Iraq key socio-economic indicators for Baghdad, Basra and Erbil : country of origin information report : September 2020.
Date: 2020-09-29
Institutions: European Asylum Support Office
Subjects: Iraq, demography, economic indicator, education, food security, health policy, housing policy, job access, living conditions, migration, poverty, report, social indicator, woman

European Asylum Support Office 

Iraq 
Key  socio-economic 
indicators 
For Baghdad, Basra and Erbil  

Country of Origin Information Report 

September 2020 

SUPPORT IS OUR MISSION 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
European Asylum Support Office 

Iraq 

Key socio-economic 
indicators 

For Baghdad, Basra and Erbil 

Country of Origin Information Report 

September 2020 

 
 
 
 
More information on the European Union is available on the Internet (http://europa.eu). 

ISBN: 978-92-9485-646-3              doi: 10.2847/63636                      BZ-02-20-561-EN-N 

© European Asylum Support Office (EASO) 2020 

Reproduction is authorised, provided the source is acknowledged, unless otherwise stated. 

For third-party materials reproduced in this publication,  reference is made to the copyright 
statements of the respective third parties. 

Cover photo©: David Roberto (iStock), 1174348812: Baghdad, Iraq - July 6, 2019: Many shops 
on  the  street,  15  September  2019,  https://www.istockphoto.com/photo/amazing-iraq-
culture-gm1174348812-326567507 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS 

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Acknowledgements 

This  report  was  drafted  by  the  EASO  COI  sector.  The  following  national  asylum  and  migration 
departments and organisations have contributed by reviewing this report: 

ACCORD, the Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research 

Poland, COI Unit, Office for Foreigners 

The Netherlands, Office for Country Information and Language Analysis, Ministry of Justice  

The review carried out by the mentioned departments, experts or organisations contributes to the 
overall  quality of  the  report,  but  does  not  necessarily  imply  their  formal endorsement of  the  final 
report, which is the full responsibility of EASO. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS 

Contents 

Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................................. 3 

Contents .................................................................................................................................................. 4 

Disclaimer................................................................................................................................................ 7 

Glossary and Abbreviations .................................................................................................................... 8 

Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 9 

Terms of Reference ............................................................................................................................ 9 

Methodology ...................................................................................................................................... 9 

Structure and use of the report ........................................................................................................ 10 

Map ....................................................................................................................................................... 11 

1. General overview .............................................................................................................................. 12 

1.1 Demographics ............................................................................................................................. 12 

1.2 Humanitarian context ................................................................................................................. 13 

1.3 IDPs/returnees ............................................................................................................................ 14 

1.3.1 Number of IDPs and returnees............................................................................................ 14 

1.3.2 Trends .................................................................................................................................. 14 

1.3.3 Housing, living conditions, and food security ..................................................................... 17 

1.3.4 Access to education............................................................................................................. 19 

1.3.5 Access to health care ........................................................................................................... 20 

1.3.6 Employment opportunities ................................................................................................. 21 

1.3.7 Legal restrictions on travel or residence inside Iraq ........................................................... 22 

1.4 Women ....................................................................................................................................... 24 

1.4.1 Employment ........................................................................................................................ 24 

1.4.2 Working conditions ............................................................................................................. 25 

1.4.3 Access to health care ........................................................................................................... 26 

1.4.4 Access to education/dropout rates ..................................................................................... 26 

1.4.5 Freedom of movement ....................................................................................................... 26 

1.4.6 Impact of COVID-19 on women .......................................................................................... 27 

1.5 Children....................................................................................................................................... 27 

1.6 Networks of support ................................................................................................................... 28 

1.7 Obtaining lost documents for returnees and IDPs ..................................................................... 30 

1.7.1 Implications of missing documents ..................................................................................... 30 

1.7.2 Current arrangements and regulations in place ................................................................. 30 

 
 
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1.7.3 How to obtain lost documents ............................................................................................ 32 

1.7.4 Obstacles and difficulties .................................................................................................... 33 

1.8 Impact of COVID-19 .................................................................................................................... 33 

2. Socio-economic indicators in Iraq – with a focus on Baghdad, Basra, and Erbil .............................. 36 

2.1 Economy ..................................................................................................................................... 36 

2.1.1 Country overview ................................................................................................................ 36 

2.1.2 Baghdad ............................................................................................................................... 38 

2.1.3 Basra .................................................................................................................................... 38 

2.1.4 Erbil...................................................................................................................................... 39 

2.2 Employment ............................................................................................................................... 40 

2.2.1 Country overview ................................................................................................................ 40 

2.2.2 Baghdad ............................................................................................................................... 42 

2.2.3 Basra .................................................................................................................................... 42 

2.2.4 Erbil...................................................................................................................................... 43 

2.3 Poverty ........................................................................................................................................ 43 

2.3.1 Country overview ................................................................................................................ 43 

2.3.2 Baghdad ............................................................................................................................... 44 

2.3.3 Basra .................................................................................................................................... 45 

2.3.4 Erbil...................................................................................................................................... 46 

2.4 Food security .............................................................................................................................. 46 

2.4.1 Country overview ................................................................................................................ 46 

2.4.2 Baghdad ............................................................................................................................... 49 

2.4.3 Basra .................................................................................................................................... 49 

2.4.4 Erbil...................................................................................................................................... 50 

2.5 Health care .................................................................................................................................. 50 

2.5.1 Country overview ................................................................................................................ 50 

2.5.2 Baghdad ............................................................................................................................... 52 

2.5.3 Basra .................................................................................................................................... 52 

2.5.4 Erbil...................................................................................................................................... 53 

2.6 Education .................................................................................................................................... 53 

2.6.1 Country overview ................................................................................................................ 53 

2.6.2 Baghdad ............................................................................................................................... 56 

2.6.3 Basra .................................................................................................................................... 56 

2.6.4 Erbil...................................................................................................................................... 56 

2.7 Housing and living conditions ..................................................................................................... 57 

2.7.1 Country overview ................................................................................................................ 57 

 
 
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EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS 

2.7.2 Baghdad ............................................................................................................................... 58 

2.7.3 Basra .................................................................................................................................... 59 

2.7.4 Erbil...................................................................................................................................... 60 

Annex 1: Bibliography ........................................................................................................................... 61 

Annex 2: Terms of Reference ................................................................................................................ 76 

 
 
 
 
 
EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS 

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Disclaimer 

This report was written according to the EASO COI Report Methodology (2019).1 The report is based 
on carefully selected sources of information. All sources used are referenced. 

The information contained in this report has been researched, evaluated and analysed with utmost 
care.  However,  this  document  does  not  claim  to  be  exhaustive.  If  a  particular  event,  person  or 
organisation is not mentioned in the report, this does not mean that the event has not taken place or 
that the person or organisation does not exist.  

Furthermore,  this  report  is  not  conclusive  as  to  the  determination  or  merit  of  any  particular 
application for international protection. Terminology used should not be regarded as indicative of a 
particular legal position. 

‘Refugee’, ‘risk’ and similar terminology are used as generic terminology and not in the legal sense as 
applied in the EU Asylum Acquis, the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the 
Status of Refugees. 

Neither EASO nor any person acting on its behalf may be held responsible for the use which may be 
made of the information contained in this report. 

The drafting of this report was finalised on 27 July 2020. Any event taking place after this date is not 
included in this report. More information on the reference period for this report can be found in the 
methodology section of the Introduction. 

1 The EASO methodology is largely based on the Common EU Guidelines for processing Country of Origin Information (COI), 
2008, and can be downloaded from the EASO website: url. 

 
 
 
                                                           
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EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS 

Glossary and Abbreviations 

BTI 

CSIS 

CSO 

DRC 

DTM 

ECHO 

EPIC 

FGD 

HNO 

HPG 

IDP  

ILO 

IQD 

IRC 

ISF 

Bertelsmann Transformation Index 

Center for Strategic and International Studies 

Central Statistical Organisation of Iraq 

Danish Refugee Council 

Displacement Tracking Matrix 

European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations 

Education for Peace in Iraq Center 

Focus Group Discussion 

Humanitarian Needs Overview (UNOCHA) 

Humanitarian Policy Group 

Internally Displaced Person  

International Labour Organization  

Iraqi Dinar 

International Refugee Committee 

Iraqi Security Forces 

ISIL (also known as 

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant  

 ISIS, IS, Daesh) 

IWPR 

KRG 

KRI 

NRC 

Institute for War and Peace Reporting 

Kurdistan Regional Government 

Kurdistan Region of Iraq 

Norwegian Refugee Council 

OHCHR 

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 

PMU (also PMF) 

Popular Mobilisation Units; Popular Mobilisation Forces 

PDS 

PHC 

PRS 

USD 

Public Distribution System 

Primary Health Care 

Poverty Reduction Strategy 

United States Dollar 

UNAMI 

United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq 

UN-HABITAT 

United Nations Human Settlement Programme 

UNHCR 

UNOCHA 

WFP 

WHO 

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 

World Food Programme 

World Health Organization 

 
 
EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS 

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Introduction 

The  purpose  of  this  report  is  to  provide  relevant  information  for  the  assessment  of  international 
protection status determination, including refugee status and subsidiary protection. In particular, it is 
intended  to  inform  the  update  of  the  chapter  on  Internal  Protection  Alternative  within  the  EASO 
Country  Guidance  on  Iraq  2020  update.  This  report  aims  to  provide  information  on  key  socio-
economic indicators in Iraq focusing on the cities of Baghdad, Basra, and Erbil, and highlighting aspects 
of the situation of women and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in those areas.  

This report is an update to the EASO COI Report: Iraq Key Socio-economic Indicators, url, published in 
February 2019. 

Terms of Reference 

The terms of reference of this report are based on the input received from policy experts from EU+ 
countries2 within the context of an EASO country guidance development on Iraq. 

It was determined that the report will concentrate information on the main urban areas of Baghdad, 
Basra, and Erbil, within the relevant national context. Members of the EASO COI Specialist Network 
and  the  EASO  Country  Guidance  Network  were  consulted  and  gave  input  on  the  ToR  prior  to  its 
finalisation.  A  section  dedicated  to  the  impact  of  COVID-19  on  different  sectors,  e.g.  economy, 
education, freedom of movement, was added despite the fact that it was not included in the Terms 
of Reference. 

Methodology 

This  report  is  produced  in  line  with  the  EASO  COI  Report  Methodology  (2019)3  and  the  EASO  COI 
Writing and Referencing Style Guide (2019).4 

Information  in  the  report  is  the  result  of  desk  research  of  public,  specialised  paper-based  and 
electronic sources until 30 June 2020. Some additional information was added during the finalisation 
of this report in response to feedback received during the quality control process, until 31 July 2020. 
In  this  quality  review  process,  a  review  was  carried  out  by  COI  specialists  from  the  countries  and 
organisations listed in the Acknowledgments section of this report. All comments made by reviewers 
were taken into consideration and most of them were implemented in the final draft of this report. 
Furthermore, and since this report is an update to the previous Iraq Key Socio-economic Indicators 
report  published  in  February  2019,  information  from  that  report  was  included  where  no  new 
information was available. 

The general time frame set for the content of this report was to capture trends between January 2019 
and July 2020. Sources did not always differentiate information between national, governorate and 
district, or city-level. Information was also sometimes only available for the national or governorate 
level. Where possible, the distinction is made in the report.  

2 EU Member States, Norway and Switzerland 
3 The EASO methodology is largely based on the Common EU Guidelines for processing Country of Origin Information (COI), 
2008, and can be downloaded from the EASO website: url 
4 https://coi.easo.europa.eu/administration/easo/PLib/2019_EASO_COI_Writing_and_Referencing_Guide.pdf 

 
 
                                                           
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EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS 

Structure and use of the report 

The report is divided into two main parts: general overview and indicators pertinent to the cities of 
Baghdad, Basra and Erbil. The first part includes information on demographics, humanitarian context, 
IDPs/returnees,  women,  children,  networks  of  support,  documents,  and  impact  of  COVID-19.  The 
second  part  comprises  information  on  the  socio-economic  indicators  specified  in  the  ToRs.  Each 
section is divided into four sub-sections: an overview of the indicator at a national level, and an update 
on the situation in each of the three cities (I.e. Baghdad, Basra and Erbil) with regard to the indicators, 
i.e.  economy,  employment,  poverty,  food  security,  health  care,  education,  and  housing  and  living 
conditions.  

 
 
 
EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS 

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Map  

Map 1: UN, Iraq - Map No. 3835 Rev.6, July 20145 

5 UN, Iraq - Map No. 3835 Rev.6, July 2014, url 

 
 
 
                                                           
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EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS 

1. General overview 

1.1 Demographics 

According  to  the  Australian  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs  and  Trade  (DFAT),  the  last  full  national 
census was held in 1987 (the census of 1997 did not include the KRI). Efforts to collect full census data 
have  been  hindered  by  insecurity,  internal  displacement  and  capacity  problems.6  The  Central 
Statistical Organisation of Iraq (CSO) estimated the population to be 40 150 200 in 2020 and to reach 
51 311 700 in 2030.7 It is worth mentioning that a new demographic and habitation census is planned 
by the CSO and the United Nations Human Settlement Programme (UN-HABITAT) at the end of 2020.8 

Iraq has a very high proportion of young people, with about 37 % of the population aged between 0 
and 14 years old.9 More than 70 % of the population lives in an urban environment, with much of the 
population  concentrated  in  the  north,  central  and  eastern  parts  of  Iraq,  mainly  around  the  larger 
urban  centres.  The  major  cities  are  the  capital  Baghdad  (7.144 million  inhabitants),  Mosul 
(1.630 million),  Basra  (1.352 million),  Kirkuk  (1.013 million),  Najaf  (0.874 million),  and  Erbil 
(0.847 million).10  

The country is administratively divided into 18 governorates, with the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI; 
Dohuk, Sulaimaniya, Erbil) governed as an autonomous region by the Kurdistan Regional Government 
(KRG).11  

The three largest demographic groups in Iraq are Shia Arabs, Sunni Arabs, and Kurds.12 It is estimated 
that 75-80 % of the inhabitants are Arab and 15-20 % are Kurdish. Minority groups include those such 
as Turkmens, Yazidis, Shabaks, Kaka’is, Bedouins, Romanis, Assyrians, Circassians, Sabaean-Mandaens 
and  Persians.  Islam  is  the  country’s  official  religion,  with  95-98 %  of  the  population  being  Muslim 
(roughly  64-69 %  Shia  and  29-34 %  Sunni).  Christians  make  up  1 %  of  the  population  and  other 
religions between 1 and 4 %.13 

The  majority  of  the  population  of  the  KRI  identifies  ethnically  as  Kurdish  and  is  of  Sunni  Muslim 
religion. Kurdish is the most widely spoken language in the KRI.14 The most widely spoken language in 
the rest of the country is Arabic. Few Iraqis speak both Arabic and Kurdish. This amounts to a language 
divide between north and south, though there has been some overlap,15 for example, Baghdad had a 
large Kurdish community that spoke both languages.16 Kurds in Baghdad numbered about 300 000, 
according to a report published by the Kurdish media source, Rudaw, in 2016.17 

اك رتشم 

ادقع ناعقوي ةي

رشبلا تانطوتسملل ةدحتملا مملأا جمانربو قارعلا [Iraq and UN-

6 Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report – Iraq, 17 August 2020, url, p. 10 
7 Iraq, CSO, ة رتفلل قارعلا ناكس تاريدقت (2015-2030) [Iraqi Population Estimates for the Period (2015-2030], 30 June 2020, url  
8 Iraq, CSO, يراجلا ماعلا ةياهن ناكسلل ماعلا دادعتلا ذيفنت معدل 
HABITAT Sign a Contract to Support Conducting the Demographic Census in the End of This Year], 23 January 2020, url  
9 US, CIA, The World Factbook; Iraq; People and Society, 17 June 2020, url  
10 US, CIA, The World Factbook; Iraq; Economy, 17 June 2020, url  
11 US, CIA, The World Factbook; Iraq, Government, 17 June 2020, url  
12 MRG, Iraq, May 2018, url  
13 US, CIA, The World Factbook; Iraq, People and Society 17 June 2020, url  
14 Encyclopaedia Britannica, Kurd, 21 September 2018, url ; IWPR, Arabic-Kurdish Language Divide, 21 July 2006, url  
15 IWPR, Arabic-Kurdish Language Divide, 21 July 2006, url  
16 IWPR, Arabic-Kurdish Language Divide, 21 July 2006, url  
17 Rudaw, Baghdad’s Kurdish population sees dramatic decline, official data shows, 9 April 2016, url  

 
                                                           
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EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS 

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1.2 Humanitarian context 

In its Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO) of November 2019, UNOCHA stated that Iraq remained 
‘unstable  with  widespread  humanitarian  concerns’.  The  HNO  observed  that  social,  sectarian,  and 
ethnic  tensions  persisted  in  Iraq,  together  with  intensifying  ‘[p]olitical  uncertainty  and  natural 
disasters’. The report added that the most vulnerable people were those who were displaced in the 
wake of the 2014-2017 conflict against ISIL, and those whose livelihoods were impacted.18 According 
to the UN Human Rights Council, insecurity in Iraq continued to ‘pose a challenge to host communities, 
internally  displaced  persons,  returnees  and  humanitarian  actors,  as  remnant  ISIL  cells  continue  to 
carry out attacks.’19 The European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO) identified 
reconstruction  and  development  as  major  needs,  and  observed  that  the  security  situation  in  Iraq 
remained unstable and that ‘mass protests were a source of serious concern’.20 

In addition to security situation, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC) observed that 
storms and flooding caused 37 000 new displacements in 2019 as the Tigris and the Euphrates flooded 
the adjacent plains and urban areas every year. Moreover, an additional 34 000 people from southern 
Iraq were estimated to have been displaced due to water scarcity in the governorates of Basra, Missan, 
Thi Qar and Muthanna. Reportedly, many of the displaced persons moved to urban areas.21  

1 381 332 IDPs currently remain in Iraq,22 78 % of which suffer from protracted displacement23. The 
protracted displacement  and/or returning goes with problems ‘related to resilience  and recovery’, 
such as lack of livelihoods, lack of social cohesion, lack of shelter rehabilitation, and the inability of 
local government to ‘conduct basic civil administration and provide basic and specialized services’.24 

The UN Human Right Council observed that 4.1 million of the displaced population remained in need 
of  humanitarian  assistance.25  According  to  UNOCHA,  2.8 million  people  (i.e.  68 %  of  the  people  in 
need) were ‘in acute need’.26 Moreover, in its situation report covering the period 1 January 2020 – 
31  March  2020,  UNICEF  stated  that  1.89 million  children  in  Iraq  were  in  need  of  humanitarian 
assistance.27 

Finally, Iraq has seen an increase in the number of COVID-19 cases. According to UNHCR, the number 
of  confirmed  cases  reached  77 506  as  of  12  July  2020.  More  than  40 %  of  these  cases  have  been 
registered in Baghdad, followed by Sulaimaniya and Basra. The number of deaths reached 3 150, and 
the authorities in the KRI and in the central and southern governorates imposed restrictive measures 
including curfew and travel bans. UNHCR observed that vulnerable displaced families faced risks which 
included the socio-economic consequences incurred by lack of livelihoods, rise of domestic violence, 
and suspension of education activities.28 In the KRI, CARE surveyed more than 1 400 people and found 
that 74 % of the interviewees had to reduce their meals and 61 % had to make further debt in order 
to survive the economic situation incurred by the COVID-19 crisis.29 

18 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview: Iraq, November 2020, url, p. 4  
19 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally 
displaced persons, A/HRC/44/41/Add.1, 13 May 2020, url, p. 3 
20 ECHO, Iraq, 20 May 2020, url, p. 1 
21 IDMC, Global Report on Internal Displacement: Grid 2020, 23 April 2020, url, p. 33 
22 IOM, Displacement Tracking Matrix, Iraq Master List Report 116, 30 June 2020, url, p. 1 
23 IDMC, Global Report on Internal Displacement: Grid 2020, 23 April 2020, url, p. 33 
24 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Response Plan: Iraq, January 2020, url, p. 14 
25 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally 
displaced persons, A/HRC/44/41/Add.1, 13 May 2020, url, p. 5 
26 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Response Plan: Iraq, January 2020, url, p. 14 
27 UNICEF, 2020 Internal Displacement Crisis Humanitarian Situation Report, 23 April 2020, available at: url 
28 UNHCR, Iraq: UNHCR COVID-19 Update XII, 12 July 2020, url, p. 2 
29 CARE, CARE warns: Rapidly rising COVID-19 cases and massive lack of humanitarian funding put most vulnerable on the 
brink of survival in Iraq, 9 July 2020, url 

 
 
                                                           
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EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS 

1.3 IDPs/returnees 

1.3.1 Number of IDPs and returnees 

A UN Security Council report published on 6 May 2020 stated that the number of IDPs in Iraq was 
around 1.4 million people as of 27 January 2020,  living in over 3 000 locations across the country, 
including  67  IDP  camps.30  The  UN  Special  Rapporteur on the  Human  Rights  of  Internally  Displaced 
Persons estimated the number of IDPs in Iraq to be 1.5 million people, of which 70 % suffered from 
‘protracted displacement’.31 Finally, according to IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) dataset 
covering May and June 2020, the number of IDPs was 1 381 332, of which 35 034 were in Baghdad, 
236 496 in Erbil, and 6 528 in Basra.32  

Regarding  returnees,  the  DTM  dataset  of  May  and  June  2020  indicated  that  the  total  number  of 
returnees was 4 718 130 persons, most of whom were displaced between 2014 and 2017. According 
to the dataset, returns were to the following governorates: Anbar (1 503 468) – Baghdad (90 228) – 
Dohuk (768) – Diyala (230 244) – Erbil (53 004) – Kirkuk (341 106) – Ninawa (1 807 170) – Salah Al-Din 
(692 142).33   

The UN Human Rights Council stated that as of 31 December 2019, 4.6 million IDPs had returned to 
their  areas  of  origin  and  that  the  policies  of  the  Iraqi  government  ‘have  been  instrumental  in 
promoting  the  returns;  however,  premature,  coerced  and  forced  returns,  in  addition  to  blocked 
returns,  have  also  been  reported’.  The  report  added  that  around  1.4  million  people  remained  in 
displacement as of 31 December 2019, many of them suffered from failed attempts to return.34 In a 
report published in January 2020, UNOCHA stated that at the time of data collection and analysis, 
there were 370 000 IDPs living in camps and estimated that the number would drop to 288 000 by 
January 2020, and to 180 000 by the end of 2020.35 

1.3.2 Trends  

Obstacles to return  

The UN Security Council report of 6 May 2020 observed that the ‘rate of return of internally displaced 
persons had slowed significantly in 2019, leading to a substantial proportion of the internally displaced 
population in Iraq experiencing prolonged displacement’.36 The UN Special Rapporteur on the Human 
Rights of Internally Displaced Persons indicated that 70 % of those who remained displaced ‘have been 
displaced for longer than three years’. She added that, according to recent surveys, 90 % of them ‘do 
not intend to return in the short term, and 70 per cent in the long term’.37 She also raised the issue of 

30 UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2470 (2019): Report of the Secretary-General, S/2020/363, 6 May 2020, 
url,  p. 11 
31 OHCHR, End of Mission Statement by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced 
persons, Ms. Cecilia Jimenez-Damary, upon conclusion of her official visit to Iraq – 15 to 23 February 2020, 27 February 2020, 
url  
32 IOM, Displacement Tracking Matrix, Iraq Master List Report 116 May – June 2020, 30 June 2020, url, pp. 2, 3 
33 IOM, Displacement Tracking Matrix, Iraq Master List Report 116 May – June 2020, 30 June 2020, url, pp. 1, 5 
34 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally 
displaced persons, A/HRC/44/41/Add.1, 13 May 2020, url, p. 3 
35 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Response Plan: Iraq, January 2020, url, p. 14 
36 UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2470 (2019): Report of the Secretary-General, S/2020/363, 6 May 2020, 
url, p. 11 
37 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally 
displaced persons, A/HRC/44/41/Add.1, 13 May 2020, url, p. 12 

 
                                                           
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secondary displacement and the risk it presented for IDPs who failed to return and who could ‘remain 
under the radar and further slide into economic impoverishment and social marginalisation’.38  

