COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 2020 Rule of Law Report Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Romania Accompanying the document COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 2020 Rule of Law Report The rule of law situation in the European Union
Date: 2020-09-30
Institutions: European Commission, Secretariat-General
Subjects: Romania, administrative transparency, coronavirus disease, corruption, democracy, epidemic, independence of the judiciary, infringement of EU law, political rights, rule of law

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 30.9.2020  SWD(2020) 322 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 2020 Rule of Law Report  Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Romania Accompanying the document COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS  2020 Rule of Law Report       The rule of law situation in the European Union {COM(2020) 580 final} - {SWD(2020) 300 final} - {SWD(2020) 301 final} - {SWD(2020) 302 final} - {SWD(2020) 303 final} - {SWD(2020) 304 final} - {SWD(2020) 305 final} - {SWD(2020) 306 final} - {SWD(2020) 307 final} - {SWD(2020) 308 final} - {SWD(2020) 309 final} - {SWD(2020) 310 final} - {SWD(2020) 311 final} - {SWD(2020) 312 final} - {SWD(2020) 313 final} - {SWD(2020) 314 final} - {SWD(2020) 315 final} - {SWD(2020) 316 final} - {SWD(2020) 317 final} - {SWD(2020) 318 final} - {SWD(2020) 319 final} - {SWD(2020) 320 final} - {SWD(2020) 321 final} - {SWD(2020) 323 final} - {SWD(2020) 324 final} - {SWD(2020) 325 final} - {SWD(2020) 326 final}  
 
 
ABSTRACT  

Since  accession  to  the  EU  in  2007,  Romanian  reforms  in  the  areas  of  justice  and  anti-
corruption have been followed by the Commission through the Cooperation and Verification 
Mechanism  (CVM),  as  an  important  framework  for  progress  towards  meeting  the  set 
benchmarks. 

In 2020, the Government continued to affirm its commitment to restore the path of judicial 
reform after the reverses of 2017-2019. This led to a significant decrease in tensions with the 
judiciary. The recent appointments of new leadership for the key prosecutorial services could 
pave  the  way  for  more  efficient  continuation  of  prosecutorial  activity.  However,  progress 
towards  amending  the  relevant  legislation  has  been  postponed  due  to  the  COVID-19 
pandemic combined with the forthcoming national elections. The controversial measures with 
negative  impact  on  judicial  independence  continue  to  apply,  such  as  the  Section  for  the 
Investigation of Offences in the Judiciary, tasked exclusively with the prosecution of crimes 
committed  by  judges  and  prosecutors.  The  continued  implementation  of  these  measures 
increases  uncertainty  for  the  functioning  of  the  justice  system,  in  particular  through  their 
combined  effect.  Moreover,  some  of  these  measures  may  also  negatively  affect  the  human 
resources within the justice system, with implications for its efficiency.  

Romania  has  a  comprehensive  national  anti-corruption  strategic  framework  based  on  the 
large participation of national and local institutional actors. Despite Romania’s progress and 
track record in the fight against corruption over the last decade, the challenges faced by the 
judiciary  during  2017-2019  have  raised  questions  as  to  the  sustainability  of  anti-corruption 
reforms. Even if the current political context means less confrontation, key institutions face a 
challenging environment with consequences for the implementation of legal framework and 
institutional capacity. Although key competent institutions have continued their activity, this 
poses  challenges  to  maintaining  the  strong  track  record  of  prosecuted  cases  and  court 
judgments convicting high-level corruption. The pending amendments of the Criminal Code 
and  Code  of  criminal  procedures  raise  uncertainty  about  the  effectiveness  of  the  anti-
corruption  legal  framework,  making  it  important  that  legal  and  policy  solutions  are  found 
responding  to  key  Constitutional  Court  decisions.  The  current  Government  has  shown  a 
renewed  commitment  to  make  progress  on  the  preventive  side  through  the  comprehensive 
National Anti-Corruption Strategy. 

The  relevant  legal  safeguards  concerning  media  freedom  and  pluralism  are  in  place. 
Nonetheless,  issues  arise  in  relation  to  the  implementation  and  enforcement  of  the  existing 
legislative framework. Transparency of media ownership appears to  be incomplete, and the 
audio-visual media regulatory authority lacks the resources to fully perform its tasks. Media 
may be prone to political pressures, as specific legal safeguards for editorial independence are 
mostly lacking, apart from some self-regulation at newsroom or publisher level.  

The ordinary process for preparing and enacting laws is well regulated, including an extended 
institutional  set-up  of  checks  and  balances,  but  its  effectiveness  varies.  Government 
Emergency Ordinances continue to be widely used and successive uncoordinated legislative 
amendments also have an impact on the quality of legislation and legal certainty, including 
for  the  business  environment.  There  is  an  enabling  legislative  framework  for  civil  society, 
which is an active force and has been able to react against attempts to limit its activities. Civil 
society has had an important role in defending the rule of law in Romania. 

1 

 
 
 
 
A  particularity  of  Romania,  as  for  Bulgaria,  is  that  the  Cooperation  and  Verification 
Mechanism  (CVM)  was  established  at  the  accession  to  the  European  Union  in  2007  as  a 
transitional measure to facilitate Romania’s continued efforts to reform its judiciary and step 
up the fight against corruption1. In line with the decision setting up the Mechanism, the CVM 
ends when all the benchmarks applying to  Romania are satisfactorily met2.  In its reports of 
January 2017, the Commission adopted a comprehensive assessment of  Romania’s progress 
over  the  ten  years  of  the  CVM.  It  also  set  out  a  path  towards  the  conclusion  of  the 
Mechanism  based  on  12  final  key  recommendations  that,  if  complied  with,  would  be 
sufficient to meet the goals of the CVM. Due to developments that followed in Romania the 
Commission issued eight additional recommendations in November 2018. In the latest CVM 
report,  adopted  in  October  2019,  the  Commission  concluded  that  Romania  still  had  to 
progress on the recommendations of the January 2017 and November 2018 reports. In 2019, 
Romanian courts referred several  requests for preliminary rulings to  the Court of Justice of 
the  EU  on  the  obligations  of  Romania  under  the  CVM  and  to  follow  up  on  CVM 
recommendations3. The cases are currently pending. 

I.   JUSTICE SYSTEM  

The Romanian judicial system is structured in four instances, both civil and military: the first 
instance  county  courts,  the  ordinary  and  specialised  tribunals,  the  courts of  appeal4  and  the 
High  Court  of  Cassation  and  Justice.  The  High  Court  of  Cassation  and  Justice  judges  first 
instance and appeal criminal cases for certain categories of persons5, as well as appeal cases 
for certain civil and administrative cases. One fundamental role of this Court is to ensure the 
uniform interpretation and application of the law by the other courts. The Superior Council of 
Magistracy, tasked with guaranteeing judicial independence, is divided into two sections, the 
section for judges and the section for prosecutors. Each section has exclusive competence for 
the  recruitment  and  management  of  the  career  of  judges  and  prosecutors  respectively,  and 
acts as a disciplinary court in disciplinary matters. The prosecution service is headed by the 
Prosecutor General of the Public Prosecutor’s Office attached to the High Court of Cassation 
and  Justice.  The  Public  Prosecutor’s  Office  includes  specialised  structures  with  special 
jurisdiction  and  organisation,  the  National  Anti-Corruption  Directorate  (DNA)  and  the 
Directorate for Investigation and Combating Organised Crime and Terrorism (DIICOT), led 
by  chief  prosecutors,  and,  since  2018,  the  Prosecutorial  Section  for  the  Investigation  of 
Offences in the Judiciary (SIIJ)6. There are also military prosecutorial offices. The Prosecutor 
General  and  the  Chief  Prosecutors  of  the  specialised  structures,  DNA  and  DIICOT,  are 

1   Following  the  conclusions  of  the  Council  of  Ministers,  17  October  2006  (13339/06),  the  Mechanism  had 

been established by a Commission Decision of 13 December 2006 (C(2006)928).  

2   Council  Conclusions  on 

https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/20171212-st15587_en.pdf.  The 
report  can  be 
the  CVM  Decision.  The 
Romania  are  set  out 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/technical-report-romania-2019-swd-2019-393_en.pdf.  

last  CVM 

the  Cooperation  and  Verification  Mechanism,  12  December  2017 
four  benchmarks  applying 

- 
to 
found  here: 

in 

3   See the Opinions delivered on 23 September 2020 by Advocate General Bobek in Joined Cases C-83/19, C-

127/19 and C-195/19, Cases C-291/19 and C-355/19, and in Case C-397/19. 

4   Courts of appeal judge at both first instance (more complex cases) and second instance, in appeals against 

decisions handed down by the lower courts. 

5   The  Criminal  Section  of  the  High  Court  of  Cassation  and  Justice  hears,  as  a  court  of  first  instance,  cases 
involving offences committed by senators, deputies, and Romanian members of the European Parliament, by 
members of the Government, by judges of the Constitutional Court, by members of the Superior Council of 
Magistracy,  by  judges  of  the  High  Court  of  Cassation  and  Justice,  and  by  prosecutors  of  the  Prosecutor's 
Office attached to the High Court of Cassation and Justice. 

6   Prosecutors’ offices attached to the courts of appeal are headed by general prosecutors, and the ones attached 

to the tribunals and county courts are led by first prosecutors. 

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appointed  by  the  President  of  the  Republic,  upon  a  proposal  of  the  Minister  of  Justice  and 
after  having  received  a  non-binding  opinion  of  the  Superior  Council  of  Magistracy7.  The 
Romanian National Union of Bar Associations is a legal entity of public interest, comprising 
all  41  bars  in  Romania.  The  Constitutional  Court  is  responsible  for  the  constitutional 
compliance  check  of  laws  and  settling  conflicts  of  constitutional  nature  between  public 
authorities. 

