Opinion of the European Central Bank of 20 April 2020 on reform of Sveriges Riksbank (CON/2020/13)
Date: 2020-04-20
Institutions: European Central Bank
Subjects: financial stability, foreign-exchange reserves, legal basis, monetary policy, money, payment system

EN  

ECB-PUBLIC 

OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 

of 20 April 2020 

on reform of Sveriges Riksbank 

(CON/2020/13) 

Introduction and legal basis 

On 10 December 2019, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Swedish Ministry 

of Finance for an opinion on a proposal for amendments to the Swedish Instrument of Government, which 
forms part of the Swedish Constitution1, amendments to the Law on Parliament2, a new Law on Sveriges 

Riksbank  (hereinafter  the  ‘draft  law  on  Sveriges  Riksbank’),  amendments  to  the  Law  on  exchange  rate 
policy3,  and  amendments  to  the  draft  Law  on  the  National  Debt  Office’s  borrowing  for  the  needs  of 
Sveriges Riksbank 4 (hereinafter referred to collectively as the ‘draft law’). The draft law is contained within 

a  Swedish  Government  Official  Report  (2019:46  A  new  law  on  Sveriges  Riksbank)  (hereinafter  the 

‘Report’) by a Committee of Inquiry on Sveriges Riksbank (hereinafter the ‘Committee’). 

The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the 

Functioning of the European Union (hereinafter the ‘Treaty’) and the second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth 
indents  of  Article 2(1)  of  Council  Decision  98/415/EC5,  as  the  draft  law  concerns  means  of  payment, 

Sveriges  Riksbank,  the  collection,  compilation  and  distribution  of  monetary,  financial  and  banking 

statistics,  payment  and  settlement  systems  and  rules  applicable  to  financial  institutions  insofar  as  they 

materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence 

of  Article 17.5  of  the  Rules  of  Procedure  of  the  European  Central  Bank,  the  Governing  Council  has 

adopted this opinion. 

1. 

1.1 

1 
2 
3 
4 
5 

6 

Purpose of the draft law 

As noted  by  the Committee in the Report, the Law on Sveriges Riksbank6 entered  into force in 

1989. The Law was largely framed in the second half of the 1980s when the exchange rate was 

fixed  in  Sweden  and  the  financial  system  had  a  completely  different  appearance.  Since  then 

there  have  been  great  changes  in  the  economic  policy  landscape,  including,  for  instance, 

changes  to  the  Swedish  exchange  rate  regime,  the  deregulation  and  internationalisation  of 

Kungörelse (1974:152) om beslutad ny regeringsform. 

Riksdagsordningen (2014:801). 
Lagen (1998:1404) om valutapolitik. 

Förslag till lag om Riksgäldskontorets upplåning för Riksbankens behov. 
Council  Decision  98/415/EC  of  29 June  1998  on  the  consultation  of  the  European  Central  Bank  by  national 
authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42). 

Lag (1988:1385) om Sveriges Riksbank. 

  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
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financial markets and Swedish membership of the Union. In the aftermath of the global financial 

crisis  considerable  changes  have  also  been  made  to  the  international  and  European  regulatory 

frameworks  in  order  to  promote  financial  stability.  In  Sweden,  the  Finansinspektionen  (SFSA, 

Swedish  Financial  Supervisory  Authority)  has  been  given  responsibility  for  macroprudential 

policies  and  the  Riksgäldskontoret  (NDO,  Swedish  National  Debt  Office)  has  been  given 

responsibility for resolution. Moreover, as a result of technological development and digitalisation, 

extensive  and  rapid  change  has  occurred  in  the  payment  market,  which  has  affected  Sveriges 

Riksbank’s  activities  in  the  payment  system.  The  conditions  for  Sveriges  Riksbank’s  cash 
activities have also been affected by the rapid decrease in the use of cash in Sweden7. 

1.2 

As  a  result  of  the  institutional  and  economic  changes  that  have  taken  place  over  the  past  30 

years, many parts of the Law on Sveriges Riksbank are, according to the Committee, outdated. 

According  to  the  Committee,  this,  in  turn,  contributes  to  a  lack  of  clarity  regarding  Sveriges 

Riksbank’s  responsibility  in  the  area  of  financial  stability,  its  objectives,  tasks  and  powers  in 

relation  to  monetary  policy  and  its  international  activities,  cash  activities  and  responsibility  to 

maintain  preparedness  for  contingencies.  There  are  also  some  unclear  points  concerning  the 

powers and distribution of responsibility in the management of Sveriges Riksbank, both within the 
Executive Board and between the Executive Board and the Governing Council8. 

1.3 

In  the  light  of  this  new  situation,  the  Committee  was  given  the  task  of  reviewing  the  monetary 

policy  framework  and  the  Law  on  Sveriges  Riksbank.  In  the  Report  the  Committee  analyses, 

reviews  and  proposes  amendments  in  the  following  areas:  (1)  the  objectives  of  the  monetary 

policy and the means by which it is carried out; (2) Sveriges Riksbank’s responsibility regarding 

financial  stability;  (3)  Sveriges  Riksbank’s  institutional  independence,  organisation  and  role  in 

international  contexts;  (4)  democratic  scrutiny  of  Sveriges  Riksbank;  and  (5) cash  activities  and 
preparedness for contingencies in the payment system9. 

1.4 

A  significant  change  proposed  in  the  draft  law  is  that  if  Sveriges  Riksbank  decides  on  the 

formulation  of  a  price  stability  objective,  its  Executive  Board  will  submit  a  request  to  the 

Parliament for approval of this objective. If the Parliament does not approve the request, Sveriges 

Riksbank’s immediately preceding decision  on the formulation of the price stability objective will 
continue  to  apply10.  According  to  the  Committee,  the  price  stability  objective  would,  for  this 

purpose, cover the target variable (inflation target, price level target or mean inflation), the target 
level  (growth  rate)  and  the  price  index 11.  Currently,  Sveriges  Riksbank  can  amend  the 

specification of the price stability target without any requirement for approval from the Parliament. 

1.5 

A  notable  structural  change  proposed  by  the  draft  law  is  that  in  the  draft  law  on  Sveriges 

Riksbank  there  is  a  division  between  (1)  Sveriges  Riksbank’s monetary  policy  objectives,  tasks 

and  powers,  and  (2)  its  financial  stability  objectives,  tasks  and  powers.  In  this  respect,  the 

7 
8 
9 
10 
11 

See Chapter 6.3.8 of the Report. 

See Chapter 13.1 and 13.4 and pp. 42-43 of the Report. 
See Chapter 3.2 of the Report. 
See the amendment introducing the new Chapter 11, Section 18a of the Law on Parliament. 

See Chapter 15.2.4 of the Report. 

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monetary  policy  and  financial  stability  objectives,  tasks  and  powers  are  contained  in  separate 

chapters in the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank. The monetary policy chapter contains provisions 

relating  to,  inter  alia,  Sveriges  Riksbank’s  main  objective  of  maintaining  price  stability,  and  its 

exchange  rate  management,  interest  rate  management  and  liquidity  instruments,  purchase  and 

sale  of  financial  instruments  other  than  Swedish  sovereign  debt  instruments  and  minimum 

reserve requirements. The financial stability chapter contains provisions relating, inter alia, to the 

following  objectives, tasks and powers of Sveriges Riksbank: (1) the objective  of contributing to 

the  financial  system’s  stability  and  effectiveness,  including  the  public  being  able  to  make 

payments, without neglecting the price stability objective; (2) the provision of payment settlement 

systems,  including  related  deposit-taking  and  the  provision  of  credit  in  relation  to  its  payment 

settlement  system;  (3)  the  oversight  of  financial  infrastructures  and  the  development  of  the 

payment market; (4) powers in relation to central counterparties in third countries; (5) support for 

the  liquidity  of  the  financial  system,  including  general  liquidity  support,  market-making, 

emergency  liquidity  assistance  and  special  liquidity  facilities;  (6)    monitoring  of  the  financial 

system in general and preparing for crises; and (7) provision of information to and/or collaboration 

and  consultation  with  the  Swedish  Government,  the  SFSA  and  the  NDO  with  respect  to  these 
financial stability related activities and liquidity supporting measures12. 

1.6 

According  to  the  Committee,  the  main  reason  for  this  division  between  provisions  concerning 

(1) monetary  policy  and  price  stability  and  (2)  the  financial  system  and  financial  stability  is  that 

Sveriges  Riksbank  has  sole  responsibility  for  monetary  policy  and  the  Union  prohibition  on 

seeking or taking instructions under Article 130 of the Treaty applies in this area. With respect to 

financial  stability,  however,  responsibility  is  divided  between  several  authorities,  including  the 

Government, the SFSA, which is responsible for macroprudential policies, and the NDO, which is 

responsible  for  resolution.  The  Committee  emphasises  that,  despite  the  fact  that  Sveriges 

Riksbank  shares  some  of  its  responsibility,  e.g.  in  respect  of  financial  stability,  with  others,  it 

makes  independent  decisions  on  what  actions  to  take  and  will  be  able  to  act  swiftly  on  its  own 

within all  of the areas of its operations if the situation so requires.  According to the Committee, 

this  division  between  monetary  policy  and  price  stability  and  the  financial  system  and  financial 

stability is made despite the fact that the powers within the two areas partially overlap, e.g. when 

it comes to liquidity assistance. In such a situation, the main purpose of the credit is decisive as 

to whether the credit is a matter of monetary policy or financial stability. Since there is, according 

to the Committee, a connection between price stability and financial stability, situations where the 

main purpose of an operation is not obvious may arise. However, the Committee considers that 

this lack of clarity is offset by, inter alia, improving collaboration between Sveriges Riksbank, the 
Government and other authorities with respect to tasks outside the area of monetary policy13. 

1.7 

It is also of note that Sveriges Riksbank’s general authority under the Law on Sveriges Riksbank 

to  decide  on  the  implementation  of  the  foreign  exchange  rate  system  decided  on  by  the 

Government  and  to  purchase  and  sell  foreign  reserves  and  issue  its  own  debt  instruments 

12 
13 

See Chapters 2 and 3 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank. 

See Chapter 25 of the Report. 

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denominated in foreign currency in pursuance of its foreign exchange policy  is not confirmed  in 
the  draft  law  on  Sveriges  Riksbank14.  Instead  it  provides  that  Sveriges  Riksbank  may  conduct 

foreign currency interventions for a monetary policy purpose, taking into account which exchange 

rate system applies. In terms of Sveriges Riksbank’s ability to build up its foreign reserves for this 

purpose,  a  specific  set  of  provisions  is  introduced  that  authorise  Sveriges  Riksbank,  subject  to 

certain  constraints,  to  build  up  foreign  reserves  either  through  borrowings  from  the  NDO  or 

through arrangements with foreign central banks. Borrowings from the NDO in excess of the 5% 

gross domestic product (GDP) cap would only be possible in exceptional circumstances, with an 

obligation  to  report  the  matter  to  the  Parliament’s  Finance  Committee.  Insofar  as  arrangements 

with  foreign  central  banks  are  reciprocal  in  nature  and  do  not  contribute  to  the  stability  of  the 

financial  system,  the  Parliament’s  approval  would  be  required.  Aside  from  borrowings  from  the 

NDO  and  arrangements  with 

foreign  central  banks,  Sveriges  Riksbank’s  authority 

to 

independently  buy  foreign  currency  is  confined  to  purchases  made  in  order  to  finance  its 

provision  of  general  liquidity  assistance,  market-making  and  emergency  liquidity  assistance  for 
financial stability purposes 15. 

1.8 

Finally, the draft law modifies substantial aspects of Sveriges Riksbank’s equity and provisioning 

regime.  According  to  the  Committee,  the  draft  law  thereby  aims  to  strengthen  Sveriges 

Riksbank’s financial resilience. 

2. 

General observations 

Sweden’s status as a Member State with a derogation 

2.1 

The  ECB  would  like  to  emphasise  that,  although  Member  States  with  a  derogation,  including 

Sweden, do not  yet participate in the third stage of economic and monetary union, they have a 

legal  duty  to  adapt  the  statutes  of  their  national  central  banks  (NCBs)  to  ensure 
compatibility  with  the  Treaty16  and  the  Statute  of  the  European  System  of  Central  Banks 

and  of  the  European  Central  Bank  (hereinafter  the  ‘Statute  of  the  ESCB’).  Any  legislative 

reform in any such Member State should aim to gradually achieve consistency with ESCB 
standards 17. 

2.2 

The ECB has repeatedly pointed out in its convergence reports that Sweden needs to adapt its 
legislation governing Sveriges Riksbank to comply with Treaty requirements18. The ECB and its 

precursor,  the  European  Monetary  Institute  (EMI),  have  issued  several  opinions  in  response  to 

consultation requests from the Swedish authorities which have considered matters relating to the 
independence of Sveriges Riksbank19. 

14 
15 

16 
17 

18 
19 

See Chapter 7, Sections 1-3 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank. 
See  Chapter  2,  Section  3  and  Section  4(3),  and  Chapter  10  of  the  draft  law  on  Sveriges  Riksbank.  See  also 
paragraphs 8.1.1 to 8.1.6. 
See Article 131 of the Treaty. 

See  paragraph  3.4  of  Opinion  CON/2008/34.  All  ECB  opinions  are  published  on  the  ECB’s  website  at 
www.ecb.europa.eu. 
See, e.g., Convergence Report, May 2018, pp. 201-207. 

See  paragraphs  5,  6,  7  and  9  of  Opinion  CON/2005/54,  paragraph  4  of  Opinion  CON/2008/34,  paragraph  4  of 

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Sveriges Riksbank’s independent design of its price stability objective 

2.3 

As regards the Parliament’s right to  approve  or reject any  decision taken by  Sveriges Riksbank 

on the design of the price stability objective, the ESCB’s primary objective is to maintain price 

stability  under  Articles  127(1)  and  282(2)  of  the  Treaty  and  Article  2  of  the  Statute  of  the 

ESCB. As previously noted by the ECB, central bank independence is not an end in itself, but is 

instrumental in achieving an objective that should be clearly defined and should prevail over any 

other objective. Functional independence requires each NCB’s primary objective to be stated in a 

clear  and  legally  certain  way  and  to  be  fully  in  line  with  the  primary  objective  of  price  stability 

established  by  the  Treaty.  It  is  served  by  providing  the  NCBs  with  the  necessary  means  and 

instruments  to  achieve  this  objective  independently  of  any  other  authority.  The  Treaty’s 

requirement of central bank independence reflects the generally held view that the primary 

objective of price stability is best served by a fully independent institution with a precise 
definition of its mandate20.  

2.4 

As regards timing, as previously noted by the ECB, the Treaty is not clear about when the NCBs 

of Member States with a derogation must comply with the primary objective of price stability set 

out  in  Articles  127(1)  and  282(2)  of  the  Treaty  and  Article  2  of  the  Statute  of  the  ESCB.  While 

Article 127(1)  of  the  Treaty  does  not  apply  to  Member  States  with  a  derogation  (see 

Article 139(2)(c) of the Treaty), Article 2 of the Statute of the ESCB does apply to such Member 

States  (see  Article  42.1  of  the  Statute  of  the  ESCB).  The  ECB  takes  the  view  that  the 

obligation  of  the  NCBs  to  have  price  stability  as  their  primary  objective  applies  from  1 

June 1998 in the case of Sweden. This is based on the fact that one of the guiding principles of 

the Union, namely price stability (Article 119 of the Treaty), also applies to Member States with a 

derogation.  It  is  also  based  on  the  Treaty  objective  that  all  Member  States  should  strive  for 

macroeconomic  convergence,  including  price  stability.  This  conclusion  is  also  based  on  the 

underlying rationale of central bank independence, which is only justified if the overall objective of 
price stability has primacy21. 

2.5 

Under Article 130 of the Treaty, when exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties 

conferred  upon  them  by  the  Treaties  and  the  Statute  of  the  ESCB,  neither  an  NCB  nor  any 

member  of  its  decision-making  bodies  shall  seek  or  take  instructions  from  Union  institutions, 

bodies, offices or agencies, from any government of a Member State or from any other body. This 

obligation  applies  to  all  Member  States.  As  far  as  central  bank  independence  is  concerned, 

national legislation in Member States with a derogation, such as Sweden, had to be adapted to 

comply  with  the  relevant  provisions  of  the  Treaty  and  the  Statute  of  the  ESCB  by  the  date  of 

establishment of the ESCB on 1 June 1998. The rights of third parties to approve, suspend, 

annul and defer an NCB’s decisions are contrary to NCBs’ institutional independence and 

incompatible with the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB as far as ESCB-related tasks are 

concerned. The Parliament’s right to approve or reject  Sveriges Riksbank’s decisions on 

Opinion CON/2013/53, paragraph 3 of Opinion CON/2017/17, and paragraphs 4 to 15 of EMI Opinion CON/1997/26. 
See Convergence Report, May 2018, p. 20. 

See Convergence Report, May 2018, p. 20. 

20 
21 

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the design of the price stability objective would therefore be inconsistent with Article 130 
of  the Treaty22.  This  decision  should  rather  be  taken  by  Sveriges  Riksbank’s  Executive  Board, 

as  the  decision-making  body  responsible  for  the  formulation  of  Sveriges  Riksbank’s  monetary 

policy.  

Sveriges Riksbank’s independent performance of its basic monetary policy and payment system 

tasks necessary for Sveriges Riksbank’s ability to achieve its primary objective of price stability 

2.6 

Article 139(2)(c) of the Treaty stipulates, inter alia, that the basic tasks of the ESCB as listed in 

Article 127(2) of the Treaty, including the definition and implementation of the monetary policy of 

the Union  and promoting  the smooth operation  of payment systems, shall not  apply to Member 

States  with  a  derogation,  such  as  Sweden.  In  addition,  in  accordance  with  Article  42.2  of  the 

Statute  of  the  ESCB,  the  central  banks  of  Member  States  with  a  derogation  shall  retain  their 

powers  in  the  field  of  monetary  policy  according  to  national  law.  Nevertheless,  each  Member 

State with a derogation is also obliged under Article 131 of the Treaty to ensure that its national 

legislation, including the statutes of its NCB, is compatible with the Treaties and the Statute of the 

ESCB, in view of the abrogation of the potential derogation and the adoption of the euro in those 

Member States in accordance with Article 140 of the Treaty. Therefore, any legislative reform 

in Sweden should aim to gradually achieve legal convergence with, rather than divergence 

from,  ESCB  standards, 

in  accordance  with  the  convergence  process  obligations 

enshrined in the Treaty.  

2.7 

Against  this  background,  the  narrow  conceptualisation  of  monetary  policy  and  broad 

conceptualisation of financial stability under the draft law, combined with the prohibition 

on  Sveriges  Riksbank  seeking  and  taking  instructions  applying  only  within  the  narrowly 

defined  area  of  monetary  policy,  does  not  provide  the  legally  required  compatibility  with 

the Treaties and the Statute of the ESCB. Sveriges Riksbank needs to independently exercise 

all the basic monetary policy and payment system tasks that are necessary for a central bank to 

be able  to achieve  its primary objective of price stability  established under the Treaties  and the 

Statute  of  the  ESCB.  Under  Article  127(2)  of  the  Treaty  the  basic  central  banking  tasks  to  be 

carried out through the ESCB, in order to achieve the primary objective of price stability, include, 

inter alia, defining and implementing the monetary policy of the Union and promoting the smooth 

operation  of  payment  systems.  Under  Chapter  IV  of  the  Statute  of  the  ESCB  the  monetary 

functions and operations of the ESCB include a variety of open market and credit operations, as 

well  as  providing  facilities  and  making  regulations  to  ensure  efficient  and  sound  clearing  and 

payment  systems  within  the  Union  and  with  third  countries.  The  provision  of  liquidity  is  a 

monetary  policy task at any central bank, including  Sveriges Riksbank. Within the framework of 

the  Eurosystem  the  provision  of  liquidity  support  is,  with  the  exception  of  emergency  liquidity 

assistance,  considered  to  be  part  of  the  basic  task  of  implementing  monetary  policy,  and  is 

subject to the prohibition on NCBs seeking or taking instructions. Sveriges Riksbank’s provision 

of  payment  settlement  systems  and  its  oversight  of  financial  market  infrastructures  and  the 

22 

See Convergence Report, May 2018, pp. 20, 22. 

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payment  market  are  also  inextricably  linked  with  its  monetary  policy  tasks  and  price  stability 

objective. Settlements in a central bank’s payment system take place in central bank money, and 

the provision of intra-day credit in a central bank’s payment system operations can spill over into 

overnight credit extended within the framework of the central bank’s monetary policy operations. 

Disturbances  affecting  financial  market  infrastructures  can  have  an  impact  on  a  central  bank’s 

price stability objective through several channels. For example, such disturbances can affect the 

liquidity  position  of  credit  institutions,  potentially  disrupting  the  smooth  functioning  of  payment 

systems. This could lead to increased demand for central bank liquidity and possible challenges 

in  implementing  monetary  policy.  In  addition,  such  disturbances  can  impair  the  functioning  of 
financial market segments that are key to the transmission of monetary policy23. 

2.8 

The  ability  of  an  NCB  of  a  Member  State  with  a  derogation  to  independently  achieve  its 

primary  stability  objective,  as  required  under  Articles  127  and  130  of  the  Treaty  and 

Articles 2  and  7  of  the  Statute  of  the  ESCB,  would  be  jeopardised  if  that  NCB’s  basic 

monetary policy and payment system tasks are not subject to the prohibition on seeking 
or taking instructions24. 

