COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 2020 Rule of Law Report Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Portugal Accompanying the document COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 2020 Rule of Law Report The rule of law situation in the European Union
Date: 2020-09-30
Institutions: European Commission, Secretariat-General
Subjects: Portugal, administrative transparency, coronavirus disease, corruption, democracy, epidemic, independence of the judiciary, infringement of EU law, political rights, rule of law

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 30.9.2020  SWD(2020) 321 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 2020 Rule of Law Report Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Portugal Accompanying the document COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS  2020 Rule of Law Report      The rule of law situation in the European Union {COM(2020) 580 final} - {SWD(2020) 300 final} - {SWD(2020) 301 final} - {SWD(2020) 302 final} - {SWD(2020) 303 final} - {SWD(2020) 304 final} - {SWD(2020) 305 final} - {SWD(2020) 306 final} - {SWD(2020) 307 final} - {SWD(2020) 308 final} - {SWD(2020) 309 final} - {SWD(2020) 310 final} - {SWD(2020) 311 final} - {SWD(2020) 312 final} - {SWD(2020) 313 final} - {SWD(2020) 314 final} - {SWD(2020) 315 final} - {SWD(2020) 316 final} - {SWD(2020) 317 final} - {SWD(2020) 318 final} - {SWD(2020) 319 final} - {SWD(2020) 320 final} - {SWD(2020) 322 final} - {SWD(2020) 323 final} - {SWD(2020) 324 final} - {SWD(2020) 325 final} - {SWD(2020) 326 final}  
 
 
ABSTRACT 

The  Portuguese  justice  system  continues  to  face  challenges  as  regards  its  efficiency,  in 
particular  in  administrative  and  tax  courts.  Several  initiatives  are  underway  to  improve  the 
quality  and  the  efficiency  of  justice,  and  special  attention  is  being  given  to  the 
implementation  of  digital  solutions  in  all  types  of  courts.  Important  reforms  have  been 
undertaken  regarding  the  adaptation  of  the  judicial  map  and  for  matching  the  existing 
resources  with  the  identified  needs.  Following  allegations  of  specific  breaches  in  the 
electronic case allocation system, the High Council for the Judiciary has applied disciplinary 
sanctions and is investigating possible irregularities in the allocation of cases. 

The  criminal  legal  framework  to  fight  corruption  is  broadly  in  place.  A  National  Anti-
Corruption  Strategy  is  in  preparation.  Until  December  2019,  when  the  Government 
announced that it will work on a national anti-corruption strategy, there was no coordinated 
strategic approach to corruption. Policy and legislative responses were largely introduced in a 
patchwork  manner,  to  address  various  shortcomings  as  they  were  revealed.  Progress  in  the 
fight  against  corruption  has  continued  to  be  achieved  by  the  specialised  prosecution  and 
criminal police. Nevertheless, constraints as regards an effective anti-corruption prosecution 
result from a lack of resources and specialisation of the law enforcement bodies. A legislative 
package  on  transparency  in  public  office,  asset  declarations,  and  incompatibilities  has  been 
adopted in 2019 and has entered into force. Preventive action so far remains limited and the 
Council for Prevention of Corruption lacks capacity in terms of resources and specialisation, 
and does mostly awareness work. The newly established Transparency Entity in charge of the 
monitoring and supervision of asset declarations and conflict of interest is not yet functional. 

The Constitution enshrines freedom of expression and information as well as media freedom 
and pluralism, and a culture of respect for the editorial freedom of journalists prevails. The 
regulatory  authority  for  audio-visual  media  -  Entidade  Reguladora  para  a  Comunicação 
Social  (ERC)  -  is  deemed  independent  and  effective.  As  regards  the  remaining  areas  of 
concern  criminal  sentences  for  defamation  have  been  considered  by  the  European  Court  of 
Human  Rights  as  violating  freedom  of  expression.  The  legal  system  includes  provisions 
regarding  the  disclosure  of  media  ownership  and  financing,  as  well  as  the  transparency  of 
state  advertising  campaigns.  Both  aspects  are  monitored  by  the  media  regulator.  Access  to 
information  and  documents  held  by  public  authorities  is  safeguarded  through  specific 
legislation. 

As  regards  checks  and  balances,  the  system  of  constitutional  review  provides  for  the 
possibility  of  ex  ante  and  ex  post  control,  and  covers  the  omission  to  legislate.  The 
Ombudsman has an extensive mandate to safeguard fundamental rights, and unjustified lack 
of  cooperation  with  the  Ombudsman  is  criminally  punished.  There  are  safeguards  for  the 
transparency of the legislative process, and the participation of stakeholders is ensured. The 
High  Council  for  the  Judiciary  is  entitled  to  propose  legislative  initiatives  regarding  the 
improvement  of  the  judicial  institutions.  Civil  society  benefits  from  an  enabling  legislative 
framework and is active.  

1 

 
 
 
I.  JUSTICE SYSTEM  

The  Portuguese  justice  system  is  characterised  by  a  court  system  comprising  the 
Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court of Justice and the judicial courts of first and second 
instance, the Supreme Administrative Court and the administrative and tax courts of first and 
second  instance,  and  the  Court  of  Auditors1.  The  High  Council  for  the  Judiciary,  the  High 
Council for Administrative and Tax Courts and the High Council for the Public Prosecution 
exercise  disciplinary  action  over  the  respective  magistrates  and  are  entrusted  with  relevant 
managerial  functions.  Furthermore,  they  are  competent  to  nominate,  transfer  and  promote 
judges  and  prosecutors.  Judges  and  prosecutors  are  appointed  by  the  respective  Council, 
following  an  open  competition  and  according  to  the  grades  obtained  in  mandatory  training 
courses at the Centre for Judicial Studies. The public prosecution service is independent from 
the  judicial  power  and  operates  autonomously  from  the  executive  branch.  It  has  its  own 
governance  system  in  which  the  Prosecutor  General’s  Office  is  the  highest  body.  The  Bar 
Association is an independent legal entity governed by public law and, in the exercise of its 
public powers, performs regulatory functions.  

Independence 

Changes to the composition of the judicial High Councils are being discussed. The High 
Council for the Judiciary is composed of the President of the Supreme Court of Justice (who 
chairs), two members appointed by the President of the Republic, seven members elected by 
Parliament,  and  seven  judges  elected  by  their  peers  in  accordance  with  the  principle  of 
proportional representation2. As the High Councils are endowed with important powers with 
respect  to  judicial  appointments  and  careers,  the  importance  of  safeguarding  their 
independence from political influence has been highlighted3. A legislative proposal amending 
the composition of the the High Council for Public Prosecution4 to increase the number of lay 
members was  rejected in  Parliament  in  2018, and the majority of the members of the High 
Council for Public Prosecution remain prosecutors. A similar proposal regarding changes to 
the composition of High Council for the Judiciary was informally circulated in 20195, but has 
not  been  pursued.  While  the  proposal  has  not  been  formally  tabled  for  discussion  in 
Parliament,  it  is  important  that  any  changes  take  account  of  Council  of  Europe 
recommendations6.  

1   Execution of criminal sentences courts, maritime courts, intellectual property courts, competition, regulation 
and supervision courts, central instruction courts, arbitration tribunals and justices of the peace may also be 
set up. 

2   Art. 218 of the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic. Similarly, the High Council for Administrative and 
Tax Courts is composed of the President of the Supreme Administrative Court (who chairs), two members 
appointed by the President of the Republic, four members elected by the Parliament and four judges elected 
by their peers. In accordance with the principle of proportional representation. 

