Lebanese Hezbollah’s experience in Syria.
Date: 2020-08-18
Institutions: European University Institute
Subjects: Lebanon, Syria, economic activity, military intervention, political participation, political parties

Lebanese Hezbollah’s 
Experience in Syria

Mazen Ezzi

Wartime and Post-Conflict in 
Syria (WPCS)

Research Project Report
13 March 2020
2020/04

© European University Institute 2020
Content and individual chapters © Mazen Ezzi, 2020

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Middle East Directions
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13 March 2020

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Lebanese Hezbollah’s Experience in Syria

Mazen Ezzi*

* Mazen Ezzi is a research contributor working on the Wartime and Post-Conflict in Syria project (WPCS) within the 
Middle  East  Directions  Programme  of  the  Robert  Schuman  Centre  for Advanced  Studies  at  the  European  University 
Institute in Florence. Ezzi’s work focuses on the war economy in Syria and the areas under regime control.

This paper was published in Arabic on 3 March 2020 (https://bit.ly/2wrBDoZ) and translated into English by DocStream.

Table of Contents

Executive Summary  

Introduction  

1. 
1.1. 

1.2. 
1.3. 

The Significance and Function of Hezbollah’s Military Deployment in Syria  
Syrian Shia Organisations in Areas of Shia Settlement and Displacement  
Syrian Hezbollah  
Key Militias in Hezbollah’s Orbit Operating in Damascus  
The Syrian-Lebanese Border: Protecting Supply Lines  
South Syria: Security Presence and the Israeli Threat  

Hezbollah’s Economic Activities and Geographical Variations  
Smuggling across the Syrian-Lebanese Border  

2. 
2.1. 
2.2.  Drug Dealing  
2.3.  Real Estate Trade and Demographic Change  

3. 
3.1. 
3.2. 

Networks of Social Relations as Means of Control  
Shia Religious Bodies and the Spread of Shiism  
Integration in Local Communities  

Conclusion  

  1

  2

  3
  4
  4 
  6 
  8 
  9

  10
  10
  12
  13

  15
  15
  16

  18

 
 
Executive Summary

The purpose and nature of the deployment of Lebanon’s Hezbollah (‘Party of God’) in Syria 
vary from one region to another in accordance with the strategic importance of the region to the party. 
Similarly, the way in which the party builds its alliances and relations with local communities and 
state institutions also varies according to the region. Hezbollah has focused on the Syrian-Lebanese 
border zone and southern Syria through a direct presence there or through security cells and Syrian 
proxy militias. However, it has also worked to create a large umbrella for Syrian Shia militias. These 
are known as Syrian Hezbollah and exist predominantly within the Shia areas of Damascus, Homs 
and Aleppo. The inclusion of these militias within the ranks of the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) in the 
form  of  Local  Defence  Forces  (LDFs)  has  provided  an  opportunity  for  the  party  to  strengthen  its 
influence over the Syrian military establishment.

As Hezbollah’s engagement in the war evolved, it began to explore the economic prospects of its 
political-military influence and started sponsoring economic activities such as smuggling and drug 
trafficking to finance its operations in Syria. It took advantage of its control over the Syrian-Lebanese 
border to monopolise the smuggling of goods. With its local partner, the SAA’s 4th Armoured Division, 
it  also  sponsored  the  opening  of  the  al-Dimass  market  to  supply  areas  under  regime  control  with 
various goods that the Syrian market lacked. In addition, it used its military and security networks 
to market drugs produced in Lebanon in the domestic Syrian market and to smuggle them to Jordan 
and from there to the Gulf. The party then invested a proportion of the revenue generated in financing 
various activities, including purchases of land in places such as the town of al-Qusayr in the Homs 
countryside and the Sayyidah Zaynab area south of Damascus.

Hezbollah is strengthening its position, influence and sustainability in Syria, creating what may be 
described as a network of social relations not limited to the Shia community in Syria. Under Iranian 
auspices, it is working to carry out an integrated social, cultural and economic project in Syria. The 
comparatively small size of Syria’s Shia community has obliged it to explore new options, including 
attempting to encourage conversions to Shiism and making use of relations and ties with local and 
tribal dignitaries, with whom the party works to annex them to its network of patronage.

1

Introduction

Hezbollah began its military intervention in Syria in the early days of the Syrian revolution, 
in March 2011, in the form of consultations with the regime’s armed forces and security agencies. 
In addition, groups from its foreign elite Unit 910 intervened directly on the ground in both Daraa 
and Damascus. As the death toll of members killed carrying out what the party called their ‘jihadist 
duty’ in Syria grew, it was compelled to officially announce its military participation in May 2013, 
shortly before its first offensive against the opposition in an urban environment, in the town of al-
Qusayr in the Homs countryside. At the time, the party’s Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah justified 
the military intervention by saying “Syria is the backbone of the Resistance. If Syria falls into the 
hands of the Americans, Israelis, takfiris and America’s proxies in the region, the Resistance will be 
surrounded and Israel will enter Lebanon to impose its conditions on it” and pursue its goals anew. 
“If Syria falls,” he added, “Palestine is lost.”1

According to these statements, the party intervened to prevent the fall of the Syrian regime, secure the 
overland transit of weapons to the party from Iran and protect its forces’ training camps and weapons 
stores in Syria. However, the seven years that have since elapsed have transformed Hezbollah from 
being a local Lebanese player into a regional force capable of sending combat units to fight on foreign 
soil in the manner of a formal army in the service of goals no longer necessarily related to ‘resisting’ 
Israel or confronting regional alliances. Despite this, the party’s intervention has cost it dearly, both 
militarily and politically.

Typically,  the  variation  in  Hezbollah’s  modus  operandi  in  different  areas  in  Syria  is  explained 
according to the strategic and geopolitical goals it seeks to achieve through its military intervention.2 
This paper adopts an approach that starts by analysing developments on the ground to explain the 
party’s different behaviour according to its different strategic and geopolitical goals. The study also 
seeks to draw a new map of the party’s position in Syria – militarily, economically and culturally. It 
thus examines how Hezbollah has developed its tools to maintain a long-term presence in Syria, even 
though this presence has led to the creation of what might be described as an independent project led 
by Shiites in Syria under the name of Syrian Hezbollah. Furthermore, the paper addresses the features 
of the economically and socially integrated project that the party is seeking to implement in Syria.

The  research  for  this  study  involved  16  interviews  conducted between  October  2019  and  January 
2020 with fellow researchers, specialists and journalists following Hezbollah’s activities in Syria, the 
collation and analysis of a large number of relevant articles, verifying the information they contained 
by comparing it with public online sources and a personal archive. Reference was also made to the 
relevant available literature to lay out the general framework for the research and formulate its central 
questions.3

1  Islamic Resistance, “Sayyed Nasrallah to the Resistance Audiences: I Promise You Victory Again” (in Arabic), 27 May 
2013, https://bit.ly/37qXkSG.
2  Marisa Sullivan, “Hezbollah in Syria,” Institute for the Study of War, April 2014. Also see Mohanad Hage Ali, “Power 
Points Defining the Syria-Hezbollah Relationship,” Carnegie Middle East Centre, 7 May 2019, https://bit.ly/2UY4wmE.
3  Waddah Sharara, The State of Hezbollah: Lebanon as an Islamic Society (in Arabic), (Beirut: Dar Al-Nahar, 2006); 
Joseph Daher, The Political Economy of Hezbollah in Lebanon (Pluto Publications, 2016).

2

1.  The Significance and Function of Hezbollah’s Military Deployment 
in Syria

The nature of Hezbollah’s presence in Syria varies according to the area and its function. The 
party  has  created  a  network  of  Syrian  Shia  militias  known  as  Syrian  Hezbollah.  It  has  managed 
incoming Iraqi Shia militias and deployed its forces alongside Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard 
Corps (IRGC) to provide it with protection and to mediate between it and the Syrians. In addition, the 
party has trained and directed a network of proxy militias4 incorporated within the National or Local 
Defence Forces and regime forces. It has deployed its own forces in certain strategic areas, in which 
it has established military bases, observation points and security groups.

