COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 2020 Rule of Law Report Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary Accompanying the document COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 2020 Rule of Law Report The rule of law situation in the European Union
Date: 2020-09-30
Institutions: European Commission, Secretariat-General
Subjects: Hungary, administrative transparency, coronavirus disease, corruption, democracy, epidemic, independence of the judiciary, infringement of EU law, political rights, rule of law

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 30.9.2020  SWD(2020) 316 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 2020 Rule of Law Report  Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary Accompanying the document COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS  2020 Rule of Law Report       The rule of law situation in the European Union {COM(2020) 580 final} - {SWD(2020) 300 final} - {SWD(2020) 301 final} - {SWD(2020) 302 final} - {SWD(2020) 303 final} - {SWD(2020) 304 final} - {SWD(2020) 305 final} - {SWD(2020) 306 final} - {SWD(2020) 307 final} - {SWD(2020) 308 final} - {SWD(2020) 309 final} - {SWD(2020) 310 final} - {SWD(2020) 311 final} - {SWD(2020) 312 final} - {SWD(2020) 313 final} - {SWD(2020) 314 final} - {SWD(2020) 315 final} - {SWD(2020) 317 final} - {SWD(2020) 318 final} - {SWD(2020) 319 final} - {SWD(2020) 320 final} - {SWD(2020) 321 final} - {SWD(2020) 322 final} - {SWD(2020) 323 final} - {SWD(2020) 324 final} - {SWD(2020) 325 final} - {SWD(2020) 326 final}  
 
 
ABSTRACT 

Over the past years, judicial independence in Hungary has been raised by EU institutions as a 
source  of  concern,  including  in  the  Article  7(1)  TEU  procedure  initiated  by  the  European 
Parliament.  The  call  for  strengthening  judicial  independence,  made  in  the  context  of  the 
European Semester, remains to be addressed. In particular, the independent National Judicial 
Council  faces  challenges  in  counter-balancing  the  powers  of  the  President  of  the  National 
Office for the Judiciary in charge of the management of the courts. Developments related to 
the  Supreme  Court  (Kúria)  also  raise  concerns,  notably  its  decision  to  declare  unlawful  a 
request  for  preliminary  ruling  to  the  European  Court  of  Justice.  New  rules  allow  for 
appointment  to  the  Supreme  Court  of  members  of  the  Constitutional  Court,  elected  by 
Parliament,  outside the  normal  procedure, and lower the eligibility criteria for the Supreme 
Court President. As regards efficiency and quality, the justice system performs well in terms 
of the length of proceedings and has a high level of digitalisation. 

The  institutional  anti-corruption  framework  is  shared  among  different  bodies.  Deficient 
independent  control  mechanisms  and  tight  interconnections  between  politics  and  certain 
national  businesses  are  conducive  to  corruption.  When  serious  allegations  arise,  there  is  a 
systematic lack of determined action to investigate and prosecute corruption cases involving 
high-level officials or their immediate circle. This has been raised in the European Semester 
and by GRECO in view of the lack of commitment to comply with its recommendations. The 
verification of assets and interests declarations may be improved as regards systematic checks 
and independent oversight. Whilst the regulation of lobbying remains incomplete, corruption 
prevention  policies  have  focused  on  integrity  in  state  administration  and  law-enforcement 
agencies. The shrinking possibilities of civic oversight in the context of restrictions to media 
freedom, a hostile environment for civil society organisations and constant new challenges in 
the application of the transparency and access to public information rules further weaken the 
anti-corruption framework. 

The independence and effectiveness of the Media Council is at risk. Transparency of media 
ownership  is  not  fully  guaranteed.  Media  concentration  via  the  creation  of  the  Central 
European  Press  and  Media  Foundation  (KESMA)  conglomerate  increased  risks  to  media 
pluralism. Significant amounts of state advertising channelled to pro-government outlets have 
permitted  the  Government  to  exert  indirect  political  influence  over  the  media.  Independent 
media outlets face systematic obstruction and intimidation, while a trend of economic take-
over of such outlets raises additional concern.  

The transparency  and quality of the legislative process  is  a source of concern  as the use of 
public consultations and impact assessments has diminished. The new possibility for public 
authorities  to  challenge  final  court  decisions  in  the  Constitutional  Court raises  questions  of 
legal certainty. The weakening of independent institutions and the increased pressure on civil 
society further affect checks and balances. The Court of Justice found that the legislation on 
the transparency of foreign-funded civil  society  organisations is  incompatible with EU law. 
Legislative measures required to execute the judgment are under preparation.   

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I.  JUSTICE SYSTEM 

The structure of the Hungarian court system has been shaped by constitutional changes and 
regular  judicial  reforms  introduced  since  2011.  The  most  recent  reform  was  adopted  in 
December  2019.  Hungary  has  a  four-tier  court  system.  113  district  courts  operate  at  first 
instance,  while  20  regional  courts  hear  appeals  against  district  court  decisions  and  certain 
cases at first instance. Five regional appeal courts decide on appeals against decisions of the 
regional  courts.  The  main  role  of  the  Supreme  Court  (Kúria)  is  to  guarantee  the  uniform 
application  of  the  law.  The  President  of  the  National  Office  for  the  Judiciary  (NOJ)  is  an 
organ,  provided  for  by  the  Fundamental  Law  and  elected  by  Parliament,  tasked  with  the 
central  administration  of  the  courts.  The  National  Judicial  Council  is  an independent  body, 
which, according to the Fundamental Law, supervises the NOJ President and participates in 
the  administration  of  the  courts.  Judges  are  appointed  by  the  President  of  the  Republic 
following  a  recommendation  of  the  NOJ  President  based  on  a  ranking  of  candidates 
established  by  the  local  judicial  councils  (composed  of  judges  elected  by  their  peers).  The 
NOJ  President  cannot  deviate  from  this  ranking  without  the  prior  consent  of  the  National 
Judicial  Council.  The  Constitutional  Court  is  not  part  of  the  court  system,  and  reviews  the 
constitutionality  of  laws  and  judicial  decisions.  The  prosecution  service  is  an  independent 
institution  vested  with  powers  to  investigate  and  prosecute  crime.  The  Hungarian  Bar 
Association  and  the  regional  bar  associations  are  self-governing  public  bodies  representing 
the  interests  of  the  legal  profession,  laying  down  and  enforcing  professional  standards, 
including through disciplinary measures. 

Independence 

The National Judicial Council faces  difficulties in counter-balancing the powers of the 
President of the National Office for the Judiciary; the election of a new President of the 
National Office for the Judiciary may open the way for reinforced cooperation. The NOJ 
President  is  elected  by  Parliament1  and  is  entrusted  with  extensive  powers  relating  to  the 
administration of the court system. The NOJ President operates under the supervision of the 
National  Judicial  Council2.  However,  the  National  Judicial  Council  is  facing  a  series  of 
structural limitations that prevent it from exercising effective oversight regarding the actions 
of  the  NOJ  President.  In  particular,  it  has  no  right  to  be  consulted  on  legislative  proposals 
affecting the justice system3. It has a limited role as regards judicial appointments4, as well as 

1   The  NOJ  President  is  nominated  by  the  President  of  the  Republic  and  elected  by  Parliament  with  a  two 
thirds majority from among judges with at least five years’ experience as a judge for a period of nine years, 
without the possibility of re-election (see Hungary’s contribution to the Annual Rule of Law Report). 

2   The National Judicial Council is composed of the Kúria President ex officio and 14 judges-members (and 14 
substitute  members)  elected  by  their  peers  for  a  period  of  six  years  (see  Hungary’s  contribution  to  the 
Annual Rule of Law Report). 

3   In the legislative process the NOJ President represents the judiciary.  
4   Judicial applications are assessed on the basis of a points system established by Decree 7/2011 of 4 March 
2011, issued by the Minister of Justice and based on Act CLXII of 2011, which contains an exhaustive list of 
criteria to be taken into consideration in determining the ranking of applicants. The Minister of Justice can 
define the number of points to be awarded for these criteria. The assessment system awards points based on 
an  interview  and  certain  elements  of  the  application  file.  The  local  judicial  councils  (composed  of  judges 
elected  by  their  peers)  interview  the  applicants  and  rank  them  applying  the  points  system.  Following  an 
amendment to the Decree, on which the National Judicial Council was not consulted and which entered into 
force on 1 November 2017, the role of the local judicial councils has been reduced by decreasing the number 
of points awarded by them. 

2 

 
 
                                                 
the  appointment  of  court  presidents  and  other  court  managers5.  Furthermore,  the  National 
Judicial  Council  has  limited  resources  and  depends  on  the  NOJ  President  for  budgetary 
disbursements6.  The  absence  of  effective  control  over  the  NOJ  President  increases  the 
possibility of arbitrary decisions in the management of the judicial system7. In particular, the 
National Judicial Council criticised the previous NOJ President for having breached the law 
when  annulling  the  procedures  for  selecting  court  presidents  and  discretionarily  appointing 
ad  interim  court  presidents  without  the  approval  of  the  National  Judicial  Council8.  This 
situation led the National Judicial Council to formally request Parliament to remove the NOJ 
President9. The competent parliamentary committee examined that request and, in June 2019, 
Parliament  rejected it. The limited powers of the  National  Judicial  Council and the need to 
reinforce them were underlined by the Council of Europe10, the European Commission11 and 
stakeholders12.  On  9  July  2019,  in  the  context  of  the  European  Semester,  the  Council 
addressed  to  Hungary  a  recommendation  to  ‘strengthen  judicial  independence’,  noting  that 
the National Judicial Council faces increasing difficulties in counter-balancing the powers of 
the  NOJ  President13.  No  legislative  steps  have  been  taken  since  then  to  address  these 
structural  issues.  The  National  Judicial  Council  welcomed  the  election  of  a  new  NOJ 
President in December 2019, which may open the way for a reinforced cooperation with the 
National  Judicial  Council,  while  balancing  of  powers  can  be  achieved  with  legal  certainty 
only through a legislative reinforcement of the Council’s powers.  

Perceived  judicial  independence  is  average  among  the  general  public  and  very  low 
among  companies,  although  the 
level  of 
independence of courts and judges is perceived as average (48% ‘fairly or very good’) by the 
general population14, but very low (26% ‘fairly or very good’) by companies15. However, in 

improvement.  The 

latest  data  show 

5   Presidents and certain other managers of the regional courts and regional appeal courts are appointed by the 
NOJ President following a ranking based on a vote by the court concerned sitting as a full court by a secret 
ballot  (the  points  system  is  not  applicable).  The  NOJ  President  may  deviate  from  the  ranking  but  the 
appointment  of  a  candidate  who  did  not  receive  the  majority  of  votes  of  the  full  court  requires  the  prior 
consent of the National Judicial Council. 

6   The  National  Judicial  Council  determines  its  budget  and  makes  an  agreement  thereon  with  the  NOJ 
President. The budget of the National Judicial Council is defined separately within the budget of the NOJ. 
Although  the  National  Judicial  Council  has  its  own  budget,  it  lacks  legal  personality,  does  not  control  its 
own finances independently, lacks sufficient human resources in terms of staff (has only one staff member) 
and cannot decide to hire extra staff (European Network of Councils for the Judiciary’s contribution to the 
Annual Rule of Law Report). 

7   European Commission, 2019 Country Report Hungary, SWD(2019) 1016 final, p. 42. 
8   Resolutions 59/2018. (V.02.) OBT and 60/2018. (V. 02.) OBT. 
9   Resolution  34/2019.  (V.08.)  OBT.  English  translation  available  at  https://orszagosbiroitanacs.hu/?mdocs-

file=1150.  

10   GRECO  (2019),  Hungary:  Insufficient  progress  and  lack  of  transparency  hamper  fight  against  corruption; 
Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe (2019) Dunja Mijatović report following her visit 
to Hungary from 4 to 8 February 2019. 

