took place in May and July.  

  This  designation  is  without  prejudice  to  positions  on  status,  and  is  in  line  with  UNSCR  1244/1999  and  the  ICJ 
Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence. 

66 

 
                                                            
Turkey further increased its investments in Serbia and developed relations with the country in all 
areas.  At  a  High  Level  Cooperation  Council  in  October,  both  countries  agreed  to  increase 
bilateral cooperation in a number of areas. A trilateral summit between Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Serbia  and  Turkey  took  place  in  October,  during  which  an  official  ceremony  for  the  start  of 
construction work of the Sarajevo-Belgrade highway was held. 

5. 

ABILITY TO ASSUME THE OBLIGATIONS OF MEMBERSHIP 

5.1.  Chapter 1: Free movement of goods 

The  free  movement  of  goods  ensures  that  many  products  can  be  traded  freely  across  the  EU 
based  on  common  rules  and  procedures.  Where  products  are  governed  by  national  rules,  the 
principle  of  the  free  movement  of  goods  prevents  these  from  creating  unjustified  barriers  to 
trade. 

Turkey  is  at  a  good  level  of  preparation  for  the  free  movement  of  goods.  It  made  limited 
progress  in  addressing  last  year’s  recommendations,  notably  on  aligning  with  the  ‘New  and 
Global Approach’ EU acquis. Technical barriers to trade continued to prevent the free movement 
of some goods and requirements that discriminate against EU products continued to be in place, 
violating Turkey’s obligations under the Customs Union. 

In the coming period, Turkey should in particular: 

  eliminate  non-tariff  barriers  to  the  free  movement  of  goods  that  are  in  breach  of  Customs 
Union  obligations,  such  as  surveillance  regimes  for  the  import  of  certain  products,  export 
restrictions,  prior  registration  requirements,  conformity  assessments  and  inspections, 
licensing surveillance and other documentation requirements for imports and non-acceptance 
of EU good manufacturing practices certificates;  

  re-consider  schemes  imposing  local  content  requirements  or  relocation  of  production 

particularly in the area of medicines for human use; 

  increase the coverage and effectiveness of market surveillance measures; 

  implement  the  EU  acquis  on  mutual  recognition  of  goods  lawfully  marketed  in  another 

Member State. 

General principles 

The framework for the free movement of goods is largely in place in Turkey. However, issues 
related to implementation remain. A range of non-tariff barriers to the free movement of goods 
that are in breach of Customs Union obligations were still in place or newly introduced. These 
included  surveillance  regimes  for  the  import  of  certain  products,  export  restrictions,  prior 
registration  requirements,  conformity  assessments  and  inspections,  licensing  surveillance  and 
other  documentation  requirements,  as  well  as  non-acceptance  of  EU  good  manufacturing 
practices  certificates  and  discrimination  against  EU  products.  Furthermore,  schemes  to  ensure 
the local manufacture or local content requirements create de facto market access barriers for EU 
products and are considered not in line with the Customs Union.  

At the COVID-19 outbreak, Turkey restricted entry of non-Turkish truck drivers to its territory. 
These  measures  were  later  progressively  eased  in  order  to  facilitate  the  transport  and  trade  of 
essential  goods  between  the  EU  and  Turkey.  Temporary  export  restrictions  for  some  specific 
hygiene  products  and  medical  equipment  were  revoked  in  May  2020.  Turkey  introduced  early 
March  a  prior  authorisation  requirement  for  exports  of  a  number  of  personal  protection 
equipment (PPE) items, which is still in place. 

Non-harmonised area 

Although  a  legal  base  to  ensure  mutual  recognition  in  the  non-harmonised  area  has  been  in 
place since July 2013, the number of notifications from Turkey decreased from 26 in 2018 to 9 

67 

 
in 2019. This is insufficient considering Turkey’s legislative activity in this area. Turkey should 
make  sure  that  the  legal  base  follows  the  latest EU  acquis  on  the  mutual  recognition  of  goods 
lawfully marketed in another Member State applicable since April 2020. 

Harmonised area: quality infrastructure 

Turkey is aligned to the EU acquis on technical regulations, standards, conformity assessment, 
accreditation,  metrology,  and  market  surveillance.  A  new  Product  Safety  and  Technical 
Regulations Law was adopted in March 2020, replacing the outdated framework legislation on 
the same subject.  

for  Standardisation 

The  Turkish  Standards  Institute  is  independent,  able  to  implement  European  and  international 
standards. It has adequate staff resources and financing, and since 2012 is a full member of the 
European  Committee 
for 
Electrotechnical  Standardisation  (CENELEC).  By  December  2019,  it  had  adopted  20,579 
national  standards  aligned  with  European  standards.  The  rate  of  harmonisation  with  CEN  and 
CENELEC  standards  is  98%  and  95%,  respectively.  Six  Turkish  economic  operators  are  full 
members  of  the  European  Telecommunications  Standards  Institute  (ETSI)  and  one  is  an 
observer.  A  national  standardisation  strategy  for  2017-2020  and  the  National  Development 
Programme (NDP) 2019-2023 are in place including a measure on increasing the participation of 
stakeholders in standardisation. 

the  European  Committee 

(CEN)  and 

Turkey  has  49  notified  bodies,  two  technical  approval  bodies  and  one  recognised  third  party 
organisation  in  place  as  of  March  2020.  The  Turkish  Accreditation  Agency  (TÜRKAK)  is  a 
signatory  of nine  multilateral agreements as  part of  the  European cooperation for accreditation 
association. The  National  Metrology  Institute (TÜBÍTAK-UME)  is  a  member  of  the  European 
Association of National Metrology Institutes (EURAMET) and participates in the Committee of 
the  European  Metrology  Programme  for  Innovation  and  Research  (EMPIR).  The  Ministry  of 
Industry  and  Technology  participates  at 
the  European  Legal  Metrology  Organisation 
(WELMEC). 

Turkey  performs  market  surveillance  in  line  with  the  EU  acquis  and  submits  its  annual 
programme  to  the  European  Commission.  However,  the  number  of  products  subject  to  market 
surveillance checks in 2018 (the last reported year) decreased by 22% as compared with 2017, 
and the market surveillance budget also declined. Market surveillance is not done on the basis of 
risk  assessment,  and  remains  limited  with  regard  to  products  placed  on  the  market  by  e-
commerce. Only 31% of unsafe products were subject to fines in 2018, raising concerns on the 
enforcement of product safety legislation.  

Harmonised area: sectoral legislation 

On the ‘new and global approach’ product legislation, implementing legislation was issued for 
in-vitro diagnostic medical devices and measuring instruments. 

On ‘old approach’ product legislation, Turkey adopted amending legislation on motor vehicles. 
Turkey  did  not  accept  EU  good  manufacturing  practice  (GMP)  certificates  on  medicines  for 
human  use,  in  contradiction  to  Customs  Union  rules.  Turkey  is  only  partly  aligned  with  the 
European  Regulation  on  Registration,  Evaluation,  Authorisation  and  Restriction  of  Chemicals 
(REACH).  Turkey’s  schemes  impose  the  requirement  of  local  manufacturing  on  medicines  for 
human use and on agricultural and forestry tractors, which create market access barriers for EU 
products.  Turkey  requires  submission  of  safety  assessment  reports  before  imported  cosmetic 
products  are  placed  on  the  market,  in  contradiction  to  the  EU  acquis  and  its  own  Cosmetics 
Regulation, which was transposed to align  with the EU  acquis. Turkey imposed  a requirement 
for  additional  excessive  documentation  and  information  on  risk  assessment  on  footwear, 
machineries,  telecom  and  electrical  equipment,  although  such  additional  checks  should  be 
justified  on  the  basis  of  a  risk  analysis.  These  additional  administrative  requirements  create 
additional  market  access  barriers  and  discriminate  against  EU  products.  Turkey  continued  to 

68 

 
systematically  delay  the  application  of  new  EU  emission  limits  for  motor  vehicles,  which 
represents a trade barrier. 

On  procedural  measures,  there  is  a  specific  licensing  and  regulation  system  for  economic 
operators  dealing  with  drug  precursors,  with  a  strict  follow-up  and  monitoring  system  in 
cooperation  with  the  police  and  customs  authorities.  Turkey  is  aligned  regarding  licensing 
procedures  for  firearms.  There  was  no  progress  on  alignment  to  the  EU  acquis  on  cultural 
goods. 

5.2.  Chapter 2: Freedom of movement for workers 

Citizens of one Member State have the right to work in another Member State and must be given 
the same working and social conditions as other workers. 

Preparations in the area of freedom of movement for workers are at an early stage and there was 
no progress during the reporting period.  

There  was  no  progress  on  access  to  the  labour  market  or  coordination  of  social  security 
systems. So far, Turkey has concluded 16 bilateral social security agreements with EU Member 
States, but no new bilateral social security agreements were signed during the reporting period. 
There  were  no  developments  on  future  participation  in  the  European  employment  services 
network (EURES). 

5.3.  Chapter 3: Right of establishment and freedom to provide services 

EU natural and legal persons have the right to establish themselves in any Member State and to 
provide  cross-border  services.  For  certain  regulated  professions,  there  are  rules  on  mutual 
recognition of qualifications. Postal services are gradually being opened up to competition. 

Preparations in the area of right of establishment and freedom to provide services are at an early 
stage. There was no progress in the reporting period. Substantial efforts are still needed to align 
with the EU acquis. There was no implementation of the 2019 report's recommendations. 

In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

  align with the Postal Services Directive 

  align with the Services Directive on the provision of cross-border services and set up a point 

of single contact; 

  align  its  national  legislation  with  the  EU  acquis  in  the  area  of  the  mutual  recognition  of 

professional qualifications.  

No progress was made on the right of establishment where many requirements still restrict this 
right, while regarding the freedom to provide cross-border services, registration, licensing and 
authorisation requirements are still in place for service providers registered in the EU. There is 
no  point  of  single  contact  yet.  Preparations  to  transform  the  retail  sector  information  system 
(PERBIS) into a sector-specific point of single contact were not finalised. 

No progress was observed in the area of postal services. Turkey did not align with the Postal 
Services  Directive  as  regards  the  provision  of  universal  postal  services.  A  reserved  area  still 
exists in the standard postal letter service sector and the universal service provider still maintains 
its exclusive rights.  

On  the  mutual  recognition  of  professional  qualifications,  the  Vocational  Qualifications 
Authority  continued  to  issue  occupational  standards.  Some  regulated  professions  remained 
subject to reciprocal recognition requirements. Nationality and  language requirements have yet 
to  be  removed.  Alignment  of  national  legislation  with  the  EU  acquis  in  this  area  needs  to 
continue. 

5.4.  Chapter 4: Free movement of capital 

69 

 
In  the  EU,  capital  and  investments  must  be  able  to  move  without  restriction  and  there  are 
common  rules  for  cross-border  payments.  Banks  and  other  economic  operators  apply  certain 
rules to support the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing. 

Turkey is moderately prepared on free movement of capital. Overall, there was no progress 
in  this  area  in  the  reporting  period.  Restrictions  imposed  on  capital  outflows  and  foreign 
exchange-denominated  transactions  after  the  August  2018  currency  crisis  are  still  in  force. 
Legislation  on  real  estate  acquisition  is  not  aligned  with  the  EU  acquis.  There  was  no 
implementation of the 2019 report's recommendations.  

In addition to addressing the shortcomings set out below, Turkey should in particular: 

  draft and adopt an action plan on real estate acquisition by foreigners to lift restrictions and 

increase transparency; 

  further  align  with  the  EU  acquis  by  strengthening  measures  to  prevent  the  misuse  of  its 
financial system for the purposes of money laundering and the financing of terrorism; 

  continue alignment of the legislative framework and administrative set up with a view to 

comply with the Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF) recommendations. 

On  capital  movements  and  payments,  Turkey’s  legislation  on  real  estate  acquisition  by 
foreigners remains opaque and does not apply to all EU nationals in a non-discriminatory way. 
An action plan to further liberalise the purchase of real estate by foreigners needs to be adopted 
and  implemented,  bringing  Turkey’s  laws  in  line  with  the  EU  acquis.  Restrictions  applying  to 
foreign ownership remain in place in many sectors such as radio and TV broadcasting, aviation 
and  maritime  transportation,  education,  mining  and  the  electricity  market.  The  restrictions 
introduced  after  the  August  2018  currency  crisis,  on  capital  movements  for  residents  and  non-
banking  corporations,  in  particular  for  transactions  denominated  in  foreign  currencies  (such  as 
banning  the  use  of  foreign  currencies  in  the  purchase,  sale  or  lease  of  some  movable  and 
immovable  properties)  are  still  in  place.  The  temporary  measure  forcing  the  transfer  of  export 
earning  into  the  country  evolved  into  a  permanent  provision  of  the  Turkish  legislative 
framework. However, the obligation to convert these revenues into domestic currency was lifted. 
The Banking and Supervision Agency (BRSA) also restricted domestic banks’ ability to do swap 
operations and other derivatives operations with foreign counterparties.  

Turkey has reached a good standard in payment systems. In December, Turkey adopted a new 
legislation  on  payment  service  providers  and  electronic  money  institutions,  aiming  at  further 
alignment  with  the  EU  acquis.  The  supervisory  and  regulatory  authority  over  payment  service 
providers  and  electronic  money  institutions  was  transferred  from  the  Banking  Regulation  and 
Supervision Agency to the Central Bank. 

Turkey  made  limited  progress  in  the  fight  against  money  laundering  and  financing  of 
terrorism. The country is party to the Council of Europe’s Convention on Laundering, Search, 
Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism. Turkey 
was  subjected  to  the  fourth  round  of  the  Financial  Action  Task  Force’s  (FATF)  mutual 
evaluations, and needs to continue its alignment of the legislative framework and administrative 
set up with a view to comply with the FATF's recommendations. The Mutual Evaluation Report 
published  in  December  2019  found  that  Turkey’s  legal  framework  on  fight  against  money 
laundering and terrorist financing has certain shortcomings in key areas, which would need to be 
addressed in order to demonstrate the effectiveness of the Turkish system. The country currently 
lacks an up-to-date strategy and an action plan to fight money laundering and terrorist financing. 
It  needs  to  pursue  money  laundering  and  terrorist  financing  in  line  with  the  country’s  risk 
assessment  (the  number  of  money  laundering  investigations  currently  results  in  only  few 
convictions). Turkey also needs to develop a national strategy to permanently deprive criminals 
of the proceeds of their crimes and strengthen its ability to freeze assets of entities designated by 
the United Nations Security Council without delay. In reforming its legal framework, Turkey is 

70 

 
now  in  the  monitoring  process,  carried  out  by  the  FATF's  International  Co-operation  Review 
Group and needs to address the findings of the Mutual Evaluation Report in order to avoid listing 
by FATF. Failure to address these recommendations would put Turkey at risk of being included 
in  the  EU  list  of  high-risk  third  countries  presenting  strategic  deficiencies  in  their  anti-money 
laundering/countering financing of terrorism regimes.  

The Financial Crimes Investigation Board of Turkey (MASAK) strengthened its administrative 
and  enforcement  capacity,  and  improved  its  cooperation  with  law  enforcement  agencies  and 
judicial  authorities.  The  number  of  suspicious  transaction  reports  submitted  to  the  MASAK 
decreased  from  222,743  in  2018  to  203,786  in  2019.  In  2019,  nine  people  were  convicted  for 
money  laundering.  The  number  of  confiscations  and  of  seizure  of  assets  remained  limited  in 
relation to money laundering and terrorism financing as stand-alone crimes. 

Turkey  maintains  its  Citizenship  law,  which  enables  foreign  investors  to  obtain  Turkish 
citizenship  on  the  basis  of  investment.  The  conditions  are  either  to  invest  USD  250,000  in 
Turkish  real  estate,  which  must  be  maintained  for  a  minimum  of  3  years,  or  deposit 
USD 500,000 into a Turkish Bank Account, to be held for a minimum of 3 years with no access 
to funds. Such investor citizenship schemes pose risks for the EU. A robust monitoring system 
linked to this scheme should be put in place, in particular to counter possible security risks such 
as  money  laundering,  terrorist  financing  and  infiltration  of  organised  crime.  In  addition,  as 
provided for by the new EU anti-money laundering rules, particular attention should be given to 
enhanced customer due diligence in the context of the investors’ citizenship programme.  

5.5.  Chapter 5: Public procurement 

EU  rules  ensure  that  the  public  procurement  of  goods  and  services  in  any  Member  State  is 
transparent  and  open  to  all  EU  companies  on  the  basis  of  non-discrimination  and  equal 
treatment. 

Turkey is moderately prepared in the area of public procurement. No progress was made in the 
past  year.  Large  gaps  remained  in  its  alignment  with  the  EU  acquis.  The  coverage  of  public 
procurement rules is significantly reduced by various exemptions.  With the persistence of local 
content requirements, Turkey still maintains offsets and discriminatory rules. The Commission’s 
recommendations from last year have not been implemented, and remain valid. 

In addition to addressing the shortcomings set out below, Turkey should pay particular attention 
in the coming year to: 

  revise  its  public  procurement  legislation  to  further  align  it  with  the  2014  EU  Directives  on 
public  procurement  including  concessions  to  provide  for  remedies  in  line  with  EU  public 
procurement directives and to increase transparency; 

  eliminate  the  discriminatory  domestic  price  advantages  and  set-off  practices  and  repealing 

exemptions; 

  establish  a  fully  independent  procurement  review  board,  separate  from  the  public 

procurement authority and ensuring the independence of board members. 

Institutional set-up and legal alignment 

Concerning  the  legal  framework,  Turkey’s  national  public  procurement  legislation  broadly 
reflects  the  principles  of  the  Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the  European  Union.  However, 
compulsory  domestic  price  advantages  and  offsets,  which  allow  authorities  to  demand 
compensating  measures  if  goods  are  not  produced  domestically,  is  discriminatory  and  thus 
contradicts the EU acquis. Offset practice is not subject to any lower limit as well. 

The  Public  Procurement  Law  (PPL)  is  partly  aligned  with  the  2004  EU  Public  Procurement 
Directives  and  still  needs  to  be  fully  harmonised  with  the  2014  EU  Public  Procurement 
Directives in order to remedy the inconsistencies with the EU  acquis. The legislation, which is 

71 

 
compatible with and supported by budget and expenditure regulations, allows public contracts to 
be prepared, awarded, and managed in line with sound project management principles. However, 
many  sector-specific  laws  limit  transparency  and  the  coverage  of  public  procurement  rules  is 
significantly reduced by a long and increasing list of exclusions of varying importance and scope. 
Turkey does not have a comprehensive legislative framework for concessions and public-private 
partnerships. 
Turkey's 11th Development Plan (2019-2023) aims at increasing domestic production particularly 
for  chemistry,  pharmaceuticals  and  medical  devices,  electronics,  machinery  and  electrical 
equipment, automotive and railway services sectors by means of using public procurement as a 
subsidising tool. For  such purpose, a domestic price advantage of up to  15%  remains available 
for ‘medium and  high-technology industrial  products’  and the offset practices are promoted. In 
2019,  the  share  of  domestic  price  advantage  in  tenders  open  to  international  competition  was 
51.39%  up  from  43.75%  in  2018,  while  in  terms  of  the  contract  value  it  was  48.93%,  a  slight 
increase compared to 44% in 2018.  

The  Public  Procurement  Authority  (PPA)  is  responsible  for  implementing  the  Public 
Procurement Law and monitoring the public procurement system. The Ministry of Treasury and 
Finance (MoTF) is in charge of coordinating policy formulation and implementation. The PPA is 
affiliated to MoTF but is nominally autonomous. However, the operational independence of the 
Public  Procurement  Board  within  the  PPA  is  impaired,  since  the  President  of  the  Republic  is 
authorised  to  directly  appoint  its  president  and  members,  while  the  specific  requirements  on 
education and sector experience have been removed. 

Implementation and enforcement capacity 

Turkey’s public procurement market corresponds to 3.3% of country’s GDP in 2019 compared 
with  5.7%  in  2018.  Procedures  continued  to  generally  respect  transparency  and  efficiency 
principles. 

Operational  responsibility  for  preparing  and  carrying  out  public-private  partnerships  (PPP) 
projects lies with the line ministries or other authorities concerned. The President has the power 
to approve the public-private partnerships, while the early-stage review of the projects is carried 
out by the Strategy and Budget Directorate affiliated to the Presidency. Turkey still does not have 
a  functioning  single  framework  for  coordinating,  supervising  and  monitoring  public-private 
partnership operations. In 2019, there were four PPP projects, down from eight in 2018. 

Monitoring  of  the  contract  awards  and  implementation  is  satisfactory.  The  PPA  issues 
statistics on a six-month basis, which provide the source for measuring performance and making 
improvements to the public procurement system. 

Contracting  authorities’  capacity  to  manage  public  procurement  processes  continued  to 
improve.  Turkey  promoted  the  effective  use  of  e-procurement.  In  2019,  the  electronic 
procurement  (put  into  practice  in  the  last  quarter  of  2016)  was  used  for  4,551  tenders 
corresponding to a total contract amount of TL 4.1 billion, thus recording a significant increase 
from  309  tenders  for  a  total  amount  of  TL  60  million  implemented  in  2018.  The  number  will 
continue  to  rise  in  2020  as  in  the  framework  of  COVID-19  administrative  package,  the  PPA 
instructed  the  procurement  authorities  to  use  electronic  procurement  for  the  new  and  cancelled 
tenders. 

Mechanisms to identify and address corrupt and fraudulent practices are in place, including rules 
on integrity and conflict of interest. However, Turkey needs to develop a risk indicator system 
that signals potential integrity problems in the procurement process. Turkey should also fill the 
substantial  number  of  vacant  posts  in  the  PPA in  order  to  strengthen  its  administrative  
and coordination capacity. 

72 

 
Efficient remedy system 

The right to legal remedy is secured in the Constitution and the PPL lays down the institutional 
set up and mechanism for handling complaints. Contracting authorities' decisions on complaints 
can be appealed before the Public Procurement Board within the PPA. The review and remedies 
system  provides  for  effective,  swift  and  competent  handling  and  resolution  of  complaints  and 
sanctions.  However,  further  alignment  of  the  legislation  with  the  EU  Remedies  Directive  is 
needed. 

The  implementation  capacity  of  the  Public  Procurement  Board  remains  stable  with  141  staff. 
The  Public  Procurement  Board  received  1,864  complaints  in  2019  (2.87  %  of  contracts), 
compared with 2,017 complaints in 2018, at the time amounting to 2.41% of the contracts. The 
appointment  policy  and  the  Board’s  position  as  part  of  the  PPA  remained  a  concern.  A  fully 
independent  Public  Procurement  Board  would  avoid  possible  conflicts  of  interest  and  ensure 
transparency. 

5.6.  Chapter 6: Company law 

The  EU  has  common  rules  on  the  formation,  registration  and  disclosure  requirements  of  a 
company, with complementary rules for accounting and financial reporting, and statutory audit. 

Turkey is well advanced in company law. Limited progress was made through amendments to 
the  ethics  code  for  independent  auditors  in  line  with  international  standards.  The  2019 
recommendations were not met and therefore remain valid.   

In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

→ finalise technical alignment with the EU acquis in the company law area; 

→ adopt the financial reporting standard for small and micro companies to achieve further EU 

acquis alignment. 

On  company  law,  no  legislative  action  was  taken  during  the  year  to  address  outstanding 
alignment  issues,  which  include  cross-border  mergers,  domestic  mergers  and  divisions,  and 
takeovers.  The  Ministry  of  Trade  started  providing  business  registry  documents  electronically 
upon  request  of  the  company  representative.  However,  overall  financial  documents  of 
companies  are  still  not  accessible  in  the  business  register  (EU  company  law  and  accounting 
rules require such documents to be disclosed and made publically available).  

Concerning corporate accounting and auditing, the alignment with the EU acquis on financial 
reporting  standard  for  small  and  micro  companies  is  pending.  There  is  no  clarity  concerning 
alignment  of  non-financial  information  and  reports  on  payments  to  government.  Specific 
provisions apply for the statutory audit of public-interest entities, and a system of investigations 
and  sanctions  for  the  companies  that  are  subject  to  independent  audit  is  in  place.  During  the 
reporting period, Turkey issued an amended version of the ethics code for independent auditors, 
in line with the revisions in the Ethics Code by the International Ethics Standard Board. Further 
work is required to align with the EU acquis on accounting and statutory audit. 

5.7.  Chapter 7: Intellectual property law 

The EU has harmonised rules for the legal protection of intellectual property rights (IPR) and of 
copyright and related rights. Rules for the legal protection of IPRs cover, for instance, patents 
and  trademarks,  designs,  biotechnological  inventions  and  pharmaceuticals.  Rules  for  the  legal 
protection  of  copyright  and  related  rights  cover,  for  instance,  books,  films,  computer 
programmes and broadcasting. 

Turkey  has  a  good  level  of  preparation  in  this  area.  There  was  limited  progress  during  the 
reporting period, with the continued consultations on revisions of the legislation of the copyright 
and  related  rights,  and  increased  awareness  raising  campaigns.  Recommendations  from  last 
year’s report were only partially met and remain valid.  

