COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 2020 Rule of Law Report Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Slovenia Accompanying the document COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 2020 Rule of Law Report The rule of law situation in the European Union
Date: 2020-09-30
Institutions: European Commission, Secretariat-General
Subjects: Slovenia, administrative transparency, coronavirus disease, corruption, democracy, epidemic, independence of the judiciary, infringement of EU law, political rights, rule of law

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 30.9.2020  SWD(2020) 323 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 2020 Rule of Law Report Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Slovenia Accompanying the document COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS  2020 Rule of Law Report      The rule of law situation in the European Union {COM(2020) 580 final} - {SWD(2020) 300 final} - {SWD(2020) 301 final} - {SWD(2020) 302 final} - {SWD(2020) 303 final} - {SWD(2020) 304 final} - {SWD(2020) 305 final} - {SWD(2020) 306 final} - {SWD(2020) 307 final} - {SWD(2020) 308 final} - {SWD(2020) 309 final} - {SWD(2020) 310 final} - {SWD(2020) 311 final} - {SWD(2020) 312 final} - {SWD(2020) 313 final} - {SWD(2020) 314 final} - {SWD(2020) 315 final} - {SWD(2020) 316 final} - {SWD(2020) 317 final} - {SWD(2020) 318 final} - {SWD(2020) 319 final} - {SWD(2020) 320 final} - {SWD(2020) 321 final} - {SWD(2020) 322 final} - {SWD(2020) 324 final} - {SWD(2020) 325 final} - {SWD(2020) 326 final}  
 
 
ABSTRACT 

The  Slovenian  justice  system  is  characterised  by  an  important  role  for  the  Judicial  Council 
and the Supreme Court in the appointment, career, and governance of the judiciary, and by an 
advanced level of Information and Communication Technology tools for case management. 
Providing  adequate  resources  for  the  Judicial  Council,  as  well  as  the  State  Prosecutorial 
Council, is an important condition for the independent and effective functioning of these self-
governance bodies. The Constitutional Court’s upcoming decision on the merit regarding the 
constitutionality of the Parliamentary  Inquires Act  may  give  guidance as  regards protecting 
the  independence  and  autonomy  of  judges  and  prosecutors.  While  the  State  Prosecution 
increased its efficiency, challenges remain in effectively prosecuting economic and financial 
crime. Although the backlogs continued to decrease and do not present a systemic issue, the 
length of court proceedings in money laundering cases continue to present a challenge.   

Slovenia  has  the  legal  and  institutional  framework  for  preventing  and  fighting  corruption 
broadly in place. Comprehensive policies on access to public information, public consultation 
and transparency of the legislative process are well observed in practice. Slovenia also has an 
autonomous  and  independent  specialised  anti-corruption  body,  the  Commission  for  the 
Prevention of Corruption, which oversees the prevention of corruption and the strengthening 
of integrity of public office. Its human and financial resources are limited and raise concerns. 
Furthermore, concerns remain over its capacity and the gap between legislation and practice, 
especially  as  regards  implementation  of  the  Integrity  and  Prevention  of  Corruption  Act, 
Slovenia’s foremost anti-corruption legislation. 

While the independence of the media regulator – the Agency for Communication Networks 
and  Services  –  is  ensured  by  law,  the  Agency  operates  with  low  resources  considering  its 
competences,  which  affects  its  effectiveness.  The  current  system  of  media  ownership 
declaration makes  certain information  publicly available and thus  ensures partial ownership 
transparency, but it does not extend to the ultimate owners. The lack of media-specific rules 
to prevent conflicts of interest in the sector affects negatively media pluralism in Slovenia, at 
national and regional level. Obtaining access to public information can be a lengthy process 
for  the  general  public  and  journalists.  Besides  lawsuits  with  an  intimidating  effect,  online 
harassment of and threats against journalists is  an issue of concern, and the response of the 
criminal justice system is lacking.  

The  system  of  checks  and  balances  is  supported,  among  others,  through  well-developed 
online tools for consultation of the public and other stakeholders, assisted by a Human Rights 
Ombudsperson  and  an  independent  Advocate  of  the  Principle  of  Equality.  However,  the 
consultation  period  is  often  short  and  the  position  of  the  independent  bodies  is  not  always 
taken  into  account.  The  Constitutional  Court  can  carry  out  ex-post  constitutional  review. 
However,  due  to  an  increase  in  incoming  constitutional  complaints  and  rising  backlogs, 
proceedings before the Constitutional Court are becoming lengthier, which could influence its 
effective functioning.  A national  strategy has  been presented for improving support to  non-
governmental organisations by 2023. 

1 

 
 
 
I.  JUSTICE SYSTEM  

The Slovenian justice system has three levels,  with  Local  and District  Courts (dealing with 
civil and commercial cases) and Labour Courts (one also dealing with social security cases) 
and  an  Administrative  Court  (with  the  status  of  a  higher  court)  at  first  instance  (altogether 
sixty),  four  Higher  Courts  at  second  instance  (dealing  with  appeals  to  first  instance  courts’ 
decisions) and the Supreme Court at third instance (dealing with appeals to certain judgments 
of  Higher  Courts  and  the  Administrative  Court).  The  Constitution  provides  for  a  Judicial 
Council,  a  sui  generis  body  outside  of  the  three  branches  of  Government,  which  is  tasked 
with  protecting  the  independence  as  well  as  promoting  and  ensuring  the  accountability, 
efficiency and quality of work of the judiciary.1 Candidate judges are selected by the Judicial 
Council  and  then  proposed  for  appointment  by  the  National  Assembly  (Državni  zbor  -  the 
first  chamber  of  Parliament).2  If  the  Judicial  Council  selects  a  candidate  who  has  already 
been elected to judicial office, the candidate is promoted to the new judicial position by the 
Council  itself.  The  State  Prosecution  is  an  independent  authority,  but  also  part  of  the 
executive power, whereas the main powers regarding the career of state prosecutors and its 
functioning rest  with  the State Prosecutorial  Council and the Prosecutor  General.  The State 
Prosecutorial Council is an independent state body that performs the tasks of self-governance 
of  the  State  Prosecution  and  participates  in  ensuring  the  uniformity  of  prosecution  and 
safeguarding the independence of state prosecutors. The Slovene  Bar  Association is  part of 
the judiciary, and an autonomous and independent body.  

Independence 

An  investigation  opened  in  the  beginning  of  2019  by  a  Parliamentary  Inquiry 
Committee  envisaged  looking  into  actions  of  prosecutors  and  judges  in  concrete 
criminal  cases.  However,  the  Constitutional  Court  later  suspended  the  application  of  the 
Parliamentary Inquiries Law due to a risk to the independence of judges and prosecutors from 
such a parliamentary inquiry into concrete cases. The Inquiry Committee was established by 
the National Assembly on request of the National Council (Državni svet, the second chamber 
of  Parliament).3  The  Constitutional  Court,  to  which  the  case  was  referred  by  the  Judicial 
Council and the State Prosecution, suspended the application of the Parliamentary Inquiries 
Law  both  with  regard  to  judges  and  State  Prosecutors,  pending  its  review  of  the  law’s 
constitutionality.4  The  Constitutional  Court  also  suspended 
the 
parliamentary Act,  establishing the  Inquiry Committee. The Judicial  Council stated that the 
scope of the parliamentary inquiry, as defined in the parliamentary act establishing it, would 
not  cover  the  functioning  of  the  judiciary  as  a  whole,  but  rather  aimed  at  focussing  on 

the  application  of 

1    The  primary  responsibility  of  the  Judicial  Council  is  the  selection  of  candidate  for  judicial  offices.  As 
guaranteed by the Constitution, the majority of members of the Judicial Council are judges, elected by their 
peers.  The  remaining  five  members  are  representatives  of  other  legal  professions,  elected  by  the  National 
Assembly based on the nomination of the President of the Republic. The Judicial Council manages its own 
budget.  

2    Since  the  initial  re-election  of  judges  after  the  independence  of  Slovenia  in  1990s,  the  Parliament  has 
rejected a candidate judges for first appointment only once. It should be noted a candidate judge, who is not 
appointed, cannot request judicial review against the decision of the Parliament. 

3    For more details on the Parliament’s structure, see pillar IV. Other institutional issues related to checks and 

balances. 

4    Judicial  Council  (2019),  Request  for  constitutional  review  and  partial  suspension  of  application  of  the 
Parliamentary Inquiries Act; Supreme State Prosecutor’s Office and Prosecutor General (2019), Initiative for 
constitutional review of the parliamentary inquiries act; Constitutional Court (2019), Decision on temporary 
suspension  of  the  Parliamentary  Inquiries  Act  as  far  as  it  concerns  judges;  Constitutional  Court  (2019), 
Decision on temporary suspension of the Parliamentary Inquiries Act as far as it concerns State Prosecutors.  

