COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 2020 Rule of Law Report Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Bulgaria Accompanying the document COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 2020 Rule of Law Report The rule of law situation in the European Union
Date: 2020-09-30
Institutions: European Commission, Secretariat-General
Subjects: Bulgaria, administrative transparency, coronavirus disease, corruption, democracy, epidemic, independence of the judiciary, infringement of EU law, political rights, rule of law

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 30.9.2020  SWD(2020) 301 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 2020 Rule of Law Report Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Bulgaria Accompanying the document COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS  2020 Rule of Law Report       The rule of law situation in the European Union {COM(2020) 580 final} - {SWD(2020) 300 final} - {SWD(2020) 302 final} - {SWD(2020) 303 final} - {SWD(2020) 304 final} - {SWD(2020) 305 final} - {SWD(2020) 306 final} - {SWD(2020) 307 final} - {SWD(2020) 308 final} - {SWD(2020) 309 final} - {SWD(2020) 310 final} - {SWD(2020) 311 final} - {SWD(2020) 312 final} - {SWD(2020) 313 final} - {SWD(2020) 314 final} - {SWD(2020) 315 final} - {SWD(2020) 316 final} - {SWD(2020) 317 final} - {SWD(2020) 318 final} - {SWD(2020) 319 final} - {SWD(2020) 320 final} - {SWD(2020) 321 final} - {SWD(2020) 322 final} - {SWD(2020) 323 final} - {SWD(2020) 324 final} - {SWD(2020) 325 final} - {SWD(2020) 326 final}  
 
 
ABSTRACT 

Since  accession  to  the  EU  in  2007,  Bulgarian  reforms  in  areas  including  justice  and 
corruption have been followed by the Commission through the Cooperation and Verification 
Mechanism (CVM).  

Judicial  reform  in  Bulgaria  has  been  a  gradual  process  with  important  implications  for 
judicial independence and public confidence. Challenges remain, in particular on the need to 
finalise, taking account of the Venice Commission opinion, the reform process commenced in 
2019 regarding legal procedures concerning the effective accountability and criminal liability 
of the Prosecutor General. The composition and functioning of the Supreme Judicial Council 
and its Inspectorate have also been subject of further debate, leading to new reform proposals. 
More generally, attacks against the judiciary are reported to increase without proper reaction 
from the competent authorities. Controversial provisions relating to the automatic suspension 
of  magistrates  in  case  of  a  criminal  investigation,  and  to  the  obligation  for  magistrates  to 
declare their membership in professional organisations, have been repealed. 

In 2017 and 2018, Bulgaria carried out a comprehensive reform of its legal and institutional 
anti-corruption  frameworks.  The  reform  has  led  to  improved  cooperation  between  the 
relevant authorities. A number of high-level investigations were launched in the first half of 
2020  and  charges  have  been  brought  in  a  number  of  cases.  The  new  reforms  provide  for 
public access to the property and interests declarations of senior public office holders which 
can  be  considered  a  good  practice.  Nevertheless,  important  challenges  remain,  as  also 
illustrated  by  the  perception  surveys  that  show  a  very  low  level  of  public  trust  in  the  anti-
corruption institutions. Lack of results in the fight against corruption is one of the key aspects 
raised throughout the summer 2020 protests. A solid track-record of final convictions in high-
level corruption cases remains to be established. Better and more effective communication as 
regards  the  development  and  implementation  of  the  anti-corruption  strategy  would  be 
beneficial. It is important that the authorities are provided with sufficient resources in order to 
be able to fight corruption effectively. A legal framework is in place for conflict of interest, 
yet  concerns  exist  as  regards  lobbying,  which  remains  unregulated  by  law,  and  the 
transparency and predictability of the legislative process in the country. 

Concerning  media  pluralism,  the  Bulgarian  legal  framework  is  based  on  a  set  of 
constitutional  safeguards  and  legislative  measures,  such  as  the  Radio  and  Television  Act, 
which are often not effectively implemented in practice. The Audiovisual Media Regulatory 
Authority  (CEM)  is  considered  as  independent  and  transparent  about  its  activities,  but  the 
Authority  lacks  resources  to  perform  its  tasks  efficiently.  Lack  of  transparency  of  media 
ownership  is  considered  as  a  source  of  concern.  The  legal  framework  against  political 
interference in the media does not explicitly forbid politicians from owning outlets, and links 
between  political  actors  and  some  media  outlets  have  been  established.  Several  media 
freedom associations report physical or online attacks on journalists.  

Issues  concerning  checks  and  balances  include  concerns  about  the  limited  use  of  public 
consultations  and  impact  assessment  in  the  legislative  process.  Despite  their  limited 
resources, the functioning of national human rights institutions has continued to improve. The 
already narrowed civic space in Bulgaria could be further affected in view of a new draft law 
on foreign funding for NGOs. 

1 

 
 
 
The Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) was established at the accession to the 
European Union in 2007 as a transitional measure to facilitate Bulgaria’s continued efforts to 
reform its judiciary and step up the fight against corruption and organised crime.1 In line with 
the decision setting up the mechanism and as underlined by the Council, the CVM ends when 
all  the  benchmarks  applying  to  Bulgaria  are  satisfactorily  met.2  The  latest  CVM  report, 
adopted in October 2019, recorded that Bulgaria had made a number of further commitments 
and the Commission concluded that the progress made under the CVM was sufficient to meet 
Bulgaria’s commitments made at the time of its accession to the EU. As the Commission also 
underlined,  Bulgaria  will  need  to  continue  working  consistently  on  translating  the 
commitments  specified 
legislation  and  on  continued 
implementation.  Before  taking  a  final  decision,  the  Commission  will  also  take  duly  into 
account the observations of the Council, as well as of the European Parliament.3 

into  concrete 

its  report 

in 

I.  JUSTICE SYSTEM  
The judicial system of the Republic of Bulgaria4 includes a total number of 182 courts which 
are  ordinary  and  specialised.  As  a  general  rule,  the  ordinary  courts  hear  cases  in  three 
instances, with the system of these courts comprising 113 regional courts, 28 district courts 
and  5  courts  of  appeal.  The  specialised  courts  include  also  military,  criminal  and 
administrative courts. The Supreme Court of Cassation is the court of last instance in cases 
heard by ordinary, military and specialised criminal courts, while for administrative cases, the 
Supreme  Administrative  Court  is  the  court  of  last  instance.  Outside  of  the  ordinary  court 
system, the Supreme Court of Cassation and the Supreme Administrative Court are the courts 
of last instance. The judiciary also includes the Prosecutor’s Office, while the Constitutional 
Court  of  Bulgaria  is  not  part  of  it.5  The  Prosecutor’s  Office  has  a  unified  structure  and  is 
headed  by  the  Prosecutor  General.  The  Supreme  Judicial  Council  is  the  highest 
administrative  authority  in  the  Bulgarian  judiciary.  It  is  responsible  for  managing  the 
judiciary and ensuring its independence. Judges, prosecutors and investigators6 are appointed, 
promoted, transferred and dismissed by their respective chamber (Judges’ or Prosecutors’) of 

1   Following  the  conclusions  of  the  Council  of  Ministers,  17  October  2006  (13339/06),  the  Mechanism  had 

been established by a Commission Decision of 13 December 2006 (C(2006) 6570). 

2   Council  Conclusions  on 

the  Cooperation  and  Verification  Mechanism,  12  December  2017 

- 

https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/20171212-st15587_en.pdf. 

3   On  18  December  2019,  the  Chair  of  the  LIBE  Committee  addressed  a  letter  to  the  President  Sassoli, 
notifying him of the Committee’s support for the Commission’s report, notably the lifting of the CVM for 
Bulgaria. President Sassoli in turn has confirmed this message in a letter of 20 December 2019 to President 
von  der  Leyen.  Meanwhile  in  the  Council  no  consensus  was  reached  on  conclusions,  and  the  Finnish 
presidency issued a Presidency report on 13 December 2019, noting the divisions on the line  to take  with 
regard to Bulgaria among Member States in the Council. Other discussions on Bulgaria and the CVM were 
organised by the LIBE Committee in August and September 2020. 

4   For  a  description  of  the  judicial  structure  see  e.g.  CEPEJ  (2020),  Study  on  the  functioning  of  the  judicial 

systems in the EU Member States. 

5   The Constitutional Court is not included in Chapter 6 Judiciary of the Constitution. It has a special Chapter 

8. In addition, Case 18/1993 of the Constitutional Court says that it is outside of the Judiciary.  

6   Venice Commission opinion (CDL-AD(2019)031) para. 13-14: The majority of the investigators are police 
officers,  procedurally  supervised  by  the  prosecutors;  a  smaller  number  of  investigators  have  the  status  of 
magistrates  and  work  in  the  National  Investigative  Service  or  in  investigative  units  which  are  part  of 
prosecutors’  offices  at  regional  level.  Procedurally,  they  are  all  under  the  supervision  of  prosecutors. 
Procedural  supervision  means  that  all  decision  by  an  investigator  can  be  overturned  by  a  supervising 
prosecutor.  The  supervising  prosecutor  is,  in  turn,  subject  to  a  supervision  by  a  hierarchically  superior 
prosecutor, up to the level of the Prosecutor General. 

2 

 
                                                 
the  Supreme  Judicial  Council.7  The  Supreme  Bar  Council  is  an  independent  and  self-
governing body established by law.8 

Independence  

A  reform  concerning  the  accountability  of  the  Prosecutor  General  and  his  or  her 
deputies is ongoing. In the past years, the Prosecution service underwent a series of reforms, 
which aimed to restructure the service.9 Despite this progress, in Bulgaria, the combination of 
the  powers  and  position  of  the  Prosecutor  General  exerts  considerable  influence,  as  the 
Prosecutor General may annul or amend any decision taken by any prosecutor which has not 
been reviewed by a judge.10 Furthermore, he may second prosecutors without their consent, 
for  a  period  of  3  months  within  a  calendar  year,  and  issue  written  instructions  to  them, 
including in individual cases.11 The Prosecutor General also has significant powers over the 
prosecutors who are the heads of offices at district and provincial level.12 Consequently, all 
prosecutors and investigators are de facto subordinate to the Prosecutor General. As regards 
his  or  her  accountability,  the  Prosecutor  General  can  only  be  removed  from  office  by  a 
proposal  of  the  Plenary  of  the  Supreme  Judicial  Council  (SJC)  to  the  President  of  the 
Republic.13  While  the  powers  of  the  Prosecutor  General  are  not  unique  to  the  Bulgarian 
justice  system14,  concerns  have  been  raised  due  to  their  combination  with  the  Prosecutor 
General’s position in the SJC. In the Prosecutors’ Chamber, the Prosecutor General, as an ex 
officio member and chairman, plays a decisive role in relation to the career and disciplinary 
proceedings  regarding  prosecutors.15  The  lack  of  a  possibility  for  an  effective  criminal 

7   In accordance with the Constitution and the Judicial System Act (JSA).  
8   Art. 134(1) and (2) of the Constitution. 
9   The 2016 JSA reform removed the possibility of verbal instructions (JSA, Art. 143(2) JSA) and established 
that the prosecutors are subordinate to the administrative heads of their prosecution office, and not directly to 
the Prosecutor General (Art. 136(3) and (4). 

10   See the powers under Article 126 of the Constitution, Article 139(2) of the Judicial System Act and Article 

243 of the Criminal Procedure Code. See also Constitutional Court Case 15/2019, 23 July 2020.  

11   Other powers: to carry out acts within the competence of lower prosecutors in cases determined by the law, 
to ensure the identification of omissions and breaches of prosecutors, and the grounds for taking appropriate 
organisational and/or disciplinary measures. JSA, Art.138 para. 1 n. 6, Art.227, para. 1 and Art.147, para. 2 
and 3, Art.143 para. 3, Art.139 para. 2; Bulgarian Constitution, Art.126 para. 2; Figure 55, 2020 EU Justice 
Scoreboard; Figure 56, 2019 EU Justice Scoreboard.  

