Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/979 of 7 July 2020 in support of the development of an internationally recognised system for the validation of arms and ammunition management according to open international standards
Date: 2020-07-07
Institutions: Council of the European Union
Subjects: European arms policy, arms control, arms limitation, arms trade, common foreign and security policy, firearms and munitions, international cooperation, international standard, non-proliferation of arms, peacekeeping




L_2020218EN.01000101.xml










8.7.2020   


EN


Official Journal of the European Union


L 218/1








            COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2020/979
of 7 July 2020
         
in support of the development of an internationally recognised system for the validation of arms and ammunition management according to open international standards


THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Articles 28(1) and 31(1) thereof,


Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,

Whereas:







(1)


On 19 November 2018, the Council adopted the EU Strategy against illicit firearms, small arms & light weapons ('SALW') and their ammunition, entitled 'Securing Arms, Protecting Citizens' (the 'EU SALW Strategy'). The purpose of the EU SALW Strategy is to guide integrated, collective and coordinated European action to prevent and curb the illicit acquisition of SALW and their ammunition by terrorists, criminals and other unauthorised actors, and to promote accountability and responsibility with regard to the legal arms trade.












(2)


The EU SALW Strategy observes that poor stockpile security is a key factor that allows arms and ammunition to be diverted from the licit to the illicit markets. The Union and its Member States are committed to helping other countries to improve the management and security of state-held stockpiles by strengthening national legislative and administrative frameworks and strengthening institutions that regulate the legitimate supply and stockpile management of SALW and ammunition for defence and security forces.












(3)


The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) has developed standards and good practices for the management of small arms and ammunition: the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG) and the Modular Small-Arms-control Implementation Compendium (MOSAIC), formerly known as the International Small Arms Control Standards (ISACS). The EU SALW Strategy commits the Union to promoting and implementing standards and good practices.












(4)


On 30 June 2018, the third United Nations Conference to Review Progress Made in the Implementation of the UN Programme of Action against illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons adopted an outcome document in which States renewed their commitment to prevent and combat the diversion of small arms and light weapons. States reaffirmed that they are to redouble national efforts to provide for the safe, secure and effective management of stockpiles of small arms and light weapons held by government armed forces and by government security forces, in particular in conflict and post-conflict situations. States also acknowledged the application of relevant international standards in strengthening the implementation of the UN Programme of Action.












(5)


The UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development affirms that combating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons is necessary for the achievement of many sustainable development goals, including those relating to peace, justice and strong institutions, poverty reduction, economic growth, health, gender equality and safe cities. Therefore, in Sustainable Development Goal 16.4, all States have committed to significantly reducing illicit financial and arms flows.












(6)


In the Agenda for Disarmament 'Securing our Common Future' (1), which was presented on 24 May 2018, the UN Secretary-General called for addressing the excessive accumulation of conventional arms and the illicit trade in conventional arms and called for the support of country-level approaches on small arms. The Union has decided to support the Agenda's Action 22: 'Secure excessive and poorly maintained stockpiles'.












(7)


The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) contributes to the development, review and promotion of the International Mine Action Standards, and, through its Ammunition Management Advisory Team (AMAT), to the development, review and dissemination of the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG). AMAT is part of GICHD. AMAT was created as a result of a joint initiative between the GICHD and UNODA in response to the urgent need for support to States in the safe, secure and effective management of ammunition, in accordance with the IATG.












(8)


On 4 December 2017, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 72/55 on problems arising from the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus. That resolution supports initiatives at the international, regional and national levels that shed light on improving the sustainable management of ammunition, including through the implementation of the IATG.












(9)


The Union and its Member States are top donors for small arms control assistance and capacity development in general, and for physical security and stockpile management in particular. While various international standards and guidelines for stockpile management exist, there is no standardised and internationally recognised methodology for carrying out independent assessments and validation of compliance according to these standards. Consequently, the impact of the Union's assistance for arms stockpile security is difficult to measure.












(10)


An internationally recognised methodology for the independent validation of compliance with international arms management standards will make the impact of the Union's assistance to third countries in relation to arms stockpile management measureable; it will also support the risk assessment in the context of arms export control and the provision of military assistance.