11   European Commission, 2019 Country Report Hungary, SWD(2019) 1016 final, pp. 41-42. 
12   E.g. European Association of Judges (2019), Report on the fact-finding mission of the EAJ to Hungary.  
13   Council  Recommendation  of  9  July  2019  on  the  2019  National  Reform  Programme  of  Hungary  and 
delivering  a  Council  opinion  on  the  2019  Convergence  Programme  of  Hungary.  This  issue  was  also 
addressed  in  recital  27  of  Council  Recommendation  of  20  July  2020  on  the  2020  National  Reform 
Programme of Hungary and delivering a Council opinion on the 2020 Convergence Programme of Hungary. 
14   2020  EU  Justice  Scoreboard,  Figure  44.  The  level  of  perceived  judicial  independence  is  categorised  as 
follows: very low (below 30% of respondents perceive judicial independence as fairly good and very good); 
low (between 30-39%), average (between 40-59%), high (between 60-75%), very high (above 75%). 

15   2020 EU Justice Scoreboard, Figures 46 and 48. Main reasons among companies for the perceived lack of 
independence  according  to  Eurobarometer:  the  status  and  position  of  judges  do  not  sufficiently  guarantee 

3 

 
 
                                                 
2020  the  negative  trend  observed  for  a  number  of  years  has  turned,  with  both  indicators 
improving16. 

The  Kúria  has  declared  unlawful  an  order  for  preliminary  reference  to  the  European 
Court of Justice. Upon a motion by the Prosecutor General, the Kúria issued a judgment17 
on 10 September 2019, in which it held a preliminary reference by a District Court judge to 
the Court of Justice to be unlawful, considering the questions irrelevant for the case at hand. 
The Kúria judgment was of a declaratory nature and did not annul the decision to refer the 
case to the Court of Justice18. Nevertheless, in October 2019, the ad interim president of the 
Budapest Regional Court (Fővárosi Törvényszék), referring explicitly to the judgment of the 
Kúria,  initiated  disciplinary  proceedings  against  the  judge  who  issued  the  preliminary 
reference.  In  November  2019,  the  court  president  withdrew  his  motion.  The  fact  that  the 
Kúria  can,  in  the  context  of  an  extraordinary  judicial  remedy,  review  the  necessity  of 
preliminary references could interfere with the possibility of national courts to refer questions 
of interpretation of Union law to the Court of Justice and that disciplinary proceedings could 
be  initiated19,  could  discourage  individual  judges  from  making  requests  for  a  preliminary 
ruling20. 

Judges  and  lawyers  are  subject  to  negative  narratives  in  the  media21.  In  several  press 
statements  made  since  January  2020,  the  Government  and  pro-government  media  outlets 
have  criticised  certain  judicial  decisions,  including  those  releasing  convicts  on  parole, 
awarding compensation to Roma children segregated in schools22 and to inmates complaining 

their  independence  (17%),  interference  or  pressure  form  economic  or  other  specific  interests  (18%), 
interference or pressure from government and politicians (19%) (2020 EU Justice Scoreboard, Figure 47). 
16   Eurobarometer  data  (Figures  44  and  46,  2020  EU  Justice  Scoreboard);  according  to  the  World  Economic 
Forum  that  trend  continued  among  businesses  (2020  EU  Justice  Scoreboard,  Figure  48).  According  to  a 
recent survey covering 19 EU Member States, the overall perception (5.2/10) of independence of judges by 
lawyers  is  very  low.  (Independence  and  Accountability  of  the  Judiciary  –  ENCJ/CCBE  (2020)  Survey 
among lawyers on the independence of judges, 2018-2019, Figures 7, 9, 15, 16, 17). 

17   Bt.III.838/2019/11.  Sections  667  to  669  of  Act  XC  of  2017  on  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure  allow  the 
Kúria  to  review  in  criminal  cases  the  legality  of  final  judicial  decisions,  including  those  ordering  the 
submission of questions for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice. 

18   Case C-564/19 – IS, pending. 
19   According to the Act CLXII of 2011, the court president or the appointing authority have the right to request 
the  opening  of  disciplinary  proceedings.  The  NOJ  President  may  request  the  opening  of  disciplinary 
proceedings only against court managers he/she has appointed and against judges assigned to the NOJ. The 
designated disciplinary panel of the service court (‘szolgálati bíróság’) decides whether to open disciplinary 
proceedings,  refuse  to  open  disciplinary  proceedings,  or  order  a  preliminary  hearing.  The  president  and 
members of the service court are appointed by the National Judicial Council. The rules of procedure of the 
service court comprise the composition of the competent panels and the rules on case allocation. The rules of 
procedure  adopted  by  the  service  court  are  approved  and  published  by  the  National  Judicial  Council.  An 
elected judge member of the  National Judicial Council  may be subjected to disciplinary proceedings upon 
the consent of National Judicial Council (see Hungary’s contribution to the Annual Rule of Law Report). 
20   This effect could be amplified by the fact that as of 1 April 2020, lower level courts are required by law to 
explain  why  they  do  not  follow  the  interpretation  of  legal  provisions  given  by  the  Kúria  in  its  published 
decisions.  Such  deviation  is  a  ground  for  an  extraordinary  remedy  before  the  Kúria.  See  e.g.  Sections 
561(3)(g), 648(d), 649(6), 652(1) of Act XC of 2017 on the Code of Criminal Procedure. 

21   A survey conducted among judges in 2019 found that 40 % of them had experienced a lack of respect for 
their  independence  by  the  Government  and  the  media.  European  Network  of  Councils  for  the  Judiciary, 
Contribution to the online stakeholder consultation for the 2020 Rule of Law Report. The survey covered 21 
EU Member States. (European Network of Councils for the Judiciary, Independence and Accountability of 
the Judiciary – ENCJ (2020) Survey on the independence of judges, 2019, Figures 43 and 45.) 

22   Act LXXXVII of 2020, adopted by the Hungarian Parliament on 3 July 2020, amended Act CXC of 2011 on 
National  Public  Education  in  the  sense  that  in  case  of  segregation  in  school,  the  courts  may  award  moral 

4 

 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
judges26  and  other  stakeholders27  expressed  concerns  over 

about their detention conditions23. In February 2020, the Government announced its intention 
to  organise  a  ‘national  consultation’24  on  these  justice-related  issues.  The  bar  association25, 
the  association  of 
the 
Government’s  narrative,  arguing  that  it  could  undermine  public  trust  and  confidence  in  the 
justice  system.  Eventually,  the  consultation  was  abandoned.  In  September  2019,  in  the 
context  of  the  execution  of  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  judgment  Baka  v. 
Hungary28, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe has voiced concerns over 
the ‘chilling effect’ on the freedom of expression of judges and court presidents29. 

New  special  rules  on  judicial  appointments  to  the  Kúria  have  been  introduced.  The 
number  of  judicial  posts  in  the  Kúria  is  not  set  by  statute,  but  is  determined  by  the  NOJ 
President30. Under the normal procedure, judges are appointed to the Kúria by its President, 
following  a  call  for  applications,  on  the  basis  of  an  opinion  of  the  Kúria’s  competent 
department and of an assessment and ranking of candidates by the Kúria’s judicial council31. 
An  ‘omnibus’  legislation  introduced  in  December  201932  allows  members  of  the 
Constitutional Court, who are elected by Parliament, to request to be appointed as a judge33 
without  an  application  procedure.  Having  obtained  the  status  of  a  judge,  members  of  the 
Constitutional  Court  can  request  to  be  appointed  to  the  Kúria  after  the  termination  of  their 

damages in the form of educational or training services only, thereby excluding the possibility of awarding 
monetary damages. 

23   As a follow-up to the pilot judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 10 March 2015, Varga and 

others v. Hungary. 

24   The  ‘national  consultation’  is  a  tool  consisting  of  letters  sent  directly  to  every  Hungarian  household  ‘on 
behalf  of  the  Government  of  Hungary’,  accompanied  by  questionnaires  allowing  the  citizens  to  submit 
answers to sets of questions formulated by the Government and supported by a countrywide billboard and 
media campaign.  

25   Statement of the Presidium of the Hungarian Bar Association (21 January 2020). 
26   Statement of the Hungarian Association of Judges (MABIE) (10 March 2020). 
27   E.g. statement by Eötvös Károly Policy Institute (21 February 2020). 
28   Application  No.  20261/12.  The  case  concerned  the  premature  removal  of  the  former  President  of  the 
Supreme Court prompted by his views and criticisms on a planned major reform of the judicial system. The 
Grand  Chamber  found  that  ‘the  premature  termination  of  the  applicant’s  mandate  undoubtedly  had  a 
“chilling effect” in that it must have discouraged not only him but also other judges and court presidents in 
future from participating in public debate on legislative reforms affecting the judiciary and more generally 
on issues concerning the independence of the judiciary’ (para. 173). 

29   Decision  of  25  September  2019  of 

the  Committee  of  Ministers  of 

the  Council  of  Europe, 
CM/Del/Dec(2019)1355/H46-11.  According  to  the  Hungarian  Government,  no  further  cases  have  been 
communicated to the Government by the European Court of Human Rights where the applicants would have 
raised allegations related to their freedom of expression in the context of their independence as a judge. 
30   See  Section  76(4)(a)  of  Act  CLXI  of  2011.  Currently,  there  are  113  posts  (see  Decision  41.SZ/2020.  (III. 
24.) OBHE), 82 posts are occupied by judges of the  Kúria, three posts are occupied by judges seconded to 
the  Kúria.  Kúria  judges  are  assigned  to  departments  (‘kollégium’):  Criminal  Department  (17  judges), 
Administrative Department (25 judges) and Civil Department (40 judges). The number of judges assigned to 
the various departments is not fixed. Due to the retirement of judges, in 2020 there will be three vacancies in 
the Civil Department and five vacancies in the Criminal Department; in 2021 there will be one vacancy in 
the  Civil  Department,  two  vacancies  in  the  Criminal  Department  and  two  vacancies  in  the  Administrative 
Department. 

31   Ranking is based on the points system. The Kúria President may not appoint the candidate ranked second or 

third without the prior consent of the National Judicial Council. 

32   Act  CXXVII  of  2019  on  the  amendment  of  certain  Acts  in  relation  to  the  single-instance  administrative 

procedures of district offices. 

33   They  have  to  meet  the  general  eligibility  criteria  related  to  citizenship,  legal  capacity,  law  degree,  bar 
examination,  at  least  1  year  of  professional  experience,  aptitude  test,  no  criminal  record,  asset  declaration 
(Section  4  of  Act  CLXII  of  2011).  By  decisions  dated  26  June  2020  (published  on  3  July  2020),  the 
President of the Republic, upon their request, appointed eight members of the Constitutional Court as judges.  

5 

 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
mandate,  without  the  need  to  follow  the  normal  appointment  procedure.  As  a  result,  in 
practice,  the  election  by  Parliament  to  the  Constitutional  Court,  which  does  not  entail  the 
involvement of a body drawn in substantial part from the judiciary, can in itself lead to the 
appointment as a judge of the Kúria if requested by the judge concerned34. These legislative 
changes have de facto increased the role of Parliament in judicial appointments to the Kúria. 
Moreover,  the  Kúria  President  is  elected  by  Parliament  following  a  proposal  from  the 
President of the Republic, from among judges – not necessarily of the Kúria – with at least 
five  years’  experience  as  a  judge35.  As  of  1  January  2020,  rules  on  selecting  the  Kúria 
President  were  also  amended36  allowing  time  served  as  a  senior  legal  secretary37  at  the 
Constitutional Court or at an international court to be taken into account when calculating the 
‘experience  as  a  judge’.  This  widening  of  the  eligibility  criteria  increases  the  pool  of 
candidates  that  could  potentially  be  elected  as  Kúria  President,  increasing  the  discretion  of 
the President of the Republic in this regard.  

The  ‘omnibus’  legislation  introduced  structural  changes  to  the  existing  court  system 
seeking to make administrative justice work faster and more predictably.  District-court 
level  administrative  and  labour  courts  have  been  abolished.  As  of  1  April  2020, 
administrative  cases  at  first  instance  are  heard  by  eight  designated  regional  courts,  and  all 
requests for ordinary or extraordinary remedies are determined by the Kúria. The envisaged 
establishment of a separate administrative court system has been abandoned38. 

