Study on the interaction between security and wildlife conservation in Sub-Saharan Africa . Part II (Case Studies).
Date: 2020-02-07
Institutions: Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development
Subjects: biodiversity, case study, conservation of resources, corruption, development policy, economic consequence, ecosystem, illicit trade, international cooperation, organised crime, protection of animal life, protection of plant life, regional security, rule of law, sub-Saharan Africa, the EU's international role, wildlife

Study on the interaction 
between security and  
wildlife conservation in  
Sub-Saharan Africa 

Part II (Case Studies) 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
International Cooperation and Development 
Study on the interaction between security and wildlife  
in Sub-Saharan Africa  

© European Union, 2019 

The opinions expressed are those of the author(s) only and should not be considered as 
representative of the European Commission’s official position. 

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doi 10.2841/611134  MN-02-19-994-EN-N 

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Table of Contents 

Abbreviations and acronyms .............................................................................. 4 

Overview of case studies ................................................................................... 6 

1. NRT Northern Conservancies, Lewa Conservancy (Kenya) ................................... 7 

2. Kenya-Somalia Coastal Marine PAs And Coastal NRT Conservancies (Kenya) ....... 17 

3. Gabon Coastal Marine Protected Areas (Gabon) ............................................... 26 

4. Minkebe National Park landscape (Gabon) ...................................................... 34 

5. Boma and Badingilo National Park landscape (South Sudan) ............................. 40 

6. Bamingui-Bangoran & Manovo-Gounda St Floris NP landscape (CAR) ................. 60 

7. Zakouma National Park landscape (Chad) ...................................................... 69 

8. WAP/Arly National Park landscape (Burkina Faso-Benin-Niger) .......................... 80 

9. Virunga National Park landscape (DRC) .......................................................... 86 

10. Garamba NP (DRC), Tri-Border Area landscape (DRC-South Sudan-CAR) .......... 99 

11. Niassa National Reserve Landscape (Mozambique) ........................................ 114 

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Abbreviations and acronyms 

Kenya North 
NRT 
KWS 
KFS 
NRM 
JOCC 
HWC 

Kenya Coast 
PA 
MPA 
IUCN 
UNESCO 
(I)NGO  
CBO 
CBD 
CCC 
CMS 
CITES   
IUU 
IOC 
NRTT 
TNC 
PRSP 

MASE 
MESA 
EEZ 
SWIO 
PFZ 
LAPSSET 
MOI 
GMES   
VMS  

Gabon 
ANPN 
WCS 
ANPA 

FADs  
FCWC   
ECOWAS 
CEMAC  
MCS 
GGC  
ICAT  
ICCF  
LAGA 
EAGLE   
CAF  
MINFOF  

Northern Rangeland Trust 
Kenya Wildlife Service 
Kenya Forest Service 
natural resource management 
Joint Operations Command Center 
human wildlife conflict   

protected area 
marine protected area 
International Union for Conservation of Nature 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation 
(international) non-governmental organisation 
community-based organisation 
Convention on Biological Diversity 
Convention on Climate Change 
Convention on Migratory Species 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of wild fauna and flora 
illegal, unregulated, unreported 
Indian Ocean Commission 
Northern Rangelands Trust Trading 
The Nature Conservancy 
Fisheries Surveillance Regional Programme (Programme Régional de 
Surveillance des Pêches 
Maritime Security programme 
Monitoring of Environment and Security in Africa programme 
Exclusive Economic Zones 
South-west Indian Ocean 
Potential Fishing Zone 
Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia-Transport 
Mauritius Oceanography Institute 
Global Monitoring for Environment and Security 
Vessel Monitoring System 

Agence Nationale des Parcs Nationaux (National Agency of National Parks) 
Wildlife Conservation Society 
National Agency for Fisheries and Aquaculture/ Agence Nationale des Pêches  
et de l'Aquaculture 
fish aggregating devices 
Fisheries Committee of the West Central Gulf of Guinea 
Economic Community of West African States 
Communauté Economique et Monétaire d’Afrique Centrale 
monitoring, control and surveillance 
Gulf of Guinea Countries 
International Commission for Atlantic Tuna 
International Conservation Caucus Foundation 
Last Great Ape Association 
Eco Activists for Governance and Law Enforcement 
Control of Forest Management 
Ministry of Forestry and Wildlife 

