COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 2020 Rule of Law Report Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Spain Accompanying the document COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 2020 Rule of Law Report The rule of law situation in the European Union
Date: 2020-09-30
Institutions: European Commission, Secretariat-General
Subjects: Spain, administrative transparency, coronavirus disease, corruption, democracy, epidemic, independence of the judiciary, infringement of EU law, political rights, rule of law

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 30.9.2020  SWD(2020) 308 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 2020 Rule of Law Report Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Spain Accompanying the document COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS  2020 Rule of Law Report      The rule of law situation in the European Union  {COM(2020) 580 final} - {SWD(2020) 300 final} - {SWD(2020) 301 final} - {SWD(2020) 302 final} - {SWD(2020) 303 final} - {SWD(2020) 304 final} - {SWD(2020) 305 final} - {SWD(2020) 306 final} - {SWD(2020) 307 final} - {SWD(2020) 309 final} - {SWD(2020) 310 final} - {SWD(2020) 311 final} - {SWD(2020) 312 final} - {SWD(2020) 313 final} - {SWD(2020) 314 final} - {SWD(2020) 315 final} - {SWD(2020) 316 final} - {SWD(2020) 317 final} - {SWD(2020) 318 final} - {SWD(2020) 319 final} - {SWD(2020) 320 final} - {SWD(2020) 321 final} - {SWD(2020) 322 final} - {SWD(2020) 323 final} - {SWD(2020) 324 final} - {SWD(2020) 325 final} - {SWD(2020) 326 final}  
 
 
ABSTRACT 

The Spanish  justice system  is  facing challenges concerning its efficiency, with  increasingly 
lengthy court proceedings. To address this issue, a new Code of Criminal Procedure aiming at 
accelerating criminal proceedings is in preparation, as well as a draft law on procedural and 
technological measures. The use of electronic means is well established in the justice system 
and  further  improvements  are  being  implemented,  while  certain  issues  remain,  especially 
regarding the interoperability among the systems used in different regions of the country. The 
situation  of  the  Judicial  Council  is  another  challenge,  in  particular  given  that  its  new 
members have not yet been appointed. The relation between the Prosecutor General and the 
executive  is  subject  to  discussion,  in  particular  the  regime  of  the  appointment  and  term  of 
office of the Prosecutor General, as well as the registration of the communications with the 
Minister of Justice. 

Spain  has  strengthened  its  anticorruption  framework  in  recent  years  both  on  the  preventive 
and  repressive  dimensions.  While  Spain  has  no  overarching  anticorruption  strategy,  the 
National  Strategy  against  Serious  and  Organised  Crime,  adopted  in  February  2019,  has  the 
objective to improve investigative capacity and access to financial databases and to improve 
inter-agency  cooperation.  Although  the  Criminal  Code  and  Criminal  Procedure  Code  were 
revised in February 2019, new draft legislation amending the Code of Criminal Procedure is 
being prepared. As a result, Spain has put in place an improved legal framework for integrity 
in  the  public  sector,  strengthening  the  integrity  mechanisms  in  Parliament,  as  well  as 
reinforcing the regime of asset disclosure, conflict  of interest  and incompatibilities of high-
ranking  officials  in  the  central  state  administration.  An  extended  statute  of  limitations  now 
exists  for  serious  offences,  and  corruption-related  crimes  can  be  sanctioned  more  severely, 
including  with  a  longer  period  of  disqualification  from  public  office.  Legislative  changes 
concerning  lobbying  and  strengthening  whistle-blower  protection,  and  an  omnibus  anti-
corruption bill have been proposed but not yet adopted. A new ethical code for members of 
Parliament  was  adopted  in  April  2019,  establishing  a  Parliamentary  Office  of  Conflicts  of 
Interests to oversee its implementation. 

The Constitution enshrines the rights to freedom of expression and media freedom, as well as 
the  right  to  information.  While  the  television  and  radio  sectors  are  subject  to  reinforced 
ownership  transparency  requirements,  this  is  not  the  case  for  the  print  media  sector.  The 
information available in the companies’ registry (‘registro mercantil’) is the same as for any 
other kind of company in Spain and is difficult to understand for the general public. Concerns 
were  raised  about  new  legislation  on  public  security,  allegedly  restricting  the  freedom  of 
information and the freedom of expression. 

The  process  for  enacting  laws  foresees  guarantees  of  transparency  and  the  involvement  of 
stakeholders,  in  particular  through  public  consultations.  The  transparency  framework 
continues to be implemented and all Spanish regions now have their own legal framework in 
this area. The Government’s legislative initiative and its right to issue decree-laws are subject 
to  the  control  of  Parliament  and  of  the  Constitutional  Court.  The  Ombudsman  has  an 
extensive mandate, which it can exercise in defence of citizens’ rights. The Government has 
been developing open  government  policies with  the aim of further involving citizens in  the 
development of public policies. 

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I.  JUSTICE SYSTEM  

The  Spanish  judicial  system  is  composed  of  courts  of  general  jurisdiction1  and  specialised 
courts2, and is  structured  in  accordance with  the territorial organisation of the country. The 
Supreme Court is the highest judicial body in all areas of law. The Constitutional Court has 
jurisdiction  over  constitutional  matters  as  well  as  individual  applications  concerning  due 
respect  for  fundamental  rights.  The  General  Council  of  the  Judiciary,  established  by  the 
Spanish Constitution, is the body of judicial self-governance, and ensures the independence 
of  courts  and  judges3.  As  such,  it  does  not  form  part  of  the  judiciary  itself.  It  exercises 
disciplinary  action  and  is  competent  to  appoint,  transfer  and  promote  judges,  as  well  as 
responsible  for  the  training  and  recruitment  of  judges.  The  public  prosecution  service  is 
integrated in  the judiciary  with  functional  autonomy, and pursues  the mission of promoting 
justice in defence of the law, the rights of the citizens and the general interest. The Prosecutor 
General is appointed by the Head of State, upon proposal of the Government, following the 
consultation  of  the  General  Council  of  the  Judiciary4.  The  Local  Bars  are  public  law 
organisations of professionals, independent from the public administration and do not depend 
on the budgets of the public authorities, nor are their assets public. They have competences 
for  the  organisation  of  the  profession  and  professional  deontology,  and  approve  their  own 
Code of Ethics. 

