COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT A fresh look at the Single European Sky Accompanying the documents Amended proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the implementation of the Single European Sky (recast) and Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 as regards the capacity of the European Union Aviation Safety Agency to act as Performance Review Body of the Single European Sky
Date: 2020-09-22
Institutions: Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport, European Commission
Subjects: Eurocontrol, European Aviation Safety Agency, Single European Sky, air safety, air space, air traffic control, civil aviation, common transport policy, environmental protection, reduction of gas emissions

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  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 22.9.2020  SWD(2020) 187 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT A fresh look at the Single European Sky Accompanying the documents     Amended proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the implementation of the Single European Sky (recast) and Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 as regards the capacity of the European Union Aviation Safety Agency to act as Performance Review Body of the Single European Sky {COM(2020) 579 final}  
 
 
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  EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table of Contents 

Contents 
1. 

Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 2 

2. 

Challenges ......................................................................................................................... 4 

3.  Objectives pursued ......................................................................................................... 11 

4.  Modifications to original proposal and evidence .......................................................... 12 

ANNEXES 

ANNEX I Analysis of options for the set-up of the Performance Review Body 

ANNEX II Abbreviations  

ANNEX III Overview of SES legislation 

ANNEX IV List of reports, studies and other evidence 

1 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. 

Introduction 

1.1. 

 Policy context 

The  Single  European  Sky  (SES)  initiative  aims  to  improve  the  overall  efficiency  of  the  way  in  which 
European airspace is organised and managed. This is done through the reform of the industry providing 
air navigation services, which are natural monopolies regulated at Union level.  

Air traffic management  (ATM)  in Europe  needs to be  reformed to cope  both with sustained air traffic 
growth over the last decade and with significant unforeseen traffic variations such as the one caused by 
the COVID-19 pandemic. This requires changes allowing operations to take place under the safest, most 
cost-  and  flight-efficient  and  environmentally  friendly  conditions,  as  well  as  measures  contributing  to 
the reduction of aviation emissions, in accordance with the objectives of the European Green Deal.  

This  implies  de-fragmenting  the  European  airspace,  reducing  delays,  increasing  safety  standards  and 
flight  efficiency  to  reduce  the  aviation  environmental  footprint,  and  regulating  charges  related  to 
monopolistic  service  provision.  In  this  context,  close  civil-military  collaboration,  at  national  and  EU 
levels, is necessary for the implementation of the Single European Sky.  

Today, two of the biggest challenges facing the European ATM network are: 

 
the need for a system with scalable air  traffic control capacity, capable of managing aircraft in 
the  safest  and  most  economically  and  environmentally  friendly  way,  minimising  delays  and 
consequential extra fuel burn and emissions, inconvenience for passengers, and congestion; and 
 
the continued need to reduce the environmental footprint through appropriate measures in the 
area  of  air  traffic  management,  knowing  that  such  measures  can  contribute  directly  and  indirectly  to 
such reductions. 

A  lack  of  air  traffic  control  capacity  results  in  additional  costs,  delays  or  emissions.  Delays  are 
unnecessary and avoidable and cost the EU €6 billion alone in 2019.1 These costs are passed on to the 
passenger  by  the  airline.  Flight  paths  can  be  environmentally  sub-optimal  in  terms  of  CO2  emissions, 
when pilots have to fly around congested airspace sectors or when airlines evade charging zones with 
higher  rates.  The  Single  European  Sky  legislation  aims  to  address  the  issue  of  un-scalable  air  traffic 
control capacity and introduce measures that will improve in particular the environmental performance, 
which can be achieved through ATM.  

1.2. 

 Legislative background 

Two major legislative packages constitute the current SES system – the first (SES I) adopted by the co-
legislators  in  2004  consists  of  now  three  (initially  four)  regulations,  and  the  second  (SES  II)  amended 
those Regulations in 2009. The number of Commission acts adopted in this area is significant, and so is 
the breadth of the details covered.2 The relevant legislative rules are closely linked to those developed 

1 Eurocontrol: PRC analysis in 2013 SES2+ impact assessment 
2 An overview of SES legislation can be found in Annex III 

2 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
for  the  European  Union  Aviation  Safety  Agency  (EASA),  parts  of  which  have  been  superseded  by  the 
EASA  Basic  Regulation  adopted  in  2018.3  The  experience  gained  with  SES  I  and  SES  II  since  2004  and 
2009, respectively, as well as with the high number of implementing acts adopted, has shown that the 
principles and direction of the SES are valid and warrant a continuation of their implementation. Despite 
this body of legislation, the high costs of air traffic management (ATM) and delays resulting from limited 
capacity, as well as inefficiencies in ATM causing congestion leading to delays that are detrimental to the 
environment, persist. It is clear that the overall targets set when SES was first established were not fully 
achieved in their expected timeframe. The aviation sector has evolved over the last decade, and these 
changes should be taken into account.  

1.3.  Rationale for amending the SES2+ proposal and the EASA Basic Regulation 

The  original  proposal  for  a  regulation  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  the 
implementation of the Single European Sky (SES2+) was adopted by the Commission on 11 June 2013. 
The  Transport  (TTE)  Council  agreed  a  partial  General  Approach  on  3  December  2014.  Trilogue 
negotiations  began  in  2015,  but  stalled  for  different  reasons,  inter  alia  because  of  the  disagreement 
between the United Kingdom and Spain over the status of Gibraltar airport.  

In 2017, the  European Court  of Auditors (ECA) issued a Special Report on the Single European Sky4. It 
made recommendations for implementation by the Commission, most of which already featured in the 
SES2+  proposal.    In  2019,  the  ECA  followed  up  this  analysis  with  another  Special  Report  on  the 
regulation of ATM modernisation in the  EU.5  The report makes recommendations to the Commission. 
Both reports provide valuable advice on the implementation of SES and its technological pillar, SESAR6.  

In 2019, work began to revive the discussion on the future of the Single European Sky. A Wise Person’s 
Group, composed of fifteen eminent experts in the field, was set up to assess the current situation and 
future needs for ATM in the EU. After months of consultations in the form of hearings with all relevant 
operational  stakeholders,  a  common  view  was  formed,  resulting  in  the  Report  of  the  Wise  Persons 
Group  on  the  future  of  the  Single  European  Sky  in  April  2019,  containing  ten  recommendations.7  In 
parallel, a Pilot Project was commissioned by the European Parliament on the future architecture of the 
European airspace, which also resulted in a report in March 20198. Under the Finnish Presidency of the 
Council of the  European Union, a high-level conference  on the future of the Single European Sky  was 
held in September 2019, resulting in a signed joint stakeholder declaration urging action on the part of 
the European institutions to simplify the regulatory framework and institutional set-up to respond to the 
current and future needs of European ATM, making it fit for purpose. 

From a political perspective, the European Parliament called on the Presidency of the Council ahead of 
the Transport Council of December 2019 to start work on the SES2+ proposal, putting it on the agenda 

3 Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2018 
4 https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR17_18/SR_SES_EN.pdf 
5 https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR19_11/SR_SESAR_DEPLOYMENT_EN.pdf 

7https://ec.europa.eu/transport/sites/transport/files/2019-04-report-of-the-wise-persons-group-on-the-future- 
of-the-single-european-sky.pdf 
8 https://www.sesarju.eu/node/3253 

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of the Council. A policy debate was held during this session, resulting in the following conclusions by the 
Presidency on a way forward regarding the next legislative steps to be taken: 

“…a majority of Member States advocated working on the basis of the SES II+ draft text and a 
complementary analysis from the Commission on proposals for new measures” 

Finally, the departure of the United Kingdom from the Union lifted the formal barrier that blocked the 
negotiations on the SES2+ proposal.   

In light of these developments, it would appear appropriate to amend the SES2+ proposal, in particular 
for the following reasons: 

The  text  needs  to  be  aligned  with  relevant  Union  legislation  adopted  and  in  force9  since  the 

 
negotiations on the SES2+ proposal stalled; 
 
A  revision  of  some  definitions  and  concepts  would  simplify  the  text  and  reflect  stakeholder 
inputs  and  current  operating  environment,  as  well  as  relevant  conclusions  from  reports  and  studies 
recently carried out;10 
 
Recommendations  resulting  from  the  European  Parliament  pilot  project  on  the  future 
architecture  of  the  European  Airspace  and  from  the  European  Court  of  Auditors  may  need  to  be 
reflected; 
 
account.  

Technology  has  advanced  in  addition  to  market  developments,  which  should  be  taken  into 

The push for decarbonisation in the context of the European Green Deal across industry sectors has also 
led to additional considerations for measures that can be taken to reduce the environmental footprint 
of ATM. 

 In  some  cases,  the  preferred  options  from  the  2013  impact  assessment  should  be  considered  valid, 
while in other cases, those options should be updated to reflect changes in the sector. Section 4 of this 
Commission Staff Working Document describes the new approaches proposed and presents evidence to 
support the changes. 

2. 

Challenges 

The  core  problems  identified  in  the  2013  impact  assessment  on  the  Single  European  Sky  focus  on  air 
traffic  control  capacity  and  delays,  cost  reduction  in  air  navigation  service  (ANS)  provision  and  flight 
efficiency  and  environment.  The  same  challenges  are  addressed  in  this  Staff  Working  Document  and 
amended proposal, with a decreased emphasis on cost reduction and an increased emphasis on delays 
and the environment.   

9 Primarily the EASA Basic Regulation 1139/2018 
10 The evidence used in this Staff Working Document and for the modifications in the legislative text can be found 
in Annex IV. 

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In the short term, the COVID-19 crisis has substantially altered the economic conditions under which air 
navigation services are provided. Air navigation service providers are faced with the challenge to adjust 
activities  and  related  costs  in  response  to  the  crisis  –  also  to  support  the  future  recovery  of  the  air 
transport sector – while at the same time ensuring that future air traffic growth does not create another 
delay crisis like  the  one  experienced before the  current crisis caused by the  COVID-19 pandemic. This 
ultimately shows the need for transforming the way air navigation services are provided so that changes 
in demand can improve and be accommodated in a more flexible way. 

2.1.  Delays and congestion  
From this point  forward, ATM fixed costs  must  be  reduced to a minimum, so that service  provision is 
economically sustainable even in cases of unforeseen traffic variations, for example in times of crisis.  

Figure 1 presents the long-term traffic forecast as calculated for the Challenges of Growth – European 
Aviation in 2040 study.   

Figure 1: Overview of the future long-term traffic (IFR movements)11 

This forecast does not take into account the current crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Currently, 
there is no other forecast that reliably estimates the impact of the crisis on the long-term traffic levels. 
Past experience shows that after all crises Europe has faced in the past (e.g. SARS, volcanic ash, financial 
crisis), the demand for travel returned. This is depicted in Figure 2 (below). 

11 European Aviation in 2040 - Challenges to growth – flight forecast (EUROCONTROL) 

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Initial analysis of capacity levels for the next months are estimated by Eurocontrol as follows:  

Figure 2: Traffic growth recovery after certain crises 

Figure 3 – Draft Traffic Scenarios 2020-2021 

The figure above depicts a sharp decline in traffic levels compared to 2019 between January and April 
2020, during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic in Europe and the introduction of travel restrictions. 
lines  of  two  scenarios:  the 
Recovery  begins  shortly  thereafter,  with  a  prediction  along  the 
implementation of coordinated or uncoordinated measures. Actual recovery has been more rapid than 

6 

10.00015.00020.00025.00030.00035.0001995199619971998199920002001200220032004200520062007200820092010201120122013201420152016201720182019Average daily traffic in ECACSARSEconomic downturnVolcanic eruption9/11 
 
 
 
 
predicted with nearly 40% of traffic recovery in July 2020, predicted to reach 50% of capacity recovery in 
August 2020.  

Considering  the  big  picture,  and  looking  ahead to  the  recovery of  the  traffic,  there  have  been  limited 
improvements in air traffic control capacity over the last several years, while growth in the number of 
flights has increased, causing congestion and delays over a large area of the Union. The summer peak 
travel period of 2018 in particular and 2019 were witness to major air traffic control capacity crises in 
the core areas of European airspace. This can be observed in Table 1, which shows the increase in  en 
route  delay  of  more  than  100%  in  2018  compared  with  2017.    The  summer  of  2020  was  forecast  to 
experience a similar capacity crunch and resulting delays. However, this is no longer the case due to the 
current travel restrictions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.  

Airport ATFM delays 
En-route ATFM delays 
Total ATFM delays 

2016 
(minutes 000s) 
6,823 
8,665 
15,488 

2017 
(minutes 000s) 
6,574 
9,282 
15,856 

2018  
(minutes 000s) 
6,575 
19,052 
25,627 

2019 
(minutes 000s) 
6,686 
17,481 
24,166 

Table 1: Evolution of delays 2016-2019 - EUROCONTROL 

The main causes of delay and actual delay minutes have not changed considerably over the years, as can 
be seen in the table below. In the first quarter of 2020, however, delay minutes were close to zero as a 
direct  result  of  travel  restrictions  due  to  the  COVID-19  pandemic.  In  other  years,  the  primary  reason 
remains air traffic controller (ATC) staffing and capacity as shown in Figure 4. 

Figure 4: European ATFM en-route network delays 2019 - delay causes - EUROCONTROL 

In  2018  and  2019,  the  Network Manager,  re-appointed  by  the  Commission  for  the  2019-2029  period, 
took crisis measures to manage the congestion by re-routing aircraft around the congested areas, which 

7 

0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%2016201720182019DelayYearsThe main reasons for en-route ATFM delayCapacity/staffingWeatherDisruptions/events 
 
 
 
was  a  necessary  measure  to  manage  the  traffic.  The  actions  managed  to  alleviate  the  congestion  to 
some degree but these measures are unsustainable in the long term. Additional avoidable CO2 emissions 
were  generated  due  to  inefficient  flight  paths  taken  due  to  the  required  diversions  around  the 
congested  areas.  Nevertheless,  without  these  crisis  measures,  the  delay  situation  would  have  been 
worse  as  flights  would  likely  have  to  wait  in  holding  patterns  or  be  instructed  to  make  additional 
diversions, resulting in increased fuel burn.  

One  of  the  main  lessons  learned  from  the  congestion  caused  by  un-scalable  capacity  is  that  air 
navigation  service  providers  often  could  not  provide  the  level  of  air  traffic  control  capacity  that  was 
committed in the Network Operations Plan prepared by the Network Manager. The evidence of this is 
shown in Table 2 below. 