South Sudan 
USAID   
USFWS  
SAF 
SPLA 
SSWS   

United States Agency for International Development 
US Fish and Wildlife Service 
Sudan Armed Forces 
Sudan People’s Liberation Army 
South Sudan National Wildlife Service 

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GEF 
ECF 
IDP 
SPLM(-IO)  
GoSS 
MWCT   
BJEL 
DYY 
SPLA-iG 
SPLA-IO 
NRM 
IDP 
IGAD 
UN 
AU 
CSO 
CBO 
DRC 
NTFP 
NARD 
CEPO 
ART 
PDCO 
EWCA   
HOAREC 
REDD    
PPP 
MoU 
EIA 
EPI 
HAWEN  

Global Environment Facility 
Elephant Crisis Fund 
internally displaced person 
Sudan People's Liberation Movement (in Opposition) 
Government of South(ern) Sudan 
Ministry of Wildlife Conservation and Tourism  
Boma-Jonglei-Equatoria Landscape 
David Yau Yau 
Sudan People’s Liberation Army-in Government 
Sudan People’s Liberation Army-in Opposition 
natural resource management 
internally displaced person 
Inter-Governmental Authority on Development 
United Nations 
African Union  
civil society organisation 
community-based organisation 
Democratic Republic of Congo 
non-timber forest product 
National Agency for Relief, Peace and Development 
Community Empowerment for Progress Organization 
Anyuak Recovery Trust  
Peace and Development Collaborative Organization  
Ethiopian Wildlife Conservation Agency 
Horn of Africa Regional Environment Centre  
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation 
public-private partnership 
Memorandum of Understanding 
Environmental Impact Assessment 
Elephant Protection Initiative 
Horn of Africa Wildlife Law Enforcement Network 

Central African Republic 
CAR 
ZCV 
PDRN    

Central African Republic 
zones cynégétiques villageoise (community hunting zones) 
Programme de development de la région Nord (Development Programme of the
Northern Region) 
Front populaire pour la renaissance de la Centrafrique (Popular Front for the  
rebirth of CAR) 
Lord's Resistance Army 

FPRC  

LRA  

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Overview of case studies 

Part II of this report on the interaction between security and wildlife conservation in Sub-
Saharan Africa contains the following case study reports: 

1.  Kenya-Northern Rangelands Trust (NRT) Northern Conservancies, Lewa Conservancy 

(Kenya) 

2.  Kenya-Somalia coastal marine protected areas and coastal NRT conservancies (Kenya) 

3.  Gabon coastal marine protected areas (Gabon) 

4.  Minkebe National Park Landscape (Gabon) 

5.  Boma and Badingilo National Park Landscape (South Sudan) 

6.  Bamingui-Bangoran & Manovo-Gounda St Floris National Park Landscape (CAR) 

7.  Zakouma National Park Landscape (Chad) 

8.  W-Arly-Pendjari Transboundary Biosphere Reserve (WAP)/Arly National Park Landscape 

(Burkina Faso-Benin-Niger) 

9.  Virunga National Park Landscape (DRC) 

10. Garamba National Park (DRC), Tri-border Area Landscape (DRC-South Sudan-CAR) 

11. Niassa National Reserve Landscape (Mozambique) 

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Case study 1. NRT Northern Conservancies, Lewa Conservancy (Kenya) 

Site name and location:  Northern Kenya – Northern Rangelands Trust Conservancies of the 
Centre Region (Samburu, Baringo, Meru, Laikipia, Isiolo counties) 

Introduction  
The savannahs and dry bush lands of northern Kenya’s Samburu, Laikipia, Meru, Baringo and 
Isiolo counties include the Samburu, Shaba and Buffalo Springs National Reserves, Lake Bogoria 
National Reserve protected areas, privately owned ranches and conservancies (including Ol 
Pejeta, Lewa, Borana, etc.), and 28 community-managed conservancies created and supported 
by the Northern Rangelands Trust. The areas support critical populations of elephant, black and 
white rhino, reticulated giraffe, buffalo, common zebra, Grevy’s zebra, African wild dog, ostrich 
and a host of other key species. Two-fifths of the world’s remaining Eastern Black rhino and 
20 % of Kenya’s elephants are in these areas (surveys estimated 7 300 elephants in 2017, 
increasing from an estimated 6 400 in 2012). Rhino exist within fenced sanctuaries in this 
landscape, whereas elephants continue to range freely across an area of 50 000 km2, half of 
which is under some form of conservation management (predominantly community and private 
conservancies). Numerous other endangered and endemic wildlife species also live in this 
landscape. 