Independence 

The  Council  for  the  Judiciary  has  been  exercising  its  functions  ad  interim  since 
December 2018. According to the Constitution, the Council consists of  the President of the 
Supreme Court (who chairs) and of 20 individuals – 12 judges or magistrates, and 8 lawyers 
or  other  jurists  of  recognised  competence  with  more  than  fifteen  years  of  professional 
practice5.  Parliament  is  responsible  for  the  appointment  of  the  judicial  members  of  the 
Council6, upon receiving from the Council a list of candidates who have received the support 
of a judges’ association or of 25 judges7. The appointment of new members of the Council is 
subject to a qualified majority of three fifths s. In the context of the two general elections held 
in 2019, such a majority was not reached and the members of the Council have remained in 
place  ad  interim  until  a  new  Council  is  elected.  Professional  associations  have  called  for  a 
renewal of the Council8, and have legally challenged the competence of the acting Council to 

1   Covering  the  fields  of  civil,  criminal,  administrative  and  social  law.  In  total,  there  are  2269  first  instance 

courts of general jurisdiction. 

2   Commercial  courts,  EU  trademark  courts,  Courts  with  special  duties  in  the  matter  of  criminal  sentencing, 
juvenile courts, courts dealing with violence against women, and other specialised courts that can be created 
by  resolution  of  the  General  Council  of  the  Judiciary.  In  total,  there  are  1465  first  instance  courts  of 
specialised jurisdiction. 

3   Art. 117 of the Spanish Constitution enshrines the independence of magistrates and judges. 
4   Art. 124(4) of the Spanish Constitution. 
5   While the Constitution requires the eight attorneys and other jurists to be appointed by a three-fifths majority 
in each chamber of the Parliament (four by the Congress and four by the Senate), it does not specify how the 
members representing judges are to be appointed (Art. 122(3) of the Spanish Constitution). 

6   Of the 12 members who must be Judges or Magistrates, 6 are elected by Congress and 6 by the Senate, from 
a list of 36 candidates proposed by associations of judges or by non-associate judges (Art. 567 of Organic 
Law 6/1985). 

7   Figures  51  and  52,  2020  EU  Justice  Scoreboard.  To  be  noted  that  according  to  Council  of  Europe 
recommendations, not less than half the members of such councils should be judges chosen by their peers 
(Recommendation  CM/Rec(2010)12  of  the  Committee  of  Ministers  of  the  Council  of  Europe  states,  para. 
27). 

8   El Pais, Los jueces exigen al ministro la renovación cuanto antes del Poder Judicial, 20 February 2020.  

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continue  with  appointments  for  top  judicial  positions9.  While  the  law  foresees  that  the 
Council remains fully functional until a new one is in place10, the Council decided, in January 
2020,  to  suspend  the  appointments  for  judicial  positions11.  However,  in  May  2020,  the 
Council  restarted  the  appointments12.  The  acting  president  of  the  Council  has  repeatedly 
brought  to  the  attention  of  Parliament  the  need  to  proceed  with  the  nomination  of  the 
members of the Council13. The acting president has also referred to the current circumstances 
as  an  ‘institutional  anomaly’,  and  warned  that  the  prolongation  of  this  situation  could 
discredit the Council14. The Council of Europe has noted that these developments confirm the 
importance  of  ensuring  that  the  Council  is  not  perceived  as  being  vulnerable  to 
politicisation15.  

The  level  of  perceived  judicial  independence  is  average.  Since  2016,  citizens’  and 
companies’ perception of independence of courts and judges has fluctuated considerably. In 
2020,  there  was  a  slight  improvement  in  comparison  to  the  previous  year,  both  among  the 
general public (44% perceive it as ‘very good’ or ‘fairly good’) and companies (42% perceive 
it as ‘very good’ or ‘fairly good’)16.  

The relation between the Prosecutor General and the executive is being discussed.  The 
Prosecutor  General  is  appointed  by  the  Head  of  State,  acting  on  a  proposal  of  the 
Government,  from  among  eminent  Spanish  jurists with  more than  fifteen  years of effective 
practice. Before proposing a candidate, the Government must have heard the General Council 
of the Judiciary, and the candidate’s suitability must have been assessed by the corresponding 
committee in the Congress of Deputies17. The Supreme Court can exercise an ex post control 
of the legality of the appointment. The Government has no powers to dismiss the Prosecutor 
General.  However,  the  Prosecutor  General’s  mandate  ends  at  the  same  time  as  the 
Government’s mandate18. This system has been subject to criticism considering in particular 
that the coincidence in  the term  of office may  affect  the perception of independence19. The 
Council  of  Europe  has  highlighted  that,  for  public  confidence,  it  is  not  only  crucial  that 
prosecution  is,  but  also  appears  to  be  impartial,  objective,  and  free  from  any  influence, 
particularly  of  political  nature20.  The  Council  of  Europe  acknowledged  that  this  issue  had 
been duly considered, but  urged the authorities to  take more substantiated improvements to 
provide  for  greater  autonomy  of  the  prosecution  service,  in  particular,  with  respect  to 
transparency  of  communication  with  the  Government21.  The  Prosecutor  General  acts  in  an 

9   Order of the Civil Section of the Supreme Court, of 5 June 2019.  
10   Art.  570,  Organic  Law  No.  6/1985,  of  1  July.  The  Council  in  functions  ad  interim  is  not  limited  in  its 

competences, except as regards the possibility to elect a new President. 

11   Press release of the Council of the Judiciary of 16 January 2020.  
12   The  appointments  were  then  discontinued  in  July.  The  Council  announced  that  they  would  be  resumed  in 

September.  

13   Press release of the Council of the Judiciary of 15 July 2020.  
14   Press release of the Council of the Judiciary of 23 December 2019. 
15   GRECO, Fourth Evaluation Round – Corruption prevention in respect of members of Parliament, judges and 
prosecutors, Second interim compliance report, Recommendation v. (para 29 and 32 relating to the need to 
remove the selection of the judicial shift from politicians).  

16   Figures 44 and 46, 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard. The level of perceived judicial independence is categorised 
as  follows:  very  low  (below  30%  of  respondents  perceive  judicial  independence  as  fairly  good  and  very 
good); low (between 30-39%), average (between 40-59%), high (between 60-75%), very high (above 75%). 

17   The opinions of the Council and of the Congress of Deputies are consultative. 
18   Art. 31(1)(e), Law No. 50/1981 of 30 December. 
19   GRECO Fourth Evaluation Round – Evaluation report, para 126. 
20   GRECO  (2013),  Fourth  Evaluation  Round  –  Corruption  prevention  in  respect  of  members  of  Parliament, 

judges and prosecutors, Evaluation report, para 126. 

21   GRECO (2019), Fourth Evaluation Round – Second Interim Compliance report, para 54. 

3 

 
                                                           
independent  and  impartial  manner,  and  cannot  receive  instructions  or  orders  from  the 
Government  or  any  other  administrative  or  judicial  body.  However,  the  Government  can 
draw the Prosecutor General’s attention to relevant actions in defence of the public interest22. 
While  the  law  determines  that  all  the  communication  between  the  executive  and  the 
prosecution services should be conducted between the Minister of Justice and the Prosecutor 
General23,  it  does  not  require  this  communication  to  be  made  public,  nor  the  obligation  to 
register such communications in writing. This has also been raised as a concern by the Group 
of  States  against  Corruption  (GRECO)24.  It  appears,  however,  that  there  is  a  practice  to 
publish some of these communications via press releases on the webpage of the Ministry of 
Justice25. Stakeholders draw attention to the importance of ensuring this publicity, in order to 
dispel  any  impression  of  political  interference  of  the  executive  in  the  prosecution,  and 
reinforce public trust in criminal justice26.  