The  Returns  Working  Group  and  IOM  Displacement  Tracking  Matrix  indicated  that  the  number  of 
locations that have not witnessed any returns, as of April 2020, was 269 locations: Erbil (45), Ninawa 
(115), Kirkuk (13), Salah Al-Din (38), Diyala (43), Babil (13) and Anbar (2)39. Human Rights Watch, citing 
humanitarian  workers,  stated  that  242  areas  in  Iraq  have  not  seen  any  returns,  either  due  to 
contamination  with  ISIL  remnants  of  war  or  due  to  a  ban  on  returns  imposed  by  security  forces 
because of perceived sympathy to ISIL.40 UNOCHA also reported that ‘3,367 square kilometres of land 
contaminated with explosive ordinances bars returns and impacts the exercise of rights’.41 The report 
of the UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons identified several 
obstacles to the return of IDPs in Iraq. These included destroyed or damaged housing, land property 
rights,  long  standing  property  disputes,  land  contamination  by  explosive  remnants  of  war,  lack  of 
livelihood opportunities, restrictions on freedom of movement, lack of social cohesion, trauma or fear 
of  retaliation  in  the  areas  of  origin,  fear  of  ISIL  resurgence,  and  perceived  ISIL  affiliation.42 
Furthermore,  in  September  2019,  the  New  Arab,  citing  unspecified  UN  and  Iraqi  parliamentary 
reports, mentioned three reasons that have been impeding the return of IDPs to their areas of origin. 
These included the refusal of militias controlling 16 cities and town, such as Jurf Al-Sakhr, Al-Awesat, 
Yathreb, Baiji, Rabi’a, and Kharaghol, to allow families to return, the widespread destruction in areas 
recaptured  from  ISIL,  as  well  as  tribal  considerations.43  An  official  in  the  Iraqi  Ministry  of  Interior 
estimated that 250 000 families were perceived to have ISIL affiliation and could not return to their 
areas of origin because of objections by Iraqi authorities or local communities.44 

Notwithstanding the obstacles to returns mentioned above, the UN Security Council report observed 
that in the five governorates previously held by ISIL (Salah Al-Din, Anbar, Ninawa, Kirkuk, and Diyala), 
2 375 stabilisation projects in the areas of housing, livelihoods, education, etc. were completed as of 
4 April 2020, and 215 others were  still underway. Those projects enabled the return of 4.7 million 
Iraqis to their homes as of 29 February 2020 according to the source.45    

Voluntary returns 

UNOCHA’s report of January 2020 stated that the number of IDPs in camps dropped from 449 858 to 
293 402 from January to November 2019. This, according to the report was ‘a result of a combination 
of  voluntary  returns  and  spontaneous  departures  catalysed  by  sudden  camp  consolidations  and 
closures initiated by the Government of Iraq.’46 

Regarding the procedure for voluntary return, Human Rights Watch stated that three families formerly 
residing  in  Kilo-18  IDP  camp  in  Anbar  were  granted  authorisation  to  return  home  after  they  had 
fulfilled all the requirements which constituted finding a community leader (to act as a sponsor) and 
providing  ten  testimonies  that  they  have  never  been  ISIL  sympathisers.  Furthermore,  the  report 

38 OHCHR, End of Mission Statement by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced 
persons, Ms. Cecilia Jimenez-Damary, upon conclusion of her official visit to Iraq – 15 to 23 February 2020, 27 February 2020, 
url 
39 RWG and IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix, Areas of origin having witnessed no return, April 2020, url 
40 HRW, Iraq: Not a Homecoming, 14 June 2019, url 
41 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview: Iraq, November 2019, url, p. 52 
42 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally 
displaced persons, A/HRC/44/41/Add.1, 13 May 2020, url, pp. 12-13 
43  New  Arab  (The),  مهندم  لىإ  ن
Towns/Cities], 16 September 2019, url  
44 HRW, Iraq: Not a Homecoming, 14 June 2019, url  
45 UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2470 (2019): Report of the Secretary-General, S/2020/363, 6 May 2020, 
url,  p. 11 
46 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Response Plan: Iraq, January 2020, url, p. 45 

 يحزانلا  ةداعإ  تاوطخ  نأشب  لدج  :قارعلا  [Iraq:  Debate  about  the  Steps  of  Returning  IDPs  to  Their 

 
 
                                                           
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observed  a  case  where  an  elderly  woman  was  asked  to  pay  40 000  USD  to  a  majority  tribe  to  be 
allowed to return to her home in Anbar.47 

Finally,  Human  Rights  Watch  referred  to  possible  cases  of  revenge  attacks  against  returnees  who 
returned willingly to four villages in Sinjar. According to the source, 550 Arab families returned to their 
villages and were at risk of revenge attacks by their Yazidi neighbours. The returnees claimed that 
their homes were destroyed and looted by armed forces upon their flight. The source added that only 
a small Iraqi Army unit was present in the area to protect the returning families, who claimed being 
attacked by local Popular Mobilisation Units (PMUs).48   

Forced returns 

UN agencies reported on cases of forced returns of IDPs, notably through the closure and merging of 
camps. UNOCHA warned about the severe effect of ‘involuntary and premature returns, and coerced 
departures in camps’ on the physical and mental well-being of IDPs. Such returns, according to the 
source,  took  place  particularly  in  Ninawa,  Salah  Al-Din,  Anbar  and  Kirkuk,  and  often  resulted  in 
secondary displacement.49 UNHCR’s Protection Update of August 2019 observed that departures from 
IDP camps doubled in August compared to July 2019. The report referred to ‘forced evictions, forced 
relocations and coerced departures’ resulting from camp closures in Salah Al-Din, Anbar, Kirkuk and 
Ninawa.50  The UN Human Rights  Council stated that  as of 31 December 2019, 4.6 million IDPs had 
returned to their areas of origin and that the policies of the Iraqi government ‘have been instrumental 
in promoting the returns; however, premature, coerced and forced returns, in addition to blocked 
returns, have also been reported’.51 

The New Arab report also referred to recent attempts by the Iraqi government to return IDPs to their 
areas of origin, some of which were allegedly forceful.52 Similarly, HRW observed that around 60 IDP 
families  were  forced  to  return  to  their  village  of  origin,  Tal  Abu  Jarad,  which  was  still  in  rubble. 
According to the report, armed groups in the area engaged in recruiting one male member of each 
family to join ‘a local neighbourhood watch’.53 

Damaged property compensation scheme 

Regarding compensation schemes in place, the Global Protection Cluster stated that Law No. 20 of 
2009  provided  that  the  Iraqi  government  would  ‘compensate  all  citizens,  including  IDPs,  whose 
properties were affected by war-related incidents’. This Law was amended by Law  No. 57 of 2015 
which stipulated that ‘all Iraqis affected or harmed during military operations and terrorist actions are 
entitled to financial compensation’. Five categories were eligible for compensation, one of which was 
damaged property.54 Furthermore, Law No. 2 of 2020 established compensation sub-committees in 
Baghdad and the KRI in addition to those already established in conflict-affected governorates and 
gave the sub-committees more competences and authority.55 

According to the report of the Global Protection Cluster, all property owners can submit compensation 
claims. A copy of a valid ID document should be provided alongside other documents including a proof 

47 HRW, Iraq: Not a Homecoming, 14 June 2019, url  
48 HRW, Iraq: Not a Homecoming, 14 June 2019, url  
49 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview: Iraq, November 2019, url, p. 52 
50 UNHCR, Iraq Protection Update, August 2019, available at: url, p. 1 
51 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally 
displaced persons, A/HRC/44/41/Add.1, 13 May 2020, url, p. 3 
52  New  Arab  (The),  مهندم  لىإ  ن
Towns/Cities], 16 September 2019, url  
53 HRW, Iraq: Not a Homecoming, 14 June 2019, url  
54  Global  Protection  Cluster,  PROPERTY  COMPENSATION  GUIDELINES:  Based  on  Iraqi  Law  20,  2009,  Law  57,  2015  (First 
Amendment) and Law 2 of 2020 (Second Amendment), March 2020, url, p. 4  
55  Global  Protection  Cluster,  PROPERTY  COMPENSATION  GUIDELINES:  Based  on  Iraqi  Law  20,  2009,  Law  57,  2015  (First 
Amendment) and Law 2 of 2020 (Second Amendment), March 2020, url, p. 5 

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of ownership of ‘property title deed (tapoo)’. In case of loss of ownership documents, owners could 
request a replacement either from Regional Real Estate Registration Offices or from the Central Office 
in  Baghdad.  Alternatively,  the  owner  could  obtain  an  Ownership  Proof  Form,  which  ‘should  be 
endorsed by the Mukhtar, community leaders, municipal council, local authorities, and two witnesses. 
All of them would have to validate that the property truly belongs to the said claimant’. High quality 
pictures of the damaged property and the exact address should be provided with the claim as well. 
For IDPs who are still in displacement, written claims by the Mukhtar, Mayor, and neighbours could 
replace the pictures for assessing the damage.56  

A report published by Minority Rights Group on 22 January 2020 stated that as of November 2019, 
26 000 families from Ninawa governorate filed claims for property damage compensation. The report 
pointed  out  to  problems  in  the  mechanism,  mainly the  ‘cumbersome  procedure  required  to  file  a 
claim,  combined  with  the  significant  processing  delays  and  alleged  corruption’.57  UNOCHA  also 
observed  that  access  to  compensation  schemes  for  damaged  private  property  was  ‘extremely 
challenging’.58  The  Global  Protection  Cluster  stated  that  the  procedures  were  ‘quite  complex, 
complicated,  somewhat  contradictory  or  ambiguous’  with  no  clear  instructions  or  mechanism  in 
place.59 The UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons noted that 
‘[d]estroyed or damaged housing and other issues related to housing, land and property, such as lack 
of documentation to prove tenure, remain a significant obstacle for IDPs to return to their place of 
origin’. The Special Rapporteur observed that despite the existence of mechanisms for compensation 
for  damaged  property,  IDPs  were  either  unaware  of  those  mechanisms,  or  faced  obstacles  when 
applying  due  to  lack  of  documents.60  In  a  later  report  published  on  13  May  2020,  the  Special 
Rapporteur stated that many compensation claims were left unprocessed, and added that ‘allegations 
of corruption, nepotism and discrimination in the processing of claims are also a matter of concern’.61 

1.3.3 Housing, living conditions, and food security  

The UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons noted that ‘IDPs in 
and out of camp settings lack (or have limited) access to food, housing, healthcare, education, and 
livelihood  opportunities.’  She  pointed  out  that  there  were  IDPs  who  were  living  in  ‘sub-standard’ 
shelters, and that the level of poverty was so high that IDPs were seen selling food and non-food items 
they received.62 IOM dataset of 12 June 2020 indicated that out of 231 590 IDP households, 18 817 
were living in critical shelters.63  UNOCHA estimated the number of individuals who lived in critical 
shelters, e.g. unfinished or abandoned structures, makeshift shelters, and worn tents, to be around 
700 000  and  identified  1.5  million  people  who  were  in  need  of  shelter  and  NFI  (Non-Food  Items) 
support.64 According to UNOCHA, around 187 000 IDPs living outside of camps ‘fear eviction from their 
habitual residence’ due to failure to pay rent or family disputes over property , while property damage 

56  Global  Protection  Cluster,  PROPERTY  COMPENSATION  GUIDELINES:  Based  on  Iraqi  Law  20,  2009,  Law  57,  2015  (First 
Amendment) and Law 2 of 2020 (Second Amendment), March 2020, url, pp. 5-6 
57 MRG, Mosul after the Battle: Reparations for civilian harm and the future of Ninewa, 22 January 2020, url  
58 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview: Iraq, November 2019, url, p. 52 
59  Global  Protection  Cluster,  PROPERTY  COMPENSATION  GUIDELINES:  Based  on  Iraqi  Law  20,  2009,  Law  57,  2015  (First 
Amendment) and Law 2 of 2020 (Second Amendment), March 2020, url, p. 7 
60 OHCHR, End of Mission Statement by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced 
persons, Ms. Cecilia Jimenez-Damary, upon conclusion of her official visit to Iraq – 15 to 23 February 2020, 27 February 2020, 
url  
61 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally 
displaced persons, A/HRC/44/41/Add.1, 13 May 2020, url, p. 12 
62 OHCHR, End of Mission Statement by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced 
persons, Ms. Cecilia Jimenez-Damary, upon conclusion of her official visit to Iraq – 15 to 23 February 2020, 27 February 2020, 
url  
63 IOM, Displacement Tracking Matrix, Iraq IDPS Master List: Round 115, 12 June 2020, url,  TAB ‘Summary’ 
64 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview: Iraq, November 2019, url, p. 57 

 
 
                                                           
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was reported by 60 % of returnees.65 UNOCHA also maintained that around 370 000 IDPs residing in 
camps and 2 million ‘out-of-camp individuals’ are in need of shelter assistance. Moreover, around ‘half 
of female-headed households living in critical shelter have heightened needs related to safety and 
privacy’.66 Furthermore, the New Humanitarian stated that UNDP was rehabilitating 15 000 buildings 
in west Mosul. According to the source, UNDP performed partial repairs only, while ‘[r]econstruction 
is in the hands of the government, and entire neighbourhoods still lie in ruins‘.67 

As for returnees, IOM noted that a total of 27 574, or 3 % of all returnee households were living in 
shelters  classified  as  critical,  i.e.  uninhabitable  buildings,  informal  settlements,  and  abandoned, 
religious or school buildings, compared to 756 623 households living in non-critical shelters, mainly 
host families, rented houses  and habitable buildings.68  In Baghdad, 13 889 households returned to 
non-critical  shelters  compared  to  1 044  who  returned  to  critical  shelters.  In  Erbil,  almost  all  the 
returnee households returned to non-critical shelters.69 In its Humanitarian Response Plan of January 
– May 2019, UNOCHA observed that ‘[n]early all families who have returned to their areas of origin 
(an estimated 95 per cent) have returned to a habitual residence that is in a good condition’. According 
to the report, returnees provided consistent reasons for return, which included ‘improvements in the 
security situation, provision of services and rehabilitation of houses in areas of origin’.70  

In its 2019 Iraq Factsheet, IOM stated that rental costs for two-bedroom houses ranged between 200-
750 USD in 2019, and the price depended on the location and size of the property. Reportedly, it was 
easier for single men to rent apartments or studio apartments than to rent houses. Moreover, IOM 
observed that there were no governmental agencies to assist returnees in finding accommodation, 
and the available option was real-estate agencies. Finally, the government provided housing loans to 
citizens  who  possessed  lands  with  areas  of  more  than  100  square  meters  and  who  met  certain 
eligibility criteria. However, according to IOM, the programme is on hold in the KRI.71  

With regard to sanitation conditions, UNOCHA estimated that 1.85 million people across Iraq were in 
‘critical need of sustained, equitable access to safe and appropriate WASH services’, of which 49 % 
were women and girls, 38 % children, and 4 % elderly.72 However, during the recent COVID-19 crisis, 
a  Security  Council  report  published  on  6  May  2020  noted  that  ‘[h]ealth  and  water,  hygiene  and 
sanitization interventions for internally displaced persons were expanded in both camp and non-camp 
settings’.73 

Concerning food security, UNOCHA stated that a ‘total of 425,000 returnees and 125,000 out-of-camp 
IDPs are food insecure’, with the highest numbers being in Ninawa, Salah Al-Din, Anbar, and Diyala. 
The report added that female-headed households were among the most vulnerable and that girls aged 
between 6 and 17 were particularly affected and were ‘more likely to be denied food by caregivers 
and … more prone to undertaking unsafe income generating activities’.74 Concerning water, UNOCHA 
stated that ‘[a]s many as 46 per cent of households in camps, 36 per cent out of camps and 21 per 
cent of returnee households are unable to access enough water for domestic use’.75 

65 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview: Iraq, November 2019, url, p. 54 
66 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview: Iraq, November 2019, url, p. 57 
67 New Humanitarian (The), Nowhere to go: Mosul residents in limbo as camps close, 11 March 2020, url  
68 IOM, Displacement Tracking Matrix, Iraq: Returnees Master List – Round 115, 12 June 2020, url, Tab ‘Summary’ 
69 IOM, Displacement Tracking Matrix, Iraq: Returnees Master List – Round 115, 12 June 2020, url, Tab ‘Shelter Type by Gov 
of Return’ 
70 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Response Plan: Monitoring Report January – May 2019, 27 August 2019, url, p. 8 
71 IOM, Country Factsheet: Iraq, 2019, url, p.6 
72 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview: Iraq, November 2019, url, p. 59 
73 UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2470 (2019): Report of the Secretary-General, S/2020/363, 6 May 2020, 
url, p. 10 
74 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview: Iraq, November 2019, url, p. 47 
75 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview: Iraq, November 2019, url, p. 20 

 
                                                           
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With regard to livelihoods, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced 
Persons stated that lack of livelihood opportunities affected female-headed households in particular 
and constituted an obstacle to returning to places of origin.76 UNOCHA estimated that 370 000 IDPs 
in  formal  camps,  343 000  IDPs  in  out  of  camp  settings,  and  980 000  returnees  could  not  ‘attain  a 
minimum level of living standards.77 

Finally, the Health Cluster stated that in March 2020, the Iraqi Ministry of Migration and Displacement 
decided  to  suspend  humanitarian  assistance  to  IDPs  residing  in  informal  settlements  in  the  Anbar 
province. Reportedly, only in-camp IDPs will continue to receive assistance from the Ministry.78 

1.3.4 Access to education 

UNOCHA, in its Humanitarian Needs Overview of November 2019, estimated that in 2020, 1.22 million 
IDP children aged 6 – 17 would need government assistance in the education sector. Currently, around 
345 000  IDP  children,  and  815 500  returnee  children  ‘are  particularly  vulnerable  and  in-need  of 
assistance to access education’, notably in Ninawa, Al-Anbar, Salah Al-Din, Kirkuk, Al-Sulaimaniya, Erbil 
and Dohuk.79 

The  UN  Special  Rapporteur  on  the  Human  Rights  of  Internally  Displaced  Persons  expressed  her 
concern ‘at the extent to which internally displaced children in and out of camp settings are deprived 
of education’. She added that internally displaced children in areas previously held by ISIL suffered 
from discrimination and reduced mobility due to lack of documents. Additionally, children ‘born out 
of sexual violence’ or who had lost their father but did not hold a death certificate were unable to 
obtain birth certificates or other types of civil documentation, which in turn, barred their access to 
education.80 A report jointly published by UNAMI and OHCHR in February 2020 observed that children 
and young adults who lived in former ISIL-held areas ‘accumulated a substantial gap in their academic 
knowledge  due  to  years  of  missed  education  and  also  face  challenges  in  obtaining  the  civil 
documentation required to enrol in formal schooling’.81 Finally, the Special Rapporteur observed that 
many IDP children worked in order to contribute to the family income.82 

The UNAMI/OHCHR report highlighted a gap in education provision for IDPs in areas previously held 
by ISIL. According to the report, despite the Iraqi government’s directive ‘advising teachers to adhere 
to standard “placement test” policies to enable children to re-enter the formal education system’, 
‘students living in IDP settings were more commonly held back from joining age appropriate grades 
and  were  placed  with  younger  children’  which  resulted  in  high  dropout  rates  in  intermediate  and 
secondary education. Moreover, class over-crowdedness and time limitation, and ‘untreated societal 
and individual trauma’ exacerbated the problem.83 In addition, and according to a mapping exercise 
conducted in May 2019 by United Nations led Camp Coordination and Camp Management Cluster, 

76 OHCHR, End of Mission Statement by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced 
persons, Ms. Cecilia Jimenez-Damary, upon conclusion of her official visit to Iraq – 15 to 23 February 2020, 27 February 2020, 
url  
77 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview: Iraq, November 2019, url, p. 20 
78 Health Cluster Iraq, Health Cluster Bulletin No. 3, March 2020, url, p. 2 
79 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview: Iraq, November 2019, url, p. 43 
80 OHCHR, End of Mission Statement by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced 
persons, Ms. Cecilia Jimenez-Damary, upon conclusion of her official visit to Iraq – 15 to 23 February 2020, 27 February 2020, 
url 
81 UNAMI and OHCHR, The Right to Education in Iraq: Part One: the legacy of ISIL territorial control on access to education, 
February 2020, url, p. 4 
82 OHCHR, End of Mission Statement by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced 
persons, Ms. Cecilia Jimenez-Damary, upon conclusion of her official visit to Iraq – 15 to 23 February 2020, 27 February 2020, 
url  
83 UNAMI and OHCHR, The Right to Education in Iraq: Part One: the legacy of ISIL territorial control on access to education, 
February 2020, url, p. 9 

 
 
                                                           
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ten IDP camps did not have education provisions at all, while the schools in Mosul operated in three 
shifts, which reduced schooling time to four hours per day.84 UNICEF made reference to challenges in 
the education sector which included ‘limited availability of physical structures, teaching materials, and 
qualified personnel.’85 In order to fill in this gap, the Iraqi Ministry of Education created the nation-
wide Accelerated Learning Programme (ALP), albeit for the primary curriculum only. Nevertheless, the 
majority of the residents of IDP camps and rural areas in governorates previously held by ISIL were 
not able to benefit from such initiatives due to lack of freedom of movement.86 

According to the UNAMI/OHCHR report, the current directives of the Ministry of Education require 
several types of civil documents for school registration. Reportedly, 45 000 children in IDPS camps do 
not have such documents, and most of the families who lived in former ISIL-held areas miss essential 
documents. This  has  an  impact  on  access  to  education.  This  is  particularly  relevant  for  children  of 
deceased  fathers,  as  the  directives  of  the  Ministry  of  Education  require  the  submission  of 
identification documents for both the child and the parents.87 A report of the Danish Refugee Council 
(DRC), Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), and International Refugee Committee (IRC) pointed out that 
discrepancies  existed  among  governorates  with  regard  to  the  required  documentation  for  school 
enrolment. The report found that in Salah Al-Din, only the student’s ID was required to attend, while 
in Anbar, those of the student and the parents were requested.88 Finally, the Ministry of Education 
issued  a  directive  ‘allowing  school-age  children  to  register  in  schools  without  documentation  but 
requiring  documents  to  be  submitted  by  parents  within  one  month  of  enrolment’.  This  directive, 
according to UNAMI was not effective due to under-dissemination and the lengthy process to obtain 
documents, which exceeded the one-month delay.89 

As for what concerns returnee children who went to school abroad, IOM observed that the following 
documents were required for school enrolment in Iraq: foreign school certificate certified by the Iraqi 
embassy in the host country and the Ministries of Education/Higher Education and Foreign Affairs in 
Iraq, ID of the student and parents, Food Ration Card, and personal photos. Additionally, high school 
certificates had to be equalised by the Ministry of Higher Education.90 

1.3.5 Access to health care 

According  to  IOM’s  2019  Iraq  Factsheet,  the  health  system  in  Iraq  is  accessible  to  all  citizens.  For 
adults, only the ID card is required to register at a clinic or hospital. When receiving vaccination, infants 
are provided with leaflets and checklists, and parents are required to bring them along when they visit 
the hospital. The information contained in the leaflet is obtained from the infant’s birth certificate and 
the parents’ ID cards.91 As regards access to healthcare, Human Rights Watch observed that those 
who missed documents did not have access to healthcare and could not get birth certificates for their 
children.92 

84 UNAMI and OHCHR, The Right to Education in Iraq: Part One: the legacy of ISIL territorial control on access to education, 
February 2020, url, p. 10 
85 UNICEF, 2020 Internal Displacement Crisis Humanitarian Situation Report, 23 April 2020, available at: url  
86 UNAMI and OHCHR, The Right to Education in Iraq: Part One: the legacy of ISIL territorial control on access to education, 
February 2020, url, pp. 10-11 
87 UNAMI and OHCHR, The Right to Education in Iraq: Part One: the legacy of ISIL territorial control on access to education, 
February 2020, url, p. 11 
88  NRC,  et  al.,  Paperless  people  of  post-conflict  Iraq:  Denied  rights,  barred  from  basic  services  and  excluded  from 
reconstruction efforts, 16 September 2019, url, p. 11 
89 UNAMI and OHCHR, The Right to Education in Iraq: Part One: the legacy of ISIL territorial control on access to education, 
February 2020, url, p. 12 
90 IOM, Country Factsheet: Iraq, 2019, url, p. 9 
91 IOM, Country Factsheet: Iraq, 2019, url, p. 4 
92 HRW, Iraq: Not a Homecoming, 14 June 2019, url  

 
                                                           
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UNOCHA observed that less people were in need of humanitarian health support due to the return 
movement that already took place, and ‘the gradual regeneration of basic government health services 
in areas of return’. The source added that the need for trauma care at frontlines and for ‘life-saving 
primary health care services’ has ceased to exist since the end of the conflict.93 Nevertheless, UNOCHA 
observed that around 325 000 IDPs in camps and 500 000 in out-of-camp settings continued to be in 
need  of  basic  health  services,  ‘including  essential  primary  health  care  services  delivered  by 
humanitarian partners addressing gaps in Directorate of Health (DoH) capacity.’ Reportedly, around 
2 million  returnees  risked  having  their  basic  health  needs  unmet  in  2020  in  areas  of  return  if 
humanitarian actors were not able to provide services. The governorates of Al-Anbar, Babil, Baghdad, 
Dohuk, Diyala, Erbil, Kirkuk, Al-Najaf, Ninawa, Salah Al-Din and Sulaimaniya remained the priority for 
UNOCHA.94 Moreover, medicine cost was considered ‘the biggest barrier to accessing health services’, 
while  specific  medicines  for  chronic  illnesses  were  not  consistently  available  or  supplied  by  the 
Directorate of Health.95 

In a report published on 11 March 2020, the Iraq Protection Cluster observed that in Baghdad, 4 189 
people were in need of psychosocial support in 2020, of which 656 were IDPs and 3 472 returnees. In 
Erbil, the total number of people in need of psychosocial support was 10 598, of which 9 764 were 
IDPs and 829 returnees. The report stated that in 2019, 13 implementing partners/NGOs were present 
in Baghdad and 16 in Erbil, to cater for the psychosocial support needs.96 

For information about the impact of COVID-19 on the healthcare system in Iraq, see Section 1.8 below. 

