COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL 2020 Strategic Foresight Report STRATEGIC FORESIGHT – CHARTING THE COURSE TOWARDS A MORE RESILIENT EUROPE
Date: 2020-09-09
Institutions: European Commission, Secretariat-General
Subjects: EU policy, activity report, climate change policy, digital technology, economic consequence, economic recovery, epidemic, green economy, infectious disease, social impact

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 9.9.2020  COM(2020) 493 final  COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL 2020 Strategic Foresight Report          STRATEGIC FORESIGHT – CHARTING THE COURSE TOWARDS A MORE RESILIENT EUROPE  
 
 
Table of Contents 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................................2 

1.  EMBEDDING STRATEGIC FORESIGHT INTO EU POLICYMAKING ...............3 

2.  RESILIENCE AS A NEW COMPASS FOR EU POLICIES .....................................5 

3.  A FOUR-DIMENSIONAL ANALYSIS OF RESILIENCE .......................................7 

3.1.  The social and economic dimension ..................................................................7 

3.2.  The geopolitical dimension ..............................................................................13 

3.3.  The green dimension ........................................................................................20 

3.4.  The digital dimension ......................................................................................27 

4. STRATEGIC FORESIGHT AGENDA .........................................................................32 

4.1 Monitoring resilience ...........................................................................................32 

4.1.1 Prototype resilience dashboards ..............................................................32 

4.1.2 Work ahead for monitoring resilience ....................................................35 

4.2 Horizontal foresight activities to foster effective EU transition-led policies ......36 

4.3 Thematic strategic foresight agenda ....................................................................37 

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

President  von  der  Leyen’s  political  guidelines  set  a  strategic  long-term  direction  to 
achieve the transition towards a green, digital and fair Europe1. They lay out a path for 
Europe to become the first climate-neutral continent by 2050, to be fit for the digital age, and 
to cultivate its unique social market economy and democratic order.  

The  COVID-19  crisis  has  shocked  the  world,  both  exposing  vulnerabilities  and 
highlighting  capacities  within  the  EU.  The  pandemic  has  already  claimed  the  lives  of 
almost a million people globally and has led to economic, social and psychological hardship. 
In the EU, it has exacerbated social and economic inequalities: in 2020, despite various safety 
nets, unemployment is projected to rise to more than 9% and real disposable income to drop 
by  1%,  disproportionately  affecting  women  and  poorer  households2.  The  EU’s  strongly 
diversified trade has proven to be a strength, even if reliance on a limited number of non-EU 
suppliers  for some critical  goods and services has  been exposed as a vulnerability. The EU 
and  its  Member  States  were  also  able  to  rely  on  their  social  market  economies,  sustainable 
ecosystems,  robust financial systems  and an effective governance framework. The recovery 
plan  for  Europe3  now  shows  the  way  forward:  Next  Generation  EU  aims  to  build  a  more 
resilient, sustainable, and fair Europe through large-scale financial support for investment and 
reforms. 

Strategic  foresight  will  play  a  key  role  in  helping  future-proof  EU  policymaking  by 
ensuring that short-term initiatives are grounded in a longer term perspective. To make 
the most of its potential, this Commission has a strong mandate to put  strategic foresight at 
the heart of EU policymaking4. Strategic foresight can help build collective intelligence in a 
structured manner to  better chart the way  forward for the twin  green and digital  transitions 
and to recover from disruptions. With this Communication, the Commission sets out how it 
will  integrate  strategic  foresight  in  EU  policymaking  and  outlines  related  priorities.  This  is 
vital,  as  we  are  entering  a  new  era,  where  action-oriented  foresight  will  stimulate  strategic 
thinking  and  shape  EU  policies  and  initiatives,  including  future  Commission  work 
programmes. 

The central theme of this first report is resilience, which has become a new compass for 
EU  policies with  the  COVID-19  crisis.  Resilience  is  the  ability  not  only  to  withstand  and 
cope  with  challenges  but  also  to  undergo  transitions  in  a  sustainable,  fair,  and  democratic 
manner.  Resilience  is  necessary  in  all  policy  areas  to  undergo  the  green  and  digital 
transitions, while maintaining the EU’s core purpose and integrity in a dynamic and at times 
turbulent  environment.  A  more  resilient  Europe  will  recover  faster,  emerge  stronger  from 
current and future crises, and better implement the United Nations’ Sustainable Development 
Goals.  

1 A Union that strives for more. Political Guidelines for the next European Commission 2019-2024. 
2 European Commission, European Economic Forecast. Spring 2020. 
3 COM(2020)456 final, Europe's moment: Repair and Prepare for the Next Generation. 
4 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/mission-letter-maros-sefcovic-2019_en.pdf  

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This first annual Strategic Foresight Report outlines how foresight will  inform policies 
with a view to strengthening the EU’s resilience in four interrelated dimensions: social 
and economic, geopolitical, green, and digital. It analyses the EU’s resilience in response 
to  the  COVID-19  crisis  in  the  context  of  the  acceleration  or  deceleration  of  relevant 
megatrends,  long-term  driving  forces  that  will  likely  have  a  large  influence  on  the  future. 
This Communication shows how policies to improve resilience, by mitigating vulnerabilities 
and strengthening capacities, can open new opportunities in each of the four dimensions. This 
includes reconsidering the future of wellbeing, work, labour markets and skills, reconfiguring 
global  value  chains,  supporting  democracy,  reforming  our  rules-based  trading  system, 
building alliances in emerging technologies, and investing in the green and digital transitions.  

This new focus on resilience calls for close monitoring. This Communication proposes to 
move  towards  resilience  dashboards,  which,  once  fully  developed  in  cooperation  with  the 
Member  States  and  other  key  stakeholders,  should  be  used  for  assessing  the  vulnerabilities 
and capacities of the EU and its Member States in each of the four dimensions. Such analysis 
can help answer the question: are we, through our policies and recovery strategy, effectively 
making the EU more resilient?  

The  strategic  foresight  agenda  will  encompass  horizontal  foresight  activities  and 
thematic  forward-looking  exercises.  For  the  upcoming  year,  these  include:  open  strategic 
autonomy,  the  future  of  jobs  and  skills  for  and  in  the  green  transition,  and  deepening  the 
twinning of the digital and green transitions. This agenda will bring a dynamic perspective of 
synergies  and  trade-offs  among  EU  policy  goals,  thereby  supporting  the  coherence  of  EU 
policies.  

1.  EMBEDDING STRATEGIC FORESIGHT INTO EU POLICYMAKING 

The Commission has made use of foresight for many years, but now aims to mainstream 
it into policymaking in all fields. Foresight5 – the discipline of exploring, anticipating and 
shaping the future – helps build and use collective intelligence in a structured and systematic 
way  to  anticipate  developments  and  better  prepare  for  change.  Horizon  scanning6,  the 
assessment  of  megatrends,  emerging  issues  and  their  policy  implications,  as  well  as  the 
exploration  of  alternative  futures  via  visioning  and  scenario  planning,  are  key  to  informing 
strategic  political  choices.  Strategic  foresight  in  support  of  EU  policymaking  was  first 
developed  under  President  Delors’  Cellule  de  Prospective.  Together  with  long-term 
modelling7,  it  has  since  informed  many  policies,  including  climate  action.  To  support  its 
long-term  ambition  of  a  climate-neutral  continent  fit  for  the  digital  age,  the  von  der  Leyen 

5 Strategic foresight draws useful insights for strategic planning, policymaking and preparedness, (European Commission, 2017, Strategic  
Foresight Primer). It is not about predicting the future but about exploring different plausible futures that could arise and the opportunities 
and challenges they could present. It involves identifying trends and emerging issues, using them to create visions and associated pathways 
to make better decisions and act in the present in order to shape the future we want. 
(https://www.sciencedirect.com/book/9780128225967/science-for-policy-handbook). 
6 Horizon scanning is part of trend analysis and is typically used to add context in foresight activities. It can act as a forum to review and 
share information about future developments, provide orientation, identify opportunities and serve as an early warning system. 
7 Modelling uses historical data as inputs to make informed estimates on the direction of future trends. Strategic foresight and modelling are 
complementary approaches for anticipatory- and evidence-based policy making. 

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Commission aims to mainstream strategic foresight into the preparation of major initiatives. 
This  process  is  already  under  way  –  for  instance,  the  recently  adopted  Communication  on 
Critical  Raw  Materials  makes  significant  use  of  foresight8.  Over  the  coming  years, 
establishing  a  forward-looking  culture  in  policymaking  will  be  crucial  for  the  EU  to 
strengthen  its  capacity  to  deal  with  an  increasingly  volatile  and  complex  world9  and  to 
implement  its  forward-looking  political  agenda.  It  will  ensure  that  short-term  actions  are 
grounded in long-term objectives and will allow the EU to lead the way in charting its own 
course and shaping the world around it. 

Strategic  foresight  should  inform  major  policy  initiatives.  As  such,  it  will  become  an 
integral part of the Commission’s Better Regulation toolbox, for example in  ex ante impact 
assessments.  This  will  ensure  that  EU  policies  draw  on  a  clear  understanding  of  possible 
future trends, scenarios and challenges, especially in policy areas subject to rapid structural 
change.  Strategic  foresight  will  also  support  the  regulatory  fitness  and  performance 
programme10, which identifies opportunities to reduce Europe’s regulatory burden and helps 
assess whether existing EU laws remain ‘fit for the future’11. 

A  regular  stream  of  strategic  foresight  activities  will  support  EU  policymaking.  The 
annual Strategic Foresight Reports will contribute to an inclusive reflection on questions of 
strategic  importance  for  Europe’s  future,  analysing  key  trends,  defining  topics  of  critical 
interest for the EU and exploring ways to pursue our aspirations (Section 4). The preparation 
of future reports will be based on full foresight cycles12, including in-depth and participatory 
foresight  exercises  on  major  initiatives,  and  will  aim  to  feed  into  the  annual  State  of  the 
Union  address,  Commission  work  programmes,  and  multiannual  programming  exercises. 
Building  on  in-house  resources13,  external  expertise  and  cooperation  with  Member  States, 
other  key  stakeholders  and  citizens,  the  Commission  will  expand  its  strategic  foresight 
capacities to assess risks and opportunities, aid early warning and situational awareness14, and 
explore alternative futures.   

Strategic foresight will foster participatory and forward-looking governance in Europe 
and beyond. The Commission will build close foresight cooperation and alliances with other 
EU institutions, notably in the context of the European Strategy and Policy Analysis System 
(ESPAS)15,  reaching  out  to  international  partners  and  launching  an  EU-wide  foresight 

8 European  Commission,  2020,  Critical  Raw  Materials  for  strategic  technologies  and  sectors  –  a  foresight  study  (doi:  10.2873/58081), 
accompanying COM(2020)474 final, Critical Raw Materials Resilience: Charting a Path towards greater Security and Sustainability. 
9 https://www.routledge.com/Transforming-the-Future-Open-Access-Anticipation-in-the-21st-Century/Miller/p/book/9781138485877. 
10 https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-making-process/evaluating-and-improving-existing-laws/refit-making-eu-law-simpler-and-less-costly. 
11 Foresight can for instance, help apply the innovation principle when designing and reviewing European laws 
(https://ec.europa.eu/info/news/innovation-principle-makes-eu-laws-smarter-and-future-oriented-experts-say-2019-nov-25_en). 
12 A foresight cycle can take up to one year to complete and covers: a diagnosis of how past developments have led to the current situation, 
the likely future evolution based on trends and emerging issues if no action is taken, and alternative future possibilities; collective visions; 
alternative roadmaps and a timetable for their implementation; the selection of pathways and associated strategies, actions and partnerships; 
and  the  definition  of  adequate  monitoring  indicators,  so  that  actions  can  be  adapted  along  the  way.  The  external  dimension  of  foresight 
cycles includes engaging systematically in strategic discussions with Member States, European institutions, citizens, civil society and key 
stakeholders. The internal dimension includes the mainstreaming of strategic foresight into policy- and decision-making, through methods 
such as impact assessments, alternative scenario planning and testing and information sharing to build collective intelligence. 
13 The  Commission’s  foresight  capacities  include  the  Joint  Research  Centre’s  Competence  Centre  on  Foresight  and  the  Commission’s 
strategic foresight network, coordinated by the Secretariat-General. 
14 Situational awareness is the part of decision-making aimed to perceive environmental elements and events with respect to time or space, 
to understand what they mean, and to projection their future status. 
15 https://espas.secure.europarl.europa.eu/orbis/espas2018about. 

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network  to  develop  partnerships  that  draw  on  Member  States’  public  foresight  capabilities, 
think  tanks,  academia  and  civil  society.  Embedding  foresight  in  EU  policymaking  needs  to 
happen in an iterative and systematic way, building on approaches that have already proven 
effective. It will help develop a shared vision of policymaking at the highest political level, 
while  allowing  for  the  upscaling  of  best  practices  and  keeping  the  door  open  to 
experimentation. 

2.  RESILIENCE AS A NEW COMPASS FOR EU POLICIES 

The COVID-19 crisis has exposed a number of vulnerabilities in the EU and its Member 
States. An analysis of the impacts of the crisis, beyond its terrible human toll, reveals severe 
disruptions  across  Europe’s  economy  and  society.  Preparedness  and  prevention,  early 
warning systems  and  coordination  structures were clearly under strain,  thus underlining the 
need for more ambitious  crisis  management for large-scale  emergencies at  EU level.  In the 
first  months of the pandemic, many hospitals were overwhelmed, free movement of people 
and  goods  was  severely  restrained  and  essential  medicines  and  equipment  were  in  short 
supply. The need to treat COVID-19 patients affected the capacity of the system to deal with 
non-COVID-19  patients,  while  residential  care  facilities  and  essential  support  services  for 
older  people  and  persons  with  disabilities  were  particularly  challenged.  Schools  and 
universities  were  forced  to  close,  many  ill-prepared  to  offer  digital  learning  alternatives  to 
classrooms,  particularly  to  children  from  disadvantaged  backgrounds  or  those  with  a 
disability.  Overall,  confinement  measures  have  had  a  much  more  severe  effect  on  the 
economy than the 2008 financial crisis.  

After  an  uneasy  start,  the  EU  and  its  Member  States  pulled  together  to  deal  with  the 
crisis. Agility and leadership at all levels of government played a key role in our response. 
Initial knee-jerk competition for scarce medical resources and unilateral actions by Member 
States  in  the  single  market  and  Schengen  Area  quickly  evolved  into  improved  cooperation 
and  coordination,  facilitated  by  the  Commission.  The  EU  devised  innovative  solutions  and 
demonstrated its resilience capacities. EU manufacturers and 3D printing companies16 swiftly 
adapted  their  production  lines  to  produce  facemasks,  ventilators  and  hand  sanitiser17.  The 
Commission established the first-ever common strategic reserve of medical equipment as part 
of  rescEU  and  helped  facilitate  more  than  350  flights  to  bring  stranded  EU  citizens  back 
home.  After  initial  border  restrictions  resulting  in  supply  bottlenecks,  the  Commission 
implemented  and  coordinated  the  green  lanes  allowing  freight  transport  to  move 
unhindered18.  Distance  learning  was  established  to  compensate  for  closed  schools  and 
universities.  Companies  and  administrations  shifted  to  teleworking  where  possible. 
Consumers  turned  to  e-commerce  and  home  deliveries.  Member  States  put  in  place  safety 
nets to protect firms and workers during the confinement measures. Between April and May 

16 Formlabs  produced  150 000  swabs  with  250  printers  each  day.  Similarly,  Paris  hospital  workers  scanned  valves,  syringe  pumps  and 
medical plug connections and produced medical material with 60 3D printers to avoid shortages.  
17 https://ec.europa.eu/info/live-work-travel-eu/health/coronavirus-response/coronavirus-european-solidarity-
action_en#euindustrystepsintoprotecteuropeancitizens  
18 C(2020)1897  final,  Communication  from  the  Commission  on  the  implementation  of  the  Green  Lanes  under  the  Guidelines  for  border 
management measures to protect health and ensure the availability of goods and essential service. 

