Disruption by technologies : impacts on politics, economics and society : in-depth analysis.
Date: 2020-09-24
Institutions: Directorate-General for Parliamentary Research Services
Subjects: European defence policy, coronavirus disease, cultural identity, democracy, digital technology, economic consequence, economic model, economic policy, information, international relations, judicial power, regulation (EU), social impact, standard, technological change

Disruption by 
technology 
Impacts on politics, 
economics and 
society 

IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS 

EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service 

Authors: Philip Boucher, Naja Bentzen, Tania Lațici, Tambiama Madiega,  
Leopold Schmertzing and Marcin Szczepański 

EN 

PE 652.079 – September 2020 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AUTHORS 

Philip Boucher, Scientific Foresight Unit (STOA), Naja Bentzen, Tania Lațici and Tambiama Madiega, Members' 
Research  Service,  Leopold  Schmertzing,  Global  Trends  Unit,  and  Marcin  Szczepański,  Members'  Research 
Service. 

Graphics by Samy Chahri, EPRS 

This paper has been drawn up by policy analysts from the Directorates for the Members' Research Service, 
Impact  Assessment  and  European  Added  Value  and  the  Library  and  Knowledge  Services  within  the 
Directorate-General for Parliamentary Research Services (EPRS) of the Secretariat of the European Parliament. 

To contact the authors, please e-mail eprs@ep.europa.eu 

LINGUISTIC VERSIONS 

Original: EN 

Translations: DE, FR 

Manuscript completed in July 2020.  

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Reproduction  and  translation  for  non-commercial  purposes  are  authorised,  provided  the  source  is 
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Brussels © European Union, 2020. 

PE 652.079 
ISBN 978-92-846-6958-5 
doi:10.2861/718464 
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Disruption by technology 

Executive summary 

Rapid and dramatic change 
Disruption is a specific form of change which occurs relatively quickly or dramatically. Technology 
has long been seen as a source of disruption to our lives, communities and civilisations, provoking 
disruptive  change  at  all  scales,  from  individuals'  routine  daily  activities  to  dramatic  competition 
between global superpowers. This disruption can have both positive and negative effects, although 
they are often unevenly distributed across different groups.  

In  the  current  wave  of  data-driven  internet  technologies,  the  disruptive  force  of  innovation  has 
become a central feature of many firms' business models. However, the key disruptive force of 2020, 
the coronavirus pandemic, is non-technological. In this context, technologies have been deployed 
as an antidote to disruption, not least in enabling some social and economic activities to continue 
while maintaining physical distance. 

Disruption by technology 
Technology  development  disrupts  the  economic  system  by  creating  (and  destroying)  certain 
business models, supply chains and patterns of employment. In defence, technological innovation 
has  a  disruptive  effect  on  all  aspects  of  military  activity,  from  logistics  and  training  to  strategic 
decision-making and physical combat.  

Democratic debates have been disrupted by technology developments such as social media. Many 
of  these  online  platforms  benefit  from  emotional,  polarising  content  and  sometimes  promote 
disinformation that can increase rifts in society and undermine democratic processes, whereas facts 
and  information  rarely  go  viral.  Social  norms,  values  and  identities  have  also  been  disrupted  by 
technologies,  affecting  our  most  profound  understanding  of  ourselves,  our  activities  and 
relationships with others.  

Disruption to international relations has also been attributed to technology development, adjusting 
the global balance of power, and even transforming the international system itself. In response to 
these disruptions, laws and regulations are changing towards a more flexible approach to policy-
making, with the emergence of smart regulatory tools. 

Converging disruptions 
Disruptions  in  these  different  domains  converge,  along  with  other  disruptive  forces  such  as  the 
coronavirus, to propel other phenomena such as extended state and commercial surveillance. 

Often, technology disruption can provoke the same kind of tensions at different scales. For example, 
access to information that informs citizens' voting and purchasing decisions is unevenly distributed, 
in the same way as it is for company directors and world leaders making strategic choices. Likewise, 
households,  small  businesses,  large  multinationals  and  nation  states  all  need  to  find  a  means  of 
working together with digital tools to make good decisions while maintaining their autonomy. 

It  is  not  clear  where  these  tensions  will  lead  us,  but  our  path  in  this  increasingly  technology-
dependent world will be decided to a great extent by the social, political, and economic choices we 
make now. 

I 

 
 
 
EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service 

Contents 

Executive summary  ______________________________________________________________ I 

1. Introduction  _________________________________________________________________  1 

2. Disrupting economies  _________________________________________________________  2 

3. Disrupting defence ____________________________________________________________  5 

4. Disrupting democratic debates __________________________________________________  8 

5. Disrupting social norms, values and identities _____________________________________ 11 

6. Disrupting international relations _______________________________________________ 14 

7. Disrupting laws and regulations  ________________________________________________ 17 

8. Converging disruptions: The case of surveillance ___________________________________ 20 

9. Concluding remarks __________________________________________________________ 23 

II 

 
 
 
 
Disruption by technology 

1. Introduction 

Technology development has long been considered as a disruptive force, provoking change at all 
scales,  from  individuals'  mundane  daily  activities  to  dramatic  competition  between  global 
superpowers. But what do we mean by disruption, and what is disruptive about technology? 

First, consider disruption. We can understand it as a specific form of change that occurs relatively 
quickly or dramatically, but it also implies that the change is provoked by an external stimulus, rather 
than from within. Sometimes this stimulus is natural, such as an earthquake, while other times it is 
social,  as  in  political  revolutions.  While  disruption  can  have  negative  connotations,  its  effects 
depend on the perspective. Moments of dramatic change present challenges and opportunities, but 
their impacts are unevenly distributed across the different groups affected.  

Next, consider technology. While technologies can appear as an external force, they are also deeply 
social, in the sense that an important part of their existence depends upon human activity. Without 
a sitter, the chair is reduced to simple pieces of wood. It only becomes a chair by its being for sitting 
on.  In  this  sense,  technological  artefacts  only  exist  as  such  through  their  use  by  people.1  Since 
technologies  can  only  disrupt  through  human  activities,  technological  disruptions  are  more  like 
revolutions than earthquakes.  

Indeed,  technology  developments  are  frequently  described  as  revolutionary.  From  fragile  but 
lucrative porcelain to crude but deadly gunpowder, from the printing press that invented public 
opinion  to  the  TV  that  some  say  made  people  'bowl  alone',  new  technologies  have  regularly 
changed  the  course  of  lives,  communities  and  civilisations.  In  the  current  wave  of  data-driven 
internet technology, its disruptive force is a central feature of the business model. This is perhaps 
exemplified by the 'move fast and break things' motto, initially adopted by Facebook but coming to 
symbolise the willingness – and even determination – of Silicon Valley firms to disrupt what they 
see  as  antiquated  social  norms,  political  ideas  and  economic  models,  often  with  a  'better  ask 
forgiveness than permission' approach to legal compliance.2 

The  key disruptive  force of  2020 is  non-technological:  Covid-19. The  pandemic  may  be  a  natural 
disruption in the sense that it is a biological phenomenon, but it was certainly enabled by human 
activities  including  global  trade  and  long-distance  travel.  The  response  to  the  virus  is  deeply 
technological, including the search for treatments and vaccines, the development of contact tracing 
apps,  and  the  widespread  shift  to  working  from  home  and  socialising  at  distance  via  internet 
communications.  In  this  context,  technologies  are  positioned  as  an  antidote  to  disruption.  If, 
however,  these  technologies  succeed  in  disrupting  coronavirus  and  re-establishing  normality, 
society could emerge as even more deeply dependent on technologies. 

It is in this context that this report examines how technologies can be disruptive. Each chapter is 
dedicated to the disruption of a different domain: the economic system; the military and defence; 
democratic debates and the 'infosphere'; social norms, values and identities; international relations; 
and the legal and regulatory system. Subsequently, surveillance is presented as an example of how 
technological disruptions across domains can converge to propel other phenomena. Reflections on 
technology disruption in the context of Covid-19 are embedded throughout all sections. 

1  

2  

The social construction of technologies is further explained in P. Boucher What if all technologies were inherently 
social?, EPRS, European Parliament, 2018. 

P. Nemitz, Constitutional democracy and technology in the age of artificial intelligence, Philosophical Transactions of 
the Royal Society, 2018. 

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EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service 

2. Disrupting economies 

Technology  is  often  a  factor  in  rapid  changes  to  the  economy,  including 
established models, value chains and job markets. These changes are likely to 
be  even  more  dynamic  in  the  future  as  workers  and  organisations  from  all 
economic  sectors  are  faced  with  a  multitude  of  new  technologies  which 
generate both opportunities and challenges. Indeed, many argue that digital 
transformation is a modern form of creative destruction, irreversibly changing 
economies and jobs. 

Business models and value chains 

Technology shifts can challenge even the most 
successful  business  models.  The  difficulty  of 
swapping one core technology for another has 
been demonstrated. By some estimates, only a 
quarter  of  efforts  to  find  growth  beyond  core 
business  succeed.  Amazon  is  an  example  of 
successful  entrance  on  new  markets  with  its 
storage  (cloud)  and  IT  services.  The  difficulty 
arises  because  incumbent  firms  focus  their 
resources  on  their  existing  customer  base  at 
the  expense  of  developing  and  applying  new 
technologies  that  appear  from  their  vantage 
point  to  be  less  profitable.  The  bankruptcy  of 
Kodak  with  the  arrival  of  digital  cameras 
illustrates  how  technology  as  a  source  of 
competitive  advantage  can  morph 
into  a 
serious burden. 

Nokia and Apple 
In  2007,  when  Apple  entered  the  mobile 
phone market, Nokia held a 50 % market share. 
By  2019,  Apple  had  a  20 %  share  with  its 
relatively  high  price  iPhones,  and  Nokia  just 
1 %.  Nokia's  market  value  dropped  from 
US$150  to  US$15 billion  between  2007  and 
2019,  while  Apple's 
from 
US$110 billion to US$1.4 trillion. Many experts 
suggest  Nokia's  key  mistake  was  to  focus  on 
hardware  (mobile  phones)  while  overlooking 
software (operating systems and apps). Apple, 
on  the  other  hand,  saw  smartphones  as  an 
entirely  new  product  category  with  huge 
potential 
for  value  creation  beyond  the 
purchase of the device.  

skyrocketed 

It  is  difficult  for  mature  companies  to  change  their  core  business,  since  they  need  to  identify  in 
advance  the  causes  of  possible  failure  (including  potential  technological  disruption)  and  the 
strategies for maintaining success.3 New firms based on emerging technologies can improve their 
offer faster  and  gain  a massive  global  value  base,  challenging  the incumbents.  Digitalisation,  for 
example,  was  based  upon  using  technology  to  boost  the  productivity  of  skills  and  capital  and 
accompanied by the rise of intangible assets such as intellectual property, software and algorithms. 
Illustrating  the  scale  of  the  transition  it  caused,  the  world's  largest  companies  in  2008  were 
characterised by ownership of fixed capital assets, but as the intangible economy took over, by 2018, 
the five biggest global firms were technology-based. 