Quality 

Draft legislation amending the Code of Criminal Procedure is being prepared.  In April 
2020, the Ministry of Justice initiated the procedure for the revision of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure. In particular, a significant change to the investigative phase is being considered, 
which  will  allow  the  judicial  investigation  to  be  led  by  prosecutors.  Currently,  the  system 
confers on the investigative judge the power to lead the investigation, while prosecutors can 
only  demand  the  adoption  of  precautionary  or  investigative  measures  to  be  taken  by  the 
judge27.  Stakeholders  criticise  the  current  system,  linking  it  to  the  lack  of  efficiency  of 
criminal  procedures28.  In  July  2020,  Article  324  of  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure  was 
already revised with a view to extending the time limits for the investigations. Stakeholders 
had  called  for  this  revision,  as  the  strict  time  limits  to  the  investigation  were  said  to  be 
incompatible with the diligence needed when investigating complex cases29. 

The  use  of  ICT  tools  is  well  established  in  the  justice  system  and  investment  in 
digitalisation continues.  In particular, the project  ‘Justicia Digital’,  with  a strong  focus on 
administrative modernisation and the use of digital solutions in the administration of justice, 
has  been  fully  implemented.  However,  interoperability  between  the  management  systems 
used in different autonomous regions remains an issue. The project ‘Justicia 2030’ plans to 
integrate ICT services in the field of justice more efficiently30. The purpose of this project is 
to  set  a  new  model  of  communication  with  citizens,  providing  services  automatically  and 

22   Art. 8, Law No. 50/1981 of 30 December. When the Prosecutor General receives a communication from the 
Government,  he/she  decides  on  the  viability  or  appropriateness  of  the  actions  requested  after  hearing  the 
Board of Chamber Prosecutors of the Supreme Court in this respect, and he/she presents his/her decision to 
the Government in a reasoned manner. 
23   Art. 8(2), Law No. 50/1981 of 30 December. 
24   GRECO (2019), Fourth Evaluation Round – Second interim compliance report, recommendation ix. 
25   This practice was welcomed by GRECO (GRECO Fourth Evaluation Round  – Second interim compliance 

report, para 57. 

26   See,  for  instance,  Asociación  de  Fiscales  (2020),  Contestación  de  la  Asociación  de  Fiscales  a  la  consulta 
realizada por la Comisión Europea para el ‘Annual Rule of Law Report - stakeholder consultation’ (Informe 
Anual sobre el Estado de Derecho)’.  
27   Art. 5, Law No. 50/1981 of 30 December. 
28   Asociación  de  Fiscales  (2020),  Contestación  de  la  Asociación  de  Fiscales  a  la  consulta  realizada  por  la 
Comisión Europea para el “Annual Rule of Law Report - stakeholder consultation” (Informe Anual sobre el 
Estado de Derecho)’. 

29   Asociación  de  Fiscales  (2020),  Contestación  de  la  Asociación  de  Fiscales  a  la  consulta  realizada  por  la 
Comisión Europea para el “Annual Rule of Law Report - stakeholder consultation” (Informe Anual sobre el 
Estado de Derecho)’. 

30   Input from Spain for the 2020 Rule of Law Report. 

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proactively.  The  project  also  includes  the  development  of  alternative  means  for  dispute 
settlement. While digital transformation of justice in Spain needs to be further improved, the 
country shows a high level of availability of ICT for case management31. Spain is also among 
the  Member  States  that  put  in  place  most  arrangements  for  producing  machine-readable 
judicial  decisions32.  Spain  received  support  from  the  European  Commission  to  increase  the 
accessibility  and  the  quality  of  justice  by  promoting  the  implementation  of  cyber  justice 
through  a  strategic  and  knowledge-centred  approach,  as  well  through  a  comprehensive 
change  of  management  and  unification  or  full  interoperability  of  respective  ICT  systems 
deployed  by  the  Ministry  of  Justice  and  the  Autonomous  Regions.  Spain  also  received 
support from the European Union and the Council of Europe for improving the collection of 
judicial statistics and enhancing the capacity of the office in  charge of the victim’s support 
(ICT and institutional support)33. In the second and current phase of the project, the Council 
of  Europe  will  support  some  of  the  projects  of  Justicia  2030,  such  as  the  feasibility  of 
electronic procedural norms and a handbook on the implementation of digital projects. 

The  COVID-19  pandemic  has  had  an  impact  on  the  functioning  of the  justice  system. 
Spain  declared  the  state  of  alarm  on  14  March34.  Consequently,  the  activity  of  courts  was 
limited  for  the  three  months  during  which  the  state  of  alarm  was  in  force,  with  procedural 
acts being maintained only in urgent procedures, and procedural deadlines being suspended. 
Stakeholders have voiced concerns that these measures may have an impact on the capacity 
of  the  justice  system  to  deal  with  the  backlogs  generated  and  the  foreseeable  increase  in 
litigation,  especially  in  light  of  the  challenges  with  efficiency  that  the  system  already 
experienced35. Efforts are undertaken to minimise the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on 
the  justice  system.  In  particular,  new  legislation  has  been  enacted,  foreseeing  special 
procedural  and  organisational  measures36,  but  also  specific  norms  for  bankruptcy 
procedures37.  The  measures  envisaged  also  include  a  wider  use  of  digital  technologies  for 
procedural acts. 

Efficiency 

The  duration  of  court  proceedings  in  Spain  is  increasing.  The  disposition  time  in  civil, 
commercial and administrative cases in first instance has been increasing since 201638. It is 
particularly lengthy for  civil  and commercial cases in  the Supreme Court, where it exceeds 
600 days39. Moreover, the rate of resolving cases is also decreasing. In civil and commercial 

31   Figure 40, 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
32   Figure 29, 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
33   Cooperation Programme of the European Union and the Council of Europe, Promoting cyber justice in Spain 
through  change  management  and  improvement  of  data  collection,  phase  I  (November  2018-  November 
2019, budget: EUR 250,000) and phase II (June 2020- February 2022, budget EUR 370,000). 

34   Royal Decree 463/2020, declaring the state of alarm as a result of the health crisis caused by COVID-19. 
35   Information received in the context of the country visit and of the consultation process for the preparation of 
the report; see also press release of the professional association Juezas y Jueces para la Democracia, of 18 
May 2020. The Commission has also addressed this issue in the context of the European Semester. Recital 
28, Council Recommendation on the 2020 National Reform Programme of Spain and delivering a Council 
opinion  on  the  2020  Stability  Programme  of  Spain.  https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-
releases/2020/07/20/european-semester-2020-country-specific-recommendations-
adopted/?utm_source=dsms-
auto&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=European+Semester+2020%3a+country-
specific+recommendations+adopted.   