2 

 
 
                                                 
specific  final  judgments  and  individual  judges.  The  Constitutional  Court, in  its  decision  on 
interim measures, highlighted the lack of adequate mechanisms in the Act to protect judges 
and state prosecutors from parliamentary inquiries into their “political responsibility”. It also 
stressed that there was a risk of the parliamentary inquiry encroaching upon the independence 
of  judges  and  prosecutors,  which  “could  irreparably  affect”  both  the  independence  of  the 
judiciary  and  the  independence  and  autonomy  of  the  State  Prosecution.  The  Constitutional 
Court has yet to deliver its final decision on the merits. 

The level of perceived judicial independence has continuously improved in recent years 
but  remains  low  to  average.  The  level  of  perceived  judicial  independence  among  the 
general public is average (42% fairly and very good), and among companies it remains low 
(36%), whilst having continuously increased in both surveys showing a positive trend.5 The 
main  reason  for  the  perceived  lack  of  independence  of  courts  and  judges  cited  by  the 
companies is the perception of interference or pressure from the Government and politicians, 
closely  followed  by  the  perception  of  interference  or  pressure  from  economic  or  other 
specific interests, which both remain among the highest in the EU in comparative terms.6 The 
Supreme  Court  commissioned  a  study  into  the  reasons  behind  the  low  perception  of  the 
independence  of  judges  and  courts  and  low  trust  in  the  justice  system,  which  could  help 
identify avenues for improvement. Among the reasons for such low trust identified through 
focussed  surveys  and  stakeholders’  workshops  involving  court  users,  legal  professionals, 
court  staff  and  the  general  public,  was  a  the  lack  of  knowledge  and  information  about  the 
justice  system,  organisational  and  communication  issues,  and  issues  with  navigating  court 
buildings. These findings led to a number of measures, implemented by the Supreme Court 
and other bodies, from training to better information tools for court users once they reach the 
court,  which  aim  at  improving  the  trust  into  judiciary  and  the  level  of  perceived  judicial 
independence.7  

Quality 

The  digitalisation  of  the  justice  system  for  case  management  is  well  advanced  and 
further developments are ongoing to improve electronic communication between courts 
and  parties.  Information  and  Communication  Technologies  for  case  management  are 
advanced.8  Data  coming  from  all  judicial  management  systems  are  standardised,  integrated 
(using  data-warehouse  tools)  and  centralised,  and  used  for  management  and  statistical 
purposes.  The  IT  policies  and  strategies  are  defined,  coordinated,  and  governed  by  the 
Supreme Court. However, the electronic communication between courts and parties remains 
less  developed.  For  example,  it  is  not  always  possible  to  submit  a  case  electronically,  to 
receive summons electronically, or to monitor the stages of proceedings  online.9  Electronic 
communication  is  already  advanced  in  certain  areas,  such  as  undisputed  debt  recovery, 
managed by a special organisational unit at the Local Court in Ljubljana (COVL), where case 
files  only  exist  in  electronic  form,  as  well  as  in  insolvency,  and  land  registry.  Improving 
electronic  communication 
in  civil,  criminal  and 
misdemeanour  procedures  has  been  a  priority  area  for  the  Supreme  Court  since  2019.  A 

in  other  areas,  particularly 

tools 

5    Figures 44 and 46, 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard. The level of perceived judicial independence is categorised 
as  follows:  very  low  (below  30%  of  respondents  perceive  judicial  independence  as  fairly  good  and  very 
good); low (between 30-39%), average (between 40-59%), high (between 60-75%), very high (above 75%).  

6   Figures 45 and 47, 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
7    Slovenian Government (2018), The Supreme Court presented new activities for the long-term improvement 

of the quality and reputation of the Slovenian judiciary.  

8    Figure 40, 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
9    Figure 27, 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard. 

3 

 
 
                                                 
project  to  develop  e-files,  e-submissions,  digital  serving  of  judicial  documents,  online 
payment of court fees and other digital tools has been launched.10  

Results of the Supreme Court’s survey of court users are being used to further improve 
the  quality  of  justice.  The  Supreme  Court  commissioned  a  study  (see  above),  which 
included  surveys  with  court  users  and  other  stakeholders.  With  the  aim  of  increasing  the 
quality of judicial activity and the trust in justice, the Supreme Court set up a special project 
group. Among others, the group organised surveys among judges and court staff, workshops 
with  key  players,  interviews  and  in-house  observations.  On  this  basis,  the  Supreme  Court 
developed manuals for new judges, procedural manuals in various fields of law, training for 
court staff, and information materials for the public, such as brochures, videos and a website, 
including on court procedures.11 The project was internationally awarded.12 

The Supreme Court plays an important role in allocating resources to courts. Advanced 
ICT tools for case management are following granular data at level of particular courts. This 
allows the Court Presidents, court managerial staff and the Supreme Court to allocate human 
and financial resources based on comparative data on courts’ efficiency.13 Every year, Court 
Presidents  submit  their  proposals  on  resources  to  the  Supreme  Court.  The  Supreme  Court 
then  analyses  the  efficiency  data,  compares  the  workload  at  each  court  and  presents  the 
analysis to the Court Presidents in the discussion on resources. Subsequently, a compromise 
is found on the allocation of resources taking into account the comparative court data. 

The Judicial Council and the State Prosecutorial Council are facing challenges in terms 
of resources, despite some improvements. The Judicial Council is becoming more active in 
its efforts to improve the quality of justice, particularly through its role in the evaluation of 
judges,  disciplinary  proceedings,  and  the  improvement  in  the  remuneration  of  judges.14 
Despite  having  been  granted  additional  resources  in  recent  years,  the  Judicial  Council  still 
operates with a comparatively low number of staff in light of the wide range of powers and 
non-professional members of the Council.15 According to stakeholders, these efforts require 
additional resources to increase the Judicial Council’s administrative capacity, including for 
improving the process of selecting judges, particularly the reasoning of decisions. The State 
Prosecutorial  Council  still  lacks  human  and  financial  resources,16  which  means  that  it  is 
unable  to  work  on  improving  the  general  quality  of  the  State  Prosecution.  Its  role  in 
improving the process of selecting prosecutors is also inhibited by a lack of staff. 

10   Supreme Court (2019), Annual report of 2019, pp. 124-125.  
11   Website can be visited at http://www.sodisce.si/vsrs/objave/2018102509355191/.  
12   In  2019,  the  Supreme  Court’s  project  Improving  the  quality  of  justice”  (IQ  Justice)  received  the  CEPEJ 
Crystal  Scales  of  Justice  Prize.  In  2019,  the  project  to  improve  procedural  justice,  particularly  the 
communication with court users, received the UX Design Award 2019 for a high level of user friendliness.  
13   The  Supreme  Court allocates the budget to particular courts  while  the Judicial  Council  has a predominant 

role in the selection and career of judges. 

14   The  primary  responsibility  of  the  Judicial  Council  is  the  selection  of  candidate  for  judicial  offices.  As 
guaranteed by the Constitution, the majority of members of the Judicial Council are judges, elected by their 
peers.  The  remaining  five  members  are  representatives  of  other  legal  professions,  elected  by  the  National 
Assembly based on the nomination of the President of the Republic. 

15   The Judicial Council has only 15 employees. For a comparative perspective of resources of Councils for the 
Judiciary, Contribution from the European Networks of Council for the Judiciary for the 2020 Rule of Law 
Report, p. 9. For a comparative perspective on powers of the Councils for the Judiciary, see Figure 50, 2016 
EU Justice Scoreboard. 

16   The State Prosecutorial Council has only four employees. 

4 

 
 
                                                 
Consultations are ongoing to finalise the judicial map reform. Over the last decades, the 
judicial map (defining the location and jurisdiction of courts) swayed between a single court 
and  multiple  courts  of  first  instance  (district  and  local).  Currently,  the  court  system  has  55 
first  instance  courts,  with  44  Local  Courts  dealing  with  low  (financial)  value  civil  litigious 
and civil non-litigious cases, and 11 District Courts dealing with high-value civil  cases and 
commercial  cases  among  legal  persons.  The  split  between  the  first  instance  civil  and 
commercial  courts  has  long  been  identified  as  affecting  the  efficiency  of  the  courts.  As  a 
partial remedy, the 2009 and 2015 reforms brought Local Courts under the stronger control of 
District Courts in order to even out the caseload and reduce jurisdictional conflicts.17 Well-
advanced  ICT  systems  for  case  management  and  Supreme  Court’s  experience  in  resource 
management  would  allow  for  creating  bigger  courts  in  city  areas.18  Consultations  by  the 
Ministry of Justice with the judiciary on a new revised judicial map have continued in 2019, 
but the legislative draft has yet to be finalised by the Government. 