It is difficult to distinguish the boundaries of pro-Iranian militia operations in Syria, but Hezbollah has 
noticeably operated in three key areas: in the main Shia settlement areas; in southern Syria; and on the 
Syrian-Lebanese border. This division is based on the different forms of the party’s presence, which 
correspond to its military, economic and cultural objectives in each particular region. By contrast, 
Hezbollah’s presence in eastern Syria remains relatively weak as there it is subject to direct Iranian 
management through the IRGC.5 In Aleppo the mixed presence of Hezbollah and the IRGC presents 
a unique experience. The party’s military deployment there appears to complement and protect the 
IRGC,  which  has  established  its  largest  and  most  fortified  strategic  base  in  Syria  in  Jabal Azzan, 
which  is  relatively  far  from  direct  Israeli  pursuit  despite  it  having  been  struck  by  Israel  in  early 
2019. Hezbollah command centres and the joint Hezbollah-IRGC operations room are located in the 
military academy and three military colleges in Aleppo’s western neighbourhood alongside Iranian 
observation points.6

Map 1. Key Areas of Deployment by Lebanese Hezbollah and Allied Syrian Militias 

Source: Interviews conducted by the researcher

4  These proxy militias are pro-regime militias within the National or Local Defence Forces. Their members come from 
various sectarian and ethnic backgrounds and are not necessarily Shia.
5  Ziad Awad, “Iran in Deir ez-Zor: Strategy, Expansion and Opportunities,” Research Project Report (Florence, Italy: 
European University Institute), 7 October 2019, http://bit.ly/38NfJtI.
6  WhatsApp interview with journalist Khaled al-Khatib, 23 December 2019.

3

1.1.  Syrian Shia Organisations in Areas of Shia Settlement and Displacement

Syrian Hezbollah

Since  the  start  of  2012,  Hezbollah  has  established  an  exclusive  umbrella  for  its  proxy  Shia 
militias known as Syrian Hezbollah. However, this formation has faced several crises. Even though 
the Syrian Shia community has been subject to large-scale militarisation since 2011, no unified Syrian 
Hezbollah leadership has been formed. This is due to the small size of the sect, which before 2011 
represented around 1 to 2 percent of the population, its geographical dispersion and the diversity of 
its local and cultural references. In effect, Syrian Hezbollah comprises Syrian Shia militias operating 
under  Lebanese  leadership,  or  sometimes  Syrians  trained  in  Iran  and  affiliated  with  the  Lebanese 
leadership.7 Owing to Lebanon’s geographical proximity to Syria and Hezbollah’s close social ties 
with  Syria’s  Shia  community,  the  party  has  been  able  to  maintain  direct  control  over  its  Syrian 
offshoots.8

Syrian Hezbollah is mainly deployed in Syria’s Shia areas, where it provides Shiites with protection 
given that they have actively participated in regime and Hezbollah military operations outside their 
home  regions.  However,  the  demographic  changes  witnessed  during  the  Syrian  war  have  led  to  a 
redeployment of some of these militias. For example, most Shia residents in al-Fouaa and Kefraya 
in Idlib moved to Sayyidah Zaynab in Damascus after they were evacuated under the ‘four-towns 
agreement.’9 The same happened as a result of the heavy Shia displacement from Nubl and al-Zahraa 
in the Aleppo countryside. In Daraa, the party initially focused its presence on the Shia of Busra,10 but 
a large proportion of them moved to Sayyidah Zaynab when the opposition took control of Busra in 
2015. As for Hama and the Mediterranean coast, Syrian Hezbollah is deployed among small groups 
of Alawite converts to Shiism, while its efforts to form a militia in the Druze Sweida governorate 
bore no fruit. In contrast, the al-Baqir Brigade in the Aleppo countryside is a special case for Syrian 
Hezbollah in that it mainly consists of a branch of the Sunni Baqqara clan, which converted to Shiism.

It should be mentioned that all the Shia militias established by Hezbollah in Syria follow the Iranian 
wilayat al-faqih (‘guardianship of the Islamic jurist’) ideology, and their flags carry the Hezbollah 
insignia, including a raised arm, rifle and globe. In general, the militias created by Hezbollah in Syria 
are all broadly similar. They are led by Lebanese Shia clerics and to a lesser extent by Syrian and Iraqi 
clerics, each of them known as Hajj. They comprise Syrian members organised in brigades, factions 
and companies.

7  WhatsApp interview with Mohanad Hage Ali, a researcher at the Carnegie Middle East Institute, 13 December 2019.
8   Phillip  Smyth,  “Lebanese  Hezbollah’s  Islamic  Resistance  in  Syria,”  The  Washington  Institute,  26  April  2018, 
 http://bit.ly/2IF5FbE.
9  This agreement was signed in April 2017 between Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, Ahrar al-Sham and the IRGC. It stipulated that 
fighters and inhabitants of Madaya and al-Zabadani in western Damascus who refused to stay would be evacuated to the 
north in exchange for the full evacuation of Kefraya and al-Fouaa in two waves and the release of 1,500 detainees from 
the regime’s prisons. Enab Baladi, “The File of ‘Four Cities’ is Closed with the Evacuation of Kefraya and al-Fouaa” (in 
Arabic), 19 July 2018 https://bit.ly/37cFXoR.
10  Prior to 2011, the population of Daraa totalled one million, including about 10,000 Shia scattered through the villages 
and cities of Busra al-Sham, Izraa, Sheikh Maskin, Ghabaghib, Muthabeen, Tafas, Bir al-Sabil and Alqin.

4

Map 2. Syrian Hezbollah’s Key Militias

Source: Interviews conducted by the researcher, public online sources, social media and Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi’s blog11

There are some indications that the Syrian Shia community resents the Lebanese party’s dominance 
over its decisions, not to mention its sensitivity over the inequality between Syrians and the Lebanese. 
The most prominent example of this is a leaked document issued in February 2017 by the “Emergency 
Committee to Address the Situation of Our People in Homs,” which is affiliated with the al-Ridha 

11  Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi’s blog, https://bit.ly/3cftB2S 

5

Forces, the Syrian Hezbollah branch  in  the villages of  Umm  al-Amad and  its  surroundings  in the 
Homs countryside. The document refers to the arrogance with which the Lebanese Hajjs deal with 
their Syrian counterparts, injustice against the Syrian militia regarding the salaries of its members, 
their security, military and social statuses, and their lack of “access to the Syrian state commensurate 
with their sacrifices.”12

Several analyses have interpreted the leaked document as an implicit rejection by the Syrian regime 
of Hezbollah’s growing influence and a call to contain and curtail Syrian Hezbollah militias within the 
regime’s forces.13 Behind this interpretation is an increased importance that analysts have given to the 
role in founding the al-Ridha forces of the Lebanese Hezbollah leader, Hamza Ibrahim Haidar, who 
was killed in the Khalidiya district of Homs in 2013.14 However, the actual founder, who continues 
to  lead  them  as  an  ideological  organisation  that  espouses  wilayat  al-faqih  and  unites  the  Syrian 
Shia  militiamen  was  the  regime’s  Colonel  Zeineddine  under  the  supervision  of  Hezbollah.15  This 
contradiction  in  the  al-Ridha  forces  from  their  very  foundation  is  analogous  to  that  of  the  Syrian 
Hezbollah,  which  serves  two  masters  at  once  –  the  Lebanese  Hezbollah  and  the  Syrian  state  –, 
combining  the  Shia  jihadist  mentality  committed  to  wilayat  al-faqih  with  a  concern  for  the  ‘dear 
homeland’ and the Syrian Arab Army.16

In  fact,  the  relationship  between  the  two  parties  is  further  clarified  in  the  secret  document  leaked 
in April 2017.17 The document refers to the incorporation of Iranian militias in Syria in the Local 
Defence Forces ensuring that the relationship between “civilian and military Syrians in the forces 
operating with the Iranian side” is organised. It is noteworthy that the total number of these forces 
is 88,733 fighters and that the “Iranian side” is responsible for “combat and material insurance of all 
kinds” and for “securing the material rights of the martyrs, the wounded and the missing.”18