3   GRECO, Fourth evaluation round - Evaluation report, paras. 92 ss. 
4   According to Art. 22 of the Statute of Public Prosecution, the High Council is composed of the Prosecutor 
General  (who  chairs),  four  Regional  Prosecutors-General,  seven  prosecutors  elected  by  their  peers,  and 
seven lay members (five elected by Parliament and two appointed by the Government). 

5   Press  release  of  the  Portuguese  People’s  Party,  of  30  August  2019.  The  proposal  envisaged  reducing  the 

number of members of the Council who are judges elected by their peers. 

6   GRECO,  Fourth  evaluation  round  –  Interim  compliance  report  Portugal,  paras.  38  ss.  See  also 
Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, para. 27. See 
also Judgment of the Court of Justice of 19 November 2019, AK, Joined Cases C‑ 585/18, C‑ 624/18 and 
C‑ 625/18, para. 137 and 138. 

2 

 
                                                 
The electronic system of allocation of cases in courts is under scrutiny. The allocation of 
cases  both  in  judicial  and  in  administrative  and  tax  courts  is  done  electronically,  through  a 
system that provides random allocation in accordance with a predefined algorithm, allowing 
for  the  consultation  of  the  distribution  of  cases  online.  However,  allegations  of  breaches  in 
the system and interference with the random allocation of cases surfaced in the beginning of 
2020,  when  top  judges  were  indicted  in  a  case  of  high-level  corruption,  influence  peddling 
and money laundering. The High Council for the Judiciary has applied disciplinary sanctions 
to  two  of  the  judges  involved7,  and  is  also  currently  leading  an  investigation  as  regards 
possible  irregularities  in  the  allocation  of  cases8.  The  High  Council  addressed  the  situation 
publicly,  highlighting  the  seriousness  of  these  allegations  and  the  possible  damages  it  may 
entail for citizens’ and companies’ perception of justice9.  

The  perceived  judicial  independence  among  the  general  public  has  decreased.  Among 
the general public, the level of perceived independence of courts and judges is average (40% 
qualify it as ‘fairly good’ or ‘very good’), but has been decreasing since 201710. Companies 
perceive  it  more  positively  (45%  qualify  it  as  ‘fairly  good’  or  ‘very  good’),  which  is  an 
improvement in relation to previous years11. 

The  Statute  of  Public  Prosecution  and  the  Statute  of  Judicial  Magistrates  have  been 
amended12.  One  feature  of  both  new  statutes  is  the  removal  of  the  previously  applicable 
ceiling  to  the  remuneration  of  the  President  of  the  Supreme  Court  and  of  the  Prosecutor 
General,  which  linked  it  to  the  remuneration  of  the  Prime  Minister.  These  amendments 
ensure parallel careers of judges and prosecutors. The new Statute of Public Prosecution also 
adapts the structure of the prosecution services to the new territorial organisation introduced 
by the reforms of the judicial map of 2013 and 201913. It also introduces provisions aimed at 
clarifying the limits of hierarchical intervention in criminal proceedings14. The High Council 
for the Judiciary, the High Council for the Public Prosecution and the relevant professional 
associations were consulted during the legislative process.  

Quality 

New reforms on the judicial map and on courts specialisation have been adopted.  This 
reorganisation was implemented as the follow-up to an evaluation of the broad reform of the 
judicial  map  of  201315,  and  aims  at  addressing  some  of  the  shortcomings  identified16.  In 

7   The Supreme Court confirmed the disciplinary  sanction in the context of an appeal brought by one of the 

judges. 

8   Press release of 3 March 2020.  
9   Press conference of 3 March 2020. 
10   Figure  44,  2020  EU  Justice  Scoreboard.  The  level  of  perceived  judicial  independence  is  categorised  as 
follows: very low (below 30% of respondents perceive judicial independence as fairly good and very good); 
low (between 30-39%), average (between 40-59%), high (between 60-75%), very high (above 75%). 

11   Figure 46, 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
12   Law No. 68/2019, of 27 August 2019 and Law No. 67/2019, of 27 August 2019, respectively. 
13   See below, Section I – ‘Quality’. 
14   The issue of legal certainty with regards to instructions has been the subject of a GRECO recommendation, 
which invited Portugal to ensure that the rules governing prosecutorial hierarchy ‘protect prosecutors from 
undue or illegal interference from within the system’. GRECO, Fourth evaluation round  – Evaluation report 
Portugal, paras. 163-164. 

15   Law  No.  62/2013, of  26  August.  This  reform  aimed  at  achieving  three  primary  objectives:  to  broaden  the 
territorial base of the judicial districts, to set up specialised courts on a national level and to implement a new 
management model for the court districts. In 2013, 27 courts were converted into ‘proximity sections’. The 
number of judicial circumscriptions (‘comarcas’) was reduced to 23 (previously 231). 

16   Decree-Law No. 38/2019, of 18 March 2019. 

3 

 
                                                 
particular, this included the reopening of 20 courts that had been closed during the reform of 
2013, in order to increase proximity to the citizens. Moreover, the new reform also provides 
for  further  specialisation,  with  the  installation  of  more  specialised  courts,  in  particular  in 
areas of the country where they did not exist before, and the requalification of existing courts. 
The reform also aims at a better allocation of the existing resources, taking into consideration 
the caseload of the courts. The authorities expect this reform to have a positive impact on the 
efficiency of courts. In parallel, amendments to the Statute of Administrative and Tax Courts 
also  came  into  force17.  These  foresee,  in  particular,  the  creation  of  four  new  types  of 
specialised chambers – public procurement, administrative social chambers, tax enforcement 
and  infraction  review  chambers.  The  first  specialised  chambers  will  be  operational  in 
September  2020,  and  will  be  installed  in  the  courts  where  the  highest  backlogs  have  been 
identified18. 

Measures to improve the digitalisation of the justice system continue to be implemented. 
In  particular,  an  amendment  to  the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure  implemented  the  principle  of 
‘digital by default’ to all civil proceedings19. The same principle was already applicable to tax 
and  administrative  proceedings.  In  particular,  parties  and  legal  counsels  are  now  able  to 
access  the  files  and  follow  all  procedural  developments  online.  The  second  phase  of  the 
‘Justiça  +  Próxima’  Programme,  which  is  based  on  four  pillars  –  efficiency,  innovation, 
proximity and humanisation – is being implemented. This programme includes the ‘Tribunal 
+  360º’  project,  which  aims  at  implementing  full  digitalisation  and  a  paperless  system  in 
courts,  whilst  simultaneously  simplifying  the  contact  and  communication  between  citizens 
and courts. Changes are also being introduced regarding the functioning of courts, in order to 
simplify the experience of citizens when in court. The authorities expect to fully implement 
the ‘Tribunal + 360º’ project by 202320. In parallel, training initiatives are being developed, 
in order to familiarise magistrates and court clerks with the new tools21.  

There are discussions on the resources for the justice system. The reduced allocation of 
budgetary resources to the justice system and the lack of material and human resources is a 
concern  often  voiced  by  stakeholders22.  For  instance,  the  total  number  of  judges  currently 
serving  in  first  instance  tax  and  administrative  courts  is  significantly  below  what  is 
established  in  the  legal  framework,  a  circumstance  that  stakeholders  link  to  the  efficiency 
issues identified in tax and administrative courts23. Some announced measures to improve the 
efficiency  of  courts  remain  pending  due  to  budgetary  constraints.  This  is  the  case  for  the 
creation of advisory cabinets to aid judges – while already foreseen in law, the High Council 
has informed that the implementation of this measure will not be possible in the absence of 

17   Law No. 114/2019, of 12 September 2019. 
18   Order No. 121/2020, of 22 May 2020. 
19   Decree-Law No. 97/2019, of 26 July 2019. 
20   ‘Justiça mais Próxima 20/23’, https://justicamaisproxima.justica.gov.pt/medida/tribunal-360o/.  
21   The  Commission  has  provided  support  in  designing  and  implementing  reforms  in  the  judicial  sector.  A 
training  model has been developed for court staff, both in  terms of the  methods currently followed and in 
terms  of  the  training  content  available  and  channels  used.  In  addition,  Portugal  has  requested  support  to 
increase  its  capacities  to  more  effectively  and  efficiently  deal  with  the  prosecution  of  international  crimes 
(specifically crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes). 

