JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS Tackling COVID-19 disinformation - Getting the facts right
Date: 2020-06-10
Institutions: European Commission, Secretariat-General
Subjects: EU action, access to information, consumer protection, disinformation, epidemic, freedom of expression, fundamental rights, infectious disease, international cooperation, social media

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION HIGH REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SECURITY POLICY Brussels, 10.6.2020  JOIN(2020) 8 final  JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS Tackling COVID-19 disinformation - Getting the facts right  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 

The  COVID-19  (‘Coronavirus’)  pandemic  has  been  accompanied  by  an  unprecedented 
‘infodemic’.1 A flood of information about the virus,2 often false or inaccurate and spread 
quickly  over  social  media,  can  –  according  to  the  World  Health  Organisation  (WHO)  – 
create confusion and distrust and undermine an effective public health response. 

This ‘infodemic’ feeds on people’s most basic anxieties. Social confinement has obliged 
millions of people to stay in their homes, increasing the use of social media including as 
means  of  access  to  information,  while  online  platforms,  fact-checkers  and  social  media 
users are reporting millions of false or misleading posts.3 Given the novelty of the virus, 
gaps  in  knowledge  have  proven  to  be  an  ideal  breeding  ground  for  false  or  misleading 
narratives to spread. 

Building  on  the  Action  Plan  against  Disinformation,4  this  calls  for  more  coordinated 
action,  in  line  with  our  democratic  values,  to  address  the  risks  for  open  societies.  Our 
common values and democratic institutions, including free expression and free and plural 
media, are keystones to the resilience of our societies to the challenges of the COVID-19 
pandemic. 

Responding to the call of the members of the European Council5 and EU Foreign Affairs 
Ministers,6  as  well  as  to  the  concerns  of  the  European  Parliament,  this  Joint 
Communication  focuses  on  the  immediate  response  to  disinformation  around  the 
coronavirus pandemic, looking at the steps already taken and concrete actions to follow, 
which can be quickly set in motion based on existing resources.  

It also highlights areas where the crisis has pointed to more fundamental challenges, to be 
further assessed as the crisis evolves and to form part of the wider approach to strengthen 
democracy, which will be set out in the European Democracy Action Plan, as announced 
in President von der Leyen’s Political Guidelines.7 Its aim will be to further strengthen the 
EU’s work to counter disinformation and to adapt to evolving threats and manipulations, 
as  well  as  to  support  free  and  independent  media.  The  upcoming  Digital  Services  Act,8 
regulating digital services, is part of this comprehensive approach. 

1   The  term  has  been  used  and  described  by  WHO:  ’infodemics  are  an  excessive  amount  of  information 
about  a  problem,  which  makes  it  difficult  to  identify  a  solution.  They  can  spread  misinformation, 
disinformation  and  rumours  during  a  health  emergency.  Infodemics  can  hamper  an  effective  public 
health  response  and  create  confusion  and  distrust  among  people’:  https://www.who.int/docs/default-
source/coronaviruse/situation-reports/20200305-sitrep-45-covid-19.pdf?sfvrsn=ed2ba78b_4  

2   Daily  media  monitoring  by  the  European  Commission  points  to  hundreds  of  thousands  of  COVID-19 
related article (https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/covid-19-media-surveillance?solrsort=ds_created%20desc) and 
millions of mentions on social media worldwide. 

3   https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/corona_fighting_disinformation.pdf  
4   JOIN(2018) 36 final of 5 December 2018. 
5   On  26  March  2020,  the  Members  of  the  European  Council  agreed  a  joint  statement  committing  to 
resolutely counter disinformation with transparent, timely and fact-based communication on their actions 
and reinforce the resilience of their societies. The Commission and the High Representative were asked 
to 
Council. 
on 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/43076/26-vc-euco-statement-en.pdf  

involved 

efforts 

report 

fully 

joint 

and 

our 

the 

be 

6   On  3  April  2020,  EU  Foreign  Affairs  Ministers  shared  concerns  about  disinformation  and 
misinformation and the need to continue fighting the negative impact on societies and people's lives and 
public  health.  They  emphasised  the  need  to  intensify  joint  efforts  in  the  fight  against  disinformation 
social  media. 
through  close  cooperation  between  EU 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/2020/04/03/  

institutions,  Member  States  and 

to 

7   https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/political-guidelines-next-commission_en.pdf 
8   The public consultation is ongoing: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_962   

1 

 
                                                           
EU actions against disinformation to date 

The European Commission and the High Representative set out their approach to counter 
disinformation  in  2018.9  The  Action  Plan  against  Disinformation  was  anchored  in 
European  values  and  fundamental  rights,  in  particular  the  freedom  of  expression.  It  set 
out a ‘whole-of-society’ approach, strengthening cooperation between key actors such as 
public  authorities,  journalists,  researchers,  fact-checkers,  online  platforms,  and  civil 
society. It built on the experience since 2015 of the East StratCom Task Force, set up in 
the  European  External  Action  Service  (EEAS)  to  address  disinformation  campaigns 
originating in Russia.10 An important part of the 2018 Action Plan was to urge platforms 
to  implement  the  self-regulatory  Code  of  Practice  on  Disinformation  they  had  agreed 
upon following the Commission Communication of April 2018.11 In March 2019, a Rapid 
Alert System was established to connect disinformation experts from EU Institutions and 
Member  States  and  to  facilitate  the  sharing  of  analysis  and  best  practice,  such  as  on 
proactive  communication  and  effective  response,  between  governments.  Another  key 
element  of  the  Action  Plan  was  increased  international  cooperation,  such  as  in  the 
framework of the G7 and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). In addition, the 
European  Commission  and  the  European  Parliament  have  developed  an  active 
communication policy and ‘myth-busting’, including activities at regional and local levels. 

1.  THE  KEY  CHALLENGES  OF  THE  COVID-19  INFODEMIC  AND  NEXT  STEPS  TO 

ADDRESS THEM 

The COVID-19 ‘infodemic’ has demanded a rapid response from the EU and its Member 
States. Disinformation can have severe consequences: it can lead people to ignore official 
health advice and engage in risky behaviour, or have a negative impact on our democratic 
institutions,  societies,  as  well  as  on  our  economic  and  financial  situation.  The  crisis  has 
opened  the  door  to  new  risks,  for  citizens  to  be  exploited  or  be  victims  of  criminal 
practices in addition to targeted disinformation campaigns by foreign and domestic actors 
seeking  to  undermine  our  democracies  and  the  credibility  of  the  EU  and  of  national  or 
regional  authorities.  Combatting  the  flow  of  disinformation,  misinformation  and  foreign 
influence  operations,  including  through  proactive  and  positive  communication,  calls  for 
action  through  the  EU’s  existing  tools,  as  well  as  with  Member  States’  competent 
authorities, civil society, social media platforms and international cooperation, enhancing 
citizens’ resilience.12 This work must be done in full respect of freedom of expression and 
other fundamental rights and democratic values.  

