Opinion of the European Central Bank of 6 October 2020 on conferral of additional tasks related to the single euro payments area (SEPA) on the Bank of Greece as national competent authority (CON/2020/23)
Date: 2020-10-06
Institutions: European Central Bank
Subjects: institutional activity, legal basis, money, payment system

EN 

ECB-PUBLIC 

OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 

of 6 October 2020 

on conferral of additional tasks related to the single euro payments area (SEPA) 

on the Bank of Greece as national competent authority  

(CON/2020/23) 

Introduction and legal basis 

On 11 September 2020 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Greek Ministry of 
Finance for an opinion on a draft amendment of paragraph 2 of Article 30 of Law 4141/20131 (hereinafter 

the ‘draft amendment’). 

The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the 

Functioning  of  the  European  Union  and  the  third  and  fifth  indents  of  Article 2(1)  of  Council  Decision 
98/415/EC2,  as  the  draft  amendment  relates  to  rules  applicable  to  the  Bank  of  Greece  (BoG)  and  to 

payment  and  settlement  systems.  In  accordance  with  the  first  sentence  of  Article 17.5  of  the  Rules  of 

Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion. 

1. 

Purpose of the draft amendment 

1.1  Under Article 10 of Regulation (EU) No 260/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council3 

which established technical and business requirements for credit transfers and direct debits in euro 

(hereinafter  the  ‘SEPA  Regulation’),  Member  States  are  required  to  designate  competent 

authorities responsible for ensuring compliance with the SEPA Regulation. Article 10 stipulates that 

Member  States  shall  designate  as  competent  authorities  public  authorities,  bodies  recognised  by 

national law or public authorities expressly empowered for that purpose by national law, including 

central banks. Article 10 further requires Member States to ensure that the designated competent 

authorities have all the powers necessary for the performance of their duties and that where there 

is more than one competent authority for matters covered by the SEPA Regulation on its territory, 
those authorities cooperate closely so that they can discharge their respective duties effectively4. 

1  

2  

3  

4  

Article 30 of Law 4141/2013 (‘measures for implementing Regulation (EC) 924/2009 and Regulation (EU) 260/2012’) 
is published in the Government Gazette A’81/2013. 
Council  Decision  98/415/EC  of  29 June  1998  on  the  consultation  of  the  European  Central  Bank  by  national 
authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42). 

Regulation  (EU)  No  260/2012  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  14  March  2012  establishing 
technical and business requirements for credit transfers and direct debits in euro and amending Regulation (EC) No 
924/2009 (OJ L 94, 30.3.2012, p. 22). 

Article  10(2)  of  the  SEPA  Regulation  requires  Member  States  to  have  notified  the  European  Commission  by  1 
February 2013 of the competent authorities designated, and to notify the European Commission and the European 
Banking Authority without delay of any subsequent change concerning those authorities. Paragraph 4 of that Article 
provides  that  the  competent  authorities  shall  monitor  compliance  by  payment  service  providers  with  the  SEPA 
Regulation effectively and take all necessary measures to ensure such compliance. Paragraph 4 of the same Article 
also requires that competent authorities shall cooperate with each other. 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
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1.2  Article  30  of  Law  4141/20135  (a)  designates  the  BoG  as  the  competent  authority  responsible  for 

ensuring  compliance  with  Regulation  (EC)  924/2009  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the 
Council6 (hereinafter the ‘cross-border payments Regulation’) and with the SEPA Regulation; and 

(b) confers on the BoG the task of imposing sanctions for infringements of Article 8 of the  cross-

border payments Regulation and of Articles 3, 4, 5 and 9 of the SEPA Regulation. Article 30 of Law 

4141/2013 also designates (a) the General Secretariat for Commerce and Consumers of the Greek 

Ministry of Development and Investment as the competent authority for managing complaints and 

imposing  the  relevant  sanctions  under  Articles  3,  4,  6  and  7  of  the  cross-border  payments 

Regulation  and  under  Articles  7  and  8  of  the  SEPA  Regulation;  and  (b)  the  Hellenic  Consumers’ 

Ombudsman,  the  Hellenic  Financial  Ombudsman  and  the  Amicable  Settlement  Committees 

referred  to  in  Greek  consumer  protection  law  as  the  competent  bodies  for  the  resolution  and/or  

out-of-court  settlement  of  disputes  arising  between  payment  service  users  (PSUs)  and  payment 

service providers (PSPs) concerning their rights and obligations under the SEPA Regulation.  