73 

 
In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

  adopt copyright legislation in line with the EU acquis 

  improve enforcement measures to combat industrial and intellectual property infringements, 
including  further  specialisation  in  Intellectual  Property  Rights  (IPR)  courts  and  facilitated 
procedures to obtain search and seizure warrants; 

  sustain a constructive dialogue with IPR owners and enhance awareness raising on concerns 
related  to  counterfeiting  and  piracy,  focusing  on  the  benefits  of  a  strong  IPR  protection 
system for economic growth. 

Concerning  copyright  and  related  rights,  consultations  on  revising  the  legislation  continued 
through a series of meetings conducted throughout 2019, but no progress was achieved. Despite 
the high level of alignment with the EU  acquis, systemic issues continued negatively affecting 
the overall efficiency of the copyright system. The Copyright Training Centre organised several 
training programs for the members of provincial inspection commissions. 

Concerning  industrial  property  rights,  the  Industrial  Property  Training  Centre  coordinated 
a number  of  awareness seminars  for  public  agencies  and  gave  several  specialised  courses.  The 
IPR Academy's implementing regulation entered into force. The legislative amendments reduced 
the  administrative  burden  on  IPR  applicants.  The  implementation  and  enforcement  of  the 
industrial property  legislation  continued to  be  slow. Regulatory  data protection was still not  in 
alignment with the Customs Union Agreement. 

Concerning judicial enforcement, most of the experienced IPR judges are no longer serving and 
their  replacements  did  not  receive  comprehensive  specialised  training  on  IPR  proceedings. 
Although  there  was a  slight  improvement in  various  cities, the industry still faced difficulty in 
obtaining  search  and  seizure  warrants  against  counterfeit  goods,  particularly  in  Istanbul. 
Although  the  industrial  property  legislation  allows  for  accelerated  destruction,  the  related 
provisions were still not widely implemented. Combined with the long judicial proceedings, this 
led to growing amounts of stored counterfeit goods that created a financial burden on the rights 
holders. Judges  continued  to unnecessarily order expert witness statements.  The supervision of 
trademark and patent agents improved but the conflict of interest situations of expert witnesses 
remain an issue. The IPR strategy that expired in 2018 was not replaced. The Turkish National 
Police  conducted  several  awareness  raising  activities,  including  radio  broadcasts  through  the 
police channel. The re-established Justice Academy together with the IPR Academy designed a 
curriculum to train lower court judges in this respect. In December 2019 and in March 2020, IPR 
specialised courts judges and prosecutors, lower criminal courts judges and prosecutors as well 
as Supreme Court relevant chambers' judges participated in seminars on IPR civil and criminal 
enforcement measures in the EU and in Turkey. 

Turkey continued to be among the top producers of counterfeit beverages, perfumes, cosmetics, 
shoes,  clothing,  and  personal  accessories.  Such illicit  and,  in  certain  cases,  hazardous  products 
were still readily available in open bazaars and in international fairs in touristic areas of Turkey. 
The wide use of unauthorised software continued to be an issue. 

In  2018,  the  number  of  seizures  at  the  customs  increased  by  14%  while  the  number  of  items 
seized at the customs increased by 60% compared with 2017. A number of training sessions on 
counterfeiting for the customs officers were launched in cooperation with around 70 trademark 
owners.  

5.8.  Chapter 8: Competition policy 

EU  rules  protect  free  competition.  They  include  antitrust  rules  against  restrictive  agreements 
between  companies  and  abuse  of  dominant  position  and  also  include  rules  on  concentrations 
between  companies,  which  would  significantly  impede  competition.  EU  rules  also  set  out  a 
system  of  State  aid  control.  Governments  are  only  allowed  to  grant  State  aid  if  restrictive 

74 

 
conditions are met, with a view to prevent distortion of competition. 

Turkey  has  some  level  of  preparation  in  the  area  of  competition  policy.  There  was  
backsliding, on account of an increase in state aid and its lack of transparency. Long awaited 
amendments were made to the Law on the Protection of Competition.  Concerns remain in the 
enforcement  capacity  in  the  field  of  State  aid.  Legislation  on  anti-trust  and  mergers  is  largely 
aligned with the EU acquis. 

In addition to addressing the shortcomings set out below, in the coming year Turkey should in 
particular: 

 step up the enforcement of the State Aid law by adopting implementing legislation without 

further delay and give access to an updated inventory of aid schemes; 

  establish  an  operational  and  independent  State  aid  authority  and  ensure  transparent 

implementation of the State aid rules.  

Anti-trust and mergers 

The legislative framework is broadly aligned with the EU acquis. The Law on the Protection of 
Competition  reflects  Article  101  and  102  of  the  Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the  European 
Union. Implementing legislation in this field is largely in place.  In June 2020, the Law on the 
Protection  of  Competition  was  amended,  addressing  several  of 
the  Commission’s 
recommendations.  

Regarding  the  institutional  framework,  the  Turkish  Competition  Authority  is  responsible  for 
implementing the Law on the Protection  of Competition. Its mandate is very similar to that of 
the European Commission. The Competition Board is the decision making body of the Turkish 
Competition Authority and is composed of seven members. The Turkish Competition Authority 
is  a  largely  independent  institution.  However,  the  direct  appointment  of  the  president  and  the 
members of the Competition Board by the President of the Republic without involvement of the 
relevant public institutions impairs the independence of the Turkish Competition Authority. In 
2019,  the  President  of  the  Republic  appointed  a  member  of  the  Capital  Market  Board  as  the 
chairperson of the Competition Board. 

is  adequate.  Overall 
The  Turkish  Competition  Authority’s  enforcement  capacity 
implementation was effective, but there was a fall in the number of decisions, in particular on 
anti-trust  (down  from  191  in  2013  to  69  in  2019),  and  in  the  total  amount  of  fines  imposed 
related  to  substance  (down  from  TRY  1,187,220,597.35  in  2013  -TRY/EUR  2.93-  to  TRY 
237,674,114.94  in  2019-  TRY/EUR  5.95).  The  total  number  of  ex  officio  investigations  and 
preliminary  investigations  remained  low  (from  17  in  2012,  to  10  in  2019).  The  Turkish 
Competition Authority conducted an average of 67 dawn raids throughout 2019). In 2019, out of 
the  61  judgements  concluded  as  a  result  of  the  appeals  against  the  Turkish  Competition 
Authority decision, 85% of them were upheld by Turkish courts. 

State aid 

The legislative framework is partially in line with the EU acquis. State aid regulations do not 
cover agriculture, fisheries and services sectors, which are not part of the EU-Turkey Customs 
Union.  Turkey’s  Law  on  the  Monitoring  and  Supervision  of  State  Aid  is  broadly  in  line  with 
Articles  107  and  108  of  the  Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the  European  Union.  However, 
concerning  implementing  legislation  Turkey  repealed  a  set  of  deadlines  previously  defined  in 
the law and empowered the former Council of Ministers (since July 2018 the President) to delay 
the  enforcement  of  implementing  legislation  for  an  unlimited  period.  Therefore,  the 
implementing legislation required to enforce the State aid control is not in place and Turkey has 
yet to adopt an action plan for alignment with the EU acquis. 

Concerning  the  institutional  framework,  the  Economic  Policies  Council  is  responsible  for 

75 

 
implementing  the  law  and  the  President  of  the  Republic  is  the  appointing  authority  of  this 
Council's  members.  In  August  2019,  another  institution,  Directorate-General  Economic 
Programs and Research, was also established under the Ministry  of Treasury  and Finance and 
assigned for coordinating the State aid. The current structure is not considered independent and 
operational.  

No assessment of Turkey's enforcement capacity or implementation in this area can be made 
as there is no functional organisational structure or implementing legislation in force. A state aid 
inventory  has  yet  to  be  set  up  and  made  accessible.  Furthermore,  the  implementation  of  the 
project basis investment programme, where in practice, support is provided on a selective basis, 
is a source of concern. In August 2019, Turkey also announced the technology-driven industry 
initiative embedded in the project basis investment programme and the 2012 incentives scheme. 
This  new  incentive  scheme  is  aimed  at  securing  or  increasing  the  domestic  production  in 
medium-high-  and  high-technology  level  products,  such  as  chemicals  (pharmaceuticals), 
medical and dental instruments, computers, electronics and optics, electrical devices, machinery, 
transportation  vehicles,  as  identified  in  the  11th  Development  Plan.  Turkey  has  to  ensure 
transparency and compatibility of these State aid schemes.  

Liberalisation 

Competition and State aid rules apply to state-owned enterprises. The competences concerning 
the privatisation process lie with the President, who has assumed power over the privatisation 
decisions and procedures. 

5.9.  Chapter 9: Financial services 

EU  rules  aim  at  ensuring  fair  competition  between  and  the  stability  of  financial  institutions, 
namely banking, insurance, supplementary pensions, investment services and securities markets. 
They include rules on authorisation, operation and supervision of these institutions. 

Turkey  has  a  good  level  of  preparation  in  the  area  of  financial  services.  There  was  some 
progress during the reporting period in the areas of market supervision, with the establishment 
of  an  Insurance  and  Private  Pension  Regulation  and  Supervision  Agency,  and  market 
development with a new implementing regulation for equity crowdfunding.  

In addition to addressing the shortcomings set out below, in the coming year Turkey should in 
particular: 

  further  strengthen  bank  governance  and  supervision,  crisis  management  and  the  resolution 

framework; 

→  improve  the  transparency  of  asset  quality  review  by  publishing  the  details  of  stress  test 

scenarios and methodology; 

→ continue to support the development of Turkish capital markets and their proper supervision. 

For  banks  and  financial  conglomerates,  the  Banking  Regulation  and  Supervision  Agency 
revised the rules on banks' loan transactions, by reducing the threshold of total risk amount for 
which  borrowers  are  requested  to  provide  additional  documents.  In  February  2020,  Turkey 
amended the Banking Law, to oblige banks to submit pre-emptive recovery plans constituting of 
an  assessment  of  potential  risks  that  could  lead  to  financial  structure  deterioration,  and  of 
measures to mitigate those risks. The Agency published the main conclusions of its asset quality 
review  processes,  without  however  presenting  the  details  of  stress  test  scenarios  and 
methodology.  The  lack  of  transparency  and  details  in  the  bank  stress  tests  undermines  the 
credibility of the regulatory and supervisory authority.  

As  part  of  the  measures  to  mitigate  the  economic  impact  of  the  COVID-19  outbreak,  the  time 
allowed  for  certain  loans  to  remain  unpaid  before  they  are  classified  as  non-performing  loans 

76 

 
was increased from 90 to 180 days. Furthermore, the Central Bank lowered reserve requirements 
for banks with a growing lending portfolio, as a measure to support the economy. This creates 
incentives for banks to increase their activity faster. The banking sector was providing flexible 
loan payment options for their customers and restructuring possibilities for corporate debtors in 
view  of  supporting  the  economy  amid  the  COVID-19  outbreak.  The  President  of  the  Republic 
has  the  power  to  directly  appoint  the  president and  members  of  the  Agency  and  of  the  Saving 
Deposit  Insurance  Fund.  A  new  legislative  framework  has  strengthened  the  penalties  and 
measures  against  manipulations  and  misleading  information  within  the  financial  system.  The 
Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency adopted a new implementing regulation, listing the 
transactions and practices considered to be manipulative and misleading in the financial markets. 

There  was  some  progress  in  the  area  of  insurance  and  occupational  pensions,  with  the 
adoption of legislation in October 2019, paving the way for the establishment of the Insurance 
and Private Pension Regulation and Supervision Agency. It is set as a new associated institution 
under the Ministry of Treasury and Finance. 

There  was  no  further  progress  on  financial  market  infrastructure  while  some  progress  was 
made on securities markets and investment services. The Capital Markets Board adopted the 
new  implementing  regulation  for  equity  crowdfunding  in  October  2019.  Following  the 
amendments  introduced  in  the  Capital  Market  Law  in  February  2020,  the  funds  for 
crowdfunding  platforms  could  be  also  raised  through  borrowing  in  addition  to  equity 
crowdfunding.  The  independence  of  the  Board  remained  limited,  as  the  President  of  the 
Republic  has  the  power  to  directly  appoint  its  president  and  members.  The  appointment  of  a 
banker convicted for bank fraud in the US as the Head of the Istanbul Stock Exchange was also 
a source of concern. 

5.10.  Chapter 10: Information society and media 

The EU supports the smooth functioning of the internal market for electronic communications, 
electronic commerce and audio-visual media services. The rules protect consumers and support 
universal availability of modern services. 

Turkey  has  some  level  of  preparation  in  the  area  of  information  society  and  media.  Overall, 
there  was  backsliding.  Serious  concerns  regarding  the  lack  of  transparency  of  media  funding, 
concentration  of  media  ownership,  political  influence  on  editorial  policies,  restrictions  on 
freedom  of  expression  and  lack  of  independence  of  regulatory  authorities  were  not  addressed. 
There was inadequate competition in fixed voice and broadband markets and excessive taxation 
and  costs  for  operators  and  consumers  of  information  and  communications  technologies.  No 
progress  can  be  reported  in  the  media  sector  in  terms  of  alignment  with  the  EU  acquis  in  the 
reporting period.  

As  last  year’s  recommendations  were  not  addressed,  they  remain  valid.  In  the  coming  year 
Turkey should in particular: 

→ strengthen the independence of the regulatory authority and its board members and amend the 
Internet Law in line with the Venice Commission’s recommendations with a view to ensuring 
media pluralism; 

→  align  the  universal  service,  authorisation  arrangements,  market  access  and  rights  of  way  in 

electronic communications with the EU acquis; 

→ finalise the digital switchover process; 

→ take steps to strengthen the public broadcaster’s independence. 

On  electronic  communications  and  information  and  communications  technologies,  there 
was no progress in aligning  the legislation with the  EU  acquis on market access and universal 
service.  The  independence  of  the  Information  and  Communication  Technologies  Board  and 
Cyber Security Council remains a concern. Competition in fixed voice market slightly improved. 

77 

 
The  share  of  alternative  fixed  voice  operators  was  49.4%  in  the  third  quarter  of  2019,  against 
45.5%  in  2018.  The  broadband  market  still  lacked  a  sufficient  level  of  competitiveness. 
Municipalities  charged  high  fees  for  rights  of  way  and  for  base  station  installations,  which 
further  increased  costs.  Accessibility  to  physical  network  and  increased  fibre  penetration  are 
required  for  effective  competition  in  this  market.  Mobile  broadband  penetration  slightly 
increased  to  75%  in  2019  against  the  OECD  average  of  109.7%.  The  fixed  broadband 
penetration  rate  was  16.1%  compared  to  the  OECD  average  of  30.8%.  The  number  of  4.5G 
subscribers reached 76 million in the third quarter of 2019 with an increase of 4.7 million new 
subscriptions  compared  to  71.3  million  subscribers  in  the  last  quarter  of  2018.  Turkey  did  not 
amended its Internet Law in line with the UN and Council of Europe recommendations, which is 
a source of concern. The establishment of a Digital Transformation Office under the Presidency 
was  completed.  The  Office  is  responsible  for  the  digital  transformation  of  public  services  in 
Turkey and will help establish a digital transformation ecosystem together with the stakeholders 
from the private sector, academia and civil society. It will also engage in projects related to cyber 
security, big data and artificial intelligence. 

Concerning the information society services, the national strategy covering 2015-2018 needs to 
be  updated.  The  proportion  of  citizens  using  e-government  increased  from  50.22%  in  2018  to 
54.2% in 2019. 

In the area of audio-visual policy, in the run up to the local elections of 31 March 2019 and the 
re-run  of  the  Istanbul  municipal  elections  held  on  23  June  2019,  the  candidates  of  the  ruling 
party and its allies enjoyed a notable advantage, which was reflected in proportionally excessive 
coverage by government-affiliated public and private media. Since the adoption of a decree in 
2017,  the  Radio  and  Television  Supreme  Council  (RTÜK)  has  no  authority  over  broadcasters 
during  elections  to  ensure  impartiality.  In  October  2019,  the  Congress  of  Local  and  Regional 
Authorities of the Council  of Europe  concluded in  its final election  monitoring  report that the 
framework  conditions  for  ensuring  a  level  playing  field  for  all  contestants  and  genuine  media 
freedom have proved weak in the most recent local elections (See political criteria). 

The  media  ownership  structure  fails  to  provide  the  public  with  unbiased,  pluralistic  and 
independent news. The concentration of media outlets in the hands of a few holding groups with 
strong ties  to the government or  dependent on public contracts, represents a threat to  free and 
independent  media.  According  to  professional  media  organisations,  90%  of  Turkish  media  is 
now  owned  by  pro-government  groups.  Since  2018,  the  public  broadcaster  TRT  has  been 
overseen  by  the  Directorate  of  Communications,  which  is  a  presidential  institution.  TRT’s  
decision  in  May  2019  to  replace  experienced  media  workers  with  new  staff  from  other 
institutions with no or little public broadcasting experience raises concern.  

The  Regulation  on  Radio,  Television  and  Voluntary  Online  Broadcasts  entered  into  force  in 
August  2019.  It  does  not  apply  to  personal  communications,  but  empowers  RTÜK  to  inspect 
online broadcasts, including news websites broadcasting from abroad and obliges media service 
providers and platform operators that wish to provide services merely on the internet, to obtain 
broadcasting licenses from RTÜK. There were around 600 applications for licenses. The same 
rules apply for service and content providers abroad. Media service providers who already hold 
a  valid  broadcast  license  from  RTÜK  can  broadcast  their  content  online  with  their  existing 
license,  thereby  exempting  mainstream  broadcasters,  who  are  largely  pro-government.  The 
regulation  lacks  clarity  in  terms  of  its  scope,  definitions,  licencing  criteria  and  costs,  and 
contains controversial provisions regarding jurisdiction and restricting access to online content. 
Furthermore,  the  regulation  allows  RTÜK  to  impose  its  own  definition  and  interpretation  of 
obscenity,  general  morality  or  national  integrity  for  internet  broadcasting,  as  it  does  for  TV 
broadcasting.  The  regulation  is  likely  to  affect  economically  small  media  operators,  thus 
potentially  further  limiting  media  pluralism.  There  have  been  around  600  applications  for 
licenses.  There  are  two  pending  applications  before  the  Council  of  State  requesting  the 
cancellation  of  the  regulation  arguing  that  some  articles  contradict  freedom  of  expression  and 

78 

 
principles  of  the  rule  of  law.  Throughout  2019,  RTÜK  imposed  57  monetary  fines  on  12  TV 
channels,  one  radio  channel  and  23  broadcasts  for  their  news  reports,  films  and  programmes, 
and  suspended  24  programmes.  Broadcast  bans  authorised  by  criminal  judges  of  peace  and 
various  courts  were  imposed  by  RTÜK  on  a  wide  range  of  cases  such  as  child  abuse,  terror 
attacks,  divorce  and  even  flood-related  news.  In  October  2019,  two  days  after  the  launch  of 
Turkey's military operation into northeast Syria, RTÜK announced on its website, without prior 
discussion  among  its  members,  that  it  would  silence  broadcasters  that  speak  out  against  the 
military operation. Between January and May 2020, RTÜK sanctioned TV and radio channels 
39 times and fined 28.  

In  July  2019,  Parliament  held  elections  for  three  vacant  seats  in  RTÜK  that  resulted  in  the 
appointment  of  opposition  representatives  for  the  first  time  in  almost  two  years.  However,  in 
September  2019,  on  the  proposal  of  its  chairperson,  RTÜK  ousted  one  of  the  members 
nominated  by  the  opposition.  Reportedly,  the  reasons  for  his  dismissal  were  his  criticism 
regarding the lack of transparency in RTÜK and some of its decisions as well as his disclosure 
of misconduct within the RTÜK management. The dismissed member brought his case before 
the Ankara Administrative Court.  This  development further questions  the  independence of the 
regulatory authority. 

Following  the  first  case  of  COVID-19  on  11  March  2020,  in  their  programmes  media  outlets 
featured  experts  that  presented  their  views.  Subsequently,  they  received  official  notifications 
from  RTÜK,  encouraging  them  to  invite  experts  pre-selected  by  the  Supreme  Council,  in  an 
attempt to restrict freedom of expression.  

In  July  2020,  the  Parliament  adopted  a  law  on  the  ‘Arrangement  of  Internet  Publication  and 
Combating Crimes Committed through These Publication’. This law triggered controversy as it 
places new obligations on social media providers, which would lead to heavy fines and restricted 
bandwidth  if  they  fail  to  comply  with  these  new  requirements  and  gives  the  government 
sweeping new powers to regulate social media content. 

TV,  radio  and  digital  broadcasts  in  languages  other  than  Turkish  continued.  There  were  32 
broadcasters,  including  the  public  broadcaster  TRT,  which  broadcasted  in  Albanian,  Arabic, 
Armenian, Assyrian, Bosnian, Circassian, English, German, Kurdish, Laz, Uyghur and Russian. 

Preparations for the completion of the digital switchover were ongoing. 

5.11.  Chapter 11: Agriculture and rural development 

The common agricultural policy (CAP) supports farmers and rural development. This requires 
strong  management  and  control  systems.  There  are  also  common  EU  rules  for  quality  policy 
and organic farming. 

Turkey reached some level of preparation in the area of agriculture and rural development. No 
progress was made with respect to the Commission’s recommendations from last year. There is 
still  no  strategy  for  producing  agricultural  statistics.  Strategic  policy  orientations  suggest  that 
Turkey’s  agricultural  support  policy  may  be  moving  away  from  the  common  agricultural 
policy’s principles.  

In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

→ adopt and start to implement a strategy for producing agricultural statistics; 

→  develop and start to implement a strategy to align its agricultural support policy. 

On horizontal issues, in October 2019 Turkey adopted the Agricultural Policy Strategic Plan for 
2019-2023,  which  focuses  among  other  issues  on  improving  the  welfare  of  rural  areas  and 
increasing the yield and quality of agricultural production to ensure stable food supply. The plan, 
together with the policy orientations given by the National Agriculture and Forestry Council in 
November 2019, suggest that Turkey’s agricultural support policy may be moving away from the 

79 

 
common agricultural policy’s principles, notably by increasing the support coupled to production 
and aiming at shifting to a region or basin based management model. As regards future strategic 
planning processes, Turkey is encouraged to conduct more effective and inclusive consultations 
with the EU. 

Important  steps  were  taken  for  the  development  of  an  integrated  administration  and  control 
system (IACS). The farm accountancy data network (FADN) covers all 81 provinces and was 
integrated into the agricultural production and registration system. The agricultural census is not 
yet complete and the strategy for agricultural statistics remains to be adopted. Further alignment 
with EU policies requires the decoupling of payments from production and linking  area-based 
payments to cross-compliance standards. 

On common market organisation, no progress was made regarding legislative alignment. 

There was a sharp decline in imports of live cattle, beef and derivate products from the EU in 
the  reporting  period.  Turkey  remains  to  fully  implement  its  obligations  under  the  EU-Turkey 
trade  agreement  for  agricultural  products,  by  opening  quotas  for  beef  and  live  animals  on  a 
lasting basis. Proper and transparent management of import quotas needs to be implemented.  

In  the  EU  pre-accession  assistance  programme  for  rural  development  (IPARD  II),  some 
progress  was  made  in  2019.  3,826  new  applications  were  received  and  649  projects  were 
contracted with EUR65.4 million of EU contribution to investments in agricultural holdings and 
in  processing  and  marketing,  and  farm  diversification  (measures  1.3  and  7).  53  Local  Action 
Groups applied for the LEADER measure in 12 provinces. Some work was done on the National 
Rural Network. Implementation of the pilot agri-environment measure continued. 

On  quality  policy,  Turkey  continued  to  implement  legislation  on  protection  of  Geographical 
Indications, which is largely aligned to the EU acquis. 

Alignment  with  the  EU  acquis  on  principles  and  implementation  of  organic  farming  is  well 
advanced. The Turkish Accreditation Agency accredits organic agriculture control bodies. 

The farm advisory system remains to be fully harmonised with the EU acquis; the outcome of a 
recently  EU-financed  project  should  be  fully  taken  into  consideration    to  ensure  a  fully 
functional IACS. 

5.12.  Chapter 12: Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy 

EU hygiene rules for foodstuff production ensure a high level of food safety. Animal health and 
welfare and the safety of food of animal origin are safeguarded together with quality of seeds, 
plant protection material, protection against harmful organisms and animal nutrition. 

Turkey  reached  some  level  of  preparation  in  the  area  of  food  safety,  veterinary  and 
phytosanitary  policy.  There  was  some  progress  in  the  past  year  concerning  enforcement 
capacity  for  animal  welfare  and  food  safety  legislation.  The  Commission’s  recommendations 
from last year were only partially taken up. Food establishments are yet to be upgraded to meet 
relevant  EU  standards.  Full  implementation  of  the  EU  acquis  in  this  area  requires  significant 
further work. 

In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

→  upgrade  food  establishments  to  meet  EU  standards,  including  submitting  a  national 

programme and a monitoring plan; 

→  make further progress in addressing zoonoses. 

There was limited progress in aligning and implementing the EU acquis on general food safety. 
Turkey  is  yet  to  fully  align  its  veterinary  policy  with  the  EU  acquis.  The  identification  and 
registration  of  bovines  and  small  ruminants  continued.  Turkey  extended  the  electronic 
identification system to cattle. Border inspection posts at land and sea borders and at the Sabiha 

80 

 
Gökçen Airport in Istanbul are still not fully operational. 