Independence 

Several amendments to the Justice laws in 2018 and 2019 continue to raise concerns as 
regards  their  impact  on  judicial  independence.  The  Justice  laws  regulate  the  status  of 
judges  and  prosecutors,  the  organisation  of  the  justice  system  and  the  functioning  of  the 
Superior  Council  of  Magistracy.  The  amendments  entered  into  force  in  July  and  October 
2018,  and  were  further  modified  through  several  Government  Emergency  Ordinances.  The 
measures  raised  concerns,  in  particular  as  their  combined  effect  was  considered  by  several 
national and international stakeholders to represent a serious threat to the independence of the 
judiciary8. Major issues were identified with the creation of a Section for the Investigation of 
Offences in the Judiciary (SIIJ), the system of civil liability of judges and prosecutors, early 
retirement  schemes,  entry  into  profession,  and  the  status  and  appointment  of  high  ranking 
prosecutors. From the outset, their implementation has confirmed the concerns of pressure on 
judges  and  prosecutors,  and  on  the  independence,  efficiency  and  quality  of  the  judiciary9. 
Furthermore,  the  continued  application  of  the  laws  has  highlighted  new  issues  beyond  the 
problems identified early on10.  

The  prolonged  implementation  of  the  amended  justice  laws  creates  increased 
uncertainty for the functioning of the justice system. While the current  Government has 
expressed  willingness  to  engage  in  a  dialogue  with  the  judiciary  and  political  parties  to 
reverse the controversial measures, it has also pointed out that the current political situation 
does not provide for the right conditions to obtain a broad consensus and necessary majority 
in Parliament to ensure support for comprehensive reforms11. It is unlikely that such reforms 
will  be  undertaken  before  new  parliamentary  elections  are  held.  The  fact  that  these 
amendments remain in place creates uncertainty for the functioning of the judicial system as a 
whole, and for individual magistrates with regard to their independence, statute and career in 
particular. The uncertainty is exacerbated by strong divisions within the justice system as to 
the solutions to be put forward to amend the Justice laws. In this context, while based on its 
functions  the  Superior  Council  of  Magistracy  should  be  taking  a  leading  role  and  building 
consensus, its recent work has been marked by internal divisions and controversy.  

The perception of judicial independence among the general public is low, and shows a 
decreasing trend in recent years. The level of perceived judicial independence among the 

7   The  chief  prosecutor  of  the  section  to  investigate  crimes  within  the  judiciary  is  appointed  by  a  special 

procedure involving only members of the Superior Council of Magistracy. 
8   Venice Commission Opinions CDL-PI(2018)007 and CDL-AD(2019)014. 
9   CVM report 2018 and 2019. The Commission has recommended that Romania urgently revise the amended 
Justice laws taking fully into account the recommendations under the CVM and those issued by the Venice 
Commission and GRECO. This CVM recommendation is still pending. 

10   In  particular  relating  to  appointment  rules  for  the  High  Court  of  Cassation  and  Justice,  for  the  Judicial 

Inspection and for the entry into profession in general.  
11   Information received in the context of the country visit. 

3 

 
 
                                                 
general  public  remains  low  (37%),  and  has  been  decreasing12.  Among  the  companies,  the 
level  of perceived judicial independence is  average (53%)13.  In both  cases, the reason most 
often  invoked  for  the  perceived  lack  of  judicial  independence  is  related  to  interference  or 
pressure from the Government and politicians14. The public debate on the judiciary has been 
marked  by  strong  tensions,  and  the  existence  of  public  attacks  on  the  judiciary  from  the 
political  world  and  the  media15,  but  such  tensions  have  decreased  significantly  under  the 
current  Government.  Although  the  Superior  Council  of  Magistracy  has  reacted  to  some 
complaints brought to its attention regarding the defence of the independence, reputation and 
impartiality of magistrates, the overall activity of the Council in this area was limited16.  

The  prosecutorial  Section  for  the  Investigation  of  Offences  in  the  Judiciary  (SIIJ) 
remains  in  place,  despite  widespread  criticism.  This  Section17  is  tasked  exclusively  with 
the  prosecution  of  crimes  committed  by  judges  and  prosecutors.  In  addition,  it  also  has 
jurisdiction to prosecute cases against other individuals that are investigated together with the 
judges  or  magistrates  concerned18.  The  Venice  Commission  noted  that  the  rationale  behind 
the  creation  of  this  Section  does  not  appear  justified  by  factual  evidence19,  and  its 
establishment  and  practice  has  been  criticised  both  for  its  effects  on  the  independence  of 
magistrates  and  for  the  negative  effects  it  could  have  on  the  effectiveness  of  the 
prosecution20. Furthermore, the perception that the pressure of the Section can affect judicial 
independence also adversely impacts on the appearance of independence, which is in itself an 

12   Figure  44,  2020  EU  Justice  Scoreboard.  The  level  of  perceived  judicial  independence  is  categorised  as 
follows: very low (below 30% of respondents perceive judicial independence as fairly good and very good); 
low (between 30-39%), average (between 40-59%), high (between 60-75%), very high (above 75%). 

13   Figure 46, 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
14   Figures 45 and 47, 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard.  
15   Successive CVM reports have referred to the existence of public attacks on judges and prosecutors from the 
political world and media (e. g., Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council 
on  Progress  in  Romania  under  the  Cooperation  and  Verification  Mechanism,  COM(2019)  499  final).  A 
survey conducted among judges in 2019 found that over 50 % of them had experienced a lack of respect for 
their  independence  by  the  Government  and  the  media  (European  Network  of  Councils  for  the  Judiciary, 
Contribution to the online stakeholder consultation for the 2020 Rule of Law Report). The survey covered 21 
EU  Member  States  (European  Network  of  Councils  for  the  Judiciary  (2020)  -  Independence  and 
Accountability of the Judiciary – ENCJ Survey on the independence of judges 2019, Figures 43 and 45).  
16   European Commission, Technical report Romania 2019 (SWD (2019) 393 final), p.18. Progress report under 
the CVM from Romanian authorities February 2020 and June 2020. In addition, when the Council found that 
media  statements  or  smear  campaigns  have  infringed  on  the  independence  or  reputation  of  a  judge  or 
prosecution,  there  is  rarely  a  follow-up  from  the  National  Audio-visual  Council  despite  the  existence  of  a 
collaboration protocol with the Superior Council of Magistracy (https://www.cna.ro/Protocol-de-colaborare-
dintre.html). 

17   A Separate Directorate created in 2018 within the Prosecution Service, to deal with offences committed by 

magistrates. 

18   Law on judicial organisation No. 304/2004, Art. 88 (1) and (2). 
19   Only a marginal number of corruption crimes are de facto committed by magistrates  – six out of 997 cases 
investigated  in  2017  by  the  anti-corruption  directorate,  as  an  example  see  Venice  Commission  (CDL-
AD(2018)017), para 84. 

20   Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on Progress in Romania under the 
Cooperation and Verification Mechanism, COM(2019) 499 final; GRECO (2019), Fourth Evaluation Round 
– Second interim compliance report Romania; GRECO (2019) Follow-up Report to the Ad hoc Report on 
Romania (Rule 34); Venice Commission Opinion (CDL-AD(2019)014); Consultative Council of European 
Judges  (CCJE)  (2019),  Opinion  of  the  CCJE  Bureau  following  a  request  by  the  Romanian  Judges  Forum 
Association  as  regards  the  situation  on  the  independence  of  the  judiciary  in  Romania;  and  Consultative 
Council  of  European  Prosecutors,  Opinion  of  the  CCPE  Bureau  following  a  request  by  the  Romanian 
Movement  for  Defending  the  Status  of  Prosecutors  as  regards  the  situation  on  the  independence  of 
prosecutors in Romania. 

4 

 
 
                                                 
essential requirement of judicial independence21. The current Minister of Justice has started 
consultations  on  a  draft  proposal  to  disband  the  Section  and  reinstate  the  previous 
organisational model of the prosecution services22, but both the COVID-19 pandemic and the 
political situation have hindered these steps, and the Section remains operational. On 21 July 
2020, Parliament rejected a draft initiative introduced by a group of members of Parliament 
to  dismantle  the  Section,  which  had  also  received  a  negative  consultative  opinion  from  the 
Superior  Council  of  Magistracy23.  Although  authorities  and  stakeholders  report  that  since 
October 2019 the Section has ceased the practice of withdrawing appeals, and the number of 
cases initiated against magistrates has decreased, concerns that it can be used as a tool to put 
pressure  on  magistrates  remain.  In  2019,  Romanian  courts  referred  several  requests  for 
preliminary  rulings  to  the  Court  of  Justice  of  the  EU,  questioning  the  compatibility  of  the 
creation of the Section with EU law, in particular with Article 19(1) TEU and Article 47 of 
the Charter24. The cases are currently pending. 

New  heads  of  the  prosecution  services  were  appointed  in  2019,  but  long-standing 
concerns with the procedure for appointment and dismissal of high ranking prosecutors 
remain. In October 2019, none of the prosecution bodies had an appointed leadership25. One 
of the first actions of the current Minister of Justice was to organise the selection procedures, 
with  increased  transparency,  and  take  forward  a  leadership  process  for  the  prosecution26. 
Nevertheless,  while  the  new  DNA  chief  prosecutor  was  appointed  following  a  positive 
opinion  of  the  Superior  Council  of  Magistracy,  the  Prosecutor  General  and  the  Chief 
prosecutor  for  DIICOT  were  appointed  despite  a  negative  opinion  of  the  Council.  This 
situation highlighted the long-standing shortcomings previously set out by the Commission, 
which,  in  the  context  of  the  CVM,  has  recommended  that  a  more  robust  and  independent 
appointment procedure is needed, and that a sustainable solution could best be achieved with 
the support of the Venice Commission27.  

The  dismissal  in  2018  of  the  former  anti-corruption  directorate  chief  prosecutor  has 
been reviewed by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Romania was found in 
violation  of  Articles  6(1)  (‘Right  to  a  fair  trial’)  and  10  (‘Freedom  of  expression’)  of  the 
European  Convention  of  Human  Rights  in  the  context  of  the  dismissal  of  the  former  DNA 

21   Judgment  of  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  of  6  Nov.  2018,  Ramos  Nunes  de  Carvalho  e  Sá  v. 

