COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT EVALUATION Ex-post evaluation of the Technical Assistance provided by the Task Force for Greece (TFGR) 2011-2015
Date: 2020-02-25
Institutions: Directorate-General for Structural Reform Support, European Commission
Subjects: EU aid, EU programme, Greece, distribution of EU funding, economic reform, financial aid, structural adjustment, technical cooperation

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 25.2.2020  SWD(2020) 37 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT  EVALUATION Ex-post evaluation of the Technical Assistance provided by the Task Force for Greece (TFGR) 2011-2015 {SWD(2020) 38 final}  
 
 
Table of contents 

GLOSSARY ........................................................................................................................ 2 

1 

INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................... 4 

2  BACKGROUND TO THE INTERVENTION ........................................................... 5 

2.1  Rationale for setting up the TFGR ....................................................................... 5 

3  OBJECTIVES AND INTERVENTION LOGIC ........................................................ 5 

4 

IMPLEMENTATION ................................................................................................. 8 

4.1 

Setting up and organisation of the TFGR ............................................................ 8 

4.2  Resources allocation and distribution .................................................................. 9 

4.3 

4.4 

1) 

2) 

Identification of the needs.................................................................................. 11 

Identification of technical assistance expertise .................................................. 12 

For specific policy areas: selection of Domain Leaders .................................... 12 

For all policy areas: selection of providers ........................................................ 12 

5  METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH ....................................................................... 16 

5.1 

5.2 

The external evaluation carried out in 2018 ...................................................... 16 

Limitations of the external evaluation ............................................................... 19 

6  ANALYSIS AND ANSWERS TO THE EVALUATION QUESTIONS ................ 20 

6.1  Relevance ........................................................................................................... 20 

6.2 

6.3 

Effectiveness ...................................................................................................... 21 

Efficiency ........................................................................................................... 24 

6.4  Coherence .......................................................................................................... 26 

6.5 

EU added value .................................................................................................. 27 

7  CONCLUSIONS ....................................................................................................... 29 

7.1 

Lessons learned .................................................................................................. 29 

1 

 
 
 
Glossary 

Term or acronym 

Meaning or definition 

AROP 

CF 

DG ECFIN 

DG EMPL 

Administrative Reform Operational Programme 

Cohesion Fund 

Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs 

Directorate General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion 

DG TAXUD 

Directorate General for Taxation and Customs Union 

EC 

ECA 

ECB 

EOPYY 

EQ 

ERDF 

ESF 

EU 

HCA 

IMF 

ITC 

JC 

MoU 

MS 

OECD 

OAED 

SF 

SRSS 

European Commission 

European Court of Auditors 

European Central Bank 

National Organization for Healthcare Provision 

Evaluation Question 

European Regional Development Fund 

European Social Fund 

European Union 

Hellenic Court of Audit 

International Monetary Fund 

Information Technology and Communications  

Judgment Criteria 

Memorandum of Understanding 

Member State 

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 

Hellenic Manpower Employment Organization 

Structural Funds 

Structural Reform Support Service 

2 

 
 
 
TA 

TFGR 

UNECE 

WB 

Technical Assistance 

Task Force for Greece 

United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 

World Bank 

3 

 
1.

INTRODUCTION 

This Staff Working Document (SWD) presents the results of the ex-post evaluation of the actions 

carried out by the Task Force Greece (TFGR) during the 2011-2015 period. 

It follows a recommendation from the European Court of Auditors (ECA) issued in the context 
of the Special Report no 19/20151: “More attention to results needed to improve the delivery of 

Technical Assistance (TA) to Greece”. The ECA report raised two main questions:  

1.  To  what  extent  was  the  EU  technical  assistance  provided  to  Greece  under  the 

coordination of the TFGR managed effectively?  

2.  To  what  extent  has  the  EU  technical  assistance  provided  to  Greece  under  the 
coordination of the TFGR contributed positively to the process of reforms in Greece? 2 

This SWD provides a reply to these questions. It is based on the evidence gathered through two 

external evaluations: 

i) 

the “Preliminary evaluation of the Technical Assistance provided to Greece in 2011-2013 
in the areas of Tax Administration and Central Administration Reform” 3; and 

ii)  the external study on “Evaluation of the Technical Assistance provided by the Task Force 

for Greece 2011-2015”4.  

The three economic adjustment programmes 5for Greece are out of the scope of this evaluation.  

1 European Court of Auditors (ECA), Special Report No 19/2015: “More attention to results needed to improve the delivery of 

technical assistance to Greece”, https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR15_19/SR_TFGR_EN.pdf 

2 European Parliament, Special Reports of  the European Court of Auditors, 2017: “A Rolling Check-List of  recent findings” 

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/598604/EPRS_STU(2017)598604_EN.pdf 

3 Adam Smith International, 2014, “Preliminary Evaluation of the Technical Assistance provided to Greece in 2011-2013 in the 

areas of Tax administration and Central Administration Reform” 
http://dl.icdst.org/pdfs/files/77a9ed8c6671649c617cbdbf41a54213.pdf 

4 Ernst&Young, 2019, “Evaluation of the technical assistance provided by the Task Force for Greece (TFGR) 2011-2015“, Final 
report – January 2019 - https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/45625812-2056-11e9-8d04-
01aa75ed71a1/language-en 

5 The first programme, the Greek loan facility (GLF) of 2010,  the second programme, the European Financial Stability Facility 
(EFSF) of 2012 and the third programme, the  European Stability Mechanism (ESM) of 2015, are going to be subject of a 
specific evaluation  

4 

 
 
                                                           
2.

  BACKGROUND TO THE INTERVENTION 

2.1  Rationale for setting up the TFGR 

In  spring  2010,  facing  severe  financial  crisis,  Greece  requested  financial  assistance  from  the 

international partners. The Eurogroup agreed to provide bilateral loans pooled by the European 

Commission  (Greek  Loan  Facility  –  GLF)  which  was  part  of  a  joint  package  with  the  IMF’s 
Stand-By Arrangement (SBA)6.  

Following  the  request  from  the  Greek  authorities,  in  the  summer  of  2011,  the  Commission 

established  the  ad  hoc  TFGR  in  order  to  coordinate  and  provide  the  requested  technical 

assistance.  

Acting upon request of the Greek authorities, the mandate of the TFGR was twofold:  

1)   To  provide  technical  assistance  to  the  Greek  authorities  to  support  the  delivery  of 

commitments undertaken under the economic adjustment programme; and  

2)   To provide technical assistance to the Greek authorities for the acceleration in the absorption 

of EU funds.   

The TFGR regularly reported on its activities through quarterly reports7. It concluded its mandate 

at the end of June 2015.  

3.