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2020,  the  Commission  adopted  a  safety  net  package19  and  issued  country-specific 
recommendations  under  the  European  Semester20  that  applied  maximum  flexibility  to 
accommodate  this  extraordinary  situation.  It  also  put  forward  a  coordinated  strategy  to  lift 
confinement  measures  and  a  comprehensive  recovery  plan21.  Therefore,  the  pandemic  has 
also underlined Europe’s capacity to act in the face of adversity. 

Resilience refers to the ability not only to withstand and cope with challenges but also to 
transform  in  a  sustainable,  fair,  and  democratic  manner22.  In  light  of  the  COVID-19 
crisis  and  of  the  transition-led  political  agenda,  it  is  clear  that  Europe  needs  to  further 
strengthen  its  resilience  and  bounce  forward,  i.e.  not  only  recover  but  emerge  stronger  by 
intensifying  these  transitions.  The  EU  needs  to  draw  lessons  from  the  pandemic,  anticipate 
future developments, and strike the right balance between the wellbeing of current and future 
generations23.  

The  EU’s  vulnerabilities  and  resilience  capacities  are  analysed  in  the  light  of  relevant 
megatrends, long-term driving forces that will most likely have a significant influence on the 
future.  Fourteen  global  megatrends  have  been  identified  by  the  Commission’s  Megatrends 
Hub24.  Section  3  provides  a  preliminary  systematic  analysis  of  the  vulnerabilities  and 
capacities  revealed  by  the  crisis  in  the  EU  and  its  Member  States,  in  light  of  the  possible 
acceleration or slowing down of these megatrends due to the crisis, as depicted in Figure 2.1. 
For instance, COVID-19 has deepened inequalities, as well as accelerated hyperconnectivity 
and demographic imbalances. The analysis  also  identifies major opportunities to  strengthen 
Europe’s resilience through relevant policy action. 

19 https://ec.europa.eu/info/live-work-travel-eu/health/coronavirus-response/overview-commissions-response_en#economic-measures  
20 https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/2020-european-semester-country-specific-recommendations-commission-recommendations_en  
21 COM(2020)456 final, Europe's moment: Repair and Prepare for the Next Generation. 
22 Manca, A.R., Benczur, P., and Giovannini, E., 2017, Building a scientific narrative towards a more resilient EU society. 
23 Giovannini,  E.,  Benczur,  P.,  Campolongo,  F.,  Cariboni,  J.,  Manca,  A.R,  2020.  Time  for  transformative  resilience:  the  COVID-19 
emergency, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. 
24 These  long-term  driving  forces  are  identified  and  monitored  by  the  Commission’s  Joint  Research  Centre  (JRC).  They  are  continually 
reviewed by JRC experts to include updates and accommodate associated trends of relevance or interest for the EU Commission Services. 
The definitions of the 14 megatrends are available at: https://ec.europa.eu/knowledge4policy/foresight/tool/megatrends-hub_en. See also the 
ESPAS Report 2019: Global Trends to 2030 (https://ec.europa.eu/knowledge4policy/publication/espas-report-2019-global-trends-2030_en). 

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Figure 2.1 – Potential impact of COVID-19 on megatrends 

Forward-looking  policies  supported  by  foresight  will  strengthen  the  EU’s  resilience. 
Foresight  can  help  anticipate  developments  likely  to  have  adverse  impacts,  to  strengthen 
resilience through structural changes25. Figure 2.2 shows one cycle of how strategic foresight 
can inform resilience-enhancing policies across the social and economic, geopolitical, green, 
and digital dimensions, taking into account the impact of the crisis on relevant megatrends. 
Policies  benefitting  from  strategic  foresight  can  better  mitigate  the  vulnerabilities  and 
strengthen  the  capacities  revealed  by  the  crisis,  opening  new  opportunities  and  making 
Europe more resilient. This is a continuous process, with constant re-evaluation and feedback 
loops. 

25 European Parliamentary Research Service, 2020, Towards a more resilient Europe post-coronavirus. An initial mapping of structural risks 
facing the EU. 

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Figure 2.2 – Link between strategic foresight and resilience 

3.  A FOUR-DIMENSIONAL ANALYSIS OF RESILIENCE 

3.1.  The social and economic dimension 

The social and economic dimension of resilience refers to the ability to tackle economic 
shocks  and  achieve  long-term  structural  change  in  a  fair  and  inclusive  way.  It  means 
building  the  social  and  economic  conditions  for  a  recovery  geared  towards  the  transitions, 
promoting social and regional cohesion, and supporting the most vulnerable in society, while 
taking into account demographic trends, and in line with the European Pillar of Social Rights. 

Capacities 

Europe’s  social  and  economic  resilience  rests  on  its  population  and  its  unique  social 
market  economy.  It  combines  a  highly  skilled  workforce  and  competitive  economy  with 
social  systems  that  aim  to  protect  people  from  adverse  events  and  help  them  cope  with 
change.  Through  social  dialogue,  social  partners  contribute  to  sustainable  and  inclusive 
growth.  People  across  the  EU  have  guaranteed  access  to  education  and  social  protection 
measures,  such  as  sickness  and  unemployment  benefits,  family  leave  and  flexible  work 
arrangements.  Although  put  under  stress,  this  model  played  a  key  role  in  cushioning  the 
effects of the crisis, for instance by safeguarding jobs and keeping companies afloat26. Some 
Member  States  have  been  hit  harder  by  the  crisis,  mainly  due  to  their  different  economic 
structures and fiscal space. Member States with higher levels of public debt might generally 
be more constrained in cushioning the impact of the crisis. However, national measures were 
complemented  by  those  at  EU  level,  in  particular  the  three  major  safety  nets  for  workers, 

26 https://esip.eu/new/details/2/82-COVID-19%20?social_security=  

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businesses  and  government,  worth  €540  billion, which  were  endorsed  in  April 2020 by the 
European  Council27.  Looking  to  the  future,  the  EU’s  strong  public  education  system  helps 
deliver the skills needed to prepare for the jobs of tomorrow, a key element in ensuring a just 
transition towards the green and digital economy.  

Europe can also  rely  on the strength of its single  market28. The single market  improves 
mobility, ensures that innovative business models can flourish, making it easier for retailers 
to do business across borders, and enhances access to goods and services throughout the EU. 
Transport infrastructure, the single currency and diversified economic sectors are amongst the 
key  enablers  of  the  economic  resilience.  Across  the  single  market,  economic,  regional  and 
social  diversity  equips  the  Union  with  an  unparalleled  competitive  advantage  on  a  global 
scale and underpins its collective resilience. 

Europe’s  strong  trade  and  investment  links  will  help  get  the  economy  back  on  track. 
With  85%  of  the  world’s  future  growth  projected  to  occur  outside  of  the  EU  and  with  35 
million European jobs depending on exports and 16 million on foreign investment, trade and 
investment  will  be  key  to  connect  Europe  to  external  sources  of  growth.  This  is  especially 
true as demand is likely to pick up asymmetrically after the crisis.  

The EU’s financial system has drawn important lessons from the 2008 financial crisis. It 
proved resilient in the early days of the pandemic, thanks in part to the EU financial reform 
agenda, in particular the creation of the Banking Union. It is now far more robust, with banks 
better  capitalised  to  focus  on  lending  to  households  and  companies  than  in  200829. 
Opportunities for businesses to raise financing on capital markets have improved as well.   

Collaborative  and  non-profit  organisations  strengthen  social  and  economic  resilience. 
Cooperatives,  mutual  societies,  non-profit  associations,  foundations  and  social  enterprises 
have  helped  public  services  cope  with  the  crisis30.  They  have  demonstrated  their  ability  to 
provide  a  wide  range  of  products  and  services  across  the  single  market  in  circumstances 
where for-profit companies would not have been able to generate adequate returns on capital, 
thus  creating  and  preserving  millions  of  jobs31.  They  are  also  a  crucial  engine  for  social 
innovation.  

European solidarity is key to overcoming collective challenges like COVID-19. Cohesion 
policy and the EU Solidarity Fund play a key role in the Coronavirus Response Investment 
Initiative,  helping  exposed  sectors  like  healthcare,  SMEs,  and  labour  markets  in  the  most 

27 https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/ecfin/item-
detail.cfm?item_id=675083&utm_source=ecfin_newsroom&utm_medium=Website&utm_campaign=ecfin&utm_content=EU%20leaders%
20approve%20%20billion%20package%20of%20safety%20nets%20and%20task%20Commission%20&lang=en. 
28 The EU Single Market accounts for 450 million consumers and 22.5 million small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). 
29 Euro area banking sector resilient to stress caused by coronavirus, ECB analysis shows:  
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2020/html/ssm.pr200728~7df9502348.en.html. 
30 In COVID-19 crisis, for example, organisations such as SOS Médecins in France were alleviating the pressure on the health service and 
hospitals  by  providing  doctor  home  visits  for  persons  who  needed  it.  In  the  UK  over  30%  of  home  nursing  were  provided  by  social 
enterprises 
(http://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/social-economy-and-the-covid-19-crisis-current-and-future-roles-
f904b89f/#:~:text=The%20COVID%2D19%20crisis%20has%20allowed%20the%20social%20economy%20to,to%20provide%20goods%2
0and%20services). 
31 There are two million social economy enterprises in Europe, representing 10% of all businesses in the EU. More than 11 million people, 
about 6% of EU’s employees, work for social economy enterprises: https://ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors/social-economy_en. 

9 

 
                                                 
affected Member States and regions32. The Emergency Support Instrument – a financing arm 
of  the  Joint  European  Roadmap  towards  lifting  COVID-19  confinement  measures  –  allows 
mitigating the consequences of the pandemic in a coordinated manner at EU level33.   

Vulnerabilities 

The crisis exposed health and social vulnerabilities in Europe. Residential care facilities 
and  support  services  for  older  people  and  persons  with  disabilities  were  structurally 
vulnerable and unprepared to cope with and control the spread of the coronavirus. Those with 
chronic diseases,  especially  with  weak immune systems or respiratory problems, have been 
especially affected. Health systems in several Member States, as well as the pharmaceutical 
industry,  were  not  fully  prepared,  experiencing  problems  including  shortages  of  personal 
protective equipment and chemicals required for the production of pharmaceuticals. Notably, 
Europe  struggled  to  prepare  and  coordinate  when  the  first  warnings  began  to  emerge  from 
China.  There  is  a  need  to  better  anticipate  health  risks  and  prevent  the  spread  of  new 
infectious  diseases  and  associated  disorders.  COVID-19  has  shifted  attention  away  from 
major health challenges like non-communicable diseases, notably cancer and obesity. 

Confinement measures have affected overall wellbeing. Together with life satisfaction, it 
has dropped to its lowest level in over 40 years34. In the first 6 months of 2020, the feeling of 
loneliness  in  Europe  almost  tripled,  especially  among  young  and  older  people,  and  mental 
health challenges increased35.  

Economic, gender, skills, regional, and ethnic inequalities have all worsened36. COVID-
19  increased  the  number  of  people  in,  or  at  risk  of,  poverty  in  Europe37.  Some  of  those 
economically impacted by the pandemic were also impaired in accessing food38. Racial and 
ethnic minorities are statistically more at risk of contracting the virus and of facing financial 
insecurity39.  Unequal  access  to  digital  infrastructure  and  services  was  also  exposed  by  the 
crisis, widening the digital divide. Students from disadvantaged backgrounds were less likely 
to benefit from online learning, and lower skilled workers were more likely to be employed in 
‘contact  jobs’,  risking  greater  exposure  to  the  disease  whilst  having  lower  access  to 
healthcare.  (Tele-)  working  parents,  and  especially  mothers,  faced  extra  burdens  with  no 
access  to  childcare.  Front-line  workers  consisted  of  a  disproportionate  number  of  women, 
who  represent  70%  of  all  health  and  social  services  staff.  Domestic  violence  rose 

32 In  April 2020, the Commission launched two packages of measures to mobilise support against COVID-19: the Coronavirus Response 
Investment  Initiative  (CRII)  and  the  Coronavirus  Response  Investment  Initiative  Plus  (CRII+),  which  were  swiftly  endorsed  by  the 
European Parliament and the European Council. 
33 https://ec.europa.eu/info/live-work-travel-eu/health/coronavirus-response/emergency-support-instrument_en. 
34 https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/europe/well-being-in-europe-addressing-the-high-cost-of-covid-19-on-life-satisfaction# 
35 The megatrend ‘shifting health challenges’ (https://ec.europa.eu/knowledge4policy/shifting-health-challenges_en) has accelerated. 
36 The megatrend ‘diversifying inequalities’ (https://ec.europa.eu/knowledge4policy/diversifying-inequalities_en) has accelerated. 
37 Using the  assumptions  of  the Commission  Spring 2020  Economic  Forecast,  the  ‘at  risk  of  poverty’  rate  is  expected  to increase  by  4.8 
percentage  points.  The  extra  policies  that  Member  States  have  introduced  during  the  crisis  can  mitigate  this  increase  (to  1.7  percentage 
points). Almeida, V., Barrios, S., Christl, M., De-Poli, S., Tumino, A., van der Wielen, W., 2020, Households’ income and the cushioning 
effect of fiscal policy measures in the Great Lockdown. JRC Working Papers on Taxation and Structural Reforms No 06/2020, European 
Commission, Joint Research Centre, Seville. JRC121598. Similar findings have been presented in  https://voxeu.org/article/inequality-and-
poverty-effects-lockdown-europe.  
38 Foodbanks witnessed an exponential increase in demand worldwide (http://www.fao.org/food-loss-reduction/news/detail/en/c/1271024/).  
39 https://www.enar-eu.org/Evidence-of-the-impact-of-Covid-19-on-racialised-communities-exposes-need-to. 

10 

 
                                                 
significantly40.  In  addition,  the  crisis  highlighted  the  social  and  economic  vulnerability  of 
extra-EU workers41, as well as their crucial contribution to Europe's coronavirus response42. 
Economic hardship and recession may also lead to higher exposure to organised crime and a 
rise in corruption43. 

Economic  sectors  and  firms  have  been  hit  hard  by  the  crisis.  In  the  second  quarter  of 
2020, still marked by COVID-19 confinement measures in most Member States, seasonally 
adjusted GDP decreased by 12.1% in the euro area and by 11.7% in the  EU compared with 
the previous quarter44. Cumulative net revenue losses of EU companies are estimated in the 
range  of  13-24%  of  EU  GDP45.  A  fragile  corporate  sector  can  lead  to  company  failures, 
which can cause lasting economic damage by increasing unemployment, wasting capital, and 
destroying  the  equity  of  its  owners.  Business  failures  also  disrupt  economic  networks  and 
bring international supply chains to a halt. Even for companies that survive, their capacity to 
invest  will  shrink.  The  crisis  has  also  further  aggravated  payment  delays  in  business 
transactions46. For small businesses, late payments can make the difference between survival 
and  bankruptcy,  and  compromise  their  ability  to  pay  employees  and  suppliers,  operate, 
produce  and  grow.  Given  the  limited  resources  and  existing  obstacles  in  accessing  capital, 
SMEs may have less resilience and flexibility in dealing with the costs associated with shocks 
such as COVID-1947. Public administrations were put under severe strain to provide services 
to firms and citizens. 

