REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS Report on Competition Policy 2019
Date: 2020-07-09
Institutions: Directorate-General for Competition, European Commission
Subjects: EU competition policy, State aid, anti-trust legislation, competitiveness, control of State aid, control of restrictive practices, merger control, restriction on competition, single market

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 9.7.2020  COM(2020) 302 final  REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS Report on Competition Policy 2019 {SWD(2020) 126 final}  
 
 
REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE 
COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE 
COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS  

Report on Competition Policy 2019 

1. Introduction  

2019 marked the beginning of a new term for the European Union. Following the elections in 
May,  which  had  the  highest  overall  turnout  since  1994  (50.66%)1,  the  European  Parliament 
gave its green light to the new European Commission on the basis of the priorities outlined in 
President-elect Ursula von der Leyen’s Political Guidelines2. The mission letter addressed to 
Margrethe  Vestager,  Executive  Vice-President  for  a  Europe  fit  for  the  Digital  Age, 
emphasises  the  need  to  “ensure  our  competition  policy  and  rules  are  fit  for  the  modern 
economy, vigorously enforced and contribute to a strong European industry, both internally 
and on the global stage”3.  

The foundations of EU competition law are as relevant today as they were when the Treaty of 
Rome was signed more than 60  years ago. European competition  rules enable businesses of 
all sizes to have a fair chance to compete and help European consumers obtain a fair deal in 
the internal market. Enforcement of EU competition rules helps create open and competitive 
markets that make European companies more efficient, innovative and able to compete on a 
global  scale.  In  2019,  the  Commission’s  competition  policy  and  enforcement  actions 
continued to target anticompetitive conduct and measures in markets that matter for citizens 
and  businesses  in  the  EU,  such  as  the  telecommunications  and  digital  sectors,  energy  and 
environment, manufacturing, financial services, taxation, agriculture and food and transport.  

At  the  same  time,  it  is  important  that  the  EU  competition  framework  remains  fit  for  a  fast-
changing world, by continuously adapting to the modern economy that is green and digital. In 
particular, European competition policy must tackle new challenges linked to the use of data, 
algorithms  and  fast-moving  markets  in  an  increasingly  digital  environment,  as  well  as 
strengthen cooperation networks between Member States' authorities and the Commission to 
support fair competition in the single market. At the same time, evaluations are underway of 
the relevant State aid rules, including the environmental and energy guidelines, which will be 
revised also to reflect the policy objectives of the European Green Deal. 
In April 2019, the Commission published the Report “Competition policy for the digital era”4, 
by  three  independent  Special  Advisers,  designed  to  provide  input  to  the  Commission's 
ongoing reflection process about how competition policy can best serve European consumers 
in  a  digital,  fast-changing  world.  The  report  analyses  the  main  characteristics  of  the  digital 
economy – extreme returns of scale of digital services, network externalities and the role of 
data – which have given rise to large incumbent digital players.  

1 See: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20191029IPR65301/final-turnout-data-for-2019-
european-elections- announced.  
2 Ursula von der Leyen, "A Union that strives for more. My agenda for Europe" Political Guidelines for the next 
European Commission 2019-2024, Opening Statement in the European Parliament Plenary Session, 16 July 
2019: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/political-guidelines-next-commission_en.pdf. 
3 Ursula von der Leyen, Mission Letter to Margrethe Vestager, Executive Vice-President for a Europe fit for the 
Digital Age, 1 December 2019, available at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/sites/comm-
cwt2019/files/commissioner_mission_letters/mission-letter-margrethe-vestager_2019_en.pdf. 
4 See: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/reports/kd0419345enn.pdf. 

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In  2019,  in  order  to  ensure  that  competition  law  remains  fit  for  purpose,  the  Commission 
engaged in broad evaluation exercises, aimed at assessing the functioning of competition rules 
in order to provide a basis for decisions on the need for improving its ability to tackle many of 
these  challenges  and  for  improving  the  effectiveness  of  its  enforcement.  The  review  covers 
the antitrust regulations that will expire in the new mandate and the respective guidelines, a 
number of State aid rules and guidance, and the ongoing evaluation of certain merger control 
rules. At the end of the year, Executive Vice-President Vestager also announced the launch of 
the review of the Market Definition Notice.  

Competition policy also plays a significant part in the EU’s modern industrial policy, with the 
aim  of  rendering  European  companies  more 
therefore  competitive 
internationally. EU State aid rules support this objective where there are market failures and a 
need to strengthen value chains. In December 2018 and in December 2019, the Commission 
found  that  two  projects  jointly  notified  by  a  number  of  Member  States  in  the  European 
priority areas of microelectronics and batteries, respectively, were in  line with  EU State aid 
rules  and  contribute  to  a  common  European  interest5.  The  participating  Member  States  will 
provide up to EUR 5 billion in funding for these two projects combined, that together aim to 
unlock an additional EUR 11 billion in private investments.  

innovative  and 

EU  competition  policy  is  implemented  through  enforcement  of  Treaty  based  rules, 
underpinned  by  rigorous  economic  analysis  and  thorough  due  process.  Therefore,  non-
discrimination,  transparent  and  predictable  enforcement,  the  right  to  be  heard,  as  well  as 
protection  of  confidentiality,  are  all  core  principles  and  standards,  which  the  Commission 
implements in its enforcement practice and which it promotes worldwide.  

The  Commission  works  hand  in  hand  with  Member  States'  national  competition  authorities 
and  with  national  courts  to  enforce  the  European  competition  rules.  At  the  same  time,  the 
Commission  actively  cooperates  with  relevant  international  fora  and  with  competition 
agencies  across  the  world  to  develop  a  truly  global  level  playing  field.  Within  the  World 
Trade  Organisation,  the  Commission  engaged  in  negotiations  on  e-commerce  and  telecom 
services, as well as on improving international rules on subsidies.  

EU  competition  rules  support  the  growth  and  development  of  strong  European  companies, 
whether large, small or medium enterprises. Nevertheless, at global level, European firms face 
a  number  of  challenges  regarding  level  playing  field.  Other  tools  than  competition  law  are 
more suitable to  address these challenges. The Commission’s ongoing reflection includes to 
what extent the existing EU toolbox can address the distortive effects of foreign subsidies and 
state ownership and which (combination of) additional instruments may be needed. 

This  report is  a non-exhaustive summary of  activities undertaken by the  Commission in  the 
field of competition policy over the year 2019 (Part I). As such, this report does not cover the 
Commission’s actions to support the EU economy in the context of the COVID-19 outbreak. 
Additional  and  more  detailed  information  on  the  activities  described  in  the  report  can  be 
found in the accompanying Commission Staff Working Document (Part II) and on the website 
of the Competition Directorate-General6. 

2. Further enhancing the effectiveness of EU competition policy and enforcement 

In  2019,  the  Commission  embarked  upon  a  comprehensive  evaluation  and  review  of  its 
competition rules and guidelines to assess to what extent they are still fit for purpose. .  

5 See https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_18_6862, and 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_19_6705.  
6 See: https://ec.europa.eu/competition/index_en.html.    

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The Commission launches a “fitness check” of State aid rules7 

In  May  2012,  the  Commission  launched  a  major  reform  package,  the  State  Aid 
Modernisation, resulting in the revision since 2013 of a large number of  State aid rules. This 
comprehensive  reform  package  has  allowed  Member  States  to  swiftly  implement  State  aid 
measures that foster investment, economic growth and job creation.  

In January 2019, the Commission launched a process aimed at evaluating the rules under the 
State  Aid  Modernisation  package  in  line  with  the  Commission’s  Better  Regulation 
Guidelines,  and  consequently  prolonging  the  validity  of  those  State  aid  rules  that  would 
otherwise expire by the end of 2020. The evaluation takes the form of a “fitness check”, and 
will  prepare  for  a  revision  of  the  relevant  guidelines  in  light  of  the  policy  objectives  of  the 
European Green Deal. 

The “fitness check” of the State aid modernisation package, railways guidelines and short-term 
export credit insurance 

The  aim  of  the  “fitness  check”  is  to  analyse  the  relevance,  effectiveness,  efficiency,  coherence  and 
EU-added value of these State aid rules, while at the same time providing a basis for decisions by the 
Commission regarding the potential further prolongation or possibly updating of the rules.  

The “fitness check” covers two Regulations and nine Guidelines, as follows:  
- the General block exemption and De minimis Regulations,  
- the Regional aid Guidelines,  
- the Research and Development Framework,  
- the IPCEI Communication,  
- the Risk finance Guidelines,  
- the Airport and Aviation Guidelines,  
- the Environmental and Energy Guidelines, as well as  
- the Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines.  

Additionally,  the  Railways  Guidelines  and  Short-term  export  credit  Communication,  which  did    not 
form  part  of  the  2012  State  Aid  Modernisation  package,  are  also  included  in  the  ongoing  “fitness 
check”.   

Member States and other stakeholders had the opportunity to provide their input and comments to the 
“fitness  check”  during  a  public  consultation,  via  various  questionnaires.  The  consultation  ended  in 
July 2019, with the exception of the IPCEI questionnaire, which was open until the end of October. A 
series of studies is also under way. 

Furthermore,  in  February  2019,  the  Commission  launched  public  consultations  to  evaluate 
and prepare the revision of the existing Guidelines on certain State aid measures in the context 
of the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading scheme post-2012 (ETS Guidelines)8. The 
ETS  Guidelines,  adopted  in  2012  and  based  on  the  2005  EU  Greenhouse  Gas  Emission 
Trading  Scheme,  set  out  the  conditions  under  which  Member  States  can  compensate  some 
companies  in  certain  sectors  with  high  electricity  consumption  for  part  of  the  higher 
electricity costs arising from the EU emissions trading scheme, in the period 2013-2020. At 
their expiry on 31 December 2020, the 2012  ETS Guidelines will be updated to  ensure that 
they are adapted to the EU’s new emissions trading scheme for 2021-20309.  

Finally, in June 2019, the Commission launched an evaluation of the State aid rules for health 
and  social  Services  of  General  Economic  Interest  (SGEI)  and  the  SGEI  de  minimis 

7 See: https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-19-182_en.  
8 See: https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/initiatives/ares-2018-6600267_en.  
9 Directive (EU) 2018/410 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2018 amending Directive 
2003/87/EC to enhance cost-effective emission reductions and low-carbon investments, and Decision (EU) 
2015/1814, OJ L 76, 19.3.2018, pp. 3–27. 

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Regulation10,  which  expire  in  December  2020.  As  part  of  this  evaluation,  a  public  and  a 
targeted consultation were carried out between July and December 2019, which will be duly 
considered in the evaluation exercise. 