  OBJECTIVES AND INTERVENTION LOGIC 

The specific mandate of the TFGR was structured around four specific objectives8: 

1)  To  identify,  coordinate  and  agree  on  the  details  of  the  technical  assistance  needed,  upon 

request and in close coordination with the Greek authorities; 

6European Commission, Directorate- General for economic and financial affairs, 2010 “European Economy” 

http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2010/op61_en.htm  
https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-coordination/eu-financial-assistance/which-eu-
countries-have-received-assistance/financial-assistance-greece_en#taskforceforgreece 

7Task Force for Greece, 2010-2014, “Quarterly reports”:  

http://ec.europa.eu/archives/commission_2010-2014/president/news/documents/2011/11/index_en.htm 
http://ec.europa.eu/commission_20102014/president/news/documents/2011/11/20111117_documents_1_en.htm 
http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/president/news/speeches-statements/pdf/20111117_1_en.pdf 
http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/president/news/speeches-statements/pdf/qr_march2012_en.pdf 
http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/president/pdf/qr4_en.pdf 
http://ec.europa.eu/archives/commission_2010-2014/president/pdf/qr5_en.pdf 
http://ec.europa.eu/archives/commission_2010-2014/president/pdf/qr6_en.pdf 
http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/president/pdf/qr7_en.pdf 

8 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-599_en.htm 

5 

 
                                                           
2)  To provide support regarding the legislative, regulatory and administrative framework; 

3)  To make available to the relevant Greek authorities the needed technical assistance; and 

4)  To increase the stakeholders’ awareness of the progress of TFGR activities.  

The  intervention  logic  of  the  TFGR  was  based  on  the  expectation  that  the  technical  assistance 

activities and outputs would be defined and agreed in detail with the Greek authorities, based on 

their requests, in order to respond to the identified needs.  

The  TFGR  identified  the  needs  of  the  Greek  Authorities  through  study  visits  and  expert 

missions.  Following  the  assessment  of  the  needs,  the  TFGR  planned  and  organised  the 

appropriate  technical  assistance  with  the  view  to  formulate  recommendations,  guidelines, 

roadmaps  and  other  guiding  documents  for  implementing  specific  milestones  of  the  economic 

adjustment programme, upon request of the Greek Authorities. 

Figure 1 below shows the intervention logic of TFGR. 

6 

 
Figure 1: The TFGR intervention logic 

Source: Ernst&Young, Analysis 2018 

7 

 
 
 
4.

IMPLEMENTATION 

This section includes a description of selected elements of the TFGR operations. 

4.1  Setting up and organisation of the TFGR 

The  President  of  the  European  Commission  established  the  TFGR  in  July  2011,  as  an 

organisational  entity  initially  embedded  in  the  Commission’s  Director-General  of  Human 

Resources and Security. The Head of the Task Force, appointed at a level equivalent to the rank 
of Director-General9, reported directly to  the President of the European Commission  under the 

guidance of the Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs (Figure 2). The TFGR was 
placed within the Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN) as of 1st 

May  2012  in  order  to  “ensure  the  highest  possible  levels  of  synergies,  coordination  and 

coherence  of  the  Commission’s  work  to  support  the  economic  adjustment  programme  of 
Greece”.10  The TFGR operated from offices in Brussels and Athens and, as of February 2015, 
employed 65 staff11.  

A dedicated financial team in the geographical unit of the Directorate General for Employment, 

Social Affairs and Inclusion (DG EMPL) provided support to the TFGR. 

Finally,  the  TFGR  coordinated  a  High-Level  Steering  Group  -  composed  by  representatives  of 

Greece, other EU Member States, Commission services and, where relevant, representatives of 

the international organisations – which had an advisory role on the support provided to the Greek 

Authorities. 

9 European Commission, 2011, PERS doc (2011) 111/2 of 19.07.2011. Information Point. 
10Commission decision, 2012, C(2012)2688 final of 18 April 2012, 

http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/10061/2012/EN/PV-2012-1998-F1-EN-MAIN-PART-1.PDF 
11 ECA Special Report no 19/2015 : https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR15_19/SR_TFGR_EN.pdf 

8 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Figure 2: The TFGR organisational structure 

Source: Ernst&Young, Analysis 2018 

4.2  Resources allocation and distribution  

The  European  Commission  had  to  quickly  empower  the  TFGR,  provide  resources  and  set  up 
local operations12. 

The  total  budget  spent  by  the  TFGR  for  the  technical  assistance  to  Greece  during  2011-  2015 

was EUR 12.85 million. 

The areas of intervention covered the Public Administration and different  economic sectors, in 

particular:  

1)  Administrative reform at central level, e-Government;  

12 Concomitantly with the establishment of the TFGR, the EC issued an internal decision on 20 July 2011 (PV(2011)1969 final), 
according to which the Head of the Task Force was appointed and basic administrative measures were decided on. The latter 
concerned modalities of employing staff, the collaboration of the TFGR with other DGs and EC services, logistical issues, as 
well as basic financial arrangements.  

9 

 
 
                                                           
2)  Administrative reform at regional and local level;  

3)  Anti-corruption, anti-money laundering, anti-fraud;  

4)  Business  environment  and  reform  of  product  and  service  markets,  public  procurement, 

better regulation;  

5)  Financial sector and access to finance;  

6)  Healthcare;  

7)  Judicial reform, migration, asylum, state aid, infringements;  

8)  Labour Market, social security, innovation & education (R&D&I);  

9)  Privatisation, land use and land registry;  

10) Revenue administration and public financial management;  

11) Structural Funds and sectoral issues. 

Figure 3 below presents the distribution of this amount per policy area in descending order. 

The  39%  of  the  resources  have  been  devoted  to  interventions  in  the  field  of  “Revenue 

Administration and Public Financial Management” 

10 

 
 
 
Figure 3: Financial resources deployed by the TFGR, by policy area 

Source:  Ernst&Young,  Analysis  2018  based  on  technical assistance  data  of  the  TFGR,  from  the  European  Social 

Fund (ESF), the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) (art. 45 Regulation 1083/2006) and the FISCALIS 
programme13. 

4.3 

Identification of the needs 

Following  the  identification  of  the  general  technical  assistance  needed  by  Greece14,  the  TFGR 

assisted  the  relevant  Greek  authorities  in  defining  work  programmes/roadmaps  for  technical 

assistance,  containing  priorities,  concrete  assistance  activities  to  be  undertaken  and  related 
timeframe15.  

The work programmes were either prepared by the TFGR and/or technical assistance providers, 

in  partnership  with  the  relevant  Greek  authorities,  or  by  the  Greek  government  itself,  with  the 

input of the TFGR and/or technical assistance providers. Work programmes were, for example, 

defined  in  the  field  of  Administrative  Reform  (both  at  central  and  local  level),  eGovernance, 

Anti-Money Laundering, Trade Facilitation, innovation or cadastre. 

 14 European Commission, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, 2010, “The economic adjustment programme 
for  Greece”-  May  2010  -  https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/64c89a77-ddc4-46f4-9bb0-
18d7e80f6f0c/language-en 

15https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-coordination/eu-financial-assistance/which-eu-

countries-have-received-assistance/financial-assistance-greece_en#taskforceforgreece 

11 

 
 
                                                           
 
4.4 

Identification of technical assistance expertise 

The identification of the relevant technical support expertise was done in one or two main waves, 

depending on the policy area: 

1)  For specific policy areas: selection of Domain Leaders  

The  responsibility  of  Domain  Leader  was  undertaken  by  a  national  government  with  a  strong 

track record in  a policy  field  of particular  complexity (reform of the public administration, for 

example). This role had varying characteristics depending on the phase of technical assistance. In 

the first phase, its role was to assist the Greek authorities in preparing the global architecture and 

the strategy to implement the necessary reforms. More specifically, the Domain Leader, in close 

relation  with  Greek  authorities  and  the  TFGR,  prepared  a  draft  roadmap,  in  coordination  with 

TFGR,  which  would  be  submitted  to  the  Greek  authorities  for  final  adoption.  In  the  second 

phase, the Domain Leader consulted the Greek authorities for defining which actions and/or sub-

actions  Greece  needed  technical  assistance  and  what  kind  of  technical  assistance  should  be 

provided.  

