REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL on Trade and Investment Barriers 1 January 2019 - 31 December 2019
Date: 2020-06-15
Institutions: Directorate-General for Trade and Economic Security, European Commission
Subjects: World Trade Organisation, common commercial policy, foreign trade, free-trade agreement, investment abroad, liberalisation of trade, market access, protectionism, third country, trade restriction

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 15.6.2020  COM(2020) 236 final  REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL on Trade and Investment Barriers    1 January 2019 - 31 December 2019  
 
 
INTRODUCTION  

The 10th edition of the Trade and Investment Barriers Report analyses the new barriers 
faced  by  EU  business  in  2019  and  those  removed  for  our  companies  in  the  same  year 
thanks  to  the  EU  Market  Access  Partnership,  which  brings  together  the  Commission, 
Member  States  and  EU  businesses1.  This  Partnership  identifies  barriers  that  EU  firms 
face  in  third  countries,  defines  a  common  strategy  to  remove  them,  and  follows  this 
strategy through.  

To respond to the rise in protectionism, the Commission has made enforcement – along 
with the sharper focus on the implementation of trade agreements – a top priority. With 
respect  to  the  traditional  market  access  element,  we  have  strenghtened  our  work  by 
improving  coordination  among  EU  institutions  and  stakeholders  and  a  savvier 
prioritisation of barriers. Importantly, the Commission has also improved communication 
efforts  to  explain,  especially  to  small  and  medium-sized  enterprises  (SMEs),  how  they 
can use the Market Access Partnership to remove the various barriers they face. This has 
benefited from our Market Access Days initiative, where in 2019 sessions addressed to 
companies were held in the Netherlands, Lithuania, Portugal, France and Latvia. 

Since  2016,  every  year  has  brought  improvements  to  the  Report.  This  year’s  edition 
benefits  from  a much more granular analysis of which type of barriers causes the most 
problems to our companies, and of a specific focus on the sector that has seen the best 
results, agrifood. 

As  in  last  year’s  Report,  we  first  analyse  the  total  stock  of  438  active2  trade  and 
investment barriers, per country and per type of barrier, as reported to the Commission 
and recorded in the EU’s Market Access Database (MADB)3. 

We then provide a detailed analysis of the 43 new barriers reported in 2019, describing 
specific  trends  in  various  countries  and  sectors  and  assessing  potentially  affected  trade 
flows. 

The next section identifies the tools used to address the 40 barriers successfully resolved 
in  2019,  and  provides  a  review  per  country,  type  of  measure,  and  sector.  This  year’s 
edition  offers  a  special  focus  on  the  Mediterranean  and  Middle  East  region,  explaining 

1 The Market Access Partnership was set up in 2007 to deepen cooperation between the Commission, the 
Member States and EU business both in Brussels  and in third countries. It works by means of monthly 
meetings  of  the  Market  Access  Advisory  Committee  (MAAC)  and  sectorial  Market  Access  Working 
Groups  (MAWGs)  in  Brussels,  and  regular  meetings  of  the  Market  Access  Teams  (MATs)  or  trade 
counsellors’ meetings in third countries. 

2  ‘Active’  barriers  are  those  that  are  being  actively  followed  up  in  the  Market  Access  Partnership  (as 

opposed to resolved barriers that have become inactive once resolved).  

3  In  place  during  the  period  under  consideration  (1  January  –  31  December  2019),  the  Market  Access 
Database  (now  being  replaced  by  the  improved  ‘Access  to  Markets’  portal)  provides  information  to 
companies  exporting  from  the  EU  about  import  conditions  in  third  country  markets.  This  includes 
information not only on trade barriers but also on tariffs and rules of origin, procedures and formalities 
for  importing  into  third  countries,  sanitary  and  phytosanitary  (SPS)  measures,  statistics,  and  specific 
export services provided to SMEs.  

1 

 
 
                                                           
how targeted efforts have helped eliminate some of the otherwise rather numerous trade 
barriers in these countries. 

This is followed by a section that delves in more detail into some of the most impactful 
resolved  barriers  and  also  elaborates  on  the  economic  gains  generated  by  our  Market 
Access Partnership in 2019 on the basis of economic modelling.  

Finally,  a  specific  section  is  devoted  to  the  relationship  with  the  United  States,  as  we 
continue to fight the significant barriers that have emerged in this jurisdiction. 

Throughout this Report, we have focused not only on partners with the highest number of 
new and resolved barriers, but have also put emphasis on barriers that affect most trade 
flows from EU exporters, shedding light on their significance. 

Box 1 – Methodological note on the inventory of barriers 

Our stakeholder-driven approach implies that our Report focuses exclusively on 
obstacles flagged by our businesses. The Report focuses on trade barriers faced by 
EU companies in third countries, related trends, and actions taken to remove them 
in the framework of our Market Access Partnership. While the database and this 
Report do not prejudge the (il)legality of the recorded measures, these barriers 
have all been identified as problematic for EU companies and prioritised for 
further action in our market access work, since they might be discriminatory, 
disproportionate or otherwise trade-restrictive. 

The reader will notice several important running threads throughout the Report. First, the 
continuing rise in the number of barriers, the multiplication of types of barriers involved 
and the increasing difficulty of removing many of them points to a new paradigm where 
protectionism  is  becoming  deeply  ingrained  in  our  structural  trade  relations.  Second, 
barriers  are  increasingly  affecting  sectors  linked  to  the  EU’s  technological  sovereignty 
and  strategic  autonomy.  Third,  we  find  that  it  is  increasingly  challenging  to  tackle 
barriers in the industrial and service sectors. Fourth, protectionist measures are spreading 
across specific regions. 

This  requires  a  radically  new  approach  to  defend  EU  trade  interests  –  one  of  the  top 
priorities of the von der Leyen Commission. 

2 

 
 
 
 
 
 
I. 

OVERVIEW OF TRADE AND INVESTMENT BARRIERS  

At the end of 2019, 438 active trade and investment barriers in 58 third countries4 were 
listed  in  the  EU’s  Market  Access  Database5.  This  record  figure,  together  with  the 
increasing  lifespan  of  a  number  of  barriers,  points  not  only  to  increasing  protectionism 
but  also  to  the  fact  that  protectionism  is  becoming  structurally  ingrained  in  our  trade 
relations with many partners. 

OVERALL  STOCK  OF  TRADE  AND  INVESTMENT  BARRIERS  PER 

A. 
THIRD COUNTRY 

Compared  to  2018,  the  top  five  countries  with  the  highest  number  of  barriers  have 
remained  the  same.  China  remains  the  country  with  the  highest  stock  of  recorded 
barriers,  with  38  obstacles  hindering  EU  export  and  investment  opportunities.  Russia 
came  second  with  31  barriers  currently  in  place,  followed  by  Indonesia  (25),  and  the 
United States (24). India and Turkey share the fifth place, with 23 reported measures.  

Other third countries with ten or more trade barriers in place include Brazil (19), South 
Korea  (19),  Australia  (14),  Algeria  (12),  Thailand  (12),  Mexico  (11),  Egypt  (10)  and 
Malaysia (10). Figure 1 provides a more detailed breakdown of barriers across the world. 

4  Algeria,  Argentina,  Armenia,  Australia,  Bangladesh,  Belarus,  Bolivia,  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  Brazil, 
Canada,  Chile,  China,  Colombia,  Dominican  Republic,  Ecuador,  Egypt,  Hong  Kong,  Iceland,  India, 
Indonesia,  Iran,  Iraq,  Israel,  Japan,  Jordan,  Kazakhstan,  Lebanon,  Malaysia,  Mexico,  Morocco, 
Mozambique,  New  Zealand,  Nigeria,  Norway,  Oman,  Pakistan,  Panama,  Paraguay,  Peru,  Philippines, 
Qatar,  Russian  Federation,  Saudi  Arabia,  Singapore,  South  Africa,  South  Korea,  Switzerland,  Taiwan, 
Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United States of America, Uruguay, 
Venezuela, and Vietnam. 

5 Tallying last  year's  measures (425 active barriers)  with 2019 figures (43 new and 40 resolved barriers) 
would yield 428 barriers. The difference resides in the fact that, to keep track  of barriers only partially 
resolved,  the  Commission  has  encoded  follow-up  active  barriers  as  of  2019,  leading  to  a  nominally 
higher number of barriers while not altering the underlying trends.  

3 

 
 
                                                           
EU 

Number of barriers 

Figure 16: Geographical breakdown of trade and investment barriers in the MADB 

6 Created using mapchart.net © 

4 

China38Russian Federation31Indonesia25United States of America24India23Turkey23Brazil19South Korea19Australia14Algeria12Thailand12Egypt11Mexico11Malaysia10Philippines8Saudi Arabia8South Africa8Vietnam8Canada7Hong Kong7Pakistan7Argentina6Chile6Israel6Lebanon6Morocco6Nigeria6Uruguay6Colombia5Iran5Japan5Switzerland5United Arab Emirates5Paraguay4Taiwan4Tunisia4Ukraine4Venezuela4Peru3Belarus2Dominican Republic2Kazakhstan2New Zealand2 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
B.  OVERALL  STOCK  OF  TRADE  AND  INVESTMENT  BARRIERS  PER  TYPE 
OF MEASURE 

Figure  2  shows  that  in  2019,  for  the  first  time,  border  measures  (229  or  52%)  are  more 
numerous than behind-the-border measures (188 or 43%)7. This is a sign that partners are 
resorting to a wider panoply of types of barrier to achieve protectionist goals. 