Portugal, 55391/13, 57728/13 and 74041/13, para 149.  

22   In  February  2020,  following  a  polling  of  all  courts  and  prosecution  offices,  the  Minister  of  Justice  put 
forward for consultation a proposal to dismantle the section to investigate crimes committed by magistrates, 
which was interrupted due to the COVID-19 pandemic. On 11 June, the invitation to submit proposals was 
renewed, and on 24 June a public debate was held, following a request from an ONG. 

23   The Superior Council of Magistracy Plenum cast ten votes against and eight votes for the proposal, and one 

abstention.  

24   See the Opinion delivered on 23 September 2020 by Advocate General Bobek in Joined Cases C-83/19, C-

127/19 and C-195/19, Cases C-291/19 and C-355/19. 

25   The DNA Chief Prosecutor had been ad interim since July 2018, the Prosecutor General had retired in April 

2019 and the Chief prosecutor of DIICOT had resigned in October 2019. 

26   The selection criteria, the name of candidates and procedures were published on the website of the Ministry 
of  Justice,  interviews  were  streamed.  The  chief  prosecutor  of  the  SIIJ  is  appointed  through  a  different 
procedure managed by the Superior Council of Magistracy. Despite several attempts, the Superior Council of 
Magistracy could not finalise a procedure for nominating a chief prosecutor, deepening the internal divisions 
on the existence of the Section. 

27   Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on Progress in Romania under the 
Cooperation  and  Verification  Mechanism,  COM(2019)  499  final.  The  CVM  reports  recommended  to 
relaunch a process to appoint a Chief prosecutor and to respect negative opinions from the Superior Council 
on  appointments  or  dismissals  of  prosecutors  at  managerial  posts,  until  such  time  as  a  new  legislative 
framework is in place in accordance with recommendation 1 from January 2017. 

5 

 
 
                                                 
chief  prosecutor28.  The  ECtHR  held  that  the  former  chief  prosecutor  had  not  been  able  to 
effectively challenge in court the reasons for her removal from the position29. In that context, 
the  ECtHR  drew  attention  to  the  growing  importance  attached  to  the  intervention  of  an 
authority independent of the executive and the legislature in respect of decisions affecting the 
appointment  and  dismissal  of  prosecutors30.  With  regard  to  the  freedom  of  expression,  the 
ECtHR  underlined  also  that  the  dismissal  could  have  a  chilling  effect,  discouraging  other 
prosecutors and judges from participating in public debate on legislative reforms affecting the 
judiciary  and  more  generally  on  issues  concerning  the  independence  of  the  judiciary31. 
Regarding  the  participation  of  magistrates  in  the  public  debate,  the  CVM  reports  had 
expressed concern as regards the practice of the Judicial Inspection32 of initiating disciplinary 
proceedings  against  judges  and  prosecutors  on  the  basis  of  their  public  statements  on  the 
judicial reforms33.  

Amendments  to  the  law  on  the  Statute  of  Judges  and  Prosecutors  changed  the  rules 
governing  the  civil  liability  of  judges34.  The  new  rules  entitle  the  Ministry  of  Finance  to 
assess  whether  a  judicial  error  was  committed  in  bad  faith  or  by  gross  negligence  and, 
subsequently,  to  initiate  recovery  actions  against  judges  for  the  damage  caused  by  their 
judgments. The new regime provides that, to  establish a judge’s civil  liability, first,  a court 
must  establish  that  the  judgment  concerned  contained  a  judicial  error  and  that  the  harmed 
party should receive compensation, without the judge having rendered the contested decision 
being  involved  in  this  first  judicial  procedure.  Then,  the  Ministry  of  Finance  can  start  a 
recovery action in  court  against the judge, based  on its own assessment of the fact  that the 
judicial  error  resulted  from  the  exercise  of  duties  and  prerogatives  in  bad  faith  or  by  gross 
negligence35. Although the Ministry has the obligation to  consult the Judicial  Inspection on 
this  matter,  the  latter’s  opinion  is  not  binding.  The  Council  of  Europe  recognised  that, 
although it may be legitimate to provide for personal liability of a judge for damage caused 
by a ruling rendered in bad faith or gross negligence, such possibility must be circumscribed 
with  clear  safeguards36  in  order  to  protect  judges  against  abuse  and  prevent  the  executive 
from  exerting  undue  pressure  on  judges.  Concerns  have  been  raised  as  regards  the  power 
assigned  to  the  Ministry  of  Finance  in  this  context37.  The  Council  of  Europe  noted  the 

28   The dismissal took place in 2018 on a proposal of the Minister of Justice. As the Prosecutors’ Section of the 
Council  of  Magistracy  refused  to  endorse  the  proposal,  the  President  of  the  Republic  refused  to  sign  the 
dismissal  decree,  which  prompted  the  Prime  Minister  to  complain  to  the  Constitutional  Court,  which 
ultimately ordered the President to sign the decree. 

29   Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 5 May 2020, Kövesi v. Romania, 3594/19, para 157. 
30   Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 5 May 2020,  Kövesi v. Romania, 3594/19, para 156. 
See also CCPE (2014), Opinion No.9 of the Consultative Council of European Prosecutors to the Committee 
of Ministers of the Council of Europe on European norms and principles concerning prosecutors, para XII 
and explanatory note no. 73. 

31   Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 5 May 2020, Kövesi v. Romania, 3594/19, para 209. 
32   The  Judicial  Inspection  is  a  statutory  body  within  the  judiciary,  functioning  as  an  autonomous  structure 
within the Superior Council of Magistracy, competent  to order and carry out disciplinary investigations in 
view of the exercise of disciplinary action against magistrates. 

33   CVM reports 2018 and 2019. Concerns pointed in particular to the role of the management of the Judicial 
Inspection during that period. The re-appointment of the same Chief Inspector in May 2019 did not assuage 
the concerns. 

34   Art. 1 (151) of Law No. 242/2018 amending Art. 96 of Law No. 303/2004. 
35   Art. 96(8) of Law No. 303/2004. 
36   Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, para 66. 
37   Notably, Venice Commission Opinion (CDL-AD(2018)017), GRECO Ad hoc Report on Romania (Rule 34) 
AdHocRep(2018)2),  CCJE  (Opinion  of  the  CCJE  Bureau  following  a  request  by  the  Romanian  Judges 
Forum  Association  as  regards  the  situation  on  the  independence  of  the  judiciary  in  Romania)  and  CCPE 

6 

 
 
                                                 
potential chilling effect that this new regime could have on judges and prosecutors, especially 
in conjunction with the creation of the new Section for the Investigation of Offences in the 
Judiciary38. A request for a preliminary ruling regarding the new regime of civil liability of 
magistrates is currently pending before the Court of Justice39. 

Quality 

The deficit of human resources in the  justice  system has increased.  In December 2019, 
over  12%  of  the  judges’  positions40  and  almost  20%  of  the  prosecutors’  positions  were 
vacant41.  There  are  concerns  that  the  judiciary  may  become  increasingly  understaffed  once 
the new early retirement scheme for senior judges42 come into force43. While the entry into 
force of the early retirement scheme has been delayed44, this is a temporary solution, which 
does not fully address the concerns45. Moreover, lower courts are also likely to be affected by 
staff shortages, as new provisions extended the period of training and internship for aspiring 
judges46,  the  COVID-19  pandemic  delayed  new  recruitment  procedures  and  no  human 
resources  strategies  have  been  put  forward  by  the  Superior  Council  of  Magistracy. 
Furthermore, the Constitutional Court ruled that the provision entrusting the Superior Council 
of Magistracy with  the task of approving the regulation  on the organisation and conduct  of 
the competition for admission to the judiciary is unconstitutional47, which may lead to further 
delays in new recruitments48. 

The creation of the Strategic Judicial Management did not produce the expected results. 
In  2017,  the  Strategic  Judicial  Management  was  set  up  with  the  aim  of  addressing  major 
strategic  questions  for  the  judicial  system,  bringing  together  the  main  institutions  with 

(Opinion of the CCPE Bureau following a request by the Romanian Movement for Defending the Status of 
Prosecutors as regards the situation on the independence of prosecutors in Romania). 

38   Venice Commission Opinion (CDL-AD(2018)017), paras 117 and 164. 
39   See the Opinion delivered on 23 September 2020 by Advocate General Bobek on case 397/19. 
40   Out of the total of 5068 positions of judge, 4415 positions were occupied and 653 vacant. 
41   Out of the total of 3029 positions of prosecutor, 2492 positions were occupied and 587 vacant. 
42   The 2018 amendments to Law No. 303/2004. 
43   According  to  the  amendment,  magistrates  would  be  able  to  retire  after  20  years  of  service  without  any 
condition  of  age,  with  pensions  which  could  amount  to  75  %  of  the  last  gross  salary,  constituting  an 
incentive  for  judges  and  prosecutors  to  retire.  GRECO  mentions  estimates  that  1.500  to  2.000  magistrates 
would be in a position to retire under this scheme. 

44   Pursuant to Law No. 239/2019, of 19 December 2019, the entry into force of the amendments to Art. 82(3) 

of Law No. 303/2004 was postponed until 1 January 2022.  

45   In particular, the Venice Commission recommended to Romania to reconsider the early retirement scheme, 
to conduct an impact assessment, and, if no particularly convincing arguments for this scheme are found, to 
replace  the  early  retirement  with  other  appropriate  incentives  and  benefits  for  serving  magistrates.  Venice 
Commission Opinion (CDL-AD(2018)017-e), para 155. 

46   The initial and practical training of new recruits is increased to six years altogether (instead of four under the 

current rules). Contribution from MEDEL for the 2020 Rule of Law Report. 