Publication of first instance court judgments remains limited, particularly in civil  and 
commercial  cases.  While  most  judgments  of  the  Supreme  Court  and  Higher  Courts  are 
published online, the publication of first  instance judgments remains low.19  In addition,  the 
machine  readability  of  published  judgments,  which  would  allow  developing  services  and 
products  for  court  users  based  on  artificial  intelligence  solutions,  is  relatively  low.20  The 
project  for  improving  online  accessibility  of  first  instance  court  judgments  led  by  the 
Ministry of Justice has been stalled, due to challenges related to automatic anonymization of 
judgments. A new method is being explored together with researchers.  

Efficiency 

Improved efficiency of the justice system has led to a further reduction of backlogs, and 
the length of court proceedings mostly remained stable. Despite having one of the highest 
numbers of incoming civil cases in the EU, the Slovenian justice system has seen a continued 
improvement  of  efficiency  in  nearly  all  categories  of  cases.21  In  2019,  the  total  backlog  of 
cases  further  decreased  by  more  than  7%,  compared  to  2018.22  The  courts  again  resolved 
more cases than they received, despite resolving fewer cases than in the past.23 The average 
length  of  proceedings  rose  to  around  13  months  in  litigious  civil  cases  and  stagnated  at  11 
months in litigious commercial cases, as older cases were prioritised. However, it still takes 
more than 12 months until the first hearing in a commercial case trial. On appeal, these cases 
are  resolved  quickly,  usually  in  around  3  months.  Nearly  one  quarter  of  litigious  civil  and 
commercial cases are resolved through a court settlement. However, it still takes between 14 
and 17 months until a written judgment is delivered in those types of cases. 

17   For  example,  according  to  the  amendments,  the  President  of  the  District  court  can,  in  agreement  with  the 
President  of  the  Local  Court,  in  the  annual  distribution  of  work  assign  judges  to  work  within  the  district, 
including  at  the  District  Court.  In  addition,  the  President  of  the  Ljubljana  District  Court  can  assign  that 
certain cases will be dealt with before specific Local Courts in that district. See Articles 71 and 105.a of the 
Courts Act. 

18   Slovenia  received  support  from  the  European  Commission  Structural  Reform  Support  Programme  to 
improve  the  quality  of  its  justice  system,  namely  to  share  national  practices  on  judicial  map  reforms: 
workshop on judicial map reform with experts from FI and NL, 28-29 Sept. 2016, Ljubljana. 

19   Figure 28, 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
20   Figure 29, 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
21   Figures 2, 5 – 19, 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
22   Data on the efficiency of courts for 2019, Supreme Court. 
23   Total clearance rate of 101%. Altogether, the courts resolved about 70 000 per month in 2019, compared to 

nearly 100 000 per month in 2012. 

5 

 
 
                                                 
Efficiency challenges remain particularly regarding economic and financial crime cases. 
Court proceedings, particularly in money laundering, and prosecution proceedings are often 
lengthy. Criminal courts continued to resolve more cases than they received (clearance rate of 
102%). However, the length of criminal cases decreased in local courts to about 9.5 months 
and increased in district courts (to more than 14 months).24 When dealing with more complex 
money laundering offences, the length of trials in first instance courts continues to rise and 
reached  1132  days,  on  average.25  In  2019,  the  State  Prosecution  resolved  more  complaints 
(criminal  notifications)  than  it  received  in  that  year,  mostly  taking  between  one  to  two 
months  to  either  reject  a  notification,  request  additional  police  investigation  or  submit  an 
indictment  to  court.26  However,  the  Specialised  State  Prosecutor’s  Office,  dealing  with 
economic  and  financial  crimes,  needed  about  four  months  on  average  for  these  steps.  As 
regards the cases brought by the State Prosecution to the criminal courts, the number has been 
steadily  decreasing.27  Despite  some  improvements,  investigations  by  the  police  and  the 
prosecutors into financial and economic crime can sometimes take several years, partly due to 
a  lack  of  resources.  These  efficiency  and  quality  challenges  are  being  addressed  through 
focused  training  (including  on  anti-money  laundering),  exchange  of  good  practices  and 
analyses  of  prosecutors’  efficiency  using  an  upgraded  Information  and  Communication 
Technology system. 

II.  ANTI-CORRUPTION FRAMEWORK  

The  institutional  and  legislative  framework  to  prevent  and  fight  corruptionconsists  of  the 
Integrity  and  Prevention  of  Corruption  Act.  Laws  are  in  place  which  regulate  conflicts  of 
interest  and  assets  declaration  for  members  of  the  public  administration,  ministries  and  the 
Parliament,  on  lobbying  and  ‘revolving  doors’.  The  institutional  framework  to  fight 
corruption  comprises  an  autonomous  state  body,  the  Commission  for  the  Prevention  of 
Corruption, which cooperates with other bodies engaged in the fight of corruption, the police 
and the special prosecutor’s office. 

Slovenia  scored  60/100  in  the  2020  Corruption  Perception  Index  of  Transparency 
International,  ranking  11th 
in  the  European  Union  and  35th  globally.  Recent 
Eurobarometer figures show that 87% of respondents consider corruption to be widespread in 
Slovenia (EU average 71%) and 36% of people feel personally affected by corruption in their 
daily  lives  (EU  average  26%).28  According  to  the  surveys,  90%  of  companies  consider 
corruption  to  be  widespread  (EU  average  63%)  and  41%  of  companies  consider  that 
corruption  is  a  problem  when  doing  business  (EU  average  37%).  23%  of  people  find  that 
there are enough successful prosecutions to deter people from corrupt practices (EU average 
36%)  while  10%  of  companies  consider  that  people  and  businesses  caught  for  bribing  a 
senior official are appropriately punished (EU average 31%).29 

The basic legal framework for strengthening the integrity in the public sector, ensuring 
transparency  and  avoiding  conflicts  of  interests,  is  the  Integrity  and  Prevention  of 
Corruption  Act.  However,  the  adoption  of  amendments  to  the  Integrity  and  Prevention  of 

24   Data on efficiency of courts in 2019, Supreme Court. 
25   Figure 21, 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard, presenting data for 2014, 2015, 2016 and 2018. 
26   In 2019, clearance rate was above 106%. State Prosecution data. 
27   The  number  of  cases  that  the  State  Prosecution  brought  to  the  criminal  courts,  decreased  from  about  620 
data, 
2018 

cases 
https://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=crim_crt_case&lang=en. 

inhabitants),  Eurostat 

100.000 

about 

2014 

(per 

458 

in 

to 

in 

28   Special Eurobarometer 502 (2020). 
29   Special Eurobarometer 502 (2020). 

6 

 
 
                                                 
Corruption  Act  to  address  deficiencies  of  the  anti-corruption  framework  have  been 
postponed.  It  is  the  main  legal  act  to  combat  corruption  in  Slovenia  and  also  regulates  the 
responsibilities of the Commission for the Prevention of Corruption (CPC). Amendments to 
the  Integrity  and  Prevention  of  Corruption  Act  (IPCA)  to  address  some  of  the  key 
deficiencies  in  the  existing  framework,  including  those  highlighted  by  the  Council  of 
Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO), were passed by the Government in 
January  2018  and  scheduled  for  approval  in  the  Parliament  in  June  2020.30  However,  their 
adoption  was  postponed,  leaving  key  anti-corruption  reforms  still  pending.  No  major 
developments  are  evident  in  rules  of  conduct,  conflicts  of  interest,  whistleblowing,  or 
‘revolving doors’, which are all only partly addressed by the IPCA.31  

The Commission for the Prevention of Corruption (CPC) operates within a good legal 
framework,  but  with  limited  resources.  The  CPC  is  an  autonomous  state  body  whose 
independence  is  ensured  by  its  leadership  selection  procedure,  where  a  special  selection 
board  composed  of  members  from  each  of  the  three  branches  of  power  and  civil  society 
issues an appointment recommendation to the President. The CPC cooperates regularly with 
the  police  and  special  prosecutor’s  office,  but  retains  supervisory  and  administrative 
investigative  powers.  Furthermore,  it  oversees  the  prevention  of  corruption  and  the 
strengthening of public office integrity. The CPC conducts administrative investigations and 
holds broad legal powers to access or instruct other law enforcement bodies and institutions 
to  gather  evidence.  It  is  responsible  for  overseeing  the  implementation  of  provisions  on 
conflicts of interest, integrity plans, asset declarations, gifts and restrictions from the Integrity 
and  Prevention  of  Corruption  Act.  However,  GRECO  has  noted  that  insufficient  resources 
and  procedural  shortcomings  appear  to  hamper  CPC  actions.32  The  IPCA  amendments  are 
also expected to address legal issues surrounding the CPC’s sui generis procedure for dealing 
the  CPC  undertakes  administrative 
with  corruption  cases.  The  process,  whereby 
investigations  and  issues  public  decisions  has  seen  cases  challenged  in  the  courts,  as  the 
rights  of  defence  of  suspects  were  considered  not  sufficiently  guaranteed  during  the 
procedure.33  