1.3.6 Employment opportunities 

UNOCHA remarked that the ‘main recovery need’ for IDPs was access to employment and work, the 
third  most  important  reported  need  for  IDPs  and  returnees  after  food  and  medical  care.97  IOM’s 
Integrated Location Assessment III, published in January 2019, stated that access to employment and 
livelihoods was a top concern for IDPs in nearly all of the over 4 000 locations it assessed in 2018.98 
The lack of livelihoods translated into difficulties accessing basic needs such as food, household/non-
food items, and shelter.99 Moreover, in its Humanitarian Needs Overview of November 2019, UNOCHA 
stated  that  ‘lack  of  livelihoods  has  been  a  primary  barrier  to  sustainable  returns,  providing  a 
disincentive for IDPs to return and a catalyst for secondary displacement for returnees’. According to 
the report, indebtedness existed among returnees and IDPs outside of camps, and unemployment 
among  IDPs  and  returnees  from  Ninawa,  Anbar,  Salah  Al-Din,  Diyala,  and  Kirkuk  was  high. 
Furthermore,  UNOCHA  estimated  the  number  of  people  in  need  of  livelihoods  assistance  to  be 
2.39 million in 2020.100 With regard to unemployment among IDPs, the World Bank stated in its report 
of January 2018 that in the seven governorates affected by conflict, i.e. Anbar, Babil, Diyala, Kirkuk, 
Ninawa,  Salah  Al-Din  and  Baghdad,  unemployment  reached  17.7 %  and  underemployment  9.7 %. 
According  to  the  report,  the  rate  of  unemployment  in  Anbar  and  Diyala  was  33.6 %  and  20.7 % 
respectively.101 

In its Humanitarian Bulletin of April 2020, UNOCHA made reference to a government campaign in late 
2019 to recruit security personnel. Reportedly, the campaign ‘saw a number of internally displaced 

93 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview: Iraq, November 2019, url, p. 50 
94 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview: Iraq, November 2019, url, p. 49 
95 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview: Iraq, November 2019, url, p. 20 
96 Protection Cluster Iraq, Psychosocial Support (PSS) Activities in Iraq: 2019 Achievements & 2020 Needs, 11 March 2020, 
url  
97 UNOCHA, Iraq: Humanitarian Needs Overview - November 2018, 16 December 2018, url, pp. 51-52 
98 IOM, Integrated Location Assessment Part III, 2 January 2019, url, p. 6 
99 IOM, Integrated Location Assessment Part III, 2 January 2019, url, pp. 6, 34-35 
100 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview: Iraq, November 2019, url, p. 45 
101 World Bank Group, Iraq: Reconstruction and Investment, January 2018, url, p. 32 

 
 
                                                           
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persons  (IDPs)  gaining  employment  with  the  Iraqi  Security  Forces  (ISF)  and  as  police  officers.’ 
According to the Bulletin, the recruited personnel worked in rotation within or across governorates 
and returned to their camp of residence for breaks.102  

According  to  IOM’s  Iraq  Factsheet  of  2019,  the  Iraqi  government  provides  vocational  training 
programmes to address the issues of unemployment, lower skill levels and to respond to ‘the needs 
of  an emerging  private  sector’.  Returnees can  request  assistance  from the Ministry  of Labour  and 
Social Affairs, and have to provide ID and Food Ration Cards, in addition to other varying documents 
to register at the Ministry.103 

1.3.7 Legal restrictions on travel or residence inside Iraq 

Article 44 of the Iraqi Constitution of 2005 stipulated that ‘[e]ach Iraqi has freedom of movement, 
travel, and residence inside and outside Iraq’.104 On 11 February 2019, the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court 
reiterated that Iraqi citizens enjoy freedom of travel inside and outside Iraq, and that this freedom 
cannot  be  curtailed  by  any  legislation.105  Information  about  the  types  of  documents  required  for 
internal mobility and about the (in)existence of legal restrictions on freedom of movement between 
regions in Iraq was scarce, and the focus of the sources consulted during the drafting of this report 
was on IDPs.  

The UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons noted that Iraqi IDPs 
faced ‘numerous barriers’ in the way to obtain civil documentation. She stressed the importance of 
those documents for ‘the enjoyment of a wide range of human rights, in terms of IDPs accessing basic 
services,  education, healthcare  and social security benefits,  housing, land and property rights,  and 
freedom of movement’.106 In addition, she expressed her concern for ‘the restrictions on freedom of 
movement imposed on IDPs’, notably through the requirement to obtain security clearance to be able 
to travel. She added that ‘security clearances are required and often denied to members of families 
perceived as affiliated to extremist groups’.107 Human Rights Watch’s report of 14 June 2019 stated 
that members of the security forces in Iraq admitted that the ban on issuing security clearances to 
IDPs  who  had  lived  under  ISIL  aimed  at  limiting  their  movement  in  order  to  keep  them  under 
surveillance. The report added that movement without a valid ID card in Iraq could lead to arrest, and 
consequently to torture.108 Moreover, The UN Special Rapporteur in the Human Rights of IDPs made 
reference to information according to which, IDPs were confined in their camps and needed escorts 
to go to medical or legal services.109 UNOCHA observed that the need for legal assistance among IDPs 
and  returnees  regarding  civil  documentation  and  Housing  and  Land  Property  remained  high,  with 
more than 500 000 households missing essential documents. According to the report, persons missing 
documents were susceptible to deteriorating living standards and rights violations.110 

قارعلا رفس ةيرح دييقت زوجي لا :ةيداحتلاا ةمكحملا [Federal Court: Iraqis’ Freedom of Travel inside and 

102 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Bulletin, April 2020, url, p. 1 
103 IOM, Country Factsheet: Iraq, 2019, url, p. 5 
104 Iraq, Constitution of Iraq, 2005, url, Art. 44 
105 Al-Sumaria, اهجراخو دلابلا لخاد  ي
outside Iraq Should not be Curtailed], 11 February 2019, url 
106 OHCHR, End of Mission Statement by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced 
persons, Ms. Cecilia Jimenez-Damary, upon conclusion of her official visit to Iraq – 15 to 23 February 2020, 27 February 2020, 
url  
107 OHCHR, End of Mission Statement by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced 
persons, Ms. Cecilia Jimenez-Damary, upon conclusion of her official visit to Iraq – 15 to 23 February 2020, 27 February 2020, 
url  
108 HRW, Iraq: Not a Homecoming, 14 June 2019, url  
109 OHCHR, End of Mission Statement by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced 
persons, Ms. Cecilia Jimenez-Damary, upon conclusion of her official visit to Iraq – 15 to 23 February 2020, 27 February 2020, 
url  
110 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview: Iraq, November 2019, url, p. 52 

 
                                                           
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—  23  

A  report  published  on  16  September  2019  by  the  Norwegian  Refugee  Council  (NRC),  the  Danish 
Refugee  Council  (DRC),  and  the  International  Refugee  Committee  (IRC)  indicated  that  most  of  the 
surveyed people ‘reported that a combination of the civil ID and security clearance was required to 
pass  through  checkpoints  in  areas  formerly  controlled  by  IS’.    In  Salah  Al-Din,  people  mentioned 
difficulties in travelling within the governorate either because the security clearances they had were 
not recognised by checkpoints, or because they were asked to obtain additional ‘security slips’ or to 
have sponsorships.111. Finally, Human Rights Watch observed that failure to possess civil documents 
and security clearance in Iraq resulted in a restriction on freedom of movement.112  

In  November  2019,  UNHCR  published  ‘Country  of  Origin  Information  on  Access  and  Residency 
Requirements in Iraq (Update I)’. According to the document, persons originating from ‘formerly ISIS-
held or conflict-affected areas,  particularly Sunni Arabs (including persons who returned to Iraq from 
a third country)’ needed a sponsor to access Missan, Muthanna, and Dohuk governorates. Entry to 
the  governorates  of  Babel,  Baghdad,  Basra,  Diyala,  Erbil,  Kerbala,  Kirkuk,  Najef,  Qadissiyah, 
Sulaymaniyah and Wassit did not require sponsorship. Moreover, ‘Sponsorship requirements in order 
to enter Basrah, Erbil, Qadissiyah and Sulaymaniyah Governorates via air or at internal land borders 
were lifted in early 2019.’  

With regard to residency, UNHCR observed the following requirements that concerned persons from 
formerly ISIS-held or conflict-affected areas, particularly Sunni Arabs: 

  Baghdad governorate: two sponsors from the neighbourhood in which the person intends to 

reside and a support letter from the local Mukhtar. 

  Dohuk  governorate:  approval  of  the  local  Asayish  obtained  by  approaching  them  with  the 
sponsor from Dohuk. This was pertinent to ‘Arabs from formerly ISIS-held or conflict-affected 
areas and Turkmen from Tal Afar’. 

  Diyala governorate: a sponsor from the neighbourhood in which the person intends to reside 
and a support letter from the local Mukhtar. In Khanaqin District, ‘letters from three entities 
are required (mukhtar’s office, National Security, and Intelligence)’. 

  Kirkuk city: only a support letter from the local Mukhtar of the neighbourhood in which the 
person  intends  to  reside  was  required.  Previous  sponsorship  requirements  were  lifted 
following the re-establishment of central government control on 16 October 2017. 

  Southern governorates: a local sponsor and a support letter from the local Mukhtar.  

  Erbil  and  Sulaimaniya  governorates:  residency  cards  (or  information  cards)  were  obtained 
from the local Asayish in the neighbourhood in which the person intends to reside and no 
sponsor was required. Single Arab and Turkmen men needed to ‘submit a support letter from 
their employer in order to obtain a one-year, renewable residency card’. UNHCR stated that 
persons  who  did  not  have  regular  employment  obtained  ‘only  a  one-month  renewable 
residency’ which made it difficult for them to find regular employment. 

UNHCR concluded that ‘[a]ccess and residency requirements are not always clearly defined and/or 
implementation can vary or be subject to changes depending mostly on the security situation’ and 
that  ‘[s]ponsorship  requirements  are  generally  not  grounded  in  law  nor  are  they  officially 
announced’.113 

111  NRC  et  al.,  Paperless  people  of  post-conflict  Iraq:  Denied  rights,  barred  from  basic  services  and  excluded  from 
reconstruction efforts, 16 September 2019, url, p. 17 
112 HRW, Iraq: Not a Homecoming, 14 June 2019, url  
113 UNHCR, Iraq: Country of Origin Information on Access and Residency Requirements in Iraq: Ability of Persons Origination 
from Formerly ISIS-Held or Conflict-Affected Areas to Legally Access and Remain in Proposed Areas of Relocation (Update I), 
6 November 2019, available at: url, pp. 2, 3 

 
 
                                                           
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For more information on obtaining lost documents for returnees and IDPs, see Section 1.7 below. 

1.4 Women  

1.4.1 Employment 

The Iraqi National Development Plan of 2018 – 2022 acknowledged that women’s participation in the 
labour market was weak (14.5 % in total, 12 % in rural areas and 14 % in urban areas).114 In a Blog post 
published  on  the  website  of  the  World  Bank  on  27  August  2019,  the  authors  stated  that  the 
percentage of employed women in Iraq was 19 % of the total female population aged 15 and above. 
Those with lower education were usually self-employed or worked in the informal sector.115 The World 
Bank, based on ILO estimates, indicated that female unemployment in Iraq was 30.4 % of the female 
labour force in 2019.116 Moreover, and according to the IOM 2018 demographic survey on the KRI, at 
Erbil governorate-level, 10.7 % of women were ‘part of the labour force’, with a higher percentage in 
urban areas (11.1 %) compared to rural ones (8 %) at the KRI level.117 

In its report of November 2019, REACH mentioned official plans and policies aimed to protect and 
promote women’s employment. Those included the National Action Plan for the Implementation of 
United  Nations  Security  Council  Resolution  No.  1325,  the  2014-2018  National  Strategy  for  the 
Advancement of the Status of Iraqi Women, and the Iraq Labour Law of 2015. Notwithstanding such 
efforts, REACH concluded that there was notable inconsistency in the application of those policies, 
especially in the private sector.118 

The Iraqi National Development Plan of 2018 – 2022 outlined numerous challenges that hindered an 
effective participation of women in the labour market. Such challenges included the ‘weak activation 
of women empowerment laws’ due to social and cultural factors, the cancellation of the Ministries of 
Women Affairs and Human Rights, and the high rate of practices that infringed the Personal Status 
Law  such  as  child  marriage.  Moreover,  lack  of  sensitivity  to  gender  issues  in  the  state  budget, 
discrimination against women with regard to social and economic roles, increase in the number of 
widows  and  orphans,  and  women’s  insufficient  education  and  skills  also  impacted  women’s 
employment.119 The objectives set in the Plan to improve the economic situation of women included 
the improvement of women’s participation in the labour market through training and facilitation of 
borrowing, and in the private sector through increasing small loans to women and focusing on the 
activation of the chapter pertinent to women in the Iraqi Labour Law No. 37/2015.120 

UNAMI  observed  that  factors  such  as  violence,  insecurity,  societal  views  of  women  and  weak 
performance  of  state  functions  impacted  ‘the  role  of  Iraqi  women  in  rebuilding  the  country’.121 
Moreover, Iraqi women tended to be highly affected by unreliable electric supply, which ‘impedes 
income and productivity of women’s small sized businesses, and … discourages women from pursuing 
further education and or engaging in income-generating activities’.122   

114 Republic of Iraq, Ministry of Planning, National Development Plan 2018 – 2022, June 2018, url, p. 211 
115 Canpolat, E. and Maier, E., Powering Women in Iraq, 27 August 2019, url  
116 World Bank (The), Unemployment, female (% of female labor force) (modeled ILO estimate) – Iraq, 1 July 2020, url, TAB. 
Data 
117 IOM, Demographic Survey Kurdistan Region of Iraq, July 2018, url, p. 39 
118  REACH,  Iraq:  Assessment  on  employment  and  working  conditions  of  conflict  affected  women  across  key  sectors, 
November 2019, url,  p. 3 
119 Republic of Iraq, Ministry of Planning, National Development Plan 2018 – 2022, June 2018, url, p. 211 
120 Iraq, Ministry of Planning, National Development Plan 2018 – 2022, June 2018, url, p. 212 
121 UNAMI, Country Profile, n. d., url 
122 Canpolat, E. and Maier, E., Powering Women in Iraq, 27 August 2019, url  

 
                                                           
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—  25  

In a survey conducted by the World Bank in the KRI, more than 70 % of the surveyed men and women 
considered that women’s employment in the private sector was acceptable and more than 50 % of 
the  surveyed  unemployed  women  indicated  their  willingness  to  work.123  Regarding  the  type  of 
occupation for women in Erbil City, 82.3 % of the working women were employed in the public sector, 
10.5 % in the private sector, 2.9 % were self-employed, and 1.9 % were daily wageworkers.124 The KRI 
2020 Vision stated that around 80 % of the employed women in the KRI worked in the public sector.125 

The KRI Vision 2020 acknowledged that ‘cultural considerations continue to restrict the equal access 
of women to resources and leadership positions in society.’ The report stated  that the majority of 
women in the KRI reported that they lacked in educational qualification required for employment. The 
goal of the KRG is ‘to narrow the literacy and school enrolment gap between men and women’ and to 
‘ensure that women have equal opportunities in all activities in society.’126 

1.4.2 Working conditions 

The World Bank stated that, ‘[i]rrespective of sector, women earn significantly less than men with 
similar characteristics’.127 In the same report, the World Bank reported that ‘[w]omen with low levels 
of education and skills are often self-employed and concentrated in private sector activities. These are 
usually informal, low-paying jobs with almost no access to benefits such as health insurance, maternity 
leave or pensions’, and those employed in the informal economy were excluded from Labour Code 
protections. Of the women who participated in the labour force, 70 % were employed in the public 
sector and usually possessed secondary or higher education.128  

According to REACH, 167 out of 416 surveyed women in former conflict areas, i.e. Anbar, Baghdad, 
Dohuk,  Erbil,  Ninawa,  Salah  al-Din,  and  Sulaimaniya, reported  not  being  aware  of  labour  laws  and 
policies in place. Moreover, having an employment agreement was higher among women employed 
in  the  health  and  education  sectors  compared  to  those  employed  in  agriculture.  With  regard  to 
transportation, numerous respondents indicated ‘walking as their form of transportation to work’.129 
REACH also found that a ‘small portion of women’ reported on cases of verbal or sexual harassment 
at work, and this was due to the sensitivity of the topic. Of this small portion, almost 50 % indicated 
that the victim of harassment quit or changed her job.130 USDOS noted that female IDPs, widows, and 
single women ‘were particularly vulnerable to economic exploitation and discriminatory employment 
conditions’, and that single women and widows faced difficulties registering their children.131  

Moreover, the challenges that women in the KRI faced in relation to employment were the lack  in 
childcare  solutions,  the  requirement  to  return  home  before  5 p.m.,  and  the  ‘weak  legislative 
protection to women and families in the workplace’.132 

123 World Bank (The), Helping Women in Kurdistan region of Iraq to Find Jobs, 21 March 2019, url  
124 IOM, Demographic Survey Kurdistan Region of Iraq, July 2018, url, p. 100 
125 KRG, Ministry of Planning, Kurdistan Region of Iraq 2020: A Vision for the Future, n.d., url,  p. 16 
126 KRG, Ministry of Planning, Kurdistan Region of Iraq 2020: A Vision for the Future, n.d., url,  pp. 11-12 
127 World Bank (The), Iraq systematic country diagnostic, 3 February 2017, url,  p. 50 
128 World Bank (The), Iraq systematic country diagnostic, 3 February 2017, url,  p. 49 
129  REACH,  Iraq:  Assessment  on  employment  and  working  conditions  of  conflict  affected  women  across  key  sectors, 
November 2019, url,  pp. 4-5 
130  REACH,  Iraq:  Assessment  on  employment  and  working  conditions  of  conflict  affected  women  across  key  sectors, 
November 2019, url,  p. 5 
131 USDOS, 2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 11 March 2020, url 
132 World Bank (The), Helping Women in Kurdistan region of Iraq to Find Jobs, 21 March 2019, url  

 
 
                                                           
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EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS 

1.4.3 Access to health care 

The National Development Plan 2018 – 2022 indicated that the health services provided to women 
suffered  from  shortage  due  to  ‘the  limited  number  of  reproductive  health  and  family  planning 
centres’. Shortage in female medical staff especially in rural areas and the insufficient awareness of 
the significance of early detection of women diseases added up to the challenges faced by women in 
the process of integration in the labour market in Iraq.133 

In the wake of COVID-19 situation in Iraq, the GBV Sub-Cluster stated that ‘[w]omen and girls may not 
be able to access health care services if infected, as it is culturally unacceptable to put women and 
girls in mixed-gender spaces without their relatives’. Moreover, women and girls may be left without 
medical care if female health workers are not available as their families may not allow them to receive 
medical checks by male health workers.134 

1.4.4 Access to education/dropout rates 

The National Development Plan 2018 – 2022 observed that the enrolment rates of male students in 
primary, intermediate and secondary levels were higher than those of their female counterparts. The 
report  added  that  the  dropout  rate  of  females  is  ‘higher  than  males  and  increases  with  the 
development of education stages’, and that families were not ‘very keen on providing education to 
their female children’.135 According to BTI 2020 Country Report, girls were less likely to go to school 
than boys. Citing the World Bank, the report stated that 49 % of young men were enrolled in school 
compared to 19 % of 17-year-old women. Consequently, illiteracy was higher among women (62 % 
compared to 47 % among men).136 Finally, the Iraqi CSO indicated that illiteracy among women aged 
15-49 in 2018 was 2.3 % in Baghdad137 and 28.9 % in Basra138. 

1.4.5 Freedom of movement 

On 11 May 2020, the NRC published a report, which stated that displaced Iraqi women ‘are 11 per 
cent  more  likely  to  face  barriers  impeding  them  from  going  back  home  after  years  of  suffering  in 
displacement camps since the end of the war against Islamic State group in their areas of origin.’139 
The UK Department for International Development observed that ‘[s]ocial and cultural barriers also 
often hinder women’s participation in Iraq, particularly the patriarchal cultural norm whereby women 
often  need  permission  to  engage  in  activities  outside  the  home’.140According  to  USDOS  Country 
Report  on  Human  Rights  Practices  2019,  ‘[l]aw  and  custom  generally  do  not  respect  freedom  of 
movement  for  women’.  Reportedly,  women  could  not  apply  for  a  passport  or  obtain  Civil  Status 
Identification  (required  to  access  several  services)  without  the  consent  of  a  male  guardian  or 
relative.141  Freedom  House  observed  the  same  practice  and  concluded  that  ‘[t]he  movement  of 
women is limited by legal restrictions’.142  

133 Iraq, Ministry of Planning, National Development Plan 2018 – 2022, June 2018, url, p. 211 
134 GBV Sub-Cluster Iraq: Guidance Note on GBV Service Provision during the Time of COVID-19, March 2020 url, p. 2 
135 Iraq, Ministry of Planning, National Development Plan 2018 – 2022, June 2018, url, p. 209 
136 BTI, 2020 Country Report — Iraq, 29 April 2020, url, p. 23 
137 Iraq, CSO, 2018 دادغب  ي
138 Iraq, CSO, 2018 ةصربلا  ي
139 NRC, Iraqi women denied their property by relatives, tribes and militias, 11 May 2020, url  
140  O’Driscoll,  D.,  Women’s  participation  in  peacebuilding  and  reconciliation  in  Iraq.  K4D  Helpdesk  Report.  Brighton,  UK: 
Institute of Development Studies, 24 November 2017, url, p. 7 
141  USDOS  –  US  Department  of  State:  Country  Report  on  Human  Rights  Practices  2019  -  Iraq,  11  March  2020 
url  
142 Freedom House: Freedom in the World 2020 - Iraq, 4 March 2020, url 

 ئاصحلاا زجوملا [Baghdad Statistical Summary 2018, 21 June 2020, url  
 ئاصحلاا زجوملا [Basra Statistical Summary 2018],21 June 2020, url  

 
                                                           
EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS 

—  27  

OXFAM stated that according to women surveyed in Diyala, the exclusion of women from livelihoods 
in Iraq was not due to ‘deficiencies in the law’ but due to ‘the restricted freedom of movement that is 
imposed on them either by social norms or perceived lack of safety and security, or both’.143 The report 
found  that  harassment  played  a  role  in  the  limitation  of  freedom  of  movement  for  IDP  women. 
Reportedly,  in  Kirkuk  male  relatives  would  accompany  women  in  all  their  movements  outside  the 
house, or women would avoid contact with the host communities altogether. Moreover, women in 
Hawija, Kirkuk governorate, tended to minimise their movement in town ‘in order to avoid the risk of 
coming into contact with armed groups’.144 

In a blog post published on the website of The World Bank in August 2019, the authors stated that 
Iraqi women faced ‘increased sense of insecurity and limited mobility’ due to unreliable electricity 
supply, as they were unable to leave the house at night.145 

1.4.6 Impact of COVID-19 on women 

On 23 March 2020, UNFPA published a report which warned of the potential impact COVID-19 crisis 
could have  on women in Iraq. According to the report, potential risks comprised limited access to 
services, risk of exploitation and sexual violence, added burdens on women and girls as caregivers, 
heightened  risk  of  COVID-19  infection,  increased  number  of  female-headed  households  due  to 
quarantine  measures  against  male  breadwinners,  financial  constraints  for  migrant  women  due  to 
confinement, and limited access to healthcare.146 

The NRC report published on 11 May 2020 highlighted that COVID-19 related measures implemented 
in Iraq rendered women more vulnerable. According to an assessment conducted by the source in 
Dohuk, Ninawa, Anbar and Kirkuk governorates147, ‘66 % of respondents indicated that they would 
not be able to pay their rent in the next three months.’148 Moreover, the Institute for War and Peace 
Reporting  (IWPR)  launched  a  campaign  to  combat  the  rise  of  GBV  during  the  COVID-19  lockdown 
measures and cited a community police director who stated that ‘his department was focusing on 
addressing social problems, “foremost violence against women, which has increased in the wake of 
the corona pandemic crisis”’.149 

For more information on the impact of COVID-19 in Iraq, see Section 1.8 below. 