Technological  disruption  has  been  identified  as  an  external  factor  that  pressures  innovation  of 
existing  business  models  and  value  chains.4  While  many  innovations  are  incremental,  some  can 
dramatically  change  price  and  performance.  For  example,  the  internet  enabled  the  gradual 
emergence of the platform economy, which in turn dramatically disrupted the traditional economic 
landscape by transforming established business processes, consumer behaviour and value creation, 
as  well  as  the  structure  of  many  industries.  These  companies  developed  and  implemented  a 

3   One approach is to set up autonomous units with the freedom to explore new opportunities.  
4  

J.  Lee,  T.  Suh,  D.  Roy,  M.  Baucus,  Emerging  Technology  and  Business  Model  Innovation:  The  Case  of  Artificial 
Intelligence, Journal of Open Innovation, Technology Market and Complexity, 2019. 

2 

 
 
Disruption by technology 

supply 

breakthrough  in  digital  business  models, 
based on leveraging the power of software 
and ubiquitous connectedness.  

Evolving supply chains  
First  identified  in  the  'global  factory'  of  China, 
Covid-19  and  its  associated  confinement  policies 
have disrupted global supply chains. The crisis has 
focused attention on supply risk management and 
chain  dependence  on  China. 
the 
Globalisation,  lean  business  models  and  'just-in-
time'  production  also  expose  supply  chains  to 
external,  uncontrollable  shocks.  Furthermore, 
rising  wages  in  China  reduce  the  efficiency  of 
global  supply  chains.  Possible  solutions  include 
reshoring and tightening the chains (nearshoring). 
While  this  was  generally  considered  too  costly, 
robotics  and  automation  render  it  increasingly 
accessible. One long-lasting effect of the crisis may 
be the development of risk management practices 
based on technology and digital infrastructure that 
can  prevent  future  crises  from  having  the  same 
devastating effect. 

Disruptive technologies are often seen as 
enabling  simpler,  more  convenient  and 
affordable  products  and  services,  new 
value propositions, lower costs and lower 
profit  margins,  and  the  creation  of  new 
business structures.5 These characteristics 
can  be  seen  when  comparing  platform 
traditional 
businesses 
counterparts  (e.g.  Amazon  vs  high-street 
shops,  Airbnb  vs  hotels, or  Uber  vs  taxis). 
Disruptive  technologies  can  also  create 
new  markets  (e.g.  cryptocurrencies),  lead 
to  the  failure  of  dominant  firms  (e.g. 
Blockbuster)  and  generate  significant 
(e.g.  Google 
competitive  advantages 
search  engine).6  While  traditional  models 
were  based  on  controlling  tangible/fixed 
assets  along  a  vertical  value  chain,  platforms  use  artificial  intelligence  (AI)  and  big  data  to 
orchestrate knowledge obtained from third-parties (users) and capture its value.7  

their 

to 

As  well  as  creating  novel  value  chains,  technology  is  also  transforming  many  traditional  ones. 
Industrial  value  chains  are  increasingly  decentralised  and  globalised.  Firstly,  digital  technologies 
allow critical phases of production such as product design, engineering and manufacturing, to take 
place in different locations, enable supply chains to span across continents, and allow supervision 
of  the  international  movement  of  production  components,  goods,  workers  and  investments. 
Secondly,  digital  technology,  internet  and  production  are  increasingly  merged  into  one  cyber-
physical system covering manufacturing, servicing, customisation, and even energy management. 
This phenomenon is still at an early stage, but will be stronger in the future.  

Job markets 
Automation  –  either  replacing  humans  with  machines  or  using  machines  to  perform  previously 
impossible  tasks  –  creates  major  disruptions  on  job  markets.  From  2013  to  2018,  installations  of 
industrial robots increased by 19 % per year. Europe is already the second largest market for robot 
workers, and half of the top 10 countries for robots per worker are EU Member States. Meanwhile, 
AI broadens the range of tasks that can be automated. 

5   A. Cozzolino, G. Verona, F.T. Rothermael, Unpacking the Disruption Process: New Technology, Business Models, and 
Incumbent Adaptation, Journal of Management Studies 55:7, 2018. See how the technology-empowered use of data 
creates strong competitive advantages for platforms in M. Szczepański, Is data the new oil? Competition issues in the 
digital economy, EPRS, European Parliament, 2020.  

6   G. Sordi Schiavi, A. Behr, Emerging technologies and new business models: a review on disruptive business models, 

Information and Management Review, 2018.  

7  

See  how  the  technology-empowered  use  of  data  creates  strong  competitive  advantages  for  platforms  in  M. 
Szczepański, Is data the new oil? Competition issues in the digital economy, EPRS, European Parliament, 2020. 

3 

 
 
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to  concentrate  on 

The impact of automation on unemployment can be fluid and nuanced. Job losses can be offset as 
the  workforce  adapts  and  new  jobs  are  created.  Higher  productivity  and  lower  prices  can  also 
increase  salaries  and  consumer  demand,  boosting  employment  in  other  industries.  Current 
disruptive  technologies  such  as  AI,  big 
data  or  the  internet  of  things  (IoT)  also 
create entirely new jobs and, by this logic, 
this  wave  of  automation  will  have  similar 
to  previous  waves. 
'rebound'  effects 
However, insufficient jobs may be created 
for displaced workers without appropriate 
skills.  Education  and  training  (which  may 
positively or negatively influence the level 
of  technical  and  digital  preparedness  of 
society)  and  the  overall  mix  of  sectors 
(receiving positive and negative spill over 
effects from automation) will play key roles 
in how the future plays out.8  

Covid-19 and employment  
The  most  severe  impact  of  the  Covid-19  crisis  is 
the  already  most 
likely 
vulnerable  segments  of  the  working  population. 
Many lower-income workers cannot do their work 
from home, but at the same time are not allowed to 
return to work. This also applies to those working in 
gig  economy.  While  lockdown  measures  have 
increased  our  reliance  on  some  of  them,  such  as 
delivery couriers, others experienced an abrupt end 
to demand for their services and far weaker social 
protection  than  other  employees.  Furthermore,  if 
individuals in the first group fall sick in the course 
of  their  work  or  need  to  quarantine,  they  rarely 
receive sick pay. The crisis has therefore confirmed 
the  vulnerability  of  platform  workers  due  to 
inadequate  social  protection.  A  situation  the  EU 
had already highlighted before the crisis.  
The  pandemic  has  also  led  to  an  unprecedented 
'experiment', as working from home becomes the 
'new  normal'  for  many,  raising  questions  about 
work-life  balance  and  data  security.  While  the 
longer-term  effects  are  still  unknown,  it  seems 
likely  that  teleworking  will  be  more  widely  used 
from now. 

Many  future  workers  are  likely  to  be 
increasingly  dependent  on  atypical  work 
contracts,  and  will  need  to  retrain  and 
reskill  to  keep  up  with  the  pace  of 
technological change. This may be difficult 
and costly for many, particularly the most 
vulnerable  to  job  losses.  Technological 
disruption  can  also  have  uneven  impacts 
on workers, depending on their skills and 
occupations.  These  effects  may  also  vary 
across  countries  and  regions.  The  rise  of 
the gig economy already poses questions about workers' wellbeing and social protection, including 
pensions, insurance, and maternity leave among other things. Disruptive technologies might lead 
to job polarisation, as jobs at different skill levels are affected differently. Since technological change 
is  skill-biased,  it  leads  to  a  process  in  which  the  disruption  predominantly  benefits  workers  with 
higher skills. In parallel, those employed by the undisputed beneficiaries of technological disruption 
are  enjoying  better  employment  quality  and  rewards  than  those  in  sectors  which  struggle  with 
keeping up with the digitalisation. Left unmitigated, the skills-bias and the strong concentration of 
profits and financial means could exacerbate existing income and wealth inequalities. However, the 
undesirable  effects  could  be  mediated  by  some  market  forces  such  as  labour  costs  and  the 
profitability  of  investment  in  labour-replacing  technologies.  Consumer  choices  and  social 
preferences regarding labour market regulations and ethical standards could also play a role, as well 
as institutional norms and regulations and the role of trade unions.9  

8  

See for example D. Kleinert, E. Fernández-Macías, J-I. Antón, Don't blame it on the machines: Robots and employment 
in Europe, CEPR Policy Portal, 2020 and B. Vermeulen, J. Kesselhut, A. Pyka, P.P. Saviotti, The Impact of Automation on 
Employment: Just the Usual Structural Change?, Sustainability, MDPI, Open Access Journal, 2018. 

9   OECD, Employment Outlook 2019: The future of work, 2019.  

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Disruption by technology 

3. Disrupting defence  

Having an edge in technological innovation and industrial ability is generally 
associated with an international leadership position.10 While the EU has just 
begun to speak of technological sovereignty, the United States of America is 
ever more outspoken about maintaining military supremacy, as is China about 
achieving military modernisation. Intelligent systems are disrupting defence 
as  thoroughly  as  communications  systems  did  in  the  past.  As  technological 
superiority  once  again  becomes  entangled  in  geopolitics,  this  section  illustrates  how  innovation 
disrupts the full spectrum of defence, and is structured around the DOTMLPF-I concept: doctrine, 
organisation, training, material, leadership, personnel, facilities and interoperability.11 

Doctrine: Automation meets strategy 
Military strategy and doctrine formulation are increasingly disrupted by AI-enabled technologies, 
which speed up automation systems and processes. Intelligent systems are already used to inform 
strategists  through  long-term  forecasting  and  rapid  analyses.  The  'deus  ex  machina'  concept  – 
whereby  conflict  could  be  ended  through  unmatched  and  highly  destructive  technological 
superiority  –  is  a  perennial  dilemma  in  defence  innovation.  Just  like  the  belligerents'  search  for 
technological breakthroughs in the Second World War culminated with the atomic bomb, present 
and future strategy-making has to undertake even more complex risk assessments with regards to 
developments  such  as  hypersonic  weapons.10  Deeper  reflections  about  the  role  of  technological 
innovation in global power projection are increasingly required when designing strategic priorities 
and, particularly, red lines.12 This includes accounting for possible asymmetries in accessing key and 
dual-use technologies.13 Strategists have the double task of adapting to the disruptions in their own 
work while reflecting about the impact on and future role of new technologies in policy objectives.  

Organisation: Modern bureaucracies 
Defence  institutions  are  built  on  precise  structures  and  strict  chains  of  command,  which  could 
inhibit innovation. Institutions with flexible structures, reduced red tape and narrower hierarchies 
could  facilitate  doctrine  to  respond  to  disruptive  innovation.  Institutions  themselves  are  already 
experiencing  disruptions  to  their  administration,  communications,  recruitment, 
financial 
management and security as a result of AI-enabled predictive technologies. While this trend could 
lead to increased efficiency and speed, it could also lead to a reshaping of the military workforce. 
Science fiction novel Drone State imagined this in the form of an AI supercomputer threatening the 
jobs of human police intelligence analysts in a futuristic Europol. 

