COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Follow-up on recommendations to the 30th annual report on the protection of the Union’s financial interests and the fight against fraud - 2018 Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL 31st Annual Report on the protection of the European Union's financial interests - Fight against fraud - 2019
Date: 2020-09-03
Institutions: European Anti-Fraud Office, European Commission
Subjects: EU Member State, EU budget, EU strategy, activity report, corruption, crime, fight against crime, financial control, fraud, fraud against the EU

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 3.9.2020  SWD(2020) 158 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Follow-up on recommendations to the 30th annual report on the protection of the Union’s financial interests and the fight against fraud - 2018 Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL 31st Annual Report on the protection of the European Union's financial interests - Fight against fraud - 2019 {COM(2020) 363 final} - {SWD(2020) 156 final} - {SWD(2020) 157 final} - {SWD(2020) 159 final} - {SWD(2020) 160 final}  
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

List of Abbreviations .................................................................................................................. 2 

Executive Summary .................................................................................................................... 3 

1. 

FOLLOW UP BY RECOMMENDATION .................................................................. 8 

Methodology and thematic analysis: .......................................................................................... 8 

1.1. 

REVENUE .................................................................................................................... 8 

1.1.1.  Customs controls strategies for cross-border e-commerce trade ................................ 10 

1.1.2.  Tackling potential abuse of low-value consignments reliefs (LVCR) ....................... 13 

1.1.3.  Detection of potentially undervalued or incorrectly declared goods .......................... 16 

1.1.4.  Specific control measures to prevent artificial splitting of consignments .................. 18 

1.1.5.  Ensuring that ex-post controls include verifications on traders’ compliance on low 

value consignments relief ........................................................................................... 20 

1.1.6.  Authorised Economic Operators (AEOs) ................................................................... 22 

1.2. 

EXPENDITURE ......................................................................................................... 23 

1.2.1.  National Anti-fraud Strategies .................................................................................... 25 

1.2.2.  Risk Analysis .............................................................................................................. 29 

The use of IT tools .................................................................................................................... 29 

The use of PIF reports’ findings in fraud risk assessments ...................................................... 32 

Exploring the potential of risk analysis to different types of expenditure ................................ 34 

1.2.3.  Horizontal issues ......................................................................................................... 36 

Assessing the spontaneous reporting of irregularities and strengthening the protection of 

whistle-blowers ........................................................................................................... 36 

Cooperation Between Judicial and Administrative Authorities ................................................ 38 

2. 

REPLIES OF MEMBER STATES ............................................................................ 42 

2.1. 

Revenue ...................................................................................................................... 42 

2.2. 

Expenditure ................................................................................................................. 84 

1 

 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 

AEO: Authorised Economic Operator 

AFCOS: Anti-Fraud Coordination Service 

CAPs: Customs Automated Processing System 

CIS: Customs Information System 

EC: European Commission 

ECA: European Court of Auditors 

ENS: Entry summary declaration 

ERDF: European Regional Development Fund 

ESF: European Social Fund 

EPPO: European Public Prosecutor’s Office 

IMS: Irregularity Management System 

LVCR: Low-value consignments reliefs 

MA: Managing Authorities 

NAFS: National Anti-Fraud Strategies 

PIF: Protection of the EU’s financial interests 

TFEU: Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 

TOR: Traditional Own Resources 

UCC: Union Customs Code 

UCC DA: Union Customs Code delegated act 

UCC IA: Union Customs Code implementing act 

UPU: Universal Postal Union 

VAT: Value added tax 

2 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

In  the  2018  Article  325  TFEU  Report  on  the  protection  of  the  European  Union’s  financial 
interests  (‘PIF  report’),  the  Commission  made  two  recommendations  to  the  Member  States, 
one for the revenue  side and  one  for  the  expenditure side of  the  budget.  This staff  working 
document collects and summarises the Member States’ replies for follow-up on the 2018 PIF 
report’s recommendations, and provides updated information, initiatives and measures taken 
in 2018 and 2019 in the respective areas of revenue and expenditure.  

A.  REVENUE (Recommendation 1)  

Member States are asked to enhance and enforce their customs control strategies for 
cross-border  e-commerce  trade,  particularly  for  the  potential  abuse  of  low-value 
consignments reliefs (LVCR) and to ensure proper TOR collection.  
Therefore, Member States are requested to ensure that: 

  electronic customs declaration systems do not automatically apply claimed duty 
relief on goods with the declared intrinsic value above EUR 150, on commercial 
consignments declared as gifts and on goods ineligible for relief; 

  electronic  customs  declaration  systems  systematically  detect  potentially 
undervalued  or  incorrectly  declared  goods  under  LVCR  by  means  of  risk 
profiles or randomly; 

  specific  control  measures  are  in  place  to  prevent  artificial  splitting  of 

consignments, aiming to benefit from duty relief; and  

  ex post controls include verifications on traders’ compliance with customs duty 
relief  for  low-value  consignments  and  that  authorised  economic  operators 
(AEOs) are not excluded from such compliance checks. 

As concerns  customs  control strategies for  cross-border e-commerce trade, and in particular 
the  potential  abuse  of  low-value  consignments  reliefs  (LVCR),  12 1 Member  States  have 
implemented this in full, 122 reported partial implementation, and 33 have not implemented it. 
The  measures  taken  range  from  focused  risk  profiles  for  undervaluation,  which  cover  low-
value consignments, to upgrades and improvements of the Member States’ customs systems. 

Several Member States have taken specific measures to deal with this recommendation. For 
example, Greece’s operational plan for the independent authority for public revenue (IAPR) 
includes quantitative targets for controls on e-commerce consignments. Luxembourg Customs 
deployed  an  IT  solution  dedicated  to  electronic  risk  analysis  of  structured  pre-arrival 
consignment-level  data  related  to  low-value  consignments.  Hungary  drew  up  a  strategy 
dedicated  to  cross-border  e-commerce  taking  into  account  the  recommendation  of  the  2018 
PIF report. Romania focused on the improvement of cooperation between public authorities, 
national  and  international  organisations  in  the  field  of  fraud  in  cross-border  e-commerce. 
Finland has a control plan, ‘Undervaluation through e-commerce’. 

1Germany, Estonia, Ireland, Spain, France, Latvia, Luxembourg, Hungary, the Netherlands, Austria, Slovenia 

and Slovakia. 

2 Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechia, Greece, Italy, Lithuania Poland, Portugal, Romania, Finland and Sweden. 
3 Croatia, Cyprus and Malta 

3 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
In addition, the Member States were requested to ensure that:  
a)  Electronic customs declaration systems do not automatically apply claimed duty relief on 
goods  with  the  declared  intrinsic  value  above  EUR  150,  on  commercial  consignments 
declared as gifts and on goods ineligible for relief. The follow-up for 2018 showed that 15 
Member  States 4 replied  that  they  are  fully  implementing  this  recommendation  and  95 
reported partial implementation. Three Member States6 have not implemented it.  

b)  Electronic  customs  declaration  systems  systematically  detect  potentially  undervalued  or 
incorrectly  declared  foods  under  LVCR  by  means  of  risk  profiles  or  randomly.  In  the 
follow-up  for  2018,  16  Member  States 7  replied  that  they  fully  implemented  this 
recommendation and 118 reported partial implementation.  

c)  Specific  control  measures  are  in  place  to  prevent  artificial  splitting  of  consignments, 
aiming  to  benefit  from  duty  relief.  In  the  follow-up  for  2018,  9  Member  States9 replied 
that  they  are  fully  implementing  this  recommendation  and  13 10  reported  partial 
implementation. Five Member States11 have not implemented it. 

d)  Ex post controls include verifications on traders’ compliance with customs duty relief for 
low-value consignments. In the follow-up for 2018, 14 Member States12 replied that they 
fully  implemented  this  recommendation  and  1113 reported  partial  implementation.  Two 
Member States14 have not implemented it. 

e)  Authorised  economic  operators  (AEOs)  are  not  excluded  from  such  compliance  checks. 
Most  Member  States15 have  implemented  this  recommendation  in  full;  two16 have  not 
implemented it.  

B.  EXPENDITURE (Recommendation 2)  

4 Belgium, Czechia, Estonia, Ireland, France, Spain, Latvia, Luxembourg, Cyprus, Hungary, Austria, Portugal, 

Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia 

5 Bulgaria, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Croatia, Italy, Lithuania, Poland and Sweden 
6 Malta, the Netherlands and Finland 
7 Denmark, Germany, Spain, France, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, Lithuania, the Netherlands, 
Austria, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia and Slovakia. 
8 Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechia, Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Croatia, Cyprus, Romania, Finland and Sweden 
9 Germany, Estonia, Greece, Latvia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Slovakia and Sweden. 
10  Bulgaria, Ireland, Spain, Croatia, Italy, Cyprus, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia and 

Finland. 

11 Belgium, Czechia, Denmark, France and Malta. 
12 Germany,  Ireland,  Spain,  France,  Italy,  Cyprus,  Latvia,  Luxembourg,  Lithuania,  Malta,  Austria.  Romania, 

Slovenia and Slovakia. 

13   Belgium,  Bulgaria,  Czechia,  Estonia,  Greece,  Hungary,  the  Netherlands,  Poland,  Portugal,  Finland  and 

Sweden. 

14 Denmark and Croatia. 
15 Bulgaria,  Czechia  ,  Germany,  Denmark,  Estonia,  Ireland,  Greece,  Spain,  France,  Croatia,  Lithuania,  Italy, 
Cyprus, Latvia, Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, the Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, 
Finland and Sweden. 
16 Belgium and Slovakia. 

4 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
 
The Commission reiterates the appropriateness of Member States that have not already done so 
to adopt national anti-fraud strategies. 
These strategies should be developed in cooperation with all bodies and authorities which have 
a specific role and expertise in the protection of the EU financial interests, including law 
enforcement and prosecution services. 
In line with what was recommended in previous years, these strategies should take into 
account:  
 
 

the risk analysis conclusions contained in this and previous reports;  
the need to structure the coordination between administrative and criminal checks and 
investigations; 

  how to incorporate tips from media and whistleblowers in the control system; and 
 

the opportunity to strengthen the risk analysis based approach to detect irregularities 
and fraud, including the use of IT tools (such as ARACHNE). 

As concerns the recommendation to the Member States which have not already done so that 
they  adopt national  anti-fraud strategies, (NAFS), these should be developed in cooperation 
with all bodies and authorities which have a specific role and expertise in the protection of the 
EU’s  financial  interests,  including  law  enforcement  and  prosecution  services.  In  line  with 
what was recommended in previous years, these strategies should take into account a) the risk 
analysis  conclusions  contained  in  this  and  previous  reports  and  b)  the  need  to  structure  the 
coordination between administrative and criminal checks and investigations. 

The  follow-up  for  2018  showed  that  10  Member  States  reported  that  they  have  adopted  or 
updated a NAFS which they have  communicated  to  the Commission (OLAF)17, whereas 17 
have  not  adopted  a  NAFS.18   Four  Member  States  are  considering  adopting  or  are  in  the 
preparation stage of a new NAFS, not yet communicated to the Commission (OLAF).19 

Nine  Member  States  have  fully  developed  their  NAFS  in  cooperation  with  all  bodies  and 
authorities  that  have  expertise  in  the  area  of  the  protection  of  the  EU’s  financial  interests, 
including  law  enforcement  and  prosecution  services20.  Three  MS  have  partly  implemented 
this 21  and  1  has  not  implemented  it 22 .  This  recommendation  was  not  applicable  to  the 
remaining 14 Member States as they have not done any work on a NAFS yet23.  

Seven  Member  States  developed  their  NAFS  fully  taking  into  account  the  risk  analysis 
conclusions  contained  in  the  2018,  2017  and  2016  PIF  reports. 24  Five  Member  States 

17 Bulgaria, Czechia, Greece, France, Italy, Latvia, Hungary, Malta, Austria and Slovakia 
18 Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Ireland, Spain, Croatia, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Lithuania, Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Finland, Sweden. 
19 Belgium, Spain, the Netherlands, Romania. 
20 Bulgaria, Czechia, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Hungary, Malta, Romania and Slovakia 
21 France, the Netherlands, Sweden 
22 Austria 
23 Belgium,  Denmark,  Germany,  Estonia,  Ireland,  Spain,  Croatia,  Cyprus,  Lithuania,  Luxembourg,  Poland, 
Portugal, Slovenia, Finland. 
24 Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Hungary, Malta, Austria and Romania 

5 

 
 
 
                                                           
implemented  this  partially 25  whereas  2  Member  States  have  not  implemented  it 26 .  This 
recommendation was not applicable to the 13 remaining Member States27.  

Eight  Member  States  have  developed  a  NAFS  that  fully  takes  into  account  the  need  to 
structure the coordination between administrative and criminal checks and investigations28, 5 
have  implemented  this  part  of  the  recommendation  partially29 and  1  did  not  implement  it.30 
This recommendation was not applicable to the 13 remaining Member States31. Five Member 
States made an assessment of the impact of the NAFS on the fight against fraud affecting the 
EU’s financial interests32; 9 have not done so33. This recommendation was not applicable to 
the 13 remaining Member States34. 

The Member States were recommended to strengthen their risk analysis to detect irregularities 
and fraud, including the use of IT tools (such as ARACHNE), to share results deriving from 
the use of findings in the PIF reports in their fraud risk assessments and to further exploit the 
potential of risk analysis, tailoring the approach to the different types of expenditure. On the 
detection  of  irregularities  and  fraud  including  the  use  of  IT  tools  (such  as  ARACHNE),  16 
Member  States  have  fully  implemented  it35,  10  have  partly  implemented  it36 and  1  has  not 
provided  information37.  Thirteen  Member  States  made  use  of  ARACHNE  during  their  risk 
analysis38. The majority of Member States uses a combination of national and other publicly 
available tools.  

As concerns the sharing of results deriving from the use of the PIF Report’s findings in their 
fraud risk assessments, 16 Member States shared their results39 and 9 did not have any results 
to report40. One Member State has not provided information.41 

25 Czechia, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia and Sweden 
26 Austria and Malta 
27 Belgium,  Denmark,  Germany,  Estonia,  Ireland,  Spain,  Croatia,  Cyprus,  Lithuania,  Luxembourg,  Poland, 
Sweden and Finland. 
28 Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Hungary, Malta, Austria and Romania 
29 Czechia, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia and Sweden. 
30 France 
31 Belgium,  Denmark,  Germany,  Estonia,  Ireland,  Spain,  Croatia,  Cyprus,  Lithuania,  Luxembourg,  Poland, 
Slovenia and Finland. 
32 France, Italy, Latvia, Austria and Romania 
33 Bulgaria, Czechia, Greece, Hungary, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia and Sweden 
34 Belgium,  Denmark,  Germany,  Estonia,  Ireland,  Spain,  Croatia,  Cyprus,  Lithuania,  Luxembourg,  Poland, 

Slovenia and Finland. 

35 Bulgaria,  Czechia,  Germany,  Greece,  Croatia,  Italy,  Latvia,  Luxembourg,  Hungary,  Malta,  the  Netherlands, 
Austria, Poland, Portugal, Romania and Slovakia. 
36 Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, Spain, France, Cyprus, Slovenia, Finland and Sweden. 
37 Lithuania. 
38  Belgium,  Bulgaria,  Czechia,  Denmark,  Ireland,  Italy,  Latvia,  Hungary,  Netherlands,  Portugal,  Romania, 

Slovenia and Slovakia. 

39 Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechia, Germany, Estonia, Greece, Croatia, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Luxembourg, Hungary, 
Poland, Portugal, Slovenia and Slovakia. 
40 Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Austria, Romania, Finland and Sweden. 

6 

 
 
 
                                                           
Regarding the exploitation of the potential of risk analysis, tailoring the approach to different 
types  of  expenditure,  follow-up  on  the  recommendations  for  2018  showed  that  15  Member 
States have fully implemented this recommendation42, 11 have partly implemented it43 and 1 
has not implemented it44. One Member State has not provided information45. 

As  regards  cross-cutting  issues,  the  Commission  recommended  that  the  Member  States 
facilitate and assess the spontaneous reporting of irregularities and strengthen the protection 
of whistleblowers. Thirteen Member States have implemented this recommendation in full46, 
1047 have partly implemented it and 348 have not implemented it. One Member State has not 
provided any information49. There has been no significant change in implementation since last 
year’s follow-up on this recommendation. This year, the Member States focused on providing 
information  on  their  stage  of  implementation  in  2018  and  2019.  Several  Member  States 
referred  to  the  upcoming  transposition  of  the  Union’s  Whistleblowing  Directive  by  17 
December 202150.  Some Member  States have already  adopted legislation on whistleblowers 
in 201951. 

In  addition,  the  Member  States  were  asked  to  promote  systematic  and  timely  cooperation 
between  judicial  and  administrative  authorities.  Eighteen  Member  States  have  implemented 
this recommendation in full52, 353 have partly implemented it and 354 have not implemented it. 
Three  Member  States  have  not  provided  information 55.  More  Member  States  have  fully 
implemented  this  recommendation  since  last  year’s  partial  or  non-implementation 56.  The 
majority  of  Member  States  provided  updated  information  on  initiatives  taken  in  2019,  with 
the role of AFCOS being more prominent than last  year as a coordinator for cooperation in 
anti-fraud matters between different national authorities. 

41 Lithuania. 
42 Bulgaria,  Czechia,  Germany,  Croatia,  Greece,  Italy,  Cyprus,  Latvia,  Luxembourg,  Hungary,  Malta,  Austria, 

Poland, Portugal and Romania. 

43  Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, Spain, France, Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland and Sweden. 
44 The Netherlands. 
45 Lithuania. 
46  Bulgaria,  Croatia,  Greece,  Italy,  Latvia,  Hungary,  Malta,  the  Netherlands,  Poland,  Portugal,  Romania, 

Slovakia and Sweden. 

47 Belgium, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, Spain, France, Luxembourg, Slovenia and Finland. 
48 Germany, Cyprus and Austria. 
49 Lithuania. 
50 Germany, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France. 
51 Latvia and Slovakia. 
52  Belgium,  Czechia,  Greece,  Spain,  Croatia,  Italy,  Cyprus,  Latvia,  Luxembourg,  Hungary,  Malta,  the 

Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia and Sweden. 

53 Belgium, Germany and Estonia. 
54 Denmark, Austria and Finland 
55 Ireland, France and Lithuania. 
56 Spain, Italy, Romania, Slovenia and the Netherlands 

7 

 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
1. 

FOLLOW-UP BY RECOMMENDATION 

METHODOLOGY AND THEMATIC ANALYSIS: 

is  divided 

The  following  section  provides  a  comprehensive  overview  of  the  implementation  of  each 
recommendation  by  the  Member  States  and  summarises  the  replies  received  for  each 
the 
recommendation.  This  section 
recommendations  related  to  the  revenue  and  expenditure  sides  of  the  budget.    Each 
recommendation is analysed first by providing results by the number of Member States that 
addressed  each  of  the  recommendations,  and  second  by  providing  a  summary  of  the  most 
important  details  provided  by  Member  States.    For  more  details,  readers  are  referred  to  the 
Member States’ original replies  which are reproduced under Section 2, ‘Replies of  Member 
States’.  

two  sub-sections,  one  each  on 

in 

1.1. 

REVENUE 

The Commission provided  the  following  questionnaire to the  Member  States with  regard to 
addressing the first recommendation: 

Q.1.1  Have  you enhanced and enforced your customs control strategies for cross-border e-
commerce  trade,  particularly  for  the  potential  abuse  of  low-value  consignments  reliefs 
(LVCR)? 

Q.1.2  Have  you  ensured  that  your  electronic  customs  declaration  system  does  not 
automatically apply claimed duty relief on goods with (a) the declared intrinsic value above 
EUR 150, (b) on commercial consignments declared as gifts and (c) on goods ineligible for 
relief?  

Q.1.3  Have  you  ensured  that  your  electronic  customs  declaration  systems  systematically 
detect  potentially  undervalued  or  incorrectly  declared  goods  under  LVCR  by  means  of  risk 
profiles or randomly? 

Q.1.4  Have  you  ensured  that  there  are  any  specific  control  measures  in  place  to  prevent 
artificial splitting of consignments, aiming to benefit from duty relief? 

Q.1.5  Have  you  ensured  that  ex  post  controls  include  verifications  on  traders’  compliance 
with customs duty relief for low-value consignments? 

Q.1.5.a  Are  authorised  economic  operators  (AEOs)  not  excluded  from  such  compliance 
checks? 

The table below represents the overall results of the implementation of each question 
corresponding to the Commission’s recommendation.  

8 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
1.1.1. CUSTOMS CONTROL STRATEGIES FOR CROSS-BORDER E-COMMERCE TRADE  

The  Member  States  were  asked  to  provide  information  on  whether  they  enhanced  and 
enforced  customs  control  strategies  for  cross-border  e-commerce  trade,  particularly  for  the 
potential abuse  of  low-value consignments reliefs (LVCR). Twelve57 Member States  replied 
that they fully implement this question, 1258 reported partial implementation and 359 have not 
implemented it. 

57Germany,  Estonia,  Ireland,  Spain,  France,  Latvia,  Luxembourg,  Hungary,  the  Netherlands,  Austria,  Slovenia 

and Slovakia. 

58 Belgium,  Bulgaria,  Czechia,  Denmark,  Greece,  Italy,  Lithuania,  Poland,  Portugal,  Romania,  Finland  and 

Sweden. 

9 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Several Member States provided details in their replies (in summary)60: 

Belgium reported that automatic selections occur in BE-gate but that quite a few operators are 
not there and BE-gate provides only limited selection options. It contains selection profiles for 
undervaluation and a random selection.  

Bulgaria  has  no  specific  strategy  targeting  low-value  consignments,  as  this  has  not  been 
developed yet. However, the Customs Agency has developed and is implementing a strategy 
for controlling the customs value of imported goods, which covers low-value consignments. 

The  Czech  Customs  Administration  uses  focused  risk  profiles  set  for  specific  risky 
commodities under EUR 22. For consignments over EUR 22 and below EUR 150, electronic 
risk analysis is performed with no exceptions for AEOs. After January 2021, electronic risk 
analysis will be expanded on the consignments under EUR 22. 

Denmark  reported  that  the  Danish  Customs  Agency  has  not  adopted  a  separate  control 
strategy within the area of cross-border e-commerce, but has stepped up its general focus in 
that area. For example, by carrying out control actions focusing on fraud and abuse related to 
the import of low-value consignments. 

Estonia  reported  that  about  20%  of  the  postal  and  express  consignments  declared  by 
individuals are sent for checking on the basis of a specifically created criterion. 100% of the 
consignments with low value, which are sent by C2C as gifts, are directed for checking. 

Ireland reported that the Customs Division has various risk profiles in place for clearance and 
simplified declarations at national and local station level.  

Greece  reported  that  the  operational  plan  of  the  IAPR  includes  quantitative  targets  for 
controls  on  e-commerce  consignments.  The  measures  taken  include  the  introduction  of  a 
primary inspection prior to submission of the document, stepping up the means of control (X-
rays, radiation detectors, sniffer dogs), etc. 

Spain  reported  that  risk  profile  updates  take  into  account  the  new  trends  identified  by  the 
Customs Department of the Tax Agency. 

France  reported  that  items  of  negligible  value  are  handled  electronically  and  subject  to 
checks. A risk analysis and investigations are carried out, aiming to detect value decreases.  

Croatia  reported  that  upgrades  and  improvements  are  planned  for  the  new  customs 
declaration (H7) which will be in production from 1 January 2021. 

Italy  indicated  the  memorandum  stipulated  by  the  Customs  and  Monopolies  Agency  that 
allows the operators to use a single customs tariff code in cases of declarations of goods under 
LVCR. 

Cyprus is in the process of implementing a new system in 2022. 

59 Cyprus, Croatia and Malta. 
60 For more detailed information please see Section 2, ‘Replies of Member States’. 

10 

 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Latvia explained that since November 2019, import customs declarations must be lodged for 
postal consignments. This functionality has been introduced in the national electronic customs 
data  processing  system.  In  addition,  a  strategy  of  control  for  postal  consignments  has  been 
developed and put into practice. 

Luxembourg reported that in addition to the general electronic customs clearance system and 
its  rules  engine  applicable  for  electronic  customs  declarations,  Customs  deployed  an  IT 
solution  (DAkOTA)  especially  dedicated  to  electronic  risk  analysis  of  structured  pre-arrival 
consignment-level data related to low value shipments. 

Hungary  reported  that  with  regard  to  cross-border  e-commerce,  the  National  Tax  and 
Customs  Administration  (NTCA)  drew  up  a  separate  strategy  for  2020,  taking  into  account 
the  initial  recommendation  made  in  the  PIF  report  for  2018.  On  1  January 2021,  an  EU 
package will enter into force that will fundamentally  change how small-value consignments 
are handled: VAT will have to be paid on them irrespective of the amount involved and, to 
ensure VAT is recovered, data will have to be submitted in advance. 

The  Netherlands  reported  that  they  started  with  a  number  of  e-commerce  companies  to 
decrease the risk of low value consignments in close cooperation with the tax authorities. 

The Austrian risk management approach in the field of low consignments is a combination of 
specific electronic risk profiles, risk profiles with a minimum control quota and focal control 
operations beside the electronic targeting system. 

Poland’s  National  Revenue  Administration  started  work  on  optimising  the  clearance  and 
control  of  e-commerce  consignments  in  September  2018.  A  new  customs  clearance  model 
was  designed  for  postal  traffic.  A  national  analytical  unit  (Strategic  Analysis  Centre)  is 
preparing  the  terms  of  reference  and  scope  of  operations  for  checking  postal  and  courier 
consignments containing low-value goods. 

Portugal reported that electronic declarations concerning e-commerce are covered by applied 
risk analysis parameters based on risk indicators/risk profiles. 

Romania’s General Directorate for Customs focused on the improvement of cooperation with 
public authorities, national and international organisations and other stakeholders in the field 
of  fraud  in  cross-border  e-commerce.  It  participates  to  the  joint  actions  and  national 
operations. It improves risk analysis and management to prevent the infringement of customs 
legal  regulations  on  cross-border  e-commerce  and  monthly  monitors  the  results  of  the 
customs controls performed on postal/express courier consignments. Romania highlighted the 
development of an e-commerce strategy containing measures meant to improve the customs 
controls on postal/express courier consignments. 

Slovakia  reported  on  the  procedure  followed  when  goods  are  released  into  the  free 
circulation, on entry of postal consignment where the declaration is fully completed and the 
customs officer considers the data to be relevant. 

Finland:  Finnish  Customs  has  a  control  plan,  ‘Undervaluation  through  e-commerce’.  For 
example, they analyse the operators in cross-border e-commerce trade. 

11 

 
 
 
Sweden: Swedish Customs is notified of all arriving low value consignments and the decision 
to  release  the  goods  is  sent  electronically  from  Swedish  Customs  to  the  designated  UPU 
operator in Sweden. 

12 

 
 
 
 
1.1.2. TACKLING POTENTIAL ABUSE OF LOW-VALUE CONSIGNMENTS RELIEFS (LVCR) 

The  Member  States  were  asked  to  provide  information  on  whether  they  ensured  that  their 
electronic customs declaration system does not automatically apply claimed duty relief on: (a) 
goods with a declared intrinsic value above EUR 150, (b) commercial consignments declared 
as  gifts  and  (c)  goods  ineligible  for  relief.  Fifteen  Member  States61 replied  that  they  fully 
implement  it  and  10 62  reported  partial  implementation.  Three  Member  States 63  have  not 
implemented it. 

Several Member States provided details in their replies (in summary)64: 

Bulgaria  replied  that no customs declarations are filed electronically for consignments  of  a 
value up to BGN 30. For consignments with an intrinsic value of more than BGN 30 but less 
than EUR 150, a customs declaration is lodged by electronic means. As regards checking for 
potential  abuses  of  relief  from  import  duties  and/or  VAT  on  consignments  of  a  value  not 
exceeding  EUR 150  and  consignments  of  a  value  not  exceeding  EUR 45  sent  from  one 
individual  to  another  and  the  financial  risk  criteria,  there  are  plans  to  create  risk  profiles, 
which  will  be  used  to  check  compliance  with  the  conditions  for  relief  from  customs  duties 
and/or VAT and to monitor other criteria for identifying financial risks. 

Denmark  reported  that  their  Customs  Agency  has  implemented  a  ‘lock’  in  the  system  to 
cause  entries  with  a  value  above  EUR  150  to  fail  if  duty  relief  is  claimed.  Commercial 
consignments declared as gifts will fail unless it is stated to be a C2C shipment. Nothing was 
implemented concerning goods ineligible for relief. 

Germany replied  that there  is  a  mechanism  in  the electronic  customs clearance system that 
gives an indication to the user if the value of goods exceeds EUR 150. On declared gifts, only 
checks based on risk profiles are possible and have been implemented.  

Estonia reported that when the duty relief is claimed on the declaration, the system checks if 
the use of this duty and VAT relief codes are justified. Also, 100% of declarations with low 
value and excise goods with declared low value are directed for checking. 

Ireland  explained  the  procedure  in  their  e-customs  declaration  system  for  consignments  of 
negligible value, for consignments where the customs value is less than EUR 45. Ireland does 
not have a built-in validation function to identify goods ineligible for relief, but a robust risk 
profiling system is in place. 

Greece replied that in the case of goods not eligible for exemption, the electronic system does 
not  automatically  apply  claimed  customs  duty  relief.  In  the  other  two  cases  the  claimed 
customs  duty  relief  is  not  automatically  applied  until  the  special  codes  have  been  filled  in. 

61 Belgium, Czechia, Estonia, Ireland, France, Spain, Cyprus, Latvia, Luxembourg, Hungary, Austria, Portugal, 
Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia. 
62 Bulgaria, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Croatia, Italy, Lithuania, Poland and Sweden. 
63 Malta, the Netherlands and Finland. 
64 For more detailed information please see Section 2, ‘Replies of Member States’. 

13 

 
 
 
                                                           
Greece  notes  that  there  are  inherent  difficulties  in  managing  the  customs  declaration  as 
regards identifying risks. 

Spain reported that intrinsic value is not data included in the customs declarations. Based on 
the customs value, declared risk profiles are applied in order to detect incorrect declarations. 

France  replied  that  for  trade  flows  (B2B  and  B2C)  τhe  French  customs  clearance  system, 
Delta, is programmed to not grant relief from customs duties automatically for goods with a 
declared value lower than EUR 150.  Automated checks have been put in place to ensure that 
relief is granted. An exemption is issued under two conditions. For non-commercial flows, the 
exemption from customs duties and VAT is fixed at EUR 45. The grant of the exemption is 
subject to verification under conditions. 

Croatia:  Customs  declarations  used  for  these  kinds  of  duty  relief  are  controlled  under  risk 
analysis profiles. There is no automatic applying of this duty relief.  However, consignments 
under EUR 22 of value are not declared by a customs declaration.   

Italy  replied  that  the  controls  in  the  national  IT  system  ensured  non-automatically  applied 
relief  to  low  value  shipments  when  the  value  presented  to  customs  exceeds  EUR 150.  The 
identification of ‘gifts’ is not currently detectable as this indication is contained in box 44 in 
the free text subfield. 

Latvia:  The  electronic  customs  data  processing  system  does  not  allow  the  automatic 
application of claimed duty relief on consignments with a value exceeding EUR 150. A risk 
profile has been created to control goods declared as gifts and goods eligible for relief. 

Luxembourg  reported that Customs implemented both declaration processing and risk rules 
in  their  electronic  customs  clearance  system  in  order  to  prevent  the  misuse  of  relief  codes. 
AEOs are not excluded from these rules. Post-clearance controls by the audit unit also cover 
declarations declared under LVCR. 

Cyprus  replied  that  specifications  (as  rules)  were  created  in  the  national  application  to 
prevent these cases from being submitted. 

Hungary: Where the scope of items under Council Regulation (EC) No 1186/2009 setting up 
a Community system of reliefs from customs duty permitted, filters were incorporated into the 
customs data processing system and, in certain cases, systematic risk profiles were generated.   

Malta replied that an upgrade in the Customs electronic system will be requested from their 
service provider to address this recommendation. 

The Netherlands have not implemented this in the system because the customs value is not 
the same as the intrinsic value of a consignment. 

Austria reported that there are procedures in the electronic system that check the submitted 
data  to  rule  out  the  risks  of  submitting  falsified  documents.  When  necessary  these  are 
supported by specific risk profiles. 

Poland  introduced  a  rule  triggering  the  need  for  the  customs  authority  to  check  that  the 
consignment’s value does not exceed EUR 150. Goods declared as gifts are largely declared 
as  postal  consignments.  The  electronic  customs  declaration  is  not  used  in  such  cases.  As 

14 

 
 
 
consignments  of  this  type  also  benefit  from  VAT  relief,  they  are  declared  in  the  form  of  a 
summary  declaration.  If  the  goods  exceed  EUR 150,  the  customs  authority  can  refuse  to 
accept  a  declaration  claiming  duty  relief  or  accept  the  declaration  and  issue  an  assessment 
notice. 

Portugal  replied  that  the  system  for  automatically  processing  import  customs  declarations 
does  not  allow  the  additional  scheme  code  C07  to  be  declared  if  the  value  of  the  declared 
goods is in excess of EUR 150, nor does it allow code C08 to be declared if the value of the 
declared goods is in excess of EUR 45. 

Romania implemented in 2018 a risk profile to impose the verification of the customs values 
declared for all the declarations containing the additional code C07. 

Slovenia  replied  that  their  electronic  customs  declaration  systems  does  not  automatically 
apply claimed duty relief on goods with a value above EUR 150 and on declared gifts or on 
goods ineligible for relief. This is ensured by the risk analysis system and risk profiles. 

Slovakia  reported  that  customs  clearance  is  done  electronically  but  not  all  procedures  for 
postal consignment are fully electronic and automatic.  

Finland has no risk profile on this but is planning to set one up using random sampling. 

Sweden: Low value consignments above SEK 2,500 are re-routed for post-clearance control 
in the system. The ones below SEK 2,500 are automatically cleared. For declared gifts with a 
value above SEK 500, the declaration is re-routed as well.  

15 

 
 
 
 
1.1.3. DETECTION OF POTENTIALLY UNDERVALUED OR INCORRECTLY DECLARED GOODS 

Member  States  were  asked  to  provide  information  on  whether  they  have  ensured  that  their 
electronic  customs  declaration  systems  systematically  detect  potentially  undervalued  or 
incorrectly  declared  goods  under  LVCR  by  means  of  risk  profiles  or  randomly.  Sixteen 
Member  States65 replied  that  they  fully  implement  this  recommendation  and  1166 reported 
partial implementation.  

Several Member States provided details in their replies (in summary)67: 

Bulgaria  replied  that  risk  profiles  have  now  been  established  for  checking  the  declared 
customs  value  of  all  goods  falling  within  Chapters  61,  62,  63  and  64  of  the  Combined 
Nomenclature (CN) of the European Union, and they do not exclude low-value consignments. 

Czechia  noted  that  there  are  specific  risk  profiles  for  certain  high  risky  commodities.  On  a 
global level, it is very difficult to set out a risk profile just for undervaluation, also because of 
the high volume of consignments per year. 

Denmark  reported  that  the  Danish  Customs  Agency  has  implemented  risk  profiles  that 
specifically select entries under the LVCR. 

Estonia: 100% of the parcels with a declared value below EUR 22 are directed for checking. 

Ireland  has  a  significant  number  of  profiles  in  place  to  target  undervalued/incorrectly 
declared  goods.  Large-scale  profiling,  however,  is  subject  to  the  proportionality  test  and 
impact assessment so as to avoid excessive and unnecessary profile hits at customs stations. 

Greece: There are general and specific risk profiles as well as randomness profiles. However, 
lack of data hampers the effectiveness of targeting and controls. 

Spain Risk profiles have been implemented for control in simplified customs declarations in 
low  value  consignments.  194  specific  and  3  random  risk  profiles  are  in  force  since  2019. 
72,400 customs declarations have been controlled thanks to these risk profiles. 

The  French  customs  authorities  have  put  in  place  risk  analysis  and  automated  targeting  of 
these flows, with a view to combating tax fraud. French Customs is in the process of recasting 
its  targeting  IT  tools,  in  particular  the  RMS  application,  with  a  view  to  the  use  of  the  H7 
declaration. 

Croatia replied that no customs declaration is submitted for small-value consignments, under 
EUR 22, and no risk analysis profiles can be applied. 

Cyprus:  The  risk  analysis  on  low  value  goods  is  done  manually  by  customs  officers  who 
select for control goods suspected to be undervalued. About 2% of the consignments that are 
selected for control are found to be undervalued. 

65Denmark,  Germany,  Spain,  France,  Italy,  Lithuania,  Latvia,  Luxembourg,  Hungary,  Malta,  the  Netherlands, 

Austria, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia and Slovakia. 

66 Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechia, Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Croatia, Cyprus, Romania, Finland and Sweden 
67 For more detailed information please see Section 2, ‘Replies of Member States’. 

16 

 
 
 
                                                           
Latvia  replied  that  for  postal  consignments  one  of  the  main  risks  is  undervaluation,  and 
specific  risk  profiles  were  set  up  to  tackle  this.  Risky  companies  and  natural  persons  are 
profiled. 

In  Luxembourg,  any  available  risk  information  on  LVC  is  assessed  and  the  necessary  risk 
profiles are created whenever relevant. 

Hungary: for low-value consignments, more risk profiles have been put in place since mid-
2019. These check the duration of the conditions for customs and tax exemptions and, where 
necessary, systematically signal to the performer of the customs procedure what risk has been 
identified and what measures should be introduced to deal with the risk indicated. Since these 
profiles  have  been  in  effect,  they  have  generated  804  hits,  and  action  was  taken  in  160  of 
those cases.  

Poland:  Data  entered  in  the  declarations  submitted  for  each  consignment  are  sent  from  the 
operations system to the automated risk analysis system. This triggers an automated analysis, 
and if data are identified in the declaration that are risk criteria for the algorithm, a risk profile 
is activated, displaying a message with information on the risk and the scope and method of 
control. 

Romania reported that identification of priorities within a risk area is based on information 
from  bottom-up  signals,  new  EU  legislation  and  available  resources.  The  risk  analyses 
produced are risk profiles, info-risks, alerts etc.  

Slovakia  indicated that the risk profile warning checks all consignments for code C07 (low 
value shipments up to EUR 150) and those for which the code has been applied illegally, are 
regularly  captured,  as  the  value  of  the  goods  on  the  invoice  was  higher  or  the  goods  were 
incorrectly declared. 

Sweden  has  risk  profiles  for  random  selection  of  declarations  in  the  system.  These 
declarations are evaluated and might undergo physical inspections. 

17 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1.4. SPECIFIC CONTROL MEASURES TO PREVENT ARTIFICIAL SPLITTING OF CONSIGNMENTS 

Member States were asked to report whether there are any specific control measures in place 
to prevent artificial splitting of consignments with the aim of benefiting from duty relief. Nine 
Member  States68 replied  that  they  fully  implement  this  recommendation  and  1369 reported 
partial implementation. Five Member States70 have not implemented it. 

Several Member States provided details in their replies (in summary)71:  

Bulgaria  and  Czechia  replied  that  even  though  it  is  difficult  to  automate  the  process  for 
screening consignments for artificial splitting with a view to benefiting from relief from duty, 
both are preparing measures and guidance in this matter for the future. 

of 

the 

37(4) 

to  Article 

Estonia  According 
Estonian  Customs  Act 
(https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/521012014009/consolide),  the  customs  authorities  may 
refuse to accept separate customs declarations for parts of a consignment upon import if the 
value of a declared part of the consignment does not exceed the tax exempt limit. For express 
consignments with a commercial purpose, the customs official checks manually if there is one 
single  consignor,  consignee  and  shipment  document.  For  postal  and  express  consignments 
declared by individuals, the system automatically checks the tracking number and if the same 
number has already been used it cannot be used again. 

Spain also indicated that risk profiles are in force but splitting is very difficult to detect.  

Croatia:  In  case  of  doubt,  customs  officers  check  internet  orders  to  control  if  certain 
consignments are distributed deliberately for applying a duty relief. 

Italy  is planning to set up guidelines focused on the prevention for the  artificial splitting of 
consignments. 

Cyprus:  During  manual  check  of  manifest  report,  customs  officers  are  trying  to  detect 
shipments  that  may  concern  the  same  consignment.  Such  cases  have  very  rarely  been 
identified. 

In Latvia, cases of artificial splitting are identified in the post-clearance process. 

Hungary:  Taking  into  account  the  findings  of  the  judgment  in  case  C-7/08  Har  Vaessen 
Douane  Service  BV  v  Staatssecretaris  van  Financien),  the  customs  data  processing  system 
does  not  permit  preventive  customs  clearance  in  customs  procedures  requested  under 
procedure 4000-C07.  

The Netherlands has developed and implemented a monitoring tool. 

68 Germany, Estonia, Greece, Latvia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Slovakia and Sweden. 
69  Bulgaria, Ireland, Spain, Croatia, Italy, Cyprus, Hungary, Poland, Lithuania, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia and 

Finland. 

70 Belgium, Czechia, Denmark, France and Malta. 
71 For more detailed information please see Section 2, ‘Replies of Member States’. 

18 

 
 
 
                                                           
Poland:  In  the  system  handling  import  declarations,  the  declaration  of  exemption  from 
customs duties of consignments up to a value equivalent to EUR 150 is flagged up so that the 
system operator  checks that the value of the consignment does not exceed the equivalent of 
EUR 150.  If  the  goods  are  found  to  exceed  the  equivalent  of  EUR 150,  taking  into  account 
cases of artificial splitting, the customs authority can refuse to accept a declaration claiming 
duty relief (code C07) or accept the declaration and issue an assessment notice. 

Portugal  replied  that  measures  to  enable  the  potential  identification  of  split  consignments 
carried on different means of transport or under the cover of different transport documents are 
being  examined  for  implementation.  They  are  based  on  the  analysis  of  the  frequency 
associated with an operator and other data in the declaration. Such measures are likely to be 
introduced from next year (2021).  

Romania: The General Directorate of Customs of the Ministry of Public Finances’ National 
Agency  for  Fiscal  Administration  reported  that  the  identification  of  priorities  within  a  risk 
area is based on information from bottom-up signals, new legislation and available resources.  
For that purpose the risk analyses products used are risk profiles, Inforisks, alerts, etc. Those 
risk analysis products are mostly focused on LVCR, IPR etc. At the same time, the constant 
guidance  provided  to  the  customs  officers  by  the  headquarters  specialised  staff  had  in  view 
this  specific  aspect  of  the  possibility  of  fraudulent  acts    by  means  of  splitting  the 
consignments, aiming to benefit from duty relief. 

Slovenia  replied  that  the  prevention  of  artificial  splitting  of  consignments  is  ensured  by 
means of risk profiles and risk analyses. 

Slovakia:  Consignments  submitted  are  inspected  by  customs  officers  daily.  For  targeting 
consignments,  customs  officers  check  the  consignor’s  country,  repeating  consignee,  shape 
and size of consignment. 

Finland replied that Customs have included one post-release audit in the control plan 2020 of 
express couriers, where they will examine also the splitting of consignments. 

Sweden  reported  that  artificial  splitting  is  most  common  on  exit  declarations  for  customs 
warehousing.  To  prevent  this,  the  customs  clearance  system  for  import  does  not  accept  the 
combination of procedure code 4071 with C07. 

19 

 
 
 
 
 
1.1.5. ENSURING  THAT  EX  POST  CONTROLS 

INCLUDE  VERIFICATIONS  OF  TRADERS’ 

COMPLIANCE ON LOW VALUE CONSIGNMENTS RELIEF 

Member  States  were  asked  to  provide  information  on  whether  they  ensured  that  ex  post 
controls include verifications  on traders’ compliance  with  customs duty relief for low-value 
consignments.  Fourteen  Member  States 72  replied 
this 
recommendation  and  1173 reported  partial  implementation.  Two  Member  States74 have  not 
implemented it. 

they  fully 

implement 

that 

Several Member States provided details in their replies (in summary)75:  

In Belgium, ex post controls carried out are either the Court’s Audit Policies and Standards 
(CAPs) or audits requested via proposals made by the risk management.  

In  Bulgaria,  checks  on  low-value  goods  cover  potential  risks  such  as  (i)  the  splitting  of 
consignments  into  smaller  consignments  for  the  purpose  of  evading  import  duties,  (ii)  the 
relief  from  import  duties  of  goods  contained  in  consignments  with  an  intrinsic  value 
exceeding  the  BGN  equivalent  of  €  150,  (iii)  incorrect  tariff  classification  and/or  incorrect 
declaration of the origin of imported goods for the purpose of circumventing various import 
measures  resulting  from  EU  policies,  and  (iv)  invoices  presented  to  the  customs  authorities 
when  releasing  low-value  goods  for  free  circulation  that  contain  data  diverging  from  those 
recorded  in  the  company’s  accounts,  e.g.  quantity,    description  of  the  goods,  invoice  value, 
etc. 

Czechia:  Taking  into  account  that  consignees  are  mainly  physical  persons  that  have  no 
obligation  under  Czech  law  to  retain  any  evidence  (invoices,  etc.)  it  would  be  extremely 
difficult to prove a breach after the release of goods. 

In Ireland, within their electronic ‘Customs, Risk Intervention, Selection’ programme, there 
are categories of risk rules within which the risks surrounding LVC are covered. 

Greece  replied  that  the  recommendation  is  applied  in  full  where  an  import  document 
(declaration)  is  presented  on  the  basis  of  a  local  risk  analysis,  whereas  in  cases  where  an 
‘oral’  import  declaration  (non-statistical  SAD)  is  presented  the  recommendation  is  partially 
implemented. 

In  France,  national  and  local  services  rely  on  the  expertise  of  the  National  Directorate  for 
Customs  Investigations  and  Intelligence  to understand  and block fraud patterns with a view 
also  to  establish  monitoring  methods  and  a  suitable  inspection  policy.  The  main  purpose  of 
the surveys is to detect and sanction sub-assessments of value (from the first euro for VAT in 
the case of mail-order sales, and from EUR 150 onwards for customs duties). 

72 Germany,  Ireland,  Spain,  France,  Italy,  Cyprus,  Lithuania,  Latvia,  Luxembourg,  Malta,  Austria  Romania, 

Slovenia and Slovakia. 

73   Belgium,  Bulgaria,  Czechia,  Estonia,  Greece,  Hungary,  the  Netherlands,  Poland,  Portugal,  Finland  and 

Sweden. 

74 Denmark and Croatia. 
75 For more detailed information please see Section 2, ‘Replies of Member States’. 

20 

 
 
 
                                                           
Italy:  Specific  indications  issued  in  2017  in  which,  among  other  things,  the  selection  of 
operators for PCA involves also who imports goods at risk of under-invoicing. In addition, the 
SIDDA  IT  procedure  carried  out  a  periodic  detection  of  the  anomalous  values  of  certain 
parameters of customs declarations. 

Cyprus:  A  big  case  of  undervaluation  was  detected  concerning  the  import  of  electronic 
cigarettes from China. 

Latvia replied that it is not common practice to carry out post-clearance checks on LVC since 
the benefits are disproportionate to the amount of recovered duties. Controls for small-value 
shipments are carried out during customs clearance. 

Hungary: Since post-release controls are imposed in the light of a preliminary risk analysis, 
low-value consignments regularly arriving in large numbers are examined as part of targeted 
inspections  above  and  beyond  the  inspection  plan,  in  cooperation  with  the  risk  analysis 
department. 

The Netherlands has post-clearance audits at a number of companies. 

Poland  replied  that  operators  holding  customs  exemptions  for  low-value  consignments  are 
therefore subject to the general rules of Union and national law governing the classification of 
operators  for  customs  and  tax  control  purposes.  The  department  of  the  National  Revenue 
Administration checking postal consignments introduced into the EU customs territory carries 
out the measures laid down in Chapter 3 of Title V of the Implementing Regulation and the 
controls provided for in Article 48 of the Union Customs Code. 

Portugal reported that all economic operators are considered at the risk assessment stage with 
a view to selection for ex post controls. However, so far, no operators exhibiting potential risk 
characteristics  leading  to  selection  for  ex  post  controls  have  been  identified  with  regard  to 
relief linked to low-value consignments. 

Romania: The General Directorate of Customs of the Ministry of Public Finances’ National 
Agency for Fiscal Administration reported that all territorial structures are obliged to include 
in  the  quarterly  programmes  of  post-clearance  controls  the  customs  declarations  that  raise 
suspicions regarding the way of establishing the customs value. 

Slovenia  reported  that  the  approach  for  selecting  traders  for  ex  post  controls  takes  into 
account the frequency of parcel imports for particular consignor and/or consignee, the value 
of goods (low value) and the description/nature of goods. 

Slovakia reported that the national post-release control plan for 2020 contains a specific focus 
on post-release checks on low-value shipments.  

Finland  reported  that  in  2020  they  have  one  post-release  audit  of  express  couriers  where 
Finnish Customs will control the courier’s compliance with the LVCR. 

Swedish  Customs  reported,  among  others,  that  it  is  working  to  correct  declarations  where 
procedure code C07 has been misused and to charge due duties to the declarant. 

21 

 
 
 
 
1.1.6. AUTHORISED ECONOMIC OPERATORS (AEOS)  

Member  States  were  asked  to  provide  information  on  whether  AEOs  are  excluded  from 
compliance checks with customs duty relief for low-value consignments. As with last year’s 
follow-up, the majority of the Member States76 has implemented this recommendation in full. 
Two Member States77 have not implemented it.  

76  Bulgaria,  Czechia,  Germany,  Denmark,  Estonia,  Ireland,  Greece,  Spain,  France,  Croatia,  Italy,  Cyprus, 
Lithuania,  Latvia,  Luxembourg,  Hungary,  Malta,  the  Netherlands,  Austria,  Poland,  Portugal,  Romania, 
Slovenia, Finland and Sweden. 

77 Belgium and Slovakia. 

22 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
 
1.2. 