Judicial salaries have been increased since January 2020 and a system of bonuses is in 
place. Under the ‘omnibus’ legislation, judicial salaries will be raised by 60% over a period 
of  3  years.  The  increased  remuneration  of  judges  is  a  positive  development  as  salaries  of 
Hungarian  judges  were  amongst  the  lowest  in  the  EU39.  Such  an  increase  contributes  to 

34   According  to  the  Council  of  Europe  Recommendation,  where  the  constitutional  or  other  legal  provisions 
prescribe  that  the  head  of  state,  the  government  or  the  legislative  power  take  decisions  concerning  the 
selection and career of judges, an independent and competent authority drawn in substantial part  from the 
judiciary should be authorised to make recommendations or express opinions which the relevant appointing 
authority  follows  in  practice  (Committee  of  Ministers  of  the  Council  of  Europe  Recommendation 
CM/Rec(2010)12,  para.  47). See  also  Court  of  Justice  case  C-585/18,  C-624/18  and  C-625/18,  A.K.,  para. 
134. 

35   There is no call for applications. The President of the Republic proposes a candidate. The National Judicial 
Council  gives  a  non-binding  opinion,  following  a  personal  interview.  Parliament  votes  with  two-thirds 
majority. The next president is due to be elected in 2020 under the new rules. The  Kúria President may be 
removed  from  office  –  without  the  involvement  of  the  judiciary  –  by  Parliament  upon  a  proposal  by  the 
President  of  the  Republic,  without  the  possibility  of  judicial  review  (Sections  74,  115  and  116(1)  of  Act 
CLXI of 2011). 

36   Section 1 of Act XXIV of 2019. 
37   A senior legal secretary (‘főtanácsadó’ in Hungarian,‘référendaire’ in French) is a civil servant employed by 
the Office of the Constitutional Court and assigned to the cabinet of a member of the Constitutional Court, 
tasked with the drafting of decisions. 

38   In December 2018, the Hungarian Parliament – implementing the Seventh Amendment (28 June 2018) to the 
Fundamental  Law  –  adopted  two  laws  (Acts  CXXX  and  CXXXI  of  2018)  establishing  an  administrative 
court  system.  Concerns  as  regards  their  compliance  with  the  requirements  of  judicial  independence  were 
raised  by  numerous  actors  including  the  Venice  Commission  (Opinion  CDL-AD(2019)004)  and  the 
Commissioner  for  Human  Rights  of  the  Council  of  Europe  (2018),  Commissioner  calls  on  Hungary’s 
President  to  return  to  the  Parliament  the  legislative  package  on  administrative  courts  (statement  of  14 
December 2018). The planned reform  was  first fine-tuned  (Act XXIV of 2019, adopted on 1 April 2019), 
then stayed (Act LXI of 2019, adopted on 2 July 2019). Act CXXX of 2018 on administrative courts has not 
entered  into  force  but  has  not  been  repealed  either.  On  12 December  2019,  the  Eighth  Amendment  to  the 
Fundamental Law removed provisions stipulating the setting up of a separate administrative court system. 

39   Council of Europe (2018), European judicial systems - Efficiency and quality of justice, Table 3.20. 

6 

 
 
                                                 
enhancing  judicial  independence40.  However,  concerns41  have  been  raised  as  regards  the 
possibility  for  the  authorities  managing  the  courts  to  award  bonuses42  to  judges  on  a 
discretionary basis, without objective and transparent criteria43. According to the Council of 
Europe,  systems  making  judges’  core  remuneration  dependent  on  performance  should  be 
avoided as they could create difficulties for the independence of judges44. The impact of such 
a system on judicial independence is the subject-matter of a preliminary question referred to 
the Court of Justice45. 

While  a  number  of  aspects  related  to  the  organisation  of  the  prosecution  service  have 
been  addressed,  some  elements  still  raise  concerns.  In  November  2019,  the  Prosecutor 
General was re-elected by Parliament with a two-thirds majority, for a period of nine years46. 
The  prosecution  service  is  organised  in  a  strictly  hierarchical  structure47.  While  the 
independence of the prosecution service is  enshrined in  law48, certain  elements of the legal 
framework led GRECO to issue recommendations to review the rules for appointment of the 
Prosecutor General  in  order to  safeguard the office from  political  influence49. GRECO also 
recommended introducing strict criteria to guide and justify decisions to remove cases from 
subordinate  prosecutors,  and  called  for  the  review  of  how  disciplinary  proceedings50  are 

40   In accordance with the case-law of the Court of Justice, the receipt by members of the judiciary of a level of 
remuneration  commensurate  with  the  importance  of  the  functions  they  carry  out  constitutes  a  guarantee 
essential to judicial independence, see in particular judgment of the  Court of Justice of 27 February 2018, 
Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses,  C-64/16, para. 27, and judgment of the  Court of Justice of 7 
February 2019, Carlos Escribano Vindel, C-49/18, para. 66. 

41   E.g.  contributions  of  Amnesty  International  Hungary,  Hungarian  Civil  Liberties  Union  and  Hungarian 

Helsinki Committee to the Annual Rule of Law Report. 

42   Beyond the basic salary and allowances, judges may receive rewards and bonuses.  The NOJ President and 
the regional court presidents appointed by him have a wide margin of appreciation to confer on judges extra 
tasks entailing various rewards (Article 10 of Annex 2 to Directive 5/2013 (VI. 25.) OBH). The scheme of 
rewards  is  capable  of  significantly  increasing  the  income  of  certain  judges,  who  may  accumulate  rewards 
due  for  various  tasks.  Moreover,  the  NOJ  President  determines  the  average  ratio  of  normative  bonuses 
(‘normatív  jutalom’)  to  be  paid  from  the  unspent  budget  appropriation.  The  head  of  the  budgetary  entity 
(including  the  president  of  the  regional  court)  may  differentiate  between  employees  (including  judges 
working at a district court that belongs to the given regional court) (see Article 11 of Annex 2 to Directive 
5/2013 (VI.  25.)  OBH).  Regional  court  presidents  have  the  discretionary  power  to  give  higher  bonuses  to 
some judges whilst decreasing or denying such bonuses to other judges. 

43   On these criteria, see Venice Commission Report CDL-AD(2010)004, paras. 46 and 51; Venice Commission 

Opinion CDL-AD(2019)004, para. 80. 

44   Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12, para. 55. 
45   Case C-564/19 – IS, pending. 
46   The  Prosecutor  General  is  nominated  by  the  President  of  the  Republic  and  elected  by  Parliament,  from 

among prosecutors. 

47   The Prosecutor General can give instructions to prosecutors in individual cases, with no safeguards in place 
(Figure 55, 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard). The prosecutor concerned may request the Prosecutor General to 
provide a written confirmation of the instruction in an individual case. The prosecutor can explicitly deny the 
instruction,  if  it  would  constitute  a  criminal  or  an  administrative  offence  or  would  put  the  prosecutor  in 
danger, and if the prosecutor does not agree with the instruction, he/she can request the transfer of the case to 
another prosecutor and such a request cannot be rejected (Section 53 Act CLXIV of 2011).  

48   Act CLXIII of 2011 on the Prosecution Service of Hungary. 
49   GRECO  Fourth  Evaluation  Round  –  Evaluation  Report,  para.  177;  GRECO  Fourth  Evaluation  Round  – 
Interim  Compliance  Report,  para.  20.  A  minority  blocking  the  election  in  Parliament  of  a  successor  can 
maintain the Prosecutor General in office after the expiry of their mandate. 

50   GRECO  Fourth  Evaluation  Round  –  Evaluation  Report,  paras.  190  and  216;  GRECO  Fourth  Evaluation 
Round – Interim Compliance Report, paras. 24 and 34. GRECO recommended (recommendation xvii) that 
disciplinary proceedings in respect of prosecutors ‘be handled outside the immediate hierarchical structure of 
the  Prosecution  Service’.  To  meet  GRECO’s  recommendations,  as  of  January  2019  an  amendment 
introduced the position of a disciplinary commissioner tasked  with the examination of supposed breaches. 
Yet the superior prosecutor remains involved in disciplinary processes. The Prosecutor General decides on 

7 

 
 
                                                 
the  full 
handled.  While  most 
implementation  of  the  outstanding  recommendations  would  also  have  a  positive  impact  on 
the anti-corruption framework. 

  GRECO  recommendations  have  been  addressed51, 

Quality 

The digitalisation of the justice system is  overall high.  Hungary ranks very high when it 
comes  to  the  availability  of  electronic  means52,  as  regards  online  access  to  published 
judgments by the general public53. It also ranks high as regards arrangements for producing 
machine-readable  judicial  decisions,  although  judgments  are  not  modelled  according  a 
standard  that  would  enable  their  machine  readability54.  Moreover,  Hungary  has  very  good 
results  as  regards  the  promotion  of  and  incentives  for  using  alternative  dispute  resolution 
methods55. However, court fees remain high56, and there are concerns as regards the level of 
inclusiveness of the legal aid scheme57. Government measures in response to the COVID-19 
pandemic  had  an  impact  on  the  functioning  of  the  courts.  On  14  March  2020,  following  a 
proposal  by  the  NOJ  President,  the  Kúria  President  and  the  Prosecutor  General,  the 
Government ordered by Decree that the functioning of Hungarian courts be suspended, apart 
from  certain  urgent  cases,  for  an  undefined  period  of  time58.  However,  on  30  March  2020, 
that Decree became ineffective59. On 31 March 2020, the Government introduced changes to 
the procedural laws, aimed at facilitating the operation of the justice system during the ‘state 
of danger’60. 

Efficiency 

The efficiency in civil and administrative cases is high. According to the 2020 EU Justice 
Scoreboard,  Hungary  performs  very  well  as  regards  the  estimated  time  needed  to  resolve 
administrative cases at first instance and the number of pending administrative cases at first 
instance courts61. Hungary also performs well as regards the estimated time needed to resolve 

measures to revoke a distinction, to demote by paygrade or by rank or to dismiss. The Head of Unit (superior 
prosecutor) may adopt lighter measures (reprimand, censure) regarding a prosecutor under their supervision. 
Decisions  on  disciplinary  measures  are  open  to  appeal  before  a  labour  court  (Figure  53,  2020  EU  Justice 
Scoreboard).  

51   According to the Second Interim Compliance Report of the GRECO, as regards recommendations relating to 
the  prosecutions  service,  one  recommendation  (xvi)  remains  not  implemented  and  three  recommendations 
have  been  partially  implemented  (xiv,  xv  and  xvii).  As  regards  recommendation  xiv),  the  Hungarian 
authorities reconsidered the possibility to re-elect the Prosecutor General; GRECO was satisfied that the first 
part  of  recommendation  xiv)  had  been  duly  addressed  (GRECO  Fourth  Evaluation  Round  –  Interim 
Compliance Report, paras. 19-22). Also, recommendation xv) was partly implemented with the introduction 
of rules prescribing that a brief reason for the removal of a criminal or administrative case from a prosecutor 
must be indicated in the case file (GRECO Fourth Evaluation Round  – Interim Compliance Report, paras. 
23-26). As regards recommendation xvii), see footnote 50. 

52   Figure 27, 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
53   Figure 28, 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
54   Figure 29, 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
55   Figure 30, 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
56   Figure 25, 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
57   A person with an income half of the poverty threshold may not be eligible for legal aid. Figure 23, 2020 EU 

Justice Scoreboard. 

58   Government Decree 45/2020 of 14 March 2020.  
59   In accordance with Article 53(3) of the Fundamental Law. 
60   Government  Decree  74/2020  of  31  March  2020.  That  Decree  became  ineffective  on  18  June  2020,  in 

accordance with Article 53(4) of the Fundamental Law. 

61   Figures 8 and 15, 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard.  

8 

 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
litigious civil and commercial cases62. The new Codes of Civil Procedure63, of Administrative 
Court Procedure64 and of Criminal Procedure65 entered into force in 2018. These new rules 
could facilitate the hearing of civil and criminal  cases and judicial review of administrative 
decisions within a reasonable time66.  

Effective  remedies  in  cases  of  excessively  lengthy  proceedings  are  still  lacking.  The 
execution  of  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  judgment  Gazsó  v.  Hungary,  is  still 
ongoing and Hungary remains under enhanced supervision of the Committee of Ministers of 
the Council of Europe67. 

II.  ANTI-CORRUPTION FRAMEWORK 

The  competence  to  prevent,  investigate  and  prosecute  corruption  is  shared  among  different 
specialised  authorities.  The  coordination  of  anti-corruption  activities  in  Hungary  is  carried 
out by the National Protective Service (NVSZ) under the oversight of the Ministry of Interior. 
The investigation and prosecution of corruption in the public sector fall under the exclusive 
competence  of  the  Investigation  Division  of  the  Central  Chief  Prosecution  Office  of 
Investigation  and  five  regional  offices.  The  prosecution  service  is  supported  by  the 
investigative forces of the police and the National Protective Service. The State Audit Office 
has  competences  for  the  financial  management  of  public  funds  and  auditing  of  political 
parties. 