12   JSA,  Art.136  para.  3  and  4.  See  also  Venice  Commission  opinion  (CDL-AD(2019)031),  para.  8.  The 
Supreme  Judicial  Council  has  been  reorganised  in  2015  with  the  creation  of  two  separate  Chambers  for 
Judges and Prosecutors. On the one hand, the creation of a separate judicial Chamber reduced the influence 
of  the  Prosecutor  General  on  the  career  and  discipline  of  lower  courts’  judges,  but  on  the  other  hand  it 
increased  his  or  her  influence  within  the  Prosecutorial  Chamber  on  the  career  and  on  disciplinary  matters 
concerning prosecutors and investigating magistrates, as well as on the appointment or dismissal of heads of 
prosecutor’s  offices.  In  addition,  he/she  retained  influence  on  the  appointment  of  the  presidents  of  the 
highest courts through the Plenary of the SJC. 

13   Venice Commission opinion (CDL-AD(2019)031), para. 17: In case the judge/prosecutor is found guilty of 
an  intentional  crime,  he/she  is  automatically  dismissed.  In  addition,  dismissal  is  possible  for  a  serious 
disciplinary offence, by a decision of the  respective chamber of the SJC, or, in the case of the PG or two 
chief judges – by 17 votes (out of 25) in the Plenary of the SJC. See also JSA Art. 320 para. 4 and para. 6, 
Art. 33 para. 3 and Art. 129 para. 2 and para. 3 of the Constitution.  

14   Figure 55, 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard. See also Figures 55 and 56, 2019 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
15   Venice  Commission opinion (CDL-AD(2019)031) para.  8. The reorganisation of the SJC increased [PG’s] 
his or her influence within the Prosecutorial Chamber on the career and on disciplinary matters concerning 
prosecutors  and  investigating  magistrates,  as  well  as  on  the  appointment  or  dismissal  of  heads  of 
prosecutor’s  offices;  see  also  para.  18.  That  decisive  role  also  stems  from  the  fact  that  he  or  she  is  the 
hierarchical superior of the peer elected members (four prosecutors and one investigator) and the majority is 
obtained through their votes and his or her own vote in the Prosecutors’ chamber of the SJC. In addition, lay 

3 

 
                                                 
investigation  concerning  the  Prosecutor  General  and  his  or  her  deputies  is  a  long  standing 
issue which has been raised not only by the European Commission16 but also by the European 
Court of Human Rights  17 and the Council of Europe.18 In June 2019, a draft law was tabled 
to  address  this  issue  but  serious  concerns  were  raised  by  various  stakeholders.  On  a 
recommendation  from  the  Commission,  Bulgaria  requested  an  opinion  from  the  Venice 
Commission to avoid any risk to judicial independence, while still ensuring the effectiveness 
of the proposed mechanism. In December 2019, the Ministry of Justice published a new draft 
law which addressed some of the recommendations of the Venice Commission.19 This  new 
draft law on the matter is now before Parliament20, providing for a “special prosecutor”21 who 
would  be  in  charge  of  investigating  crimes  possibly  committed  by  the  Prosecutor  General. 
This  special  prosecutor  would  be  elected  by  the  Prosecutors’  Chamber  of  the  SJC,  on  a 
proposal  from  three  of  its  members  and  with  a  majority  of  eight  out  of  eleven  votes,  for  a 
fixed-term  mandate  of  seven  years.  He  or  she  would  enjoy  procedural  independence  when 
supervising an investigation against the Prosecutor General and his or her deputies, but would 
remain  subordinate  to  the  Prosecutor  General  for  other  activities.22  Certain  elements  in  the 
appointment procedure and the investigative powers of the “special prosecutor” have raised 
concerns and it would be important that the draft law takes account of the Council of Europe 
recommendations.23 On 18 December 2019, the Government asked the Constitutional Court 
whether the supervision of legality24 by the Prosecutor General, a power which is enshrined 
in  the  Constitution,  also  applies  to  the  investigations  against  him  or  her.  This  request 
indirectly  challenged  the  constitutionality  of  the  draft  legislation.  On  23  July  2020,  the 
Constitutional Court ruled that the Prosecutor General cannot exercise supervision of legality 
over prosecutors who investigate him/her.25 This ruling will enable Parliament to resume its 

members of the Judges’ chamber elected by Parliament may also come from the ranks of prosecutors. See 
also the paragraph regarding the composition of the Supreme Judicial Council.  

16   Progress report Bulgaria 2019[COM(2019)498], p. 6. 
17   ECtHR, judgment of 5 February 2010, Kolevi v. Bulgaria, paras. 121-127, 129, 135 and 136. 
18   Council  of  Europe,  Supervision  of 

judgments, 
the 
(Decision 
CM/Notes/1377bis/H46-9  of  1-3  September  2020,  and  Committee  of  Ministers 
CM/Del/Dec(2020)1377bis/H46-9); See also CM/Notes/1362/H46-6 of 3-5 December 2019, and Committee 
of Ministers (Interim Resolution CM/ResDH(2019)367 of 5 December 2019; Venice Commission Opinion 
(CDL-AD(2019)031). 

the  European  Court’s 

execution  of 

19   As recommended by the Venice Commission, the new draft abandoned the envisaged suspension mechanism 
of the Prosecutor General as well as the extension of the accountability to the presidents to the two supreme 
courts. Venice Commission Opinion (CDL-AD(2019)031), paras. 66-67. 
20   Draft law approved by the Bulgarian Government on 7 December 2019. 
21   The head of an “Inspectorate” Department of the Supreme Cassation Prosecutor’s Office. 
22   Venice  Commission  opinion  (CDL-AD(2019)031),  paras. 55  and  63.  It  clarifies  that  cases  implicating  the 
Prosecutor  General  (PG)  should  be  withdrawn  from  the  jurisdiction  of  ordinary  investigators  and 
prosecutors, subordinated to the PG, and entrusted to a body or an official who does not receive instructions 
from the PG, who does not owe his/her appointment to the PG, and whose further career does not depend, 
even in the long run, on the PG, and that it would be important to ensure that after the termination of their 
mandate such ad-hoc prosecutors do not need to return to the prosecution system and to become subordinate 
to the PG. 

23   Interim  Resolution  CM/ResDH(2019)367 of 5 December 2019 para. 7: “arrangements envisaged to secure 
hierarchical and institutional independence of all bodies supervising or conducting the investigation should 
ensure  also  strong  practical  independence,  inter  alia  through  rules  which  make  it  impossible  for  a  Chief 
Prosecutor to be able to influence the appointment or the career of persons responsible for investigating him 
or her”. 

24   ‘Supervision  of  legality’  is  the  expression  used  in  the  Constitution  which  refers  to  the  legality  of  the 

prosecution activities, including those conducted by the prosecutors.  

25   Constitutional  Court  Case  15/2019,  23  July  2020.  On  the  ruling,  see  Council  of  Europe’s  Decision 
CM/Del/Dec(2020)1377bis/H46-9 of 3 September 2020: the Chief Prosecutor’s oversight does not apply in 
respect  of  investigations  against  him,  that  limitation  does  not  appear  to  concern  investigations  into  high-

4 

 
                                                                                                                                                        
work. However, the ruling does not solve the concerns related to the appointment procedure 
of the envisaged special prosecutor and to the fact that he or she would remain subordinate to 
the Prosecutor General for activities other than the investigation against the latter and his or 
her deputies. A further consultation of the Venice Commission on the draft law would give 
reassurance about the effectiveness of the new accountability mechanism.  

Despite  the  progress  made,  the  composition  and  functioning  of  the  Supreme  Judicial 
Council  has  been  subject  of  further  debate.  Notwithstanding  previous  reforms  and 
progress,26 the situation of the SJC has been identified as a source of concern by the Council 
of  Europe27  and  various  stakeholders.28  As  regards  the  composition,  the  abovementioned 
reforms  have  provided  for  a  more  balanced  structure  of  the  SJC.29  However,  the  overall 
number  of  judges  elected  by  their  peers  does  not  amount  to  a  majority.30  Furthermore,  the 
Prosecutor  General  plays  a  decisive  role  in  the  Prosecutors’  chamber31  and  has  also  an 
influence on the plenary32 and potentially the Judges’ chamber33, as the law provides that lay 
members elected to the Judges’ chamber by Parliament may theoretically also come from the 
ranks of the prosecutors.34 This has been raised by the Venice Commission35 as a source of 
concern because prosecutors, and the Prosecutor General in particular, are still significantly 
involved in the governance of judges. The overall structure of the SJC could limit its ability 
to  safeguard  judicial  independence36  against  pressure  by  the  executive,  the  legislature,  the 

ranking  officials,  in  particular  prosecutors,  close  to  the  Chief  Prosecutor  nor  address  the  risks  to 
independence  caused  by  the  existing  appointment,  accountability,  career,  supervision  and  subordination 
arrangements. 

26   Amendments  to  the  Constitution  of  Bulgaria  (2015)  –  Art.  130a;  Amendments  to  the  JSA  (2016)  –  Art. 

30(1).  

27   GRECO  Fourth  evaluation  round  –  Second  compliance  report,  recommendation  v,  paras.  13-15;  CCJE 
Bureau,  2019  edition  of  the  Report  on  judicial  independence  and  impartiality  in  the  Council  of  Europe 
member States. 

28   Contributions  from  Anti-corruption  Fund  and  Bulgarian  Institute  for  Legal  Initiatives  Foundation  for  the 

2020 Rule of Law Report. 

29   Venice Commission opinion (CDL-AD(2017)018), para. 9. 
30   CM/Rec(2010)12,  para  27;  JSA,  Art.  16(3)  and  (4)  - The  Judges’  chamber  of  the  SJC  (14  members)  is 
presided  by  either  one  of  the  ex  officio  members,  the  President  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  Cassation  or  the 
President of the Supreme Administrative Court. Six of the members are elected directly by judges and six 
others are elected by Parliament. A majority can be reached, both in the Plenary of the SJC and the Judges’ 
chamber, without the votes of the judges elected by their peers. 

31   JSA, Art. 16 (3) and (4) - The Prosecutors’ chamber (11 members) is presided by the ex officio member the 
Prosecutor General and it consists of five members elected by the Parliament, four by prosecutors and one by 
investigators elected by their respective peers. 

32   JSA,  Art.  30(1)  and  32  -  The  Plenary  of  the  SJC  (25  members)  is  comprised  of  both  the  aforementioned 
chambers and is presided by the Minister of Justice, who does not have the right to a vote. The plenary of the 
SJC decides upon the draft budget, disciplinary removal from office and proposals for the appointment of the 
Presidents of the Supreme Cassation Court, the Supreme  Administrative Court and the Prosecutor General 
(JSA, Art. 30(2)). The two chambers take decisions on appointment, promotion, relocation and release from 
office, matters related to acquisition and restoration of tenure and decide on disciplinary sanctions (JSA, Art. 
30(5)). 

33   Venice Commission opinion (CDL-AD(2017)018), para. 19. 
34   The  legal  requirement  under  JSA  Art.  16,  para.  3  states  that  the  election  by  chamber  shall  be  held  from 
among  judges,  prosecutors,  investigating  magistrates,  academic-degree-holding  scholars  in  legal  sciences, 
lawyers  and  other  jurists  of  high  professional  standing  and  moral  integrity,  taking  into  account  their 
professional qualification and specialization.” – Currently there are no prosecutors in the Judges’ chamber, 
however it appears that in the previous Judges’ chamber there were members who were former prosecutors.  

35   Venice Commission opinion (CDL-AD(2017)018) adopted in October 2017, para. 16, 17 and 19. 
36   JSA,  Art.  16(1) JSA. The Supreme Judicial  Council represents the judicial power, assures and  upholds its 
independence, determines the composition and the organisation of the courts, the prosecution offices and the 

5 

 
                                                                                                                                                        
judiciary,  including  the  office  of  the  Prosecutor  General  and  the  SJC  itself.  The  risk  to 
judicial  independence  is  evidenced  by  the  number  of  judges  subject  to  attacks,37  targeted 
criticism based on the content of their rulings38 or the recent rhetoric used by public figures.39 
On  14  August  2020,  the  Prime  Minister  announced  a  plan  for  a  new  Constitution40  which 
would  include  a  reform  of  the  composition  of  the  Supreme  Judicial  Council41  and  of  its 
Inspectorate;42 it would also include a change in the appointment procedure and the length of 
the mandate of the President of the Supreme Court of Cassation, the President of the Supreme 
Administrative  Court  and  the  Prosecutor  General.43  It  is  important  that  any  such  reform 
should take account of the Council of Europe recommendations.44 

The level of perceived judicial independence in Bulgaria remains low. Only 37% among 
the  general  public  consider  it  to  be  ‘fairly  or  very  good’,  and  among  companies  it  also 
remains average, with 45% considering it to be ‘fairly or very good’.45 

The regime for additional remuneration and promotion of magistrates raises concerns. 
In the current system, a magistrate can receive additional remuneration according to criteria 
set by the SJC, can become irremovable after five years of service, and can be promoted after 
passing a competition. The additional remuneration criteria has been raised as an issue by the 

investigation bodies and secures from a financial and technical point their activity without interfering in it; 
Information confirmed also during the country visit. 