The Northern Rangeland Trust (NRT) conservancies are organised in distinct clusters called 
regions, comprising North Rift region (including Turkana and West Pokot counties), Centre 
region (including Samburu, Baringo, Meru, Laikipia and Isiolo counties), and North-East region 
(including Marsabit county), covering an estimated 39 810 km2 of conservancies in the north of 
the country. The Coast region (including Garissa, Lamu, and Tana River counties) holds an 
estimated 5 190 km2 of conservancies. This case study analysis focuses primarily on the 
conservancy areas of the NRT Centre region, with some references concerning the North Rift 
and North-East regions. For reference to the Coast conservancies, please see the Kenyan Coast 
case study in this report.  

A study by the International Livestock Research Institute documented widespread major 
declines in Kenyan wildlife as herds of livestock displace wild animals. Over four decades (1977-
2016) livestock numbers have increased 76 %, while wildlife fell by 68 %. As pastoralist 
populations have grown so have their herds, grazing sparse pasture into desert. According to 
the report, the causes for the dramatic decline in wildlife include exponential human population 
growth, increasing livestock numbers, declining rainfall and a striking rise in temperatures. 
Policy, institutional and management interventions were recommended as likely to succeed in 
reducing the declines and restoring rangeland health, most notably through strengthening 
and investing in community and private wildlife conservancies in the rangelands. 

This case study analysis is based on a literature review, interviews with key sources, and a field 
visit to Lewa conservancy to meet with staff from both the Northern Rangelands Trust and 51 
degrees Ltd during the period 20 to 22 September 2017. Interviews included were with Ian 
Craig (NRT Director of Conservation), Rob McNeil (NRT Chief Operating Officer), Titus Letaapo 
(NRT Chief Programme Officer), Josephine Ekiru (NRT Peace Coordinator), John Tanui (Law 
enforcement Domain Awareness System (DAS)) and 51 Degrees Ltd Director Batian Craig, 
together with wildlife protection technical experts Pete Newland, Sam Taylor and Barry Cork.   

Key wildlife/security issues identified at this site 
The region of northern Kenya is subject to both direct local security concerns as well as more 
regional threats (including from Somalia).   

During the period 2011-2015, serious rhino poaching developed in the area as a result of the 
Africa-wide rhino horn and ivory poaching crisis. This poaching crisis in northern Kenya involved 
well-organised networks operating with the support of corrupt authorities. In addition, organised 
syndicates involved in human trafficking in East Africa also reportedly became involved in rhino 
horn and might also have been involved in other natural resource trafficking (e.g. sandalwood). 
The rhino and elephant-poaching crisis was addressed effectively through robust intelligence-led 
enforcement measures and has now been brought under control. However, the networks 

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involved previously represent a potential threat that can easily re-emerge given any reduction 
in law enforcement. 

Elephant poaching for ivory by local poachers was on the rise from 2011 when 62 elephants 
were poached within NRT conservancies; it rose to 103 in 2012 but there were 45 in 2013 and 
only 8 in 2016. Whilst the demand persists, the black market ivory prices to the gunman have 
fallen from a high of USD 150 per kg in 2012 to USD 40/50 today, with generic indications that 
the demand for ivory has also reduced; law enforcement efforts have also led to a decrease in 
poaching in recent years. However, wildlife hunting for the commercial bushmeat trade is 
becoming an increasing problem, including in the Isiolo area. 

Cattle raiding by local groups and pastoralists, who are ranging more broadly in search of 
pasture and water, is judged to be among the top sources of insecurity and conflict in the 
region. Cattle raiding and tit-for-tat revenge raids and killings, while traditionally practiced in 
the region, are a significant source of insecurity, which becomes increasingly violent with 
modern weapons.  Pastoralist competition for access to water and grazing areas is also a 
significant source of inter-communal conflict and insecurity. 