Labour  markets  have  been  disrupted48,  with  massive  job  losses  that  could  have 
cascading  long-term  effects.  Member  States’  capacities  differ  when  it  comes  to  financing 
safety  nets  for  people  and  firms  to  absorb  the  impact  of  the  crisis,  with  the  ensuing 
asymmetries threatening regional and social cohesion. Unlike in previous crises, employment 
was hardest hit in the service sector, the engine of job creation over the last decade49. Almost 
8%  of  all  jobs  in  Europe,  equivalent  to  12  million  full-time  jobs,  are  forecast  to  be  lost  in 
202050, without counting the devastating effect on atypical forms of labour and project-based 
work.  This  increases  the  risk  of  structural  and  long-term  unemployment,  resulting  in  a 
deskilling of the labour force at precisely the moment when digital and other specialist skills 
are key for future employment and 2 out of 5 Europeans lack digital literacy51. Young people 

40  Affecting  particularly  women,  children  and  LGBTI+  communities  (https://unric.org/en/who-warns-of-surge-of-domestic-violence-as-
covid-19-cases-decrease-in-europe/). 
41 https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/handle/JRC120730. 
42 https://ec.europa.eu/knowledge4policy/sites/know4pol/files/key_workers_covid_0423.pdf. 
43 https://eucrim.eu/news/europol-how-covid-19-shapes-serious-and-organised-crime-landscape-eu/. 
44 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/11156775/2-31072020-BP-EN.pdf/cbe7522c-ebfa-ef08-be60-b1c9d1bd385b. 
45 https://voxeu.org/article/eu-firms-post-covid-19-environment. 
46  In  March  2020,  payment  delays  in  commercial  transactions  in  France  tripled  compared  to  the  same  period  in  2019.  In  Spain,  70%  of 
SMEs declared to have payment terms unilaterally extended by their debtors. In Italy, payment delays to SMEs in the first quarter of 2020 
were estimated at more than €15 billion. 
47 http://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/coronavirus-covid-19-sme-policy-responses-04440101/. 
48 COM(2020)112 final, Coordinated economic response to the COVID-19 outbreak. 
49 Hospitality, air travel, tourism and culture were hit particularly hard. Some areas like delivery and healthcare saw an increase in jobs, but 
these were mainly precarious. Cancelled cultural performances, shut down venues, halted productions, and the related impact on income, 
have  made  the  situation  of  the  cultural  and  creative  sector  more  precarious  than  ever  before.  The  media  sector,  playing  a  key  role  for 
democracy, has also been heavily impacted. Commission estimates of May 2020 foresaw a drop in turnover of over 50% in 2020, without 
taking into account further confinement periods. See: SWD(2020)98 final, Identifying Europe's recovery needs; Eurofound, 2020, COVID-
19: Policy responses across Europe, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg.  
50 https://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/newsroom/news/WCMS_740893/lang--en/index.htm. 
51 Digital Economy and Society Index 2020 (https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/desi). 

11 

 
                                                 
entering the workforce at this time will also find it harder to secure their first job52. Moreover, 
the  pandemic  hit  when  21%  of  people  living  in  the  EU  were  already  at  risk  of  over-
indebtedness53.  

The Banking Union has been crucial to weathering the storm in the short term, but the 
Economic and Monetary Union remains incomplete. We see more than ever the long-term 
importance of a Capital Markets Union, at a time when the role of market finance for the real 
economy  is  indispensable.  While  opportunities  for  market  finance  of  businesses  have 
improved in general, measures to facilitate access to equity finance would make them more 
resilient. To build a sustainable future, the EU thus needs  a more resilient financial market 
infrastructure,  with  deep  and  wide  capital  markets  that  can  be  leveraged  in  a  world  of 
strategic competition. 

COVID-19 is likely to contribute to the ongoing trend of Europe’s shrinking population. 
Demographers54 expect even lower birth rates in Europe due to the uncertainty caused by the 
pandemic  and  ensuing  recession55.  As  Europe’s  population  is  ageing,  older  people  and 
persons with  disabilities are also  most prone to  poverty  and COVID-1956, and are the most 
socially  isolated  by  distancing  measures57.  Furthermore,  demographic  trends  impact  social 
and economic resilience as a whole. 

Opportunities 

Private and public investments are key to social and economic resilience and recovery. 
They  must  be  in  line  with  the  EU’s  policy  goals  of  inclusiveness,  digitalisation, 
decarbonisation  and  sustainability,  and  foresight  will  be  instrumental  in  developing  a 
perspective  that  will  ensure  these  conditions  are  met.  The  2021-2027  multiannual  financial 
framework  and  Next  Generation  EU  will  foster  substantial  investment,  innovation  and 
economic  convergence  between  Member  States,  with  safeguards  for  the  rule  of  law.  It  will 
also ensure the good functioning of the single market. The Recovery and Resilience Facility 
(RRF)  will  foster  social  and  economic  resilience  through  the  support  of  packages  of 
investment and reforms. 

Funding  for  companies,  especially  SMEs,  needs  to  meet  their  present  needs  and  those 
brought  about  by  long-term  transitions.  Action  to  strengthen  the  banking  sector,  capital 
markets and equity financing, including fostering the Capital Markets Union and completing 
the Banking Union, will be important in bolstering the EU’s resilience. Workers will benefit 
from such reforms, increasing the ability of firms to secure and create jobs. Adapting social 
protection  systems  to  labour  markets  marked  by  the  movement  of  workers  between 
professions and countries will be important for preserving employment. Investment in human 

52 European Commission 2020 Spring Economic Forecast. 
53 Eurofound, 2020, Addressing household over-indebtedness, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg.  
54 The megatrend ‘increasing demographic imbalances’ (https://ec.europa.eu/knowledge4policy/increasing-demographic-imbalances_en) has 
accelerated. 
55 https://population-europe.eu/policy-brief/demography-and-coronavirus-pandemic. 
56 https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/demography_report_2020_n.pdf. 
57 https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/wess/wess_dev_issues/dsp_policy_01.pdf and 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2020/05/18/which-jobs-are-most-at-risk-because-of-covid-19/. 

12 

 
                                                 
capital  and  innovation,  well-functioning  institutions  and  an  attractive  business  environment 
are key. 

COVID-19  has  produced  rapid  shifts  in  labour  markets.  Changes  predicted  to  happen 
over  decades,  such  as  entire  organisations,  national  administrations,  and  companies 
teleworking, or virtual conferences and events replacing face-to-face gatherings58, have taken 
place in weeks due to the pandemic59. While a part of this shift is likely to be temporary, it 
will  open  the  door  to  new  employment  opportunities  and  strengthen  integration  of  the 
European  labour  market.  It  also  presents  an  opportunity  to  rethink  and  adapt  forms  of 
employment and career models. 

Schools  and  universities  had  to  go  virtual  almost  overnight,  presenting  new 
opportunities for delivering education and learning60. Hyperconnectivity and cross-border 
cooperation between education institutions, new pedagogical approaches and delivery modes 
(e.g.  virtual  or  blended),  advancements  in  cognitive  sciences,  information  availability  and 
greater emphasis on lifelong learning are all contributing to changes in learning models and 
access to education.  

Disruption  of  established  lifestyles  has  intensified  the  debate  on  how  we  measure 
progress  and  conceive  ‘wellbeing’.  As  stressed  in  the  2020  annual  sustainable  growth 
strategy61,  economic  growth  is  not  an  end  in  itself.  In  December  2019,  the  Commission 
presented the European Green Deal, the new EU growth strategy that aims to transform the 
Union  into  a  modern,  resource-efficient  and  competitive  economy  where  climate  and 
environmental challenges are turned into opportunities. The crisis has reignited the debate on 
what kind of economic growth is desirable, what actually matters for human wellbeing in a 
world of finite resources and on the need for new metrics to measure progress beyond GDP 
growth.  The  EU  is  well-placed  to  assume  an  international  leadership  role  and  promote 
inclusive growth and equality, with the United Nations (UN) Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs)  at  the  centre  of  economic  policy62.  The  SDGs  can  be  regarded  as  a  means  to 
achieving  greater  resilience.  In  turn,  strategic  foresight  can  help  identify  the  best  ways  to 
meet the SDGs. 

Strategic  foresight  can  help  identify  further  social  and  economic  opportunities  and 
pathways to achieve the green, digital, and fair transitions. This includes designing new 
social and fiscal  reforms and testing their long-term sustainability, to  reinvigorate Europe’s 
social market economy  model while ensuring the EU’s leading role in the global economy. 
Strategic foresight is also relevant for shaping the occupations of the future, identifying new 
skills  necessary  for  the  green  and  digital  economy,  learning  patterns  and  partnerships,  and 
understanding  the  related  interplay  between  new  technologies,  jobs,  education,  and  key 

58 The megatrend ‘changing nature of work’ (https://ec.europa.eu/knowledge4policy/foresight/changing-nature-work_en) has accelerated.  
59 https://www2.deloitte.com/be/en/pages/covid-19/articles/workforce/workforce-strategy.html  
60 The megatrend ‘diversification of education and learning’ (https://ec.europa.eu/knowledge4policy/diversification-education-learning_en) 
has accelerated. 
61 https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/2020-european-semester-annual-sustainable-growth-strategy_en. 
62 The  SDGs  (https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/)  are  a  roadmap  for  humanity  encompassing 
almost  every  aspect  of  human  and  planetary  well-being.  They  are  a  key  tool  to  reboot  Europe’s  growth  strategy  towards  competitive 
sustainability,  ensuring  that  the  economy  works  for  everyone  and  that  growth  is  sustainable.  To  support  the  central  role  of  SDGs  in 
economic policymaking, and in particular in the European Semester, Eurostat publishes an annual monitoring report. 

13 

 
                                                 
stakeholders.  In  light  of  broader  demographic  trends  affecting  some  rural  areas,  challenges 
exacerbated by regional  and local  inequalities, as well as a geography of  discontent, a long 
term  vision  on  rural  areas  will  also  be  required,  taking  into  account  social  and  economic 
development, infrastructure needs, access to basic services, and territorial cohesion; this long-
term vision should cut across several policy areas and require an integrated and coordinated 
approach at European, national, and regional level. Finally, strategic foresight could support 
the reflection on a new meaning for progress and wellbeing and on indicators that would be 
most meaningful for measuring these aspirations (Section 4). 

3.2.  The geopolitical dimension 

Geopolitical resilience relates to Europe bolstering its ‘open strategic autonomy’63 and 
global  leadership role. It  is  anchored in  the expression of the EU’s values within a highly 
interdependent  world  of  competing  powers,  where  COVID-19  has  impacted  geopolitical 
trends and power balances. As the United States turns further inwards, it leaves a void on the 
global  stage,  which  other  players  such  as  China64  are  eager  to  fill.  In  mobilising  strategic 
resources for humanitarian and development  aid  and striving to make a COVID-19 vaccine 
and  medicines  available  worldwide,  the  EU  is  playing  a  leading  role  through  its  ‘Team 
Europe’ approach65.  

Capacities   

The  EU  is  considered  a  trusted  partner  and  responsible  leader.  As  the  global  order 
threatens to erode and fragment, the EU can act as an anchor of stability and a guarantor of 
peace. The EU mediates in situations of crisis, brokers international agreements and uses its 
convening  power  to  craft  global  solutions  to  global  problems.  The  pandemic  shows  that 
global  challenges  require  effective,  agile  international  cooperation  and  common  solutions. 
The  EU  actively  shapes  cooperation  in  global  governance  structures,  and  its  foreign  and 
security policy is underpinned by multi-faceted diplomacy and strategic partnerships with key 
players and regions. The EU’s foreign and security policy priorities are  driven by its global 
strategy.  Understanding  the  importance  of  security  and  defence  cooperation,  the  EU  has, 
amongst  other  things,  established  a  European  Defence  Fund  and  the  Permanent  Structured 
Cooperation (PESCO)66, and has launched a military mobility initiative. 

Europe’s extensive global trade capacity underpins its geopolitical power and resilience. 
An analysis of trade dependency for products relying on a small number of suppliers shows 
that, for almost all products imported into the EU, there are alternative sources of supply. Just 
1% of the EU’s total import value is sourced from a sole supplier, whereas 10% is sourced 
from no less than 67 alternative suppliers, and half of all products come from more than 25 

63 Open  strategic  autonomy  is  defined  as  the  EU’s  commitment  to  open  and  fair  trade,  preserving  the  benefits  of  an  open  economy  and 
supporting partners around the world to lead the renewed and reinvigorated form of multilateralism the world needs. At the same time, the 
EU  is  aware  of  the  need  to  reduce  its  dependency  and  strengthen  its  security  of  supply  across  key  technologies  and  value  chains 
(COM(2020)456 final, Europe's moment: Repair and Prepare for the Next Generation). 
64 https://www.cfr.org/conference-calls/after-covid-19-chinas-role-world-and-us-china-relations. 
65 The  objective  of  the  “Team  Europe”  approach  is  to  combine  resources  from  the  EU,  its  Member  States,  and  financial  institutions,  in 
particular the European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
66 Articles 42(6) and 46 TEU, and Protocol No 10.  

14 

 
                                                 
suppliers  worldwide67.  In  addition,  over  two-thirds  of  EU  imports  are  intermediate  inputs 
used  in  its  production  processes.  The  EU  is  therefore  consistently  able  to  use  its  economic 
leverage and bargaining power to deliver international agreements that protect its citizens.  

The  EU  is  a  space  power.  It  has  developed  critical  space  capabilities,  which  serve  as  a 
geopolitical  tool to  strengthen its global role in  technology development  and surveillance68. 
Several critical economic sectors rely on services provided by Europe’s space-based assets.  

The EU builds resilience in its neighbourhood and beyond. It is the world’s largest donor 
of development and humanitarian aid, focusing in particular on its neighbourhood and Africa. 
Europe  supports  partner  countries  with  funding,  training  and  structural  improvements  to 
boost  their  development  and  resilience,  as  well  as  in  implementing  the  SDGs.  In  addition, 
through  the  Eastern  Partnership  initiative,  the  EU  contributes  to  increasing  the  stability, 
prosperity and resilience of its neighbours, by helping them progress in the green and digital 
transitions. 

The EU has a long-standing capacity and legacy in shaping international standards and 
norms.  It  now  needs  to  strengthen  forward-looking  alliances  to  continue  shaping 
international  norms  and  standards  in  a  way  that  reflects  European  values  and  interests. 
Despite  the  EU’s  track  record  of  proactive  engagement  with  the  UN  family  and  other 
international  organisations  in  various  fora69,  such  alliances  are  particularly  relevant  in  the 
face of growing pressure from influential global players.  

The  EU  can  apply  its  geopolitical  capacities  and  international  clout  coherently  and 
effectively  now  and  in  the  future.  Europe  will  need  to  continue  developing  a  strategic 
network  of  partnerships  and  alliances  to  reduce  dependencies  in  critical  value  chains,  help 
peace  and  stability  in  its  neighbourhood,  seek  effective  solutions  to  global  problems  and 
revitalise a rules-based multilateral global order, as well as to leverage its financial resources 
in support of its political objectives. The EU is in a strong position to shape the multilateral 
system  of  global  economic  governance,  develop  mutually  beneficial  relations  to  boost  its 
competitiveness70,  and  to  advance  and  set  global  standards  for  the  green  and  digital 
transitions.  This  should  be  done  while  promoting  its  democratic  values  and  ensuring 
coherence  with  broader  priorities  in  the  areas  of  sustainability,  climate  change,  digital 
economy and security.  

Vulnerabilities  

Multilateralism  and  the  global  financial  system  are  under  increasing  pressure  from 
narrow  national  interests.  Preserving  a  space  for  consensus-building  and  joint  action  to 
address  global  challenges  and  protect  common  public  goods  is  central  to  geopolitical 
resilience.  

67 https://ecipe.org/blog/how-survive-trade-apocalypse/. 
68 For instance, satellite navigation, Earth Observation, telecommunication, For Galileo Public Regulated Service. 
69  The  United  Nations  Conference  on  Trade  and  Development  (UNCTAD),  the  International  Telecommunications  Union  (ITU),  and  the 
World  
Intellectual  Property  Organisation  (WIPO).  Also,  with  the  G7,  the  G20,  the  OECD,  the  Council  of  Europe,  Internet  Cooperation  for 
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), the World Trade Organization (WTO), ASEAN and ASEM.  
70 COM(2020)102 final, A New Industrial Strategy for Europe; SWD(2020)98 final, Identifying Europe's recovery needs. 

