COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 2020 Rule of Law Report Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Slovakia Accompanying the document COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 2020 Rule of Law Report The rule of law situation in the European Union
Date: 2020-09-30
Institutions: European Commission, Secretariat-General
Subjects: Slovakia, administrative transparency, coronavirus disease, corruption, democracy, epidemic, independence of the judiciary, infringement of EU law, political rights, rule of law

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 30.9.2020  SWD(2020) 324 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 2020 Rule of Law Report Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Slovakia Accompanying the document COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 2020 Rule of Law Report    The rule of law situation in the European Union {COM(2020) 580 final} - {SWD(2020) 300 final} - {SWD(2020) 301 final} - {SWD(2020) 302 final} - {SWD(2020) 303 final} - {SWD(2020) 304 final} - {SWD(2020) 305 final} - {SWD(2020) 306 final} - {SWD(2020) 307 final} - {SWD(2020) 308 final} - {SWD(2020) 309 final} - {SWD(2020) 310 final} - {SWD(2020) 311 final} - {SWD(2020) 312 final} - {SWD(2020) 313 final} - {SWD(2020) 314 final} - {SWD(2020) 315 final} - {SWD(2020) 316 final} - {SWD(2020) 317 final} - {SWD(2020) 318 final} - {SWD(2020) 319 final} - {SWD(2020) 320 final} - {SWD(2020) 321 final} - {SWD(2020) 322 final} - {SWD(2020) 323 final} - {SWD(2020) 325 final} - {SWD(2020) 326 final}  
 
 
ABSTRACT 

Efforts  have  been  undertaken  in  recent  years  to  improve  the  quality  and  efficiency  of  the 
Slovak justice system and have started to show some promising results. However, the justice 
system is  characterised  by a very low level  of perceived judicial independence among both 
the general public and businesses. Since 2019, this has been exacerbated by serious concerns 
about the full integrity of the judiciary and prosecution services. The Government appointed 
in  March  2020  announced  a  range  of  reforms  in  sensitive  areas,  such  as  the  appointment 
procedures  for  members  of  the  Judicial  Council,  the  Constitutional  Court  and  the  Supreme 
Court as well as the Prosecutor General and introducing a fixed retirement age for judges.  

The  fight  against  corruption  has  been  identified  as  one  of  the  key  priorities  in  the  political 
programme  of  the  new  Government,  which  announced  a  range  of  reforms  to  improve  the 
situation. The capacity to detect,  investigate and prosecute corruption offences is  hampered 
by  a  lack  of  resources  and  dedicated  analytical  expertise  in  both  the  Special  Prosecution 
Office  and  the  National  Crime  Agency,  as  well  as  difficulties  in  obtaining  evidence. 
Lobbying  activities  are  not  regulated  and  ‘revolving  doors’  provisions  are  weak.  New 
legislation  concerning  asset  declarations  and  conflict  of  interests  of  members  of  the 
government and other public office-holders took effect at the beginning of 2020. 

Slovakia’s  Constitution  and  secondary  legislation  provide  a  robust  legal  framework  for  the 
protection of freedom of expression, the right to access public information, the establishment 
of structures to ensure media pluralism and press rights. However, concerns have been raised 
about  a  lack  of  robust  rules  for  ensuring  transparency  of  media  ownership,  at  preventing 
conflicts  of  interests  between  media  owners  and  political  parties  and  establishing  a 
framework  for  the  distribution  of  state  advertising.  The  assassination  of  investigative 
journalist Ján Kuciak and his fiancée in 2018 is widely considered to have marked a genuine 
turning point in Slovak society and raised awareness about the need to improve the safety of 
journalists.  

As  regards  the  system  of  checks  and  balances  in  Slovakia,  there  is  a  need  to  improve  the 
legislative  process  by  strengthening  the  involvement  of  stakeholders  and  civil  society  and 
making better use of the existing impact assessment framework. Independent authorities such 
as the National Centre for Human Rights or the Public Defender of Rights have an important 
role to play in securing checks and balance, but need to be fully mandated and equipped to 
effectively  exercise their roles. The Government  announced plans for reforms  to  strengthen 
rule of law, in particular reforms to increase the powers of the Constitutional Court. The rule 
of law as a subject of public debate has gained in importance over the last years, which could 
foster the emergence of a more robust rule of law culture. 

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I.  JUSTICE SYSTEM 

The court system  of the Slovak Republic consists of 54 District Courts, 8 Regional  Courts, 
the  Specialised  Criminal  Court,  the  Supreme  Court  and  the  Slovak  Constitutional  Court1. 
There is no distinct branch of administrative courts in Slovakia. The Regional Courts function 
as the courts of appeal in civil, commercial and criminal cases and at the same time function 
as  the  courts  of  first  instance  in  administrative  matters.  The  Specialised  Criminal  Court  is 
competent  to  judge  serious  criminal  matters  as  enumerated  in  the  relevant  provision  of  the 
Code  of  Criminal  Procedure2.  The  Judicial  Council  plays  a  central  role  in  the  self-
administration of the judiciary and in the appointment, suspension and dismissal of judges as 
well as in maintaining judicial ethics. Currently, half of its members (9 out of 18) are judges 
elected  by  their  peers.  In  its  present  composition,  some  of  the  Judicial  Council’s  other 
members  are  appointed  by  the  Slovak  President,  Parliament  and  Government3.  The  public 
prosecution  service  of  Slovakia  is  an  independent  state  authority  headed  by  the  Prosecutor 
General4.  The  Slovak  Bar  Association  is  an  independent  self-administrative  professional 
organisation5. 

Independence 

Longstanding concerns regarding the independence and integrity of the Slovak justice 
system  have  continued  to  mount  since  August  2019.  Revelations  and  findings  from 
criminal  investigations  point  to  a  number  of  cases  of  high-level  corruption.  This  includes 
concerns over the possible exercise of undue influence and collusion by individual members 
of the executive and other politicians over and with members of the judiciary, including high-
ranking judges.6 Furthermore, suspicions arose regarding individual cases of abuse of office 
by  judges  and  prosecutors,  including  a  former  Prosecutor  General7.  In  autumn  2019,  these 
events  sparked  public  protests  and  reinforced  calls  on  the  authorities  to  step  up  efforts  to 
reduce corruption in the Slovak justice system. A number of disciplinary proceedings as well 
as  criminal  investigations  have  been  initiated  against  a  number  of  judges  and  prosecutors, 
some  of  whom  have  been  suspended  or  resigned  from  office.  In  certain  cases,  ongoing 
criminal investigations have also led to detentions of judges and prosecutors8. 

