COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT EVALUATION Ex post evaluation of major projects in environment financed by the European Regional Development Fund and the Cohesion Fund between 2000 and 2013
Date: 2020-02-21
Institutions: Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy, European Commission
Subjects: Cohesion Fund, EU Member State, EU environmental policy, European Regional Development Fund, coordination of financing, direct investment, economic and social cohesion, environmental protection, investment project, principle of additionality

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 21.2.2020  SWD(2020) 43 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT  EVALUATION Ex post evaluation of major projects in environment financed by the European Regional Development Fund and the Cohesion Fund between 2000 and 2013 {SWD(2020) 44 final}  
 
 
Table of Contents 

1. 

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................ 5 

Large-scale environmental projects ................................................................................................ 6 

Purpose and scope .......................................................................................................................... 6 

2. 

BACKGROUND TO THE INTERVENTION ..................................................................................... 8 

Goals and intervention logic of cohesion policy ............................................................................. 8 

Shared management — a key feature of cohesion policy .............................................................. 9 

Large infrastructure projects: technical aspects ........................................................................... 10 

Environmental infrastructures ...................................................................................................... 11 

3. 

IMPLEMENTATION / STATE OF PLAY ........................................................................................ 12 

Description of the current situation .............................................................................................. 12 

Short description of the methodology .......................................................................................... 13 

Review and selection of the case studies ...................................................................................... 14 

Limitations and specificity of the methodology applied ............................................................... 15 

4.  ANALYSIS ......................................................................................................................................... 16 

4.1  Effectiveness ........................................................................................................................... 16 

4.1.1 Project objectives were generally well defined ........................................................... 18 

4.1.2 Projects were effective, but only few fully achieved their objectives ......................... 19 

4.1.3 Benefits are maximised by accompanying/synergic investments and adequate 
response to individuals’ needs .............................................................................................. 22 

4.1.4 Environmental projects generate long-term effects through a variety of mechanisms
 ............................................................................................................................................... 23 

4.1.5 Forecasting future demand is the main and most problematic determinant of project 
performance .......................................................................................................................... 25 

4.2 Efficiency ................................................................................................................................. 28 

4.2.1 Most projects were efficient, delivering social benefits that exceeded the costs ....... 30 

4.2.2 Most projects were not as efficient as expected: cost overruns and time delays 
affected their performance ................................................................................................... 33 

4.3  Relevance ............................................................................................................................... 37 

4.3.1 The projects contributed to integrate sustainability concerns in programme ............ 37 

design and implementation .................................................................................................. 37 

4.3.2 All projects addressed real and significant environmental needs ............................... 39 

4.3.3 Projects address not only environmental, but also economic needs .......................... 40 

4.4.4 Projects are aligned with EU and national priorities .................................................... 42 

4.5  Coherence .............................................................................................................................. 42 

4.5.1 Projects were coherent with the EU environmental framework ................................. 44 

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4.5.2 Project components were generally consistent with the project objectives ............... 44 

4.5.3 Project components were well placed in the wider policy context ............................. 44 

4.6  EU added value ....................................................................................................................... 45 

4.6.1 EU financial support ..................................................................................................... 46 

4.6.2 EU strategic support ..................................................................................................... 47 

4.6.3 EU Triggering transboundary effects and fostering knowledge sharing ...................... 48 

4.6.4 EU technical support and institutional capacity-building............................................. 49 

5. CONCLUSIONS ...................................................................................................................................... 50 

ANNEX 1: PROCEDURAL INFORMATION ............................................................................................ 53 

ANNEX 2: STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION ....................................................................................... 55 

ANNEX 3: METHODS AND ANALYTICAL MODELS .......................................................................... 58 

ANNEX 4: CASE STUDIES ........................................................................................................................ 66 

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GLOSSARY 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
B/C ratio 

CBA 

BWD 

CF 

CPR  

Benefit/cost ratio 

Cost-benefit analysis 

Bathing Water Directive 

Cohesion Fund 

Common Provisions Regulation 

DG REGIO 

Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy 

DWD 

EC 

EIA 

EIB 

ENPV 

ERDF 

ESIFs 

ERR 

EU 

FNPV/C  

FNPV/K 

FRR/C 

GDP 

GHG 

GNI 

ISPA 

Drinking Water Directive 

European Commission 

Environmental Impact Assessment 

European Investment Bank 

Economic net present value 

European Regional Development Fund 

European Structural and Investment Funds 

Economic rate of return 

European Union 

Financial net present value of the investment 

Financial net present value of national capital 

Financial rate of return on investment 

Gross domestic product 

Greenhouse gas 

Gross national income 

Structural Pre-Accession Instrument 

JASPERS 

Joint Assistance to Support Projects in European Regions 

MFF 

NPV 

NUTS 

O&M 

P&R 

SCF 

Multiannual financial framework 

Net present value 

Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics 

Operating and maintenance  

Protection and remediation 

Standard conversion factor 

3 

 
 
 
SDR 

UWWTD 

WFD 

Social discount rate 

Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive 

Water Framework Directive 

4 

 
1. 

INTRODUCTION 

Cohesion  policy  is  the  EU’s  key  investment  tool.  Enshrined  in  Articles 174-178  of  the 
Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the  European  Union  (TFEU),  it  aims  to  strengthen 
economic,  social  and  territorial  cohesion  by  reducing  disparities  in  the  level  of 
development between regions.  

Cohesion policy relies notably on three Funds:  

 

 

 

the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF); 

the Cohesion Fund (CF);  

the European Social Fund (ESF).  

Environmental infrastructure projects are financed by the ERDF and the Cohesion Fund, 
as follows: 

 

 

the  ERDF  invests  in  growth-enhancing  sectors  to  foster  competitiveness  and 
create  jobs  in  EU  regions  and  cities.  ERDF  actions  are  designed  to  address 
territorial,  economic,  environmental  and  social  challenges,  with  a  focus  on 
sustainable urban development; and 

the  Cohesion  Fund  invests  in  environment  and  transport  networks  in  Member 
States with a Gross national income per inhabitant below 90% of the EU average 
(‘cohesion  countries’1).  It  aims  to  reduce  economic  and  social  disparities  and  to 
promote sustainable development.  

In 1997, the Treaty of  Amsterdam  introduced a requirement to  integrate environmental 
protection provisions into all the Union’s policies and activities. Following the entry into 
force of the Treaty of Lisbon (1 December 2009), this requirement was incorporated in 
the TFEU, Article 11 which provides that: 

‘Environmental  protection  requirements  must  be  integrated  into  the  definition  and 
implementation  of  the  Union’s  policies  and  activities,  in  particular  with  a  view  to 
promoting sustainable development.’ 

As  the  EU’s  main  investment  tool,  cohesion  policy  contributes  to  and  acts  in  synergy 
with  several  EU  sectoral  policies.  The  European  Structural  and  Investment  Funds 
(ESIFs)2  strongly  support  infrastructure  projects  that  contribute  to  compliance  with  the 
environmental acquis communautaire and its broader sustainable development goals. In 
return,  by  reducing  economic,  social  and  territorial  disparities  between  Member  States 
and 
regions,  and  by  supporting  growth  and  competitiveness,  environmental 
infrastructures contribute to the achievement of the core goals of cohesion policy.   

1 

2 

Spain,  Greece,  Portugal  and  Ireland  were  eligible  under  the  CF  from  1 January 2000  (Ireland,  with 
average  GNP  above  101%,  was  ineligible  as  of  1  January  2004).  From  1 May 2004  (with  EU 
enlargement),  all  new  Member  States  (Cyprus,  Czechia,  Estonia,  Hungary,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Malta, 
Poland,  Slovakia  and  Slovenia)  qualified.  The  current  (2014-2020)  cohesion  countries  are  Bulgaria, 
Croatia,  Cyprus,  Czechia,  Estonia,  Greece,  Hungary,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Malta,  Poland,  Portugal, 
Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
In  the  current  programming  period,  the  ERDF,  the  Cohesion  Fund  and  the  ESF,  together  with  the 
European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund. 
5 

 
 
                                                           
Cohesion policy is implemented on the basis of programming periods that generally last 
seven  years  in  parallel  with  the  EU’s  multiannual  financial  framework  (MFF).  This 
report covers the 2000-2006 and 2007-2013 periods. 

Large-scale environmental projects 

Large-scale  environmental  infrastructure  projects  often  involve  significant  investments 
and  can  account  for  a  substantial  proportion  of  the  resources  allocated  to  operational 
programmes  (OPs).  In  both  programming  periods,  projects  for  an  eligible  cost  of  over 
€50 million3 were subject to specific rules for ‘major’ projects, including an assessment 
procedure and specific approval from the European Commission. In 2000-2006, cohesion 
policy  support  was  granted  to  844  major  projects  in  the  environmental  sector4.  Of  945 
major projects in 2007-2013, 234 were environmental in nature5.  

Purpose and scope 

The Financial Regulation6 requires the Commission to carry out ex post evaluations of all 
programmes  and  activities  that  entail  significant  spending,  in  order  to  improve  future 
decision-making.  This  requirement  is  explicitly  reflected  in  the  general  regulations7  for 
the ERDF/Cohesion Fund programmes8 for each programming period.  

Ex post evaluations for the periods in question were finalised in 20109 and 201610. While 
both  covered  environmental  projects,  neither 
focused  specifically  on  major 
environmental infrastructure projects. Given the long-term nature of such projects and the 
fact that their effects take longer to materialise, it was in fact too early to evaluate them.  

This  staff  working  document  aims  to  fill  that  knowledge  gap.  It  presents  an  ex post 
evaluation of major environmental projects11 implemented in 2000-2006 and 2007-2013 
with ERDF and Cohesion Fund co-financing. A similar document assessing the impact of 
large infrastructure projects in the transport sector has just been adopted. This document 
follows  the  same  logic  and  methodology,  adjusted  to  the  specificities  of  the 
environmental sector.  

3  The  threshold  was  initially  €25 million  (Council  Regulation  (EC)  No 1083/2006  of  11  July  2006 
laying  down  general  provisions  on  the  European  Regional  Development  Fund,  the  European  Social 
Fund and the Cohesion Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999). 

4  European Commission (DG REGIO) data. 
5  DG REGIO, Major projects monitoring (October 2016); COWI (2019), Integration of environmental 

concerns in cohesion policy funds (ERDF, ESF, CF), Final report. 

6  Commission  Financial  Regulation  (2012),  Chapter  7,  Art.  30(4):  ‘In  order  to  improve  decision-
making,  institutions  shall  undertake  both  ex  ante  and  ex post  evaluations  in  line  with  guidance 
provided by the Commission. Such evaluations shall be applied to all programmes and activities which 
entail significant spending and evaluation results shall be disseminated to the European Parliament, the 
Council and spending administrative authorities’. 

7  Article 43 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 of 21 June 1999 laying down general provisions 
on the Structural Funds (the General Provisions Regulation for 2000-2006); Article 49(3) of Council 
Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006. 

8  Cohesion  Fund  support  was  project-based  in  2000-2006.  In  2007-2013,  it  was  programmed  jointly 

with the ERDF in national programmes. 
https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/policy/evaluations/ec/2000-2006/ 

9 
10  SWD (2016) 318 final. Ex post evaluation of the ERDF and Cohesion Fund 2007-2013. 
11  The  ERDF  and  the  Cohesion  Fund  finance  a  number  of  activities  and  projects  in  other  areas. 
Consequently,  the  evaluation  will  have  a  narrower  scope  than  would  have  been  the  case  for  an 
evaluation of the funds. 

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As  regards  the  scope  of  the  assessment,  10  major  projects  from  the  two  programming 
periods were selected. In order to be able to capture long-term effects as well as possible, 
only  projects  that  had  been  in  operation  for  at  least  five  years  were  considered  for 
selection.  The  selected  projects  are  not  meant  to  be  statistically  representative.  The 
choice of projects followed an analysis12 of all major projects undertaken in both periods, 
taking  account  of  data  availability,  available  project  documentation,  interviews  with 
managing authorities and web/desk research.  

The aim was to select illustrative examples that could provide interesting and generally 
valid  insights  into  the  long-term  effects  of  large-scale  environmental  infrastructure 
projects.  In this respect, the analysis provides an opportunity to draw lessons for future 
ERDF and Cohesion Fund support for such projects.  

Overall,  the  10  cases  represent  more  than  €  689.73  million  of  total  (national  plus 
cohesion policy) investments, out of which the ERDF and the Cohesion Fund accounted 
for € 291.79 million of support.  

Overall, the list of selected projects13 is balanced across: 

 

sectors (drinking water, wastewater and waste treatment, remediation);  

  countries  (Bulgaria,  Croatia,  France,  Italy,  Malta,  Poland,  Romania,  Slovenia, 
Slovakia and Spain) – despite a prevalence of projects from EU-13 countries14, a 
good coverage of EU-15 countries15 is also ensured; and  

  programming periods (five projects for each period). 

Table  1  gives  an  overview  of  the  case  studies.  They  are  presented  in  more  detail  in 
Annex 4. 

12  See section 3.3 and Annex 3 for details. 
13  The total EU contribution to the projects is € 286 million. 
14  The  EU-13  Member  States  (which  joined  the  EU  in  2004  and  after)  are  Bulgaria,  Croatia,  Cyprus, 

Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. 

15  The EU-15 (which were already Member States before 2004) are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and 
the United Kingdom. 

7 

 
                                                           
Table 1.  Overview of case studies 

PROJECT 

MS 

SUB-SECTOR 

FUND 

PERIOD 

Sofia integrated water project 

BG  Water and wastewater 

Malta  South  sewage 
plant 

treatment 

MT  Wastewater 

Sochaczew sewage management 

PL  Wastewater  

Craiova sewerage network  

RO  Water and wastewater 

Water supply and sewerage system 

HR  Water and wastewater  

Favara di Burgio aqueduct 

IT  Water  

Aguilas desalination plant 

ES  Water  

Cohesion 
Fund 
(ISPA16) 

Cohesion 
Fund 

Cohesion 
Fund 
(ISPA) 

Cohesion 
Fund 
(ISPA) 

Cohesion 
Fund 
(ISPA) 

2000-2006 

2007-2013 

2007-2013 

2000-2006 

2007-2013 

ERDF 

2000-2006 

ERDF 

2000-2006 

Purchase of a multifunctional ship  EE  Waste management / risk reduction  ERDF 

2007-2013 

Celje waste management centre  

SI 

Waste management 

Cohesion 
Fund 

2000-2006 

Sète-Marseillan lido protection 

FR 

Protection and remediation 

ERDF 

2007-2013 

2.  BACKGROUND TO THE INTERVENTION 

Goals and intervention logic of cohesion policy 

The objectives of cohesion policy are enshrined in the Treaty. Article 174 of the Treaty 
on  the  functioning  of  the  EU  stipulates:  ‘[i]n  order  to  promote  its  overall  harmonious 
development, the Union shall develop and pursue actions leading to the strengthening of 
its  economic,  social  and  territorial  cohesion.  The  Union  shall  also  aim  at  reducing 
disparities  between  the  levels  of  development  of  the  various  regions  and  the 
backwardness of the least favoured regions’.  

16  Structural Pre-Accession Instrument. 

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Figure 1. 

 Cohesion policy – hierarchy of objectives 

Source: SWD (2016)318 final. Ex post evaluation of the ERDF and Cohesion Fund 2007-2013 

The objectives of cohesion policy can be ordered on three levels17 (see Figure 1): 

  General – achieving economic, social and territorial cohesion. Disparities in levels 

of development can be seen, inter alia, in terms of: 

o  economic goals (e.g. innovation, entrepreneurship); 

o  social goals (e.g. inclusion, health); and  

o 

territorial goals (e.g. access to quality environmental services); 

  Strategic  –  achieving  smart,  sustainable  and  inclusive  goals,  as  defined  in  the 
Lisbon  Strategy  and  Europe  2020.  These  are  not  just  a  link  between  economic, 
social  and  territorial  cohesion  on  the  one  hand  and  individual  investment 
objectives  on  the  other,  but  also  a  link  to  the  Union’s  overriding  priorities  and 
goals; and 

  Operational – individual policy themes, which contribute to cohesion by: 

o 

reducing social, economic and territorial disparities (see above); and 

o  strengthening social, economic and territorial cohesion overall. 

Shared management — a key feature of cohesion policy 

The  ERDF  and  Cohesion  Fund  are  delivered  under  shared  management18.  Programmes 
are not run directly by the Commission; instead they are implemented in partnership with 
the Member States. The principles and priorities of cohesion policy are distilled through 
a process of discussion between the Commission and Member States. However, the day-

17  SWD(2016) 318 final, p. 8. 
18  See  Financial  Regulation  applicable  to  the  general  budget  of  the  Union  and  its  rules  of  application 

(2017), Title IV, Chapter II, Article 58(b). 

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to-day  management  of  the  policy,  including  selection  of  investment  projects,  is  carried 
out  by  managing  authorities  (a  national  ministry,  regional  authority  or  local  council) 
appointed by the Member States.  

Large infrastructure projects: technical aspects 

The 2000-2006 Regulation19 specified that major projects are those ‘which comprise an 
economically indivisible series of works fulfilling a precise technical function and which 
have clearly identified aims  and whose total  cost  taken into account  in  determining the 
contribution of the Funds exceeds EUR 50 million’.  

In  the  2007-2013  period,  major  projects  were  defined  along  the  same  lines20.  In  this 
period,  the  threshold  for  environmental  major  projects  was  initially  set  at  €25  million, 
before being aligned to €50 million which was the threshold in all other fields. During the 
2000-2006  and  2007-2013  periods,  major  projects  had  to  undergo  specific  approval 
procedures.  The Commission  had to  appraise and approve major projects that were co-
financed  within  the  operational  programmes.  When  submitting  a  major  project  for 
approval  to  the Commission,  the competent  authority presented a  cost-benefit analysis 
of  the  project  including:  (i)  an  assessment  of  financial  costs  and  benefits;  (ii)  a  risk 
assessment; (iii) information on the economic viability of the project; (iv) an assessment 
of the feasibility of obtaining full or partial private financing for the project; and (v) an 
indication of how far the Funds’ contribution would influence whether the projects would 
be implemented.  

In the case of investment in major projects, an analysis of the project’s social costs and 
benefits  was  indispensable,  including  an  indication  of  the  foreseeable  impact  on  the 
development or conversion of the region concerned, and of the application of EU rules on 
public contracting. With this information, the Commission then assessed the project and 
took its decision on the basis of the following factors:  

 
 

the type of investment planned and, where applicable, the revenue expected; 
the results  of the cost-benefit analysis, where the project  had to  have an  overall 
positive  marginal  equity  (i.e.  society  would  be  better  off  with  the  project  than 
without the project); 
 
the result of the evaluation of the impact on the environment; 
  consistency with the priorities in the corresponding assistance; 
  compliance with other EU policies; 
  a  breakdown  of  the  main  sources  of  the  expected  economic  and  social  benefits, 
particularly in terms of employment, value of time saved and value of accidents 
saved, having regard to the financial resources deployed; 
the  coordination  of  the  financial  instruments  and  the  combination  of  assistance 
and loans. 

 

In 2007-2013, requirements were similar. Member States were requested to submit: 

19  Art. 25 of the Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 of 21 June 1999 laying down general provisions 

on the Structural Funds. 

20  Art. 39 of the Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006 of 11 July 2006 laying down general provisions 
on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund and 
repealing  Regulation  (EC)  No  1260/1999:  ‘an  operation  comprising  a  series  of  works,  activities  or 
services intended in itself to accomplish an indivisible task of a precise economic or technical nature, 
which has clearly identified goals’. 

10 

 
                                                           
  an analysis of the forecast impact on the sector concerned; 
  an analysis of the forecast impact on the socio-economic situation in the Member 
State  and/or  the  region  concerned  and,  where  possible  and  appropriate,  in  other 
relevant regions. 

In  2005,  facing  the  challenge  of  preparing  and  approving  large  infrastructure  projects 
from  the  Member  States  that  joined  the  EU  in  2004  (the  ‘EU-10’),  the  European 
Commission joined forces with the European Investment Bank (EIB) in a new initiative 
known as ‘Joint Assistance to  Support  Projects  in  European Regions’ (JASPERS). The 
aim was to provide Member States with independent advice to help them prepare quality 
proposals for large investment projects for funding through the EU’s Cohesion Fund and 
ERDF.  

The initiative was financed through the Commission’s technical assistance budget. Since 
200621  JASPERS  has  assisted  more  than  500  projects  (mainly  major  projects).  Support 
from  JASPERS is  initiated at  the request  of a Member State, on the basis of an annual 
action plan. The action plan identifies a number of project tasks that JASPERS will carry 
out for the Member State in the year in question. 

Environmental infrastructures  

Environmental infrastructures have traditionally  been a cohesion  policy  priority,  geared 
to preserving and improving the environment22 in line with Treaty23 obligations.  

The  2000-2006  General  Provisions  Regulation  provided  that  ‘the  Community  shall 
contribute  to  […]  the  protection  and  improvement  of  the  environment’.  Similarly,  the 
2007-2013  Regulation  stated  that  ‘the  objectives  of  the  Funds  shall  be  pursued  in  the 
framework  of  sustainable  development  and  the  Community  promotion  of  the  goal  of 
protecting and improving the environment’24.  

Environmental  projects  are  instrumental  in  ensuring  economic,  social  and  territorial 
cohesion,  in  line  with  the  EU’s  overall  development  strategies25.  The  environment  is  a 
key  dimension  of  the  integrated  approach  promoted  by  cohesion  policy  (European 
Commission  2005a),  which  requires  that  the  most  pressing  socioeconomic  issues  be 
tackled  through  integrated  strategies  for  the  renewal,  regeneration  and  development  of 
urban and rural areas. Moreover, infrastructure investments in the environment and risk 
prevention  support  cohesion  policy  efforts  to  trigger  economic  development  by 
strengthening the competitiveness and attractiveness of EU regions.  

Environmental investments are expected to contribute to the economy by:  

  ensuring the long-term sustainability of economic growth;  

  reducing  external  environmental  costs  to  the  economy  (e.g. health,  clean-up  and 

damage recovery); and  

21 

JASPERS  was  originally  intended  to  operate  for  the  2007-2013  period  only,  but  following  two 
evaluations, in 2010 and 2012, the Commission and EIB decided to continue with the initiative. 

22  See, for example, Article 1 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999. 
23  Article 11 TFEU: ‘Environmental protection requirements  must be integrated into the definition and 
implementation  of  the  Union's  policies  and  activities,  in  particular  with  a  view  to  promoting 
sustainable development’. 

24  Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006. 
25  Both  the  Lisbon  Strategy  (for  2000-2010)  and  the  Europe  2020  Strategy  (for  2010-2020)  feature 

environmental objectives among their top priorities.   

11 

 
                                                           
  stimulating innovation and job creation26. 

Environmental policy objectives can be pursued: 

 

as  a  horizontal  principle  across  the  range  of  sectors  covered  by  cohesion  policy 
throughout the programming cycle (horizontal integration); or  

  by funding specific investments aimed at protecting or improving the environment 

and meeting the objectives generally (vertical integration).  

Cohesion policy investments in the environmental sector can be direct or indirect27: 

 

 

the  direct  investments  are  those  in  environmental  infrastructures  that  contribute 
directly to compliance with EU legislation in areas such as drinking water supply, 
wastewater  treatment,  solid  waste  management  and  ‘green  infrastructure’ 
(contributing to the achievement of EU targets in fields such as biodiversity and 
the protection of ecosystems); and 

indirect  investments  in  ‘green’  energy,  transport  and  production  systems 
contribute more broadly to the transition to a low-carbon, resource-efficient, safe 
and sustainable economy.  

This report concerns only direct investments. 

3. 

IMPLEMENTATION / STATE OF PLAY 

Description of the current situation  

Allocations  for  direct  environmental  investments  remained  fairly  stable  in  each 
programming  period,  at  around  €40 billion28,  while  those  for  indirect  environmental 
investments rose sharply. This reflects a ‘greening’ of cohesion policy investments in key 
sectors,  including  energy  and  transport.  The  largest  share  of  financing  in  both  periods 
went to drinking and wastewater, followed by waste management.  

Allocations  to  large-scale  environmental  infrastructure  projects  rank  second  after  those 
for  transport29.  In  2000-200630,  cohesion  policy  supported  116  major  environmental 
projects, for a total EU contribution of € 7.6 billion. The main beneficiary countries were 
Spain  (ERDF,  Cohesion  Fund),  France  (ERDF),  Poland  (Cohesion  Fund),  Portugal 
(Cohesion  Fund),  Greece  (Cohesion  Fund)  and  Italy  (ERDF).  Cohesion  Fund  mainly 

26  European  Commission  (2005),  Communication  on  Cohesion  policy  in  support  of  growth  and  jobs: 

27 

Community strategic guidelines, 2007-2013 (COM(2005) 0299). 
Integration  of  environmental  concerns  in  cohesion  policy  funds  (ERDF,  ESF,  CF):  results  evolution 
and  trends  through  three  programming  periods  (2000-2006,  2007-2013,  2014-2020),  COWI  A/S, 
Milieu sprl (March 2019). 
Ibid. 

28 
29  REGIO Data, 2018. 
30  For  this  period,  a  ‘major  project’  was  a  project  ‘comprising  a  series  of  works,  activities  or  services 
intended in itself to accomplish an indivisible task of a precise economic or technical nature, which has 
clearly  identified  goals  and  whose  total  cost  exceeds  €50 million’  (Article 25(b)  of  the  Council 
Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999). 

12 

 
 
                                                           
supported  wastewater  treatment  projects  (46%)  and  the  ERDF  mainly  drinking  water 
supply projects (84%)31. 

In  2007-201332,  the  ERDF  and  the  Cohesion  Fund  supported  167  environmental  major 
projects  for  a  total  of  €9.4 billion33.  Most  of  the  support  went  to  Romania,  Poland, 
Hungary, Spain and Portugal. In terms of sub-sectors funded, most of the funds went to 
wastewater  management  projects,  followed  by  drinking  water  management  and 
distribution  projects,  and  projects  supporting  the  management  of  household  and 
industrial waste. Support  for air-quality, pollution-control  and biodiversity  projects  was 
much less significant34. 

