COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 2020 Rule of Law Report Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland Accompanying the document COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 2020 Rule of Law Report The rule of law situation in the European Union
Date: 2020-09-30
Institutions: European Commission, Secretariat-General
Subjects: Poland, administrative transparency, coronavirus disease, corruption, democracy, epidemic, independence of the judiciary, infringement of EU law, political rights, rule of law

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 30.9.2020  SWD(2020) 320 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 2020 Rule of Law Report    Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland Accompanying the document COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS  2020 Rule of Law Report         The rule of law situation in the European Union {COM(2020) 580 final} - {SWD(2020) 300 final} - {SWD(2020) 301 final} - {SWD(2020) 302 final} - {SWD(2020) 303 final} - {SWD(2020) 304 final} - {SWD(2020) 305 final} - {SWD(2020) 306 final} - {SWD(2020) 307 final} - {SWD(2020) 308 final} - {SWD(2020) 309 final} - {SWD(2020) 310 final} - {SWD(2020) 311 final} - {SWD(2020) 312 final} - {SWD(2020) 313 final} - {SWD(2020) 314 final} - {SWD(2020) 315 final} - {SWD(2020) 316 final} - {SWD(2020) 317 final} - {SWD(2020) 318 final} - {SWD(2020) 319 final} - {SWD(2020) 321 final} - {SWD(2020) 322 final} - {SWD(2020) 323 final} - {SWD(2020) 324 final} - {SWD(2020) 325 final} - {SWD(2020) 326 final}  
 
 
ABSTRACT 

Poland’s  justice  reforms  since  2015  have  been  a  major  source  of  controversy,  both 
domestically and at EU level, and have raised serious concerns, several of which persist. The 
reforms,  impacting  the  Constitutional  Tribunal,  the  Supreme  Court,  ordinary  courts,  the 
National Council for the Judiciary and the prosecution service, have increased the influence 
of  the  executive  and  legislative  powers  over  the  justice  system  and  therefore  weakened 
judicial independence. This  led the Commission to  launch the procedure  under Article 7(1) 
TEU  in  2017,  which  is  still  under  consideration  by  the  Council.  In  2019  and  2020,  the 
Commission launched two new infringement procedures to safeguard judicial independence 
and the Court of Justice of the EU has granted interim measures to suspend the powers of the 
Supreme Court’s Disciplinary Chamber with regard to disciplinary cases concerning judges. 

A  developed  legal  and  institutional  framework  exists  to  prevent  corruption  and  promote 
transparency.  A  dedicated  government  anti-corruption  programme  focusses  on  providing 
training  and  guidance  for  officials.  However,  structural  weaknesses  have  been  identified  in 
areas  such  as  the  current  asset  declaration  schemes  and  lobbying  regulations.  Plans  are 
ongoing  for  transparency  of  public  life  legislation  to  reorganise  key  preventive  provisions 
into a single legal act, but concerns exist over repeated delays. Concerns also exist over the 
independence  of  the  main  institutions  responsible  for  preventing  and  fighting  corruption, 
considering  in  particular  the  subordination  of  the  Central  Anti-Corruption  Bureau  to  the 
executive and the fact that the Minister of Justice is at the same time the Prosecutor General. 

The  Polish  legal  framework  concerning  media  pluralism  is  based  both  on  constitutional 
safeguards and sectorial legislation. Relevant safeguards for the media regulator, the National 
Broadcasting  Council,  appear  to  be  in  place,  however  some  concerns  regarding  its 
independence have been raised. The role of the regulator has been also reduced by the 2016 
reform, which assigned the competences over the management of the Polish public media to a 
National  Media  Council  (RMN).  The  legal  framework  on  media  ownership  transparency  is 
not  equally  applicable  to  all  media  actors.  With  regard  to  the  protection  of  journalists,  the 
criminalisation of insulting public officials remains problematic. 

Other  components  of  the  system  of  checks  and  balances  are  also  under  pressure.  Reforms 
have  been  adopted  through  expedited  legislative  procedures  with  limited  consultation  of 
stakeholders  or  opportunities  for  the  opposition  to  play  its  role  in  the  law-making  process. 
Poland  has  a  vibrant  civil  society  and  strong  professional  associations  of  judges  and 
prosecutors,  which  participate  in  the  public  debate.  Nevertheless,  organisations  have  been 
subject  to  unfavourable  statements  by  politicians.  Despite  the  difficult  environment,  the 
Ombudsman has continued to play a key role as a rule of law safeguard. 

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I.  JUSTICE SYSTEM  

The  Polish  justice  system  is  separated  in  two  main  branches,  administrative  and  ordinary 
judiciary.  The  Supreme  Administrative  Court  and  16  administrative  courts  exercise  control 
over  public  administration,  including  the  lawfulness  of  measures  of  bodies  of  local 
government  and  of  territorial  organs  of  government  administration.  The  ordinary  judiciary, 
supervised  by  the  Supreme  Court1,  consists  of  three  levels:  11 appeal  courts,  46  regional 
courts and over 300 district courts. Judges are appointed by the President of the Republic at 
the  request  of  the  National  Council  for  the  Judiciary.  The  Constitutional  Tribunal,  which 
adjudicates notably on the Constitutionality of legislation, is composed of 15 judges chosen 
by the Sejm (lower chamber of the Parliament) for a term of office of 9 years. The National 
Council for the Judiciary is tasked by the Constitution to safeguard judicial independence. A 
particular  characteristic  of  the  prosecution  system,  which  is  not  part  of  the  independent 
judiciary, is that the Prosecutor General and the Minister of Justice are the same person. The 
Constitution provides that advocates and legal counsellors can self-regulate their practice. 

Independence  

The  justice  reforms  started  in  November  2015  were  continued.  These  reforms  were 
carried out  through more than 30 laws relating to the entire structure of  the justice system, 
including  the  Constitutional  Tribunal,  the  National  Council  for  the  Judiciary,  the  Supreme 
Court, the ordinary courts, administrative courts, and the prosecution service. Various aspects 
of the justice reform  raise serious concerns  as regards the rule of law, in particular judicial 
independence.  This  is  the  main  focus  of  the  Article  7(1)  TEU2  procedure  initiated  by  the 
European  Commission,  which  is  still  under  consideration  by  the  Council.  The  European 
Parliament has also raised concerns regarding the rule of law in Poland3. Furthermore, certain 
aspects  of  these  reforms  are  subject  to  infringement  proceedings4.  The  safeguarding  of 
judicial independence in Poland was one of the country-specific recommendations addressed 
in the context of the 2020 European Semester5. 

The perception of judicial independence among the general public and companies is low 
and  has  shown  a  decreasing  trend  in  recent  years.  Whereas  34%  of  the  general  public 
perceives  independence  of  courts  and  judges  as  ‘fairly  or  very  good’  in  2019,  27%  of 
companies shares the same perception6. The reason most often invoked for the perceived lack 
of  judicial  independence  is  related  to  interference  or  pressure  from  the  Government  and 
politicians7. The public debate on the judiciary is marked by strong tensions. In 2019, Polish 

1   The Supreme Court also supervises military courts. 
2   Commission IP/17/5367.  
3   European  Parliament  resolution  of  16  January  2020  on  ongoing  hearings  under  Article 7(1)  of  the  TEU 
regarding Poland and Hungary; resolution of 1 March 2018 on the Commission’s decision to activate Article 
7(1) TEU as regards the situation in Poland; resolution of 15 November 2017 on the situation of the rule of 
law and democracy in Poland.  

4   In  two  cases,  the  Court  of  Justice  found  an  infringement  (C-192/18  and  C-619/18).  C-719/19  is  pending, 

while a fourth procedure was launched on 29 April 2020. 

5   Council  Recommendation  of  20  July  2020  on  the  2020  National  Reform  Programme  of  Poland  and 
delivering a Council opinion on the 2020 Convergence Programme of Poland, p. 15 (OJ C 282/21); see also 
European Commission, Country Report Poland 2020, SWD(2020) 520 final, p. 6 and 36. 

6   Figures 44-47, 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard. The level of perceived judicial independence is categorised as 
follows: very low (below 30% of respondents perceive judicial independence as fairly good and very good); 
low (between 30-39%), average (between 40-59%), high (between 60-75%), very high (above 75%). 

7   Figures 45 and 47, 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard.  

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media  reported  that  high-ranking  officials8  had  allegedly  been  associated  with  a  smear 
campaign against judges who openly criticised the justice reforms9.  

Court  of  Justice  judgments  have  confirmed  EU  law  requirements  on  judicial 
independence. In 2019, the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘the Court of Justice’) 
issued two rulings confirming that the legislation contested by the Commission in the context 
of infringement proceedings was in violation of EU law as regards requirements of judicial 
independence10.  The  Court  of  Justice  ruled  against  changes  to  the  retirement  regime  for 
Supreme Court judges, which resulted in prematurely terminating the mandate of around one 
third  of  the  judges  of  that  court11.  Furthermore,  the  Court  of  Justice  found  the  Polish 
legislation concerning the new retirement  regime of ordinary  court judges to  be contrary to 
EU law, in particular on the grounds that it did not contain sufficient safeguards for judicial 
independence12. Prior to the rulings, the Polish authorities had already amended the national 
law. The Court of Justice was also seized by Polish courts in more than 10 preliminary ruling 
procedures as regards the justice reform13. 

Concerns over the independence and legitimacy of the Constitutional  Tribunal,  raised 
by  the  Commission  under  the  Article  7(1)  TEU  procedure,  have  so  far  not  been 
resolved14. In 2019, the Ombudsman and the Supreme Court15 continued to express concerns 
on  the  functioning  and  legitimacy  of  the  Tribunal.  Concerns  relating  to  the  Constitutional 
Tribunal have been reiterated by the Venice Commission16, and by international organisations 
and NGOs17. Cases concerning politically sensitive issues, in particular those concerning the 

8   These  included  officials  from  the  Ministry  of  Justice.  Certain  members  of  the  newly  composed  National 
Council  for  the  Judiciary  were  reportedly  involved.  Cf.  Onet.pl  (2019)  ‘Onet’s  investigation.  The  farm  of 
trolls  in  the  Ministry  of  Justice,  that  is  ‘we  will  not  put  you  down  for  doing  good’’.  Statements  of  PACE 
(2020),  para  11;  according  to  NGOs,  smear  campaigns  against  judges  started  already  in  2017  (Helsinki 
Foundation for Human Rights report of 2017; Amnesty International report of 2019). 