Turkey continued its fight against animal diseases. Foot and mouth disease outbreaks decreased 
as  a  result  of  mass  vaccination.  The  disease-free  zone  ensured  by  vaccination  in  the  area  of 
western  Turkey  bordering  Bulgaria  and  Greece  was  maintained  by  strict  movement  controls. 
Vaccination  against  lumpy  skin  disease  continued.  Significant  efforts  are  still  needed  to  fully 
align  with  the  EU  acquis  on  transmissible  spongiform  encephalopathies  and  surveillance 
systems,  including  full  compliance  with  the  February  1998  Decision  of  the  EC-Turkey 
Association Council on the trade regime for agricultural products. A regulation on welfare and 
protection  of  aquatic  vertebrate  animals  used  for  scientific  purposes  was  published. 
Implementation  of  the  legislation  concerning  animal  welfare  during  transport  was  not  yet 
launched and further structural and administrative work is necessary to fully implement the EU 
acquis  in  this  area.  There  was  some  progress  on  zoonoses,  with  the  implementation  of  the 
salmonella control programme. 

Turkey continued implementing training, inspection and monitoring programmes for the placing 
of food, feed and animal by-products on the market. The administrative capacity for official 
controls  was  improved.  No  progress  was  made  on  developing  the  national  plan  for  upgrading 
agri-food establishments. Significant work is still needed to apply the new rules on registering 
and  approving  food  establishments.  Substantial  work  on  animal  by-products  is  still  required. 
Provisions for funding inspections were not yet aligned with the EU system. 

Alignment  of  food  safety  rules  with  the  EU  acquis  advanced  on  issues  such  as  labelling, 
additives and purity criteria, flavourings, food supplements and enzymes. A regulation on food 
irradiation was published. Relevant legislation  on infant formulae and follow on formulae and 
on foods for total diet replacements were adopted. Progress on specific rules for feed remains 
limited.  

Some  progress  was  made  on  phytosanitary  policy.  A  regulation  concerning  combat  against 
Xylella  fastidiosa  leaf  blight  was  published.  Turkey  ratified  the  revised  International  Plant 
Protection  Convention.  Alignment  is  yet  to  be  ensured  for  novel  food  and  for  genetically 
modified organisms. 

5.13.  Chapter 13: Fisheries  

The common fisheries policy lays down rules on fisheries management, protects living resources 
of the sea and limits the environmental impact of fisheries. This includes setting catch quotas, 
managing fleet capacity, rules on markets and aquaculture and support for fisheries and coastal 
communities. 

Turkey  has  some  level  of  preparation  in  the  area  of  fisheries.  Good  progress  was  made  as 
regards  the  adoption  of  key  amendments  to  the  fisheries  law,  on  fisheries  and  aquaculture, 
resources and fleet management, and inspection and control. 

In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

→ implement the fisheries law; 

→  enhance  further  multilateral  cooperation  on  fisheries,  including  at  the  General  Fisheries 
Commission  for  the  Mediterranean  (GFCM)  Ministerial  Conference  on  Black  Sea  fisheries 
sustainability and at the GFCM post-2020 Strategy Conference.   

The law amending the current fisheries law was adopted in November 2019. The new law aims 
to ensure sustainable fisheries management and to conserve the resources by improving control 
measures  and  sanctions.  Progress  was  made  on  control.  Nevertheless,  Turkey  needs  to 
implement  it  at  operational  level  in  order  to  fight  Illegal,  unreported  and  unregulated  (IUU) 
fishing efficiently, focusing also on the GFCM Regional Plan of Action to fight and eliminate 
IUU fishing.    

81 

 
Some  progress  was  made  on  resources  and  fleet  management.  The  number  of  vessels 
monitored  via  the  vessel  monitoring  system  increased  from  1,500  to  1,608.  The  institutional 
capacity of data collection and stock assessment increased. On  inspections and control, good 
progress  was  made  in  legislative  alignment  and  on  implementation  of  the  International 
Commission  for  the  Conservation  of  Atlantic  Tunas  (ICCAT)  and  the  General  Fisheries 
Commission for the Mediterranean (GFCM) recommendations. Turkey cooperated with the EU 
and was actively involved in the GFCM High Level Conference on MedFish4Ever initiative in 
June 2019 on Mediterranean fisheries. 

On  market  policy,  no  progress  was  made  on  building  up  the  ministry’s  capacity.    Regarding 
international  agreements,  the  EU  cooperated  with  Turkey  on  the  preparation  of  the  43rd 
GFCM annual session. As the EU implements provisions of the United Nations Convention on 
the  Law  of  the  Sea,  inter  alia  in  the  common  fisheries  policy,  Turkey’s  ratification  of  the 
Convention would improve cooperation with the EU on fisheries and maritime policy. 

5.14.  Chapter 14: Transport policy 

The  EU  has  common  rules  for  technical  and  safety  standards,  security,  social  standards,  and 
market  liberalisation  in  road  transport,  railways,  inland  waterways,  combined  transport, 
aviation and maritime transport. 

Turkey is moderately prepared in transport policy. Some progress was made in the reporting 
period  in  completing  key  sector  reforms  and  most  of  the  2019  recommendations  remain  valid. 
Negotiations on a comprehensive agreement in the aviation sector  were suspended in line with 
the July 2019 Council conclusions on Turkish drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean.  

Turkey should in particular: 

→ adopt its new Road Safety Strategy for 2021-2030 and establish the road safety lead authority 

to ensure better coordination among the relevant stakeholders; 

→ phase out the subsidies to the incumbent railway operator State Railways of the Republic of 
Turkey  (TCDD)  in  order  to  facilitate  a  competitive  market  environment  for  all  railways 
operators; 

→  adopt  its  national  Intelligent  Transport  System  (ITS)  architecture  in  line  with  the  EU 

framework to ensure interoperability and connectivity. 

As  regards  the  EU  acquis  on  general  transport,  Turkey  launched  a  comprehensive  study  to 
assess the level of alignment in the transport sector and identify action plans to bridge the gaps 
based  on  economic  impact  assessment.  Turkey  is  not  yet  aligned  with  the  Clean  Power  for 
Transport package. There was an increased interest from Turkish municipalities for the European 
urban  mobility  initiatives  such  as  sustainable  urban  mobility  planning  and  road  safety.  Urban 
mobility  needs  a  concrete  policy  framework  and  a  clear  policy  framework  adopted  with  the 
consultation of all stakeholders, in particular the large cities. 

The  organisational  structure  of  the  Ministry  of  Transport  and  Infrastructure  was  changed.  The 
Directorate-General  for  Railways  Regulation,  DG  for  Road  Regulation  and  the  DG  for 
Dangerous  Goods  and  Combined  Transport  were  merged  in  one  DG  for  Transport  Services. 
Moreover,  the  DG  for  Maritime  and  Inland  Waters  and  the  DG  for  Merchant  Marine  were 
merged in one DG for Maritime Affairs. The impact of these significant changes will need to be 
further observed and analysed.  

On  road  transport,  the  legal  framework  is  at  a  good  level  of  preparation  regarding  the 
alignment with the EU acquis. Some progress was made in the reporting period. Turkey doubled 
the number of roadside inspections on commercial vehicles in the last five years. The Regulation 
on Energy Efficiency in Transport was published in May 2019. Turkey is expected to set targets 
in line with the Stockholm Declaration and the new EU road safety strategy covering 2021-2030 
to halve road fatalities by 50%. The establishment of a road safety lead authority is a key step to 

82 

 
ensure  better  targeting,  monitoring  and  coordination  among  the  relevant  stakeholders.  No 
progress  was  made  in  the  adoption  of  the  EU  acquis  for  intelligent  transport  services.  A 
structured  legal  framework  and  stronger  institutional  capacity  are  needed  in  order  to  provide 
wider  support  for  the  Intelligent  Transport  System  (ITS)  sector  development,  including  urban 
mobility.  

Turkey  is  moderately  prepared in  the  field  of  rail  transport.  Some  progress  was  made  during 
the  reporting  period.  Draft  regulations  on  railway  interoperability  and  on  railway  passenger 
rights  are  in  their  final  stage  of  preparation,  pending  further  consultation  with  the  European 
Commission.  Railway  liberalisation  did  not  take  full  effect  due  to  continuing  subsidies  to  the 
incumbent  railway  operator.  According  to  the  legislation,  the  transition  period  for  the  State 
Railways  of  the  Republic  of  Turkey  company  (TCDD)  was  set  to  end  by  2020  and  subsidies 
should  not  be  further  extended  in  order  to  ensure  that  other  players  can  benefit  from  railway 
liberalisation. Under the same legislation, the provisions that only domestically produced freight 
and passenger rolling stock can be registered until the end of 2020 do not allow market players 
the flexibility to choose from a wide array of rolling stock. Certain inconsistencies with the EU 
acquis persist regarding the institutional setup of the Turkish railways. Effective independence of 
the railway regulator from the Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure needs to be ensured. The 
railway regulatory authority was incorporated into a new DG for Transport Services. 

Turkey has achieved a good level of preparation in aligning with the EU acquis in the field of 
maritime transport. Limited progress was made during the reporting period. Turkey is aiming 
to  establish  the  maritime  single  window  which  should  also  take  into  consideration  the  EU 
system. Turkey was developing a financial facility to ensure green shipping and decarbonisation 
of  maritime  transport.  This  is  a  positive  step  towards  complying  with  the  Clean  Power  for 
Transport  package  and  contributing  to  fulfil  the  global  climate  objectives  set  under  the  Paris 
Agreement  (to  which  Turkey  is  not  yet  a  party).  Turkey  still  needs  to  invest  more  in  the 
institutional and technical capacity required to fulfil its responsibilities under IMO conventions. 
Turkey has to align with the relevant EU legislation on maritime ports. 

Turkey has to align with the relevant EU legislation on inland waterway. Turkey did not sign the 
main international agreements on inland waterways. Turkey has limited inland waterways. 

While Turkey is moderately prepared in the field of aviation, there was limited progress during 
the reporting period. Negotiations on a comprehensive air transport agreement between the EU 
and Turkey were suspended by the EU in July 2019 because of Turkey’s illegal drilling activities 
in  the  Eastern  Mediterranean.  No  progress  was  made  on  the  renewal  of  the  working 
arrangements between the Turkish Directorate-General for Civil Aviation and EASA. The lack 
of adequate communication between air traffic control centres in Turkey and Cyprus continued 
to  compromise  air  safety  in  the  Nicosia  flight  information  region,  requiring  an  operational 
solution. In other areas of the EU acquis on aviation, Turkey made some progress in aligning its 
regulations  with  the  EU  acquis  but  further  efforts  are  needed,  particularly  in  air  traffic 
management and aviation safety. 

There was no progress on combined transport. 

As  long  as  restrictions  remain  in  place  on  vessels  and  aircraft  registered  in  Cyprus,  related  to 
Cyprus,  or  whose  last  port  of  call  was  Cyprus,  Turkey  will  not  be  in  a  position  to  fully 
implement the EU acquis relating to this chapter. 

5.15.  Chapter 15: Energy 

EU  energy  policy  covers  security  of  supply,  the  internal  energy  market,  hydrocarbons, 
renewable energy, energy efficiency, nuclear energy, nuclear safety and radiation protection. 

Turkey is moderately prepared in this chapter. Good progress was made overall, in particular 
on  security  of  supply,  renewable  energy,  energy  efficiency  and  nuclear  energy.  The  2019 
recommendations were addressed to some extent.  Turkey updated its regulatory framework on 

83 

 
nuclear  energy.  Structural  and  staffing  transition  between  the  new  regulatory  body  and  its 
predecessor is yet to be completed.  

On  hydrocarbons,  Turkey  continued  its  unauthorised  drilling  activities  in  the  Eastern 
Mediterranean.   

In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

→ proceed with the gas market reform by setting up a legally binding plan and a timetable for 
transparent,  cost-reflective  and  non-

the  unbundling  of  activities  and  establishing 
discriminatory pricing in the gas sector; 

→ cooperate in the organisation of a transparent peer review of the national stress test report of 
the Akkuyu nuclear plant with the Commission and the European Nuclear Safety Regulators 
Group (ENSREG); 

→ continue supporting the development of renewable energy generation and energy efficiency 

by adopting clear and fair financing mechanisms. 

The very good progress on security of supply continued. The Trans-Anatolian Pipeline project 
(TANAP) was fully completed and ready to commence transmitting the first gas to the European 
section  of  the  Southern  Gas  Corridor  (SGC).  With  the  expected  completion  of  the  last 
component  of  the  SGC,  the  Trans-Adriatic  Pipeline,  the  construction  of  SGC  will  thus  be 
finished  in 2020.  The  two  lines  of the  TurkStream  pipeline  project  conducted  by Turkey  with 
Russia were completed by the end of 2019. 

The construction of a third Floating Storage Regasification Unit (FSRU) in Saros on the Aegean 
coast  is  planned  alongside  the  ongoing  expansion  of  the  country’s  second  underground  gas 
storage  facility  in  Salt  Lake.  Considering  the  soon-to-expire  natural  gas  contracts,  Turkey 
published the call for natural gas import licence applications covering 2023  - 2043 in order to 
grant the entities with licences the right to import natural gas from Iraq with an annual amount 
of 2.7 bn m3/year. These developments are crucial for security of supply and indicate Turkey’s 
strategic intention to balance imports of natural gas through pipelines with imports of liquefied 
natural gas, which grew substantially in 2019.  

As regards electricity networks, Turkey’s progress in aligning with the EU network codes and 
increasing  its  capacity  of  efficient  interconnections  continued.  Connections  with  Bulgaria  and 
Greece were already in operation, while studies were also conducted regarding connections with 
Romania.  The  Turkish  Electricity  Transmission  System  Operator's  (TEIAŞ)  application  to 
continue  as  an  observer  member  of  the  European  Network  of  Transmission  System  Operators 
for  Electricity  (ENTSO-E)  was  not  approved,  but  Turkey  continued  to  participate  in  technical 
discussions on pertinent topics.  

As  regards  gas  networks  and  Transmission  System  Operator  (TSO)  cooperation,  the 
membership of Turkey’s National Petroleum Corporation BOTAŞ to the European Network of 
Transmission System Operators for Gas (ENTSO-G) is not foreseen at the moment. The state-
owned  BOTAŞ  remained  vertically  integrated  and  dominant  on  Turkey’s  gas  market  with  its 
trading and grid operator functions, which stifles market competition. Limited progress can be 
reported on the establishment of a transparent, cost-reflective and non-discriminatory gas transit 
regime. The gas market law update is long overdue.   

On the internal energy market, limited progress was made on transparent, cost-reflective and 
non-discriminatory  pricing  mechanisms  for  electricity  and  gas.  The  volume  of  spot  market 
transactions  in  natural  gas  on  Turkey’s  natural  gas  spot  trading  platforms,  operated  by  the 
EXIST  Energy  Exchange,  has  increased  in  2019.  Yet,  the  dominant  market  position  of  the 
vertically integrated BOTAŞ would not allow for a real viability of the energy exchange. With 
some  of  the  country’s  long-term  natural  gas  supply  contracts  expiring  in  the  coming  years, 

84 

 
Turkey has a chance to reassess and adopt more transparent and diversified pricing mechanisms, 
taking advantage of more spot price indexing. 

On hydrocarbons, Turkey is at an advanced stage of alignment with the EU legislation but it 
has  to  further  align  with  Directive  2013/30/EU  on  the  Safety  of  Offshore  Oil  and  Gas 
Operations,  also  as  regards  transit  of  hydrocarbons.  In  the  reporting  period,  Turkey  was 
deploying drilling and seismic vessels in the Cypriot Exclusive Economic Zone, including in an 
area that has been licensed by the Government of Cyprus to European oil and gas companies, as 
well as in Cypriot territorial sea. Despite repeated calls from the EU to cease its illegal activities, 
Turkey  launched  six  new  drilling  sessions.  In  reaction  to  these  activities,  the  EU  adopted  a 
framework  for  targeted  measures  against  Turkey  in  November  2019  and  decided  in  February 
2020 to add two individuals to the list of designations under this sanctions framework.  

Turkey is well advanced on renewable energy and continued to increase its power generation 
capacity  from  local  and  renewable  sources.  The  share  of  renewable  energy  in  the  country's 
power generation stood at 34% in 2019, most of which was hydropower (20%). Changes were 
introduced in the scope definition of renewable energy installations, which had an impact on the 
applicable  state  incentives.  The  legislative  changes  made  it  impossible  for  renewable  energy 
installations  under  5  MW  to  receive  state  incentives,  such  as  preferential  feed-in-tariffs  and 
some  tax  exemptions.  The  legislative  changes  made  in  2019  addressed  budgetary  concerns 
related to the current feed-in-tariffs, which expire by the end of 2020. Tenders within the scope 
of  Renewable  Energy  Resource  Areas  will  be  held  in  Turkish  Lira  instead  of  US  dollars. 
Concerns  remained  regarding  local-content  requirements,  which  affected  the  EU  and  other 
international companies’ access to tenders in the renewable energy sector in Turkey. 

On  energy  efficiency,  the  implementation  of  the  National  Energy  Efficiency  action  plan  saw 
some  progress.  The  envisaged  national  energy  efficiency  financing  mechanism  is  still  not  in 
place. International donor funding and concessional debt are still the main means of funding for 
the urgently-needed energy efficiency  projects across the country. A new legal  obligation was 
introduced  for  public  buildings  to  save  at  least  15%  of  their  energy  bill  compared  to  the 
calculated average consumption of the building in the last 3 years. A new concessional loan and 
grant  agreement  was  signed  to  improve  the  public  institutions  capacity  and  infrastructure  in 
energy  efficiency.  Turkey’s  policies  on  energy  efficiency  in  buildings  are  well  developed  and 
aligned with the EU acquis. The existing gaps are mainly related to insufficient detail as regards 
targets,  standards  and  implementation  methodologies.  The  existing  legislation  does  not  fully 
address the growing demand for cooling and the potential use of renewable energy technologies 
in  buildings.  The  public  sector’s  involvement  in  improving  energy  efficiency  suffers  from  the 
lack  of  a  dedicated  agency  for  energy  efficiency,  which  could  harmonise  the  efforts  of  all 
stakeholders, including various government departments and agencies. This role is played, with 
certain  institutional  limitations,  by  the  Department  of  Energy  Efficiency  and  Environment, 
established in 2019 within the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources. 

Some progress was made on nuclear energy, nuclear safety and radiation protection. Turkey 
updated  its  regulatory  framework.  A  chairman  was  appointed  in  2019  to  the  newly  created 
Regulatory  Body  of  the  Atomic  Industry.  However,  the  newly  created  Body  was  restructured 
once again in the first half of 2020. The process of structural and staffing transition between the 
new regulatory body and its predecessor is yet to be completed. Turkey has not yet acceded to 
the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive 
Waste Management, and is not yet a member of the European Community Urgent Radiological 
Information Exchange system.  

In July 2019, Turkey transmitted the revised Stress Tests National Report related to the Akkuyu 
nuclear power plant project following the voluntary commitment taken in 2011 to conduct such 
stress  tests  using  the  EU  model.  The  next  step  will  be  the  organisation  of  a  transparent  peer 

85 

 
review of the National Report coordinated by the Commission and the European Nuclear Safety 
Regulators Group (ENSREG). Turkey has an observer status in ENSREG. 

5.16.  Chapter 16: Taxation 

EU  rules  on  taxation  cover  value  added  tax  and  excise  duties  as  well  as  aspects  of  corporate 
taxation. They also deal with cooperation between tax administrations, including the exchange 
of information to prevent tax evasion. 

Turkey is moderately prepared in the area of taxation. No progress was made in this area, and 
last year’s recommendations were not addressed. In the context of the identification of an EU list 
of  non-cooperative  jurisdictions  for  tax  purposes,  Turkey  took  further  measures  but  needs  to 
solve  all  open  issues  for  the  automatic  exchange  of  tax  information  to  be  implemented 
effectively with all EU Member States.  

In addition to addressing the shortcomings set out below, in the coming year Turkey should in 
particular: 

 put arrangements in place for the effective implementation of the automatic exchange of tax 

information with all EU Member States; 

 align the range of excisable energy products with the EU acquis; 

  step  up  the  fight  against  the  informal  economy  and  follow-up  the  progress  through 

performance indicators. 

As  regards  indirect  taxation,  a  wide  range  of  products  is  subject  to  a  1%  value  added  tax, 
deviating  from  the  EU  acquis  (a  15%  minimum  rate  is  standard  although  Member  States  can 
apply reduced rates of VAT to certain goods and services). VAT for passenger transport services 
by  air  was  also  lowered  from  18%  to  1%  for  3  months  as  part  of  the  COVID-19  response 
measures. Legislation on structure, exemptions, special schemes and the scope of reduced rates 
need to be further aligned with the EU acquis. 

On excise duties, the overall level on cigarettes is close to EU levels but Turkey’s legislation on 
cigarette excise duties is not in line with the EU acquis in terms of the specific and ad valorem 
elements of the tax. Excise duties on energy products are generally well above the EU minimum 
rates,  but  kerosene,  coal  and  electricity  are  not  subject  to  excise  duties,  contrary  to  the  EU 
acquis.  The  regular  practice  of  introducing  temporary  tax  cuts  and  restructuring  public  debts 
continued in 2019 and is detrimental to voluntary tax compliance in Turkey. On the other hand, 
in December 2019 Turkey introduced a tax on accommodation services at 2% (1% until the end 
of 2020) and a tax on digital advertising and content at 7.5%. 

In  the  area  of  direct  taxation,  in  December  2019,  legislation  was  adopted  to  increase  the  top 
personal income tax rate to 40%. An Action Plan and Strategy for the Fight against the Informal 
Economy  was  adopted.  Within  the  scope  of  measures  to  counter  the  impact  of  the  COVID-19 
outbreak, the implementation of the accommodation tax was delayed until 1 January 2021. 

As regards administrative cooperation and mutual assistance, Turkey was granted time until 
31  December  2020  in  the  framework  of  the  EU  listing  process  on  non-cooperative  tax 
jurisdictions to solve all open issues regarding the implementation of common reporting standard 
on  automatic  exchange  of  information  and  notify  all  EU  Member  States  as  intended  exchange 
partners. Failure to fulfil these commitments would put Turkey at risk of being included  in the 
EU list of non-cooperative tax jurisdictions. 

In  the  context  of  the  COVID-19  response  measures,  in  March  2020,  the  Turkish  Revenue 
Administration  (TRA)  laid  down  the  principles  of  tax  related  components  of  the  stimulus 
package.  The  following  categories  of  taxpayers  were  granted  “force  majeure”  status  for  the 
period of 1 April to 30 June 2020 (or during the curfew declared by the Ministry of Interior): (i) 
taxpayers  with  income  tax  liability  in  terms  of  commercial,  agricultural  and  professional 

86 

 
earnings; (ii) taxpayers operating in 17 sectors directly affected by the COVID-19 outbreak; (iii) 
taxpayers operating in sectors which were temporarily suspended by the Ministry of Interior; (iv) 
taxpayers  having  chronic  illness  or  aged  65  and  over.  Force  majeure  status  meant  that  the 
deadline for submitting tax statements was extended to July 2020, and the due date for taxes was 
extended by six months. 

Turkey  signed  the  Multilateral  Competent  Authority  Agreement  in  2017  and  incorporated it  at 
domestic level on 31 December 2019. Turkey remains committed to improve its rating led by the 
Global Forum for the implementation of the exchange of information on request standard and to 
apply the OECD base erosion and profit shifting minimum standards.  

Regarding  operational  capacity  and  computerisation,  the  Revenue  Administration  remained 
affiliated to the Ministry of Treasury and Finance within the scope of the presidential system and 
maintained  its  mandate.  An  electronic  document  management  system  has  been  used  by  the 
Revenue  Administration  since  2013.  Efforts  to  establish  an  integrated  public  finance 
management  information  system  are  ongoing.  In  May  2019,  the  Revenue  Administration 
published a Strategy and an Action Plan for the fight against the informal economy (2019-21). 
The former action plan covering 2015-17 period had estimated the rate of the informal economy 
to  GDP  at  26.5%  in  2014  and  targeted  5  percentage  points  decrease  until  2018.  However,  the 
new  action  plan  does  not  provide  concrete  performance  indicators,  while  the  informal  sector 
continues to represent a considerable percentage of economic activity in Turkey, with a share of 
27% of GDP (OECD, 2017). 

5.17.  Chapter 17: Economic and monetary policy 

EU rules require the independence of central banks and prohibit them from directly financing 
the  public  sector.  Member  States  coordinate  their economic  policies  and  are  subject  to  fiscal, 
economic and financial surveillance. 

Turkey  remains  moderately  prepared  in  the  area  of  economic  and  monetary  policy. 
Backsliding  continued  during  the  reporting  period,  reflecting  the  intensified  political  pressure 
on the central bank,  undermining its independence  and credibility. Reserve requirements  were 
lowered and state-owned banks were encouraged by the Government to increase lending to the 
economy.  Deadlines  for  the  submission  of  the  Economic  Reform  Program  (ERP)  and  fiscal 
notifications  were  not  always  respected.  There  was  no  implementation  of  the  2019  report's 
recommendations. 

In addition to addressing the shortcomings set out below, in the coming year Turkey should:  

→ avoid any political interference undermining the independence and credibility of the central 

bank; 

→ submit timely fiscal notifications aligned with ESA 2010 and the ERP by the set deadlines. 

