COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT on providing Macro-Financial Assistance to enlargement and neighbourhood partners in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic crisis Accompanying the document Proposal for a DECISION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on providing Macro-Financial Assistance to enlargement and neighbourhood partners in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic crisis
Date: 2020-04-22
Institutions: Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, European Commission
Subjects: EU aid, EU loan, European neighbourhood policy, economic reform, economic stabilisation, epidemic, financial aid, infectious disease, macro-financial assistance

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 22.4.2020  SWD(2020) 63 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT on providing Macro-Financial Assistance to enlargement and neighbourhood partners in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic crisis Accompanying the document Proposal for a DECISION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on providing Macro-Financial Assistance to enlargement and neighbourhood partners in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic crisis {COM(2020) 163 final}  
 
 
Table of contents 

1 

1.1 

1.2 

1.3 

2 

2.1 

2.2 

2.3 

2.4 

2.5 

3 

4 

4.1 

4.2 

5 

Problem analysis and needs assessment ............................................................ 2 

Introduction ........................................................................................................... 2 

The macroeconomic situation following the COVID-19 crisis in the enlargement 
and neighbourhood regions ................................................................................... 3 

The macroeconomic situation and financing needs of the beneficiary countries 
following the COVID-19 crisis ............................................................................. 4 

1.3.1 

Enlargement countries ............................................................................ 4 

1.3.2 

Eastern Partnership countries ............................................................... 10 

1.3.3 

Southern neighbourhood countries ...................................................... 13 

Objectives and related indicators of the macro-financial assistance ............ 17 

Objectives ............................................................................................................ 17 

Conditionality ...................................................................................................... 17 

Indicators ............................................................................................................. 17 

Delivery mechanisms .......................................................................................... 17 

Risk assessment ................................................................................................... 18 

Added value of EU involvement ....................................................................... 19 

Planning of future monitoring and evaluation ............................................... 19 

Monitoring ........................................................................................................... 19 

Evaluation ............................................................................................................ 20 

Achieving cost-effectiveness ............................................................................. 20 

1 

 
 
1 

PROBLEM ANALYSIS AND NEEDS ASSESSMENT 

1.1 

Introduction 

The COVID-19 pandemic has by now spread to all continents. More than 2 million persons 
have  been  infected  and  almost  140,000  persons  with  confirmed  infections  have  died  in  its 
wake  (according  to  WHO  data  as  of  17  April).  The  initial  response  focuses  on  saving  lives 
across  the  globe,  by  taking  various  measures  to  contain  the  spread  of  the  virus  and 
strengthening  healthcare  systems.  Many  of  these  measures  have  brought  societies  and 
economies to a standstill, but there can be no tradeoff between saving lives and jobs. On the 
contrary,  getting  the  virus  under  control  is  a  prerequisite  for  sustainable  development,  be  it 
economic or social.  

Measures  are  also  rapidly  put  in  place  to  limit  the  economic  fallout  of  the  crisis. 
Notwithstanding these measures, together with the impact of a global recession and the severe 
stress in the financial markets, most, if not  all, enlargement and neighbourhood partners  are 
set for a recession this year. Although the trigger for this crisis is shared across countries, its 
duration and severity of the recession will differ, reflecting the partners’ economic structure 
(such as the importance of global supply chains,  tourism, remittances or, in some cases, the 
slump in commodity prices), as well as their ability to take effective counteracting measures. 
Several  partners  will  not  only  encounter  falling  economic  activity,  but  sharp  increases  in 
unemployment  with  renewed  pressures  on  public  deficits  and  debts.  Moreover,  several  had 
considerable liquidity needs already before the crisis. Together with the collapse of trade and 
the shift in risk aversion away from emerging markets in general, many will see their balance 
of payments (BoP) come under acute stress. Depending on the spread of the virus, as well as 
on  its  economic  consequences,  there  is  also  a  clear  and  imminent  risk  related  to  social 
stability and security, with possible spillovers within the region and beyond.  

Against  this  background,  the  European  Commission  is  proposing  the  use  of    macro-
financial  assistance  (MFA)  to  support  ten  neighbouring  partners  in  the  context  of  the 
COVID-19 crisis.  

MFA is part of the EU’s external crisis response toolkit. It is used to address situations of BoP 
crises in tandem with a disbursing IMF arrangement that is subject to an agreed programme of 
economic reforms. In this exceptional situation, the Commission proposes MFA programmes 
also  for  partners  that  benefit  from  emergency  funding  from  the  IMF,  which  can  come 
without prior actions and/or conditionality, such as through the Rapid  Financing  Instrument 
(RFI). These ‘crisis MFAs’ will therefore be shorter in duration (12 months instead of the 
usual 2.5 years) and include only two disbursements. The first disbursement will be released 
as  soon  as  possible  after  the  adoption  of  the  MFA  Decision  and  upon  the  corresponding 
agreement  on  a  Memorandum  of  Understanding  (MoU)  with  each  partner.  The  second 
disbursement  will  be  released  upon  the  fulfilment  of  conditions  as  detailed  in  the 
corresponding  MoU.  This  conditionality  is  specific  to  each  partner  to  ensure  that  it  is  fully 
adequate.  Moreover,  it  will  need  to  be  formulated  in  a  way  that  makes  it  still  possible  to 
implement, taking into account the shorter time span and the context of the ongoing pandemic 
(except for Jordan, where the top-up will be included in the MoU currently under negotiation, 
which is covering the regular 2,5 years). Thus, while the focus may differ across countries, the 
conditionality  will  be  done  within  the  framework  of  the  overall  objective  of  the  MFA 
instrument  to  foster  macroeconomic  stability  whilst  improving  the  overall  macroeconomic 
improving 
management,  strengthening  economic  governance  and 
conditions for renewed sustainable growth.  

transparency,  and 

2 

 
Overall,  the  European  Commission  submits  to  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  a 
proposal to grant MFA to ten partners1 for a total amount of EUR 3 billion: the Republic of 
Albania,  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  Kosovo*,  Montenegro  and  the  Republic  of  North 
Macedonia in the Western Balkans; Georgia,  the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine in 
the  Eastern  neighbourhood;  and  the  Hashemite  Kingdom  of  Jordan  (top-up  of  the 
existing MFA) and the Republic of Tunisia in the Southern neighbourhood. However, the 
situation is still evolving and the COVID-19 crisis is becoming increasingly challenging also 
in  other  countries.  MFA  remains  available  also  for  other  eligible  countries  in  situations  of 
balance-of-payments  difficulties  that  may  appear  later.  The  Commission  will  also  initiate  a 
discussion  on  the  scope  of  the  EU  MFA  instrument  and  how  it  interacts  with  other  EU 
external policies. 

The  assistance  would  take  the  form  of  medium-term  loans,  with  no  grant  component  being 
envisaged. The proposed MFA is in line with the aims of the EU’s Western Balkans strategy, 
the Eastern Partnership and the orientations of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). It 
signals  to  the  enlargement  and  neighbourhood  partners  that  the  EU  continues  to  support  its 
partners in  this time of unprecedented crisis.  In  this  context, the Commission considers that 
the political and economic pre-conditions for an MFA operation of the proposed amount and 
nature are satisfied. 

1.2  The  macroeconomic  situation  following  the  COVID-19  crisis  in  the  enlargement 

and neighbourhood regions 

The  economic  consequences  of  the  coronavirus  pandemic  are  expected  to  be  severe  in  the 
enlargement region. Before the crisis hit, the Western Balkan partners were enjoying several 
years of relatively robust output growth, which averaged more than 3% a year in 2015-2019. 
However, as the region is closely linked to the EU economy, the sharp downturn in the EU 
will  have  knock-on  effects  on  their  economies,  plunging  them  into  a  severe  recession.  The 
main transmission channels will be dampened demand for their exports and possibly reduced 
remittances  (from  the  EU  and  Switzerland),  which  is  an  important  source  of  financing 
external  imbalances.  This  may  be  exacerbated  by  many  expatriates  from  these  partners 
working  in  the  services  sector,  e.g.  hotels/restaurants,  i.e.  sectors  that  are  hit  especially 
severely by the current crisis. In addition, containment measures and lockdowns will further 
suppress  trade  and  domestic  demand  in  the  near  term.  Furthermore,  health  systems  are 
generally  weak  and  underfunded,  which  might  exacerbate  the  supply  shock  from  reduced 
labour  availability  due  to  sickness  and  absenteeism,  depending  also  on  the  spread  of  the 
disease. External positions have improved in recent years, but the current account deficit for 
the  region  still  averaged  around  5-6%  of  GDP  in  recent  years  as  large  merchandise  deficits 
were  only  partially  offset  by  surpluses  in  the  services  and  secondary  income  accounts.  The 
external deficits were to a large extent financed by net FDI inflows; however, this source of 
financing is now set to take a hit from the crisis. External financing needs remain high while 
adverse financial market conditions might negatively impact rollover plans, requiring external 

1  

* 

The situation is still evolving, and the COVID-19 crisis could become increasingly challenging also in 
other countries. The cut-off date to be included in this omnibus MFA proposal prepared in the context 
of  COVID-19  was  17  April  2020.  Any  additional  requests  for  support  coming  thereafter  will  be 
considered in the traditional case-by-case manner. 
This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and 
the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence. 

3 

 
                                                           
assistance  to  meet  refinancing  needs  and  sustain  the  capacity  for  health-  and  crisis-related 
measures in some cases.  