1.5 Children 

According to USDOS, the Iraqi Constitution and law ‘prohibit the worst forms of child labor’, and the 
minimum  age  for  employment  is  15  in  areas  under  the  authority  of  Iraq’s  central  government. 
Nevertheless,  the  report  stated  that  child  labour  existed  throughout  the  country.150  The  Iraqi  CSO 

143 OXFAM, Protection Landscapes in Diyala and Kirkuk, Iraq, March 2020, url, p. 23 
144 OXFAM, Protection Landscapes in Diyala and Kirkuk, Iraq, March 2020, url, pp. 24-25 
145 Canpolat, E. and Maier, E., Powering Women in Iraq, 27 August 2019, url  
146 UNFPA, GBV Sub-Cluster Iraq, Guidance Note on GBV Service Provision during the Time of COVID-19, 23 March 2020, url, 
p. 2 
147 In the report, the NRC explained the methodology as follows: ‘The information and analysis in this report is 
based  upon  NRC’s programmatic experience in assisting women  with housing, land and  property issues in Iraq, in-depth 
interviews with women and other key stakeholders, focus group discussions, including separate focus group discussions for 
men and women, and a large scale quantitative survey in 2019.’ 
148 NRC, Broken Home: Women’s housing, land and property rights in post-conflict Iraq, 11 May 2020, url, p. 6 
149 IWPR, Iraq: Activists Join Police to Combat Domestic Violence, 19 May 2020, url  
150 USDOS, 2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Iraq, 11 March 2020, url 

 
 
                                                           
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indicated that child labour in Iraq was 7.3 % according to 2018 Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys.151 It 
added that in 2018, child labour was 4.8 % in Baghdad, 13.1 % in Erbil and 4.9 % in Basra.152  

UNOCHA observed that the deterioration in the economic situation and absence of income generating 
activities  resulted  in  ‘negative  coping  mechanisms,  including  drug  trade  and  abuse,  child  labour, 
prostitution and early marriage’153. OXFAM stated that 70 % of the FGD respondents in Diyala province 
indicated that child labour was on the rise, notably among low-income and other vulnerable families. 
According to the report, children ‘most commonly work in urban areas such as Jalawla and Khanaqin, 
as street pedlars, beggars or rubbish collectors. They can also work part-time after school’.154 In Kirkuk, 
the  report  observed  that  child  labour  was  common,  with  children  employed  as  ‘street  pedlars,  as 
handymen at markets or at construction sites, with a high risk of exploitation into forced labour and 
other forms of violence and abuse’.155  

OXFAM observed that there was sporadic information about recruitment of children by ISIL or state-
affiliated forces in Diyala.156 In Kirkuk, the report stated that recruitment of children was reported to 
have taken place by armed militias in Taza and Hawija.157 For more information on the recruitment of 
children by the different actors in Iraq, refer to Chapter 3.8.1 of EASO’s 2019 Targeting of Individuals 
Report. 

Human Rights Watch stated that one of the practices used by the PMUs in Sinsil, Diyala governorate, 
to allow the return of IDP families was to recruit one male member of the family to join a local armed 
unit for neighbourhood patrols. The report cited a local source who claimed that ‘there were at least 
10 members under 18, the youngest 16’ in those patrols. Human Rights Watch acknowledged that 
‘Iraq used to have a large number of child soldiers but has made real strides over the past decade to 
reduce their ranks’ and warned that this practice ‘by local armed groups threatens that progress’.158 
Moreover, a UN General Assembly/Security Council report published on 9 June 2020 indicated that in 
2016, three boys were recruited by the ISF and one by the PMU.159 However, USDOS maintained that 
‘[t]here were no reports that the central government’s Ministry of Defense conscripted or recruited 
children  to  serve  in  the  security  services’  and  that  ‘[t]he  government  and  Shia  religious  leaders 
expressly prohibited children younger than 18 from serving in combat’. According to the report, the 
government had limited ability to control child recruitment and use by certain PMU groups such as 
Asa’ib Ahl Al-Haqq and Kata’ib Hezbollah.160 

1.6 Networks of support 

In  a  comment  on  EASO’s  Key  Socio-economic  Indicators  report  published  in  2019,  Dr Chatelard161 
explained that patronage or clientelism is a structuring force in Iraqi society, and recourse to non-
state support networks represents the most frequent coping mechanism adopted by all categories of 
the population to access social protection and economic resources. In the absence of rule of law and 
an equitable system for the allocation of public resources (including individual protection), accessing 
these resources requires the mediation of political strongmen, religious figures and other influential 

رشؤملا ددعتملا يدوقنعلا حسملا تا

رشؤم [Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys], 21 June 2020, url  

151 Iraq, CSO, تا
152 Iraq, CSO, 2018 Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS6 ) Briefing, n. d., url, p. 34 
153 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Bulletin, March 2020, 29 April 2020, url, p. 2 
154 OXFAM, Protection Landscapes in Diyala and Kirkuk, Iraq, March 2020, url, p. 18 
155 OXFAM, Protection Landscapes in Diyala and Kirkuk, Iraq, March 2020, url, p. 19 
156 OXFAM, Protection Landscapes in Diyala and Kirkuk, Iraq, March 2020, url, p. 19 
157 OXFAM, Protection Landscapes in Diyala and Kirkuk, Iraq, March 2020, url, p. 20 
158 HRW, Iraq: Not a Homecoming, 14 June 2019, url  
159 UN General Assembly and UN security General, Children and armed conflict, A/74/845–S/2020/525,  9 June 2020, url, p. 
11 
160 USDOS, 2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Iraq, 11 March 2020, url 
161 An independent consultant and social scientist currently associated with the Iraq (Erbil) branch of the Institut français du 
Proche-Orient (French Institute in the Near East) 

 
                                                           
EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS 

—  29  

people  who  represent  constituencies  in  exchange  for  allegiance.  ‘Family  ties  (of  which  tribes  are 
extensions), connections within the religious community, political parties, armed groups or militias, 
together with all other forms of relationships people can tap into with a certain degree of trust (such 
as neighbours, work colleagues, former classmates or members of the ethno-religious community) 
may be mobilised to find a job, facilitate administrative procedures, speed up an application for social 
assistance, gain access to better medical care, borrow money, etc.’162 

Wasta is a system which ‘includes a range of actors involved in governance beyond the formal political 
system, like businessmen, into the governance system’, enforcing loyalties and affiliations. Tribalism 
plays  an  intricate  role  in  the  wasta  system  across  Iraq.163  According  to  the  think-tank  ‘The 
Conversation’, wasta, ‘which involves serving those you favour and hold close, such as friends and 
family’  continued  to  serve  Iraq’s  elites  who  governed  through  this  system  at  the  expense  of  the 
majority of citizens who have been struggling.164  

investment 

in  support  networks,  which 

In areas previously held by ISIL, REACH found that 407 out of 499 women who participated in surveys 
and  FGDs  ‘reported  asking  friends  and  family  contacts  and  networks  for  help  in  finding  a  job’. 
According to the report, connections were indispensable to secure government contracts and IDPs 
tended to rely more on friends and relatives than on political connections.165 In a report published on 
23 October 2019, and based on more than 1 250 surveys conducted in Mosul and Tal Afar, DRC found 
that 
include  family  members,  relatives,  friends, 
cultural/religious  groups,  and  local  businesses  was  important  ‘to  meet  basic  needs,  often  through 
small cash loans or acquiring goods and services on credit’. Additionally, maintaining those networks 
required  certain  social  decorum,  e.g.  attending  social  events,  meeting  social  obligations,  and 
reciprocating behaviour.166  Furthermore, socially investing in such  networks was a prerequisite for 
accessing  debt.167  Nevertheless,  Humanitarian  Policy  Group  observed  that  in  Mosul  ‘the  networks 
supporting people in displacement or under ISIL rule have now dissipated and have been replaced by 
a reported atmosphere of mistrust’. The report added that nepotism and corruption were pertinent 
to securing jobs and receiving compensations, and that even working for NGOs was dependent on 
connections.168  

Welfare services 

The IOM 2019 Iraq Factsheet stated that the Iraqi government provided basic services such as free 
education, healthcare, and food rations to all citizens without discrimination, including returnees. The 
welfare  system  varied  between  municipalities  and  provinces,  and  criteria  existed,  based  on  which 
cases of people with vulnerabilities, e.g. disabled individuals and families with widows, were assessed. 
The eligibility criteria were applicable to returnees who needed to register at the Ministry of Labour 
and Social Affairs Offices and submit their ID and Food Ration Cards, as well as other documents the 
Ministry might request.169 In addition to government assistance, UNOCHA stated in the 2020 Global 
Humanitarian Overview that ‘humanitarian organizations will provide support related to well-being 
and living standards for acutely vulnerable returnees’. According to the report, the focus in 2020 will 

162 Chatelard, G., Comment made during the review of EASO’s 2019 Key Socio-economic Indicators - Iraq, 19 October 2018  
163 Hesselink, E., On Coercion and Persuasion: How militia group Hashd al-Shaabi made strategic use of legitimacy sources in 
establishing civilian compliance in Ninewa governorate, Iraq, in 2017 and 2018, Utrecht University, 2 August 2019, url, p. 27 
164 Conversation (The), Iraq’s discontent – its roots and how to begin fixing it, 23 October 2019, url  
165  REACH,  Iraq:  Assessment  on  employment  and  working  conditions  of  conflict  affected  women  across  key  sectors, 
November 2019, url, p. 26 
166 DRC and UKAID, Household Debt in Iraq: Borrowing in a time of Crisis, 23 October 2019, url, p. 10 
167 DRC and UKAID, Household Debt in Iraq: Borrowing in a time of Crisis, 23 October 2019, url, p. 24 
168 HPG, The humanitarian response in Iraq: Support beyond international assistance in Mosul, July 2019, url, p. 21 
169 IOM, Country Factsheet: Iraq, 2019, url, p. 7 

 
 
                                                           
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be  on  1.8 million  persons  who  are  the  most  vulnerable  out  of  the  4.1 million  persons  in  need  of 
assistance in Iraq.170 

According to a UNOCHA report published in November 2019, IDP children residing outside of camps 
as well as vulnerable children in host communities ‘require stronger linkages with social protection 
safety nets to ensure access to education’.171 Furthermore, a report published in April 2019 by DRC 
observed that female-headed households were more susceptible to stigmatisation and exclusion due 
to lack of ‘strong community support networks to navigate potentially hostile environments’.172 

1.7 Obtaining lost documents for returnees and IDPs 

1.7.1 Implications of missing documents 

Aid groups estimated that ‘in early 2019 at least 156,000 displaced people are missing at least some 
of  their  essential  civil  documentation’.173  A  joint  report  published  on  16  September  2019  by  the 
Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), the Danish Refugee Council (DRC), and the International Refugee 
Committee (IRC) stated that 80 000 families across Iraq were estimated to have members who miss 
at least one civil document.174 UNHCR reported that from June to August 2019, a Multi-Cluster Needs 
Assessment was conducted which revealed that ‘nearly 2.9 million individuals, including camp-based 
and out-of-camp IDPs as well as returnees, are missing at least one form of civil documentation’.175 

A policy research paper of the World Bank Group published in February 2020 stated that IDPs were 
registered  by  the  Ministry  of  Migration  and  Displacement.  Reportedly,  registered  IDP  households 
were issued special ID cards, which enabled them to receive government and NGO assistance.176  

According to Landinfo, an ID card is essential, ‘since it is used in all contact with the public authorities, 
the health service, the social welfare services, schools, and when buying and selling houses and cars. 
In addition, the ID card must be presented when applying for other official documents, for example a 
passport.’177  Furthermore,  the  difficulty  in  obtaining  death  or  missing  person  certificate  ‘impacts 
women’s ability to access services’ in cases where relevant documents were issued in the names of 
their husbands or fathers. This included claiming unpaid salaries of spouses.178 

1.7.2 Current arrangements and regulations in place 

The  UNAMI/OHCHR  report  of  February  2020  stated  that  ‘according  to  the  Civil  Status  Law, 
identification documents must be renewed in the applicant’s place of origin, requiring IDPs to return 
to their hometown for this purpose’. The report added that the return of IDPs to areas previously held 
by ISIL was problematic due to ‘local “decrees” and threats of violence’.179 The UN Special Rapporteur 
on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons also observed that the current practice was that 

170 UNOCHA, Global Humanitarian Overview 2020, 4 December 2019, url, p. 45 
171 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview: Iraq, November 2019, url, p. 43 
172 NRC, Barriers from Birth: Undocumented children in Iraq sentenced to a life on the margins, April 2019, url, p. 14 
173 HRW, Iraq: Not a Homecoming, 14 June 2019, url  
174  NRC,  et  al.,  Paperless  people  of  post-conflict  Iraq:  Denied  rights,  barred  from  basic  services  and  excluded  from 
reconstruction efforts, 16 September 2019, url, p. 5 
175 UNHCR, Iraq: UNHCR Civil Documentations for IDPs, 20 November 2019, available at: url, p. 1 
176 Phadera, L. et al, Iraq’s Universal Public Distribution System : Utilization and Impacts During Displacement, World Bank 
Group, February 2020, url, p. 6 
177 Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Travel documents and other identity documents, 16 December 2015, url, p. 17 
178  NRC  et  al.,  Paperless  people  of  post-conflict  Iraq:  Denied  rights,  barred  from  basic  services  and  excluded  from 
reconstruction efforts, 16 September 2019, url, p. 21 
179 UNAMI and OHCHR, The Right to Education in Iraq: Part One: the legacy of ISIL territorial control on access to education, 
February 2020, url, p. 12 

 
                                                           
EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS 

—  31  

IDPs  needed  to  go  to  their  places  of  origin  to  obtain  civil  documentation  according  to  Iraqi  law. 
However, she made reference to an initiative by the Iraqi government and humanitarian partners ‘to 
send mobile units to a number of IDP camps’.180  

In  a  report  published  in  December  2019,  UNHCR  stated  that  it  collaborated  with  the  Ministry  of 
Interior ‘to implement mobile missions to dispatch government officials to issue civil documentation 
to IDPs in camps and out-of-camp locations’. Reportedly, the Ministry launched missions to issue civil 
documents to IDPs in 15 camps in the governorates of Erbil, Dohuk, Ninawa, Sulaimaniya and Kirkuk. 
By the end of December 2019, the Ministry of Interior managed to issue 9 678 Civil Status IDs, 17 854 
Nationality Certificates, 471 Unified National IDs across three governorates.181 

On 1 November 2019, Kirkuk Now announced the opening of the first centre to issue the new National 
Card  in  Mosul,  Ninawa  governorate.182  The  issue  of  the  electronic  biometric  cards  has  started  in 
September 2015183, and according to Kirkuk Now, the National Card will replace four other documents 
including the ID card, and the procedures to obtain the new document are much simpler as applicants 
are able to book appointments online. The source cited the Governor of Ninawa who stated that the 
authorities  plan  to  open  other  offices  across  the  governorate.184  In  a  press  release  issued  on  31 
October  2019,  UNHCR  announced  the  opening  of  this  National  Identification  Document  Centre  in 
Ninawa governorate. However, according to UNHCR, the new National Card will replace only two civil 
documents, namely the civil ID status data and the citizenship certificate. Moreover, UNHCR stated 
that  by  the  end  of  2020,  600 000  people  in  Ninawa  would  benefit  from  the  new  centre.185  On  10 
February 2020, the Iraqi Ministry of Interior announced the closure of three old civil document offices 
in  Missan  governorate  in  preparation  for  adopting  the  new  National  Card  system.186  Finally,  Iraq 
Network Press, a media platform, reported that there have been complaints about a mistake in the 
blood type field on the new National Card, with citizens blaming the authorities of filling the field with 
a default O+.187 

Regarding the issue of civil status cards for Iraqi citizens living abroad, the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs stated that ‘[t]he Consular Section organizes the papers to obtain the Civil Status Card and send 
them to the General Directorate of Travel and Nationality / Directorate of Civil Status’. According to 
the Ministry, the applicant has to submit an application form ‘used to obtain the Civil Status Card for 
the first time or to renew it or to get damaged or lost alternate form and stamp with the circular stamp 
of the consulate.’ The form can be filled by the head of the family, the ‘family housewife’, the owner 
of  the  record,  the  guardian,  or  the  legal  agent.  It  has  to  include  the  following  information:  ‘[t]he 
number  of  the  page,  the  record,  the  name  of  the  directory  and  the  governorate,  in  which  the 
registration happened according to the census of 1957 and full descriptions and the names of those 
the applicant wants to give them a personal card. The applicant must sign and write his full name and 
address in the cell provided and the form must be stamped by the consul.’ Moreover, an amount of 
750 IQD (equivalent to 1 USD according to the source) has to be paid, and the applicant can authorise 

 تح لخدت ةدحوملا ةينطولا ةقاطبلا [Unified National Card Enters into Force in Ninawa for 

180 OHCHR, End of Mission Statement by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced 
persons, Ms. Cecilia Jimenez-Damary, upon conclusion of her official visit to Iraq – 15 to 23 February 2020, 27 February 2020, 
url  
181 UNHCR, IRAQ | UNHCR CIVIL DOCUMENTATION FOR IDPS, December 2019, url, p. 2 
ق ذيفنتلا  ن
182 Kirkuk Now, لىولأا ةرملل ىونين  ي
the First Time], 1 November 2019, url 
183 EASO, Iraq: Internal Mobility, February 2019, url, p. 21 
ق ذيفنتلا  ن
184 Kirkuk Now, لىولأا ةرملل ىونين  ي
the First Time], 1 November 2019, url 
185 UNHCR, Press Release - With the support of UNHCR: Inauguration of the first National Identification Document Centre in 
Ninewa Governorate, 31 October 2019, available at: url 
186 Iraq, Ministry of Interior, ةينطولا ةقاطبلاب لمعلا ضرغل رئاود ةثلاثب لمعلا فاقيا نلعت ناسيم ةظفاحم [Missan governorate announces 
the closure of three departments in order to switch to the National Card], 10 February 2020, url 
187 INP Plus, ؟وه امف .. ةيقارع تاظفاحم ةدع  ي
Unified National Card in Several Iraqi Governorates.. What Is It?], 25 June 2019, url 

 تح لخدت ةدحوملا ةينطولا ةقاطبلا [Unified National Card Enters into Force in Ninawa for 

ق حداف أطخ! [A Grave Error in the Issue of the Iraqi 

ق ةدحوملا ةيقارعلا ةينطولا ةقاطبلا رادصإ  ي

 
 
                                                           
ن
ن
ن
ن
32 — 

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS 

another Iraqi citizen residing in Iraq to follow up with the Civil Affairs Department. Once issued, the 
Department of Nationality and Civil Status sends the card to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which in 
turn  sends  it  to  the  embassy  or  the  mission  concerned.188  The  same  information  is  found  on  the 
websites of the Iraqi embassies in Brussels189, Berlin190, Vienna191, and Bern192 among others. 