Border measures are restrictions that directly affect imports and exports at customs level, 
whether through sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures (102 barriers), tariff increases 
and  quantitative  restrictions  (73),  administrative  procedures  and  import  licensing  (38), 
export  taxes  and  restrictions  (16),  or  trade  remedies  not  in  line  with  international 
obligations (14). 

Behind-the-border  measures  affect  products  after  importation  through  restrictions  related 
to unjustified technical barriers to trade (TBT) concerning trade in goods (78), intellectual 
property rights (34), government procurement (25), services (22 barriers) and investments 
(15). 

Thanks to  the much more granular categorisation of trade barriers, we are presenting for 
the first time a disaggregated view of specific barrier types affecting our companies. 

7 The remaining 21 barriers (5% of the total stock), are classified in the category ‘other measures’.  

5 

 
 
 
                                                           
Figure 2: Breakdown of trade and investment barriers recorded in the MADB per type 
of measures, in percentage of the total stock of barriers  
(Border measures are in shades of brown, behind-the-border measures in shades of blue) 

Box 2 – The case of local content requirements 

Local  content  requirements  (LCR)  commit  foreign  companies  to  using  a  certain 
amount of goods or services produced locally. LCRs are embedded in many types of 
barrier,  affecting  e.g.  preferential  loans,  public  procurement,  or  conditions  affecting 
foreign direct investment (FDI). In order to identify these highly distortive provisions, 
the MADB has been improved so that the LCR componenent of any kind of barrier can 
be  readily  tallied.  Thanks  to  this  approach,  we  are  able  to  show  that  by  the  end  of 
2019, a very significant proportion (7%) of all barriers had an LCR component. This 
calls for attentive focus by the EU on these practices. 

6 

SPS23%Tariffs and equivalents and quantitative restrictions17%Administrative procedures9%Export taxes and restrictions3%others5%TDI barriers, subsidies and other competition distortions3%Investment3%Services5%Government Procurement6%IPR8%TBT18% 
 
 
 
 
 
II. 

NEW TRADE AND INVESTMENT BARRIERS REPORTED IN 2019 

Unfortunately,  the  increase  in  new  measures  continues  apace.  The  43  new  barriers 
registered in 2019 in 22 third countries8 were almost on a par with the 45 reported in 2018. 
This continuing and significant increase signals that protectionism has structurally become 
part of the very fabric of international trade relations. This new reality can have a profound 
effect on our trade flows. 

Trade  flows  affected  by  barriers  reported  in  2019  amount  to  EU-27  exports  worth  about 
€35.1 billion (see Box 3). 

Box 3– Methodological note on the quantification of potentially affected trade 

The  trade  flows  potentially  affected  are  quantified  based  on  EU  export  figures  for  the 
relevant  Harmonised  System  tariff  codes,  capturing  the  trade  that  happens  despite  the 
barrier. All quantitative data refer to the 27 current EU Member States. 

The impact is likely to be somewhat underestimated, however, because: 

- these figures do not include service barriers, or barriers where the product coverage is not 
easily identifiable. 

- some  goods and services affected by the measures may  be  enabling  elements  for other 
sectors of activity (the high-tech sector for example). 

More generally, analysis of non-tariff barriers and their impact remains challenging. The 
main reason is that non-tariff barriers are characterised by different degrees of restriction. 
Other than outright bans, most trade-restrictive measures do not fully eliminate trade, but 
reduce it. Moreover, restrictions regarding the same products or services may overlap. As a 
result,  additional  barriers  may  not  necessarily  mean  additional  impact,  nor  does  the 
removal of one barrier imply automatic improvement in market access. 

A. 

 NEW BARRIERS REPORTED IN 2019 PER THIRD COUNTRY 

Table 1 and Figure 3 provide an overview of the geographical breakdown of new barriers 
recorded  in  2019.  The  highest  number  of  new  barriers  were  reported  in  our  trade  and 
investment  relations  with  Saudi  Arabia  and  Lebanon,  which  both  registered  five  new 
barriers.  China  and  Algeria  follow  closely,  with  four  and  three  new  barriers  registered, 
respectively.  Two  barriers  have  been  reported  in  Singapore,  South  Korea,  Malaysia, 
Kazakhstan,  Egypt,  Morocco,  Turkey  and  Australia.  The  remaining  ten  barriers  were 
recorded for other third countries.  Looking at  the regional trends, we observe that a vast 

8  Algeria,  Australia,  Brazil,  China,  Colombia,  Dominican  Republic,  Egypt,  Hong  Kong,  Indonesia, 
Kazakhstan,  Lebanon,  Malaysia,  Mexico,  Morocco,  Pakistan,  Philippines,  Qatar,  Saudi  Arabia,  Singapore, 
South Korea, Taiwan, and Turkey. 

7 

 
 
 
                                                           
 
majority of the new barriers in 2019 was imposed in the Mediterranean and Middle East 
region9 (20) and in Asia (17). 

Compared  with  2018,  two  facts  stand  out:  a  contagion  effect  emerging  in  the 
Mediterranean and Middle East region, and the continued presence of China at the top of 
the list, highlighting a long-term negative trend. 

Table 1: Geographical breakdown of new barriers reported in 2019 

9  Nine  countries  of  the  region  were  involved  in  at  least  one  new  or  resolved  barrier  in  2019:  Algeria, 
Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar. Besides, Jordan and Oman 
have one barrier each, recorded in the overall stock of barriers as of 31.12.2019. 

8 

 
 
                                                           
Figure 3: Geographical breakdown of new barriers reported in 2019, per region 

Emphasising the economic weight of new barriers, Figure 4 illustrates the estimated trade 
flows  affected  against  the  number  of  barriers  recorded  in  2019  for  each  partner  country 
and  region.  It  shows  that  Asia  -  predominantly  China,  also  South  Korea  -  and  the 
Mediterranean & Middle East region  rank the highest  regarding both the number of new 
barriers and the magnitude of trade flows affected in 2019. These two regions account for 
almost €30 billion of the €35.1 billion of trade affected by new barriers (85% of the total), 
and for 35 barriers (over 80% of all barriers). 

Australia comes third, with one high-impact barrier for motor vehicles. 

Figure  4:  Number  of  new  barriers  reported  and  trade  affected,  selected  partner 
countries and regions 

Table  2  shows  the  trade  flows  affected  for  all  22  partner  countries  that  resorted  to  new 
trade  barriers  in  2019.  However,  the  assessment  of  the  economic  impact  of  new  market 
access barriers may not at times fully reflect the real impact of obstacles. This might be the 

9 

 
 
case concerning barriers in services or of horizontal nature, which are difficult to quantify, 
or when it comes to overlapping restrictions covering the same products. 

Table 2: EU-27 Trade flows affected by new barriers reported in 2019 by partner 
countries, (€ billion) 

Due to the sheer size of its economy and the key sectors impacted (including strategic ones 
for the EU), the implications of China’s trade policy are immediately apparent, potentially 
hampering over €15.5 billion of EU trade.  

B. 

NEW BARRIERS REPORTED IN 2019 PER TYPE OF MEASURE 

A breakdown of the 43 new barriers per type of measure shows a preponderance of new 
border  measures  (65%)  over  behind-the-border  measures  (28%):  again,  the  panoply  of 
protectionist measures used is increasingly wide.  

A key feature in 2019 is that SPS measures alone represent one third of all new barriers. A 
more  detailed  analysis  reveals  that  animal  health  reasons  are  the  most  frequent  (5 
barriers)10,  followed  by  plant  health  reasons  and  public  health  reasons  (2  each).  On 
occasion, SPS restrictions combine several of these features (4). 

Other border measures are primarily relative to increased custom duties, tariffs and quotas 
(7 barriers) and administrative procedures (7). This year, one new barrier was also reported 
in the field of export restrictions (1). 

Behind-the-border  measures  are  mostly  Technical  Barriers  to  Trade  (9),  with  also  some 
instances  of  intellectual  property  rights  (IPR)  issues  (1),  trade  remedies  not  in  line  with 

10 For SPS, new barriers were raised where third countries banned exports from the whole territory of certain 
EU Member States, instead of limiting restrictions to areas affected by the animal disease. EU regionalisation 
policy  was  not  recognised.  The  EU  has  worked  to  tackle  these  barriers  and  continues  to  work  on  similar 
barriers raised before 2019. 

10 

 
 
 
                                                           
international  obligations  (1)  and  impeded  access  to  government  procurement  for  EU 
companies (1). 

Figure 5: Breakdown of new trade and investment barriers reported in 2019 per type of 
measure, in percentage of the number of new barriers  
(Border measures are in shades of brown, behind-the-border measures in shades of blue) 

This breakdown points to the use of cruder, less sophisticated border measures to hamper 
trade.  Running  counter  to  the  longer-term  trend,  partners  appear  to  be  more  comfortable 
with  these  blatantly  protectionist  measures  rather  than  counting  solely  on  more  elusive 
behind-the-border measures, underlining that such behavior is becoming more structurally 
ingrained in trade policy for many of them. 

C. 