(11)


The Union should therefore support a project for establishing the feasibility of the development of a voluntary internationally recognised system for the validation of arms and ammunition management on the basis of open international standards,





HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:



Article 1

1.   With a view to the implementation of the EU Strategy against Illicit Firearms, Small Arms & Light Weapons and their Ammunition entitled 'Securing Arms, Protecting Citizens' ('the EU SALW Strategy') and the promotion of peace and security, the Union shall support a project to study the feasibility of establishing an internationally recognised validation system for the validation of policies and practices for the safe and secure management of SALW and ammunition.
The project shall consist of two phases, 'Phase I' and 'Phase II'.






—


During Phase I, in the first year of the implementation, a feasibility study for the development of an internationally recognised Arms and Ammunition Management Validation System ('AAMVS') shall be undertaken to investigate options for appropriate methodologies and tools for the assessment of risk and quality;










—


Subject to paragraph 2, during Phase II, based on the outcome of the feasibility study of Phase I, a concept for the creation of an AAMVS shall be developed.




A description of the project is set out in the Annex.


2.   The Council shall decide on the basis of the outcome of the feasibility study that results from Phase I of the project whether Phase II of the project is to be implemented.



Article 2

1.   The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy ('the High Representative') shall be responsible for the implementation of this Decision.


2.   The technical implementation of the project referred to in Article 1 shall be carried out by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining ('GICHD') and its specialised agency, the Ammunition Management Advisory Team ('AMAT').


3.   The GICHD shall perform its tasks under the responsibility of the High Representative. For that purpose, the High Representative shall enter into the necessary arrangements with the GICHD.



Article 3

1.   The financial reference amount for the implementation of the project financed by the Union referred to in Article 1 shall be EUR 1 642 109.


2.   The amount intended to cover Phase I of the project shall be EUR 821 872. The remaining amount of EUR 820 237 shall be used if the Council decides to implement Phase II of the project.


3.   The expenditure financed by the reference amount set out in paragraph 1 shall be managed in accordance with the procedures and rules applicable to the general budget of the Union.


4.   The Commission shall supervise the proper management of the expenditure referred to in paragraph 1. For that purpose, it shall conclude the necessary financing agreement with the GICHD. The financing agreement shall stipulate that the GICHD has to ensure the visibility of the Union's contribution, appropriate to its size.


5.   The Commission shall endeavour to conclude the financing agreement referred to in paragraph 4 as soon as possible after the entry into force of this Decision. It shall inform the Council of any difficulties in that process and of the date of conclusion of the financing agreement.



Article 4

1.   The High Representative shall report to the Council on the implementation of this Decision on the basis of regular half-year narrative reports prepared by the GICHD. Those reports shall form the basis of the evaluation to be carried out by the Council.


2.   The Commission shall report to the Council on the financial aspects of the project referred to in Article 1.



Article 5
This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.
This Decision shall expire 14 months after the date of the conclusion of the financing agreement referred to in Article 3(4), unless the Council decides to extend the Decision in order to allow for the implementation of Phase II of the project, or, if no agreement has been concluded within that period, six months after the date of its entry into force.




Done at Brussels, 7 July 2020.


For the Council


The President

M. ROTH
            





(1)  https://www.un.org/disarmament/publications/more/securing-our-common-future/