The perceived level of independence of the judiciary in Slovakia has remained very low, 
despite some efforts in the past to strengthen judicial independence and transparency. 
The  perceived  level  of  independence  of  courts  and  judges  among  the  general  public  in 
Slovakia  remains  very  low,  with  a  clear  minority  of  both  the  general  population  and 

1   For a  description of the judicial structure, see e.g. the  Annual study  for the European Commission carried 

out by CEPEJ. 

2   Slovak  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure,  para.  14  (e.g.  premeditated  murder,  corruption,  terrorism,  organised 

crime, severe economic crimes, damaging the financial interests of the EU etc.). 

3   Art. 141a of the Slovak Constitution. 
4   Arts. 149 – 151 of the Slovak Constitution; Act No. 153/2001 Coll. on Public Prosecution Service. 
5   Parliamentary Act No. 586/2003 Coll. on the Legal Profession and on Amending Act No. 455/1991 Coll. on 

the Business and Self-employment Services (Business Licensing Act) of 4 December 2003. 

6   See European Commission, 2020 Country Report Slovakia, SWD(2020) 524 final. 
7   European Commission, 2020 Country Report Slovakia, SWD(2020) 524 final, pp. 6, 20, 50. The European 
Parliament  has  also  expressed  concerns  as  regards  the  situation  in  Slovakia,  see  European  Parliament 
resolution of 28 March 2019 on the situation of the rule of law and the fight against corruption in the EU, 
specifically in Malta and Slovakia; resolution of 19 April 2018 on protection of investigative journalists in 
Europe: the case of Slovak journalist Ján Kuciak and Martina Kušnírová. 

8   This has also been reported by Slovak authorities during the preparation of the present report. 

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companies perceiving the level of judicial independence as ‘fairly or very good’ (26 % of the 
general population and 15 % of companies). The reason most often invoked for the perceived 
lack of judicial independence is related to interference or pressure from the Government and 
politicians9.  It  is  noteworthy  that  this  comparatively  low  level  of  perceived  judicial 
independence has persisted over an extended period10, which is also recognised by the Slovak 
authorities11.  

The Government has announced reform plans to strengthen judicial independence and 
integrity.  In  this  context,  it  is  necessary  to  recall  attempts  of  previous  Governments  to 
address  some of the longstanding  concerns over the integrity of judges,  which had led to  a 
change  of  the  Slovak  Constitution  and  included  a  controversial  introduction  of  mandatory 
background  checks  on  judges  and  candidate  judges  on  the  basis  of  information  from  the 
Slovak National Security Authority12. The Slovak Constitutional Court, in a landmark ruling 
on 30 January 201913 held  that these background  checks  were in  breach of the principle of 
judicial  independence  and  that  the  constitutional  amendment  dating  from  2014  was 
unconstitutional14.  

The Government has announced reform plans to change the current composition of the 
Judicial  Council.  These  plans  include  the  appointment  process,  inter  alia  to  guarantee 
regional  representation  and  to  strengthen  the  controls  of  asset  declarations  of  judges15.  Six 
new  members  were  appointed  on  23  April  2020,  26  April  2020  and  20  May  202016,  and  a 
new  President  of  the  Judicial  Council  was  elected  on  29  June  202017,  following  the 
resignation  of  some  of  its  members  on  23  March  202018,  and  the  resignation  of  the  former 
President on 23 June 202019. 

The Government has  also  announced plans to strengthen the appointment process  for 
the Constitutional Court. In past years, the appointment of new judges of the Constitutional 
Court  has  repeatedly  been  the  subject  of  controversy  between  the  Government,  Parliament 
and the Slovak President, regularly resulting in  long delays in  the appointment  process  and 
even  endangering  the  sound  functioning  of  the  Court.  Indeed  in  2019,  only  four  out  of  the 

9   Figures 44 and 46, 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard. The level of perceived judicial independence is categorised 
as  follows:  very  low  (below  30%  of  respondents  perceive  judicial  independence  as  fairly  good  and  very 
good); low (between 30-39%), average (between 40-59%), high (between 60-75%), very high (above 75%). 
10   2013 – 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard; World Economic Forum, 2012-2019 Global Competitiveness. It is also 
to be noted that Slovak lawyers rate the independence of judges in their country very low (5.4/10 points) in 
comparative  terms  (figure  7  of  ENCJ/CCBE  Survey  among  lawyers  on  the  independence  of  judges  2018-
2019). 

11   E.g. input from Slovakia for the 2020 Rule of Law Report, point 10.  
12   European Commission, 2015 Country Report Slovakia, SWD(2015) 44 final/2, pp. 35 – 36. 
13   Judgment of the Constitutional Court PL. ÚS 21/2014-96. 
14   2018 Global Review of Constitutional Law, p. 272. 
15   Programové  vyhlásenie  vlády  Slovenskej  republiky  na  obdobie  rokov  2020  –  2024  of  19  April  2020 

(hereinafter: Political Manifesto), p. 8. 

16   Communiques of the Judicial Council of 26, 30 April and 20 May 2020. 
17   A former judge and President of the Slovak Constitutional Court and Slovak Advocate-General at the Court 

of Justice of the European Union (Prof. Dr. Ján Mazák). 

18   Communique of the Judicial Council of 23 March 2020; noting that one of the new members filled a position 
that was vacant since a resignation of a former member on 13 November 2019, Communique of the Judicial 
Council of 13 November 2019. 

19   Communique of the Judicial Council of 23 June 2020. 

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foreseen 13 judges were in office20 because the selection and appointment procedure for the 
remaining judges  was  not  concluded21. This  issue has been  addressed by  a country-specific 
recommendation  in  the  context  of  the  2019  European  Semester22.  On  a  positive  note,  in 
October  2019  the  Slovak  President  appointed  the  remaining  number  of  judges  to  the 
Constitutional Court ending an impasse that had existed since February 2019.  

The Government further announced that it would introduce a fixed retirement age for 
judges. Plans include the introduction of a fixed retirement age of 65 years for judges and of 
70  years  for  judges  of  the  Constitutional  Court23  as  currently,  no  fixed  retirement  age  for 
judges exists in Slovakia.24 It is important that this envisaged reform be in line with EU law 
requirements25  and take account  of Council of Europe recommendations relating to  judicial 
independence26. 

Quality 

Efforts to improve the quality of the Slovak justice system have picked up over the last 
years. Against the background of a series of country-specific recommendations in the context 
of the European Semester in  2014, 2016 and 2017 to  improve the efficiency  and quality of 
the  Slovak  justice  system27,  the  Slovak  authorities  have  started  to  implement  a  number  of 
reforms aimed at improving both the efficiency and quality of the Slovak justice system. This 
process has also been informed by a comprehensive functional review of the Slovak justice 
system28,  which  identified  a  number  of  areas  for  reform29  and  provided  for  62 
recommendations on how to improve the efficiency and quality of the Slovak justice system. 