The following non-exhaustive list  of examples illustrates the complexity  of the situation 
experienced during the COVID-19 crisis:  

9   The 2018 ‘Action Plan Against Disinformation’ (JOIN(2018) 36 final of 5 December 2018) builds on the 
policy  approach  defined  in  the  Commission  Communication  ‘Tackling  online  disinformation:  a 
European approach’ COM(2018) 236 final of 26 April 2018.  

10   The  Task  Force  develops  communication  products  and  campaigns  focused  on  better  explaining  EU 
policies  in  the  Eastern  Partnership  countries  (Armenia,  Azerbaijan,  Belarus,  Georgia,  Moldova  and 
Ukraine). It also supports wider EU efforts aimed at strengthening the media environment in the region. 
It  reports  on  and  analyses  disinformation  trends,  explains  and  exposes  disinformation  narratives,  and 
raises awareness of disinformation coming from the Russian State and Russian sources. 

11   https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/code-practice-disinformation  
12   For  more 

response 

factual 

details 

EU 

on 

to 

disinformation 

please 

see: 

https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/corona_fighting_disinformation.pdf  
https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/countering-disinformation_en 

2 

 
                                                           
 

Information  circulating 
includes  dangerous  hoaxes  and  misleading  healthcare 
information,  with  false claims (such as ‘it  does not  help  to  wash  your hands’ or ‘the 
Coronavirus is only a danger to the elderly’). Such content is not necessarily illegal but 
can  directly  endanger  lives  and  severely  undermine  efforts  to  contain  the  pandemic. 
One  response  is  for  key  actors  such  as  public  authorities,  media,  journalists,  online 
platforms,  fact-checkers  and  civil  society  to  make  available  and  easily  visible 
authoritative  health-related  content.  Another  one  is  to  increase  citizens’  ability  to 
recognise  and  react  to  such  disinformation.  When  such  behaviours  are  illegal,  they 
should be addressed by the competent authorities in line with applicable legal norms. 
  Conspiracy  theories  that  may  endanger  human  health,  harm  the  cohesion  of  our 
societies  and  may  lead  to  public  violence  and  create  social  unrest  (for  example 
conspiracies  and  myths  about  5G  installations  spreading  COVID-19  and  leading  to 
attacks on masts, or about a particular ethnic or religious group being at the origin of 
the spread of COVID-19, such as the worrying rise in COVID-19 related anti-Semitic 
content)  require  to  strengthen  the  commitment  of  the  whole  society,  including 
competent  authorities,  media,  journalists,  fact-checkers,  civil  society  and  online 
platforms, and include for example prompt debunking, demotion, possible removal or 
action against accounts. 
Illegal hate speech (for example as a result of disinformation about a particular ethnic 
or  religious  group  being  blamed  for  the  spread  of  COVID-19,  such  as  the  worrying 
rise  in  COVID-19  related  racist  and  xenophobic  content)  is  subject  to  the  rules  on 
taking  down  illegal  content  by  platforms  and  authorities  and  to  action  by  competent 
authorities  under  the  criminal  laws  of  the  Member  States,  in  line  with  the 
Recommendation on measures to effectively tackle illegal content online.13  

 

  Consumer  fraud  (for  example  selling  of  ‘miracle  products’  with  unsupported  health 
claims) is illegal and needs to be acted against by consumer protection authorities and 
online platforms.  

  Cybercrime  (such  as  hacking/phishing  using  COVID-19  related  links  to  spread 
malware)  requires  direct  action  by  law  enforcement  authorities  as  well  as  citizen 
awareness-raising campaigns.14 

  Foreign  actors  and  certain  third  countries,  in  particular  Russia15  and  China,16  have 
engaged  in  targeted  influence  operations  and  disinformation  campaigns  around 
COVID-19  in  the  EU,  its  neighbourhood  and  globally,  seeking  to  undermine 
democratic debate and exacerbate social polarisation, and improve their own image in 
the COVID-19 context. 

Against this background, one of the lessons learned from this crisis is the need to clearly 
differentiate  between  the  various  forms  of  false  or  misleading  content  revealed  by  the 
‘infodemic’  and  to  calibrate  appropriate  responses.  To  this  end,  it  is  important  first  to 
distinguish between illegal content, as defined by law, and content that is harmful but not 
illegal.  Second,  it  is  important  to  determine  whether  there  is  an  intention  to  deceive  or 
cause  public  harm,  or  to  make  economic  gain.  Where  there  is  no  such  intention,  for 

13   Commission Recommendation of 1 March 2018 on measures to effectively tackle illegal content online 

(C(2018) 1177 final). 

14   Although disinformation  per se is not criminal in nature, some of its aspects could be related to crime. 
Europol  has  established  a  COVID-19  page  to  help  citizens  and  businesses  protect  themselves 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/staying-safe-during-covid-19-what-you-need-to-know  

15   www.EUvsDisinfo.eu  has  identified  over  500  examples  of  pro-Kremlin  disinformation  in  its  publicly 
available database, and the EEAS has described foreign states’ activities in its public analytical reports. 
16   See  for  example:  https://euvsdisinfo.eu/eeas-special-report-update-short-assessment-of-narratives-and-

disinformation-around-the-covid19-pandemic-updated-23-april-18-may/  

3 

 
                                                           
 
example,  when  citizens  share  false  information  unknowingly  with  friends  and  family  in 
good  faith,  the  content  concerned  can  be  viewed  as  misinformation;  by  contrast,  and  as 
defined in the Commission Communication of April 2018,17 the presence of such intention 
would qualify the content as disinformation.  

Influence  operations  by  third  country  actors  can  use  a  range  of  actions,  including  the 
techniques mentioned above, in different combinations. In that sense, disinformation may 
be  part  of  an  influence  operation;  often  other  actions  and  tactics  of  manipulative 
interference18  are  used,  such  as  the  amplification  through  manipulative  behaviour,  the 
coordinated  use  of  fake  or  inauthentic  accounts,  automated  bots  and  other  ways  to 
artificially boost the popularity of  content. Such coordination reveals  an intention  to  use 
false or misleading information to cause harm.  

A  calibrated  response  is  needed  from  all  parts  of  society,  depending  on  the  degree  of 
harm,  the  intent,  the  form  of  dissemination,  the  actors  involved  and  their  origin.  Thus, 
misinformation  can  be  addressed  through  well-targeted  rebuttals  and  myth  busting  and 
media literacy initiatives; disinformation, on the other hand, needs to be addressed through 
other means, including actions taken by governments, as spelled out amongst others in the 
Action  Plan  against  Disinformation.  Platforms  need  to  curb  coordinated  manipulative 
behaviour and increase transparency around malign influence operations.  