In early 2017, armed pastoralists undertook major land invasions of private ranches with tens 
of thousands of their livestock to access water and pasture in Laikipia county. They also 
conflicted with local agriculturists. These resulted in violent clashes as well as several high-
profile attacks, including on landowners. These tensions over land access had been occurring 
since 2004, yet there was no progress on negotiating access settlements. With increased 
drought and climate change factors, as well as some political angles, the forceful land invasions 
have become a significant source of insecurity and conflict.   

The 2017 land invasions created a security vacuum and had a disastrous impact on wildlife in 
the area: African wild dog, elephant, buffalo, lion, giraffe, zebra and antelope have all been 
affected by shooting, starvation and disease, or by being forced out of their usual habitats. 
Elephants also died at a tremendous rate, with 84 deliberately targeted and killed in the first 
half of 2017, compared to 75 during the whole of 2016 (a source from MIKE). 

Climate change is increasing the pressure on pastoralists to access scarce and changing 
pasture and water availability, which in turn exacerbates other security threats such as cattle 
raiding, pastoralist competition and communal conflicts, as well as banditry. 

Socio-economic security of local communities in the region is directly and indirectly 
threatened by cattle raiding, banditry, land conflicts and poaching of key species (all of which in 
turn undermine tourism programme development). 

Sandalwood harvesting and trafficking in northern Kenya has expanded dramatically in 
recent years. The wood is sourced for its oils, which are used in pharmaceutical and cosmetic 
industries in Europe, Asia and South Africa. The illegal harvesting and trafficking of this high-
value timber species involves an entire supply chain that includes local community members 
and local authorities. Organised crime networks have developed around the trafficking, which is 
well established and involves extensive corruption. This illegal activity significantly undermines 
the rule of law in the region and is therefore a security threat.    

Corruption in relation to sandalwood trafficking is systemic from bottom to top. The corruption 
of officials in relation to rhino and ivory poaching was organised with mid-level organisations 
and businessmen involved in Kenyan-based networks. Challenges of corruption in wildlife 
services exist but systems are built to work against them: governance systems within the 
community conservancies are critical for detecting, deterring and preventing corruption, both in 
terms of the internal conservation management as well as regarding natural resource trafficking 
(see below under management approaches). 

The influence of the Al-Shabab terrorist group from the eastern border areas with Somalia is a 
potential security threat in the area. Though not thought to be very active at present in the 
northern NRT areas, there is potential for infiltrations and expansion to the zone. 

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Security risks to those involved in wildlife protection 
While undertaking patrolling and law enforcement operations, community rangers of the NRT 
conservancies and private conservancy rangers occasionally have armed clashes with cattle 
raiders, bandits and poachers.  In the past 5 years, 5 rangers have been killed in the line of 
duty and a further 2 wounded. The NRT-armed National Police Reserve mobile teams are 
deployed on a daily basis in law enforcement support to the KWS, Kenya Forest Service (KFS) 
and the Kenya Police. This inevitably places the teams at the forefront of potential armed 
contact; however every effort is made to minimise such contacts and the main emphasis of the 
law enforcement teams is in community policing through dialogue within adjoining communities. 
This has resulted in a decrease in stock theft, road banditry and poaching over the past 5 years. 

Given the presence of large numbers of illegal firearms amongst the wider community, the 
security threats will remain for the foreseeable future; however the fact that local people are 
employed to police their own communities gives a level of local ownership, enabling long-term 
criminals to be exposed and arrested. Currently road banditry remains a challenge with two 
incidents recorded in the past 3 months; stock theft is an inherent problem linked to strong 
cultural traditions that will only reduce over time as law enforcement becomes stronger and new 
economic opportunities emerge, and education becomes more widespread. 

Management approaches applied to address these issues/threats 
From its inception, the Northern Rangelands Trust conservancies’ initiative has embraced 
security and peace building as part of its core strategic objectives. Accordingly, the NRT is one 
of the pioneering programmes in Africa in terms of conservation and natural resource 
management, both from the perspective of a human security objective, as well as from its 
innovative approaches to establishing and managing formal community conservancy 
governance structures.  

