REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL on the implementation of Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016 laying down rules against tax avoidance practices that directly affect the functioning of the internal market as amended by Council Directive (EU) 2017/952 of 29 May 2017 amending Directive (EU) 2016/1164 as regards hybrid mismatches with third countries
Date: 2020-08-19
Institutions: Directorate-General for Taxation and Customs Union, European Commission
Subjects: European tax cooperation, approximation of laws, basis of tax assessment, corporation tax, national implementing measure, single market, tax avoidance, tax collection, tax harmonisation, tax law

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 19.8.2020  COM(2020) 383 final  REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL on the implementation of Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016 laying down rules against tax avoidance practices that directly affect the functioning of the internal market as amended by Council Directive (EU) 2017/952 of 29 May 2017 amending Directive (EU) 2016/1164 as regards hybrid mismatches with third countries  
 
 
1.  Introduction  

Council Directive (EU) 2016/11641 of 12 July 2016 laying down rules against tax avoidance 
practices  that  directly  affect  the  functioning  of  the  internal  market,  as  amended  by  Council 
Directive  (EU)  2017/9522  of  29  May  2017  amending  Directive  (EU)  2016/1164  as  regards 
hybrid  mismatches  with  third  countries  (further  referred  to  as  “the  ATAD”),  sets  out  EU 
measures  to  address  the  most  common  forms  of  aggressive  tax  planning  by  laying  down 
minimum standard rules that should be included in all Member States’ corporate income tax 
laws.  

The  ATAD  ensures  a  minimum  level  of  protection  for  all  Member  States’  tax  bases,  a 
coherent and consistent approach against tax avoidance throughout the single market, and a 
coordinated EU implementation of some of the recommendations from the Organisation for 
Economic  Cooperation  and  Development  (OECD)/G20  initiative  against  base  erosion  and 
profit shifting (BEPS) Project. The ATAD provides for measures in five distinct areas, which 
Members States  are required to  implement: interest  limitation  rule, exit taxation, controlled 
foreign  company  rule  (“CFC”),  hybrid  mismatches  rule  and  general  anti-abuse  rule 
(“GAAR”). 

1.1. The transposition timeframes 

The main3 ATAD transposition timeline requirements are: 
Measure 
Interest limitation, GAAR, and CFC  
Exit taxation, Hybrid mismatches (apart 
from reverse hybrid mismatches)  
Reverse hybrid mismatches (with third 
countries) 

Transposition deadline  Application date 
31 December 2018 
31 December 2019 

1 January 2019 
1 January 2020 

31 December 2021 

1 January 2022 

1.2. The report 

Article  10  of  the  ATAD  requires  that  the  Commission  evaluate  the  implementation  of  the 
ATAD,  in  particular  the  interest  limitation  provisions,  by  9  August  2020,  and  report  to  the 
Council on it. By derogation, the provisions in respect of the hybrid mismatches are required 
to be evaluated by the Commission by 1 January 2022.  

This  report  is  the  first  step  in  the  evaluation  of  the  impact  of  the  ATAD  and  provides  an 
overview of the implementation of the early applicable ATAD measures (interest limitation, 
GAAR,  CFC)  across  Member  States4.  The  next  step  will  consist  of  the  delivery  of  a 

1 OJ L 193 of 19 July 2016, p.1 
2 OJ L 144 of 7 June 2017, p.1 
3 Article 11(6) of the ATAD provides derogation in respect of interest limitation (further details in section 2.1) 
for certain Member States; Article 11(4) provides for certain derogation for Estonia in respect of exit taxation 
4 As the UK is not part of the EU at this point of time the UK’s implementation of the ATAD is not included in 
this report. The UK was part of the EU at the time the ATAD were adopted and until the end of the transition 
period of their departure the ATAD are still applicable in the UK.  

1 

 
 
 
                                                           
comprehensive  evaluation  report  of  the  ATAD  measures,  including  overview  of  the 
implementation of those ATAD measures that were not included in this report.  

2.  Description  of  measures  including  options  and  some  approaches  available  to 

Member States 

Some  degree  of  prescribed  optionality  is  permitted  in  the  transposition  of  the  ATAD 
measures.  Additionally,  as  the  ATAD  is  a  minimum  standard  directive  it  allows  Member 
States  to  provide  more  restrictive  rules  in  their  national  legislation  transposing  the  ATAD 
than  the  text  of  the  directive  prescribes  itself,  provided  that  such  measures  would  comply 
with  the  fundamental  freedoms  of  the  Internal  Market.  An  overview  of  more  noteworthy 
instances  where  Member  States  have  provided  for  stronger  measures  in  their  national 
legislation is also included in this section. 