The  economic  outlook  for  the  Eastern  neighbourhood  countries  has  radically  changed 
following the global spread of the corona virus in early 2020. Their economic performance in 
2019  was  generally  strong,  with  average  GDP  growth  of  3%,  an  overall  moderate  inflation 
and low budget deficits. At the start of this year, forecasts were for a similar performance in 
2020,  or  even  better,  with  growth  expected  to  strengthen  because  of  strong  consumer  and 
business confidence underpinning domestic consumption. The spread of the coronavirus has 
brought  an abrupt deterioration of the outlook: all Eastern neighbours appear to be set for a 
deep recession this year, while its duration and relative severity are still difficult to estimate 
and will reflect the different channels at play: shocks on the supply and demand side of the 
economy, including confidence effects,  and stress in the financial markets. Being very open 
economies,  all  are  likely  to  be  heavily  affected  by  the  weaker  global  demand  in  general, 
including  for  tourist  services,  and  lower  commodity  prices  (such  as  metals).  In  order  to 
alleviate  the  burden  of  the  crisis  on  the  economy  and  population,  the  authorities  have 
announced a number of health-related, fiscal and monetary policy measures. However, several 
of them will only be able to sustain these with the help of official external funding  

improvements 

in  growth  rates  for  2020,  among  moderating 

The COVID-19 pandemic will also have a severe impact on the economies of  the Southern 
neighbourhood.  Most  countries  imposed  timely  containment  measures  in  March  2020  to 
restrict the spread of the virus, but the sharp deterioration in domestic and external conditions 
will  have  a  sizable  negative  effect  on  economic  activity.  Economic  growth  had  already 
slowed down throughout 2019 in the region, but the forecasts at the start of this year projected 
mostly 
inflation  and 
accommodative  monetary  policies  across  countries.  Despite  high  uncertainty  around  the 
evolution  of  the  crisis,  the  economic  outlook  has  now  rapidly  deteriorated  and,  beyond  the 
health emergency, most Southern neighbours are likely to enter into a recession this year, with 
limited  or  no  economic  buffers.  The  downturn  will  materialise  through  several  channels, 
including shocks  from  global demand (including from  tourism), pressure on public finances 
and  stress  in  financial  markets.  While  most  countries  have  announced  a  number  of  fiscal, 
financial and monetary policy measures to counter the economic fallout, some countries in the 
region  will  be  in  need  of  additional  financial  support  from  partners  to  provide  liquidity, 
sustain macro-economic stability and maintain fiscal space. 

1.3  The  macroeconomic  situation  and  financing  needs  of  the  partners  following  the 

COVID-19 crisis 

1.3.1  Enlargement partners  

Albania 

Albania is particularly vulnerable to the economic fallout from the pandemic due to its 
close economic relations with some highly affected EU Member States, the importance of 
the tourism sector and its high refinancing needs. The damages from the November 2019 
earthquake,  which  already  absorbed  a  large  part  of  both  public  and  private  reserves  for  the 
emergency  response,  and  the  limited  capacity  of  the  health  sector  aggravate  the  situation. 
Faced  with  the  spread  of  COVID-19,  the  government  has  put  strong  social-distancing 
measures in place since 8 March and announced the state of emergency on 28 March. Albania 
faces  a  recession  with  international  institutions  forecasting  real  GDP  to  decrease  by  around 
5%  in  2020,  driven  by  a  drop  in  private  consumption  and  in  goods  and  services  (tourism) 
exports. Albania has close economic relations with EU Member States highly affected by the 

4 

 
COVID-19  crisis,  such  as  Italy,  which  receives  half  of  Albania’s  merchandise  exports 
(textiles)  and  is  the  largest  source  of  its  remittances  (amounting  to  5.2%  of  GDP). 
Furthermore, Albania strongly depends on travel and tourism, which accounts for 9% of GDP 
and  about  23%  of  employment.  The  annual  peak  of  tourism  revenue  is  usually  in  the  third 
quarter,  much  of  which  is  at  risk  this  year.  The  IMF  expects  the  current-account  deficit  to 
widen  to  11.2%  of  GDP  in  2020.  Foreign  reserves  are  covering  over  6  months  of  imports, 
providing  some  buffer,  but  external  financing  needs  are  high.  In  particular,  the  government 
needs  to  refinance  foreign  debt  amortisation  of  EUR  545  million  (3.8%  of  GDP)  in  2020, 
partly by issuing a EUR 500-600 million Eurobond. The government postponed the Eurobond 
issuance  from  May  to  October,  the  latest  possible  date,  but  the  conditions  will  certainly  be 
less favourable than the 3.4% interest of the 2018 Eurobond – if it can be placed at all.  

Table 1: Selected Macro-Economic indicators for Albania 

Indicator 
Real GDP change, % 
Consumer price inflation, %, end of period 
Key monetary policy rate, %, end of period 
Unemployment rate, % 
General government balance, % of GDP 
Public debt, % of GDP 
Current account balance, % of GDP 
International reserves, USD billion 
International reserves, months of imports 
Gross external debt, % of GDP 
Foreign direct investment, % of GDP 
Sources: WIIW, IMF 

2014 
1.8 
0.7 
2.3 
17.5 
-5.2 
70.1 
-10.8 
2.5 
5.2 
69.5 
8.4 

2015 
2.2 
1.9 
1.8 
17.1 
-4.1 
72.7 
-8.6 
2.9 
7.4 
74.4 
8.3 

2016 
3.3 
2.2 
1.3 
15.2 
-1.8 
72.4 
-7.6 
2.9 
6.8 
73.5 
9.3 

2017 
3.8 
1.8 
1.3 
13.7 
-2.0 
70.2 
-7.5 
3.3 
7.0 
68.8 
8.8 

2018 
4.1 
1.8 
1.0 
12.3 
-1.6 
67.7 
-6.8 
3.7 
6.8 
65.2 
8.5 

2019 
2.2 
1.1 
1.0 
11.5 
-1.9 
66.3 
-7.6 
3.5 
6.5 
60.5 
8.1 

With the adopted measures, which only cover the most urgent needs for about 2 months, 
the fiscal deficit is set to reach 4% of GDP and public debt could increase from 66.3% of 
GDP to over 69% of GDP, according to the very optimistic budget amendment. Despite very 
limited fiscal policy space, the government swiftly adopted policy support measures of about 
2%  of  GDP  for  affected  businesses  and  households,  and  additional  funding  for  the  health 
sector.  The  government  issued  a  moratorium  on  loan  repayments  together  with  the  central 
bank, which has lowered its already low policy rate to 0.5% and releases liquidity. Before the 
corona  crisis,  the share  of foreign debt  had increased to  about  46% of total public debt  and 
overall  interest  payments  were  estimated  to  reach  2.1%  to  2.3%  of  GDP.  Future  debt 
sustainability is likely to weaken with higher interest on the foreign-owned part of the debt, a 
depreciating  exchange  rate  and  the  increasing  domestic  debt,  which  has  usually  been  of 
shorter maturity and higher interest. The government requested and the IMF Executive Board 
approved  on  10  April  emergency  liquidity  assistance  under  the  Rapid  Finance  Instrument 
(RFI) of about EUR 172 million. The EU announced a reallocation of IPA funding of EUR 50 
million. In addition, the World Bank and the Agence Française de Développement have been 
asked to frontload planned loans of approximately EUR 130 million. The financing gap after 
IMF  and  World  Bank  loans  and  EU  grants  could  reach  about  EUR  350  million  (2.5%  of 
GDP). 

Bosnia and Herzegovina 

Having already been on a decelerating growth path, Bosnia and Herzegovina now faces 
a major recession. During 2019, economic growth decelerated to 2.6% from 3.3% in 2018, 
largely reflecting deteriorating external demand and a continued political stalemate, delaying 
necessary  structural  reforms  and  negatively  affecting  investment.  Brain-drain  has  gained 
substantial  momentum  in  recent  years,  undermining  the  country’s  growth  potential.  The 

5 

 
outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic sharply exacerbated the already ongoing slowdown, in 
particular affecting transport and tourism, but also workers’ remittances, accounting for some 
10% of GDP and providing an important lifeline, in particular for lower income households. 
The latest IMF projection expects a 5% drop in economic activity in 2020.  