NEW BARRIERS REPORTED IN 2019 PER SECTOR 

The  new  barriers  reported  in  2019  affected  EU  trade  in  17  sectors  of  economic  activity, 
some of these sectors being touched by multi-sectors barriers. 

The  highest  number  of  new  barriers  were  recorded  in  agriculture  and  fisheries  (16), 
followed by 9  horizontal  or multi-sector  measures.  The  ICT and  automotive sectors both 
faced the emergence of three new barriers in 2019, while the pharmaceuticals and wood, 
paper and pulp industries each saw two new hurdles appear. Finally, several other sectors 
were  each  affected  by  one  newly  imposed  barrier  to  trade:  mineral  products,  iron,  steel 
and non-ferrous metals, textiles and leather, ceramics and glass, cosmetics, shipbuilding, 
wines & spirits and other industries. 

11 

TBT21%IPR2%Government Procurement2%Trade remedies, competition & subsidies 2%others7%Export restrictions2%Administrative procedures16%Import tariff measures, taxes and quantitative restrictions16%SPS -Multiple5%SPS -Other5%SPS -Public Health Reasons5%SPS -Plant Health Reasons5%SPS -Animal Health Reasons12%SPS32% 
 
 Figure 6: Sectorial breakdown of trade and investment barriers reported in 2019 
 (number of barriers) 

Beyond  the  number  of  measures,  the  analysis  of  trade  affected  sheds  more  light  on  the 
actual weight of each barrier. As shown in Figure 7, industrial sectors accounted for more 
than  85%  of  trade  flows  affected,  while  barriers  in  the  sectors  ICT  (€15  billion), 
automotive  (€5.7  billion)  and  electronics  (€2.6  billion)  make  two  thirds  of  all  EU27 
exports  affected  by  new  reported  barriers.  These  are  sectors  which  are  directly  linked  to 
the EU’s technological sovereignty and strategic autonomy. 

 Figure 7: EU-27 trade flows affected by barriers reported in 2019, per sector11 
 (in € billion and percentage) 

11 ‘Other’ includes the following sectors: ceramics and glass, chemicals, construction industry, wines & 
spirits, textiles and leather, iron, steel and non-ferrous metals, and other industries. 

12 

 
                                                           
Protectionist  trends  affecting  our  high-tech  sectors,  already  spotted  last  year,  continue 
unabated in 2019. If not effectively addressed, these barriers constitute an objective threat 
not  only  to  the  competitiveness  of  EU  firms,  but  to  the  EU’s  position  as  a  global 
technological leader.  

13 

 
 
 
III.  QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF NEW BARRIERS REPORTED IN 2019 

A.  CHINA 

In  2019,  China  has  continued  to  introduce  numerous  trade  restrictions  in  high-tech 
industries,  whose  impact  ripples  across  many  other  sectors  –  the  €15  billion  of  trade 
potentially  affected  thus  underestimates  the  size  of  this  barrier.  These  measures,  like  the 
previous ones related to implementing China’s cybersecurity policies, are closely aligned 
with  China’s  other  policy  objectives  of  protecting  the  domestic  market  and  developing 
capacity and technologies under the Made in China 2025 strategy. There are no immediate 
signs of this trend subsiding in the near future.  

The  Draft  for  Cybersecurity  Review  Mechanism  was  published  in  May  2019.  Under 
this  draft,  commercial  contracts  could  be  made  conditional  on  the  affected  party 
successfully  passing  the  review.  As  the  draft  does  not  indicate  what  type  of  information 
and material will be subject to review and inspection, strong provisions would be needed 
to  ensure  full  protection  of  intellectual  property  rights  and  avoid  transfer  of  business 
sensitive information. 

Draft  Measures  on  the  Security  Assessment  of  the  Cross-Border  Transfer  of  Personal 
Information  and  Administrative  Measures  on  Data  Security  were  published  in  June 
2019. The Measures appear to go beyond their own legal basis in the Cybersecurity Law 
(CSL) when they would extend the scope of data localisation requirement. Furthermore, it 
is  not  clear  how  data  transfers  within  a  single  (multinational)  business  group  would  be 
treated. The key provisions in the drafts remain vague and it is not clear how the proposed 
measures would apply in relation to other measures/guidelines/standards applying to data. 

Market access in telecom networks in China is a growing and significant concern for the 
EU, as 5th-generation (5G) networks are rolled out. Based on the information available of 
the early tendering results,  outcomes overwhelmingly  favour Chinese network providers. 
These results do not seem to reflect the competitive position of EU vendors, indicating the 
existence of harmful market access barriers in this sector. 

In  2019,  China  Shipbuilding  Group  was  created  using  state  subsidies  and  local  content 
requirements.  In  line  with  the  ‘Made  in  China  2025’  plan,  China’s  goal  is  to  become 
dominant in the field of high-tech ships and marine equipment. 

In the SPS area, China has restrictions in place on ash wood products (logs and lumber) 
from Europe due to the risk of the ash dieback fungus in Europe. The restriction of imports 
has no clear phytosanitary rationale and effective risk mitigation measures are available. 

The EU is  closely following the application of the  social credit system in  the economic 
sphere. The implementation of the social credit system aims at a unified system assigning 
a  score  to  each  individual  and  each  business.  While  still  being  developed,  this  could 
become a formidable and horizontal market access barrier for EU companies as businesses 
might  face  challenges  to  comply  with  a  heightened  regulatory  scrutiny  and  with  some 
rating  requirements  going  beyond  regulatory  scrutiny.  All  the  more  so  as  these 
requirements  may  be  (even  just  de  facto)  more  difficult  to  fulfil  for  foreign  companies. 
The social credit system could also have repercussions beyond trade. 

14 

 
 
 
Box 4 – China backgrounder: a systemic rival and economic competitor 

Across the EU, the perception of China has changed, with increasing awareness of the 
challenges posed by China and its state-led model and the lack of a level playing field in 
economic  relations.  This  was  reflected 
the  Joint  (Commission  and  High 
Representative)  Communication  adopted  on  12  March  2019,  which  for  the  first  time 
referred to China as a ‘systemic rival and an economic competitor’. The Communication 
proposed concrete actions to  rebalance our relationship with  China, through  continued 
engagement  but  also  through  domestic  actions  (including  reviving  the  International 
framework  and 
Procurement 
implementing  the  FDI  screening  mechanism).  Work  to  implement  the  10  actions 
identified in the Communication is ongoing across the Commission. 

identifying  gaps 

Instrument, 

regulatory 

in  our 

in 

At  the  EU-China  Summit  in  Brussels  on  9  April  2019,  the  Joint  Statement  included 
important commitments on the reform of the World Trade Organization (WTO) (i.e. on 
strengthening  rules  on  industrial  subsidies),  as  well  as  on  making  decisive  progress  in 
the  Comprehensive  Agreement  on  Investment  negotiations  in  2019,  with  a  view  to 
concluding  them  in  2020,  and  on  seeking  faster  progress  for  China  to  join  the  WTO 
Agreement  on  Government  Procurement  (GPA).  Importantly,  the  Joint  Statement 
explicitly called for concrete results in barrier removal.  

B.  MEDITERRANEAN AND MIDDLE EAST REGION 

The  geographic  proximity,  historical  ties  and  interconnected  value  chains  with  the  EU, 
involving  in  many  cases  SMEs,  make  frictionless  trade  with  this  region  particularly 
important.  As  already  reported  in  2018,  unfortunately,  the  region  saw  rising  trends  of 
protectionism  driven  by  economic  instability  or  structural  problems.  New  measures 
appeared  again  in  Algeria,  and  protectionist  attitudes  spread  to  Lebanon  and  Morocco, 
while they also intensified in Turkey and Saudi Arabia12. 

1.  Algeria  

Since  2015,  the  Algerian  authorities  have  introduced  a  significant  number  of  import 
restrictive  measures  with  a  very  negative  impact  on  EU  exports  and  in  breach  of  their 
obligations under the bilateral Association Agreement. This trend continued in 2019, with 
three new barriers introduced. 

In  September  2019,  on  top  of  earlier  trade  restrictive  measures,  the  authorities  issued 
instructions  to  commercial  banks  to  the  effect  that  letters  of  credit  for  certain  imports 
(mobile  phones,  kits  for  home  appliances)  may  only  be  issued  subject  to  cumbersome 
conditions. The same circular provided that these rules would be extended to all imports 
by the end of 2019. Thanks to coordinated action by all EU stakeholders (see Box 8), new 
circulars were issued on 25 December 2019 by the competent authorities introducing some 
flexibilities in the application of these measures.  

12 As will be shown in subsequent sections, some of these barriers have been successfully resolved in the past 

year. 

15 

 
 
                                                           
A special custom surcharge (DAPS) was applied by a decree signed by the Minister of 
Trade in January 2019 to a wide list of goods (between 30% and 200% of the value of the 
goods).  The  list  can  change  frequently  according  to  the  evolving  needs  of  domestic 
industry. 

In  May  2019,  the  Algerian  Ministry  of  Industry  told  carmakers  conducting  assembling 
operations in the country that a value-based quota on the import of car parts would be 
established  without  notice  and  with  retroactive  effect.  The  decision  may  cause  the 
interruption of assembling operations for lack of parts. 