ANSP 

Austrocontrol – Vienna ACC 
Skeyes – Brussels ACC 
DFS – Karlsruhe ACC 
DSNA – Marseille ACC 

Capacity (2019 
planned) 
202 
140 
399 
287 

Capacity (2019 
achieved) 
181 
118 
279 
222 

Difference 
(%) 
-11% 
-15% 
-30% 
-23% 

Table 2: Planned vs achieved capacity in 2019 (movements per hour) - EUROCONTROL 

In case one air navigation service provider is unable to provide the required air traffic control capacity, 
then the possibility to delegate service provision to another service provider is needed. For example, in 
2019,  Deutsche  Flugsicherung  (DFS)  committed  to  deliver  the  capacity  of  399  movements/hour  from 
their  Karlsruhe  Area  Control  Centre.  The  actual  delivery  was  279  movements/hour,  which  is  30%  less 
than  what  was  committed.  As  a  result,  a  number  of  flights  had  to  be  re-routed,  flying  sub-optimal 
routes. This is not the only example of non-delivery of the planned capacity.  

In order to avoid this situation, stronger commitment by air navigation service providers is needed in the 
planning (pre-tactical) phase so that the Network Manager can be in a position to manage the capacity-
brokering process, which has been hampered in the past by air navigation service providers that did not 
deliver the capacity they committed to the Network Manager.  

2.2. 

 Environmental challenges 

2.2.1.  Air Traffic and Emissions Growth 

There were 10.3 million flights in the Single European Sky (SES) area12 during 2019. The increase for the 
year  was  4.92%  and  1.15%  from  2017  and  2018,  respectively.  Flights  are  forecast  to  increase  at  an 
average  annual  growth  rate  of  1.6%  over  the  third  Reference  Period  (RP3  –  2020-2024)  of  the 
performance scheme13 to 11.2 million flights by 2024 under the base traffic forecast14. This forecast was 
revised  downward  in  comparison  to  the  forecast  made  at  the  beginning  of  2019  reflecting  the 
uncertainty  related  to  withdrawal  of  the  United  Kingdom  from  the  Union,  the  precarious  economic 

12 EU28 + Norway & Switzerland 
13 See section 4.3 
14 EUROCONTROL STATFOR statistics and forecast service spring 2020 

8 

 
 
                                                           
outlook, recent  bankruptcy of airlines  and the grounding of the Boeing 737MAX  aircraft, in particular. 
This, coupled with the continuing increase of aircraft size, means decelerating flight growth. 

Moreover, the travel restrictions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 resulted in an almost 90% 
reduction in capacity and flights in April 2020. This figure is gradually recovering but is forecast to return 
to  pre-health  crisis  levels  only  in  2021  at  the  earliest  (see  Figure  3.5  above).  The  entire  STATFOR15 
forecast for RP3 will be revised to take into account the pandemic and gradual air traffic recovery. From 
now  on,  building  on  low  traffic  levels,  environmentally  optimal  trajectories  should  continue  to  be  the 
main objective.  Under a scenario in which capacity is sufficient, flights can more easily be planned with 
direct routes, ensuring lower emissions. 

16, the total emissions for flights flying within the ECAC17 area have increased by 9% from 
As regards CO2
191.3 million tonnes (Mt) in 2017 to 208.7 Mt in 2019. If nothing is done, it is estimated that future CO2 
emissions  under  the  base  traffic  forecast  scenario  would  increase  to  302.8  Mt  by  2035  i.e.  a  58% 
increase vs. 2017. 

The figure below presents the dispersion of CO2 emissions during all phases of flight.  

Figure 5: Aviation CO2 emissions and flight phases in 2019 

15 EUROCONTROL’s statistics and forecast service 
16 While greenhouse gas emissions includes non-CO2 effects such as nitrogen oxides (NOx), vapour trails and cloud formation 
triggered by the altitude at which aircraft operate, this chapter focuses on carbon dioxide (CO2). 
17 European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) - 44 Member States: Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands,  North  Macedonia, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United 
Kingdom 

9 

Surface: Taxi-in2.01%Surface: Taxi-out3.62%Surface: Take-off run3.01%Departure (to 40NM, incl. CCO inefficiency to ToC)18.39%En route airspace162.178%Arrival (from 40NM, incl. CDO inefficiency to ToD)19.79%208.7MtonnesSource: EUROCONTROLEstimated CO2emissions in the ECAC area in 2019  
 
 
                                                           
The  main  contributor  to  the  total  gate-to-gate  CO2  emissions  is  that  produced  during  en  route  flight, 
accounting for 78%, with 18% of the total emissions generated during the departure and arrival phases, 
and finally, 4% of emissions during surface movements (including the take-off run). 

2.2.2.  Network flight inefficiencies 

When  comparing  the  gate-to-gate  actual  trajectories  of  all  flights  controlled  in  the ECAC  area  in 2019 
against  their  unimpeded  trajectories18,  there  are  an  additional  6%  gate-to-gate  CO2  emissions19  .  This 
corresponds to a “benefit pool” of 11.6 Mt of excess CO2 emissions that ATM can directly influence, as 
can be seen in Figure 6. It should be noted, however, that there are a number of reasons why the actual 
trajectory  flown  can  vary  from  the  unimpeded  trajectory,  and  therefore  100%  efficiency  is  not 
achievable  (e.g.  due  to  adverse  weather,  avoidance  of  ‘Danger  Areas’,  need  to  maintain  minimum 
separation).  Some 
is  unrecoverable  due  to  necessary  operational  constraints  and 
interdependencies20.  

inefficiency 

In  recent  years,  the  congestion  and  necessary  re-routing  of  many  flights  added  several  %  points  of 
additional emissions, leading the total avoidable emissions to around 10%.  

Figure 6: ANS CO2 benefit pool 2019 

18 Unimpeded trajectories are characterised by: zero additional taxi-out time, no level-off during climb (full fuel CCO), no sub-
optimal cruise level, en-route actual distance equal to great circle distance (orthodromic distance i.e. shortest distance between 
two points on the surface of a sphere), no level-off during descent (full fuel CDO), no additional time in the Arrival Sequencing 
and Metering Area (ASMA), zero additional taxi-in time. 
19 EUROCONTROL Aviation Intelligence Unit 
20 CANSO, 2012, ATM Global Environment Efficiency Goals for 2050 

10 

Surface: Taxi-in0.474%Surface: Taxi-out1.029%Terminal airspace: departure path extension0.00%Climb: inefficiency due to intermediate level off0.11%En route airspace: horizontal inefficiency4.539%En route airspace: vertical inefficiency2.118%Terminal airspace: arrival path extension2.420%Descent: inefficiency due to intermediate level-off1.19%11.6MtonnesSource: EUROCONTROLTheoretical ANS CO2benefit pool in 2019 (ECAC area) 
 
 
                                                           
Figure 7 illustrates the relative excess CO2 emissions21 broken down into the different flight phases. The 
relative excess CO2 emissions have remained roughly stable over the last eight years, even though traffic 
has  increased.  This  is  an  average  across  all  annual  operations  but  that  masks  significant  diversity  of 
emissions performance across the network both on city-pairs and by individual air carriers. 

Figure 7: Breakdown gate-to-gate excess CO2 emissions due to network inefficiency in the ECAC area 

Clearly, a number of measures  can be  taken, in addition  to the implementation of the European ATM 
Master Plan, to improve flight efficiency and subsequently reduce CO2 emissions during most, if not all, 
phases  of  flight,  such  as  the  implementation  of  a  continuous  descent  approach,  local  measures,  etc. 
ATM  charges  should be  increasingly  used to incentivise efficient  behaviour and the Network Manager 
should have a strengthened coordination role in pursuit of this goal. 

3.  Objectives pursued 

The main objective of the 2013 SES2+ proposal was to:  

 ‘improve the competitiveness of the European aviation system vis-à-vis other comparable regions, 
and in particular developing further the SES initiative, which implies de-fragmenting the European 
airspace, reducing delays, increasing safety standards and flight efficiency as to reduce the 
environmental footprint of aviation and the costs related to service provision.’ 

That same objective should be maintained, with an even greater emphasis on delay reduction and flight 
efficiency, in order to contribute to reducing aviation’s carbon footprint, while maintaining the goals of 
cost-efficiency  and  de-fragmentation.  Safety  in  ATM  is  a  paramount  constant  objective,  and  is  being 
effectively addressed and managed under Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 (‘EASA Basic Regulation’) and at 
national level. Clear links between the two Regulations should therefore be established. 

21 Excess emissions expressed as a percentage of the total annual emissions with unimpeded trajectories in the ECAC area 

11 

 
 
 
                                                           
The  amended  SES2+  proposal  should  take  into  account  outcomes  from  the  inter-institutional 
negotiations at the time, and retain the same high-level policy objectives and choices as were agreed to 
by Member States in 2009 and again stated in the 2011 White Paper for Transport.22 Furthermore, the 
Commission’s  Aviation  Strategy  for  Europe  of  201523  called  for  the  immediate  adoption  of  the  SES2+ 
proposal by the co-legislators. The European Parliament Resolution on this Strategy specifically recalled 
that  ‘airspace  is  also  part  of  the  EU  single  market,  and  that  any  fragmentation  resulting  from  its 
inefficient use, as well as diverging national practices’ causes ‘longer flight times, delays, extra fuel burn 
and higher levels of CO2 emissions.’  The letter from the European Parliament’s Committee on Transport 
and Tourism to the Finnish Presidency of the Council of the European Union of November 2019 urged 
them to put SES2+ back on the agenda of the Council and begin work, as they ‘are ready to negotiate the 
text in a swift manner.’24 The Commission’s European Green Deal of December 201925 identifies SES as a 
measure  that  ‘will  help  achieve  significant  reductions  in  aviation  emissions.’  The  Single  European  Sky 
reform should be a reform with structural changes designed to ensure that the sector is fit and better 
able to realise  its economic potential in a balanced way, by providing for a more flexible and scalable 
provision of air navigation services, fit for the operating environment of today and of the future, and by 
improving on environmental performance. Once the pandemic is contained, it will be even more crucial 
to increase resilience and scalability in the management of European skies. In the short term, this means 
reducing  the  risk  that  a  progressive  return  to  operations  would  be  disrupted  by  unforeseen  airspace 
closures  or  lack  of  air  traffic  control  capacity.  It  is  crucial  to  arrive  at  a  more  agile  service  provision 
environment  with  an  ability  to  scale  the  capacity  quickly  and  efficiently  to  demand  when  it  grows  or 
declines, or where the geographical needs change. Scalability means the capacity that the ATM system 
needs  to  adapt  quickly  to  traffic  demand  variations  without  generating  negative  externalities  such  as 
cost, delay or emissions.  

4. 

 New approaches and evidence 

4.1. 

 General 

This  section  describes  what  issues  should  be  addressed  in  the  SES2+  proposal,  how  they  should  be 
addressed, and the evidence to justify changes. 

4.1.1.  Coherence with Union legislation 

Provisions that now fall under the competence of the EASA Basic Regulation26 should be removed, such 
as  oversight  tasks  related  to  safety  and  rules  on  interoperability.  Definitions  should  be  updated  and 
added, for example, on SESAR. 

22 https://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/strategies/2011_white_paper_en  
23 https://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air/aviation-strategy_en 
24 TRAN/D/2019/38211 Letter from Chairwoman Karima Delli to H.E. Minna Kivimaki, Ambassador of Finland to the 
European Union 28.11.2019 
25 COM(2019) 640 final 
26 Regulation No 2018/1139 

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4.2. 

 National Supervisory Authorities - NSAs 

4.2.1. 

Independence of NSAs 

The preferred policy option in the impact assessment accompanying the 2013 SES II+ proposal refers to 
the  ineffective  role  of  NSAs  and  calls  for  the  introduction  of  mutual  cooperation  and  EU-level 
coordination  as  well  as  institutional  separation  of  NSAs  from  the  air  navigation  service  providers 
(ANSPs). Full institutional separation instead of current functional separation of NSAs from the ANSPs 
that  they  oversee,  as  is  the  case  in  some  Member  States,  is  required.  The  intention  was  to  further 
increase  the  level  of  independence  and  keep  NSAs  from  using  ANSP  personnel  for  oversight  and 
economic regulation related tasks. This intention remains valid. 

NSA  independence  should  be  strengthened  vis-à-vis  the  2013  SES  II+  proposal  as  regards  strategic 
decision-making. This would follow the same approach as regulation in other transport sectors such as 
rail,  for  example  as  regards  requirements  on  persons  in  charge  of  strategic  decisions.  The  preferred 
option  in  the  impact  assessment  was  the  institutional  separation  of  NSAs  from  ANSPs,  in  addition  to 
mutual co-operation and EU coordination, a logic that should continue to be followed.  

In its 2017 Special Report No 18 on the Single European Sky, the European Court of Auditors issued a 
specific recommendation on the independence and capacity of NSAs. 

Recommendation 3 of the European Court of Auditors – Ensure full independence and capacity of NSAs  

NSAs should be fully independent and have the capacity to fulfil  their functions. To this end, Member 
States should ensure that NSAs are hierarchically, financially and functionally independent from ANSPs 
and have the resources necessary to oversee and monitor the performance and charging schemes. We 
note that the  prompt  adoption of the  applicable provisions in the SES2+  legislative package  would be 
beneficial in this regard. Deadline: 2019 

Arguably,  the  ECA  recommendation  alone  justifies  a  strengthened  proposal  for  the  independence  of 
NSAs  from  ANSPs,  or  from  any  private  or  public  entity.  Some  NSAs  continue  to  be  only  functionally 
separated from the ANSPs they oversee, which is seen as a conflict of interest. This situation should be 
remedied to ensure the full independence of the NSA, in terms of their organisation, functioning, legal 
structure and decision-making. National supervisory authorities should also have the necessary financial 
resources and capabilities to carry out the tasks assigned to them. 

4.2.2.  Tasks of NSAs 

The NSA tasks should slightly change to include conducting the activities necessary for the issuance of 
economic  certificates,  overseeing  the  correct  application  of  procurement  requirements  and  to  reflect 
their role regarding the functioning of the performance and charging schemes.  

Furthermore, NSAs should be able to delegate tasks related to the implementation of the performance 
and charging scheme to the Agency acting as Performance Review Body (PRB), in order to further assist 
NSAs, which would help overcome difficulties in resourcing NSAs.  

