COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE Report on the 2019 elections to the European Parliament
Date: 2020-06-19
Institutions: Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers, European Commission
Subjects: European Parliament, European election, European electoral system, data processing, disinformation, election result, organisation of elections, parliamentary election, right to stand for election, right to vote

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 19.6.2020  COM(2020) 252 final  COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE Report on the 2019 elections to the European Parliament {SWD(2020) 113 final}  
 
 
1. Introduction 

The elections to the European Parliament are among the largest democratic exercises in the 
world. In May 2019, European Union citizens directly elected 751 Members of the European 
Parliament (MEPs)1 from over 15,000 parliamentary candidates, with over 250 million votes 
cast in Europe. 

The  record-high  turnout  in  the  2019  European  Parliament  elections  (‘the  elections’),  the 
highest in 25 years, shows the vibrancy of our democracy and the renewed engagement of 
EU  citizens  in  shaping  the  future  of  the  EU,  especially  among  its  youth.  The  post-election 
survey shows that EU citizens believe that their voice counts in the EU as never before.2 A 
truly European debate emerged on topics such as the economy, climate change and human 
rights and democracy.3 

These  were  also  the  most  digital  European  Parliamentary  elections.  A  large  proportion  EU 
citizens use the internet,4 and online sources and social media play an increased role in our 
European  democratic  debate,  giving  political  actors  unprecedented  opportunities  to  get 
their message across, and even greater access to the debate for citizens.  

The  Cambridge  Analytica  scandal5  revealed  a  darker  side  to  these  advances.  It  brought  to 
light  interference  in  elections  exploiting  online  social  networks  to  mislead  citizens  and 
manipulate  the  debate  and  voters’  choices,6  by  concealing  or  misrepresenting  key 
information  such  as  the  origin  and  political  intent  of  communications,  their  sources  and 
their funding.  

1 On 31 January, the UK left the  EU and the UK’s elected Members ceased to  be Members of the European Parliament. 
Consequently, the total number of MEPs went down from 751 to 705, with 46 of the 73 seats vacated by the UK held in 
reserve  for  new  countries  joining  the  EU.  The  remaining  27  seats  were  redistributed  among  14  EU  countries,  better  to 
reflect  the  principle  of  degressive  proportionality,  as  follows:  France  (+5),  Spain  (+5),  Italy  (+3),  The  Netherlands  (+3), 
Ireland (+2), Sweden (+1), Austria (+1), Denmark (+1), Finland (+1), Slovakia (+1), Croatia (+1), Estonia (+1), Poland (+1) and 
Romania (+1). Data presented in this report has been adjusted to reflect this change. 
2  56%  agree  that  their  voice  counts  in  the  EU  (the  most  positive  result  since  this  question  was  first  asked  in  2002). 
European Parliament, The 2019 post-electoral survey, p. 11, see: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/at-your-service/files/be-
heard/eurobarometer/2019/post-election-survey-2019-complete-results/report/en-post-election-survey-2019-report.pdf. 
3  Based  on  over  11,000  electoral  materials,  including  posters,  television  commercials,  social  media  posts  and  printed 
announcements  by 418  political  parties or candidates, as well as 193 official Facebook accounts,  the European Elections 
Monitoring  Center  identified  the  most  common  issues  raised  in  election  campaigns,  namely  ‘Europe’  (15% of  all  topics), 
followed  by  ‘values,’  ‘economics,’  ‘social’  and  the  ‘environment’.  See  Johansson,  Bengt  and  Novelli,  Edoardo,  ‘2019 
European  elections 
July  2019, 
https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/e6767a95-a386-11e9-9d01-01aa75ed71a1/language-en. 
4  Most  EU  citizens  use  the  internet  at  least  once  a  week  and  almost  half  (45%)  now  use  it  as  their  main  source  for 
information  on  national  political  matters  and  to  find  out  about  the  EU.  Standard  Eurobarometer  90  –  Media  use  in  the 
European 
2018, 
https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/ResultDoc/download/DocumentKy/86432.  
5  The  scandal  broke  in  2018  following  reports  including  from  former  employees  of  Cambridge  Analytica,  a  consultancy 
company,  that  Cambridge  Analytica  had  commissioned  an  app  made  available  to  Facebook  users  to  harvest  data  from 
them and their circle of contacts, which was used subsequently to target political messaging in the context of a number of 
elections in subsequent years. Data was taken from US citizens, and citizens from a number of EU states. Follow-up actions 
were taken by regulators. 
6 For instance by targeting specific minorities and vulnerable groups (See on this, the European Parliament Resolution of 10 
October  2019  on  foreign  electoral  interference  and  disinformation  in  national  and  European  democratic  processes 
(2019/2810(RSP)). 

the  28  Member  States’,  9 

topics,  media 

campaign  – 

December 

Images, 

Union, 

in 

1 

 
 
                                                           
Personal data could also be used covertly and unlawfully to target citizens with manipulative 
content. Behavioural insights derived from citizens’ online activity were used to ‘game’ the 
online  platforms’  systems  to  artificially  amplify  this  content.  Other  online  interference 
techniques  may  be  used,  including  cyberattacks  and  circumvention  of  traditional  electoral 
safeguards such as funding rules. 

Before  the  elections,  the  Commission  published  a  package  of  measures  (‘the  electoral 
package’) aimed at addressing these challenges, helping to ensure that the elections were 
both free and fair. The package promoted a comprehensive approach and mutual support 
among  competent  authorities,  supported  by  the  establishment  of  elections  networks  at 
national  and  European  level.  It  built  on  long-standing  work  with  Member  States  in  the 
context of elections and called for improved transparency in political campaigning, provided 
increased clarity on the application of data protection requirements in the electoral context, 
promoted oversight by competent authorities and protection against cyber threats, as well 
as greater awareness and readiness to meet the challenges of the online environment.7 

The  Commission’s  Fundamental  Rights  Colloquium  in  November  2018  was  dedicated  to 
Democracy  in  Europe.  This  high-level  event  identified  avenues  to  foster  free,  open  and 
healthy  democratic  governance 
in  elections,  populism, 
in  an  era  of 
disinformation and challenges facing civil society.8 

low  turnout 

The  electoral  package,  coupled  with  the  Commission’s  initiatives  on  disinformation  –  the 
code of practice on disinformation9 and the action plan against disinformation,10 including 
the Rapid Alert System and the analytical and awareness-raising activities of the European 
External  Action  Service  (EEAS)  Strategic  Communication  (StratCom)  Task  Forces  – 
contributed  to  securing  the  integrity  of  the  electoral  process  and  voters’  confidence  in  it, 
which improved.11 

Building on the findings of the report on the 2014 European Parliament elections,12 lessons 
learned from past elections, and delivering on the commitments in the 2017 EU citizenship 
report to promote and enhance citizens’ participation in the democratic life of the EU,13 the 
Commission took a number of initiatives to increase the sense of a European dimension in 
the elections and to support the broad participation of all EU citizens. It worked with other 
EU institutions, as well as with political parties, Member States and others. It also engaged 

of 

on 

the 

State 

2018, 

Adopted 

September 

7 
12 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_18_5681. 
8 https://ec.europa.eu/info/events/annual-colloquium-fundamental-rights/2018-annual-colloquium-fundamental-rights-
2018-nov-26_en.  
9 https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=54454.  
10  Jointly  issued  in  2018  by  the  European  Commission  and  the  High  Representative  of  the  Union  for  Foreign  Affairs  and 
Security Policy https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/action_plan_against_disinformation.pdf.  
11  Confidence  in  free  and  fair  elections  improved  in  21  Member  States  between  September  2018  and  June  2019.  The 
biggest  increases  were  observed  in  Greece  (80%,  +18  pp.),  Lithuania  (78%,  +14  pp.),  Romania  (65%,  +14  pp.)  and  Spain 
(77%, +12 pp.). For further details, see section 4 of the staff working document which accompanies this communication. 
12 https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/com_2015_206_en.pdf  
13 http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/document.cfm?doc_id=40723  

Union 

2018, 

2 

 
 
                                                           
with Member States to ensure that EU law and rights are upheld in the elections, addressing 
the concerns raised by individual citizens and stakeholders. The Commission also stepped up 
its  communication  efforts  vis-à-vis  European  citizens,  in  close  cooperation  with  the 
European Parliament with a strong national and local dimension.  

This report reviews the above elements14 based on: 

-  extensive  responses  to  Commission  questionnaires  received  from  Member  States, 
the European and national political parties, national data protection authorities and 
IT platforms;15  

-  exchanges with Member States in the framework of the newly established European 

Cooperation Network on Elections and a related expert group; and  

-  Eurobarometer  and  other  surveys  including  the  post-election  survey  published  by 

the European Parliament, and relevant studies.  

2. Participation in the elections 

50.66%16 of EU citizens eligible to vote took part in the 2019 elections. This figure is a 25-
year high and marks the first increase in turnout since 1979. The increases since the 2014 
elections were strong in most Member States, particularly in nine.17 Modest decreases were 
also observed in eight Member States.18 Significant discrepancies in turnout among Member 
States remain.19 

Both  Europe’s  young  and  first-time  voters  drove  turnout  figures  up.  Their  turnout 
increased  strongly  and  exceeded  the  increase  in  turnout  of  other  age  groups.20  Of  the 
youngest age category,21 42% indicated they voted, compared to only 28% in 2014: a large 
increase.  The  increase was  also  notable for the  25-39  age  group  (up  from  35%  in  2014  to 
47%  in  2019).  Older  voters  nevertheless  continue  to  turn out more  strongly  than  younger 
ones (52% and 54% for the 40-54 and 55+ age groups respectively).22

What motivated young voters to vote is just as important as the turnout itself. They share a 

14 An initial assessment covering the implementation of the action Plan against disinformation was presented in June 2019. 
See JOIN(2019) 12 final, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/joint_report_on_disinformation.pdf.  
15  In  total,  26  Member  States,  3  European  political  parties,  17  national  political  parties  from  7  Member  States,  and  4  IT 
platforms replied to the questionnaire. See the Annex of the staff working document accompanying this Communication. 
16 This number rises to 52.4% without the UK. 
17  Poland,  Romania,  Spain,  Austria,  Hungary,  Germany,  Czechia,  Denmark  and  Slovakia  (from  the  highest  increase  of 
percentage points to the lowest one). 
18  Bulgaria,  Portugal,  Belgium,  Ireland,  Italy,  Luxembourg,  Malta  and  Greece  (from  the  highest  decrease  of  percentage 
points to the lowest one). 
19 From 88% in Belgium (where voting is compulsory) to 23% in Slovakia. 
20  The  turnout  for  young  people  aged  under  25  is  42%  (+14  percentage  points).  For  the  ones  aged  25–39,  47%  (+12 
percentage points). This remains below the turnout of those aged 55 or over (54%, +3 percentage points). 
21 Aged 18-24 in all Member States except Greece, where the voting age is 17, and Austria and Malta, where the voting age 
is 16. 
22 European Parliament, The 2019 post-electoral survey, p. 22. 