37   Examples of pressure against judges in the study on “Media Monitoring and Analysis of Attacks on Courts 
during the period 01/08/2017 – 30/11/2019” (99 judges pressured by the media; 16 judges pressured by 23 
public  figures  and  institutions,  including  representatives  of  the  three  branches  of  power).  This  is  a  second 
study on the matter, the first one was made for the period 01/01/2015 – 01/07/2017 (44 judges pressured by 
the  media;  8  judges  pressured  by  15  public  figures  and  institutions,  including  representatives  of  the  three 
branches of power).  

38   COM(2019) 498 final, p. 2, para. 3 and footnote 11; See also the follow-up of the matter: Judges’ Chamber 
of the SJC statement (24 September 2019) related to the parole decision (No. 429 on 19.09.2019) adopted by 
the  Sofia  Court  of  Appeal  -  http://www.vss.justice.bg/page/view/9671.  After  a  declaration  signed  by  292 
judges on 26 September 2019 appealing to the Bulgarian society to step up and defend the independence of 
the judiciary, the rule of law and democracy in the country, a new statement of the Judges’ Chamber of the 
SJC  was  issued  on  27  September  2019  -  http://www.vss.justice.bg/page/view/9686.  On  10  June  2020,  the 
Inspectorate SJC concluded that there is no violation by the judges. 

39   Recent example of abusive rhetoric from the executive and from the representative of the SJC in support of 

it. https://www.parliament.bg/bg/parliamentarycommittees/members/2577/steno/ID/6005 

40   After several weeks of protests, the Prime Minister announced that a reform of the Constitution is currently 

being planned. A draft text was submitted to the National Assembly on 17 August 2020. 

41   The SJC would be split in two Judicial Councils, one for judges and one for prosecutors and investigators, 
without a shared plenary. The Judicial Council for judges would be composed of 7 judges elected by their 
peers, 6 members elected by the National Assembly and, ex officio, the President of the Supreme Court of 
Cassation and the President of the Supreme Administrative Court. The composition of the Judicial Council 
for prosecutors would remain the same as the composition of the current prosecutors chamber. There is no 
provision on whether the mandate of the current members of the SJC would be prematurely terminated. 

42   Two inspectorates would be established, one for judges and one for prosecutors and investigators.  
43   The draft provides for a 5 year term instead of the current 7 year term. There is no provision on whether the 
current presidents of the supreme courts and the Prosecutor General would reach the end of their mandate or 
whether their mandate would be prematurely terminated. 

44   Recommendation  CM/Rec(2010)1  of  the  Committee  of  Ministers  of  the  Council  of  Europe;  Venice 

Commission opinion (CDL-AD(2019)031). 

45   Figures 44 and 46, 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard. The level of perceived judicial independence is categorised 
as  follows:  very  low  (below  30%  of  respondents  perceive  judicial  independence  as  fairly  good  and  very 
good); low (between 30-39%), average (between 40-59%), high (between 60-75%), very high (above 75%). 
See  also,  a  survey  conducted  among  judges  in  2019  found  that  50  %  of  them  had  experienced  a  lack  of 
respect  for  their  independence  by  the  Government  and  the  media.  European  Network  of  Councils  for  the 
Judiciary, Independence and Accountability of the Judiciary – ENCJ Survey on the independence of judges, 
2019, Figures 43 and 45. The survey covered 21 EU Member States. 

6 

 
                                                                                                                                                        
Council of Europe concerning the rules set in 2018-19 by the SJC because they give broad 
discretionary  powers  to  the  Presidents  of  courts.46  In  the  same  context,  the  long  period 
necessary to  acquire a life tenure may  also  raise concerns about  judicial independence.47  In 
addition, following a recent amendment to the Judicial System Act (JSA),48 members of the 
SJC can be automatically promoted to a higher-ranking position at the end of their mandate. 
This  has  raised  concerns  in  light  of  Council  of  Europe  recommendations49  and  may  affect 
judicial  independence  taking  into  account  the  structure  of  the  legal  order  set  by  the 
Constitution  in  Bulgaria,  as  indicated  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  Cassation.50  As  a  result  of 
those  concerns,  the  JSA  was  very  recently  further  amended  and  currently  provides  that  the 
appointment to a higher position is subject to a number of conditions.51 

Amendments to the Judicial System Act (JSA) have been put in place. In February 2020, 
the automatic suspension of magistrates in case of a criminal investigation against them has 
been  withdrawn.52  Previously,  the  relevant  chamber  of  the  SJC  was  obliged  to  suspend 
without any assessment the magistrate in question. The provision of Article 230 of the JSA 
has been repealed in compliance with a decision of the Constitutional Court53 and responds to 
the  expectations  of  the  European  Commission  and  the  recommendations  of  the  Council  of 
Europe.54  Further  amendments  to  the  JSA  concern  the  obligation  of  magistrates  to  declare 
membership  in  professional  organisations.  The  former  requirement  for  judges,  prosecutors 
and investigating magistrates to declare their membership of professional associations to the 
Supreme Judicial Council had raised concerns over the freedom of association.55 According 
to  amendments,  the  declaration  is  no  longer  required.56  Nonetheless,  the  register  of 
magistrates  participating  in  professional  associations  is  still  available  on  the  website  of  the 
SJC and has allegedly been used by public figures to pressure judges.57 

A  motion  for  a  reform  of  the  Inspectorate  to  the  Supreme  Judicial  Council  has  been 
proposed. Under the current regime, the Inspectorate scrutinises the activity of the judiciary, 
carries  out  checks  on  the  integrity  and  potential  conflicts  of  interest  of  magistrates,  and 
proposes  the  opening  of  disciplinary  proceedings  regarding  magistrates  to  the  SJC.  The 
Inspectorate  consists  of  an  Inspector  General  and  ten  Inspectors,  who  are  independent  and 
elected by the National Assembly.58 The risk of political influence has been previously raised 
by  the  Venice  Commission.59  Following  the  project  “Support  for  the  enhancement  of  the 

46   According  to  GRECO,  the  system  of  applying  supplementary  remuneration  appears  still  to  be  subject  to 
broad discretionary decisions and risks of undue influence. GRECO Fourth Evaluation Round  – Evaluation 
report,  recommendation  x,  para.  26;  See  also  Venice  Commission  (CDL-AD(2010)004),  para.  46  and  51; 
Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)1 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, para. 55. 

47   GRECO Fourth Evaluation Round – Evaluation report, recommendation vi, para. 17-21 2019. 
48   Law on amendment and supplement of the JSA - https://www.parliament.bg/bg/laws/ID/157167. 
49   Venice Commission, (CDL-AD(2010)004), para. 23-24. 
50   Request of 27 May 2020 addressed by the Plenary of the Supreme Court of Cassation to the Constitutional 

Court. http://www.vks.bg/novini/2020-05-27-iskane-KC-ZSV-2020.pdf.  

51   On 3 September 2020, the National Assembly adopted amendments to Article 28 (1) of the JSA 
52   On 23 January 2020, the National Assembly adopted amendments to the JSA.  
53   The Constitutional Court ruled that the Supreme Judicial Council needs to be able to assess the necessity and 

proportionality of the suspending measure in each case. 

54   Committee  of  Ministers,  Interim  Resolution  CM/ResDH(2019)367;  2019  Progress  report  for  Bulgaria, 

COM(2019)498, p 6. 

55   COM(2019)489, p 6, footnote 29; Venice Commission (CDL-AD(2020)017), para. 29. 
56   On 23 January 2020, the National Assembly adopted amendments to the JSA.  
57   See footnote 39 – the statement by the executive was made on the basis of the information available in the 

register.  

58   Art. 132a Constitution of Republic of Bulgaria. 
59   Venice Commission (CDL-AD(2017)018), para. 58. 

7 

 
                                                 
capacity of ISJC”60, the Inspectorate itself made a motion for an amendment of the JSA that 
would require the Inspector General and the Inspectors to be proposed by other bodies, such 
as the plenaries of the Supreme Cassation Court and the Supreme Administrative Court or the 
General Meetings of magistrates and professional organisations, rather than the members of 
Parliament.61  Nevertheless,  the  Inspectorate  is  currently  working  on  the  basis  of  a  mandate 
that  has  expired62,  under  the  principle  of  continuity.63  Aside  from  the  composition  of  the 
Inspectorate,  concerns  have  been  raised  by  stakeholders  in  relation  to  the  activity  of  this 
body.64  Concerns  have  been  raised  that  under  the  provision  that  allows  the  Inspectorate  to 
propose  disciplinary  proceedings  for  magistrates65,  the  SJC66  and  the  Prosecutor  General67 
have been informing the Inspectorate to trigger an inspection, which resulted in pressure on 
individual judges.68 

Quality 

Access to justice requires improvement. There are calls for lowering the threshold for legal 
aid accessibility69, exempting legal aid  recipients  from court fees70, lowering the amount of 
court fees to initiate proceedings71 and improving the digitalisation in the judiciary.72 In the 

60   Project  funded  by  the  Structural  Support  Programme  of  the  European  Commission,  finalised  in  February 

2020. 

61   Contribution from the International Social Justice Commission for the 2020 Rule of Law Report.  
62   The procedure for election of a new Inspectors and Inspector General  was supposed to start no later than 9 
February  2020  for  the  Inspector  General  and  no  later  than  14  January  2020  for  the  Inspectors  (JSA,  Art. 
44(1)).  Such  procedure  has  not  been  initiated  to  this  date.  A  similar  situation  occurred  also  during  the 
mandate of the previous Chief Inspector who operated under a de facto 2 year extension of the mandate. 
63   Decision  No.  13/15.12.2010  on  Case  No.  12/2010  from  the  Constitutional  Court  of  Republic  of  Bulgaria, 

which ruled that the principle of continuity is applicable to college governed bodies.  

64   Example of application of the powers of the ISJC - On July 18th, 2019, the ISJC published assets statement 
of a judge (involved in a professional association) without deleting her personal and family data; JSA, arts 
54-60 – powers of the Inspectorate to the SJC. See also the website of the Bulgarian Association of Judges -
http://judgesbg.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Declaracia_IVSS.pdf 

65   JSA, Art. 312(1)(3) in conjunction with Art. 54(1)(6). 
66   On  28  November  2018,  the  president  of  Supreme  Court  of  Cassation  initiated  an  internal  inspection  on  a 
decision of the Specialised Criminal Court of Appeal; 11 judges from the same Court complained through an 
open letter about the aforementioned inspection; after the inspection had found procedural irregularities, the 
president  of  the  Supreme  Court  submitted  a  request  for  disciplinary  action  to  the  Judges’  chamber  of  the 
SJC,  which  was  rejected.  By  decision  of  the  Judges’  College  of  the  SJC  of  14  December  2018,  the 
Inspectorate  was  notified  of  an  inspection  against  the  President  the  Supreme  Court  of  Cassation,  accusing 
him of breaching the principle of independence. On 1 April 2019, the Inspectorate adopted a decision closing 
the inspection due to insufficient evidence of violations.  

67   On  4  November  2019,  the  Prosecutor  General  filed  a  request  to  the  Inspectorate  for  an  inspection  on  the 
merit of a decision taken by a judge. On 22 February 2020, the Inspectorate declined its competence having 
“no  right  to  make  inspections  on  the  merits  of  the  acts  of  the  magistrates”.  According  to  the  Bulgarian 
Authorities, upon conducting a preliminary inquiry on the report, the investigating inspector upheld that the 
ISJC  was  not  competent  to  rule  on  the  merits  of  the  judicial  acts  and,  in  so  far  as  no  violations  of  the 
formation,  movement and completion of the  case  with an  opinion of 2 January 2020 were established, the 
investigating inspector upheld that there were no grounds for investigation. See also contributions to the UN 
Special  Rapporteur  -  Report  on  Independence  of  judges  and  lawyers  –  practice  used  by  the  Prosecutor 
General to send signal to the Inspectorate regarding judges. 