NRT articulates that: ‘The Northern Rangelands Trust is a community-led, non-governmental 
organisation that was set up in 2004 in northern Kenya by a coalition of local leaders, politicians 
and conservation interests. Its mission is to develop resilient community conservancies, which 
transform people’s lives, secure peace and conserve natural resources. NRT is a community 
conservancy membership organisation. The 35-member conservancies work across 4.5million 
hectares of northern and coastal Kenya. NRT is supporting and empowering communities to 
develop locally led governance structures, run peace and security programmes, take the lead in 
natural resource management, and manage sustainable businesses linked to conservation. The 
community conservancies are starting to have a significant impact on building peace, improving 
lives and managing the rangelands, and their success has helped shape new government 
regulations on establishing, registering and managing community conservancies in Kenya.’    

The annual NRT report for 2016 includes the following indicators based on surveys done with 
conservancy stakeholders: 

• 

The top 3 reported conservancy benefits: Security, Transport, Cattle market 

•  92 % of those surveyed feel safe in their conservancy  

•  83 % believe wildlife is important for their future 

•  7 % believe their conservancy improves their well-being 

•  49 % feel that benefits are fairly distributed. 

For more detailed information about the programme, activities and progress, see 
http://www.nrt-kenya.org/about/ 

Under the Northern Rangelands Trust’s conservancy structures for community 
governance, NRM structures have been formally created with both security and conservation 
mandates. A key element to the success and potential for the programme’s continued success is 
this formal governance structure, which includes human security together with wildlife and other 
natural resource use in the conservancies (e.g. addressing cattle raiding and banditry).  NRT 
rangers are formally mandated by the Government to act as auxiliaries of the National Police as 
well as the Kenya Wildlife Service.  The conservancy governance structure also serves to 

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coordinate all development assistance in the areas (e.g. water, health, education, roads), thus 
linking all the development benefits with conservation and NRM principles. 

The NRT conservancy governance model has been replicated across the conservancies in the 
north and on the coast, and has the potential for further conservancy creation and expansion 
over even greater spatial areas. The conservancy approach is effectively a way of managing for 
NRM, good governance and security. Key elements to this are reported to include 1) having 
senior members of the community (who are trusted and committed) lead the process, 2) 
creation and animation of conflict mitigation mechanisms, 3) rotation of the leadership with 
terms of 3 years and a maximum of 2 terms served by any one leader, and 4) keeping the 
structure simple with comprehensive authority (avoid creating conflicting structures). The goal 
is for the overall governance structure of the conservancy to be embraced, supported and 
trusted by the community members.  

There is a decentralisation of authority to communities and counties with continued Government 
oversight. The security and management initiatives are therefore in reality implemented at the 
local level by the communities along the guidelines approved and overseen by the Government. 

Core NRT community conservancies’ income generation programmes in the north include 
tourism, livestock management and marketing, and bead jewellery programmes. Further 
livelihood support and development efforts focus on water, renewable energy, micro-finance 
and education. With tourism being a major revenue-generation activity directly connected to 
wildlife protection, success is a very strong incentive to protect wildlife in the conservancies. 
The NRT security programme provides the critical stability under which the economic activities 
can be developed. Peace building initiatives include peace committees with monitoring and 
first-alert mechanisms for conflicts between communities and approaches to conflict resolution, 
including the empowerment of women in the processes. Monitoring programmes are employed 
to detect developing conflict, movement of armed groups and to communicate information for 
rapid political mitigation and security responses.  

NRT conservancies employed some 1 800 employees and 700 armed rangers in 2017, making 
them the top employer in the region.  

Law enforcement management is critical for achieving security for both local communities 
and wildlife. Seven hundred rangers are currently employed, with 200 having already received 
Kenya Police Reservist status, which legally mandates the rangers to address human security 
(banditry, cattle theft, etc.) together with their duties of wildlife protection. Rangers are 
recruited from the local communities of the conservancies and units are mixed and deployed 
strategically. Specialised elite ‘Nine’ teams are organised for rapid intervention and to provide 
support for difficult missions. ‘Nine’ teams are made up of members from diverse tribes, 
enabling operations to take place everywhere. Both the Police and Kenya Wildlife Service 
intervene to support the units as required for difficult situations. Law enforcement operations by 
the conservancies are coordinated with those of neighbouring private conservancies and 
ranches, and with the protected areas in the region. All the conservancies are linked through a 
common digital radio system manned 24/7 that links the conservancies to the KWS, KFS and 
the Kenya Police through a Joint Operations Command Center (JOCC) based at the NRT’s 
headquarters. 