EXPENDITURE 

This section summarises the Member States’ replies. The Commission provided the following 
questionnaire to the Member States on the second recommendation: 

Questionnaire: 

1. 

National Anti-Fraud Strategies (NAFS) 

Q.2.1  Have  you  adopted  or  updated  a  national  anti-fraud  strategy,  which  you  have 
communicated to the European Commission/OLAF? 

Q.2.1.a. If yes, have you developed this strategy in cooperation with all bodies and authorities 
which  have  a  specific  role  and  expertise  in  the  protection  of  the  EU  financial  interests, 
including law enforcement and prosecution services? 

Q.2.1.b. Has your national AFS taken into account the risk analysis conclusions contained in 
the 2018, 2017 and 2016 PIF reports? 

Q.2.1.c  Has  your  national  AFS  taken  into  account  the  need  to  structure  the  coordination 
between administrative and criminal checks and investigations? 

Q.2.1.d. Did you make any assessment of the impact of the NAFS on the fight against fraud 
affecting the EU’s financial interests? 

2. 

Risk Analysis 

Q.2.2.a Has risk analysis been strengthened to detect irregularities and fraud, including the 
use of IT tools (such as ARACHNE)? 

Q.2.2.b. Can you share any results deriving from the use of findings from PIF reports in your 
fraud risk assessments? 

Q.2.2.c Have you further exploited the potential of risk analysis, tailoring the approach to the 
different types of expenditure? 

Horizontal Issues 

3. 
Q.2.3.a.  Have  you  facilitated  and  assessed  the  spontaneous  reporting  of  irregularities  and 
strengthened the protection of whistle-blowers who are also a crucial source for investigative 
journalism? 

Q.2.3.b  Have  you  promoted  systematic  and  timely  cooperation  between  judicial  and 
administrative authorities? 

The tables below show the overall results by question and Member State: 

23 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24 

 
 
 
 
 
1.2.1. NATIONAL ANTI-FRAUD STRATEGIES 

The Member States were recommended to adopt national anti-fraud strategies (NAFS). These 
strategies  should  be  developed  in  cooperation  with  all  bodies  and  authorities  which  have  a 
specific  expertise  and  role  in  the  protection  of  the  EU’s  financial  interests.  Moreover,  the 
strategies should take into account the risk analysis conclusions in the PIF report and the need 
to structure the coordination between administrative and criminal checks and investigations. 
The Member States were asked to share any results of the impact of their NAFS. 

Ten  Member  States  reported  that  they  have  adopted  or  updated  a  NAFS  which  they  have 
communicated to the Commission (OLAF)78. 17 Member States have not adopted a NAFS79, 
4 are  considering  adopting  one  or  are  preparing  a  new  NAFS  not  yet  communicated  to  the 
Commission (OLAF)80.  

Nine  Member  States  have  fully  developed  their  NAFS  in  cooperation  with  all  bodies  and 
authorities  that  have  expertise  in  the  area  of  the  protection  of  the  EU’s  financial  interests, 
including  law  enforcement  and  prosecution  services 81.  Three  Member  States  have  partly 
implemented this82, 1 has not implemented it83 and the recommendation was not applicable to 
the 14 remaining Member States84. 

Seven  Member  States  developed  their  NAFS  fully  taking  into  account  the  risk  analysis 
conclusions  contained  in  the  2018,  2017  and  2016  PIF  reports 85 .  Five  Member  States 
implemented this partially86 whereas 2 have not implemented it87. This recommendation was 
not applicable to the 13 remaining Member States88. 

Eight Member States have developed a NAFS fully taking into account the need to structure 
the  coordination  between  administrative  and  criminal  checks  and  investigations89,  5  have 

78 Bulgaria, Czechia, Greece, France, Italy, Latvia, Hungary, Malta, Austria and Slovakia. 
79 Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Ireland, Spain, Croatia, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Lithuania, Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Finland, Sweden. 
80 Belgium, Spain, the Netherlands, Romania. 
81 Bulgaria, Czechia, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Hungary, Malta, Romania and Slovakia. 
82 France, the Netherlands, Sweden 
83 Austria. 
84 Belgium,  Denmark,  Germany,  Estonia,  Ireland,  Spain,  Croatia,  Cyprus,  Lithuania,  Luxembourg,  Poland, 
Portugal, Slovenia, Finland. 
85 Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Hungary, Malta, Austria and Romania. 
86 Czechia, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia and Sweden. 
87 Austria and Malta. 
88 Belgium,  Denmark,  Germany,  Estonia,  Ireland,  Spain,  Croatia,  Cyprus,  Lithuania,  Luxembourg,  Poland, 
Sweden and Finland. 
89 Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Hungary, Malta, Austria and Romania. 

25 

 
 
 
                                                           
implemented  this  partially90 and  1  did  not  implement  it91.  This  recommendation  was  not 
applicable to the 13 remaining Member States92. 

Five Member States made an assessment of the impact of the NAFS on the fight against fraud 
affecting  the  EU’s  financial  interests 93  and  9  did  not 94 .This  recommendation  was  not 
applicable to the 13 remaining Member States95. 

Below are the Member States’ replies (in summary)96.  

Belgium  reported  that  their  NAFS  is  under  preparation.  It  should  be  adopted  by  the  end  of 
2020. 

Bulgaria’s NAFS  was  adopted and  communicated to  the Commission/OLAF.  It  was  drawn 
up with the cooperation of all bodies involved in the management and control of EU funds, 
including the Public Prosecutor’s Office. It takes account of all European Union strategic and 
regulatory  documents  predating  its  adoption  in  2014,  including  the  PIF  reports.  In  2019 
Bulgaria launched  the process  of  drafting a national strategy  for 2021-2027.  In  2020 all the 
national  authorities  involved  in  the  management  and  control  of  EU  funds  will  continue 
working  actively  on  the  draft  NAFS  for  2021-2027.  The  new  NAFS  will  be  based  in 
particular on risk analysis and will include the implementation of the recommendations of the 
Commission and the ECA, including the recommendations of the PIF reports. 

Czechia has adopted a national strategy approved in Government Resolution No 535 dated 14 
May 2008. In February 2020, an approval procedure for a second amendment was launched 
which reflects the developments in relevant legal acts as well as the recommendations of the 
ECA  Special  Report  6/2019.  The  national  strategy  has  been  drafted  in  consultation  with  all 
relevant bodies and authorities. To improve the effectiveness of cooperation in detecting and 
prosecuting  irregularities  and  to  define  the  framework  for  cooperation  in  reporting  of 
irregularities concerning specific EU funds,  agreements on the provision  of information and 
cooperation were signed between the Central Contact Point (CCP) of AFCOS and the relevant 
ministries. Training by  AFCOS is provided twice a  year to relevant ministries to keep them 
updated with the latest developments in the PIF area. 

Greece  adopted  a  sectoral  NAFS  for  cohesion  policy  accompanied  by  an  action  plan, 
submitted to OLAF on 5 May 2014 and updated in 2017. The Secretariat-General for Public 
Investments  and  the  NSRF,  the  Financial  Audit  Committee  (EDEL),  the  Financial  Crime 

90 Czechia, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia and Sweden. 
91 France. 
92 Belgium,  Denmark,  Germany,  Estonia,  Ireland,  Spain,  Croatia,  Cyprus,  Lithuania,  Luxembourg,  Poland, 

Slovenia and Finland. 

93 France, Italy, Latvia, Austria and Romania. 
94 Bulgaria, Czechia, Greece, Hungary, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia and Sweden. 
95 Belgium,  Denmark,  Germany,  Estonia,  Ireland,  Spain,  Croatia,  Cyprus,  Lithuania,  Luxembourg,  Poland, 

Slovenia and Finland. 

96 For more detailed information please see Section 2, ‘Replies of Member States’. 

26 

 
 
 
                                                           
Squad  (SDOE),  the  National  Anti-Corruption  Coordinator  and  the  General  Inspector  for 
Public Administration collaboratively developed the strategy and prepared the action plan up 
until the designation of the AFCOS, through constructive meetings and by providing texts and 
data.    AFCOS  is  the  link  between  the  administrative  authorities  in  the  management  and 
control  system  of  the  OPs  of  the  NSRF  2014-2020  (CEPOL  Objective)  and  the  competent 
national  authorities  and  bodies  responsible  for  carrying  out  checks,  but  also  for  law 
enforcement and prosecution. The role of AFCOS in structural actions is provided for in the 
relevant  institutional  framework  and  is  set  out  in  detail  with  specific  steps  in  the  relevant 
procedures (and corresponding flow charts) of the MCS. 

Spain: In 2019, the Advisory Council for the prevention and fight against fraud affecting the 
financial interests of the European Union created a Commission for the creation and follow-
up  of  a  National  Antifraud  Strategy  in  the  field  of  the  financial  interests  of  the  EU. 
Coordination of the NAFS is carried out by AFCOS (which holds its Secretariat), the General 
Public  Prosecutor’s  Office,  the  National  Police  and  Guardia  Civil,  all  the  managing 
authorities for Structural Funds, the Central Paying and Coordination Agency for agricultural 
funds, the Audit Authority, the Tax Agency, the Office for Asset Recovery, the State Treasury 
(Anti-money Laundering authority) and representatives of regional and local entities. 

France’s NAFS has not been developed involving the police and the prosecution service. The 
AFCOS has no investigative powers, and it did not consider that it was entitled to develop this 
strategy  in  coordination  with  the  judicial  and  administrative  authorities.  However,  any 
revision  of  the  strategy  will  be  developed  in  conjunction  with  the  police  and  the  judicial 
prosecutor’s office. An impact of the NAFS to be shared is that the organisations that manage 
EU funds have better knowledge of the type of controls they need to prevent fraud. 

Croatia  has  adopted  two  anti-fraud  strategies  so  far.  One  covered  2010-2012  and  the  other 
2014-2016, and both strategies were fully implemented. However, no new anti-fraud strategy 
has been  adopted because of significant lack of  human resources  at the  AFCOS  service. At 
the same time, the AFCOS service has been faced with a constant rise in workload. 

Italy  gave  an  example  of  the  impact  of  their  NAFS  for  the  programmes  managed  by  the 
Agency for Territorial Cohesion: a fraud risk assessment team was established in the agency, 
which contributed to the formal adoption of risk assessment tools. 

Latvia’s first NAFS for 2017-2019 was adopted on January 16, 2017. The AFCOS started to 
work on new NAFS covering the period from 2020-2022. It is expected to be adopted in the 
first  half  of  2020  and  afterwards  communicated  to  OLAF.  The  AFCOS  Council  has  been 
involved  in  drafting  the  NAFS,  and  it  involved  institutions  including  law  enforcement  and 
prosecution  services.  Concerning  the  impact  of  the  NAFS,  Latvia  presented  the  campaign 
#FraudOff! To better understand the focus themes, AFCOS carries out a yearly study asking 
for  public  opinion  on  the  level  of  fraud.  According  to  a  study  carried  out  at  beginning  of 
2019, overall confidence in the public administration in the prevention of fraud and corruption 
is very low, but compared to previous years, this indicator has increased (2017 -9%, 2018 -
11%, 2019 -13%). 

27 

 
 
 
The  preparation  of  a  NAFS  in  Luxembourg  is  in  progress.  There  is  ongoing  cooperation 
between  national  stakeholders  and  the  competent  Commission  services.  In  addition,  several 
managing  authorities  have  already  implemented  internal  policies  describing  the  steps  to 
follow  in  case  of  fraud  detection.  In  cases  of  suspected  fraud  followed  by  an  investigation, 
AFCOS is kept  informed on  the  exchanges the  managing authority  has  with OLAF  and the 
Public Prosecutor’s Office. 

Hungary has had an anti-fraud strategy since 15 June 2015, which has been communicated to 
OLAF. The strategy was drawn up by the Prime Minister’s Office, responsible for the use of 
EU funds that time, in collaboration with participants in the network of institutions involved 
in performing tasks related to development policy. 

The  Maltese  NAFS  tabled  in  Parliament  in  2008  was  also  communicated  to  the 
Commission/OLAF. The strategy is currently in the process of being updated as necessary. 

In Romania, a draft of the NAFS for the current PP was prepared, but it was not adopted in 
the reference period.  The Romanian  AFCOS is in the process of evaluating the  updating of 
the draft strategy for the next programming period 2021-2027. 

Slovakia:  The  Slovak  NAFS  was  signed  by  the  Head  of  the  Government  Office  on  4  June 
2019.  The  major  novelty  introduced  in  this  updated  NAFS  is  the  new  tasks  for  2019-2020 
defined in the action plan, which forms one of the Slovak NAFS’ annexes. In addition, some 
of  the  tasks  from  the  previous  action  plan  have  been  moved  to  the  main  text  of  the  Slovak 
NAFS  as  permanent  tasks.  The  updated  NAFS  was  sent  to  OLAF  in  December  2019.  The 
NAFS  was  approved  by  a  network  of  21  partners  representing  the  General  Prosecutor’s 
Office, the National Criminal Agency and the Ministry of Justice. The NAFS and the action 
plan contain various tasks on improving the coordination between administrative and criminal 
authorities. One of these is to set up a network of liaison officers at the level of the AFCOS 
network  partners  (these  partners  also  include  representatives  of  individual  managing 
authorities, the General Prosecutor’s Office, the  National Criminal Agency and the Ministry 
of Justice) to enhance the effectiveness of operational cooperation in the area of protection of 
EU’s financial interests in Slovakia. 

Sweden  reported  that  they  have  different,  individual  anti-fraud  strategies  for  all  authorities 
managing  EU  funds  and  to  compile  these  strategies  into  one  would  not  provide  any  added 
value. 

28 

 
 
 
 
 
1.2.2. RISK ANALYSIS 

THE USE OF IT TOOLS 

The  Member  States  were  asked  to  provide  information  on  whether  risk  analysis  has  been 
strengthened to detect irregularities and fraud, including using IT tools such as ARACHNE.  
16  Member  States  have  fully  implemented  this  recommendation 97 ,  10  have  partly 
implemented it98 and 1 has not provided information99.  

Below are the Member States’ replies (in summary)100:  

In Belgium, the MA of Wallonia ERDF Programme still uses ARACHNE, and the Brussels 
ERDF  MA  has  boosted  its  control  of  the  result  indicators  provided  by  the  coordinators  of 
financed projects by implementing a new systematic control procedure. 

Bulgaria  reported  that the  MA of operational programmes financed by  EU structural funds 
regulate  access  to  ARACHNE  through  administrative  orders  specifying  the  names  and 
positions of those with access to ARACHNE. Bulgaria provided detailed information of the 
use of ARACHNE set out in the following chapters of the manuals of the MA for individual 
programmes: 1. the chapter on risk management and the related risk control, 2. the chapter on 
financial  management,  3.  the  chapter  describing  the  steps  for  providing  grants,  and  4.  the 
chapter on irregularities. 

Czechia  set  up  a  risk  management  system  at  the  level  of  operational  programmes,  which 
consists of systematic identification, evaluation, management and reporting of all significant 
risks, within which due attention is paid to the identification and management of fraud risk. 
The MA has established the Register of Fraud Indicators and the Register of Complaints from 
Information Systems. Data from both records are entered through the set of risk factors into 
the interim risk analysis on projects. The interim risk analysis on the projects from which the 
control plans are generated is carried out on the basis of risk factors (e.g. risk factor Presence 
on the list of the 10 most risky projects in Arachne, Presence of the applicant on the list of 
risk  entities  and  the  state  of  affairs,  increased  risk  of  fraud).  Information  on  detected  fraud 
indicators is shared across the MA’s departments, which leads to general awareness and gives 
individual employees experience of fraud indicators and their search. Furthermore, in the MA 
self-assessment  process,  all  representatives  of  departments  at  the  level  of  directors  are 
acquainted with all cases of detected fraud indicators during the reporting period. At present, 
data mining from Arachne as part of administrative check is being tested. 

The  Danish  Business  Authority  carries  out  data  analysis,  including  cross-analysis  and  risk-
based sampling in each reporting period for all projects. In autumn 2014, the MA carried out 

97 Bulgaria,  Czechia,  Germany,  Greece,  Croatia,  Italy,  Latvia,  Luxembourg,  Hungary,  Malta,  the  Netherlands, 
Austria, Poland, Portugal, Romania and Slovakia. 
98 Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, Spain, France, Cyprus, Slovenia, Finland and Sweden. 
99 Lithuania. 
100 For more detailed information please see Section 2, ‘Replies of Member States’. 

29 

 
 
 
                                                           
an initial test of Arachne, but has reservations about to compliance with data protection rules 
when  using  the  tool.  The  Agricultural  Agency  obtained  external  expertise  from  Deloitte  to 
expand  and  structure  their  risk  profile  with  regard  to  project  support  (NON-AIACS).  With 
regard  to  ARACHNE,  the  agency  continuously  monitors  and  evaluates  the  experience  of 
other authorities and Member States with the tool. 

In Ireland, further steps were taken in 2019 by the ERDF Managing Authorities to implement 
ARACHNE. This included the first batch imports of live ERDF data from the Irish eCohesion 
system to ARACHNE and training for the ERDF managing authority and certifying authority 
staff.  This  was  provided  by  the  Commission’s  ARACHNE  team  in  May  2019  and  led  to 
further  development  work  by  the  managing  authorities  to  align  eCohesion  reports  with  the 
ARACHNE system requirements.  

Greece makes use of the following tools: 1) the Integrated Information System (IIS), which is 
the  central  management  tool  and  the  means  of  electronic  data  exchange  among  all  the 
authorities/bodies  involved;  2)  the  State  Aid  Management  Information  System  (PSKE)  and 
the State Aid Cumulating System (SACS); 3) The Irregularities Management System (IMS) 
and  4)  the  Commission’s  Fraud  Risk  Assessment  Tool  (developed  by  DG  REGIO).  Greece 
provided a description on how risk analysis is conducted, and on the reporting of irregularities 
via  IMS.  The  Directorate  for  Financial  Control,  Audit  and  Cooperatives  selects  the 
undertakings to be audited as part of the annual audit programme by applying a risk analysis 
methodology. The managing authority of the Fisheries and Maritime OP has taken measures 
which  are  recorded  in  the  Fraud  Risk  Assessment  Tool  concerning  the  detection  of 
irregularities, and the relevant OLAF Guidelines are also implemented. 

Italy has established a Fraud Risk Assessment Task Force and a Checks Quality Review Task 
Force in addition to implementing ARACHNE. 

Cyprus  replied  that  among  other  factors,  their  risk  analysis  process  takes  into  account  the 
results  of  previous  years’  verifications  and  on-the-spot  checks,  the  frequency  of  the  errors 
identified  in  each  project,  the  nature  of  the  projects,  nature  of  beneficiaries  and  type  of 
expenditure.  This  information  is  consolidated  at  fund  level  and  is  taken  into  account  at  the 
sampling process. Therefore, high-risk areas are more likely to be selected for verifications or 
on-the-spot checks. Additionally, the ‘Summary of Errors’ (SoE), which is annually submitted 
to the EC through  the submission of the accounts, is used  to  document  all  the irregularities 
identified  through  several  verifications,  including  cases  which  may  be  excluded  from 
reporting because these have been detected before the submission of the payment claim. The 
SoE of previous  year  is taken into  account in order to determine  the verification strategy in 
the next year. Further to the above, a new development is the access to the electronic platform 
of  the  Department  of  Registrar  of  Companies  and  Official  Receiver  has  been  provided  to 
authorised  officers  of  the  Verifications  and  Certification  Directorate,  through  which 
companies’ information can been identified. This tool allows authorised users to identify any 
relationships  between  corporate  beneficiaries  and/or  its  representatives  (e.g.  Directors)  and 
shareholders,  which  can  be  used  to  assess  whether  there  is  any  potential  conflict  of  interest 
when awarding contracts to beneficiaries funded by ESIF funds. 

30 

 
 
 
In  Latvia,  the  Ministry  of  Finance,  MA  for  Structural  Funds,  makes  use  of  ARACHNE 
among other available databases. The Ministry of Agriculture’s Rural Support Service uses its 
IT system tools  including  a list  of  risk  clients, links to other  external systems, area satellite 
imagery and atypical case studies. 

Hungary has installed ARACHNE in every MA. How actively Arachne is used depends on 
the  group  of  beneficiaries  a  MA  has.  MAs  which  typically  cooperate  with  the  budgetary 
institutions  do  not  use  ARACHNE,  as  the  FAIR  EUPR  fraud  prevention  functionality 
provides  them  with  sufficient  information.  This  special  functionality  was  developed  in  the 
section  of  the  Hungarian  Development  Policy  Database  and  Information  System  (FAIR) 
dealing  with  Union  support.  Its  aim  is  to  prevent  fraud  and  abuses  and  detect  it  early  (the 
‘fraud prevention functionality’). The functionality is being constantly improved in the light 
of emerging needs: in 2018, it was expanded with a question about indicators. According to 
the  model  protocol  for  irregularity  procedures  issued  by  the  Coordination  Body,  cases  of 
irregularities  registered  as  suspected  fraud  must  be  recorded  separately,  so  they  can  also  be 
filtered using the FAIR EUPR irregularity module. 

The  Netherlands  reported  that  after  several  pilot  projects  in  previous  years  on  the  use  of 
ARACHNE,  this  year  ARACHNE  is  fully  operational.  To  this  end,  project  data  was 
exchanged with ARACHNE. This has not led to detection of fraud. 

In Poland, as regards cohesion policy, successive measures have been taken to reinforce risk 
analysis aimed  at  detecting different  kinds of irregularities and fraud. This is done  using  IT 
tools  that  simplify  work  and  step  up  action  in  the  selected  fields.  A  ‘Cross  Checks’  IT 
application  is  being  developed  for  the  purpose  of  identifying  cases  of  double  financing  of 
expenditure incurred by beneficiaries implementing projects co-financed by Union funds. 

Portugal’s Inspectorate-General for Finance - Audit Authority (IGF - AA) uses ARACHNE, 
which  has  been  instrumental  in  getting  the  other  national  authorities  to  start  ‘feeding’  and 
using it. 

Romania provided examples from various authorities. For instance, the Ministry of European 
Funds often detects irregularities and in some instances fraud as a direct consequence of using 
ARACHNE together with other internal methods of verification and control. 

In Slovenia, ARACHNE is mainly used for development and cohesion policy. However, it is 
used  in  combination  with  information  provided  in  different  national  computer  applications 
(for  example  as  provided  by  the  Commission  for  the  Prevention  of  Corruption  called  Erar, 
application  Gwin,  application e-credit).  Also, the MAs use  risk analysis for selection of the 
projects to be checked on the spot. ARACHNE is not always the best tool for the Slovenian 
situation (ARACHNE is very useful tool when dealing with a non-Slovenian provider).  

MAs use risk analysis also for selection of the projects to be checked (by MA and IB) on the 
spot.   

31 

 
 
 
Slovakia  reported  that  the  Ministry  of  Environment,  the  Ministry  of  Agriculture  and  Rural 
Development,  the  Ministry  of  Education,  Science,  Research  and  Sport,  the  Ministry  of 
Interior  and  the  Antimonopoly  Office  are  making  full  use  of  the  ARACHNE  tool,  in 
combination  with  other  useful  IT  tools  for  the  detection  of  irregularities.  The  Ministry  of 
Education  provided  an  example.  The  irregularities  recorded  under  OP  II  (Operational 
Programme  research  &  innovation)  were  identified  based  on  media  coverage  of  calls  for 
applications for a non-repayable financial contribution to support and irregularities resulting 
from the investigation of the National Criminal Agency.  The case is being prosecuted for the 
offence of damaging the EU’s financial interests in parallel with the crime of machinations in 
public procurement and public auctions.  

32 

 
 
 
 
 
THE USE OF PIF REPORTS’ FINDINGS IN FRAUD RISK ASSESSMENTS 

The Member States were asked to share any results deriving from the use of the PIF Reports’ 
findings in their fraud risk assessments.  16 Member States shared their results101, and 9 did 
not have any results to report102. One Member State has not provided information.103 

Below are the Member States’ replies (in summary)104:  

Belgium’s  ERDF  Wallonia  reported  (a)  the  signing  by  the  beneficiaries  of  a  declaration  of 
absence of conflicts of interest in public procurement contracts and (b) the continuous use of 
the ARACHNE tool. 

Bulgaria:  In  2019,  the  Ministry  of  the  Interior’s  AFCOS  Directorate  carried  out 
administrative checks on the reporting and management of reports of fraud and irregularities 
at  the  State  Fund  for  Agriculture.  The  inspections  resulted  in  reports  in  which,  following 
analysis  of  the  problem  areas  identified,  the  AFCOS  Directorate  made  recommendations 
aiming to make the fight against irregularities and fraud affecting the EU’s financial interests 
more  effective.  For  its  part,  the  State  Fund  for  Agriculture  has  taken  the  steps  necessary  to 
implement the recommendations made by the AFCOS Directorate. 

Czechia:  In  the  checklists  for  on-the-spot  checks,  the  MA  has  added  questions  about 
ARACHNE  concerning  public  procurements  and  contracts  or  concerning  eligibility  and 
efficiency of  expenditures.  In 2019,  the  MA’s  self-assessment  and the  regular  evaluation of 
the implementation of measures of the strategy for combating fraud and corruption within the 
drawing  of  funds  of  the  common  strategic  framework  in  2014-2020  were  carried  out.  The 
internal anti-corruption programme for 2018-2020 was updated in 2018. Cooperation with the 
police  in  the  case  of  fraud  has  been  gradually  intensified  by  written,  electronic  or  phone 
communication. A special department was created for communication with the Czech Police.  

Estonia reported improved risk analyses in order to find cumulative supports to the same land 
cadastres despite different applicants, with the goal of finding artificially created applicants in 
the area of rural development. 

Greece:  The  Directorate  for  Financial  Control,  Audit  and  Cooperatives  of  the  Ministry  of 
Rural  Development  and  Food  shared  two  results:  (a)  scoring  and  mapping  as  many  risk 
parameters  as  possible,  in  order  to  see  that  the  selection  of  undertakings  best  ensures  the 
effectiveness  of  measures  to  prevent  and  detect  irregularities;  (b)  ensuring  the  quality  of  ex 
post  checks  and  cross-checks  of  the  commercial  documents  of  those  entities  receiving  or 
making payments and directly or indirectly related to the system of financing by the EAGF, or 

101  Belgium,  Bulgaria,  Czechia,  Germany,  Estonia,  Greece,  Croatia,  Italy,  Cyprus,  Latvia,  Luxembourg, 
Hungary, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia and Slovakia. 
102 Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Austria, Romania, Finland and Sweden. 
103 Lithuania. 
104 For more detailed information please see Section 2, ‘Replies of Member States’. 

33 

 
 
 
                                                           
their  representatives,  in  accordance  with  Regulation  (EU)  No  1306/2013  of  the  European 
Parliament and of the Council. 

Italy: The use of findings from PIF enabled improvements in the control system. 

Cyprus:  Risk  assessment  has  been  incorporated  into  all  administrative  and  on-the-spot 
procedures  undertaken  by  responsible  bodies  involved  in  programmes  under  shared 
management  in  the  areas  of  cohesion  policy,  fisheries  and  aid  to  the  most  deprived.    Risk 
assessment  methodologies,  for  example,  are  incorporated  into  systems  for  selecting 
procurement  procedures  in  order  to  perform  administrative  verifications  of  the  legality  and 
regularity of  the tender  notice, evaluation and assignment  procedures.  Risk analysis  is also 
used to select transactions for verification of payment claims submitted by beneficiaries with 
a large number of supporting documents, or during on-the-spot controls for measures with a 
large number of final recipients. Risk analysis incorporates data on the nature of beneficiaries, 
the nature of  projects  and  the  type  of  expenditure  involved, based on  ex ante assessment of 
the  associated  risk  to  each  category  and  incorporating  results  of  previous  verifications  and 
audits.  Additionally,  through  the  preparation  of  SoE  and  typology  of  errors  (common 
typology of errors), we can identify the frequency of errors in each type of error and target the 
high-risk areas in order to proceed with enhanced control testing and verifications in the next 
year. 

Latvia:  the  Rural  Support  Service  has  identified  individual  cases  that  have  allowed  the 
detection of irregularities and the prevention of undue payments.  

Hungary:  The  use  of  a  specially  designed  fraud  prevention  functionality  in  the  part  of 
Hungary’s  IT  system  (FAIR)  dealing  with  EU  funds  (EUPR)  is  ongoing;  this  interface 
provides information on every project, with the aim first and foremost of preventing fraud and 
abuse  and  enabling  early  detection.  The  use  of  ARACHNE  is  continuous  in  investigations 
where it provides information in addition to that provided by the national IT system (such as 
on ownership relationships, for instance). 

Poland:  Since  2016,  the  staff  of  the  Agency  for  Restructuring  and  Modernisation  of 
Agriculture, in its capacity as the Paying Agency, have been made more aware of fraud by: 
(1)  the  introduction  of  a  list  of  red  flags  for  the  purpose  of  raising  the  awareness  of  staff 
involved in all stages of the administrative and control cycle of anomalies (signs) that could 
warrant suspicions of fraud; (2) annual analysis of the risk of fraud aimed at identifying risk 
areas, evaluating the effectiveness of the control mechanisms deployed and, in specific cases, 
introducing new control mechanisms to reduce to a minimum the risk of fraud in respect of 
financial support granted by the Agency; and (3) training on fraud for Agency staff. 

Romania: The Ministry of European Funds reported that the MA has not used any results of 
findings  from  PIF  Reports,  mainly  due  to  the  fact  that  the  findings  presented  in  the  report 
describe,  among  other  things,  various  rules  (e.g.  new  rules  adopted  to  reduce  VAT  fraud), 
different  operational  measures  adopted  by  several  Member  States  on  expenditure  to  raise 
awareness, a collection  of main achievements regarding detection of fraud and irregularities 

34 

 
 
 
by some Member States etc., whereas the purpose of fraud risk assessment was intended to be 
a useful tool for self-evaluation, based on which the MA could easily identify new possible 
risks, following a careful consideration of the status quo of each internal structure within the 
MA.  However, the MA  fully complies  with the requirements stipulated at  Chapter 9.9.2 of 
the 2018 final PIF report issued by OLAF. For example, the MA has an anti-fraud policy in 
place  and,  at  the  same  time,  provides  useful  information  and  actively  participates  (when 
requested) to meetings in order to strengthen the efforts to create and properly implement the 
national  anti-fraud  strategy.  Some  irregularities  and  all  cases  of  fraud  identified  by  the  MA 
are  managed  in  very  close  collaboration  with  institutions  that  are  directly  responsible  for 
criminal checks and investigations (e.g. DLAF, National Anticorruption Directorate etc.). The 
MA takes into consideration all viable external sources such as whistleblowers and tips from 
media.  The  information  received  form  this  kind  of  sources  is  carefully  analysed  and 
afterwards cross-examined by competent bodies, without disclosing the identity of the person. 
The protection of personal data of the source is guaranteed by internal procedures and other 
specific national and EU regulations. Given the examples provided above, The Fight against 
Fraud  Department  (RO  AFCOS)  took  into  account  the  conclusions  from  the  previous  PIF 
reports  concerning  the  fraud  risk  assessment  of  every  authority  by  introducing  a  specific 
objective in the draft national anti-fraud strategy. 

Slovenia: Cooperation with the State Attorney’s Office, better information with the IB, better 
cooperation with the IB, early detection of fraud upon improved checklists, improved system 
performance and consequently fewer corrections. 

Slovakia:  Provided  examples  (findings  and  measures)  by  the  Ministry  of  Interior,  the 
Ministry of  Agriculture  and the Ministry of  Environment. An indicative  example is  the one 
given by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development. In line with the zero-tolerance 
approach  to  fraud,  the  managing  authority  for  the  programmes  Interreg  SK-CZ  and  SK-AT 
prepared and published an anti-fraud policy document. Managing authorities use risk analysis 
to identify the most vulnerable areas of fraud. Managing authorities also use IT tools such as 
ARACHNE, the IT monitoring system ITMS2014+ and a system to protect whistleblowers. 

35 

 
 
 
 
 
EXPLORING THE POTENTIAL OF RISK ANALYSIS FOR DIFFERENT TYPES OF EXPENDITURE 

The  Member  States  had  been  recommended  to  further  exploit  the  potential  of  risk  analysis, 
tailoring  the  approach  to  different  types  of  expenditure.  15  Member  States  have  fully 
implemented  this  recommendation 105 ,  10  have  partly  implemented  it 106  and  1  has  not 
implemented it107. One Member State has not provided information108. 

Below are the Member States’ replies (in summary)109:  

Belgium’s  ERDF  Brussels-Capital  region’s  MA  is  considering  carrying  out  an  extensive 
control of compliance by project coordinators with State aid legislation in 2020. 

Bulgaria  provided  information  about  risk  analysis  carried  out  by  the  MA  for  the  Structural 
Funds,  the  MA  for  Agricultural  Funds  and  the  Audit  Authority.  Bulgaria  provided  a  best 
practice example of 2019: eight officials from the State Fund for Agriculture and one from the 
Ministry of the Interior’s AFCOS Directorate underwent training in countering irregularities 
and fraud at Croatia’s Agriculture, Fisheries and Rural Development Agency. The purpose of 
the visit was to share best practices from the measures developed and implemented by Croatia 
and Bulgaria to combat fraud and irregularities in the management of EU agricultural funds. 

Czechia described  the  MA’s monitoring of the occurrence of  fraud  indicators during 1) the 
review in the process of project approval/before awarding the grant, and 2) the control in the 
project implementation process. On 1 January 2019, the risk analyses were divided into risk 
analysis  for  individual  projects  and  risk  analysis  for  simplified  projects,  which  are  in  some 
respects specific and the originally set of risk scale factors were not adequate. 

Denmark:  The  Danish  Business  Authority  indicated  the  use  of  OBS  lists.  There  is  and 
probably  always  will be  potential for smarter use of data, particularly where there  is a very 
large  and  growing  volume  of  data.  The  Danish  Agricultural  Agency  has  carried  out  a  risk 
analysis  of  project  support,  divided  into  market  organisations,  schemes  with  standard  costs 
and  schemes  with  two  tenders.  The  aim  was  to  identify  and  rank  risks  in  relation  to  the 
Agency’s current fraud prevention frameworks. The Danish Fisheries Agency reported that in 
2018 and 2019 they reviewed their administrative fundament and case management. This has 
led to the detection of cases of suspected fraud. The areas with the highest risk of fraud have 
been stating the correct level of expenditure, and maintaining eligibility after completing an 
operation. These findings have led to updates and alterations in the legislation and their case-
handling procedures. The measures taken have been risk based, however not on the basis of 
ARACHNE but on national IT tools and especially case-handling procedures. 

105 Bulgaria, Czechia,  Germany, Greece, Croatia, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, Austria, 

Poland, Portugal and Romania. 

106  Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, Spain, France, Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland and Sweden. 
107 The Netherlands. 
108 Lithuania. 
109 For more detailed information please see Section 2, ‘Replies of Member States’. 

36 

 
 
 
                                                           
Ireland: The ERDF  MA had  been carrying out (mid-2017-early 2018)  a risk assessment of 
each  intermediate  body  (IB)  submitting  a  declaration  of  expenditure  to  the  MS.  The  MA  is 
now in the process of reviewing these and are also undertaking risk analysis on those IBs that 
are progressing from expenditure to declaration stage.  

Greece provided examples of risk analysis exploitation by EYTHY (the Special Institutional 
Support  Service),  EDEL  (the  Financial  Audit  Committee)  and  the  Directorate  dealing  with 
Agricultural  Funds.  EYTHY  explained  that  the  methodology  for  risk  assessment  of 
operations/beneficiaries applied under the MCS for planning the spot checks on non-State aid 
operations  includes  risk  factors/indicators  which  take  account  of  different  types  of 
expenditure. 

France:  The  audit  authority  notes  that  the  irregularities  relate  mainly  to  the  same  subjects: 
public procurement, State aid and eligibility of expenditure. The audit authority bases its risk 
analysis on all the irregularities declared in the SYNERGIE information system. This enables 
it  to  map  the  risks  at  national  level  but  also  at  regional  level,  taking  into  account  all  audits 
(operation  audits  and  system  audits)  and  to  better  target  the  audit  plan  and  supervision  of 
audits according to the risks highlighted in each region. 

Cyprus:  Information regarding  staff  involved in  co-financed  projects has  been incorporated 
into the MIS used for the management of four shared management programmes covering the 
areas of cohesion policy, fisheries and aid to the most deprived.  Staff cost has been assessed 
as a high-risk area for fraud during the fraud risk self-assessment exercise undertaken by the 
responsible authorities. The information in the MIS will be extracted from reports in order to 
identify  trends  and  used  in  the  framework  of  administrative  and  on-the-spot  controls.  This 
function is in progress and is being gradually implemented. 

Luxembourg:  In  2016,  following  a  fraud  discovery,  the  MA  for  FEAGA  and  FEADER 
created  the  ‘Procedure  and  Special  Investigations’  whose  mission  is  to  prevent  fraud  cases. 
Before that, a guidance note for premium managers to prevent fraud in the agricultural sector 
had been created. The reason behind it was a scam which was discovered in 2013 following 
an  internal  administrative  audit.  Following  that  incident,  the  Ministry  of  Agriculture 
fundamentally  reviewed  its  external  and  internal  control  systems.  An  alert  system  has  also 
been set up to detect facts that may indicate fraud or attempted fraud. In case of INTERREG, 
the expenditure is always 100% controlled, but the manual of the program insists on paying 
particular attention to the staff cost and to external expertise, in particular to the services that 
require respect for public procurement procedures. A risk chart has also been created and is 
updated  on  a  biannual  basis  (last  time  in  2018).  For  ESPON,  the  risk  approach  has  been 
tailored since it mainly focuses on public procurement. Specific provisions where included in 
the programme implementation guidelines for the single beneficiary. 

Hungary:  The  MAs  identify  and  assess  the  risk  of  fraud  on  the  basis  of  the  EGESIF_14-
0021-00  guidance  document  published  by  the  Commission,  for  which  the  Hungarian 
authorities have drawn up methodological guidance.  

Poland:  As regards cohesion policy, the sampling of expenditure and projects for control is 
based  on  risk  analysis.  The  assumptions  underlying  the  analysis  are  set  out  in  the  annual 

37 

 
 
 
control  plans  drawn  up  for  each  operational  programme  for  a  given  accounting  year.  MAs 
also apply the risk analysis advocated in the Commission’s guidelines. 

Romania: The MA for Operational Programme Administrative Capacity identified that, as a 
result  of  the  use  of  the  fraud  risk  assessment  tool  recommended  by  the  Commission,  it  is 
necessary  to  use  the  ARACHNE  instrument  in  a  specific  manner  regarding  public 
procurement expenses and to use a different approach of the instrument as far as the process 
of evaluating financing operations is concerned. 

Slovakia: The Ministry of Interior identified insufficient strategy for improving professional 
skills in the area of fraud prevention and detection.  

Sweden:  Typically  the  Swedish  authorities  managing  EU  funds  only  deal  with  one  type  of 
expenditure rather than several types. The annual assessment is carried out with the purpose 
of identifying new risks, evaluating actions, etc. 

1.2.3. CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES 

The  questions  concerning  the  assessment  of  spontaneous  irregularities,  strengthening 
whistleblower  protection  and  enhancing  cooperation  between  judicial  and  administrative 
authorities  are  repeated  from  last  year.  Last  year,  the  results  showed  that  about  half  the 
Member  States  implemented  the  recommendation  related  to  whistleblowers.  On  the 
promotion  of  systematic  and  timely  cooperation  between  judicial  and  administrative 
authorities,  just  about  half  of  the  Member  States  implemented  this  last  year.  This  year’s 
follow-up  aims  at  shedding  more  light  into  the  Member  States’  actions  concerning  the 
implementation of this recommendation. 

ASSESSING  THE  SPONTANEOUS  REPORTING  OF  IRREGULARITIES  AND  STRENGTHENING  THE 
PROTECTION OF WHISTLEBLOWERS  

The  Member  States  were  recommended  by  the  Commission  to  facilitate  and  assess  the 
spontaneous  reporting  of  potential 
the  protection  of 
whistleblowers, who are also a crucial source for investigative journalism. 13 Member States 
have implemented this recommendation  in  full110,  10111 have  partly  implemented  it and 3112 
have not implemented it. One Member State has not provided any information113. 

irregularities  and  strengthen 

Several Member States provided details of their actions taken in 2018/2019 (in summary)114: 

Belgium:  In  its  regional  policy  declaration  (2019-2024),  the  Walloon  Government  has 
committed to recognising whistleblower status by ensuring the protection of any official who, 

110  Bulgaria,  Croatia,  Greece,  Italy,  Latvia,  Hungary,  Malta,  the  Netherlands,  Poland,  Portugal,  Romania, 

Slovakia and Sweden. 

111 Belgium, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, Spain, France, Luxembourg, Slovenia and Finland. 
112 Germany, Cyprus and Austria. 
113 Lithuania. 
114 For more detailed information please see Section 2, ‘Replies of Member States’. 

38 

 
 
 
                                                           
in  good  faith,  reports  criminal  behaviour  within  his/her  administration  and  to  extending 
application of this status across regional and local public services. This process is ongoing. 

Bulgaria  provided  detailed  information  about  the  reporting  system  established  within  the 
managing  authorities  of  operational  programmes’  websites  with  regard  to  structural  funds. 
They provided an example: in 2019 two reports concerning suspected fraud under one of the 
operational programmes by the beneficiary of two different projects led to a total of seven on-
the-spot  checks  by  the  managing  authority’s  irregularities  officers:  one  on  the  beneficiary, 
four on its partners in the two projects, and, following a second report concerning one of the 
projects,  two  simultaneous  on  the-spot  checks  on  the  equipment  supplied  and  the  two 
partners.  The  files  relating  to  the  checks  carried  out  under  the  two  reports  were  sent  to  the 
Public Prosecutor’s Office for follow-up. 

Czechia: There is no special legal act for the protection of whistleblowers in Czechia yet, but 
an act is currently  under  preparation.  In general,  there are special websites, email addresses 
and/or phone lines at each ministry for whistleblowers. Complaints from third parties relating 
to the implementation of projects from the ESIF are recorded and investigated and dealt with 
as suspected irregularities. Depending on the nature of the complaint, it is determined whether 
it will be verified by an administrative or on-site inspection or whether a criminal complaint 
may  be  filed.  An  example  of  findings  detected  during  on-the-spot  check  that  have  been 
performed  because  of  information  received  from  informants  is  an  irregularity  concerning 
childcare facilities. 

The  Danish  Business  Authority,  the  MA  for  the  ERDF  and  ESF,  has  specified  further 
guidance  for  whistleblowers  in  the  anti-fraud  policy.  Last  year  they  launched  a  new 
whistleblower  scheme,  which  is  based  on  a  web  form  solution  allowing  the  possibility  to 
report anonymously. 

In Germany, there is no comprehensive legal provision to protect whistleblowers. Following 
the entry into force of Directive (EU) 2019/1937, there is a need of transposition for both the 
private and public sectors. The Federal Government is working on the necessary measures to 
ensure that the Directive is implemented by December 2021. 

Estonia:  In  2019,  a  draft  bill  was  presented  to  the  Parliament,  which  among  other 
amendments  also  strengthens  the  protection  of  people  who  report  breaches  of  anti-money 
laundering measures. 

Ireland: The EU Whistleblowing Directive, which must be transposed by 17 December 2021, 
will require changes to Ireland’s legislation in this area. 

Greece:  The  establishment  of  a  modern  institutional  framework  for  the  protection  of 
whistleblowers is an action of the National Anti-Corruption Action Plan (NACAP). Greece is 
in the process of adopting new rules for the protection of witnesses, which were published in 
the Official Journal of the EU on 26.11.2019 (Directive 2019/1937). 

Spain:  In  line  with  what  was  reported  last  year,  more  managing  authorities/intermediate 
bodies and paying agencies have adopted the confidential channel established by AFCOS and 
have  fulfilled  its  recommendations  in  order  to  facilitate  the  spontaneous  reporting  of 

39 

 
 
 
irregularities and fraud affecting the financial interests of the EU. The number of allegations 
received through the reporting channel was higher in 2019 than in 2018. With regard to the 
protection of whistleblowers,  the legislative proposal  (reported last  year) was  ultimately not 
adopted  because  of  the  general  elections  in  Spain  in  2019.  Now  that  the  Directive  (EU) 
2019/1937 has been adopted, Spain will initiate the process for its transposition. 

France also reported that it will transpose Directive EU 2019/1937 of 23 October 2019 on the 
protection of persons who report breaches of EU law. 

Croatia: As regards the spontaneous reporting of irregularities and in case of suspected fraud, 
alerts  are  forwarded  to  the  State  Attorney’s  Office  and  the  Ministry  of  Interior  by  AFCOS. 
Nonetheless, the AFCOS Service cannot measure the real effect of its work (i.e. coordination 
activities) because it relies on written observations submitted by competent management and 
control  system  bodies  (irregularity  reporting  system  bodies)  and  it  does  not  check  the 
substance  of  the  case.  The  Irregularity  Management  System  (IMS)  has  eight  cases  where 
irregularities have been established based on the information received from informants, out of 
which two cases relate to suspected fraud. The Act on the Protection of Whistleblowers was 
adopted on February 8, 2019 and came into force on July 1, 2019 (OG 17/2019). 

Cyprus replied that the whistleblowers regulation is yet to be released by the Parliament. 

Latvia:  The  Whistleblower  Protection  Law  entered  into  force  on  May  1  2019.  The  Rural 
Support  service  received  two  alarm  reports  which  were  evaluated  but  the  facts  were  not 
confirmed.  Also,  the  focus  theme  for  2019  in  social  campaign  #FraudOff!  Was  ‘Reporting 
culture’.  A  reporting  tool  was  created  where  individuals  can  report  about  different 
irregularities (www.atkrapies.lv). 

Poland:  In  1  January-31  December  2019,  the  paying  agency  and  implementing  bodies 
initiated 1,182 investigations into reports of irregularities and fraud. In 2019 there were 102 
fewer investigations than in 2018. On 9 January 2020 the situation with regard to reports on 
suspected  irregularities  received  by  the  paying  agency  was  as  follows:  1)  no  irregularities 
were found in 378 cases; 2) irregularities were found in 59 cases; 3) proceedings are ongoing 
in 572 cases; and 4) reports were left unexamined in 173 cases. 

Portugal:  A  specific  section  for  whistleblowers  is  available  on  the  website  of  the 
Inspectorate-General  for  Finance  -  Audit  Authority 
(https://www.igf.gov.pt/paginas-
participacao-civica/nova-participacao.aspx). 

Romania provided examples from various authorities’ experience. The Ministry of European 
Funds approved the system procedure for reporting irregularities and the protection of people 
who  complain  or  notice  irregularities.  The  MA  for  Operational  Programme  Administrative 
Capacity  had  as  source  of  detection  of  irregularities/frauds  whistleblowers  or  mass  media 
reports,  which  are  currently  being  treated  as  being  in  the  suspicion  phase  and  undergoing 
specialised checks/investigations.  

Slovenia’s Government Office for Development and European Cohesion Policy reported that 
guidance is currently being prepared concerning lobbying. Whistleblower standards will also 
be included.  In the  case  of consent,  the  guidance will be published on the MA  website  and 
thus will be binding for all IM bodies. 

40 

 
 
 
Slovakia adopted in January 2019 an Act on the protection of whistleblowers, on anti-social 
activity  and  on  amendments  to  certain  acts.  This  Act  also  creates  a  new  Office  for  the 
protection  of  whistleblowers  with  new  competencies  in  this  field,  as  an  independent  state 
administration  body.  Information  was  also  provided  by  various  government  departments  on 
different measures taken to implement the recommendation. 

In Finland, the possibility for anonymous reporting was established for structural funds. 

Sweden  reported  that  one  of  the  largest  newspapers  (Dagens  Nyheter)  has  written  several 
articles about suspected irregularities in the Swedish ESF Council. The newspaper was able to 
get access to all documents thanks to the Swedish Public Access to Information and Secrecy 
Act. 

COOPERATION BETWEEN JUDICIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES 

The  Member  States  were  recommended  to  promote  systematic  and  timely  cooperation 
between  judicial  and  administrative  authorities.  Eighteen  Member  States  have  implemented 
this recommendation in full115, 3116 have partly implemented it and 3117 have not implemented 
it. Three Member States have not provided information118. 

Several Member States provided details of their actions taken in 2018/2019 (in summary)119: 

Bulgaria:    In  2019,  three  instances  of  suspected  fraud  were  reported  to  the  Public 
Prosecutor’s Office under only one of the operational programmes. The prosecutions service 
has  followed  up  all  three  reports  and  pre-trial  investigations  are  currently  under  way.  Most 
cases of irregularities are detected prior to payment, but where fraud is found to have resulted 
in the payment of irregular expenditure, managing authorities of operational programmes take 
measures to recover public funds from the dishonest beneficiaries. As regards the agricultural 
funds, the State Fund for Agriculture works closely with representatives of the Ministry of the 
Interior’s AFCOS Directorate, the Ministry of  Interior’s specialised investigative bodies, the 
managing  authorities  of  operational  programmes  financed  by  EU  Structural  Funds  and  the 
Public  Prosecutor’s  Office.  The  Audit  Authority  sent  14  final  audit  reports  containing 
suspicions  of  fraud  identified  during  the  audit  checks  to  the  Public  Prosecutor’s  Office  for 
appropriate follow-up. 

Czechia reiterated that cooperation between individual administrative and judicial authorities 
and individual procedures are regulated in the relevant chapters of the Operational Manual.  

115  Belgium,  Czechia,  Greece,  Spain,  Croatia,  Italy,  Cyprus,  Latvia,  Luxembourg,  Hungary,  Malta,  the 

Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia and Sweden. 

116 Belgium, Germany and Estonia. 
117 Denmark, Austria and Finland. 
118 Ireland, France, and Lithuania. 
119 For more detailed information please see Section 2, ‘Replies of Member States’. 