Alongside  the  specialised  Commission  for  Prevention  of  Corruption,  several  public 
bodies are involved in the prevention and repression of corruption. The Specialised State 
Prosecutor’s Office and  Police, and other state  authorities fulfil important  roles in  the  fight 
against  corruption.  The  Ministry  of  Justice  is  responsible  for  most  of  legal  framework  for 
prevention  and  prosecution  of  corruption,  including  the  Integrity  and  Prevention  of 
Corruption Act and the Penal Code. The Ministry of Public Administration is competent for 
regulating the status, rights and obligations of officials and has a role in promoting integrity. 
The  Court  of  Audit  is  the  highest  body  for  supervising  state  accounts,  budget  and  public 
spending.  It  exercises  its  powers  of  audit  entirely  independently  and  these  cannot  be 
challenged  before  the  courts  or  other  state  bodies.  The  National  Review  Commission  for 
public  procurement  award  procedures  is  an  independent  specialised  tribunal  that  provides 
legal  protection  to  tenderers.  A  Programme  of  Government  Measures  for  Integrity  and 
Transparency  2017-2019  focussed  on  raising  awareness  of  integrity  and  transparency 

30   GRECO Fifth Evaluation Round – Evaluation Report.  
31   European Semester Country Report 2020. 
32   GRECO Fifth Evaluation Round – Evaluation Report, recommendation i. 
33   The  process  involves  fact-finding,  sending  the  concerned  person  a  draft  of  the  findings,  followed  by 
adoption  of  the  findings  and  their  presentation  to  the  public,  together  with  the  response  of  the  concerned 
person. According to the Supreme Court,  procedures before the CPC  must include the same safeguards as 
under  general  administrative  law  procedures.  This  includes  informing  the  concerned  person  about  the 
verification, allowing him/her to submit clarifications and to be represented during the verifications. 

7 

 
 
                                                 
amongst  public  officials  and  offering  management  and  control  mechanisms  for  public 
finances.  It  also  aimed  to  increase  transparency  in  drafting  regulations  and  managing 
procedures.34 

Rules  of  conduct  are  in  place.  Relevant  provisions  are  contained  in  the  Public 
Administration  Act,  the  Civil  Servants  Act  and  the  Integrity  and  Prevention  of  Corruption 
Act.  Whilst  Ministers  and  state  secretaries  are  subject  to  the  2015  Code  of  Ethics  for 
Government and Ministerial Officials, the Integrity and Prevention of Corruption Act is the 
basic legal act governing conflicts of interest for public sector officials. It governs officials’ 
duties regarding conflicts of interest, asset declarations and their supervision, restrictions on 
the performance of other activities and prohibitions relating to  gifts.  It  applies to  the Prime 
Minister,  ministers,  state  secretaries,  cabinet  members  and  the  secretary  general  of  the 
government.  Certain  provisions,  for  example  on  asset  declaration  and  post-employment 
restrictions, also apply to former officials.35 On 12 June 2020, the National Assembly adopted 
a  code  of  ethics.  The  latter  lists  ethical  principles  which  deputies  must  adhere  to  and  sets 
reprimands  for  violations.  However,  shortcomings  in  the  Code  of  Conduct  of  the  National 
Council in respect of conflicts of interest, supervision and sanctions, have been underlined.36 

Provisions  on  preventing  and  managing  conflicts  of  interest  are  in  place.  Rules  on  the 
avoidance  of  conflicts  of  interest,  and  asset  declarations  are  defined  in  the  Integrity  and 
Prevention  of  Corruption  Act.  Avoiding  conflicts  of  interest  is  primarily  the  obligation  of 
each  public  official,  who  must  immediately  inform  in  writing  his  or  her  superiors  or  the 
Commission for the Prevention of Corruption (CPC) if a conflict arises. Additional rules on 
incompatibility of functions and restricting business activities also aim to prevent conflicts of 
interest  in  the  public  sector.  In  addition,  the  Public  Employees  Act  prohibits  civil  servants 
from performing activities that would entail a conflict of interest. It also provides for certain 
restrictions  and  duties  of  civil  servants  (and  members  of  their  family)  related  to  accepting 
gifts. Planned amendments will extend the scope of obliged individuals for reporting conflict 
of interests. The Act also sets the scope and determines which officials are obligated to file 
declarations with the CPC.37 Declarations are to be submitted to the CPC upon taking office, 
a year after ceasing functions and upon every change in office, activities, ownership or assets 
that exceeds EUR 10.000. The CPC uses ad hoc checks and keeps records on persons subject 
to asset declaration duties. The asset declarations are open to the public during each official’s 
tenure  and  up  to  one  year  after.  However,  top  executive  functions’  asset  declarations  are 
neither published, nor subject to substantial scrutiny.38 In this regard, widening the scope of 
asset  declarations  to  family  members  of  ministers  and  state  secretaries,  without  necessarily 
making  these  public,  has  been  recommended.39  To  respond  to  these  recommendations,  the 
Slovenian  authorities  plan  to  amend  the  scope  of  asset  declaration  and  oversight.  The  CPC 
remains however understaffed and lacks both financial and human resources in performing its 

34   GRECO Fifth Evaluation Round – Evaluation Report, para. 54. 
35   GRECO Fifth Evaluation Round – Evaluation Report, para. 40. 
36   GRECO Fourth Evaluation Round – Interim report, conclusions on the National Council. 
37   These  include  high-level,  local,  elected  and  appointed  officials  such  as:  professional  high-level  officials, 
non-professional mayors and deputy mayors, high-ranking civil servants, managers, persons responsible for 
public procurement, civil servants of the National Review  Commission for Reviewing Public Procurement 
Procedures. 

38   GRECO has recommended ensuring timely publication of ministers and state secretaries’ asset declarations 
and that substantive checks be carried out by the CPC. GRECO Fifth Evaluation Round – Evaluation Report, 
recommendation viii. 

39   GRECO Fifth Evaluation Round – Evaluation Report, recommendation vii.  

8 

 
 
                                                 
tasks. In this respect, GRECO recommended that the CPC should be provided with adequate 
resources to effectively perform its tasks.40 

Lobbying and ‘revolving doors’ are regulated.41 The IPCA provides that it is prohibited to 
lobby  on  issues  subject  to  judicial  and  administrative  proceedings,  and  lobbying  activities 
may only be performed by a natural person entered in the registry of lobbyists, set up by the 
CPC. Public officials may agree to lobbying only if the lobbyist is entered in the register and 
must decline contact if there are conflicts of interest. However, it has been recommended that 
the implementation of rules on contacts with lobbyists by members of the National Assembly 
42  This  remains 
and  the  National  Council  be  subjected  to  a  thorough  assessment.
unimplemented,  despite  76%  of  businesses  in  Slovenia  considering  that  the  only  way  to 
succeed in business is to have political connections (EU average is 54 %).43 In addition, for 
top  executive  functions,  the  rules  on  lobbying  contain  some  loopholes  and  are  poorly 
complied with. Not all contacts with third parties who seek to influence government decision-
making  are  duly  reported,  including  those  from  legal  and  authorised  representatives  of 
companies and interest groups.44 In addition, the IPCA also provides a “cooling – off” period 
for high-level officials. During this period, the latter are prohibited from lobbying or acting as 
a representative of a business entity that had business contacts with the body in which they 
held  office  for  two  years  after  their  departure  from  office.  A  public  body  may  also  not  do 
business with an entity in which a former official has an interest, for a period one year from 
his departure from office.45 

increase 
Slovenia  has  developed  further  measures  to  prevent  corruption  and 
transparency  in  public  procurement.  Slovenia  ranks  among  the  most  developed  OECD 
members in terms of transparency and has introduced several measures to prevent corruption 
in public procurement. For instance, integrity plans are tools for verifying the integrity of an 
organisation. They constitute a documented process for assessing levels of vulnerability and 
exposure  to  unethical  or  corrupt  practices.  All  public  institutions  are  obliged  to  send  their 
integrity  plans  to  the  CPC,  with  the  primary  goal  of  identifying  risks  and  implementing 
measures  to  strengthen  integrity.  The  Public  Procurement  Act  includes  a  system  for  the 
mandatory  electronic  submission  and  publishing  of  tenders  of  a  certain  value  alongside  the 
contracting  authority’s  final  decisions  and  reasoning.  These  measures  are  accompanied  by 
required  asset  declarations  of  the  persons  responsible  for  public  procurement  as  detailed  in 
the IPCA. Available since January 2016, the IT solution STATIST ensures the publication of 
information on public contracts awarded in Slovenia since 2013. The CPC has also developed 
an  online  application  (ERAR)  which  provides  the  public  with  user-friendly  access  to 
information  on  business  transactions  of  all  public  sector  bodies.  It  continues  to  be  an 
important driver for public sector transparency, enabling the visualisation of public spending. 
However,  whilst  the  CPC  states  that  only  10%  of  all  corruption  reports  are  connected  to 
public  procurement,  Eurobarometer  surveys  show  that  businesses  remain  sceptical  about 
public procurement practices in Slovenia.  