Short description of the methodology 

This staff working document is largely based on a study by an independent consultant35. 
The  analysis  is  complemented  by  internal  Commission  data  on  fund  management, 
analytical reports36 and past evaluations37. The evaluation follows the principles set out in 
the  Commission’s  Better  Regulation  Guidelines38  and  addresses  the  five  standard 
evaluation criteria: relevance, coherence, effectiveness, efficiency and EU added value. 

The  methodology  follows  that  used  for  the  evaluation  of  large  transport  infrastructure 
projects, adjusted to the specific features of environmental projects. It is therefore based 
on  an  extensive  review  of  the  relevant  theoretical  and  empirical  literature39  and  ex post 
cost-benefit  analysis  (CBA)  of  the  individual  projects,  complemented  by  qualitative 
assessment  techniques  (site  visits,  interviews  with  stakeholders,  press  articles,  reviews, 
etc.) in such a way as to produce a ‘narrative’ for each project.  

As a first step, the impacts of large environmental infrastructure projects were mapped, 
measured and quantified. A comprehensive set of parameters and unit values for the most 
to  all  cases. 
common  direct  effects  was  developed  and  applied  consistently 
Counterfactual scenarios were used as baseline for comparison to assess the performance 
of  the  projects.  From  an  ex  post  perspective,  the  counterfactual  were  produced  on  the 
basis of ‘what would have happened in the absence of the project?’. 

The  CBA  methodology  followed  the  Commission  Guide  to  Cost-Benefit  Analysis  of 
Investment projects40, adapted to the ex post perspective. It included financial, economic 
and  risk  analysis.  Where  quantification  and  monetisation  were  not  possible,  qualitative 
assessments of the effects were carried out.  

31  REGIO Data, 2018. 
32  For this period, Commission Regulation (EU) No 832/2010 (amending Regulation (EC) No 1828/2006 
setting  out  rules  for  the  implementation  of  Council  Regulations  (EC)  No 1083/2006  and  (EC) 
No 1080/2006) took over the definition of ‘major project’ from 2000-2006. 

Ibid. 

33  DG REGIO data, 2018. 
34 
35  CSIL,  Ramboll  (2019),  Ex  post  evaluation  of  major  projects  supported  by  the  European  Regional 
Development Fund (ERDF) and the Cohesion Fund between 2000 and 2013 – Final report (study was 
conducted between June 2018 and June 2019). 

36  See Annex 1, point 5. 
37  https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/policy/evaluations/ec/2000-2006/ and SWD(2016) 318. 
38  SWD(2017) 350. 
39  See Annex 1, point 5. 
40  European Union (2015), Guide to Cost-Benefit  Analysis of Investment Projects. Economic appraisal 

tool for Cohesion Policy 2014-2020. 

13 

 
                                                           
As the next step, the analysis looked into the factors that determined the observed chain 
of  effects.  Field  visits  were  carried  out  for  each  case  study  and  an  extensive  interview 
plan  allowed  for  the  collection  of  primary  data  and  the  views  of  a  broad  range  of 
stakeholders.  A  total  of  217  people  were  interviewed,  mainly  face  to  face.  They 
represented  various  interest  groups:  civil  servants  (Commission,  national  ministries, 
managing authorities), experts (engineers and planners), project managers, policymakers 
(mayors,  regional  and  municipal  councillors),  users’  and  citizens’  associations,  and 
journalists. 

Review and selection of the case studies41 

The 10 case studies were selected from a preliminary screened list of 30 major projects 
supported  by  the  ERDF  and  the  Cohesion  Fund  in  the  two  programming  periods  (for 
details of the selection process, see Annex 3). 

As  the  objective  was  to  analyse  the  long-term  effects  of  large  environmental 
infrastructure  projects,  the  projects  needed  to  have  been  in  operation  for  at  least  five 
years at the time of the evaluation.   

The case studies were selected on the basis of three broad criteria (weighted for relative 
importance): 

  strategic relevance for evaluation purposes (40%);  

  availability and quality of data from existing sources (30%);  

  stakeholders’ availability and willingness to cooperate (30%). 

The second and third criteria were key. In shared management, managing authorities are 
responsible for collecting and monitoring data at project  level  (except  for the Cohesion 
Fund  projects  in  2000-2006,  the  Commission  collected  data  only  at  programme  level). 
Project-level data availability and quality may therefore be challenging; it was essential 
that  the  evaluators  could  rely  on  quality  data  and  stakeholders’  willingness  to  provide 
them. Cohesion policy data monitoring and collection have improved in recent years. In 
particular, the introduction of the Open Data Platform has radically boosted transparency.  

The  choice  of  projects  was  also  intended  to  be  representative  in  terms  of  geographical 
and sectoral coverage (taking account of the relative scale of expenditure on the various 
sub-sectors), financing periods, types of project and types of financing. 

It includes five projects financed in 2000-2006 and five in 2007-2013, as follows: 

 

seven water sector projects, of which: 

o 

o 

o 

two on wastewater collection and/or treatment (Poland and Malta); 

two on water (Italy and Spain);  

three relating to water and sanitation (Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania); 

 

 

two waste management projects (Estonia and Slovenia);  

one protection and remediation project (France). 

41  For full details, see First Interim Report, vol. II (see Annex 5). 

14 

 
 
                                                           
Figure 2. Case studies42 

Source: CSIL, Ramboll (2019). 

Limitations and specificity of the methodology applied 

Effects  produced by large scale  environmental infrastructures take more  or less time to 
materialise and achieve full potential. Also, projects differ in terms of the spatial scale of 
their  effects.  The  evaluation  captures  changes  that  the  projects  brought  over  time, 
comparing the situations before and after their implementation.  

Some of the environmental effects were assessed only qualitatively, due to a lack of data 
and/or  valuation  difficulties  (e.g. as  regards  biodiversity  preservation).  Similarly,  wider 
effects (e.g. impacts on socioeconomic structures, health and social effects) were difficult 
to  isolate  and  attribute  to  an  individual  project.  These  effects  were  also  analysed  in  a 
qualitative  way  and  assessed  conservatively.  Finally,  as  stressed  in  the  staff  working 
document on transport, it is difficult to separate the impact of an individual project from 
a whole set of factors influencing growth, jobs and other long-term outcomes. Individual 
(even large-scale) projects rarely produce impacts of a magnitude that could be reflected 
in macroeconomic indicators.  

Since  the  projects  are  in  operation,  it  was  necessary  to  cover  ex ante  and  ex post 
perspectives (i.e. past and future values). Ex ante values serve as a starting point for the 
analysis and the deviations from initial assumptions; ex post values are examined to find 

42  Projects  are  classified  according  to  their  dominant  theme.  ‘Water  projects’  refer  to  drinking  water 

infrastructures. 

15 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
the  reasons  for  any  differences.  The  objective  of  comparing  ex ante  and  ex post 
assumptions is therefore not to produce an updated CBA, but  rather to complement the 
analysis of the projects’ performance. 

The sample was not meant to be statistically representative. The decision to focus on 10 
major projects was the result of an internal analysis. It took into account the financial and 
timing constraints associated with assessing a wider sample and the need for quality data. 
It may have led to an under-estimate of effectiveness. However, the ten projects selected 
are  considered  as  examples  illustrating  a  wide  range  of  experience,  suitable  for 
developing project narratives and capable of producing policy lessons. 

The objective was to capture long-term contributions to economic development, quality 
of  life  and  environmental  sustainability.  Therefore,  only  projects  that  had  been  in 
operation for at least five years at the time of the evaluation and therefore ‘finalised’ and 
mature  enough  to  produce  stable  outcomes  were  chosen.  This  factor  per  se  may  have 
created a positive bias.  

4.  ANALYSIS  

4.1  Effectiveness 

A  project’s  effectiveness  is  the  extent  to  which  it  achieves  its  stated  objectives  and 
delivers  the  expected  effects.  The  expected  long-term  effects  of  major  environmental 
projects identified and analysed in the report relate to:  

  economic growth; 

  quality of life and wellbeing; 

  environmental sustainability; and  

  distributional aspects.  

Because effects differ according to the environmental focus area, they were analysed in 
three groups (see Table 2):  

a)  water supply and wastewater; 

b)  solid waste management; and  

c)  environment remediation and protection / risk prevention. 

Table 2. Most typical effects observed in evaluated projects 

Effects 

a)  water 

supply 

/ 

Economic 
growth 

wastewater 

Variations in:  

  quantity  of  water  supplied 
and wastewater treated; 

  reliability  of  water  sources 

and water supply; 

  water quality; 

b)  solid 

waste 

management 

c)  protection 
prevention 

/ 

risk 

Variations in: 

Variations in: 

  waste to landfill; 

  value of assets; 

  recovery of materials; 

 

  energy recovery; 

interruption 
economic activity; 

of 

  reliability  of  waste 

 

tourism; 

collection; 

  fishing  and  hunting 

  resource 

savings 

(water 

preserved for other uses); 

  deployment  cost  for 

utility services 

  operating costs 

yields; 

  yields from timber and 
other raw materials 

Indirect:  

  variation 

in 

16 

 
agricultural 
(indirect 
services); 

yields 
ecosystem 

  economies 

of 

agglomeration; 

 

institutional learning 

Variations in: 

  health; 

  recreational 

opportunities 

Preservation  of  species  or 
ecosystems 
Variations in: 

Quality  of  life 
and wellbeing 

Environmental 
sustainability 

Variations in: 

Variations in: 

  number 

of 

consumers 
served by water supply and 
treatment services;  

  quality of water supply 

Variations in: 

  number of consumers 
by  waste 

served 
management 
services; 

  exposure  to  negative 
environmental  effects 
of waste disposal;  

  household income; 

  human  health  and 

hygiene 

Variations in: 

  contamination of air,  water 

  GHG emissions; 

and soil; 

  protection and resilience of 
natural resource systems; 

  GHG emissions 

by 

Distributional  Change  in  socio-geographical 
boosting 
distribution 
growth  and  productivity 
in 
areas  where  they  might  have 
been constrained in the past.  
Certain  types  of  user  may  be 
highly  affected  by  changes  in 
drinking water and wastewater 
pricing.  

  contamination  of  air, 

water and soil 

  carbon sequestration; 

  hazard risks 

Not identified 

Projects  improved  living 
of 
conditions 
low-income groups. 

The most typical effects of the projects relate to: 

  economic  growth  –  these  are  effects  resulting  in  more  productive  economic 
activities. They are not the main drivers behind environmental investments (where 
the main aims are to protect the environment and restore ecosystems), but they do 
materialise,  in  terms  of  costs  avoided  (risk  prevention  investments43)  and  costs 
saved  (waste  and  wastewater  treatment  facilities44).  Also,  high-quality  water  and 
wastewater  infrastructures  can  stimulate  other  activities,  such  as  tourism,  in 
previously  unserved  areas.  ‘Natural  capital’  is  also  an  input  into  economic 
activity, so it has an impact on economic returns; 

  quality  of  life  and  wellbeing  –  water  quality  is  fundamental  for  people’s 
wellbeing.  Investments  in  water  and  waste  management  facilities  reduce  health 
risks in the long term, improve hygiene and make regions more attractive;  

43  The  costs  of  inaction  in  environmental  protection  can  exceed  the  cost  of  action.  For  example,  once 
biodiversity  loss  exceeds  a  certain  threshold,  ecosystem  services  can  no  longer  be  provided  and 
become costly to recover. 

44  For  waste  management  investments,  savings  could  come  either  from  increased  recycling  or  from 
re-use of materials. Investments in modern waste and wastewater facilities reduce the risks of soil and 
water contamination, so they may reduce health costs. 

17 

 
                                                           
  environmental  sustainability  – 

relevant  expected  effects  of 
the  most 
environmental infrastructure investments  are those that improve the condition  of 
natural  resources  (water,  air,  soil  and  biodiversity)  and  help  to  preserve  them  in 
the  long  term.  This  includes  making  ecosystems  more  resistant  to  potentially 
harmful phenomena (e.g. floods, droughts) and human activities; and  

  distributional  impacts  –  new  infrastructures  may  change  socio-geographical 
distribution by boosting economic growth and productivity in (typically rural and 
more  sparsely  populated)  areas  where  they  might  previously  have  been 
constrained.  Projects  leading  to  changes  in  water,  wastewater  or  waste 
management  tariffs  may  affect  the  economic  situation  of  specific  groups 
(e.g. low-income households) or high water consuming industries.  

Main findings 

  Project objectives were generally well defined. 

  Projects were effective, but only few fully achieved their objectives. 

  Benefits  are  maximised  by  accompanying  or  synergic  investments.  However, 
projects addressing multiple phases of the water cycle are more exposed to risk. 

  Environmental projects generate long-term effects through a variety of mechanisms. 

  Forecasting future demand is  one of the most problematic determinants  of projects 

performance. 

4.1.1 Project objectives were generally well defined 
Setting well-defined, measurable and realistic objectives makes it possible to monitor and 
quantify benefits, and to evaluate a project’s performance. The case studies also highlight 
the  importance  of  such  objectives  in  enabling  us  to  identify  and  secure  all  potential 
benefits.  Mechanisms  for  monitoring  long-term  achievements  are  fundamental  to 
assessing whether projects have actually been effective. 

All but one of the selected projects had clearly structured objectives (primarily driven by 
local needs and compliance with EU legislation), which in turn brought improved living 
conditions  and  clear  environmental  benefits  (access  to  clean  water,  limited  pollution, 
etc.).  The  objectives  were  generally  in  line  with  what  could  be  expected  from  such 
investments, given the relevant EU directives and strategies.  

The  exception  was  the  Slovenian  project  (phase II  of  the  Celje  regional  waste 
management centre), where the objectives were not well defined and lacked quantitative 
targets, thus preventing proper quantitative assessment. Also, some objectives overlapped 
and  were  more  relevant  for  the  waste  management  centre  as  a  whole.  Better 
objective-setting would have made decision-making more transparent and accountable. 

The  Bulgarian  project  achieved  its  goal  of  contributing  to  compliance  with  EU 
directives. However, it could have been more effective if the initial set of objectives had 
not  been  reduced  during  implementation,  thus  preventing  it  from  also  contributing  to 
flood prevention in Sofia. The narrower scope represented a missed opportunity, as not 
all potential benefits were secured. The project was therefore only partially effective.  

18 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In  the  Maltese  case,  updated  values  were  unavailable  for  some  of  the  monitored 
parameters  and  no  evidence  could  be  found  on  the  degree  to  which  some  expected 
benefits were achieved. 

4.1.2 Projects were effective, but only few fully achieved their objectives  
According to the ex post CBAs, nine of the projects delivered net benefits, but only two 
fully achieved their intended objectives. Table 3 summarises the main findings:  
Table 3. Effectiveness score45 per project (1 to 5) 

Score  Motivation 

Sector 

Case study 

Waste-
water 

Bulgaria  –  Sofia 
integrated  water 
project 

Objectives  (as  in  project 
application) 
Compliance  with  Drinking 
Water Directive (DWD) and 
Wastewater 
Urban 
Treatment 
Directive 
(UWWTD). 
Stimulate  local and regional 
economic 
and 
development. 

activities 

Waste-
water 

Malta  South  – 
sewage treatment  

Compliance  with  UWWTD, 
Bathing  Water  Directive 
Water 
(BWD) 
and 
Directive 
Framework 
(WFD). 
objectives: 
Secondary 
enhance 
tourism  potential 
thanks  to  cleaner  seawater 
and  thus  trigger  economic 
development. 

3 

3 

Directives, 

The  project  largely  achieved  its 
goals  (contributing  to  compliance 
with 
improving 
reliability  of  water  distribution, 
reducing losses, reducing pollution 
in  rivers).  A  sewage  collection 
system was developed, the number 
of households whose wastewater is 
treated increased, tertiary treatment 
was  provided  and  water  supply 
security improved.  
However,  the  project  could  have 
been  more  effective.  If  its  scope 
reduced  during 
had  not  been 
implementation, 
it  could  have 
improved  flood  prevention  in  the 
centre  of  Sofia  and  the  supply  of 
treated  water 
two  smaller 
to 
settlements.  
The  project  achieved  its  primary 
objective 
(treating  wastewater 
collected by  sewerage  networks in 
before 
the 
discharge),  restored  bathing  water 
quality 
ensured  Malta’s 
compliance with the BWD.  
However,  it  is  not  yet  in  full 
compliance with the UWWTD and 
farm  waste 
illegally  discharged 
into sewers negatively affected the 
plant’s  operational  phase.  Fishing 
activity has not increased and there 
is  no  evidence  of  better  drinking 
water. There are concerns over the 
impact of population growth in the 
long run. 
The project achieved its objectives 
of providing a sewerage service for 

of  Malta 

south 

and 

Waste-
water 

Poland 
Sochaczew 

– 

Improve 
wastewater 
management  in  the  area  by 

4 

45  The scores range from 1 to 5, as follows: 

1 = the project did not achieve the expected objectives due to endogenous factors; 
2 = the project did not achieve the expected objectives due to exogenous factors; 
3 = the project partially achieved the expected objectives; 
4 = the project achieved the expected objectives with some delay with respect to schedule. It turned 

out to be the best option among all feasible alternatives; 
5 = the project achieved the expected objectives on schedule. 

19 

 
 
                                                           
sewage 
management 

increasing connection rate to 
and 
sewerage 
and 
enhancing 
effectiveness  of  wastewater 
treatment. 

network 
quality 

Waste-
water 

Romania 
Craiova 
sewerage 
network  

– 

Treat  wastewater 
with 
Romanian 
transposing UWWTD. 

in 

line 
law 

Water 

Croatia  –  water 
supply 
and 
sewerage system  

Reduce  water  pollution, 
improve 
living  conditions 
and  ensure  compliance  with 
EU legislation. 

Water 

Italy  –  Favara  di 
Burgio aqueduct 

Water 

Spain  –  Anguilas 
desalination plant 

effective  water 
Restore 
captation,  collection  and 
adduction 
aqueduct, 
at 
reduce  leaks  from  around 
20%  to  5%  of  total  input 
and  ensure  continuity 
in 
provision  of  water  to  head 
tanks for inhabited areas. 
Address over-exploitation of 
water 
the 
resources 
region  and  ensure  reliable 
water  service  to  inhabitants 
and farmers. 

in 

Water 

Estonia 
purchase  of 
multifunctional 

– 
a 

Prevent and respond rapidly 
to  pollution 
to 
avoid  contamination  and 

incidents 

4 

3 

4 

4 

5 

it 

of 

treatment 

new  households  and  ensuring  the 
the  municipal 
capacity 
plant 
wastewater 
(WWTP),  but  the  generation  of 
benefits  was  delayed  due  to  slow 
connection  of  households  to  the 
network. 
The project achieved its objectives 
(reduction  of 
river  pollution, 
transboundary  pollution  and  water 
losses in distribution network).  
However,  it  had  a  minor  negative 
impact  related  to  odour  emissions 
around  the  WWTP.  Operation  of 
the  WWTP  resulted  in  increased 
is 
energy  consumption  and 
currently not used at full capacity.  
The project improved the sewerage 
system  and  enabled  wastewater 
treatment.  It  increased  the  number 
of  inhabitants  connected  to  the 
drainage  system,  raising 
living 
standards  and  protecting  the  Sava 
River.  
However,  it  led  to  an  increase  in 
GHG  emissions.  At  present,  the 
WWTP  operates  at  half  capacity 
due to depopulation resulting from 
the  economic  crisis.  Mitigating 
measures  are  being  taken,  as  full 
capacity  is  expected  thanks  to 
implementation  of  a  new  project 
(Slavonski Brod II) to connect two 
neighbouring  agglomerations  with 
compliance  obligations.  Technical 
issues  also  limited  the  project’s 
impacts. 
its  goal 
The  project  achieved 
(water provision to municipal head 
tanks)  with  minor  delays.  It  has 
further  potential  to  sustain  local 
development,  but  accompanying 
investments were limited. 

its  goal 
The  project  achieved 
for 
(reliable  water  provision 
households 
and 
farms) 
and 
end-users  are  benefiting  from  its 
implementation.  New  projects  are 
planned  to  take  advantage  of  it. 
The  generation  of  benefits  was 
delayed 
during 
implementation. 
The project achieved the objectives 
based 
HELCOM 
recommendations46. It achieved its 

issues 

by 

on 

46  The Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission (or Helsinki Commission  – HELCOM) is an 
intergovernmental  organisation  governing  the  Convention  on  the  Protection  of  the  Marine 
Environment of the Baltic Sea Area. It brings together eight EU Member States, the EU itself and the 
Russian Federation, and works to protect the marine environment in the Baltic Sea. 

20 

 
                                                           
main  target  of  improving  offshore 
sea-pollution  control  capacity  and 
reduced  the  risk  of  damage  from 
maritime pollution.  

it 

is  difficult 

The objectives were poorly defined 
and  lacked  quantitative  indicators, 
so 
to  assess 
effectiveness.  On  the  whole,  the 
objectives  were  achieved  (though 
later than scheduled).  
However,  the  expected  benefits 
were  achieved  only  partially, 
mainly 
demand 
under-estimation.  Selection  of  a 
different  technology  could  have 
improved effectiveness and further 
reduced GHG emissions, e.g. as in 
the  case  of  the  Ljubljana  waste 
management  centre,  which  used 
cogeneration of electricity.  
The project’s main objectives were 
achieved. 

because 

of 

ship 

Waste 

Slovenia  –  Celje 
waste 
management 
centre  

disturbance  of  habitats  and 
maintain 
favourable 
their 
status, ensure functioning of 
critical areas and reduce risk 
to human health and life. 
Ensure  mechanic  biological 
(MBT) 
treatment 
(61 500 t/yr)  and 
thermal 
treatment  (TT)  (25 000 t/yr) 
of municipal waste. 

Others 

– 

France 
Sète-Marseillan 
lido protection 

environment, 

Restore  normal  functioning 
of  coastline  and  ensure 
better  protection 
against 
erosion. 
Protect 
in 
particular  natural  area  of 
ecological, 
and 
floristic  interest  and  Natura 
2000 perimeter. 
Maintain  mobility  function 
of coast road. 
Maintain 
activities on lido. 

local  economic 

fauna 

2 

5 

Source: CSIL, Ramboll (2019). 

The Estonian and French projects, in the area of risk prevention and remediation, fully 
achieved  their  objectives  and  therefore  scored  highest.  In  the  water  and  wastewater 
sector,  the  Polish,  Romanian,  Italian  and  Spanish  projects  were  effective.  They 
achieved  their  stated  objectives  and  delivered  the  expected  effects,  despite  minor 
reservations in each case. Three projects (in Poland, Italy and Spain) produced benefits 
later  than  planned,  due  to  implementation  issues  that  postponed  the  start  of  their 
operation phase. This  was particularly  relevant  in the  Spanish  and Polish  cases.  In the 
Romanian  case,  the  WWTP  is  still  not  working  at  full  capacity  as  a  result  of 
over-optimistic estimates at the project design stage. Even after being revised, estimates 
of  capacity  remained  too  high  due  to  a  drastic  decrease  in  water  demand,  because  of 
reduced water losses in the networks and a diminishing population connected to the water 
and  wastewater  services.  There  are  minor  negative  effects  due  to  odours  and  increased 
GHG emissions. The Favara di Burgio aqueduct project (Italy) achieved its primary goal 
(providing water to the municipal head tanks), but did not deliver all its potential benefits 
because the requisite accompanying investments were not implemented.  

The lower effectiveness scores for the four other projects (in Bulgaria, Malta, Croatia 
and Slovenia) are due to various factors, with no identifiable unifying pattern. In the case 
of  the  Bulgarian  project,  the  expected  effects  were  delivered  later  than  expected  as  a 
result of implementation issues. Also, the scope of the project was further reduced during 
implementation, thus preventing it from delivering all potential benefits.  

21 

 
In  Malta,  full  compliance  with  the  UWWTD  has  yet  not  been  achieved,  due  to  illegal 
dumping of farm waste into the sewers, and there is no evidence that some of the benefits 
expected ex ante (e.g. better-quality drinking water) have been secured.  

The Croatian  project achieved its  primary  goal  of improving the sewerage system  and 
enabled wastewater treatment, but it also led to an increase in GHG emissions. Also, the 
WWTP is operating only at half capacity.  

The low score for the Slovenian project stems from its poorly defined objectives and a 
lack of quantitative indicators. As a result, it is difficult to assess effectiveness. While the 
general/strategic  objectives  in  the  project  application  can  be  considered  as  having  been 
achieved,  there  are  significant  differences  between  the  benefits  that  were  expected  and 
those that were achieved, due to  a failure to  take account  of changes in  recycling rates 
(thanks to the implementation of EU legislation), which led to a decrease in the volume 
of mixed municipal waste. 

In the cases of the Maltese and Croatian projects, the capacity to forecast demographic 
trends  proved  to  be  an  important  factor  influencing  effectiveness.  In  both  cases,  this 
affected project performance.  

4.1.3 Benefits are maximised by accompanying/synergic investments and adequate 
response to individuals’ needs  
EU waste and water legislation reflects  the importance of co-investment  in  maximising 
the benefits  of waste  and water management systems. For example, the WFD aimed to 
bring about a shift from fragmented policies and investment in the water sector towards 
integrated management of water resources.  

The  project  sample  shows  that  in  the  case  of  investments  following  an  integrated 
approach  (water  and  waste),  benefits  can  be  maximised  through  accompanying  or 
synergic  investments  and/or  measures.  In  fact,  impacts  can  be  limited  by  a  lack  of 
accompanying measures.  

It  also  shows the complexity and difficulty of such an approach,  as  projects  addressing 
multiple  phases  of  the  water  cycle  are  inevitably  more  exposed  to  risk.  A  trade-off 
emerges  in  this  regard:  while  projects  with  the  most  integrated  approach47  allow  for 
highly consistent planning and comprehensive design, more risk factors can affect overall 
project performance, as forecasting is multi-faceted and considerably more demanding.  

The Spanish desalination plant project is an example of this. Addressing only one phase 
of the water cycle, it met all set objectives (reducing water deficit, reducing pressure on 
aquifers), but could have had a greater impact if accompanying investments (e.g. in water 
storage facilities) had been made to enable the plant to operate at a more efficient scale.  

Similarly,  the  Polish  project  did  not  involve  any  incentive  mechanisms  to  facilitate 
physical  connection  between  individuals  and  the  new  wastewater  network.  This  took 
longer  than  expected  and  affected  the  project’s  effectiveness.  Likewise,  in  the  Italian 
project,  a  lack  of  investment  in  local  water  distribution  networks  prevented  the 
reconstructed  aqueduct  from  achieving  all  potential  benefits.  On  the  other  hand,  in  the 
Maltese case, the design of the WWTP allowed for future upgrades, i.e. the construction 

47  The  Bulgarian  and  Croatian  projects  cover  water  supply,  wastewater  collection  and  wastewater 

treatment. 