3 

 
 
 
  
                                                           
strong sense of voting being a civic duty (over 50%)23 and they were also strongly motivated 
by  a  concern  about  climate  change  (a  motivation  shared  across  age  groups),  a  desire  to 
promote  human  rights  and  democratic  values  (which  motivated  them  more  than  other 
groups), as well as the economy.24  

A  growing  group  of  citizens  entitled  to  vote  and  stand  as  candidates  in  European 
Parliament elections are “mobile EU citizens”: citizens who moved to live, work or study in 
another Member State. It is estimated that of the over 17 million mobile EU citizens in the 
EU, almost 14 million were eligible to vote (over 3% of the total EU voting population) in the 
European Parliamentary elections organised in another Member State.  

While EU law confers a direct right on mobile EU citizens to vote and stand as candidates in 
European  Parliament  elections  in  their  Member  State  of  residence,  they  may  also  be 
granted  a  right  under  national  law  to  vote  and stand  in  their Member State  of  nationality 
(even  if  residing  abroad).  In that case, like all other citizens, they may only vote once and 
therefore are required to choose whether to vote in the Member State of their residence or 
that of their nationality.  

NUMBE R  O F N O N - N AT I O NA L CA NDI DAT ES PE R 
ME MBE R  STAT E  

7
3

4
3

2
2

0
2

M
U

I

G
L
E
B

E
C
N
A
R
F

N

I

A
P
S

Y
N
A
M
R
E
G

4
1

A

I

R
T
S
U
A

4

D
N
A
L
N

I
F

3

N
E
D
E
W
S

2

1

S
D
N
A
L
R
E
H
T
E
N

E
H
T

,

A

I

V
T
A
L

,
Y
L
A
T
I

,

,

A

I

R
A
G
L
U
B

G
R
U
O
B
M
E
X
U
L

,

A

I

N
A
U
H
T
I
L

,

D
N
A
L
E
R

I

,

A

I

H
C
E
Z
C

,

A

I

N
A
M
O
R

,
L
A
G
U
T
R
O
P

,

A
T
L
A
M

A

I

N
E
V
O
L
S

,

A

I

K
A
V
O
L
S

23 Idem, p. 49. 
24 Idem, p. 57. 

4 

 
 
 
                                                           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A  relatively  low  number  of  mobile  EU  citizens  exercised  their 
electoral rights, and usually in their countries of origin. Ahead of 
the elections citizens indicated that they would prefer to exercise 
their EU rights and vote in lists in their country of residence. Four 
times as many25 registered to vote for lists from their country of 
nationality,  however,  where  that  option  was  available.26  This 
suggests that choice is important to keeping participation high. 

The  number  of  mobile  EU  citizens  standing  as  candidates  fell, 
from 170 mobile citizen candidates in 2014, to 16827in 2019 (in 18 
Member  States).  Five  were  elected,  three  in  France  and  two  in 
the United Kingdom.  

insufficient 

Challenges remain to the participation of mobile EU citizens, such 
as  with  registration  on  the  electoral  roll.  Issues  can  also  arise 
from 
their 
administration,28  such  as  with  administrative  letters  being  sent 
too  late,  cumbersome  postal  voting  procedures,  insufficient 
voting booths and staffing at consulates. 

options 

remote 

voting 

and 

The participation and representation of women increased in the 
2019  elections  compared  to  the  previous  elections.  The  gender 
gap  in  turnout  reduced  from  4%  in  2014  to  3%  in  2019.29 
Likewise,  the  number  of  women  MEPs  increased  from  37%  to 
39.4%.  There  remain,  however,  major  differences  between 
Member  States  and  many  challenges  need  to  be  overcome  to 
achieve gender parity. The table below compares the proportion 
of women candidates and the proportion of women elected. 

Practices 
mobile EU citizens 

to  support 

the 

elections, 

the 
Before 
Commission 
encouraged 
Member  States  to  share  best 
practice  to  boost  mobile  EU 
citizens’  voter  participation  and 
and 
provided 
and 
information  on 
standing as a candidate, such as:  

support 

voting 

through 

Information  and  guidance  on 
voting  formalities  and  deadlines 
through  the  Your  Europe  advice 
portal;  on  voting  formalities  and 
voting  methods 
the 
European  elections  webpages 
and  factsheets  jointly  produced 
with  the  European  Parliament; 
voter 
encouraging 
and 
participation  though  a  targeted 
social media campaign. 

Choice 
for  citizens.  Member 
States shared their experience on 
voting  methods  ahead  of  the 
elections  in  high-level  event  on 
and  democratic 
participation 
matters (April 2018). 

Support  to  projects  under 
its 
Rights,  equality  and  citizenships 
programme. 

25 On the basis of the data received, around 5.5 million compared to 1.3 million. For more detail, see section 2.2.1 of the 
staff working document accompanying this Communication. 
26 Some Member States limit the right to vote of their nationals who reside outside their territories, even in other Member 
States. This loss of the right to vote, which for elections not covered by EU rights such as national parliamentary elections, 
can amount to disenfranchisement, will be considered further in the Commissions 2020 report on EU citizenship, expected 
to issue this year.  
27 152 when candidates in the UK are not counted. 
28  See 
remote  voting 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/eu-citizenship/electoral-rights/studies_en.  
29 In some Member States the turnout of women increased markedly for instance in Finland from 38% to 43.4%.  

in  many  groups,  2017-18 

the  use  of 

study  on 

support 

turnout 

the 

to 

5 

 
 
                                                           
 
 
0%

10%

100%

40%

80%

70%

60%

30%

20%

48% 

41% 

45% 

39% 

50% 

22% 

50% 

47% 

39% 

31% 

57% 

39% 
41% 

FEMALE CANDIDATES VS. FEMALE MEMBERS OF 
50%
90%
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
[CATEGORY NAME] 
[CATEGORY NAME] 
[CATEGORY NAME] 
[CATEGORY NAME] 
[CATEGORY NAME] 
[CATEGORY NAME] 
[CATEGORY NAME] 
[CATEGORY NAME] 
[CATEGORY NAME] 
[CATEGORY NAME] 
[CATEGORY NAME] 
[CATEGORY NAME] 
[CATEGORY NAME] 
[CATEGORY NAME] 
[CATEGORY NAME] 
[CATEGORY NAME] 
[CATEGORY NAME] 
[CATEGORY NAME] 
[CATEGORY NAME] 
[CATEGORY NAME] 
[CATEGORY NAME] 
[CATEGORY NAME] 
[CATEGORY NAME] 
[CATEGORY NAME] 
[CATEGORY NAME] 
[CATEGORY NAME] 
[CATEGORY NAME] 
[CATEGORY NAME] 
Column2

52% 
50% 
50% 
50% 
50% 
50% 
49% 
48% 
48% 
46% 
44% 
42% 
42% 
39% 
39% 
38% 
38% 
36% 
35% 
33% 

28% 
Female Candidates

30% 
32% 
34% 

29% 
29% 
27% 

Female MEPs

Male MEPs

43% 
43% 

21% 

42% 

43% 

24% 

18% 

50% 

21% 

35% 

47% 

24% 

32% 

50% 

24% 

0% 

Male Candidates

Many  Member  States  took  measures  to  improve  the  participation  of  women  in  the 
elections. These included linking the allocation of public funding for political parties to the 
promotion  of  political  participation  of  women  (e.g.  Ireland),  quota  systems  for  candidate 
lists or introducing a general obligation for political parties to have gender-balanced lists of 
candidates (e.g. Romania).  

For  ethnic  minorities  featuring  on  candidate  lists,  registering  for  elections  or  performing 
other  electoral  procedures  can  be  more  difficult  than  for  the  rest  of  the  population.  For 
instance, voters belonging to certain communities, such as the Roma community, are more 
likely to face difficulties in accessing voter registration procedures.  

This is partly due to this population group lacking documentation, lacking knowledge about 
the procedural requirements needed to vote (such as how to provide valid proof of address) 
and  lacking  support  to  take  them  through  the  administrative  process.  Ethnic  minorities 
make  up  5%  of  the  membership  of  the  European  Parliament  and  10%  of  the  overall 
population.30 

30 ENAR’s Election Analysis - other minorities in the new European Parliament 2019-2025, https://www.enar-eu.org/ENAR-
s-Election-Analysis-Ethnic-minorities-in-the-new-European-Parliament-2019. 

6 

 
 
 
                                                           
in  terms  of 

EU  Citizens  with  disabilities31  face  similar  difficulties  when 
participating  in  elections.  They  also  face  additional  barriers  to 
exercising  their  rights,  for  example 
insufficient 
accessibility. All EU Member States, as well as the EU, have ratified 
the  UN  Convention  on  the  Rights  of  Persons  with  Disabilities 
(UNCRPD).32  According  to  a  recent  report  from  the  European 
Economic  and  Social  Committee,  an  estimated 800,000  EU  citizens 
from  16  Member  States  could  have  been  deprived  of  the  right  to 
participate  in  the  elections  because  their  national  rules  and 
organisational  arrangements  do  not  take  their  specific  needs  into 
account  sufficiently.33  People  with  disabilities  appear  to  remain 
underrepresented  among  elected  Members  of  the  European 
Parliament. 

The Commission raises awareness about the rights of persons with 
disabilities  and  the  obligations  in  the  UNCRPD  in  meetings  with 
Member  States.34  It  organised  dedicated  discussions  on  the  issue, 
demonstrated  accessible  voting  machines  and  more  generally 
supported the sharing of good practices. The EU also funds EU-level 
disability  organisations  to  raise  awareness  and  advocate  for  their 
rights and to improve the capacity of their member organisations.  

Member  States  implement  various  practices  to  help  different 
groups of citizens participate.35 The Commission has facilitated the 
exchange  of  such  practices  since  the  2014  elections,  including  at  a 
in  April  2018.  The 
high-level  event  on  electoral  matters 
Commission’s  Fundamental  Rights  Colloquium  dedicated 
to 
democracy in Europe in 2018 included broad exchanges on practices 
for  the  promotion  of  broad  participation  and  representation  as  a 
condition for inclusive democratic societies.36 

Data  on  the  electoral  participation  of  other  underrepresented 
groups remains limited and few Member States collect it. 

Practices  to  support 
citizens  with 
a 
disability included 

Mobile  ballot  boxes 
people 
with 
(Bulgaria). 

for 
disabilities 

information 
Targeted 
material  drafted 
in  plain 
language  and  braille  (videos, 
brochures) to support specific 
groups  in  different  languages 
(Belgium and Lithuania). 

Autonomous 
voting 
the 
for 
impaired (Belgium). 

electronic 
visually 

Accessible  polling  stations 
and  ballot  boxes  in  nursing 
homes 
institutions 
(Ireland). 

and 

Lowered 
establish 
(Romania). 

Braille 
(Slovakia). 

threshold 

political 

to 
parties 

paper 

ballots 

support 

Specific 
for 
parliamentary candidates with 
including  funded 
disabilities 
political 
internships  with 
parties 
Scottish 
– 
government project). 