36   For example, 11 to 31 August were declared working days for procedural purposes. 
37   Royal Decree-Law No. 16/2020 of 28 April.  
38   Figure 5, 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
39   Figure 7, 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard. 

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litigious cases, the clearance rate fell to 86.7% in 201840. The clearance rate in administrative 
courts  of  first  instance  has  also  been  falling,  faring  below  100%.  As  more  cases  enter  the 
system  than  those  that  are  solved,  this  generates  a  backlog  of  cases,  which  is  increasing41. 
Spain  has  a  good  level  of  efficiency  in  some  specific  areas  of  EU  law.  In  particular,  as 
regards  EU  trademark  infringement  cases,  the  length  of  proceedings  decreased  by  half  in 
201842.  Regarding  consumer  protection,  the  average  length  of  judicial  review  is  short  and 
remains stable43. 

Spain  is  taking  measures  to  increase  efficiency  in  courts.  In  particular,  proceedings  to 
establish a new Code of Criminal Procedure are ongoing, which aims to accelerate criminal 
proceedings.  The  Ministry  of  Justice  is  also  working  on  a  draft  law  on  procedural  and 
technological measures and the implementation of alternative dispute resolution procedures. 
These  measures  seek  to  speed  up  judicial  proceedings,  improve  its  effectiveness  and 
implement measures enabling the current system of the administration of justice to respond in 
a reasonable and useful manner to the judicial protection sought by citizens44. 

II.  ANTI-CORRUPTION FRAMEWORK 

The  competences  and  responsibilities  for  the  development  and  implementation  of  anti-
corruption  policies  as  well  as  for  preventing,  detecting,  investigating  and  prosecuting 
corruption are shared between several law enforcement authorities. The Office of Conflicts of 
Interest,  established  in  2015,  is  responsible  for  controlling  the  asset  declaration,  while  the 
Council of Transparency and Good Governance, established in 2014, monitors the access to 
information and compliance with transparency obligations and good governance. 

Spain  scores  62/100  in  the  Transparency  International  2019  Corruption  Perceptions 
Index and ranks 10th in the European Union and 30th globally45. 94% of respondents to 
the 2020 Special Eurobarometer survey on corruption perceive corruption as widespread (EU 
average  71%)46  and  58%  feel  personally  affected  by  corruption  in  their  daily  lives  (EU 
average  26%).  34%  of  people  find  that  there  are  enough  successful  prosecutions  to  deter 
people  from  corrupt  practices  (EU  average  36%).  Almost  nine  in  ten  Spanish  companies 
(88%) consider that corruption is very or fairly widespread (EU average 63%).47 More than 
half of the companies responding to the survey (52%) consider that corruption is a problem 
when  doing  business  (EU  average  37%),  while  21%  of  companies  believe  that  people  and 
businesses caught for bribing a senior official are appropriately punished (EU average 31%). 

Spain has strengthened its legal framework to cover extensively the criminalisation and 
prosecution  of  corruption-related  offences,  as  well  as  the  criminal  liability  of  legal 
entities for bribery and corruption in international commercial transactions. Two major 
reforms took place as regards the amendments to the Criminal Code in the last five years. The 
definition of trading in influence with respect to foreign public employees was amended, and 
the scope of the offence of private commercial bribery was extended to persons accepting the 

40   Figure 11, 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard; Figure 11, 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard Quantitative Data Factsheet. 
41   Figure 13, 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
42   Figure 18, 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
43   Figure 19, 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
44   Input from Spain for the 2020 Rule of Law Report. 
45   Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (2019).  
46   Special Eurobarometer 502 (2020).  
47   Flash Eurobarometer 482 (2020). 

6 

 
                                                           
promise of benefit or advantage48. Furthermore, corporate criminal liability was extended to 
the  crime  of  embezzlement  of  public  resources49,  and  therefore  to  those  legal  entities  who 
manage public resources or are responsible for such public resources. An extended statute of 
limitations now exists for serious offences, and corruption-related crimes can be sanctioned 
more severely, including with a longer period of disqualification from public office. 

There  is  no  dedicated  overall  anti-corruption  strategy  in  place.  However,  the  Strategy 
against  Organised  Crime  and  Serious  Crime  adopted  in  February  2019  establishes  fighting 
corruption as a priority. The Strategy defines, among others, the need to strengthen the access 
to  financial  data,  cooperation  and  coordination  between  the  different  actors  involved  in  the 
fight  against  this  form  of  crime,  and  to  implement  measures  provided  for  in  the  Criminal 
Convention on Corruption. This issue has also been highlighted by GRECO, which noted that 
law enforcement  authorities, especially the Police and the Civil  Guard,  could  increase their 
coordination  and  collectively  develop  an  anti-corruption  strategy  designed  to  reinforce 
internal compliance mechanisms50. 

The investigation and prosecution of corruption offences is divided between several law 
enforcement authorities. The Special Prosecution Office against corruption and Organised 
Crime (ACPO) within the Public Prosecution Service has as main competences to investigate 
all major cases related to economic offences or any offences committed by public officials in 
the  exercise  of  their  official  duties  related  to  corruption51.  Apart  from  carrying  out 
prosecutorial investigations, ACPO can intervene directly in criminal proceedings in specific 
corruption  crime  cases,  such  as  embezzlement  of  public  funds,  crimes  of  influence 
trafficking,  foreign  bribery  that  fall  under  its  jurisdiction.52  The  investigative  work  is  well 
supported by the analytical capacities of four units, which include tax inspectors, controllers, 
law  enforcement  and  specialised  police  officers.  The  remainder  of  cases  are  dealt  with  by 
other  prosecution  departments  and  territorial  units53.  As  regards  resources,  ACPO  has  29 
prosecutors, including the chief prosecutor. In view of the lack of resources identified in the 
2018  annual  report54,  the  Government  has  strengthened  the  capacity  of  ACPO  with  nine 
further  positions  in  April  201955.  As  regards  the  staff  allocation,  GRECO  raised  concerns 
regarding the autonomy of the Prosecution and the Anti-corruption prosecution office, given 
that the Ministry of Justice decides on staff allocation56. According to the data published by 
the General Council of the Judiciary, 91 (71%) of the cases in 2019 for crimes of corruption 
were convictions and 26 (29%) were acquittals. 