2.9 

It is therefore suggested that the provisions relating to Sveriges Riksbank’s operation and 

oversight  of  payment  settlement  systems,  financial  infrastructures  and  the  payment 

market  and  the  provision  of  liquidity  support  (with  the  exception  of  emergency  liquidity 

assistance)  should  be  removed  from  Chapter  3  of  the  draft  law  on  Sveriges  Riksbank 

regarding the financial system, and placed in a single chapter addressing monetary policy 

and  payment  systems.  Furthermore,  Sveriges  Riksbank’s  responsibilities  under  the 

proposed  amendments  to  the  Instrument  of  Government,  in  respect  of  which  Sveriges 

Riksbank  may  not  seek  or  take  instructions,  should  be  aligned  with  the  conception  of 
basic central banking tasks under the Treaty25. 

2.10 

It  may  also  be  noted  that  the  restriction  on  Sveriges  Riksbank´s  ability  to  purchase  and  sell 

financial  instruments  other  than  Swedish  sovereign  debt  instruments  constitutes  a  constraint  in 

the  context  of  the  Statute  of  the  ESCB  that  encroaches  on  Sveriges  Riksbank’s  independent 
monetary policy under the Treaty26. 

Sveriges Riksbank’s independent performance of its basic foreign exchange and foreign reserve 

management tasks 

2.11 

As  noted  by  the  ECB  in  a  previous  opinion  addressed  to  the  Swedish  Ministry  of  Finance,  the 

conduct of foreign exchange operations and the holding and management of foreign reserves in 

pursuance  of  a  central  bank’s  monetary,  exchange  rate  and  liquidity  policies  is  a  basic  central 
bank function, both within the ESCB and internationally27. Two of the basic tasks to be carried out 

through the ESCB are the conduct of foreign exchange operations consistent with exchange rate 

23 
24 
25 
26 
27 

See Opinion CON/2017/39 (General observations). 

See also paragraphs 7.2.1 to 7.2.3. 
See also paragraphs 3.1 and 3.2. 
See also paragraph 6.2.3. 

See paragraph 3.4.1 of Opinion CON/2017/17. 

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policy,  whose  primary  objective  is  price  stability,  and  the  holding  and  management  of  Member 

States’  official  foreign  reserves.  In  order  to  achieve  the  ESCB’s  objectives  and  to  carry  out  its 

tasks, the ECB and the NCBs may operate in the financial markets by buying and selling outright 

(spot  and  forward)  or  under  repurchase  agreement  and  by  lending  or  borrowing  claims  and 

marketable instruments, whether in euro or other currencies, as well as precious metals. In order 

to  ensure  that  their  national  legislation  is  compatible  with  the  Treaties  and  the  Statute  of  the 

ESCB, as required by Article 131 of the Treaty, the NCBs have to be allowed to acquire and sell 

(spot and forward) all types of foreign exchange assets, including securities and all other assets 

in  the  currency  of  any  country  or  units  of  account  and  in  whatever  form  held,  and  precious 
metals28. 

2.12  As  previously  noted,  central  bank  independence  requirements  under  the  Treaty  and  the 

Statute  of  the  ESCB  require  that  Sveriges  Riksbank  must  be  able  to  autonomously  avail 

itself  of  sufficient  financial  resources  to  fulfil  its  monetary  and  foreign  exchange  policy 

mandates and finance its own operations. A Member State may not put its NCB in a position 

where  it  has  insufficient  financial  resources  to  carry  out  its  monetary  and  exchange  rate  policy 

tasks,  as  well  as  its  national  tasks.  Sveriges  Riksbank  is  best  placed  to  independently 

assess  what  level  of  foreign  reserves  is  necessary  to  enable  it  to  perform  its  tasks.  The 

ECB  is  particularly  concerned  that,  under  the  draft  law  on  Sveriges  Riksbank,  Sveriges 

Riksbank  may  only  build  up  its  foreign  reserves  for  financial  stability  purposes.  The 

constraints  under  the  draft  law  on  Sveriges  Riksbank  on  Sveriges  Riksbank’s  ability  to 

increase  its  foreign  reserves  whenever  necessary  in  pursuance  of  its  independently 

formulated monetary, foreign exchange and liquidity policies clearly encroach on Sveriges 

Riksbank’s independence under the Treaty and Statute of the ESCB in the performance of 

its  basic  monetary,  foreign  exchange  and  liquidity  policies,  jeopardising  its  capacity  to 
achieve its Treaty-based primary objective of maintaining price stability29. 

Sveriges  Riksbank’s  financial  independence  and  compliance  with  the  prohibitions  on  monetary 

financing and privileged access under the Treaty 

2.13 

In addition to the foregoing, certain other provisions in the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank 

undermine  Sveriges  Riksbank’s  financial  independence  or  are  incompatible  with  the 

prohibition of monetary financing under the Treaty. 

First, the ECB would welcome the introduction of an explicit reference to the possibility of 

Sveriges  Riksbank  submitting  a  request  for  the  restoration  of  its  capital,  in  line  with  its 

existing  general  right  to  submit  such  a  request  to  the  Parliament  or  the  Government. 

Furthermore,  the  level  at  which  Sveriges  Riksbank  should  have  the  possibility  to  request  the 

Parliament to restore its target equity level should be increased, in order to ensure that Sveriges 

Riksbank  has  sufficient  funds  at  its  disposal  to  be  able  to  perform  its  tasks,  consistent  with  its 

28 

29 

See  the  second  and  third  indents  of  Articles  127(2)  of  the  Treaty;  and  the  first  and  second  indents  of  Article  18.1, 
and Articles 30 and 31 of the Statute of the ESCB. 

See paragraphs 3.4.3 and 3.4.5 of Opinion CON/2017/17. 

8 

                                                 
ECB-PUBLIC 

financial independence under the Treaty30. 

Second, Sveriges Riksbank may only grant credit to international financial institutions of 

which  Sweden  is  a  member  to  the  extent  compatible  with  the  monetary  financing 
prohibition under the Treaty31. 

Third,  the  restriction  on  Sveriges  Riksbank’s  ability  to  purchase  and  sell  financial 

instruments  other  than  Swedish  sovereign  debt  instruments  appears  to  circumvent  the 
prohibition of privileged access under Article 124 of the Treaty32. 

2.14 

Finally,  the  ECB  understands  that  since  Sveriges  Riksbank’s  annual  accounts  are  audited,  the 

possibility for the Parliament to set aside a decision of Sveriges Riksbank on the profit and loss 

account,  the  balance  sheet  and  the  profit  for  the  year  if  the  numbers  are  not  calculated  in 

accordance  with  the  applicable  law  is  rather  theoretical  in  nature  and  the  likelihood  of  such 

rejection occurring in practice is slim. 

3. 

Specific observations on draft amendments to the Instrument of Government 

3.1 

Purpose of the draft amendments to the Instrument of Government 

The draft law contains an amendment to the Instrument of Government, which forms part of the 

Constitution. The present Instrument of Government states that Sveriges Riksbank is responsible 

for  monetary  policy  and  that  no  public  authority  may  determine  how  Sveriges  Riksbank  shall 
decide  in  matters  regarding  monetary  policy33.  According  to  the  amended  Instrument  of 

Government  Sveriges  Riksbank  is  responsible  for  the  following:  (1)  defining  and  implementing 

monetary policy; (2) conducting foreign currency interventions; (3) holding and managing foreign 

reserves;  (4) promoting  the  smooth  operation  of  payment  systems  within  the  framework  of 

cooperation  in  the  ESCB;  and  (5)  collecting  the  statistical  information  needed  for  cooperation 

within  the  ESCB.  The  amended  Instrument  of  Government  also  states  that  no  public  authority 

may  determine  how  Sveriges  Riksbank  shall  decide  in  matters  for  which  it  is  responsible  (as 

described above) and that Sveriges Riksbank may not seek or take instructions in these areas of 
responsibility from anyone34. 

3.2 

Specific observations 

3.2.1  The  ambit  of  the  tasks  conferred  upon  NCBs  by  the  Treaties  and  the  Statute  of  the  ESCB,  in 

order  to  independently  achieve  their  primary  objective  of  price  stability,  is  wider  than  that 

envisaged  by  the  proposed  amendments  to  the  Instrument  of  Government.  Article  139(2)(c)  of 

the  Treaty  stipulates  that  the  basic  tasks  of  the  ESCB  as  listed  in  Article  127(2)  of  the  Treaty, 

including the definition and implementation of the monetary policy of the Union and promoting the 

smooth operation of payment systems, shall not apply to Member States with a derogation, such 

30 
31 
32 
33 
34 

See paragraphs 13.3.5 to 13.3.10. 

See paragraphs 11.2.1 to 11.2.2. 
See paragraph 6.2.4. 
See Chapter 9, Section 13 of the Instrument of Government. 

See the amendment to Chapter 9, Section 13 of the Instrument of Government. See also Chapter 28.3 of the Report. 

9 

 
                                                 
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as Sweden. Nevertheless, Member States with a derogation are obliged under Article 131 of the 

Treaty to ensure that their national legislation is compatible with the Treaties and the Statute of 

the ESCB of the ESCB, in view of the potential abrogation of the derogation and the adoption of 

the  euro  in  those  Member  States.  The  NCBs  of  Member  States  with  a  derogation  must  also 

independently  exercise  all  the  basic  monetary  policy  and  payment  system  tasks  that  are 

necessary  for  a  central  bank  to  be  able  to  achieve  the  primary  objective  of  price  stability 

established under  the Treaties and the  Statute of the  ESCB.  Against this background, the  ECB 

refers to Chapter IV of the Statute of the ESCB on the monetary functions and operations of the 

ESCB,  which  include  a  variety  of  open  market  and  credit  operations,  as  well  as  the  task  of 

ensuring efficient and sound clearing and payment systems. Furthermore, under Article 128(1) of 

the  Treaty  the  ECB  has  the  exclusive  right  to  authorise  the  issue  of  euro  banknotes  within  the 
Union  and  the  ECB  and  the  NCBs  may  issue  such  banknotes 35.  It  is  not  clear  that  all  of  these 

basic central banking tasks are covered by the list of Sveriges Riksbank’s responsibilities under 

the proposed amendments to the Instrument of Government. 

3.2.2  As noted in paragraph 1.5, many of Sveriges Riksbank’s proposed powers in relation to liquidity 

support,  including  the  provision  of  liquidity  within  Sveriges  Riksbank’s  payment  settlement 

system,  general  liquidity  support,  market-making,  emergency  liquidity  assistance  and  special 

liquidity facilities, are classified under the draft law as falling within Sveriges Riksbank’s objective 

of  contributing  to  the  financial  system’s  stability  and  effectiveness.  Within  the  framework  of  the 

ESCB  the  provision  of  liquidity  is,  with  the  exception  of  emergency  liquidity  assistance, 

considered  to  be  part  of  the  basic  tasks  of  implementing  monetary  policy  and  promoting  the 

smooth  operation  of  payment  systems,  and  is  subject  to  the  prohibition  on  NCBs  seeking  or 

taking instructions. In the case of emergency liquidity assistance, there are procedures in place to 

ensure consistency with monetary policy.  

3.2.3  Similarly,  Sveriges  Riksbank’s  powers  in  relation  to  payment  systems,  monitoring  financial 

infrastructures and developing the payment market, outside the narrow context of promoting the 

smooth operation of payment systems within the framework of ESCB cooperation, are classified 

under the draft law as falling within Sveriges Riksbank’s objective of contributing to the financial 

system’s  stability  and  effectiveness,  which  includes  the  public  being  able  to  make  payments. 

Within  the  framework  of  the  ESCB  these  powers  are  considered  to  be  part  of  the  basic  task  of 

promoting  the  smooth  operation  of  payment  systems  and  the  related  task  of  ensuring  efficient 

and  sound  clearing  and  payment  systems,  and  are  thus  covered  by  the  central  bank 

independence protection under Article 130 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB. 

3.2.4  The  ECB 

recommends 

that  Sveriges  Riksbank’s 

responsibilities  under 

the  proposed 

amendments  to  the  Instrument  of  Government,  in  respect  of  which  no  public  authority  may 

determine  how  Sveriges  Riksbank  shall  decide  and  Sveriges  Riksbank  may  not  seek  or  take 

instructions, be aligned with the conception of basic central banking tasks under the Treaty. 

35  

Article 139(2)(g) of the Treaty also stipulates that Article 128 of the Treaty does not apply to Member States with a 
derogation. 

10 

                                                 
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4. 

Specific observations on draft amendments to the Law on Parliament and the draft law on 

Sveriges  Riksbank’s  provisions  regarding  public  information  and  reporting  to  the 

Parliament’s Finance Committee 

4.1 

Purpose of the draft amendments to the Law on Parliament and the provisions regarding public 

information  and  reporting  to  the  Parliament’s  Finance  Committee  in  the  draft  Law  on  Sveriges 

Riksbank 

4.1.1  A  new  provision  is  introduced  into  the  Law  on  Parliament36  stating  that,  with  respect  to  the 

activities of Sveriges Riksbank, the Finansutskottet (Parliament’s Committee on Finance) will also 

be  responsible,  alongside  the  Riksrevisionen  (NAO,  National  Audit  Office),  for  monitoring  and 
evaluating Sveriges Riksbank’s activities. As noted by the Committee37, this provision will provide 

the  Parliament  with  a  right  to  hold  Sveriges  Riksbank  accountable  for  its  decisions  and  the 

achievement  of  its  goals  by  making  Sveriges  Riksbank  explain  the  reasons  for  its  actions.  The 

Parliament  will  regularly  scrutinise  and  evaluate  all  the  activities  of  Sveriges  Riksbank  with 

respect  to  the  achievement  of  its  objectives  and  efficiency.  The  Parliament  will  be  entitled  to 

demand  both  oral  and  written  presentations  from  Sveriges  Riksbank  in  relation  to  various 

questions. It will also be entitled to pose questions to individual members of the Executive Board 

regarding the reasons for their decisions. 

4.1.2  As  noted  in  paragraph  1.4,  the  draft  amendments  to  the  Law  on  Parliament  propose  that  if 

Sveriges Riksbank should decide on the formulation of the price stability objective, its Executive 

Board will then submit a request to the Parliament for approval of the objective. If the request is 

not  approved  by  the  Parliament,  Sveriges  Riksbank’s  immediately  preceding  decision  on  the 
formulation of the price stability objective will continue to apply38. 

4.1.3  The  draft  amendments  to  the  Law  on  Parliament  provide  that  the  Parliament’s  Committee  on 

Finance may decide to launch a special investigation of circumstances that can form the basis for 
removing a member of Sveriges Riksbank’s Executive Board from office39. This provision would 

supplement  the  existing  provisions  of  the  Instrument  of  Government,  whereby  Sveriges 

Riksbank’s General Council has the right to remove a member of the Executive Board from their 

employment if they no longer fulfil the requirements laid down for the performance of their duties 
or are guilty of serious misconduct40. 

4.1.4  The  draft  law  on  Sveriges  Riksbank  requires  Sveriges  Riksbank  to  publish  the  minutes  of 

monetary  policy  meetings  and  other  meetings  of  its  Executive  Board  and  General  Council. 

However,  information  covered  by  secrecy  requirements  under  the  Law  on  public  access  to 
information  and  secrecy41  will  not  be  published.  The  monetary  policy  meeting  minutes  must 

36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 

See the amendment to Chapter 7, Section 9 of the Law on Parliament. 
See Chapter 33.6.4 of the Report. 

See the amendment introducing the new Chapter 11, Section 18a of the Law on Parliament. 
See the amendment introducing the new Chapter 13, Section 25 of the Law on Parliament. 
See Chapter 12, Sections 1 and 2 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank. 

Offentlighet och sekretesslagen (2009:400). 

11 

 
                                                 
ECB-PUBLIC 

reflect  the  viewpoints  presented  at  meetings.  Sveriges  Riksbank  must  also  provide  information 

about  payment  settlement  systems,  other  aspects  of  the  financial  system,  cash,  crisis 
preparedness, and its international and other activities 42. 

4.1.5  The  draft  law  on  Sveriges  Riksbank  also  requires  Sveriges  Riksbank  to  regularly  report  to  the 

Parliament’s  Finance  Committee  (including  at  the  Committee’s  request)  on  a  range  of  matters, 

including  monetary  policy,  monetary  policy  strategy,  Sveriges  Riksbank’s  assessment  of  future 

price trends and other factors affecting price stability  and the interests of the real economy, the 

cash handling situation in Sweden, Sveriges Riksbank’s work regarding payment settlements, the 
financial system, crisis preparedness and Sveriges Riksbank’s international activities43. 

4.1.6  The  draft  law  on  Sveriges  Riksbank  requires  its  General  Council  to  submit  annual  financial 
statements to the Parliament and the NAO each year before 22 February44. Currently, the Law on 
Sveriges  Riksbank  provides  that  the  annual  report  is  presented  by  the  Executive  Board45.  This 

amendment  reflects  the  fact  that  under  the  draft  law  on  Sveriges  Riksbank  it  is  the  General 
Council that adopts Sveriges Riksbank’s profit and loss account and balance sheet46. 

4.1.7  The  draft  law  on  Sveriges  Riksbank  requires  Sveriges  Riksbank  to  report  annually  to  the 

Parliament on what measures it has taken based on the NAO’s observations 47. 

4.2 

Specific observations 

4.2.1  As regards the Parliament’s Committee on Finance’s democratic scrutiny of Sveriges Riksbank’s 

achievement  of  objectives  and  efficiency,  central  bank  independence  under  Article  130  of  the 

Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB is fully compatible with holding NCBs accountable 

for  their  decisions,  which  is  an  important  aspect  of  enhancing  confidence  in  their  independent 

status. This entails transparency and dialogue with third parties. Dialogue between an NCB and 

third  parties,  even  when  based  on  statutory  obligations  to  provide  information  and  exchange 

views,  is  compatible  with  central  bank  independence,  provided  that:  (1)  this  does  not  result  in 

interference with the independence of the members of the NCB’s decision-making bodies; (2) the 

special status of Governors in their capacity as members of the ECB’s decision-making bodies is 

fully  respected;  and  (3)  confidentiality  requirements  resulting  from  the  Statute  of  the  ESCB  are 
observed 48. 

4.2.2  As  noted  in  paragraph  2.3,  the  Parliament’s  right  to  approve  or  reject  Sveriges  Riksbank’s 

decisions  on  the  design  of  the  price  stability  objective  would  be  inconsistent  with  Article  130  of 

the Treaty. 

4.2.3  As  regards  the  Parliament’s  Committee  on  Finance’s  power  to  launch  special  investigations  of 

42 
43 
44 
45 

46 
47 
48 

See Chapter 12, Section 1 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank. 
See Chapter 12, Sections 3-6 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank. 

See Chapter 12, Section 7 of the Law on Sveriges Riksbank. 
See Chapter 10, Section 3 of the Law on Sveriges Riksbank. 

See Chapter 8, Section 4, second paragraph of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank. 
See Chapter 12, Section 10 of the Law on Sveriges Riksbank. 
See  Convergence  Report,  May  2018,  p.  20,  paragraph  2.2.3  of  Opinion  CON/2016/33  and  paragraph  3.2.4  of 
Opinion CON/2016/52. 

12 

                                                 
ECB-PUBLIC 

circumstances that can form the basis for removing a member of Sveriges Riksbank’s Executive 

Board from office, the ECB understands that this constitutes a specific tool for the Parliament to 

assess whether grounds for relieving from office as referred to under Article 14.2 of the Statute of 

the  ESCB  can  be  established.  The  ECB  would  appreciate  clarification  that  this  specific  tool  is 

without prejudice to the personal independence of the member of Sveriges Riksbank’s Executive 

Board. 

4.2.4  As  regards  the  NAO’s  audit  of  Sveriges  Riksbank,  as  previously  noted  by  the  ECB,  where  an 

NCB’s  operations  are  subject  to  the  control  of  a  state  audit  office  or  similar  body  charged  with 

controlling the use of public finances, the scope of the control should be: (1) clearly defined under 

the  legal  framework;  (2)  without  prejudice  to  the  activities  of  the  NCB’s  independent  external 

auditors;  and,  (3)  in  line  with  the  principle  of  institutional  independence,  comply  with  the 

prohibition on giving instructions to an NCB and its decision-making bodies and not interfere with 

the  NCB’s  ESCB-related  tasks.  The  state  audit  should  be  done  on  a  non-political,  independent 

and  purely  professional  basis.  The  access  of  a  state  audit  office  to  an  NCB’s  confidential 

information  and  documents  must  be  limited  to  what  is  necessary  for  the  performance  of  the 

statutory  tasks  of  the  body  that  receives  the  information  and  must  be  without  prejudice  to  the 

ESCB’s  independence  and  the  ESCB’s  confidentiality  regime  to  which  the  members  of  NCBs’ 

decision-making bodies and staff are subject. NCBs should ensure that such bodies protect the 

confidentiality of information and documents disclosed at a level corresponding to that applied by 
the NCBs 49. 

5. 