(UK 

report  a  basic  activity  difficulty.  See  Eurostat 

31  15.1%  of  women  and  12.9%  of  men  aged  15-64 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/images/8/8c/Infographic_Disability_statistics_final.png. 
32 The UNCPRD guarantees to persons with disabilities political rights and the opportunity to enjoy them on an equal basis 
with others https://www.un.org/development/desa/disabilities/convention-on-the-rights-of-persons-with-
disabilities/article-29-participation-in-political-and-public-life.html  
33  Real 
https://www.eesc.europa.eu/sites/default/files/files/qe-02-19-153-en-n.pdf.  
34 This included within the Disability High level Group, the Work forum on the implementation of the UNCRPD, and the 
annual European conference on the European day of persons with disabilities. 
35  Some  examples  are  provided  in  the  sidebars  above.  Further  details  on  practices  exchanged  are  available  in  the  staff 
working document accompanying this Communication.  
36 https://ec.europa.eu/info/files/conclusions-colloquium-2018_en.  

in  European  Parliament  elections  –  March  2019, 

rights  of  persons  with  disabilities 

to  vote 

7 

 
 
                                                           
Under  its  Rights,  Equality  and  Citizenship  programme,  the  Commission  supported  the 
participation  of  underrepresented  EU  citizens.  Between  2014  and  2020  the  programme 
provided EUR 20 million to finance initiatives with the aim of promoting and enhancing the 
exercise of rights deriving from citizenship of the Union. This includes action grants of EUR 
8.5  million  under  which  more  than  20  projects  have  so  far  received  funding.37  Projects 
included: 
 

tools  to  raise  EU  citizens’  awareness  of  their  political  rights  and  of  the  procedures  to 
participate in European Parliament elections;38  

  good practice guides for Member States’ authorities to support EU citizens in exercising 

their voting rights;39  

  multilingual  tools  providing  information  about  the  political  programmes  promoted  by 

political parties during the electoral campaign;40 and  
targeted initiatives to encourage underrepresented groups to participate.41  

 

The Europe for Citizens programme supported activities that cover civic participation in the 
broadest  sense.  Town-twinning  projects  and  civil  society  projects  addressed  the  question 
how to reach voters, including first time voters or voters living in remote areas. 

To  support  electoral  participation  ahead  of  the  elections  and  empower  citizens  to  take 
informed decisions, the Commission conducted information and communication campaigns 
in close cooperation with the European Parliament,42 including on what the EU does, how to 
vote  and  how  to  engage.43  These  campaigns  were  proactive  and  multilingual  and  had  a 
strong local dimension. 

From  November  2014  until  the  elections,  Members  of  the  Commission  and  senior 
Commission officials participated in more than 1730 citizens’ dialogues across Europe in the 
style  of  town-hall  debates.  These  dialogues  helped  citizens  understand  of  how  European 
policies work for them, in an effort to increase their direct engagement with senior decision-
makers in the Commission, as well as with European democracy more broadly.  

Member  States’  authorities,  civil  society  organisations,  fact-checkers,  private  bodies 
including  platforms  and  other  stakeholders  engaged  in  numerous  awareness-raising 
activities  in  the  run  up  to  the  elections.  Commission  Representations  often  helped  to 
coordinate these activities, linking the local level to the European one. 

37 Links to examples of funded projects are available in the Commission staff working document accompanying this 
Communication. 
38 See for example http://www.spaceu2019.eu/.  
39 See for example https://smp.eelga.gov.uk/migrant-workers/act-project/  
40 See for example https://euandi2019.eui.eu/ and https://yourvotematters.eu/en/.  
41 
https://www.lawcentres.org.uk/lcn-s-work/living-rights-project.  
42 See e.g. https://europa.eu/youreurope/citizens/residence/elections-abroad/european-elections/index_en.htm ; 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2018/623556/EPRS_ATA(2018)623556_EN.pdf 
43 With many different national registration deadlines and voting methods for citizens, it was essential to inform mobile EU 
citizens about their electoral rights. 

http://www.diversitygroup.lt/fwp_portfolio/migrant-political-participation/ 

example 

See 

and 

for 

8 

 
 
                                                           
Analysis and follow-up measures 

The record turnout showed a renewed engagement in EU democracy. Overall, it improved 
greatly  overall  but  not  equally  across  Member  States  and  across  all  groups  of  EU  citizens. 
Communications activities contributed to building momentum for democratic participation. 

Certain  simple  practices  applied  can  make  a  big  difference  to  particular  groups,  such  as 
adjustments for voters with disabilities, support for community championing at a local level, 
a  wider  range  of  voting  methods,  and  working  with  political  parties  to  encourage 
opportunities for underrepresented citizens to stand as candidates. However, such practices 
are not widely applied. 

The  quality  of  indicators  and  data  collected  on  the  participation  of  specific  groups  is 
limited.  

Citizens including young people do not always have sufficient tools to participate actively. 
This process starts before reaching voting age.44 Many of the citizens who will vote for the 
first  time  in  the  2024  elections  are  currently  in  full  time  education.45  That  is  why  it  is 
important to develop innovative techniques suitable for different ages and needs to support 
democratic participation.  

For the 2024 elections, efforts must continue to engage all citizens in European democracy 
and support long-term high turnout. No one should be left behind and the participation in 
and  outcomes  of  European  Parliamentary  elections  should  reflect  the  population  and  the 
diversity of the Union. 

Policies  which  raise  awareness  and  public  involvement  in  European  decision-making  are 

important  to  ensuring  that  EU  citizens  are  confident  that  their  voice  is  heard,  and  that 

voting matters.  

These important considerations will contribute to reflections on the future of Europe and be 

followed-up  on  as  part  of  the  upcoming  European  Democracy  Action  Plan  and  other 

initiatives. 

Along these lines the Commission will:  

  maintain its efforts to ensure access to accurate information about the European Union 
to support citizens’ active involvement in the European political life and the exercise of 
their  electoral  rights.  Innovative  approaches,  multilingual  communication  and  new 
information channels will be used to reach all groups and local actors will be involved. 
Cooperation  with the  Parliament  will  continue  and  reinforced  collaboration  with  other 
EU institutions and relevant bodies will be explored. Citizens’ dialogues, tailored to the 

44 For its part, the Commission has organised the Back to School initiative, which has seen several EU officials going to 
schools in several Member States to discuss their work and experiences in the EU and listen to pupils. This is now 
complemented by a similar 'Back to University' initiative. 
45 https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/flash/fl_375_en.pdf  

9 

 
 
                                                           
 

 

local  linguistic  and  cultural  context,  will  be organised  across the  Union  to  increase the 
connection  between  citizens’  views  and  EU  policymaking  covering  issues  affecting 
citizens’ daily lives; 

foster best practices and the exchange of knowledge among Member States and other 
concerned  bodies  to  support  high  turnout  including  on  easy  and  accessible  voting 
procedures.  A  specific  workshop  on  voting  procedures  will  be  organised  within  the 
European Cooperation Network on Elections in 2021; 

support  inclusive  and  equal  participation,  in  cooperation  with  Member  States, 
Parliaments, civil society and other stakeholders, including by promoting best practice, 
awareness-raising and making use of funding.46 For the 2024 elections, a specific focus 
will  be  on  younger  and  older  people,  women,  mobile  EU  citizens  and  people  with 
disabilities.47 In line with its Gender Equality Strategy presented on 5 March 202048, the 
Commission will promote specific actions to achieve gender balance in decision-making 
and in politics. The Commission will also dedicate in 2020 a joint session of the European 
Cooperation Network on Elections and the expert group on electoral matters to consider 
inclusiveness and equality in democratic participation; 

  work with Member States’ authorities, with the support of its network of academics on 
citizenship  rights  and  in  consultation  with  civil  society  organisations,  to  improve 
indicators  and  data  collection  in  full  compliance  with  fundamental  rights  and  data 
protection requirements; 

  assess  practical  measures  making  best  use  of  the  digital  technologies  to  facilitate  the 
inclusive  exercise  of  electoral  rights,  while  guaranteeing  the 
freedom  and 
confidentiality  of  the  vote,  as  well  as  the  protection  of  personal  data,  building  among 
others on the outcomes of the study on remote voting solutions49 and projects funded 
under the Rights, Equality and Citizenship Programme;  

  explore ways to foster the involvement of children in the European democratic life also 
in  view  of  their  active  democratic  participation  as  EU  citizens  when  adults.  This  could 
include  supporting  child  participation  mechanisms  at  local  and EU  level  (children’s  city 
councils and children’s national Parliaments for instance);  

 

increase  the  outreach  to  children  and  young  people  including  in  the  context  of  their 
school lives;50 

46 This includes the upcoming funding Citizenship, Equality, Rights and Values Programme. 
47 European Pillar of Social Rights, principle 1: “Everyone has the right to quality and inclusive education, training and life-
long learning in order to maintain and acquire skills that enable them to participate fully in society (…).” 
48 https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/gender-equality/gender-equality-strategy_en  
49 
use 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/eu-citizenship/electoral-rights/studies_en  
50 Initiatives like the back to school or back to university promoted by the Commission are relevant in this context. 

Commission 

turnout, 

support 

remote 

voting 

study 

See 

the 

the 

on 

to 

of 

2017-18 

10 

 
 
                                                           
  consider  further  measures  to  promote  and  enhance  citizens’  participation  in  the 

democratic life of the Union in its 2020 EU citizenship report. 

Member States are encouraged to:  

-  prepare reports on the conduct of European Parliamentary elections in their country, 
and  to  include  in  these  reports  statistics  on  participation  in  elections,  including  on 
underrepresented groups, to inform policymaking at all levels; 

-  explore  options  offering  greater  choice  in  how  and  when  citizens  may  vote  (remote 

and advance voting, as well as other facilitations to accommodate specific needs); 

- 

- 

continue to share practices and take action to promote awareness of electoral rights as 
well  as  a  wider,  inclusive  participation  in  the  European  Parliamentary  elections  and 
representation in elected bodies; and 

consider  pooling  resources  and  other  mutual  support  among  Member  States  in  the 
administration  of  European  elections  (such  as  through  shared  temporary  facilities  to 
accommodate voting booths and voter administration at locations with a high number 
of resident mobile EU citizens, taking differences in national rules e.g. on administrative 
deadlines  such  as  for  voter  registration  into  account,  and  sharing  best  practices  on 
appropriate input to support citizenship courses). 

European  political  parties,  in  collaboration  with  their  national  constituencies,  could  also 
step up their efforts to encourage inclusive participation in elections and the dissemination 
of accurate information about the European Union.  

3. The European dimension and the exercise of EU electoral rights  

3.1. EU electoral rights and the European dimension of the elections 

The  European  Parliamentary  elections  are  unique.  The  Member  States,  each  with  their 
national  campaigns,  national  lists  and  distinctive  rules  and  traditions,  contribute  to  a 
collective  result,  with  elected  Members  of  the  Parliament  representing  all  EU  citizens. 
Certain common principles and procedures are set out in EU law, including the rules which 
enable  mobile  EU  citizens  to  exercise  their  right  to  vote  and  stand  in  the  European 
Parliamentary elections in their country of residence, the rules governing European political 
parties  and  foundations,  as  well  as  the  1976  EU  electoral  Act.51  The  remainder  emerges 
from the diverse, rich national political traditions of the Member States. For instance, each 
Member State organises voting in the European Parliamentary elections on the day of the 
week on which national elections are usually held. This means that elections occur over four 

51 Including the rules which enable mobile EU citizens to exercise their right to vote and stand in the European elections in 
their country of residence, the rules governing European political parties and foundations, as well as the 1976 EU electoral 
Act.  For  an  overview  of  the  relevant  and  EU  laws  and  other  instruments,  see  https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-
and-fundamental-rights/eu-citizenship/electoral-rights_en#europeanparliamentelections.  