2.1. Interest limitation rule 

The  Interest  Limitation  rule  (Article  4  of  the  ATAD)  limits  the  deductibility  of  taxpayers' 
exceeding  (net)  borrowing  costs  by  relation  to  a  30%  ratio  of  taxpayer's  taxable  earnings 
before  interest,  tax,  depreciation  and  amortisation  (EBITDA).  In  addition  to  this  rule, 
Member  States  can  provide  targeted  rules  against  intra-group  debt  financing,  such  as  thin 
capitalisation rules. 

Member States may consider the overall position of all group entities in the Member State, 
including a separate entity taxation system, and may allow the transfer of profits or interest 
capacity between entities within  a group, when applying rules that limit the deductibility of 
interest. 

The ATAD provides that, by way of derogation from Article 4, Member States which have 
national targeted rules for preventing base erosion and profit shifting risks at 8 August 2016, 
which are equally effective to the interest limitation rule set out in Article 4, may apply these 
targeted rules until the end of the first full fiscal year following the date of publication of the 
agreement between the OECD members on the official website on a minimum standard with 
regard to BEPS Action 4, but at the latest until 1 January 2024. 5 

a)  Level of deductibility of exceeding borrowing costs in relation to EBITDA.   

Member States may reduce the limit to below 30% ratio if they wish to. 

b)  Application  of  de  minimis  or  safe  harbour  threshold  i.e.  full  deductibility  of  exceeding 

borrowing costs up to a threshold 

In order to reduce the administrative and compliance burden of the rules without significantly 
diminishing their effectiveness, Article 4 provides that Member States are free to allow a safe 
harbour.  This  safe  harbour  can  be  up  to  a  fixed  amount  of  EUR3  million  of  exceeding 
borrowing  costs  as  deductible,  irrespective  of  the  deductibility  limit  based  on  the  EBITDA 

5 Further information in section 4.3 

2 

 
 
                                                           
ratio.  Member  States  can  reduce  the  fixed  threshold  in  order  to  ensure  a  higher  level  of 
protection of their domestic tax base. 

c)  Level of deductibility for standalone entities 

Since  base  erosion  and  profit  shifting  in  principle  takes  place  through  excessive  interest 
payments mostly between associated entities, Article 4 allows Member States to provide for 
an  exclusion  of  standalone  entities  from  the  scope  of  the  interest  limitation  rule  given  the 
limited risks of tax avoidance (i.e. entities that are not subject to transfer pricing rules). 

d)  Borrowing costs incurred on loans, which were concluded before 17 June 2016  

In  order  to  facilitate  the  transition  to  the  ATAD’s  interest  limitation  rule,  Article  4  allows 
Member States to provide for a grandfathering clause that would cover pre-existing loans to 
the  extent  that  their  terms  are  not  subsequently  modified.  In  the  case  of  a  subsequent 
modification, the grandfathering would not apply to any increase in the amount or duration of 
the loan but would be limited to the original terms of the loan. 

e)  Borrowing  costs  incurred  on  loans  used  to  finance  long-term  public  infrastructure 

projects in the European Union 

Considering  that  financing  arrangements  of  long-term  public  infrastructure  projects  present 
little  or  no  base  erosion  and  profit  shifting  risks  Member  States  can  exclude  exceeding 
borrowing costs incurred on loans used to fund such projects from the scope of the Article 4 
interest  limitation  rules.  In  order  to  avail  of  this  option,  the  project’s  operator,  borrowing 
costs, assets and income are all required to be located in the Union. 

f)  Increased  deductibility  for  a  taxpayer,  being  a  member  of  consolidated  group  for 

financial accounting purposes through either:  
f.1.  The “equity escape” rule under article 4(5)(a) of the ATAD, or 
f.2.  The “group ratio” rule under article 4(5)(b) of the ATAD. 

Where the taxpayer is  part of  a  consolidated accounting  group, the  group’s indebtedness  at 
worldwide  level  may  be  considered  for  the  purpose  of  allowing  higher  amounts  of 
deductibility of exceeding borrowing costs.  To that extent, Member States can provide that a 
taxpayer is given the right to utilise one of two approaches.  