All of the above remedies should be implemented in full respect of fundamental rights, in 
particular freedom of expression. 

The experience with the COVID-19 crisis has shown that EU public policy could benefit 
from a more coordinated and faster response. A sound and effective approach to tackling 
these  challenges  requires  a  thorough  understanding  of  the  problem  and  evidence  of  its 
impact.  As  the  COVID-19  crisis  evolves,  the  EU  needs  to  further  develop  its  actions  to 
address  the  shortcomings  revealed  and  better  understand  and  anticipate  upcoming 
challenges. For example, disinformation and misinformation around a possible COVID-19 
vaccine  continue  to  flourish  and  are  likely  to  make  the  deployment  of  vaccines  once 
available more difficult. Coordination and collaboration with actors at both EU and global 
levels,  together  with  the  WHO  and  online  platforms,  will  be  essential  to  monitor  and 
effectively respond to these challenges. 

Building  on  experience  in  fighting  COVID-19-related  disinformation  so  far,  the  EU  can 
take  further  concrete  and  short-term  actions  to  help  empower  citizens,  building  better 
cooperation within the EU and with partners around the world. All EU institutions need to 
be engaged in a common effort and be complementary to Member States, bringing added 
value, such as their analytical capacity and access to platforms. 

These  actions  should  also  feed  into  future  EU  work  on  disinformation,  notably  the 
upcoming evaluation of the Code of Practice and the European Democracy Action Plan. 
The security dimension of the problem should also be reflected in the new Security Union 
Strategy. 

17   See footnote 9. 
18   Council  conclusions  on  complementary  efforts  to  enhance  resilience  and  counter  hybrid  threats 

(Document 14972/19 of 10 December 2019). 

4 

 
                                                           
2.  STRENGTHENING STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION WITHIN AND OUTSIDE THE EU  

Since  the  beginning  of  the  COVID-19  crisis,  clear  and  accessible  communication  and 
accurate  information  have  been  central  to  protecting  citizens’  health.  Aside  national 
information channels, the EU has played a role in this through its institutions, multipliers 
and  networks  in  the  Member  States,  in  its  neighbourhood  and  beyond.  The  work  has 
included effective pro-active communication efforts  to  promote verifiably reliable health 
information,19  inform  citizens  and  third-country  partners  about  the  EU’s  activities  to 
tackle the crisis,20  as well as to  raise awareness  of the risks of disinformation.  In March 
2020,  the  Commission  launched  a  specific  webpage  addressing  false  claims  related  to 
COVID-19,  promoting  content  that  is  authoritative  and  helping  separating  facts  from 
fiction, for example to counter narratives about the lack of solidarity in the EU.21 

Much  like  the  pandemic  itself,  the  ‘infodemic’  surrounding  COVID-19  is  a  global 
challenge. Since the beginning of the crisis, the Commission and the High Representative 
as well as Member States, have been working closely in international fora, such as the G7 
(and in particular its Rapid Response Mechanism) and NATO. The EEAS has also stepped 
up its efforts to address foreign influence operations, publishing regular reports analysing 
the  information  environment  in  this  respect  and  sharing  its  findings  with  civil  society, 
media  and  expert  communities.22  The  EU  Rapid  Alert  System  has  been  used  to  share 
information  and  analysis  to  generate  a  comprehensive  picture  of  the  information 
environment  around  COVID-19.  Europol  has  issued  a  dedicated  report23  and  is 
systematically  monitoring  the  impact  of  the  COVID-19  pandemic  on  the  cybercrime 
landscape,  providing  updated  threat  pictures  and  assessments  of  potential  further 
developments in this crime area. More broadly, the EU has worked to counter misleading 
narratives  such  as  the  EU’s  alleged  lack  of  assistance  to  partners,  with  targeted 
communication campaigns around the world. These also involved close coordination with 
the  WHO.  Given  the  risks  and  threats  from  foreign  influence  operations,  and  even  if 
action has been taken since the start of the crisis, there remains a need to further improve 
the EU’s capacity to deliver timely, consistent, coherent and visible messages to external 
audiences  globally,  with  a  particular  emphasis  on  the  EU’s  immediate  neighbourhood, 
Africa, Asia and Latin America.  

Actions 

  The Commission and the High Representative will:  

o  further  invest  in  their  strategic  communication  capabilities,  in  line  with  the 
Action  Plan  against  Disinformation,  stepping  up  cooperation  and  coordination 
with Member States. 

o  step  up  the  use  of  existing  mechanisms,  to  facilitate  concrete  cooperation  with 
Member States and international partners on strategic communication, including 
through the Commission’s cooperation channels with the Member States and the 
EEAS Strategic Communications Task Forces.  

o  a  special  section  in  the  Rapid  Alert  System  will  be  created  to  facilitate  the 
exchange  of  COVID-19  relevant  communication  material  between  the  EU 

19   For 

example 

from 

the  European  Centre 

for  Disease 

Prevention 

and  Control: 

https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en  

20   https://ec.europa.eu/info/live-work-travel-eu/health/coronavirus-response_en  
21   https://ec.europa.eu/info/live-work-travel-eu/health/coronavirus-response/fighting-disinformation_en  
22   https://euvsdisinfo.eu/eeas-special-report-update-short-assessment-of-narratives-and-disinformation-

around-the-covid19-pandemic-updated-23-april-18-may/  

23   https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/catching-virus-cybercrime-disinformation-and-

covid-19-pandemic  

5 

 
                                                           
Member States and relevant EU institutions. 

o  further  strengthen  strategic  communications  and  public  diplomacy  capabilities 
of  EU  Delegations,  working  closely  with  the  EU  Member  States’  diplomatic 
network and with third-country governments and civil society. 

  The Commission Representations in Member States will play a more active role in 
national  debates  with  fact-based  information,  tailored  to  the  local  situation,  in 
particular by using social media. 

3.  COOPERATING BETTER WITHIN THE EU 

Fighting disinformation, misinformation and foreign influence operations in  the COVID-
19  crisis  has  proved  that  cooperation  between  the  EU  institutions  and  Member  States  is 
essential to ensure consistency of message and coherence of effort. Further actions should 
be  taken  to  streamline  and  strengthen  capacities,24  25  improve  risk  analysis  and  further 
develop regular reporting. Cooperation inside the EU also needs to integrate the platforms 
and other key stakeholders such as for example national competent authorities, researchers 
and fact-checkers.  

An important step in ensuring that all initiatives are complementary is to raise awareness 
among Member States of the instruments available; the crisis has demonstrated that this is 
not  always  the  case.  There  have  been  attempts  to  better  coordinate  amongst  different 
actors, for example by cross-referencing the different web-pages dedicated to COVID-19 
disinformation, but they remain modest in comparison with the needs. 