11 

 
 
 
                                                           
days.  However,  EU  law  prohibits  official  results  from  being  declared  before  the  last  polls 
close.52 

The outcome of European Parliamentary elections has direct implications for citizens. They 
need  to  know  what  is  at  stake  at  European  level  to  make  informed  political  choices.  The 
political  debate  and  campaign  are  however  often  overshadowed  by  national  and  local 
topics.  Further  fostering  the  European  dimension  in  the  elections  strengthens  the  link 
between  citizens  and  the  European  institutions  and  hence  the  democratic  legitimacy  of 
European decision-making. It is also a matter of political accountability. To be able to hold 
politicians  to  account,  citizens  need  to  see  a  clear  link  between  the  candidates’  national 
campaigns and programmes and European policies and political parties with which they are 
affiliated.  

In 2015 the Parliament used its right of initiative to present a proposal53 to reform the 1976 
electoral  Act.54  Agreement  was  found  in  the  Council  on  a  limited  number  of  provisions 
including  a  compulsory  minimum  threshold  for  parties  and  the  criminalisation  of  multiple 
voting.  The  process  of  national  approval  exceptionally  required  for  this  act  to  enter  into 
force could not be completed in time before the elections: the amendments did not enter 
into force for the 2019 elections, and remain pending. 

Before  the  elections,  the  Commission  also  took  specific  steps  to  enhance  the  European 
dimension of the  elections.  In  2017,  the  rules  on  the funding  of  European  political parties 
and foundations were amended on the basis of a Commission proposal.55 The reform aimed 
to  improve  democratic  legitimacy  and  strengthen  enforcement,  including  as  regards  the 
respect of European values. Another objective was making the links between European and 
national  parties  more  transparent.  European  parties  are  now  required  to  make  sure  that 
their  logo  and  programme  appear  on  the  websites  of  all  the  national  parties  they  are 
affiliated  with.56  At  the  time  of  writing,  no  information  had  been  published  regarding 
whether  European  political  parties  which  applied  for  funding  complied  with  these 
requirements.57  After  consulting  the  Authority,  the  European  Parliament  should  publish  a 
report  on  the  Regulation  by  31  December  2021.  The  Commission  should  present  its  own 

52 Article 10(2) of the 1976 electoral Act. 
53  European  Parliament  Resolution  of  11  November  2015  on  the  reform  of  the  electoral  law  of  the  European  Union 
(2015/2035(INL)), OJ C 366, 27.10.2017, p. 7–18. 
54 The announced objective was to “enhance the democratic and transnational dimension of the European elections and the 
democratic legitimacy of the Union decision-making process, reinforce the concept of citizenship of the Union, improve the 
functioning of the European Parliament and the governance of the Union, make the work of the European Parliament more 
legitimate, strengthen the principles of electoral equality and equal opportunities, enhance the effectiveness of the system 
for conducting European elections, and bring MEPs closer to their voters, in particular the youngest amongst them”. 
55 European Commission, Proposal for a regulation amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) No. 1141/2014 of 22 October 2014 
on the statute and funding of European political parties and European political foundations, COM(2017)481. 
56 The Commission’s proposal also included the publication, on its member parties' websites, of information on the gender 
representation  among  the  candidates  at  the  last  European  elections.57  Regulation  (EU,  Euratom)  No  1141/2014  of  the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014 on the statute and funding of European political parties and 
European political foundations, OJ L 317, 4.11.2014, p. 1–27. 
57  Regulation  (EU,  Euratom)  No  1141/2014  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  22  October  2014  on  the 
statute and funding of European political parties and European political foundations, OJ L 317, 4.11.2014, p. 1–27. 

12 

 
 
                                                           
report within 6 months of that publication.  

In 2018 the Commission issued a Recommendation58 on enhancing the European nature and 
efficient conduct of the 2019 elections to the European Parliament which was addressed to 
Member States and political parties. It called on them to build on the lead candidate system 
and to take steps to enhance transparency by making the link between the national parties 
and the European political parties to which the national parties are affiliated more visible in 
all relevant communications, including campaign materials and ballot papers.  

Based on the information provided by Member States and European and national political 
parties, opportunities remain to improve such transparency. For instance, several Member 
States59 indicate that their national rules do not permit the display of European party logos 
on national party ballot papers. Few political parties indicated being aware of or intending 
to make use of this option, even where it is possible.60 

Some  progress  has  nonetheless  been  made.  Certain  political  parties,  including  in  France, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Greece and Ireland, did provide information to voters about 
their  European  affiliations  and  several  parties  took  steps  to  stimulate  the  European 
dimension  of  the  elections  through  their  campaign  materials  and  websites.  Two  political 
parties61  were  present  in  several  Member  States  and  campaigned  for  a  pan-European 
programme. One MEP from such a party was elected from a German list.62  

Europe  and  European  issues  including  ‘values,’  ‘economics,’  ‘social’  and the  ‘environment’ 
appeared  prominently  in  relevant  materials  during  the  campaign,  which  points  to  an 
emerging, distinct European political debate around the elections.63  

3.2. Monitoring and enforcement of electoral rights  

Fully exercising EU electoral rights is essential to the enjoyment of the status of EU citizen. 
Member  States  are  responsible  for  making  sure  that  the  common  rules  and  principles 
applicable  to  the  European  Parliamentary  elections  under  EU  law  are  implemented 
correctly.  The  Commission,  acting  as  guardian  of  the  Treaties, monitors and takes  actions, 
where necessary. 

58 Commission Recommendation (EU) No 2018/234 of 14 February 2018 on enhancing the European nature and efficient 
conduct  of  the  2019  elections  to  the  European  Parliament,  OJ  L  45,  17.2.2018,  p.  40–43.59  Bulgaria,  Czechia,  Denmark, 
Germany,  Estonia,  Spain,  Croatia,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Hungary,  Malta,  Poland,  Portugal,  Romania,  Slovakia,  Finland  and 
Sweden. 
59  Bulgaria,  Czechia,  Denmark,  Germany,  Estonia,  Spain,  Croatia,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Hungary,  Malta,  Poland,  Portugal, 
Romania, Slovakia, Finland and Sweden. 
60 For more detail on this point, see section 3 of the staff working document accompanying this Communication. 
61 Volt and DiEM25. 
62 For Volt Deutschland. DiEM25 was unsuccessful in the European Parliamentary elections, but it has also run candidates 
in national elections in Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Austria, Poland and Portugal, and has members in the 
Danish, Greek, Polish and Portuguese legislatures. 
63 These themes also emerged in the over 1,700 citizens’ dialogues organised around the Union since the last elections. 
Johansson, Bengt and Novelli, Edoardo, ‘2019 European elections campaign – Images, topics, media in the 28 Member 
States’, 9 July 2019, https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/e6767a95-a386-11e9-9d01-
01aa75ed71a1/language-en. 

13 

 
 
                                                           
Ahead  of  the  elections,  the  Commission  took  various  actions  to  ensure  that  EU  law  was 
being  implemented  and  to  eliminate  possible  obstacles  to  the  exercise  of  EU  citizens’ 
electoral rights. The Commission was in dialogue with three Member States on the right of 
mobile EU citizens to join a political party and one on the right to found a party. Talks were 
also  held  with  several  Member  States  to  ensure  information  is  exchanged  within  the  five 
days envisaged so that candidates who have been disqualified in their home Member State 
can  be  prevented  from  being  elected  in  another  Member  State.64  Following  these  talks, 
several Member States amended their laws.  

Dialogue with one Member State successfully addressed the issue of protecting the secrecy 
of voting and discussions with another Member State resolved an issue on enabling people 
without a fixed place of residence to exercise their electoral rights.  

Before  the  elections  and  immediately  following  them,  many  EU  citizens  contacted  the 
Commission  to  express  their  concerns  regarding  the  elections.  The  most  common  issues 
raised were citizens: 

-  being  unable to  vote  remotely  (by post,  by proxy or  online)  or  in  person  outside  their 
country  of  origin  (in  consulates,  embassies  or  specially  established polling  stations),  or 
where such an option was provided, experiencing administrative complexities, delays or 
other issues; 

-  encountering delays or complications in national registration procedures.65  

The Commission was in talks with the concerned countries on these issues. 

3.3. Prevention of multiple voting 

The  Commission  supported  Member  States  in  implementing  the  specific  provisions  of  EU 
law  related  to  electoral  rights  of  mobile  EU  citizens,  within  the  framework  of  the  expert 
group  on  electoral  matters.66  Exchanges  covered  the  applicable  formalities,  including  the 
relevant deadlines applicable to registration, and practices to support participation.  

Exchanges also included measures to prevent multiple voting by mobile EU citizens. Under 
the relevant EU rules, Member States exchanged information on mobile citizen voters who 
have  registered  and  indicated  their  intention  to  vote  in  the  European  Parliamentary 
elections in their country of residence, so that they can be removed from the electoral rolls 
for  the  elections  in  their  countries  of  origin.  To  support  Member  States’  efforts,  the 
Commission  provided  a  tool  to  support  the  secure  and  data-compliant  exchange  of  this 
information  and  facilitated  the  sharing  of  relevant  information  among  Member  States, 

64  Under  Directive  93/109/EC  laying  down  detailed  arrangements  for  the  exercise  of  the  right  to  vote  and  stand  as  a 
candidate in elections to the European Parliament for citizens of the Union residing in a Member State of which they  are 
not nationals 
65 This applied to European Union citizens attempting to complete formalities established by their country of nationality, 
including when voting from outside that country, and attempting to complete formalities established by their country of 
residence. 
66 https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupDetail&groupID=617.  

14 

 
 
                                                           
including  on  electoral  deadlines.  Between  February  and  May  2019,  Member  States 
exchanged  data  on  over  1.2  million  voters  and  114  parliamentary  candidates.  The  close 
collaboration  between  Member  States  permitted  the  identification  of  around  214,000 
multiple  registrations  of  citizens.67  The  Commission  was  not  made  aware  of  incidents  of 
multiple voting in the elections. 

This process was conducted more efficiently and securely compared to previous elections. 
Member  States,  however,  underlined  that  the  differences  in  the  applicable  national 
procedures created challenges, including on the quality of the data exchanged68. Issues also 
resulted from differences in the applicable deadlines for registration and deregistration, and 
the  effect  of  registration  and  deregistration  on  a  citizen’s  ability  to  vote  in  other  national 
elections.  

3.4. Other actions  

Citizens themselves are generally confident that their countries were doing what is needed 
to ensure free and fair elections.69 Election observation is important to ensure respect for 
electoral  rights,  to  empower  and  involve  citizens  and  more  broadly  to  build  public 
confidence  in  electoral  processes.  Member  States  have  different  approaches  on  this. 
Discussion  and  exchange  of best  practice  including  with observer  organisations took place 
through the European Cooperation Network on Elections before and after the elections.70  

Analysis and follow-up measures 

More  work  is  needed  to  strengthen  the  prominence  of  the  European  dimension  of  the 
European Parliamentary elections. Although some progress has been made and a European 
political  dimension  develops  gradually  within  a  growing  European  democratic  space, 
measures to sustain and reinforce it are needed. Member States and the national political 
parties play a central role here.  Transparency of the relationships between the European 
and  national  political  levels  should  be  further  promoted  and  supported  including  by 
national  rules.  Political  parties  have  a  specific  responsibility as  regards  the  visibility  of  the 
connections  between  national  European  political  parties  and  the  prominence  given  to 
European issues. 