Specific observations on the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank: general provisions 

5.1 

Purpose of the draft general provisions in the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank 

5.1.1  The draft general provisions in the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank clarify that Sveriges Riksbank 

is a separate legal entity owned by the State. Furthermore, it is clarified that the State guarantees 

Sveriges Riksbank’s obligations, and that Sveriges Riksbank manages its own assets and related 

income.  It  is  also  stated  that  Sveriges  Riksbank  is  part  of  the  ESCB  and  is  one  of  the 

shareholders  in  the  capital  of  the  ECB,  and  shall  participate  in  collaboration  with  other  central 

banks  within  the  ESCB.  Sveriges  Riksbank  shall  aim  for  a  high  level  of  efficiency  and  manage 

State  funds  prudently,  and  may  only  take  a  measure  in  accordance  with  the  principle  of 

proportionality.  In  order  to  be  able  to  fulfil  its  tasks,  Sveriges  Riksbank  shall  follow  general 

economic developments and developments in financial markets.  It shall also identify the threats 

to sustainable development that affect the possibilities of attaining the objectives under the draft 

Law on  Sveriges Riksbank. Sveriges Riksbank may also conduct research  of importance for its 
ability to attain the objectives under the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank 50. 

5.1.2  The  general  provisions  in  the  draft  law  on  Sveriges  Riksbank  51  purport  to  reproduce  the 

49 
50 
51 

See Convergence Report 2018, p. 24. 
See Chapter 1, Sections 2, 3, 4, 5, 8 and 9 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank. 

See Chapter 1, Sections 10 and 11. See also Chapter 13.7 and pp. 1772-1774 of the Report. 

13 

 
                                                 
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prohibition  of  monetary  financing  contained  in  Article  123  of  the  Treaty  and  Council  Regulation 
(EC) No 3603/93 52. 

5.2 

Specific observations 

5.2.1  The ECB welcomes the draft general provisions in the draft Law on Sveriges Riksbank clarifying 

Sveriges  Riksbank’s  role  within  the  ECB  and  the  ESCB.  The  ECB  also  welcomes  the 

clarifications  that  the  State  guarantees  Sveriges  Riksbank’s  obligations  and  that  Sveriges 

Riksbank  manages  its  own  assets,  which  serve  to  underline  its  financial  independence  under 

Article  130  of  the  Treaty.  Regarding  Sveriges  Riksbank’s  proposed  duties  to  follow  general 

economic  developments,  identify  threats  to  sustainable  development  and  conduct  research,  the 

ECB notes that these duties are linked to Sveriges Riksbank’s ability to fulfil its tasks and attain 

its  objectives  under  the  draft  Law  on  Sveriges  Riksbank.  The  ECB  understands  that  Sveriges 

Riksbank’s role  in  this  respect  would  not  go  beyond  monitoring  activities  that  result  from  or  are 

linked,  either  directly  or  indirectly,  to  the  discharge  of  its  monetary  policy  and  central  banking 
mandate53. 

5.2.2  Regarding  the  proposed  reproduction  of  the  monetary  financing  prohibition,  it  is,  in  general, 

unnecessary  to  transpose  Article  123  of  the  Treaty,  supplemented  by  Regulation  (EC)  No 

3603/93,  into  national  legislation  as  they  are  both  directly  applicable.  If,  however,  national 

legislative  provisions  mirror  these  directly  applicable  Union  provisions,  they  may  not  narrow  the 

scope  of  application  of  the  monetary  financing  prohibition  or  extend  the  exemptions  available 
under  Union  law54.  For  example,  although  the  proposed  reproduction  of  the monetary  financing 

prohibition under the  draft  law  on  Sveriges Riksbank seems to have amended  the existing Law 
on  Sveriges  Riksbank 55  to  address  previous  comments  made  by  the  ECB56,  there  is  still  a 

discrepancy between the wording of Article 123(2) of the Treaty and the relevant provisions of the 
draft  law  on  Sveriges  Riksbank 57.  The  exemption  from  the  monetary  financing  prohibition  for 

publicly owned credit institutions set out in Article 123(2) of the Treaty is only stated to apply ‘in 

the context of the supply of reserves by central banks’, whereas this wording is absent from the 

draft  law  on  Sveriges  Riksbank,  thus  expanding  this  exemption  beyond  the  particular  context 

envisaged  under  the  Treaty.  In  the  event  of  a  conflict  between  these  provisions,  the  directly 

applicable Union provisions prevail. 

6. 

Specific  observations  on  the  draft  law  on  Sveriges  Riksbank:  provisions  on  monetary 

policy 

6.1 

Purpose of the provisions on monetary policy in the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank 

52 

53 

54 
55 
56 
57 

See  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No 3603/93  of  13  December  1993  specifying  definitions  for  the  application  of  the 
prohibitions referred to in Article 104 and 104b(1) of the Treaty (OJ L 332, 31.12.1993, p. 1). 

See paragraph 4.3 of Opinion CON/2012/105, paragraph 5.5 of Opinion CON/2013/90 and paragraph 5.5 of Opinion 
CON/2013/91. 

See Convergence Report, May 2018, p. 30. 
See Article 1(3) and (4) of the Law on Sveriges Riksbank. 
See Convergence Report, May 2018, pp. 203-204. 

See Chapter 1, Section 11 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank. 

14 

 
                                                 
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6.1.1  Under  the  provisions  on  monetary  policy  in  the  draft  law  on  Sveriges  Riksbank,  Sveriges 

Riksbank’s  primary  objective  is  to  maintain  price  stability  through  sustainably  low  and  stable 

inflation.  Within  the  sphere  of  monetary  policy,  Sveriges  Riksbank  shall  also  contribute  to  a 

balanced  development  of  production  and  employment  without  setting  aside  the  price  stability 
objective  (upholding  the  interests  of  the  real  economy)  58.  The  Law  on  Sveriges  Riksbank 

contains no provision stating that Sveriges Riksbank shall take considerations relating to the real 
economy into account. According to the Committee59, as long as the Swedish formulation of the 

interests of the real economy does not conflict with the corresponding requirements of Union law, 

it should be compatible with Union law to incorporate a provision that is worded differently from 

the rule under Union law. The formulation of the type of interests of the real economy that should 

be  furthered  by  Sveriges  Riksbank  should  be  more  concrete  than,  for  example,  supporting  the 

economic policy of the Swedish  Parliament, as this  increases the clarity  of  Sveriges Riksbank’s 

duty and facilitates assessment and accountability. The Committee considers that production and 

employment encapsulate what a central bank can chiefly influence in the real economy in order to 

improve the welfare of society, and notes that these are also terms are commonly used in other 

countries. 

6.1.2  Under  the  draft  law  on  Sveriges  Riksbank,  Sveriges  Riksbank  would  be  assigned  a  number  of 

monetary  policy  powers,  including  interest  rate  management  and  liquidity  instruments  and 
minimum  reserve  requirements60.  Sveriges  Riksbank’s  interest  rate  management  and  liquidity 
instruments61  include  receiving  deposits,  providing  credit  in  Swedish  kronor  or  foreign  currency 

against adequate collateral, entering into repurchase agreements and buying and selling Swedish 

sovereign  debt  instruments  in  the  secondary  market.  Sveriges  Riksbank  may  also  buy  and  sell 

financial  instruments,  other  than  Swedish  sovereign  debt  instruments,  admitted  to  trading  on  a 

regulated market, but only if there are exceptional reasons for doing so. In the Law on Sveriges 

Riksbank  no  such  distinction  is  drawn  between  Swedish  sovereign  debt  instruments  and  other 

financial instruments. 

6.1.3  Under  the  draft  law  on  Sveriges  Riksbank,  Sveriges  Riksbank  must  publish  the  conditions  that 

are generally applicable to Sveriges Riksbank’s deposit-taking, lending, repurchase agreements 

and  the  collateral  that  can  be  accepted  in  respect  of  its  Swedish  kronor  credits.  Furthermore, 

Sveriges  Riksbank  shall  inform  the  public  in  an  appropriate  way  about:  (1)  the  price  stability 

objective, the interests of the real economy and its monetary policy strategy; (2) monetary policy 

decisions taken, the reasons for them and dissenting opinions in the Executive Board; and (3) its 

assessment both of future price developments and of other circumstances that have a substantial 

impact  on  the  design  of  monetary  policy  and  the  possibilities  of  attaining  the  price  stability 

objective  and  the  interests  of  the  real  economy.  Sveriges  Riksbank  must  also  make  public  the 

minutes of the monetary policy meetings and other meetings of the Executive Board and General 

58 
59 
60 
61 

See Chapter 2, Section 1 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank. 
See Chapter 16.4 and 16.6 of the Report. 
See Chapter 2, Sections 4-7 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank. 

See Chapter 2, Section 4 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank. 

15 

                                                 
ECB-PUBLIC 

Council. Minutes of the monetary policy meetings must reflect the standpoints put forward at the 
meetings, except that, under the Law on public access to information and secrecy62, information 
covered by secrecy obligations shall not be made public63. 

6.1.4  Under  the  draft  law  on  Sveriges  Riksbank,  Sveriges  Riksbank  shall  inform  the  minister 

designated by the Government of the monetary policy decisions taken. This information shall be 

given as soon as possible after the decision and, if possible, before it is announced to the public. 

Sveriges Riksbank may also conduct a dialogue with the Government and other public authorities 

or organisations about questions that affect the design of monetary policy and the possibilities of 

attaining the price stability objective and the interests of the real economy. 

6.2 

Specific observations 

6.2.1  Taking into account Article 131 of the Treaty, which obliges Member States with a derogation to 

ensure that their national legislation is compatible with the Treaties and the Statute of the ESCB 

in view of the potential abrogation of the derogation, the ECB welcomes that Sveriges Riksbank’s 

primary monetary policy objective is stated in a clear and legally certain way that is in line with the 

ESCB’s primary objective of maintaining price stability under Article 127(1) of the Treaty. 

6.2.2  As  previously  noted  by  the  ECB,  the  draft  law  on  Sveriges  Riksbank  should  also  reflect  the 

ESCB’s secondary objective of supporting the general economic policies of the Union in line with 
Article 127(1)  of  the  Treaty64.  Although  the  ECB  welcomes  the  proposed  introduction  of  the 

interests of the real economy into the secondary monetary policy objective of Sveriges Riksbank 

in  the  draft  law  on  Sveriges  Riksbank    (i.e.  contribution  to  balanced  development  of  production 

and  employment),  the  ECB  notes  that  this  formulation  is  more  limited  than  the  objective  of 

supporting the general economic policies in the Union as set out in Article 127(1) of the Treaty. 

6.2.3  The  first  indent  of  Article  18.1  of  the  Statute  of  the  ESCB  provides  that  NCBs  may,  in  order  to 

achieve the objectives of the ESCB and to carry out its tasks, operate in the financial markets by 

buying and selling outright (spot and forward) or under repurchase agreement and by lending or 

borrowing claims and marketable instruments, whether in euro or other currencies. The restriction 

on  Sveriges  Riksbank’s  ability  to  purchase  and  sell  financial  instruments  other  than  Swedish 

sovereign  debt  instruments  constitutes  a  constraint  in  the  context  of  Article  18  of  the  Statute  of 

the ESCB, which allows the NCBs to buy and sell outright or under repurchase agreements and 

by lending or borrowing all manner of claims and marketable instruments, including instruments 

issued  by  sovereign  and  private  issuers  alike.  In  addition,  and  as  previously  mentioned  by  the 
ECB 65,  NCBs  shall  be  provided  with  the  necessary  means  and  instruments  for  achieving  the 

primary objective of price stability independently of any other authority to meet the requirements 

in respect of functional independence. 

6.2.4  Furthermore,  the  restriction  on  Sveriges  Riksbank’s  ability  to  purchase  and  sell  financial 

62 
63 
64 
65 

Offentlighet och sekretesslagen (2009:400). 
See Chapter 2, Sections 8-9 and Chapter 12, Section 1 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank. 
See Convergence Report, May 2018, p. 204. 

See Convergence Report, May 2018, p. 20. 

16 

                                                 
ECB-PUBLIC 

instruments  other  than  Swedish  sovereign  debt  instruments  raises  the  question  of  compliance 

with  Article  124  of  the  Treaty,  which  applies  to  Member  States  with  a  derogation,  such  as 

Sweden. Article 124 of the Treaty prohibits any measure, not based on prudential considerations, 

establishing  privileged  access  by,  inter  alia,  central  governments  to  financial  institutions.  Under 
Article 1(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 3604/9366 privileged access is understood as any law, 

regulation or other binding legal instrument adopted in the exercise of public authority which, inter 

alia, obliges financial institutions to acquire or to hold liabilities of, inter alia, central governments, 

or  confers  financial  advantages  that  do  not  comply  with  the  principles  of  a  market  economy,  in 

order to encourage those institutions to acquire or hold such liabilities. Thus, as public authorities, 

NCBs  may  not  take  measures  granting  privileged  access  to  financial  institutions  by  the  public 
sector  if  such  measures  are  not  based  on  prudential  considerations 67.  Furthermore,  in 

accordance  with  Article  3(2)  and  recital  10  of  Regulation  (EC)  No  3604/93,  rules  on  the 

mobilisation or pledging of debt instruments enacted by the NCBs must not be used as a means 

of circumventing the prohibition on privileged access. Member States’ legislation in this area may 

not establish such privileged access. Article 2 of Regulation (EC) No 3604/93 defines ‘prudential 

considerations’ as those which underlie national laws, regulations or administrative actions based 

on, or consistent with, Union law and designed to promote the soundness of financial institutions 

so  as  to  strengthen  the  stability  of  the  financial  system  as  a  whole  and  the  protection  of  the 

customers  of  those  institutions.  According  to  the  Committee  the  purchase  and  sale  of  private 

securities can directly affect asset prices and loan terms, and entails much greater financial risk-
taking for Sveriges Riksbank and for public finances 68. As the Committee’s concerns do not seem 

to be motivated by prudential considerations within the meaning of Article 124 of the Treaty, the 

restriction  on  Sveriges  Riksbank’s  ability  to  purchase  and  sell  financial  instruments  other  than 

Swedish sovereign  debt instruments appears to circumvent the prohibition on privileged access 

under Article 124 of the Treaty. 

6.2.5  The  ECB  generally  welcomes  the  provisions  designed  to  contribute  to  Sveriges  Riksbank’s 

transparency. 

6.2.6  Under  the  existing  Law  on  Sveriges  Riksbank,  the  minister  appointed  by  the  Government  is 

required  to  be  informed  prior  to  Sveriges  Riksbank making  a monetary  policy  decision  of  major 
importance69.  As  previously  noted  by  the  ECB 70,  this  requirement  could  potentially  breach  the 

prohibition on giving instructions to the NCBs pursuant to Article 130 of the Treaty and Article 7 of 

the Statute of the ESCB, and should therefore be adapted accordingly. By adapting this provision 

so  that  information  may  only  be  furnished  to  the  minister  before  it  is  announced  to  the  public  if 

this is possible, the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank will ensure that the Government may continue 

to  be  kept  informed  of  monetary  policy  decisions  without  constraining  Sveriges  Riksbank’s 

66 

67 
68 
69 
70 

See  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No 3604/93  of  13  December  1993  specifying  definitions  for  the  application  of  the 
prohibition of privileged access referred to in Article 104a of the Treaty (OJ L 332, 31.12.1993, p. 4). 

See Convergence Report, May 2018, pp. 35-36. 
See Chapter 18.11.3 of the Report. 
See Chapter 6, Section 3 of the Law on Sveriges Riksbank. 

See, e.g., Convergence Report, May 2018, p. 202. 

17 

                                                 
ECB-PUBLIC 

independence.  As  previously  noted71,  dialogue  between  an  NCB  and  third  parties,  even  when 

based  on  statutory  obligations  to  provide  information  and  exchange  views,  is  compatible  with 

central  bank  independence  provided  that:  (1)  this  does  not  result  in  interference  with  the 

independence  of  the  members  of  the  NCB’s  decision-making  bodies;  (2)  the  special  status  of 

Governors in their capacity as members of the ECB’s decision-making bodies is fully respected; 

and (3) confidentiality requirements resulting from the Statute of the ESCB are observed. 

7. 

Specific  observations  on  the  draft  law  on  Sveriges  Riksbank:  provisions  on  the  financial 

system 

7.1 

Purpose of the provisions on the financial system in the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank 

7.1.1  The draft law on Sveriges Riksbank provides that the objective of Sveriges Riksbank’s activities 

regarding  the  financial  system  shall  be  to  contribute  to  the  financial  system’s  stability  and 

efficiency,  including  the  public  being  able  to  make  payments,  without  setting  aside  Sveriges 
Riksbank’s price stability objective72. According to the Committee, this objective does not exist in 

the Law on Sveriges Riksbank but has been considered to be part of Sveriges Riksbank’s task of 
promoting a safe and efficient payment system 73. 

7.1.2  To achieve its financial stability objective Sveriges Riksbank is given a number of tasks related to 

the  operation  and  oversight  of  payment  systems,  financial  infrastructures  and  the  payment 
market  under  the  draft  law  on  Sveriges  Riksbank74,  which  the  Committee  views  as  largely  a 

codification  of  the  activities  currently  conducted  by  Sveriges  Riksbank  with  respect  to  financial 

stability:  (1)  to  provide  a  payment  settlement  system  and  issue  regulations  thereon,  deciding 

which  financial  companies  and  public  authorities  may  be  participants  in  this  system,  taking 

deposits, charging fees and extending credit in connection with this system, and taking account of 

the  principles  of  open  access  and  neutrality;  (2)  to  collaborate  in  payment  settlements  and 

participate in payment or settlement systems; (3) to conduct oversight of central counterparties, 

other clearing organisations, financial market settlement systems, central securities depositories, 

trade repositories, and operations conducted  by other legal persons of particular  importance for 

the financial infrastructure in Sweden; (4) to adopt relevant requirements in relation to a central 

counterparty  established  in  a  third  country;  and  (5)  to  follow  the  development  of  the  payments 

market. 

7.1.3  As part of its financial stability objective the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank also gives Sveriges 

Riksbank the task of assessing whether the financial system is stable and efficient and working to 

identify vulnerabilities and  risks in the financial system that may lead to serious disturbances or 

significant efficiency losses. If Sveriges Riksbank concludes that another authority needs to take 

measures  to  reduce  the  risk  of  serious  financial  disturbances  in  the  Swedish  economy,  it  is  to 

71 
72 
73 
74 

See, e.g., Convergence Report, May 2018, pp. 22-23. 
See Chapter 3, Section 1 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank. 
See Chapter 20.8.6 of the Report. 

See Chapter 3, Sections 2, 5, 8, 9 and 20 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank. 

18 

 
                                                 
alert the authority in question and other interested parties 75. 

7.1.4  Under  the  draft  law  on  Sveriges  Riksbank76,  Sveriges  Riksbank  may  also  decide  to  provide 

liquidity support pursuant to its financial stability objective. 

ECB-PUBLIC 

First,  Sveriges  Riksbank  is  given  the  power  to  provide  general  liquidity  support  in  the  form  of 

collateralised  credit  extensions  or  repurchase  agreements  in  Swedish  kronor  or  foreign 

currencies  to/with  Swedish  financial  firms,  foreign  firms  operating  in  Sweden  through  branches 

and  central  counterparties,  if  this  is  needed  to  counter  a  serious  disturbance  in  the  financial 

system in Sweden. 

Second, Sveriges Riksbank may also buy and sell financial instruments at predetermined prices, 

in a similar manner to a market maker, in order to temporarily support the functioning of system-

critical financial markets if this is needed to counter a serious disturbance in the financial system 

in Sweden and if there are exceptional reasons for doing so. 

Third,  regarding  emergency  liquidity  assistance,  Sveriges  Riksbank  may,  in  order  to  support 

liquidity,  extend  collateralised  credits  in  Swedish  kronor  or  foreign  currency  to  a  going-concern 

firm that has temporary liquidity problems if this is needed to counter a serious disturbance in the 

financial system in Sweden and if there are exceptional reasons for doing so. Sveriges Riksbank 

must  inform  the  minister  designated  by  the  Government  before  deciding  to  provide  any 

emergency liquidity assistance. 

Fourth,  Sveriges  Riksbank  may,  after  consulting  the  SFSA,  also  offer  special  liquidity  facilities 

which may be included in the calculation of the liquidity coverage requirement under Commission 
Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/61 77. 

Sveriges Riksbank is also required to plan and make preparations to establish good capability to 

counter  serious  disturbances  in  the  Swedish  financial  system.  As  part  of  this,  it  must  identify 

liquidity support measures that may be used to counteract such disturbances. 

Sveriges  Riksbank  must  make  public  the  facilities  it  intends  to  offer  and  the  specific  conditions 

applicable to them, unless it is inappropriate to do so having regard to the stability and efficiency 

of the financial system. 

Sveriges  Riksbank  must  provide  the  Swedish  Government,  the  SFSA  and  the  NDO  with 

information about liquidity-supporting measures undertaken that the agency in question requires 

for its activities. 

Sveriges  Riksbank  is  also  authorised  to  issue  regulations  on  the  terms  for  its  general  liquidity 

support, market-making and special liquidity facilities. 

7.1.5  The  draft  law  on  Sveriges  Riksbank  clarifies  that  Sveriges  Riksbank  may  also  take  part  in 

resolution  colleges  and  participate  in  other  crisis  preparation  work  organised  by  bodies  in 

75 
76 
77 

See Chapter 3, Section 4 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank. 