22 

 
                                                           
of  a  polishing  plant  providing  treated  sewage  effluent  for  irrigation,  which  was 
instrumental  in  putting  an  end  to  the  illegal  dumping  of  farm  waste  into  sewers,  thus 
succeeding where law enforcement had failed.  

Individuals may react in various ways to policy incentives and their response may affect 
projects’ effectiveness.  The effectiveness  of an  environmental project  depends not  only 
on  infrastructure  investments  and  legal  provisions,  but  also  on  how  choices  are  shaped 
and  what  practical  alternatives  to  negative  paths  are  offered.  In  this  respect,  other 
non-infrastructure accompanying measures can play a positive role.  

The  Slovenian  waste  management  project  included  a  campaign  to  promote  waste 
separation. This  delivered good results. Although a causal link is  difficult  to  prove, the 
subsequent  slowing-down  of  the  campaign  and  related  educational  activities  coincided 
with a reduction in the quantity and quality of separate waste collection48.  

that 

large  environmental 

4.1.4  Environmental  projects  generate  long-term  effects  through  a  variety  of 
mechanisms 
The  analysis  shows 
infrastructure  projects  generate 
non-environmental  benefits  by  improving  quality  of  life  and  contributing  to  economic 
development.  This  is  in  line  with  the  rationale  of  environmental  and  cohesion  policy 
legislation,  where  interventions  are  based  on  both  socioeconomic  and  environmental 
considerations. The Water Framework Directive49 and the Waste Framework Directive50 
promote  a  market-based  approach:  an  efficient  use  of  water  resources  and  the  use  of 
market-based  instruments  to  provide  incentives  for  the  application  of  the  waste 
hierarchy51, respectively. Member States have to apply the ‘cost recovery’ and ‘polluter 
pays’  principles52  in  achieving  the  Directives’  environmental  objectives.  These  factors 
have clear economic implications for operators and consumers.  

Large-scale environmental investment projects improve the territorial distribution of key 
infrastructures  (e.g. wastewater  treatment  plant  (WWTPs))  and  citizens’  and  firms’ 
access to services  (e.g. water supply) and ecosystems (e.g. a restored lido). In this way, 
they  make  territories  more  attractive  for  both  the  population  and  economic  operators, 
thus providing a necessary (but not sufficient) precondition for territorial development in 
line with cohesion policy objectives.  

Environmental interventions are multidimensional and give rise to multiple changes. For 
instance, the Maltese project was aimed at treating wastewater before discharge into the 
sea, thus contributing to seawater quality. In turn, this contributed to the preservation of 
seawater ecosystems (environmental impact), odour reduction and the recreational value 
of beaches (impacts on human wellbeing). 

The  additional  benefits  generated  by  the  projects  differ  according  to  the  field  of 
the  CBA)  and 
intervention.  The  main  ones  –  both  measurable  (included 
non-measurable (not included in the CBA) – were: 

in 

48  RegioStars 2012 Awards: 

https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/projects/regiostars/doc/regiostars/2011/regiostars2011.pdf 
49  Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing 

a framework for Community action in the field of water policy. 

50  Directive 2008/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on waste. 
51  Article 4 of the Waste Framework Directive. 
52  Article 9 WFD. 

23 

 
                                                           
 

 

 

 

the  water  supply  projects  generated  mainly  benefits  of  economic  growth  (Italy 
and Spain); 

the projects combining wastewater collection and treatment (in Bulgaria, Poland, 
Romania  and  Croatia)  had  a  big  impact  in  terms  of  quality  of  life  and 
environmental sustainability; 

the Maltese project,  which focused mainly on wastewater treatment  with only  a 
minor component of wastewater collection, generated benefits mainly in terms of 
environmental sustainability; and 

in  the  three  other  cases,  environmental  benefits  were  not  the  most  significant 
effects53.  The  Slovenian  and  Estonian  projects  positively  influenced  economic 
development, while the French project mainly improved the quality of life. 

These considerations remain largely true if measurable effects (economic growth, quality 
of  life,  environmental  sustainability),  covered  in  the  ex  post  CBAs,  are  taken  into 
consideration (see Figure 3).  

Figure 3.  Long-term effects quantified by CBAs (%) 

Source: CSIL, Ramboll (2019).  

All  the  selected  major  projects  show  benefits  across  the  three  categories,  with  the 
exception  of  the  Italian  project,  which  shows  a  negative  impact  in  terms  of 
environmental  sustainability.  This  is  due  to  the  counterfactual  scenario  used  for  the 
analysis and the lack of quantified ex post data. The project consisted of replacing an old 
aqueduct that was characterised by high levels of leakage and required high amounts of 
energy to  operate. However, the analysis did  not  capture the positive effect  in  terms  of 
energy  savings,  as  the  counterfactual  scenario  used  was  ‘no  operation’  rather  than 
‘business as usual’ (which was considered unrealistic)54. For the purpose of the CBA, the 
new aqueduct is therefore considered as a greenfield investment that generated new GHG 
emissions not compensated by other positive environmental effects55. 

53  However, this should be partly attributed to the approach to categorising the effects. 
54  Works on the existing aqueduct were at no point considered a viable option. 
55  The choice was due to the fact that the old infrastructure was not providing a reliable service and to the 
complete  lack  of  data.  The  same  approach  had  been  adopted  in  the  ex ante  CBA  and,  when 
interviewed, several stakeholders confirmed it was the only possible one. 

24 

 
 
                                                           
The  varying  degrees  of  environmental  impact  reflect  two  important  features  of 
environmental infrastructure projects in the cohesion policy framework: 

 

the  development  of  water  supply  infrastructures  involves  integrating  economic 
considerations (efficient use of natural resources) into water management in order 
to  make  efficiency  gains  and  minimise  costs.  Investments  in  water  supply, 
sanitation  and  waste  management  are  aimed  at  improving  the  availability, 
reliability  and  quality  of  water  and  waste  services.  Accordingly,  these  projects 
addressed  not  only  environmental  protection,  but  also  human  wellbeing  and 
economic development56; 

 

 even  where  a  project  achieves  environmental  objectives  (e.g. the  French  case, 
where the objective was to  counteract  coastal erosion), it may  give rise to  much 
greater non-environmental benefits. 

In  some  cases,  there  may  be  a  trade-off  between  environmental  benefits  and 
environmental  costs.  For  example,  the  modernisation  of  the  WWTP  in  Poland  had  a 
positive impact in terms of avoiding the contamination of surface water and soil, but also 
a  negative  impact  in  terms  of  increased  GHG  emissions.  Where  investments  entail 
substantial energy usage, either in construction or operation, the negative environmental 
implications  thus  need  to  be  considered,  since  they  may  reduce  the  net  environmental 
benefits of a project.   

4.1.5 Forecasting future demand is the main and most problematic determinant of 
project performance  
Several factors were found to affect project performance:  

 

 

 

the quality of ex ante analysis, in particular forecasting and management capacity;  

the quality of the selection process; and  

the governance structure. 

‘Forecasting  and  management  capacity’  is  understood  as  the  ability  to  predict  future 
trends  and  react  to  unpredicted  challenges  by  estimating  and  adapting  resource 
requirements.  It relates to technical effort in the ex ante (project preparation) phase and 
the  professional  capacity  to  manage  the  project  in  the  operational  phase  to  deliver  the 
expected level of service. 

The forecasting exercise (including data collection and modelling) is  the foundation for 
sound  project  performance.  The  case  studies  show  that  ex ante  forecasts  are  often 
over-optimistic and under-estimate completion time. This may affect the project’s design, 
overall timeline and financial sustainability, and the actual delivery of long-term effects. 
The  exercise  is  also  the  core  of  the  CBA,  the  quality  of  which  is  thus  affected  by 
deficiencies in the forecasts. 

The  main  areas  where  proper  forecasting  is  essential  and  forecasting  weaknesses  were 
identified were demand, costs and completion time. The analysis echoes the findings of 
the  ex post  evaluation  of  major  transport  projects  in  2000-2006  and  2007-2013,  which 

56  The  main  objective  of  the  Italian  aqueduct  project  was  to  ensure  continuous  water  supply  to 
municipalities  in  the  area.  However,  the  project  was  part  of  a  larger  effort  to  reorganise  the 
management  of  the  main  aqueducts  in  four  provinces  in  Sicily,  in  order  to  optimise  the  use  of 
resources. Its main effects are thus the result of economic considerations. 

25 

 
                                                           
highlighted  forecasting  capacity  as  a  critical  factor  in  the  implementation  of  large 
infrastructure projects57. 

In  several  cases,  a  failure  to  predict  demand  accurately  can  be  attributed  to  official 
statistical data that do not factor in changes in macro-trends and to local administrators’ 
difficulty in anticipating and integrating territorial dynamics in available data.  

Box 1. Forecasting demand 

Demand  for  the  planned  environmental  infrastructures  was  over-estimated  in  six  of  the  reviewed  cases, 
leading to overcapacity. However, whether this leads to operational inefficiencies depends on the chosen 
technology.  

For example, the promoters of the Slovenian project did not adequately forecast the effects of changes in 
waste management legislation on trends in municipal waste. The technology chosen for the waste treatment 
plant was not fit for the actual amount of waste collected. Consequently, the unit cost of processing waste 
is higher than expected. Moreover, the aerobic biological treatment of such lower quantities of waste is not 
efficient,  so  electricity  for  the  plant’s  operation  needs  to  be  sourced  from  the  grid,  causing  higher  GHG 
emissions than when higher quantities were processed.  

In  contrast,  in  the  Romanian  case,  where  demand  for  treated  wastewater  was  also  over-estimated,  the 
choice of technology enables the operator to adapt to different quantities without an impact on efficiency.  

Final demand was under-estimated in the case of the Maltese sewage treatment plant, which was designed 
for a resident population of 500 000. However, due to strong population growth (17% nationwide between 
2007 and 2018), which is expected to continue in the next decade, the plant will have reached maximum 
capacity by 2023 and will have to be scaled up. 

As  regards  completion-time  forecasting,  seven  projects  took  longer  to  implement  than 
initially  forecast.  Under-estimation  of  the  complexity  and  duration  of  administrative 
procedures  and  over-estimation  of  contractors’  capacity  were  the  two  main  factors 
contributing to delays.  

In the Bulgarian case, Sofia Municipality had unanticipated difficulties in expropriating 
properties so that the water pipelines could be built; these contributed to a 3-year delay in 
project implementation. In the Italian project, authorisations from local authorities took 
longer than expected and contributed to a 12-month delay. 

Three of the projects were delivered on budget.  The overruns in the other cases can be 
explained  by  the  volatility  of  material  and  labour  costs  during  and  after  the  financial 
crisis. 

The examples  above highlight  that  careful planning  and forecasting of project  demand, 
time  and  costs  are  essential  in  preventing  project  underperformance.  At  the  same  time, 
where  a  project  deviates  from  a  plan,  its  success  depends  on  the  response  of  those 
involved. An appropriate response to implementation or operational difficulties can turn 
a project  around. Similarly, where  a project  is  going better than  expected, the situation 
can  be  further  improved  by  exploiting  unexpected  opportunities.  For  example,  when  it 
became  clear  that  the  construction  costs  for  the  Estonian  multifunctional  ship  would 
come  in  under  budget,  the  project  promoters  included  additional  project  management 
services (e.g. juridical and reporting services) in the budget. This ensured a high level of 
construction quality.  

57  CSIL, Ramboll (2019), p. 123. 

26 

 
                                                           
The quality of the selection process relates to the institutional and legislative framework 
in which public investment decisions (especially those co-financed by ESIFs) are taken. 
In  particular,  it  concerns  the  processes  in  place  and  the  tools  used  to  choose  between 
projects. 

Overall,  the  selection  process  made  a  positive  or  slightly  positive  contribution  to  the 
performance  of  the  projects.  Selection  went  smoothly  and  there  were  no  major 
complications,  partly  thanks  to  the  fact  that  the  projects  were  included  in  Operational 
Programmes and sector-specific plans, for which planning and selection are governed by 
well-established regulatory and administrative frameworks.  

In the examined cases, the steps usually included a preliminary needs-based assessment, 
followed by  a feasibility and options  analysis.  In general,  once an option is  selected, it 
undergoes  stakeholder  consultation,  usually  in  the  form  of  a  public  hearing  where 
complaints and suggestions are taken into account. The project design is then completed 
and the project is implemented.  

The analysis shows that selection processes can be lengthy. Major environmental projects 
take a lot of time; many years may pass from the first idea to actual implementation. For 
strategic,  financial  and  technical  reasons,  projects  may  remain  in  the  pipeline  for  a 
significant  period,  with  a  clear  negative  impact  on  effectiveness,  as  the  generation  of 
benefits  is  significantly  delayed. Postponements, delays, administrative inertia and long 
tendering procedures are among the main reasons for the longest selection processes.  

In  Italy,  Malta  and  Poland,  the  selection  process  involved  stakeholder  consultations. 
These  helped  to  ensure  that  the  concerns  of  local  communities  were  addressed  and  no 
evidence was found that they contributed to delays in the selection process.  

Evidence  shows  that,  regardless  of  the  length  of  the  selection  process,  the  project 
assessment should be updated and revised to take account of changed circumstances.  

The evaluation showed that, in some cases, a CBA was carried out only in the framework 
of  the  funding  request  (attached  to  the  application  form),  rather  than  as  a  basis  for 
decision-making. 

Box 2. 

Good practice in planning – Malta 

The  Maltese  project  is  an  example  of  good  planning  practice.  The  construction  of  a  new  WWTP  in  the 
south  of  Malta  was  part  of  a  1992  sewerage  masterplan  for  Malta  and  Gozo,  which  set  out  the  need  for 
three  new  WWTPs. The  first  feasibility  study  (2000)  identified  the  components  of  the  future  investment 
and  featured  an  options  analysis,  which  was  updated  in  2006,  2007  and  2010  with  three  project 
alternatives: phasing out, maintaining or upgrading the existing plant. The preferred option was selected in 
2010  on  the  basis  of  cost,  energy  consumption,  CO2  footprint,  the  impact  of  construction  works  and 
technology.  Stakeholders  were  consulted  as  part  of  the  selection  process  and  a  monitoring  committee 
ensured that the concerns of the local community were duly addressed. 

In the context of this document, ‘project governance’ concerns: 

 

 

 

the number and type of stakeholders involved during the project cycle; 

the degree to which they cooperate effectively; and  

the way roles and responsibilities are shared.  

27 

 
Project  governance  has  major  implications  for  the  partners’  financing  arrangements, 
autonomy  and  responsibilities.  The  most  important  determinant  of  success  was 
leadership by a single entity with the responsibility and capacity to lead all stakeholders. 
The  involvement  of  a  large  number  of  stakeholders  in  project  implementation  is  not 
necessarily  a  sign  of  a  weak  governance  structure,  if  the  leadership  and  coordination 
tasks  are  carried  out  effectively.  However,  some  cases  seemed  to  show  a  correlation 
between a higher number of stakeholders and a less positive impact from the governance 
structure. 

In  some  cases,  the  Commission  supported  the  formation  of  an  efficient  governance 
structure.  In  the  EU-15  projects,  it  had  discussions  with  project  promoters  at  the 
application  stage  and  then  followed  the  projects  more  passively.  With  the  EU-13 
projects, it took a more active role in steering project implementation by interacting with 
stakeholders at various levels of governance. 

Box 3. 

Governance structure 

In the Italian case, a multi-faceted and complex set of institutional actors and stakeholders were involved 
in project implementation, due to a multi-level governance structure in which no institutional stakeholder 
played a strong supervisory role over the whole water cycle. In addition, institutional conflicts significantly 
hampered  the  implementation  of  indispensable  complementary  investments,  preventing  the  benefits 
generated by the new aqueduct from being maximised.  

A lack of clarity in the assignment of responsibilities within the governance structure might put at risk the 
future financial sustainability of the French project. Initially, the costs of maintaining the wave attenuators 
were to be split between the urban community of Sète and the towns of Sète and Marseillan. However, the 
related  maintenance  costs  have  proved  to  be  higher  than  expected  and  the  dredging  costs  for  Marseillan 
have risen in the course of project implementation. As a result, the costs will probably need to be shared 
differently in future and it is not clear that the three stakeholders will be able to meet them. 

4.2 Efficiency 

‘Project  efficiency’  gauges  the  relationship  between  resources  used  and  changes 
generated,  i.e. value  for  money58.  It  expresses  how  input  resources  (especially  time  and 
costs) were used in order to produce the desired effects.  

Main findings 

  Most of the projects were efficient, delivering social benefits that exceeded the costs. 

  Most of the projects were not as efficient as expected ex ante: cost overruns and time 

delays affected their performance. 

58  The analysis focuses on the efficiency of the project as implemented and not directly on the efficiency 

of the project preparation and approval process. 

28 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Table 4. Project efficiency – final assessment score (1 to 5)59 

Sector 

Case study 

Score  Motivation 

2 

3 

3 

Due to pitfalls in the planning stage, the project was severely 
delayed,  over-estimated  final  demand  and  its  scope  was  in 
the  end  reduced.  Nevertheless,  the  socioeconomic  benefits 
outweigh the costs. 

The  project  was  completed  on  budget.  Some  differences 
were  reported  between  costs  and  benefits  forecast  ex ante 
and those that can be observed ex post: an expected increase 
in fishing and aquaculture activities and an expected increase 
in  the  quality  of  drinking  water  did  not  materialise. 
Nevertheless, the project delivered a positive socioeconomic 
return on investment. 

The project was completed with a large cost underrun due to 
the  macroeconomic  situation.  Demographic  trends  meant 
that demand was not as high as anticipated. Nevertheless, the 
project delivered high net socioeconomic benefits. 

Bulgaria 
Sofia 
cycle 

– 
water 

Malta  South  – 
WWTP 

Wastewater 

Poland 
Sochaczew 
sewage 
management 

– 

– 

Romania 
Craiova 
sewerage 
wastewater 
treatment 

and 

4 

Despite  an  over-estimation  of  demand,  the  project  was 
completed  on  budget  and  provides  socioeconomic  benefits 
that exceed costs. 

Water 

Others 

Croatia 
– 
Slavonski  Brod 
supply, 
water 
sewerage 
and 
wastewater 
treatment 

Italy  –  Favara 
di 
Burgio 
aqueduct 

– 

Spain 
Anguilas 
desalination 
plant 

– 
Estonia 
multifunctional 
ship 

France  –  Sète 
lido protection 

Slovenia 
Celje 
management 

– 
waste 

4 

4 

3 

4 

4 

1 

Final costs were lower than in the original CBA, as services, 
equipment  and  materials  prices  changed  due  to  the  global 
economic  crisis.  Implementation  was  in  line  with  the 
schedule. Overall, the project generated net benefits. 

The project was implemented on budget. The operating costs 
ended  up  lower  than  predicted,  contributing  to  a  net 
socioeconomic benefit. 

The  project  cost  was  above  the  initial  budget  due  to  an 
increase  in  scope.  However,  the  socioeconomic  benefits 
outweigh the costs, as forecast. 

team 

Good project planning, design and implementation, due to a 
between 
strong 
competent 
stakeholders,  ensured  that  the  project  was  finished  below 
anticipated  cost.  The  socioeconomic  benefits  are  roughly 
equal to the costs. 

cooperation 

and 

The  project  is  on  track  to  be  delivered  within  budget,  with 
the socioeconomic benefits outweighing the costs. 

No  proper  assessment  was  possible,  as  no  data  were 
available  on  project  design  and  technology  (thus  justifying 
the  low  score).  Costs  increased  in  the  construction  phase. 
The  demand  forecast  was  over-estimated,  causing  the  plant 
to  operate  below  minimum  efficient  capacity.  Both  effects 
to  socioeconomic  costs  exceeding  socioeconomic 
led 

59  The scores range from 1 to 5, as follows: 

1 = the determinant plays a positive, but almost negligible, role in the overall project performance;  
2 = the determinant makes a slightly positive contribution to project performance;  
3 = the determinant contributes in a moderately positive way to performance;  
4 = the determinant makes a positive contribution to the overall performance of the project;  
5 = the determinant is responsible for the positive performance of the project. 

29 

 
                                                           
Sector 

Case study 

Score  Motivation 

benefits.  

Source: CSIL, Ramboll (2019).  

4.2.1 Most projects were efficient, delivering social benefits that exceeded the costs 
The CBAs show that all but one of the analysed projects delivered benefits that exceeded 
the costs60. The projects generated value for money, independently of whether they were 
completed  on  time  and  on  budget.  At  the  same  time,  most  were  not  as  efficient  as 
expected ex ante: in some cases, costs exceeded the ex ante forecasts and benefits were 
affected by factors such as over-estimated demand. In some cases, delays were a cause of 
less-than-expected efficiency in project implementation. 

There  was  insufficient  data  to  look  into  the  unit  costs  of  comparable  investment  (or 
alternative technical solutions) to determine whether the same benefits could have been 
secured with fewer resources / at lower cost. However, evidence from projects suffering 
from overcapacity suggests that resources could have been allocated more efficiently.  

The  two  lowest  B/C  ratios  are  caused  by  different  factors.  In  the  Slovenian  case  (B/C 
ratio  < 1),  final  construction  costs  are  higher  and  actual  demand  is  lower  than  in  the 
ex ante  forecasts.  Waste  treatment  suffers  from  overcapacity  (causing  excessive 
operating costs) and inflexible technology for energy sourcing.  

In the Estonian case (B/C ratio = 1), the low ratio is the result of conservative estimates 
of net benefits: the ship’s impact in terms of reducing the number of deliberate spills has 
not been quantified, due to the lack of data.  

Figure 4. 

B/C ratio in all selected projects 

Source:  Ex  post  evaluation  of  major  projects  supported  by  the  European  Regional  Development  Fund 
(ERDF) and the Cohesion Fund between 2000 and 2013. 

60  B/C ratio > 1 in eight cases, B/C = 1 in one case, B/C < 1 in one case. 

30 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
Financial sustainability 
‘Financial  sustainability’ is  a measure of a project’s capacity to  cover its costs through 
the investment and operating phases. In line with the rationale of EU funding for major 
projects,  none  -  except  one  -  of  the  selected  projects  were  financially  profitable:  their 
financial net present values were negative or zero and they required funding. For  these, 
the EU grant was decisive in ensuring financial sustainability. 

The exception was the Italian project, which turned out to be financially profitable after 
the event. Ex ante, it was not assessed as financially viable for the private sector. Ex post, 
however,  the  reductions  in  operating  costs  were  greater  than  expected.  Due  to  strong 
political  will,  the  project  would  probably  have  been  implemented  even  without  EU 
support (see below).  

Project funding came from various sources in addition to the EU. As shown in Table 5, 
all projects received national contributions or equivalents.  

Table 5.  Funding structure in case studies 

Case study 

National 
contribution or 
equivalent 

Infrastructure 
manager’s own 
resources 

ERDF / 
Cohesion 
Fund 

EIB 

Private loan / 
bonds 

Funding 

Loans 

Sochaczew 

Bulgaria  –  Sofia  water 
cycle 
Malta South – wastewater 
treatment 
– 
Poland 
sewage management 
Romania 
Craiova 
– 
sewerage  and  wastewater 
treatment 
Croatia –  Slavonski  Brod 
water  supply,  sewerage 
and wastewater treatment 
Italy  –  Favara  di  Burgio 
aqueduct 
Spain 
desalination plant 
Estonia  –  multifunctional 
ship 
France 
protection 
Slovenia  –  Celje  waste 
management 

Anguilas 

–  Sète 

lido 

– 

Source: CSIL, Ramboll (2019).  

All  but  one  of  the  projects  generated  revenues  that  formed  the  basis  of  their  financial 
sustainability  in  the  operational  phase.  In  seven  cases,  the  revenues  covered  the 
operational costs and ensured long-term financial sustainability. Three projects required 
public  funding  from  local,  regional  or  national  sources  to  cover  the  operating  and 
maintenance costs.  

31 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All water and waste projects collected revenues from end-users, in line with the ‘polluter 
pays’ principle61. The Water Framework Directive promotes the sustainable use of water 
as a scarce resource by requiring that the price of water reflect its true cost, in terms both 
of infrastructure provision and external costs to the environment (European Environment 
Agency 2013). Similarly, it applies the ‘polluter pays’ principle in the waste sector. 

Box 4. Financial sustainability and revenue-generating projects 

In three cases, tariffs ensured financial sustainability over the lifetime of the project. In the Italian case, the 
company managing local water distribution imposed a tariff on final household and industrial users. Part of 
this tariff covered the  service of  water transit,  which is paid by the local distributor to the company  that 
operates  the  aqueduct  and  supplies  water  to  the  municipal  head  tankers.  The  revenues  from  the  tariffs 
exceeded  the  operating  costs  over  the  project  lifetime  and  so  ensured  the  financial  sustainability  of  the 
aqueduct.  

Likewise, in the Bulgarian project, the tariffs were set by a national commission at a level that is expected 
to be sufficient to generate a net revenue throughout the project’s operational phase.  

The Polish project was not expected to experience cash flow problems, as revenues from the wastewater 
tariff completely cover operating, maintenance and depreciation costs. Also, due to unexpected reductions 
in  investment  costs,  the  depreciation  of  the  project  is  lower  than  expected,  which  has  allowed  for  a 
reduction of the tariff.  

Some  projects  became  financially  sustainable  only  after  a  transition  period,  due  to 
end-users’ low willingness to pay and the existence of alternatives. In the Maltese case, 
there  were  concerns  that  users  might  not  be  able  to  pay  tariffs  at  the  level  required  to 
guarantee  financial  sustainability  immediately  after  project  completion.  Therefore,  the 
tariff is scheduled to increase gradually until 2032, when costs will have been completely 
recovered.  In  the  meantime,  the  operating  company  (WSC)  will  receive  subsidies  from 
the  government,  which  (together  with  collected  revenues)  will  ensure  the  project’s 
sustainability. 