Significant care and attention is paid to basic support (equipment, food, operations, health) of 
the ranger units. A structured Standard Operating Procedure and management and support 
systems for law enforcement personnel provide a clear foundation to guide operations. The 
ranger units of NRT benefit from the technical support and mentorship of the private security 
company 51 Degrees Ltd.  With this support, robust information-gathering systems are 
designed and managed to address security threats to people and wildlife. Training is of a high 
quality and continued mentorship supports performance, thus improving the morale of the law 
enforcement personnel.    

Aviation assets (fixed wing), robust communication systems and tracker dogs also support the 
law enforcement operations. A centralised secure law enforcement operations room (JOCC) at 
the Lewa Conservancy operations base employs the latest technology (tracking 24/7 year-round 

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threats, rangers, planes, collared elephants, vehicles, etc.) and is well organised to coordinate 
and guide the law enforcement efforts, including an effective rapid response mechanism.   

The governance, natural resource management and security programmes of the conservancies 
through the above outlined core activities provide a comprehensive approach to managing what 
has become a large network of interlinked conservancies.     

Progress of the NRT conservancies’ initiative requires long-term commitment (e.g. 50 years), 
professional technical support, local expert development and appropriation of leadership 
responsibility, and long-term funding from donors alongside revenue-generating activities of the 
conservancies themselves. 

Summary 
1.  Where does wildlife trafficking trigger conflicts, fuel existing unrest or lead to 

scaled-up conflicts (from local to national/regional, international)? 

With the increased international demand and soaring prices of rhino horn and elephant ivory 
since 2011, the NRT areas were subject to increased poaching and involvement of organised 
networks (particularly for rhino horn), which contributed to insecurity and corruption in the 
zone. This has largely been eliminated by strong enforcement efforts. The harvesting and 
trafficking of sandalwood and the associated widespread corruption along the chain is a serious 
threat to governance, undermining even the strong systems in place.  

2.  Where have conflicts triggered or fuelled wildlife-trafficking or hampered 

conservation?  

Cattle raiding and rustling and banditry are a direct threat to wildlife conservation and 
communities in the area. Increasing land invasion conflicts catalysed by drought and politics 
have a major negative impact on conservation in the region, directly impacting the privately 
owned ranches and conservancies, as well as destabilising the neighbouring community 
conservancies. These have also directly contributed to widespread poaching; moreover key 
wildlife species were affected by starvation and disease, or by being forced out of their usual 
habitats. While Al-Shabab is impacting NRT progress in the coastal conservancies (see Kenya 
Marine case study), the northern conservancies are not reporting major problems at this time, 
though the potential of this threat expansion is present and significant. 

3.  How is socio-economic security undermined by trafficking and poor conservation, 

both at local and national levels? 

The poaching of key wildlife species directly threatens and undermines tourism development in 
the conservancies and therefore is a threat to socio-economic security. Banditry and cattle 
raiding also undermine tourism and local community livelihoods. Land conflicts, if left 
unaddressed by comprehensive programmes, will undermine security in the region, discourage 
tourism and economic investment, and therefore undermine socio-economic security.    

4.  How does wildlife trafficking undermine the rule of law and legitimate institutions 

(notably because of the links with corruption)?  

Rhino horn poaching (now under control) and ivory poaching (still a problem) involve organised 
groups and corruption along structured chains, which undermine the rule of law and also foster 
corruption in wildlife units. As outlined above, the sandalwood exploitation and trafficking, 
however, is reported to be the most significant threat at this time and involves widespread 
networks and corruption. 

5.  How does wildlife-related insecurity (whether in term of conflict or from a socio-

economic point of view) contribute to migration flows (intra-state, inter-state, 
global)?  

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The NRT conservancy programmes effectively project security to a broad area and create 
sustainable economic opportunities for local communities, which act as an incentive for local 
people not to migrate out of the region. With increased drought fluctuations, however, there 
may be more movements of semi-nomadic pastoralist groups (particularly from the north) in 
search of land and water, and this will further impact security. 