In the latest Corruption Perceptions Index by Transparency International, the country 
scores  44/100  and  ranks  19th  in  the  EU  and  70th  globally68.  Amongst  Hungarian 
respondents, 87% believe that corruption is widespread (EU average 71%) and 32% believe 
that  corruption  affects  their  daily  life  (EU  average  26%)69.  80%  of  companies  perceive 
corruption as widespread (EU average 63%) and 48% of companies believe that corruption is 
a  problem  when  doing  business  (EU  average  37%).  39%  of  people  consider  that  there  are 
enough  successful  prosecutions  to  deter  people  from  corrupt  practices  (EU  average  36%) 
while  19%  of  companies  believe  that  people  and  businesses  caught  for  bribing  a  senior 
official are appropriately punished (EU average 31%)70. 

62   Figure 7, 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard.  
63   Act CXXX of 2016. It is expected to accelerate civil proceedings by introducing a double-phase procedure 
before first-instance courts, composed of a trial phase preceded by a preparatory phase aimed at clarifying 
the scope of the case and fixing the claims of the parties. 

64   Act I of 2017. The most important provisions which are expected to contribute to the timely conclusion of 
administrative  proceedings  are  the  ones  relating  to  default  judgments  in  cases  when  the  administrative 
authorities fail to observe time-limits for their decisions. 

65   Act XC of 2017. At the trial phase, a preparatory hearing is held to fix the scope of the case and, in order to 
prevent delaying tactics, subsequently new motions for taking evidence can only be submitted in exceptional 
circumstances. 

66   Input from Hungary for the 2020 Rule of Law Report. 
67   In October 2018, the Government tabled in Parliament Bill T/2923. In September 2020, the Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted a third interim resolution ‘noting with profound disappointment 
that,  despite  their  own  undertakings  and  the  Committee’s  urgings  already  expressed  in  two  interim 
resolutions and a number of decisions, most recently in March 2020, the authorities have not submitted any 
kind of information that would allow the Committee to consider that progress has been made.’. See Interim 
Resolution CM/ResDH(2020)180. 

68   Transparency International (2019), Corruption Perceptions Index. 
69   Special Eurobarometer 502 (2020). 
70   Flash Eurobarometer 482 (2019).  

9 

 
 
                                                 
The  criminal  anti-corruption  legal  framework  is  largely  in  place.  The  Criminal  Code 
includes the relevant definitions of corruption and related offences and criminalises different 
forms  of  bribery  and  trading  in  influence,  embezzlement,  misappropriation  of  public  funds 
and abuse of public authority. In April 2020, a draft law was tabled in Parliament aimed at 
addressing the recommendations made by the OECD Working Group on Bribery71, namely to 
amend the definition of ‘foreign public official’ in order to clarify that it includes officials of 
foreign public enterprises. 

Anti-corruption competences are shared among different bodies. The National Protective 
Service under the Ministry of Interior is in charge of coordinating anti-corruption policies. As 
of  February  2019,  following  a  reform  of  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure,  criminal 
investigation  and  prosecution  of  corruption  in  the  public  sector  fall  under  the  exclusive 
competence  of  the  Investigation  Division  of  the  Central  Chief  Prosecution  Office  and  five 
regional  offices.  The  Division  investigates  complex  corruption  cases  committed  by  or 
involving persons enjoying immunity, foreign public officials, the President of the Republic, 
the  Prime  Minister,  members  of  the  Government,  and  high-ranking  officials  of  the  public 
security  authorities.  The  prosecution  service  is  supported  by  the  investigative  forces  of  the 
police  and  the  National  Protective  Service.  The  State  Audit  Office  also  plays  a  role  in  the 
implementation of anti-corruption policies, notably through its control functions on finances 
of  state  institutions  and  political  party  financing.  The  State  Audit  Office  also  carries  out 
regular national integrity surveys. 

While  there  is  prosecution  of  high-level  corruption  in  some  cases,  it  remains  very 
limited.  In  its  2018  Annual  Report,  the  Prosecutor  General’s  Office  published  corruption 
crime statistics for 2016-2018. According to the figures, the number of registered proceedings 
in corruption-related crimes has increased: 984 for 2016, 1123 for 2017 and 2046 for 2018. 
However, the number of convicted persons has remained almost the same: 250 in 2018, 254 
in  2017 and 351 in  201672. According to  the Prosecutor General’s Office, most corruption-
related cases involve public officials, typically tax and customs officials73. The fact that there 
had been no determined action to prosecute corruption involving high-level officials or their 
immediate circle  has  also  been addressed in  the  context  of the European  Semester74. While 
the  prosecution  service  has  launched  a  limited  number  of  corruption-related  investigations 
against members of Parliament from the ruling party, there has been no prosecution of high-
level government officials in recent years. 

Corruption  prevention  policies  in  Hungary  have  focused  on  integrity  in  state 
administration and law-enforcement agencies. Following the expiry of  the previous anti-
corruption programme in 2018, in June 2020, the Government  adopted75 a new programme 
covering  a  two-year  period  (2020-2022).  The  strategy  maintains  the  focus  of  previous 
strategic programmes on integrity in the public administration and contains actions related to 
strengthening  e-administration  and  automated  decision-making  to  prevent  corruption. 
Furthermore,  the  strategy  aims  at  increasing  the  efficiency  of  investigations,  assessing 

71   OECD (2019). 
72   Prosecutor General’s Office (2019).  
73   European Commission, 2020 Country Report Hungary, SWD(2020) 516 final, pp. 45-46. 
74   Council  Recommendation  of  9  July  2019  on  the  2019  National  Reform  Programme  of  Hungary  and 
delivering  a  Council  opinion  on  the  2019  Convergence  Programme  of  Hungary,  recital  16;  European 
Commission, 2019 Country Report Hungary, SWD(2019) 1016 final, p. 44. 

75   Government Decision 1328/2020 of 19 June 2020 on Mid-term National Anti-corruption Strategy for 2020-

2022 and the accompanying action plan. 

10 

 
 
                                                 
corruption risks and evaluating the legal framework as well as establishing internal controls 
in public administration and strengthening integrity measures. The integrity framework gives 
a central role to internal integrity advisors76 in public authorities. However, the strategic anti-
corruption  framework  does  not  include  actions  in  other  areas  relevant  for  corruption 
prevention, such as political party financing, asset disclosure, or regulation of lobbying and 
‘revolving  doors’.  It  also  does  not  address  risks  related  to  clientelism,  favouritism  and 
nepotism  in  high-level  public  administration  or  those  arising  from  the  interface  between 
businesses and political actors. According to the State Audit Office’s 2019 integrity survey, 
the  highest  level  of  risk  of  corruption  was  calculated  for  government  bodies  (50%),  local 
administrative  bodies  (51%)  and  higher  education  (50%).  During  the  period  2015-2019, 
Hungary  had  the  highest  number  of  OLAF  investigations  (43)  closed  with  a  financial 
recommendation among Member States77.  

The  verification  of  assets  and  interests  declarations  may  be  improved  as  regards 
systematic  checks  and  independent  oversight.  Hungary  has  an  extensive  asset  disclosure 
system.  The  system  in  place  requires  members  of  Parliament,  government  officials,  and 
public  officials  to  declare  their  assets  and  interests.  Asset  and  interest  declarations  of 
government members, as well as senior civil servants and parliamentarians are available on 
the  Internet78.  Nevertheless,  verifications  are  not  systematic  but  based  on  notifications  of 
suspicions. Verification is left to the employer of the public official, or to the Parliamentary 
Committee  of  Immunity  and  Credentials  Verifications  for  the  declarations  of  members  of 
Parliament  and  high-ranking  government  officials.  Suspicions  of  unjustified  increase  in 
wealth  may  lead  to  a  verification  procedure  conducted  by  the  National  Tax  and  Customs 
Authority.  However,  the  Tax  Authority  can  start  such  proceedings  only  if  investigative 
authorities  have  also  opened  criminal  inquiries,  which  restricts  the  room  for  independent 
verifications. The issue of effective supervision and enforcement of rules of conduct, conflict 
of 
to 
interests  and  asset  declarations  for  members  of  Parliament  was  subject 
recommendations by GRECO, the implementation of which is pending79. 

Regulation  of  lobbying  in  Hungary  is  incomplete  and  there  are  no  rules  in  place  to 
effectively  regulate  ‘revolving  doors’.  The  2010  dedicated  lobbying  legislation  has  been 
revised80, making it mandatory for public officials to disclose contacts with lobbyists. Public 
officials  are  obliged  to  inform  their  superior  in  writing  if  a  certain  meeting  with  lobbyists 

76   As  a  result  of  the  integrity  control  systems  introduced  by  a  Government  Decree  in  2013,  all  public 
institutions need to designate such an advisor. A dedicated university programme has been established with 
the  National  University  for  Public  Service  (NKE)  providing  training  and  qualifications  for  becoming 
integrity advisors. 

77   Financial recommendations are addressed by OLAF to the EU institutions or national authorities providing 
or managing EU funds to seek the recovery of the defrauded EU funds to the EU budget. OLAF’s financial 
recommendations in the two main areas of shared management (European Structural and Investment Funds 
and agriculture) from 2015-2019 amounted to 3.93% of the total payments to Hungary for the years 2015-
2019  (the  highest  of  any  Member  State,  with  the  EU-27  average  at  0.36%).  The  financial  impact  of  the 
irregularities detected by Hungary itself was 1.41%. (The OLAF Report 2019, Table 6). The indictment rate 
based on OLAF recommendations is 47% in Hungary, which is above the EU average (The OLAF Report 
2019, Table 7). 

78   Act No. XLIII of 2010 on central Government organs and on the standing of the members of Government 

and State secretaries. 

79   GRECO  Fourth  Evaluation  Round  –  Evaluation  Report.  In  December  2019,  Parliament  amended  Act 
XXXVI  of  2012  regulating  the  functioning  of  Parliament  and  the  status  of  its  members  as  of  1  February 
2020  aiming  to  implement  GRECO  recommendations  (see  Hungary’s  contribution  to  the  Annual  Rule  of 
Law Report).  

80   Government Decree 50/2013 of 25 February 2013.  

11 

 
 
                                                 
carries  risks  for  the  organisation’s  integrity.  The  superior  may  prohibit  the  meeting  or  may 
make  it  conditional  upon  the  presence  of  a  third  person.  However,  the  applicable  Decree 
regulates  only  certain  aspects  of  meetings  between  government  officials  and  lobbyists.  In 
particular, it does not provide for the mandatory registration of lobbyists or the obligation to 
disclose or report contacts with lobbyists to an independent control body, nor does it require 
civil servants to ask permission and report back on such contacts. GRECO noted the need to 
improve integrity standards and adopt  a  code of  conduct  for members of  Parliament  and to 
ensure  an  effective  supervision  and  enforcement  of  rules  of  conduct  and  conflicts  of 
interest81.  Hungary  lacks  specific  regulation  as  regards  the  prevention  of  ‘revolving  doors’. 
Although  both  the  Labour  Code82  and  a  special  Act83  on  public  officials  contain 
confidentiality clauses, they do not specify any cooling off period84. 

Hungary has specific legislation in place to protect whistle-blowers. The Whistle-blowers 
Protection  Act85  provides  anonymity  for  whistle-blowers  and  enables  the  submission  of 
complaints  electronically,  using  a  designated  reporting  channel,  which  is  operated  by  the 
Ombudsman  (‘Commissioner  for  Fundamental  Rights’)  (see  section  on  Other  Institutional 
Issues  related  to  Checks  and  Balances  below).  However,  the  Ombudsman  has  only  limited 
competence in relation to reports submitted to their office. In practice, the primary task of the 
Ombudsman  is  to  forward  the  reports  to  competent  authorities.  These  reports  are  not 
automatically transmitted to law enforcement authorities, and an administrative investigation 
is  carried  out  instead  first  by  the  integrity  advisor  of  the  institution  concerned.  Integrity 
advisors  report  directly  to  their  head  of  institution.  Either  upon  request  or  ex  officio,  the 
those  authorities  have  followed  up 
Ombudsman  may,  however,  examine  whether 
appropriately  on  the  reports.  The  public  interest  disclosures  are  investigated  by  the 
institutions concerned, and their answer containing the result of the investigation is uploaded 
to an electronic registry. 