Actions 

  The  Commission  will  propose  to  the  other  institutions  to  set  up  and  test 
mechanisms26 to improve coordination on COVID-19-related disinformation within 
existing structures and to share assessments and analyses. 

  Member  States  should  more  extensively  use  the  Rapid  Alert  System  and  other 
appropriate  means  to  strengthen  cooperation  with  EU  institutions  and  amongst 
themselves,  in  particular  on  information  environment  assessment  and  situational 
awareness.  

  Building  on  the  experience  gained  by  the  European  Cooperation  Network  on 
Elections, the Commission will facilitate the exchange of best practices on specific 
issues relating to disinformation, such as micro-targeting. 

4.  COOPERATION WITH THIRD COUNTRIES AND INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS  

Disinformation  and  foreign  influence  operations  around  COVID-19  do  not  focus  on  the 
EU  or  individual  Member  States  alone.  Third  countries,  international  cooperation 
frameworks and multilateralism more broadly have also been targeted.27  

Given  the  risks  and  threats  that  disinformation  campaigns  pose,  the  EU  has  started  to 
deliver  timely,  consistent,  coherent  and  visible  messages  to  audiences  globally,  and 

24   Such as the Council Working Party on Information, the Rapid Alert System, the integrated political crisis 

response (IPCR), the Health Security Committee and the Crisis Communicator's Network. 

25   See also the European Parliament resolution of 17 April 2020 on EU coordinated action to combat the 
COVID-19  pandemic  and  its  consequences,  also  calling  for  EU  action  against  disinformation  about 
COVID-19 (P9_TA-PROV(2020)0054). 

26   Such as regular contact group/weekly videoconferences. 
27   See for example EEAS Special Reports on EUvsDisinfo (https://euvsdisinfo.eu/)  

6 

 
                                                           
notably  in  the  EU’s  immediate  neighbourhood,  the  Western  Balkans  and  in  Africa.  For 
example,  to  counter  narratives  about  the  EU’s  lack  of  assistance  to  third  countries, 
communication campaigns were deployed in several countries, including in the European 
neighbourhood.  The  Commission  and  the  EEAS  are  also  coordinating  closely  with  the 
WHO  and  other  international  partners  to  ensure  maximum  visibility  of  the  delivery  of 
EU’s COVID-19 assistance and its positive impact on the ground, including through Team 
Europe. 

Furthermore, existing foreign policy instruments have already shifted funds to support to 
regional governments in tackling the crisis and took actions to debunk disinformation that 
can further fuel tensions and conflict, in conflict- and crisis-affected contexts including the 
Sahel, the Great Lakes region, the Horn of Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. In 
addition, the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights finances projects to 
support journalists, promotes fact-checking and the fight against disinformation related to 
COVID-19. 

Cooperation  with  the  G7  Rapid  Response  Mechanism,  NATO  and  others  has  led  to  an 
increased  sharing  of  information  and  activities  and  best  practice.  It  has  allowed  for  a 
quicker  exchange  of  information  and  opened  the  door  for  further  joint  activities  in  the 
future.  

Actions 

  The  Commission  and  the  High  Representative,  will,  within  their  respective 

responsibilities: 
o  work in partnership with the WHO to enhance its epidemiological surveillance 
through  effective  media  monitoring  and  to  promote  detection  and  response  to 
misleading and harmful narratives; 

o 

o  support cooperation and sharing of best practice in fighting disinformation and 
foreign influence operations globally, with  concrete  cooperation activities and 
support  programmes,28  building  on  existing  public  diplomacy  programmes29 
and awareness-raising activities; 
intensify the exchange of information with relevant partners from civil society 
and  the  private  sector  in  third  countries  on  situational  awareness  and  threat 
development,  inter  alia,  by  organising  consultations,  conferences  and  public 
events;30  
intensify  existing  partnerships  including  with  the  G7  and  NATO  and  extend 
cooperation  to  the  UN  and  regional  organisations,  including  the  OSCE,  the 
Council of Europe and the African Union.  

o 

  As part of the ‘Team Europe’ package of efforts to support partners in tackling the 
impact  of  the  pandemic,  promote  the  access  to  reliable  information,  fight 
disinformation, work with journalists and media and support initiatives to address 
disinformation and misinformation in third countries through EU Delegations and 
Member States diplomatic missions on the ground.31 32  

28   See for example the event “Disinfo Alert” organised in Tiblisi in 2019:https://euvsdisinfo.eu/georgia/ 
29   Which already support the civil society  with targeted actions to fight disinformation in third countries, 

such as Russia, Brazil or Indonesia. 
the 

information 

30   More 

on 

event 

“Disinfo 

Horizon” 

can 

be 

found 

here: 

https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_20_160  
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/disinformation-aims-at-undermining-democracy/  

31   See also the Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social  Committee  and  the  Committee  of  the  Regions  ‘Communication  on  the  Global  EU  response  to 
COVID-19’ (JOIN/2020/11 final). 

7 

 
                                                           
5.  GREATER  TRANSPARENCY  OF  ONLINE  PLATFORMS  ABOUT  DISINFORMATION  AND 

INFLUENCE OPERATIONS 

Cooperation  with  social  media  platforms  is  a  key  element  in  developing  both  a 
comprehensive assessment of the challenge and an effective response to the ‘infodemic’. 
Since  the  beginning  of  the  crisis,  the  Commission  has  underlined  the  need  for  online 
platforms to ensure full implementation of their commitments under the Code of Practice. 
Platforms’  responses  to  this  challenge  have  been  closely  monitored,  even  though  it  is 
difficult to reliably assess the timeliness, completeness and impact of their actions.33  

Online  platforms34  have  reported  that  they  made  adjustments  to  their  policies  to  address 
the  COVID-19  disinformation  threat.  They  have  promoted  accurate  and  authoritative 
information about COVID-19 from the WHO, national health authorities and professional 
media  outlets.35  They  have  demoted  content  that  is  fact-checked  as  false  or  misleading, 
and  limited  ads  that  promote  false  products  and  services.  In  accordance  with  their 
community standards, they have removed content that could harm citizens’ health or affect 
public safety.36  

Fact-checkers, researchers and civil society organisations have a crucial role to play, but 
platforms have not sufficiently empowered them during the current public health crisis, for 
example by making more data available or giving due prominence to fact-checks on their 
services  in  all  Member  States.  There  is  therefore  a  need  for  additional  efforts  and 
information-sharing  by  social  media  platforms,  as  well  as  increased  transparency  and 
greater  accountability.37  This  highlights  the  need  to  enforce  and  strengthen  the  policies 
that the platforms have committed to implement under the Code of Practice.  