In  the  Spanish  case,  the  tariff  for  water  from  the  desalination  plant  was  set  at 
cost-recovery  levels  from  the  beginning.  Because  this  was  nearly  double  the  tariff  for 
water  from  aquifers  (which  arguably  did  not  cover  external  environmental  costs), 
demand for the desalinated water was initially low. Therefore, the operator initially failed 
to  cover  operating  costs  and  national  public  contributions  were  required  to  sustain 
operations.  Later,  however,  farmers  experienced  difficulties  in  obtaining  water  from 
other sources and had to resort to  the desalination plant;  eventually, demand picked up 
and the desalination plant became financially sustainable.  

Even if financial sustainability is  secured in  the  short term,  it may be threatened in  the 
long run as a result of political factors or demographic trends. For instance, the Croatian 
project was financially sustainable at the time of the evaluation (2018), as the water price 
covered operational and administrative costs. However, due to strong depopulation in the 
area, water consumption may decrease in the future, in which case the revenues collected 
via  the  water  tariff  may  not  be  sufficient  to  cover  operating,  maintenance  and 
depreciation costs, and operations may become financially unsustainable. For this reason, 
the national authorities have prepared a phase II of the Slavonski Brod project whereby it 
will take in two neighbouring agglomerations (Grcin and Brodski Stupkin). In addition, a 
consolidation of water utility companies throughout Croatia is currently under way. 

61  Article 191(2) TFEU. 

32 

 
                                                           
Similarly, in  the  Slovenian  case, the volume of municipal waste treated  by the plant is 
already (by 2018) less than predicted ex ante. This is a result of updated waste legislation 
and  the  introduction  of  separate  waste  collection  and  recycling  in  Slovenia.  Increased 
recycling  rates  created  financial  problems  for  the  project  in  the  first  few  years  of  its 
operation, but this was compensated by taking in waste from a wider area. At the time of 
writing, this has ensured cost recovery and the financial sustainability of the project.  

Unlike water and waste projects, risk-reduction projects rely exclusively on government 
subsidies  for  their  financial  sustainability.  The  operations  of  Estonia’s  multifunctional 
ship  were  funded  purely  by  the  government.  In  France,  the  costs  of  maintaining  the 
wave  attenuator  were  covered  by  the  local  municipality  and  all  other  operating  costs 
(e.g. relating  to  the  maintenance  of  the  beach  and  car  parks)  were  covered  by  the  two 
towns  nearest  the  beach.  Although  the  project  generated  revenues  in  the  form  of 
concessions  paid  by  businesses  operating  on  the  beach,  these  were  not  earmarked  to 
cover the operating costs of the project infrastructure. 

4.2.2 Most projects were not as efficient as expected: cost overruns and time delays 
affected their performance 
As discussed extensively in the literature, cost and time overruns in project construction 
are  common 
to  environmental 
infrastructure63. Investment costs are often under-estimated. Delays postpone benefits and 
may result in cost overruns as well. Seven out of ten selected projects  experienced time 
overruns,  while only three experienced cost overruns64. Table 6 summarises these factors 
for each of the case studies. 

in  major  projects62, 

including 

relating 

those 

Table 6. Divergences from planned schedule and budget 

Case study 

Was the project completed on schedule? 

Was the project completed within 
budget? 

Bulgaria 
Sofia 
cycle 

– 
water 

Delayed by 3 years due to prolonged 
expropriation  procedures  that  were 
not predicted. 

  Completed on time. 

Delays  of  over  a  year  due  to  a  slow 
procurement process. 

Malta  South  – 
wastewater 
treatment 

– 

Poland 
Sochaczew 
sewage 
management 

Romania 
Craiova 
sewerage 
wastewater 

– 

and 

Substantial cost overrun (+32%) 
mainly from price increases due 
to  a  construction  boom  and 
extension of public procurement 
procedures. 

Slight  cost  underrun  (-2%)  due 
to  non-occurrence  of  planned 
contingencies  and 
favourable 
project management contract. 

(-
Significant  cost  underrun 
51%)  due  to  price  reductions 
from 
and 
competitive tendering process. 

economic 

crisis 

Slightly  delayed  implementation  due 
to  underperformance  of  a  contractor 
and re-launch of tendering process. 

Slight  cost  underrun  (-2%)  due 
to savings achieved in tendering 
process and works contract. 

e.g. Flyvbjerg (2014). 
e.g. RGL Forensics (2011) and COWI, Milieu and CSIL (2016). 

62 
63 
64  The  ex-post  CBAs  were  carried  out  on  the  basis  of  the  “actual”  costs  as  observed  “ex-post”.  They 
therefore  included  all  project  “savings”,  whether  resulting  from  procurement  processes  (cost 
reductions granted by contractors) or effective management. 

33 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Case study 

Was the project completed on schedule? 

Was the project completed within 
budget? 

treatment 

Croatia 
– 
Slavonski  Brod 
supply, 
water 
sewerage 
and 
wastewater 
treatment 

Italy  –  Favara 
di 
Burgio 
aqueduct 

– 

Spain 
Anguilas 
desalination 
plant 

Estonia 
– 
multifunctional 
ship 

France  –  Sète 
lido protection 

Finished  with  1-month  delay  due  to 
bad weather conditions. 

Significant  cost  underrun 
(-
22%)  due  to  price  reductions 
following financial crisis. 

Delay  of  1  year  due  to  bad  weather, 
administrative 
and 
third-party supplier delays. 

procedures 

Delayed  by  3  years  due  to  lack  of 
complementary 
and 
change in project design. 

investments 

Completed  4  months  earlier  than 
expected 
experienced 
contractors  and  good  stakeholder 
cooperation. 

due 

to 

Delayed  by  3  years  due 
to 
introduction  of  a  testing  phase  for 
innovative technology. 

Significant  cost  underrun 
(-
17%) due to discount offered by 
winning 
of 
contractors. 

consortium 

Cost  overrun  (+63%)  due  to 
changes in project design. 

Slight  cost  underrun  (-0.6%) 
due to changes in project design 
(elements excluded). 

Cost  underrun  (-7%)  due  to 
good 
project  management 
(e.g. introduction  of  cost-saving 
test phase). 

(6%)  due 

Cost  overrun 
to 
multiple  changes  in  contractors, 
design 
resulted 
which 
also 
changes.  Low 
influenced 
of 
by 
appropriate data.  

in 
score 
lack 

Slovenia 
Celje 
management 

– 
waste 

Delay  of  1.5  years  from  changes  in 
to 
contractors 
selected 
bankruptcy and limited experience.   

due 

Source:  CSIL,  Ramboll  (2019).  Final  project  completion  time  and  costs  compared  to  data  contained  in 
major project applications  

Delays 
Three of the projects were completed on schedule. In two cases, project preparation was 
crucial for smooth  implementation65. For example, during the planning of the  Estonian 
multifunctional ship, a team of sectoral experts mapped the possible risks associated with 
the  implementation  phase.  This  risk-mapping,  combined  with  the  high  expertise  of  the 
construction and design companies, resulted in a smooth and timely construction of the 
ship.  In  the  Croatian  case,  thanks  partly  to  the  technical  assistance  provided  to  the 
project promoters, the project was well prepared in terms of technical documentation, a 
feasibility  study  and  CBA.  In  addition,  it  received  strong  political  support  at  local  and 
national levels and was completed on time. 

The other seven projects experienced delays. In three cases, the delays were significant 
and can be partly attributed to contractors’ underperformance. This was the case with the 
Romanian  project,  where  the  original  contractor  had  to  be  replaced  through  a  new 

65  This study has been able to ascertain only the benefits of the project preparation phase. Its scope does 
not cover the costs and administrative burdens of project preparation, which have therefore not been 
estimated here. 

34 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
tendering  procedure.  For  the  Slovenian  project,  a  full  assessment  of  cost  and  time 
overruns  was  hampered  by  a  lack  of  supporting  data  for  the  technology  and  design 
decisions (hence the very low score). In addition, the first two selected contractors filed 
for bankruptcy and the third had little experience with the type of technology selected for 
a  solid  waste  treatment  plant  of  such  a  scale.  This  led  to  delays  in  the  building  and 
installation of equipment, changes in the design of the plant and thus to increased costs. 
In addition, a fire damaged the MBT plant, so reconstruction and further investment were 
needed.   

In  two  cases,  the  delay  was  caused  partly  by  unpredicted  exogenous  factors:  adverse 
weather conditions (Italian and Polish projects) and unpredictable events. In the case of 
the  Polish  project,  the  builders  came  up  against  underground  infrastructure  that  had 
probably been built over 50 years previously, was not included in existing registers and 
maps, and required additional works and changes to project design.  

However,  exogenous  factors  do  not  necessarily  cause  delays  if  they  are  properly 
predicted in the planning phase. The Italian project was interrupted due to archaeological 
findings requiring additional excavations. However, the project was not delayed, as this 
possibility had been factored in during the planning phase.  

In contrast, a lack of experience led to significant delays to the Bulgarian water supply 
network. The project promoters under-estimated the complexity of (and time involved in) 
concluding expropriation procedures to carry out the construction work. The impact was 
amplified  by  the  lack  of  a  geographical  information  system,  which  meant  that  the 
identified  manually  –  a  highly 
properties 
time-consuming activity.  

to  be  expropriated  were 

initially 

Slow  procurement  procedures  caused  delays  in  both  the  Romanian  and  the  Polish 
projects.  

The  French  project  was  deliberately  delayed.  It  involved  using  two  innovative 
technologies to reduce coastal erosion: 

  an on-land drainage system that accelerates the infiltration of water into sand on 

the beach to stabilise it; and 

  a soft (as opposed to hard) wave attenuator placed 300 m out to sea.  

Although  both  technologies  had  been  successfully  tested  elsewhere,  the  French 
authorities required a three-year trial period in which both were tested on a limited scale. 
The  wave  attenuator  was  then  selected  as  the  best  solution.  The  decision  to  test  the 
technologies  ensured  the  project’s  financial  sustainability,  as  full  deployment  of  both 
would  have  resulted  in  a  net  loss.  This  is  an  example  of  prudent  project  management, 
where delay was the result of an active strategic choice.  

Cost overruns 
For  seven  of  the  projects,  the  final  costs  were  within  estimated  budgets.  Two  projects 
experienced significant cost overruns, while one ran a slight overrun.  In general, where 
benefits exceed costs by a sufficient margin, projects may remain efficient (and still have 
a  good  B/C  ratio)  even  in  the  event  of  cost  overruns  and  delays.  For  example,  the 
Bulgarian and Spanish projects suffered from significant cost overruns and delays, but 
were still efficient, in the sense of socioeconomic benefits outweighing costs. 

35 

 
Discounts provided by contractors during the procurement processes played an important 
role in budget control in several of the analysed projects. For instance, the Polish project 
was  split  into  smaller  contracts,  so  that  small  companies  could  take  part  in  the  tender 
procedure. This increased competition among contractors and put downward pressure on 
the  prices  of  submitted  tenders.  In  the  Italian  case,  interest  charged  due  to  delayed 
payments  and  additional  payment  requests  by  the  construction  company  increased 
expenditure  by  about  €2 million.  However,  due  to  the  discount  offered  by  the  winning 
consortium at the end of the tendering procedure, the total project costs were still 16.8% 
below those initially envisaged. The tendering strategy had encouraged the participation 
of  local  engineering  firms  with  good  knowledge  of  the  construction  area.  Similarly,  a 
well-executed tendering  procedure led to  total  cost  savings of about  €1.5 million  in the 
Romanian case. 

Severe  macroeconomic  shocks  can  heavily  influence  the  construction  costs  of  major 
projects.  As  the  cases  below  show,  these  may  have  a  major  impact  on  the  financial 
sustainability of project implementation, but are difficult to foresee. 

In  the  Polish  case,  the  onset  of  the  financial  crisis  increased  competition  among 
contractors, putting downward pressure on prices in the sector. Also, the crisis caused a 
devaluation of the Polish currency, reducing project expenditure in euro terms. The crisis 
therefore contributed to significant cost underruns of about half the predicted total cost. It 
had a similar effect on the Croatian project, albeit resulting in a smaller cost underrun. 
The  macroeconomic  situation  had  the  opposite  effect  in  Bulgaria.  A  boom  in  the 
construction  sector  at  the  time  of  implementation  (between  2006  and  2009)  led  to  an 
increase  in  construction  prices  and  a  cost  overrun  amounting  to  about  a  third  of  the 
envisaged total costs.   

Changes to project design influenced the implementation costs in two projects. In Spain, 
this was due to a decision to construct pipeline connections to the irrigation community 
dams, to facilitate the full operation of the desalination plant, which gave rise to a request 
from  Spain  to  modify substantially the initial  eligible costs of the project66.  In  contrast, 
the  scope  of  the  Bulgarian  project  was  reduced  due  to  under-estimated  difficulties  in 
carrying  out  expropriation  procedures.  This  led  to  a  reduction  in  the  overall  expected 
costs and, as a result, in the grant from the EU67. The Slovenian project suffered a slight 
cost  overrun  due  to  adjustments  in  the  design  of  the  planned  TT  plant  for  waste.  In 
contrast,  the  promoters  of  the  Estonian  project  decided  to  exclude  an  on-board 
laboratory for the chemical testing of oil spill samples from the project design, because 
the Police and Border Guard Board (the operating organisation) did not have a laboratory 
technician.  This  change  of  specifications  allowed  bidders  to  reduce  their  prices  in  the 
procurement procedure and the project was completed with a slight cost underrun. 

In the Maltese case, the choice of technology and design for the sewerage treatment plant 
best suited to the context, and good management, resulted in cost underruns. No technical 
issues or modifications to the original project plans were reported during implementation. 
Therefore, none of the €1.5 million budgeted for contingencies was disbursed.   

As underlined in  the effectiveness  section68,  forecasting  capacity  proved to be a critical 
factor and in some cases affected the final efficiency of the project.  In the ten analysed 

66  Commission Decision of 2 December 2008 amending Decision C(2006) 6550. 
67  At this stage, there was still a cost overrun. 
68  See p. 25-26. 

36 

 
                                                           
the  design, 

thus  affecting 

case  studies,  ex-ante  forecasts  were  often  too  optimistic  in  terms  of  demand,  time,  and 
timeline,  financial 
costs  estimation 
sustainability  as  well  as  the  actual  delivery  of  long-term  effects  of  major  projects. 
Forecasts  were  not  always  adjusted  over  time  in  line  with  the  evolving  context  of  the 
projects,  such  as  demographic  trends,  institutional  or  legislative  framework  and 
behavioural  patterns.  Demand  was  for  example  overestimated  in  the  case  of  the 
Sochaczew sewage management plant and in the Slovenian case, causing the plants to 
operate below their minimum efficient capacity and suggesting a sub-optimal allocation 
of resources. 

implementation 

Administrative costs 
Managing  and  implementing  ESIF  programmes  demands  financial  and  personal 
investments from all involved. ‘Administrative costs’69 (costs linked to the administrative 
tasks of any fund-programming body) relate to administrative workload and the costs for 
the purchase of services (e.g. expertise) and goods. The ex post evaluation did not study 
the overall administrative cost of preparing and managing these specific projects.  

A recent study70 established a new baseline for the administrative costs and burden of the 
current  ESIF  programming  period.  It  concluded  that  the  administrative  costs  linked  to 
managing  the  ESIFs  are  reasonable  overall  and  decrease  as  a  proportion  of  the  budget 
with the size of the project.  

4.3  Relevance 

‘Project relevance’ is a twofold concept relating to a project’s: 

  alignment with existing needs; and 

  consistency with priorities established in the field at various levels (local/regional, 

national and EU).  

Main findings 

  The  projects  contributed  to  integrate  sustainability  concerns  in  programme 

design and implementation. 

  All projects address real and significant environmental needs. 
  The projects remain relevant over time. 
  Projects address not only environmental, but also economic needs. 
  Compliance is a significant driver for project implementation. 
  Projects are aligned with the EU and national priorities. 

70  Spatial  Foresight  &  t33  (August  2018).  New  assessment  of  ESIF  administrative  costs  and  burden. 
Final report. Administrative costs were not analysed in detail in the case studies. This analysis is based 
on  New  assessment  of  ESIF  administrative  costs  and  burden  –  final  report,  Spatial  Foresight  &  t33 
(2018). 

37 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
 
 
4.3.1 The projects contributed to integrate sustainability concerns in programme  

design and implementation  
Attention to sustainable development as a horizontal theme has increased over the years, 
which is reflected in the legislative changes of the three programming periods. 

In 2000-2006, project relevance from an environmental point of view was not always a 
prime concern of cohesion policy. The ex post evaluation of 2000-2006 cohesion policy 
programmes71 in the environmental sector found that: 

‘none of the analysed OPs contained a comprehensive analysis of how environmental 
issues  may  interact  with  the  economic  and  social  development  of  the  regions. 
Decisions  on  the  allocation  of  funds  were  driven  by  sectoral  approaches  rather  than 
addressing the regional needs from a more integrated perspective. The interventions in 
the  environmental  sector  were  designed  to  address  the  main  environmental  issues 
within  the  framework  of  sectoral  policies  and  were  not  integrated  into  a  regional 
perspective.  This  was  particularly  true  for  the  major  sectoral  programmes  covering 
environment that were oriented towards environmental objectives.’  

The  evaluation  also  concluded  that  little  attention  was  paid  to  sustainable  development 
(linking  three  pillars:  economic,  social  and  environmental)  as  a  horizontal  theme  in 
programme  design  and  implementation.  Efforts  in  this  area  were  mostly  seen  as  a 
question of fulfilling regulatory requirements rather than developing the concept72.  

In 2007-2013, integrating sustainability concerns into programme implementation proved 
challenging,  particularly  when  it  came  to  developing,  appraising  and  selecting  projects 
for financing. In particular, the newer Member States struggled to transfer the complexity 
of sustainable development into actual project development and on the ground73. 

The  Common  Provisions  Regulation  (CPR)  for  2014-202074  puts  greater  emphasis  on 
sustainable development by requiring Member States and the Commission to ensure that 
environmental  requirements  are  promoted  in  the  preparation  and  implementation  of 
partnership agreements and programmes.  

Table 7. Project relevance – final assessment score (1 to 5) 

Sector 

Case study 

Score 

Motivation 

Waste 
water 

– 

Bulgaria 
Sofia 
integrated 
water project 

5 

The  project  addressed  a  clear  bottleneck  in  infrastructure  endowment 
and service provision, and severe environmental concerns, caused by a 
lack of sewage system in part of the city, illegal sewer connections and 
sewage  discharge  into  watercourses.  The  project  was  aligned  with 

71  ADE,  Agrotec,  BIO  Intelligence  Service,  Orbicon  (2009).  Ex  post  evaluation  of  major  projects 
supported  by  the  European  Regional  Development  Fund  (ERDF)  between  2000  and  2006  (work 
package 5B: environment and climate change – final report; vol. I, p. 61). 

72  ADE,  Agrotec,  BIO  Intelligence  Service,  Orbicon  (2009).  Work  package 11:  management  and 

implementation systems. 

73  COWI  A/S,  Milieu  sprl  (2019).  Integration  of  environmental  concerns  in  cohesion  policy  funds 

(ERDF, ESF, CF) – Final report. 

74  Article 8 of the Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 
December 2013 laying down  common provisions on  the European Regional Development  Fund, the 
European  Social  Fund,  the  Cohesion  Fund,  the  European  Agricultural  Fund  for  Rural  Development 
and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and laying down general provisions on the European 
Regional  Development  Fund,  the  European  Social  Fund,  the  Cohesion  Fund  and  the  European 
Maritime  and  Fisheries  Fund  and  repealing  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  1083/2006  Common 
Provision Regulation. 

38 

 
                                                           
Sector 

Case study 

Score 

Motivation 

priorities established at local, national and EU levels. 

Malta  South  – 
sewage 
treatment 
infrastructure 

– 

– 

Poland 
Sochaczew 
sewage 
management 

Romania 
Craiova 
sewerage 
network  

– 
supply 
sewerage 

Croatia 
water 
and 
system  

Italy  –  Favara 
di 
Burgio 
aqueduct 

Water 

– 

Spain 
Aguilas 
desalination 
plant 

– 
Estonia 
purchase  of  a 
multifunctional 
ship 

Others 

– 
waste 

Slovenia 
Celje 
management 
centre  

France 
– 
Sète-Marseillan 
lido protection 

5 

5 

5 

5 

5 

5 

4 

5 

The project addressed the issue of untreated wastewater discharge into 
the  sea,  which  hampered  the  use  of  coastal  waters  and  damaged 
ecosystems.  It  was  in  line  with  EU  directives  in  the  water  sector 
(especially  UWWTD)  and  directly  addressed  EU  and  national 
priorities (e.g. in the Malta and Gozo sewerage masterplan). 

The project addressed a real need (lack of wastewater infrastructure in 
part  of  the  city),  which  meant  that  rivers  and  soil  (and  indirectly 
groundwater)  were  affected  by  sewage  discharge.  It  was  consistent 
with strategic priorities set at European, national and local levels. 

The  project  aimed  to  address  the  lack  of  an  operating  WWTP,  an 
incomplete  sewer  system  and  water  leaks  in  the  water  distribution 
network.  It  was  aligned  with  the  strategic  objectives  of  the  Danube 
pollution reduction programme and with EU directives. 

The  project  addressed  a  low  connection  rate  to  the  water  supply 
system,  water  leaks  in  the  water  distribution  network,  an  insufficient 
wastewater  network  and  the  lack  of  a  WWTP.  It  was  in  line  with 
national, regional and local priorities, as well as EU directives. 

in  addressing  serious  water 
The  project  was  highly  relevant 
management  problems  caused  by  an  old  and  dysfunctional  aqueduct 
that did not ensure a reliable water supply to municipal head tanks. It 
was  in  line  with  EU  directives  and  directly  addressed  priorities 
established  at  national  level  (reorganisation  of  the  water  sector)  and 
regional level (countering local water shortages). 

The  project  tackled  serious  problems  in  water  management:  the 
existing  plant  was  not  operating  at  full  efficiency  and  there  was  a 
severe water deficit and aquifer over-exploitation. Water provision for 
irrigation  was  hampered,  leading  to  land  abandonment  and  economic 
slowdown.  The  project  was  in  line  with  EU  directives  in  the  water 
sector and directly addressed national and regional priorities. 

The  project  addressed  the  lack  of  pollution-removal  capacity  in 
Estonia’s Baltic waters. It was consistent with EU directives, national 
strategies  and  Baltic  cooperation  under  the  Convention  on  the 
Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area. 

Despite poorly defined goals, the project addressed real needs (lack of 
landfill  space,  failure  to  comply  with  the  Landfill  Directive  and 
national  law,  lack  of  separate  waste  collection).  It  was  in  line  with 
Slovenia’s  2004-2006  single  programming  document,  which  included 
the priority  measures of national  waste policy and  was  funded by the 
CF.  Not  all  objectives  were  relevant  for  the  phase II  project,  as  they 
were more important for the waste management centre as a whole. 

The  project  addressed  natural  risks  (erosion,  unregulated  parking  and 
camping,  pollution  linked  to  waste,  noise  pollution,  accidents  and 
congestion)  and  took  account  of  ecological  and  economic  factors.  It 
was  in  line  with  EU  and  national  recommendations  on  strategies  to 
deal with erosion issues. 

Source: CSIL, Ramboll (2019). 

39 

 
  
 
 
4.3.2 All projects addressed real and significant environmental needs 
All 10 projects responded to a clearly identified need for intervention and addressed real 
and significant environment-related needs, while delivering a range of benefits.  

As regards the two water supply projects (Italy’s Favara di Burgio aqueduct and Spain’s 
desalination plant in Aguilas), new infrastructure was necessary to address water deficits 
resulting from resource-management problems. When the Italian project was conceived, 
the  existing  aqueduct  was  in  poor  condition  and  suffered  from  high  water  losses,  so  a 
reliable  water supply to  municipal head tanks  could  not  be  ensured. The  Sicilian water 
crisis  (1999-2004)  exacerbated  the  need  for  immediate  action.  Before  the  Spanish 
project  was  implemented,  water  supply  was  not  consistently  ensured  due  to  permanent 
water  scarcity.  This  led  to  land  abandonment  and  over-exploitation  of  aquifers.  An 
existing desalination plant was underperforming due to operational problems. 

In  other  cases,  it  was  necessary  to  intervene  to  address  severe  environmental  concerns 
and  avoid  potential  future  damage  or  destruction  of  the  natural  environment.  A 
compromised  environmental  situation  characterised  the  five  projects  (in  Bulgaria, 
Malta, Poland, Romania and Croatia) featuring wastewater treatment infrastructure, all 
of which dealt primarily with the discharge of raw sewage into water bodies. The aim of 
the  Estonian  and  French  projects  was  to  deal  with  environmental  hazards  that 
threatened to cause irreversible damage to natural resources.  

Seven projects addressing a water cycle, together with the Slovenian waste management 
project,  were  designed  to  ensure  the  sustainable  provision  of  key  services  of  general 
interest  (e.g. water  supply,  wastewater  collection  and  treatment,  and  waste  treatment), 
which  were  necessary  for  civil  and  economic  activities.  In  these  cases,  the  ex ante 
situation  differed  depending  on  the  sub-sector.  In  the  water  supply  sector  (projects  in 
Italy  and  Spain,  project  components  in  Bulgaria,  Romania  and  Croatia),  services 
generally existed but were not satisfactory. As regards wastewater collection (projects in 
Bulgaria, Poland, Romania and Croatia and, to some extent, the Maltese project), no 
or  only  incomplete  services  were  provided  in  the  project  areas.  Wastewater  treatment 
services  were  lacking  in  Malta  and  Croatia,  and  they  needed  to  be  upgraded  in 
Bulgaria, Poland and Romania.  

The  ten  selected  major  projects  remained  on  the  whole  relevant  over  time.  All  the 
projects addressed basic human needs, and the use and preservation of natural resources, 
that remain relevant over time. Evolving needs and consumption patterns were to a large 
extent  taken  into  consideration  during  planning  and  implementation,  partly  through 
stakeholder consultation. This also guaranteed relevance over time.  

The  Estonian  project  and  the  Slovenian  waste  management  project  both  appear  to  be 
characterised by a trade-off between the requisite intervention and long-term relevance. 
While they were highly relevant at the moment of the financing decision (in the absence 
of other solutions), they may become less so over time with the adoption of measures to 
comply with further requirements. 

