COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS Critical Raw Materials Resilience: Charting a Path towards greater Security and Sustainability
Date: 2020-09-03
Institutions: Directorate-General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs, European Commission
Subjects: EU industrial policy, circular economy, innovation, investment, mineral resources, processing industry, raw material, security of supply, third country, waste recycling

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 3.9.2020  COM(2020) 474 final  COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS Critical Raw Materials Resilience: Charting a Path towards greater Security and Sustainability  
 
 
1.  Introduction 

Metals, minerals and natural materials are part of our daily lives. Those raw materials that are 
most  important  economically  and  have  a  high  supply  risk  are  called  critical  raw  materials. 
Critical  raw  materials  are  essential  to  the  functioning  and  integrity  of  a  wide  range  of 
industrial ecosystems. Tungsten makes phones vibrate. Gallium and indium are part of light-
emitting diode (LED) technology in lamps. Semiconductors need silicon metal. Hydrogen fuel 
cells and electrolysers need platinum group metals.  

Access to resources is a strategic security question for Europe’s ambition to deliver the Green 
Deal1. The new industrial strategy for Europe2 proposes to reinforce Europe’s open strategic 
autonomy,  warning  that  Europe’s  transition  to  climate  neutrality  could  replace  today’s 
reliance on fossil fuels with one on raw materials, many of which we source from abroad and 
for which global competition is becoming more fierce. The EU’s open strategic autonomy in 
these  sectors  will  therefore  need  to  continue  to  be  anchored  in  diversified  and  undistorted 
access  to  global  markets  for  raw  materials3.  At  the  same  time,  and  in  order  to  decrease 
external  dependencies  and  environmental  pressures,  the  underlying  problem  of  rapidly 
increasing global resources demand needs to be addressed by reducing and reusing materials 
before recycling them. 

The  enormous  appetite  for  resources  (energy,  food  and  raw  materials)  is  putting  extreme 
pressure on the planet, accounting for half of greenhouse gas emissions and more than 90% of 
biodiversity  loss  and  water  stress.  Scaling  up  the  circular  economy  will  be  vital  to  achieve 
climate neutrality by 2050, while decoupling economic growth from resource use and keeping 
resource use within planetary boundaries4.  

Access  to  resources  and  sustainability  is  key  for  the  EU’s  resilience  in  relation  to  raw 
materials. Achieving resource security requires action to diversify supply from  both primary 
and secondary sources, reduce dependencies and improve resource efficiency and circularity, 
including sustainable product design. This is true for all raw materials, including base metals, 
industrial  minerals,  aggregates  and  biotic  materials,  but  is  even  more  necessary  when  it 
concerns those raw materials that are critical for the EU. 

As if this challenge was not enough, the COVID-19 crisis has revealed just how fast and how 
deeply  global  supply  chains  can  be  disrupted.  The  Commission  has  proposed  an  ambitious 
COVID-19 recovery plan5 to increase resilience and open strategic autonomy and to foster the 

1 Communication COM (2019) 640 final.  
2 Communication COM (2020) 102 final. 
3 Global trade and its integrated value chains will remain a fundamental growth engine and will be essential for Europe’s recovery. With this 
in mind, Europe will pursue a model of open strategic autonomy. This will mean shaping the new system of global economic governance and 
developing mutually beneficial bilateral relations, while protecting ourselves from unfair and abusive practice. 
4 Communication COM (2020) 98 final.  
5 Communication COM (2020) 456 final.  

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transition towards a green and digital economy. With its aim of ensuring resilience through a 
secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials, this Communication can make a major 
contribution to the recovery and the long-term transformation of the economy. 

Building on the EU’s Raw Materials Initiative6, this Communication presents: 

- 
- 

the EU 2020 list of critical raw materials  
the challenges for a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials and actions 
to increase EU resilience and open strategic autonomy.    

1. The 2020 EU Critical Raw Materials List  

The  Commission  reviews  the  list  of  critical  raw  materials  for  the  EU  every  three  years.  It 
published the first list in 2011, updating it in 2014 and 20177. The assessment is based on data 
from the recent past and shows how criticality has evolved since the first list was published. It 
does  not  forecast  future  trends.  This  is  why  the  Commission  is  also  presenting  a  foresight 
study (see below).  

The 2020 assessment follows the same methodology as in 20178. It uses the average for the 
most  recent  complete  5-year  period  for  the  EU  without  the  United  Kingdom  (EU-27).  It 
screened 83 materials  (5 more than in  2017) and, where possible, looked more closely than 
previous  assessments  at  where  criticality  appears  in  the  value  chain:  extraction  and/or 
processing.   

Economic  importance  and  supply  risk  are  the  two  main  parameters  used  to  determine 
criticality for the EU. Economic importance looks in detail at the allocation of raw materials 
to  end-uses  based  on  industrial  applications.  Supply  risk  looks  at  the  country-level 
concentration  of  global  production  of  primary  raw  materials  and  sourcing  to  the  EU,  the 
governance  of  supplier  countries9,  including  environmental  aspects,  the  contribution  of 
recycling (i.e. secondary raw materials), substitution, EU import reliance and trade restrictions 
in third countries.  

The  resulting  list  of  critical  raw  materials  provides  a  factual  tool  to  support  EU  policy 
development.    The  Commission  takes  the  list  into  consideration  when  negotiating  trade 
agreements  or  seeking  to  eliminate  trade  distortions.  The  list  helps  to  identify  investment 

6 Communication COM (2008) 699 final. This initiative set out a strategy for reducing dependencies for non-energy raw materials for 
industrial value chains and societal well-being by diversifying sources of primary raw materials from third countries, strengthening domestic 
sourcing and supporting supply of secondary raw materials through resource efficiency and circularity. 
7 Communications COM (2011) 25 final, COM(2014) 297 final and COM(2017) 490 final. 
8 Methodology for establishing the EU list of critical raw materials, https://op.europa.eu/s/nBRd 
9 EU methodology uses the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI): http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/. WGI is addressing 
environmental aspects under the Government Effectiveness and Regulatory quality indicators. 