The  rules  on  asset  disclosure,  conflict  of  interests  and  incompatibilities  are  not 
consistent across various levels of Government and categories of officials. As regards the 
prevention of corruption, the regional and local level lack tailor-made preventive strategies. 
The asset declaration regime is in place and requirements regarding the disclosure of assets, 

48   Art. 286bis, Law 1/2019. 
49   Art. 435, Law 1/2019. 
50   GRECO Fifth Evaluation Round – Evaluation report. 
51   Law 10/1995, of 24 April, amending Law 50/1981, of 30 December, which regulates the Organic Statute of 
the  Public  Prosecutor's  Office  and  creates  the  Special  Prosecutor's  Office  for  the  Repression  of  Economic 
Crimes Related to Corruption: https://www.boe.es/buscar/doc.php?id=BOE-A-1995-10066. 

52   Section 19.4 of the Organic Statute of the Public Prosecutor’s Office. 
53   OECD, Specialised Anti-Corruption Institutions – Review of Models, Anti-Corruption Network for Eastern 

Europe and Central Asia. 

54   Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (2018), Annual report 2018, p. 468. 
55   Royal Decree 255/2019, of 12 April 2010. 
56   GRECO, Fourth Evaluation Round –Second interim compliance report.  

7 

 
                                                           
interests  and  incompatibilities  for  senior  officials  and  members  of  the  Government  are  laid 
down in the Law 3/2015 of 30 March 2015. The Office of Conflicts of Interest (‘Oficina de 
Conflictos  de  Intereses’  –  OCI)  was  established  in  2006  and  reinforced  in  2015.  It  is 
responsible for controlling the asset declaration, incompatibilities and conflicts of interest of 
political  appointees,  as  well  as  for  managing  the  incompatibility  regime  of  State  public 
employees. The OCI is attached to the Ministry of Territorial Policy and Civil Service, and 
according to the legislation, it acts with full functional autonomy57. The powers of the Office 
of Conflicts of Interest have increased over the years. There is no permanent mechanism of 
regular  cooperation  with  similar  structures  at  regional  level.  However,  the  OCI  assists 
regional offices upon request58.  

The  Council  of  Transparency  and  Good  Governance  monitors  access  to  information, 
compliance  with  transparency  obligations  and  good  governance.  The  Council  faces 
challenges  regarding  financial  and  human  resources,  as  noted  by  GRECO59.  Some  regional 
pieces of legislation require high-ranking officials to publish their agendas.  

Provisions  on  ethics  and  conflicts  of  interests  have  been  established  as  regards 
Government and senior officials. Apart from these provisions60, however, there is no stand-
alone Code for all elected officials. GRECO noted in this regard the need to for a single code 
of  conduct  which  is  accessible  to  the  public  and  has  among  others  practical  measures  for 
implementation61. On 28 February 2019, the Congress approved its first Code of Conduct62. 
The  Code  of  Conduct  establishes  the  principles  governing  the  behaviour  of  deputies  and 
determines  that  the  Deputies  must  take  all  necessary  measures  to  avoid  that  they  get 
themselves  into  situations  of  conflict  of  interest.  A  Parliamentary  Office  of  Conflicts  of 
Interest has the responsibility to verify the content of the statements included in the Register 
of  Interests.  Among  the  changes  incorporated  in  this  Code  of  Conduct,  each  Deputy  must 
publish  his  or  her  institutional  agenda  in  the  Transparency  Portal  of  the  Congress.  This 
includes meetings held with the representatives of any entity that has the status of an interest 
group. The Code has also contains a procedure for the imposition of sanctions on deputies in 
case of infringements. 

Whistle-blower  protection  and  lobbying  regulation  require  attention.  While  the 
protection  of  witnesses  and  experts  provides  safeguards  for  those  who  feel  physically  at 
risk,63  Spain  lacks  a  general  whistle-blower  protection  framework,  despite  some  sectorial 
regulation.  In  2019,  a  new  legislative  proposal  was  envisaged  to  address  some  of  the 
shortcomings  of  the  system  through  the  Whistle-blower  Protection  Act,  which  has  not  yet 
been  enacted.  In  June  2020,  the  Government  started  working  on  new  draft  legislation  to 
protect  whistle-blowers.  As  for  lobbying,  Spain  has  no  specific  legislation  in  this  domain. 
However, some autonomous regions and municipalities have adopted specific regulations on 
lobbying practices64. This issue has also been raised by GRECO65. 

57   According to Law No. 3/2015. 
58   European Commission, 2018 Country Report Spain, SWD(2018)207 final. 
59   GRECO, Fifth evaluation round - Evaluation Report. 
60   Law 3/2015 and Law 19/2013. 
61   GRECO, Fifth evaluation round - Evaluation Report: p.16. 
62   Press release of the Congress of deputies, of 2 April 2019. 
63   Law 19/1994.  
64   In  addition,  a  number  of  public  national  entities  and  companies  have  adopted  codes  of  conduct  which 

address aspects related to lobbying. 

65   GRECO (2019), Fourth Evaluation Round – Second interim compliance report. 

8 

 
                                                           
III.  MEDIA PLURALISM 

The  Constitution  enshrines  the  rights  to  freedom  of  expression  and  media  freedom.  In 
addition,  Spain  adopted  progressive  legislation  and  developed  a  comprehensive  legal 
framework for ensuring media pluralism. An independent multi-regulatory body assumes the 
role of audio-visual regulator. Spain has a National Registry of Audio-visual Communication 
Service  Providers,  which  can  be  accessed  freely  by  the  public  and  contains  information  on 
owners with significant participation in the capital of service providers.66  

Regulatory  powers  for  audio-visual  media  services  are  entrusted  to  the  CNMC 
(National  Commission  of  Markets  and  Competition).  The  CNMC  is  a  ‘multi-regulator’ 
created by law67 in 2013, with the purpose of consolidating a number of existing regulatory 
bodies  into  one  entity,  responsible  for  overseeing  several  fields  (competition,  energy, 
telecom, postal services, audio-visual media, as well as railroads and airports). The rationale 
of this unification was to enhance the respective bodies’ independence, and to provide legal 
certainty  and  institutional  trust  by  adopting  an  inclusive  view  from  regulatory  and 
competition standpoints, aiming to promote the modernisation of the economy to the benefit 
of  consumers.  The  CNMC  has  four  investigatory  directorates  (Competition,  Energy, 
Telecommunications  and  the  Audio-Visual  Sector,  as  well  as  the  Transport  and  the  Postal 
Sector)  that  report  to  the  President.  The  relevant  investigative  Directorate  undertakes 
practical case handling of audio-visual media matters. The CNMC consists of two governing 
bodies: the Council and the President, who chairs the Council. The Council is the CNMC's 
collective  decision-making  body.  It  consists  of  ten  members  appointed  by  the  Government 
amongst individuals of renowned prestige and professional competence in the Commission's 
areas of activity. Their appointment must be approved by the Parliament upon assessment of 
their  suitability  and  any  potential  conflicts  of  interest.  Their  term  lasts  six  years,  is  not 
renewable, and is subject to strict eligibility requirements. The reasons for termination of the 
mandate  are  listed  in  article  23  of  the  2013  law68.  In  accordance  with  the  2013  law,  the 
regulatory  authority  is  autonomous  and  fully  independent  of  the  Government,  public 
authorities,  and  all  business  and  commercial  interests69.  The  CNMC  has  earned  a  solid 
reputation, and is deemed fully effective and independent in its work. Accordingly, the Media 
Pluralism  Monitor  (MPM  2020)  report  for  Spain70  considers  there  is  a  low  risk  to  the 
independence and effectiveness of the media authority. 