1.7.3 How to obtain lost documents 

The UNAMI/OHCHR report outlined the current process for obtaining new civil registration documents 
in Iraq. The first step is to apply for security clearance by submitting one’s name to the intelligence 
forces  in  the  applicant’s  area.  Names  are  checked  against  a  database  of  ISIL  affiliates,  and  the 
application is denied if a relative’s name appears in the database. Moreover, the report stated that 
cases of denial of security clearance, destruction of application and/or the old documents, and arrest 
of applicants were reported to UNAMI.193 A report published earlier by Human Rights Watch on 14 
June 2019 described the same procedure.194 

With regard to IDPs obtaining security clearance, Human Rights Watch described different practices 
in different locations. First, it described a process called tabriya (acquittal), whereby IDP families who 
had a missing relative could lodge a complaint against that relative over ISIL affiliation before a judge. 
The judge would then issue a document enabling the family to obtain security clearance. The source 
cited a woman in Qaim who was allegedly forced to do tabriya after her return. Moreover, tabriya is 
rejected in certain areas where there is a ‘blanket ban’ on the return of IDP families with ISIL links. The 
second practice is the issuance of special pink ID cards in Karma, Anbar governorate, to more than 200 
returning  families  who  have  relatives  suspected  with  ISIL  affiliation.  According  to  the  report,  the 
authorities  in  the  town  stated  that  ‘the  families  were  allowed  to  return  home  and  can  use  the 
documents to travel through checkpoints but will be permanently marked by the pink cards’. The third 
practice was to force one male member of the family to join a local armed unit of the PMU in Sinsil, 
Diyala, to conduct ‘neighborhood patrols’ without a pay.195 

Finally, the NRC/DRC/IRC report observed that persons with a missing or deceased relative could not 
obtain  documents  until  the  government  locates  the  body  of  the  relative.  Due  to  the  difficulty  in 
proving death, the relatives are required to declare the person missing in a police station with the 
testimony of two men or four women. The Criminal Investigation Court will then open a case and the 
relatives  are  required  to  publish  a  public  notice  in  the  newspaper.  When  two  years  have  passed 
without news from the missing persons, the relatives can request that the person be declared dead 
by the Personal Status Court, although this can take up to four years according to the  source.196 A 
Human  Rights  Council  report  dated  5  June  2018  made  reference  to  what  could  be  considered  as 
‘certificate of absence’ issued by a judge and valid for three years. According to the report, ‘these 
certificates may be withheld from families of disappeared suspected ISIL members, including those 
that went missing after surrendering to ISF or affiliated forces.’197  

188 Iraq, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, THE CIVIL STATUS ID, n. d., url 
189 Iraq, Embassy of the Republic of Iraq in Brussels, The Civil Status ID, n. d., url 
190 Iraq, Embassy of the Republic of Iraq in Berlin, The Civil Status ID, n. d., url 
191 Iraq, Embassy of the Republic of Iraq in Vienna, The Civil Status ID, n. d., url 
192 Iraq, Embassy of the Republic of Iraq in Bern, The Civil Status ID, n. d., url 
193 UNAMI and OHCHR, The Right to Education in Iraq: Part One: the legacy of ISIL territorial control on access to education, 
February 2020, url, p. 12 
194 HRW, Iraq: Not a Homecoming, 14 June 2019, url 
195 HRW, Iraq: Not a Homecoming, 14 June 2019, url  
196  NRC  et  al.,  Paperless  people  of  post-conflict  Iraq:  Denied  rights,  barred  from  basic  services  and  excluded  from 
reconstruction efforts, 16 September 2019, url, p. 21 
197 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on  extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on her 
mission to Iraq, 5 June 2018, url, pp. 15-16 

 
                                                           
EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS 

—  33  

As  regards Iraqi living abroad, the  Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicated that  the  procedure to 
obtain  a  lost  document  is  similar  to  the  regular  procedure  described  in  1.7.2  above.  The  only 
difference is that the consul has to write down the statement of the applicant which must include 
information about the place, time, and the way in which the document was lost.198 

1.7.4 Obstacles and difficulties 

The NRC/DRC/IRC report of 16 September 2019 indicated a number of challenges that people with 
lost documents had to face in order to obtain new ones. The first was high costs: persons interviewed 
for the study stated that they had to pay 200 000 IQD (equivalent to 148 EUR199) to obtain a civil ID, 
and 50 000 IQD (equivalent to 37 EUR) for a blood test required to formalise marriages in Tikrit. In 
addition,  respondents  flagged  widespread  corruption,  bribery,  and  Wasta,  especially  in  Mosul.200 
Moreover,  over-crowdedness  of  the  civil  directorates  (most  serious  in  Salah  Al-Din  and  Ninawa), 
scatteredness of courts and bureaucracy made it difficult for Iraqis to obtain documents. In Mosul, 
IDPs and returnees signalled significant delays in the process of document renewal, which hindered 
them from travelling for work.201 Finally, as paperless persons are required to go to their areas of origin 
to replace  documents, many cannot for financial or security reasons. Those who are  blocked from 
returning  to  their  areas  of  origin  often  cannot  proceed  further  with  the  process  to  obtain 
documents.202  

1.8 Impact of COVID-19 

The  World  Health  Organization  (WHO)  stated  that  as  of  17  July  2020,  there  have  been  83 867 
confirmed cases of COVID-19, with 3 432 deaths in Iraq.203 In an attempt to limit the spread of the 
pandemic, the Iraqi government announced a nation-wide curfew that entered into force on 17 March 
2020;  in  the  KRI,  the  curfew  started  on  14  March  2020.204  According  to  UNHCR  COVID-19  update 
published on 12 July 2020, the KRG extended movement restrictions until further notice and banned 
movement  between  governorates.  The  Government  of  Iraq  imposed  partial  curfew  from  19:00  to 
06:00  during  weekdays  and  24  hours  during  weekends  in  the  central  and  southern  governorates. 
Moreover, mass gatherings as well as the majority of public spaces were closed until further notice at 
a national level.205 

UNOCHA reported on the impact of COVID-19 and the consequent movement restriction measures 
on IDPs. The impact included delayed cash distributions, limitation on physical mobility, and increased 
prices and scarcity of items. Additionally, UNOCHA observed that ‘some IDPs resorted to engaging 
unauthorized vendors to enable the cash-out process, who charged them a significant commission to 
access their money’ due to the closure of banks. Finally, UNOCHA also stated that due to the COVID-
19 impact on the Iraqi economy, the WFP extended its list of ‘people identified as most at risk of food 
insecurity’ to include additional 10 000 IDPs and 35 000 refugees.206 

198 Iraq, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, THE CIVIL STATUS ID, n. d., url 
199 Exchange rates from url accessed on 9 June 2020 
200  NRC  et  al.,  Paperless  people  of  post-conflict  Iraq:  Denied  rights,  barred  from  basic  services  and  excluded  from 
reconstruction efforts, 16 September 2019, url, p. 19 
201  NRC  et  al.,  Paperless  people  of  post-conflict  Iraq:  Denied  rights,  barred  from  basic  services  and  excluded  from 
reconstruction efforts, 16 September 2019, url, pp. 17, 20 
202  NRC  et  al.,  Paperless  people  of  post-conflict  Iraq:  Denied  rights,  barred  from  basic  services  and  excluded  from 
reconstruction efforts, 16 September 2019, url, pp. 20-21 
203 WHO, WHO Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Dashboard: Iraq, 21 June 2020, url  
204 Health Cluster Iraq, Health Cluster Bulletin No. 3, March 2020, url, p. 3 
205 UNHCR, IRAQ | UNHCR COVID-19 UPDATE XII, 12 July 2020, url, p. 1 
206 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Bulletin, April 2020, url, p. 3 

 
 
                                                           
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A UN Security Council report published on 6 May 2020 made reference to COVID-19 crisis and all the 
subsequent preventive measures giving rise to ‘concerns regarding the population’s economic welfare 
and access to health resources’. According to the report, protests against the imposed measures and 
their  impact  on  livelihoods  were  organised  in  Baghdad  and  other  locations.207  In  a  briefing  to  the 
Security Council on 12 May 2020, the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General 
for Iraq stated that the imposed curfew ‘brought commercial activity to a near standstill, imperilling 
the already problematic livelihoods of many Iraqis who rely on daily earnings to feed themselves and 
their families’.208 According to DRC, the restrictive measures imposed by the Iraqi government ‘have 
already had drastic consequences on the country’s economy’. Reportedly, 83 % of respondents in the 
assessed  areas,  i.e.  Dohuk,  Erbil,  Diyala,  and  Salah  Al-Din,  did  not  have  any  household  member 
currently working, and 97.7 % reported that they had to incur debt to meet basic needs.209 

Moreover, UNAMI stated that it received ‘credible reports of social stigmatization of infected persons 
in their communities, including verbal and physical attacks against them and their property’.210 The 
report observed that the COVID-19 crisis, together with the drop in oil prices, had severely affected 
the economic situation in Iraq.211 The Security Council Report on the Implementation of Resolution 
2470  (2019)  stated  that  on  7  April  2020,  the  Iraqi  government  allocated  a  sum  of  600 billion IQD 
(500 million USD) ‘to mitigate the economic impact of the curfew on approximately 10 million affected 
citizens over the next two months’.212 

Regarding the impact of COVID-19 on the healthcare system in Iraq, Education for Peace in Iraq Center 
(EPIC) observed that there has been an exponential increase in the number of COVID-19 cases since 
mid-May.  The  report  added  that  the  ‘situation  at many  of  Iraq’s  hospitals  deteriorated  rapidly,  as 
waves of new cases exposed their capacity to cope with extraordinary pressure  and overwhelmed 
their  overworked  and  under-resourced  staff.’213  Moreover,  WHO  data  showed  that  6.2 %  of  the 
COVID-19 cases were Health Care Providers214, which might have catastrophic repercussions on the 
healthcare system in Iraq, which is already suffering from a limited number of health care providers.215 
Finally, the EPIC report suggested that the actual numbers of COVID-19 deaths might be higher than 
the official ones due to the difficulty in registering death cases that occur outside hospitals.216 

Finally, regarding the impact of COVID-19 on education, UNICEF stated that schools in federal Iraq 
have been closed since 27 February 2020 in order to limit the spread of the virus. Closure of schools 
was  extend  each  time  the  Ministry  of  Health  extended  curfews  and  movement  restriction.  This, 
according to UNICEF, ‘leaves all school-age children, who make up around 30 per cent of the estimated 
population of 37 million, without access to learning.’217 

207 UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2470 (2019): Report of the Secretary-General, S/2020/363, 6May 2020, 
url, p. 13 
208 UNAMI, Briefing to the Security Council by Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General for Iraq Jeanine 
Hennis-Plasschaert, 12 May 2020, url  
209 DRC, Labor Market and Livelihoods Competency Assessment : Iraq, April 2020, url, p. 15 
210  UN  Security  Council,  Implementation  of  resolution  2470  (2019): Report  of  the  Secretary-General,  S/2020/363,  6  May 
2020, url, p. 9 
211  UN  Security  Council,  Implementation  of  resolution  2470  (2019): Report  of  the  Secretary-General,  S/2020/363,  6  May 
2020, url, p. 13 
212  UN  Security  Council,  Implementation  of  resolution  2470  (2019): Report  of  the  Secretary-General,  S/2020/363,  6  May 
2020, url, p. 3 
213 EPIC, IRAQ’S HEALTH SYSTEM AT RISK: THE STRUGGLE TO FIGHT COVID-19 AND SAVE LIVES, 25 June 2020, url, pp. 1-2 
214 WHO, Iraq COVID-19 dashboard, n. d., url 
215 EPIC, IRAQ’S HEALTH SYSTEM AT RISK: THE STRUGGLE TO FIGHT COVID-19 AND SAVE LIVES, 25 June 2020, url, p. 3 
216 EPIC, IRAQ’S HEALTH SYSTEM AT RISK: THE STRUGGLE TO FIGHT COVID-19 AND SAVE LIVES, 25 June 2020, url, p. 5 
217 UNICEF, 2020 Internal Displacement Crisis Humanitarian Situation Report, 23 April 2020, available at: url  

 
 
                                                           
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—  35  

 
 
 
 
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EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS 

2. Socio-economic indicators in Iraq – with a 
focus on Baghdad, Basra, and Erbil 

2.1 Economy 

2.1.1 Country overview 

In a report published in the second half of 2019, the World Bank reported on a ‘broad-based’ recovery 
of  the  Iraqi  economy  incurred  by  the  increase  in  the  oil  production  and  improvements  in  the 
agriculture and electricity sectors. The expansion in the oil sector was estimated to be 4.4 % and the 
services sector was also reported to have improved.218 Moreover, the report stated that consumption 
‘picked  up’  in  2019,  while  ‘overall  investment’  made  little  progress  because  of  ‘persistent  public 
investment management constraints and unfavorable business environment’.219 The public debt was 
reportedly on the rise in 2019 due to increased reliance on domestic financing.220 Bertelsmann Stiftung 
Transformation Index (BTI) indicated that in Iraq, the private sector is weak, and that the ‘economy is 
largely public or semi-public’.221 

Notwithstanding the above-mentioned observations of the World Bank in the first half of 2019, the 
Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General for Iraq predicted in May 2020 that 
the Iraqi economy would contract  by 9.7 %.222  BTI stated that, for the reporting period 1 February 
2017  –  31  January  2019,  Iraq’s  economy  ranked  168  out  of  190  worldwide,  making  it  ‘one  of  the 
weakest in the world’. The factors that contributed to this were corruption and political instability, as 
well as ‘visa requirements, shortages in electricity supply,  customs regulations, “unreliable dispute 
resolution  mechanisms”  and  a  lack  of  access  to  finance’.223  The  source  noted  that  ‘private  limited 
liability  companies  (LLCs)  constitute  the  main  organs  of  investment  in  Iraq,  with  branch  offices  of 
foreign corporations  also  contributing  significantly  to  the  private  sector’,  which  remained weak.224 
Moreover, the CSO indicated that the inflation rate increased by 0.7 % for the period July – September 
2019 compared to the previous quarter.225 

BTI  observed  that  the  Iraqi  economy  is  dependent on  global oil  prices  as 90 %  of the  government 
revenue comes from oil.226 This, according to UNOCHA, has resulted in high rates of unemployment, 
as the public sector became the main employer while the private sector was incapable of employing 
‘the thousands of college graduates searching for jobs’.227 The CIA World Factbook also observed that 

218 World Bank Group, Iraq Economic Monitor – Turning the Corner: Sustaining Growth and Creating Opportunity for Iraq’s 
Youth, Fall 2019, url, p. 3 
219 World Bank Group, Iraq Economic Monitor – Turning the Corner: Sustaining Growth and Creating Opportunity for Iraq’s 
Youth, Fall 2019, url, p. 4 
220 World Bank Group, Iraq Economic Monitor – Turning the Corner: Sustaining Growth and Creating Opportunity for Iraq’s 
Youth, Fall 2019, url, p. 7 
221 Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2020 Country Report — Iraq, 29 April 2020, url, p. 19 
222 UNAMI, Briefing to the Security Council by Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General for Iraq Jeanine 
Hennis-Plasschaert, 12 May 2020, url 
223 Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2020 Country Report — Iraq, 29 April 2020, url, p. 20 
224 Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2020 Country Report — Iraq, 29 April 2020, url, p. 21 
225 Iraq, CSO,  ةنـــسل ثلاثلا عــبرـلل رـــكبملا راذــنلإا تارـــشؤـم2019 [Early Warning Indicators for the Third Quarter of 2019], 2019, url, p. 
5 
226 Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2020 Country Report — Iraq, 29 April 2020, url, p. 19 
227 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview: Iraq, November 2019, url, p. 11 

 
                                                           
EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS 

—  37  

the oil sector dominated the economy, and provided around 85 % of government revenue and 80 % 
of foreign exchange earnings.228 

Following a decision taken by OPEC to reduce the production of oil, the KRG and the Iraq government 
agreed to reduce the production of oil accordingly.229 The UN report stated that ‘Baghdad and Erbil 
continued  to  affirm  that  the  disbursement  of  salaries  to  government  employees  would  not  be 
affected’  by  the  worldwide  decrease  in  oil  prices.  Moreover,  the  report  cited  the  KRG,  which 
announced that civil servants in the KRI would continue to receive their salaries.230 However, the New 
Arab stated that in mid-April, Baghdad decided to stop paying the KRI its share of the federal budget 
and claimed outstanding payments from Erbil. According to the source, the budget allocated by the 
federal government to the KRG each month corresponds to 50% of the public salaries in the region.231 

Several sources referred to corruption and governance-related issues as the major challenges the Iraqi 
economy  has  been  facing.  The  World  Bank  Group  categorised  weak  governance  and  wide  spread 
corruption as a main factor that hindered private sector development.232 BTI observed that ‘corruption 
and  the  lack  of  institutional  capacity  remain  endemic,  undermining  governmental  performance  in 
protecting  socioeconomic  and  political  outcomes,  and  civil  liberties  and  the  rights  of  citizens’.233 
Moreover, the source reiterated that high levels of corruption and the weak rule of law have damaged 
the  ‘already  crippled  economy’.234  In  addition,  the  Special  Representative  of  the  United  Nations 
Secretary-General  for  Iraq stated that  corruption  ‘is perhaps  the  greatest  source  of  dysfunction  in 
Iraq’, affecting the everyday life of the Iraqi citizen and putting off investors.235 According to the 2020 
Index  of  Economic  Freedom  published  by  the  Heritage  Foundation,  ‘[b]ribery,  money  laundering, 
nepotism, and misappropriation of public funds are common’ and government officials engaged in 
corruption and enjoyed impunity.236 

There have been rising concerns regarding the impact of the COVID-19 crisis and the plummeting oil 
prices on the economic situation in Iraq. The report of the UN Security Council reiterated that ‘[t]he 
economic situation of Iraq has been severely affected by the COVID-19 pandemic and declining global 
oil prices’.237 The WFP Iraq Market Monitor Report of April 2020 echoed the same concern. The report 
observed that the COVID-19 crisis and the global drop in oil prices risk reversing ‘the economic gains 
of the previous year ’which saw a GDP growth of 4.4 %.238  

The World Bank Group stated that ‘Iraqis have taken the streets in October 2019 to protest lack of 
jobs,  ramping  corruption,  and  poor  quality  of  services.  The  demonstrators  were  mostly  young, 
between  the  ages  of  18  to  30,  and  were  mobilized  by  social  demands.’239  According  to  an  article 
published by Al-Monitor on 21 May 2020, demonstrations in Iraq were  resumed after around two 
months of quiet.240 A recent wave of protests was incited by government measures taken in the wake 

228 US, CIA, The World Factbook: Iraq, 17 June 2020, url  
229  UN  Security  Council,  Implementation  of  resolution  2470  (2019): Report  of  the  Secretary-General,  S/2020/363,  6  May 
2020, url, p. 4 
230  UN  Security  Council,  Implementation  of  resolution  2470  (2019): Report  of  the  Secretary-General,  S/2020/363,  6  May 
2020, url, p. 3 
231 New Arab (The), In Iraqi Kurdistan, plunging oil prices raise fears of economic collapse, 28 May 2020, url  
232 World Bank Group, Iraq Economic Monitor – Turning the Corner: Sustaining Growth and Creating Opportunity for Iraq’s 
Youth, Fall 2019, url, p. 11 
233  BTI, 2020 Country Report — Iraq, 29 April 2020, url, p. 4 
234 BTI, 2020 Country Report — Iraq, 29 April 2020, url, p. 27 
235 UNAMI, Briefing to the Security Council by Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General for Iraq Jeanine 
Hennis-Plasschaert, 12 May 2020, url 
236 Heritage Foundation (The), 2020 Index of Economic Freedom: Iraq, 2020, url, p. 265 
237  UN  Security  Council,  Implementation  of  resolution  2470  (2019): Report  of  the  Secretary-General,  S/2020/363,  6  May 
2020, url, p. 13 
238 WFP, Iraq Market Monitor Report, Issue No. 30, April 2020, url, p. 2 
239 World Bank Group, Iraq Economic Monitor – Turning the Corner: Sustaining Growth and Creating Opportunity for Iraq’s 
Youth, Fall 2019, url, p. 13 
240 Al-monitor, Iraqi protests resume as new government builds support for reform, 21 May 2020, url 

 
 
                                                           
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of the economic crisis in Iraq. On 17 June 2020, Aljazeera reported that hundreds of people took to 
the streets in central and southern provinces in Iraq to protest the government’s decision to stop the 
compensations/salaries it has been paying to Rafha refugees.241 According to Iraq Business News, the 
Council of Ministers decided on 9 June 2020 to limit the payments to former political prisoners, so-
called Rafha Detainees, to one person per family, i.e. the head of household, provided that he/she 
does not receive other government salaries.242 Previously, the benefits were paid to each member of 
those families.243 

2.1.2 Baghdad 

Baghdad  City  is  the  capital  of  Iraq,  home  to  the  Iraqi  federal  government.  A  large  part  of  Iraq’s 
manufacturing is located in Baghdad, with the exception of heavy industry. The government is the 
city’s  principal  employer.244  The  governorate  of  Baghdad  is  the  centre  of  the  Iraqi  economic, 
commercial, banking and financial sectors. It is also an important hub for the oil and gas industry, as 
well as for the production of tobacco, leather and cement. Baghdad International Airport is the main 
airport in Iraq and the capital is well connected by roads and rail to the rest of the country. Baghdad 
City is home to four universities and a number of educational and research institutions.245  

New  York  Times  outlined  several  simultaneous  crises  Iraq  has  been  undergoing,  including  the 
plummeting oil prices, COVID-19 and the nation-wide curfew imposed to slow the spread of the virus, 
the  anti-government  protests,  and  the  attacks  launched  by  Iran-backed militias  against  US  troops. 
According to the source, ‘[c]onstruction workers, street vendors, domestic workers and taxi drivers 
have been forced to stay at home’ because of the curfew, and are ‘on the edge of hunger’.246 

2.1.3 Basra 

According  to  Sajad  Jiyad, Basra’s  oil exports  constituted  around  98 %  of  Iraq’s  federal  revenues  in 
2019, ‘with a monthly average of around $6.5bn’. Despite this massive oil export, the source observed 
that poverty and lack of basic services were prevalent in the governorate and were the driver behind 
the protests that took place in 2018 and 2019. Moreover, the source referred to governance-related 
issues Basra has been facing since 2003, especially with regard to the responsibilities of the local and 
the  federal  governments.  Finally,  the  source  concluded  that  the  population  growth  rate  (current 
population stands at 4 million in Basra city and 1 million in the rural part of the governorate), the rural-
to-urban migration driven by environmental change, the drop in global oil prices and the COVID-19 
crisis may have an impact on the economy of Basra.247  

On 3 January 2020, Al-Arabiya reported that the US embassy in Baghdad urged all US citizens to leave 
Iraq immediately, in the wake of the targeting of the commander of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary 
Guard  Corps  (IRGC)  and  a  commander  of  an  Iraqi  militia  in  a  US  airstrike.  The  Iraqi  Oil  Ministry 

ق نويواحفرلا [Rafhawis in Iraq.. Who Are They and Why  Are They Protesting 

241 Aljazeera,  ؟نلآا نورهاظتي اذاملو مه  نم ..قارعلا  ي
Now?], 17 June 2020, url  
According  to  the  source,  the  Rafha  refugees  are  considered  by  the  Iraqi  law  as  activists  who  participated  in  the  1991 
revolution against the regime of Saddam Hussein and who were forced to flee Iraq to the neighbouring city of Rafha in Saudi 
Arabia. 
242 Iraq Business News, Cabinet Ends Double Payments to fmr Detainees at Camp Rafha, 24 June 2020, url  
243 NRT, Iraq cuts benefits to families who sheltered in Rafha camp during gulf war, 22 June 2020. url  
244 Encyclopaedia Britannica, Iraq, 25 October 2018, url  
245 NCCI, Baghdad Governorate Profile, December 2015, url, p. 2 
246 New York Times (The), Oil Prices Crash, Virus Hits, Commerce Stops: Iraq Is in Trouble., 29 March 2020, url  
247 Jiyad, S., Failure of Governance in Basra puts all of Iraq at Risk, LSE, 2 April 2020, url  

 
                                                           
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EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS 

—  39  

announced that some US citizens working in the oil industry in Basra were leaving in compliance with 
their embassy’s call.248 

2.1.4 Erbil 

The KRI economy is dominated by government employment, construction, wholesale and retail trade, 
and agriculture. It also has a growing oil industry.249 In a 2016 report, the World Bank described the 
KRI economy as being dominated by government employment which amounted to more than 50 % in 
total employment, and by a high dependency on the oil sector.250 According to a Minority Rights Group 
International  2017  report  ‘90 %  of  all  Kurdish  government  revenues  come  from  the  oil  and  gas 
sector.’251 

The  Erbil  governorate  is  the  commercial  and  administrative  centre  of  the  KRI.  It  is  rich  in  natural 
resources, especially oil and gas, while the food supply is dependent on agriculture and food products 
imported from Iran and Turkey.252 According to IOM, ‘the city of Erbil is a trade center in Iraq and a 
transit point for most imported materials reaching Iraq from abroad, particularly from Turkey.’253 Its 
attractiveness to tourists makes Erbil the most visited region of the KRI, representing two thirds of 
tourist  arrivals.254  According  to  a  2017  analysis  by  Mark  A.  DeWeaver,  economist  at  the  American 
University of Iraq Sulaimani, the KRI has entered into the third year of an economic recession that has 
started  with  the 2014  crash  in  world  oil  prices  (which  fell  by  over 50 %  in  the second  half of  that 
year).255  Following  tensions  in  2014  over  oil  revenue  sharing  between  the  regional  and  federal 
government256,  the  relations  between  Erbil  and  Baghdad  worsened  after  the  KRG  held  an 
independence referendum in September 2017 that saw 93 % of voters overwhelmingly endorsing the 
secession from Iraq.257 The vote, which was opposed by Baghdad and Iraq’s neighbouring countries, 
Turkey,  Iran  and  Western  powers,  was  met  with  military  and  economic  retaliation  from  Baghdad, 
which  included  forced  closure  of  Erbil  International  Airport  and  re-gaining  control  of  disputed 
territories such as the oil-rich area of Kirkuk.258 

The World Bank noted in April 2018 that as a result of Iraq’s punitive measures ‘KRG has lost half of 
its oil revenue’ and the ‘federal budget proposes to reduce transfers to KRG from ID12 trillion [about 
EUR 8.86 billion] in 2017 to ID6.7 trillion [about EUR 4.95 billion] in 2018 and requires KRG to transfer 
the entirety of its remaining oil export receipts to the federal government.’259 The World Bank pointed 
out that lower level of transfers could be insufficient to pay salaries to KRG’s civil servants and the 
military and ‘could further increase vulnerability in KRG’.260 In a May 2018 report, the United States 