22   See,  for  instance,  intervention  of  the  Prosecutor  General  in  the  Opening  Session  of  the  Judicial  Year,  6 
2020. 

January 
http://www.ministeriopublico.pt/sites/default/files/anexos/intervencoes/discurso_ano_judicial_2020.pdf. 

23   High Council of the Administrative and Tax Courts (2019), Annual Report – 2018.  

4 

 
                                                 
dedicated  resources24.  Insufficient  human  and  technical  resources  at  the  disposal  of 
prosecution services were also identified as a constraint to efficient prosecution25.  

Several  measures  were  taken  to  limit  the  impact  of  the  COVID-19  pandemic  on  the 
functioning  of  the  justice  system.  In  the  context  of  the  COVID-19  pandemic,  Portugal 
declared  a  state  emergency  26,  which  was  followed  by  a  ‘state  of  calamity’27.  During  this 
period,  several  measures  regarding  the  functioning  of  courts  were  adopted,  in  particular  in 
relation  to  enforcement  of  teleworking  schemes,  and  possibilities  to  hold  hearings  and 
conduct other procedures remotely. Stakeholders highlight the importance of existing digital 
tools  in  avoiding  the  total  paralysation  of  the  system  during  this  period28.  While  the 
distribution  of  urgent  and  non-urgent  cases  was  never  interrupted  in  first  instance  courts, 
deadlines  in  non-urgent  cases  were  suspended,  and  non-urgent  acts  were  adjourned.  In  the 
context  of  the  phasing-out  of  emergency  measures,  Portugal  foresees  a  set  of  measures 
covering justice. In particular, to deal with potential backlogs and an increase in litigation, a 
temporary  regime  of  reduction  of  court  fees  with  the  objective  of  facilitating  court 
agreements has been created. In addition, the staff (judges and court clerks) of the Labour and 
Commercial  Courts  will  be  reinforced,  as  an  increase  of  cases  in  the  economic  and  social 
services is expected.  

Efficiency 

Despite improvements, the efficiency of the justice system continues to face challenges. 
This  issue  has  also  been  addressed  by  a  country-specific  recommendation  in  the  context  of 
the  2020  European  Semester,  regarding  the  need  to  improve  the  efficiency  in  tax  and 
administrative  courts29.  Portugal  has  made  efforts  to  tackle  these  issues  by  implementing  a 
number of measures to improve the efficiency of its courts. In particular, rapid reaction teams 
have been created to deal with case backlogs in tax and administrative courts30. These efforts 
lead  to  some  considerable  gains  in  efficiency31.  Nevertheless,  courts  still  have  a 
comparatively high number of backlog cases, and proceedings remain comparatively lengthy. 
These  problems  affect  in  particular  administrative  and  tax  justice,  where  the  country  rates 
among  the  Member  States  with  the  lengthiest  proceedings  –  the  disposition  time  in 
administrative and tax courts remains above 900 days in first instance, and above 1000 days 
in  second  instance32.  Moreover,  despite  the  resolution  rate  having  risen  above  100%33, 
Portugal  continues  to  have  one  of  the  highest  rates  of  pending  administrative  cases34.  The 

24   Press release of 8 April 2019.  
25   Public  Prosecution  Service  –  Judicial  District  of  Porto  (2020),  Annual  Report  2019;  Public  Prosecution 

Service – Judicial District of Lisbon (2019), Annual Report 2018. 
26   Decree of the President of the Republic No. 14-A/2020, of 18 March. 
27   Resolution of the Council of Ministers No. 33-A/2020, of 30 April 2020. 
28   Information received in the context of the country visit to Portugal. 
29   Council  Recommendation  of  20  July  2020  on  the  2020  National  Reform  Programme  of  Portugal  and 
the  2020  Stability  Programme  of  Portugal,  available  at 

delivering  a  Council  opinion  on 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2020/07/20/european-semester-2020-country-
specific-recommendations-adopted. 

30   In its first six months in place, these teams were able to solve over 1600 cases that had entered the system 

before 2013. 

31   For instance, the disposition time  for civil and commercial cases decreased from 369 days in 2012 to 229 

days in 2018 (Figure 6, 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard). 

32   Figure 8, 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
33   Figure 12, 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
34   Figure 15, 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard. 

5 

 
                                                 
efficiency  challenges  in  Administrative  and  Tax  Courts  have  also  been  highlighted  by  the 
Council of Europe35. 

II. ANTI-CORRUPTION FRAMEWORK 

Competencies  to  prevent,  investigate  and  prosecute  corruption  are  shared  among  different 
bodies.  The  Department  of  Investigation  and  Penal  Action  (DCIAP)  under  the  Prosecutor 
General’s Office and the National Unit for Combating Corruption of the police are designated 
to  investigate  corruption  cases.  The  Court  of  Audit  also  plays  an  important  role  in  fighting 
corruption.  The  Council  for  the  Prevention  of  Corruption,  operating  within  the  Court  of 
Auditors  and  chaired  by  its  president,  is  the  authority  responsible  for  coordination  and 
analysis  of  corruption  prevention  activities.  Recent  legislative  revisions  established  a  new 
Transparency Authority within the Constitutional Court that will be in charge of monitoring 
and  verifying  asset  disclosure.  A  national  anti-corruption  strategy  was  announced  in 
December 2019, including actions such as a National Anti-Corruption Report. 

In  the  latest  Corruption  Perceptions  Index  of  Transparency  International,  Portugal 
scored  62/100  and  ranks  10th  in  the  European  Union  and  30th  globally36.  94%  of 
Portuguese  respondents  to  the  2020  Special  Eurobarometer  survey  on  corruption  consider 
corruption widespread in their country (EU average 71%), and 59% of people feel personally 
affected by corruption in their daily lives (EU average 26%). As regards businesses, 92% of 
companies  consider  corruption  to  be  widespread  (EU  average  63),  and  53%  of  companies 
consider  that  corruption  is  a  problem  when  doing  business  (EU  average  37%)37.  34%  of 
people  find  that  there  are  enough  successful  prosecutions  to  deter  people  from  corrupt 
practices  (EU  average  36%)  while  16%  of  companies  consider  that  people  and  businesses 
caught for bribing a senior official are appropriately punished (EU average 31%). 

The criminal legal framework to fight corruption is broadly in place. Passive and active 
bribery in  the public  and private sector, influence peddling,  as well as trading in  influence, 
embezzlement  and  misappropriation  are  criminalised  in  the  Criminal  Code38.  A  reform 
carried  out  in  2015  brought  several  criminal  law  provisions  in  line  with  GRECO 
recommendations, notably as regards the degree of crime for some offences 39. 

A  National  Anti-Corruption  Strategy  is  in  preparation.  After  announcing  plans  to 
establish  this  strategy  in  December  2019,  the  Government  established  a  working  group 
responsible for elaborating the strategy. The working group is mandated inter alia to prepare 
a national anti-corruption report and revise the whistle-blower protection framework, fraud-
proof  legislation,  improve  public  procurement  processes,  reinforce  the  transparency  of 
political  party  financing  and  ensure  that  medium  and  large  companies  have  corruption 
prevention  plans  in  place.  On  3  September,  the  Council  of  Ministers  launched  a  public 
consultation  on  the  National  Anti-Corruption  Strategy  proposal40.  The  2020  European 

35   Portugal is currently under enhanced supervision by the Committee of Ministers for the excessive length of 
proceedings before both civil and administrative jurisdictions (violations of Art. 6 ECHR) [H46-20 Vicente 
Cardoso group v. Portugal (Application No. 30130/10)]. 