In  the  first  approach,  Member  States  can  lay  down  rules  for  an  equity  escape  provision, 
where  the  interest  limitation  rule  does  not  apply  if  the  taxpayer  can  demonstrate  that  its 
equity  over  total  assets  ratio  is  broadly  equal  to  or  higher  than  the  equivalent  ratio  of  the 
group.  

In  the  second  approach  Member  States  can  allow  taxpayers  to  deduct  higher  amounts  of 
exceeding borrowing costs based on the indebtedness of the overall group at worldwide level 
vis-à-vis third parties. 

3 

 
 
 
 
g)  Member States can provide for rules either: 

g.1. to carry forward, without time limitation, exceeding borrowing costs which cannot be 

deducted in the current tax period;  

g.2. to  carry forward, without  time limitation,  and back, for  a  maximum of  three years, 
exceeding borrowing costs which cannot be deducted in the current tax period, or 
g.3. to  carry  forward,  without  time  limitation,  exceeding  borrowing  costs  and,  for  a 
maximum  of  five  years,  unused  interest  capacity,  which  cannot  be  deducted  in  the 
current tax period. 

In  order  to  address  volatility  in  taxpayer’s  profitability,  Member  States  can  allow  that  the 
amount  of  unrelieved  borrowing  costs  or  interest  capacity  can  be  carried  forward  or  back. 
Member States are free to place a time limit on such carry forward or back to ensure a higher 
level of protection. 

h)  Position in respect of financial undertakings  

Although  it  is  generally  accepted  that  financial  undertakings,  i.e.  financial  institutions  and 
insurance undertakings, should also be subject to limitations to the deductibility of interest, it 
is equally acknowledged that these two sectors present special features which call for a more 
customised approach. As the discussions in this field were not sufficiently conclusive in the 
international and the European Union context, it was not possible to provide specific rules in 
the  financial  and  insurance  sectors.  As  such,  Member  States  are  allowed  to  exclude  certain 
financial undertakings regulated at EU level from the scope of Article 4. 

2.2. The CFC rule 

The Controlled foreign company rule (Articles 7 and 8 of the ATAD) attributes the income of 
a low-taxed controlled subsidiary or a permanent establishment (“PE”) to its parent company 
or head office. The parent company or head office becomes taxable on this attributed income 
in the State where it is resident if the actual corporate tax paid by the controlled entity/PE on 
its income is lower than the difference between the corporate tax that would have been paid 
on  the  same  profits  in  the  Member  State  of  the  domestic  taxpayer/parent  company  and  the 
actual corporate tax paid by the entity/PE in the source state.  

a)  Taxation of specific categories of income (article 7(2)(a)) or targeting income artificially 

diverted to the subsidiary/PE (article 7(2)(b)) 

Member States can choose CFC rules that either target specific categories of income, or are 
limited to income which has artificially been diverted to the subsidiary/PE. 

“Option  A”  of  the  CFC  rules  provides  that  certain  predefined  categories  of  undistributed 
passive income (e.g. dividends, interest, royalties and income from financial activities) of the 
CFC  are  attributed  to  the  taxpayer  (parent  company/head  office).  Income  to  be  included 
under “option A” is calculated in accordance with the rules of the Member State in which the 
taxpayer is resident and according to its participation in the CFC. 

“Option  B” provides  that  undistributed income of the CFC from  non-genuine arrangements 
that  have  been  put  into  place  for  the  essential  purpose  of  obtaining  a  tax  advantage  is 

4 

 
 
attributed to the taxpayer (parent company/head office). The attribution of CFC income is to 
be calculated in accordance with the arm’s length principle. 

b)  In  implementing  “option  A”,  Member  States  are  allowed  to  extended  the  substance 
escape provision to CFCs resident or situated in a third country that is not party to the 
EEA Agreement 

To  comply  with  the  EU  fundamental  freedoms  the  Article  provides  a  substance  carve-out 
aimed to limit, within the Union (and EEA), the impact of the rules to cases where the CFC 
does not carry on a substantive economic activity.  Member States can extend this carve-out 
to third countries. 

c)  In  implementing  “option  A”,  Member  States  are  allowed  not  to  treat  an  entity/PE  as  a 

CFC if one-third or less of its income falls within predefined income categories 

With a view to limiting the administrative burden and compliance costs, Member States may 
exempt certain entities with low profits or a low profit margin that give rise to lower risks of 
tax avoidance. 