2)  For all policy areas: selection of providers  

The TFGR selected technical assistance providers (Commission officials, Member States experts, 

international  organisations,  private  experts)  depending  on  the  assistance  to  be  delivered,  in 

coordination with the Greek authorities (and, if relevant, with the Domain Leader).  

Table  1:  Mapping  of  Domain  Leaders  and  Member  States  providing  support  during  the 

TFGR intervention 

Policy  areas  supported 
by TFGR 

Domain Leader(s) 

Acceleration  of  Cohesion 
Policy projects 

No Domain Leader 

Financial 
Access to finance 

institutions 

/ 

No Domain Leader 

12 

Member  States  providing  support 
through  public  officials,  private 
experts and public agencies  
Austria,  Belgium,  Estonia,  France, 
Germany,  Hungary, 
Italy, 
Lithuania,  Netherlands,  Poland,  Spain, 
United Kingdom 
Austria,  Czech  Republic,  Denmark, 
France,  Germany, 
Italy, 
Netherlands,  Portugal,  Sweden,  United 
Kingdom 

Ireland, 

Ireland, 

 
Member  States  providing  support 
through  public  officials,  private 
experts and public agencies  
Austria,  Belgium,  Estonia,  Finland, 
Ireland,  Netherlands,  Portugal,  Spain, 
Sweden, United Kingdom 

Austria,  Denmark,  Estonia,  Finland, 
Germany, 
Lithuania, 
Italy, 
Luxembourg,  Poland,  Portugal,  Spain, 
Sweden, United Kingdom 

Austria, Belgium, Germany, Norway 

Ireland, 

Austria,  Bulgaria,  Cyprus,  Finland, 
Italy,  Lithuania, 
Germany, 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, 
United Kingdom 
Belgium,  Estonia,  France,  Lithuania, 
Netherlands,  Portugal,  Sweden,  United 
Kingdom 
Estonia,  France,  Germany, 
Italy, 
Netherlands,  Poland,  Slovenia,  Spain, 
United Kingdom  
Austria,  Estonia,  France,  Germany, 
Ireland, 
Italy,  Netherlands,  Poland, 
Portugal,  Slovenia,  Spain,  United 
Kingdom  
Austria,  Belgium,  Czech  Republic, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Sweden, United Kingdom 
Austria,  Czech  Republic,  Estonia, 
France,  Germany,  Italy,  Netherlands, 
Romania,  Spain,  Sweden,  United 
Kingdom 
Austria,  Belgium,  Estonia,  Finland, 
France, Germany and Italy 

Policy  areas  supported 
by TFGR 

Domain Leader(s) 

Administrative reform 

Revenue 
and 
public 
management 

administration 
financial 

laundering 

Anti-money 
and anti-corruption 
Business environment 

on 

central 
on 
France 
administration;  Germany 
on 
local 
regional  and 
administration 
Belgium 
debt 
collection; France on high 
wealth 
individuals; 
Netherlands  on  dispute 
resolution  and  on 
the 
Hellenic  Court  of  Audit 
(HCA) 
Netherlands 
on 
money laundering 
Netherlands 
promotion 

for  export 

anti-

Healthcare reform 

Germany 

Judicial reform 

Austria 

Judicial  reform,  central 
State  Aid  Unit 
and 
infringements,  migration, 
asylum and borders 
Labour  market, 
social 
security,  innovation  and 
education 
Privatisation 
registry 

land 

and 

No Domain Leader 

No Domain Leader 

Netherlands 
registry 

on 

land 

Industry 
services 

sectors 

and 

No Domain Leader 

13 

 
Source: Ernst&Young, Analysis 2018 - Assessment based on the TFGR quarterly progress reports (2011 to 2014, 
listed individually in the bibliography), minutes of the high-level meetings, European Commission, TFGR (2012-
2014).16 

The timeline of the TFGR operations is shown in more details in Figure 4.  

16 Ernst&Young, 2019, “Evaluation of the technical assistance provided by the Task Force for Greece (TFGR) 2011-2015“, Final 
report  –  January  2019  -  https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/45625812-2056-11e9-8d04-
01aa75ed71a1/language-en 

14 

 
                                                           
Figure 4: Milestones and the timeline of the TFGR  

Source: Ernst &Young, Analysis 2018 

15 

 
 
 
 
5.

  METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 

This  Staff  Working  Document  assesses  the  relevance,  effectiveness,  efficiency,  coherence  and 

added value of the TA activities coordinated and provided by the TFGR. It is based on the data 
gathered by an external study carried out in 201817. 

Because  of  the  extensive  consultation  carried  out  on  targeted  stakeholders  by  the  external 

evaluator, no open public consultation took place. 

5.1  The external evaluation carried out in 2018 

The  methodology  applied  in  the  above-mentioned  evaluation  for  gathering  data  refers  to  three 

main sources of data:  

1)  Desk  research  of  relevant  documents:  such  as  internal  assessments  of  the 

Commission services, as well as external evaluation studies, including the results of 
the preliminary evaluation carried out in 201318.  

2)  A structured electronic survey; 
3)  In-depth semi-structured interviews19.  

The stakeholders were grouped into three main categories:  

1)  Strategic  and  management  –  institutions  and  individuals  involved  in  the  set-up, 

overall strategic steering and day to day management of TFGR interventions; 

2)  Beneficiaries  –  institutions  benefiting  from  technical  assistance  interventions 

coordinated by TFGR; 

3)  Providers  –  international  organisations,  national  agencies  and  individual  experts 

providing technical assistance. 

17 Ernst&Young, 2019, “Evaluation of the technical assistance provided by the Task Force for Greece (TFGR) 2011-2015“, Final 
report  –  January  2019  -  https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/45625812-2056-11e9-8d04-
01aa75ed71a1/language-en 

18TFGR quarterly reports; Alvarez & Marsal Taxand and Adam Smith International” 2014 - Final report and ECA Special Report 

no 19/2015. 

19A total number of 36 interviews were conducted. 

16 

 
 
                                                           
The structured electronic survey targeted 278 stakeholders who were distributed among the three 

categories as follows:  

1)  Strategic and management: 4% 

2)  Beneficiaries: 33 % 

3)  Providers – including individual experts from the Domain leaders: 63% 

Out of the 278 individuals consulted for the survey, 101 responded to the online questionnaire, 

representing a response rate of 36%. 