248 Al-Arabiya, Iraq oil ministry confirms US oil workers leaving Basra, 3 January 2020, url  
249 Georges, V., et. al, Initiatives  to Improve Quality of Education in the Kurdistan Region  — Iraq: Administration, School 
Monitoring, Private School Policies, and Teacher Training. Kurdistan Regional Government, 2016, url, pp. 3-4  
250  World  Bank  (The),  The  Kurdistan  region  of  Iraq  -  Reforming  the  economy  for  shared  prosperity  and  protecting  the 
vulnerable, 2016, url, pp. x-xi 
251 MRG, Crossroads: The future of Iraq’s minorities after ISIS, 7 June 2017 url, p. 21  
252 IOM, Community Stabilization Handbook: An overview of community transition and recovery achievements in Iraq 2015-
2016, 19 January 2017, url, p. 138 
253 IOM, Community Stabilization Handbook: An overview of community transition and recovery achievements in Iraq 2015-
2016, 19 January 2017, url, p. 138 
254  World  Bank  (The),  The  Kurdistan  region  of  Iraq  -  Reforming  the  economy  for  shared  prosperity  and  protecting  the 
vulnerable (Vol. 2): Main report, 2016 url, p. 52  
255 DeWeaver, M. A., Making Ends Meet: Economic Reforms in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, in IRIS Iraq Report , American 
University of Iraq-Sulaimani, 2017, url, p. 2 
256 CRF, The Time of the Kurds, 29 July 2015, url  
257 Reuters, Iraqi Kurds gear up for elections hoping to end turmoil, 11 September 2018, url  
258 IPS, Homebound: Hardship Awaits Internally Displaced Iraqis, 18 April 2018, url  
259 World Bank (The), Iraq Economic Monitor From War to Reconstruction and Economic Recovery, April 2018 url, p. x  
260 World Bank (The), Iraq Economic Monitor From War to Reconstruction and Economic Recovery, April 2018  url, p. 15 

 
 
                                                           
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EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS 

Institute  of  Peace  estimated  that  ‘KRG’s  debt  is  at  least  USD 17 billion  [about  EUR 15 billion],  an 
unsustainable level that is probably in excess of 100 % of the region’s GDP.’261 

The recent plummeting of oil prices has exacerbated the economic crisis in the KRI according to the 
New Arab. The source quoted the KRG Prime Minister, who declared that ‘[t]he Kurdish economy was 
slashed  by  more  than  90  percent  since  the  recent  oil  price  crash’.  The  crisis  affected  all  economy 
sectors including the services sector and private businesses. Furthermore, there were plans in mid-
May to diversify the economy and to invest in sectors other than oil, such as agriculture, industry and 
tourism.262 

2.2 Employment 

2.2.1 Country overview 

As of 2017, the public sector was Iraq’s largest employer, representing an estimation of 42 %-50 %263 
and as high as 60 % of all jobs.264 The sector employed people mainly in education, defence, and the 
Ministry of Interior. Public sector wages accounted for 40 % of the government’s budget in 2017.265 
The same trend was noted in the KRI. It is estimated that in 2016 the public sector, excluding the one 
of the KRG, accounted for approximately 1.8 million employees. The Ministry of Education provided 
the most jobs, more than 650 000.266 It is estimated that the public sector in the KRI in 2018 provided 
for 682 021 jobs.267 

The International Labour Organisation (ILO) estimated that in 2017 approximately 40 % of the total 
employment in Iraq was self-employment.268 In the private sector, construction constituted 15 % of 
all private sector employment. Private sector manufacturing companies existed, but 97 % were large 
companies owned by the government. Moreover, agriculture used to be the sixth largest economic 
sector, but the years of conflict, climate change, legislative challenges, and low investment in new 
technologies negatively impacted the sector.269 

Unregistered  or  informal  work  accounted  for  about  20 %  of  Iraq's  employment.270  Iraqis  faced 
competition  on  the  job  market  by  foreign  workers,  residing  and  working  in  Iraq  either  legally  or 
illegally. The media reported that employers may prefer foreign workers either because of specific 
qualifications or because they would accept lower wages.271  

A report published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) on 26 May 2020 stated 
that there are no reliable figures regarding unemployment in Iraq, but indicators show that ‘Iraq may 
need to find some 300,000-450,000 additional new jobs for its young men and women per year during 
2020-2030’.272 A DRC report published in April 2020 stated that 2.5 million unemployed Iraqis were in 
urgent need for jobs.273 Based on 2017 data, the WFP stated that unemployment rates were at 10.8 %, 

261 USIP, Kurdistan Region’s Debt Crisis Threatens Iraq’s Economy, 9 May 2018, url  
262 New Arab (The), In Iraqi Kurdistan, plunging oil prices raise fears of economic collapse, 28 May 2020, url  
263 IMF, Iraq – Selected Issues: IMF Country Report 17/252, August 2017, url, pp. 5-6 
264 BTI, Iraq Country Report, 2018, url, p. 30 ; Mirza, A. “The Rentier Trap in Iraq: Comments and Recommendations’’, cited 
in: Atlantic council, Beyond Security: Stabilization, Governance, and Socioeconomic Challenges in Iraq, July 2018, url 
265 IMF, Iraq – Selected Issues: IMF Country Report 17/252, August 2017, url, pp. 5-6  
266 IMF, Middle East and Central Asia Department, Public Wage Bills in the Middle East and Central Asia, 2018, url, p. 51  
267 LSE Middle East Centre Blog, url, 31 July 2018, url  
268 World Bank Data, Self-employed, total (% of total employment) (modelled ILO estimate), September 2018, url  
269 DRC, Labor Market and Livelihoods Competency Assessment : Iraq, April 2020, url, pp. 9-10 
270 Gunter, F. R., The Political Economy of Iraq, Cheltenham, Elgar 2013, p. 195 
271 Arab Weekly (The), Foreign workers seeking jobs in Iraq despite perils, 18 February 2018,  url; Washington Post (The), 
Protests are mounting in Iraq? Why?, 21 July 2018, url   
272 CSIS, Strategic Dialogue: Shaping a U.S. Strategy for the “Ghosts” of Iraq, 26 May 2020, url, p. 31 
273 DRC, Labor Market and Livelihoods Competency Assessment : Iraq, April 2020, url, p. 9 

 
                                                           
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—  41  

and rose to over 15 % in 11 provinces. Moreover, unemployment rates exceeded 25 % in some of the 
districts  of  Muthanna,  Thi-Qar,  Wasit,  Missan  and  Salah  Al-Din.274  The  following  map  shows  the 
unemployment percentages across Iraq: 

Map 2: WFP Percentage of Unemployment 2019 based on 2016 data 275 

According to the CIA Factbook, and based on 2017 estimates, unemployment among young people 
aged 15-24 was 25.6 % in total, 22 % among males and 63.3 % among females.276 The World Bank, 
based  on  ILO  estimates,  indicated  almost  no  change  in  unemployment  rates  in 2019  compared  to 
2018. According to the dataset, unemployment reached 12.86 % in 2018 and 12.82 in 2019277; for men 
the rates were 10.10 % in 2018 and 10.08 % in 2019278 and for women 30.85 % in 2018 and 30.40 % in 
2019279.  

IOM’s  Iraq  Factsheet  stated  that  improvement  in  the  security  situation  resulted  in  an  increase  in 
private  investment,  notably  in  the  liberated  areas  where  jobs  in  the  sectors  of  tourism  and 
entertainment were created. The wages, according to the Factsheet ranged between 200 USD and 
2 500 USD depending on the level of education and skills. Furthermore, employment centres were 
created in most cities, and the government approved a programme to ‘assist workers with wages of 
less  than  one  USD  per  day  and  unemployed  people’.  Finally,  IOM  observed  that  there  was  no 
unemployment cash assistance at a national level.280  

274 WFP, Iraq Socio-economic Atlas, 2019, url, p. 40 
275 WFP, Iraq Socio-economic Atlas, 2019, url, p. 42 
276 US, CIA, The World Factbook: Iraq, 17 June 2020, url  
277 World Bank (The), Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) (modelled ILO estimate), 21 June 2020, url, TAB: Data 
278 World Bank (The), Unemployment, male (% of male labor force) (modelled ILO estimate), 21 June 2020, url, TAB: Data 
279 World Bank (The), Unemployment, female (% of female labor force) (modelled ILO estimate), 21 June 2020, url, TAB: Data 
280 IOM, Country Factsheet: Iraq, 2019, url, p. 5 

 
 
 
                                                           
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2.2.2 Baghdad 

According to the WFP, Baghdad governorate had the lowest unemployment rates ranging from 6 to 
10 %  (2016  data)281,  while  unemployment  among  persons  aged  15  –  24  was  5-7 %  (2017  data)282. 
According  to  the  CSO,  unemployment  among  young  people  aged  15-24  was  18.6 %  in  2016  in 
Baghdad283, while the total unemployment rate in 2017 was 9.3 %.284 No more recent data could be 
found in the course of preparing this report. 

2.2.3 Basra 

Employment opportunities in southern Iraq are described as ‘limited’ due to the dominance of the oil 
industry and DFAT reported in 2018 that people were moving to other areas of Iraq such as Baghdad, 
in search of employment.285  

Oil  dominated  the  economy,  but  provided  only  one  percent  of  the  labour  force  nationally.286  Oil 
companies in Basra frequently hire foreign workers instead of Iraqis, fuelling frustrations of the local 
population with higher unemployment rates in the south.287 In response, the government approved a 
regulation that requires that 50 % of oil workers employed by foreign companies are Iraqis.288 NRC 
conducted a market assessment in Basra and found that 80 % of the employers interviewed in the 
business survey considered the private sector in Basra to be the main sector providing employment. 
Of the respondents, 60 % reported that the main type of business was commerce/trading, while ‘7% 
each reported basic metal production, forestry wood, health, mechanical and electric engineering oil 
and gas production, and oil refining and services sectors as main business types in Basra’.289 

Rural  employment  in  the  Basra  governorate  is  mainly  agriculturally  based;  the  sector  has  been 
negatively impacted by water salinity and shortages in 2018.290  

An  NRC  Fact  Finding  Mission  from  September  2018  found  that  residents  of  Basra  stated  that 
unemployment  had  worsened  in  recent  years  and  armed  groups  were  ‘often  the  only  employer’, 
noting that it was extremely hard to find employment, even in day labour.291 Some analysts stated 
that  returning  former  Popular  Mobilisation  Forces  (PMF)  members  who  left  to  fight  ISIL  have  put 
additional  pressure  on  services  and  demand  for  employment.292  With  regard  to  challenges  young 
people  faced  in  making  money,  the  NRC  surveyed  40  young  job  seekers  in  Basra.  Reportedly,  the 
challenges to youth employment were ‘corruption (34%), lack of employment opportunities (20%), 
employers’  preference  to  hire  foreign  workers  to  nationals  in  the  private  sector  (18%),  lack  of 
experience and skills among youth (9%), customs and traditions, (5%) and lack of national production 
(14%)’.293 

رشؤم [Employment and Unemployment Indicators], n. d., url  

 ئاصحلاا زجوملا [Statistical Summary Baghdad 2018],n. d., url 

281 WFP, Iraq Socio-economic Atlas, 2019, url, p. 42 
282 WFP, Iraq Socio-economic Atlas, 2019, url, p. 43 
283 Iraq, CSO, ةلاطبلاو ليغشتلا تا
284 Iraq, CSO, 2018 دادغب  ي
285 Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report – Iraq, 9 October 2018, url, p. 30 
286 National (The), In Iraq’s oil-rich Basra, shanty towns flourish, 19 April 2018, url  
287  National  (The),  In  Iraq’s  oil-rich  Basra,  shanty  towns  flourish,  19  April  2018,  url;    Al  Monitor,  Basra  protests  spark 
government scramble to create jobs, 22 August 2018, url 
288 Al Monitor, Basra protests spark government scramble to create jobs, 22 August 2018, url  
289 NRC, Market Assessment Report: Basra City, November 2019, url, pp. 15-16 
290 NRC, Basra Livelihoods Technical Assessment, 21 October 2018, url  
291 NRC, Basra Fact-Finding Mission Report #2, 22 September 2018, url, p. 3; the FFM took place from 26 to 29 August 2018 
292 FP, Northern Iraq May Be Free, but the South is Seething, 9 November 2018, url;  NRC, Basra Fact Finding Mission Report 
#1, 9 September 2018, url,  p. 2, the FFM took place from 26 to 29 August 2018 
293 NRC, Market Assessment Report: Basra City, November 2019, url, p. 26 

 
                                                           
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—  43  

Finally, the WFP stated that Basra governorate had an unemployment rate of 11 – 15 % (2016 data)294 
while unemployment among persons aged 15 – 24 was 8-10 % (2017 data).295 According to the CSO, 
unemployment among the youth aged 15-24 in Basra was 25.5 % in 2016296 and was 7.6 % in total in 
2017.297 No more recent data could be found in the course of preparing this report. 

2.2.4 Erbil 

According  to  the  IOM  2018  demographic  survey,  the  labour  force  participation  in  Erbil  City  was 
registered at 65.9 % of men and 14.8 % of women.298  Regarding the type of occupation, IOM data 
showed  that 43.7 %  of  Erbil’s  city  labour  force  had  been  working  in the  public sector, 13 %  in the 
private sector, 18.7 % were self-employed, and 19.2 % were daily wageworkers.299  

In Erbil governorate, the majority of the population is employed in the public sector, and 78 % of the 
employed population had a written employment contract whereas informal employment was more 
prone to take place in sectors such as construction and wholesale/retail sectors.300 In these sectors, 
UNHCR writes, ‘only 30 % of workers are legally employed and receive wages instead of salaries.’301 

The  WFP observed  that  unemployment  rates  in  Erbil  governorate  ranged  between  11 %  and  15 % 
(2016 data).302  Unemployment  amongst  persons aged 15  – 24 was  8-10 %,  based on 2017 data.303 
According to the CSO, unemployment among the youth aged 15-24 in Erbil was 13.6 % in 2016.304 No 
more recent data could be found in the course of preparing this report. 

2.3 Poverty 

2.3.1 Country overview 

BTI stated that 22.5 % of the Iraqi population is under poverty line, with poverty rates rising from 3.5 
to  12.5 %  in  the  KRI  and  reaching  41.2 %  in  areas  held  by  ISIL  and  30 %  in  southern  provinces.305 
Moreover, UNESCO observed that ‘[p]overty headcount ration at $1.90 a day’ was at 2.5 %.306 The 
Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General for Iraq predicted that poverty rates 
would double to reach 40 % in 2020.307 On 2 July 2020, Al-Sumariya stated that the Iraqi Minister of 
Labour and Social Affairs announced that due to the COVID-19 crisis and the plummeting of oil prices, 
poverty in Iraq increased from 22 % to 34 %.308 

رشؤم [Employment and Unemployment Indicators], n. d., url  

 ئاصحلاا زجوملا [Statistical Summary Basra 2018], n. d., url  

294 WFP, Iraq Socio-economic Atlas, 2019, url, p. 42 
295 WFP, Iraq Socio-economic Atlas, 2019, url, p. 43 
296 Iraq, CSO, ةلاطبلاو ليغشتلا تا
297 Iraq, CSO, 2018 ةصربلا  ي
298 IOM, Demographic Survey Kurdistan Region of Iraq, July 2018, url, p. 105 
299 IOM, Demographic Survey Kurdistan Region of Iraq, July 2018, url, p. 100 
300  UNHCR,  Displacement  as  challenge  and  opportunity  Urban  profile:  Refugees,  internally  displaced  persons  and  host 
community Erbil Governorate, Kurdistan Region of Iraq, April 2016, url, p. 34 
301  UNHCR,  Displacement  as  challenge  and  opportunity  Urban  profile:  Refugees,  internally  displaced  persons  and  host 
community Erbil Governorate, Kurdistan Region of Iraq, April 2016, url, p. 30 
302 WFP, Iraq Socio-economic Atlas, 2019, url, p. 42 
303 WFP, Iraq Socio-economic Atlas, 2019, url, p. 43 
304 Iraq, CSO, ةلاطبلاو ليغشتلا تا
305 BTI, 2020 Country Report — Iraq, 29 April 2020, url, p. 17 
306 UNESCO, Iraq : General Information, n. d., url  
307 UNAMI, Briefing to the Security Council by Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General for Iraq Jeanine 
Hennis-Plasschaert, 12 May 2020, url 
308 Al-Sumariya, دلابلا  ي
from 22 % to 34 % in the country], 2 July 2020, url 

ق ةئملاب 34 لىا 22 نم رقفلا ةبسن ةدايز نلعت لمعلا [Ministry of Labour announces that poverty rates increased 

رشؤم [Employment and Unemployment Indicators], 21 June 2020, url  

 
 
                                                           
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In Iraq, the social safety net is ‘expansive’ as a high percentage of the population is employed in the 
public sector or receives pensions.309 IOM observed that public sector employees could retire at the 
age of 65 after having served for 25 years. In Baghdad, however, employees can retire at the age of 
55 or after having worked for 25 years, or 15 years for employees with medical issues. Regarding the 
private sector, IOM stated that ‘[s]ome employees in the private sector may receive a pension stipend, 
which is managed by their employer.’310 

According  to  WFP,  poverty  alleviation  mechanisms  existed  and  were  enacted  by  the  government. 
These included the Public Distribution System (PDS), which distributed food rations to over 95 % of 
Iraqi  families,  Social  Protection  Network  (which  supported  more  than  1.2  million  vulnerable  Iraqi 
families by providing economic and social safety nets), education subsidies and public healthcare.311  
The PDS continues to function, but has been impacted by the political instability in the country, and 
provisions  have  not  been  delivered  regularly.312  USDOS  observed  that  the  PDS  was  implemented 
‘sporadically  and  irregularly,  with  limited  access  in  recently  liberated  areas’.  Reportedly,  not  all 
commodities were distributed each month, and the system was not accessible to all IDPs since it is 
required  that  citizens  ‘redeem  PDS  rations  or  other  services  only  at  their  registered  place  of 
residence’.313 

The Iraqi government launched the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) for 2018-2022. The challenges 
the PRS aimed at addressing were related to security and stability, good governance, fair distribution 
and diversification of income, mitigating the negative impact of economic reforms on the poor, and 
the high costs of the war on terrorism and the IDP crisis in the aftermath of the war against ISIL.314 

Dr Chatelard commented that women without male relatives, including women-headed households, 
divorced  women  and  widows  are  placed  in  a  vulnerable  position  economically  and  in  terms  of 
exposure  to  harassment,  and  have  difficulty  finding  employment,  noting  that  the  situation  is  not 
markedly  better  for  widows,  who  also  ‘lack  the  protection  of  a  male  relative  and  necessary 
connections to find employment and sustain dependent children’.315 UNOCHA reported in 2017 that 
IDPs,  particularly  women  in  female-headed  households,  widows,  disabled  women  and  girls  and 
teenage girls, were at risk of falling victim to abuse and experienced difficulties in getting humanitarian 
aid.316 IDPs in Baghdad with female-headed households had a higher proportion of people reporting 
having no livelihood source and a high reliance on humanitarian aid and government assistance  to 
cover their basic needs.317 

2.3.2 Baghdad 

The  WFP  Socio-economic  Atlas  of  Iraq  provided  the  following  wealth  index  quintile  for  Baghdad: 
poorest  (17 %),  lower-middle  (24 %),  middle  (19 %),  upper-middle  (21 %),  and  richest  (19 %).  With 
regard to household assets, the Atlas indicated the following breakdown for Baghdad: owner (67 %), 
rented (19 %), free with owner agreement (11 %), and random house (3 %).318 According to Oxford 

309 BTI, 2020 Country Report — Iraq, 29 April 2020, url, pp. 22-23 
310 IOM, Country Factsheet: Iraq, 2019, url, p. 7 
311 WFP, Iraq Socio-economic Atlas, 2019, url, p. 40 
312 BTI, 2020 Country Report — Iraq, 29 April 2020, url, p. 22 
313USDOS, 2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 11 March 2020, url  
314 Iraq, Ministry of Planning, Strategy for the Reduction of Poverty in Iraq 2018-2022, January 2018, url, pp. 1-2 
315 Chatelard, G., Comment made during the review of this report, 19 October 2018 
316 UNOCHA, Humanitarian needs overview, January 2017, p. 15, url   
317 REACH, Comparative Multi-Cluster Assessment of IDPs Living in Camps, April 2018, url, p. 18 
318 WFP, Iraq Socio-economic Atlas, 2019, url, p. 101 

 
                                                           
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Poverty  and  Human  Development  Initiative  2019  dataset,  1.14 %  of  the  population  of  Baghdad 
governorate were in severe poverty, and 4 % were vulnerable to poverty in 2018.319  

Baghdad has a high proportion of female-headed IDP households who were living in camps (24 % of 
those  surveyed  by  REACH  as  of  April  2018).320  IOM  also  noted  in  October  2017  high  numbers  of 
vulnerable  groups  in  the  population:  ‘Baghdad  hosts  17 %  of  IDPs  in  need of  protection  –  30 %  of 
mothers  under  18,  18 %  of  female  heads  of  household  and  17 %  of  all  physically  and/or  mentally 
challenged  individuals.  A  total  of  5 %  of  physically  and/or  mentally  challenged  returnees  are  also 
hosted in the governorate.’321 

Internally displaced people and returnees in Baghdad reported that access to employment was a top 
concern for those living in Baghdad.322 IOM stated that it was estimated that 88 % of IDPs relied on 
earnings  from  informal  labour,  less  than  20 %  depended  on  pensions,  17 %  were  dependent  on 
support from family and friends, and 26 % relied on cash aid.323 A joint IOM/Georgetown University 
study  noted  that,  compared  to  other  governorates,  in  Baghdad,  the  highest  percentage  of  IDPs 
(73.7 %)  reported  to  be  able  to  have  an  adequate  standard  of  living.  Local  charities  and  aid 
organisations based in Baghdad play an important role in providing assistance for IDPs living in the 
capital. In addition, a relevant portion of IDPs had already relatives residing in the city, who provided 
them with support.324  

2.3.3 Basra 

According  to  Oxford  Poverty  and  Human  Development  Initiative  2019  dataset,  2.25 %  of  the 
population of Basra governorate were in severe poverty, and 8.79 % were vulnerable to poverty in 
2018.325 

Poverty varies significantly between districts in Basra governorate.326 The World Bank found in 2015 
that Basra district  itself had the  highest poverty rate in the governorate,  followed by Al Zubair, Al 
Khaseeb, Al Qurna, Al Hartha, Al Deer, and Shatt Al Arab.327  

In Basra City, begging has become a growing problem, with beggars forming organised systems and 
gangs, and become associated with, or run by criminal networks.328 Some female beggars have been 
reported to drug their children whom they bring with them to beg.329 In impoverished areas of Basra, 
gangs form to make a living from sifting through the garbage of wealthier inhabitants of the city.330  

319 Alkire, S. et al., The Global Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI), Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative, 
2019, url, Tab 5.1 MPI Region 
320 REACH, Comparative Multi-Cluster Assessment of IDPs Living in Camps, April 2018, url, p. 15 
321 IOM, Iraq Displacement Tracking Matrix, Integrated Location Assessment II, Governorate Profiles, October 2017, url, p. 5 
322 IOM, Iraq Displacement Tracking Matrix, Integrated Location Assessment II, Governorate Profiles, October 2017, url, p. 
32 
323 IOM, Iraq Displacement Tracking Matrix, Integrated Location Assessment II, Governorate Profiles, October 2017, url, p. 
25 
324 IOM, SFS/Georgetown University, Access to durable solutions among IDPs in Iraq; Part One, April 2017, url, p. 23 
325 Alkire, S. et al., The Global Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI), Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative, 
2019, url, Tab 5.1 MPI Region 
326 NCCI, Basrah Governorate Profile, December 2015, url, p. 5 
327 World Bank The), Where are Iraq’s Poor: Mapping Poverty in Iraq, 2015, url, p. 56   
328 Niqash, Mister can you spare a dinar – life with the beggar mafia of Basra, 30 January 2014, url  
329 Niqash, Mister can you spare a dinar – life with the beggar mafia of Basra, 30 January 2014, url  
330 Niqash, Mister can you spare a dinar – life with the beggar mafia of Basra, 30 January 2014, url  

 
 
                                                           
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2.3.4 Erbil 

According  to  Oxford  Poverty  and  Human  Development  Initiative  2019  dataset,  zero %  of  the 
population  of  Erbil  governorate  were  in  severe  poverty,  and  5.32 %  were  vulnerable to  poverty  in 
2018.331 