41 

 
 
 
                                                           
Estonia  reported  that  regular  meetings  with  different  related  bodies  (the  Environment 
Agency, Competition Authority and other investigative bodies) take place to discuss the risky 
projects/support measures to prevent fraud and other problems. 

Greece,  as part of the procedure for setting up a mechanism  for monitoring  criminal cases, 
and in accordance with the circulars issued by the Supreme Court Public Prosecutor’s Office 
(2/2018 and 2a/2018), collects case statistics from the whole country every 4 months on the 
progress  of  all  pending  cases  relating  to  the  prosecution  of  corruption,  financial  crime  and 
money laundering. The data are collected anonymised, and include all ongoing cases of fraud 
against the financial interests of the European Union. The data are brought to the attention of 
the  administrative  authorities  (Ministry  of  Justice,  National  Authority  for  Transparency  –
AFCOS). At the same time, AFCOS, in cooperation with UNODC, is working on creating a 
standardised statistical  data collection system, which will be fully  in line with the country’s 
current  obligations,  to  provide  input  to  international  organisations  and  bodies,  including 
OLAF. 

In Spain,  the AFCOS has been  working together with Guardia Civil and National Police to 
formalise the corresponding cooperation agreements with those entities, covering issues such 
as  operative  support  and  exchange  of  information,  mutual  technical  advice,  strategic 
cooperation and training. The AFCOS has also been working with the State Attorney’s Office 
to formalise a procedure for the transmission of punctual information regarding the initiation, 
follow-up  and  closure  of  judicial  (criminal)  proceedings  which  affect  the  EU’s  financial 
interests. 

Croatia:  A  regulation  on  the  institutional  framework  of  the  system  for  combating 
irregularities  and  fraud  has  been  adopted.  This  regulation  defines  AFCOS  as  a  system 
comprised of (1) administrative authorities (irregularity reporting system bodies/management 
and  control  system  bodies);  (2)  law  enforcement  and  prosecution  authorities,  as  well  as 
authorities  which  have  a  specific  expertise  (AFCOS  network);  and  (3)  a  coordinating 
authority (AFCOS service). The decision on the AFCOS network has been adopted. Protocols 
on cooperation have been signed with the State Attorney’s Office, the Ministry of Interior and 
the  Audit  Authority.  Meetings  have  been  organised  between  administrative  authorities 
(irregularity  reporting  system  bodies/management  and  control  system  bodies)  and  law 
enforcement  and  prosecution  authorities,  or  authorities  which  have  a  specific  expertise 
(AFCOS  network)  in  cases  where  administrative  authorities  need  expert  opinion  (advice) 
from  law  enforcement  and  prosecution  authorities,  or  authorities  which  have  a  specific 
expertise. 

Cyprus:  Enhanced cooperation between judicial and administrative authorities exists in cases 
of detected irregularities which may  result in a suspicion of fraud or established fraud. Any 
other  types  of  irregularities  are  handled  within  administrative  authorities.  The  Legal 
Department of the Cyprus Government and specifically the European Union Law Section of 
the Attorney General together with the Cyprus Police work closely with AFCOS. Especially 
where an economic operator resists in any control (performed either by OLAF or VCD or IB), 
and authorities other than administrative are required in order to be able to proceed with the 
on-the-spot  checks,  the  three  authorities  liaise  between  them  and  if  required  the  check  is 

42 

 
 
 
performed  at  the  economic  operator  premises  in  the  presence  of    police.    In  other  cases,  a 
Bank  Judicial  Disclosure  Order  was  necessary  in  order  for  OLAF  to  be  able  to  obtain  any 
necessary  information  from  the  economic  operator,  and  this  was  achieved  through  close 
collaboration between the Legal Department, Cyprus Police and OLAF. 

In France, the Ministry of Justice met OLAF in October 2019 and requested to be informed 
of the judicial recommendations issued by the Office to the French courts. Such information 
could help to improve the follow-up procedures and cooperation with OLAF. Systematic and 
regular promotion  of such cooperation  will  be explored  when the anti-fraud strategy is next 
revised. 

Latvia:  In  2019,  several  interinstitutional  meetings  were  organised  between  administrative 
bodies in EU funds and law enforcement bodies working on criminal cases. Those meetings 
and  exchange  of  information  are  essential,  not  only  to  take  appropriate  administrative 
measures  in  projects,  but  to  assist  investigation  in  general.  There  are  training  programmes 
regarding  cooperation  structure  which  are  designed  in  close  collaboration  between 
investigation  authorities  and  administrative  institutions.    The  aim  of  this  training  is  to  help 
institutions  better  understand  each  other’s  work  and  to  find  the  best  ways  to  cooperate  on 
daily basis. These kinds of educational activities were carried out in 2018 and 2019. 

Luxembourg:  In  March  2019,  a  member  of  Luxembourg’s  AFCOS  and  one  prosecutor 
covering  OLAF  related  issues  jointly  attended  a  conference  in  Bucharest  called  ‘EU  Anti-
Fraud  Partners’  Meeting’.  The  latter  was  organised  by  Romania’s  Fight  against  Fraud 
Department – DLAF. The aim of the event was to provide a basis for exchanging information, 
experience and best practices on EU anti-fraud issues, especially in the context of the future 
cooperation between Member States,  OLAF  and  EPPO.  Further, in  November 2019,  an EU 
Conference  on  investigating  frauds  and  corruption  affecting  the  financial  interests  of  the 
European Union in Bucharest was attended by a representative of Luxembourg’s Inspectorate 
General of Finances. 

In  Portugal,  in  addition  to  the  Inspectorate  General  for  Finance  (IGF)  making  its  own 
resources  available,  the  Audit  Authority  participates  in  training  sessions  (Lisbon  and  Porto) 
aimed at public prosecutors on ‘Fraud in obtaining subsidies’. 

In Romania, cooperation with judicial and administrative authorities is governed by national 
legislation  and  internal  working  procedures.  The  Managing  Authority  for  the  Regional 
Operational Programmes reported that there are requests for information and documents from 
the National Anticorruption Directorate, to which the Ministry of Public Works, Development 
and Administration responds promptly,  but also requests formulated by the MPWDA to the 
NAD  regarding  the  state  of  the  NAD  investigations.  The  information  is  requested  for  the 
correct updating and reporting of cases of suspected fraud. There is no collaboration protocol 
concluded between MPWDA and NAD, but there are two collaboration protocols concluded 
between  MPWDA  and  The  Fight  against  Fraud  Department  and  the  National  Agency  for 
Integrity,  respectively,  regarding  the  exchange  of  information.  The  General  Directorate  for 
European  Territorial  Cooperation  –  Ministry  of  European  Funds  reported  that  there  are 
requests  for  information  and  documents  from  the  National  Anticorruption  Directorate,  to 

43 

 
 
 
which  the  Ministry  of  Public  Works,  Development  and  Administration  responds  promptly. 
Also,  the  MPWDA  requests  NAD  information  on  the  status  of  investigations  in  order  to 
update suspicion cases.  There  is no  collaboration  protocol concluded between  the MPWDA 
and NAD, but there are two collaboration protocols concluded between the MPWDA and The 
Fight against Fraud Department and the National Agency for Integrity, respectively, regarding 
the exchange of information. 

Slovenia:  An  annual  meeting  between  the  EU  Cohesion  Policy  Department  and  the  State 
Attorney’s  Office  at  the  end  of  2019  took  place  to  discuss  outstanding  issues  and  how  the 
cooperation between the two bodies could be strengthened. The cooperation was found to be 
exemplary and positive for both sides. The result is also a table of all open procedures/cases 
where  the  ECP  is  the  subject/legal  basis,  as  well  as  sending  a  few  examples  of  open  cases 
with brief descriptions of what stage/status they are in. 

Slovakia: Organised training sessions in 2018 for AFCOS Network partners on the protection 
of  the  EU’s  financial  interests.  In  2018,  the  Public  Procurement  Office  started  to  deepen 
cooperation  with  key  central  state  administration  and  judicial  bodies  on  the  basis  of  signed 
cooperation agreements. 

44 

 
 
 
 
2. 

REPLIES OF MEMBER STATES 

2.1. 

REVENUE 

Revenue fraud through the undervaluation of goods imported in the EU will remain a threat in the coming 
years. OLAF’s investigations on the undervaluation of textiles and shoes imported from China demonstrated 
that fraudsters will use any loopholes and that large-scale fraud can pay off.  The digitalisation of the global 
economy  and  new  economic  models  like  e-commerce  are  rapidly  shifting  cross-border  trade  from  a  few 
large/bulk shipments to a large number of low-value and small shipments. Cross-border e-commerce trade of 
goods poses risks for the EU’s financial interests and for the Member States.  

A  particular  risk  is  the  abuse  of  the  low-value  consignment  reliefs  by:  (i)  undervaluing  e-commerce  trade 
goods;  (ii)  splitting  consignments  so  that  they  fall  below  the  relief  threshold  (EUR  150);  (iii)  importing 
commercial consignments declared as gifts; or (iv) importing goods ineligible for the relief. 

Growing e-commerce requires that Member States’ adapt their customs control strategies to strike the right 
balance between trade facilitation/simplification and protecting the EU’s financial interests.  

A flexible combination of different controls is therefore pivotal to close any loophole exploited by fraudsters 
and to enable customs to successfully respond to different economic models applied through technology (like e-
commerce)  and  to  effectively  protect  the  EU’s  financial  interests  while  permitting  trade  facilitation  and 
simplification.120 

120 See PIF report 2018 p.30 https://ec.europa.eu/anti-fraud/about-us/reports/communities-reports_en  

45 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
BE  Q.1.1. Have you enhanced and enforced your customs control strategies for cross-border e-commerce 
trade,  particularly  for  the  potential  abuse  of  low-value  consignments  reliefs  (LVCR)?☒YES,  partly 
implementing the recommendation 
Automatic selections occur in Be-gate but: 
• 
• 
It contains selections profiles for undervaluation and also a random selection. 

quite a few operators are not in Be-gate; 
Be-gate provides only limited selection options (for instance, FRC cannot be fully implemented). 

Q. 1.2 Have you ensured that your electronic customs declaration system does not automatically apply 
claimed duty relief on goods with (a) the declared intrinsic value above EUR 150, (b) on commercial 
consignments declared as gifts and (c) on goods ineligible for relief? 

☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

Q. 1.3 Have you ensured that your electronic customs declaration systems systematically detect potentially 
undervalued or incorrectly declared goods under LVCR by means of risk profiles or randomly?  

☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 

Automatic selections occur in Be-gate but: 
• 
• 
It contains selections profiles for undervaluation and also a random selection. 

quite a few operators are not in Be-gate; 
Be-gate provides only limited selection options (for instance, FRC cannot be fully implemented). 

Q. 1.4 Have you ensured that there are any specific control measures in place to prevent artificial splitting of 
consignments, aiming to benefit from duty relief?☒NO 

There are no clear guidelines yet as to what should be done with the control results should a control take 
place. 

Q.  1.5  Have  you  ensured  that  ex-post  controls  include  verifications  on  traders’  compliance  with  customs 
duty relief for low-value consignments?  

☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 

The  ex-post  controls  carried  out  are  either  CAPs  or  audits.  These  types  of  controls  are  requested  via 
proposals  made  by  Risk  Management.  Operations  are  therefore  only  able  to  carry  out  the  CAPs/Audits 
requested. 

Q. 1.5.a. Are authorised economic operators (AEOs) not excluded from such compliance checks?☒NO 

46 

 
 
BG  Q.1.1. Have you enhanced and enforced your customs control strategies for cross-border e-commerce trade, 
particularly for the potential abuse of low-value consignments reliefs (LVCR)?☒ YES, partly implementing 
the recommendation 

specific 

strategy 

targeting 

specifically 

No 
yet.  
The Customs Agency has developed and is implementing a strategy for controlling the customs value of imported 
goods,  which  covers  low-value  consignments.  Furthermore,  on  the  Customs  Agency’s  intranet,  newsletters  have 
been  published  concerning  relief  from  import  duties  and/or  VAT  on  the  release  for  free  circulation  of 
consignments of negligible value (up to EUR 150) or consignments sent from one private individual to another (up 
to EUR 45). 

consignments  has  been  developed 

low-value 

Q. 1.2 Have you ensured that your electronic customs declaration system does not automatically apply claimed 
duty  relief  on  goods  with  (a)  the  declared  intrinsic  value  above  EUR  150,  (b)  on  commercial  consignments 
declared as gifts and (c) on goods ineligible for relief? ☒ 

YES, partly implementing the recommendation 

Article 23(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1186/2009 of 16 November 2009 setting up a Community system of 
reliefs from customs duty currently grants relief from import duties for goods with an intrinsic value not exceeding 
EUR 150 per consignment dispatched from third countries, provided the goods contained in those consignments are 
not subject to prohibitions and restrictions. Article 58(14)(1) of the VAT Act (ZDDS) grants VAT relief for goods 
imported under the duty-free arrangements, provided the total value of the goods does not exceed BGN 30. In this 
context, no customs declarations are filed electronically for consignments of a value up to BGN 30. Such 
consignments are deemed to have been declared for release for free circulation under Article 141 of Commission 
Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/2446 of 28 July 2015 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council as regards detailed rules concerning certain provisions of the Union Customs Code. 
The act deemed to be a customs declaration is the consignment’s presentation to customs pursuant to Article 139 of 
Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 October 2013 laying down the 
Union Customs Code, provided that the data required are accepted by the customs authorities.  
In such cases, the risk analysis and the verification of compliance with the conditions for relief from customs duties 
and VAT are carried out manually using the data from the paper version. Note, however, that data which are not 
received electronically are often of poor quality, which limits the risk analysis that can be carried out. For 
consignments with an intrinsic value of more than BGN 30 but less than EUR 150, a customs declaration is lodged by 
electronic means. Relief from import duty is granted by entering the code CO7 ‘Consignments of negligible value’ in 
data element 1/11 ‘Additional procedure’. For consignments sent by one private individual to another containing 
goods of a value not exceeding EUR 45, relief from import duty and VAT is granted, in accordance with Article 25 of 
Regulation (EC) No 1186/2009 and Article 58(14)(2) of the VAT Act, by entering code CO8 ‘Consignments sent from 
one private individual to another’ in data element 1/11 ‘Additional procedure’. The postal operator Balgarski Poshti 
EAD currently uses the Customs Information System for imports to lodge customs declarations for release for free 
circulation containing the reduced data set for consignments of a value not exceeding EUR 1000. Despite the reduced 
data set, risk analysis is carried out on the basis of the information provided and no restrictions are applied to 
consignments for which the code CO7 or CO8 figures in data element 1/11. The other operators, including express 
couriers, use standard customs declarations to declare low-value consignments. Risk analysis and other additional 
checks are carried out using a full data set. There are no exceptions to the risk analysis for them either.  
Those customs declarations, including those for low-value consignments, therefore undergo risk analysis, including 
analysis of the financial risks. Steps have been taken to configure automatic controls to check whether goods for 
which relief is sought by entering code CO7 ‘Consignments of negligible value’ or code CO8 ‘Consignments sent 
from one private individual to another’ in data element 1/11 ‘Additional procedure’ qualify for relief from import 
duties. Pursuant to the Director of the Customs Agency’s Order No ZAM-147 of 3 February 2020, the release version 
of the Customs Information System for imports is to undergo acceptance testing from 5 to 14 February 2020. During 
that period automatic controls are to be configured for checking those conditions, thereby ensuring compliance with 
the recommendation that the system should not automatically apply claimed duty relief to goods with the declared 
intrinsic value above EUR 150 or consignments sent from one private individual to another with a value of more than 
EUR 45. As regards checking for potential abuses of relief from import duties and/or VAT on consignments containing 
goods of a value not exceeding EUR 150 and consignments of a value not exceeding EUR 45 sent from one private 
individual to another and the financial risk criteria, there are plans to create risk profiles, which will be used to check 
compliance with the conditions for relief from customs duties and/or VAT and to monitor other criteria for identifying 
financial risks. Steps have also been taken to update the Customs Information System for imports in the light of 
amendments to the VAT rules applicable to e-commerce. 
Q.  1.3  Have  you  ensured  that  your  electronic  customs  declaration  systems  systematically  detect  potentially 
undervalued or incorrectly declared goods under LVCR by means of risk profiles or randomly?☒  YES,  partly 
implementing the recommendation 

Risk profiles have now been established for checking the declared customs value of all goods falling within Chapters 
61, 62, 63 and 64 of the Combined Nomenclature (CN) of the European Union, and they do not exclude low-value 
consignments. Identical risk profiles have also been created for certain plastic products, toys, light fittings, handbags, 
articles of a kind normally carried in the pocket and certain devices used with telecommunications apparatus. 

47 

 
 
CZ  Q.1.1. Have you enhanced and enforced your customs control strategies for cross-border e-commerce 
trade, particularly for  the  potential  abuse of low-value consignments  reliefs (LVCR)?  ☒YES, partly 
implementing the recommendation 
Czech  Customs  Administration  uses  focused  risk  profiles,  set  for  specific  risky  commodities  under  22  €, 
performed by competent officers on the control spot of the Customs offices. For the consignment over 22 € 
and below 150 € electronic risk analysis is performed, based on general and specific electronic risk profiles. 
There are no exceptions for AEOs. After 1 January 2021, electronic risk analysis will be expanded also on 
the consignments under 22 €.   
Q. 1.2 Have you ensured that your electronic customs declaration system does not automatically apply 
claimed duty relief on goods with (a) the declared intrinsic value above EUR 150, (b) on commercial 
consignments  declared  as  gifts  and  (wc)  on  goods  ineligible  for  relief? ☒YES, fully implementing the 
recommendation 
Q.  1.3  Have  you  ensured  that  your  electronic  customs  declaration  systems  systematically  detect 
potentially  undervalued  or  incorrectly  declared  goods  under  LVCR  by  means  of  risk  profiles  or 
randomly? 
☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
For certain high risky commodities (such as clothes, shoes, electronics, automotive parts) there are specific 
risk profiles set out. On global level, it is very difficult to set out a risk profile just for undervaluation, also 
because of high volume of consignments per year (there is about 30 millions of consignments forwarded to 
the Czech Republic just by the Czech Post). Certain risk profiles are still being prepared and discussed for 
future development.  
Q.  1.4  Have  you  ensured  that  there  are  any  specific  control  measures  in  place  to  prevent  artificial 
splitting of consignments, aiming to benefit from duty relief?☒NO 
While it is very difficult to set out a specific control measure which can be focused on artificial splitting of 
consignments, Czech Customs Administration is still discussing and preparing such measure which will be 
directly focused on that. At present time, controls and measures, which are focusing on such case, are made 
mainly on random basis in connection with other risks. It is like this because until today majority of customs 
declarations for consignment  are under 22 € and are declared orally or by any other act. For the future, 
when obligation of electronic customs declaration comes into force, special measure will be set also for the 
e-commerce goods.  
Q.  1.5  Have  you  ensured  that  ex-post  controls  include  verifications  on  traders’  compliance  with 
customs duty relief for low-value consignments? ☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
Czech Customs Administration does not exclude low value consignments from its post release controls, but 
in case that the impact of such control has a low economic meaning and volume of the consignment is very 
high (about 30 million of separate parcels), priorities of post release controls are in different field. Taking 
into account the fact, that that consignees are mainly physicals persons, that have no obligation (according 
to Czech law) to hold any evidence (invoices, orders and so on), it would be extremely difficult to prove any 
breach after the release of goods.  

Q. 1.5.a. Are authorised economic operators (AEOs) not excluded from such compliance checks? 

☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation. 
AEOs  are  not  excluded  from  any  kind  of  compliance  checks,  including  e-commerce  and  low  value 
consignments trade. 

48 

 
DK 

Q.1.1. Have you enhanced and enforced your customs control strategies for cross-border e-commerce 
trade,  particularly  for  the  potential  abuse  of  low-value  consignments  reliefs  (LVCR)?☒YES,  partly 
implementing the recommendation 

The Danish Customs Agency has for the time being not adopted a separate control strategy within the area 
of  cross-border  e-commerce.  However,  the  Danish  Customs  Agency  has  enhanced  its  general  focus  on 
cross-border  e-commerce,  and  therefore  also  on  the  potential  abuse  of  low-value  consignments  reliefs 
(LVCR).  To  this  end,  the  Danish  Customs  Agency  e.g.  carries  out  control  actions  focusing  on  fraud  and 
abuse related to the import of low-value consignments.  

Q. 1.2 Have you ensured that your electronic customs declaration system does not automatically apply 
claimed duty relief on goods with (a) the declared intrinsic value above EUR 150, (b) on commercial 
consignments  declared  as  gifts  and  (c)  on  goods  ineligible  for  relief?☒YES,  partly  implementing  the 
recommendation 

The Danish Customs Agency has implemented a “lock” in the system, which causes entries with a value 
above EUR 150 to fail if duty relief is claimed. Besides, a “lock” has been implemented in the system, which 
means that commercial consignments declared as gifts will fail unless it is stated to be a shipment from 
private to private. The Danish Customs Agency has not implemented anything concerning goods that are 
ineligible for relief. 

Q.  1.3  Have  you  ensured  that  your  electronic  customs  declaration  systems  systematically  detect 
potentially  undervalued  or  incorrectly  declared  goods  under  LVCR  by  means  of  risk  profiles  or 
randomly? 

☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

The Danish Customs Agency has implemented risk profiles that specifically select entries under the LVCR 
for control with focus on undervaluation and misclassification. 

Q.  1.4  Have  you  ensured  that  there  are  any  specific  control  measures  in  place  to  prevent  artificial 
splitting of consignments, aiming to benefit from duty relief?☒NO 

The Danish Customs Agency has not initiated control measures with a specific focus on preventing artificial 
splitting of consignments. 

Q.  1.5  Have  you  ensured  that  ex-post  controls  include  verifications  on  traders’  compliance  with 
customs duty relief for low-value consignments? ☒NO 

The  Danish  Customs  Agency:  For  the  time  being,  post  release  control  (ex-post  control)  does  not  include 
verifications  on  traders’  compliance  with  customs  duty  relief  for  low-value  consignments.  However,  the 
Danish Customs  Agency has ongoing discussions with the designated postal operator  concerning customs 
related issues, such as the handling of low-value consignments. 

Q. 1.5.a. Are authorised economic operators (AEOs) not excluded from such compliance checks? 

The  Danish  Customs  Agency  do  not  perform  the  compliance  checks  described  in  Q.  1.5.  However,  when 
AEOs dealing with low-value consignments get their certification, the operators’ processes are reviewed.  

49 

 
DE 

Q.1.1. Have you enhanced and enforced your customs control strategies for cross-border e-commerce 
trade,  particularly  for  the  potential  abuse  of  low-value  consignments  reliefs  (LVCR)?☒YES,  fully 
implementing the recommendation 

Q. 1.2 Have you ensured that your electronic customs declaration system does not automatically apply 
claimed duty relief on goods with (a) the declared intrinsic value above EUR 150, (b) on commercial 
consignments declared as gifts and (c) on goods ineligible for relief? 
(a) the declared intrinsic value above EUR 150 and (c) on goods ineligible for relief?  ☒YES, partly 
implementing the recommendation 
In the electronic customs clearance system (ATLAS) exists a mechanism that gives an indication to the user 
if the value of the goods exceeds EUR 150. The user decides whether to stop the process or not. 
(b) on commercial consignments declared as gifts ☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
As long as the commercial nature of a good is not foreseen as an indicator in the customs declaration, the 
information can only be derived from the content of the consignor / consignee data (i.e. indication of a legal 
entity like "GmbH" or "AG" which does not unambiguously indicate the commercial nature). Therefore only 
checks based on risk profiles are possible and have been implemented. 
(c) on goods ineligible for relief? ☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

Q. 1.3 Have you ensured that your electronic customs declaration systems systematically detect 
potentially undervalued or incorrectly declared goods under LVCR by means of risk profiles or 
randomly? 
☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation  

Q. 1.4 Have you ensured that there are any specific control measures in place to prevent artificial 
splitting of consignments, aiming to benefit from duty relief? 
☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

Q. 1.5 Have you ensured that ex-post controls include verifications on traders’ compliance with 
customs duty relief for low-value consignments? ☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

Q. 1.5.a. Are authorised economic operators (AEOs) not excluded from such compliance checks? 
☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

50 

 
 
 
 
 
 
EE  Q.1.1. Have you enhanced and enforced your customs control strategies for cross-border e-commerce 
trade,  particularly  for  the  potential  abuse  of  low-value  consignments  reliefs  (LVCR)?☐YES,  fully 
implementing the recommendation 
Our  control  strategy  is  based  on  the  efficient  risk  analysis.  Approximately  20%  of  the  postal  and  express 
consignments  declared  by  private  persons  are  sent  for  checking  on  the  basis  of  a  specially  created  risk 
criterion.  For  postal  and  express  consignments  with  commercial  purpose  a  random  selection  criterion  is 
applied. 100% of the consignments having a low value, which are sent from C2C as gifts, are directed for 
checking. 
Q. 1.2 Have you ensured that your electronic customs declaration system does not automatically apply 
claimed duty relief on goods with (a) the declared intrinsic value above EUR 150, (b) on commercial 
consignments declared as gifts and (c) on goods ineligible for relief? 
☐YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
a)when the duty relief is claimed on the declaration, then the system checks if the use of this duty and VAT 
relief codes are justified; 
b)100% of the declarations with the declared low value (examples, samples) are directed for checking 
c)100% of the declarations (excise goods) with the declared low value (examples, samples) are directed for 
checking 
Q.  1.3  Have  you  ensured  that  your  electronic  customs  declaration  systems  systematically  detect 
potentially  undervalued  or  incorrectly  declared  goods  under  LVCR  by  means  of  risk  profiles  or 
randomly? 
☐YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
In  the  postal  company,  the  employee  performs  the  initial  check  (manual  risk  analysis)  of  the  items  and  if 
there is a doubt, directs it to customs clearance. The postal workers are trained by the customs.  
For postal and express consignments having a commercial purpose a random selection criterion is applied. 
100% of the parcels with the declared value below EUR 22.00 are directed for checking.  
Q.  1.4  Have  you  ensured  that  there  are  any  specific  control  measures  in  place  to  prevent  artificial 
splitting  of  consignments,  aiming  to  benefit  from  duty  relief?☐YES,  fully  implementing  the 
recommendation 
According 
Act 
(https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/521012014009/consolide):  (4)  The  customs  authorities  may  refuse  to 
accept separate customs declarations for parts of a consignment upon import if the value of a declared part 
of  the  consignment  does  not  exceed  the  tax  exempt  limit.  For  express  consignments  with  a  commercial 
purpose  the  customs  official  checks  manually  if  there  is  one  single  consignor,  consignee  and  shipment 
document.  For  postal  and  express  consignments  declared  by  private  persons  the  system  checks 
automatically the  tracking  number and  if  the same number has already  been used, then  it cannot be used 
again.  
Q.  1.5  Have  you  ensured  that  ex-post  controls  include  verifications  on  traders’  compliance  with 
customs duty relief for low-value consignments? ☐YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
Customs officials check regularly the quality of the declarations submitted by couriers and customs agents.  
Q.  1.5.a.  Are  authorised  economic  operators  (AEOs)  not  excluded  from  such  compliance 
checks?☐YES, fully implementing the recommendation - All AEOs are covered with the same risk criteria 
as non-AEOs and are also included in the quality control checks.  

Estonian 

Customs 

article 

37, 

the 

to 

of 

4 

§ 

51 

 
IE  Q.1.1. Have you enhanced and enforced your customs control strategies for cross-border e-commerce 
trade,  particularly  for  the  potential  abuse  of  low-value  consignments  reliefs  (LVCR)?☒YES,  fully 
implementing the recommendation 
Response:  To  enhance  and  enforce  our  Customs  Control  strategies  for  cross-border  e-commerce  trade, 
particularly for  the  potential abuse of low-value consignments reliefs ,  Customs Division  has various risk 
profiles in place for Clearance and Simplified Declarations at National and local station level. The profiles 
target all or a selection of the following factors on declarations: Amount, Origin, Net/Gross Mass, Express 
Carriers, Consignors and item level. Profiles are created in proportion to the overall risk and are monitored 
regularly for effectiveness.   
Q. 1.2 Have you ensured that your electronic customs declaration system does not automatically apply 
claimed duty relief on goods with (a) the declared intrinsic value above EUR 150, (b) on commercial 
consignments  declared  as  gifts  and  (c)  on  goods  ineligible  for  relief?☒YES,  fully  implementing  the 
recommendation 
Part  (a):  In  our  e-customs  declaration  system  (AEP)  code  CO7  is  input  in  Box  37b  for  consignments  of 
negligible value where the intrinsic value is less than €150. However, if the intrinsic value input is above 
€150 the appropriate rate of duty will be charged accordingly.  
Part (b): In our AEP system code CO8 is input in Box 37b for consignments where the customs value is less 
than €45. However, if the customs value input is above the threshold with C08 in Box 37b the appropriate 
rate of duty will be charged accordingly.  
Part  (c):  Although  we  do  not  have  a  built-in  validation  function  within  our  system  to  identify  goods 
ineligible  for  relief,  we  have  we  have  a  robust  risk  profiling  system  in  place  and  in  addition  to  this 
declarations  can  be  subject  random  inspection  or  to  a  verification  audit  as  part  of  our  ongoing  post 
clearance inspection programme.  
Q.  1.3  Have  you  ensured  that  your  electronic  customs  declaration  systems  systematically  detect 
potentially  undervalued  or  incorrectly  declared  goods  under  LVCR  by  means  of  risk  profiles  or 
randomly?☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
We  have  specific  risk  profiles  which  systematically  target  potentially  undervalued  or  incorrectly  declared 
goods.  As  noted  in  our  response  to  Q1.1  our  profiles  target  a  range  of  risk  factors  and  we  also  target 
consignments randomly. Additionally, we have created profiles specifically targeting each commodity code 
in Chapters 61-64 of the CN (textiles and footwear). While we have a significant amount of profiles in place 
to target undervalued/incorrectly declared goods, large scale profiling is subject to the proportionality test 
and impact assessment so as to avoid excessive and unnecessary profile hits at our customs stations.     
Q.  1.4  Have  you  ensured  that  there  are  any  specific  control  measures  in  place  to  prevent  artificial 
splitting  of  consignments,  aiming  to  benefit  from  duty  relief?☒YES,  partly  implementing  the 
recommendation 
We acknowledge that the issue raises serious risks from a fiscal perspective and we are exploring the best 
avenues  of  approach  with  a  view  to  full  implementation  by  the  date  of  the  introduction  of  IOSS  on  the 
01/01/21. 
Q.  1.5  Have  you  ensured  that  ex-post  controls  include  verifications  on  traders’  compliance  with 
customs duty relief for low-value consignments? ☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
IE  has  a  post  clearance  programmes  unit  in  place  that  has  planning  policy  in  accordance  with  identified 
priorities  with  relevant  monitoring  and  controls  in  place,  utilising  available  risk  analysis  and  risk 
assessment  tools.  Within  our  electronic  Customs  Risk,  Intervention,  Selection  Programme  (CRISP),  there 
are categories of risk rules within which the risks surrounding low-value consignments are covered. 
For example:  
1. 
present in some but not all items and B46 Stat Value is greater than 150 euro.  
2. 
box 37, possible misuse of this code to avoid duty. 
52 
Q. 1.5.a. Are authorised economic operators (AEOs) not excluded from such compliance checks? 
☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
Response: AEOs are not excluded from any post clearance interventions including risks identified in CRISP.  

Use of C07 code in B37 (Consignments of negligible value) for Multi Item SAD where C07 code is 

Traders with 10 or more SADs within a 4 month period using the same CN code with code C07 in 

 
EL 

Q.1.1. Have you enhanced and enforced your customs control strategies for cross-border e-commerce 
trade, particularly for  the  potential  abuse of low-value consignments  reliefs (LVCR)?  ☒YES, partly 
implementing the recommendation 

IAPR (Independent Authority for Public Revenue) – CUSTOMS: The Operational Plan of the IAPR includes 
quantitative targets for controls on e-commerce consignments. The measures taken include the introduction 
of  a  primary  inspection  prior  to  submission  of  the  document,  stepping  up  the  means  of  control  (x-rays, 
radiation detectors, sniffer dogs), etc. 

Q. 1.2 Have you ensured that your electronic customs declaration system does not automatically apply 
claimed duty relief on goods with (a) the declared intrinsic value above EUR 150, (b) on commercial 
consignments  declared  as  gifts  and  (c)  on  goods  ineligible  for  relief?☒YES,  partly  implementing  the 
recommendation 

IAPR  (Independent  Authority  for  Public  Revenue)  –  CUSTOMS:  In  the  case  of  goods  not  eligible  for 
exemption, the electronic system does not automatically apply claimed customs duty relief. In the other two 
cases the claimed customs duty relief is not automatically applied, but only after the special codes have been 
filled  in.  For  a  more  comprehensive  approach,  customs  officers  make  a  primary  inspection  before  the 
electronic  submission  of  the  document,  where  infringements  are  often  found  (e.g.  false  declaration  as  a 
gift/low value, etc.). Please note that there are inherent difficulties in managing the customs declaration as 
regards identifying risks. 

Q.  1.3  Have  you  ensured  that  your  electronic  customs  declaration  systems  systematically  detect 
potentially  undervalued  or  incorrectly  declared  goods  under  LVCR  by  means  of  risk  profiles  or 
randomly?☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 

IAPR (Independent Authority for Public Revenue) – CUSTOMS: There are general and specific risk profiles 
as well as randomness profiles. However, lack of data hampers the effectiveness of targeting and controls. 

Q.  1.4  Have  you  ensured  that  there  are  any  specific  control  measures  in  place  to  prevent  artificial 
splitting  of  consignments,  aiming  to  benefit  from  duty  relief?☒YES,  fully  implementing  the 
recommendation 

Q.  1.5  Have  you  ensured  that  ex-post  controls  include  verifications  on  traders’  compliance  with 
customs duty relief for low-value consignments? ☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 

IAPR  (Independent  Authority  for  Public  Revenue)  –  CUSTOMS:  The  recommendation  is  applied  in  full 
where an import document (declaration) is presented on the basis of a local risk analysis, whereas in cases 
where  an  ‘oral’  import  declaration  (non-statistical  SAD)  is  presented  the  recommendation  is  partially 
implemented. 

Q.  1.5.a.  Are  authorised  economic  operators  (AEOs)  not  excluded  from  such  compliance 
checks?☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

53 

 
ES  Q.1.1. Have you enhanced and enforced your customs control strategies for cross-border e-commerce trade, 
particularly for the potential abuse of low-value consignments reliefs (LVCR)?☒YES, fully implementing 
the recommendation 

Risk  profiles  are  updated  taken  in  account  the  new  trends  identified  by  the  Customs  Department  of  the 
Spanish Tax Agency. 

Q. 1.2 Have you ensured that your electronic customs declaration system does not automatically apply 
claimed duty relief on goods with (a) the declared intrinsic value above EUR 150, (b) on commercial 
consignments  declared  as  gifts  and  (c)  on  goods  ineligible  for  relief?  ☒YES,  fully  implementing  the 
recommendation 

Intrinsic  value  is  not  a  data  included  in  the  customs  declarations.  Traders  have  to  request  the  exemption 
including the corresponding codes in box 37.2 of customs declaration. Based on the customs value (and its 
adjustments) declared risk profiles are applied in order to detect incorrect declarations. 

Q. 1.3 Have you ensured that your ECS systematically detect potentially undervalued or incorrectly 
declared  goods  under  LVCR  by  means  of  risk  profiles  or  randomly?☒YES,  fully  implementing  the 
recommendation 

Risk  profiles  have  been  implemented  for  control  in  Simplified  Customs  Declarations  in  low  value 
consignments.  194  specific  and  3  random  risk  profiles  have  been  in  force  in  2019.  72.400  customs 
declarations have been controlled due to this 197 risk profiles. 

Q.  1.4  Have  you  ensured  that  there  are  any  specific  control  measures  in  place  to  prevent  artificial 
splitting  of  consignments,  aiming  to  benefit  from  duty  relief?☒YES,  partly  implementing  the 
recommendation 

Risk profiles are in force, but splitting is very difficult to detect. In case of detection, proper measures will 
be applied.    

Q.  1.5  Have  you  ensured  that  ex-post  controls  include  verifications  on  traders’  compliance  with 
customs duty relief for low-value consignments? ☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

Regular exchange of data with courier companies and controls over final consignees. 

Q.  1.5.a.  Are  authorised  economic  operators  (AEOs)  not  excluded  from  such  compliance  checks?☒YES, 
fully implementing the recommendation 

AEO are not excluded of controls. 

54 

 
FR 

Q.1.1. Have you enhanced and enforced your customs control strategies for cross-border e-commerce 
trade, particularly for the potential abuse of low-value consignments reliefs (LVCR)?☒YES, fully 

Low  value  consignments  are  handled  electronically  and  are  subject  to  checks.  Risk  analysis  and 
investigations are carried out in order to detect undervaluation. This is to ensure that duty relief for goods 
with a value lower than EUR 150 has been lawfully granted (see answers below). 

Q. 1.2 Have you ensured that your electronic customs declaration system does not automatically apply 
claimed duty relief on goods with (a) the declared intrinsic value above EUR 150, (b) on commercial 
consignments  declared  as  gifts  and  (c)  on  goods  ineligible  for  relief?☒YES,  fully  implementing  the 
recommendation. 

A/  For  trade  flows  (B2B  and  B2C):  The French customs clearance system, Delta, is  programmed to not 
grant  relief  from  customs  duties  automatically  for  goods  with  a  declared  value  lower  than  EUR  150. 
Automated  checks  have  been  put  in  place  to  ensure  duty  relief  is  granted  appropriately.  Duty  relief  is 
granted if the following two conditions are met: 

- 

the trader must include an additional Community code (C07) in the customs declaration; 

this code generates an automated admissibility check in Delta to ensure that the value declared in 

- 
box 42 of the customs declaration does not exceed EUR 150. 

B/ For non-trade flows (C2C): VAT and duty-free entry are set at EUR 45. Duty relief is granted subject to 
the verification of the following two conditions: 

the  trader  must  include  an  additional  Community  code  (C08)  in  the  customs  declaration,  used  to 

- 
declare C2C goods with a value lower than EUR 45; 

this  code  generates  an  automatic  admissibility  check  in  Delta  to  ensure  that  the  value  declared  in 

- 
box 42 of the SAD does not exceed EUR 45. 

If  the  codes  are  not  provided,  the  goods  are  taxed  and  the  amount  of  duties  and  tax  are  calculated 
automatically. 

Q.  1.3  Have  you  ensured  that  your  electronic  customs  declaration  systems  systematically  detect 
potentially  undervalued  or  incorrectly  declared  goods  under  LVCR  by  means  of  risk  profiles  or 
randomly?☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

The  French  customs  authorities  have  effectively  implemented  risk  analysis  and  automated  targeting  for 
these flows in order to combat tax evasion.  

Risk analysis and automated targeting: We have defined risk criteria and have integrated risk profiles into 
our  IT  system.  Indeed,  the  French  customs  clearance  system  Delta  is  connected  to  an  application 
specifically dedicated to automated risk analysis (RMS or Risk Management System).  Risk profiles can be 
integrated at local, regional or national levels. These profiles are aimed in particular at detecting customs 
undervaluation. 

Combatting  undervaluation  is  a  priority  for  the  French  customs  authorities.  The  objective  is  both  the 
recovery of customs duties and the recovery of VAT. The French customs authorities are currently updating 
their  targeting  IT  tools,  particularly  the  RMS  application,  so  that  the  H7  declaration  can  be  used.  It  has 
been  decided  that  checks  on  flows  cleared  through  customs  using  the  H7  declaration  will  be  carried  out 
following an automated risk analysis but also by random selection. 

Random  selection  checks  during  customs  clearance:  The  French  customs  authorities  have  decided  to 
continue to give staff the possibility of randomly checking declared goods, although automated selection is 
the only way to check declarations lodged for conventional freight. 

Q.  1.4  Have  you  ensured  that  there  are  any  specific  control  measures  in  place  to  prevent  artificial 
splitting of consignments, aiming to benefit from duty relief?☒NO  

55 

This type of risk is not taken into account by our customs clearance IT system (Delta), but will however be 
dealt with as part of the update to our declaration targeting IT system (RMS). 

 
HR 

Q.1.1. Have you enhanced and enforced your customs control strategies for cross-border e-commerce 
trade, particularly for the potential abuse of low-value consignments reliefs (LVCR)?☒NO 

Upgrades and improvements are planned for the new customs declaration (H7) which will be in production 
from 1 January 2021. By then, the current system cannot be upgraded. 

Q. 1.2 Have you ensured that your electronic customs declaration system does not automatically apply 
claimed duty relief on goods with (a) the declared intrinsic value above EUR 150, (b) on commercial 
consignments  declared  as  gifts  and  (c)  on  goods  ineligible  for  relief?☒YES,  partly  implementing  the 
recommendation 

Customs  declarations  used  for  declaring  these  kinds  of  duty  relieves  are  under  control  by  risk  analysis 
profiles. There is no automatic applying of this duty relief.  However, consignments under 22 EUR of value 
are not declared by a customs declaration.   

Q.  1.3  Have  you  ensured  that  your  electronic  customs  declaration  systems  systematically  detect 
potentially  undervalued  or  incorrectly  declared  goods  under  LVCR  by  means  of  risk  profiles  or 
randomly?☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 

No  customs  declaration  is  submitted  for  small  value  consignments,  under  22  EUR,  and  no  risk  analysis 
profiles can be applied. 

Q.  1.4  Have  you  ensured  that  there  are  any  specific  control  measures  in  place  to  prevent  artificial 
splitting  of  consignments,  aiming  to  benefit  from  duty  relief?☒YES,  partly  implementing  the 
recommendation 

I case of a doubt, customs officers check Internet orders to control if certain consignments are distributed 
deliberately for applying a duty relief. 

Q.  1.5  Have  you  ensured  that  ex-post  controls  include  verifications  on  traders’  compliance  with 
customs duty relief for low-value consignments? ☒NO 

Q. 1.5.a. Are authorised economic operators (AEOs) not excluded from such compliance checks? 

☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation  

56 

 
 
IT 

Q.1.1. Have you enhanced and enforced your customs control strategies for cross-border e-commerce 
trade,  particularly  for  the  potential  abuse  of  low-value  consignments  reliefs  (LVCR)?☒YES,  partly 
implementing the recommendation 

The  answer  "yes  partly"  is  justified  by  the  "Memorandum"  stipulated  by  the  Customs  and  Monopolies 
Agency that allows the operators to use a single customs tariff code in cases of declarations of goods under 
LVCR.Anyway,  specific  risk  profiles  have  been  set  up  within  the  system  of  selecting  customs  declarations 
carried by the main operators in the sector. A working group has been set up, coordinated between central 
and local offices, dedicated to carrying out specific analyses, monitoring and controls at express and postal 
courier companies. 

Q. 1.2 Have you ensured that your electronic customs declaration system does not automatically apply 
claimed duty relief on goods with (a) the declared intrinsic value above EUR 150, (b) on commercial 
consignments  declared  as  gifts  and  (c)  on  goods  ineligible  for  relief?☒YES,  partly  implementing  the 
recommendation 

Given that the concept of intrinsic value expressed in the application is not applicable as it refers to future 
developments in the field of ecommerce; the following is represented:In application of the recommendation 
1 first point the controls currently implemented in the national IT system ensured not automatically apply 
claimed relief to low value shipments when the value presented to customs exceeds € 150;The identification 
of "gift" shipments is not currently detectable by the IT system as this indication is contained in box 44 in the 
free text subfield. 

Q.  1.3  Have  you  ensured  that  your  electronic  customs  declaration  systems  systematically  detect 
potentially  undervalued  or  incorrectly  declared  goods  under  LVCR  by  means  of  risk  profiles  or 
randomly?☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

The Customs Declaration Selection System provides both risk profiles with specific indicators and random 
selections. 

Q.  1.4  Have  you  ensured  that  there  are  any  specific  control  measures  in  place  to  prevent  artificial 
splitting  of  consignments,  aiming  to  benefit  from  duty  relief?☒YES,  partly  implementing  the 
recommendation 

Regarding  the  traffic  B  to  B  the  answer  is  “yes  partially”  because  we  are  planning  to  set  up  guidelines 
focused on the prevention of the artificial splitting of consignments. These guidelines are going to be issued 
taking into account the specific future results of the IOSS working group of the DG Taxud.  Regarding  the 
traffic B to C the answer is “no” due to the specific guidelines drawn up in the IOSS working group of the 
DG Taxud. These guidelines say that “each order is considered a separate supply irrespective of whether it 
is  a  single  vendor  or  underlying  supplier  selling  via  electronic  interfaces.  As  each  separate  order/supply 
does  not  exceed  EUR  150,  the  IOSS  should  be  applied  by  the  underlying  supplier/electronic  interface 
registered  in  the  IOSS.  If  multiple  orders  are  packed  together  they  will  be  considered  as  single 
consignment”. 

Q.  1.5  Have  you  ensured  that  ex-post  controls  include  verifications  on  traders’  compliance  with 
customs duty relief for low-value consignments? ☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

Specific  indications  issued  in  the  2017  in  which,  among  other  things,  the  selection  of  operators  for  PCA  
involves also who import goods at risk of under-invoicing. In addition, the SIDDA IT procedure carried out 
a  periodic  detection  of  the  anomalous  values  of  certain  parameters  of  customs  declarations  (statistical 
value/weight;  additional  statistical  value/additional  unit  [if  available];  additional  weight/unit  [if 
available]). Based on these findings, the Statistical Analysis Office sent an e-mail to the Registration Offices 
(Customs/S.O.T.)  for  each  (single)  transaction  that  was  found  to  be  outlier  for  the  purposes  of  ex  post 
controls. Specific guidelines for combating under-invoicing in after-examinations are  also included in the 
guidelines  for  the  controls  issued  in  the  2011.  It  is  also  pointed  out  that  -  the  Italian  Government  has 

57 

 
CY  Q.1.1. Have you enhanced and enforced your customs control strategies for cross-border e-commerce 

trade, particularly for the potential abuse of low-value consignments reliefs (LVCR)?☒ NO 

We are in the process to implement a new system in 2022. 

Q. 1.2 Have you ensured that your electronic customs declaration system does not automatically apply 
claimed duty relief on goods with (a) the declared intrinsic value above EUR 150, (b) on commercial 
consignments  declared  as  gifts  and  (c)  on  goods  ineligible  for  relief?☒YES,  fully  implementing  the 
recommendation 

Specifications  (as  rules)  were  created  in  the  national  application  to  prevent  the  above  cases  from  being 
submitted. 

Q. 1.3 Have you ensured that your ECS systematically detect potentially undervalued or incorrectly 
declared  goods  under  LVCR  by  means  of  risk  profiles  or  randomly?☒ YES, partly implementing the 
recommendation 

The  risk  analysis  on  low  value  goods  is  done  manually  by  customs  officers  who  select  for  control  goods 
suspected  to  be  undervalued.  About  2%  of  the  consignments  that  are  selected  for  control  found  to  be 
undervalued.  

Q.  1.4  Have  you  ensured  that  there  are  any  specific  control  measures  in  place  to  prevent  artificial 
splitting  of  consignments,  aiming  to  benefit  from  duty  relief?☒YES,  partly  implementing  the 
recommendation 

During manual check of manifest report, customs officers are trying to detect shipments that may concern 
the same consignment. Such cases have very rarely been identified. 

Q.  1.5  Have  you  ensured  that  ex-post  controls  include  verifications  on  traders’  compliance  with 
customs duty relief for low-value consignments? ☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

A big case of undervaluation was detected concerning the importation of electronic cigarettes from China. 

Q.  1.5.a.  Are  authorised  economic  operators  (AEOs)  not  excluded  from  such  compliance 
checks?☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

Compliance was confirmed. 

58 

 
LV  Q.1.1. Have you enhanced and enforced your customs control strategies for cross-border e-commerce 
trade,  particularly  for  the  potential  abuse  of  low-value  consignments  reliefs  (LVCR)?☒YES,  fully 
implementing the recommendation  
Since  19  November  2019  in  Latvia  import  customs  declarations  must  be  lodged  for  postal  consignments. 
This functionality has been introduced in the national electronic customs data processing system (EMDAS). 
A  strategy  of  control  for  postal  consignments  has  been  developed  and  put  into  practice.Natural  persons 
declare consignments with a value exceeding EUR 22. Import customs declarations for postal consignments 
are released after the risk analysis has been done. Consignments with value of less than EUR 22 are subject 
to control measures within the Customs Control Point. Consignments are diverted for control in the event of 
justified  suspicions  or  random  selection.  Risk  mitigation  measures  are  also  implemented  for  customs 
declarations with total amount more than 500 (EUR or USD) with a view to preventing unjustified use of the 
additional procedure C07( consignments of negligible value). 
Q. 1.2 Have you ensured that your electronic customs declaration system does not automatically apply 
claimed duty relief on goods with (a) the declared intrinsic value above EUR 150, (b) on commercial 
consignments  declared  as  gifts  and  (c)  on  goods  ineligible  for  relief?☒YES,  fully  implementing  the 
recommendation.  
Electronic  customs  data  processing  system  does  not  allow  to  automatically  apply  claimed  duty  relief  on 
postal consignments with a value of more than EUR 150.Risk profile has been created especially to control 
gifts and goods eligible for relief (additional procedure C08 (consignments sent from one private individual 
to  another),  59S  (VAT  exemption)  and  29S  (Customs  duty:  2.5%  for  goods  received  by  individuals  in 
consignments from private persons or travellers' personal luggage)). 
Q.  1.3  Have  you  ensured  that  your  electronic  customs  declaration  systems  systematically  detect 
potentially  undervalued  or  incorrectly  declared  goods  under  LVCR  by  means  of  risk  profiles  or 
randomly?☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation.  
The possible unjustified use of customs tax reliefs for low-value consignments is prevented by risk profiles 
designed to select consignments of goods to in-depth customs control. For postal consignments one of main 
risks  is  undervaluation  and  specific  risk  profiles  have  been  set  up  to  tackle  this.  Risky  companies  and 
natural persons are profiled, but taking into consideration the huge amounts of postal consignments main 
risk mitigation measure is random profiles with specific criteria. Consignments where customs debt is less 
than EUR 10 may not be charged (not recovered) in accordance with Article 88 of Regulation 2015/2446.  It 
is taken into account in the preparation of risk profiles. 
Q.  1.4  Have  you  ensured  that  there  are  any  specific  control  measures  in  place  to  prevent  artificial 
splitting  of  consignments,  aiming  to  benefit  from  duty  relief?☒YES,  fully  implementing  the 
recommendation 
Cases  of  artificial  splitting  of  consignments  are  identified  in  the  post-clearance  process,  by  analysing  the 
consignees list and by selecting the consignees with the biggest number of submitted declarations. National 
Customs board of Latvia is sending the information to authorised authority in the State Revenue Service to 
carry out audits. 
Q.  1.5  Have  you  ensured  that  ex-post  controls  include  verifications  on  traders’  compliance  with 
customs duty relief for low-value consignments? ☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
Consignees who receive a lot of low-value consignments in short time period are identified for the risk of 
unregistered business, therefore National Customs board of Latvia is sending this information to authorised 
authority in the State Revenue Service to carry out audits. 
It is not common practice to carry out post-clearance checks on low-value consignments, since the benefits 
are  disproportionate  to  the  amount  of  recovered  duties.  In  Latvia,  controls  for  small-value  shipments  are 
carried out during customs clearance stage. However, where there is an obvious irregularity and customs 
debt is more than EUR 10, customs declarations are selected for post-clearance verification. 
Q. 1.5.a. Are authorised economic operators (AEOs) not excluded from such compliance checks? 
☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
Authorised economic operators (AEOs) are not excluded from checks during customs clearance as well as 
from post-clearance checks. 