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needs,  and to  guide research and innovation  under the EU’s Horizon 2020, Horizon Europe 
and national programmes, especially on new mining technologies, substitution and recycling. 
It is also relevant for the circular economy10, to promote sustainable and responsible sourcing, 
and  for  industrial  policy.  Member  States  and  companies  can  also  use  it  as  an  EU  reference 
framework for developing their own specific criticality assessments.  

The 2020 EU list contains 30 materials as compared to 14 materials in 2011, 20 materials in 
2014  and  27  materials  in  2017.  26  materials  stay  on  the  list.  Bauxite,  lithium,  titanium  and 
strontium  are added to  the list  for the first  time. Helium  remains a concern as far as supply 
concentration is concerned, but is removed from the 2020 critical list due to a decline in its 
economic importance. The Commission will continue to monitor helium closely, in view of its 
relevance for a range of emerging digital applications. It will also  monitor nickel closely, in 
view of developments relating to growth in demand for battery raw materials.    

2020 Critical Raw Materials (new as compared to 2017 in bold) 

Antimony 
Baryte 
Beryllium 
Bismuth 
Borate 
Cobalt 
Coking Coal 
Fluorspar 
Gallium 
Germanium 

Hafnium 
Heavy Rare Earth Elements 
Light Rare Earth Elements 
Indium 
Magnesium 
Natural Graphite 
Natural Rubber 
Niobium 
Platinum Group Metals 
Phosphate rock 

Phosphorus 
Scandium 
Silicon metal 
Tantalum 
Tungsten 
Vanadium 
Bauxite 
Lithium 
Titanium 
Strontium 

More details on the materials are available in Annex 1, the report on the assessment and the 
factsheet  accompanying  each  material,  published  on  the  EU  Raw  Materials  Information 
System11.  

The  supply  of  many  critical  raw  materials  is  highly  concentrated.  For  example,  China 
provides 98 % of the EU’s supply of rare earth elements (REE), Turkey provides 98% of the 
EU’s supply of borate, and South Africa provides 71% of the EU’s needs for platinum and an 
even  higher  share  of  the  platinum  group  metals  iridium,  rhodium,  and  ruthenium.  The  EU 
relies on single EU companies for its supply of hafnium and strontium.  

10 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/circular-economy/indicators/monitoring-framework 
11 https://rmis.jrc.ec.europa.eu/  

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Figure 1: biggest supplier countries of CRMs to the EU 

Source: European Commission report on the 2020 criticality assessment 

2.  Enhancing the EU’s Resilience : the Supply and Sustainability Challenge 

intelligence  are  preconditions  for 

informed  decision-making.  The 
Knowledge  and 
Commission already developed the Raw Materials  Information System and will reinforce it, 
but  more  is  needed.  To  this  end,  the  Commission  will  strengthen  its  work  with  Strategic 
Foresight  Networks  to  develop  robust  evidence  and  scenario  planning  on  raw  materials 
supply, demand and use for strategic sectors. The criticality assessment methodology may be 
reviewed for the next list (2023) to integrate the latest knowledge. 

The EU will contribute to global efforts towards better resource management in co-operation 
with relevant international organisations.  

This  knowledge  base  should  enable  strategic  planning  and  foresight,  reflecting  the  EU’s 
objective of a  digital  and climate-neutral  economy by 2050  and  enhance its  leverage on the 
world  stage.  The  geopolitical  aspect  should  also  play  an  integral  part  in  foresight,  enabling 
Europe to anticipate and address future needs. 

Based on the information that is currently available, the foresight report12 published with this 
Communication,  complements  the  criticality  assessment  based  on  recent  data,  by  providing 
the critical raw materials outlook to 2030 and 2050 for strategic technologies and sectors. It 

12 Report on Raw Materials for strategic technologies and sectors 

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translates the EU’s (pre COVID-19) climate-neutrality scenarios for 205013 into the estimated 
demand for raw materials and addresses supply risks at different levels of the supply chains:  

  For  electric  vehicle  batteries  and  energy  storage,  the  EU  would  need  up  to  18  times 
more lithium and 5 times more cobalt in 2030, and almost 60 times more lithium and 
15  times  more  cobalt  in  2050,  compared  to  the  current  supply  to  the  whole  EU 
economy. If not addressed, this increase in demand may lead to supply issues14. 

  Demand for rare earths used in permanent magnets15, e.g. for electric vehicles, digital 

technologies or wind generators, could increase tenfold by 2050.  

This  should  be  seen  in  the  global  context  of  growing  demand  for  raw  materials  due  to 
population  growth,  industrialisation,  decarbonisation  of  transport,  energy  systems  and  other 
industrial  sectors,  increasing  demand  from  developing  countries  and  new  technological 
applications. 

The World Bank projects that demand for metals and minerals increases rapidly with climate 
ambition16. The most significant example of this is electric storage batteries, where the rise in 
demand  for  relevant  metals,  aluminium,  cobalt,  iron,  lead,  lithium,  manganese  and  nickel 
would grow by more than 1000 per cent by 2050 under a 2°C scenario compared to a business 
as usual scenario. 

The OECD forecasts that, despite improvements in materials intensity and resource efficiency 
and  the  growth  in  the  share  of  services  in  the  economy,  global  material  use  will  more  than 
double from 79 billion tons in 2011 to 167 billion tons in 2060 (+110%).  

This  is  an  overall  figure,  which  includes  relatively  abundant  and  geographically  spread 
resources  such  as  construction  materials  and  wood.  For  criticality  purposes,  it  is  worth 
looking more closely at  the OECD’s forecast  for metals,  projected to  increase from  8 to  20 
billion tonnes in 2060 (+150%)17. The EU is between 75% and 100% reliant on imports for 
most metals18.  