40   GRECO Fifth Evaluation Round – Evaluation Report, p. 4.  
41   1)  non-public  contact;  2)  goal  of  influencing  discussion  and  adoption  of  regulations  and  other  general 

documents; 3) carried out in the interest, name or on behalf of a certain interest group/lobbying client. 

42   GRECO Fourth Evaluation Round – Evaluation Report, recommendation ii. 
43   Special Eurobarometer 502 (2020), p. 71. 
44   GRECO Fifth Evaluation Round – Evaluation Report, recommendation v. 
45   Such as a 5% participation in the founders' rights,  management or capital,  either by direct participation or 

through the participation of other legal persons. 

9 

 
 
                                                 
The  Corruption  section,  located  within  the  Economic  Crime  Division  of  the  General 
Police  Directorate  (GPD),  is  responsible  for  handling  corruption  crime  at  a  national 
level.  It  monitors,  manages  and  directs  the  work  of  all  police  directorates,  and  investigates 
suspected  acts  of  corruption  reported  through  e-notifications.  The  GPD  annual  budget  for 
2019  (EUR  369,400)  is  a  7.3%  increase  compared  to  2018.  GRECO  has  welcomed  steps 
taken by the police to prevent corruption within its ranks, as police officers have no immunity 
or procedural privileges. The police is consistently among the most trusted of state authorities 
in Slovenia.46 Established in November 2009, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) is a 
unit within the Criminal Police Directorate of the General Police Directorate. It is specialised 
in  serious  and  complex  criminal  offences,  including  financial  crime,  organised  crime  and 
corruption.  While  the  Bureau  has  autonomy  in  selecting  cases,  this  practice  has  been 
criticised by the Specialised State Prosecutor's Office, as on some occasions, the local police 
is facing difficulties with complex cases which the bureau has not decided to pursue .47 

Several  high-profile  corruption  cases  are  ongoing,  but  specific  challenges  exist  in 
ensuring  successful  prosecutions.  The  Specialised  State  Prosecutor's  Office  (SSPO) 
prosecutes  the  most  serious  criminal  offences,  including  corruption,  which  has  been 
considered a policy priority since 2017.48 However, several high-level cases are enduring or 
reached  statutes  of  limitation,  and  the  finalisation  of  cases  is  reportedly  affected  by  police 
inefficiency  in  prioritising  cases  and  transmitting  of  case-related  information.  In  addition, 
Slovenia  registers  the  highest  percentage  of  respondents  who  consider  that  there  are  not 
enough  successful  prosecutions  to  deter  people  from  corrupt  practices  (72%)  and  disagree 
with  the  statement  that  government  efforts  to  combat  corruption  are  effective  (77%).49 
Slovenia introduced civil assets forfeiture into its national law in 2011, when the Confiscation 
of Proceeds of Crime Act was adopted. However, the Constitutional Court in 2018 ruled that 
the targeting of assets, obtained by an indicted person before 2011, represents ‘inadmissible 
retroactivity’.50  This  ruling  has  practical  implications  on  the  operation  of  the  civil 
confiscation  regime  and  its  effectiveness,  as  the  authorities  can  now  only  deploy  the  civil 
confiscation  instrument  in  relation  to  assets  obtained  by  a  person  indicted  after  2011. 
Nonetheless,  in  2019,  the  State  Prosecution  filed  147  corruption-related  indictments,  22% 
less than in 2018 (188). In 2019, the courts issued 21 convictions, 30% less than in 2018 (30), 
as well as nine acquittals (three in 2018) and one dismissal (two in 2018). There are another 
225  open  corruption  cases  in  the  courts  at  various  stages  of  criminal  proceedings,  and  the 
courts  have  yet  to  issue  first-instance  judgments.51  Authorities  have  noted  that  a  reduced 
number  of  indictments  and  convictions  can  be  attributed  to  difficulties  in  following  up  on 
evidence provided by whistle-blowers who are only partly protected under the IPCA.52  

46   Special Eurobarometer 502 (2020). 
47   Information received in the context of the country visit. 
48   SPPO Annual report, Vrhovno Državno tožilstvo. Letno poročilo za leto 2019. 
49   Special Eurobarometer 502 (2020). 
50   Decision of the Constitutional Court of 5 July 2018, U-I-6/15-23, Up-33/15-32 and Up-1003/15-27.  
51   SPPO Annual report, Vrhovno Državno tožilstvo. Letno poročilo za leto 2019. 
52   Information received in the context of the country visit. 

10 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
III.  MEDIA PLURALISM 

In  Slovenia,  the  freedom  of  expression  and  information  are  enshrined  in  the  Constitution, 
while media plurality is  ensured through specific sectorial legislation. The media regulator, 
the Agency for Communication Networks and Services, is an independent authority, which is 
legally  and  functionally  distinct  from  the  Government.  The  rules  on  transparency  of  media 
ownership  require  companies  to  declare  to  the  competition  authorities  the  ownership  or 
management  influence  above  a  certain  threshold.  A  considerable  change  in  ownership 
requires  also  the  agreement  of  the  competent  ministry.  The  protection  of  journalists  is  not 
specifically regulated and the mechanisms available to all citizens apply.53  

The  independence  of  the  Agency  for  Communication  Networks  and  Services  is 
stipulated  by  law,  however,  its  effectiveness  is  constrained  by  the  lack  of  human 
resources  and  the  lack  of  safeguards  against  political  interference.  Besides  being  the 
media regulator, the Agency for Communication Networks and Services  of the Republic of 
Slovenia  (AKOS)  is  also  the  regulatory  body  for  the  telecommunications,  post  and  rail 
transport sectors. The status of AKOS is guaranteed by the Electronic Communications Act.54 
It  draws its enforcement powers in  the  audiovisual media  field  from the  Mass Media  Act55 
and  Audiovisual  Media  Services  Act.56  Both  acts  are  currently  being  revised  and  are  to 
transpose the revised Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD): a public consultation 
was launched in July 2020 with a duration of only five days. Following widespread criticism, 
among others from national and international media associations, the consultation period has 
been  extended  until  the  beginning  of  August  and  September,  respectively.57  AKOS  is 
managed by the Director and the Agency’s Council, consisting of five council members. The 
decision-making power lies with the Director, while the Council supervises the realisation of 
the  work  programme  and  approves  the  financial  planning.  Both  are  appointed  by  the 
Government based on a previous selection procedure, with the Director being proposed to the 
Government by the responsible minister. Suspension and dismissal can only take place due to 
unsuitability  for  the  position  fulfilled  or  incompetence,  or  due  to  other  compelling  reasons 
related to the person concerned. Although rules regarding conflicts of interest with industry 
are defined in the Electronic Communications Act, there are no specific provisions in place 
addressing  the  possibility  of  the  Director  having  a  conflict  of  interest  with  respect  to  a 
political party.58 The financial and human resources are at the discretion of the regulator. The 
budget  is  drawn  from  the  income  gained  from  the  Agency’s  activity,  which  reinforces  its 
independence  from  the  Government.  However,  considering  the  wide  range  of  powers,  it 
appears  that  the  Agency  lacks  human  resources,  which  may  in  turn  influence  its 
effectiveness.  The  Agency  has  the  power  to  issue  sanctions,  which  may  be  challenged  in 
court.  The  Agency  presents  its  annual  report  to  the  Government  and  Parliament,  and 
publishes all relevant documents on its website, ensuring a good level of transparency.59 The 

53  After dropping two places between 2018 and 2019, Slovenia regained its previous position in the Reporters 
Without Borders World Press Freedom Index, now registering again at 32nd position worldwide. Reporters 
without borders, Slovenia. 

54   Zakon o elektronskih komunikacijah (ZEKon-1).  
55   Zakon o medijih (ZMed).  
56   Zakon o avdiovizualnih medijskih storitvah (ZAvMS).  
57  Draft Mass Media Act,   https://e-uprava.gov.si/drzava-in-druzba/e-demokracija/predlogi-predpisov/predlog-
predpisa.html?id=10493, Draft Audiovisual Media Services Act, https://e-uprava.gov.si/drzava-in-druzba/e-
demokracija/predlogi-predpisov/predlog-predpisa.html?id=11475. Draft changes to the media law that have 
an impact on the review of media mergers have been opposed by the country's competition authority. 

58   2020 Media Pluralism Monitor, Art. 182 of Zakon o elektronskih komunikacijah (ZEKon-1).  
59   In  this  context,  it  should  be  recalled  that  the  revised  AVMSD  sets  out  specific  guarantees  for  the 

independence and effectiveness of national media regulators. 