The  Figure  5  shows  that  there  was  a  balanced  distribution  of  replies  among  the  different 

stakeholders’  categories,  with  a  predominant  response  from  individual  experts  and  from  the 

Greek  authorities, who represent  the main actors involved in  the activities and in  the decision-
making process for the follow-up of the technical assistance.20 

Figure 5: Respondents to the survey by stakeholder category (Number of respondents: 101) 

Source: Ernst & Young Questionnaire for targeted stakeholder consultation (2018) 

20  Ernst&Young,  2019,  “Evaluation  of  the  TA  provided  by  the  Task  Force  for  Greece  (TFGR)  2011-2015”  ISBN  978-92-79-

98400-6” 
https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/45625812-2056-11e9-8d04-01aa75ed71a1/language-en 

17 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
The survey targeted the following policy areas: 

1)  Horizontal intervention in all areas, as strategic/country level coordinator 

2)  Revenue administration and Public Financial Management 

3)  Business environment 

4)  Administrative reform 

5)  Acceleration of the cohesion projects 

6)  Privatisation and land registry 

7)  Healthcare reform 

8)  Labour market, social security 

9)  Judicial reform 

10) Anti-money laundering and anti-corruption 

11) Financial Institution access to finance 

12) Industry sectors and Services 

13) Environment & waste management 

The  replies  received  were  balanced  among  the  different  policy  areas  as  illustrated  in  the 

following Figure 6, with however more weight for those policy areas where the TFGR activities 

were mostly concentrated (i.e. for the administrative reform area for example). 

18 

 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Respondents to the survey by policy field (Number of respondents: 101)  

Horizontal/strategic/country level…
Revenue administration and Public…

10 

15 

Business environment
Administrative reform
Acceleration cohesion projects
Privatisation and land registry
Healthcare reform
Labour market, social security
Judicial reform
Anti-money laundering and anti-corruption
Financial Institution access to finance
Industry sectors and Services
Environment & waste management

7 

7 

7 

7 

7 

1 

4 

5 

1 

4 

26 

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Source: Ernst & Young Questionnaire for targeted stakeholder consultation (2018) 

5.2  Limitations of the external evaluation 

This evaluation focuses on the results of the technical assistance. It is conditioned by the fact that 

the follow-up of the technical assistance actions was to be implemented by the beneficiaries of 

the  assistance.  This  was  an  external  factor  influencing  the  outcomes  of  the  TFGR  activities, 

which was not under the TFGR responsibility. 

In  addition,  a  certain  delay  generally  occurs  between  the  implementation  of  a  reform  and  its 

social  and  economic  impacts.  Therefore,  results  and  impacts  of  the  TFGR  technical  assistance 
can only be observed in the longer term.21  

21European  Central  Bank,  Working  Paper  N°  2111  –  November  2018,  “  Structural  reform  waves  and    economic  growth” 

https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecb.wp2111.en.pdf?f64de93f52740a46db6434372435c84a 

19 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
6.

  ANALYSIS AND ANSWERS TO THE EVALUATION QUESTIONS 

6.1  Relevance 

This criterion has replied to the following evaluation questions: 

1)  To what  extent were the objectives of  identifying, coordinating  TA needs  and  assisting 

Greek authorities relevant for achieving the two specific objectives and namely:  

a.  Supporting the delivery of the commitments within the economic adjustment 

programme; and  

b.  Accelerating the absorption of the Structural Funds.  

2)  To what extent were the TFGR actions and target groups relevant for achieving its overall 

and specific objectives?  

Based on the results of the desk analysis22, the TFGR supported a significant number of Greek 

authorities, upon their request. The TFGR focused on key, central institutions responsible for the 

reform  planning  and  implementation,  as  defined  in  the  conditionalities  of  the  economic 

adjustment programmes.  

To  substantiate  this  finding,  the  external  evaluation  has  addressed  to  the  stakeholders  an 

operational question: 

“To  what  extent  the  TFGR  assisted  all  the  relevant  institutions  that  needed  support  for  the 
implementation of commitments undertaken as part of the economic adjustment programme?” 

The majority of stakeholders (60%) stated that the TFGR assisted to a high extent or very high 

extent all institutions needing support for the implementation of commitments undertaken as part 

of the economic adjustment programme. 

10% of respondents considered that the TFGR was of little or no assistance to institutions, some 

of them calling for more direct cooperation with local authorities. 

22  Ernst&Young,  2019,  “Evaluation  of  the  TA  provided  by  the  Task  Force  for  Greece  (TFGR)  2011-2015”  ISBN  978-92-79-
98400-6” – Pages 8, 9, 22, 24, 25 , mainly based on ECA Special Report no 19/2015; the TFGR quarterly progress reports; 
2014  Preliminary  Evaluation  of  the  Technical  Assistance  provided  to  Greece;  reports  on  the  reviews  of  the  economic 
adjustment programmes and ECA Special Report no. 17/2017 

https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/45625812-2056-11e9-8d04-01aa75ed71a1/language-en 

20 

 
                                                           
Figure 7: The extent to which the TFGR assisted the relevant institutions in implementing 
the 
programme  
the 
commitments 
(Number of respondents: 89) 

adjustment 

economic 

under 

taken 

I do not know

Very high extent

High extent

Low extent

Not at all

2 

8 

25 

15 

39 

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

Source: Ernst & Young Questionnaire for targeted stakeholder consultation (2018) 

6.2  Effectiveness 

The  following  evaluation  questions  were  addressed  in  order  to  assess  the  effectiveness  of  the 

activities of TFGR: 

1)  To what extent have the specific objectives of the TFGR – a) supporting the delivery 

of the commitments within the economic adjustment programme and b) accelerating 

the absorption of the SF - been achieved?  

2)  What  have  been  the  qualitative  and  quantitative  effects  of  the  technical  assistance 

provided?  

3)  To what extent have the actions financed under the TFGR contributed to achieving its 

specific objectives?  

According to  the  external  evaluation,  the SF absorption of the programming period 2007-2013 

improved  and  in  the  current  programming  period  2014-2020,  clearly  the  implementation  was 

triggered by the TFGR involvement, but also by the continuous support of the relevant DGs in 

the  EC,  namely  DG  Employment,  Social  Affairs  &  Inclusion  and  DG  Regional  and  Urban 

Policy.  

By  the  end  of  2015  Greece  had  the  highest  absorption  rate  in  the  EU  (99.5%)  for  Structural 

Funds allocated under the Cohesion Fund, European Regional Development Fund and European 

Social Fund. This performance was driven particularly by the increase in the maximum EU co-

21 

 
 
 
financing  rates  to  100%  for  the  2007-2013  programmes  but  also  by  the  focused  efforts  of  all 

stakeholders  to  use  EU  funds  under  the  challenging  circumstances  determined  by  the  financial 
crisis.23 

TFGR  has  been  the  main  direct  technical  assistance  provider  for  the  Greek  authorities  at  a 

central-coordination  level  as  in  Greece  the  resources  available  under  the  technical  assistance 

Operational Programme 2007-2013 were spent on the reimbursement of employment costs and 

additional  operational  costs  (84%).  A  very  small  proportion  (approximately  1%  or  roughly  €2 

million)  was  spent  on  developing  systems  and  tools  and  only  0.1%  on  capacity-building 

activities. 

Based  on  the  results  of  the  desk  research24,  the  conclusions  of  the  preliminary  evaluation  of 

2014, and the external evaluation carried out in 2018, the main findings are the following: 

a)  The TFGR focused on the identification of detailed needs, planning of reforms and 

the design of solutions; 

b)  The detailed needs identification process was extensive and covered a large number 

of areas, sub-areas, and responsible institutions. 