2.  Morocco  

The  EU  has  been  closely  monitoring  the  situation  to  assess  the  actual  impact  of  the 
introduction of the conformity-marking requirement on EU exports. At our initiative, a 
constructive dialogue took place between the EU and Moroccan experts, following which 
the Moroccan authorities engaged in clarifying the application of the requirements for EU 
operators, addressing a large part of their market access concerns. Other issues such as the 
new  requirements  for  pharmaceutical  products  and  the  externalisation  of  conformity 
assessment procedures were also addressed in these meetings. 

3.  Lebanon 

Against a backdrop of socio-economic, financial and political crisis, new trade barriers had 
been  introduced,  notably  the  temporary  duty  of  3%  on  almost  all  imports  and 
additional duties (ranging from 7% to 20%) on imports of some selected products such 
as  marble,  canned  food  or  furniture.  A  mandatory  requirement  for  registration  of 
factories  for  certain  products  including  textiles  was  also  established,  and  the  Lebanese 
authorities did not take corrective action in 2019 on a measure that would impose customs 
duties on imports from the EU of oil/petroleum products. 

A new horizontal measure on the legalisation of invoices also added one additional barrier 
to market access. These measures have been subject to intense discussions and exchanges 
of  letters  with  Lebanese  authorities.  Lebanon  eventually  removed  the  double  customs 
certification  requirement  for  imports,  introduced  in  2019,  about  which  the  EU  had 
repeatedly expressed concerns. 

4.  Turkey  

In 2019, the additional duties applied by Turkey seriously disturbed the functioning of the 
Customs  Union,  as  they  forced  EU  producers  to  submit  certificates  of  origin.  Turkey 
continued  to  extend  these  duties  to  more  products,  leading  to  a  sharp  rise  in  such 
certificates  issued  by  responsible  authorities,  which  represents  a  direct  cost  as  well  as 
significant uncertainty for all operators concerned. 

In April 2019, Turkey reintroduced the export restriction on copper scrap. The current 
application  of  the  export-licensing  regime  amounts  to  a  de  facto  ban  as  the  conditions 
required are difficult to fulfil and not in line with Turkish obligations under the Customs 
Union. 

Another newly introduced barrier concerned an amendment to the Cosmetics Regulation 
that  would  move  the  framework  of  the  Turkish  cosmetic  regulatory  system  from  an  in-
market  control  to  a  pre-registration  system.  A  detailed  safety  assessment  –  including  the 
disclosure of sensitive data  –  was  even  required  in  order to  market  cosmetic products in 
Turkey. This runs counter to Turkey’s obligations under the Customs Union agreement. 

16 

 
Box 5 – Turkey backgrounder 

In  2019,  Turkey  remained  the  EU’s  fifth-largest  trading  partner  overall,  while  the  EU 
remains  by  far  Turkey’s  most  important  trading  partner.  In  particular,  the  entry  into 
force  in  1996  of  the  EU-Turkey  Customs  Union  agreement  has  led  to  a  substantial 
increase  in  trade  between  the  EU  and  Turkey  over  previous  decades.  This  agreement 
ensures  the  free  movement  of  all  industrial  goods  and  certain  processed  agricultural 
products between the EU and Turkey. It also requires Turkey’s alignment with the EU’s 
external  customs  tariffs  and  rules  for  imports  from  third  countries,  as  well  as  with 
commercial  policy,  competition  policy,  intellectual  property  rights  and  EU  technical 
legislation  related  to  the  scope  of  the  Customs  Union.  Problems  have  started  to 
accumulate in recent  years. The Commission of course continues to insist on Turkey’s 
compliance  with  the  agreed  Customs  Union  rules  and  the  non-discriminatory 
implementation  of  the  Additional  Protocol  to  the  Association  Agreement  towards  all 
Member States, including the Republic of Cyprus. 

In  2019,  the  Commission  continued  to  make  use  of  all  means  available  to  raise  these 
concerns, including at the Customs Union Joint Committee and other bilateral meetings. 
Regarding  the  continued  Turkish  policy  of  forced  localisation  in  the  pharmaceutical 
sector, the EU launched a WTO case for the first time ever against a candidate country.  

5.  Saudi Arabia 

In  Saudi  Arabia,  EU  companies  face  numerous  market  access  trade  barriers,  such  as  the 
procedure  for  acquiring  the  Saudi  Quality  Marks  (in  particular  for  ceramic  tiles).  New 
SPS  import  conditions  for  EU  fruit  and  vegetable  exports  also  create  unnecessary 
administrative  burdens  and  costs.  These  barriers  are  systematically  raised  by  the 
Commission  at  the  WTO  and  in  bilateral  contacts  with  Saudi  Arabia,  and  remain  key 
issues on the agenda of the EU-Gulf Cooperation Council trade and investment dialogue. 

Thanks to  swift interventions before entry into force, two draft technical regulations that 
emerged as new barriers in 2019were solved within the same year, related respectively to 
added  sugar  upper  limits  in  some  food  products,  and  to  traffic  light  labelling.  While 
partial progress was recorded for certain Member States in 2019, Saudi Arabia continues 
to  impose  temporary  country-wide  bans  on  the  import  of  live  animals  in  cases  of 
animal disease outbreaks, not following the OIE13 international standards.  

C.  AUSTRALIA 

Australia’s fuel quality is among the worst in the OECD, and ranked 70th in the world. In 
particular, the sulphur content of unleaded gasoline is currently 15 times the EU standard. 
This  poor-quality  fuel  is  in  fact  incompatible  with  the  latest,  high-efficiency  Euro  6 
engines,  meaning  some  EU  manufacturers  have  had  to  de-tune  engines,  or  even  replace 
engines of some models with older, more polluting standards. 

13  

World Organisation for Animal Health, which uses its historical acronym OIE (‘Office International 
des Epizooties’) 

17 

 
 
                                                           
The standards were due to expire in 2019, but the Australian government has no concrete 
plans to address fuel efficiency. This appears to be connected to the cost associated with 
upgrading  Australia’s  gasoline-refining  capacity  to  the  standard  required.  The  relevant 
industry  does  not  seem  willing  to  make  this  investment  in  the  absence  of  government 
support.  

D.  SOUTH KOREA 

Since early 2019, EU suppliers of ballast water management systems have encountered 
a  new  barrier  due  to  lack  of  recognition  of  tests  performed  outside  Korea  as  part  of  the 
type approval process for the installation of such systems on Korean-flagged vessels. Since 
all  new  vessels  from  September  2018  have  to  be  equipped  with  a  ballast  water 
management  system,  and  all  existing  vessels  up  to  2024  must  be  retrofitted  with  such  a 
system,  the  market  at  stake  is  very  large.  The  asymmetry  in  the  certification  procedures 
between the EU and Korea has been raised bilaterally with Korea. 

Second, imports of baby garments have become increasingly difficult in 2019. A new set 
of  guidelines,  ‘Updated  safety  confirmation  criteria  for  textile  products  for  infants’ 
establishes  exceptionally  stringent  procedures,  yet  was  not  notified  through  the  WTO 
platform.  It  has  led  to  a  significant  number  of  additional  recertification  procedures  and 
testing, and to exponential re-testing costs. The Korean Customs Service agreed to follow 
up  on  written  comments  by  the  EU,  and  the  Commission  will  actively  pursue  the 
resolution of this barrier. 

18 

 
 
  
 
IV. 

TRADE AND INVESTMENT BARRIERS RESOLVED IN 2019 

A.  EU STRATEGY TO ADDRESS TRADE AND INVESTMENT BARRIERS 

In order to remove trade barriers, the EU’s Market Access Strategy resorts to a variety of 
tools. 

Tool 1: Diplomatic action. There is a stream of diplomatic work, where the Commission, 
the European External Action Service, the EU Member States and industry engage in close 
collaboration through the network of EU delegations and Member State embassies in third 
countries.  This  encompasses  a  wide  variety  of  activities,  ranging  from  technical  trade 
projects  to  formal  demarches  such  as  high-level  missions  of  Commissioners  and 
ministerial  and  presidential  actions.  Wherever  it  enhances  the  effectiveness  of  our  work, 
action is coordinated with like-minded partners. 

Tool  2:  Dispute  settlement.  Regular  WTO  committee  work  is  complemented  by  the 
Commission’s  robust  activity  in  the  context  of    dispute  settlement.  The  EU  has  also 
ensured  the  correct  implementation  of  WTO  rulings  by  third  countries,  vigilantly 
monitoring  that  these  rulings  are  properly  implemented.  The  launch  in  2019  of 
proceedings  with  Ukraine under the Association  Agreement  (wood  export ban), with  the 
Southern African Customs Union under the Economic Partnership Agreement (poultry), as 
well as the launch of WTO dispute settlement cases against Indonesia (export restrictions 
on raw materials) and the US (trade defence measures on ripe olives) demonstrate that the 
Commission does not hesitate to resort to bilateral dispute settlement as provided for in its 
free trade agreements, nor to multilateral dispute settlement. Furthermore, the Commission 
has made a formal proposal to strengthen the Enforcement Regulation14, which allows the 
EU to take certain countermeasures in case there are obstacles to the proper functioning of 
bilateral or multilateral dispute settlement. Finally, as an additional tool, the  Commission 
can also, at the request of exporters, make use of the procedure provided for by the Trade 
Barrier Regulation (TBR). 