On monetary policy, the central bank continued to pursue price stability and financial stability 
objectives through multiple instruments but the inflation target was not met, a recurrent feature 
of  recent  years.  The  inflation  target  is  determined  jointly  by  the  central  bank  and  the 
government.  The  appointment  and  dismissal  procedures  within  the  central  bank  are  not 
transparent, especially as regards the grounds on which the President of the Republic dismissed 
the governor in July 2019. Political pressure on the central bank to lower interest rate increased 
further,  undermining  its  institutional  and  operational  independence  and  credibility.  After  the 
change of the governor, the central bank successively lowered its main policy rate by a total of 
1,425 basis points, from 24% to 8.25% between July 2019 and May 2020. The central bank also 
reduced the reserve requirement for banks with a real annual loan growth rate between 5% and 
15%, as a way of encouraging economic recovery. The government called on state-owned banks 
to  increase  lending  to  the  economy  (a  number  of  state-owned  banks  have  provided  loans  at 
below market rates and restructured the debts of consumers and businesses). However, the EU 

87 

 
acquis require the public sector not to have privileged access to financial institutions and not to 
benefit  from  monetary  financing.  The  amendments  introduced  to  the  Central  Bank  Law  have 
changed the principles for allocating the annual net profit of the Central Bank by cancelling the 
obligatory  allocation  of  20%  of  the  profit  to  the  Reserve  Fund  and  paved  the  way  for 
transferring  accumulated  extraordinary  reserve  funds  to  the  Treasury  without  approval  of  the 
General Assembly. Such transfers were made several times during the reporting period.  

On  economic  policy,  further  alignment  with  the  Directive  on  requirements  for  budgetary 
frameworks is needed, including the introduction of numerical fiscal rules and establishment of 
an  independent  fiscal  council  that  monitors  fiscal  policy.  Further  efforts  are  required  to  align 
fiscal reporting and notifications under the excessive deficit procedure with ESA 2010. Turkey 
needs  to  improve  the  delimitation  of  the  general  government  sector  and  the  application  of  the 
accrual principle in accounting for tax receipts and deductions. Further improvements are  also 
needed  on  the  credibility  of  macroeconomic  forecasts  and  related  policy  plans.  The  New 
Economy  Programme  presents  an  optimistic  macroeconomic  framework  for  2020-2022, 
characterised  by  internally  inconsistent  assumptions  of  parallel  strong  economic  rebound,  fast 
inflation reduction and balanced current account.   

The  2020-2022  Economic  Reform  Programme  (ERP)  was  formally  submitted  on  10  February 
2020, one week late. The  structural reform priority  measures it contains improved in terms of 
description, timeline, estimated impact and risks. However, they only reflect to a limited extent 
the important policy reforms announced in Turkey’s New Economic Programme 2020-2022. 

5.18.  Chapter 18: Statistics 

EU  rules  require  that  Member  States  are  able  to  produce  statistics  based  on  professional 
independence,  impartiality,  reliability,  transparency,  and  confidentiality.  Common  rules  are 
provided for the methodology, production and dissemination of statistical information. 

Turkey is moderately prepared in the area of statistics. Turkey made some progress in further 
aligning  with  the  EU  acquis  and  in  the  use  of  administrative  records  of  public  institutions. 
Further efforts are needed to align macroeconomic and agricultural statistics with the EU acquis. 
There was no significant implementation of last year’s recommendations. 

In  addition  to  addressing  the  shortcomings  set  out  below,  in  the  coming  year  Turkey  should 
continue to: 

  improve  compliance  with  the  European  System  of  National  and  Regional  Accounts  (ESA 

2010); 

 strengthen coordination between TurkStat and other data providers; 

 improve statistics on agriculture and migration. 

As regards statistical infrastructure, Turkey’s statistics legislation is based on the principles of 
the European Statistics Code of Practice. However, a presidential decree adopted in July 2018 
shortened  the  length  of  the  term  of  office  of  the  President  of  the  Turkish  Statistical  Institute 
(TurkStat)  from  5  to  4  years  and  changed  the  appointment  procedures  of  its  senior  officials. 
There are still concerns regarding the transparency of the appointment and dismissal processes 
within  TurkStat.  Significant  efforts  were  made  to  improve  the  use  of  public  institutions' 
administrative  records  and  their  integration  into  statistical  production.  Closer  cooperation 
between TurkStat and other data providers will help to improve the quality of these registers and 
increase the use of administrative data. 

For  macroeconomic  statistics, Turkey continues  its efforts to  integrate administrative records 
into the national accounting system. The GNI inventory submitted to Eurostat in 2017 represents 
a substantial improvement compared to the earlier version, but still needs to be further aligned 
with  Eurostat’s  GNI  Inventory  Guide.  Seasonally  adjusted  quarterly  national  accounts  are 

88 

 
transmitted to Eurostat. TurkStat compiled the annual Institutional Sector Accounts 2016-2018. 
Regional accounts were calculated at level 3 of the nomenclature for statistical regions for 2015-
2018.  However,  only  the  aggregate  figures  could  be  published,  as  detailed  data  were  flagged 
confidential. Turkey produces highly compliant statistics on international trade in goods. Turkey 
was  sending  Excessive  Deficit  Procedure  (EDP)  tables  with  improving  quality  and  coverage. 
However, the transmission was usually delayed significantly. Important areas for improvement 
in government finance statistics are the publication of statistics on accrual basis, an agreement 
between  the  three  main  statistical  authorities  (Turkstat,  Turkish  Ministry  of  Finance,  Central 
Bank) on the timely procurement of data, the institutionalisation of data quality controls, and the 
delimitation  of  the  boundaries  of  the  general  government.  The  harmonised  index  of  consumer 
prices is implemented in line with the EU acquis. 

For business statistics, TurkStat has started to use administrative records to produce indicators 
related to short-term and structural business statistics. Short-term statistics are largely aligned, 
with the exception of the services producer price index and the monthly index of production in 
construction.  Innovation,  ICT  and  full  data  sets  for  R&D  statistics  are  produced  and  sent  to 
Eurostat.  Rail,  maritime  and  regional  transport  statistics  are  highly  compliant,  but  further 
progress is needed on road freight data. Tourism statistics are also available. Further progress is 
needed in foreign affiliate statistics (FATS). 

As for social statistics, data from the income and living conditions survey are available. Labour 
market statistics are fully aligned with the EU acquis, as the methodology for employment data 
follows  EU  practice  since  2014.  Data  on  education  and  vocational  training  are  available. 
Alignment in public health statistics is very high for data related to causes of death and health 
surveys,  but  further  progress  is  needed  for  data  on  health  expenditure  and  non-monetary 
healthcare.  Social  protection  statistics  are  highly  compliant.  Crime  statistics  are  produced  and 
submitted to Eurostat. Statistics on immigration and emigration were produced for the first time 
in  September  2018,  based  on  administrative  registers.  However,  there  are  still  problems  of 
comparability with EU data because of definitional problems. 

As regards agricultural statistics, no agricultural census has been carried out since 2001. Crop, 
and the most critical animal production, milk and dairy statistics are available. Supply balance 
sheets are also available for almost all basic crop products and for wine. Work is still ongoing 
for  the  economic  accounts  for  agriculture  and  the  agricultural  input  price  index,  but  progress 
appears  slow.  The  microdata  and  methodological  report  of  the  Farm  Structure  Survey  carried 
out in 2016 and published in 2018 have not yet been shared with Eurostat. Turkey also provides 
statistics on fisheries and aquaculture.  

As for environmental statistics, waste statistics are available, but further progress is needed for 
construction waste data. Environmental accounts on greenhouse gas emissions and statistics on 
environmental  taxes,  material  flow  and  environmental  protection  expenditure  are  available. 
Energy statistics are in line with the EU acquis. Energy prices are available in good quality and 
are sent regularly to Eurostat. 

5.19.  Chapter 19: Social policy and employment 

EU  rules  in  the  social  field  include  minimum  standards  for  labour  law,  equality,  health  and 
safety at work and non-discrimination. They also promote social dialogue at European level. 

Turkey has some level of preparation in the area of social policy and employment. There was 
no  progress  during  the  reporting  period.  The  2019  recommendations  have  not  been 
implemented. In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

  remove  obstacles  limiting  the  enjoyment  of  trade  union  rights  and  the  functioning  of  the 

bilateral and tripartite social dialogue 

89 

 
  improve the enforcement and implementation of legislation pertaining to workers’ rights, in 
particular the labour law and the laws on health and safety at work including its secondary 
legislation; 

  promote women's employment by stepping up appropriate work-life balance policies. 

In the field of labour law, Turkey is moderately prepared, but considerable gaps in enforcement 
and  implementation  of  core  legislation  persist.  The  overall  rate  of  unregistered  employment 
reached  34.5%  in  2019.  Agriculture  and  forestry  workplaces  with  less  than  50  employees and 
domestic workers are still not covered by labour law, except for matters of health and safety at 
work. The number of labour inspectors has slightly increased, but efforts to improve inspection 
capacities  need  to  continue  in  line  with  the  benchmarks  set  by  the  International  Labour 
Organisation  (ILO).  Statistics  concerning  mediation  on  labour  disputes  (mandatory  before 
resorting to labour  courts) indicate that 65%  of cases  were concluded with  an agreement. The 
impact of the mandatory mediation system needs to be evaluated. For the first time since 2012, 
Turkey published in March 2020 data on child labour.  It declined among children aged below 
17  years  covered  by  the  labour  force  survey  from  893,000  in  2012  to  720,000  in  2019.  For 
children aged 14 and below, the reduction was particularly significant from 292,000 to 146,000. 
Half of working children are in the service sector (45.5%, up from 31% in 2012, nearly one third 
(30.8%) in agriculture (down from 44.8% in 2012, while the share in industry remained stable 
(23.7%).  However,  it  is  not  clear  whether  or  to  what  extent  these  figures  include  refugee 
children. Child labour prevention units made up of staff in the Ministry of Family, Labour and 
Social  Services  have  been  established  in  all  provinces.  Child  labour  practices  persist  due  to 
household  poverty,  negative  social  norms,  business  practices  as  well  as  ineffective  inspection 
and  sanctions.  The  impact  of  the  national  programme  for  the  elimination  of  child  labour 
covering 2017-2023 is yet to be seen.  

On health and safety at work, legislation is largely in line with the EU framework directive. 
The requirement for low-risk firms with less than 50 employees to employ occupational health 
and  safety  (OHS)  professionals  was  introduced  in  July  2020.  Occupational  accidents  claimed 
1,542 lives in 2018, down from 1,636 in 2017. Turkey has implemented an awareness campaign 
on work safety in the construction sector. A nationwide project on improving OHS management 
systems in mining enterprises was launched. Migrant child labourers are increasingly involved 
in  agricultural  work,  which  exposes  them  to  occupational  risks.  Identification  and  reporting 
systems in the field of OHS should be improved. Turkey needs to strengthen its prevention and 
diagnosis  system  for  occupational  diseases,  and  should  publish  respective  official  statistics. 
Increasing levels of informal work and practice of long working hours beyond legal limits are 
major factors increasing safety risks for employees.  
There  was  no  progress  in  social  dialogue  last  year.  Turkey  held  its  11th  labour  assembly 
meeting,  bringing  together  national  social  partners,  in  May  2019.  It  focused  on  the  future  of 
work agenda of ILO, but no conclusions were adopted. The Economic and Social Council has 
not  convened  since  2009.  Other  formal  social  dialogue  mechanisms  are  either  not  utilised  or 
lack  genuine  democratic  involvement  of  all  parties  thus  cannot  promote  consensus  building. 
Trade union participation among private sector employees who are formally employed stood at 
13.84%  (January  2020).  Trade  union  participation  among  the  2.54  million  public  servants  is 
high at 66.7% (July 2019), but decreasing since 2016. Anti-union discrimination by employers 
is  reportedly  very  strong.  Managers  and  members  of  some  unions  continued  to  face  arbitrary 
dismissals,  harassment  and  detention  for  various  union  activities  of  a  peaceful  nature.  These 
factors undermine the rights to freedom of association. Public sector employees have no right to 
strike, and several categories of them including senior public employees, magistrates and prison 
guards are deprived of the right to organise. This is not in line with the core labour standards of 
ILO  to  which  Turkey  committed  itself.  The  collective  bargaining  system  in  the  public  sector 
needs to be improved in line with ILO standards, including the composition and functioning of 
the  public  employee  arbitration  board.  Turkey  needs  to  ensure  that  its  law  does  not  interfere 

90 

 
with the right to organise a trade union according to ILO Convention 87. Trials of trade union 
members  and  other  workers  involved  in  the  Istanbul  airports  protests  in  September  2018 
continued.  The  State  of  Emergency  Inquiry  Commission,  mandated  to  examine  dismissals  of 
public servants, continued to have a very large backlog of unresolved cases for those affected by 
measures  under  the  state  of  emergency.  A  public  school  teacher,  after  being  reinstated  by  the 
Commission, sued the state and was granted full compensation by a court for her financial losses 
after being dismissed under the state of emergency. This was the only such case in the reporting 
period. (See chapter 23 - Judiciary and Fundamental Rights).  

On  employment  policy,  the  labour  market  situation  deteriorated  with  low  labour  market 
participation by women and high rates of informality among the essential shortcomings in 2019. 
The unemployment rate increased from 11.2% to 14%, while the overall employment rate (15+) 
fell from 52% to 50.3%. The labour force participation rate remained at 58.5% with a wide gap 
between  the  participation  by  men  (78.2%)  and  women  (38.7%).  Although  there  has  been  an 
increase in the absolute number of women in the labour market, the employment rate for women 
decreased slightly from 32.9% to 32.2%. The decrease in the employment rate for men was even 
stronger (from 70.9% to 68.3%). The long-term unemployment rate (23.5% of all unemployed) 
remains  another  challenge.  The  youth  unemployment  rate  increased  to  25.4%  as  compared  to 
20.3%,  with  a  large  difference  between  men  (22.5%)  and  women  (30.6%).  The  rate  of  young 
people  who  are  not  in  employment,  education  or  training  (NEETs)  increased  from  24.5%  to 
26%. Total public sector employment amounted to 4,612,000 people, showing a 7.4% increase. 

The  number  of  job  and  vocational  counsellors  in  the  Turkish  Employment  Agency  (ISKUR) 
reached 4 788, with the employment of new 831 counsellors in 2019. Further increases in the 
number  of  the  counsellors  are  needed.  Active  labour  market  measures  provided  by  ISKUR 
covered a total of 615,834 jobseekers in 2019, primarily for 3-to-9 months on-the-job training 
for  young  people  (402,393  participants)  and  short  vocational  training  courses  for  unemployed 
(124,920  people)  with  a  50%  employment  guarantee.  More  tailor-made  efforts  and  outreach 
strategies  are  needed  to  improve  the  employability  of  low  skilled,  women  and  young  people, 
NEETs  in  particular.  Turkey  continued  its  employment  incentives  programmes  of  previous 
years,  funded  by  the  Unemployment  Insurance  Fund.  Additional  three-month  wage  support 
incentives  and  minimum  wage  support  to  businesses  were  introduced  in  2019,  but  an  overall 
picture of the number of beneficiaries and the budget involved is not available. Further efforts 
are needed to increase employability and access to the labour market for people with disabilities. 
There are over 55,000 civil servants with a disability, slightly less than 3%. Approximately one 
million  Syrian  refugees  are  employed,  95%  informally.  Efforts  have  continued  to  give  these 
refugees  access  the  formal  labour  market,  but  no  more  than  100,000  work  permits  were 
delivered by the end of 2019. The influx of informal workers originating from Syrian refugees 
under  temporary  protection  increased  the  already  big  informal  sector  in  Turkey.  Given  this 
situation, measures to reduce informality should continue in a more focused and comprehensive 
way.  The  specific  situation  of  Syrian  refugees  and  migrants  may  require  tailor  made  policy 
responses.  Roma  remain  largely  excluded  from  formal  jobs  in  the  absence  of  targeted  policy 
measures.  Turkey  has  a  good  level  of  preparation  for  using  the  European  Social  Fund.  The 
Ministry  of  Family,  Labour  and  Social  Services  continues  to  manage  similar  sectoral  funds 
under IPA programmes, covering areas of employment, education, lifelong learning and social 
inclusion.  (Concerning  the  effectiveness  of  management  of  IPA  funds,  refer  to  chapter  22  – 
Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments). 

In  social  inclusion  and  social  protection,  poverty  and  income  inequalities  have  been 
increasing. The Gini coefficient of 0.408 and the income quintile ratio (P80/P20) of 7.8 in 2018 
indicate that income inequality has slightly increased and remained higher than the EU average. 
The  at-risk-of-poverty-rate  rose  to  21.2%  in  2018,  and  the  severe  material  deprivation  was 
26.5%.  Regional  disparities  on  poverty  remained  high.  34.6%  of  children  experienced  severe 
material  deprivation  in  2017,  an  improvement  compared  to  the  previous  year,  yet  the  highest 

91 

 
rate in Europe. Expenditure on social protection amounted to only 12.1% of GDP, compared to 
26.8% in the EU (2017). Turkey has no specific policy framework for poverty reduction. Yet, 
some  social  assistance  programmes  are  in  place  for  citizens  in  need.  In  2019,  43  different 
programmes provided a total support of TRY 55 billion to nearly 3.5 m households. An increase 
of 12% to TRY 69.5 billion is projected for 2020. Social assistance beneficiaries were referred 
to  the  public  employment  service  for  employment  or  active  labour  market  measures.  Turkey 
continued  to  provide  a  wide  range  of  public  and  social  services  to  refugees,  predominantly 
Syrian  nationals.  Financial  assistance  for  home-based  care  targeting  elderly  and  severely 
disabled  persons  continued.  Turkey  needs  to  promote  community-based  support  services  and 
affordable occupational therapy services, while making public services more accessible. There is 
an  urgent  need  to  increase  quality  social  services  including  care  services  for  elderly  people. 
Coordination between social services and social assistance needs to be improved.  

Turkey  has  no  strategy  or  action  plan  for  non-discrimination  in  employment  and  social 
policy.  Data  on  discrimination  in  employment,  social  policy  and  social  protection  is  not 
available.  Discrimination  on  the  grounds  of  sexual  orientation  and  gender  identity  is  not 
prohibited by law. (see Chapter 23 – Judiciary and fundamental rights). 

On  equality  between  women  and  men  in  employment  and  social  policy,  there  were  no 
legislative developments in relation to part-time work for working parents in the public sector. 
The employment rate for women was 32.2%  while it was 68.3%  for men in  2019.   While the 
enrolment  of  5-year  old  children  in  preschool  education  had  increased  to  68%  in  2018-2019, 
compared to 43.5% five years earlier, early childhood education and care for children below 5 
years  old  is  still  very  limited  (around  100,000  children  between  3-5  years  old)  and  largely 
concentrated  in  metropolitan  areas.  The  government  has  launched  the  mother-at-work  project 
providing  financial  support to  mothers of children aged  0-15 for participation in employment-
guaranteed  vocational  training  courses  or  on-the-job  training.  Of  18,288  participants  in  2019, 
only  316  benefitted  from  an  additional  child-care  support  for  children  aged  2-5  years.  To 
support work-life balance, half-time work allowances were paid to 7,132 beneficiaries in 2019, 
making a total of only 25,987 since 2016. Part-time work is less developed in Turkey with 10%, 
compared to the EU average of 19%. There is very limited focus on gender equality in national 
policy  documents.  The  legislative  and  institutional  mechanisms  needed  to  balance  family  and 
working life as a basic component of all national policies promoting women’s employment are 
still lacking. The gender pay gap is 12.9% and motherhood pay gap is 29.6%. Turkey is among 
the  countries  where  there  is  a  high  disproportion  between  men  and  women  in  time  spent  in 
unpaid  work.  There  is  no  official  data  for  sexual  harassment  in  the  workplace.  The  Gender 
Equality  Monitoring  and  Evaluation  Commission  established  in  the  Turkish  Employment 
Agency (İŞKUR) has an important role to play if it could function effectively. Representation of 
women in decision-making positions is very limited (Please see also Chapter 23). 

5.20.  Chapter 20: Enterprise and industrial policy 

EU  enterprise  and  industrial  policy  strengthens  competitiveness,  facilitates  structural  change 
and encourages a business-friendly environment that stimulates small and medium-sized firms. 

Turkey has a good level of preparation in the area of enterprise and industrial policy. Turkey 
made  some  progress  by  implementing  some  of  the  results  of  the  Small  Business  Act  report, 
notably in the field of access to finance and by adopting a new Industrial Strategy, as well as a 
Strategy and an Action Plan on the fight against the informal economy. Yet, challenges remain, 
especially  the  schemes  to  ensure  local  manufacturing  and  generous  state  aid  for  large 
investments, as  well as the  long-term  financing of small  and medium-sized enterprises and the 
legal framework for microfinance.  

In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

92 

 
→ improve policy compliance following the results of the Small Business Act report, notably on 

skills and innovation; 

→ set up an evaluation plan for the development plan and the industrial strategy, including the 

impact of the preceding versions. 

On  enterprise  and  industrial  policy  principles,  there  has  been  some  progress  on  the  policy 
framework, with the adoption of the new 11th Development Plan and the Industrial Strategy both 
covering the period between  2019 and 2023. The  new Industrial Strategy contains  measurable 
indicators,  but  it  was  not  based  on  an  evaluation  of  the  impact  of  the  previous  strategies.  A 
Strategy  and  Action  Plan  to  tackle  the  informal  economy  was  issued.  No  information  is 
available about the outcome of the preceding action plan.  The informal economy remains a key 
challenge for Turkey.   

A new Agency on Tourism Promotion and Development was established in July 2019, aiming to 
increase the share of tourism income in GDP, through promotion and marketing. 

The  government  made  progress  in  improving  the  regulatory  business  environment;  however, 
according  to  the  Small  Business  Act  report,  Turkey’s  performance  in  enforcing  contracts  and 
resolving insolvency deteriorated.  

Turkey’s focus on localisation schemes (some of which create obstacles to the free movement of 
goods with the EU - see Chapter 1) and the strategic use of public procurement for the benefit of 
local industry have continued during the reporting period. Turkey maintained the scope of the 
15%  domestic  price  advantage  in  public  procurement  with  compulsory  use  for  medium  and 
high-technology  industrial  products,  contrary  to  EU  rules  (see  also  Chapter  5).  The 
Industrialisation Executive Board described in the 11th National Development Plan is expected 
to develop strategic models in public procurement that will support domestic production. Such 
steps,  as  well  as  existing  and  planned  schemes  for  localisation  in  sectors  such  as 
pharmaceuticals,  medical  devices,  biotechnological  products  and  agricultural  and  forestry 
machinery,  are  not  considered  effective  means  to  raise  innovation  performance  and  are 
incompatible with the principles of the EU industrial policy.  

Support  for  innovation  eco-systems  is  fragmented  across  numerous  programmes  and 
concentrated  regionally.  EU  industrial  policy,  in  contrast,  emphasises  the  significance  of  a 
territorially-balanced  innovation  system  for  a  country’s  competitiveness  and  industrial 
transformation and stresses the catalytic function of public policy in this respect. 

On  enterprise  and  industrial  policy  instruments,  Turkish  legislation  is  not  yet  fully 
harmonised with the Late Payment Directive. The 11th Development Plan and the new Industrial 
Strategy  focus  on  technological  transformation  of  manufacturing.  Turkey  intends  to  support 
investment in 400 product groups in strategically chosen sectors such as machinery, computer, 
electronic,  optics,  electrical  hardware,  pharmaceuticals,  chemistry,  and  transport  vehicles.  The 
amount  of  state  aid  granted  for  this  investment  is  not  disclosed,  contrary  to  the  commitments 
under  the  EU-Turkey  Customs  Union.  Turkey  has  continued  to  implement  various  schemes 
supporting companies, particularly small and medium firms. A new economic incentive package 
worth EUR 4.5 billion was announced in May 2019 providing advantageous loans through three 
public banks.  

Furthermore, five new investment funds for techno-entrepreneurs and start-ups were created in 
cooperation  with  12  research  universities  in  Turkey,  with  a  total  size  of  EUR  105  million. 
Several  technical  assistance  and  financing  schemes  run  by  the  SME  support  administration 
(KOSGEB)  are  operational.  Turkey  has  continued  to  support  technology  development  zones. 
There were 85 of these zones as of January 2020 (69 in 2017), 67 of them operational. In 2019, 
1,117 patents were obtained from 33,921 completed projects (compared with 1,022 patents from 
29,053  projects  in  the  previous  reporting  period).  Turkey  remains  active  in  the  COSME 
programme,  the  Erasmus  for  Young  Entrepreneurs,  the  Enterprise  Europe  Network  and  in  the 

93 

 
Small Business Act assessment process. KOSGEB is in charge of the overall coordination of the 
11 Enterprise Europe Network consortia consisting of 48 partner organisations. 

5.21.  Chapter 21: Trans-European networks 

The EU promotes trans-European networks in the areas of transport and energy to strengthen 
the internal market and contribute to growth and employment. 

Turkey is well advanced on trans-European networks. Good progress was made, especially on 
energy  networks.  Turkey’s  role  in  fostering  energy  security  in  the  region  and  the  EU  was 
asserted  through  the  completion  of  the  Trans-Anatolian  Pipeline  project  (TANAP),  the 
backbone of the Southern Gas Corridor. On transport networks, some progress was made. The 
construction  of  the  Halkali-Kapikule  railway  line  started  in  May  2019.  Last  year’s 
recommendations remain valid.  