Therefore,  the  TFGR  was  effective  in  fulfilling  its  mission  “of  integrating  the  TA  in  the 

adjustment  programmes  as  an  effective  way  to  push  wide-ranging  changes  through  in  a  short 

space of time, but, as such is not conducive to achieving sustainable reform. By definition, this 

model  of  “independent  intervention  of  TA”  is  not  applicable  outside  of  situations  of  extreme 
distress”25. 

The results of the targeted stakeholder consultation are reported below: 

23 Ernst&Young, 2019, “Evaluation of  the TA provided by  the Task  Force for Greece (TFGR) 2011-2015” ISBN 
33. 
978-92-79-98400-6” 
European  Commission  (2016).  Delivery  system.  Final  report.  Work  package  12.  Ex  post  evaluation  of  Cohesion  Policy 
programmes 2007-2013, focusing on the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the European Social Fund (ESF) 
and the Cohesion Fund (CF). 

Page 

– 

24  Alvarez  &  Marsal  Taxand  and  Adam  Smith  International”  2014  –  “Preliminary  Evaluation  of  the  Technical  Assistance 

provided to Greece in 2011-2013”- Final report, Page 44. 

25  Alvarez  &  Marsal  Taxand  and  Adam  Smith  International”  2014  –  “Preliminary  Evaluation  of  the  Technical  Assistance 

provided to Greece in 2011-2013”- Final report, Page 44. 

22 

 
                                                           
Figure  8:  The  extent  to  which  the  Greek  Authorities’  need  of  support  was  identified  in 
detail, as reported by the stakeholder consultation (Number of respondents: 68) 

I do not know

3 

Very high

12 

High

Low

None

2 

0

8 

10

43 

20

30

40

50

Source: Ernst & Young Questionnaire for targeted stakeholder consultation (2018) 

The  large  majority  of  respondents  (80%)  found  that  the  needs  of  the  Greek  authorities  were 

identified in detail to a high or very high extent. Those that disagreed considered that this was 

due  to  uncertainties  in  the  political  framework  or  to  lack  of  administrative  capacity  from  the 

Member State. These findings were corroborated by both Greek and international respondents. 

As  the  initial  technical  assistance  requests  representing  the  needs  identified  by  the  Greek 

authorities  were  general  in  nature,  the  TFGR  undertook  great  efforts  to  specify  the  necessary 

reform  actions.  The  key  determinants  for  the  adequate  specification  of  needs  were  the  Greek 

authorities' capacity to perform such specification of needs, the availability of financial resources 

for swift expertise deployment and the involvement of the existing national network of experts.  

In this context the contribution of Member States and of international organisations, coordinated 
by the TFGR, enabled a rapid and appropriate design of the support to be provided26.  

The  TFGR  provided  adequate  support  in  terms  of  improving  legislative  and  regulatory 

frameworks  where  requested/needed.  For  example  in  the  area  of  absorption  of  EU  funds,  the 

26 Ernst&Young, 2019, “Evaluation of the technical assistance provided by the Task Force for Greece (TFGR) 2011-2015“, Final 
-  https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/45625812-2056-11e9-8d04-

report  –  January  2019 
01aa75ed71a1/language-en  
Based on interviews with TFGR staff, EC officials, Greek authorities, providers and individual experts, desk research (ECA 
Special Report no 19/2015) and survey (incl. answers to open questions). 59% of the responding stakeholders (40 out of 68) 
answered ‘high extent’ and ‘very high extent’ to: To what extent the Member States and European Commission inputs into 
this  process  were  adequately  coordinated  by  the  TFGR?  Only  15%  (10  out  of  68)  have  a  different  view,  answering  ‘low 
extent’ and ‘not at all’. The ‘I don’t know’ answers (26%, namely 18 out of 68) are explained by the lack of information of 
providers and independent experts (66%, namely 12 out of 18) on this subject. 

23 

 
 
 
                                                           
rules  relating  to  the  speeding  up  of  procedures  for  environmental  licensing,  expropriations, 

bidding and contracting procedures were prepared with support from the TFGR.  

The TFGR supported substantially the strategic preparation for 2014-2020 programming period 

for Greece including key simplification measures introduced in the relating implementing law. 

The  support  for  the  restructuring  of  administrative  frameworks  was  provided  in  most  policy 

areas, e.g. the reorganisation and consolidation of tax and customs administrations.  

Moreover,  the  TFGR  extensively  supported  the  efforts  undertaken  by  different  ministries  to 

implement the recommendations of the Greek central administration. The role of several central 

institutions such as the Hellenic Court of Audit (HCA), the Single Public Procurement Authority, 

the  General  Secretariat  for  Public  Revenue,  the  Labour  Inspectorate  and  Hellenic  Manpower 

Employment  Organization  (OAED)  was  strengthened  by  the  TFGR  technical  assistance, 

achieving therefore the specific objective of “providing support on the legislative, regulatory and 

administrative framework”. 

6.3  Efficiency 

In order to assess the efficiency of the TFGR activities, the following questions have been raised: 

1)  To what extent did the available financial envelopes adequately cover the TA needs? 

2)  To  what  extent  did  the  coordination,  management  and  administrative  structures  in 

place ensure an economic and efficient use of resources in the achievement of TFGR 

outputs, results and impacts?  

3)  To what extent were the actions and outputs delivered at a reasonable cost?   

Efficiency  has  been  analysed  by  taking  into  account  two  variables:  the  timely  delivery  of  the 

support and the budget spent for carrying out those different activities. 

According  to the data  gathered by the evaluator, the TFGR adequately supported the technical 

assistance needs  expressed by the Greek authorities by  ensuring in  a timely manner i) detailed 

needs  identification;  ii)  matching  with  needed  expertise;  iii)  implementation  of  the  support 

measures.  

The TFGR was set up less than two months after the request of the Greek authorities. The needs 

of  the  Greek  authorities  were  identified  within  less  than  a  month  from  the  moment  the  Greek 

24 

 
government submitted its request for support, and high-level meetings were organised to further 
specify  these  needs27.  The  needs  identification  process  continued  throughout  the  lifetime  of 

TFGR  as  new  policy  areas,  projects  and  work-streams  were  constantly  added  to  the  TFGR 

intervention.  

The  efficient  use  of  resources  for  the  achievement  of  TFGR  outputs,  results  and  impacts  was 

ensured  through  a  timely  deployment  of  financial,  human  and  ICT  resources,  as  well  as  by  a 

management mode that enabled decision-making focused on the timeliness principle and by the 

procurement  of  services  at  a  reasonable  cost.  Coordination  mechanisms  were  put  in  place  to 

ensure  operational  consistency  of  TFGR  actions,  while  the  administrative  structures  and 

procedures induced a reasonable level of administrative burden to the extent that they depended 

on the TFGR. 

Based  on  the  stakeholders’  answers,  the  administrative  processes  of  TFGR  were  assessed  as 

satisfactory.  Providers  and  experts  were  less  satisfied  because  of  the  administrative  burden 

associated to the reimbursement of expenditures. This aspect was acknowledged to be the effect 

of  the  EU  general  spending  rules  to  be  applied  also  to  the  financial  sources  available  to  the 

TFGR.  