The  Commission  examines  new  market  trends  in  the  area  of  vertical  supply  and  horizontal 
cooperation agreements 
In  2019,  the  Commission  started  the  evaluation11  of  the  rules  exempting  certain  horizontal 
agreements12  from  the  EU’s  general  competition  rules.  The  EU  competition  rules  on 
horizontal agreements include two Block Exemption Regulations for horizontal co-operation 
agreements  that  exempt,  respectively,  certain  research  and  development,  as  well  as 
specialisation  agreements  from  Article  101  TFEU.  The  accompanying  Guidelines  on 
horizontal  cooperation  agreements  (Horizontal  Guidelines)  provide  further  guidance  to  help 
companies  in  their  efforts  to  engage  in  competition  law  compliant  cooperation  agreements, 
giving  also  detailed  recommendations  on  topics  such  as  the  competitive  assessment  of 
information  exchanges,  joint  purchasing,  joint  commercialisation  and  standardisation.  The 
two  Horizontal  Block  Exemption  Regulations  (HBERs)  will  expire  on  31  December  2022. 
While the Horizontal Guidelines do not have an expiry date, they will be evaluated together 
with the HBERs. 
The  Commission  made  considerable  progress  in  its  evaluation13  of  the  Vertical  Block 
Exemption Regulation (VBER)14 and of the accompanying Guidelines on Vertical Restraints. 
The Commission launched the evaluation in October 2018, in view of the VBER’s expiry on 
31 May 2022. In February 2019, the Commission launched a three-month public stakeholder 
consultation, followed by a study in August 2019 on market trends on distribution models and 
strategies.  Furthermore,  in  November  2019,  the  Commission  held  an  evaluation  workshop 
with the active participation of stakeholders, discussing more in depth on areas of particular 
interest for the evaluation of the VBER, with a focus on how the rules benefit consumers. 
In February 2019, the Commission published the evaluation roadmap15 of the Motor Vehicle 
Block  Exemption  Regulation  (MVBER)16.  The  roadmap  triggered  a  four-week  online 
consultation  of  stakeholders.  In  addition,  a  study  was  commissioned  to  allow  for  a  better 
understanding  of  how  market  conditions  have  evolved  in  the  motor  vehicle  sector  over  the 
past decade. The MVBER expires in May 2023. 

The purpose of these evaluations is to allow the Commission to decide whether to let the rules 
lapse, prolong their duration, or revise them.  

Upgrading the EU leniency programme 

10 See: https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/modernisation/evaluation_sgei_en.html.  
11 See: https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/initiatives/ares-2019-4715393/public-consultation_en.  
12 Commission Regulation No 1217/2010 of 14 December 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the 
Treaty on the functioning of the European Union to categories of research and development agreements,  OJ L 
335, 18.12.2010, p. 36; Commission Regulation No 1218/2010 of 14 December 2010 on the application of 
Article 101(3) of the Treaty to categories of specialisation agreements, OJ L 335, 18.12.2010, p. 43. 
13 See: https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/initiatives/ares-2018-5068981_en.  
14 Commission Regulation (EU) No 330/2010 of 20 April 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices, OJ L 
102, 23.4.2010, p. 1. 
15 See: https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/initiatives/ares-2018-6188380_en.  
16 Commission Regulation 461/2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices in the motor vehicle sector, OJ L 
129, 28.5.2010, p. 52. 

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In order to  improve further the effectiveness  of its  procedures, the Commission  launched in 
March 2019 its “eLeniency” online tool.17 Under the EU leniency programme, companies or 
their lawyers can already submit their leniency statements to the Commission either by email 
to a functional mailbox or through the oral procedure. The eLeniency tool offers a third option 
to submit leniency statements online, as part of leniency applications (to receive immunity or 
a reduction of fines), as part of cartel settlement procedures, or as part of cooperation in non-
cartel  cases.  It  therefore  reduces  the  costs  and  the  burden  for  companies  and  their  legal 
representatives involved in such proceedings, with the same guarantees applying in terms of 
confidentiality  and  legal  protection.  Since  its  launch,  the  Commission  has  received  a  high 
number of statements and documents through eLeniency. 

The fight against cartels continues 

Access to adequately priced input products is essential in an era of global competition. Cartels 
often concern intermediate products, which can be vital inputs for industry, and they can thus 
affect  both  the  competitiveness  of  European  industry  and  the  consumers.  Competition 
enforcement in 2019 continued to target such cartels.  
In March 2019, the Commission fined Autoliv and TRW18, producers of car safety equipment, 
EUR 368 million for breaching EU antitrust rules by taking part in two cartels for the supply 
of  car  seatbelts,  airbags  and  steering  wheels  to  European  car  producers  Volkswagen  Group 
and BMW Group, respectively. A third participant to the collusion, Takata, was not fined as it 
received full immunity for revealing the two cartels to the Commission, in line with the EU 
leniency procedure. All companies acknowledged their involvement in the cartels and agreed 
to settle the case. This cartel decision is part of a series of major investigations into collusions 
in  the  automotive  parts  sector.  The  Commission  has  already  fined  suppliers  of  automotive 
bearings, wire harnesses in cars, flexible foam used (inter alia) in car seats, parking heaters in 
cars and trucks, alternators and starters, air conditioning and engine cooling systems, lighting 
systems, occupant safety systems, and spark plugs and braking systems19. The 2019 decision 
brings the total amount of Commission fines for cartels in this sector to EUR 2.15 billion. 

Enforcing procedural obligations in merger control  

EU merger control contributes to ensuring that all companies operating in European markets 
are  able  to  compete  on  fair  and  equal  terms,  with  proposed  transactions  that  may  distort 
competition  being  subject  to  close  scrutiny  by  the  Commission.  In  2019,  the  Commission 
continued to make significant efforts to enforce procedural obligations under the EU Merger 
Regulation.20  
In April 2019, the Commission imposed a fine of EUR 52 million on General Electric (GE) 21 
for  providing  incorrect  information  during  the  review  of  its  acquisition  of  LM  Wind. 
According to the EU Merger Regulation, the Commission can impose fines of up to 1% of the 
aggregated  turnover  of  companies,  which  intentionally  or  negligently  provide  incorrect  or 

17 See: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_19_1594.   
18 Case 40481 Occupants Safety Systems II, Commission decision of 5 March 2019, available at:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_40481.  
19 Cases: AT.39748 Automotive Wire Harnesses (2013), AT.39922 Automotive bearings (2014), AT.39801 
Polyurethane Foam (2014), AT.40055 Parking Heaters (2015), AT.40028 Alternators and Starters (2016), 
AT.39960 Thermal Systems (2017), AT.40013 Lighting Systems (2017), AT.39881 Occupant Safety Systems 
(2017), and AT.40113 Spark plugs (2018). 
20 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation), OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, pp. 1-22. 
21 Case M.8436 General Electric Company / LM Wind Power Holding, Commission decision of 8 April 2019, 
available at: https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_8436.  

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misleading  information  to  the  Commission.  This  fining  decision  had  no  impact  on  the 
Commission's  approval  of  the  transaction  under  EU  merger  rules,  which  was  based  on 
rectified information from the second notification. 
Furthermore,  in  June  2019,  the  Commission  fined  Canon22,  the  Japan-based  imaging  and 
optical  products  manufacturer,  EUR  28  million  for  partially  implementing  its  acquisition  of 
Toshiba  Medical  Systems  Corporation  before  notification  and  approval  by  the  Commission 
(so-called  “gun  jumping”).  EU  merger  rules  require  merging  companies  to  notify  planned 
mergers with an EU dimension for review by the Commission prior to their implementation 
and to not implement them until notified to and cleared by the Commission.  

3. Tackling new challenges in the digital, telecoms and media sphere  

Through  its  policy  initiative  “A  Europe  fit  for  the  digital  age”23,  the  Commission  President 
defined  the  digital  area  as  one  of  her  top  priorities  for  the  current  Commission  mandate. 
Competition policy plays an essential and integral part in achieving a well-functioning Single 
Market for digital services.   
In April 2019, the Commission published the report “Competition policy for the digital era”24 
delivered by the three independent Special Advisers25 on the future challenges of digitisation 
for competition policy. 

The Report on “Competition policy for the digital era” 

In their report, the three Special Advisers: (i) identify what they see as the main specific features of 
digital markets; (ii) provide their views on the goals of EU competition law in the digital era; and (iii) 
discuss the application of competition rules to digital platforms and data, as well as the role of merger 
control in preserving competition and innovation. 

The  three  Special  Advisers  considered  that  the  basic  framework  of  competition  law  is  sound  and 
sufficiently  flexible  to  protect  competition  in  the  digital  era.  They  also  advised  that  the  specific 
characteristics  of  platforms,  digital  ecosystems,  and  the  data  economy  should  be  better  taken  into 
account  by  competition  enforcers  and  regulators  in  order  to  prevent  certain  anticompetitive  conduct 
from occurring or from remaining unpunished. Moreover, the Special Advisers are of the opinion that 
digital markets require additional emphasis on theories of harm and identification of anti-competitive 
strategies. Concerning access to data, according to the authors, sector-specific regulation could provide 
solutions  that  are  more  effective.  The  report  equally  contains  specific  analysis  and  suggestions  on 
merger control issues, both from a jurisdictional and a substantive perspective. 

Together with the call for public contributions from 7 July to 30 September 2018, and the conference 
"Shaping  competition  policy  in  the  era  of  digitisation",  which took  place in  Brussels  on  17 January 
2019,  the  report  is  designed  to  provide  input  to  the  Commission's  ongoing  reflection  process  about 
how competition policy can best serve European consumers in a fast-changing world. 

On  9  December  2019,  Executive  Vice-President  Vestager  announced  the  planned  review  of 
the Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community 
competition  law  (“Market  Definition  Notice”)26,  which  provides  guidance  as  to  how  the 
Commission  applies  the  concept  of  relevant  product  and  geographic  market  in  its  ongoing 
enforcement of EU competition law. The main reason for launching this review is to ensure 
that the Notice reflects how the Commission’s practice in defining markets has evolved over 

22 Case M.8179 Canon /Toshiba Medical Systems Corporation, Commission decision of 27 June 2019, available 
at: https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_8179.  
23 See: https://ec.europa.eu/info/priorities/europe-fit-digital-age_en.   
24 See: https://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/reports/kd0419345enn.pdf.  
25 The three Special Advisers are Heike Schweitzer, a German law professor; Jacques Crémer, a French 
professor of economics; and Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye, a Belgian assistant professor of data science. 

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the  past  twenty  years  and  that  it  is  fit  for  a  world  that  is  changing  fast  and  becoming 
increasingly digital. The objective of the review is to give guidance that is accurate and up-to-
date,  and  that  sets  out  a  clear  and  consistent  approach  to  both  antitrust  and  merger  cases 
across different industries, in a way that is easily accessible.  

Antitrust enforcement:  enhanced scrutiny in digital markets 

The  digital  era  has  seen  the  rise  of  online  platforms,  some  of  which  have  risen  to  become 
major  technology  providers.  Decisions  by  platforms  enjoying  market  power  can  influence 
many  other  markets,  whose  businesses  rely  on  these  platforms  to  connect  with  their 
customers. For example, platforms can act as hosts and market regulators by setting the rules 
in a way that keep markets open for competition and, if used in an abusive manner, their dual 
role can be problematic and harm competition. To ensure that markets in Europe serve people 
and to create higher degrees of transparency and fairness, new EU rules on transparency for 
business users on platforms27 were adopted in July 2019. Further to competition enforcement, 
such complementary regulatory tools will equally serve consumers and create higher degrees 
of transparency and fairness. 
On 20 March 2019, the Commission fined Google28 EUR 1.49 billion for abusing its market 
dominance, in breach of EU antitrust rules.  

The “Google AdSense” case: protecting competition in online search advertising  

The Commission fined Google EUR 1 494 459 000 for abusing its market dominance by imposing a 
number  of  restrictive  clauses  in  contracts  with  third-party  websites.  This  misconduct  lasted  over  10 
years and denied Google's rivals from placing their search adverts on these websites. 

Google  was  by  far  the  strongest  player  in  online  search  advertising  intermediation  in  the  European 
Economic Area, with a market share above 70% from 2006 to 2016. Through “AdSense” for Search, 
Google functions as an intermediary between advertisers and owners of publisher websites.  

The Commission’s investigation found that:   

- Starting with 2006, Google included exclusivity clauses in its contracts, thus prohibiting publishers 

from placing any search adverts from competitors on their search results pages. 