Before the elections, the Commission worked closely with the Member States to ensure that 
the applicable EU law was implemented in the May 2019 elections. This was effective and 
will be continued in view of the 2024 elections. This brought to light areas where EU rules 

67 See section 3.2. of the staff working document accompanying this Communication. 
68 Indeed, mobile EU citizen voters can only be identified across borders when the identifying data are compatible between 
national administrations. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/soteu2018-data-protection-law-
electoral-guidance-638_en.pdf 
69  Including  to  prevent  illegal  and  fraudulent  activities  during  elections.  See  special  Eurobarometer  477  Democracy  and 
elections – p. 14. 
70This included interventions from the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and Election-Watch.EU, which 
presented  its  own  initiative  report  on  the  elections,  see  https://www.wahlbeobachtung.org/en/european-parliament-
elections-2019-election-watch-eu-eam-final-report-with-16-recommendations.  

15 

 
 
                                                           
could  be  streamlined  and  where  further  convergence  between  national  systems  could  be 
beneficial, to facilitate the efficient conduct of the elections, coordination among Member 
State  authorities  and  campaigning  at  a  European  level.  For  instance  nationally  established 
campaigning and elections periods could be more closely aligned.  

One  of  the  six  headline  ambitions  for  the  von  der  Leyen  Commission  is  a  new  push  for 
European  democracy.  This  implies  fostering  the  European  dimension  of  the  elections  and 
increasing  the  link  between  citizens  and  European  decision-making,  making  best  use  of 
appropriate  linguistic  and  cultural  tools.  EU  citizens  will  have  a  stronger  role  in  decision-
making, a greater say and a leading and active part in setting European priorities and level of 
ambition. 

The  Conference  on  the  future  of  Europe  will  have  one  strand  addressing  topics  related  to 
democratic  processes  and  institutional  matters,  notably the  lead  candidate  system for the 
election of the President of the European Commission and transnational lists for elections to 
the European Parliament. The Conference should come forward with its legislative or other 
proposals  on  this  topic.  The  Commission  will  follow  up  on  these  proposals  where  it  has 
competence to act on what is agreed by the Conference and stands ready to intervene as a 
facilitator  and  honest  broker  between  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council.  For 
instance, the Commission can make available legal and institutional expertise, research on 
electoral processes and insight into inter-institutional relations.71  

In  good  time  before  the  2024  elections,  the  Commission  will  also  present  proposals  to 
strengthen  the  rules  applicable  to  European  political  parties  and  foundations,  including 
clarifying  their  financing.  In  this  context,  the  Commission  will  consult,  including  the 
Authority  for  European  Political  Parties  and  European  Political  Foundations,  European 
political parties and liaise with the European Parliament. It will also examine the possibility 
to  entrust  the  Authority  for  European  Political  Parties  and  European  Political  Foundations 
with additional tasks. 

The Commission is committed to supporting efforts to enhance the European dimension of 
the elections. It will consider specific measures, including to: 

- 

- 

- 

stimulate awareness of European dimension of the elections in its effort to reach out to 
citizens; 

strengthen  the  partnership  between  the  European  Commission  and  the  European 
Parliament in preparing for the 2024 elections, and work together to develop options to 
enhance the European dimension of the next elections; 

support  clearer  indications  of  the  affiliations  between  European  political  parties  and 
national  ones.  This  will  include  funding  actions.  The  Commission  will  also  include  the 

71 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council shaping the Conference on the 
Future of Europe 22.1.2020, COM(2020) 27 final. The Conference will address among other things improving the lead 
candidate system and the issue of transnational lists. 

16 

 
 
                                                           
promotion of debate on this topic within relevant structures such as the Conference of 
Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs of Parliaments of the EU and the European 
Cooperation Network on Elections; 

- 

foster the generation of awareness and momentum around the elections including on 
elections  night,  and  discuss  concrete  measures  as  regards  the  secure  transmission  of 
results in the framework of the European cooperation network of elections;  

-  encourage  Member  States  to  converge  their  electoral  periods  further,  including  the 
campaigning  and  other  relevant  periods,  to  strengthen  the  momentum  built  across  all 
Member  States  for  the  elections,  and  to  facilitate  the  effectiveness  of  silence  periods 
and other rules on campaigning; 

Working  closely  with  the  Member  State  authorities,  both  in  the  European  Cooperation 
Network on Elections and in the expert group on electoral matters, and engaging with other 
international organisations and stakeholders, the Commission will: 

  consider in its next EU citizenship report, to be published in 2020, the added value of a 
helpdesk to support the exercise of electoral rights by EU citizens available for both EU 
citizens (including mobile EU citizens) and relevant authorities in the run-up and during 
the elections; 

 

reinforce  the  exercise  of  EU  electoral  rights  by  mobile  EU  citizens  and  promote 
additional safeguards to prevent multiple voting. This will include reviewing the existing 
framework  governing  electoral  rights  of  mobile  EU  citizens  including  on  the  data 
exchanged, fostering enhanced coordination among Member States on the preparation 
of  the  national  electoral  rolls  (including  different  national  rules  on  timetables, 
identification  requirements  and  qualification  criteria)  and  awareness-raising  among 
citizens that multiple voting is prohibited; 

  support  the  exchange  of  best  practice  on  elections  observation  including  ways  to 
directly involve citizens. Within the European Cooperation Network on Elections, direct 
communication  channels  between  Member  States’  authorities  and  relevant  observer 
organisations will continue to be fostered. 

4. Addressing  disinformation  and  protecting  the 

integrity  and 

resilience of the electoral process 

Campaigning in the 2019 elections was the most digital to date. Almost half of EU citizens 
now rely on online news as their main source for information about national and European 
politics.  Social  media  is  also  an  important  tool  for  politicians  to  reach  voters  and  for 
campaigns groups to organise supporters.  

 The  speed,  ease  and  reach  of  online  communication,  and  the 
possibilities  that  online  social  platforms  have  created  to  target 

17 

 
 
 
people through political advertisements and communications pose new challenges. Most EU 
citizens,  while  agreeing  that  online  social  networks  are  a  modern  way  to  keep  up  to  date 
with politics, also believe that online political information cannot be trusted.72 Elections in 
Europe and around the world have become a target for manipulation attempts from various 
bad actors, both state and non-state, which seek to exploit the opportunities that the digital 
environment provides.73  

Electoral  interference  can  take  many  forms,  and  can  be  motivated  by the  desire  to  shape 
voter  choices,  suppress  turnout,  undermine  public  confidence  in  democracy  or  obtain 
financial gain. Dark money, cyber-attacks, disinformation, misinformation, misleading online 
behaviour, manipulative and divisive narratives,74 forgery, misrepresentation, fraud, misuse 
of  personal  data  and  unlawful  micro-targeting  are  used  to  circumvent  and  undermine 
electoral and other rules relevant to the electoral context, distort democratic outcomes and 
erode trust in institutions. Interference in elections can be a tool for hybrid influencing by 
external actors to encourage citizens to disconnect from politics, divide and destabilise our 
Union  and  undermine  the  credibility  of  EU  institutions,  fuelling  discontent  and  distrust.  It 
can also be a tool of organised crime.75  

Certain actors seek in particular to undermine the EU's credibility as a guarantor of the core 
EU  values,  including  democracy  and  equality  of  all  citizens  (e.g.  gender  equality  and  the 
protection of specific groups). Hate speech and other forms of harassment aim to shrink the 
space for democratic debate and for civic engagement.76 

Together  with  the  action  plan  against  disinformation,77  the  Commission’s  electoral 
package78  provides  a  toolkit  for  addressing  these  challenges,  building  on  monitoring  and 
enforcement  of  rules  related  to  online  activities  relevant  to  the  electoral  context  and 
bringing together all the relevant entities in the Member States and in the EU institutions. 
The EU institutions and the Member States worked intensively to deliver these initiatives in 
the run up to elections.  

Competent Member State authorities, civil society organisations, journalists, fact-checkers, 
platforms, and other stakeholders joined efforts to support the resilience of the elections.  

a 

of 

For 

survey 

impact 

72 Standard Eurobarometer 90 —Media use in the European Union, December 2018. 
73 See for example A. Dawson and M. Innes ‘How Russia’s Internet Research Agency Built its Disinformation Campaign’ The 
Political Quarterly, Vol. 90, No. 2, April–June 2019. For an inventory of efforts to use technology for manipulation see for 
example https://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/research/cybertroops2019/.  
74 
instance 
such 
https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/work/2018_02_geog_discontent.pdf.  For  a  behavioural  approach 
to 
see 
decision-making, 
http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC117161/understanding-our-political-nature.pdf.  
75 See for example research into the use of cyber-interference to manipulate elections prepared by the European Centre of 
Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats https://www.hybridcoe.fi/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Strategic-Analysis-2018-
8-Past.pdf.  
76 Also targeting journalists belonging to specific groups. 
77 The action plan builds on the Commission’s April 2018 Communication on tackling online disinformation. 
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/communication-tackling-online-disinformation-european-approach  
78 Adopted on the 12 September 2018, State of the Union 2018. 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_18_5681. 

information 

narratives, 

political 

see 

for 

on 

of 

18 

 
 
                                                           
The  Commission  addressed  specifically  instances  of  disinformation  affecting  the  EU 
including via targeted communication actions, both by rebutting false claims and by raising 
public awareness about the challenges and risks of disinformation. 

These  were  important  steps  towards  more  efficiently  deterring  attacks  and  electoral 
manipulation, as well as towards exposing disinformation and other unlawful interference in 
the democratic debate. 

As  noted  in  the  June  2019  report  on  the  implementation  of  the  action  plan  against 
disinformation,  Russia  remained  a  persistent  actor  in  this  field.  Pro-Kremlin  messaging, 
important  source  of 
often  deriving  from  official  Russian  state  sources,  was  an 
disinformation,  as  documented  by  the  EEAS  East  StratCom  Task  Force.79  Other  actors 
increasingly  deploy  the  same  tactics,  blurring  the  line  between  foreign  and  ‘home-grown’ 
manipulation  and  rendering  attribution  difficult.  Efforts  were  identified,  for  instance  to 
suppress  voter  turnout  through  attacks  on  government  websites  and  to  disseminate 
manipulative content.80  

While  these  manipulative  efforts  recurrently  focused  on  politically  sensitive  topics  and 
targeted EU audiences ahead of the elections, no large-scale covert interference operation 
in the 2019 elections has been identified so far.  

Electoral  interference  in  one  Member  State  has  an  impact  on  the  EU  as  a  whole.  Further 
actions  are  needed  to  address  both  interference  and  manipulation  efforts  targeting 
elections and the democratic debate.  

4.1. Unprecedented cooperation  

The challenges facing elections are complex and cross-cutting. No country or public 
authority can address them adequately alone. That is why a central recommendation of the 
electoral package is for Member States to establish national elections networks of 
competent authorities responsible for monitoring and enforcing rules related to online 
activities relevant to the electoral context. They involved electoral commissions, data 
protection authorities, cyber security authorities, media regulators and other authorities as 
needed. 