In addition to addressing the shortcomings set out below, in the coming year Turkey should in 
particular 

  accelerate efforts to align with key pieces of the EU acquis to facilitate alignment in TEN-T 

networks; 

  establish a transparent, cost-reflective and non-discriminatory gas transit regime in line with 

the EU acquis; 

  convene the railway overview board to monitor the progress, financing and tendering of the 
Halkali-Kapikule  railway  line  project  and  other  conditionality  under  the  project  financing 
agreement. 

As regards transport networks, construction of the Halkali-Kapikule railway line project began 
in  May  2019. It is  a project of European interest in  the TEN-T railway network and  lies  on a 
cross-border section, which has the potential to become one of the key freight corridors from the 
EU  to  Turkey  and  Asia.  As  part  of  the  bilateral  project  agreement  signed  in  February  2019, 
Turkey  committed  to  complete  the  railway  connection  between  the  European  and  Asian  rail 
networks through the third Bosphorus bridge until 2029. The EU funding (EUR 275 million) is 
conditional  on  the  completion  of  the  other  sections  of  the  Halkali-Kapikule  railway  line,  the 
finalisation of the railway connection to the Yavuz Sultan Selim Bridge from the European and 
Asian  sides  as  well  as  the  connection  to  the  Anatolian  Railway  network.  Turkey  agreed  to 
convene  the  railway  overview  board  to  start  jointly  monitoring  the  progress,  financing  and 
tendering  of  these  conditionality  projects  under  the  bilateral  project  agreement.  Turkey  is 
regularly  encoding  TEN-T  network  data  to  the  transport  information  management  systems. 
Current  and  future  investments  in  infrastructure  need  to  fully  comply  with  EU  standards  on 
public  procurement,  state  aid  and  environmental  impact  assessment.  Additionally,  all 
infrastructure investments must be aligned with cost-benefit analyses that need to be carried out 
in  accordance  with  EU  best  practices.  As  a  reaction  to  the  COVID-19  pandemic,  following 
initial  disruptions,  green  corridors were  established  and  are  functioning  effectively  throughout 
the major border crossing points.  

As  regards  energy  networks,  very  good  progress  was  achieved  on  gas  networks  and  in 
particular on the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline project (TANAP), the backbone of the Southern Gas 
Corridor (SGC). In 2019, TANAP saw its full completion on Turkey’s territory. TANAP and the 
Trans-Adriatic  Pipeline  Project  (TAP)  are  connected.  In  addition,  the  two  lines  of  the 
TurkStream  pipeline  project  conducted  by  Turkey  with  Russia  were  completed  by  the  end  of 
2019.  The  construction  of  the  on-land  connecting  line  to  the  Turkish  Petroleum  Pipeline 
Corporation's  (BOTAŞ)  existing  transit  pipeline  is  ongoing.  Limited  progress  was  made  on 
establishing  a  transparent,  cost-reflective  and  non-discriminatory  gas  transit  regime.  (see 
Chapter 15 – Energy). As regards electricity networks, Turkey continued progress in aligning to 
the EU network codes and increasing its capacity of efficient interconnections. Technical studies 

94 

 
for additional interconnection lines with Bulgaria and Greece were ongoing, while studies have 
also been conducted regarding connections with Romania. The Turkish electricity Transmission 
System  Operator's  (TEIAŞ)  application  to  continue  as  an  observer  member  of  the  European 
Network  of  Transmission  System  Operators  for Electricity (ENTSO-E)  was  not  approved,  but 
TEIAŞ continues to be present in technical discussions of the relevant working groups. 

5.22.  Chapter 22: Regional policy and the coordination of structural instruments 

Regional  policy  is  the  EU’s  main  investment  policy  for  sustainable  and  inclusive  economic 
growth.  Member  States  bear  responsibility  for  its  implementation,  requiring  adequate 
administrative capacity and sound financial management of project design and execution. 

Turkey is moderately prepared in the area of regional policy and the coordination of structural 
instruments.  Overall,  some  progress  was  demonstrated  in  this  area,  including  because  of  the 
acceleration of the absorption of IPA II funds and more effective strategic planning. There was 
no progress in strengthening implementation of audit recommendation as well as of monitoring 
and evaluation. 

In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

→  continue  focusing  on  the  finalisation  of  the  ongoing  operations  under  IPA  II,  in  order  to 
ensure  full  implementation  of  the  EU  funds  by  the  set  deadlines  to  deliver  high  quality 
results and avoid de-commitments; 

→ ensure effective strategic planning and risk management at the programme level; 

→  implement  action  plans  established  by  the  National  IPA  Coordinator  (NIPAC),  National 
Authorising Officer (NAO) and Audit Authority (AA) in order to strengthen the monitoring 
and  evaluation  activities  concerning  the  implementation  of  sector  operational  programmes 
and improve the overall performance in managing EU funds. 

Limited progress was made in the legislative framework. The tasks and responsibilities of the 
authorities involved in the Indirect Management by Beneficiary Country (IMBC) system were 
updated in the last quarter of 2019. No progress was made regarding the policy framework on 
evidence-based  policies  and  results  based  programming.  No  mechanisms  for  evidence-based 
policymaking, policy and programme evaluations and impact assessment are yet in place. There 
are  still  no  general  framework  nor  appropriate  statistical  tools  for  monitoring  and  evaluating 
implementation  of  the  National  Strategy  for  Regional  Development  (NSRD)  and  the 
performance of the Regional Development Agencies' (RDAs). Notwithstanding the existence of 
the NSRD and the RDAs, national policy-making is still quite centralised. Local actors are still 
not adequately represented in the RDAs’ Board of Directors. 

There  was  no  progress  on  the  institutional  framework.  The  functioning  of  the  IMBC 
authorities is monitored by the National IPA Coordinator office (NIPAC) in coordination with 
the National Authorising Officer (NAO) under the regular oversight of the Presidential Office. 
The  Financial  Cooperation  Committee,  which  groups  all  IMBC  authorities,  has  met  more 
regularly. However, the role of the NIPAC continues to remain weak. A permanent Head of the 
Audit Authority responsible for auditing the functionality and efficiency of the management and 
control  mechanisms  was  appointed  in  April  2019.  The  Audit  Authority,  the  NAO,  the  NAO 
management structure, including the support office and the National Fund, are all located under 
the same ministry; internal organisational measures need to fully guarantee the independence of 
the  Audit  Authority  from  the  influence  of  the  other  bodies  that  are  under  its  audit  scope.  The 
State  Supervisory  Council  was  designated  to  investigate  irregularities  committed  against  EU 
interests. 

There  was  some  progress  in  the  strengthening  of  the  administrative  capacities  of  IPA 
management  authorities,  with  lower  staff  turnover,  improved  internal  procedures,  increased 
contracting and disbursement rates, better execution of training programmes as well as technical 

95 

 
assistances for capacity development. However, procurement and financial forecasting still need 
to be improved. The action plans established by the NIPAC and NAO are positive steps in view 
of  strengthening  supervision  and  monitoring  capacity  and  improving  the  overall  performance 
with a focus on attaining the envisaged project results and outcomes. 

Some  progress  was  made  in  programming.  Project  pipelines  were  established  by  all  IPA 
structures  for  the  IPA  II  period  under  2014-2020  multi-annual  operational  programmes 
(MAAPs).  Annual  programming  for  2019  and  2020  was  launched  in  parallel.  While 
procurement accelerated, contracting and implementation need to be enhanced. 

Concerning  monitoring  and  evaluation,  only  limited  progress  was  made.  No  evaluation  was 
launched  by  the  IMBC  authorities.  Steps  were  taken  to  improve  project  implementation,  data 
analysis  and monitoring capacity. But,  there is still a  need to  improve the  results  frameworks, 
develop risk indicators and report at outcome level. 

Concerning  financial  management,  control  and  audit,  de-commitment  risk  for  IPA  II  funds 
remains  high,  in  particular  IPA  2015  funds  within  MAAPs,  which  need  be  used  by  the end  of 
2020.  Despite  some  progress  noted,  the  Operating  Structures  still  lack  capacities  for  the 
preparing  tender  documentation  and  procurement.  In  many  instances,  the  recommendations  of 
the Audit Authority are not implemented because of disagreement between the Audit Authority 
and the auditee. It is important that a system is put in place to ensure that the Audit Authority 
findings are addressed within a reasonable timeframe. Similarly, findings of internal audits need 
to be followed up more systematically. However, in relation to regional integration and territorial 
cooperation there have been some achievements in setting up management and control systems 
as well as with the implementation of IPA I projects. 

5.25.  Chapter 25: Science and research 

The EU provides significant support for research and innovation. All Member States can benefit 
from  the  EU’s  research  programmes,  especially  where  there  is  scientific  excellence  and  solid 
investment in research. 

Overall,  Turkey’s  preparations  in  the  area  of  science  and research are  well  advanced.  Turkey 
made  some  progress,  notably  in  the  fields  of  energy,  the  European  Research  Council,  and  in 
Marie  Skłodowska-Curie  Actions.  Turkey  also  made  some  progress  to  implement  last  year’s 
recommendations.  The  development  of  an  action  plan  to  boost  the  national  research  and 
innovation  capacity  as  well  as  its  alignment  with  the  European  Research  Area  (ERA)  is  a 
positive  step  in  this  regard.  However,  its  implementation  and  impact  should  be  closely 
monitored.  

In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

→ improve its efforts towards aligning its national research area (TARAL) with the ERA; 

→ update the National Science, Technology and Innovation Strategy (2011-2016); 

→ increase participation and success rates in Horizon 2020 by implementing its action plan and 
prepare for Horizon Europe to maximise the benefits of EU R&I Framework Programmes.  

On  research  and  innovation  policy,  the  share  of  the  R&D  expenditure  to  GDP  increased  to 
1.03% in 2018 compared with 0.96% in 2017 (EU28 average is 2%). Total number of full time 
equivalent R&D personnel increased to 172 119 in 2018 compared with 153 552 in 2017. The 
share  of  female  personnel  has  not  changed  and  remained  at  32%.  The  new  Industry  and 
Technology Strategy foresees ambitious targets such as the gross domestic expenditure on R&D 
to  be  increased  to  1.8%  by  2023  and  the  full  time  equivalent  R&D  personnel  number  to  be 
increased  to  300 000  by  2023.  Although  there  was  progress  in  2018,  the  gap  between  actual 
figures, the 2023 targets and the EU28 average remains significant.  

96 

 
On framework programmes, Turkey’s participation in Horizon 2020 and its success rate were 
increasing but were still at a low level. The total Turkish success rate in Horizon 2020 is around 
10.2% as compared to 12% overall Horizon 2020. Turkish entities received EUR 219.2 million 
euros of direct EU contribution. 

More efforts are needed in further increasing Turkey’s Horizon 2020 participation. As a positive 
action,  Turkey  developed  a  new  action  plan  to  boost  the  national  research  and  innovation 
capacity as well as cooperation with and alignment to the European Research Area (ERA). This 
action plan, together with the Horizon 2020 roadmap, is expected to lead to a tangible impact on 
Turkey’s  participation  in  Horizon  2020  and  its  successor  Horizon  Europe.  Robust  monitoring 
mechanisms to follow up the implementation of the action plan need to be established.  

On  alignment  with  the  ERA,  Turkey  achieved  its  best  performances  on  gender  equality  and 
gender  mainstreaming  in  research  and  knowledge  transfer  priorities.  It  is  ranked  third  among 
ERA countries for inclusion of gender dimension in research content. In the area of knowledge 
transfer,  Turkey  achieved  13%  share  of  public  R&D  funded  privately,  exceeding  twice  the 
EU28  benchmark  (7%).  Turkey’s  weakest  performance  was  observed  in  transnational 
cooperation  and  open  access  priorities.  In  all  remaining  priorities,  Turkey’s  scores  were 
generally  below  the  ERA  averages.  Turkey  needs  to  continue  its  efforts  towards  aligning  its 
National Research Area (TARAL). 

On  Innovation  Union,  Turkey  remains  a  ‘moderate  innovator’  according  to  the  European 
Innovation Scoreboard for 2019 where the performance relative to the EU has increased strongly 
by 12.5%. In 2018, there was a significant increase of innovation performance mainly due to the 
number  of  innovators,  the  amounts  of  investments  by  firms  and  an  innovation  friendly 
environment.  However,  structural  difficulties  persist  in  the  low  share  of  employment  in  high-
tech manufacturing and knowledge-intensive services as well as the limited FDI net inflows. 

5.26.  Chapter 26: Education and culture 

The  EU  supports  cooperation  in  education  and  culture  through  funding  programmes  and  the 
coordination of Member State policies through the open method of coordination. Member States 
must also prevent discrimination and ensure quality education for children of migrant workers, 
including those from disadvantaged background. 

Turkey  is  moderately  prepared  on  education  and  culture.  There  was  some  progress  on  this 
chapter,  notably  regarding  the  national  qualifications  system.  Turkey  made  some  progress  to 
implement last year’s recommendations. Turkey recognises the value of culture in development 
policies and encourages the promotion and protection of its cultural heritage. 

In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

→  further  improve  inclusive  education,  with  a  particular  focus  on  girls  and  children  from 
disadvantaged  groups  and  closely  monitor  and  continue  work  to  reduce  the  proportion  of 
school drop-outs; 

→ ensure the good functioning of the Turkish Qualifications Framework; 

→  take  concrete  steps  to  implement  the  2005  UNESCO  Convention  on  the  Protection  and 

Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions. 

In the area of education, the level of public expenditure fell from 4.3 % of GDP in 2018 to 3.7 
% of GDP in 2019.  

There  was  some  progress  in  the  net  enrolment  rate  for  pre-school  education  for  2018-2019, 
which increased from 66.9% to 68.3%. The net enrolment rate in primary school for 2018-2019 
increased  slightly  from  91.7%  to  92.1%  for  girls  and  from  91.4%  to  91.8%  for  boys.  In  the 
2018-2019 school year, lower secondary enrolment fell (compared to 2017-2018) for both girls 
(from  94.7%  to  93.6%)  and  boys  (from  94.3%  to  92.9%).  In  upper  secondary  education,  net 

97 

 
enrolment increased from 83.6% to 84.2% for 2018-2019 with 84.5% of boys and 83.9% of girls 
enrolled.  

The 2018 PISA test scores by 15 year-olds represented an improvement over the previous round 
in 2015. The 2018 round included 15.2 students per teacher, slightly above the OECD average of 
13.1. Inequality in educational opportunities persists, with resources unevenly distributed among 
schools and more disadvantaged provinces. 

Turkey  is  at  an  advanced  stage  of  implementing  the  Bologna  process,  although  significant 
quality  differences  persist  among  the  country’s  209  universities.  The  reorganisation  of  the 
Higher  Education  Quality  Council  (THEQC)  led  to  greater  administrative  and  financial 
independence. THEQC became a national authority mandated to independently evaluate Turkish 
higher  education  institutions.  THEQC  became  a  member  of  the  European  Association  for 
Quality Assurance in Higher Education (ENQA) in April 2020. 

Implementation  of a  national vocational qualifications  system by the Vocational Qualifications 
Authority (VQA) is ongoing. VQA, the competent authority for preparing national occupational 
standards and national qualifications and for authorising certification bodies, is also in charge of 
implementing the Turkish Qualifications Framework (TQF). 

As of June 2020, the number of national occupational standards published in the Official Gazette 
had  reached  855  and  498  qualifications  had  been  approved.  During  the  reporting  period,  the 
number  of  authorised  certification  bodies  increased  from  182  to  217.  The  number  of  VQA 
vocational qualifications certificates issued increased from 431,907 to 1,047,044. The number of 
occupations on heavy and dangerous works, for which vocational certificates became mandatory 
in October 2019, reached 143. Studies regarding the full implementation of TQF continued under 
the coordination of the VQA. 

Although the TQF is referenced to the European qualifications framework, Turkey still needs to 
ensure that principles and procedures relating to quality assurance, credit systems, inclusion of 
qualifications,  and  validation  of  non-formal  and  informal  learning  are  fully  in  place.  In  the 
formal  vocational  education  and  training  sector,  implementing  the  modular  curricula  and 
credited module system, instead of the current class passing system, remains an important issue 
for  the  effective  application  of  the  TQF.  An  amendment  to  the  Law  on  Private  Education 
adopted in May 2018 still undermines the effective implementation of the TQF in Turkey as it 
puts  on  equal  footing  holders  of  certificates  for  completion  of  training  issued  by  a  private 
educational institution and holders of certificates issued by an accredited vocational qualification 
institution. The amendment undermines the efforts made to establish a quality-assured vocational 
qualification system in Turkey and should be reconsidered. 

Turkey  has  been  participating  in  the  EU  education  programmes  since  2004.  In  the  current 
financial  period  (2014-2020),  around  280,000  participants  from  Turkey  have  taken  part  in  the 
Erasmus+  programme.  During  these  years,  Turkey  has  received  the  highest  number  of 
applications  for  Erasmus+  among  all  the  participating  countries.  Turkey  is  the  6th  sending 
country and the 15th receiving country in terms of individual mobility. Since 2014, the Erasmus+ 
Turkish National Agency has contracted almost 8,000 projects, for a total amount of EUR 617 
million.  As  of  June  2020,  applications  for  the  Erasmus+  programme’s  mobility  actions  had 
increased from 10,584 in 2018 to 12,816 in 2019, with a budget of nearly EUR 123 million.  

As  for  culture,  the  National  Culture  Action  Plan  (2017-2022)  was  implemented.  It  covers 
cultural  policies,  cultural  diplomacy,  cultural  economy,  cultural  assets,  museums  and 
archaeology,  performance  arts,  cinema,  radio  and  television,  music,  visual  arts,  language  and 
literature, publishing and libraries, and the connections between culture and the following areas: 
media, architecture, local administrations, Turkish diaspora, family and children. The Ministry 
of Culture and Tourism (MOCT) invested in promoting and protecting cultural heritage, notably 
through the opening of three museums and the joint undertaking of archaeological excavations 
involving Turkish and foreign experts. Work is ongoing to prepare a national inventory system. 

98 

 
Turkey  is  preparing  a  road  map  for  implementing  the  2005  UNESCO  Convention  on  the 
Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions. Two rounds of consultation 
were held in March and October 2019 respectively for developing cooperation with NGOs and 
strengthening  cultural  industries.  Nevertheless,  33  cases  of  artistic  freedom  violation  were 
documented.  The Turkish government was the main violator  of artistic freedom and primarily 
executed  the  violations  under  the  rationales  of  countering  terrorism  and  protecting  the  state. 
Silencing artists through misapplied anti-terror legislation intensified self-censorship after 2018, 
when the state of emergency decrees were adopted into permanent legislation.  

Measures  have  yet  to  be  taken  to  implement  the  Convention.  Turkey  has  formally  expressed 
interest in re-joining the Creative Europe programme for the 2021-2027 period.  

In  October,  new  procedures  for  evaluating  and  classifying  cinema  films  came  into  effect.  It 
became  compulsory  for movie theatre operators to inform the MOCT of the films they screen 
and  the  number  of  tickets  sold.  Films  produced  in  Turkey  or  imported  are  now  evaluated  and 
classified  before  they  are  authorised  for  commercial  circulation  and  screening.  If  a  film  is 
deemed  inappropriate,  it  will  not  be  made  available  for  commercial  circulation  and  screening 
and will be authorised for screening with a +18 sign, only during festivals, special screenings or 
similar cultural and artistic events. This requirement concerns mostly low budget, independent 
local and foreign films and documentaries and has been criticised as it may further discourage 
the production, distribution and screening of films with high age ratings for financial reasons. 

Local  authorities  have  the  power  to  cancel  artistic  and  cultural  events  for  maintaining  public 
order  or  for  security  reasons.  In  November  2019,  a  photo  exhibition  in  Diyarbakir  in  the 
memory  of  lawyer  Tahir  Elci  was  denied  permission  on  such  grounds.  Cultural  NGOs  have 
started employing lawyers when organising festivals, events, and exhibitions and self-censoring 
on their legal advice. Finding public spaces to perform artistic work has become more difficult, 
as  renting  requires  prior  permissions  from  both  the  local  authorities  and  the  police.  Artists 
working  for  the  public  sector  also  suffer  from  arbitrary  decisions.  In  January,  150  artists  and 
technical  staff  of  the  state  opera,  ballet  and  theatre  were  dismissed  without  prior  judicial 
process,  based  on  a  Presidential  Decree  which  regulates  the  number  of  contract  personnel  in 
public  institutions,  allegedly  because  they  failed  to  pass  the  security  check  (see  Chapter  23: 
Judiciary and fundamental rights). 

On  youth  and  sport,  Turkey  actively  participates  in  the  youth  actions  of  the  Erasmus+ 
programme. Turkey joined the European Solidarity Corps programme in 2019, with a budget of 
EUR 6 million. Turkey became a leading partner in ten projects under Erasmus+ Sport 2019 call. 
The National Youth and Sports Policy Paper continued to be implemented. It includes key topics 
defined  in  European  Union  Work  Plan  for  Sport  (2017-2020)  such  as  anti-doping,  good 
governance, innovation in sport, sport and health, social inclusion and education through sport. 
As an Erasmus+ Programme country, Turkey also participated in the European Week of Sport. 

5.27.  Chapter 27: Environment and climate change 

The  EU  promotes  strong  climate  action,  sustainable  development  and  protection  of  the 
environment.  EU  law  contains  provisions  addressing  climate  change,  water  and  air  quality, 
waste  management,  nature  protection,  industrial  pollution,  chemicals,  noise  and  civil 
protection. 

Turkey  has  some  level  of  preparation  in  this  area.  There  was  some  progress,  mainly  in 
increasing  capacity  in  waste  management  and  wastewater  treatment  and  legislative  alignment, 
but  enforcement  and  implementation  still  remain  weak.  Therefore,  the  2019  recommendations 
remain valid. More ambitious and better coordinated environment and climate policies need to 
be  established  and  implemented.  Strategic  planning,  substantial  investment  and  stronger 
administrative capacity are required as well.  

In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

99 

 
→ complete alignment with the directives on waste, water and industrial pollution, and ensure 

that the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive is correctly implemented; 

→ ensure alignment with the EU acquis and actual implementation on public participation and 

the right to access environmental information; 

→  ratify  the  Paris  Agreement  on  climate  change,  start  implementing  its  contribution  to  the 

Agreement, and complete its alignment with the EU acquis on climate action. 

Environment 

Turkey  has  achieved  some  level  of  preparation  in  the  area  of  horizontal  legislation. 
Implementation  of  the  Directive  on  Infrastructure  for  Spatial  Information  is  still  at  an  early 
stage.  Provisions  in  the  Environmental  Impact  Assessment  (EIA)  legislation  that  waive 
licencing  and  other  restrictions  for  strategically  important  investment  projects  remain  a  major 
concern.  Procedures  for  transboundary  consultations  are  not  aligned  with  the  EIA  and  the 
Strategic Environmental Assessments (SEA) Directives. The existing EIA legislation  continued 
to  be  implemented.  However,  there  were  concerns  about  the  application  of  the  rule  of  law  in 
court decisions on environmental issues, about public participation as well as about the right to 
environmental information. The public concerns on the Kanal İstanbul Project, for the artificial 
sea-level waterway connecting the Black Sea to the Sea of Marmara, led to several court cases 
against the EIA positive decision. In March 2020, the first tender was launched for the planning 
phase of reconstructing two historic bridges located in the area where the canal is expected to be 
built.  A  comprehensive  impact  analysis  is  required  for  this  major  project  that  will  impact 
riparian  states  of  the  Black  Sea  and  the  Mediterranean  Sea.  Turkey  is  still  not  party  to  the 
Aarhus  and  Espoo  Conventions.  Turkey  aligned  with  the  SEA  Directive    in  some  sectors. 
Alignment on environmental liability remained limited.  

On  air  quality,  national  legislation  still  needs  to  be  adopted  in  line  with  EU  directives  on 
ambient  air  quality  and  national  emissions  ceilings.  Severe  air  pollution  in  some  cities  is 
reported  on  an  annual  basis.  Local  clean  air  action  plans  were  prepared  for  64  out  of  81 
provinces.  A  national  strategy  for  air  quality  monitoring  was  in  place  and  7  out  of  8  planned 
regional networks were operational. Air quality monitoring data was published online. 

The legal framework on waste management is partially aligned with the new EU acquis. Turkey 
adopted  a  strategy  promoting  a  zero  waste  management  approach,  efficient  use  of  natural 
resources, landfilling reduction and increased recycling and reuse. A ban on the free distribution 
of lightweight plastic bags came into force in January 2019; Turkey adopted the by-law on zero 
waste in  July 2019 that included a roadmap  for municipalities, buildings and  settlements to  be 
completed  by  2023.  Turkey  also  plans  to  introduce  a  deposit  fee  for  plastic  bottles  by  2021. 
Work  continued  to  bring  waste  treatment  facilities  up  to  EU  acquis  standards.  Alignment  and 
capacity  for  sorting,  recycling  and  medical  waste  treatment  increased.  However,  significant 
efforts  are  necessary  to  implement  waste  management  plans  at  local  and  regional  level. 
Economic  instruments  to  promote  recycling  and  the  prevention  of  waste  generation  improved, 
but  remain  limited.  In  March  2020,  Turkey  extended  the  previous  recycling  and  re-use  targets 
initially  defined  until  end  of  2020,  to  cover  the  years  2020,  2021-2031  and  beyond  2031. 
Accordingly, the target percentages for total recycling were also increased. Legislation on ship 
recycling  which  would  mirror  the  requirements  of  the  EU  Ship  Recycling  Regulation,  was 
pending adoption. In the meantime, the current notification procedure practices were  in line with 
the Basel Convention.  