Table 2: Selected Macro-Economic indicators for Bosnia and Herzegovina 

Indicator 
Real GDP change, % 
Consumer price inflation, %, end of period 
Key monetary policy rate, %, end of period* 
Unemployment rate, % 
General government balance, % of GDP 
Public debt, % of GDP 
Current account balance, % of GDP 
International reserves, USD billion 
International reserves, months of imports 
Gross external debt, % of GDP 
Foreign direct investment, % of GDP 
* Banks use the Euribor as a reference 
Sources: WIIW, IMF, Bosnia & Herzegovina Agency for Statistics 

2014 
1.2 
-0.4 
n.a. 
27.5 
-2.0 
41.6 
-7.2 
4.8 
5.5 
53.4 
3.0 

2015 
4.1 
-1.3 
n.a. 
27.7 
0.7 
41.9 
-5.1 
4.7 
6.6 
54.3 
2.2 

2016 
3.4 
-0.5 
n.a. 
25.4 
1.2 
40.4 
-4.7 
5.0 
7.0 
54.8 
2.1 

2017 
3.0 
0.7 
n.a. 
20.5 
2.6 
36.1 
-4.3 
6.3 
7.6 
54.2 
2.5 

2018 
3.3 
1.6 
n.a. 
18.4 
2.3 
34.2 
-3.7 
6.6 
7.3 
54.1 
2.3 

2019 
2.6 
0.2 
n.a. 
15.7 
1.0 
31.7 
-3.6 
7.0 
7.0 
55.6 
2.8 

Despite rather sound fiscal headline numbers, the country’s fiscal space is very limited. 
The health sector is poorly equipped for coping with the virus-related strong increase in the 
demand  for  intensive  care  and  requires  substantial  additional  spending.  The  economic 
slowdown  and  announced  measures  to  alleviate  the  COVID-19  related  shock  will  lead  to  a 
large  drop  in  revenues  and  a  sharp  increase  in  transfers,  which  will  severely  worsen  the 
budget  balance.  Given  the  country’s  currency  board  regime  with  the  euro  as  it  anchor 
currency, the room for monetary policy is very limited. As the crisis is expected to hit exports 
and  remittances,  the  IMF  projects  the  current  account  deficit  to  widen  to  7.5%  of  GDP  in 
2020,  resulting  in  a  strong  increase  in  external  financing  needs.  Due  to  the  country’s  poor 
credit  rating,  access  to  international  financial  markets  is  very  limited,  while  the  country’s 
financial  markets  are  too  shallow  to  accommodate  these  financing  needs.  Against  this 
background,  the  Bosnian  authorities  have  already  requested  emergency  financing  from  the 
IMF amounting to up to EUR 330 million (nearly 2% of GDP). Current estimates point to a 
remaining  financing  gap  of  some  EUR  500  million  (2.8%  of  GDP)  in  2020,  after  expected 
IMF and World Bank contributions.  

Kosovo 

The  risk  of  economic  contraction  is  very  high  in  Kosovo.  Before  the  outbreak  of  corona 
crisis,  the  economy  was  undergoing  a  cyclical  upswing  in  2015-2019,  with  real  GDP 
increasing by 4% annually. The key growth drivers were services exports, gross-fixed capital 
formation and private consumption, the latter boosted by large remittances from abroad, and 
by  robust  wage  and  credit  growth.  Services  exports  (tourism)  and  private  investment  were 
also to a large extent supported by the diaspora. The outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic and 
the related shutdown are disrupting Kosovo’s trade and financial flows with a drastic impact 
on  the  economy.  A  further  vulnerability  of  Kosovo’s  economy  is  the  fragile  private  sector, 
dominated by micro enterprises with limited liquidity buffers or access to finance. Due to the 
large  informal  sector  (accounting  for  around  30%  of  GDP)  and  the  already  high 
unemployment rate (26% in late 2019), the most likely scenario is a rapid increase in poverty 
and  unemployment.  The  IMF  projects  real  GDP  to  contract  by  5%  and  the  current  account 

6 

 
deficit to widen to 7.4% of GDP in 2020 as exports and remittances will fall, while financing 
flows, including FDI, will diminish significantly.  

Table 3: Selected Macro-Economic indicators for Kosovo 

Indicator 
Real GDP change, % 
Consumer price inflation, %, end of period 
Key monetary policy rate, %, end of period 
Unemployment rate, % 
General government balance, % of GDP 
Public debt, % of GDP 
Current account balance, % of GDP 
International reserves, USD billion 
International reserves, months of imports 
Gross external debt, % of GDP 
Foreign direct investment, % of GDP 
Sources: WIIW, IMF, ERP, Ministry of Finance Kosovo 

2014 
1.2 
-0.4 
9.3 
35.3 
-2.2 
10.7 
-6.9 
0.7 
2.4 
31.2 
2.7 

2015 
4.1 
-0.2 
7.7 
32.9 
-2.0 
13.1 
-8.6 
0.7 
2.6 
33.3 
5.3 

2016 
4.1 
1.3 
7.2 
27.5 
-1.2 
14.4 
-7.9 
0.6 
2.0 
33.2 
3.6 

2017 
4.2 
0.5 
6.8 
30.5 
-1.3 
16.6 
-5.4 
0.7 
2.1 
32.6 
4.0 

2018 
3.8 
2.9 
6.0 
29.6 
-3.0 
16.9 
-7.6 
0.8 
2.2 
30.3 
4.0 

2019 
4.2 
1.1 
6.4 
25.7 
-2.9 
17.5 
-5.8 
0.9 
2.3 
30.3 
3.8 

Despite moderate deficit and debt-to-GDP levels in 2019, fiscal space is limited. Headline 
budget  deficit  and  public  debt  stood  at  2.9%  and  17.5%  of  GDP,  respectively,  in  2019. 
Kosovo’s  tax-revenue  base  is  constrained  by  the  large  informal  economy,  while  public 
spending is  burdened by costly spending on social transfers for specific  groups.  As Kosovo 
has no access to international financial markets (due to the lack of credit rating), nearly two-
thirds  of  its  total  debt  is  held  by  a  narrow  investor  base,  with  the  Kosovo  Pension  Security 
Trust and the Central Bank accounting for around 38% and 23%, respectively, of the total. A 
further 35% of domestic debt is held by commercial banks. The IMF and IBRD hold nearly 
one third of Kosovo’s international debt each while the remaining part is mainly with foreign 
banks. Due to the unilateral decision to use the euro as its currency, Kosovohas no scope for 
an independent monetary policy. 

Plummeting public revenue combined with large basic payments and the crisis response 
measures  constitute an acute liquidity risk. The  IMF estimates that  government  revenues 
will fall by 50-60% year-on-year in April-June and projects an annual decline of up to 12.5%. 
This would lead to a widening of the budget deficit to almost 5% of GDP in 2020. The key 
drivers  are related to  a severe contraction in  economic activity and the postponement of tax 
payments.  The  caretaker  government  approved  an  emergency  package  worth  EUR  180 
million  containing  16  measures,  mainly  to  support  affected  businesses,  reinforce  social 
protection  of  the  most  vulnerable  households,  protect  formal  and  informal  employment  and 
support public organisations working in the front-line of the fight against the pandemic. The 
government  bank  balance,  which  has  already  fallen  below  the  legally  prescribed  4.5%  of 
GDP, is expected to decline further to 2.5% of GDP in 2020. Kosovo has requested and the 
IMF  Board  approved  on  10  April  emergency  IMF  liquidity  assistance  of  EUR  51.6  million 
through  the  RFI.  Current  estimates  point  to  a  remaining  financing  gap  of  some  EUR  210 
million.  

Montenegro 

Montenegro is particularly exposed to the economic fallout from the pandemic due to its 
very  strong  reliance  on  the  tourism  sector  as  well  as its  high  external  financing  needs. 
Montenegro  faces  a  deep  recession  in  2020,  with  the  IMF  forecasting  a  steep  9%  real 
contraction of the economy. Tourism, one of the most affected sectors, accounts for more than 
20%  of  GDP  and  is  a  key  source  of  foreign  exchange,  employment  and  fiscal  revenues. 
However,  coronavirus  containment  measures  brought  tourism  and  travel  to  a  standstill  at  a 

7 

 
time when these activities were about to enter the high season. Official reserves amounted to 
some 5 months of imports  in  2019, providing some buffer, but  external  financing needs are 
sizeable. The government needs to refinance maturing foreign debt of about 1.6% of GDP in 
the remainder of 2020, while an additional 6.8% of GDP worth of foreign debt will need to be 
refinanced  in  2021.  The  government  is  currently  negotiating  a  syndicated  EUR  250  million 
loan, backed by a EUR  80 million  loan from  the World  Bank in order to  meet  some of the 
rollover needs. In addition, the government requested emergency liquidity assistance from the 
IMF under the Rapid  Finance  Instrument (RFI),  which could  be up to  EUR 75 million, and 
the EU announced a reallocation of IPA funding of EUR 50 million. The remaining financing 
gap  after  IMF  and  World  Bank  loans  as  well  as  EU  grants  could  reach  about  EUR  120 
million. 

Table 1: Selected Macro-Economic indicators for Montenegro 

Indicator 
Real GDP change, % 
Consumer price inflation, %, end of period 
Key monetary policy rate, %, end of period 
Unemployment rate, % 
General government balance, % of GDP 
Public debt, % of GDP 
Current account balance, % of GDP 
International reserves, USD billion 
International reserves, months of imports 
Gross external debt, % of GDP 
Foreign direct investment, % of GDP 
* Gross external public debt 
Sources: WIIW, IMF 

2014 
1.8 
-0.6 
8.4 
18.0 
-2.9 
59.9 
-12.4 
0.6 
2.9 
45.2 
10.8 

2015 
3.4 
1.7 
7.7 
17.6 
-8.3 
66.2 
-11.0 
0.7 
3.4 
53.5 
17.2 

2016 
2.9 
1.0 
6.7 
17.4 
-3.6 
64.4 
-16.2 
0.8 
3.7 
50.6 
5.2 

2017 
4.7 
2.9 
6.2 
16.1 
-5.3 
64.2 
-16.1 
1.0 
3.7 
51.5 
11.5 

2018 
5.1 
1.5 
5.8 
15.2 
-2.9 
70.1 
-17.0 
1.2 
4.1 
59.2 
8.9 

2019 
3.6 
1.2 
5.5 
14.6 
-2.3 
69.0 
-15.2 
1.5 
5.1 
53.8 
8.2 

The  government  has  adopted  a  first  package  of  emergency  economic  measures.  In 
March,  the  government  adopted  measures  to  deal  with  the  health-related  and  economic 
consequences  of  the  COVID-19  pandemic.  Despite  limited  fiscal  space,  these  measures 
amount to some 2% of GDP and concern in particular deferred payments of taxes and social 
contributions, a moratorium on loan repayments and on rent payments for the lease of state-
owned property, as well as subsidies for businesses and workers. A second set of measures is 
currently  being  discussed  with  social  partners  and  should  be  adopted  in  April.  Preliminary 
estimates  from  the  Ministry  of  Finance  expect  the  fiscal  deficit  to  rise  to  more  than  7%  of 
GDP and public debt to increase by an additional 2.6 pps. to 82% of GDP in 2020, the highest 
in the region. Montenegro’s unilateral adoption of the euro as its official currency means that 
it has no monetary policy autonomy. 