6.  How are approaches being applied to address the wildlife-security nexus as a 

basis for development and improving security? 

Overall, the NRT conservancies establish centres of security and stability, monitor law 
enforcement and governance (community structure) in remote areas, which stabilise, prevent 
and deter banditry/armed conflicts/terrorist exploitation and radicalism cultivation in what might 
otherwise be lawless zones. The scale of the area covered and the cooperation with the Police 
and KWS result in a significant area of coverage with improved surveillance and governance 
structures. 

By enhancing economic opportunities and security, the NRT programme provides incentives for 
local communities to stay in the area (avoiding out-migration) and renders local 
populations less vulnerable to extremism. 

NRT conservancies present a good governance model at both the local and national levels 
given the strong Government and KWS support. Community conservancies expand the 
conservation and NRM estate and governance, improving security for people and wildlife on a 
very large scale. 

Suggestions for the way forward for the next 5 years 

1. Programmes/activities 
The Northern Rangeland Trust conservancies’ initiative provides a robust governance structure 
through which security, conservation and development are being delivered in remote areas that 
might otherwise be highly vulnerable to insecurity. Mobilising adequate funding for the 
programme is essential, alongside continued support for income-generating components in 
development.  Continued and increased international funding commitments over the long term 
will be essential to support the programme to realise its objectives. Further expansion of the 
programme to priority areas in the Matthews Range and further north in the Turkana area as a 
means of stabilising the area is recommended. Funding is clearly justified as an investment in 
both conservation and security (local, national and international). 

NRT engagement with facilitating land access negotiations and mitigating conflicts between 
pastoralists and private ranch and conservancy owners is a key element to maintaining security 
in the area. For political reasons it may be strategic to mobilise a third party to moderate such 
conflicts, which is advised by the NRT’s experts in the region. 

The involvement of 51 degrees Ltd as an external support provider and mentor to law 
enforcement actions of the NRT programme provides a high-quality and independent technical 
structure, helping to ensure quality control and high standards for the law enforcement 
activities of the NRT. This structure is effective and likely helps to deter corruption in the law 
enforcement units; it should therefore be continued as a key part of the initiative. 

2. Policy initiatives 
The NRT approach is a well-performing example of improved governance at local as well as 
national level, in that the Government of Kenya and the departments of Kenya Wildlife Service 
and the National Police fully support the programme and the decentralisation of authority to the 
counties and community conservancies. Through the community conservancies’ estate, natural 
resource management and governance for security for people and wildlife are projected on a 
large scale to complement protected area management and private conservancy initiatives. 
Continued high-level political support from the national Government as well as from the 
international community is critical for the programme. 

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Given the sensitivities and corruption surrounding sandalwood collection and trafficking, it is 
recommended that an outside organisation or institution be mandated by the Government of 
Kenya to undertake a thorough review of the trade, and that a series of measures be taken to 
set up sustainable management programmes to regulate and transparently manage this trade. 
A review of its protection status under CITES may be required. 

Security incidents  
Below is the monthly summary table of all security incidents across the entire NRT landscape for 
the period May to December 2017. (Source: NRT) 

INCIDENT TYPE 

Road banditry 
Stock theft 
Poaching (elephants) 
HWC 
Illegal activities (logging, 
charcoal) 
Arrests 
Tourist attacks 
Recovered weapons 
Recovered ivory 
Al-Shabab attacks 

MONTHLY OCCURRENCE 
JUNE 
MAY 
- 
1 
13 
12 
1 
1 
9 
21 
4 
- 

JULY  AUG 
2 
15 
- 
19 
1 

4 
18 
- 
16 
4 

SEPT  OCT  NOV  DEC 
5 
17 
- 
6 
1 

3 
25 
1 
9 
1 

3 
11 
- 
18 
1 

- 
7 
- 
3 
- 

TOTAL 
18 
118 
3 
102 
12 

2 
- 
1 
- 
- 

1 
1 
- 
1 
2 

4 
- 
1 
- 
2 

- 
- 
- 
- 
4 

2 

1 
- 
3 

1 
- 
3 
- 
- 

3 
- 
- 
2 
1 

- 
- 
- 
1 
- 

13 
1 
6 
4 
12 

July 2019  13 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
International Cooperation and Development 
Study on the interaction between security and wildlife  
in Sub-Saharan Africa  