The  OECD  concludes  that  the  growth  in  materials  use,  coupled  with  the  environmental 
consequences of material  extraction, processing and waste, is  likely to  increase the pressure 
on the resource bases of the planet’s economies and jeopardize gains in well-being. Without 
addressing the resource implications of low-carbon technologies, there is a risk that shifting 

13 In-depth analysis in support of the Communication COM(2018) 773 
https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/clima/files/docs/pages/com_2018_733_analysis_in_support_en_0.pdf  
14 Cobalt: demand-supply balances in the transition to electric mobility. 
https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC112285/jrc112285_cobalt.pdf. 
15 For permanent magnets: Dysprosium, Neodymium, Praseodymium, Samarium; The remaining rare earths are: Yttrium, Lanthanum, 
Cerium, Promethium, Europium, Gadolinium, Terbium, Holmium, Erbium, Thulium, Ytterbium, Lutetium  
16 World Bank (2017), The Growing Role of Minerals and Metals for a Low Carbon Future 
17 OECD (2019), Global Material Resources Outlook to 2060: Economic Drivers and Environmental Consequences. 
18 European Commission, EIP on Raw Materials, Raw Materials Scoreboard 2018. 

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the burden of curbing emissions to other parts of the economic chain may simply cause new 
environmental  and  social  problems,  such  as  heavy  metal  pollution,  habitat  destruction,  or 
resource depletion19. 

The  COVID-19  crisis  is  leading  many  parts  of  the  world  to  look  critically  at  how  they 
organise  their  supply  chains,  especially  where  the  sources  of  supply  for  raw  materials  and 
intermediate  products  are  highly  concentrated  and,  therefore,  at  higher  risk  of  supply 
disruption.  Improving the resilience of critical  supply  chains  is  also  vital  to  ensure both the 
clean energy transition and energy security20. 

In its proposal for the European recovery plan, the Commission sees critical raw materials as 
one of the areas where Europe needs to be more resilient in preparation for future shocks and 
to  have  more  open  strategic  autonomy.  This  can  be  achieved  by  diversifying  and 
strengthening global supply chains including by continuing to work with partners around the 
world, reducing excessive import dependence, enhancing circularity and resource efficiency, 
and, in strategic areas, by increasing supply capacity within the EU.  

3.  Turning Challenges into opportunities  

China, the United States, Japan and others are already working fast to secure future supplies, 
diversify  sources  of  supply  through  partnerships  with  resource-rich  countries  and  develop 
their internal raw material-based value chains.   

The EU should act urgently to ensure a secure, sustainable supply of raw materials, pooling 
the efforts of companies, sub-national and national authorities as well as the EU institutions.  

The EU action plan for critical raw materials should: 

-  Develop resilient value chains for EU industrial ecosystems; 
- 

reduce dependency on primary critical raw materials through circular use of resources, 
sustainable products and innovation;  
strengthen  the  sustainable  and  responsible  domestic  sourcing  and  processing  of  raw 
materials in the European Union, and 

- 

-  diversify  supply  with  sustainable  and  responsible  sourcing  from  third  countries, 
strengthening  rules-based  open  trade  in  raw  materials  and  removing  distortions  to 
international trade.  

The  Commission  intends  to  develop  and  implement  these  priority  objectives  and  the  action 
plan with the help of Member States and stakeholders, in particular the European Innovation 
Partnership on Raw Materials and the Raw Materials Supply Group. It will also draw on the 

19 The International Resource Panel assesses these trade-offs in its reports to the United Nations Environment Programme, UNEP/IRP Global 
Resources Outlook 2019.  
20 Study underway to identify and improve the resilience of critical supply chains for clean energy transition and energy security. 

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support  and  expertise  of  the  European  Institute  of  Innovation  and  Technology  (EIT)  Raw 
Materials. 

3.1. Resilient value chains for EU industrial ecosystems  

Gaps in EU capacity for extraction, processing, recycling, refining and separation capacities 
(e.g. for lithium or rare earths) reflect a lack of resilience and a high dependency on supply 
from other parts of the world. Certain materials mined in Europe (like lithium) currently have 
to  leave  Europe  for  processing.  The  technologies,  capabilities  and  skills  in  refining  and 
metallurgy are a crucial link in the value chain.  

These  gaps,  and  vulnerabilities  in  existing  raw  materials  supply  chains,  affect  all  industrial 
ecosystems and therefore require a more strategic approach: adequate inventories to prevent 
unexpected  disruption  to  manufacturing  processes;  alternative  sources  of  supply  in  case  of 
disruption,  closer  partnerships  between  critical  raw  material  actors  and  downstream  user 
sectors, attracting investment to strategic developments.   

Through the European Battery Alliance, public and private investment has been mobilised at 
scale and should, for example, lead to 80% of Europe’s lithium demand being supplied from 
European sources by 2025.  

The new industrial strategy proposes to  develop  new industrial alliances. The raw materials 
dimension  should  be  an  integral  part  of  these  alliances  and  of  the  corresponding  industrial 
ecosystems  (as  preliminarily  identified  in  the  Staff  Working  Document  accompanying  the 
Recovery  Plan21  -  see  Annex  2).  However,  there  is  also  a  need  for  a  dedicated  industrial 
alliance on raw materials, as announced in the industrial strategy, since there are a number of 
important  challenges  such  as  highly  concentrated  global  markets,  technical  barriers  to 
investment  and  to  innovation,  public  acceptance  and  the  need  to  raise  level  of  sustainable 
sourcing.    

In a first phase, this European Raw Materials Alliance will focus on the most pressing needs, 
which is to increase EU resilience in the rare earths and magnets value chain, as this is vital to 
most EU industrial ecosystems (including renewable energy, defence and space). The alliance 
can expand to address other critical raw material and base metal needs over time. The work of 
the  alliance  will  be  complementary  to  external  actions  to  secure  access  to  these  critical 
materials. 