North Macedonia  

The  economic  recovery  is  disrupted  by  the  external  shock.  The  pace  of  economic 
expansion in North Macedonia accelerated in 2019 (+0.9 pp. to 3.6%) on the back of firming 
domestic  demand,  including  a  recovery  of  investment  and  supported  by  a  sizeable  fiscal 
stimulus,  accommodative  monetary  policy,  and  solid  increases  in  bank  lending.  Labour-
market conditions improved continously and the current-account deficit remained contained. 
The economic upswing is projected to be reversed (temporarily) this year, as extended social 
and economic containment measures are having a severe impact on output and employment, 
and  trade  activity  is  hit.  Current  IMF  projections  expect  the  economy  to  contract  by  4%  in 
2020.  

8 

 
The main economic impact from the crisis is through the trade channels.  Exports are an 
important pillar of growth, amounting to 62% of GDP in 2019 (goods and services). The main 
trading  partner  is  Germany  (49%  of  total  goods  exports).  Over  half  of  exports  are  derived 
from  foreign  companies  established  in  the  country.  Their  production  largely  depends  on 
imported intermediate inputs, capital goods and commodities, which exposes them to the risk 
of supply-chain disruptions as well as lower global demand from third countries. Producers of 
automotive supplies have already faced a shortage of components imported from China since 
January, due to  COVID-related factory closures there. On the domestic side, the production 
and internal trade lockdown has already led to a massive drop in output and large layoffs and 
pay  cuts  in  the  workforce.  In  comparison  with  regional  peers,  tourism  assumes  a  less 
important  role  in  the  country’s  economy,  but  it  is  severely  hit  by  the  crisis,  with  strong 
repercussions on activity and employment in transport and trade. 

Table 4: Selected Macro-Economic indicators for North Macedonia 

Indicator 
Real GDP change, % 
Consumer price inflation, %, end of period 
Key monetary policy rate, %, end of period 
Unemployment rate, % 
General government balance, % of GDP 
Public debt, % of GDP 
Current account balance, % of GDP 
International reserves, USD billion 
International reserves, months of imports 
Gross external debt, % of GDP 
Foreign direct investment, % of GDP 
Sources: WIIW, IMF 

2014 
3.6 
-0.6 
3.3 
28.0 
-4.2 
45.7 
-0.5 
2.7 
4.9 
70.0 
2.4 

2015 
3.9 
-0.3 
3.3 
26.1 
-3.4 
46.6 
-2.0 
2.2 
4.9 
69.3 
2.4 

2016 
2.8 
-0.3 
3.8 
23.7 
-2.7 
48.7 
-2.9 
2.5 
4.0 
74.7 
3.5 

2017 
1.1 
2.4 
3.3 
22.4 
-2.8 
47.6 
-1.0 
2.5 
4.2 
73.4 
1.8 

2018 
2.7 
0.8 
2.5 
20.7 
-1.1 
48.6 
-0.1 
3.0 
4.2 
73.3 
5.7 

2019 
3.6 
0.4 
2.3 
17.3 
-2.1 
48.8 
-2.8 
3.3 
4.5 
72.2 
1.8 

The  authorities  have  taken  swift  and  decisive  action  to  mitigate  the  socioeconomic 
impact of the crisis.  After the central bank lowered the key policy rate and adopted measures 
to  ease  credit  extension,  the  government  followed  with  two  packages  of  economic  support 
measures.  A  first  set  targets  the  most  impacted  sectors,  and  includes  interest-free  loans  for 
SMEs; subsidies to employee benefits for  April to June, by up to 50% of the average salary 
paid in 2019 totalling EUR 120 million; and, exemptions from personal and corporate income 
tax, for April, May and June. A second set of measures, totalling EUR 200 million, includes 
financial  support  for  private  firms  affected  by  the  crisis;  delay  of  loan  repayments;  and  a 
further EUR 8 million in interest-free loans to SMEs.  

Fiscal  space  to  accommodate  the  economic  fallout  from  the  crisis  is  limited.  The 
government expects a revenue shortfall of between 20-40% this year, compared to the original 
budget.  It  plans  to  reallocate  budgeted  expenditure  towards  the  health  sector  and  the  new 
economic  measures,  without  increasing  the  expenditure  ceiling.  In  general,  fiscal  space  for 
discretionary  measures  to  cope  with  the  multiple  shocks  is  limited.  Low  tax  rates,  a  large 
array of tax expenditures, and persistent shortcomings in revenue collection have contributed 
to  a  decline  in  public  revenue  ratios  in  recent  years,  adding  to  fiscal  risks  from  a  rising 
pension  deficit  and  high  indebtedness  of  public  enterprises.  The  share  of  transfers  in  total 
public  expenditure  of  the  general  government  has  risen  from  51%  in  2014  to  57%  in  2019. 
Moreover,  particularly  high  refinancing  needs  are  arising  in  2020-2021,  including  for  the 
amortisation of two maturing Eurobonds, part of a World Bank PBG, and large commercial 
loans  of  the  Public  Enterprise  for  State  Roads,  which  is  tasked  with  the  implementation  of 
major  road  transport  infrastructure.  North  Macedonia  has  requested  emergency  assistance 
from the IMF in the form of a Rapid Financing Instrument (RFI), which amounts to EUR 177 

9 

 
million,  and  was  approved  by  the  IMF  Board  on  10  April.  Current  estimates  point  to  a 
remaining  financing  gap  of  around  EUR  330  million  after  IMF,  World  Bank  and  EU  grant 
funding.  

1.3.2  Eastern Partnership countries 

Georgia 

Notwithstanding  strong  growth  in  2019,  Georgia  is  heading  for  a  deep  recession  this 
year.  Robust  real  GDP  growth  (of  5%)  was  recorded  in  2019,  but  in  March  2020  activity 
came  to  an  abrupt  halt  as  measures  to  contain  the  spread  of  the  virus  kicked  in.  Georgia 
declared  a  state  of  emergency,  restricted  travel  and  closed  all  but  essential  shops,  and  later 
introduced  a  nationwide  lockdown  and  curfew.  Given  the  importance  of  the  tourism  sector 
(where revenues in foreign currency were equivalent to 19% of GDP in 2019), the impact of 
the travel ban and the global recession on the outlook is set to be severe. While the depth and 
length  of  the  recession  is  uncertain,  it  can  be  expected  to  be  broad-based.  Recent  estimates 
taking  into  account  the  impact  of  the  virus  suggest  an  annual  contraction  of  around  4%, 
assuming that the economy will start to recover in the fourth quarter of the year.  

Georgia has limited space to address the crisis. The budget deficit widened in 2019, despite 
the  solid  growth  performance.  This  reflects,  in  part,  efforts  to  strengthen  capital  and  social 
spending, in an attempt to improve education and infrastructure to strengthen the economy’s 
growth potential further out. The higher deficit, together with lari depreciation (by 6% in 2019 
against  the  euro),  contributed  to  an  increase  in  the  public  debt  ratio  to  about  41%  of  GDP. 
Georgia’s international reserves rose last  year (totalling USD 3.5 billion at the end of 2019, 
which corresponds to around 4 months of imports). However, in March 2020, the central bank 
drew  on  its  reserves  to  intervene  against  the  depreciation  of  the  currency  (down  by  15%  in 
March  against  the  euro).  Measures  to  contain  the  economic  fallout  of  the  crisis  initially 
targeted  the  sectors  most  affected  (hotels,  restaurants,  travel  agencies  etc.)  and  included 
postponement  of  taxes,  as  well  as  subsidised  loans.  More  recently,  the  government  has 
announced  a  further  support  package  to  mitigate  the  impact  of  the  crisis.  Specific  measures 
are  to  include  time-limited  support  to  employees  who  lost  their  jobs,  transfers  to  SMEs  to 
subsidise labour costs, electricity subsidies to poorer households etc.  

Georgia’s balance of payments and public finances have come under heavy pressure due 
to the COVID-19 crisis, and Georgia has asked the EU, the IMF and other international 
partners  for  additional  support  to  cover  the  financing  gap.  The  2020  budget  deficit  is 
expected to  increase from the 2.4% envisaged in the budget law to more than 8% of GDP due 
to  lower  revenues  in  the  recession,  increased  expenditures  for  support  to  companies  and 
individuals affected by the crisis, as well as increased healthcare spending. Georgia’s balance 
of payment will deteriorate due to lower revenues from export of services (tourism, transport), 
lower inflows of remittances (which  are  equivalent  to  10% of GDP), likely lower inflow of 
FDI and an outflow of portfolio capital. This may be partially counterbalanced by a reduction 
in the goods trade deficit due to import compression on faltering domestic demand.   