ANNEX
PROJECT FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNISED SYSTEM FOR THE VALIDATION OF ARMS AND AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT ON THE BASIS OF OPEN INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
1.   Rationale for CFSP support
This project aims to enhanced security and safety of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and ammunition stockpiles through the development of an internationally recognised system that would allow independent validation/certification of compliance by States with open international standards, on a voluntary basis, displaying their ability to address and prevent diversion and accidental explosions.
The diversion and illicit proliferation of SALW and ammunition fuels crime, terrorism, armed violence and instability, undermining sustainable development, good governance, law and order, as well as access to education, healthcare, justice and other civil rights. In addition, illicit SALW can be used to commit or facilitate serious acts of gender-based violence. The diversion and illicit proliferation of SALW and ammunition has the potential to undermine peace and security, destabilising States and societies and eventually entire regions. In so doing, it undermines progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), especially SDG 16 (peace, justice and strong institutions), but also SDG 5 (gender equality) and 11 (sustainable cities and communities).
The safe, secure and sustainable management of national SALW and ammunition stockpiles is instrumental in curbing illicit proliferation. Ineffective stockpile management is a key factor allowing arms and ammunition to be diverted from licit to illicit markets. Stockpile management is especially precarious in states affected by violent conflict or weak institutions and governance structures. In such contexts, fostering safe, secure and sustainable stockpile management promotes the accountability and responsibility of national authorities for preventing the diversion of SALW and ammunition, which, in turn, contributes to enhancing stability, development and good governance.
The Union and its Member States have been assisting third countries to improve the management and security of national stockpiles by strengthening national legislative and administrative frameworks and institutions that regulate the legitimate supply of SALW and ammunition for defence and security forces and the management of such stockpiles. But the impact of this assistance is difficult to measure. There is currently no international mechanism for allowing third countries to demonstrate their compliance with regulatory requirements and with technical and management standards. This can be problematic for States which have invested in improving their SALW and ammunition management policies and practices but which fail to encourage confidence and trust from international partners because of past track records on diversion and on poor stockpile management and security.
While various international standards, guidelines and best practices for stockpile management and security exist, there is no standardised and internationally recognised methodology for carrying out independent assessments and validation of compliance with these standards. In many sectors – industrial as well as governmental – in order to showcase quality, safety and security of products and services and compliance with international norms, some form of guarantee involving certification or validation is required. The issuance of certificates governed by the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) is a well-known example. The same method can be applied to the safe and secure management of SALW and ammunition stockpiles.
A certification or validation system would allow a State which has invested in stockpile management and security to voluntarily demonstrate that its system for managing SALW and ammunition (i.e. policies and practices) complies with internationally recognised standards. The voluntary certification of national policies and practices would indicate that the risks of accidental explosion and diversion have been addressed and mitigated because implementation of open international standards will have been independently verified. In addition, the guarantee would instil confidence in local communities, as well as among regional and international partners, in the State's ability to effectively govern and manage its stockpiles, without the State having to disclose information pertaining to the nature and size of its SALW and ammunition stockpile. Certification could also be used to inform diversion risk assessments carried out by arms supplying States within the context of arms export control (such as those outlined under Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) Article 11 and criterion 7 of Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP (1)).
Furthermore, regarding cooperation and assistance in the field of SALW and ammunition control, validation and certification can provide guidance in programming decisions and inform impact assessment of past assistance activities.
This project is also relevant in the context of the ongoing work of the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) that is examining problems arising from the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus in response to the adoption of UNGA resolution 72/55 of December 2017.
2.   Introduction
This project will study the feasibility of establishing an internationally recognised validation/certification system for SALW and ammunition management policies and practices. The risk of diversion of SALW and ammunitions to unauthorised actors is present all along the supply chain: from manufacture to transfer (export, transit and import), through stockpiling (storage and utilisation), to disposal (transfer and destruction). Ammunition stockpiles also pose a risk of accidental explosion, particularly in storage but potentially also at other points of the stockpile supply chain. Addressing these challenges is a State responsibility and requires a comprehensive life-cycle approach in line with national and international norms and measures, including, but not limited to, the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG), the Modular Small-arms-control Implementation Compendium (MOSAIC), best practices issued by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Allied Ammunition Storage and Transport Publication (NATO-AASTP).
The primary aim of this project is to support the establishment of safe, secure and sustainable policies and practices regarding the management of SALW and ammunition in countries with track records of diversion and accidental explosions. Specifically, the project will generate and analyse options for the internationally recognised validation/certification of policies and practices for the safe and secure management of SALW and ammunition across the supply chain. The project will support the development of a system that would allow States to voluntarily demonstrate through an independent assessment that these issues have been addressed and that their arms management practices and policies are in accordance with open international standards.
This project supports the implementation of the EU Strategy against illicit firearms, small arms & light weapons, and their ammunition ('EU SALW Strategy'). It aims to strengthen the capacity of beneficiary States in the implementation of the UN PoA, the International Tracing Instrument (ITI), the ATT, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (in particular Goals 16 (target 16.4), 5 and 11), and the UN Secretary General's Agenda for Disarmament (2018, Action 22: Disarmament that saves lives). Implementing the project will increase transparency and accountability in the governance and management of conventional arms and ammunition in accordance with international good practice, including the IATG, the MOSAIC, OSCE guidelines and the NATO-AASTP. The project will also take into account the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs' findings and efforts regarding gender sensitive weapons and ammunition management.
3.   Project Goal and Main Objectives
The overall goal of this project is the globally enhanced security and safety of stockpiles of SALW and ammunition through the development of an internationally recognised system that would allow independent validation/certification of compliance with open international standards on the management of national small arms and ammunition stockpiles.
The desired outcome of the project is intended to serve third countries (non-EU Member States) that have been experiencing challenges with regard to the safe and secure management of arms and ammunition that have led to arms diversion and unintended explosions.
For the sake of the readability this proposal will refer to internationally recognised systems for the validation of arms and ammunition management according to open international standards as Arms and Ammunition Management Validation Systems or AAMVS.
To achieve this goal, the project has the following main objectives:






(a)


undertake a feasibility study on options to develop an Ammunition Management Validation System, through the development of appropriate risk and quality assessment methodology and tools;










(b)


based on the results of objective (a), develop a concept and a way forward to obtaining an internationally recognised Ammunition Management Validation System, with a view to preventing diversion and accidental explosions in arms and ammunition stockpiles.




4.   Project Description
Given the uncertainties regarding international travel in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and the desire to reduce air travel in light of climate change, where possible and feasible, the implementer will look at meeting-options that do not require travelling (by air).

Phase I: Assessing the feasibility of an internationally recognised Arms and Ammunition Management Validation System (AAMVS)

4.1.   Project Consolidation

Objective: the development of the overall project implementation plan in collaboration with the EEAS and partners, the development of the scope of the feasibility study, including methodology and the identification of key stakeholder interviews (KSI), the establishment of the expert working group (EWG) to support and review the feasibility study and to raise awareness of the project.

Activities: specific activities carried out under this output and implemented during the first two months of the project include:






1.


Development of Project Plan (Year 1, Month 1): consultations with the core project team to finalise project planning/timelines, responsibilities, and scope and methodology of the feasibility study.










2.


Establishment of the EWG (Year 1, Month 1): identifying relevant experts (maximum of 10 individuals) and inviting them to join the EWG. The EWG will be made up of practitioners (with expertise in arms management, conducting national assessments on weapons and ammunition management, accreditation and certification, arms control, SALW and ammunition manufacture). It will provide ongoing support and expert review of the feasibility study and the subsequent development of the validation methodology. The project team will take the necessary steps to ensure that gender and diversity considerations are taken into account in the makeup of the EWG.










3.


Inception Workshop (Year 1, Month 2): organising a one-day workshop in Geneva to bring together 20 key stakeholders (including the core project team, EU/EEAS designates, the EWG, and representatives of partners) to present the scope and methodology of the feasibility study and kick off the project. The workshop will be designed and implemented taking gender and diversity into account.





Results: the production of a project plan, agreement on project scope, the establishment of the EWG, increased awareness of the project, production of inception workshop summary report.
4.2.   Preliminary Analysis

Objective: conduct a preliminary analysis to obtain a more developed understanding of the need for developing an AAMVS. This will be the first milestone of the project. If there is no insurmountable opposition during this assessment, the project will proceed with the full feasibility study.

Activities: specific activities implemented during the first five months of the project include:






1.


Desk Study (Year 1, Month 2 to 5): collate and review relevant literature, instruments, guidelines, procedures and open standards pertaining to the management of arms and ammunition stockpile and provide an overview of relevant international validation and certification mechanisms.










2.


Key Stakeholder Interviews (Year 1, Month 2 to 5): develop a methodology for key stakeholder interviews (KSI) and use this methodology to interview relevant policy practitioners to understand the need for the development of an AAMVS and the appetite for doing so. KSIs will be conducted via telecommunication and in person in Vienna, Brussels, and New York, as well as on the sidelines of relevant meetings/conferences (e.g. MSAG Symposium, UN PoA Meetings of States, UN General Assembly, ATT Conference of State Parties, and various regional meetings). KSIs will be identified taking gender and diversity into account.