The  alliance  will  be  open  to  all  relevant  stakeholders,  including  industrial  actors  along  the 
value chain, Member States and regions, trade unions, civil society, research and technology 
organisations, investors and NGOs. The alliance will be built on the principles of openness, 
transparency,  diversity  and  inclusiveness.  It  will  respect  EU  competition  rules  and  EU 

21 SWD(2020) 98 final 

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international  trade  commitments.  The  alliance  will  identify  barriers,  opportunities  and 
investment  cases  and  will  have  an  agile  governance  framework  involving  all  relevant 
stakeholders and allowing project-based work to be carried out.  

The European Investment Bank has recently adopted its new energy lending policy, in which 
it  states  that  the  bank  will  support  projects  relating  to  the  supply  of  critical  raw  materials 
needed for low-carbon technologies in the EU. This is important to help de-risk projects and 
attract  private  investment  in  the  EU  and  in  those  resource-rich  third  countries  within  its 
operating  mandate.  At  the  same  time  it  must  be  ensured  that  such  projects  are  free  from 
distortions and contribute to the EU’s open strategic autonomy and resilience in a resource-
efficient and sustainable manner.  

The  EU  sustainable  finance  taxonomy  will  guide  public  and  private  investments  towards 
sustainable activities. It will address the enabling potential of the mining and extractive value 
chain  and  the  need  for  the  sector  to  minimise  its  impacts  on  the  climate  and  environment, 
taking  into  account  life  cycle  considerations22.  This  should  help  to  mobilise  support  for 
compliant  exploration,  mining  and  processing  projects  for  critical  raw  materials  in  a 
sustainable and responsible way. 

Action  1  –  Launch  an  industry-driven  European  Raw  Materials  Alliance  in  Q3  2020, 
initially  to  build  resilience  and  open  strategic  autonomy  for  the  rare  earths  and  magnets 
value chain, before extending to other raw material areas (industry, Commission, investors, 
European Investment Bank, stakeholders, Member States, regions).    

Action 2 – Develop sustainable financing criteria for the mining, extractive and processing 
sectors  in  Delegated  Acts  on  Taxonomy  by  end  2021  (Platform  on  Sustainable  Finance, 
Commission).  

3.2. Circular use of resources, sustainable products and innovation 

The European Green Deal’s Circular Economy Action Plan23 aims to decouple growth from 
resource use through sustainable product design and mobilising the potential of secondary raw 
materials24. Moving towards a more circular economy could bring a net increase of 700 000 

22 Regulation (EU) 2020/852 on the establishment of a framework to facilitate sustainable investment. 
23 Communication COM (2020) 98 final  
24 EU resource productivity grew on average by 1.7% per year between 2003 and 2018 according to the Monitoring report on progress 
towards the SDGs in an EU context — 2020 edition, p. 227. 

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jobs  in  the  EU,  by  203025.  Circularity  and  recycling  of  raw  materials  from  low-carbon 
technologies  is  an  integral  part  of  the  transition  to  a  climate-neutral  economy.  Increasing 
product life-time, and the use of secondary raw materials, through a robust and integrated EU 
market and retention of value of high-grade materials, will help to cover a growing share of 
the  EU’s  raw  materials  demand.  For  example,  to  foster  recovery  of  materials  from  rapidly 
increasing  amounts  of    batteries  placed  on  the  European  market  ,  the  Commission  will 
propose by October 2020 a new comprehensive regulation addressing, among other aspects, 
the  end-life-phase,  i.e.  second  life  (re-use  and  re-purposing),  collection  rates,  recycling 
efficiency and recovery of materials, recycled content and extended producer responsibility. 

The  EU  is  at  the  forefront  of  the  circular  economy  and  has  already  increased  its  use  of 
secondary raw materials. For example, more than 50% of some metals such as iron, zinc, or 
platinum  are  recycled  and  they  cover  more  than  25%  of  the  EU’s  consumption.  For  others, 
however, especially those needed in renewable energy technologies or high-tech applications 
such  as  rare  earths,  gallium,  or  indium,  secondary  production  makes  only  a  marginal 
contribution.  This  is  a  huge  loss  of  potential  value  to  the  EU  economy  and  a  source  of 
avoidable strain on the environment and climate.    

25 Impacts of circular economy policies on the labour market (2018). Cambridge Econometrics, ICF, Trinomics for the European 
Commission. ISBN: 978-92-79-86856-6 

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Figure  2:  Recycling’s  contribution  to  meeting  materials  demand  (Recycling  Input 
Rate)26 

More  research  into  waste  reprocessing  will  help  to  avoid  valuable  materials  ending  up  in 
landfill. Significant amounts of resources leave Europe in the form of wastes and scrap, which 
are  potentially  recyclable  into  secondary  raw  materials  here.  The  extractive  and  processing 
industries  must  also  become  greener  –  reducing  their  planetary  footprint,  including 
greenhouse gas emissions.     

We  lack  complete  information  on  the  amount  of  raw  materials  contained  in  products,  in 
extractive  waste  or  landfilled,  i.e.  potentially  available  for  recovery  or  recycling.    An 
assessment of the amount of materials in stock, i.e. contained in products that are in use, could 

26 The Recycling Input Rate (RIR) is the percentage of overall demand that can be satisfied through secondary raw materials.  Figure from: 
Study on the EU's list of  Critical Raw Materials (2020) Final Report 

10 

 
 
 
                                                           
shed light on when these would become available for recycling, considering the average life-
time of products.  

Replacing  a  critical  raw  material  with  a  non-critical  raw  material  that  offers  similar 
performance  (substitution)  is  another  way  to  alleviate  critical  raw  materials  dependency. 
Materials  innovation;  sustainable  design  and  the  development  of  alternative  technologies 
requiring different materials can also contribute to mitigating supply risk.  