Tool 3: EU free trade agreements (FTAs). Barriers detected via our market access work 
are channelled directly into trade negotiations, or – where FTAs exist – into the relevant 
implementation  mechanisms,  to  ensure  that  market  access  priorities  are  effectively 
addressed.  The  Commission  has  also  reinforced  its  implementation  and  enforcement 
efforts in order to ensure that businesses, including SMEs, can take advantage of existing 
commitments. The EU has the tools, and uses them effectively to eliminate trade barriers, 
improve the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPR), bring dispute 
settlement  action  and  impose  trade  defence  measures  in  cases  of  unfair  trade,  and  has 
improved coordination of these various pillars of its enforcement activities. 

Importantly,  our  Market  Access  Partnership  also  serves  as  an  early  warning  system  to 
prevent barriers even before they could occur. 

14  

Commission proposal COM(2019) 623, 12.12.2019 

19 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
B.  BARRIERS RESOLVED IN 2019 PER THIRD COUNTRY 

Thanks  to  the  combined  efforts  of  all  stakeholders  in  our  Market  Access  Partnership,  a 
total of 40 barriers were fully or partially resolved in 2019 in 22 different third countries 
and in nine sectors of economic activity, as well as horizontally. When accounting for all 
quantifiable barriers, EU exports concerned by the removed trade barriers in 2019 reached 
€19.4 billion for the EU-27. 

Figure  8  shows  third  countries  where  barriers  were  successfully  tackled.  Saudi  Arabia 
ranks first in line with five barriers resolved in 2019, followed by Egypt, Singapore, and 
Russia (three each). Two barriers were removed in Australia, Canada, China, Japan, South 
Korea,  Mexico,  Ecuador,  and  the  United  Arab  Emirates.  Ten  additional  trade  barriers 
faced by EU companies in ten other third countries were also removed in 2019.  

Figure 8: Geographical breakdown of barriers resolved in 2019 

Based  on  the  value  of  trade  affected  (Table  3)  of  removed  barriers,  the  most  significant 
obstacles  were  removed  in  China,  corresponding  to  a  share  of  63%  of  all  trade  flows 
affected,  followed  by  Saudi  Arabia  and  the  United  Arab  Emirates,  representing  roughly 
17%. It is worth noting, however, that trade flows in some countries or regions might be 
underestimated  here,  as  resolved  barriers  with  horizontal  product  coverage  are  more 
difficult to estimate. 

20 

 
Table 3: EU-27 trade flows affected by barriers resolved in 2019 by partner countries,  
(€ billion)15 

Even in the currently most  challenging of environments for trade, such as China and the 
Mediterranean  &  Middle  East  region,  our  strategy  can  yield  tangible  results  for  EU 
exporters, in particular SMEs active in the agrifood sector. 

C.  BARRIERS RESOLVED IN 2019 PER TYPE OF MEASURE 

Our Market Access Partnership efforts have contributed more considerably to the removal 
of  SPS  matters  (24)  in  the  agriculture  and  fisheries  sector.  Other  border  measures  were 
also  removed,  namely  import  tariff  measures  (3),  customs  administrative  procedures  (2), 
and export restrictions (2). 

Behind-the-border  obstacles  addressed  were  impacting  EU  businesses  in  the  form  of 
Technical  Barriers  to  Trade  (6  measures),  IPR  (1  barrier),  and  one  barrier  in  trade  in 
services was also successfully resolved in 2019. 

15  

‘Other countries’ include Egypt, Ecuador, Kazakhstan, the UAE, Canada, Thailand, Indonesia, 
Japan, Mexico, Moldova, South Africa, and Iran. 

21 

02468101214ChinaSaudi ArabiaTunisiaRussiaSouth KoreaAustraliaTurkeySingaporeOther 
 
                                                           
Figure 9: Breakdown of barriers resolved in 2019 per type (number of measures) 

In 2019, significant progress was achieved in removing SPS barriers. Conversely, types of 
measure that typically apply to industrial sectors or services proved challenging to resolve. 
This  calls  for  a  more  robust  approach  from  our  side,  as  well  as  increased  focus  in  the 
coming years. 

D.  BARRIERS RESOLVED IN 2019 PER SECTOR 

Figure  10  gives  an  overview  of  the  number  of  barriers  resolved  in  the  various  areas  of 
economic  activity.  Agriculture  and  fisheries  was  the  sector  with  the  most  measures 
resolved  (26).  These  include  the  SPS  matters  fully  or  partially  resolved  (24)  and  two 
technical regulations (notably, one on ‘traffic light’ labelling). 

The wines and spirits sector accounted for three resolved barriers, and the cosmetics sector 
for two. Individual barriers were resolved respectively in the ICT, communication services, 
textiles and leather, wood, paper and pulp, and iron & steel sectors. 

Finally,  a  total  of  three  barriers  were  also  addressed  that  were  either  fully  horizontal  or 
affected various industries. 

22 

TBT; 6; 15%IPR; 1; 2%Barriers to services; 1; 2%Multiple; 1; 2%Export taxes and restrictions; 2; 5%Administrative procedures; 2; 5%Import tariff measures, taxes and quantitative restrictions ; 3; 8%SPS -Multiple; 3; 8%SPS -Other; 4; 10%SPS -Public Health Reasons; 1; 3%SPS -Plant Health Reasons; 2; 5%SPS -Animal Health Reasons; 14; 35%SPS; 24; 61% 
 
Figure 10: Sectorial breakdown of barriers resolved in 2019 as recorded in MADB 
(number of barriers) 

Based on calculations of affected trade flows, Figure 11 displays the economic weight of 
the  resolved  barriers  in  the  different  sectors,  highlighting  that  their  resolution  in  2019 
could positively affect EU exports first and foremost the agriculture and fisheries sector, 
which  corresponds  to  72%  percent  of  the  overall  potentially  affected  trade  flows,  which 
corresponds to €14.1 billion. The wines & spirits (€2.5 billion) and cosmetics (€1.5 billion) 
sectors also benefited considerably from the removal of barriers. 

23 

 
 
Figure 11: EU-27 trade flows affected by barriers resolved in 2019, per sector16 
(in € billion and percentage) 

The  quantifiable  effectivness  of  the  EU  strategy  to  remove  SPS  barriers  and  to  grant 
market access to EU exports in 2019 stems from a multi-pronged approach. Aside from the 
measures mentioned under Section V, Box 6 below illustrates some success stories of such 
an approach. 

Box 6 – Solving SPS barriers – some success stories 

  Japan - agrifood 

Ban on imports of beef due to BSE17 

For over 20  years, Japan imposes a ban on imports of beef from  countries notifying a 
BSE  outbreak.  Such  measures  are  considered  disproportionate,  and  Japan  has  not 
provided a risk assessment based on science for justifying more stringent measures than 
the OIE standard. In recent years, dialogue with the Japanese authorities has led to the 
lifting of BSE-related ban for several EU Member States. In 2019, after several years of 
discussion, Japan lifted the ban on beef from Croatia  and accepted beef from animals 
above  30  months  from  Ireland.  The  new  bilateral  structures  set  up  by  the  EU-Japan 
Economic  Partnership  Agreement  open  further  possibilities  for  the  Commissionto 
request more tangible results on this issue with Japan and to lift remaining barriers. 
Country-wide ban in the events of outbreaks of HPAI (avian influenza) 

The  OIE  international  standards  on  infection  with  avian  influenza  viruses  define  the 

16  

17  

‘Others’ include ceramics and glass, chemicals, electronics, ICT, iron, steel and non-ferrous metals, 
wood, paper and pulp and other industries. 
BSE: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy. 

24 

 
 
 
                                                           
cases  of  outbreaks  for  which  no  trade  restriction  measures  should  be  taken,  and  those 
where  trade  restrictions  should  be  limited  to  the  defined  infected  areas  in  the  country 
concerned (rather than including the whole territory). Japan imposes country-wide bans 
following  outbreaks  of  pathogenic  avian  influenzas,  despite  the  EU’s  effective  and 
stringent  regionalisation  measures,  in  line  with  the  international  standard,  that  should 
allow trade to continue in all safety. 

Some progress was reached as hatching eggs and day old chicks from The Netherlands 
can  be  exported  to  Japan  from  free  zones  in  the  event  of  HPAI  outbreaks.  The 
Commission has a broader engagement with Japan, including in the context of the new 
bilateral  structures  under  the  EU-Japan  Agreement,  to  establish  mutual  recognition  of 
regionalisation measures related to animal health status. Tangible results on this project 
are expected within an acceptable delay. 

  Canada - agrifood 

Phytosanitary import conditions for fresh tomatoes 

In 2016, Canadian phytosanitary import requirements entered into force related to Tuta 
absoluta (tomato leaf miner) for fresh tomatoes, requiring that green parts of tomatoes 
are  being  removed  if  imported  from  a  country  affected  with  Tuta  absoluta.  In  2019, 
Spain was the first country authorised to certify shipments of fresh tomato fruit without 
green  parts.  There  is  also  interest  in  exporting  tomatoes  with  green  parts,  and  an 
application has been made to Canada with control conditions guaranteeing that trade can 
take place in all safety. This application is still under assessment by Canada. 