3.


Preliminary Report (Year 1, Month 4 to 5): based on the desk study and KSIs, draft a report explaining the need for the creation of an AAMVS. The report will provide a clear indication of whether to continue with the feasibility study, and if so, it will outline the scope of the study.





Results: desk study, KSI methodology and analysis, background paper on developing an AAMVS.
4.3.   Feasibility Study

Objective: assess the feasibility and options for developing an AAMVS through the development of appropriate methodologies and tools for risk and quality assessment The feasibility study will be guided by the following seven questions that relate to the establishment of an AAMVS:






—


Is the system technically and operationally feasible?










—


Is the system legally feasible?










—


Is the system economically/commercially feasible?










—


Is the system politically feasible?










—


Is the system feasible in terms of military security?










—


Is the system feasible in terms of safety and security to the community?










—


Is the system feasible within a reasonable period of time?





Activities: specific activities to be carried out under this output and implemented during the first twelve months of the project include:






1.


Expert Workshops (Year 1, Month 5 to 11): three workshops will be held, bringing together the up-to ten members of the Expert Working Group (EWG) to discuss and develop the feasibility study. The first two workshops will be held virtually, while the third workshop will be a two-day event in Geneva. The first workshop will be devoted to reviewing the findings of the preliminary report and defining the outline of the feasibility study. The second workshop will be devoted to exploring the technical and operational aspects of setting up an AAMVS. The first day of the third workshop will focus on the legal and economic aspects of such as system, as well as the timeline for the system, while the second day of the third workshop will take stock of the feasibility study as a whole. The workshops will be designed and implemented taking gender and diversity into account.










2.


Expert Workshop Reports (Year 1, Month 5 to 11): following each workshop, a workshop report will be drafted and shared with the participants of the EWG and EEAS. The reports will summarise the main discussion, highlighting points of convergence and divergence.










3.


Feasibility Report (Year 1, Month 11 to 12): a report outlining the options for developing an AAMVS, through the development of appropriate methodologies and tools for assessing risk and quality.





Results: expert workshops and reports, and feasibility report outlining options for an international validation/certification system for arms and ammunition stockpile management.
4.4.   Yearly meetings on arms and ammunition stockpile validation/certification

Objective: raise awareness of the project, present on the progress of the project, and share experiences among the Union States and partners regarding existing international validation/certification methodologies and systems.

Activities: up to two one-day meetings (held at the end of the first and second years of the project, respectively). The meetings will be held in Brussels and will be dedicated to bringing together stakeholders, including Union Member States, representatives of EEAS and the Commission, and relevant partners to raise awareness of the project and present the feasibility study (end of Phase I), and risk and quality assessment methodology and tools (end of Phase II).
The first annual meeting will be the second milestone of the project.

Results: exchanges of information between stakeholders regarding measures for preventing and addressing diversion; meeting report.
The Council will consider the feasibility study resulting from Phase I and will decide whether to continue the project and implement Phase II. The project will expire after 14 months, unless the Council takes a decision to extend it to allow the implementation of Phase II. Setting the expiration at 14 months, instead of 12 months, gives the Council sufficient time to consider the outcome of the feasibility study.

Phase II: Developing a plan for the creation of an Arms and Ammunition Management Validation System (AAMVS)

4.5.   Development of validation/certification methodology, tools, and resources

Objective: most of Phase II will be devoted to development of a concept and development plan for establishing an AAMVS.
Note 1: The implementation of Phase II will depend on a the Council taking a new Decision to extend the project based on the outcome of the feasibility study (Phase I).

Activities: specific activities carried out under this output and implemented during year two of the project include:






—


Phase II Project Plan (Year 2, Month 1): consultations with the core project team to finalise Phase II planning/timelines, responsibilities, cooperation, the scope of technical assistance (i.e. regional workshops and pilot assessment/validation visits to test methodology).










—


Phase II Planning workshop (Year 2, Month 2): the organisation of a one-day workshop in Geneva to bring together 20 key stakeholders (including the core project team, representatives of international standard bodies, representatives of certification bodies, EU/EEAS designates, the EWG, and representatives of partners) to agree upon the scope and content of the AAMVS.