Reforms  of  the  justice  system  have  been  adopted  and  are  being  implemented,  whilst 
additional reforms have been announced. This includes in particular the introduction of so-
called ‘flying’ or guest judges to address temporary workload challenges in individual courts, 
legislative measures to de-register old and inactive enforcement cases that had been a drain 
on resources and ongoing projects on case weighting as well as time-frames.  

20   European Commission, 2019 Country Report Slovakia, SWD(2019) 1024 final, p. 47. See further the Venice 

Commission Opinion (CDL-AD(2017)001-e). 

21   After  the  end  of  the  term  of  office  of  9  judges  of  the  Constitutional  Court  in  the  beginning  of  2019,  the 
Parliament (drawing up the list of candidates) could not agree on the final list of candidates to be submitted 
to the President of the Republic.  

22   Council  Recommendation  of  9  July  2019  on  the  2019  National  Reform  Programme  of  Slovakia  and 
delivering a  Council opinion  on the 2019 Stability Programme of  Slovakia, OJ C 301, 5.9.2019, pp. 148–
153. 

23   Political Manifesto, p. 8. 
24   Under  Article  147  of  the  Slovak  Constitution,  a  judge  may  be  recalled  by  the  President  of  the  Slovak 

Republic on a proposal by the Judicial Council if he or she has attained the age of 65. 

25   E.g. cases of Court of Justice C-619/18, Commission v Poland (Indépendance de la Cour suprême) and C-
192/18,  Commission v Poland  (Indépendance des juridictions de droit commun),  C-282/12,  Commission v 
Hungary. 

26   Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, para. 49. 
27   Council Recommendations of 8 July 2014 (OJ C 247, 29.7.2014, p. 122–126); of 12 July 2016 (OJ C 299, 

18.8.2016, p. 61–64); of 11 July 2017 (OJ C 261, 9.8.2017, p. 110–113). 

28   CEPEJ,  Efficiency  and  Quality  of  the  Slovak  Judicial  System.  This  study  was  financed  from  European 
Structural and Investment Funds under the operational programme ‘Effective Public Administration 2014 – 
2020’. 

29   This includes areas  such as court organization, budgetary issues,  human resources, court  management and 

efficiency and quality of courts. 

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Slovakia  is  actively  engaging  to  advance  the  digitalisation  of  its  justice  system.  The 
Government  has  announced  to  further  promote  dissemination  of  the  use  of  information 
technology in courts30. This would complement the on-going efforts to upgrade the available 
IT  tools  and  analytical  capacity31.  In  particular,  a  completed  project  on  performance 
dashboards for all Slovak courts to  increase transparency  and allow the  visualisation of the 
key performance indicators32 is a promising example and has already gained the interest from 
stakeholders outside of Slovakia. Certain IT projects have been receiving technical support at 
European  level33.  A  2018  study  concluded  that  the  Slovak  judiciary  is  already  subject  to 
comparatively high levels of transparency34.  

Some  challenges  remain  as  regards  access  to  justice  and  potentially  high  court  fees. 
Legal  aid  remains  not  fully  accessible  for  individuals  at  risk  of  poverty  and  court  fees  in 
specific  commercial  disputes  are  among  the  highest  in  the  EU35.  The  Government  has 
announced a review of the current legal  aid system with a view to  reviewing existing court 
fees36  and  covering  a  larger  group  of  low-income  earners,  which  is  not  otherwise  able  to 
access justice. 

Efficiency 

Efficiency-oriented reforms undertaken in past years have started to show results and 
by  now,  the  Slovak  justice  system  largely  manages  to  deal  with  its  workload.  In 
particular, courts continue to perform efficiently in terms of length of proceedings in litigious 
civil and commercial cases in first instance (157 days in 2018 compared to 171 days in 2017) 
and  clearance  rate  (130.6%  in  2018),  also  benefitting  from  a  reduced  inflow  of  new  cases. 
However, the performance of courts in administrative cases has dropped as the clearance rate 
fell (96.1% in 2018 compared to 118.1% in 2017), the disposition time further increased (401 
days in 2018 compared to 317 days in 2017)37. Authorities also indicated that there are still 
some challenges concerning the more efficient resolution of older cases, i.e. those pending for 
more  than  two  years.  The  Government  has  announced  plans  to  create  a  new  Supreme 
Administrative  Court,  to  reform  Slovakia’s  judicial  map  and  to  increase  specialisation  of 
judges38. 

30   Political Manifesto, p. 10. 
31   Authorities have also  made progress in the absorption of earmarked funding from the European Structural 
and Investments Funds for the 2014–2020 funding period, which provides the bulk of funding for the further 
reform  of  the  justice  system.  Moreover,  since  2018,  technical  support  has  been  provided  by  the  European 
Commission under the Structural Reform Support Programme to the Slovak ministry of justice to develop an 
IT Architecture strategy and transition plan, to set up tools for assessing the courts' performance and to build 
capacity for better court and case management. 

32   The data can be found at: http://web.ac-mssr.sk/dashboard/. 
33   E.g. CEPEJ-COOP(2017)15, Report on the evaluation of the current state of affairs of IT tools for the 

Slovak judicial system and advise on their development. 

34   Transparency International Slovakia (2018), Let’s judge the judges  – How Slovakia opened its judiciary to 

unprecedented public control.  

35   Figures 23 & 25, 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
36   Political Manifesto, p. 13. 
37   Cf. CEPEJ, Study on the functioning of judicial systems in the EU Member States, Part 2, p. 611. 
38   Political Manifesto, p. 8. 

5 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
II.  ANTI-CORRUPTION FRAMEWORK 

The  legal  and  institutional  framework  to  prevent,  investigate  and  prosecute  corruption  is 
broadly in place. The competences for the prevention, detection and prosecution of corruption 
are shared between several authorities. The Office of the Government is the central body for 
the  co-ordination  of  the  prevention  of  corruption.  The  National  Crime  Agency  of  the 
Presidium  of  the  Police  Force  is  in  charge  of  the  detection  and  investigation  of  corruption 
offences with the exception of corruption crimes committed by members of the police itself 
and  certain  law  enforcement  agencies  falling  under  the  remit  of  the  Bureau  of  Inspection 
Service.  The  Special  Prosecutor’s  Office  has  jurisdiction  over  the  investigation  of  criminal 
offences.  The  control  of  asset  declarations  is  currently  performed  at  national  level  by 
a parliamentary committee and, at the local level, by a local council committee.  