9   Whereas  a  deputy  Minister  for  Justice  allegedly  involved  in  the  campaign  resigned,  others  denied  the 
allegations.  See  a  report  of  the  judges’  association  Iustitia  of  4  November  2019  (Iustitia  Quarterly 
3(37)2019). A statement of the Helsinki Foundation of Human Rights of 20 August 2019. 

10   Judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 24 June 2019, Commission v Poland, C-619/18; 

and of 5 November 2019, Commission v Poland, C-192/18. 

11   Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 24 June 2019, Commission v Poland, C-619/18. 
A  legislative  amendment  had  already  been  adopted  by  the  Polish  authorities  to  remove  the  provisions  in 
question. 

12   Judgment  of  the  Court  of  Justice  of  the  European  Union  of  5  November  2019,  Commission  v  Poland,  C-
192/18. A legislative amendment had already been adopted by the Polish authorities to remove the difference 
in  mandatory  retirement  age  of  male  and  female  judges,  and  changed  the  regime  of  prolongation  of  the 
active service of ordinary court judges (see below). 

13   See already judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 19 November 2019, A.K., C‑ 585/18, 
C‑ 624/18  and  C‑ 625/18;  and  judgment  of  26  March  2020,  Miasto  Łowicz  and  others,  C‑ 558/18  and 
C‑ 563/18, where the Court declared these two requests inadmissible.  

14   Cf. paras 92-113 of the Reasoned Proposal for a Council decision on the determination of a clear risk of a 
serious  breach  by  the  Republic  of  Poland  of  the  rule  of  law  (COM/2017/0835  final  -  2017/0360  (NLE)). 
Questions regarding the composition of the Tribunal have also been brought before the European Court of 
Human Rights; Case Xero Flor v. Poland (No. 4907/18) communicated on 2 September 2019. 

15   Ombudsman’s information of his office’s activities in 2019; Ombudsman’s request of 22 November 19 to 

recuse a judge of the Constitutional Tribunal; Supreme Court’s statement of 28 February 2020. 
16   Venice Commission’s opinions CDL-AD(2020)017; CDL-AD(2017)031; CDL AD(2016)026. 
17   In open letters, judges of the Constitutional Tribunal expressed concerns over the functioning of the Tribunal 
alleging  in  particular  mishandling  of  cases  by  its  President  and  unlawful  recomposition  of  the  already 
designated  hearing  benches  (see  index  for  references);  2017  Report  of  Special  Rapporteur  on  the 
independence  of  judges  and  lawyers  on  his  mission  to  Poland;  2018  statement  of  the  Batory  foundation; 
2018 report of the Helsinki Foundation. 

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justice reforms, have been initiated by the Prime Minister18, the Marshal  of the Sejm19, the 
National  Council  for  the  Judiciary20  and  the  newly  created  Disciplinary  Chamber  of  the 
Supreme Court21. Certain  cases initiated by the Prosecutor General  and by the Disciplinary 
Chamber  seek  an  assessment  of  the  compatibility  with  the  Constitution  of  EU  Treaty 
provisions22. 

The  National  Council  for  the  Judiciary  is  composed  mainly  of  politically  appointed 
members.  The  2018  justice  reform  changed  the  procedure  for  the  appointment  of  judges-
members  of  the  National  Council  for  the  Judiciary  (NCJ)23.  The  judges-members,  who 
constitute the majority of the members of the  NCJ, are now directly appointed by the Sejm 
instead  of  by  their  peers  as  previously.  The  new  composition  of  the  NCJ  did  not  take  into 
account  the Council of Europe recommendations24 and is  one of the concerns raised by the 
Commission in its Reasoned Proposal adopted under the Article 7(1) TEU procedure relating 
to the rule of law in Poland25. On 25 March 2019, upon request of the NCJ, the Constitutional 
Tribunal  declared  that  the  new  procedure  of  appointment  of  the  NCJ’s  judges-members 
complies with the Constitution26. On 19 November 2019, upon a preliminary reference of the 
Supreme  Court  on  the  independence  and  impartiality  of  the  newly  created  Disciplinary 
Chamber,  the  Court  of  Justice  considered  that  for  the  participation  of  a  Council  for  the 
Judiciary in making the appointment process of judges by the President of the Republic more 
objective, such body must itself be sufficiently independent of the legislature and executive 
and  of  the  body  to  which  it  gives  an  opinion27.  On  23  January  2020,  the  Supreme  Court, 

18   The case concerned the constitutionality of the Supreme Court’s resolution of 23 January 2020 on judicial 
appointments in which the Supreme Court indicated that it implemented the preliminary ruling of the Court 
of Justice of 19 November 2019 in case C-585/18. The Prime Minister lodged a request on 24 February 2020 
and the ruling was delivered on 20 April 2020 (case U 2/20).  

19   The case  concerned the possibility  for the Supreme  Court  to issue the  resolution of 23  January 2020. The 
Marshal of the Sejm lodged, pre-emptively, a request on 22 January 2020 and the ruling was delivered on 21 
April 2020 (case Kpt 1/20).  

20   The  case  on  the  constitutionality  of  the  new  composition  of  the  National  Council  for  the  Judiciary  was 
lodged on 27 November 2018 and the Constitutional Tribunal delivered the ruling on 25 March 2019 (case K 
12/18).  

21   The Disciplinary Chamber referred a question to the Constitutional Tribunal on 13 December 2019 on the 
possibility of recusing a judge appointed upon a request by the NCJ in its new composition and a ruling was 
delivered on 4 March 2020 (case P 22/19).  

22   Cf. Cases K 7/18 and in I DO 16/19, currently pending.  
23   Pursuant  to  the  Constitution,  the  NCJ  consists  of  ex  officio  members  (the  First  President  of  the  Supreme 
Court, the minister of Justice, the President of the Supreme Administrative Court and a representative of the 
President of the Republic) and of chosen members (4 members chosen by the Sejm from among its deputies, 
2 members chosen by the Senate from among senators, and 15 judges chosen from among judges). The term 
of office of chosen members is of four years.  

24   The  2010  Recommendation  of  the  Committee  of  Ministers  of  the  Council  of  Europe  recommends  that, 
where  a  council  for  the  judiciary  has  been  established,  'not  less  than  half  the  members  should  be  judges 
chosen  by  their  peers  from  all  levels  of  the  judiciary  and  with  respect  for  pluralism  inside  the  judiciary' 
(Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12 of the Committee of Ministers, para 27). 

25   Cf.  Paras  137-145  of  the  Reasoned  Proposal.  Similar  concerns  have  also  been  raised  by  the  Venice 
commission  (opinion  (CDL-AD(2017)031)  and  by  GRECO  in  2019  Second  Addendum  to  the  Second 
Compliance Report, para. 65. Cases concerning the premature dismissal of the previous judges-members of 
the  NCJ  and  its  new  composition  have  been  brought  before  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights: 
applications no. 39650/18  Żurek vs Poland (communicated on 14 May 2020), 43572/18 Grzęda vs Poland 
(communicated on 9 July 2019), 43447/19, 49868/19 and 57511/19  Reczkowicz and two Others vs Poland 
(communicated on 5 June 2020). 

26   Ruling of 25 March 2019 in case K 12/18. 
27   Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 19 November 2019, A.K., C‑ 585/18, C‑ 624/18 
and C‑ 625/18, paras 137-145. The Court also stated that “the referring court will need to assess, in the light, 
where  relevant,  of  the  reasons  and  specific  objectives  alleged  before  it  in  order  to  justify  certain  of  the 

4 

 
 
                                                 
referring  to  this  ruling  of  the  Court  of  Justice,  issued  a  resolution28  stating  that  the  newly 
composed NCJ is not independent and asserting that new Supreme Court judges selected by it 
are  not  allowed  to  adjudicate  cases29.  The  resolution  was  subsequently  found  to  be 
inconsistent  with  the  Constitution  and  with  EU  law  by  the  Constitutional  Tribunal, 
adjudicating upon request of the Prime Minister and the Marshal of the Sejm, supported by 
the President of the Republic and by the Prosecutor General30. The Supreme Court, however, 
has continued to apply its resolution31. The NCJ continues to propose candidates for judicial 
appointments to the President of the Republic32. 

The  two  new  chambers  in  the  Supreme  Court,  created  under  the  2018  reform,  have 
been  granted  new  powers  in  2019.  The  Disciplinary  Chamber  and  the  Chamber  of 
Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs are composed solely of new judges appointed at the 
request  of  the  newly  composed  National  Council  for  the  Judiciary  (NCJ).  Following  the 
ruling  of  the  Court  of  Justice  of  19  November  201933,  the  Supreme  Court  in  three  rulings 
found  the  Disciplinary  Chamber  not  to  be  an  independent  court  within  the  meaning  of  EU 
and national law34. The law of 20 December 2019 granted the new Chamber of Extraordinary 
Control  and  Public  Affairs  the  sole  power  to  decide  on  issues  related  to  judicial 
independence35.  This  part  of  the  said  law  is  one  of  the  elements  raised  in  the  infringement 
proceedings initiated by the Commission on 29 April 202036. The new Disciplinary Chamber 
has also been given the competence to lift the immunity of judges when criminal proceedings 
are  brought  against  them  (a  competence  previously  exercised  by  disciplinary  courts  of  first 
instance).  These  new  powers  granted  to  the  chambers  have  been  criticised  by  a  number  of 
national institutions and the Venice Commission37. 

measures in question, whether, taken together, the factors referred to in paragraphs 143 to 151 above and all 
the other relevant findings of fact which it will have made are capable of giving rise to legitimate doubts, in 
the minds of subjects of the law, as to the imperviousness of the Disciplinary Chamber to external factors, 
and,  in  particular,  to  the  direct  or  indirect  influence  of  the  legislature  and  the  executive,  and  as  to  its 
neutrality with respect to the interests before it and, thus, whether they may lead to that chamber not being 
seen  to  be  independent  or  impartial  with  the  consequence  of  prejudicing  the  trust  which  justice  in  a 
democratic society must inspire in subjects of the law” (para 153). 