1.3  The current wording of Article 30(2) of Law 4141/2013 does not explicitly state whether the BoG’s 

sanctioning power with regard to infringements of Article 9 of the SEPA Regulation is exercisable in 

relation to payment service providers (PSPs) or to payment service users (PSUs), both as defined 
in the SEPA Regulation7.  

1.4 

In addition, Article 30(2) currently stipulates that the relevant decision of the BoG to impose a fine 

is to be taken in accordance with Article 55A of the Statute of the BoG. Article 55A of the Statute of 

the  BoG  regulates  the  supervisory  tasks  of  the  BoG  with  respect  to  credit  institutions,  insurance 

companies,  financial  leasing  companies,  factoring  companies,  mutual  guarantee  companies, 

bureaux  de  change,  companies  intermediating  in  interbank  markets,  money-market  broker 

companies,  counter-guarantee  funds,  and  payment  institutions  –  all  of  which  are  financial 

institutions.  

1.5  According to the draft explanatory report accompanying the draft amendment, it therefore appears 

that the task conferred on the BoG of ensuring compliance with Article 9 of the SEPA Regulation, 

and  the  relevant  sanctioning  powers,  are  restricted  to  entities  that  are  subject  to  the  BoG’s 

supervision. 

1.6  The draft amendment aims to clarify that the BoG is empowered to sanction both PSPs and PSUs 

for infringements of Article 9 of the SEPA Regulation, whether or not the relevant PSP or PSU is 

supervised by the BoG. In particular, the draft amendment provides that the BoG is empowered to 

impose sanctions for infringements of Article 8 of Regulation (EC) 924/2009 and of Articles 3, 4, 5 

and 9 of the SEPA Regulation, by PSPs or PSUs and irrespective of whether the relevant PSP or 

5  

6  

7  

Article 30 of Law 4141/2013 (‘measures for implementing Regulation (EC) 924/2009 and Regulation (EU) 260/2012’) 
is published in the Government Gazette A’81/2013. 
Regulation (EC) No 924/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 on cross-border 
payments in the Community and repealing Regulation (EC) No 2560/2001 (OJ L 266, 9.10.2009, p. 11). 
See Article 2(8) and Article 2(9) of the SEPA Regulation. ‘PSP’ is defined to mean ‘a payment service provider falling 
under  any  of  the  categories  referred  to  in  Article  1(1)  of  Directive  2007/64/EC  and  the  legal  and  natural  persons 
referred to in Article 26 of Directive 2007/64/EC, but excludes the bodies listed in Article 2 of Directive 2006/48/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of 
credit institutions  benefiting  from a  waiver under  Article 2(3) of Directive 2007/64/EC’.  ‘PSU’  is defined  to mean ‘a 
natural or legal person making use of a payment service in the capacity of payer or payee’. 

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the PSU is an entity supervised by the BoG. The draft amendment also removes the reference to 

Article 55A of the Statute of the BoG.  

2. 

General observation  

The  ECB  welcomes  the  objective  of  the  draft  amendment  to  close  a  regulatory  gap  in  the 

designation of competent authorities in Greece responsible for ensuring compliance with Article 9 
of  the  SEPA  Regulation8.  The  ECB  considers  that  the  closure  of  this  gap  will  contribute  to  the 

continued success of the single euro payments area (SEPA) project launched in 2012, which has 

been a significant step in the effort to achieve a fully integrated internal market for payments and 

payment services, and in enhancing the confidence of the public in the single currency.  

3. 

Substantial amendment of tasks conferred on the BoG 

3.1  BoG’s new functions 

3.1.1  The  BoG  is  currently  one  of  the  competent  authorities  in  Greece  responsible  for  ensuring 

compliance  with  the  SEPA  Regulation.  The  draft  amendment  confers  on  the  BoG  the  task  of 

imposing sanctions for infringements of, among others, Article 9 of the SEPA Regulation by PSPs 

or PSUs alike and irrespective of whether the relevant PSP or the PSU is an entity supervised by 

the BoG. Article 9 of the SEPA Regulation relates to the acceptance of any euro payment account 

within the EU for making or receiving payments and contains obligations vis-à-vis PSUs, including 
payers and payees9. In particular, Article 9 ensures that payers (are able to) send credit transfers 

and payees (are able to)  receive debit payments to  payment accounts held  with PSPs which are 

located in any Member State, provided that the payment account is reachable in accordance with 

Article 3 of the SEPA Regulation. Examples of natural or legal persons making use of a payment 

service  in  the  capacity  of  payer  or  payee  include  consumers,  businesses,  tax  and  other  public 

authorities,  energy  providers,  telecommunication  operators,  insurance  companies  or  other  utility 

companies. 