59 

 
 
LT 

Q.1.1. Have you enhanced and enforced your customs control strategies for cross-border e-commerce 
trade,  particularly  for  the  potential  abuse  of  low-value  consignments  reliefs  (LVCR)?☒YES,  partly 
implementing the recommendation 

The Customs of the Republic of Lithuania has developed and approved its Operational Strategy in the Area 
of Controls that defines the fields, methods, organisational measures and actions of the controls. The control 
of e-commerce is among the fields of controls defined in this Strategy. To ensure the customs control in the 
manner  prescribed  by  the  law,  the  Customs  of  the  Republic  of  Lithuania  carries  out  the  all  the  customs 
controls  by  applying  various  methods  and  measures  that  are,  in  its  view,  necessary  to  ensure  the  right 
application of the customs operational rules and other legal acts regulating the movement of goods between 
the customs territory of the Community and the third countries or in the customs territory of the Community. 
The customs controls are ensured in the following three stages 1) prior to the customs clearance of goods; 
2) at the time of the customs clearance of goods; 3) post to the customs clearance and release of goods.  The 
controls of the goods at the time of the customs clearance and after the customs clearance is based on the 
risk  assessment  results.  The  detailed  customs  valuation  control  at  the  time  of  the  customs  clearance  and 
after  the  customs  clearance  is  regulated  by  the  Rules  of  Controls  of  the  Customs  Valuation  of  Imported 
Goods approved on 28 April 2004 by Order No. 1B-431 of the General Director of the Customs Department 
under  the  Ministry  of  Finance  of  the  Republic  of  Lithuania.  The  above-mentioned  Rules  indicate  the 
measures applicable to the controls of customs valuation, the items and documents subject to controls and 
decisions to be taken by the customs official performing the controls. 

Q. 1.2 Have you ensured that your electronic customs declaration system does not automatically apply 
claimed duty relief on goods with (a) the declared intrinsic value above EUR 150, (b) on commercial 
consignments  declared  as  gifts  and  (c)  on  goods  ineligible  for  relief?☒YES,  partly  implementing  the 
recommendation 

1. In accordance with Article 141 (3) and (4) and Article 144 of the Commission delegated Regulation (EU) 
2015/2446, postal consignments are declared by providing the forms defined by the Universal Postal Union 
(CN22, CN23, etc.): 

(a) where value of the goods in the postal consignment does not exceed EUR 1 000;  

(b) no application for repayment or remission is made in relation these goods;  

(c) they are not subject to prohibitions and restrictions.  

(AB  Lietuvos  Pastas  is  the  postal  service  provider  in  the  Republic  of  Lithuania.  Therefore,  AB  Lietuvos 
Pastas alone may carry ou the import, export and transit of postal consignemnts by using CN22, CN23 form 
declarationas in the Republic of Lithuania). 

(d) Postal undertaking sorts the goods received in the postal consigmnments in the distribution centre:  

-where value of the goods in the postal consignment is higher than EUR 22 Eur but lower than EUR 150, the 
customs calculates the VAT on importation; 

- where value of the goods in the postal consignment is higher than EUR 150 Eur but lower than EUR 1000, 
the customs calculates the customs duty, excise and VAT on importation A local risk is applicable and all 
the goods brought in postal consignments are subject to customs controls by scanning. 

Where criteria set out in (a)-(c) are not met or where the senders or receivers of the goods whish to declare 
the  goods  themselves  (having  informed  the  Lithuanian  postal  undertaking  about  that  in  writing  (e-mail, 
phone)  prior  to  the  provision  of  the  goods  in  postal  consignments  to  the  customs,    a  standard  electronic 
import  declaration  should  be  submited  on  the  electronic  Customs  Clearance  Systam  (MDAS).  Therefore, 
here an automated risk assessment is applied. 

2. Carriage of consignments without using the forms defined by the Universal Postal Union (CN22, CN23, 
etc.): 

60 

(a)  low  value  good  (up  to  EUR  22)  carried  in  small  consignments  (e.  g.  by  Express  courriers)  may  be 
subject to oral declaration. In these cases, local risk may be applicable. 

 
LU  Q.1.1. Have you enhanced and enforced your customs control strategies for cross-border e-commerce 
trade,  particularly  for  the  potential  abuse  of  low-value  consignments  reliefs  (LVCR)?☒YES,  fully 
implementing the recommendation 
In addition to the general electronic customs clearance system (PLDA IETA) and its rules engine applicable 
for  electronic  customs  declarations,  Customs  deployed  an  IT  solution  (DAkOTA)  especially  dedicated  to 
electronic risk analysis of structured pre-arrival consignment-level data related to low value shipments. This 
system is used to perform pre-arrival safety & security, national prohibitions & restrictions and fiscal risk 
analysis. The data is exchanged on a regular basis with LU competent authority for VAT. Customs controls 
are based on electronic risk profiles as well as on manual selection by customs officers. This dedicated IT 
solution for LVC risk analysis was set up in order to best meet the provisions of art. 104 (Waiver to lodge 
entry  summary  declarations  in  regard  of  LVC  <  22  EUR)  as  well  as  of  art.  141  (Acts  deemed  to  be  a 
customs declaration, LVC < 22 EUR) of Commission delegated regulation (EU) 2015/2446 of 28 July 2015. 
DAkOTA is primarily used for risk analysis purposes and the data provided there is not to be considered as 
electronic customs declarations as such. The latter are lodged in PLDA IETA whenever required. 
Q. 1.2 Have you ensured that your electronic customs declaration system does not automatically apply 
claimed duty relief on goods with (a) the declared intrinsic value above EUR 150, (b) on commercial 
consignments  declared  as  gifts  and  (c)  on  goods  ineligible  for  relief?  ☒YES,  fully  implementing  the 
recommendation 
Customs  implemented  both  declaration  processing  and  risk  rules  in  their  electronic  customs  clearance 
system  in  order  to  prevent  the  misuse  of  relief  codes.  AEO’s  are  not  excluded  from  these  rules.  Post-
clearance controls by Audit unit also cover declarations declared under LVCR. 
Q.  1.3  Have  you  ensured  that  your  electronic  customs  declaration  systems  systematically  detect 
potentially  undervalued  or  incorrectly  declared  goods  under  LVCR  by  means  of  risk  profiles  or 
randomly? ☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
For this purpose, apply electronic risk profiles as well as random selections. Any available risk information 
on LVC is assessed and the necessary risk profiles are created whenever relevant. 
Q.  1.4  Have  you  ensured  that  there  are  any  specific  control  measures  in  place  to  prevent  artificial 
splitting  of  consignments,  aiming  to  benefit  from  duty  relief?☒YES,  fully  implementing  the 
recommendation 
Making LVC data available by electronic means allows inter alia the alphabetic sorting of operator names, 
which  is  efficient  in  this  regard.  Furthermore,  the  detection  of  this  risk  is  in  the  scope  of  post-clearance 
checks. 
Q.  1.5  Have  you  ensured  that  ex-post  controls  include  verifications  on  traders’  compliance  with 
customs duty relief for low-value consignments? ☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
The  Audit  Inspection  regularly  monitors  LVCR  imports.  Searches  are  carried  out  manually  and  focus  on 
consignees and as well as on goods. The purpose of the checks is to detect commercial networks and goods’ 
under-valuation. 
Q.  1.5.a.  Are  authorised  economic  operators  (AEOs)  not  excluded  from  such  compliance  checks? 
☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
Customs do not distinguish between economic operators. 

61 

 
HU 

Q.1.1. Have you enhanced and enforced your customs control strategies for cross-border e-commerce 
trade,  particularly  for  the  potential  abuse  of  low-value  consignments  reliefs  (LVCR)?☒YES,  fully 
implementing the recommendation 

Cross-border e-commerce in particular creates possibilities for the abuse of low-value consignments reliefs, 
requiring the Customs authorities to take coordinated action to prevent, detect and contain them and ensure 
traditional own resources are properly recovered. As a rule, the legal frameworks and possibilities in law 
for action by the Customs authorities are  provided for  in the Union’s customs legislation, which does not 
recognise e-commerce as a separate concept and does not prescribe separate procedures relating to it. With 
regard  to  cross-border  e-commerce,  the  National  Tax  and  Customs  Administration  (NTCA)  drew  up  a 
separate strategy for 2020, taking into account the initial recommendation made in the PIF report for 2018. 
On 1 January  2021, an EU  package will enter into force that will fundamentally change how small-value 
consignments  are  handled:  VAT  will  have  to  be paid  on  them  irrespective  of  the  amount  involved  and,  to 
ensure VAT is recovered, data will have to be submitted in advance. Basically, the centralised operational 
risk assessment incorporated in the processing of customs procedures serves to eliminate possible abuses. 
However, the Customs administration receives data only about consignments with a value exceeding EUR 
22, which the customs data processor allows to be entered into the system. The risk assessment is therefore 
automated.  Consignments  registered  as  having  a  value  of  less  than  EUR  22  may  not  be  recorded  in  a 
customs declaration, so the customs authority does not possess the data on the basis of which those items 
could  have  been  made  subject  to  centralised  operational  risk  analysis.  Low-value  consignments  delivered 
via e-commerce are typically, though not always, sent by mail or courier, so the task falls specifically within 
the  remit  of  the  NTCA’s  Airport  Directorate.  There  is  close  cooperation  between  postal  and  courier 
services; the scope and tasks of Customs and the postal services are laid down in so-called ‘technological 
agreements’. In 2019, the NTCA’s Airport Directorate inspected a total of 929,893 consignments; of these, 
87,711 were selected for further inspection following a risk assessment. If the customs inspection concluded 
that  the  value  of  goods  in  the  consignment  exceeded  EUR  22,  the  NTCA’s  Airport  Directorate  requested 
documents furnishing proof of the true customs value (the original invoice and proof of payment) from the 
customs broker. On the basis of the documents provided, more than 80% of the items selected revealed that 
their  respective  consignments  had  arrived  undervalued  in  order  to  evade  customs  and  VAT  payments. 
However, a declaration of the true customs value is submitted on the basis of the documents enclosed by the 
customer, so the goods can be released for free circulation only when the customs and VAT payments have 
been made.  It should also be pointed out that, on several occasions in 2019, an inspection revealed other 
infringements. For example, goods infringing intellectual property rights or products subject to prohibitive 
or restrictive measures were detected in consignments registered for a duty-free procedure. In the light of 
the above, it can be said that, both for consignments of less than EUR 22 in value and those of more than 
EUR 22 in value, the NTCA’s Airport Directorate implemented measures in keeping with the objectives of 
the above strategy by carrying out a centralised operational risk analysis with a full manual handling risk 
assessment or detection activities inherently linked thereto. 

Q. 1.2 Have you ensured that your electronic customs declaration system does not automatically apply 
claimed duty relief on goods with (a) the declared intrinsic value above EUR 150, (b) on commercial 
consignments  declared  as  gifts  and  (c)  on  goods  ineligible  for  relief?  ☒YES,  fully  implementing  the 
recommendation 

Where the scope of items (e.g. items subject to thresholds or quantitative limits) under Council Regulation 
(EC)  No  1186/2009  setting  up  a  Community  system  of  reliefs  from  customs  duty  permitted,  filters  were 
incorporated  into  the  customs  data  processing  system  (through  IT  development)  and,  in  certain  cases, 
systematic risk profiles were generated.   

Q.  1.3  Have  you  ensured  that  your  electronic  customs  declaration  systems  systematically  detect 
potentially  undervalued  or  incorrectly  declared  goods  under  LVCR  by  means  of  risk  profiles  or 
randomly?☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

62 

For low-value consignments, more risk profiles have been put in place since the middle of 2019 onwards. 

 
MT 

Q.1.1. Have you enhanced and enforced your customs control strategies for cross-border e-commerce 
trade, particularly for the potential abuse of low-value consignments reliefs (LVCR)?☒NO 

The  Customs  Electronic  System  does  not  cater  for  detection  of  such  declarations  however  a  selection  of 
these declarations are still verified through post clearance checks and through random selection. 

Q. 1.2 Have you ensured that your electronic customs declaration system does not automatically apply 
claimed duty relief on goods with (a) the declared intrinsic value above EUR 150, (b) on commercial 
consignments declared as gifts and (c) on goods ineligible for relief? ☒NO 

A change (upgrade) in the Customs electronic system will be requested from our service provider to address 
points (a), (b) and (c) of this question. 

Q.  1.3  Have  you  ensured  that  your  electronic  customs  declaration  systems  systematically  detect 
potentially  undervalued  or  incorrectly  declared  goods  under  LVCR  by  means  of  risk  profiles  or 
randomly? ☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

Q.  1.4  Have  you  ensured  that  there  are  any  specific  control  measures  in  place  to  prevent  artificial 
splitting of consignments, aiming to benefit from duty relief?☒NO 

By artificial splitting,  it is being  understood that  an individual may order 100 pieces  of product  ‘A’ from 
supplier ‘X’ and then orders the supplier to ship the goods in 4 different consignments of 25 pieces each so 
that  the  value  of  each  consignment  will  not  exceed  150  Euro.  The  assumption  here  is  that  the  4 
consignments are delivered under 4 different transport documents with the consignor bearing Supplier ‘X’ 
and  the  consignee  bearing  the  name  of  the  individual  who  ordered  the  goods  in  the  first  instance.  In  this 
instance  the  Customs  system  does  not  have  the  capabilities  to  highlight  that  these  four  consignments 
cumulatively form one whole original consignment, the value of which exceeds 150 Euro. In this vein, the 
Department is eager to learn whether such a detection mechanism exists and how it works so that it can be 
deployed locally. 

Q.  1.5  Have  you  ensured  that  ex-post  controls  include  verifications  on  traders’  compliance  with 
customs duty relief for low-value consignments?☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

Q.  1.5.a.  Are  authorised  economic  operators  (AEOs)  not  excluded  from  such  compliance  checks?  
☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation  

63 

 
NL 

Q.1.1. Have you enhanced and enforced your customs control strategies for cross-border e-commerce 
trade,  particularly  for  the  potential  abuse  of  low-value  consignments  reliefs  (LVCR)?☒YES,  fully 
implementing the recommendation 

E-commerce:  We  started  with  a  number  of  e-commerce  companies  to  decrease  the  risk  of  low  value 
consignments, this is done in close cooperation with the tax authorities and FIOD. Based on the conclusions 
of the audit of the European court of Auditors (ECA) regarding VAT and customs duties The Netherlands 
concluded a number of enforcement activities. Those activities were focusing on the import declarations and 
post clearance audits.   

Q. 1.2 Have you ensured that your electronic customs declaration system does not automatically apply 
claimed duty relief on goods with (a) the declared intrinsic value above EUR 150, (b) on commercial 
consignments declared as gifts and (c) on goods ineligible for relief?☒NO 

We don’t have implemented this in our system due to the fact that the customs value is not the same as the 
intrinsic value of a consignment (insurance costs and freight are not included).   

Q.  1.3  Have  you  ensured  that  your  electronic  customs  declaration  systems  systematically  detect 
potentially  undervalued  or  incorrectly  declared  goods  under  LVCR  by  means  of  risk  profiles  or 
randomly?☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

We have risk profiles.  

Q.  1.4  Have  you  ensured  that  there  are  any  specific  control  measures  in  place  to  prevent  artificial 
splitting  of  consignments,  aiming  to  benefit  from  duty  relief?☒YES,  fully  implementing  the 
recommendation 

We have developed and implemented a monitoring tool. 

Q.  1.5  Have  you  ensured  that  ex-post  controls  include  verifications  on  traders’  compliance  with 
customs duty relief for low-value consignments? ☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 

We have post clearance audits at a number of companies.  

Q.  1.5.a.  Are  authorised  economic  operators  (AEOs)  not  excluded  from  such  compliance 
checks?☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

No different approach. 

64 

 
 
AT 

Q.1.1. Have you enhanced and enforced your customs control strategies for cross-border e-commerce 
trade,  particularly  for  the  potential  abuse  of  low-value  consignments  reliefs  (LVCR)?☒YES,  fully 
implementing the recommendation 

Austria applies a multi layered risk analysis and control approach following the principles “control when 
required, where required and with the most appropriate control measure”. The Austrian risk management 
approach  in  the  field  of  low  value  consignments  is  a  combination  of  specific  electronic  risk  profiles,  risk 
profiles with a minimum control quota and focal control operations beside the electronic targeting system. 

Q. 1.2 Have you ensured that your electronic customs declaration system does not automatically apply 
claimed duty relief on goods with (a) the declared intrinsic value above EUR 150, (b) on commercial 
consignments  declared  as  gifts  and  (c)  on  goods  ineligible  for  relief?☒YES,  fully  implementing  the 
recommendation 

There are logical routines in the electronic customs systems which check the submitted data to exclude the 
risks of submitting falsified declarations. Whenever necessary these routines are supported by specific risk 
profiles. 

Q.  1.3  Have  you  ensured  that  your  electronic  customs  declaration  systems  systematically  detect 
potentially  undervalued  or  incorrectly  declared  goods  under  LVCR  by  means  of  risk  profiles  or 
randomly?☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

AT applies specific risk profiles as well as profiles for minimum control quota. 

Q.  1.4  Have  you  ensured  that  there  are  any  specific  control  measures  in  place  to  prevent  artificial 
splitting  of  consignments,  aiming  to  benefit  from  duty  relief?☒YES,  fully  implementing  the 
recommendation 

Q.  1.5  Have  you  ensured  that  ex-post  controls  include  verifications  on  traders’  compliance  with 
customs duty relief for low-value consignments? ☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

Ex post controls are carried out based on risk analysis. The risk “economic operator” is taken into account 
in the selection of cases subject to ex-post controls. 

Q.  1.5.a.  Are  authorised  economic  operators  (AEOs)  not  excluded  from  such  compliance 
checks?☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

65 

 
 
PL 

1.1  Have  you  enhanced  and  enforced  your  customs  control  strategies  for  cross-border  e  commerce 
trade,  particularly  for  the  potential  abuse  of  low-value  consignments  reliefs  (LVCR)?☒YES,  partly 
implementing the recommendation. 

In  September  2018  the  National  Revenue  Administration  (KAS)  started  work  on  optimising  the  clearance 
and  control  of  e-commerce  consignments.  The  main  aim  was  to  assess  the  amount  of  duty  that  might  be 
raised in the event of 100% checks on packages, assuming that each package was a mail order delivery, and 
the time and money it would cost the Administration to do so. The checks suggested that it would take an 
official assigned  to  carry out a  100% check on  a  consignment 1 working hour to receive  and process the 
documents received from the consignee and to check them against the customs declaration.  

In the light of the above actions and Article 144 of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/2446 of 28 
July 2015 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council as 
regards detailed rules concerning certain provisions of the Union Customs Code, a new customs clearance 
model  was  designed  for  postal  traffic.  The  document  proposes  new  legal,  organisational  and  IT  solutions 
connected with the need to introduce solutions ‘sealing’ traffic in low-value consignments (e-commerce). 

Work is now under way to adapt the customs clearance model for goods in consignments carried by postal 
and courier services. This is connected with the entry into force on 1 January 2021 of new tax rules, namely 
the VAT e-commerce package that translates into changes to EU customs rules through amendments to the 
Union Customs Code Delegated Regulation and the Union Customs Code Implementing Regulation. In the 
case of postal traffic, the amendments will have a broader reach than the VAT e-commerce package, as they 
will tie in with changes in Poczta Polska S.A.’s role in customs formalities. This change will see the postal 
operator  making  customs  declarations  as  the  indirect  representative  of  the  consignees  of  postal 
consignments.  Introducing  the  changes  arising  from  the  new  clearance  model  entails  adjustments  to  the 
national IT systems handling postal and courier traffic, major organisational changes and amendments to 
national law, especially tax law and customs rules, in particular the Regulation of the Minister for Finance 
of 17 August 2016 on customs declarations in postal traffic (Journal of Laws, item 1293). 

Owing  to  the  need  to  introduce  ‘sealing’  solutions  for  low-value  consignments,  a  national  analytical  unit 
(Strategic Analysis Centre) is preparing the terms of reference and scope of operations for checking postal 
and courier consignments containing low-value goods. 

1.2  Have  you  ensured  that  your  electronic  customs  declaration  system  does  not  automatically  apply 
claimed duty relief on goods with (a) the declared intrinsic value above EUR 150, (b) on commercial 
consignments  declared  as  gifts  and  (c)  on  goods  ineligible  for  relief?☒ YES, partly  implementing the 
recommendation 

Re a) In the system for handling import declarations, for goods with the additional procedure code C07 for 
customs duty relief for goods up to a value equivalent to EUR 150 (data requirement 1/11 from Annex B to 
Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/2446 - equivalent to the second section of box 37 of the SAD) 
a  rule  has  been  introduced  triggering  the  need  for  the  customs  authority  to  check  that  the  value  of  the 
consignment does not exceed the equivalent of EUR 150 (duty relief under Article 23 of Regulation (EC) No 
1186/2009). 

 Re b) Goods declared as gifts (duty relief under Article 25 of Regulation (EC) No 1186/2009) are largely 
declared  as  postal  consignments  under  Article  141(3)  and  the  second  subparagraph  of  Article  144  of 
Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/2446, which means that a customs declaration is submitted in 
the  form  of  an  act  deemed  to  be  a  customs  declaration  using  documents  CN22  and  CN23;  the  electronic 
customs declaration is not used in such cases. 

In  other  cases,  e.g.  courier  consignments,  electronic  customs  declarations  are  entered  in  the  system  for 
handling import declarations. However, because consignments of this type also benefit from VAT relief, they 
are declared in the form of a summary declaration (a number of consignments in a single-item declaration), 
so automatic checks on whether the value of a single consignment exceeds the ceiling for relief from customs 
duty (the equivalent of EUR 45) are not possible. 

66 

 
PT 

Q.1.1. Have you enhanced and enforced your customs control strategies for cross-border e commerce 
trade,  particularly  for  the  potential  abuse  of  low-value  consignments  reliefs  (LVCR)?  SPF  Finances 
(douane) ☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 

Portugal  has  significantly  enhanced  its  control  strategy  for  combating  traditional  own  resources  fraud  to 
cover all electronic customs declarations, and systematically applies risk analysis parameters based on risk 
indicators/risk  profiles.  Electronic  declarations  concerning  e-commerce  are  covered  by  these  measures 
when processing is mandatory. As regards the other declarations, PT is developing an IT support system for 
processing  electronic  declarations  relating  to  low-value  consignments,  in  line  with  the  timetable  for 
COM/MASP-C (the European Commission’s Multi-Annual Strategic Plan for Customs). In accordance with 
our  planning,  the  system  will  be  linked  to  a  risk  analysis  system  in  which  specific  risk  profiles  will  be 
entered  in  order  to  analyse  and  mitigate  the  risk  associated  with  low-value  consignments  traded  on 
electronic platforms (e-commerce consignments). 

Q. 1.2 Have you ensured that your electronic customs declaration system does not automatically apply 
claimed duty relief on goods with (a) the declared intrinsic value above EUR 150, (b) on commercial 
consignments  declared  as  gifts  and  (c)  on  goods  ineligible  for  relief?☒YES,  fully  implementing  the 
recommendation 

The system for automatically processing import customs declarations (STADA - Imports) does not allow the 
additional scheme code C07 to be declared if the value of the declared goods is in excess of EUR 150, nor 
does it allow code C08 to be declared if the value of the declared goods is in excess of EUR 45. In order to 
declare  other  additional  scheme  codes  in  the  C  series  (Relief  -  Regulation  (EC)  No  1186/2009),  the 
declarant  must  make  a  request  to  that  end,  to  be  analysed  by  the  customs  official  responsible.  STADA  - 
Imports also requires that the TARIC code always be declared in box 33 (Commodity  code) of the import 
declaration in order to ensure that prohibited goods cannot be cleared or that no import restrictions apply 
to the goods or, if such restrictions apply, that they are complied with. 

Q.  1.3  Have  you  ensured  that  your  electronic  customs  declaration  systems  systematically  detect 
potentially  undervalued  or  incorrectly  declared  goods  under  LVCR  by  means  of  risk  profiles  or 
randomly?☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

LVC declarations that qualify for duty relief pursuant to Article 23 of Regulation (EC) No 1186/2009 are 
customs  cleared  (released  for  free  circulation  and  consumption)  by  virtue  of  their  being  presented  to 
customs. Clearance through presentation to customs is processed using an electronic system that is linked to 
the  risk  analysis  system  (SSA  -  Sistema  de  Seleção  Automática  (Automatic  Selection  System)).  The  SSA 
systematically assesses the risk associated with each LVC. If a risk is identified through the combination of 
risk  indicators  based  on  risk  profiles,  the  SSA  selects  the  relevant  consignments,  which  then  undergo  a 
physical check by a customs officer. 

Q.  1.4  Have  you  ensured  that  there  are  any  specific  control  measures  in  place  to  prevent  artificial 
splitting  of  consignments,  aiming  to  benefit  from  duty  relief?☒YES,  partly  implementing  the 
recommendation 

Risk  profiles,  which  combine  risk  indicators,  are  applied.  Some  of  these  indicators  combine  the  declared 
value and, for example, the average weight, identifying possible inconsistencies. The systems are set up to 
detect  situations  where  a  split  consignment  is  declared  under  the  same  transport  document.  Measures  to 
enable the potential identification of split consignments carried on different means of transport or under the 
cover  of  different  transport  documents  are  being  examined  for  implementation.  They  are  based  on  the 
analysis of the frequency associated with an operator and other data in the declaration. Such measures are 
likely to be introduced from next year (2021). 

Q.  1.5  Have  you  ensured  that  ex-post  controls  include  verifications  on  traders’  compliance  with 
customs duty relief for low-value consignments? ☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 

67 

 
RO  Q.1.1. Have you enhanced and enforced your customs control strategies for cross-border e-commerce 

trade, particularly for the potential abuse of low-value consignments reliefs (LVCR)? ☒YES, partly 

implementing  the  recommendation  -Ministry  of  Public  Finances  –  National  Agency  for  Fiscal 
Administration – General Directorate of Customs: The fast development of the international e-commerce of 

goods and the increasing of the volume of low value shipments, as a result of the orders made by using the 
Internet made the adaptation of the customs authority activity through appropriate measures necessary, in 

order to facilitate the legitimate trade, to ensure a fast customs clearance process, and at the same time, for 
managing potential risks related to safety and security. In this respect the General Directorate of Customs 

was  focused  on:  1.  To  improve  cooperation  with  public  authorities,  national/international  organisations 
and private stakeholders for identification and prevention of the customs and/or fiscal frauds in the field of 

cross-border e-commerce. For instance, in 2018 the General Directorate of Customs concluded a Protocol 
with  the  National  Company  Posta  Romana  SA;  at  the  same  time,  there  are  also  in  place  protocols 

concluded  between  Customs  and  the  most  important  express  courier  companies,  outlining  each  other’s 
roles  and  responsibilities.  Those  Protocols  give  a  commitment  to  cooperation  between  high-level 

management.  Romanian  customs  authorities  have  established  inter-agency  cooperation  agreements  with 
relevant government authorities to prevent illicit trade and fraud (e.g.: Romanian Border Police, National 

Police).  2.  To  participate  to  the  Joint  actions/national  operations-  i.e.:  POSTBOX  at  European  level 
focused  on  counterfeiting  and  drugs.  At  the  same  time  national  customs  operations  were  carried  out 

quarterly,  focused  on  undervaluation  of  goods-  LVCR.  3.  To  improve  risk  analysis  and  management,  in 
order to prevent and fight against infringement of the customs/fiscal legal regulations on cross-border e-

commerce. 4. To participate to and carry on training/guidance activities at national and local level. 5. To 
monitor monthly the results of the customs controls performed on the postal/express couriers consignments 

as far as the difference between the value declared and the value effectively paid which is to be reflected in 
the VAT and customs duties (if applicable). At the same time, the type of goods submitted to the customs 

clearance is already taken into account in order to avoid the impact on the national/EU financial interests 
(e.g.: intellectual property rights field).  It can be highlighted that the Romanian Customs has developed an 

E-commerce  Strategy  containing  measures  meant  to  improve  the  customs  controls  on  the  postal/express 
courier consignments. The Draft is under consideration (in order to be approved) at the top management 

level.For the future the General Directorate of Customs has in view:  

  To  continue  to  participate  to  the  meetings  organised  under  the  Customs  Against  Internet  Crime 
(C@IC)  action,  within  the  current  10th  Action  Plan  of  the  Customs  Cooperation  Working  Party 
2020-2021  

  The  collaborative  work  with  partners  (NC  Posta  Romana  SA  and  Express  couriers)  to  be 

strengthened, more focused and developed;  

  Joint actions/operations to be encouraged;  

  Risk analysis and control activities to be enhanced; 

  Training activities at national and local level to be carried on. 

Q.  1.2  Have  you  ensured  that  your  electronic  customs  declaration  system  does  not  automatically 
apply  claimed  duty  relief  on  goods  with  (a)  the  declared  intrinsic  value  above  EUR  150,  (b)  on 

commercial  consignments  declared  as  gifts  and  (c)  on  goods  ineligible  for  relief?☒YES,  fully 

implementing the recommendation 
Ministry  of  Public  Finances  –  National  Agency  for  Fiscal  Administration  –  General  Directorate  of 

Customs: In 2018 a permanent risk profile was implemented at national level in the IT system that imposed 
the verification of the customs value declared for all the declarations containing the additional code CO7. 

Q.  1.3  Have  you  ensured  that  your  electronic  customs  declaration  systems  systematically  detect 
potentially  undervalued  or  incorrectly  declared  goods  under  LVCR  by  means  of  risk  profiles  or 

68 

randomly?☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 

 
Sl 

 Q.1.1. Have you enhanced and enforced your customs control strategies for cross-border e-commerce 
trade,  particularly  for  the  potential  abuse  of  low-value  consignments  reliefs  (LVCR)?☒YES,  fully 
implementing the recommendation 
Financial  Administration  of  the  Republic  Slovenia  answer:  Financial  administration  of  the  Republic  of 
Slovenia  has  enhanced  and  enforced  Slovenian  customs  control  strategies  for  cross-border  e-commerce 
trade,  particularly  for  the  potential  abuse  of  low-value  consignments  reliefs  (LVCR)  mostly  by  Slovenian 
risk analyses system (risk profiles). 
Q. 1.2 Have you ensured that your electronic customs declaration system does not automatically apply 
claimed duty relief on goods with (a) the declared intrinsic value above EUR 150, (b) on commercial 
consignments  declared  as  gifts  and  (c)  on  goods  ineligible  for  relief?☒YES,  fully  implementing  the 
recommendation 
Financial  Administration  of  the  Republic  Slovenia  answer:  The  Slovenian  electronic  customs  declaration 
systems  does  not  automatically  apply  claimed  duty  relief  on  goods  with  (a)  the  declared  intrinsic  value 
above  EUR  150,  (b)  on  commercial  consignments  declared  as  gifts  and  (c)  on  goods  ineligible  for  relief. 
This is ensured by Slovenian risk analyses system by means of risk profiles. 
Q.  1.3  Have  you  ensured  that  your  electronic  customs  declaration  systems  systematically  detect 
potentially  undervalued  or  incorrectly  declared  goods  under  LVCR  by  means  of  risk  profiles  or 
randomly?☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
Financial  Administration  of  the  Republic  Slovenia  answer:The  Slovenian  electronic  customs  declaration 
systems systematically detect potentially undervalued or incorrectly declared goods under LVCR by means 
of risk profiles. 
Q.  1.4  Have  you  ensured  that  there  are  any  specific  control  measures  in  place  to  prevent  artificial 
splitting  of  consignments,  aiming  to  benefit  from  duty  relief?☒YES,  partly  implementing  the 
recommendation 
Financial  Administration  of  the  Republic  Slovenia  answer:  The  prevention  of  artificial  splitting  of 
consignments, aiming to benefit from duty relief is ensured by Slovenian risk analyses system by means of 
risk  profiles,  and  agreement  between  Slovenian  post  and  Financial  administration  of  the  Republic  of 
Slovenia. 
Q.  1.5  Have  you  ensured  that  ex-post  controls  include  verifications  on  traders’  compliance  with 
customs duty relief for low-value consignments? ☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
Financial Administration of the Republic Slovenia answer: All the consignments of e-commerce are entered 
into Import Customs System (ICS) with metadata (such as consignor, consignee, short goods description, the 
price, the transport fees, customs code – not obligatory), which are available in time of release goods for 
free  circulation.  The  approach  for  selection  traders  ex-post  controls  in  this  area  takes  into  account  the 
parcels frequency of imports for particular consignor and/or consignee, the value of goods (low-value), the 
description/nature of goods. 
Q. 1.5.a. Are authorised economic operators (AEOs) not excluded from such compliance checks?☒YES, 
fully implementing the recommendation 
Financial Administration of the Republic Slovenia answer: In the ex-post controls, the authorised economic 
operators (AEOs) are not be excluded from such compliance checks. If the AEOs will be hit by the approach 
mentioned above, the controls will be performed independent of their status.   

69 

 
SK  Q.1.1.  Have  you  enhanced  and  enforced  your  customs  control  strategies  for  cross-border  e-commerce 
trade,  particularly  for  the  potential  abuse  of  low-value  consignments  reliefs  (LVCR)?    ☒YES,  fully 
implementing the recommendation Present process:  
Goods  are  released  into  the  free  circulations,  on  entry  of  postal  consignment  -  based  on  the  CN22  or  CN23 
declaration, where the declaration is fully completed and the customs officer considers the data to be relevant. In 
other cases, when doubts arise as to the relevance of CN22 / CN23 or the  data are incomplete, the Slovenská 
pošta, a.s. (the national post office company) requires from the consignee to prove the value of the goods.  
Slovakia has “Official-duty assessment system”, Slovenská pošta, a.s. - the posting department issues and sends 
to the consignee a "Postal notifications" - information on the arrival of a consignment which is subject of the 
customs  supervision.  Via  the  "Postal  notifications",  the  consignee  is  notified  of  what  kind  of  document  or 

evidence must be presented to the customs office for the purposes of the customs clearance. If there is no doubt 
about the classification of the goods under the Customs Tariff, the customs clearance takes place resulting in 
the decision to release of the goods to the free circulation, which include the amount of the customs duty. The 
customs office hands over this decision in case of the representation to the Slovenská pošta, a.s., which delivers 
it to the consignee together with the consignment. Goods are considered as released for free circulation when 
delivered to the consignee. The customs debt and other payments are payable upon receipt of the goods in the 
form of a cash on delivery directly to the post office.  

Q.  1.2  Have  you  ensured  that  your  electronic  customs  declaration  system  does  not  automatically  apply 
claimed  duty  relief  on  goods  with  (a)  the  declared  intrinsic  value  above  EUR  150,  (b)  on  commercial 
consignments  declared  as  gifts  and  (c)  on  goods  ineligible  for  relief?  ☒YES,  fully  implementing  the 
recommendation  
Customs clearance is done electronically, but not all procedures for postal consignment are fully electronic and 
automatic, Slovenská pošta, a.s. works on the development of the electronic declaration system related to the e-
commerce.  
Q. 1.3 Have you ensured that your electronic customs declaration systems systematically detect potentially 
undervalued  or  incorrectly  declared  goods  under  LVCR  by  means  of risk  profiles  or  randomly?  ☒YES, 
fully implementing the recommendation  
The risk profile warning checks all consignments for which the national mode code C07 (low value shipments up 
to  150  €)  is  applied  and  these  consignments,  for  which  the  code  has  been  applied  illegally,  are  regularly 
captured, as the value of the goods on the invoice was higher, or the goods were incorrectly declared.  
Q. 1.4 Have you ensured that there are any specific control measures in place to prevent artificial splitting 
of consignments, aiming to benefit from duty relief? ☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation  
Consignments submitted by Slovenská pošta, a.s. are inspected by customs officers daily, by physical checks, by 
scans, by sniffer dogs and in justified cases also by other control authority which are invited (Slovak Business 
Inspection, Health and Veterinary Inspections etc.). The risk analysis is based on the generating a risk profile in 
IT  system  and  the  experience  of  customs  officers  obtained  by  daily  physical  inspection  of  consignments.  For 
targeting  consignments  customs  officer  check  consignor’s  country,  repeating  consignee,  shape  and  size  of 
consignments etc.  
Q. 1.5 Have you ensured that ex-post controls include verifications on traders’ compliance with customs 
duty  
Declared  consignments  of  negligible  value  are  also  checked  when  carrying  out  post-clearance  checks.  If  any 
irregularities are identified, measures are taken to additionally assess the customs debt.  
The  national  post-release  control  plan  for  2020  contains  a  specific  focus  on  post-release  checks  on  low  value 
shipments.  
Q. 1.5.a. Are authorised economic operators (AEOs) not excluded from such compliance checks?  
 ☒NO  

70 

 
FI  Q.1.1. Have you enhanced and enforced your customs control strategies for cross-border e-commerce 
trade, particularly for  the  potential  abuse of low-value consignments  reliefs (LVCR)?  ☒YES, partly 
implementing the recommendation 
Low-value consignment reliefs have been taken into account in the ex-post control planning of the Finnish 
Customs. The Finnish Customs has a control plan “Undervaluation through e-commerce” which is updated 
regularly.  For  example,  we  analyse  the  operators  in  cross-border  e-commerce  trade.  For  low-value 
consignments  reliefs  we  have  a  risk  profile  with  random  sampling  (Q.  1.3).For  low-value  consignment 
reliefs Finland have had short term operations (one day) concerning courier services. In the control plan, 
2020 there will be an audit concerning a courier service. In the end of the year 2020 we will start to use a 
new risk profile system in import declaration system. The new system has improved features also in tackling 
the potential abuse of LVCR. 
Q. 1.2 Have you ensured that your electronic customs declaration system does not automatically apply 
claimed duty relief on goods with (a) the declared intrinsic value above EUR 150, (b) on commercial 
consignments declared as gifts and (c) on goods ineligible for relief?☒NO 
At this moment, we do not have a risk profile but we are planning to set a risk profile with random sampling. 
Q.  1.3  Have  you  ensured  that  your  electronic  customs  declaration  systems  systematically  detect 
potentially  undervalued  or  incorrectly  declared  goods  under  LVCR  by  means  of  risk  profiles  or 
randomly?☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
For low-value consignments reliefs we have a risk profile with random sampling. 
Q.  1.4  Have  you  ensured  that  there  are  any  specific  control  measures  in  place  to  prevent  artificial 
splitting  of  consignments,  aiming  to  benefit  from  duty  relief?  ☒YES,  partly  implementing  the 
recommendation 
The Finnish Customs have included one post-release audit of express courier in to our ex-post control plan 
2020.  In this audit, the Finnish Customs will examine also the splitting of consignments.   
Q.  1.5  Have  you  ensured  that  ex-post  controls  include  verifications  on  traders’  compliance  with 
customs duty relief for low-value consignments? ☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
In the ex-post control plan 2020 of the Finnish Customs, we have one post-release audit of express courier. 
In this audit, the Finnish Customs will control the courier´s compliance with the LVCR. 
Q. 1.5.a. Are authorised economic operators (AEOs) not excluded from such compliance checks? 
☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
Authorised economic operators (AEOs) are included in the control planning of the Finnish Customs. In our 
ex-post  control  plan  2020,  we  have  two  monitoring  audits  of  AEO  express  couriers.  In  these  monitoring 
audits,  the  Finnish  Customs  will  evaluate  the  criteria  of  the  AEO  status.  The  AEOs  internal  control 
processes and the management of the low value consignments will be evaluated.   

71 

 
SE  Q.1.1. Have you enhanced and enforced your customs control strategies for cross-border e-commerce 
trade,  particularly  for  the  potential  abuse  of  low-value  consignments  reliefs  (LVCR)?☒YES,  partly 
implementing the recommendation. The solution used in Sweden means that Swedish Customs is notified for 
all  arriving  low  value  consignments  via  declaration  CN22.  Decision  for  release  of  goods  is  sent 
electronically from Swedish Customs to the designated UPU operator in Sweden. For consignments where 
VAT is payable additional information is added to the CN22 declaration to enable a correct calculation of 
the VAT amount. The designated UPU operator ensures that the consumer is willing to pay the VAT amount 
before clearance of the consignments, if not the consignment is returned to the sender. 
Q. 1.2 Have you ensured that your electronic customs declaration system does not automatically apply 
claimed duty relief on goods with (a) the declared intrinsic value above EUR 150, (b) on commercial 
consignments  declared  as  gifts  and  (c)  on  goods  ineligible  for  relief?☒YES,  partly  implementing  the 
recommendation: Low value consignments, procedure C07, with a total value above 2500 SEK is re-routed 
for post clearance control in the customs clearance system. Consignments with a value below 2500 SEK is 
automatically  cleared.  As  the  150  EUR  only  consists  of  the  value  of  the  goods  2500  SEK  also  includes 
additional costs which should be added to the customs value. Gifts, procedure C08, is possible to declare 
with values above 500 SEK on a single item in the declaration. If the value is above 500 SEK the declaration 
is re-routed for post clearance control in the customs clearance system, similar to the cases regarding C07.  
Q.  1.3  Have  you  ensured  that  your  electronic  customs  declaration  systems  systematically  detect 
potentially  undervalued  or  incorrectly  declared  goods  under  LVCR  by  means  of  risk  profiles  or 
randomly?☒YES,  partly  implementing  the  recommendation.  The  customs  clearance  system  has  a  risk 
profile  which  randomly  selects  declarations  in  the  system.  This  enables  the  authority  to  randomly  detect 
goods  that  might  be  undervalued.  Declarations  selected  by  the  random  risk  profile  is  then  evaluated  and 
might undergo physical inspections.  
Q.  1.4  Have  you  ensured  that  there  are  any  specific  control  measures  in  place  to  prevent  artificial 
splitting  of  consignments,  aiming  to  benefit  from  duty  relief?☒YES,  fully  implementing  the 
recommendation.  Artificial  splitting  is  most  common  on  exit  declarations  for  customs  warehousing.  To 
prevent this, the  customs clearance  system  for import  does not accept the combination of procedure code 
4071  with  C07.  From  19  February  2019  it  is  only  possible  to  declare  the  C07  in  combination  with  the 
following procedure codes: 4000, 4200, 4500. 
Q.  1.5  Have  you  ensured  that  ex-post  controls  include  verifications  on  traders’  compliance  with 
customs  duty  relief  for  low-value  consignments? ☒YES,  partly  implementing  the  recommendation.  As 
mentioned  in  question  1.2  and  1.4  procedure  code  C07  low  value  consignments  is  only  accepted  in  the 
customs clearance system if combined with procedures 4000, 4200, 4500. Consignments with values above 
2500 SEK is re-routed for post clearance control. Swedish Customs is now working to correct declarations 
where procedure code C07 have been misused and charge the declarant of due duties. Courier companies 
have been audited during 2019 and these operators have included own system checks to prevent the misuse 
of  C07  in  their  declarations.  During  2020  Swedish  Customs  aim  for  the  re-routing  for  post  clearance 
control to be changed to pre-release controls instead. As a general rule customs value is always a topic of 
Swedish  Customs’  post  clearance  controls.  This  includes  control  of  the  low  value  regulations.  However, 
controls  of  the  low  value  regulations  might  have  a  lower  priority  in  a  post  clearance  control  if  the  risk 
evaluation  shows  higher  risks  elsewhere.  Swedish  Customs  always  conducts  a  risk  valuation  to  pin  point 
where the highest risks are in the control 
Q.  1.5.a.  Are  authorised  economic  operators  (AEOs)  not  excluded  from  such  compliance  checks? 
☒YES, fully implementing  the recommendation.  Sweden does  not exclude AEOs  from  any  analysis or risk 
profiles. 

72 

 
2.2. 

EXPENDITURE 

BE 

Q.2.1. Have you adopted or updated a national anti-fraud strategy, which you have communicated 

to  the  European  Commission/OLAF?  AFCOS  BE  (ICCF)☒NO  The  national  anti-fraud  strategy  is 

currently  being  prepared,  in  collaboration with the  federated  entities  that  manage  European  funds  and 

customs. It should be adopted at the end of 2020. 

Q.2.2.a In line with what was recommended in previous years, has risk analysis been strengthened 

to detect irregularities and fraud, including the use of IT tools (such as ARACHNE)?  ☒YES, partly 

implementing the recommendation 

ERDF Wallonia: The Management Authority of the Wallonia 2020.EU (ERDF) programme still uses the 
ARACHNE tool. 

ERDF  Brussels-Capital  Region:  The  ERDF  Management  Authority  of  the  Brussels-Capital  Region  has 
boosted  its  control  of  the  result  indicators  provided  by  the  coordinators  of  financed  projects,  by 

implementing a new generalised and systematic control procedure.   

Q.2.2.b Can you share any results deriving  from the  use of the findings from  PIF  Reports in your 

fraud risk assessments? ☒YES (ERDF Wallonia) ☒NO (ERDF Brussels-Capital Region). 

ERDF Wallonia: 
public procurement contracts, Continued use of the ARACHNE tool 

Signing  by  the  beneficiaries  of  a  declaration  of absence  of  conflict  of  interests  in 

ERDF Brussels-Capital Region: We do not have complete documents listing those results. 

Q.2.2.c Have  you  further  exploited  the  potential  of  risk  analysis,  tailoring  the  approach  to  

the different types of expenditure? ☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 

ERDF Brussels-Capital Region: The fraud detection measures have been set up within the Management 
Authority  of  the  ERDF  Brussels-Capital  Region,  both  in  terms  of  analysis  of  public  procurement  and 

conflict of interest. For 2020, the Management Authority is considering carrying out an extensive control 
concerning compliance by project coordinators with State aid legislation.    

Q.2.3.a Have you facilitated and assessed the spontaneous reporting of potential irregularities and 
strengthen  the  protection  of  whistle-blowers,  who  are  also  a  crucial  source  for  investigative 

journalism?☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 

ERDF  Wallonia:  The  Management  Authority  has  procedures  in  place  for  reporting  fraud  cases  both 
internally  and  to  the  European  Anti-Fraud  Office.  All  reported  cases  are  treated  in  the  strictest 
confidentiality and in accordance with personal data protection legislation. Furthermore, in its regional 

policy  declaration  (2019-2024),  the  Walloon  Government  has  committed  to  recognising  whistle-blower 
status  by  ensuring  the  protection  of  any  official  who,  in  good  faith,  reports  criminal  behaviour  within 

73 

 
his/her  administration,  and  to  extending  application  of  this  status  across  regional  and  local  public 

services, in line with what has been adopted at the federal administration level. This process is therefore 
ongoing.    

ERDF  Brussels-Capital  Region:  The  Management  Authority  of  the  ERDF  Brussels-Capital  Region  has 
not set up a specific system  enabling spontaneous reporting of irregularities and/or fraud. However, in 

the event of any such reporting by means of, for instance, sending an e-mail directly to the service, the 
Management Authority carries out an in-depth audit of the project on the basis of the behaviour reported 

and  carries  out,  where  applicable,  any  resulting  financial  corrections.  Over  the  course  of  the  current 
programming,  only  one  such  report  has  been  made  to  the  Management  Authority.  It  concerned  the 

submitting of incorrect time-sheets intended to substantiate unjustified work time that had not been spent 
on the project.    

Q.2.3.b Have   you   promoted   systematic   and   timely   cooperation   between   judicial   and 

administrative  authorities?☒YES,  partly  implementing  the  recommendation  (ERDF  Wallonia)☒NO 

(ERDF Brussels-Capital) 

ERDF Wallonia: Management Authority staff are bound by Article 29 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 

to report immediately any fraud or suspicion of fraud to the competent Public Prosecutor.   

74 

 
BG 

Q.2.1. Have you adopted or updated a national anti-fraud strategy, which you have communicated to 
the European Commission/OLAF?☒ 

YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

In  summary  record  No  53  of  the  meeting  of  the  Council  of  Ministers  of  17  December  2014,  Bulgaria 
adopted  a  national  strategy  for  preventing  and  combating  irregularities and  fraud  affecting  the  financial 
interests  of  the  European  Union  for  the  period  2014-2020.  The  European  Commission  was  officially 
notified of this fact. The AFCOS Directorate of the Ministry of Interior also sent the strategy in Bulgarian 
and  English  to  the  European  Anti-Fraud  Office  (OLAF)  in  2015  and  uploaded  it  to  the  CIRCA  BC 
information  sharing  platform  for  working  groups.  In  2019  Bulgaria  launched  the  process  of  drafting  a 
national  strategy  for  the  period  2021-2027  under  the  management  of  the  AFCOS  Directorate  of  the 
Ministry of the Interior. 