13 

 
 
 
  
There  should  be  a  clear  delineation  of  tasks  between  NSAs  and  the  national  competent  authorities 
(NCAs) referred to in the EASA Basic Regulation. NSAs would be responsible for economic regulation, for 
overseeing  the  correct  application  of  procurement  requirements  as  well  as  the  performance  and 
charging  scheme.  NSAs  would  also  be  in  charge  of  issuing  the  economic  certificates  covering 
requirements unrelated to safety (financial robustness, liability and insurance cover). NCAs would focus 
on safety oversight and other tasks described in Regulation (EU) 2018/1139. This distinction would not 
prevent Member States from attributing both sets of tasks to one entity at national level, provided that 
the independence requirements are respected. 

4.2.3.  Cooperation between NSAs 

Mutual  cooperation  regarding  safety  certification  and  safety oversight  is  addressed  by  the  EASA  Basic 
Regulation. Mutual cooperation and EU-level coordination regarding economic regulation tasks should 
also be addressed, in line with the preferred policy option on NSAs.  

4.3.  Service provision 
4.3.1.  Economic certification of air navigation service providers and designation of air traffic service 
providers  

Safety  certification  and  safety  oversight  tasks  are  carried  out  by  the  national  competent  authorities 
(NCAs) and are laid out in the EASA Basic Regulation. Only additional requirements not covered by the 
EASA  Basic  Regulation,  namely  requirements  on  financial  robustness,  liability  and  insurance  cover, 
should be maintained. Those requirements should be subject to a separate economic certificate to be 
issued by national supervisory authorities, as it would relate to their field of competence.  In order to 
provide air navigation services in the Union, air navigation service providers would need both the safety 
certificate,  regulated  under  EASA  Basic  Regulation,  and  the  economic  certificate,  regulated  under  the 
SES. 

Conditions  for  the  designation  of  air  traffic  service  providers  should  be  strengthened  to  ensure  that 
minimum  public  interest  requirements  are  fulfilled.  This  would  notably  align  with  Union  trade  and 
competition  policies.  The  designation  should  be  time  limited,  with  a  possibility  of  renewal.  Such  a 
system  would  ensure  that  the  Member  States  reconsider  the  designation  decision  in  a  reasonable 
timeframe. Provisions related to the functional airspace blocks (FABs) have turned out not to function 
well, which pleads for their removal. 

4.3.2.  Conditions regarding the provision of services including Communication and Navigation (CNS), 
Aeronautical  Information  (AIS),  ATM  Data  (ADS),  Meteorological  (MET)  and  terminal  air  traffic 
services (ATS) 

4.3.2.1. New approach to the provision of CNS, AIS, ADS, MET and terminal ATS  

The procurement of CNS, AIS, ADS, MET and terminal air traffic services under market conditions has the 
potential to enhance cost-efficiency and should therefore be made possible., It would be important to 
ensure a level playing field and avoid discrimination, cross-subsidisation and distortion of competition. 
Therefore, en route services should be organisationally separated from the other air navigation services. 
This approach would be without prejudice to the choice as to whether or not to de-couple these services 

14 

 
 
 
 
from the provision of air traffic services. Moreover, the above-mentioned objectives could only be fully 
achieved where accounts are separated as appropriate.  

In  order  to  ensure  that  procurement  entails  the  expected  benefits,  it  would  be  preferable  that 
compliance  with  the  requirements  be  monitored.    To  this  effect,  NSAs  should  oversee  the  correct 
application  of  those  requirements.  Providers  could  decide  to  continue  providing  all  the  services  in  an 
integrated manner, but could not prevent other providers from offering competing services.  This aspect 
presents a close link with the issue of exchange of and access to operational data, which are necessary 
for  the  provision  of  the  services  concerned.  In  this  respect,  the  price  for  access  to  those  data  is 
important. It would be appropriate to base that price on marginal cost, so that it covers only the costs 
that are not already paid for.  

A set of requirements along these lines would enable cross-border air traffic data service provision and 
the possibility for competition of data service provision on a European market.  

At  the  same  time,  the  above  approach  could  lead  to  a  separate  offer  of  ATM  data  services  and,  as  a 
consequence,  to  potentially  important  rationalisation.  Corresponding  capacity  could  be  available  ‘on 
demand’  and  possibly  cross-border,  with  greater  flexibility  for  monopolistic  ATS  services.  It  should 
however remain the choice of the air traffic service providers, or of the airport, to make use of this or 
not. 

Airport operators should be enabled to procure terminal air traffic services for aerodrome control under 
market conditions, to reap cost-efficiency gains. Where they would decide to do so, the Member States 
should  designate  the  ATS  providers  chosen  by  the  airport  operators  as  a  result  of  a  procurement 
procedure.  Regarding  terminal  air  traffic  services  for  approach  control,  by  contrast,  Member  States 
should  retain  the  possibility  to  choose  whether  to  allow  procurement,  as  the  services  are  sometimes 
provided by more than one airport. It  would not appear appropriate to constrain the action of airport 
operators or supervisory authorities any further: Where a Member State has allowed procurement, the 
decision  on  whether  to  procure  or  not  would  be  left  to  the  airport  operator,  or  to  the  national 
supervisory  authority  where  the  approach  control  is  not  provided  by  an  airport,  but  is  provided  by  a 
group of airports.  

Since  the SES performance and charging schemes  are aimed at problems specific to services provided 
outside  market  conditions,  terminal  air  traffic  service  providers  operating  under  market  conditions 
should  not  be  subject  to  those  schemes.  However,  they  should  provide  relevant  data  on  the 
performance of air navigation services for monitoring purposes.  

This new approach would directly follow from the preferred option of the 2013 impact assessment and 
would present a potential for rationalisation which is significant and would allow for the implementation 
of ‘capacity on demand’, meaning that service provision could be taken over by different providers more 
flexibly.  However, in contrast to the original proposal, it would introduce more choice and flexibility in 
order to account for the variety of situations in Europe and for the reasons laid out in 4.3.2.2.  

Indeed,  in  the  2013  impact  assessment,  the  preferred  option  was  to  structurally  separate  support 
services from core services (ATS). Under that option, the assets and staff required for support services 
provision  were  to  be  transferred  into  a  separate  organisation,  independent  from  the  core  air  traffic 
service provider. As a consequence, and under the same option, , the possibility for Member States to 

15 

 
 
designate  these  support  service  providers  was  to  be  removed  as  those  services  could  no  longer  be 
bundled  together  with  the  core  service  (ATS)  and  designation  could  only  take  place  in  respect  of  the 
core service. This would have made the support services subject to European procurement rules. As a 
result,  the  2013  proposal  envisaged  the  compulsory  unbundling  of  support  services,  i.e.  air  traffic 
services in all Member States were supposed to be separated from the provision of support services and 
made  open  to  competition  within  the  Union.  It  also  suggested  to  enable  centralised  services  to  be 
offered by the Network Manager. 

The approach suggested above achieves similar results, but through somehow different means. It allows 
certain services to be opened to the market, but requires the separation of accounts from en route air 
traffic services, leading to greater transparency and competition.  

4.3.2.2. Justification for the new approach 

At  the  time  of  the  original  SES2+  proposal,  the  ‘vertical  unbundling’  of  services  was  one  of  the  most 
contentious proposals and was politically unacceptable for Member States in the initial discussions, and 
was  one  of  the  reasons  that  negotiations  on  SES2+  stalled.  The  2013  impact  assessment  describes 
stakeholder views as especially negative on the side of trade unions and professional staff associations, 
as well as political opposition in certain Member States: 

Figure 8: Support for unbundling of services from the core bundled ANSPs and opening up the market for them 

Airlines  fully  supported  the  idea  while  the  majority  of  ANSPs  agreed,  at  least  to  some  extent.  As, 
however,  revealed  in  bilateral  consultations,  the  expected  long-term  effects  of  the  then-proposed 
measures gathered large support. It was widely accepted that structural separation enables the creation 
of  a  true  market,  since  services  were  supposed  to  be  tendered  out  through  an  open  process.  Similar 
views are held still today.  

Furthermore,  the  report  adopted  by  the  Wise  Persons  Group,  regarding  the  future  of  the  Single 
European Sky recommends inter alia the creation of a new market for ATM data service providers.  

This justifies that the general idea of de-coupling be maintained. However, given the experiences drawn 
from the legislative discussions held so far, a change towards a voluntary de-coupling of CNS, AIS, ADS, 

16 

 
 
 
MET or terminal air traffic services from en route air traffic services, appears appropriate. It should be 
combined with an obligatory separation of accounts. This would allow for the creation of a (voluntary) 
market for data services in particular, a concept that most stakeholders indeed support. The creation of 
an  opportunity  to  voluntarily  participate  in  a  market  for  data  services  would  help  overcome  the 
difficulties that arose during the negotiations on the 2013 SES2+ proposal, as the unbundling of services 
would not be imposed. 

The creation of such a market is supported also by the findings made in the European Parliament’s pilot 
project Airspace Architecture Study, in which the major ATM stakeholders participated. This assessment 
was performed on the assumption of a new target architecture with an ATM data layer, presuming that 
ten air traffic data service providers (ADSPs) would operate in the market. The study estimates that the 
additional resilience brought by the dynamic delegation of air traffic services and capacity on demand 
would  account  for  38  million  saved  minutes  of  delay  in  the  period  2019-2030.  The  following  benefits 
were estimated: 

Environment: Between 240 and 450 kg of CO2 saved on average per flight due to optimisation of 

 
Capacity:  Network  is  able  to  accommodate  15,7  million  flights  (increase  of  50%  in  Network 
throughput compared to 2017) with delays below or at the level of the agreed SES target (max 0,5 min 
per flight distributed across all flights)  
 
trajectories  
 
 
safety levels can be maintained27 

Cost Efficiency: Between EUR 57-73 saved per flight due to ANS productivity gains  
Safety: All simulations have been done against controller workload and indicate that the same 

Furthermore,  this  approach  would  embrace  the  logic  of  a  Digital  Single  Market.  Finally,  an  ongoing 
Commission  study  on  ATM  Data  Services  Provision  suggests  that  ATM  data  services,  including 
production and processing of data, account for a market potential of up to EUR €2.2 billion per year or 
25%  in  the  ANS  costs.  The  study  also  estimates  the  cost  reduction  potential  at  about  15%  of  present 
costs of data production infrastructure and processing. 

4.3.3.  Common information services for unmanned aircraft (i.e. drones) 

The  SES  ecosystem  has  evolved  since  the  beginning  of  the  initiative  in  2004.  The  new  users  of  the 
airspace  are  one  of  the  significant  changes.  Unmanned  aircraft,  commonly  called  drones,  are  already 
delivering  innovative  services  within  the  European  airspace.  Yet,  these  emerging  technologies  also 
present a challenge. The rising number of unmanned aircraft system (UAS) operations in the European 
airspace  poses  safety,  security  and  airspace  integration  issues.  In  order  to  ensure  safe  UAS  traffic 
management while at the same time ensuring that those unmanned aircraft can safely operate within 
the existing air traffic environment in a harmonised way across the European airspace, there is a need to 
develop a robust regulatory framework.   

It is therefore necessary to establish requirements on the pricing, and related oversight, of the Common 
Information  Services  (CIS)  that  are  needed  to  enable  safe  air  traffic  management  of  the  unmanned 

27 https://www.sesarju.eu/node/3253 

17 

 
 
 
  
 
                                                           
traffic  (i.e.  drones),  as well  as  on  the  pricing of  and access  to  data  necessary  for  such  services. Those 
requirements should be similar to those relating to air traffic data services, namely that air navigation 
service providers must make data available at marginal cost. In addition, if an ANSP wishes to become a 
CIS provider, and in the interest of transparency and to avoid discrimination and cross-subsidisation, it 
should have separate accounts.  

If  U-space  services  are  provided  under  market  conditions,  then  a  single  point  of  truth  needs  to  be 
established on data to enable the dynamic reconfiguration of airspace intended for unmanned aircraft. 
For this, rules on common information services are necessary. 

This issue needs to be considered in the context of the ongoing work in the EASA Committee on the U-
space regulation. 

4.3.4.  Performance scheme  

4.3.4.1. New approach to the performance scheme  

The approach to the performance scheme should change in several aspects. 

Firstly,  the  responsibility  of  drafting  and  submitting  the  performance  plans,  which  include  binding 
performance targets, should be shifted away from the NSAs to the ATS providers. As a result, each air 
traffic service provider would draft its own plan, which would include the costs for the all air navigation 
services  provided  and  procured  necessary  for  the  provision  of  air  traffic  services.  This  practice  would 
enable air traffic service providers to take responsibility for their own plans, and allow NSAs to focus on 
their supervisory tasks. 

Secondly, the performance plans should no longer be submitted to the Commission, as is the practice 
today,  but  rather  to  the  Agency  acting  as  Performance  Review  Body  or  to  the  national  supervisory 
authority.  This  would  ensure  that  the  assessment  of  the  performance  plans  be  carried  out  with  the 
required  expertise  and  resources,  while  guaranteeing  the  independence  of  that  assessment,  which 
remains  necessary.  It  would  also  allow  for  appeal  procedures  against  the  decisions  taken  on  the 
performance plans.  

The Agency acting as PRB would be in charge of assessing and approving the performance plans for en 
route air navigation services. The national supervisory authorities would be in charge of assessing and 
approving the performance plans for terminal air navigation services.  

Such split of responsibilities however raises an issue of articulation between the procedures, in case air 
traffic  service  providers  supply  both  types  of  services.  Logically,  they  should  in  this  case  submit  two 
separate  performance  plans,  which  however  could  give  rise  to  diverging  assessments  as  regards  the 
allocation of costs between en route and terminal air navigation services. 

In  order  to  address  this  risk,  the  Agency  acting  as  PRB  would  first  assess  the  said  allocation  of  costs 
between the two types of services. This would best be done on the basis of the classification of services 
notified by Member States and approved by the Commission ahead of each reference period. 

18 

 
 
 
 
 
 
In  addition,  the  Network  Manager  should  also  draft  and  submit  a  performance  plan  for  network 
functions, which would be assessed and approved by the Commission on the basis of an opinion of the 
Agency acting as PRB.  

An  additional  change  would  include  the  removal  of  the  targets  on  safety,  since  such  target  does  not 
appear necessary in light of the existing substantive rules. 