The external funding gap is tentatively estimated by the IMF at USD 1.6 billion in 2020-
2021, and Georgia will need assistance from its international partners to cover this gap. The 
IMF has an Extended Fund Facility programme with Georgia, valid until April 2021, of USD 
290 million, most of which has already been disbursed. On 14 April the authorities concluded 
a  staff  level  agreement  with  the  IMF  providing  for  an  augmentation  of  this  programme  by 
approx. USD 375 million, of which USD 308 million to be disbursed in 2020. They are also 
negotiating with several partners, including the World Bank, ADB, AFD, KfW and EIB about 

10 

 
augmenting  policy-based  loans.  On  current  information,  around  75%  of  the  estimated 
financing gap for this year remains to be filled.  

Georgia has an ongoing EU MFA programme. The first instalment of EUR 20 million was 
disbursed to Georgia in December 2018. The second (and final) instalment of EUR 25 million 
(EUR  5  million  in  grants  and  EUR  20  million  in  loans)  is  expected  to  be  disbursed  in  the 
second  quarter  of  2020  subject  to  implementation  of  the  agreed  policy  conditions;  most  of 
them have already been met. However, reflecting the escalating COVID-19 induced crisis and 
as an important element of the support to close the financing gap, in addition to the ongoing 
MFA, a new and higher EU MFA programme is needed for Georgia.  

Table 5: Selected Macro-Economic indicators for Georgia 

Indicator 
Real GDP change, % 
Consumer price inflation, %, end of period 
Key monetary policy rate, %, end of period 
Unemployment rate, % LFS 
General government balance, % of GDP 
Gross public debt, % of GDP 
Current account balance, % of GDP 
International reserves, USD billion 
International reserves, months of imports 
Gross external debt, % of GDP 
Foreign direct investment, % of GDP 
Sources: Geostat, Ministry of Finance, National Bank of Georgia 

2014 
4.6 
0.0 
4.0 
14.6 
-2.3 
37.2 
-10.8 
2.7 
3.7 
84.7 
8.7 

2015 
2.9 
0.0 
8.0 
14.1 
-1.2 
36.8 
-12.7 
2.5 
3.6 
109.6 
10.2 

The Republic of Moldova 

2016 
2.8 
1.8 
6.5 
14.0 
-1.7 
40,.3 
-13.1 
2.8 
3.5 
110.7 
8.6 

2017 
4.8 
6.7 
7.3 
13.9 
-1.3 
39.9 
-8.7 
3.0 
3.4 
106,9 
11.2 

2018 
4.7 
1.5 
7.0 
12.7 
-1.8 
39.9 
-7.4 
3.3 
3.4 
101.2 
7.0 

2019 
5.1 
7.0 
9.0 
10.9 
-3.3 
41.2 
-5.1 
3.5 
4.0 
105.1 
7.2 

A  recession  appears  unavoidable  in  the  Republic  of  Moldova  (referred  to  as  Moldova 
hereafter).  GDP  rose  by  3.6%  in  real  terms  in  2019,  on  the  back  of  rising  investments,  in 
particular.  The  impact  of  the  measures  to  halt  the  spread  of  the  corona  virus  (including 
declaring a state of emergency) and the fallout from the global recession are set to bring the 
economy to a standstill. Although surrounded by signficant uncertainty, the outlook for 2020 
is  for  a  deep  recession.  Moldova  is  particularly  affected  by  disruptions  to  migrant  work 
(remittances account for 15% of GDP in Moldova) and decreased trade with countries hit by 
the  crisis,  in  particular  EU  member  states  such  as  Romania,  Italy  and  Germany.  The 
inflationary pressures that built up in 2019, when consumer price inflation stood at 7.5%, are 
fading fast. This reflects to some extent a monetary tightening in the course of 2019, but also 
the current slump in demand. 

Moldova has some space to counteract the shock from the COVID-19 crisis, but not for 
long  and  clearly  within  limits.  The  budget  deficit  declined  to  1.5%  of  GDP  in  2019, 
following a number of fiscal measures, taken in cooperation with the IMF, that reined in the 
deficit. The deficit was set to increase this year to finance rising capital expenditures. Funds 
of  some  of  these  planned  infrastructure  investment  projects  are  now  being  reallocated  to 
finance expenditures related to the crisis. Public debt decreased in 2019 to 27% of GDP. The 
deficit  is  primarily  financed  through  the  issuance  of  domestic  bonds  and  by  IFIs  and  other 
international  assistance  as  Moldova  has  a  restricted  access  to  international  capital  markets. 
International  reserves  rose  last  year  to  stand  at  USD  3.1  billion  at  the  end  of  2019 
(corresponding to about 5 months of imports).  

Moldova’s balance of payments and public finance have come under heavy pressure due 
to the COVID-19 crisis. Already before the crisis, the current account deficit was significant 

11 

 
at around 10% of GDP in the last years. The external funding gap is tentatively estimated at 
USD  800  million  (about  7%  of  GDP)  in  2020  and  the  fiscal  financing  gap  is  estimated  at 
MDL  10.5  billion  (around  USD  550  million).  A  three-year  EFF/ECF  programme  with  the 
IMF  came  to  an  end  in  March  2020  and  Moldova  had  already  expressed  interest  in  a 
successor  arrangement  before  the  COVID-19  crisis.  The  IMF  has  extended  about  USD  240 
million  (EUR  220  million)  to  mitigate  the  economic  effects  of  the  COVID-19  crisis.  One-
third  of  the  RCF/RFI  came  from  the  PGRT  at  0%  interest  rate  and  two-thirds  from  general 
resources at less than 2% interest rate.  Moldova has an ongoing MFA programme where the 
second and third instalments of EUR 70 million in total can be disbursed if the conditions are 
met before the programme expires in July 2020. In addition, already announced credits from 
Russia  of  EUR  200  million  for  2020,  which  were  primarily  aimed  for  infrastructure 
investments, could be reallocated to address the effects of the crisis. However, given the weak 
and deteriorating balance of payments situation and the limited access to international capital 
markets,  Moldova  would  be  in  need  of  additional  assistance  to  cover  the  external  financing 
gap.  

Table 6: Selected Macro-Economic indicators for Moldova 

Indicator 
Real GDP change, % 
Consumer price inflation, %, end of period 
Key monetary policy rate, %, end of period 
Unemployment rate, % LFS 
General government balance, % of GDP 
Public debt, % of GDP 
Current account balance, % of GDP 
International reserves, USD billion 
International reserves, months of imports 
Gross external debt, % of GDP 
Foreign direct investment, % of GDP 
Sources: Moldovian National Bureau of Statistics, National Bank of Moldova, Moldova Ministry of Finance 

2018 
4.3 
0.9 
6.5 
3.0 
-0.8 
30.1 
-10.6 
3.0 
5.5 
65.1 
2.4 

2016 
4.4 
2.4 
9.0 
4.2 
-1.6 
36.9 
-3.5 
2.2 
4.9 
76.6 
0.9 

2015 
-0.3 
13.6 
19.5 
5.0 
-1.9 
29.7 
-5.9 
1.8 
4.7 
78.4 
2.8 

2017 
4.7 
7.3 
6.5 
3.9 
-0.6 
32.7 
-5.7 
2.8 
5.3 
71.8 
1.5 

2014 
5.0 
4.7 
6.5 
3.9 
-1.5 
27.3 
-5.9 
2.2 
5.8 
68.0 
3.2 

2019 
3.6 
7.5 
5.5 
3.9 
-1.5 
27.4 
-9.7 
3.1 
5.2 
63.1 
4.6 

Ukraine 

After a significant improvement in Ukraine’s macroeconomic situation over the past few 
years  (up  to  the  third  quarter  of  2019),  the  outlook  deteriorated  rapidly  in  March 
following  an  abrupt  government  reshuffle  which  coincided  with  the  outbreak  of  the 
global  coronavirus  crisis.  Real  GDP  growth  reached  3.2%  in  2019,  after  a  disappointing 
fourth  quarter  (+1.5%  only),  in  particular  in  the  industrial  and  agricultural  sectors.  While 
gross  fixed  capital  formation  strengthened  somewhat  to  18%  of  GDP,  it  still  remains  far 
below the 25%-30% range typical for emerging and developing economies. In the second half 
of 2019, strengthened demand to hold the hryvnia in the context of a bank-credit contraction 
kept  inflationary  pressures  down  and  the  consumer-price  index  fell  below  the  5%  target  in 
December 2019. Foreign reserves continued to grow in 2019 (reaching the equivalent of EUR 
23.7 billion at the end of February 2020, which corresponds to above 4 months of imports). 
However, following the  loss of confidence  around a  government  reshuffling in  early March 
and  the  corona-virus  outbreak  and  ensuing  containment  measures,  the  earlier  exchange-rate 
appreciation (+16% in 2019 against the US dollar) was quickly erased (-20% by end-March 
2020).  In  this  context,  the  demand  to  hold  hryvnia  weakened  and  the  National  Bank  of 
Ukraine  (NBU)  had  to  intervene  selling  the  equivalent  of  about  EUR  2  billion  in  March, 
which  reduced  official  international  reserves  by  more  than  8%.  Following  containment 
measures since mid-March, similar to those adopted in other countries, economic activity has 
been curtailed. Analysts expect a deep recession (with the GDP fall ranging between 4% and 

12 

 
9%)  in  2020.  To  ensure  the  sustainability  of  the  recovery,  the  reform  effort  pursued  so  far 
must be kept, in particular to overcome vested interests and corruption, to further improve the 
business climate, and to advance privatisation and liberalisation in key sectors such as energy. 