Party financing in Hungary remains a concern. GRECO noted that while the registries of 
political  parties  are  transparent,  the  sources  of  party  income  and  the  length  of  election 
campaign periods lack clarity. Also as regards political parties receiving state subsidies, there 
is a need to have monitoring mechanisms in place86.  

III.  MEDIA PLURALISM 

Protection of media freedom and pluralism in Hungary87 is provided for in the Fundamental 
Law88, as well as in sectoral legislation (the Media Act89 and the Freedom of the Press Act90). 
The Freedom  of the Press  Act,  stipulates that  freedom  of the press  embodies independence 

81   GRECO Fourth Evaluation Round – Interim Compliance Report, para 39.  
82   Section 8(4) of Act I of 2012. 
83   Section 93(1)(g) of Act CXXV of 2018. 
84   Section  117(1)  of  Act  CXXV  of  2018  provides  that  the  Government  must  determine  the  sectors  and 
positions where a government official may not be employed after the termination of his/her public service. 
That provision remains to be implemented. 

85   Act CLXV of 2013. 
86   GRECO Third Evaluation Round - Second Addendum to the Second Compliance Report, para. 24. 
87   Between  2019  and  2020,  Hungary  fell  two  places  in  the  Reporters  without  Borders  World Press  Freedom 

Index, now registering at 89th position worldwide.  

88   Article IX (2) of the Fundamental Law stipulates that: ‘Hungary shall recognise and protect the freedom and 
diversity of the press and shall ensure the conditions for the free dissemination of information necessary for 
the formation of democratic public opinion’. 

89   Act CLXXXV of 2010 on Media Services and on the Mass Media. 
90   Act CIV of 2010 on the Freedom of the Press. 

12 

 
 
                                                 
from  the  State  and  from  any  and  all  organisations  and  interest  groups.  The  right  to  access 
public  information  is  recognised  by  the  Fundamental  Law  and  finds  expression  in  the 
Freedom  of  Information  Act91.  The  Media  Act  establishes  the  National  Media  and  Info-
communications Authority (the Media Authority), whose decision-making body is the Media 
Council92. 

Whilst the Media Authority has adequate resources, the independence and effectiveness 
of the Media Council is at risk. The Media Council is composed of a President93 and four 
members  elected  by  Parliament.  The  rules  on  nomination  are  designed  to  favour  political 
consensus  in  the  appointment  of  the  members  of  the  Media  Council94.  The  2020  Media 
Pluralism  Monitor  points  to  the  fact  that  in  practice  these  rules  have  not  prevented  the 
governing  party  from  nominating  all  five  members  of  the  Media  Council.  The  Monitor 
registers  medium  risk  (53%)  in  terms  of  the  independence  and  effectiveness  of  the  Media 
Council.  

The  Editors-in-Chief’s  Forum  Hungary  (Főszerkesztők  Fóruma)  is  an  industry  NGO 
established  in  2012.  It  gathers  editors  of  all  major  electronic,  print  and  online  media  in 
Hungary on a voluntary basis. Its main objectives include strengthening ethics in journalism 
education, preparing guidelines, fostering best practices in ethical journalism and increasing 
trust  in  media  and  formulating  media  self-regulation  procedures.  In  2015,  the  Forum  laid 
down the ethical standards and values of journalism such as impartiality, thoroughness, rules 
for obtaining  and handling information.  It  seeks  to  promote quality journalism  in  particular 
through prizes for journalists. 

The plurality of the media market is at high risk in Hungary. By virtue of a Government 
Decree95,  the  merger  of  more  than  470  government-friendly  media  outlets  through  the 
creation  of  the  ‘KESMA’96  media  conglomerate  in  November  2018  was  exempted  from 
scrutiny by Competition Authority97 and the Media Authority98 by declaring it ‘a merger of 
strategic  national  importance’  thereby  preventing  the  authorities  from  scrutinising  it.  By 
decision  dated  25  June  2020,  the  Constitutional  Court  rejected  an  application  lodged  by  a 
quarter  of 
the  Government  Decree.  The 
Constitutional Court  found  that  it  rests  solely  and  exclusively  within  the  prerogative  of  the 
Government to determine matters of ‘strategic national importance’, and that nothing in the 

the  members  of  Parliament  challenging 

91   Act CXII of 2011 on the Right to Informational Self-determination and on Freedom of Information. 
92   The  Media  Act  clearly  lays  down  the  objectives  of  the  Authority,  stipulating  that  it  is  ‘an  autonomous 
regulatory  agency  subordinated  solely  to  the  law’  (Section  109)  and  that  the  Media  Council  is  ‘an 
independent body of the Authority reporting to Parliament subject only to Hungarian law’ (Section 123).  

93   The President of the Media Council concurrently occupies the post of President of the Media Authority. 
94   Following  Venice  Commission  recommendations  (Opinion  CDL-AD(2015)015),  the  provisions  of  the 
Media Act relating to the appointment and dismissal of the chairperson and members of the Media Council 
were  amended  accordingly.  Section  124  of  the  Media  Act  requires  a  unanimous  decision  of  the  ad-hoc 
parliamentary committee in charge of  nominating candidates.  (The President of the Media Authority  is an 
ex-officio  candidate.)  The  nomination  committee  is  composed  of  one  Member  from  each  political  group; 
their  voting  power  reflects  the  size  of  the  political  group  they  represent.  If  the  nomination  committee  is 
unable to present four nominees within the prescribed time limit, it may nominate candidates with at least 
two-thirds of the weighted votes.  

95   Government Decree 229/2018 of 5 December 2018. 
96   Central European Press and Media Foundation. 
97   By  judgment  of  29 January  2020,  the  Budapest  Regional  Court  ruled  that  the  approval  of  the  merger  was 
unlawful due to the  fact that  the Competition  Authority  had not conducted any substantive scrutiny of the 
merger and ordered the latter to conduct such scrutiny. 

98   In accordance with Section 24/A of Act LVII of 1996 on the Prohibition of Unfair and Restrictive Market 

Practices. 

13 

 
 
                                                 
merger could  be read  as necessarily threatening  media pluralism  in  the  country.  An ad-hoc 
report99  of  the  Centre  for  Media  Pluralism  and  Media  Freedom  concluded  that  ‘the 
establishment  of  KESMA  via  the  merger  of  more  than  470  […] different  media  outlets  will 
exacerbate  the  overall  risk(s)’  to  media  pluralism  in  Hungary  across  several  key  indicators 
analysed  by  the  Media  Pluralism  Monitor,  including  journalists’  working  conditions, 
horizontal  and  cross-media  ownership  concentration  and  the  allocation  of  state  advertising. 
Specifically, analysing these developments from the prism of media authority independence 
from  political  and/or  economic  influence  and  governmental  ability  to  override  the  Media 
Authority,  the  report  found  that  ‘the  total  exclusion  of  scrutiny  by  the  Hungarian  media 
authority of an important operation such as KESMA […] represents an additional element of 
risk’ to  media pluralism  in  Hungary. Serious concerns have been voiced by  Hungarian and 
European media freedom organisations100 as well as civil society following the dismissal, on 
22 July 2020, of the editor-in-chief and the ensuing resignation of almost all journalists101 of 
Hungary’s most-widely read independent news media site, Index.hu. The concerns were also 
pointing  to  the  fact  that  Index.hu  might  follow  a  pattern  of  economic  takeover  of  the 
remaining  independent  news  media  sites  by  pro-government  businesspersons,  as  previously 
observed in the case of news media outlet Origo. 

Transparency of media ownership is not regulated in sector-specific legislation . Linear 
media  service  providers  must  notify  the  Media  Authority  about  their  (or  their  parent 
company’s)  direct  or  indirect  ownership  in  media  service  providers102.  The  Media  Act 
contains detailed rules for the prevention of media market concentration. However, the 2020 
Media  Pluralism  Monitor  considers  the  situation  with  regard  to  transparency  of  media 
ownership as one presenting high risk (75%).  

State  advertising  allows  the  Government  to  exert  indirect  political  influence  over  the 
media. According to the Media Pluralism Monitor, and as argued by key stakeholders103, the 
highest  risk  to  media  freedom  and  pluralism  in  Hungary  is  in  the  area  of  political 
independence  (82%).  The  Media  Pluralism  Monitor  finds  that  although  direct  political 
influence  and  control  is  not  widespread,  it  is  common  knowledge  that  indirect  influence  is 
exerted  over  the  media.  The  KESMA  conglomerate  referred  to  above  is  considered  a 
culmination of this process in terms of pro-government media. This has been exacerbated by 
the absence of legislation and transparency in the distribution of state advertising, leading the 
2020 Media Pluralism Monitor to score this indicator at the highest possible risk level (97%). 
The  2020  Media  Pluralism  Monitor  highlights  the  fact  that  in  2019,  the  share  of  state 
advertising  that  went  to  pro-government  outlets  in  the  newspaper  market  was  75%,  in  the 
television market 95%, in the online news market 90% and in the radio market 90%.  

99   Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom (2019). 
100  https://europeanjournalists.org/blog/2020/07/28/hungary-media-freedom-crackdown-our-letter-to-eu-leaders/ 
101  In a statement dated 24 July 2020, the journalists described the dismissal of their editor-in-chief as ‘an overt 
attempt  to  apply  pressure’.  Index.hu  (24  July  2020),  Editorial  board  of  Index  and  more  than  70  staff 
members resign. 

102  Section 42 of the Media Act. Basic information on company ownership is freely accessible on a Ministry of 
Justice  website.  Owners  of  any  company  are  obliged  to  register  their  companies  in  the  general  National 
System  of  Company  Information  and  Company  Registration  and  their  published  titles  with  the  Media 
Authority.  

103  International  Press  Institute  (IPI),  Article  19,  the  Committee  to  Protect  Journalists  (CPJ),  the  European 
Centre  for  Press  and  Media  Freedom  (ECPMF),  the  European  Federation  of  Journalists  (EFJ),  Free  Press 
Unlimited (FPU) and Reporters without Borders (RSF): Conclusions of the joint international press freedom 
mission to Hungary (3 December 2019). 

14 

 
 
                                                 
Public access to information is hindered. Classifying this area at ‘low risk’, the 2020 Media 
Pluralism  Monitor  points  out  that,  while  the  applicable  legislation  is  clear  and  courts104  tilt 
towards  granting  access  to  journalists  and  the  general  public,  court  judgments  overturning 
negative decisions of public bodies are often unenforceable in practice105. In 2016, the United 
Nations  Special  Rapporteur  on  human  rights  defenders  recommended  that  Hungary  review 
the  legal  provisions  related  to  freedom  of  information  and  data  protection  in  order  to 
guarantee free and uncontrolled access to public interest information106. This issue was also 
raised  by  a  country-specific  recommendation  in  the  context  of  the  2020  European 
Semester107.  The  Freedom  of  Information  Act  provides  that  any  ‘organ  performing  public 
duties’ must provide access to data of public interest under its control if so requested subject 
to  the  exceptions  stipulated  in  that  Act108.  While the  Freedom  of  Information  Act  has  been 
relatively  stable,  piecemeal  changes  to  other  sectoral  laws  have  continued,  corroding  the 
overall transparency and access-to-information framework109. In 2013, Hungary amended110 
the Freedom of Information Act in order to prevent ‘abusive’ information requests. In 2016, 
the  Government  issued  a  Decree111  which  empowers  public  institutions  to  require  the 
reimbursement of the costs incurred by the requests of access  to  public information  in  case 
replying to the request would entail additional work on the part of the public authority. With 
regard  to  journalists’  direct  access  to  public  events,  the  2020  Media  Pluralism  Monitor 
reports that barring journalists’ access to certain public events is an increasing phenomenon.  