Q.2.1.a. If yes, have you developed this strategy in cooperation with all bodies and authorities which 
have  a  specific  role  and  expertise  in  the  protection  of  the  EU  financial  interests,  including  law 
enforcement and prosecution services?☒  YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

A national strategy for preventing and combating irregularities and fraud affecting the financial interests of 
the European Union for the period 2014-2020 was drawn up with the cooperation of all bodies involved in 
the  management  and  control  of  EU  funds,  including  the  Public  Prosecutor’s  Office  of  the  Republic  of 
Bulgaria.  The  draft  strategy  will  be  endorsed  by  the  Council  for  coordinating  the  fight  against 
infringements affecting the financial interests of the European Union (AFCOS Council) established at high 
political level and submitted to the Council of Ministers for adoption. In 2020 all the national authorities 
involved in the management and control of EU funds will continue working actively on the draft national 
strategy for the period 2021-2027. 

Q.2.1.b.  In  line  with  what  had  been  recommended  in  previous  years,  has  your  national  anti-fraud 
strategy  taken  into  account  the  risk  analysis  conclusions  contained  in  the  2018,  2017  and  2016  PIF 
reports?☒  YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

The national strategy for preventing and combating irregularities and fraud affecting the financial interests 
of  the  European  Union  for  the  period  2014-2020  takes  account  of  all  European  Union  strategic  and 
regulatory documents predating its adoption in 2014, including the PIF reports. The recommendations of 
the PIF reports for 2016, 2017 and 2018 are reflected in the annual implementation plan accompanying the 
2014-2020 national strategy and in the new national anti fraud strategy being drafted for the period 2021-
2027.  The new national anti-fraud  strategy  for the period 2021-2027 will be based  in  particular on risk 
analysis  and  will  include  a  complementary  objective:  implementation  of  the  recommendations  of  the 
European Commission and the European Court of Auditors, including the recommendations of Article 325 
TFEU reports. 

Q.2.1.c. In line with what was recommended in previous years, has your national anti-fraud strategy 
taken into account the need to structure the coordination between administrative and criminal checks 
and investigations;☒ YES,  fully  implementing  the  recommendation.  The  need  for  coherence  between 
administrative and criminal inspections and investigations is enshrined in the annual implementation plan 
of the 2014-2020 national strategy. It provides for different activities in this regard, e.g. regular meetings 

75 

 
between  officers  of  the  General  Directorate  for  Combating  Organised  Crime  (GDBOP)  (criminal 
investigations)  and  the  AFCOS  Directorate  (administrative  investigations),  round-tables  between 
specialised bodies, etc. Other activities in the annual plan include: improving the interaction between the 
General Directorate for Combating Organised Crime, the AFCOS Directorate, the Prosecutor’s Office, the 
Customs  Agency  and  the  National  Security  Agency  (SANS);  the  provision  by  the  AFCOS  Directorate  of 
information on operational interaction with OLAF, etc. to the National Police General Directorate and/or 
the  General  Directorate  for  Combating  Organised  Crime.  Frequent  use  is  made  of  joint  investigation 
teams, thereby strengthening ties between the administrative and criminal authorities. 

Q.2.1.d. Did you make any assessment of the impact of the NAFS on the fight against fraud affecting 
the EU’s financial interests?☒ 

NO 

As  the  National  Strategy  applies  until  31  December  2020,  its  implementation  will  be  evaluated  in  the 
second half of 2020. 

Q.2.2.a. In line with what was recommended in previous years, has risk analysis been strengthened to 
detect irregularities and fraud, including the use of IT tools (such as ARACHNE)?☒ YES, 
fully 
implementing the recommendation 

The managing authorities of operational programmes financed by  EU structural funds regulate access to 
ARACHNE  through  administrative  orders  specifying  the  names  and  positions  of  those  with  access  to 
ARACHNE. A significant number of managing authorities’ staff have access to ARACHNE: while a small 
proportion are managers or observers, most are case-handlers. 

The use of ARACHNE is set out in the following chapters of the manuals of the managing authorities for 
individual programmes: 

- 

in the chapter on risk management and the related risk control 

In  order  to  monitor  and  prevent  the  risk  of  fraud  at  a  managing  authority,  checks  are  carried  out  in  the 
ARACHNE  system.  There  are  also  procedures  for  reporting  irregularities  based  on  checks  in  the 
ARACHNE system. 

- 

in the chapter on monitoring projects and verifying expenditure 

ARACHNE is used when selecting a sample for on-the-spot checks, when checking State aid in the course of 
the  implementation  of  grant  agreements  and  when  checking  and  verifying  technical  reports,  payment 
requests and financial statements accompanying the package of accounting documents. If, when checking a 
given risk category of beneficiary in ARACHNE, the case-handlers responsible for technical and financial 
verification find high risk values for a given category of beneficiary, which are highlighted in yellow or red, 
they check the relevant documentation and information available in UMIS 2020, all public registers and in 
managing  authority  databases.  Checks  are  documented  by  a  specific  check  in  the  checklists  concerned. 
When  checks  are  carried  out,  high-risk  projects  are  flagged  up  to  the  staff  dealing  with  irregularities  so 
they can exercise particular care when handling the related documents or, if necessary, take appropriate 
measures. 

- 

in the chapter on financial management 

76 

 
Before making any payment to a beneficiary, a member of the accounting unit checks ARACHNE to make 
sure  that  the  beneficiary  does  not  present  a  high  risk  of  bankruptcy  and/or  insolvency  and  that  it  is  not 
blacklisted.  Where  there  is  a  high  risk  of  the  above  circumstances,  the  member  of  staff  carries  out 
additional checks within the unit’s remit and may request additional information from other departments of 
the managing authority. If there is reason to suspect an irregularity, the member of staff reports the matter 
to the irregularities officer in accordance with the relevant chapter of the managing authority’s manual. 

- 

in the chapter describing the steps for providing grants 

The use of the instrument is prescribed in the process whereby members of the committee evaluating and 
ranking project proposals for the purposes of awarding grants are screened for conflicts of interest before 
the  committee’s  appointment;  the  persons  appointed  to  rule  on  the  merits  of  any  objections  received  are 
screened for conflicts of interest; screening for conflicts of interest prior to the conclusion of an agreement 
in  project  selection/direct  award  procedures,  which  requires  the  use  of  ARACHNE  to  assess  the  risk 
involved in these processes and rules for verifying and following up cases reported by ARACHNE. 

- 

in the chapter on irregularities 

The rules and procedures for reporting an irregularity based on a check in ARACHNE are set out. 

Continuous  training  courses  on  the  use  of  ARACHNE  figure  in  the  annual  training  plans  for  managing 
authority staff. 

The managing authorities of operational programmes financed by EU Structural Funds can access and use 
both  the  official  public  electronic  systems,  such  as  the  Commercial  Register,  containing  information  on 
beneficiaries  and  the  electronic  systems  of  the  National  Revenue  Agency  (NAP),  Sofia  Municipality,  the 
Ministry of Justice, the General Labour Inspectorate Executive Agency (GIT EA) and the National Labour 
Market Database of the Employment Agency. Active use is also made of information from the Management 
and Monitoring System for EU Funds in Bulgaria (UMIS) 2020. 

With regard to the Agricultural Funds, the State Fund for Agriculture, for the purposes of analysing the risk 
involved in its operations and as part of its battery of instruments, carries out, in the course of its annual 
planning exercise and in the framework of various audit engagements, risk assessment and analysis on the 
basis of predefined criteria, including the assessment of quality, good practices, use of IT tools and Arbutus 
specialised data-analysis software, and the capabilities of the control environment and control activities in 
place, for the purpose of detecting and preventing situations linked to the occurrence of irregularities and 
fraud.  

The  Audit  Authority  (Executive  Agency  for  the  Audit  of  EU  Funds)  prioritises  the  use  of  the  statistical 
approach  when  selecting  samples  for  operations  audits.  All  auditors  have  an  ARACHNE  user  account. 
ARACHNE is used when planning system audits and, after samples have been selected for each operational 
programme, when carrying out checks to identify the presence or absence of indicators of irregularities and 
fraud. 

Q.2.2.b  Can  you  share  any  results  deriving  from  the  use  of  the  findings  from  PIF  Reports  in  your 
fraud risk assessments?☒  YES 

77 

 
Each year the  managing authorities of  operational  programmes financed from  EU Structural Funds take 
note of the reports’ recommendations in the fraud risk assessment process. The process of preparing fraud 
risk  assessments  and  managing  authorities’  action  plans  involves  not  only  prevention  and  proactive 
measures to detect fraud following checks by irregularities staff on reports received but also cooperation 
with  prosecutions  services,  courts  and  investigating  authorities.  Examples  of  cooperation  include  the 
checks carried out on suspicions of fraud, the sending of files to the prosecutor’s office and the initiation of 
pre-trial  proceedings.  ARACHNE  is  actively  used  when  assessing  the  risk  of  fraud,  implementing  the 
measures  identified  and  checking  reports.  Some  managing  authorities  set  up  fraud  risk  self-assessment 
teams  comprising  representatives  of  the  directorates  responsible  for  project  selection  and  contracting, 
verification,  accounting  and  payments,  risk  management  and  control  and  representatives  of  technical 
assistance  teams.    The  internal  operating  rules  for  these  teams  lay  down  procedures  for  monitoring  the 
effectiveness of fraud prevention and detection measures. As regards the agricultural funds, the State Fund 
for  Agriculture  carries  out  intensive  coordination  activities  with  other  state  institutions  and  law-
enforcement  bodies  with  a  view  to  providing  the  information  and  documents  needed  by  Bulgaria’s 
investigating authorities and judiciary.  These activities are necessary to detect and prevent irregularities 
and fraud. 

In  2019  the  Ministry  of  the  Interior’s  AFCOS  Directorate  carried  out  administrative  checks  on  the 
reporting  and  management  of  reports  of  fraud  and  irregularities  at  the  State  Fund  for  Agriculture.  The 
inspections  were  concluded  by  reports  in  which,  following  analysis  of  the  problem  areas  identified,  the 
AFCOS  Directorate  made  recommendations  aimed  at  making  the  fight  against  irregularities  and  fraud 
affecting the EU’s financial interests more effective. For its part, the State Fund for Agriculture has taken 
the steps necessary to implement the recommendations made by the AFCOS Directorate. 

Q.2.2.c  Have  you  further  exploited  the  potential  of  risk  analysis,  tailoring  the  approach  to  the 
different types of expenditure?☒  YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

When  carrying  out  risk  analysis,  the  managing  authorities  of  operational  programmes  financed  by  EU 
Structural  Funds  use  an  approach  consistent  with  the  different  types  of  operations,  taking  into  account 
whether the operation involves project selection or direct award and the amount of the grant and whether 
the operation is to be carried out using a simplified procedure. In the case of partial implementation, the 
value  of  verified  expenditure  is  reduced;  if  the  case  involves  a  failure  to  meet  the  set  of  indicators,  a 
financial  correction  is  made.  As  regards  agricultural  funds,  every  directorate  of  the  State  Fund  for 
Agriculture  administering  schemes  and  measures  co-financed  by  European  Union  funds  and  the  national 
budget has introduced additional controls in the form of lists of fraud indicators (red flags). These red flags 
determine the scope for additional checks during the administrative handling of projects and applications 
for support and serve  to filter risky  applicants out of a procedure. Case-handlers processing  candidates’ 
documents are required to carry out further analysis when they encounter red flags.  This further analysis 
helps  the  entire  State  Fund  for  Agriculture  take  key  decisions  when  an  irregularity  is  found  and  to  take 
appropriate follow-up by imposing a penalty, investigating suspicions of fraud or recovering grants. 

In this context, the Fraud Prevention Directorate conducted two training sessions in 2019, one of the topics 
addressed  being  the  introduction  and  use  of  the  lists  of  red  flags.  266  Fund  employees  underwent  such 
training.  The  lists  of  red  flags  are  helping  to  upgrade  and  improve  the  risk  assessment  and  management 

78 

 
system,  reinforcing  internal  controls  and  increasing  the  effectiveness  of  action  to  detect  and  counter 
irregularities and fraud affecting the financial interests of the EU. 

From 1 to 3 July 2019, eight officials from the State Fund for Agriculture and one from the Ministry of the 
Interior’s  AFCOS  Directorate  underwent  training  in  countering  irregularities  and  fraud  at  Croatia’s 
Agriculture,  Fisheries  and  Rural  Development  Agency.  This  training  continued  the  good  working 
relationship developed by Bulgaria’s State Fund for Agriculture and its Croatian counterpart in countering 
fraud involving agricultural funds. The purpose of the visit was to share best practices from the measures 
developed and implemented by Croatia and Bulgaria to combat fraud and irregularities in the management 
of EU agricultural funds. Risk analysis is an integral part of the Audit Authority’s audit work at all levels. 
Risk assessment  is  carried out when drawing up the audit  strategies for  each operational programme, in 
accordance with Article 127(4) of Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council,  and  when  preparing  the  annual  audit  plan,  the  annual  control  report  and  the  schedule  of  audit 
engagements. For the purpose of the strategic planning and prioritisation of audit work on system audits, 
audits of operations and audits of operational programmes, the Audit Authority performs a comprehensive 
risk assessment covering the management and control systems of the programme concerned (the managing 
authority  and  the  certifying  authority).  When  selecting  the  risk-assessment  approach,  account  is  taken  of 
the Guidance for Member States on Audit Strategy, the Guidance for the Commission and Member States 
on  a  common  methodology  for  the  assessment  of  management  and  control  systems  in  the  Member  States 
(EGESIF 14-0010 of 18/12/2014) and the European Commission’s Guidance on fraud risk assessment and 
effective and proportionate anti-fraud measures. 

YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

Q.2.3.a  Have  you  facilitated  and  assessed  the  spontaneous  reporting  of  potential  irregularities  and 
strengthen  the  protection  of  whistle-blowers,  who  are  also  a  crucial  source  for  investigative 
journalism? ☒ 
The  managing  authorities  of  operational  programmes  financed  by  EU  Structural  Funds  maintain  an 
‘Irregularities’ button  on their websites that anyone is entitled to  use to report an  irregularity, suspected 
fraud or fraud in relation to the implementation of projects financed by EU Structural Funds. Reports may 
also be submitted  anonymously.  Reports may also be submitted by  mail  to  a managing  authority’s postal 
address, which is publicly available, by hand at a managing authority’s head office or by e-mail. Reports 
are  verified  by  an  irregularities  officer,  who  then  informs  the  whistleblower  of  the  outcome  of  the 
verification. By special order, the heads of the managing authorities of operational programmes financed 
by  EU  Structural  Funds  have  approved  internal  rules  for  the  protection  of  whistleblowers  reporting 
corruption,  acts  of  corruption  and/or  conflicts  of  interest  at  the  managing  authority  of  the  programme 
concerned.  All  irregularity  reports  are  followed  up  by  administrative  checks;  if  necessary,  internal  and 
external  reports  are  followed  up  by  unannounced  on-the-spot  checks.  For  example,  in  2019  two  reports 
concerning  suspected  fraud  under  one  of  the  operational  programmes  by  the  beneficiary  of  two  different 
projects led to a total of seven on-the-spot checks by the managing authority’s irregularities officers: one 
on the beneficiary, four on its partners in the two projects, and, following a second report concerning one 
of the projects, two simultaneous on the-spot checks on the equipment supplied and the two partners. The 
files relating to the checks carried out under the two reports were sent to the Public Prosecutor’s Office for 
follow-up.  The  managing  authorities  of  operational  programmes  financed  by  EU  Structural  Funds  have 
laid  down  anti-fraud  policies  for  their  respective  programmes,  including  a  policy  to  combat  conflicts  of 

79 

 
interest,  in  line  with  the  European  Commission’s  Guidance  for  Member  States  and  bodies  managing 
programmes  on  fraud  risk  assessment  and  effective  and  proportionate  anti-fraud  measures.  Managing 
authorities’ general anti-fraud policies include a strategy for the development of an anti-fraud culture, the 
allocation  of  responsibilities  in  anti-fraud  actions,  mechanisms  for  reporting  suspected  fraud  and 
mechanisms for cooperating with the competent authorities. These policies are approved by the head of the 
relevant managing authority and published on the managing authority’s website. The policy is also usually 
included in the manual for the management of the programme concerned. As regards the agricultural funds 
and  the  fisheries  fund,  reporting  channels  at  the  State  Fund  for  Agriculture  are  clear  within  the 
organisation and guarantee confidentiality. 
At the State Fund for Agriculture, reports on fraud and corrupt practices can be submitted: 
- 
- 
- 
- 
the-spot checks; in person during an open day; 
by a member of the Fund’s staff. 
- 
Any information received by the State Fund for Agriculture, including from anonymous sources, is written 
up  in  a  document  containing  data  concerning  the  alleged  or  established  act/omission  by  the  economic 
operator  concerned.  The  State  Fund  for  Agriculture  has  an  internal  procedure  for  registering  and 
examining  the  reports  received,  complying  with  the  principle  of  protecting  whistle-blowers,  and  for 
following up the reports received. 

by email toSIGNALI@DFZ.BG; 
by telephoning the hotline 0700-106-16; 
by submitting, in the case of an outside source, a written report to the Fund’s secretariat; 
orally, where information is received by a member of the Fund’s staff over the telephone; during on-

Q.2.3.b  Have  you  promoted  systematic  and  timely  cooperation  between  judicial  and  administrative 
authorities?☒ YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

After  carrying  out  thorough  checks  on  reports  of  irregularities,  all  managing  authorities  of  operational 
programmes financed by EU Structural Funds report cases of suspected fraud to the Public Prosecutor’s 
Office. In 2019 three  instances of suspected  fraud were reported  to the  Public Prosecutor’s  Office under 
only  one  of  the  operational  programmes.  The  prosecutions  service  has  followed  up  all  three  reports  and 
pre-trial investigations are currently under way. Most cases of irregularities are detected prior to payment, 
but where fraud is found to have resulted in the payment of irregular expenditure, managing authorities of 
operational programmes take measures to recover public funds from the dishonest beneficiaries. Managing 
authorities of operational programmes financed by EU Structural Funds carry out annual training sessions 
with representatives of the judiciary, at which specific case studies are examined and proposals are drawn 
up  for  improving  the  regulatory  framework.  In  the  area  of  the  administrative  investigation  of  suspected 
irregularities and fraud, managing authorities maintain active contacts with the Ministry of the Interior’s 
AFCOS Directorate.  Where necessary, joint on-the-spot checks are carried out, including the participation 
of  officers  from  the  Economic  Police  Department.  As  regards  the  agricultural  funds,  the  State  Fund  for 
Agriculture  works  closely  with  representatives  of  the  Ministry  of  the  Interior’s  AFCOS  Directorate,  the 
Ministry of Interior’s specialised investigative bodies, the managing authorities of operational programmes 
financed by EU Structural Funds and the Public Prosecutor’s Office. Where necessary, the State Fund for 
Agriculture and the national authorities referred to above hold joint workshops in a variety of formats to 
discuss  matters  of  relevance  to  specific  cases  or  to  overall  policy  for  preventing  and  combating 

80 

 
irregularities and fraud affecting the financial interests of the European Union. The Audit Authority sent 14 
final  audit  reports  containing  suspicions  of  fraud  identified  during  the  audit  checks  to  the  Public 
Prosecutor’s Office for appropriate follow-up. 

81 

 
CZ 

Q.2.1. Have you adopted or updated a national anti-fraud strategy, which you have communicated to 
the European Commission/OLAF?☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

The  National  Strategy  was  approved  in  Government  Resolution  No  535  dated  14  May  2008.  The  first 
amendment of the document, reflecting the  legislation development  in  the EU  and in the Czech Republic, 
came into force on 1 September 2017. In February 2020, an approval procedure for the second amendment 
has been launched. The second amendment reflects the developments in relevant legal acts as well as the 
recommendations of the ECA Special Report 6/2019.  

Q.2.1.a. If yes, have you developed this strategy in cooperation with all bodies and authorities which 
have  a  specific  role  and  expertise  in  the  protection  of  the  EU  financial  interests,  including  law 
enforcement and prosecution services? 

☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

The  National  Strategy  and  both  of  its  amendments  have  been  consulted  with  all  relevant  bodies  and 
authorities. 

Q.2.1.b. In line with what had been recommended in previous years, has your national anti-fraud strategy 
taken into account the risk analysis conclusions contained in the 2018, 2017 and 2016 PIF reports?  ☒YES, 
partly implementing the recommendation 

In  order  the  further  improve  the  effectiveness  of  the  cooperation  in  detection  and  prosecution  of 
irregularities in the area of EU financial interests’ protection and define the necessary framework for the 
cooperation  in  reporting  of  irregularities  concerning  specific  EU  funds,  agreements  on  the  provision  of 
information  and  cooperation  were  signed  between  the  Central  Contact  Point  (CCP)  of  AFCOS  and  the 
relevant ministries.  

Twice  a  year,  trainings  are  provided  by  the  CCP  of  AFCOS  to  local  contact  points  of  AFCOS  of  the 
relevant ministries in order to keep them up-to-date with latest developments in the area of protection of EU 
financial interests. 

Q.2.1.c. In line with what was recommended in previous years, has your national anti-fraud strategy 
taken into account the need to structure the coordination between administrative and criminal checks 
and investigations;☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 

As  a  follow-up  to  the  Action  Plan  to  the  National  Strategy,  agreements  on  exchange  of  information  and 
mutual cooperation are being negotiated between the CCP of AFCOS and the Supreme Public Prosecutor’s 
Office as well as between the CCP AFCOS and the Police of the Czech Republic. These agreements shall 
formalise and streamline the cooperation between those bodies in the area of protection of EU’s financial 
interests.  

Q.2.1.d. Did you make any assessment of the impact of the NAFS on the fight against fraud affecting 
the EU’s financial interests? ☒NO 

82 

 
Q.2.2.a. In line with what was recommended in previous years, has risk analysis been strengthened to 
detect  irregularities  and  fraud,  including  the  use  of  IT  tools  (such  as  ARACHNE)?☒YES,  fully 
implementing the recommendation 

At the level of Operational Programme, a risk management system is set up, which consists of systematic 
identification, evaluation, management and reporting of all significant risks, within which due attention is 
paid to the identification and management of fraud risk. The risk management system is based on the ESI 
Funds  Risk  Management  Guideline  for  the  2014-2020  programming  period.  The  Managing  Authority’s 
(MA)  self-assessment  tool  is  used  to  carry  out  regular  evaluation  of  the  effectiveness  of  control 
mechanisms,  which  is  based  on  the  Methodological  Guideline  for  the  performance  of  controls  under  the 
responsibility of  MAs  in  the implementation  of the ESIF for 2014-2020.  The tool primarily addresses the 
risks of fraud. 

During the administrative verification and on-site control the fraud indicators, described in the Operational 
Manual, are verified. Relevant chapters of the Manual describe in detail the procedure of the MA staff for 
identifying and monitoring the possible risk of fraud, including subsequent evaluation, which results in the 
examination of information in the form of an on-site inspection or the filing of a criminal complaint. The 
MA  has  established  the  Register  of  Fraud  Indicators  and  the  Register  of  Complaints  from  Information 
Systems. Data from both records are entered through the set of risk factors into the interim risk analysis on 
projects. The interim risk analysis on the projects from which the control plans are generated is carried out 
on the basis of risk factors (e.g. risk factor Presence on the list of the 10 most risky projects in Arachne, 
Presence  of  the  applicant  on  the  list  of  risk  entities  and  the  state  of  affairs,  Increased  risk  of  fraud). 
Information  on  detected  fraud  indicators  is  shared  across  the  MA’s  departments,  which  leads  to  general 
awareness  and  gaining  experience  of  individual  employees  with  fraud  indicators  and  their  search.  All 
employees have “read”  access to both records, so they can continuously get to know the identified cases 
and the status of their solution. Each department informs its staff about new cases and thereby enhances the 
quality of performance of further inspections for the same / similar type of projects. In addition, meetings 
with the heads of administration departments take place twice a year, in which all cases of identified fraud 
indicators that occurred are presented in an anonymous form, and possible measures are discussed. To this 
end, the “Theoretical Examples of Fraud” record has been created, with descriptions of the fraud scheme 
and warning signs. Furthermore, in the MA self-assessment process, all representatives of departments at 
the level of directors are acquainted with all cases of detected fraud indicators during the reporting period. 
At  present,  data  mining  from  Arachne  as  part  of  administrative  check  is  being  tested.  Testing  started  in 
April 2019. Data mining is based on the analysis of projects generated as the most risky. Data collection 
from  Arachne  is  based  on  the  selection  of  the  most  risky  projects  based  on  the  set  criteria,  where  the 
reasons for the occurrence of increased values of individual risk indicators are being verified. In the event 
of an increase in values for any of the risk categories, the causes of the increase will be verified as part of 
the administrative check. The  reasons and outcome of the verification  are entered in the records that the 
MA intends to use subsequently when creating the on-site inspection plan. 

Q.2.2.b  Can  you  share  any  results  deriving  from  the  use  of  the  findings  from  PIF  Reports  in  your 
fraud risk assessments?☒YES 

83 

 
For  example  in  the  checklists  for  on-the-spot  checks  the  MA  has  added  questions  about  ARACHNE 
concerning public procurements and contracts or concerning eligibility and efficiency of expenditures. In 
2019,  the  MA’s  self-assessment  and  the  regular  evaluation  of  the  implementation  of  measures  of  the 
Strategy  for  Combating  Fraud  and  Corruption  within  the  drawing  of  funds  of  the  Common  Strategic 
Framework  in  2014-2020  were  carried  out.  The  internal  anti-corruption  programme  for  2018-2020  was 
updated  in  2018.  In  the  case  of  suspicion  of  committing  a  criminal  offence  (e.g.  fraud)  and  if  criminal 
proceedings  have  already  been  commenced  in  the  given  case  pursuant  to  Section  158  (3)  of  Act  No. 
141/1961  Coll.,  Criminal  Procedure  Code,  the  officers  of  the  control  and  audit  unit  of  EU  funds  report 
these cases as an irregularity through MS2014 + (IRQ3). This procedure ensures the awareness of other 
relevant authorities such as Payment and Certification Authority, Audit Authority and others. Irregularities 
over 10 000 EUR of the ESI Funds are secured through OLAF - IMS. The cooperation with the Police of the 
Czech  Republic  in  the  case  of  fraud  has  been  gradually  intensified  by  written,  electronic  or  phone 
communication. A special department was created for communication with the Czech Police. The officers of 
the  control  and  audit  unit  of  EU  funds  in  cooperation  with  the  Intermediate  Body  provide  them  with  the 
requested information on specific projects.  The ARACHNE information system is used by the Intermediate 
body, especially before  the Grant  Decision  is  issued. Furthermore, the  ARACHNE system is also used in 
other project control activities. 

Q.2.2.c Have  you  further  exploited  the  potential  of  risk  analysis,  tailoring  the  approach  to  the 
different types of expenditure? ☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

During  the  entire  process  of  programme  administration  and  implementation,  the  MA  monitors  the 
occurrence of fraud indicators: 
1) Review in the process of project approval / before the legal act on awarding of the grant 
In addition to monitoring the occurrence of the fraud indicator, the MA checks the risk of the applicant / 
project partner in terms of collision with the list of criminal complaints resulting from the implementation 
of the projects or its interconnection through ownership structure with other entities or persons that appear 
on this list. If an increased project risk is identified, it will be taken into account in the risk analysis of the 
projects.  
2) Control in the project implementation process 
In the administration of monitoring reports, the occurrence of fraud indicators is assessed in accordance 
with  the  relevant  provisions.  Data  from  information  systems  are  used  to  identify  risk  operations.  These 
information systems include e.g. Arachne, Justice.cz portal, ARES applications, commercial register, trade 
register and other publicly available information records and registers. Based on discussions on setting risk 
factors for projects running in 2018, on 1 January 2019, the risk analyses were divided into risk analysis 
for individual projects and risk analysis for simplified projects, which are in some respects specific and the 
originally set of risk scale factors were not adequate. In addition, the Annex with risk factors for separate 
risk analysis for the period of project sustainability entered into force. In the course  of the year, the risk 
factor for individual and simplified projects was supplemented by the risk factor of double financing risk. 
Based on the experience of the MA with the implementation of procedures for assessing the occurrence of 
fraud indicators, the risk factor of Increased fraud risk was added to both lists. The MA is obliged to use 
such identified and evaluated data for its control activities (on-site inspections). This is done in the form of 

84 

 
ad  hoc  on-site  inspections  on  the  basis  of  a  complaint  arising  from  administrative  verification  or,  as  the 
case may be, an external complaint, of which the MA becomes aware. If the MA suspects, on the basis of its 
inspection  activities,  that  a  crime  has  been  committed,  it  sends  a  criminal  complaint  to  the  Public 
Prosecutor’s Office. 

Q.2.3.a  Have  you  facilitated  and  assessed  the  spontaneous  reporting  of  potential  irregularities  and 
strengthen  the  protection  of  whistle-blowers,  who  are  also  a  crucial  source  for  investigative 
journalism?☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 

There is no special legal act for the protection of whistleblowers in the Czech Republic yet, however, such 
act  is  currently  under  preparation  (in  line  with  the  Directive  (EU)  2019/1937).  The  protection  of 
whistleblowers  is  solved  within  the  Civil  Service  Act.  Based  on  this  Act  each  resort  has  its  own 
Methodological  Guidelines,  which  solve  the  protection  of  whistleblowers,  reporting  of  corruption  and 
fraud.  In  general,  there  are  special  websites,  e-mail  addresses  and  /or  phone  lines  at  each  ministry  for 
whistleblowers. Complaints from third parties relating to the implementation of projects from the ESIF are 
recorded  and  investigated  and  dealt  with  as  suspected  irregularities.  Depending  on  the  nature  of  the 
complaint, it is settled whether it will be verified by an administrative or on-site inspection or a criminal 
complaint  may  be  filed.  Based  on  the  outcome  of  the  verification,  it  is  then  resolved  as  a  (un)confirmed 
irregularity or suspected crime. The presentation at seminars for beneficiaries includes information on how 
to  proceed  in  case  of  detected  corruption  or  fraud  and  where  the  necessary  information  can  be  found, 
including a link to OLAF’s website where fraud can be reported. An example of findings detected during 
on-the-spot  check  that  have  been  performed  because  of  information  received  from  informants  is  an 
irregularity concerning childcare facilities. 

Q.2.3.b  Have  you  promoted  systematic  and  timely  cooperation  between  judicial  and  administrative 
authorities?☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

Cooperation  between  individual  administrative  and  judicial  authorities  and  individual  procedures  are 
regulated within the relevant chapters of the Operational Manual. The MA continuously communicates with 
individual  financial  administration  authorities  in  order  to  resolve  reported  irregularities  and  to  clarify 
different  opinions  on  the  cases.  Reporting  of  irregularities  and  the  actual  process,  including  the 
transmission of information, is also continuously consulted with the Paying and Certifying Authority, Audit 
Authority and CCP of AFCOS and at the working level within the Working Group on Control, Audit and 
Irregularities.  Reporting  of  irregularities  is  carried  out  in  the  MS2014+  system,  where  irregularities  of 
more than EUR 10,000 in EU share are transmitted to AFCOS LCP and subsequently to IMS, accessible to 
state prosecutors, to give them a  quick overview of the  case  concerning  suspected criminal offences. The 
suspicion of a criminal offence itself is reported to the Paying and Certifying Authority, through the newly 
established Serious Findings Module to the Ministry of Finance and the relevant Public Prosecutor's Office 
is also informed. In case of any need, the MA shall ensure cooperation throughout the investigation. A new 
element in the interconnected system is the SharePoint of the AFCOS CCP, which is to ensure an overview 
of  all  judgments  concerning  damage  to  the  EU's  financial  interests  and,  by  sharing  it  with  all  managing 
authorities, to ensure concurrence in the execution of the sentence. If, in the case of a public procurement 
inspection, a suspicion of a misdemeanour is found under the Public Procurement Act, a complaint is sent 
to the Office for the Protection of Competition. 

85 

 
DK 

Q.2.1. Have you adopted or updated a national anti-fraud strategy, which you have communicated to 
the European Commission/OLAF?☒NO 

Denmark does not have a national anti-fraud strategy. 

2. Risk Analysis 

Q.2.2.a. In line with what was recommended in previous years, has risk analysis been strengthened to 
detect  irregularities  and  fraud,  including  the  use  of  IT  tools  (such  as  ARACHNE)?☒YES,  partly 
implementing the recommendation  

The Danish Business Authority: The Managing Authority carries out data analysis, including cross-analysis 
and risk-based sampling in each reporting period for all projects. In autumn 2014 the Managing Authority 
tried  out  a  preliminary  test  of  the  European  Commission’s  ARACHNE  tool,  but  it  has  some  reservations 
about compliance with the data protection regulations when using the tool. 

The Danish Agricultural Agency: Has enlisted the help of external consultants from Deloitte to amplify and 
structure  its  risk  profile  for  project  support  (NON-AIACS).  We  can  conclude  that  switching  to  standard 
costs  for  the  rural  development  programme  eliminates  some  risks,  such  as  manipulation  of  the  tender 
procedure, but we also need to be alert, from the outset, to any new risks that may result from the model. As 
regards  ARACHNE,  the  Danish  Agricultural  Agency  is  continuously  monitoring  and  evaluating  other 
authorities’ and Member States’ experiences with the tool. 

The Danish Fisheries Agency: The Danish Fisheries Agency has not implemented the ARACHNE tool, but 
has focused on strengthening the case handlings procedures. We are currently working on updating our IT 
system, which will help eliminate attempts to commit fraud. 

Q.2.2.b  Can  you  share  any  results  deriving  from  the  use  of  the  findings  from  PIF  Reports  in  your 
fraud risk assessments?☒NO 

The  Danish  Business  Authority:  No  examples  of  fraud  were  found  using  OBS  lists  (data  analysis  of  all 
reported data). Many examples of input errors or similar errors were found. 

The Danish Agricultural Agency: The Agency uses the PIF reports as input for its risk assessments. Many 
sources are used for this process and it is difficult to link the results directly to any single source. 

The  Danish  Fisheries  Agency:  The  Danish  Fisheries  Agency  has  reviewed  our  administrative  fundament 
and case management with focus on the case-handlings-procedures in order to detect fraud or attempts on 
fraud. Since the new case handling procedures have been implemented we haven’t detected new examples 
of fraud. 

Q.2.2.c Have  you  further  exploited  the  potential  of  risk  analysis,  tailoring  the  approach  to  the 
different types of expenditure? ☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 

The  Danish  Business  Authority:  Use  of  OBS  lists.  There  is  and  probably  always  will  be  potential  for 

86 

 
smarter use of data - particularly where there is a very large and growing volume of data. 

The  Danish  Agricultural  Agency  has  carried  out  a  risk  analysis  of  project  support,  divided  into  market 
organisations, schemes with standard costs and schemes with two tenders. The aim was to identify and rank 
risks in relation to the Agency’s current fraud prevention frameworks. 

The  Danish  Fisheries  Agency:  During  2018  and  2019  the  Danish  Fisheries  Agency  has  reviewed  our 
administrative fundament and case management. This has led to the detection of cases suspicious of fraud. 
The areas with the highest risk of fraud have been: stating the correct level of expenditures and maintaining 
eligibility  after  completing  an  operation.  These  findings  have  led  to  updates  and  alterations  in  the 
legislation and our  case  handling procedures. The measures taken have  been risk based, however not on 
basis of ARACHNE, but national IT tools and especially case handling-procedures. 

3. Horizontal issues 

Q.2.3.a  Have  you  facilitated  and  assessed  the  spontaneous  reporting  of  potential  irregularities  and 
strengthen  the  protection  of  whistle-blowers,  who  are  also  a  crucial  source  for  investigative 
journalism?☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 

The  Danish  Business  Authority:  The  Danish  Business  Authority,  MA  for  ERDF  and  ESF  have  specified 
further guidance for informers of irregularities in the anti-fraud policy.  

Last  year  we  launched  a  new  whistleblower  scheme,  which  is  based  on  a  web  form  solution  where  its 
possible to anonymously report suspected fraud. 

Since 2014 the Danish Agricultural Agency has made it easier for whistleblowers to make contact via the 
Agency’s website. 

Since 2014 there has been a portal on the website of the Danish Fisheries Agency where external parties or 
whistleblowers can report fraud or irregularities. The Fisheries Agency has also set up an anti-fraud mail 
box to which the public can send reports of suspected fraud involving EU funds.  

Q.2.3.b  Have      you      promoted      systematic      and      timely      cooperation      between      judicial      and 
administrative authorities?☒NO 

87 

 
DE 

Q.2.1. Have you adopted or updated a national anti-fraud strategy, which you have communicated to 
the European Commission/OLAF? ☒NO 

Q.2.2.a. In line with what was recommended in previous years, has risk analysis been strengthened to 
detect  irregularities  and  fraud,  including  the  use  of  IT  tools  (such  as  ARACHNE)?  ☒YES,  fully 
implementing the recommendation 

The  procedures  for  risk  analysis  contained  in,  inter  alia,  the  fraud  prevention  manuals  of  the  competent 
authorities  in  the  agricultural  and  fisheries  sectors  shall  be  continuously  adapted  to  the  specific 
circumstances. Computer systems are also used for this purpose, according to the scope and specification 
of the risk analyses to be carried out. ARACHNE is not used in Germany. The results of the risk analyses 
are documented and evaluated by the implementing authorities (paying agencies/managing authorities). 

Q.2.2.b  Can  you  share  any  results  deriving  from  the  use  of  the  findings  from  PIF  Reports  in  your 
fraud risk assessments? ☒YES See the reply for Q.2.2.a 

Q.2.2.c Have  you  further  exploited  the  potential  of risk  analysis,  tailoring  the  approach  to  the different 
types of expenditure? ☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation  See the reply for Q.2.2.a 

Q.2.3.a  Have  you  facilitated  and  assessed  the  spontaneous  reporting  of  potential  irregularities  and 
strengthen the protection of whistle-blowers, who are also a crucial source for investigative journalism? 
☒NO 
To  date,  there  is  no  comprehensive  legal  provision  in  Germany  to  protect  persons  providing  information. 
Following the entry into force of Directive (EU) 2019/1937, there is a need for transposition for both the private 
and public sectors. The Federal Government is working on the necessary measures to ensure that the Directive 
is implemented by the 16th deadline. December 2021. 

Q.2.3.b  Have  you  promoted  systematic  and  timely  cooperation  between  judicial  and  administrative 
authorities? ☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation  

88 

 
 
 
EE 

 Q.2.1. Have you adopted or updated a national anti-fraud strategy, which you have communicated to 
the European Commission/OLAF?☒NO 

Q.2.2.a. In line with what was recommended in previous years, has risk analysis been strengthened 

to detect irregularities and fraud, including the use of IT tools (such as ARACHNE)?☒YES, partly 

implementing the recommendation 

Regular  meetings  with  different  related  bodies  (The  Environment  Agency,  Competition  Authority,  other 

investigative bodies) to discuss the risky projects / support measures to prevent fraud and other problems.  

Q.2.2.b Can you  share any results  deriving from  the use of the findings from PIF  Reports in your 

fraud risk assessments?☒YES   

Improved risk analyses in order to find  cumulative supports  to the same land cadasters despite different 

applicants. The goal is to find artificially created applicants (Rural development measure schemes) 

Q.2.2.c  Have  you  further  exploited  the  potential  of  risk  analysis,  tailoring  the  approach  to  the 
different types of expenditure? 

 ☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 

We  improved  risk  analyses  in  order  to  find  cumulative  supports  to  the  same  land  cadastres  despite 

different  applicants.  The  goal  is  to  find  artificially  created  applicants  (Rural  development  measure 
schemes)  +  Training  courses  to  raise  fraud  awareness  of  the  Estonian  Auditors'  Association  and  law 

makers in the Ministry of Rural Affairs. 

Q.2.3.a  Have  you  facilitated  and  assessed  the  spontaneous  reporting  of  potential  irregularities  and 
strengthen  the  protection  of  whistle-blowers,  who  are  also  a  crucial  source  for  investigative 
journalism? YES, partly implementing the recommendation 

In 2019 a draft bill was presented to the Parliament, which amongst other amendments also strengthens 

the protection of people who report breaches of anti-money laundering measures.  

Q.2.3.b Have you promoted systematic and timely cooperation between judicial and administrative 

authorities?☐YES, partly implementing the recommendation 

Regular  meetings  with  different  related  bodies  (The  Environment  Agency,  Competition  Authority,  other 

investigative bodies) to discuss the risky projects / support measures to prevent fraud and other problems.  

89 

 
 
IE 

Q.2.1. Have you adopted or updated a national anti-fraud strategy, which you have communicated to 
the European Commission/OLAF?☒NO 

Q.2.2.a. In line with what was recommended in previous years, has risk analysis been strengthened to 
detect  irregularities  and  fraud,  including  the  use  of  IT  tools  (such  as  ARACHNE)?☒YES,  partly 
implementing the recommendation 

Further  steps  were  taken  in  2019  by  the  ERDF  Managing  Authorities  to  implement  ARACHNE.  This 
included  the  first  batch  imports  of  live  ERDF  data  from  the  Irish  eCohesion  system  to  ARACHNE  and 
training  for  the  ERDF  Managing  Authority  and  Certifying  Authority  staff.  This  was  provided  by  the 
Commission’s  ARACHNE  team  in  May  2019  and  led  to  further  development  work  by  the  Managing 
Authorities  to  align  eCohesion  reports  with  the  ARACHNE  system  requirements.  The  ERDF  Managing 
the  reporting  of  
Irregularities  Management  System 
Authorities  also  utilise 
irregularities/fraud under the Regional Operational Programmes. 

(IMS) 

the 

for 

Q.2.2.b Can you share any results deriving from the use of the findings from PIF Reports in your fraud risk 
assessments?☒NO 

Q.2.2.c Have  you  further  exploited  the  potential  of  risk  analysis,  tailoring  the  approach  to  the 
different types of expenditure? ☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 

The  ERDF  Managing  Authorities  agreed  on  an  approach  to  carry  out  a  Risk  Assessment  on  each 
Intermediate Body submitting a declaration of expenditure to the Managing Authorities. The first set of risk 
assessments  was  carried  out  over  the  period  mid-2017  to  early  2018  and  utilised  the  self-assessment 
checklist provided by the Commission. As these run bi-annually, the Managing Authorities are now in the 
process of reviewing these with the Intermediate Bodies concerned and are also undertaking Risk Analysis 
on  those  Intermediate  Bodies  that  are  progressing  expenditure  to  Declaration  stage.  Both  Managing 
Authorities  are  represented  on  a  Risk  Assessment  team  that  reviews  the  documentation  provided  by 
Intermediate Bodies and will liaise with the national AFCOS representative with a view to its inclusion in 
the process.  

Q.2.3.a  Have  you  facilitated  and  assessed  the  spontaneous  reporting  of  potential  irregularities  and 
strengthen  the  protection  of  whistle-blowers,  who  are  also  a  crucial  source  for  investigative 
journalism?☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 

The Protected Disclosures Act 2014 provides robust statutory protections from retaliation for workers who 
speak  up  about  wrongdoing  in  the  workplace.  The  definition  of  “wrongdoing”  in  the  Act  is  broad  and 
includes,  inter  alia,  any criminal  offence  (including  fraud),  failure  to  comply  with  a legal  obligation  and 
any unlawful or otherwise improper use of public funds (including EU funds) or the resources of a public 
body.  All  public  bodies  are  required  by  law  to  have  formal  channels  and  procedures  for  receiving  and 
handling reports of wrongdoing from whistleblowers. The statutory guidance for public bodies, which sets 
out the recommended practice for establishing and operating these channels and procedures provides, inter 
alia, that, “The control functions of the public body (such as Internal Audit or Compliance) should monitor 
the operation of the Procedures on an ongoing basis and report to the Audit Committee or equivalent on 
their  finding”. The  EU  Whistleblowing  Directive,  which  entered  into  force  on  26  November  and  must  be 

90 

 
transposed by 17 December 2021, will require changes to Ireland’s national legislation in this area.  

91 

 
EL  Q.2.1. Have you adopted or updated a national anti-fraud strategy, which you have communicated to 

the European Commission/OLAF?☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
EYTHY  (Special  Institutional  Support  Service)  (STRUCTURAL  FUNDS):  The  Secretariat-General  for 
Public  Investments  and  National  Strategic  Reference  Framework  (NSRF)  of  the  Ministry  of  Development 
and  Investment  drew  up  a  sectoral  NAFS  for  cohesion  policy,  the  ‘National  Anti  Fraud  Strategy  for 
Structural Actions’, which it submitted to OLAF on 5 May 2014 and which was accepted in August 2014. 
An integral part of this is a detailed Action Plan which includes specific actions, responsibilities, timelines 
and  results  indicators.  This  Sectoral  Strategy  was  updated  and  resubmitted  to  OLAF  and  other  EU 
departments in March 2017. The updated Action Plan on combating fraud in Structural Actions includes all 
measures/actions and their evolution since 2014 to reflect the overall picture of how the Strategy is being 
implemented  and  the  results  achieved.  Achieving  the  goals  of  the  Strategy  ensures  that  in  the  2014-2020 
programming  period  fraud  in  structural  actions  is  now  addressed  systemically  and  systematically: 
Systemically, because the Fraud Management System is fully integrated into the Management and Control 
System (MCS) of the NSRF, through: 
• 
• 
Systematically, because the prevention and combating of fraud is ensured through: 
✓ 

legislative provisions and specific measures; 
clear procedures, workflows, reporting mechanisms and defined responsibilities. 

the application of the relevant MCS procedures throughout the new programming period; 

✓ 

the exploitation of our IT systems; 

the  operation  of  an  Internal  Cooperation  Network  which  we  have  created  between  our  Managing 

✓ 
Authorities and our Service; 
✓ 

the fruitful cooperation we have with the competent national bodies and EU departments; 

✓ 

the training of the agencies involved, which is being gradually extended to a wider audience; and 

continuous improvement. 

✓ 
Given that the actions of the National Anti-Fraud Strategy have been fully integrated into the Management 
and  Control  System  (MCS)  of  the  OPs  of  the  NSRF  2014-2020  (CEPOL  Objective),  the  prevention  and 
combating of fraud  is  ensured by  implementing the  MCS and monitoring it systematically throughout the 
programming  period.  Therefore,  possible  new  control  measures  for  preventing  and  combating  fraud  will 
now be introduced through the MCS of the OPs of the NSRF 2014-2020. 
On the basis of the above, the Greek National Strategy for combating fraud in Structural Actions (cohesion 
policy) is not outdated and we therefore request the removal of the relevant wording for Greece, in footnote 
2 to this report and in footnote 20 to the 2018 Report on the Protection of the EU’s Financial Interests. 

MANAGING AUTHORITY OF THE FISHERIES AND MARITIME OP 
Although  it  has  not  drawn  up  and  submitted  to  OLAF  an  official  text  of  an  Anti-Fraud  Strategy  for  the 
fisheries  sector,  the  Fisheries  and  Maritime  OP  Managing  Authority  has  integrated  procedures  and 
measures for preventing and combating fraud into the MCS of the Fisheries and Maritime OP, along the 
same lines as those that have been integrated into the MCS for the OPs of the ERDF, ESF and CF – as part 
of  the  ‘Investment  for  Growth  and  Jobs’  goal  in  accordance  with  the  Greek  National  Strategy  against 
Fraud in Structural Actions. 

92 

 
 
 
Q.2.1.a. If yes, have you developed this strategy in cooperation with all bodies and authorities which 
have  a  specific  role  and  expertise  in  the  protection  of  the  EU  financial  interests,  including  law 
enforcement and prosecution services?☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
EYTHY (Special Institutional Support Service) 
In January 2014, at the initiative of the Secretariat-General for Public Investments and the NSRF, it was 
proposed to establish a Cooperation Network for the National Strategy against Fraud in Structural Actions, 
linking  the  Secretariat-General  for  Public  Investments  and  the  NSRF,  the  Financial  Audit  Committee 
(EDEL), the Financial Crime  Squad (SDOE), the National Anti-Corruption Coordinator and the General 
Inspector  for  Public  Administration.  This  network  was  fully  exploited  in  developing  the  Strategy  and  in 
preparing  the  Action  Plan  up  until  the  designation  of  the  AFCOS,  through  constructive  meetings  and  by 
providing texts and data. 
Following  the  official  designation  of  the  Greek  AFCOS  [today  the  National  Transparency  Authority 
(EAD)],  which  coordinates  the  authorities/bodies  responsible  for  investigating  and  combating  fraud,  but 
also through the other responsibilities it has assumed (such as the coordination and operational planning of 
national  control  mechanisms),  a  new  framework  has  been  ensured  for  cooperation  and  information 
exchange, the link between administrative and judicial authorities to combat fraud and the joint response at 
national level. Cooperation between the Secretariat-General for Public Investments and the NSRF with the 
Greek  AFCOS  is  continuous.  It  was  particularly  constructive  in  finalising  critical  issues  during  the 
planning of the MCS of the OPs of the NSRF 2014-2020 (CEPOL Objective), for handling suspected fraud 
and complaints about co-financed projects. 
Finally,  in  developing  the  anti-fraud  strategy  in  the  Structural  Funds  and  the  Cohesion  Fund,  the 
Secretariat-General for Public Investments and the NSRF have been closely associated with the European 
Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), as well as the Task Force for Greece through experts. 
In this context, technical meetings and training seminars of senior staff of the Managing Authorities were 
held  in  Greece  and  abroad,  and  there  was  continuous  cooperation  with  the  expert  group  monitoring  the 
implementation of the Action Plan. 
Q.2.1.b.  In  line  with  what  had  been  recommended  in  previous  years,  has  your  national  anti-fraud 
strategy  taken  into  account  the  risk  analysis  conclusions  contained  in  the  2018,  2017  and  2016  PIF 
reports?☒ YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
Q.2.1.c. In line with what was recommended in previous years, has your national anti-fraud strategy 
taken into account the need to structure the coordination between administrative and criminal checks 
and investigations;☒ YES, fully implementing the recommendation ☐ 

EYTHY (Special Institutional Support Service) 
Given  that  the  National  Strategy  against  Fraud  in  Structural  Actions  is  sectoral  and  concerns  cohesion 
policy,  continuous  cooperation  with  the  Greek  AFCOS  (the  National  Transparency  Authority)  has  been 
ensured since it was set up. AFCOS is the link between the administrative authorities in the Management 
and  Control  System  of  the  OPs  of  the  NSRF  2014-2020  (CEPOL  Objective)  and  the  competent  national 
authorities and bodies responsible for carrying out checks, but also for law enforcement and prosecution. 
The role of AFCOS for structural actions is provided for in the relevant institutional framework and is set 
out in detail with specific steps in the relevant procedures (and corresponding flow charts) of the MCS. 