28   The resolution of three joined Chambers of the Supreme Court of 23 January 2020; this resolution is binding 

on the Supreme Court. 

29   Already in 2018, the European Network of Councils for the Judiciary suspended the membership of the NCJ 
due to the concerns relating to its independence and on 27 May 2020, the Board of the network proposed to 
expel the NCJ. 

30   Rulings of 20 April 2020 in case U 2/20 and of 21 April 2020 in case Kpt 1/20. 
31   E.g. a decision of the Criminal Chamber of 25 June 2020 in case I KZP 1/20. 
32   On  4  May  2020,  the  President  of  the  Republic  made  six  appointments  to  the  Supreme  Court  (including 3 
members of the Disciplinary Chamber). On 27 May 2020, the President of the Republic appointed 77 new 
judges to all levels of ordinary and administrative judiciary. 

33   Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 19 November 2019, A.K., C‑ 585/18, C‑ 624/18 

and C‑ 625/18.  

34   In particular judgment of the Supreme Court of 5 December 2019 in case III PO 7/18, and two rulings of 15 

January 2020 in cases III PO 8/18 and III PO 9/18. 

35   This power includes the examination of  motions to recuse judges from cases in  view  of doubts as to their 
independence or impartiality. Such decisions are de facto immunised from being changed by other Chambers 
of  the  Supreme  Court.  This  was  explicitly  criticised  by  the  Venice  Commission  (opinion  CDL-
AD(2020)017), para 40, which recalled that such motions, based on the involvement of the newly composed 
NCJ in the judicial appointment procedure, will be decided by judges appointed in the same way.  

36   In  these  infringement  proceedings,  the  Commission  considers  that  this  law  prevents  Polish  courts  from 
fulfilling  their  obligation  to  apply  EU  law  or  request  preliminary  rulings  from  the  Court  of  Justice  of  the 
European Union.  

37   Cf.  Venice  Commission  (opinion  CDL-AD(2020)17;  OSCE-ODIHR  (Urgent  Interim  Opinion  JUD-
POL/365/2019[AlC]); Ombudsman’s opinion of 7 January 2020; the Supreme Court’s opinions of 16 and 23 

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The  Supreme  Court  has  been  subject  to  new  reforms,  in  particular  as  regards  the 
procedure for appointing its First President. A few months before the end of the term of 
office  of  the  Supreme  Court’s  previous  First  President,  a  new  law,  adopted  by  the  lower 
house  of  the  Parliament  (Sejm)38  amended  the  procedure  for  appointment  of  the  new  First 
President39. The law which came into force in February 2020 provides that the President of 
the Republic can appoint an acting First President to be in charge of organising the procedure 
for selecting candidates and changes the quorum necessary to vote on a list of candidates to 
the  office40.  On  1  May  2020,  the  President  of  the  Republic  appointed  an  acting  First 
President,  from  among  the  judges  who,  according  to  the  aforementioned  Supreme  Court 
resolution41, are no longer empowered to adjudicate. The selection procedure was subject to 
controversy42,  in  particular  as  the  acting  First  President  refused  to  exclude  from  that 
procedure  members  of  the  Disciplinary  Chamber  in  spite  of  the  lack  of  guarantees  of  their 
independence43.  On  26  May  2020,  the  President  of  the  Republic  appointed  a  new  First 
President who is also one of the judges who, according to the aforementioned Supreme Court 
resolution, are no longer empowered to adjudicate.  

The  disciplinary  regime  for  judges  has  been  amended  and  is  actively  used.  The 
disciplinary  regime,  substantially  amended  in  201844,  has  raised  concerns  that  it  lacks 
appropriate  safeguards  to  protect  judicial  independence,  due  to  the  risk  that  judges  may  be 
sanctioned  because  of  the  content  of  judicial  decisions,  including  decisions  to  request 
preliminary rulings from the Court of Justice. Moreover, concerns remain with regard to the 
independence  of  the  Disciplinary  Chamber  of  the  Supreme  Court,  which  acts  as  the  final 
instance  for  disciplinary  cases  and  is  composed  solely  of  judges  selected  by  the  newly 
composed NCJ45. The Commission decided on 10 October 2019 to refer Poland to the Court 
of Justice, contesting these new arrangements46. The disciplinary regime allows judges to be 
subject  to  disciplinary  proceedings  in  view  of  the  content  of  their  judicial  decisions  or 

December 2019. It should be noted that cases concerning the independence of the two new Chambers have 
been  brought  before  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights.  See  applications  no.  43447/19,  49868/19  and 
57511/19 Reczkowicz and two Others vs Poland (communicated on 5 June 2020). 

38   Law of 20 December 2019 amending the Law on the Ordinary Courts Organisation  and certain other laws. 
This  change  was  also  criticised  by  the  Venice  Commission  in  its  Opinion  of  16  January  2020  (CDL-
AD(2020)017), paras 51-55. 

39   The  Law  of  20  December  2019  provides  for  a  three-tier  selection  process,  granting  the  President  of  the 
Republic the right to invalidate a selection procedure if considered in breach of the law (without setting out 
any criteria in that respect). If no candidates  have been  selected by the General  Assembly of the Supreme 
Court following the expiry of the term of office of the sitting First President, the President of the Republic 
may appoint a person among the Supreme Court judges as acting First President, who is to re-convene the 
General Assembly in order to ensure that the President of the Republic nominate a candidate to the office of 
the First President. 

40   The law increased the quorum in the General Assembly of Supreme Court necessary for selecting a list of 
five  candidates  to  the  post  of  the  First  President  of  the  Supreme  Court:  at  first  stage,  84  Supreme  Court 
judges need to participate in the Assembly. If this number is not met, 75 judges need to be present. If again 
that number of judges is not met, the next Assembly composed of at least 32 Supreme Court judges would 
be able to select five candidates.  

41   This resolution has been contested by the Constitutional Tribunal (see the paragraph on the NCJ above). 
42   In a statement of 23 May 2020, a majority (50) of Supreme Court judges, appointed to the Court prior to the 

justice reform, criticised the procedure as unconstitutional.  

43   See the paragraph on the NCJ above. 
44   Law of 8 December 2017 on the Supreme Court which entered into force on 3 April 2018. For an overview 

of the new disciplinary regime, see Commission press release of 10 October 2019 IP/19/6033. 

45   See the paragraph on the NCJ above. 
46   Case C-791/19 (pending). A disciplinary regime can be used as a system of political control of the content of 
judicial  decisions  in  violation  of  the  requirements  of  judicial  independence  as  established  by  the  Court  of 
Justice (cf. Case C-216/18 PPU, LM, 25 July 2018, para 67). 

6 

 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
statements they make about the functioning of constitutional bodies in Poland47. On 8 April 
2020,  following  a  request  for  interim  measures,  the  Court  of  Justice  ordered  Poland  to 
immediately  suspend  the  application  of  the  national  provisions  on  the  powers  of  the 
Disciplinary  Chamber  with  regard  to  disciplinary  cases  concerning  judges48.  Following  the 
order,  the  Disciplinary  Chamber  referred  a  question  of  law  to  the  Constitutional  Tribunal, 
contesting the constitutionality of Treaty provisions on which the interim measures order is 
based49. The law of 20 December 2019 further broadened the notion of disciplinary offence 
and  increased  the  risk  to  judicial  independence.  This  issue  is  an  element  of  the  new 
infringement  proceedings  launched  by  the  Commission  on  29  April  202050.  The  new 
disciplinary  regime  and  the  law  of  20  December  2019  have  led  courts  of  other  Member 
States,  in  the  context  of  judicial  cooperation  within  the  EU,  to  question  the  judicial 
safeguards of the Polish system51.  

Judges are subject to numerous new requirements. The law of 20 December 2019 obliges 
all  judges  in  Poland  to  disclose  personal  information,  such  as  their  membership  in 
associations,  functions  in  non-profit  organisations  or  their  membership  and  position  in 
political  parties  prior  to  29  December  1989.  Such  provisions  raise  concerns  as  regards  the 
right to respect for private life and the right to protection of personal data as guaranteed by 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and the General Data Protection Regulation52. 
These  new  requirements  follow  other  requirements  introduced  in  2018  relating  to  the 
prolongation  of  the  active  service  of  ordinary  court  judges,  which  is  now  decided  by  the 
National  Council  for  the  Judiciary  (NCJ).  While  this  change  was  a  response  to  the 
infringement  proceedings53,  it  has  not  been  sufficient  to  address  the  problem  regarding  the 
impact on judicial independence, due to the concerns relating to the NCJ.  

A general prohibition for Polish courts to challenge the powers of courts and tribunals, 
constitutional organs and law enforcement agencies has been introduced by the law of 
20 December 2019. The law prevents Polish judges from ruling on the lawfulness of judicial 
appointments  and  on  a  judge’s  power  to  perform  judicial  functions.  The  same  prohibition 

47   In 2019, action was taken against judges who, following the Court of Justice ruling of 19 November 2019, 
publicly  questioned  the  legitimacy  of  the  NCJ  and  the  validity  of  judicial  appointments  carried  out  at  its 
request.  For  an  overview  of  pending  disciplinary  investigations  and  proceedings,  see  e.g.  Helsinki 
Foundation for Human  Rights’ report ‘The  Time  of Trial. How do changes in justice  system affect Polish 
judges?’ of 24 July 2019; the 2019 Batory Foundation statement ‘Pogłębiający się kryzys w Polsce. – Kiedy 
w Europie umiera praworządność’.  

48   Order of the Grand Chamber of 8 April 2020 in case C-791/19 R. In view of implementing the order, on 5 
May 2020, the acting First President of the Supreme Court adopted Regulation no 55/2020 and the President 
of the Disciplinary Chamber adopted Regulation no 21/2020. 

49   The question focuses on the assessment of compliance with the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of the 
provisions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the  European Union as 
regards the scope of the obligation of a Member State to implement interim measures granted by the Court of 
Justice in matters concerning the system and the functioning of constitutional judiciary organs (file ref. No. 
P7/20). 