Independent  media  outlets  face  systemic  obstruction  and  intimidation.  Mérték  Media 
Monitor  reported  that  based  on  revenue,  pro-government  media  controls  about  80%  of  the 
news media market and coverage of political content112. The small market share occupied by 
independent media is complemented by systemic obstruction and intimidation of independent 
journalists  and  media  outlets.  Research  conducted  by  the  Hungarian  Civil  Liberties  Union 
(TASZ) in 2019 and during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 points to ‘systemic obstruction 
of  the  work  of  the  independent  media’  by,  inter  alia,  ignoring  press  inquiries,  limiting 
physical  access  of  journalists  and  the  discrediting,  stigmatisation  and  intimidation  of 
sources113.  There  have  been  no  reports  of  physical  attacks  on  journalists  and  other  media 
for 
professionals. 

the  envisaged  sanctions 

imprisonment 

In  Hungary, 

is  among 

104  Between 2013 and2016, in over 70% of the 500 court cases regarding access to information, the courts ruled 

in favour of the data requestors (Kúria, 2018).  

105  The indicator on access to Government information is 4 on a scale of 10 (SGI, 2019).  
106  End of mission statement by Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders, Visit to Hungary 

8 - 16 February 2016. 

107  Council  Recommendation  of  20  July  2020  on  the  2020  National  Reform  Programme  of  Hungary  and 

delivering a Council opinion on the 2020 Convergence Programme of Hungary, recital 32. 

108  Proactive  disclosure  of  data  also  remains  a  challenge,  with  70%  of  municipalities  failing  to  publish  the 
minimum required information on  their  website (Budapest  Institute,  Corruption  Research Center Budapest 
(2019). 

109  European  Commission,  2020  Country  Report  Hungary,  SWD(2020)  516  final,  p.  46.  One  example  is  an 
amendment  to  the  law  on  foreign  representations  (Act  LIX  of  2019)  introducing  restrictions  on  access  to 
foreign investment data. This continues a trend started in 2012, which contributes to increased uncertainty 
about  the  interpretation  of  the  access  to  information  legislation.  On  19  May  2020,  the  Parliament  adopted 
Act XXIX of 2020; its Section 2(3) limits – for a period of 10 years – public access all contracts and other 
documents related to the implementation of the Budapest-Belgrade railway connection project. 

110  Act XCI of 2013 (‘Lex Átlátszó’). 
111  Government Decree 301/2016 of 30 September 2016. Out of the 300 complaints addressed by the National 
Authority  for  Data  Protection  and  Freedom  of  Information  in  2018,  about  10%  concerned  the  unjustified 
application of fees (National Authority for Data Protection and Freedom of Information (2019). 

112  Mérték Media Monitor (2019).  
113  Hungarian Civil Liberties Union (TASZ) (2020). 

15 

 
 
                                                 
defamation114.In  2019,  the  Council  of  Europe’s  Platform  to  promote  the  protection  of 
journalism  and  the  safety  of  journalists  published  two  alerts  concerning  Hungary  on 
restrictions  to  activities  of  journalists  in  Parliament115  and  a  smear  campaign  against  two 
Index.hu  reporters  in  pro-governmental  media,  far-right  media  and  by  means  of  posters, 
widely  considered  to  be  anti-Semitic,  which  appeared  in  Budapest.  In  the  same  year,  a 
weekly  pro-government  magazine  published  a  list  of  more  than  200  individuals,  among 
which  several  journalists,  that  were  labelled  ‘mercenaries’  of  George  Soros.  In  2020,  the 
Platform  published  four  alerts  concerning  the  ban  of  the  dissemination  of  Forbes  Hungary 
business  magazine116,  Government  instructions  to  Hungarian  State  media  staff  to  request 
permission before writing on a number of issues, a campaign of legal and other threats and 
intimidation  against  cartoonist  Gábor  Pápai,  following  the  publication  of  an  allegedly 
blasphemous cartoon and the Bill (which became law117 on 30 March 2020) which introduced 
the offence of spreading ‘false information’ on COVID-19 and sanctions of up to five years 
in  prison118.  Hungary  provided  detailed  replies  to  several  of  these  alerts.  As  to  the 
criminalisation  of  stating  or  spreading  false  information  related  to  the  pandemic,  the 
European Commission has stated that this raises concerns as regards legal certainty and may 
have a chilling effect on freedom of expression119. 

IV.  OTHER INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RELATED TO CHECKS AND BALANCES 

Hungary  is  a  parliamentary  republic  with  a  unicameral  Parliament  (National  Assembly). 
Parliament  –  inter  alia  –  adopts  and  amends120  the  Fundamental  Law  of  Hungary, 
legislates121,  elects  the  Prime  Minister,  and  elects  –  by  a  two-thirds  majority  –  the  most 
important  public  officials122  of  the  country.  The  President  of  the  Republic  is  elected  by 
Parliament.  There  are a  number of institutions tasked with  counter-balancing the powers of 
the legislature  and the  executive, including the  Constitutional  Court, the State Audit  Office 
and  the  Ombudsman  (‘Commissioner  for  Fundamental  Rights’).  Not  only  the  Government, 

114  Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom (2019), Decriminalisation of Defamation. 
115  On  21  October  2019,  the  Speaker  of  Parliament  introduced  rules  which  restrict  the  freedom  of  movement 

and activities of journalists working in both the Parliament building and the offices of Parliament.  

116  In  January  2020,  an  interim  relief  was  ordered  by  a  court  banning  the  dissemination  of  Forbes  Hungary 

business magazine invoking data protection rules. 

117  Act XII of 2020.  
118  E.g.  International  Press  Institute  (2020),  Hungary  seeks  power  to  jail  journalists  for  ‘false’  COVID-19 
coverage,  23  March  2020,  Human  Rights  Watch,  Hungary’s  Orban  Uses  Pandemic  to  Seize  Unlimited 
Power, 23 March 2020. 

119  Commission statement in the European Parliament plenary debate on emergency legislation in Hungary and 
its impact on the Rule of Law and fundamental rights (14 May 2020). Section 337(2) of the Criminal Code is 
still in force; with the termination of the ‘state of danger’ on 18 June 2020, the crime defined therein can no 
longer be committed. 

120  A two-thirds majority of all the members is required to adopt or amend the Fundamental Law (Article S(2) 

of the Fundamental Law). 

121  The  Fundamental  Law  provides  for  the  adoption  of  32  cardinal  laws  implementing  some  of  its  provisions 
and containing detailed rules on the functioning of key institutions or on the exercise of certain fundamental 
rights.  Cardinal  laws  may  be  adopted  or  amended  by  a  two-thirds  majority  of  the  members  of  Parliament 
present  (Article  T(4) of  the  Fundamental  Law).  The  Venice  Commission  has  criticised  Hungary  for  using 
cardinal acts beyond  what is strictly necessary, and even in respect of detailed legislation, which has been 
considered  questionable  from  a  democratic  perspective  as  it  makes  it  difficult  to  introduce  reforms  in  the 
future  (Opinion  CDL-AD(2012)009,  para.  47).  The  Government  argues  that  a  high  level  of  political 
consensus is needed to regulate the most important aspects of fundamental rights and the organisation of the 
State. 

122  The President of the Republic, the members and President of the Constitutional Court, the  Kúria President, 
the Prosecutor General, the NOJ President, the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioners for Fundamental 
Rights, the President of the State Audit Office, the President of the National Bank of Hungary. 

16 

 
 
                                                 
the  President  of  the  Republic  and  every  parliamentary  committee,  but  any  member  of 
Parliament may table a bill123. 

The  use  of  public  consultations  and  impact  assessments  has  diminished.  Hungarian 
legislation provides for the mandatory use of public consultation,  as well as  ex ante and  ex 
post  impact  assessments124.  In  practice,  the  consultation  and  impact  assessments  are  rather 
formal or symbolic125. Concerns relating to the involvement of the social partners and to the 
quality and predictability of policy-making have been raised in the context of the European 
Semester126.  Consultations  and  impact  assessments  have  been  recurrently  bypassed  by 
applying special legislative procedures, such as via urgent procedures or individual member’s 
bills, since the consultation and impact assessment requirements apply only to bills proposed 
by the Government127.  

On 11 March 2020, a ‘state of danger’128 was declared by the Government129 in response 
to  the  COVID-19  pandemic.  Its  duration  was  not  predefined  and  the  Government  had 
discretionary power to maintain it or to terminate it130. On 30 March 2020, Parliament passed 
a  new  law131  that  allowed  the  Government  to  set  aside  any  law  by  decree.  The  emergency 
powers granted appeared extensive, in light of the combined effect of broadly defined powers 
and the absence of a clear time limit. Certain emergency measures using those powers raised 
questions as regards their necessity and proportionality and interfered with business activities 
and the stability of the regulatory environment132. This issue was also addressed by a country-
specific recommendation in the context of the 2020 European Semester133, where the Council 
recommended that Hungary ‘ensure that any emergency measures be strictly proportionate, 
limited  in  time  and in  line  with  European  and  international  standards  and  do  not  interfere 
with business activities and the stability of the regulatory environment’. As of 18 June 2020, 
the  Government  terminated  the  ‘state  of  danger’134  and  declared  a  ‘state  of  public  health 

123  Article 6(1) of the Fundamental Law. 
124  Act CXXX of 2010 on Law-making, Act CXXXI of 2010 on Public Participation in Developing Legislation 
and  the  Minister  of  Justice  Decree  24/2011  of  9  August  2011  on  ex-ante  and  ex-post  regulatory  impact 
assessment. 

125  European  Commission,  2020  Country  Report  Hungary,  SWD(2020)  516  final,  p.  29.  The  main  tripartite 
body  for  social  dialogue  is  the  Permanent  Consultation  Forum  of  the  Private  Sector  and  the  Government 
(‘VKF’). Members of the Forum are selected by the Government and do not include some of the traditional 
trade unions and employers’ organisations. 

126  Council  Recommendation  of  20  July  2020  on  the  2020  National  Reform  Programme  of  Hungary  and 

delivering a Council opinion on the 2020 Convergence Programme of Hungary, recital 28.  

127  See  Council  Recommendation  of  20  July  2020  on  the  2020  National  Reform  Programme  of  Hungary  and 
delivering  a  Council  opinion  on  the  2020  Convergence  Programme  of  Hungary,  recital  28.  In  2019,  only 
very few documents were published on the Government’s designated website (National Authority for Data 
Protection and Freedom of Information (2019), p. 129.). 

128  Article 53(1) of the Fundamental Law. 
129  Government Decree 40/2020 of 11 March 2020. 
130  Article 54(3) of the Fundamental Law. 
131  Act  XII  of  2020  implementing  Article  53(2)  of  the  Fundamental  Law  that  allows  the  Government  to  set 
aside laws by decree. The new Act provided that the extraordinary powers of the Government may only be 
exercised  insofar  as  those  are  necessary  and  proportionate  to  the  purpose  of  preventing,  tackling  and 
eliminating the COVID-19 outbreak and preventing and combating its detrimental effects. 

132  Council  Recommendation  of  20  July  2020  on  the  2020  National  Reform  Programme  of  Hungary  and 
delivering  a  Council  opinion  on  the  2020  Convergence  Programme  of  Hungary,  recital  27.  See  also  the 
Venice Commission Report CDL-AD(2020)014, in particular paras. 6-16. 

133  Council  Recommendation  of  20  July  2020  on  the  2020  National  Reform  Programme  of  Hungary  and 

delivering a Council opinion on the 2020 Convergence Programme of Hungary. 

134  Government Decree 282/2020 of 17 June 2020. The concrete measures taken by the Government lasted until 

the termination of the ‘state of danger’.  

17 

 
 
                                                 
emergency’ until 18 December 2020135. The applicability of some of the emergency measures 
were  extended  beyond  the  ‘state  of  danger’136.  Certain  emergency  measures  have  been 
challenged  before  the  Constitutional  Court137.  In  July  2020,  the  Constitutional  Court 
dismissed138 a motion to review an emergency measure139 issued during the ‘state of danger’, 
invoking the exclusion of its competence in taxation and budgetary matters140. 

New rules on the constitutional complaint procedure were introduced by the ‘omnibus’ 
legislation  in  December  2019.  As  a  result  of  this  legislative  reform,  administrative 
authorities may challenge before the Constitutional Court a judicial decision that has already 
become  final,  if  it  violates  their  rights  and  curtails  their  powers  under  the  Fundamental 
Law141.  Such  a  procedural  arrangement  raises  questions  as  regards  the  principle  of  legal 
certainty142.  