See Chapter 3, Sections 6, 7, 11-14, 17, 18 and 20 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank. 
Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/61 of 10 October 2014 to supplement Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of 
the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  with  regard  to  liquidity  coverage  requirement  for  Credit  Institutions  (OJ 
L 11, 17.1.2015, p. 1). 

19 

                                                 
ECB-PUBLIC 

Sweden or abroad78. 

7.1.6  The draft law on Sveriges Riksbank requires Sveriges Riksbank to collaborate with the SFSA and 
NDO  in  order  to  contribute  to  the  stability  and  effectiveness  of  the  financial  system79.  Sveriges 

Riksbank must  consult  with  the  SFSA  and  the  NDO  on  important  matters  that  are  linked  to  the 

stability and efficiency of the financial system and/or that affect their respective supervisory and 

resolution  activities,  providing  the  authority  concerned  with  the  information  it  needs.  No 

consultation  needs  to  take  place  if  there  are  exceptional  reasons,  but  in  such  a  case  Sveriges 

Riksbank must inform the SFSA or the NDO of the matter. 

7.1.7  The  draft  law  on  Sveriges  Riksbank  requires  Sveriges  Riksbank  to  immediately  inform  the 

relevant authorities within the European Economic Area (EEA) with responsibility for group-based 

supervision if it learns of a critical situation that has arisen in Sweden and which may jeopardise 
liquidity in the financial markets or the stability of the financial system within an EEA state80. 

7.2 

Specific observations 

7.2.1  Article  139(2)(c)  of  the  Treaty  stipulates  that  the  basic  tasks  of  the  ESCB  as  listed  in  Article 

127(2)  of  the  Treaty,  including  the  financial  stability  mandate  referred  to  in  Article  127(5)  of  the 

Treaty,  shall  not  apply  to  Member  States  with  a  derogation,  such  as  Sweden.  Nevertheless, 

Member  States  with  a  derogation  are  obliged  under  Article  131  of  the  Treaty  to  ensure  that  its 

national  legislation  is  compatible  with  the  Treaties  and  the  Statute  of  the  ESCB,  in  view  of  the 

abrogation  of  the  derogation  and  the  potential  adoption  of  the  euro  in  those  Member  States. 

Against  this  background,  the  broad  conceptualisation  of  financial  stability  and  the  narrow 

conceptualisation  of  monetary  policy  under  the  draft  law  on  Sveriges  Riksbank,  combined  with 

the  prohibition  on  Sveriges  Riksbank  seeking  and  taking  instructions  only  applying  within  the 

narrowly defined area of monetary policy, does not provide the legally required compatibility with 

the Treaties and the Statute of the ESCB (see paragraph 2.7). 

7.2.2 

In  addition  to  the  ESCB’s  basic  tasks  under  Article  127(2)  of  the  Treaty,  Article  127(5)  of  the 

Treaty provides that the ESCB shall contribute to the smooth conduct of policies pursued by the 

competent authorities relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and the stability of 

the  financial  system.  Article  25.1  of  the  Statute  of  the  ESCB,  under  which  the  ECB  may  offer 

advice to and be consulted on the scope and implementation of Union legislation relating to the 

prudential supervision of credit institutions and to the stability of the financial system, is contained 

within  Chapter  V  (entitled  ‘Prudential  Supervision’)  of  the  Statute  of  the  ESCB.  The  close  links 

under  Union  law  between  financial  stability  and  prudential  supervision  are  also  reflected  in  the 
provisions of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/201381. 

7.2.3  From  a  material  perspective,  the  provision  of  liquidity  is  a  monetary  policy  task  at  any  central 

78 
79 
80 
81 

See Chapter 3, Section 7 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank. 
See Chapter 3, Sections 15 and 16 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank. 

See Chapter 3, Section 19 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank. 
See Article 1(1) and recitals 2, 5, 6, 13, 16, 27, 30, 42, 44, 55, 56 and 65 of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 
of  15  October  2013  conferring  specific  tasks  on  the  European  Central  Bank  concerning  policies  relating  to  the 
prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63). 

20 

                                                 
ECB-PUBLIC 

bank,  including  Sveriges  Riksbank.  For  example,  in  implementing  its  monetary  policy,  the 

Eurosystem  employs  the  following  monetary  policy  tools:  it  conducts  open  market  operations, 

offers  standing  facilities  and  requires  credit  institutions  to  hold  minimum  reserves  on  accounts 

with  the  Eurosystem.  The  set  of  instruments  at  the  Eurosystem’s  disposal  for  conducting  open 

market operations aim to ensure the orderly functioning of the money market and to help banks 

meet  their  liquidity  needs  in  a  smooth  and  well-organised  manner.  Within  the  Eurosystem  the 

main responsibility for the  provision of emergency  liquidity assistance lies at national  level,  with 

the  NCBs  concerned.  In  order  to  ensure  that  emergency  liquidity  assistance  operations  do  not 

interfere  with  the  Eurosystem’s  single  monetary  policy,  the  ECB  would  have  to  be  informed  or 

consulted  in  order  to  allow  for  a  smooth  sterilisation  of  any  undesired  liquidity  effects  and  an 
assessment of any systemic implications82. 

7.2.4  The  requirement  that  Sveriges  Riksbank  must  inform  the  Swedish  Cabinet  Minister  before 

Sveriges  Riksbank  approves  any  emergency  liquidity  assistance  should  not  be  understood  as 

undermining the requirement that the assistance be granted by Sveriges Riksbank independently 

and at its full discretion. Furthermore, the ECB notes that an NCB within the ESCB is required to 

have sufficient financial resources not only to perform its ESCB-related tasks but also its national 
tasks, including the provision of ELA83. 

7.2.5  The ECB notes that Sveriges Riksbank would not be obliged to make public the financial stability 

liquidity  facilities  it  intends  to  offer,  and  the  specific  conditions  applicable  to  them,  where  it  is 

inappropriate  to  do  so  having  regard  to  the  stability  and  efficiency  of  the  financial  system.  The 

degree  of  ex  ante  transparency  in  this  respect  is  a  policy  issue  which  Sveriges  Riksbank’s 

Executive Board is best positioned to decide on. 

7.2.6  The clarification that operations conducted by other legal persons ‘of particular importance for the 

financial infrastructure in Sweden’ should be included under Sveriges Riksbank’s oversight (see 

paragraph 7.1.1) is to  be  welcomed, considering the increasing use and importance of services 

such as Swish,  a mobile payment service, and  BankID, an  electronic authentication service, on 

the Swedish market. 

8. 

Specific  observations  on  draft  amendments  to  the  Law  on  exchange  rate  policy  and  the 

draft  law  on  Sveriges  Riksbank’s  provisions  on  exchange  rate  management  and  foreign 

reserves 

8.1 

Purpose  of  the  draft  amendments  to  the  Law  on  exchange  rate  policy  and  the  draft  law  on 

Sveriges Riksbank’s provisions on exchange rate management and foreign reserves 

8.1.1  The  Law  on  exchange  rate  policy  provides  that  the  Government  shall  decide  on  the  exchange 

rate system for the Swedish krona in relation to foreign currencies. The draft law amends the Law 

82 

83  

See paragraph 3.1 of the ECB/Eurosystem Agreement on emergency liquidity assistance (17 May 2017), available 
on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 

See paragraph 2.6 of Opinion CON/2020/11 and paragraph 2.5 of CON/2016/55. 

21 

 
                                                 
ECB-PUBLIC 

on exchange rate policy84 by adding that, where applicable, the Government shall also decide on 

the central exchange rate  and bandwidth, that Sveriges Riksbank may request the Government 

to set a central exchange rate or bandwidth and that the Government will consult with  Sveriges 

Riksbank before it sets a central exchange rate or bandwidth. It is further stated that decisions by 

the Government as set out above must be consistent with the price stability  objective set out in 
the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank85. 

8.1.2  The draft law on Sveriges Riksbank provides that if the Government has decided on an exchange 

rate  target  under  the  Law  on  exchange  rate  policy,  Sveriges  Riksbank  will  apply  that  target 

without prejudice to the price stability objective. Sveriges Riksbank may conduct foreign currency 

interventions  for  a  monetary  policy  purpose  and  these  must  be  carried  out  taking  into  account 

which exchange rate system applies. However, Sveriges Riksbank may only issue and trade in its 
own  debt  instruments  in  Swedish  kronor86.  It  is  thus  clarified  that,  in  line  with  the  Committee’s 

interpretation of the present situation, Sveriges Riksbank is not allowed to issue debt instruments 
in foreign currency87.  

8.1.3  The task of Sveriges Riksbank to hold and manage foreign reserves is expressly included in the 

amended Instrument of Government as one of Sveriges Riksbank’s responsibilities, with respect 

to which no authority may stipulate how Sveriges Riksbank must decide, and Sveriges Riksbank 
may neither request nor receive instructions 88. The draft law on  Sveriges Riksbank sets out the 

objectives of this task, providing that Sveriges Riksbank holds and manages the foreign reserves 

and  its  other  assets  to  enable  it  to  fulfil  its  tasks  and  generate  sufficient  yield  to  finance  its 

activities.  The  principles  governing  asset  management  are  that  Sveriges  Riksbank’s  assets  will 

be managed taking into account Sveriges Riksbank’s status as a central bank, in accordance with 

a low-risk strategy, taking into account the various purposes for which the assets are held. In the 

management  of  assets,  special  consideration  will  be  given  to  how  sustainable  growth  can  be 
promoted without compromising the abovementioned objectives and principles 89. As noted by the 

Committee,  Sveriges  Riksbank’s  asset  management  provides  a  means  for  it  to  fulfil  its  other 

tasks (e.g. concerning monetary policy and the financial system) and is not an objective in itself. 

From a risk management perspective, the performance of these monetary and other tasks takes 
precedence over the prescribed level of risk90. 

8.1.4  The  draft  law  on  Sveriges  Riksbank  provides  that  Sveriges  Riksbank  may  decide  to  borrow 

foreign  currency  from  the  NDO  to  reinforce  its  foreign  currency  reserve.  Sveriges  Riksbank  will 

fully reimburse the State’s borrowing costs, and repay loans to the NDO when there is no longer 

a  need  for  them.  Sveriges  Riksbank  will  consult  the  NDO  before  deciding  to  borrow  and  may 

84 
85 
86 

87 
88 
89 
90 

Proposed law amending Lagen (1998:1404) om valutapolitik, p. 221. 
See Chapter 2, Section 1, first paragraph of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank. 

See Chapter 2, Sections 3 and 4, third paragraph and Chapter 10, Section 5, second paragraph of the draft law on 
Sveriges Riksbank. 

See Chapter 18.2.1 and Chapter 30.4 of the Report. 
See the amendment to Chapter 9, Section 13 of the Instrument of Government. 
See Chapter 9, Sections 1-3 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank. 

See Report, p. 1835. 

22 

                                                 
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borrow  foreign  currency  that,  including  previous  borrowing,  corresponds  to,  at  most,  5%  of 

Sweden’s GDP for the previous year in order to reinforce foreign currency reserves in advance. If 

there are exceptional reasons for doing so, Sveriges Riksbank may decide to temporarily borrow 

foreign  currency  for  advance  reinforcement  of  the  foreign  reserves  beyond  the  5%  GDP  limit. 

Sveriges  Riksbank  must  explain  the  reasons  for  such  advance  reinforcement  of  the  foreign 
reserves  to  the  Parliament’s  Committee  on  Finance  as  soon  as  possible 91.  According  to  the 

Committee,  exceptional  reasons  justifying  such  additional  borrowing  refer  to  clear  signs  of 

elevated  concern  in  the  financial  markets,  an  increased  risk  of  Swedish  banks potentially  being 

exposed  to  serious  liquidity  stress  in  foreign  currency  or  other  circumstances  that  make  further 

enforcement of the foreign reserves clearly necessary to counteract a serious disturbance in the 
Swedish financial system 92. If Sveriges Riksbank’s total outstanding foreign currency loans from 

the NDO on 1 January 2023 exceed the 5% GDP limit and the conditions for borrowing beyond 

the 5% GDP limit are not met, Sveriges Riksbank must repay the loans as they fall due until the 
loan balance falls within the 5% GDP cap93. 

8.1.5  The draft law on Sveriges Riksbank provides that Sveriges Riksbank may also decide to borrow 

foreign currency to replenish the foreign reserves if they have been used in Sveriges Riksbank’s 

provision of general liquidity assistance, market-making and emergency liquidity assistance. The 

portion  of  the  foreign  reserves  that  has  not  been  funded  with  loans  from  the  NDO  will  be 

replenished up to its previous level with the borrowed funds. The 5% GDP limit does not apply in 

the event of such a replenishment. 

8.1.6  The  draft  law  on  Sveriges  Riksbank  provides  that  Sveriges  Riksbank  may  also  buy  foreign 

currency in order to be able to finance its provision of general liquidity assistance, market-making 

and emergency liquidity assistance for financial stability purposes, either immediately or at a later 
date. Foreign currency that has been bought for this purpose may be sold if appropriate 94. 

8.2 

Specific observations  

8.2.1  As previously noted by the ECB, it is relatively unusual within the ESCB for an NCB to strengthen 

its  foreign  reserve  assets  by  borrowing  from  its  national  debt  office  or  government.  Insofar  as 

such borrowings are financed by debt issuances in the international capital markets by the NDO, 

on behalf of the State, the ECB fully understands the Government’s desire to impose limitations 

on Sveriges Riksbank’s ability to increase its foreign reserves by these particular means. It would 

not  seem  realistic  for  Sveriges  Riksbank  to  rely  exclusively  on  the  NDO  to  meet  its  foreign 

currency needs in a financial crisis situation, taking account of the availability and cost of funding 

in such situations, as well as the time period within which the NDO would be able to borrow the 
necessary  amounts  of  foreign  currency  on  the  market95.  Thus,  Sveriges  Riskbank  needs  to  be 

able  to  increase  its  foreign  reserves  in  any  way  it  considers  necessary  in  pursuance  of  its 

91 
92 
93 
94 
95 

See Chapter 10, Sections 1-3 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank. 

See Report, pp. 1840-1841. 
See Chapter 13, Section 8, point 10 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank. 
See Chapter 10, Section 5, first paragraph of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank. 

See paragraph 3.4.5 of Opinion CON/2017/17. 

23 

                                                 
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independently formulated monetary, foreign exchange and liquidity policies. 

8.2.2  So  far  as  arrangements  with  foreign  central  banks  are  concerned,  as  previously  noted  by  the 

ECB,  the  provision  of  euro  liquidity  pursuant  to  currency  swap  arrangements  between  Sveriges 
Riksbank and the ECB is not available on an unconditional basis 96. 

8.2.3  As  previously  noted  by  the  ECB,  central  bank  independence  requirements  under  Article  130  of 

the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB require that Sveriges Riksbank must be able 

to  autonomously  avail  itself  of  sufficient  financial  resources  to  fulfil  its  monetary  and  foreign 

exchange policy mandates and finance its own operations. A Member State may not put its NCB 

in a position where it has insufficient financial resources to carry out its monetary and exchange 

rate policy tasks, as well as its national tasks. Sveriges Riksbank is best placed to independently 

assess what level of foreign reserves is necessary to enable it to perform its tasks. The ECB is 

particularly  concerned  that,  under  the  draft  law  on  Sveriges  Riksbank,  Sveriges  Riksbank  may 

only build up its foreign reserves for financial stability purposes.  The constraints under the draft 

law  on  Sveriges  Riksbank  on  Sveriges  Riksbank’s  ability  to  increase  its  foreign  reserves 

whenever  necessary,  through  appropriate  means,  in  pursuit  of  its  independently  formulated 

monetary,  foreign  exchange  and  liquidity  policies  clearly  encroach  on  Sveriges  Riksbank’s 

independence  under  the  Treaty  and  Statute  of  the  ESCB  in  the  performance  of  its  basic 
monetary, foreign exchange and liquidity policies 97. 

8.2.4  Consistent  with  previous  observations  made  by  the  ECB  regarding  the  powers  of  the  Swedish 
Government and Sveriges Riksbank in the area of exchange rate policy98, the draft amendments 

to  the  Law  on  exchange  rate  policy  and  the  draft  law  on  Sveriges  Riksbank’s  provisions  on 

exchange rate management and foreign reserves do not recognise the Council’s and the ECB’s 

powers in the area of exchange rate policy and the management of foreign reserves in the event 

of the abrogation of Sweden’s derogation. 

8.2.5  The ECB notes that the draft amendments to the Law on exchange rate policy would provide a 

legal basis for any possible future decision by Sweden to enter the exchange rate mechanism in 
Stage Three of Economic and Monetary Union (ERM II)99. 

9. 

Specific observations on the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank: provisions on cash 

9.1 

Purpose of the provisions on cash in the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank 

9.1.1  According to the Committee, Sweden is probably the country in the world where the use of cash 

has decreased the fastest during the last decade and where the proportion of cash payments in 
comparison  with  electronic  payments  is  the  lowest100.  However,  according  to  the  Committee, 

cash still has a special position as it is the only means of payment that can be used to settle a 

96 
97 
98 
99 

See paragraph 3.4.4 of Opinion CON/2017/17. 
See paragraphs 3.4.3 and 3.4.5 of Opinion CON/2017/17. 

See, e.g., Convergence Report, May 2018, p. 206. 
See Resolution of the European Council on the establishment of an exchange-rate mechanism in the third stage of 
economic and monetary union Amsterdam, 16 June 1997 (OJ C 236, 2.8.1997, p. 5). 

100 

See Report, p. 1579. 

24 

 
                                                 
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debt immediately and finally without intermediaries. It is the physical form of cash that allows this 

as  there  is  no  need  for  accounts  or  clearing.  It  is  also  easier  to  use  cash  than  some  electronic 

means  of  payment,  particularly  for  the  disabled.  Cash  may  be  the  only  means  of  payment 

available to people who have no access to bank services. The physical form of cash means it can 

also  be  transported  and  kept  in  many  different  places  and  can  be  used  even  when  there  is  no 

electricity  or  access  to  electronic  communication.  These  characteristics  and  its  high  level  of 

protection against counterfeiting  give cash some advantages over electronic means of payment 

from a contingency planning point of view. The fact that cash is not  traceable,  in other  words a 

cash  payment  is  anonymous  and  cannot  be  traced  to  a  particular  person,  is,  according  to  the 

Committee,  an  advantage  from  the  privacy  and  data  protection  perspectives.  Finally,  the 

Committee states that the possibility to convert private bank money (claims on a bank) into risk-

free  central  bank  money  with  legal  tender  status  (at  present  cash)  can  be  important  for 

confidence  in  the  monetary  system  as  a  whole.  At  present,  however,  it  is  not  clear  who  is 

responsible for ensuring that cash management and the related cash infrastructure is functioning 

properly  in  Sweden.  There  is  no  authority  with  specific  overall  responsibility  for  cash 

management. Sveriges Riksbank’s responsibility for the various parts of the cash chain under the 

Law on Sveriges Riksbank has been interpreted in different ways over the years. The Committee 
therefore believes that responsibilities for the cash chain should be clarified and defined in law101. 

9.1.2  Against  this  backdrop  and  for  the  purpose  of  strengthening  the  position  of  cash  as  a  means  of 

payment and store of value accessible for all groups of the population, and emphasising that the 

State should work to ensure continued access to cash services so that the public’s and society’s 
need  for  cash  are  met102,  the  draft  law  on  Sveriges  Riksbank  provides  that  the  objective  of 

Sveriges  Riksbank’s  activities  concerning  cash  is  to  contribute  to  the  availability  of  cash  to  a 
satisfactory extent throughout Sweden 103. According to the Committee, the word ‘contribute’ was 

chosen in order to clarify that, in addition to Sveriges Riksbank, other actors, such as banks and 
the State104,  also affect the availability of cash in society105, even though Sveriges Riksbank, by 
issuing and redeeming banknotes and coins, is the first and last component in the cash chain106. 

To ‘contribute’ means that Sveriges Riksbank, when performing its tasks regarding cash, needs 

to  analyse  and  take  into  account  how  cash  handling  and  access  to  cash  is  affected  and  how 
Sveriges Riksbank contributes to the maintenance of the cash chain in the whole of Sweden107. 
According to the Committee108, the objective of Sveriges Riksbank’s activities concerning cash is 

closely connected to the proposed legislation on the requirements for certain credit institutions to 

provide cash services to an adequate extent in the whole of Sweden, on which the ECB issued 

101 
102 
103 
104 
105 
106 
107 
108 

See Chapter 34.1, 34.4.1 and 34.4.4 of the Report. 
See Chapter 34.1 and 34.3 (in particular pp. 1543-1544) of the Report. 

See Chapter 4, Section 1 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank. 
See Report, p. 1545. 

See Report, p. 1769. 
See Report, p. 1546. 
See Report, p. 1524. 

See Report, pp. 1543-1544. 

25 

                                                 
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an own-initiative opinion on 26 November 2019109. 

9.1.3  According  to  the  Law  on  Sveriges  Riksbank110,  banknotes  and  coins  issued  by  Sveriges 

Riksbank are legal tender. This has been interpreted in court practice as being mandatory in most 

legal  relationships  governed  predominantly  by  public  law  (e.g.  legal  relationships  concerning 
medical care)111. The draft law  on  Sveriges Riksbank112 provides that everyone has the right to 

discharge an obligation by paying with banknotes and coins issued by Sveriges Riksbank (legal 

tender), unless otherwise provided by another statute or by the terms of a contract. 