5.1.  AN INTENSIFIED ROLE FOR ONLINE PLATFORMS IN THE CRISIS 

Platforms  should  deepen  their  work  to  combat  the  risks  sparked  by  the  crisis.  Drawing 
inspiration from the experience gained with the monitoring of the Code of Practice ahead 
of the 2019 European elections, the Commission intends to establish an agile monitoring 
and  reporting  programme  under  the  Code,  focused  on  COVID-19  related  disinformation 
and  misinformation.  This  should  be  broadened  to  platforms  that  are  not  presently 
signatories  to  the  Code  of  Practice.38  The  Commission,  with  the  help  of  the  European 
Regulators Group for Audiovisual Media Services (ERGA),39 could then assess the impact 
of platforms’ policies on the spreading of COVID-19 disinformation and misinformation. 
This  would  also  provide  relevant  information  to  support  mitigation  efforts  to  limit  the 

32   Such as in African countries affected by conflict situations, such Central African Republic or the Congo. 
33   It is also the case that some platforms used to distribute misleading information are not those within the 

Code of Practice (for example WhatsApp or TikTok). 

34   Notably Google, Facebook, Twitter and Microsoft. 
35   In  this  regard  new  tools  such  as  information  panels,  cards,  pop-ups,  maps  and  prompts  that  lead  users 
directly to authoritative information sources in multiple languages have been launched by the platforms. 

36   E.g. false claims that drinking bleach cures the virus. 
37   As  illustrated  for  example  by  Brookings:  https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/encrypted-messaging-

apps-are-the-future-of-propaganda/ 

38   In particular those prominently visible during the COVID-19 crisis, such as WhatsApp or TikTok.  
39   In  response  to  the  crisis,  ERGA  has  recently  extended  the  remit  of  its  subgroup  on  disinformation  to 
include an assessment on how platforms react to the challenges posed by this extraordinary situation. The 
assessment  will  put  a  particular  focus  on  the  platforms’  measures  to  identify,  control  and  prevent  the 
dissemination of fake, misleading or incorrect information on medical treatments and the disease as such, 
the  way  it  is  spreading  as  well  as  measures  taken  by  governments  and  national  regulatory  authorities, 
see: https://erga-online.eu  

8 

 
                                                                                                                                                                               
damage. This  will also  feed into future EU work, in  particular the European Democracy 
Action Plan and the Digital Services Act. 

Actions 

The  platforms  will  be  asked  to  make  available  monthly  reports  on  their  policies  and 
actions to address COVID-19 related disinformation, with the following features: 

 

 

Initiatives  to  promote  authoritative  content  at  EU  and  at  Member  State  level.40 
Platforms  should  provide  data  on  the  actions  taken  to  promote  information  from 
national  and international  health agencies, national  and EU authorities, as well as 
professional media.  
Initiatives  and  tools  to  improve  users’  awareness.  Platforms  should  provide  data 
about  implementation  of  their  polices  to  inform  users  when  they  interact  with 
disinformation.  

  Manipulative  behaviour.  Platforms  should  report  all  instances  of  social  media 
manipulation and malign influence operations or coordinated inauthentic behaviour 
detected on their services. Platforms should also cooperate with EU Member States 
and 
the  assessment  and  attribution  of 
disinformation campaigns and influence operations. 

to  facilitate 

institutions 

in  order 

  Data on flows of advertising linked to COVID-19 disinformation.41 The signatories 
of the Code should provide data, broken down by Member State where possible, on 
policies  undertaken  to  limit  advertising  placements  related  to  disinformation  on 
COVID-19  on  their  own  services.  Platforms  and  advertising  network  operators, 
should also provide such data on policies to limit advertising placements on third-
party  websites  using  disinformation  around  COVID-19  to  attract  advertising 
revenues.42  

The  Commission  will  strongly  encourage  other  relevant  stakeholders  that  are  not 
currently signatories to the Code to participate to the above monitoring programme on a 
voluntary basis. 

5.2.  SUPPORT FOR FACT-CHECKERS AND RESEARCHERS 

Fact checking is fundamental for all of us to have access to reliable information as well as 
to a plurality of views. The COVID-19 crisis has underlined the need for online platforms 
to  provide  more  data  on  the  nature,  scope  and  impact  of  disinformation  and  to  compare 
and  assess  effectiveness  of  the  actions  taken.  The  European  Digital  Media  Observatory 
(EDMO)  has  just  been  launched  to  support  the  creation  of  a  cross-border  and 
multidisciplinary  community  of  independent  fact-checkers  and  academic  researchers, 
which will collaborate with  relevant  stakeholders to  detect,  analyse and expose potential 
disinformation threats, including in the area of COVID. In this regard, a greater access to 
aggregated  data  sets  of  platforms  stemming  from  COVID  is  essential  for  research 
purposes and a better understanding of disinformation threats and trends. In addition, there 
is a need for dedicated research infrastructure to detect, analyse and expose disinformation 

40   Certain stakeholders have developed trustworthiness indicators for news sources, such as the Journalism 

Trust Initiative. 

41   See,  e.g.  reports  by  GDI  https://disinformationindex.org/2020/05/why-is-tech-not-defunding-covid-19-

disinfo-sites/  

42   To  this  end  platforms  should  consider  use  of  indicators  of  trustworthiness  developed  by  independent 

fact-checkers/researchers or other stakeholders (e.g. GDI, Newsguard). 

9 

 
                                                           
and foreign influence operations across the whole EU territory. All of this should be done 
in line with the applicable regulatory framework, including on data protection. 

Actions 

  The Commission calls on the platforms to broaden and intensify their cooperation 
with fact-checkers and actively offer access to their fact-checking programmes to 
organisations in all EU Member States – as well as in its neighbourhood – for all 
languages.  

  The  Commission  will  support  fact-checking  and  research  activities43  including 
through the newly established European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO).44 45 
This  will  support  an  independent  multidisciplinary  community  on  COVID-19 
disinformation  with  a  technological  infrastructure  with  tools  and  services.46 
EDMO could also help public authorities with research and establish appropriate 
links to the Rapid Alert System. 

  The  Commission  invites  platforms  to  agree  with  EDMO  upon  a  framework 
providing  academic  researchers  privacy-protected  access  to  relevant  platforms’ 
data to enhance the detection and analysis of disinformation.  

  The Commission will consider open-sourcing some of the tools it has developed 
to  detect  misleading  narratives  and  unreliable  online  sources  to  make  them 
available to the fact-checking community. 

6.  ENSURING FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND PLURALISTIC DEMOCRATIC DEBATE 

The  current  COVID-19  crisis  has  shown  the  risk  that  some  measures  designed  to  tackle 
the ‘infodemic’ can be used as a pretext to undermine fundamental rights and freedoms or 
abused  for  political  purpose  in  and  outside  the  European  Union.  Hence,  the  need  to  be 
vigilant and uphold our fundamental rights and common values, which should be central 
to  our  response  to  COVID-19.  In  this  context,  free  and  plural  media  is  key  to  address 
disinformation and inform citizens. 