11 

 
 
                                                 
Media  Pluralism  Monitor  (MPM  2020)  assesses  the  independence  and  effectiveness  of  the 
media  authority  at  medium  risk,  mainly  due  to  the  absence  of  safeguards  against  political 
interference.60  

The  transparency  of  media  ownership  requires  declaration  of  ownership  or 
management stakes. According to the Mass Media Act, a publisher or broadcaster needs to 
declare whenever individual ownership or management  stakes in  the company  reach 5% or 
more.  Certain  information  is  made  publicly  available  on  the  website  of  the  Ministry  of 
Culture.61 Particularly in the case of multiple cascading owners, the current legislation may 
make it difficult to identify if decision-making is being concentrated in the background.62 The 
MPM 2020 therefore assessed media ownership transparency in  Slovenia  at  medium  risk.63 
The draft proposal for a revision of the law presented in July 2020, extends the scope of the 
Mass  Media  Act  to  digital  media  and  removes  the  minimum  threshold  of  5%,  except  for 
companies  organised  as  joint  stock  companies.64  The  draft  proposal  also  makes  all 
information  related  to  ownership  publicly  available,  including  the  previously  non-disclosed 
financial sources and the newly introduced sources deriving from public funds.65  

Allocation of state advertising is not specifically regulated. In the absence of collection of 
data on the revenues of media companies, it is difficult to obtain reliable information on the 
advertising  expenditure,  including  the  identity  of  the  contractor.  During  elections,  only  the 
Public  Service  Media  are  required  to  give  enough  airtime  to  ensure  a  fair  political 
representation in relevant programmes.  

The  Integrity  and  Prevention  of  Corruption  Act  provides  general  rules  on  conflicts  of 
interest for public officials, including in the media sector. 66 Apart from these, there are no 
specific  rules,  which  would  regulate  conflict  of  interest  in  the  media  sector,  for  example 
between political parties and media owners. In practice, this has a negative effect on media 
pluralism in Slovenia. A high level of political influence over media companies, which can 
trickle  down  to  the  press  and  broadcasters  at  regional  and  local  levels,  is  reported. 
Particularly  large  media  in  Slovenia  are  often  perceived  by  the  population  as  politically 
biased.  For  example,  at  least  two  TV  stations  and  further  also  print  and  online  media  are 
considered  as  politically  controlled  by  a  political  party.67  In  this  context,  the  MPM  2020 
addressed  the  political  independence  of  media  at  high  risk.  Concerns  have  been  raised  by 
stakeholders about possible changes related to the funding of the national public broadcaster 
and  the  governance  of  the  national  press  agency,  which  were  considered  as  politically 
motivated.  

The  implementation  of  the  right  to  information  leads  to  lengthy  procedures,  but  not 
many  cases  of  violation  have  been  recorded.68  The  right  is  enshrined  in  the  Constitution 
and regulated in the Access to Public Information Act. Appeal mechanisms are in place and 

60   2020 Media Pluralism Monitor.  
61   Arts. 12 and 14, Mass Media Act.   
62   Information received in the context of the country visit for the 2020 Rule of Law Report. 
63   It should be recalled in this regard that the revised AVMSD encourages Member States to adopt legislative 
measures  providing  that  media  service  providers  under  their  jurisdiction  make  accessible  information 
concerning their ownership structure, including the beneficial owners. 

64   Amended Art. 12, Draft Mass Media Act. 
65   See previous note.  
66   Integrity And Prevention Of Corruption Act. 
67   2020 Media Pluralism Monitor. 
68   See previous note.  

12 

 
 
                                                 
managed by the Information Commissioner. The MPM 2020 attributed the protection of right 
to information a low risk.  

While physical attacks against journalists are rare, online harassment or threats against 
journalists are frequent and rarely sanctioned by the justice system.  With regard to the 
framework  for  journalists’  protection,  the  freedom  of  expression  and  information  are 
enshrined  in  the  Constitution  and  relevant  laws  (e.g.  the  Criminal  Code),  and  judicial 
mechanisms are in place. While Reporters Without Borders noticed that in 2019, there were 
no  recorded  physical  attacks  against  journalists,69  lawsuits  with  an  intimidating  effect  were 
reported.70 There were also reports on the prosecution of journalists disclosing information of 
public interest.71  The “right  to  correction”,72 weakened media pluralism  and self-censorship 
of journalists were highlighted as problematic by the World Press Freedom Index 2019.73 In 
Slovenia,  imprisonment  is  among  the  envisaged  sanctions  for  defamation.  MPM  2020 
assessed the protection of freedom of expression at medium risk for the years 2018 and 2019. 
However,  the  situation  appears  to  have  worsened.  The  Council  of  Europe’s  Platform  to 
promote  the  protection  of  journalism  and  safety  of  journalists  published  four  alerts 
concerning Slovenia in 2020, mainly related to the harassment of journalists.74 Three of the 
four alerts have been addressed through a reply from the Slovene authorities, as indicated on 
the platform. Online attacks and threats, including from politicians, are numerous but many 
perpetrators remain anonymous.75 Several organisations have raised concerns about the safety 
of an investigative journalist in the light of a worrying recent case.76 A narrow application of 
criminal law causes that online harassment or threats against journalists are rarely sanctioned. 
This relies on the legal interpretation by the State Prosecution, whereby public incitement to 
hatred needs to be ‘concrete’, amounting to a ‘concrete danger for public order and peace’ to 
be prosecuted as a crime.77 This interpretation may have a negative effect on the protection of 
journalists by the criminal justice system.  In addition, various sources reported that judicial 
procedures  involving  journalists  can  be  lengthy,  which  leads  to  a  chilling  effect  on  the 
freedom of expression and causes victims to often refrain from reporting such acts.78  

69   Reporters Without Borders, Slovenia. 
70   See previous note.  
71   MPM 2020, Council of Europe, Platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists. 
72   Mass  Media  Act:  Art.  26,  offering  the  possibility  to  demand  the  correction  of  a  statement  if  the  affected 

person’s rights and interests were not respected.  

73   Reporters Without Borders, Slovenia.  
74   Council of Europe, Platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists.  
75   2020 Media Pluralism Monitor. 
76   Council  of  Europe,  Platform  to  promote  the  protection  of  journalism  and  safety  of  journalists,  alert  n° 
journalist  Blaž  Zgaga;  https://rsf.org/en/news/seven-organisations-call-

28/2020  about 
slovenian-government-stop-harassing-investigative-journalist. 

investigative 

77   ECRI – Fifth Report,  Legal opinion of the Supreme State Prosecutor's Office regarding the prosecution of 
Art. 297 of the Criminal Code. It should be noted, however, that in 2019, the Supreme Court clarified that 
there  are two  ways of committing the crime  from  Art. 297 of  the Criminal  Code, either (a) by inciting or 
inflaming hatred and violence or intolerance in a manner that can endanger or disturb public order and peace, 
or  (b)  with  threats,  insults  or  verbal  abuse.  It  stated  that  in  the  case  that  the  conduct  is  carried  out  with 
threats, insults or verbal abuse, there is no requirement that there be any potential endangerment of public 
order and peace. It also clarified, however, that when the conduct is carried out in a way that can endanger or 
disturb public order and peace, there is no requirement that this endangerment is already immediate, but that 
it 
endangerment. 
http://www.sodisce.si/vsrs/objave/2019080810051183/. 

potential 

concrete 

result 

only 

has 

the 

78   In this context, it should be recalled that, in line with European standards, and as indicated by the Council of 
Europe  Recommendation  2016/4,  “Member  States  should  put  in  place  a  comprehensive  legislative 
framework  that  enables  journalists  and  other  media  actors  to  contribute  to  public  debate  effectively  and 
without fear”. 

in 

to 

13 

 
 
                                                 
IV.  OTHER INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RELATED TO CHECKS AND BALANCES 

Slovenia  has  a  parliamentary  system  of  government  with  an  imperfect  bicameral  structure, 
where only the National Assembly (the first chamber of the Parliament), and not the National 
Council (the second chamber of the Parliament), adopts laws.79 Draft legislation can be tabled 
by  the  Government,  any  member  of  the  Parliament  or  at  least  5000  ‘voters’.  The 
Constitutional Court carries out ex-post constitutional review, including in concrete cases on 
the basis of  a constitutional  complaint.  In addition to  the justice system,  a number of other 
institutions, notably the Ombudsperson and the Advocate of the Principle of Equality play a 
role in the system of checks and balances.  