3.1.2  The addition of PSUs to the group of entities whose compliance the BoG is now tasked to monitor 

and sanction is a substantial expansion of the BoG’s existing task – which is to monitor compliance 

of, and sanction, entities supervised by it as well as PSPs. In this respect, the BoG now also has 

conferred  upon  it  the  task  of  receiving  complaints  concerning  the  infringement  of  Article  9  of  the 

SEPA Regulation.  

3.1.3  The ECB emphasises that a proposed conferral of new tasks on a national central bank (NCB) in 

the  European  System  of  Central  Banks  (ESCB)  must  be  assessed  against  the  prohibition  on 

monetary  financing  laid  down  in  Article  123  of  the  Treaty.  For  the  purposes  of  that  prohibition, 

8  

9  

The ECB understands that on 14 May 2020 the European Commission sent a reasoned opinion to Greece for non-
compliance with the SEPA Regulation and set a deadline of four months to Greece to take all necessary measures 
to rectify its failure to comply with the SEPA Regulation. 

A ‘payer’ is defined in Article 2(3) of the SEPA Regulation to mean a natural or legal person who holds a payment 
account and allows a payment order from that payment account or, where there is no payer’s payment account, a 
natural or legal person  who makes a payment order  to a payee’s payment account. A ‘payee’  is defined in  Article 
2(4)  of  the  SEPA  Regulation  to  mean  a  natural  or  legal  person  who  holds  a  payment  account  and  who  is  the 
intended recipient of funds which have been the subject of a payment transaction. 

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Article  1(1)(b)(ii)  of  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No 3603/9310  defines  ‘other  type  of  credit  facility’  as 

‘any financing of the public sector’s obligations vis-à-vis third parties’.  

3.1.4  Ensuring that Member States implement a sound budgetary policy is one of the key objectives of 
the  prohibition  on  monetary  financing  and  may  not  be  circumvented11.  Therefore,  the  task  of 

financing measures – which are usually the responsibility of the Member States and financed from 

their budgetary sources rather than by the NCBs – must not be entrusted to NCBs. To decide what 

constitutes  financing  of  the  public  sector’s  obligations  vis-à-vis  third  parties,  which  can  be 

interpreted  as  financing  provided  by  an  NCB  outside  the  scope  of  central  bank  tasks,  it  is 

necessary  to  carry  out  an  assessment,  on  a  case-by-case  basis,  of  whether  the  task  to  be 

undertaken  by  an  NCB  is  a  central  bank  task  or  a  government  task,  i.e.  a  task  within  the 

responsibility  of  the  Member  States.  In  other  words,  adequate  safeguards  must  be  in  place  to 

ensure no circumventions of the objective of the monetary financing prohibition that Member States 

maintain a sound budgetary policy. 

3.1.5  In the exercise of its duty to ensure that NCBs honour their obligations laid down in the Treaty, the 

Governing Council has, on the basis of Article 271(d) of the Treaty and Article 35.6 of the Statute of 

the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter the ‘Statute 

of the ESCB’), exercised the discretion available to it and endorsed safeguards against the breach 

of those obligations. These safeguards take the form of criteria for determining which tasks should 

be  considered  as  falling  within  the  scope  of  ‘the  public  sector’s  obligations  vis-à-vis  third  parties’ 

within  the  meaning  of  Article  1(1)(b)(ii)  of  Regulation  (EC)  No  3603/93  or,  in  other  words,  what 

constitutes a government task, as follows: 

First, central bank tasks are those tasks that are related to the tasks that have been conferred upon 

the ECB and the NCBs by the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB. These tasks are mainly defined 

in Article 127(2), (5) and (6) and Article 128(1) of the Treaty, and in Article 22 and Article 25.1 of 

the Statute of the ESCB.  