d)  In  implementing  “option  A”,  Member  States  are  allowed  not  to  treat  financial 
undertakings  as  a  CFC,  where  one-third  or  less  of  the  predefined  categories  income 
comes from transactions with the taxpayer or its associated enterprises 

With a view to limiting the administrative burden and compliance costs, Member States are 
allowed not to treat as a CFC, certain financial undertakings regulated at EU level, for which 
one-third  or  less  of  the  predefined  categories  of  income  comes  from  transactions  with  the 
taxpayer  or  its  associated  enterprises.  This  is  because  such  undertakings  give  rise  to  lower 
risks of tax avoidance. 

e)  In implementing “option B” Member States are allowed to exclude from the scope of the 

rules an entity or permanent establishment:  
e.1. with accounting profits of no more than €750 thousands, and non-trading income of 

no more than €75 thousands; or 

e.2. of which the accounting profits amount to no more than 10% of its operating costs 

for the tax period 

With a view to limiting the administrative burden and compliance costs, Member States may 
exempt certain entities with low profits or a low profit margin that give rise to lower risks of 
tax avoidance. 

f)  Broader definition of a CFC 

Member States are free to follow a broader approach than in Article 7 when defining a CFC, 
such  as  reducing  the  control  threshold,  or  employing  a  higher  threshold  in  comparing  the 
actual corporate tax paid with the corporate tax that would have been charged in the Member 
State of the taxpayer.  

5 

 
 
 
g)  Use of white, grey or black lists 

In transposing CFC rules into their national law, Member States can use white, grey or black 
lists  of  third  countries,  which  are  compiled  on  the  basis  of  certain  criteria  set  out  in  the 
ATAD  and  may  include  the  corporate  tax  rate  level,  or  use  white  lists  of  Member  States 
compiled on that basis. 

2.3. General anti-abuse rule  

The General anti-abuse rule (Article 6 of the ATAD) tackles abusive tax practices that have 
not  been  dealt  with  through  specifically  targeted  provisions  and  does  not  affect  the 
applicability  of  specific  anti-abuse  rules.  The  ATAD  requires  GAARs  to  be  applied  to 
arrangements  that  are  not  genuine,  as  the  taxpayer  has  the  right  to  choose  the  most  tax 
efficient structure for its commercial affairs. When evaluating whether an arrangement is to 
be  regarded  as  genuine,  Member  States  can  consider  all  valid  economic  reasons,  including 
financial activities. 

2.4. Exit taxation 

Exit taxation (Article 5 of the ATAD) ensures that where a taxpayer moves assets or its tax 
residence  out  of  a  Member  State,  that  State  taxes  the  economic  value  of  any  capital  gain 
created in its territory even though that gain has not yet been realised at the time of the exit. 
The gain is computed on the market value of the transferred assets at the time of exit of the 
assets (based on the arm's length principle).  

Within  the  European  Union,  it  is  necessary  to  address  the  application  of  exit  taxation  and 
illustrate  the  conditions  for  being  compliant  with  European  Union  law.  In  those  situations, 
taxpayers have the right to either immediately pay the amount of exit tax assessed, or defer 
payment  of  the  amount  of  tax  by  paying  it  in  instalments  over  a  certain  number  of  years. 
Member  States  can  charge  interest  on  deferred  tax,  and  can  require  taxpayers  to  provide  a 
guarantee as a condition for deferring the payment of exit tax where there is a demonstrable 
and actual risk of non-recovery. 

2.5. Hybrid mismatches rule  

Hybrid  mismatches  rule  (Articles  9,  9a  and  9b  of  the  ATAD  introduced  by  the  amending 
directive)  neutralizes  the  tax  effects  of  hybrid  arrangements.  Hybrid  mismatches  are 
differences between tax systems that can be exploited to achieve: (i) double non-taxation; (ii) 
double  deduction;  (iii)  deduction  without  inclusion  and  (iv)  non-taxation  without  inclusion. 
These mismatches can subsequently result in base erosion.  

The  ATAD provides  rules  to  counteract  hybrid  mismatches  arising  between  EU  Member 
States  and  with  third  countries,  including  imported  mismatches,  reverse  hybrid  mismatches 
and tax residency mismatches. 

The  ATAD  allows  some  optionality  in  the  scope  of  the  denial  of  deduction  in  the  payer 
jurisdiction  in  certain  circumstances  and  in  the  exclusion  from  the  scope  of  certain  hybrid 

6 

 
 
mismatches resulting from a payment of interest under a financial instrument to an associated 
enterprise until 31 December 2022. 