Consultation with the public on draft laws is organised through a dedicated online tool. 
A parliamentary resolution recommends that public consultations last between 30 to 60 days 
and that the process be summarised in a report.80 The draft laws are published on a dedicated 
website  “e-Demokracija”,81  through  which  the  public  can  send  their  contributions.  In 
practice,  the  public  does  not  always  have  sufficient  opportunity  to  participate  in  the 
legislative process. The recommended consultation period is often not followed, as the public 
is given a shorter time to submit their comments. In some instances, comments are not being 
duly  taken  into  consideration.82  Laws  may  be  adopted  in  a  shortened  or  an  emergency 
procedure under conditions stipulated by the Rules of Procedure of the National Assembly.83 
The Collegium of the President of the National Assembly then decides whether the law will 
be discussed in this manner.84 During the shortened and emergency procedure, general debate 
does  not  take  place  and  the  second  and  third  readings  are  held  during  the  same  session  of 
Parliament. In the parliamentary term 2014-2018, 39% of all laws were adopted according to 
the  regular  procedure,  19.1%  of  laws  were  adopted  according  to  the  emergency  procedure, 
and 23% of laws according to the shortened legislative procedure.85   

Due to an increase in constitutional complaints, the Constitutional Court’s backlog and 
length  of proceedings continued to rise. According to  the Constitution, the Constitutional 
Court has the power to review the conformity of laws, regulations, general acts issued in the 
exercise  of  public  authority,  international  treaties  and  constitutional  complains.  The 
proceedings  can  be  initiated,  amongst  others,  by  the  National  Assembly,  one  third  of  its 
deputies,  the  Government,  the  Ombudsperson,86  the  Judicial  Council  or  the  Prosecutor 

79   Constitutional Court of Slovenia, Judgment of 22 October 2008, U-I-295/07.  
80   Resolution  on  Legislative  Regulation.  Public  consultations  are  not  conducted  during  special  legislative 

procedures, such as emergency procedures, or over certain matters, such as the state budget. 

81   Website can be visited at https://e-uprava.gov.si/drzava-in-druzba/e-demokracija.  
82   European  Network  of  National  Human  Right  Institutions  (2020),  The  rule  of  law  in  the  European  Union: 
Reports  from  National  Human  Rights  Institutions.  Information  received  in  the  context  of  the  consultation 
process for the preparation of the 2020 Rule of Law Report.  

83   Legislation may be adopted in a shortened procedure in the following cases: minor  amendments to the law, 
expiration of law or some of  its provisions,  minor  harmonisation  with EU or other  national legislation, or 
amendments to laws that were subjects to decisions of the Constitutional Court (Rules of Procedure of the 
National  Assembly,  Art.  142);  in  case  of  national  security,  natural  disasters,  or  to  prevent  serious 
consequences to the functioning of the State, the Government may propose to the National Assembly that the 
act be adopted under an urgent procedure (Rules of Procedure of the National Assembly, Art. 143). 

84   Rules of Procedure of the National Assembly, Art. 143. 
85   National  Assembly  of  the  Republic  of  Slovenia  (2018),  Report  on  National  Assembly’s  work  in  the 

Parliamentary term 2014-2018. 

86   Over the years, the Ombudsman has also filed 31 requests for a review of the constitutionality or legality of a 
regulation or a general act issued to exercise public powers,  European Network of National Human Right 
Institutions  (2020),  The  rule  of  law  in  the  European  Union:  Reports  from  National  Human  Rights 
Institutions. 

14 

 
 
                                                 
General.  The  Constitutional  Court  may  abrogate  laws  that  are  not  in  conformity  with  the 
Constitution,  and  abrogate  or  annul  regulations  or  general  acts  issued  for  the  exercise  of 
public  authority  that  are  unconstitutional  or  unlawful.  If  the  Constitutional  Court  deems  a 
regulation  unconstitutional  or  unlawful,  it  issues  a  declaratory  decision.  In  2019,  the 
Constitutional  Court  resolved  1804  cases.87  While  the  requests  for  constitutional  review 
further decreased (to 165 cases), due to a continued increase in constitutional complaints, the 
Constitutional Court is not able to cope with the caseload. It is currently handling more than 
2500 cases, among which more than four fifths are constitutional complaints. Since 2016, the 
backlog  increased  by  approximately  25%  each  year.  Consequently,  the  average  length  of 
proceedings increased from 250 days in 2012 to  425 days and almost 500 days in 2019 for 
constitutional  complaint  cases  and  constitutional 
respectively.  The 
Constitutional Court has also been seized to review certain measures adopted in response to 
the COVID-19 pandemic.88  

review  cases, 

The  Human  Rights  Ombudsperson  and  the  Advocate  of  the  Principle  of  Equality  are 
also  in  charge  of  the  protection  of  the  rights  of  individuals.  The  Human  Rights 
Ombudsperson is in charge of protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms vis-à-vis 
state  authorities,  local  self-government,  and  persons  who  hold  public  authority.  The 
Ombudsperson  is  accredited  as  the  national  human  rights  institution  with  “B”  status  by 
Global  Alliance  of  National  Human  Rights  Institutions.  Since  the  accreditation,  the 
Ombudsperson’s  powers  were  extended  in  order  to  achieve  “A”  status.89  The  Office  of  the 
Ombudsperson  also  acts  as  the  children’s  rights  advocate.  The  Ombudsperson  prepares 
annual  reports,  which  are  discussed  in  the  National  Assembly.90  The  Government  then 
prepares  a  response  to  the  findings  and  recommendations  contained  in  the  report.  Another 
independent  institution  tasked  with  the  protection  of  human  rights  is  the  Advocate  of  the 
Principle  of  Equality,  an  independent  body  whose  tasks  include  the  protection  against 
discrimination and promotion of equality at a systemic level, counselling, legal support and 
court representation to victims of discrimination, and issuing legally binding decisions based 
on  complaints  against  discrimination.  However,  the  Advocate  of  the  Principle  of  Equality 
does  not  have  the  power  to  issue  sanctions.91  Despite  an  increase  in  financial  resources,  it 
operates with relatively few employees.92 To be noted that other independent bodies are also 
facing challenges.93  

87   Work Report of the Constitutional Court for 2019.  
88   In order to address the COVID-19 pandemic, Slovenia did not declare a state of emergency and most of the 
measures were adopted by the Government in accordance with the Communicable Diseases Act, which was 
also amended in  April 2020. In line  with this law, the  Government  must inform the Parliament about any 
measures  taken.  See  e.g.  Constitutional  Court  decision  regarding  the  restriction  on  movement  between 
municipalities, U-I-83/20-10, 16.4.2020. 

89   The re-accreditation scheduled for March 2020 was postponed due to COVID-19 pandemic. 
90   Reports 

http://www.varuh-rs.si/sl/promocija-publikacije-projekti/publikacije-

accessed 

can 

be 

at 

gradiva/letna-porocila-priporocila-dz-odzivna-porocila-vlade/.   

91   To be noted that the Commission Recommendation states that where equality bodies have the legal capacity 
to take binding decisions , the Member State should  also grant them the capacity to issue adequate, effective 
and proportionate  sanctions.  See Commission Recommendation of 22 June 2018 on standards for equality 
bodies C(2018) 3850 final, 1.1.2(5). 

92   In its first year of operation, the Advocate was allocated a total of EUR 200,000, which hindered its ability 
to  develop,  and  to  fulfil  its  broad  mandate.  However,  in  the  beginning  of  2019  the  national  budget  was 
rebalanced and the Advocate was allocated EUR 1,100,000. See Slovenian input to the 2020 Rule of Law 
Report. At end of 2019, the Advocate had 19 employees. 

93   In  May  2020,  the  Government/general  director  of  the  police  replaced  the  heads  of  several  independent 
bodies: the director of the specialised anti-corruption police department; the director of the Statistical Office 
(SURS); the Director of the Financial Intelligence Unit. It was the first time that such dismissals happened 

15 

 
 
                                                 
The  National  Strategy  for  the  Development  of  the  Non-Governmental  Sector  and 
Volunteering  aims  at  improving  support  to  non-governmental  organisations  by  2023. 
The  Strategy  lays  down  measures  to  support  these  organisation  in  contributing  to  the 
principles  of  pluralism  and  democracy  in  the  society.94  The  Strategy  also  promotes 
transparency,  integrity  and  accountability  of  NGOs.  The  state  finances  NGO  projects  and 
programmes,  in  areas  where  it  considers  that  NGOs  could  implement  public  policies  and 
provide services  to  citizens. Financing flows  mostly through public tenders, public calls, or 
direct  financing. Slovenia is  considered as  having an open and extensive civil  society, with 
relatively high levels of volunteering.95 

without stating a cause. To be noted that in June 2020, the Commission sent a letter asking for clarification 
regarding  dismissal  of  the  director  of  Statistical  Office,  in  view  of  the  EU  rules  on  the  independence  of 
national  statistical  authorities.  The  director  of  the  specialised  anti-corruption  police  department  and  the 
director  of  the  Statistical  Office  have  initiated  judicial  review  of  their  dismissal.  Ministry  of  the  Interior: 
Police  (2020),  Slovenian  Government  (2020),  47th  correspondence  session  of  the  Government  of  the 
Republic of Slovenia. 

94   The strategy can be accessed at https://www.gov.si/en/topics/non-governmental-organisations/.  
95   Rating  given  by  CIVICUS;  ratings  are  on  a  five-category  scale  defined  as:  open,  narrowed,  obstructed, 

repressed and closed. 

16 

 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Annex: List of sources in alphabetical order* 

* The list of contributions received in the context of the consultation for the 2020 Rule of Law report 
can be found at (COM website). 

Centre  for  Media  Pluralism  and  Media  Freedom  (2020),  2020  Media  pluralism  monitor. 

https://cmpf.eui.eu/media-pluralism-monitor/mpm-2020.  