Slovakia  scored  50/100  over  the  past  three  years  in  a  row  in  Transparency 
International’s Corruption  Perception  Index,  ranking 16th  in the European Union and 
59th globally39. 87% of respondents consider corruption widespread (EU average 71%) and 
41% of people feel personally affected by corruption in their daily life (EU average 26%)40. 
According  to  the  surveys,  88%  of  companies  consider  corruption  to  be  widespread  (EU 
average  63%)  and  53%  of  companies  consider  that  corruption  is  a  problem  when  doing 
business  (EU  average  37%).  Then,  37%  of  people  find  that  there  are  enough  successful 
prosecutions  to  deter  people  from  corrupt  practices  (EU  average  36%),  while  13%  of 
companies  believe  that  people  and  businesses  caught  for  bribing  a  senior  official  are 
appropriately punished (EU average 31%)41. 

The  fight  against  corruption  has  been  identified  as  one  of  the  key  priorities  in  the 
political programme of the new government, which announced a range of reforms in this 
area. This responds to public outcry over the revelations made in the context of investigations 
into the murder of journalist Ján Kuciak and his fiancée Martina Kušnírová that a top oligarch 
exerted  significant  influence  over  politicians,  law  enforcement  and  the  judiciary.  These 
revelations  triggered,  amongst  others,  the  resignation  of  the  Prosecutor  General  in  March 
201942.  

The criminal legal framework for fighting corruption is broadly in place and specialised 
institutions have been set up. All forms of active, passive, direct and indirect corruption are 
criminalised. As a result of the third evaluation round of implementation of the OECD Anti-
Bribery  Convention43,  national  provisions  on  foreign  bribery  offences  have  been  amended. 
Slovakia adopted new legislation on criminal liability, which regulates sanctions applicable to 
legal persons44.  

The competences for the prevention, detection and prosecution of corruption are shared 
between several authorities. The Office of the  Government is the central body for the co-
ordination  of  the  prevention  of  corruption,  including  sectoral  anti-corruption  coordinators 

39   Transparency International (2020), 2019 Corruption Perceptions Index. 
40   Special Eurobarometer 502 (2020). 
41   Flash Eurobarometer 482 (2019). 
42   On  3  September  2020,  the  Special  Criminal  Court  acquitted  two  persons  charged  with  the  murders;  this 

ruling is being appealed by the Slovak prosecution services. 

43   OECD (2012) Slovakia: Phase 3 Report on Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in the Slovak 

Republic. 

44   Act No. 91/2016 on the Criminal Liability of Legal Persons. 

6 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
who  have  been  put  in  place  at  each  central  administration  body  since  2019.  In  December 
2019,  the  Office  of  the  Government  introduced  a  dedicated  software  tool  to  increase  the 
effectiveness  of corruption risk management.  The National  Crime Agency  of the Presidium 
of the Police Force (NAKA) is in charge of detection and investigation of corruption offences 
with  the  exception  of  corruption  crimes  committed  by  members  of  the  police  itself  and 
certain  law  enforcement  agencies45,  falling  under  the  remit  of  the  Bureau  of  Inspection 
Service.  The  Special  Prosecutor’s  Office  has  jurisdiction  over  the  investigation  of  criminal 
offences under the substantive jurisdiction of the Specialised Criminal Court (SCC), which is 
a court of first instance established in 2009.  

In  recent  years,  only  few  high-level  corruption  cases  have  been  investigated  and  are 
being prosecuted. According to statistics of the Special Prosecution Office, only 48 persons 
were  indicted  for  corruption  in  2018,  the  lowest  number  since  2009,  while  63  persons 
concluded  plea  bargain  agreements.  The  country  specific  recommendation  addressed  to 
Slovakia  in  the  context  of  the  European  Semester  in  2019  points  out  that  corruption  as 
continue  to  represent  a  challenge  as  Slovakia  only  has  limited  capacity  to  investigate  and 
prosecute  high-level  corruption  cases46.  Consequently,  there  are  only  very  few  high-level 
corruption cases that have been adjudicated by the Specialised Criminal Court. In this regard, 
the  weak  protection  offered  to  whistle-blowers  is  a  point  of  concern.  Disclosing  crimes  of 
corruption continues to occur at a very low level with few high-level corruption cases being 
prosecuted.  

The  effectiveness  of  the  specialised  anti-corruption  institutions  is  a  serious  challenge. 
The National  Crime Agency  (NAKA) has been  reorganised in  2019, but  its resources were 
not  increased.  One  key  challenge  identified  by  stakeholders  as  regards  detecting  and 
prosecuting corruption, including high-level cases, is the investigation capacity. In particular 
the  capacity  to  find  the first  indications  of  corruption  is  hampered  by  the  lack  of  resources 
and  specific  expertise47.  The  Special  Prosecution  Office  has  raised  concerns  about  its 
resources.  It  is  staffed  with  one  prosecutor  in  the  position  of  the  Head  of  Anti-Corruption 
Department of the Office and four additional prosecutors. On average, each prosecutor is in 
charge  of  approximately  80  cases  at  a  time,  which  raises  questions  in  relation  to  the 
effectively  supervising  investigations.  The  Special  Prosecution  Office  has  asked  for  more 
resources, but so far, there appear to be no plans to increase the number of prosecutors.  

The  2019  Whistle-blower  Protection  Act  aims  to  increase  the  protection  measures  by 
establishing  an  independent  office  for  complaints  but  its  implementation  is  being 
delayed. The Act was adopted in January 201948, however as at September 2020 the head of 
the office has not  been appointed and the office has not  yet  taken up its function. The new 
law  aims  at  addressing  concerns  raised  by  the  previous  framework,  notably  the  uncertainty 
arising  from  the  requirement  to  report  in  good  faith,  the  discrepancies  in  the  protection 

45   Members of armed security  units,  members of the judiciary  guards and prison  wardens  corps and customs 

officers. 

46   Council  Recommendation  of  9  July  2019  on  the  2019  National  Reform  Programme  of  Slovakia  and 

delivering a Council opinion on the 2019 Stability Programme of Slovakia, pp. 148–153. 

47   Input  from  Slovakia  for  the  2020  Rule  of  Law  Report,  section  on  Potential  obstacles  to  investigation  and 

prosecution of high-level and complex corruption cases (e.g. political immunity regulation). 

48   Act no. 54/2019 Coll. on Whistleblowers’ Protection. 

7 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
accorded  to  different  categories  of  officials,  and  the  absence  of  simultaneous  internal  and 
external channels for reporting misconduct49.  