4.3.3 Projects address not only environmental, but also economic needs 
While  environmental  concerns  were  the  main  drivers  of  all  10  projects,  they  made 
equally  important  contributions  to  economic  development.  However,  unlike  transport 
investments, which directly trigger economic growth, environmental projects contribute 
to  economic  development  mainly  by  managing  natural  resources  efficiently  and 
providing basic environmental services in previously unserved areas.  

40 

 
In  most  of  the  assessed  cases,  considerations  relating  to  the  efficient  and  sustainable 
management  of  natural  and  socioeconomic  resources  were  never  separate  from  purely 
environmental  concerns.  For  instance,  water  is  a  key  input  for  various  economic 
activities  and  aquatic  ecosystems  deliver  goods  and  services  used  by  certain  sectors 
(e.g. water-related tourism, professional fishing). Also, specific projects aimed to deliver 
services  to  households.  Accordingly,  economic  considerations  can  relate  to  the 
optimisation  (in  terms  of  efficiency,  sustainability  and  quality)  of  the  management  of 
natural resources and the preservation of ecosystems.  

In  several  cases,  economic  goals  featured  among  the  projects’  primary  objectives.  For 
example,  the  area  around  Aguilas,  where  the  Spanish  desalination  plant  was  built, 
suffered from land abandonment and general economic slowdown as a result of irregular 
water  supply.  The  project  was  designed  to  address  this  problem  in  the  long  term.  The 
Maltese WWTP was partly designed to promote tourism and economic development on 
the  south-east  coast,  where  they  had  been  hampered  by  seawater  contamination. 
Similarly, the protection of local economic activities was part of the rationale for the lido 
protection project in France.  

On a different note, the primary goal of the Italian project was to enhance water supply 
to  municipal  tanks.  However,  the  project  also  generated  economic  effects,  as  the 
increased  availability  of  water  proved  a  significant  incentive  for  entrepreneurs  to 
establish their firms in the area.  

The  selected  projects  did  not  involve  zero-sum  trade-offs  between  environmental  and 
economic  considerations  (e.g. the  protection  of  natural  resources,  on  the  one  hand,  and 
the protection of jobs, on the other). As such, they were generally not controversial and 
enjoyed the support of economic operators and (most) citizens.  

4.3.4 Compliance is a significant driver of project implementation  
The analysis reveals that compliance was a significant driver behind the implementation 
of  major  environmental  projects  analysed  in  this  ex  post  evaluation,  particularly  as 
regards  drinking  water,  wastewater  treatment  and  waste  management.  However,  it  was 
never  an  objective  per se.  Rather,  compliance  with  environmental  standards  was 
instrumental in the prioritisation of needs and investments, and the recognition of some 
as  more  pressing  than  others.  ERDF/Cohesion  Fund  co-funding  for  major  projects  is  a 
means  of  ensuring  the  implementation  of  EU  environmental  legislation,  particularly  in 
EU-13 Member States. 

The  role  of  compliance  as  a  driver  for  project  prioritisation  is  a  peculiarity  of  the 
environmental sector; it was not so evident in the transport sector, for instance (see EC, 
2018). Environmental legislation is characterised by standards and requirements that are 
stricter than those in other infrastructure sectors.  

All  five  wastewater  treatment  projects  (in  Romania,  Malta,  Poland,  Croatia  and 
Bulgaria)  were  driven  by  the  need  to  comply  with  EU  accession  criteria  and  the 
environmental acquis75. However, it is important to stress that compliance considerations 
simply reflected the countries’ urgent need for such investments.  

75  UWWTD, WFD, Drinking Water Directive (DWD) and the Bathing Waters Directive (BWD). 

41 

 
 
                                                           
Incomplete compliance with the requirements of the Landfill Directive (due to a lack of 
landfill space and separate waste collection to ensure the suitable treatment of municipal 
waste) was one of the main drivers for the Slovenian waste management project.  

As implied above, compliance with EU requirements was less a driver in the EU-15. For 
example, it was not among the lead drivers for the Italian and Spanish projects (the two 
investments  dealing  only  with  water  supply),  which  aimed  to  address  failures  in  the 
provision of water for civil and agricultural uses respectively. However, the projects still 
had to be in line with the WFD and the DWD. 

The Estonian project was slightly different, in that a major driver was compliance with 
HELCOM recommendations, in line with the Convention on the Protection of the Marine 
Environment  of  the  Baltic  Sea  Area.  Further  legal  parameters  stemmed  from  national 
strategies and EU directives (Marine Strategy Framework Directive, Birds Directive and 
Habitats Directive). 

4.3.5 Projects are aligned with EU and national priorities 
As required by the applicable legal provisions, all the projects had to be included in an 
OP and screened against the OP’s objectives before acceptance. Most were part of wider 
strategic  sectoral  plans.  Major  projects  must  be  strategically  aligned  with  national  and 
EU  objectives  to  be  eligible  for  EU  funding.  This  requirement  has  been  further 
strengthened  for  the  2014-2020  period,  with  the  introduction  of  specific  ex ante 
conditions. 

Analysis confirms that most of the water and wastewater projects were developed as part 
of  an  integrated  network76,  so  they  were  covered  by  wider  local,  regional  or  national 
plans. For example, the Italian aqueduct was part of a wider strategic approach aimed at 
countering  the  water  emergency  through  the  joint  management  of  all  major  Sicilian 
aqueducts.  Similarly,  the  WWTP  in  Malta  was  part  of  a  broader  strategy  to  enhance 
wastewater connection and treatment in the country.  

All  10  projects  were  found  to  be  consistent  with  EU  and  national  and  priorities. 
Alignment with regional priorities played a role in the two projects (in Italy and Spain) 
dealing  only  with  water  supply,  while  local  priorities  were  particularly  relevant  for  the 
projects (in Bulgaria, Poland and Croatia) dealing with wastewater treatment77.  

Specific  policy  frameworks  apply  to  the  two  projects  with  cross-border  (including 
extra-EU) effects, which had to comply with an additional layer of provisions: 

 

in  Romania  was  designed  and 
the  Craiova  sewerage  network  project 
implemented  in  alignment  with  the  Danube  pollution  reduction  programme  and 
the strategic action plan for the Danube river basin, developed under the auspices 
of  the  International  Commission  for  the  Protection  of  the  Danube  River,  an 
international  organisation  established  in  1998  and  consisting  of  14  cooperating 
states and the EU. The project was also listed as a priority in Romania’s national 
environmental action programme and national plan for the environment under the 
Structural Pre-Accession Instrument (ISPA); and 

 

the  multifunctional  ship  in  Estonia  contributed  to  alignment  with  HELCOM 
recommendations (see above). 

76  Projects in Bulgaria, Malta, Romania, Croatia, Italy and Spain. 
77 

In the case of Malta, due to the country’s limited size, no differentiation was identified between local, 
regional and national priorities. 

42 

 
                                                           
4.5  Coherence 

‘Project  coherence’  refers  to  consistency  between  project  components/features  and  the 
wider stated project objectives – be it at European or local level. It refers only to strategic 
alignment, regardless of how and whether strategies and plans are actually implemented.  

Main findings 

  Projects were coherent with the EU environmental framework.  

  Project components were generally consistent with the project objectives. 

  They were also  well placed in  the wider policy  context,  contributing to EU and 

local priorities.   

Table 8. Project coherence – final assessment score (1 to 5) 

Sector 

Case study 

Score 

Motivation 

Bulgaria 
– 
Sofia  integrated 
water project 

Malta  South  – 
sewage 
treatment 
infrastructure 

– 

– 

Poland 
Sochaczew 
sewage 
management 

Romania 
Craiova 
sewerage 
network  

Croatia – water 
supply 
and 
sewerage 
system  

Italy  –  Favara 
di 
Burgio 
aqueduct 

– 

Spain 
Aguilas 
desalination 
plant 

5 

5 

5 

5 

5 

5 

5 

Waste 
water 

Water 

All project components were in line with the stated objectives and the 
project was in line with larger investments by the Sofia Municipality. 

All  project  components  were  in  line  with  the  stated  objectives.  The 
project was in line  with two  other treatment plants. It  enabled further 
investments (in re-using treated sewage)78. 

All  project  components  were  in  line  with  the  stated  objectives.  With 
respect  to  external  coherence,  the  project  can  be  deemed  to  be 
independent from other projects. 

Initially,  the  project  included  a  WWTP  and  focused  on  the  sewage 
network;  later,  it  included  the  rehabilitation  of  the  water  distribution 
network.  Project  components  were  in  line  with  the  stated  objectives. 
External  coherence:  further  water  and  wastewater  infrastructure 
projects are planned at county level. 

Project  components  were  overall  in  line  with  the  intended  objectives. 
The  project  was  part  of  the  local  municipal  company’s  long-term 
investment plan and other projects are being prepared. 

All  project  components  were  in  line  with  the  stated  objectives.  The 
project  was  part  of  a  wider  investment  plan,  with  the  renewal  of  two 
other aqueducts. 

All  project  components  were  in  line  with  the  stated  objectives.  The 
project was part of Spain’s broader AGUA investment programme. 

78  Although implementation was fully consistent with the relevant EU directives, at the time of writing 
(2019) illegal discharges to sewers in its operational phase have prevented the project from achieving 
full compliance with the UWWTD. 

43 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
 
Others 

Estonia 
– 
purchase  of  a 
multifunctional 
ship 

–  
waste 

Slovenia 
Celje 
management 
centre  

France  -  Sète-
Marseillan  lido 
protection 

4 

3 

3 

Project  components  were  in  line  with  the  stated  objectives  and  the 
project  represented  part  of  a  broader  effort  to  meet  HELCOM 
recommendations (further measures are expected in the future).  

Project components were in line with the stated objectives, except for 
one  (reduction  of  waste  load  in  the  environment  and  reduction  of 
methane emissions). The project was phase II of the implementation of 
the  waste  management  centre.  Synergies  with  other  investments  have 
been ensured. 

Project  components  were  consistent  with  the  stated  objectives. 
Substantial  incoherence  can  be  identified  in  the  building  of  a  new 
neighbourhood very close to the most fragile part of the lido. 

Source: CSIL, Ramboll (2019). 

4.5.1 Projects were coherent with the EU environmental framework  
All the 10 projects selected were either compliant with EU environmental legislation, or 
had  compliance  among  their  main  objectives,  particularly  in  the  fields  of  wastewater 
treatment  and  waste  management.    This  was  particularly  the  case  in  the  new  Member 
State  where  the  projects  pushed  the  national  and  regional  administrations  to  align  their 
environmental  legislation  with  the  EU  environmental  acquis,  and  finally  to  achieve 
coherence with respect to the regulatory requirements. 

Coherence  with  environmental  legal  standards  was  instrumental  to  prioritise  needs  and 
investments.  For  example,  one  of  the  main  objectives  of  the  Bulgarian  project was 
compliance  with  EU  accession  criteria  and  with  the  environmental  acquis.  The  Polish 
project  directly  implemented  the  National  Programme  for  Municipal  Wastewater 
Treatment, which in turn aimed to fulfil the obligations assumed by Poland in the Treaty 
of Accession as regards the Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive.  

4.5.2 Project components were generally consistent with the project objectives 
In  most  cases,  the  features  of  the  project,  in  particular  the  selected  variant,  were  those 
most appropriate in  the light  of  identified need(s). A partial exception is the Slovenian 
waste management project, where internal coherence was satisfactory overall, but project 
components were poorly defined ex ante. 

ensuring 

strength  of 

4.5.3 Project components were well placed in the wider policy context 
An  important  feature  of  large  environmental  infrastructure  projects,  particularly  in  the 
water  and  wastewater  sectors,  is  their  integrated  approach.  Currently,  this  represents  a 
considerable 
consistency  with 
infrastructure  projects, 
complementary  investments  and  allowing  for  economies  of  scale.  The  Bulgarian, 
Croatian and Romanian projects were hybrid in nature, covering different phases of the 
water  cycle  (i.e. water  supply,  wastewater  collection  and  wastewater  treatment).  The 
Italian  project  was  part  of  a  broader  effort  by  the  regional  and  national  authorities  to 
revamp  aqueducts  in  Sicily.  The  Favara  di  Burgio  aqueduct  was  intended  to  form  the 
backbone of the new regional infrastructure for water provision as part of a package of 
investments. According to the initial design and the initial investment plan, the primary 
intervention was to be accompanied by the overall refurbishment of the local distribution 
networks connecting the municipal central reservoirs to end-users. A series of problems 
in  the  implementation  phase  (relating  to  the  management  of  the  local  distribution 

44 

 
 
 
services) meant that this did not happen. However, this development, which is the result 
of  implementation  problems,  does  not  put  into  question  the  initial  coherence  of  the 
design.  

Most water supply and wastewater projects were part of larger sectoral investment plans, 
drawn  up  at  national  level  (Malta  and  Spain),  regional  level  (Italy)  and  local  level 
(Bulgaria  and  Croatia).  These  involved  a  series  of  projects  addressing  a  problematic 
issue (e.g. discharge of raw sewage into water bodies, water crisis) shared across a wider 
area than that affected by the main project alone.  

4.6  EU added value 

‘EU added value’ refers to beneficial impacts that can be attributed to EU intervention, 
over and above what  could  reasonably have been expected and achieved from  Member 
State action alone. 

The study confirmed that in most cases, the EU’s contribution was beneficial to project 
implementation  and  ensured  the  achievement  of  the  observed  results,  which  might 
otherwise  have  been  postponed,  not  achieved  or  achieved  in  a  different  manner 
(e.g. without meeting certain standards).  

Main findings 

The EU’s contribution added value in three ways: 

  helping to finance the project (financial support);  

  setting priorities and standards (strategic support); 

 

triggering transboundary effects and fostering knowledge sharing; 

  determining  the  technical  aspects  of  the  project  (technical  support)  and 

institutional capacity building. 

Table 9. EU added value – final assessment score (1 to 5) 

Sector 

Case study 

Score 

Bulgaria 
–  
Sofia water cycle 

5 

Waste 
water 

Malta  South  – 
wastewater 
treatment 

– 

Poland 
Sochaczew 
sewage 
management 

4 

4 

Motivation 
The project would not have taken place  without EU financing, due to 
the limited financial capacity of local institutions and heavily regulated 
water  prices  translating  into  insufficient  revenues.  This  was  the  first 
major  project  in  Bulgaria  of  such  scale  and  complexity,  and  (along 
with  technical  support  from  the  EU  delegation)  it  built  local 
administrative and technical capacity. The political visibility and drive 
for compliance led to a revision of national tariff policy. 
The  project  would  not  have  been  implemented  without  the  EU 
contribution,  which  covered  85%  of  the  total  cost.  Technical  support 
from Jaspers greatly improved the project application and ex ante CBA 
methodology,  which  was  instrumental  in  facilitating  the  financing 
decision. The project also helped Malta to comply with EU wastewater 
directives and improve environmental standards. 
The  project  would  probably  not  have  been  implemented  without  the 
EU contribution, due to the limited financial resources of the operator 
and  the  city.  Technical  assistance  from  JASPERS  helped  optimise 
the 
project  design  and  co-financed 
beneficiary’s  capacity  to  carry  out  similar  projects  in  the  future.  The 
EU  intervention  also  mobilised  local  stakeholders  to  achieve  project 

technical  assistance  built 

45 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sector 

Case study 

Score 

Motivation 

objectives. 

– 

and 

Romania 
Craiova 
sewerage 
wastewater 
treatment 
Croatia 
– 
Slavonski  Brod 
supply, 
water 
and 
sewerage 
wastewater 
treatment 

Water 

Italy – Favara di 
Burgio aqueduct 

– 

Spain 
Anguilas 
desalination 
plant 

– 

Estonia 
multifunctional 
ship 

5 

5 

2 

4 

4 

Others 

France  –  Sète 
lido protection 

4 

Slovenia  –  Celje 
waste 
management 

3 

Source: CSIL, Ramboll (2019).  

The  project  had  started  decades  before,  but  had  stopped  indefinitely 
due to lack of funds. It would not have been implemented  without EU 
financing. It supported compliance with an EU directive on river water 
pollution.  The  establishment  of  a  project  implementation  unit  (PIU) 
strengthened the capacity of the operator and managing authority. 

Although the investment was included in the operator’s long-term plan, 
the  EU  financing  accelerated  implementation  by  several  decades.  It 
enabled Croatia to comply with the UWWTD. Technical assistance in 
project preparation, design and implementation built local capacity. 
Due  to  its  high  relevance  for  national  and  regional  objectives  and  its 
urgency,  the  project  would  probably  have  been  implemented  even 
without  EU  support.  The  financing  decision  was  made  after  the 
contract  for  construction  works  had  been  signed.  Therefore,  the  EU 
had limited influence on project planning.  

As EU financing was a national precondition for project approval, the 
implementation  of  the  project  was  probably  accelerated  by  the  EU 
contribution.  
Although the application for EU co-financing was submitted after the 
procurement  process  had  started,  the  EU  contribution  was  planned 
from the beginning of the development phase. Due to limited national 
funds,  the  project  would  not  have  taken  place  without  EU  support.  It 
has a positive transboundary effect, as it reduces risk across the Baltic 
Sea and contributes to cooperation among surrounding countries. 
The  EU  financing  decision  attracted  additional  support  from  local, 
regional and national financiers. The project is an innovative technical 
solution  to  coastal  erosion,  which  has  already  inspired  scientific 
communities  across  Europe  and  spin-off  projects  with  European 
partners.  Coastal  erosion  will  be  an  issue  across  the  EU  in  the  future 
due  to  climate  change,  so  lessons  learned  from  this  project  are 
important. Dialogue with the Commission built local capacity to carry 
out ex ante CBA of such projects. 
The  project  would  not  have  been  implemented  without  the  EU 
contribution,  due  to  the  beneficiary’s  lack  of  financial  capacity.  It 
contributed  to  compliance  with  EU  legislation.  The  final  design  and 
technology were suboptimal, thus reducing the added value score. The 
project could have benefited from more technical support.  

4.6.1 EU financial support 
In many cases, the availability of a significant and critical share of funding accelerated – 
or even enabled – project implementation. This is probably the most obvious dimension 
of EU added value. Figure 5 shows the extent of EU co-financing for the projects. 

46 

 
Figure 5. EU co-funding, 2018 (€ million) 

Source: CSIL, Ramboll (2019). 

As  Figure 5  shows,  the  EU  grant  ranges  from  nearly  a  fifth  (19%  for  the  Spanish 
desalination plant) to well over three quarters (85% for the Maltese WWTP) of the total 
investment cost.  

Six  of  the  projects  could  not  have  been  financed  by  the  Member  State  alone  and  EU 
objectives  would  not  have  been  reached  in  time  or  at  all.  In  Bulgaria, Malta,  Poland, 
Romania,  Estonia  and  Slovenia,  EU  funding  was  decisive  for  implementation,  as  the 
authorities  responsible  for  the  projects  had  limited  or  no  financial  capacity  to  invest  in 
large-scale infrastructure.  

Other projects would have been financed from national sources, but the EU grant greatly 
accelerated implementation. This is the case with Croatia, where the construction of the 
water  supply  and  sewerage  infrastructure,  while  included  in  the  operator’s  long-term 
plan,  would  have  probably  taken  decades.  Thanks  to  the  EU  funding,  the  project  was 
implemented  within  5  years  of  being  approved.  In  the  case  of  the  Spanish  project,  the 
managing authority and the operator agreed that project approval depended on securing 
funding  from  three  different  sources,  including  the  EU.  Therefore,  without  the  EU 
contribution,  the  national  financing  decision  would  have  probably  been  delayed  or  not 
taken at all. 

The  EU  grant  decision  for  the  French  project  generated  support  from  additional  local, 
regional and national financiers. This shows that EU financing can provide leverage and 
bring in additional public investors.  

For the Italian project, EU financing was not a determining factor. The modernisation of 
the water supply infrastructure was a top priority and featured high on the regional and 
national agenda. The project would therefore most probably have been implemented even 
without  the  EU  contribution.  In  this  case,  EU  funding  might  have  released  national 
resources for other uses.  

47 

 
 
In line with the principle of additionality79, EU contributions must not replace public or 
equivalent structural expenditure by a Member State in the regions concerned, but rather 
be  additional  to  national  funding.  The  release  of  national  funds  for  other  uses  can  be 
considered as  adding  value only if it  complies with this principle.  If the  national  funds 
were  reinvested  in  environmental  infrastructure  in  the  same  region,  the  EU  financing 
would be additional and considered to be adding value. Otherwise, if the financing went 
against the additionality principle, the EU added value would be questionable. It was not 
possible  to  determine  from  the  case  studies  how  the  released  national  resources  were 
invested. 

4.6.2 EU strategic support 
In  co-financing  large  environmental  infrastructure  projects,  the  EU  can  play  a  strategic 
role by shaping the framework in which the projects are implemented. This leads to the 
selection of projects that are consistent with EU priorities and objectives. 

The weight of EU funds as a proportion of total investment provides important leverage 
for project implementation, although it is not the only aspect related to EU added value. 
As  ERDF  and  Cohesion  Fund  financing  is  provided  on  strict  conditions,  it  can  guide 
public investments towards compliance with EU environmental standards. For example, 
the Croatian project contributed to Croatia’s compliance with the environment and water 
management acquis. Similarly, prior to the construction of the sewage treatment plant in 
Malta, wastewater was dumped directly into the sea. EU financing enabled the country 
to  make  important  progress  towards  compliance  with  EU  directives  on  wastewater 
treatment  and  the  objectives  of  preserving  the  environment  and  ensuring  high-quality 
bathing waters. Thus, by strategically co-financing projects in line with its environment 
policy, the EU can influence national spending in the direction of its own priorities and 
steer  national  agendas  towards  environmental  improvements  that  go  beyond  minimum 
requirements. 

Compliance with the acquis in the water and waste sectors has been further promoted in 
the 2014-2020 period, with the CPR making it a condition for eligibility for EU funding.   

4.6.3 EU Triggering transboundary effects and fostering knowledge sharing 
Environmental issues are often transboundary in nature and require action at international 
level80. As a supranational organisation, the EU can facilitate such action,  inter alia via 
ERDF  and  Cohesion  Fund  investments.  Its  involvement  helps  to  secure  socioeconomic 
gains that may not have been attainable through Member State action alone. 

For  example,  the  multifunctional  ship  in  Estonia  reduces  the  risk  of  environmental 
damage from chemical spills and marine pollution for a large part of the Baltic Sea, thus 
benefiting  all  surrounding  countries,  including  non-EU  countries  (Russia).  The  project 
has  contributed  to  improve  well-being  all  over  the  Baltic  Sea  basin  and  to  enhance  co-
operation  among  countries in  the area. Similarly, in  the  case of the  Romanian  project, 
the fact that untreated water is no longer dumped into the Jiu River has helped to reduce 
pollution in the Danube, which runs through many countries and into the Black Sea.  

79  Additionality is one of the key principles of cohesion policy action; see: 

https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/policy/what/glossary/a/additionality/ 

80   This is because the cost of such pollution is not fully borne by the polluting country. If countries act out 
of  self-interest,  they  typically  fail  to  internalise  the  external  costs  of  pollution.  Thus,  transboundary 
pollution often requires action at supranational level; see, for example, Persson (2008), p. 2. 

48 

 
                                                           
 
Transboundary effects can also be economic in nature: a slow or ineffective elimination 
of seawater pollution in case of a pollution event could in fact negatively affect maritime 
transport, interrupt economic activities and change the flow of international transit in the 
Baltic  Sea  (thus  damaging  not  only  neighbouring  countries,  but  also  foreign  economic 
operators). 

By financing innovative solutions, which inherently involves a degree of risk, the ERDF 
and Cohesion Fund can stimulate technological development and knowledge-sharing. For 
example,  to  protect  the  shoreline  from  coastal  erosion  in  Sète  (France),  a  new 
technology was deployed in the form of a soft rubber tube instead of placing traditional 
hard wave attenuators (i.e. cement blocks) in the sea. Unlike the old technology, this does 
not cause erosion of other beaches in the region. The project has attracted great interest 
from  scientific  communities  across  Europe  and  spurred  several  spin-off  projects 
involving  European  partners  as  many  countries  in  Europe  are  faced  with  the  risk  of 
coastal erosion, which is expected to increase in the future due to climate change.  

EU  funding  may  give  a  project  greater  visibility,  which  in  turn  stimulates  engagement 
and  cooperation  among  national  and  local  stakeholders.  For  example,  the  EU 
contribution  in  Poland  boosted  local  stakeholders’  cooperation  in  connecting  11 000 
households  to  the  water  distribution  network.  Similarly,  the  EU  involvement  in  the 
Bulgarian project led to greater interaction between national institutions and triggered a 
review of the water tariff policy.  

More  generally,  the  strategic  role  played  by  the  EU  can  be  inferred  from  the  projects’ 
high scores for relevance and coherence.  

4.6.4 EU technical support and institutional capacity-building 
Input from various EU institutions can improve the technical specifications of a project. 
Table 10 summarises which were involved in the case studies. 

Table 10. EU organisations providing technical support, by project 

Case study 

European 
Commission 

EIB 

Jaspers 

Bulgaria – Sofia water cycle 

Malta South – wastewater treatment 

Poland – Sochaczew sewage management 

Romania  –  Craiova  sewerage  and  wastewater 
treatment 

Croatia  –  Slavonski  Brod  water 
sewerage and wastewater treatment 

supply 

Italy – Favara di Burgio aqueduct 

Spain – Anguilas desalination plant 

Estonia – multifunctional ship 

France – Sète lido protection 

Slovenia – Celje waste management centre 

Source: CSIL, Ramboll (2019). 

49 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For some projects, the Commission’s involvement in the preparation and implementation 
phases served to build local institutional capacity. For example, for the French project, 
dialogue with the Commission facilitated the  ex ante CBA, which had never previously 
been done for such a project in that region. In Croatia, an EU delegation was involved 
with the project management throughout the implementation phase. This strengthened the 
administrative capacity of the managing authority and the operator. 

The EIB offers in-depth scrutiny of a project’s financial and technical merits. It asked the 
Danube  Investment  Support  Facility  to  assist  the  operator  of  the  Croatian  project  in 
preparing  the  project  documents.  Its  funding  significantly  improved  the  project 
preparation process. In addition, EIB financing is usually considered to encourage other 
lenders. Four of the analysed case studies received an EIB loan.  

The Croatian, Maltese and Polish projects received some form of support or input from 
Jaspers and this was perceived as being an important factor in their preparation.  