According to a 2015 World Bank assessment, the poverty rate in Erbil governorate was 4.1 %.332  2018 
data  from  IOM  showed  that  29 %  of  households  surveyed  in  Erbil  governorate  lived  on  a monthly 
income between IQD 500 000 and 750 000 (about EUR 368 – 550) whereas 25.9 % earned between 
IQD 250 000 and 500 000 (about EUR 184 – 368) and 21.1 % had a monthly income situated between 
IQD 750 000  and  1 000 000  (about  EUR 550  –  735).333  8.2 %  of  the  Erbil  governorate  households 
surveyed lived on a monthly income lower than IQD 250 000 (about EUR 184). When compared to 
other KRI governorates higher income households were more prevalent in Erbil (16 %).334 

The  IOM  2018  KRI  demographic  survey  findings  noted  that  female-headed  households  are  more 
prevalent  in  Erbil  (10.7 %)  and  Sulaimaniya  (11.2 %)  and,  in  general,  more  in  urban  than  in  rural 
locations (11 % versus 8 %).335 Female-headed households have fewer job opportunities as a result of 
their responsibilities at home and because of the stigma around working as a divorcee or widow.336 
Without  having  an  income  source,  female-headed  households  are  more  likely  to  be  supported  by 
family, friends and institutions.337 IOM wrote that ‘nearly 50 % of female-headed households also rely 
on pensions as a source of income, an expected finding considering that female household headship 
is often associated with widowhood at older ages.’338  

2.4 Food security 

2.4.1 Country overview 

The Iraqi National Development Plan 2018-2022 warned that 4 095 377 donums (approximately 4 095 
square kilometres) of Iraq’s agricultural land were in danger of desertification.339 

In  its  Iraq  Socio-economic  Atlas  for  2019,  the  WFP  estimated  that  in  2017,  11 %  of  Iraqi  families 
depended  on  agriculture  for  livelihood,  which was  Iraq’s  main  source  of  food security.  Agriculture 
contributed  to  9 %  of  the  total  GDP,  and  only  27 %  of  Iraq’s  surface  was  suitable  for  farming. 
Furthermore, the report stated that extreme weather changes, land degradation, and displacement 
and infrastructure damage incurred by war could pose a threat to agriculture in Iraq.340 

Regarding the percentages of food insecure families across Iraq, the WFP stated that food insecurity 
among men in urban areas was 1.8 % and in rural areas 4.9 %, while among women the percentages 
were 1.5 % in urban areas and 7.6 % in rural areas.341  The following maps show the distribution of 
food insecurity per gender and at a governorate level as well as the food security zones in Iraq: 

331 Alkire, S. et al., The Global Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI), Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative, 
2019, url, Tab 5.1 MPI Region 
332 World Bank (The), Where are Iraq’s Poor: Mapping Poverty in Iraq, 2015, url, p 28   
333 IOM, Demographic Survey Kurdistan Region of Iraq, July 2018, url, p. 44  
334 IOM, Demographic Survey Kurdistan Region of Iraq, July 2018, url, p. 44 
335 IOM, Demographic Survey Kurdistan Region of Iraq, July 2018, url, p. 22 
336 Kaya, Z. N. and Luchtenberg, K. N., Displacement and Women’s Economic Empowerment: Voices of Displaced Women in 
the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, 2018, url, p. 23 
337 IOM, Demographic Survey Kurdistan Region of Iraq, July 2018, url, p. 45 
338 IOM, Demographic Survey Kurdistan Region of Iraq, July 2018, url, p. 45 
339 Iraq, Ministry of Planning, National Development Plan 2018-2022, June 2018, url, p. 226 
340 WFP, Iraq Socio-economic Atlas, 2019, url, p. 19 
341 WFP, Iraq Socio-economic Atlas, 2019, url, p. 34 

 
                                                           
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Map 3: WFP Percentage of food insecure households 2019 based on 2016 data 342 

342 WFP, Iraq Socio-economic Atlas, 2019, url, p. 34 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
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Map 4: WFP Food Security Zones 2019343 

According to WFP, the percentages of people who are vulnerable to food insecurity were significantly 
higher, amounting to around 50 % in urban areas and 60 % in rural areas.344 

With regard to water resources in Iraq, the Ministry of Planning noted the existence of a serious water 
resources problem stemming from external and internal factors such as the drop in the levels of water 
of the Euphrates and Tigris, climate change, and high contamination level.345 BTI stated that the main 
reason behind water scarcity in Iraq was the ‘increasing number of projects and dams that affect water 
flow  along  the  Tigris  and  Euphrates  rivers’  in  Turkey.346  Iraq  experienced  prolonged  drought  and 
decades of aging water infrastructure, which has depleted its ability to provide water and sanitation 
to  the  population;  rural  populations  have  the  greatest  difficulty  accessing  water  and  sanitation.347 
Water access has improved since 2010, however many Iraqis still rely on ‘informal wells, government 
and NGO water trucks and unreliable tap systems’ while Iraq’s freshwater continues to be depleted.348 
Water shortages are reported.349  

In  a  report  dated  30  April  2020,  the  WFP  observed  a  tendency  to  hoard  food  for  the  COVID-19 
lockdown period, which led to a surge in food prices towards the end of March. However, the prices 
stabilised in April due to price control measures and the distribution of essential food items through 
the PDS. However, the WFP stated that ‘the fall in global oil prices resulted in a significant revenue 
shortfall  for  oil-based  economies  such  as  Iraq’s’  and  warned  that  if  this  situation  persisted,  social 

343 WFP, Iraq Socio-economic Atlas, 2019, url, p. 33 
344 WFP, Iraq Socio-economic Atlas, 2019, url, p. 35 
345 Iraq, Ministry of Planning, National Development Plan 2018-2022, June 2018, url, pp. 132-133 
346 BTI, 2020 Country Report — Iraq, 29 April 2020, url, p. 25 
347 IRIN, Water shortage leads people to drink from rivers, 18 February 2007, url  
348 EPIC, Drought in the land between two rivers, 18 July 2017, url  
349 World Bank (The), Iraq Economic Monitor, October 2018, url, p. 6 

 
 
                                                           
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safety nets such as the PDS could become difficult to sustain.350 The average of goods availability at a 
national level was 8.5 out of 10, and markets across the country showed very good resilience in terms 
of  supply  chain.351  With  regard  to  food  prices,  the  WFP  noted  that  the  year-on-year  (y/y)  price  of 
wheat flour in Iraq was 21 % higher in 2019. The highest y/y price increase was for eggs (28 %), while 
items such as tomatoes and beans underwent a month-on-month price increases of 24 % and 15 % 
consecutively.352 

2.4.2 Baghdad 

The WFP Socio-economic Atlas of Iraq stated that in Baghdad, 53 % of households were food secure, 
46 % marginally food secure and 1 % food insecure.353 The WFP Iraq Market Monitor indicated non-
significant  changes  in  month-on-month  prices  in  Baghdad  markets  for  March-April,  but  low 
predictability of future changes.354 

The production of wheat in Baghdad governorate dropped significantly, from 159 984 tons in 2017 to 
91 141 tons in 2018. Similarly, the production of barley dropped from 10 378 tons in 2017 to 5 466 
tons in 2018. However, the production of dates increased from 124 176 tons in 2017 to 130 593 tons 
in 2018.355 

The  World  Bank  stated  that  the  residents  of  Baghdad  deal  with  daily  water  service  interruptions, 
especially in summer. Droughts356, inadequate infrastructure, along with rapid population growth and 
the inflow of IDPs have led to water shortages and the outbreak of waterborne diseases. Sewer pipes 
leakages  contaminate  drinking  water  networks.  Families  are  thus  forced  ‘to  spend  a  significant 
fraction of their income on medical treatment and to purchase bottled water’.357  

Drinking and agricultural water available in Baghdad City is of poor quality. It is estimated that the 
level of organic material pollution in water in the capital is three times higher than national and WHO’s 
limits. In Sadr City, for example, the only source of clean water is bottled, which is inaccessible for the 
poorer population.358  

2.4.3 Basra 

The  WFP  Iraq  Market  Monitor  indicated  insignificant  changes  in  month-on-month  prices  in  Basra 
markets for March-April, but predictability of future changes was low.359 

The production of wheat dropped by more than half in Basra governorate, from 38 643 tons in 2017 
to 15 637 tons in 2018. Similarly, the production of barley dropped from 1 225 tons in 2017 to 584 
tons in 2018. The production of dates, however, remained almost the same: 37 556 tons in 2017 to 
37 816 tons in 2018.360 

350 WFP, Iraq Market Monitor Report, Issue No. 30, April 2020, url, p. 4 
351 WFP, Iraq Market Monitor Report, Issue No. 30, April 2020, url, p. 3 
352 WFP, Iraq Market Monitor Report, Issue No. 30, April 2020, url, p. 4 
353 WFP, Iraq Socio-economic Atlas, 2019, url,  p. 101 
354 WFP, Iraq Market Monitor Report, Issue No. 30, April 2020, url, p. 3 
355 Iraq, CSO, 2018 دادغب  ي
356 Al Jazeera, Iraqi farmers, including in the areas near Baghdad Iraq's farmers hit hard by water shortages, 3 August 2018, 
url  
357 World Bank (The), Iraq: 5 Million Residents in Baghdad to Benefit from Improved Water Supply and Wastewater Services, 
31 February 2018, url, EPIC, Drought in the land between two rivers, 18 July 2017, url  
358 EPIC, Drought in the land between two rivers, 18 July 2017, url  
359 WFP, Iraq Market Monitor Report, Issue No. 30, April 2020, url, p. 3 
360 Iraq, CSO, 2018 ةصربلا  ي

 ئاصحلاا زجوملا [Statistical Summary Baghdad 2018], n. d., url 

 ئاصحلاا زجوملا [Statistical Summary Basra 2018], n. d., url  

 
 
                                                           
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In 2015, it was reported that Basra had above average high rates of access to the public water network 
and ‘improved water sources’, however, the quality of the water was poor.361 Access to safe drinking 
water represented one of the main problems in Basra.362 Southern Iraq’s freshwater, particularly in 
Basra, was largely from the Shatt Al-Arab waterway, which has become heavily salty due to upstream 
dams,  drought,  and  pollution. In  recent years, water shortages  have  caused  reduced  cultivation  of 
crops, such as rice and wheat.363 Following a fact-finding mission to Basra City in September 2018, NRC 
found that the water crisis has negatively impacted livelihoods in agriculture in rural areas around 
Basra364, and forced 3 780 people from rural areas of southern Iraq to be displaced in August 2018.365 
Due to water scarcity, a rise in rural to urban displacement was noted in Basra in September 2018.366 
In  November  2018,  IOM  reported  that  the  number  of  families  displaced  by  the  water  crisis  and 
drought in southern governorates was 3 522 (most of whom were in Thi Qar).367  

2.4.4 Erbil 

The  WFP  Iraq  Market  Monitor  observed  ‘high  price  changes’  in  month-on-month  prices  in  Erbil 
markets for March-April, with a high predictability of future changes.368 

Access to safe drinking water was nearly universal in Erbil governorate, with 89.7 % of households 
having  the  public  network/tap  as  a  source  of  freshwater  supply,  whereas  8.9 %  relied  on  wells.369 
Sources indicated that water shortages might occur in KRI as a result of rapid population increase and 
waste.370  The quality of Erbil’s drinking water was evaluated to be within acceptable limits.371 Houses 
in Erbil governorate were equipped with sanitation facilities, such as connection to the public sewage 
network with covered canal (25.6 %) or septic tanks (71.8 %).372 

2.5 Health care 

2.5.1 Country overview 

In a report published on 2 March 2020, Reuters stated that ‘Iraq’s healthcare system is in crisis’, and 
suffered from shortages of drugs and medical personnel. Reuters observed that the healthcare system 
in Iraq was centralised, whereby Baghdad received ‘the bulk of funding’ and Basra was underfunded. 
The report added that ‘[w]here the rest of Iraq has 1.1 hospital beds and 0.8 doctors per 1,000 people, 
Kurdistan has 1.5 beds and 1.4 doctors’. In order to improve the capacity of the healthcare system, 
the Ministry of Health enabled the investment of the private sector, which resulted in an increase of 
4 % in the number of beds per 1 000 people in the first  half of 2019 in Iraq.  373 The Congressional 
Research  Service  (CRS)  pointed  out  that  Iraq’s  health  systems,  public  and  private,  suffered  from 
limited capacity and significant shortcomings. The report, citing the World Bank, stated that ‘Iraq has 

361 NCCI Iraq, Basrah Governorate Profile, December 2015,  url, p. 5 
362 UNIAU, Basrah Governorate Profile, November 2010, available at: url, p. 1 
363 Bloomberg, Basra’s Tap Water is Too Salty and Polluted Even for Washing, 2 August 2018, url  
364 NRC, Basra Fact-Finding Mission Report #2, 22 September 2018, url, p. 3; the FFM took place from 26 to 29 August 2018 
365 NRC, Iraq: Basra’s children face disease outbreak in rundown schools, 23 October 2018,  url  
366 NRC, Basra Fact Finding Mission Report #1, 9, September 2018, url, p. 8; the FFM took place from 26 to 29 August 2018 
367 IOM, Iraq Water Crisis (Central/South), November 2018, url   
368 WFP, Iraq Market Monitor Report, Issue No. 30, April 2020, url, p. 3 
369 IOM, Demographic Survey Kurdistan Region of Iraq, July 2018 url, p. 50 
370 Denmark, DIS, The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Access, Possibility of Protection, Security and Humanitarian Situation, 
11 April 2016, url, p. 59; Rudaw, Erbil water shortages to be solved by new pipeline: governor, 8 July 2018, url  
371 Jadoon, S., et al., Evaluation of Drinking Water Quality in Erbil City Kurdistan, Region-Iraq, Journal of Environment and 
Earth Science, Vol.5, No.21, 2015, url, p. 17 
372 IOM, Demographic Survey Kurdistan Region of Iraq, July 2018, url, p. 49 
373 Reuters, The medical crisis that’s aggravating Iraq’s unrest, 2 March 2020, url  

 
                                                           
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approximately 0.8 physicians and 1.3 hospital beds per 1,000 people (below the global averages of 1.5 
and 2.7, respectively)’.374 

The  WFP  observed  that  the  Iraqi  State  provided  ‘universal  healthcare  and  medical  supplies  at  a 
subsidised  cost’  to  all  Iraqis.  The  source  also  reported  on  a  low  rate  of  less  than  one  hospital  per 
100 000 persons. According to the  report,  even ‘[l]ower incidences  of hospitals and physicians  are 
observed in the governorates of Kirkuk, Thi-Qar, Nainawa, Maysan and Anbar’.375 

Map 5: WFP Number of Hospitals per 100 000 Population 2019376 

In its Iraq Country Factsheet 2019, IOM observed that public hospitals and clinics charged minimal 
fees,  but  might  not  provide  all  medical  services.  Moreover,  most  of  the  infrastructure  was 
rehabilitated, save for the newly liberated areas. IOM stated that there might be waiting times for 
certain medical specialisations, particularly in big cities. Furthermore, patients should visit a clinic for 
diagnosis first before they were referred to the appropriate healthcare facility. The costs of medical 
services depended on numerous factors (e.g. age and gender) and costs of medications depended on 
diagnoses. Additionally, in public hospitals medications were provided at a lower cost but were subject 
to shortages.377 Reuters, citing Iraq’s former Minister of Health, stated that in 2018, ‘more than 85% 
of drugs on Iraq’s essential medicines list were either in short supply or completely unavailable’, with 
cancer  drugs  being  ‘among  the  scarcest  and  most  smuggled’.  Moreover,  Reuters  observed  that 
pharmacies were full with smuggled drugs that either could be unsafe or expired.378 

Although reliable data is sparse for the post-2008 period, the deterioration of the security situation 
after the ISIL offensive in 2014 has intensified the need for mental care and specialised staff, according 
to  EPIC.379  In  2018,  it was  estimated  that  between  15 and  20 %  of  the  country’s  population  faced 

374 CRS, Iraq and U.S. Policy, 16 June 2020, url, p. 2 
375 WFP, Iraq Socio-economic Atlas, 2019, url, p. 40 
376 WFP, Iraq Socio-economic Atlas, 2019, url, p. 51 
377 IOM, Country Factsheet: Iraq, 2019, url, p. 4 
378 Reuters, The medical crisis that’s aggravating Iraq’s unrest, 2 March 2020, url  
379 EPIC, Iraq’s quiet mental health crisis, 05 May 2017, url  

 
 
 
 
                                                           
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mental health issues.380 WHO representatives, interviewed by Landinfo and DIS, in 2018 noted that 
with  regard  to  mental  health  ‘there  are  huge  needs  and  the  available  services  do  not  meet  the 
demand.’381 The growing mental health needs haven not been met due to a shortage of specialised 
staff,  as, according  to  IRIN  news, there  were only  80  clinical  psychologists  in  the  country, working 
alongside a limited number of psychiatrists.382 

2.5.2 Baghdad 

According  to the  WFP  Socio-economic  Atlas,  and  based  on  2017  data,  there  was  one  government 
hospital  for  140 001-177 000  persons  in  Baghdad  governorate.  Regarding  the  overall  number  of 
hospitals (public and private), the WFP estimated a range of 50-95 in Baghdad governorate, with a 
rate  of 10.1-15 % of physicians for every 10 000 persons.383  Moreover, mortality rates  for children 
under  five  in  Baghdad  were  20.1-30  percent.384  The  CSO  stated  that  in  2017,  the  numbers  of 
governmental hospitals and Primary Healthcare centres were 95 and 257 consecutively.385 According 
to the  National Development  Plan 2018-2022, and based on 2016 data, there was  a deficit of 110 
governmental  hospitals  and  538  primary  health  care  units  in  Baghdad  between  the  standard  and 
actual numbers.386 

The WHO Iraq Health Cluster Response Monitoring Interactive Dashboard 2018 indicated that in the 
Baghdad governorate, six organisations were operating health facilities in 12 locations. This included 
one facility for mental health and eight for treatment of common diseases.387 According to the Country 
Cooperation strategy for WHO in Iraq, inadequate mental health services were provided as primary 
care across all Iraq. In 2016, two trauma centres were opened in Baghdad. A UNAMI/OHCHR report 
noted that in 2016 there were 45 NGOs in Baghdad who had registered with the Ministry of Labour 
and Social Affairs and were specifically providing medical support on disability. According to the NGOs 
surveyed  by  the  UNAMI/OHCHR  report,  there  was  only  one  centre  for  plastic  limbs  and  medical 
cushions  in  Baghdad  and  one  specialised  hospital  for  persons  with  disabilities  with  spinal  cord 
injuries.388 

2.5.3 Basra 

In  a  report  published  on  2  March  2020,  Reuters  stated  that  the  healthcare  system  in  Basra  was 
underfunded, despite the governorate’s massive oil production. According to the report, doctors and 
nurses  in  Basra  were  ‘overworked’.  Additionally,  Basra  suffered  from  a  shortage  in  vital  medical 
equipment, and had only three CT scanners and one MRI unit per million residents, ‘a fraction of the 
average rate of 34 CT scanners and 24 MRI units for developed countries’.389 

According  to the  WFP  Socio-economic  Atlas,  and  based  on  2017  data,  there  was  one  government 
hospital for 177 001-227 100 people in Basra governorate.390 The WFP noted that Basra governorate 
had a range of 16-26 public and private hospitals, while the rate of physicians per 10 000 persons was 

380 Rudaw, Seminar examines mental health challenges in post-conflict Iraq, 2 April 2018, url   
381 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Northern Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs) 
in the disputed areas, incl. possibility to enter and access the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), 5 November 2018, url, p. 54 
382 IRIN News, Iraq’s growing mental health problem, 16 January 2017, url 
383 WFP, Iraq Socio-economic Atlas, 2019, url, pp. 51,52 
384 WFP, Iraq Socio-economic Atlas, 2019, url, p. 61 
385 Iraq, CSO, 2018 دادغب  ي
386 Iraq, Ministry of Planning, National Development Plan 2018-2022, June 2018, url, p. 173 
387 WHO, Iraq Health Cluster Response Monitoring Interactive Dashboard 2018, url  
388 UNAMI, Report on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in Iraq, December 2017, url, p. 12-13 
389 Reuters, The medical crisis that’s aggravating Iraq’s unrest, 2 March 2020, url  
390 WFP, Iraq Socio-economic Atlas, 2019, url, p. 51 

 ئاصحلاا زجوملا [Statistical Summary Baghdad 2018], n. d., url 

 
                                                           
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at 8.1-10 %.391 Moreover, mortality rates for children under five in Basra were 30.1-40 %.392 The CSO 
stated  that  in  2017,  the  number  of  healthcare  facilities  in  Basra  was  246,  of  which  19  were 
governmental  hospitals  and  139  were  Primary  Healthcare  centres.393  According  to  the  National 
Development  Plan  2018-2022,  and  based  on  2016  data,  there  was  a  deficit  of  42  governmental 
hospitals and 154 primary health care units in Basra between the standard and actual numbers.394 

2.5.4 Erbil 

In the three governorates of the KRI, the ratio of government hospitals to residents was significantly 
higher, i.e. one hospital per 60 000-75 000.395 According to the WFP, Erbil governorate had a range of 
27-49  public  and  private  hospitals  and  a  higher  rate  of  15.1-19  physicians  per  10 000  persons.396 
Moreover,  mortality  rates  for  children  under  five  in  Erbil  were  10.1-20  %.397  Additionally,  Reuters 
observed that in the KRI, there was 1.5 hospital beds per 1 000 people.398 According to the National 
Development  Plan  2018-2022,  and  based  on  2016  data,  there  was  a  deficit  of  11  governmental 
hospitals  and  a  surplus  of  96  primary  health  care  units  in  Erbil  between  the  standard  and  actual 
numbers.399 

Many of the basic primary care services were provided in the KRI, however not in a consistent way.400 
The  PHC  [Primary  Health  Care]  system  covers  all  Iraqis,  including  non–KRI  residents  who  are  Iraqi 
citizens. However, non-KRI residents who do not have citizenship of Iraq cannot avail themselves of 
health facilities and medicines under the same terms as Kurdistan citizens.401 The same source noted 
that ‘all citizens are  eligible  for a broad package  of health care, dental, and emergency services in 
public hospitals and PHCs. The services provided are limited by the budget, available equipment and 
medicines, and the education and training of the staff’.402 Syrian refugees residing in the KRI had the 
right to access public healthcare.403 The distribution of PHC centres was not necessarily uniform across 
the Kurdistan Region, with most main PHCs serving too many people, and most sub-centres serving 
too few people. The centres providing services to a larger population were, however, equipped with 
more doctors and nurses than the sub-centres.404  In August 2018, Rudaw reported that medication 
was illegally imported into the KRI and that this included counterfeit medication.405    

2.6 Education 

2.6.1 Country overview 

In its report for 2019, the civil society movement ‘Global Campaign for Education’ noted an increase 
in education funding for 2019, but this increase, according to the source, would not be enough to 

 ئاصحلاا زجوملا [Statistical Summary Basra 2018], n. d., url  

391 WFP, Iraq Socio-economic Atlas, 2019, url, pp. 51-52 
392 WFP, Iraq Socio-economic Atlas, 2019, url, p. 61 
393 Iraq, CSO, 2018 ةصربلا  ي
394 Iraq, Ministry of Planning, National Development Plan 2018-2022, June 2018, url, p. 173 
395 WFP, Iraq Socio-economic Atlas, 2019, url, p. 51 
396 WFP, Iraq Socio-economic Atlas, 2019, url, pp. 51,52 
397 WFP, Iraq Socio-economic Atlas, 2019, url, p. 61 
398 Reuters, The medical crisis that’s aggravating Iraq’s unrest, 2 March 2020, url  
399 Iraq, Ministry of Planning, National Development Plan 2018-2022, June 2018, url, p. 173 
400 Moore, M., Ross C. A. et al., The future of health care in the Kurdistan Region – Iraq, 2014, url, p. 70 
401 Moore, M., Ross C. A. et al., The future of health care in the Kurdistan Region – Iraq, 2014, url, p. 60 
402 Moore, M., Ross C. A. et al., The future of health care in the Kurdistan Region – Iraq, 2014, url, p. 60 
403 Ceasefire Centre for Civilian Rights, Asuda, Broken Lives: Violence against Syrian refugee women and girls in the Kurdistan 
Region of Iraq, March 2018, url, p. 4 
404 Moore, M., Ross C. A. et al., The future of health care in the Kurdistan Region – Iraq, 2014, url  
405 Rudaw, 27 August 2018, KRG cracks down on counterfeit medications worth millions, url  

 
 
                                                           
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rehabilitate thousands of schools damaged during the conflict in areas previously held by ISIL.406 BTI 
stated that Iraq suffered from ‘weak educational infrastructure, especially in areas liberated from the 
IS group’. Reportedly, one out of five schools was destroyed during the conflict against ISIL.407 

The National Development Plan 2018-2022 noted that male enrolment rates at primary, intermediate 
and high schools were higher than those of females based on 2016 data. Moreover, dropout rates of 
female students were higher than those of their male counterparts.408 BTI observed that decades of 
conflict in Iraq have led to a decline in school attendance, especially as some families and children feel 
there is no bright future ahead’.409 The CSO provided the following data for 2018/2019 at a national 
level: 

  Primary education: Number of schools 17 235 – Enrolment 6 501 053 – Dropout 127 891 – 

Number of teachers 290 664. 