50   Commission press release of 29 April 2020, IP/20/772. 
51   E.g.  on  17  February  2020,  the  Karlsruhe  Higher  Regional  Court  suspended  the  execution  of  a  European 
Arrest Warrant concerning a Polish citizen, raising concerns about the possibility of ensuring his right to fair 
trial.  See:  OLG  Karlsruhe,  order  of  17  February  2020  –  Aktenzeichen  Ausl  301  AR  156/19.  On  31  July 
2020,  the  Court  of  Amsterdam  made  a  request  for  a  preliminary  ruling  in  the  context  of  execution  of  a 
European Arrest Warrant issued against a Polish citizen seeking clarifications regarding its obligations under 
EU law in the light of the recent changes in the Polish justice system. See: Rechtbank Amsterdam, order of 
31 July 2020 – ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2020:3776 and Case C-354/20 PPU. 

52   Commission press release of 29 April 2020, IP/20/772. 
53   Judgment  of  the  Court  of  Justice  of  the  European  Union  of  5  November  2019,  Commission  v  Poland,C-

192/18. 

7 

 
 
                                                 
applies  to  judges  assessing  the  lawfulness  of  the  composition  of  a  hearing  bench.  These 
requirements  have  been  challenged  in  the  infringement  proceedings  launched  by  the 
Commission  on  29  April  202054.  The  same  law  introduced  new  limits  on  statements  and 
actions  that  can  be  made  by  judges,  courts  and  other  independent  bodies,  who  are  now 
prohibited  from  challenging  the  powers  of  judicial  and  constitutional  bodies  as  well  as  law 
enforcement  agencies.  The  law  imposes  such  a  prohibition  also  as  regards  statements  or 
actions  of  bodies  of  judicial  self-governance  that  challenge  judicial  appointments.  These 
changes have given rise to concerns of national institutions and the Venice Commission55. As 
regards the court presidents, following a dismissal of over 70 court presidents by the Minister 
of Justice no means have been proposed to remedy their situation56. A case concerning such 
dismissals has been brought before the European Court of Human Rights57. 

The fact that the Minister of Justice is at the same time the Prosecutor General raises 
particular concerns regarding the power to issue instructions in individual cases and to 
transfer prosecutors. Following the reforms carried out in 2016, the position of Prosecutor 
General  and  that  of  Minister  of  Justice  were  merged.  The  Minister  of  Justice  therefore 
directly wields the powers vested in the highest prosecutorial office, including the authority 
to  issue  instructions  to  prosecutors  in  specific  cases.  In  2019,  the  power  of  the  General 
Prosecutor,  or  higher  ranking  prosecutors,  to  issue  instructions58  in  individual  cases 
(including not to prosecute) was used on several occasions, including in  politically relevant 
cases59.  This  power  has  been  subject  to  criticism  including  by  the  Venice  Commission60. 
Furthermore,  the  Prosecutor  General  has  the  authority  to  decide  on  the  secondment  of 
prosecutors, without their consent and without providing justification, to another post for up 
to 6 months. Moreover, he can discretionally reattribute cases among prosecutors, which has 
equally  given  rise  to  concerns  that  political  considerations  could  have  an  impact  on  the 
conduct of criminal proceedings61.  

Quality 

Funding for the judiciary has seen a gradual increase since 2016. Poland spends around 
EU average per inhabitant on courts. At the same time, Poland has one of the highest general 
government  expenditures  for  the  justice  system  (including  prosecution  and  legal  aid)  as  a 
percentage of GDP62.  

54   Cf. Commission press release IP/20/772. 
55   Cf.  Venice  Commission  (opinion  CDL-AD(2020)017);  OSCE-ODIHR  (Urgent  Interim  Opinion  JUD-
POL/365/2019[AlC]); Ombudsman’s opinion of 7 January 2020; the Supreme Court’s opinions of 16 and 23 
December 2019. 

56   From  August  2017  to  February  2018,  the  Minister  of  Justice  had  the  discretionary  power  to  dismiss  and 

appoint court presidents of all ordinary courts; cf. Paras 151-162 of the Reasoned Proposal. 

57   Applications  no.  26691/18  Broda  vs  Poland  and  no.  27367/18  Bojara  vs  Poland  (communicated  on 

2 September 2019). 

58   The instructions are used in politically sensitive cases in which prosecutors become subject to disciplinary 
proceedings; cf. resolution of the Lex Super Omnia Association of 26 April 2020. Moreover, media stated 
that a number of individual instructions is not reported or put in writing in sensitive cases (cf. Gazeta Prawna 
‘21 osobistych instrukcji Zbigniewa Ziobry dla prokuratorów. Nie oznacza to, że nieformalnych nacisków w 
ogóle  nie  ma.’  of  2018;  Gazeta  Wyborcza  ‘Minister  kontroli,  nacisków  i  ręcznego  sterowania.  Zbigniew 
Ziobro dzieli i rządzi w resorcie sprawiedliwości.’ of 2019). 

59   E.g. investigation concerning the Financial Supervisory Commission. See also the footnote above. 
60   Venice  Commission  (opinion  CDL-AD(2017)028);  see  also  the  association  of  prosecutors  ‘Lex  Super 

Omnia’ statements of 26 April and of 3 June 2020. 

61   Polish Ombudsman’s communique regarding the case of prosecutor Krasoń of 2019. 
62   Figure 33, 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard. 

8 

 
 
                                                 
As regards human resources, a number of judicial posts remain vacant. It is noted that 
prior to the changes in composition of the NCJ in 2018, the Minister of Justice delayed the 
publication of vacant posts in courts, which is a precondition for any person to apply to such 
a  post.  This  was  raised  as  an  issue  by  the  Ombudsman63  and  by  representatives  of  judicial 
associations64,  who  argued  that  understaffed  courts  remain  the  main  reason  for  their 
decreasing efficiency.  

There is room for improvement as regards digitalisation of the justice system. Compared 
to  previous  years, Poland improved the availability of online information about  the judicial 
system for the general public65.Although some important progress has been made, the need to 
introduce IT tools in the context of judicial procedures remains66. Calls for further efforts to 
digitalise courts came from associations of judges67, the Ombudsman68, and the National Bar 
Council69,  who  indicate  that  the  lack  of  digitalisation  became  a  recurrent  issue  during  the 
time of COVID-19 pandemic.  

Reforms concerning legal aid, court fees and civil procedure have entered into force in 
2019.  Free  legal  aid  and  free  civil  advice  is  available  in  Poland  to  any  person  who  cannot 
afford to receive paid advice and who makes a declaration to that effect. There are also plans 
to  gradually  enable  free  mediation70.  The  National  Bar  Council  expressed  concerns  over 
amendments to the code of civil procedure adopted in 2019 which would not contribute to an 
increase in the pace of judicial proceedings71.  

Efficiency 

The overall performance of ordinary courts is close to the EU average when it comes to 
length of proceedings. However, in 2018, there was an increase in the estimated time needed 
to  resolve  litigious  civil  and  commercial  cases,  as  well  as  a  deterioration  of  the  rate  of 
resolving such cases. Whereas the number of such cases has dropped, the number of pending 

63   Polish Ombudsman’s statement of 9 October 2018 submitted to the Ministry of Justice.  
64   Prawo.pl ‘Wakaty uderzają w sądy…najbardziej okręgowe’ of 2019.  
65   Figure 22, 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard.  
66   The  following  possibilities  currently  exist:  taking  evidence  with  the  use  of  technical  devices  enabling  this 
activity to be performed remotely; replaying the recorded video and sound at the hearing; preparing minutes 
of a hearing or a court session using an audio or video recording device; sharing the content of the minutes 
and  letters  in  electronic  form  via  the  ICT  system  supporting  court  proceedings  or  another  teleinformation 
system  used  to  make  them  available  and  possibility  for  the  parties  and  participants  of  the  proceedings  to 
obtain recorded sound or image and sound from the case files; admittance of electronic evidence; electronic 
writ-of-payment proceedings; and making deliveries via the ICT system. 

67   ‘Iustitia’ association of judges’ statement of 9 May 2020.  
68   Ombudsman’s letter of 9 June 2020 submitted to the Ministry of Justice.  
69   The Bar resolution (2020) of 12 March 2020 (No. 155/20) with appendix. 
70   Prawo.pl (2019) ‘Finansowe zachęty mają motywować do korzystania z mediacji.’. Poland is also organising 
a wide range of activities to encourage the use of mediation (figure 20, 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard).    
71   The resolution of the National Bar Council No. 61/2019. In particular, the National Bar Council underlines 

that the amendments introduce excessive formalism of procedure. 

9 

 
 
                                                 
cases increased72. Poland remains under enhanced supervision of the Committee of Ministers 
of the Council of Europe for the length of civil and criminal proceedings73.  

The performance of administrative courts is above the EU average. A slight decrease is 
visible in the number of incoming administrative cases and in the estimated time needed to 
resolve them. The rate of resolving such cases remains above 100%74.  

II.  ANTI-CORRUPTION FRAMEWORK 

The legal  and institutional  framework to  prevent and combat  corruption  is  largely in  place. 
The Central Anti-Corruption Bureau (CAB) is the specialised anti-corruption body. The CAB 
combines intelligence and police functions and can trigger both administrative and criminal 
proceeding.  The  planned  Law  on  the  ‘Transparency  of  Public  Life’  aims  to  reorganise  key 
preventive  provisions  into  a  single  legal  act.  As  part  of  this,  certain  elements,  such  as  the 
current asset declaration systems and lobbying regulations will be amended.  

In  the  latest  Corruption  Perceptions  Index  of  Transparency  International,  Poland 
scores 58/100  and ranks  12th in the European Union and 41st globally75. Eurobarometer 
surveys  show  that  the  number  of  Polish  respondents  who  consider  corruption  to  be 
widespread in their country (59%) is lower than the EU average (71%) while 37% of people 
feel  personally  affected  by  corruption  in  their  daily  lives  (EU  average  26%)76.  As  regards 
businesses, 49% of companies consider corruption as widespread (EU average 63%) and 27% 
of companies consider that corruption is a problem when doing business (EU average 37%). 
Then, 43% of people find that there are enough successful prosecutions to deter people from 
corrupt  practices  (EU  average  36%)  while  26%  of  companies  believe  that  people  and 
businesses  caught  for  bribing  a  senior  official  are  appropriately  punished  (EU  average 
31%)77. 