—


Expert Methodology Development Workshops (Year 2, Months 3 to 8): three workshops bringing together the Expert Working Group (EWG) and experts in certification and accreditation of international standards to discuss and draft a development plan for the creation of an AAMVS. Two of the workshops will be held virtually, while the third workshop will be a one-day event held in Geneva.










—


Validation workshop (Year 2, Month 9): a one-day Validation workshop in Geneva, bringing together 20 participants and providing an opportunity for the project team, the EWG, and experts in certification and accreditation of international standards to present the development plan for an AAMVS. This workshop would not only serve to raise awareness of the benefits and modalities of an AAMVS but also provide an opportunity for identifying concrete steps to be taken to ensure the development and implementation of the AAMVS. The workshop will be designed and implemented with due consideration of gender and diversity.










—


Finalisation of the development plan for an AAMVS and identification of next steps (Year 2, Month 10-12): amending the plan based on feedback from validation workshop and publication of the development plan.





Results: establishing a plan for the development of an AAMVS.
5.   Project Monitoring and Evaluation

Objective: provide a mid-term and final assessment of the activities of the project to ensure the project has met its objectives and that project expenditures are in line with the agreed budget.

Activities: the project will include both internal monitoring and external evaluation.






—


The Council will be regularly briefed about the progress of the implementation of the project.










—


Internal Monitoring: based on the results-based management system applied within AMAT and supported by core project staff.










—


External Evaluation: in collaboration with the Council, the recruitment of an external evaluation team (i.e. independent consultants not working for the GICHD or the Union at the time of project implementation) which will undertake a mid-term review and final assessment of the project.
The mid-term review and final assessment will be held in Brussels, back-to-back with the yearly meetings if possible (see 4.4). The mid-term review will be a two-day workshop, bringing together EEAS, representatives from Union Member States and partners. The final assessment event will be a two-day meeting, attended by EEAS, representatives from Union Member States, as well as representatives from partners.










—


The project will include a financial audit in accordance with the Union requirements.





Results: assessment report of the project impacts; financial audit.
6.   Implementing agencies and partnerships
The GICHD, through AMAT, is the lead implementing agency for the project. Specifically, AMAT will spearhead the feasibility study (Phase I) and work with relevant partners to develop the concept for an assessment methodology and tools (Phase II).
Proposals for additional partners, whose involvement would be of a structural nature for the implementation of the project, will be submitted to CONOP for agreement. That said, potential partners include the Small Arms Survey (SAS), Conflict Armament Research (CAR) and Golden West Humanitarian Foundation (GWHF). Under AMAT's leadership, SAS and CAR will provide the project with their institutions' considerable knowledge and expertise on all aspects of diversion, supply chain management, and export controls (the ATT and the Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP). GWHF will commit to supporting AMAT's in-house resources with technical assistance in the development and implementation of the assessment/validation criteria.
To ensure the project outputs are of the highest quality, operational partnerships will be sought with organisations that specialise in assessing risks, capabilities and analyses that relate to ammunition and arms management, including representatives from military organisations, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Multinational Small Arms and Ammunition Group (MSAG), and organisations that specialise in the development of certification of management standards and associated accreditation. AMAT will also connect with ongoing Union-funded SALW control projects and Physical Security and Stockpile Management (PSSM) projects, such as SEESAC, iTrace and PSSM Sahel, with a view to exchanging experiences and lessons learned.
7.   Duration and possible next steps
The project duration is intended to be 24 months. The initial Council Decision, will expire after 14 months, and thus the project will expire after 14 months unless the Council decides to extend the project. The activities of Phase I of the project should be completed in the first year of the implementation. The Council will be invited to decide on its extension before the expiration of the initial Decision.
8.   EU-visibility
The GICHD/AMAT will be required to take all appropriate measures to publicise that this project has been funded by the Union, in line with the Communications and Visibility Requirements for EU External Actions - 2018 published by the European Commission. The Union's support will also be acknowledged in invitations and other documents that are shared with the participants of the various events. The GICHD/AMAT will ensure that the Union will be represented in events, where possible, that are supported under this Decision.


(1)  Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment (OJ L 335, 13.12.2008, p. 99).