68   Contribution  from  Bulgarian  Institute  for  Legal  Initiatives  Foundation  for  the  2020  Annual  Rule  of  Law 

Report. 

69   Contributions  from  the  Civil  Liberties  Union  for  Europe  and  the  Bulgarian  Prisoners'  Association  for 

Rehabilitation for the 2020 Rule of Law Report; Figure 23, 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard. 

70   2020 EU Justice Scoreboard, p. 25. 
71   Contributions from Anti-corruption fund Foundation, the Bulgarian Institute for Legal Initiatives Foundation 
and the Group of Bulgarian lawyers (informal group of activists) for the 2020 Rule of Law Report; Figure 
24, 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard.  

8 

 
                                                 
current state of the legal aid system in Bulgaria, even a person whose income is at or slightly 
below the Eurostat poverty threshold is not entitled to legal aid. Particular attention has been 
drawn to the significantly high level of court fees in the area of administrative justice.73 As 
regards digitalisation, while it is not possible to submit a case online, it is possible to transmit 
summons and to monitor some cases.74 In addition, the use of and follow-up on the results of 
surveys  conducted  among  court users  are limited.75 A  comprehensive view on the situation 
regarding  e-justice  will  be  available  at  the  end  of  2020,  when  the  ongoing  project 
“Development  of  a  Model  for  Optimization  of  the  Judicial  Map  of  Bulgarian  Courts  and 
Prosecutor’s  Offices  and  of  a  Unified  Information  System  for  Courts”  is  supposed  to  be 
completed.76 The COVID-19 pandemic has illustrated the shortcomings of the judicial system 
in  the  area  of  e-justice.  Following  a  decision  of  the  Judges’  chamber  of  the  SJC77,  the 
processing  of  court  cases  was  temporarily  suspended  for  one  month  during  the  state  of 
emergency, except for urgent cases.78 

Financial  and  human  resources  raise  concerns.  It  appears  that  authorities,  among  which 
the Prosecutor’s office, and the Specialised Criminal Court experience issues related to lack 
of human or financial resources, despite the reported investment made by the Government in 
the justice system over the past years.79 

Efficiency 

The lack of data regarding civil and commercial 1st and 2nd instance courts still hinders 
the monitoring of the efficiency of justice. The process of collecting statistical data through 
aggregate  statistics  does  not  allow  for  a  breakdown  of  litigious  and  non-litigious  civil  and 
commercial cases (1st and 2nd instance) and does not permit a proper evaluation of the overall 
efficiency  of  the  judicial  system.80  However,  there  are  two  positive  developments.  When  it 
comes to the length of proceedings at the Supreme Court of Cassation, Bulgaria is performing 
well  in  comparison  to  the  other  Member  States.81  Furthermore,  the  performance  of 
administrative courts regarding the lenght of proceedings shows improvement. The estimated 

72   Figure 27, 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
73   Contributions  of  the  Bulgarian  Institute  for  Legal  Initiatives  Foundation,  the  Anti-corruption  fund 
Foundation  and  the  Group  of  Bulgarian  lawyers  for  the  2020  Rule  of  Law  Report.  Under  the  current 
legislation, every citizen may approach the relevant court, seeking an exemption from court fees. The power 
to grant such requests is entirely within the competence of each individual panel of the court. The Code of 
Administrative Procedure also contains  mechanisms  for exemption or reduction of court fee depending on 
the financial means of the person. 
74   Figure 27, 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
75   Figures 41 and 42, 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard. See also European Commission, Country Report Bulgaria 

2019, SWD(2019) 1001 final/2, p. 59. 

76   ESF  funded  project  (2016-2020).  http://2020.eufunds.bg/en/1/0/Project/.  The  Supreme  Judicial  Council  is 
implementing a number of projects, funded by budgetary resources and external donor programs, to improve 
and enhance e-justice and facilitate its accessibility. 

77   Judges’ chamber SJC, Extraordinary Session, Short Protocol No. 9, 10 March 2020. 
78   Such  as  those  on  reviewing  pre-trial  detention,  or  undertaking  victim  protection  measures  and  child 
protection  measures.  See  also  Fundamental  Rights  Agency,  “Coronavirus  COVID-19  outbreak  in  the  EU 
Fundamental  Rights  Implications”,  p.3.  https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/bulgaria-report-
covid-19-april-2020_en.pdf. 

79   Figures 32-35 and 37, 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard.  
80   Figures 6, 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
81   Figure 7, 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard. 

9 

 
                                                                                                                                                        
time  for  resolving  administrative  cases  at  all  instances  have  been  improving  over  the  past 
years.82  

II.  ANTI-CORRUPTION FRAMEWORK 

In 2017 and 2018, Bulgaria carried out a comprehensive reform of its legal and institutional 
anti-corruption  frameworks.  Through  the  merging  of  several  existing  structures,  the  reform 
established  the  Commission  for  Counteracting  Corruption  and  Illegal  Assets  Forfeiture 
(hereinafter  the  Anti-corruption  Commission).  The  competence  for  high-level  corruption 
cases was transferred to the Specialised Criminal Court while the investigation of such cases 
is carried out under the supervision of the Specialised Prosecutor’s Office. The current anti-
corruption strategy covers the period 2015-2020 and a new strategy for 2021-2027 is under 
preparation. The fight against corruption has been declared a main priority of the Government 
in its 2017-2021 programme83. At the same time, protests that erupted in summer 2020 show 
discontent in society with the lack of progress in effectively fighting corruption. The protests 
led to the resignations of five ministers in July and September 2020. 

In the latest Transparency International 2019 Corruption Perceptions Index, Bulgaria 
scored  43/100  and  was  ranked  last  in  the  EU  and  74th  globally.84  80%  of  Bulgarian 
respondents  to  the  latest  Eurobarometer  survey  on  corruption  are  of  the  opinion  that 
corruption  is  widespread  in  their  country  (EU  average:  71%)85  while  85%of  companies 
consider  corruption  to  be  widespread  (EU  average  63%).  Similarly,  51%  of  businesses 
considered  corruption  to  be  a  problem  when  doing  business  in  the  country.  28%  of 
respondents  state  that  they  feel  personally  affected  by  corruption  in  their  daily  lives  (EU 
average 26%), while 63% do not think that there are enough successful prosecutions to deter 
people from corrupt practices (EU average 36%). Finally, only 13% of companies responded 
that people and businesses caught for bribing a senior official are appropriately punished (EU 
average 31%).86 

The  National  Strategy  for  Preventing  and  Countering  Corruption  covers  the  period 
2015-2020.87  The  implementation  of  the  strategy  is  monitored  and  coordinated  by  the 
National Council on Anti-Corruption Policies. The latest report on the implementation of the 
strategy  for  the  period  until  31  January  201988  notes  the  continuous  upgrading  of  the 
institutional  framework,  the  improved  authority  of  the  inspectorates  and  anti-corruption 
trainings of public administration. The Council reports that it launched consultations on the 
evaluation of the implementation of the 2015-2020 strategy and the development of the new 
strategy  for  2021-2027.  The  Council’s  website  does  not  provide  functional  access  to 
information  as  regards  the  current  members  of  the  council  or  its  activities,  including  its 
meetings  or  discussions.89  Furthermore,  a  new  Code  of  Conduct  for  Public  Administration 
was adopted in April 2020.90 The new code puts an emphasis on anti-corrupt behaviour in the 
administration. 

82   Figures 8 and 9, 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard.  
83   Management Program of the Government of the Republic of Bulgaria for the period 2017-2021.  
84   Transparency International (2020), 2019 Corruption Perceptions Index. 
85   Flash Eurobarometer 502 (2020), Corruption. 
86   Flash Eurobarometer 482 (2019), Businesses’ attitudes towards corruption in the EU. 
87   National Strategy for Prevention and Countering Corruption in the Republic of Bulgaria 2015-2020. 
88   Report  on  implementation  of  the  national  anti-corruption  strategy  2015  –  2020  for  the  period  until  31 

January 2019. 

89   Public consultation portal - http://www.strategy.bg/. 
90   Available at https://dv.parliament.bg/DVWeb/showMaterialDV.jsp?idMat=147322 

10 

 
                                                 
The  legal  framework  to  fight  corruption  is  largely  in  place,  but  challenges  remain. 
Corruption  and  related  crimes  are  regulated  in  the  Special  Part  of  the  Bulgarian  Criminal 
Code.  The  overall  implementation  of  the  Council  Framework  Decision  2003/568/JHA  on 
combating  corruption  in  the  private  sector  can  be  considered  satisfactory.91  Only  natural 
persons  can  bear  criminal  responsibility  in  Bulgaria.  Legal  entities  can  only  be  subject  to 
administrative  (non-criminal  sanctions)  pursuant  to  the  Administrative  Offences  and 
Penalties Act. The complex and formalistic Bulgarian system of criminal procedural law has 
been  highlighted  by  different  reports  and  analyses  over  the  years  as  an  obstacle  to  the 
effective investigation and prosecution of high-level  corruption.92 This  has  also  been  raised 
by  the  Anti-Corruption  Fund  Foundation,  which  pointed  out  that  the  formalism  of  the 
criminal  proceedings  prevents  the  development  of  innovative  and  original  investigation 
strategies.93 The contribution of the national authorities highlights several deficiencies in the 
legal  framework,  including  the  encouragement  of  bona  fide  procedural  behaviour  by 
excluding  criminality  or  imposing  lighter  sentences  in  the  cases  where  the  persons 
committing  a  bribery  offence  voluntarily  report  it  and  cooperate  with  the  investigating 
authorities.94 

The  institutional  framework  has  recently  been  consolidated.  Through  the  merging  of 
several  structures,  the  2018  Act  on  Counteracting  Corruption  and  on  the  Forfeiture  of 
Illegally  Acquired  Property  (hereinafter  ‘the  anti-corruption  law’)  established  the  new 
Commission for Counteracting Corruption and Illegal Assets Forfeiture. The Anti-corruption 
Commission  has  a  broad  remit  of  responsibilities.95  The  chairperson  of  the  Anti-corruption 
Commission, his or her deputy and the three members are elected by simple majority in the 
National Assembly. Stakeholders have raised concerns about this election procedure, noting 
that  it  creates  possible  risks  for  the  political  independence  of  the  Anti-corruption 
Commission’s work. Amendments to  the Criminal  Procedural  Code in  2017 transferred the 
jurisdiction for high-level corruption cases, committed by senior public office holders, from 
the  remit  of  the  Sofia  City  Court  to  the  Specialised  Criminal  Court.96  The  investigation  of 
such cases is carried out by investigating magistrates from the investigation department of the 
Specialised  Prosecutor’s  Office.  Outside  of  these  cases,  the  detection  and  investigation  of 
corruption offences committed by persons who are not senior public office holders falls under 
the competence of the Ministry of Interior. 

The  Anti-corruption  Commission  has  faced  a  number  of  challenges  since  its 
establishment.  A  series  of  highly  publicised  scandals  took  place  in  the  spring  of  2019, 
involving  the  purchase  of  private  properties  at  below  market  value  by  high-level  officials. 
The  Anti-corruption  Commission  did  not  find  any  evidence  for  conflicts  of  interests.  The 
scandal,  referred  to  as  ‘Apartmentgate’,  led  to  the  resignation  of  a  number  of  high-level 

91   COM(2019) 355 final. 
92   Technical  report  on  Bulgaria  accompanying  the  Report  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament 
and  the  Council  on  Progress  in  Bulgaria  under  the  Cooperation  and  Verification  Mechanism  SWD(2019) 
392 final.  

93   Contribution of the Anti-Corruption Fund Foundation for the 2020 Rule of Law Report.  
94   Input from Bulgaria for the 2020 Rule of Law Report, p. 44. 
95   They include: (i) the implementation of preventive anti-corruption activities; (ii) the gathering, analysis and 
verification of information where there is reason to believe that senior public office holders have committed 
acts of corruption; (iii) the verification and analysis of declarations of assets and interests by senior public 
office holders; (iv) ascertainment of conflicts of interest of  senior public office holders; (v) the initiation of 
confiscation  proceedings  for  illegally  acquired  assets  and  (vi)  preparation  of  analyses  and  development  of 
methodologies for corruption risks. 