Action  3-  Launch  critical  raw  materials  research  and  innovation  in  2021  on  waste 
processing,  advanced  materials  and  substitution,  using  Horizon  Europe,    the  European 
Regional Development Fund and national R&I programmes (Commission, Member States, 
regions, R&I Community);  

Action 4 - Map the potential supply of secondary critical raw materials from EU stocks and 
wastes and identify viable recovery projects by 2022 (Commission, EIT Raw Materials). 

3.3. Sourcing from the European Union 

As global demand for critical raw material grows, primary raw materials will continue to play 
a  key  role.  Mobilising  Europe’s  domestic  potential  better  is  an  essential  part  of  the  EU 
becoming more resilient and developing open strategic autonomy.   

Europe  has  a  long  tradition  of  mining  and  extractive  activities.  It  is  well-endowed  with 
aggregates and industrial minerals as well as certain base metals such as copper and zinc. It is 
less  successful  in  developing  projects  to  source  critical  raw  materials,  even  though  there  is 
significant potential for these. See Figure 3. The reasons are multi-faceted: lack of investment 
in exploration and mining, diverse and lengthy national permitting procedures or low levels of 
public acceptance.  

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Figure 3: CRM deposits EU-27 (2020) 

Looking at the geographical distribution of critical raw materials in Europe, the development 
of  battery  raw  materials  such  as  lithium,  nickel,  cobalt,  graphite  and  manganese  provides 
interesting opportunities. Companies in several Member States are already participating in the 
European Batteries Alliance, benefiting from private sector, EU and national funding, both for 
the exploitation of the raw materials and for their processing in Europe.  

Figure  4  shows  that  many  EU  battery  raw  material  resources  lie  in  regions  that  are  heavily 
dependent  on  coal  or  carbon-intensive  industries  and  where  battery  factories  are  planned. 

12 

 
 
 
Furthermore, many mining wastes are rich in critical raw materials27 and could be revisited to 
create  new  economic  activity  on  existing  or  former  coal-mining  sites  while  improving  the 
environment. 

Figure 4: Battery raw material mines, battery factories and coal mines  

Source: Joint Research Centre 

The  Just  Transition  Mechanism  will  help  to  alleviate  the  socio-economic  impact  of  the 
transition  to  climate  neutrality  in  coal  and  carbon-intensive  regions.  It  can  support  the 
economic  diversification  of  regions  including  through  circular  economy  investments.  The 
sustainable infrastructure window under InvestEU could also support regional development of 
critical raw materials.  

The development of territorial just transition plans provides an early opportunity for Member 
States to assess the potential of critical raw materials as one of the alternative business models 
and  sources  of  regional  employment.  Many  of  the  mining  and  engineering  skills  are 
transferable to the exploitation of metals and minerals, often in the same regions. The updated 
EU Skills Agenda could support this adaptation.    

27 https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/publication/recovery-critical-and-other-raw-materials-mining-waste-and-landfills 

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The EU and its Member States already have a good legislative framework in place to ensure 
that mining takes place under environmentally and socially sound conditions.  

However, it is very difficult to bring new critical raw material projects to the operational stage 
quickly. This is partly due to the inherent risk and cost of new projects, but is also attributable 
to  the  lack  of  incentives  and  financing  for  exploration,  the  length  of  national  permitting 
procedures  and  the  lack  of  public  acceptance  for  mining  in  Europe.  Under  the  Better 
Regulation  agenda,  the  Commission  is  currently  working  with  key  stakeholders  to  map  out 
obstacles to major infrastructure projects with a view to accelerate and facilitate procedures in 
the Member States, as highlighted by the 21 July 2020 European Council Conclusions, while 
maintaining high standards. 

Innovative technological solutions are transforming the mining and processing of critical raw 
materials.  The  sector  is  already  using  automation  and  digitalisation.  Remote  sensing  using 
Europe’s  earth-observation  Copernicus  Programme  can  become  a  powerful  tool  to  identify 
new critical raw material sites, monitor the environmental performance of mines during their 
operating life and after closure.  

Action  5  -  Identify  mining  and  processing  projects  and  investment  needs  and  related 
financing  opportunities    for  critical  raw  materials  in  the  EU  that  can  be  operational  by 
2025,  with  priority  for  coal-mining  regions  (Commission,  Member  States,  regions, 
stakeholders);  

Action 6 – Develop expertise and skills in mining, extraction and processing technologies, 
as  part  of  a  balanced  transition  strategy  in  regions  in  transition  from  2022  onwards 
(Commission, industry, trade unions, Member States and regions); 

Action  7  -  Deploy  Earth-observation  programmes  and  remote  sensing  for  resource 
exploration,  operations  and  post-closure  environmental  management  (Commission, 
industry); 

Action  8  –  Develop  Horizon  Europe  R&I  projects  on  processes  for  exploitation  and 
processing  of  critical  raw  materials  to  reduce  environmental  impacts  starting  in  2021 
(Commission, R&I community).  

14 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.4. Diversified sourcing from third countries 

Due to the geological limitations of the EU, future demand of primary critical raw materials 
will continue to be largely met by imports also in the medium to long term. The  EU’s open 
strategic  autonomy  in  these  sectors  therefore  needs  to  continue  to  be  anchored  in  well-
diversified and undistorted access to global markets for raw materials. 