There  is  currently  no  regulation  governing  lobbying  in  Slovakia  and  postemployment 
restrictions are weak. Partial measures and rules, such as restrictions for gifts, received by 
public officials in connection with their public functions, are subject to the Act on Conflict of 
Interests50. The programme of the new government also contains a commitment to adopt an 
act on lobbying which will combine legislative measures, a mandatory registry of lobbyists, a 
code  of  conduct  and  the  creation  of  a special  registry  (on  areas  of  intended  lobbying, 
information  on  their  clients,  costs  and  remuneration  for  lobbying  activity)51.  In  this  regard, 
the  anticorruption  plan  adopted  in  September  2019  already  foresees  that  the  Ministry  of 
Justice  should  submit  draft  legislation  to  the  Government  by  the  end  of  2021.  As  regards 
‘revolving doors’, postemployment provisions are included in the Act of Conflict of Interest. 
It  applies  exclusively  to  public  officials  who  were  in  executive  functions  or  members  of  a 
collective decision-making body, while advisers and senior civil servants closely associated 
with  top  executive  functions  are  not  included.  Limitations  after  holding  public  office  (a 
cooling-off period) are applicable for one year upon the end of the tenure (in case the person 
had decision-making powers on support, benefits or excusing from obligations for two years 
prior  to  the  end  of  his/her  office,  or  concluded  a  contract  on  public  procurement  during 
his/her tenure). GRECO has noted in this regard the rather limited scope of the provisions and 
recommended broader restrictions, which should also include senior civil servants involved in 
top  executive  functions  and  rules  put  in  place  to  prevent  former  top  officials  from  lobbing 
activities after they left the office52. 

New legislation concerning asset declarations and conflict of interests of members of the 
Government  and  other  public  office-holders  took  effect  on  1  January  2020.  The  new 
law53  extended  the  scope  of  assets  to  be  declared  by  public  officials  (to  include  the  use  of 
movables and immovables belonging to third parties, and the specification of gifts received). 
The  aim  of  the  new  law  is  to  remove  shortcomings  of  the  legislation  as  arising  from  the 
GRECO recommendations54. Act No. 66/2019 expands the scope of public officials who are 
subject  to  the  Constitutional  Act  on  Conflicts  of  Interests  to  the  President  and  members  of 
supervisory  boards  of  legal  persons  in  which  the  state  has  a  majority  interest  and  city 
mayors55.  

The  control  of  asset  declarations  is  currently  performed  at  national  level  by 
a parliamentary committee and, at the local level, by a local council committee. The new 
government  has  pledged to  establish an independent  institution, which shall not  only check 
asset declarations but also be responsible for ethical issues. The national action plan requires 
the  Government  Office  and  other  relevant  authorities  to  review  the  mechanism  of  asset 
disclosures. A dedicated working group has been established with representatives of relevant 

49   European Commission, Country Report Slovakia 2020, SWD(2020) 524 final, p. 51. 
50   Constitutional  Act No. 357/2004  Coll.  on  Protection  of  Public  Interest  in  the  performance  of  functions  of 

public officials (‘Conflict of Interest Act’). 

51   Political Manifesto, pp. 4 and 14. 
52   GRECO Fourth Evaluation Round – Evaluation Report.  
53   Act no. 66/2019 amending Constitutional Act no. 357/2004 Coll. on the protection of the public interest in 

the exercise of the functions of public officials, as amended by Constitutional Act no. 545/2005 Coll. 

54   GRECO Fourth Evaluation Round – Evaluation report.  
55   Prior to the adoption of this amendment, declarations of interests and assets of mayors were only submitted 

to the commission of a municipal council. 

8 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
state  authorities,  including  the  Judicial  Council,  the  General  Prosecutor’s  Office  and  the 
National Council as well as two NGOs56.  

Integrity  systems  for  the  public  administration  have  been  improved  by  way  of  an 
amendment  to  the  Civil  Service  Act.  This  concerns  state  employees,  including  ministers, 
secretaries of state and heads of central state administration bodies. These legislative changes 
include  a  state  employee  Code  of  Ethics57,  and  a  system  to  assess  compliance  of  a  state 
employee’s  actions  with  the  code.  The  code  anchors  the  basic  ethical  values  for  a  state 
employee:  political  neutrality, 
in 
interpersonal relations. 

interest,  dignity  and  respect 

impartiality,  public 

III. MEDIA PLURALISM 

The  Constitution  of  Slovakia  enshrines  freedom  of  expression,  the  right  of  access  to 
information  and  the  right  to  express  opinions  in  words,  print,  image  or  by  other  means,  as 
well  as  to  search  for,  receive  and  disseminate  ideas  and  information.  The  right  to  access 
information  finds  legal  expression  in  the  Freedom  of  Information  Act58.  The  Broadcasting 
and Retransmission Act59 is aimed at ensuring plurality of information while the Press Act60 
establishes  rules  relating  to  the  press  and  to  journalists.  While  freedom  of  expression  is 
generally  considered  to  be  robustly  protected  in  Slovakia,  criminal  legislation  foresees  the 
highest punishment - imprisonment for up to 8 years - for criminal defamation among all EU 
Member States. The Government announced its intention to reform the legal framework for 
certain  online  media  services  as  well  as  the  financial  resources  allotted  to  the  relevant 
regulatory authorities61. 

A Council for Broadcasting and Retransmission exists and has clear competences and 
responsibilities. The Council’s mission is to reinforce the public interest in its exercise of the 
right  to  information,  freedom  of expression as  well as the right  of  access  to  cultural  values 
and  education.  Furthermore,  the  Council  is  tasked  with  implementing  state  regulation  in 
broadcasting,  retransmission  and  the  provision  of  audiovisual  media  services.  The  Council, 
inter alia, issues broadcasting licences, handles all relevant complaints, can order suspension 
of retransmission, imposes sanctions on broadcasters, retransmission operators and providers 
of  on-demand  audiovisual  media  service  providers  and  ensures  cooperation  with  self-
regulatory  bodies.  The  authority  disposes  of  its  own  budget  and  the  resources  allotted  are 
considered  adequate  for  the  accomplishment  of  its  tasks62.  Clear  rules  on  appointment  and 
dismissal of the Council’s members are established by law63. The Media Pluralism Monitor 
202064  concludes  that  the  independence  of  the  Council  is  overall  guaranteed  with  the  risk 
factor remaining stable in the low risk margin, but refers to increasing political nominations 

56   Input from Slovakia for the 2020 Rule of Law Report, section on Integrity framework: asset disclosure rules, 
lobbying,  revolving  doors  and  general  transparency  of  public  decision-making  (including  public  access  to 
information). 

57   Decree no. 400/2019 on State Employee Code of Ethics.  
58   Act 211/2000 Coll., Freedom of Information Act. 
59   Act 308/2000 Coll., Broadcasting and Retransmission Act. 
60   Act 167/2008 Coll., Press Act. 
61   Slovakia climbed two places in the Reporters Without Borders World Press Freedom Index, now registering 

at 33rd position worldwide, Reporters without Borders, Slovakia. 