-  As  of  March  2009,  Google  gradually  began  replacing  the  exclusivity  clauses  with  so-called 
“Premium Placement” clauses. As a result, Google's competitors were prevented from placing their 
search adverts in the most clicked on parts of the websites' search results pages. 

- As of March 2009, Google also included clauses requiring publishers to seek written approval from 
Google before making changes to the way in which any rival adverts were displayed. This allowed 
Google to control how attractive competing search adverts could be. 

Google  ceased  the  illegal  practices  a  few  months  after  the  Commission  issued  a  Statement  of 
Objections concerning this case, in July 2016. .  

Google's practices amount to an abuse of Google's dominant position in the online search advertising 
intermediation  market  by  preventing  competition  on  the  merits.  Google’s  behaviour  equally  denied 
European consumers the benefits of effective competition in the online search advertising market.  

26 Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law, OJ C 
372, 9.12.1997, pp. 5–13. 
27  Regulation (EU) 2019/1150 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on promoting 
fairness and transparency for business users of online intermediation services (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 
186, 11.7.2019, pp. 57–79. 
28 Case AT.40411 Google Search (AdSense), Commission decision of 20 March 2019, available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_40411. 

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Market dominance is, as such, not illegal under EU antitrust rules, however dominant companies have 
a special responsibility not to abuse their powerful market position by restricting competition, either in 
the market where they are dominant or in separate markets.  

The Commission decision requires Google to, at a minimum, stop its illegal conduct, to the extent it 
has  not  already  done  so,  and  to  refrain  from  any  measure  that  has  the  same  or  equivalent  object  or 
effect. Google is also liable to face civil actions for damages29  that can be brought before the courts of 
the Member States by any person or business affected by its anti-competitive behaviour. 

Earlier,  in  June  2017,  the  Commission  had  fined  Google  EUR  2.42  billion  for  abusing  its 
dominance  as  a  search  engine  by  giving  an  illegal  advantage  to  its  own  comparison 
Shopping30 service; and in July 2018, the Commission had fined Google EUR 4.34 billion for 
illegal practices regarding Android31 mobile devices to strengthen the dominance of Google's 
search  engine.  Including  the  March  2019  case,  the  European  Commission  has  imposed  on 
Google antitrust fines totalling EUR 8.25 billion.  

On 17 July 2019, the Commission  opened a formal antitrust  investigation  to  assess whether 
Amazon's32 use of sensitive data from independent retailers who sell on its marketplace is in 
breach  of  EU  competition  rules.  When  providing  a  marketplace  for  independent  sellers, 
Amazon  continuously  collects  data  about  the  activity  on  its  platform.  Based  on  the 
Commission's  preliminary  fact-finding,  Amazon  appears  to  use  competitively  sensitive 
information about marketplace sellers, their products and transactions on the marketplace. The 
Commission  is  investigating  the  standard  agreements  between  Amazon  and  marketplace 
sellers,  which  allow  Amazon’s  retail  business  to  analyse  and  use  third  party  seller  data, 
aggregated from data available to Amazon marketplace. 

29 Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on certain rules 
governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the 
Member States and of the European Union, OJ L 349, 5.12.2014, pp. 1–19. 
30 Case AT.39740 Google search (Shopping), Commission decision of 27 June 2017, available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_39740.   
31 Case AT.40099 Google Android, Commission decision of 18 July 2018, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_40099. 
32 Case AT.40462 Amazon Marketplace, available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_40462.  

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EU antitrust rules protecting price competition and better choice for consumers in the area of 
e-commerce 

The rapidly growing online commerce market was worth over EUR 600 billion in Europe in 
2019,  with  more  than  half  of  Europeans  shopping  online.  E-commerce  creates  significant 
possibilities for consumers, who can access a wider choice of goods and services and be able 
to  compare  prices  across  Europe,  as  well  as  for  businesses,  who  can  trade  throughout  the 
Single Market of more than 500 million people using a single website as their shop window.  
The Commission’s e-commerce sector inquiry results, published on 10 May 201733 as part of 
the  Commission’s  Digital  Single  Market  strategy,  showed  increased  use  of  contractual 
restrictions  to  better  control  product  distribution.  Effective  competition  enforcement  in  this 
area is therefore very important.  

On  7  March  2019,  the  Commission  made  commitments  offered  by  Disney,  NBCUniversal, 
Sony  Pictures,  Warner  Bros.  and  Sky34  legally  binding  under  EU  antitrust  rules.  These 
commitments  address  the  Commission's  concerns  regarding  certain  clauses  in  these  studios' 
film licensing contracts for pay-TV with Sky UK regarding geo-blocking. 

On 5 April 2019, the Commission addressed a Statement of Objections concerning potentially 
illegal bilateral agreements to Valve, owner of the world's largest PC video game distribution 
platform called Steam,  and five PC video  game  publishers,  Bandai Namco, Capcom, Focus 
Home, Koch Media and ZeniMax35. The Commission expressed concerns that Valve and the 
five  PC  video  game  publishers  agreed,  in  breach  of  EU  antitrust  rules,  to  use  geo-blocked 
activation keys to prevent cross-border sales. In addition, the Commission expressed concerns 
that  four  of  the  game  publishers  may  have  infringed  EU  competition  rules  by  including 
contractual  export  restrictions  in  their  agreements  with  a  number  of  distributors  other  than 
Valve.  

Antitrust enforcement in the telecommunications sector 
On 18 July 2019, the Commission fined Qualcomm36 EUR 242 million for abusing its market 
dominance, through predatory pricing, in the worldwide market for chipsets complying with 
the  Universal  Mobile  Telecommunications  System  (UTMS),  the  third  generation  standard 
(3G),  in  breach  of  EU  antitrust  rules.  The  decision  established  that  between  mid-2009  and 
mid-2011, Qualcomm supplied certain quantities of three of its UMTS chipsets to two of its 
key customers, Huawei and ZTE, below cost, with the aim of forcing its competitor Icera out 
of the market. Icera was a UK-based start-up and Qualcomm’s main competitor at the time in 
the  leading  edge  segment  of  the  UMTS  chipset  market.  The  fine  represents  1.27%  of 
Qualcomm's turnover in 2018 and it equally  aims to  deter market  players from  engaging in 
such anti-competitive practices in the future. 

On 7 August 2019, the Commission adopted a Statement of Objections against the two largest 
operators  in  Czechia,  O2/CETIN  and  T-Mobile37  in  respect  of  a  network  sharing  agreement 
between  these  parties.  The  Commission  preliminarily  considered  that  this  specific  network 

33 See: https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/sector_inquiry_final_report_en.pdf, and see: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/sector_inquiries_e_commerce.html.  
34 Case AT.40023 Cross-border access to pay-TV, available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_40023.  
35 Cases AT.40413 Focus Home, AT.40414 Koch Media, AT.40420 ZeniMax, AT.40422 Bandai Namco and 
AT.40424 Capcom. See also: https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-19-2010_en.htm.  
36 Case AT.39711 Qualcomm (predation), Commission decision of 18 July 2019, available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_39711.   
37 Case AT.40305 Network sharing - Czech Republic, available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_40305.  

9 

 
 
                                                           
sharing  arrangement  is  anti-competitive  because  it  is  likely  to  remove  the  incentives  of  the 
two  mobile  operators  to  improve  their  networks  and  services  for  the  benefit  of  consumers. 
The Commission’s preliminary analysis was in line with the principles applied by the Body of 
European  Regulators  for  Electronic  Communications  (BEREC)  in  its  common  position  on 
mobile infrastructure sharing of 13 June 2019.38  
On  16  October  2019,  the  Commission  ordered  Broadcom39,  the  world's  leading  supplier  of 
chipsets used for TV set-top boxes and modems, to stop applying certain provisions contained 
in agreements with six of its main customers. The Commission’s assessment concluded that 
Broadcom abused at first sight its dominant position in the markets of systems-on-chip for (i) 
TV set-top boxes, (ii) fibre modems, and (iii) xDSL modems by entering into agreements with 
manufacturers of TV set-top boxes and modems that contain exclusivity-inducing provisions. 
Furthermore,  it  concluded  that  serious  and  irreparable  damage  to  competition  would  have 
likely  materialised  in  the  absence  of  interim  measures.  The  Commission  concluded  that  an 
urgent intervention was required to prevent competitors from being marginalised or forced to 
exit  the  market.  The  interim  measures  apply  for  the  earlier  of  three  years,  or  the  date  of 
adoption  of  a  final  decision  on  the  substance  of  Broadcom's  conduct,  or  the  closure  of  the 
Commission  investigation  of  that  conduct.  The  substantive  investigation  on  the  case  is  still 
ongoing.  Interim  measures  is  one  of  the  tools  made  available  to  the  Commission  by 
Regulation 1/2003 but has not been used in the last 18 years prior to this case.  

By means of an interim measures decision, the Commission can order a company to cease and 
desist from a conduct while an investigation is pending. Interim measures can be imposed for 
the duration of an investigation to avoid that the alleged anti-competitive behaviour causes the 
market serious and irreparable damage, which could not be remedied through the adoption of 
the final measure in a Commission investigation. Interim measures are generally considered 
as  exceptional  measures,  because  of  the  burden  imposed  on  a  company  not  yet  found  in 
breach of existing rules. In most cases, a prohibition decision with a cease and desist order or 
remedies is sufficient to restore the competitive conditions.  

Merger review in the telecommunications and media sectors 

In the telecommunications sector, the Commission cleared on 15 July 2019 the acquisition of 
DNA  by  Telenor.40  DNA  provides  mobile  and  fixed  communications  services,  broadband 
internet  services  and  TV  distribution  services  in  Finland,  while  Telenor  is  active  in  mobile 
and  fixed  telecommunications  services  and  TV  distribution  services  in  the  Nordic  region. 
There  were  very  limited  overlaps  between  the  companies'  activities  and  a  number  of  strong 
players  remain  after  the  merger.  Furthermore,  the  Commission  approved  on  18  July  2019, 
after an in-depth investigation, the acquisition by Vodafone of Liberty Global's cable business 
in  Czechia,  Germany,  Hungary  and  Romania.41  The  approval  is  conditional  on  full 
compliance with a commitments package offered by Vodafone. 

In the media sector, on 12 November 2019, the Commission authorised Telia's acquisition of 

38 See: 
https://berec.europa.eu/eng/document_register/subject_matter/berec/regulatory_best_practices/common_approac
hes_positions/8605-berec-common-position-on-infrastructure-sharing.   
39 Case AT.40608 Broadcom, available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_40608.  
40 Case M.9370 Telenor / DNA, Commission decision of 15 July 2019. See: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_9370. 
41 Case M.8864 Vodafone / Certain Liberty Global Assets, Commission decision of 18 July 2019. See: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_8864. 

10 

 
 
                                                           
Bonnier Broadcasting42. Following an in-depth investigation, the Commission  had  concerns 
that the transaction would have significantly reduced competition in Finland and Sweden. The 
approval is conditional on full compliance with commitments offered by Telia.  

State aid enforcement in broadband networks 

Digital infrastructure is  a key digitisation driver, therefore it is essential that the appropriate 
broadband  infrastructure  can  meet  new  needs  for  very  high  digital  speeds,  capacities,  and 
quality. The Commission’s “Gigabit Communication”43 of 2016 identifies very high capacity 
networks  as  one  of  its  strategic  priorities.  Public  funding  is  equally  required  to  ensure  that 
rural, remote and other underserved areas can benefit from the new technologies, so that no 
areas or citizens are left behind. At the same time, private investment should not be crowded 
out and distortions of competition need to be limited to a minimum.  