While the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights was accredited with ‘A’ status, its re-
accreditation  was  deferred.  In  October  2019,  the  UN  Sub-Committee  on  Accreditation 
(‘SCA’) considered that the information provided as regards the steps taken to respond to a 
number of recommendations and concerns was insufficient143. The SCA was of the view that 
the  selection  process144  is  not  sufficiently  broad  and  transparent145  and  that  the  information 
provided by the Commissioner did not demonstrate adequate efforts in addressing all human 
rights issues, nor had it spoken out in a manner that promotes and protects all human rights. 
This  was  raised  in  particular  as  regards  the  position  taken  by  the  Commissioner  on  the 
‘Foreign Funded Organisations Act’ (see below). The SCA also recommended advocating for 
adequate  funding.  As  of  May  2020,  a  new  law  on  the  status  and  remuneration  of  the 
Commissioner’s  staff146  provides  for  a  30%  average  pay  rise.  Moreover,  in  2020,  the 

135  Government Decree 283/2020 of 17 June 2020. 
136  Act  LVIII  of  2020.  For  instance,  Section  162  extended  until  15  August  2020  the  latest  the  Government 
control over the publicly traded KARTONPACK Nyrt ordered by Government Decree 128/2020 of 17 April 
2020. 

137  E.g. Government Decrees 135 and 136/2020 of 17 April 2020 containing rules on special economic zones 
and appointing such a zone in the City of Göd, and Government Decree 179/2020 of 4 May 2020 suspending 
the application of certain provisions of the GDPR; these cases are pending before the Constitutional Court. 
On 14 July 2020, the Constitutional Court rejected the motion challenging Government Decree 47/2020 of 
18  March  2020  allowing  employers  and  employees  to  agree  on  departing  from  provisions  of  the  Labour 
Code  (Order  II/887/2020);  the  Constitutional  Court  argued  that  the  Government  Decree  is  no  longer 
applicable. 

138  Decision 3234/2020. (VII. 1.) AB. 
139  Government  Decree  92/2020  of  6  April  2020  removing  vehicle  registration  tax  revenue  from  the 

municipalities. 

140  Article  37(4)  of  the  Fundamental  Law.  That  limitation  gave  rise  to  concerns  expressed  by  the  Venice 

Commission (Opinion CDL-AD(2012)009, para 38). 

141  Section 27 of  Act  CLI of 2011. The possibility  for public authorities  to challenge a  final judicial decision 
before the Constitutional Court was first recognised in Decision 23/2018. (XII. 28.) AB of the Constitutional 
Court  quashing  a  judgment  of  the  Kúria  which  had  found  unlawful  a  decision  of  the  Hungarian  National 
Bank acting as a financial supervisor authority. 

142  See also Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, para. 

16; Venice Commission Report CDL-AD(2010)004, para. 67; Opinion CDL-AD(2017)031, para. 54. 

143  United  Nations  (2019).  For  instance,  in  2016,  the  United  Nations  Special  Rapporteur  on  human  rights 
defenders  recommended  that  Hungary  strengthen  the  role  and  independence  of  the  Commissioner  and 
reinforce the financial autonomy of his office; consult the Commissioner on legislative processes and ensure 
adequate implementation of his recommendations. 

144  Act CXI of 2011. 
145  The SCA noted that the selection process does not require the advertisement of vacancies; establish clear and 
uniform merit criteria on which candidates are assessed; specify the process for achieving broad consultation 
and/or participation in the application, screening, selection and appointment process. 

146  Act CVII of 2019. 

18 

 
 
                                                 
Commissioner took over the responsibilities of the Independent Police Complaints Board147. 
Concerns have been raised as regards the independence of a number of institutions and their 
capacity to function as counter-weight to the Government’s powers148. 

Civil  society  remains  under  pressure,  especially  when  taking  a  critical  stance  towards 
the Government. In June 2020, the Court of Justice found that the Hungarian legislation149 
on  the  transparency  of  foreign-funded  civil  society  organisations,  adopted  in  June  2017,  is 
incompatible  with  free  movement  of  capital  as  well  as  with  the  right  to  freedom  of 
association  and  the  rights  to  protection  of  private  life  and  personal  data  enshrined  in  the 
Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights150.  Legislative  measures  required  to  execute  the  Court  of 
Justice  judgment  are  under  preparation.  In  November  2019,  the  Commission  referred 
Hungary to the Court of Justice151 in relation to a piece of legislation152 (labelled ‘Stop Soros’ 
by the Government) that criminalised the organisation of assistance offered by any person on 
behalf  of  national,  international  and  non-governmental  organisations  to  people  wishing  to 
apply for asylum. In June 2018, the Venice Commission and the OSCE ODIHR published a 
Joint Opinion, concluding that the provisions examined infringe upon the right to freedom of 
association and expression and should be repealed153. Another law, introducing a special 25% 
immigration  tax  applicable  to  financial  support  to  organisations  carrying  out  ‘activities 
facilitating  immigration’,  was  criticised  by  the  Venice  Commission  and  OSCE  ODIHR154. 
Moreover,  hostile  rhetoric  used  by  the  Government  and  pro-government  media  hinders 
constructive  cooperation  with  civil  society  organisations.  Civic  space  in  Hungary  is  rated 
‘obstructed’155. It is important that the applicable legal framework and the political and public 
environment take account of Council of Europe recommendations relating to protection and 
promotion of civil society space156. 

147  Section 145 of Act CIX of 2019. 
148  Transparency International contribution for the 2020 Rule of Law Report. 
149  Act LXXVI of 2017 on the Transparency of Organisations which receive Support from Abroad. Under that 
law,  civil  organisations  receiving  donations  from  abroad  have  to  register  with  the  Hungarian  courts  as  an 
‘organisation in receipt of support from abroad’ where the amount of the donations sent to them from other 
Member States or from third countries over the course of a year exceeds a set threshold. When registering, 
they  must  also  indicate,  inter  alia,  the  name  of  the  donors  whose  support  reached  or  exceeded  the  sum  of 
HUF  500 000  (approximately  €1 400)  and  the  exact  amount  of  the  support.  That  information  is  then 
published on a  freely accessible public electronic platform. Furthermore, the civil organisations concerned 
must state, on their homepage and in all their publications, that they are an ‘organisation in receipt of support 
from abroad’. 

150  Judgment of the Court of Justice of 18 June 2020, Commission v. Hungary, C-78/18. 
151  Case of the Court of Justice C-821/19, pending. 
152  Act VI of 2018. Subsequently, the Constitutional Court emphasised in its decision No. 3/2019. (III. 7.) AB 
that  the  wording  of  the  criminal  offence  under  Section  353/A  of  the  Criminal  Code  does  not  refer  to  the 
prohibition of the activities of the humanitarian organisations. 

153  Venice Commission and OSCE ODIHR Joint Opinion (CDL-AD(2018)013). 
154  ‘the  special  tax  on  immigration  constitutes  an  unjustified  interference  with  the  rights  to  freedom  of 
expression and of association of the NGOs affected.  The imposition of this special tax will have a chilling 
effect on the exercise of fundamental rights and on individuals and organisations who defend these rights or 
support their defence financially. It will deter potential donors from supporting these NGOs and put more 
hardship  on  civil  society  engaged  in  legitimate  human  rights’  activities.’  Venice  Commission  and  OSCE 
ODIHR Joint Opinion (CDL-AD(2018)035). 

155  Rating by CIVICUS; ratings are on a five-category scale defined as: open, narrowed, obstructed, repressed 
and closed. The ‘obstructed’ rating is typically given to countries where civic space is heavily contested by 
power  holders,  who  impose  a  combination  of  legal  and  practical  constraints  on  the  full  enjoyment  of 
fundamental rights.  

156  Recommendation CM/Rec(2018)11 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. 

19 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
Annex I: List of sources in alphabetical order* 

* The list of contributions received in the context of the consultation for the 2020 Rule of Law report 

can be found at (COM website). 

Bertelsmann 

Stiftung 

(2019), 

Sustainable  Governance 

Indicators. 

https://www.sgi-

network.org/2019/Governance/Executive_Capacity/Evidence-based_Instruments.  

Budapest  Institute,  Corruption  Research  Center  Budapest  (2019),  Transparency  and  Integrity:  the 
Online  Presence  of  Hungarian  Municipalities  –  Analysis  of  Urban  Municiaplities’  websites  in 
Hungary. http://www.crcb.eu/?p=1799.  

Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom (2019), Assessing certain recent developments in the 
the  Media  Pluralism  Monitor. 

Hungarian  media  market 
https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/79196553-5c39-11ea-8b81-01aa75ed71a1.  

the  prism  of 

through 

Centre  for  Media  Pluralism  and  Media  Freedom  (2019),  Decriminalisation  of  Defamation. 
https://cmpf.eui.eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/decriminalisation-of-defamation_Infographic.pdf.  

Centre  for  Media  Pluralism  and  Media  Freedom  (2020),  Media  Pluralism  Monitor  2020. 

https://cmpf.eui.eu/media-pluralism-monitor/mpm-2020.  

CEPEJ (2018), European judicial systems  - Efficiency and quality of justice, CEPEJ STUDIES No. 

26, 2018 Edition (2016 data). https://rm.coe.int/rapport-avec-couv-18-09-2018-en/16808def9c.  

CIVICUS, Monitor tracking civic space: Hungary. https://monitor.civicus.org/country/hungary/.    

Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe (2018), Commissioner calls on Hungary’s 
President to return to the Parliament the legislative package on administrative courts (statement of 
14 December 2018). https://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/-/commissioner-calls-on-hungary-s-
president-to-return-to-the-parliament-the-legislative-package-on-administrative-courts.  

Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe (2019) Dunja Mijatović report following 
to  8  February  2019  –  Strasbourg,  21  May  2019. 

her  visit 
https://rm.coe.int/report-on-the-visit-to-hungary-from-4-to-8-february-2019-by-dunja-
mija/1680942f0d.  

to  Hungary 

from  4 

Council  of  Europe,  Platform  to  promote  the  protection  of  journalism  and  safety  of  journalists  – 

Hungary. https://www.coe.int/en/web/media-freedom/hungary.   

Council  of  Europe:  Committee  of  Ministers  (2010),  Recommendation  CM/Rec(2010)12  of  the 
Committee of Ministers to member states on judges: independence, efficiency and responsibilities. 

Council  of  Europe:  Committee  of  Ministers  (2018),  Recommendation  CM/Rec(2018)11  of  the 
Committee of Ministers to member States on the need to strengthen the protection and promotion of 
civil society space in Europe.  

Council  of  Europe:  Committee  of  Ministers  (2019),  Decision  of  25  September  2019, 

CM/Del/Dec(2019)1355/H46-11. 

Council of Europe: Committee of Ministers (2020), Interim Resolution CM/ResDH(2020)180. 

Council of Europe: Venice Commission (2012), Hungary  –  Opinion on Act CLXIII of 2011 on the 
Prosecution Service and Act CLXIV of 2011 on the Status of the Prosecutor General, Prosecutors 
and other Prosecution Employees and the Prosecution Career of Hungary, CDL-AD(2012)008.  

Council of Europe: Venice Commission (2010), Report on the Independence of the Judicial System 

Part I: The Independence of Judges, CDL-AD(2010)004. 

Council  of  Europe:  Venice  Commission  (2012),  Hungary  –  Opinion  on  Act  CLI  of  2011  on  the 

Constitutional Court of Hungary, CDL-AD(2012)009.  

Council  of  Europe:  Venice  Commission  (2012),  Hungary  –  Opinion  on  Act  CLXII  of  2011  on  the 
Legal  Status  and  Remuneration  of  Judges  and  Act  CLXI  of  2011  on  the  Organisation  and 
Administration of Courts of Hungary, CDL-AD(2012)001. 

20 

 
 
Council  of  Europe:  Venice  Commission  (2012),  Hungary  –  Opinion  on  the  Cardinal  Acts  on  the 
Judiciary  that  were  amended  following  the  adoption  of  Opinion  CDL-AD(2012)001  on  Hungary, 
CDL-AD(2012)020.  