36   Transparency International (2020), Corruption Perceptions Index 2019. 
37   Flash Eurobarometer 482 (2019). 
38   Art. 372, 373, 374, 375 and 335 of Criminal Code. Arts. 8 (Passive corruption in the private sector) and 9 
(Active  corruption  in  the  private  sector)  of  Law  No.  20/2008,  of  21  April,  establishing  the  criminal 
framework to combat corruption in international trade and in the private sector. 

39   GRECO, Third evaluation round, Addendum to the Second Compliance Report on Portugal. 
40   The  proposed  strategy  builds  on  seven  priorities:  to  improve  the  knowledge,  education  and  institutional 
practices regarding transparency and integrity; to prevent and detect corruption risks in the public sector; to 

6 

 
                                                 
Semester  country  report  for  Portugal  noted  the  need  for  a  clear  strategy  with  a  view  to 
creating a coherent and robust anti-corruption legislative and policy framework41.  

Prosecution  services  are  making  efforts  to  improve  their  effectiveness,  including  as 
regards  the  treatment  of  high-level  corruption  cases.  The  Department  Investigation  and 
Penal  Action together with its regional departments  (DIAPs) are chiefly  responsible for the 
investigation and prosecution of corruption. As regards investigation, DCIAP is competent to 
treat cases which cover several regions or are particularly complex42. DCIAP carries out the 
necessary  types  of  co-ordination  between  the  various  departments43.  DCIAP  is  led  by  a 
director (assistant attorney general) appointed by the Prosecutor General, 3 deputies and 31 
prosecutors and is supported in its work by judicial police, which has a specialised National 
Unit  against  Corruption.  Efforts  to  further  improve  the  prosecution  track  record  continued 
including as regards the treatment of high-level corruption cases44. At the same time, a large 
proportion  of  the  corruption-related  investigations  are  concluded  without  indictments.  As 
regards  the  application  of  sanctions  for  corruption  offences,  in  2017  only  10%  of  those 
convicted  for  corruption  were  sentenced  to  prison  and,  83%  had  suspended  sentences.  In 
2018,  12.3%  were  convicted  to  an  effective  prison  sentence,  and  73.6%  had  suspended 
sentences45.  The  Public  Prosecutors  Union  cited  a  persistent  lack  of  resources  in  the 
specialised  unit  of  the  judicial  police  to  track  illicit  financial  flows,  as  well  as  a  lack  of 
sufficient  specialisation  among  public  prosecutors  in  investigating  economic  and  financial 
crime46.  According  to  the  DCIAP,  this  may  impact  the  effectiveness  of  the  prosecution.  In 
order  to  address  needs  for  training  and  specialisation  as  well  as  to  empower  the  regional 
departments  for  penal  actions  and  investigations  for  treating  complex  investigations  more 
efficiently, some organisational and further capacity-building measures are envisaged47. 

The Council for the Prevention of Corruption (CPC) is the public authority responsible 
for  developing  national  actions  regarding  the  prevention  of  corruption  and  related 
offences. The CPC is an independent body that operates within the Court of Auditors and is 
chaired by the President of the Court of Auditors. The CPC’s financial and human resources 
capacity  is  very  limited48.  The  CPC  activities  in  the  area  of  prevention  of  corruption  focus 
mainly on providing guidance for corruption risks and carrying out awareness campaigns in 
schools. The council also cooperates with various Ministries to integrate corruption plans in 

engage  the  private  sector  in  the  prevention  and  repression  of  corruption;  to  reinforce  the  cooperation 
between  public  and  private  organisations;  to  ensure  a  more  effective  application  of  the  legal  remedies 
available,  improving  the  response  time  of  the  judicial  system  and  the  adequacy  and  effectiveness  of  the 
penalties;  to  produce  and  promote  quality  information  on  corruption  phenomena;  to  cooperate  at  the 
international level on fighting corruption. 

41   European Commission, 2020 Country Report Portugal, SWD (2020) 521 final. 
42   As a rule, corruption cases are attributed to the relevant regional department, unless they involve more than 

one judicial district, in which case the Prosecutor General can attribute the case to DCIAP. 

43   Departamento Central de Investigação e Ação Penal - http://dciap.ministeriopublico.pt/.  
44   European Commission, 2020 Country Report Portugal, SWD(2020)521 final. 
45   Direção Geral das Políticas da Justiça (2019), Estatísticas de Justiça: Corrupção. Ministério da Justiça. Other 

penalties include fines or community work. 

46   Público (2019), “Queixas de corrupção são arquivadas em 94% dos casos”, Público, Lisboa, 6 July 2019. 
Retrieved  from  https://www.publico.pt/2019/07/06/sociedade/noticia/queixas-corrupcao-sao-arquivadas94-
casos-1878985. 

47   European Commission, 2020 Country Report Portugal, SWD(2020)521 final. 
48   European Commission, 2019 Country Report Portugal, SWD(2019)1021 final. 

7 

 
                                                                                                                                                        
audit  exercises  and  publishes  statistics  on  the  treatment  of  corruption-related  complaints, 
including as regards indictments and final court decisions49. 

New rules were introduced in 2019 with a view to increase transparency and integrity in 
public life. As a response to several controversies reported in the media related to family ties 
at  top  government  and  cabinet  level,  new  rules  for  the  political  appointment  of  cabinet 
advisors  and  support  staff,  senior  officials  and  public  managers  have  entered  into  force  in 
September  201950.  The  law  introduces  stricter  rules  to  prevent  nepotism  and  conflict  of 
interests.  Earlier  in  2019,  a  broader  legislative  process  targeting  different  anti-corruption 
provisions  was  finalised.  The  process,  led  by  an  ad-hoc  Parliamentary  Committee  for  the 
Strengthening of Transparency in the Exercise of Public Functions set up in 2016, resulted in 
revisions of the integrity framework of members of Parliament and senior officials, targeting 
in  particular  some  aspects  of  the  asset  and  interest  disclosure  system  and  of  the  rules 
regarding incompatibilities51. The new law notably foresees the creation of the Transparency 
Entity,  a  new  body  in  charge  of  monitoring  and  verifying  the  declarations  of  assets  and 
interests submitted by political office-holders and high-ranking appointed officials, attached 
to the Constitutional Court. The reform aims to address shortcomings in the asset verification 
system, which were subject also to several GRECO recommendations, in particular as regards 
members of Parliament52. However, its full extent and effectiveness remain to be assessed, as 
the Transparency Entity is not yet operational53. 

As  part  of  the  2019  reforms,  the  Parliament  also  adopted  a  Code  of  Conduct  for 
Members  of  Parliament.  This  is  the  first  document  of  its  kind  in  Parliament54.  The  Code 
establishes that, in the exercise of their mandate, members of Parliament should observe the 
general  principles  of  conduct,  namely  freedom,  independence,  the  pursuit  of  the  public 
interest, transparency and political responsibility. The Statute of Members of Parliament has 
also  been  reviewed  to  introduce  a  new  set  of  public  interest,  transparency  and  political 
responsibility. The Statute of Members of Parliament has also been reviewed to introduce a 
new set of incompatibilities. In general, members of Parliament cannot combine their position 
in  Parliament  with  other  public  functions,  including  being  a  civil  servant55.  The  recent 
amendment  enlarged  the  scope  of  what  can  be  considered  public  functions  to  include 

49   According to the 2019  Annual  Activity Report,  the  volume of reported instances has increased by 31.7%: 
from 604 reported instances in 2018 to 796 in 2019 (783 judicial instances plus 13 audit reports). In what 
concerns the 783 judicial instances: 389 instances (49.7%) were dismissed due to lack of criminal evidence; 
134 had sufficient criminal evidence (17.1%); and 260 led to the opening of an inquiry (33.2%) (Conselho 
de Prevenção da Corrupção (2019), Annual Activity Report).  