A planned initiative aims to further develop the anti-corruption legal framework. Polish 
criminal  law  provides  a  solid  basis  for  the  investigation,  prosecution  and  adjudication  of 
corruption  offences.78  Poland  also  has  a  legal  framework  for  preventing  corruption,  with 
several  legal  acts  regulating  issues  of  ethics  and  integrity  in  the  public  sector79  as  well  as 
disclosure  obligations  for  assets  and  conflicts  of  interest80.  Nevertheless,  a  number  of 

72   Figures  3,  7,  11  and  14,  2020  EU  Justice  Scoreboard.  The  number  of  incoming  civil  and  commercial 
litigious cases remained high in recent years (figure 3, 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard). Despite an increase of 
pending  civil,  commercial,  administrative  and  other  cases  in  first  instance  in  comparison  to  2012,  their 
clearance rate did not significantly drop in 2018 (figures 10 and 13, 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard). 

73   Council  of  Europe  CM/Del/Dec(2018)1331/H46-19:  H46-19  Bąk  (Application  No.  7870/04),  Majewski 
(Application No. 52690/99), Rutkowski and Others (Application No. 72287/10) and Jan Załuska, Marianna 
Rogalska and 398 other applications (Application No. 53491/10) v. Poland. 

74   Figures 8, 9 and 12, 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
75   Transparency International (2020), Corruption Perceptions Index 2019. 
76   Special Eurobarometer 502 (2020). 
77   Flash Eurobarometer 482 (2019). 
78   GRECO  EU  Anti  Corruption  Report  2014;  GRECO  Third  Evaluation  Round,  Evaluation  report, 

recommendation iii.  

79   Relevant  laws  include:  the  Law  of  21  August  1997  on  Restriction  of  Business  Activity  by  Persons 
Performing Public Duties; the Law of 6 September 2001on Access to Public Information; the Law of 7 July 
2005 on Lobbying Activity in the Law making Process; and the Law of 21 August 1997 on Restriction  of 
Business Activity by Persons Performing Public Duties. 

80   These include the Law on the Civil Service of 21 November 2008, the Law on employees of the Government 

offices of 16 September 1982 and the Law on public procurement of 29 January 2004. 

10 

 
 
                                                 
concerns have been raised, in particular as regards conflict of interest and asset disclosure81. 
A new Law on the Transparency of Public Life is currently in an advanced preparatory stage, 
aiming  to  reinforce  existing  anti-corruption  mechanisms  and  incorporate  transparency 
principles into one single act. A further objective of the law is to repeal certain existing acts 
to standardise the current asset declaration system and rules. The proposal also aims to amend 
existing rules on lobbying and the law on access to public information, and enhance measures 
to protect whistleblowers82.  

Changes  to  the  Criminal  Code  were  proposed.  A  June  2019  draft  law  amending  the 
Criminal  Code83  was  on  14  July  2020  considered unconstitutional  by  the  Constitutional 
Tribunal84.  It  proposed  changes  to  the  definition  of  a  person  performing  a  public  function, 
and it would have introduced a broader definition of a “person performing a public function” 
to  include,  amongst  others,  a  domestic  or  foreign  organisational  unit  disposing  of  public 
funds, board members or representatives of state-owned enterprises, and entities whose share 
capital  is  owned by central  or local  government  in  excess  of 50%. Other proposed changes 
would  have  included  raising  sanctions  for  active  and  passive  bribery  offences  connected  to 
high-value assets. Nonetheless, mechanisms such as the “non-punishment” clause would have 
remained, providing that a person giving a bribe, is not punishable if they voluntarily notify 
law enforcement authorities of the crime. Concerns about elements of the immunities regime 
and its impact on the prosecution of corruption-related offences has been raised by Council of 
Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO)85.  

The Central Anti-Corruption Bureau (CAB) is the specialised anti-corruption body. The 
CAB  combines  intelligence  and  police  functions  and  can  trigger  both  administrative  and 
criminal proceedings86. The detection of corruption is part of its core functions, and in cases 
of reasonable suspicion the CAB can conduct criminal investigations. It has the competence 
to verify asset declarations and control public procurement decisions. It is also charged with 
monitoring  non-compliance  with  incompatibility  rules  regarding  outside  business  activity 
restrictions  by  public  officials  and  initiating  procedures  for  the  return  of  unfairly  obtained 
benefits.  The  CAB  also  has  a  preventive  role  and  oversees  the  coordination  of  the 
Governmental  Anticorruption  Programme  for  2018-2020  whose  general  objectives  include 
improving anti-corruption regulations, and enhancing cooperation and coordination between 
law enforcement authorities. The Head of the Bureau is appointed by the Prime Minister for a 
term  of  four  years.  The  CAB  works  under  the  authority  of  the  Prime  Minister  and  of  a 
designated ‘Minister-coordinator for special services’87. Under the current  legal  framework, 
this  appointment  procedure  and  the  office’s  subordination  to  the  executive  has  raised 
concerns  as  regards  the  CAB’s  independence  and  ultimate  independence  from  executive 
power.88  

81   GRECO Fifth Evaluation Round– Evaluation report. 
82   GRECO The Second Addendum to the Second Compliance Report, para 27. 
83   The Law of 13 June 2019 amending the Criminal Code and certain other laws, was sent by the President to 
the Constitutional Tribunal on 28 June 2019 within the framework of preventive constitutional control. 
84   The Constitutional Tribunal considered that the amendments to the Criminal Code were adopted following a 

procedure which did not comply with the internal rules of the Sejm governing legislative work. 

85   GRECO Fifth Evaluation Round - Evaluation report, recommendation xii, para 87. 
86   Established by the Law on the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau of 9 June 2006. 
87    The  CAB  is  an  office  of  the  Government  administration  whose  head  is  himself  a  central  authority  of  that 
administration. The Head is appointed for 4 years by the Prime Minister renewable once and supervised by 
him/her  through  the  Minister  specially  appointed  as  Coordinator  of  the  Special  Services.  GRECO  Fifth 
Evaluation Round – Evaluation report, para 34. 

88   GRECO Fifth Evaluation Round – Evaluation report, para 78. 

11 

 
 
                                                 
Issues of ethics and integrity in the public sector, and conflicts of interest are currently 
regulated  by  several  basic  acts.  The  main  legal  act  promoting  integrity  is  the  Law  on 
Restrictions  on  Conduct  of  Business  Activities  by  Persons  Performing  Public  Functions, 
which  prohibits  certain  activities,  and  limits  business  shareholdings  and  membership  in 
various boards. The ordinance on the ethical framework for the civil service sets the ethical 
standards for the public administration, but does not cover top executives, whose conduct is 
broadly  regulated  by  the  constitution.  Ministries  also  address  integrity  in  their  ranks  to 
different extents. GRECO has underlined the potential benefits of a more coherent policy and 
recommended  the  elaboration  of  a  general  integrity  plan,  the  development  of  a  code  of 
conduct  with  robust  supervision  and  sanctioning  mechanisms,  and  awareness  raising  on 
integrity  matters89.  In  addition,  several  other  legal  texts  provide  for  an  obligation  to  report 
specific situations of conflicts of interest, but without clear coordination or consolidation into 
a single framework90. Whilst there is no legal definition of conflicts of interest in commonly 
binding  laws,  the  Code  of  Administrative  Procedures  is  covering  conflicts  of  interest  for 
public officials. For ministers and other senior officials, these are limited to certain specific 
situations involving property interests91. In 2019, the CAB examined 2477 conflict of interest 
issues in the Ministries of Health and Defence (4581 in 2018), covering 2187 persons (2110 
in 2018) with 3 cases referred to the Prosecutor’s office92.  

There is no unified legislation or centralised submission and monitoring system for asset 
declarations. Members of Parliament submit asset declarations in accordance with the Law 
on  the  discharge  of  their  duties  by  Sejm  deputies  and  Senators  of  May  1996.  The  Law  on 
Restrictions  on  Conduct  of  Business  Activities  by  Persons  Performing  Public  Functions 
prescribes  the  yearly  disclosure  of  financial  and  economic  activities  for  top  executive 
functions. However, the legislation is applied in practice to politicians at all levels, concerns 
exist  over  the  divergent  systems  and  the  frameworks  to  guarantee  the  publication  of 
declarations93. In 2019, the CAB carried out 90 asset declaration controls (69 in 2018), 364 
pre-control  analyses  (330  in  2018)  and  341  control  cases  (320  in  2018)94.  However, 
amendments to the Law on the Exercise of the Mandate of a Deputy and Senator, meant to 
extend the catalogue of obliged persons and the scope of information included, are currently 
being  challenged  before  the  Constitutional  Tribunal.  Whilst  welcoming  the  existence  of 
obligations, GRECO has stated that Poland’s arrangements for asset declarations need to be 
strengthened  and  complemented  with  an  independent  and  effective  review  mechanism95.  In 
this regard, a draft law with a new declaration of assets form is being prepared and the CAB 
is  developing  a  unified  system  to  address  the  lack  of  electronic  and  automated  methods  of 
submitting and controlling declarations96.  

Measures exist to regulate lobbying and ‘revolving doors’ and certain provisions allow 
for  the  protection  of  whistleblowers.  The  Law  on  Lobbying  Activity  in  the  Law-making 
Process  broadly  defines  lobbying,  establishes  a  public  register,  and  determines  obligations 
and sanctions for unregistered activities. However, the law’s provisions restrict the concept of 
lobbying  to  the  process  of  law  making.  GRECO  has  recommended  that  interactions  by 

89   GRECO Fifth Evaluation Round – Evaluation report, recommendations i, ii iii and ix. 
90   See footnote 77. 
91   GRECO Fifth Evaluation Round – Evaluation report, para 53. 
92   Central Anti-Corruption Bureau Annual Report 2019. 
93   GRECO Fifth Evaluation Round – Evaluation report, paras 66-72. 
94   Central Anticorruption Bureau, Annual Report 2019 pp. 23, 25, 28. 
95   GRECO Fifth Evaluation Round– Evaluation report, recommendations x and xi, paras 72 and 78. 
96   The Government Anticorruption Programme for 2018-2020. 

12 

 
 
                                                 
parliamentarians with lobbyists be made more transparent,97 that detailed rules be introduced 
for  interactions  with  lobbyists,  and  that  sufficient  information  about  the  purpose  of  these 
contacts be disclosed98. ‘Revolving doors’ are regulated by a cooling-off period of one year 
but this is limited to entities for whom an official issued specific decisions. Whilst plans exist 
to extend the period, a broadening of the scope of application has also been recommended99. 
Certain  legal  acts  include  provisions  for  whistleblower  protection,  yet  there  is  no  specific 
legislation on the matter and the need to strengthen protections of reporting persons has been 
underlined100. 

III.  MEDIA PLURALISM 

The legal framework concerning media pluralism is based both on constitutional safeguards 
and sectorial legislation. The Constitution guarantees the independence of the national media 
authority  -  the  National  Broadcasting  Council  (KRRiT)  -  and  the  competences  of  the 
regulator  are  further  specified  by  the  1992  Broadcasting  Law101.  With  regard  to  the 
framework for journalists’ protection, freedom of expression is constitutionally protected102. 
At the same time, however, the Criminal Code includes offences of insulting State symbols, 
senior public officials and religion. The Constitution also guarantees the right of citizens to 
be informed about the activities of public authorities103. This right is further specified in the 
Law of 6 September 2001 on access to public information104.  

The legal framework provides safeguards for the independence of the media regulator. 
The  Constitution105  gives  the  National  Broadcasting  Council  (KRRiT)  the  role  of 
safeguarding freedom of speech, the right to information and the public interest in radio and 
television broadcasting. Its members are appointed by the Parliament and the President of the 
Republic. They may not belong to a political party, trade union or perform public activities 
incompatible with the dignity of their function. The Broadcasting Law includes a specific list 
of  KRRiT’s  competences.  The  revised  Audiovisual  Media  Services  Directive  (AVMSD)106 
sets  out  a  range  of  specific  guarantees  for  the  independence  and  effectiveness  of  national 
media  regulators.  Poland  is  currently  in  the  process  of  transposing  the  revised  AVMSD, 
during  which  some  further  alignments  of  the  national  legislation  with  the  EU  framework 
might be proposed and could be adopted in early autumn 2020107. 

The Polish media regulator might still be subject to political influence. The MPM 2020 
reported medium risk with regard to the independence and effectiveness of the Polish media 
regulatory  authority108,  assessing  that  the  appointment  procedures  for  the  National 
Broadcasting  Council  (KRRiT)  have  not  effectively  limited  the  risk  of  political  influence 

97   GRECO  Fourth  Evaluation  Round  –  Evaluation  report,  recommendation  i.  Paragraph  11  of  the  2nd 
addendum to the second compliance report states that this recommendation still has not been implemented. 

98   GRECO Fifth Evaluation Round– Evaluation report, recommendation vi, para 44. 
99   GRECO Fifth Evaluation Round – Evaluation report, recommendation viii and para 65. 
100  United Nations Convention Against Corruption (2015) Implementation Review Group (cycle 1) and OECD 

Poland: Follow up to the Phase 3 Report and Recommendations. 

101  The Law of 29 December 1992 on the Broadcasting.  
102  Article 54 of the Constitution. 
103  Article 61 of the Constitution. 
104  Between 2019 and 2020 Poland fell by three places in the Reporters Without Borders World Press Freedom 

Index, now registering at 62nd position worldwide. 

105  Articles 213-215 of the Constitution. 
106  Directive (EU) 2018/1808 of 14 November 2018. 
107  Information received in the context of the country visit to Poland. 
108  As regards the independence of the Office of Electronic Communications, see section IV. 

13 

 
 
                                                 
over the media. For instance, no electoral monitoring was ordered to analyse media coverage 
of the 2019 electoral campaigns to European and national Parliaments. Similarly, in the case 
of the 2020 presidential campaign, as reported by OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions 
and  Human  Rights  (ODIHR),  the  KRRiT  did  not  ensure  independent  monitoring  of  the 
campaign109.  In  addition,  as  a  result  of  the  2016  reform110,  some  of  the  competences  of 
KRRiT  were  taken  away  and  assigned  to  the  newly  established  National  Media  Council 
(RMN)111, which is now in charge of appointing and removing management and supervisory 
boards of the Polish Television (TVP), Polish Radio and Polish Press Agency. In December 
2016, the Polish Constitutional Tribunal considered the exclusion of KRRiT from the process 
of  appointment  of  the  public  media’s  management  as  unconstitutional112.  The  judgment 
remains to be implemented113.  

The legal framework concerning the transparency of media ownership in Poland is not 
equally applicable to all media actors. In particular, there are no sector-specific provisions 
on  transparency  of  news  media  ownership.  Due  to  this  fact,  the  MPM  2020  has  assessed 
transparency of media ownership in Poland to be at medium risk, noting however, that some 
specific rules are in place in the broadcasting sector. These refer to disclosure of information 
to the public body KRRiT.  

There is a lack of regulatory safeguards limiting political control over media outlets in 
Poland. Such safeguards concern rules on conflicts of interest between owners of media and 
the ruling parties, partisan groups or politicians114. The CBOS survey from 2019 shows that 
the perception of political bias in the media is widespread115. Nevertheless, as recognised by 
the MPM 2020, owners of the largest media in Poland have no open affiliation with political 
parties,  and  most  of  the  news  media,  including  digital  outlets,  promote  distinct  political 
views.116  It  appears  that  during  the  2020  presidential  campaign,  the  governing  coalition 
referred to possible legislative changes concerning the concentration of foreign-owned media 
outlets117.  If  such  changes  were  to  materialise,  they  could  have  implications  for  media 
pluralism and for the internal market of the EU. 

Criminal  law  provisions  may  affect  certain  aspects  of  the  framework  for  journalists’ 
protection and activities. The Criminal Code includes offences of insulting State symbols, 
senior public officials and religion. Imprisonment (of maximum 1 year) is among the possible 
sanctions for defamation118 which occurs by means of mass communication119. As mentioned 

109  Statement of preliminary findings and conclusions of the ODIHR Special Election Assessment Mission  
110  Sejm’s official communique of 7 July 2016. 
111  Ibidem. According to  Law on the National Media  Council, the  Council consists of  five  members,  three of 
them appointed by the Sejm and two by the President for term of six years. The President of Poland appoints 
members of the Council from candidates nominated by the largest parliamentary opposition groups. 

112  Judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 13 December 2016 in case K 13/16. 
113  Ombudsman’s communique of 3 February 2020. 
114  2020 Media Pluralism Monitor. 
115  Press.pl, ‘CBOS: dla większości badanych media nie są bezstronne, najgorzej wypada TVP’ (as referred to 

in the 2020 Media Pluralism Monitor). 

116  Information gathered in the context of the country visit; MPM 2020, page 12. 
117  Reuters.com,  ‘Poland  to  propose  limits  on  foreign  media  soon,  Kaczynski  says’.  More  recently,  a 
representative of the governing party dealing with media issues confirmed that the draft legislation will be 
tabled in Autumn (WirtualneMedia ‘Lichocka: jesienią Sejm zajmie się dekoncentracją mediów. Czarnecki: 
trzeba będzie odkupywać je od Niemców’).  

118  CMPF’s mapping of decriminalisation of defamation.  
119 According to the Polish authorities. The Polish authorities also specified that there is no criminal liability if 
allegations regarding persons holding a public office are true and that in a vast majority of cases financial 
penalties have been imposed and imprisonment only in a negligible percentage of cases. 

14 

 
 
                                                 
by  some  representatives  of  journalists,  this  regime  has  been  subject  to  the  long  lasting 
criticism  as  the  issue  of  defamation  could  be  sufficiently  tackled  on  the  basis  of  the  civil 
liability  framework120.  In  this  context,  the  MPM  2020  also  notes  that  the  self-regulatory 
measures  that  could  contribute  to  the  strengthening  of  the  position  of  journalists  have  not 
been  implemented  effectively  in  Poland.  On  a  positive  note,  the  Law  on  the  Press  was 
amended and it no longer obliges journalists to follow the editorial line of a particular title. 
The  Law  now  gives  the  possibility  to  a  journalist  to  reject  a  binding  instruction  if  it 
contradicts  the  principles  of  fairness,  objectivity  and  professional  accuracy.  With  regard  to 
safety  of  journalists,  the  Council  of  Europe’s  Platform  to  promote  the  protection  of 
journalism and safety of journalists published two alerts concerning Poland in 2019 and six in 
2020. The alerts have been classified under the category of harassment of journalists and the 
category  of acts  having  chilling  effects  on  media  freedom121.  As  regards  digital  safety  of 
journalists,  the  MPM  2020  reports  occasional  cases  where  journalists  were  threatened 
through  surveillance  by  the  police  and  intelligence  services  as  well  as  cases  of  using 
journalists’ telecom or internet data without prior notification122. 

The  current  legal  framework  recognises  the  right  of  access  to  public  information. 
However,  there  have  been  recurring  cases  of  refusing  such  access.  The  Law  of  6 
September 2001 on access to public information requires state authorities (and other entities) 
to  make  available  any  information  on  public  matters.  Under  the  Law,  the  right  to  public 
information includes the right to obtain such information containing up-to-date knowledge of 
public matters without delay. Classified information is excluded from this  rule. With regard 
to  application  of  this  right  in  practice,  the  MPM  2020  reports  cases  where  access  to 
information  has  been  denied  at  the  local  level,  especially  as  regards  information  about 
activities  of  local  and  regional  government  or  planned  investments.  Other  cases  of  denial 
included denying journalists access to debates about educational and judicial reforms.  

IV. OTHER INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RELATED TO CHECKS AND BALANCES 

Poland is a representative democratic republic with a directly elected President, a bicameral 
Parliament123  and  a  Constitutional  Tribunal  in  charge  of  constitutional  review  of  laws.  The 
Sejm  has  the  final  decision-making  power  when  adopting  laws.  The  President  of  the 
Republic, the Senate, a group of 15 deputies, the Council of Ministers and a group of at least 
100.000 citizens have the right to propose new legislation. The independent Ombudsman is 
tasked  with  safeguarding  the  freedoms  and  rights  of  persons  and  citizens  specified  in  the 
Constitution and other normative acts. 

In the period of 2015-2019, the expedited adoption of legislation was widely used, with 
important examples including significant structural reforms of the judiciary. As regards 

120  Information received in the context of the country visit to Poland. 
121  With  regard  to  safety  of  journalists,  the  2020  alerts  concern:  1)  the  lawsuit  concerning  the  protection  of 
personal  rights  filed  against  the  publisher  and  journalists  with  regards  to  the  content  of  an  investigative 
article;  2)  the  accusations  towards  a  photojournalist  with  regard  to  breaking  social  distancing  measures, 
while he was taking pictures of the protest against the leader of the ruling party; 3) the criminal investigation 
against  a  journalist  alleging  her  of  “unauthorised  distribution  of  messages  from  a  public  trial  before  they 
were  disclosed  in  court  proceedings”;  4)  the  vandal  attack  on  the  editorial  office  of  a  publishing  house  in 
Warsaw;  5)  managerial  sanctions  of  the  public  radio  towards  a  journalist  who  refused  to  broadcast 
discriminatory information. 

122  In  line  with  Council  of  Europe  recommendations,  a  comprehensive  legislative  framework  that  enables 
journalists  and  other  media  actors  to  contribute  to  public  debate  effectively  and  without  fear 
(Recommendation CM/Rec(2016)4 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe). 
123  The Parliament is composed of the Sejm (the lower chamber) and the Senate (the higher chamber).  

15 

 
 
                                                 
the  legislation  on  justice  reforms,  Parliament  spent  on  average  18  days  on  each  law124.  In 
particular, concerns have been raised over the expedited procedure applied by the legislator in 
December 2019 to adopt controversial changes in the laws on the judiciary, including the way 
the changes to the initial draft were proposed in the legislative process.  The Supreme Court 
has considered that this violated the rules of good legislation125. The Venice Commission and 
OSCE  have  on  several  occasions  underlined  the  importance  of  thorough  deliberations  of 
legislative proposals and amendments, including meaningful consultations with stakeholders, 
experts  and  the  civil  society,  and  a  dialogue  with  the  political  opposition126.  It  should  be 
noted that public consultations are mandatory only in case of a legislative proposal lodged by 
the Council of Ministers, while judicial reforms were initiated by members of Parliament, for 
which no consultation is necessary127.  

On 20 March 2020, the Government introduced a state of epidemic to face the COVID-
19 pandemic128. Stakeholders have expressed concerns about  the measures  imposed in that 
context in view of their impact on fundamental rights and presidential elections129. The state 
of epidemic is still in force although restrictions are being gradually lifted. Certain measures 
adopted  in  order  to  tackle  the  state  of  epidemic  adversely  affect  terms  of  office  of  specific 
state  authorities130,  including  the  Office  of  Electronic  Communications  for  which  the 
European Commission launched infringement proceedings131. 

Supreme  Court  judges  appointed  under  the  2017  reform  are  empowered  to  review 
ordinary  courts’  rulings  in  certain  cases  dating  back  20  years.  Under  the  new 
extraordinary  appeal  procedure,  the  new  Chamber  of  the  Extraordinary  Control  and  Public 
Affairs  is  empowered  to  overturn  fully  or  in  part  any  final  judgment  delivered  by  ordinary 
courts  in  the  past  20  years,  subject  to  some  exceptions.  The  power  to  lodge  the  appeal  is 
vested  inter  alia  in  the  Prosecutor  General  and  the  Ombudsman.  According  to  the 
information  available,  most  of  the  proceedings  so  far  have  been  lodged  by  the  Prosecutor 
General132. Concerns have been expressed that this procedure can be used also for what could 

124  Counted from the time of a draft legislation being tabled in Parliament to  its being adopted  with the  final 
effect  by  the  Sejm;  based  on  the  data  provided  on  the  website  of  the  Sejm  indicating  the  legislative 
proceedings on laws.  

125  As set out in the Supreme Court’s opinions (e.g. opinions of 16 and 23 December 2019).  
126  Venice  Commission’s  opinions  CDL-AD(2020)017,  para.  18;  CDL  AD(2016)026-e,  paras.  21-22;  OSCE-

ODIHR (Urgent Interim Opinion JUD-POL/365/2019[AlC]), para. 30.  

127  The practice of using an accelerated procedure for adopting laws regulating important aspects of the legal or 
political  order  is  generally  dissuaded  by  bodies  such  as  the  Venice  Commission  (cf.  Checklist  (CDL-
AD(2019)015) para. 75).  

of 

128  Regulation of 20 March 2020 of the Minister of Health concerning the introduction, within the borders of the 
Republic  of  Poland,  of  the  state  of  epidemic.  The  state  of  epidemic  has  no  pre-fixed  duration  and  can  be 
prolonged by the Government.  

129  Under  the  Constitution,  fundamental  rights  can  be  limited  only  in  case  of  declaration  of  the  state  of 
emergency, which has not been declared. Presidential election did not take place as initially planned. See e.g. 
statements 
epidemic: 
https://www.rpo.gov.pl/pl/kategoria-tematyczna/koronawirus-i-epidemia-w-polsce. 

the  Ombudsman 

the  COVID-19 

on  measures 

counteracting 

130  One  of  the  measures  empowered  the  Prime  Minister  to  arbitrarily  and  prematurely  terminate  the  term  of 
office of any member of the Social Dialogue Council. On 26 May 2020, the President of the Republic lodged 
a request with the Constitutional Tribunal, requesting it to declare the unconstitutionality of the legislation 
concerned (case K 9/20; pending).  

131  On  2  July  2020,  the  Commission  addressed  a  letter  of  formal  notice  to  Poland,  on  the  grounds  that 
implementing certain legal provisions that could affect the independence of the Polish National Regulatory 
Authority, the Office of Electronic Communications, have resulted with an early dismissal of its President.  
132  According to the information provided by the Ombudsman and the Supreme Court. It is noted that according 

to the data provided by the Supreme Court, in April there were 45 such extraordinary appeals pending. 

16 

 
 
                                                 
appear  as  political  motives133.  More  generally,  this  new  extraordinary  appeal  procedure, 
based on broad criteria, raises issues as regards the principle of legal certainty134 and is one of 
the  concerns  raised  by  the  Commission  in  its  Reasoned  Proposal  adopted  under  the  Article 
7(1) TEU procedure135. 

New  developments  adversely  affect  the  civil  society  space136.  Poland  has  a  broad  and 
vibrant  civil  society,  consisting  of  more  than  120.000  different  NGOs.  However, 
developments have shown that NGOs that are critical towards one or the other policy of the 
Government  are  targeted  by  unfavourable  statements  of  the  representatives  of  the  public 
authorities137.  A  National  Institute  of  Freedom  –  Centre  for  Civil  Society  Development  is 
responsible  for  the  distribution  of  government  funding,  as  well  as  nationally  attributed  EU 
funding,  to  NGOs.  The  organisations’  representatives  constitute  a  minority  in  the  decision-
making process under this institute, which is chaired by a member of the Government. The 
OSCE found that the Government appears to have a decisive influence on the governance and 
operation of the National Institute of Freedom and made recommendations in that respect138. 
The 2020 update of the CIVICUS report considers that the civic space for NGOs functioning 
has  narrowed139.  Stakeholders  have  raised  concerns  regarding  the  fact  that  members  of  the 
Government  recently  proposed  legislation  which  would  oblige  NGOs  to  disclose  foreign 
subsidies  received  and  under  certain  conditions  would  consider  NGOs  as  ‘foreign 
founded’140. The decision of certain regions to declare themselves to be ‘LGBTI-free zones’ 
has  created  serious  doubts  as  to  the  capacity  of  the  local  authorities  to  fairly  distribute  EU 
funds  among  NGOs141.  Actions  of  the  government  aimed  at  LGBTI  groups,  including 
arresting and detaining some of the groups’ representatives, and smear campaigns conducted 
against such groups have raised concerns142.  

The Ombudsman plays an important role in defending the rule of law. The Ombudsman 
was re-accredited with ‘A’ status in November 2017 by the UN Global Alliance of National 
Human Rights Institutions (GANHRI)143. GANHRI underlined the need for the provision of 
adequate  funding  to  enable  the  Ombudsman  to  carry  out  its  mandate  effectively.  The 
Ombudsman has issued a number of opinions on new legislation, including reforms affecting 
the functioning of the judiciary, and intervened before Polish courts and the Court of Justice 
of the EU. The Ombudsman regularly intervenes in support of individuals in cases regarding 

133  Venice Commission’s opinion CDL-AD(2017)031. It is noted that on 11 June 2020, the Prosecutor-General 
lodged  an  extraordinary  appeal  in  a  case  concerning  a  judge  and  former  spokesperson  of  the  National 
Council for the Judiciary who has publicly criticised the justice reform. 

134  Venice Commission opinion of 11 December 2017 (CDL-AD(2017)031), paras. 53-63.  
135  Reasoned Proposal, paras 128-131. 
136  PACE (2020). 
137  Ombudsman’s statement of 8 January 2020. See also OSCE-ODHIR, Guidelines on the Protection of Human 

Rights Defenders, paras 70-73. 

138  OSCE-ODIHR  (2017),  Opinion  on  the  Draft  Act  of  Poland  on  the  National  Freedom  Institute,  para  12. 
Concerns have also been raised on the award of grants for post-penitentiary assistance by the Justice Fund 
managed by the Ministry of Justice, Civil Space Watch (2019). 

139  CIVICUS Monitor – Tracking Civic Space; ratings are on a five-category scale defined as: open, narrowed, 

obstructed, repressed and closed. 

140  Press release of the Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of Justice of 7 August 2020.  
141  On  2  June  2020,  services  of  the  European  Commission  addressed  a  letter  to  the  Polish  authorities  in  this 

regard. 

142  Statement of 8 August 2020 of the Council of Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights. 
143  Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions (GANHRI), Sub-Committee on Accreditation (SCA), 

Accreditation Report – November 2017.  

17 

 
 
                                                 
possible violations of fundamental rights144. Other activities of the Ombudsman are focused 
on promoting judicial independence standards, the rule of law, and fundamental rights. Since 
2016, the Ombudsman has been facing a more challenging environment characterised by an 
inadequate budget (decided upon by the Sejm145), criticism from the ruling political majority 
and personal attacks in certain media outlets146.  

144  In 2019, the Ombudsman received 59.524 cases, including 27.113 new cases. In addition, 4.385 people came 
to  the  Ombudsman's  office  in  person,  and  32.395  persons  received  individually  advices  and  explanations 
concerning their situation. Cf. Ombudsman’s statement of activities in 2019. 

145  EIGE  (2020),  report  on  Poland.  An  adequate  level  of  funding  is  required  by  international  standards;  cf. 
United Nations Paris Principles: “2. The national institution shall have an infrastructure  which is suited to 
the smooth conduct of its activities, in particular adequate funding. The purpose of this funding should be to 
enable it to have its own staff and premises, in order to be independent of the Government and not be subject 
to financial control which might affect its independence”. 

146  DoRzeczy  ‘Sejmowa  awantura  o  Bodnara.  “Antypolski  rzecznik”,  “to  jest  kryminał”’  of  2019;  Wprost 

‘Krytyka TVP po materiale o synu Bodnara. ”14-latek groził nożem rówieśnikom”’ of 2019. 

18 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
Annex I: List of sources in alphabetical order* 

* The list of contributions received in the context of the consultation for the 2020 Rule of Law report 
can be found at (COM website). 

Amnesty International (2019), 2019 Report on Poland. https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/europe-

and-central-asia/poland/report-poland/. 

Batory 

Foundation 

(2018a), 

Eksperci 

krytycznie 

oceniają 

funkcjonowanie 

TK. 

https://www.batory.org.pl/informacje_prasowe/eksperci-krytycznie-oceniaja-funkcjonowanie-tk/. 

Batory  Foundation  (2019),  Pogłębiający  się  kryzys  w  Polsce  –  Kiedy  w  Europie  umiera 

praworządność. 
https://www.batory.org.pl/upload/files/Programy%20operacyjne/Forum%20Idei/Poglebiajacy%20si
e%20kryzys%20w%20Polsce.pdf.  

Centre  for  Media  Pluralism  and  Media  Freedom  (2020),  2020  Media  pluralism  monitor. 

https://cmpf.eui.eu/media-pluralism-monitor/mpm-2020.  

CIVICUS, Poland Country Profile. https://monitor.civicus.org/country/poland/.  

Civil  Space  Watch  (2019),  The  2019  Civic  Space  Watch.  http://civicspacewatch.eu/civic-space-

watch-report-2019-%E2%80%A2-success-stories-of-resistance-is-out/.  

Constitutional  Tribunal  (2018),  Open  letter  addressed  to  the  judge  exercising  the  office  of  the 
Constitutional  Tribunal.  https://tvn24.pl/polska/list-sedziow-trybunalu-konstytucyjnego-do-julii-
przylebskiej-ra851319-2389711.  

Constitutional  Tribunal  (2018),  Open  letter  addressed  to  the  judge  exercising  the  office  of  the 
https://oko.press/images/2018/12/List-Se%CC%A8dzio%CC%81w-

Tribunal. 

Constitutional 
TK_5.12.2018-r..pdf.  

Constitutional  Tribunal  (2018),  Open  letter  signed  by  five  judges  of  the  Constitutional  Tribunal. 
https://archiwumosiatynskiego.pl/wpis-w-debacie/list-pieciorga-sedziow-tk-w-sprawie-istotnych-
problemow-wynikajacych-z-dzialalnosci-orzecznictwa-trybunalu-konstytucyjnego-w-2017-roku/.  

Constitutional Tribunal (2019), Open letter of a person appointed to an already occupied post of the 
CT  judge  addressed  to  the  judge  exercising  the  office  of  the  Constitutional  Tribunal. 
https://tvn24.pl/polska/sedzia-tk-jaroslaw-wyrembak-stawia-zarzuty-prezes-julii-przylebskiej-
apeluje-o-dymisje-ra986349-2299314.  

Constitutional Tribunal (2019), Open letter signed by two retired CT judges. 

http://monitorkonstytucyjny.eu/archiwa/11447.  

Constitutional Tribunal (2020), Open statement of a group of former CT judges.   

https://wiadomosci.onet.pl/kraj/oswiadczenie-sedziow-trybunalu-konstytucyjnego-w-stanie-
spoczynku/0w4enjq.  

Constitutional Tribunal, judgment of 13 December 2016 in case K 13/16. 

Constitutional Tribunal, ruling of 4 March 2020 in case P 22/19. 

Constitutional Tribunal, ruling of 25 March 2019 in case K 12/18.  

Constitutional Tribunal, ruling of 20 April 2020 in case U 2/20.  

Constitutional Tribunal, ruling of 21 April 2020 in case Kpt 1/20. 

Council  of  Europe:  Committee  of  Ministers,  CM/Del/Dec(2018)1331/H46-19:  H46-19  Bąk 
(Application  No.  7870/04),  Majewski  (Application  No.  52690/99),  Rutkowski  and  Others 
(Application  No.  72287/10)  and  Jan  Załuska,  Marianna  Rogalska  and  398  other  applications 
Poland. 
(Application 
https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectID=09000016808fde36. 

53491/10) 

No. 

v. 

19 

 
 
 
Council  of  Europe:  Committee  of  Ministers  (2010),  Recommendation  CM/Rec(2010)12  of  the 
Committee of Ministers to member states on judges: independence, efficiency and responsibilities. 

Council  of  Europe:  Committee  of  Ministers  (2016),  Recommendation  CM/Rec(2016)4  on  the 

protection of journalism and safety of journalists and other media actors. 

Council  of  Europe:  Venice  Commission  (2016),  Poland  -  Opinion  on  the  Act  on  the  Constitutional 

Tribunal, CDL AD(2016)026-e. 

Council of Europe: Venice Commission (2017), Opinion on the Act on the Public Prosecutor's office, 

as amended, CDL-AD(2017)028. 

Council  of  Europe:  Venice  Commission  (2017),  Parameters  on  the  Relationship  between  the 

Parliamentary Majority and the Opposition in a Democracy: a checklist, CDL-AD(2017)031. 

Council of Europe: Venice Commission (2019), Checklist of 24 June 2019, CDL-AD(2019)015. 

Council  of  Europe:  Venice  Commission  (2020),  Poland  -  Joint  Urgent  Opinion  of  the  Venice 
Commission and the Directorate General of Human Rights and Rule of Law (DGI) of the Council 
of Europe on amendments to the Law on the Common courts, the Law on the Supreme court and 
some other Laws, CDL-AD(2020)017. 

Council  of  Europe:  Commissioner  for  Human  Rights  (2020),  statement  of  8  August  2020. 

https://twitter.com/CommissionerHR/status/1292007235447656448?s=20.  

Council  of  the  European  Union  (2020),  Council  Recommendation  of  20  July  2020  on  the  2020 
National Reform Programme of Poland and delivering a Council opinion on the 2020 Convergence 
Programme of Poland. 
https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-8440-2020-INIT/en/pdf.  

Court of Justice of the European Union, judgment of 24 June 2019, Commission v Poland, C-619/18. 

Court  of Justice  of  the  European  Union, judgment  of  5  November  2019,  Commission  v  Poland,  C-

192/18. 

Court of Justice of the European Union, judgment of 19 November 2019, A.K., C‑ 585/18, C‑ 624/18 

and C‑ 625/18.  

Court  of  Justice  of  the  European  Union,  judgment  of  26  March  2020,  Miasto  Łowicz  and  others, 

C‑ 558/18 and C‑ 563/18.  

DoRzeczy (2019), Sejmowa awantura o Bodnara. “Antypolski rzecznik”, “to jest kryminał”. 

https://pinkosz.dorzeczy.pl/kraj/113540/sejmowa-awantura-o-bodnara-antypolski-rzecznik-to-jest-
kryminal.html. 

European Commission (2017), Information concerning the launching of Article 7(1) TEU procedure 

against Poland. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_17_5367.  

European Commission (2019), Information concerning the infringement launched against Poland and 
2020. 

referred 
Court 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_19_6033.  

October 

Justice 

the 

on 

10 

of 

to 

European  Commission 

(2020),  Country  Report 

Poland, 

SWD(2020) 

520 

final. 

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20 

 
 
 
 
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21 

 
 
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22 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Prawo.pl 

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following 

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23 

 
 
 
 
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nozem-rowiesnikom.html. 

24 

 
 
 
 
Annex II: Country visit to Poland 

The Commission services held virtual meetings in June and July 2020 with: 

  Association of Journalists (Towarzystwa Dziennikarskiego) 
  Association of Polish Journalists (Stowarzyszenie Dziennikarzy Polskich) 
  Associations of Judges 'Iustitia' and 'Themis' 
  Association of Local and Regional Polish TV Stations  
  Association of Prosecutors 'Lex Super Omnia' 
  Batory Foundation; 
  Chamber of Press Editors 
  Civil Development Forum 
  Constitutional Tribunal 
  Free Courts 
  Helsinki Foundation of Human Rights 
 
  Local Newspapers Association 
  Ministry for Justice 
  National Council for the Judiciary 
  National Council for the Television and Radio Broadcasting 
  National Council of Media 
  Office of the Ombudsman 
  Polish Media Association  
  Supreme Administrative Court 
  Supreme Court 

Jagiellonian Club 

* The Commission also met the following organisations in a number of horizontal meetings:  

  Amnesty International 
  Civil Liberties Union for Europe 
  Civil Society Europe 
  Conference of European Churches  
  EuroCommerce 
  European Center for Not-for-Profit Law  
  European Centre for Press and Media Freedom 
  European Civic Forum  
  Free Press Unlimited 
  Front Line Defenders 
 
ILGA-Europe 
 
International Commission of Jurists 
 
International Federation for Human Rights  
 
International Press Institute  
  Lifelong learning Platform  
  Open Society Justice Initiative/Open Society European Policy Institute 
  Reporters without Borders  
  Transparency International EU  

25