79 See for example the East Stratcom Task Force’s European elections updates: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/eu-elections-update-
the-long-game/ and https://euvsdisinfo.eu/eu-elections-update-reaping-what-was-sown/.  
80  Limited  DoS  attacks  were  reported  by  two  Member  States  against  national  authority  websites  which  were  promptly 
identified and swiftly resolved. Further details are provided in section 4 of the staff working document accompanying this 
Communication. 

19 

 
 
                                                           
All  Member  States  established  such  networks,  under  various 
structures  and  leadership.81  Half  of  national  data  protection 
authorities82 and fewer than half of the media regulators have so 
far  been  involved  in  the  network.  Some  networks  included  law 
enforcement  and  links  to  the  security  authorities.  Member 
States  stressed  the  value  of  clear  political  leadership  and 
sufficient resources so that the networks can be effective. 

Links between these networks were formed with other relevant 
structures such as national Computer Incident Support Teams as 
well  as  the  EU’s  Rapid  Alert  System.83  The  Rapid  Alert  System 
was  established  before  the  elections  and  also  facilitated  an 
exchange  between  experts  and  its  national  points  of  contact. 
The  cooperation  between  the  European  Cooperation  Network 
on  Elections  and  the  Rapid  Alert  System  fostered  the  interlink 
between  the  expert  communities  in  line  with  the  election 
package  and 
the  development  of  a 
to 
comprehensive  overview  of  disinformation  activities  during  the 
election period. 

contributed 

In  line  with  the  elections  package,  the  national  networks’ 
activities  included  conducting  exercises  to  identify  threats  and 
gaps  in  monitoring  and  enforcing  the  relevant  rules  and/or  to 
assess risks to electoral processes (18 Member States), and the 
national  mapping  and  review  of  laws  relevant  to  the  electoral 
(10  Member  States).84  This  supported 
informed 
context 
policymaking. 

Most  Member  States  indicated  that  they  use  these  networks 
for  other  elections  besides  the  European  Parliamentary 
elections.  Some  Member  States  provided  their  networks  with 
specific  tools  such  as  access  to  a  secure  communications 
platform,  but  additional  specific  financial  resources  were  not 
reported. Member States expressed an interest in the availability 
of additional EU resources to support these networks, which the 
Commission will make available again in 2020.85 

Examples  of  practices 
shared  in  the  European 
Cooperation  Network 
on Elections 

Latvia  presented  an  application, 
which  allows  EU  citizens 
to 
monitor  political  party  financing 
and  report  cases  of  potential 
the  Anti-corruption 
abuse 
Bureau. 
participatory 
This 
application  had  a  deterrent,  as 
well as enforcement effect. 

to 

An  awareness-raising  campaign 
conducted  by  the  Netherlands, 
which  targets  disinformation  in 
critical 
general, 
reading  tips  and  therefore  has 
application beyond the elections. 

focuses 

on 

Austria  described  a  national 
master  plan  for  digitalisation  and 
a safer internet initiative. 

Luxembourg  devised  a  national 
action  plan  covering  all  areas 
highlighted 
election 
package. 

the 

in 

a 
guidance 

produced 
and 

bilingual 
Spain 
website 
for 
elections,  and  a  24-hour  helpline 
on disinformation.  

is 

law 

France 

France  enacted  a  new 
in 
December  2018  on  political 
also 
campaigning. 
considering  legislation  to  support 
citizenship. 
in  EU 
education 
being 
is 
Further 
legislation 
further 
impose 
to 
considered 
obligations  on 
social  media 
platforms.  

81 Member States included national security and intelligence authorities, Prime Minister’s offices and ministries such as 
Foreign Affairs, Justice, Internal Affairs, Digital Affairs and Public Administration. 
82 Out of the 14 national data protection authorities which responded to the questionnaire of the Commission. 
83 An ongoing structure which enables the sharing of information and analysis between EU Institutions and EU Member 
States: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-
homepage_en/59644/Factsheet:%20Rapid%20Alert%20System. 
84 See section 4.1.1. of the staff working document accompanying this Communication. 
85 https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/portal/screen/opportunities/topic-details/rec-rcit-citi-ag-2020. 

20 

 
 
                                                           
To  support  the  sharing  of  expertise  and  best  practices  among 
Member  States, 
including  on  threats,  gaps  and  enforcement, 
Member  States  were  also  asked  to  nominate  a  contact  point  from 
in  the  European 
their  national  elections  networks  to  gather 
Cooperation  Network  on  Elections.  The  network  met  three  times 
before and twice after the elections. Member States exchanged on 
specific  activities  they  had  conducted  nationally,  such  as  on 
awareness-raising campaigns, risk assessment and process mapping, 
monitoring and enforcement, and legislative developments (see box 
on  mapping  the  rules).  They  also  shared  information  about  their 
policies,  software  and  research,  on  a  secure  platform  provided  by 
the  Commission,  which  was  also  used  during  the  elections  for 
exchanging information.  

The  European  Cooperation  network  on  Elections  also  facilitated 
exchanges  with  other  bodies,  including  the  European  Parliament, 
Authority  for  European  Political  Parties  and  Foundations,  the 
European  Regulators  Group  for  Audiovisual  Media  Services  (ERGA), 
EUROPOL, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 
the  European  Data  Protection  Board  and  the  European  Data 
Protection  Supervisor,  and  other  stakeholders  including  elections 
observers and fact-checking organisations. Its members participated 
in a EU-US expert-level dialogue on resilience of electoral systems on 
26 November 201986. 

The  Commission  supported  Member  States  in  mapping  their  rules 
and practices relevant to the electoral context. This covered rules on 
contributions  (bans  on  foreign  funding,  limits,  disclosure  rules), 
spending  (earmarking  and  limits),  campaigning  (duration,  silence 
period, polling and other restrictions), and media (equality between 
candidates,  broadcasting,  transparency  of  political  advertising  and 
social  media  rules).  This  mapping  fostered  mutual  understanding 
and Members States have indicated a willingness to go further with 
it.  

4.2. Enhanced transparency and better exposure of 

manipulations 

The  European  Cooperation  Network  on  Elections  also  supported 
exchanges  on  the  implementation  of  the  other  recommendations 

Mapping the rules 

Most Member States: 

  have 

rules 

on 
of 
and/or 
anonymous 

transparency 
donations 
prohibit 
donations; 

parties 

  ban  foreign  funding  of 
and 
political 
campaigns,  though  some 
only  limit  its  amount  or 
impose 
disclosure 
requirements;  

  have  rules  on  silence 
(when 
must 

periods 
campaigning 
cease). 

About  half  of  the  Member 
States  require  transparency 
for  paid  political  adverts  and 
communications;  

A  few  Member  States  have 
specific rules on social media; 

Over  a  third  of  the  Member 
States have rules that control 
the  broadcast  media 
in 
elections; 

A  few  Member  States  have 
such rules applicable online;  

clearly 

A  third  of  Member  States 
have 
defined 
campaign  periods.  In  other 
Member  States,  there  are  no 
specific 
requirements 
applicable. 

86 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/12/11/joint-eu-us-statement-following-the-eu-us-
justice-and-home-affairs-ministerial-meeting/.  

21 

 
 
                                                           
contained in the elections package,87 a key part of which was promoting transparency and 
thus  accountability.  Many  interference  activities,  such  as  dark  money  and  targeted 
disinformation, thrive in the dark. The Commission called on  Member States and political 
parties  to  take  measures  to  enable  citizens  to  recognise  paid-for  communications  online, 
the  amount  of  money  spent,  its  source  and  the  means  by which  it  was  targeted  to  them, 
with sanctions to be applied as appropriate. 

Some Member States reported having transparency rules on paid political communications, 
though difficulties remain with access to data and capability to conduct monitoring and thus 
enforcement  for  online  conduct.88  Some  Member  States  reported  that  they  are  now 
considering  legislation  in  this  area,  to  introduce  or  modernise  online  transparency  rules. 
Member  States promoted  transparency,  and  in some  cases  conducted  specific  awareness-
raising  activities.  Guidance  or  training  was  provided  to  specific  groups,  such  as  political 
parties.  Member  States  also  exchanged  in  the  Network  on  the  application  of  their  offline 
electoral safeguards online. 

In  March  2019,  then  Commissioner  Jourová  wrote  to  national  political  parties89  calling  on 
them  to  put  into  practice  the  Commission’s  Recommendation.90  A  specific  exchange  with 
European Political Parties also took place. 

The Commission also worked with the online platforms and the IT industry to protect the 
2019 elections from disinformation campaigns and online manipulation. The self-regulatory 
code of practice on disinformation for online platforms and the advertising sector91 sets out 
a  range  of  commitments,  including  to  provide  transparency  and  public  disclosure  around 
political  advertising,  prevent  the  manipulative  use  of  online  services  by  malicious  actors, 
empower citizens and researchers, and take other actions to improve the accountability and 
trustworthiness  of  the  online  ecosystem.  The  Commission,  with  the  support  of  ERGA,92 
carried  out 
intermediate  monitoring  aimed  at  ensuring  that  the  Code’s 
commitments  were  implemented  in  advance  of  the  elections.93  The  Commission,  with 
ERGA’s assistance, is currently assessing the overall effectiveness of this Code during its first 

intensive 

87 See section 4.1.2. of the staff working document accompanying this Communication. 
88 In some cases it is not foreseen in the relevant legislation, or it is complicated by for instance a lack of access to online 
data or depends on passive monitoring on the basis of paper disclosures by the political actors. 
89 https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/letter_political_parties_final_en.pdf.  
90 Commission Recommendation of 12.9.2018 on election cooperation networks, online transparency, protection against 
cybersecurity incidents and fighting disinformation campaigns in the context of elections to the European Parliament, C 
(2018) 5949 final. 
91 Signatories to the code of practice include the major online platforms Facebook, Google, Twitter, and Microsoft as well 
as Mozilla and trade associations representing the online advertising sector.  
92 The ERGA Sub-Group charged with this task reported in June 2019 on the first phase of its monitoring activities, which 
focussed on the implementation of Code commitments related to the transparency of political advertising. http://erga-
online.eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/ERGA-2019-06_Report-intermediate-monitoring-Code-of-Practice-on-
disinformation.pdf.  
93 https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/code-practice-disinformation 

22 

 
 
                                                           
year of operations.94  

The  Code  has  provided  an  opportunity  for  enhanced  transparency  into  the  platforms’ 
policies  on  disinformation.  In  the  run-up  to  the  2019  elections,  Facebook,  Google  and 
Twitter  stepped  up  efforts  to  provide  for  increased  transparency  of  political  ads,95  made 
efforts to increase the integrity of their services by detecting and closing down manipulative 
activities  (such  as  coordinated  operations  aimed  at  amplifying  content  and  abusive  use  of 
bots and fake accounts) and improved the scrutiny of ad placements to limit malicious click-
baiting  practices  and  reduce  advertising  revenues  for  purveyors  of  disinformation. 
Moreover,  platforms  took  a  number  of  measures  to  promote  content  from  “authentic”96 
sources  and  limit  the  distribution  of  disinformation.  While  these  were  an  important  step 
towards  more  transparency  in  the  election  context,  they  are  not  sufficient.  Not  all  the 
platforms had ad libraries in place in all Member States before the elections, the ad libraries 
were  not  sufficiently  complete,  and  did  not  give  easy  access  to  relevant  bodies,  including 
Member States’ authorities to exercise their oversight functions and researchers for analysis 
of  the  archive.  Progress  needs  to  be  made  in  this  regard  in  the  perspective  of  future 
elections. 