4.3.4.2. Justification for a new approach to the performance scheme 

A change in the approach to the performance scheme is justified to adhere to the impact assessment’s 
preferred policy option on the performance scheme, which is to reduce Member States’ involvement in 
the  target-setting  process.  This  could  be  achieved  by  letting  the  ATS  providers  themselves  set  their 
performance targets, and those targets would be approved by either the PRB or independent NSAs. By 
shifting  the  responsibility  of  drawing  up  the  performance  plans  away  from  the  NSAs  to  the  air  traffic 
service providers (ATSPs), the NSAs would be able to fully focus on their economic oversight and local 
regulatory  role,  which  is  in  line  with  the  objective  of  having  a  more  neutral  target-setting  process  as 
addressed in the impact assessment  and a strengthened independence of NSAs. The issue of resource 
limitations  of  NSAs  would  be  addressed  by  providing  that  NSAs  must  be  financed  sufficiently.  ATSPs 
should  be  made  fully  responsible  for  their  performance  plans.  This  approach  aligns  with  regulation 
applicable to other network industries such as telecoms or energy, in that performance decisions would 
be taken by a dedicated, independent entity and not by the Member State, as is the case today. It would 
separate  better  the  responsibilities  of  the  operator  and  the  regulator  also  at  national  level.  Finally,  a 
reduction of the reference period to two years as a minimum would reflect the current preferences of 
Member States. 

With a strong, independent and technically competent Performance Review Body (PRB) function for the 
Agency  to  assess  and  approve  the  targets  for  en  route  services,  and  independent  NSAs  assessing  and 
approving  the  targets  for  terminal  services,  the  involvement  of  Member  States  in  the  target-setting 
process  would  be  reduced,  allowing  a  de-politicized  target-setting  process.  Such  a  change  would 
therefore  be  within  the  scope  of  the  preferred  policy  option,  which  was  to  revise  the  target-setting 
process and improve the economic regulation.  

4.3.5.  Charging scheme  

4.3.5.1. Adaptations of the charging scheme 

The main principles related to the charging scheme should remain unchanged. However, if performance 
plans  are  to  be  adopted  by  air  traffic  service  providers  and  no  longer  by  Member  States,  minor 
adaptations are needed. In particular, the unit rates should be set specifically by the NSAs, rather than 
by Member States at large, after verification and approval of the Agency acting as PRB that they are in 
accordance  with  the  performance  plans  and  the  charging  rules.  Given  their  role  as  supervisors  of  air 
traffic service providers, the NSAs are best placed for these purposes. The costs incurred by NSAs and 
other  costs  incurred  by  the  Member  State  in  relation  to  air  navigation  services  (such  as  the  costs  of 
EUROCONTROL) ought to be charged to the air traffic service provider so that they could be included in 
the cost base for charges.  

19 

 
 
 
 
The  charging  scheme  should  continue  to  be  fully  consistent  with  Article  15  of  the  1944  Chicago 
Convention on International Civil Aviation and take due account of Eurocontrol’s charging system for en 
route charges. 

4.3.5.2. Modulation of charges 

The charging scheme should foresee that the Commission sets up Union-wide mechanisms supporting in 
particular the rollout of new technologies, or improvements in environmental performance and service 
quality. NSAs should also be able to set up such mechanisms at terminal charging zone level.  

The possibility to modulate charges at local level in the performance and charging scheme already exists 
in  Regulation  (EC)  No  550/2004  and  is  further  laid  out  in  Commission  Implementing  Regulation  (EU) 
2019/317 of 11 February 2019 laying down a performance and charging scheme in the single European 
sky, and is a possibility left to Member States. Most Member States, however, have not made use of it. 
Modulation should be mandatory at EU level in light of its positive effect on reducing CO2 emissions. For 
example, charges may be modulated for airspace users that choose more environmentally-friendly flight 
paths.  

Implementing  modulation  of  charges  at  national  level  is  difficult  because  modulation  needs  to  be 
effective and ensure a level playing field across Member States (i.e. if one Member State applies it but 
the neighbouring Member State  does  not,  it would reduce  the benefits  and limit its impact). It would 
also  be  impracticable  if  each  Member  State  would  set  up  different  modulation  mechanisms  for  the 
airspace  under  their  responsibility.  The  benefits  of  modulation  can  materialise  only  if  a  flight  is 
incentivised in a similar manner along all the portions of airspace through which it flies. Moreover, the 
environmental impact of aviation is cross-border by nature.  

Therefore,  en  route  charges  should  be  modulated  at  European  level,  in  a  harmonised  way,  to  ensure 
consistency, fairness, a level playing field and effectiveness of such measures across the pan-European 
network. For example, an aircraft equipped with ‘clean’ technologies or burning sustainable aviation fuel 
could  benefit  at  network  level  by  being  offered  priority  services,  or  reduced  ANS  charges,  whereas  a 
‘polluting’  aircraft would  have  to  pay  higher  charges.  Creating  a  pan-European modulation of  charges 
would help overcome the reluctance of Member States to do this only at local level. 

This  would  also  address  the  ECA  Special  Report  of  2019  on  the  deployment  of  ATM  technologies,28 
which explicitly calls for a mandatory system for the modulation of charges: 

Recommendation 2 of the European Court of Auditors – Reinforce the effectiveness of common projects  

The  Commission  should  make  proposals  to  reinforce  the  effectiveness  of  Common  projects  by 
strengthening their enforcement mechanisms. This could include, for example, a making mandatory the 
system  of  modulation  of  charges,  applicable  to  both  ground  and  airborne  stakeholders,  which  is 
currently  voluntary  in  the  charging  scheme  regulation.  Such  modulation  should  notably  include  more 
favourable navigation charges for early movers in the deployment of common projects. Timeframe: end 
of 2020. 

28 https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR19_11/SR_SESAR_DEPLOYMENT_EN.pdf 

20 

 
 
                                                           
4.3.5.3. Common unit rate 

In  addition,  a  possibility  of  introducing  a  common  unit  rate  for  en  route  air  traffic  services  across the 
Single  European  Sky  airspace  should  be  introduced.  The  aim  would  be  to open  up  the  opportunity to 
incentivize airspace users to fly the shortest possible routes, but also to include a possibility for charging 
for potential higher airspace operations, in case this market segment develops in the future. In any case, 
the measure should be revenue neutral for air traffic service providers. 

An  expert  opinion  was  produced  by  Eurocontrol  for  DG  MOVE  on  this  issue.  Airspace  users  optimise 
their routings by minimising not only the sum of fuel costs, but also the route charges. This may lead to 
choosing to fly longer routes because the charges are lower in a certain charging zone. To address this 
problem,  one  solution  is  to  supress  any  incentive  for  airspace  users  to  fly  longer  routes  for  these 
purposes by setting a common unit rate that would apply in  en route charging zones of the thirty SES 
States.  The  calculation  would  be  per  flight  and  would  be  made  only  for  charging  purposes,  not  for 
setting  the  determined  costs:  this  means  that  it  would  be  revenue  neutral  for  air  traffic  service 
providers. This would result in benefits to the environment, network, ANSPs, airspace users and for the 
route charges system. Concretely, according to Eurocontrol, this would result in some of the following 
benefits: 

 
 
 
 
 
 

 

Lower CO2 emissions (-0.17%, 290 000 tons per annum) 
Lower fuel consumption (-0.17%, 90 000 tons per annum) 
Lower NOx emission (-0.15%) 
Improved flow and sector load predictability for the network 
Financial transparency for Member States and ANSPs 
Lower Direct Operating Costs (-€150mn per annum) for airspace users due to lower flight time (-
0.07%) and fuel burn (-0.17%) 
Simpler invoicing for airspace users as there would be a fixed charge per flight 

Currently,  airspace  users  are  flying  direct  routes  since  there  is  no  congestion,  due  to  the  COVID-19 
pandemic. Incentives generated by a single unit rate would materialise in times of greater congestion, as 
it would incentivize airspace users to fly more direct routes, thereby saving on emissions. This is why a 
single  unit  rate  should  not  be  made  mandatory  by  the  legislator  at  this  stage.  Rather,  the  legislator 
should provide for a corresponding empowerment for the Commission, which the latter may resort to 
where appropriate, following further study and notably if congestion returns to pre-COVID-19 pandemic 
levels. 

4.3.6.  Establishment and tasks of a PRB function 

4.3.6.1. New approach on the PRB 

A new function for the Performance Review Body should be established, for the implementation of the 
performance and charging schemes. The tasks and powers should form a complete and consistent set, 
covering all relevant aspects of the performance and charging schemes. This includes the assessment of 
the  allocation  of  costs  between  en  route  and  terminal  air  navigation  services,  and  assessing  and 

21 

 
 
 
 
 
approving  the  performance  plans  of  designated  air  traffic  service  providers  for  en  route  services.  It 
would also be to provide opinions to the Commission for the setting of Union-wide performance targets 
and  for  the  assessment  of  the  Network  performance  plan.  Another  task  should  be  to  monitor  the 
performance  of  en  route  air  navigation  services  and  to  compile  a  Union-wide  overview  of  the 
performance  of  terminal  air  navigation  services,  on  the  basis  of  the  monitoring  done  by  national 
supervisory  authorities.    Finally,  it  should  be  to  issue  corrective  measures  where  performance  targets 
are  not  met,  and  to  conduct  investigations  as  part of  the  review  of  compliance  with  the  rules  on  the 
performance and charging schemes. 

The  new  function  should  be  administratively  integrated  into  EASA  (‘the  Agency’),  which  would  act  as 
PRB, clearly separated from EASA’s safety-related tasks.  

It  could  be  explored  between  the  Union  and  Eurocontrol  that  technical  expertise  and  relevant 
performance-related  data  be  transferred  from  Eurocontrol  to  the  Agency  acting  as  PRB,  in  order  to 
make  use  of  existing  knowledgeable  staff  and  to  avoid  duplication  of  data  collection.  Today,  costs 
related to Eurocontrol staff are charged to airspace users and only costs related to data collection are 
paid through the Union budget. Transfers of staff from Eurocontrol to the Agency acting as PRB would 
therefore, from an airspace  user  perspective, maintain stable  staff costs  related to work  on economic 
regulation of air navigation services.  This transfer would require an agreement between the Union and 
Eurocontrol.  The  preferred  option  in  the  2013  impact  assessment  called  for  shortening  the  target-
setting process and favouring technocratic input from the PRB. The PRB would be entirely nominated by 
the  Commission  to  ensure  impartiality  and  allow  for  expertise  from  outside  the  aviation  sector  to  be 
introduced. The new approach would not introduce a new concept, in relation to the PRB, that is outside 
the scope of the 2013 impact assessment. 

4.3.6.2. Justification for the establishment and tasks of the PRB function 

The economic regulation of air traffic management is a permanent task, requiring substantial technical 
work and expertise. Therefore, a permanent PRB function should be established. Under the constraints 
of  the  Union’s  financial  rules,  it  is  increasingly  difficult  to  engage  high-quality,  stable  and  technically 
knowledgeable support services for the Commission to exercise this regulatory function. Qualitatively, a 
more professionalised PRB function would make the economic regulation of ATM more robust, with a 
staff and management  able  to deliver  better quality recommendations, in a more efficient and timely 
manner. This would allow for shorter reference periods as the current periods of five years have been 
repeatedly  criticised  by  Member  States.  In  order  to  reduce  this  period,  it  is  necessary  to  have  staff 
working  full  time  with  adequate  expertise  in  all  key  performance  areas.  Part  of  this  staff  could  be 
composed of Eurocontrol technical experts transferred from Eurocontrol’s Performance Review Unit in 
case  a  suitable  agreement  would  be  found  between  the  Union  and  Eurocontrol.  A  permanent  PRB 
function would ensure stability of experts required to perform core work tasks and analyses, and limit 
the need for extensive coordination between different organisations, as is the case today. It would also 
gain more credibility, which would allow for more effective performance improvements in Europe.  

Finally,  one  of  the  recommendations  of  the  Wise  Persons  Group  on  the  future  of  the  SES  calls  for 
establishing  a  strong,  independent  and  technically  competent  economic  regulator  at  European  level, 
accommodating it within EASA. The decisions of the independent economic regulator should be subject 
to an appeal mechanism. 

22 

 
 
Structure of the PRB 

Annex I analyses and assesses the different options for the set-up of the PRB.  

The PRB function  should be  executed by a Union body.  Establishing a standalone,  independent Union 
body would be the preferred option to guarantee the full independence and strong focus on economic 
regulation of the PRB and its experts. However, for cost-efficiency reasons, the option to locate the PRB 
within an existing Union agency operating in the aviation sector, i.e. in EASA, should be chosen. Indeed, 
integrating the PRB into an existing structure would keep the marginal administrative  and IT costs  for 
the  new  structure  to  a  minimum.  In  general,  locating  a  new  Union  body  in  an  existing  agency  is 
considered to be a more cost-efficient option. 

This option would entail the establishment of the PRB function and its administrative integration within 
EASA,  which  would  thus  become  the  agency  hosting  the  PRB  function.  This  implies  that  EASA  would 
provide infrastructure and support services (human resources, finance, IT, etc.) to the PRB.  If technical 
expertise from Eurocontrol could be transferred to the PRB, the cost of human resources would remain 
stable for airspace users. In case of an agreement between the Union and Eurocontrol, the office of the 
PRB  could  be  set  up  in  the  facilities  of  Eurocontrol  in  Brussels,  which  would  contribute  to  create 
synergies. 

However,  as  EASA’s  responsibilities  include  safety  oversight  and  certification  of  air  navigation  service 
providers,  it  is  of  crucial  importance  to  ensure that the  economic  regulation  pillar  is  functionally  fully 
separated from the safety pillar for the Single European Sky regulated under EASA Basic Regulation. This 
entails  an  independent  governance  for  the  PRB,  segregated  from  the  current  tasks  and  personnel  of 
EASA.  This  structure  would  need  to  ensure  an  absence  of  conflict  of  interests  between  the  safety 
oversight functions and the economic regulation function. 

In particular, there should be a functional separation between the activities on performance review and 
the  rest  of  EASA’s  activities.  This  would  be  reflected  in  reporting  and  accountability  channels  at 
management level. In order to ensure full separation, a Regulatory Board for Performance Review and a 
separate Board of Appeal for Performance Review should be established. 

As regards the budget, the fees and charges levied for the PRB function for the exercise of activities on 
performance review should be clearly identified and separated from the other fees and charges of EASA. 
This is to ensure that what is charged to air navigation service providers, and ultimately to airspace users 
via air navigation charges, for the PRB function, covers only the activities on performance review.   