In  the  area  of  water  quality,  the  legislative  alignment  is  advanced  but  implementation  and 
enforcement should be improved. Over 30% of water bodies were identified as sensitive areas. 
Management plans for five out of 25 river basins were completed and adopted. Transboundary 
consultations  on  water  issues  were  still  at  an  early  stage.  The  law  on  Protection  of  Drinking 
Water Basins was amended in March 2020. Wastewater treatment capacity increased as a result 

100 

 
of  continuous  investments.  A  by-law  on  bathing  water  was  adopted  in  September  2019. 
Alignment with the EU Marine Strategy is still pending. 

Turkey  has  some  level  of  preparation  on  nature  protection.  The  framework  legislation,  the 
national biodiversity strategy and an action plan have yet to be adopted. Regulations allowing 
planning and construction in wetlands, forests and natural sites are still not in line with the EU 
acquis.  The  lists  of  habitats  and  species  detected  in  Turkey  under  the  Habitats  and  Birds 
Directives  were  prepared.  The  institutional  framework  for  managing  future  Natura  2000  sites 
needs to be streamlined and adequately resourced. Investments, particularly in hydropower and 
mining, need to comply with EU environmental legislation, especially for potential Natura 2000 
areas. In 2019, a review of existing natural site areas was initiated. A number of changes to the 
status of such protected areas occurred over the course of the year including, but not limited to, 
the  removal  of  the  National  Park  of  Cappadocia  from  the  list  of  national  parks.  This  change 
raised  concerns  with  regard  to  its  legal  basis,  transparency  and  the  lack  of  stakeholders’ 
participation. 

In  industrial  pollution  and  risk  management,  alignment  with  the  EU  acquis  is  at  an  early 
stage. The by-law harmonising the EU Directive on SEVESO III was adopted in March 2019. 
Alignment with the Industrial Emissions Directive, the eco-management and audit scheme, and 
the Paints Directive were still pending. 

On  chemicals,  the  overall  level  of  legislative  alignment  is  advanced  but  implementation  and 
enforcement  remains  weak.  Turkey  is  only  partly  aligned  with  the  European  Regulation  on 
Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH). The regulatory 
framework to implement the directive on the protection of animals used for scientific  purposes 
was adopted in April 2019. In March 2020, Turkey adopted a law aiming to align with the EU 
acquis on  biocidal products. 

Alignment  with  legislation  on  noise  is  well  advanced  but  implementation  and  enforcement 
should  be  improved.  Preparation  of  noise  mapping  and  local  noise  action  plans  are  at  an 
advanced stage. 

On civil protection, Turkey’s collaboration under the EU Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM) 
increased  in  2019,  notably  with  regard  to  tackling  the  COVID-19  pandemic.  Turkey  is 
encouraged to commit further response capacities to the European Civil Protection Pool and to 
offer  assistance  under  the  Union  Civil  Protection  Mechanism  during  emergencies.  The 
establishment of the Common Emergency Communication and Information System (CECIS) is 
still pending. Turkey, as a Participating State of UCPM, has not yet completed its obligation to 
submit the summary of the country’s national risk assessment and risk assessment management 
capability for disaster risks. Turkey is encouraged to install the Secure Trans European Services 
for  Telematics  between  Administrators  (sTESTA)  system  to  be  able  to  connect  through  the 
CECIS  with  the  Emergency  Response  Coordination  Centre  (ERCC)  of  the  European 
Commission. The COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the need to strengthen the legal framework 
and  institutional  capacities  as  well  as  human  and  financial  resources  of  civil  protection 
authorities  also  with  regard  to  health  emergencies.  Turkey  should  step  up  cooperation  in  the 
framework of the UCPM. 

Climate change 

No progress was made in this area over the reporting period. A national strategy consistent with 
the EU 2030 climate and energy framework was not formulated, and mainstreaming of climate 
action into other sector policies was still limited. The existing national strategy and action plan 
addressed  climate  change  mitigation  concerns  only  partially  and  in  a  short-term  perspective. 
Turkey has not yet ratified the Paris Agreement on climate change. Regarding its commitments 
under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, Turkey submitted the latest national 
inventory on greenhouse gasses in April 2020. 

101 

 
Turkey did not align its legislation with the Emission Trading Directive as well as with the EU’s 
economy-wide  greenhouse  gas  monitoring  mechanism.  Further  efforts  are  needed  to  fully 
implement the Fuel Quality Directive and to initiate alignment on emissions standards for new 
cars.  Turkey  also  needs  to  establish  an  alignment  plan  for  the  Carbon  Capture  and  Storage 
Directive. 

5.28.  Chapter 28: Health and consumer protection 

EU  rules  protect  consumers’  economic  interests  in  relation  to  product  safety,  dangerous 
imitations and liability for defective products. The EU also ensures high common standards for 
tobacco control, blood, tissues, cells and organs, patients’ rights and communicable diseases. 

There is a good level of preparation for legislative alignment of consumer and health protection. 
There  was  no  progress  on  last  year’s  recommendations,  though  there  were  some  positive 
developments  on  institutional  capacity  in  the  area  of  consumer  protection  and  on  the 
establishment of structures needed to implement the EU acquis in public health. 

In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

  ensure  effective  protection  of  consumers  by  better  enforcement  and  better  coordination  of 

and cooperation with consumer groups; 

  increase 

its 

institutional/administrative  capacity, 

inter-sectoral  cooperation,  financial 
resources and appropriate diagnostic facilities to address public health issues at central and 
provincial level. 

Consumer protection 

The national legislation is largely aligned with the EU acquis on consumer protection in non-
safety related issues.  Although  insufficient,  there was improvement in  enforcement, consumer 
awareness,  coordination  and  cooperation  with  sectoral  stakeholders.  There  is  an  on-going 
training and public awareness campaign aiming at all relevant parties and the general public. A 
series of promotional advertisements have been made available to the public.  

In the first half of 2020, the DG For Consumer Protection and Board of Advertisements imposed 
fines  on  sellers  due  to  infringements  of  consumer  rights  in a  number  of  areas,  including price-
fixing arrangements, especially for essential personal hygiene consumer products related to the 
COVID-19  pandemic.  Due  to  COVID-19  pandemic  restrictions,  the  official  deadlines  for 
submitting  complaints,  petitions  and  pleas  in  consumer  arbitration  committees,  as  well  as 
periodical committee meetings, were postponed to the period after 15 June 2020. 

Turkey made good progress in training judges and arbitration committee members in almost all 
provinces  on  EU  consumer  policy,  EU  best  practices,  and  the  implementation  of  the  relevant 
legislation.  However,  the  average  duration  for  the  resolution  of  disputes  remained  a  concern. 
Impartiality  of  expert  witnesses  in  consumer  conflicts  was  still  an  issue  and  there  was  a 
considerable  decrease  in  the  use  of  expert  witnesses  by  the  arbitration  committees.  The 
consumer  organisations  need  strengthening.  Better  coordination  and  cooperation  among 
consumer protection stakeholders should be encouraged. 

Turkey  continued  to  improve  its  market  surveillance  and  consumer  protection  regime.  With 
regard to safety-related measures, the long-awaited Product Safety and Technical Regulations 
Law was published in March 2020 and will enter into force one year after its publication. One of 
the  important  new  features  of  this  law  is  the  inclusion  of  product  safety  provisions  in  e-
commerce, radio and TV marketing in favour of the protection of consumers. (See  Chapter 1: 
Free  movement  of  goods).  Hence,  such  products  will  be  subject  to  market  surveillance  and 
producers  face  measures  in  case  of  non-safety.  For  the  first  time,  the  Directorate  General  for 
Consumer  Protection  and  Market  Surveillance  (DGCMS)  performed  an  analysis  towards 
systemic  improvement  of  the  deficiencies  in  consumer  protection.  Three  distinct  reports  were 

102 

 
made  available,  which  related  to  the  efficiency  of  consumer  arbitration  committees  (CAC), 
evaluation  of  the  decisions  given  by  the  CACs  and  a  needs  analysis  for  the  consumer 
associations.  Turkey  should  take  into  consideration  these  reports  in  developing  further  policy 
initiatives and ensure that these analyses are regularly updated. The DGCMS continued market 
surveillance inspections pursuant to the Law on the Protection of Consumers. 

Public Health 

In the area of public health, some progress was made in the alignment with the EU acquis. 

In the field of tobacco control, a new regulation of March 2019 requires plain packaging and 
larger  health  warnings  by  the  manufacturer  as  of  December  2019  and  by  the  retailer  as  of 
January  2020.  These  measures  are  expected  to  serve  as  dis-incentives  for  would-be  smokers, 
especially  among  the  youth,  and  curb  tobacco  and  cigarette  sales.  A  warning  about  a  ban  on 
cigarette sales for those under the age of 18 was replaced with a warning that such sales carry a 
prison sentence. 

Estimates from the Tobacco Atlas indicate about 83,100 deaths from tobacco-caused diseases in 
Turkey each year, making it the main risk factor for non-communicable diseases (NCDs) along 
with poor nutrition and lack of physical activity. Combined with aging of the population, the 
share of the non-communicable diseases NCDs is increasing in the total burden of diseases. In 
2018, deaths from circulatory system diseases accounted for 38.4% of total deaths, followed by 
tumours (19.7%) and respiratory diseases (12.5%). In the fight against risk factors for NCDs, the 
number of Healthy Life Centres increased to 202. Under the cancer control programme, cervical 
and  breast  cancer  screenings  reached  80%  and  37%  of  the  respective  target  groups.  The 
Europe’s Beating Cancer Plan that will be adopted by the European Commission by the end of 
20205  could  be  used  as  guidance  by  Turkey  to  strengthen  its  national  cancer  control  policies. 
Prevalence  of  obesity  was  on  the  rise;  one  in  four  children  was  either  overweight  or  obese. 
Turkey  has  the  second  highest  diabetes  prevalence  (12.8%)  among  OECD  countries.  The 
Healthy  Nutrition  and  physically  active  Life  Programme,  which  introduced  inter-sectoral 
interventions to attain 25% reduction in the causes of premature deaths in the country by 2025, 
become operational through the opening of Healthy Life Centres.  

There  was  good  progress  in  the  area  of  communicable  diseases  and  serious  cross  border 
threats  to  health.  The  Communicable  Diseases  Guideline  was  updated  putting  in  place  the 
operational procedures to be followed by provincial health staff in case of a threat to health. The 
Implementing Regulation on the Surveillance and Control Principles of Communicable Diseases 
was amended. Accordingly, the number of notifiable diseases rose from 73 to 80, with revised 
case  definitions  compatible  with  the  EU  directives.  To  maintain  coordination  within  the 
Ministry of Health and with other Ministries in case of a national and international public health 
threat,  roles  and  responsibilities  of  the  central  and  local  public  authorities  were  defined  by  a 
circular published on 15 March 2019. 

Turkey  completed  its  antibiotic  use  policies  and  antimicrobial  resistance  (AMR)  control 
mechanisms,  in  line  with  the  Global  and  Regional  AMR  action  plan.  Inspections  on  sale  of 
antibiotics  without  prescription  continued  under  the  control  of  the  Turkish  Medicines  and 
Medical  Devices  Agency.  The  monitoring  of  the  electronic  prescription  system  reveals 
improvements with a reduction in prescriptions of antibiotics from 35% to 25%. 

On  blood,  tissues,  cells  and  organs,  the  capacity  building  of  the  blood  banking  system  was 
ongoing.  The  number  of  temporary  blood  banks  within  the curative  system  of  the  Ministry  of 
Health  fell  to  13  in  2019  compared  with  37  in  2018,  indicating  an  increase  in  the  supply 
capacity of the Turkish Red Crescent (TRC). TRC collected 89% of the total blood needed in 
2019,  compared  to  82.6%  in  2016.  Following  the  improvements  in  the  online  hemo-vigilance 
software programme, testing of the monitoring system was launched in January 2020.  

5 https://ec.europa.eu/health/non_communicable_diseases/cancer_en 

103 

 
                                                            
No progress can be reported on the alignment of organ legislation with the EU acquis. Existing 
legislation  on  tissues  and  cells  was  under  revision.  A  system  was  established  to  monitor  all 
relevant phases of transplant programmes from donor to recipient, including adverse events and 
reactions. In the field of blood, tissues, cells and organs, administrative capacity for enforcement 
still needs to be strengthened both at central and local levels. 

On mental health, no progress can be reported. Since 2012, there has been a dramatic increase 
in suicide rates in Turkey. In 2018, according to official statistics, 3 161 people ended their lives. 
Unfavourable economic and labour market conditions continue to pose challenges for effective 
universal health coverage. 

In  the  context  of  COVID-19  pandemic  outbreak  in  March  2020,  the  Ministry  of  Health  took 
measures to  minimise the burden on health  facilities and medical professionals  and protect the 
public health. Turkey put in place actions in line with the EU Directives on communicable 
diseases and WHO International Health Regulations.  

According to the official declarations from the Turkish authorities, the Turkish healthcare system 
was  coping  with  the  COVID-19  needs.  Testing  and  hospitalisation  were    granted  free  to  all 
individuals  irrespective  of  their  social  security  coverage.  However,  there  is  no  external 
assessment available on the capacity of the Turkish health system.  Turkey set up a task force of 
experts  to  coordinate  COVID-19  containment,  which  took  stringent  measures,  including  closure  of 
schools, public places, weekend curfews, strict confinement of young and elderly persons.   

Turkey was cooperating with the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECPM) 
through  the  EU  funded  project  since  the  early  phase  of  the  crisis,  and made use of the donated 
positive  control  material  for  SARS-Cov-2  testing,  developed  by  the  Joint  Research  Centre.  Turkey 
started in June 2020 sharing data with the ECPM.   

5.29.  Chapter 29: Customs Union  

All  Member  States  are  part  of  the  EU  customs  union  and  follow  the  same  customs  rules  and 
procedures.  This  requires  legislative  alignment,  adequate  implementing  and  enforcement 
capacity, and access to the common computerised customs systems. 

Turkey maintains a good level of preparation for the customs union. There was backsliding in 
the  reporting  period.  Turkey  continued  to  extend  the  scope  of  additional  duties  applied  on 
imports of a large number of products originating in third countries, which are in free circulation 
in the EU, thus infringing the fundamental principle of the Customs Union. The requirement for 
a certificate of origin for goods in free circulation in the EU is in breach of the Customs Union 
rules.  Duty  relief,  free  zones  and  surveillance  measures  remain  not  fully  in  line  with  the  EU 
acquis nor with Turkey’s obligations under the Customs Union. The recommendations from last 
year were not implemented. 

In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

→ step up efforts to align with the EU Customs Code; 

→ bring risk-based controls and simplified procedures in line with the EU acquis; 

→ eliminate import and export restrictions hampering the effective free movement of goods. 

There  was  backsliding  in  the  area  of  customs  legislation.  Turkish  customs  law  needs  to  be 
aligned with the EU Customs Code and risk-based controls and simplified procedures need to be 
improved to facilitate legitimate trade, while ensuring security and safety. Rules on surveillance, 
free zones and duty relief are yet to be aligned with the EU acquis. Turkey continued to extend 
the scope of additional duties  applied on imports  of a large number of  products  originating in 
third  countries.  Turkey  reintroduced  export  restrictions  on  copper  scrap  and  failed  to  wholly 
eliminate the restriction on certain leather products, which is in violation of the Customs Union 

104 

 
rules.  The  designation  of  specialised  customs  offices  and  the  requirement  for  a  certificate  of 
origin  for  goods  in  free  circulation  in  the  EU  are  not  compatible  with  the  provisions  of  the 
Customs Union. The unilateral decision by Turkey to increase duty on imports of sweet corn to 
a disproportionally high level was contrary to Customs Union rules. 

On  administrative  and  operational  capacity,  efforts  to  strengthen  customs  enforcement 
capacity  for  border  controls  continued.  Customs  enforcement  of  intellectual  property  rights 
continued  to  improve,  though.  Further  alignment  is  required.  Efforts  to  improve  risk-based 
controls to enforce safety and security measures need to be bolstered. Turkey implemented the 
computerised transit system as part of its membership of the Convention on a Common Transit 
Procedure.  However,  tariff  IT  systems  (TARIC,  Surveillance)  are  yet  to  become  operational. 
The IT strategy in  line with  business  initiatives needs to  be implemented and  the documented 
customs business processes aligned to the legal basis need to be kept up-to-date. 

5.30.  Chapter 30: External relations 

The  EU  has  a  common  trade  and  commercial  policy  towards  third  countries,  based  on 
multilateral and bilateral agreements and autonomous measures. There are also EU rules in the 
field of humanitarian aid and development policy. 

Turkey is moderately prepared in the area of external relations. The backsliding continued in 
the  reporting  period.  The  level  of  alignment  with  the  Common  Customs  Tariff  (CCT) 
diminished as Turkey continued to apply and extend additional customs duties, while divergence 
from the EU Generalised Scheme  of Preferences further increased in breach of Turkey’s legal 
commitments under the EU-Turkey Customs Union. The recommendations from last year were 
not implemented. 

In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

→ urgently re-align the customs tariff with the CCT; 

→  complete  alignment  with  the  EU’s  Generalised  System  of  Preferences  and  dual-use  export 

control regime. 

No  progress  was  made  on  the  common  commercial  policy.  Turkey’s  once  good  level  of 
alignment  with  the  EU  common  commercial  policy  was  further  eroded  by  the  unilateral 
imposition  of  additional  duties.  While  Turkey  eliminated  additional  duties  on  one  specific 
product, those on a large number of imported products remained in place and further extensions 
were  added (see Chapter 29 - Customs Union). In  addition, Turkey  continued to  deviate from 
the EU Generalised Scheme of Preferences in terms of both countries and products. The opening 
of new investigations based on weak evidence and the use  of safeguards  where  more targeted 
trade  defence  measures  -  such  as  the  anti-dumping  instrument  -  would  have  been  more 
appropriate, remained a cause of concern. There is a need for closer coordination between the 
EU  and  Turkey  within  the  World  Trade  Organisation, in  particular  on  the  Doha  Development 
Agenda, and at the OECD and the G-20.  

On  export  controls  on  dual-use  goods,  Turkey  did  not  align  with  the  EU  position  on  certain 
multilateral  export  control  arrangements,  such  as  the  Wassenaar  Arrangement  on  Export 
Controls  for  Conventional  Arms  and  Dual-Use  Goods  and  Technologies  and  the  Missile 
Technology Control Regime. There is still no alignment with the EU position on medium and 
long-term export credits. 

Regarding  bilateral  agreements  with  third  countries,  the  free  trade  agreement  signed  with 
Kosovo  entered  into  force.  Turkey  continued  to  implement  its  free  trade  agreement  with 

 This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ 
Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence. 

105 

 
                                                            
Malaysia  although  the  EU  has  no  such  agreement  with  that  country.  In  addition,  Turkey 
continued the process of concluding an agreement with Venezuela. 

As  for  development  policy  and  humanitarian  aid,  official  development  assistance  (ODA)  
granted by Turkey reached EUR 7.3 billion, equivalent to 1.10%  of its gross national income 
(GNI)  in  2018,  thus  further  exceeding  the  0.7%  target    enshrined  in  Sustainable  Development 
Goal  17.  This  assistance  was  largely  directed  towards  humanitarian  support  for  Syria-related 
activities on Turkey’s own territory.  

5.31.  Chapter 31: Foreign, security and defence policy  

Member  States  must  be  able  to  conduct  political  dialogue  under  EU  foreign,  security  and 
defence  policy,  to  align  with  EU  statements,  to  take  part  in  EU  actions  and  to  apply  agreed 
sanctions and restrictive measures. 

Turkey has some level of preparation in the area of foreign, security and defence policy. There 
was  backsliding  in  the  framework  of  political  dialogue  on  foreign  and  security  policy  as 
Turkey’s foreign policy increasingly collided with the EU priorities under the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy. Dialogue with the EU was hampered by Turkey’s provocative actions in the 
Eastern Mediterranean and the corresponding EU reaction. The latter included the adoption of a 
framework for restrictive measures. Turkey intervened militarily in north-east Syria as well as in 
Libya  and  signed  bilateral  memoranda  with  the  Libyan  Government  of  National  Accord  on 
maritime delimitation and on security and military cooperation. Turkey reached agreements with 
the US and with Russia on a ceasefire in north-east Syria, which included the establishment of a 
Turkish-controlled area along the border in Syria, with the declared objective of fighting against 
the alleged PKK allies in Syria. Cooperation with the EU on counter-terrorism and on the EU's 
common  security  and  defence  policy  was  discussed  in  senior  officials  meetings.  However,  the 
political context impacted on the further holding of the respective structured dialogues. Turkey 
continued to provide substantial assistance to over 4 million refugees, out of which 3.6 million 
are Syrian.  

In the coming year, Turkey should in particular:  

  take  decisive  steps  to  significantly  improve  alignment  with  EU  declarations  and  Council 

decisions on common foreign and security policy; 

  enhance the political dialogue on foreign and security policy with the EU. 

The  political  dialogue  between  the  EU  and  Turkey  on  foreign  and  security  policy  issues 
continued,  including  as  part  of  the  March  2019  EU-Turkey  Association  Council  and  senior 
officials  meetings.  Discussions  focused  on  Eastern  Europe,  the  Western  Balkans  and  Asia. 
Following  the  July  2019  Council  conclusions,  the  high-level  political  dialogue  did  not  take 
place. Contacts at Presidential and Ministerial level continued, notably in the framework of the 
Turkish President’s meeting with the Presidents of the European Council and of the European 
Commission on 9 March 2020. Following this meeting, the High Representative/Vice President 
was  tasked,  together  with  his  Turkish  counterpart,  to  take  stock  of  the  implementation  of  the 
March 2016 Joint Statement. Intensified contacts have followed.  

A  Political  Directors'  meeting  took  place  in  September  2019.  The  discussions  touched  upon 
cooperation on foreign policy issues, including Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), 
counterterrorism  and  regional  issues.  Turkey  attended  a  number  of  events  organised  or 
supported  by  the  EU,  including  the  Brussels  III  and  IV  Syria  Conferences  and  the  EU-hosted 
high-level meeting on Syria in the margins of the 74th session of the UN General Assembly. In 
January 2020, the EU Special Representative for Central Asia held bilateral consultations with 
Turkey  in  Ankara.  Turkey  conducts  High  Level  Strategic/Cooperation  Councils  with  25 
countries  and  is  part  of  eight  trilateral  or  quadrilateral  regional  mechanisms.  It  held  the 
chairmanship of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Union for the Mediterranean.  

106 

 
(See Political criteria — Regional issues and international obligations - for more information on 
developments in bilateral relations with other enlargement countries and EU Member States.) 

The  institutional  framework  enabling  Turkey's  participation  in  the  common  foreign  and 
security policy (CFSP) and CSDP is in place. In 2019, Turkey aligned, when invited, with 19 
out of 91 relevant High Representative declarations on behalf of the EU and Council decisions, 
that representing an alignment rate of around 21%. Turkey continued not to align with most EU 
restrictive  measures,  including  related  to  Russia,  Venezuela  and  Syria.  Turkey  has  not  yet 
signed the statute of the International Criminal Court and not yet ratified the Paris Agreement on 
Climate  Change.  Turkey  held  the  Chairmanship  of  the  Organisation  of  Islamic  Cooperation 
(OIC) Summit until the end of May 2019. 

In October 2019, Turkey launched 'Operation Peace Spring' in north-east Syria, carried out by 
Turkish  Armed  Forces  and  the  opposition  Syrian  National  Army.  The  proclaimed  Turkish 
objectives of the operation were the removal of the Democratic Union Party/People's Protection 
Units (PYD/YPG), that Turkey considers to be a terrorist organisation, from the border region, 
and establishing a buffer zone to resettle Syrian refugees. This operation led to a deterioration in 
Turkey’s  relations  with  the  EU,  the  US  and  countries  in  the  region.  The  EU  condemned 
Turkey's  unilateral  military  action  in  north-east  Syria  and  urged  Turkey  to  end  its  military 
action,  withdraw  its  forces  and  respect  international  humanitarian  law.  The  vast  majority  of 
Member States decided to halt arms export licensing to Turkey.  

Separate agreements with the US and with Russia, concluded in October, resulted in the creation 
of  a  Turkish-controlled  area  stretching  from  Tel  Abyad  to  Ras  al-Ayn  and  going  30  km  deep 
into  the  Syrian  territory.  The  Turkish  authorities  supported  activities  conducted  by  the  Syrian 
Interim Government to bring back stability and create administrative structures on the ground. 
They further encouraged the Syrian Interim Government to produce results in the investigation 
and judicial outcome of alleged war crimes conducted by Turkey-backed Syrian National Army 
elements.  In  September  2019,  Turkey  hosted  the  5th  Astana  Summit  in  Ankara,  which 
contributed significantly to the finalisation of the composition of the Constitutional Committee. 
Turkey  continued  to  support  the  National  Coalition  for  Syrian  Revolutionary  and  Opposition 
Forces, based in Istanbul.  