Resilience  for  critical  raw  materials  supply  will  also  be  achieved  by  reinforcing  use  of  EU 
trade policy tools (including Free Trade Agreements and enhanced enforcement efforts) and 
work  with  international  organisations  to  ensure  undistorted  trade  and  investment  in  raw 
materials in a manner that supports the EU’s commercial interests. The EU will also continue 
to be resolute in addressing non-respect of international obligations by third countries, in line 
with  its  commitment  to enhance enforcement activities in  the area of trade through the new 
Chief  Trade  Enforcement  Officer  (CTEO).  The  EU  is  also  currently  negotiating  Free  Trade 
Agreements  with  a  number  of  important  countries  from  a  raw  materials  perspective.  There 
will  be  potential  for  levelling  the  playing  field  further  to  allow  European  industries  to 
compete on an equal  footing with  third country  companies to  engage directly in  sustainable 
and responsibly-sourced raw materials. Energy and economic diplomacy with third countries 
is  also  important  to  reinforce  the  resilience  of  critical  supply  chains  for  the  clean  energy 
transition and energy security. 

Shifting EU import payments for critical raw materials from other international currencies to 
the  euro  would  have  some  advantages  such  as  reducing  price  volatility,  and  making  EU 
importers and third-country exporters less dependent on US dollar funding markets.  

The  Commission  cooperates  with  partners  on  critical  raw  materials  and  sustainability  in  a 
range of international fora. These include the annual EU-US-Japan Trilateral on Critical Raw 
Materials  (supply  risks,  trade  barriers,  innovation  and  international  standards),  the 
Organisation  for  Economic  Cooperation  and  Development  (conflict  minerals,  guidance  on 
raw  materials,  responsible  sourcing),  the  United  Nations  (global  outlook,  environmental 
pressures,  resource  management,  mineral  governance),  the  WTO  (market  access,  technical 
barriers,  export  restrictions)  and  the  G20  (resource  efficiency).  It  also  has  bilateral  raw 
material dialogues with a range of countries, including China.  

The  EU  will  need  to  engage  in  strategic  partnerships  with  resource-rich  third  countries, 
making  use  of  all  external  policy  instruments  and  respecting  its  international  obligations. 
There  is  large  untapped  potential  for  building  sustainable  and  responsible  strategic 
partnerships  with  resource-rich  countries.  These  range  from  highly  developed  mining 
countries like Canada and Australia, several developing countries in Africa and Latin America 
and countries close to the EU like Norway, Ukraine, enlargement countries and the Western 

15 

 
 
Balkans. It is important to integrate the Western Balkans into EU supply chains28. Serbia, for 
example has borates, while Albania has platinum deposits. Rather than trying to develop  all 
these  partnerships  at  once,  the  Commission  envisages,  before  launching  pilot  partnership 
projects  in  2021,  to  discuss  priorities  with  Member  States  and  industry,  including  in  the 
countries concerned as they have local expertise and a network of Member State embassies.  

Such  strategic  partnerships  covering  extraction,  processing  and  refining  are  particularly 
relevant for resource-rich developing countries and regions such as Africa. The EU can help 
our  partner  countries’  to  develop  their  mineral  resources  sustainably  through  supporting 
improved local governance and dissemination of responsible mining practices, creating in turn 
value added in the mining sector and drivers for economic and social development.  

Increased engagement with strategic partners to secure critical raw materials will need to go 
hand  in  hand  with  responsible  sourcing.  High  supply  concentration  in  countries  with  low 
standards of  governance29 not  only poses a security  of supply risk, but  may  also  exacerbate 
environmental and social problems, such as child labour. Conflicts arising from or aggravated 
by access to resources are also a recurrent source of international tension. 

Responsible  sourcing  and  due  diligence  are  growing  in  importance  throughout  the  raw 
materials value chain. The EU Regulation on Conflict Minerals30, covering tin, gold, and the 
critical raw materials tantalum and tungsten, applies to EU importers as of 1 January 2021 and 
addresses such concerns. The European Partnership on Responsible Minerals31 helps mines to 
comply with the EU Regulation and OECD due diligence guidance. The forthcoming proposal 
for a Batteries Regulation will address the responsible sourcing of battery raw materials and 
the  Commission  is  considering  making  a  possible  horizontal  regulatory  proposal  on  due 
diligence.    

instruments,  such  as  development  cooperation, 
The  use  of  EU  external  financial 
neighbourhood  funding  and  the  Partnership  Instrument  Policy  Support  Facility  will  help  to 
leverage  private  investment,  thus  ensuring  that  mutual  benefits  are  achieved  and  that  EU 
companies can participate on a level playing field in projects taking place in third countries. 

28 See EU-Western Balkans Zagreb Summit of 6 May 2020 
29 According to the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), which assess (I) Voice and Accountability; (II) Political Stability and Absence 
of Violence; (III) Government Effectiveness; (IV) Regulatory Quality; (V) Rule of Law; and (VI) Control of Corruption 
30 Regulation (EU) 2017/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2017 laying down supply chain due diligence 
obligations for Union importers of tin, tantalum and tungsten, their ores, and gold originating from conflict-affected and high-risk areas; OJ L 
130, 19.5.2017, p. 1 
31 https://europeanpartnership-responsibleminerals.eu/ 

16 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
Action 9 – Develop strategic international partnerships and associated funding to secure a 
diversified and sustainable supply of critical raw materials, including through undistorted 
trade  and  investment  conditions,  starting  with  pilot  partnerships  with  Canada,  interested 
countries  in  Africa  and  the  EU’s  neighbourhood  in  2021  (Commission,  Member  States, 
industry and third country counterparts);  

Action 10 - Promote responsible mining practices for critical raw materials through the EU 
regulatory framework (proposals in 2020-2021) and relevant international cooperation32 
(Commission, Member States, industry, civil society organisations); 

32 Extractive Industries Transparencies Initiative (EITI), Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), World Bank, the European Partnership for responsible Minerals (EPRM) and Germany’s Gesellschaft für 
internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ).  

17 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
4.   Conclusion 

The stakes are high. The EU’s success in transforming and modernising its economy depends 
on securing in a sustainable way the primary and secondary raw materials needed to scale up 
clean and digital technologies in all of the EU’s industrial ecosystems.  