All  of  the  Syrian  pro-Iranian  militias,  including  Syrian  Hezbollah,  are  on  the  Syrian  Ministry  of 
Defence’s  records.  This  does  not  mean,  however,  that  Syrian  Hezbollah  is  annexed  to  the  Syrian 
army and its ‘national ideology’ but that there is additional Iranian expansion within Syrian sovereign 
institutions

Key Militias in Hezbollah’s Orbit Operating in Damascus

Lebanese Hezbollah has maintained a direct presence in Sayyidah Zaynab south of Damascus 
in addition to Syrian Shia militia formations composed of those who were displaced there and which 
now make up, along with foreigners, more than 70 percent of its population. Despite Sayyidah Zaynab 
being a densely populated residential area, the party has established weapons armouries, intelligence 
centres, operations rooms and prisons there. Dozens of Shia militias are based there. They are closely 
related to Hezbollah, which is alone responsible for protecting the Sayyidah Zaynab shrine.19

In contrast to the closed zone of Sayyidah Zaynab, Hezbollah leaves the al-Shaghour neighbourhood 
–  the  Damascene  Shia  centre  –  open  to  the  public  without  checkpoints,  although  its  security  is 

12  Al-Modon, “Al-Ridha Militias: The Two-Fold Sensitivity towards the Regime and Hezbollah” (in Arabic), 22 April 
2017 https://bit.ly/2vjqPsp.
13  Hage Ali, “Power Points Defining the Syria-Hezbollah Relationship” 
14   Aymenn  Jawad  al-Tamimi,  “Quwat  Al-Ridha:  Syrian  Hezbollah,”  Aymenn  Jawad  al-Tamimi  Blog,  31  July  2015  
https://bit.ly/37igY46.
15  WhatsApp interview with Colonel Ismail Ayoub, 6 January 2020.
16  Al-Modon, “Al-Ridha Militias”, ibid.
17  A proposal issued by the Organisation and Administration Directorate and Arming Branch, signed and approved by the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Armed Forces, Bashar al-Assad.
18   Al-Modon,  “How  are  Iranian  Militias  Integrated  within  the  Forces  of  the  Regime?”  (in  Arabic),  4  May  2017  
https://bit.ly/2Ro9s1Z.
19  WhatsApp interview with journalist Raed al-Salhani, 24 December 2019.

6

maintained from an operations room that runs a network of surveillance cameras distributed around 
the old Damascus neighbourhoods and the vicinity of the Sayyidah Ruqayya shrine and the Umayyad 
Mosque. The  Sayyidah  Zaynab  model,  however,  has  been  adopted  in  the  vicinity  of  the  Ruqayya 
shrine in Damascus, which is considered a closed security area in which multinational Shia militias 
are deployed to protect Shia pilgrims at the shrine and the Bab al-Saghir cemetery. Also located near 
the Ruqayya shrine are Hezbollah’s headquarters and light weapons depot, with armed men wearing 
the Iranian Basij militia insignia. Hezbollah has closed off the al-Bahsa area, home to Shia pilgrims, 
and uses it to hold security and military meetings of its militias’ top brass.20

Table 1. Key Militias in Hezbollah’s Orbit Operating in Damascus

Year of 
Foundation 

Current Area 
of Operations

Notes

Name of 
Militia

Sayyid al-
Shuhada 
Brigades

Abu al-Fadl 
al-Abbas 
Brigade

Zulfiqar 
Brigade

al-Imam 
al-Hussein 
Brigade

Asadullah 
al-Ghalib 
Brigade

2013

Damascus

2013

2013

2012

Sayyidah 
Zaynab / 
Damascus

Sayyidah 
Zaynab / 
Damascus

Sayyidah 
Zaynab / 
Damascus

2013

Damascus

Ammar bin 
Yasir Brigade

al-Wa’ad al-
Sadiq [‘Sincere 
Promise’] 
Forces
Rapid 
Intervention 
Regiment
Hurras al-
Maqam 
[‘Guardians of 
The Shrine’]

2012

2013

Damascus and 
Aleppo

Sayyidah 
Zaynab / 
Damascus

Sayyidah 
Zaynab / 
Damascus

Sayyidah 
Ruqayya / 
Damascus

Founded by the Iraqi Fateh al-Khazali as a military front in 
Syria for the Sayyid al-Shuhada Movement. It was joined 
by the Ja’afari force al-Sayyida Ruqayyah Brigade in late 
2014 and then by Asadullah al-Ghalib in 2016.
The first network of Shia militias in Syria. It worked for 
a period of time in the National Defence Forces. It is led 
by the Syrian Maher Ajeeb Jatha – ‘Abu Ajeeb’ – from 
Nubl in Aleppo. In different periods it included the al-
Imam al-Hussein Brigade, the Zulfiqar Brigade and the 
Asadullah al-Ghalib Brigade. It currently belongs to 
the 1421th Battalion of the 104th Republican Guards 
Brigade. 
An Iraqi brigade that added “Defender of the Holy Sites 
in Iraq and the Levant” to its name after the fall of Mosul 
into the hands of the Islamic State organisation. It was 
responsible for the al-Nabak massacre in 2013. It is led by 
Abu Shahd al-Juburi under the banner of the Republican 
Guards 104 Brigade Infantry. 
According to the records, it is affiliated with the 4th 
Division. It maintains a relationship with the al-Sadr 
group in Iraq. It is led by the Iraqi Asaad al-Bahadali, 
who succeeded his brother Amjad al-Bahadali. 
Includes Iraqi advisers from Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq and 
has a recruitment network in Iraq, where it established 
a branch in 2014. In January 2016, it announced that 
it had joined the Iraqi al-Abdal Movement, which is 
linked to the Sayyid al-Shuhada Brigade and the Badr 
Organisation in Iraq.
A Syrian front for the Iraqi Nujaba Hezbollah Movement. 
Also known as al-Nujaba. Most of its fighters are from al-
Fouaa, Kefraya and Shias of Damascus. 

Special Operation Group commanded on the field by 
Syrians. It has not appeared recently.

Iraqi.

Composed of Syrian, Iraqi and Lebanese members. 
It takes charge of protecting the surroundings of the 
Ruqayya and Zaynab shrines in Damascus.

Source: Interviews conducted by the researcher, public online sources, social media and Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi’s blog

20  WhatsApp interview with journalist Raed al-Salhani, 24 December 2019.

7

It should be noted that the first militias deployed in Damascus were branches of Iraqi militias that 
espouse wilayat al-faqih, which Hezbollah contributed to forming after the US invasion of Iraq in 
2003. These included Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq and the al-Nujaba Movement. At first, these militias included 
some  Iraqi  members  but  they  soon  recruited  Syrian  Shia  in  their  various  areas  of  deployment. 
The  concentration  of  the  militias  in  Damascus  and  its  southern  countryside  was  in  proportion  to 
concentrated waves of Syrian Shia displacement there. Moreover, these militias witnessed continual 
reconfiguration, splits and mergers until they generally consisted of Shia Syrians at both the rank-
and-file and leadership levels.

1.2.  The Syrian-Lebanese Border: Protecting Supply Lines

Hezbollah initially declared that its intervention in Syria was aimed at protecting dual Lebanese-
Syrian  citizens  living  in  certain  border  villages  on  the  outskirts  of  the  town  of  al-Qusayr  in  the 
Homs countryside.21 However, the party quickly expanded its deployment across the entirety of the 
Lebanese-Syrian border zone, which became a cordon in which the party maintained a presence of its 
official forces led by Lebanese Hajjs and bolstered at the rank-and-file level by local Syrian members.

Hezbollah has recently begun to focus its presence in Qalamoun, where it maintains roads, tunnels 
and armouries which are considered relatively safe due to the rugged mountainous terrain that protects 
them  from  Israeli  raids  and  their  distance  from  urban  centres,  which  reduces  the  chance  of  being 
spied on. The lack of a Russian presence in the area is an additional factor. Hezbollah constitutes 
more than half of the total military manpower in Western Qalamoun and 20 percent of the total forces 
in Eastern Qalamoun,22 where there is also an IRGC base in al-Nasriyah which Hezbollah is deployed 
to protect.23

As for Western Ghouta and the Syrian-Lebanese border area, the party focuses on the intelligence role 
of Syrians in its ranks gaining information on opposition groups and activities against it. Hezbollah’s 
grip  is  strong  in Western  Ghouta,  where  it  shares  some  sites  with  the  regime’s  4th  Division.  It  is 
noteworthy that the party is still preventing residents from returning to some locations in western al-
Zabadani, which is considered a security zone.24

In  the  town  of  al-Qusayr  and  its  surroundings  in  the  Homs  countryside  near  the  Syrian-Lebanese 
border, Hezbollah has military bases, weapons depots and training camps for its members. On 19 
May  2013,  it  launched  a  military  campaign  in  al-Qusayr  with  the  support  of  the  Syrian  air  force 
against the opposition in the town, seizing it after seventeen days of fighting. As the link between the 
Lebanese Bekaa Valley and Homs in Syria, al-Qusayr was the entrance from which Hezbollah forces 
began their direct military intervention in Syria, allowing for control over the area between Damascus 
and the Syrian coast. The road from Beirut to Tehran passes through it too, via Palmyra in the Syrian 
desert and from there to al-Bukamal on the Syrian-Iraqi border.

Al-Qusayr’s importance to Hezbollah was demonstrated by it holding there its only public military 
parade on  the occasion of  its  ‘Martyr’s  Day’  in  November 2016.  Hundreds  of  its  fighters  and  the 
armoured regiment participated. Hezbollah believes that its control over al-Qusayr has turned it into 
a cross-border army.25 There does not appear to be much likelihood of al-Qusayr’s displaced residents 
returning in the foreseeable future, given the damage to their homes and the fact the area is ‘militarily 
occupied.’ Hezbollah owns the most prominent military base in the area, namely the Dabaa military 
airfield, where small military cargo planes sometimes land.26

21  Hage Ali, “Power Points Defining the Syria-Hezbollah Relationship”.
22  Survey conducted by the researcher with journalists from the Sawt al-Asima network.
23  Skype interview with journalist Ahmad al-Shami, 17 December 2019.
24  Ibid.
25  Al-Jazeera, “Hezbollah’s First Military Parade in Syria” (in Arabic), 14 November 2016, https://bit.ly/37u7Qto.
26  Interview with Colonel Ismail Ayoub, ibid.

8

1.3.  South Syria: Security Presence and the Israeli Threat

Hezbollah’s presence in Daraa, Quneitra, the ‘Triangle of Death’27 and the southern Damascus 
countryside reflects the importance it attaches to this strategic area, which constitutes an access point 
for it to the Syrian-Israeli border, giving it an opportunity to pose a threat to Israel. This is why the 
party established bases and fixed training camps east of the Damascus-Amman international highway. 
It has also infiltrated both the western Daraa countryside and Quneitra with security groups from the 
region in what appears to be only a perfunctory commitment to Russian-Israeli agreements to remove 
Iran’s militias 80 km from the Syrian-Israeli border. It is reported that these sites have been subjected 
to repeated Israeli raids since the end of 2018.

In addition, Hezbollah has worked at forming numerous groups from the Shia remaining in Daraa, 
such as Saraya al-Areen 313 (‘Brigades of Den 313’), which is composed of Busra Shia, the al- Imam 
al-Mahdi Brigade, comprising Shia from Busra, Qarfa and al-Sheikh Maskin,28 and the Hadhart Abbas 
Brigade, active in Izraa. After the displacement of the Busra Shia to Sayyidah Zaynab in Damascus, 
the relatively small numbers of Shia remaining in southern Syria led the party to rely on proxy militias 
such as the Golan Regiment, which was formerly an opposition group known as the Mu’tasim Billah 
Division and later affiliated with the Syrian Republican Guards after a settlement with the regime in 
2014. Since the reconciliation agreement in mid-2018, Hezbollah has amassed around 2,500 local 
fighters in Daraa and Quneitra, mostly under the leadership of Lebanese Hajjs. Most of these troops 
were previously opposition fighters.29

Hezbollah has also established four large fixed military bases in the southern region – three in Daraa 
and one in Quneitra – to serve as training and preparation centres for new volunteers and arms and 
ammunition depots. Hezbollah also works to form combat groups and security cells manned by the 
people of the region Their tasks are to monitor Israeli forces on the other side of the border fence 
and to train and prepare for operations against them.30 These cells are also responsible for gathering 
intelligence on ‘reconciled’ former opposition factions, pursuing opponents of the Iranian presence 
and targeting people who have previously dealt with Israel.31 For example, the Air Force Intelligence 
arrested Khalil Hleihil, the commander of what was known as the al-Sobtain Brigade, who previously 
operated under the banner of the Syrian Revolutionary Front (SRF). Months later in late 2018, he 
was released on condition that he formed a group in al-Rafid on the border with the Golan Heights to 
monitor the border. Information provided by the Hleihil group led in late 2018 to the assassination of 
the former SRF leader, Ibrahim al-Aar, who was accused of dealing with Israel.32

Since  mid-2018,  Hezbollah’s  heavy  military  presence  in  the  ‘Triangle  of  Death’  has  become  an 
attempt to perpetuate a balance of deterrence with Israel. The party has installed there a medium-range 
surface-to-surface missile base, drone launchers and anti-aircraft missile bases, in addition to military 
bases in Tulul Fatima, Tall al-Shaar, Tall Ghareen and Tall al-Shaham. Hezbollah circumvents the 
Russian-Israeli agreement by deploying within the regime’s 90th Brigade. The Fatimiyoun Brigade, 
al-Radwan Forces and Mahdi al-Shirazi missile forces are also active in the Triangle of Death.33

27  The area is located at the intersection of the southern governorates of Damascus, Daraa and Quneitra. It was named the 
Triangle of Death after the heavy losses suffered there by the Afghan Fatimiyoun Brigade in 2015.
28  Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi, “Liwa al-Imam al-Mahdi: A Syrian Hezbollah Formation,” Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi Blog, 
23 July 2016, https://bit.ly/30MBk39.
29  Skype interview with an informed source who asked to remain anonymous, 27 December 2019.
30  Recruitment in the border region of the Golan extended to some of the Druze in the town of Hader and the Sunni al-
Naeem clan close to Hezbollah due to it having Shia members.
31  WhatsApp interview with journalist Samir al-Saadi, 14 December 2019.
32  WhatsApp interview with an informed source who asked to remain anonymous, 13 February 2020.
33  WhatsApp interview with journalist Sebastian al-Hamdan, 8 December 2019.

9

On the other hand, the presence of the IRGC increases as one moves north toward Damascus. Five 
years  ago,  in  al-Kiswah  south  of  Damascus  the  IRGC  established  one  of  its  largest  underground 
military  bases  in  Syria,  in  an  area  affiliated  with  the  regime’s  1st Armoured  Division  which  was 
subjected to many Israeli raids. Hezbollah is extensively deployed in the region to secure protection 
of the Iranian base.34 It has even moved much of its heavy weaponry towards Tall al-Mana, near the 
base.

On 3 January 2020 in Baghdad, the US assassinated the leader of the Iranian al-Quds Force, Qassem 
Soleimani. After this, Hezbollah redeployed and distributed some of its forces to Daraa, Qalamoun, 
Western  Ghouta  and  Damascus,  replacing  its  banners  with  Syrian  flags  while  its  forces  changed 
their  positions  within  the  same  area  and  fortified  them. The  party  was  keen  to  not  remain  in  one 
place  for  long.  Instead,  it  periodically  changed  its  positions  and  focused  on  digging  tunnels  and 
building underground sites. Most prominently, the party entered Jabadeen in western Qalamoun for 
the first time, where it was stationed in the Air Defence Forces’ battalion with heavy machine guns 
and shoulder-mounted anti-aircraft weaponry.35

2.  Hezbollah’s Economic Activities and Geographical Variations

Throughout its involvement in the Syrian war, Hezbollah has not hesitated to make use of the 
economic  opportunities  arising  from  it.  It  has  worked  to  supplement  its  budget  with  independent 
revenue sources in the light of the financial crisis in Iran, its main financier, following the withdrawal 
of the United States from the nuclear deal in May 2018 and the consequent reactivation of sanctions. 
The  party’s  commercial  activities  have  developed  and  changed  during  the  war,  from  selling  light 
weapons to opposition forces,36 to car trading in besieged areas, to buying weapons from the opposition 
after reconciliation and evacuation agreements.

The party has monopolised smuggling operations across the Syrian-Lebanese border in both directions. 
It also controls the drug trade in Syria and exports of drugs from there to Jordan and the Gulf. It has 
used some of the revenue from its illicit activities to finance purchases of land and real estate in two 
main areas of influence in Syria: al-Qusayr in the Homs countryside and the vicinity of Sayyidah 
Zaynab southeast of Damascus.

2.1.  Smuggling across the Syrian-Lebanese Border

Since  the  1980s,  the  Syrian-Lebanese  border  has  been  crossed  to  supply  goods  smuggled 
from Lebanon into the capital Damascus and central Syria37 in the light of the Syrian government’s 
restrictions on importing what it considered ‘luxury’ goods, including electrical appliances, tobacco, 
foodstuffs and medicines.38 In the other direction, smuggling provided the Lebanese market with cheap 
Syrian food products such as vegetables, meat and fuel. Smuggling operations have continued since 

34  WhatsApp interview with journalist Sebastian al-Hamdan, 8 December 2019.
35  Interview with Raed al-Salhani, ibid.
36   Between  2013  and  2015  in  the  western  countryside  of  Damascus  and  Qalamoun  on  the  Syrian-Lebanese  border, 
Hezbollah  was  the  second-largest  source  of  light  weapons  purchased  by  the  opposition,  with  Syrian  regime  military 
officers being the first. Skype interview with Ahmed al-Shami, 16 December 2019. Also see Ali al-Amin, “Syria and 
Lebanon and The War Trade from Weapons to Drugs” (in Arabic), al-Arab 26 April 2016, https://bit.ly/2OAifvX.
37   Elizabeth  Picard,  Lebanon-Syria,  Two  Intimate  Strangers:  A  Century  of  Socio-Political  Interactions  (in  French), 
(France: Sindbad Actes Sud, April 2016).
38  In the 1980s smuggling operations were active concurrently with severe austerity policies which followed the decline in 
Gulf financing of the Assad regime – due to its pro-Iranian stance in the first Gulf War – and the subsequent US economic 
blockade.

10

the outbreak of the Lebanese civil war in 1975 and during the subsequent period of Syrian military 
intervention in Lebanon.39 Syrian customs agents affiliated with the ministry of finance turned a blind 
eye to the main smuggling market in the town of Madaya in Western Ghouta in exchange for shares 
in the trade. From the July 2006 war to 2011, Hezbollah’s participation in smuggling began to expand 
on the Lebanese side of the border, in partnership with the 4th Division and with military security on 
the Syrian side.40 In 2019, the volume of smuggling trade to Syria from Lebanon was about 2.5 billion 
USD, according to official statements by Lebanon’s then minister of defence.

Hezbollah  controls  the  entire  Syrian-Lebanese  border  strip,  which  extends  375  km  and  includes 
dozens of unofficial crossings. The party uses these crossings to move its forces and arms shipments, 
to  provide  the  forces  with  logistical  and  military  support  and  to  supply  areas  under  its  control  in 
Lebanon with Syrian goods and products without subjecting them to customs duty. The party also 
uses some crossings to support illicit economic activities, including smuggling people on both sides 
of the border.41

While most of the smuggled goods find their way from Lebanon to the markets in Syrian border towns 
for local distribution, the al-Dimass market in the western countryside of Damascus remains one of 
the most prominent examples of the vitality of smuggling operations, their centralisation and the local 
dynamics. Al-Dimass is 15 km from the Masnaa border crossing. The market was started there in 
2012 in conjunction with Hezbollah isolating the cities of al-Zabadani and Madaya, which were the 
main markets for smuggled goods from Lebanon before 2011. While al-Zabadani and Madaya had 
been outside regime control since late 2011 and were then subjected to years of double siege by the 
regime and Hezbollah, al-Dimass and its surrounding towns, such as al-Saboura, Ras al-Ain and al-
Jdaydah, did not witness an anti-regime movement. On the contrary, many of its residents volunteered 
in local groups affiliated with the 4th Division, military security and Hezbollah itself.

Since  2011,  volunteers  from  the  region  in  the  4th  Division  and  Hezbollah  have  succeeded  in 
transforming the al-Dimass market into a wholesale distribution centre for smuggled goods to various 
Syrian  regions  by  setting  up  warehouses  and  stores,  and  preparing  dozens  of  new  stores  with  the 
increasing demand in the market. The smuggled goods include electrical appliances, food, clothing, 
fuel,  cigarettes,  spirits  and  car  parts. The  market  was  dominated  by  a  group  of  families  from  the 
region known for their longstanding ties to Hezbollah. They include the Nakrash, al-Kurdi, al-Arsani, 
Abu Sabha and Talib families.

The 4th Division checkpoints impose on smugglers from Lebanon what is known as ‘trunk customs,’ 
an illegal fee depending on the type of goods in a car’s load. It limits the smuggling trade to the al-
Dimass merchants by being lax with them as they pay monthly royalties to sustain the ‘partnership.’ 
Merchants and industrialists in Damascus and its countryside have established ties with al-Dimass 
dealers to secure the raw materials needed to operate their facilities from Lebanon through a network 
of taxi drivers.42

39  Sanaa al-Jack, “Smuggling on the Border with Syria is Destroying the Lebanese Economy” (in Arabic), al-sharq al-
Awsat, 20 May 2019 https://bit.ly/2vWm9Jb.
40  Skype interview with an informed source who asked to remain anonymous, 7 February 2020.
41  Ahmad al-Shami, “Between Syria and Lebanon: Human Smuggling Increases Under the Auspices of the Fourth and 
Hezbollah” (in Arabic), al-Modon 20 March 2019 https://bit.ly/2UWGdpp.
42  Al-Modon, “Smuggling from Lebanon to Syria: The Fourth Division and ‘Trunk Customs’” (in Arabic), 10 March 2019 
https://bit.ly/36zzWSt.

11

In  addition,  the  4th  Division  secures  the  movement  of  goods  in  and  out  of  al-Dimass  market  by 
means of cargo escorting or by ‘selling’ trade routes to merchants.43 In fact, the 4th Division officers 
and  influential  Hezbollah  officials  eventually  entered  the  al-Dimass  market  directly  and  ran  their 
own  warehouses  and  stores.44  For  example,  in  late  2015  the  4th  Division  and  Hezbollah  helped  a 
merchant from the town of Madaya close to them, Abdo Ghalyoun, to establish a shipping company 
operating between Syria and Lebanon. No campaign has been carried out to combat smuggled goods 
in al-Dimass in the past three years, which have otherwise seen Syrian customs tighten their grip and 
pursue smuggled goods in the areas controlled by the regime.

However, the smuggling trend has recently begun to reverse after popular protests in Lebanon started 
in October 2019 in conjunction with the financial crisis and the difficulties in importing goods from 
Lebanon. Hezbollah has become concerned with supplying its populous areas in Lebanon with Syrian 
food commodities.45

2.2.  Drug Dealing

In recent years, Syria has become a major exporter and consumer of drugs and stimulants, as the 
war has increased the demand for them and an absence of legal prosecution has given way to producers 
and traders. The Syrian domestic production of cannabis and hashish is still only experimental and is 
sponsored by Hezbollah in the Hawran region, around al-Qusayr and in Talkalakh. Hezbollah plays 
a major role in supplying the Syrian market with drugs, relying on its historical cultivation in the 
Lebanese  Bekaa Valley,  which  has  not  witnessed  any  drug  destruction  campaigns  in  recent  years, 
contrary to what was the norm prior to 2011. In addition, the party uses Syrian refugees in Lebanon 
as a labour force in hashish farms, having recruited a large part of the Lebanese Shia labour force to 
fight in Syria.46

It is difficult to estimate the quantities of drugs that Hezbollah supplies for domestic consumption 
in Syria or those designated for smuggling to Jordan and from there to the Gulf states. It is therefore 
difficult  to  estimate  the  percentage  of  the  drug  economy’s  contribution  to  financing  Hezbollah’s 
operations in Syria. Some analysts deem the percentage negligible, not exceeding 5 percent.47 Other 
estimates based on monitoring the shipments of drugs which are intended for local consumption only 
that Hezbollah transports through the illegal crossings between Syria and Lebanon to the villages of 
Western Qalamoun indicate that the traffic ranges between 2 and 3 shipments a week, with a value 
of 1 million USD each.48 It appears that the Syrian domestic market for drugs is worth an average 
of 96 million USD annually and is distributed over the various Syrian governorates, including areas 
controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the so-called Euphrates Shield and Olive Branch 
areas controlled by Turkey, and Idlib. The size of this trade represents almost 12 percent of Hezbollah’s 
Iranian budget, which, according to Israeli estimates, amounted to 830 million USD in 2017.49

These shipments consist primarily of hashish and Captagon and Hezbollah does not interfere in the 
local marketing and trading of these drugs. Instead, family militias in the villages of Fulaita and Qara 
in Western Qalamoun manage the business in return for a share in the distribution. In addition to the 

43  For more on the activities of the 4th Division, see Ayman Aldassouky, “The Economic Network of the Fourth Division 
During the Syrian Conflict,” Research Project Report (Florence, Italy: European University Institute), 13 January 2020, 
http://bit.ly/2wSsBS9.
44  Interview with Ahmad al-Shami, ibid.
45   Al-Modon,  “The  Syrian  Coast:  Is  ‘Hezbollah’  Smuggling  Food  to  Lebanon?”  (in  Arabic),  19  November  2019,  
https://bit.ly/2tLvxPk.
46  Mazen Ezzi, “Hezbollah: Hashish Terrorism and Wars” (in Arabic), al- Modon 13 June 2016 https://bit.ly/3aOPEfQ.
47  Skype interview with researcher Joseph Daher, 13 December 2019.
48  WhatsApp interview with a tribal source from the region familiar with smuggling, 3 January 2020.
49  Mohanad Hage Ali, “830 Million Dollars” (inArabic), al-Modon, 25 September 2017, https://bit.ly/2UtUgCF.

12

Western  Qalamoun  road,  Hezbollah  smuggles  drug  shipments  through  two  other  routes:  from  the 
town of Serghaya on the Beirut-Damascus road and from the Shebaa and Rakhlah crossings in Mount 
Hermon.50

As for drugs intended for smuggling to Jordan and Iraq and from there to the Persian Gulf, they pass 
along the Qalamoun road to the Syrian desert and then on to the perimeter of the al-Tanf area, or else 
across  the  Quneitra-Daraa  line  to  the  Jordanian  border.  Smuggling  into  Jordan  increased  after  the 
re-opening of the Nasib-Jabir border crossing in October 2018, which has since been closed again 
several  times  due  to  the  discovery  of  drug  shipments  intended  for  smuggling.51  Scarcely  a  week 
passed before the Jordanian authorities announced they had seized large quantities of drugs on their 
northern borders and destroyed them.52

Moreover, in July 2019 the Greek authorities seized Captagon in what they described as the largest 
quantity  of  narcotics  coming  from  Syria  seized  in  the  world,  stating  that  it  was  worth  more  than 
half  a  billion  euros.53 Although  there  are  local  Captagon  presses  in  more  than  one  location  in  the 
countrysides of Damascus and Daraa, the raw materials come from Lebanon along smuggling lines 
that are protected by Hezbollah and the 4th Division. The drug is intended for local production and 
consumption.54  In  addition,  at  the  Hmeimim  military  base  on  the  Syrian  coast,  where  Russia  has 
absolute control, Hezbollah is partnering with Russian officers in drug smuggling by sea through the 
port of Latakia to Russia, and possibly from there on to European markets.55 According to the US 
Drug Enforcement Administration, Hezbollah has used its drug revenue to purchase weapons for its 
fighters on behalf of the Assad regime. A senior Hezbollah commander, Ali Fayyad, and one other 
person are believed to have made the purchases.56

2.3.  Real Estate Trade and Demographic Change

In addition to the areas controlled militarily by Hezbollah, the party’s real estate interests are 
concentrated in two main areas: al-Qusayr in the Homs countryside and the Sayyidah Zaynab vicinity 
southeast of Damascus. These interests indicate a desire to stay in these two regions for a long time, 
and  to  this  end  the  party  forcibly  seizes  property  and  even  finds  legal  grounds  for  remaining  in 
specific Syrian regions. This ‘legal’ aspect of its real estate acquisition is not part of a comprehensive 
party strategy in Syria. Instead, it is a local policy used in specific areas deemed vital by the party to 
expand its reach and social support base.

Hezbollah  benefits  from  exclusive  facilitations  provided  to  it  by  the  official  Syrian  Real  Estate 
Authority, municipalities and security agencies to obtain licenses to restore damaged real estate, carry 
out inventory procedures for inheritance and ownership transfers and obtain security approvals. These 
procedures are usually complicated if not indeed impossible, particularly for the Sunni populations 
of certain areas.57

50  Skype interview with the editor-in-chief of Sawt al-Asima, 13 December 2019.
51  Interview with Samir al-Saadi, ibid.
52   Interview  with  Sebastian  al-Hamdan,  ibid.  Also  see  Al-Ghad,  “The  Northern  Military  Region  Thwarted  an 
Attempt to Smuggle Drugs” (in Arabic), 23 January 2020, https://bit.ly/37AAaKA؛, and Al-Ghad, “Smuggling of 2.6 
Million  Narcotic  Pills  in  Consignment  of  Fruit Across  the  Jaber  Borders  Thwarted”  (in Arabic),  8  November  2019,  
https://bit.ly/37xQ0pp.
53   George  Georgiopoulos,  “Greece  Confiscates  Record  Amount  of  Narcotic  Pills  Coming  From  Syria”  (in  Arabic), 
Reuters, 5 July 2019 https://bit.ly/38CH16i.
54  Interview with Raed al-Salhani, ibid.
55  Abdul Salam Haj Bakri, “From Bekaa to Lattakia. This is a Drug Trip to Russia” (in Arabic), al-Modon, 11 August 
2019, https://bit.ly/2uGM2fl.
56  John Fernandez, “The DEA's Targeting of Hezbollah's Global Criminal Support Network” The Washington Institute, 10 
January 2020, http://bit.ly/39MCS0N.
57  Interview with Raed al-Salhani, ibid.

13

In  al-Qusayr  and  its  countryside,  Hezbollah  focuses  on  the  purchase  of  destroyed  real  estate  and 
agricultural land along the road between the town and the village of Hawsh al-Sayyid Ali, which is a 
major bastion of Hezbollah forces on the Syrian-Lebanese border. Its Sunni population was displaced 
to Lebanon after the party seized it in May 2013. Approximately 70 percent of the population of al-
Qusayr and its environs have not returned. In fact, Hezbollah chooses who can return on a sectarian 
basis, as it has allowed Christians and Shia to return without prior security approval while preventing 
the return of Sunnis.58 Although Hezbollah’s secretary-general announced on 20 September 2019 that 
the people of al-Qusayr would be allowed to return in coordination with the Syrian and Lebanese 
authorities,  this  has  not  been  the  case  on  the  ground.59  Hezbollah’s  openness,  in  theory  if  not  in 
practice, to the return of some residents is consistent with the Syrian regime’s concept of the voluntary 
return of loyalists, even if they are Sunnis.60

In  addition,  sales  of  real  estate  and  agricultural  land  in  the  villages  of  Haweek,  Jusiat  al-Kharab 
and  al-Munqati  in  the  al-Qusayr  countryside  has  been  documented  by  Syrian  mediators  offering 
to  purchase  agricultural  land  owned  by  displaced  persons  after  convincing  them  that  returning  is 
impossible. Al-Qusayr City Council, which is affiliated with Hezbollah, helps facilitate the procedures 
for legally selling and transferring property in the name of Syrian Hezbollah members.61 Since Syrian 
law prohibits foreign ownership of real estate, the party intervened with the regime to grant Syrian 
citizenship to the families of a few hundred Lebanese fighters from the border areas near al-Qusayr 
and to house them on the opposite side of the border.62

In  the  Sayyidah  Zaynab  vicinity  southeast  of  Damascus,  the  buyers  are  different,  as  Hezbollah 
encourages wealthy Lebanese Shia supporters to take advantage of the relatively low value of real 
estate.  In  this  sense,  Hezbollah’s  economic  influence  in  Syria  cannot  be  seen  merely  as  a  direct 
reflection  of  its  military  presence  but  rather  it  has  become  an  expression  of  the  interests  of  the 
Lebanese Shia bourgeoisie.63 Owing to this heavy investment in real estate, the Sayyidah Zaynab area 
has turned into a tourist attraction for pilgrims and Shia visitors. The real estate purchase movement 
is also active along most of the road leading to Sayyidah Zainab, in order to expand the area and 
prepare it to receive more foreign Shia pilgrims during the Ashura and Arbaeen seasons. Here too, 
buyers have access to renovation permits and security clearances to document purchases, even if the 
property is under precautionary sequestration.64

58  Javier Gonzalez, “Land, House Occupations, and Destruction in Strategic Area: The Case of al-Qusayr in Syria,” in 
Reclaiming Home: The Struggle for Socially Just Housing, Land and Property Rights in Syria, Iraq and Libya, ed. Hannes 
Baumann, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2019, https://bit.ly/36uR5wY.
59  WhatsApp interview with a Syrian researcher who is familiar with al-Qusayr who asked to remain anonymous, 16 
January 2020; WhatsApp interview with journalist and activist from Homs, Samer al-Salman, 26 January 2019.
60  Ahmad al-Shami, “Al-Qusayr: Hezbollah Allows Conditional Return of Some Families” (in Arabic), al-Modon, 8 July 
2019, https://bit.ly/2U2arGZ.
61  Fares al-Rifai, “Facts and Figures: This is How Hezbollah Seized the Properties and Assets of the People of al- Qusayr” 
(in Arabic), Eqtsad, 24 January 2019, https://bit.ly/315Z828.
62  Interview with Samer al-Salman, ibid.
63  Interview with Joseph Daher, ibid.
64  Raed al-Salhani, “Why is Umm Ali Purchasing Land on the Babbila-Sayyidah Zaynab Road?” (in Arabic), al-Modon, 
14 December 2018, https://bit.ly/2O4nmEE.

14

3.  Networks of Social Relations as Means of Control

In the past few years, Hezbollah and behind it Iran have not only established militias to militarise 
Syrian Shia but have also spread Shiism and expanded in other sectarian circles as well. The party 
seeks to integrate within the local social fabric to ensure civil support in the long term by linking the 
widest possible segments of society with its network of interests and by creating an environment to 
defend itself, irrespective of any major changes on the horizon.65

It appears difficult to distinguish between Hezbollah’s activities aimed at spreading Shiism, bringing 
Syrian communities closer to it and to the religious principles of the Twelver Jaafari school of thought 
and the extensive Iranian activities in this regard aimed at subduing Syrian society and ridding it of 
the ‘scourge of terrorism.’66 However, Hezbollah’s activity is more evident in areas with a Syrian 
Shia presence, especially Sayyidah Zaynab, where Shia clerics close to Hezbollah attend religious 
ceremonies delivering speeches focusing on the role of Hezbollah and the ‘Axis of Resistance’ in 
‘defeating terrorism.’67 The party also has influence in a group of newly established Shia religious 
bodies in Syria and in a network of charities.

3.1.  Shia Religious Bodies and the Spread of Shiism

Recent years have witnessed the emergence of multiple religious bodies representing the Twelver 
Shia community in Syria, suggesting a need of the Shia military forces for a religious umbrella to 
empower them and highlight their role. If the spread of these bodies is still limited and is restricted 
to  the  geographically-dispersed  Syrian  Shia  population,  it  nonetheless  is  intended  to  increase  the 
representation  of  the  Syrian  Shia  community  to  a  degree  disproportionate  to  its  numbers,  albeit 
supposedly commensurate with the ‘large sacrifices’ it claims to have made to maintain the regime.

In  2012,  the  Islamic  Jaafari  Supreme  Council  was  established  in  Syria.  It  is  aligned  with  wilayat 
al-faqih  and  headed  by  the  Damascene  Sheikh  Mohammad Ali  al-Misky,  who  is  at  the  forefront 
of traditional Shia ceremonies in Damascus commemorating the death of Imam Hussein and who 
moves  between  the  various  Syrian  Shia  towns.  The  Council,  which  professes  allegiance  to  Iran’s 
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, is the common religious umbrella for the various Syrian Hezbollah 
militias.68 That Sheikh al-Misky is commonly referred to as an ‘Ayatollah’ indicates he has attained 
the malakat al-ijtihad (‘scholarly reasoning’) distinction in the Twelver Shia doctrine, meaning he 
is able to adjudicate on religious rulings and has the right to issue a fatwa. Al-Misky also frequently 
visits Shia religious schools and holy sites in Iran and Iraq, where senior Shia clerics meet. He attends 
these occasions as the representative of ‘The Shrine and Sanctuary of the Wise Woman of the Bani 
Hashem,  Protector  of  the  Levant,  Sayyidah  Zaynab,  Peace  be  upon  Her.’69  However,  none  of  the 
official Syrian publications refer to the establishment of the Council or clarify whether it is an official 
institution recognised by the Syrian state, even though Facebook pages and some social media outlets 
refer to Sheikh al-Misky as the Council’s president.70

65  WhatsApp interview with researcher and publisher Lokman Slim, 19 January 2020.
66  Majd al-Khatib, “Iran and The Adaptation of Syrian Society: The Tribal Council” (in Arabic), al-Modon, 26 February 
2017, https://bit.ly/2StIXJk.
67  YouTube, the Islamic Jaafari Supreme Council in Syria Channel https://bit.ly/39vMbBF.
68  Mohanad Hage Ali, “The Resurrection of the Shia” (in Arabic), Diwan, Carnegie Middle East Centre, 4 May 2017, 
https://bit.ly/30OexUo.
69  Iran Today News Agency, “President of the Islamic Jaafari Supreme Council in Syria on a Visit to Iran” (in Arabic), 29 
August 2018, https://bit.ly/2SpFfPE.
70  Facebook, the Islamic Jaafari Supreme Council in Syria (in Arabic), https://bit.ly/2SzsRxO.

15

The Council is made up of a religious committee comprising twelve clerics from various Syrian Shia 
regions. The religious committee elects a president and a general committee. Sponsored by Iran, the 
Council works to monopolise representation of the Syrian Twelver Shia community and to “speak in 
its name and specify its positions.”71 During the Syrian war, Iran succeeded in converting the majority 
of the Syrian Shia community into Khomeinists adopting the wilayat al-faqih doctrine, which entails 
direct loyalty to the Iranian Supreme Leader. However, the establishment of the Council gives a form 
of Syrian national character to the Twelver Shia situation in Syria.

The  Council  is  not  the  only  Shia  religious  body  in  Syria.  Other  groups  of  Shia  religious  leaders 
quickly emerged, such as ‘The Islamic Scientific Committee of the Followers of Ahl al-Bayt in Syria,’ 
which is headed by the country’s most important Shia cleric, Abdullah Nizam, a Damascene who 
gives Friday sermons in the Sayyidah Ruqayya shrine and has a direct relationship with Hezbollah 
Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah. Nizam is currently a mediator between Syrian state institutions 
and the Shia community regarding everyday issues such as employment, redeployment, exemption 
from military service and security settlement.72 Nizam also supervises the Muhsiniyya School in the 
Damascus  neighbourhood  of  al-Amarah  and  chairs  the  Sayyidah  Ruqayya  branch  of  the  Bilad  al-
Sham University for Sharia Studies. The Committee aims to unify religious discourse in harmony 
with “Islamic and national unity” and “care for the affairs of Ahl al-Bayt scholars.”73

In  addition  to  Nizam,  the  Shia  cleric  Fadi  Burhan  from  al-Zabadani  is  also  considered  close  to 
Hezbollah. He describes himself as an “ambassador of peace between the sects,” although he played 
a role in implementing the Four Towns Agreement, the first official demographic engineering process 
in  Syria.  Sheikh  Burhan  assumes  the  position  of  Director  of  External  Relations  in  the  Khomeini 
Religious Hawza in Sayyidah Zaynab and supervises the documentation of the lineage of Ahl al-Bayt. 
He describes himself as naqib al-ashraf (‘head of the Prophet Muhammad’s descendants’)74 in Syria. 
He also has a close relationship with a number of the most important figures in the Syrian regime. It 
is reported that his rapid rise, which was due to his excellent relationship with Hezbollah, angered 
higher-ranked Shia clerics in Sayyidah Zaynab.75

In  addition,  Iran  is  spreading  Shiism,  particularly  within  Sunni  tribal  circles,  through  calls  for 
affiliation with Ahl al-Bayt. Hence the importance of the ‘Ahl al-Bayt centres and councils’ based in 
Sayyidah Zaynab and the determination of the genealogy and number of Ahl al-Bayt descendants. 
Organisations involved in this field include the World Assembly of Ahl al-Bayt, the Sons of Imam 
Ali Centre and the Assembly of Shia References, in addition to the Naqabat al-Ashraf in Syria led 
by Fadi Burhan.76 Through its activities in tribal areas, by establishing an Arab tribal council in 2015 
and holding frequent tribal gatherings, Hezbollah seeks to create a mixed-doctrine tribal framework 
to reduce the severity of the popular rejection of its presence in Syria.77

3.2. 

Integration in Local Communities

After years of ferocious war in Syria accompanied by intense sectarian incitement, Hezbollah 
is  now  working  to  unwind  resentment  between  Syrian  Sunnis  and  Shiites  and  bring  them  closer 
in  various  ways.  In  these  endeavours,  the  party  is  capitalising  on  existing  Shia  communities  and 

71  Mohanad Hage Ali, “The Islamic Jaafari Council in Syria” (in Arabic), al-Modon, 24 April 2017, https://bit.ly/2TVj722.
72  Interview with Raed al-Salhani, ibid.
73  “Dialogue with His Eminence, Mr. Abdullah Nizam, Head of the Scholars Committee in Syria” (in Arabic), Iuvmpress 
website, 18 January 2017, https://bit.ly/2tb9fWS.
74  Al-ashraf are those who claim to descend from the Prophet Mohammad through his daughter Fatima.
75  WhatsApp interview with journalist Diaa Mohamed, 7 January 2020.
76  Ali Muhammad Taha, “Iranian Centres in Syria to Facilitate Affiliation with Ahl al-Bayt” (in Arabic), al-Rasid, 17 
September 2017, https://bit.ly/36GYyJr.
77  Interview with a Syrian researcher based in Canada who asked to remain anonymous, 27 December 2019.

16

expanding through them into a broader social environment. It distributes food and financial aid to the 
poor and provides protection for anti-regime groups in ‘reconciled’ areas. For example, it has been 
able to recruit approximately 3,000 people from Daraa into its ranks, reflecting its ability to reach 
their families through certain charities78 in order to bring them closer to the Twelver Shia doctrine.79

Indeed,  Hezbollah  targets  diverse  segments  of  the  population,  often  focusing  on  minorities.  For 
example, it appeals to Bedouin clans in the villages of Kamouneh and Alqin and through the mayor of 
Bir al-Sabil in the Triangle of Death on the old Damascus-Daraa road. It also seeks to expand among 
Palestinians in the town of al-Mazareeb in the Daraa countryside and to families of the al-Waysiyyah 
tribe originally from the Syrian Golan, now residing in Sayyidah Zaynab.

Moreover,  in  cooperation  with  the  IRGC  Hezbollah  has  succeeded  in  integrating  within  local 
communities  in  Aleppo  through  the  Aleppo  Defenders  Corps,  which  provides  relief  services  to 
families such as supplies of bread and fuel and contributes to the renovation of schools. Naturally, 
the  Corps  pays  special  attention  to Aleppo’s  Shia  in  Nubl  and  al-Zahraa,  the  Shia  displaced  from 
al-Fouaa and Kefraya and the families of Afghan, Pakistani and Iraqi fighters in Aleppo, for whom 
the  party  has  arranged  housing  in  the  homes  of  those  displaced  from  eastern Aleppo.  The  Corps 
also participates in Armenian, Syriac, Sunni and Christian celebrations in Aleppo, in addition to Sufi 
mawalid celebrations.

The Aleppo Defenders Corps was formed in February 2017 as an umbrella group for local militias 
affiliated with the National Defence Forces, although it also plays a role in civilian life. Currently, it 
not only controls entire militias, including the al-Baqir Brigade affiliated with Syrian Hezbollah, but 
also has control over mukhtar and district councils and has representation in governorate and city 
councils. Each of the Corps’ zones has branch offices dealing with education, culture, services and 
religious affairs.80 Although their commander, Hajj Mohsen, is known only by name, he is considered 
the de facto ruler of Aleppo.

Most of the sector and zone commanders in the Corps belong to Lebanese Hezbollah and are clearly 
influenced by its experience as an integrated project. Therefore, they work to make the Corps’ work 
integrated,  providing  various  preaching  and  welfare  services,  including  caring  for  the  families  of 
those  killed  during  the  war,  organising  proselytism  and  other  religious  activities  and  participating 
in religious and official ceremonies. The Corps also includes hundreds of workers, volunteers and 
employees both male and female and has heavy machinery, including bulldozers, fire engines and 
ambulances, in addition to children’s clubs and health clinics.81

78  Such as the Supporters of The Immortal Leader, al-Zahraa Society, Imdad Association, Al-Bustan and Ayadi al-Khayr.
79  Interview with Samir al-Saadi, ibid.
80  Khaled al-Khatib, “Aleppo Defenders Corps: Four Zones of Iranian Influence” (in Arabic), al-Modon, 30 June 2019, 
https://bit.ly/38O0ssT.
81  Interview with Khaled al-Khatib, ibid.

17

Conclusion

The  nature  of  Hezbollah’s  deployment  in  different  Syrian  regions  varies  according  to  its 
perception  of  the  strategic  importance  of  each  region.  Hezbollah  has  maintained  a  widespread 
presence in the small Syrian Shia community and has encouraged Syrian Shia militias to join the 
regime’s forces, which has given it additional influence over the Syrian military establishment. The 
party also focuses on the Syrian-Lebanese border zone in order to secure land routes, weapons depots 
and training camps, and also on the south of Syria in preparation for any possible confrontation with 
Israel.

As Hezbollah’s engagement in the Syrian war evolved, it explored the potential for maintaining sources 
of self-financing in the light of the sanctions imposed on it and on Iran. It began to monopolise the 
smuggling market and to control the drug trade, thereby financing a portion of its Syrian operations, 
and it strengthened its presence in the border region between Lebanon and Syria. Part of the revenue 
has been invested in financing land purchases and promoting demographic change to build and expand 
its popular base, especially in al-Qusayr south of Homs and Sayyidah Zaynab southeast of Damascus.

Given the integrated dimensions of Hezbollah’s presence in Syria, it appears determined to remain in 
the country over the long term. It pursues this goal not only by establishing permanent military bases 
but also by connecting people to its economic network of interests and creating various umbrellas 
and formations, both military and civilian, to empower Syrian Shia and draw closer to the rest of the 
Syrian population in sectarian and ethno-tribal terms.

Hezbollah’s experience in Syria has not been an unequivocal success story. The party has suffered many 
setbacks at the tactical and strategic levels and has undergone a continual process of reassessment. 
Hezbollah has managed to achieve the aims of its intervention, but it has also suffered great losses 
among  its  fighters  and  exposed  its  locations  in  Syria  to  repeated  Israeli  targeting,  not  to  mention 
the political cost incurred in terms of its general image in the Arab and Islamic worlds as it turned 
from ‘resistance’ against Israel into an armed party in a sectarian struggle between Sunnis and Shia. 
Likewise, its military intervention in Syria has not sufficed to turn it into an influential political player. 
It has found itself excluded from the negotiation table regarding Syria’s future, with Iran remaining 
the chief negotiator in the name of the ‘axis’ for which Hezbollah fights.

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Research Project Report
13 March 2020
2020/04

ISBN:978-92-9084-879-0
doi:10.2870/446912