In  2019,  the  Commission  approved  various  broadband  schemes  under  EU  State  aid  rules. 
These  concerned,  in  Greece,  a  EUR  50  million  voucher  scheme  for  faster  broadband 
services44; in Ireland, EUR 2.6 billion public support for the Irish National Broadband Plan45; 
in  Spain,  a  EUR  400  million  scheme  for  very  high  speed  broadband  networks46;  and  in 
Germany,  the  approval  in  Bavaria  of  a  scheme  for  very  high  capacity  broadband  networks, 
following an earlier gigabit pilot project involving six Bavarian municipalities and approved 
by the Commission in December 201847.  

4.  Competition  policy  in  support  of  the  EU's  low-carbon  energy  and  environment 
objectives   

In  December  2019,  the  Commission  adopted  the  “European  Green  Deal”  Communication, 
outlining policy initiatives to reach net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 and to tackle 
environment-related challenges48. Competition policy, just like all other Commission policies, 
will contribute to achieving these ambitious objectives. Indeed, during 2019 the Commission 
launched  the  “fitness  check”  covering  Environmental  and  Energy  Guidelines  and  continued 
the evaluation of its Guidelines on certain State aid measures in the context of the greenhouse 
gas emission allowance trading scheme post-2012 (ETS Guidelines)49 in preparation of their 
revision  to  ensure  that  they  are  adapted  to  EU’s  new  emissions  trading  scheme  for  2021-
203050. The ongoing “fitness check” of the State aid modernisation package will prepare for a 

42 Case M.9064 – Telia Company / Bonnier Broadcasting Holding, Commission decision of 12 November 2019. 
See: https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_9064. 
43 See: https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/communication-connectivity-competitive-digital-
single-market-towards-european-gigabit-society. 
44 Case SA.49935 Superfast Broadband (SFBB) Project – Greece, Commission decision of 7 January 2019, 
available at: https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_49935.  
45 Case SA.54472 National Broadband Plan – IE, Commission decision of 15 November 2019, available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_54472.  
46 Case SA.53925 Broadband Scheme for NGA White and Grey Areas – Spain, Commission decision of 10 
December 2019, available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_53925. 
47 Case SA.54668 Bavarian gigabit scheme – DE, Commission decision of 29 November 2019, available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_54668.  
48 Communication from the Commission to the  European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions The European Green Deal, 
COM/2019/640 final. See: https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/communication-european-green-deal_en.  
49 See: https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/initiatives/ares2018-6600267_en.  
50 Directive (EU) 2018/410 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2018 amending 
Directive 2003/87/EC to enhance cost-effective emission reductions and low-carbon investments, and Decision 
(EU) 2015/1814, OJ L 76, 19.3.2018, pp. 3–27. 

11 

 
 
                                                           
revision of the relevant guidelines in light of the policy objectives of the European Green Deal 
by 2021. 

State aid underpinning EU’s “zero pollution” ambition and resource efficiency 

In  2019,  the  Commission  approved  EUR  195  million  of  additional  public  support  until  the 
end  of  2022  for  electric  buses  and  charging  infrastructure  in  Germany51.  In  addition,  the 
Commission  approved EUR 430 million  in  public support to  retrofit diesel  vehicles used in 
municipalities where the limits for NOX emissions were exceeded in 201752.  Both types of 
measures are in line with EU’s environmental goals, as well as with the European Strategy for 
low-emission mobility, and its support for the move towards zero-emission vehicles in cities 
and for creating a market for such vehicles. 
The  Commission  also  approved  a  Czech  scheme53  providing  aid  to  installations  generating 
electricity  from  waste  heat  and  from  mining  gases.  The  scheme  contributes  to  resource 
efficiency  by  reducing  the  consumption  of  primary  energy  sources  used  for  electricity 
production.  

On  25  November  2019,  the  Commission  approved  EUR  93.8  million  to  support  the 
construction and operation of a high-efficient cogeneration plant in Bulgaria54. The plant will 
produce heat and electricity using fuel derived from unrecyclable municipal waste.   

On 28 January 2019, the Commission approved EUR 36 million investment aid to chemical 
company  LG  Chem55  for  a  new  electric  vehicle  batteries  plant  in  Poland.  The  new  plant  is 
expected to supply batteries for more than 80 000 electric vehicles per year and create more 
than 700 direct jobs, contributing to the Dolnoślaskie region's development whilst preserving 
competition. This project could not have been carried out without public funding. 

State aid in support of renewable energy 

The objective of State aid control is to maximise environmental, social and economic benefits 
from  limited  public  funds,  by  minimising  costs  for  the  State,  industry  and  consumers,  by 
ensuring public money does not crowd out private spending, as well as by contributing to a 
level playing field in the Single Market. In 2019, the Commission continued to approve State 
aid schemes allowing Member States to meet their energy-efficiency targets and contribute to 
the reduction of carbon dioxide emissions in line with the EU’s environmental objectives.  

On  14  June  2019,  the  Commission  approved  EUR  5.4  billion  support  for  the  production  of 
electricity from renewable sources in Italy56, to help it reach its renewable energy targets. The 

51 Budget increase and prolongation of scheme SA.48190 Germany - Support scheme for the acquisition of 
electric buses for urban public transport, Commission decision of 26 February 2018, available at:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_48190. 
52 SA.53054 Scheme for retrofitting heavy municipal vehicles, SA.53055 Scheme for retrofitting heavy 
commercial vehicles and SA.53056 Scheme for retrofitting light commercial and municipal vehicles. Germany 
notified an amendment to those schemes, which the Commission approved on 25 October 2019 under SA.55230, 
SA.55231 and SA.55232 respectively. The amendment introduced, inter alia, a more flexible concept of eligible 
municipalities. 
53 Case SA.35179 Czech Republic – Promotion of electricity from secondary sources, Commission decision of 
26 September 2019, available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_35179 
54 Case SA.54042 Sofia waste-to-energy project/ cogeneration unit with recovery of energy from RDF- Bulgaria, 
Commission decision of 25 November 2019, available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_54042. 
55 Case SA.47662 LIP – Aid to LG Chem Wrocław Energy Sp. z o.o., Commission decision of 28 January 2019, 
available at: https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_47662.  
56 Case SA.53347 Italy - Support to electricity from renewable sources 2019-2021, Commission decision of 14 
June 2019, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_53347 . 

12 

 
 
                                                           
scheme  will  support  electricity  production  from  renewable  sources,  such  as  onshore  wind, 
solar photovoltaic, hydroelectric and sewage gases and will be applicable until 2021.  
On 26 July 2019, the Commission approved support for six offshore wind farms in France57. 
The construction is to start this year and they should be operational as of  2022. The support 
measures  will  help  France  boost  its  share  of  electricity  produced  from  renewable  energy 
sources to meet its climate targets, in line with EU’s environmental objectives58.  

Regulation and competition policy work hand in hand to ensure security of energy supply for 
European citizens and businesses  

Capacity mechanisms are measures taken by Member States to ensure that electricity supply 
can match demand in the medium and long term. They are designed to fill expected capacity 
gaps  and  ensure  security  of  supply.  It  is  important  that  the  design  of  capacity  mechanisms 
avoid  distortions  of  competition,  as  they  may  otherwise  lead  to  higher  electricity  prices  for 
consumers,  give  undue  advantages  to  certain  energy  operators  or  hinder  electricity  flows 
across EU borders. 

At  the  same  time,  capacity  mechanisms  cannot  substitute  electricity  market  reforms  at 
national  and  European  levels.  The  new  electricity  market  Regulation59  requires  Member 
States planning to introduce capacity mechanisms to present a market reform plan to address 
regulatory  and  other  failures  that  undermine  investment  incentives  in  the  electricity  sector. 
The  Regulation  will  also  prevent  high-emission  generation  capacity  from  participating  in 
capacity mechanisms. 
In 2019, the Commission issued two decisions related to capacity mechanisms in Italy60 and 
Great  Britain  (following  an  in-depth  investigation)61,  which  already  take  into  account  the 
provisions of the electricity market regulation on capacity mechanisms.  

Investigating potential cartels that hinder the use of innovative technologies    

The  Commission's  Guidelines  on  horizontal  co-operation  agreements  explain,  among  other 
things, the forms of cooperation between companies aimed at improving product quality and 
innovation, which do not raise concerns under EU competition law. It is illegal for companies 
to  agree  to  stifle  competition  on  quality  and  innovation.  On  5  April  2019,  the  Commission 
sent  a Statement  of  Objections  to  BMW,  Daimler and the  Volkswagen Group (Volkswagen, 
Audi, Porsche)62, informing them of its preliminary view that they have breached EU antitrust 
rules  from  2006  to  2014  by  colluding  to  restrict  competition  on  the  development  of 
technology  to  clean  the  emissions  of  petrol  and  diesel  passenger  cars.  The  Commission's 
preliminary view is that the car manufacturers' behaviour aimed at restricting competition on 
innovation  for  two  emission-cleaning  systems,  and  may  have  denied  consumers  the 

57 Case SA.45274 France - Offshore wind park of Courseulles, Commission decision of 26 July 2019, SA.45275 
France - Offshore wind park of Fécamp, Commission decision of 26 July 2019, SA.45276 France - offshore 
wind park of Saint-Nazaire, Commission decision of 26 July 2019, SA.47246 France - Offshore wind park in 
Islands of Yeu et Noirmoutier, Commission decision of 26 July 2019,  SA.47247 France - Offshore wind park of 
Dieppe, Commission decision of 26 July 2019, and SA.48007, France - Offshore wind park of Saint-Brieuc 
Commission decision of 26 July 2019. See: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_19_4749. 
58 See: https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024. 
59 Regulation (EU) 2019/943 of the European Parliament and the Council of 5 June 2019 on the internal market 
for electricity, OJ L 158, 14.06.2019, p.54. 
60 Case SA.53821 Modification of the Italian capacity mechanism, Commission decision of 14 June 2019, 
available at: https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_53821.  
61 SA.35980 GB capacity mechanism, Commission decision of 24 October 2019, available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_35980.  
62  Case AT.40178 Car emissions, available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_40178.  

13 

 
 
                                                           
opportunity  to  buy  less  polluting  cars,  despite  the  technology  being  available  to  the 
manufacturers. 

5. Protecting competition in the manufacturing sector  

Competition enforcement in the manufacturing sector ensures that firms can compete on fair 
and equal terms in the Single Market. In addition, State aid enforcement steers public funding 
towards research, training and energy efficiency. Only innovative companies with sustainable 
business plans can deliver smart goods and services at competitive prices for EU consumers 
and  businesses.  Improving  EU  businesses’  efficiency  and  long-term  competitiveness  in  the 
Single Market makes these companies fit for competing in the global market place. 

Merger decisions and investigations in basic industries with high barriers to entry  

EU  merger  control  contributes  to  ensure  that  companies  active  in  the  Single  Market  can 
compete  on  fair  and  equal  terms.  Notified  transactions  that  may  significantly  distort 
competition  are  subject  to  close  scrutiny  by  the  Commission.  In  its  assessment,  the 
Commission takes into account efficiencies brought about by mergers, which may positively 
impact  costs,  innovation  and  other  aspects,  provided  that  such  efficiencies  are  verifiable, 
merger-specific  and  likely  to  be  passed  on  to  consumers.  In  case  there  are  competition 
concerns,  merging  companies  have  the  possibility  to  dismiss  such  concerns  by  offering 
commitments.  If  no  adequate  and  sufficient  commitments  are  found  or  agreed  upon,  the 
Commission prohibits the transaction. Over the past ten years, the Commission has approved 
more than 3000 mergers, out of which over 90% were cleared unconditionally. In comparison, 
over the same period, the Commission only blocked ten mergers, of which three in 2019.   