15 

 
                                                 
The  shift  of  power  to  the  East  and  South  is  a  global  megatrend.  Although  it  has 
temporarily  decelerated  as  a  result  of  the  COVID-19  crisis,  it  is  likely  to  continue  as  it  is 
driven by the growing economic and political weight of emerging players, supported by their 
demographic  weight.  As  the  EU’s  share  in  the  world  population  and  in  global  GDP 
diminishes71, this may have a further impact on its clout in many critical areas.  

The security environment is continuously changing. It is marked by the shifting balance of 
power,  increasing  use  of  hybrid  threats,  space  and  cyber  warfare,  disinformation,  and  the 
growing role of non-state actors72. The crisis has also further exacerbated pressures that can 
lead to conflict. The impact of economic measures driven by political considerations, such as 
the extra-territorial impact of sanctions or protectionist measures, poses additional challenges 
to  the  EU.  The  COVID-19  pandemic  has  shown  the  fragility  of  key  infrastructure  and  the 
need to protect it against physical and digital threats73. The crisis has also worsened existing 
vulnerabilities and inequalities in conflict-affected and fragile countries. To foster a coherent 
strategic vision, the EU needs a common understanding of the security environment as well 
as common goals and objectives. By the end of 2020, the High Representative will present an 
analysis  of  threats  and  challenges,  as  background  for  a  Strategic  Compass  on  security  and 
defence,  to  be  delivered  by  2022.  This  will  provide  a  crucial  contribution  to  developing  a 
common  European  security  and  defence  culture,  give  new  impetus  to  different  defence 
initiatives and reinforce their coherence74.  

Managing migration in an orderly way will continue to be a priority. The root causes of 
migration, including local conflicts, poverty and inequalities exacerbated due to the COVID-
19  crisis  and  climate  change,  will  continue75,76.  Addressing  these  challenges77  will  require 
enhanced  attention,  agility,  resources,  and  diplomatic  efforts  underpinned  by  assistance, 
alongside strategic, balanced and tailor-made partnerships with key third countries in order to 
find sustainable and effective solutions to managing migration78. 

A lack of unity in specific foreign and security policy areas is a source of fragility. The 
EU’s strength and credibility abroad has a direct correlation to its internal unity and cohesion, 
which builds on its diversity. A lack of unity and coordination among Member States can, at 
times,  limit  the  effectiveness  and  agility  of  action  at  EU  level,  which  might  enable  foreign 
powers to apply divide-and-rule strategies.  

The  COVID-19  crisis  has  revealed  Europe’s  overreliance  on  non-EU  suppliers  for 
critical  raw  materials79,  and  has  highlighted  how  supply  disruptions  can  affect 

71 https://ec.europa.eu/research/social-sciences/pdf/policy_reviews/global-europe-2050-report_en.pdf. 
72 COM(2020)605 final, The EU Security Union Strategy. 
73 Ibidem 
74 D. Fiott, 2020, Uncharted territory? Towards a common threat analysis and a strategic compass for EU security and defence, European 
Institute of Security Studies 
75 The World Bank estimates that, by 2050, climate change could force over 140 million people to become internal climate migrants across 
Africa, South Asia and Latin America (https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2018/03/19/climate-change-could-force-over-140-
million-to-migrate-within-countries-by-2050-world-bank-report). 
76 This  also  requires  further  evidences  and  research,  analysing  the  complexity  of  long-term  intertwined  factors,  as  part  of  the  foresight 
approach, as developed by the Knowledge Centre for Demography (https://ec.europa.eu/knowledge4policy/migration-demography_en). 
77 COM(2020)605 final, The EU Security Union Strategy. 
78 Solutions will be put forward by way of legislative and non-legislative initiatives under the new Pact on Migration and Asylum. 
79 Global  supply  chains  are  highly  complex.  Multinational  enterprises  are  responsible  for  two  thirds  of  international  trade  with  a  high 
fragmentation  of  production  of  intermediate  goods  shipped  between  different  production  sites  (https://iap.unido.org/articles/lessons-past-
disruptions-global-value-chains; https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/349229). 

16 

 
                                                 
industrial ecosystems and other productive sectors. While there are alternative sources of 
supply  for  most  products,  Europe  is  increasingly  reliant  on  a  limited  number  of  external 
suppliers  for  some  critical  goods,  components,  and  raw  materials  (Box  3.1),  as  well  as 
agricultural products. Factory closures in COVID-19 hotspots in China and northern Italy led 
to  Europe-wide  shutdowns  of  automotive  plants,  resulting  in  losses  equivalent  to  12.5%  of 
the  total  production  for  201980.  A  similar  picture  emerges  for  pharmaceuticals  from  India 
leading  to  shortages  in  generic  drugs81.  In  April  2020,  European  industrial  production  had 
decreased by 27% over 12 months82. Moreover, Europe relies heavily on third countries for 
advanced  components  for  data  processing,  in  particular  microprocessors,  with  only  around 
10%  of  global  production  in  the  EU83.  With  escalating  global  tensions,  European  supply 
chains are increasingly vulnerable. 

Box 3.1: CASE STUDY - Critical raw materials  

Irrespective  of  supply  disruptions  during  the  COVID-19  crisis,  the  EU  is  heavily  dependent  on 
non-EU countries for critical raw materials that are essential for staying at the forefront of global 
competition – be it in economic or defence terms (Figure 3.1). Addressing over-dependency on non-
EU countries for critical raw materials84, such as graphite, cobalt, lithium and rare earths85, is therefore 
one of the crucial elements to bolster Europe’s open strategic autonomy in key technologies needed to 
achieve a carbon-neutral and digital society. These include batteries, fuel cells, solar and wind energy, 
as well as hydrogen. As more of these technologies are deployed, the EU risks replacing its reliance on 
fossil fuels with a dependency on a range of raw materials, many of which are sourced from abroad. 
According to a high demand scenario, the EU would need 18 times more lithium by 2030 and 60 times 
more  by  205086.  Figure  3.2  indicates  that  global  extraction  of  raw  materials,  including  critical  raw 
materials, is projected to more than double by 2050.  

High dependency calls for greater resilience and diversification of supply, notably by making better 
use of EU domestic sourcing, the circularity of raw materials or the extension of products’ lifetime with 
a focus on reuse, repair and recycling, as well as through our strategic trade policy and diplomacy.  

Exploiting  the  urban  mines,  that  is,  recovering  raw  materials  from  urban  waste  through 
recycling, could eventually satisfy a large share of the EU’s demand for critical raw materials87. 
Europe is a global leader in its infrastructure for recycling metals, and European industry produces over 
half of its base metals from recycled sources, compared to 19% in the rest of the world. But more needs 
to be done if the EU is to secure the resources it needs to realise the green and digital transitions.  

Europe’s  own  mineral  resources  are  under-exploited,  and  the  EU  has  vulnerabilities  in 
processing,  recycling,  refining  and  separation88.  This  is  due  to  high  production  costs  compared  to 
global  market  prices,  high  environmental  standards  and  current  low  levels  of  public  acceptance. 
Investment in the production of primary and secondary raw materials would benefit employment in all 

80 https://www.acea.be/press-releases/article/298-automobile-factories-operating-across-europe-new-data-shows. 
81 https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/covid19_e/trade_related_goods_measure_e.htm. 
82 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/10294900/4-12062020-AP-EN.pdf/93c51a4c-e401-a66d-3ab3-6ecd51a1651f  
83 https://www.economist.com/leaders/2018/12/01/chip-wars-china-america-and-silicon-supremacy. 
84 Strategies to overcome dependencies include diversifying sources, developing substitutes, or prolonging the life of related products. 
85 European industry, especially battery, motor and wind generator production, depends on imports of graphite (of which 48% comes from 
China), cobalt (of which 68% comes from the Democratic Republic of Congo), lithium (of which 78% comes from Chile) and rare earths (of 
which nearly 100% come from China). 
86 European Commission, Critical Raw Materials for strategic technologies and sectors – a foresight study, 2020 (doi: 10.2873/58081). 
87 www.prosumproject.eu. 
88 https://minatura2020.eu. 

17 

 
                                                 
manufacturing  industries. Mining  and  refining  in  the  EU  already  employs  3.4 million  workers,  while 
related manufacturing accounts for a further 25 million jobs. Repair and materials recovery provide 2.2 
million jobs, a number which is growing. These investments could help retain existing geological and 
metallurgical  high-tech  skills  and  develop  new  ones  to  boost  the  EU’s  global  competitiveness  in  a 
sector  that  has  solid  growth  potential  in  the  21st  century.  However,  investments  in  the  EU’s  mining 
capacities should not come at the expense of environmental standards. 

Figure 3.189 Supply risk of raw materials for key technologies90

Figure 3.2. Global material extraction by resource type91 

89 Figure 3.1 shows supply risks for raw materials (on a scale of 1 to 6), key technologies in  which they are used and their geographical 
sources. 
90 European Commission, 2020, Critical Raw Materials for strategic technologies and sectors – a foresight study (doi: 10.2873/58081). 
91  OECD,  2019,  Global  Material  Resources  Outlook  to  2060:  Economic  Drivers  and  Environmental  Consequences,  OECD  publishing, 
Paris... 

18 

 
 
                                                 
Trade  and  investment  have  plunged,  undermining  global  prosperity  and  stability. 
According  to  estimates,  world  trade  volumes  will  drop  by  between  9%  (IMF)  and  32% 
(WTO) in 2020, while foreign direct investment has decreased by 28.2% in the first half of 
2020 compared to the same period in 201992. 

Europe’s economic sovereignty is at stake. Other global powers are combining geopolitical 
and economic interests to increase their influence in the world. This includes protectionism, 
export control and the international role of currencies. While the international role of the euro 
is  rising,  it  is  still  far  from  challenging  that  of  the  US  dollar.  COVID-19  put  Europe’s 
industrial  and  corporate  assets  under  stress,  which  calls  for  protecting  its  economic 
sovereignty through an integrated strategy93. Insolvencies due to the pandemic are exposing 
the EU’s strategic industries to hostile foreign takeovers. This raises the chances of foreign 
investors  attempting  to  acquire  strategic  European  assets,  especially  in  the  health,  defence 
and space supply chains94, as well as for critical infrastructures. To preserve EU companies 
and  critical  assets,  the  EU’s  openness  to  foreign  investment  needs  to  be  balanced  by  the 
appropriate  tools95.  The  regulation  on  Foreign  Direct  Investment  Screening96  will  help 
safeguard Europe’s security and public order through a cooperation mechanism between the 
Commission  and  the  Member  States  to  address  concerns  on  incoming  foreign  direct 
investment. Foreign subsidies should also be addressed as they can distort the EU’s internal 
market and undermine the level-playing field97.   

The  crisis  accelerated  attacks  from  authoritarian  regimes  against  democratic  systems 
via  misleading  narratives.  The  spread  of  mis-  and  disinformation  and  conspiracy  theories 

92 The drop refers to the number of deals regarding acquisition of equity stakes of at least 10% of the total capital between January and June 
2020 compared to 2019. The drop is -33.5% for intra-EU cross-border investments, and -23% for non-EU investments in Europe. Source: 
JRC Foreign Investment Bulletin, July 2020, JRC 121392. 
93 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_528,https://www.bruegel.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/PC-
09_2019_final-1.pdf, https://peacediplomacy.org/2019/10/25/how-eu-can-achieve-economic-sovereignty/. 
94 C(2020)1981  final,  Guidance  to  the  Member  States  concerning  foreign  direct  investment  and  free  movement  of  capital  from  third 
countries, and the protection of Europe’s strategic assets, ahead of the application of Regulation (EU) 2019/452 (FDI Screening Regulation). 
95 Ibidem. 
96 Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 2019 establishing a framework for the screening of 
foreign direct investments into the Union. The regulation will apply as from 11 October 2020. 
97 COM(2020)253 final, White Paper on levelling the playing field as regards foreign subsidies. 

19 

 
 
 
                                                 
represents a threat to democracy98. Conspiracy theories about COVID-19 and the propagation 
of  general  vaccine  hesitancy  are  continuing  to  put  people’s  lives  at  risk99.  Such 
‘infodemics’100  are  both  cause  and  consequence  of  rising  distrust  of  governments  and 
media101, raising the pressure on the EU to protect more energetically the values it was built 
on  and  step  up  efforts  to  defend  democracy  and  the  rule  of  law.  The  EU  institutions  are 
contributing  to  the  fight  against  mis-  and  disinformation102,  thereby  increasing  democratic 
resilience, which is at the core of the upcoming European Democracy Action Plan. 

Opportunities 

The shift towards an increasingly multipolar world offers a new opportunity for Europe 
to reinforce its role in the global order and lead the revival of multilateral governance 
structures.  The  globalisation  process,  which  has  temporarily  slowed  down,  is  likely  to 
resume once the crisis is over. At the same time, glocalisation – combining global business 
models with more consideration for localisation of production, consumption, and taxation  – 
offers renewed opportunities for the EU to position itself as a frontrunner and role model to 
the  world,  provided  the  right  conditions  are  in  place  (e.g.  taxation,  availability  of  funding, 
standards). 

Strong  cooperation  with  like-minded  democracies  is  increasingly  important.  The  EU 
must protect the openness and democratic nature of its model, and needs to rally its partners 
in  these  efforts,  safeguarding  its  fundamental  values  from  foreign  interference.  Upholding 
democracy, human rights and the rule of law must start at home and should continue to be the 
guiding  principle  of  the  EU’s  external  relations,  including  with  regards  to  digital 
technologies. Issue-based cooperation and partnerships with like-minded countries, and other 
countries where possible, is an investment in multilateral governance and initiatives. With its 
convening power, the EU can be a first-choice partner for countries around the world.   

Boosting  Europe’s  open  strategic  autonomy  is  an  imperative.  The  crisis  offers  an 
economic,  social,  and  ecological  opportunity  to  strengthen  the  EU’s  resilience  to  future 
shocks and secure its place in next-generation global value chains. As stated in the European 
recovery  plan,  this  means  shaping  global  economic  governance  and  developing  mutually 
beneficial  bilateral  relations,  while  protecting  ourselves  from  unfair  and  abusive  practices. 
This is key to helping the EU diversify and solidify global supply chains in critical sectors, 
intensifying  ties  with  partners,  including  in  Africa,  re-shoring  production  where  necessary, 
developing substitutes through innovation, and increasing our strategic reserves103.  

A reliable supply of food also needs to be ensured across the EU. The Commission will 
thus  continue  monitoring  food  security  and  competitiveness.  It  will  further  assess  the 

98 JOIN(2020)8  final,  Tackling  COVID-19  disinformation  -  Getting  the  facts  right;  see  also  https://euvsdisinfo.eu/eeas-special-report-
update-short-assessment-of-narratives-and-disinformation-around-the-COVID-19COVID-19-pandemic/. 
99 A hoax about the connection of 5G, chipping and COVID-19 spread widely on social media (Downing, J., Ahmed, W., Vidal-Alaball, J. 
& Lopez Seguí, F., 2020, Battling fake news and (in)security during COVID-19. E-International Relations). 
100 Infodemics  are  the  result  of  the  simultaneous  action  of  multiple  human  and  non-human  sources  of  fake  or  unreliable  news 
(https://arxiv.org/pdf/2004.03997.pdf). 
101 https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/2478. 
102 https://www.europol.europa.eu/staying-safe-during-covid-19-what-you-need-to-know; https://ec.europa.eu/info/live-work-travel-
eu/health/coronavirus-response/fighting-disinformation_en. 
103 COM(2020)102 final, The new industrial strategy. 

20 

 
                                                 
resilience of the food system and step up its coordination of a common European response to 
crises.  As  the  biggest  importer  and  exporter  of  agri-food  products,  the  EU  will  further 
promote the global transition to sustainable food systems.  

Being  more  strategic  about  raw  materials  is  fundamental.  The  EU  must  secure  a 
sustainable  supply  of  critical  raw  materials.  This  means  building  diversified  value  chains, 
decreasing  dependence,  raising  circularity,  supporting  innovation  for  alternatives  and 
ensuring  a  greener  and  socially-responsible  level  playing  field  in  the  single  market  and 
beyond. Key opportunities include the upcoming European Raw Materials Alliance104 and the 
EU  Raw  Materials  Intelligence  Capacity105,  to  explore  these  issues  with  industry  and  other 
key stakeholders. 