  Secondary education: Number of schools  8 139 – Enrolment 3 140 110 – Dropout 72 658 – 

Number of teachers 168 330. 

  Vocational education: Number of schools 314 – Enrolment 50 603 – Dropout 1 607 – Number 

of teachers 10 976.410 

The  following  maps  show  the  primary,  lower  and  upper  secondary  school  attendance  ratios  per 
gender: 

Map 6: WFP Primary School Attendance Ratio 2019411 

406 Global Campaign for Education, Iraq Spotlight Report 2019, 2019, url, p. 7 
407 BTI, Iraq Country Report, 2018 url, p. 25 
408 Iraq, Ministry of Planning, National Development Plan 2018-2022, June 2018, url, p. 209 
409 BTI, Iraq Country Report, 2018, url, p. 25 
410 Iraq, CSO, ميلعتلا تا
411 WFP, Iraq Socio-economic Atlas, 2019, url, p. 84 

رشؤم [Education Indicators], n. d., url  

 
 
                                                           
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Map 7: WFP Lower Secondary School Attendance Ratio 2019412 

Map 8: WFP Upper Secondary School Attendance Ratio 2019413 

412 WFP, Iraq Socio-economic Atlas, 2019, url, p. 85 
413 WFP, Iraq Socio-economic Atlas, 2019, url, p. 86 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
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2.6.2 Baghdad 

The  2016/2017  school  enrolment  rates  in  Baghdad  were  97 %  for  elementary  school,  67.7 %  for 
secondary, 34.6 % preparatory, and 66.3 % high school.414 The CSO stated that during the school year 
2017/2018, 1 573 526 students were enrolled in primary schools and 788 082 in secondary schools in 
Bagdad.415 Moreover, the WFP provided the following breakdown of the education level of household 
members who were +10 of age: illiterate (9 %), read only (2 %), read and write (14 %), primary (33 %), 
intermediate (15 %), secondary (12 %), diploma (5 %), and higher (9 %).416  

The  National  Development  Plan  observed  that  ‘2908  buildings  are  needed  for  kindergarten,  2849 
elementary schools, 353 middle and high schools in Baghdad’ to reach the standard number based on 
Baghdad residents’ criteria.417 

Unlike  the  rest  of  the  country,  where  private  schools  were  still  underdeveloped,  Baghdad  had  an 
estimated 5 % of private schools.418 Higher quality education in private and international schools in 
Baghdad  was  accessed  by  wealthy  families.  The  average  fee  for  private  school  was  approximately 
USD 1 300 (EUR 1 145) per month.419 

2.6.3 Basra 

The National Development Plan 2018-2022 stated that in 2016/2017, school enrolment rates in Basra 
province were 96.5 % for elementary school, 59.8 % secondary school, 28.2 % preparatory school, and 
60.8 %  high  school.420  Moreover,  there  was  a  gap  of  1 022  buildings  for  kindergarten  and  734  for 
elementary  schools,  and  a  surplus  of  47  buildings  for  middle  and  high  school  buildings  in  Basra 
province.421  The  CSO stated that  for the  school year 2017/2018, 602 512 were  enrolled in primary 
schools and 291 393 in secondary schools.422 

2.6.4 Erbil 

Based on a 2018 survey, the WFP stated that the percentage of children attending primary school in 
Erbil  province  was  20.1-25 %.423  A  joint  report  by  the  Erbil  Refugee  Council,  IOM,  the  Joint  Crisis 
Coordination  Centre,  UNHCR,  UN-HABITAT,  OCHA  and  UNFPA  stated  that  ‘[b]asic  and  high  school 
education are provided mainly through public schools, which are free to the residents of the Kurdistan 
Region.’424 The economic crisis in KRI has seriously affected education financing which has consistently 
decreased since 2012-2013, significantly impacting Erbil governorate, where the implementation rate 
of the education budget dropped from 45.9 % in 2021-2013 to 3.7 % in 2015-2016.425 

Erbil governorate hosts three universities and a number of colleges and other education facilities. 426 
According to IOM’s 2018 demographic survey Erbil governorate  scored among the highest literacy 

 ئاصحلاا زجوملا [Statistical Summary Baghdad 2018], n. d., url 

414 Iraq, Ministry of Planning, National Development Plan 2018-2022, June 2018, url, p. 170 
415 Iraq, CSO, 2018 دادغب  ي
416 WFP, Iraq Socio-economic Atlas, 2019, url, p. 101 
417 Iraq, Ministry of Planning, National Development Plan 2018-2022, June 2018, url, p. 170 
418 World Bank (The), Iraq: reconstruction and investment, part 2, January 2018, url, p. 25 
419 Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report Iraq, 9 October 2018, url, p. 9  
420 Iraq, Ministry of Planning, National Development Plan 2018-2022, June 2018, url, p. 170 
421 Iraq, Ministry of Planning, National Development Plan 2018-2022, June 2018, url, p. 171 
 ئاصحلاا زجوملا [Statistical Summary Basra 2018],21 June 2020, url  
422 Iraq, CSO, 2018 ةصربلا  ي
423 WFP, Iraq Socio-economic Atlas, 2019, url, p. 83 
424  UNHCR,  Displacement  as  challenge  and  opportunity  Urban  profile:  Refugees,  internally  displaced  persons  and  host 
community Erbil Governorate, Kurdistan Region of Iraq, April 2016, url, pp. 23-24 
425 UNICEF, The Cost and Benefits of Education in Iraq: An analysis of the education sector and strategies to maximize the 
benefits of education, 21 May 2017, available at: url, p. 33 
426 NCCI,  Erbil Governorate Profile, December 2015, url, p. 3 

 
                                                           
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levels in KRI with around 80 % of respondents being able to read and write.427 School attendance level 
for Erbil governorate was recorded at 37 %, whereas 45.9 % were not currently attending and 17.1 % 
had  never  attended.428  An  article  on  Opendemocracy.net  states  that  ‘economic  problems’  caused 
most of the drop outs from school in the city of Sulaimaniya. The article furthermore states that 25 % 
of the schools in the KRI are ‘completely unserviceable’ and 50 % of the schools need renovation.429 
Corroborating information could not be found. 

2.7 Housing and living conditions 

2.7.1 Country overview 

Housing 

According to the  National Development Plan 2018-2022, there was  a housing deficit of 2.5 million 
units in Iraq by the end of 2016, 50 % of which in Baghdad and Ninawa governorates. Moreover, the 
plan referred to ‘[p]ersistent gaps in housing provision among provinces and between rural and urban 
areas’. Rapid population growth and constant growth in informal settlements inside and around cities 
(mainly Baghdad and Basra) were aspects of the current housing situation in Iraq.430 

In  its  Humanitarian  Needs  Overview  of  November  2019,  UNOCHA  observed  that  around  700 000 
people (out of 2.4 million estimated to be in need of shelter and NFI assistance) remained in critical 
shelter,  such  as  makeshift  shelters,  unfinished  or  abandoned  buildings,  worn  tents  or  public 
buildings.431 Regarding IDPs, destruction of housing was a ‘primary issue’ keeping people in situations 
of displacement  in conflict-affected areas, according to IOM, in 2018, noting that the worst house 
destruction was reported to be in Anbar, and IDPs were significantly more likely to cite this as a reason 
for lack of return.432 

Electricity, hygiene, sewerage and sanitation 

UNOCHA reported in February 2018 that 5.4 million persons in Iraq were in need of water, hygiene 
and sanitation assistance.433 They estimated this dropped to 2.3 million people in need of water and 
sanitation access as of December 2018.434 UNICEF noted that between 1 January 2020 and 31 March 
2020, 1.85 million people, of which 851 000 were children and 943 000 females) were in need of ‘at 
least one form of humanitarian WASH support.435 

The delivery of electricity was chronically deficient; already before the conflict, it was reported that 
supply  was  insufficient.  Years  of  neglect  have  led  to a  dilapidated  electricity  infrastructure. Power 
outages  were  very  common.436  IOM  reported  in  its  2019  ILA  III  that  overall,  public  electricity  was 
available in most residences in locations where IDPs/returnees lived, but that the availability of daily 
hours of electricity was quite varied depending on the region. The southern governorates had 20 hours 
of electricity per day, while Ninawa and Salah al-Din had the lowest availability at 10 hours per day.437 
On 4 June 2020, Reuters reported that Iraq has signed an agreement with Iran to import electricity for 

427 IOM, Demographic Survey Kurdistan Region of Iraq, July 2018, url, p. 34 
428 IOM, Demographic Survey Kurdistan Region of Iraq, July 2018, url, p. 35 
429 Open Democracy, Corruption corrodes Kurdish education, 15 October 2018, url  
430 Iraq, Ministry of Planning, National Development Plan 2018-2022, June 2018, url, p. 158 
431 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview: Iraq, November 2019, url, p. 57 
432 IOM, Reasons to Remain – Categorizing Protracted Displacement in Iraq, November 2018, url, p. 13 
433 UNOCHA, Iraq: 2018 Humanitarian Response Plan, 14 February 2018, url, p. 5 
434 UNOCHA, Iraq: Humanitarian Needs Overview - November 2018, 16 December 2018, url, pp. 6, 37 
435 UNICEF, 2020 Internal Displacement Crisis Humanitarian Situation Report, 23 April 2020, available at: url, p. 3 
436 World Bank (The), Iraq Economic Monitor, From War to Reconstruction and Economic Recovery, 2018, url, p. 6 
437 IOM, Integrated Location Assessment Part III, 2 January 2019, url, p. 30 

 
 
                                                           
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two  years  (2020  and  2021).438  However,  due  to  the  US  sanctions  on  Iran,  the  Iraqi  government  is 
envisaging to switch to the Gulf Countries for energy supply. According to Al-Mada, 80 % of the project 
to link Iraq’s electricity grids to the Gulf Cooperation Council grid has been finalised.439 Kurdistan 24, 
citing AFP, stated that this agreement ‘was hailed as a “landmark deal” and is planned to provide 500 
megawatts of electricity to Iraq’s “overstretched grid by 2020”’.440 

IOM remarked that nationally, ‘the most inefficient [infrastructure and services] sectors appeared to 
be sewerage and waste management/disposal, which existed but were only functioning in locations 
where around 10 % of returnees and 40 % of IDPs lived. While these services were mostly present in 
the  KRI,  the  main  problem  in  the  north-central  governorates  seemed  to  be  the  absence  of  both 
services, whereas malfunctioning was reported in the south.’441  

Large parts of the Iraqi population were not connected to sewer systems.442 The conflict with ISIL has 
impacted the state of critical infrastructure in Iraq, particularly in areas that were difficult to reach, 
and in recently retaken areas from ISIL, greater damage to water infrastructure was affecting non-
displaced  populations.443  UNOCHA  reported  that  1.4 million  people,  including  IDPs  from  Ninawa, 
Kirkuk, Salah al-Din, and Anbar, who lived in 33 camps, were in need of water and sanitation support 
and access due to inadequate facilities and sanitation coverage.444  

2.7.2 Baghdad 

A map published by WFP showed that Baghdad governorate had 334-1022 informal settlements.445 
Based on estimates for 2017, the National Development Plan 2018-2022 indicated the existence of 
1 022 informal settlements and 136 689 informal housing units in Baghdad province.446 

Regarding water and sanitation, the WFP Socio-economic Atlas stated that 70 % of the households in 
Baghdad had continuous availability of drinking water while 30 % had irregular availability. Moreover, 
91 % obtained drinking water from the general network while 9 % relied on bottled water.447 The CSO 
stated that 86.9 % of Baghdad inhabitants were served with drinking water networks in 2017.448 The 
National Development Plan 2018-2022 indicated a deficit of 35 % in drinking water demand coverage 
in Baghdad outskirts.449 

The  National  Development  Plan  also  stated  that  the  sewer  system  in  Baghdad  was  old  and  ‘has 
exceeded its design life’, and that it suffered from various problems especially in the rain season.450 
The WFP Atlas observed that 52 % of toilets were with siphon and 48 % without.451 The CSO indicated 
that in 2017, 75.9 % of Baghdad inhabitants were served with a sewer system.452 

438 Reuters, Iran signs two-year contract with Iraq to export electricity: IRNA, 4 June 2020, url 
439 Al-Mada, ةيجيلخلا لقنلا طوطخ نم % 80 لامكإ نلعت ءابرهكلا [Electricity Department announces that 80 % of the GCC lines have 
been finalised], 26 June 2020, url 
440 Kurdistan 24, US hails Gulf Arab plan to supply electricity to Iraq, 17 July 2020, url 
441 IOM, Integrated Location Assessment Part III, 2 January 2019, url, p. 28 
442 BTI, Iraq Country Report, 2018 url, p. 8 
443 REACH, Iraq, Multi-Cluster Needs Assessment (MCNA), December 2017, url, p. 4 
444 UNOCHA, Iraq: Humanitarian Needs Overview - November 2018, 16 December 2018, url, p. 37 
445 WFP, Iraq Socio-economic Atlas, 2019, url, p. 46 
446 Iraq, Ministry of Planning, National Development Plan 2018-2022, June 2018, url, p. 158 
447 WFP, Iraq Socio-economic Atlas, 2019, url, p. 101 
448 Iraq, CSO, 2018 دادغب  ي
449 Iraq, Ministry of Planning, National Development Plan 2018-2022, June 2018, url, p. 161 
450 Iraq, Ministry of Planning, National Development Plan 2018-2022, June 2018, url, p. 163 
451 WFP, Iraq Socio-economic Atlas, 2019, url, p. 101 
452 Iraq, CSO, 2018 دادغب  ي

 ئاصحلاا زجوملا [Statistical Summary Baghdad 2018], n. d., url 

 ئاصحلاا زجوملا [Statistical Summary Baghdad 2018],n. d., url 

 
                                                           
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IOM  stated  that  overall,  infrastructure  in  Baghdad  appeared  to  be  mostly  functioning.453  Power 
outages  were  however  commonplace.454  The  damage  to  the  housing  stock  in  the  governorate  of 
Baghdad was estimated to amount to IQD 337.5 billion (EUR 251.2 million).455 Significant residential 
damage was mainly reported in Abu Ghraib (3 %) and Mahmoudiya (7 %) areas.456 

The large inflow of IDPs and migrants to urban areas has put notable pressure on the housing market 
in Baghdad.457 According to a 2018 academic study, an estimated 187 000 housing units in Baghdad 
(around 31 % of the capital housing stock) were inappropriate. The housing shortage, along with lack 
of construction materials and scarce serviced urban lands, were the main reasons for an increase of 
housing costs.458 Housing prices in Baghdad varied depending on the area, with prices being lower 
outside the centre. IOM reported that an unfurnished house in suburban Baghdad of 200m2 could rent 
for USD 100-300 [EUR 87-263], while inside Baghdad a house of that size would cost USD 750-1000 
[EUR 658-877].459   

In terms of living costs in Iraq, IOM stated that on average a family would spend monthly: USD 13 
[EUR 11] on gas, USD 9-22 [EUR 8-19] on water, USD 22-30 [EUR 19-26] on public electricity, and the 
same on private or community generators.460 

2.7.3 Basra 

A  WFP  map  showed  that  the  governorate  of  Basra  had  the  same  rate  of  informal  settlements  as 
Baghdad, i.e. 334-1022.461 The National Development Plan 2018-2022 indicated the existence of 677 
informal settlements and 62 602 informal housing units in Basra province.462  

In a report published on 22 July 2019, Human Rights Watch stated that Iraqi authorities ‘have failed 
to properly manage and regulate Iraq’s water sources, depriving the people in Iraq’s southern Basra 
governorate … of their right to safe drinking water’. According to the report, Basra’s main water source 
was the Shatt Al-Arab River with its fresh water canals. Human Rights Watch also observed that over 
300 000 residents in the Basra governorate were not connected to the water and sewage network, 
which  led  them  to  ‘contaminate  groundwater with raw sewage  and  to  illegally tap  into  the  piping 
network  to  access  water,  exposing  the  systems  to  wastage  and  revenue  loss,  decreased  water 
pressure, and potential contamination.’ Moreover, public water plants in Basra were not equipped 
with  the  technology  required  ‘to  remove  dissolved  constituents  from  seawater  intrusion  from  the 
Shatt Al-Arab, which render chlorine less effective in removing harmful substances’. Finally, salinity 
and other problems related to water quality have impacted agriculture, raising livestock and fisheries 
in the governorate.463 The CSO stated that 90 % of Basra inhabitants were served with drinking water 
networks in 2017.464 Concerning water coverage, the National Development Plan 2018-2022 indicated 

453 IOM, Iraq Displacement Tracking Matrix, Integrated Location Assessment II, Governorate Profiles, October 2017, url, p. 
10 
454 Reuters, As Baghdad life improves, some still seek refuge in its past, url  
455 World Bank, Iraq reconstruction & investment part 2 Damage and Needs Assessment of Affected Governorates, January 
2018, url, p. 16 
456 IOM, Iraq Displacement Tracking Matrix, Integrated Location Assessment II, Governorate Profiles, October 2017, url, p. 6 
457 World Bank, Iraq - Systematic Country Diagnostic, 3 February 2017, url, p. 44 
458 Al-Hafith, Omar, B.K. Satish (et al.), A systematic assessment of architectural approaches for solving the housing problem 
in Iraq, in: Frontiers of Architectural Research, July 2018, url, p. 2  
459 IOM, Information on Return and Reintegration in Iraq, December 2015, url, pp. 7-8 
460 IOM, Information on Return and Reintegration in Iraq, December 2015, url, p. 5 
461 WFP, Iraq Socio-economic Atlas, 2019, url,  p. 46 
462 Iraq, Ministry of Planning, National Development Plan 2018-2022, June 2018, url, p. 158 
463 HRW, Basra is Thirsty: Iraq’s Failure to Manage the Water Crisis, 22 July 2019, url 
464 Iraq, CSO, 2018 ةصربلا  ي

 ئاصحلاا زجوملا [Statistical Summary Basra 2018], n. d., url  

 
 
                                                           
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a deficit of 26 % in drinking water demand coverage in Basra province.465 The CSO indicated that in 
2017, only 34.1 % of Basra inhabitants were served with a sewer system466. 

Regarding electricity, the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington (AGSIW) observed that high tension 
lines were damaged during the years of conflict, and that although the damage was concentrated in 
the  north,  ‘it  affected  the  whole  country,  including  the  southern  oil  province  of  Basra’  as  all 
governorates were interconnected by the national grid.467 According to an article published by Meed, 
a source for business intelligence and economic analysis, on 12 June 2020, Iraq imported 1 200 MW 
of electricity from Iran in average. Moreover, the source stated that an independent power project 
near Basra (i.e. Rumaila power plant) was underway, and that the second phase ‘has come online’. 
Reportedly, the project will produce 3 000 MW.468 

On 26 November 2019, Al-Monitor reported on ‘deadly protests’ in Basra, where several people were 
killed.469  On  3  October  2019,  BBC  reported  that  in  Basra,  people  protested over power shortages, 
unsafe drinking water, corruption and unemployment for weeks.470 On 24 November 2019, Euronews 
reported that Basra ‘has seen weeks of protests against poor quality of services, especially chronic 
shortages  of  clean  water  and  acute  power  shortages,  leaving  residents  with  only  a  few  hours  of 
electricity per day.’471 

2.7.4 Erbil 

IOM 2018 data showed that ‘nearly all families in Erbil governorate live in proper housing, such as an 
entire house occupied by a single household (92.1 %); a house shared by more than one household 
(6.3 %); or an apartment/flat (1.4 %).’472 Erbil governorate’s rate of urbanisation was estimated to be 
over 80 %  as result  of the influx  of economic migrants  and IDPs.473  IOM  assessed in 2017 that the 
infrastructure was mostly functioning in all districts.474 

According to the demographic survey of the KRI conducted by IOM in 2018 ‘access to the electricity 
grid in the KRI is universal but supply is limited and households have an average supply of 17 hours 
per day.’475 In Erbil governorate the average number of hours per day of public electricity supply was 
15.6.476 

 ئاصحلاا زجوملا [Statistical Summary Basra 2018], n. d., url  

465 Iraq, Ministry of Planning, National Development Plan 2018-2022, June 2018, url, p. 161 
466 Iraq, CSO, 2018 ةصربلا  ي
467 AGSIW, Iraq’s Electricity Challenges Mount as Oil Revenue Slows to a Trickle, 15 May 2020, url 
468 Meed, The 3,000MW Rumaila plant is being developed as an independent power project, Power Technology, 12 June 
2020, url 
469 Al-Monitor, Protests spread in oil-rich Basra as death toll rises, 26 November 2019, url 
470 BBC, Iraq protests: Curfew imposed in Baghdad amid widespread unrest, 3 October 2019, url 
471 Euronews, Iraq protests: Basra streets fill with black smoke, burning tyres, 24 November 2019, url 
472 IOM, Demographic Survey Kurdistan Region of Iraq, July 2018, url, p. 48 
473 IOM, Demographic Survey Kurdistan Region of Iraq, July 2018, url, p. 14 
474 IOM, Integrated Location Assessment Part II – Governorate Profiles, October 2017, url,  p. 14 
475 IOM, Demographic Survey Kurdistan Region of Iraq, July 2018, url, p. 50 
476 IOM, Demographic Survey Kurdistan Region of Iraq, July 2018, url, p. 50 

 
 
 
                                                           
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—  61  

Annex 1: Bibliography 

Oral Sources: 

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19 October 2018 

Public Sources: 

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Al-Hafith, Omar, B.K. Satish, A., Bradbury, S., De Wilde, P., systematic assessment of architectural 
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ةيجيلخلا لقنلا طوطخ نم %

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 لامكإ نلعت ءابرهكلا

80 

 [Electricity Department announces that 80 % 

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 ىلا

22 

34 

دلابلا يف ةئملاب

 نم رقفلا ةبسن ةدايز نلعت لمعلا

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—  67  

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Annex 2: Terms of Reference 

Reference period: January 2019 to 6 July 2020. 

1. General overview 

This  report  will  include  two main  sections:  one  providing  a  general overview,  and  one  providing  a 
description of the situation in each of the three cities Bagdad, Basra and Erbil by a set of indicators. 

The general overview will include separate chapters on IDPs/returnees, women children, and single 
persons.  

The chapter on IDPs/returnees will focus on housing and living conditions, access to education, health 
care and employment, and on obtaining lost ID documents (current arrangements and regulations in 
place, state of issuing offices in areas recaptured from ISIL). 

The chapter on women will focus on employment, working conditions, access to health care, access 
to education/dropout rates, and freedom of movement for women. 

The  chapter  on  the  situation  for  children  will  focus  on  child  labour  (legislation,  statistics, 
underreporting, prevalence in IDP/returnee communities, underage recruitment and/or use by armed 
actors (such as the PMUs). 

The chapter on networks of support for single persons will cover both men and women. It will focus 
on family and community networks, political and patronage networks, and wasta. The importance of 
networks  for  security  will  be  covered,  as  well  as  the  prevalence  of  organizations/arrangements 
providing support to persons without network. 

2. Baghdad, Basra and Erbil, by indicator. Focus on the situation inside each city.   

In this chapter, the following indicators will be applied: Economy, employment, poverty, food security, 
health care, education, and housing and living conditions.  

There will be separate paragraphs for each of the three cities under each of the indicators, covering 
the reference period. 

 
 
 
 
 
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                                                          doi: 10.2847/63636 

doi: