COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard
Date: 2020-07-10
Institutions: Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers, European Commission
Subjects: EU Member State, EU statistics, access to the courts, disciplinary proceedings, independence of the judiciary, judge, judicial proceedings, judicial reform, public prosecutor's department, rule of law

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 10.7.2020  COM(2020) 306 final  COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard  
 
 
1. 

INTRODUCTION 

Effective justice systems are essential for implementing EU law and for upholding the rule of law 
and the values upon which the EU is founded. National courts act as EU courts when applying 
EU law. It is national courts in the first place that ensure that the rights and obligations provided 
under EU law are enforced effectively (Article 19 TEU). 

Effective  justice  systems  are  also  essential  for  mutual  trust,  the  investment  climate  and  the 
sustainability  of  long-term  growth.  For  this  reason,  improving  the  efficiency,  quality  and 
independence  of  national  justice  systems  continues  to  feature  among  the  priorities  of  the 
European Semester – the EU’s annual cycle of economic policy coordination. The 2020 annual 
sustainable growth strategy, which sets out the economic and employment policy strategy for the 
EU and places sustainability and social inclusion at the heart of the EU's economic policymaking, 
reiterates  the  link  between  effective  justice  systems  and  the  business  environment  in  Member 
States.  Well-functioning  and  fully  independent  justice  systems  can  have  a  positive  impact  on 
investment and therefore contribute to productivity and competitiveness. They are also important 
to  ensure  effective  cross-border  enforcement  of  contracts  and  administrative  decisions  and 
dispute resolution, which are essential for the functioning of the single market (1). 

Against  this  background,  the  EU  Justice  Scoreboard  presents  an  annual  overview  of  indicators 
focusing  on  the  essential  parameters  of  effective  justice  systems:  efficiency,  quality  and 
independence. The 2020 edition further develops the indicators on all three elements. It does not 
reflect the consequences of the COVID-19 crisis, as the data covers the years 2012 to 2019, but 
not 2020. 

 The European Rule of law Mechanism – 

As  announced  in  the  political  guidelines  of  President  von  der  Leyen,  the  Commission  has 
established a comprehensive European Rule of Law Mechanism to deepen its monitoring of the 
situation in Member States. The Rule of Law Mechanism will act as a preventive tool, deepening 
dialogue  and  joint  awareness  of  rule  of  law  issues.  Its  main  features  are  detailed  in  the 
Commission's 2019 ‘Communication on further strengthening the rule of law within the Union – 
A blueprint for action’ The new Mechanism will rely on  an annual Rule of Law Report, which 
will provide a synthesis of significant developments – both positive and negative – in all Member 
States. The Report will be based on a variety of sources, including the EU Justice Scoreboard.  

1  

See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee  and the Committee of the  Regions  “Identifying and addressing barriers to the Single 
Market” COM(2020)93 and accompanying SWD(2020)54.  

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What is the EU Justice Scoreboard? 

The EU Justice Scoreboard is an annual comparative information tool. Its purpose is to assist the EU and 
Member States improve the effectiveness of their national justice systems by providing objective, reliable 
and comparable data on a number of indicators relevant for the assessment of the efficiency, quality and 
independence of justice systems in all Member States. It does not present an overall single ranking, but 
gives an overview of how all the justice systems function, based on indicators that are of common interest 
for all Member States. 
The Scoreboard does not promote any particular type of justice system and treats all Member States on an 
equal footing.  
Efficiency, quality and independence are essential parameters of an effective justice system, whatever the 
model of the national justice system or the legal tradition in which it is anchored. Figures on these three 
parameters  should  be  read  together,  as  all  three  elements  are  often  interlinked  (initiatives  aimed  at 
improving one of them may have an influence on the other).  
The Scoreboard mainly focuses on litigious civil and commercial cases as well as administrative cases in 
order  to  assist  Member  States in  their  efforts to  create  a  more  investment,  business  and  citizen-friendly 
environment. The Scoreboard is a comparative tool which evolves in dialogue with Member States and the 
European Parliament (2). Its objective is to identify the essential parameters of an effective justice system 
and to provide relevant annual data. 

What is the methodology of the EU Justice Scoreboard? 

The Scoreboard uses a range of information sources. Large parts of the quantitative data are provided by 
the  Council  of  Europe’s  European  Commission  for  the  Efficiency  of  Justice  (CEPEJ)  with  which  the 
Commission  has  concluded  a  contract to  carry  out  a  specific  annual  study.  These  data  cover  the  period 
from  2012  to  2018,  and  have  been  provided  by  Member  States  according  to  CEPEJ’s  methodology  (3). 
The study also provides detailed comments and country-specific factsheets that give more context. They 
should be read together with the figures (4). 
Data on the length of proceedings collected by CEPEJ show the ‘disposition time’ which is a calculated 
length  of  court  proceedings  (based  on  a  ratio  between  pending  and  resolved  cases).  Data  on  courts’ 
efficiency  in  applying  EU  law  in  specific  areas  show  the  average  length  of  proceedings  derived  from 
actual  length  of  court  cases.  Note  that  the  length  of  court  proceedings  may  vary  substantially  between 
areas  within  a  Member  State,  particularly  in  urban  centres  where  commercial  activities  may  lead  to  a 
higher caseload. 
Other sources of data, which cover the period from 2010 to 2019 (5), are: the group of contact persons on 
national justice systems (6), the European Network of Councils for the Judiciary (ENCJ) (7), the Network 
of the Presidents of the Supreme Judicial Courts of the EU (NPSJC) (8), the Association of the Councils of 

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e.g. European Parliament resolution of 29 May 2018 on the 2017 EU Justice Scoreboard (P8_TA(2018)0216). 
To  reduce  the  time-span,  the  2020  EU  Justice  Scoreboard takes  2012  as  the  baseline  year  for  CEPEJ  data, 
while the 2019 edition used data from 2010.  
https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/justice-and-fundamental-rights/effective-justice/eu-justice-scoreboard_en 
One figure (48) still uses 2010 data, as in some Member States, the relevant Global Competitiveness Report 
survey on perceived independence was conducted in 2010, 2011 or 2012. 
To help prepare the EU Justice Scoreboard and to promote the exchange of best practices on the effectiveness 
of  justice  systems,  the  Commission  asked  Member  States  to  designate  two  contact  persons,  one  from  the 
judiciary and one from the ministry of justice. This informal group meets regularly. 
ENCJ  unites  the  national  institutions  in  the  Member  States  that  are  independent  of  the  executive  and 
legislature,  and  that  are  responsible  for  supporting  the  judiciaries  in  the  independent  delivery  of  justice: 
https://www.encj.eu/ 
NPSJC provides a forum that gives European institutions the opportunity to request the opinions of Supreme 
Courts  and  to  bring  them  closer  by  encouraging  discussion  and  the  exchange  of  ideas:  http://network-
presidents.eu/ 

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State and Supreme Administrative Jurisdictions of the EU (ACA-Europe) (9), the European Competition 
Network  (ECN)(10),  the  Communications  Committee  (COCOM)(11),  the  European  Observatory  on 
infringements  of  intellectual  property  rights(12),  the  Consumer  Protection  Cooperation  Network 
(CPC)(13), the Expert Group on Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (EGMLTF)(14), Eurostat(15), 
the European Judicial Training Network (EJTN)(16), and the World Economic Forum (WEF)(17). 
Over  the  years,  the  methodology  for  the  Scoreboard  has  been  further  developed  and  refined  in  close 
cooperation  with  the  group  of  contact  persons  on  national  justice  systems,  particularly  through  a 
questionnaire  (updated  annually)  and  collecting  data  on  certain  aspects  of  the  functioning  of  justice 
systems. 
The  availability  of  data,  in  particular  for  indicators  on  the  efficiency  of  justice  systems,  continues  to 
improve as many Member States have invested in their capacity to produce better judicial statistics. Where 
difficulties  in  gathering  or  providing  data  continue  to  exist,  this  is  either  due  to  insufficient  statistical 
capacity or to the fact that the national categories for which data are collected do not correspond exactly to 
the ones  used for  the  Scoreboard.  Only  in  very  few cases is the  data  gap  due  to  a lack  of  contributions 
from national authorities. The Commission continues to encourage Member  States to further reduce this 
data gap. 

How does the EU Justice Scoreboard feed into the European Semester? 

The  Scoreboard  provides  elements  for  assessing  the  efficiency,  quality  and  independence  of  national 
justice systems and thereby aims at helping Member States to improve the effectiveness of their national 
justice  systems.  By  comparing  information  on  the  justice  systems,  the  Scoreboard  makes  it  easier  to 
identify shortcomings and best practices and to keep track of challenges and the progress. In the context of 
the  European  Semester,  country-specific  assessments are  carried  out  through  bilateral  dialogue  with  the 
concerned  national  authorities  and  stakeholders  concerned.  This  assessment  is  reflected  in  the  annual 
country  reports  within  the  European  Semester  and  combines  the  insights  from  the  Scoreboard  with 
qualitative, country-specific analysis that reflects the characteristics of the legal systems and the broader 
context  of  the  Member  States  concerned.  Where  identified  shortcomings  have  macro-economic 

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12 

13 

14  

15 
16 

17 

ACA-Europe  is  composed  of  the  Court  of  Justice  of  the  EU  and  the  Councils  of  State  or  the  Supreme 
administrative jurisdictions of each EU Member State: http://www.juradmin.eu/index.php/en/ 
The ECN has been established as a forum for discussion and cooperation of European competition authorities 
in cases where Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU are applied. The ECN is the 
framework  for  the  close  cooperation  mechanisms  of  Council  Regulation  1/2003.  Through  the  ECN,  the 
Commission  and  the  national  competition  authorities  in  all  EU  Member  States  cooperate  with  each  other: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/index_en.html 
COCOM is composed of representatives of EU Member States. Its main role is to provide an opinion on the 
draft  measures  that  the  Commission  intends  to  adopt  on  digital  market  issues:  https://ec.europa.eu/digital-
single-market/en/communications-committee 
The  European  Observatory  on  Infringements  of  Intellectual  Property  Rights  is  a  network  of  experts  and 
specialist stakeholders. It is composed of public- and private-sector representatives, who collaborate in active 
working groups. https://euipo.europa.eu/ohimportal/en/web/observatory/home  
CPC is a network of national authorities responsible for enforcing EU consumer protection laws in EU and 
EEA 
countries: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/scoreboard/performance_by_governance_tool/consumer_protection_coop
eration_network/index_en.htm  
EGMLTF meets regularly to share views and help the Commission define policy and draft new legislation on 
anti-money laundering and terrorist financing: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/financial-crime/index_en.htm 
Eurostat is the statistical office of the EU: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/about/overview 
EJTN  is  the  principal  platform  and  promoter  of  training  and  exchange  of  knowledge  of  the  European 
judiciary.  It  develops  training  standards  and  curricula,  coordinates  judicial  training  exchanges  and 
programmes,  disseminates  training  expertise  and  promotes  cooperation  between  EU  judicial  training 
institutions. EJTN has some 34 members representing EU Member States as well as EU transnational bodies. 
http://www.ejtn.eu/ 
WEF  is  an  international  organisation  for  public-private  cooperation,  whose  members  are  companies: 
https://www.weforum.org/ 

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significance,  the  analysis  under  the  European  Semester  may  lead  to  the  Commission  proposing  to  the 
Council to adopt country-specific recommendations to improve the national justice systems in individual 
Member States (18). 

Why are effective justice systems important for an investment friendly business environment? 

Effective justice systems that uphold the rule of law have been identified as having a positive economic 
impact.  Where  judicial  systems  guarantee  the  enforcement  of  rights,  creditors  are  more  likely  to  lend, 
businesses  are  dissuaded  from  opportunistic  behaviour,  transaction  costs  are  reduced  and  innovative 
businesses are more likely to invest. The beneficial impact of well-functioning national justice systems for 
the  economy  is  supported  by  a  wide  range  of  studies  and  academic  literature,  including  from  the 
International  Monetary  Fund  (19)  the  European  Central  Bank  (20),  the  OECD  (21),  the  World  Economic 
Forum (22), and the World Bank (23). 
A study has found that reducing the length of court proceedings by 1% (measured in disposition time (24)) 
may increase growth of firms (25) and that a higher percentage of companies perceiving the justice system 
as independent by 1% tends to be associated with higher turnover and productivity growth (26). Another 
study  has  indicated  a  positive  correlation  between  perceived  judicial  independence  and  foreign  direct 
investment flows in Central and Eastern Europe (27).  
In  addition,  several  surveys  have  highlighted  the  importance  of  the  effectiveness  of  national  justice 
systems  for  companies.  For  example,  in  one  survey,  93%  of  large  companies  replied  that  they 
systematically review the rule of law conditions (including court independence) on a continuing basis in 
the countries  they  invest  in(28).  In  another,  over  half  of  small  and  medium-sized  enterprises replied that 

18   

19  

20 

21 

22 

23 

24  

25  

26  
27  

28  

are 

country 

available 

recent  2020 

reports,  published  on  26  February  2020, 

In  the  2020  European  Semester,  the  Council,  on  Commission’s  proposal,  addressed  country-specific 
recommendations to eight Member States relating to their justice system (HR, IT, CY, HU, MT, PL, PT and 
SK).  In  addition  to  those  Member  States  that  received  proposal  for  country-specific  recommendations,  a 
further eight Member States (BE, BG, IE, EL, ES, LV, RO and SI) are facing specific challenges as regards 
their justice systems, including the rule of law and the independence of justice, which are being monitored by 
the Commission through the European Semester. These challenges have been reflected in  the recitals of the 
proposed  Country-Specific  Recommendations  and  the  country  reports  relating  to  these  Member  States.  The 
most 
at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/2020-european-semester-country-reports_en 
IMF, Regional Economic Outlook, November 2017,  Europe: Europe Hitting its Stride, pp. xviii, pp. 40, 70: 
https://www.imf.org/~/media/Files/Publications/REO/EUR/2017/November/eur-booked-print.ashx?la=en  
ECB, ‘Structural policies in the euro area’, June 2018, ECB Occasional Paper Series No 210: 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpops/ecb.op210.en.pdf?3db9355b1d1599799aa0e475e5624651  
See e.g. ‘What makes civil justice effective?’,, OECD Economics Department Policy Notes, No. 18 June 2013 
and ‘The Economics of Civil Justice: New Cross-Country Data and Empirics’, OECD Economics Department 
Working Papers, No. 1060. 
World  Economic 
https://www.weforum.org/reports/global-competitiveness-report-2019  
World Bank, ‘World Development Report 2017: Governance and the Law, Chapter 3: The role of law’, pp. 
83, 140: http://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/wdr2017  
The ‘disposition time’ indicator is the number of unresolved cases divided by the number of resolved cases at 
the end of a year multiplied by 365 (days). It is a standard indicator defined by Council of Europe's CEPEJ: 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/evaluation/default_en.asp 
Vincenzo Bove and Leandro Elia; The judicial system and economic development across EU Member States, 
JRC  Technical  Report,  EUR 28440  EN,  Publications  Office  of 
the  EU,  Luxembourg,  2017: 
http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC104594/jrc104594__2017_the_judicial_system_a
nd_economic_development_across_eu_member_states.pdf 
Idem. 
Effect of judicial independence on foreign direct investment in Eastern Europe and South Asia; Bülent Dogru; 
2012, 
https://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/40471/1/MPRA_paper_40322.pdf  .  EU  Member  States  included  in  the  study  were:  BG,  HR, 
CZ, EE, HU, LV, LT, RO, SK and SI. 
The Economist Intelligence Unit: ‘Risk and Return – Foreign Direct Investment and the Rule of Law’, 2015  
http://www.biicl.org/documents/625_d4_fdi_main_report.pdf, p.22. 

‘The  Global  Competitiveness  Report 

2019’,  October 

Archive: 

Personal 

Munich 

Forum, 

MPRA 

RePEc 

2019: 

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cost  and  excessive  length  of  judicial  proceedings,  respectively,  were  the  main  reasons  for  not  starting 
court  proceedings  over  infringement  of  intellectual  property  rights  (IPR)  (29).  The  Commission 
Communication  “Identifying  and  adressing  barriers  to  the  Single  Market”  (30)  and  the  Single  Market 
Enforcement Action Plan (31) also provide insight into the importance of effective justice systems for the 
functioning of the single market, in particular for businesses.  

How does the Commission support the implementation of good justice reforms through the Technical 
Support? 

Member States can draw on the Commission’s technical support available through the Directorate-General 
REFORM under the structural reform support programme(32) which has a total budget of €222.8 million 
for 2017-2020. Since 2017, 16 Member States (33) have already been receiving or have requested technical 
support in many areas. This includes for example technical support to improve the efficiency of the court 
system,  to  reform  the  judicial  map,  on  court  organisation,  on  the  design  or  implementation  of  e-justice 
programmes and cyber justice, on case-management systems, on the selection and promotion process for 
judges, for the training of judges and for the out-of-court resolution of consumer disputes. In May 2020, 
the  Commission  also  presented  its  proposals  for  a  Recovery  Plan  (34).  As  part  of  the  Recovery  Plan,  a 
Technical Support Instrument  (35) was proposed as the continuation of the existing Structural Reform 
Support  Programme.  It  builds  on  its  success,  allowing  the  Commission  to  help  strengthening  the 
institutional  and  administrative  capacity  of  EU  Member  States.  The  Instrument  will  continue  to  allow 
Member States to ask for technical support in the area of, among others, the justice system.  

29  

30  
31  

(EUIPO), 

Intellectual  Property 

Intellectual  Property  Office 

(IP)  SME  Scoreboard  2016: 

EU 
https://euipo.europa.eu/tunnel-
web/secure/webdav/guest/document_library/observatory/documents/sme_scoreboard_study_2016/Executive-
summary_en.pdf 
COM(2020)93 and SWD(2020)54.   
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social  Committee and the Committee of the  Regions  “Long term action plan for better  implementation  and 
enforcement of single market rules”, COM(2020)94, see in particular actions 4, 6 and 18.  
https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/funding-opportunities/funding-programmes/overview-funding-
programmes/structural-reform-support-programme-srsp_en 
BE, BG, CZ, EE, EL, ES, HR, IT, CY, LV, HU, MT, PL, PT, SI and SK. 
See 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_940    
35         https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2020:0409:FIN  

IP/20/940, 

available 

33  
34  

release 

2020, 

press 

May 

27 

32 

at:  

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2. 

CONTEXT: DEVELOPMENTS IN JUSTICE REFORMS IN 2019 

In  2019,  a  large  number  of  Member  States  continued  their  efforts  to  further  improve  the 
effectiveness  of  their  justice  systems.  Figure  1  presents  an  updated  overview  of  adopted  and 
planned  measures  across  the  different  functional  areas  of  justice  systems  in  Member  States 
engaged in reform activities. 

Figure  1:  Legislative  and  regulatory  activity  concerning  justice  systems  in  2019  (adopted 
measures/initiatives under negotiation per Member State) (source: European Commission (36))  

In 2019, procedural law continued to be an area of particular focus in a large number of Member 
States with a significant amount of ongoing or planned legislative activity. Reforms concerning 
the status of judges, the rules for legal professionals and prosecutors also saw elevated activity. 
Compared with the last edition of the EU Justice Scoreboard, the adoption of measures in areas 
such as the administration of courts and councils of the judiciary gathered further momentum as 
Member  States  followed  up  on  earlier  announcements.  .  Activity  in  other  areas,  such  as 
information  and  communication  technology  (ICT)  development  in  the  justice  system  or  re-
designing judicial maps, slowed down. Some Member States are already actively using or at least 
planning to make use of artificial intelligence in their justice systems. Once more, the overview 
confirms  the  observation  that  justice  reforms  require  their  time  –  sometimes  spanning  several 
years – from their announcement until the adoption of the legislative and regulatory measures and 
their actual implementation on the ground. 

36 

The  information  has  been  collected  in  cooperation  with  the  group  of  contact  persons  on  national  justice 
systems for 26 Member States. DE explained that a number of reforms are under way on judiciary,  where the 
scope and scale of the reform process can vary within the 16 federal states. 

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3. 

KEY FINDINGS OF THE 2020 EU JUSTICE SCOREBOARD 

Efficiency, quality and independence are the main parameters of an effective justice system, and 
the Scoreboard presents indicators on all three. 

3.1. Efficiency of justice systems 

The Scoreboard presents indicators for the efficiency of proceedings in the broad areas of civil, 
commercial  and  administrative  cases  and  in  specific  areas  where  administrative  authorities  and 
courts apply EU law(37). 

3.1.1. Developments in caseload 

The caseload of national justice systems decreased in a majority of Member States and remains 
largely below the 2012 levels, even if it continues to vary considerably between Member States 
(Figure 2). This shows the importance of remaining attentive to ensure the effectiveness of justice 
systems. 

Figure  2:  Number  of  incoming  civil,  commercial,  administrative  and  other  cases,  2012  – 
2018 (*) (1st instance/per 100 inhabitants) (source: CEPEJ study (38)) 

(*) Under the CEPEJ methodology, this category includes all civil and commercial litigious and non-litigious cases, 
non-litigious  land  and  business  registry  cases,  other  registry  cases,  other  non-litigious  cases,  administrative  law 
cases and other non-criminal cases. Methodology changes in LV (applied retroactively to 2016 and also 2017)  SK 
and SE (data for 2016 and 2017 has been adapted to include migration law cases as administrative cases, in line 
with CEPEJ methodology).  

37  

38  

The  enforcement  of  court  decisions  is  also  important  for  the  efficiency  of  a  justice  system.  However, 
comparable data are not available in most Member States. 
2019  study  on  the  functioning  of  judicial  systems  in  the  EU  Member  States,  carried  out  by  the  CEPEJ 
Secretariat  for  the  Commission:  https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/justice-and-fundamental-rights/effective-
justice/eu-justice-scoreboard_en 

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Figure  3:  Number  of  incoming  civil  and  commercial  litigious  cases,  2012  –  2018  (*)  (1st 
instance/per 100 inhabitants) (source: CEPEJ study) 

(*) Under the CEPEJ methodology, litigious civil/commercial cases concern disputes between parties, e.g disputes 
about  contracts.  Non-litigious  civil/commercial  cases  concern  uncontested  proceedings,  e.g.  uncontested  payment 
orders. Methodology changes in EL and SK. Data for NL include non-litigious cases. 

Figure  4:  Number  of  incoming  administrative  cases,  2012  –  2018  (*)  (1st  instance/per  100 
inhabitants) (source: CEPEJ study)  

(*)  Under  the  CEPEJ  methodology,  administrative  law  cases  concern  disputes  between  individuals  and  local, 
regional  or  national  authorities.  DK  and  IE  do  not  record  administrative  cases  separately.  Dejudiciarisation  of 
some  administrative  procedures  have  occurred  in  RO  in  2018.  Methodology  changes  in  EL,  SK  and  SE.  In  SE, 
migration cases have been included under administrative cases (reotractively applied for 2016 and also 2017). 

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3.1.2. General data on efficiency 

The  indicators  on  the  efficiency  of  proceedings  in  the  broad  areas  of  civil,  commercial  and 
administrative cases are:  estimated length  of proceedings (disposition time), clearance rate; and 
number of pending cases. 

 Estimated length of proceedings – 

The length of proceedings indicates the estimated time (in days) needed to resolve a case in court, 
meaning the time taken by the court to reach a decision at first instance. The ‘disposition time’ 
indicator is the number of unresolved cases divided by the number of resolved cases at the end of 
a  year  multiplied  by  365  (days)  (39).  It  is  a  calculated  quantity  that  indicates  the  estimated 
minimum time that a court would need to resolve a case while maintaining the current working 
conditions.  The  higher  the  value,  the  higher  is  the  probability  that  it  takes  the  court  longer  to 
reach a decision. Figures mostly concern proceedings at first instance courts and compare, where 
available, data for 2012, 2016, 2017 and 2018 (40). Two figures show the disposition time in 2018 
in  civil  and  commercial  litigious  cases,  and  administrative  cases  at  all  court  instances,  and  one 
figure  shows  the  average  length  of  proceedings  in  money  laundering  cases  at  first  and  second 
instance courts. 

Figure  5:  Estimated  time  needed  to  resolve  civil,  commercial,  administrative  and  other 
cases, 2012 – 2018 (*)(1st instance/in days) (source: CEPEJ study) 

(*) Under the CEPEJ methodology, this category includes all civil and commercial litigious and non-litigious cases, 
non-litigious  land  and  business  registry  cases,  other  registry  cases,  other  non-litigious  cases,  administrative  law 
cases  and  other  non-criminal  cases.  Methodology  changes  in  SK.  Pending  cases  include  all  instances  in  CZ  and, 
until 2016, in SK. LV: the sharp decrease is due to court system reform, and error checks and data clean-ups in the 
Court information system. 

39 

40 

Length of proceedings, clearance rate and number of pending cases are standard indicators defined by CEPEJ: 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/evaluation/default_en.asp 
The years were chosen to keep the seven-year perspective with 2012 as a baseline, while at the same time not 
overcrowding the figures. Data for 2010, 2013, 2014 and 2015 are available in the CEPEJ report. 

10 

 
 
                                                           
Figure  6:  Estimated  time  needed  to  resolve  litigious  civil  and  commercial  cases,  2012  – 
2018(*) (1st instance/in days) (source: CEPEJ study) 

(*) Under the CEPEJ methodology, litigious civil/commercial cases concern disputes between parties, e.g disputes 
about  contracts.  Non-litigious  civil/commercial  cases  concern  uncontested  proceedings,  e.g.  uncontested  payment 
orders. Methodology changes in EL and SK. Pending cases include all instances in CZ and, until 2016, in SK. Data 
for NL include non-litigious cases. 

Figure  7:  Estimated  time  needed  to  resolve  litigious  civil  and  commercial  cases  (*)  at  all 
court instances in 2018 (1st, 2nd and 3rd instance/in days) (source: CEPEJ study) 

(*) The order is determined by the court instance with the longest proceedings in each Member State. No data are 
available for first and second instance courts in  BE, BG and IE, for second instance courts in NL, for second and 
third instance courts in NL and AT or for second instance courts in DE and HR. There is no third instance court in 
MT. Access to a third instance court may be limited in some Member States.  

11 

 
 
 
 
Figure  8:  Estimated  time  needed  to  resolve  administrative  cases,  2012  –  2018  (*)  (1st 
instance/in days) (source: CEPEJ study) 

(*) Administrative law cases concern disputes between individuals and local, regional or national authorities, under 
the CEPEJ methodology. Methodology changes in EL and SK. Pending cases include all court instances in CZ and, 
until 2016, in SK. DK and IE do not record administrative cases separately.  CY: in 2018, the number of resolved 
cases has increased as a consequence of cases being tried together, the withdrawal of 2,724 consolidated cases and 
the creation of an Administrative Court 2 years ago. 

Figure 9: Estimated time needed to resolve administrative cases (*) at all court instances in 
2018 (1st and, where applicable, 2nd and 3rd instance/in days) (source: CEPEJ study) 

(*)  The  order  is  determined  by  the  court  instance  with  the  longest  proceedings  in  each  Member  State.  No  data 
available:  for  the  first  instance  court  in  LU,  for  second  instance  courts  in  MT  and  RO  and  for  the  third  instance 
court in NL. The supreme or another highest court is the only appeal instance in CZ, IT, CY, AT, SI and FI. There 
is no third instance court for these types of cases in HR, LT, LU, and MT. The highest Administrative Court is the 
first and only instance for certain cases in BE. Access to third instance court may be limited in some Member States. 
DK and IE do not record administrative cases separately. 

 Clearance rate – 

The  clearance  rate  is  the  ratio  of  the  number  of  resolved  cases  over  the  number  of  incoming 
cases. It measures whether a court is keeping up with its incoming caseload. When the clearance 
rate  is  around  100%  or  higher,  it  means  the  judicial  system  is  able  to  resolve  at  least  as  many 
cases as come in. When the clearance rate is below 100 %, it means that the courts are resolving 
fewer cases than the number of incoming cases. 

12 

 
 
 
Figure 10: Rate of resolving civil, commercial, administrative and other cases, 2012 – 2018 
(*)  (1st  instance/in  %  —  values  higher  than  100 %  indicate  that  more  cases  are  resolved  than 
come in, while values below 100 % indicate that fewer cases are resolved than come in) (source: 
CEPEJ study) 

(*)  Methodology  changes  in  SK.  IE:  the  number  of  resolved  cases  is  expected  to  be  underreported  due  to  the 
methodology. IT: different classification of civil cases introduced in 2013. 

Figure  11:  Rate  of  resolving  litigious  civil  and  commercial  cases,  2012  –  2018  (*)  (1st 
instance/in %) (source: CEPEJ study) 

(*) Methodology changes in EL and SK. IE: the number of resolved cases is expected to be underreported due to the 
methodology. IT: different classification of civil cases introduced in 2013. Data for NL include non-litigious cases. 

13 

 
 
Figure 12: Rate of resolving administrative cases, 2012 – 2018 (*) (1st instance/in %) (source: 
CEPEJ study) 

(*) Past values for some Member States have been reduced for presentation purposes (CY in 2018 = 219%;  IT in 
2012=279,8 %); Methodology changes in EL and SK. DK and IE do not record administrative cases separately. In 
CY the  number of resolved cases has increased as a consequence of cases being tried together, the withdrawal of 
2,724 consolidated cases and the creation of an Administrative Court 2 years ago. 

 Pending cases – 

The number of pending cases expresses the number of cases that remains to be dealt with at the 
end of the year in question. It also influences the disposition time. 

Figure 13: Number of pending civil, commercial and administrative and other cases, 2012 – 
2018 (*) (1st instance/per 100 inhabitants) (source: CEPEJ study) 

(*)  Methodology  changes  in  SK.  Pending  cases  include  all  instances  in  CZ  and,  until  2016,  in  SK.  IT:  different 
classification of civil cases introduced in 2013. 

14 

 
 
Figure  14:  Number  of  pending  litigious  civil  and  commercial  cases,  2012  –  2018  (*)  (1st 
instance/per 100 inhabitants) (source: CEPEJ study) 

(*)  Methodology  changes  in  EL  and  SK.  Pending  cases  include  all  instances  in  CZ  and,  until  2016,  in  SK.  IT: 
different classification of civil cases introduced in 2013. Data for NL include non-litigious cases. 

Figure  15:  Number  of  pending  administrative  cases,  2012  –  2018  (*)  (1st  instance/per  100 
inhabitants) (source: CEPEJ study) 

(*)  Past  values  for  some  Member  States  have  been  reduced  for  presentation  purposes  (EL  in  2012=3.5). 
Methodology changes in EL and SK. Pending cases include all instances in CZ and, until 2016, in SK. DK and IE 
do not record administrative cases separately. 

15 

 
 
 
 
3.1.3. Efficiency in specific areas of EU law 

This section complements the general data on the efficiency of justice systems and  presents the 
average  length  of  proceedings  (41)  in  specific  areas  when  EU  law  is  involved.  The  2020 
Scoreboard builds on previous data in the areas of competition, electronic communications, EU 
trademark,  consumer  law  and  anti-money  laundering.  The  areas  are  selected  because  of  their 
relevance for the single market and the business environment. In general, long delays in judicial 
proceedings  may  have  negative  consequences  on  rights  stemming  from  EU  law,  e.g.  when 
appropriate remedies are no longer available or serious financial damages become irrecoverable. 

– Competition – 

Effective  enforcement  of  competition  law  ensures  a  level  playing  field  for  businesses  and  is 
therefore essential for an attractive business environment. Figure 16 presents the average length 
of  cases  against  decisions  of  national  competition  authorities  applying  Articles  101  and  102 
TFEU (42). 

Figure  16:  Competition:  Average  length  of  judicial  review,  2013-2018  (*)  (1st  instance/in 
days) (source: European Commission with the European Competition Network) 

(*)  EE: no cases.  IE and AT: scenario is not applicable as the authorities do not have  powers to take  respective 
decisions.  AT: data includes cases decided by the Cartel Court involving an infringement of Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU, but not based on appeals against the national competition authority. An estimation of length was used in BG, 
IT. An empty column can indicate that the Member State reported no cases for the year. The number of cases is low 
(below 5 per year) in many Member States, which can make the annual data dependent on one exceptionally long or 
short  case.  A  number  of  the  longest  cases  in  the  dataset  included  the  time  needed  for  a reference  to  the  Court  of 
Justice  of  the  European  Union  (e.g.  LT), a  constitutional  review  (e.g.  SK)  or  specific  procedural delays  (e.g.  CZ, 
EL, HU).  

41  

42  

The length of proceedings in specific areas is calculated in calendar days, counting from the day on which an 
action or appeal was lodged before the court (or the indictment became final) until the day on which the court 
adopted  its  decision  (Figures  16-21).  Values  are  ranked  based  on  a  weighted  average  of  data  for  2013  and 
2016-2018  for  Figures  16-18,  data  for  2013,  2015-2016  and  2018  for  Figure  19,  and  data  for  2014  and 
2016-2018 for Figures 20 and 21. Where data was not available for all years, the average reflects the available 
data, calculated based on all cases, a sample of cases or estimations. 
See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT&from=EN. 

16 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
– Electronic communications – 

The objective of EU electronic communications legislation is to raise competition, to contribute 
to the development of the single market and to generate investment, innovation and growth. The 
positive effects for consumers can be achieved through effective enforcement of this legislation 
which  can  lead  to  lower  end-user  prices  and  better  quality  services.  Figure  17  presents  the 
average  length  of  judicial  review  cases  against  decisions  of  national  regulatory  authorities 
applying EU law on electronic communications(43). It covers a broad spectrum of cases, ranging 
from more complex ‘market analysis’ reviews to consumer-focused issues. 

Figure  17: Electronic communications: Average length  of judicial  review cases, 2013-2018 
(*) (1st instance/in days) (source: European Commission with the Communications Committee) 

(*)  The  number  of  cases  varies  by  Member  State.  An  empty  column  indicates  that  the  Member  State  reported  no 
cases for the year (except PT for 2017 and 2018, and RO for 2018: no data). LU: no cases. In some court instances, 
the  limited  number  of  relevant  cases  (LV,  LT,  MT,  SK,  SE)  can  make  the  annual  data  dependent  on  one 
exceptionally long or short case and result in large variations from one year to the other. DK: quasi-judicial body in 
charge of 1st instance appeals. ES, AT, and PL: different courts in charge depending on the subject matter. MT: an 
exceptionally  long  case  of  2500  days  was  reported  in  2016,  which  related  to  a  complex  issue  whereby  a  local 
authority,  together  with  several  residents,  filed  proceedings  in  relation  to  alleged  harmful  emissions  from  base 
mobile radiocommunications stations. 

– EU trademark – 

Effective  enforcement  of  intellectual  property  rights  is  essential  to  stimulate  investment  in 
innovation.  EU legislation on EU trademarks (44) gives a significant  role to  the national  courts, 
which  act  as  EU  courts  and  take  decisions  affecting  the  single  market.  Figure  18  shows  the 
average length of EU trademark infringement cases in litigation among private parties. 

43   

44  

The  calculation  has  been  made  based  on  the  length  of  cases  of  appeal  against  national  regulatory  authority 
decisions  applying  national  laws  that  implement  the  regulatory  framework  for  electronic  communications 
(Directives  2002/19/EC  (Access  Directive),  Directive  2002/20/EC  (Authorisation  Directive),  Directive 
2002/21/EC (Framework Directive), Directive 2002/22/EC (Universal Service Directive), and other relevant 
EU law such as the radio spectrum policy programme, Commission spectrum decisions, excluding Directive 
2002/58/EC on privacy and electronic communications. 
Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European 
Union trade mark (OJ L 154, 16.62017, p. 1-99). 

17 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Figure 18: EU trademark: Average length of EU trademark infringement cases, 2013-2018 
(*)  (1st  instance/in  days)  (source:  European  Commission  with  the  European  Observatory  on 
infringements of intellectual property rights) 

(*) FR, IT, LT, LU: a sample of cases used for data for certain years. BG: estimation by courts used for 2016. PL: 
estimation by courts used for 2015. Particularly long cases affecting the average reported in  EE, IE, LV and SE. 
EL: data based on weighted average length from two courts. DK: data from all trademark cases - not only EU - in 
Commercial  and  Maritime  High  Courts;  for  2018,  no  data  on  average  length  due  to  new  ICT  system.  ES:  cases 
concerning other EU IP titles are included in the calculation of average length; for 2018, an estimation is used. 

– Consumer protection – 

Effective enforcement of consumer law ensures that consumers benefit from their rights and that 
companies  infringing  consumer  rules  do  not  gain  unfair  advantage.  Consumer  authorities  and 
courts  play  a  key  role  in  the  enforcement  of  EU  consumer  law  (45)  within  the  various  national 
enforcement  systems.  Figure  19  illustrates  the  average  length  of  judicial  review  cases  against 
decisions of consumer protection authorities applying EU law.  

For consumers or companies, effective enforcement can involve a chain of actors, not only courts 
but  also  administrative  authorities.  To  continue  the  examination  of  this  enforcement  chain,  the 
length  of proceedings by consumer  authorities is  presented again.  Figure  20 shows the  average 
length of administrative decisions by national consumer protection authorities in 2014-2018 from 
the moment a case is opened. Relevant decisions include declaring infringements of substantive 
rules, interim measures, cease and desist orders, initiation of court proceedings or case closure. 

45   

Figures 19 and 20 relate to the enforcement of the Unfair Terms Directive (93/13/EEC), the Consumer Sales 
and  Guarantees  Directive  (1999/44/EC),  the  Unfair  Commercial  Practices  Directive  (2005/29/EC)  and  the 
Consumer Rights Directive (2011/83/EC), and their national implementing provisions. 

18 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
Figure  19:  Consumer  protection:  Average  length  of  judicial  review,  2013-2018(*)  
(1st instance/in days) (source: European Commission with the Consumer Protection Cooperation 
Network) 

(*)  AT,  FI,  DE,  LU:  scenario  is  not  applicable  as  consumer  authorities  are  not  empowered  to  decide  on 
infringements of relevant consumer rules. The number of relevant cases is low (less than five) in CY, IE, NL and SE. 
An estimate of average length was provided by EL and RO.  

Figure  20:  Consumer  protection:  Average  length  of  administrative  decisions  by  consumer 
protection authorities, 2014-2018(*) (1st instance/in days) (source: European Commission with 
the Consumer Protection Cooperation Network) 

(*) AT, DE, LU: scenario is not applicable as consumer authorities are not empowered to decide on infringements 
of  relevant  consumer  rules.  The  number  of  relevant  cases  is  low  (less  than  five)  in  NL  and  SE.  An  estimate  of 
average length was provided by DK, FI, FR, EL, FR and RO. 

19 

 
 
 
 
 
– Money Laundering – 

In addition to contributing to the fight against crime, the effectiveness of the fight against money 
laundering is crucial for the soundness, integrity and stability of the financial sector, confidence 
in  the  financial  system  and  fair  competition  in  the  single  market  (46).  As  underlined  by  the 
International  Monetary  Fund,  money  laundering  can  discourage  foreign  investment,  distort 
international  capital  flows  and  negatively  affect  a  country’s  macroeconomic  performance, 
resulting in welfare losses, draining resources from more productive economic activities (47). The 
anti-money  laundering  Directive  requires  Member  States  to  maintain  statistics  on  the 
effectiveness  of  their  systems  to  combat  money  laundering  or  terrorist  financing(48).  In 
cooperation  with  Member  States,  an  updated  questionnaire  was  used  to  collect  data  on  the 
judicial  phases  of  the  national  anti-money  laundering  regimes.  Figure  21  shows  the  average 
length of first instance court cases dealing with money laundering criminal offences.  
Figure  21:  Money  laundering:  Average  length  of  court  cases,  2014-2018(*)  (1st  instance/in 
days)  (source:  European  Commission  with  the  Expert  Group  on  Money  Laundering  and 
Financing of Terrorism) 

(*) No data for 2018: BE, EE, CY, AT, PL, and PT. ES, NL: estimated length. LV: Due to a relatively low number 
of cases in 2016 various factors possibly impact the length of proceeding, e.g. a stay in a single case for objective 
reasons. PL: Calculation of length for 2016 based on a randomly selected sample of cases. SE: calculation in 2017 
based  on  a  sample  of  resolved  cases;  the  data  for  2018  are  preliminary.  IT:  data  refer  to  the  responding  courts, 
covering about 91% of the total proceedings in 2015, and about 99% in 2016 and 2017; data refer to both trial and 
preliminary court hearings. 

46 

47  

48  

Recital 2 of Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the 
prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing. 
IMF  factsheet,  March  8,  2018:  https://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/08/01/16/31/Fight-
Against-Money-Laundering-the-Financing-of-Terrorism  
Article  44(1)  of  the  Directive  (EU)  2015/849.  See  also  the  revised  Article  44  in  Directive  (EU)  2018/843, 
which entered into force in June 2018 and had to be implemented by Member States by January 2020 at the 
latest.  

20 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
3.1.4. Summary on the efficiency of justice systems 

An efficient justice system manages its caseload and backlog of cases, and delivers its decisions 
without  undue  delay.  The  main  indicators  used  by  the  EU  Justice  Scoreboard  to  monitor  the 
efficiency of justice systems are therefore the length of proceedings (estimated or average time in 
days needed to resolve a case), the clearance rate (the ratio of the number of resolved cases over 
the number of incoming cases) and the number of pending cases (that remains to be dealt with at 
the end of the year). 

General data on efficiency 
The 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard contains data on efficiency spanning seven years (2012-2018). 
This time-span allows to identify certain trends and to take into account that justice reforms often 
take time to show their impact. 
Looking at the available data since 2012 in civil, commercial and administrative cases, efficiency 
has  improved  or  remained  stable  in  11  Member  States,  while  it  decreased,  albeit  often  only 
marginally, in eight Member States. 
Positive developments can be observed in most of the Member States that have been identified in 
the context of the European Semester as facing specific challenges (49): 
  Since  2012,  in  nearly  all  of  those  Member  States,  the  length  of  first  instance  court 
proceedings  in  the  broad  ‘all  cases’  category  (Figure  5)  and  the  litigious  civil  and 
commercial  cases  (Figure  6)  has  decreased  or  remained  stable.  In  administrative  cases 
(Figure  8),  the  length  of  proceedings  since  2012  decreased  or  remained  stable  in  most  of 
these  Member  States.  Overall,  only  a  few  Member  States  saw  an  increase  in  the  length  of 
proceedings in 2018. 

 

  The  Scoreboard  presents  data  on  the  length  of  proceedings  in  all  court  instances  for 
litigious  civil  and  commercial  cases  (Figure  7)  and  administrative  cases  (Figure  9).  Data 
show  that  in  a  number  of  Member  States  identified  as  facing  challenges  with  the  length  of 
proceedings  in  first  instance  courts,  higher  instance  courts  perform  in  a  more  efficient 
manner. On the contrary, for some other Member States facing challenges, the average length 
of proceedings in higher instance courts is even longer than in first instance courts. 
In the broad ‘all cases’, and the litigious civil and commercial cases categories (Figures 10 
and 11), the overall number of Member States where the clearance rate is more than 100% 
has  increased  since  2012.  In  2018,  nearly  all  Member  States,  including  those  facing 
challenges,  reported  a  high  clearance  rate  (more  than  97%),  which  means  that  courts  are 
generally  able  to  deal  with  the  incoming  cases  in  these  categories.  In  administrative  cases 
(Figure 12), a larger variation of the clearance rate can be observed from one year to another 
and while it generally remains lower than in other categories of cases, some Member States 
have made good progress. In particular, most of the Member States facing challenges report 
an increase in the clearance rate in administrative cases since 2012.  

  Since 2012, progress  is  continuing in  almost  all Member States  facing the most substantial 
challenges  with  their  backlogs  ,  regardless  of  the  category  of  cases.  Often  substantial 
progress  in  reducing  pending  cases  has  been  made  for  both  litigious  civil  and  commercial 
cases  (Figure  14)  and  administrative  cases  (Figure  15).  Despite  these  improvements, 

49  

HR,  IT,  CY,  HU,  MT,  PT  and  SK,  which  received  2019  European  Semester  country-specific 
recommendations, and BE, BG, IE, EL, ES, LV, PL, RO, and SI for which the challenges have been reflected 
in the recitals of their 2019 country-specific recommendations and country reports.  
Variance in the results over the 7 years analysed may be explained by contextual factors (variations of more 
than 10% of incoming cases are not unusual) or systemic deficiencies (lack of  flexibility and responsiveness 
or inconsistencies in the process of reform).  

21 

 
 
                                                           
significant  differences  between  Member  States  with  comparatively  few  pending  cases  and 
those  with  a  high  number  of  pending  cases  remain,  and  in  some  Member  States,  backlogs 
appear to be building up. 

Efficiency in specific areas of EU law 
Data on the average length of proceedings in specific areas of EU law (Figures 16-21) provide an 
insight into the functioning of justice systems in these types of business-related disputes.  

Data  on  efficiency  in  specific  areas  of  law  are  collected  on  the  basis  of  narrowly  defined 
scenarios  and  the  number  of  relevant  cases  may  appear  low.  However,  as  compared  to  the 
calculated length of proceedings presented in the general data on efficiency, these figures provide 
for an actual average length of all relevant cases in specific areas in a year. It is therefore worth 
noting that several  Member States which do not  appear to  be facing  challenges  on the basis of 
general data on efficiency report significantly longer average length of cases in specific areas of 
EU  law.  At  the  same  time,  the  length  of  proceedings  in  different  specific  areas  may  also  vary 
considerably in the same Member State. 

The figures in specific areas of EU law show the following trends : 
  For  competition  cases  (Figure  16),  although  the  overall  caseload  faced  by  courts  across 
Member States increased slightly, the length of judicial review decreased or remained stable 
in  six  Member  States,  while  it  increased  in  five  other  Member  States.  In  2018  the  positive 
trend  continued, with  only two Member States reporting an  average length exceeding 1000 
days (compared to three in 2017). 
In  the  area  of  electronic  communications  (Figure  17),  the  case-loads  faced  by  courts 
continued  to  increase,  ending  the  positive  trend  in  terms  of  reduced  length  of  proceedings 
observed  in  previous  years.  In  2018,  most  Member  States  registered  an  increase  in  the 
average lengths of proceedings, both compared to 2017 and to 2013. 

 

  As  regards  EU  trademark  infringement  cases  (Figure  18),  in  2018  trends  in  the  average 
length  of  proceedings  varied  significantly.  Some  Member  States  registered  sharp  increases, 
while  others  managed  to  cope  better  with  their  caseload  and  reduced  the  time  needed  to 
resolve cases.  

  The possible combined effect of the enforcement chain consisting of both administrative and 
judicial review proceedings is presented in the area of consumer law (Figures 19 and 20). In 
2018,  seven  Member  States  reported  that  their  consumer  protection  authorities  took  on 
average  less  than  three  months  to  issue  a  decision  in  a  case  covered  by  EU  consumer  law, 
while  in  nine  Member  States  they  took  more  than  6  months.Where  the  decisions  of  the 
consumer protection authorities were challenged in courts, in 2018 the judicial review of an 
administrative decision took on average less than one year in the majority of Member States.  
  The  effective  fight  against  money  laundering  is  crucial  in  protecting  the  financial  system, 
fair  competition  and  preventing  negative  economic  consequences.  Challenges  in  length  of 
court proceedings when dealing with money laundering offences, may influence the effective 
fight  against  money  laundering.  The  2020  EU  Justice  Scoreboard  presents  updated  data  on 
the length of judicial proceedings dealing with money laundering offences (Figure 21), which 
show that while in around half of Member States the first instance court proceedings take up 
to a year on average, these proceedings take around two years on average in several Member 
States facing challenges regarding prosecution of money laundering offences (50). 

50   Directive (EU) 2018/1673 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on combating 
money laundering by criminal law  will eliminate  legal obstacles that  may delay prosecution, such as that a 
prosecution  for  money laundering can only start  when the  proceedings  for the  underlying predicate offence 
have been concluded. Member States have to transpose the Directive before 8 December 2020. 

22 

 
 
                                                           
3.2. Quality of justice systems 

There  is  no  single  way  of  measuring  the  quality  of  justice  systems.  The  2020  EU  Justice 
Scoreboard continues to examine factors that are generally accepted as relevant for improving the 
quality of justice. As in previous years, they are grouped into four categories: 

1) accessibility of justice for citizens and businesses; 

2) adequate financial and human resources; 

3) putting in place assessment tools; and 

4) using quality standards. 

3.2.1. Accessibility 

Accessibility  is  required  throughout  the  whole  justice  chain  to  enable  people  to  obtain  relevant 
information — about the justice system, how to initiate a claim and the related financial aspects, 
the state of play of proceedings up until their end — so that the judgment can be swiftly accessed 
online. 

– Giving information about the justice system – 

Citizen-friendly  justice  requires  that  information  about  the  judicial  system  is  not  only  easily 
accessible but is also tailored to specific groups of society that would otherwise have difficulties 
in accessing the information. Figure 22 shows the availability of online information on specific 
aspects of the judicial system and for specific groups of society. 

Figure  22:  Availability  of  online  information  about  the  judicial  system  for  the  general 
public, 2019(*) (source: European Commission (51)) 

(*) DE: Each federal state as well as the federal level decide individually which information to provide online. 

51 

2019 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems. 

23 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
– Legal aid, court fees and legal fees – 

The cost of litigation is  a key  factor  for  access  to justice. High litigation costs, including  court 
fees(52) and legal fees(53), may hamper access to justice. Litigation costs in civil and commercial 
matters are not harmonised at EU level. They are governed by national legislation and therefore 
vary from one Member State to another.  
Access to legal aid is a fundamental right enshrined in the Charter(54). It allows access to justice 
for those who would not be able to bear or advance the costs of litigation. Most Member States 
grant legal aid on the basis of the applicant’s income(55). 

Figure 23 shows the availability of full or partial legal aid in a specific consumer case involving a 
claim  of  €6,000.  It  compares  the  income  thresholds  for  granting  legal  aid,  expressed  as 
percentage  of  the  Eurostat  poverty  threshold  in  each  Member  State  (56).  For  example,  if  the 
threshold for legal  aid  appears at  20 %, it means that an applicant  with  an income 20 % higher 
than the Eurostat poverty threshold in his or her Member State will be still eligible for legal aid. 
On the contrary, if the threshold for legal aid appears at below 0, it means that a person with an 
income below the poverty threshold may not be eligible for legal aid. 

Some  Member  States  operate  a  legal  aid  system  that  provides  for  100 %  coverage  of  the  costs 
linked to litigation (full legal aid), complemented by a system covering partial costs (partial legal 
aid), the latter applying eligibility criteria different from that of the former. Other Member States 
operate either only a full or only a partial legal aid system. 

52  

53  
54  
55 

56  

Court  fees  are  understood  as  an  amount  to  be  paid  to  initiate  non-criminal  law  proceedings  in  a  court  or 
tribunal. 
Legal fees are the consideration for services provided by lawyers to their clients. 
Article 47(3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. 
Member  States  use  different  methods  to  establish  the  eligibility  threshold,  e.g.  different  reference  periods 
(monthly/annual  income).  About  half  of  the  Member  States  also  have  a  threshold  related  to  the  personal 
capital of the applicant. This is not taken into account for this figure. In BE, BG, IE, ES, FR, HR, HU, LV, 
LT, LU, NL and PT, certain groups of people (e.g. individuals who receive certain benefits) are automatically 
entitled to receive legal aid in civil/commercial disputes. Additional criteria that Member States may use, such 
as the merit of the case, are not reflected in this figure. Although not directly related to the figure, in several 
Member States (AT, CZ, DE, DK, EE, ES, FR, IT, NL, PL, PT, SI) legal aid is not limited to natural persons. 
To collect comparable data, each Member State’s respective Eurostat poverty threshold has been converted to 
a monthly income. The at-risk-of-poverty (AROP) threshold is set at 60 % of the national median equivalised 
disposable  household  income.  European  Survey  on  Income  and  Living  Conditions,  Eurostat  table  ilc_li01, 
available at: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/income-and-living-conditions/data/database. 

24 

 
 
                                                           
Figure 23: Income threshold for legal aid in a specific consumer case, 2019(*) (differences in 
% from Eurostat poverty threshold) (source: European Commission with the CCBE(57))  

(*) EE: decision to grant legal aid is not based on the level of financial resources of the applicant. IE: partial legal 
aid has to take into account also the disposable assets of the applicant.  LV: thresholds vary by municipality, upper 
limit is represented in the chart. 

Most  Member  States  require  parties  to  pay  a  court  fee  when  starting  judicial  proceedings. 
Recipients of legal aid are often exempt from paying court fees. Only in BG, EE, IE, NL, PL and 
SI are recipients  of legal  aid  not  automatically  exempt from  paying  court  fees.  In CZ the court 
decides  on  an  individual  basis  whether  to  exempt  a  legal  aid  recipient  from  paying  court  fees. 
Figure 24 compares for two scenarios the level of the court fee presented as a share of the value 
of the claim. If, for example, in the figure below the court fee appears at 10 % of a €6,000 claim, 
the consumer will have to pay a €600 court fee to start judicial proceedings. The low value claim 
is based on the Eurostat poverty threshold for each Member State. 

57  

2019  data  collected  through  replies  by  CCBE  members  to  a  questionnaire  based  on  the  following  specific 
scenario:  a  dispute  of  a  consumer  with  a  company  (two  different  values  of  the  claim  have  been  indicated: 
€6 000 and the Eurostat poverty threshold in each Member State). Given that conditions for legal aid depend 
on the applicant’s situation, the following scenario was used: a single 35-year-old employed applicant without 
any dependant and legal expenses insurance, with a regular income and a rented apartment. 

25 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Figure 24: Court fee to start judicial proceedings in a specific consumer case, 2019(*) (level 
of  court  fee  as  a  share  of  the  value  of  the  claim)  (source:  European  Commission  with  the 
CCBE(58)) 

(*) ‘Low value claim’ is a claim corresponding to the Eurostat poverty threshold for a single person in each Member 
State, converted to monthly income (e.g. in 2019, this value ranged from €164 in RO to €1,804 in LU). BE, EL and 
RO: no information on court fees for a low value claim was provided. LU: Litigants have to pay bailiff fees to start 
proceedings as a plaintiff unless they benefit from legal aid. NL: Court fees for income <€2275/month.  

58  

The data refer to income thresholds valid in 2019 and have been collected through replies by CCBE members 
to  a  questionnaire  based  on  the  following  specific  scenario:  a  dispute  of  a  consumer  with  a  company  (two 
different values of the claim have been indicated: €6000 and the Eurostat poverty threshold in each Member 
State). 

26 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Efficient  contract  enforcement  is  essential  for  the  economy.  The  likelihood  of  recovering  the 
actual  costs  of  litigation  strenghtens  the  position  of  the  creditor  seeking  to  enforce  a  contract. 
Typically, the creditor, as plaintiff, is required to pay a court fee for filing a case with the court. 
The courts generally order the defendant who loses to reimburse in full the court fees advanced 
by  the  plaintiff  who  has  won.  Figure  25  shows  the  level  of  court  fee  required  for  starting  a 
judicial proceeding in a specific commercial case (see footnote 59).  

Figure 25: Court fee to start judicial proceedings in a specific commercial case, 2019(*) (in 
€) (source: European Commission with the CCBE(59)) 

(*) Recovery of court fees is decided on a case-by-case basis in ES, PT and RO. There is no full recovery of court 
fees by the winning party in EL and HU.  

Normally,  the  creditor  has  to  advance  the  fees  of  their  own  lawyer  not  only  throughout  the 
litigious  phase  but  already  in  the  pre-litigious  phase.  As  regards  reimbursement,  most  Member 
States apply the rule according to which a party that loses a lawsuit is expected to bear not only 
its  own  legal  expenses,  but  also  those  of  the  winning  party.  Such  a  fee-shifting  rule  deters  the 
ﬁling of low-probability-of-winning cases, whilst it encourages the filing of high-probability-of-
winning cases. Figure 26 shows the amount the court would award to the successful plaintiff in a 
specific  commercial  case  scenario  (see  footnote  60).  Three  main  systems  can  be  distinguished: 
(1)  in  Member  States  with  a  statutory  fee  system,  reimbursement  of  legal  fees  depends  on  the 
level of statutory fee envisaged for the work carried out by the lawyer, which vary significantly 
between Member States; (2) in Member States without a statutory fee system, there is either full 
(HU,  PT,  FI)  or  partial  (PL,  LV,  LU)  reimbursement  of  the  legal  fee;  and  (3)  in  a  number  of 
Member States the reimbursement is decided by the court on a case-by-case basis.  

59  

The  data  have been collected through replies by CCBE  members to a questionnaire based on the  following 
specific  scenario:  a  dispute  between  two  companies  in  trans-border  commercial  litigation  concerning  the 
enforcement of contract. The value of the claim has been indicated as 20.000€. CCBE members were asked to 
provide information on the payable court fee to file the action in the case in the scenario.  

27 

 
 
                                                           
Figure  26:  Recoverability  of  legal  fees  in  a  commercial  trial,  2019  (*)  (in  EUR)  (source: 
European Commission with the CCBE(60))  

(*) For  this figure, legal fees do not include clerical costs and VAT, if payable. The hypothetical legal fee  for the 
litgious phase provided for in the scenario is €1 650. Full recovery in systems without statutory fee means that this 
amount  (€1,650)  can  be  recovered.  Member  States  with  partial  recovery  (PL,  LV,  LU)  are  sorted  by  order  of  the 
recoverable  legal  fee  (highest  to  lowest,  amounts  range  from  €1,275  –  €500).  The  figure  does  not  include 
information on the recoverability of legal fees for the pre-litigious phase, which is is not envisaged in all Member 
States. AT: scenario not fully applicable to ATs system of reimbursement. MT: there is no concept of an hourly legal 
fee in MT, reimbursement is determined based on the value of the claim. IT: there is a statutory fee in IT (€3235 in 
the scenario), but the court can decide on reimbursement within a set range.  LT: court decides taking into account 
guidance by the Ministry of Justice, maximum amount in the scenario would be €3,350.  

– Submitting and following a claim online – 

The  ability  to  complete  specific  steps  in  the  judicial  procedure  by  electronic  means  is  an 
important  part  of  the  quality  of  justice  systems  because  the  electronic  submission  of  claims  as 
well as the possibility to monitor and advance a proceeding online can ease access to justice and 
reduce  delays  and  costs.  ICT  systems  in  courts  also  play  an  increasing  role  in  cross-border 
cooperation between judicial authorities and facilitate the implementation of EU legislation, for 
example, on small claims procedures.  

60  

The  data  have  been  collected  through  replies  by  CCBE  members  to  a  questionnaire  based  on  the  same 
hypothetical case as for figure 25 (cf. FN 58). The following scenario was used as a basis for calculating the 
legal fees: the company seeking to enforce the contact contracted a specialised and experienced lawyer, who 
carried  out  the  following  work:  In  the  pre-litigious  phase:  3  hours  of  work,  one  document  produced  for  an 
hourly  legal  fee  of  150€ (overall  450€).  Litigious  phase:  11  hours  of  work,  3  documents  produced, 2  court 
hearings  for  an  hourly  legal  fee  of  150€  net  (overall  1650€).  CCBE  members  were  asked  to  provide 
information on a) the  statutory fee  foreseen for the  work in the (pre-) litigious phase, if existing and b) the 
amount of legal fee that the court would reasonably order to be reimbursed by the losing party. 

28 

 
 
 
  
 
 
                                                           
Figure  27:  Availability  of  electronic  means,  2018  (*)  (0  =  available  in  0%  of  courts,  4  = 
available in 100% of courts (61)) (source: CEPEJ study) 

(*) New methodology, data is not comparable to past years. DK and RO: cases may be submitted to courts by email.  

– Accessing judgments – 

Ensuring online access to judgments increases the transparency of justice systems, helps citizens 
and  businesses  understand  their  rights,  and  can  contribute  to  consistency  in  case-law.  The 
arrangements for online  publication of judicial decisions are  essential for creating user-friendly 
search  facilities  (62)  that  make  case-law  more  accessible  to  legal  professionals  and  the  general 
public. Seamless access to and easy reuse of case law enables innovative ‘legal tech’ applications 
supporting practitioners.  

The  online  publication  of  court  decisions  requires  balancing  a  variety  of  interests,  within  the 
boundaries set by legal and policy frameworks. The General Data Protection Regulation (63) fully 
applies to the processing of personal data by courts. A fair balance has to be struck between the 
right to data protection and the right to publicity of court decisions and transparency of the justice 
system when assessing what data are to be made public. This is particularly the case where there 
is prevailing public interest that justifies the disclosure of those data. In many countries, the law 
or  practice  requires  the  anonymisation  or  pseudonymisation  (64)  of  judicial  decisions  before 
publication,  either  in  a  systematic  manner  or  upon  request.  Data  produced  by  the  judiciary  are 
also  governed  by  European  legislation  on  open  data  and  the  reuse  of  public  sector  information 
(65). 

61  

62  

64  

65  

Data concern 2018. Equipment rate  from 100 % (device  completely deployed) to 0 % (device  non-existing) 
indicates  the  functional  presence  in  courts  of  the  device  covered  by  the  graph,  according  to  the  following 
scale: (100 % = 4 points if applicable to all matters / 1.33 points per specific matter; 50-99 % =  3 points if 
applicable to all matters / 1 point per specific  matter; 10-49 % =  2 points if applicable to all  matters / 0.66 
point  per  specific  matter;  1-9 %  =  1  point  if  applicable  to  all  matters  /  0.33  points  per  specific  matter. 
“Specific matter” relates to the type of litigation handled (civil/commercial, criminal, administrative or other). 
See  Best  practice  guide  for  managing  Supreme  Courts,  under  the  project  Supreme  Courts  as  guarantee  for 
effectiveness of judicial systems, p. 29. 
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27  April 2016 on the protection 
of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and 
repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1). 
Anonymisation/pseudonymisation is more efficient if assisted by an algorithm. However, human supervision 
is needed, since the algorithms do not understand context. 
Directive 2003/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 November 2003 on the re-use of 
public  sector  information  (OJ  L  345,  31.12.2003,  p.  90)  and  Directive  (EU)  2019/1024  of  the  European 
Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on open data and the re-use of public sector information (OJ L 
172, 26.6.2019, p. 56). 

29 

 
 
 
                                                           
The availability of judicial decisions in  a machine-readable format (66) facilitates an algorithm-
friendly justice system (67). 

Figure  28:  Online  access  to  published  judgments  by  the  general  public,  2019  (*) 
(civil/commercial,  administrative  and  criminal  cases,  all 
instances)  (source:  European 
Commission (68)) 

(*)  Maximum  possible:  9  points.  For  each  court  instance,  one  point  was  given  if  all  judgments  are  available  for 
civil/commercial  and  administrative  and  criminal  cases  respectively  and  0.5  points  when  some  judgments  are 
available.  For  Member  States  with  only  two  court  instances,  points  have  been  given  for  three  court  instances  by 
mirroring  the  respective  higher  instance  court  of  the  non-existing  instance.  For  those  Member  States  that  do  not 
distinguish the two areas of law (civil/commercial and administrative), the same number of points has been given for 
both  areas.  BE:  for  civil  and  criminal  cases,  each  court  is  in  charge  of  deciding  on  the  publication  of  its  own 
judgments.  BG:  Court  of  Cassation  criminal  decision  are  all  published  except  those  containing  classified 
information. DE: each federal state decides on online availability of first instance judgments. IE: for criminal cases, 
summary  cases  are  not  generally  the  subject  of  a  written  judgment.  CY:  for  administrative  and  criminal  cases, 
judges  decide  on  which  judgments  to  be published.  LU  and  SE:  courts  do  not  publish  judgments  regularly  online 
(only landmark cases). AT: for first and second instance, judges decide which judgments are published. NL: courts 
decide on publication according to published criteria.  PL: for administrative cases, the chief of unit in every court 
decides  on  the  publication.  PT:  for  civil  and  criminal  cases,  a  commission  within  the  court  decides  on  the 
publication.  

66  

67  

68 

Judgments  modelled  according  to  standards  (e.g.  Akoma  Ntoso)  and  their  associated  metadata  are 
downloadable  free  of  charge  in  the  form  of  a  database  or  by  other  automated  means  (e.g.  Application 
Programming Interface). 
See  also  Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament,  the  Council,  the  European 
Economic  and  Social  Committee  and  the  Committee  of  the  Regions  –  A  European  strategy  for  data, 
COM(2020)  66  final,  Commission  White  Paper  on  Artificial  Intelligence  –  A  European  approach  to 
excellence  and  trust,  COM(2020)  65  final,  and  Conclusions  of  the  Council  and  the  representatives  of  the 
Governments  of  the  Member  States  meeting  within  the  Council  on  Best  Practices  regarding  the  Online 
Publication of Court Decisions (OJ C 362, 8.10.2018, p. 2). 
2019 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems. 

30 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Figure  29:  Arrangements  for  producing  machine-readable  judicial  decisions,  2019  (*) 
instances)  (source:  European 
(civil/commercial,  administrative  and  criminal  cases,  all 
Commission (69)) 

(*) Maximum possible: 24 points per type of cases. For each of the three instances (first, second, final) one point can be given  if 
all  judicial decisions  are  covered.  If  only  some  judicial decisions  are  covered  at  a  given  instance,  only  half  point  is  awarded. 
Where  a  Member  State  has  only  two  instances,  points  have  been  given  for  three  instances  by  mirroring  the  respective  higher 
instance  as  the  non-existing  instance.  For  those  Member  States  that  do  not  distinguish  between  administrative  and 
civil/commercial cases, the same points have been allocated for both areas of law.  ES: The use of the General Council for the 
Judiciary (CGPJ) database for commercial purposes, or the massive download of information is not allowed. The reuse of this 
information for the elaboration of databases or for commercial purposes must follow the procedure and conditions established by 
the CGPJ through its Judicial Documentation Center. FR: Only the judgments published by the Cour de Cassation are accessible 
to the public, free of charge. Those published by the courts of appeal on Jurica are accessible through the private virtual justice 
network, and to legal publishers. Judgments transmitted by the first instance and high courts to the Cour de Cassation, are not 
subject to anonymisation or pseudonymisation. Open access to court judgments – excluding repetitive and systematice requests – 
has been established. The reuse of personal data of judges and judicial staff for evaluating, analysing, comparing or predicting 
their  actual  or  supposed  professional  practices  is  punishable.  IE:  The  Irish  legal  system  does  not  have  a  specialised  court 
jurisdiction to deal with administrative law cases. LU: In administrative cases, there are only two court levels. 

69  

2019 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems. 

31 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
– Accessing alternative dispute resolution methods – 

Figure  30  shows  Member  States’  efforts  in  promoting  the  voluntary  use  of  alternative  dispute 
resolution  methods  through  specific  incentives,  which  may  vary  depending  on  the  area  of  law 
(70).  

Figure 30: Promotion of and incentives for using ADR methods, 2019 (*) (source: European 
Commission (71)) 

(*)  Maximum  possible:  52  points.  Aggregated  indicators  based  on  the  following  indicators  :  1)  website  providing 
information  on  ADR,  2)  Publicity  campaigns  in  media,  3)  Brochures  for  the  general  public,  4)  Court  provides 
specific  information  sessions  on  ADR  upon  request,  5)  ADR/mediation  co-ordinator  at  courts,  6)  Publication  of 
evaluations on the use of ADR, 7) Publication of statistics on the use of ADR, 8) Legal aid covers (partly or in full) 
costs incurred with ADR, 9) Full or partial refund of court fees, including stamp duties, if ADR is successful, 10) No 
lawyer for ADR procedure required, 11) Judge can act as mediator, 12) Agreement reached by the parties becomes 
enforceable by the court 13) Use of electronic tools to resolve the dispute through ADR methods. For each of these 
13 indicators, one point was  awarded for each area of law.  CZ: data for administrative disputes is not available. 
DK: each court has an ambassador responsible for promoting the use of mediation. Administrative courts have the 
possibility to propose to the parties to turn to mediation. IE: administrative cases are subsumed within the category 
of civil and commercial cases.  EL: ADR exists in the area of public procurement procedure before Administrative 
Courts of Appeal. ES: ADR is mandatory in labour law cases. LT: a secretary at the National Courts Administration 
coordinates  the  judicial  mediation  processes  in  courts.  PT:  for  civil/commercial  disputes,  court  fees  are  refunded 
only  in  case  of  justices  for  peace.  SK:  the  Slovak  legal  order  does  not  support  the  use of  ADR  for  administrative 
purposes.  SE: judges have procedural discretion on ADR. Seeking an amicable dispute settlement is a  mandatory 
task for the judge unless it is inappropriate due to the nature of the case.  

70  

71  

The methods to promote and incentivise the use of ADR do not cover compulsory requirements to use ADR 
before  going  to  court,  as  such  requirements  raise  concerns  about  their  compatibility  with  the  right  to  an 
effective remedy before a tribunal enshrined in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
2019 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems. 

32 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
– Child-friendly justice –  

Figure  31  shows  the  various  arrangements  in  Member  States  that  make  justice  system  more 
accessible  for  children  and  suited  to  their  needs,  for  example  by  providing  child-friendly 
information  on  proceedings  or  undertaking  measures  to  prevent  the  child  having  to  go  throuh 
several hearings.  

Figure 31: Child-friendly justice, 2019 (*) (source: European Commission (72)) 

3.2.2. Resources 

including 

Sufficient  resources, 
technical 
infrastructure, and well-qualified, trained and adequately remunerated personnel of all categories, 
are necessary for the good functioning of the justice system. Without adequate facilities, tools or 
personnel with the required qualifications, skills and access to continuous training, the quality of 
proceedings and decisions is put at stake. 

into  physical  and 

the  necessary 

investments 

– Financial resources – 

The figures below show the actual government expenditure on the operation of the justice system 
(excluding  prisons),  both  per  inhabitant  (Figure  32)  and  as  a  share  of  gross  domestic  product 
(GDP) (Figure 33) and, finally, the main categories of expenditure on law courts (Figure 34) (73). 

2019 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems. 

72  
73    General government total (actual) expenditure on the administration, operation or support of administrative, 
civil  and  criminal  law  courts  and  the  judicial  system,  including  enforcement  of  fines  and  legal  settlements 
imposed by the courts and operation of parole probation systems, and legal aid as well as legal representation 
and  advice  on  behalf  of  government  or  on  behalf  of  others  provided  by  government  in  cash  or  in  services, 
excluding  prison  administrations  (National  Accounts  Data,  Classification  of  the  Functions  of  Government 
(COFOG), group 03.3), Eurostat table gov_10a_exp, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database. 

33 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Figure  32:  General  government  total  expenditure  on  law  courts,  2012,  2016-2018  (*)  (in 
EUR per inhabitant) (source: Eurostat) 

(*) Member States are ordered according to the expenditure in 2018 (from highest to lowest). 2018 data for ES, FR, 
HR, PT and SK are provisional.  

Figure  33:  General  government total  expenditure on law courts, 2012, 2016-2018 (*) (as a 
percentage of GDP) (source: Eurostat) 

(*) Member States are ordered according to the expenditure in 2018 (from highest to lowest). 2018 data for ES, FR, 
HR, PT and SK are provisional.  

34 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure  34  shows  the  main  economic  categories  comprising  government  expenditure  on  law 
courts:  1)  wages  and  salaries  of  judges  and  court  staff,  including  social  contributions 
(‘compensation  of  employees’  (74)),  2)  operating  costs  for  goods  and  services  consumed  by  the 
law  courts  such  as  building  rentals,  office  consumables,  energy  and  legal  aid  (‘intermediate 
consumption’  (75)),  3)  investment  in  fixed  assets,  such  as  court  buildings  and  software  (‘gross 
fixed capital formation’ (76)), and 4) other expenditure. 

Figure 34: General government total expenditure on law courts by category (*) (in 2018, as 
a percentage of total expenditure) (source: Eurostat) 

(*) Data for ES, FR, HR and SK are provisional, data for PT are estimated.  

– Human resources – 

Adequate  human  resources  are  essential  for  the  quality  of  a  justice  system.  Diversity  among 
judges,  including  gender  balance,  adds  complementary  knowledge,  skills  and  experience  and 
reflects the reality of society. 

74  

75  

76  

imputed  social  contributions 

Compensation of employees  consists of  wages and salaries in cash or in kind (D.11) and employer's actual 
and 
(D.121  and  D.122).  See:  https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php?title=Glossary:Compensation_of_employees. 
Intermediate consumption is a national accounts concept which measures the value of the goods and services 
consumed  as  inputs  by  a  process  of  production.  It  excludes  fixed  assets  whose  consumption  is  recorded  as 
consumption of fixed capital. The goods and services may be either transformed or used up by the production 
process. 
See https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Glossary:Intermediate_consumption. 
Gross  fixed  capital  formation,  abbreviated  as  GFCF,  consists  of  resident  producers’  investments,  deducting 
disposals, in fixed assets during a given period. It also includes certain additions to the value of non-produced 
assets realized by producers  or institutional units. Fixed assets  are tangible or intangible assets produced as 
outputs  from  production  processes  that  are  used  repeatedly,  or  continuously,  for  more  than  one  year.  See 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php?title=Glossary:Gross_fixed_capital_formation_(GFCF). 

35 

 
 
 
                                                           
Figure 35: Number of judges, 2012-2018 (*) (per 100,000 inhabitants) (source: CEPEJ study) 

(*)  This  category  consists  of  judges  working  full-time,  under  the  CEPEJ  methodology.  It  does  not  include  the 
Rechtspfleger/court  clerks  that  exist  in  some  Member  States.  AT:  Data  on  administrative  justice  is  introduced  for 
2016 cycle for the first time. EL: the total number of professional judges includes different categories over the years 
shown above, which partly explains their variation. Since 2016, data on number of professional judges includes all 
the  ranks  for  criminal  and  political  justice  as  well  as  administrative  judges.  IT:  The  regional  audit  commissions, 
local  tax  commissions  and  military  courts  are  not  taken  into  consideration.  LU:  numbers  have  been  revised 
following an improved methodology. 

Figure  36:  Proportion  of  female  professional  judges  at  Supreme  Courts  2017-2019  (*) 
(source: European Commission (77)) 

(*) sorted by 2019 figures, highest to lowest. 

77  

2019  data.  European 
http://eige.europa.eu/lt/gender-statistics/dgs/indicator/wmidm_jud_natcrt__wmid_natcrt_supcrt 

for  Gender  Equality,  Gender  Statistics  Database,  available  at: 

Institute 

36 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Figure  37:  Number  of  lawyers,  2012  -  2018  (*)  (per  100,000  inhabitants)  (source:  CEPEJ 
study) 

(*) Under CEPEJ methodology a lawyer is a person qualified and authorised according to national law to plead and 
act  on  behalf  of  his  or  her  clients,  to  engage  in  the  practice  of  law,  to  appear  before  the  courts  or  advise  and 
represent  his  or  her  clients  in  legal  matters  (Recommendation  Rec  (2000)21  of  the  Committee  of  Ministers  of  the 
Council  of  Europe  on  the  freedom  of  exercise  of  the  profession  of  lawyer).  DE:  no  distinction  is  made  between 
different  groups  of  lawyers  in  Germany,  such  as  between  solicitors  and  barristers.  FI:  since  2015,  the number  of 
lawyers  provided  includes  both  the  number  of  lawyers  working  in  the  private  sector  and  the  number  of  lawyers 
working in the public sector.  

– Training – 

Judicial  training  is  important  in  contributing  to  the  quality  of  judicial  decisions  and  the  justice 
service delivered to  citizens. The data set  out  below cover judicial training in  a broad range of 
areas, including communication with parties and the press and on judicial skills.  

Figure 38: Share of continuous training of judges on various types of skills, 2018  (*) (as a 
percentage  of  total  number  of  judges  receiving  these  types  of  training)  (source:  European 
Commission (78)) 

(*)  (*)  Figure  38  shows  the  distribution  of  judges  participating  in  continuous  training  activities  (i.e.  those  taking 
place after the initial training period to become a judge) in each of the four identical areas as a percentage of the 
total number of judges trained in these types of training. Legal training activities are not taken into account. Judicial 
training  authorities  in  EL,  MT  and  PT  did  not  provide  specific  training  activities  on  the  selected  skills.  DK: 
including court staff. AT: including prosecutors. 

78  

2018  data  collected  in  cooperation  with  the  European  Judicial  Training  Network  and  CEPEJ.  ‘Judgecraft’ 
includes activities such as conducting hearings, writing decisions or rhetoric. 

37 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
Figure 39: Availability of training in communication for judges, 2019 (*) (source: European 
Commission (79)) 

(*) Maximum possible: 14 points. Member States were given 1 point if they have initial training and 1 point if they 
have  continuous  training  (maximum  of  2  points  for  each  type  of  training).  DK:  no  training  is  offered  on 
communicating with people who are visually or hearing impaired because the state offers support in form of tools or 
an assistant in the courtroom to visually or hearing impaired people, e.g. a deaf interpreter. Other communication 
related  trainings  include:  courses  aimed  at  enhancing  the  public  communication  skills  and  communication  with 
media  (BE,  BG,  EE,  LV,  NL,  PL,  RO,  SK);  courses  on  questioning  skills  (DE  and  AT),  courses  on  people 
management (BE, ES, PL) and soft skill trainings cover enhancing the clarity of court decisions and presentation 
methods (CZ, DK, LV, HU, PL, SK).  

3.2.3. Assessment tools 

Monitoring and evaluation of court activities help to detect shortcomings and needs, and therefore 
help the justice system increase its quality. Regular evaluation could improve the justice system’s 
responsiveness to current and future challenges. Adequate ICT tools could provide real-time case 
management  systems  and  could  help  to  provide  nationwide  standardised  court  statistics.  In 
addition, they could be used to manage backlogs and automated early-warning systems. Surveys 
are essential in assessing how justice systems operate from the perspective of legal professionals 
and court users. An adequate follow-up on the surveys’ findings is a prerequisite to improve the 
quality of justice systems. 

79  

2019 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems. 

38 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Figure  40:  Availability  of  ICT  for  case  management  and  court  activity  statistics,  2018  (*)  
(0 = available in 0% of courts, 4 = available in 100% of courts (80)) (source: CEPEJ study) 

(*) New methodlogy, data not comparable to past years.  

Figure 41: Topics of surveys conducted among court users or legal professionals, 2018  (*) 
(source: European Commission (81)) 

(*) Member States were given one point per survey topic indicated regardless of whether the survey was conducted 
at  national,  regional  or  court  level.  ‘Other  topics’  include:  surveys  among  lawyers  on  the  functioning  of  certain 
courts (ES); awareness of ICT measures as a means of improving user accessibility  (MT); resources and material 
conditions  of  courts  (PT);  questions  related  to  a  project  on  procedural  fairness  (SI),  possibilities  for  the 
improvement of the courts’ functioning (SK); conceptions of appropriate pubishment (FI); and satisfaction of legal 
professionals and court users with the services delivered by the judicial system (SE). In DE, a number of different 
surveys were carried out at the level of the federal states.  

80  

81  

2018 data. Equipment rate from 100% (device completely deployed) to 0% (device non-existing) indicates the 
functional presence in courts of the device covered by the graph, according to the following scale: 100% = 4 
points  if  applicable  to  all  matters  /  1.33  points  per  specific  matter;  50-99%  =  3  points  if  applicable  to  all 
matters / 1 point per specific matter; 10-49% = 2 points if applicable to all matters / 0.66 point per specific 
matter; 1-9% = 1 point if applicable to all matters / 0.33 points per specific matter. “Specific matter” relates to 
the type of litigation handled (civil/commercial, criminal, administrative or other). 
2018 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems. 

39 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Figure 42: Follow-up of surveys conducted among court users or legal professionals, 2018 
(*) (source: European Commission (82)) 

(*)  Member  States  were  given  one  point  per  type  of  follow-up.  The  category  ‘other  specific  follow-up’  included: 
inspection  (ES);  use  as  guidance  for  internal  policy  development  (MT);  publication  of  informative  tools  for  the 
general (SI); and self-assessmemt reports of courts (SK). 

3.2.4. Standards 

Standards  can  improve  the  quality  of  justice  systems.  Following  the  overview  of  standards  on 
timing  and  information  to  parties  in  the  previous  editions,  the  2020  EU  Justice  Scoreboard 
focuses on timing, backlogs and timeframes as a management tool for the judiciary (83). Figure 43 
shows  an  overview  of  which  Member  States  use  standard  measures  on  time  limits,  timeframes 
and backlogs  and includes for the first  time information  broken down by the areas of laws and 
instances  at  which  such  standards  exist.  Time  limits  are  quantitative  deadlines,  e.g.  maximum 
number of days between the registration of a case until the first hearing. Backlogs are cases older 
than an identified period of time. Timeframes are measurable targets/practices e.g. specifying a 
pre-defined share of cases to be completed within a certain time period.  

82  
83   

2018 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems. 
In  the  EU  Justice  Scoreboard,  the  standards  on  time  limits  and  timeframes  go  beyond  the  requirements 
stemming  from  the  right  to  a  hearing  within  a  reasonable  time  as  enshrined  in  Article 47  of  the  Charter  of 
Fundamental Rights of the EU and in Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 

40 

 
 
 
                                                           
Figure 43: Existence of standards on timing, 2019 (*) (source: European Commission (84)) 

(*)  Member  States  were  given  1  point  per  instance  (first,  second,  final)  for  each  area  of  law  (civil/commercial, 
administrative  and criminal)  if a standard is defined. Maximum possible: 27 points. For Member States  with only 
two  court  instances,  points  have  been  given  for  three  court  instances  by  mirroring  the  respective  higher  instance 
court  of  the  non-existing  instance.  For  those  Member  States  that  do  not  distinguish  the  two  areas  of  law 
(civil/commercial and administrative), the same number of points have been given for both areas.  

84  

2019 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems. 

41 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
3.2.5. Summary on the quality of justice systems 

Easy  access,  sufficient  resources,  effective  assessment  tools  and  appropriate  standards  and 
practices are the factors that contribute to a high quality of justice systems. Citizens and business 
expect  high  quality  decisions  from  an  effective  justice  system.The  2020 EU  Justice  Scoreboard 
develops its comparative examination of these factors. 

Accessibility 
This edition looks again at a number of elements contributing to a citizen-friendly justice system: 
  Almost  all  Member  States  provide  access  to  some  online  information  about  their  judicial 
system, including a centralised web portal with online forms and interactive education on legal 
rights (Figure 22). Differences appear on the content of the information and how adequate it is 
to respond to people’s needs. For example, only a limited number of Member States (9) enable 
people  to  find  out  whether  they  are  eligible  for  legal  aid  through  an  interactive  online 
simulation. However, information for non-native speakers as well as targeted information for 
visually or hearing impaired people is available in the majority of Member States. 

  The availability of legal aid and the level of court fees have a major impact on the access to 
justice,  in  particular  for  people  in  poverty.  Figure  23  shows  that  in  some  Member  States, 
consumers whose income is below the Eurostat poverty threshold would not receive legal aid. 
Compared to  last  year, accessibility of legal  aid  has remained stable. At the same time, over 
the years, legal aid has become less accessible in some Member States. The level of court fees 
(Figure 24) has remained largely stable since 2016, although the burden of court fees continues 
to  be  proportionally  higher  for  low  value  claims.  The  difficulty  in  benefiting  from  legal  aid 
combined with high levels of court fees in some Member States could have a dissuasive effect 
for people in poverty to access justice.  

  The 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard for the first time also includes information on court fees and 
the  recoverability  of  legal  costs  in  a  commercial  case.  The  level  of  court  fees  for 
commercial litigation (Figure 25) varies greatly among Member States (ranging from 0.1% to 
6% of the value of the claim), with only two Member States having no court fee at all. Figure 
26 shows, for the first time, to what extent legal costs can be recovered by the winning party in 
a commercial case. Large differences regarding the recoverablity of legal fees for the litigious 
phase appear both between Member States with and without a statutory fee system as well as 
within  these  groups  (in  particular  between  more  and  less  generous  statutory  fee  systems).  In 
addition,  in  many  Member  States,  recoverability  of  legal  costs  depends  on  the  courts’ 
discretion.  The  level  of  generosity  of  the  system  for  recovering  legal  fees  can  have  either 
incentivizing  or  deterring  effects  on  the  probability  of  filing  a  case,  and  therefore  on  the 
overall access to justice. 

  The availability of electronic means during the judicial procedure contributes to easier access 
to justice and the reduction of delays and costs. Figure 27 shows that in more than half of the 
Member  States,  electronic  submission  of  claims  and  transmission  of  summons  is  still  not  in 
place  or  is  possible  only  to  a  limited  extent,  as  was  already  seen  in  the  2019  EU  Justice 
Scoreboard.  Large  gaps  remain  in  particular  as  regards  the  possibility  to  follow  court 
proceedings  online,  where  no  Member  State  has  reached  full  deployment  in  all  courts  in  all 
areas of law.  

  Compared  to  previous  years,  online  access  to  court  judgments  (Figure  28)  has  remained 
stable, particularly for the publication of judgments at the highest instance: 19 Member States 
publish  all  civil/commercial  and  administrative  judgments  and  the  same  number  of  Member 
States  also  publish  criminal  judgments  at  the  highest  instance.  These  positive  numbers 
encourage  all  Member  States  to  further  improve  as  decisions  at  the  highest  instance  play  an 
important  role  for  the  consistency  of  case  law.  At  lower  instances,  the  number  of  Member 
States  publishing  all 
lower,  both  for  criminal  and 
is  still  significantly 
civil/commerical and administrative judgments, a figure that has remained stable since 2017.  

judgments 

42 

 
 
  The 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard deepens the examination of  arrangements in place in the 
Member States that can facilitate producing machine-readable judicial decisions (Figure 
29).  All  Member  States  have  at  least  some  arrangements  in  place  for  civil/commercial, 
administrative and criminal cases. However a considerable variance among the Member States 
can be observed. It appears that administrative courts are relatively more advanced as regards 
creating  the  enabling  factors  for  algorithm-friendly  justice  system.  Justice  systems  where 
arrangements  for  modelling  judgments  according  to  standards  enabling  their  machine 
readability have been put in place seem to have potential to achieve better results in the future. 
  The number of Member States promoting the voluntary use of alternative dispute resolution 
methods  (ADR)  (Figure  30)  for  private  disputes  has  again  continued  to  grow  compared  to 
previous  years.  This  is  mainly  achieved  by  introducing  more  incentives  for  the  use  of  ADR 
across different areas of law. Administrative disputes have now been taken into consideration 
for the second year in a row, showing a slight expansion as now more than half of the Member 
States allow ADR in this area. 

  For  the  first  time,  the  2020  EU  Justice  Scoreboard  presents  a  consolidated  overview  of  the 
measures taken by Member States for a child-friendly justice system (Figure 31). Almost all 
Member  States  make  at  least  some  accommodations  for  children,  with  measures  for  child-
friendly  hearings  (including  in  the  settings)  and  to  prevent  several  hearings  of  a  child 
particularly prevalent. However, less than half of Member States have dedicated child-friendly 
websites providing information about the justice system. 

Resources 
High  quality  justice  systems  in  Member  States  require  sufficient  levels  of  financial  and  human 
resources,  including  the  necessary  investments  into  physical  and  technical  infrastructure, 
appropriate  initial  and  continuous  training,  as  well  as  diversity  among  judges,  including  gender 
balance. The 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard shows the following: 

 

In terms of financial resources, the data show that, overall, in 2018, general government total 
expenditure  on  law  courts  continued  to  remain  mostly  stable  in  Member  States,  with 
significant differences in actual amounts, both  in EUR per inhabitant  and as a percentage of 
GDP  between  Member  States  persisting  (Figures  32  and  33).  Almost  all  Member  States 
increased their expenditure per capita in 2018 (an increase compared to 2017) and a majority 
also increased their expenditure as percentage of GDP.  

  As in 2019, the 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard also shows the breakdown of total expenditure 
into  different  categories  based  on  data  gathered  by  Eurostat.  Figure  34  shows  major 
differences in spending patterns among Member States. On the one hand, while the wages and 
salaries of judges and court staff (including social contributions) represent the biggest share in 
most  Member  States,  investment  into  fixed  assets  such  as  court  buildings  and  software  is 
generally  very  low,  and  even  absent  in  some  Member  States.  The  expenditure  on  operating 
costs (e.g. building rentals, legal aid and other consumables), on the other hand, is significantly 
higher in  a few Member States  than in  most others. This  breakdown has remained relatively 
stable year-to-year (Figure 34).  

  Women still represent less than fifty percent of judges at the level of Supreme Courts in most 
Member States (Figure 36). The evolution over the three year period from 2017 to 2019 shows 
that  trends  diverge  between  Member  States,  but  the  proportion  of  female  judges  at  Supreme 
Courts has grown since 2010 in most Member States. 

  On the training of judges, while almost all Member States provide at least some continuous 
training on judgecraft, fewer offer training on IT skills, court management and judicial ethics 
and the share of judges receiving such training remains low in most countries (Figure 38). On 
training  to  communicate  with  vulnerable  groups  of  parties,  there  is  a  continued  trend  of 
improvement, in particular concerning persons who are visually or hearing impaired, victims 

43 

 
 
of gender-based violence and asylum seekers (Figure 39). Training on awareness raising and 
dealing with disinformation has also become more widely available compared to last year. 

Assessment tools 
  While most Member States have fully implemented  ICT case management systems (with a 
few exceptions), gaps continue to remain as regards tools of producing court activity statistics 
(Figure 40). These systems serve various purposes, including generating statistics, and are to 
be  implemented  consistently  across  the  justice  system.  Some  Member  States  have  early-
warning  systems  to  detect  malfunctions  or  non-compliance  with  case  processing  standards, 
which enables the finding of timely solutions. In some Member States, it is still not possible to 
ensure nationwide data collection across all justice areas. 

  The use of surveys among court users and legal professionals (Figure 41) has again decreased, 
with  a  rising  number  of  Member  States  opting  not  to  conduct  any  surveys.  However,  there 
seems to be some variance as to which Member States did not conduct surveys, inidcating that 
sometimes  surveys  are  conducted  only  every  other/every  few  years.  Accessibility,  customer 
service, court hearings and judgments, as well as the overall trust in the justice system, remain 
recurring topics for surveys, but only a few Member States inquired about the satisfaction of 
groups  with  special needs  or about  individuals’ awarness  of their rights.  Almost  all Member 
States who used surveys also ensured follow-up (Figure 42), although the extent of this follow-
up continued to vary greatly. Results generally fed into annual or specific reports and in many 
Member States they fed an evalution or were used to identify the need to amend legislation. 

Standards 
Standards can drive up the quality of justice systems. This edition of the EU Justice Scoreboard 
continues to examine in more detail certain standards aiming to improve the timing of proceedings 
and  breaks  down  these  standards  in  more  granular  manner  taking  into  account  the  instance  and 
areas of law where such standards exist.  

  Almost all Member States use standards on timing, although they are not always developed to 
the same degree at all instances and in all areas of law. Standards fixing time limits (e.g. fixed 
time  from  the  registration  of  a  case  until  the  first  hearing)  continue  to  become  more  wide-
spread,  while  standards  on  time  frames  (e.g.  specifying  a  pre-defined  share  of  cases  to  be 
completed within a certain time) and backlogs remain comparatively less common (Figure 43). 
However,  certain  Member  States  facing  particular  challenges  on  efficiency  are  currently  not 
using such standards or only to a limited extent.  

44 

 
 
 
 
 
3.3. Independence 

Judicial independence, which is integral to the task of judicial decision-making, is a requirement 
stemming  from  the  principle  of  effective  judicial  protection  referred  to  in  Article 19  TEU,  and 
from  the  right  to  an  effective  remedy  before  a  court  or  tribunal  enshrined  in  the  Charter  of 
Fundamental  Rights  of  the  EU  (Article 47)  (85).  That  requirement  presumes  (a)  external 
independence,  when  the  body  concerned  exercises  its  functions  wholly  autonomously,  without 
being subject to any hierarchical constraint or subordinated to any other body and without taking 
orders  or  instructions  from  any  source  whatsoever,  thus  being  protected  against  external 
interventions  or  pressure  liable  to  impair  the  independent  judgment  of  its  members  and  to 
influence their decisions, and (b) internal independence and impartiality, when an equal distance 
is maintained from the parties to the proceedings and their respective interests with regard to the 
subject matter of those proceedings (86). Judicial independence guarantees that all the rights that 
individuals  derive  from  EU  law  will  be  protected  and  that  the  values  common  to  the  Member 
States set out in Article 2 TEU, in particular the value of the rule of law, will be safeguarded (87). 
The preservation of the EU legal order is fundamental for all citizens and business whose rights 
and freedoms are protected under EU law.  

The perceived independence of the judiciary is a growth-enhancing factor, as a perceived lack of 
independence can deter investments. In addition to indicators on perceived judicial independence 
from  various  sources,  the  2020  EU Justice  Scoreboard  presents  a  number  of  indicators  on  how 
justice systems are organised to protect judicial independence in certain types of situations where 
independence could be at risk. Reflecting the input from the European Network of Councils for 
the  Judiciary  (ENCJ),the  Network  of  the  Presidents  of  the  Supreme  Judicial  Courts  of  the  EU 
(NPSJC),  and  from  the  Expert  Group  on  Money  Laundering  and  Financing  of  Terrorism,  the 
2020  EU  Justice  Scoreboard  shows  updated  indicators  in  relation  to  legal  safeguards  on  the 
disciplinary proceedings regarding judges, and the appointment of members of the Councils for 
the Judiciary, and two new overviews on the disciplinary proceedings regarding prosecutors.  

85  
86  

87  

See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012P/TXT&from=EN 
Court  of  Justice  of  the  European  Union,  judgment  of  19  November  2019,    A.  K.  and  Others,  C  585/18,  C 
624/18 and C 625/18, ECLI:EU:C:2019:982, paras 121 and 122; judgment of 24 June 2019, Commission v. 
Poland,  C-619/18,  ECLI:EU:C:2019:531  paras  73  and  74;  judgment  of  27  February  2018,  Associação 
Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, C‑ 64/16, EU:C:2018:117, paragraph 44; judgment of 25 July 2018, Minister 
for Justice and Equality, C‑ 216/18 PPU, EU:C:2018:586, paragraph 65. 
Court  of  Justice  of  the  European  Union,  judgment  of  24  June  2019,  Commission  v.  Poland,  C-619/18, 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:531 para 44. 

45 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
3.3.1. Perceived judicial independence 

Figure  44:  Perceived  independence  of  courts  and  judges  among  the  general  public  (*) 
(source: Eurobarometer (88) — light colours: 2016, 2018 and 2019, dark colours: 2020) 

(*) Member States are ordered first by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and 
judges is very good or fairly good (total good); if some Member States have the same percentage of total good, then 
they are ordered by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is fairly 
bad or very bad (total bad); if some Member States have the same percentage of total good and total bad, then they 
are ordered by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is very good; if 
some Member States have the same percentage of total good, total bad and of very good, then they are ordered by 
the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is very bad. 
Figure 45 shows the main reasons given by respondents for the perceived lack of independence of 
courts  and  judges.  Respondents  among  the  general  public,  who  rated  the  independence  of  the 
justice system as being ‘fairly bad’ or ‘very bad’, could choose between three reasons to explain 
their rating. The Member States are listed in the same order as in Figure 44. 

88  

Eurobarometer survey FL483, conducted between 7 and 11 January 2020. Replies to the question: ‘From what 
you know, how would you rate the justice system in (our country) in terms of the independence of courts and 
judges?  Would  you 
see: 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/justice-and-fundamental-rights/effective-justice/eu-justice-scoreboard_en 

fairly  bad  or  very  bad?’, 

is  very  good, 

fairly  good, 

say 

it 

46 

 
 
 
                                                           
Figure 45: Main reasons among the general public for the perceived lack of independence 
(share of all respondents — higher value means more influence) (source: Eurobarometer (89)) 

Figure  46:  Perceived  independence  of  courts  and  judges  among  companies  (*)  (source: 
Eurobarometer (90) — light colours: 2017, 2018 and 2019, dark colours: 2020) 

(*) Member States are ordered first by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and 
judges is very good or fairly good (total good); if some Member States have the same percentage of total good, then 
they are ordered by the percentage  of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is fairly 
bad or very bad (total bad); if some Member States have the same percentage of total good and total bad, then they 
are ordered by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is very good; if 
some Member States have the same percentage of total good, total bad and of very good, then they are ordered by 
the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is very bad. 

89  

90  

Eurobarometer survey FL483, replies to the question: ‘Could you tell me to what extent each of the following 
reasons explains your rating of the independence of the justice system in (our country): very much, somewhat, 
not really, not at all?’. 
Eurobarometer  survey  FL484,  conducted  between  7  January  and  20 January  2019.  Replies  to  the  question: 
‘From what you know, how would you rate the justice system in (our country) in terms of the independence of 
courts  and  judges?  Would  you  say  it  is  very  good,  fairly  good,  fairly  bad  or  very  bad?’,  see: 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/justice-and-fundamental-rights/effective-justice/eu-justice-scoreboard_en. 

47 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
Figure 47 shows the main reasons given by respondents for the perceived lack of independence of 
courts  and  judges.  Respondents  among  companies,  who  rated  the  independence  of  the  justice 
system as being  ‘fairly  bad’ or ‘very bad’, could choose between three  reasons  to  explain their 
rating. The Member States are listed in the same order as in Figure 46. 

Figure 47: Main reasons among companies for the perceived lack of independence  (rate of 
all respondents — higher value means more influence) (source: Eurobarometer (91)) 

Figure 48: WEF: businesses’ perception of judicial independence, 2010-2019 (perception — 
higher value means better perception) (source: World Economic Forum (92)) 

91  

92  

Eurobarometer survey FL484; replies to the question: ‘Could you tell me to what extent each of the following 
reasons explains your rating of the independence of the justice system in (our country): very much, somewhat, 
not really, not at all?’. 
The World Economic Forum (WEF) bases its indicator on survey answers to the question: ‘In your country, 
how independent is the judicial system  from influences of the government,  individuals, or companies? [1 = 
not independent at all; 7 = entirely independent]’. Responses to the survey came from a representative sample 
of  businesses  representing  the  main  sectors  of  the  economy  (agriculture,  manufacturing  industry,  non-
manufacturing  industry,  and  services)  in  all  the  Member  States  concerned.  The  survey  is  administered  in  a 
variety  of  formats,  including  face-to-face  or  telephone  interviews  with  business  executives,  mailed  paper 
forms, and online surveys. See https://www.weforum.org/reports/global-competitiveness-report-2019  

48 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
3.3.2. Structural independence  

The guarantees of structural independence require rules, particularly as regards the composition 
of  the  court  and  the  appointment,  length  of  service  and  grounds  for  abstention,  rejection  and 
dismissal of its members, in order to dispel any reasonable doubt in the minds of individuals as to 
the imperviousness of that court to external factors and its neutrality with respect to the interests 
before it (93). Those rules must, in particular, be such as to preclude not only any direct influence, 
in  the  form  of  instructions,  but  also  types  of  influence  which  are  more  indirect  and  which  are 
liable to have an effect on the decisions of the judges concerned (94). 

European standards have been developed, particularly by the Council of Europe, for example in 
the  2010  Council  of  Europe  Recommendation  on  judges:  independence,  efficiency  and 
responsibilities  (95).  The  2020  EU  Justice  Scoreboard  presents  a  number  of  indicators  on  how 
justice systems are organised to safeguard judicial independence. 

This edition of the EU Justice Scoreboard contains updated indicators on bodies and authorities 
involved  in  disciplinary  proceedings  regarding  judges  (Figures  49  and  50),  and  on  the 
appointment of members of the Councils for the Judiciary (Figures 51 and 52) (96). The 2020 EU 
Justice  Scoreboard  also  presents  information  on  bodies  and  authorities  involved  in  disciplinary 
proceedings  regarding  prosecutors  (Figures  53  and  54)  and  an  updated  more  detailed  figure  on 
instructions  to  prosecutors  in  individual  cases  (Figure  55)  (97).  The  figures  present  the  national 
frameworks as they were in place in December 2019. 

The figures presented in the Scoreboard do not provide an assessment or present quantitative data 
on the effectiveness of the safeguards. They are not intended to reflect the complexity and details 
of the safeguards. Having more safeguards does not, in itself, ensure the effectiveness of a justice 
system. It should also be noted that implementing policies and practices to promote integrity and 
prevent  corruption  within  the  judiciary  is  also  essential  to  guarantee  judicial  independence. 

93  

94  

95  

96  

97  

See Court of Justice , judgment of 19 November 2019,  A. K. and Others (Independence of the Disciplinary 
Chamber  of  the  Supreme  Court),  C-585/18,  C  624/18  and  C-625/18,  ECLI:EU:C:2019:982,  paras  121  and 
122;  judgment  of  24  June  2019,  Commission  v.  Poland,  C-619/18,  ECLI:EU:C:2019:531  paras  73  and  74; 
judgment of 25 July 2018, LM, C-216/18 PPU, ECLI:EU:C:2018:586. para 66. See also paragraphs 46 and 47 
of the Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12 Judges: Independence, Efficiency and  Responsibility (adopted by 
the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 17 November 2010) and Explanatory Memorandum, 
which provide that the authority taking decisions on the selection and career of judges should be independent 
of  the  executive  and  legislative  powers.  With  a  view  to  guaranteeing  its  independence,  at  least  half  of  the 
members of the authority should be judges chosen by their peers. However, where the constitutional or other 
legal  provisions  prescribe  that  the  head  of  state,  the  government  or  the  legislative  power  take  decisions 
concerning the selection and  career of judges, an independent and competent authority  drawn in substantial 
part  from  the  judiciary  (without  prejudice  to  the  rules  applicable  to  councils  for  the  judiciary  contained  in 
Chapter  IV)  should  be  authorised  to  make  recommendations  or  express  opinions  which  the  relevant 
appointing authority follows in practice.  
See Court of Justice , judgment of 19 November 2019,  A. K. and Others (Independence of the Disciplinary 
Chamber  of  the  Supreme  Court),  C-585/18,  C-624/18  and  C-625/18,  ECLI:EU:C:2019:982,  para  123; 
judgment of 24 June 2019, Commission v. Poland, C-619/18, ECLI:EU:C:2019:531 para 112. 
See Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12 Judges: Independence, Efficiency and Responsibility, adopted by the 
Committee  of  Ministers  of  the  Council  of  Europe  on  17  November  2010  and  Explanatory  Memorandum 
(hereinafter: ‘the Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12’). 
The  figures  are  based  on  the  responses  to  an  updated  questionnaire  drawn  up  by  the  Commission  in  close 
association  with  the  ENCJ.  Responses  to  the  updated  questionnaire  from  Member  States  that  have  no 
Councils for the Judiciary, are not ENCJ members, or their ENCJ membership has been suspended (CZ, DE, 
EE, CY, LU, AT, PL and FI)  were obtained through cooperation  with the Network of the Presidents of the 
Supreme Judicial Courts of the EU. 
The  figures  are  based  on  responses  to  an  updated  questionnaire  drawn  up  by  the  Commission  in  close 
cooperation with the Expert Group on Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism. 

49 

 
 
                                                           
Ultimately,  the  effective  protection  of  judicial  independence  requires  a  culture  of  integrity  and 
impartiality, shared by magistrates and respected by the wider society. 

– Safeguards on disciplinary proceedings regarding judges – 

Disciplinary proceedings regarding judges are among the most sensitive situations in relation to 
judicial  independence.  According  to  the  Court  of  Justice  “the  rules  governing  the  disciplinary 
regime […] of those who  have the task of adjudicating in a dispute must provide the necessary 
guarantees  in  order  to  prevent  any  risk  of  that  disciplinary  regime  being  used  as  a  system  of 
political control of the content of judicial decisions” (98). The set of guarantees identified by the 
Court  of  Justice  as  essential  for  safeguarding  the  independence  of  the  judiciary  include  rules 
which  define  both  conduct  amounting  to  disciplinary  offences  and  the  penalties  actually 
applicable, rules which provide for the involvement of an independent body in accordance with a 
procedure  which  fully  safeguards  the  rights  enshrined  in  Articles  47  and  48  of  the  Charter,  in 
particular  the  rights  of  the  defence,  and  rules  which  lay  down  the  possibility  of  bringing  legal 
proceedings  challenging  the  disciplinary  bodies’  decisions  (99).  The  Court  of  Justice  held  that 
“Article 267 TFEU  gives national  courts the widest  discretion in  referring matters to  the Court 
(…) at whatever stage of the proceedings they consider appropriate” (100). According to the Court 
of  Justice,  any  national  rule  inhibiting  this  discretion  “in  order  to  avoid  being  (…)  exposed  to 
disciplinary penalties” is “detrimental to the prerogatives granted to national courts and tribunals 
by  Article  267  TFEU  and,  consequently,  to  the  effectiveness  of  the  cooperation  between  the 
Court  and  the  national  court  (…)  established  by  the  preliminary  ruling  mechanism”  (101).  The 
Court has also stated that “not being exposed to disciplinary sanctions for (…) sending a request 
for  a  preliminary  ruling  to  the  Court  (…)  constitutes  a  guarantee  essential  to  judicial 
independence” (102). 

According  to  the  Council  of  Europe  standards,  disciplinary  proceedings  regarding  judges  may 
follow  where  they  fail  to  carry  out  their  duties  in  an  efficient  and  proper  manner  (103).  The 
interpretation  of  the  law,  assessment  of  facts  or  weighing  of  evidence  carried  out  by  judges  to 
determine cases should not give rise to civil or disciplinary liability, except in case of malice and 
gross  negligence  (104).  Moreover,  disciplinary  proceedings  should  be  conducted  by  an 
independent  authority  as  a  court  with  all  the  guarantees  of  a  fair  trial.  The  judge  under 
disciplinary  proceeding  should  have  the  right  to  challenge  both  the  decision  and  the  sanction. 
Disciplinary sanctions should be proportionate (105). 

Figure  49  presents  an  updated  overview  of  the  authorities  that  decide  on  disciplinary  sanctions 
regarding ordinary judges, which can be either (a) regular independent authorities such as courts 
(Supreme  Court,  Administrative  Court  or  Court  President)  or  Councils  for  the  judiciary,  or  (b) 

98  

99  

100  

101  
102  
103  
104  
105  

judgments  of  5  November  2019,  Commission  v.  Poland,  C-192/18, 
See  Court  of  Justice, 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:924, para 114; of 24 June 2019, Commission  v. Poland, C-619/18, ECLI:EU:C:2019:531, 
para 77, and of 25 July 2018, LM, C-216/18 PPU, ECLI:EU:C:2018:586, para 67.  
See  Court  of  Justice  of  the  European  Union,  judgment  of  24  June  2019,  Commission  v.  Poland,  C-619/18, 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:531,  para  77,  and  judgment  of  25  July  2018,  LM,  C-216/18  PPU,  ECLI:EU:C:2018:586, 
para 67. 
See  Court  of  Justice  ,  judgment  of  5  July  2016,  Ognyanov,  C-614/14,  ECLI:EU:C:2016:514,  para.  17.  See 
also  Court  of  Justice  of  the  European  Union,  judgment  of  19  November  2019,  A.  K.  and  Others 
(Independence  of  the  Disciplinary  Chamber  of  the  Supreme  Court),  C-585/18,  C  624/18  and  C-625/18, 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:982, para 103. 
See Court of Justice, judgment of 5 July 2016, Ognyanov, C-614/14, ECLI:EU:C:2016:514, para. 25.  
See Court of Justice, order of 12 February 2019, RH, C-8/19, ECLI:EU:C:2019:110, para. 47. 
Para 69 of the Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12. 
Para 66 of the Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12. 
Para 69 of the Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12. 

50 

 
 
                                                           
other authorities whose members are specifically appointed by the Council for the Judiciary, by 
judges or by the executive. 

Figure 49: Authority deciding on disciplinary sanctions regarding judges (*) (106) 

(*) BG: Lighter disciplinary sanctions may be imposed by the Court President. Any decision on disciplinary measures are open to judicial review 
before the Supreme Administrative Court. CZ: Disciplinary cases are examined by disciplinary chambers of the Supreme Administrative Court. 
The  members  are  proposed  by  the  President  of  the  Court  from  among  a  list  of  judges  and  are  chosen  by  sortition.  DK:  The  special  Court  of 
Indictment and Revision comprising five members, formally appointed by the Minister of Justice but nominated respectively by the Supreme Court, 
the High Courts, the Judges Association and the Bar Association in addition to a distinguished academic, decides on disciplinary sanctions. The 
president of a first instance court can issue a warning. DE: Disciplinary measures can be applied in formal disciplinary proceedings (see Section 
63 German Judiciary Act for federal judges and the equivalent provision at the level of the Länder) by service courts (‘Dienstgericht des Bundes’ 
concerning  federal  judges  and  ‘Dienstgerichte  der  Länder’  concerning  federal  state  judges),  which  are  special  panels  in  regular  courts.  The 
members of these panels are appointed by the judges (‘Präsidium’) of the particular court (the Federal Court of Justice or higher regional court 
or regional court). Less severe disciplinary measures, such as reprimands, can be issued in a disciplinary order (see Section 64 German Judiciary 
Act for federal judges and the equivalent provisions at the level of the Länder) by either a court president or the ministry of justice (both at the 
level  of  federal  states  and  at  federal  level).  EE:  Disciplinary  cases  are  examined  by  the  Disciplinary  Chamber  of  Judges  appointed  by  the 
Supreme Court, and by the General Assembly of all Estonian judges. IE: The Judicial Conduct Committeee decides, which is established by the 
Judicial  Council  and  is  composed  by  three  judges  elected  by  their  peers,  five  court  presidents  (members  ex  officio)  and  by  five  lay-members 
appointed by the government. Under the Constitution, a judge may be removed from office for stated misbehaviour or incapacity upon resolutions 
passed by both Houses of Parliament (the Oireachtas) calling for his/her removal. EL: The disciplinary authority over judges is exercised, in the 
first and second instance, by councils composed of regular judges of higher rank chosen by lot. Disciplinary authority over high ranking judges is 
exercised  by  the  Supreme  Disciplinary  Council..  IT:  Decisions  of  the  Council  for  the  Judiciary  on  disciplinary  measures  are  open  to  judicial 
review before the Supreme Court. LV: : Disciplinary cases are examined by the Judicial Disciplinary Committee, whose members are appointed 
by the general meeting of judges. ES: Disciplinary decisions regarding minor disciplinary offences are made by the governance chamber of the 
respective  Court  of  the  district  where  the  disciplined  judge  sits  (High  Court  of  Justice,  National  Court  and  Supreme  Court,  and  even  by  the 
Presidents of Supreme Court, National Audience and Superior Court of Justice where the disciplined judge sits according 421.1.a) Organic Law 
of  Judiciary).  LT:  At  first  instance,  the  Judicial  Court  of  Honour,  whose  members  and  chairperson  (judge,  elected  by  the  Council  for  the 
Judiciary) are laid out in the Ruling of the Council for the Judiciary, decides. It is composed of six judges selected and appointed by the Council 
for the Judiciary, two members appointed by the President of the Republic and two members appointed by the Speaker of the Seimas. At second 
instance, the Supreme Court decides. HU: Disciplinary cases are examined by the Service Court appointed by the National Judicial Council. The 
president  of  the  court  may  impose  the  mildest  sanction  (‘warning’)  that  can  be  challenged  before  the  Service  Court.  MT:  The  Committee  for 
Judges and Magistrates, which is a subcommittee of the Commission for the Administration of Justice, decides. The Committee consists of three 
judges  or  magistrates  elected  by  their  peers.  PL:  The  Minister  of  Justice  selects  disciplinary  judges  after  a  non-binding  consultation  with  the 
National Council for the Judiciary. The Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court, tasked with deciding i.a. on disciplinary  cases of judges in 
second instance, was found to be not an independent court within the meaning of EU law in three rulings of the Supreme Court, implementing the 
judgment  of  the  Court  of  Justice of 19 November  2019.  SI:  The  disciplinary  court  is  appointed  by  the  Council for  the Judiciary,  from  among 
members of the Council itself and from among judges proposed by the Supreme Court. SK: Presidents of first instance courts have the power to 
impose the disciplinary sanction of a ‘written warning’. Disciplinary panels are appointed by the Council for the Judiciary. For the President and 
Vice President of the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court is competent for disciplinary proceedings. SE: A permanent judge may be removed 
from office only if they have committed a serious crime or repeatedly neglected their duties, and thereby show that they are manifestly unfit to 
hold the office. Should the decision to remove the judge from office have been made by another authority than a court (in practice by the National 
Disciplinary Offence Board), the judge concerned may call upon a court to review that decision. The decision can be challenged by the judge on 
their own in the district court or with a support of the trade union in the labour court as a first instance court. 

Figure  50  presents  an  updated  overview  of  the  investigative  bodies,  that  carry  out  the  formal 
investigation  during  disciplinary  proceedings  regarding  judges.  It  does  not  concern  preliminary 
enquiries to decide whether or not to initiate a formal disciplinary proceeding. The investigation 
phase is a particularly sensitive step within disciplinary proceedings, which could affect judicial 
independence.  The  investigative  power  can  be  exercised  either  (a)  by  regular  independent 
authorities  such  as  Court  Presidents  or  Councils  for  the  Judiciary,  or  (b)  by  other  investigators 
who are specifically appointed -by the Council of the Judiciary, by judges or by other authorities- 
for conducting investigations in disciplinary proceedings regarding judges. 

106  

Data collected through an updated questionnaire drawn up by the Commission in close association  with the 
ENCJ. Responses to the updated questionnaire from Member States that have no Councils for the Judiciary, 
are not ENCJ members or whose ENCJ membership has been suspended, were obtained through cooperation 
with the NPSC. 

51 

 
 
                                                           
Figure  50:  Investigator  in  charge  of  formal  disciplinary  proceedings  regarding  judges  (*) 
(107) 

(*) BG: The relevant administrative head of the court [for facts which might lead to the sanction of the reprimand] or the Judge’s 
College (disciplinary panel) to the Supreme Judicial Council of Bulgaria investigates. The Inspectorate at the Supreme Judicial 
Council carries out inspections on which basis it can make proposals for disciplinary proceedings.  CZ: The minister of justice 
can  also  conduct  some  preliminary  enquiries  in  order  to  prepare  the  motion  to  initiate  disciplinary  proceedings,  normally 
consulting the president of the court where the concerned judge sits.  DK:Anyone can bring a complaint to the Special Court of 
Indictment and Revision, which is located and administered at the Supreme Court, and which decides after hearing both parties. 
The  Director  of  the  Public  Prosecution  can  also  investigate.  DE:  There  is  no  formal  pre-investigatory  phase.  In  disciplinary 
orders,  concerning  less  severe  disciplinary  measures  such  as  reprimand,  the  court  president  and  the  highest  service  authority 
(usually  the  ministry  of  justice,  both  at  the  level  of  federal  states  and  at  federal  level)  assess  the  facts.  The  highest  service 
authority decides whether to launch a disciplinary proceeding before the court. Then the court carries out formal investigations. 
EE: The president of a court or the Chancellor of Justice (Ombudsman) can conduct an investigation. IE: Judges are not subject 
to  a  disciplinary  body  or  disciplinary  regime  apart  from  the  procedure  under  the  Constitution  under  which  a  judge  may  be 
removed  from  office  for  stated  misbehaviour  or  incapacity  upon  resolutions  passed  by  both  Houses  of  Parliament  (the 
Oireachtas)  calling  for  their  removal.  EL:  For  civil  and  criminal  courts:  The  Judicial  Inspection  Body  which  is  elected  from 
among judges by lot. For administrative courts: The investigator is chosen by lot among the members of the Council of State. ES: 
The Promoter of disciplinary action is appointed by the General Council for the Judiciary; the Promoter is selected from a pool 
of  judges  of  the  Supreme  Court  and  Magistrates  with  more  than  25  years  of  legal  experience,  but  exclusively  exercises  the 
functions of Promoter during their mandate. FR: The president of the Council for the Judiciary chooses one or two members of 
the Council for the Judiciary to conduct the relevant investigations. The ministry can ask a report to the Judicial inspection body 
before the decision to bring the case to the Council. IT: The Prosecutor General at the Supreme Court is entitled to conduct the 
investigation.  The  Inspectorate  General  at  the  Ministry  of  Justice  is  entitled  to  carry  out  administrative  enquiries.  CY:  The 
investigative  judge, appointed  by  the  Supreme  Court,  investigates.  LV:  The  Judicial  Disciplinary  Committee  investigates.  HU: 
The Disciplinary Commissioner, appointed by the Service Tribunal (disciplinary court), investigates. LT: The Judicial Ethics and 
Discipline Commission, whose members and chairperson (elected by the Council for the Judiciary) are laid out in the Ruling of 
the Council for the Judiciary, is composed of four judges appointed by the Council for the Judiciary, two members appointed by 
the  President  of  the  Republic,  and  one  member  appointed  by  the  Speaker  of  the  Seimas,  investigates.  The  chairperson  of  the 
Judicial  Ethics  and  Discipline  Commission  has  the  right  to  delegate  the  court  president  in  which  the  judge  is  working  or  the 
president of the higher court to carry out the investigation and present the results of the investigation.  MT: The Committee of 
Judges  and  Magistrates  investigates.  NL:  The  Prosecutor-General  investigates.  PL:  The  Minister  of  Justice  appoints  the 
Disciplinary  Officer  for  ordinary  court  judges  and  his/her  two  deputies  (they,  in  turn,  appoint  their  own  deputies  from  among 
judges)  to  investigate.  The  Minister  of  Justice  can  take  over  any  ongoing  investigation  by  appointing  an  ad  hoc  Disciplinary 
Officer of the Minister of Justice. PT: The Council for the judiciary appoints the Judicial Inspection Body, which investigates. RO 
The Judicial Inspection Body investigates.  SI: The Judicial Council appoints a disciplinary prosecutor from among candidates 
proposed by the Supreme Court to investigate. SK: The Disciplinary Panel, appointed by the Council for the Judiciary, conducts 
the  investigation.  SE:  The  Parliamentary  Ombudsman  and  the  Chancellor  of  Justice  act  as  prosecutors  in  cases  of  serious 
malpractice. 

– Safeguards on the nomination of judges-members of the Councils for the Judiciary – 

Councils for the judiciary are essential bodies for ensuring the independence of justice. It is for 
the  Member  States  to  organise  their  justice  systems,  including  deciding  on  whether  or  not  to 
establish a Council for the Judiciary. However, well established European standards, in particular 
Recommendation  CM/Rec(2010)12,  recommend  that  ‘not  less  than  half  the  members  of 
[Councils for the Judiciary] should be judges chosen by their peers from all levels of the judiciary 

107   Data collected through an updated questionnaire drawn up by the Commission in close association  with the 
ENCJ. Responses to the updated questionnaire from Member States that have no Councils for the Judiciary, 
are not ENCJ members, or whose ENCJ membership has been suspended, were obtained through cooperation 
with the NPSC. 

52 

 
 
                                                           
and  with  respect  for  pluralism  inside  the  judiciary’  (108).  The  figure  below  shows  whether  the 
judiciary is involved in the appointment of judges-members of the Councils for the Judiciary.  

Figure 51: Appointment of judges-members of the Councils for the Judiciary: involvement 
of the judiciary (*) (109) 

(*) The Member States appear in the alphabetical order of their geographical names in the original language. The 
figure  presents  the  national  frameworks  as  they  were  in  place  in  December  2019.  DK:  Judges-members  of  the 
Council are selected by judges. All members are formally appointed by the Minister of Justice. EL: Judges-members 
are  selected  by  lot.  ES:  Judges-members  are  appointed  by  the  Parliament  —  the  Council  communicates  to  the 
Parliament  the  list  of  candidates  who  have  received  the  support  of  a  judges’  association  or  of  25  judges.  NL: 
Judges-members are selected by the judiciary and are appointed on the proposal of the Council, based among others 
on the advice of a selection committee (consisting mainly of judges and court staff). All members of the Council are 
formally  appointed  by  Royal  Decree,  an  administrative  act  that  does  not  leave  any  room  for  discretion  to  the 
executive.  PL:  Candidate  judges-members  are  proposed  by  groups  of  at  least  2 000  citizens  or  25  judges.  From 
among the candidates, the deputies’ clubs select up to nine candidates, from which a committee of the lower chamber 
of the Parliament (Sejm) establishes a final list of 15 candidates, who are appointed by the Sejm. RO: The campaign 
and election of judges-members are organised by the Superior Council of Magistracy. Once the final list of elected 
judges-members is confirmed, the Senate will validate it "en bloc". The Senate may refuse to validate the list only in 
case  of  infringement  of  the  law  in  the  procedure  for  the  election  of  the  members  of  the  council  and  only  if  the 
infringement  has  had  an  influence  over  the  result  of  the  election.  The  Senate  cannot  exercise  discretion  over  the 
choice of candidates.  
The figure shows the composition of Councils for the Judiciary (110) according to the nomination 
process.  In  particular,  it  shows  whether  the  members  of  the  Councils  are  judges/prosecutors 
proposed and selected/elected by their peers, members nominated by the executive or legislative 
branch, or members nominated by other bodies and authorities. Not less than half the members of 
Councils should be judges chosen by their peers from all levels of the judiciary and with respect 
for pluralism inside the judiciary (111). The Figure is a factual representation of the composition 
of  the  Councils  for  the  Judiciary  and  does  not  make  a  qualitative  assessment  of  their  effective 
functioning.  

108  

Recommendation  CM/Rec(2010)12,  para.  27;  see  also  2016  CoE  action  plan,  C  item  (ii);  Opinion 
no.10(2007)  of  the  Consultative  Council  of  European  Judges  (CCJE)  to  the  attention  of  the  Committee  of 
Ministers of the  Council of Europe on the  Council  for the  Judiciary at the  service of  society, para. 27; and 
ENCJ, Councils for the Judiciary Report 2010-11, para. 2.3. 

109   Data collected through an updated questionnaire drawn up by the Commission in close association  with the 
ENCJ. Responses to the updated questionnaire from Member States that have no Councils for the Judiciary, 
are not ENCJ members, or whose ENCJ membership has been suspended, were obtained through cooperation 
with the NPSC. 
Councils for the Judiciary are independent bodies, established by law or under the constitution, that seek to 
safeguard  the  independence  of  the  judiciary  and  of  individual  judges  and  thereby  to  promote  the  efficient 
functioning of the judicial system. 
See  recommendation  CM/Rec(2010)12  of  the  Committee  of  Ministers  to  Member  States  on  judges: 
independence, efficiency and responsibilities, §26-27. 

110  

111  

53 

 
 
 
                                                           
Figure  52:  Composition  of  the  Councils  for  the  Judiciary  according  to  the  nomination 
process (*) 

(*) BE: Judicial members are either judges or prosecutors;  BG: the Supreme Judicial Council is composed of the Judges’ Chamber (fourteen 
members of which the Chairmen of the Supreme Court of Cassation and of the Supreme Administrative Court, six members elected directly by the 
judges and six members elected by the National Assembly) and of the Prosecutors’ Chamber (eleven members of which the Prosecutor General, 
four  members  elected  directly  by  the  prosecutors,  one  member  elected  directly  by  the  investigators  and  five  members  elected  by  the  National 
Assembly);  DK:  all  members  of  the  National  Courts  Administration  board  are  formally  appointed  by  the  Minister  of  Justice;  the  category 
‘Appointed/nominated by other bodies/authorities’ includes two court representatives (nominated by the union for administrative staff and by the 
police union). In addition a Judicial Appointments Council exists, which prepares proposals for judicial appointments (half of its members are 
judges selected by their peers); IE: The figure reflects the composition of the Courts Service, member of the European Network of Councils for the 
Judiciary,  according  to  the  framework  in  force  in  beginning  of  December  2019.  On  17  December  2019,  a  new  Judical  Council  was  formally 
established pursuant to the Judicial Council Act of 2019. The first plenary session of the Judicial Council, comprising all of the judges of Ireland, 
was  held  on  7  February  2020.  ES:  :  Members  of  the  Council  coming  from  the  judiciary  are  appointed  by  the  Parliament  —  the  Council 
communicates to the Parliament the list of candidates who have received the support of a judges’ association or of twenty five judges; EL(civil & 
criminal judiciary): the council has the total of 11/15 members, out of which 7/11 are judges. Judges and prosecutors are chosen by a lot.  EL 
(admininistrative judicary): the council has the total of 11/15 members, out of which 10/14 are judges, who are chosen by a lot. FR: The Council 
has two formations — one with jurisdiction over sitting judges, the other with jurisdiction over prosecutors; the Council includes one member of 
the  Conseil  d’Etat  (Council of State)  elected by  the general assembly  of  the  Conseil d’Etat;  IT-CSM:  Consiglio Superiore  della  Magistratura 
(covering civil and criminal courts, and the prosecution service); according to the Constitution, the President of the Republic, the first President 
at  the  High  Court  of  Cassation  and  the  Prosecutor  General  at  the  Hight  Court  of  Cassation  are  members  ex  officio.  IT-CPGA:  Consiglio  di 
presidenza  della giustizia  amministrativa  (covering  administrative  courts);  MT:  :  The  leader of  the  opposition  appoints  one  lay  member.  NL: 
Members are formally appointed by Royal Decree on a proposal from the Minister of Security and Justice.  PL: Candidate judges-members are 
proposed by groups of at least 2 000 citizens or 25 judges. From among the candidates, the deputies’ clubs select up to nine candidates, from 
which a committee of the lower chamber of the Parliament (Sejm) establishes a final list of 15 candidates, who are appointed  by the Sejm. On 23 
January 2020, the Supreme Court, implementing the preliminary ruling of the Court of Justice issued in joined cases C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-
625/18,  ruled that  in  its  current composition  the  Council  is not independent  from executive and legislative  powers and  judges appointed at  its 
request  cannot  adjudicate  cases.  On  17  September  2018,  an  Extraordinary  General  Assembly  of  the  European  Network  of  Councils  for  the 
Judicary decided to suspend the membership of the National Council for the Judiciary (KRS) because it no longer met the requirements of the 
ENCJ that it is independent of the Executive and Legislature in a manner which ensured the independence of the Polish Judiciary. PT: The figure 
refers to the composition of the Conselho Superior da Magistratura. In addition, a High Council for the Administrative and Tax Courts (Conselho 
Superior dos Tribunais Administrativos e Fiscais) and a High Council for the Public Prosecution (Conselho Superior do Ministério Público) also 
exist. RO: elected magistrates are validated by the Senate; SI: Non-judge members are elected by the National Assembly on a proposal from the 
President of the Republic. 

 – Safeguards relating to the functioning of national prosecution services in the EU – 

Public  prosecution  plays  a  major  role  in  the  criminal  justice  system  as  well  as  in  cooperation 
between Member States  in criminal matters. The proper functioning of the national prosecution 
service  is  crucial  for  the  effective  fight  against  crime,  including  economic  and  financial  crime, 
such  as  money  laundering  and  corruption.  According  to  the  Court  of  Justice  case  law,  in  the 

54 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
context of the Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant (112), the public prosecutor’s 
office can be considered a Member State judicial authority for the purposes of issuing a European 
arrest  warrant  whenever  it  can  act  independently,  without  being  exposed  to  the  risk  of  being 
subject, directly or indirectly, to directions or instructions in a specific case from the executive, 
such as a Minister for Justice (113).  

The  organisation  of  national  prosecution  services  varies  throughout  the  EU  and  there  is  no 
uniform model for all Member States. However, there is a widespread tendency to have a more 
independent  prosecutor’s  office,  rather  than  one  subordinated  or  linked  to  the  executive  (114). 
According  to  the  Consultative  Council  of  European  Prosecutors,  for  the  effective  fight  against 
corruption and money laundering and related economic and financial crime, greater independence 
and autonomy of the prosecution service, along with its accountability, can be a further guarantee 
for the respect of the rule of law (115). Whatever the model of the national justice system or the 
legal  tradition  in  which  it  is  anchored,  European  standards  require  that  Member  States  take 
effective measures to guarantee that public prosecutors are able to fulfil their professional duties 
and  responsibilities  under  adequate  legal  and  organisational  conditions  (116)  and  without 
unjustified  interference  (117).  In  particular,  where  the  government  gives  instruction  of  a  general 
nature,  for  example  on  crime  policy,  such  instructions  must  be  in  writing  and  published  in  an 
adequate  way  (118).  Where  the  government  has  the  power  to  give  instructions  to  prosecute  a 
specific case, such instructions must carry with them adequate guarantees (119). According to the 
2000 Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, instructions not 

112  

113  

114  

Council  Framework  Decision  2002/584/JHA  on  the  European  arrest  warrant  and  the  surrender  procedures 
between Member States (OJ L 190, 18.7.2002, p. 1). 
Court of Justice, judgment of 27 May 2019, OG and PI (Public Prosecutor’s Office of Lübeck and Zwickau), 
Joined Cases C-508/18 and C-82/19 PPU, paras 73, 74 and 88, ECLI:EU:C:2019:456; judgment of 27 May 
2019, C‑ 509/18, para 52, ECLI:EU:C:2019:457; see also judgments of 12 December 2019, Parquet général 
du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg and Openbaar Ministerie (Public Prosecutors of Lyon and Tours), in Joined 
Cases  C-566/19 PPU  and  C-626/19,  ECLI:EU:C:2019:1077;  Openbaar  Ministerie  (Swedish  Prosecution 
Authority), C-625/19 PPU, ECLI:EU:C:2019:1078, and Openbaar Ministerie (Public Prosecutor in Brussels), 
C-627/19 PPU,  ECLI:EU:C:2019:1079.  See  also  judgment  of  10  November  2016,  Kovalkovas,  C-477/16 
PPU, paras 34 and 36, ECLI:EU:C:2016:861, and judgment of 10 November 2016,  Poltorak, C-452/16 PPU, 
para 35, ECLI:EU:C:2016:858, on the term ‘judiciary’, ‘which must […] be distinguished, in accordance with 
the  principle  of  the  separation  of  powers  which  characterises  the  operation  of  the  rule  of  law,  from  the 
executive’.  See also Opinion  No. 13(2018) Independence, accountability  and ethics of prosecutors, adopted 
by the Consultative Council of European Prosecutors (CCPE), recommendation xii. 
CDL-AD(2010)040-e Report on European Standards as regards the Independence of the Judicial System: Part 
II — the Prosecution Service — Adopted by the Venice Commission — at its 85th plenary session (Venice, 
17-18 December 2010), para. 26. 

115   Opinion  No.  14(2019),  The  role  of  prosecutors  in  fighting  corruption  and  related  economic  and  financial 

crime, adopted by the Consultative Council of European Prosecutors (CCPE), recommendation iii. 
Recommendation Rec(2000)19 on the role of public prosecution in the criminal justice system, adopted by the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 6 October 2000 (the 2000 Recommendation), para. 4. 
The 2000 Recommendation, paras 11 and 13. See also: Opinion No. 13(2018) Independence, accountability 
and  ethics  of  prosecutors,  adopted  by  the  Consultative  Council  of  European  Prosecutors  (CCPE), 
recommendations i and iii; Group of States against corruption (GRECO), fourth evaluation round “Corruption 
prevention - Members of Parliament, Judges and Prosecutors”, a vast number of recommendations ask for the 
introduction of arrangements  to shield  the prosecution service  from undue influence and interference in  the 
investigation of criminal cases. 
The 2000 Recommendation, para. 13, point c). 
The 2000 Recommendation, para. 13, point d). 

116  

117  

118  
119  

55 

 
 
                                                           
to  prosecute  should  be  prohibited  (120).  Interested  parties  (including  victims)  should  be  able  to 
challenge a decision of a public prosecutor not to prosecute a case (121). 

The figures below present  a factual overview of certain  aspects  of the  framework  applicable to 
the  prosecution  services  and  does  not  assess  their  effective  functioning,  which  requires  a 
qualitative assessment taking into account specific circumstances of each Member State. 

Figure 53 presents an overview of the authorities that decide on disciplinary sanctions regarding 
basic-rank prosecutors. These can be either (a) independent authorities such as courts or Councils 
for  the  Judiciary  or  Prosecutorial  Councils,  or  (b)  other  bodies  or  authorities,  such  as  the 
Prosecutor  General  or  a  superior  prosecutor,  independent  bodies,  special  bodies  composed  of 
prosecutors,  or  the  Minister  of  Justice.  Unless  stated  differently  in  the  explanation  below  the 
figure,  a  decision  of  the  authority  on  disciplinary  measures  regarding  a  prosecutor  is  open  to 
judicial review (122). 

Figure 53: Authority deciding on disciplinary sanctions regarding prosecutors (*)  (Source: 
European  Commission  with  the  Expert  Group  on  Money  Laundering  and  Financing  of 
Terrorism) 

(*)  BE:  The  superior  prosecutor  (head  of  the  prosecutor's  office)  has  the  power  to  decide  on  minor  disciplinary  sanctions,  while  major  sanctions  are 
imposed by the disciplinary court of first instance. Decisions on disciplinary measures are open to appeal before a disciplinary court of appeal.  BG: The 
Prosecutorial Chamber of the Supreme Judicial Council is composed of the Prosecutor General, four members elected by prosecutors, one member elected 
by investigative magistrates and five members elected by the National Assembly. Its decisions on disciplinary measures regarding a prosecutor are open to 
judicial review before the Supreme Administrative Court. The administrative head of the prosecutor may only impose a reprimand, notifying this sanction to 
the Prosecutorial Chamber, which may confirm or revoke this sanction.  CZ: Disciplinary cases are examined by a disciplinary chamber of the Supreme 
Administrative  Court.  The  chamber  is  composed  of  two  judges  (a  judge  of  the  Supreme  Administrative  Court  and  a  judge  of  the  Supreme  Court),  two 
prosecutors, a lawyer, and a person of another legal profession. Members of the chamber are selected by lot by the President of the Supreme Administrative 
Court drawing from lists of candidates provided by representatives of the different legal professions (by the Supreme Administrative Court, the President of 
the  Supreme  Court,  Prosecutor  General,  President  of  the  Bar  Association,  and  deans  of  law  schools).  No  appeal  is  open  against  the  decision  of  the 
disciplinary  chamber.  DK:  The  Danish  Ministry  of  Justice  has  the power  to  decide  on  specific  disciplinary  measures  against prosecutors.  However, in 
practice  the  Ministry  of  Justice  empowers  the  Prosecution  Service  to  handle  disciplinary  measures  against  prosecutors.  All  decisions  on  disciplinary 
measures taken by the Prosecution Service can be appealed to the Ministry of Justice. Judicial review is open against disciplinary measures taken by the 
Ministry of Justice and a prosecutor may bring a complaint to the Parliamentary Ombudsman. DE: The superior prosecutor may impose a disciplinary 
measure of a lighter nature.  Because of  the  competence of the  states for regulating  the disciplinary law of the  state  officials,  there are  various special 
features in the laws of the states. EE: The Prosecutor General decides on disciplinary measures, including dismissal, on the proposal of the Prosecutors’ 
Disciplinary  Committee.  Decisions  on  disciplinary  measures  are  open  to  appeal  before  an  administrative  court.  IE:  The  Deputy  Director  of  Public 
Prosecutions  decides  on  disciplinary  measures  concerning  basic  rank  prosecutors.  The  recommendation  from  the  relevant  manager  that  a  disciplinary 
measure should be adopted is open to appeal before an external Disciplinary Appeals Board, before the disciplinary decision is adopted. EL: Five-member 
Disciplinary  Councils  of  Courts  of  Appeal  are  primarily  responsible  for  adjudicating  disciplinary  offenses  and  imposing  all  disciplinary  penalties  on 
prosecutors except dismissal, which is decided upon by the plenary of the Court of Cassation. Decisions by the five-member Disciplinary Councils are open 
to appeal before a seven-member Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court.  ES: The Chief Prosecutors of the various bodies of the Public Prosecutor’s 
Office decide on disciplinary measures, which can be appealed to the Consejo Fiscal. This body consists of the Prosecutor General, the Deputy Prosecutor 
General, the Chief Inspector and six other prosecutors. Its decisions are open to judicial review at the Audiencia Nacional.  FR: The Ministry of Justice 
decides on the measure after the Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature issues a non-binding opinion. Decisions on disciplinary measures can be appealed 
before the Conseil d'Etat. HR: The State’s Attorney Council decides on disciplinary measures, which can be reviewed before the administrative courts. IT: 

120  

121  
122  

The 2000 Recommendation, para. 13, point f). See also Opinion No. 13(2018) Independence, accountability 
and  ethics  of  prosecutors,  adopted  by  the  Consultative  Council  of  European  Prosecutors  (CCPE), 
recommendation iv. 
The 2000 Recommendation, para. 34. 
The 2000 Recommendation, para. 5, point e).  

56 

 
 
 
                                                           
Decisions of the Council for the Judiciary on disciplinary measures are open to judicial review before the Supreme Court. CY: Disciplinary measures are 
adopted  by  the  Public  Service  Commission,  a  constitutional  body  consisting  of  five  members  appointed  by  the  President  of  the  Republic  for  a  six-year 
period.  Decisions  on  disciplinary  measures  are  open  to  appeal  before  the  administrative  court,  and  subsequently  before  the  Supreme  Court.  LV:  The 
Prosecutor  General  can  decide  on  any  disciplinary  measure  against  any  prosecutor.  Head  Prosecutors  can  make  an  annotation  or  a  reprimand  to 
prosecutors under their management. In the event of a more serious violation, the Head Prosecutor may submit a proposal to the Prosecutor General to 
apply  another  disciplinary  measure.  Decisions  on  disciplinary  measures  adopted  by  a  Head  Prosecutor  can  be  appealed  to  the  Prosecutor  General. 
Decisions  on  disciplinary  measures  adopted  by  the  Prosecutor  General  are  open  to  appeal  before  a  Disciplinary  Court.  LT:  The  Prosecutor  General 
decides  on  disciplinary  measures.  Decisions on  disciplinary  measures are  open  to  appeal before an administrative  court.  LU:  The  Prosecutor  General 
decides  on  disciplinary  measures.  HU:  The  Prosecutor  General  decides  on  measures  to  revoke  a  distinction,  to  demote  by  paygrade  or  by  rank  or  to 
dismiss.  The  Head  of  Unit  (superior  prosecutor)  may  adopt  lighter  measures  (reprimand,  censure)  regarding  a  prosecutor  under  their  supervision. 
Decisions  on disciplinary  measures are  open to  appeal  before a labour  court.  MT:  The Committee on  Advocates and  Legal  Procurators  consists of an 
advocate  appointed  by  the  Commission  for  the  administration  of  justice,  an  advocate  appointed  by  the  Attorney  General  and  three  legal  procurators 
appointed by the Chamber of Legal Procurators. The Committee may impose a pecuniary penalty, issue and admonishment and make recommendations to 
the prosecutor. The Committee may request the Commission to recommend to the Prime Minister to advise the President of Malta to suspend or dismiss a 
prosecutor. Measures adopted by the Committee can be appealed to the Commission for the Administration of Justice.  NL: The hierarchically superior 
prosecutor may impose certain measures of a lighter nature (written reprimand, reduction of annual leave, extra working hours). The Minister of Justice 
may  decide  on  transfer  without  consent,  suspension,  a  financial  fine  and  measures  relating  to  salary,  after  the  hierarchically  superior  prosecutor  has 
proposed  this  measure  or  issued  an  advice.  The  government  has  the  power  to  dismiss  a  prosecutor,  after  the  hierarchically  superior  prosecutor  has 
proposed dismissal or given an advice. Decisions on disciplinary measures are open to appeal before the Centrale Raad van Beroep. AT: Special chamber 
of a court decides on disciplinary measures. PL: At first instance, disciplinary measures are generally decided upon by a disciplinary body at the General 
Prosecutor’s Office, consisting of three prosecutors appointed by assemblies of prosecutors. These measures are open to appeal before the Disciplinary 
Chamber of the Supreme Court, which in certain cases acts as the deciding authority at first instance. When acting as the court of second instance, this 
Chamber is composed of two Disciplinary Chamber judges and one lay judge. A prosecutor who has been sanctioned twice with a sanction different than a 
reprimand may be dismissed from office by the Prosecutor General (who is also the Minister of Justice) in case of commitment of a new disciplinary offence 
(which  is  not  to  be  ascertained  by  the  disciplinary  court  and  without  the  possibility  of  judicial  review  of  the  Prosecutor-General’s  decision.  PT:  The 
Disciplinary Section of the High Council of the Prosecution Service decides on the adoption of disciplinary measures. Its decisions can be appealed to the 
plenary of the High Council of the Prosecution Service, and subsequently to the Supreme Administrative Court. RO: The Superior Council of Magistracy 
decides on disciplinary measures. Decisions on disciplinary measures are open to appeal before the Supreme Court. SI: The Disciplinary court appointed 
by the Prosecutorial Council decides on disciplinary sanctions. The Disciplinary court of first degree is composed of six state prosecutors proposed by the 
Prosecutor General and three judges proposed by the president of the disciplinary court of first instance for judges from among the members of this court. 
The disciplinary court of second instance is composed of six members appointed by the Prosecutorial Council: the president, deputy of the president and 
two members are proposed by the president of the disciplinary court for judges of second instance from among the members of this court; two supreme state 
prosecutors are proposed by Prosecutor General.  SK: A disciplinary board composed of three prosecutors, appointed by the Prosecutor General from a 
database  of  at  least  40  persons  proposed  by  the  Prosecutor’s  Council,  decides  on  disciplinary  measures.  These  decisions  are  open  to  appeal  before  a 
Disciplinary Board of Appeal at the General Prosecutor’s Office, composed of five prosecutors appointed by the Prosecutor General from a database of 
persons proposed by the Council of Prosecutors. Judicial review against decisions of the Disciplinary Board of Appeal is open before the regional courts. 
FI: The Prosecutor General decides on disciplinary measures. Decisions to adopt disciplinary measures are open to appeal before an administrative court. 