62   As confirmed during the country visit. 
63   The  Council  has  nine  members,  who  are  elected  and  repealed  by  the  National  Council  of  the  Slovak 

Republic (the Parliament). 
64   2020 Media Pluralism Monitor. 

9 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
as an emerging issue. Civil society organisations have complained that the Council failed to 
properly monitor public service television during the latest electoral period65.  

There is no systematic regulatory framework in Slovakia allowing for transparency of 
media  ownership. The MPM 2020 therefore  concludes that this represents  the highest  risk 
area for the country. The MPM 2020 further points out that while the Act on the Register of 
Public Sector Partners66 allows for the indirect disclosure of ultimate owners of major media 
outlets, media that do not do business with the state or do not receive public funding are not 
listed therein. While both the Council for Broadcasting and Retransmission and the Ministry 
of Culture gather partial information on the owners of traditional media, they lack the legal 
tools  to  obtain  information  with  regard  to  ultimate  owners  and  beneficiaries.  The  Slovak 
authorities pointed out that this poses a significant problem with  regard to electronic media 
and  that  the  issue  is  expected  to  be  addressed  by  means  of  legislative  intervention.  In  this 
context,  it  should  also  be  recalled  that  the  revised  Audiovisual  Media  Services  Directive 
(AVMSD)  encourages  Member  States  to  adopt  legislative  measures  providing  that  media 
service  providers  under  their  jurisdiction  make  accessible  information  concerning  their 
ownership structure, including the beneficial owners. 

In  terms  of  political  independence,  Slovakia  lacks  the  legal  safeguards  that  would 
effectively preclude conflicts of interest between owners of media and the ruling parties, 
partisan groups or politicians. This problem appears particularly acute in local publications 
during  electoral  periods  given  that  most  local  media  is  financed  or  co-owned  by  local 
municipal authorities. On the other hand, the major newspapers and press agencies continue 
to show resistance to political pressure. 

Currently no framework for regulating the distribution of state advertising exists. The 
Slovak authorities pointed out that the Broadcasting and Retransmission Act does not define 
the term “state advertising”. All contracts between the state and the private sector, however, 
are  registered  in  the  central  register  of  contracts.  This  register  is  publicly  accessible  and 
consequently provides for a certain degree of transparency in this respect. Editorial autonomy 
depends on self-regulation, which the MPM 2020 considers to be usually effective in the case 
of those outlets, which apply the Code of Ethics of the Slovak Syndicate of Journalists.  

The murder of a journalist Ján Kuciak and his fiancée Martina Kušnírová in 2018 led 
to  a  wide-ranging  debate  across  Slovak  society  on  the  safety  of  journalists.  The  debate 
focussed  on  reported  cases  of  illegal  spying  on  journalists  by,  among  others,  a  former 
member of the state security service, a lack of police reaction following the lodging of reports 
about  death  threats  against  journalists  and  the  revelations  that  a  top  oligarch  exerted 
significant influence over politicians67.  

It  is  widely  agreed  that  Slovak  civil  society,  the  political  level  and  the  relevant 
authorities have reacted robustly following the assassination and in its aftermath. Civil 
society and journalists’ organisations have made it clear that the assassination represented a 

65   E.g. OSCE-ODIHR, Slovak Republic – Parliamentary Elections, ODIHR Election Assessment Mission Final 

Report (2020), p. 14. 

66   Act no. 315/2016. 
67   See also the anti-corruption part of the chapter (above). 

10 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
genuine  turning  point  in  the  country,  not  least  with  regard  to  the  standing  of  investigative 
journalism in Slovak society68.  

Some degree of harassment against journalists persists. In 2019, the Council of Europe’s 
Platform  to  promote  the  protection  of  journalism  and  safety  of  journalists  published  four 
alerts  for  Slovakia69.  The  alerts  concerned  verbal  attacks  and  negative  communication 
campaigns against journalists, surveillance of journalists as well as a law mandating a right of 
reply  for  politicians70.  In  2020,  the  Platform  received  two  alerts,  concerning  criminal 
defamation charges against a newspaper opinion writer and a threat against a journalist71. 

IV.  OTHER INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RELATED TO CHECKS AND BALANCES 

Slovakia is a parliamentary republic where the National Council (the Parliament) is the sole 
constitutional  and  legislative  body72.  The  right  to  introduce  legislation  belongs  to  the 
Committees of the Parliament, individual members of the Parliament and the Government.73 
The  Constitutional  Court  decides  on  the  compliance  of  laws  with  the  Constitution, 
constitutional  acts  and  international  agreements  and  ensures  respect  for  fundamental  and 
constitutional  rights.  Independent  authorities  also  play  a  role  in  safeguarding  fundamental 
rights.  

Improvements have been announced as regards the process for preparing and enacting 
laws.  The  Government  appointed  in  March  2020  has  indicated  that  it  aims  to  improve  the 
stability and predictability of the regulatory framework through actions such as improving of 
planning  and  of  transparency  in  the  legislative  process.  In  addition,  the  Government  has 
indicated its intention to focus on strengthening compliance with existing legislation74 and to 
strengthen  the  analytical  units75.  Currently,  conducting  impact  assessments  and  consulting 
stakeholders are not yet well-established practices for enacting legislation in Slovakia. While 
the  policy-making  process  is  formally  based  on  consultations  and  evidence,  the  political 

68   E.g.  Committee  to  Protect  Journalist’s  analysis  (2019),  Mission  Journal:  One  year  on,  Ján  Kuciak  murder 

seen as turning point by Slovak press. 

69   Council of Europe, Platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists.  
70   The first related to the former Prime Minister’s verbal attacks on journalists and the media in Slovakia whom 
he accused of leading an open war against his party. The second concerned the revelation of the existence of 
a wide-ranging surveillance operation on journalists conducted between March 2017 and February 2018 by a 
former  intelligence  agent,  on  behalf  of  the  individual  linked  with  the  Kuciak-  Kušnírová  murders.  Media 
also  reported  that  the  surveillance  team  obtained  extensive  access  to  official  police  databases,  collecting 
private data on journalists ranging from vehicle license plates to tax information. The third concerned a bill – 
later promulgated into law on 17 March 2019  – which mandates a right of reply for politicians and public 
officials  who  claim  their  honour  or  reputation  has  been  damaged  in  media  reports.  The  bill  has  been 
condemned by the Slovak Press Publishers’ Association and other media freedom organisations. Finally, the 
former  Slovak  Commissioner  of  Police  launched  a  negative  communication  campaign  aimed  at  three 
journalists who have been covering the Kuciak-Kušnírová murders. 