Several  projects  received  ISPA  funding.  Often,  this  involved  technical  assistance  to 
facilitate  investments  and  build  capacity  in  accession  countries.  Of  the  analysed  cases, 
those in Bulgaria, Croatia, Poland and Romania received technical assistance as ISPA 
projects. For example, for the integrated water cycle project in Bulgaria, ISPA provided 
the Ministry of Environment and Water with a framework for technical assistance for the 
preparation  of  the  funding  application.  Project  implementation  units  (PIUs)  served  to 
concentrate and retain knowledge in all of the ISPA projects.  

The  timing  of  EU  engagement  in  a  project  may  determine  the  EU  added  value  from 
technical support. Due to the late application for co-funding for the Italian project, the 
ERDF  contribution  came  at  a  time  when  construction  had  already  begun,  so  there  was 
limited  scope  for  the  EU  to  influence  the  project  planning.  The  Commission  financing 
decision  for  the  Maltese  project  was  taken  in  November  2010,  while  the  construction 
works  had  begun  in  December  2008.  The  application  for  EU  co-financing  for  the 
Estonian  project  was  submitted  after  the  procurement  process  had  been  initiated.  For 
projects  that  receive  EU  support  late  in  the  development  process,  the  main  EU  added 
value may be largely financial. 

In  all  10  cases  assessed,  institutional  learning  took  place  mainly  at  a  local  level.  For 
example, in the Bulgarian project, institutional capacity-building benefited mainly Sofia 
Municipality  and  the  operator.  Similarly,  the  operator  in  the  Croatian  project  gained 
expertise from the technical support financed by the EIB. This is in contrast with major 
transport  projects,  for  which  capacity-building  took  place  mainly  at  the  level  of  the 
national authorities (European Commission, 2018)81.  

5. CONCLUSIONS 

There is evidence that large-scale environmental infrastructure projects co-funded by the 
ERDF  and  the  Cohesion  Fund  contributed  to  the  achievement  of  core  cohesion  policy 
goals by supporting economic growth and competiveness, and protecting and improving 
the environment82.  

81  For  example,  EU  support  for  the  construction  of  the  M43  motorway  between  Szeged  and  Mako  in 

Hungary served to improve the administrative capacity of the National Development Agency. 

82  Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006. 

50 

 
                                                           
While such projects are primarily a response to environmental needs, the evaluation has 
shown that they generate wider benefits and affect economic development and quality of 
life. They  do so primarily  by  allowing  for the  efficient and sustainable  management of 
natural  resources  and  providing  basic  environmental  services  to  previously  unserved 
areas.  In  this  way,  they  make  those  areas  more  economically  and  socially  attractive, 
drawing in people and firms, and creating necessary (though not sufficient) conditions for 
territorial development.  

In most of the assessed cases, the availability of a significant  and critical  proportion of 
EU  funding  accelerated  (and  even  enabled)  project  implementation  and  thus  the 
achievement of EU objectives. The financial support was therefore the most obvious and 
most widely recognised dimension of EU added value.  

At  the  same  time,  environmental  infrastructure  projects  contributed  to  compliance  with 
the  environmental  acquis  and  broader  sustainable  development  strategies.  The  need  to 
comply with EU environmental standards provided a practical, clear legal framework that 
was instrumental in the selection of the most urgent investments, especially in the EU-13 
Member  States.  Compliance  with  the  acquis  was  therefore  a  key  driver  for  investment 
prioritisation and the strategic EU-level legal framework was the most important aspect 
of  EU  added  value.  The  fact  that  individual  projects  are  implemented  within  a  single, 
sector-specific,  stringent  legal  framework  made  it  possible  to  achieve  EU-wide 
environmental  effects  according  to  agreed  standards.  This  could  not  have  been  done 
without the EU legislation and funds. In addition, the investment priorities based on this 
common  framework  give  innovative  and  complex  investments  demonstrable  value  and 
enable knowledge transfer, as clearly shown by some of the projects.  

The projects contributed to the development of administrative capacity, especially in the 
EU-13 Member States.  

Project  efficiency  was  affected  by  cost  and  time  overruns,  which  are  common  in  large 
infrastructure projects, including environmental ones. Most of the projects were affected 
by  time  overruns,  but  budget  planning  proved  to  generally  be  accurate.  Delays  were 
primarily  due  to  contractors’  underperformance,  low  capacity,  slow  procurement 
procedures or unpredicted exogenous factors such as adverse weather conditions.  

Forecasting  capacity  (especially  as  regards  future  demand)  and  design  flexibility 
emerged as problematic determinants of performance.  

In the future, the environment will remain a priority for EU cohesion policy, which will 
continue to support large infrastructure projects in the sector thanks to a specific policy 
objective  targeting  a  greener,  low-carbon  Europe83.  The  ‘thematic  concentration’ 
provisions proposed by the Commission, whereby Member States would have to devote a 
greater proportion of their resources to policy objectives such as ‘a smarter Europe’ and 
‘a greener Europe’, would further boost the environmental benefits of cohesion policy.  

The  Commission’s  proposals  for  the  next  programming  period  drop  the  procedural 
distinction  between  projects  above  and  below  a  specific  threshold.  All  projects, 

83  Article 4(1)(b)  of  Commission  proposal  for  a  Regulation  laying  down  common  provisions 

(COM(2018) 375);  
Article 2(1)(b)  of  Commission  proposal  for  a  Regulation  on  the  ERDF  and  the  Cohesion  Fund 
(COM(2018) 372). 

51 

 
                                                           
 
regardless  of  their  size,  would  undergo  an  enhanced  selection  procedure  incorporating 
some  features  of  the  old  ‘major  projects’  approach.  Selected  operations  will  have  to 
present  the  best  mix  of  amount  of  support,  activities  undertaken  and  achievement  of 
objectives.  Beneficiaries  will  have  to  have  the  necessary  financial  resources  and 
mechanisms to cover operation and maintenance costs, thus addressing potential financial 
sustainability  issues.  The  clear  prioritisation  of  projects  is  designed  to  maximise  the 
contribution of EU funding to the achievement of the programme’s objectives.  

Achievement of these objectives would be further supported by the proposed introduction 
the  2014-2020  ex ante 
of  new  enabling  conditions  replacing  and  reinforcing 
conditionalities  for  environmental  investments.  The  two-tier  approach  requiring  a 
cost/benefit  analysis  (CBA)  only  for  projects  above  a  certain  threshold  would  be 
discontinued.  To  prioritise  projects  offering  the  best  value  for  money,  programme 
authorities will need a suitable assessment tool or mechanism.  After decades of project 
development experience in the framework established by the Commission, Member State 
administrations  and  beneficiaries  have  developed  their  own  economic  and  financial 
assessment  capacity  and  skills,  adapted  to  the  context  in  which  they  operate,  including 
national and regional requirements. Member States will therefore be free to choose what 
form  this  takes,  but  it  is  likely  that  many  will  continue  to  use  CBAs,  given  their 
experience from previous periods and the straightforwardness of the tool.  

The  Commission’s  proposal  would  require  that  the  most  important  projects  from  a 
strategic  perspective  be  explicitly  included  in  the  programme  and  be  subject  to 
heightened  monitoring  in  discussions  with  the  monitoring  committee,  and  with  the 
Commission  in  the  annual  review  process.  They  would  also  be  subject  to  stricter 
visibility and communication requirements. 

52 

 
 
 
ANNEX 1: PROCEDURAL INFORMATION 

1.  LEAD DG, DeCIDE PLANNING/CWP REFERENCES 

DG Regional and Urban Policy was the lead DG. 

Decide Planning: PLAN/2018/4708- Planning (Planned) – 17.12.2018 

2.  ORGANISATION AND TIMING 

Tender procedure launched  
Contract signed  
1st steering group meeting 
Last steering group meeting 
Final report accepted  
Number of steering group meetings  5 
Participating  DGs  (in  addition  to 
DG REGIO) 

December 2016 (contract renewal)  
May 2018 
September 2018 
17 September 2019 
August 2019 

CONNECT:  Communications  Networks,  Content 
and Technology 
ENV: Environment 
MOVE: Mobility and Transport 
RTD: Research and Innovation 
SG: Secretariat-General 

3.  EXCEPTIONS TO BETTER REGULATION GUIDELINES 

The initiative was exempted from a general open public consultation, as agreed with the 
Secretariat-General  in  line  with  the  approach  followed  for  the  Evaluation  on  Major 
projects in the transport sector. It was considered in fact that general public might not be 
familiar  with  the  notion  of  ‘major  projects’  thus  making  it  difficult  to  collect  relevant 
feedback  on  cohesion  policy  investments  in  the  sector.  The  limited  number  of  replies 
(40) to the on-line targeted public consultation conducted as part of the ex post evaluation 
of  major  projects  supported  by  the  ERDF  and  Cohesion  Fund  in  2000-2013  confirmed 
the identified difficulties.  Therefore in  the case  of this evaluation,  as mentioned in  the 
roadmap84,  the  consultation  strategy  involved  interviews  for  all  selected  projects  and  a 
seminar  with 
including  major  project  beneficiaries, 
programme-managing  authorities,  national  and  regional  authorities,  academics  and 
experts in environmental infrastructures.  

stakeholders, 

relevant 

4.  EVIDENCE, SOURCES AND QUALITY 

This staff working document is based largely on a study by an independent consultant, to 
which  the  Commission  contributed  through  active  participation  in  the  interservice 
steering group, which ensured the quality of the study. 

The analysis is complemented by internal Commission fund management data, analytical 
reports  and  past  evaluations.  It  follows  the  methodology  provided  for  in  the  Better 

84  See Evaluation Roadmap: 

file:///C:/Users/amichcl/AppData/Local/Packages/Microsoft.MicrosoftEdge_8wekyb3d8bbwe/TempSt
ate/Downloads/PART-2018-591321V1.pdf. 

53 

 
 
                                                           
 
Regulation  Guidelines  and  the  Commission’s  Guide  to  cost-benefit  analysis.  The  main 
sources of information were: 

  European Commission (2018), Ex post evaluation of major projects supported by 
the European Regional  Development  Fund (ERDF) and Cohesion  Fund between 
2000 and 2013 – final report; 

  European  Commission  (2005),  Ex  post  evaluation  of  a  sample  of  projects 

co-financed by the Cohesion Fund (1993-2002) – synthesis report; 

  European Commission (2010), Ex post evaluation of cohesion policy interventions 
2000-2006  financed  by  the  Cohesion  Fund  (including  former  ISPA)  –  work 
package C: cost-benefit analysis of selected environment projects (DG REGIO); 

  European  Commission  (2012),  Ex  post  evaluation  of  investment  projects 
co-financed by the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and Cohesion 
Fund (CF) in the period 1994-1999 (DG REGIO); 

  European  Union  (2015),  Guide  to  cost-benefit  analysis  of  investment  projects  – 

economic appraisal tool for cohesion policy 2014-2020; 

  European Commission (2016), Ex post evaluation of cohesion policy programmes 
2007-2013,  focusing  on  the  European  Regional  Development  Fund  (ERDF)  and 
the Cohesion Fund (CF) – work package 6: environment – final report; 

  ADE,  Agrotec,  Bio  Intelligence  Service,  Orbicon  (2009),  Ex  post  evaluation  of 
cohesion  policy  programmes  2000-2006  co-financed  by  the  European  Fund  for 
Regional Development (objectives 1 and 2) – work package 5b: environment and 
climate change – final report (Volume I); 

  ADE  (2009),  Ex  post  evaluation  of  cohesion  policy  programmes  2000-2006 
co-financed by the European Fund for Regional Development (objectives 1 and 2) 
– work package 5b: environment and climate change – second intermediate report; 

  Applica (2012), Ex post evaluation of the Cohesion Fund (including former ISPA) 

in the 2000-2006 period – work package E:  

  Applica (2012), Ex post evaluation of cohesion policy programmes 2000-2006 co-
financed by the ERDF (objectives 1 and 2)  – work package 5a: transport  – final 
report; 

  COWI  A/S,  Milieu  sprl,  (2019),  Integration  of  environmental  concerns  in 
cohesion policy funds (ERDF, ESF, Cohesion Fund): results, evolution and trends 
through three programming periods (2000-2006, 2007-2013, 2014-2020); 

  COWI  A/S,  Milieu,  CSIL  (2016),  Ex  post  evaluation  of  cohesion  policy 
programmes  2007-2013,  focusing  on  the  European  Regional  Development  Fund 
(ERDF) and the Cohesion Fund (CF) – work package 6: environment;  

  https://cohesiondata.ec.europa.eu/ (Open Data platform). 

54 

 
 
ANNEX 2: STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION 

As  envisaged  in  the  evaluation  roadmap,  the  consultation  strategy  involved  two  main 
activities: qualitative interviews for case studies and a seminar with stakeholders.  

The  interviews  took  place  between  September  and  December  2018.  The  seminar  took 
place in March 2019.  

                       Consultation activities 

  Stakeholders 

Interviews (for case studies) 

Seminar 

Managing  authorities  responsible  for 
programmes including major projects 

Relevance, 
Coherence, 
Effectiveness,  Efficiency,  EU 
added value, Sustainability 

Relevance, 
Coherence, 
Effectiveness,  Efficiency,  EU 
added value, Sustainability 

10 

the 

studies 

Beneficiaries of major projects covered 
and 
by 
case 
in 
environmental  major  projects 
general 
authorities 
Regional/national 
responsible 
where 
for 
environmental  major  projects  were 
implemented 

areas 

Experts and academics 

Interviews for case studies 

Effectiveness, 
Sustainability 

Efficiency, 

Effectiveness, 
Sustainability 

Efficiency; 

Relevance, 
Effectiveness,  EU 
value 

Coherence, 
added 

Relevance, 
Effectiveness,  EU 
value 

Coherence, 
added 

Relevance,  Effectiveness,  EU 
added value 

Relevance,  Effectiveness,  EU 
added value 

Field  missions  for  each  case  study  were  essential  in  the  assessment  of  project 
performance. An extensive interview plan was drawn up to collect primary data and the 
views and perceptions of a broad range of stakeholders. On average, 20 interviews with 
relevant stakeholders were conducted for each case study. The 217 interviewees included 
civil servants (national ministries and EC officials, managing authorities), representatives 
of the service provider, experts (engineers and planners), policymakers (mayors, regional 
and municipal councillors), users and journalists. They were especially helpful in:  

  describing  the  projects,  with  a  critical  focus  on  scoping,  geographical  and 

technical aspects and key stakeholders; 

  analysing  the  socioeconomic  context  in  which  projects  were  implemented, 
highlighting  key  regional  development  needs  and  how  the  projects  could  meet 
them; 

  reconstructing the decision-making process as regards the choice of project; 

  exploring  whether  other  feasible  alternatives  were  available  and  explaining  the 

reasons for the final choice; and 

  collecting  evidence  on  non-quantifiable  effects  and  factors  affecting  project 

outcomes (both in the past and in the present/future).  

55 

 
 
 
 
The independent consultants who run the study provided the case studies’ authors  with a 
toolkit for conducting interviews with the relevant stakeholders. A matrix was set up to 
investigate the major projects according to the evaluation criteria (relevance, coherence, 
effectiveness,  efficiency,  EU  added  value).  As  a  result,  it  was  possible  to  deepen  the 
evidence by:  

 

introducing effects that are by nature unquantifiable and excluded from the CBA, 
but are relevant to the evaluation; and  

  analysing  project  governance  and  organisational  arrangements  for  correlations 
roles 
and  motivations, 

between  project 
(decision-making process and stakeholder involvement).  

responsibilities 

results 

and 

A list of interviewees is attached to each case study report. 

Seminar 

The seminar took place on 5 March 2019 in Brussels and gathered 42 experts. The main 
topics discussed were:  

 

 

 

the benefits of environmental infrastructure projects; 

the EU added value of major projects in the environment sector; and 

forecasting capacity and project success. 

The main conclusions can be summarised as follows:  

  benefits  –  environmental  infrastructure  projects  can  bring  a  wide  range  of 
benefits, many of which are multidimensional, e.g. improved seawater quality can 
generate  benefits  in  terms  not  only  of  environmental  sustainability,  but  also  of 
economic growth and quality of life. The exact scope of a project within the wider 
network  and  the  counterfactual  scenario  determine  what  types  of  benefit  can  be 
detected; 

  maximisation of benefits – the benefits can: 

o  be maximised through accurate prioritisation of related projects; 

o  ensure timely implementation of accompanying investments; and 

o 

take account of potential external factors; 

 

the  valuation  of  ecosystem  services  (i.e. goods  and  services  provided  by  the 
natural  environment  that  benefit  people)  is  a  good  way  of  capturing  the  value 
provided  by  the  environment  in  a  CBA.  The  inclusion  of  ecosystem  services  in 
CBAs has become standard procedure – the approach is to calculate the value that 
people attach to them, taking into consideration both use and non-use values;  

  EU added value can be delivered as:  

o 

financial  and  technical  value  (e.g.  raising  enough  funds  to  realise  the 
projects  and  freeing  up  national  funds  for  alternative  projects;  enhancing 
the  credibility  of  EU-funded  projects,  thus  encouraging  other  lenders  to 
follow suit);  

o  knowledge 

transfer  and 

innovation  value  (e.g. financing 

innovative 

solutions, facilitating knowledge transfer);  

56 

 
o  environmental  value  (e.g.  promoting  compliance  with  EU  environmental 
standards  and  directives,  setting  political  agendas,  solving  common 
cross-border environmental problems); and 

o  capacity-building 

and 

stakeholder 

engagement  value 

(e.g. local 

capacity-building, increasing visibility and engagement).  

It  can  be  maximised  by  identifying  and  funding  projects  that  show  potential 
benefits  in  all  four  categories.  Also,  transboundary  effects  represent  a  key 
argument for EU intervention on environmental protection;  

forecasting  capacity  remains  a  critical  issue.  Two  main  sources  of  potential 
forecasting  errors  were  identified:  project  outcomes  and  parameter  values. 
Uncertainty  is  an  inherent  part  of  forecasting  and  thus  of  policymaking.  The 
impact of behavioural aspects should be taken into account in this context. While 
experience  from  previous  projects,  statistical 
interdisciplinary 
cooperation  can  help  to  mitigate  errors,  a  sensitivity  and  risk  analysis  (to  verify 
the accuracy of the economic evaluation) is key to a sound assessment;  

trends  and 

costs  and  benefits  of  disaster  risk  reduction  –  prevention  and  risk-reduction 
projects entail difficulties, as they incur costs in the present, but their benefits are 
not tangible and will theoretically materialise only in the future. The benefits are 
difficult to estimate or promote, as they relate to an absence of damage. In order to 
determine  the  true  benefit  of  such  projects,  it  is  necessary  to  compare  the 
socioeconomic costs of implementation with those of non-action in the event of a 
disaster. Therefore, there is a need to develop a fully-fledged systematic approach 
for risk modelling, adopting a ‘what if’ perspective; 

economic  valuation  of  environmental  goods  and  services  –  economics  can 
provide valuations only in terms of anthropocentric values. Therefore, the values 
determined  in  a  CBA  represent  only  a  lower  bound  of  the  true  value  of  nature, 
which  would  incorporate  other  intrinsic  values  beyond  its  significance  for 
humans.  However,  as  a  tool  CBAs  allow  for  systematic  analysis  and  provide 
transparency for decision-makers. In particular, they make it possible to check for 
and adjust assumptions, over-estimates and under-estimates; and  

relationship between environmental impact assessment (EIA) and CBA – it is 
crucial  to  follow  closely  the  results  of  the  EIA  in  order  to  identify  the  relevant 
physical  effects  detected  by  scientists  and  incorporate  them  in  the  CBA.  These 
effects can be used as a basis for valuing and monetising the anticipated changes. 

 

 

 

 

57 

 
 
ANNEX 3: METHODS AND ANALYTICAL MODELS 

The methodology used for this evaluation followed that used for the ex post evaluation of 
major  projects  in  transport,  but  was  adjusted  to  the  specificities  of  large  environmental 
infrastructures. The aim was to analyse the long-term contribution of 10 major projects in 
the EU in the environment sector in the 2000-2006 and 2007-2013 programming periods 
and co-financed by the ERDF or the Cohesion Fund. The main goal was to assess their 
role in economic development and improving citizens’ quality of life and wellbeing, and 
their environmental sustainability.  

The  evaluation  concerns  only  major  projects  supported  by  direct  cohesion  policy 
investments in the environment sector.  Case studies were the main tools used: the focus 
of the exercise was to evaluate 10 illustrative examples of environment projects capable 
of delivering insights into the possible long-term effects of infrastructures and the causal 
chain leading to those effects.   

Process of selection 

First, the Commission produced a list of 30 major environmental projects financed in the 
programming periods in question and particularly relevant to the scope of the evaluation. 
The following criteria were taken into account: 

• 

• 

the projects should be implemented in Member States investing the most cohesion 
policy  resources  (in  absolute  and/or  relative85  terms)  in  certain  fields  of 
intervention (FOIs) (2000-2006) or priority themes (PTs) (2007-2013);  

they  should  reflect  the  financial  allocation  among  the  four  environmental 
FOIs/PTs: 

o  category 45 – management and distribution of water (drinking water);  

o  category 46 – water treatment (wastewater);  

o  category 44 – management of household and industrial waste; and  

o  category 54  –  other  measures  to  preserve  the  environment  and  prevent 

risks;   

• 

they should have been operational for at least five years by the time the evaluation 
was  launched  and  not  have  been  covered  by  case  studies  in  other  DG REGIO 
evaluations;  

•  data availability; 

•  capacity to provide relevant policy lessons;  

•  project variety in terms of expected long-term effects;  

• 

stakeholders’ willingness to cooperate.  

The  evaluation  team  prepared  project  summary  sheets  on  the  basis  of  the  following 
research and analysis:  

85 

i.e. in relation to their cohesion policy allocation. 

58 

 
 
                                                           
o 

o 

thorough analysis of project documents available to the Commission and collected 
by the national and local authorities in charge of the projects; 

interviews  with  managing  authorities  or 
institutions  and,  where 
relevant,  other 
correspondents’ knowledge of the projects’ history; and 

intermediate  bodies,  beneficiary 
informed  parties,  and  national 

o  desk  research  of  publicly  available  information  and  data  (including  project 

websites, press articles, reports and studies).  

The evaluation  experts then conducted an in-depth  analysis to  select  the  final  10 major 
projects. They developed an evaluability scoring system in order to select the case studies 
in an objective and consistent way. In particular, the projects’ evaluability was assessed 
according to the following criteria, weighted to reflect their relative importance:  

 

strategic relevance for evaluation purposes (40%);  

  availability and quality of data from existing sources (30%);   

 

stakeholders’  availability  and  willingness  to  cooperate,  and  availability  and 
relevance  of  information  for  assessing  the  chain  of  effects  in  the  development, 
implementation and operational stages of the project in its wider context (‘theory 
of change’ analysis) (30%). 

For each criterion, a set of questions was compiled and four conditions identified, to be 
scored  on  a  four-point  scale.  By  summing  up  the  scores  and  weighting  for  the  relative 
importance  of  the  criteria,  a  total  score  was  calculated  for  each  criterion.  The  projects 
were  then  ranked  according  to  evaluability  and  qualitative  comments  added  setting  out 
the reasons for the rankings. 

The  following  variables  were  also  considered,  in  order  to  ensure  a  balanced  sample  of 
projects:  

 

 

• 

• 

• 

sector – water (including wastewater and water supply projects), solid waste and 
other environmental projects;  

financing  period  –  2000-2006  or  2007-2013.  There  is  a  trade-off  between  more 
mature  and  more  recent  projects.  While  the  former  are  more  likely  to  have 
long-term effects that have fully materialised, they may be associated with issues 
that  have  already  been  addressed/discussed  and  so  less  informative  for  the  next 
programming  period.  On  the  other  hand,  the  latter  are  in  principle  more 
informative,  but  operational  for  a  shorter  time  span,  so  it  is  more  difficult  to 
capture their long-term contribution to wellbeing;  

location – geographical distribution across Member States; 

type of project; and 

type of financing. 

The  evaluation  team  prepared  a  toolkit  to  guide  the  case  studies’  authors  and  national 
correspondents in their work. The guidelines sought to provide helpful suggestions on the 
sources to be used for the quantitative and qualitative analysis, and the structure and style 
of the documents themselves.  

The  qualitative-quantitative  approach  required  national  correspondents  to  use  several 
sources  of  information.  Official  sources  were  the  main  basis  for  research  and  analysis, 

59 

 
but  independent  reports,  press  articles  and  stakeholders’  perceptions  and  opinions  were 
also used.  

Field  missions  and  direct  interviews  played  an  essential  part  in  the  assessment  (see 
Annex 2). The interviewees provided overall insights into the impacts and history of the 
projects. The field missions enabled the authors to observe the projects in person. 

Once qualitative and quantitative information had been gathered, the evaluation experts  
integrated it into a coherent  narrative.  In order to guarantee consistency, the evaluation 
team developed a case study template.  

Analysis -method 

The  methodology  used  for  the  evaluation  consisted  of  an  ex  post  CBA  combined  with 
qualitative techniques (site visits, stakeholder interviews, press articles, reviews, etc.).  

The  core  team  developed  the  methodological  framework  on  the  basis  of  an  extensive 
review of the relevant theoretical and empirical literature. It was then uniformly applied 
to all 10 selected case studies. It allows for comparisons to be made and common policy 
lessons to be drawn.  

The methodology consisted of four building blocks:  

  mapping the effects of large environmental infrastructure projects;  

  measuring the effects;  

  understanding the effects;  

  synthesis and conclusions. 

Assessment framework 

Source: CSIL and Ramboll.  

60 

 
 
 
 
Mapping the effects 

The  first  step  was  to  conduct  a  comprehensive  literature  review  to  map  and  develop  a 
common understanding  of  the potential effects  of major environmental projects  in  each 
of  the  three  sub-sectors  (water  supply  and  sanitation,  waste  management,  and 
environment  protection,  remediation  and  risk  prevention).  The  effects  were  grouped  in 
four broad categories:  

•  effects on economic growth;  

•  effects relating to quality of life and wellbeing;  

•  effects relating to environmental sustainability;  

•  effects relating to distributional issues.  