9.1.4 

In  addition,  under  the  draft  law  on  Sveriges  Riksbank,  Sveriges  Riksbank  is,  as is  currently  the 
case113,  responsible  for  issuing  and  redeeming  banknotes  and  coins  in  kronor  that  have  legal 

tender status, but will be assigned overall responsibility for cash handling. Furthermore, Sveriges 
Riksbank may, as is currently the case114, redeem banknotes and coins that have ceased to be 

legal  tender.  The  draft  law  clarifies  that  Sveriges  Riksbank  is  responsible  for  running  depots, 

which  are  physical  locations  for  the  storage,  release  and  delivery  of  cash.  Unless  otherwise 

decided  by  the  Parliament,  there  must  be  at  least  five  depots  in  Sweden  at  which  companies 

approved by Sveriges Riksbank may collect and deliver banknotes of all denominations. At least 

two of these depots must be in northern parts of Sweden. Sveriges Riksbank may carry out these 
activities  through  outsourcing  in  collaboration  with  another  entity115.  Although  cash  handling  is 

currently performed by a private company, as agent and on behalf of Sveriges Riksbank, and the 

depots  are  run  by  private  actors  that  have  entered  into  cash  supply  agreements  with  Sveriges 

Riksbank,  it  is  still  Sveriges  Riksbank  that  is  currently  responsible  for  ensuring  that  their 
performance is in line with the objective set out in the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank116. Sveriges 
Riksbank may also issue emergency currency in a heightened state of emergency117. 

9.1.5  Sveriges  Riksbank  may  only  issue  or  circulate  electronic  money  under  the  Law  on  electronic 
money118,  which  implements  Directive  2009/110/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the 
Council119, or otherwise provide means of payment intended for the public other than banknotes 
and coins or emergency currency if the Parliament has approved this 120. 

109 
110 
111 
112 
113 
114 
115 
116 

See Opinion CON/2019/41. 
See Chapter 5, Section 1 of the Law on Sverige Riksbank. 
See Report, p. 1582. 

See Chapter 4, Section 15 of the draft Law on Sverige Riksbank. 
See Chapter 5, Section 3 of the Law on Sveriges Riksbank. 

See Chapter 5, Section 4 of the Law on Sveriges Riksbank. 
See Chapter 4, Sections 3-7 and 15 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank. 

See  p.  1547  and  Chapter  34.4.3  of  the  Report  and  Section  29  of  Riksbankens  föreskrifter  om  kontantförsörjning 
(RBFS 2013:2) (Sveriges Riksbank’s provisions on cash supply). 

See Chapter 4, Sections 3-6, 10 and 15 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank. 
See Chapter 4, Section 11 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank. 

117 
118 
119  Directive  2009/110/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  16  September  2009  on  the  taking  up, 
pursuit and prudential supervision of the business of electronic money institutions, amending Directives 2005/60/EC 
and 2006/48/EC and repealing Directive 2000/46/EC (OJ L 267, 10.10.2009, p. 7). 

120 

See Chapter 4, Section 11 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank. 

26 

                                                 
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9.2 

Specific observations 

9.2.1  As  previously  noted  by  the  ECB 121,  although  electronic  payment  instruments  are  increasingly 

used as the  preferred method  of payment in  Sweden, and the use  of cash is declining, cash  in 

general is still an established means of payment providing for immediate settlement of debts and 

direct  control  over  the  payer’s  spending.  Furthermore,  the  ability  to  pay  in  cash  remains 

particularly  important  for  certain  groups  in  society  that,  for  various  legitimate  reasons,  prefer  to 

use  cash  rather  than  other  means  of  payment,  or  who  are  unable  to  use  digital  technology. 

Additionally,  cash  payments  facilitate  the  inclusion  of  the  entire  population  in  the  economy  by 
allowing  it  to  settle  any  kind  of  financial  transaction  in  this  way122.  Furthermore,  the  number  of 

krona banknotes in circulation in Sweden has increased since 2017 and while the rate of identity 

theft and card fraud continues to rise with the increasing number of transactions, it is still among 
the lowest in Europe123. The ECB notes that cash could play an important role in the event of a 

disturbance in the payment systems, even though cash machines and other service points may 

also be affected as these are dependent on interaction with the account holding institutions. 

9.2.2  Notwithstanding that the ECB holds a positive view of further innovation and development in the 

field of electronic payment instruments, the ECB also welcomes the objective of the draft law on 

Sveriges Riksbank’s provisions on cash to facilitate the continued use of cash in Swedish society 
by  ensuring  an  adequate  level  of  access  to  cash  services  throughout  Sweden124.  However,  the 

draft law on Sveriges Riksbank seems to undermine the legal tender status of kronor banknotes 

and  coins  in  Sweden.  As  noted  in  paragraph  9.1.3,  the  provisions  in  the  Law  on  Sveriges 

Riksbank regarding  the  status  of  banknotes  and  coins  as  legal  tender  have  been  interpreted  in 

court practice as being mandatory in most legal relationships governed predominantly by public 

law, e.g. legal relationships concerning medical care. However, the Committee is of the opinion 

that  the  draft  law  on  Sveriges  Riksbank  should  allow  freedom  of  contract  even  in  legal 
relationships  governed  predominantly  by  public  law 125.  Consistent  with  this,  the  draft  law  on 

Sveriges  Riksbank  seems  to  impair  the  status  of  banknotes  and  coins  as  legal  tender  in 

comparison with what is currently the situation. It seems inconsistent to seek to ensure that, on 

the  one  hand,  cash  is  available  to  a  satisfactory  extent  throughout  Sweden,  and,  on  the  other 

hand, to undermine the legal tender status of cash by weakening the right to pay with banknotes 

and  coins  in  a  public  law  context.  It  is  therefore  strongly  suggested,  at  a  minimum,  to  preserve 

the existing legal tender status of cash in Sweden.  

9.2.3  The ECB considers it important that all Member States, including non-euro area Member States, 

take  appropriate  measures  to  ensure  that  credit  institutions  and  branches  operating  within  their 

121 
122 

123 

124 
125 

See paragraph 2.1 of Opinion CON/2019/41. 

Prop. 2019/20:23 om skyldighet för kreditinstitut att tillhandahålla kontanttjänster (Legislative proposal (2019/20:23) 
on the requirement for credit institutions to provide cash services), p. 31. See Opinions CON/2017/8, CON 2017/40 
and CON/2019/4. 
See  Sveriges  Riksbank’s 
in  Sweden  of  7  November  2019,  p.  24,  available  at 
https://www.riksbank.se/payments-in-sweden-2019, and Sveriges Riksbank’s statistics on notes and coins, available 
at https://www.riksbank.se/en-gb/statistics/payments-notes-and-coins/notes-and-coins/. 
See paragraph 2.2 of Opinion CON/2019/41. 

report  Payments 

See Report, p. 1582. 

27 

                                                 
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territories  provide  adequate  access  to  cash  services,  in  order  to  facilitate  the  continued  use  of 
cash126.  

9.2.4  With  reference  to  paragraph  9.1.5,  the  ECB  understands  that  the  provision  in  the  draft  law  on 

Sveriges  Riksbank  regarding  Sveriges  Riksbank  issuing  or  circulating  electronic  money  or 

otherwise providing means of payment intended for the public other than banknotes and coins or 

emergency currency, establishes a duty for Sveriges Riksbank to seek the Parliament’s approval 

before  issuing  (1)  electronic  money  within  the  meaning  of  Directive  2009/110/EC,  and  (2)  any 

form of central bank digital currency. 

9.2.5  Regarding electronic money,  under Article 1(1)(d)  of Directive 2009/110/EC Member States are 

required  to  recognise  NCBs  of  the  ESCB,  including  Sveriges  Riksbank,  as  eligible  issuers  of 

electronic  money,  provided  that,  in  issuing  electronic  money,  the  latter  are  not  acting  in  their 

capacity  as  monetary  or  other  public  authorities.  To  the  extent  that,  as  an  issuer  of  electronic 

money, Sveriges Riksbank would not be acting in its capacity as Sweden’s monetary authority, it 

would  seem  that  Sveriges  Riksbank  would  not  be  required  under  the  Directive  to  seek  the 

consent of the Parliament for its possible issuance of electronic money. 

9.2.6  Regarding  Sveriges  Riksbank’s  possible  future  issuance  of  means  of  payment  intended  for  the 

public  other  than  banknotes  and  coins,  the  ECB  notes  that  discussions  regarding  the  possible 

issuance of central bank digital currency are ongoing. Insofar as these discussions might evolve 

in a direction whereby central bank digital currency is equated with cash, and insofar as Sveriges 

Riksbank  is  responsible  for  issuing  cash  in  Sweden  by  issuing  and  redeeming  banknotes  and 

coins  denominated  in  kronor,  the  legislator  may  wish  to  consider  whether  the  consent  of  the 

Parliament  for  Sveriges  Riksbank’s  possible  issuance  of  central  bank  digital  currency  would 

necessarily be required in all circumstances. This is especially the case so long as central bank 

digital currency does not enjoy legal tender status in Sweden, and would merely be offered as an 

alternative to krona banknotes and coins,  without  affecting access to cash and  deposit facilities 

for the general public and businesses. That said, it is appreciated that these discussions are still 

ongoing, and that it may therefore be necessary to revisit these issues as discussions unfold. 

10. 

Specific  observations  on  the  draft  law  on  Sveriges  Riksbank:  provisions  on  crises  and 

heightened states of emergency 

10.1 

Purpose  of  the  provisions  on  crisis  and  heightened  states  of  emergency  in  the  draft  law  on 

Sveriges Riksbank 

10.1.1  The  draft  law  on  Sveriges  Riksbank  provides 127  that  the  objective  of  Sveriges  Riksbank’s 

activities regarding crisis and heightened states of emergency are to enable the public to make 

necessary  payments  (which,  according  to  the  Committee,  including  payments  for,  e.g.,  food, 
accommodation,  medicine  and  fuel 128)  during  peacetime  crises  and  heightened  states  of 

126 
127 
128 

See paragraph 2.3 of Opinion CON/2019/41. 
See Chapter 5, Section 1 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank. 

See Report, p. 1803. 

28 

 
                                                 
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emergency,  to  ensure  that  Sveriges  Riksbank  has  a  good  capability  to  handle  its  tasks  even 

under these circumstances and to limit vulnerability concerning payments. 

10.1.2  Under the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank, Sveriges Riksbank will be responsible for planning for 

peacetime  crisis  situations  and  heightened  states  of  emergency  as  regards  its  own  activity. 

Sveriges Riksbank will also have a planning and control responsibility in relation to legal entities 

and  economic  operators  within  the  domain  of  cash  handling  services  and  the  performance  of 

electronic payments. Sveriges Riksbank is required to plan and undertake preparations to handle 

peacetime  crises,  and  in  a  heightened  state  of  emergency  to  first  focus  on  tasks  that  are 

significant for defence purposes. Sveriges Riksbank must ensure that the relevant personnel both 

at  Sveriges  Riksbank  and  at  relevant  legal  entities  and  economic  operators  undergo  the 
necessary training and exercises129. 

10.1.3  Neither the General Council nor the Executive Board of Sveriges Riksbank may meet in an area 

occupied by a foreign power. Provision is also made for the wartime deployment of the personnel 
of Sveriges Riksbank and relevant legal entities and economic operators 130. 

10.1.4  Sveriges Riksbank is required to consult the SFSA on its activity regarding crises and heightened 

states of emergency, and to keep the Swedish Government and the NDO informed in the event of 

a  heightened  state  of  emergency  or  of  serious  disruptions  to  payments  during  peacetime  crisis 

situations.  In  a  heightened  state  of  emergency  Sveriges  Riksbank  must  provide  the  Swedish 

armed forces with the documents necessary for the armed forces to be able to keep the Swedish 
Government informed131. 

10.2 

Specific observations 

10.2.1  It  should  be  clarified  that  Sveriges  Riksbank  will  achieve  its  objectives  relating  to  its  activities 

concerning  crises  and  heightened  states  of  emergency  without  neglecting  its  main  objective  of 

maintaining price stability. 

10.2.2  The  ECB  notes  that,  in  adopting  the  euro,  a  Member  State  irreversibly  transfers  to  the  Union 

monetary policy, payment system and other powers enumerated in the Treaty and the Statute of 
the  ESCB  with  regard  to  ESCB  tasks132.  In  these  fields  certain  policymaking  and  legislative 

powers, including contingency planning with respect to the continued performance of these tasks, 

belong  exclusively,  under  Articles  8  and  12  of  the  Statute  of  the  ESCB,  to  the  decision-making 
bodies  of  the  ECB 133.  As  previously  noted  by  the  ECB,  pursuant  to  the  principle  of  sincere 

cooperation  under  Article  4(3)  of  the  Treaty  on  European  Union,  these  Member  States  should 
refrain  from  taking  any  measures  that  could  jeopardise  the  ECB’s  or  the  ESCB’s  objectives 134. 

Article 347 of the Treaty envisages that a Member State may be called upon to take action in the 

129 
130 
131 
132 
133 

134 

See Chapter 5, Sections 2-9, 15 and 16 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank. 

See Chapter 5, Sections 10-13 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank. 
See Chapter 5, Sections 17-19 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank. 

See Article 3(1)(c) of the Treaty. 
See  paragraph  9  of  Opinion  CON/2002/27,  paragraph  8  of  Opinion  CON/2006/6,  paragraph  2.1  of 
Opinion CON/2014/24, and paragraph 2.1 of Opinion CON/2020/2. 

See paragraph 2.1 of Opinion CON/2018/46 and paragraph 2.1 of Opinion CON/2020/2. 

29 

                                                 
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event  of  serious  internal  disturbances  affecting  the  maintenance  of  law  and  order,  war,  serious 

international  tension  constituting  a  threat  of  war,  or  in  order  to  carry  out  obligations  it  has 

accepted  for  the  purpose  of  maintaining  peace  and  international  security.  Accordingly,  in  the 

event  of  emergency  conditions  under  Article  347,  national  authorities  may  be  justified  in 

exercising,  on  a  temporary  basis,  powers  that  fall  within  the  exclusive  competence  of  the 
ESCB135. Any reliance on Article 347 of the Treaty must take place strictly under conditions laid 
down in the Treaty itself, as interpreted by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)136. 

10.3  New task of Sveriges Riksbank 

10.3.1  Responsibility for planning for peacetime crisis situations and heightened states of emergency as 
regards  its  own  activities  is  not  a  new  task  of  Sveriges  Riksbank137.  However,  the  draft  law  on 

Sveriges Riksbank also tasks it with planning and control responsibility in relation to legal entities 

and  economic  operators  within  the  domain  of  cash  handling  services  and  the  performance  of 

electronic  payments  (the  ‘crisis  preparedness  task  for  cash  handling  and  electronic  payment 

services’), which does not exist in the Law on Sveriges Riksbank. Currently, Sveriges Riksbank is 

only responsible for crisis preparedness as concerns its own activities, and not in respect of any 
financial companies 138. 

10.3.2  The  ECB  underlines  that  a  proposed  conferral  of  new  tasks  on  an  NCB  in  the  ESCB  must  be 
assessed against the prohibition on monetary financing under Article 123 of the Treaty139. For the 

purposes of that prohibition, Article 1(1)(b)(ii) of Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 defines ‘other type 

of  credit  facility’,  inter  alia,  as  ‘any  financing  of  the  public  sector’s  obligations  vis-à-vis  third 

parties’. 

10.3.3  The  monetary  financing  prohibition  aims  to  encourage  the  Member  States  to  follow  a  sound 

budgetary policy and not to allow the monetary financing of public deficits or privileged access by 

public authorities to the financial markets to lead to excessively high levels of debt or excessive 
Member  State  deficits 140.  Therefore,  the  task  of  financing  measures,  which  are  normally  the 

responsibility of the Member States, and which are financed from their budgetary sources rather 

135 
136 

137 

138 
139 
140 

See paragraph 2.2 of Opinion CON/2014/24 and paragraph 2.2 of Opinion CON/2020/2. 

judgment  of 

See judgment of the Court of Justice of 19 December 1968, Salgoil v Ministero del commercio con l’esturo, C-13/68, 
the  Court  of  Justice  of  5  May  1981,  Commission  v  UK,  C-804/79, 
ECLI:EU:C:1968:54; 
ECLI:EU:C:1981:93;  paragraph  13  of  Opinion  CON/2006/6;  paragraph  2.3  of  Opinion  CON/2020/2;  Gilsdorfer  and 
Brandtner,  ‘Vorbem.  zu  den  Artikeln  296  bis  298  EG’,  No  3-5,  in  Bardenhewer-Rating,  Grill,  Jakob  and  Woelker 
(eds.),  EG-  und  EU-Kommentar,  6th  ed.  (2004),  p.  1534;  Zilioli,  C.,  ‘National  Emergency  Powers  and  Exclusive 
Community Competences – A  Crack in the Dam?’ Legal Aspects of the European System of Central Banks, ECB, 
2005, pp. 115-133, at pp. 131-132. 

See Chapter 9, Section 7  of the Law on Sveriges Riksbank  and Chapter 35.3.3 of the Report. Sveriges Riksbank 
will  also  voluntarily  coordinate  the  planning  initiated  together  with  the  other  involved  authorities  within  the  financial 
services sector regarding the reinforcement of the total defence capacity in Sweden, see https://www.riksbank.se/en-
gb/payments--cash/payments-in-sweden/payments-in-sweden-2019/the-riksbank-is-adapting-to-the-digital-
world/strengthened-preparedness-in-the-financial-sector/swedens-total-defence-has-been-resumed/,  as  well  as 
participate  in  a  total  defence  exercise  during  2020,  https://www.riksbank.se/en-gb/payments--cash/payments-in-
sweden/payments-in-sweden-2019/the-riksbank-is-adapting-to-the-digital-world/strengthened-preparedness-in-the-
financial-sector/the-riksbank-to-participate-in-total-defence-exercise-2020/. 

See Report, p. 1598. 
See paragraph 3.1.4 of Opinion CON/2020/2. 
See, to that effect, judgments of the Court of Justice of 1 October 2015, Bara and Others, C-201/14, EU:C:2015:658, 
paragraph 22, and of 16 June 2015, Gauweiler and Others, C-62/14, EU:C:2015:400, paragraph 100. 

30 

                                                 
ECB-PUBLIC 

than  by  the  NCBs,  must  not  be  entrusted  to  NCBs.  To  decide  what  constitutes  financing  of  the 

public  sector’s  obligations  vis-à-vis  third  parties,  which  can  be  translated  as  the  provision  of 

central bank financing outside the scope of central bank tasks, it is necessary to carry out, on a 

case-by-case basis, an assessment of whether the task to be undertaken by an NCB is a central 

bank task or a government task, i.e. a task within the responsibility of the Member States. In other 

words,  adequate  safeguards  must  be  in  place  to  ensure  that  circumventions  of  the  objective  of 

the monetary financing prohibition of maintaining a sound budgetary policy of Member States do 
not take place141. 

10.3.4  As part of its discretion in the exercise of its duty, on the basis of Article 271(d) of the Treaty and 

Article 35.6 of the Statute of the ESCB, to ensure that NCBs honour the obligations laid down by 

the Treaty, the Governing Council has endorsed safeguards of that kind in the form of criteria for 

determining what may be seen as falling within the scope of a public sector obligation within the 

meaning of Article 1(1)(b)(ii) of Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 or, in other words, what constitutes a 
government task. These are as set out below142. 

First,  central  bank  tasks  relate,  in  particular,  to  tasks  conferred  upon  the  ECB  and  the  NCBs 

under the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB. These tasks are mainly defined in Article 127(2), 

(5) and (6) and Article 128(1) of the Treaty, as well as Article 22 and Article 25.1 of the Statute of 

the ESCB. 

Second, as Article 14.4 of the Statute of the ESCB allows NCBs to perform other functions, new 

tasks,  i.e.  tasks  that  are  not  related  to  tasks  that  have  been  conferred  upon  the  ECB  and  the 

NCBs, are not precluded per se. However, new tasks that are undertaken by an NCB and which 

are  atypical  of  NCB  tasks  or  which  are  clearly  discharged  on  behalf  of,  and  in  the  exclusive 

interest  of,  the  government  or  of  other  public  sector  entities  should  be  considered  government 

tasks. 

Third,  an  important  criterion  for  qualifying  a  new  task  as  atypical  of  an  NCB  task  or  as  being 

clearly  discharged  on  behalf  of  and  in  the  exclusive  interest  of  the  government  or  other  public 

sector entities is the impact of the task on the institutional, financial and personal independence 

of that NCB. 

In particular, the following aspects should be taken into account: 

(1)   Whether the performance of the new task creates conflicts of interest with existing central 

bank  tasks  which  are  not  adequately  addressed  and  does  not  necessarily  complement 

those  tasks.  If  a  conflict  of  interest  arises  between  existing  and  new  tasks,  sufficient 

safeguards  to  mitigate  that  conflict  should  be  in  place.  The  complementarity  between  a 

new task and the existing central bank tasks should not be interpreted broadly, so as to 

lead to the creation of an indefinite chain of ancillary tasks. Such complementarity should 

be examined in relation to the financing of those tasks. 

(2)   Whether  without  new  financial  resources  the  performance  of  the  new  task  is 

141 
142 

See paragraph 3.1.5 of Opinion CON/2020/2. 

See paragraph 3.1.6 of Opinion CON/2020/2. 