71   The  first  concerned  a  case  in  which  Slovak  authorities  brought  criminal  defamation  charges  against  a 
newspaper opinion writer accused of offending religious believers for having mocked and sharply criticised 
a Catholic priest. The charges carry a potential sentence of one to three years in prison. The second alert, on 
25  June  2020,  concerned  the  case  of  an  investigative  journalist  working  for/publishing  on  a  Slovak  news 
website, who found a bullet in the mailbox of his Bratislava apartment. The journalist reported the incident 
to a local police station, an investigation has been opened and measures were taken to protect the journalist’s 
safety. 

72   Article 72 of the Slovak Constitution. 
73   Article 87 of the Slovak Constitution. 
74   Political Manifesto, pp. 15-17. 
75   Political Manifesto, pp. 14-16. 

11 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
priorities  of  the  parties  in  the  Government  and  the  real  involvement  of  social  actors  is 
limited76. Legislative initiatives by ministries have clear written rules and undergo an impact 
assessment,  but  the  regular  use  of  fast-track  parliamentary  procedures  hampers  evidence-
based  policy  making,  for  example  by  not  allowing  for  a  proper  impact  assessment  and 
consultation with stakeholders77. In addition, analytical capacities of ministries are weak and 
impair  effective  policy-making78.  A  whole-of-government  approach  to  regulatory  policy 
making  was  established  in  the  Better  Regulation  Strategy  and  has  helped  to  strengthen  the 
methodological  basis  for  assessing  the  economic  impact  of  regulation.  So  far,  this  did  not 
yield the expected results as impact assessments only apply to legislative measures initiated 
by the Government79.  

The  Government  is  considering  to  strengthen  the  powers  of  the  Constitutional  Court. 
This  would  concern  the  strengthening  of  powers  of  the  Constitutional  Court  as  regards  the 
assessment  of  compliance  of  laws  with  the  Constitution  and  proceedings  of  constitutional 
complaints  regarding  violations  of  fundamental  rights  and  through  individual  control  of 
constitutionality.  The  Government  is  also  considering  the  possibility  of  introducing  ex-ante 
control of compliance of laws with the Constitution80. 

Further work is necessary to strengthen the transparency, efficiency and accountability 
of  the  public  administration.  While  coordination  mechanisms  are  in  place,  a  pronounced 
departmentalism challenges coordination and efficient planning81. The creation of a National 
Strategic  Plan82,  as  proposed  by  the  new  Government,  could  potentially  improve  internal 
coordination. The political cycle has a high impact on staff turnover83. The new Government 
has  indicated  that  it  aims  to  strengthen  the  civil  service  by  making  transparency  and  ethics 
key elements of this reform84.  

As  of  16  March  2020,  the  Government  declared  the  state  of  emergency  in  the  health 
care  system  in  order  to  face  the  COVID-19  pandemic85.  Following  approval  by  the 
Government  on  10  June,  the  national  emergency  officially  ended  on  13  June.  On  13  May 
2020,  the  Constitutional  Court  partially  suspended  a  controversial  legislation  related  to 
tracking information collected during the pandemic.  

Independent  authorities  play  a  role  for  safeguarding  fundamental  rights,  but  would 
benefit  from  clearer  mandates,  including  full  legal  status  and  sufficient  resources  to 
exercise  their  roles  effectively.  The  Slovak  National  Centre  for  Human  Rights  is  the 
competent  National  Human  Rights  Institution  as  well  as  the  equality  body  in  Slovakia.  It 
prepares  and  publishes  an  annual  report  on  the  observance  of  human  rights,  including  the 
principle of equal treatment. There remain some concerns over the independence of National 
Centre for Human Rights, and in 2018 the Ministry of Justice published a draft amendment to 
the  legal  framework  to  ensure  that  the  Centre  fully  complies  with  the  United  Nations 

76   Public administration characteristics and performance in EU28, p. 905. 
77   European Commission, 2020 Country Report Slovakia, SWD(2020) 524 final, p. 48. 
78   The Public Administration in the EU 27, p. 906. 
79   European Commission, 2019 Country Report Slovakia, SWD(2019) 1024 final, p. 44. 
80   Political Manifesto, p. 8. 
81   European Commission, 2020 Country Report Slovakia, SWD(2020) 524 final, p. 48. 
82   Political Manifesto, p. 77. 
83   Public administration characteristics and performance in EU28, pp. 902. 
84   Political Manifesto, pp. 4-5. 
85   Pursuant to the Article 5 of the Constitutional Law No. 227/2002 Coll. 

12 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Principles on the Status of National Institutions (‘Paris principles’)86. The draft amendments 
received criticism from the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights87 
and the legal proposals failed to pass in June 201988. Funding for the Slovak National Centre 
of  Human  Rights  rests  at  the  lower  end  on  a  comparative  European  scale  and  a  lack  of 
competence  to  issue  legally  binding  decisions  or  to  impose  sanctions  raises  questions 
concerning its overall effectiveness89.  

The Slovak Public Defender of Rights  is  an independent  body, with  the mandate to  protect 
the  fundamental  rights  and  freedoms  of  natural  persons  and  legal  entities  in  proceedings 
before  the  public  administration  and  other  public  bodies,  if  activities,  decision-making  or 
inactivity  of  the  bodies  is  inconsistent  with  the  Slovak  legal  order.  It  may  also  file  a 
complaint  with  the  Slovak  Constitutional  Court,  if  fundamental  rights  or  freedoms  of  a 
natural person or legal entity are violated by a generally binding legal regulation. The Public 
Defender of Rights further submits an annual activity report and has the power to submit an 
extraordinary  report  if  he  finds  that  an  infringement  of  fundamental  right  and  freedom  is 
significant or relates to a higher number of persons90. In its 2019 Activity Report, the Public 
Defender  of  Rights  indicated  that  budgetary  resources  were  insufficient  to  perform  all  its 
tasks  properly91.  The  OSCE’s  Office  for  Democratic  Institutions  and  Human  Rights  in  its 
Legal Opinion on the Slovak National Centre for Human Rights recommended defining the 
relationship  between  the  Public  Defender  of  Rights  and  the  National  Centre  for  Human 
Rights,  clarifying  the  division  of  competences  between  them  and  fostering  cooperation  to 
avoid overlapping mandates92. 

The Supreme Audit Office of Slovakia is another key body tasked with supervising the 
accountability, quality and work of public authorities. The purpose of the Supreme Audit 
Office is to point out uneconomical, inefficient and ineffective use of funds in state and local 
government  organisations,  state-owned  enterprises,  state-owned  joint-stock  companies  or 
entities, in which the state has an equity interest or which fulfil the public interest93. Over the 
last  years,  the  Supreme  Audit  Office  has  improved  the  frequency  and  quality  of  its 
performance  audits,  but  their  impact  has  been  limited  so  far  because  it  can  enforce  only 
limited changes94. The Government has indicated the intention to strengthen its competencies 
and  it  considers  the  possibility  of  imposing  sanctions  in  the  event  that  the  inspection  body 
does not eliminate the deficiencies identified by the inspection. 