Measuring the effects  

The second step involved measuring the relevant negative and positive effects. CBA was 
selected as the most suitable method for assessing long-term effects. As demonstrated in 
the literature and in  international  practice, it makes it possible to  identify,  quantify and 
value in monetary terms most of the direct economic effects generated by major projects. 
Also,  it  is  particularly  appropriate  given  the  micro  level  of  analysis,  which  produces 
findings  and  recommendations  that  can  be  used  in  project  design,  selection  and 
implementation. Finally, CBA is the quantitative method used most commonly to assess 
the  long-term  effects  of  infrastructure  projects  both  ex ante  and  ex post.  As  required 
under  the  ‘major  project’  procedure,  an  ex ante  CBA  was  available  for  all  the  selected 
projects, so using CBA for ex post evaluation allowed for comparison of ex ante forecasts 
with observed effects in order to assess project effectiveness. 

Qualitative analysis was used to complement the CBA with a broader view of long-term 
effects.  Some  intangible  long-term  contributions  (e.g. institutional  learning,  social 
cohesion)  are  difficult  to  express  in  monetary  terms.  Although  they  are  additional  to 
direct  effects  accounted  for  in  the  CBA,  they  are  relevant,  particularly  for  a 
comprehensive  understanding  of  the  mechanisms  of  change,  so  qualitative  assessment 
was used to take account of them. This mix is particularly appropriate, because it gives a 
broad  view  of  long-term  effects,  while  sticking  to  a  prudent  approach  based  on  hard 
facts. 

The long-term effects of major projects in the environment sector are: 

•  effects  that  are  naturally  expressed  in  monetary  terms  (e.g. price/cost  savings)  – 

these can easily be included in a CBA; 

•  effects that are quantitative, but not expressed in monetary terms, and that can be 
converted  into  monetary  units  in  a  reasonably  reliable  way  (e.g. variation  in 
energy recovery in  waste-to-energy projects)  – these can  also  be included in  the 
CBA; 

•  effects that are quantitative, but not expressed in monetary terms, for which there 
are  no  reasonably  reliable  conversion  factors  –  they  were  not  included  in  the 
CBA,  but  discuss    in  qualitative  terms  together  with  the  overall  outcome  of  the 
CBA; 

•  effects  that  are  difficult  to  measure  in  quantitative  (cardinal)  terms,  but  lend 
themselves to  ordinal measurement  (projects  can be ranked  ‘very  good’,  ‘good’, 

61 

 
‘neutral’, ‘bad’, ‘very bad’, for example, on the basis of their impact) – they were 
analysed in qualitative terms; 

•  effects that might occur, but are subject to a high degree of uncertainty – these are 

addressed in the risk/scenario analysis in the CBA; and 

•  effects  that  might  occur,  but  cannot  even  be  expressed  in  an  ordinal  (ranking) 
manner – these are residual effects that can be described in qualitative terms in the 
case study report. 

Where possible, effects were quantified and monetary values were assigned to them for 
inclusion  in  a  CBA  model.  Otherwise,  a  qualitative  assessment  was  carried  out.  It  was 
then possible to use a scoring system to build consistent metrics of the effects.  

The  approach  proposed  in  the  Commission’s  CBA  guide  was  adjusted  slightly  to  take 
account  of  the  interim  perspective  of  the  assessment.  While  the  CBA  guide  adopts  an 
ex ante  perspective,  the  evaluation  covered  projects  in  operation  for  at  least  five  years 
before the launch of the study itself and so involved an interim assessment in relation to 
the  projects’  lifetime.  For  this  reason,  the  approach  also  drew  lessons  from 
Florio (2014)86, which contains useful insights for carrying out  ex post CBAs, and from 
the team’s experience of applying ex post CBA to a sample of major projects co-financed 
by the ERDF and the Cohesion Fund in 1994-1999.  

The first implication of the interim perspective was that, while the most significant set of 
effects that the evaluation experts expected to observe ex post were those also reflected in 
the ex ante CBA, the ex post CBA could be slightly more ambitious in terms of effects to 
be  accounted  for,  as  the  risk  of  optimism  bias  was  mitigated  by  the  availability  of 
observed data. While prudence is fundamental to avoid optimism bias in an ex ante CBA, 
an ex post CBA benefits from much greater certainty and knowledge as to what actually 
happened.  

Also,  the  fact  that  it  is  carried  out  during  a  project’s  lifetime  lends  the  CBA  a  hybrid 
character that shares features of an ex ante and a pure ex post (i.e. retrospective) exercise. 
The  CBA  is  conducted  ‘today’,  i.e. it  looks  both  backwards  (using  past  evidence  of 
project  performance)  and  forward  (forecasting  future  developments).  Therefore,  it  is 
necessary to mix historical data with present data and forecasts.  

The  main  aim  of  the  analysis  was  to  assess  the  long-term  contribution  of  the  selected 
projects to economic development and quality of life, rather than comparing the ex ante 
and  ex post  CBAs.  For  this  reason,  the  ex ante  appraisal  was  used  as  a  reference  to 
understand  better  the  rationale  of  project  selection  and  the  underlying  assumptions,  in 
order more accurately to reconstruct the decision-making process; it will not necessarily 
be a comparator for the observed ex post CBA. 

The interim perspective posed some challenges to the treatment of key parameters in the 
CBA and some important related issues: 

• 

time horizon – this depends on the sector; the recommended periods are:  

o 

o 

for water and waste management, 30 years;  

for projects that relate to ecosystem services, 100 years;  

86  Florio,  M.  (2014).  Applied  welfare  economics:  cost-benefit  analysis  of  projects  and  policies 

(Routledge; London, UK). 

62 

 
                                                           
o 

for disaster risk reduction projects, 35-50 years; 

•  choice  between  current  and  real  prices  –  the  CBA  is  based  on  constant  (real) 

prices; 

•  project identification – this is based on two criteria:  

o  self-standing unit of analysis;  

o  pertinence.  

This approach meant that:  

 

investments completed before project  year ‘zero’ that are not functionally 
related to existing infrastructure are treated as sunk costs and not included 
in the CBA;  

  preparatory  works,  site  arrangements,  environmental  protection  and 
land-use  related  costs  are  included,  as  they  are  necessary  for  the 
implementation of the project;   

  operating (and extraordinary maintenance) costs are included;  

• 

• 

reference  scenario  –  from  an  ex  post  perspective,  the  counterfactual  scenario  is 
what  would  have  happened  in  the  absence  of  the  project.  While  the  ex post 
perspective  would  allow  to  take  account  of  unpredictable  events  that  occurred 
after  the  start  of  the  project,  this  knowledge  is  ignored  in  the  definition  of  the 
counterfactual scenario; 

forecasting  the  future  –  the  ‘today’  viewpoint  involves  forecasting  inflows  and 
outflows from today until the end of the time horizon. In this regard, the  ex post 
and ex ante approaches do not differ significantly; 

•  discount rates – the social discount rate (SDR) is used to discount economic costs 
and  benefits  in  the  future,  as  it  reflects  how  society  evaluates  today’s  wellbeing 
versus future wellbeing. As the CBA was carried out in the middle of the project’s 
lifecycle, it was necessary to discount future cash flows and capitalise past ones. 
For  this  reason,  a  backward  and  a  forward  SDR  were  needed.  Ad hoc 
country-specific  SDR  values  are  provided.  In  contrast,  the  financial  analysis 
applies  a  single  backward  and  onward  financial  discount  rate  (4%)  to  financial 
flows; 

• 

• 

shadow prices – in a hybrid ex post CBA, two sets of conversion factors should 
ideally  be  estimated  for  the  two  levels  of  analysis  (backwards  and  onwards),  as 
the opportunity cost may change over time. For this reason, ad hoc backward and 
onward  conversion  factors  of  labour  at  regional  level  were  computed.  For  other 
major  inputs  (e.g. land  and  utilities),  ad  hoc  conversion  factors  were  estimated 
case  by  case,  depending  on  available  data  and  according  to  national  guidelines 
where applicable; 

standard conversion factors (SCFs) – these are used to adjust the cost of all inputs 
into the financial analysis for which a specific conversion factor is not available. 
Normally,  SCFs  are  used  only  for  correcting  the  financial  prices  of  minor 
(non-tradable) inputs. For the purpose of this study and based on methodological 
considerations, they were set at 1;  

•  monetisation of economic benefits – unit values of typical economic benefits and 
costs  generated  by  environmental    projects  are  estimated  using  the  standard 

63 

 
methodologies  currently  used  for  CBAs  of  major  projects  for  the  2014-2020 
programming period and updating values to today’s value. 

It should be stressed that the main aim of this study was not to verify the ex ante CBA 
and/or merely discover ex post deviations from it.  

Qualitative  analysis  complemented  the  quantitative  exercise.  The  techniques  used  were 
documentary analysis, desk research and interviews with stakeholders.  

Effects investigated in qualitative terms were then aggregated to measurable effects and a 
comprehensive assessment was provided through a scoring system from -5 (‘the highest 
negative effect was generated’) to +5 (‘given the existing constraints, the highest positive 
effect was generated’). The purpose of this scoring system was to highlight intuitively the 
most  important  effects  generated  in  each  case  study,  regardless  of  whether  they  were 
measurable.  

Understanding the effects  

Once the project effects had been identified and measured, and the causal chain linking 
different  categories  of  short-term  and  long-term  effects  investigated,  the  third  stage 
entailed looking at the external and internal factors that determined the observed causal 
chain of effects and influenced the observed project performance.  

The  evaluation  team  identified  six  determinants  of  project  outcomes  and  their 
development:  

• 

• 

relation  to  the  context,  which  includes  aspects  of  the  institutional,  social  and 
economic environment surrounding the project;  

selection process, which relates to the institutional and legislative framework that 
regulates how public investment decisions are taken; 

•  project design, which refers to the technical capacity to design a project properly; 

• 

forecasting  capacity,  which  relates  to  the  possibility  of  predicting  future  trends 
and forecasting demand level and technical challenges, and the ability to do so; 

•  project governance, which concerns the number and type of stakeholders involved 

during the project cycle and how responsibilities are attributed and shared;  

•  managerial capacity, which refers to the professional ability to: 

o 

react to changes in the project context and to unforeseen events;  

o  deliver the expected level of services in the operational phase.  

These determinants were highly interrelated and capable of reinforcing or diluting each 
other. Also, determinants can change over time, so it is important to make clear the link 
between  identified  determinants  and  the  specific  effect  triggered.  In  doing  so,  the 
evaluation team identified typical ‘paths’ or project behaviours linking the determinants 
in a dynamic fashion. These patterns represented common narratives describing recurring 
performance patterns, and typical problems that can influence the sequence of events. 

Summary and conclusion 

The  fourth  stage  of  the  methodology  was  to  summarise  the  findings  from  the  projects 
using  a  set  of  evaluation  questions.  This  enabled  a  final  assessment  based  on  the 
following evaluation criteria:  

64 

 
• 

relevance  (were  the  objectives  in  line  with  development  needs  and  priorities  at 
programme, national and/or EU level?); 

•  coherence  (with  other  national  and/or  EU  interventions  in  the  same  sector  or 

region); 

•  effectiveness  (were  the  objectives  achieved,  and  on  time?  Did  other  effects 

materialise? Were other options considered?); 

•  efficiency (costs and benefits relative to each other and to ex ante values);  

•  EU added value (was EU support necessary? EU-wide effects? Further EU action 

required?) 

A  stakeholder  seminar  to  discuss  preliminary  evidence  from  the  case  studies  was  an 
integral  part  of  the  methodology.  It  was  held  on  March  2019  in  Brussels  and  was 
attended by 42 people, including policymakers, academic experts and local stakeholders. 
The main topics discussed were:  

 

the benefits of environmental infrastructure projects; 

  EU added value of major projects in the environment sector;  

 

forecasting capacity and project success. 

65 

 
 
ANNEX 4: CASE STUDIES 

PROJECTS  IN  THE  WATER  SUPPLY  AND  SANITATION  SECTOR,  INCLUDING  WASTEWATER 
TREATMENT 

Sofia integrated water project (Bulgaria) 

This  project  was  co-financed  by 
the  Cohesion  Fund  in  the  ISPA 
2000-2006 programming period. 

It  covered  the  whole  water  cycle 
in the Sofia municipality, from the 
treatment  and  distribution  of 
potable  water  to  the  collection, 
conveyance  and  return  of  treated 
wastewater to the environment. In 
the 
particular, 
design,  planning  and  construction 
of a sewerage network to convey sewage to a reconstructed and enlarged WWTP in Sofia 
up  to  the  EU  standard  and  the  rehabilitation  of  two  drinking  water  treatment  plants  to 
ensure the public supply of purified water.  

it  consisted  of 

The  overall  objective  was  to  achieve  compliance  with  the  EU  environmental  acquis 
(particularly  the  DWD  and  UWWTD)  and  to  stimulate  local  and  regional  economic 
activity and regional development. 

Sofia,  the  capital  of  Bulgaria,  is  located  in  the  western  part  of  the  country  below  the 
northern Vitosha Mountain and has a rapidly expanding population that currently stands 
at  around  1.2 million.  At  the  time  of  project  implementation,  highly  insufficient  water 
and wastewater infrastructure investments had resulted in poor maintenance and a failure 
to  replace  or  expand  the  wastewater  network,  as  required  in  the  light  of  the  city’s 
development. The sewerage system in the newly built neighbourhoods was undeveloped. 
As a consequence, both the water bodies and the surrounding environment were in poor 
condition.  

The  Municipality  was  unable  to  meet  citizens’  and  businesses’  infrastructure  needs.  In 
some areas, sewerage systems  were only  partially  constructed, while a third of the  city 
had none. This hindered opportunities for business development, improving inhabitants’ 
quality  of  life  and,  more  generally,  the  sustainable  economic  and  environmental 
development of the area.  

The  construction  phase  ran  from  2009  to  2011,  while  the  operational  phase  started  in 
2012.  The  project  involved  a  total  investment  of  €68.4 million87,  of  which  €31 million 
was  co-financed  by  ISPA.  The  remaining  investment  was  covered  by  a  national  public 
contribution of €31.3 million and a €6.1 million EIB loan. 

87 

In nominal prices, excluding VAT. 

66 

 
 
                                                           
The beneficiary (and owner) of the infrastructure is Sofia Municipality and it is operated 
by Sofiyska Voda JSC under a 25-year concession contract. Tariffs are controlled by the 
Energy and Water Regulatory Commission. 

The scope of the project was changed during project preparation by excluding three main 
components, due to delays in land expropriation procedures, additional investment costs 
and over-estimation of the components’ performance. This led to a 20% decrease in EU 
assistance.  

The  project  achieved  its  objectives  of  contributing  to  achieving  compliance  with  the 
WFD  and  UWWTD,  making  the  water  distribution  system  more  reliable  and  reducing 
losses and river pollution.  

The evidence is that the project had a positive impact on economic growth, welfare and 
the environment. This impact was all the greater because the ex ante situation was so bad 
and the project addressed very urgent needs. Therefore, the project is assessed as highly 
relevant. It remained fully in line with the development needs and priorities established at 
various levels. The benefits to society could have been maximised through more precise 
forecasting and project selection. However, the good management qualities shown by the 
main players helped overcome the challenges of the planning period and achieve the set 
objectives. Effectiveness could have been maximised if the scope of the project had not 
been  reduced.  That,  together  with  the  implementation  delays  and  the  reduction  in  the 
amount of the EU grant, meant that the project was less efficient than initially planned. 
However,  the  gradual  improvement  of  the  tariff-setting  system,  ensuring  sustainability 
and  compliance  with  the  ‘polluter  pays’  and  ‘cost  recovery’  principles,  deserves  to  be 
recognised. Beyond financial aid, significant EU added value lay in the capacity-building 
and 
the  course  of  project  preparation  and 
implementation. 

learning  acquired 

institutional 

in 

67 

 
 
 
Malta South sewage treatment plant (Malta) 

South 

sewage 
The  Malta 
treatment  plant  was  co-financed 
by  the  EU  in  the  2007-2013 
programming  period.  The  project 
is  located  on  the  south-east  coast 
of Malta.  

In  the  past  decade,  the  south  of 
Malta, like rest of the country, has 
seen  strong  population  growth, 
significant 
with 
combined 
economic development. Several infrastructure projects implemented before and after EU 
accession in 2004 have formed the backbone of the island’s economic growth.  

Before project implementation, most of the wastewater produced on the Maltese islands 
was  discharged  untreated  into  the  Mediterranean.  This  caused  high  levels  of 
contamination,  which  damaged  coastal  ecosystems  and  hampered  bathing  and  other 
recreational activities.  

The core of the project was the construction of a new sewage treatment plant near the old 
discharge  site.  The  primary  goal  was  to  treat  wastewater  before  discharging  it  into  the 
sea,  thereby  improving  offshore/inshore  water  quality,  restoring  bathing  water  quality 
and thus achieving compliance with EU directives.  

The  project  involved  a  total  initial  investment  of  €68 million  in  nominal  prices 
(excluding  VAT),  which  was  co-financed  from  national  funds  (15%)  and  a  Cohesion 
Fund contribution (85%), allocated through Malta’s Operational Programme I – Investing 
in competitiveness for a better quality of life (2007-2013). Initial project ideas from 1992 
were  included  in  the  sewerage  masterplan  for  the  Maltese  Islands,  drawn  up  for  the 
Ministry of Development and Infrastructure. After feasibility studies, an accurate option 
analysis and project design, construction works were carried out between 2008 and 2010. 
The operational phase started in 2011. 

The construction of the sewage treatment plant was the last and the largest part of a wider 
investment plan, which included two smaller plants, one in Gozo and one in the north of 
Malta.  Together,  the  three  infrastructures  represented  a  new  long-term  vision  for 
sustainable wastewater treatment in Malta. 

The  project  achieved  its  main  objective  of  treating  all  collected  wastewater  before 
discharging it into the sea. However, while the effluent is compliant with the BWD (all 
bathing  waters  have  been  ‘excellent’  since  2014),  it  is  not  yet  fully  compliant  with  the 
UWWTD.  

Thanks  to  its  high  relevance,  socioeconomic  desirability  and  consistency  with  national 
and EU needs and objectives, this represents a good example of a major project. Project 
implementation  proceeded  smoothly  overall  and  efficient  use  was  made  of  public 
resources. 

There are some concerns in relation to plant capacity. Continuing population growth may 
affect the relevance of the project in the long term. Other factors, such as the discharge of 

68 

 
farm waste into sewers and the lack of alternatives to the landfilling of sludge, had a big 
impact on project performance. 

69 

 
 
 
Sochaczew sewage management (Poland) 

The  construction  of  a  wastewater  network 
serving  nearly  a  third  of  the  population  of 
Sochaczew  was  a  major  project  co-financed 
by  the  EU  in  the  2007-2013  programming 
period. 

Sochaczew  is  a  medium-size  city  and  the 
capital of Sochaczew county, in the Masovian 
voivodeship  in  central  Poland.  Its  population 
is  on  a 
just  below  37 000) 
(currently 
downward 
to 
trend,  which 
continue.  Although  it  is  in  Poland’s  most 
developed region, most of its macroeconomic 
indicators  are 
the  national 
average,  due  to  its  being  located  at  the 
regional border.  

is  expected 

line  with 

in 

Previously,  the  wastewater  network  covered 
only  part  of  the  city  and  over  a  third  of  the 
a  wastewater 
population  was  without 
collection system. In 2008, the situation was much worse than the Polish average (85% 
connection rate to the wastewater network).  

The  project  involved  constructing  about  91.3 km  of  wastewater  network,  including 
pumping stations, modernisation of the municipal WWTP, closure of the small outdated 
WWTPs  and  rehabilitation  of  the  3.4 km  wastewater  network  in  the  city  centre.  Its 
primary goal was to ensure wastewater collection and proper treatment for an additional 
11 138 inhabitants.  

The  project  involved  a  total  final  investment  of  €21.5 million  in  nominal  prices 
(excluding  VAT),  which  was  co-financed  from  the  beneficiary’s  own  funds  (17%),  the 
Cohesion Fund (58%) and corporate bonds (25%). The Cohesion Fund contribution was 
allocated through the 2007-2013 infrastructure and environment OP.  

The first ideas for the project date back to 2004, but the project was actually designed in 
2007-2010 and the construction works lasted from 2010 to 2013. The operational phase 
started in late 2013, while connections to the wastewater network continued to the end of 
2016. 

Despite  some  delay,  the  project  achieved  the  objective  stated  in  the  CF  support 
application  form,  i.e. connection  of  over  11 000  inhabitants  to  the  wastewater  network 
and ensuring the municipal WWTP’s treatment capacity and parameters. 

The project is considered successful overall, in that it achieved its primary objectives. It 
addressed real needs and was implemented smoothly. However, the lack of connections 
to individual users that were not a part of the project  and which were not financed from 
other sources prevented the project from reaping the full benefits of the investment after 
implementation.   

In  this  respect,  the  project  illustrates  that  addressing  the  whole  value  chain  through 
investments is essential to achieving project objectives effectively and without delay. 

70 

 
 
Craiova sewerage network (Romania)   

network 

sewerage 

and 
The 
wastewater  treatment  facilities  in 
Craiova  were 
in 
order to protect the River Danube, 
in a major CF co-financed project 
in 
2000-2006 
ISPA 
programming period. 

rehabilitated 

the 

Craiova  is  the  main  city  in  Dolj 
county,  a  major  economic  and 
industrial centre in the south-west 
of  Romania.  According  to  the 
urban  development  plan, 
the 
population was around 306 000 on 
1 January 1996  and  expected  to 

reach 320 000 in 2010.  

The  Craiova  area  is  by  far  the  largest  city  in  the  catchment  area  of  the  Jiu  River,  a 
tributary of the Danube. Wastewater is discharged downstream from all major cities and 
towns in the area. Craiova accounts for over 50% of the pollutant load from wastewater 
discharged into the Jiu River. 

Craiova did not have an operating WWTP until 2011. A WWTP was designed in 1979 
and construction works started in 1989, but the plant was never finalised due to lack of 
finance.  Some  of  the  civil  works  were  completed,  but  no  mechanical  or  electrical 
equipment was installed. The site had no equipment until 2000, when implementation of 
the ISPA project started. 

In  addition,  the  sewer  system  in  Craiova  was  incomplete.  Domestic  and  industrial 
wastewater  was  discharged  directly  into  a  partly  open  channel  (the  Craioviţa  channel) 
passing through the city or a small lake (the Craioviţa Lake) in a recreational area in the 
city.  It then  flowed untreated into the Jiu  River. The discharge of sewage into the lake 
and the open channel was a hygiene risk for the local population – hence the need for a 
WWTP. 

The  overall  objective  of  the  original  project  was  to  reduce  the  volume  of  wastewater 
flowing from Craiova into the Jiu River and onwards into the Danube. The upgrading of 
the  WWTP  included  sludge  treatment,  rehabilitation  and  extension  of  the  main 
wastewater collector. This was meant to provide the city with a sewerage system meeting 
modern hygiene requirements. Cutting discharge into the Jiu and Danube to levels below 
the thresholds imposed by national legislation would significantly reduce transboundary 
pollution. More specifically, the main aim was to attain effluent parameters that complied 
with the relevant EU (i.e. UWWTD) and Romanian legislation.  

The main objective of the works was to redirect discharge from the Craioviţa Lake and 
the  Craioviţa  channel  into  the  sewerage  system,  thus  ensuring  proper  treatment  of  the 
wastewater.  

In  2004,  the  rehabilitation  of  the  drinking  water  distribution  network  was  added  as  a 
further component of the ISPA project. The plan was to reduce substantial water losses 

71 

 
from  the  old  and  damaged  water  pipelines,  which  were  the  main  source  of  infiltration 
into the sewerage network. 

The final project had three main works components: 

1.  rehabilitation  and  upgrading  of  the  Craiova  city  WWTP  –  completion  of  the 
existing plant for biological oxygen demand removal (second stage) and extension 
of the plant for tertiary treatment (compliance of effluent demand for discharges 
into sensitive areas). This involved construction of a new laboratory facility; 

2.  rehabilitation and extension of the sewerage network: 

o  55 km extension of sewerage networks;  

o  elimination  of  wastewater  discharges  into  Craioviţa  lake  and  Craioviţa 
channel, and transfer of these discharges into the sewerage system; and 

o 

reduction  of  storm  water  discharges  into  the  sewerage  system  and 
discharge into the Jiu River; and 

3.  rehabilitation of drinking water distribution network:  

o 

rehabilitation of 42 km of water pipes;  

o  construction of 6.70 km of new water pipes;  

o 

o 

o 

o 

o 

rehabilitation of a pumping station;  

repair works on damaged water pipes;  

installation of 8 000 water meters;  

rehabilitation of water tanks; and 

restructuring of primary and secondary network in order to monitor flows 
and pressures in the 18 districts of the network.  

The  completion  date  for  this  component  was  extended  when  it  was  changed  to 
include  additional  works  relating  to  the  rehabilitation  of  the  drinking  water 
distribution  network  and  the  completion  of  a  water  metering  system  for  all 
consumers.  The  component  had  a  positive  impact  by  reducing  water  losses  and 
infiltration into the sewerage system. 

Construction took place between July 2003 and July 2011. The operational phase started 
in July 2011 and is planned to last up to 30 years. 

According  to  the  latest  financing  decision,  the  total  estimated  investment  costs,  in  line 
with amendment 6 to the financing memorandum, were €84.3 million, of which 62.64% 
was co-financed through the Cohesion Fund. The remaining investment cost was covered 
from an EIB loan (20.88%) and a national public contribution (16.48%). 

The project achieved its objectives, i.e. pollution prevention and control. 

Overall, the project represented a starting point in the improvement of living standards in 
one of the biggest cities in Romania. Also, it helped to cut pollution of the water bodies 
by  reducing  discharges  of  untreated  wastewater  into  the  Jiu  River  and  on  into  the 
Danube. 

On the basis of the ISPA project, CAO (the implementing body) was able to enlarge the 
area  of  operation,  thus  rehabilitating,  modernising  and  extending  water  supply  and 

72 

 
wastewater systems at county level. It used the lessons learnt from one phase to the next, 
in line with national and EU requirements in the field of water/wastewater management. 

The project also marked a milestone in the strengthening of CAO’s capacity to manage 
large  infrastructure  projects  in  the  field  of  water  supply  and  treatment,  especially 
EU-financed  projects  with  strict  requirements  in  terms  of  planning,  preparation, 
procurement,  implementation  (e.g. International  Federation  of  Consulting  Engineers 
condition of contract) and monitoring.  