Basic  manufacturing  and  consumer  goods  industries  continued  to  account  for  a  substantial 
share of the Commission's competition enforcement in 2019.  
On 6 February 2019, the Commission prohibited Siemens’ proposed acquisition of Alstom63 
under the EU Merger Regulation. Siemens and Alstom, both champions in the rail industry, 
had not offered remedies sufficient to address the Commission’s concerns on a lasting basis.  

The Siemens/Alstom merger: protecting rail operators and passengers 

Trains  and  the  signalling  equipment  that  guide  them  are  essential  for  transport  in  Europe.  Siemens 
(Germany)  and  Alstom  (France)  are  both  global  leaders  in  rail  transportation,  and  the  proposed 
transaction  would  have  combined  the  two  largest  suppliers  of  rolling  stock  (trains)  and  signalling 
solutions in the European Economic Area (EEA) not only in terms of size of the combined operations, 
but also in terms of their geographic footprint. Both companies also have leading positions globally. 

In  its  in-depth  assessment,  the  Commission considered  that,  without  sufficient remedies, the  merger 
would have harmed competition in several markets for railway signalling systems and in the market 
for  very  high-speed  trains.  It  would  have  created  the  undisputed  market  leader  in  several  railway 
signalling markets and a dominant player in very high-speed trains in the EEA. In all relevant markets 
in which competition concerns were identified, the competitive pressure from remaining competitors 
would  not  have  been  sufficient  to  ensure  effective  competition.  As  part  of  its  investigation,  the 
Commission  also  carefully  considered  the  competitive  landscape  in  the  rest  of  the  world,  and 
considered that the entry of new competitors, including potential Chinese suppliers, into the EEA in 
the  very  high-speed  rolling  stock  market  or  the  signalling  solutions  markets  for  which  competition 
concerns were identified, were unlikely to occur in the near future.  

Siemens  and  Alstom  offered  remedies  that  were  insufficient to solve  the  Commission’s  competition 
concerns.  Market  participants  consulted  by  the  Commission  to  indicate  their  views  on  the  proposed 

63 Case M.8677 Siemens / Alstom, Commission decision of 6 February 2019, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_8677.   

14 

 
 
                                                           
remedies provided negative feedback, confirming the Commission’s assessment. 

In the absence of adequate remedies that addressed its competition concerns for the very-high speed 
rolling  stock  market  and  the  railway  signalling  markets, the  Commission  concluded  that  the  merger 
would  have  led  to  higher prices,  reduced  choice  for  suppliers  and  fewer  innovative  products, to  the 
detriment of train operators, rail infrastructure managers and ultimately the millions of Europeans who 
use rail transportation every day for work or leisure. It therefore prohibited the proposed transaction. 

On  6  February  2019,  the  Commission  also  prohibited,  under  the  EU  Merger  Regulation, 
Wieland's  proposed  acquisition  of  Aurubis  Rolled  Products  and  Aurubis'  stake  in 
Schwermetall.64  The  Commission’s  concerns  included  reduced  competition  and  increased 
prices  for  rolled  copper  products  used  by  European  manufacturers.  A  large  number  of 
European  industrial  customers  also  expressed  concerns  regarding  both  access  to  pre-rolled 
strip from Schwermetall, and price increases for rolled products. Wieland and Aurubis were 
two  of  the  three  biggest  producers  of  rolled  copper  products  in  Europe.  If  their  merger  had 
gone  through,  Wieland  would  have  become  the  dominant  player  in  the  market  for  rolled 
copper  products,  with  a  market  share  in  Europe  of  over  50%,  and  with  only  one  other 
competitor,  with  a  market  share  above  10%.  As  Wieland  was  not  willing  to  address 
effectively the expressed concerns, the Commission prohibited the proposed transaction. 

In  the  plastics  industry,  on  18  January  2019,  the  Commission,  following  an  in-depth 
investigation,  approved  the  acquisition  of  Solvay’s  polyamide  (nylon)  business  by  BASF65, 
subject  to  the  divestment  of  most  of  Solvay’s  relevant  assets  in  the  EEA.  The  Commission 
identified the risk that the transaction as notified would likely have given rise to higher prices 
and/or less input available throughout  the nylon  6.6 value chain,  as well  as higher prices to 
end  customers.  Nylon  6.6  products  include  specialty  plastics  used  in  the  automotive, 
electronic or construction industries. They are often used as substitutes for heavier metal parts 

64 Case M.8900 Wieland / Aurubis Rolled Products / Schwermetal, Commission decision of 6 February 2019, 
available at: https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_8900.  
65 Case M.8674 BASF / Solvay’s EP and P&I Business, Commission decision of 18 January 2019, available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_8674.  

15 

 
 
 
                                                           
and  to  generate  energy  savings.  On  25  November  2019,  the  Commission  approved  the 
purchase of the divested business by Domo Chemicals.66 

On 11 June 2019, the Commission prohibited, under the EU Merger Regulation, the proposed 
joint  venture  between  Tata  Steel  and  ThyssenKrupp67,  which  would  have  combined  the  flat 
carbon  steel  and  electrical  steel  activities  of  ThyssenKrupp  and  Tata  Steel  in  the  EEA. 
ThyssenKrupp, the second largest producer of flat carbon steel in the EEA, and Tata Steel, the 
third  largest,  are  also  significant  producers  of  metallic  coated  and  laminated  steel  for 
packaging  applications  and  of  galvanised  flat  carbon  steel  for  the  automotive  industry.  The 
Commission’s concerns looked at  reduced competition (less  choice for steel  customers) and 
increased  prices  for  different  types  of  steel.  The  parties  did  not  offer  adequate  remedies  to 
address these concerns. The Commission also sought the views of market participants about 
the  proposed  remedies,  and  their  feedback  was  negative.  As  a  result,  the  Commission 
prohibited the proposed transaction. 

On  1  October  2019,  following  an  in-depth  investigation,  the  Commission  approved  the 
acquisition  of  aluminium  player  Aleris  by  rival  Novelis68  subject  to  conditions.  The 
Commission  had  concerns  that  the  transaction  would  have  resulted  in  higher  prices  for 
European  customers  of  aluminium  automotive  body  sheets,  which  are  used  in  the 
manufacturing of cars also with the aim to reduce fuel consumption and emissions. To address 
the  Commission’s  concerns,  the  companies  offered  to  divest  Aleris’  entire  aluminium 
automotive  body  sheet  business  in  Europe,  including  its  production  plant  in  Belgium.  The 
divestiture  includes  R&D  assets  as  well  as  funding  for  an  investment  to  improve  further  its 
capabilities.  As  the  proposed  divestiture  would  remove  the  entire  overlap  created  by  the 
transaction in aluminium automotive body sheets in Europe, the Commission concluded that 
the transaction, as modified by the commitments, would no longer raise competition concerns. 
The approval is conditional on full compliance with the commitments. 

The  Commission  also  opened  in-depth  investigations  into  various  proposed  mergers  in  the 
manufacturing  sector.  The  opening  of  in-depth  investigations  does  not  prejudge  their 
outcomes. On 4 October 2019, the Commission opened an in-depth investigation to assess the 
proposed  creation  of  two  joint  ventures  by  aircraft  manufacturers  Boeing  and  Embraer69, 
under the EU Merger Regulation. The Commission's concerns were that the transaction may 
result in higher prices and less choice as regards commercial aircraft.  

Furthermore,  on  30  October  2019,  the  Commission  opened  an  in-depth  investigation  to 
determine  whether  the  proposed  acquisition  of  Chantiers  de  l'Atlantique  by  Fincantieri70  is 
likely  to  significantly  reduce  effective  competition.  Both  shipbuilding  companies  are  global 
leaders in an already concentrated and capacity constrained market.  

Moreover, on 17 December 2019, the Commission opened an in-depth investigation to assess 
the proposed acquisition of Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering CO., Ltd (DSME) by 

66 Case M.9553 Domo Investment Group / Solvay Performance Polyamides Business in the EEA, Commission 
decision of 25 November 2019, available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_9553. 
67  Case M.8713. Tata Steel / Thyssenkrupp / JV, Commission decision of 11 June 2019, available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_8713.  
68 Case M.9076 Novelis/Aleris, Commission decision of 1 October 2019, available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_9076.  
69 Case M.9097 Boeing / Embraer, available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_9097. On 25 April 2020, Boeing 
terminated the agreement to establish Joint Ventures with Embraer. 
70 Case M.9162 Fincantieri / Chantiers De L'Atlantique, available at : 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_9162.  

16 

 
 
                                                           
another  shipbuilding  group,  Hyundai  Heavy  Industries  Holdings  (HHIH)71,  under  the  EU 
Merger Regulation. The Commission is concerned that the merger may reduce competition in 
various global cargo shipbuilding markets. Cargo shipbuilding is an important industry for the 
EU.  European  shipping  companies  are  major  customers  of  DSME  and  HHIH  and  represent 
30% of worldwide demand for cargo ships. 

EU State aid rules contribute to boosting innovation  

In June 2014, the Commission adopted a Communication on Important Projects of Common 
European  Interest  (IPCEI),  setting  out  criteria  under  which  Member  States  can  support 
transnational projects of strategic significance for the EU72. The Communication clarifies the 
compatibility  rules so that it facilitates cooperation between Member States on projects  that 
make  a  clear  contribution  to  economic  growth,  sustainability,  jobs  and  the  EU’s 
competitiveness.  The 
to  ensure  extensive 
dissemination  of  new  knowledge  throughout  the  EU  as  well  as  a  detailed  competition 
assessment  to  minimise  any  undue  distortions.  The  IPCEI  framework  complements  other 
State aid rules such as the General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER)73 and the Research, 
Development and Innovation Framework74, which also enable support to innovative projects 
whilst ensuring that potential competition distortions are limited.  

requires  commitments 

framework  also 

In  December  2018,  the  Commission  found  that  an  integrated  project  jointly  notified  by 
France,  Germany,  Italy  and  the  UK  for  research  and  innovation  in  microelectronics,  a  key 
enabling technology, is in line with EU State aid rules and contributes to a common European 
interest75. The four Member States are to provide up to EUR 1.75 billion in funding for this 
project that aims to unlock an additional EUR 6 billion in private investment.  

In December 2019, a second project,  concerning batteries, followed this first  IPCEI project. 
Battery production is of strategic interest for the European economy and society because of its 
potential in terms of clean mobility, energy, sustainability and competitiveness. 

Important Projects of Common European Interest: supporting all battery value chain segments 

In  December  2019,  the  Commission  approved  a  second  Important  Project  of  Common  European 
interest jointly notified by Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Poland and Sweden to support 
research and innovation in the common European priority area of batteries76. The seven Member States 
will provide in the coming years up to approximately EUR 3.2 billion in funding, which is expected to 
unlock an additional EUR 5 billion in private investments.  

The  completion  of  the  overall  project  is  planned  for  2031  (with  differing  timelines  for  each  sub-
project). The project will involve 17 direct participants, mostly industrial actors, including small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). 

71 Case M.9343 Hyundai Heavy Industries Holdings / Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering, available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_9343.  
72 In line with Article 107(3)(b) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 
73 See: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/legislation/block.html. 
74 Communication from the Commission — Framework for State aid for research and development and 
innovation, OJ C 198, 27.6.2014, pp. 1–29. 
75 Cases SA.46705 (France), SA.46578 (Germany), SA.46595 (Italy) and SA.46590 (United Kingdom). See also: 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_18_6862.  
76 Cases SA.54793 (Belgium), SA.54801 (Germany), SA.54794 (France), SA.54806 (Italy), SA.54808 (Poland), 
SA.54796 (Sweden) and SA.54809 (Finland). See also: 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_19_6705.  