Figure  54  presents  an  overview  of  the  investigative  bodies  that  carry  out  the  investigation  during 
disciplinary proceedings regarding prosecutors. Unless stated differently in the footnote to the figure, 
it  does  not  concern  preliminary  enquiries  to  decide  whether  or  not  to  initiate  a  formal  disciplinary 
proceeding. The investigation phase is an important step within disciplinary proceedings, which may 
have an impact on the autonomy of the prosecution service. The investigative power can be exercised 
either  (a)  by  regular  independent  authorities  such  as  a  court  or  the  Council  for  the  Judiciary  or 
Prosecution, or (b) by the Prosecutor General or a superior prosecutor, or (c) by other bodies. 

Figure 54: Investigator in charge of formal disciplinary proceedings regarding prosecutors 
(*) (Source: European Commission with the Expert Group on Money Laundering and Financing 
of Terrorism)  

(*)  BE:  The  hierarchically  superior  prosecutor  conducts  the  investigation.  BG:  The  administrative  head  of  the  prosecutor  investigates  in  case  of  a 
reprimand. For all other sanctions, the investigation is conducted by a three-member disciplinary panel elected by the Prosecutors Chamber of the Supreme 
Judicial Council from its members. The Prosecutorial Chamber of the Supreme Judicial Council is composed of the Prosecutor General, four members 
elected  by  prosecutors,  one  member  elected  by  investigative  magistrates  and  five  members  elected  by  the  National  Assembly.  The  Inspectorate  at  the 
Supreme Judicial  Council  carries out inspections on  which basis it can  make proposals for  disciplinary proceedings.  CZ:  The  Prosecutor  General and 
Chief Public Prosecutor can look into the prosecutor´s case file, and ask for their statement. DK: The Prosecution Service conducts the investigation. DE: 
The head of the public prosecutor’s office not only decides whether to initiate disciplinary proceedings against a public prosecutor, but also conducts the 
disciplinary proceedings. Because of the competence of the states for regulating the disciplinary law of the state officials, there are various special features 
in the laws of the states. EE: The hierarchically superior prosecutor or the Prosecutor General conducts the investigation, depending on who initiated the 
disciplinary proceedings. They or she may also assign the task of gathering evidence and demanding explanations to another prosecutor, who is neither a 
member of the disciplinary committee, nor the prosecutor against whom the proceedings are initiated or a subordinate to that prosecutor. The case is heard 
by the prosecutors’ disciplinary committee, which is composed of two prosecutors of the Office of the Prosecutor General, two prosecutors from district 

57 

 
 
 
prosecutors’  offices  and  one  judge.  IE:  A  hierarchically  superior  prosecutor  conducts  the  investigation.  In  cases  where  the  facts  are  complex  or  the 
suspected misconduct is serious, human resources department will arrange for an investigation to take place.  EL The hierarchically superior prosecutor 
conducts the investigation. ES: The hierarchically superior prosecutor conducts the investigation. FR: Following an administrative enquiry, the Minister of 
Justice  can  decide  to  seize  the  Conseil  Supérieur  de  la  Magistrature  to  investigate  the  case.  HR:  The  Superior  State  Attorney  investigates.  IT:  The 
Prosecutor General at the Supreme Court isentitled to conduct the investigation. The Inspectorate General at the Ministry of Justice is entitled to carry out 
administrative enquiris. CY: The Attorney General appoints one or more officers of superior rank than the officer in question, who conduct the investigation 
and produce a report. The Attorney General then decides on the basis of the evidence whether to refer the matter to the Public Service Commission. LV: An 
official, who has the right to apply a disciplinary sanction (the Prosecutor General or head prosecutors), shall review all materials received and request an 
explanation  from  a  prosecutor  and,  if  necessary,  organise  the  investigation  of  the  fact  of  a  disciplinary  violation.  Investigation  can  be  conducted  by 
prosecutor of the General Prosecutor’s Office or head prosecutors. LT: The Internal Investigation Division of the Prosecutor General’s Office or official 
inspection  commission  made  pursuant  to  the  order  of  the  Prosecutor  General.  LU:  A  Council  chamber  of  the  Superior  Court  of  Justice  conducts  the 
investigation. HU: The Disciplinary Commissioner investigating the case is a prosecutor appointed to investigate by the Head of Unit (superior prosecutor) 
of the prosecutor under investigation. MT: The Committee on Advocates and Legal Procurators investigates the case. This body consists of an advocate 
appointed by the Commission for the Administration of Justice, an advocate appointed by the Attorney General and three legal procurators appointed by 
the Chamber of Legal Procurators.  NL: The hierarchically superior prosecutor conducts the investigation. AT: Special chamber of a court conducts the 
investigation. PL: The case is investigated by a Disciplinary Officer, who is a prosecutor appointed to that function by the Prosecutor General (who is also 
the Minister of Justice). The Minister of Justice may also appoint, on an ad hoc basis, a prosecutor as a Disciplinary Officer of the Minister of Justice 
empowered  to  take  over  any  ongoing  disciplinary  investigation  or  initiate  a  disciplinary  investigation  or  proceedings.  PT:  The  Inspection  of  Public 
Prosecutors conducts the investigation. This body is composed of public prosecutors appointed by the High Council of the Public Prosecution Service. RO: 
The Judicial Inspection Body is a body within the Superior Council of Magistracy. The section investigating disciplinary measures concerning prosecutors 
is composed of 13 prosecutors, appointed by the Chief Inspector of the Judicial Inspection Body following a competition. SI: A disciplinary state prosecutor 
and his deputy investigate, who are supreme state prosecutors appointed by the Prosecutorial Council on the proposal of the Prosecutor General with their 
consent. SK: A disciplinary board composed of three prosecutors, appointed by the Prosecutor General from a database of at least 40 persons proposed by 
the Prosecutor’s Council. FI: The Prosecutor General conducts the investigation. SE: The Swedish Prosecution Authority conducts the investigation. 
Figure 55 shows in which Member States either the Prosecutor General or the Minister of Justice 
can give instructions to prosecutors in individual cases (authority that can instruct) and presents 
some of the safeguards that are in place if such instructions are given in an individual case. Apart 
from  safeguards  presented  in  the  figure  (123),  there  could  be  other  in  place.  In  countries  where 
instructions from the minister of justice are allowed according to the law, this power may have 
been, or is only rarely, exercised in practice (see explanatory footnote below the figure). 

Figure  55: Instructions to prosecutors in individual  cases: authority that can instruct and 
safeguards (*) (Source: European Commission with the Expert Group on Money Laundering and 
Financing of Terrorism) 

Authority that can give instructions to prosecutors in individual cases: 

Selected safeguards in case instructions are given in an individual case: 

(*)  BE:  Minister  of  Justice  has  the  power  to  give  instructions  regarding  prosecution  in  individual  cases  (a  right  of  positive 
injunction  to  prosecute  is  foreseen  in  art.  364  of  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure  and  art.  151  (1)  of  the  Constitution). 
Instructions are enclosed to the case file but their reading by the parties depends on the occasion for ruling and the current stage 
of the case. BG: Appeal is possible except for the acts of the Prosecutor General.  CZ: The Prosecutor General has a power to 
give instructions regarding prosecution in individual cases only within the Prosecutor General Office and towards high public 

123    See 2000 Recommendation, para. 13, points d) – e). 

58 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
prosecutor offices. DE: #: The safeguards differ depending on the federal or state level. The Federal Public Prosecutor General 
is the one public prosecutor at the federal level who is under the supervision and direction of the Federal Minister of Justice and 
Consumer Protection and the public prosecutors general of the 16 German states are under the supervision and direction of the 
respective  state  departments  of  justice.  The  right  to  supervision  and  direction  includes  the  power  to  give  instructions  to  the 
respective prosecutor general, but is limited by the principle of legality (i.e., principle of mandatory prosecution). Instructions in 
individual cases hardly ever occur. As examples, the federal ministry and the government parties of Saxony issued commitments 
not to exercise their rights to give instructions. The ministry of Thuringia committed itself not to give instructions in individual 
cases, the ministry of North Rhine-Westphalia and the government of Lower Saxony committed to give individual instructions only 
in  exceptional  cases.  There  are  no  federal  laws  but  there  are  certain  state  laws  as  well  as  federal  and  state  regulations  and 
guidelines setting forth rules on instructions. As examples, instructions of the federal ministry and the ministries of North Rhine-
Westphalia and Thuringia need to be in writing, in Thuringia they must also be reasoned, in Lower Saxony  they need to be in 
written form if no agreement is reached and in Schleswig Holstein they need to be documented in written form and reported to the 
president of the parliament. At the federal and state level, instructions of a superior official are only binding within the internal 
employment relationship of the prosecutor and acts that are in breach with an instructions are still effective. As a prosecutor has 
a duty to comply with the laws he must refuse to follow illegal instructions. He may remonstrate and have instructions reviewed 
by the next higher superior official. If the instruction is confirmed and the prosecutor still has doubts as to its lawfulness, he may 
request a review by the next higher level official. If the instruction is again confirmed, the prosecutor must follow the instruction 
and he is not in breach of his duties if the instruction is illegal. However, as an exception, prosecutors must never comply  with 
instructions if such acts would constitute a crime, administrative offence or violation of human dignity. There is no special legal 
remedy to have instructions reviewed by a court. However, courts may review the lawfulness of instructions during disciplinary 
proceedings  against  prosecutors,  e.g.  if  they  have  to  decide  if  non-compliance  with  instructions  constitutes  a  breach  of 
professional  duties.  DK:  Minister  of  Justice  has  the  power  to  give  instructions  regarding  prosecution  in  individual  cases  (the 
administration of Justice Act, section 98 (3)). Different Ministers of Justice have, however, been very reluctant to use this option, 
and such an instruction has not been given since the 1990s. The President of the Danish Parliament must be informed about the 
instruction(s)  in  written  form  (the  Administration  of  Justice  Act,  section  98(3)).  The  regional  state  prosecutors  can  review 
decisions  from  the  police  districts  and  the  Director  of  Public  Prosecutions  can  review  decisions  from  the  regional  state 
prosecutors.  IE: Not specified in Section 4.1 of the Prosecution of Offences Act, 1974.  ES: The Attorney General sets internal 
orders and instructions appropriate to service and to the exercise of prosecuting functions, which may be general or related  to 
specific  matters.  LT:  Instructions  from  the  Prosecutor  General  can  be  appealed  at  the  court.  The  Prosecutor  General  cannot 
instruct  on  which  decision  to  make.  LU:  Prosecutor  General  and  Minister  of  Justice  may  instruct  prosecution  services  to 
prosecute in a case (but cannot instruct not to prosecute). However, there have not been any instructions from the Minister of 
Justice  since  more  than 20  years.  There  is  no  legal  requirement  to  consult a  prosecutor or  seek  the  opinion of the  Prosecutor 
General  on  such  an  instruction.  HR:  Instructions  from  the  Prosecutor  General  can  be  reviewed  regarding  their  legality. 
efficiency, etc. HU: According to Section 53 Act CLXIV of 2011 on the Status of the Prosecutor General, Prosecutors and Other 
Prosecution  Employees  and  the  Prosecution  Career,  the  prosecutor  may  request  the  Prosecutor  General  to  receive  written 
confirmation of the instruction in an individual case. The prosecutor can explicitly deny the instruction, if it would constitute a 
criminal  or  an  administrative  offence  or  would  put  the  prosecutor  in  danger,  and  if  the  prosecutor  does  not  agree  with  the 
instruction  he/she  can  request  to  transfer  the  case  to  another  prosecutor  and  such  a  request  cannot  be  rejected.  MT:  With 
reference  to  the  questions  regarding  the  role  of  individual  prosecutors  as  opposed  to  the  role  of  the  Attorney  General,  the 
Constitution of Malta establishes the office of the Attorney General himself. It also confers upon him rights and obligation and 
gives him security of tenure as stipulated in terms of article 91 and 97 of the Constitution. In terms of Chapter 90 of the Laws of 
Malta  -  Attorney  General  Ordinance,  the  attorney  general  employs  officers  to  represent  him  in  his  functions  and  duties  in 
accordance  with  law.  Such  officers  represent  the  Attorney  General  in  his  functions  and  discretion.  When  representing  the 
Attorney General in his functions, the officers are endowed with the same protection at law. Hence, in terms of Maltese law the 
prosecutors  are  not  specifically  given  guarantees  because  in  the  functions  of  their  office  in  terms  of  law  they  are  deemed  to 
represent the Attorney General himself and in such functions they enjoy the protection that the law grants to the Attorney General 
himself.  NL:  Minister  of  Justice  may  instruct  prosecution  services  to  prosecute  or  not  to  prosecute  in  a  case,  but  needs  to 
beforehand  obtain  a  written  reasoned  opinion  of  the  Attorney  General’s  Council  (College  van  procureurs-generaal)  on  the 
suggested instructions, and notification to Parliament is required in case of instructions not to prosecute. However, so far, there 
has  only  been  one  such  case  more  than  twenty  years  ago.  There  are  no  special  regulations  regarding  instructions  given  by 
Prosecutor General in individual cases. The College of Prosecutors-General may give instructions to a prosecutor in a specific 
case. This body is composed of three to five members, and decides by majority with at least three members present. There are no 
specific  safeguards  in  place,  in  cases  where  the  College  gives  instructions  in  a  specific  case.  AT:  Minister  of  Justice  has  the 
power  to  give  instructions  regarding  prosecution  in  individual  cases,  following a  non-binding  opinion  of  an  independent  body 
(Weisungsrat) established at the General Prosecutors office. The Minister of Justice has to report annually to Parliament about 
all  instructions  issued  in  individual  cases,  once  the  cases  concerned  have  been  concluded,  including  on  the  reasoning  for  not 
following an  opinion  of  the  Weisungsrat,  if applicable  (§29a.(3) of  the  Law on  the  Prosecution  Service).  For  the period 2012-
2017, 54 instructions in individual cases were reported (Weisungsbericht 2018). PL: Prosecutor General is also the Minister of 
Justice. If a public prosecutor disagrees with an instruction in individual case, he/she can request the instruction to be changed or 
himself/herself to be excluded from administering the act or from participating in the case. The exclusion is finally adjudicated by 
the  public  prosecutor  who  is  the  immediate  superior  of  the  public  prosecutor  who  has  given  the  order.  SK:  Instructions  in 
individual  cases  must  be  attached  to  the  case  file  so  other  parties  can  read  them  and  make  comments  only  under  specific 
conditions. 

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3.3.3. Summary on judicial independence 
Judicial  independence  is  a  fundamental  element  of  an  effective  justice  system.  It  is  vital  for 
upholding  the  rule  of  law,  the  fairness  of  judicial  proceedings  and  the  trust  of  citizens  and 
businesses in the legal system. For this reason,  any justice reform should uphold the rule of law 
and comply with  European standards on judicial  independence.  The Scoreboard shows trends in 
perceived  judicial  independence  among  the  general  public  and  companies.  This  edition  also 
presents some selected indicators concerning legal safeguards in relation to the bodies involved in 
disciplinary  proceedings  regarding  judges  and  prosecutors.  The  structural  indicators  do  not  in 
themselves  allow  for  conclusions  to  be  drawn  about  the  independence  of  the  judiciaries  of  the 
Member States, but represent possible elements which may be taken as a starting point for such an 
analysis.  
  The 2020 Scoreboard presents the developments in perceived independence from surveys of 
the  general  public  (Eurobarometer)  and  companies  (Eurobarometer  and  World  Economic 
Forum): 

  All surveys generally show similar results, in particular as regards the composition of 
the  two  groups  of  Member  States  that  have  the  highest  and  the  lowest  perceived 
judicial independence. 

  The  World  Economic  Forum  survey  (Figure  48),  presented  for  the  eight  time,  shows 
that businesses’ perception of independence has improved or remained stable in about 
two-thirds of the Member States when compared to 2010 as well as to last year. Also 
among  the  Member  States  facing  specific  challenges  (124),  the  perception  of 
independence  improved  or  remained  stable  in  nearly  three-fifths  of  those  countries 
looking over the nine-year period.  

  The Eurobarometer survey among the general public (Figure 44), presented for the fifth 
time,  shows  that  the  perception  of  independence  has  improved  in  about  two-thirds  of 
the  Member  States  when  compared  to  2016.  The  general  public’s  perception  of 
independence has improved in more than two-thirds among the Members States facing 
specific challenges looking over the five-year period. However, compared to last year, 
the  general  public’s  perception  of  independence  decreased  in  about  two-fifths  of  all 
Member States and in about half of the Members States facing specific challenges, and 
in a few Member States, the level of perceieved independence remains particularly low.  
  The  Eurobarometer  survey  among  the  companies  (Figure  46),  presented  for  the  fifth 
time,  shows  that  the  perception  of  independence  has  improved  in  over  half  of  the 
Member  States  both  compared  to  2016  and  in  about  three-fifths  of  Member  States 
compared to the last year (compared to last year this was the case in about three-fifths 
of  Members  States  facing  specific  challenges,  and  over  two-thirds  of  other  Member 
States).  However,  in  a  few  Member  States,  the  level  of  perceieved  independence 
remains particularly low.  

  Among  the  reasons  for  the  perceived  lack  of  independence  of  courts  and  judges,  the 
interference or pressure from government and politicians was the most stated reason, 
followed  by  the  pressure  from  economic  or  other  specific  interests.  Compared  to 
previous  years,  both  reasons  remain  notable  for  several  Member  States  where 
perceived independence is very low (Figures 45 and 47). 

  Among the reasons for good perception of independence of courts and judges, nearly 
four-fifths of companies and of the general public (equivalent to 43% and 44 % of all 
respondents, respectively) named the guarantees provided by the status and position of 
judges. 

124  

See footnote 18. 

60 

 
 
                                                           
  The  2020  EU  Justice  Scoreboard  presents  updated  overviews  on  the  disciplinary  authorities 
dealing  with  proceedings  regarding  judges  as  well  as  competence  of  the  judiciary,  the 
executive  and  the  parliament  in  the  selection  of  judges-members  of  the  Councils  for  the 
Judiciary, as well as a few overviews regarding prosecution services: 

  Figure  49  presents  an  updated  overview  of  the  authorities  in  charge  of  disciplinary 
proceedings regarding judges.  In the majority  of Member States,  the  authority deciding on 
disciplinary  sanctions  is  an  independent  authority  such  as  a  court  (Supreme  Court, 
Administrative  Court  or  Court  President)  or  a  Council  for  the  Judiciary,  while  in  some 
Member States, it is a special court whose members are specifically selected or appointed (by 
the Council for the Judiciary, by Judges or, in one Member State, by the Minister of Justice) to 
act in disciplinary proceedings. 

  Figure 50 presents an updated overview of who is the investigator in charge of disciplinary 
investigations regarding judges. In the majority of Member States, the investigator is a Court 
President  or  a  Council  for  the  Judiciary.  In  some  Member  States,  the  investigator  is 
specifically  selected  either  by  judges  or  by  the  Council  of  the  Judiciary  or,  in  one  Member 
State, by the Minister of Justice. 

  Figures  51  and  52  show  updated  overviews  of  the  the  involvement  of  the  judiciary  in  the 
appointment of judges-members of the Council for the Judiciary and the composition of 
the Councils for the Judiciary. It is up to the Member States to organise their justice systems, 
including whether or not  to  establish a Council for the Judiciary. However, where a Council 
for  the  Judiciary  has  been  established  by  a  Member  State,  the  independence  of  the  Council 
must be guaranteed in line with European standards. In almost all Member States, the judges-
members of the Councils are proposed and elected, or selected by judges. 

  Figures  53  and  54  present  overviews  on  the  disciplinary  authorities  dealing  with 
proceedings regarding prosecutors. Figure 55 shows an updated and more detailed overview 
of which bodies can give instructions to prosecutors in individual cases and presents some 
of the safeguards that are in place, if such instructions are given in a concrete case. 

4. 

CONCLUSIONS 

The 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard shows a continued improvement in the effectiveness of justice 
systems in large majority of Member States. Nevertheless, challenges remain to ensure full trust 
of citizens in the legal systems of those Member States where guarantees of status and position of 
judges, and thereby their independence, might be at risk.  

The EU Justice Scoreboard provides objective and comparable information on the independence, 
quality  and  efficiency  of  national  justice  systems,  and  is  used  as  a  reference  in  the  European 
Semester, and will be one of the sources in the upcoming Rule of law Report.  As announced in 
the Communication on further strengthening the rule of law within the Union  – A blueprint for 
action,  the  EU  Justice  Scoreboard  will  be  further  developed  in  the  relevant  rule  of  law  related 
areas. 

61