The  economic  recession  is  expected  to  result  in  a  severe  deterioration  of  the  budget, 
which will test the sustainability of the buffers that Ukraine has managed to build up so 
far. The steady economic improvements over the past years allowed Ukraine to strengthen its 
public finances. The budget deficit fell below 2% for the last three years and the consolidated 
public  debt-to-GDP  ratio  decreased  to  44.3%  of  GDP  in  2019,  or  51½%  when  government 
guarantees  are  included.  This  rather  positive  environment  has  enabled  the  Ukrainian 
authorities  to  take  a  number  of  anti-coronavirus  crisis  measures  including  limited  and 
temporary  tax  relief,  as  well  as  one-off  income  support  for  pensioners  and  the  most 
vulnerable. The revised 2020 budget,  adopted by the parliament  on 13 April, provides for a 
EUR 2.5 billion coronavirus fund for immediate measures to counter the spread of COVID-
19,  including  support  to  doctors  and  procurement  of  medical  equipment.  Monetary  policy 
measures have also been deployed: the NBU cut interest rates; extended the frequency and the 
maturity of its liquidity-providing operations; introduced a new loan facility, with a maturity 
of up to five years, to stimulate bank credit in hryvnia; and introduced capital-relief measures 
for the banks. 

It  is  unlikely  that  the  government  of  Ukraine  can  finance  all  of  its  2020-2021  funding 
needs  at  the  domestic  and  international  financial  markets.  In  light  of  the  expected 
recession-driven  deterioration  of  public  finances,  the  Ukrainian  parliament  revised  the  2020 
budgetary deficit to 7.5% of GDP, or the equivalent of USD 10.5 billion. While some of the 
budget  deficit  can  be  financed  domestically,  the  government  also  has  USD  5  billion  in 
external  debt  repayments  falling  due  in  2020.  The  IMF  estimates  the  overall  external 
financing gap to be around USD 12 billion in 2020. Against this backdrop, the IMF agreed to 
increase the size of its recently negotiated three-year programme from USD 5.5 billion to up 
to USD 10 billion, of which USD 3.5 billion would become available this year. Along with a 
World  Bank  loan  and  the  remaining  EUR  500  million  tranche  of  the  EU’s  existing  MFA 
programme (for which conditions have been fulfilled and which can be disbursed as soon as 
the prior actions for the new IMF programme have been implemented), around USD 5 billion 
of financing are available. The remainder of the USD 12 billion gap would need to be covered 
through additional official financing or through a drawdown of official international reserves.  

Table 7: Selected Macro-Economic indicators for Ukraine 

Indicator 
Real GDP change, % 
Consumer price inflation, %, end of period 
Key monetary policy rate, %, end of period 
Unemployment rate, % LFS 
General government balance, % of GDP 
Gross public debt, % of GDP 
Current account balance, % of GDP 
Official international reserves, USD billion 
Official reserves, months of imports 
Gross external debt, % of GDP 
Foreign direct investment, % of GDP 
Sources: National Bank of Ukraine, Ministry of Finance of Ukraine 

2014 
-6.6 
17.5 
14.0 
9.3 
-4.5 
59.7 
-3.2 
7.5 
1.8 
94.1 
0.2 

2015 
-9.8 
43.4 
22.0 
9.1 
-1.6 
67.1 
2.3 
13.3 
3.0 
129.5 
3.3 

2016 
2.4 
12.4 
14.0 
9.3 
-2.3 
69.2 
-1.3 
15.5 
3.0 
120.7 
3.5 

2017 
2.5 
13.7 
14.5 
9.5 
-1.4 
61.5 
-2.2 
18.8 
3.2 
102.9 
2.3 

2018 
3.3 
9.8 
18.0 
8.8 
-1.9 
52.2 
-3.3 
20.8 
3.3 
87.7 
1.8 

2019 
3.2 
4.1 
13.5 
8.2 
-2.0 
44.3 
-0.8 
25.3 
4.0 
79.5 
1.6 

13 

 
1.3.3  Southern neighbourhood countries 

Jordan 

The  impact  of  the  coronavirus  outbreak  on  economic  prospects  is  expected  to  be 
significant and is likely to plunge Jordan into a recession in 2020. In mid-March, Jordan 
announced strict measures to contain the spread of the virus, including closure of businesses 
and banks, travel routes and restrictions on public life. These will affect the domestic services 
sector,  as  well  as  tourism,  which  accounts  for  around  11%  of  GDP.  Even  before  the 
coronavirus outbreak, Jordan was on a slow growth trajectory, with a steady pace of 2% real 
GDP expansion per year between 2016 and 2019. In the same context, COVID19 is expected 
to affect foreign direct investments which already weakened to an average of 2.1% of GDP in 
the period 2018-2019 from 4.5% of GDP in the period 2016-2017. The subdued growth has 
had a negative effect on the labour market, with unemployment increasing over the years to 
reach  19%  in  2019.  This  is  at  risk  of  increasing  further,  depending  on  the  duration  of  the 
lockdown.  

In  an  effort  to  limit  the  economic  damage  from  the  pandemic,  Jordan  has  deployed 
primarily  monetary  policy  measures.  Jordan’s  central  bank  cut  compulsory  reserves  for 
commercial banks to 5% from 7% to inject more than JOD 500 million (USD 700 million) of 
extra liquidity and reduced the rate in all monetary instruments by 100 basis points. However, 
the effectiveness of these measures is likely to be curtailed by the lockdown. Furthermore, the 
central  bank’s  room  to  lower  interest  rates  further  and  to  provide  for  liquidity  injections  is 
limited  by  the  exchange  rate  peg  to  the  US  dollar.  Positively,  the  current-account  deficit 
narrowed significantly to 3.4% of GDP in  the  first  three quarters of 2019 from  9.3% in  the 
same  period  of  2018,  driven  largely  by  the  favourable  development  of  the  goods  trade 
balance.  While  part  of  this  improvement  reflected  a  drop  in  import-intensive  FDI,  which 
muted the impact on the overall balance of payments, foreign reserves nonetheless increased 
mildly at the end of 2019 to USD 12.2 billion (USD 14.3 billion including gold) or around 7 
months of imports. The fall in the oil prices is expected to have a positive effect in the balance 
of payments in 2020. However, given the disruptive effect of the lockdown to the economy, 
the  regional  uncertainty,  the  widening  of  the  current  account,  the  easing  of  the  monetary 
policy  in  relation  to  the  peg  with  the  US  dollar  and  the  existence  of  large  obligations  in 
foreign currency (Eurobond of USD 1.25 billion due in October 2020), there is clearly a need 
for Jordan to preserve its foreign reserve buffer. 

Fiscal policy space is severely limited in Jordan. Fiscal consolidation was not sustained in 
2019  and  the  deficit  slipped  from  2.4%  in  2018  to  3.4%  in  2019  (including  grants).  As  a 
result, Jordan has not managed to contain the steady and long-standing upward trend in gross 
public  debt,  which  stood  at  96.6%  of  GDP  at  end-2019.  This  is  very  high  for  an  emerging 
market  country;  in  fact,  without  foreign  support  through  grants  and  highly  concessional 
lending,  debt  would  already  be  unsustainable.  The  fiscal  trajectory  is  expected  to  worsen 
severely  in  2020.  The  lockdown  of  the  economy  is  expected  to  have  a  grave  impact  on 
revenue collection while additional spending will be required to support the health system. As 
a result, the fiscal deficit is very likely to widen in 2020 and gross public debt to exceed 100% 
of GDP. The surge in the interest rates for emerging countries following the outbreak of the 
coronavirus increases the importance of concessional lending for financing the fiscal deficit.   

Jordan  has  access  to  a  new,  four-year  arrangement  under  the  IMF’s  Extended  Fund 
Facility  (EFF)  of  around  USD  1.3  billion.  This  was  approved  by  the  IMF  Board  on  25 
March  2020.  However,  and  following  the  outbreak  of  the  coronavirus,  the  macro-economic 
framework has worsened steeply and the IMF programme is likely to be re-designed as new 

14 

 
considerable financing needs have emerged. The IMF has called publicly for the continuation 
of donor support as  a critical  element  for the success  of its programme.  In view of the new 
financing needs that have emerged, Jordan has requested an increase in its IMF resources on 
top of the USD 1.3 billion of approved in the context of the EFF programme. 

Furthermore, Jordan has access to an existing EU MFA operation of EUR 500 million. 
The corresponding MFA Decision was adopted by the EP and the Council in January 2020. 
The MoU is currently under negotiation where a first disbursement could potentially be made 
in  May/June  2020.  The  COVID-19  crisis  calls  for  a  reinforcement  of  the  resources  of  the 
MFA  programme  that  was  approved  in  January  2020  as  around  USD  1.5  billion  of  the 
estimated financing gap for 2020 remains to be filled.  