Training: Virtual battlefields 
Military training and exercises already use technologies to better simulate theatres of operation, and 
to  train  for  scenarios  in  which  technologies  are  deployed  offensively  by  adversaries.  Virtual  and 
augmented  reality  simulations,  for  example,  provide  a  safer,  cheaper  and  less  environmentally 
damaging  alternative  to  traditional  training  in  the  field.  Uniformed  officers  and  policy  planners 
could  increasingly  benefit  from  more  realistic  learning  experiences  through  AI-enabled  training 
platforms which 'accurately mimic the actions of individual adversaries' but also adapt to different 
user  responses.14  New  applications  can  also  offer  tailored  learning  experiences  by  adjusting 

Initially used as DOTMLPF by the US military, the interoperability element was added by NATO.  

10   R. Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World, Penguin Books, 2006. 
11  
12   Red lines could include moral and ethical considerations, emphasising human-centric technological developments. 
13   F. Gaub, Global Trends to 2030, ESPAS Report, 2019. 
14   D. Fiott, G. Lindstrom, Artificial Intelligence: what implications for EU security and defence?, EUISS, December 2018. 

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teaching styles to a student's own progress and goals. In turn, personnel training also increasingly 
focuses on using, deploying, maintaining, repairing, and teaming up with smart applications.  

Material: Smart weapons 
From  weapons  systems  to  high-tech  wearables,  modern  armies  have  higher  demands  for  digital 
gear.  Defence  industries  are  prioritising  the  development  of  such  equipment  while  investing  in 
moonshot programmes to develop game-changing breakthrough technologies such as quantum 
computing.15  This  invites  the  question,  is  industry  developing  technologies  to  meet  military 
demand, or is the military pressured to procure the latest technologies available on the market?16 
Defence institutions are increasingly compelled towards public-private partnerships to access new 
technologies, largely developed in the private sector.17 Supply chain security and dependence on 
foreign  sources  for  strategic  equipment  is  already  a  politically  sensitive  topic,  intensified  by  the 
Covid-19  crisis.  Acquisition  of  dual-use  technology,  e.g.  3D  printing,  cognitive  computing, 
hypersonic  weapons,  high-energy 
technology  and  human  enhancement 
biotechnology could be increasingly used as a bargaining chip in the competition between powers. 

lasers,  space 

Leadership: Hypercommand for hyperwar 
Dynamic and complex situations demand faster and better informed decision-making processes. 
Officers at all levels of command are empowered with technological support that is bound to disrupt 
traditional working methods. For example, AI-enabled analytical tools collect immense amounts of 
data from various sources, process it, and translate their findings into a format that human operators 
can make use of. Such tools can perform forecasting based on historical data analysis and generate 
live simulations of various crisis scenarios. As operational environments, whether physical terrains, 
cyberspace or outer space, are bound to become more dynamic and critical decisions might need 
to  be  made  within  fractions  of  a  second,18  human  decision-making  capabilities  could  be 
overwhelmed  without  support  from  automated  advisers,  which  can  quickly  make  sense  of  live 
sensors and imagery transmissions from a chaotic battlefield.  

Military technologies endowed with advanced sensors, cameras and recording abilities, such as bee-
sized  drones  or  fully  autonomous  boats  for  example,  can  provide  information  superiority  and 
strategic advantages for decision-makers as long as they are matched by proportionate analytical 
capabilities  at  headquarters.  While  some  argue  that  intelligent  machines  can  improve  decision-
making by providing a clearer and more objective view of conflict situations, others are concerned 
about  the  ethical  aspects  of  decisions  increasingly  informed  –  or  taken  autonomously  –  by 
technologies.19 This is further complicated by considering a possible nuclear aspect. 

Personnel: Machine-assisted soldiers and soldier-assisted machines 
Contemporary warfare demands new skills from armed forces. Just as automation affects civilian 
jobs,  machines  are  poised  to  take  over  mechanical  and  repetitive  roles  in  the  military  while 
empowering  humans in  strategic  thinking  and  creative  tasks.  For  example,  the  sheer quantity of 
data – including millions of hours of drone footage – is collected faster than human analysts can 
analyse it, so military personnel are increasingly required to supervise, check and assist intelligent 
systems in their processing of this data.20 On the contrary, jobs demanding emotional intelligence 

15   P. Guest, The subatomic age: Asia's quantum computing arms race, Nikkei, 2020. 
16   While technologies such as the internet or nuclear power were initially developed for military purposes and only later 

adapted for civilian uses, new technologies are experiencing a reversal of this trend. 

17   Famous examples include Project Maven, a partnership between Google and the US Department of Defense, and the 

cloud services contract (Joint Enterprise Defense Infrastructure) between the latter and Microsoft. 

18   Artificial Intelligence in Land Forces, German Bundeswehr, 2019. 
19   M. Horowitz, The promise and peril of military applications of AI, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 2018. 
20   P. Scharre, Killer Apps, Foreign Affairs, 2019. 

6 

 
 
Disruption by technology 

and  critical  thinking,  such  as  psychotherapy,  might  increase  demand  for  humans  as  'the  force' 
digitalises.21  Drones  and  robots  are  already  deployed  alongside  soldiers  to  reduce  human  risk 
exposure  with  AI-powered  (semi-)  autonomous  partners  providing  protection,  such  as  the 
Battlefield Extraction Assist Robot, which is meant to extract soldiers from the battlefield. Analytical 
technologies can further reduce risk as they can identify the smallest pixel change in images that 
could indicate hidden objects and communicate them in real time to soldiers in the field. In some 
cases,  personnel  can  avoid  physical  deployment  altogether,  for  example  by  operating  remote-
controlled drones or demining robots. The benefits of these disruptions come with risks, in particular 
their vulnerability to hacking, or jamming of communication systems. Even without the ability to 
decrypt signals, detecting their presence can serve as intelligence for adversaries.  

Facilities: Intelligent logistics 
Logistics  and  planning  have  always  been  key  factors  in  successful  defence,  as  illustrated  by 
Napoleon's defeat in Russia or the Battle of the Bulge at the end of the Second World War. Logistics 
have historically been tightly knit with transport innovations that disrupt the conduct of warfare. 
These range from the use of horses as a main means of military transport and high-end warfare, to 
steam  ships  and  rail,  up  to  contemporary  technologies  such  as  (semi)  autonomous  transport 
systems. Predictive maintenance technologies are increasingly deployed, using connected sensors 
to anticipate when components in systems such as aircraft or engines will become defective.14 AI-
enabled analyses can also be used to identify safe locations (e.g. for landing, evacuation and supply) 
and to calculate supply needs and inventory. These technologies cumulate into benefits for human, 
financial and natural resources while reducing the element of surprise. However, as the connectivity 
of critical infrastructure increases, so do vulnerabilities to cyber-attacks targeting communication 
channels. For example, fast progress on AI-enabled software trained to automatically defend against 
cyber-attacks and even retaliate is already impacting the way cyber warfare is led. 

Figure 1 – Defence disruptions by domain 

Source: EPRS. 

Interoperability: Can technological superiority be shared?  
Interoperability  is  challenged  by  the  emergence  and  adoption  of  new  technologies  by  allies.  As 
different forces digitalise and innovate at different speeds in a race for technological superiority, it 
can  become  more  difficult  to  operate  their  technologies  together.  Gaps  between  more  and  less 
advanced allies could emerge and eventually impair military action. Different cyber capabilities and 
visions  of  cyberwarfare  are  already  visible  and  there  is  a  risk  that  incompatible  systems  could 
mutually classify each other as hostile, despite their human masters' formal alliances.22 

J. Perkins, More than Killer robots, Modern War Institute, 2019. 

21  
22   M. Smeets, Cyber Command's Strategy Risks Friction With Allies, Lawfare, 2019.  

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4. Disrupting democratic debates 

Disintermediators, disinformants and our infosphere 
Our  information  sphere  is  constantly  evolving,  and  regularly  disrupted  and 
shaped  by  technological  innovations:  a  3 000-year  old  clay  tablet  depicts 
scenes  of  information  designed  to  trick  its  readers;  the  invention  of  the 
printing  press  in  1450  disrupted  and  revolutionised  the  dissemination  of 
information.  The  advent  of  social  media  has  changed  our  online  lives,  in 
particular since Facebook entered the scene in 2004, followed by YouTube in 
2005  and  Twitter  in  2006.  Back  then,  many  embraced  social  media  as  a  blessing  for  freedom  of 
speech:  anyone  with  internet  access  and  a  smartphone  could  and  still  can  have  a  say,  without 
gatekeepers  such  as  traditional  media.  A  decade  later,  however,  the  flipsides  began  to  curb  this 
initial enthusiasm. The big online platforms have absorbed most of the advertising revenues that 
used to fund traditional media, weakening the latter's role and making many people more reliant 
on social media for news; roughly two-thirds of US adults and over half of Europeans get their news 
on  social  media.  At  the  same  time,  online  disinformation  (deliberately  deceptive  information) 
became a key component in the Kremlin's ongoing hybrid war against Ukraine since 2014.The Brexit 
referendum  in  the  United  Kingdom,  the  2016  presidential  election  in  the  United  States  and  a 
number of other elections have brought new realisations about the effect of disintermediation on 
our public space for debate.23 Violence sparked by false information spread via social media has cost 
countless lives and caused severe problems for many societies.24 The mounting concern over digital 
disruptions of our infosphere has been accelerated by the infodemic – an overabundance of both 
accurate and false information – accompanying the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic.  

The attention-fuelled 'junk cycle' 
For social media platforms, user attention is crucial for advertising revenues: time is money. In other 
words,  the  more  time  users  spend  on  online  platforms,  the  more  money  these  companies  earn. 
Search  engines  and  social  media  such  as  Google,  YouTube,  Facebook  and  Twitter  are  using 
algorithms – automated predictions of what users are interested in seeing – to spark engagement 
and maximise revenues. Based on users' habits and their history of clicks, shares and likes, algorithms 
filter and prioritise the content that users receive. As users tend to engage more with content that 
sparks  an  emotional  reaction  and/or  confirms  already  existing  biases,  this  type  of  content  is 
prioritised.25  On  a  social  scale,  this  can  amplify  divisions,  prevent  the  correction  of  clearly  false 
information  and  contribute  to  political  and  societal  polarisation.  When  data  from  87 million 
Facebook  users  (including  2.7 million  EU  citizens)  were  improperly  shared  with  the  political 
consultancy  company  Cambridge  Analytica,  predictions  about  sexual  orientation,  race  and 
intelligence were used to microtarget and mobilise voters in the US Presidential election and the UK 
referendum  on  EU  membership.  As  calls  mount  for  more  algorithmic  accountability  and 
transparency,  users  and  digital  journalists  compete  to  post  potentially  viral  content  first,  in  a 
continued quest for likes and shares that contribute to the 'junk cycle'.26 

23   H. Berghei, Weaponizing Twitter litter: Abuse-forming networks and social media, Computer, 2018. 
24   Hate speech about the Rohingya Muslim minority in Myanmar, leading to ethnic cleansing, was spread via Facebook. 