Financial impact 

Quantitatively,  a  more  professionalised  PRB  would  make  a  positive  impact  on  the  Union  budget  as 
currently  €6  million  annually  are  spent  on  PRB  experts  and  administrative  support  from  the  Union 
budget. It is objectively justified to finance the PRB function from fees and charges  paid by designated 
air  traffic  services  providers,  on  account  of  interventions  necessary  for  the  application  of  the 
performance  and  charging  schemes.  There  should  also  be  a  possibility  for  voluntary  financial 
contributions from Member States, or national supervisory authorities. Such a configuration is easier to 
be realised if this function is hosted in an Agency, i.e. EASA. As a result of this configuration, there would 
be no negative impact on the Union budget, nor on the budget of EASA for its other activities.  

23 

 
 
 
The activities of a professionalised PRB would be charged to air traffic service providers and included in 
their  cost  bases.  The  cost  would  in  fact  be  passed  on  to  airspace  users  via  route  charges.  It  can  be 
estimated that  the  corresponding  increase of the  charges  would  only  be  marginal.  Using  2019  figures 
and  dividing  the  total  cost  of  the  PRB  by  the  total  number  of  service  units  in  Europe,  the  following 
figures emerge: 

Current PRB cost = €6 million  
Total number of en route service units (2019) = 139 million 
This makes an increase in the unit cost of €0.04. The targeted unit cost for 2019 was €50.65, so 

 
 
 
this would be an increase of 0.07%. 

Therefore,  even  if  a  permanent  PRB  would  be  financed  without  Union  funding,  the  corresponding 
increase  of  the  charge  to  airspace  users  would  be  negligible.  Financial  synergies  would  be  leveraged 
from the cost-efficiency gained from a common administrative structure by being located within EASA. 
Part of this staff could be composed of technical experts transferred from Eurocontrol. In addition, if an 
agreement  between  the  Union  and  Eurocontrol  would  be  found,  it  may  be  possible  to  set  up  a  local 
office  of  the  PRB  in  the  facilities  of  Eurocontrol  in  Brussels,  which  would  also  contribute  to  create 
synergies. 

4.3.7.  Transparency of accounts of air navigation service providers  
The  transparency  of  accounts  of  ANSPs  should  be  further  strengthened,  particularly  by  requiring  the 
maintenance of separate accounts for each air navigation service. NSAs and the  Agency acting as PRB 
should have a right of access to the accounts of the ANSPs under their supervision. Financial data should 
be  audited  by  the  NSA  or  an  entity  independent  from  the  ANSP,  and  conclusions  should  be  made 
publicly available.  

This is in line with accounting standards, market rules, and would allow for a voluntary de-coupling of 
services, by ensuring that discrimination, cross-subsidisation and distortion of competition are avoided. 

4.4.  Chapter IV (Network Management) 

4.4.1.  Functional Airspace Blocks (FABs)  

FABs  should  no  longer  be  regulated,  but  may  continue  to  exist  by  choice  of  their  Member  States,  if 
deemed useful. The abolition of specific rules on FABs would not stand in the way of, or otherwise affect 
more flexible cooperation configurations among ANSPs.  

Indeed, the experience and assessment of the functioning of FABs since they were first set up in 2009 
has made clear that the FABs have failed to address the problem of airspace fragmentation, which was 
their original objective. As an example, performance plans for the third reference period (RP3) were all 
submitted to the Commission by Member States individually at the end of the second reference period 
(RP2), with the exception of FABEC. In bilateral meetings with FABs carried out in 2019 with DG MOVE, it 
became  clear that  only a few FABs are effectively functioning. In  addition, other types of cooperation 
between Member States without limiting them to a predefined geographical area are also encouraged. 
This  is  why  the  obligation  for  Member  States  to  formally  cooperate  within  FAB  should  be  abolished. 
However, this would not prevent Member States from continuing to cooperate in the context of FABs or 

24 

 
 
 
other  forms  or ways,  should  they  wish  to  do  so.  Neither  would  this  prevent  any  ANSP  to  delegate  or 
outsource certain services to the ANSP of another Member State (i.e. cross-border service provision) to 
enable better capacity management and match with resources. 

The 2013 impact assessment accompanying the SES2+ proposal presents a preferred option of making 
FABs more flexible. It presents evidence that flexibility over rigidity is preferred. The option would focus 
the FABs as tools for achieving the performance scheme targets. Airspace design would be increasingly 
moved  to  the  level  of  the  Network  Manager  to  ensure  seamless  airspace  throughout  the  network, 
whereas the FABs themselves would focus on finding the optimal alliances for each part of the services 
being  provided.  The  desired  flexibility  expounded  by  the  preferred  option  could  be  addressed  by 
removing requirements on FABs altogether. 

4.4.2.  Network management  

4.4.2.1. Adaptions suggested 

In order to facilitate the discharge of network functions and to enable the Network Manager to better 
respond to crises, a number of adaptations should be made. 

The network functions should be more clearly defined and should include the facilitation of delegation 
of air traffic services provision as well as management of the delivery of air traffic control capacity in the 
network,  as  set  out  in  the  binding  Network  Operations  Plan  previously  agreed  between  the  Network 
Manager  and  individual  air  navigation  service  providers.  An  additional  function  should  consist  in  the 
management  of  the  planning,  monitoring  and  coordination  of  the  implementation  activities  of 
deployment of the European ATM network infrastructure, in accordance with the European ATM Master 
Plan  and  taking  into  account  operational  needs.  More  generally,  the  definition  of  network  functions 
should  be  reviewed  in  a  perspective  of  strengthening  the  overall  network-oriented  approach.  This 
should  notably  support  the  implementation  of  the  mandatory  Network  Operations  Plan,  the 
achievement  of  the  binding  performance  targets,  as  well  as  the  deployment  of  the  ATM  network 
infrastructure in accordance with the European ATM Master Plan. 

The role of the Network Manager in contributing to the execution of the network functions should be 
clearly set out. Requirements on the cooperative decision-making process should also be strengthened, 
to ensure  that the  interest  of  the  network  prevails and  that  the  procedures  allow  for  resolving  issues 
and finding consensus.  Airports  should also be addressed in the proposal and shall be  fully integrated 
into the network. 

The overall aim would be to strengthen the functioning of the European network.  

Cooperation  and  consultation  with  operational  stakeholders  should  remain  a  key  activity  for  the 
execution of the network functions. Critically, Member States’ sovereignty over their airspace and the 
requirements of the Member States relating to public order, public security and defence matters should 
remain unaffected. 

The Network functions should remain subject to an adapted performance scheme.  

The safety oversight of Network Manager and its capacity to perform network functions should remain, 
as today, the responsibility of EASA. 

25 

 
 
One of the preferred options of the 2013 impact assessment consisted in creating a joint undertaking of 
the  industry  to  operate  the  Network  Manager  with  a  role  for  Eurocontrol  built  around  the  Network 
Manager,  and  a  more  comprehensive  centralised  service  provider,  including  also  airspace  design  in  a 
broad  sense.  Better  defining  and  strengthening  the  network  functions  and  the  governance  of  the 
Network  Manager  would  be  in  line  with  the  rationale  of  that  preferred  option.  The  studies  and 
recommendations available justify the proposed approach, as will be explained immediately below.  

4.4.2.2. Justification  

The  airspace,  capacity  and  infrastructure  management  concepts  developed  below  build  on  reports  of 
the Network Manager periodically presented to Member States in the comitology committee (Single Sky 
Committee), on the second recommendation of the Wise Persons Group on the Future of SES, as well as 
on the EP Pilot Project on the  New Airspace  Architecture Study. In the  peak summer seasons of 2018 
and 2019, when delays negatively affected large parts of the network, the Network Manager developed 
a  number  of  measures  to  address  the  ‘capacity  crisis’.  This  experience  has  shown  the  essential  role 
played by the Network Manager, but also the need to strengthen its coordination function, as well as to 
ensure that the interests of the network prevails in its daily, as well as crisis, management.  

The  table  below  shows  in  summary  what  are  the  airspace,  capacity  and  infrastructure  management 
concepts 

Airspace management  

Capacity management  

Infrastructure 
management 

 
Optimised  organisation  and  utilisation  of  airspace  leading  to 
better  scalability,  additional  capacity  and/or  more  efficient  use  of 
existing capacity, and making the network more resilient. 

 
Airspace  design  and  utilisation  would  be  such  as  to  promote 
the  use  of  the  best  possible  trajectories  and  preferred  routes  for  civil 
airspace users and, for military airspace users, to improve effectiveness 
of military activities. 
 
The  Network  Operations  Plan  as  a  binding  instrument  would  
be  of  assistance  when  it  comes  to  compliance  with  the  Union-wide 
performance target on capacity. 

 
An  integration  of  the  Airport  Operations  Plans  with  the  
Network Operations Plan would facilitate the connection of capacity on 
the ground with capacity in the air 

 
Planning: This item would entail improved planning, in terms of 
identifying  the  ATM  network  infrastructure  deployment  needs  aiming 
to  support  the  sustainable  future  development  of  ATM  infrastructure 
with  a  view  to  supporting  sustainable  future  development  of  ATM 
including  in  the  form  of  infrastructure  rationalisation.  The  planning 
would  be  aligned  to  the  European  ATM  Master  Plan  and  involve  full 
cooperation with all concerned stakeholders. 

 
Deployment:  The  item  would  facilitate  the timely  deployment 
of  ATM  network  infrastructure  improvements  based  on  standardised 

26 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
and  sustainable  technologies,  subject  to  coordination  between  the 
Network  Manager  and  the  SESAR  Joint  Undertaking  regarding  the 
industrialisation phase. 

 
Monitoring: This would concern the deployment and technical 
performance of the relevant infrastructure and would contribute to the 
effective operation of the European ATM network. 

Table 3: Airspace, capacity and infrastructure management concepts 

The  work  of  the  Network  Manager  already  largely  achieves  the  objectives  of  the  “airspace 
management”  item  referred  to  above,  through  the  discharge  of  the  existing  functions  in  accordance 
Implementing  Regulation  2019/123.  Reinforced  cooperative  decision-making 
with  Commission 
procedures would further improve the efficiency of this work. 

In  order  to  facilitate  capacity  management,  the  Network  Operations  Plans  should  become  mandatory 
and be linked to the individual ATSPs performance plans. Evidence from the Network Manager on the 
Network  Operational  Plan  (NOP)  shows  a  lack  of  commitment  by  some  Member  States  to  provide 
capacity.  It  also  shows  that  actual  performance  is  not  in  line  with  the  NOP.  Moreover,  lower  than 
planned delivery of capacity cannot  be  justified by corresponding reduced needs, as significant  delays 
are observed. These delays are shown in the Table below. In comparison to the target set at an average 
of 0.5 min of delay per flight. In some Member States, these delay figures are double or triple.  

ANSP 
Austrocontrol – Vienna ACC 
Skeyes – Brussels ACC 
DFS – Karlsruhe ACC 
DSNA – Marseille ACC 

Delay 2019 
4787 min/day or 1.88min/flt 
1771 min/day or 1.02 min/flt 
8382 min/day or 1.67 min/flt 
5515 min/day or 1.71 min/flt 

Table 4: Delays 2019 in ATM Network 

In addition, airports must be fully integrated into the network in order to effectively contribute to the 
overall performance of the network and the performance scheme in general. This could be achieved by 
integrating the Airport Operations Plan (AOP) and the NOP, so as to connect capacity on the ground with 
capacity in the air.  

As regards infrastructure management, the 2019 ECA Special Report 11 on modernisation of ATM calls 
for a more effective way of managing ATM infrastructure: 

Recommendation 5 of the European Court of Auditors – Ensure appropriate monitoring of performance 
benefits delivered by ATM modernisation 

The Commission should:  

(a)  ensure  that  ATM  modernisation  is  appropriately  monitored.  Performance  benefits  should  be 
measured and compared with the initial expectations (PCP CBA);  

(b) where applicable in the performance scheme, ensure that targets being proposed take into account 
all performance gains being realised – thereby assuring their delivery to airspace users.  

27 

 
 
 
 
Timeframe: as soon as possible and at the latest for the next target setting exercise (reporting period 4 
of the performance scheme) 

Finally,  in  secondary  legislation,  the  work  of the  two  working  groups  supporting  the  existing  Network 
Management Board, the working group on operations (NDOP) and the NDTECH, composed of relevant 
stakeholders  should  be  strengthened  to  ensure  continued  industry  leadership  in  the  work  of  the 
Network Manager. These groups are likely to be the main fora to reinforce the industry role in achieving 
effective decision-making in a single value chain from operations to technology. 

4.4.3.  Availability of and access to operational data for general air traffic  

It  is  necessary  to  ensure  that  the  provision  of  air  traffic  data  services  can  be  carried  out  on  a  cross-
border and Union-wide basis for operational purposes. In addition, it is important that new entrants to 
the data market have access to the relevant operational data of ANSPs even before they are certified, so 
that they are able to decide on market entry. Therefore, access to this data should be granted not only 
to  authorities, but also to air traffic service providers, airspace users and airports, to  entities having a 
proven  interest  in  considering  the  provision  of  air  navigation  services.  In  order  to  prevent  cross-
subsidisation or double charging, principles for pricing rules should also be laid down. 

4.5.  Airspace, Interoperability and technological innovation 

4.5.1.  Flexible Use of Airspace (FUA) 

Flexible use of airspace was only mentioned in the recitals of the 2013 SES2+ proposal, and the existing 
Article 7 of Regulation (EC)  551/2004 should be  re-inserted. It should, in addition, clearly  allocate  the 
responsibility of ensuring the uniform application of FUA to Member States, and ensure its consistency 
with  the  ATM  Master  Plan.  This  would  be  complementary  to  the  EASA  Basic  Regulation,  which 
establishes  the  essential  requirement  that  airspace  management  needs  to  support  the  uniform 
application of FUA.  

4.5.2.  SESAR coordination  

SESAR was set up in 2004 and has been evolving,  driven by the objectives of the Single European Sky, 
from the definition phase to the development phase and ultimately to the deployment phase. A number 
of  instruments  and  actors  related  to  SESAR  have  been  developed  and  put  in  place  under  Union  law 
including  implementing  acts,  such  as  the  common  project  regulation29,  the  European  ATM  Master 
Plan30, the SESAR Joint Undertaking and the SESAR Deployment Manager. However, this reality should 
also  be  appropriately  reflected  in  the  legal  framework.  Definitions  for  SESAR  should  therefore  be  laid 
down, and provisions for the effective coordination between all phases of the SESAR project should be 
defined. This would allow for increased coherence with other legal instruments related to SES and for 

29 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 716/2014 of 27 June 2014 on the establishment of the Pilot Common Project 
supporting the implementation of the European Air Traffic Management Master Plan 
30 https://www.atmmasterplan.eu/ 

28 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
future changes  to SESAR to address  the challenges  of ATM  modernisation, while  maintaining a strong 
and clear link to the Single European Sky framework.  