Freedom of expression and the right of the media and civil society to scrutinise the actions 
of  the  state  are  as  important  as  ever  during  this  crisis:  the  accountability  of  public 
authorities should not be reduced because they are operating through emergency powers. 
Public  authorities  must ensure  transparency  of  their  work,  which  contributes  to  building 
trust  towards  citizens  and  allows  for  scrutiny  of  decision-making.  The  free  flow  of 
information  contributes  to  the  protection  of  life  and  health  and  enables  and  promotes 

43   Like the ‘Health Emergency Response in Interconnected Systems’ (‘HERoS’) project developing a new 
method for information retrieval from social media regarding Covid-19 rumours and misinformation (For 
further  details:  https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/101003606).  Moreover,  Horizon  2020  mobilises 
academia,  research  organisations,  practitioners  and  private  companies  to  counter  misinformation, 
develop fact-checking capacity and online accountability, and research on the importance of a strong and 
independent media landscape. 

44   https://edmo.eu/  
45   In  June  2020  the  second  phase  of  EDMO  will  be  launched,  to  establish  national/regional  hubs  for 
research on disinformation. Further funding will be provided in 2021 under Digital Europe to ensure the 
presence  of  national/regional  hubs  in  the  whole  EU.  Full  geographical  coverage  for  EDMO  will  be 
pursued through the upcoming Digital Europe programme. In the meantime, the Commission will seek 
synergies with funding provided by the European Parliament by launching calls for proposals in summer 
2020 with a view to supporting research on COVID-19 disinformation. 

46   Including access to public databases, repositories of fact-checks and mechanisms for privacy-compliant 
access to platforms’ data to facilitate the detection, the analysis and the exposure of disinformation.  

10 

 
                                                           
social, economic, political and other policy discussions and decision-making.47 Ultimately, 
democracy shows its true strength and value in times of crises.  

Problems  related  to  freedom  of  expression  have  been  signalled  during  the  crisis,48 
including  reports  that  journalists,  civil  society  organisations  and  academics  have  been 
restricted in their access to information, that such access has been unnecessarily delayed, 
that journalists faced increased risks to their safety, including threats and intimidation, or 
that they were wrongly accused of spreading disinformation. 

Since  the  beginning  of  the  crisis,  the  Commission  has  been  closely  monitoring  the 
emergency  measures  taken  by  Member  States  and  their  consistency  with  the  Treaty,  as 
well  as  EU  law  in  general  and  the  Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights  in  particular.  Several 
Member  States  already  had  provisions,  including  of  criminal  nature,  related  to 
disinformation  and  one  Member  State  introduced  a  specific  new  criminal  offence  for 
spreading  of  disinformation  during  the  state  of  emergency.49  Laws  which  define  these 
crimes  in  too  broad  terms  and  with  disproportionate  penalties  attached  can  constrain 
sources’  willingness  to  speak  to  journalists,  as  well  as  lead  to  self-censorship,50  raising 
particular concerns as regards freedom of expression. 

The  Commission  has  been  co-funding,  with  the  support  of  the  European  Parliament,  a 
series  of  projects  to  map  threats  and  risks  to  media  freedom  and  pluralism,  support 
investigative journalism, and provide assistance to journalists in need.51  

The COVID-19 crisis has demonstrated the crucial role of free and independent media as 
an  essential  service,  providing  citizens  with  reliable,  fact-checked 
information, 
contributing  to  saving  lives.  However,  the  crisis  has  also  amplified  the  already  difficult 
economic  situation  of  the  sector  due  to  a  dramatic  fall  in  advertising  income,  despite 
increased audiences.52 The situation is particularly difficult for vulnerable smaller players 
and local and regional media outlets. The whole EU media ecosystems and its diversity is 
weakened by result. The Commission’s recovery and repair package would  help  address 
immediate  liquidity  needs  though  the  solvency  support  and  cohesion  funding,  while 
strengthening  the  digital  investment  and  resilience  of  the  sector  through  InvestEU, 
Creative Europe, and Horizon Europe Programme. 

The  COVID-19  crisis  has  also  greatly  exacerbated  similar  challenges  around  the  world, 
including  faced  by  independent  media  outlets  as  bulwarks  for  democracy  and  human 
rights. The EU will monitor developments in line with the Action Plan on Human Rights 

47   ‘Disease pandemics and the freedom of opinion and expression’, Report of the UN Special Rapporteur 
on the  promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, David Kaye,  April 
2020.  

48   Cases have been documented on the Council of Europe’s Platform for the Protection of Journalism and 
freedom 

the  EU  co-funded  platform  on  mapping  media 

Safety  of  Journalists  and  via 
https://mappingmediafreedom.org/  

49   Amendment to Section 337 of the Hungarian criminal code. 
50   The Commission has made clear that democracy cannot  work without free and independent media and 

that respect for freedom of expression and legal certainty are essential during such times.  

      https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/STATEMENT_20_567   
51   https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/media-freedom-projects  
52   Early  estimates  suggest  the  drop  may  reach  80%  of  revenues  for  news  publishers  depending  on  the 
country. 
hardest. 
are 
http://www.newsmediaeurope.eu/news/covid-19-and-the-news-media-journalism-always-comes-at-a-
cost/  

publishers 

expected 

Small, 

local 

the 

hit 

be 

to 

11 

 
                                                           
and  Democracy  2020-2024.53  The  EU  will  pay  particular  attention  to  the  situation  in 
Eastern and Southern Neighbourhood and the Western Balkans.  

All this raises questions over the ability of the media and civil society to fully play their 
own role in counteracting disinformation and misinformation. 

The EU needs to intensify both political  and practical support  to independent media and 
journalists in the EU and across the world, as well as helping civil society organisations in 
their efforts to monitor and report on restrictions of freedom of expression and civic space. 

Actions 

  The  Commission  will  continue  to  closely  monitor  the  impact  of  emergency 
measures  on  EU  law  and  values  until  all  measures  are  phased  out  and  continue 
engaging with Member States on identified issues. This monitoring will inform the 
upcoming  Annual  Rule  of  Law  Report  to  be  published  in  the  third  quarter  of 
2020,54 as well as the future Strategy on the effective application of the Charter of 
fundamental  rights  in  the  European  Union  and  the  European  Democracy  Action 
Plan.  

  The  Commission  calls  upon  Member  States  to  intensify  efforts  in  these  times  of 
crisis  to  ensure  that  journalists  can  work  safely,55  in  the  right  conditions,  and 
recognise news media as an essential service.  