Provisions regarding the transparency of media ownership are enshrined in the General 
Law  for  Audio-visual  Communication71.  This  law  creates  a  National  Registry  of  Audio-

66   Spain appears in the 29th position in the 2020 World Press Freedom Index, the same position as in 2019. See 

Reporters without Borders (2020), World Press Freedom Index – Spain. 

67   Law  3/2013  of  4  June  2013  creating  the  National  Markets  and  Competition  Commission  (Comisión 

Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia).https://www.cnmc.es/file/64267/download. 

68   Law 3/2013, Art. 23, Amongst them “f) Due to removal, ordered by the Government, on account of a serious 
breach  of  the  duties  inherent  in  their  office  or  breach  of  the  obligations  on  incompatibility,  conflict  of 
interest and the duty of confidentiality. Removal shall be ordered by the Government, independently of the 
penalty rules that  may, as the case  may be, apply, following an investigation by the Minister of Economy 
and Competitiveness”. 

69   Law No. 3/2013, Preamble and Art. 2. 
70   2020 Media Pluralism Monitor.  
71   Law. No. 7/2010 (Ley General de la Comunicación Audiovisual). The preamble identifies as one of its main 
objectives  ‘to  protect  the  citizen  from  dominant  positions  of  opinion  or  from  restrictions  of  access  to 
universal  content  of  great  interest  or  value’  [….]  ‘guaranteeing  also  pluralism  and  the  protection  of  civic 
rights;  while  establishing  clear  rules  of  transparency  and  competition  in  a  context  of  coexistence  of  the 
public and private sector and liberalization of audio-visual activity’. 

9 

 
                                                           
visual Communication Service Providers72, which can be accessed freely by the public73. As 
regards  shareholding,  Article  33.2  of  this  law  dictates  that  owners  of  significant 
participation74 in the service providers should also appear in the Registry with an indication 
of  the  percentage  of  capital  owned.  Information  is  also  available  in  the  Company  Registry 
(‘registro mercantil’), but it is not exhaustive. MPM 2020 considers that it is difficult even 
for experts to have a clear idea of who exactly is behind each company and identifies medium 
risk to media pluralism under this indicator75. 

Legislative  provisions  regulate  the  contracting  of  state  advertising  and  institutional 
campaigns76.  The  Secretary  of  State  for  Communication  verifies  that  media  plans  follow 
objective  criteria  in  the  distribution  and  weight  of  the  different  media.  The  Directorate 
General  for  Rationalisation  and  Centralisation  of  Procurement  of  the  Ministry  of  Finance 
(DGRCC) centralises the contracts of media plans and campaigns proposed by the different 
administrative  bodies  and  agencies  of  the  State  central  administration.  Occasionally,  in 
function of specificities related to the target public or aims of the campaign, different criteria 
may  be  established  as  long  as  these  do  not  generate  inequalities,  in  line  with  the  doctrine 
established by the Constitutional Court rulings 104 and 130/2014. 

Media  freedom is  protected by law.  As regards the framework for journalists’ protection, 
the Constitution provides the baseline,  as  it  enshrines the freedom  of the press,  the  right  to 
freedom of expression, as well as the right to access documents held by public authorities. In 
addition,  Spain  adopted  progressive  legislation  and  developed  a  comprehensive  legal 
framework for ensuring media pluralism. Imprisonment is among the envisaged sanctions for 
serious defamation against some members of the Royal family while carrying out the duties 
of  office77.  Moreover,  in  recent  years  instances  of  hostility  towards  journalists  have  been 
registered, including situations where journalists were the targets of threats or violence78. 

Civil  society  has  raised  concerns  as  regards  the  protection  of  freedom  of  information. 
Aspects  of  the  2015  reform  of  the  Criminal  Code79,  Organic  Law  2/2015,  as  well  as  the 
Organic Law on the protection of public security80 are contested by NGOs as restrictions to 
the freedom of information81. Moreover, Reporters Without Borders points out that there is a 
growing  tendency  on  the  part  of  the  judicial  authorities  and  the  police  to  override  the 
protection  of  journalists’  sources  and  to  obstruct  investigative  journalism82.  Obstacles  to 
effective access to information, such as targeted denial of media accreditation by a political 
party,  and  instances  where  the  safety  of  journalists  has  been  affected,  such  as  physical 
assaults, are also reflected in the alerts concerning Spain in the Council of Europe’s Platform 

72   Regulated by the Real Decreto 847/2015.  
73   The registry can be accessed at https://sedeaplicaciones.minetur.gob.es/RuecaListadosPublicos/.  
74   Significant  participation  understood  to  represent  directly  or  indirectly:  a)  5%  of  the  capital,  b)  30  of  the 
voting rights, or less if it would allow to designate in the 24 months following the acquisition more than half 
of members of the management board. 

75   2020 Media Pluralism Monitor.  
76   Law No. 29/2005 of 29 December, on Institutional Advertising and Communication, and Real Decreto No. 

947/2006.  

77   Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom (2019), Decriminalisation of Defamation – Factsheet. 
78   Reporters without Borders (2019), Alarm about growing violence against reporters in Catalonia. 
79   Organic Law 1/2015. 
80   Organic Law 4/2015. These three laws are commonly referred to as the ‘Gag Law’. 
81   PDLI et al., 2019, quoted in 2020 Media Pluralism Monitor. 
82   Reporters without Borders (2020), World Press Freedom Index – Spain. 

10 

 
                                                           
to promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists83. Six alerts were posted in 
2019, and three in 202084. 

IV.  OTHER INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RELATED TO CHECKS AND BALANCES 
Spain  is  a  parliamentary  monarchy,  with  a  bicameral  Parliament  (‘Cortes  Generales’)85. 
Spain  is  a  decentralised  unitary  state  where  the  State  and  the  Autonomous  Regions 
(‘Comunidades  Autónomas’)  have  both  exclusive  and  shared  competences86.  The 
Constitutional Court is competent to review the constitutionality of laws. Both chambers of 
the Parliament – the Congress and the Senate – have legislative competence, which they can 
delegate  to  the  Government,  subject  to  certain  limitations87.  The  Government,  the  two 
Chambers  of  the  Parliament,  the  assemblies  of  the  autonomous  regions,  and  a  group  of  at 
least 500.000 citizens have the right of legislative initiative.  