Nevertheless, the overall perception of the stakeholders was that the administrative burden was 

reasonable  and,  consequently,  that  the  TFGR  administrative  procedures  could  not  have  been 

further simplified. 

Some  contextual  factors  influenced  –  positively  or  negatively  -  the  efficiency  of  the  TFGR 

interventions.  

According  to  the  evidence  collected  by  the  evaluator28,  the  factors  positively  influencing  the 

efficiency of the interventions were the following:  

a) 

the solidarity of other Member States; 

27 Specifically, the Greek authorities communicated an overview of their needs for support to the TFGR on 4 October 2011 and 

the first high-level meeting took place the same month. 

28  Ernst&Young,  2019,  “Evaluation  of  the  TA  provided  by  the  Task  Force  for  Greece  (TFGR)  2011-2015”  ,  page  40  
ISBN  978-92-79-98400-6”  -  https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/45625812-2056-11e9-8d04-
01aa75ed71a1/language-en 

25 

 
                                                           
b) 

the ownership of the Greek authorities; and 

c) 

the dedication and ongoing involvement of the TFGR staff. 

Factors limiting the efficiency of intervention were, according to the stakeholders’ opinion:  

a) 

the political instability;  

b) 

the existing administrative capacity; and  

c) 

the exiting budgetary options/constraints. 

The  overall  conclusion,  based  on  the  data  analysis,29  is  that  the  TFGR  intervention  was 

efficient.  It  supported  the  technical  assistance  needs  expressed  by  the  Greek  authorities  in  a 

timely manner and within the budgetary constraints. It did so despite the initial period of funding 
uncertainty and the lack of a dedicated budget30.  

6.4  Coherence  

In order to assess the coherence of the TFGR, the following questions were raised: 

1)  By design, were the TFGR actions coherent with the policies of the Greek government? 

2)  Was  an  internal  coordination  mechanism  put  in  place  in  order  to  avoid  overlaps  with 

Structural Funds interventions implemented in Greece? 

3)  Were  complementarities  with  Structural  Funds  under  shared  management  fully 

exploited? 

According  to  the  data  gathered  through  the  desk  research  and  the  targeted  stakeholder 

consultation  carried  out  by  the  external  evaluator,  the  TFGR  activities  were  in  line  with  the 

commitments  undertaken  by  the  Greek  Government  under  the  economic  adjustment 
programmes31, therefore coherent with the policies. 

29  Ernst&Young,  2019,  “Evaluation  of  the  TA  provided  by  the  Task  Force  for  Greece  (TFGR)  2011-2015”  ,  page  46, 
https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/45625812-2056-11e9-8d04-01aa75ed71a1/language-en 

30 94% of the responding Greek authorities (16 out of 17) answered ‘highly adequate’ and ‘adequate’ to the following question: 
How  do  you  assess  the  time  lag  between  the  moment  when  your  request  for  support  was  submitted  to  TFGR  and  the 
moment when your needs were comprehensively identified, together with TFGR? 

31 Ernst&Young, 2019, “Evaluation of the technical assistance provided by the Task Force for Greece (TFGR) 2011-2015“, Final 
report  –  January  2019  –  page  52  -  https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/45625812-2056-11e9-
8d04-01aa75ed71a1/language-en  

26 

 
                                                           
As  for  the  internal  mechanism  coordination,  it  was  successfully  put  in  place  to  avoid  funding 

overlaps with Structural Funds interventions implemented in Greece. 

The  avoidance  of  overlaps  between  the  TFGR  actions  and  Structural  Funds  interventions 

implemented  in  Greece  was  conducted  through  an  internal  procedure  applied  in  the  case  of 
contracts financed by the centrally managed technical assistance budgets of ESF/ ERDF32. 

The stakeholders responding to the survey likewise confirmed the coherence between the TFGR 

interventions with the Greek policies. 

An internal coordination mechanism was put in place within the Commission to avoid overlaps 

of EU funds implemented in Greece. In particular, the analysis of potential overlaps between the 

TFGR  actions  and  Structural  Funds  interventions  implemented  in  Greece  (ESF/ERDF)  was 

conducted through an internal procedure applied by the dedicated financial and operational teams 

in the DG for Employment, Inclusion and Social Affairs. 

6.5  EU added value  

The EU added value has been assessed against the following sub-criteria:  

1)  The  contribution  of  the  TFGR  activities  to  the  development  and  implementation  of 
solutions  that  address  national  challenges  which  have  an  impact  on  cross-border  or 
Union-wide challenges; 

2)  The contribution of the TFGR activities to EU values, including solidarity; 

3)  The contribution of the TFGR activities to a consistent and coherent implementation of 

EU laws and policies. 

According  to  the  data  gathered  by  the  external  evaluator,  through  desk  research  and  targeted 

stakeholder consultation, the TFGR was the catalyst for the mobilisation of tools and resources 
and its involvement served to trigger or accelerate reforms in Greece33.  

32  Ernst&Young,  2019,  “Evaluation  of  the  TA  provided  by  the  Task  Force  for  Greece  (TFGR)  2011-2015”  ,  page  53  -
https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/45625812-2056-11e9-8d04-01aa75ed71a1/language-en 

33 In addition to the sources mentioned in specific case, the reconstruction of the TFGR intervention based on desk research also 
supported  the  findings:  TFGR  quarterly  progress  reports  (2011  to  2014,  listed  individually  in  the  bibliography),  ECA 
Special Report no 19/2015, Alvarez & Marsal Taxand and Adam Smith International Final report: VC/2014/002, minutes of 
the high-level meetings. 

27 

 
                                                           
The  solidarity  of  Member  States  was  essential  for  a  timely  identification  and  mobilization  of 

expertise.  This  happened  not  only  in  the  initial  phase  of  needs  identification,  when  certain 

Member  States  promptly  offered  to  become  Domain  Leaders,  but  also  in  the  subsequent 
phases.34 

The creation of the TFGR is considered as an “ad-hoc” instrument – built under strict deadlines – 

for  supporting  structural  reforms.  It  mobilised  at  the  same  time  at  the  European  Commission, 

Member  States’  and  international  organisations’  levels,  in  order  to  address  the  national 

challenges with Union-wide effects. 

According to 29% of the stakeholders’ opinion, a similar national action for the provision of 

technical  assistance  would not  have  been possible without  the EU  and  the  TFGR.  Almost 

half (43%) of those who responded to the question were of the view that a similar national action 

for the provision of technical assistance had a low probability to be implemented. This has been 

highlighted  in  particular  by  considering  the  scale  of  the  needed  reforms,  the  particular  tight 

deadlines  and  the  budgetary  constraints,  i.e.  lacking  of  a  specific  budget  line  dedicated  to  this 

type of intervention. On the other end, approximately 19% of stakeholders were of the view that 

the  technical  assistance  activities  were  likely  or  very  likely  to  be  implemented  without  the 

TFGR.   

34  Ernst&Young,  2019,  “Evaluation  of  the  TA  provided  by  the  Task  Force  for  Greece  (TFGR)  2011-2015”  ,  page  40  -
https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/45625812-2056-11e9-8d04-01aa75ed71a1/language-en 

28 

 
 
 
                                                           
Figure 9: The extent to which the TA activities implemented could have been carried out 
without the TFGR (Number of respondents: 70) 

Source: Ernst & Young Questionnaire for targeted stakeholder consultation (2018) 

7.