The  EU  must  act  to  become  more  resilient  in  coping  with  possible  future  shocks  and  in 
leading the twin green and digital transformations. One of the lessons of the COVID-19 crisis 
is the need to reduce dependency and strengthen diversity and security of supply. Enhancing 
open strategic autonomy will be a long-term benefit to the EU. The EU institutions, national 
and  sub-national  authorities  as  well  as  companies  should  become  much  more  agile  and 
effective in securing a sustainable supply of critical raw materials. 

This Communication highlights related priorities and recommends key areas of work for the 
EU to reinforce its strategic approach towards more resilient raw materials value chains. 

To  that  end,  the  Commission  will  work  in  close  partnership  with  other  EU  institutions,  the 
European Investment Bank, Member States, regions, the industry and other key stakeholders. 
It  will  monitor  progress  in  implementing  the  above  strategic  priorities  and  actions,  explore 
any additional support measures needed and make relevant recommendations by 2022 at the 
latest. 

18 

 
 
 
 
Annex 1: List of Critical Raw Materials  

Raw 
materials 

Stage 

Main global  
producers 

Antimony 

Extraction  China (74%) 

Tajikistan (8%) 
Russia (4%) 

Baryte 

Extraction  China (38%) 
India (12%) 
Morocco (10%) 

Bauxite 

Extraction  Australia (28%) 

China (20%) 
Brazil (13%) 

Main EU 
sourcing33 
countries 
Turkey (62%) 
Bolivia (20%) 
Guatemala (7%) 

China (38%) 
Morocco (28%) 
Other EU (15%) 
Germany (10%) 
Norway (1%) 

Guinea (64%) 
Greece (12%) 
Brazil (10%) 
France (1%) 

Import 
reliance34  

EoL-
RIR35 

Selected Uses 

100% 

28% 

70% 

1% 

 Flame retardants 
 Defence applications 
 Lead-acid batteries 

 Medical applications 
 Radiation protection 
 Chemical applications 

87% 

0% 

 Aluminium production 

Beryllium 

Extraction  United States (88%) 

n/a 

n/a36 

0% 

 Electronic and  

China (8%) 
Madagascar (2%) 

Bismuth 

Processing  China (85%) 
Lao Pdr (7%) 
Mexico (4%) 

China (93%) 

100% 

0% 

Communications 
Equipment  

 automotive, aero-space 

and defence  
components  

 Pharmaceutical and 

animal feed industries 
 Medical applications 
 Low-melting point 

alloys 

Borate 

Extraction 

Turkey (42%) 
United States (24%) 
Chile (11%) 

Cobalt 

Extraction  Congo DR (59%) 

China (7%) 
Canada (5%) 

Coking coal  Extraction  China (55%) 

Australia (16%) 
Russia (7%) 

Turkey (98%) 

100% 

1% 

 High performance 

glass 

 Fertilisers 
 Permanent magnets 
 Batteries  
 Super alloys 
 Catalysts 
 Magnets 

 Coke for steel  
 Carbon fibres 
 Battery electrodes 

86% 

22% 

62% 

0% 

Congo DR (68%) 
Finland (14%) 
French Guiana (5%) 

Australia (24%) 
Poland (23%) 
United States (21%) 
Czechia (8%) 
Germany (8%) 

33 Based on Domestic production and Import (Export excluded) 
34 IR = (Import – Export) / (Domestic production + Import – Export) 
35 The End of Life Recycling Input Rate (EoL-RIR) is the percentage of overall demand that can be satisfied through secondary raw materials 
36 The EU import reliance cannot be calculated for beryllium, as there is no production and trade for beryllium ores and concentrates in the 
EU 

19 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
  
  
 
   
 
                                                           
Raw 
materials 

Stage 

Main global  
producers 

Fluorspar 

Extraction  China (65%) 

Mexico (15%) 
Mongolia (5%) 

Gallium 

Processing  China (80%) 

Germany (8%) 
Ukraine (5%) 

Germanium 

Processing  China (80%) 

Finland (10%) 
Russia (5%) 

Hafnium 

Processing  France (49%) 

United States (44%) 
Russia (3%) 

Indium 

Processing  China (48%) 

Korea, Rep. (21%) 
Japan (8%) 

Main EU 
sourcing33 
countries 
Mexico (25%) 
Spain (14%) 
South Africa (12%) 
Bulgaria (10%) 
Germany (6%) 

Germany (35%) 
UK (28%) 
China (27%) 
Hungary (2%) 

Finland (51%) 
China (17%) 
UK (11%) 

France (84%) 
United States (5%) 
UK (4%) 

France (28%) 
Belgium (23%) 
UK (12%) 
Germany (10%) 
Italy (5%) 

Import 
reliance34  

EoL-
RIR35 

Selected Uses 

66% 

1% 

 Steel and iron making 
 Refrigeration and  
Air-conditioning  
 Aluminium making 
and other metallurgy 

31% 

0% 

 Semiconductors 
 Photovoltaic cells 

31% 

2% 

0%37 

0% 

0% 

0% 

 Optical fibres and 
Infrared optics 
 Satellite solar cells 
 Polymerisation 

catalysts 
 Super alloys 
 Nuclear control rods 
 Refractory ceramics 

 Flat panel displays 
 Photovoltaic cells and 

photonics 

 Solders 

 Batteries 
 Glass and ceramics 
 Steel and aluminium 

metallurgy 

Lithium 

Processing  Chile (44%) 
China (39%) 
Argentina (13%) 

Chile (78%) 
United States (8%) 
Russia (4%) 

100% 

0% 

Magnesium 

Processing  China (89%) 

China (93%) 

100% 

13% 

 Lightweight alloys for 

United States (4%) 

automotive, 
electronics, packaging 
or  
construction 

 Desulphurisation agent 

in steelmaking 

Natural 
Graphite 

Extraction  China (69%) 
India (12%) 
Brazil (8%) 

China (47%) 
Brazil (12%) 
Norway (8%) 
Romania (2%) 