31 

                                                 
ECB-PUBLIC 

disproportionately burdensome in view of the NCB’s financial or organisational capacity, 

and may have a negative impact on its capacity to properly perform existing central bank 

tasks. 

(3)   Whether  performance  of  the  new  task  fits  into  the  institutional  set-up  of  the  NCB  in  the 

light of central bank independence and accountability considerations. 

(4)   Whether the performance of the new task harbours substantial financial risks. 

(5)   Whether performance of the new task exposes the members of the NCB decision-making 

bodies to political risks which are disproportionate and may also have an impact on their 

personal  independence  and,  in  particular,  on  the  guarantee  of  term  of  office  set  out  in 

Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB. 

10.3.5  Based  on  the  criteria  set  out  above,  the  following  paragraphs  assess  whether  Sveriges 

Riksbank’s new task is in line with the prohibition of monetary financing. 

Tasks related to those conferred upon the  ECB and  NCBs by the Treaty and the Statute of the 

ESCB 

The ECB understands that the crisis preparedness task for cash handling and electronic payment 

services is closely linked to the central banking tasks of issuing banknotes under Article 128(1) of 

the Treaty and promoting the smooth operation of payment systems under the second indent of 

Article 127(2) of the Treaty. Sveriges Riksbank’s crisis preparedness task for cash handling and 

electronic payment services is therefore related to the tasks conferred upon the ECB and NCBs 

by the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB. 

Task which are atypical of NCB tasks 

As  the  crisis  preparedness  task  for  cash  handling  and  electronic  payment  services  is  closely 

linked to the central banking tasks set out above, it is not to be considered a task that is atypical 

of NCB tasks. 

Tasks clearly discharged on behalf of and in the exclusive interest of the Government 

As  the  performance  of  Sveriges  Riksbank’s  crisis  preparedness  task  for  cash  handling  and 

electronic payment services is closely linked to the performance of its central banking tasks, the 

crisis preparedness task for cash handling and electronic payment services cannot be considered 

to be discharged on behalf of or in the exclusive interest of the Government. 

Extent  to  which  performance  of  the  new  task  creates  conflicts  of  interest  with  existing  central 

bank tasks 

The  performance  of  the  crisis  preparedness  task  for  cash  handling  and  electronic  payment 

services  would  be  unlikely  to  give  rise  to  any  conflicts  of  interests  with  Sveriges  Riksbank’s 

existing central bank tasks. Rather, it could be seen as complementing the performance of some 

of those tasks. 

Extent to which performance of the new task is disproportionate to Sveriges Riksbank’s financial 

or organisational capacity 

32 

ECB-PUBLIC 

As previously noted by the ECB 143, the principle of financial independence requires that Member 

States may not put their  NCBs in a  position  where they  have  insufficient resources to carry out 

both  their  ESCB-related  tasks  and  their  national  tasks,  from  an  operational  and  financial 

perspective.  Furthermore,  when  allocating  specific  new  tasks  to  NCBs,  each  NCB  concerned 

should have sufficient financial and human resources at its disposal to ensure that the tasks can 

be  carried  out  without  impacting  on  the  NCB’s  financial  or  operational  capacity  to  perform  its 

ESCB  tasks.  In  order  to  ensure  that  Sveriges  Riksbank’s  capacity  to  perform  its  ESCB-related 

tasks  is  not  impaired,  Sveriges  Riksbank  must,  therefore,  be  in  a  position  to  avail  itself  of  the 

necessary resources to carry out its duties under the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank. According 
to  the  Committee144,  the  effects  of  Sveriges  Riksbank’s  greater  responsibility  for  preparedness 

regarding  payments  during  crises  and  in  wartime,  i.e.  the  crisis  preparedness  task  for  cash 

handling  and  electronic  payment  services,  on  the  overall  public  sector  finances  amounts  to 

roughly 15 to 20 full-time employees (amounting to increased costs of approximately SEK 19 to 

25 million per year) as from 2023, and means that significantly more resources will be required in 

this  area  in  a  few  years’  time.  It  is  suggested  that  these  estimates  be  evaluated  by  Sveriges 

Riksbank.  

Extent to which performance of the new task fits into the institutional set-up of Sveriges Riksbank, 

in the light of central bank independence and accountability considerations 

The  ECB  considers  that  the  crisis  preparedness  task  for  cash  handling  and  electronic  payment 

services is unlikely to be in conflict with the institutional set-up of Sveriges Riksbank as Sveriges 

Riksbank  is  already  responsible  for  issuing  banknotes  and  promoting  the  smooth  operation  of 

payment systems, to which this crisis preparedness task is closely linked. 

Extent to which the performance of tasks harbours substantial financial risks 

The  ECB  understands  that  the  general  principles  on  State  liability  are  applicable  to  Sveriges 

Riksbank,  in  its  capacity  as  a  public  authority  under  the  Swedish  Parliament.  In  this  respect, 
under the Law on tort liability the State or a municipality shall compensate 145: (1) personal injury, 

property  loss  and  pure  economic  loss  caused  through  wrongful  or  negligent  exercise  of  public 
authority146  within  operations  for  whose  performance  the  State  or  a  municipality  is  responsible; 

(2) pure  economic  loss  caused  by  a  public  authority,  through  the  commission  of  a  wrong  or 

through  negligence,  providing  incorrect  information  or  advice,  if  there  are  special  reasons 
considering  the  circumstances147;  (3)  personal  injury,  property  loss,  pure  economic  loss,  loss 

other than that set out under (2) above, if arising due to the victim’s rights in accordance with the 

European  Convention  for  the  Protection  of  Human  Rights  and  Fundamental  Freedoms  being 

143 
144 
145 
146 

147 

See, e.g., paragraph 4.6 of Opinion CON/2018/21. 

See Chapter 38.4.3 and p. 1745 of the Report. 
Skadeståndslagen (1972:207), Chapter 3, Sections 2-4. 

I.e.  decisions  and  actions  which  constitutes  expressions  of  society’s  power  to  decide  over  its  citizens’  rights  and 
obligations or otherwise grant benefits only a public authority may grant. 

In accordance with Chapter 3, Section 3 of the Law on tort liability, in determining whether there are special reasons 
considering  the  circumstances,  especially  the  nature  of  the  information  or  advice,  the  connection  between  the 
information and advice and the relevant public authority’s areas of operations and the circumstances at hand when 
the information or advice was offered shall be taken into account. 

33 

                                                 
ECB-PUBLIC 

infringed by the State or a municipality; and (4) other intangible loss caused by such infringement. 

In each specific case the relevant public authority must pay compensation in respect of any loss 
or  damage  caused  by  it148.  Thus,  the  ECB  understands  that  Sveriges  Riksbank  will  harbour 

substantial  financial  risks  to  the  extent  that  it  is  liable  for  the  performance  of  all  its  tasks, 

including, in this particular context, the crisis preparedness task for cash handling and electronic 

payment services. 

Extent  to  which  the  performance  of  the  new  task  exposes  members  of  the  decision-making 

bodies  of  Sveriges  Riksbank  to  disproportionate  political  risks  and  impacts  on  their  personal 

independence 

The  ECB  does  not  consider  that  the  crisis  preparedness  task  for  cash  handling  and  electronic 

payment  services  would  expose  the  members  of  the  decision-making  bodies  of  Sveriges 

Riksbank 

to  disproportionate  political  risks  or 

that 

it  would 

impact  on 

their  personal 

independence. 

Conclusion 

The ECB considers that, given the link to the ESCB tasks of issuing banknotes and promoting the 

smooth  operations  of  payment  systems,  the  crisis  preparedness  task  for  cash  handling  and 

electronic  payment  services  is  a  central  banking  task.  As  such,  its  financing  by  Sveriges 

Riksbank  is  in  compliance  with  the  prohibition  of  monetary  financing  under  Article  123  of  the 

Treaty. 

11. 

Specific observations on the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank: provisions on international 

activities 

11.1 

Purpose of the provisions on international activities in the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank 

11.1.1  The draft law on Sveriges Riksbank clarifies that Sveriges Riksbank may act as a liaison body in 

relation  to  international  financial  institutions  of  which  Sweden  is  a  member.  Sveriges  Riksbank 

may  grant  credit  to  international  financial  institutions  of  which  Sweden  is  a  member  and  make 
agreements on long-term international financial commitments, if the Parliament so approves 149. 

11.1.2  Sveriges Riksbank must ensure that the Government regularly receives information about events 

of  significance  to  the  international  work  in  which  Sveriges  Riksbank  participates.  In  respect  of 

decisions on important matters of principle in international contexts that are linked to the activities 

of other public authorities, Sveriges Riksbank must consult with such other authorities. Sveriges 

Riksbank shall base its international work on statements that the Parliament or the Government 
has made about Sweden’s general stance150. As statements about Sweden’s general stance are 

meant  to  affect  the  society  at  large  and  not  constitute  instructions  to  specific  authorities  or 

concern  a  certain  negotiation  or  international  organisation,  the  intention  of  this  obligation  of 

Sveriges Riksbank is that it is to operate, on a general level, in the same direction as the State at 

148 
149 
150 

Förordning (1975:1345) med instruktion för Justitiekanslern, Section 2a. 
See Chapter 6, Sections 1 and 2 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank. 

See Chapter 6, Sections 11-13 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank. 

34 

 
                                                 
ECB-PUBLIC 

large 151. If Sveriges Riksbank chooses to not pursue a position which is in line with the general 

stance  of  Sweden,  Sveriges  Riksbank  should  be  able  to  explain  to  the  Parliament’s  Committee 
on Finance the circumstances leading to this position152. 

11.1.3  Regarding  the  financing  of  the  International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF)  in  particular,  the  draft  law  on 
Sveriges  Riksbank  provides  that153  Sveriges  Riksbank  may  be  a  financial  counterparty  to  the 

IMF.  Sveriges  Riksbank  may  make  capital  contributions  from  its  own  funds  to  the  IMF,  if  the 

Parliament  approves  this.  Sveriges  Riksbank  may  acquire  the  special  drawing  rights  resulting 

from  Sweden's  participation  in  the  IMF  and  must  fulfil  the  obligations  resulting  from  Sweden's 

participation in this system. Sveriges Riksbank may decide to provide credits or other funding of 

the IMF’s activities if the funding has been approved by the Parliament. Regarding the financing 

of the IMF’s activities for low income countries, Sveriges Riksbank may decide to provide credits 

or other financing when informed by the Government that the Parliament has approved this. This 

provision is new, as at present it is Sveriges Riksbank that submits a petition to the Parliament to 

be  allowed  to  participate  as  concerns  both  the  IMF’s  financing  directed  towards  low  income 

States and other financings. According to the Committee, Swedish standpoints in the IMF should 

be  developed  in  cooperation  between  the  Government  and  Sveriges  Riksbank,  as  they  are  at 

present. However, since it is Sweden, as a country, that is a member of the IMF, the Committee’s 

assessment  is  that,  ultimately,  it  is  the  Government  that  decides  what  position  Sweden  should 

adopt.  The  exception  to  this  is  in  matters  concerning  monetary  policy  or  other  ESCB-related 
questions 154. 

11.1.4  In connection with the transfer of funds from Sveriges Riksbank to the IMF when making capital 

contributions  from  its  own  funds  to  the  IMF  or  providing  credits  or  other  funding  of  the  IMF’s 

activities,  Sveriges  Riksbank  must  borrow  a  corresponding  sum  from  the  NDO,  and  will 

remunerate  the  NDO  at  the  interest  rate  corresponding  to  the  interest  payment  received  by 

Sveriges Riksbank from the IMF. Capital amounts that Sveriges Riksbank receives back from the 
IMF must be returned to the NDO 155. 

11.2 

Specific observations 

11.2.1  The tasks performed by Sveriges Riksbank must comply with the monetary financing prohibition 

under Article 123 of the Treaty. As previously noted by the ECB, national legislation providing for 

the  financing  by  an  NCB  of  a  Member  State’s  financial  commitments  to  international  financial 

institutions  other  than  the  IMF  in  the  capacities  provided  for  in  Regulation  (EC)  No  3603/93  is 
incompatible  with  the  monetary  financing  prohibition156.  As  previously  noted  by  the  EMI,  the 

Swedish Government’s assumption of all responsibilities resulting from Sweden’s membership in 

the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank) was necessary to 

151 
152 
153 
154 
155 
156 

See Chapter 26.9.5 of the Report.  
See Chapter 26.9.5 of the Report.  

See Chapter 6, Sections 3-8 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank. 
See Chapter 27.9.2 of the Report. 
See Chapter 6, Sections 7 and 8 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank. 

See Convergence Report, May 2018. 

35 

                                                 
ECB-PUBLIC 

ensure  that  Sveriges  Riksbank’s  statute  was  compatible  with  the  prohibition  of  central  bank 

financing  of  public  sector  obligations  vis-à-vis  third  parties  specified  in  Article 1(1)(b)(ii)  of 
Regulation  (EC)  No  3603/93157.  Against  this  backdrop,  it  is  suggested  to  clarify  that  Sveriges 

Riksbank may only grant credit to international financial institutions of which Sweden is a member 

and make agreements on long-term international financial commitments to the extent compatible 

with the monetary financing prohibition under Article 123 of the Treaty.  

11.2.2  Regarding Sveriges Riksbank’s financing of Sweden’s obligations vis-à-vis the IMF, this is subject 

to  an  exemption  from  the  monetary  financing  prohibition  laid  down  in  Regulation  (EC) 

No 3603/93. In particular, Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 provides that the financing by 

NCBs  of  obligations  falling  upon  the  public  sector  in  relation  to  the  IMF  are  not  regarded  as  a 

credit  facility  within  the  meaning  of  Article  123  of  the  Treaty.  Recital  14  of  Regulation  (EC)  No 

3603/93 clarifies the rationale behind this exemption, stating that it is appropriate to authorise the 

financing by the central banks of obligations falling upon the public sector in relation to the IMF 

because  such  financing  ‘results  in  foreign  claims  which  have  all  the  characteristics  of  reserve 

assets’. The exemption laid down in Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 must be interpreted 

in  line  with  this  rationale.  IMF-related  financings  that  do  not  result  in  claims  that  have  the 

characteristics of reserve assets within the meaning of recital 14 of Regulation (EU) No 3603/93 
are therefore a form of monetary financing prohibited by Article 123(1) of the Treaty158. Reserve 

assets have been defined for this purpose as those external assets that are readily available to 

and  controlled  by  monetary  authorities  for  meeting  balance  of  payments  financing  needs,  for 

interventions  in  exchange  markets  to  affect  the  currency  exchange  rate,  and  for  other  related 

purposes,  such  as  maintaining  confidence  in  the  currency  and  the  economy,  and  serving  as  a 

basis for foreign borrowing. Under this definition, reserve assets must be foreign currency assets 
and, other than gold bullion, must be claims on non-residents 159. Against this backdrop, the ECB 

recommends  clarifying  that  Sveriges  Riksbank’s  financing  of  Sweden’s  obligation  in  relation  to 

the IMF is subject to compliance with the monetary financing prohibition under Article 123 of the 

Treaty. 

11.2.3  Regarding Sveriges Riksbank’s obligation to base its international  work on statements made by 

the Government or the Parliament about Sweden’s general stance described in paragraph 11.1.2, 

the  ECB  emphasises  that,  in  accordance  with  Article  130  of  the  Treaty,  an  NCB  must  not  be 

limited 

in 

terms  of 

its  ability 

to  perform 

its  ESCB-related 

tasks 

independently.  The 

abovementioned  obligation  of  Sveriges  Riksbank  entails  a  risk  of  the  Parliament  influencing 

Sveriges Riksbank in a way that is not compatible  with Article 130 of the Treaty. Therefore, the 

ECB suggests setting out the obligation in the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank without prejudice to 

Sveriges Riksbank’s independence under the Treaty. 

157 
158 
159 

See paragraph 4 of Opinion CON/1995/8. 
See paragraphs 2.1 and 2.2 of Opinion CON/2016/21. 
See  paragraph  3.2  of  Opinion  CON/2017/4  (citing  International  Monetary  Fund,  Balance  of  Payments  and 
International Investment Position Manual (Sixth ed., 2009), pp. 111-18). 

36 

 
                                                 
ECB-PUBLIC 

12. 

Specific  observations  on  the  draft  law  on  Sveriges  Riksbank:  other  provisions  regarding 

reporting, statistics and the provision of benchmarks 

12.1 

Purpose  of  the  provisions  regarding  reporting,  statistics  and  the  provision  of  benchmarks  in  the 

draft law on Sveriges Riksbank 

12.1.1  The  draft  law  on  Sveriges  Riksbank160  provides  that,  at  the  request  of  Sveriges  Riksbank, 

financial  companies  that  conduct  operations  in  Sweden  are  obliged  to  provide  it  with  the 

information necessary to enable it to fulfil its tasks under the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank. This 

means that the group of companies obliged to report information to Sveriges Riksbank has been 

expanded  slightly  compared  with  the  present  regulations  to  enable  Sveriges  Riksbank  to  carry 

out all its tasks under the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank. 

12.1.2  The  draft  law  on  Sveriges  Riksbank161  provides  that  Sveriges  Riksbank  is  responsible  for 

producing and publishing balance-of-payment statistics, statistics on the international investment 

position and financial market statistics. An express provision is introduced concerning the right of 

Sveriges Riksbank to produce and disseminate statistical information required for collaboration in 

the  ESCB,  the  Bank  for  International  Settlements  (BIS),  the  IMF  or  other  international 

organisations. 

12.1.3  The draft law on Sveriges Riksbank162 provides that Sveriges Riksbank may provide and publish 

interest rate benchmarks and other benchmarks referred to in Regulation (EU) 2016/1011 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council 163. 

12.2 

Specific observations 

12.2.1  Interest  rate  benchmarks  are  important  for  the  functioning  of  financial  markets  and  the 
transmission of monetary  policy164. The ECB understands that the Stockholm Interbank Offered 

Rate  (STIBOR)  has,  up  until  now,  been  provided  by  the  Swedish  STIBOR  banks,  and  that 

Financial  Benchmarks  Sweden  AB,  a  Swedish  subsidiary  of  the  Swedish  Banking  Association, 

has been responsible for administering STIBOR, whilst Nasdaq Stockholm AB is responsible for 

publishing STIBOR every business day at 11:00. The ECB notes that the common framework to 

ensure  the  accuracy  and  integrity  of  indices  used  as  benchmarks  in  financial  instruments  and 
financial  contracts  under  Regulation  (EU)  2016/1011  does  not  apply  to  central  banks165,  as 

central banks already apply principles, standards and procedures which ensure that they exercise 
their activities with integrity and in an independent manner 166. Accordingly, if Sveriges Riksbank 

were to decide to provide  and publish reference  interest rates and  other benchmarks under the 

See Chapter 7, Section 1 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank. See also Chapter 36.1.2 of the Report. 
See Chapter 7, Section 5 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank. See also Chapter 36.1.3 of the Report. 

160 
161 
162  Chapter 7, Section 6 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank. See also Chapter 36.3 of the Report. 
163  Regulation  (EU)  2016/1011  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  8  June  2016  on  indices  used  as 
benchmarks in financial instruments and financial contracts or to measure the performance of investment funds and 
amending Directives 2008/48/EC and 2017/14/EU and Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 (OJ L 171, 29.6.2016, p. 1). 

164 

See recital 1 of Guideline (EU) 2019/1265 on the euro short-term rate (€STR) (ECB/2019/19) (OJ L 199, 26.7.2019, 
p. 8). 
Article 2(2)(a) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1011. 

165 
166  Recital 14 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1011. 

37 

                                                 
ECB-PUBLIC 

draft  law  on  Sveriges  Riksbank,  it  would  have  full  discretion  to  develop  the  methodology  for 

determining  the  new  benchmark  so  as  to  ensure  its  accuracy,  integrity  and  reliability.  When 

central  banks  provide  benchmarks,  it  is  their  responsibility  to  establish  appropriate  internal 

procedures  in  order  to  ensure  the  accuracy,  integrity,  reliability  and  independence  of  those 
benchmarks, taking into account international best practice where relevant and appropriate 167. 

12.2.2  The  draft  law  on  Sveriges  Riksbank  does  not  confer  any  new  tasks  on  Sveriges  Riksbank  as 

concerns  the  provision  and  publication  of  reference  interest  rates  and  other  benchmarks.  The 
ECB understands that, pursuant to the Law on interest168, Sveriges Riksbank is currently obliged 

to publish a reference rate every six months, which is used for calculating interest on arrears. The 

draft law on Sveriges Riksbank merely opens up the possibility that Sveriges Riksbank may also 

provide and publish reference interest rates and other benchmarks referred to in Regulation (EU) 

2016/1011.  Based  on  this,  the  ECB  understands  that  the  possibility  for  Sveriges  Riksbank  to 

provide and publish reference interest rates and other benchmarks referred to in Regulation (EU) 

2016/1011  would  not  confer  a  new  task  on  it.  Therefore,  the  issue  of  assessing  whether  the 

conferral of new tasks on  an NCB complies  with the  prohibition of monetary financing does not 

arise in the case at hand. 

13. 

Observations  on  the  draft  law  on  Sveriges  Riksbank:  provisions  regarding  Sveriges 

Riksbank’s budget, accounting and equity 

13.1 

Purpose of the provisions on Sveriges Riksbank’s budget, accounting and equity in the draft law 

on Sveriges Riksbank 

13.1.1  The  draft  law  on  Sveriges  Riksbank’s  provisions  regarding  Sveriges  Riksbank’s  budget, 

accounting and equity regime apply as of the financial year 2023169. 