50   Law No. 78/2009, of 2 September 2009. 
51   Law  No.  52/2019,  of  31  July  2019.  The  new  rules  foresee  inter  alia:  the  merging  of  the  previous  three 
separate  declarations  into  a  single  declaration  of  income,  assets,  interests,  incompatibilities  and 
impediments;  the  extension  of  disclosure  rules  to  magistrates;  stricter  sanctions  for  non-compliance; 
expanding the register of incompatibilities; extending the rules related to gifts and hospitality to all political 
and senior public office holders. Portuguese authorities have informed that the Committee can now issue a 
written opinion on conflicts of interest when requested by the declarants or the President of the Parliament; 
inquire into facts occurring within Parliament that may compromise the honour or dignity of any Member as 
well as any irregularities or serious breaches of the Members’ duties, at the request of the Member or upon 
the  determination  of  the  President  of  the  Parliament;  and  issue  generic  statements  and  recommendations 
promoting good Parliamentary practice. 

52   GRECO, Fourth evaluation round – Evaluation report Portugal, paras. 163-164. 
53   Article 5 of Organic Law No. 4/2019 of 13 September provides that until the establishment of the Entity for 
Transparency, single declarations of income, assets and interests continue to be filed with the Constitutional 
Court and scrutinised under the previous regime. 

54   Resolution of the Parliament No. 210/2019, of 20 September. 
55   Law No. 7/93, of 1 March, Art. 20 (1). 

8 

 
                                                 
positions  in  state-owned  companies,  other  decentralised  and/or  autonomous  public  entities, 
public-private partnerships or any other company in which the state owns any shares56. The 
Parliamentary  Committee  on  Transparency  and  Members'  Statute  has  replaced  the  previous 
Ethics Committee, while retaining its competences57. 

New rules have been introduced to strengthen the regime regulating ‘revolving doors’, 
but  lobbying  remains  unregulated.  Changes  introduced  address  state-owned  companies’ 
board members, who now may not hold positions in the acquiring or concessionary entities 
within  three  years  of  the  date  of  disposal  or  concession  of  assets  in  which  they  have 
intervened, as well as  cabinet members, where a  cooling-off period of three  years has  been 
introduced during which there is a ban on any functions of subordinate work or consultancy 
in  international  organisations,  with  whom  cabinet  members  have  established  institutional 
relations in a public function58. However, there appears to be little monitoring of how these 
restrictions  are  implemented.  As  regards  lobbying,  efforts  to  promote  a  bill  regulating 
lobbying activities failed, after the President returned for re-examination a bill approved by 
Parliament in June 201959. Meanwhile, some parliamentary groups have presented new draft 
legislation. The need to prioritise COVID-19 related initiatives has led to some delay in their 
examination. 

As  regards  whistle-blower  protection,  general  provisions  for  public  officials  are  in 
place60. The provisions foresee that those who report violations of which they become aware 
during  the  exercise  of  their  duties,  cannot  in  any  way  be  harmed,  including  through 
involuntary transfer or through dismissal. Disciplinary sanctions against whistle-blowers are 
presumed abusive until proven otherwise, if implemented up to one year after the respective 
denunciation.  Whistle-blowers  are  entitled  to  anonymity,  until  the  indictment  is  produced. 
They  are  also  entitled  to  witness  protection  measures.  While  the  provisions  as  such  are  in 
place, stakeholders61 stressed that the implementation in practice needs to be strengthened. 

III.  MEDIA PLURALISM 

The  Constitution  enshrines  the  freedom  of  expression  and  information  as  well  as  media 
freedom  and  pluralism.  In  Portugal,  a  culture  of  respect  for  the  editorial  freedom  of 
journalists  prevails62.  The  Regulatory  Authority  for  the  Media  monitors  activities  of  media 
outlets63.  

The  Regulatory  Authority  for  the  Media  is  deemed  independent  and  effective.  The 
Entidade  Reguladora  para  a  Comunicação  Social  (ERC)  is  an  independent  administrative 

56   Law No. 60/2019, of 13 August, which amended Art. 20 (1) of Law No. 7/93, of 1 March. 
57   Law 60/2019, of August 13, Article 27. º-A. This Committee has the competences of verifying the cases of 
incompatibility,  incapacity  and  impediment  of  the  members  of  Parliament,  instructing  the  processes 
regarding  the  conduct  of  members  of  Parliament  and  violations  of  the  rules,  and  issuing  opinions  and 
recommendations  in  several  aspects  of  the  activities  of  members  of  Parliament,  including  gifts  and 
hospitality. 

58   Law No 52/2019, of 31 July. 
59   European Commission, 2020 Country Report Portugal SWD(2020)521 final. 
60   Law 19/2008, of 21 April. 
61   Information received in the context of the country visit to Portugal. 
62   Between  2019  and  2020,  Portugal  climbed  two  places  in  the  Reporters  Without  Borders  World  Press 

Freedom Index, now registering at 10th position worldwide.  

63   Article 6 of the Law No. 53/2005, of 8 November 2005, establishing the Portuguese Regulatory Authority 
for the Media, Statutes of ERC, states that “[a]ll entities that pursue media activities, within the jurisdiction 
of the Portuguese State, are subject to the surveillance and intervention of the regulatory board (…)”. 

9 

 
 
                                                 
body  established  by  virtue  of  the  Constitution  and  statutory  law64.The  ERC  regulatory 
mandate extends to all legal persons pursuing media activities within the jurisdiction of the 
Portuguese  State,  which  includes  press  agencies,  newspapers,  radio  stations  and  television 
providers.  The  ERC  performs  the  media  regulation  tasks  entrusted  by  the  Constitution 
independently of any instruction by political authorities. It must inform the Parliament of its 
decisions  and  activities,  by  means  of  monthly  and  annual  reports  as  well  as  the  annual 
statement  of  accounts.  The  ERC  encompasses  the  Regulatory  Board,  the  Executive 
Directorate,  the  Advisory  Council  and  the  Auditor.  The  Regulatory  Board,  responsible  for 
defining  and  implementing  the  regulatory  activities  of  ERC,  comprises  the  chair,  the  vice-
chair and three board members. Four of the five members of the Regulatory Board are elected 
by the Parliament, and the fifth member is co-opted by the previously elected four. The chair 
and  the  vice-chair  are  elected  from  amongst  the  five  members  of  the  Board.  The  five 
members  of  the  Board  have  a  5-year  term,  not  renewable,  and  remain  in  office  until  their 
effective replacement or termination of service. The Statutes of the ERC detail the conditions 
for the termination of office of the members and the dismissal of the Regulatory Board. These 
provisions  safeguard  the  independence  of  the  regulator,  in  line  with  the  objectives  of  the 
revised  Audio-visual  Media  Services  Directive  (AVMSD)65.  The  2020  Media  Pluralism 
Monitor Report on Portugal (MPM 2020)66 considers the independence of the regulator at a 
very low risk. 

Portugal  has  a  thorough  framework  for  ensuring  transparency  of  media  ownership67. 
The  obligation  of  disclosure  of  ownership  and  financing  of  the  media  appears  in  the 
Constitution, and its monitoring is the responsibility of the ERC. The Law 78/2015 of 29 July 
2015  regulates  transparency  of  ownership,  management  and  the  means  of  financing  of 
entities  that  pursue  media  activities.  MPM  2020  assessed  media  ownership  transparency  in 
Portugal to be at low risk68.  