Table 8: Selected Macro-Economic indicators for Jordan 

Indicator 
Real GDP change, % 
Consumer price inflation, %, end of period 
Key monetary policy rate, %, end of period 
Unemployment rate, % LFS 
General government balance, % of GDP 
Gross public debt, % of GDP 
Current account balance, % of GDP 
International reserves, USD billion 
International reserves, months of imports 
Gross external public debt, % of GDP 
Foreign direct investment, % of GDP 
Source: Central Bank of Jordan, Ministry of Finance of Jordan, IMF 

2014 
3.1 
1.7 
4.0 
11.9 
-2.3 
89.1 
-7.2 
14.7 
7.0 
31.6 
5.8 

2015 
2.4 
-1.6 
3.8 
13.1 
-3.5 
93.4 
-9.1 
15.7 
8.3 
34.9 
4.2 

2016 
2.0 
0.8 
3.8 
15.3 
-3.2 
93.6 
-9.8 
14.8 
8.1 
37.0 
3.9 

2017 
2.0 
3.2 
5.0 
18.3 
-2.6 
94.3 
-10.8 
15.0 
7.8 
41.1 
5.0 

2018 
1.9 
4.5 
5.8 
18.6 
-2.4 
94.4 
-7.0 
12.9 
6.8 
40.3 
2.3 

2019  Dates 

1.9  Q1-Q3 2019 
0.3  End-2019 
5.0  End-2019 
19.1  Q3 2019 
-3.4  End-2019 
96.6  End-2019 
-3.4  Q1-Q3 2019 
14.3  End-2019 
7.7  End-2019 
39.6  Q3 2019 

2.1  Q1-Q3 2019 

Tunisia 

The  country  will  likely  plunge  into  a  recession  in  2020,  as  activity  will  be  negatively 
affected by the collapse in global demand and the effect of containment measures introduced 
in  mid-March  to  halt  the  spread  of  the  coronavirus.  The  government  suspended  all 
international flights and closed its borders, introduced a lockdown and a twelve-hour nightly 
curfew. On the external side, the sharply deteriorating economic cycle in Europe will impact 
economic performance, given close industrial and trade links, as well as the expected drop in 
the  tourism  sector.  The  downturn  will  put  additional  severe  pressure  on  employment  and 
social  stability.  It  will  also  result  in  a  further  severe  deterioration  of  the  budget,  reducing 
revenues  and  putting  additional  pressure  on  expenditure  to  support  the  economy  and  the 
health system. Having grown at just 1.6% per year on average over the past five years and at 
only 1% in 2019, Tunisia will face a recession in 2020 with very limited policy buffers. 

Several policy measures have been adopted to mitigate the economic impact of the crisis. 
On the monetary side, this includes a 100 basis points interest rate cut and liquidity support 
measures. A fiscal support package (worth around 2% of GDP) has been approved, providing 
financial assistance to poor families, delaying tax debts and loan payments. The government 
also announced financial measures including a support mechanism to lower interest rates on 
investment  loans,  a  state  guarantee  for  new  credits  (TND  500  million,  equivalent  to  around 
EUR 158 million) and a new investment fund (TND 600 million, equivalent to around EUR 
190 million)..  

Although  Tunisia  had  a  reasonably  good  year  in  2019,  macroeconomic  imbalances 
persist,  policy  space  remains  limited  and  financing  needs  are  high.  Tunisia  managed  to 
reduce its public deficit somewhat in 2018-2019, but it remains relatively elevated at 3.5% of 

15 

 
GDP, notably in combination with a lacklustre growth performance. Public debt reached 72% 
of GDP at the end of 2019. The recession is expected to result in a severe deterioration of the 
budget, reducing revenues while additional spending will be required to support the economy 
and the health system. As a result, the fiscal deficit will likely widen significantly in 2020 and 
the public debt will increase. The current-account deficit narrowed to 8.8% of GDP in 2019 
(from double digits previously) and foreign reserves rose from a dangerously low level of just 
69  days  of  imports  in  September  2018  to  around  115  days  of  imports  in  March  2020. 
However,  increased  tourism  receipts  and  remittances  were  largely  behind  this  positive 
development  in  2019.  Both  will  be  severely  affected  by  the  COVID-19  crisis  due  to  closed 
borders and temporary income losses in host countries of Tunisian labour migrants.  

The government will most likely not be able to cover its financing needs from domestic 
and  international  markets  in  2020-2021.  The  government  expects  a  larger  than  projected 
fiscal deficit in 2020 (to an estimated 4.3 % of GDP) for which about USD1 billion (or 2.6% 
of  GDP)  in  additional  external  financing  would  still  need  to  be  mobilized.  The  balance  of 
payments needs will be even larger (around 4.7% of GDP), given the expected fallout of the 
pandemic  on  the  private  sector  and  its  access  to  external  financing.  The  sharp  decline  in 
remittances  and  tourism  (over  7%  of  GDP),  despite  lower  oil  prices,  will  also  lead  to  a 
shortfall  of  foreign  exchange  revenues.  The  government  needs  around  USD  3.5  billion  in 
external financing and will have to repay USD 1.6 billion on its external debt during the year, 
with  reimbursement  peaks  in  April  and  June  putting  pressure  on  liquidity.  Moreover, 
financing  needs  are  set  to  increase  further  in  line  with  the  COVID-19  fiscal  impact  and 
response, while access to financial markets will remain very challenging during the year. The 
foreseen Eurobond emission for 2020 (originally USD 1.1 billion) will most probably have to 
be cancelled or delayed. While domestic financing might continue to be available, the country 
faces a situation in which, after IMF and World Bank loans, USD 2.5 billion of the external 
financing  needs  for  the  budget  remains  to  be  filled  through  foreign  partners  or  market 
issuance. 

Tunisia  has  requested  help  from  the  IMF.  In  response  to  the  COVID-19  crisis,  the  IMF 
approved on 10 April a USD 745 million emergency assistance loan under the RFI (100% of 
the quota). This emergency programme provides bridge financing until a new Extended Fund 
Facility programme will be worked out. The current EFF programme (approved in 2016) will 
be cancelled, as it is neither possible to run parallel programmes nor to complete a programme 
review given the current degree of uncertainty. The country’s existing EFF programme would 
have expired in May 2020 and still had USD 1.3 billion available, but had been dormant since 
before  the  October  2019  elections,  which  delivered  a  fragmented  parliament  and  turned  the 
formation of a government into a lengthy process.  

Tunisia  is  eligible  for  MFA  support.  The  country  completed  a  EUR  500  million  MFA 
operation in November 2019 and the authorities had expressed interest in further MFA even 
before  the  pandemic.  Previous  EU  policy  documents  have  publicly  confirmed  the  EU’s 
positive predisposition towards renewed MFA support for Tunisia.  

16 

 
Table 9: Selected Macro-Economic indicators for Tunisia 

Indicator 
Real GDP change, % 
Consumer price inflation, %, end of period 
Key monetary policy rate, %, end of period 
Unemployment rate, % LFS 
General government balance, % of GDP 
Gross Public debt, % of GDP 
Current account balance, % of GDP 
International reserves, USD billion 
International reserves, months of imports 
Gross external debt, % of GDP 
Foreign direct investment, % of GDP 
Other investment, % of GDP 
Sources: Tunisian National Institute of Statistics, Tunisian Ministry of Finance, Central Bank of Tunisia 

2017 
1.9 
6.2 
5.00 
15.4 
-6.2 
70.4 
-10.3 
5.6 
2.6 
86.2 
2.0 
6.9 

2018 
2.7 
7.5 
6.75 
15.5 
-4.8 
77.9 
-11.1 
5.3 
2.7 
99.4 
2.5 
8.6 

2014 
2.9 
4.8 
4.75 
15.0 
-5.0 
50.8 
-9.1 
7.7 
3.9 
63.7 
2.2 
7.8 

2016 
1.2 
4.2 
4.25 
15.5 
-6.1 
62.3 
-8.8 
6.0 
3.0 
75.2 
1.5 
5.5 

2015 
1.2 
4.1 
4.25 
15.2 
-4.8 
55.4 
-8.9 
7.4 
3.9 
68.4 
2.3 
6.5 

2019 
1.0 
6.0 
7.75 
15.2 
-3.5 
71.9 
-8.7 
7.4 
4.4 
103.5 
2.0 
10.9 

2 

OBJECTIVES AND RELATED INDICATORS OF THE MACRO-FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE 

2.1  Objectives 

The objectives of the proposed MFA operation are to:  

  Contribute  to  covering  the  external  financing  needs  of  the  partner  in  the  context  of  a 
significant  deterioration of the partner’s external  accounts brought  about  by the on-going 
COVID-19 crisis.  

  Alleviate the partner’s budgetary financing needs. 

  Support  the  fiscal  consolidation  effort  and  external  stabilisation  in  the  context  of  the 
foreseen  IMF  programme,  which  could,  exceptionally,  also  be  in  the  form  of  emergency 
funding from the IMF. 

  Support  structural  reforms  aimed  at  improving  the  overall  macroeconomic  management, 
strenghening  economic  governance  and  transparency,  and  improving  conditions  for 
sustainable growth. 

2.2  Conditionality 

In view of the critical  needs of the beneficiaries in  the context  of the escalating COVID-19 
crisis,  the proposed MFA programmes needs to  be prepared and  adapted to  be better fit for 
purpose at the current exceptional juncture. They have been bundled together to allow for a 
swifter  preparation  process;  they  are  valid  for  one  year  (compared  to  2.5  years  for  regular 
MFAs) and come with two disbursements only. To maintain the leverage of MFA and its role 
in fostering reforms, the second disbursement would still be linked to a limited set of reform 
actions. Thus, the assistance will be conditional on an IMF arrangement being in place and on 
the implementation by the partner of the aforementioned specific reform measures that will be 
agreed  by  the  Commission  on  behalf  of  the  EU  and  the  partner  in  a  Memorandum  of 
Understanding. 