4.6.  Final Provisions 

As regards committee procedure, each Member State should be allocated two seats, so that they can be 
represented both by a civil and a military representative.  

As  regards  consultation  of  stakeholders,  requirements  for  consultation  should  not  only  apply  to  the 
Commission and to NSAs, but also to Member States, EASA including in its function as PRB, and to the 
Network Manager.  The  list  of stakeholders  to  be  consulted  should also  include  the  Network Manager 
and  relevant  non-governmental  organisations.  In  this  light,  necessary  arrangements  and  consultation 
processes  should  be  put  in  place  to  support  civil  and  military  collaboration  in  order  to  guarantee  a 
balanced consideration of economic as well as security and defence requirements.  

.  

4.7.  Secondary legislation 

Not all of the recommendations put forward by the European Court of Auditors, the Wise Persons Group 
or other relevant stakeholders lend themselves to being implemented by the co-legislators, as they are 
particularly detailed and/or technical, to a point that would be unusual and indeed impractical for basic 
legislation.  Furthermore,  some  of  the  details  and  technicalities  would  require  additional  assessment. 
The basic legislation should provide a legal basis to develop the relevant details in secondary legislation. 
The timeline for this legislation would be before the end of the third reference (performance) period of 
SES, which is towards the end of 2024. 

Changes to air traffic controllers’ (ATCOs) way of working may result from the implementation of SESAR 
solutions. This issue does not need to be touched upon in an amendment to the SES legislation, since it 
could be addressed in a Commission act amending Regulation (EU) 2015/340.31 

On training and licencing of ATCOs to adapt to the future systems architecture, the lack of availability of 
ATCO  resources  is  identified  as  one  of  the  structural  causes  for  capacity  shortages.  Several  Member 
States have also acknowledged, in their performance plans, the need for investing in recruitment. 

Another key element that hampers scalability and sustainability of the European ATM network is limited 
flexibility  in  the  use  of  ATCO  resources  across  area  control  centres  (ACCs).  In  current  operations, 
airspace is organised in sectors. Each controller is responsible for controlling within one sector or group 
of sectors only, and the most usual setup is that one planner and one executive controller assume full 
responsibility for a given sector. Each sector/group of sectors has its own specificities in terms of shape, 
available routes, exit and entry points to the airspace, traffic patterns, etc. For a controller to be able to 
work  in  a  sector,  he  or  she  must  hold  not  only  a  generic  controller  licence,  but  also  be  trained  and 
certified to understand and deal with the specificities of the sector. The larger the number of sectors a 

31  Commission  Regulation  (EU)  2015/340  of  20  February  2015  laying  down  technical  requirements  and 
administrative procedures relating to air traffic controllers' licences and certificates pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 
216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council, amending Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 
923/2012 and repealing Commission Regulation (EU) No 805/2011 (OJ L 63, 6.3.2015, p. 1) 

29 

 
 
                                                           
controller is endorsed for, the more flexibility is available to the ANSP for rostering on any given day (as 
the ANSP can assign the controller to work at any of the sectors they are endorsed for). This limitation is 
recognised  both  by  the  Wise  Persons  Group  report  and  the  Airspace  Architecture  Study.  EASA  will 
investigate  the  evolution  of  ATCO  training  and  ATCO  licencing  to  move  from  a  sector  dependent  to 
sector independent approach. 

30 

 
 
 
ANNEX I – Analysis of options for the set-up of the Performance Review Body 

1.  Options for the PRB set up 

Two options have been assessed in identify the preferred set up for the Performance Review Body, and 
are presented in the table below. As explained in section 4.3.2.5, the economic regulation of air traffic 
management  is  a  permanent  task,  requiring  substantial  technical  work  and  expertise.  Therefore,  a 
permanent PRB should be established. Option 1 and Option 2 both address this issue. 

Option 1: New standalone Agency 

Option 2: PRB integrated in an existing Agency 

This  option  would  create  a  new  independent  and 
standalone Agency for the PRB.  

This  would  entail  creating  a  body  with  a  legal 
personality  and  setting  up  a  new  administrative 
structure.  

This agency would be fully independent to perform 
economic  regulation  of  air  navigation  services,  in 
particular for en route services.  

This  option  would  extend  the  mandate  of  an 
existing  Union  decentralised  agency  to  integrate 
the tasks of the PRB.  

This would entail sharing the  same  administrative 
structure,  while  creating  a  department  for  the 
economic  regulation  of  air  navigation  services. 
Separate boards to cater for the different streams 
of work would be created. 

This  option  would  allow  for  the  creation  of  an 
independent  regulator,  while  benefiting  from 
administrative  synergies  with  an  already  existing 
and full-fledged EU agency. 

The chosen Agency would be  EASA because of its 
work in the aviation sector. 

2.  Assessment of the two options 

2.1 Budget 

In  terms  of  budget,  for  both  Option  1  or  Option  2,  the  PRB  would  be  mainly  financed  from  fees  and 
charges  (the  rest  of  the  revenues  including  voluntary  financial  contributions  from  Member  States, 
national supervisory authorities, or from third countries). Fees and charges would be levied by the PRB. 
These costs would be charged to air traffic service providers and therefore included in the unit rates set 
by the NSA and paid by airspace users via route charges. Therefore, quantitatively, the new structure for 
the PRB would make a positive impact on the Union budget, as currently €6 million annually are spent 
on PRB experts and administrative support from the Union budget.  

Both in case of Option 1 and Option 2, initial set up costs would be incurred, before the PRB is fully able 
to begin offering its services. The Regulation should foresee contributions made by designated air traffic 

31 

 
 
 
service providers covering the future set up costs of the PRB. Given that the administrative structure of 
EASA already exists, the initial set up costs for the PRB would be lower under Option 2 than Option 1.  

As  a  conclusion,  Option  1  and  Option  2  are  equivalent  in  terms  of  impact  on  the  Union  budget  but 
Option 2 is better regarding the set up costs. 

2.2 Efficiency 

Under  Option  1,  the  full  costs  of  all  the  administrative,  IT  and  billing  tasks,  and  the  related 
infrastructure, would need to be covered. Under  Option 2 however, only the marginal costs for these 
assignments and marginal cost for the additional infrastructure would be required.  

One  criteria  to  consider  when  assessing  Options  1  or  2  is  therefore  the  size  of  the  agency,  and  the 
proportion of such costs in the overall cost structure. Indeed, as highlighted in the Evaluation of the EU 
decentralised Agencies,32 small agencies often face specific efficiency constraints, and governance may 
be a non-negligible fixed cost in proportion of their resources. This Evaluation recommends in particular 
to  extend  the  mandate  of  another  existing  agency  dealing  with  similar  goals,  tasks  and/or  interest 
groups  instead  of  creating  an  agency,  especially  if  the  staff  is  assumed  to  remain  under  75  for  some 
years. 

The intended size for the PRB would be small, circa 40 FTEs. This makes the proportional costs for the 
administrative and IT tasks, and the related infrastructure high. Such size is below the ‘critical mass’ of 
75  FTEs  assessed  in  the  Evaluation.  It  is  therefore  preferable to  choose  Option  2  and  administratively 
integrate the PRB into EASA. 

In terms of governance, Option 1 would entail having its own governance. This includes also having its 
own financial and audit functions and entails substantial oversight costs. Under Option 2, the marginal 
oversight  cost  could  be  catered  for  by  the  resources  dedicated  to  overseeing  EASA.  From  an 
administrative perspective, efficiency gains could be made from the sharing of resources.   

As a conclusion, Option 2 is preferable in terms of cost efficiency. 

2.3 Effectiveness 

Both Option 1 and Option 2 address the objective of setting up a permanent and independent body for 
the economic regulation of air navigation services. 

Under Option 1, there would be no pre-existing expert staff in which to tap. Recruitment would need to 
focus on hiring staff with both sectoral expertise on air traffic management and regulatory expertise on 
economic  regulation  of  network  industries.  This  would  need  to  be  done  in  parallel  to  setting  up  the 
administrative structure of the new body.  

32https://europa.eu/european-union/sites/europaeu/files/docs/body/synthesis_and_prospects_en.pdf 

32 

 
 
                                                           
 
Under the option of locating the PRB in an existing Agency, choosing which Agency should be of utmost 
importance.  The  defining  criteria  when  deciding  where  to  locate  the  PRB  should  be  the  skills  and 
expertise related to the aviation sector.  

However,  in  order  to  meet  the  objective  of  establishing  an  independent  regulator,  the  absence  of 
conflict of interests should be guaranteed and the PRB should be fully functionally separated from the 
other activities of EASA. Indeed, EASA’s responsibilities include the safety oversight and certification for 
air  navigation  service  providers.  It  is  particularly  important  to  keep  safety  oversight  separate  from 
economic  regulation,  and without  significant  independence  of  the  PRB on the  management,  decision-
making and budgetary issues, accommodating the PRB in EASA could create conflicts of interest. 

As a conclusion, both Options 1 and Option 2 would be effective in achieving the policy goal. Option 2 
would  be  more  cost-effective  in  the  short  and  long  term,  considering  the  benefits  from  sharing 
administrative costs, provided potentially damaging conflicts of interest are adequately addressed. 

2.4 Conclusion  

Given the options considered against the criteria of their impact on the budget, the efficiency and the 
effectiveness, the preferred option would be to administratively integrate the PRB into EASA. 

33 

 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX II – Abbreviations 

ACC – Area Control Centre 

ADS – Air Traffic Data Services 

ADSP – Air traffic Data Service Provider 

AIS – Aeronautical Information Services 

ANS – Air Navigation Services 

ANSP – Air Navigation Service Provider 

ATC – Air Traffic Control(ler) 

ATFM – Air Traffic Flow Management 

ATM – Air Traffic Management 

ATS – Air Traffic Services 

CDM – Cooperative Decision-Making 

CNS – Communication, Navigation and Surveillance 

CO2 - Carbon Dioxide 

DFS – Deutsche Flugsichering (DFS) 

EASA – European Aviation Safety Agency 

ECA – European Court of Auditors 

ECAC – European Civil Aviation Conference 

FAB – Functional Airspace Block 

FABEC – Functional Airspace Block Europe Central 

FUA – Flexible Use of Airspace 

KPA – Key Performance Areas 

MET – Meteorological Services 

NM – Network Manager 

NOP – Network Operational Plan 

NSA – National Supervisory Authority 

PRB – Performance Review Body 

RP – Reference Period 

SES – Single European Sky 

34 

 
 
SESAR – Single European Sky ATM Research 

STATFOR – EUROCONTROL’s Statistics and Forecast  

TTE – Transport and Tourism Council 

WPG – Wise Persons Group on the future of SES 

35 

 
 
 
 
ANNEX III – Single European Sky legislation 

Regulatory area 

Legislation 

AIR TRANSPORT 

SINGLE 
EUROPEAN 
SKY 

Regulation (EC) No 549/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2004 laying 
down the  framework  for the  creation of the single European sky (the  framework  Regulation), OJ  L 96, 
31.3.2004, p.1.  

[IMPLEMENTATION  IN  THE  EEA:  Y  (549/2004)]  [APPLICATION  IN  THE  EEA:  cf.  OJ  L  230, 
25.08.2016, p. 45]  

Framework 
Regulation 

Amended by: 

Regulation (EC) No 1070/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009, OJ L 
300, 14.11.2009, p. 34. [APPLICATION IN THE EEA: cf. OJ L 154, 22.05.2014, p. 25] 

Implementing rules 

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/123  of 24 January 2019 laying down detailed rules 
for  the  implementation  of  air  traffic  management  (ATM)  network  functions  and  repealing  Commission 
Regulation (EU) No 677/2011 (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 28, 31.1.2019, p. 1  

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317 of 11 February 2019 laying down a performance 
and  charging  scheme  in  the  single  European  sky  and  repealing  Implementing  Regulations  (EU)  No 
390/2013 and (EU) No 391/2013, (Text with EEA relevance),  OJ L 56, 23.2.2019, p.1. 

Commission 
decisions 

Commission Implementing Decision of 11 March 2014 setting the Union-wide performance targets for 
the  air  traffic  management  network  and  alert  thresholds  for  the  second  reference  period  2015-19  (Text 
with EEA relevance) (2014/132/EU), OJ L 71, 12.03.2014, p. 20. [ APPLICATION IN THE EEA: cf. OJ L 
230, 3.9.2015, p. 43 ] [APPLICATION IN THE EEA: cf. OJ L 230, 25.08.2016, p. 45] 

Commission  Implementing  Decision  (EU)  2019/903  of  29 May  2019  setting  the  Union-wide 
performance  targets  for  the  air  traffic  management  network  for  the  third  reference  period  starting  on 
1 January 2020 and ending on 31 December 2024 (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L144, 3.6.2019, p.49 

Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/347 of 2 March 2015 concerning the inconsistency of 
certain targets included in the national or functional airspace block plans submitted pursuant to Regulation 
(EC)  No  549/2004  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  with  the  Union-wide  performance 
targets for the second reference period and setting out recommendations for the revision of those targets 
(notified  under document C(2015) 1263) (Only the  Bulgarian, Spanish, Czech, German,  Greek, French, 
Croatian,  Italian,  Hungarian,  Maltese,  Dutch,  Portuguese,  Romanian,  Slovak  and  Slovenian  texts  are 
authentic) (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 60, 4.3.2015, p. 48. 

Commission  Implementing  Decision  (EU)  2015/348  of  2  March  2015  concerning  the  consistency  of 
certain targets included in the national or functional airspace block plans submitted pursuant to Regulation 
(EC)  No  549/2004  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  with  the  Union-wide  performance 
targets  for  the  second  reference  period  (notified  under  document  C(2015)  1293)  (Text  with  EEA 
relevance), OJ L 60, 4.3.2015, p. 55. 

36 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Amended by: 

Commission  Implementing  Decision  (EU)  2017/2376  of  15  December  2017  amending  Implementing 
Decision (EU) 2015/348 as regards the consistency of the revised targets in the key performance area of 
cost-efficiency included in the amended national or functional airspace block plans submitted by Malta, 
Bulgaria  and  Poland  (notified  under  document  C(2017)  8433)  (Text  with  EEA  relevance),  OJ  L  337, 
19.12.2017, p. 68. 