93 

 
 
As  an  interface,  it  officially  receives  every  case  of  suspected  fraud  detected  by  the  MCS  Authorities  and 
forwards them to the appropriate authority/body for further investigation or prosecution. Accordingly, it is 
responsible  for  informing  the  MCS  Authorities  of  the  development  of  any  suspected  fraud  relating  to 
structural  actions  until  each  case  is  closed.  Furthermore,  being  responsible  for  receiving  and  handling 
complaints  about  structural  actions,  it  again  plays  a  key  role  in  assessing  each  case,  forwarding  it 
appropriately  for  investigation  within  or  outside  the  MCS,  and  keeping  the  Authorities  informed  of  all 
developments until the end of each case.EAD (National Transparency Authority)See also reply to Q.2.3.b. 

Q.2.1.d. Did you make any assessment of the impact of the NAFS on the fight against fraud affecting the 
EU’s financial interests?☒ NO 

Q.2.2.a In line with what was recommended in previous years, has risk analysis been strengthened to 
detect  irregularities  and  fraud,  including  the  use  of  IT  tools  (such  as  ARACHNE)?☒YES,  fully 
implementing the recommendation 
This  refers  to  risk  analysis  tools  for  the  targeting  of  projects/operations  to  be  submitted  to  specific 
verifications,  on-the-spot checks, audits  or other types of controls (as relevant). Please  provide results in 
terms of irregularities/fraud detected during controls that have been started (also) because of risk analysis. 
The Irregularities Management System (IMS) provides this information, but the Member State may want to 
add  detections  that  are  excluded  from  reporting  (such  as  detections  before  inclusion  of  expenditure  in  a 
statement  of  expenditure  submitted  to  the  Commission).  The  Member  States  are  encouraged  to  provide 
relevant details to explain the actions undertaken or planned (in case of partial implementation) (see also 
question under section 2). If applicable, explain why no such action was taken. 
EYTHY (Special Institutional Support Service) 
The  Greek  Management  and  Control  System  (MCS)  of  the  OPs  of  the  NSRF  2014-2020,  financed  by  the 
ERDF,  the  ESF  and  the  CF,  under  the  ‘Investment  for  Growth  and  Jobs’  goal,  includes  a  coherent  and 
clear framework of workflows, procedures, roles and responsibilities, based on legislative, organisational 
and operational interventions, for preventing and combating fraud. 
The  ‘Handbook  of  MCS  Procedures  2014-2020’,  which  is  applied  by  the  competent  authorities/bodies, 
includes  procedures  and  measures  aimed  at  ensuring  the  prevention  and  combating  of  fraud,  on  a 
systematic basis, and also the continuous improvement and reinforcement of the system. The application of 
these  procedures  is  supported,  inter  alia,  by  IT  tools,  to  which  extensive  reference  was  made  in  2017  in 
response to the follow-up to Recommendation 4 of the 2016 Report. These tools are: 
✓ 
The  Integrated  Information  System  (IIS),  which  is  the  central  management  tool  and  the  means  of 
(beneficiaries,  managing 
the  authorities/bodies 
electronic  data  exchange  among  all 
authorities/intermediate  bodies  (MA/IB),  Certifying  Authority,  Audit  Authority,  Commission).  All  the 
necessary information on the co-financed programmes and operations of the NSRF is recorded in the IIS, 
as  well  as  data  relating  to  the  MCS  procedures.  Following  its  technological  and  operational  upgrade, 
procedures and methodologies have been automated, and internal controls have been introduced to monitor 
the accuracy and completeness of the information (validations, etc.). The Greek AFCOS also has access to 
the IIS. 
✓ 

The  State  Aid  Management  Information  System  (PSKE)  and  the  State  Aid  Cumulation  System 

involved 

94 

 
 
 
(SACS), which have been specifically developed for State aid operations. 
✓ 

The Irregularities Management System (IMS). 

✓ 
The  Commission’s  Fraud  Risk  Assessment  Tool  [EGESIF  14-0021-00  (16/06/2014)],  which  has 
been adapted and optimised as regards inclusion of all the existing control measures introduced by Greece 
in the ‘Handbook of MCS Procedures 2014-2020’. 
Please note that: 
✓ 
Risk analysis: In the MCS, the planning of on-the-spot checks takes into account a risk assessment 
methodology  for  operations/beneficiaries  based  on  extraction  of  data  from  the  IIS  and  assignment  of  a 
score  to  20  risk  factors/indicators  (e.g.  beneficiaries  implementing  several  projects  at  the  same  time, 
modifications,  financial  corrections,  etc.).  To  apply  this  methodology,  specific  instructions  and  standard 
forms have been issued and mechanisms have been set up that automatically score 15 of the 20 risk factors 
and  directly  calculate  the  overall  score  for  each  operation.  The  risk  assessment/analysis  is  carried  out 
entirely  through  the  IIS  and  is  applied  every  six  months,  based  on  the  most  up-to-date  information 
available, and recorded in the online system for each operation and beneficiary. 
✓ 
Reporting  of  irregularities/suspected  fraud:  The  MCS  authorities/bodies  report  irregularities  and 
suspected fraud by providing the necessary information through the IMS, on the basis of the roles assigned 
to  them  and  applying  the  separate  procedure  set  out  in  the  MCS  Handbook:  ‘DΙΙΙ_3:  Reporting  of 
Irregularities to the European Commission’. Irregularities excluded from reporting (such as irregularities 
detected before the expenditure was entered in a statement of expenditure submitted to the Commission) are 
included in the Annual Summary to be submitted to the Commission for each OP. 
The  Annual  Summary  also  indicates  the  corresponding  corrective  measures  taken  (reduction  of  amounts, 
etc.). 
Please note that, for irregularities concerning suspected fraud in particular, the Commission is informed of 
the following through the IMS: 
✓ 
(even if this amount was not included in a statement of expenditure to the Commission); 
✓ 
also,  where  a  suspected  fraud  is  linked  to  a  detected  irregularity  but  not  to  actual  expenditure 
incurred, the suspected fraud is notified to the Commission where the amount, if paid, would be over EUR 
10,000  in  terms  of  contribution  from  the  Funds  (e.g.  when  the  suspicion  has  been  raised  at  the  time  of 
approval of legal commitment). 

all cases of suspected fraud registered involving a contribution from the funds of over EUR 10,000 

DIRECTORATE  FOR  FINANCIAL  CONTROL,  AUDIT  AND  COOPERATIVES  OF  THE  MINISTRY  OF 
RURAL DEVELOPMENT AND FOOD (Agricultural Funds) 
The  Directorate  for  Financial  Control,  Audit  and  Cooperatives  selects  the  undertakings  to  be  audited  as 
part of the annual audit programme by applying a risk analysis methodology. To ensure that the selection 
of  undertakings  for  audit  contributes  to  the  effectiveness  of  the  measures  for  preventing  and  detecting 
irregularities  in  EAGF  funding,  the  Directorate  for  Financial  Control,  Audit  and  Cooperatives  has 
improved and upgraded the ‘RISK ANALYSIS’ computer application. 
The risk analysis includes assessment of the previous year’s risk analysis, weighting of the risk factors and 
all relevant information regarding the approach to be followed, the techniques, the criteria and the method 
of implementation, in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 of the European Parliament and of 

95 

 
 
the Council and its implementing acts. 
The  Directorate  for  Financial  Control,  Audit  and  Cooperatives  has  updated  the  control  procedures  and 
checklists for each scheme and has drawn up a checklist for a new measure, ‘exceptional adjustment aid to 
milk producers’, with a detailed list of the risks to be checked. 
The audit guidelines include the parameters examined for eliminating the risk factors. 
MANAGING AUTHORITY OF THE FISHERIES AND MARITIME OP 
The Managing Authority of the Fisheries and Maritime OP has taken measures which are recorded in the 
Fraud Risk Assessment Tool concerning the detection of irregularities, and the relevant OLAF Guidelines 
are also implemented. 

Q.2.2.b  Can  you  share  any  results  deriving  from  the  use  of  the  findings  from  PIF  Reports  in  your 
fraud risk assessments?☒YES 
DIRECTORATE  FOR  FINANCIAL  CONTROL,  AUDIT  AND  COOPERATIVES  OF  THE  MINISTRY  OF 
RURAL DEVELOPMENT AND FOOD (Agricultural Funds) 
The results derived from using the findings of these reports are as follows: 
(a)  scoring  and  mapping  as  many  risk  parameters  as  possible,  in  order  to  see  that  the  selection  of 
undertakings best ensures the effectiveness of measures to prevent and detect irregularities; 
(b) ensuring the quality of ex post checks and cross-checks of the commercial documents of those entities 
receiving or making payments and directly or indirectly related to the system of financing by the EAGF, or 
their representatives, in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council. 

Q.2.2.c  Have  you  further  exploited  the  potential  of  risk  analysis,  tailoring  the  approach  to  the 
different types of expenditure?☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

EYTHY (Special Institutional Support Service) 
The methodology for risk assessment of operations/beneficiaries applied under the MCS for planning on the 
spot checks on non-State aid operations  (as  referred  to  in  Q.2.2.a) includes risk factors/indicators which 
take account of different types of expenditure.For example: 
- an operation which is financed from one Fund is examined and scored differently from an operation which 
is financed from more than one Fund or uses a flexibility clause; 
there  is  a  distinct  ‘Nature  of  the  operation’  factor,  which  takes  into  account  whether  the  operation  is  a 
study or a technical project or a  specific  ECB case, or a combination of  these,  etc.there is a ‘Method of 
implementation’  factor,  which  takes  into  account  whether  the  operation  is  implemented  exclusively  by 
means of public procurement  contracts  or whether it is  implemented with own  means or in another form 
(voucher) or uses simplified cost methods, etc. 
EDEL (Financial Audit Committee): 
All  fraud  risk/complaint  inputs  are  notified  to  the  audit  authority  by  the  MCS  bodies  (e.g.  AFCOS, 
Managing Authorities), and are taken into account as additional risk factors in the risk assessment for the 
selection of bodies to be audited. 
DIRECTORATE  FOR  FINANCIAL  CONTROL,  AUDIT  AND  COOPERATIVES  OF  THE  MINISTRY  OF 

96 

 
 
 
 
RURAL DEVELOPMENT AND FOOD (Agricultural Funds) 
The Directorate for Financial Control, Audit and Cooperatives takes all measures in the context of auditing 
the expenditure of EAGF financing for market measures, with risk analysis at all levels and with specific 
audit guidelines which are updated and are adapted to each audited sector and beneficiary. 

Q.2.3.a  Have  you  facilitated  and  assessed  the  spontaneous  reporting  of  potential  irregularities  and 
strengthen  the  protection  of  whistle-blowers,  who  are  also  a  crucial  source  for  investigative 
journalism? 
☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

NATIONAL AUTHORITY FOR TRANSPARENCY (AFCOS) 
✓ 
The  National  Authority  for  Transparency  is  an  independent  administrative  authority  and  is  the 
national  contact  point  for  complaints.  With  a  view  to  ensuring  ease  of  public  access  to  the  system  for 
receiving  complaints,  complaints  may  be  submitted  electronically  or  by  mail  or  in  person  or  by  a 
representative,  in  the  complainant’s  name  or  anonymously,  in  Greek  or  English.  The  Inspection  and 
Control  Unit  of  the  Authority,  staffed  by  320  specialised  auditors,  is  responsible  for  dealing  with 
complaints. 
✓ 
The establishment of a  modern institutional  framework for  the protection of whistle-blowers is an 
action of the National Anti-Corruption Action Plan (NACAP). In that context, Greece took an active part in 
the  European  Council  Working  Party  (FREMP  –  The  Working  Party  on  Fundamental  Rights,  Citizens’ 
Rights and Free Movement of Persons) and before the Council’s Committee of Permanent Representatives 
(COREPER), in the process of adopting new rules for the protection of witnesses, which were published in 
the Official Journal of the EU on 26.11.2019 (Directive 2019/1937). 

Q.2.3.b  Have  you  promoted  systematic  and  timely  cooperation  between  judicial  and  administrative 
authorities?☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
NATIONAL  AUTHORITY  FOR  TRANSPARENCY  (DIRECTORATE-GENERAL  FOR  INTEGRITY 
AND ACCOUNTABILITY – AFCOS) 
As  mentioned  above,  in  accordance  with  the  MCS  2014-2020,  every  time  an  MCS  Authority  detects 
suspected fraud, the AFCOS is responsible for forwarding the case to the competent national authorities for 
further  investigation  or  prosecution.  It  is  also  responsible  for  informing  the  MCS  services  of  the 
development  of  any  suspected  fraud  relating  to  structural  actions  until  each  case  is  closed.  At  the  same 
time, as part of the procedure for setting up a mechanism for monitoring criminal cases, and in accordance 
with  the  circulars  issued  by  the  Supreme  Court  Public  Prosecutor's  Office  (2/2018  and  2a/2018),  case 
statistics  are  collected  from  the  whole  country,  every  four  months,  on  the  progress  of  all  pending  cases 
relating  to  the  prosecution  of  corruption,  financial  crime  and  money  laundering.  The  data  are  collected, 
taking into account the basic principles of our justice system; they are anonymised, and include all ongoing 
cases of fraud against the financial interests of the European Union. The data are brought to the attention 
of the administrative authorities (Ministry of Justice, National Authority for Transparency –AFCOS). 
At  the  same  time,  the  National  Authority  for  Transparency,  in  cooperation  with  UNODC,  is  working  on 
creating  a  standardised  statistical  data  collection  system,  which  will  be  fully  in  line  with  the  country’s 

97 

 
 
 
 
current obligations, to provide input to international organisations and bodies, including OLAF. 

98 

 
ES 

Q.2.1. Have you adopted or updated a national anti-fraud strategy, which you have communicated to 
the European Commission/OLAF?☒NO 

The Royal Decree 91/2019 has created the  Advisory Council for the Prevention and Fight against Fraud 
affecting the financial interests of the European Union. In its first Plenary meeting, this Advisory Council 
created two Commissions: one for the analysis and revision of the antifraud legal framework and the other 
one for the elaboration and follow-up of a National Antifraud Strategy in the field of the financial interests 
of the EU. 

The  Advisory  Council  for  the  Prevention  and  Fight  against  Fraud  affecting  the  financial  interests  of  the 
European Union, which will coordinate the elaboration of a National Antifraud Strategy through one of its 
Commissions, is composed by AFCOS (which holds its Secretariat), the General Public Prosecutor Office, 
National Police and Guardia Civil, all the Managing Authorities for structural funds, Central Paying and 
Coordination Agency for agricultural funds, Audit Authority, Tax Agency, Office for Asset Recovery, State 
Treasury  (Anti-money  Laundering  authority)  and  a  representation  of  Regional  and  Local  entities,  among 
others. 

Once  the  process  for  the  elaboration  of  a  National  Antifraud  Strategy  starts,  risk  analysis  conclusions 
contained in the 2018, 2017 and 2016 PIF reports will be taken into account. 

The coordination between administrative and law enforcement authorities is one the issues to be included in 
a future National Antifraud Strategy. Some steps are already being taken in that direction, as it is explained 
above 

Q.2.2.a. In line with what was recommended in previous years, has risk analysis been strengthened to 
detect  irregularities  and  fraud,  including  the  use  of  IT  tools  (such  as  ARACHNE)?☒YES,  partly 
implementing the recommendation 

Risk  analysis  (and  their  periodic  update)  carried  out  by  MAs/IBs  and  Paying  agencies  include  elements 
which are oriented to the detection of irregularities and fraud, such us the results of previous audits, new 
fraud  patterns  detected,  areas  in  which  the  irregularities/fraud  are  more  frequent  according  to  the  PIF 
Reports,  the  extent  to  which  the  specific  management  processes  are  automatised,  the  existence  of  cross 
checks,  the  linkages  among  companies,  the  possible  existence  of  double  funding,  etc.  The  selection  of 
operations  to  be  verified/controlled  takes  into  account  the  results  of  this  risk  analysis  and  thus  it  is 
concentrated in those areas where the risk of irregularity or fraud is more relevant. However, although the 
use of IT tools for this purpose is increasing, it is not fully widespread.  None of the authorities consulted to 
elaborate this reply have reported any irregularities/fraud detected during controls that have been started 
because of risk analysis, different from those which have been reported through IMS. 

Q.2.2.b  Can  you  share  any  results  deriving  from  the  use  of  the  findings  from  PIF  Reports  in  your 
fraud  risk  assessments?  ☒NO.  In  line  with  which  was  reported  last  year,  the  findings  from  the  PIF 
Reports are only one of the multiple elements which are taken into account in the fraud risk assessments, so 
it  is  difficult  to  isolate  the  effects  that  each  of  those  elements  has  as  a  result  of  its  inclusion  in  such 

99 

 
assessments. 

Q.2.2.c Have  you  further  exploited  the  potential  of  risk  analysis,  tailoring  the  approach  to  the 
different types of expenditure?☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

As  it  was  reported  last  year,  fraud  risk  assessments  were  already  tailored  to  the  different  types  of 
expenditures  (public  procurement,  grants,  personnel  costs,  etc.),  and  continue  being  tailored  during  this 
year.  

Q.2.3.a  Have  you  facilitated  and  assessed  the  spontaneous  reporting  of  potential  irregularities  and 
strengthen  the  protection  of  whistle-blowers,  who  are  also  a  crucial  source  for  investigative 
journalism? 

☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 

In  line  with  which  was  reported  last  year,  more  Managing  Authorities/Intermediate  Bodies  and  Paying 
Agencies  have  adopted  the  confidential  channel  established  by  AFCOS  and  have  fulfilled  its 
recommendations in order to facilitate the spontaneous reporting of irregularities and fraud affecting the 
financial  interests  of  the  EU  (see  those  recommendations  in  the  last  year  reply  to  the  follow-up  of  PIF 
2017). 
As a result of this, the number of allegations received through this channel has increased during 2019 with 
respect to 2018. 
With regard to the protection of whistleblowers, the legislative proposal about which we informed  last year 
(in the framework of the follow-up to the recommendations contained in PIF report 2017) was finally not 
adopted  because  of  the  general  elections  celebrated  in  Spain  in  2019.  According  to  the  Spanish  legal 
system, the celebration of general elections implies the automatic deletion of every legislative proposal that 
had not been approved by the Parliament at the moment in which the general elections are celebrated. 
Now  that  the  Directive  (UE)  2019/1937  has  been  adopted,  Spain  will  initiate  the  process  for  its 
transposition.  Several  legislative  proposals  have  been  already  submitted  to  the  Parliament  by  different 
political groups in order to regulate the protection of whistleblowers. 
This does not affect to the fact that a number of “Comunidades Autónomas” have adopted laws in order to 
protect  whistleblowers  at  a  regional  level,  covering  protection  measures  which  are  similar  to  those 
included  in  the  legislative  proposal  at  national  level  (which  finally  has  not  been  adopted,  as  mentioned 
before). 

Q.2.3.b  Have      you      promoted      systematic      and      timely      cooperation      between      judicial      and 
administrative authorities? ☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 

In addition to what was reported last year and to the creation of the Advisory Council for the prevention 
and  fight  against  fraud  affecting  the  financial  interests  of  the  EU  (which  has  been  reported  in  the 
questionnaire  for  the  PIF  report  2019),  the  AFCOS  has  been  working  together  with  Guardia  Civil  and 
National  Police  with  the  objective  to  formalise  the  corresponding  cooperation  agreements  with  those 
entities, covering issues such as operative support and exchange of information, mutual technical advice, 

100 

 
strategic cooperation and training, among others. This work is still ongoing.  

The AFCOS has also been working with the State Attorney´s Office in order to formalise a procedure for 
the  transmission  of  punctual  information  regarding  the  initiation,  follow-up  and  closure  of  judicial 
(criminal) proceedings which affects the financial interests of the European Union and in which the State 
Attorney´s Office is participating on behalf of a national authority. This work is also still ongoing. 

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FR 

Q.2.1. Have you adopted or updated a national anti-fraud strategy, which you have communicated to 
the European Commission/OLAF? ☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

Q.2.1.a. If yes, have you developed this strategy in cooperation with all bodies and authorities which 
have  a  specific  role  and  expertise  in  the  protection  of  the  EU  financial  interests,  including  law 
enforcement and prosecution services?☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation.  

Our current strategy has not been developed with the police and the prosecution service. As AFCOS has no 
investigative  powers,  it  did  not  consider  itself  to  have  the  power  to  develop  this  strategy  alongside  the 
judicial  and  administrative  authorities.  Any  revision  of  the  strategy  will  be  conducted  together  with  the 
police and the prosecution service. 

Q.2.1.b.  In  line  with  what  had  been  recommended  in  previous  years,  has  your  national  anti-fraud 
strategy  taken  into  account  the  risk  analysis  conclusions  contained  in  the  2018,  2017  and  2016  PIF 
reports?☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation  

Q.2.1.c. In line with what was recommended in previous years, has your national anti fraud strategy 
taken into account the need to structure the coordination between administrative and criminal checks 
and investigations; ☒ NO. 

As AFCOS does not have any investigative powers, it did not consider itself to have the power to coordinate 
the treatment of individual cases with the judicial and administrative authorities. When the strategy is next 
revised, this coordination function will be re-evaluated.  

Q.2.1.d. Did you make any assessment of the impact of the NAFS on the fight against fraud affecting 
the EU’s financial interests? YES.  It can be argued that the organisations that manage EU funds have a 
better understanding of the types of controls needed to prevent fraud.  

Q.2.2.a. In line with what was recommended in previous years, has risk analysis been strengthened to 
detect  irregularities  and  fraud,  including  the  use  of  IT  tools  (such  as  ARACHNE)?  ☒YES,  partly 
implementing the recommendation.  

Regarding ARACHNE, these are the actions taken or that will soon be taken by the coordinating authority 
(CGET,  Commissariat  général  à  l’égalité  des  territoires  (General  Commission  for  Territorial  Equality), 
which  on  1  January  2020  became  ANCT,  Agence  nationale  de  la  cohésion  des  territoires  (National 
Territorial Cohesion Agency )): 

a  working  party  meeting  to  develop  the  ARACHNE  usage  strategy  on  3  December  2019  at  the 

- 
CGET; 

an  ARACHNE  training  session  on  4  December  2019  at  the  CGET  in  particular  for  the  Europact 

- 
conference, Île-de-France, Corsica (and others); led by J.-M. Gautier from DG Employment; 

- 

a training session on using ARACHNE for the overseas management led by J.-M. Gautier from DG 

102 

 
Employment had to be postponed due to the covid-19 pandemic and the lockdown.        

The working party meeting of 3 December 2019 brought together several managing authorities so that they 
could present how they had got on in making use of the tool. 

A  relative  disparity  in  its  implementation  and  use  became  apparent.  Some  regions  have  made  good 
progress  and  have  even  been  able  to  use  the  tool  on  many  occasions  as  part  of  their  management  and 
control activities. 

Thanks  to  the  working  party  meeting,  it  was  possible  to  acquire  an  overview  of  the  ways  in  which  the 
ARACHNE tool was being used and to give a new impetus to its implementation by working on putting into 
place a strategy for the tool’s usage. 

Finally,  as  for  the  technical  aspect  of  sending  data  from  the  various  operational  programmes  and  their 
integration in the tool, the ANCT is pursuing work on the the aggregator Synergie and similar programmes 
in order to allow  regular transmission  of data from the  various operational programmes to feed  into the 
ARACHNE tool. 

Other actions have been taken by managing authorities themselves. 

Q.2.2.b  Can  you  share  any  results  deriving  from  the  use  of  the  findings  from  PIF  Reports  in  your 
fraud risk assessments?☒NO 

Q.2.2.c  Have  you  further  exploited  the  potential  of  risk  analysis,  tailoring  the  approach  to  the 
different types of expenditure?☒ YES, partly implementing the recommendation 

From  one  marketing  year  to  the  next,  the  audit  authority  notes  that  irregularities  relate  primarily  to  the 
same issues: public purchasing, State aid and eligibility of expenditure. The audit authority bases its risk 
analysis on all the irregularities declared in the Synergie information system. This has enabled it to map 
risks at national level,  but  also at regional level, by taking  all audits into account  (operation and system 
audits)  and  to  tailor  the  audit  plan  and  supervision  better  to  the  risks  highlighted  in  each  region. 
Subsequently,  efforts  to  provide  support  on  these  issues  have  been  made:  the  Centre  de  formations  des 
agents  territoriaux  (Training  centre  for  local  staff)  and  the  CGET,  the  coordinating  authority  for  ESIF 
(European Structural and Investment Funds) have implemented training activities, in particular on public 
procurement, for all those involved in managing European funds. Furthermore, the often complex problems 
(notably those regarding State aid) faced by the auditor examining these issues are shared and illustrated 
through  case  studies  thanks  to  seminars  and  meetings,  or  presented  to  the  internal  control  committee 
responsible for ruling on interpretations of the regulations. 

Q.2.3.a  Have  you  facilitated  and  assessed  the  spontaneous  reporting  of  potential  irregularities  and 
strengthen  the  protection  of  whistle-blowers,  who  are  also  a  crucial  source  for  investigative 
journalism?☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation  

The  French  government  adopted  the  circular  of  19  July  2018  ‘on  the  procedure  for  whistle  blowing  by 
public officials within the framework of Articles 6 to 15 of Law No 2016 1691 of 9 December 2016’. This 

103 

 
 
circular identifies public officials who are likely to be whistle-blowers in the public administration, as well 
as the recipients of whistle blowing reports. It also lists all the deeds or acts likely to be reported, detailed 
rules for whistle blowing within the context of the procedure detailed in Article 8 of the Law of 9 December 
2016, as well as the measures adopted to protect and safeguard public officials who are whistle-blowers. 
Furthermore, it is worth noting that France must carry out the transposition of Directive EU 2019/1937 of 
23 October 2019 on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law. 

Q.2.3.b  Have  you  promoted  systematic  and  timely  cooperation  between  judicial  and  administrative 
authorities?☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 

The  Ministry  of  Justice  (DACG,  Direction  des  Affaires  criminelles  et  des  Grâces,  the  Directorate  for 
Criminal Matters  and  Pardons)  met OLAF  in October 2019 and requested to be informed of the judicial 
recommendations  issued  by  the  Office  to  the  French  courts.  Such  information  could  help  to  improve  the 
follow-up procedures and cooperation with OLAF. Systematic and regular promotion of such cooperation 
will be explored when the anti-fraud strategy is next revised. 

104 

 
HR  Q.2.1. Have you adopted or updated a national anti-fraud strategy, which you have communicated to 

the European Commission/OLAF? ☒NO 

The Republic of Croatia has adopted two anti-fraud strategies so far. One was covering the period 2010-
2012  while  the  other  was  covering  the  period  2014-2016,  and  both  strategies  were  fully  implemented. 
However, no new anti-fraud strategy has been adopted because of significant lack of human resources at 
the  AFCOS  service.  At  the  same  time,  the  AFCOS  service  has  been  faced  with  the  constant  rise  in  a 
workload. 

Q.2.1.a. If yes, have you developed this strategy in cooperation with all bodies and authorities which 
have  a  specific  role  and  expertise  in  the  protection  of  the  EU  financial  interests,  including  law 
enforcement and prosecution services?☒NO 

The  answer  to  this  question  is  ‘no’  because  no  new  anti-fraud  strategy  has  been  adopted.  However,  the 
previous anti-fraud strategies were developed in close collaboration with authorities managing and using 
EU funds as well as with law enforcement and prosecution authorities. 

Q.2.1.b.  In  line  with  what  had  been  recommended  in  previous  years,  has  your  national  anti-fraud 
strategy  taken  into  account  the  risk  analysis  conclusions  contained  in  the  2018,  2017  and  2016  PIF 
reports? ☒NO 

The  answer  to  this  question  is  ‘no’  because  no  new  anti-fraud  strategy  has  been  adopted.  However,  the 
AFCOS service has developed Irregularity and Fraud Risk Management Methodology and it has conducted 
risk  assessments  in  accordance  with  this  Methodology.  Therefore,  the  new  anti-fraud  strategy  would 
incorporate results of such assessments.  

Q.2.1.c. In line with what was recommended in previous years, has your national anti-fraud strategy 
taken into account the need to structure the coordination between administrative and criminal checks 
and investigations;☒NO 

The  answer  to  this  question  is  ‘no’  because  no  new  anti-fraud  strategy  has  been  adopted.  However,  the 
need  to  structure  the  coordination  between  administrative  and  criminal  checks  and  investigations  was 
addressed in the first anti-fraud strategy covering the period 2010-2012. To structure that coordination, a 
number of measures have been implemented: the new Budget Act has been adopted where definition of the 
AFCOS  system  in  the  Republic  of  Croatia  has  been  formulated  and  which  has  provided  legal  basis  for 
adoption  of  the  Regulation  on  the  institutional  framework  of  the  system  for  combating  irregularities  and 
fraud. In addition, the Decision on AFCOS network has been adopted and Protocols on cooperation have 
been signed with the State Attorney’s Office, the Ministry of Interior and the Audit Authority. It has to be 
clarified  that the  AFCOS  Network  in the  Republic  of  Croatia  gathers  representatives  of  law  enforcement 
and prosecution authorities, as well as authorities with specific expertise (e.g. in public procurement). 

Q.2.1.d. Did you make any assessment of the impact of the NAFS on the fight against fraud affecting 
the EU’s financial interests?☒ NO 

105 

 
Q.2.2.a. In line with what was recommended in previous years, has risk analysis been strengthened to 
detect  irregularities  and  fraud,  including  the  use  of  IT  tools  (such  as  ARACHNE)?☒YES,  fully 
implementing the recommendation 

Q.2.2.b  Can  you  share  any  results  deriving  from  the  use  of  the  findings  from  PIF  Reports  in  your 
fraud risk assessments?☒YES 

The  Ministry  of  Regional  Development  and  EU  Funds  is  the  Managing  Authority  (MA)  for  Operational 
Programme  Competitiveness  and  Cohesion  2014-2020.  MA  establishes  effective  and  proportionate 
measures  to  combat  fraud,  taking  into  account  the  identified  risks.  All  management  and  control  system 
bodies  (MA,  Coordination  body,  Intermediate  bodies  level  I  (IB  I),      Intermediate  bodies  level  II  (IB  II), 
Certifying  authority  (CA),  Audit  authority)  carry  zero  tolerance  policies  to  fraud  and  corruption,  and 
accordingly MA,  IB  I,  IB II and CA carry out fraud risk assessment for the  purpose of fraud prevention, 
detection  and  taking  of  necessary  corrective  measures.  MA  collects  mentioned  assessment,  while  the 
Ministry of Finance is  responsible  for processing and  analysing  the  obtained  results, in accordance with 
the designated obligations. 

Q.2.2.c Have  you  further  exploited  the  potential  of  risk  analysis,  tailoring  the  approach  to  the 
different types of expenditure?☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

The  Common  National  Rules  (CNR)  that  are  obligatory  at  the  operational  programme  level  for  all 
management  and  control  system  (MCS)  bodies  (Part  10:  Risk  Management;    chapters  8-11)  incorporate 
fraud  risk  assessment  principles  from  Guidance  Note  on  Fraud  Risk  Assessment  and  Effective  and 
Proportionate 
Measures  
(http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/information/publications/guidelines/2014/fraud-risk-assessment-
and-effective-and-proportionate-anti-fraud-measures).  According  to  the  abovementioned  chapter  of  the 
CNR, MCS bodies  are  obliged to  conduct annual  fraud risk  assessment,  while  the Ministry of Finance is 
responsible  for  processing  and  analysing  the  obtained  results.  In  addition,  the  mentioned  fraud  risk 
assessment is facilitated with supporting documents (guidelines) and templates provided within the CNR to 
enable more precise definition and recognition of any possible fraud. 

Anti-Fraud 

Q.2.3.a  Have  you  facilitated  and  assessed  the  spontaneous  reporting  of  potential  irregularities  and 
strengthen  the  protection  of  whistle-blowers,  who  are  also  a  crucial  source  for  investigative 
journalism?☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
Croatian AFCOS Service is not authorised for conducting administrative investigations/checks. However, it 
coordinates competent authorities to process irregularity alerts or suspected fraud as soon as possible. This 
means  that  received  alerts  are  sent  to  the  competent  management  and  control  system  body  (irregularity 
reporting  system  body)  with  a  request  to  send  written  observations  regarding  the  alert  as  well  as  profs 
which support those observations. In case of suspected fraud, alerts are forwarded to the State Attorney’s 
Office and the Ministry of Interior. Nonetheless, the AFCOS Service cannot measure the real effect of its 
work  (i.e.  coordination  activities)  because  it  relies  on  written  observations  submitted  by  competent 

106 

 
 
management  and  control  system  bodies  (irregularity  reporting  system  bodies)  and  it  does  not  check  the 
substance  of  the  case.  The  Irregularity  Management  System  (IMS)  has  8  cases  where  irregularities  have 
been  established  based  on  the  information  received  from  informants,  out  of  which  two  cases  relate  to 
suspected  fraud.  With  regard  to  the  protection  of  whistle-blowers,  the  Act  on  the  Protection  of  Whistle-
blowers was adopted on February 8, 2019 and came into force on July 1, 2019 (OG 17/2019). 

Q.2.3.b  Have      you      promoted      systematic      and      timely      cooperation      between      judicial  and 
administrative authorities?☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

If the word ‘promoted’ stands for encouraging and facilitating, than the following measures can be listed: 

- Regulation on the institutional framework of the system for combating irregularities and fraud has been 
adopted.  This  Regulation  defines  AFCOS  as  a  system  comprised  of  1)  administrative  authorities 
(irregularity  reporting  system  bodies/management  and  control  system  bodies),  2)  law  enforcement  and 
prosecution authorities, as well as authorities which have a specific expertise (AFCOS network), and 3) a 
coordinative authority (AFCOS service).  

- Decision of AFCOS network has been adopted 

- Protocols on cooperation have been signed with the State Attorney’s Office, the Ministry of Interior and 
the Audit Authority 

-  meetings  have  been  organised  between  administrative  authorities  (irregularity  reporting  system 
bodies/management  and  control  system  bodies)  and  law  enforcement  and  prosecution  authorities,  or 
authorities  which  have  a  specific  expertise  (AFCOS  network)  in  cases  where  administrative  authorities 
need expert opinion (advice) from law enforcement and prosecution authorities, or authorities which have a 
specific expertise. 

With regard to educational activities that would encourage and facilitate cooperation between judicial and 
administrative  authorities,  no  such  activities  were  organised  in  2019  due  to  significant  lack  of  human 
resources. 

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IT  Q.2.1. Have you adopted or updated a national anti-fraud strategy, which you have communicated to 

the European Commission/OLAF?☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
Q.2.1.a. If yes, have you developed this strategy in cooperation with all bodies and authorities which 
have  a  specific  role  and  expertise  in  the  protection  of  the  EU  financial  interests,  including  law 
enforcement and prosecution services? ☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation. 
Q.2.1.b.  In  line  with  what  had  been  recommended  in  previous  years,  has  your  national  anti-fraud 
strategy  taken  into  account  the  risk  analysis  conclusions  contained  in  the  2018,  2017  and  2016  PIF 
reports? ☒ YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
Q.2.1.c. In line with what was recommended in previous years, has your national anti-fraud strategy 
taken into account the need to structure the coordination between administrative and criminal checks 
and investigations; ☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
Q.2.1.d. Did you make any assessment of the impact of the NAFS on the fight against fraud affecting 
the EU’s financial interests? ☒ YES  
In  the  fight  against  Fraud,  Italy  is  among  those  countries  than  have  an  efficient  strategy  and  effectively 
pursue the largest number of crimes against European funds. To take just one, for the Programmes owned 
by  the  Agency  for  Territorial  Cohesion  –  PON  Città  Metropolitane  2014/2020  and  PON  Governace  e 
Capacità  Istituzionale  2014/2020  it  was  established  (for  each  Programme)  the  Fraud  Risk  Assessment 
Team which provided to the formal adoption of risk assessment tools. 
Q.2.2.a. In line with what was recommended in previous years, has risk analysis been strengthened to 
detect  irregularities  and  fraud,  including  the  use  of  IT  tools  (such  as  ARACHNE)?☒YES,  fully 
implementing the recommendation 
The Managing Authorities, generally, have established a Fraud Risk Assessment Task Force and a Checks 
Quality  Review  Task  Force,  in  addition  to  implementing  the  ARACHNE  system  with  assistance  from  the 
Ministry of Economy and Finance/Auditing Authority. 
Q.2.2.b  Can  you  share  any  results  deriving  from  the  use  of  the  findings  from  PIF  Reports  in  your 
fraud risk assessments?☒YES 
Overall, the use of findings from PIF allowed to improve the “Control” system making it among the most 
effective and efficient. 
Q.2.2.c Have  you  further  exploited  the  potential  of  risk  analysis,  tailoring  the  approach  to  the 
different types of expenditure?☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
Q.2.3.a  Have  you  facilitated  and  assessed  the  spontaneous  reporting  of  potential  irregularities  and 
strengthen  the  protection  of  whistle-blowers,  who  are  also  a  crucial  source  for  investigative 
journalism?☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
Pursuant  to  Italian  legislation,  all  national  public  administrations,  under  which  the  Managing  Authority 
operates,  have  implemented  a  comprehensive  whistleblowing  protection  system.  The  MA  itself  routinely 
receives reports from whistleblowers, which are always investigated, while ensuring that the identity of the 
whistleblower is not disclosed. 
Q.2.3.b  Have      you      promoted      systematic      and      timely      cooperation      between      judicial      and 
administrative authorities?☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
The Managing Authority will always respond to any request from a national judicial authority, while at the 

108 

 
same time monitoring Court proceedings which are related to irregularities in the Operational Programme. 
It  should  be  noted  that  Italian  judicial  authorities  are  independent  from  the  Civil  Service;  moreover, 
proceedings  will  often  be  classified.  The  cooperation  between  administrative  authorities  is  mandated  by 
Italian law. 

109 

 
 
CY 

Q.2.1. Have you adopted or updated a national anti-fraud strategy, which you have communicated to 
the European Commission/OLAF?☒NO 

Currently, the House of Parliament is under discussion of the legislation for the function of the Independent 
Authority against Corruption and Fraud. The Independent Authority will have several functions including 
investigation and reporting. The new Independent Authority will undertake the role of AFCOS. It is worthy 
to note that, there is already an Anti-Corruption policy, however the Anti-Fraud Strategy will be covered, 
through the new legislation. 

Q.2.2.α. In line with what was recommended in previous years, has risk analysis been strengthened to 
detect  irregularities  and  fraud,  including  the  use  of  IT  tools  (such  as  ARACHNE)?☒YES,  partly 
implementing the recommendation 

Our Risk Analysis process, takes into account among other factors, the results of previous year verifications 
and  on-the-spot  checks,  the  frequency  of  the  errors  identified  in  each  project,  the  nature  of  the  projects, 
nature of beneficiaries and type of expenditure. This information is consolidated at Fund Level and is taken 
into  account  at  the  sampling  process.  Therefore,  high  risk  areas  are  more  likely  to  be  selected  for 
verifications or on-the-spot checks. 

Additionally,  the  “Summary  of  Errors”  (SoE),  which  is  annually  submitted  to  the  EC  through  the 
submission  of  the  accounts,  is  used  to  document  all  the  irregularities  identified  through  several 
verifications,  including  cases  which  may  be  excluded  from  reporting  because  these  have  been  detected 
before  the  submission  of  the  payment  claim.  The  SoE  of  previous  year  is  taken  into  account  in  order  to 
determine the verification strategy in the next year.  

Further  to  the  above,  a  new  development  is  the  access  to  the  electronic  platform  of  the  Department  of 
Registrar of Companies and official Receiver has been provided to authorised officers of the Verifications 
and Certification Directorate, through which companies’ information can been identified. This tool allows 
the authorised users to identify any relationships between corporate beneficiaries and/or its representatives 
(e.g  Directors)  and  shareholders,  which  can  be  used  to  assess  whether  there  is  any  potential  conflict  of 
interest in cases of awarding contracts by Beneficiaries funded by ESIF funds. 

2. Risk Analysis 

Q.2.2.b  Can  you  share  any  results  deriving  from  the  use  of  the  findings  from  PIF  Reports  in  your 
fraud risk assessments?☒YES 

Risk  assessment  has  been  incorporated  in  all  administrative  and  on  the  spot  procedures  undertaken  by 
responsible  bodies  involved  in  programmes  under  shared  management  in  the  areas  of  Cohesion  Policy, 
Fisheries  and  Aid  to  the  Most  Deprived.    E.g.  Risk  assessment  methodologies  are  incorporated  in 
procedures for selecting procurement procedures in order to perform administrative verifications regarding 
the legality and regularity of the tender notice, evaluation and assignment procedures.   

Risk analysis is also used in order to select transactions to verify in terms of payment claims submitted by 

110 

 
beneficiaries  with  a  large  number  of  supporting  documents,  or  during  on  the  spot  controls  for  measures 
with a large number of final recipients. 

Risk  analysis  incorporates  data  on  the  nature  of  beneficiaries,  the  nature  of  projects  and  the  type  of 
expenditure  involved,  based  on  ex-ante  assessment  of  the  associated  risk  to  each  category  and 
incorporating results of previous verifications and audits. 

Additionally, through the preparation of SoE and Typology of Errors (common typology of errors), we can 
identify the frequency of errors in each type of error and target the high risk areas in order to proceed with 
enhanced control testing and verifications in the next year. 

Q.2.2.c Have  you  further  exploited  the  potential  of  risk  analysis,  tailoring  the  approach  to  the 
different types of expenditure?☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

Information regarding staff involved in co-financed projects has been incorporated in the MIS used for the 
management of four shared management programmes covering the areas of Cohesion Policy, Fisheries and 
Aid to the Most Deprived.  Staff cost has been assessed as a high risk area for fraud during the fraud risk 
self-assessment  exercise  undertaken  by  the  responsible  authorities.  The  information  in  the  MIS  will  be 
extracted in reports in order to identify trends and used in the framework of administrative and on-the-spot 
controls. This function is in progress and is gradually implemented. 

3. Horizontal issues 

Q.2.3.a  Have  you  facilitated  and  assessed  the  spontaneous  reporting  of  potential  irregularities  and 
strengthen  the  protection  of  whistle-blowers,  who  are  also  a  crucial  source  for  investigative 
journalism?☒NO 

Whistle-blowers regulation is yet to be released by the House of Parliament.  

Q.2.3.b  Have      you      promoted      systematic      and      timely      cooperation      between      judicial      and 
administrative authorities? YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

Enhanced  cooperation  between  judicial  and  administrative  authorities  exist  in  cases  of  detected 
irregularities which may result to a suspicion of fraud or established fraud. Any other types of irregularities 
are  handled  within  administrative  authorities.  The  Legal  Department  of  the  Cyprus  Government  and 
specifically  the  European  Union  Law  Section  of  the  Attorney  General  together  with  Cyprus  Police  work 
closely  with  AFCOS.  Especially  in  the  event  of  an  economic  operator  resists  in  any  control  (performed 
either by OLAF or VCD or IB), and authorities other than administrative are required in order to be able to 
proceed with the on-the-spot checks, then the three authorities liaise between them and if required the check 
is  performed  at  the  economic  operator  premises  at  Police  presence.    In  other  cases,  Banking  Judicial 
Disclosure Order was necessary in order for OLAF to be able to obtain any necessary information by the 
Economic Operator and this has been achieved through close collaboration between the Legal Department, 
Cyprus Police and OLAF. 

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LV  Q.2.1. Have you adopted or updated a national anti-fraud strategy, which you have communicated to 

the European Commission/OLAF?☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

First National Anti-fraud Strategy and Action plan (NAFS) for period 2017 - 2019 was adopted on January 
16,  2017.  Action  Plan  has  been  successfully  implemented  and  in  the  end  of  2019  AFCOS  working  party 
started to work on New national anti-fraud strategy and Action Plan covering period from 2020 – 2022. It 
is expected that new Strategy will be adopted by Government ( Cabinet of Ministers) in the first half of 2020 
and afterwards communicated with OLAF. 

Q.2.1.a. If yes, have you developed this strategy in cooperation with all bodies and authorities which 
have  a  specific  role  and  expertise  in  the  protection  of  the  EU  financial  interests,  including  law 
enforcement and prosecution services?☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

All AFCOS Council has been involved in drafting NAFS. Firstly, with survey about measures, which should 
be included in NAFS, afterwards, with concrete working party which drafted NAFS project. NAFS Action 
Plan includes the most important measures in field of protection of EU financial interests, which should be 
taken  in  upcoming  years.  AFCOS  Council  involves  institutions  from  all  Fraud  cycles,  including,  law 
enforcement and prosecution services. 

Q.2.1.b.  In  line  with  what  had  been  recommended  in  previous  years,  has  your  national  anti-fraud 
strategy  taken  into  account  the  risk  analysis  conclusions  contained  in  the  2018,  2017  and  2016  PIF 
reports?X YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

Managing authorities (and other institutions) are regulary working on improvements of risk analysis and 
implementation  of  recommendations.  Therefore,  internal  strategies  and  other  documentation  is  regulary 
updated  and  improved.  NAFS  is  drafted  on  actual  needs  from  institutions  involved  in  AFCOS  Council; 
therefore, NAFS includes those measures, which haven’t been stipulated in other legislative acts. 

Q.2.1.c. In line with what was recommended in previous years, has your national anti-fraud strategy 
taken into account the need to structure the coordination between administrative and criminal checks 
and investigations;XYES, fully implementing the recommendation 

In  process  of  implementation  NAFS  Action  Plan,  OLAF  assistance  Law  was  drafted  in  order  to  ensure 
effective  cooperation  with  OLAF  (more  information  in  PIF  questionnaire).  During  this  process,  main 
question was to find a best way to assist OLAF during administrative investigations and how to structure 
coordination  between  criminal  and  administrative  investigations.    During  the  process  of  updating  NAFS, 
this question is actualised once more with aim to implement OLAF assistance Law in practice, as well as 
strengthen cooperation between AFCOS Council members via educational activities.  

Q.2.1.d. Did you make any assessment of the impact of the NAFS on the fight against fraud affecting 
the EU’s financial interests? 

XYES  

One of measures included in NAFS for period 2017-2019 was social informative campaign #FraudOff!. In 

112 

 
ordered to better understand which would be the focus themes for campaign, AFCOS every year (starting 
from 2017) carries out a study on opinion of society on the level of fraud and other related questions. This 
helps to understand not only results of campaign #FraudOff! but also impact of all NAFS. Final results (for 
NAFS period 2017-2019) will be available at the end of March, 2020.  

We can see from study carried out at beginning of 2019 that overall confidence in public administration in 
the prevention of fraud and corruption is very low, but compared to previous years' studies, this indicator 
has increased dynamically over the years (2017.- 9%, 2018.- 11%, 2019.- 13%). 

Q.2.2.a. In line with what was recommended in previous years, has risk analysis been strengthened to 
detect  irregularities  and  fraud,  including  the  use  of  IT  tools  (such  as  ARACHNE)?☒YES,  fully 

implementing  the  recommendation  (Ministry  of  Finance,  MA  for  Structural  funds)☒YES,  partly 
implementing the recommendation (Ministry of Agriculture, MA for agriculture and fisheries) 

This  refers  to  risk  analysis  tools  for  the  targeting  of  projects/operations  to  be  submitted  to  specific 
verifications, on-the-spot checks, audits  or other types of controls (as relevant). Please  provide results in 
terms of irregularities/fraud detected during controls that have been started (also) because of risk analysis. 
The Irregularities Management System (IMS) provides this information, but the Member State may want to 
add  detections  that  are  excluded  from  reporting  (such  as  detections  before  inclusion  of  expenditure  in  a 
statement  of  expenditure  submitted  to  the  Commission).  The  Member  States  are  encouraged  to  provide 
relevant details to explain the actions undertaken or planned (in case of partial implementation) (see also 
question under section 2).  If applicable, explain why no such action was taken. 

Ministry of Finance, MA for Structural funds: 

One  of  the  functions  of MA  is  verifications  over  management  and  control  system,  which  include  controls 
over delegated functions of Intermediate Bodies by overseeing and revising their control system and checks. 
Major MA controls are - procurement ex-ante controls, eligibility and payment claim verification, on-the-
spot verifications, controls of process of contract/agreement modifications as well as revise of procedures 
of  Intermediate  Bodies.  Planning  of  MA  controls  of  delegated  function  is  based  on  the  risk-cantered 
approach, taking into account risky spheres, which were identified during the time of previous checks. For 
verifications  MA  is  using  not  only  publicly  available  data  bases,  but  also    European  Commission’s 
ARACHNE information system as an additional inspection tool in cases when the possibility of fraud exists 
within  the  process  of  checks,  and  MA  ensures  that  Intermediate  Body  is  using  ARACHNE  information 
system during their provided checks as well. 