Access  to  information,  including  to  administrative  decisions,  is  ensured  by  Slovakia’s 
legislation on access to governmental information. This policy could however benefit from 
a  holistic  approach  that  also  includes  accountability  and  anticorruption  actions95.  If  fully 

86   European  Commission,  A  comparative  analysis  of  non-discrimination  law  in  Europe  2019,  p.  116.;  see 
further  the  Principles  relating  to  the  Status  of  National  Institutions  (The  Paris  Principles),  adopted  by  the 
United Nations General Assembly resolution 48/134 of 20 December 1993. 

87   OSCE-ODIHR,  Opinion  on  the  Draft  Amendments  to  the  Act  on  Establishment  of  the  Slovak  National 

Centre for Human Rights, 2019. 

88   European Network of Human Rights Institutions (2020), The rule of law in the European Union, p. 192.  
89   European Commission, Equality bodies making a difference, pp. 103, 105, 107. 
90   Input of Slovakia for the 2020 Rule of Law Report, point 39. 
91   Public Defender of Rights, Report on the Activities of the Public Defender of Rights for 2019, p. 44. 
92   OSCE/ODIHR,  Opinion  on  the  Draft  Amendments  to  the  Act  on  Establishment  of  the  Slovak  National 

Centre for Human Rights, pp. 4, 8, 9. 

93   Supreme Audit Office of the Slovak Republic, Report Audit Activities, Results in 2019. 
94   Public administration characteristics and performance in EU28, p. 899. 
95   See previous note, p. 909. 

13 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
implemented,  plans  announced  by  the  Government  to  expand  access  to  information  and 
broaden  the  application  of  open  government96  could  further  strengthen  Slovakia’s 
transparency policy.  

While  Slovakia  has  an  enabling  framework  for  civil  society  in  place,  the  Government 
has announced a policy for further strengthening civil society97. In its political manifesto, 
the Slovak Government announced that it intends to strengthen the system for the financing 
of NGOs and to  support organisations dealing with the protection and promotion  of human 
rights, building democratic citizenship, eliminating all forms of discrimination and detecting 
corruption, among others98.  

There  is  an  increasing  attention  for  rule  of  law  topics  in  society.  The  assassination  of 
investigative  journalist  Ján  Kuciak  and  his  fiancée  in  February  2018  triggered  the  biggest 
public  protests  in  Slovakia  since  the  Velvet  Revolution  in  1989.  The  murders  were  widely 
seen  as  an  attack  on  the  rule  of  law,  civil  society  and  freedom  of  expression.  Stakeholders 
reported that these developments present an opportunity for Slovakia to  break with its past, 
characterised  by  a  high  degree  of  political  polarisation,  which  affected  the  functioning  of 
institutions and public administration. The Government has placed the rule of law on top of 
its political agenda adopted in April 2020 and included plans for far-reaching reforms in this 
respect.  In addition, the President of Slovakia in  her first ‘State of the Republic’ address in 
June 2020 stressed the importance of the rule of law for society and democracy99. 

96   Political Manifesto, pp. 6-7. 
97   The  CIVICUS  Monitor  considers  the  civic  space  in  Slovakia  as  ‘narrowed’.  Cf.  CIVICUS  Monitor  – 
Tracking Civic Space; ratings are on a five-category scale defined as: open, narrowed, obstructed, repressed 
and closed. The latest update by CIVICUS on Slovakia took place in 2016. 

98   Political Manifesto, pp. 17-18. 
99   President of the Republic (2020), Report on the State of the Republic. 

14 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Annex I: List of sources in alphabetical order* 

* The list of contributions received in the context of the consultation for the 2020 Rule of Law report 
can be found at (COM website).  

Centre  for  Media  Pluralism  and  Media  Freedom  (2020),  2020  Media  pluralism  monitor. 

https://cmpf.eui.eu/media-pluralism-monitor/mpm-2020/.  

CEPEJ (2017), Efficiency and Quality of the Slovak Judicial System. 

CEPEJ (2020), Study on the functioning of the judicial systems in the EU Member States. 

CIVICUS Monitor – Tracking Civic Space: Slovakia. https://monitor.civicus.org/country/slovakia/.  

Committee to Protect Journalist’s analysis (2019), Mission Journal: One year on, Ján Kuciak murder 
seen  as  turning  point  by  Slovak  press.  https://cpj.org/2019/02/slovakia-jan-kuciak-murder-
journalist-safety-anniversary/.  

Council of Europe, Council of Europe, Platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety of 

journalists – Slovakia. https://www.coe.int/en/web/media-freedom/slovak-republic.   

Council  of  Europe,  Recommendation  CM/Rec(2010)12  of  the  Committee  of  Ministers  to  member 

states on judges: independence, efficiency and responsibilities. 

Council  of  Europe:  Venice  Commission  (2017),  Slovakia  –  Opinion  on  questions  related  to  the 

appointment of judges of the Constitutional Court (CDL-AD(2017)001-e). 

Council of the European Union (2014), Council Recommendation of 8 July 2014 on Slovakia’s 2014 
national  reform  programme  and  delivering  a  Council  opinion  on  the  Stability  Programme  of 
Slovakia, 2014, OJ C 247. 

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Court  of  Justice  of  the  European  Union,  C-192/18,  Commission  v  Poland  (Indépendance  des 

juridictions de droit commun).  

Court of Justice of the European Union, C-282/12, Commission v Hungary. 

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suprême). 

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towards corruption in the EU. 

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15 

 
 
 
 
 
 
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16 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex II: Country visit to Slovakia 

The Commission services held virtual meetings in May and June 2020 with: 

  Corruption Prevention Department 
  Ministry of Justice 
  Ministry of the Interior 
  National Crime Agency of the Police 
  Office of the Prosecutor General  
  Office of the Special Prosecutor 
  Slovak Council for Broadcasting 
  Transparency International Slovakia  
  Via Iuris 

* The Commission also met the following organisations in a number of horizontal meetings:  

  Amnesty International 
  Civil Liberties Union for Europe 
  Civil Society Europe 
  Conference of European Churches  
  EuroCommerce 
  European Center for Not-for-Profit Law  
  European Centre for Press and Media Freedom 
  European Civic Forum  
  Free Press Unlimited 
  Front Line Defenders 
 
ILGA-Europe 
 
International Commission of Jurists 
 
International Federation for Human Rights  
 
International Press Institute  
  Lifelong learning Platform  
  Open Society Justice Initiative/Open Society European Policy Institute 
  Reporters without Borders  
  Transparency International EU  

17