There are rules in place for regulating the transparency of state advertising. Provisions 
concerning  the  transparency  of  state  advertising  campaigns  are  enshrined  in  law69. 
Advertising  campaigns  must  also  comply  with  the  rules  of  public  procurement70,  obliging 
contractors to monitor the implementation of contracts, in particular with regard to possible 
subcontracting  relationships  and  the  acquisition  of  advertising  spaces.  Law  95/2015  also 
includes measures for state advertising in the regional press and local and regional radio. The 
Law  further  establishes  a  distribution  of  advertising  campaigns  between  the  press,  radio, 
television and digital media. Supervision of compliance is assigned to the ERC, which has a 
dedicated  web  portal  where  all  public  advertising  campaigns  are  launched.  Anomalies  or 
deviations from the law are to be referred to the Court of Auditors. While MPM 2020 found 
no  evidence  of  non-transparent  rules  or  situations  regarding  the  distribution  of  state 
advertising in Portugal for the period 2018-2019, journalist associations pointed to concerns 
as  regards  the  criteria  for  allocating  a  media  support  package  in  202071.  According  to  the 

64   Portuguese Regulatory Authority for the Media, Statutes of ERC (Law No. 53/2005, of 8 November 2005).  
65   The transposition of this directive was presented by the Government in June 2020.  
66   2020 Media Pluralism Monitor.  
67   It should be recalled in this regard that the revised AVMSD encourages Member States to adopt legislative 
measures  providing  that  media  service  providers  under  their  jurisdiction  make  accessible  information 
concerning their ownership structure, including the beneficial owners. 

68   2020 Media Pluralism Monitor. 
69   Law No. 95/2015, of 17 August 2015. 
70   The Public Procurement Code, Decree-Law No. 18/2008, of 29 January 2008. 
71   Information  received  in  the  context  of  the  country  visit  to  Portugal.  The  media  support  package  is  an 
exceptional and temporary regime for the purchase of institutional advertising by the State, during 2020, in 

10 

 
                                                 
Portuguese  authorities,  such  criteria  for  choosing  media  and  amounts  were  set  following 
discussions  with  the  representatives  of  the  media  sector  and  bind  the  State  to  purchase 
time/space for institutional advertisement in media belonging to each group, in line with the 
specified amounts.  

Safeguards are in place to guarantee media independence and to protect the exercise of 
journalistic  profession  from  interference  by  state  authorities.  In  particular,  the 
Constitution  prohibits  any  interference,  whether  political  or  economic,  or  any  form  of 
censorship. The independence of journalists is also developed in the Statute of the Journalist, 
adopted by Law No. 1/99, of 13 January 1999. The MPM 2020 assessed the risk of political 
influence on the media as low72. 

While  basic  protection  standards  for  journalists  are  well  established,  defamation  is 
punishable  with  imprisonment.  Portugal’s  framework  for  journalists’  protection  is 
comprehensive  and  well  established73.  According  to  the  Constitution,  offences  committed 
against  journalists  in  the  exercise  of  their  profession  are  subject  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
courts  and  the  independent  regulatory  body.  Thus,  the  ERC  is  also  tasked  with  ensuring 
freedom  of  the  press.  Regarding  basic  protection  standards,  the  MPM  2020  estimates  the 
risks as low74. However, insult and defamation  are punishable with imprisonment75, despite 
judgments  of  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  pointing  to  violations  of  freedom  of 
expression 76. No alerts have been posted in relation to Portugal since the Council of Europe 
Platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists was established in 
2015. 

Access to information and documents held by public authorities is safeguarded through 
specific  legislation.  This  legislation  aims  at  facilitating  the  performance  of  journalistic 
functions.  While  the  Constitution  guarantees  the  right  of  journalists  to  access  sources  of 
information77, rules of general application78 regulate access to administrative documents and 
administrative  information.  Non-respect  of  the  right  of  access  to  administrative  documents 

television, radio and printed press to inform citizens on COVID-19 (Input from Portugal for the 2020 Rule 
of Law Report). A total of 15 million euro, allocated 75% to national media and 25% to regional and local 
media.  Acquisition  is  determined  by  law  (Decree-Law  20-A/2020,  of  6  of  May  2020)  and  its  terms  are 
defined  by  regulation  (Council  of  Ministers  Resolution  nº  38-B/2020,  of  15  of  May).  The  purchase  is 
governed  by  the  public  procurement  rules  and  the  legal  framework  for  institutional  advertisement  by  the 
State (Law n. 95/2015, of 17 of August 2015).  

72   2020 Media Pluralism Monitor. 
73   In  this  context,  it  should  also  be  recalled  that,  in  line  with  European  standards,  set  out  in  the  Council  of 
Europe  Recommendation  2016/4,  ‘Member  States  should  put  in  place  a  comprehensive  legislative 
framework  that  enables  journalists  and  other  media  actors  to  contribute  to  public  debate  effectively  and 
without fear’. Recommendation CM/Rec(2016)4 of the Committee of Ministers of Council of Europe, para. 
I-2. 

74   2020 Media Pluralism Monitor. 
75   Centre  for  Media  Pluralism  and  Media  Freedom  (2019),  Decriminalisation  of  Defamation  –  Factsheet.  It 
should  also  be  noted  that  suspension  of  the  execution  of  the  sentence  of  imprisonment  is  possible  in  the 
defamation criminal cases and is applied in practice. 

76   In particular, in its judgment of 8 October 2019, L.P. and Carvalho v. Portugal (applications nos. 24845/13 
and 49103/15) the European Court of Human Rights held that ‘although the fine imposed on L.P. was small 
and his conviction did not give rise to a criminal record, the imposition of a criminal sanction in itself had a 
chilling  effect  on  the  exercise  of  freedom  of  expression’.  The  two  applications  referred  to  cases  brought 
before the Portuguese courts by two lawyers, who considered that their freedom of expression in the exercise 
of their professional duties had been violated.  

77   The  Statute  of  Journalists,  approved  by  Law  No.  1/99,  of  13  January  1999,  contains  provisions  aimed  at 

ensuring this right (Art. 8). 

78   Law No 26/2016, of 22 August 2016. 

11 

 
                                                                                                                                                        
can be appealed to the Administrative and Tax Courts. A complaint may also be filed before 
the  independent  administrative  Commission  for  Access  to  Administrative  Documents,  but 
opinions on complaints are not binding on public institutions.  

IV.  OTHER INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RELATED TO CHECKS AND BALANCES 

Portugal  is  a  representative  democratic  republic  with  a  directly  elected  President  and  a 
unicameral Parliament. In the semi-presidential regime, the President of the Republic, elected 
by  direct  popular  vote,  has  significant  constitutional  and  political  powers,  including  the 
competence to  dissolve Parliament79. The Prime  Minister has the competences  to  direct  the 
Government’s general policy and to  coordinate and orient the actions of all the Ministers80. 
Parliament  and  the  Government  share  legislative  competence.  The  members  of  Parliament 
and the parliamentary groups, the Government, the regional assemblies and a group of at least 
20.000 citizens have the right of legislative initiative. The independent Ombudsman is tasked 
with safeguarding and promoting the freedoms, rights and guarantees of citizens, and has the 
right to trigger constitutional review. 

The  Constitutional  system  provides  safeguards  for  the  regime  of  checks  and  balances. 
The Constitutional Court can exercise ex ante81 or ex post82 control of constitutionality, and 
can  also  review  the  omission  to  adopt  the  necessary  legislative  measures  to  execute 
constitutional  norms83.  While  both  Parliament  and  the  Government  can  legislate,  the 
Constitution  reserves  legislative  competence  to  Parliament  in  certain  matters84.  The 
Constitutional  Court  is  competent  to  declare  the  unconstitutionality  of  governmental 
legislative  acts  that  have  breached  this  division  of  competences.  Moreover,  a  group  of  ten 
members of Parliament can request the legislative acts of the Government to be submitted for 
review by Parliament85. 