The situation in the Idlib region, which was marked by a renewed advance by the regime on the 
province in 2019, escalated even more in the beginning of 2020 and raised concerns for Turkey 
and for the international community in view of possible spill-over effects and of a potential new 
humanitarian crisis with close to 1 million new Syrian IDPs moving close to the Syrian-Turkish 
border.  Turkey  suffered  numerous  casualties  among  the  military  and  civilian  staff  present  in 
Idlib  and  reacted  with  attacks  on  military  positions  of  the  Syrian  regime,  notably  in  the 
framework  of  the  Turkish  operation  ‘Spring  Shield’,  which  it  launched  days  after  airstrikes 
killed 34 Turkish soldiers. In March 2020, Russia and Turkey reached a ceasefire agreement that 
stabilised frontlines in north-west Syria, established a new corridor along the M4 highway, and 
created a framework for joint  Russian-Turkish military patrols.  Turkey maintained its military 
observation  posts  on  the  ground,  including  those  situated  in  territories  now  controlled  by  the 
Syrian regime, and brought in further reinforcements to the region. Turkey cooperates with the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and initiated a regional dialogue regarding the 
conditions for safe, voluntary and dignified return of Syrian refugees. 

Relations with the US continued to be strenuous, also in light of the continued US opposition to 
the  purchase  of  Russian  S-400  air  defence  systems  by  Turkey.  US  sanctions  against  Turkey 
remained an option and legislation passed by the US Senate in late 2019 renewed a decision to 
exclude Turkey from the US-led F-35 fighter jet programme. The same piece of US legislation 
included a measure to sanction companies involved in Russian natural gas pipelines to Europe, 
which also affects TurkStream.  Other irritants in the relation were the longstanding request of 
Turkey for the extradition of Fethullah Gülen, penalties on Halkbank for the alleged breach of 

107 

 
sanctions  on  Iran  and  the  US  policy  on  Palestine,  notably  on  the  issue  of  settlements  and  the 
future status of Jerusalem. The Turkish President had regular contacts with the US President and 
visited the US in November 2019 to discuss regional and bilateral issues. During the Idlib crisis 
in February 2020, the US openly expressed support for the Turkish Armed Forces trying to stop 
the offensive of the Syrian regime with the support of Russian aviation and Iranian militias. In 
spite of irritants, the US-Turkey cooperation continued against Da’esh and in the security field 
as NATO allies. 

Relations with the Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA) were marked by the signing 
of  a  Memorandum  of  Understanding  on  the  delimitation  of  maritime  jurisdictions  in  the 
Mediterranean  Sea  in  November  2019,  ratified by  the  Turkish  Grand  National  Assembly.  The 
EU  stressed  that  the  Turkey-Libya  Memorandum  of  Understanding  on  the  delimitation  of 
maritime jurisdictions infringes upon the sovereign rights of third States, does not comply with 
the  Law  of  the  Sea  and  cannot  produce  any  legal  consequences  for  third  States.    A  second 
Memorandum of Understanding was signed on the security and military cooperation, which was 
not  supported  by  the  opposition  parties  during  ratification  in  the  Turkish  Grand  National 
Assembly.  Following  the  attack  by  General  Haftar  forces  on  Tripoli  in  April  2019,  the  GNA 
formally requested the military support from five countries, the USA, Italy, Algeria, the UK and 
Turkey, with the latter being the only one to have responded positively. The significant military 
deployment  of  Turkish  military  assets    continued  since  then.  The  EU  expressed  its  strong 
concern about the decision of the Turkish Grand National Assembly to the military deployments 
in  Libya,  in  a  blatant  violation  of  the  UN  arms  embargo  regime.  In  response  to  the  Turkish 
military  build-up,  Russia  also  stepped  up  the  deployment  of  its  military  assets  to  Libya,  with 
both countries further deepening their military foothold. The increasing foreign interference in 
Libya by these and other regional actors continued to seriously challenge the implementation of 
the UN-led Berlin process that aims to relaunch the political process as the only responsible way 
out of the Libyan crisis.    

Turkey  and  Russia further developed their bilateral cooperation in  a range of areas, including 
cooperation in defence, economic, energy, tourism and culture fields. On Idlib/Syria and Libya, 
though,  they  support  different  conflicting  parties.  Turkey  and  Russia  leaders  met  and  spoke 
regularly, and both countries are coordinating military control in north-east Syria as well as in 
parts  of  north-west  Syria.  In  January  2020,  Russia  and  Turkey  inaugurated  the  TurkStream 
pipeline, which will supply Turkey and some EU countries with natural gas from Russia. 

Relations with Ukraine further developed, with mutual visits by the Presidents, notably in the 
areas of defence and aerospace. Turkey continues to stand on Ukraine's side regarding Russia's 
illegal  annexation  of  Crimea  and  support  to  the  "rebels"  in  the  Donbass  region.  Turkey 
welcomed the exchange of prisoners between Moscow and Kiev. 

Turkey  supported  the  safeguarding  of  the  Joint  Comprehensive  Plan  of  Action  on  Iran  and 
acknowledged  the  EU  initiatives  on  the  matter.  US  sanctions  and  the  contracting  Iranian 
economy  seriously  affected  bilateral  trade,  leading  to  a  decrease  by  one  third  in  2019  as 
compared to 2012. Turkey maintained close relations with Iraq and various high-level meetings 
took place amid growing tensions between Iran and the USA, notably following the US targeted 
drone  strike  near  the  Baghdad  International  Airport  that  killed  Iranian  major  general  Qasem 
Soleimani  of  the  Islamic  Revolutionary  Guard  Corps.  Turkey,  at  all  occasions,  reiterated  its 
support  to  Iraq’s  sovereignty  and  political  stability.  The  Turkish  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs 
visited Baghdad and advocated for de-escalation and stability in the region. Turkey proposed a 
draft joint document designed to become a new framework for cooperation in the military and 
security  fields.  Turkey  also  maintained  good  relations  with  Iraq's  Kurdistan  Regional 
Government administration and launched the military operations ‘Claw-Eagle’ and ‘Claw-Tiger’ 
in June 2020 on Iraqi territory in its fight against terrorism, in particular against the PKK, which 
remains on the EU list of persons, groups and entities involved in acts of terrorism. 

108 

 
Turkey  intensified  its  relations  with  Tunisia  and  Algeria  through  high-level  visits,  notably  at 
the  end  of  December  in  light  of  the  developments  in  Libya.  Relations  with  Egypt  remained 
tense  and  respective  positions  further  diverged  on  the  situation  in  Libya  and  on  the  issue  of 
energy  cooperation  in  the  Eastern  Mediterranean.  Turkey  continued  to  criticise  Israel  for  its 
settlement policy and intervened in defence of the Palestinian  interests, including in its  strong 
rejection  of  the  US  Middle  East  initiative.  It  mobilised  humanitarian  support  for  Palestine. 
Turkey  praised  the  report  by  the  UN  Special  Rapporteur  extrajudicial,  summary  or  arbitrary 
killings released in June on the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi at the Consulate of Saudi 
Arabia in Istanbul. In March 2020, Istanbul Prosecutor’s office indicted 20 Saudi nationals on 
charges  of  murder  and  incitement  to  murder  and  issued  arrest  warrants.  Both  sides  blocked 
media outlets that are affiliated with the respective other governments. High-level meetings took 
place between Turkey and Qatar, who agreed to provide Turkey with USD 2 billion in currency 
swaps  to  help  support  the  Turkish  economy.  Turkey  increased  its  military  presence  in  Qatar. 
Relations  with  the  United  Arab  Emirates  (UAE)  were  marked  by  increasing  tensions,  as 
opposed  sides  in  the  Libyan  conflict  and  in  view  of  media  reports  of  the  UAE  demarches  in 
Damascus against the Idlib ceasefire. 

Regarding  the  South  Caucasus  countries,  after  14  years,  the  Turkey-Georgia  Economic 
Commission resumed talks on trade and economic relations and agreed to work on a simplified 
customs line to help end transportation delays. Turkey and Azerbaijan inaugurated the Europe 
link  of  the  strategic  Trans-Anatolian  Natural  Gas  Pipeline  in  November,  and  continue  to 
strengthen their  historical,  strategic and  cultural  ties.  Turkey's  relations  with  Armenia  did  not 
improve, in spite of some attempts of dialogue. 

Turkey considers the  Central Asian states as strategic partners in regional and global affairs, 
and Turkey’s regional strategy focused on enhanced connectivity and energy projects, as well as 
on  the  Turkic  Council.  Cooperation  with  Kazakhstan,  Turkmenistan,  Tajikistan  and 
Kyrgyzstan developed, in particular on trade. Turkey signed a cooperation deal on information 
sharing with Afghanistan, to which Turkey continued to provide humanitarian and development 
assistance. Turkey also attended the signature of the US-Taliban peace agreement and promoted 
itself  as  a  candidate  to  mediate  the  intra-Afghan  negotiation  dialogue.  Turkey  continued  to 
contribute to NATO’s mission in Afghanistan. Turkey expressed its concern on the annulment 
of article 370 of India's Constitution granting special status to Jammu-Kashmir, and asked India 
and Pakistan to engage in a dialogue within the framework of the relevant UN resolutions. 

Turkey  and  China  worked  together  to  align  Turkey's  Middle  Corridor  infrastructure  strategy 
with  China's  Belt  and  Road  Initiative.  The  first  freight  train  traveling  from  China  to  Europe 
crossed  via  Istanbul  through  the  sub-sea  Bosphorus  rail  tunnel  in  November  2019.  Turkey 
further  developed  its  cooperation  with  Indonesia  in  the  defence  industry.  Turkey  and  Japan 
worked  on  an  economic  partnership  deal  and  agreed  on  technical  cooperation  between  their 
respective  state-run  aid  agencies.  A  trilateral  meeting  was  held  with  Malaysia  and  Pakistan. 
Turkey held talks with Thailand and Philippines on trade and defence cooperation. 

Turkey  further  strengthened  its  relations  with  partners  in  Africa  and  Latin  America.  Turkey 
increased  the  number  of  embassies  on  the  African  continent  to  42  and  hosted  the  3rd  African 
Muslim Religious Leaders summit. It increased trade relations on the continent and a Turkey-
Africa partnership summit was scheduled to take place in 2020, but had to be postponed due the 
COVID-19  pandemic.  Relations  with  Asia  and  Africa  represent  renewed  priorities  for  the 
Turkish foreign relations. 

Turkey  continued  to  actively  participate  in  Operation  EUFOR  ALTHEA  in  the  framework  of  
the  EU  common  security  and  defence  policy  (CSDP),  conducted  under  the  ‘Berlin  Plus’ 
arrangements  between  the  EU  and  NATO.  It  remains  the  biggest  non-EU  troop  contributor  to 
this  military  crisis  management  operation  and  the  largest  single  third  country  contributor  to 
CSDP. Turkish participation in the EU Advisory Mission (EUAM) Ukraine and the EU Rule of 

109 

 
Law Mission (EULEX) in Kosovo was suspended after Turkish seconded staff was withdrawn 
following  the  attempted  coup  of  2016,  but  Turkey  later  expressed  its  interest  in  continuing  to 
contribute to these missions and submitted applications to EULEX.  

Turkey,  together  with  other  non-EU  NATO  Allies,  continues  to  request  to  be  involved  in  EU 
defence initiatives (PESCO, EDF). Turkey’s narrow interpretation of the EU-NATO cooperation 
framework  continues  to  pose  an  obstacle  to  building  a  genuine  organisation-to-organisation 
relationship,  in  particular  by  limiting  the  exchange  of  information  and  blocking  the  inclusive 
participation of all Member States in joint activities of the two organisations.  

Turkey  is  currently  contributing  to  eight  UN  peacekeeping  operations.  Turkey  participated  at 
President  level  in  the  UN  General  Assembly  in  September  2019,  making  a  strong  plea  for 
multilateralism,  and  continued  to  voice  support  for  a  reform  of  the  UN  Security  Council.  It 
reiterated  its  dedication  to  the  2030  Agenda  of  the  Sustainable  Development  Goals.  In  June 
2020, a former Turkish Minister for EU Affairs was elected President of the 75th session of the 
UN  General  Assembly.  Turkey  participated  at  the  G20  Osaka  Summit  and  the  OSCE 
Ministerial Council in Bratislava. In light of the COVID-19 pandemic, Turkey  maintained that 
global cooperation is indispensable in order to fight efficiently the pandemic and participated in 
the Coronavirus Global Response International Pledging Event hosted by the European Union on 
4 May 2020, pledging EUR 75 million. Turkey stepped up its foreign policy initiatives mainly by 
providing humanitarian aid to more than 120 countries, including EU Member States. 

5.32.  Chapter 32: Financial control 

The  EU  promotes  the  reform  of  national  governance  systems  to  improve  managerial 
accountability,  sound  financial  management  of  income  and  expenditure,  and  external  audit  of 
public  funds.  The  financial  control  rules  further  protect  the  EU’s  financial  interests  against 
fraud in the management of EU funds and the euro against counterfeiting. 

Turkey has a good level of preparation on financial control. Limited progress was made in the 
reporting period. The Turkish Court of Accounts (TCA) published its 2019-2023 Strategic Plan. 
While a new anti-fraud coordination service (AFCOS) was assigned to facilitate cooperation and 
exchange of information with the European Commission, the AFCOS network has yet to be re-
established.  The  purpose,  authority  and  responsibility  of  internal  audit  is  undermined  by  the 
absence  of  a  legal  requirement  to  have  internal  audit  units  in  Ministries.  The  Turkey  Wealth 
Fund remained not fully subject to the direct audit by the Turkish Court of Accounts. Last year’s 
recommendations were only partially addressed and remain valid. 

In the coming year, Turkey should: 

→ update the Public Internal Financial Control policy paper and its action plan and ensure that a 
formal  coordination,  monitoring  and  reporting  framework  is  put  in  place  for  the  updated 
action plan; 

→ ensure systematic and timely implementation of external audit recommendations; 

→ re-establish the AFCOS network and adopt a national anti-fraud strategy. 

Public internal financial control (PIFC) 

The  strategic  framework  is  partially  in  place.  The  update  of  the  Public  Internal  Financial 
Control  policy  paper  is  in  progress  since  2012.  There  is  no  mechanism  in  place  to  coordinate 
implementation  of 
to  ensure  regular  monitoring  and  reporting  on 
implementation. As Turkey does not have a strategic framework for public administration reform 
in place, it is not clear to what extent  all the enabling conditions for managerial accountability 
are being addressed. (See also Public administration reform) 

the  reforms  and 

110 

 
Exceptional management and control procedures or derogations applied by the authorities during 
the  COVID-19  crisis  need  to  be  well  documented,  accompanied  by  adequate  safeguards  and 
considered for special audits. 

The  Turkish  administration  has  a  uniform  management  structure  that  combines  elements  of 
managerial  accountability  and  delegation  with  a  results-oriented  performance  management 
system.  Further  efforts  are  needed  to  address  harmonisation  of  legislation,  managerial 
accountability,  including  delegation  of  decision-making  responsibilities,  and  functioning  of 
internal  control.  The  Public  Financial  Management  and  Control  (PFMC)  Law  applies  to  all 
public  institutions  and  sets  out  the  relevant  responsibilities  of  the  heads  of  public  institutions, 
including managerial duties and the delegation of authority to authorising officers.  

The  PFMC  Law  regulates  internal  control,  which  functions  largely  in  line  with  international 
standards.  The  application  of  risk  management  is  still  at  an  early  stage,  and  monitoring  and 
reporting of irregularities are yet to be further developed. Turkey has a treasury single account, 
but  the  inclusion  of  local  administrations  and  regulatory  and  supervisory  agencies  within  its 
scope raises concerns. 

Internal audit practice is regulated in line with international standards in the PFMC Law. An 
internal audit manual and a code of ethics are in place, as are manuals prepared by the Central 
Harmonisation Unit, but they have not been updated since 2013. There is no legal requirement 
for Ministries to have an internal audit unit, just internal auditors, and there is no formal status 
for  heads  of  internal  audit  as  a  Unit  Head.  There  is  no  entity  performing  the  role  of  an  Audit 
Committee  and  auditors  report  directly  to  their  Deputy  Ministers  or  a  senior  manager.  These 
reporting  arrangements  could  compromise  auditors’  independence  in  planning  and  performing 
their work. Quality review needs to be systematically implemented. There is generally a lack of 
data on internal audit planning and implementation of recommendations. There is no systematic 
follow-up of the implementation of internal audit recommendations. 

Two Central Harmonisation Units, one for financial management and control and the other for 
internal  audit,  are  in  charge  of  developing  and  disseminating  methodological  guidance, 
monitoring and reporting on PIFC implementation. The former does not perform internal control 
quality  reviews.  The  Internal  Audit  Coordination  Board,  which  notably  monitors  the  internal 
audit systems of the public administrations, develops IA standards and publishes manuals, is not 
operating, hampering the CHUs from developing their work.  

External audit 

The constitutional and legal framework provides for the independence of the Turkish Court of 
Accounts  (TCA).  The  TCA  law  is  in  line  with  International  Organisation  of  Supreme  Audit 
Institutions (INTOSAI) standards. It provides for an almost exhaustive audit mandate and gives 
the  TCA  full  discretion  in  discharging  its  responsibilities.  Concerns  exist  around  fiscal 
discipline, transparency and accountability  in  relation to  the Turkey  Wealth  Fund (TWF), now 
directly affiliated with the President of the Republic and not fully subject to the direct audit by 
the TCA. Only a number of companies in the TWF portfolio are audited by the TCA and some 
TWF activities are not subject to external audit. The TWF is audited by auditors appointed by the 
President, who is also the Chairman of the TWF. 

The  TCA  has  both  audit  and  judicial  functions.  In  2018,  it  had  1,844  staff,  including  772 
auditors.  The  TCA  published  its  2019  -  2023  Strategic  Plan,  which  notably  foresees  the 
development of risk-based audit and the development of its human resources capacity. 

The TCA has improved the quality of audit work carrying out 275 performance audits in 2018. 
The  audit  reports largely  comply  with  international  standards.  The  TCA  submits  annually  four 
audit  reports  to  the  Parliament  (External  Audit  General  Evaluation  Report,  Accountability 
General  Evaluation  Report,  Financial  Statistics  Evaluation  Report,  and  Report  on  State 

111 

 
Enterprises) in addition to a statement of general conformity. The reports of the TCA are only 
considered by the Parliament during its deliberations on the budget. 

Regarding  the  impact  of  audit  work,  the  TCA  assesses  the  internal  control  environment  of 
audited entities  as  part of  its audit  work, and thus contributes to  PIFC development. The TCA 
reports  on  state-owned  enterprises  are  analysed  by  the  commission  of  state-owned  enterprises, 
while  other  audit  reports  are  analysed  by  the  committee  on  planning  and  budget.  The  TCA 
reports  are  published  online  every  year,  with  the  exception  of  those  on  state  economic 
enterprises. The TCA annual audit report is discussed in the relevant parliamentary committee, 
but  increased  parliamentary  scrutiny  and  an  appropriate  mechanism  for  following-up  audit 
findings  and  recommendations  still  need  to  be  ensured.  The  low  number  of  referrals  for 
prosecution continues to be of concern. Many TCA recommendations are not systematically and 
swiftly  implemented  by  the  audited  institutions.  A  working  group  between  the  TCA  and  the 
Ministry of Treasury and Finance is operational and there is a need for a similar working group 
with the Parliament. 

Protection of the EU’s financial interests 

While Turkey has reached a good level of EU acquis alignment, it still needs to fully align its 
legislation with the EU Directive on the fight against fraud to the Union’s financial interests by 
means of criminal law. Turkey assigned the State Supervisory Council (SSC) as the anti-fraud 
coordination service (AFCOS) to work with the European Commission. However, an AFCOS 
network, involving other relevant authorities, still has to be re-established. Turkey also needs to 
adopt a national anti-fraud strategy. Turkey should significantly strengthen its cooperation with 
the  European  Commission  during  investigations,  and  continue  to  report  irregularities  and 
suspected fraud cases to the Commission. Turkey reported 637 cases to the Commission via the 
online  irregularity  management  system  since  2012,  of  which  109  cases  in  2019  only.  Turkey 
needs to continue to develop a solid track record on investigations and reporting of irregularities. 

Protection of the euro against counterfeiting 

Turkey  has  reached  a  high  level  of  EU  acquis  alignment  in  this  area.  Technical  analysis  of 
counterfeit money, including euro banknotes and coins, is carried out by a dedicated department 
in  the  Central  Bank  and  technical  analysis  of  counterfeit  coins  including  euro  coins  are 
performed by the Turkish State Mint. Credit institutions that do not withdraw counterfeits from 
circulation are subject to financial penalties. Turkey ensures cooperation with the Commission 
and the European Central Bank and takes part in the actions of the Pericles 2020 programme. 

5.33.  Chapter 33: Financial and budgetary provisions 

This chapter covers the rules governing the funding of the EU budget (‘own resources '). These 
resources  mainly  consist  of:  (i)  contributions  based  on  the  gross  national  income  of  each 
Member  State;  (ii)  customs  duties;  and  (iii)  a  resource  based  on  value-added  tax.  Member 
States must have the appropriate administrative capacity to adequately coordinate and ensure 
the correct calculation, collection, payment and control of own resources. 

Turkey  has  some  level  of  preparation  in  the  area  of  financial  and  budgetary  provisions.  No 
progress  was  made  during  the  reporting  period.  Solid  coordination  structures,  administrative 
capacity  and  implementing  rules  for  the  correct  application  of  the  own  resources  systems  will 
need to be set up in due course. 

In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

→ further align the GNI Inventory with Eurostat’s GNI Inventory Guide. 

Basic principles and  institutions in the underlying policy areas linked to the application of the 
own  resources  system  are  already  in  place  (see  Chapters  16  -  Taxation,  18  -  Statistics,  29  - 
Customs  union  and  32  -  Financial  control).  The  Customs  Union  with  the  EU  on  processed 
agricultural goods and industrial goods (with the exception of coal and steel products) continues 

112 

 
to  ensure  considerable  alignment  of  Turkey’s  customs  legislation  with  the  EU  acquis  on 
customs while a draft customs law aligned with the Union Customs Code is yet to be adopted. 
This will facilitate preparation in traditional own resources, i.e. mainly customs duties. 

For  the  value  added  tax-based  resource,  preparation  is  needed  to  correctly  calculate  the 
statistical  VAT  base,  the  weighted  average  rate  and  the  positive  and  negative  corrections  to 
offset  the  impact  of  derogations  from  the  EU  acquis.  Sound  measures  are  needed  to  combat 
VAT  and  customs  duties  fraud  and  resolute  actions  are  needed  to  tackle  the  non-observed 
economy. 

Concerning the gross national income-based resource, Turkey will need to continue its efforts 
to ensure that its national accounts and GNI calculations take account of the informal economy 
and  exhaustiveness  in  general  and  to  bring  them  fully  in  line  with  the  European  system  of 
accounts (ESA 2010).  

As concerns the administrative infrastructure, Turkey will need to set up a fully operational 
coordination  structure,  with  appropriate  administrative  capacity  and  implementing  rules,  to 
ensure that it will be able to correctly calculate, forecast, account for, collect, pay, control and 
report own resources to the EU in line with the EU acquis. 

113 

 
 
 
 
 
Annex I – Relations between the EU and Turkey 

Within the framework of accession negotiations, 16 chapters have been opened so far and one 
of  these  was  provisionally  closed.  In  June  2019,  the  General  Affairs  Council  reiterated  the 
Council’s position of June 2018 that Turkey has been moving further away from the European 
Union.  Turkey's  accession  negotiations  have  therefore  effectively  come  to  a  standstill  and  no 
further chapters can be considered for opening or closing.  

Dialogue  between  the  EU  and  Turkey  was  hampered  by  Turkey’s  provocative  actions  in  the 
Eastern Mediterranean and the corresponding EU reaction. In light of the unauthorised drilling 
activities of Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean, in July 2019 the Council decided to suspend 
negotiations  with  Turkey  on  the  Comprehensive  Air  Transport  Agreement,  not  to  hold  for  the 
time  being  the  EU-Turkey  Association  Council  as  well  as  further  meetings  of  the  EU-Turkey 
high-level  dialogues,  to  endorse  the  Commission’s  proposal  to  reduce  the  pre-accession 
assistance to Turkey for 2020, and to invite the European Investment Bank to review its lending 
activities in Turkey, notably with regard to sovereign-backed lending. The EU further adopted a 
framework  for  targeted  measures  against  Turkey  in  November  2019  and  decided  in  February 
2020 to add two individuals to the list of designations under this sanctions framework.  