Ministry of Agriculture, MA for agriculture and fisheries: Intermediate body - The Rural Support Service 
uses its IT system tools, incl. a list of risk clients, links to other external systems, area satellite imagery and 
atypical case studies. 

Q.2.2.b  Can  you  share  any  results  deriving  from  the  use  of  the  findings  from  PIF  Reports  in  your 
fraud risk assessments?☒YES (Ministry of Agriculture, MA for agriculture and fisheries)☒NO (Ministry 
of Finance, MA for Structural funds and Ministry of Welfare, MA for FEAD) 

113 

 
Ministry of Agriculture, MA for agriculture and fisheries: 

Intermediate  body  -  The  Rural  Support  Service  has  identified  individual  cases  that  have  allowed  the 
detection of irregularities and the prevention of undue payments. 

Ministry of Finance, MA for Structural funds: 

Regarding  the  fraud  and  corruption  risk  assessment  in  the  monitoring  and  control  system  of  the 
Operational Programme for the Implementation of the European Structural and Investment funds, practical 
fraud risk self-assessment tool (based on Annex 1 of the Commission's guidance EGESIF of 16 June 2014 
“Programming period 2014-2020 Guidance note on fraud risk assessment and effective and proportionate 
anti-fraud measures”) is used. 

The fraud risk self-assessment tool targets the main situations where key processes in the implementation of 
the  programme  (selection  of  applicants;  implementation  and  verification  of  the  operations;  certification 
and payments) could be most open to manipulation by fraudulent individuals or organisations. 

Q.2.2.c Have  you  further  exploited  the  potential  of  risk  analysis,  tailoring  the  approach  to  the 
different types of expenditure?☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation (Ministry of Finance, MA 

for  Structural  funds  and  Ministry  of  Agriculture,  MA  for  agriculture  and  fisheries)  ☒NO  (Ministry  of 
Welfare, MA for FEAD) 

Ministry of Welfare, MA for FEAD: 

Set up internal risk management and anti-fraud control system in the managing authority, clearly defining 
the roles and responsibilities of personnel in the implementation of the activities, avoiding any conflict of 
interest  in  the  decision-making  process,  ensuring  at  least  two  participation  in  decision  making  and  the 
person responsible for the supervision of operations to be supported and ensuring FEAD beneficiaries of 
the  awareness  of  the  institutions  involved  in  the  management  of  the  FEAD  readiness  ensure  the  risk 
management process and capacity to fight fraud. 

The institutions involved in the management of the FEAD shall take the measures necessary to prevent and 
detect  potential  risks,  including  fraud.  The  risk  management  established  for  expenditure  shall  be  applied 
uniformly to all types 

Q.2.3.a  Have  you  facilitated  and  assessed  the  spontaneous  reporting  of  potential  irregularities  and 
strengthen  the  protection  of  whistle-blowers,  who  are  also  a  crucial  source  for  investigative 
journalism?☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation  

Whistleblower  Protection  Law  entered  in  force  on  May  1,  2019.  Thus,  public  and  private  legal  entities 
introduced  an  internal  alert  system  and  developed  procedures  for  evaluating  external  alert  reports.  The 
objective  of  the  law  is  strengthening  of  whistle-blowers  protection  in  Latvia  and  to  facilitate  alarm 
sounding in the  interests of the  society  on  various irregularities.  For example, the Rural  Support Service 
received 2 alarms reports during this time, which were properly evaluated but did not confirm the facts. In 
addition,  focus  theme  for  2019  in  social  campaign  #FraudOff!  was  –  Reporting  culture.  Within  the 

114 

 
campaign  we  communicated  with  society  about  reporting  positive  effects  and  necessity  in  order  to  fight 
fraud  and  corruption.  Reporting  tool  was  created  where  individuals  can  report  about  different 
irregularities in easy and understandable way. Tool is situated in website www.atkrapies.lv  

Q.2.3.b  Have      you      promoted      systematic      and      timely      cooperation      between      judicial      and 
administrative authorities?☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

AFCOS Council is made as a network, which involves institutions from all fraud cycles. Therefore, we have 
meetings where all institution involved in protection of EU financial interests, meets at least twice a year. 
Many cooperation aspects are discussed during those meetings. 

In  2019,  there  were  several  inter-institutional  meetings  organised  between  administrative  bodies  in  EU 
funds  and  law  enforcement  bodies  within  concrete  criminal  cases.  Those  meetings  and  exchange  of 
information  are  essential,  not  only  to  take  appropriate  administrative  measures  in  project,  but  to  assist 
investigation in general. 

And,  of  course,  training  programmes  regarding  cooperation  structure  which  are  designed  in  close 
collaboration between investigation authorities and administrative institutions.  Aim of those trainings is to 
help institutions better understand each other’s work and to find best way for cooperation on daily basis. 
These kind of educational activities were carried out on 2018 and 2019. 

115 

 
 
LT 

Q.2.1. Have you adopted or updated a national anti-fraud strategy, which you have communicated to 
the European Commission/OLAF? ☒NO 

116 

 
LU  Q.2.1. Have you adopted or updated a national anti-fraud strategy, which you have communicated to 

the European Commission/OLAF?☒NO 
The  preparation  of  the  LU  anti-fraud  strategy  document  is  in  progress.  In  any  event,  risk  management 
through  the  collection  and  analysis  of  the  fraud  related  data  is  an  ongoing  process  that  is  enhanced  each 
time a fraud case is  discovered. The managing  authorities are in  charge  of inputting the data in the  IMS. 
There is an ongoing cooperation between national stakeholders and the competent Commission services. In 
addition, several managing authorities already implemented internal policies describing the steps to follow 
in case of fraud detection. In case of fraud suspicion followed by an investigation, AFCOS is kept informed 
on the exchanges the managing authority has with OLAF and the Public Prosecutor’s Office. 
Pending  finalisation  of  the  strategy,  implementation  of  the  recommendations  by  national  stakeholders  is 
ongoing. 
Q.2.2.a. In line with what was recommended in previous years, has risk analysis been strengthened to 
detect irregularities and fraud, including the use of IT tools (such as ARACHNE)? ☒YES, fully  
The  managing  authority  of  the  European  Regional  Development  Fund  (FEDER),  the  Ministry  of 
Economics, the managing authority of the European Social Fund (ESF), the Ministry of Labour, as well as 
the  INTERREG programme,  managed by  the  Ministry  for Spatial  Planning, all implemented  the  Arachne 
tool.  This  was  done  in  tight  collaboration  with  the  Commission's  services.  The  latter  helped  them  to 
enhance management of their internet platforms, used by promoters to upload information regarding, inter 
alia, expenses. The managing authorities use the internet platform as a management control tool for their 
projects  as  all  the  information  is  centralised  on  it.  Collected  information  is  exported  in  Arachne. 
INTERREG  uses  in  addition  a  Risk  Assessment  Tool  in  the  framework  of  the  establishment  of  their 
management  control  system.  Its  procedures  are  adapted  based  on  the  results  from  the  Risk  Assessment 
Tool.  In  addition,  INTERREG  programme  elaborated  more  tools  to  report  on  fraud,  like  a  formulary  to 
notify first level controllers. Controls are made onsite. The Ministry of Agriculture, the managing authority 
for  the  European  Agricultural  Fund  for  Rural  Development  (FEADER)  and  the  European  Agricultural 
Guarantee  Fund  (FEAGA)  uses  the  IMS  in  the  framework  of  its  activities.  Same  for  the  managing 
authorities of FEDER and ESF. The Inspectorate General of Finances, which is also ESF’s Audit Authority, 
can access ESF’s IMS and ESF’s internet platform. The latter is used for the daily management of the ESF 
and  its  projects.  The  application  has  a  back  office  for  the  managing  authority  and  a  front  office  for  the 
project owners. Most of the common tasks are done through or with the support of the platform: deposit of 
new  projects,  reporting  of  data  (i.e.  payment  claims,  follow-up  of  indicators,  monitoring  of,  first  level 
control,…). All available data on ESFprojects is centralised on this platform and it ensures transparency 
and a possible audit trail. When accessing it, the Inspectorate General of Finances can get all the available 
information  needed  for  their  second  level  control.  ESPON  does  a  risk  analysis  and  in  its  programme 
documents  include  that  the  Single  Beneficiary  of  the  programme  is,  in  addition,  obliged  to  have  a  risk 
analysis  that  is  updated  every  year.  The  managing  authority  checks  the  risk  analysis  of  the  Single 
Beneficiary on a yearly basis during the quality checks on the spot. Based on the results of the management 
authority’s verifications and of the quality checks, the decision is taken whether there is a need to update 
the programme level risk analysis. Arachne was not an option for ESPON having only one beneficiary for 
the programme. This has been duly discussed with Commission’s services. It has been notified that it was 
not possible to grant access to Arachne to the Single Beneficiary since it was not useful for the programme. 

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Q.2.2.b  Can  you  share  any  results  deriving  from  the  use  of  the  findings  from  PIF  Reports  in  your 
fraud risk assessments?☒NO 
If yes, please provide a summary of the results achieved. If no, please provide the reasons. In case of ESF 
there  is  a  very  low  margin  for  error.  Expenses  are  under  EUR  10,000.  FEDER  only  disburses  to  public 
entities, which are all risk assessed by our national court of auditors. For INTERREG, ESPON and FEAGA 
& FEADER there are no findings. 
Q.2.2.c  Have  you  further  exploited  the  potential  of  risk  analysis,  tailoring  the  approach  to  the 
different types of expenditure? ☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
In  the  framework  of  the  ESF,  a  simplification  of  cost  options  for  the  projects  exists,  so  as  to  reduce 
administrative burden and to focus on the outputs and results of the projects instead of limiting the checks 
of  the  application  of  accountability  rules.  This  has  been  agreed  with  the  Commission’s  services.  As  for 
FEDER there is no need for since the managing  authority only disburses to public entities, which are all 
risk  assessed  by  our  national  court  of  auditors.  In  2016,  following  a  fraud  discovery,  the  Ministry  of 
Agriculture,  the  managing  authority  for  FEAGA  and  FEADER,  created  the  "Procedure  and  Special 
Investigations service –  service Procédure  et Enquêtes Particulières  (PEP)", whose mission is to prevent 
fraud cases. Before that a guidance note for Premium managers to prevent fraud in the agricultural sector 
has  been  created.  The  reason  behind  it  was  a  scam  which  was  discovered  in  2013  following  an  internal 
administrative  audit.  Following  that  incident,  the  Ministry  of  Agriculture  fundamentally  reviewed  its 
external  and  internal  control  system.  Several  measures  /safeguards  were  taken  or  reinforced  since  then. 
This  procedure  is  one  of  them.  An  alert  system  has  also  been  set  up  in  (the  framework  of  article  58  of 
regulation 1306/2013) to detect facts that may indicate fraud or attempted fraud. In case of INTERREG, the 
expenditure  is  always  100%  controlled,  but  the  manual  of  the  program  insists  on  paying  particular 
attention  on  the  staff  cost  and  on  external  expertise,  in  particular  to  the  services  that  require  to  respect 
public procurement procedures. A risk chart has also been created and is updated on a 2-years basis (last 
time  in  2018),  abiding  by  the  Commission’s  guidelines.  For  ESPON  the  risk  approach  has  been  tailored 
since it mainly focuses on public procurement. The explanation is the following: when the risk analysis at 
programme  level  was  implemented  the  ESPON  team  detected  a  series  of  risks  mainly  related  to  the 
implementation of public procurement. On this basis, specific provisions where included in the programme 
implementation guidelines for the single beneficiary: (i) obligation of having a project specific risk analysis 
is  updated  every  year,  (ii)  separation  of  function,  (iii)  need  for  an  independent  lawyer  verifying  the 
implementation of public procurement, (iv) cooperation on rotation basis of project expert in charge of the 
content  and  the  financial  expert  in  charge  of  the  administrative  part  of  the  procurement,  (v)  rotation 
principle of project experts to avoid that they work with the same service providers; (vi) definition of the 
role  of  the  managing  authority  as  observer  in  certain  procurements  or  in  certain  phases  of  the 
procurements. 
Q.2.3.a  Have  you  facilitated  and  assessed  the  spontaneous  reporting  of  potential  irregularities  and 
strengthen  the  protection  of  whistle-blowers,  who  are  also  a  crucial  source  for  investigative 
journalism? ☒YES, partly implementing  
The managing authority in charge of FEAGA and FEADER, the Ministry of Agriculture, set up an internal 
whistle-blowers  policy  following  the  discovery  of  a  fraud  case  in  2015.  ESPON  has  introduced  in  its 
internal  manual  specific  provision  for  whistle-blower.  The  INTERREG  program  has  an  email  address  to 

118 

 
which  whistle-blowers  can  report.  FEDER  and  ESF  do  not  have  specific  measures  to  protect  whistle-
blowers,  however,  with  reference  to  article  23  paragraph  2  of  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure,  civil 
servants  are  obliged  to  report  any  suspicion  of  fraud  or  irregularity  to  the  Public  Prosecutor’s  Office. 
International standards of auditing and checklists are used by the managing authorities in the framework of 
their reporting. 
Q.2.3.b  Have  you  promoted  systematic  and  timely  cooperation  between  judicial  and  administrative 
authorities? ☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
The managing authorities report to the Public Prosecutor’s Office any suspicion of fraud. AFCOS is also in 
contact with the Public Prosecutor’s Office as often as required and in line with applicable legislation. In 
March 2019, a member of Luxembourg’s AFCOS and one prosecutor, covering OLAF related issues, jointly 
attended a conference in Bucharest, called “EU Anti-Fraud Partners’ Meeting”. The latter was organised 
by Romania’s Fight against Fraud Department – DLAF. The aim of the event was to provide the adequate 
ground for exchanging information, experience and best practices on EU anti-fraud issues, especially in the 
context of the future cooperation between Member States, OLAF and EPPO. Further, in November 2019, 
an “EU Conference on investigating frauds and corruption affecting the financial interests of the European 
Union” in Bucharest has been attended by a representative of our Inspectorate General of Finances. 

119 

 
HU 

Q.2.1. Have you adopted or updated a national anti-fraud strategy, which you have communicated to 
the European Commission/OLAF?☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

Hungary has had an anti-fraud strategy since 15 June 2015, which has been communicated to OLAF. 

Q.2.1.a. If yes, have you developed this strategy in cooperation with all bodies and authorities which 
have  a  specific  role  and  expertise  in  the  protection  of  the  EU  financial  interests,  including  law 
enforcement and prosecution services?☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

The Anti-Fraud Strategy was drawn up by the Prime Minister’s Office, responsible for the use of EU funds 
that  time  in  collaboration  with  participants  in  the  network  of  institutions  involved  in  performing  tasks 
related to development policy. 

Q.2.1.b.  In  line  with  what  had  been  recommended  in  previous  years,  has  your  national  anti-fraud 
strategy  taken  into  account  the  risk  analysis  conclusions  contained  in  the  2018,  2017  and  2016  PIF 
reports? ☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

A meeting of the Fraud Risk Assessment Coordination Working Party was held. The Managing Authorities 
(MAs)  drew  up  action  plans  and  then  performed  their  risk  assessments  according  to  those  plans.    The 
Coordination Body assessed and analysed the integrity and corruption risks and drew up an action plan to 
deal with them. Implementation of these measures is ongoing. 

An Order of the Minister of State for Administrative Affairs at the Prime Minister’s Office on the procedure 
for  collecting  and  investigating  reports  of  abuses,  infringements  and  integrity  and  corruption  risks 
associated  with  the  operations  of  the  Coordination  Body  was  adopted.  Following  adoption,  it  will  be 
applied on an on-going basis. Audit trails have been updated centrally in line with the amendments made to 
Government Decree No 272/2014. The national strategy has been reviewed since 2016. 
The  Managing  Authorities  identify  and  assess  the  risk  of  fraud  on  the  basis  of  the  EGESIF_14-0021-00 
guidance  document  published  by  the  Commission,  for  which  the  Hungarian  authorities  have  drawn  up 
methodological guidance. 
The main processes inspected as part of the assessment were: 
• 
• 
• 
• 

applicant selection; 
operation implementation and verification; 
certification and payments;  
public procurements conducted directly by the Managing Authorities. 

Q.2.1.c. In line with what was recommended in previous years, has your national anti-fraud strategy 
taken into account the need to structure the coordination between administrative and criminal checks 
and investigations;☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

The national strategy has been reviewed since 2016. 

The  Management  and  Security  Department  of  the  Ministry  of  Innovation  and  Technology  deals  with  the 
registration of criminal complaints related to EU funds, ongoing criminal cases and whistleblowing. With 
regard  to  ongoing  criminal  cases,  the  Department  keeps  in  regular  contact  with  the  law  enforcement 
authorities and the Managing Authorities. Government Decree No 272/2014 of 5 November 2014 contains 

120 

 
detailed  procedural  rules.  A  special  functionality  was  developed  in  the  section  of  the  Hungarian 
Development  Policy  Database  and  Information  System  (FAIR)  dealing  with  Union  support.  Its  aim  is  to 
prevent  fraud  and  abuses  and  detect  it  early  (the  ‘fraud  prevention  functionality’).  The  functionality  is 
being constantly improved in the light of emerging needs: In 2018, it was expanded with a question about 
indicators.  

According  to  the  model  protocol  for  irregularity  procedures  issued  by  the  Coordination  Body,  cases  of 
irregularities registered as suspected fraud must be recorded separately, so they can also be filtered using 
the FAIR EUPR irregularity module. 

Cooperation with  the National  Tax and Customs  Administration is ongoing. Contact was also made with 
the National Office for the Judiciary, as a result of which a whole-day training course entitled ‘Fiscal fraud 
and related crimes’ was held for the network of institutions handling Union support. The aim of the training 
was to present case-law. 

The Hungarian Competition Authority and the Public Procurement Authority held a training course for the 
network of institutions handling Union support as part of a similar training course in 2018. 

Also, in November 2019, training was held on the use of the Arachne system, involving a presenter from the 
European Commission.  

In  2019,  OLAF’s  Anti-fraud  coordination  service  (AFCOS),  in  cooperation  with  the  Coordinating  Body, 
provided a training course to the network of institutions handling Union funds on a total of two occasions, 
entitled ‘Fraud prevention in the field of EU development policy’. 

Q.2.1.d. Did you make any assessment of the impact of the NAFS on the fight against fraud affecting 
the EU’s financial interests?☒NO 

Q.2.2.a. In line with what was recommended in previous years, has risk analysis been strengthened to 
detect  irregularities  and  fraud,  including  the  use  of  IT  tools  (such  as  ARACHNE)?☒YES,  fully 
implementing the recommendation 

This  refers  to  risk  analysis  tools  for  the  targeting  of  projects/operations  to  be  submitted  to  specific 
verifications, on-the-spot checks, audits  or other types of controls (as relevant). Please  provide results in 
terms of irregularities/fraud detected during controls that have been started (also) because of risk analysis. 
The Irregularities Management System (IMS) provides this information, but the Member State may want to 
add  detections  that  are  excluded  from  reporting  (such  as  detections  before  inclusion  of  expenditure  in  a 
statement  of  expenditure  submitted  to  the  Commission).  The  Member  States  are  encouraged  to  provide 
relevant details to explain the actions undertaken or planned (in case of partial implementation) (see also 
question under section 2). If applicable, explain why no such action was taken. Arachne software has been 
installed in every Managing Authority which deals with ERDF, ESF and CF.  How actively Arachne is used 
depends  on  the  group  of  beneficiaries  a  Managing  Authority  has.  Managing  Authorities  which  typically 
cooperate  with  the  budgetary  institutions  do  not  use  Arachne,  as  the  FAIR  EUPR  fraud  prevention 
functionality  provides  them  with  sufficient  information.  Data  obtainable  using  Arachne  software  enables 
ownership relationships among companies, conflicts of interest and concentrations to be checked and SME 
status  to  be  verified.    In  2017  we  ran  a  training  course  entitled  ‘A  general  presentation  of  the  Arachne 

121 

 
system, and a presentation of risk categories and risk indictors’ with 39 participants, at which the presenter 
sent by the Commission described how the system is used. Another training session was held in November 
2018.  Use  of  the  Arachne  system  is  regulated  by  the  Methodological  guidance  for  the  application  of  the 
ARACHNE  IT  system  to  ensure  evaluation  of  the  risk  of  fraud  in  the  implementation  of  the  2014-2020 
programming period.  Test data have already been dispatched to the ARACHNE system and, on the basis of 
the Commission’s feedback, Hungary has made the requisite corrections. We sent you live data for the first 
time  in  mid-October  2018  and  most  recently  at  the  end  of  2019.  The  application  of  ARACHNE  user 
authorisation  can  be  initiated  by  anyone  whose  remit  justifies  it,  by  filling  in  Annex  1  to  the  ARACHNE 
system  access  management  regulation.  The  number  of  authorised  persons  is  continuously  expanding  in 
accordance with demand – currently 128 people have access. 81 users from   managing authorities and 47 
from the audit authority have authorisation. 

Q.2.2.b  Can  you  share  any  results  deriving  from  the  use  of  the  findings  from  PIF  Reports  in  your 
fraud risk assessments?☒YES 

When examining the public interest reports placed on the public interest reporting system operated by him 
(www.anti-lop.hu), the minister responsible for the use of EU funds may request information and data from 
the  managing  authorities  and  may  notify  of  a  suspected  irregularity;  the  managing  authorities  send  this 
information and data to the minister responsible for the use of EU funds within five working days of receipt 
of the request for information on any infringement proceedings that may have been initiated. The Minister 
takes the necessary measures on that basis. 

The  regulation  on  the  operation  of  the  reporting  system  and  protection  of  the  whistle-blower  was  issued 
under  number  SZBF/1/6/2/2016:  ‘Order  of  the  State  Secretariat  for  Administrative  Affairs  of  the  Prime 
Minister’s Office on the procedures for collecting and investigating reports on abuses, infringements and 
integrity  and  corruption  risks  associated  with  the  operations  of  the  Prime  Minister’s  Office’.  The  audit 
trails  were  updated  centrally  by  the  deadline,  pursuant  to  the  amendments  to  Government  Decree  No 
272/2014. 

In addition to the above, training was provided to colleagues, the Managing Authorities drew up their own 
anti-fraud policy, and Arachne software was installed in each and every Managing Authority. Discussions 
on  experience  in  analysing  fraud  risk  took  place  within  the  Fraud  Risk  Analysis  Coordination  Working 
Party. 

The use of a specially  designed  special  fraud prevention functionality in the part  of  Hungary’s IT system 
(FAIR)  dealing  with  EU  funds  (EUPR)  is  ongoing;  this  interface  provides  information  on  every  project, 
with the aim first and foremost preventing fraud and abuse and enabling early detection. 

The  ARACHNE  system:  use  of  the  fraud  prevention  system  designed  by  the  Commission  is  continuous  in 
investigations where it provides information in addition to that provided by the national IT system (such as 
on ownership relationships, for instance).  

Q.2.2.c  Have  you  further  exploited  the  potential  of  risk  analysis,  tailoring  the  approach  to  the 
different types of expenditure?☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

122 

 
 
The  Managing  Authorities  identify  and  assess  the  risk  of  fraud  on  the  basis  of  the  EGESIF_14-0021-00 
guidance  document  published  by  the  Commission,  for  which  the  Hungarian  authorities  have  drawn  up 
methodological guidance. The main processes inspected as part of the assessment were: 
• 
• 
• 
• 

applicant selection; 
operation implementation and verification; 
certification and payments;  
public procurements conducted directly by the Managing Authorities. 

Q.2.3.a  Have  you  facilitated  and  assessed  the  spontaneous  reporting  of  potential  irregularities  and 
strengthen  the  protection  of  whistle-blowers,  who  are  also  a  crucial  source  for  investigative 
journalism?☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

Citizen's complaints are of considerable help in detecting cases and identifying irregularities – the forum 
for  those  is  the  website  www.anti-lop.hu,  where  citizens  can  report  abuses  anonymously  with  a  view  to 
protecting their privacy.  Furthermore, requests sent to the customer service of the coordination body, by 
which  an  informant  may  request  information  and  data  from  the  managing  authorities  and  notify  of  a 
suspected irregularity, are also examined; the Managing Authorities send this information and data to the 
minister  responsible  for  the  use  of  EU  funds  within  five  working  days  of  receipt  of  the  request  for 
information on any infringement proceedings that may have been initiated. The minister takes the necessary 
measures  on  that  basis.  The  regulation  on  the  operation  of  the  reporting  system  and  protection  of 
informants  was  issued  under  number  SZBF/1/6/2/2016:  ‘Instruction  of  the  State  Secretariat  for 
Administrative  Affairs  of  the  Prime  Minister’s  Office  on  the  procedures  for  collecting  and  investigating 
reports  on  abuses,  infringements  and  integrity  and  corruption  risks  associated  with  the  operations  of  the 
Prime  Minister’s  Office’.    The  data  processing  obligations  associated  with  the  Managing  Authorities’ 
reports are set out in the Single Operations Manual – they have no separate procedures.   

Q.2.3.b  Have    you    promoted    systematic    and    timely    cooperation    between    judicial  and 
administrative authorities?☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

Currently  the  Management  and  Security  Department  of  the  Ministry  of  Innovation  and  Technology  is 
responsible  for  the  coordination  of  official  requests  relating  to  the  use  of  EU  funds  and  whistleblowing. 
Thus the entire criminal inquiry referred to the Managing Authority is concentrated in one department. This 
reinforces the personal contacts between the authorities and administrative bodies, increases transparency, 
reduces  the  number  of  parallel  investigations  and  facilitates  the  detection  and  prevention  of  crimes 
associated  with  the  use  of  EU  funds.  In  addition,  cooperation  between  the  National  Tax  and  Customs 
Administration,  the  Hungarian  State  Treasury,  the  National  Office  for  the  Judiciary,  the  Hungarian 
Competition Authority and the Public Procurement Authority is ongoing. 

123 

 
MT  Q.2.1. Have you adopted or updated a national anti-fraud strategy, which you have communicated to 

the European Commission/OLAF?☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
Malta’s Reply: The Maltese ‘National Anti-fraud and Corruption Strategy’ tabled in Parliament by the then 
Prime Minister of Malta in 2008 was also communicated to the European Commission/OLAF. 
Q.2.1.a. If yes, have you developed this strategy in cooperation with all bodies and authorities which 
have  a  specific  role  and  expertise  in  the  protection  of  the  EU  financial  interests,  including  law 
enforcement and prosecution services? ☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
Q.2.1.b.  In  line  with  what  had  been  recommended  in  previous  years,  has  your  national  anti-fraud 
strategy  taken  into  account  the  risk  analysis  conclusions  contained  in  the  2018,  2017  and  2016  PIF 
reports?☒ NO 
Malta’s Reply: The Strategy is currently in the process of being updated as necessary. 
Q.2.1.c. In line with what was recommended in previous years, has your national anti-fraud strategy 
taken into account the need to structure the coordination between administrative and criminal checks 
and investigations; ☒ YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
Q.2.1.d. Did you make any assessment of the impact of the NAFS on the fight against fraud affecting 
the EU’s financial interests? ☒ NO 
Q.2.2.a. In line with what was recommended in previous years, has risk analysis been strengthened to 
detect  irregularities  and  fraud,  including  the  use  of  IT  tools  (such  as  ARACHNE)?  ☒  YES,  fully 
implementing the recommendation 
Q.2.2.b  Can  you  share  any  results  deriving  from  the  use  of  the  findings  from  PIF  Reports  in  your 
fraud risk assessments?☒ NO - No results are available. 
Q.2.2.c  Have  you  further  exploited  the  potential  of  risk  analysis,  tailoring  the  approach  to  the 
different types of expenditure? ☒ YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
Q.2.3.a  Have  you  facilitated  and  assessed  the  spontaneous  reporting  of  potential  irregularities  and 
strengthen  the  protection  of  whistle-blowers,  who  are  also  a  crucial  source  for  investigative 
journalism? ☒ YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
The  Protection  of  the  Whistleblower  Act,  which  was  adopted  in  July  2013  and  made  applicable  by  a 
ministerial decision of 15 September 2013, establishes a system of internal and external reporting channels 
to be used by persons  disclosing  in  good  faith corrupt  practices  and other  suspicious behaviour. The act 
allows various forms of protection for the whistleblower, including immunity from criminal proceedings, in 
which  case  the  Attorney-General  acting  in  consultation  with  a  Judge  of  the  superior  Courts  and  the 
Commissioner of Police may grant such immunity where the reporting person was him/herself involved in 
criminal acts. 
Whistleblower Act  (Chapter  527 of the Laws  of  Malta) applies in the context of an employer –  employee 
relationship. The terms ‘employer’ and ‘employee’ are specifically defined in the Act. 
Q.2.3.b  Have  you  promoted  systematic  and  timely  cooperation  between  judicial  and  administrative 
authorities?☒ YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

124 

 
 
NL  Q.2.1. Have you adopted or updated a national anti-fraud strategy, which you have communicated to 

the European Commission/OLAF?☒NO 
There  is  a  procedure  to  come  to  a  combined  outline  of  all  antifraud  policy  for  the  means  in  shared 
management. A next step is a transformation to an actual strategy. 
Q.2.1.a. If yes, have you developed this strategy in cooperation with all bodies and authorities which 
have  a  specific  role  and  expertise  in  the  protection  of  the  EU  financial  interests,  including  law 
enforcement and prosecution services? ☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
Strategic cooperation with all bodies is in place and is part of the procedure to come to an outline of all 
antifraud policy and measures.  
Q.2.1.b.  In  line  with  what  had  been  recommended  in  previous  years,  has  your  national  anti-fraud 
strategy  taken  into  account  the  risk  analysis  conclusions  contained  in  the  2018,  2017  and  2016  PIF 
reports? 
The Netherlands has taken into account the risk analysis conclusions of the previous PIF reports. Not in the 
NAFS, because it is not implemented yet, but per fund risk analysis is in place.  
Q.2.1.c. In line with what was recommended in previous years, has your national anti-fraud strategy 
taken into account the need to structure the coordination between administrative and criminal checks 
and investigations; 
The need to structure between administrative and criminal checks has taken into account in the policies of 
the individual funds in shared management (but not in NAFS because it isn’t implemented yet).  
Q.2.1.d. Did you make any assessment of the impact of the NAFS on the fight against fraud affecting 
the EU’s financial interests? 
Not implemented yet 
Q.2.2.a. In line with what was recommended in previous years, has risk analysis been strengthened to 
detect  irregularities  and  fraud,  including  the  use  of  IT  tools  (such  as  ARACHNE)?  ☒YES,  fully 
implementing the recommendation 
After  several  pilot  projects  in  previous  years  on  the  use  of  ARACHNE,  this  year  ARACHNE  is  fully 
operational.  To  this  end,  project  data  was  exchanged  with  ARACHNE.  This  has  not  led  to  detection  of 
fraud. 
Q.2.2.b  Can  you  share  any  results  deriving  from  the  use  of  the  findings  from  PIF  Reports  in  your 
fraud risk assessments?☒NO 
Q.2.2.c Have  you  further  exploited  the  potential  of  risk  analysis,  tailoring  the  approach  to  the 
different types of expenditure? ☒NO 
Risk analysis is already sufficient to detect fraud. 
Q.2.3.a  Have  you  facilitated  and  assessed  the  spontaneous  reporting  of  potential  irregularities  and 
strengthen  the  protection  of  whistle-blowers,  who  are  also  a  crucial  source  for  investigative 
journalism? ☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
No changes compared to 2018. At that time it had already been implemented. 
Q.2.3.b  Have      you      promoted      systematic      and      timely      cooperation      between      judicial      and 
administrative authorities? ☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
No changes compared to 2018. 

125 

 
AT  Q.2.1. Have you adopted or updated a national anti-fraud strategy, which you have communicated to 

the European Commission/OLAF? ☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
No details. 
Q.2.1.a. If yes, have you developed this strategy in cooperation with all bodies and authorities which 
have  a  specific  role  and  expertise  in  the  protection  of  the  EU  financial  interests,  including  law 
enforcement and prosecution services? ☒NO 
No details. 
Q.2.1.b.  In  line  with  what  had  been  recommended  in  previous  years,  has  your  national  anti-fraud 
strategy  taken  into  account  the  risk  analysis  conclusions  contained  in  the  2018,  2017  and  2016  PIF 
reports? ☒NO 
No details. 
Q.2.1.c. In line with what was recommended in previous years, has your national anti-fraud strategy 
taken into account the need to structure the coordination between administrative and criminal checks 
and investigations; ☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
No details. 
Q.2.1.d. Did you make any assessment of the impact of the NAFS on the fight against fraud affecting 
the EU’s financial interests? ☒YES  
No details.  
Q.2.2.a. In line with what was recommended in previous years, has risk analysis been strengthened to 
detect  irregularities  and  fraud,  including  the  use  of  IT  tools  (such  as  ARACHNE)?  ☒YES,  fully 
implementing the recommendation 
No details. 
Q.2.2.b  Can  you  share  any  results  deriving  from  the  use  of  the  findings  from  PIF  Reports  in  your 
fraud risk assessments? ☒NO 
No details. 
Q.2.2.c Have  you  further  exploited  the  potential  of  risk  analysis,  tailoring  the  approach  to  the 
different types of expenditure? ☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
No details. 
Q.2.3.a  Have  you  facilitated  and  assessed  the  spontaneous  reporting  of  potential  irregularities  and 
strengthen  the  protection  of  whistle-blowers,  who  are  also  a  crucial  source  for  investigative 
journalism? ☒NO 
No details. 
Q.2.3.b  Have      you      promoted      systematic      and      timely      cooperation      between      judicial      and 
administrative authorities? ☒NO 
No details. 

126 

 
PL 

 2.1 Have you adopted or  updated a national anti-fraud strategy, which you have  communicated to 
the European Commission/OLAF?☒NO 

A national anti-fraud strategy has yet to be drawn up. Poland has yet to take a decision on drawing up a 
strategy,  as  the  European  Commission  has  imposed  no  obligation  to  do  so.  Before  any  such  strategy  is 
drafted,  the  competent  national  bodies  will  analyse  the  pros  and  cons  of  adopting  such  a  tool.  In  the 
meantime, the managing authorities of the individual operational programmes have established anti-fraud 
documents.  Depending  on  the  approach  adopted  and  the  nature  of  the  programme,  such  a  document  is 
termed ‘strategy’, ‘policy’ or ‘guidelines’. The programme approach applied allows a proper assessment of 
the  current  situation  with  regard  to  anti-fraud  measures,  risk  assessment  and  the  development  and 
introduction of proportionate measures to combat fraud at the lowest possible management level. 

2.2.a In line with what was  recommended in previous years, has risk analysis been  strengthened to 
detect  irregularities  and  fraud,  including  the  use  of  IT  tools  (such  as  ARACHNE)?  ☒  YES,  fully 
implementing the recommendation 

As  regards  cohesion  policy,  successive  measures  have  been  taken  to  reinforce  risk  analysis  aimed  at 
detecting different kinds of irregularities and fraud. This is done using IT tools that simplify work and step 
up  action  in  the  selected  fields.  A  ‘Cross  Checks’  IT  application  is  being  developed  for  the  purpose  of 
identifying  cases  of  double  financing  of  expenditure  incurred  by  beneficiaries  implementing  projects  co-
financed by Union funds. 

A  machine  algorithm  flags  up  suspected  cases  of  invoices  issued  by  a  given  issuer  (based  on  the  NIP 
number) that may have been submitted more than once by a beneficiary and may indicate double financing 
of  expenditure.  The  application  is  set  to  evolve  into  a  larger  system  known  as  SCANER  (Score-based 
Antifraud  National  Estimation  of  Risks),  which  is  currently  at  the  design  stage.  In  addition  to  the  ‘Cross 
Checks’ application,  the  system  will include  other applications for such purposes as collecting data from 
external databases such as the National Court Register, the Central Register and Information Repository on 
Economic  Activity  (CEiDG)  and  the  report  on  the  recruitment  of  personnel  for  projects  that  have  been 
carried  out.  Taking  into  account  the  functionality  of  the  tool  developed  and  subsequent  activities  for  its 
development,  it  is  not  only  innovative  and  transparent  but  has  the  potential  to  become  a  comprehensive 
risk-analysis tool. Owing to the functionality and architecture of the system introduced, ARACHNE is not 
used. 

As regards supervision by the managing authority over the bodies involved in implementing the 2014-2020 
Rural  Development  Programme,  quarterly  checks  are  carried  out  under  the  Ministry  of  Agriculture  and 
Rural Development’s control plan. The risk analysis carried out for the purposes of designing the control 
plan  covers  such  aspects  as  the  state  of  implementation  of  individual  support  instruments  (including  the 
amount of public money spent), the results of earlier checks and audits (including the results of checks by 
the  Supreme  Audit  Office,  the  Agency  for  Restructuring  and  Modernisation  of  Agriculture,  the  European 
Commission  and  the  European  Court  of  Auditors),  planned  checks  by  the  Paying  Agency,  complaints, 
conclusions  and  other  reports  on  irregularities  and  the  results  of  studies  and  analysis.  The  risk  factors 
taken into account in this analysis are adapted to the current state of the RDP’s implementation in order to 
identify the scope of control, the support instrument and the operator controlled as well as possible. 

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Paying Agency case-handlers use a list of red flags that could warrant suspicions of fraud. After identifying 
red  flags,  the  case-handlers  take  further  measures  to  verify  the  procedures  laid  down  or  perform  other 
appropriate checks/controls (in-depth analysis of the case). In specific cases, an analysis is also carried out 
on the basis of the registers and databases available to the Agency. 

2.2.b Can you share any results deriving from the use of the findings from PIF Reports in your fraud 
risk assessments? ☒YES 

As regards data in the PIF report, information on irregularities and fraud detected are a key element of risk 
analysis.  Another  element  is  constituted  by  complaints/conclusions  or  other  reports  received  by  the 
competent  bodies  of  potential  errors/infringements.  These  data  are  taken  into  account  in  risk  analysis. 
Since 2016 Paying Agency staff have been made more aware of fraud by: 

1. the introduction of a list of red flags for the purpose of raising the awareness of Agency for Restructuring 
and  Modernisation  of  Agriculture  staff  involved  in  all  stages  of  the  administrative  and  control  cycle  of 
anomalies (signs) that could warrant suspicions of fraud; 

annual analysis of the risk of fraud aimed at identifying risk areas, evaluating the effectiveness of 
2. 
the control mechanisms deployed and, in specific cases, introducing new control mechanisms to reduce to a 
minimum the risk of fraud in respect of financial support granted by the Agency; 

3. 

training for Agency staff on fraud. 

2.2.c Have you further exploited the potential of risk analysis, tailoring the approach to the different 
types of expenditure? ☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

As regards cohesion policy, the sampling of expenditure and projects for control is based on risk analysis. 
The  assumptions  underlying  this  analysis  are  set  out  in  the  annual  control  plans  drawn  up  for  each 
operational  programme  for  a  given  accounting  year.  Managing  authorities  also  apply  the  risk  analysis 
advocated in the Commission’s guidelines. 

On-the-spot checks are carried out by the Paying Agency on the basis of a separate risk analysis for each 
type of expenditure and action. An individual risk analysis is performed for each action (scheme). For every 
risk  identified,  a  control  mechanism  is  laid  down  along  with  a  reference  to  the  procedure,  guidelines  or 
circular  governing  the  control  in  question  and  information  on  whether  the  checks  are  documented  and 
whether their effectiveness is subject to regular scrutiny. The functioning of the above control mechanism 
for preventing fraud is verified in the course of internal control by staff from Agency headquarters. 

2.3.a  Have  you  facilitated  and  assessed  the  spontaneous  reporting  of  potential  irregularities  and 
strengthen  the  protection  of  whistle-blowers,  who  are  also  a  crucial  source  for  investigative 
journalism? ☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

Polish law gives bodies managing and implementing Union funds a free hand when it comes to voluntarily 
reporting  potential  irregularities.  For  instance,  the  Managing  Authority  for  the  Infrastructure  and 
Environment  Operational  Programme  has  developed  a  reporting  mechanism  for  the  2014-2020 
programme.  Irregularity  reports  are  sent  via  the  reporting  mechanism  to  the  e-mail  address: 
the  programme’s  dedicated  webform:  e-Nieprawidłowości  [e-
nadużycia.pois@mfipr.gov.pl  or 

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Irregularities].  Note  that  reports  received  via  these  channels  sometimes  concern  other  operational 
programmes  too.  In  that  case  a  report  is  sent  to  the  competent  authority  concerned  (e.g.  the  competent 
managing authority) or the person concerned is informed of the body to which they should report the case.  

Under the reporting mechanism for the Infrastructure and Environment Operational Programme, an initial 
verification  is  carried  out  by  the  relevant  staff  at  the  Managing  Authority,  who  send  the  contents  of  the 
report  (in  the  form  of  an  anonymised  attachment  if  the  person  making  the  report  wishes  to  remain 
anonymous) to the unit  of  the intermediate body/implementing body responsible for the action  concerned 
with a request for a detailed analysis of the possible irregularities. Once the analysis has been carried out, 
an  implementing  authority/intermediate  body  must  inform  the  managing  authority  of  the  action  taken  to 
resolve the issue, including in particular handing over the case to other authorities and services, namely: 
the Office of Competition  and Consumer Protection (UOKiK), the Central Anti-Corruption Office (CBA), 
the Internal Security Agency (ABW) or the public prosecution service. 

A  monitoring  table  enables  the  follow-up  to  reports  on  suspected  irregularities  or  fraud  to  be  recorded 
regardless  of  the  form  of  those  reports.  Once  suspicions  of  fraud  or  irregularities  concerning  the 
the  Managing 
Innovation  and  Environment  Operational  Programme  have  been  confirmed  by 
Authority/Intermediate  Body/Implementing  Body  (on  the  basis  of  an  investigation  launched  by  the  law-
enforcement authorities or by the Office for the Protection of Competition and Consumers on the basis of a 
notification by the Managing Authority for the Innovation and Environment Operational Programme), these 
reports are entered without delay in the Database of investigations by the law-enforcement authorities and 
the Office for the Protection of Competition and Consumers and fraud or suspected fraud. The Managing 
Authority  for  the  Infrastructure  and  Environment  Operational  Programme  monitors  and  evaluates  the 
irregularity reports received. Having seen how this mechanism has worked in practice, we are considering 
recommending that all other managing authorities adopt the same solution. 

Furthermore,  national  rules  require  administrative  authorities  to  examine  and  handle  complaints  and 
conclusions  within  their  remit.  Moreover,  nobody  can  be  exposed  to  loss  or  blame  for  having  filed  a 
complaint or objection. To give an example of good practice in the handling of citizens’ complaints, if the 
Managing  Authority  for  the  2014-2020  Rural  Development  Plan  receives  an  anonymous  complaint,  it 
carries out an investigation or, in accordance with the division of competences, forwards the  case to the 
competent body with a request for an investigation into the accusations made. 

The  Paying  Agency  records  all  irregularities  found,  including  voluntary  repayments  by  beneficiaries.  As 
regards  reports  to  the  Paying  Agency  concerning  possible  irregularities  and  fraud,  the  Agency’s  website 
announces  the  possibility  of  reporting  fraud  affecting  aid  granted  by  the  Agency  for  Restructuring  and 
Modernisation of Agriculture and corruption involving the latter Agency’s staff. Reports can also be made 
to  the  Agency  for  Restructuring  and  Modernisation  of  Agriculture  by  letter  or  email  (including 
anonymously). 
The mailbox sygnal@arimr.gov.pl has been created for that purpose, and every report sent to the Paying 
Agency  by  letter  or  email  is  routinely  verified  and  analysed  before  being  investigated.  In  2020  there  are 
also  plans  to  update  the  Paying  Agency’s  anti-corruption  policy  to  include  rules  on  the  procedure  for 
reporting fraud, staff under pressure to behave  corruptly or possessing information on corrupt behaviour 
by another member of staff, taking account of the legislation in force and the instruments available for their 

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protection. 
In  the  period  1  January-31  December  2019  the  Paying  Agency  and  implementing  bodies  initiated  1182 
investigations into reports of irregularities and fraud. In 2019 there were 102 fewer investigations than in 
2018.  At  9  January  2020  the  situation  with  regard  to  reports  on  suspected  irregularities  received  by  the 
Paying Agency was as follows: 
1) 
2) 
3) 
4) 

no irregularities were found in 378 cases, 
irregularities were found in 59 cases, 
proceedings are ongoing in 572 cases, 
reports were left unexamined in 173 cases. 

2.3.b  Have  you  promoted  systematic  and  timely  cooperation  between  judicial  and  administrative 
authorities?  ☒ YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

As  regards  cooperation  between  Poland’s  judicial  and  administrative  authorities,  there  is  an  agreement 
between  the  National  Prosecutor  and  the  minister  responsible  for  regional  development.  On  the  basis  of 
this agreement, regular exchanges of data take place concerning beneficiaries of EU funds that have been 
the object of investigative measures. In addition, some bodies make use of the possibility to consult public 
prosecution service representatives if they urgently need data on specific ongoing proceedings. 
At the Paying Agency, in the event of suspicions of fraud, the competent authorities are notified under the 
procedures  adopted  and  in  accordance  with  Article  304(2)  of  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure. 
Furthermore, draft reports on suspected crimes or misdemeanours are drawn up on the basis of the results 
of checks carried out by the internal control service. As regards cooperation with the law-enforcement and 
judicial  authorities,  the Paying  Agency  routinely  cooperates  with  the  Police,  the  Prosecutor’s  Office,  the 
Central Anti-Corruption Bureau and the Internal Security Agency to detect fraud on the part of Agency for 
Restructuring and Modernisation of Agriculture beneficiaries, forwarding the requisite data and documents 
and organising meetings on specific cases. 

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PT  Q.2.1. Have you adopted or updated a national anti-fraud strategy, which you have communicated to 

the European Commission/OLAF?AFCOS BE (ICCF) ☒NO 
The  anti-fraud  strategy  was  communicated  to  all  actors  in  the  management  and  control  systems  of  the 
European Funds and was taken into account by them when designing their internal control procedures. The 
descriptions  in  the  management  and  control  systems  of  all  the  managing  and  certifying  authorities  are 
reviewed  each  year  by  the  Inspectorate-General  for  Finance  (IGF)  -  Audit  Authority.  As  provided  for  by 
law,  the  anti-fraud  strategy  stipulates  that  each  entity  involved  must  prepare  a  risk  management  plan 
regarding corruption and related offences, which is reassessed every year. 
Q.2.1.c. In line with what was recommended in previous years, has your national anti-fraud strategy 
taken into account the need to structure the coordination between administrative and criminal checks 
and investigations;☐  X YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
We would highlight the Protocol concluded between the Agency and the DCIAP  (Central Department for 
Criminal Investigation and Prosecution) and regular cooperation of the Inspectorate-General for Finance - 
Audit Authority (IGF - AA), which systematically makes available its own resources to investigation teams 
of  the  Public  Prosecutor’s  Office.  In  addition,  specific  training  events  were  held  in  the  field  of  fraud, 
including two events aimed at public prosecutors, in which the IGF - AA played an active part. 
Q.2.2.a. In line with what was recommended in previous years, has risk analysis been strengthened to 
detect  irregularities  and  fraud,  including  the  use  of  IT  tools  (such  as  ARACHNE)?  ☒YES,  fully 
implementing the recommendation 
The  Inspectorate-General  for  Finance  -  Audit  Authority  (IGF  -  AA)  uses  ARACHNE,  which  has  been 
instrumental in getting the other national authorities to start ‘feeding’ and using it. 
Q.2.2.b  Can  you  share  any  results  deriving  from  the  use  of  the  findings  from  PIF  Reports  in  your 
fraud risk assessments? ☒NO (FEDER Bruxelles-capitale). 
The findings of the PIF Reports are taken into consideration in the annual review of procedures, including 
in the fraud risk assessment conducted by the various actors in the management and control systems. 
Q.2.2.c  Have  you  further  exploited  the  potential  of  risk  analysis,  tailoring  the  approach  to  the 
different types of expenditure?☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
Q.2.3.a  Have  you  facilitated  and  assessed  the  spontaneous  reporting  of  potential  irregularities  and 
strengthen  the  protection  of  whistle-blowers,  who  are  also  a  crucial  source  for  investigative 
journalism?☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
A specific section for whistle-blowers is available on the website of the Inspectorate-General for Finance - 
Audit Authority (https://www.igf.gov.pt/paginas-participacao-civica/nova-participacao.aspx).  The reported 
information  is  analysed  and  forwarded  to  the  competent  entities,  which  must  notify  the  IGF,  within  a 
reasonable time, of the outcome of the steps taken. The whistle-blowers are informed of the progress of the 
procedures. 
Q.2.3.b  Have  you  promoted  systematic  and  timely  cooperation  between  judicial  and  administrative 
authorities? ☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation (FEDER wallonie) 
As  mentioned  in  Q.2.1.c,  in  addition  to  the  IGF  making  its  own  resources  available,  the  Audit  Authority 
participates  in  training  sessions  (Lisbon  and  Porto)  aimed  at  public  prosecutors  on  ‘Fraud  in  obtaining 
subsidies’. 

131 

 
RO 

 Q.2.1. Have you adopted or updated a national anti-fraud strategy, which you have communicated to 
the European Commission/OLAF?☒NO 

A draft of the national anti-fraud strategy for the current programming period was prepared, but it was not 
adopted in the reference period. The RO AFCOS is in the process of evaluating the updating of the draft 
strategy for the next programming period of 2021-2027. 

Q.2.1.a. If yes, have you developed this strategy in cooperation with all bodies and authorities which 
have  a  specific  role  and  expertise  in  the  protection  of  the  EU  financial  interests,  including  law 
enforcement and prosecution services?☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

The draft strategy was developed in cooperation with all the national bodies and authorities which have a 
specific role and expertise in the protection of the EU financial interests. The draft was not adopted – see 
answer to question Q.2.1. 