47   Decision no. 121/2020 regarding the exception of unconstitutionality of the provisions of art. 106 lit. a) and 
d) of Law no. 303/2004 on the status of judges and prosecutors, of 9 June 2020. Following this decision, on 
22 June, the Ministry of Justice submitted to public debate  the draft law on the admission to the National 
Institute  of  Magistracy.  http://www.just.ro/ministerul-justitiei-supune-dezbaterii-publice-proiectul-de-lege-
privind-concursul-de-admitere-la-institutul-national-al-magistraturii/.  In  September  2020,  the  Ministry  of 
Justice  announced  the  completion  of  the  public  consultation  phase,  and  the  preparation  of  the  adoption 
process by the Government and subsequent transmission to Parliament. 

48   Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12 of the Committee of  Ministers of the Council of Europe, para 35: ‘[a] 
sufficient number of judges and appropriately qualified support staff should be allocated to the courts’. 

7 

 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
responsibility for the functioning of the judicial system49. It was also responsible for ensuring 
the implementation of the Action Plan of the Strategy for the  Development of the Judiciary 
2015-202050,  which  would  become  the  main  motor  for  judicial  reform,  internalising  the 
reform  momentum  from  the  CVM.  The  action  plan  included  solutions  to  the  issues  of 
shortages  of  court  clerks,  excessive  workload  and  delays  in  motivation  of  decisions. 
However,  following  its  establishment,  the  Strategic  Judicial  Management  has  not  been 
operational as planned and the action plan remains largely unimplemented. 

Romania  has  an  overall  good  level  of  digitalisation  of  justice  and  efforts  continue  to 
develop it further. At present, it is possible to transmit summons and to monitor the stages 
of proceedings online and to submit a case by electronic means, in most courts51. However, 
only some judgments are accessible online52. There are ongoing efforts to improve the case 
management system, which will be used to identify the number of definitive judgments where 
public  institutions  are  debtors  or  creditors.  Currently,  an  analysis  is  being  developed  to 
identify  the  steps  necessary  for  a  modernisation  of  the  system,  including  features  such  as 
electronic  accessibility  of  procedural  documents,  electronic  archiving  and  electronic 
signature. The analysis should be concluded by the end of 2020.  

Efficiency 

Overall,  the  justice  system  handles  its  caseload  efficiently.  In  2018,  the  length  of 
proceedings  at  first  instance  courts  in  civil  and  commercial  cases  decreased  slightly  in 
comparison  to  201753,  while  it  remained  almost  unchanged  for  administrative  cases54.  The 
clearance rate increased  and is  now above 100%55, which means that  the judicial  system is 
able to  resolve more cases than those that are lodged.  In  general,  the length  of proceedings 
regarding  specific  areas  of  EU  law  are  comparatively  low56,  except  for  money  laundering 
cases57.  

Legislative  amendments  affecting  human  resources  may  hinder  Romania’s  efforts  to 
reduce the length of judicial proceedings. Several legislative changes from 2018 could put 
the efforts to reduce excessive length of civil and criminal cases at risk58. The provisions of 
the civil procedure code on council chamber proceedings, aiming at improving the efficiency 
of the handling of the cases have been eliminated59. However, the main concern stems from 
the amendments of the Justice laws which risk contributing to increasing the deficit in human 

49   It is composed of the Minister of Justice, the President of the Superior Council of Magistracy, the President 
of the High Court of Cassation and Justice and the Prosecutor-General of the Prosecutor’s Office attached to 
the High Court of Cassation and Justice.  

50   Action Plan approved by Government Decision 282 of 2016. 
51   Figure 27, 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
52   Figure 28, 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
53   Figure 6, 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
54   Figure 8, 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
55   Figure 10, 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
56   Figures 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20, 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
57   Figure 21, 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
58   Romania has been found in violation of Art. 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights on account 
of the excessive length of civil or criminal proceedings in a significant number of cases, and subsequently 
brought  structural  solutions  to  this  issue.  E.  g.,  Judgment  of  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  of  26 
November  2013,Vlad  v.  Romania  (application  No.  40756/06,  )  is  a  leading  case  for  30  repetitive  cases 
regarding excessive length of civil and criminal proceedings and lack of an effective remedy, which remains 
under enhanced supervision of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe.  

59   The entry into force of the respective provision of the Civil Procedure Code was delayed several times and 

eventually abrogated.  

8 

 
 
                                                 
resources  (see  above),  but  also  require  additional  judges  on  certain  panels60  or  higher 
seniority in  the specialised prosecution offices.  Stakeholders also  voice concerns as regards 
the efficiency of the justice system61. In response to these concerns, the Superior Council of 
Magistracy  has  launched  two  projects  aimed  at  identifying  tools  needed  for  developing  the 
judicial system, and addressing the causes of the overload of courts62.  

II.  ANTI-CORRUPTION FRAMEWORK 

Romania has the legislative and institutional anti-corruption framework broadly in place. The 
implementation  of the  current  National  Anti-corruption Strategy, covering the period 2016-
2020,  is  ongoing.  The  coordination  of  its  implementation  is  ensured  by  the  Ministry  of 
Justice. The specialised anti-corruption prosecution, the National Anti-corruption Directorate 
(DNA)  has  the  competence  to  investigate  medium  and  high-level  corruption  cases  and  the 
Prosecutor  General’s  office  investigates  all  other  corruption  cases.  A  specialised  anti-
corruption directorate exists in the Ministry of Interior, competent for integrity and corruption 
issues within the staff employed by the Ministry, including the police. The National Integrity 
Agency (ANI) is responsible for the monitoring and verification of assets, conflicts of interest 
and  incompatibilities,  including  of  all  elected  officials.  The  National  Agency  for  the 
Management of Seized Assets (ANABI) ensures the management of seized and confiscated 
criminal assets. 

In  the  Transparency  International  Corruption  Perceptions  Index,  Romania  scored 
44/100 and ranks 19th in the European Union and 70th globally63. 83% of the Romanian 
respondents consider corruption widespread in their country (EU average 71%) and 64% of 
people  feel  personally  affected  by  corruption  in  their  daily  lives  (EU  average  26%)64.  As 
regards  businesses,  97%  of  companies  consider  corruption  to  be  widespread  (EU  average 
63%) and 88% of companies consider that corruption is a problem when doing business (EU 
average 37%). At the same time,  58% of respondents  find that there are  enough successful 
prosecutions  to  deter  people  from  corrupt  practices  (EU  average  36%)  while  37%  of 
companies  consider  that  people  and  businesses  caught  for  bribing  a  senior  official  are 
appropriately punished (EU average 31%)65. 

Romania  has  a  comprehensive  national  anti-corruption  strategic  framework  based  on 
the  large  participation  of  national  and  local  institutional  actors.  The  current  National 
Anti-corruption  Strategy  (NAS),  covering  the  period  2016-2020,  provides  for  the  voluntary 
involvement  of  a  very  large  part  of  the  public  administration,  including  local  government, 
and State-owned enterprises, as well as law enforcement, the prosecution service, the courts, 
and civil society. The prevention tools are based on corruption prevention plans developed by 
each  participating  institution  through  self-evaluation  and  risk  assessments,  and  commonly 
developed  methodologies,  as  well  as  peer  review  evaluations.  The  effectiveness  of  the 
strategy  relies  heavily  on  political  commitment  and  its  implementation  has  been  rather 
subdued in the period 2017-2019, despite deadlines set by the Government in August 2016. 

60   The entry into force of these provisions related to the 3 judges’ composition of panels (instead of 2 judges) 
has been delayed to 2021 (Law no. 239/2019 approved GEO no. 92/2018 for the amendment and completion 
of some normative acts in the field of justice). 

61   Contribution from MEDEL to the online stakeholder consultation for the 2020 Rule of Law Report. 
62   Contribution  from  the  Superior  Council  of  Magistracy  to  the  online  stakeholder  consultation  for  the  2020 

Rule of Law Report. 

63   Transparency International (2020), 2019 Corruption Perceptions Index.  
64   Special Eurobarometer 502 (2020). 
65   Flash Eurobarometer 482 (2019). Businesses' attitudes towards corruption in the EU. 

9 

 
 
                                                 
In 2019, the commitment of the current Government to address corruption has translated into 
a renewed impetus to implement the preventive national anti-corruption strategy. The level of 
implementation of the strategy has increased and the preventive actions are being followed up 
both at national and at local level. The Ministry of Justice is now also evaluating the strategy 
in view of designing the next one66.  

The  effectiveness  of  the  investigation  and  sanctioning  of  corruption  cases  has  been 
impacted by pressure exercised  on the legal and institutional framework.  In the period 
2013-2017,  the  track  record  of  the  institutions  involved  in  investigating,  prosecuting  and 
ruling  on  high-level  and  medium  level  corruption  has  been  strong  and  consistently 
maintained. In 2018 and 2019, whereas the institutions continued to investigate and sanction 
high-level corruption offences, the CVM reports noted a pattern of pressure on the key anti-
corruption  institutions,  and  growing  concerns  that  the  continued  pressure  had  a  detrimental 
impact. Both the DNA and the Prosecutor General67 reported a backtracking of results in the 
fight against corruption for 2019. Ad interim leadership for a prolonged period impacted their 
capacity  to  deal  with  the  constant  pressure  and  the  repeated  challenges.  Their  institutional 
capacity has been further affected by detrimental provisions in the amended Justice laws on 
the human resources68. The creation of the Section to Investigate crimes within the Judiciary 
(SIIJ)  also  impacted  the  results  of  the  fight  against  high-level  corruption69.  In  addition,  a 
number  of  Constitutional  Court  decisions  have  had  a  particular  impact  on  high-level 
corruption cases notably decisions on the practices for  establishing the three and five-judge 
criminal  panels  in  the  High  Court  of  Cassation  and  Justice70,  on  technical  supervision 
methods (wiretapping)71 and on the corruption related crime of abuse in office72. According 
to the DNA, the combined implications of these decisions are particularly severe, leading to 
the  dropping  of  investigations  and  annulment  of  cases  in  court,  annulment  of  final  court 

66   Next  to  the  internal  evaluation,  the  National  Anti-Corruption  Strategy  is  also  evaluated  by  an  external 

contractor. 