Spain has a mixed regime for the constitutional review of laws. The Constitutional Court 
has  exclusive  competence  to  review  the  constitutionality  of  legislation.  In  general,  a 
declaration of unconstitutionality by the Court triggers the nullity of the law erga omnes, and 
produces retroactive effects. Ordinary courts may also exercise the control of constitutionality 
of  infra-legislative,  such  as  governmental  regulations.  In  the  latter  case,  the  effect  of  the 
review  is  limited  to  the  declaration  of  the  inapplicability  of  the  norm  in  the  concrete  case. 
However, there is  also a specific judicial procedure that allows the declaration of nullity of 
the  norm  in  certain  circumstances.  The  possibility  to  seek  constitutional  review  before  the 
Constitutional  Court  is  open  to  the  Head  of  Government,  the  Ombudsman,  fifty  Deputies, 
fifty Senators the Public Prosecutor's Office, the Autonomous Regions and courts. Individuals 
can  bring  a  case  to  the  Constitutional  Court,  but  they  cannot  appeal  legislation.88.  The 
possibility  to  seek  constitutional  review  was  used  in  May  2020  by  a  group  of  over  fifty 
Deputies,  who  challenged  before  the  Constitutional  Court  the  constitutionality  of  several 
legal  provisions  adopted  in  the  context  of  the  state  of  alarm  declared  to  manage  the  health 
crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic89.  

Stakeholders  are  involved  in  the  legislative  procedure,  and  there  are  safeguards  for 
transparency. In particular, the law foresees the obligation to conduct public consultations, 
for which a minimum period of 15 days is foreseen90. Moreover, draft legislation should be 
accompanied by a regulatory impact analysis report, which should include a summary of the 
submissions received in  the context of the public consultation. The law also determines the 

83   See also the Recommendation CM/Rec(2016)4 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. 
84   Council of Europe, Platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists. Alerts on the 
Platform are placed by NGOs and other agents concerned. As of August 2020, 16 alerts remained “active”, 
out  of  which  in  seven  the  source  of  threat  is  ‘non  state’  or  ‘unknown’.  The  authorities  have  already 
submitted a reply to six of them. 

85   It consists of the Congress of Deputies (the lower house), and the Senate (the upper house). Both are directly 

elected. 

86   Autonomous Regions have political and financial autonomy, having an institutional organisation based on a 
Legislative  Assembly,  a  Governing  Council  with  executive  and  administrative  functions  and  a  President, 
elected by the Assembly from among its members. Autonomous Regions hold the power to pass laws on a 
wide  range  of  areas  over  which  they  have  exclusive  competence,  but  also  secondary  legislation  in  certain 
matters that are competence of the State, as well as the execution of State regulations. 

87   Art. 82 of the Spanish Constitution. 
88   Individuals can apply to the Constitutional Court in case of alleged violation of fundamental rights, after all 

other remedies have been exhausted.  

89   Constitutional complaint No. 2054-2020. The case is currently pending. 
90   This  period  can  be  reduced  to  seven  days,  when  motivated  by  special  circumstances,  or  when  an  urgent 

legislative procedure applies. 

11 

 
                                                           
concrete  cases  in  which  the  General  Council  of  the  Judiciary  and  the  Prosecution  Council 
must be consulted during the legislative process. The Congress and the Senate publish all the 
information concerning the legislative initiatives and proposals on the respective portals. All 
Spanish regions have their own legal framework on transparency91. 

Emergency  powers  were  used  in  the  context  of  the  COVID-19  pandemic.  The  state  of 
alarm was declared by the Government92, and subsequently communicated to the Congress of 
Deputies93. The Congress of Deputies authorised six prorogations of the state of alarm94. The 
Constitution also confers on the Government the right to legislate via decree-laws in cases of 
extraordinary  and  urgent  need,  and  within  a  defined  material  scope95.  The  Government  is 
subject  to  the obligation to  present  such a decree-law to  the Congress,  the latter having the 
prerogative to derogate from it. The Constitutional Court may also control if the Government 
exceeded its margin of discretion in the definition of the urgent need invoked, and assess the 
connection between the enabling circumstances and the measures adopted. 

The  protection  of  fundamental  rights  is  ensured  by  independent  authorities.  The 
Ombudsman  (‘Defensor  del  Pueblo’)  is  the  National  Human  Rights  Institution  in  Spain.  In 
2018, the Ombudsman was re-accredited with ‘A’ status by the Global Alliance of National 
Human  Rights  Institutions  (GANHRI)  as  regards  its  compliance  with  the  UN  Paris 
Principles96.  The  Ombudsman  is  appointed  by  the  Parliament,  and  ensures  that  the 
fundamental  rights  of  all  citizens  in  relations  with  the  administration  are  upheld97.  The 
Ombudsman is an independent institution; it does not receive instructions from any authority 
and carries out its duties autonomously. Every year, it forwards a report to the Parliament on 
its  activity98  and  may  also  present  reports  on  any  topic  that  it  finds  particularly  serious  or 
urgent. The Ombudsman is also competent to trigger constitutional review and habeas corpus 
proceedings99. For transparency purposes, all relevant investigations and complaints are made 
public in the Ombudsman’s website in real time.  

Spain  has  developed  so-called  ‘Open  Government  Plans’.  Since  2013,  the  Government 
has  implemented  open  government  norms100  with  the  aim  to  strengthen  the  links  between 
citizens and the authorities, and to develop a permanent dialogue in order to get citizens more 
involved  in  development  of  public  policies.  In  this  context,  Spain  has  developed  ‘Open 

91   The 

regional 

transparency 

portals 

and 

legislative 

framework 

can 

be 

accessed 

on 

https://transparencia.gob.es/transparencia/transparencia_Home/index/MasInformacion/Administraciones-
publicas.html#casm. 

92   Royal Decree 463/2020, of 14 March, declaring the state of alarm for the management of the health  crisis 
caused  by  COVID-19.  The  state  of  alarm  is  the  least  severe  of  the  three  possible  states  of  emergency 
provided for in the Spanish Constitution. It does not suspend the general validity of the fundamental rights 
set out in the Constitution, although some specific freedoms may be restricted. 

93   Art. 116(2) of the Spanish Constitution and Arts. 6 and 8 of the Organic Law No. 4/1981, of 1 June 1981. 
94   While  the  competence  to  declare  the  state  of  alarm  lies  exclusively  with  the  Government,  its  prorogation 
must be expressly authorised by the Congress of Deputies, which can present proposals regarding the extent 
and the conditions applicable during the prorogation of the state of alarm. See also Royal Decree 476/2020, 
of  27  March  2020;  Royal  Decree  487/2020, of  10  April  2020;  Royal  Decree  492/2020,  of  24  April  2020; 
Royal Decree 514/2020, of 8 May 2020; Royal Decree 537/2020, of 22 May 2020; Royal Decree 555/2020, 
of 5 June 2020. The state of alarm ceased on 21 June 2020.  