Q.2.1.b.  In  line  with  what  had  been  recommended  in  previous  years,  has  your  national  anti-fraud 
strategy  taken  into  account  the  risk  analysis  conclusions  contained  in  the  2018,  2017  and  2016  PIF 
reports? ☒ YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
In  the  draft  Strategy  (which  was  not  adopted  -  see  answer  to  question  Q.2.1),  the  general  objective 
“Strengthening the national anti-fraud system through prevention measures” was introduced and it had as 
a  specific  objective  “The  adoption  of  effective  and  proportionate  measures  to  combat  fraud,  taking  into 
account the risks identified”. The measures that were to be taken in order to reach this objective were: 
- 
Intent; 
- 
- 
- 
identified. 

identifying and assessing fraud risks; 
developing and implementing a National Register of fraud risks; 
the adoption of effective and proportionate measures to combat fraud, taking into account the risks 

the adoption by the European funds Managing Authorities of the Initial Declaration of Anti-Fraud 

All these measures should have taken into account the risk analysis conclusions contained in the 2018, 2017 
and 2016 PIF reports (if the Strategy would  have been adopted see answer to question Q.2.1). 

Q.2.1.c. In line with what was recommended in previous years, has your national anti-fraud strategy 
taken into account the need to structure the coordination between administrative and criminal checks 
and investigations;☒ YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

In  the  draft  Strategy  (which  was  not  adopted  -  see  answer  to  question  Q.2.1),  the  general  objective 
“Strengthening the national anti-fraud system through prevention measures” was introduced and it had as 
a  specific  objective  “Strengthening  the  interinstitutional  cooperation  in  the  field  of  the  protection  of  the 
European Union's financial interests in Romania”. One of the measures to be taken in order to reach this 
objective was “Preparation / updating of the collaboration protocols with the partner institutions” 

Q.2.1.d. Did you make any assessment of the impact of the NAFS on the fight against fraud affecting 
the EU’s financial interests?☒ YES  

The  draft  strategy  aimed  to  promote  a  competitive,  fair  and  integrated  business  environment  and  reduce 

132 

 
vulnerabilities  and  risks  of  fraud  in  the  business  environment.  It  also  concerns  the  regional  and 
international promotion of the anti-fraud expertise held by Romania, which offers guarantees on the loyal 
fulfilment of the obligations incumbent on the Member States within the single market. 

Q.2.2.a. In line with what was recommended in previous years, has risk analysis been strengthened to 
detect  irregularities  and  fraud,  including  the  use  of  IT  tools  (such  as  ARACHNE)?☒YES,  fully 
implementing the recommendation. Examples from the RO authorities experience: 

Ministry of European Funds 

Irregularities  and  also,  in  some  instances,  cases  of  fraud  are  often  detected  as  a  direct  consequence  of 
using  ARACHNE  together  with  other  internal  methods  of  verification  and  control.  However,  we  have,  so 
far, not detected any irregularities and/or fraud following fraud risk self-assessment process realised by the 
MA. 

Managing Authority for Operational Programme Administrative Capacity 

AM POCA uses the ARACHNE tool in the process of evaluating operations for obtaining financing, in the 
process  of  administrative  verification  of  public  procurement,  as  well  as  in  the  activity  of  checking  and 
finding the irregularities. However, following the use of this tool, no irregularity / fraud was identified. 

Also, at the AM POCA level, the fraud risk assessment tool recommended by the EC in the Guidance Note 
EGESIF_14-0021-00 is used. In this regard, in May 2015, before designing the controls / verifications of 
the managing authority for POCA management, a first self-assessment (ex-ante) of the risks of fraud was 
finalised at the level of the 4 key processes and new/supplementary measures and controls were established 
were established, whose implementation and effectiveness have been finalised and measured respectively by 
specific  reports.  Subsequently,  according  to  the  EC  recommendations  regarding  the  frequency  of  self-
assessments,  the  self-assessments  of  fraud  risks  were  completed,  on  the  basis  of  the  existing  /  applicable 
controls / verifications at the level of the managing authority. 

Managing Authority for Regional Operational Programme  

In  2019,  a  training  session  was  organised  at  the  request  of  the  Ministry  of  Regional  Development  and 
Public Administration, which  was attended  by  representatives from  the Irregularities Detection and Anti-
Fraud Service, the Project Monitoring Directorate, the Priority Axis Contracting Service, the Procurement 
Verification Service and the Project Authorization Service. In the activity of the Irregularities Detection and 
Anti-Fraud Service, ARACHNE was used in specific cases, when it was required from the analysis of the 
case under review. Currently, at the Ministry of Public Works, Development and Administration level, the 
personnel from various departments is in the training stage, so that ARACHNE can be used as a means of 
fraud prevention. 

Q.2.2.b  Can  you  share  any  results  deriving  from  the  use  of  the  findings  from  PIF  Reports  in  your 
fraud risk assessments? ☒NO - Examples from the RO authorities experience: 

Ministry of European Funds  

As stated before in the previous PIF questionnaire (2018), the MA has not used any results deriving from 
the  use  of  findings  from  PIF  Reports,  mainly  due  to  the  fact  that  the  findings  presented  in  the  report 

133 

 
describe,  among  other  things,  various  rules  (e.g.:  new  rules  adopted  to  reduce  VAT  fraud),  different 
operational measures adopted by several Member States on expenditure to raise awareness, a collection of 
main achievements regarding detection of fraud and irregularities by some Member States etc., whereas the 
purpose of fraud risk assessment was intended to be a useful tool for self-evaluation, based on which the 
MA  could  easily  identify  new  possible  risks,  following  a  careful  consideration  of  the  status  quo  of  each 
internal structure within the MA.  

(Completing  the  PIF  questionnaire  consists  mostly  in  enumerating  the  main  measures  (administrative, 
legislative,  organisational  etc.)  that  have  contributed  or  can  contribute  to  a  good  extent  to  effectively 
protect the financial interests of the European Union, while assessing the risks of fraud means, basically, 
the  assessment  of  existing  controls  and  identifying  eventually  new  planned  controls  designated  to  better 
tackle this matter.)  

However, the MA fully complies with the requirements stipulated at Chapter 9. 9.2 of the final PIF report of 
2018 issued by OLAF. For example, the MA has an anti-fraud policy put in place and, at the same time, 
provides useful information and actively participate (when requested) to meetings in order to strengthen the 
efforts of creating and properly implementing the national anti-fraud strategy.  

Some irregularities and all cases of fraud identified by MA (through internal and/or external sources) are 
managed in very close collaboration with institutions that are direct responsible with criminal checks and 
investigations (e.g.: DLAF, National Anticorruption Directorate etc.). 

The MA takes into consideration  all viable  external sources such  as whistleblowers and  tips from media. 
The information received form this kind of sources are carefully analysed and afterwards cross-examined 
by competent bodies, without disclosing, in any way, the identity of the person. The protection of personal 
data of the source is guaranteed by internal procedures and other specific national and EU regulations.  

Given the examples provided above, The Fight against Fraud Department (RO AFCOS) took into account 
the conclusions from the previous PIF reports concerning the fraud risk assessment of every authority by 
introducing a specific objective in the draft national anti-fraud strategy – see answer to question Q.2.1.b. 

Q.2.2.c Have  you  further  exploited  the  potential  of  risk  analysis,  tailoring  the  approach  to  the 
different  types  of  expenditure?☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation.  Examples from the RO 
authorities experience: Managing Authority for Operational Programme Administrative Capacity  

AM POCA identified that, as a result of the use of the fraud risk assessment tool recommended by the EC, it 
is necessary to use the ARACHNE instrument in a specific manner regarding public procurement expenses 
and to use a different approach of the instrument as far as the process of evaluating financing operations is 
concerned. 

Q.2.3.a  Have  you  facilitated  and  assessed  the  spontaneous  reporting  of  potential  irregularities  and 
strengthen  the  protection  of  whistle-blowers,  who  are  also  a  crucial  source  for  investigative 
journalism?☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

Examples from the RO authorities experience 

Ministry of European Funds  

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Romania  already  has  in  place  legal  framework  concerning  the  protection  of  whistle-blowers  (Law 
571/2004). By Order of the Minister of European Funds no. 353/2019 was approved the system procedure 
for reporting irregularities and the protection of the persons who complain or notice irregularities.  
Ministry of Justice 
The  protection  of  the  persons  reporting  on  breaches  of  Union  law  is  included  among  the  preventive 
measures  listed  in  Annex  3  to  the  National  Anticorruption  Strategy  (NAS)  regarding  the  inventory  of 
measures of institutional transparency and prevention of corruption, as well as of the evaluation indicators,  
NAS is focusing its efforts on strengthening integrity, reducing vulnerabilities and risks of corruption in the 
sectors identified as vulnerable to the phenomenon of corruption. 
In  order  to  achieve  this  objective,  a  knowledge  of  the  situation  on  the  ground  is  required,  which  is  why 
monitoring the implementation of the strategy is carried out through a set of tools designed to facilitate the 
dialogue between all the participants in the fight against corruption and to allow: identifying the progress 
made  in  the  NAS  implementation;  identifying  and  correcting  the  practical  problems  arising  in  the 
application of anti-corruption policies and norms; increasing the degree of knowledge, understanding and 
implementation of measures to prevent corruption. 
One of these tools is the thematic evaluation missions. The evaluation procedure consists of completing the 
thematic  evaluation  questionnaire  sent  in  advance  to  the  evaluated  public  institution,  organising  the 
evaluation  visit  at  its  headquarters  and  drafting  the  evaluation  report  including  good  practices  and 
recommendations. 
In 2019 a number of 90 thematic missions for the evaluation of the 2016-2020 NAS implementation were 
carried out, at the level of the local public administration. These were organised in collaboration with the 
Ministry  of  Public  Works,  Development  and  Administration,  based  on  the  collaboration  agreement 
concluded in 2016. 
Among the topics that have been the subject of the evaluation missions mentioned above are the protection 
of the persons warning on integrity in the public interest. 
Also, one of the objectives  set in the NAS,  relevant from the perspective  of the protection  of  the integrity 
warning, is to increase the efficiency of the anti-corruption preventive measures by remedying the gaps and 
legislative  inconsistencies  regarding  the  ethics  counselor,  the  protection  of  the  warning  in  the  public 
interest and the post-employment prohibitions (pantouflage). 
The Ministry of Justice has endorsed the EU legislation on the protection of persons reporting violations of 
EU  law,  participating  both  through  experts  seconded  within  the  RPRO  BXL,  as  well  as  through  experts 
from  the  Crime  Prevention  Directorate,  in  the  negotiations  regarding  the  Directive  on  the  protection  of 
persons reporting on breaches of Union law. This instrument was finalised during the PRES RO mandate, 
and its file constituted a priority. 
On April 16, 2019,  the European  Parliament adopted the Directive at first reading, and subsequently, as 
mentioned above, on October 7, it was adopted by the Council of Ministers (JHA). 
Managing Authority for Operational Programme Administrative Capacity  
AM  POCA  had  as  source  of  detection  of  irregularities  /  frauds  whistle-blowers  or  mass  media  reports, 
which,  at  the  current  date,  are  treated  as  being  in  the  suspicion  phase  and  undergo  specialised  checks  / 
investigations. 
Managing Authority for Regional Operational Programme  

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All the allegations of irregularity / fraud received through the whistle blowing system were transmitted for 
verification and investigated by the control structure within the Ministry of Public Works, Development and 
Administration  and  the  confidentiality  of  the  information  regarding  the  identification  data  of  the  persons 
who transmitted the notification was ensured. These allegations, usually, have not been confirmed. 
General Directorate for European Territorial Cooperation – Ministry of European Funds  
All the allegations of irregularity / fraud received through the whistle blowing system were transmitted for 
verification and investigated by the control structure within the Ministry of Public Works, Development and 
Administration  and  the  confidentiality  of  the  information  regarding  the  identification  data  of  the  persons 
who transmitted the notification was ensured. These allegations, usually, have not been confirmed. 
Q.2.3.b  Have      you      promoted      systematic      and      timely      cooperation      between      judicial      and 
administrative  authorities?☒YES,  fully  implementing  the  recommendation.  Examples  from  the  RO 
authorities experience: Ministry of European Funds  Please see answer to Q 2.2.b. 
Cooperation  with  judicial  and  administrative  authorities  is  governed  by  national  legislation  and  internal 
working procedures. 
Managing Authority for Regional Operational Programme  
There are requests for information and documents from the National Anticorruption Directorate, to which 
the  Ministry  of  Public  Works,  Development  and  Administration  responds  promptly,  but  also  requests 
formulated by the MPWDA to the NAD regarding the state of the NAD investigations. The information is 
requested  for  the  correct  updating  and  reporting  of  cases  of  suspected  fraud.  There  is  no  collaboration 
protocol  concluded  between  MPWDA  and  NAD,  but  there  are  two  collaboration  protocols  concluded 
between  MPWDA  and  The  Fight  Against  Fraud  Department  and  the  National  Agency  for  Integrity, 
respectively, regarding the exchange of information. 
General Directorate for European Territorial Cooperation – Ministry of European Funds  
There are requests for information and documents from the National Anticorruption Directorate, to which 
the Ministry of Public Works, Development and Administration responds promptly. Also, MPWDA requests 
DNA information on the status of investigations in order to update suspicion cases. 
There is no collaboration protocol concluded between MPWDA and NAD, but there are two collaboration 
protocols concluded between MPWDA and The Fight Against Fraud Department and the National Agency 
for Integrity, respectively, regarding the exchange of information. 

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SI 

 Q.2.1. Have you adopted or updated a national anti-fraud strategy, which you have communicated to 
the European Commission/OLAF?☒NO 
The MA (Government Office of the Republic SLOVENIA for Development and European Cohesion Policy) 
has in 2016 prepared a sectoral AFS that relates to the scope of the ECP for Objective 1 

Q.2.2.a. In line with what was recommended in previous years, has risk analysis been strengthened to 
detect  irregularities  and  fraud,  including  the  use  of  IT  tools  (such  as  ARACHNE)?☒YES,  partly 
implementing the recommendation 

Government  Office  of  the  Republic  SLOVENIA  for  Development  and  European  Cohesion  Policy  answer: 
ARACHNE  is  mainly  used  by  MA.  ARACHNE  is  not  always  the  best  tool  for  the  Slovenian  situation 
(ARACHNE is very useful tool when we  are dealing with non-Slovenian provider). Therefore, we use the 
information provided in different national computer applications that are publicly available (for example as 
provided by the Commission for the Prevention of Corruption called Erar, application Gwin, application e-
credit) which provides date for additional verification options (appropriate for Slovenia). 

MA use risk analysis also for selection of the projects to be checked (by MA and IB) on the spot.   

This  refers  to  risk  analysis  tools  for  the  targeting  of  projects/operations  to  be  submitted  to  specific 
verifications, on-the-spot checks, audits  or other types of controls (as relevant). Please  provide results in 
terms of irregularities/fraud detected during controls that have been started (also) because of risk analysis. 
The Irregularities Management System (IMS) provides this information, but the Member State may want to 
add  detections  that  are  excluded  from  reporting  (such  as  detections  before  inclusion  of  expenditure  in  a 
statement  of  expenditure  submitted  to  the  Commission).  The  Member  States  are  encouraged  to  provide 
relevant details to explain the actions undertaken or planned (in case of partial implementation) (see also 
question under section 2).  If applicable, explain why no such action was taken. 

Q.2.2.b  Can  you  share  any  results  deriving  from  the  use  of  the  findings  from  PIF  Reports  in  your 
fraud risk assessments?☒YES 

Government  Office  of  the  Republic  SLOVENIA  for  Development  and  European  Cohesion  Policy  answer: 
Cooperation  with  the  State  Attorney's  Office,  better  information  with  the  IB,  better  cooperation  with  IB, 
early detection of fraud upon improved check lists, improved system performance and consequently fewer 
corrections. 

Q.2.2.c Have  you  further  exploited  the  potential  of  risk  analysis,  tailoring  the  approach  to  the 
different types of expenditure?☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 

Government  Office  of  the  Republic  SLOVENIA  for  Development  and  European  Cohesion  Policy  answer: 
Cooperation  with  the  Attorney-General  and  police  will  be  strengthened.  There  is  still  room  for 
improvements.  Arachne  was  introduced  and  it  is  used  mainly  by  MA.  Arachne  will  be  more  spread  to 
implement in future.  More exchange of views and experiences with IB and AA on the matter. 

Q.2.3.a  Have  you  facilitated  and  assessed  the  spontaneous  reporting  of  potential  irregularities  and 
strengthen  the  protection  of  whistle-blowers,  who  are  also  a  crucial  source  for  investigative 
journalism?☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 

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Government  Office  of  the  Republic  SLOVENIA  for  Development  and  European  Cohesion  Policy  answer: 
Guidance  is  in  the  process  of  setting  out  the  procedure  for  lobbying.  Whistle-blower  norms  will  also  be 
included in this guidance. In the case of consent, the guidance will be published on the MA website and thus 
binding for all IM Bodies. AAMRD-Agency for Agricultural Markets and Rural Developm.of the R. Slovenia 
answer: We encourage the employees to report any irregularities related to the Agency's scope of work. We 
have  put  a  mailbox  in  the  hallway  for  the  employees  to  anonymously  report  irregularities  or  other 
infringements related to the funding or the administrative procedure. The applicants (or other parties, the 
public) on the other hand can choose a contact in the Agency's webside and report irregularities via e-mail. 

Q.2.3.b  Have      you      promoted      systematic      and      timely      cooperation      between      judicial      and 
administrative authorities?☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

Government  Office  of  the  Republic  SLOVENIA  for  Development  and  European  Cohesion  Policy  answer: 
We  had  an  annual  meeting  with  the  DODV  -  State  Attorney's  Office  at  the  end  of  2019  to  discuss 
outstanding  issues  and  how  the  cooperation  between  the  two  bodies  could  be  strengthened.  The  idea  of 
connecting the State Attorney's Office with the State Prosecutor's Office dropped and the cooperation in the 
field of criminal law was dropped. The cooperation was found to be exemplary and positive for both sides. 
The  result  is  also  a  table  of  all  open  procedures/cases  where  ECP  is  the  subject/legal  basis,  as  well  as 
sending a few examples of open cases with brief descriptions of what stage / status they are in. 

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SK 

 The Government Office  of the Slovak republic,  Central Contact Point for OLAF (CCP  OLAF)  as Slovak 
AFCOS  contacted  AFCOS  network  partners  (national  authorities,  including  managing  authorities, 
certifying  authority,  control  bodies  and  judicial  authorities)  in  order  to  provide  relevant  information 
concerning  the  expenditure  side  of  this  material.  AFCOS  network  partners  provided  information  with 
respect to the questions in Risk analysis and Horizontal issues parts. CCP OLAF, the body who took part in 
preparing the Slovak National Anti-Fraud Strategy in cooperation with AFCOS network partners answered 
the questions relating to the National anti-fraud strategies. 

Q.2.1. Have you adopted or updated a national anti-fraud strategy, which you have communicated to 
the European Commission/OLAF?☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

The  National  Strategy  for  the  Protection  of  the  European  Union’s  Financial  Interests  in  the  Slovak 
Republic (adopted in 2015), was updated in June 2019 in order to address new challenges in the area of the 
protection of the EU’s financial interests. The updated version of The National Strategy for the Protection 
of the European Union’s Financial Interests in the Slovak Republic (hereinafter referred to as “The Slovak 
NAFS”) was approved by the Steering Committee for the Protection of the EU’s Financial Interests in the 
Slovak  Republic  on  30  May  2019  and,  subsequently  signed  by  the  Head  of  the  Government  Office  of  the 
Slovak Republic on 4 June 2019. The major novelty the updated version of The Slovak NAFS introduces are 
the  new  tasks  for  years  2019  –  2020  defined  in  the  Action  Plan,  which  forms  one  of  The  Slovak  NAFS 
annex. In addition, some of the tasks from the previous Action Plan have been moved to the main text of The 
Slovak NAFS as permanent tasks. The updated version of The Slovak NAFS was send to OLAF in December 
2019. 

Q.2.1.a. If yes, have you developed this strategy in cooperation with all bodies and authorities which 
have  a  specific  role  and  expertise  in  the  protection  of  the  EU  financial  interests,  including  law 
enforcement and prosecution services?☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

The Slovak NAFS, updated in 2019, was approved by the Steering Committee for the Protection of the EU’s 
Financial  Interests  in  the  Slovak  Republic,  in  which  21  network  partners  are  represented,  including 
representatives  from  General  Prosecutors  Office  of  the  Slovak  Republic,  National  Criminal  Agency  and 
Ministry of Justice of the Slovak Republic. AFCOS network partners were engaged in commenting on the 
final version of The Slovak NAFS. 

Q.2.1.b.  In  line  with  what  had  been  recommended  in  previous  years,  has  your  national  anti-fraud 
strategy  taken  into  account  the  risk  analysis  conclusions  contained  in  the  2018,  2017  and  2016  PIF 
reports?☒ YES, partly implementing the recommendation 

The  updated  version  of  the  Slovak  NAFS  has  taken  into  account  the  need  for  improved  coordination 
between administrative and judicial authorities. Regarding the new Action Plan (annex of the Slovak NAFS) 
the CCP OLAF  in  cooperation  with  other relevant authorities prepares an overview of  the  most frequent 
forms  of  fraud  in  the  implementation  of  EU  funds  identified  during  the  2007-2013  and  2014-2020 
programming  periods  and  at  the  same  time  prepares  an  analysis  of  cases  in  which  the  AFCOS  network 
partners  identified  suspicion  of  criminal  offences  harming  the  EU’s  financial  interests  in  Slovakia  in  the 
course  of  the  controls/audits/checks  performed  (statistics,  number  of  cases,  etc.).  These  two  tasks  will  be 
developing in cooperation with representatives from Managing Authorities, General Prosecutors Office of 
the Slovak Republic, Ministry of Finance of the Slovak Republic, etc. 

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Q.2.1.c. In line with what was recommended in previous years, has your national anti-fraud strategy 
taken into account the need to structure the coordination between administrative and criminal checks 
and investigations; ☒ YES, partly implementing the recommendation 

The Slovak NAFS emphasises that “structured coordination (information and data exchange) between the 
anti-fraud authorities, managing authorities and other stakeholders represents a good practice. However, 
effective  investigation  of  fraud  cases  requires  establishing  closer  cooperation  links  between  the  bodies 
responsible  for  the  implementation  of  EU  funds  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  law  enforcement  and  judicial 
authorities  on  the  other.  Cooperation  between  the  AFCOS  network  partners  should  focus  on  information 
exchange and operational assistance.” 

The Slovak NAFS and the Action Plan, which forms its annex, contain various tasks focused on improving 
the coordination between administrative and criminal authorities. One of these tasks, defined in the Action 
plan, is to set up a network of liaison officers at the level of the AFCOS network partners (these partners 
include  also  representatives  from  individual  Managing  Authorities,  General  Prosecutors  Office  of  the 
Slovak  Republic,  National  Criminal  Agency  of  Slovakia,  Ministry  of  Justice  of  the  Slovak  republic)  to 
enhance the effectiveness of operational cooperation in the area of protection of EU’s financial interests in 
Slovak republic. This task was completed in the end of 2019 and the Slovak AFCOS have started to use the 
network of liaison officers for purposes  of coordination of the operational cooperation  in  the area of the 
protection of the EU´s financial interests. 

In order to exchange good practice and information, the CCP OLAF, in cooperation with AFCOS network 
partners, also organises anti-fraud trainings focusing on the protection of the EU’s financial interests. CCP 
OLAF  currently  organises  training  sessions  in  cooperation  with  experienced  prosecutors  and  police 
investigators  from  GPO  and  National  Crime  Agency.  The  list  of  trainings  for  2017-2018  shows  that  ten 
seminars  took  place  covering  a  wide  variety  of  topics  on  the  protection  of  the  EU’s  financial  interests. 
Several repeated sessions were related to the following areas: awareness of fraud are collusion, cartels and 
distortion  of  competition,  the  most  common  infringements  of  public  procurement  rules,  and  detection  of 
fraudulent practices in the implementation of ESI Funds. 

Q.2.1.d. Did you make any assessment of the impact of the NAFS on the fight against fraud affecting 
the EU’s financial interests?☒ NO 

The assessment of the impact of the NAFS on the fight against fraud affecting the EU’s financial interests, 
as such, is not carried out, but every year, the Secretariat of the Steering Committee for the Protection of 
the EU’s Financial Interests in the Slovak Republic, based on the information from the network partners, 
informs  the  Steering  Committee  about  the  fulfilment  of  the  tasks  defined  in  The  Slovak  NAFS  and  in  The 
Action Plan, which forms one of the annexes of The Slovak NAFS. 

Q.2.2.a. In line with what was recommended in previous years, has risk analysis been strengthened to 
detect  irregularities  and  fraud,  including  the  use  of  IT  tools  (such  as  ARACHNE)?☒YES,  fully 
implementing the recommendation 

I.  The  Ministry  of  Environment  of  the  Slovak  Republic  (fully  implemented  the  recommendation)  as  the 
Managing  Authority  for  the  Operational  Programme  Quality  of  Environment  (hereinafter  “MA”)  uses 

140 

 
system ARACHNE as an auxiliary tool and source of information for evaluating individual risk indicators. 
MA  carries  out  risk  /  fraud  risk  management  relevant  to  the  Operational  Programme  Quality  of 
Environment. 

II.  The  Ministry  of  Agriculture  and  Rural  Development  of  the  Slovak  Republic  (fully  implemented  the 
recommendation.) Managing authorities for the operational programmes use IT tools (such as ARACHNE, 
IT  monitoring  system  ITMS2014+  etc.)  and  has  also  established  risk  management  task  forces  for 
programmes in accordance with the European Commission Guidelines for Member States and Programme 
Managers on fraud risk  assessment and  effective and proportionate anti-fraud measures of 16 June 2014 
(EGESIF_14-021-00-16 / 06/) to detect irregularities and fraud. Agricultural paying agency uses IT tools 
ARACHNE. 

III. The Ministry of Education, Science, Research and Sport of the Slovak Republic fully implemented the 
recommendation. At the Ministry of Education, Science, Research and Sport of the Slovak Republic as the 
Intermediate  Body  for  the  Operational  Programme  Integrated  Infrastructure  (formerly  the  Managing 
Authority for the Operational Programme Research and Innovation) and as the Intermediate Body for the 
Human  Resources  Operational  Programme  was  created  by  local  administrator  ARACHNE  (LA 
ARACHNE). LA ARACHNE manages users' access to ARACHNE for the relevant operational programme. 
LA  ARACHNE  is  managed  by  a  manager  of  ITMS.  The  ARACHNE  system  and  its  use  is  described  in 
Chapter 7 of the IT Monitoring System - ITMS2014 + in the Procedures Manual, which also includes the 
ARACHNE Risk Verification Checklist. 

In 2019, The  Ministry  of Education,  Science, Research and  Sport  of the Slovak Republic updated: Fraud 
Risk  Catalog  "Fraud  Risk  Assessment  and  Effective  and  Appropriate  Measures  Against  Fraud", 
Comprehensive  Risk  Catalog,  Risk  Management  Procedures  and  Statute  and  Rules  of  Procedure  of 
Working Group for risk management. 

The irregularities found so far have not resulted from checks carried out for risk analysis. The irregularities 
detected under OP II (formerly OP Research&Innovations) did not result from checks carried out for risk 
analysis. The irregularities recorded under OP II (formerly OP Research&Innovations) were identified on 
the basis of media coverage of calls for applications for a non-repayable financial contribution to support 
and irregularities resulting from the investigation of the National Criminal Agency (NCA). 

Irregularity  registered  on  the  base  of  the  letter  from  the  NCA,  by  which  the  NCA  asked  the  Ministry  of 
Education, Science, Research and Sports of the Slovak Republic to provide cooperation in the investigation 
of suspected criminal the offence of damaging the European Union's financial interests. The case is being 
prosecuted (for the offence of damaging the financial interests of the European Union in parallel with the 
crime of machinations in public procurement and public auctions). 

IV. The Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic also fully implemented the recommendation. 

V.  The  Ministry  of  Finance,  Audit  Authority  verifies  the  management  and  control  system  of  managing 
authorities and others relevant authorities as a part of the system audit. Within the audit the risk analysis 
elaborated by the managing authority is checked also. When verifying the risk analysis, the audit authority 
verifies  that  the  Managing  Authority  has  implemented  the  recommendations  and  guidelines  developed  by 
the European Commission (including recommendations on usage of relevant IT tools). 

141 

 
VI.  The  Public  Procurement  Office  partly  implemented  the  recommendation.  Since  1st  April  2019,  low 
value contracts can be awarded through the electronic public procurement system “EVO”. 

VII.  The  Antimonopoly  Office  of  the  Slovak  Republic  (also  partly  implemented  the  recommendation) 
ensured access to the ARACHNE system for the employees of the Office. At the request of the Office were 
organised  additional  training  tailored  to  new  functions  of  the  ARACHNE,  which  will  be  relevant  for  the 
Office.  Based  on  this  training  The  Antimonopoly  Office  of  the  Slovak  Republic  plans  to  start  to  use  the 
relevant functionalities of ARACHNE within the investigation activities. 

VIII. The Supreme Audit Office of the Slovak Republic 

According to the Constitution of the Slovak Republic, the Supreme Audit Office of the Slovak Republic is an 
independent  body.  Therefore,  internal  procedures,  strategies  and  analysis  are  developed  and  applied 
independently, according to the relevant standards. 

We  consider  coordination  among  the  authorities  concerned  to  be  above  standard,  as  the  Supreme  Audit 
Office of the Slovak Republic has some concluded cooperation memoranda. 

SAO has an effective monitoring system in place based on information from the media. 

Unfortunately, SAO has not been allowed access to ARACHNE. Nevertheless, the Supreme Audit Office of 
the  Slovak  republic  collects  the  necessary  information,  data  and  documents  for  the  purposes  of  risk 
analysis. This is done through its own monitoring and legal documents and/or information requests. 

Q.2.2.b  Can  you  share  any  results  deriving  from  the  use  of  the  findings  from  PIF  Reports  in  your 
fraud risk assessments?☒YES 

I. The Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic: (YES) 

Finding 1.: Insufficient monitoring of the effectiveness of anti – fraud measures 

Measures:  The  Managing  Authority  (MA)  updated  the  Internal  procedures  documentation.  The  update 
concerns especially the performance monitoring of anti – fraud measures which will be carried out not just 
through the relevant indicators (which are compared also with other operational programmes) but also by 
the MA employees who are members of the Working group for risk management on the level of Department 
of  European  policies  of  the  Ministry  of  Interior.  The  monitoring  process  is  also  ensured  by  the  list  of 
controls, audits and certifying verifications which are the basic framework for the MA for working out the 
Annual report on anti – fraud strategy. 

Finding 2: Insufficient awareness of the anti – fraud prevention measures 

Measure:  The  Managing  authority  has  updated  its  Communication  strategy,  especially  the  part  of  anti  – 
fraud prevention and detection. 

II. The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development of the Slovak Republic (YES) 

In line with the zero-tolerance approach to fraud, the Managing authority for the programmes Interreg SK-
CZ  and  SK-AT  prepared  and  published  anti-fraud  policy  document.  Managing  authorities  use  a  risk 
analysis  to  identify  the  most  vulnerable  areas  of  fraud.  Managing  authorities  also  use  IT  tools  such  as 
ARACHNE, IT monitoring system ITMS2014+ and whistleblowing system. 

142 

 
III. The Ministry of Environment of the Slovak Republic (YES) 

MA  for  the  Operational  Programme  Quality  of  Environment  (hereinafter  “OP  QE”)  carries  out  the 
management of risks / risks of frauds relevant to the OP QE in accordance with EGESIF_14-0021-00 of 16 
June 2014 ”Fraud Risk Assessment and Effective and Proportionate Anti-Fraud Measures” and in line with 
the Risk Management Procedures of the OP QE. 

IV.  As  the  fraud  risk  assessments  and  setting  the  procedures  which  reflects  the  existing  risks  are  prior 
responsibilities  of  the  other  authorities  (e.g.  managing  authority),  The  Ministry  of  Finance  of  the  Slovak 
Republic as the Audit Authority and The Public Procurement Office do not share any results in this field. 
The audit authority performs audits (system audit and audit of operation). 

2.2.c Have you further exploited the potential of risk analysis, tailoring the approach to the different 
types of expenditure? ☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 

I. The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development of the Slovak Republic and The Agricultural Paying 
Agency (YES, partly implementing the recommendation) 

The Agricultural paying agency shall carry out on-the-spot checks to determine the origin of the property. 

II. The Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic: (Yes, partly implementing the recommendation 

Finding:  Identified  insufficient  strategy  for  improving  professional  skills  in  the  area  of  anti  –  fraud 
prevention and detection 

Implemented measures 

Two  employees  of  the  Department  have  been  designated  to  participate  in  training  concerning  the  anti  – 
fraud prevention and detection, organised by the European Commission and Office of Government. 

Measures to be implemented: The MA has sent the request to the Central Coordination Body (CCB), which 
is responsible for education and trainings for employees who are implementing the EU funds, to complete 
the education plan by the activities concerning the issue of anti – fraud prevention and detection. In case of 
positive feedback from the CCB, the Managing authority will nominate all the employees who are members 
of the Working group for risk management, to participate in this kind of activities. 

III. The Ministry of Finance of the Slovak Republic as the Audit Authority 

The audit authority performs audits (system audit and audit of operation). The fraud risk assessments and 
setting  the  procedures  which  reflects  the  existing  risks  are  prior  responsibilities  of  the  other  authorities 
(e.g. managing authority). 

IV. The Public Procurement Office (No) 

Risk analysis is in competence of Managing Authorities. 

Q.2.3.a  Have  you  facilitated  and  assessed  the  spontaneous  reporting  of  potential  irregularities  and 
strengthen  the  protection  of  whistle-blowers,  who  are  also  a  crucial  source  for  investigative 
journalism? ☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

In 30 January 2019, Slovakia adopted Act no. 54/2019 Coll. Act on the protection of whistleblowers of anti-

143 

 
social activity and on amendments to certain acts. This new Act strengthens the position of whistleblowers 
and indirectly help to protect of the EU financial interests and make the fight against fraud more effective. 
The act is effective as of 26 February 2019. The subject of this act are conditions for provision of protection 
of persons against unjustified punishment in the employment relationship in connection with the reporting 
of  crime  or  other  anti-social  activity  as  well  as  the  rights  and  obligations  of  natural  persons  and  legal 
persons in the reporting of anti-social activity. This legislative also creates in Slovakia a new Office for the 
Protection  of  Whistleblowers,  with  new  competencies  in  this  field,  because  as  an  independent  state 
administration body can provide the protection of whistleblowers more effective, and could effectively help 
with the fight against the fraud. 

I. The Ministry of Culture of the Slovak Republic (YES, fully implementing the recommendation.) 

Ministry of Culture of the Slovak Republic prepared the Anti-Corruption Programme 2019 (document has 
been approved in August 2019), on the basis of the Government Resolution no. 585/2018 of 12 December 
2018,  named  the  Anti-Corruption  Policy  of  the  Slovak  Republic  for  the  years  2019  –  2023.The  anti-
corruption  programme  has  been  developed  to  improve  the  anti-corruption  preventing  and  combating 
corruption  by  identifying  corruption  risks  and  causes  corruption  to  prevent  the  emergence  of  new 
conditions, opportunities and situations for corrupt behaviour in the resort. 

II. The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development of the Slovak Republic and The Agricultural Paying 
Agency  (YES,  fully  implementing  the  recommendation.)Information  and  instructions  for  spontaneous 
reporting of potential irregularities are published on the websites of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development of the Slovak republic and Agricultural Paying Agency. The Organisation has set up emails to 
facilitate reporting fraud. 

Organisations  has  created  a  whistleblowing  system  and  communicate  all  suspicions  of  fraud  to  criminal 
investigation or prosecution bodies and also if it is needed cooperate with any others, such as OLAF. The 
protection of whistle-blowers is carried out under the new Whistleblower Protection Act (Act. No. 54/2019 
Coll. SK). 

III.  The  Ministry  of  Education,  Science,  Research  and  Sport  of  the  Slovak  Republic  (YES,  fully 
implementing the recommendation) 

In 2019, the Ministry of Education, Science, Research and Sport of the Slovak Republic, as an intermediary 
body  for  OP  II  (formerly  OP  VaI),  issued  the  document  Anti-fraud  Policy.  The  aim  of  this  policy  is  to 
promote a culture to discourage people from committing fraud and to facilitate the prevention and detection 
of fraud. The document contains procedures to assist in the investigation of fraud and related crimes and to 
ensure that fraud will  solved  in  a time  and appropriate  and responsible manner. The  document identifies 
options for anonymous and non-anonymous reporting of fraud. 

IV. The Ministry of Environment of the Slovak Republic (fully implemented the recommendation) 

The  management  documentation  for  the  OP  QE  includes  the  implementation  of  the  fraud  notification 
system,  the  key  element  of  which  is  the  protection  of  whistle-blowers  in  accordance  with  the  above 
mentioned Act. 

Currently, in relation with the OP QE it is possible: 

144 

 
-  Anonymous  or  non-anonymous  reporting  of  potential  risks,  including  suspicion  of  fraud  and  illegal 
activities  at  the  email  address:  rizika_opkzp@enviro.gov.sk,  -  Anonymous  corruption  reporting  via  a 
transparency  policy: 
in 
telephone 
https://www.minzp.sk/strazca/, - Anonymous or non-anonymous corruption reporting via the telephone line 
established  by 
the  Slovak  Republic,  available  at: 
the  Office  of 
www.bojprotikorupcii.vlada.gov.sk, 

the  Government  of 

line  established  by 

the  MoE  SR 

framework  of 

the 

the 

- Non-anonymous reporting of suspected criminal offences or other illegal activities, with an impact on EU 
and Slovak Republic finances on the e-mail address: infoirq@minv.sk established by the National Criminal 
Agency of the Presidium of the Police Force, - Anonymous reporting of suspected fraud and irregularities 
with an impact on EU funds to the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF EC): https://fns.olaf.europa.eu/. 

V. The Public Procurement Office (YES, partly implementing the recommendation) 

To  report  suspected  irregularities  in  public  procurement,  the  Public  Procurement  Office  has  set  up  the 
following e-mail address: irregularities@uvo.gov.sk. 

VI. The Ministry of Finance (Audit Authority): 

Potential  irregularities  are  reported  different  ways.  The  audit  authority  deals  with  all  the  reports  (even 
anonymous ones). 

VII. The Antimonopoly Office of the Slovak Republic 

The protection of whistle-blowers in the area of the competence of the Antimonopoly Office of the Slovak 
Republic is laid  down  in  the  relevant  provisions  of §  38 of the Law on the Protection of  Competition No 
136/2001 Coll. as amended (the reward for the submission of the evidence on the existence of agreements 
restricting  competition)  and  also  in  the  Guidance  Note  on  selected  issues  of  the  procedure  of  the 
Antimonopoly  Office  of  the  Slovak  Republic,  where  evidence  of  an  agreement  restricting  competition  is 
submitted. 

Q.2.3.b  Have  you  promoted  systematic  and  timely  cooperation  between  judicial  and  administrative 
authorities?☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

In the area of trainings the CCP OLAF has organised training activities and seminars for AFCOS network 
partners  based  on  the  Training  Plan  for  the  Protection  of  the  EU’s  Financial  Interests  in  the  Slovak 
Republic. The list of trainings for 2017-2018 shows that ten seminars took place covering a wide variety of 
topics  on  the  protection  of  the  EU’s  financial  interests.  Several  repeated  sessions  were  related  to  the 
following areas: awareness of fraud are collusion, cartels and distortion of competition, the most common 
infringements of public procurement rules, and detection of fraudulent practices in the implementation of 
ESI Funds. 

I. The Ministry of Finance of the SR, Certifying authority (CA) 

(YES, fully implemented the recommendation) 

Taking into account that there have not been adopted any new laws or national measures regulating the co-
operation  between  the  Certifying  Authority  (CA)  and  the  judicial  and  administrative  authorities  in  the 
Slovak Republic, no significant changes compared to 2018 took place. It is, therefore, valid that we always 

145 

 
promote  the  cooperation  between  judicial  and  administrative  authorities.  The  Certifying  Authority 
considers  close  cooperation  with  above  mentioned  authorities  as  essential,  especially  in  relation  to 
Managing Authorities. CA does not have a necessity to cooperate with mentioned authorities on a regular 
basis, since all the data related to CA work are obtained through Managing Authorities. However, CA itself 
had taken steps to strengthen relationship with the Public Procurement Office and the Antimonopoly Office 
by  closing  memorandum  of  cooperation.  CA  works  on  closing  of  a  co-operation  agreement  with  the 
Supreme  Audit  Office.  As  to  the  judicial  authorities,  CA  agenda  does  not  require  direct  cooperation, 
nevertheless  CA  is  regularly  analysing  the  decisions  issued  by  courts.  When  CA  is  approached  by 
administrative  authorities,  a  court  or  law  enforcement  authorities  with  the  request  for  co-operation,  CA 
always  provides  all  available  information  in  order  to  contribute  to  clarifying  respective  matters  at  the 
earliest possible date. The obligation to cooperate closely and exchange all necessary information between 
authorities directly results from several specific regulations. 

II. The Ministry of Education, Science, Research and Sport of the Slovak Republic (YES, fully implemented 
the recommendation) 

As an example, one of the irregularities was registered on the base of the letter from the National Criminal 
Agency  (NCA)  by  which  the  NCA  asked  the  Ministry  of  Education,  Science,  Research  and  Sports  of  the 
Slovak  republic  to  submit  documentation  for  an  ongoing  investigation  into  the  criminal  offence  of 
Machinations  in  public  procurement  and  public  auction  in  conjunction  with  the  crime  Damaging  the 
European Communities' financial interests. 

III. The Public Procurement Office 

(YES, fully implemented the recommendation) 

In  2018,  the  Chairman  of  the  Public  Procurement  Office  started  to  deepen  cooperation  in  the  control  of 
public  procurement  with  key  central  state  administration  and  judicial  bodies  on  the  basis  of  signed 
cooperation agreements. Those are: 

• Antimonopoly Office of the SR, 

• Supreme Audit Office of the Slovak Republic, 

• General Prosecutor's Office of the Slovak Republic, 

• Ministry of Finance of the Slovak Republic as the Audit Authority 

IV. The Ministry of Environment of the Slovak Republic 

(YES, partly implemented the recommendation) 

The  MA  for  the  OP  QE  carries  out  regular  quarterly  monitoring  of  all  ongoing  judicial  proceedings  in 
which  the  Ministry  of  Environment  of  the  Slovak  republic  acts  as  a  party  (or  injured  party)  and  which 
resulted  from  the  implementation  of  the  OP  QE.  At  the  same  time,  the  MA  provides  all  the  cooperation 
necessary  for  the  detection  of  irregularities,  incl.  fraud,  in  relation  to  both  courts  and  law  enforcement 
agencies. We would like to point out the fact that in line with the Manual of Procedures of the MA for the 
OP QE, the MA employees are obliged to report suspicion of committing a crime to relevant units of the 
Police Force. 

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147 

 
 
FI  

Q.2.1. Have you adopted or updated a national anti-fraud strategy, which you have communicated to 
the European Commission/OLAF?☒NO 

At  this  stage  a  separate  national  anti-fraud  strategy  is  not  deemed  to  be  a  priority  as  the  national 
administration is working with other strategies related to issues in the same field such as anti-corruption 
and shadow economy. 

Q.2.2.a. In line with what was recommended in previous years, has risk analysis been strengthened to 
detect  irregularities  and  fraud,  including  the  use  of  IT  tools  (such  as  ARACHNE)?☒YES,  partly 
implementing the recommendation 

Risk analysis for expenditure  from EAGF and EAFRD is  updated  annually or when needed. The updated 
information  is  taken  into  the  actual  guidance  notes  and  checklists  for  administrative  controls,  which  are 
built into the respective IT-systems. In ERDF and ESF, training is provided for the intermediate bodies of 
different types of fraud cases. 

Q.2.2.b  Can  you  share  any  results  deriving  from  the  use  of  the  findings  from  PIF  Reports  in  your 
fraud risk assessments?☒NO 

So far, the findings brought forward have mostly been acknowledged in the risk analysis. 

Q.2.2.c Have  you  further  exploited  the  potential  of  risk  analysis,  tailoring  the  approach  to  the 
different types of expenditure?☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 

In EAGF and EAFRD, a separate risk analysis has been carried out for different types of measures. 

Q.2.3.a  Have  you  facilitated  and  assessed  the  spontaneous  reporting  of  potential  irregularities  and 
strengthen  the  protection  of  whistle-blowers,  who  are  also  a  crucial  source  for  investigative 
journalism?☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 

Possibility for anonymous reporting was established for structural funds. 

Q.2.3.b  Have      you      promoted      systematic      and      timely      cooperation      between      judicial      and 
administrative authorities? 

☒NO 

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SE 

 Q.2.1. Have you adopted or updated a national anti-fraud strategy, which you have communicated to 
the European Commission/OLAF? ☒NO 

Answer:  All  Swedish  authorities  managing  EU  funds  have  individual  anti-fraud  strategies.  Essential 
sections are shared by the authorities while other sections are individually drafted, since some authorities 
have broader areas of responsibility than that of managing EU funds. To compile these strategies into one 
serves no purpose. 

Q.2.1.a. If yes, have you developed this strategy in cooperation with all bodies and authorities which 
have  a  specific  role  and  expertise  in  the  protection  of  the  EU  financial  interests,  including  law 
enforcement and prosecution services?☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 

Answer:  Essential  sections  of  the  strategy  like  the  policy  of  compulsory  reporting  to  the  prosecution 
authority and instructions regarding how to handle suspected fraud have been jointly developed within the 
Council for the Protection of EU´s Financial Interests in Sweden (the SEFI-council) chaired by the Swedish 
Economic Crime Authority. Other sections are individually developed.  

Q.2.1.b.  In  line  with  what  had  been  recommended  in  previous  years,  has  your  national  anti-fraud 
strategy  taken  into  account  the  risk  analysis  conclusions  contained  in  the  2018,  2017  and  2016  PIF 
reports? X YES, partly implementing the recommendation 

Answer: The PIF reports like other recommendations from the Commission are considered along with other 
data when the authorities revise their strategies, which is done annually. 

Q.2.1.c. In line with what was recommended in previous years, has your national anti-fraud strategy 
taken into account the need to structure the coordination between administrative and criminal checks 
and investigations; X YES, partly implementing the recommendation 

Answer:  Sweden  regards  this  as  one  of  the  most  important  issues  to  work  with.  Formally  all  concerned 
parties  make  the  correct  distinctions  in  their  strategies,  policies,  guidelines  etc.  However,  the  formal 
distinction  seems  not  to  have  an  impact  on  the  number  of  reported  suspected  fraud  to  the  Prosecution 
authority.  That  is  why  the  SEFI-Council  in  accordance  with  a  statement  made  by  the  management  of  all 
concerned authorities in December 2019 decided to make a study very much like ECA´s report 06/2019 in 
order  to  learn  whether  the  staff  of  the  authorities  fail  to  report  suspected  fraud  when  they  identify 
irregularities. 

Q.2.1.d. Did you make any assessment of the impact of the NAFS on the fight against fraud affecting 
the EU’s financial interests? NO 

Q.2.2.a. In line with what was recommended in previous years, has risk analysis been strengthened to 
detect  irregularities  and  fraud,  including  the  use  of  IT  tools  (such  as  ARACHNE)?☒YES,  partly 
implementing the recommendation 

Answer:  The  risk  analysis  work  carried  out  by  the  concerned  authorities  are  continuously  focusing  on 

149 

 
enhancing  the  strategies  used.  The  larger  Swedish  authorities  have  special  risk  assessment  teams  for  this 
assignment  and  in  this  context  the  SEFI-council  serves  as  a  fora    for  exchange  of  best  practices  and 
facilitates  educational  seminars  and  so  on.  How  the  authorities  deal  with  risk  analysis  is  also  monitored 
according to the Swedish regulation (2007:603) of internal risk and control.    

Q.2.2.b  Can  you  share  any  results  deriving  from  the  use  of  the  findings  from  PIF  Reports  in  your 
fraud risk assessments?☒NO 

Answer:  Typically,  the  results  of  the  PIF  report  are  not  direct  applicable  to  the  Swedish  conditions. 
Therefore, it is more correct to say that the findings of the PIF report may inspire Swedish authorities to 
consider  a  finding  but  in  a  Swedish  environment.  One  such  subject  –  area  of  concern  -  is  public 
procurement. 

Q.2.2.c Have you  further  exploited  the  potential  of  risk  analysis,  tailoring  the  approach  to  the 
different types of expenditure?☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 

Answer:  The  annual  assessment  and  continuous  revision  performed  by  the  risk  assessment  teams  of  the 
authorities are carried out with the purpose of identifying new risks, evaluating actions taken etc. in order 
to formulate an action plan for dealing with risks the following year. Typically, the Swedish authorities who 
manages EU funds only deal with one type of expenditure rather than several different types of expenditure. 

Q.2.3.a  Have  you  facilitated  and  assessed  the  spontaneous  reporting  of  potential  irregularities  and 
strengthen  the  protection  of  whistle-blowers,  who  are  also  a  crucial  source  for  investigative 
journalism?☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

Answer:  Several  authorities  have  a  whistle-blower  function  in  place  and  policies  to  strengthen  the 
protection of whistle-blowers. One of the largest newspapers (Dagens nyheter) have written several articles 
about some suspected irregularities in the Swedish ESF Council. The newspaper have gotten access to all 
documents thanks to the Swedish Public Access to Information and Secrecy Act. 

Q.2.3.b  Have      you      promoted      systematic      and      timely      cooperation      between      judicial      and 
administrative authorities?☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

Answer:  The  eight  managing  authorities  (some  are  administrative  and  some  judicial)  have  regular 
networking meetings several times a year. They meet to discuss the implementation of EU programmes, take 
part  in  COCOLAF  meetings  and  are  also  part  of  the  SEFI  Council  which  is  headed  by  the  Swedish 
Economic Crime Agency. 

150