National and European political parties reported that they took steps to comply both with 
the  applicable  legislation  and  the  requirements  set  by  online  platforms  in  their  terms  of 
service.  Some  platform  requirements  were  however  described  as  problematic.97  Parties 
indicated  particular  difficulties  with  changes  made  to  platform  terms  of  service  shortly 
before  the  elections.  At  their  level,  parties  did  not  generally  undertake  additional 
transparency  activities  such  as  listing  their  adverts,  or  disclosing  their  spending  for  online 
political  adverts,  on  their  websites.98  In  their  replies  to  the  Commission’s  questionnaire, 
they indicated that they would value clarification of the rules on transparency, the correct 
approach  to  be  taken  by  platforms  as  regards  EU-wide  campaigning  and  the  provision  of 
open access online databases for the parties’ to make their transparency disclosures. 

In  the  framework  of  the  European  Cooperation  Network  on  Elections,  Member  States 
shared their experience on their interactions with the social media platforms. The platforms 
engaged directly with some of them providing specific support including escalation routes.99 

94  The  signatories  to  the  Code  have  provided  annual  self-assessment  reports  on  their  implementation  of  the  Code. 
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/annual-self-assessment-reports-signatories-code-practice-
disinformation-2019.  In  addition  to  ERGA,  the  Commission  is  also  being  supported  in  its  assessment  of  the  Code  by  an 
independent consultant  
95 In particular by labelling them and making them publicly available via searchable ad repositories; 
96  The  question  of  authenticity  of  content  is  an  issue  under  debate  with  respect  to  online  publication,  and  a  number  of 
approaches are being explored to help users understand where content comes from, as well as to prioritise information on 
certain  subjects  from  authoritative  sources,  for  instance  so  that  users  can  find  out  about  election  formalities  from  the 
national electoral body. 
97 Facebook required advisers to register in the country where they wanted to purchase political advertising. This meant 
that EU political parties had to be registered in all EU Member States in order to run EU wide information campaigns. 
98 See electoral package Recommendation, point 9. 
99 For example, Facebook worked with the German Federal Office for Information Security to launch an initiative to create 
a better and more comprehensive understanding of interference into elections and develop guidance on how to combat it. 

23 

 
 
                                                           
 
Discussions  in  Network100  highlighted  the  need for  more  equal treatment among  Member 
States, more operational interactions to support their oversight functions101 including better 
access to data, points of contacts and exchanges in the languages of the concerned Member 
States.  Member  States  indicated  that  the  platform’s  efforts  were  inconsistent,  not 
sufficiently effective, and that the support offered directly to actors such as political parties, 
candidates  and  journalists  could  also  raise  concerns  under  their  legal  order.102  Similar 
concerns were expressed in the framework of the Rapid Alert System. 

The  Commission  also  engaged  with  the  online  platforms  in  the  context  of  the  Code  of 
Conduct on Countering Illegal Hate Speech Online.103 

4.3. Reinforced data protection compliance 

The Commission also published specific guidance on the application of EU data protection 
law  in  the  electoral  context.  They  were  the  first  elections  where  the  updated  EU  data 
scandal105 
framework  applied.104  The  Facebook-Cambridge  Analytica 
protection 
demonstrated the relevance of EU data protection rules in the electoral context, illustrating 
the danger of personal data being used in violation of data protection rules in an attempt to 
unlawfully influence elections.106  

National  authorities  including  some  electoral  commissions  took  specific  measures  to 
promote  data  protection  compliance,  including  notifying  political  parties  directly  of  their 
responsibilities.  Some  Member  States  reported  having  imposed  fines  in  the  run-up  to  the 
elections, some incidents were reported,107 and some investigations are ongoing.  

Contributions from political parties show that there is insufficient clarity on data protection 
requirements in the electoral context and that further awareness-raising is needed. 

The  election  package  contained  a  legislative  proposal  to  introduce  sanctions  against 
European  parties  and  foundations  which  sought  to  take  advantage  of  an  infringement  of 
data  protection  rules  to  deliberately  influence  or  attempting  to  influence  the  outcome  of 

Twitter included national officials and researchers into a partner support portal to facilitate research into disinformation. 
Google  provided  support  for  journalists  and  independent  fact-checking  networks.  Further  detail  on  these  activities  is 
provided in section 4.2.3. of the staff working document accompanying this Communication. 
100  See  the  reports  of  the  European  Cooperation  Network  on  Elections  and  further  detail  in  the  staff  working  document 
accompanying this Communication. 
101  This  concerns  for  instance  compliance  with  national  rules,  such  as  in  monitoring  campaign  expenditure  and  silence 
periods online 
102 For instance, national rules controlling donations to political campaigns. 
103 Code of Conduct on Countering Illegal Hate Speech Online: https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-
rights/combatting-discrimination/racism-and-xenophobia/countering-illegal-hate-speech-online_en.  
104  Regulation  2016/679  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  27  April  2016  on  the  protection  of  natural 
persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 
95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”)). 
105 That case involved misuse of personal data collected directly from the concerned person and data derived from their 
behaviour and their social network in order to target them with specific political content. 
106 The GDPR provided national authorities strengthened powers to monitor and enforce these rules. 
107 For instance, France established a dedicated form through which 697 complaints were reported in the context of the 
elections,  including  11  against  political  parties.  In  Spain,  102  complaints  were  reported.  For  further  details,  see  section 
4.3.2. of the staff working document accompanying this Communication. 

24 

 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
the European Parliamentary elections. This proposal was adopted swiftly and was in force 
during  the  elections.108  The  responsible  Authority  for  European  political  parties  and 
European  Political  Foundations  engaged  with  Member  States  to  ensure  its  effective 
implementation. So far, no cases under this new mechanism have been brought to light. 

4.4. Increased cyber resilience 

The Commission worked with Member State authorities to implement its recommendations 
to  manage  the  risk  of  cyberattack  in  elections.109  It  invited  Member  States  to  take 
appropriate  steps  to  understand  and  manage  the  risks  of  cyberattack,  and  to  apply  the 
Compendium on Cyber Security of Election Technology prepared by the Cooperation Group 
established  under  the  Directive  on  the  security  of  Network  and  Information  Systems.110 
Member States were also asked to take steps to raise awareness of such risks and many did, 
including  by organising  specific  training  and  exercises  involving  relevant stakeholders  such 
as political parties and journalists. The Recommendation also asked political parties to act to 
mitigate cyber risks. 

To  support  the  implementation  of  the  Recommendation  and  to  enhance  cooperation 
between different national authorities, the Commission organised a high-level workshop on 
cyber-enabled threats to elections in October 2018,111 where cybersecurity authorities met 
with election authorities to discuss the upcoming challenges.112 

In cooperation with the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) and the European 
Parliament, the Commission conducted a table-top exercise in April 2019 in the framework 
of  the  European  Cooperation  Network  on  Elections  to  test  the  effectiveness  of  the  Union 
and Member States’ response procedures and crisis plans.113 ENISA’s report on the exercise, 
shared with Member States, included policies and capabilities considered essential to cyber-
security resilience in the elections.  

Member States indicated that the transmission of results to the Parliament on election night 
could  be  improved.  In  some  cases  authorities  provided  specific  assistance  and  training  to 
political  parties  and  candidates,  as  well  as  to  journalists  and  to  the  media  to  support 
cybersecurity and resilience in the elections.114 

Analysis and follow-up measures 

108 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32019R0493.  
109 Electoral package Recommendation points 12-18. 
110https://ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/image/document/2018-
30/election_security_compendium_00BE09F9-D2BE-5D69-9E39C5A9C81C290F_53645.pdf.  
111 https://wayback.archive-it.org/12090/20191129081252/https://ec.europa.eu/epsc/events/election-interference-
digital-age-building-resilience-cyber-enabled-threats_en 
112 The outcome of that workshop also fed into the Fundamental Rights Colloquium held at the end of November 2018, 
focused on “Democracy in the European Union”. 
113  ENISA  had  previously  issued  an  opinion  on  cybersecurity  of  elections,  which  informed  this  exercise,  and  supported 
national  cybersecurity  exercises  in  the  run  up  to  the  elections  https://www.enisa.europa.eu/news/enisa-news/enisa-
makes-recommendations-on-eu-wide-election-cybersecurity 
114 For further details, see section 4.4. of the staff working document accompanying this Communication. 

25 

 
 
                                                           
The  threat  of  manipulation  of  and  unlawful  interference  in  the  elections  in  view  of 
manipulating voter opinion and choice was real and multifaceted, and so was the work to 
address  it.  Isolated  cyberattacks,  data  protection  and  other  elections-related  complaints 
were reported, though a covert, coordinated large-scale effort to interfere in the elections 
has  not  been  identified.  Feedback  from  the  Member  States  shows  that  the  elections 
package and other EU measures played an essential role in their efforts to prevent threats 
and exercise their oversight functions.  

Member  States  largely  implemented  the  electoral  package.  They  achieved  high  levels  of 
cooperation and coordination, both internally among the competent authorities115 including 
within  the  framework  of  the  national  election  networks  and  with  private  and  other 
concerned bodies, as well as among Member States and with European institutions.  

The  value  of  a  comprehensive  ‘whole-society’  approach  was  demonstrated  and  proved 
effective.116  

Key lessons include: 

Further progress is necessary to address disinformation, manipulation and unlawful foreign 
interference.117 Safeguards relevant to elections need to be effective and fit for the online 
environment.  The  transparency  of  political  ads  and  communications  is  not  sufficiently 
reliable.  

Developing  sufficient  capacity  within  the  EU  institutions,  the  Member  States  and  civil 
society to detect, analyse and expose manipulation and interference is essential. 

There is a need to reinforce the capability and efforts from relevant authorities to exercise 
their  oversight  functions  and  their  engagement  with  platforms.  Online  platforms  should 
have the necessary structures and procedures in place to allow them to monitor compliance 
with relevant national and EU laws, treating Member States equally.  

Member States have expressed support for enhanced coordination at EU level in this area, 
including  to  ensure  equal  treatment  between  Member  States  and  operational  follow-up 
when issues arise.  

Reinforced  cooperation  between  relevant  authorities  at  the  national  and  European  level 
including data protection authorities and media regulators should also be deepened.  

Online  platforms  should  further  enhance  the  transparency  and  accountability  of  their 
activities  linked  to  political  content  and  their  commitments  should  be  verifiable  by  third 

115 This also included cooperation between electoral experts and experts on Strategic Communication as regards 
disinformation. 
116  As  compared  between  the  Special  Eurobarometer  477—Democracy  and  elections,  November  2018,  and  European 
Parliament, The 2019 post-electoral survey. 
117  Findings  are  detailed  in  section  4.2.4.  of  the  staff  working  document  accompanying  this  Communication,  and  are 
echoed  in  the  recommendations  of  the  report  of  the  NATO  Stratcom  Centre  of  Excellence  report  into  the  role  of  social 
media  platforms  in  combatting  inauthentic  behaviour  https://www.stratcomcoe.org/how-social-media-companies-are-
failing-combat-inauthentic-behaviour-online. 