67   Information received in the context of the country visit. 
68   Such as abrupt increases in seniority requirements for prosecutors or new rules for delegations. The impact 
of staff shortage was also increased as, at the same time, the prosecution services were forced to develop in 
house capacity for surveillance measures and wiretapping. 

69   For  cases  that  involve  a  judge  or  a  prosecutor,  the  Section  retains  powers  of  criminal  prosecution  for  all 
other persons potentially involved. A number of complex high-level corruption cases being investigated by 
the DNA and involving investigations of elected public officials  were thus transferred to the new  Section, 
while the section  was understaffed and lacked the expertise. Since it became operational in October 2018, 
the  Section  has  issued  a  negligible  number  of  indictments.  Furthermore,  the  Section  withdrew  appeals  in 
several high-level corruption cases previously lodged by the DNA. See also CVM Progress report 2019. 
70   Constitutional Court of Romania, Decisions no. 685/2018 and no. 417/2019. The Constitutional Court ruled 
that  the  practice  of  appointing  de  jure  members  –  one  by  panel  (the  president  or  the  vice-president  of  the 
High Court) – in the composition of the five-judge panels of the High Court of Cassation and Justice (HCCJ) 
was  contrary  to  the  rule  that  required  that  all  members  be  drawn  by  lot.  It  also  ruled  that,  contrary  to  the 
applicable legislation, the HCCJ had failed to establish specialist three-judge panels to deal at first instance 
with  corruption  offences.  The  Constitutional  Court’s  rulings  imply  the  possibility  to  reopen  appeal 
proceedings  or  to  have  cases  re-examined  at  first  instance,  under  certain  conditions  mentioned  in  the 
respective decisions of the Constitutional Court. Several requests for a preliminary ruling regarding the legal 
effects of these rulings of the Constitutional Court and their compatibility with EU law are currently pending 
before the Court of Justice (joined cases C-357/19 and C-547/19, case C-379/19 and joined cases C-811/19 
and C-840/19). 

71   A number of decisions were ruled in the period 2016-2020. Constitutional Court rulings meant that for any 
future cases the prosecution should no longer use the technical and human capacity of Intelligence Services 
to collect evidence to be used in criminal procedures and should establish its own capability. 

72   Constitutional Court of Romania, Decision of 2016. Uncertainty in the definition of the crime has resulted in 
investigations  being  dropped  or  cases  annulled  in  court.  There  is  a  need  for  the  legislator  to  clarify  the 
definition in the Criminal Code, as is the case for a number of Constitutional Court decisions.  

10 

 
 
                                                 
decisions  and  the  reopening  of  trials  on  the  merits  of  the  cases  concerned,  with  a  risk  of 
potentially enabling the evasion of criminal responsibility for corruption offences. In the first 
months of 2020, the situation appears to have improved with a reduction in political pressure 
and  the  appointments  of  stable  management  teams.  Nevertheless,  the  uncertainty  about 
ongoing  investigations  and  trials  in  high-level  corruption  cases  remains.  During  the  2015-
2019  period,  Romania  had  the  second  highest  number  of  OLAF  investigations  (40)  closed 
with a financial recommendation among Member States73. 

Continued  uncertainty  about  amendments  of  the  Criminal  Code  and  Criminal 
Procedure Code puts the fight against corruption at risk. A number of amendments to the 
Criminal Code and Criminal Procedure Code are long overdue74. These amendments should 
in  particular  find  legal  and  policy  solutions  to  a  number  of  far-reaching  decisions  of  the 
Constitutional Court since 2014, which have annulled provisions of the codes and impacted 
in  particular  the  fight  against  corruption  and  organised  crime75.  However,  in  April  2019, 
amendments  to  the  Criminal  Code,  the  Criminal  Procedure  Code  and  the  special  law  on 
corruption  were  adopted  by  Parliament  through  urgency  procedures  with  potential  negative 
consequences  for  the  fight  against  crime  in  general  and  the  fight  against  corruption  in 
particular.  These  amendments,  which  follow  an  initial  aborted  attempt  of  weakening  the 
criminal  codes  in  201876,  received  widespread  criticism  and  were  ruled  unconstitutional  in 
July  201977.  Hence,  they  did  not  enter  into  force.  The  task  to  bring  the  Criminal  Code  and 
Criminal  Procedure  Code  in  line  with  all  decisions  of  the  Constitutional  Court  remains 
pending.  The  legal  uncertainty  and  the  risks  to  the  sustainability  of  the  fight  against 
corruption therefore remain. 

Other  obstacles  to  effective  prosecution  continue.  One  specific  issue  concerns  the 
accountability  of  Parliament  in  its  decisions  on  requests  from  the  prosecution  to  authorise 
preventive measures such as searches or arrest and on requests to authorise the investigation 
of a Member of Parliament when he/she is also or has been a Minister. Responding to CVM 
and GRECO recommendations78, the Chamber of Deputies amended its rule of procedure in 

73   Financial recommendations are addressed by OLAF to the EU institutions or national authorities providing 
or managing EU funds to seek the recovery of the defrauded EU funds to the EU budget. OLAF’s financial 
recommendations in the two main areas of shared management (European Structural and Investment Funds 
and Agriculture) from 2015-2019 amounted to 0.35% of the total payments to Romania for the years 2015-
2019  (with  the  EU-27  average  at  0.36%).  The  financial  impact  of  the  irregularities  detected  by  Romania 
itself was however higher at 2.92% (The OLAF Report 2019, Table 6). 

74   CVM reports had consistently recommended to improve the stability of the codes, with amendments limited 
to where specifically required by Constitutional Court decisions and transposition of EU Directives. In the 
2017  CVM  report,  the  Commission  recommended  that  the  reform  of  the  criminal  code  and  criminal 
procedure  code  should  be  concluded  with  Parliament  taking  forward  the  amendments  presented  by  the 
Government. 

75   See  previous  paragraph.  A  number  of  draft  laws  and  Emergency  Ordinances  have  been  adopted  by  the 

successive governments but most are still pending in Parliament.  

76   A first aborted attempt to weaken the criminal codes took place in 2018. The legislative changes of 24 April 
2018 to the Criminal Code and to the Code of Criminal Procedure through urgency procedure were heavily 
criticised. In October 2018 the Constitutional Court ruled that many provisions were unconstitutional. As a 
result,  the  November  2018  CVM  report  (COM(2018)851)  issued  an  additional  recommendation  to  review 
the  revision  of  the  two  codes  taking  fully  into  account  the  need  for  compatibility  with  EU  law  and 
international  anti-corruption  instruments,  as  well  as  the  recommendations  under  the  CVM  and  the  Venice 
Commission Opinion (CDL-AD(2018)021).  

77   Constitutional Court of Romania, Decision 466 of 29 July 2019.  
78   CVM Recommendation 10:” Adopt objective criteria for deciding on and motivating lifting of immunity of 
Members of Parliament to help ensure that immunity is not used to avoid investigation and prosecution of 
corruption crimes. The government could also consider modifying the law to limit immunity of ministers to 

11 

 
 
                                                 
2019 making reference to criteria set out by the Venice Commission. The new procedure has 
not been tested yet, and the Senate does not have a similar procedure. Two requests from the 
prosecution  in  2019  to  start  investigating  two  former  ministers  and  members  of  Parliament 
were rejected. 

The  National  Integrity  Agency  (ANI)  continues  to  deliver,  however  its  effectiveness  is 
under  stress,  due  to  weakening  of  its  legislative  framework  and  decreasing  resources. 
ANI  is  responsible  for  examining  administrative  conflicts  of  interest,  incompatibilities  and 
unjustified wealth and has developed a strong track-record. Sanctioning incompatibilities and 
conflicts  of interest  are  an important  element  in  the prevention of corruption. ANI has  also 
developed  strong  prevention  tools  on  administrative  conflicts  of  interest,  in  particular  in 
relation  to  public  procurement,  and  overall  awareness  campaigns,  including  relating  to 
national and local elections. CVM reports have highlighted continued challenges to the legal 
framework  for  integrity  and  the  need  for  stability  and  clarity  and  a  robust  and  stable 
framework79. Several legislative changes that came into effect in 2019 weakened the regime 
of  incompatibilities  and  conflicts  of  interest80.  As  a  result  ANI  had  to  close  an  important 
number  of  ongoing  investigations  and  further  cases  have  been  annulled  in  court.  ANI  also 
reports  an  increase  in  challenges  to  the  application  of  sanctions  following  final  court 
decisions  for  local  elected  officials,  with  the  result  that  the  sanctions  for  incompatibility  or 
conflicts  of interest  are  not  applied, with  consequences on the  application of integrity rules 
for elections. The Agency has proposed to work with the Ministry of Justice and stakeholders 
to  review  the  integrity  laws  and  design  a  coherent  and  consolidated  legal  framework. 
Although the workload of the Agency increases significantly in election times, its budget has 
been reduced.  

Codes  of  ethics  and  conduct  were  introduced  for  members  of  Parliament81  and  the 
Government82  in  recent  years,  in  addition  to  the  existing  ones  for  the  civil  service. 
However,  the  effectiveness  of  the  mechanism  to  enforce  the  code  of  conduct  of 
parliamentarians  remains  to  be  proven,  as  there  are  only  a  few  cases  of  members  of 
Parliament having been disciplined83.  

The National Agency for the Management of Seized Assets (ANABI) is fully operational. 
The  mission  of  ANABI  is  to  ensure  an  effective  execution  rate  of  the  confiscation  orders 
issued  in  criminal  matters,  through  an  efficient  management  of  seized  assets  that  are 
distributed to the Agency by prosecutors and judges. It has progressed on the development of 
a national integrated system to monitor the measures taken by the authorities at each step of 

time in office. These steps could be assisted by the Venice Commission and GRECO. The Parliament should 
set up a system to report regularly on decisions taken by its Chambers on requests for lifting immunities and 
could  organise  a  public  debate  so  that  the  Superior  Council  of  Magistracy  and  civil  society  can  respond”; 
GRECO – Fourth Evaluation round. 