  CONCLUSIONS 

The purpose of the evaluation of activities carried out by the TFGR was to reply to the two main 

questions raised by the Court of Auditors,  

1) To what extent was the EU TA provided to Greece under the coordination of the TFGR 

managed effectively? 

2) To what extent has the EU TA provided to Greece under the coordination of the TFGR 

contributed positively to the process of reforms in Greece? 

Based  on  the  external  study  findings  and  by  the  data  gathered  in  the  context  of  the  evaluation 
process, the following conclusions were drawn35: 

1)  The TFGR intervention was overall relevant in satisfying the needs, given the particular 

situation  in  Greece  where  immediate  and  wide-ranging  of  actions  were  necessary  to 

redress  the  financial  and  socio-economic  situation.  The  TFGR  intervened  swiftly, 

mobilised  support  from  the  Member  States  and  the  European  Commission  and 

adequately  coordinated  the  requests  from  the  Greek  authorities  for  assistance  with 

available expertise. 

35  Ernst&Young,  2019,  “Evaluation  of  the  TA  provided  by  the  Task  Force  for  Greece  (TFGR)  2011-2015”  ,  page  61  -
https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/45625812-2056-11e9-8d04-01aa75ed71a1/language-en 

29 

 
 
 
                                                           
2)  . The specific objectives of the TFGR were largely achieved. The TFGR succeeded to 

a high extent to detail the needs of the Greek authorities and to define concrete actions 

for  reform  implementation.  The  high-level  meetings  played  an  important  role  in 

elaborating  and  matching  Greek  authorities’  needs  with  the  technical  assistance.  The 

TFGR  involved  an  extensive  network  of  international  organisations,  European 

Commission representatives and experts for this purpose in order to be able to offer to 

Greek authorities the needed support.  

3)  The  detailed  technical  assistance  needs  of  the  Greek  authorities  were  timely 

identified,  given  the  swift  operationalisation  of  the  TFGR.  Furthermore,  identification 

and mobilisation of expertise was done in a very short period thanks to the direct support 

provided by the TFGR and by the European Commission staff, as well as thanks to the 

solidarity  demonstrated  by  the  Member  States.  The  TFGR  human  resources  and 

organisational  set-up  were  efficiently  deployed,  making  use  of  flexibility  within  the 

existing European Commission rules, specifically in order to enhance time efficiencies. 

The  pace  of  implementation  of  the  support  for  structural  reforms  in  Greece  was 

adequate,  even  if  marked  by  contextual  and  institutional  factors  such  as  the  political 

instability. 

4)  The  size  of  TFGR’s  budget  was  appropriate  and  proportional  to  the  type  of 

intervention it was set out to achieve – integrating several funding sources to finance the 

actions of the TFGR. Administrative burden was reasonable.  

5)  Based  on  its  mandate,  the  TFGR  intervention  was  in  line  with  the  commitments 

undertaken  by 

the  Greek  Government  under 

the  economic  adjustment 

programmes.  The  coordination  mechanism  put  in  place  at  the  level  of  European 

Commission services and in particular between the TFGR and DG EMPL (in the latter, 

through  a  dedicated  financial  team  and  the  geographical  unit  in  charge  of  Greece) 

focused primarily on avoiding potential funding overlaps. The TFGR actions contributed 

then to a coherent implementation of EU law and policies.  

6)  The TFGR provided significant EU added value by achieving better results than what 

could  have  been  achieved  solely  by  the  actions  of  the  supported  Member  State,  by 

30 

 
leveraging  on  the  high-level  and  senior  expertise  of  various  DGs  of  the  European 

Commission and of the involved Member States. 

7)  The  TFGR  contributed  to  the  development  and  implementation  of  solutions  that 

addressed  national  challenges that have an impact on cross-border or Union-wide 

challenges. In addition, the TFGR supported the promotion of EU values, in particular 

solidarity  within  the  European  Union.  Both  the  European  Commission  and  EU 

Member  States  provided  expertise  and  financed  the  cost  of  such  expertise.  Good 

practices  were  exchanged  extensively  in  almost  all  policy  areas  both  to  support  the 

planning  of  needed  reforms,  as  well  as  to  develop  and/or  pilot  specific  solutions  for 

reforms.  Out  of  the  solutions  implemented  in  Greece,  several  could  be  identified  as 

transferable  good  practices  (e.g.  trade  facilitation  roadmap  in  business  environment, 

the realisation of job descriptions with respect to administrative reform at central level). 

Finally,  most  of  the  stakeholders  recognized  the  EU  added  value  of  the  TFGR 

intervention,  either  by  its  direct  or  coordinated  technical  contribution  or  by  its 

contribution  to  triggering  some  organisational  and  functional  changes  at  the  level  of 

Greek authorities. 

7.1  Lessons learned 

1)  Future  similar  interventions  should  be  clearly  framed  from  the  start.  An  in-depth 

problem  analysis,  the  key  elements  of  the  intervention  and  the  identification  of  the 

objectives  to  be  achieved,  the  definition  of  the  expected  results  with  the  respective 

indicators  constitute  the  necessary  programming  phase  to  be  performed  before  any 

action. Although, in case of economic and financial crisis - when the quick deployment 

of assistance is required – this is hard to be implemented.  

2)  An adequate monitoring system would also need to be put in place from the outset of 

the intervention.  

3)  The  coherence  with  other  EU/national  interventions  implemented  by  the  Member 

State requesting the support should be set as a pre-condition for the award of support. It 

would benefit the recipient country both in terms of impacts as well as sustainability of 

reform actions. 

31 

 
4)  The creation of a dedicated budget upon the set-up of similar instruments could lead to 

more  predictability  in  the  planning  of  the  support  for  all  relevant  stakeholders  and 

enable a swift delivery of support on the ground. 

5)  The  request  of  support  received  in  the  framework  of  similar  interventions  need  to  be 

substantiated by a comprehensive needs identification based on which the objectives 

of the needed support can be drawn, as well as the nature, volume, length and sequence 

of activities can be determined.  

6)  Attention should be paid to the project management and technical capacity available 

at the level of the entity requesting the support.  

7)  The  partnership  between  the  beneficiary  institution  and  providers  of  technical 

support  should  be  strengthened,  to  ensure  ownership  and  endorsement/adoption  of 

outputs and to facilitate the reform implementation process.  

8)  The  technical  assistance  should  focus  on  operational  activities  related  to  the 

implementation  of  reforms  and  building,  as  needed,  the  capacity  of  the  requesting 

institutions to implement such reforms.  

9)  A  structured  database  of  technical  assistance  providers  should  be  developed  to 

facilitate rapid identification of required expertise.  

10)  The  role  of  the  institution  managing  the  intervention  should  be  clearly  defined  in 

alignment with the tasks and responsibilities of other stakeholders involved. The extent 

to  which  the  beneficiary  institution  applies/uses  the  outputs  of  the  technical  support 

should be monitored.   

11)  A  mechanism  should  be  put  in  place  to  clarify  the  obligations  of  supported 

beneficiaries with a view to ensuring that expected results are obtained.  