3.  Overview of the implementation  

This section provides an overview of how Member States have implemented different 
measures of the ATAD on the basis of the carve-outs, options and different approaches. The 
format and referencing in this section follows section 2.6  

3.1.  Interest limitation rule 
Reference  

2.1.a 

2.1.b 

2.1.c 

2.1.d 

2.1.e 

2.1.f 

2.1.g 

2.1.h 

30% of the EBITDA 
22 
€3 million 
16 
Standalone entity exemption 
9 
Loans before 17 June 2016 excluded 
9 
Public infrastructure loans excluded 
16 
Equity escape available 
8 
Option g.1 with or without time limitation 
20 
Financial undertakings excluded 
17 

Lower than 30% of the EBITDA 
1 
Less than €3m 
6 
No standalone entity exemption 
18 
Loans before 17 June 2016 not excluded 
18 
Public infrastructure loans not excluded 
11 
Group ratio rule available 
6 
Option g.3 
1 
Financial undertakings not excluded 
10 

6 Numbers of Member States electing various options indicated in the table do not necessarily add up to 27 as 
some of the Member States have not yet transposed all ATAD measures. Furthermore, the assessment of 
national implementing measures by the Commission is still ongoing.  

7 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
 
3.2.  The CFC rule 

Reference  

2.2.a 

2.2.b 

2.2.c 

2.2.d 

2.2.e 

2.2.f 

2.2.g 

“Option A” implemented 
16 
The substance escape provision extended 
to 3rd countries 
10 
one-third or less of  income escape clause 
implemented 
12 
one-third or less of income escape for 
financial undertakings implemented 
5 
Low accounting profit or profit margin 
escape clause provided for 
7 
Broader definition of a CFC 
17 

“Option B” implemented 
10 
The substance escape provision not extended 
to 3rd countries 
5 
one-third or less of income escape clause not 
implemented 
3 
one-third or less of income escape for 
financial undertakings not implemented 
10 
Low accounting profit and profit margin 
escape clause not provided for 
3 
No broader definition of a CFC 
10 

White list 
1 

Black list 
7 

White and black list 
1 

No white, grey or black list 
18 

3.3.  GAAR 

There  are  no  options  available  to  Member  States  or  specific  approaches  taken  by  Member 
States in the transposition of GAAR that require inclusion in this section.  

3.4. Exit taxation 

As  mentioned  in  section  1.2,  the  overview  of  the  implementation  of  exit  taxation  across 
Member States will be included in the ATAD evaluation report.   

3.5. Hybrid mismatches rule  

As mentioned in  section 1.2, the overview of the implementation  of the hybrid mismatches 
rule across Member States will be included in the ATAD evaluation report.   

4.  Completeness and conformity of Member States’ transposition of the ATAD 

4.1.  Actions 

foreseen  by 

the  Commission 

to  ensure 

timely  and  adequate 

implementation of the ATAD by the Member States 

As announced in the 2016 “Communication from the Commission — EU law: Better results 
through  better  application”,7  the  Commission  takes  various  actions  to  ensure  proper 
application  of  EU  law  by  the  Member  States.  These  actions  include  (i)  dialogue  with  and 
assistance to  the Member States in  their capacity building as well as (ii) conducting formal 
infringement  procedures  for  violation  of  EU  law.  Both  types  of  actions  were  taken  by  the 
Commission  to  ensure  proper  implementation  and  application  of  ATAD  1  by  the  Member 

7 OJ C 18 of 19 January 2017, p.10. 

8 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
States.  The  Commission  has  the  duty  to  examine  the  notifications  in  two  steps:  (i)  the 
completeness of notifications and (ii) conformity of notified measures with the Directives. 

4.2.  “Capacity building” actions taken prior to the deadline for implementation of the 

ATAD 

In 2018, the Commission organized a seminar with the Member States’ delegates to discuss 
the  legal  issues  which  arose  during  the  drafting  of  the  implementing  legislation.  It  covered 
discussion of questions submitted in advance by the Member States with Commission’s staff 
experts. 

4.3.  Transposition  checks  and  infringement  procedures  for  failure  to  notify  national 

implementing measures or improper transposition of ATAD 

Member  States  must  notify  national  implementing  measures  within  the  deadlines  set  out  in 
the Directive (31 December 2018 for notification of 3 measures:  Interest  limitation, GAAR 
and CFC).  