79   CVM reports regretted the absence of a sustainable integrity framework (see for example COM(2017) 44). 
80   One particular concern is related to a provision setting a prescription deadline of three years from the deeds 
that  determine  the  state  of  conflict  of  interest  or  incompatibility.  As  a  result,  ANI  had  to  close  about  200 
investigations, and it has further lead to cases being annulled in court, with the result that it is now unclear 
whether a sanction can still be applied after a final court decision if this (rather than the ANI report itself) 
comes after the end of the three year period. 

81   Parliament of Romania, Decision no° 77/2017 on the Code of Conduct of deputies and senators. 
82   Code  of  Conduct  for  members  of  the  Government:  http://gov.ro/ro/guvernul/sedinte-guvern/cod-de-

conduita-al-membrilor-guvernului.  

83   GRECO – Fourth Evaluation round. The 2019 CVM report further notes that the lack of explicit provisions 
on the respect of the independence of the judiciary does not make it clear whether the codes of conduct are 
able to act as effective tools of accountability. 

12 

 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
the  asset  recovery  process.  In  December  2019,  over  30  non-governmental  organisations 
requested  the  Government  to  re-instate  the  provisions  of  ANABI’s  mandate  on  ‘social 
reuse’84, which would have ensured that part of the confiscated proceeds of crime are used to 
finance crime prevention projects visible in society85.  

Romania  has  a  dedicated  law  on  whistleblowing  protection  since  2004.  Lobbying  is 
regulated by soft law, in particular through the setting up of a voluntary transparency register. 
‘Revolving doors’ aspects are regulated in specific legal provisions86. Legislative provisions 
ensure  protection  from  public  authorities,  public  institutions  and  other  entities  for  staff 
reporting  violations  of  the  law87.  Many  institutions  have  adopted  operational  procedures 
aimed  at  implementing  the  whistleblowing  legislation  and  other  integrity  instruments. 
However, the private sector is not covered by the existing legislation. 

III.  MEDIA PLURALISM 

The Constitution enshrines the right to freedom of expression as well as the right of access to 
any  information  of  public  interest.  The  Audio-visual  Law  determines  the  mission  and 
composition  of  the  media  regulator  and  requires  it  to  ensure  the  transparency  of  the 
organisation, functioning and financing of the mass media in the audio-visual sector88. 

The regulatory authority in the field of audio-visual media is the National Audio-visual 
Council  (CNA).  Its  mission  is  established  by  the  Audio-visual  Law89.  CNA  is  an 
autonomous  public  authority  under  parliamentary  control  and  the  guarantor  of  the  public 
interest in the field of audio-visual communication90. The decisions and opinions of the CNA 
are publically available on its website91. The Council is composed of 11 members appointed 
by the Parliament - by the majority of the present senators and deputies, for a 6 years mandate 
-  on  the  basis  of  the  nomination  by  the  Senate  (3  members);  Chamber  of  Deputies  (3 
members); President of Romania (2 members); and the Government (3 members). The Media 
Pluralism  Monitor  (MPM  2020)  assesses  the  independence  and  effectiveness  of  the  media 
authority  at  low  risk.  It  notes,  however,  the  limited  expertise  of  some  of  the  appointed 
Members  and  a  lack  of  consensus  about  norms92.  It  appears  from  the  country  visit  that  the 
budget allocated by the State to finance CNA’s activities has been hit by the Covid-19 crisis, 
and the authority is understaffed, notably in view of the additional tasks linked to the digital 
environment93.  

84   In 2018, the Government adopted an emergency ordinance abolishing the social reuse. Art. 60 of GEO no. 

114/2018 repealed art. 37 of the Law no. 318/2015. 

85   Centre 

for  Legal  Resources:  http://www.crj.ro/apel-peste-30-de-onguri-solicita-guvernului-romaniei-

inlaturarea-efectelor-distructive-ale-oug-114-2018-in-privinta-reutilizarii-sociale-a-sumelor-confiscate-din-
infractiuni/.  

86   Law No. 161/2003; Emergency Ordinance of the Government no. 66/2011 and the Law no. 98/2016.  
87   https://www.whistleblowing.it/Romanian%20Law%20571-2004%20-%20whistleblowingEN.pdf. 
88   Reporters without Borders (2020), World Press Freedom Index: Romania is at the 48th position worldwide: 

https://rsf.org/en/ranking. 

89   Law 504/2002. 
90   Input from Romania for the 2020 Rule of Law Report. 
91   National Audio-visual Council of Romania website: http://www.cna.ro/-Informa-ii-privind-licen-ele-.html.  
92   2020 Media Pluralism Monitor. 
93   In this context, it should be recalled that the revised Audio-visual Media Services Directive (AVMSD) sets 
out specific guarantees for the independence and effectiveness of national media regulators. The Romanian 
authorities have prepared a first draft of the law transposing the revised AVMSD. 

13 

 
 
                                                 
In terms of self-regulation in the press sector, professional norms are established at the 
level of the newsroom or publisher. MPM 2020 reports that the lack of specific safeguards 
for  editorial  independence  and  professional  norms,  either  through  legislation  or  self-
regulation, is a cause for concern. 

Transparency  of  media  ownership  appears  to  be  incomplete.  The  Audio-visual  Law94 
provides  that  the  Council  shall  be  required  to  ensure  the  transparency  of  the  organisation, 
functioning  and  financing  of  the  mass  media  in  audio-visual  sector.  Rules  governing 
transparency of media ownership are also included in the company law95.  

State advertising is reportedly used as a method for state interference. The MPM 2020 
reports a high risk to media pluralism in this regard. Stakeholders report that there are gaps in 
the legislation in terms of disclosure requirements, which is seen as a factor contributing to 
the  lack  of  transparency  and  to  potential  for  misuse.96  Also,  the  distribution  of  state 
advertising funds in a discretionary manner is a tool used by state authorities to interfere with 
the media, notably at the local level97.  

While  freedom  of  expression  is  recognised  by  the  Constitution98,  and  access  to  the 
the 
is  unrestricted,  some  reported 
journalistic  profession 
implementation of the legal framework. The MPM 2020 reports some issues related to the 
protection  of  freedom  of  expression,  considering  that  those  issues  tend  to  arise  from 
implementation problems rather than the legislative framework itself. The legislation meant 
to protect people’s dignity and reputation requires those interests to be balanced against the 
freedom of expression. MPM 2020 reports inconsistencies in the interpretation of the law and 
the gravity of the sanctions applied against journalists in that context99. However, ‘libel’ and 
‘insult’ have been decriminalised when the Criminal Code was revised back in 2014.  

issues  stem 

from 

The  enforcement  of  the  constitutional  right  of  access  to  any  information  of  public 
interest faces obstacles. MPM 2020 reports issues with the enforcement of that right when it 
comes to access to documents held by public bodies. Stakeholders report that replies are often 
coming  late100  and/or  incomplete.  Nevertheless,  MPM  2020  also  reports  that  in  all 
contentious  cases  concerning  issues  like  journalistic  access  and  use  of  documents  or 
protection  of  sources,  decisions  are  adjudicated  in  court  following  the  ECHR  case  law101. 
Several stakeholders102 referred to the alleged abuses of the data protection legislation with a 
view to restrict media freedom. Derogation for the processing of personal data for journalistic 
purposes are limited in the Romanian Data Protection Law103. MPM 2020 considered that the 

94   The Audio-visual Law 504/2002 (Legea audiovizualului). 
95   Law 31/1990. 
96   Contribution from the European Federation of Journalists for the 2020 Rule of Law Report. 
97   Findings of the 2020 Media Pluralism Monitor, as confirmed and clarified during the country visit. 
98   Constitution of Romania, Art. 30. 
99   Judgment  of  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  of  28  July  2020,  Monica  Macovei  v.  Romania 
(application no. 53028/14) pointing to a violation of the right to freedom of expression and holding that the 
remedy - damages and the order to pay for the final judgment to be published in newspapers - had a chilling 
effect on the applicant’s freedom of expression. 

100  The time period to reply has been extended from 30 to 60 days. See https://www.osce.org/representative-on-
freedom-of-media/449380. This extension is however temporary, as was established through the Presidential 
Decree No. 195/2020, Art. 56, annex 1, its application being limited to the state of emergency period. 

101  Statement 

from 

the  OSCE 

representative: 

https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-

media/449380.  

102  Information received in the context of the country visit to Romania. 
103  Law no. 190/2018, Art. 7. 

14 

 
 
                                                 
‘national version of the GDPR’ did not feature adequate protection for journalistic work and 
reported  a case  where the Romanian Data Protection Authority (DPA) allegedly sought  the 
disclosure by a news outlet of its sources. 

Threats to Romanian journalists have been reported due to their professional activities. 
In  2019  and  2020,  the  Council  of  Europe  Platform  to  promote the  protection  of  journalism 
and  safety  of  journalists  published  four  alerts  concerning  Romania:  two  alerts  related  to 
abusive defamation lawsuits, one to a death threat targeting an investigative journalist104, and 
one to a suspension of transmission of a TV station105. 

IV.  OTHER INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RELATED TO CHECKS AND BALANCES 

Romania is a semi-presidential representative democratic republic. The Romanian Parliament 
is  bicameral,  comprising  the  Senate  (the  upper  house),  and  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  (the 
lower  house).  The  Government,  Deputies,  Senators,  or  a  group  of  no  less  than  100.000 
citizens have the right of legislative initiative106. The Constitutional Court is the guarantor for 
the supremacy of the Constitution and is responsible for the review of laws107. 