13.1.2  The  draft  law  on  Sveriges  Riksbank  provides  that,  each  year  before  the  end  of  December, 

Sveriges Riksbank’s Executive Board will adopt a budget for Sveriges Riksbank’s activities during 

the  following  financial  year.  The  Executive  Board  shall  submit  the  budget  to  the  Parliament’s 

Committee  on  Finance,  the  NAO  and  Sveriges  Riksbank’s  General  Council  for  information 
purposes 170. 

13.1.3  The draft law on Sveriges Riksbank further provides that Sveriges Riksbank is obliged to maintain 

accounting records and to  draw up its  annual financial statements in accordance with generally 

accepted  accounting  principles.  In  this  context,  Sveriges  Riksbank  will  continue  to  follow 
Guideline  (EU)  2016/2249  of  the  European  Central  Bank  (ECB/2016/34) 171  to  the  extent  that  it 

167 

See  paragraph  3.4  of  Opinion  CON/2019/18;  Board  of  the  International  Organization  of  Securities  Commissions 
(OICU-IOSCO), Principles for Financial Benchmarks (July 2013), available at www.iosco.org. 

168  Räntelag (1975:635). 
169 

See Chapter 13, Section 8(7) of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank. In this context, it should be noted that Sveriges 
Riksbank’s  rules  for  annual  accounts  refer  to  Guideline  (EU)  2016/2249  (ECB/2016/34).  See  Annual  Report  for 
Sveriges Riksbank 2019, p. 71. 
See Chapter 8, Section 1 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank. 

170 
171   Guideline (EU) 2016/2249 of 3 November 2016 on the legal framework for accounting and financial reporting in the 

European System of Central Banks (ECB/2016/34) (OJ L 347, 20.12.2016, p. 3). 

38 

 
                                                 
applies to Sveriges Riksbank, and it will substantiate any deviations from it172. 

13.1.4  The draft law on Sveriges Riksbank also provides that Sveriges Riksbank may establish financial 

ECB-PUBLIC 

provisions 
(EU)  2016/2249 
(ECB/2016/34) 173. The Committee states that in order not to risk the purpose of a statutory profit 

in  accordance  with  Guideline 

reasonable  extent 

to  a 

allocation rule being undermined, one might conceive of a system in which all or certain financial 

provisions  are  aggregated  with  equity  and  the  result  for  the  year  and  defined  as  distributable 
capital174. Thus, the scenario in which Sveriges Riksbank sets aside funds in order that the equity 

be  kept  under  the  target  level  and  thus  prevents  a  distribution  of  profits  taking  place  could  be 

avoided.  However,  including  financial  provisions  in  distributable  capital  would,  according  to  the 

Committee,  risk  confounding  the  purpose  of  the  provisions  themselves  and  make  the  profit 

allocation rule more opaque. As long as the guidelines that Sveriges Riksbank applies to financial 

provisions  are  clear  and  transparent,  the  risk  of  the  proposed  profit  allocation  rule  being 

undermined is, according to the Committee, probably low. 

13.1.5  The annual report shall contain a profit and loss account, a balance sheet and a directors’ report. 

Sveriges  Riksbank’s  General  Council  will  adopt  the  profit  and  loss  account  and  the  balance 

sheet.  The  directors’  report  drawn  up  by  Sveriges  Riksbank’s  Executive  Board  will  contain  an 

account  of  the  monetary  policy  conducted  and  of  Sveriges  Riksbank´s  other  activities.  In  the 

annual  report,  the  Executive  Board  will  make  an  assessment  whether  the  internal  controls  at 
Sveriges Riksbank are satisfactory175. 

13.1.6  The Law on Sveriges Riksbank 176 provides that Sveriges Riksbank will have capital in an amount 
of one billion kronor (SEK), a reserve fund of SEK 500 million and a contingency fund 177. Each 

year, Sveriges Riksbank’s General Council makes proposals to the Parliament and the NAO on 

the  allocation  of  Sveriges  Riksbank’s  profit.  Sveriges  Riksbank’s  profit  and  loss  account  and 

balance sheet are approved by the Parliament, which also determines the allocation of  Sveriges 
Riksbank’s profit178. 

13.1.7  The  draft  law  on  Sveriges  Riksbank  provides  that  Sveriges  Riksbank’s  equity  will  consist  of 

capital,  a  reserve  fund  and  retained  profits.  Funds  in  revaluation  accounts,  as  referred  to  in 

Guideline (EU) 2016/2249 (ECB/2016/34), are not included in equity. Sveriges Riksbank’s equity 

shall initially be SEK 60 billion upon the new draft law on Sveriges Riksbank entering into effect 

(referred to as the ‘target equity’). At the same time, the Parliament may decide on a higher target 

172 
173 

See Chapter 8, Section 2 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank. 
See Chapter 8, Section 10 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank. 

174   See Chapter 29.6.5 of the Report. 
175 

See Chapter 8, Section 4 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank. 

176 
177 

See Chapter 10, Section 1 of the Law on Sveriges Riksbank. 
Sveriges Riksbank’s balance sheet also includes, within the ‘reserves’ item, a balancing fund. See Annual Report for 
Sveriges Riksbank 2019, p. 94. 

178  Guidelines  have  been  drawn  up  by  the  General  Council  of  Sveriges  Riksbank  on  how  its  profit  is  to  be  allocated. 
They  provide  that  Sveriges  Riksbank  should  pay  80%  of  its  profit  to  the  State,  after  adjustment  for  exchange  rate 
and gold valuation effects and based on a five-year average, with the remaining 20% to be used to increase its own 
capital.  See  Sveriges  Riksbank's  submission  to  the  Parliament,  Proposal  for  the  allocation  of  Sveriges  Riksbank's 
profits for the financial year 2016, p.4, and the General Council's Annual Report 2016, available at www.riksbank.se. 
However, as these guidelines are not legally binding, there is no statutory provision limiting the amount of profit that 
may be paid out. 

39 

                                                 
ECB-PUBLIC 

equity.  The  amount  corresponding  to  two  thirds  of  target  equity  is  described  as  the  base  level  of 

equity. The target equity  will  be  adjusted  annually  in  accordance  with the  percentage change in 

the Swedish consumer price index published by Statistics Sweden (the ‘CPI adjustment’), except 

that  if  the  change  is  less  than  zero  (i.e.  in  the  event  of  deflation),  no  recalculation  needs  to  be 
done 179. 

13.1.8  Based on the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank, at the end of the financial year 2023 the capital will 

amount  to  SEK  40  billion  and  the  reserve  fund  to  zero.  The  proportion  of  Sveriges  Riksbank’s 

equity  exceeding  SEK  40  billion  at  that  time  will  be  included  in  retained  profits.  Furthermore,  if 

Sveriges Riksbank’s equity for the financial year 2023 exceeds the target level of SEK 60 billion, 

the excess amount is to be included in retained profits. 

13.1.9  The draft law on Sveriges Riksbank provides that if Sveriges Riksbank’s annual accounts show a 

profit,  a  transfer  must  be  made  to  the  reserve  fund.  This  transfer  may  not  exceed  an  amount 

corresponding  to  the  change  in  the  base  level  of  equity,  as  adjusted  pursuant  to  the  CPI 

adjustment. Any excess funds will be transferred to retained profits. If, after such transfers to the 

reserve  fund  and  retained  profits,  Sveriges  Riksbank’s  equity  exceeds  the  target  equity 

(SEK 60 billion, subject to the CPI adjustment, if applicable), the excess profit is to be distributed 

to the State. Whenever the reserve fund exceeds SEK 5 billion, Sveriges Riksbank must transfer 
these funds to capital180. 

13.1.10 The  draft  law  on  Sveriges  Riksbank  also  provides  that  if  Sveriges  Riksbank’s  annual  accounts 

show a loss, this loss will in the first instance be covered by retained profits, then by the reserve 

fund and, as a last resort, by the capital. If, after covering for losses, retained profits are greater 

than  zero,  an  amount  may  be  transferred  from  retained  profits  to  the  reserve  fund  that 

corresponds  to  no  more  than  the  change  in  the  base  level  of  equity  pursuant  to  the  CPI 

adjustment. If the capital has been used to cover losses, the profits of future years will in the first 

instance be used to restore the capital to its level prior to incurring losses. Excess funds may be 

transferred to the reserve fund until Sveriges Riksbank’s equity amounts to the base level set out 
above (SEK 40 billion, subject to the CPI adjustment, if applicable) 181. 

13.1.11 As  set  out  in  the  Law  on  Sveriges  Riksbank,  Sveriges  Riksbank’s  General  Council  makes 

proposals  to  the  Parliament  and  the  NAO  on  the  allocation  of  Sveriges  Riksbank’s  profit,  and 

Sveriges Riksbank’s profit and loss account and balance sheet are approved by the Parliament, 
which also determines the allocation of Sveriges Riksbank’s profit182. The draft law on Sveriges 

Riksbank  stipulates  that,  following  the  Executive  Board’s  approval,  the  General  Council  may 

decide on the distribution of funds from retained profits, following the appropriation of profit as set 

out  above.  The  General  Council  will  also  decide  on  the  profit  and  loss  for  the  year.  The 

Parliament will decide either to approve or to set aside the General Council’s decision concerning 

the  profit  and  loss  account,  the  balance  sheet  and  the  profit  or  loss  for  the  year.  Thus,  the 

179 
180 
181 

182 

See Chapter 8, Sections 6-9 and Chapter 13, Sections 8 and 9 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank. 
See Chapter 8, Section 11 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank. 
See Chapter 8, Section 12 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank. 

See Chapter 10, Sections 3 and 4 of the Law on Sveriges Riksbank.  

40 

                                                 
ECB-PUBLIC 

General  Council’s  decision  does  not  become  definitive  until  approved  by  the  Parliament. 

However, the General Council’s decision can only be set aside if the numbers are not calculated 

in accordance with applicable law. If the decision is set aside, the General Council makes a new 

decision. Any profit allocation to the Swedish State budget is to be made no later than one week 
after the Parliament’s decision183. 

13.1.12 The  draft  law  on  Sveriges  Riksbank  provides  that  if  losses  result  in  the  level  of  Sveriges 

Riksbank’s equity being less than one third of the target level set out above (i.e. less than SEK 20 

billion, subject to the CPI adjustment, if applicable), Sveriges Riksbank must submit a request to 

the  Parliament  for  the  level  of  the  base  equity  to  be  restored,  unless  unrealised  gains  on  the 

balance sheet mean that restoring equity is not justified. The request may be for a higher amount 

if  this  is  required  to  secure  Sveriges  Riksbank’s  capability  to  be  self-financing  in  the  long  term, 
but is not to exceed the amount that brings equity to its target level after restoration 184. In general 

terms,  if  Sveriges  Riksbank’s  activities  give  rise  to  a  question  of  statutory  amendment  or  any 

other measure on the part of the State, Sveriges Riksbank may make a proposal concerning the 
matter to the Parliament or the Government185. 

13.2  General observations 

13.2.1  The ECB has repeatedly pointed out in its convergence reports that Sweden needs to  adapt  its 

legislation  governing  Sveriges Riksbank  to  comply  with  Treaty  requirements  relating  to financial 
independence  and  the  distribution  of  profits186.  Furthermore,  the  ECB  and,  earlier,  the  EMI  have 

issued  several  opinions  addressing  matters 

relating 

to  Sveriges  Riksbank’s 

financial 

independence in response to consultation requests from the Swedish Ministry of Finance and the 
Parliament187. 

13.2.2  The overall independence of an NCB, as required under Article 130 of the Treaty and Article 7 of 

the Statute of the ESCB, would be jeopardised if it could not autonomously avail itself of sufficient 

financial resources to fulfil its mandate, i.e. to perform the ESCB-related tasks required of it under 

the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB. The principle of financial independence also implies that 

an NCB must have sufficient means to perform not only its ESCB-related tasks but also  its  own 

national  tasks,  e.g. financing  its  administration  and  own  operations.  Therefore, a  Member  State 

may not put its NCB in a position where it has insufficient financial resources and inadequate net 

equity  to  carry  out  its  tasks.  For  all  these  reasons,  financial  independence  implies  that  an  NCB 

should  always  be  sufficiently  capitalised.  Financial  independence  requires  that  in  performing  its 

tasks an NCB can independently assess the risks involved and has the power to decide on any 

necessary precautions to take. An NCB is best placed to make these assessments and needs to 

183 
184 
185 
186 
187 

See Chapter 8, Sections 4, 11 and 14 and Chapter 12, Section 9 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank. 

See Chapter 8, Section 13 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank. 
See Chapter 11, Section 27 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank. 
See, e.g., Convergence Report, May 2018, p. 203; paragraph 2.2 of Opinion CON/2017/17. 

See Opinions CON/2005/54, CON/2008/34, CON/2013/53 and CON/2017/17, and EMI Opinion CON/1997/26. 

41 

                                                 
ECB-PUBLIC 

have the necessary tools to evaluate the relevant circumstances and to make forecasts188. 

13.2.3  The ECB takes particular note that Sveriges Riksbank faces a number of financial risks, including 

the relatively large size of the banking sector in Sweden, Sveriges Riksbank’s significant holdings 

of  low  interest-bearing  government  bonds,  and  the  anticipated  decline  in  Sveriges  Riksbank’s 

seigniorage income due, inter alia, to a possible decrease in banknote usage in Sweden. Regarding 

the  relatively  large  size  of  the  Swedish  banking  sector,  the  Swedish  banking  system’s  total 
balance sheet amounted to SEK 14,724 billion in January 2020189, which is approximately three 
times  Sweden’s  GDP 190.  Sweden’s  large  cross-border  banking  sector  has  considerable 
commitments  in  foreign  currencies 191.  This  entails  significant  risks  to  financial  stability  both  in 

Sweden,  as  well  as  potentially  for  other  countries  in  the  Nordic-Baltic  region,  where  Swedish 

banking  groups  have substantial market presence. In  this respect it  would be advisable, from a 

financial  stability  perspective,  to  carefully  consider  Sveriges  Riksbank’s  day-to-day  and 

exceptional  spending  needs  given  Sveriges  Riksbank’s  tasks,  including  its  tasks  in  exceptional 

circumstances,  with  the  aim  of  supporting  liquidity,  to  grant  credit  or  provide  guarantees  on 

special  terms  to  banking  institutions  and  Swedish  companies,  subject  to  the  supervision  of  the 

SFSA.  It  is  therefore  critical  to  ensure  that  Sveriges  Riksbank  has  sufficient  capital  and  foreign 

reserves  to  conduct  its  functions,  and  that  it  remains  in  a  position  to  ensure  the  required 
existence of financial buffers, to preserve an appropriate level of own funds and reserves192. 

13.3 

Specific observations 

Level of Sveriges Riksbank’s equity capital 

13.3.1  Pursuant to the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank193, Sveriges Riksbank has its own funds that are 

kept  separate  from  the  Treasury.  Furthermore,  the  Government’s  budget  has  no  special 

appropriations  item  for  Sveriges  Riksbank.  The  cost  of  Sveriges  Riksbank’s  operations  are 

instead  covered  by  its  own  revenues,  e.g.  from  the  return  it  receives  from  investing  the  capital 

allocated  to  it.  Therefore,  it  is  important  that  Sveriges  Riksbank’s  equity  is  able  to  generate 

sufficient return to cover costs and accrued losses in its operations. 

13.3.2  The  ECB  notes  the  existence  of  a  statutory  ceiling  on  the  level  of  targeted  equity  that  may  be 

held by Sveriges Riksbank. In carrying out their tasks NCBs should assess the risks involved and 

have  the  power  to  independently  decide  on  the  necessary  precautions  to  take.  Consequently, 

NCBs should be given the ability to safeguard the real value of their capital and assets by being 

188 

189 
190 

191 

192 
193 

See  Convergence  Report,  May  2018,  p.  27;  paragraph  2.2  of  Opinion  CON/2009/53,  paragraph  2.4.2  of  Opinion 
CON/2009/83, paragraph 3.3 of Opinion CON/2014/24, paragraph 2.2 of Opinion CON/2014/27, paragraph 3.1.1 of 
Opinion CON/2014/56 and paragraph 2.3 of Opinion CON/2017/17. 

See Statistics Sweden’s Financial Markets Statistics, January 2020. 
See  Statistics  Sweden,  https://www.scb.se/en/finding-statistics/statistics-by-subject-area/national-accounts/national-
accounts/national-accounts-quarterly-and-annual-estimates/. 
See 
2019:2, 
Financial 
https://www.riksbank.se/globalassets/media/rapporter/fsr/engelska/2019/191120/financial-stability-report-2019_2.pdf, 
pp. 15-16. 
See paragraphs 2.3 and 2.4 of Opinion CON/2017/17. 

Riksbank, 

Sveriges 

Stability 

Report 

See Chapter 1, Section 2 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank. 

42 

                                                 
ECB-PUBLIC 

free to independently create adequate financial buffers.194  

13.3.3  Furthermore, the ECB understands that if Sveriges Riksbank’s equity exceeds SEK 60 billion at 

the  end  of  the  financial  year  2023,  the  excess  amount  will  not  be  allocated  to  the  State,  but 

instead transferred to retained profits and remain under this item, unless needed for subsequent 

loss  coverage,  or  unless  the  General  Council,  following  consent  from  the  Executive  Board, 
decides differently.195 

Allocation of Sveriges Riksbank’s profits and losses 

13.3.4  Detailed  legal  regulations  on  profit  allocation  are  a  positive  development  as  they  bring  not  only 

transparency  and  predictability  to  the  treatment  of  profits  and  the  timing  of  payments  to  the 

Treasury,  but  also  legally  bind  the  Government  and  the  Parliament.  In  this  respect,  the  ECB 

welcomes that profits may be distributed to the Treasury only after any accumulated losses from 

previous years have been covered and financial buffers deemed necessary to safeguard the real 

value of the NCB’s capital and assets have been created. 

13.3.5  The ECB has repeatedly pointed out196 that the current arrangements regarding the Parliament’s 

approval of the allocation of Sveriges Riksbank’s profits are incompatible with the  requirement of 

central bank independence under the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB. Against this backdrop, 

the ECB notes that the Parliament’s formal role in approving Sveriges Riksbank’s profit and loss 

account and balance sheet and in determining the allocation of its profit is  significantly reduced 

under  the  draft  law  on  Sveriges  Riksbank.  In  particular,  the  General  Council’s  decision 

concerning the profit and loss account, the balance sheet and the profit or loss for the year can 

only be set aside if the numbers are not calculated in accordance with applicable law. The ECB 

understands that since this condition should be evident from the NAO’s audit report, the setting 

aside by the Parliament of the General Council’s decision concerning the profit and loss account 

and  the  balance  sheet  for  the  year  is  an  unlikely  event.  Any  other  more  extensive  role  for  the 

Parliament  in  this  respect  would  be  incompatible  with  the  requirement  of  central  bank 

independence under the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB. 

Financial provisions 

13.3.6  As  regards  financial  provisions  or  buffers,  NCBs  must  be  free  to  independently  create  financial 

provisions to safeguard the real value of their capital and assets. Member States may not hamper 

NCBs’ ability to build up their reserve capital to the level necessary for a member of the ESCB to 
fulfil its tasks197. In this regard, the ECB welcomes that under the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank, 

Sveriges Riksbank may establish financial provisions to a reasonable extent in accordance with 

Guideline  (EU)  2016/2249  (ECB/2016/34),  Article  8  of  which  provides  that  an  NCB  may 

establish  a  provision  for  financial risks in its balance sheet and is to decide on the size and use 

194   See paragraph 3.1.9 of Opinion CON/2018/23 and paragraph 3.1 of Opinion CON/2013/96.  
195 

See Chapter 13, Section 8(9) and Chapter 8, Section 14 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank and pp. 1709-1710 
and Chapter 29.6.5 of the Report. 
See, e.g., Convergence Report 2018, p. 203. 
See  Convergence  Report  2018,  p.  28;  paragraph  3.3  of  Opinion  CON/2009/26,  paragraph  3.2  of  Opinion 
CON/2009/53 and paragraph 2.1 of Opinion CON/2012/69. 

196 
197 

43 

                                                 
ECB-PUBLIC 

of  the  provision  on  the  basis  of  a  reasoned  estimate  of  the  NCB's  risk  exposure.  At  the  same 

time, the ECB notes that operational risks are outside the scope of such provisions. 

13.3.7  Furthermore, the ECB understands that the Committee possibly intends (see paragraph 13.1.4) 

that  Sveriges  Riksbank may  not  use  financial  provisions  to  circumvent  the  framework for  target 

equity and profit distribution to the State, although the risk of such circumvention is low as long as 

the  guidelines  that  Sveriges  Riksbank  applies  to  financial  provisions  are  clear  and  transparent. 

This,  in  turn,  could  be  interpreted  as  relating  to  the  requirement  that  Sveriges  Riksbank  may 

establish  financial  provisions  to  a  ‘reasonable  extent’  in  accordance  with  Guideline  (EU) 

2016/2249  (ECB/2016/34).  As  Guideline  (EU)  2016/2249  (ECB/2016/34)  already  requires  clear 
and  transparent  motivation  of  any  financial  provision198,  the  requirement  on  the  ‘reasonable 

extent’ could be considered redundant, also taking into account the principle of proportionality set 
out in the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank 199. 