17 

 
 
                                                           
The project is part of the “European Battery Alliance” between the Commission, interested Member 
States and the industrial actors that adopted a Strategic Action Plan for Batteries in May 2018.  

6. Ensuring a level playing field in the area of taxation 

Safeguarding a level playing field for companies so that they compete on merit, also when it 
comes to taxation, increases confidence in the Single Market. Member States cannot give tax 
benefits  to  multinational  groups  that  are  not  available  to  other  companies  (often  local 
businesses),  since  that  would  severely  distort  competition.  Moreover,  it  would  deprive  the 
public  purse  and  EU  taxpayers  of  much  needed  funds  to  fight  climate  change,  to  build 
infrastructure and to invest in innovation.  

On 24 September 2019, the General Court delivered its first judgments on the Commission’s 
decisions finding that tax rulings granted to Starbucks77 and Fiat78 had constituted State aid. 
In Fiat, the General Court upheld the Commission’s decision of 21 October 201579, agreeing 
that the Commission had applied its State aid rules correctly to assess if there was an illegal 
advantage and was not seeking to harmonise tax rules across the bloc. The General Court also 
agreed with the Commission’s finding that the Luxembourg tax ruling was selective, thus not 
available  to  all  companies.  In  Starbucks,  the  General  Court  annulled  the  Commission’s 
decision of 21 October 201580 concluding that the Commission was unable to demonstrate the 
existence  of  an  advantage  in  favour  of  the  company.  In  both  cases,  the  General  Court 
endorsed the Commission’s approach in using State aid rules in tax cases.   

The Commission continues its fight against selective tax advantages 

77 Joined Cases T-760/15 and T-636/16, Kingdom of the Netherlands and Others v European Commission, 
judgment of 24 September 2019, ECLI:EU:T:2019:669. 
78 Joined Cases T-755/15 and T-759/15, Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and Fiat Chrysler Finance Europe v 
European Commission, judgment of 24 September 2019, ECLI:EU:T:2019:670. 
79 Case SA.38375 State aid which Luxembourg granted to Fiat, Commission decision of 21 October 2015, 
available at: https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_38375.  
80 Case SA.38374 State aid implemented by the Netherlands to Starbucks, Commission decision of 21 October 
2015, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_38374. 

18 

 
 
 
                                                           
In  2019,  the  Commission  continued  to  look  at  aggressive  tax  planning  measures  under  EU 
State aid rules and to assess if they result in illegal State aid.  

On  2  April  2019,  the  Commission  concluded  that  the  United  Kingdom  gave  illegal  tax 
advantages to certain multinational companies by granting them an exemption from a set of 
anti-avoidance rules known as Controlled Foreign Company (CFC)81 rules.  

On 10 January 2019, the Commission  opened an in-depth  investigation  to  examine whether 
tax  rulings  granted  by  the  Netherlands  to  Nike82  may  have  given  the  company  an  unfair 
advantage  over  its  competitors,  in  breach  of  EU  State  aid  rules.  The  Commission's  formal 
investigation  concerns  the  tax  treatment  in  the  Netherlands  of  two  Nike  group  companies. 
From 2006 to 2015, the Dutch tax authorities issued tax rulings, which endorsed a method to 
calculate  the  royalties.  As  a  result,  these  group  companies  were  only  taxed  on  a  limited 
operating  margin  based  on  sales.  The  Commission  is  concerned  that  the  royalty  payments 
endorsed by the rulings may not reflect economic reality. They appear to be higher than what 
independent companies negotiating on market terms would have agreed between themselves 
in accordance with the arm's length principle. 

On 16 September 2019, following the General Court’s judgment annulling the Belgian Excess 
Profit83 decision on grounds that the tax rulings needed to be assessed individually under EU 
State  aid  rules,  the  Commission  opened  separate  in-depth  investigations  into  39  “excess 
profit”  tax  rulings  granted  by  Belgium  to  multinational  companies.84  At  the  same  time,  the 
Commission appealed the judgment of the General Court to the European Court of Justice to 
seek further clarity on the existence of an aid scheme. The proceedings are ongoing. 

7. Making the financial sector more resilient in a Banking Union context 

The  general  stabilisation  of  the  European  financial  sector,  since  the  financial  crisis,  and 
ongoing implementation of the Banking Union regulatory framework continued to reduce the 
number of State aid cases in the financial sector.  

On 5 December 2019, the Commission adopted a decision concluding that the recapitalisation 
of German bank Norddeutsche Landesbank – Girozentrale (NordLB)85 was market conform. 
The measures involved a direct  investment  of EUR 2.8 billion and investments  to  carry out 
the necessary structural changes, as well as downsizing, to ensure that NordLB continues to 
operate  profitably  on  the  market.  The  Commission  found  that  the  State  received  a 
remuneration in line with what a private operator would also accept in similar circumstances. 
Thus,  the  measures  were  carried  out  on  market  terms,  and  with  no  State  aid  within  the 
meaning  of  EU  rules.  The  European  Central  Bank,  as  responsible  supervisor,  gave  its 
approval to the plan on 29 November 2019.  In a similar approach, on 29 October 2019, the 
Commission  had found  Romania's plans to  inject  EUR 200 million  of  capital  in  fully  state-
owned CEC Bank86 to be carried out on market terms and therefore involving no State aid in 

81 Case SA.44896 State aid scheme UK CFC Group Financing Exemption, Commission decision of 2 April 
2019, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_44896.    
82  Case SA.51284 Netherlands – Alleged aid to Nike, Commission decision of 10 January 2019, available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_51284. 
83 Case SA.37667 Excess Profit exemption in Belgium, Commission decision of 11 January 2016, available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_37667.  
84 See: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_19_5578.  
85 Case SA.49094 Market-conform measures for strengthening capital and restructuring of Norddeutsche 
Landesbank, Commission decision of 5 December 2019, available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_49094.  
86 Case SA.53869 Market-conform recapitalisation of CEC Bank, Commission decision of 29 October 2019, 
available at: https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_53869.  

19 

 
 
                                                           
favour of the bank within the meaning of EU rules. 

Nevertheless,  despite  the  improving  resilience  of  EU’s  banking  sector,  some  parts  still  face 
legacy  issues,  such  as  the  level  of  non-performing  loans  (NPL),  which  is  still  high  in  some 
Member  States.  In  2019,  the  Commission  approved  the  Hellenic  Asset  Protection  Scheme 
(also known as ‘Hercules’)87 as free of State aid, targeted to address non-performing loans in 
Greece.  This  scheme  is  an  example  of  how  Member  States  can  help  banks  clean  up  their 
balance sheets without granting aid or distorting competition. 

Continuing  to  ensure  fair  competition  in  financial  services  markets  for  the  benefit  of  both 
consumers and businesses 

The  digital  transformation  is  affecting  financial services  as  much  as  other industries in 
Europe. Digital technologies offer businesses new possibilities to serve customers better, and 
with services that cost less. To fully unlock the potential of digitisation, financial technology 
companies will need a real chance to compete, and regulatory frameworks will need to make 
sure that a level playing field can be achieved among all financial service providers. 

In  2019,  enforcement  of  competition  rules  throughout  the  financial  sector  remained  key  to 
ensuring  fair  competition  and  protecting  financial  stability  alike.  On  22  January  2019,  the 
Commission fined the card scheme Mastercard88 EUR 570 million for obstructing merchants' 
access to cross-border card payment services, in breach of EU antitrust rules. 

Mastercard II: promoting healthy competition in the payments sector  

Mastercard  is  the  second  largest  card  scheme  in  the  European  Economic  Area  (EEA)  in  terms  of 
number  of  consumer  cards  and  value  of  transactions.  Card  payments  play  a  key  role  in  the  Single 
Market, with European consumers and businesses making more than half of their non-cash payments 
through cards. When a consumer uses a debit or credit card in a shop or online, the retailer’s bank pays 
a fee called an “interchange fee” to the cardholder's bank. The bank of the retailer passes this fee on to 
the retailer who includes it, like any other cost, in the final prices for all consumers. 

The Commission’s investigation found that Mastercard's cross-border rules obliged retailers’ banks to 
apply the interchange fees of the country where the retailer was located. These rules made retailers pay 
more in bank services to receive card payments than if they had been free to shop around for lower-
priced services. The cross-border rules equally led to higher prices for retailers and consumers, limited 
cross-border competition and an artificial segmentation of the Single Market.  

87  Case SA.53519 Hellenic Asset Protection Scheme ('Hercules') – Greece, Commission decision of 10 October 
2019, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_53519.  
88 Case AT.40049 MasterCard II, Commission decision of 22 January 2019, available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_40049. 

20 

 
 
                                                           
The  Commission  concluded  that  Mastercard's  cross-border  rules  until  9  December  2015  were  in 
breach  of  EU  antitrust  rules,  as  they  limited  the  possibility  for  merchants  to  benefit  from  better 
conditions offered by banks established elsewhere in the Single Market. On this basis, the Commission 
decided to impose a fine on Mastercard of EUR 570 million. 
On  9  December  2015,  the  Interchange  Fee  Regulation  (IFR)89  had  introduced  caps  for 
interchange  fees,  which  before  had  varied  considerably  from  one  country  to  another  in  the 
EEA.  The  Commission  is  currently  assessing  the  implementation  of  the  2015  IFR  and  has 
commissioned  a  study90  in  this  respect.  The  Commission  concluded  separate  antitrust 
investigations into Mastercard's, Visa Inc.'s, and Visa International's multilateral interchange 
fees  (MIFs)  applied  to  transactions  in  the  EEA  made  with  consumer  debit  and  credit  cards 
issued  outside  the  EEA  (inter-regional  MIFs).  The  IFR  did  not  cap  these  MIFs,  which 
represented  a  significant  burden  to  European  merchants  and  increased  retail  prices  for  all 
consumers.  In  2014,  following  Visa  Europe’s  commitments,  the  proceedings  concerning  it 
were closed91. In 2019, Mastercard, Visa Inc. and Visa International, each separately, offered 
commitments that would reduce the inter-regional MIFs by an average of 40%, in line with or 
below binding caps. On 29 April 2019, the Commission adopted two decisions making these 
commitments legally binding under EU antitrust rules92. 

Furthermore, on 16 May 2019, the Commission, in two settlement decisions, fined five banks 
for taking part in two cartels in the Spot Foreign Exchange market (FOREX)93 for 11 major 
currencies.  The  first  decision  (the  so-called  “Forex  –  Three-Way  Banana  Split”  cartel) 

89 Regulation (EU) 2015/751 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2015 on interchange 
fees for card-based payment transactions (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 123, 19.5.2015, pp. 1–15. 
90 See: https://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/reports/kd0120161enn.pdf.  
91 Case AT.39398 VISA MIF, Commission decision of 26 February 2014. See: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39398/39398_9728_3.pdf.  
92 Cases AT 39398 Visa MIF and AT 40049 Mastercard II, Commission decisions of 29 April 2019. 
See:https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_40049 and 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_39398. .  
93 Case AT.40135 FOREX, Commission decision of 16 May 2019, available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_40135. 