In India, a series of mob lynchings were linked to messages circulating on WhatsApp. 

25   G.  L.  Ciampaglia,  F.  Menczer,  Biases  make  people  vulnerable  to  misinformation  spread  by  social  media,  The 

Conversation, June 2018.  

26   R. Somaiya (2019). The Junk Cycle, Columbia Journalism Review. 

8 

 
 
Disruption by technology 

'clickbait' 

from 
by 

Figure 2 – Increase in organised social media 
manipulation 2017-2019 

Growing evidence of online disinformation across the world 
Just  as  the 
industry  benefits 
financially  from  catching  people's  attention, 
an increasing number of state actors benefit 
disintermediated 
the 
politically 
infosphere 
computational 
using 
propaganda  techniques.  These  include  AI-
enabled  illegal  harvesting  of  data  to  profile 
and  microtarget  users,  algorithms  and 
automated 'bot' accounts,27 as well as human 
'trolls'  to 
curation  by  cyber  troops  or 
'purposefully 
misleading 
distribute 
information  over  social  media  networks'.28 
Such  activities  can  feed  into  coordinated 
campaigns  of  foreign  state  and  non-state 
agents  to  influence  democratic  processes 
and  political  decision-making.29 
this 
context, disinformation turns one of democracy's greatest assets — free and open debate — into a 
vulnerability. This affects most people across the world: Almost 60 % of the global population are 
active internet users.30  
A  2019  Oxford  Internet  Institute  (OII)  study31  found  increasing  social  media  manipulation  by 
governments  and  political  parties  across  the  world.  According  to  the  OII,  Facebook  and  Twitter 
found evidence of seven states – China, India, Iran, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela – 
engaging  in  information  operations  to  influence  foreign  audiences  in  2019,  including  via 
considerable cyber troop numbers. However, 10 times as many countries use such techniques to 
influence domestic audiences: In 2019, there was evidence of organised social media manipulation 
in 70 countries, compared to 48 countries in 2018, and 28 counties in 2017.32 According to the OII, 
26 countries  used  computational  propaganda  domestically  to  control  information,  suppress 
fundamental human rights, discredit political opponents and overpower dissent.  

Data source: Oxford Internet Institute. 

In 

Coronavirus crises accelerating change  
Crises, including pandemics, can exacerbate existing trends and tension. When emotions run high, 
online rumours spread 'faster and more easily' than a virus.33 Since news about the new Covid-19 
outbreak – initially suppressed by the Chinese Communist Party – was officially confirmed by the 
World  Health  Organization  (WHO)  China  Country  Office  on  31  December  2019,  the  virus  has 
provided fertile breeding ground for misinformation, disinformation and conspiracy theories across 
the world. Some of this false information is deployed as an attempt to sell fake cures or treatments; 
others  use  manipulated,  attention-grabbing  information  to  boost  online  traffic  and  increase 
advertising  revenue.  In  combination  with  failure  to  communicate  transparently,  this  undermines 

J. Pamment et al, Countering Information Influence Activities: The State of the Art, July 2018. 

27   Wilson, D.G. The Ethics of Automated Behavioral Microtargeting, AI matters, vol. 3, issue 3, 2017. 
28   Woolley, S.C. and P.N. Howard, Computational Propaganda Worldwide, Oxford University, 2017. 
29  
30   https://www.statista.com/statistics/617136/digital-population-worldwide/  
31   Bradshaw, S. and P.N. Howard, The Global Disinformation Order 2019, Oxford Internet Institute, 2019.  
32   Here, at least one political party/government agency was using social media to influence public opinion.  
33   WHO Director-General speech, Munich Security Conference, 15 February 2020. 

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trust in official health advice, governments, global health organisations and scientists, that is, the 
very institutions that responsible for organising a global response to the pandemic.34  

Due  to  the  high  demand  for  trustworthy  information  about  the  outbreak,  the  WHO  has  been 
working  closely  with  tech  companies  to  make  trustworthy  content  visible.  At  the  same  time, 
however,  the  spread  of  conspiracy  theories  by  authoritarian  states  such  as  China  and  Russia, 
including  via  social  media,  has  raised  concern  that  a  combination  of  disinformation  and  heavily 
promoted  health  diplomacy,  echoed  by  local  proxies  in  Europe,  could  pave  the  way  for  wider 
influence after the crisis. Moreover, by undermining local advertising overnight, the pandemic has 
accelerated existing trends towards reducing print days, cutting staff and closing down the offices 
of local news media.35  

How to disrupt the disruptions? The EU response 

In  recent  years,  the  EU  has  stepped  up  efforts  to  fight  disinformation.  In  2015,  the  European 
External  Action  Service  (EEAS)  East  StratCom  task  force  was  launched  to  counter  ongoing 
disinformation campaigns by the Kremlin. The European Parliament has consistently supported 
the team, including via its budgetary powers. Additional Task Forces, focusing on the southern 
neighbourhood  and  the  Western  Balkans,  respectively,  were  created  in  2017.  The  European 
Commission's April 2018 communication 'Tackling online disinformation: a European approach' 
was built upon with the creation of a voluntary code of practice where major online platforms 
and  advertisers  agreed  to  combat  disinformation,  An  action  plan  against  disinformation,  also 
helped  to  strengthen  the  EU's  capability  to  counter  disinformation  ahead  of  the  European 
elections, with initiatives such as the Rapid Alert System (RAS), set up in March 2019.36 During the 
pandemic, and in response to the call of the members of the European Council and EU Foreign 
Affairs Ministers, as well as to the concerns of the European Parliament, the Commission and High 
Representative published a joint communication on 'Tackling Covid-19 disinformation – Getting 
the  facts  right'  in  June 2020,  urging  more  coordinated  action  to  address  the  risks  for  open 
societies.37 

The ongoing reflection in the EU to boost EU rules and resilience, including by passing legislation 
to  fight  disinformation  in  the  forthcoming  digital  services  act,  has  intensified  during  the 
pandemic. The Commission aims to launch a European democracy action plan38 in late 2020, to 
help  improve  the  resilience  of  democracies  and  combat  foreign  interference  in  European 
elections. The strategy aims at countering disinformation and adapting to evolving threats and 
manipulations, as well as at supporting free and independent media. The action plan on human 
rights  across  the  world  envisages  support  for  independent  and  pluralistic  media,  access  to 
information and the fight against disinformation, as well as efforts to raise public awareness and 
stimulate public debate around actions to counter disinformation. The Covid-19 pandemic has 
shed new light on the dynamics39 between the EU and major online platforms and advertisers, 
many  of  which  teamed  up  with  the  WHO  in  February  2020  to  combat  the  spread  of  false 
information about Covid-19. While many of these companies have made more efficient efforts to 
tackle  the  coronavirus  infodemic,  compared  to  their  seeming  reluctance  to  counter  political 
disinformation  (perhaps  partly  because  they  had  verified,  authoritative  information  from  the 
WHO and national authorities to promote), the pandemic has highlighted the responsibility of 
these companies and the room for improvement. 

34   E. O'Reilly, Coronavirus "infodemic" threatens world's health institutions, Axios, 2020.  
35   K.  Doctor,  Newsonomics:  Tomorrow's  life-or-death  decisions  for  newspapers  are  suddenly  today's,  thanks  to 

coronavirus, NiemanLab, 2020. 

36   See Legislative Train Schedule: Online platforms, the digital single market and disinformation, European Parliament. 
37   N. Bentzen, The EU's response to the coronavirus 'infodemic', EPRS, European Parliament, June 2020. 
38   See Legislative Train Schedule: A new push for European democracy. European Parliament.  
39   Social media companies open new front in fight with EU, Financial Times, 2 April 2020. 

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Disruption by technology 

5. Disrupting social norms, values and identities 

Social values, norms and identities are cultural products that shape what we 
find  important  (values),  what  behaviours  we  consider  appropriate  (norms), 
and  how  we  make  sense  of  ourselves  and  our  relationship  to  others 
(identities).  They  shape  each  other  and  can  vary  substantially  between 
individuals and over their lifetimes. However, they are best understood on a 
broader social scale. Disruption in this context could be described as relatively 
fast  or  dramatic  changes  to  the  dominant  norms,  values  and  identities  in  a 
community or society. It may be provoked by wider phenomena such as natural disasters, cultural 
or  civic  movements,  economic  transitions  or,  as  we  consider  here,  technological  developments. 
Despite  the  potentially  negative  connotations  of  the  word  'disruption',  change  to  social  values, 
norms and identities is a constant fact. Since our norms guide what we see as 'normal' and our values 
provide  a  benchmark  for  determining  what  is  'good',  it  is  difficult  to  objectively  evaluate  any 
changes to them. It is also difficult to isolate technological disruption from other forms of disruption. 
For example, more widespread use of innovative video conferencing tools as the primary means of 
conducting social, professional and familial relationships may appear to be a technological trend, 
but the real driver of increased use in 2020 is probably not innovation itself, but physical distancing 
rules  established  in  response  to  the  Covid-19  pandemic.  Nonetheless,  this  section  provides 
illustrative examples of how technology development can disrupt values, norms and identities. 

Values: What is happening to privacy? 
Social values are principles that are considered important by a society. Several values are articulated 
in EU law as inviolable fundamental rights. However, values themselves are not natural or objective 
laws,  but  dynamic  and  subjective  concepts.  They  change  over  time  and  between  cultures  in 
response to their context. While this change can be resisted, imposing values beyond their 'use by 
date' can lead to friction.  

Privacy is valued so much by Europeans that it is protected as a fundamental right to 'respect for 
private and family life, home and communications' and by specific regulations such as the General 
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). There is a broad and long-standing sentiment that our privacy 
should be protected from various forms of intrusion. Nonetheless, the concept of privacy is neither 
fixed nor objective, but differs across cultures, over generations, and even during our lifetimes.40 The 
concept of privacy in terms of personal spaces was barely recognisable until the 19th century. Even 
the wealthiest people that could afford large homes would still receive guests and conduct business 
in the bedroom. Today, it is normal for bedrooms to protect privacy not only from visitors but also 
from  our  own  family.  The  concept  of  protecting  the  privacy  of  information  is  a  little  older. 
Eavesdropping and reading other's letters were punishable offences as far back as the 14th century. 