CIVICUS, Monitor tracking civic space: Slovenia. https://monitor.civicus.org/country/slovenia/ 

Commission recommendation of 22.6.2018 on standards for equality bodies C(2018) 3850 final.  

Commission staff working document – Country Report Slovenia 2020 Accompanying the document 
communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament,  the  European  Council,  the 
Council,  the  European  Central  Bank  and  the  Eurogroup  2020  European  Semester:  Assessment  of 
progress on structural reforms, prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances, and results 
of in-depth reviews under Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 SWD/2020/523 final. 

Constitutional  Court  of  Slovenia  (2019),  Decision  on  temporary  suspension  of  the  Parliamentary 

Inquiries Act as far as it concerns judges. http://pisrs.si/Pis.web/pregledPredpisa?id=SKLU291. 

Constitutional  Court  of  Slovenia  (2019),  Decision  on  temporary  suspension  of  the  Parliamentary 
Prosecutors. 

concerns 

State 

far 

Inquiries 
it 
as 
http://pisrs.si/Pis.web/pregledPredpisa?id=SKLU293.  

Act 

as 

Constitutional  Court  of  Slovenia  (2020),  Work  report  of  the  Constitutional  Court  for  2019. 

https://www.us-rs.si/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/usrs_letnoporocilo_2019.pdf.  

Constitutional  Court  of  Slovenia,  Decision  of  16  April  2020,  U-I-83/20-10,  http://www.us-
rs.si/zadrzanje-izvrsevanja-7-clena-odloka-o-zacasni-splosni-prepovedi-gibanja-in-zbiranja-ljudi-
na-javnih/.  

Constitutional Court of Slovenia, Judgment of 22 October 2008, U-I-295/07.  

Constitutional  Court  of  Slovenia,  Judgment  of  5  July  2018,  U-I-6/15-23,  Up-33/15-32  and  Up-

1003/15-27. http://pisrs.si/Pis.web/pregledPredpisa?id=ODLU1809.  

Council of Europe (2019), Newsroom: The CEPEJ awards the Crystal Scales of Justice Prize to the 
Supreme  Court  of  Slovenia.  https://www.coe.int/en/web/human-rights-rule-of-law/-/the-cepej-
awards-the-crystal-scales-of-justice-prize-to-the-supreme-court-of-slovenia. 

Council  of  Europe,  Platform  to  promote  the  protection  of  journalism  and  safety  of  journalists: 

Slovenia. https://www.coe.int/en/web/media-freedom/slovenia.  

Council  of  Europe:  Committee  of  Ministers  (2016),  Recommendation  CM/Rec(2016)4  of  the 
Committee of Ministers to member States on the protection of journalism and safety of journalists 
and other media actors. 

Council  of  Europe:  European  Commission  against  Racism  and  Intolerance  –  ECRI  (2019),  ECRI 
https://www.coe.int/en/web/european-commission-against-racism-and-

Slovenia. 

report 
on 
intolerance/slovenia.  

Directorate-General for Communication (2020), Special Eurobarometer 502: corruption. 

European Commission (2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020), The EU Justice Scoreboard. 

European  Commission  against  Racism  and  Intolerance  (ECRI)  (2019),  Fifth  report  on  Slovenia. 

https://www.coe.int/en/web/european-commission-against-racism-and-intolerance/slovenia.  

European  Network  of  National  Human  Right  Institutions  (2020),  The  rule  of  law  in  the  European 
Union:  Reports  from  National  Human  Rights  Institutions.  Contribution  in  the  context  of  the 
consultation process for the preparation of the 2020 Rule of Law Report.  

European Networks of Councils for the Judiciary (2020), Contribution from the European Networks 

of Council for the Judiciary for the stakeholder consultation for the 2020 Rule of Law Report. 

17 

 
 
GRECO (2013), Fourth Evaluation Round – Evaluation Report on Slovenia on corruption prevention 

in respect of members of parliament, judges and prosecutors.   

GRECO  (2016),  Fourth  Evaluation  Round  –  Interim  Compliance  Report  on  Slovenia  on  corruption 

prevention in respect of members of parliament, judges and prosecutors. 

GRECO  (2018),  Fifth  Evaluation  Round  –  Evaluation  Report  on  Slovenia  on  preventing  corruption 
and  promoting  integrity  in  central  governments  (top  executive  functions)  and  law  enforcement 
agencies. 

Judicial Council (2019), Request for constitutional review and partial suspension of application of the 

Parliamentary Inquiries Act. http://pisrs.si/Pis.web/pregledPredpisa?id=SKLU291.  

Ministry of Culture, Media registry web page. https://rmsn.ekultura.gov.si/razvid/mediji.  

Ministry of the Interior: Police (2020), As of today, Igor Lamberger is taking over the management of 
https://www.policija.si/medijsko-sredisce/sporocila-za-

the  National 
javnost/sporocila-za-javnost-gpue/103938-z-danasnjim-dnem-vodenje-nacionalnega-
preiskovalnega-urada-prevzema-igor-lamberger.  

Investigation  Office. 

National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia (2018), Report on National Assembly’s work in the 
https://fotogalerija.dz-

Parliamentary 
rs.si/datoteke/Publikacije/PorocilaDZ/Mandat_2014%E2%80%932018/Report_2014-2018.pdf.  

2014-2018. 

term 

Ombudsman of the Republic of Slovenia (2020), Annual report of the Ombudsman of the Republic of 
http://www.varuh-rs.si/sl/promocija-publikacije-projekti/publikacije-

Slovenia 
gradiva/letna-porocila-priporocila-dz-odzivna-porocila-vlade/.  

2019. 

for 

Reporters without borders, Slovenia. https://rsf.org/en/slovenia.  

Slovenian  Government  (2018),  The  Supreme  Court  presented  new  activities  for  the  long-term 
judiciary. 

reputation 

Slovenian 

improvement 
http://www.sodisce.si/vsrs/objave/2018102509355191/.  

quality 

and 

the 

the 

of 

of 

Slovenian  Government  (2019),  The  Supreme  Court  ruled  on  the  importance  of  sanctioning  actions 

when there are signs of hate speech. http://www.sodisce.si/vsrs/objave/2019080810051183/.  

Slovenian  Government  (2020),  47th  correspondence  session  of  the  Government  of  the  Republic  of 

Slovenia. https://www.gov.si/novice/2020-05-21-47-dopisna-seja-vlade-republike-slovenije/.  

Slovenian Government (2020), Input from Slovenia for the 2020 Rule of Law Report.  

Slovenian  Government,  e-Democracy  web  page.  https://e-uprava.gov.si/drzava-in-druzba/e-

demokracija.  

Supreme 

Court 

(2019), 

Annual 

report 

of 

2019. 

http://www.sodisce.si/mma_bin.php?static_id=2020052510305888.  

Supreme State Prosecutor’s Office (2013), Legal opinion regarding the prosecution of Art. 297 of the 
http://www.spletno-oko.si/sites/default/files/sovrazni_govor_pravno_stalisce_-

Criminal  Code. 
_vrhovno_tozilstvo_0.doc.  

Supreme State Prosecutor’s Office and Prosecutor General (2019), Initiative for constitutional review 
https://www.dt-

parliamentary 

inquiries 

act. 

of 
rs.si/files/documents/USTAVNA%20POBUDA03.pdf.  

the 

Supreme State Prosecutor's Office (2019), Annual report for 2019. 

UX  Design  Awards,  winner  of 

the  UX  Design  Award  2019.  https://ux-design-

awards.com/news/gewinner-der-ux-design-awards-2019-2/.  

Virtual country visit to Slovenia in the context of the 2020 Rule of Law Report. 

18 

 
 
 
 
Annex II: Country visit to Slovenia 

The Commission services held virtual meetings in June 2020 with: 

  Agency for Communication Networks and Services (AKOS) 
  Association of Journalists  
  Association of Journalists and Publicists 
  Commission for the Prevention of Corruption 
  General Police Directorate - Corruption Section 
 
Judicial Council 
  Ministry of Justice 
  Ministry of Public Administration 
  Specialised Prosecution Office 
  State Prosecutorial Council 
  Supreme Court 
  Supreme State Prosecutor’s Office 
  Transparency International Slovenia 

* The Commission also met the following organisations in a number of horizontal meetings:  

  Amnesty International 
  Civil Liberties Union for Europe 
  Civil Society Europe 
  Conference of European Churches  
  EuroCommerce 
  European Center for Not-for-Profit Law  
  European Centre for Press and Media Freedom 
  European Civic Forum  
  Free Press Unlimited 
  Front Line Defenders 
 
ILGA-Europe 
 
International Commission of Jurists 
 
International Federation for Human Rights  
 
International Press Institute  
  Lifelong learning Platform  
  Open Society Justice Initiative/Open Society European Policy Institute 
  Reporters without Borders  
  Transparency International EU  

19