Request for recapitalisation of Sveriges Riksbank 

13.3.8  The ECB has a number of specific concerns regarding the provisions of the draft law on Sveriges 

Riksbank concerning requests by Sveriges Riksbank for recapitalisation following losses. 

13.3.9  The ECB understands that, under the provisions of the Law on Sveriges Riksbank200 and the Law 
on  Parliament201,  Sveriges  Riksbank  has  an  unrestricted  right  to  make  proposals  to  the 

Parliament or the Government with respect to the restoration of Sveriges Riksbank’s capital. The 

ECB understands that the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank should not be understood as implying 

that Sveriges Riksbank will only be entitled to submit a request to the Parliament for the level of 

its equity to be restored up to a sum necessary to ensure the base level if Sveriges Riksbank’s 

equity has fallen below a certain level (i.e. when the equity is less than the initial level of SEK 20 

billion,  as  adjusted  by  the  CPI  adjustment,  if  any).  In  this  respect,  the  ECB  understands  that 

Sveriges  Riksbank  would  be  able  to  make  a  proposal  to  the  Parliament  or  the  Government  if 

Sveriges  Riksbank’s  activities  give  rise  to  a  question  of  statutory  amendment  or  any  other 

measure  on  the  part  of  the  State,  which  implies  that  Sveriges  Riksbank  may  request  a 

recapitalisation at any point in time, even if the reported equity is more than one third of the target 

level. However, for the avoidance of doubt, the ECB would welcome the introduction of an explicit 

reference  to  the  possibility  of  Sveriges  Riksbank  submitting  a  request  for  the  restoration  of  its 

capital, consistent with its existing general right to submit such a request to the Parliament or the 

Government.  It  is  a  crucial  element  of  Sveriges  Riksbank’s  financial  independence  that  it  has 

sufficient funds at its disposal to be able to perform its tasks, including ESCB-related and national 

tasks. 

13.3.10 Furthermore, the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank neither obliges the State to provide capital after 

Sveriges  Riksbank  has  submitted  a  request  to  have  its  base  level  equity  restored  nor  specifies 

198   See Article 8 of Guideline 2016/2249 (ECB/2016/34).  
199 
200 

See Chapter 1, Section 5 of the draft Law on Sveriges Riksbank. 
See Chapter 4, Section 1 of the Law on Sveriges Riksbank. 

201 

See Chapter 9, Section 17 of the Law on Parliament, 2014. 

44 

                                                 
ECB-PUBLIC 

the time period within which the State should respond to Sveriges Riksbank’s request202. 

13.3.11 Lastly,  according  to  the  Committee,  in  its  request  for  recapitalisation  Sveriges  Riksbank  must 

take into account whether there are significant amounts on the revaluation accounts and assess 

whether a lower increase of capital than that required for it to reach the base equity level would 
suffice203.  The  ECB  notes  that  funds  in  revaluation  accounts  as  referred  to  in  Guideline  (EU) 

2016/2249 (ECB/2016/34) are not included in Sveriges Riksbank’s equity under the draft law on 

Sveriges Riksbank, which  could raise an  issue of consistency. Furthermore, the amounts in the 

revaluation  accounts  may  be  volatile,  and  it  accordingly  seems  inappropriate  to  consider  them 

when assessing Sveriges Riksbank’s long-term financing ability. 

13.3.12 In  the  light  of  the  foregoing,  the  ECB  reiterates  the  importance  of  ensuring  that  Sveriges 

Riksbank’s  financial  independence  is  safeguarded.  Sveriges  Riksbank  should  not  be  put  in  a 

position  where  it  has  insufficient  financial  resources  and  inadequate  net  equity  to  carry  out  its 
tasks204. 

14. 

Specific observations on the  draft law on Sveriges Riksbank: provisions on organisation 

and management 

14.1 

Purpose of the provisions on Sveriges Riksbank’s organisation and management in the draft law 

on Sveriges Riksbank 

14.1.1  In  accordance  with  the  existing  provisions  of  the  Instrument  of  Government,  Sveriges  Riksbank 

has a General Council of 11 members, who are appointed by the Parliament. Sveriges Riksbank 

is run  by  an Executive Board,  which  is appointed by the General  Council. The  General Council 

may relieve from office a member of the Executive Board only if the member no longer fulfils the 

requirements  laid  down  for  the  performance  of  his  or  her  duties  or  is  guilty  of  serious 
misconduct205.  Under  the  draft  law  on  Sveriges  Riksbank  a  decision  to  relieve  from  office  a 

member of the Executive Board requires at least eight of the General Council members to be in 

favour of the decision. The General Council  will supervise the  work of the  Executive Board and 

Sveriges  Riksbank’s  other  activity.  The  General  Council  will  keep  the  Parliament’s  Finance 

Committee  informed  of  relatively  significant  matters,  and  report  its  observations  to  the  Finance 

Committee  regularly  and  at  the  Committee’s  request.  The  General  Council’s  audit  function  will 
review the work of the Executive Board206. 

14.1.2  In addition to the appointment of the members of the Executive Board, the draft law on Sveriges 

Riksbank provides that the General Council decides on the following matters: (1) appointment of 

the  Governor  from  among  the  members  of  the  Executive  Board;  (2)  determining  the  order  in 

which the Deputy Governors serve in place of the Governor if he or she resigns, is relieved from 

202 
203 
204 
205 
206 

See paragraph 3.3.6 of Opinion CON/2007/14. 

See Report, p. 1274. 
See paragraph 3.3.7 of Opinion CON/2007/14. 
See Chapter 9, Section 13, fourth paragraph of the Instrument of Government. 

See Chapter 11, Sections 6 and 7 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank. 

45 

 
                                                 
ECB-PUBLIC 

office or cannot participate due to illness or other comparable circumstance; (3) deciding on the 

remuneration and terms of employment of members of the Executive Board; (4) granting approval 

for a former member of the Executive Board becoming, within one year after the end of his or her 

term  of  office,  a  member  of  the  executive  board  of  a  bank  or  firm  supervised  by  the  SFSA,  or 

holding  other  employment  or  office  that  disqualifies  him  or  her  from  being  a  member  of  the 

Executive  Board;  (5)  approval  of  Sveriges  Riksbank’s  profit  and  loss  statement  and  balance 

sheet; (6) after approval of the Executive Board, approving distributions from the profit and loss 

account;  (7)  deciding  on  the  motifs  used  in  the  design  of  notes  and  coins  issued  by  Sveriges 
Riksbank; and (8) stakeholder responses within the scope of its responsibility 207. 

14.1.3  The draft law on Sveriges Riksbank provides that the Executive Board consists of five members 

appointed for a period of five or six years. In comparison with the Law on Sveriges Riksbank, this 

means  a  reduction  of  the  number  of  members  from  six  to  five,  but  the  Executive  Board  may 

comprise  five  or  six  members  up  to  31  December  2028.  A  member  may  only  be  reappointed 

once, but this restriction only applies to reappointments made after 31 December 2022. However, 

a person who has previously been a Deputy Governor of Sveriges Riksbank may be appointed as 

Governor for one or two terms of office. The Governor chairs the Executive Board, and the other 

members  are  Deputy  Governors. When  recruiting,  the  General  Council  must  ensure  that,  taken 

together, the Governor and Deputy Governors have appropriate competence and expertise in all 

areas  of  Sveriges  Riksbank’s  activities.  The  candidate  profile  for  the  Governor  must  include  a 

requirement for good leadership skills. A member of the Executive Board may not be a member 

of the Parliament, a Government minister, employed at the Government offices or at the central 

level  of  a  political  party,  a  member  or  alternate  member  of  the  board  of  directors  of  a  bank  or 

other company subject to supervision by the SFSA, or hold any other employment or assignment 

that makes him unsuitable  as a member of the Executive Board, or be a bankrupt or prohibited 
from trading208. 

14.1.4  The  draft  law  on  Sveriges  Riksbank  provides  that  the  Executive  Board  is  responsible  for  the 

activities  of  Sveriges  Riksbank  and  will  ensure  that  they  are  conducted  efficiently  and  in 

accordance with the law and the obligations following from Sweden’s membership of the Union, 

that they are reported in a reliable and fair manner and that Sveriges Riksbank manages public 

funds well. Matters other than those to be decided by the Executive Board may be decided by the 

Governor, or, unless otherwise decided by the  Executive Board, by  a person designated by  the 
Governor 209. 

14.1.5  The Chair and Vice Chair of the General Council have the right to be present at meetings of the 
Executive Board with the right to speak but without the right to make proposals and vote 210. 

207 

208 

209 

210 

See  Chapter  9,  Section  13,  paragraphs  3  and  4  of  the  Instrument  of  Government;  Chapter  8,  Section  4,  second 
paragraph and Section 14 and Chapter 11, Sections 8-10, Section 11, second paragraph and Sections 14-18 of the 
draft law on Sveriges Riksbank. 

See Chapter 11, Sections 12, 14, 15 and 17 and Chapter 13, Section 8, points 5 and 6 of the draft law on Sveriges 
Riksbank. 
See Chapter 11, Sections 19 and 20 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank. 

See Chapter 11, Section 21, second paragraph of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank. 

46 

                                                 
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14.1.6  The draft law on Sveriges Riksbank provides that members of the Executive Board may neither 

seek  nor  take  instructions  when  fulfilling  their  duties  concerning  the  responsibility  referred  to  in 

Chapter 9, Section 13, first paragraph of the Instrument of Government. These duties comprise 

the  following:  (1)  defining  and  implementing  monetary  policy;  (2)  conducting  foreign  currency 

interventions;  (3)  holding  and  managing  foreign  currency  reserves;  (4)  promoting  the  smooth 

operation  of  payment  systems  within  the  framework  of  cooperation  in  the  ESCB;  and 
(5) collecting the statistical information needed for cooperation within the ESCB 211. 

14.1.7  The  draft  law  on  Sveriges  Riksbank  contains  provisions  requiring  the  members  of  the  General 

Council  and  the  Executive  Board  to  make  written  disclosures  to  the  Parliament  regarding  their 

ongoing holdings of financial instruments and/or other investments (e.g., commercial properties) 

and  financial  interests  (e.g.  payments,  pension  benefits)  having  an  aggregate  market  value  of 

SEK  500,000  or  more,  as  well  as  loans  and  other  liabilities  aggregating  SEK  500,000  or  more. 

Sveriges  Riksbank  may  also  require  designated  employees  and  contractors  to  make  written 
disclosures to Sveriges Riksbank regarding their ongoing holdings of financial instruments212. 

14.1.8  The draft law on Sveriges Riksbank provides that legal action against a decision by the General 

Council on the relieving from office of a member of the Executive Board shall be brought within 

two months from service of the decision. If legal action is not brought within this period, the party 

in  question  loses  his  or  her  right  to  bring  legal  action.  In  addition,  it  is  provided  that  Sveriges 

Riksbank  may  bring  an  action  before  the  CJEU,  and  that  the  members  of  the  Executive  Board 

other than the Governor may  bring legal  action before the Swedish  Supreme Court,  which may 
declare a decision on relieving from office invalid213. 

14.2 

Specific observations 

Role of Sveriges Riksbank’s Executive Board 

14.2.1  The  ECB  notes  that  the  members  of  Sveriges  Riksbank’s  Executive  Board  may  not  request  or 

receive  instructions  from  anyone  when  they  are  fulfilling  duties  concerning  Sveriges  Riksbank’s 

responsibility  under  the  Instrument  of  Government  for  monetary  policy,  foreign  currency 

interventions,  foreign  currency  reserves,  the  smooth  operation  of  payment  systems  within  the 

framework of cooperation in the ESCB and the collection of the statistical information needed for 
cooperation within the ESCB214. As noted in paragraphs 3.2.1 and 3.2.4, the ECB suggests that 

Sveriges  Riksbank’s  responsibilities  under  the  proposed  amendments  to  the  Instrument  of 

Government, in respect of which Sveriges Riksbank may not seek or take instructions, should be 

aligned with the concept of central banking tasks under the Treaty. Within the framework of the 

Eurosystem  the  provision  of  liquidity  is,  with  the  exception  of  emergency  liquidity  assistance, 

considered  to  be  part  of  the  basic  tasks  of  implementing  monetary  policy  and  promoting  the 

211 

212 
213 
214 

See Chapter 9, Section 13, paragraph 1 of the Instrument of Government; and Chapter 11, Section 26 of the draft 
law on Sveriges Riksbank. 

See Chapter 11, Sections 31-34 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank. 
See Chapter 13, Section 5 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank. 
See Chapter 9, Section 13, paragraph 1 of the Instrument of Government; Chapter 11, Section 26 of the draft law on 
Sveriges Riksbank. 

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smooth  operation  of  payment  systems,  and  is  subject  to  the  prohibition  on  NCBs  seeking  or 

taking  instructions.  Similarly,  within  the  framework  of  the  ESCB  Sveriges  Riksbank’s  powers  in 

relation  to  payment  systems,  monitoring  financial  infrastructures  and  developing  the  payment 

market are considered to be part of the basic task of promoting the smooth operation of payment 

systems and the related task of ensuring efficient and sound clearing and payment systems, and 

are thus covered by the central bank independence protection under Article 130 of the Treaty and 

Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB. 

14.2.2  The ECB  welcomes the five or six-year terms of office of the members of the Executive  Board. 

This  is  consistent  with  the  first  paragraph  of  Article  14.2  of  the  Statute  of  the  ESCB,  which 

provides that NCB statutes must, in particular, provide that the term of office of an NCB Governor 

be  no  less  than  five  years.  Applying  the  same  rules  in  respect  of  the  security  of  tenure  and 

grounds for relieving from office of Governors will also safeguard the personal independence of 

other  members  of  the  decision-making  bodies  of  NCBs  involved  in  the  performance  of  ESCB-
related tasks215.  

14.2.3  As  regards  legal  action  against  a  decision  by  Sveriges  Riksbank’s  General  Council  on  the 

relieving from office of a member of Sveriges Riksbank’s Executive Board, the second paragraph 

of  Article  14.2  of  the  Statute  of  the  ESCB  provides  that  a  decision  to  relieve  a  Governor  from 

office may be referred to the CJEU by the Governor concerned or the ECB’s Governing Council 

on grounds of infringement of the Treaties or of any rule of law relating to their application. Such 

proceedings  shall  be  instituted  within  two  months  of  the  publication  of  the  decision  or  of  its 

notification to the plaintiff or, in the absence thereof, of the day on which it came to the knowledge 

of the latter, as the case may be. As mentioned in paragraph 14.2.2, applying the same rules in 

respect of security of tenure and in respect of grounds for relieving from office of Governors will 

also  safeguard  the  personal  independence  of  other  members  of  the  decision-making  bodies  of 

NCBs  involved  in  the  performance  of  ESCB-related  tasks.  Against  this  backdrop,  the  ECB 

welcomes that the members of the Executive Board other than the Governor may bring an action 

before the Swedish Supreme Court in respect of a decision to relieve them from office. It should 

be clarified that action in respect of relieving from office by the Governor and the members of the 

Executive  Board  needs  to  be  brought  within  two  months  of  the  publication  or  notification  of  the 

relieving  from  office  decision,  which  may  not  necessarily  be  the  same  time  as  the  date  of 

issuance of that decision. It should also be clarified that there is no provision under the Treaty for 

Sveriges Riksbank to institute such proceedings. 

Role of Sveriges Riksbank’s General Council 

14.2.4  Pursuant to Article 130 of the Treaty, when exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and 

duties  conferred  on  it  by  the  Treaty  and  the  Statute  of  the  ESCB,  neither  an  NCB,  nor  any 

member  of  its  decision-making  bodies,  may  seek  or  take  instructions  from,  inter  alia,  any 

government of a Member State ‘or from any other body’, which includes a statutory body such as 

215 

See  paragraph  2.2  of  Opinion  CON/2019/24,  paragraph  2.2  of  Opinion  CON/2019/19,  paragraph  7  of  Opinion 
CON/2004/35,  paragraph  8  of  Opinion  CON/2005/26,  paragraph  2.6  of  Opinion  CON/2006/32,  paragraph  3.7  of 
Opinion CON/2006/44, and paragraph 2.3 of Opinion CON/2007/6. 

48 

                                                 
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the Supervisory Board. The ECB understands that the Executive Board of Sveriges Riksbank is 
exclusively responsible for the performance of ESCB-related tasks216, and therefore qualifies as a 

decision-making body of Sveriges Riksbank within the meaning of Article 130 of the Treaty. The 

ECB notes that the members of the Executive Board may not request or receive instructions from 

anyone  when  carrying  out  duties  concerning  Sveriges  Riksbank’s  responsibility  under  the 

proposed  amendments  to  the  Instrument  of  Government  for  monetary  policy,  foreign  currency 

interventions,  foreign  currency  reserves,  the  smooth  operation  of  payment  systems  within  the 

framework of cooperation in the ESCB and the collection of the statistical information needed for 
cooperation  within  the  ESCB 217.  Sveriges  Riksbank’s  responsibilities  under  the  proposed 

amendments  to  the  Instrument  of  Government,  in  respect  of  which  the  Executive  Board  of 

Sveriges Riksbank shall decide and may not seek or take instructions from the General Council, 

should  be  aligned  with  the  concept  of  central  banking  tasks  under  the  Treaty.  As  previously 

noted, within the framework of the Eurosystem the provision of liquidity is, with the exception of 

emergency  liquidity  assistance,  considered  to  be  part  of  the  basic  tasks  of  implementing 

monetary policy and promoting the smooth operation of payment systems, and is subject to the 

prohibition on NCBs seeking or taking instructions. Similarly,  within the framework of the ESCB 

Sveriges  Riksbank’s  powers  in  relation  to  payment  systems, monitoring  financial  infrastructures 

and developing the payment market are considered to be part of the basic task of promoting the 

smooth  operation  of  payment  systems  and  the  related  task  of  ensuring  efficient  and  sound 

clearing  and  payment  systems,  and  are  thus  covered  by  the  central  bank  independence 

protection under Article 130 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB. Provided this 

point  is  clarified,  the  ECB  understands  that  the  General  Council  would  not  intervene  in  the 

performance  of  ESCB-related  tasks,  nor  in  the  decisions  concerning  those  tasks,  and  that  it 

therefore would not be considered to be a decision-making body within the meaning of Article 130 

of  the  Treaty  and  Article  7  of  the  Statute  of  the  ESCB.  Therefore,  having  regard  both  to  the 

structure of the General Council, as a constituent part of Sveriges Riksbank, and to its tasks, the 

General  Council  may  not  seek  to  influence  the  Executive  Board  in  its  capacity  as  Sveriges 

Riksbank’s decision-making body responsible for the performance of Sveriges Riksbank’s ESCB-
related tasks218. 

14.2.5  Regarding  the  General  Council’s  competence  to  approve  Sveriges  Riksbank’s  profit  and  loss 

statement and balance sheet, the ECB has noted that the annual accounts should be adopted by 

the NCB’s decision-making bodies, assisted by independent accountants, and may be subject to 
ex  post  approval  by  third  parties  (e.g.  the  Government  or  the  Parliament)219.  This  requirement 

would  be  materially  satisfied  by  an  arrangement  whereby  the  profit  and  loss  statement  and 

balance sheet are submitted by Sveriges Riksbank’s Executive Board to the General Council for 

216 
217 

218 

219 

See Chapter 11, Section 19 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank. 
See Chapter 9, Section 13, paragraph 1 of the Instrument of Government; and Chapter 11, Section 26 of the draft 
law on Sveriges Riksbank. 
See  paragraph  6  of  Opinion  CON/2002/16,  paragraph  2.3  of  Opinion  CON/2019/12  and  paragraph  2.1  of  Opinion 
CON/2020/7. 

See Convergence Report, May 2018, p. 27. 

49 

                                                 
ECB-PUBLIC 

approval220.  In  order  to  properly  reflect  the  Executive  Board’s  exclusively  responsibility  for  the 

performance of Sveriges Riksbank’s ESCB-related tasks, it would be advisable to clarify that the 

General Council will approve Sveriges Riksbank’s profit and loss statement and balance sheet on 

the proposal of the Executive Board. 

14.2.6  Regarding  the  General  Council’s  competence  to  approve  distributions  from  the  profit  and  loss 

account,  after the approval of the  Executive Board, decisions  on  the allocation  of profits should 

be  taken  by  the  NCB’s  decision-making  bodies  on  professional  grounds,  and  should  not  be 

subject to the discretion of third parties unless there is an express safeguard clause stating that 

this  is  without  prejudice  to  the  financial  means  necessary  for  carrying  out  the  NCB’s  ESCB-
related  tasks  as  well  as  national  tasks221. This  requirement  is  satisfied  as  the  distributions  from 

the profit and loss account are first approved by the Executive Board, which, as already noted, is 

exclusively responsible for the performance of Sveriges Riksbank’s ESCB-related tasks. 

This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. 

Done at Frankfurt am Main, 20 April 2020. 

[signed] 

The President of the ECB 

Christine LAGARDE 

220 
221 

See paragraph 2.7 of Opinion CON/2019/12 and paragraph 2.5 of Opinion CON/2020/7. 
See Convergence Report (May 2018), p. 27. See also paragraph 2.6 of Opinion CON/2019/12 and paragraph 2.6 of 
Opinion CON/2020/7. 

50