21 

 
 
 
                                                           
imposed  a  total  fine  of  EUR  811  million  on  Barclays,  the  Royal  Bank  of  Scotland  (RBS), 
Citigroup  and  JPMorgan.  The  infringement  started  on  18  December  2007  and  ended  on  31 
January 2013. The second decision (so-called “Forex-Essex Express” cartel) imposed a total 
fine  of  just  under  EUR  258  million  on  Barclays,  RBS  and  MUFG  Bank  (formerly  Bank  of 
Tokyo-Mitsubishi).  The  infringement  started  on  14  December  2009  and  ended  on  31  July 
2012.  Union  Bank  of  Switzerland  (UBS)  was  an  addressee  of  both  decisions,  but  was  not 
fined as it revealed the existence of the cartels to the Commission.  

In  2019,  the  Commission  continued  to  closely  monitor  the  credit  sector,  and  published  a 
report94 on EU loan syndication, including how such syndicates are formed and operate, and 
their impact on competition in credit markets. Syndicated loans are important instruments in 
financing major infrastructure and innovation projects. 

In the insurance sector, the Commission opened a formal antitrust investigation into Insurance 
Ireland95  in  May  2019,  to  assess  whether  companies  wishing  to  offer  their  services  on  the 
Irish motor insurance market were unfairly prevented from accessing a data pool managed by 
Insurance Ireland for its member companies. If proven, the practices under investigation may 
breach EU competition rules, and could lead to reduced choice and less competitive prices for 
Irish  drivers  regarding  motor  insurance  policies.  The  opening  of  the  formal  investigation 
follows inspections carried out in July 2017 in the Irish motor insurance market. 

8. Ensuring fair competition in the food, consumer and health sectors  

The Single Market opened the possibilities for retailers and consumers to shop around Europe 
for  a  larger  variety  of  products  and  cheaper  prices.  When  companies  restrict  traders  from 
selling merchandise  cross-border  and online within  the EU Single Market, this  leads to  less 
choice and higher prices for consumers. European competition rules  enshrined in the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the EU96 prohibit agreements between companies that prevent, restrict 
or distort competition inside the EU's Single Market.   

Antitrust enforcement in cross-border consumer products    

In 2019, the Commission closely scrutinised several cases of licensees being prevented from 
selling licensed products in a different country, in breach of EU antitrust rules.  
On  13  May  2019,  the  Commission  fined  Anheuser-Busch  InBev  NV/SA  (AB  InBev)97  EUR 
200.4 Million for restricting sales of beer across neighbouring EU Member States, in breach 
of EU antitrust rules.  

Continuing the fight against cross-border anticompetitive practices in the Single Market  

AB InBev is the world's biggest beer brewer. Its most popular beer brand in Belgium is Jupiler, which 
represents approximately 40% of the total Belgian beer market in terms of sales volume. AB  InBev 
also sells Jupiler beer in other EU Member States, including the Netherlands and France.  

In  its  investigation  opened  in  June  2016,  the  Commission  found  that  in  the  Netherlands,  AB  InBev 
sells Jupiler to retailers and wholesalers at lower prices than in Belgium due to increased competition. 
The Commission equally concluded that AB InBev is dominant on the Belgian beer market and that 
AB  InBev  abused  its  dominant  market  position  in  Belgium  by  restricting  the  possibility  for 
supermarkets and wholesalers to buy Jupiler beer at lower prices in the Netherlands and to  import it 

94 See: https://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/reports/kd0419330enn.pdf. 
95 Case AT.40511 Insurance Ireland: Insurance claims database and conditions of access, available at:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_40511. 
96 See: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:12008E101:EN:HTML.  
97 Case AT40134 AB InBev Beer Trade Restrictions, Commission decision of 13 May 2019, available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_40134.  

22 

 
 
                                                           
into  Belgium.  Therefore,  cross-border  sales  in  the  Single  Market  were  restricted,  and  consumers  in 
Belgium had to pay more for the Jupiler beer.  

The infringement of EU competition rules lasted from 9 February 2009 until 31 October 2016 and the 
fine  imposed  by  the  Commission  on  AB  InBev  amounts  to  EUR  200  409  000.  The  Commission 
decision  equally  made  the  remedy  ensuring  that  AB  InBev  provides  mandatory  food  information  in 
both French and Dutch on the packaging of its products, legally binding for  the next five years. The 
Commission decided to reduce AB InBev’s fine by 15% in light of AB InBev’s acknowledgment of 
the  infringement  and  of  its  implementation  of  remedies  aimed  towards  favouring  the  cross-border 
trade of its products.  

Market  dominance  is,  as  such,  not  illegal  under  EU  antitrust  rules.  However,  dominant  companies 
have a special responsibility not to abuse their market power by restricting competition, either in the 
market where they are dominant or in separate markets. 
On 25 March 2019, the Commission fined Nike98 EUR 12.5 million for banning traders from 
selling  licensed  merchandise,  merchandising  products  of  some  of  Europe's  best-known 
football  clubs  and  federations,  to  other  countries  within  the  EEA.  In  its  investigation,  the 
Commission found that Nike's non-exclusive licensing and distribution agreements breached 
EU competition rules, among other things, because of clauses explicitly prohibiting active and 
passive, online and offline, sales to EEA countries not specifically allocated to the licensees. 
Nike  also  enforced  certain  measures  to  indirectly  implement  those  sales  restrictions,  for 
instance  by  threatening  licensees  with  ending  their  contract  and  by  carrying  out  audits  to 
ensure compliance with  the restrictions. Similarly, on 9  July 2019,  Sanrio99 was fined EUR 
6.2 million for restricting traders from selling licensed merchandise to other countries within 
the  EEA.  This  restriction  concerned  products  featuring  characters  owned  by  Sanrio  such  as 
Hello  Kitty.  Notably,  Sanrio  limited  the  languages  that  licensees  could  use  on  the 
merchandising products. Sanrio's illegal  practices lasted approximately 11  years. Sanrio  and 
Nike each obtained a 40% reduction of their fines because in addition to acknowledging their 
respective infringements, they also cooperated to a large extent with the Commission, beyond 

98  Case AT.40436 - Licensed Merchandise – Nike, available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_40436.  
99 Case AT.40432 - Licensed Merchandise – Sanrio, available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_40432.  

23 

 
 
  
                                                           
their  legal  obligation  to  do  so.  The  Commission  equally  conducted  a  third  investigation, 
concerning the licensing practices of Universal Studios100, owner of among others the rights 
for the Minions and Jurassic World film series. 
On 27 September 2019, the Commission fined Coroos and Groupe CECAB101 a total of EUR 
31.6  million  for  breaching  EU  antitrust  rules.  Bonduelle  was  not  fined  as  it  revealed  the 
existence  of  the  cartel  to  the  Commission.  Bonduelle,  Coroos  and  Groupe  CECAB 
participated  for  more  than  13  years  in  a  cartel  for  the  supply  of  certain  types  of  canned 
vegetables to retailers and/or food service companies in the EEA. The companies set prices, 
agreed  on  market  shares  and  volume  quotas,  allocated  customers  and  markets,  coordinated 
their replies to tenders, and exchanged commercially sensitive information. The infringement 
covered the entire EEA and lasted from 19 January 2000 to 11 June 2013 for Bonduelle, and 
to  1  October  2013  for  Coroos  and  Groupe  CECAB.  The  three  companies  admitted  their 
involvement in the cartel and agreed to settle the case. 

Furthermore, in  November 2019, the Commission opened a formal antitrust  investigation to 
assess  whether  two  of  the  largest  French  groups  of  retailers,  Casino  Guichard-Perrachon 
(known  as  ‘Casino')  and  Les  Mousquetaires  (known  as  ‘Intermarché')102,  had  coordinated 
their conduct in the market, in breach of EU competition rules. The investigation is part of the 
Commission's efforts to ensure that modern grocery retail delivers benefits to consumers. 

Competition policy contributing to affordable and innovative pharmaceuticals 

On 28 January 2019, the Commission published the report “Competition enforcement in the 
pharmaceutical  sector  (2009-2017)  –  European  competition  authorities  working  together  for 
affordable and innovative medicines”103. The report provides a comprehensive overview and 
examples of how the Commission and the national competition authorities of the 28 Member 
States enforced the EU antitrust and merger rules in the pharmaceutical  sector in the period 
between 2009 and 2017. The report found that EU competition enforcerment helped maintain 
the level of innovation in the sector by intervening against practices that could have distorted 
the incentives to innovate.  

In 2019, the Commission continued proceedings in two cases where it is investigating firms 
suspected of preventing or reducing consumers’ access to effective, innovative and affordable 
medicines.  The  first  case  concerns  so-called  pay-for-delay  practices  impeding  the  market 
entry  of  generic  modafinil104,  a  sleeping  disorder  medicine.  The  Commission  aims  to 
conclude this investigation in the course of 2020. The second case concerns the Commission’s 
ongoing  formal  antitrust  proceedings  against  Aspen  Pharma105  for  a  suspected  abuse  of  its 
dominant market position. The Commission investigates allegations that Aspen Pharma may 
have imposed unfair and excessive prices for a range of cancer medicines in all countries in 

100 Case AT.40433 - Film merchandise, available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_40433 . A decision fining NBC 
Universal EUR 14.3 million for contractual restrictions in non-exclusive licensing agreements regarding the sale 
of merchandise products featuring NBC Universal’s films was adopted on 30 January 2020. 
101 Case AT.40127 Coroos and Groupe CECAB, Commission decision of 13 May 2019, available at: see: 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_19_5911. 
102 Case AT.40466 Alliance Casino & Intermarché, Commission decision of 13 May 2019, available at:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_40466.  
103  See: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/report2019/index.html, and 
https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-19-741_en. 
104 Case AT.39686 Cephalon, see: IP/17/2063 of 17 July 2017: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-
2063_en.htm. 
105  Case AT.40394 Aspen. See: IP/17/1323 of 15 May 2017: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-
1323_en.htm and http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/40394/40394_235_3.pdf. 

24 

 
 
                                                           
the EEA except Italy.106 The Commission aims to conclude this case in 2020. 

9. Transport and postal services  

The  competitiveness  of  both  transport  and  postal  services  sectors  is  important  for  a  well-
functioning Single Market,  with  beneficial spill-over effects  for other sectors in  a European 
economy integrated into the global markets. Within these sectors competition is particularly 
essential for the benefit of consumers, growth and jobs. 

State aid in the transport sector contributing to prevent distortions of competition  

On 2 August 2019, the Commission found that the marketing agreements concluded between 
the  local  Association  for  the  Promotion  of  Touristic  and  Economic  Flows  (APFTE)  and 
Ryanair107, at the airport of Montpellier, are illegal under EU State aid rules. Between 2010 
and  2017,  APFTE  concluded  various  marketing  agreements  with  Ryanair  and  its  subsidiary 
Airport  Marketing  Services  (AMS),  under  which  the  airline  and  its  subsidiary  received 
payments  in  exchange  for  promoting  Montpellier  and  the  surrounding  area  as  a  touristic 
destination on Ryanair's website. These payments gave Ryanair a selective advantage over its 
competitors. France must now recover the illegal State aid of EUR 8.5 million from Ryanair. 
The Commission is currently investigating further agreements between public authorities and 
airlines in regional airports Girona and Reus108 in Spain. 

On  28  February  2019,  the  Commission  opened  an  in-depth  investigation  to  assess  whether 
Danish and Swedish public support for the Øresund109 fixed rail-road link was in line with EU 
State aid rules. Moreover, in June 2019, the Commission opened an in-depth investigation to 
determine  whether  the  public  financing  model  of  the  Fehmarn  Belt110  fixed  rail-road  link, 
between  Denmark  and  Germany,  was  in  line  with  EU  State  aid  rules.  Both  in-depth 
investigations  follow  the  General  Court's  annulment  of  previous  Commission  decisions 
approving the respective supports.  