While the long-term trend may be towards greater value for private spaces and information, the last 
decades of technological development have provoked several disruptions to the concept of privacy, 
as well as its protection. European (and, to a greater extent, US) courts link the legal protection of 
privacy  to  the  extent  to  which  people  expect  it,  and  the  extent  to  which  this  expectation  is 

40   See J. Holvast, History of Privacy in: V. Matyáš, S. Fischer-Hübner, D. Cvrček and P. Švenda. (eds). The Future of Identity 
in the Information Society, Advances in Information and Communication Technology, vol. 298. Springer, Berlin, 2009. 

11 

 
 
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considered reasonable.41 This approach implies that, as citizens are exposed to intrusions of privacy 
and expect less of it, their legal entitlement to privacy is also eroded. 

The digitalisation of contemporary life has gone hand-in-hand with changes to how many people 
value privacy. It becomes increasingly normal for people to share much more of their personal lives 
online. Even for those that do not do so, their basic web services are often provided by mediators in 
exchange for access to their data, enabling sophisticated analysis of their habits, preferences, ideas 
and  movements. The  younger  generation of  'digital  natives'  that  grew  up with  social  media  and 
smartphones have been described as fatalistically accepting their lack of privacy and engaging in 
dangerously open sharing practices. However, closer examination reveals a more complex situation 
as young people develop sophisticated hierarchies of online activities, for example maintaining a 
completely open public presence (designed for high visibility, or to feign aloof nonparticipation) 
alongside  a  fiercely  guarded  personal  digital  space  (such  as  a  secure  folder)  and  several  other 
profiles  with  a  range  of  identities  and  sharing  policies  designed  for  engaging  with  specific 
communities in different ways.42 In this light, the social value of privacy is surviving and, perhaps, 
thriving by adapting to its context. 

Norms: How do we access information? 
Social norms are understandings of appropriate 
conduct  in  a  given  context.  Closely  linked  to 
social values, they guide and even govern what 
is considered normal, shaping how we behave 
and how we think others should behave. Since 
they  are  subjective  and  dynamic,  changing 
norms  are,  in  a  sense,  the  norm.  They  are  also 
technologies.  For 
regularly  disrupted  by 
example,  freezers  and  microwaves  provoked 
radical  changes 
in  mundane  household 
routines for the storage and preparation of food 
on  material 
with 
consumption.43 

profound 

effects 

Coronavirus: Technology and social norms  
The  unfolding  Covid-19  crisis  is  probably  the 
disruption  of  a  generation.  However,  the  role 
of technology has principally been to mitigate 
its  disruptive  effects  on  social  norms.  Video 
conferencing and other internet technologies 
maintain  communication  channels,  reducing 
the  impact  on  our  work  and  social  lives.  In 
some  cases,  they  allow  social  distancing 
measures  to  be  reduced  to  mere  physical 
distancing. We might  see some  norms  'in  the 
making',  for  example,  in  how  we  greet  each 
other  without  any  physical  contact.  Other 
norms might be used as partial solutions to the 
crisis,  including  our  near  constant  use  of 
smartphones  which  could  provide  data  as  a 
proxy  for  our  location  and  relative  distance 
from  others.  These  temporary  changes  could 
end up being more permanent as, for example, 
digital interfaces increasingly replace physical 
contact in human interactions. 

The  internet  has  provoked  radical  changes  to 
our  norms  for  accessing  news.  Until  recently, 
most people read newspapers and tuned in to 
television  and  radio  broadcasts.  Gradually, 
people began accessing more news online, and 
increasingly  via  platforms  that  curate  content 
for 
in  how 
individuals  access  information  cumulate  into 
social norms with profound structural effects. The norms of payment for news has shifted to a model 
driven  by  personalised  advertisements,  with  implications  for  how  news  is  produced  –  often  in  a 
shorter  format  with  a  greater  degree  of  personalised  targeting  designed  to  provoke  emotional 
reactions – and also how it is consumed, with more fragmented content via a range of platforms. 

individuals.  These  changes 

41   Nouwt, S., B. de Vries and C. Prins (Eds) (2005) Reasonable Expectations of Privacy? - Eleven country reports on camera 

surveillance and workplace privacy. T.M.C. Asser Press. 

42   Benjamin, G. (2017) Privacy as a Cultural Phenomenon. Journal of Media Critiques 3(10). 
43   E. Shove, Comfort, Cleanliness and Convenience: The Social Organization of Normality, Oxford: Berg, 2003. 

12 

 
 
 
 
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The effect of these changing norms has been vulnerability to disinformation as well as social and 
political polarisation.  

Identities: How do we know where we come from?  
Our identities are complex understandings of who we are, including our bodies and minds as well 
as  our  role  and  sense  of  belonging  within  our  families,  wider  communities  and  societies.  From 
human  enhancement  to  online  platforms  for  niche  communities,  several  new  technologies  can 
shape and perhaps disrupt our identities. A particularly interesting example, DNA testing, seems to 
provide  definitive  objective  answers  to  questions  about  our  bodies,  families,  and  ancestry.  By 
analysing bodily materials, DNA tests compare genetic information to reveal similarities which have 
been used to identify health risks, blood relationships, or ancestral heritage. 

Such  DNA  test  results  can  provide  apparently  hard  evidence  of  who  people  are  and  where  they 
come from. For example, results might show an individual's ancestors originate 28 % from Finland, 
15 % from Portugal, 11 % from Italy, etc. However, both the accuracy and meaning of these numbers 
are contested. The results reflect levels of genetic similarity with other people's DNA, who live in 
these places and whose DNA happens to be recorded in the same database. As such, the same DNA 
in  different  databases  gives  different  results.  Furthermore,  historic  and  contemporary  migration 
challenge the link between heritage and residence. In any case, 'Finnish' DNA would not in itself 
make someone Finnish, legally or culturally. The use of DNA tests to answer questions about our 
identities  prioritises  biological  measurements  over  other  elements  such  as  our  culture  and  lived 
experiences. The recent controversy surrounding Senator Elizabeth Warren's DNA highlighted that, 
sometimes, identity has much more to do with community participation than blood and ancestry. 

When individuals take DNA tests, they might risk disruption to their identity as a member of a family. 
For example, many people have discovered that their siblings are actually half-siblings, or that they 
have more close relatives than they knew about, leading to difficult family conversations. This does 
not only affect the test-taker, as results can disrupt other people's identities without their consent. 
Commercial  databases  regularly  reveal  the  identity  of  biological  parents  that  donated  sperm  or 
whose children were adopted under the assumption of anonymity.44 

Members of white supremacist communities have taken DNA tests and discovered evidence of 'non-
white' ancestry which disrupted a key element of their identity and, in some cases, precluded them 
from further participation in their community.45 While these groups may see greater significance in 
bloodlines  than  many  others,  the  case  highlights  the  worrying  potential  of  DNA  tests  as  a 
gatekeeper of access to communities, to benefits designed for specific groups and to access services 
such as insurance. There is also the potential for commercial and state surveillance, indeed, police 
forces have begun to use commercial DNA databases to identify suspects.46 

44   DNA tests have 'unearthed affairs, secret pregnancies, quietly buried incidents of rape and incest, and fertility doctors 
using their own sperm to inseminate patients'. S. Zhang, When a DNA Test Shatters Your Identity, The Atlantic, 2018. 

45  

Interestingly, responses from their community included criticism of the meaning of tests, showing that – even for 
those particularly attached to bloodlines – DNA testing does not always have the final word on identity. A. Panofsky 
and  J. Donovan,  Genetic  ancestry  testing  among  white  nationalists:  From  identity  repair  to  citizen  science,  Social 
Studies of Science, 49(5), 653–681, 2019. 

46   Police  have  identified  individual  suspects  from  DNA  traces  by  scanning  databases  containing  commercial  DNA 
samples for matches with distant relatives. See J. Kaiser, We will find you: DNA search used to nab Golden State Killer 
can home in on about 60% of white Americans, Science, October 2018. 

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6. Disrupting international relations 

One  might  argue  international  politics  disrupts  technology  as  often  as  the 
other  way  around.  The  Second  World  War,  for  example,  facilitated  the 
development  of  nuclear  weapons.  Nevertheless,  there  are  some  interesting 
patterns  to  the  interaction  between  technology  and  international  affairs. 
Information  and  military  technologies,  discussed  in  previous  sections,  are 
clearly 'political', but the rapid invention or diffusion of all kinds of technology 
can affect international politics. For example, the appearance of porcelain in 
Europe from China in the 18th century led to fierce state competition between several European 
powers who wanted to reverse engineer the technology, their race for status and economic gain 
involving everything from imprisonments to espionage.47  

Rapid  technology  innovation  and  diffusion  has  three  key  effects  on  the  international  political 
system:48  

1 

2 

3 

First,  new  technologies  often  affect  the  political,  economic,  social,  military  and 
technological contest between states, the international system's main actors.  
Second,  they  are  also  changing  the  international  system  itself,  introducing  new 
norms, ideas, types of actor or areas of contest, and making old norms redundant.  
Third, they can become identified as global risks by the international community.  

Some general-purpose technologies such as nuclear and information technology can be found in 
all three categories. The following sections illustrate each of these effects, mainly with reference to 
the digital transformation that has triggered the biggest disruptions of the last 30 years, and will 
probably continue to do so in the decades to come. 

Contest between states 
Significant technological disruption can increase competition, even lead to rivalry, between states 
as  seen  during  the  Cold  War  space  race  between  the  USA  and  the  Soviet  Union.49  Both  nations 
invested in rapidly improving rocket technology, which had international ramifications including 
spin-off  effects  for  the  nuclear  arms  race  and  space  militarisation.  More  general, massive  science 
investments contributed to the next technological revolution: information technology.50 The moon 
landing  in  1969  was  a  political  victory  that  tilted  the  balance  in  the  Cold  War  towards  the  USA. 
Towards  the end  of  this  period of  history,  it  helped to  lessen  superpower  rivalry:  The  last  Apollo 
module memorably docked in space with the Soviet Soyuz spacecraft, demonstrating a new will for 
cooperation.  

Today, many disruptive technologies affect inter-state competition. Three of the most important are 
AI, fracking and 5G.  

47   M. LIebermann, 'Das weiße Gold', in: GEO Epoche No 67, S. 54-61, 2014. 
48   Many of these observations also apply to domestic politics. Technology also changes the political contest between 
political actors and between ruler and the ruled. It also changes the rules of the game and often resolving issues 
requires cooperation. In both the state and international relations context, technology is not an intruder, something 
from the outside, but one of many things developed by humankind for a purpose. Some researchers say it is an actor 
in its own right.  

49   P.  Lowman,  Our  First  Lunar  Program:  What  did  we  get  from  Apollo?,  Goddard  Space  Flight  Center,  NASA, 

September 2007. 