Unjustified  trade  restrictions  due  to  non-recognition  of  country  freedom  and  pest-free 
areas of EU Member States for the Citrus and Asian longhorned beetles (CLB and ALB) 

In  2013,  Canada  imposed  an  unjustified  ban  on  the  import  of  plants  with  a  stem 
diameter  of  more  than  10  mm  from  the  entire  EU  due  to  a  considered  trade  risk  for 
transmission  of  ALB  and  CLB.  Indeed,  these  pests  are  well-regulated  in  the  EU,  with 
stringent  control  measures,  and  consequently  trade  partners  should  recognize  the  pest 
free areas. 

In response to a Commission request, Canada recognised 21 EU Member States as free 
from  CLB  and  ALB.  The  Commission  continues  to  discuss  with  Canada  with  the 
objective to recognise also the pest free areas in the affected EU Member States. 

  Mexico - agrifood 

Fresh fruit and vegetable import restrictions 

EU  exports  of  fruit  and  vegetables  to  Mexico  are  impeded  by  import  protocols  that 
include  a  disproportionate  mitigation  measure  (cold  treatment)  and  pre-shipment 
inspections in the country of origin paid by the industry (preclearance). Mexico has not 
yet  provided  the  basis  of  their  risk  assessment  to  apply  this  wide  range  of  pests  and 
mitigation  measures.  In  addition,  the  list  of  measures  to  mitigate  quarantine  pests  for 
citrus, apples, pears, kiwis and peaches are numerous and cumbersome. Each product is 
subject to a case-by-case study, to allow its entry to Mexico.  

In 2019, progress on this barrier was seen when Mexico approved imports of pears from 
Belgium.  Mexico  also  notified  the  phytosanitary  import  conditions  for  kiwi  imports 
from  Italy (request pending since 2006) and, in the second half of 2019, published the 

25 

 
import conditions on its website, meaning that the market for kiwi from Italy is open. 

Long approval procedures for imports of meat of porcine animals 

Mexico  applies  long  approval  procedures  for  imports  of  meat  of  porcine  animals. 
Progress  has  been  seen  in  recent  years,  and  in  2019  the  Netherlands  was  allowed  to 
export  pork.  Mexico  has  also  committed  to  gradually  introducing  pre-listing  to  the 
authorised Member States, eliminating the need for future establishment audits. 

The  mirror  image  of  the  success  in  the  SPS  area  is  the  fact  that  industrial  and  service 
sectors barriers removed in 2019 affected a much lower amount of EU exports. This is the 
case not least in sectors like high tech which are essential for the technological sovereignty 
and  strategic  autonomy  of  the  EU.  This  indicates  that  protectionism  in  these  areas  is 
becoming  more  pervasive,  calling  for  a  qualitatively  different  approach  from  the  EU  in 
order to cement our position not only as the biggest trading block globally, but also as a 
global technological leader. 

26 

 
 
 
 
 
V. 

QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF BARRIERS RESOLVED IN 2019 

This chapter provides a more in-depth analysis of a selected number of barriers tackled in 
2019, focusing on the countries with the most significant trade flows potentially affected 
by  the  resolved  measures.  These  are  China,  the  Mediterranean  &  Middle  East  region 
(Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, Turkey, the UAE, Saudi Arabia), Russia, Australia, and South 
Korea. These partners  correspond to  98% of trade flows potentially  affected by resolved 
measures in 2019. 

A.  CHINA 

Certification requirements for low-risk food products 

The  draft  certification  requirement  for  low-risk  foods  was  proposed  in  2015,  and  would 
have  required  an  additional  certificate  together  with  the  official  certification.  Official 
certification or attestation of all products covered by the proposed measure was not based 
on  a  scientific  assessment  of  the  risk  presented  by  these  products  and  was,  therefore, 
disproportionate.  In  March  2019  China  stated  that  the  notified  certification  requirement 
was  being  suspended  while  a  multilaterally  agreed  solution  is  sought  in  the  electronic 
Working  Group  ‘Codex  Committee  on  Food  Import  and  Export  Inspection  and 
Certification Systems’ (CCFICS). 

However,  in  late  December  2019  China  opened  a  national  consultation  on  a  draft 
regulation  on  registration  of  overseas  producers  of  imported  food.  If  implemented,  this 
regulation would impose a very burdensome administrative registration procedure on EU 
companies  exporting  foodstuffs  to  China,  irrespective  of  the  risk  associated  with  the 
foodstuff.  The  procedure  would  create  bottlenecks,  acting  as  a  genuine  non-tariff  trade 
barrier. 

Longstanding and unjustified import ban on EU bovines/ovines and their products  

In  2000,  China  imposed  an  import  ban  on  EU  bovines/ovines  and  their  products  due  to 
bovine  and  transmissible  spongiform  encephalopathies  (better  known  as  BSE  and  TSE 
respectively),  and  only  since  year  2014  are  restrictions  slowly  lifted,  Member  State  by 
Member  State.  In  2019,  imports  of  beef  were  authorised  for  France,  Ireland  and  the 
Netherlands, albeit with restrictions on the age of eligible animals, on product categories 
and  on  number  of  establishments  authorised  to  export.  The  Commission  continues  to 
follow up with China, with the aim of lifting remaining restrictions for the three Member 
States  authorised  and  to  obtain  authorisation  for  all  EU  Member  States  interested  in 
exporting bovine/ovine products to China. 

B.  MEDITERRANEAN AND MIDDLE EAST REGION 

The EU stepped up its engagement in the Mediterranean and Middle East region in recent 
years to eliminate barriers (see Box 7). Consequently, in the last few years and notably in 
2019, several barriers were resolved or reduced. 

1.  Tunisia 

In 2018, a new restrictive measure imposing import authorisations on a very long list of 
products (clothing, cosmetics, agrifood, cleaning products, toys, textiles) was enforced by 
surprise, impacting €350 million of EU trade flows. These measures imposed de facto non-
automatic  import  licenses,  which  are  quantitative  restrictions  prohibited  under  the  EU-

27 

 
 
Tunisia FTA. The measure had not been notified to the WTO and also appeared to be in 
breach  of  multilateral  rules.  In  July  2019,  following  further  extensive  calls  urging  the 
withdrawal  of  these  measures,  the  Tunisian  government  communicated  its  decision  to 
cancel these import- restricting authorisation measures. 

2.  Egypt 

In 2019, as a result of close engagement, Egypt removed the requirement for  veterinary 
checks  of  live  animals  in  the  EU  prior  to  export,  promised  to  align  BSE-related 
requirements for meat with the OIE recommendations, accepted EU standards for most of 
the  requirements  for  seed  potatoes,  and  facilitated  the  procedure  for  importing  infant 
formula from EU Member States classified as ‘non-reference’ countries. 

3.  Lebanon 

After  several  interventions  concerning  the  planned  mandatory  registration  of  factories 
for  certain  products  envisaged  in  2019,  Lebanon  informed  the  EU  that  the  decision 
would not be implemented. Similarly, Lebanon removed the double customs certification 
requirement  for  imports,  which  was  introduced  in  2019  and  about  which  the  EU  had 
repeatedly expressed concerns. 

4.  Turkey 

Under  the  EU-Turkey  Customs  Union  Agreement,  imports  from  the  EU  with  an  A.TR 
document  should  in  principle  be  excluded  from  risk  assessment.  However,  due  to  the 
limited  information  available  about  this  procedure,  a  large  number  of  such  imports 
currently  need  certificates  of  origin.  This  represents  both  a  direct  cost  as  well  as  a 
significant  uncertainty  for  all  operators  concerned.  The  Commission  nevertheless 
succeeded  in  resolving  one  particular  barrier  for  a  category  of  electronic  products 
produced  in  EU  Member  States  and  that  were  included  in  the  Turkish  additional  duty 
scheme. 

5.  Saudi Arabia 

After  considering  the  EU’s  written  comments,  Saudi  Arabia  withdrew  the  draft 
regulation  for  an  added  sugar  upper  limit  in  some  food  products.  In  addition,  Saudi 
Arabia informed that the traffic light labelling, foreseen by the draft regulation providing 
for  nutritional  labelling  of  most  packaged  food  products  would  be  voluntary  and  not 
compulsory,  as  previously  intended.  Some  achievements  were  also  recorded  on  the  SPS 
front,  with  three  barriers  fully  or  partially  addressed:  unjustified  import  restrictions  of 
bovine  and  sheep  meat  due  to  BSE,  as  well  as  country-wide  bans  of  live  animal 
imports due to OIE notification of animal disease outbreaks, were lifted for some Member 
States.  Bilateral  certificates  were  established  for  exporting  fish,  crustaceans  and 
molluscs to Saudi Arabia, effectively reopening the market for approved operators. 

6.  United Arab Emirates (UAE) 

The Commission and the EU Delegation have made targeted efforts and resolved some of 
the most important market access barriers in 2019 in the automotive and agrifood sectors: 
new  approval  procedures  including  expensive  third  party  audits,  testing  and  labelling  of 
the products, affecting all individual car parts and  certain dairy products, as well as fruit 
juices. 

28 

 
As  a  result  of  EU  outreach,  the  Emirates  Authority  for  Standardization  and  Metrology 
(ESMA)  confirmed  that  instead  of  registering  and  testing  individual  car  parts  these 
expensive  requirements  could  be  done  at  group  level  of  car  parts.  This  dramatically 
reduced the costs and administrative burden. 