Second, as Article 14.4 of the  Statute of  the ESCB allows  NCBs to perform  ‘functions other than 

those specified in [the Statute of the ESCB]’, new tasks, i.e. tasks that are not related to tasks that 

have been conferred upon the ECB and the NCBs, are not precluded per se. However, new tasks 

which are atypical of NCB tasks or which are clearly discharged on behalf of, and in the exclusive 

interest  of,  the  government  or  of  other  public  sector  entities,  should  be  considered  government 

tasks.  

Third, an important criterion for qualifying a new task as atypical of an NCB task or as being clearly 

discharged  on  behalf  of,  and  in  the  exclusive  interest  of,  the  government  or  other  public  sector 

entities, is the impact of the task on the institutional, financial and personal independence of that 

NCB. 

In particular, the following aspects should be taken into account:  

10  

11  

Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  3603/93  of  13  December  1993  specifying  definitions  for  the  application  of  the 
prohibitions referred to in Articles 104 and 104b(1) of the Treaty (OJ L 332, 31.12.1993, p. 1). 

Article  123  of  the  Treaty  also  serves  the  objective  of  maintaining  price  stability  and  reinforces  central  bank 
independence. 

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(a)  whether  the  performance  of  the  new  task  would  create  conflicts  of  interest  with  existing 

central  bank  tasks  which  are  not  adequately  addressed  and  does  not  necessarily 

complement those existing central bank tasks. If a conflict of interest arises between existing 

and  new  tasks,  sufficient  safeguards  to  mitigate  that  conflict  should  be  in  place.  The 

complementarity  between  a  new  task  and  the  existing  central  bank  tasks  should  be 

interpreted narrowly, so as to avoid leading to the creation of an indefinite chain of ancillary 

tasks.  Such  complementarity  should  also  be  examined  in  relation  to  the  financing  of  those 

tasks; 

(b)  whether without new financial resources the performance of the new task is disproportionate 

to  the  NCB’s  financial  or  organisational  capacity  and  may  have  a  negative  impact  on  the 

capacity to properly perform the existing central bank tasks; 

(c)  whether the  performance  of the  new  task fits into  the institutional set-up  of the  NCB in  the 

light of central bank independence and accountability considerations; 

(d)  whether the performance of the new task harbours substantial financial risks; 

(e)  whether the performance of the new task exposes the members of the NCB decision-making 

bodies  to  political  risks  which  are  disproportionate  and  may  also  have  an  impact  on  their 

personal  independence  and,  in  particular,  on  the  guarantee  of  term  of  office  set  out  in 

Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB.  

3.1.6  The systematic categorisation of tasks assigned to NCBs as central banking or government tasks 

applies to genuinely new tasks that did not exist in the past or did not form an integral part of the 

central  banking  tasks  already  assigned  to  the  NCB  in  the  past.  In  recognition  of  the  different 

Member  States’  legal  frameworks,  central  banking  traditions  and  national  set-ups,  the  tasks 

currently discharged by an NCB as central banking tasks are not reviewed and re-categorised, but 
may be reassessed if they are subject to legislative amendments of substance12. On the basis of 

the  criteria  set  out  in  paragraph  3.1.5,  the  following  paragraphs  assess  whether  the  substantial 

amendment to the task conferred on the BoG as a result of the draft amendment is in line with the 

prohibition on monetary financing. 

3.2  Task related to the tasks conferred upon the ECB and the NCBs by the Treaty and the Statute of  

the ESCB 

The tasks relating to the SEPA Regulation, including that of monitoring, sanctioning and receiving 

complaints  in  respect  of  infringements  by  PSUs  with  Article  9  thereof,  are  not  among  the  basic 

tasks  listed  in  Article 127(2)  and  (5)  of  the  Treaty  or  otherwise  conferred  upon  the  NCBs  by  the 

Statute  of  the  ESCB.  However,  insofar  as  the  SEPA  project  is  designed  to  achieve  a  fully 

integrated internal market for payments and payment services, thereby enhancing the confidence 

of the public in the euro, the substantial amendment to the task conferred on the BoG as a result of 

the draft amendment could be regarded as being linked to the basic ESCB task of promoting the 

smooth operation of payment systems.  

3.3  Task which is atypical of central bank tasks 

12  

This statement of  the approach  reflects, for example, paragraph 2.3.1 of Opinion CON/2015/22.  All ECB Opinions 
are published on EUR-Lex.  

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The  ECB  notes  that  Member  States  have  followed  different  approaches  when  designating 

authorities  responsible  to  ensure  the  compliance  by  PSPs  and  PSUs  with  the  SEPA  Regulation. 