50   G. Navarria, How the Internet was born: A stuttered hello, The Conversation, October 2016.  

14 

 
 
Disruption by technology 

The  race  for leadership in  AI looks much like  the  space  race.  It  promises  to dramatically increase 
international  status  and  political,  economic,  social,  military  and  technological  power.  A  further 
commonality is the symbolism of the race for states, and its framing as a contest of values between 
societies. In contrast to the space race, the AI race is co-driven by the private sector as a major source 
of  knowledge  and  capital.  The  quest  for  paradigm-shifting  advancement  in  AI  could  acquire  a 
dynamic similar to the moon landing.  

The  improvement  of  hydraulic  fracking  caused  the  USA  to  become  less  energy  dependant  on 
foreign  oil  and  therefore  on  oil  producing  allies.  This  has  contributed  to  Saudi  Arabia's  recent 
aggressive  stance  on  many  foreign  policy  issues.  Fracking  has  also  affected  the  oil  market, 
contributing to the recent disagreement between Saudi Arabia and Russia in the Organization of 
the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). With reduced incentives for involvement in the Middle 
East  and  North  Africa,  the  USA  might  continue  to  scale  back  its  involvement  there,  creating 
opportunities for other powers, large and small. 

The new 5G telecommunication standard has been developed since at least 2013, with the EU and 
China setting common standards in 2015. What started as constructive international cooperation 
turned  into  a  confrontation  between  China  and  the  USA  due  to  fears  that  the  Chinese  state  will 
obtain  access  to  critical  data  and  systems.  This  seems  likely  to  lead  to  two  increasingly  divided 
technological camps, and, possibly, a global economic and political schism.51  

Changing the international sphere 
There are many examples of technologies changing the norms, theories, type of actors or areas of 
competition in the international political arena.  

Armed drones and use of AI contest basic norms such as the humanitarian law of armed conflicts by 
challenging both the current restrictions on lawful targeting and the notion of human control over 
weapon systems. With slow progress in negotiations, and both technologies becoming widespread, 
this problem is likely to continue.  

Digital disruption has also infused political theory with some new ideas. First, Silicon Valley was a 
hotbed in the re-emergence of an anti-political modernism:52 that is, the belief that technology, not 
politics,  is  the  main  way  to  improve  society.  However,  many  political  actors  perceive  that  this 
political naivety has helped to polarise politics, enable fringe groups to acquire power, increase the 
influence of antidemocratic forces, and aid the spread of mis- and disinformation. Second, the rise 
and recent decline in the notion that the internet and social media could create a fairer and more 
complete  public  sphere53  that  might  one  day  complement  representative  democracy.  Third,  big 
data and AI provide fertile ground for political theorists and philosophers. Yuval Harari, for example, 
has outlined the emerging concept and ideology of 'Dataism', the belief that algorithms can answer 
our  questions  better  than  we  can:  'Once  that  happens,  humans  will  lose  their  authority,  and 
humanist practices such as democratic elections will become as obsolete as rain dances and flint 
knives'.54 

Communication technology disruptions such as satellite TV, the internet and social media helped 
actors that could tell a story onto the centre of the international political stage. This contributed to 

51   Eurasia Group, Eurasia Group White Paper: The Geopolitics of 5G, November 2018. 
52   M. O'Mara, The Church of Techno-Optimism, The New York Times, 28 September 2019 
53   C. Fuchs, Social media and the public sphere, in: TripleC: Communication, Capitalism & Critique, Open Access Journal 

for a Global Sustainable Information Society, 12(1), 2014, 57-101, 2014. 

54   Y.  Harari  'Yuval  Noah  Harari  on  big  data,  Google  and  the  end  of  free  will',  Financial  Times,  26  August  2016,  in: 

D. Réchard (Ed.) Global Trendometer 2018, EPRS, European Parliament, July 2018 (p. 24). 

15 

 
 
EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service 

the  decrease  of  state  power,  not  only  over  domestic  politics  (the  'governance  turn'),  but  also  in 
international politics. Such powers have reappeared with some force in recent times, as states have 
learned to live and thrive within and outside this new media environment. Authoritarian regimes 
from Syria to Russia demonstrated that they can disrupt global media to their advantage while using 
their military superiority to win conflicts, even when the other side had the better story to tell. A 
return  to  absolute  state  power  is  unlikely,  but  not  impossible.  While  new  disruptive  digital 
technologies such as blockchains will further diminish state power domestically and internationally, 
the future of AI is a big uncertainty in the medium term. It could boost the centralisation of power 
to  states,  companies  or  even  single  individuals  with  effects  that  make  all  opposing  trends 
insignificant. 

Cyberspace – the global digital technology environment – is the prime example of a new domain in 
which  states  and  other  actors  compete.  It  has  become  the  testing  ground  for  new  forms  of 
espionage  and  sabotage,  propaganda  and  disinformation  (the  spread  of  deliberately  false 
information), and the spread of revolutions and counterrevolutions. Due to increasing international 
tensions, both cyberspace and outer space have grown in their importance as areas of 21st century 
international competition. Domains, however, are not neutral. They create new actors and power 
relations. Shoshana Zuboff has described how big tech companies gain enormous power by using 
knowledge  as  a  weapon.55  Domains  also  change  the  actors  that  compete  in  them.  The  EU,  for 
example, is redefining itself as the vanguard against these tech companies; an 'ethical superpower' 
and protector. Cyberspace or outer space might develop to the extent that they transform the state-
based international system. 

Global risks 
Technology  has  shown  it  can  disrupt  political  actors  to  the  point  where  there  is  a  consensus 
developing to deal with it internationally. The key example of this is the complex set of international 
agreements that today regulate military and civilian nuclear power. As things stand, there are only 
a few examples of productive talks aimed at limiting the risks of digital technologies, and the future 
does not currently look any more promising. Due to the current geopolitical situation, international 
talks and negotiations to regulate AI and automation (esp. of weapon systems), cyber security and 
space weaponisation are stalling, while classic existing regimes covering nuclear and conventional 
disarmament are crumbling. 

Gene  modification56  has  improved  radically,  and  become  cheaper  and  easier  through  the 
CRISPR/Cas9  method.  In  2017,  a  Chinese  scientist  broke  ethical  guidelines  and  laws  to  use 
CRISPR/Cas9 to produce the world's first gene-edited baby, highlighting the potential and danger 
of  this  new  technology.  International  regimes  are  complicated  by  various  heated  national  ethics 
debates and positions. The global vulnerability to the SARS-CoV-2 virus has surely highlighted the 
power of biological weapons to malign actors around the world.  

Together, these experiences show that, unfortunately, actors are much quicker at profiting from a 
technologically disrupted international system than they are at coming together and fixing it.  

55   S. Zuboff, The age of surveillance capitalism, 2019.  
56   B. Ashok and J. Karsten, Is there a responsible way forward for gene editing?, Brookings Institution, October 2019. 

16 

 
 
Disruption by technology 

7. Disrupting laws and regulations 

This  section  focuses  on  how  technological  disruption  challenges  the 
enactment and implementation of laws and regulations. The current debate 
on EU rules in areas such as AI, IoT and financial technologies (FinTechs) has 
prompted  reflection  on  the  efficacy  of  current 
legal  and  regulatory 
frameworks and the exploration of new approaches to define and implement 
EU rules to govern emerging technologies.  

Technological disruption and normative approach  
The  pace  of  technological  innovation  makes  it  harder  to  use  traditional  legal  and  regulatory 
mechanisms.  Legislators  and  regulators  face  a  range  of  challenges  to  govern  emerging 
technologies:  technology  evolves  faster  than  the  law's  ability  to  keep  up  (the  'pacing  problem'); 
passing  new  rules  adds  to  an  increasingly  large  and  complex  body  of  laws  and  regulations  (the 
'volume of rules' problem); legislators face difficulties to properly categorise new technologies (the 
'coordination'  problem);  and  they  lack  of  proper  information  about  how  those  technologies  are 
shaped (the 'knowledge' problem).57 Additionally, in an online and dematerialised world, it is more 
difficult for law enforcement agencies to enforce the rules (the 'enforcement problem'), for instance 
with regard to copyright infringement and blockchain regulation. As a result, the Member States 
and the EU legislators' traditional normative approach needs to adapt. 

One  remarkable  feature  of  the  current  normative  approach  in  the  high-tech  sector  is  that  the 
elaboration  of  legal  norms  is  increasingly  driven  by  cooperation  mechanisms  and  less  by 
authoritative mechanisms such as hard law. Traditional 'state-based regulation' (generally top-down 
'hard-law' rules) are increasingly used with more informal governance mechanisms, based on a 'soft-
law' approach driven by the cooperation between key actors in the ecosystems. As a result, the role 
of states has been shifting from a traditional dirigiste approach to a more inclusive approach, where 
private  parties  play  an  increasingly  important  role,  for  instance  in  the  context  of  standardisation 
processes, self-regulation and co-regulation initiatives. The imposition of 'hard law' governance in 
the field of new technologies could decline and soft law governance becomes widely used in fields 
such as AI and IoT. EU level guidance on data processing in the fight against Covid-19 is a further 
example of how EU rules and their implementation should be quickly adapted or clarified through 
soft-law instruments.58 

New legal concepts governing the legislators' normative work in the high-tech sector have been 
coined in the last decades. Legislators are increasingly required to set up legislation that is 'future-
proof'  and  'forward-looking',  i.e.  resistant  to  change  and  flexible  enough  to  adapt  to  constantly 
evolving market structures and actors.59 A flexible approach to rulemaking promotes innovation, 
requires  lawmakers  to  adopt  a  proactive  rather  than  a  reactive  stance  and  rests  on  a  complex 
balance between flexibility and legal certainty.60 In this respect, policy-makers are confronted with 
a dilemma to design 'technology-neutral' rules such as the GDPR, which are abstract enough to last 
and yet detailed enough to provide legal certainty. They also need to reconcile the need for a reliable 

57   For an overview see R. Hagemann, J. Huddleston Skees and A. Thierer, Soft law for hard problems: the governance of 

emerging technologies in an uncertain future, Colo. Tech. L.J., 2019.  

58   See EDPB, Twentieth plenary session of the European Data Protection Board - scope of upcoming guidance on data 

processing in the fight against COVID-19, 2019.  

59   See the Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on 'Future proof legislation', 2016.  
60   See  S.  Ranchordás  and  M.  van  't  Schip,  Future-Proofing  Legislation  for  the  Digital  Age,  2019.  See  also  European 

Commission, EPSC, Towards an Innovation Principle endorsed by better regulation, 2016.  

17 

 
 
EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service 

and secure legal environment that can foster innovation, without intervening prematurely which 
can hinder innovation.  