The  process  for  preparing  and  enacting  laws  is  well  regulated,  including  an  extended 
institutional  set-up  of  checks  and  balances.  According  to  the  Constitution,  Parliament  is 
the legislative authority, while the Government has only delegated powers in the  legislative 
process. The ordinary legislative process foresees that the draft legislation should be endorsed 
by  the  public  authorities  with  responsibilities  in  its  application  and  subject  to  public 
consultation108.  Moreover,  the  Legislative  Council,  an  advisory  expert  body  of  Parliament, 
provides  an  opinion  on  all  new  draft  legislation,  ensures  the  systematic  unification  and  co-
ordination  of  the  whole  body  of  laws,  and  keeps  the  official  record  of  the  legislation  of 
Romania109.  Where  the  legislative  initiative  is  exercised  by  the  Government,  the  draft  law 
must be submitted to  Parliament,  where it is  discussed and adopted by both  chambers. The 
President  of  Romania  promulgates  the  law,  but  has  the  prerogative  to  return  the  law  to 
Parliament, once, for reconsideration110. An ex ante constitutionality check can be requested 
by  the  president  of  Chamber  of  Deputies,  the  President  of  the  Senate,  the  Government,  a 
group of Members of Parliament,  the High Court of Cassation  and Justice, the President of 
Romania or the Ombudsman.  

The  ordinary  legislative  process  is  often  side-lined  by  the  widespread  use  of 
Government  Emergency  Ordinances  (GEOs)111.  The  Constitution  provides  that  the 
adoption of GEOs is only possible in exceptional and motivated cases of urgency, and not for 
certain  categories  of  laws  such  as  constitutional  laws  or  laws  affecting  fundamental  rights. 
Nonetheless, successive governments have used GEOs to legislate in many areas, including 

104  The investigation of the case is on-going. 
105  Council  of  Europe,  Platform  to  promote  the  protection  of  journalism  and  safety  of  journalists.  Also 

published on the Mapping Media Freedom platform. 

106  Constitution of Romania, Art. 74. The citizens who exercise their right to a legislative initiative must belong 
to  at  least  one  quarter  of  the  country's  counties,  while,  in  each  of  those  counties  or  the  Municipality  of 
Bucharest, at least 5.000 signatures should be registered in support of such initiative. 

107  Constitution of Romania, Art. 142. 
108  The initiator of a legal act has the obligation to publish the draft law at least 30 days before being submitted 

for analysis, approval and adoption. 

109  Constitution of Romania, Art. 79. 
110  Constitution of Romania, Art. 77(2). 
111  GEOs  have  the  force  of  law  as  soon  as  they  are  published  in  the  Official  Journal.  While  they  have  to  be 

eventually confirmed as laws by Parliament, there is no deadline.  

15 

 
 
                                                 
in  justice  and  electoral  matters  and  in  areas  affecting  fundamental  rights,  raising  concerns 
regarding  the  quality  of  legislation,  legal  certainty  and  the  respect  for  the  separation  of 
powers112.  In  contrast  to  the  ordinary  legislative  procedure,  there  is  no  obligation  of 
consultation  and  the  institutional  checks  cannot  be  exercised113.  While  the  Ombudsman 
(‘Avocatul Poporului’) may challenge the use of the GEOs before the Constitutional Court, 
this prerogative has seldom been used. In a consultative referendum in May 2019 organised 
following the initiative of the President of the Republic114, a majority of citizens  supported 
banning  the  adoption  of  GEOs  in  the  area  of  justice,  as  well  as  extending  the  right  to 
challenge  ordinances  directly  at  the  Constitutional  Court  also  to  other  authorities  than  the 
Ombudsman.  

A state of emergency was declared in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. The State 
of emergency was declared by the President of the Republic on 16 March, with the consent of 
Parliament115. In this context, Romania notified the Council of Europe a derogation from the 
obligations  under  the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights116.  Following  a  request  from 
the Ombudsman in  relation  to  fines that could  be applied, among others,  for not  respecting 
quarantine  rules117, 
that  contested  provisions  were 
unconstitutional, given that, as they restricted or affected fundamental rights and freedoms of 
the citizens or fundamental institutions of the State, they had to be adopted through a law, as 
a formal act of Parliament, and not through a GEO118. 

the  Constitutional  Court  found 

Legislative amendments many times lack predictability and quality, and raise concerns 
with  regard  to  the  public  interest.  Institutional  stakeholders  report  that  key  legislation  is 
changed too often, while the objective of the amendments is often unclear and the resulting 
laws can be contradictory119. The rapid changes of legislation through GEOs and the lack of 
legal  certainty  are  also  detrimental  for  the  investments  environment120.  In  various  policy 
fields, numerous legislative amendments of the same laws, including contradictory changes, 
have been initiated and adopted by Parliament in the last three years. During the legislative 

112  CVM  report  January  2017;  CVM  report  November  2017;  CVM  report  November  2018;  CVM  report 
October  2019;  Venice  Commission  Opinion  (CDL-AD(2018)021);  Venice  Commission  Opinion  (CDL-
AD(2019)014), GRECO (2018), Ad-hoc Report on Romania and GRECO (2016) Fourth Evaluation Round 
– Evaluation Report. 

113  Only non-binding opinions can be delivered (e.g., the opinion of the Legislative Council) 
114  The  questions  submitted  in  the  referendum  were  the  following:  ‘1.  Do  you  agree  with  the  prohibition  on 
amnesties and pardons for corruption offences?; 2. Do you agree with the prohibition of the approval by the 
Government  of  emergency  ordinances  in  the  field  of  offences,  punishments  and  judicial  organisation  and 
with the extension of the right to directly appeal against the ordinances to the Constitutional Court?’. 

115  Decree on the establishment of the emergency situation on the territory of Romania, of 16 March 2020. The 
state of emergency was initially declared for a period of 30 days, and further extended for a new period of 30 
days. Following rulings from the Constitutional Court questioning the legal basis of the state of emergency 
and  the  role  of  the  Parliament  in  the  decision,  the  Parliament  adopted  Law  55/2020  establishing  the  civil 
rights  that  can  be  restricted  during  a  pandemic.  After  the  ending  of  the  second  period  of  the  state  of 
emergency, Romania is in state of danger since 15 May. 

116  Permanent Representation of Romania to the Council of Europe (2020), Note verbale JJ9014C, of 18 March 
2020.  Romania  withdrew  the  derogation  on  15  May  2020  (Permanent  Representation  of  Romania  to  the 
Council of Europe (2020), Note verbale JJ9051C, of 15 May 2020). 

117  The request referred to GEO No. 34/2020. The Ombudsman invoked the lack of clarity and predictability of 
the legal text, which did not contain a rigorous description of a misdemeanour and allowed sanctions to be 
established by military ordinances. 
118  Decision No. 152/2020, of 6 May 2020. 
119  Examples  of  institutional  stakeholders  voicing  this  concern  cited  in  past  CVM  reports  include  the  High 

Court of Cassation and Justice, DNA, and ANI.  

120  The  lack  of  legal  certainty  has  been  also  underlined  in  the  context  of  the  European  Semester;  European 

Semester Country Report 2020. 

16 

 
 
                                                 
process, the Legislative Council often exercises its prerogative to highlight the contradictory 
nature  of  draft  amendments,  as  well  as  the  possible  incompatibilities  with  the  Constitution, 
but  its  opinions  are  only  consultative.  A  large  part  of  the  legislative  proposals  adopted  by 
Parliament are challenged to the Constitutional Court before their promulgation.  

Despite  the  framework  in  place,  impact  assessments  and  public  consultations  are  not 
sufficiently used. While draft normative acts are transmitted for analysis and approval to the 
public  authorities  concerned  only  after  finalisation  of  the  public  consultation,  this 
consultation procedure is seen as formal121. However, many local and central authorities do 
not  publish  the  proposed  legislation  for  public  debate,  and  emergency  or  national  security 
reasons are often invoked to restrict transparency122.  

The  Government  has  taken  measures  to  improve  transparency  and  accountability. 
These measures taken at national and local levels aim at opening the administration through 
the  adoption  of  open  government  principles  and  initiatives.  The  Government  also  made 
available  a  dedicated  open  data  platform  where  a  list  of  open  data  sets  are  publicly 
available123.  In  the  Commission’s  Assessment  framework  for  Public  Administration  and 
Governance,  Romania  scores  very  low  as  regards  the  quality  of  procurement  data  and 
transparency in public procurement124. 

The Government committed to putting in place an Action  Plan to address  the issue of 
implementation  of  court  decisions  and  application  of  jurisprudence  of  the  courts  by 
public  administration.  After  being  found  in  violation  of  Article  6(1)  of  the  European 
Convention  on  Human  Rights  for  the  failure  or  significant  delay  by  the  State  or  by  legal 
entities  under  the  responsibility  of  the  state  to  abide  by  final  domestic  court  decisions125, 
Romania has to set up structural measures necessary to guarantee the execution of pecuniary 
and  non-pecuniary  rulings  by  the  public  administration.  Romania  is  under  enhanced 
supervision  from  the  Council  of  Europe  Committee  of  Ministers  for  the  execution  of  this 
judgment126.  On  3  April  2019,  the  Romanian  Government  approved  a  Memorandum  on 
measures to ensure the execution of judgments against a public debtor, in accordance with the 
case  law  of  the  ECtHR  regarding  non-execution  or  execution  with  delay  of  the  judgments 
handed  down  against  a  public  debtor.  This  plan  includes  a  mechanism  to  provide  accurate 
statistics to enable future monitoring. 

Independent authorities play a role in safeguarding fundamental rights and the rule of 
law. The Romanian Institute for Human Rights (RIHR) is a non-accredited associate member 
of  European  Network  on  National  Human  Rights  Institutions127,  and  has  a  promotional 
mandate  and  addresses  a  wide  range  of  human  rights  in  Romania.  In  2020,  a  legislative 
procedure  was  initiated  to  clarify  the  mandate  and  attributions  of  RIHR,  which  grants  it 
competence  to  issue  opinions  at  the  request  of  parliamentary  committees  on  drafts  or  other 

121  Public administration characteristics and performance in EU28: Romania, 2018, p. 868. 
122  Public administration characteristics and performance in EU28: Romania, 2018, p. 872.  
123  Government data portal: http://data.gov.ro/. 
124  European Commission (2019), Assessment framework for Public Administration and Governance: 2.4 out of 

10 points. 