The  majority  of  Member  States,  including  in  the  euro  area,  have  followed  a  bifurcated  approach 

whereby the competent authority as regards compliance by PSPs is the respective central bank or 

financial  supervision  authority,  and  the  competent  authority  as  regards  compliance  by  PSUs  is  a 

national  consumer  protection  or  competition  authority.  However,  a  number  of  Member  States, 

including  in  the  euro  area,  have  designated  their  respective  NCBs  as the  competent  authority  as 
regards compliance by both PSPs and PSUs13. For that reason, the task conferred on the BoG by 

the draft amendment is not atypical of central bank tasks. 

3.4  Task clearly discharged on behalf of and in the exclusive interest of the government 

The promotion of the smooth operation of payment systems is one of the core tasks to be carried 

out by the European System of Central Banks (ESCB). In that respect, the ECB has always been 

firmly  committed  to,  and  has  actively  promoted,  a  fully  integrated  payment  area  for  the  euro, 

recognising  that  this  would  help  reduce  substantially  and  eventually  eliminate  the  differences  in 

cost  and  convenience  of  making  domestic  and  cross-border  payments.  As  previously  noted,  the 

ECB  considers  that  the  creation  of  a  single  payment  area  for  the  euro  is  desirable  in  order  to 
enhance  the  confidence  of  the  public  in  the  single  currency14.  The  preamble  to  the  SEPA 

Regulation  clarifies  that  the  creation  of  a  single  payment  area  for  the  euro  is  necessary  for  the 

proper  functioning  of  the  internal  market  and  aims  to  provide  Union  citizens  and  businesses  with 

secure,  competitively  priced,  user-friendly,  and  reliable  payment  services  in  euro,  regardless  of 

location  within  the  Union.  The  task  conferred  on  the  BoG  by  the  draft  amendment  is  directly 

connected with these overarching objectives of the SEPA project and is therefore not considered a 

task that is clearly discharged on behalf of and in the exclusive interest of the government. 

3.5  Extent to which performance of the new task creates conflicts of interest with existing central bank 

tasks 

In principle, the new task regarding PSUs that is conferred upon the BoG as a result of the draft 

amendment are not expected to create any conflict of interest with existing central bank tasks. The 

ECB  understands  that  the  new  task  will  supplement  the  BoG’s  supervisory  powers  over  credit 

institutions  and  payment  institutions,  which  are  two  categories  of  PSPs,  as  well  as  the  BoG’s 

existing tasks under the SEPA Regulation regarding compliance by PSPs. In that regard, the new 

task is expected to ensure compliance by all participants in the market for payments and payment 

services, including PSUs, with the SEPA Regulation and thereby enhance confidence in the single 

currency. The conferral of this new task on the BoG is therefore aligned with the conferral on it of 

its  existing  tasks  under  the  SEPA  Regulation.  The  conferral  of  this  task  is  also  aligned  with  the 
BoG’s competence to oversee payment systems and payment instruments15.  

13  

14  

15 

See the Annex to the Report to the European Parliament and to the Council on the application of Regulation EU n° 
260/2012  establishing  technical  and  business  requirements  for  credit  transfers  and  direct  debits  in  euro  and 
amending  Regulation  (EC)  No  924/2009,  available  at  https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/171123-report-sepa-
requirements-annex_en.pdf.  

See,  for  example,  Opinion  CON/2009/1  on  a  proposal  for  a  Regulation  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the 
Council  on  cross-border  payments  in  the  Community;  Opinion  CON/2014/3  on  a  proposal  for  a  regulation  on  the 
postponement of SEPA migration date; Opinion CON/2011/32 on a proposal for a Regulation establishing technical 
requirements for credit transfers and direct debits in euro. 
Monetary Policy Council Act 50/31.7.2002. 

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3.6  Extent to which performance of the  new task is disproportionate to the  financial  or  organisational 

capacity of the BoG 

The ECB notes that PSUs are not entities already supervised by the BoG, and that the BoG will be 

required  to  commit  additional  resources  –  both  human  and  financial  –  to  carry  out  the  new  task 

conferred on it by the draft amendment. In this regard, the ECB would like to reiterate that Member 

States may not put their NCBs in a position where they have insufficient operational and financial 

resources  to  carry  out  their  ESCB-  or  Eurosystem-related  tasks,  as  applicable.  Therefore,  it  is 

necessary  that  the  performance  of  this  additional  task  does  not  affect  the  BoG’s  operational  or 

financial capacity to carry out other ESCB-related tasks.  