A stable rules-based trading system and a level playing field are key objectives for the 
EU.  Only  a  strong  trade  and  investment  policy  can  support  the  post-COVID-19  economic 
recovery, create jobs,  protect  EU companies  from  unfair practices at  home and abroad, and 
ensure  coherence  with  broader  priorities  in  the  areas  of  sustainability,  climate  change,  the 
digital  economy  and  security106.  The  current  crisis  may  provide  an  opportunity  to  drive 
meaningful  reforms  of  the  World  Trade  Organization  (WTO)  and  build  more  competitive, 
sustainable  and  resilient  economies.  The  EU  has  already  launched  a  health  initiative  in  the 
framework  of  the  WTO  to  further  support  the  global  availability  and  provision  of  essential 
health  products.  The  EU  is  now  in  the  process  of  reviewing  its  trade  policy,  in  view  of 
strengthening its open strategic autonomy. 

institutions  and 

industrial  partners  to  help 

Industrial alliances can be at  the forefront of this change, bringing together investors, 
industry  develop  strategic 
public 
technologies. This approach is already showing results in the areas of batteries and hydrogen. 
In this context, a number of existing and forthcoming alliances107 will help Europe lead the 
green and digital transitions, maintain industrial leadership and benefit European businesses 
and society while reinforcing Europe’s resilience.  

Strategic  foresight  can  be  used  to  identify possible  scenarios  for  the EU’s  place  in  the 
future  global  order  and  chart  the  best  path  towards  the  desired  future.  It  can  help 
develop  a  forward-looking  analysis  of  how  to  leverage  the  EU’s  power  to  support  its 
strategies for  cooperation and partnerships.  It  also helps  identify possible alliances, analyse 
different ecosystems and assess risks, opportunities and future needs for strategic industries. 
Moreover, foresight helps define strategic options for the best combination of approaches to 
open  strategic  autonomy,  from  diversifying  trading  partners  to  strengthening  the  EU’s  own 
capacities.   

104 COM(2020)474 final, Critical Raw Materials Resilience: Charting a Path towards greater Security and Sustainability. 
105 https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC109889/jrc109889_mica_jrc_technical_report_1.pdf. 
106 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_1058. 
107 The European Battery Alliance, the Plastic Alliance, the European Clean Hydrogen Alliance, the European Alliance for Industrial Data 
and Clouds and the European Raw Materials Alliance. 

21 

 
 
                                                 
3.3.  The green dimension 

Green  resilience  is  about  reaching  climate  neutrality  by  2050,  while  mitigating  and 
adapting to climate change, reducing pollution and  restoring the capacity of ecological 
systems  to  sustain  our  ability  to  live  well  within  planetary  boundaries.  This  entails 
eliminating  our  dependency  on  fossil  fuels,  reducing  our  impact  on  natural  resources, 
preserving  biodiversity,  developing  a  clean  and  circular  economy,  achieving  a  toxic-free 
environment,  changing  lifestyles,  production  and  consumption  patterns,  climate-proofing 
infrastructure, creating new opportunities for healthy living, green business and jobs, actively 
pursuing ecosystem restoration, as well as saving our seas and oceans.  

Capacities 

The  European  Green  Deal  aims  to  achieve  a  climate-neutral  society  by  2050,  while 
pursuing resilience to both mitigate and adapt to the impact of climate change, environmental 
degradation  and  biodiversity  loss.  This  is  an  integral  part  of  this  Commission’s  strategy  to 
implement  the  UN’s  2030  Agenda  and  the  SDGs.  It  implies  a  full  decarbonisation  of  the 
power sector and a substantial electrification of energy demand. Land use emissions need to 
be  zeroed  and  the  land  use  sink  needs  to  be  enhanced  by  restoring  the  environment  and 
adapting the farming sector, while ensuring a higher quality of life for everyone in the EU in 
a cost-efficient manner so as to bring further economic growth and enable Europe to act as a 
beacon of transformation for the rest  of the world.  To pursue this path, the EU’s capacities 
should be boosted to recover from the crisis and invest in long-term sustainability (Box 3.2).  

22 

 
 
Box 3.2: Foresight scenarios for the EU 2050 climate strategy & relevance for the Green Deal 

The last two decades have witnessed 18 of the warmest years on record108. If temperatures continue 
rising at just 0.2 °C per decade, the yearly damage from river floods in Europe could increase from 
€5 billion to €112 billion and 16% of the present Mediterranean climate zone may become arid and 
non-productive by the end of the century. By 2050, climate change, biodiversity loss and flooded 
coastal areas could force over 140 million people to become internal migrants across Africa, South 
Asia and Latin America109. 

The EU’s greenhouse gas emissions reduction strategy submitted to the United Nations Framework 
Convention  on  Climate  Change  (UNFCCC)110,  has  been  informed  by  eight  scenarios  with 
foresight dimensions111. The first five scenarios addressed the well below 2°C ambition, aiming at 
greenhouse  gas  emissions  reduction  levels  in  2050  of  around  80%  compared  to  1990.  They 
considered  differentiated  portfolios  of  options  for  decarbonisation  and  identified  trade-offs:  for 
example,  pathways  that  focus  more  on  electrification  for  end-use  also  need  high  deployment  of 
storage  (six  times  today’s  levels)  to  deal  with  variability  in  electricity  production,  but  pathways 
which deploy more hydrogen require more electricity to produce it in the first place112. Actions and 
technologies  from  the  first  category’s  five  scenarios  were  combined  into  a  sixth  scenario 
(COMBO). This results in net greenhouse gas emissions reduction in 2050 close to 90% compared 
to 1990, with little reliance on negative emissions technologies and without changes to consumer 
preferences.   

Finally, the two last scenarios considered what is necessary for the EU to reach net zero greenhouse 
gas emissions by 2050, thus doing its share in the global effort towards the Paris Agreement’s goal 
to  pursue  efforts  to  limit  temperature  increase  to  1.5°C  compared  to  pre-industrial  levels.  The 
seventh  scenario  looks  at  carbon  capture  and  storage,  and  the  eighth  scenario  assumes  a  drive 
towards  a  more  circular  economy  brought  about  by  EU  business  and  consumption  patterns.  The 
latter includes a continuation of the trend towards less carbon-intensive diets, the sharing economy 
in  transport,  the  use  of  more  sustainable  transport  modes  and  more  rational  use  of  energy  for 
heating and cooling.  

The  scenarios  showed  the  portfolio  of  options  mobilising  existing  and  new  technologies  in  all 
economic  sectors  for  Europe  to  be  climate-neutral  by  2050.  While  scenario  work  continues  to 
support  the  development  of  climate  policy,  the  green  transition  requires  all  hands  on  deck.  The 
European  Green  Deal  has  set  up  a  transformative  agenda  built  around  the  following 
elements, while being committed to mainstreaming sustainability in all EU policies and to ensure a 
just transition: 

increasing the EU’s climate ambitions for 2030 and 2050;  

1. 
2.  supplying clean, affordable and secure energy;  
3.  mobilising industry for a clean and circular economy;  
4.  building and renovating in an energy- and resource-efficient way;  
5.  accelerating the shift to sustainable and smart mobility; 
6.  from ‘farm to fork’: a fair, healthy and environmentally-friendly food system; 

108 https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/. 
109 https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2018/03/19/climate-change-could-force-over-140-million-to-migrate-within-countries-
by-2050-world-bank-report. 
110 Submission to UNFCCC of long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategy of the European Union and its Member States,  
(https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/HR-03-06-2020%20EU%20Submission%20on%20Long%20term%20strategy.pdf). 
111 In-depth analysis in support of the Commission Communication COM(2018)773 
(https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/clima/files/docs/pages/com_2018_733_analysis_in_support_en_0.pdf). 
112 COM(2018)773 final, A Clean Planet for all. A European long-term strategic vision for a prosperous, modern, competitive and climate 
neutral economy (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52018DC0773&from=EN). 

23 

 
                                                 
7.  preserving and restoring ecosystems and biodiversity; 
8.  a zero pollution ambition for a toxic-free environment. 

The EU’s regulatory power, notably in the environmental field, can lead to the highest 
standards being used to underpin competitive sustainability. In recent decades EU action 
has significantly improved not only the quality of Europe’s environment, but also the lives of 
its  citizens.  In  many  areas,  EU  environmental  standards  have  been  emulated  by  other 
countries. The EU was the first global region to pass binding legislation to enshrine climate 
and energy targets and become a highly energy-efficient climate-neutral economy113. 

The EU is a global leader in the shift towards a clean and circular economy. European 
consumers  are  an  important  force  in  this  effort.  According  to  the  circular  economy  action 
plan114,  EU  support  should  target  priority  value  chains,  while  taking  into  consideration 
sectors  and  business  models  with  opportunities  for  job  creation115.  Circular  economy 
investments and policy tools (e.g. ecodesign116, energy labelling, green public procurement, 
digitally-enabled circular business models, and the Eco-Management and Audit Scheme) will 
help reduce overall environmental and climate footprints. 

EU  industrial  frontrunners  are  demonstrating  how  clean,  bio  and  circular  production 
and  services  are  important  drivers  of  competitiveness  and  growth.  Resource  efficiency 
improvements,  pollution  prevention  and  control,  water  protection,  adoption  of  new  circular 
business models, cleaner production, eco-innovation, and the development of green markets 
are  turning  many  European  industries  into  global  leaders.  The  Commission  aims  to  ensure 
consistency and synergies between environmental, climate, energy and industrial policies117. 
This  entails  going  beyond  ‘punishing  polluters’  to  providing  a  framework  conducive  to 
avoiding pollution and increasing energy and material efficiency. Moreover, EU support to a 
sustainable bioeconomy seeks the transformation of Europe’s agricultural and industrial base 
through the creation of  new bio-based value  chains,  as well as  greener,  more cost-effective 
industrial  processes.  It  also  enhances  the  overall  status  of  our  natural  resources  and 
ecosystems. Bio-based industries could create a million new jobs by 2030118. 

The massive investment to assist the recovery will boost the green transition. To move 
towards a climate-neutral society and environmentally sustainable economy, there is a need 
to pool funding sources at all levels. The EU budget and recovery package including, among 
others,  specific  instruments  like  the  Sustainable  Europe  Investment  Plan119  and  the 
Innovation  Fund120  aim  to  mobilise  private  and  public  resources  over  the  next  decade  to 
target  climate,  environmental  and  social  investments  related  to  the  sustainable  transition121. 
The  Commission  is  also  preparing  a  renewed  sustainable  finance  strategy,  to  create 
sustainable investment opportunities and enhance sustainability-related risk management. As 

113 https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/clima/files/docs/factsheet_climate_change_2015_en.pdf. 
114 https://ec.europa.eu/environment/circular-economy/pdf/new_circular_economy_action_plan.pdf. 
115 https://ec.europa.eu/environment/circular-economy/pdf/leading_way_global_circular_economy.pdf. 
116 It should be noted that up to 80% of products’ environmental impacts are determined at the design phase. 
117 https://ec.europa.eu/environment/industry/. 
118  COM(2018)673 and  SWD(2018)431,  A  sustainable  Bioeconomy  for  Europe:  Strengthening  the  connection between  economy,  society 
and the environment; EuropaBio Report, 2016, Jobs and growth generated by industrial biotechnology in Europe. 
119 https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/innovation-fund_en. 
120 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_20_24. 
121 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/fs_20_48. 

24 

 
                                                 
stated  by  the  European  Council,  30%  of  the  €1.82  trillion  agreed  under  the  2021-2027 
multiannual  financial  framework  and  Next  Generation  EU  will  go  to  climate-related 
spending122.  Funding  in  all  areas  must  be  based  on  the  ‘do  no  harm’  principle123.  The  Just 
Transition  Mechanism, including the Just  Transition  Fund, will support Member States and 
regions most affected by the transition towards climate neutrality124.  

Europe’s blue economy plays an important role in contributing to resilience. Preserving 
marine ecosystems is key to ensuring the future of maritime economic sectors. In addition to 
natural resources for the economy, Europe’s oceans and seas provide a habitat for marine life, 
carbon sequestration, renewable energy, and coastal protection against climate change. 

Vulnerabilities  

Climate  change  is  making  extreme  weather  events  more  frequent  and  more  intense, 
including in Europe125. The  global average temperature increases hide  even more extreme 
regional  impacts.  These  range  from  unprecedented  forest  fires  and  heatwaves  above  the 
Arctic  Circle  to  increasingly  devastating  droughts  in  the  Mediterranean  region;  and  from 
accelerating  coastal  erosion  on  the  Atlantic  coast  to  more  severe  flooding  and  decimated 
forests  in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe.  All  this  comes  with  a  terrible  price  tag  –  recent 
projections show that exposing the EU economy to global warming of 3°C would result in an 
additional  annual  loss  of  at  least  €170  billion  (1.36%  of  GDP)  and  would  cost  tens  of 
thousands of lives126. 

Our current production and consumption model is increasingly exposing people and the 
environment to the impact of hazardous substances. Chemical pollution affects health and 
the antibody response to vaccines127, increasing morbidity and mortality from communicable 
diseases128.  The  world  is  failing  to  reach  the  agreed  target  for  the  sound  management  of 
chemicals and waste129, while global chemical production is set to double by 2030130, and the 
impact on people and the environment will be exacerbated without adequate policy measures. 
In  the  European  Green  Deal,  the  Commission  has  committed  to  move  towards  a  toxic-free 
environment.  This  major  goal  will  however  require  joint  efforts  by  all  societal  actors  to 
promote  a  real  shift  towards  safe  and  sustainable  chemicals,  as  well  as  a  renewed  global 
commitment. 

Lower  environmental  protection  standards  and  related  costs  in  third  countries  may 
push  some  polluting  activities  and  waste  outside  the  EU  with  a  higher  risk  of  carbon 

122 So-called ‘climate mainstreaming’. See: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/45109/210720-euco-final-conclusions-en.pdf. 
123 The ‘do no harm’ principle means that no activity or funding will undermine or counteract climate or environmental objectives. 
124 https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal/actions-being-taken-eu/just-transition-mechanism/just-
transition-funding-sources_en. 
125 The 2020 State of the European Environment report concludes that climate change has substantially increased the occurrence of climate 
and weather extremes. 
126 https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/peseta-iv. 
127  Epidemiological  studies  support  the  conclusion  that  PFOS  and  PFOA  are  associated  with  reduced  antibody  response  to  vaccination; 
EFSA’s scientific opinion on PFAS. 
128 C&en, 2019, Linking pollution and infectious disease; Science Daily, 2 October 2019, Environmental toxins impair immune system over 
multiple generations. Exposure to endocrine disruptors can damage the development of the endocrine, immune or neurological systems. 
129 SDG 12.4, to be reached by 2020. 
130 Global Chemical Outlook II, 2019. 

25 

 
                                                 
leakage131.  In addition,  there are not  always  effective measures preventing  exports of toxic 
and pollutant waste to non-EU countries132. At the same time, the economic crisis caused by 
COVID-19  risks  intensifying  these  practices  as  countries  seek  to  boost  growth  at  all  costs. 
The EU should promote its values and standards internationally, which is key to protecting its 
environmental norms, industries, workers and consumers. Otherwise, the EU is likely to lose 
further competitiveness and fail to see a reduction in trade exports in polluting sectors, while 
gaining comparative advantages in less polluting industries133. 

The  increasing  exploitation  of  renewable  and non-renewable  natural  resources  cannot 
be  sustained,  as  they  are  jeopardising  prospects  for  future  sustainable  development. 
Biodiversity loss on land and at sea, the rising extraction costs of minerals, soil, water and air 
pollution134,  as  well  as  unrelenting  greenhouse  gas  emissions  from  unsustainable  levels  of 
consumption of raw materials, energy, water, food and land use, are threatening the long-term 
livelihood  of  millions  of  people,  including  in  Europe.  Although  the  pressure  on  nature  has 
temporarily slowed down as a result of the economic downturn due to confinement measures, 
the  challenge  in  the  future  will  be  to  decouple  growth  and  wellbeing  from  consumption  of 
natural resources and its resulting environmental impacts on a long term basis.  