  The  Commission  invites  the  Parliament  and  the  Council  to  urgently  adopt  the 
comprehensive  recovery  package  that  would  help  repair  and  strengthen  resilience 
of the media sector to fight COVID-related disinformation. Member States should 
make  the  most  of  this  package  as  well  as  of  the  EU’s  COVID-19  economic 
response56  to  support  media  which  are  heavily  hit  by  the  crisis  while  respecting 
their  independence.  All  EU  actors  should  strive  to  support  media  as  part  of  the 
recovery. 

  To accompany these efforts, the Commission will continue co-funding independent 
projects  in  the  area  of  journalism,  media  freedom  and  pluralism  and  facilitating 
access to finance and funding opportunities for the media sector.57 

  By  the  end  of  this  year,  the  Commission  will  propose  action  to  strengthen  media 
freedom  and  pluralism  in  the  European  Union  as  part  the  European  Democracy 
Action Plan and will present a Media and Audiovisual Action Plan that will aim to 
further support the digital transformation and competitiveness of these sectors and 
to stimulate access to content and media pluralism. 
  The Commission and the High Representative will: 

o 

launch  targeted  actions  under  the  public  diplomacy  programmes  in  countries 
around  the  globe  to  support  civil  society  actors  in  providing  reliable 
information;58  

o  further  develop  cooperation  with  civil  society,  journalists  and  independent 

53   JOIN(2020)5 of 23 March 2020. 
54   Media  and  civil  society  faced  new  obstacles  in  playing  their  role  in  the  democratic  debate  during  this 
crisis.  The  Commission’s  Annual  Rule  of  Law  Report  will  look  closer  into  the  situation  across  all 
Member States. 

55   In line with the Council of Europe’s Guidelines on protecting freedom of expression and information in 
times 
https://www.coe.int/en/web/freedom-expression/freedom-of-expression-and-
information-in-times-of-crisis – Answers should also be provided to the alerts issued by the Council of 
Europe in the context of the Platform for the Protection of Journalism and Safety of Journalists.  

crisis 

56   https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_459 
57   For example, the Cultural and Creative Sectors Guarantee Facility is available to support the financing 

of 

- 

needs of the media sector. 

58   E.g. podcasts, fact checking support, or webinars. 

12 

 
                                                           
media  in  third  countries  through  regional  assistance  and  bilateral  support  to 
counter disinformation and promote fact-checking.  

o  Support will be stepped up in monitoring violations of press freedom, supporting 
advocacy for a safer media environment and protection of journalists, including 
by  providing  assistance  via  the  EU  Human  Rights  Defenders  Protection 
Mechanism  and  through  closer  cooperation  with  the  European  Endowment  for 
Democracy. 

7.  EMPOWERING AND RAISING CITIZEN AWARENESS  

Since the global pandemic was declared, the demand for researchers, scientists and public 
health experts’ opinions has been greater than ever. The lessons learned from the COVID-
19 crisis show that it is important to promote information from authoritative sources, and 
that decisions must be made based on advice from scientists and health professionals, and 
that  it  is  also  essential  to  maintain  a  democratic  debate.  They  show  the  challenge  of 
dealing  with  a  changing  online  environment.59
  Empowering  citizens  to  critically  analyse 
information online is key to addressing disinformation.   

information 

These challenges are better answered if society is aware of the dangers of disinformation 
and misinformation. Particular attention should be paid to vulnerable groups, for example 
young people and children, who face a higher risk of being misled and as a consequence 
expose themselves to more dangerous situations. This  implies promoting citizens’ media 
identify 
and 
disinformation and digital skills and supporting empowerment of citizens as such.60 Much 
is  already  being  done  in  this  regard,  but  there  is  a  need  for  more  action  to  identify 
synergies, potential for cooperation and exchange of information about resilience building 
measures to limit the impact of disinformation. It is also important that citizen have access 
to resources in their own language.  

including  critical 

the  capacity 

thinking, 

literacy, 

to 

Actions 

  The  Commission,  the  Council,  the  High  Representative  and  the  European 
Parliament  will  share  best  practices  on  resilience-building  measures,  in  particular 
against the lessons learned during the COVID-19 crisis. 

  The  Digital  Education  Action  Plan  Update,  to  be  adopted  later  in  2020,  will 
propose measures that will help tackle disinformation, whereas Erasmus+ and the 
European Solidarity Corps programmes provide funding opportunities for projects 
tackling disinformation. The Commission will support the development of critical 
thinking of social media users through the Preparatory Action ‘Media Literacy for 
All’61 projects, and through the European network of Safer Internet Centres. 

  The Commission  envisages, including  in  the forthcoming Media and Audiovisual 
Action  Plan,  to  propose  actions  to  raise  awareness  and  critical  thinking  amongst 
different  groups,  in  particular  young  people,  building  on  the  potential  of  social 
media  and  influencers.  This  will  build  upon  the  amended  Audiovisual  Media 
Service  Directive  which  requires  video-sharing  platforms  to  provide  for  effective 

59   Such as having to deal with rapidly appearing and disappearing individual fraudulent websites, making it 
very difficult to stop fraudster when they constantly change digital identities and to create blacklists and 
inform consumers and platforms. 

60   Such  as  with  media  literacy  projects,  support  to  civil  society  organisations  helping  citizens  and  with 

access to content verification tools. 

61   https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/2018-2019-call-proposals-preparatory-action-media-
literacy-all. The last Call of this Preparatory Action (2018-20) is planned to be published in Q2 of 2020. 

13 

 
 
                                                           
media literacy measures and tools. 

  Awareness-raising  materials  on  the  nature  of  disinformation,  its  dangers  to  the 
democratic  nature  of  our  society  and  the  tools  available  to  detect  and  respond  to 
disinformation should be produced by the EU institutions in a coordinated manner, 
shared through the relevant  networks  and citizens  engagement tools  and aimed at 
reaching a variety of groups in all Member States and in partner countries.  

8.  PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH AND CONSUMERS’ RIGHTS 

A  particular  feature  of  the  COVID-19  crisis  has  been  a  focus  on  exploiting  consumers. 
Manipulation, deceptive marketing techniques, fraud, and scams exploit fears in order to 
sell unnecessary, ineffective and potentially dangerous products under false health claims, 
or to lure consumers into buying products at exorbitant prices. Whilst this kind of content 
may contain disinformation, if it infringes the consumers’ acquis it is illegal content and 
requires  a  different  response,  under  consumers’  protection  laws  and  by  competent 
authorities.62  

Following  the  Commission’s  call,  platforms63  have  removed  millions  of  misleading 
advertisements  concerning  illegal  or  unsafe  products.64  The  Commission  coordinated  a 
screening  (‘sweep’)  of  websites,  to  find  out  where  consumers  in  the  EU  are  being 
subjected to content promoting false claims or scam products in the context of COVID-19. 
The  sweep  –  carried  out  by  the  Consumer  Protection  Cooperation  (CPC)  Network  – 
involved  both  a  high-level  screening  of  online  platforms,  and  an  in-depth  analysis  of 
specific advertisements  and websites linked to  products  with  demand boosted due to  the 
virus.  The  result  is  that  platforms  have  removed  or  blocked  millions  of  misleading 
advertisements or product listings.  