The draft amendment does not specify the resources to be used by the BoG for the discharge of 

the above-mentioned tasks, nor does it provide an estimate of the costs likely to be incurred in the 

performance of these tasks. It can therefore not be excluded that the new task may have an impact 

on the regular budget of BoG. It is therefore important that adequate resources are available to the 

BoG  in  order  to  ensure  that  it  can  properly  perform  its  tasks,  while  maintaining,  at  all  times, 

sufficient  means  to  carry  out  its  ESCB-related  as  well  as  national  tasks  and  to  meet  its 

administrative and operational expenses. 

3.7  Extent to which performance of the new task fits into the institutional set-up of the BoG, in the light 

of central bank independence and accountability considerations 

The  performance of the BoG’s new task  appears to  be  consistent  with its institutional  set-up and 

not to raise any issues in terms of accountability considerations, as the BoG has been carrying out 

other tasks in relation to the SEPA Regulation – as one of the competent authorities – since 2013. 

That  said,  it  is  likely  that  additional  organisational  units  may  need  to  be  established  to  allow  the 

BoG to perform the new tasks.  

It  should  also  be  noted  that,  insofar  as  the  draft  amendment  extends  the  BoG’s  existing 

competence to non-supervised entities, notably non-supervised PSUs, it deviates from the existing 

allocation of competences in relation to infringement of rights of PSUs under the SEPA Regulation. 

In this regard, the ECB takes note of the fact that Article 30 of Law 4141/2013 already designates 

the General Secretariat for Commerce and Consumers of the Greek Ministry of Development and 

Investment  as  the  competent  authority  for  managing  complaints  and  imposing  the  relevant 

sanctions  under  Articles  7  and  8  of  the  SEPA  Regulation,  and  the  Hellenic  Consumers’ 

Ombudsman, the Hellenic Financial Ombudsman and the Amicable Settlement Committees as the 

competent  bodies  for  the  resolution  and/or  out-of-court  settlement  of  disputes  arising  between 

PSUs and PSPs concerning their rights and obligations under the SEPA Regulation. 

3.8  Extent to which the performance of the task harbours substantial financial risks 

The draft amendment does not contain any specific provision limiting the BoG’s liability in relation 

to  the  exercise  of  the  new  task  conferred  upon  it.  The  BoG  could,  therefore,  potentially  be  held 

liable for such damages in accordance with the rules of Greek law on the liability applicable to the 

BoG.  

3.9  Extent to which performance of the new task exposes members of the decision-making bodies of 

the BoG to disproportionate political risks and impacts on their personal independence 

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The performance of the new task conferred on the BoG by the draft amendment does not appear to 

expose  the  members of the BoG’s decision-making bodies  to  disproportionate political  risks  or to 

impact their personal independence. However, it cannot be entirely excluded that the BoG and/or 

the  members  of  its  decision-making  bodies  might  be  exposed  to  reputational  risks  in  the 

performance of the new task. 

3.10  Conclusion 

Insofar as the SEPA project is designed to achieve a fully integrated internal market for payments 

and payment services, thereby enhancing the confidence of the public in the single currency, the 

task conferred on the BoG by the draft amendment is considered to be linked to the basic ESCB 

task of promoting the smooth operation of payment systems. Moreover, this task is not atypical of 

central  bank  tasks,  as  a  number  of  Member  States  have  designated  their  respective  NCBs  as 

competent  authorities  for  ensuring  compliance  by  PSUs  with  the  SEPA  Regulation.  Additionally, 

insofar as the draft amendment extends the BoG’s existing competence to non-supervised entities, 

notably non-supervised PSUs, it deviates from the existing allocation of competences in relation to 

infringement of rights of PSUs under the SEPA Regulation. It will be necessary to ensure that the 

BoG has adequate resources in order to be able to perform its new task, and that the performance 

of this additional task does not affect the BoG’s operational or financial capacity to carry out other 

ESCB-related tasks.  

The  ECB  recommends  that  the  consulting  authority  take  the  above  considerations  into  account 

when deciding on whether to confer the new task on the BoG. 

This opinion will be published on EUR-Lex. 

Done at Frankfurt am Main, 6 October 2020. 

[signed] 

The President of the ECB 

Christine LAGARDE 

8