The  legislative  process  foresees  the  involvement  of  stakeholders  and  there  are 
safeguards for transparency. In certain cases, the involvement of representatives of the civil 
society in the legislative process is enshrined in  the Constitution. The High Council for the 
Judiciary  and  High  Council  for  Public  Prosecution  are  not  only  entitled  to  issue  advisory 
opinions, but also to propose legislative initiatives regarding the efficiency and improvement 
of the judicial institutions86. The legislative initiative of the Government is subject to impact 
assessment  of  the  economic  costs  and  benefits  of  the  legislative  proposal87.  While  the 
Constitution  foresees  the  possibility  to  submit  a  legislative  draft  to  an  urgent  procedure, 
which  implies  a  reduction  of  the  deadlines  for  discussion  and  examination  of  the  proposal, 

79   Art. 133(e) of the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic. 
80   Art. 201 of the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic. 
81   Art. 278 of the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic. 
82   The  Portuguese  regime  differentiates  between  ‘abstract’  and  ‘concrete’  ex  post  constitutional  review.  The 
former can also be triggered by the Ombudsman and the Prosecutor General, whereas the latter can also be 
triggered by individuals. 

83   Art. 283 of the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic. 
84   Arts. 164 and 165 of the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic.  
85   Art. 169 of the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic. 
86   Art.  149(1)(i)  and  (j)  of  Law  No.  21/85,  of  30  July,  and  Art.  21(2)(f)  and  (i)  of  Law  No.  68/2019,  of  27 

August. 

87   Article 55, Decree-law No. 169-B/2019, of 3 December 2019. Legislative proposals by Parliament should be 
preceded by gender impact assessment and, whenever possible, accompanied by information regarding the 
costs and benefits of the application of the legislative proposal (Article 131(2)(g) and (h), Rules of Procedure 
of the Assembly of the Republic No. 1/2007, of 19 July 2007, as amended). 

12 

 
                                                 
the  submission  to  the  urgent  procedure  is  subject  to  the  opinion  of  the  competent 
parliamentary commission and to a debate in the plenary. 

Emergency  powers  were  used  in  the  context  of  the  COVID-19  pandemic.  The  state  of 
emergency  was  declared  by  the  President  of  the  Republic,  following  consultation  of  the 
Council of State and Government88, and authorised by Parliament89. The state of emergency 
was subsequently prolonged twice90. The Government must submit to Parliament reports on 
the  application  of  the  state  of  emergency91,  which  enable  Parliament  to  exercise  also  an  ex 
post  control  of  the  measures  adopted,  and  entitle  it  to  start  civil  or  criminal  liability 
procedures for the violation of the provisions of the declaration of the state of emergency92. 

The  Ombudsman  holds  important  prerogatives  to  safeguard  fundamental  rights.  The 
Ombudsman (‘Provedor de Justiça’), who is also the national mechanism for the prevention 
of  torture,  was  reaccredited  with  ‘A’  status  by  the  UN  Global  Alliance  of  National  Human 
Rights  Institutions (GANHRI)93. Its mandate includes the defence and the promotion of the 
fundamental  rights  and  freedoms,  ensuring,  through  informal  means,  the  justice  and  the 
legality  of  the  exercise  of  public  powers.  The  Ombudsman  is  entitled  to  demand  any 
information and proceed to all investigations and enquiries deemed necessary. The unjustified 
lack of cooperation with the Ombudsman constitutes crime of disobedience. The Ombudsman 
also  has  the  competence  to  request  a  constitutionality  review  of  laws  (both  for  acts  and 
omissions), and to make recommendations to the Parliament. The Ombudsman reports on the 
respect by public authorities regarding the independence and integrity of the institution in the 
performance  of  its  duties94.  In  2019,  the  UN  Committee  on  the  Rights  of  the  Child 
recommended  Portugal  to  allocate  adequate  resources  to  the  Office  of  the  Ombudsman  for 
promotion and protection of the rights of the child95. 

88   Decree of the President of the Republic No. 14-A/2020, of 18 March 2020. 
89   Resolution of the Assembly of Republic No. 15-A/2020, of 18 March 2020. 
90   Decree  of  the  President  of  the  Republic  No.  17-A/2020,  of  2  April  2020;  Decree  of  the  President  of  the 
Republic No. 20-A/2020, of 17 April 2020. The state of emergency ceased on 3 May 2020. In this context, 
the exercise of several fundamental rights was partially suspended - Article 4 of the Decree of the President 
of the Republic No. 14-A/2020 includes an exhaustive list of the rights subject to limitation; Article 5 of the 
same diploma list the rights that cannot be affected by the declaration of the state of emergency. 

91   The Government is competent to execute the declaration of the state of emergency, and is under the duty to 
keep the President of the Republic and Parliament informed of all the acts adopted (Article 17 of Law No. 
44/86 on the State of Siege and State of Emergency, of 30 September 1986). Article 29(1) of Law No. 44/86 
on the State of Siege and State of Emergency, of 30 September 1986. 

92   The  Government  submitted  to  Parliament  three  reports,  relative  to  each  period  of  the  state  of  emergency 
(Portuguese Government  – Ministry of Interior (2020), Report on the application of  the declaration of the 
state  of  emergency,  19  March  to  2  April  2020;  Report  on  the  application  of  the  second  declaration  of  the 
state of emergency, 3 April to 17 April 2020; Report on the application of the third declaration of the state of 
emergency, 18 April to 2 May 2020), , which have been approved (Resolution of the Assembly of Republic 
No. 49/2020, of 5 June 2020; Project for a Resolution of the Assembly of the Republic No. 586/XIV, of 23 
July 2020; Project for a Resolution of the Assembly of the Republic No. 587/XIV, of 23 July 2020). 

93   Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions (GANHRI), Sub-Committee on Accreditation (SCA) 

(2017), Accreditation Report – November 2017.  

94   European Network on National Human Rights Institutions (2020), The rule of law in the European Union  – 

Reports from National Human Rights Institutions. 

95   United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child (2019), Concluding observations on the combined fifth 
and  sixth  periodic  reports  of  Portugal;  European  Union  Agency  for  Fundamental  Rights  (FRA)  (2020), 
Contribution from FRA for the 2020 Rule of Law Report. 

13 

 
                                                 
Portuguese  laws  protect  civic  participation.  The  civil  society  space  is  considered  to  be 
open96.  Given  their  important  role  in  the  implementation  of  social,  cultural,  environmental, 
civic and economic programs, cooperation and development NGOs are granted a special legal 
status97. Associations representing women, migrants, youth, and persons with disabilities, and 
those  involved  in  environmental  protection,  are  also  subject  to  specific  legislation.  The 
existing  framework  appears  to  ensure  the  open  space  for  civil  society  organisations,  and 
allow them to operate without particular risks to their autonomy and security98. However, it is 
reported  that  NGOs  face  challenges  related  to  the  availability  of  funding  and  the  reduced 
diversity of funding sources99. 

96   Rating by CIVICUS; ratings are on a five-category scale defined as: open, narrowed,  obstructed, repressed 

and closed.  

97   Law No. 66/98, of 14 October. 
98   European Network on National Human Rights Institutions (2020), The rule of law in the European Union  – 

Reports from National Human Rights Institutions. 

99   See previous note. 

14 

 
                                                 
Annex I: List of sources in alphabetical order. *  
* The list of contributions received in the context of the consultation for the 2020 Rule of Law report 
can be found at (COM website). 

Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom (2019), Decriminalisation of Defamation – Factsheet. 
https://cmpf.eui.eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/decriminalisation-of-defamation_Infographic.pdf.  

Centre  for  Media  Pluralism  and  Media  Freedom  (2020),  2020  Media  Pluralism  Monitor. 

https://cmpf.eui.eu/media-pluralism-monitor/mpm-2020.  

CEPEJ (2018), European judicial systems: efficiency and quality of justice.  

CIVICUS (2020), Portugal country profile. https://monitor.civicus.org/country/portugal/ 

Council  of  Europe:  Committee  of  Ministers  (2010),  Recommendation  CM/Rec(2010)12  of  the 
Committee of Ministers to member states on judges: independence, efficiency and responsibilities. 

Council of Europe: Committee of Ministers (2016), CM/Rec(2016)4 of the Committee of Ministers to 
member  States  on  the  protection  of  journalism  and  safety  of  journalists  and  other  media  actors. 
https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectId=09000016806415d9#_ftn1.  

Council  of  Europe:  Committee  of  Ministers  (2018),  H46-20  Vicente  Cardoso  group  v.  Portugal 
(Application  No.  30130/10)  –  Supervision  of  the  execution  of  the  European  Court’s  judgments 
CM/Del/Dec(2018)1331/H46-20. 

Council  of  the  European  Union  (2020),  Council  Recommendation  of  20  July  2020  on  the  2020 
National  Reform  Programme  of  Portugal  and  delivering  a  Council  opinion  on  the  2020  Stability 
Programme of Portugal. 

Conselho 

de 

Prevenção 

da 

Corrupção 

(2019), 

Annual 

Activity 

Report. 

http://www.cpc.tcontas.pt/documentos/ra/rel_actv_cpc_2019.pdf.  

Court  of  Justice  of  the  European  Union,  judgment  of  19  November  2019,  AK,  Joined  Cases 

C‑ 585/18, C‑ 624/18 and C‑ 625/18. 

Direção  Geral  das  Políticas  da  Justiça 

(2019),  Estatísticas  de  Justiça:  Corrupção.  

https://estatisticas.justica.gov.pt/sites/siej/pt-pt/Paginas/Corrupcao.aspx.  

Directorate-General for Communication (2016-2020), Eurobarometer: perceived independence of the 

national justice system in the EU among the general public.  

Directorate-General for Communication (2020), Special Eurobarometer 502 on Corruption. 

Directorate-General  for  Communication  (2019),  Flash  Eurobarometer  482  on  Businesses’  attitudes 

towards corruption. 

European Commission (2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020), EU Justice Scoreboard. 

European Commission (2019), 2019 Country Report Portugal, SWD(2019)1021 final. 

European Commission (2020), Country report Portugal, SWD(2020)521 final. 

European  Network  of  Councils  for  the  Judiciary  (2020),  Contribution  to  the  online  stakeholder 

consultation for the 2020 Rule of Law Report. 

European  Network  on  National  Human  Rights  Institutions  (2020), The  rule  of law  in  the  European 

Union – Reports from National Human Rights Institutions. 

European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2020), Submission to the European Commission in 

the context of the preparation of the first annual Rule of Law Report. 

Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions (GANHRI), Sub-Committee on Accreditation 

(SCA) (2017), Accreditation Report – November 2017. 

GRECO (2016), Third evaluation round, Addendum to the Second Compliance Report on Portugal. 

15 

 
GRECO (2016), Fourth evaluation round – evaluation report on Portugal on corruption prevention in 

respect of members of Parliament, judges and prosecutors. 

GRECO  (2019),  Fourth  evaluation  round  on  corruption  prevention  in  respect  of  members  of 

Parliament, judges and prosecutors – Interim compliance report Portugal. 

High  Council  for 

the  Administrative  and  Tax  Courts  (2019),  Annual  Report  –  2018. 

http://www.cstaf.pt/documentos/Relatório_CSTAF_2018.pdf. 

High  Council 

for 

the 

Judiciary 

(2019), 

Press 

release 

of 

8  April 

2019.  

https://www.csm.org.pt/2019/04/08/gabinetes-de-apoio-aos-juizes-esclarecimento/.  

High  Council 

for 

the 

Judiciary 

(2020), 

Press 

release 

of 

3  March 

2020. 

https://www.csm.org.pt/2020/03/03/averiguacao-aos-procedimentos-de-distribuicao-comunicado/. 

Portuguese Government (2020), Input for the 2020 Rule of Law Report. 

Portuguese Government – Ministry of Interior (2020), Report on the application of the declaration of 

the state of emergency, 19 March to 2 April 2020. 

Portuguese  Government  –  Ministry  of  Interior  (2020),  Report  on  the  application  of  the  second 

declaration of the state of emergency, 3 April to 17 April 2020. 

Portuguese  Government  –  Ministry  of  Interior  (2020),  Report  on  the  application  of  the  third 

declaration of the state of emergency, 18 April to 2 May 2020. 

Portuguese  People’s  Party,  Press  release  of  30  August  2019.  https://www.psd.pt/rui-rio-apresentou-

medidas-para-a-justica/. 

Portuguese Regulatory Authority for the Media, Statutes of ERC (Law No. 53/2005 of 8 November). 
http://www.erc.pt/download.php?info=YTozOntzOjU6ImFjY2FvIjtzOjg6ImRvd25sb2FkIjtzOjg6I
mZpY2hlaXJvIjtzOjM5OiJtZWRpYS9maWNoZWlyb3Mvb2JqZWN0b19vZmZsaW5lLzM1MC5
wZGYiO3M6NjoidGl0dWxvIjtzOjE1OiJTdGF0dXRlcytvZitFUkMiO30=.  

Public Prosecution Service – Judicial District of Lisbon (2019), Annual Report 2018. 

Public Prosecution Service – Judicial District of Porto (2020), Annual Report 2019. 

Transparency 

International 
https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/portugal.  

(2020), 

Corruption 

Perceptions 

Index. 

Transparency International Portugal (2020), Written contribution to the 2020 Rule of Law Report. 

United  Nations  Committee  on  the  Rights  of  the  Child  (2019),  Concluding  observations  on  the 

combined fifth and sixth periodic reports of Portugal. 

Virtual country visit to Portugal in the context of the 2020 Rule of Law Report. 

16 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex II: Country visit to Portugal 

The Commission services held virtual meetings in June 2020 with: 

  Academic expert 
  Bar Association 
  Central Department of criminal action and investigation (DCIAP) 
  Court of Audits 
  Council for the Prevention of Corruption 
  Regulatory Authority for the Media 
  High Council for the Magistracy 
  High Council for Administrative and Tax Courts  
  High Council for Public Prosecution 
 
Inspectorate-General of Finance 
 
Journalists’ Professional License Committee 
 
Journalists Union 
  Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
  Ministry of Justice 
  Office of the Prosecutor General 
  Ombudsperson 
  Prosecutors Union 
  Supreme Administrative Court 
  Supreme Court of Justice 
  Transparency International – Portugal  

* The Commission also met the following organisations in a number of horizontal meetings:  

  Amnesty International 
  Civil Liberties Union for Europe 
  Civil Society Europe 
  Conference of European Churches  
  EuroCommerce 
  European Center for Not-for-Profit Law  
  European Centre for Press and Media Freedom 
  European Civic Forum  
  Free Press Unlimited 
  Front Line Defenders 
 
ILGA-Europe 
 
International Commission of Jurists 
 
International Federation for Human Rights  
 
International Press Institute  
  Lifelong learning Platform  
  Open Society Justice Initiative/Open Society European Policy Institute 
  Reporters without Borders  
  Transparency International EU  

17