12)  A communication strategy should be developed and implemented.   

32 

 
Annex 1: Procedural information 

1.  LEAD DG, DeCIDE PLANNING/CWP REFERENCES 

Secretariat  General/Structural  Reform  Support  Service 

-  Decide  planning 

reference: 

PLAN/2017/652 

2.  ORGANISATION AND TIMING 

The evaluation was lunched in the last quarter of 2017 and was concluded in May 2019.  

3.  EXCEPTIONS TO THE BETTER REGULATION GUIDELINES 

A public consultation  has  not  been carried out,  because of limited extra  value, considering the 

comprehensive targeted consultation of all involved stakeholders. 

4.  CONSULTATION OF THE RSB (IF APPLICABLE) : NA 

5.  EVIDENCE, SOURCES AND QUALITY 

The evaluation is based on the conclusions of the external evaluation as well as on the including 

the results of the preliminary evaluation carried out in 2013.  

The external evaluation study conducted in 2018 gathered qualitative and quantitative data using 

a  variety  of  methods  that  include:  desk  research  of  relevant  documents;  structured  electronic 

survey  tailored  to  each  stakeholder  category;  in-depth  semi-structured  interviews  with 

stakeholders.  

Limitations of the current evaluation:  

1)  The  data  collected  through  the  electronic  survey  were  not  based  on  a  pre-identified 

statistically  representative  sample  of  respondents  as 

the  overall  population  of 

stakeholders was not known prior to the launch of the survey. However, all stakeholders 

for whom contact data were made available to the evaluator by the various Commission 

services  were  invited  to  participate  in  the  survey  in  order  to  allow  the  widest  possible 

coverage.  Furthermore,  all  stakeholder  categories  provided  inputs  into  the  electronic 

33 

 
 
 
survey and additional in-depth interviews were conducted to balance the representation of 

stakeholder category by the main policy areas; and 

2)  The  partial  availability  of  information  from  secondary  sources  (i.e.  detailed  data 

regarding the outputs and results of the actions) was compensated by the use of in-depth 

interviews  conducted  with  stakeholders  at  the  level  of  the  main  policy  areas  and  other 

information available. 

Despite  the  above-mentioned  limitations,  the  evaluation  findings  are  based  on  evidence  as 

triangulated by the data  collected through desk research, by  the targeted  survey and by the in-

depth  interviews  with  all  relevant  stakeholder  categories,  with  an  “a  posteriori”  balanced 

representation at the level of the main policy areas targeted by the TFGR and, therefore, they can 

be considered conclusive. 

34 

 
Annex 2 (Stakeholder consultation activities) - Synopsis Report 

1.  OUTLINE OF THE CONSULTATION 

The synopsis report presents the results of all stakeholder consultation activities conducted in the 

framework of the Evaluation of the TA provided by the TFGR by the external contractor. Thus, 

it presents the opinions of the stakeholders, as reflected through the two data collection tools, the 

interviews and the online survey.  The triangulation of the information hereby collected with the 

evidence extracted through desk research, and the corresponding objective conclusions taken on 

this basis are the subject of the final evaluation report itself.  

The  targeted  consultation  included  the  following  categories  of  stakeholders  with  enhanced 

interest and influence over TFGR activities: 

1)  strategic and management – institutions and individuals involved in the set-up, overall 

strategic  steering  and  day-to-day  management  of  TFGR  interventions  (i.e.  EC  officials, 

members of the High-Level Group (HLG), TFGR members of staff); 

2)  beneficiaries – institutions benefiting from TA actions coordinated / delivered by TFGR; 

and 

3)  providers  –  international  organizations,  national  development  agencies,  and  individual 

experts providing TA support. 

The following data collection tools were used in order to reach out to the relevant audience and 

to collect the appropriate information: 

1)  targeted consultation through an electronic survey based on questionnaires customised 

by stakeholder category; and 

2)  in-depth,  semi-structured  interviews  based  on  interview  guidelines  customised  by 

stakeholder category. 

The electronic survey  was launched in  English  and Greek on 2 May 2018 and sent out  to  397 

stakeholders, after having asked for the consent  for using contact details (i.e. email  addresses). 

Out  of  the  278  individuals  reached  by  the  survey,  101  individuals  responded,  representing  a 

35 

 
 
 
response  rate  of  36%.  It  can  also  be  pointed  out  that,  at  times,  respondents  answered  “I  don’t 

know” to the survey questions, which can be attributed on a case-by-case basis to issues like a 

limited involvement in scope or in duration during the TFGR intervention. 

Following  the  completion  of  the  electronic  survey,  a  total  of  36  in-depth,  semi  structured 

interviews (i.e. with some predefined questions and guidelines to follow) have been conducted, 

beyond  the  30  interviews  planned  in  the  inception  phase  of  the  evaluation.  The  aim  of  the 

interviews was three-fold: 

1)  investigating specific issues raised through the survey that merit being explored in detail; 

2)  understanding  issues  that  received  contradictory  and  inconsistent  feedback  by  different 

respondents to the survey; and  

3)  collecting information to fill any gap from the survey. 

The  approach  to  the  stakeholder  consultation,  both  through  the  survey  and  the  interviews, 

ensured that all minimum standards of the Commission regarding stakeholder consultation were 

respected. 

2.  CONSULTED STAKEHOLDERS’ PROFILES 

The  analysis  reveals  that  the  joint  use  of  the  electronic  survey  and  the  in-depth  interviews 

ensured  an  overall  balanced  representation  of  stakeholders  participating  in  the  targeted 

consultation, both from the perspective of representation of stakeholder categories, and from the 

perspective of representation at policy level.  

The following figures present the stakeholder categories consulted during the electronic survey 

and respectively, in-depth interviews. 

36 

 
 
 
 
Figure  10:  Respondents  to  the  survey  by  stakeholder  category  (Number  of  respondents: 

101)  

Source: Ernst & Young, Analysis 2018 

Figure 11: Number of interviews by stakeholder category (Number of interviewees: 36) 

Source: Ernst & Young, Analysis 2018 

At the same time, there was a balanced representation among policy areas, with more emphasis 

on those having the largest share in the budget. When a policy area was not well represented in 

the survey, they were complemented by interviews. 

37 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Respondents to the survey by policy field (Number of respondents: 101) 

Revenue administration and Public Financial…

15 

Horizontal

10 

Business environment

Administrative reform

Acceleration cohesion projects

1 

Privatisation and land registry

Healthcare reform

Labour market, social security

Judicial reform

Anti-money laundering and anti-corruption

Financial Institution access to finance

1 

Industry sectors and Services

Environment & waste management

0

7 

7 

7 

7 

7 

4 

5 

4 

5

 Source: Ernst & Young, Analysis 2018 

26 

10

15

20

25

30

Figure 13: Number of interviews by policy field (Number of interviewees: 36) 

Source: EY Questionnaire for targeted stakeholder consultation, 2018 

38 

 
 
 
 
Finally,  the  following  figure  presents  the  distribution  of  stakeholders  participating  in  in-depth 

interviews by categories at the level of each policy area.  

Figure  14:  Distribution of interviews by policy field and stakeholder category  (Number of 

interviewees: 36) 

Source: Ernst & Young, Analysis 2018 

39