95   Art. 86 of the Spanish Constitution. 
96   ENNHRI (2020), State of the Rule of Law in Europe, Reports from National Human Rights Institutions. 
97   Art. 54 of the Spanish Constitution. 
98   Art. 3, Law No. 3/1981. 
99   I.e., the possibility to challenge a detention. 
100  Law 19/2013, on transparency, access to public information and good governance. 

12 

 
                                                           
Government Plans’101. These Plans were aimed at simplifying the procedures and improving 
transparency  of  information  and  accessibility  to  better  quality  information  for  citizens,  in  a 
broad  range  of  policy  areas,  including  justice.  A  particular  initiative  undertaken  in  this 
context  was  the  creation  of  the  ‘Open  Government  Forum’.  This  forum,  composed  of 
representatives of public administrations and civil society, aims at pursuing a dialogue with 
civil  society  and  making  information  accessible  to  citizens.  All  agreements,  minutes,  and 
other documents of the meetings of this forum are published on the Transparency Portal102. 
The fourth Open Government Action Plan, to be approved in the third trimester of 2020, has 
the objective to  sensitise the public on the values of the Open Government,  contributing to 
the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals of the 2030 Agenda103. This initiative 
is  also  relevant  in  view  of  the  fact  that  the  civil  society  space  in  Spain  is  considered  to  be 
narrowed104. 

101  In  2011  Spain  became  part  of  the  Open  Government  Partnership.  Spain  has  so  far  developed  three  ‘Open 

Government Plans’; https://www.opengovpartnership.org/members/spain/. 

102  Input from Spain for the 2020 Rule of Law Report. 
103  See previous note. 
104  Rating by CIVICUS; ratings are on a five-category scale defined as: open, narrowed, obstructed, repressed 

and closed. See also section III. 

13 

 
                                                           
Annex I: List of sources in alphabetical order. *  
* The list of contributions received in the context of the consultation for the 2020 Rule of Law report 

can be found at (COM website). 

Anti-Corruption 

– 
https://www.fiscal.es/documents/20142/183863/memoria2018_fiscalia_anticorrupcion.pdf/f6fb3789
-9dde-d9cf-eb39-c7223e13794f.   

Prosecutor’s 

Annual 

(2018), 

Report 

Office 

2018 

Asociación de Fiscales (2020), Contestación de la Asociación de Fiscales a la consulta realizada por 
la  Comisión  Europea  para  el  ‘Annual  Rule  of  Law  Report  -  stakeholder  consultation’  (Informe 
Anual  sobre  el  Estado  de  Derecho).  http://asociaciondefiscales.es/images/Pdf/200521%20-
%20Cuestionario%20Unión%20Europea.pdf.  

Asociación 

(13 
http://asociaciondefiscales.es/index.php/general/actividades-a-f/comunicados?start=14. 

Fiscales 

January 

2020), 

press 

de 

release. 

Centre  for  Media  Pluralism  and  Media  Freedom  (2020),  2020  Media  pluralism  monitor. 

https://cmpf.eui.eu/media-pluralism-monitor/mpm-2020. 

CEPEJ (2018), European judicial systems: efficiency and quality of justice.  

CIVICUS (2020), Spain country profile. https://monitor.civicus.org/country/spain/. 

Congress 

of 

deputies 

(2 

April 

2019), 

press 

release. 

http://www.congreso.es/portal/page/portal/Congreso/Congreso/SalaPrensa/NotPre?_piref73_77060
63_73_1337373_1337373.next_page=/wc/detalleNotaSalaPrensa?idNotaSalaPrensa=32975&mostr
arvolver=N.  

Consejo General de la Abogacia Española (2020), Contribution to the online stakeholder consultation 

for the 2020 Rule of Law Report. 

Constitutional  Court  of  Spain 

(8  May  2020),  Order  of  admissibility  of  Recurso  de 
inconstitucionalidad n.º 2054-2020, contra los artículos 7, 9, 10 y 11 del Real Decreto 463/2020, de 
14  de  marzo,  por  el  que  se  declara  el  estado  de  alarma  para  la  gestión  de  la  situación  de  crisis 
ocasionada por el COVID-19; el Real Decreto 465/2020, de 17 de marzo; el Real Decreto 476/2020, 
de 27 de marzo; el Real Decreto 487/2020, de 10 de abril; el Real Decreto 492/2020, de 24 de abril; 
y  la  Orden  SND/298/2020,  de  29  de  marzo,  por  la  que  se  establecen  medidas  excepcionales  en 
relación con los velatorios y ceremonias fúnebres para limitar la propagación y el contagio por el 
COVID-19. https://www.boe.es/buscar/doc.php?id=BOE-A-2020-4875.  

Council of Europe (1999), Criminal Law Convention on Corruption. 

Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers (2000), Recommendation Rec(2000)19 of the Committee 
of Ministers to Member States on the Role of Public Prosecution in the Criminal Justice System. 

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16 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex II: Country visit to Spain 

The Commission services held virtual meetings in June 2020 with: 

  Academic experts 
  Association of ‘Abogados del Estado’ 
  Association of Prosecutors  
  College of Registrars  
  National Commission of Markets and Competition 
  Court of Audits 
  European Journalists Association 
  FEPA 
  General Council of Notaries 
  General Council of Spanish Lawyers 
  General Council of the Judiciary 
 
Independent Judicial Forum 
 
Judges and Magistrates’ Association “Francisco de Vitoria” 
 
Judges for Democracy 
  Madrid Press Association  
  Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
  Ministry of Justice 
  Office of the Prosecutor General 
  Platform in Defense of Freedom of Information 
  Professional and Independent Association of Prosecutors 
  Professional Association of the Magistracy 
  Progressive Union of Prosecutors 
  Prosecutor’s Council 
  Supreme Court  
  Technical Cabinet of the Prosecutor General’s Office 
  Transparency Council  
  Transparency International Spain 

* The Commission also met the following organisations in a number of horizontal meetings:  

  Amnesty International 
  Civil Liberties Union for Europe 
  Civil Society Europe 
  Conference of European Churches  
  EuroCommerce 
  European Center for Not-for-Profit Law  
  European Centre for Press and Media Freedom 
  European Civic Forum  
  Free Press Unlimited 
  Front Line Defenders 
 
ILGA-Europe 
 
International Commission of Jurists 
 
International Federation for Human Rights  
 
International Press Institute  
  Lifelong learning Platform  
  Open Society Justice Initiative/Open Society European Policy Institute 
  Reporters without Borders  
  Transparency International EU  

17