98% 

3% 

 Batteries  
 Refractories for 
steelmaking 

37 EU is a net exporter of Hafnium and Indium 

20 

 
 
   
 
   
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
                                                           
Raw 
materials 

Stage 

Main global  
producers 

Natural 
Rubber 

Extraction 

Thailand (33%) 
Indonesia (24%) 
Vietnam (7%) 

Main EU 
sourcing33 
countries 
Indonesia (31%) 
Thailand (18%) 
Malaysia (16%) 

Import 
reliance34  

EoL-
RIR35 

Selected Uses 

100% 

1% 

Niobium 

Processing  Brazil (92%) 
Canada (8%) 

Brazil (85%) 
Canada (13%) 

100% 

0% 

 Tires 
 Rubber components  
for machinery and 
household goods 

 High-strength steel  
and super alloys for  
transportation and  
infrastructure 

 High-tech applications 

(capacitors, 
superconducting 
magnets, etc.) 

 Mineral fertilizer 
 Phosphorous  
compounds 

Phosphate 
rock 

Extraction  China (48%) 

Morocco (11%) 
United States (10%) 

Phosphorus 

Processing  China (74%) 

Kazakhstan (9%) 
Vietnam (9%) 

Scandium 

Processing  China (66%) 
Russia (26%) 
Ukraine (7%) 

Silicon 
metal 

Processing  China (66%) 

United States (8%) 
Norway (6%) 
France (4%) 

Spain (31%) 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 
(30%) 
China (19%) 

Strontium 

Extraction 

84% 

17% 

Morocco (24%) 
Russia (20%) 
Finland (16%) 

Kazakhstan (71%) 
Vietnam (18%) 
China (9%) 

100% 

0% 

 Chemical applications 
 Defence applications 

UK (98%) 
Russia (1%) 

100% 

0% 

 Solid Oxide Fuel Cells 
 Lightweight alloys 

Norway (30%) 
France (20%) 
China (11%) 
Germany (6%) 
Spain (6%) 

63% 

0% 

 Semiconductors 
 Photovoltaics  
 Electronic components 
 Silicones 

Spain (100%) 

0% 

0% 

 Ceramic magnets  
 Aluminium alloys 
 Medical applications 
 Pyrotechnics 

Tantalum 

Extraction  Congo, DR (33%)  

Rwanda (28%) 
Brazil (9%) 

Congo, DR (36%)  
Rwanda (30%) 
Brazil (13%)  

99% 

0% 

 Capacitors for 

electronic devices 

 Super alloys 

Titanium38 

Processing  China (45%)  
Russia (22%)  
Japan (22%)  

n/a 

100% 

19% 

 Lightweight high-

strength alloys for  
e.g. aeronautics, space 
and defence 

 Medical applications 

38 For Titanium metal sponge there are no trade codes available for the EU 

21 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
                                                           
Raw 
materials 

Stage 

Main global  
producers 

Tungsten39 

Processing  China (69%)  

Main EU 
sourcing33 
countries 
n/a 

Import 
reliance34  

EoL-
RIR35 

Selected Uses 

n/a 

42% 

 Alloys e.g. for 

Vietnam (7%)  
United States (6%)  
Austria (1%)  
Germany (1%) 

Vanadium40 

Processing  China (55%)  

n/a 

n/a 

2% 

South Africa (22%) 
Russia (19%) 

aeronautics, space, 
defence, electrical 
technology 

 Mill, cutting and 
mining tools 

 High-strength-low-

alloys for e.g. 
aeronautics, space, 
nuclear reactors 
 Chemical catalysts 

n/a 

100% 

21% 

 Chemical and  

Platinum 
Group  
Metals41 

Processing  South Africa (84%) 
- iridium, platinum, 
rhodium, ruthenium  
Russia (40%) 
- palladium 

Heavy Rare 
Earth  
Elements42 

Light Rare 
Earth  
Elements 

Processing  China (86%)  

Australia (6%)  
United States (2%)  

China (98%)  
Other non-EU (1%)  
UK (1%) 

100% 

8% 

Processing  China (86%) 

Australia (6%) 
United States (2%) 

China (99%)  
UK (1%) 

100% 

3% 

automotive catalysts  

 Fuel Cells 
 Electronic applications 

 Permanent Magnets for 
electric motors and 
electricity generators 

 Lighting Phosphors 
 Catalysts 
 Batteries 
 Glass and ceramics 

39 The distribution of tungsten smelters and refiners has been used as a proxy of the production concentration. Trade data are not completely 
available for commercial confidentiality reason. 
40 The EU import reliance cannot be calculated for the vanadium, as there is no production and trade for vanadium ores and concentrates in 
the EU 
41 The trade data include metal from all sources, both primary and secondary. It was not possible to identify the source and the relative 
contributions of primary and secondary materials. 
42 Global production refers to Rare Earth Oxides concentrates for both Light and Heavy Rare Earth Elements. 

22 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Annex 2: Relevance of Critical Raw Materials for industrial ecosystems 

Aerospace/ 
defence 

Textiles 

Electronics 

Mobility/ 
Automotive 

Energy-
intensive 
industries 

Renewable 
energy 

Agri-
food 

Health 

Digital 

Constructi
on 

Retai
l 

Proximity
/ social 
economy 

Tourism 

Creative/ 
cultural 
industries 

 

 

 

 

 

Antimony 
Baryte 
Bauxite 
Beryllium 
Bismuth 
Borate 
Cobalt 
Coking coal 
Fluorspar 
Gallium 
Germanium 
Hafnium 
Indium 
Lithium 
Magnesium 
Natural graphite 
Natural Rubber 
Niobium 
Phosphate rock 
Phosphorus 
Scandium 
Silicon metal 
Strontium 
Tantalum 
Titanium 
Tungsten 
Vanadium 
PGM 
HREE 
LREE 

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23