COVID-19  appears  to  have  spread  more  quickly  in  dense  urban  areas  and  poor 
neighbourhoods. Over 70% of Europe’s population live in cities; this number is expected to 
increase to  over 80% by 2050135. This  translates into 36 million  new urban dwellers, who 
will need housing, employment and care, thereby increasing pressure on city infrastructure. 
On the one hand, population density does facilitate the spread of diseases. On the other hand, 
urban areas have capacities that some of their rural counterparts still lack, such as proximity 
to healthcare facilities and digital infrastructure. 

illustrates 

the  connection  between  human  development  and 

COVID-19 
the 
environment. Contemporary pandemics like COVID-19 and previous ones such as AIDS or 
Ebola find their origin in humans encroaching on natural wildlife habitats and the destruction 
of  ecosystems136.  This  occurs  due  to  environmental  crime  (e.g.  logging  and  trade  of  exotic 
species),  some  forms  of  farming,  mining,  and  urbanisation,  driven  by  resource-intensive 
lifestyles.  

Opportunities  

131 Carbon  leakage  refers  to  the  situation  that  may  occur  if,  for  reasons  of  costs  related  to  climate  policies,  businesses  were  to  transfer 
production to other countries with laxer emission constraints. 
132 Interpol  Strategic  Analyse  Report,  2020,  Emerging  criminal  trends  in  the  global  plastic  waste  market  since  January  2018 
(https://www.interpol.int/News-and-Events/News/2020/INTERPOL-report-alerts-to-sharp-rise-in-plastic-waste-crime). 
133 http://www.oecd.org/economy/greeneco/How-stringent-are-environmental-policies.pdf. 
134 Exposure  to  air  pollution  can  lead  to  adverse  health  effects,  including  respiratory  and  cardiovascular  diseases.  A  number  of  health 
authorities  have  warned  that  those  citizens  with  certain  pre-existing  conditions,  such  as  respiratory  illnesses,  may  have  an  increased 
vulnerability to COVID-19.  However, at present it is not clear whether and to what extent ongoing exposure to air pollution might worsen 
the condition of those infected by the virus. Further epidemiological research is needed (https://www.eea.europa.eu/themes/air/air-quality-
and-covid19). 
135 https://ec.europa.eu/research/environment/index.cfm?pg=nbs . 
136 Around 75% of all emerging infectious diseases cross over from wildlife to humans (www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5711319/). 

26 

 
                                                 
improvement  of  some  environmental  parameters  resulting  from  the 
The  fast 
confinement  showed  how  resilient  nature  can  be.  Nature-based  solutions137,  like  green-
space initiatives and nature restauration plans, can contribute to the cost-effective greenhouse 
gas  emission  reductions  needed  by  2030,  while  having  numerous  co-benefits  like  flood 
protection,  cooling  during  heatwaves  and  recreational  use.  Pollution  reduction  also 
dramatically improves human health138. For the first time since the 1970s, the date at which 
we  will  exceed  the  resources  of  the  planet  beyond  the  global  sustainability  rate  has  been 
shifted backwards139. While many of the pollution reductions linked to  the confinement are 
likely  to  be  only  short-term,  they  do  offer  the  opportunity  to  inform  more  long-term, 
economically  sustainable  green  transitions  and  more  sustainable  consumption  patterns  in 
order to guarantee prosperity and health.  

Using fewer primary resources in a circular economy benefits the environment and the 
economy.  This  includes  resource  efficiency  measures  and  sustainable  use  of  renewable 
resources,  circular  business  models  and  product  policy.  The  new  circular  economy  action 
plan  highlights  the  importance  of  these  factors  in  delivering  on  our  climate  ambition  by 
reducing  environmental  footprints,  the  emission  of  greenhouse  gases  and  other  harmful 
substances, and biodiversity loss. They are also key to creating business opportunities for the 
EU, facilitating market access, and decreasing our dependency on non-EU countries for raw 
materials140.  

COVID-19  has  highlighted  the  importance  of  strengthening  the  resilience  of  urban 
areas.  These  are  important  hubs  of  innovation  and  key  to  making  the  most  of  the  green 
transition,  which  calls  for  reinforced  participatory  governance  and  collective  engagement 
towards a fairer and more sustainable future. Cooperation between EU institutions and cities, 
as  well  as  partner  cities  around  the  globe,  has  great  potential  to  make  Europe  a  world 
reference  point  in  identifying,  experimenting  with  and  applying  solutions  to  current  and 
future  challenges  that  cities  will  face,  including  those  related  to  climate  change.  For 
example, repurposing spaces  like office  buildings  or  brownfield  sites provides  abundant 
opportunities for bringing nature back to cities and improving the wellbeing of people in the 
urban  environment,  including  through  reconsidering  mobility  and  consumption  behaviours. 
Strategic  foresight  can  be  used  to  analyse  and  identify  potential  areas  for  bottom-up 
innovations  and  solutions  to  city  problems,  thus  connecting  those  directly  affected  with 
innovators, investors and start-ups141. 

137 Nature-based  solutions  can  pave  the  way  to  a  more  resource-efficient,  competitive  and  greener  economy  and  create  new  jobs  and 
economic  growth  by  manufacturing  and  delivering  new  products  and  services  that  improve  nature  rather  than  depleting  it 
(https://ec.europa.eu/research/environment/index.cfm?pg=nbs). 
138 https://www.ethicalcorp.com/wake-call-we-must-live-within-our-planetary-boundaries-avoid-future-pandemics. 
139 https://www.overshootday.org. 
140 https://ec.europa.eu/environment/circular-economy/pdf/leading_way_global_circular_economy.pdf. 
141 For  example,  the  research  project  ‘The  Future  of  Government  2030+’  by  the  Commission’s  Joint  Research  Centre  explored  changing 
power  relationships  in  society  and  new  governance  models  and  actors.  The  project  examined  stronger  alliances  of  local  governments 
through  new  types  of  political  institutions  (such  as  the  European  Parliament  of  Mayors)  and  stronger  inclusion  of  individuals  in 
policymaking through Citizen Councils. It has also proposed better synergies between the public and private sectors (especially the start-up 
(https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/publication/eur-scientific-and-technical-research-reports/future-government-2030-policy-implications-
culture) 
and-recommendations).  The  Commission  is  also  experimenting  with  ‘doughnut  economics’,  as  successfully  tested  at  city  level  in 
Amsterdam (https://www.kateraworth.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/20200416-AMS-portrait-EN-Spread-web-420x210mm.pdf).  

27 

 
 
                                                 
Box 3.3: CASE STUDY - Green jobs 

The  preservation  or  restoration  of  environmental  quality  is  at  the  heart  of  many  jobs  of  the 
future. These jobs will occur in agriculture, (re)manufacturing, construction, research and development, 
administration  and  services.  They  include,  for  instance,  sustainable  food  production  and  distribution, 
green and efficient building, water quality and regeneration, green design, forestry, urban and landfill 
mining, repair and recycling of raw materials, pharmaceuticals, low-emissions mobility and transport, 
renewable  energy,  ocean  acidity,  and  footprint  managers.  Resource  constraints  and  the  need  for 
increased  efficiency  will transform  many  professions,  bringing  in  new  business  models  and  requiring 
new skills. 

Our  environmental  policies  are  contributing  to  a  structural  shift  in  the  labour  market.  Some 
analyses estimate that a large proportion of EU jobs may evolve in a way that contributes to reducing 
greenhouse  gas  emissions  and  addressing  environmental  degradation.  Jobs  in  heavily  polluting 
industries  represent  a  mere  fraction  of  employment  in  the  EU142  and  there  are  significant  job 
opportunities  in  reducing  the  impact  of  those  industries.  The  eco-industry,  which  directly  mitigates 
environmental damage, is in itself becoming an important source of new jobs143. Moreover, increasing 
material productivity (i.e. resource efficiency) drives labour intensity and value added products, hence 
increasing  employment  opportunities.  Europe  is  already  a  leader  in  innovation  to  improve  material 
productivity, but company-level and systemic inefficiencies persist. 

The green sector can generate millions of jobs. The eco-industry sector has grown by 20% since 2000 
and provides around 4.2 million jobs in Europe, with a turnover of more than €700 billion. A shift to a 
greener economy could create 24 million new jobs globally by 2030 if the right policies are put in place, 
according to the International Labour Organisation (ILO)144, who also predicts that 72 million full-time 
jobs will be lost by 2030 due to heat stress and temperature increases.  

The recovery from the COVID-19 crisis suggests that the impact of green labour policies could be 
significantly  larger.  Given  the  number  of  people  out  of  work,  steering  recovery  plans  towards  the 
green transition could result in far more green jobs than previously thought.   

Job  creation  due  to  climate  change  policies  will  contribute  to  more  inclusive  job  growth, 
countering  trends  which  can  exacerbate  labour  market  inequalities,  such  as  automation,  robotics  and 
artificial intelligence. By 2050, employment in the electricity sector is projected to grow by 25%145, as 
industry, transport and other services become increasingly electrified. Renewable energy jobs in the EU 
are expected to reach 2.7 million or 1.3% of EU employment by 2050146.  

Effective green reskilling, especially for the built-in environment and services, can protect middle 
class jobs. The same is true with remanufacturing, reuse, repair, and recycling. Also, energy production 
and  energy-intensive  sectors  such  as  steel,  cement,  car  manufacturing,  machinery  and  chemicals  will 
need to shift to new production processes as part of the transition, which will also require new skills. 

142 https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=738&langId=en&pubId=8219,https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/publication/eur-scientific-and-
technical-research-reports/clean-energy-technologies-coal-regions. 
143 The eco-industry comprises activities which produce goods and services to measure, prevent, limit, minimise or correct environmental 
damage to water, air and soil, as well as problems related to waste, noise and eco-systems. 
144 ILO flagship report, World employment and social outlook 2018 ‘Greening with Jobs’. 
145 https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=738&langId=en&pubId=8219. 
146 https://www.irena.org/-/media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Publication/2020/Feb/IRENA_Transition_jobs_2020.pdf. 

28 

 
 
                                                 
Strategic foresight can help explore the drivers of change and individual and collective 
behaviours and assumptions about the future in a participatory way. More immediately, 
it  can  help  understand  future  structural  shifts  in  the  labour  market  as  part  of  the  transition 
towards a climate-neutral society by 2050. This will help guide the reskilling of people who 
have lost their jobs  during the COVID-19 crisis, or who are likely to  lose their jobs  due to 
accelerated  technological  change  and  automation.  Foresight  also  helps  scan  the  horizon  for 
new  developments,  including  emerging  technologies  that  could  either  accelerate  or  disrupt 
the green transition. The European Green Deal and a just transition will require the active and 
coordinated contribution of all of society. 

3.4.  The digital dimension 

Digital resilience is about ensuring that the way we live, work, learn, interact, and think 
in  this  digital  age  preserves  and  enhances  human  dignity,  freedom,  equality,  security, 
democracy,  and  other  European  fundamental  rights  and  values.  This  is  increasingly 
important as hyperconnectivity continues to accelerate, with physical-digital integration, the 
Internet of Things, smart home technology, the use of big data, augmented and virtual reality, 
machine learning, and other increasingly capable Artificial Intelligence technologies. Digital 
technologies  blur  the  distinction  between  the  physical  and  virtual  world,  and  between 
humans,  machines  and  nature,  with  implications  for  our  own  selves  and  the  policy 
frameworks147. They have been instrumental in keeping our economies and societies running 
during the pandemic. 

Capacities 

Europe  has  a  long  and  successful  history  of  technological  and  societal  innovation  and 
cooperation.  The  EU  is  stronger  when  it  works  together  with  Member  States,  involving 
regions  and  municipalities,  academia,  civil  society,  financial  institutions,  firms,  and  social 
enterprises.  Recent  agreements  in  areas  such  as  high-performance  computing148  and 
microelectronics149  have  reaffirmed  this  capacity.  Continuing  to  promote  the  digital 
transformation  of  public  administrations  and  justice  systems  throughout  Europe  is  also 
crucial to support this process150. 

Europe  has  unique  capacities  to  shape  international  standards  on  privacy  and  data 
flows. The European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) established data protection 
rules  for  all  firms  and  actors  processing  the  data  of  individuals  in  the  EU,  offering  people 
more  control  over  their  personal  data  and  benefits  to  businesses  through  a  level  playing 
field151. The role of the EU as a rule-maker in the digital sphere is being reinforced through 
engagement with non-EU countries that are currently adopting or modernising data protection 
legislation. India has followed the example of the EU GDPR in creating a plan for a Personal 

147 Online Manifesto (https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/sites/digital-agenda/files/Manifesto.pdf). 
148 https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/eurohpc-joint-undertaking, https://eurohpc-ju.europa.eu/. 
149 https://www.ipcei-me.eu/, https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/ecsel. 
150 https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/communication-shaping-europes-digital-future-feb2020_en_4.pdf. 
151 https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection_en. 

29 

 
 
                                                 
Data Protection Bill152. The California Consumer Privacy Act went in a similar direction153. 
Europe  now  needs  to  continue  building  alliances  and  maximising  its  regulatory  power, 
support for structural improvements, diplomacy and finance to promote the European digital 
model154. 

Vulnerabilities  

increase 

Sophisticated  hybrid  attacks  by  state  and  non-state  actors  threaten  our  cybersecurity 
and democracy. Vulnerabilities within the EU have been exploited through a combination of 
cyberattacks and cybercrime that have resulted in damage to critical infrastructure155. There 
the  number  of  cyberattacks  reported  against 
has  been  a  significant 
supercomputers, healthcare and financial systems156, such as hacking sensitive research from 
medical organisations and pharmaceutical companies157. ICT threats have also been flagged 
as a key source of systemic risk to electoral processes and the EU financial system158. These 
events show a worrying acceleration towards asymmetrical virtual crime159. Cybercrime, for 
example online dissemination of child sexual abuse material, has also reached unprecedented 
heights160.  

in 

The rapidly escalating US-China technological confrontation is disrupting global digital 
supply chains. It will have a direct impact on the single market and reinforce the need for the 
EU to pursue its technological sovereignty agenda and strengthen its key digital capacities.  

The  digital  divide  between  urban  and  rural  areas  is  a  cause  for  concern.  In  2019,  the 
coverage of Next Generation Access (NGA) networks, able to deliver download speeds of at 
least  30  Mbps,  increased  to  86%  of  households.  Fixed  Very  High  Capacity  networks 
(VHCNs), able to provide at least gigabit connectivity, were available to 44% of households. 
However, in rural areas NGA coverage stood at only 59% in 2019, while VHCNs reach just 
20% of households. This confirms that more investment is needed in rural areas to close the 
gap.  Development  of  digital  capacities  in  rural  areas  will  considerably  increase  their 
attractiveness. 

The crisis revealed a lack of readiness in the data economy. There was a significant lack 
of  almost  all  types  of  data  on  which  models  are  built  (such  as  employment,  consumer 
confidence,  and  production  data),  together  with  delays  in  producing  data161.  Data  on  stock, 
production  capacity,  and  demand  for  key  supplies  like  personal  protective  equipment  was 

152 https://hbr.org/2019/12/how-india-plans-to-protect-consumer-data. 
153 EIT  Report,  European  Digital  Infrastructure  and  Data  Sovereignty  (https://www.eitdigital.eu/fileadmin/files/2020/publications/data-
sovereignty/EIT-Digital-Data-Sovereignty-Summary-Report.pdf). 
154 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_273. 
155 Critical infrastructures are essential for vital societal functions, such as health, safety, security and economic or social wellbeing, whose 
disruption/destruction has a significant impact (Council Directive 2008/114/EC). 
156 https://www2.deloitte.com/ng/en/pages/risk/articles/covid-19-impact-cybersecurity.html. 
157 Craglia,  M.  et  al.,  2020,  Artificial  Intelligence  and  Digital  Transformation:  early  lessons  from  the  COVID-19  crisis.  JRC  Science  for 
Policy Report, JRC121305. 
158 https://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/reports/esrb.report200219_systemiccyberrisk~101a09685e.en.pdf. 
159 The megatrend ‘changing security paradigm’ (https://ec.europa.eu/knowledge4policy/changing-security-paradigm_en) is accelerating. 
160 COM(2020)605  final,  EU  Security  Union  Strategy;  COM(2020)607  final,  EU  strategy  for  a  more  effective  fight  against  child  sexual 
abuse. 
161 https://www2.deloitte.com/be/en/pages/strategy-operations/articles/covid-19-and-data-economy.html. 