The UAE facilitated the imports of dairy products and fruit juices from the EU. ESMA 
recognised the EU food safety system so that these products do not need to be audited in 
Europe, but only approved by documentary checks. This has significantly reduced the cost 
of approval, as companies do not need to pay the audit costs of third-party certifiers to the 
EU. The UAE also recognised the EU approvals for food additives and pesticides, and so 
the EU business can refer to the EU legislation for any agrifood products.  

Box  7:  Mediterranean  and  Middle  East  region:  an  EU  playbook  for  barrier 
removal 

The EU used a wide swathe of instruments:  

Continuous  diplomatic  engagement:  formal  high-level  demarches  and  exchanges  of 
letters with the local authorities (Algeria, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia), high-level visits; 

Assertive  use  of  key  bilateral  meetings:  Association  Committee  meeting  (Tunisia), 
dialogue  in  the  bilateral  Trade  Sub-Committees  (Tunisia,  Egypt),  series  of  technical 
meetings (Egypt, Saudi Arabia), study trips to the EU (UAE); 

Action  coordinated  by  the  Commission  and  EU  Delegations  with  Member  States,  EU 
business, and when appropriate, including like-minded partners and local stakeholders; 

Raising  issues  consistently  at  the  WTO:  Committee  on  Import  Licensing  (Tunisia), 
comments  in  the  TBT  framework,  cooperation  with  other  WTO  members  (Saudi 
Arabia).  

C.  RUSSIA 

The political events of 2014 weigh on EU-Russia relations, including trade, where contacts 
are limited to the technical level and to exchanges in the WTO. The Commission continues 
to  defend  EU  interests  with  all  available  means,  including  through  WTO  dispute 
settlement  panels,  while  continuing  to  address  trade  irritants  through  bilateral  technical 
contacts.  

In this way, three barriers to trade were removed in 2019: 

-  Russia had put in place an export ban affecting raw hides and skins in 2014. In 
2019,  export  quotas  on  certain  categories  of  birch  logs  were  introduced.  These 
measures  complicated the access of EU industries to key raw materials.  After the 
Commission repeatedly  raised the issue at  the WTO Council for Trade in  Goods, 
the WTO Committee on Market  Access  and bilaterally, Russia did  not  renew the 
temporary measures, which lapsed in 2019. 

29 

 
 
 
 
-  Russia  had  put  in  place  higher  excise  duties  for  foreign  wines.  After  the 
Commission  repeatedly  raised  the  issue  at  the  WTO  Council  on  Trade  in  Goods, 
the WTO Committee on Agriculture and bilaterally, Russia adopted a measure that 
equalised the excise tax for foreign and domestic wines from 1 January 2020. The 
Commission remains vigilant as to whether the parallel new mechanism to refund 
the  excise  duties  does  not  unduly  disadvantage  imported  wines  and  therefore 
nullifies the benefits of equalisation of excise taxes. 

While these three barriers were removed in 2019, the overall trade relationship with Russia 
remains problematic, including with new sources of concern (see Box 8). 

Box 8 – Russia backgrounder – new concerns over horizontal measures 

In  2019,  Russia  continued  to  be  the  EU’s  fourth-biggest  trade  partner.  The  policy  of 
import substitution progressively deployed by Russia since 2012 largely coincided with 
Russia’s  accession  to  the  WTO.  Instead  of  sustained  liberalisation,  Russia  has 
progressively put in place numerous measures favouring domestic products and services 
over  foreign  ones  and  incentivising  localisation  of  production  in  Russia  by  foreign 
companies. Related measures often contravene the spirit and/or the letter of WTO rules 
and are the origin of many trade irritants. EU sanctions, and Russia’s counter-sanctions, 
also have (limited) effects on trade. 

A new reform of public procurement is ongoing, with the explicit aim of increasing the 
share of Russian goods and services in  procurement not  only by  governmental  bodies, 
but also by state-owned enterprises. This is a significant cause for concern for key EU 
export  sectors  such  as  medicinal  products,  medical  devices,  machinery  or  motor 
vehicles,  and  consequently  the  Commission  is  closely  monitoring  developments  to 
ensure that the measures are in line with Russia’s WTO commitments. The prospect of 
new  legislative  initiatives  in  the  area  of  unique  identification,  tracking  and  tracing  for 
many categories of goods are also a very significant source of concern and attract close 
attention from the Commission.  

D.  SOUTH KOREA 

Two barriers were removed in South Korea in 2019: one fully, for  cosmetics, the second 
partially, for bovine meat. 

Korea’s  National  Fire  Agency  wanted  to  classify  most  cosmetics  as  dangerous  products, 
leading  to  strict  storage  and  distribution  requirements  that  the  industry  considered 
unrealistic. The issue was raised at the EU-Korea Trade in Goods Committee meeting, and 
in February 2019, Korea excluded cosmetics from the scope of application. 

South Korea does not import beef and other products from EU Member States due to BSE-
related restrictions, yet resumed imports from other countries with the same OIE status as 
the EU. Korea’s unjustified and discriminatory measures have been raised with Korea in 
many bilateral meetings at different levels, as well as in the general session of the WTO 
SPS  Committee.  Imports  from  Denmark  and  the  Netherlands  were  approved  in  2019, 
partially resolving the barrier. Yet imports from other Member States remain blocked and 
the Commission is committed to swiftly lifting this unjustified, discriminatory barrier. 

30 

 
 
 
E.  AUSTRALIA 

Two barriers were successfully adressed in Australia in 2019, in relation to cosmetics and 
to steel testing standards. 

Australia envisaged amendments to the 2017 Chemicals Bill regarding the testing for new 
chemical  ingredients  of  cosmetics.  The  EU  Delegation  sent  a  letter  to  Australian 
authorities stressing the importance of ensuring alignment between the Australian and EU 
legal frameworks. The Industrial Chemicals Act 2019 was made law in March 2019, and is 
aligned with EU practice. 

Standards  Australia  (the  recognised  national  standards  body)  initiated  a  consultation  on 
four  draft  steel-testing  standards  proposing  possible  deviation  from  ISO  testing 
requirements  to  the  Australian  standard.  The  issue  was  raised  during  EU-Australia  TP 
Dialogues. In December 2019, the drafting process for ISO 17607 was abandoned. 

F.  IMPACT OF THE BARRIERS RESOLVED  

In previous chapters of this Report, we analysed the trade flows linked to barriers resolved 
in 2019 (see Box 3). 

In  addition,  the  Report  includes  the  results  of  a  more  refined  analysis  based  on  an 
econometric  assessment  of  the  increase  in  EU  exports  to  partner  countries  that  have 
imposed a barrier, after the barrier was removed. In order to do so, a regression analysis 
has been used to quantify the impact18.  

The  result  of  this  econometric  analysis  might  not  show  the  full  impact  of  the  Market 
Access  Strategy,  as  the  methodology  does  not  allow  us  to  include  complex  horizontal 
barriers  affecting  goods,  nor  barriers  beyond  goods  (for  instance,  services,  public 
procurement,  investment,  or  intellectual  propoerty  rights)  that  may  affect  directly  or 
indirectly a variety of products via trade and investment flows. 

Results show that on average the removal of this subset of barriers19 has generated tangible 
benefits for EU exporters. The estimates point to an average increase in exports of about 
60%,  after  removal  of  the  barriers.  This  implies,  in  value  terms,  that  the  removal  of 
barriers in the period 2014 to 2018 generated about €8 billion in additional exports for EU 
companies in 2019. This is in the same order of magnitude of the benefits of trade barrier 
removal  in  previous  years  and  is  comparable  to  the  expected  increase  in  EU  exports 
resulting from some of our trade agreements. 

18  More  specifically,  we  adopted  a  difference-in-difference  methodology  and  analysed  the  impact  on  trade 
flows only between the EU and the countries that had imposed the barrier on the specific products involved 
relative to a counterfactual (EU exports to the rest of the world, excluding the country that had the barrier in 
place). 
19  The  analysis  includes  one  hundred  barriers  removed  from  2014  to  2018.  It  does  not  cover  the  barriers 
removed in 2019 as  we  need  at least one  full  year of data  after barrier removal to establish the impact on 
trade. 

31 

 
 
 
                                                           
VI. A LOOK AT THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

The  EU  and  the  United  States  are  each  other’s  most  important  trade  and  investment 
partner, based on a historic commitment to open markets and representing the largest and 
deepest  bilateral  economic  relationship  in  the  world.  EU  and  US  tariffs  are  low  (they 
average 3% or less) and  our service markets  are comparably open. The  supply chains  of 
EU  and  US  companies  are  truly  transatlantic.  Also,  global  challenges  are  only  properly 
overcome when the US and EU work together. This relationship is now faced with a set of 
new challenges, however. 

In  2019,  trade  tensions  increased  following  the  imposition  by  the  US  of  tariffs  on  $7.5 
billion  of  EU  goods  after  the  WTO  ruled  in  favour  of  the  US  in  the  Airbus  case.  The 
Commission  expressed  regret  about  the  US  decision  to  go  ahead  with  the  imposition  of 
tariffs,  as  it  had  submitted  a  proposal  to  resolve  the  dispute  in  line  with  WTO 
requirements.  The  Commission  also  reminded  the  US  that  its  decision  to  impose  tariffs 
would  effectively  compel  the  EU  to  avail  itself  of  its  retaliation  rights  when  the  WTO 
arbitrator would deliver the Boeing award in the parallel case later in 2020. 