Furthermore,  policy-makers  are  increasingly  required  to  engage  with  ethical  and  technical 
considerations before enacting rules in the high-tech sector. For instance, before setting new rules 
in the field of robotics it is necessary to reflect on the distinction between 'objects 'and 'humans' as 
(bio)robotic  applications  are  increasingly  built  into human  bodies.61  Similar  ethical  questions  are 
raised in the field of AI where legislators are increasingly called to set an ethical framework before 
legislating  on  technologies  such  as  facial  recognition.62  Moreover,  the  complexity  of  new 
technologies  require  that  legislators  understand  the  technological  constraints  that  affect  the 
implementation  of  the  rules.  Topical  examples  include  how  automated  content  filtering  can  be 
imposed on large platforms63 or how to regulate AI algorithms when their complexity make their 
decisions difficult to explain and justify (the 'black box' effect).64  

of 

to 

have 

'smart 

flexible, 

regulation' 

Figure 3 – Smart regulation  

Technological disruption and normative instruments 
Given  technological  development 
and changing business models, it is 
necessary 
adaptive 
regulation  in  place.65  To  this  end, 
the 
or 
'responsive  regulation'  approach 
helps  policy-makers  to  formulate 
imaginative  and 
more 
innovative 
policy 
forms 
instruments  especially  in  the  field 
of  emerging  technologies  such  as 
AI  and Fintech.66  While  there is  no 
agreed 
smart 
regulation,  a  number  of  key 
principles  can  be  identified  (see 
Figure 3).  Smart 
is 
primarily  about  responding  to  the 
'pacing problem', aiming at cyclical 
regulation rather than long-lasting 
rules that set fixed legal standards 
for  decades.  Smart  regulation  is 
also  about  responding  to  the 
coordination 
knowledge 
and 
problems  by  being  more  interactive  and  including  more  stakeholders  including  interest  groups, 

Data source: Deloitte. 

regulation 

definition 

of 

61   See R. Leenesa, E. Palmerinib, B.-J. Koopsa, A. Bertolinib, P. Salvinic and F. Luciverod, Regulatory challenges of robotics: 

some guidelines for addressing legal and ethical issues, Law, Innovation and Technology, 2017.  

62   See W. Wiewiórowski, Facial recognition: A solution in search of a problem?, 2019 
63   See E. Engstrom and N. Feamster, The Limit of Filtering, 2017.  
64   See Y. Bathaee,  Artificial  Intelligence  Black  box  and  the Failure of  Intent  and Causation,  Harvard  Journal  of  Law  & 

Technology, 2018.  

65   See N. Singh, How can we regulate disruptive technologies? 2019.  
66   For an overview of the notion of 'smart regulation' see N. Gunningham and D. Sinclair, Designing Smart Regulation, 
1999.  See  W.  Eggers,  M.  Turley  and  P.  Kishnani,  The  future  of  regulation  Principles  for  regulating  emerging 
technologies, 2018.  

18 

 
 
 
 
Disruption by technology 

professional bodies, industry associations and quasi-regulators (such as certification bodies).67 This 
approach enables legislators to get a more complete and diverse perspective on the issues, as well 
as potential solutions, while contributing to greater acceptance of regulatory interventions by the 
relevant stakeholders. Finally, smart regulation requires policy-makers to shift the focus from input 
to outcome-based regulation, leaving them more room to innovate. 

Smart regulation requires a range of new normative instruments, i.e. a smart regulation toolbox. The 
ordinary EU legislative procedure, whereby it takes years to enact and transpose a text at national 
level, is not flexible enough. Other mechanisms may be more appropriate, including coordination 
of  national  regulators,  executive  agencies  and  the  use  of  implementing  and  delegated  acts.68 
Furthermore, smart regulation can be implemented through a broad range of instruments including 
traditional 'hard law' as well as 'soft-law' instruments such as notices, guidance, standardisation and 
certification  processes,  regulatory  impact  assessments,  periodic  evaluation,  and  sunset  clauses, 
which enable legislators and regulators to constantly re-evaluate the effectiveness and reach of the 
various  instruments.69  Moreover,  rather  than  going  through  the  lengthy  process  of  legislation, 
policy-makers could rely upon trial and error through 'sandboxing' approaches with rapid feedback 
and  evaluation  mechanisms  (see  box).  In  this  context,  a  key issue for  technology  regulation is  to 
balance  the  use  of  new  flexible  instruments  –  enabling  private  interests  and  ideas  to  drive  the 
rulemaking  process  –  while  maintaining  legislators'  normative  powers  to  safeguard  the  general 
interest. 

Sandboxing refers to the use of controlled spaces for businesses to experiment, test and validate 
new products, services or business models under the close supervision of the regulatory authorities. 
Legal and regulatory requirements are relaxed to allow this experimentation while consumer risks 
are limited through specific safeguards. The approach can improve regulators' understanding of new 
technologies and EU regulatory sandboxes are already under consideration for AI,70 FinTech,71 and 
surveillance solutions in the context of the fight against the Covid-19 pandemic.72 In the increasingly 
complex high-tech environment, sandboxing may become more widely used as a first step before 
the enactment of rules. For instance, in its European strategy for data73 unveiled in February 2020, the 
European  Commission  proposes  an  approach  that  avoids  overly  detailed,  heavy-handed  ex-ante 
regulation for setting up a new EU framework for data access and use. The Commission opts instead 
for  a  more  agile  approach  including  regulatory  sandboxes  and  experimentation.  Against  this 
background, EU policy-makers will have to further reflect on how best articulate sandboxing exercises 
and legislative initiatives. 

67   See N. Singh, How can we regulate disruptive technologies?, 2019. 
68   See Digital Europe: Next Steps A European Agenda for the Digital-9+, Lisbon Council, 2019.  
69   See R. Leenesa and others, Regulatory challenges of robotics: some guidelines for addressing legal and ethical issues, 

Law, Innovation and Technology, 2017. 

70   See A. Renda, Artificial Intelligence Ethics, governance and policy challenges, Report of a CEPS Task Force, 2019.  
71   See  W.-G.  Ringe  and  C.  Ruof,  Keeping  up  with  Innovation:  Designing  a  European  Sandbox  for  Fintech,  ECMI 

Commentary No 58, January 2019. 

72   See  A.  Pierucci  and  J-P.  Walter,  Joint  Statement  on  the  right  to  data  protection  in  the  context  of  the  COVID-19 
pandemic, 2020. See European Commission, Mobile applications to support contact tracing in the EU's fight against 
COVID-19 Common EU Toolbox for Member States, 15 April 2020.  

73   See European Commission, A European strategy for data, COM(2020) 66 final. 

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8. Converging disruptions: The case of surveillance 

The disruptions described so far are interwoven with each other as well as with 
influence  several  other 
other  trends  and  disruptions.  Together,  they 
phenomena  that  are  important  in  our  everyday  lives.  One  such  example  is 
surveillance, which is clearly shaped by all six of the domains of technological 
disruption described in the previous chapters, as well as by non-technological 
disruptions such as Covid-19 and wider social, political and economic trends. 
There  are  many  forms  of  surveillance,  but  here  we  refer  primarily  to  digital 

varieties for both state and commercial purposes. 

Digital surveillance plays an increasingly important role in the economic system. As Bill Jordan74 
points out, digital devices have fast become an integral part of our domestic sphere. Thermostats, 
cars,  credit  cards,  street  cameras  and  mobile  phones  help  harvest  raw  material  that  is  fed  into 
'prediction'  products  that  are  traded  in  'behavioural  futures  markets'.  They  can  be  used  by 
corporations to not only predict our behaviour, 
but also to nudge, steer or modify our behaviour 
in  an  automated  manner.  Shoshana  Zuboff 
argues  that,  instead  of  exploiting  labour,  this 
new 
'surveillance  capitalism'  exploits  our 
experience and our actions to control the future, 
based  on  secretly  gathered  data.  Zuboff  warns 
that  surveillance  capitalism 
represents  an 
unequal  and  asymmetric  model  of  knowledge: 
the  companies  know  everything  about  us, 
whereas citizens, users, even policy-makers have 
limited  or  no  insight  into  the  data  they  have 
accumulated,  or  how  actions  are  taken  on  the 
basis of this data. 

Figure  4  –  Disruptions  can  converge  to 
as 
shape  other  phenomena, 
surveillance 

such 

Reaching almost half of the world's population, 
information  and  communications  technologies 
are  the  most  pervasive  in  the  world.  Zuboff 
argues75  that  such  practices  were  'invented  at 
Google,  travelled  to  Facebook,  engulfed  Silicon  Valley  and  have  since  spread  through  every 
economic  sector'.  In  the  infosphere,  personalised  political  advertising  –  based  on  users'  profiles, 
habits and history of clicks, shares and likes – is one of the most visible disruptions to democratic 
debates. As discussed in Chapter 3, the Facebook/Cambridge Analytica scandal was a wake-up call 
in this regard,76 as data was gathered without the knowledge or consent of users and improperly 
used in a way that undermined democratic processes. Jordan argues that 'the continental European 
countries, and Germany in particular, are more alert to these dangers' than the USA (who benefits 
financially from this system, as many of the world's tech giants are based there). China's social credits 
system, as well as its large tech companies (notably Huawei) enable the Chinese Communist Party 
to gather information about debts or unpaid fines, facilitating authoritarian behavioural control.74 

74   B. Jordan, Authoritarianism and how to counter it, Palgrave Pivot, Cham, 2020.  
75   S. Zuboff, The age of surveillance capitalism: The fight for a human future at the new frontier of power, London: Profile 

Books, 2019. 

76   D. Holloway, Explainer: what is surveillance capitalism and how does it shape our economy?, The Conversation, 2020.  

20 

 
 
 
Following the lead of the GDPR's global influence, the EU's responses to the threats of 'surveillance 
capitalism' – including anti-trust rules and the digital services act – could have a significant impact 
beyond Europe. 

Disruption by technology 

The  rapid  worldwide  diffusion  of  social  media  and  big  data  and  the  accompanying  upsurge  of 
surveillance has disrupted all three aspects of international relations discussed in Chapter 6, that 
is,  contests  between  states,  the  international 
system  itself,  and  global  risks.  First,  questions 
about the legitimacy of surveillance is a major 
part  of  the  bigger  contest  between  the  USA, 
China and the EU. China sees its surveillance as 
an integral part of its authoritarian system, not 
only to improve control but also to better react 
to the needs and sentiments of its population. 
The  USA  provides  high  safeguards  against 
state surveillance of its citizens, but allows for 
nearly  unfettered  commercial  and  foreign 
security surveillance. The EU tends to combat 
surveillance  as  it  regards  the  protection  of 
personal data as a fundamental right. Second, 
regarding  the  international  system  itself,  a 
state's  power  is  increasingly  determined  by 
their relational influence or, as Florence Gaub 
puts  it,  their  capacity  'to  influence  the  policy 
decisions of other states'.77 This is visible in all 
three  powers'  attempts  to  convince  other 
states to adopt their view, including by actively 
exporting 
and 
legislation. Thirdly, surveillance could develop 
into  a  truly  global  risk.  Some  international 
cooperation  exists,  but  efforts 
to  curb 
commercial and state surveillance are in their 
infancy  and  short-term  progress  appears 
unlikely. 