30 

 
                                                 
missing162,  and  data  on  cases  of  COVID-19  infections  was  collected  differently  throughout 
Europe. This demonstrated that we still need a significant leap forward on data collection and 
governance  for  economic  and  societal  benefits.  In  turn,  this  calls  for  a  ‘European  way’  of 
governing the use of data, not least to avoid data monopolies163. 

Digital  technologies  and  related  business  models,  including  Artificial  Intelligence  (AI) 
and  the  platform  economy,  will  impact  the  job  market.  While  the  interplay  between 
potential  job  obsolescence  and  creation  caused  by  AI  and  robotics  is  still  unclear164,  it  is 
evident that these and other digital  technologies165, as well as related business  models, will 
change the way we work. Issues such as health, work-life balance, and safety at work will be 
impacted166.  Demand  for  skills  in  emerging  technologies  such  as  AI,  high-performance 
computing and whole-of-society cybersecurity167  are very acute, and the problem is growing 
as  the  offer  lags  behind  market  demand.  Levels  of  preparedness  and  awareness  are  also 
unequal across the EU.  

Opportunities 

The COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated hyperconnectivity168. There is an opportunity to 
draw  lessons  from  this  real-time  experience  and  achieve  a  balance  between  physical  and 
digital interactions in the future that meets the public’s expectations. During the COVID-19 
crisis,  over  one-third  of  the  EU’s  labour  force  temporarily  shifted  to  teleworking 
arrangements169.  Connectivity  increased  in  all  areas170  and  the  spectacular  rise  in  internet 
traffic, estimated at between 10% and 30% worldwide171, remained even as countries relaxed 
confinement measures. The total amount of data generated worldwide is estimated to grow to 
around 175 billion terabytes by 2025.  

Digital  technologies  could  contribute  to  further  advances  in  healthcare.  AI  and  high-
performance  computing  have  the  potential  to  accelerate  the  development  of  treatments, 
vaccines and diagnostics, predict the spread of diseases and plan the distribution of medical 
resources172.  Such  innovations  could  also  be  used  to  analyse  individual  health  risks  for 
preventive  medicine.  Leveraging  AI  also  brings  opportunities  for  enhancing  our  defences 
against cyberattacks, notably against critical infrastructure such as hospitals.  

162 The Commission set up a clearing house for medical equipment to address market failures and facilitate the timely availability of supplies 
during  the  pandemic  (https://ec.europa.eu/info/live-work-travel-eu/health/coronavirus-response/emergency-support-instrument/covid-19-
clearing-house-medical-equipment_en).  
163 Duch-Brown, Martens and Mueller-Langer, 2017, The economics of ownership, access and trade in digital data, JRC Working Papers on 
Digital Economy 2017-01, Joint Research Centre (https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/sites/jrcsh/files/jrc104756.pdf); Crémer, J., Y-A de Montjoye and 
H. Schweitzer, 2019, Competition policy for the digital era, Report for Commissioner Vestager, European Commission.  
164 https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/future-work-work-future. 
165 With global quantum race ongoing, the investment levels in Europe are still below those of the other major global players. 
166 https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/research_and_innovation/ege/ege_future-of-work_opinion_122018.pdf; 
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/final-report-high-level-expert-group-impact-digital-transformation-eu-labour-markets. 
167 Nai  Fovino  I.,  et  al.  (eds),  2020,  Cybersecurity,  our  digital  anchor,  Science  for  Policy  Report,  Joint  Research  Centre 
(https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/facts4eufuture/cybersecurity-our-digital-anchor).  
168 The  megatrend  ‘accelerating 
technological-change-hyperconnectivity_en) has accelerated. 
169 https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/sites/default/files/ef_publication/field_ef_document/ef20058en.pdf. 
170 Netflix doubled its paid subscriptions globally, with an additional 15.7 million subscribers (which is believed to be temporary) by April 
2020 (https://orbi.uliege.be/bitstream/2268/247652/1/MAY-2020-_-N%C2%BA4.pdf). 
171 https://www.forbes.com/sites/markbeech/2020/03/25/covid-19-pushes-up-internet-use-70-streaming-more-than-12-first-figures-
reveal/#4ba355cd3104. 
172 For instance, the EU-funded consortium Exscalate 4CoV uses one of the world's most powerful high-performance computing platforms 
to screen the potential impact of known molecules against the genomic structure of coronavirus. 

technological  change  and  hyperconnectivity’  (https://ec.europa.eu/knowledge4policy/accelerating-

31 

 
                                                 
Digital  technologies  have  enabled  some  continuity  in  training  and  education  while 
schools  have  been  closed  during  the  crisis.  When  used  properly,  digital  technologies  can 
increase the effectiveness, efficiency and inclusiveness of our education and training systems. 
Strengthening  the  digital  capacities  of  education  and  training  systems  and  bridging  digital 
gaps in equipment and connectivity is key.  

Addressing challenges associated with the implementation of the EU data strategy will 
open up wide-ranging opportunities for Europe.  These include the promotion  of the EU 
data protection model, the possibility to improve data availability, reuse, interoperability and 
governance,  and  the  ability  to  avoid  inadequate  data  infrastructures,  as  well  as  rely  on 
adequate tools that can empower individuals to exercise their rights.  

Open  strategic  autonomy  is  key  to  develop  the  European  digital  economy.  5G 
connectivity,  in  combination  with  the  Internet  of  Things,  could  boost  the  digitalisation  of 
services (e.g. energy, transport, banking, and health) and processes, reduce costs and increase 
efficiency. The creation of a cloud infrastructure would be the first step to making the most of 
data generated in Europe173. Concerted legislative and financial support for the creation of a 
single  market  for  data,  based  on  the  deployment  of  common  European  data  spaces,  will 
ensure better access to data and bring benefits for the public and the growth of the European 
data economy174. 

Digital  technologies  can  contribute  to  greening  the  economy.  They  can  optimise  the 
operation of utilities, mobility and transport, products, industrial processes and buildings and 
other assets, leading to energy savings, pollution reduction and increased resource efficiency 
by enabling the transition to a circular economy. They can also improve environmental and 
risk  management  through  early  warning  systems  for  extreme  weather  events,  based  on,  for 
instance,  earth  observation  data  and  big  data  technologies.  However,  attention  needs  to  be 
paid to the energy consumption of data technologies and the short life span of digital devices 
that  makes  e-waste,  including  critical  raw  materials,  the  fastest  growing  waste  category175. 
There  is  a  fundamental  shift  to  decentralised  data  systems  brought  by  edge176  and  fog177 
computing, combined with the deployment and uptake of new mobile generation technologies 
(e.g. 5G and 6G in the future) and low energy processors that can curb the growing energy 
consumption of digital technologies by processing data closer to users, through applications 
related to the Internet of Things, and by reducing network latency. 

Strategic  foresight  can  foster  the  human-centric  shaping  and  appropriation  of  digital 
technologies, as well as their effectiveness in boosting overall sustainability. This includes 

173 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php?title=File:Degree_of_dependence_on_cloud_computing,_by_economic_activity,_EU-
28,_2018_(%25_of_enterprises_using_the_cloud).png&oldid=415896. 
174 COM(2017)9 final, Building a European Data Economy. 
175 For example, people in northern Europe produced the most e-waste – 22.4kg per person in 2019. The amount was half as much in Eastern 
Europe. Europe had the highest recycling rate in 2019, at 42%, with Asia second at 12%. 
(https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2020/jul/02/10bn-precious-metals-dumped-each-year-electronic-waste-un-toxic-e-waste-
polluting). 
176 This  brings  processing  close  to  the  data  source  and  it  does  not  need  to  be  sent  to  a  remote  cloud  or  other  centralised  system.  By 
eliminating the distance and time it takes to send data to centralised sources, it can improve the speed and performance of data transport, as 
well as devices and applications on the edge. 
177 This is a standard that defines how  edge computing should work and it facilitates the operation of computing, storage and networking 
services between end devices and cloud computing data centres. In data centres, fog is often used as a jumping-off point for edge computing. 

32 

 
                                                 
anticipating  how  technologies  could  develop  and  ways  to  seize  underlying  and  upcoming 
opportunities. It also means exploring how digital technologies impact all walks of life and 
bring  new  challenges,  such  as  dealing  with  an  increasing  flow  of  information  and  the 
artificial  soliciting  of  human  attention.  It  can  help  identify  how  the  EU  can  shape  global 
digital  standards  and  rules  to  the  benefit  of  people  and  businesses  while  also  greening  the 
economy.  To  respect  fundamental  rights  and  EU  values  and  create  the  necessary  trust  for 
citizens to  uptake AI technologies, a horizontal framework on AI is  needed. With foresight 
and  anticipation,  it  is  possible  to  explore  how  digital  technologies  can  effectively  enable 
governments  to  provide  universal  access  to  quality  basic  services,  and  how  to  make 
institutions  fully  accountable.  It  can  explore  ways  to  deploy  secure  digital  infrastructures 
(high speed networks including future 6G, cloud and data) to avoid a digital divide between 
regions and individuals. 

33 

 
 
 
Box 3.4: CASE STUDY - Green ICT 

Are the EU’s green and digital ambitions always complementary? Information and communication 
technologies (ICT) can fuel unsustainable consumption, but with the right policy framework they also 
hold  great  promise  for  reducing  energy  consumption  and  optimising  resource,  product  and asset  use. 
Digital technologies could help reduce global emissions by up to 15% through innovative solutions in 
areas including energy, manufacturing, agriculture and land use, buildings, services, transportation, and 
traffic management178. For instance, transferring and storing one gigabyte of data through the internet 
uses  between  3.1 kWh  and  7  kWh,  instead  of  0.000005  kWh  if  done  locally179.  This  calls  for  the 
establishment  of  interoperable  European  cloud  and  edge  infrastructures  that  can  accommodate  large-
scale digital solutions in Europe while ensuring the EU’s technological sovereignty.  

However,  digitalisation  could  negatively  affect  the  environment,  climate  and  human  health  via 
higher  production,  use  and  disposal  of  electronic  equipment,  and  data  centres180.  For  example,  the 
energy  consumption  from  mining  bitcoins  is  estimated  to  be  responsible  for  0.3%  of  global  energy 
consumption.  This  might  not  sound  like  much,  but  68.11  TWh  per  year  is  higher  than  the  annual 
consumption of Austria (64.60 TWh) and Czechia (62.34 TWh)181. 

Material  efficiency  is  an  important  challenge  to  address.  Every  year,  $10  billion  worth  of  gold, 
platinum and other precious metals is dumped in the growing  mountain of electronic waste. Material 
efficiency  of  digital  technologies  might  have  an  even  larger  environmental  impact  than  energy 
efficiency. 

Energy  consumption  of  computing  is  growing  at  an  unsustainable  rate.  Newer  generations  of 
wireless technologies are less energy consuming than earlier ones (e.g. 5G antennas are set to consume 
less than the 4G ones182). However, the fact that 5G will bring denser networks and the rising number 
of  devices  connected  via  5G  (e.g.  connected  and  autonomous  driving)183  might  lead  to  an  overall 
growth  of  energy  consumption,  at  least  in  the  first  years  of  deployment.  The  tech  sector’s  estimated 
global footprint in 2020 is comparable to that of the aviation industry184. 

This highlights the growing need to continue working on greening ICT. Therefore, there is a need 
to  further  consider  ways  to  rapidly  reverse  the  rising  energy  and  material  resource  consumption  of 
Europe’s digital technologies and infrastructures while ensuring that they are available for applications 
required for climate action, health, sustainability and resilience. 

Greening ICT should be done within the framework of the circular economy, including building 
local material and digital ecosystems enabling innovative product designs and business models. 

178 https://exponentialroadmap.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Exponential-Climate-Action-Roadmap-September-2018.pdf. 
179 https://medium.com/stanford-magazine/carbon-and-the-cloud-d6f481b79dfe. 
180 The EU Environmental Foresight System (FORENV) cycle: Emerging issues at the environment-social interface. 
181 Cambridge Bitcoin Electricity Consumption Index (https://www.cbeci.org). 
182 https://www.ericsson.com/en/blog/2019/9/energy-consumption-5g-nr; https://hellofuture.orange.com/en/5g-energy-efficiency-by-design/. 
183 AI Now Institute (https://ainowinstitute.org/AI_Now_2019_Report.pdf). 
184 Data centres will make up 45% of this footprint (up from 33% in 2010) and network infrastructure 24%. See: Belkhir and Elmeligi, 2018, 
AI  and  Climate  Change:  How  they’re  connected,  and  what  we  can  do  about  it  (https://medium.com/@AINowInstitute/ai-and-climate-
change-how-theyre-connected-and-what-we-can-do-about-it-6aa8d0f5b32c). 

34 

 
 
                                                 
4. STRATEGIC FORESIGHT AGENDA 

4.1 Monitoring resilience 

As resilience becomes a new compass for EU policymaking, proper monitoring tools are 
required.  This  Communication  suggests  moving  towards  resilience  dashboards  and  co-
creating  them  in  exploratory  discussions  with  Member  States  and  key  stakeholders.  It 
presents here prototypes. The purpose of these prototypes, in view of more detailed analysis, 
is  to  highlight  vulnerabilities  and  resilience  capacities  in  the  EU  and  its  Member  States. 
These  dashboards  will  need  further  work,  building  on  existing  threads  and  collective 
intelligence.  The  list  of  dashboard  indicators  will  be  dynamic  and  chosen  based  on  a 
participatory process involving Member States and key stakeholders, relying on quality data 
comparable across Member States and over time.  

The  resilience  dashboards  will  be  complementary  and  will  add  value  to  other 
monitoring  tools.  They  will  draw  upon  existing  sectoral  indicators  and  monitoring  tools, 
such as the Social Scoreboard and the Monitoring report on progress towards the SDGs in an 
EU context185. They will provide clear added value through the following specificities: (i) the 
dashboards  will be informed by strategic  foresight,  helping to  identify  emerging issues  and 
challenges  and  propose  new  forward-looking  indicators  of  vulnerabilities  or  resilience 
capacities; (ii) while existing tools aim to assess progress in the EU and its Member States, 
for  instance  along  the  transitions  or  in  specific  sectoral  policies,  the  dashboards  will  assess 
resilience,  i.e.  the  ability  to  make  progress  and  reach  policy  targets;  and  (iii) while  many 
existing  tools  tend  to  be  sectoral  or  focus  on  single  topics  or  policies,  the  dashboards  will 
focus  on  multiple  dimensions  of  resilience  and  their  interlinkages,  providing  a  holistic 
picture. 

4.1.1 Prototype resilience dashboards 

This  Communication  proposes  to  develop  prototype  dashboards  for  the  social  and 
economic,  geopolitical,  green,  and  digital  dimensions  of  resilience.  What  is  presented 
below  as  an  example  is  a  preliminary  and  yet-to-be-finalised  set  of  indicators  of 
vulnerabilities  and  resilience  capacities  at  EU  and  Member  States  level  based  on  publicly 
available data186. The illustrative prototypes provide an example of the look and feel of 
such a dashboard. For each variable, a scale of three colours indicates the countries’ relative 
situation in the last year for which data is available versus the pooled values of available data 
since  2007187.  Colours  are  assigned  based  on  the  distance  from  the  mean  of  the  underlying 
distribution188. 