On 16 December 2019, the Commission approved, under EU State aid rules, five schemes to 
support maritime transport in Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Poland and Sweden111. The schemes 
encourage  ship  registration  in  Europe  and  contribute  to  the  global  competitiveness  of  the 
sector without unduly distorting competition. 

State aid to postal services: maintaining a level-playing field  

State aid control in the postal sector ensures that where a postal service provider, typically an 
incumbent, is entrusted with a costly public service obligation, any compensation paid to the 
provider does not distort competition between postal incumbents and new entrants.  

On  22  July  2019,  the  Commission  approved  a  EUR  171.74  million  public  service 

106   The Italian competition authority adopted an infringement decision against Aspen on 29 September 2016. 
107 Case SA.47867 Aid to Ryanair Montpellier airport, Commission decision of 2 August 2019, available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_sa_47867.  
108 Case SA.33909 Girona and Reus Airports - Aid to Ryanair, available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_33909 .  
109 Cases SA.52162 and SA.52617 State aid in favour of the Oresund Bridge Consortium. See: 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_19_1468. 
110 Case SA.39078 Financing of the Fehmarn Belt Fixed Link project, available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_39078.  
111 Cases SA.51809 (Cyprus), SA.52069 (Denmark), SA.53469 (Estonia), SA.46380 (Poland), SA.46740 
(Sweden). See:  https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_19_6780.  

25 

 
 
                                                           
compensation  granted  by  Italy  to  Poste  Italiane112  for  distributing,  at  reduced  tariffs, 
newspapers  and  publications  of  book  publishers  and  non-profit  organisations  for  the  period 
2017-2019.  

Furthermore,  on  14  June  2019,  the  Commission  opened  an  in-depth  investigation  to  assess 
whether capital injections granted by Denmark and Sweden to PostNord and by PostNord to 
Post  Danmark  are  in  line  with  EU  State  aid  rules.113  Post  Danmark  is  the  national  postal 
operator  in  Denmark  and  a  wholly-owned  subsidiary  of  PostNord,  which  is  owned  by  the 
Danish (40%) and Swedish (60%) states. 

10. Joining forces in fostering a European and global competition culture  

As  world  markets  continue  to  integrate  and  more  and  more  companies  rely  on  global  value 
chains,  competition  agencies  need  to  increase  their  collaboration  and  agree  on  common 
standards  and  procedures  more  than  ever  before.  Effectively  enforcing  competition  rules 
depends to a growing extent on co-operation with other enforcement authorities.  

The  Commission  continued  to  be  at  the  forefront  of  international  cooperation  in  the 
competition  field,  both  on  the  multilateral  and  bilateral  levels.  In  2019,  the  Commission 
continued its active engagement  in  competition-related international  fora  such as the OECD 
Competition Committee, the International Competition Network (ICN), the World Bank, and 
the  United  Nations  Conference  on  Trade  and  Development  (UNCTAD).  The  Commission 
remains committed to fostering a far-reaching competition culture, as well as to promoting a 
global  level  playing  field  where  companies  can  compete  on  their  merits.  In  2019,  the 
Commission continued its endeavours to improve international rules for subsidies. Reforming 
the subsidy rules is one of the EU’s main priorities for the modernisation of WTO trade rules. 
It also contributed to a common understanding reached with the competition authorities of the 
G7 countries regarding the challenges raised by the digital economy for competition analysis. 

At bilateral level, the Commission aims at including provisions on competition and State aid 
control when negotiating Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). In 2019, the Commission continued 
FTA  negotiations  with  Australia,  Azerbaijan,  Chile,  Indonesia,  New  Zealand,  Tunisia  and 
Uzbekistan, and concluded the negotiations with Kyrgyzstan and Mercosur.  

In 2019, the Commission also  continued the cooperation in  competition  policy and in  cases 
with  China  and  reconfirmed  the  Terms  of  Reference  of  the  EU-China  Competition  Policy 
Dialogue114 and the Memorandum of Understanding on a dialogue in the area of the State aid 
control  regime  and  the  Fair  Competition  Review  System115.  The  Commission's  negotiations 
on a Comprehensive Investment Agreement with China are still ongoing.  

Furthermore, the Commission continued its technical cooperation on competition policy and 
enforcement  with  the  European  Union’s  main  trading  partners  with  which  the  Commission 
has  signed  Memoranda  of  Understanding.  Regarding  neighbouring  countries,  in  2019  the 
Commission was involved in monitoring the implementation of the EU competition acquis in 
countries such as Ukraine. 

112 Case SA.48492 Compensation to Poste Italiane for reduced tariffs for publishers and not-for profit 
organizations 2017-2019, Commission decision of 22 July 2019, available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_48492.  
113 Cases SA.49668 and SA.53403 Alleged State aid to Post Danmark. See: https://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-19-3008_en.  
114  See:  https://ec.europa.eu/competition/international/bilateral/agreement_tor_china_2019.pdf. 
115  See: https://ec.europa.eu/competition/international/bilateral/mou_china_2019.pdf. 

26 

 
 
 
                                                           
Finally, the Commission continued to monitor EU accession candidate countries’ compliance 
with  their  competition  policy  commitments  under  the  Stabilisation  and  Association 
agreements. 

Cooperation with national competition authorities within the European Competition Network 

Since 2004, the Commission and the national competition authorities in all EU Member States 
cooperate through the European Competition Network (ECN)116. The objective of the ECN is 
to build an effective legal framework to enforce European competition law against companies 
who engage in cross-border business practices which restrict competition. 

In 2019, the Commission continued to ensure the coherent application of Articles 101 and 102 
through the ECN. Two of the key supporting cooperation mechanisms in Regulation 1/2003117 
are the obligation on national competition authorities to inform the Commission about a new 
investigation  at  the  stage  of  the  first  formal  investigative  measure  and  to  consult  the 
Commission  on envisaged decisions.  In 2019, 138 new investigations were launched within 
the network and 95 envisaged decisions were submitted, compared to 165 new investigations 
and  75  envisaged  decisions  in  2018.  These  figures  include  Commission  investigations  and 
decisions, respectively.  

On top of these cooperation mechanisms set out in Regulation 1/2003, other ECN cooperation 
work  streams  equally  ensure  a  coherent  enforcement  of  the  EU  competition  rules.  The 
network meets regularly to discuss cases at early stages, policy issues, as well as matters of 
strategic  importance.  In  2019,  28  meetings  across  horizontal  working  groups  and  sector-
specific sub-groups were organised, where competition authorities’ officials exchanged views. 

Upholding a regular and constructive inter-institutional dialogue  

The European Parliament  (EP), the Council and the two consultative committees, with their 
specific roles vis-à-vis European citizens and stakeholders, are key partners in the dialogue on 
competition policy. 

In response to the Parliament’s report on the Annual Competition Report 2017 (rapporteur M. 
Reimon), the Commission highlighted the  tax rulings cases, the conference on competition in 
the digital age, environmental concerns, support for European industries, and competition as 
one of the guiding principles of the Internal Market.  

The Commission’s response to EP’s Resolution on competition policy, adopted on 31 January 
2019,  was  set  out  in  its  written  response  sent  on  3  July118.  The  Commission  welcomed,  in 
particular, the EP's support for a strong and effective competition policy, including its support 
for  the  strengthening  of  the  capacity  of  National  Competition  Authorities  to  ensure  more 
effective enforcement of EU competition  law through the so-called ECN+  Directive, and to 
ensure sufficient resources and adequate tools for the Commission to target its investigations 
and  bring  them  to  the  end  speedily,  also  in  connection  with  the  negotiations  on  the  Single 
Market  Programme  within  the  framework  of  the  next  Multiannual  Financial  Framework.  In 
2019,  Commissioner  Vestager  made  several  appearances  in  Parliament.  In  February, 
Commissioner  Vestager  appeared  before  EP’s  Special  Committee  on  Taxation,  and  also 
attended an in camera session of the Banking Union working group of the EP’s Economic and 
Monetary  Affairs  committee,  to  talk  about  the  Banca  Carige  and  Nord  LB  State  aid  cases, 
together with Vice-President Dombrovskis.  

116 Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities, OJ C 101, 27.04.2004, 
pp. 43-53 and OJ C 374, 13.10.2016, p. 10. 
117 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition 
laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ L 1, 4.1.2003, pp. 1–25. 
118 See: https://oeil.secure.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/spdoc.do?i=32005&j=0&l=en.  

27 

 
 
                                                           
In  March,  Commissioner  Vestager  participated  in  the  Structural  Dialogue  with  the  EP's 
Economic and Monetary Affairs committee where she noted the EP’s support for the work of 
the  Commission  in  the  area  of  competition  policy,  as  a  key  tool  to  deliver  an  open  Single 
Market for the benefit of citizens.  

In  addition  to  bilateral  meetings  between  the  Commissioner  and  individual  Members  of  the 
European  Parliament  (MEPs),  the  Commission  services  of  DG  Competition  delivered 
technical presentations to MEPs and their staff.  

In  December,  as  part  of  the  Annual  Competition  Report  2018  cycle,  the  Acting  Director-
General  of  DG  Competition  participated  in  the  discussions  in  the  EP's  Economic  and 
Monetary Affairs committee following the presentation of the draft report by rapporteur Yon-
Courtin. The Commission equally engaged with the two consultative committees throughout 
the year.  

On 16 May 2019, Commissioner Vestager was invited to the European Economic and Social 
Committee’s (EESC’s) 543rd plenary session, for an exchange of views with its members on 
the challenges of competition policy for the new Commission and the new EP, in particular in 
the  context  of  the  digital  economy  and  sustainable  development.  Commissioner  Vestager 
referred  to  the  challenges  for  the  new  institutional  cycle,  such  as  new  technologies  and 
innovations, dynamic of economic growth, effective taxation, the green economy as well as a 
forward-looking climate change policy.  

Under  the  Romanian  Presidency  of  the  Council,  in  the  first  half  of  2019,  Commissioner 
Vestager was invited to a lunch debate on industrial policy with the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (Coreper) on 13 March. On the same day, the Presidency chaired a full-day 
Competition Working Party, which was an opportunity for DG Competition to give technical 
briefings  to  Member  States’  competition  attachés  on  a  wide  range  of  competition  policy 
issues.  The meeting discussed subjects  ranging from  digital  challenges and industrial policy 
through competition in the agricultural and pharmaceutical sectors, the “fitness check” and the 
revision of the General Block Exemption Regulation, and recent developments on cooperation 
agreements with the Canadian and Japanese competition authorities.  

This  was  followed  on  6  May  by  an  update  on  several  of  these  topics,  with  a  focus  on  the 
achievenments  in  the  State  aid  area  in  the  form  of  important  projects  of common  European 
interest; the Special Advisers' Final Report on Competition Policy for the Digital Era; and the 
Eurobarometer results with citizens’ perceptions of competition. In February, at the Council’s 
Special  Committee  for  Agriculture,  the  Commission,  represented  by  DG  Agriculture  and 
Rural  Development  and  DG  Competition,  presented  the  main  findings  of  the  report  on  the 
application of the competition rules to the agricultural sector, according to Article 225 (d) of 
Regulation (EU) 1308/2013 (CMO Regulation). Under the Finnish Presidency of the Council, 
in the second half of 2019, representatives of DG Competition took part in the discussions of 
the High Level Group on Competitiveness and Growth on the topic “A holistic approach to 
EU agenda: interlinking Industrial and Single Market policies including services” and gave an 
update on “Data and competition policy related to platform economy”. 

28