125  Judgment  of  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  of  6  September  2005,  Săcăleanu  group  v.  Romania 

(Application No. 73970/01). 

126  Department  for  the  Execution  of  Judgments  of  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  (2019),  Decision 

CM/Del/Dec(2019)1340/H46-15. 

127  It  had  been  previously  accredited  with  C  status,  which  is  no  longer  a  valid  accreditation  status.  The 

Romanian Institute applied for accreditation in 2020. 

17 

 
 
                                                 
issues  regarding  human  rights  which  are  examined  in  Parliament128.  The  Ombudsman129  is 
mandated  to  defend  individuals’  rights  and  freedoms  in  their  relationship  with  the  public 
authorities.  It  is  a  public  authority,  autonomous  and  independent.  Its  prerogatives  include 
referring laws and government ordinances, including Government Emergency Ordinances, to 
the Constitutional Court for ex post constitutional review130. 

Romanian civil society is active in defending the rule of law, and has reacted to attempts 
to  limit  the  activities  of  non-governmental  organisations  Freedom  of  association  is 
enshrined  in  the  Constitution,  and  Government  Ordinance  26/2000  provides  for  the  rules 
governing the setting up associations and foundations131. This act creates the framework for 
facilitating the access of associations and foundations to private and public resources, as well 
as the partnership between the public authorities and the legal persons of private law without 
patrimonial purpose. The strong involvement of civil society in the anti-corruption efforts has 
been  key  to  encourage  reforms.  Between  2017  and  2019,  the  civil  society  was  active  in 
criticising  controversial  reforms132  and  expressing  its  strong  support  for  the  rule  of  law. 
Stakeholders report that there have been several attempts to interfere in the activities of non-
governmental organisations133, but that the joint reaction of civil society has prevented them 
to  materialise134.  In  particular,  stakeholders  expressed  concern  that  the  transposition  into 
Romanian law of EU rules on combating money laundering and terrorist  financing135 could 
have an impact on non-governmental organisations, namely by requiring them to publish in 
the registry at the Ministry of Justice all the beneficiaries of their activities or all their donors, 
which civil society organisations have opposed136. 

128  Contribution from the European Network on National Human Rights Institutions for the 2020 Rule of Law 

Report. 

129  The  Ombudsman  is  not  an  ENNRHI  member  and  is  not  accredited.  The  Ombudsman  applied  for 

accreditation in 2020. 

130  Art. 15(h) and (i), Law No. 35/1997, of March 13. 
131  4173 federations, associations, foundations,  unions and foreign legal persons were registered in the official 

Registry in the reference period (2019 – April 2020). 

132  See section I. 
133  The  civil  society  space  is  considered  to  be  narrowed  (ratings  given  by  CIVICUS;  ratings  are  on  a  five-

category scale defined as: open, narrowed, obstructed, repressed and closed). 

134  Contribution from Funky Citizens for the 2020 Rule of Law Report. 
135  Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the prevention 
of  the  use  of  the  financial  system  for  the  purposes  of  money  laundering  or  terrorist  financing,  amending 
Regulation  (EU)  No  648/2012  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council,  and  repealing  Directive 
2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directive 2006/70/EC. 

136  Contribution  from  Funky  Citizens  for  the  2020  Rule  of  Law  Report;  contribution  from  the  European 

Network on National Human Rights Institutions for the 2020 Rule of Law Report. 

18 

 
 
                                                 
Annex I: List of sources in alphabetical order*.  
* The list of contributions received in the context of the consultation for the 2020 Rule of Law report 

can be found at (COM website). 

CEPEJ (2018), European judicial systems: efficiency and quality of justice.  

CIVICUS (2020), Romania country profile. https://monitor.civicus.org/country/romania/. 

Consultative  Council  of  European Judges (CCJE)  (2019),  Opinion of  the  CCJE  Bureau following  a 
request by the Romanian Judges Forum Association as regards the situation on the independence of 
the judiciary in Romania. 

Consultative  Council  of  European  Prosecutors  (CCPE)  (2019),  Opinion  of  the  CCPE  Bureau 
following a request by the Romanian Movement for Defending the Status of Prosecutors as regards 
the situation on the independence of prosecutors in Romania. 

Council  of  Europe:  Committee  of  Ministers  (2010),  Recommendation  CM/Rec(2010)12  of  the 
Committee of Ministers to member states on judges: independence, efficiency and responsibilities. 

Council  of  Europe:  Committee  of  Ministers  (2016),  Recommendation  CM/Rec(2016)4  on  the 

protection of journalism and safety of journalists and other media actors. 

Court of Justice of the European Union, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, case C-64/16., 

judgment of 27 February 2018. 

Directorate-General  for  Communication  (2016,  2017,  2018,  2019,  2020),  Eurobarometer:  perceived 

independence of the national justice system in the EU among the general public. 

Eurocommerce (2020), Single Market Barriers Overview. 

European  Commission  (2013,  2014,  2015,  2016,  2017,  2018,  2019,  2020),  The  EU  Justice 

Scoreboard.  

European  Commission  (2017),  Report  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament  and  the 
Council on Progress in Romania under the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism, COM(2017) 
44 final. 

European Commission (2017), Technical report Romania 2019 SWD(2017) 25 final. 

European  Commission  (2017),  Report  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament  and  the 
Council on Progress in Romania under the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism, COM(2017) 
751 final. 

European Commission (2017), Technical report Romania 2019 SWD(2017) 701 final. 

European  Commission  (2018),  Report  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament  and  the 
Council on Progress in Romania under the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism, COM(2018) 
851 final. 

European Commission (2018), Technical report Romania 2019 SWD(2018) 551 final. 

European Commission (2020), The OLAF Report 2019. 

European Commission (2019), Assessment framework for Public Administration and Governance. 

European  Commission  (2019),  Report  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament  and  the 
Council on Progress in Romania under the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism, COM(2019) 
499 final.  

European Commission (2019), Technical report Romania 2019 (SWD (2019) 393 final. 

European Commission (2020), European semester country report – Romania. 

European  Network  of  Councils  for  the  Judiciary  (2020),  Independence  and  Accountability  of  the 

Judiciary – ENCJ Survey on the independence of judges, 2019. 

19 

 
 
European  Network  on  National  Human  Rights  Institutions  (2020),  Contribution  from  the  European 

Network on National Human Rights Institutions for the 2020 Rule of law Report. 

European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2020), Submission to the European Commission in 

the context of the preparation of the first annual Rule of Law Report. 

Funky Citizens (2020), Contribution to the online stakeholder consultation for the 2020 Rule of Law 

Report. 

GRECO  (2014),  Fourth  evaluation round  – evaluation  report  on  corruption prevention in  respect of 

members of parliament, judges and prosecutors – Romania.  

GRECO  (2019),  Fourth  evaluation round  – evaluation  report  on  corruption prevention in  respect of 

members of parliament, judges and prosecutors – Compliance report Romania.  

GRECO (2019), Follow-up Report to the Ad hoc Report on Romania (Rule 34). 

MEDEL (2020), Contribution to the online stakeholder consultation for the 2020 Rule of Law Report. 

National Union of Romanian Judges e a. (2020), Report on the State of the Justice System and of the 

Rule of Law in Romania. 

Romanian Government (2020), Written contribution to the 2020 Rule of Law Report. 

Superior  Council  of  Magistracy  (2020),  Contribution  to  the  online  stakeholder  consultation  for  the 

2020 Rule of Law Report. 

Venice Commission (2012), Opinion on the compatibility with constitutional principles and the rule 
of law of actions taken by the government and the parliament of Romania in respect of other state 
institutions  and  on  the  government  emergency  ordinance  on  amendment  to  the  law  No.  47/1992 
regarding  the  organisation  and  functioning  of  the  Constitutional  Court  and  on  the  government 
emergency ordinance on amending and completing the law No. 3/200 regarding the organisation of 
a referendum of Romania, CDL-AD(2012)026. 

Venice  Commission  (2019),  Opinion  on  Emergency  Ordinances  No.  7  and  GEO  No.  12  Amending 

the Laws of Justice. 

Virtual country visit to Romania in the context of the 2020 Rule of Law Report. 

20 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex II: Country visit to Romania 

The Commission services held virtual meetings in June 2020 with: 

  Association of Romanian Judges 
  Association “Mișcarea pentru apărarea statutului procurorilor” 
  Center for independent journalism 
  Expertforum 
  Freedom House 
  Funky citizens 
  High Court of Cassation and Justice 
 
Initiative for Justice Association 
  Legal Commission of the Chamber of Deputies 
  Legislative Council 
  Media Association – Cluj 
  Ministry of Justice 
  National Agency for the Management of Seized Assets  
  National Anti-corruption Directorate 
  National Anti-corruption Strategy 
  National Audiovisual Council 
  National Integrity Agency 
  National Union of the Romanian Judges 
  Ombudsman 
  OCCRP 
  Prosecutor’s Office attached to the High Court of Cassation and Justice 
  Romanian Judges’ Forum 
  Secretariat General of the Government 
  Superior Council for Magistracy 

* The Commission also met the following organisations in a number of horizontal meetings:  

  Amnesty International 
  Civil Liberties Union for Europe 
  Civil Society Europe 
  Conference of European Churches  
  EuroCommerce 
  European Center for Not-for-Profit Law  
  European Centre for Press and Media Freedom 
  European Civic Forum  
  Free Press Unlimited 
  Front Line Defenders 
 
ILGA-Europe 
 
International Commission of Jurists 
 
International Federation for Human Rights  
 
International Press Institute  
  Lifelong learning Platform  
  Open Society Justice Initiative/Open Society European Policy Institute 
  Reporters without Borders  
  Transparency International EU  

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