17 

 
2.3 

Indicators 

The  fulfilment  of  the  objectives  of  the  assistance  will  be  assessed  by  the  Commission, 
including in the context of the ex-post evaluation (see below), on the basis of the following 
indicators:  

  Progress with macroeconomic and financial stabilisation and economic recovery from the 

COVID-19 crisis.  

  Progress with the implementation of reforms, notably the specific policy actions identified 
as  conditions  for  the  second  disbursement  of  the  assistance,  which  will  be  included  in 
Memoranda of Understanding. 

2.4  Delivery mechanisms 

The  proposed  new  MFA  operations  with  partners  would  amount  to  a  total  of  up  to 
EUR 3 billion. Regarding the form of the assistance, the Commission proposes to disburse the 
full amount in the form of medium-term loans, in two instalments partner. The decision on the 
respective  size  of  instalments  will  be  taken  on  a  case-by-case  basis  and  in  view  of  a  more 
complete  information  on  the  partner’s  financing  needs  and  the  timing  of  other  international 
financial support, including from the IMF. 

The preferred option is to disburse the assistance in two tranches, with the first tranche being 
conditional  on  the  IMF  arrangement  being  in  place,  and  the  second  tranche  being  also 
conditional  on  the  implementation  of  the  conditions  agreed  in  the  Memorandum  of 
Understanding. There will be a delay of at least three months between the two tranches. The 
disbursement of the first is expected to take place in around mid 2020, and the disbursement 
of the second instalment in the fourth quarter of 2020 or the first half of 2021.  

MFA  is  an  untied  and  undesignated  macroeconomic  support  instrument,  which  helps  the 
partner  meet  its  external  financing  needs,  and  may  contribute  to  alleviating  budgetary 
financing  needs.  The  funds  would  be  paid  to  the  Central  Bank  of  the  partner.  Subject  to 
provisions  to  be  agreed  in  the  Memorandum  of  Understanding,  including  a  confirmation  of 
residual budgetary financing needs, the funds may be transferred to the Ministry of Finance of 
the partner as the final beneficiary.  

2.5  Risk assessment 

There are fiduciary, policy and political risks related to the proposed MFA operation.  

There is a risk that the macro-financial assistance, which is not dedicated to specific expenses 
(contrary  to  project  financing,  for  example),  could  be  used  in  a  fraudulent  way.  In  general 
terms, this risk is related to factors such as the quality of management systems in the central 
bank and the Ministry of Finance, administrative procedures, control and oversight functions, 
the security of IT systems and the appropriatedness of internal and external audit capabilities.  

To  mitigate  the  risks  of  fraudulent  use,  several  measures  will  be  taken.  First,  the 
Memorandum of Understanding and the Loan Agreement will comprise a set of provisions on 
inspection,  fraud  prevention,  audits,  and  recovery  of  funds  in  case  of  fraud  or  corruption. 
Also,  the  assistance  will  be  paid  to  a  dedicated  account  at  the  Central  Bank  of  the  partner. 
Moreover,  alongside  reaching  an  agreement  on  the  Memorandum  of  Understanding,  the 
Commission  services  will  conduct,  if  deemed  necessary  with  the  support  of  external 
consultants, an Operational Assessment, in order to assess the reliability of financial circuits 

18 

 
and administrative procedures that are  relevant  to  this type of assistance and  will determine 
whether  the  framework  for  sound  financial  management  of  macro-financial  assistance  is 
sufficiently effective in the partner. The Commission is also using budget support under the 
European  Neighbourhood  Instrument  and  the  Instrument  for  Pre-Accession  to  help  the 
authorities  improve  their  public  finance  management  systems  and  these  efforts  are  strongly 
supported by other donors. The assistance will be liable to verification, control and auditing 
procedures  under  the  responsibility  of  the  Commission,  including  the  European  Antifraud 
Office (OLAF), and the European Court of Auditors.  

Finally,  there  are  economic  risks  stemming  from  a  possible  further  weakening  of  the 
European  and  global  economic  environment  (taking  into  account  the  partners’  high 
dependence  on  the  EU  markets),  which  would  have  an  important  effect  on  their  fiscal 
consolidation  efforts  even  if  the  necessary  reforms  have  been  put  in  place.  These  risks  are 
further reinforced if the agreed reform efforts are lacking or incomplete.  

Having made a thorough assessment of the risks, the Commission services consider that there 
are sufficiently strong grounds to proceed with the MFA to the partners.  

The  Commission  services  will  maintain  close  contacts  with  the  authorities  during  the 
implementation  of  the  macro-financial  assistance  in  order  to  address  quickly  any  concerns 
that may arise.  

3 

ADDED VALUE OF EU INVOLVEMENT 

The instrument of macro-financial assistance is a policy-based instrument directed to alleviate 
short-  and  medium-term  external  financial  needs.  In  the  context  of  the  current  COVID-19 
crisis,  MFA  will  help  to  provide  economic  policy  space  for  the  authorities  to  mount  an 
effective  economic  response  to  the  crisis.  By  helping  the  partner  overcome  the  economic 
difficulties  reinforced  by  the  COVID-19  crisis,  the  proposed  MFA  will  contribute  to 
promoting  macroeconomic  and  political  stability  in  the  partners.  MFA  will  complement  the 
resources made available by the international financial institutions, bilateral donors and other 
EU  financial  institutions.  In  doing  so,  it  will  contribute  to  the  overall  effectiveness  of  the 
financial  support provided by the international  community,  as well as of other EU financial 
assistance, including budgetary support operations. 

In addition to the financial impact of the MFA, the proposed programme will strengthen the 
governments’ reform commitment and their aspiration towards closer relations with the EU. 
This result will be achieved, inter alia, through appropriate conditionality for the disbursement 
of  the  assistance.  In  a  larger  context,  the  programme  will  signal  that  the  EU  continues    to 
support partners in moments of economic difficulties. 

4 

PLANNING OF FUTURE MONITORING AND EVALUATION 

Although  this  assistance  is  of  exceptional  macroeconomic  nature,  its  monitoring  and 
evaluation will be undertaken in line with the standard Commission procedures.  

4.1  Monitoring 

Monitoring  will  involve  the  review  of  reports  and  data  provided  by  the  authorities  and  by 
review  missions  to  the  partner  by  Commission  staff.  To  monitor  the  fulfilment  of  the 
objectives of the programme, the Commission will use two types of indicators:  

19 

 
  Existence  of  and  adherence  to  an  IMF-supported  programme,  including,  where  relevant, 
compliance  with  macroeconomic  performance  criteria  and  structural  reform  benchmarks 
identified under the IMF programme, as reported by the IMF in the context of the reviews 
of regular programmes.  

  Progress  in  the  implementation  of  structural  policy  indicators,  which  are  to  be  agreed 
separately  with  the  authorities  of  each  beneficiary  country  in  a  Memorandum  of 
Understanding.  It  is  foreseen  that  the  Commission  will  start  the  preparation  of  the 
Memoranda of Understanding before the formal adoption of the decision on the assistance. 
Ahead  of  the  second  disbursements  of  the  assistance,  the  authorities  will  be  asked  to 
submit a compliance statement in relation to the agreed policy conditionality. In addition, 
under  the  Memorandum  of  Understanding  monitoring  system,  the  authorities  will  be 
required to submit relevant economic and reform indicators.  

Although  this  assistance  is  centrally  managed,  where  appropriate,  the  EU  Delegation/EU 
Office  in  the  partner  will  also  be  called  to  provide  reporting.  An  annual  report  on 
developments  in  the  management  of  the  assistance  to  the  European  Parliament  and  to  the 
Council are foreseen.  

4.2  Evaluation 

Ex-post evaluations of macro-financial assistance operations are foreseen in the Multi-Annual 
Evaluation Programme of the Commission’s Directorate-General for Economic and Financial 
Affairs.  Ex-post  evaluations  of  the  proposed  macro-financial  assistance  operations  will  be 
launched within a period of two years after the completion of each operation. A provision for 
the ex-post evaluation is included in the proposed Decision for the assistance, and will also be 
included 
the 
macroeconomic assistance budget line will be used for this evaluation.  

the  Memorandum  of  Understanding.  Budget  appropriations  from 

in 

5 

ACHIEVING COST-EFFECTIVENESS 

The proposed assistance would entail a high degree of cost effectiveness for several reasons:  

  First,  since  the  assistance  would  be  leveraged  by  the  assistance  provided  by  the 
international  financial institutions, with  which, as noted, it would be closely coordinated, 
its ultimate impact could be very significant compared to its cost. Moreover, in negotiating 
specific policy conditions, the Commission will be able to draw on the expertise of those 
institutions,  including  the  International  Monetary  Fund  and  the  World  Bank,  and  to 
influence their conditionality as well in ways that will take into account the EU’s views.  

  Second, providing coordinated macroeconomic support to the partners on behalf of the EU 
Member States, the MFA would be more cost efficient than the provision of a similar total 
amount of financial support by EU Member States individually.  

  Third, all of the assistance would be provided in the form of loans, the budgetary impact of 

which is more limited. 

  In  addition,  the  Commission  will  aim  at  achieving  synergies  with  other  EU  policies  and 
instruments  used  to  support  the  implementation  by  the  beneficiaries  of  the  relevant 
measures.  

20