In  case  of  failure  to  notify  the  implementing  legislation,  the  Commission  opens  ex  officio 
infringement  procedures  for  failure  to  communicate  the  necessary  measures  (soon  after  the 
deadline  for  notifications  set  in  the  respective  Directives).  Twelve  such  cases  were  opened 
(ten in January 20198 and two further in July 20199).  

Currently four Member States have not yet fully complied with their obligations to adopt and 
notify  transposition  measures.10  Eight  infringement  procedures  were  closed  due  to  Member 
States compliance.11  

Furthermore,  the  Commission  opened  infringement  cases  against  the  Member  States  that 
failed to notify national implementing measures for exit taxation12 and hybrid mismatches,13 
which should have been transposed by 31 December 2019. 

8 Letters of formal notice were addressed to: Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Greece, Spain, 
France, Latvia, Portugal and the UK, followed by a reasoned opinion to Denmark in July 2019 (see European 
Commission press release INF/19/4251 of 25 July 2019, point 13 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/inf_19_4251 ). 
9 Letters of formal notice were addressed to Austria and Ireland. Both procedures concern non-communication 
of national implementing measures for Art. 4 ATAD (interest limitation measure), followed by reasoned 
opinions in November 2019 (see European Commission press release INF/19/6304 of 27 November 2019, point 
8  https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/inf_19_6304 ). Both States failed to notify such 
measures, although their pre-ATAD interest limitation provisions were not regarded as “equally effective” by 
the Commission, see Commission Notice “Measures considered equally effective to Article 4 of the Anti-Tax 
Avoidance Directive”, OJ C 441 of 7 December 2018, p. 1. 
10 Austria, Denmark, Spain and Ireland.  
11 The cases against Belgium, Cyprus, Czechia, France, Greece, Portugal and the United Kingdom were closed 
in July 2019 (see European Commission press release INF/19/4251 of 25 July 2019, point 13  
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/inf_19_4251) and the case against Latvia was closed in 
October 2019 (no press release accompanied the decision). 
12 Letters of formal notice were addressed to: Germany, Greece, Latvia, Portugal, Romania and Spain. 
13 Letters of formal notice were addressed to: Cyprus, Germany, Greece, Latvia, Poland, Romania and Spain. 

9 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
4.4.  Current state of play regarding the transposition checks 

ATAD Transposition checks table - State of Play - August 202014: 

ATAD: 

Member state 

Belgium 
Bulgaria 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Germany 
Estonia 
Ireland 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Croatia 
Italy 
Cyprus 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Hungary 
Malta 
Netherlands 
Austria 
Poland 
Portugal 
Romania 
Slovenia 
Slovakia 
Finland 
Sweden 

Interest limitation, GAAR, 
and CFC 

Exit taxation 

Hybrid mismatches  
(1st deadline) 

Conformity 
checks 
INFR 

Completeness 
checks 
OK 
OK 
OK 
INFR 

OK 
INFR 
OK 
INFR 
OK 

OK 
OK 
OK 
OK 
OK 

OK 

INFR 
OK 
OK 
OK 
OK 
OK 
OK 
OK 

OK 

OK 

OK 
OK 
INFR 

OK 

OK 
INFR 

OK 
OK 
OK 
OK 

Completeness 
checks 

Conformity 
checks 

Completeness 
checks 

Conformity 
checks 

INFR 

INFR 
INFR 

INFR 
INFR 

INFR 

OK 

OK 

INFR 

INFR 
INFR 

INFR 

OK 

INFR 
INFR 

OK 
OK 

OK 

OK 
OK 

5.  Future work 

While this report is the first step in the evaluation of the impact of the ATAD and provides an 
overview  of  the  implementation  of  the  early  applicable  ATAD  measures  across  Member 
States, it is envisaged that a comprehensive evaluation report of the ATAD measures will be 
published,  preferably  by  1  January  2022.  However,  the  timing  of  the  completion  of  such 
comprehensive evaluation report will be dependent to some extent on the need to revise the 
ATAD  due  to  EU  or  other  international  developments  in  the  discussions  on  preventing 
corporate tax avoidance practices. 

14 Explanation of the abbreviations used in the table: "OK" - completeness/conformity checks completed; 
"INFR" - infringement procedure is ongoing; "empty cell" – signifies ongoing assessment. 

10