96   The persons holding senior public positions are listed in Art. 6 of the Act on Countering Corruption and on 

Seizure of Illegally Acquired Property. 

11 

 
                                                 
officials,  including  the  former  chairman  of  the  Anti-corruption  Commission.  The  latest 
annual report of the Anti-corruption Commission highlights challenges in the area of human 
resources with 100 empty vacancies out of 477 staff in total (representing more than 20%)97. 
This could have a potential impact on the effectiveness of the Anti-corruption Commission. 
The  authorities  indicated  that  measures  have  been  taken  to  remedy  the  situation.  The  latest 
Eurobarometer  survey  shows  that  only  18%  of  Bulgarian  respondents  trust  the  Anti-
corruption  Commission  to  deal  with  a  case  of  corruption,  a  decrease  of  4%  compared  to 
previous years. 

The  reforms  are  beginning  to  show  first  results  but  challenges  remain.  In  2019,  553 
inspections  were  assigned  by  the  Prosecutor’s  Office  to  the  Anti-corruption  Commission, 
compared to  343 in  2018.  In 450 cases, the work was completed  and the results have been 
reported back to the prosecutors, with evidence for a committed criminal offence in 83 of the 
cases.  The  most  recent  annual  report  of  the  Anti-corruption  Commission  notes  improved 
cooperation  in  the  automatic  electronic  exchange  of  data  with  other  public  institutions.98 
Several  outstanding  challenges  for  the  investigative  authorities  have  been  highlighted, 
including the need to hire competent and highly-qualified specialists for the purposes of the 
criminal proceedings, as well as a significant imbalance in the workload of  prosecutors and 
investigators of the Specialised Prosecutor’s Office.99  

A  solid  track  record  of  final  convictions  in  high-level  corruption  cases  remains  to  be 
established. The statistics on the investigation and prosecution of corruption offences show 
that,  in  2019,  there  were  486  accused  persons  put  on  trial  for  corruption  offences  (508  in 
2018, 582 in 2017 and 614 in 2016). The Supreme Court of Cassation’s 2019 annual report 
shows  that  convictions  were  upheld  in  20  out  of  28  corruption-related  cases,  among  which 
seven public office holders were convicted.100 A recent report by a Bulgarian anti-corruption 
watchdog analyses the progress of several high-level corruption cases and highlights that only 
a  few  have  resulted  in  final  convictions.  The  above-mentioned  report  also  shows  that  there 
were no final convictions in high-level corruption cases in 2018 and 2019.101 Moreover, 78% 
of  respondents  to  the  latest  Eurobarometer  survey  are  of  the  opinion  that  high-level 
corruption cases are not pursued sufficiently (EU average 68%) and 72% are of the opinion 
that  Government  efforts  to  fight  corruption  are  not  effective  (EU  average  55%).  It  is 
particularly noteworthy that 77% of businesses responding to the Eurobarometer survey think 
that it is unlikely that corrupt people would be fined or imprisoned by the courts. 

The  Internal  Security  Directorate  investigates  offences  committed  by  officials  of  the 
Ministry of Interior and conducts integrity tests. Over the course of the past six months, 
the Directorate has played a key  role in  a number of operations for the  arrest of high-level 
law enforcement and customs officers accused of bribery. The investigative activities of the 
Directorate  in  2019  included  the  processing  of  562  reports  for  alleged  criminal  offenses, 
including corruption crimes committed by officials from the Ministry of Interior, compared to 
172 in 2018. It also carried out 81 pre-trial investigations for police misconduct, compared to 

97   Report  on  the  activity  of  the  Anti-corruption  Commission  for  counteracting  corruption  and  forfeiture  of 

illegally acquired assets for 2019. 

98   See previous note. 
99   Input from Bulgaria for the 2020 Rule of Law Report. 
100  Annual report of the activity of the Supreme Court of Cassation in 2019.  
101  Anti-Corruption  Fund,  Konrad  Adenauer  Foundation  (2020),  Anti-corruption  institutions:  activity  without 

visible result’.  

12 

 
                                                 
98 in 2018.102 Most of the judgments on corruption-related cases delivered by the Supreme 
Court  of  Cassation  in  2019  concerned  the  offering/giving/demanding/receiving  of  bribes 
to/by  officers  from  the  Ministry  of  Interior  (ten  convictions  out  of  28  corruption  cases). 
Notably, 61% of respondents to the Eurobarometer are of the opinion that bribery and abuse 
of power for personal gain are widespread among law enforcement and customs authorities. 

In 2012, Bulgaria put in place a civil confiscation regime. The procedure is initiated by the 
Anti-corruption  Commission  when  a  person  is  charged  with  crimes  listed  in  the  anti-
corruption law. The person’s property is inspected for a period of 10 years in retrospect and 
the Commission has to identify a ‘significant discrepancy’ between the lawful net income of 
the suspect or accused person and the value of his or her property.103 The civil confiscation 
procedure  is  independent  from  any  criminal  proceedings  and  enables  the  confiscation  of  a 
person’s property without a prior conviction for a criminal offence.104Article 148 of the Anti-
corruption  Law  lays  down  the  general  method  of  appraisal  of  unlawfully  acquired  assets. 
Stakeholders have raised serious concerns that the civil confiscation cases are not conducted 
in  an  independent  and  impartial  manner.105  By  June  2020,  there  were  309  final  court 
judgments  confirming  the  confiscation  of  assets  of  a  total  value  of  BGN  133,133,611.25 
(approximately EUR 68,273,646). 

The Anti-corruption Commission verifies declarations of assets and interests by senior 
public office holders  and ascertains conflicts of interest. The anti-corruption law defines 
the term ‘senior public office holder’. The declarations of the senior public office holders are 
accessible  via  the  Register  of  Senior  Public  Office  Holders.106  The  anti-corruption  law 
enables  senior  public  office  holders  to  request  that  the  information  of  their  spouses  or  de 
facto cohabitants and their children below the age of 18 is not made publically available. In 
2019,  the  Anti-corruption  Commission  carried  out  checks  on  8,573  senior  public  office 
holders.  In  2019,  the  Commission  adopted  162  decisions  on  conflicts  of  interests  (140  in 
2018). Fourteen of those decisions identified a conflict of interests (28 in 2018) and sanctions 
amounting to BGN 173,511 (approximately EUR 88,980) were imposed.107 Office holders at 
the regional and local level also fall within the scope of the anti-corruption law.108.  

Recent  legislative  amendments109  enhanced  the  role  and  functions  of  the  General 
Inspectorate  and  the  inspectorates  in  the  ministries.  Their  competencies  include  the 
exercise  of  control  and  checks  as  regards  conflicts  of  interest  and  the  content  of  the 
mandatory  asset  declarations,  submitted  by  civil  servants,  advisors  and  experts  and  the 
alerting of the prosecution authorities in the cases where evidence is found for a committed 
offence. The inspectorates also  assess  corruption risks  and propose measures to  limit  them. 

102  The  data  quoted  is  provided  in  the  Report  on  the  implementation  of  the  Anti-corruption  Plan  2018  and 

Report on the implementation of the measures of the Anti-corruption plan 2019. 

103  The  term  ‘significant  discrepancy’  is  defined  in  the  additional  provisions  of  the  anti-corruption  law  as  a 
discrepancy  between  the  lawful  net  income  of  the  inspected  person  and  the  value  of  his  or  her  property 
amounting to at least BGN 150,000 (EUR 76,700). 

104  Art.  108(4)  of  the  Anti-corruption  Law  explicitly  highlights  that  the  civil  confiscation  proceedings 

commence and proceed even if the criminal proceedings are terminated. 
105  Contribution of Group of Bulgarian lawyers for the 2020 Rule of Law Report. 
106  Register of the Anti-corruption Commission. https://register.caciaf.bg/.  
107  Anti-corruption Commission (201), Annual report 2019 (n12). 
108  Following  the  2019  regional  elections,  the  Anti-corruption  Commission  reported  the  receipt  of  6,300 
declarations  of  mayors  and  members  of  municipal  councils,  of  whom  5,116  have  submitted  their 
introductory declarations. 272 representatives of local institutions did not submit their declaration within the 
prescribed period and 102 failed to submit at all. 

109  Amendments were carried out as regards the Public Administration Act as well as the anti-corruption law. 

13 

 
                                                 
The 2019 annual activity report of the inspectorates illustrate their increasingly active role as 
regards conducting checks and ad-hoc inspections (following alerts by citizens, organisations 
or institutions).110 

Lobbying is not regulated in Bulgaria. There are no specific obligations for registration of 
lobbyists or reporting of contacts between public officials and lobbyists. A recent analysis by 
the National Centre for Parliamentary Research covering the period April 2017 to December 
2019  shows  that  nearly  37%  of  the  adopted  legal  acts  modify  other  acts  by  amendments, 
including  in  the  transition  and  final  provisions  of  the  amending  act.111  In  some  cases,  the 
amendments  concern  legal  acts  which  are  completely  unrelated  to  the  amending  act.112 
Stakeholders have expressed serious concerns that this practice not only  impacts negatively 
on the transparency of the legislative process in the country, but could in some cases be a sign 
of irregular lobbying.113 

The  anti-corruption  law  introduced  measures  to  ensure  whistleblower  protection  and 
encourage the reporting of corruption. The persons entrusted with examining the alert are 
obliged  not  to  disclose  the  identity  of  the  whistleblower,  not  to  make  public  any  facts  and 
data of which they have become aware in connection with the examination of the alert and to 
safeguard  the  written  documents  entrusted  thereto  against  unauthorised  access  by  third 
parties.  114 The Bulgarian Institute for Legal Initiatives pointed out that a possible weakness 
of  the  existing  regime  is  that  it  does  not  allow  the  submission  of  anonymous  alerts.115  The 
Anti-corruption  Fund  raised  similar  concerns  as  regards  the  requirement  that  the 
whistleblower discloses their personal identification number.116  

110  In 2019, the total number of conducted checks reached 2,221 (1,485 in 2018 and 1,365 in 2017). The total 
number of ad-hoc inspections (following signals by citizens, organisations or institutions) is 1,902 (1,219 in 
2018). The total number of reports by citizens and organisations is 1,297, of which 1,192 refer to violations 
of  legal  procedures  by  administration  and  105  to  corruption;  2019  Annual  Activity  Report  of  the 
Inspectorates; Public Administration Act, Art. 46. 

111  National Centre for Parliamentary Research (2019), Research of the legislative activities of the 44th National 

Assembly: comparative data, covering draft laws, submitted in the 8 parliamentary sessions. 

112  For example, via the transitional and final provisions of the Independent Financial Audit Act, the  National 
Assembly  amended  other  non-related  legal  acts  concerning  taxation  matters  as  well  as  provisions  on  the 
freezing  of  bank  accounts.  Furthermore,  in  April  2020  the  Access  to  Information  Programme  expressed 
concerns  that  the  transitional  and  final  provisions  of  the  draft  law  for  supplementing  and  amending  the 
excise duties and tax warehouses act amends the access to public information act. 

113  The  risks  linked  to  irregular  lobbying  are  specifically  highlighted  in  the  contribution  of  The  Bulgarian 

Institute for Legal Initiatives Foundation for the 2020 Rule of Law Report. 

114  Chapters  VI  and  VII  of  the  Law  on  counteracting  corruption  and  for  the  forfeiture  of  illegally  acquired 

property. 

115  Written contribution by the Bulgarian Institute for Legal Initiatives. 
116  Written contribution by the Anti-corruption Fund. 

14 

 
 
 
                                                 
III.  MEDIA PLURALISM 

The Bulgarian legal framework concerning media pluralism is based on a set of constitutional 
safeguards and legislative measures, such as the Radio and Television Act117. The Access to 
Public Information Act regulates access to public information and the re-use of public sector 
information.  A Public  Information  Access  Platform  was launched in  2019, streamlining the 
application process and ensuring that the information published in response to an application 
becomes accessible to all citizens.118 

The  regulator  for  audiovisual  media  services,  the  Council  for  Electronic  Media,  is 
vested with powers in compliance with the Radio and Television Act.119 The Council for 
Electronic Media (CEM) is an independent body composed of five members: three members 
are elected by the National Assembly, and two are appointed by the President of the Republic 
of Bulgaria. The term of office of the members is 6 years. The composition of CEM rotates 
every  two  years  from  the  quota  of  the  National  Assembly  and  every  three  years  from  the 
quota of the President120.  