On  1  October  2020,  the  European  Council  stated  that,  provided  constructive  efforts  to  stop 
illegal  activities  vis-à-vis  Greece  and  Cyprus  are  sustained,  the  European  Council  agreed  to 
launch a positive political EU-Turkey agenda with a specific emphasis on the modernisation of 
the  Customs  Union  and  trade  facilitation,  people  to  people  contacts,  High  level  dialogues, 
continued cooperation on migration issues, in line with the 2016 EU-Turkey Statement. The EU 
has  a strategic interest in  a stable and secure environment in  the Eastern Mediterranean and in 
the  development  of  a  cooperative  and  mutually  beneficial  relationship  with  Turkey.  The 
European  Council  also  stressed  that  in  case  of  renewed  unilateral  actions  or  provocations  in 
breach  of international law, the EU will use  all the instruments  and the options  at  its disposal, 
including  in  accordance  with  Article  29  TEU  and  Article  215  TFEU,  in  order  to  defend  its 
interests and those of its Member States. Reforms and developments in Turkey continued to be 
monitored  by  the  bodies  set  up  under  the  Association  Agreement,  with  subcommittees  kept 
being held throughout the reporting period. The Commission, jointly with the European External 
Action Service, has maintained EU-Turkey relations in all key areas of joint interest based on a 
broad engagement. President Michel and von der Leyen met President Erdoğan in Brussels in 
March  2020.  High  Representative/Vice  President  Borrell  continued  engagement  with  Foreign 
Minister  Çavuşoğlu,  including  in  view  of  the  situation  in  the  Eastern  Mediterranean  and  the 
implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement of March 2016. The political dialogue between the 
EU and Turkey on foreign and security policy issues continued, including as part of the March 
2019 EU-Turkey Association Council and senior officials meetings.  

Turkey is the EU’s sixth largest trading partner, while the EU is Turkey’s largest. Two out of 
five  goods  traded  by  Turkey  come  from  or  go  to  the  EU  and  over  70%  of  foreign  direct 
investment  in  Turkey  originates  in  the  EU.  As  part  of  the  Economic  Reform  Programme 
exercise,  Turkey  participated  in  the  multilateral  economic  dialogue  with  the  Commission  and 
Member  States  held  in  May  2019  to  prepare  the  country  for  participation  in  multilateral 
surveillance  and  economic  policy  coordination  as  part  of  the  EU’s  Economic  and  Monetary 
Union. The EU and Turkey also continue to coordinate in the framework of the G-20.  

Regarding  the  Customs  Union,  the  Commission  adopted  a  recommendation  for  opening  of 
negotiations with Turkey on the modernisation of the Customs Union in December 2016. This 
recommendation  has  been  forwarded  to  the  Council  where  it  has  been  under  consideration, 
without  prejudice  to  Member  States'  position.  In  June  2019,  the  General  Affairs  Council 
reiterated that, under the prevailing circumstances, no further work towards the modernisation of 
the EU-Turkey Customs Union could be foreseen. The Customs Union Joint Committee met in 

114 

 
July  2019  to  discuss  a  significant  number  of  issues  hampering  the  smooth  functioning  of  the 
Customs Union.  

In the area of visa, migration and asylum, the implementation of the March 2016 EU-Turkey 
Statement has continued to deliver concrete results in reducing irregular and dangerous crossings 
on  the  Eastern  Mediterranean  Route  to  Europe  and  in  saving  lives  at  sea.  Turkey  sustained  its 
considerable  efforts  to  provide  significant  support  to  close  to  4  million  refugees,  of  which  3.6 
million  Syrians.  In  the  context  of  the  EU-Turkey  visa  liberalisation  dialogue,  despite  an 
announced acceleration of work by Turkey, no outstanding visa liberalisation benchmarks were 
fulfilled.  The  EU  and  Turkey  continued  negotiations,  launched  in  November  2018,  on  an 
international  agreement  on  the  exchange  of  personal  data  between  Europol  and  the  Turkish 
authorities competent for fighting serious crime and terrorism.  

Turkey  and  the  EU  further  built  on  the  fruitful  cooperation  under  the  Facility  for  Refugees  in 
Turkey. The Facility manages a total of EUR 6 billion; the full operational budget of the Facility 
was  committed  by  the  end  of  2019;  disbursements  have  reached  EUR  3.8  billion,  with  the 
balance  to  be  disbursed  in  the  course  of  implementation  of  Facility  projects.  Facility  funding 
continued  to  support  projects  focused  on  humanitarian  assistance,  education,  migration 
management,  health,  municipal  infrastructure,  and  socio-economic  support.  In  2020,  an 
additional  EUR  485  million  were  mobilised  by  the  EU  to  ensure  the  continuation  of  urgent 
humanitarian aid to refugees in Turkey.    

Regarding bilateral financial assistance, the financial envelope under the Instrument for Pre-
accession  Assistance  (IPA)  for  Turkey  was  further  reduced  by  the  EU  Budgetary  Authority  in 
line with previous years’ decisions based on a lack of performance and backsliding on reforms. 
The IPA allocation for Turkey for 2020 amounts to EUR 168.2 million. The assistance includes 
actions  related  to  fundamental  rights,  home  affairs,  support  to  civil  society,  co-financing 
ofTurkey's  participation  in  Union  programmes  and  agencies,  and  the  Jean  Monnet  Scholarship 
Programme. It also includes two actions on strengthening the institutional capacity of the Audit 
Authority  of  Turkey  and  the  second  phase  of  a  Town  Twinning  programme  supporting  green 
actions in Turkish municipalities.   

Taking into consideration the exceptional circumstances caused by the outbreak of the COVID-
19  pandemic,  the  Commission,  upon  request  of  the  Turkish  authorities,  agreed  to  extend  the 
operational  implementation  deadlines  for  some  of  the  ongoing  annual  and  multi-annual 
programmes. It was also agreed to redirect up to EUR 83 million of EU assistance to support the 
fight against the pandemic and support the most vulnerable. 

Turkey participates in the following EU programmes: Erasmus+, Horizon 2020, Customs 2020, 
Fiscalis  2020,  COSME  (Competitiveness  of  Enterprises  and  Small  and  Medium-sized 
Enterprises) and EASI (Employment and Social Innovation). Since 2019 it has also participated 
the  European 
in 
Environmental Agency, the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction and the 
Civil Protection Mechanism. 

the  European  Solidarity  Corps  programme.  Turkey  participates 

in 

115 

 
 
 
STATISTICAL DATA (as of 03.04.2020) 
Turkey 

Basic data 

Population (thousand) 
Total area of the country (km²) 

National accounts 

2007 

2014 

2015 

2016 

2017 

2018 

69 730 
  785 347 

76 668 
785 347 

77 696 
783 562 

78 741 
80 811 
79 815 
780 270s  780 270s  779 972b 

2007 

2014 

2015 

2016 

2017 

2018 

No
te 

No
te 

Gross domestic product (GDP) (million national currency) 

  880 461 

Gross domestic product (GDP) (million euro) 
GDP (euro per capita) 
GDP per capita (in purchasing power standards (PPS)) 
GDP per capita (in PPS), relative to the EU average (EU-27 = 100) 
Real GDP growth rate: change on previous year of GDP volume 
(%) 
Employment growth (national accounts data), relative to the 
previous year (%) 
Labour productivity growth: growth in GDP (in volume) per person 
employed, relative to the previous year (%) 
Unit labour cost growth, relative to the previous year (%) 
**3 year change (T/T-3) in the nominal unit labour cost growth 
index (2010 = 100) 
Labour productivity per person employed: GDP (in PPS) per person 
employed relative to EU average (EU-27 = 100) 
Gross value added by main sectors 
Agriculture, forestry and fisheries (%) 

2 044 46
6 
703 412 
9 110 
17 180 
64.7 
5.2 

2 338 64
8 
772 979 
9 880 
18 490 
67.3 
6.1 

2 608 52
6 
780 225 
9 840 
18 630 
66.2 
3.2 

3 110 65
0 
754 902 
9 400 
19 540 
66.9 
7.5 

3 724 38
8 
652 520 
8 020 
19 730 
65.4 
2.8 

: 

: 

: 
: 

: 

: 

: 

: 
: 

: 

: 

: 

: 
: 

: 

: 

: 

: 
: 

: 

: 

: 

: 
: 

: 

492 841 
7 020 
11 640 
47.4 
5.0 

: 

: 

: 
: 

: 

8.5 

7.5 

7.8 

7.0 

6.9 

6.5 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Industry (%) 
Construction (%) 
Services (%) 
Final consumption expenditure, as a share of GDP (%) 
Gross fixed capital formation, as a share of GDP (%) 
Changes in inventories, as a share of GDP (%) 
Exports of goods and services, relative to GDP (%) 
Imports of goods and services, relative to GDP (%) 
Gross fixed capital formation by the general government sector, as a 
percentage of GDP (%) 

Business 

Industrial production volume index (2015 = 100) 
Number of active enterprises (number) 

Birth rate: number of enterprise births in the reference period (t) 
divided by the number of enterprises active in t (%) 
Death rate: number of enterprise deaths in the reference period (t) 
divided by the number of enterprises active in t (%) 
People employed in SMEs as a share of all persons employed 
(within the non-financial business economy) (%) 
Value added by SMEs (in the non-financial business economy) 
(EUR million) 
Total value added (in the non-financial business economy) (EUR 
million) 

Inflation rate and house prices 

22.2 
7.7 
61.6 
76.1 
28.1 
0.6 
21.2 
26.1 
: 

22.7 
9.2 
60.6 
74.9 
28.9 
0.1 
23.8 
27.6 
: 

22.4 
9.3 
60.5 
74.2 
29.7 
-1.3 
23.3 
26.0 
: 

22.3 
9.7 
61.0 
74.7 
29.3 
-1.1 
22.0 
24.9 
: 

23.3 
9.7 
60.1 
73.5 
30.1 
0.9 
24.8 
29.3 
: 

24.9 
8.0 
60.6 
71.5 
29.9 
-0.3 
29.5 
30.6 
: 

2007 

2014 

2015 

2016 

2017 

2018 

69.4 
: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

94.5 
2 888 18
0 
12.2 

100.0 
2 941 23
3 
12.1 

103.4 
2 981 38
1 
12.3 

112.7 
3 100 41
2 
: 

10.8 

: 

: 

: 

75.6 

75.1 

74.6 

74.2 

110 973 

124 863 

130 934 

127 683 

197 147 

228 309 

241 711 

236 088 

114.1 
: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

2007 

2014 

2015 

2016 

2017 

2018 

No
te 

No
te 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Harmonised consumer price index (HICP), change relative to the 
previous year (%) 
**Annual change in the deflated house price index (2015 = 100) 

8.8 

8.9 

7.7 

7.7 

11.1 

16.3 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

Balance of payments 

2007 

2014 

2015 

2016 

2017 

2018 

No
te 

Balance of payments: current account total (million euro) 

Balance of payments current account: trade balance (million euro) 

Balance of payments current account: net services (million euro) 
Balance of payments current account: net balance for primary 
income (million euro) 
Balance of payments current account: net balance for secondary 
income (million euro) 
Net balance for primary and secondary income: of which 
government transfers (million euro) 
**3 year backward moving average of the current account balance 
relative to GDP (%) 
**Five year change in share of world exports of goods and services 
(%) 
Net balance (inward - outward) of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
(million euro) 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) abroad (million euro) 
of which FDI of the reporting economy in the EU-27 countries 
(million euro) 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) in the reporting economy (million 
euro) 
of which FDI of the EU-27 countries in the reporting economy 
(million euro) 

-
26 960.2 
-
34 170.7 

-
22 118.7 
-
34 914.4 
  10 280.2  20 079.0  21 836.9  13 789.0  17 648.9  22 055.9 

-
32 852.1 
-
47 868.3 

-
28 940.1 
-
43 378.1 

-
29 936.8 
-
36 942.8 

-
41 918.2 
-
52 186.4 

-4 580.8 

-6 201.7 

-8 698.5 

-8 294.3 

-9 783.1 

1 511.1 

1 138.9 

1 299.7 

1 511.4 

2 402.4 

-
10 165.7 
734.8 

1 732.9 

840.0 

978.8 

1 493.4 

2 223.6 

: 

-5.1 

-5.6 

-5.0 

-4.1 

-4.4 

-4.3 

: 

: 

12.0 

10.3 

1.2 

-0.1 

  14 550.2 

4 568.3 

11 632.3 

9 211.3 

7 277.2 

1 536.7 
: 

5 020.7 
: 

4 336.2 
: 

2 480.8 
: 

2 328.9 
: 

  16 086.8 

9 589.0 

15 968.5  11 692.1 

9 606.1 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 
: 

: 

: 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
**Net international investment position, relative to GDP (%) 
Year on year rate of change in gross inflow of remittances (in 
national currency) from migrant workers (%) 

-45.9 
-1.5 

-47.6 
9.5 

-44.6 
6.2 

-42.8 
-10.8 

-54.3 
-13.3 

: 
: 

Public finance 

***General government deficit / surplus, relative to GDP (%) 
***General government gross debt relative to GDP (%) 
Total  government revenues, as a percentage of GDP (%) 
Total government expenditure, as a percentage of GDP (%) 

Financial indicators 

Gross external debt of the whole economy, relative to GDP (%) 
Gross external debt of the whole economy, relative to total exports 
(%) 
Money supply: M1 (banknotes, coins, overnight deposits, million 
euro) 
Money supply: M2 (M1 plus deposits with maturity up to two years, 
million euro) 
Money supply: M3 (M2 plus marketable instruments, million euro) 

Total credit by monetary financial institutions to residents 
(consolidated) (million euro) 
**Annual change in financial sector liabilities (%) 
**Private credit flow, consolidated, relative to GDP (%) 
**Private debt, consolidated, relative to GDP (%) 
Interest rates: day-to-day money rate, per annum (%) 
Lending interest rate (one year), per annum (%) 

No
te 

No
te 

1) 

2) 

2007 

2014 

2015 

2016 

2017 

2018 

: 
: 
: 
: 

0.2 
28.8 
32.3 
32.1 

0.6 
27.5 
32.6 
31.9 

-1.1 
28.2 
33.0 
34.1 

-2.8 
28.2 
31.4 
34.2 

-2.8 
30.4 
32.2 
35.0 

2007 

2014 

2015 

2016 

2017 

2018 

37.0 
172.0 

43.4 
183.9 

46.7 
201.6 

47.4 
218.2 

53.4 
216.9 

44 644.3  91 570.7  97 885.2  103 716.

99 085.4 

201 366.
4 
215 308.
2 
140 157.
0 
: 
: 
: 
17.32 
21.52 

360 157.
5 
375 844.
0 
423 556.
4 
17.3 
11.1 
74.6 
9.15 
14.77 

373 608.
3 
387 047.
8 
448 738.
3 
14.5 
14.2 
79.4 
10.70 
16.85 

8 
381 255.
6 
393 581.
4 
447 892.
0 
17.5 
13.6 
84.8 
9.32 
15.79 

357 979.
5 
370 812.
3 
440 778.
9 
19.8 
13.9 
85.1 
11.58 
18.12 

: 
: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 
: 
: 
17.76 
: 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deposit interest rate (one year), per annum (%) 
Euro exchange rates: average of period (1 euro = … national 
currency) 
Trade-weighted effective exchange rate index, 42 countries (2010 = 
100) 
**3 year change (T/T-3) in the trade-weighted effective exchange 
rate index, 42 countries (2010 = 100) 
Value of reserve assets (including gold) (million euro) 

3) 

17.15 
1.786 

9.25 
2.906 

10.72 
3.026 

10.33 
3.343 

13.53 
4.121 

: 
5.708 

110 

70 

65 

60 

50 

36 

-0.4 

-18.2 

-22.3 

-23.3 

-29.1 

-44.3 

  55 757.0  95 828.4  99 624.2  95 863.2  95 361.6 

: 

External trade in goods 

Value of imports: all goods, all partners (million euro) 
Value of exports: all goods, all partners (million euro) 
Trade balance: all goods, all partners (million euro) 
Terms of trade (export price index / import price index * 100) 
(number) 
Share of exports to EU-27 countries in value of total exports (%) 
Share of imports from EU-27 countries in value of total imports (%) 

Demography 

Crude rate of natural change of population (natural growth rate): 
number of births minus deaths (per thousand inhabitants) 
Infant mortality rate deaths of children under one year of age (per 
thousand live births) 
Life expectancy at birth: male (years) 
Life expectancy at birth: female (years) 

No
te 

4) 

No
te 

2007 

2014 

2015 

2016 

2017 

2018 

123 959 
78 126 
-45 833 
104.5 

182 338 
118 654 
-63 684 
100.3 

186 536 
129 555 
-56 981 
107.1 

179 468 
128 792 
-50 676 
111.2 

207 000 
139 229 
-67 771 
105.0 

188 337 
142 290 
-46 047 
102.3 

48.6 
37.2 

37.2 
34.2 

37.2 
35.3 

39.7 
36.3 

40.9 
33.6 

43.3 
32.9 

2007 

2014 

2015 

2016 

2017 

2018 

12.8 

12.3 

11.8 

11.2 

10.8 

10.1 

16.5 

11.1 

10.7 

10.0 

9.2 

9.3 

: 
: 

75.4 
80.9 

75.4 
81.0 

75.4 
81.0 

75.7 
81.3 

76.2 
81.6 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Labour market 

Economic activity rate for persons aged 20–64: proportion of the 
population aged 20–64 that is economically active (%) 
*Employment rate for persons aged 20–64: proportion of the 
population aged 20–64 that are in employment (%) 
Male employment rate for persons aged 20–64 (%) 
Female employment rate for persons aged 20–64 (%) 
Employment rate for persons aged 55–64: proportion of the 
population aged 55–64 that are in employment (%) 
Employment by main sectors 
Agriculture, forestry and fisheries (%) 
Industry (%) 
Construction (%) 
Services (%) 
People employed in the public sector as a share of total 
employment, persons aged 20–64 (%) 
People employed in the private sector as a share of total 
employment, persons aged 20–64 (%) 
Unemployment rate: proportion of the labour force that is 
unemployed (%) 
Male unemployment rate (%) 
Female unemployment rate (%) 
Youth unemployment rate: proportion of the labour force aged 15–
24 that is unemployed (%) 
Long-term unemployment rate: proportion of the labour force that 
has been unemployed for 12 months or more (%) 
Unemployment rate for persons (aged 25–64) having completed at 
most lower secondary education (ISCED levels 0-2) (%) 

No
te 
5) 

5) 

5) 
5) 
5) 

5) 

5) 

2007 

2014 

2015 

2016 

2017 

2018 

52.7 

58.9 

59.9 

60.9 

61.9 

62.3 

48.2 

53.2 

53.9 

54.3 

55.3 

55.6 

73.0 
24.2 
27.1 

: 
: 
: 
: 
14.5 

75.0 
31.6 
31.4 

21.1 
20.5 
7.4 
51.0 
13.1b 

75.3 
32.6 
31.9 

20.6 
20.0 
7.2 
52.2 
13.5 

75.5 
33.2 
33.4 

19.5 
19.5 
7.3 
53.7 
13.8 

76.1 
34.4 
34.4 

19.4 
19.1 
7.4 
54.1 
13.3 

76.0 
35.2 
35.2 

18.4 
19.7 
6.9 
54.9 
15.4 

85.5 

86.9b 

86.5 

86.2 

86.7 

84.6 

8.9 

9.9 

10.3 

10.9 

10.9 

10.9 

8.8 
9.2 
17.3 

2.6 

7.2 

9.1 
11.9 
17.8 

2.0 

8.4b 

9.3 
12.6 
18.4 

2.2 

8.9 

9.6 
13.6 
19.5 

2.2 

9.1 

9.4 
13.9 
20.5 

2.4 

8.9 

9.5 
13.8 
20.1 

2.5 

9.1 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Unemployment rate for persons (aged 25–64) having completed 
tertiary education (ISCED levels 5-8) (%) 

5) 

5.9 

8.1 

8.4 

9.3 

9.4 

9.8 

Social cohesion 

Average nominal monthly wages and salaries (national currency) 
Index of real wages and salaries (index of nominal wages and 
salaries divided by the inflation index) (2010 = 100) 
GINI coefficient 
Poverty gap 
*Early leavers from education and training: proportion of the 
population aged 18–24 with at most lower secondary education who 
are not in further education or training (%) 

Standard of living 

Number of passenger cars relative to population size (number per 
thousand population) 
Number of mobile phone subscriptions relative to population size 
(number per thousand population) 
Mobile broadband penetration (per 100 inhabitants) 
Fixed broadband penetration (per 100 inhabitants) 

Infrastructure 

Density of railway network (lines in operation per thousand km²) 
Length of motorways (kilometres) 

No
te 

No
te 

No
te 
6) 

2007 

2014 

2015 

2016 

2017 

2018 

859 
: 

43 
28.9 
46.9 

1 648 
: 

1 828 
: 

2 031 
: 

2 287 
: 

41 
28.4 
38.3 

42 
27.8 
36.7 

43 
26.6 
34.3 

43 
26.4 
32.5 

: 
: 

: 
: 
31.1 

2007 

2014 

2015 

2016 

2017 

2018 

92.8 

128.6 

136.3 

143.7 

150.8 

153.4 

878.0e 

925.3b 

935.2 

940.4 

964.0 

977.0 

0.0 
6.5 

41.7 
11.5 

49.7 
12.1 

64.8 
13.2 

70.5 
14.8 

74.5 
16.3 

2007 

2014 

2015 

2016 

2017 

2018 

11.3 
1 908 

13.1 
2 278 

13.2 
2 282 

13.2 
2 542 

13.3 
2 657 

13.5 
2 842 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Innovation and research 

Public expenditure on education relative to GDP (%) 
*Gross domestic expenditure on R&D relative to GDP (%) 
Government budget appropriations or outlays on R&D (GBAORD), 
as a percentage of GDP (%) 
Percentage of households who have internet access at home (%) 

Environment 

*Index of greenhouse gas emissions,  CO2 equivalent (1990 = 100) 
Energy intensity of the economy (kg of oil equivalent per 1 000 
euro GDP at 2010 constant prices) 
Electricity generated from renewable sources relative to gross 
electricity consumption (%) 
Road share of inland freight transport (based on tonne-km) (%) 

Energy 

Primary production of all energy products (thousand TOE) 
Primary production of crude oil (thousand TOE) 
Primary production of solid fuels (thousand TOE) 
Primary production of gas (thousand TOE) 
Net imports of all energy products (thousand TOE) 
Gross inland energy consumption (thousand TOE) 
Gross electricity generation (GWh) 

Agriculture 

2007 

2014 

2015 

2016 

2017 

2018 

: 
0.69 
: 

4.4 
0.86 
0.32 

4.4 
0.88 
0.32 

4.7 
0.96 
0.29 

4.2 
0.96 
0.34 

4.2 
1.25 
0.35 

19.7 

60.2 

69.5 

76.3 

80.7 

83.8 

2007 

2014 

2015 

2016 

2017 

2018 

178.6 
179.8 

208.9 
154.8 

215.4 
157.1 

227.4 
161.0 

240.1 
161.6 

: 
154.4 

19.0 

20.9 

32.0 

32.9 

29.4 

32.1 

94.8 

95.1 

95.9 

95.6 

95.4 

94.8 

2007 

2014 

2015 

2016 

2017 

2018 

27 469 
2 116 
15 010 
735 
75 803 
  101 403 
  191 453 

28 803 
2 606 
13 814 
395 
94 014 
122 213 
251 625 

31 463 
2 661 
12 798 
314 
103 702 
132 326 
261 288 

35 707 
2 722 
15 498 
302 
106 056 
139 620 
273 694 

36 471 
2 700 
15 682 
292 
116 709 
150 404 
296 429 

39 912 
3 015 
16 547 
351 
109 943 
148 079 
: 

2007 

2014 

2015 

2016 

2017 

2018 

No
te 

No
te 

No
te 

No
te 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Agricultural production volume index of goods and services (at 
producer prices) (2010 = 100) 
Utilised agricultural area (thousand hectares) 
Livestock numbers: live bovine animals (thousand heads, end of 
period) 
Livestock numbers: live swine (thousand heads, end of period) 
Livestock numbers: live sheep and live goats (thousand heads, end 
of period) 
Raw milk available on farms (thousand tonnes) 
Harvested crop production: cereals (including rice) (thousand 
tonnes) 
Harvested crop production: sugar beet (thousand tonnes) 
Harvested crop production: vegetables (thousand tonnes) 

7) 

Source: Eurostat and the statistical authorities in Turkey 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

39 504 
37 797 
11 036.8  14 223.1  13 994.1  14 080.2  15 943.6  17 042.5 

38 558 

38 551 

38 328 

37 964 

1.8 

2.7 

1.6 

1.3 

1.4 

1.6 

31 748.7  41 485.2  41 924.1  41 329.2  44 312.3  46 117.4 

12 329.8  18 630.9  18 654.7  18 489.2  20 699.9  22 120.7 
34 409 
29 257 

32 714 

38 637 

36 133 

35 281 

12 415 
25 661 

16 743 
28 487 

16 023 
29 552 

19 593 
30 267 

21 149 
30 826 

17 436 
30 033 

: = not available 
b = break in series 
e = estimated value 
s = Eurostat estimate 
u = low reliability 
* = Europe 2020 indicator 
** = Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) indicator 
*** = The government deficit and debt data of enlargement countries are published on an "as is" 
basis and without any assurance as regards their quality and adherence to ESA rules. 

Footnotes 

1)  Data cover loans granted by MFIs to residents. Participation Banks and Investment 

and Development Banks are included. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2)  Data cover debt securities and loans. 
3)  Average of monthly data. Overnight deposit facility. 
4)  Underlying indices are calculated with Fisher index formula. 
5)  Unemployment based on four weeks criterion and using only active jobs search 

methods. 

6)  Main lines only. 
7)  Excluding buffaloes.