Council  of  Europe:  Venice  Commission  (2015),  Hungary  –  Opinion  on  Media  Legislation  (Act 
CLXXXV on Media Services and on the Mass Media, Act CIV on the Freedom of the Press, and 
the  Legislation  on  Taxation  of  Advertisement  Revenues  of  Mass  Media)  of  Hungary,  CDL-
AD(2015)015.  

Council of Europe: Venice Commission (2017), Poland – Opinion on the Draft Act amending the Act 
on the National Council of the Judiciary; on the Draft Act amending the Act on the Supreme Court, 
proposed by the President of Poland, and on the Act on the Organisation of Ordinary Courts, CDL-
AD(2017)031. 

Council  of  Europe:  Venice  Commission  (2019),  Hungary  –  Opinion  on  the  law  on  administrative 
courts and the law on the entry into force of the law on administrative courts and certain transitional 
rules, CDL-AD(2019)004. 

Council of Europe: Venice Commission (2020), Report  - Respect for democracy, human rights and 
the rule of law during states of emergency: reflections - taken note of by the Venice Commission on 
19 June 2020 by a written procedure replacing the 123rd plenary session, CDL-AD(2020)014.  

Council  of  Europe:  Venice  Commission  and  Organization  for  Security  and  Co-operation  in  Europe 
Office  for  Democratic  Institutions  and  Human  Rights  (OSCE  ODIHR)  (2018),  Hungary  –  Joint 
Opinion  on the  Provisions of  the  so-called “Stop  Soros”  draft  Legislative  Package  which  directly 
affect  NGOs  (in  particular  Draft  Article  353A  of  the  Criminal  Code  on  Facilitating  Illegal 
Migration), CDL-AD(2018)013. 

Council  of  Europe:  Venice  Commission  and  Organization  for  Security  and  Co-operation  in  Europe 
Office  for  Democratic  Institutions  and  Human  Rights  (OSCE  ODIHR)  (2018),  Hungary  –  Joint 
Opinion  on  Section  253  on  the  special  immigration  tax  of  Act  XLI  of  20  July  2018  amending 
certain tax laws and other related laws and on the immigration tax, CDL-AD(2018)035-e. 

Council  of  the  European  Union  (2019),  Council  Recommendation  of  9  July  2019  on  the  2019 
National  Reform  Programme  of  Hungary  and  delivering  a  Council  opinion  on  the  2019 
Convergence Programme of Hungary, OJ C 301, 5.9.2019. 

Council  of  the  European  Union  (2020),  Council  Recommendation  of  20  July  2020  on  the  2020 
National  Reform  Programme  of  Hungary  and  delivering  a  Council  opinion  on  the  2020 
Convergence Programme of Hungary, OJ C 282/17, 26.8.2020. 

Court  of  Justice  of  the  European  Union,  judgement  of  27  February  2018,  Associação  Sindical  dos 

Juízes Portugueses, C-64/16. 

Court of Justice of the European Union, judgement of 7 February 2019, Carlos Escribano Vindel, C-

49/18. 

Court  of  Justice  of  the  European  Union,  judgement  of  19  November  2019,  AK,  joined  cases 

C‑ 585/18, C‑ 624/18 and C‑ 625/18. 

Court  of  Justice  of  the  European  Union,  judgement  of  18  June  2020,  Commission  v.  Hungary,  C-

78/18. 

Court of Justice of the European Union, case C-564/19 – IS, pending. 

Court of Justice of the European Union,  case C-821/19, pending. 

Directorate-General  for  Communication  (2019),  Flash  Eurobarometer  482:  businesses’  attitudes 

towards corruption in the EU. 

Directorate-General for Communication (2020), Special Eurobarometer 502: corruption. 

21 

 
 
Eötvös 

Károly 

Policy 

Institute 

(21 

February 

2020), 

statement. 

http://www.ekint.org/alkotmanyossag/2020-02-21/csend-vagy-kialtas-hallgathatnak-e-a-birak-ha-
megtamadjak-a-biroi-fuggetlenseget.  

European Association of Judges (2019), Report on the fact-finding mission of the EAJ to Hungary, 3 
May  2019.  https://www.iaj-uim.org/iuw/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Report-on-the-fact-finding-
mission-of-a-delegation-of-the-EAJ-to-Hungary.pdf.  

European Commission (2020), The OLAF Report 2019. 

European Commission (2020), The EU Justice Scoreboard 2020.  

European Commission, 2019 Country Report Hungary, SWD(2019) 1016 final.  

European Commission, 2020 Country Report Hungary, SWD(2020) 516 final.  

European  Court  of  Human  Rights,  judgment  of  10  March  2015,  Varga  and  others  v.  Hungary, 

application nos. 14097/12, 45135/12, 73712/12, 34001/13, 44055/13, and 64586/13. 

European  Federation  of  Journalists  (2020),  Hungary  media  freedom  crackdown:  our  letter  to  EU 
https://europeanjournalists.org/blog/2020/07/28/hungary-media-freedom-crackdown-our-

leaders. 
letter-to-eu-leaders/.   

European Network of Councils for the Judiciary (ENCJ) (2019): Independence and Accountability of 
judges,  2019.  https://pgwrk-

the  Judiciary  –  ENCJ  Survey  on 
websitemedia.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/production/pwk-web-encj2017-
p/Reports/Data%20ENCJ%202019%20Survey%20on%20the%20Independence%20of%20judges.p
df.  

independence  of 

the 

European Network of Councils for the Judiciary (ENCJ) and Council of Bars and Law Societies of 
Europe (CCBE) (2019): Independence and Accountability of the Judiciary  – ENCJ/CCBE Survey 
among lawyers on the independence of judges, 2018-2019. https://pgwrk-websitemedia.s3.eu-west-
1.amazonaws.com/production/pwk-web-encj2017-
p/Reports/ENCJ%20Survey%20on%20Independence%20Accountability%20of%20the%20Judiciar
y%20among%20lawyers%20%202019.pdf.    

GRECO (2015), Fourth Evaluation Round – evaluation report on Hungary on Corruption prevention 

in respect of members of parliament, judges and prosecutors. 

GRECO (2017), Third Evaluation Round - Second Addendum to the Second Compliance Report on 

Hungary on Incriminations (ETS 173 and 191, GPC 2) - Transparency of Party Funding. 

GRECO  (2018),  Fourth  Evaluation  Round  –  Interim  compliance  report  on  Hungary  on  Corruption 

prevention in respect of members of parliament, judges and prosecutors. 

GRECO  (2019),  ‘Hungary:  Insufficient  progress  and  lack  of  transparency  hamper  fight  against 
corruption’ (1 March 2019). https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/-/hungary-insufficient-progress-and-
lack-of-transparency-hamper-fight-against-corruption.  

Human Rights Watch (23 March 2020), Hungary’s Orban Uses Pandemic to Seize Unlimited Power. 

https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/03/23/hungarys-orban-uses-pandemic-seize-unlimited-power.  

Hungarian  Association 

of 

Judges 

(‘MABIE’) 

(10  March 

2020), 

Statement. 

http://mabie.hu/index.php/1526-a-birok-neveben.  

Hungarian  Bar  Association 

the 
https://jogaszvilag.hu/napi/a-magyar-ugyvedi-kamara-visszautasitja-az-ugyvedeket-ert-
tamadasokat/.  

Statement 

January 

2020), 

(21 

of 

Presidium. 

Hungarian Civil Liberties Union (2020), Research on the obstruction of the work of journalists during 
2020). 

coronavirus 

Hungary 

April 

(15 

the 
https://tasz.hu/a/files/coronavirus_press_research.pdf.  

pandemic 

in 

Hungarian Government (2020), Input from Hungary for the 2020 Rule of Law Report. 

22 

 
 
Index.hu  (24  July  2020),  Editorial  board  of  Index  and  more  than  70  staff  members  resign. 

https://index.hu/english/2020/07/24/editorial_board_of_index_resigns.  

International  Press  Institute  (2020),  Hungary  seeks  power  to  jail  journalists  for  ‘false’  COVID-19 
coverage  (23  March  2020).  https://ipi.media/hungary-seeks-power-to-jail-journalists-for-false-
covid-19-coverage/.  

International  Press  Institute  (IPI),  Article  19,  the  Committee  to  Protect  Journalists  (CPJ),  the 
European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF), the  European Federation of Journalists 
(EFJ),  Free  Press  Unlimited  (FPU)  and  Reporters  Without  Borders  (RSF)  (2019):  Conclusions  of 
the 
(3  December  2019). 
https://www.ecpmf.eu/fact-finding-mission-hungary-2019/.  

international  press 

freedom  mission 

to  Hungary 

joint 

Kúria  (2018),  A  “közérdekű  adatok  kiadásával  kapcsolatos  perek”  bírósági  gyakorlata  tárgykörére 
felállított  joggyakorlat-elemző  csoport  összefoglaló  véleménye,  3  December  2018).  https://kuria-
birosag.hu/sites/default/files/joggyak/osszefoglalo_velemeny_adatvedelem.pdf.  

Mérték  Media  Monitor 

(2019): 

Fidesz-friendly  media 

dominate 

everywhere. 

https://mertek.eu/en/2019/05/02/fidesz-friendly-media-dominate-
everywhere/https://mertek.eu/en/2019/05/02/fidesz-friendly-media-dominate-everywhere/.  

National  Authority  for  Data  Protection  and  Freedom  of  Information  (2019),  Annual  Report  of  the 
National  Authority  for  Data  Protection  and  Freedom  of  Information  2018,  National  Authority  for 
Data  Protection  and  Freedom  of  Information,  Budapest.  https://naih.hu/files/NAIH-Annual-report-
2018-v190830.pdf.  

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2019), Implementing the OECD 

Antibribery Convention. Phase 4 Report Hungary. 

Prosecutor 

General’s 

Office 

(2019), 

Criminality 

and 

Criminal 

Justice. 

http://ugyeszseg.hu/pdf/statisztika/Criminality_and_CriminalJustice_2009_2018.pdf.  

Reporters  Without  Borders  (2020),  ‘Hungary:  Urgent  EU  response  needed  to  leading  independent 
news  site’s  demise.’  (28  July  2020).  https://rsf.org/en/news/hungary-urgent-eu-response-needed-
leading-independent-news-sites-demise.  

Reporters Without Borders (2020), World Press Freedom Index. https://rsf.org/en/ranking.    

Transparency International (2019), Corruption Perceptions Index. 

United  Nations  (2019),  Global  Alliance  of  National  Human  Rights  Institutions  (GANHRI),  Sub-

Committee on Accreditation (SCA), Accreditation Report – October 2019.  

United Nations Special Rapporteur on human rights defenders (2016), End of mission statement by 
Special  Rapporteur  on  the situation  of  human  rights defenders,  Visit  to  Hungary  8  -  16  February 
2016. 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=17048&LangID=E.   

Virtual country visit to Hungary in the context of the 2020 Rule of Law Report. 

23 

 
 
 
 
 
Annex II: Country visit to Hungary 

The Commission services held virtual meetings in June 2020 with: 

  Amnesty International Hungary 
  Committee on Legislation of the National Assembly 
  Corruption Research Center Budapest 
  Editors-in-Chief’s Forum (Főszerkesztők Fóruma) 
  Eötvös Károly Policy Institute 
  Hungarian Bar Association  
  Hungarian Civil Liberties Union  
  Hungarian Helsinki Committee  
  K-Monitor 
  Mérték Media Monitor  
  Ministry of Interior  
  Ministry of Justice  
  National Authority for Data Protection and Freedom of Information  
  National Judicial Council 
  National Media and Infocommunications Authority  
  National Office for the Judiciary  
  Office of the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights  
  Office of the Constitutional Court  
  Prosecution Service of Hungary  
  State Audit Office  
  Supreme Court (Kúria) 
  Transparency International Hungary 

* The Commission also met the following organisations in a number of horizontal meetings:  

  Amnesty International 
  Civil Liberties Union for Europe 
  Civil Society Europe 
  Conference of European Churches  
  EuroCommerce 
  European Center for Not-for-Profit Law  
  European Centre for Press and Media Freedom 
  European Civic Forum  
  Free Press Unlimited 
  Front Line Defenders 
 
ILGA-Europe 
 
International Commission of Jurists 
 
International Federation for Human Rights  
 
International Press Institute  
  Lifelong learning Platform  
  Open Society Justice Initiative/Open Society European Policy Institute 
  Reporters without Borders  
  Transparency International EU  

24