26 

 
 
                                                           
parties.  Access  to  digital  platforms’  data  including  by  the  research  community  remains 
insufficient. This can make it difficult for journalists to understand and report on the threats 
to the democratic debate and hinders efforts by civil society to raise citizens’ awareness and 
build social resilience. Platforms should allow increased access to data by researchers and 
other relevant bodies in full respect of data protection requirements including on the basis 
of  specific  structures  being  established  for  that  purpose.  This  includes  expanding  the 
network of research partners that platforms are currently cooperating with.  It is necessary 
to better analyse the scope and impact of interference on the democratic process including 
the  ways  information  travels  online,  the  algorithms  of  search  engines  and  social  media 
platforms  that  rank  information  and  the  efforts  undertaken  by  platforms  to  promote 
authentic content. 

A  free,  plural  and  accountable  media  landscape  and  the  availability  of  quality  public 
information  are  preconditions  to  a  healthy  and  informed  political  debate  and  to  allow 
citizens confronted with disinformation and other manipulation to make informed decisions 
as well as to hold power to account. This is an essential part of the democratic checks and 
balances and a prerequisite for healthy democratic discourse.118  

Looking  ahead,  more  efforts  need  to  be  invested  in  supporting  citizens’  empowerment, 
awareness-raising and media literacy and in developing skills, in citizens of all ages. 

The Commission will continue to support Member States in their efforts. In particular,  the 
Commission will: 

 

fund  action  grants  to  support  national  elections  networks  and  other  actions  to 
strengthen democratic resilience;119  

  support enhanced cooperation among Member States, making best use of the recently 
established European Cooperation Network on Elections and ensuring close interaction 
and cooperation with other networks including the Rapid Alert System, including by: 

-  practical,  operational  activities,  including  workshops  and  risk  assessments  to 

support the better identification of threats; 
fostering  cooperation  between  Member  States  in  monitoring  relevant  activities 
linked  to  online  platforms, 
information  about 
engagement  with  platforms  and  supporting  equal  treatment  among  all  Member 
States; 
facilitating  further  and  ongoing  cooperation  between  the  European  Cooperation 

including  through  sharing 

- 

- 

118  This  finding  is  echoed  the  Commission’s  engagement  with  civil  society  and  wider  stakeholders,  for  instance  in  the 
conclusions successive Commission Colloquiums on Fundamental Rights (in 2016 on "Media Pluralism and Democracy", in 
2017 on "Women's rights in turbulent times" and in 2018 on “Democracy in Europe”). See also for instance the findings 
regarding the impact of online threats to media actors on free elections, in UNESCO ‘Elections and Media in Digital Times’ 
https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000371486.locale=en  
119 https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/portal/screen/opportunities/topic-details/rec-rcit-citi-ag-
2020  

27 

 
 
                                                           
Network  on  Elections, ERGA  and the  Rapid  Alert  System,  including on  insights  and 
analysis relevant to the electoral context and interactions with online platforms; 
-  enhancing cooperation with other structures such as the European Data Protection 
Board and ENISA and the Cooperation Group established under the Directive on the 
security of Network and Information Systems (NIS Cooperation Group);120 
supporting Member  States  to  maintain  and extend the  mapping  of  the regulatory 
context relevant to elections. 

- 

  continue to engage with the online platforms, including in the context of the code of 
practice on disinformation and the  Code of Conduct on countering illegal hate speech 
online  and  contribute,  together  with  the  relevant  parties  such  as  the  European 
Cooperation  Network  on  Elections,  the  Rapid  Alert  System  and  other  relevant  EU 
networks  to  the  development  of  further  measures  aiming  at  a  joint  approach  and 
common standards to tackle issues such as disinformation and online hate messages; 

 

 

 

further  support  media  freedom,  media  pluralism  and  quality  journalism  including 
through better protection of journalists and in the context of the transformation of the 
media sector and the digital future; 

issues 

further  examine 
linked  to  the  effective  application  of  data  protection 
requirements  in  elections  including  transparency,  micro-targeting  techniques  and  use 
of algorithms; 

launch  specific  actions  to  further  empower  citizens  in  all  their  diversity  to  address 
issues  of  disinformation  and  manipulation,  critically  assess  the  information  landscape 
and take informed decisions (initiatives to support media literacy, critical thinking and 
education on EU values and citizenship).  

  strengthen the knowledge of the issues and risks at stake, including by:  

- 

In full respect of the applicable rules, respective competences and responsibilities, 
make  best  use  of  the  newly  established  European  Digital  Media  Observatory  to 
facilitate the link with fact checkers and academic researchers in Europe.  

-  A study on the impact of new and emerging technologies on free and fair elections, 
to  examine  how  using  data  about  voters  and  new  technologies,  including  micro-
targeting techniques, algorithms and artificial intelligence, can be used to affect the 
outcome of elections and public confidence in them. Results should be available late 
2020. 

  support a potential update of the Compendium of cyber security of election technology 
within  the  NIS  Cooperation  Group  working  in  close  cooperation  with  the  European 
Cooperation Network on Elections to keep the document up to date and adjust to the 
needs of the Member States.  

120  With  the  objective  of  operationalising  the  exchange  of  expertise  on  cyber  security  and  increase  related  technical 
capability. 

28 

 
 
                                                           
Upholding a strong and vibrant democracy in Europe is a question of legitimacy and trust. 
European  democracy  faces  multiple  challenges,  both  from  outside  and  from  within.  As 
announced by the President of the Commission in her political guidelines, the Commission 
will  present  a  European  Democracy  Action  Plan121  to  help  improve  the  resilience  of  our 
democracies  and  address  the  threats  of  external  interference  in  European  Parliamentary 
elections.  The  aim  will  be  to  tackle  disinformation  and  to  adapt  to  evolving  threats  and 
manipulations,  as  well  as  to  support  free  and  independent  media.  It  will  include  legal 
proposals on the transparency of political advertising and further clarifying the rules on the 
financing of European political parties.  

5. Conclusions 

Democracy is a core value of our Union. These values become all the more important in this 
period of exigency, hardship and uncertainty. The record-high turnout in the 2019 European 
Parliamentary elections was a clear sign of renewed engagement with European politics in 
Europe.  A  genuine  European  policy  debate  emerged.  Building  on  this  strong  turnout,  the 
Conference on the future of Europe will seek to encourage citizens to have a greater say and 
play an active part in setting our priorities and level of ambition.  

Europe  stepped  up  to  the  challenge  of  securing  free  and  fair  elections  from  interference, 
and  to  increasing  citizens’  confidence  and  trust  in  democracy.  With  the  support  of  the 
Commission  and  the  other  European  institutions,  Member  States  came  together  to  pool 
their  expertise  and  capabilities  as  never  before.  The  Covid-19  pandemic  has  shown  once 
again  the 
importance  of  such  cooperation  to  respond  to  disinformation  and  the 
manipulation of the democratic debate. 

There is still progress to be made on the inclusiveness of the European democracy overall. 
Not  all  groups  of  citizens  participated  equally  in  the  elections.  While  the  European 
Parliament  reflects  a  better  gender  balance122
,  there  is  still  progress  to  be  made  on  the 
democratic  participation  of  women,  citizens  with  disabilities,  younger  citizens  and  other 
groups. Mobile EU citizens encountered difficulties voting in certain Member States, some 
when trying to cast their vote for candidates in their home country, others when voting in 
their state of residence.  

Many examples  of  good  practice  to  support  the  participation  of  underrepresented  groups 
were  reported,  but  their  reach  should  be  extended  and  more  comprehensive  and  reliable 
figures  are  needed.  Further  work  is  necessary  to  remove  remaining  barriers  and  ensure 
inclusive participation. 

While  some  advances  have  been  made  in  increasing  the  European  dimension  of  the 
elections,  the  link  between  national  and  European  parties  remains  generally  unclear  for 

121 See Commission Work Programme 2020 https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/cwp-2020-publication_en.pdf. 
122  751  MEPs  were  elected  from  190  political  parties  from  28  Member  States.  61%  are  new  to  the  parliament,  60%  are 
men, and 40% are women (an increase of three percentage points compared to 2014).  

29 

 
 
                                                           
voters.  In  most  Member  States,  ballots  still  display  only  the  names  and  logos  of  national 
parties,  leaving  out  their  European  party  affiliation.123  European  parties’  manifestos  have 
also largely still not entered the mainstream political debate in the Member States.  

The elections saw increased awareness-raising activities by EU institutions, Member States, 
civil  society  and  other  bodies.  In  a  spirit  of  shared  responsibility,  the  Commission  and  the 
European Parliament joined forces in their communications activities. 

For  the  2024  elections,  the  Commission  will  continue  working  to  promote  high  turnout, 
inclusiveness  and  the  European  dimension  of  the  elections,  and  to  exercise  its  role  as 
guardian of the Treaties. It will strengthen its partnership with the European Parliament and 
the other European institutions to strengthen the European dimension of the next elections.  

The  tools  offered  by  the  Commission  to  support  the  exchange  of  data  to  prevent  double 
voting  and  the  related  cooperation  between  Member  States  worked  well.  Nevertheless, 
work  remains  to  be  done  on  this  topic  by  addressing  the  root  causes  of  the  difficulties 
Member  States  encounter,  including  as  regards  the  timing  and  content  of  the  data 
exchanged to prevent double voting. 

In  this  increasingly  digital  age,  our  open  democratic  systems  and  electoral  processes 
continue  to  encounter  new  challenges  to  which  they  must  adapt.  The  Commission 
intervened to address the risk of external interference from those who wish to divide and 
destabilise the EU. Unprecedented, coordinated action among the European institutions and 
the  Member  States  aiming  at  empowering  and  involving  citizens,  increasing  trust  and 
resilience,  raising  awareness  and  preventing  the  threats  to  the  elections  process  was 
established, including under the new European Cooperation Network on Elections. Vigilance 
was  high  and  considerable  online  activity  was  observed,  but  no  large-scale  coordinated 
attacks have been identified so far. EU citizens appear to be more satisfied with free and fair 
elections in the EU now than before the elections.124  

The  challenges  confronting  European  democracy  continue.  More  needs  to  be  done  in  the 
perspective  of  the  2024  elections.  The  Commission  will  present  a  European  Democracy 
Action  Plan  by  the  end  of  2020  to  help  improve  the  resilience  of  our  democracies  and 
address the threats of external interference.  

The  challenges  at  stake  require  a  comprehensive  approach,  which  respects  checks  and 
balance of democratic systems and ensures that all fundamental rights, including the right 
to  elections  by  free  and  secret  ballot,  the  freedoms  of  expression  and  association,  and 
procedural safeguards are respected.  

123 Article 31 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 1141/2014 of 22 October 2014 on the statute and funding of European political 
parties  and  European  political  foundations  empowers  European  political  parties,  in  the  context  of  European  Parliament 
elections, to take all appropriate measures to inform EU citizens of the affiliations between national political parties and 
candidates with the European political parties concerned. 
124 See footnote 11 above. Confidence in free and fair elections improved in 21 Member States between September 2018 
and June 2019. 

30 

 
 
                                                           
Dialogue  with  relevant  international  partners  will  continue  to  be  promoted  covering  the 
exchange of best practice for resilient electoral systems.  

31