Regarding  the  anti-subsidy  anti-dumping  duties  imposed  by  the  US  on  ripe  olives  from 
Spain, WTO consultations took place in March 2019 but failed to resolve the dispute, so 
that  in  May 2019 the EU requested the establishment of a panel.  The duties are in  place 
since  1  August  2018,  and  are  depriving  the  Spanish  companies  from  access  to  the  US 
market. 

On a positive note, some tensions created by the US investigation into the national security 
dimension  of  imports  of  cars  and  car  parts  were  defused  when  the  13  November  2019 
deadline for the US  to  take measures  passed without  a formal decision by  the President. 
The  Commission  will  remain  vigilant  on  this  file,  as  the  EU  rejects  the  notion  that 
passenger vehicle trade from the EU could constitute a national security threat to the US. 

On the other hand, the pressures on transatlantic trade continued due to the imposition by 
the  US  in  June  2018  of  tariffs  on  EU  steel  and  aluminium  on  alleged  national  security 
grounds.  The  EU  has  adopted  rebalancing  tariffs  on  US  exports  to  the  EU,  which  it  has 
offered to rescind as soon as the US side is able to lifts its tariffs. In January 2020, the US 
expanded the steel and aluminium tariffs to certain derivative products; the EU reacted in 
April  2020  by  imposing  rebalancing  measures  on  three  US  products  (certain  types  of 
lighters,  certain  types  of  plastic  fittings  for  furniture  and  coachwork  and  playing  cards). 
The Commission notes that similar duties imposed by the US on partners such as Mexico 
and Canada were withdrawn in the course of 2019 by the US.  

The Commission also  expressed regret  at  the demise of the WTO Appellate Body on 11 
December  2019,  essentially  due  to  continued  US  opposition  to  the  reappointment  of  its 
members. It also noted that this represented a very serious blow to the international rules-
based  trade  system  and  to  the  fundamental  balance  of  commitments  accepted  by  WTO 
members  at  the  end  of  the  Uruguay  Round.  The  EU  shares  the  US  view  that  the  WTO 
system  needs  to  be  reformed  in  depth,  and  urgently,  and  this  year  proposed  an  interim 
appeal arrangement to those partners who are willing to continue to resolve WTO disputes 
in a binding and independent process with the possibility of appeal. 

The Commission maintains its concerns about two specific provisions of the US Tax Cuts 
and  Jobs  Act  2017,  the  Base  Erosion  and  Anti-abuse  Tax  (BEAT),  which  has  some 
discriminatory aspects, and the Deduction for Foreign Derived Intangible Income (FDII), 

32 

 
which may constitute a prohibited subsidy. In 2019, implementing rules for both acts were 
adopted by the US administration. 

The Commission took note of the bilateral and regional trade agreements signed by the US 
with  third  countries  in  the  course  of  2019.  The  Commission  considers  that  these 
agreements raise several concerns as regards the respect for multilateralism and global free 
trade rules. First, the Commission has doubts whether the limited deal reached between the 
US  and  Japan  on  agriculture  and  digital  trade  in  September  2019  would  meet  WTO 
standards  for  free  trade  agreements.  Second,  the  Commission  is  concerned  that  the 
restrictive  rules  of  origin  for  cars  and  car  parts  included  in  the  United  States-Mexico-
Canada  Agreement  could  lead  to  a  diversion  of  trade  and  investment  flows  that  will 
negatively impact global supply chains and increase costs for producers and clients. Third, 
the  Commission  is  concerned  about  the  ‘phase  one’  trade  agreement  concluded  between 
the US and China in December 2019, particularly by its large purchase obligations that are 
at odds with free market principles and the non-discrimination obligations of the WTO. 

The  Commission  is  concerned  about  the  final  rule  published  by  the  US  Department  of 
Commerce  (DOC)  on  3  February  2020  stipulating  that  the  DOC  may  treat  a  foreign 
country's  currency  undervaluation  as  a  countervailable  subsidy  for  the  purposes  of  US 
countervailing duty (CVD) proceedings. The Commission will monitor the implementation 
of the rule to ensure that free-floating currencies like the euro are not unduly caught up in 
US  CVD  proceedings.  The  Commission  is  equally  worried  about  the  initiation  of 
antidumping and CVD investigations launched by the DOC on 9 January 2020 regarding 
imports of forged steel fluid end blocks from Germany and Italy. The DOC investigations 
include  several  alleged  EU  subsidies,  including  for  the  first  time  free  allocation  of 
allowances  under  the  EU  Emission  Trading  System  (ETS),  as  countervailable  subsidies. 
The  Commission  will  follow  these  proceedings  with  a  view  to  ensuring  that  the  ETS 
principle is not called into question. 

In May 2019, the US activated Title III of the Helms-Burton Act20 and opened the way for 
actions  under  Title  IV,  in  breach  of  the  1998  EU-US  agreement.  The  administration  has 
started  to  apply  actions  against  EU  company  executives.  The  EU  reiterates  its  strong 
opposition to the extraterritorial application of US measures under Titles III and IV of the 
Act – such as the US refusal to deny entry to representatives of EU companies – which are 
contrary to international law. 

Finally, the Commission will closely watch the development of investigations launched in 
July  2019  by  the  US  into  the  French  digital  service  tax  under  Section  301  of  the  Trade 
Agreements  Act  of  1974.  Besides  its  general  concern  about  the  use  of  unilateral 
approaches  that  are  at  odds  with  the  rules-based  multilateral  trading  system,  the 
Commission  considers  that  any  trade  measures  should  be  suspended  to  allow  the  OECD 
process on a global digital service tax to be successfully concluded. 

Against this challenging background, the EU is fully committed to working on a positive 
agenda with the US to facilitate trade and investment, eliminate unnecessary red tape and 
deliver deep reform of the WTO system. The case for regulatory cooperation between the 
EU and the US is as compelling today as it has ever been.  

20 The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996 (Helms–Burton Act) is a US federal 
law  which  strengthens  the  US  embargo  against  Cuba  by  extending  the  territorial  application  of  the  initial 
embargo to apply to foreign companies trading with Cuba. 

33 

 
                                                           
34 

 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 

This  Report  gives  an  overview  of  trade  and  investment  barriers  directly  affecting  EU 
businesses,  as  reported  and  addressed  through  the  EU’s  enhanced  Market  Access 
Partnership between the Commission, the Member States and EU business. 

In 2019, the overall number of barriers kept increasing, a sign that protectionism has now 
become ingrained in trade relations with many partners. With 438 active barriers on record 
at  the  end  of  2019  in  the  EU  Market  Access  Database,  this  constitutes  a  qualitatively 
different trade context, requiring a paradigm shift in the way the EU pursues and defends 
its legitimate interests. 

The EU-27 trade flows affected by the 43 new barriers in 2019 are estimated to reach as 
high  as  €35.1  billion,  hampering  primarily  the  ICT,  automotive  and  electronics  sectors. 
These are highly strategic domains related to EU technological sovereignty. 

EU action to remove barriers was successful, with 40 barriers removed in 2019. Detailled 
econometric  analysis  shows  that  barrier  removal  work  generated  at  least  €8  billion 
additional  export  for  EU  companies,  a  figure  comparable  to  the  benefits  of  some  of  our 
FTAs.  

At the same time, most breakthroughs took place in the agrifood sector, while removal of 
key  industrial  and  services  barriers  proved  more  challenging.  This  also  calls  for  a 
reshaping  of 
to  ensure  barrier  removal,  enforcement  and 
implementation. 

the  EU’s  approach 

From  a  geographical  perspective,  salient  points  also  emerged.  In  2019,  China  ranked 
again first with the highest total number of barriers (38). And while two agrifood barriers 
were  removed,  four  new  barriers  with  major  economic  impact  in  strategic  sectors  (data, 
cybersecurity,  telecoms)  were  added.  The  Mediterranean  &Middle  East  region 
represents  almost  half  of  all  the  new  barriers  recorded  in  2019,  unfortunately 
substantiating the fears of increasingly virulent protectionism in this area of the world. The 
situation  in  Russia  remained  challenging,  while  three  barriers  were  resolved.  New  and 
resolved  barriers  in  Australia  and  South  Korea  contributed  to  the  2019  tally  and 
represented a sizeable share of the EU trade flows potentially affected. 

Finally,  after  the  large  increase  in  market  access  barriers  in  2018,  the  situation  with  the 
United  States  did  not  improve  in  2019.  While  no  barriers  were  resolved  in  2019,  our 
comprehensive efforts continue. 

As  illustrated  in  this  Report,  there  seems  to  be  a  paradigm  shift,  with  protectionism 
becoming  ingrained  in  trade  relations,  barriers  affecting  sectors  at  the  heart  of  the  EU’s 
technological  sovereignty,  increasing  challenges  in  addressing  industrial  and  services 
barriers, and barriers spreading across specific regions in a sort of contagion effect. This 
calls for a new EU approach to defending our interests as we stand up for our rights in an 
increasingly polarised and uncertain trading environment. 

35