The independence of the CEM has been assessed as being at low risk.121 According to the 
Media  Pluralism  Monitor  (MPM  2020),  the  duties  and  responsibilities  of  CEM  are  clearly 
defined by law, and the authority is transparent about its activities.122 However, it is widely 
recognised  that  CEM  lacks  resources  to  perform  its  tasks  efficiently  and  is  financially 
dependent  on  the  State  for  the  allocation  of  the  necessary  resources123.  The  revised 
Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD) sets out a range of specific guarantees for 
the independence and effectiveness of national media regulators124. A draft Act amending and 
supplementing the Radio and Television Act was prepared by a working party set up within 
the Ministry of Culture to ensure transposition of the revised AVMSD.125 

As  regards  self-regulation,  Bulgaria  also  has  a  media  ethics  committee.  The  Bulgarian 
National Council for Journalistic Ethics Foundation (NSW) was established in 2005 as a non-
profit  legal  entity  for  performing  activities  in  the  public  interest.  The  purpose  of  the 
Foundation  is  to  establish  and  maintain  a  self-regulatory  system  for  print  and  electronic 
media in  Bulgaria on the basis of the Bulgarian  Media Code of Ethics, adopted in  2005.126 
The  NSW  processes  complaints  by  citizens  and  organisations  against  print  and  electronic 
media about violations of media ethics.127 

117  Radio and Television Act. https://www.mtitc.government.bg/en/category/168/radio-and-television-act.  
118  In  2020  Bulgaria  is  at  111th  position  worldwide  in  the  Reporters  Without  Borders  World  Press  Freedom 

Index. See https://rsf.org/en/ranking. 

119  Section  III  of  the  Radio  and  Television  Act.  Council  for  Electronic  Media  has  the  powers  to  exercise 
supervision  over  the  broadcasting  activities  of  media  service  providers;  to  elect  and  remove  the  Directors 
General  of  the  Bulgarian  National  Television  (BNT)  and  the  Bulgarian  National  Radio  (BNR)  and  to 
endorse,  upon  nomination  by  the  Directors  General,  the  members  of  the  management  boards  of  BNR  and 
BNT. 

120  Radio and Television Act, Transitional and Final Provisions. 
121  2020 Media Pluralism Monitor. 
122  All its sessions are public.  
123  ERGA Report on the independence of National Regulatory Authorities: and Country visits. 
124  Directive 2010/13/EU (Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD)), Art. 30.  
125  Input from Bulgaria for the 2020 Rule of Law Report. 
126  Bulgarian Media Code of Ethics. 
127  However,  it  appears  from  the  country  visit  that  media  often  disregard  the  Council’s  decisions  and 

recommendations. 

15 

 
                                                 
Lack  of  transparency  of  media  ownership  in  Bulgaria  is  considered  as  a  source  of 
concern. The CEM maintains and regularly updates a public register of linear and non-linear 
media  services,  as  well  as  a  list  of  undertakings  distributing  Bulgarian  and  foreign 
programmes.128 In November 2018, the Compulsory Deposit of Copies of Printed and Other 
Works Act was amended to require media outlets to provide information about their owners 
and all funding received, including the names of donors. Some observers considered that this 
placed  an  excessive  burden  on  small,  independent  media  outlets,  funded  mainly  through 
donations (e.g. crowdfunding) and could discourage private individuals from supporting such 
outlets.129  The  law  has  also  been  criticised  because  it  does  not  oblige  media  to  disclose 
certain other sources of income, such as Government funding beyond funds received through 
contracts  with  relevant  contracting  authorities.  In  practice,  according  to  stakeholders  and 
MPM 2020, many outlets do not comply with the law, and the disclosed information is not 
always easily accessible to the public. A report published by the European  Centre for Press 
and Media Freedom (ECPMF) following a joint fact-finding mission held in 2018 points to 
several  issues  linked  to  transparency  of  media  ownership.130  Furthermore,  the  report 
following  the  visit  of  the  Commissioner  for  Human  Rights  of  the  Council  of  Europe  in 
Bulgaria in November 2019 indicated that the provisions on ownership disclosure continue to 
be  implemented  only  partially.  Furthermore,  transparency  is  not  ensured  in  many  cases,  as 
media outlets tend to register under proxies or offshore companies.131  

State advertising reportedly plays an important role in the country’s media landscape, 
especially  at  local  level.  MPM  2020  reports  that  in  Bulgaria,  there  are  no  regulatory 
safeguards for fair and transparent distribution of state advertising.132 Stakeholders also report 
that  the  regulatory  framework  governing  political  advertising  does  not  extend  to  social 
media.133 It appears that distribution of state advertising expenditure is not based on clear and 
non-discriminatory  criteria.134  Stakeholders  also  report  that  sometimes,  EU  funds  are 
allegedly  used  by  local  authorities  to  strengthen  their  control  of  local  newspapers  and  TV 
channels135.  

The  legal  framework  against  political  interference  in  the  media  does  not  explicitly 
forbid  politicians from  owning  outlets.  It  is  reported  that  the  ownership  of  several  media 
outlets  is  closely  linked  to  political  actors  in  Bulgaria,  even  if  not  officially  owned  by 
them.136 Stakeholders report that the political climate is not favourable to independent media, 
and  that  many  media  owners  prefer  to  be  close  to  the  Government  in  order  to  avoid  being 
marginalised.  Moreover,  national  and  local  media  in  all  sectors  are  subject  to  systematic 
political control, and the majority of the leading newspapers in the country follow an editorial 

128  Bulgarian authorities indicate that since the beginning of 2020,  the Council for Electronic Media has been 

posting a link to the Commercial Register along with the data on media service providers 

129  Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe (2019), Report on the visit to Bulgaria.  
130  https://www.ecpmf.eu/archive/news/press-releases/ecpmf-fact-finding-mission-bulgaria.html 
131  The  report  also  claims  that  offshore  companies  continue  to  operate,  although  the  law  prohibits  such 

companies from holding TV or radio licences since 2014. 

132  2020 Media Pluralism Monitor.  
133  Information received in the context of the country visit and of the consultation process for the preparation of 
the  report,  e.g.  contribution  by  CEM.  However,  the  Bulgarian  authorities  indicated  that  the  envisaged 
amendments to the Radio and Television Act contain provisions concerning political advertising on video-
sharing platforms and social media. 

134  Joint  fact  finding  mission  to  Bulgaria.  https://www.ecpmf.eu/archive/activities/fact-finding-  /bulgaria.html. 

See also MPM 2020. 

135  See previous note. 
136  See previous note.  

16 

 
                                                 
policy favourable to the Government.137 In addition, a large number of Bulgarian journalists 
characterised political interferences in the media as “common” and “widespread”.138  

During  the  Covid-19  pandemic,  the  Parliament  tried  to  change  the  Criminal  Code  in 
order to criminalise disinformation.139 The State of Emergency Act initially adopted on 20 
March 2020, included amendments to the Criminal Code providing for a prison term of up to 
three  years  and  fines  of  up  to  BGN  10  000  (about  EUR  5100)  for  disseminating  “untrue 
information about the spreading of an infectious disease”. Although there was no definition 
of  false  information,  citizens  were  threatened  with  the  imposition  of  heavy  fines  and 
imprisonment.  In  this  light,  experts,  journalists  and  citizens  would  be  forced  to  engage  in 
self-censorship.140 However, the President vetoed that provision citing the impact on freedom 
of  speech.  Subsequently,  on  23  March  2020  the  Parliament  adopted  the  law  without  the 
controversial provision.  

Bulgarian  law  provides  the  main  legal  safeguards  for  the  protection  and  activities  of 
journalists  and  media.  The  right  to  freedom  of  expression  is  protected  by  the 
Constitution.141 The Access to Public Information Act regulates access to public information 
and the re-use of public sector information. Stakeholders report that the law has proved to be 
a powerful tool for investigative journalists and citizens alike. A Public Information Access 
Platform  was  launched  in  2019,  streamlining  the  application  process  and  ensuring  that  the 
information  published  in  response  to  an  application  becomes  accessible  to  all  citizens.142 
However,  obtaining  access  to  public  information  remains  difficult  in  Bulgaria,  despite  an 
increasing  number  of  open  public  data  sources.143  It  appears  that  some  independent 
journalists and publications have been forced to use access to information requests in order to 
communicate with certain institutions.144 

In February 2019, the Bulgarian Parliament passed amendments to the Personal Data 
Protection  Act.  Although  the  General  Data  Protection  Regulation  (GDPR)  foresees 
exceptions covering the work of journalists, they were not incorporated in the new Bulgarian 
legislation, which also established sanctions for media. Legal and media experts criticised the 
Act  for its potential  chilling effect  on journalistic investigations.145  On 15  November 2019, 
the  Bulgarian  Constitutional  Court  declared 
the  Act 
unconstitutional.146 

the  relevant  provisions  of 

Attacks on journalists are frequently reported. In particular, stakeholders denounce smear 
campaigns  against  independent  and  investigative  journalists  who  are  exposing  corruption 
cases.  147  In  2019  and  2020,  eight  alerts  regarding  attacks  on  journalists,  harassment  of 
journalists and other media actors as well as abusive lawsuits were registered for Bulgaria on 

137  2020 Media Pluralism Monitor. 
138  According to a survey carried out in mid-2017 by AEJ-Bulgaria. https://www.aej.org/page.asp?p_id=622.  
139  Law for measures and actions during the state of emergency. https://www.parliament.bg/bg/laws/ID/157379. 
140  Bulgarian  Presidency  website. 
https://m.president.bg/en/speeches-and-statements5437/izyavlenie-na-

prezidenta-rumen-radev-po-povod-prietiya-ot-parlamenta-zakon-za-merkite-i-deystviyata-po-vreme-na-
izvanrednoto-polozhenie.html.  

141  Art. 39, 40 and 41 of the Constitution. 
142  Public Information Access Platform.  
143  2020 Media Pluralism Monitor. 
144  Information received in the context of the country visit and of the consultation process for the preparation of 

the report. 

145  2020 Media Pluralism Monitor. 
146  Journalistic exemption under the European data protection law. 
147  Contribution from Civil Liberties Union for Europe for the 2020 Annual Rule of Law Report. 

17 

 
                                                 
the Platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists of the Council 
of Europe.148 A series of similar threats and attacks have also been reported until recently.149 
Media  freedom  associations  claim  that  journalists  and  media  owners  face  politically 
motivated charges with a view to silencing critical reporting. MPM 2020 reports cases where 
the State is allegedly threatening media independence by way of political, administrative and 
judicial  pressure.  The  Council  of  Europe  Platform  to  promote  the  protection  of  journalism 
and  safety  of  journalists150  as  well  as  Mapping  Media  Freedom151  also  report  such  alleged 
cases. Threats to journalists linked to their online activities are reported too. It has been noted 
that  the  most  vulnerable  targets  are  critical  and  investigative  journalists.152  There  are  court 
cases launched against journalists for posting critical information on social media.153  

IV.  OTHER INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RELATED TO CHECKS AND BALANCES 

Bulgaria  is  a  representative  democratic  republic  with  a  directly  elected  President,  a 
unicameral National Assembly and a Constitutional Court in charge of constitutional review 
of laws. The National  Assembly has a final  decision-making power when adopting laws.154 
Bulgaria has two national human rights institutions. First, the Ombudsman is an independent 
constitutional  body,  elected  by  the  National  Assembly  and  tasked  with  the  promotion  and 
protection  of  human  rights  and  fundamental  freedoms.  Second,  the  Commission  for 
Protection against Discrimination is a body that implements policies in the spheres of gender 
equality and non-discrimination.  