The  Consumer  Protection  Cooperation  Network  of  national  authorities  has  worked  with 
the Commission to fight these practices in a coordinated manner. The Commission invited 
major platforms65 to cooperate with consumer authorities and take proactive measures to 
counter  scams.66  This  exchange  with  the  major  online  platforms  is  bearing  fruit,67  but 
work will have to be pursued, notably under the future Digital Services Act. 

Rogue  traders,  however,  find  ways  to  fly  under  the  radar  of  the  platforms  to  exploit 
consumers' vulnerabilities, circumvent algorithmic checks and set up new websites. Such 

62   The  European  Commission  has  also  called  Member  States’  authorities  to  reinforce  their  vigilance  and 
adapt  their  control  activities  on  online  offers  and  advertising  of  food  and  food  supplements  related  to 
COVID-19 
(https://ec.europa.eu/food/safety/official_controls/eu-co-ordinated-control-plans/covid-
19_en)  and  the  EU  anti-fraud  office,  OLAF,  has  also  launched  inquiries  https://ec.europa.eu/anti-
fraud/media-corner/news/13-05-2020/inquiry-fake-covid-19-products-progresses_en  

63   The  platforms  which  responded  to  the  Commission’s  call  are:  Allegro,  Amazon,  Alibaba/Aliexpress, 
CDiscount,  Ebay,  Facebook  (i.e.  Facebook,  Facebook  Marketplace  and  Instagram),  Microsoft/Bing, 
Google (i.e. Google ads and YouTube), Rakuten, Wish and Verizon Media/Yahoo. 

64   https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_938  
65   I.e. market places, search engines and social media. 
66   E.g.  by  detecting  products  in  high  demand  marketed  in  a  misleading  manner  to  obtain  an  undue 
advantage  and  through  automated  means  to  proactively  take  down  misleading  advertisements  and 
‘miracle products’ with illegal health claims. 

67   For  example,  Google  has  blocked  or  removed  over  80  million  COVID-19-related  ads  (globally),  eBay 
has  blocked  or  removed  more  than  17  million  listings  from  its  global  marketplace  that  violate  EU 
consumer rules. 

14 

 
                                                           
practices  are  also  found  on  independent  websites,  which  attract  consumers  through 
advertisement displayed e.g. on social media and webmail portals or in sponsored ranking 
on  search  engines.  Thus  national  consumer  authorities  remain  on  high  alert  and  will 
continue to work together with the Commission to protect consumers online.68  

The Commission is stepping up cooperation and information exchanges with platforms, as 
well  as  with  advertising  self-regulatory  bodies,  to  develop  automatic  tools  to  find 
misleading  advertisements.  The  platforms  should  regularly  report,  until  the  end  of  the 
crisis, on the effectiveness of their measures and on new trends.  

Many  fraudulent  websites  are  under  domain  names  using  COVID-19  related  keywords 
such  as  ‘corona’,  ‘mask’  or  ‘vaccine’.69  These  websites  are  especially  damaging  when 
falsely presented as legitimate or governmental websites. The Commission engaged with 
the domain name industry to share and promote good practices to prevent speculative and 
abusive domain names use70 and agreed on similar measures with EURid, the operator of 
the ‘.eu’ domain.71 

Actions 

  The  support  to  national  consumer  protection  authorities  within  the  Consumer 
Protection  Cooperation  Network  will  include  financing  their  capacity  to  do  agile 
monitoring of markets. In the longer term, the Commission will look at providing a 
common toolbox, such as a  forensic observatory  for digital  markets  with  specific 
tools to  carry out  online investigations and screen problematic practices linked to 
COVID-19.72 
International cooperation and sharing of experience will be intensified (for example 
the  International  Consumer  Protection  Enforcers  Network)  to  promote  the  EU 
approach to misleading consumers in the COVID-19 context.73 

 

CONCLUSION 

The  EU  acted  to  respond  to  the  threat  posed  by  disinformation,  misinformation  and 
foreign influence operations in the COVID-19 crisis. However, the scale of the potential 

68   The Commission issued guidance to help consumers to identify and avoid potential COVID-19 related 
scams  when  shopping  online:  https://ec.europa.eu/info/live-work-travel-eu/consumers/enforcement-
consumer-protection/scams-related-covid-19_en  

69   The Commission is also cooperating closely with Europol and with registrars to facilitate the exchange 
of information allowing rapid detection, reporting and removal of COVID-19-related websites used for 
criminal purposes: 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/catching_the_virus_cybercrime_disinformat
ion_and_the_covid-19_pandemic_0.pdf 

70   These  include  measures  to  check  the  accuracy  and  validity  of  the  registrants’  data  for  domain  names 
containing  COVID-19  related  keywords,  and  reporting  suspicious  registrations  to  relevant  authorities, 
such 
also: 
and 
https://www.icann.org/news/blog/keeping-the-dns-secure-during-the-coronavirus-pandemic  

agencies.  See 

enforcement 

protection 

consumer 

agencies 

law 

71   https://eurid.eu/en/news/doteu-covid19-measures/  
72   The  Commission  will  coordinate  cooperation  between  the  CPC  network  and  domain  registers  and 

as 

payment service providers to address effectively consumer scams. 

73   The  OECD  has  produced  a  guidance  on  how  to  identify  scams  taking  inspiration  from  the  common 
position of the Consumer Protection Cooperation network which identifies the most common Covid-19 
related scams made public in March  
http://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/protecting-online-consumers-during-the-covid-19-
crisis-2ce7353c/  
https://ec.europa.eu/info/live-work-travel-eu/consumers/enforcement-consumer-protection/scams-
related-covid-19_en 

15 

 
                                                           
impact  on  the  health  of  citizens  and  the  stability  of  our  societies,  and  the  gaps  it  has 
revealed, call for continued efforts to step up this work. The COVID-19 crisis has become 
a  test  case  showing  how  the  EU  and  its  democratic  societies  deal  with  this  challenge. 
Based  on  the  challenges  identified,  lessons  learned  so  far  and  the  proposed  short-term 
solutions,  EU  society  and  its  democratic  oversight  could  in  the  longer-term  become 
stronger and more resilient and better prepared for the challenges of the future.  

The  Commission  and  the  High  Representative  will  quickly  set  in  motion  the  actions 
proposed in this Communication, building the ground for a longer-term approach as part 
of the European  Democracy Action Plan, which  should be presented towards the  end of 
the year, as well as of the forthcoming Digital Services Act. 

16