Coronavirus and surveillance technology 
Another  key  disruption  for  surveillance 
is 
presented in the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic. 
Many  look  to  technology  for  solutions  to 
problems including the search for vaccines and 
treatments and means of breaking the cycles of 
transmission.  Others,  however,  may  see  the 
crisis  as  an  opportunity  to  embed  further 
opportunities for data surveillance, either as a 
means  of  extending  control  over  people  (as 
employees  or  citizens),  or  as  a  means  of 
generating  profit  through  targeted  products 
and  services.  Governments  across  the  world 
have 
launched  contact-tracing  technology 
such  as  apps  to  help  curb  the  spread  of  the 
virus. Although most are voluntary and do not 
collect  or  use  any  participants'  location  data, 
there is nonetheless growing unease over the 
potential impact of handing over personal data 
to private companies and governments on our 
individual  and  collective  rights.  Against  this 
background, the EU has published guidelines* 
aiming  to  ensure  that  the  mobile  tracing  and 
warning apps are interoperable across the EU, 
and  that  they  are  voluntary,  transparent, 
temporary,  cybersecure,  using  temporary  and 
the 
pseudonymised  data. 
pandemic has acted as not only an accelerator 
of risks, but also as an opportunity for the EU to 
step up and defend its citizen-centric values. 
*  See:  Coronavirus:  a  common  approach  for  safe  and 
efficient  mobile  tracing  apps  across  the  EU,  European 
Commission, May 2020  

Revisiting  Chapter  5  and  the  disruption  of 
social norms, values and identities, many of 
the  changes  observed  in  this  domain  could 
foster  wider 
surveillance. 
and  deeper 
Regarding social norms, it is clear that our mundane habits and daily activities – such as reading 
news and conversing with others – have changed in ways that enable more detailed monitoring 
from commercial and state actors alike, creating ideal conditions for greater surveillance. Similarly, 
identities are for many people increasingly defined in machine readable terms such as DNA profiles 
and  participation in online  communities,  rather  than  by  culture  and  lived  experience.  Again,  this 
change  creates  ideal  opportunities  for  commercial  surveillance  as  the  data  is  used  to  target  the 
promotion  of  products,  services  and  ideas,  and  also  for  state  surveillance  as  illustrated  by  the 
function creep of DNA databases as a new tool for law enforcement. As we become accustomed to 

surveillance 

technology 

this  way, 

In 

77   See Global trends to 2030: Challenges and choices for Europe, ESPAS, 2019. 

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the presence of surveillance technologies, including the monitoring of our online activities, the way 
we value our own informational privacy is changing, sometimes in sophisticated ways. However, 
lower social expectations of privacy, particularly online and in in public spaces, can be accompanied 
by diminishing rights to privacy. This, again, creates opportunities for wider and deeper surveillance. 
It is worth highlighting that methods of state and commercial surveillance have been reimagined, 
redesigned and redeployed as new bottom-up forms of 'citizens' veillance' – such as 'watching the 
watchers', self-surveillance and environmental monitoring – that reflect citizens' values, promote 
their interests and protect their rights.78 

Surveillance takes a slightly different form in the domain of defence, which includes information-
gathering as well as state-supported espionage.79 Both forms of surveillance have always been vital 
for defence as the right information is essential to the success of military operations and for national 
security.  Information-gathering  for  defence  includes  intelligence,  surveillance,  target  acquisition 
and reconnaissance with the aim of providing a comprehensive picture of one or more locations by 
using all the sensors and equipment available. Such surveillance is secretive by default, particularly 
as the 'watched' are likely to alter their behaviour if they are aware of the 'watcher', especially in a 
conflict  situation.  Nevertheless,  privacy  issues  are  central  when  asking  'what constitutes  national 
security interest?' and determining the limits. All the more in a context in which technologies enable 
new dimensions of recording and storing capabilities, long endurance, increasing adaptability to 
different environments (from desert to dense urban spaces), and camouflage. Scholars have studied 
the theory of 'just war' as it applies to intelligence gathering80 but, given the suspension of the usual 
standards of morality in wartime, the acceptability of surveillance in this context is not always clear.  

Turning to the disruptive effects of technology in laws and regulations, the recent policy debate 
around the adoption of location-tracking81 measures to fight the Covid-19 pandemic is one of many 
examples of how EU policy-makers are engaged with addressing surveillance technologies. So far, 
the EU institutions have used a soft law approach to foster harmonised deployment of technologies 
that abide by the GDPR and e-Privacy Directive. The European Commission asked82 telecom firms to 
hand over anonymised mobile metadata in order to help analyse patterns of diffusion of the virus, 
and has adopted guidelines83 for ensuring that new tools respect citizens' privacy. Furthermore, the 
EU will scrutinise84 Google and Apple initiatives to develop contact-tracing technology to ensure it 
meets the bloc's privacy standards. While a quick response is vital to tackle the disease, democratic 
oversight  is  also  crucial.  The  European  Parliament  stresses  that,  as  co-legislator  and  as  the  only 
institution directly elected by universal suffrage, it must be included as an integral and essential part 
of  all  discussions  on  the  EU's  response  to  the  crisis,  and  has  called  on  the  Commission  and  the 
Member States to publish the details related to the contact-tracing applications on mobile devices 
and allow for public scrutiny and full oversight.85 

78   See  P.  Boucher,  S.  Nascimento  and  M.  Tallacchini,  Emerging  ICT  for  citizens'  veillance:  Theoretical  and  practical 

insights, Science and Engineering Ethics 24 (3) pp 821–830, 2018.  

79   While information-gathering can be executed without breaking laws, espionage involves uncovering secret information. 
80  

J. Galliott, and W. Reed, Ethics and the Future of Spying, Technology, National Security and Intelligence Collection, 
Routledge, 2016. 

81   C. Dumbrava, Tracking mobile devices to fight coronavirus, EPRS, European Parliament, April 2020.  
82   S. Stolton, EU's Breton defends COVID-19 telecoms data acquisition plans, Euractiv, 2020.  
83   European  Commission,  Guidance  on  Apps  supporting  the  fight  against  COVID  19  pandemic  in  relation  to  data 

protection, 2020.  

84   N. Drozdiak, Google, Apple covid-19 tracking tech faces EU scrutiny, Bloomberg, 2020.  
85   See European Parliament resolution of 17 April 2020 on EU coordinated action to combat the COVID-19 pandemic 

and its consequences (2020/2616(RSP)). 

22 

 
 
Disruption by technology 

9. Concluding remarks  

This  analysis  presents  brief  reviews  of  how  the  development  and  application  of  technology  can 
disrupt several domains. In disrupting economies, it shows how technologies create (and destroy) 
certain  business  models,  supply  chains  and  patterns  of  employment.  In  disrupting  defence,  it 
demonstrates how innovations are transforming militaries from logistics and training to strategic 
decision-making and physical combat. In disrupting democratic debates, it shows how the business 
models  of  social  media  –  which  benefit  from  emotional,  polarising  content  –  have  become  a 
platform for disinformation that can increase rifts in society and undermine democratic processes, 
whereas facts and information rarely go viral. At the same time, however, these dynamics also affect 
trust in these companies, seemingly leading to more awareness among advertisers – who seek to 
protect their brands – about which platforms they associate themselves with.  

In disrupting social norms, values and identities, our analysis shows how technology changes our 
most profound understanding of ourselves as well as the way we undertake the most mundane daily 
activities. In disrupting international relations, it illustrates how technology can adjust the global 
balance  of  power,  and  even  transform  the  international  system  itself.  In  disrupting  laws  and 
regulations, it shows how the pace of innovation calls for a more flexible approach to policy-making, 
heralding  the  emergence  of  smart  regulatory  tools  such  as  sandboxing  and  collaborative 
governance. A further chapter then explains how these various types of technological disruptions 
can come together, along with other disruptive forces such as Covid-19, to propel other phenomena 
such as extended state and commercial surveillance. 

Sometimes,  the  same  tensions  of  technology  disruption  play  out  at  different  scales  in  different 
domains. Technologies such as AI already generate substantial profits and functional benefits, and 
appear  to  have  room  to  grow,  but  the  distribution  of  benefits  and  risks  as  well  as  control  over 
information  are  unevenly  distributed.  This  applies  to  individuals  using  social  media  platforms  to 
inform voting choices or purchasing decisions, as well as to world leaders and military commanders 
making strategic choices. For any actor operating at any scale, it is difficult to prepare for disruption 
because the future causes of failure or success cannot be seen in advance. In this context, it is also 
worth mentioning the force of human creativity and desire for a better world as shown, for example, 
in the reimagining of surveillance technologies as opportunities for participatory activities to build 
communities, empower citizens and deliver tangible health and environmental benefits. 

The impact of technology on employment is often discussed in terms of quality and quantity of jobs, 
but another key element is how humans and machines can work together in a system to make good 
decisions while maintaining human autonomy. Again, this dilemma plays out beyond workplaces, 
across domains and scales as households, small business, large multinationals and nation states all 
face  the  same  question.  It  is  not  clear  where  these  tensions  will  lead  us,  but  our  path  in  this 
increasingly technology-dependent world will be decided to a large extent by the social, political, 
and economic choices we make now. 

Contemporary  disruptive  technologies  are  prompting  a  shift  towards  a  smart-type  regulation 
(i.e. less top-down, less command and control, more participatory). As a result, EU policy-makers are 
increasingly  using  a  range  of  normative  instruments  that  rely  less  on  the  ordinary  EU  legislative 
procedure  and  more  on  flexible  soft-law  mechanisms  such  as  guidelines  and  sandboxing 
approaches, which require greater cooperation with private actors. The European Parliament could 
align itself more closely with the elaboration of such mechanisms to ensure democratic oversight 
on measures that de facto set the legal and regulatory environment. 

23 

 
 
Q
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Technological development has long been considered 
as a disruptive force, provoking change at many levels, 
from  the  routine  daily  activities  of  individuals  to 
dramatic  competition  between  global  superpowers. 
This  analysis  examines  disruption 
caused  by 
technologies  in  a  series  of  key  areas  of  politics, 
economics  and  society.  It  focuses  on  seven  fields:  the 
economic system, the military and defence, democratic 
debates and the 'infosphere', social norms, values and 
identities,  international  relations,  and  the  legal  and 
regulatory  system.  It  also  presents  surveillance  as  an 
example of  how  technological disruption  across  these 
domains can converge to propel other phenomena. The 
key  disruptive  force  of  2020  is  non-technological, 
namely  coronavirus.  The  pandemic  is  used  here  as  an 
opportunity  to  examine  how  technological  disruption 
interacts with other forms of disruption.  

This is a publication of EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service 

This document is prepared for, and addressed to, the Members and staff of the European 
Parliament as background material to assist them in their parliamentary work. The content of 
the document is the sole responsibility of its author(s) and any opinions expressed herein should 
not be taken to represent an official position of the Parliament. 

PE 652.079 
ISBN 978-92-846-6958-5 
doi:10.2861/718464