The  establishment  of  a  post-monitoring  mechanism  is  ongoing.  As  reported  in  the 
Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) report of October 2019155, the Government 
has  decided  to  establish  an  additional,  more  comprehensive  mechanism  for  domestic 
monitoring  centred  in  a  Coordination  and  Cooperation  Council  (‘post-monitoring  council’). 
The aim of the Council is set to be the assessment of Bulgaria’s progress in judicial reform, 
fight  against  corruption  and  organised  crime  in  an  independent,  transparent  and  objective 
manner.156  The  new  body  would  receive  information  from  a  broad  range  of  relevant 
institutions and would also include a Civic Council with representatives of civil society and 
professional  associations  of  the  judiciary.  The  activity  of  the  Council  would  start  once  the 

148  Council of Europe, Platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists. 
149  Mapping Media Freedom. https://mappingmediafreedom.ushahidi.io/posts/23231. On 17 March 2020, Slavi 
Angelov,  a  long-time  criminal  reporter  at  24Chasa  daily  and  currently  the  editor  in  chief  of  its  weekly 
edition - 168Chasa, was attacked and heavily beaten. Three people have been charged in connection with the 
assault. 

150  Council of Europe, Platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists. 
151  Mapping Media Freedom: Bulgaria. https://mappingmediafreedom.org/country-profiles/bulgaria/.  
152  2020 Media Pluralism Monitor. 
153  In  that  respect,  it  should  be  recalled  that,  taking  account  of  Council  of  Europe  recommendations,  a 
comprehensive legislative framework that enables journalists and other media actors to contribute to public 
debate  effectively  and  without  fear  is  recommended  by  the  Council  of  Europe.  Recommendation 
CM/REC(2016)4 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. 

154  Art. 87 of the Constitution: any member of the National Assembly or the Council of Ministers has the right 
to introduce a draft law. It is adopted by the National Assembly in two readings. The adopted draft law is 
sent  to  the  President  of  the  Republic  of  Bulgaria,  who  signs  a  decree  for  its  promulgation.  The  act  is 
promulgated in the State Gazette and enters into force three days after its publication, unless the act provides 
otherwise. See also the recent draft reform of the Constitution mentioned in footnote 40, which extended the 
right  of  legislative  initiative  also  to  the  Councils  for  the  judiciary.  However,  this  was  later  left  out  of  the 
draft. 

155  COM(2019)498, p.3. 
156  The Decree No. 21 of 14 February 2020 has amended the original entry into force of the Decree (No. 240 of 

the Council of Ministers of 2019) establishing the National Mechanism for Monitoring.  

18 

 
                                                 
CVM  comes  to  an  end.  The  Bulgarian  authorities  started  the  selection  process  for  the  so-
called  Civic  Council  that  gathers  NGOs  from  various  fields  related  to  the  functions  of  the 
Council. However, the result of the selection regarding civil society representatives has been 
cancelled and a new procedure has been launched.157 

The  use  of  public  consultation  and  impact  assessment  is  limited.  Bulgaria’s  regulatory 
process is considered to be lacking predictability and stability due to frequent changes of the 
legislation.  For  example  the  public  procurement  law  alone  was  amended  eleven  times  in 
2018.158  Furthermore,  the  Judicial  System  Act  (JSA),  adopted  in  2007,  has  already  been 
subject to 51 amendments.159 In addition, the ‘legal technique’ observed in the anti-corruption 
chapter with the amendment of legal acts through other legal acts bypasses the requirements 
for  public  consultation  and  impact  assessment.160  Moreover,  there  is  a  trend,  noticed  by 
stakeholders,  in  the  procedure  for  adopting  laws  in  which  amendments  introduced  between 
the first and second reading in the National Assembly can create significant changes without 
the relevant public debate.161 

A  state  of  emergency,  followed  by  a  new  emergency  regime,  were  used  to  face  the 
COVID-19 pandemic. On 13 March 2020, Parliament announced a state of emergency for 
the duration of one month162, which was later extended with another one month163, to tackle 
the  pandemic.  This  decision  gave  extensive  powers  to  the  Government  in  order  to  take  all 
necessary measures to deal with the emergency. On 12 May, an amendment to the Health Act 
was  adopted164  which  introduced  a  new  emergency  regime  (‘emergency  epidemic 
situation’).165 On 13 May, the Council of Ministers, on a proposal by the Minister of Health, 
decided to declare an emergency epidemic situation for the duration of one month, which was 
later  renewed  several  times  and  is  currently  declared  until  30  September.  This  new 
emergency regime was reviewed by the Constitutional Court166 which decided on 23 July that 
the regime is compliant with the Constitution.167 

157  On the 2 June 2020, the Minister of Justice cancelled the draw that determined the NGO dealing with anti-
corruption as part of the Civic Council. As a result of an appeal before the Supreme Administrative Court, 
the procedure for the draw of NGOs to the Civic Council is currently frozen.  

158  European Commission, Country Report Bulgaria 2020, SWD(2020) 501 final, p 57. 
159  Review,  inventory  and  cataloguing  of  legislative  initiatives  and  changes,  related  to  judicial  reform  in 

Bulgaria – Bulgarian Institute for Legal Initiatives Foundation.  

160  Study on the lawmaking activity of the 44th National Assembly of Bulgaria. 
161  A  survey  on  this  matter  has  been  conducted  under  the  project  "Administration  and  Civil  Society  – 
partnership  in  governance",  supported  through  the  ESF.  See  EUPACK  2019,  p  94  –  challenges:  unclear 
responsibilities in the interaction with the civic structures among civil servants and decision makers in the 
consultative  process;  absence  of  adequate  capacity  among  decision-makers  and  civil  servants  for  working 
with civic participation; insufficient administrative capacity for organising and maintaining the functioning 
of  the  consultative  structures;  lack  of  resources  for  the  activities  related  to  public  discussions  and 
consultations. 

162  Decision to declare state of emergency. https://www.parliament.bg/bg/desision/ID/157374.  
163  Decision to extend the state of emergency. https://www.parliament.bg/bg/desision/ID/157396. 
164  Law to amend and supplement the Health Act. https://www.parliament.bg/bg/laws/ID/157427. 
165  Art.  63  Health  Act.  According  to  this  new  regime,  the  Council  of  Ministers  could  declare  an  emergency 
epidemic situation for a certain period of time at the suggestion of the Minister of Health. This would allow 
some  of  the  measures  taken  under  the  state  of  emergency  to  continue  to  apply  and  new  ones  to  be 
introduced, despite the end of the state of emergency. 

166  On the request of the President of the Republic; Constitutional Court, Case 7/2020, 14 May 2020.  
167  Constitutional Court Decision 10/2020 of Case 7/2020, 23 July 2020.  

19 

 
                                                 
The  Ombudsman  is  now  an  A  accredited  body  in  accordance  with  the  UN  Global 
Alliance  of  National  Human  Rights  Institutions  (GANHRI).168  The  Ombudsman  is  a 
supreme  independent  constitutional  body  that  is  elected  publicly  and  transparently  by  the 
National  Assembly  for  a  period  of  5  years.  The  latest  amendments  to  the  Ombudsman  Act 
from 2018 vested in the institution the power to receive and deal with complaints and reports 
of violations of citizens’ rights and freedoms, concerning state and municipal authorities and 
their  administrations,  persons  entrusted  with  the  rendering  of  public  services,  as  well  as 
private  entities.  In  exercising  this  power,  the  Ombudsman  can  also  make  proposals  and 
recommendations for the promotion and protection of the citizens’ rights and freedoms from 
private  entities.169  In  addition  to  the  Ombudsman,  the  Commission  for  Protection  against 
Discrimination  is  an  independent  specialised  state  body  which  examines  complaints  and 
reports and issues related to discrimination. Financial and human resources issues have been 
underlined as shortcomings in both institutions.170  

The  new  draft  rules  on  increased  transparency  of  foreign  funding  for  NGOs  raise 
concerns. The already narrowed civic space171 in Bulgaria could be further affected in view 
of a new draft law tabled on 3 July 2020.172 This draft law would impose new obligations on 
non-profit legal persons which receive more than BGN 1000 (about EUR 500) from foreign 
donors  except  for  the  EU  itself.  The  draft  provides  that  directors  and  members  of  the 
governing bodies of the  organisations  would be  requested to  provide asset  declarations and 
that  this  information  will  be  stored  in  a  register.  Stakeholders  raised  concerns173  about  the 
draft  law,  including  as  regards  its  compliance  with  EU  law.  It  is  important  that  any  such 
envisaged amendment be in line with EU law requirements.174  

168  Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions (GANHRI), Sub-Committee on Accreditation (SCA), 

Accreditation Report – March 2019. 

169  More than 49 000 citizens and representatives of organisations received assistance from the Ombudsman in 
2019, and the number of completed checks on complaints and reports was 13 762. (2018 – 12 258). Crucial 
to  the  effect  of  the  Ombudsman’s  activity  as  a  public  defender  is  the  degree  of  implementation  of  the 
recommendations  as  a  result  of  checks  made  on  complaints  and  reports  from  citizens  -  for  2019  the 
implemented  and  partially  implemented  recommendations  of  the  Ombudsman  account  for  96%  of  overall 
recommendations. Input from Bulgaria for the 2020 Rule of Law Report. 

170  UN CESCR review of Bulgaria 2019 – state party report. 
171  See rating given by CIVICUS. Ratings are on a five-category scale defined as: open, narrowed, obstructed, 

repressed and closed. 

172  Draft law 054-01-60 - https://www.parliament.bg/bg/bills/ID/157496.  
173 Concerns raised by stakeholders in their opinions published on the  website of the Parliament as part of the 
process for enacting the law include limitations of the freedom of association and free movement of capital, 
as  well  as  the  publicity  of  the  register  which  could  also  result  from  implementing  acts  (see  contribution 
Bulgarian  Centre  for  Not-for-profit  Law,  Bulgarian  Donation  Forum,  Bulgarian  Helsinki  Committee),  - 
https://www.parliament.bg/bg/bills/ID/157496.  

174  Court of Justice of the European Union, judgment of 18 June 2020, Commission v. Hungary, C-78/18.   

20 

 
                                                 
Annex I: List of sources in alphabetical order.*  
* The list of contributions received in the context of the consultation for the 2020 Rule of Law report 
can be found at (COM website). 

Anti-Corruption  Commission  (2019),  2019  Annual  report  on  the  activity  of  the  Anti-corruption 

Commission for counteracting corruption and forfeiture of illegally acquired assets.  

Anti-Corruption Committee, Register of senior public office holders. https://register.caciaf.bg/.   

Anti-Corruption Fund, contribution for the 2020 Rule of Law Report. 

Anti-Corruption  Fund  and  Konrad  Adenauer  Stiftung  (2020),  Anti-corruption  institutions:  activity 

without visible results. https://acf.bg/en/godishen-monitoringov-doklad-na-akf-za-20-2/.     

Association of European Journalists (2017), Bulgaria: report on the state of journalism and freedom of 

speech in 2017. https://www.aej.org/page.asp?p_id=622.     

Bulgarian  Institute  for  Legal  Initiatives  Foundation  (2015-2017),  Media  monitoring  and  analysis  of 

attacks on courts during the period of 01/01/2015 – 01/07/2017. 

Bulgarian  Institute  for  Legal  Initiatives  Foundation  (2017-2019),  Media  monitoring  and  analysis  of 

attacks on courts during the period of 01/08/2017 – 30/11/2019. 

Bulgarian  Institute  for  Legal  Initiatives  Foundation  (2020),  Overview,  inventory  and  cataloging  of 
legislative  initiatives  and  changes  related  to  the  judicial  reform  in  Bulgaria.  http://www.bili-
bg.org/cdir/bili-bg.org/files/Анализ_1.5_Категоризация_на_данни_fin.pdf.  

Bulgarian Institute for Legal Initiatives Foundation contribution for the 2020 Rule of Law Report. 

Bulgarian Media Code of Ethics - http://mediaethics-bg.org/.  

Bulgarian Prisoners' Association for Rehabilitation contribution for the 2020 Rule of Law Report. 

Centre  for  Media  Pluralism  and  Media  Freedom  (2020),  2020  Media  pluralism  monitor. 

https://cmpf.eui.eu/media-pluralism-monitor/mpm-2020.  

CEPEJ (2020), Study on the functioning of the judicial systems in the EU Member States. 

CIVICUS monitor – Bulgaria. https://monitor.civicus.org/country/bulgaria/. 

Civil Liberties Union for Europe contribution for the 2020 Rule of Law Report. 

Constitutional Court of the Republic of Bulgaria (1993), Case No. 18/1993. 

Constitutional Court of the Republic of Bulgaria (2010), Decision No. 13/2010 on Case No. 12/2010.  

Constitutional Court of the Republic of Bulgaria (2019), Case No. 15/2019.  

Constitutional Court of the Republic of Bulgaria (2020), Decision 10/2020 on Case 7/2020 

Council  of  Europe,  Platform  to  promote  the  protection  of  journalism  and  safety  of  journalists: 

Bulgaria. https://www.coe.int/en/web/media-freedom/bulgaria.  

Council  of  Europe:  CCJE  Bureau  (2019),  Report  on  judicial  independence  and  impartiality  in  the 

Council of Europe member States.  

Council  of  Europe:  Commissioner  for  Human  Rights  of  the  Council  of  Europe  Dunja  Mijatović 
(2020), Report following her visit to Bulgaria from 25 to 29  November 2019 CommDH(2020)8. 
https://rm.coe.int/report-on-the-visit-to-bulgaria-from-25-to-29-november-2019-by-dunja-
m/16809cde16.  

Council  of  Europe:  Committee  of  Ministers  (2010),  Recommendation  CM/Rec(2010)12  of  the 
Committee of Ministers to member states on judges: independence, efficiency and responsibilities. 

Council  of  Europe:  Committee  of  Ministers  (2016),  Recommendation  CM/Rec(2016)4  of  the 
Committee of Ministers to member States on the protection of journalism and safety of journalists 
and other media actors.  

21 

 
Council of Europe: Committee of Ministers (2019), Interim resolution CM/ResDH(2019)367. 

Council  of  Europe:  Committee  of  Ministers  (2019),  Supervision  of  the  execution  of  the  European 

Court’s judgments CM/Notes/1362/H46-6. 

Council  of  Europe:  Venice  Commission  (2010),  Study  No.  494  /  2008  on  the  independence  of  the 

judicial system – part I: the independence of judges.  

Council  of  Europe:  Venice  Commission  (2017),  Opinion  no.  855  /  2016  on  the  judicial  system  act 

(CDL-AD(2017)018). 

Council  of  Europe:  Venice  Commission  (2019),  Opinion  on  draft  amendments  to  the  Criminal 
Procedure  Code  and  the  Judicial  System  Act  concerning  criminal  investigations  against  top 
magistrates (CDL-AD(2019)031). 

Directive  (EU)  2018/1808  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  14  November  2018 
amending  Directive  2010/13/EU  on  the  coordination  of  certain  provisions  laid  down  by  law, 
regulation  or  administrative  action  in  Member  States  concerning  the  provision  of  audiovisual 
media  services  (Audiovisual  Media  Services  Directive)  in  view  of  changing  market  realities  L 
303/69. 

Directorate-General  for  Communication  (2020),  Flash  Eurobarometer  482:  businesses’  attitudes 

towards corruption in the EU. 

Directorate-General for Communication (2020), Special Eurobarometer 502: corruption. 

ECtHR, 

judgment 

of 

5 

February 

2010, 

Kolevi 

v. 

Bulgaria 

ECLI:CE:ECHR:2009:1105JUD000110802. 

European  Centre  for  Press  &  Media  Freedom  (2020),  Mapping  Media  Freedom:  Bulgaria  – 
by  masked  men. 

attacked 

editor 

being 

after 

newspaper 
https://mappingmediafreedom.ushahidi.io/posts/23231.  

unconscious 

left 

European  Centre  for  Press  &  Media  Freedom  (2020),  Mapping  Media  Freedom:  Bulgaria. 

https://mappingmediafreedom.org/country-profiles/bulgaria/.  

European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (2018), Bulgaria: media ownership in a captured state. 

https://www.ecpmf.eu/monitor/fact-finding-mission/.  

European  Commission  (2019),  Commission  staff  working  document  Bulgaria:  technical  report 
accompanying  the  document  report  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament  and  the 
Council  on  Progress 
the  Cooperation  and  Verification  mechanism 
SWD/2019/392 final.  

in  Bulgaria  under 

European Commission (2019), EUPACK 2019: Public administration characteristics in Bulgaria (not 

published yet). 

European  Commission  (2019),  Report  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament  and  the 
Council on Progress in Bulgaria under the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism COM(2019) 
498. 

European  Commission  (2019),  Report  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament  and  the 
Council  assessing  the  extent  to  which  the  Member  States  have  taken  the  necessary  measures  in 
order to comply with Council Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA of 22 July 2003 on combating 
corruption in the private sector COM(2019) 355 final.  

European Commission (2019-2020), The EU justice scoreboard. 

European  Commission  (2019),  Commission  staff  working  document:  Country  report  Bulgaria  2019 
accompanying  the  document  communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament, 
the European Council, the Council, the European Central Bank and the Eurogroup 2020 European 
Semester:  Assessment  of  progress  on  structural  reforms,  prevention  and  correction  of 
macroeconomic imbalances, and results of in-depth reviews under Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 
SWD(2019) 1001 final/2.  

22 

 
European  Commission  (2020),  Commission  staff  working  document:  Country  report  Bulgaria  2020 
accompanying  the  document  communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament, 
the European Council, the Council, the European Central Bank and the Eurogroup 2020 European 
Semester:  Assessment  of  progress  on  structural  reforms,  prevention  and  correction  of 
macroeconomic imbalances, and results of in-depth reviews under Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 
SWD(2020) 501 final.  

European Network of Councils for the Judiciary (ENCJ) (2019): Independence and Accountability of 
judges,  2019.  https://pgwrk-

the  Judiciary  –  ENCJ  Survey  on 
websitemedia.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/production/pwk-web-encj2017-
p/Reports/Data%20ENCJ%202019%20Survey%20on%20the%20Independence%20of%20judges.
pdf.  

independence  of 

the 

European  Regulators  Group  for  Audiovisual  Media  Services  –  ERGA  (2016),  Report  on  the 
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-

independence 
market/en/news/erga-report-independence-national-regulatory-authorities.  

authorities. 

regulatory 

national 

of 

European Social Fund (2016-2020), Development of a Model for Optimization of the Judicial Map of 
Bulgarian  Courts  and  Prosecutor’s  Offices  and  of  a  Unified  Information  System  for  Courts. 
http://2020.eufunds.bg/en/1/0/Project/BasicData?contractId=IwpyI6fyBUY%3D&isHistoric=False
.  

Inspectorates created pursuant Art. 46 of the Public Administration Act (2019), 2019 Annual activity 

report.  

Government  of  the  Republic  of  Bulgaria  (2015),  National  strategy  for  prevention  and  countering 
2015-2020. 

Bulgaria 
corruption 
http://www.strategy.bg/StrategicDocuments/View.aspx?lang=bg-BG&Id=956.  

Republic 

the 

of 

in 

Government 

of 

the  Republic 

of  Bulgaria,  Public 

information 

access 

platform. 

https://pitay.government.bg/PDoiExt/.  

GRECO  (2020),  Fourth  evaluation  round  –  second  compliance  report  on  Bulgaria  corruption 

prevention in respect of members of Parliament, judges and prosecutor. 

Group  of  Bulgarian  lawyers  (informal  group  of  activists)  contribution  for  the  2020  Rule  of  Law 

Report. 

International Social Justice Commission contribution for the 2020 Rule of Law Report. 

Internal Security Directorate (2018), Report on the implementation of the anti-corruption plan 2018. 

Internal  Security  Directorate  (2019),  Report  on  the  implementation  of  the  measures  of  the  anti-

corruption plan 2019.  

Management  Program  of  the  Government  of  the  Republic  of  Bulgaria  for  the  period  2017-2021. 

www.strategy.bg/StrategicDocuments/View.aspx?lang=bg-BG&Id=1240.  

National Assembly of the Republic of Bulgaria (2020), minutes of the meeting of the parliamentary 
affairs. 

committee 
https://www.parliament.bg/bg/parliamentarycommittees/members/2577/steno/ID/6005.  

legal 

on 

National Centre for Parliamentary Research (2020), Research of the legislative activities of the 44th 
National  Assembly  of  Bulgaria.  http://www.strategy.bg/Publications/View.aspx?lang=bg-
BG&categoryId=&Id=301&y=&m=&d=.     

National Council for Journalistic Ethics, Media ethics. http://mediaethics-bg.org/.     

National Council on Anti-Corruption Policies (2019), Report on implementation of the national anti-

corruption strategy 2015 – 2020 for the period until 31 January 2019.  

Plenary of the Supreme Court of Cassation (2020), Request from the Plenary of the Supreme Court of 
Cassation  to  the  Constitutional  Court.  http://www.vks.bg/novini/2020-05-27-iskane-KC-ZSV-
2020.pdf.  

23 

 
of 

President  of  the  Republic  of  Bulgaria  (2020),  Statement  made  by  President  Rumen  Radev  on  the 
of  Emergency  Measures  Act. 
by  Parliament  State 

occasion 
https://m.president.bg/en/speeches-and-statements5437/izyavlenie-na-prezidenta-rumen-radev-po-
povod-prietiya-ot-parlamenta-zakon-za-merkite-i-deystviyata-po-vreme-na-izvanrednoto-
polozhenie.html.     

adopted 

the 

Reporters Without Borders World Press Freedom Index. https://rsf.org/en/ranking.  

Reuters 

Institute  and 

the  University  of  Oxford 

(2020),  Digital  news 

report  2020. 

http://www.digitalnewsreport.org/survey/2020/bulgaria-2020/.    

Supreme  Court  of  Cassation  (2019),  2019  Annual  report  of  the  activity  of  the  Supreme  Court  of 

Cassation. http://www.vks.bg/analizi-i-dokladi.html.     

Supreme Judicial  Council (2018-2019),  Rules  for  Determining  and  Disbursement  of  Supplementary 

Remuneration.  

Supreme  Judicial  Council  (2019),  Position  of 

the  Bulgarian  Supreme  Judicial  Council. 

http://www.vss.justice.bg/page/view/9671.  

Transparency International (2020), 2019 Corruption Perception Index.  

UN Economic and Social Council: Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2019), Sixth 
periodic  report  submitted  by  Bulgaria  under  articles  16  and  17  of  the  Covenant,  due  in  2017. 
https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=E%2fC.12
%2fBGR%2f6&Lang=en.     

UN  Human  Rights  Office  of  the  High  Commissioner:  Special  Rapporteur  on  the  independence  of 
judges and lawyers (2019), Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and 
lawyers.  

Vilnius  Institute  for  Policy  Analysis  (2020),  Journalistic  exemption  under  the  European  data 
https://vilniusinstitute.lt/wp-

protection 
content/uploads/2020/01/VIPA_Bitiukova_2020_v4_f.pdf.  

law. 

Virtual country visit to Bulgaria in the context of the 2020 Rule of Law Report. 

24 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex II: Country visit to Bulgaria 

The Commission services held virtual meetings in June 2020 with: 

Inspectorate to the Supreme Judicial Council  
Institute for Market Economics 

  Association of European Journalists  
  Association of Prosecutors  
  Bulgarian Institute for Legal Initiatives 
  Bulgarian Judges Association  
  Centre for the Study of Democracy 
  Commission for Anti-Corruption and Illegal Assets  Forfeiture  
  Council for Electronic Media  
  Supreme Court of Cassation 
 
 
  Media Democracy Bulgaria 
  Ministry of Justice 
  Ministry of the Interior 
  National Council on Anti-Corruption Policies 
  Office of the Deputy Prime Minister  
  Office of the Prosecutor General  
  Open Society Institute 
  Specialised Criminal Court 
  Supreme Judicial Council  
  Union of Publishers  

* The Commission also met the following organisations in a number of horizontal meetings:  

  Amnesty International 
  Civil Liberties Union for Europe 
  Civil Society Europe 
  Conference of European Churches  
  EuroCommerce 
  European Center for Not-for-Profit Law  
  European Centre for Press and Media Freedom 
  European Civic Forum  
  Free Press Unlimited 
  Front Line Defenders 
 
ILGA-Europe 
 
International Commission of Jurists 
 
International Federation for Human Rights  
 
International Press Institute  
  Lifelong learning Platform  
  Open Society Justice Initiative/Open Society European Policy Institute 
  Reporters without Borders  
  Transparency International EU  

25