Commission  Implementing  Decision  (EU)  2018/2021  of  17  December  2018  amending  Implementing 
Decision (EU) 2015/348 as regards the consistency of the revised targets in the key performance area of 
cost-efficiency included in the amended national or functional airspace block plans submitted by Portugal 
and Romania (notified under document C(2018) 8489) (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 323, 19.12.2018, 
p. 18. 

Commission  Implementing  Decision  (EU)  2015/1055  of 30  June  2015  concerning  the  consistency  of 
certain  targets  included  in  the  national  or  functional  airspace  block  plans  submitted  by  Switzerland 
pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 549/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council with the Union-
wide performance targets for the second reference period (notified under document C(2015) 4403) (Only 
the French, German and Italian texts are authentic) (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 171, 2.7.2015, p. 14. 

Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/1056 of 30 June 2015 concerning the inconsistency of 
certain  targets  included  in  the  national  or  functional  airspace  block  plan  submitted  by  Switzerland 
pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 549/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council with the Union-
wide  performance  targets  for  the  second  reference  period  and  setting  out  recommendations  for  the 
revision of those targets (notified under document C(2015) 4407) (Only the French, German and Italian 
texts are authentic) (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 171, 2.7.2015, p. 18. 

Commission  Implementing  Decision  (EU)  2016/599  of  15  April  2016  concerning  the  consistency  of 
certain  targets  included  in  the  revised  national  or  functional  airspace  block  plans  submitted  pursuant  to 
Regulation  (EC)  No  549/2004  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  with  the  Union-wide 
performance  targets  for the second reference period (notified under document  C(2016) 2140) (Only the 
Bulgarian,  Croatian,  Czech,  German,  Hungarian,  Italian,  Portuguese,  Romanian,  Slovak,  Slovenian  and 
Spanish text is authentic) (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 103, 19.4.2016, p. 37. 

Commission  Implementing  Decision  (EU)  2017/258  of  13  February  2017  concerning  revised 
performance targets and appropriate  measures included in the  national or functional airspace block plan 
submitted by Switzerland pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 549/2004 of the European Parliament and of 
the  Council  that  are  not  adequate  in  respect  to  the  Union-wide  performance  targets  for  the  second 
reference  period  and  setting  out  obligations  for  corrective  measures  (notified  under  document  C(2017) 
728)  (Only  the  French,  German  and  Italian  texts  are  authentic)  (Text  with  EEA  relevance),  OJ  L  38, 
15.2.2017, p. 71. 

Commission  Implementing  Decision  (EU)  2017/259  of 13  February  2017  concerning  certain  revised 
performance targets and appropriate measures included in the national or functional airspace block plans 
submitted pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 549/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council that 
are  not  adequate  in  respect  to  the  Union-wide  performance  targets  for  the  second  reference  period  and 
setting out obligations for corrective measures (notified under document C(2017) 729) (Only the Dutch, 
English, French, German, Greek, Italian and Maltese texts are authentic) (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 
38, 15.2.2017, p. 76. 

Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2017/553 of 22 March 2017 concerning the consistency of 
the targets in the key performance areas of capacity and cost- efficiency included in the revised functional 
airspace block plan submitted pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 549/2004 by Belgium, Germany, France, 
Luxembourg  and  the  Netherlands  with  the  Union-  wide  performance  targets  for  the  second  reference 
period (notified under document C(2017) 1798) (Only the Dutch, French, and German texts are authentic) 
(Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 79, 24.3.2017, p. 11. 

Commission Decision of 29 July 2010 on the designation of the Performance Review Body of the Single 
European Sky, C(2010) 5134 final. (repeal: see Art. 7 and 8 of Commission Implementing Decision of 24 

37 

 
 
September  2014  on  the  extension  of  the  designation  of  the  Performance  Review  Body  of  the  single 
European sky (2014/672/EU), OJ L 281, 25.9.2014, p. 5: “Article 7 Repeal : Commission Decision of 29 
July  2010  and  Commission  Decision  of  25  July  2013  are  repealed.”  “Article  8  Entry  into  force  and 
application:  This  Decision  shall  enter  into  force  on  1  July  2015  and  shall  apply  until  31  December 
2016”). 

Commission  Recommendation  of  23 November  2011  on  the  revision  of  targets  contained  in 
performance plans under Commission Regulation (EU) No 691/2010, OJ C 348, 29.11.2011, p.1. 

Commission Recommendation of 26 July 2012 on the implementation of performance plans and targets 
in  consistency  with  the  European  Union-  wide  performance  targets  adopted  pursuant  to  Commission 
Regulation (EU) No 691/2010 and the preparation for the second performance reference period (Text with 
EEA relevance) (2012/C 228/01), OJ C 228, 31.7.2012, p. 1 

Commission  Implementing  Decision  (EU)  2016/1373  of  11  August  2016  approving  the  Network 
Performance Plan for the second reference period of the Single European Sky performance scheme (2015-
2019) (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 217, 12.8.2016, p. 51. 

Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/2296 of 16 December 2016 setting up the independent 
group  of  experts  designated  as  Performance  Review  Body  of  the  single  European  sky,  OJ  L  344, 
17.12.2016, p. 92. 

SINGLE 
EUROPEAN 
SKY 

Service 
provision 
Regulation 

Regulation (EC) No 550/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2004 on the 
provision of air navigation services in the single European sky (the service provision Regulation)  (OJ L 
96, 31.3.2004, p. 10)  
[APPLICATION IN THE EEA: Y (550/2004) Special adaptations with regard to Iceland]. 

Amended by: 

Regulation (EC) No 1070/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009, OJ L 
300, 14.11.2009, p. 34 [APPLICATION IN THE EEA: cf. OJ L 154, 22.05.2014, p. 25] 

Implementing rules 

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 716/2014 of 27 June 2014 on the establishment of the 
Pilot  Common  Project  supporting  the  implementation  of  the  European  Air  Traffic  Management  Master 
Plan  (Text  with  EEA  relevance),  OJ  L  190,  28.06.2014,  p.  19  [APPLICATION  IN  THE  EEA:  cf.  OJ  L 
129, 19.05.2016, p. 49] 

Commission  Implementing  Regulation  (EU)  2017/373  of  1  March  2017  laying  down  common 
requirements  for  providers  of  air  traffic  management/air  navigation  services  and  other  air  traffic 
management  network  functions  and  their  oversight,  repealing  Regulation  (EC)  No  482/2008, 
Implementing Regulations (EU) No 1034/2011, (EU) No 1035/2011 and (EU) 2016/1377 and amending 
Regulation (EU) No 677/2011 (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 62, 8.3.2017, p. 1  

Commission  Regulation  (EU)  No 176/2011  of  24 February  2011  on  the  information  to  be  provided 
before  the  establishment  and  modification  of  a  functional  airspace  block,  OJ  L  51,  25.2.2011,  p.  2. 
[APPLICATION IN THE EEA: cf. OJ L 291, 31.10.2013, p. 58] [APPLICATION IN THE EEA: cf. OJ L 
211, 17.7.2014, p. 48] 

Commission  Implementing  Regulation  (EU)  2016/1377  of  4  August  2016  laying  down  common 
requirements for service providers and the oversight in air traffic management/air navigation services and 
other air traffic  management  network  functions, repealing  Regulation (EC) No 482/2008, Implementing 
Regulations  (EU)  No  1034/2011  and  (EU)  No 1035/2011 and  amending  Regulation  (EU)  No  677/2011 

38 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 226, 19.8.2016, p. 1  

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 409/2013 of 3 May 2013 on the definition of common 
projects,  the  establishment  of  governance  and  the 
identification  of  incentives  supporting  the 
implementation of the European Air Traffic Management Master Plan (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 
123, 4.5.2013, p. 1 [APPLICATION IN THE EEA: cf. OJ L 211, 17.7.2014, p. 38] 

Commission 
decisions 

Commission  Implementing  Decision  (EU)  2015/290  of  20  February  2015  on  the  compliance  of  2014 
unit  rates  for  charging  zones  under  Article  17  of  Implementing  Regulation  (EU)  No  391/2013  and 
repealing Decision 2013/631/EU (notified under document C(2015) 882), OJ L 51, 24.2.2015, p. 10. 

Commission Implementing  Decision (EU) 2015/670 of 27 April 2015 on the compliance of  unit rates 
for  charging  zones  for  2015  under  Article  17  of  Implementing  Regulation  (EU)  No  391/2013  (notified 
under document C(2015) 2635) (Only the Bulgarian, Spanish, Czech, Danish, Estonian, Greek, English, 
Croatian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Hungarian, Maltese, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Slovenian, Finnish and 
Swedish texts are authentic) (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 110, 29.4.2015, p. 25. 

Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2017/2378 of 15 December 2017 on the compliance of unit 
rates  for  charging  zones  for  2017  under  Article  17  of  Implementing  Regulation  (EU)  No  391/2013 
(notified  under  document  C(2017)  8501)  (Only  the  Croatian,  Czech,  Danish,  Dutch,  English,  Estonian, 
Finnish, French, German, Greek, Hungarian, Italian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Portuguese, Romanian, Slovak, 
Slovenian, Spanish and Swedish texts are authentic), OJ L 337, 19.12.2017, p. 83. 

Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2018/703 of 8 May 2018 on the compliance of the unit rate 
for  the  charging  zone  of  Switzerland  for  2015,  2016  and  2018  under  Article  17  of  Implementing 
Regulation  (EU)  No  391/2013  (notified  under  document  C(2018)  2726)  (Only  the  German,  French  and 
Italian texts are authentic) (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 118, 14.5.2018, p. 16. 

Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2018/704 of 8 May 2018 on the compliance of unit rates for 
charging  zones  with  Implementing  Regulations  (EU)  No  390/2013  and  (EU)  No  391/2013  pursuant  to 
Article 17 of Implementing Regulation (EU) No 391/2013 (notified under document C(2018) 2729) (Only 
the  Bulgarian,  Croatian,  Czech,  Danish,  Dutch,  English,  Estonian,  Finnish,  French,  German,  Greek, 
Hungarian, Irish, Latvian, Lithuanian, Maltese, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Slovak, Slovenian, Spanish 
and Swedish texts are authentic) (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 118, 14.5.2018, p. 18. 

Commission  Implementing  Decision  (EU)  2019/1742  of  17  October  2019  on  the  compliance  of  unit 
rates  for  charging  zones  with  Implementing  Regulations  (EU)  No  390/2013  and  (EU)  No  391/2013 
(notified under document C(2019) 7333) (Text with EEA relevance)  OJ L 267, 21.10.2019, p. 9–11 

Commission  Implementing  Decision  (EU)  2019/1291  of  30  July  2019  on  the  compliance  of  the  2019 
unit  rate  for  the  charging  zone  of  Switzerland  with  Implementing  Regulations  (EU)  No  390/2013  and 
(EU)  No  391/2013  (notified  under  document  C(2019)  5532)  (Text  with  EEA  relevance.)    OJ  L  203, 
1.8.2019, p. 8–9 

Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2019/2074 of 17 December 2019 on the existence of market 
conditions, within the meaning of Article 35 of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, in 
respect of some of the terminal air navigation services at the airports of Alicante and Ibiza 

SINGLE 
EUROPEAN 

Regulation (EC) No 551/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2004 on the 
organisation  and  use  of  the  airspace  in  the  single  European  sky  (the  airspace  Regulation),  OJ  L  96, 

39 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SKY 

31.3.2004,  p.  20.  [APPLICATION  IN  THE  EEA:  Y    (551/2004)  Geographical  limitation  in  scope  of 
Regulation] 

Airspace 
Regulation 

Amended by: 

Regulation (EC) No 1070/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009, OJ L 
300, 14.11.2009, p. 34 [APPLICATION IN THE EEA: cf. OJ L 154, 22.05.2014, p. 25] 

Implementing rules 

Commission  Implementing  Regulation  (EU)  2017/373  of  1  March  2017  laying  down  common 
requirements  for  providers  of  air  traffic  management/air  navigation  services  and  other  air  traffic 
management  network  functions  and  their  oversight,  repealing  Regulation  (EC)  No  482/2008, 
Implementing Regulations (EU) No 1034/2011, (EU) No 1035/2011 and (EU) 2016/1377 and amending 
Regulation (EU) No 677/2011 (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 62, 8.3.2017, p. 1  

Commission Regulation (EU) No 255/2010 of 25 March 2010 laying down common rules on air traffic 
flow management, OJ L 80, 26.3.2010, p. 10.  
[APPLICATION IN THE EEA: OJ L 161, 21.6.2012, p. 33 (255/2010)] 

Amended by 

Commission  Implementing  Regulation  (EU)  No  923/2012  of  26  September  2012  laying  down  the 
common  rules  of  the  air  and  operational  provisions  regarding  services  and  procedures  in  air  navigation 
and amending Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1035/2011 and Regulations (EC) No 1265/2007, (EC) 
No  1794/2006,  (EC)  No  730/2006,  (EC)  No  1033/2006  and  (EU)  No  255/2010  (Text  with  EEA 
relevance), OJ L 281, 13.10.2012, p. 1 [APPLICATION IN THE EEA: cf. OJ L 154, 22.05.2014, p. 34] 

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/1006 of 22 June 2016 amending Regulation (EU) No 
255/2010 as regards the ICAO provisions referred to in Article 3(1) (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 165, 
23.6.2016, p. 8. [APPLICATION IN THE EEA: cf. OJ L 89, 5.4.2018, p. 16] 

Commission  Implementing  Regulation  (EU)  2017/2159  of  20  November  2017  amending  Regulation 
(EU)  No  255/2010  as  regards  certain  references  to  ICAO  provisions  (Text  with  EEA  relevance),  OJ  L 
304, 21.11.2017, p. 45. 

Commission Regulation (EC) No 2150/2005 of 23 December 2005 laying down common rules for  the 
flexible use of airspace, OJ L 342, 24.12.2005, p. 20.    [APPLICATION IN THE EEA: Y (2150/2005)] 

Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2019/709 of 6 May 2019 on the appointment of the network 
manager for air traffic management (ATM) network functions of the single European sky  (notified under 
document  C(2019) 3558), OJ L 120, 8.5.2019, p. 27. 

Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2019/2168  of 17 December 2019 on the appointment of the 
chairperson and the members and their alternates of the Network Management Board and of the members 
and  their  alternates  of  the  European  Aviation  Crisis  Coordination  Cell  for  the  air  traffic  management 
network functions for the third reference period 2020-2024, OJ L 328, 18.12.2019, p. 90–96 

Commission  Implementing  Decision  (EU)  2019/2167  of  17  December  2019  approving  the  Network 
Strategy Plan for the air traffic management network functions of the single European  sky for the period 
2020-2029, OJ L 328, 18.12.2019, p. 89–89  

40 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SINGLE 
EUROPEAN 
SKY 

Regulation (EC) No 552/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2004 on the 
interoperability of the European Air Traffic Management network (the interoperability Regulation), OJ L 
96, 31.3.2004, p. 26.  
[APPLICATION IN THE EEA: Y (552/2004)] 

Amended by: 

Interoperability 
Regulation 

Regulation (EC) No 1070/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009, OJ L 
300, 14.11.2009, p. 34 [APPLICATION IN THE EEA: cf. OJ L 154, 22.05.2014, p. 25] 

Regulation (EC) No 552/2004 repealed by:  

Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2018 on common 
rules  in  the  field  of  civil  aviation  and  establishing  a  European  Union  Aviation  Safety  Agency,  and 
amending Regulations (EC) No 2111/2005, (EC) No 1008/2008, (EU) No 996/2010, (EU) No  376/2014 
and Directives 2014/30/EU and 2014/53/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing 
Regulations (EC) No 552/2004 and (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council and 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 3922/91 (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 212, 22.8.2018, p. 1. (but see in 
particular Art. 139) 

Commission  communication  concerning  the  implementation  of  Article  4  of  Regulation  (EC)  No 
552/2004  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  the  interoperability  of  the  European  Air 
Traffic  Management  network  (Text  with  EEA  relevance)  (Publication  of  titles  and  references  of 
Community specifications under the Regulation) (2012/C 332/05), OJ C 332, 30.10.2012, p. 9 

Implementing rules 

Commission  Implementing  Regulation  (EU)  No 1206/2011  of  22 November  2011  laying  down 
requirements on aircraft identification for surveillance for the single European sky, OJ L 305, 23.11.2011, 
p.23. [APPLICATION IN THE EEA: cf. OJ L 291, 31.10.2013, p. 59] [APPLICATION IN THE EEA: cf. 
OJ L 211, 17.7.2014, p. 48] 

Commission  Implementing  Regulation  (EU)  No 1207/2011  of  22 November  2011  laying  down 
requirements for the performance and the interoperability of surveillance for the single European sky, OJ 
L 305, 23.11.2011, p.35 [APPLICATION IN THE EEA: cf. OJ L 154, 22.05.2014, p. 39] 

Amended by: 

Commission  Implementing  Regulation  (EU)  No  1028/2014  of  26  September  2014  amending 
Implementing  Regulation  (EU)  No  1207/2011  laying  down  requirements  for  the  performance  and  the 
interoperability  of  surveillance  for  the  single  European  sky  (Text  with  EEA  relevance),  OJ  L  284, 
30.9.2014, p. 7. [APPLICATION IN THE EEA :  cf. OJ L 211, 4.8.2016, p. 69] 

Commission  Implementing  Regulation  (EU)  2017/386  of  6  March  2017  amending  Implementing 
Regulation (EU) No 1207/2011 laying down requirements for the performance and the interoperability of 
surveillance for the single European sky (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 59, 7.3.2017, p. 34. 

Commission Regulation (EU) No 73/2010 of 26 January 2010 laying down requirements on the quality 
of aeronautical data and aeronautical information for the single European sky,  OJ L 23, 27.1.2010, p. 6. 
[APPLICATION IN THE EEA: cf. OJ L 85, 30.3.2017, p. 52] 

Amended by: 

Commission  Implementing  Regulation  (EU)  No  1029/2014  of  26  September  2014  amending 
Regulation  (EU)  No  73/2010  laying  down  requirements  on  the  quality  of  aeronautical  data  and 
aeronautical information for the single European sky (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 284, 30.9.2014, p. 

41 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9. [APPLICATION IN THE EEA: cf. OJ L 85, 30.3.2017, p. 52] 

Commission  Regulation  (EC)  No  262/2009  of  30  March  2009  laying  down  requirements  for  the 
coordinated  allocation  and  use  of  Mode  S  interrogator  codes  for  the  single  European  sky,  OJ  L  84, 
31.3.2009, p. 20.  
[APPLICATION IN THE EEA: Y (262/2009)] 

Amended by: 

Commission  Implementing  Regulation  (EU)  2016/2345  of  14  December  2016  amending  Regulation 
(EC)  No  262/2009  and  Implementing  Regulation  (EU)  No  1079/2012  as  regards  references  to  ICAO 
provisions (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 348, 21.12.2016, p. 11. [APPLICATION IN THE EEA: cf. OJ 
L 305, 29.11.2018, p. 32] 

Commission  Regulation  (EC)  No  29/2009 of  16  January  2009  laying  down  requirements  on  data  link 
services for the single European sky, OJ L 13, 17.1.2009, p. 3.  
[APPLICATION IN THE EEA: Y (29/2009)]  
[APPLICATION IN THE EEA: cf. also OJ L 345, 19.12.2013, p. 17] 

Amended by: 

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 441/2014 of 30 April 2014 amending Regulation (EC) 
No 29/2009 laying down requirements on data link services for the single European sky (Text with EEA 
relevance),  OJ  L  130,  1.5.2014,  p.  37.  [  APPLICATION  IN  THE  EEA:  cf.  OJ  L  230,  3.9.2015,  p.  42 ] 
[APPLICATION IN THE EEA: cf. OJ L 8, 12.1.2017, p. 23] 

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/310 of 26 February 2015 amending Regulation (EC) 
No  29/2009  laying  down  requirements  on  data  link  services  for  the  single  European  sky  and  repealing 
Implementing  Regulation  (EU)  No  441/2014  (Text  with  EEA  relevance),  OJ  L  56,  27.2.2015,  p.  30. 
[APPLICATION IN THE EEA: cf. OJ L 8, 12.1.2017, p. 23] 

Commission  Implementing  Regulation  (EU)  2019/1170  of  8  July  2019  amending  and  correcting 
Regulation (EC) No 29/2009 laying down requirements on data link services for the single European sky, OJ L 
183 9.7.2019, p.6. 

Commission  Implementing  Decision  (EU)  2019/2012  of  29  November  2019  on  exemptions  under 
Article 14 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 29/2009 laying down requirements on data link services 
for the single European sky (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 312, 3.12.2019, p. 95–100  

Commission Regulation (EC) No 633/2007 of 7 June 2007 laying down requirements for the application 
of  a  flight  message  transfer  protocol  used  for  the  purpose  of  notification,  coordination  and  transfer  of 
flights  between  air  traffic  control  units,  OJ  L  146,  8.6.2007,  p.  7.  [APPLICATION  IN  THE  EEA:  Y 
(633/2007)] 

Commission Regulation (EU) No 283/2011 of 22 March 2011 amending Regulation (EC) No  633/2007 
as regards the transitional arrangements referred to in Article 7, OJ L 77, 23.3.2011, p. 23.  
[APPLICATION IN THE EEA (283/2011) EEE OJ 76 15.3.2012, p.35] 

Commission  Implementing  Regulation  (EU)  No  1079/2012  of  16  November  2012  laying  down 
requirements  for  voice  channels  spacing  for  the  single  European  sky  (Text  with  EEA  relevance),  OJ  L 
320, 17.11.2012, p. 14 [APPLICATION IN THE EEA: cf. OJ L 154, 22.05.2014, p. 36] 

Amended by: 

42 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Commission  Implementing  Regulation  (EU)  No  657/2013  of  10  July  2013  amending  Implementing 
Regulation  (EU)  No  1079/2012  laying  down  requirements  for  voice  channels  spacing  for  the  single 
European sky (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 190, 11.7.2013, p. 37  [APPLICATION IN THE EEA: cf. 
OJ L 154, 22.05.2014, p. 38] 

Commission  Implementing  Regulation  (EU)  2016/2345  of  14  December  2016  amending  Regulation 
(EC)  No  262/2009  and  Implementing  Regulation  (EU)  No  1079/2012  as  regards  references  to  ICAO 
provisions (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 348, 21.12.2016, p. 11. [APPLICATION IN THE EEA: cf. OJ 
L 305, 29.11.2018, p. 32] 

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/2160 of 20 November 2017 amending Implementing 
Regulation  (EU)  No  1079/2012  as  regards  certain  references  to  ICAO  provisions  (Text  with  EEA 
relevance), OJ L 304, 21.11.2017, p. 47. 

Commission Regulation (EC) No 1033/2006 of 4 July 2006 laying down the requirements on procedures 
for flight plans in the pre-flight phase for the single European sky, OJ L 186, 7.7.2006, p. 46.  
[APPLICATION IN THE EEA: Y (2033/2006)] 

Amended by 

Commission  Implementing  Regulation  (EU)  No  923/2012  of  26  September  2012  laying  down  the 
common  rules  of  the  air  and  operational  provisions  regarding  services  and  procedures  in  air  navigation 
and amending Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1035/2011 and Regulations (EC) No 1265/2007, (EC) 
No  1794/2006,  (EC)  No  730/2006,  (EC)  No  1033/2006  and  (EU)  No  255/2010  (Text  with  EEA 
relevance), OJ L 281, 13.10.2012, p. 1 [APPLICATION IN THE EEA: cf. OJ L 154, 22.05.2014, p. 34] 

Commission  Implementing  Regulation (EU) No 428/2013 of 8 May 2013 amending  Regulation (EC) 
No 1033/2006 as regards the ICAO provisions referred to in Article 3(1) and repealing Regulation (EU) 
No 929/2010 (Text with EEA relevance) ), OJ L 127, 9.5.2013, p. 23.  [APPLICATION IN THE EEA: cf. 
OJ L 92, 27.3.2014, p. 30] 

Commission  Implementing  Regulation  (EU)  2016/2120  of  2  December  2016  amending  Regulation 
(EC) No 1033/2006 as regards the provisions referred to in Article 3(1) (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 
329, 3.12.2016, p. 70. [APPLICATION IN THE EEA: cf. OJ L 305, 29.11.2018, p. 31] 

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/139 of 29 January 2018 amending Regulation (EC) 
No 1033/2006 as regards references to ICAO provisions (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 25, 30.1.2018, 
p. 4. 

Commission  Regulation  (EC)  No  1032/2006  of  6  July  2006  laying  down  requirements  for  automatic 
systems for the exchange of flight data for the purpose of notification, coordination and transfer of flights 
between air traffic control units, OJ L 186, 7.7.2006, p. 27.  

Amended by 

Commission Regulation (EC) No 30/2009 of 16 January 2009 amending Regulation (EC) No 1032/2006 
as  far  as  the  requirements  for  automatic  systems  for  the  exchange  of  flight  data  supporting  data  link 
services are concerned, OJ L 13, 17.1.2009, p. 20  
[APPLICATION IN TH EEEA: Y (30/2009)] 

Implementation 

43 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Commission  Implementing  Regulation  (EU)  No  1079/2012  of  16  November  2012  laying  down 
requirements  for  voice  channels  spacing  for  the  single  European  sky  (Text  with  EEA  relevance),  OJ  L 
320, 17.11.2012, p. 14 [APPLICATION IN THE EEA: cf. OJ L 154, 22.05.2014, p. 36] 

ATCO-licence  Directive 2006/23/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2006 on a Community 

air traffic controller licence, OJ L 114, 27.4.2006, p. 22.  
[APPLICATION IN TH EEEA: Y  (2006/23)] 

SESAR 

Council Regulation (EC) No 219/2007 of 27 February 2007 on the establishment of a Joint Undertaking 
to develop the new generation European air traffic management system (SESAR), OJ L 64, 2.3.2007, p. 1. 

Amended by  

Council Regulation (EC) No 1361/2008 of 16 December 2008, OJ L 352, 31.12.2008, p.12. 

Council Regulation (EU) No 721/2014 of 16 June 2014 amending Regulation (EC) No 219/2007 on the 
establishment  of  a  Joint  Undertaking  to  develop  the  new  generation  European  air  traffic  management 
system (SESAR) as regards the extension of the Joint Undertaking until 2024 (Text with EEA relevance), 
OJ L 192, 1.7.2014, p. 1. 

44 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
ANNEX IV – List of reports, studies and other evidence 

1. 
European Court of Auditors Special Report Number 18 on the “Single European Sky: a changed 
culture but not a single sky”, https://eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR17_18/SR_SES_EN.pdf, 2017 

2. 
European  Court  of  Auditors  Special  Report  Number  11  on  “The  EU’s  regulation  for  the 
modernisation of air traffic management has added value  – but the funding was largely unnecessary”, 
https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR19_11/SR_SESAR_DEPLOYMENT_EN.pdf, 2019 

“A  proposal 

3. 
https://www.sesarju.eu/node/3253, 2019 

the 

for 

future  architecture  of 

the  European  Airspace”, 

SESAR, 

Report  of  the  Wise  Persons  Group  on  the 

4. 
future  of  the  Single  European  Sky, 
https://ec.europa.eu/transport/sites/transport/files/2019-04-report-of-the-wise-persons-group-on-the-
future-of-the-single-european-sky.pdf, April 2019 

Study on Data Services provision carried out by Steer Davies Gleeve on behalf of the European 

5. 
Commission, DG MOVE, ongoing 

“A 

high-level 

6. 
https://ec.europa.eu/transport/sites/transport/files/modes/air/single_european_sky/doc/icb/2015-01-
22-icb-high-level-vision-for-achieving-ses.pdf,  Industry Consultation Body, January 2015 and “ICB Vision 
for a Single European Sky (2nd edition),  July 2019, on request. 

European 

achieving 

Single 

vision 

Sky”, 

the 

for 

European 

7. 
https://www.easa.europa.eu/eaer/system/files/usr_uploaded/219473_EASA_EAER_2019_WEB_LOW-
RES.pdf, March 2020 

Environmental 

Aviation 

update 

Report 

2019 

and 

on 

its 

ATM, 

Joint 

stakeholder 

8. 
European 
on 
https://ec.europa.eu/transport/sites/transport/files/2019-09-high-level-conference-future-of-ses-
declaration.pdf, September 2019 

declaration 

future 

Single 

the 

of 

Sky, 

Evaluation  of 

9. 
union/sites/europaeu/files/docs/body/synthesis_and_prospects_en.pdf, December 2009 

the  EU  de-centralised  agencies 

in  2009,  https://europa.eu/european-

45