Under the project, CAO set up a tariff strategy in line with the ‘cost recovery’ principle 
to ensure the financial sustainability of its activities and investments. 

The project has generated relevant long-term infrastructure effects. However, the WWTP 
is currently used below its designed capacity, due to a downward trend in the number of 
(residential  and  non-residential)  consumers.  As  quantified  in  the  CBA,  the  balance  of 
long-term positive effects and under-use of capacity returns a slightly positive net benefit 
for the local community. 

73 

 
 
Water supply and sewerage system (Croatia) 

financed  by 

The  Slavonski  Brod  water  supply 
and sewerage system with WWTP 
project  was 
the 
for  Pre-Accession 
Instrument 
Assistance  (IPA)  under  the  2007-
2013  environmental  protection 
OP. 

In  preparation  for  EU  accession, 
Croatia had to harmonise its legal 
framework  with  the  acquis.  This 
required  significant  investment  in 
environmental infrastructures. 

The  city  of  Slavonski  Brod  (population  56 769  in  2015)  is  situated  in  Brod–Posavina 
county in the east of Croatia. Its water supply system was inefficient, with water losses of 
up  to  43%  and  low  connection  rates.  There  was  no  wastewater  network  and  untreated 
wastewater was discharged into the Sava River. 

In 2005, a local municipal company, Vodovod d.o.o., developed a project to resolve these 
problems.  In 2006, it hired the BCEOM / Jacobs Engineering joint venture consultants, 
who prepared a first draft of the project. The main goals were to: 

  ensure the functioning of the entire local water supply system; 

 

 

 

improve water supply reliability for existing consumers and connect around 4 300 
new  residents  in  Slavonski  Brod  by  improving  the  water  supply  system  and 
increasing the storage volume; 

improve the sewerage system to ensure more cost-effective wastewater treatment 
and connect 9 950 more residents to the drainage system; and 

improve  living  conditions  and  decrease  pollution  in  the  Slavonski  Brod 
conurbation,  and  improve  compliance  with  the  environmental  acquis88  in 
particular the UWWTD. 

The project was the first large infrastructure project in the water sector funded in Croatia 
under the IPA 2007-2013 environment OP89. The request for IPA funding was submitted 
in 2008. After Commission officials visited Slavonski Brod and requested some changes, 
a revised application was submitted in December 2008 and approved in April 2009. The 
project  beneficiary  (the  national  public  company  Croatian  Waters)  implemented  the 
project in close cooperation with Vodovod d.o.o., to which ownership and management 
of the completed project was transferred in 2015.   

The  planned  total  nominal  value  of  the  project  was  €29.65 million,  to  be  financed 
58.65%  by  the  IPA  fund,  41.35%  by  the  national  resources.  In  2015,  the  project  was 
completed,  with  a  total  nominal  value  of  €23.11 million,  of  which  €15.88 million 

88  The  requirements  of  the  Water  Framework  Directive  (2000/60/EC),  Drinking  Water  Directive 
(80/778/EEC,  81/858/EEC,  91/692/EEC),  Urban  Wastewater  Treatment  Directive  (91/271/EEC)  and 
Bathing Waters Directive (76/160/EEC, 91/692/EEC, 1882/2003/EC and 807/2003/EC). 

89  https://mzoip.hr/doc/operativni_program_okolis_2007-2013.pdf 

74 

 
                                                           
(68.7%) was co-financed through the IPA fund. The government covered the remaining 
investment cost. 

Thanks  to  good  preparation  (technical  documentation,  feasibility  study,  CBA),  strong 
political  support  at  national  and  local  levels,  timely  implementation  and  continuous 
monitoring  and  support  by  the  Commission  Delegation  in  Zagreb,  the  project  was 
completed  on  time  and  became  fully  operational  in  2015.  It  led  to  new  project 
applications in the water supply and sewerage system in the country.  

After  more  than  3  years  of  implementation,  the  project  can  be  said  to  be  on  track  to 
achieve the long-term goals set out in the application. The ex post evaluation shows that 
it  achieved  its  goals:  the  water  supply  and  sewerage  systems  were  improved,  new 
residents  were  connected  to  the  networks  and  river  pollution  was  reduced  with  the 
construction of the WWTP. The project has raised living standards in Slavonski Brod and 
contributed to the protection of the Sava River and the overall ecosystem.  

The successful implementation of the project has ensured the sustainability of the results 
and the effects have spread to other construction projects relating to the Slavonski Brod 
water infrastructure. 

Experience from this project proved useful in the preparation of subsequent projects. One 
of the key factors for success was the inclusion of all relevant stakeholders, particularly 
local government units, in the preparation phase.  

It is also key that public bodies improve communication on project activities, in order to 
raise  people’s  awareness  of  the  benefits  and  address  potential  causes  of  dissatisfaction 
(noise, disruption caused by construction works, etc.). 

75 

 
 
 
Favara di Burgio aqueduct (Italy) 

The reconstruction of the Favara 
di  Burgio  aqueduct  was  a major 
the 
co-financed  by 
project 
2000-2006 
in 
ERDF 
programming period. 

the 

The  project  was  located  in  the 
province  of  Agrigento  (Sicily). 
In  particular,  it  concerned  the 
municipalities 
between 
Agrigento  and  Sciacca  (total  of 
151 610  inhabitants  in  201790). 
Economic  development  in  the 
area had long been hampered by 
structural  difficulties,  including 
weak  infrastructure.  Most  macroeconomic  indicators  are  below  Italian  and  Sicilian 
averages and the province’s per capita GDP is among the lowest in the country.  

Before the project, water supply to inhabited areas was periodically threatened. A ‘water 
emergency’ was declared between 1999 and 2004, due to the very poor condition of the 
water  supply  and  distribution  infrastructures  (primarily  for  lack  of  maintenance).  The 
crumbling  and  dysfunctional  Favara  di  Burgio  aqueduct  suffered  from  a  very  high 
leakage rate (around 22%) and was not providing the municipal head tanks it served with 
a constant supply. The project provided for a replacement aqueduct, which was also to be 
connected  to  another  aqueduct,  Dissalata  Gela–Aragona.  The  main  aim  was  to  ensure 
continuity  of  water  supply  to  the  head  reservoirs  of  the  water  networks  for  inhabited 
areas and bring total water losses below 8%.  

The  project  involved  a  total  initial  investment  of  €49.5 million  in  nominal  prices 
(excluding  VAT),  which  was  co-financed  by  national  funds  (59%),  private  funds 
(Siciliacque SpA91: 14%) and the ERDF (27%) through Sicily’s 2000-2006 regional OP92. 
The first project ideas dated back to 1999, the project design was carried out in 2002 and 
the  construction  works  lasted  from  2005  to  2008.  The  aqueduct  became  operational  in 
2009. 

The reconstruction of the aqueduct was part of a wider investment plan, which included 
the  restoration  of  two  other  old,  dysfunctional  aqueducts  (Montescuro  Ovest  and  Gela-
Aragona)  and  joint  management  of  all  major  Sicilian  aqueducts  (through  a  newly 
appointed  concession-holder:  Siciliacque SpA).  The  project  was  the  first  step  in  the 
implementation of a policy designed to optimise the overall supply of water.  

The  project  achieved  its  main  objective  of  ensuring  constant  water  provision  to  the 
municipal  head  tanks.  However,  end-users  do  not  fully  benefit,  as  (mainly  due  to 
the  requisite 
institutional,  administrative  and  financial  constraints) 
governance, 

Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT). 

90 
91  The service provider. 
92  Commission Decision of 3 September 2007 (C(2007) 4179). The certified ERDF contribution amounts 

to €13.3 million, i.e. 40% of the certified total expenditure (€32.9 million). 

76 

 
                                                           
accompanying investments at the level of municipal networks, though planned, have not 
yet been carried out, resulting in significant water leaks and substandard services.  

Given  the  relevance  of  the  project  for  both  national  and  regional  objectives,  and  the 
urgent  need  for  its  implementation,  it  is  reasonable  to  assume  that  it  would  have  been 
implemented  even  without  the  EU  grant.  The  financing  decision  was  taken  after  the 
contract for the construction works had been signed, so the EU had limited influence on 
project planning. Nevertheless, the EU financing freed up national funds for other uses, 
encouraged cooperation between stakeholders and ensured that high priority is  given to 
compliance with EU and national rules. 

The  project  is  considered  successful  overall,  in  that  it  achieved  the  primary  objectives 
identified  in  the  application.  However,  as  regards  its  impact  on  local  people,  the  final 
assessment is  less straightforward, as  the lack of investment  in  local  networks deprives 
them of the full benefit of the new aqueduct. 

The story of the new aqueduct illustrates that an ambitious project design, based on good 
knowledge  of  the  local  area  and  appropriate  technical  capacity,  can  lead  to  highly 
effective  infrastructures.  However,  projects  that  are  part  of  an  integrated  cycle  can  be 
fully  effective  only  with  the  necessary  complementary  investments.  In  this  respect, 
administrative capacity and institutional coordination are both essential.  

77 

 
 
 
Aguilas desalination plant (Spain) 

of 
renewal/enlargement 
The 
Águilas desalination plant was co-
financed  by  the  EU  in  the  2000-
2006 programming period.  

The  project  was  in  the  region  of 
Murcia, which is part of the basin 
of the Segura River93. It concerned 
three  municipalities 
(total  of 
142 077  inhabitants  in  2017)  in 
Alto  Guadalentín  county,  where 
local  industry  and  employment  are  directly  and  indirectly  influenced  by  a  very  rich, 
intensive agriculture sector that supplies European markets.  

Before  project  implementation,  the  provision  of  water  was  weak.  Water  shortages 
periodically  hampered  activities  such  as  farming,  resulting  in  land  abandonment, 
over-exploitation of aquifers and economic slowdown. A state of drought was declared in 
2015.  

The  existing  desalination  plant  (constructed  in  2000  by  the  local  farmers’  committee) 
was not performing to its full potential, due to technical issues in the catchment of water. 
The project therefore provided for the building of a new plant in order to:  

 

 

 

increase  available  water  resources,  thus  guaranteeing  water  supply  in  Alto 
Guadalentín  and  its  coastal  zone,  providing  irrigation  to  Águilas,  Lorca  and 
Puerto Lumbreras; 

reduce over-exploitation of the Alto Guadalentín aquifer; 

reduce the deficit of water needs for crops in the area; and 

  have a fully operational plant. 

The  project  involved  a  total  initial  investment  of  €250.08 million  in  nominal  prices 
(excluding  VAT),  of  which  €202.20 million  was  co-financed  from  national  funds  and 
€47.88 million from the ERDF, through Murcia’s 2000-2006 OP. 

The  construction  of  the  new  desalination  plant  was  part  of  Spain’s  (partly  EU-funded) 
AGUA  programme,  which  represented  a  fundamental  policy  shift  in  national  water 
management  from  large  inter-basin  water  transfers  to  integrated  water  management, 
combining improvements to purification, re-use and desalination infrastructures. Around 
20  desalination  facilities,  water  re-use  projects  and 
irrigation 
infrastructure  improvement  were  planned  to  address  the  water  needs  of  six  provinces 
along Spain’s Mediterranean coast.  

investments  for 

The project achieved its main objective of ensuring constant and reliable water provision 
to  farming  communities.  In  this  respect,  it  can  be  considered  successful  overall.  As 
regards  its  impact  on  the  population,  the  final  assessment  is  unambiguously  positive, 
given  the  measurable  increase  in  irrigated  area,  diversification  of  traditional  crops  and 

93  The rest of the river basin is in Castilla-La Mancha (25%), the Andalusian provinces of Jaén, Almería 

and Granada (9%), and Alicante in the Valencia region (7%). 

78 

 
                                                           
boost  for  agricultural  technology.  In  addition,  it  emerged  from  interviews  with  local 
stakeholders that complementary water-saving investments are planned for water storage 
and  irrigation  modernisation  as  a  consequence  of  the  project,  thus  ensuring  its 
sustainability for future generations.  

79 

 
 
 
PROJECTS IN THE WASTE MANAGEMENT SECTOR 

Purchase of a multifunctional ship (Estonia) 

The purchase of a multifunctional 
ship  in  Estonia  was  co-financed 
by  the  EU  in  the  2007-2013 
programming period. 

A  number  of  northern  countries 
and  Baltic 
(Denmark, 
states 
Poland,  Lithuania, 
Germany, 
Latvia,  Estonia,  Russia,  Finland 
and 
strongly 
Sweden) 
connected  by 
the  Baltic  Sea. 
Marine and coastal activities bring 
social  and  economic  benefits  in  the  areas  of  goods  shipping  and  passenger  transport 
(€6.5 billion  annual  added  value),  fisheries  (€95 million),  energy  generation,  extraction 
of resources, energy re-generation (€15 billion), and leisure and tourism (€4.8 billion)94. 

are 

The  area  around  the  Baltic  Sea  is  home  to  85  million  people.  Human  activities  put 
pressure  on  the  marine  environment  and  changes  in  the  marine  environment  influence 
human  wellbeing.  Maritime  transport  is  a  case  in  point.  Over  160 million  tonnes  of 
chemicals  are  transported  annually  across  the  Gulf  of  Finland.  In  2004-2013, 
1 328 accidents were reported, 86 of which resulted in pollution. Most accidents in 2013 
occurred close to shore (26% in port and 19% in port approach) and 34% occurred in the 
open sea. Two major accidents in Estonian waters in 2006 exposed the limits of Estonia’s 
ability actively to remove pollution, especially in the winter. 

The Baltic Sea is one of Europe’s most vulnerable areas. It is shallow and semi-enclosed, 
with slow water exchange, so any pollution incident has a long-lasting effect on the entire 
Sea.  At  about  4 015 km,  the  Estonian  coastline  is  the  longest  of  all  the  Baltic  states’. 
Around 600 000 people  (40% of the Estonian population) live in  coastal  municipalities 
and  the  capital,  Tallinn,  and  may  be  at  risk  in  the  event  of  a  major  environmental 
incident.  

Only rarely do accidents in the Baltic result in an oil leakage. Nevertheless, from time to 
time large spills occur, requiring an international response to avoid significant damage to 
the environment. In order to prepare for major pollution accidents, the coastal countries 
maintain a high level of preparedness and response capacity. Cooperation between them 
is  implemented  through  a  regional  agreement  on  pollution  preparedness  and  response, 
operated  by  HELCOM.  Further  support  is  provided  by  the  EU  through  the  European 
Maritime  Safety  Agency.  Preparedness  involves  purchasing  and  maintaining  the 
necessary  equipment,  including  specialised  spill-response  vessels  and  surveillance 
aircraft.  There  are  also  commonly  agreed  regional  procedures,  which  are  practised  in 
joint annual BALEX DELTA exercises, for example. Estonia has been a member of the 
Convention  on  the  Protection  of  the  Marine  Environment  of  the  Baltic  Sea  Area  since 
1992. One of HELCOM’s recommendations is to have a development plan for national 

94  Economic and social analysis in the Baltic Sea region (HELCOM). 

80 

 
 
                                                           
capability to respond to oil spillages and other harmful substances, in order to eliminate 
pollution in an area of 4.5 km2 within 12 hours. At the time of the project application, the 
Police  and  Border  Guard  Board  had  only  one  pollution-control  ship,  which  had  been 
donated  by  Sweden  in  2002  and  accounted  for  only  13%  of  the  HELCOM 
recommendation95. 

Due to the sensitivity of the Baltic Sea ecosystem, dispersants (chemical products which 
dissolve  oil  slicks  to  minuscule  droplets)  are  not  considered  an  appropriate  primary 
response  measure  to  oil  spills.  Rather,  the  focus  is  on  mechanical  recovery  (sweeping 
arms, skimmers and brushes) and booms, in order to be able jointly to collect oil at sea 
and stop large spills from reaching shorelines96. 

The  main  objective  of  purchasing  a  multifunctional  ship  was  to  increase  the  ability  to 
detect, localise and eliminate marine pollution, thus ensuring preparedness for accidents 
(in  line  with  HELCOM  recommendations).  The  project  was  also  aimed  at  ensuring  the 
fast eradication of marine and coastal pollution through prevention and monitoring, thus 
minimising  environmental  damage  and  improving  living  conditions  for  animals  and 
people. Only with a physical presence at sea can the Estonian authorities detect potential 
danger, monitor maritime activities near small islands, protect the environment and save 
sailors in distress. 

The  ship  is  owned  by  the  Estonian  Police  and  Border  Guard  Board,  which  is  100% 
owned  by  the  state.  The  ship  mainly  operates  in  the  strategic  areas  of  the  Baltic  Sea, 
crossing the east-west (cargo) and north-south (passenger) maritime routes in the Finnish 
lagoon.  It  is  primarily  (90%)  used  for  prevention  and  surveillance  work,  followed  by 
pollution  control  (about  10%  is  for  crew  exchanges,  maintenance,  repairs,  etc.).  It  was 
the  preferred  choice  among  various  alternatives  and  is  estimated  to  have  a  30-year  life 
span, thus ensuring long-term impact on the environment. 

The total investment was €32.9 million (including VAT), of which 85% was co-financed 
through  the  ERDF.  The  remaining  cost  was  covered  through  a  national  contribution 
(15%). The construction phase lasted from April 2010 to August 2012. The operational 
phase  started  in  August  2012,  and  is  planned  to  last  for  at  least  28  years  (30  years  in 
total). 

The  project  achieved  all  planned  and  expected  objectives,  including  its  main  target:  to 
enlarge  the  sea  area  under  environmental  control.  It  is  an  important  step  in  the 
implementation of the environmental protection strategy in the Baltic and the benefits are 
felt across the region.   

The project is highly relevant. Its design and implementation phase were comprehensive 
and suffered no serious drawbacks.  

With this project, Estonia implemented 26% of HELCOM’s minimum recommendations, 
but there is still a long way to go and the state should acquire more anti-pollution vessels. 

95  Following  HELCOM  recommendations,  ships  oil  recovery  capability  is  calculated  by  means  of 

method, that takes into account ships velocity and technical parameters of high seas oil booms. 

96  Response to Spills. HELCOM Baltic Sea Case study. 

81 

 
 
                                                           
Celje waste management centre (Slovenia) 

regional  waste 
The  Celje 
management 
(phase II) 
centre 
project  involved  the  construction 
the  mechanic 
of  facilities  for 
biological  treatment  (MBT)  and 
thermal 
of 
municipal  waste.  It  covered  the 
the  waste 
second  phase  of 
management 
the 
former  landfill  site  for  the  city  of 
Celje in the district of Bukovžlak. 

treatment 

scheme 

(TT) 

for 

the 
scheme,  no  more  waste  from  the  municipality  of  Celje  and  other  municipalities  in  the 
region  could  go  to  landfill  due  to  lack  of  space  and  non-compliance  with  the  Landfill 
Directive  and  national  legislation.  At  the  same  time,  there  was  no  separate  waste 
collection as a basis for the suitable treatment of municipal waste. It was in response to 
this  situation  that  Celje  Municipality,  together  with  the  Ministry  of  Environment  and 
Spatial Planning, prepared the scheme.  

Before  phases I  and II  of 

Phase I involved: 

 

 

expanding the existing landfill; and  

constructing  a  composting  plant,  a  sorting  plant  with  a  dismantling  facility,  an 
administrative building, a car wash and supporting infrastructures.  

Phase II involved constructing: 

 

 

an MBT plant to process mixed municipal waste; and  

a TT plant, where a fraction of treated waste would provide additional energy for 
the city’s central heating system.   

Celje Municipality is one of 11 ‘city municipalities’ (municipalities consisting largely of 
urban centres) in Slovenia. With 49 377 inhabitants97, it is the third largest city and is the 
capital of the Savinjska statistical region. With its surrounding area, it is one of the main 
industrial centres in the country. While much of the  industry collapsed in the transition 
from  Communism,  some  heavy  industries  are  still  present  (steel  mill,  titanium 
production) and there is a large number of strong and very diverse SMEs. 

The  total  eligible  cost  of  the  phase II  project98  was  €29 million  (excluding  VAT);  the 
Cohesion  Fund  contribution  was  €20.3 million,  the  central  government  contributed 
€4.4 million  and  municipalities  (project  partners)  provided  €4.4 million.  The  final  cost 
(including  non-eligible  costs  and  costs  before  the  co-financing  decision)  was  €36.9 
million, which meant that the national financing was higher than planned: €10.5 million. 
The construction phase started in June 2006 and finished in August 2008. The MBT part 
of the project started operations in May 2010 and the TT part in October 2010. The MBT 

97  Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia, 2018. 
98  Commission Decision of 14 September 2009 on the amendment of Decision C(2005) 5772 concerning 
the grant of assistance from the Cohesion Fund to a project concerning Regional Waste Management 
Centre Celje – Stage II in the Republic of Slovenia CCI 2005/SI/16/C/PE/001. 

82 

 
                                                           
plant is operated by Simbio d.o.o. (formerly Javne naprave), a public utility owned by the 
Municipalities of Celje, Vojnik, Štore and Dobrna, with Celje Municipality as the main 
owner (84.1% share). The TT plant is operated by Energetika Celje d.o.o., a public utility 
owned by Celje Municipality. 

Celje  Municipality  (the  beneficiary)  was  responsible  for  the  implementation  of  the 
project, while the Government Office for Local  Government  and Regional Policy (now 
the Government Office for Development and European Cohesion Policy) was responsible 
for the funding application. 

The  project  is  considered  to  have  been  only  partially  successful.  Weaknesses  were 
identified  primarily  in  the  early  stages.  The  project  achieved  its  objectives  (although 
these  were  not  well  defined)  and  has  brought  benefits  in  terms  of  improved 
environmental  conditions  and  quality  of  life  for  the  residents  of  Celje  and  surrounding 
municipalities.  However,  it  has  not  been  successful  in  terms  of  efficiency,  as  the 
socioeconomic  costs  exceed  the  socioeconomic  benefits.  Efficiency  could  have  been 
greater with better selection of technology, forecasting and planning of implementation.  

83 

 
 
 
Projects in the Environment remediation, protection and risk prevention sector 

Sète-Marseillan lido protection (France) 

The  protection  and  sustainable 
organisation  of  the  lido  between 
Sète  and  Marseillan  was  a  major 
project  co-financed  by  the  EU  in 
programming 
the 
period. 

2007-2013 

The  project  is  located  in  the 
Hérault  department  in  the  coastal 
region  of  Languedoc-Roussillon 
(Occitania).  The  coastline  is  a 
major asset for the region, in both 
ecological and touristic terms. The 
lido is a 12 km-long sand strip linking the towns of Sète and Marseillan, and providing a 
natural  barrier  between  the  Mediterranean  and  the  7 500 ha  Thau  lagoon,  which  is  a 
regional  hotspot  for  shellfish  aquaculture.  The  entire  area  of  the  lido  and  the  lagoon  is 
rich  in  biodiversity,  economic  activity  (aquaculture,  tourist  beaches,  vine  growing,  a 
bottling  company)  and  commerce  (mainly  restaurants,  bars  and  shops  selling  nautical 
equipment). A coast road linking Sète, Marseillan and the Montpellier-Narbonne railway 
(which continues to Spain) has run across the lido since 1928.  

For  many  decades,  the  lido  has  been  subject  to  natural  erosion,  which  has  reduced  the 
width of the beach by about 40% since 1954. This has been aggravated by the fact that 
the coast road runs directly parallel to the beach, thus disrupting the natural function of 
the  dunes  in  slowing  erosion.  The  road  has  also  brought  unregulated  parking  and 
camping,  litter,  noise  pollution,  high  accident  levels  and  chronic  congestion  in  the 
summer. 

The project (CCI no. 2007FR162PR005) consisted of a mix of land and maritime works 
to protect the lido against natural hazards and organise it in a sustainable way for human 
use: 

 

 

 

 

the  land  works  involved  mainly  relocating  the  coast  road  behind  a  restored  and 
revegetated row of dunes; 

the  maritime  component  consisted  mainly  of  installing  an  innovative  ‘wave 
attenuator’ system at sea99, which was designed to reduce erosion on the coastline;  

further accompanying works involved reloading sand onto the beach to restore it 
to  its  natural  width  (70 m)  and  creating  new  beach  and  road  infrastructure  (car 
parks, a cycle path, toilets and showers); and 

an ‘ecoplage’ system was also to be tested as part of the maritime phase;  it was 
supposed to accelerate the infiltration of water into, and to stabilise, the sand on 
the beach. 

99  A ‘wave attenuator’ is a sort of tube set up 5-6 m below water and about 400 m offshore parallel to the 
coastline.  It  is  designed  to  absorb  some  of  the  impact  of  the  strongest  waves  and  storms  in  order  to 
reduce coastal erosion. 

84 

 
 
                                                           
The  total  cost  of  the  project  at  the  time  of  the  application  was  €55 million  in  nominal 
terms, but only €23 million (corresponding to some of the land and maritime works) was 
initially  included  in  the  2007-2013  major  project  application.  The  ERDF  financing  for 
the  project, 
to 
€10.9 million, of which €6.3 million was for the 2007-2013 major project. 

three  programming  periods100,  amounts 

including  grants  from 

The project can be considered a technological success and a landmark in the context of a 
wider policy shift towards the use of new, softer techniques to fight erosion. The variety 
and  number  of  (quantifiable  and  non-quantifiable)  benefits  is  also  an  indication  that  it 
was successful in addressing the wide range of issues affecting the lido. 

The  project  achieved  its  main  objectives  of  restoring  the  normal  functioning  of  the 
coastline and improving protection against erosion, without disrupting traffic on the coast 
road or local  economic activities.  It  also  succeeded in  restoring biodiversity, mainly on 
the restored dunes, reducing pollution and preserving the lido’s ecosystems. It is part of a 
larger plan by the French authorities to protect the lido and its exceptional biodiversity. 

The project has major economic benefits, mainly in terms of the sustained flow of beach 
visitors  resulting  from  decreased  beach  erosion.  It  also  has  a  large  number  of  side-
benefits, ranging from fewer road accidents to lower levels of noise and air pollution.  

There is some uncertainty as to the long-term economic benefits of the project. The final 
assessment  will  depend  heavily  on  the  level  of  natural  risks  avoided.  However,  it  is 
difficult  to  produce  reliable  projections  of  erosion  trends  and  to  document  all  the  risks 
with an accurate probability of occurrence and likely impact.  

100  I.e. 2000-2006, 2007-2013 and 2014-2020. 

85