185 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-statistical-books/-/KS-02-20-202. 
186 The  complete  list  of  indicators,  corresponding  definitions,  and  sources  are  available  in  the  following  technical  papers  of  9  September 
2020 from the Commission’s Joint Research Centre (JRC): (i) ‘Prototype dashboard for monitoring the social and economic dimension of 
resilience’, JRC121729; (ii) ‘Prototype dashboards for monitoring the geopolitical, green, and digital dimensions of resilience’, JRC121633. 
187 Data  availability  may  vary  between  countries  from  year  to  year  and  countries  with  longer  data  series  are  more  prominent  in  the 
distribution. If no data is available for a variable at the beginning of the period, the 2007-2019 distribution automatically refers to the latest 
available values. If variables are available only for a single year, relative performance is assessed only for that year. 
188 For  each  indicator, the mean and  standard  deviation  are calculated  for the  pooled  distribution  across  countries  and  years.  Yellow/blue 
indicates countries that, in the latest available year, perform at least one standard deviation worse/better than the average. Light blue refers 
to the intermediate range. 

35 

 
                                                 
The illustrative prototype dashboard for social  and economic resilience looks at social, 
economic, and health issues in connection with COVID-19. Figure 4.1189 gives a sense of 
relative vulnerabilities, resilience capacities, and common patterns in the EU and its Member 
States. For example, in this preliminary work, population ageing and rising travel in the pre-
crisis period appear as common vulnerabilities. 

Figure 4.1 – Prototype dashboard for social and economic resilience linked to the COVID-19 crisis 

The illustrative prototype dashboard for the geopolitical dimension of resilience focuses 
on raw materials. A secure supply of raw materials is a prerequisite for a resilient economy. 
A prototype dashboard, presented in the top panel of Figure 4.2190, has been prepared to give 
a sense of Member States’ relative vulnerabilities and capacities in relation to raw materials 
supply.  At  this  stage,  there  is  no  possibility  to  reflect  the  economic  structure  of  individual 
Member  States  in  the  prototype,  which  is  a  significant  limitation.  Nevertheless,  as  an 

189 Sources include Eurostat and the Commission, complemented by variables from JRC's LUISA territorial platform, the European Institute 
for  Gender  Equality,  the  Global  Competitiveness  Index  of  the  World  Economic  Forum,  the  World  Bank,  the  European  Quality  of  Life 
Survey, Eurobarometer and research (https://www.eurosurveillance.org/content/10.2807/1560-7917.ES.2018.23.46.1800516).  
190 The starting points are the Raw Materials Scoreboard 2018 (https://ec.europa.eu/growth/content/raw-materials-scoreboard-2018_en) and 
the methodology  of the  criticality assessment (Blengini et al., 2017, https://doi.org/10.2760/73303). Sources include the Commission, the 
World  Mining  Database, the  British Geological  Survey’s  World  Mineral  Production  database,  and  the  US  Geological  Survey’s  historical 
statistics. 

36 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
example, the dashboard indicates that many countries fare well in relative terms with respect 
to  import  dependence  of  base  metals,  but  less  so  to  import  dependence  of  non-metallic 
minerals  for  construction191.  Among  capacities,  the  spending  on  innovation  in  material 
sectors is a strong point in many countries.  

Figure 4.2 – Prototype dashboards for the geopolitical, green, and digital dimensions of resilience 

The  illustrative  prototype  dashboard  for  the  green  dimension  of  resilience  focuses  on 
climate change and the environment. It is presented in the middle panel of Figure 4.2192. In 
this illustrative example, indicators like the share of population covered by the Covenant of 
Mayors and the size of Natura 2000 protected areas provide a relatively positive picture for 
many countries. By contrast, water exploitation, biodiversity loss, greenhouse gas absorption 
by ecosystems, public expenditure on environmental protection and the frequency and fatality 
of floods, storms and wildfires highlight potential weaknesses.  

191 In absolute terms, however, import dependence of base metals is higher than for non-metallic minerals. 
192 The  starting  point  is  the  index  of  the  EU  Global  Climate  Change  Alliance  (Miola  et  al.,  2015,  https://doi.org/10.2788/516387), 
complemented  with  additional  variables  describing  Member  States’  efforts  and  achievements  towards  climate  adaptation  and  mitigation. 
Data sources include the World Bank, the FAO, the European Environmental Agency, and the Emergency Events Database of the Centre for 
Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (EM-DAT), the data collections of various research institutions, Eurobarometer and Eurostat. 

37 

 
 
 
                                                 
A  digital  resilience  dashboard  could  be  further  developed  starting  from  the  Digital 
Economy and Society Index (DESI). The bottom panel of Figure 4.2 presents a set of DESI 
indicators  of  digital  resilience  capacities,  like  e-governance  and  digital  skills.  They  are 
complemented with others whose importance was highlighted by the COVID-19 crisis, like 
teleworking  and  e-health.  According  to  these  indicators,  many  countries  show  strong 
capacities in e-government and the overall digital economy reflecting improving penetration 
and adoption of new technologies. At the same time, digital skills, teleworking capacities and 
the use of e-health show a more contrasted picture.  

4.1.2 Work ahead for monitoring resilience 

The  prototype  dashboards  are  presented  as  an  example.  In  cooperation  with  Member 
States  and  other  key  stakeholders,  the  Commission  will  develop  the  resilience 
dashboards further in a forward-looking perspective. The dashboards will be informed by 
strategic  foresight,  which  can  help  identify  emerging  challenges  and  propose  new  forward-
looking indicators to assess vulnerabilities or capacities. As resilience is a characteristic that 
must be enhanced over time, the focus of this work will be on the medium-to-long term, to 
give  the  best  conditions  for  foresight-informed  policies  to  mitigate  vulnerabilities  and 
strengthen  capacities.  This  will  take  into  account  the  impact  of  megatrends  and  anticipated 
risks.  For  instance,  the  dashboard  for  social  and  economic  resilience  would  be  broadened 
beyond  the  COVID-19  context,  in  close  connection  with  the  Social  Scoreboard.  Moreover, 
broader  issues  such  as  trade,  including  value  chains,  security,  and  other  aspects  of  foreign 
policy  such  as  international  cooperation  could  be  considered  for  a  more  comprehensive 
geopolitical  dashboard.  For  the  green  resilience  dashboard,  issues  beyond  climate  change, 
such as the preservation of natural resources, the impact of pollution, water and soil quality, 
the  role  of  ecosystem  services  or  job  reallocation  and  innovation  prompted  by  the  green 
transition,  could  also  be  contemplated.  The  utmost  attention  will  be  paid  to  ensure 
consistency  and  coherence  with  existing  EU  monitoring  systems  under  development  in  the 
context of the European Green Deal. A digital resilience dashboard should be used to identify 
digital  technology  areas  where  the  strategic  autonomy  of  the  EU  is  at  risk  and  where 
investments should be targeted. In addition, strategic foresight could be used to adjust the list 
of  indicators  to  include  for  instance  necessary  skills  or  vulnerabilities  linked  to  the 
widespread use of future technologies such as AI193, the number of jobs at risk as a result of 
increasing  automation,  or  new  jobs  that  could  be  created  by  the  implied  shift  towards 
personal services. 

Aggregate  indicators  at  EU  level  and  a  synthetic  resilience  index  could  also  be 
envisaged.  Building  on  the  resilience  dashboards,  as  well  as  existing  knowledge  and 
indicators,  future  discussions  with  key  stakeholders  will  aim  to  develop  these  indicators  at 
EU  level  and  explore  the  feasibility  of  a  synthetic  resilience  index.  Its  rationale  would  be 

193 A  leading  source  is  the  Commission’s  AI  Watch  initiative  (https://ec.europa.eu/knowledge4policy/ai-watch_en),  monitoring  industrial, 
technological and research capacity, uptake and technical development of Artificial Intelligence and its impact on the economy and society. 

38 

 
                                                 
similar to the logic underlying the work on the forthcoming Transition Performance Index194. 
This exploratory work could follow a participatory process. An EU-wide approach, combined 
with  the snapshot provided by the index, would complement the more comprehensive view 
provided by the underlying resilience dashboards. 

This  broad  approach  to  measuring  and  monitoring  resilience  should  feed  into  an 
integrated  approach  to  measuring  people’s  wellbeing.  The  COVID-19  crisis  has  called 
into question our ordering of priorities and reignited the public debate on the importance of 
many aspects of the quality and sustainability of human life, such as education, income, jobs 
and health195. Since the 2007 Istanbul Declaration on Measuring Social Progress and the 2009 
report  of  the  Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi  Commission,  there  has  been  a  strong  consensus  in  the 
international  community  on  the  need  to  go  beyond  conventional  economic  measures  like 
gross domestic product (GDP), to make wellbeing a policy target for the generation of today 
as  well  as  tomorrow196,197.  The  ‘Beyond  GDP’  initiative  has  led  to  the  creation  of  major 
international  measurement  frameworks198  and  efforts  by  countries  to  develop  similar, 
sometimes highly elaborate systems of national objectives, targets and measurement schemes. 
The Commission supports this paradigm shift and takes a similarly comprehensive approach, 
acknowledging the complex interaction among social, economic and environmental systems 
influencing resilience and its importance for measuring wellbeing and sustainability199.  

4.2 Horizontal foresight activities to foster effective EU transition-led policies 

Strategic foresight will be applied to bring a dynamic and forward-looking perspective 
of  synergies  and  trade-offs  among  various  EU  policy  goals  and  policies,  leading  to  a 
coherent  strategic  approach.  This  can  provide  relevant  input  for  surveillance  and 
governance  processes,  particularly  multidisciplinary  and  periodic  ones  like  the  European 
Semester  and  SDGs  monitoring.  By  supporting  a  systemic  understanding  of  the  strategic 
objectives across policy areas, strategic foresight can be used to provide a dynamic analysis 
of synergies and trade-offs between them and across time horizons. Strategic foresight should 
contribute  to  testing  and  strengthening  the  coherence  of  the  Commission’s  monitoring, 
forecasting and modelling capacities. Currently, different indicators and scoreboards are used 
across the Commission to serve various policy goals. The Commission also relies on expert-

‘GDP  and  beyond’  actions;  and 

194 The Commission is exploring the possibility of measuring the transition to sustainability by way of a scoreboard. Based on the annual 
monitoring  reports  from  Eurostat,  this  scoreboard  would  provide  an  internationally  comparable  overview  of  all  four  dimensions  of 
sustainability (economic, environmental, social and institutional), with the aim of encouraging a broad public debate throughout the EU. 
195 Gadredy, J., Jany-Catrice, F., et al., 2020, Se libérer du PIB pour mesurer ce qui compte vraiment, Le Monde.  
196 See:  the  first  Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi  Report  from  2009  (https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/8131721/8131772/Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi-
Commission-report.pdf); COM(2009)433 final, GDP and beyond: measuring progress in a changing world; SWD(2013)303 final, Progress 
on 
from  2018 
(https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264307292-en and https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264307278-en). 
197 The high-level conference ‘Beyond GDP’, hosted by the Commission, the European Parliament, the Club of Rome, the OECD and the 
WWF in 2007 focused attention on the most appropriate indices to measure progress, and how these can best be integrated into the decision-
making process. Méda, D., 2020, Promouvoir de nouveaux indicateurs de richesse: ‘histoire d’une cause inaboutie’, Fondation maison des 
sciences  de  l’homme,  Collège  d’études  mondiales;  and  Durand,  M.  and  Exton,  C.,  2019,  Adopting  a  Well-Being  Approach  in  Central 
Government: Policy Mechanisms and Practical Tools, Chapter 8 of the Global Happiness and Wellbeing Policy Report, OECD. 
198 Leading examples are the OECD Better Life  Index and the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals and Human Development 
Index. 
199 De  Smedt,  M.,  Giovannini,  E.  and  Radermacher,  W.J.,  2018,  Chapter  9:  Measuring  sustainability,  in  Stiglitz  J.E.,  Fitoussi  Jean-Paul, 
Durand Martine (Eds.), 2018, For Good Measure: Advancing Research on Well-being Metrics Beyond GDP, OECD Publishing, Paris, pp. 
241-276, (https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264307278-11-en). 

second  Stiglitz-Fitoussi-Durand 

two  volumes  of 

report 

the 

the 

39 

 
                                                 
based forecasts and a wide range of models. A review and assessment of existing monitoring 
tools could identify where and how coherence can be improved.  

Strategic  foresight  will help  enhance  resilience.  This  Communication  starts  to  show  how 
the impact of COVID-19 on megatrends can shed a new dynamic light on Europe’s evolving 
resilience. Work will continue on this forward-looking task. As part of this, the Commission 
is  proposing  to  develop  a  set  of  shared  reference  foresight  scenarios  as  a  robust  forward-
looking  framework.  These  scenarios  will  help  identify  potential  pathways  for  the  twin 
transition.  They  will:  (i)  provide  a  reference  for  debating  shared  or  alternative  visions  of 
preferred futures amongst leaders; (ii) help ensure coherence across policies; and (iii) serve as 
a  common  forward-looking  framework  for  stress-testing  policy  proposals  or  launching  ex 
ante impact assessments. This exercise can also contribute to the Conference on the Future of 
Europe.  

4.3 Thematic strategic foresight agenda 

The  EU  strategic  foresight  agenda  will  address  cross-cutting  topics  where  strategic 
foresight  can  deepen  our  understanding  of  the  dynamics  at  play  across  policy  tracks. 
Among the high-impact topics identified, the Commission will next explore:  

-  Open strategic autonomy: to secure Europe’s competitiveness and global leadership in 
the future and strengthen its resilience, strategic foresight could help explore scenarios for 
a new global order and the EU’s place in it, as well as the capacities needed to match its 
ambitions.  This  could  include  defining  pathways  for  achieving  the  twin  transitions  and 
the  pace  with  which  they  can  be  achieved,  mapping  critical  emerging  technologies, 
sectors  and  products,  and  options  for  new  industrial  alliances  and  diversification  of 
trading  partners.  In  this  context,  foresight  could  inter  alia  allow  horizon  scanning, 
including  as  regards  international  standardisation,  to  be  used  as  a  strategic  lever  by  the 
EU.  Possible  future  work  on  this  topic  would  also  need  to  be  seen  in  light  of  the 
forthcoming  review  of  the  EU’s  trade  policy  that  will  identify  its  contribution  to  open 
strategic autonomy. 

-  The future of jobs and skills for and in the green transition: As acknowledged in the 
European  Skills  Agenda,  the  green  transition  requires  a  major  shift  and  reallocation  of 
jobs  and  skills,  in  a  wide  range  of  sectors  and  public  services.  A  systemic  view  of  the 
shifts in the labour market driven by the green transition is still missing. Foresight could 
explore  the  means  by  which  such  a  systemic  view  could  be  developed,  integrating  also 
the  lessons  that  can  be  learned  from  previous  industrial  transitions.  Such  a  view  will 
inform the strategies for reskilling and accompanying people, whose jobs are transformed 
or  lost  due  to  the  industrial  transition.  This  is  also  important  to  guide  the  EU’s  future 
priorities  for  education,  lifelong  learning  and  legal  migration  pathways,  as  well  as  to 
ensure a just transition. 

-  Deepening the twinning of the digital and green transitions:  the digitalisation of our 
society  and  the  green  transition  are  happening  concurrently  and  are  intimately  related. 
However, their interactions need to be better understood and exploited. Strategic foresight 

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will explore how emerging technologies can make the most of both transitions, how they 
relate  to  each  other,  and  how,  for  instance,  the  environmental  impact  of  the  digital 
transition  can  be  reduced.  It  will  also  explore  the  skills  required  to  exploit  the 
technologies of the future, the ways in which AI can be deployed to transform our digital 
economy  and  facilitate  the  green  transition,  and  the  associated  impacts  on  European 
actors and value chains. In addition, it will analyse ways in which investment in strategic 
projects,  including  as  part  of  the  recovery,  can  benefit  both  the  green  and  digital 
transitions. 

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