Maps 
Map showing stock theft incidents from May to December 2017 (Source: NRT)  

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Study on the interaction between security and wildlife  
in Sub-Saharan Africa  

July 2019  15 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
International Cooperation and Development 
Study on the interaction between security and wildlife  
in Sub-Saharan Africa  

July 2019  16 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
International Cooperation and Development 
Study on the interaction between security and wildlife  
in Sub-Saharan Africa  

Case study 2. Kenya-Somalia coastal marine PAs and coastal NRT 
conservancies (Kenya) 

Site name and location: Kenyan coast, Northeastern Africa, Southwest Indian Ocean region 

Introduction  
In recent decades, Kenya’s marine environment, ecosystems and associated resources have 
shown signs of degradation due to over-exploitation as a result of unregulated use. In response, 
Kenya established marine protected areas (MPAs) to ensure that marine ecosystems remain 
ecologically and economically viable. The country now has a fairly unified network of MPAs 
stretching along its entire coast and covering nearly 1 140 km2 (see Figure 1 in Annex). They 
are under the management of Kenya Wildlife Service. All nine MPAs were established between 
1968 and 1993 (see table, page 25) and fall into two categories: Marine National Parks and 
Marine National Reserves.  

Marine National Parks are areas of total protection from any type of consumptive utilisation. 
Research and recreation (tourism) are the only uses allowed, and are subject to payment of 
fees.  

Marine National Reserves are areas where traditional harvesting of resources by local 
communities is allowed, as well as research and tourism. These correspond to International 
Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) categories II and VI respectively, and two of these 
MPAs are also UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation) 
Biosphere Reserves. In most cases, a marine park is surrounded by, or is contiguous with, a 
marine reserve that acts as a buffer. All MPAs have management plans produced by KWS in 
collaboration with key stakeholders, including government institutions, local communities, non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), the private sector, community-based organizations (CBOs) 
and interested individuals. International conventions, treaties and agreements are used to guide 
regional conservation efforts. These include the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), 
Convention on Climate Change (CCC), Convention on Migratory Species (CMS), Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species of wild fauna and flora (CITES), and the Nairobi 
Convention. 

Kenya is endowed with extensive fringing coral reefs all along its coast. An important function of 
MPAs is to mainly enhance marine biodiversity and, in particular, to enhance sustainable 
fisheries associated with the coral reef ecosystem. Other fragile habitats included in Kenya's 
network of MPAs are seagrass beds, mangroves, beaches and dune systems. Emblematic and/or 
threatened species associated with these habitats include green turtles, dugongs and other sea 
mammals such as dolphins and whales. The effectiveness of MPAs is a reflection of their 
management and Kenya's MPAs appear to be progressing toward relative effectiveness in 
realising their conservation objective, based on monitoring information (see Table 2 and Figure 
3 in Annex).  

A field mission researching this case study took place between 4 and 16 September 2017. Both 
primary data (interview, direct observation) and secondary data (existing and available 
documents) were collected. A wide range of stakeholders was contacted: from local NGOs, 
international NGOs and the Government Agency to the fisheries research institute. They 
include: Andrew Mwangura (Seafarers Association of Kenya), Nina Wambiji (Research Scientist, 
Kenya Marine Fisheries Research Institute), Amon Kimeli (Research Scientist, Kenya Marine 
Fisheries Research Institute), Benedict Kiilu (Principal Fisheries Officer – Fisheries compliance, 
Kenya Fisheries Service), Arthur Tuda (Assistant Director – Coastal zone & MPA, Kenya Wildlife 
Service), Mike Olendo (Turtle programme, WWF), Nyawira Muthiga (Director Kenya Marine 
Programme, Wildlife Conservation Society), Patrick Kimani (SmartFish programme – IUU, Indian 
Ocean Commission), Sankale Kiswaa (Kenya National Focal Point Maritime Security programme, 
Indian Ocean Commission), Luc Ralaimarindana (Responsible SmartFish Programme, Indian 
Ocean Commission) and Jude Palma (Regional Technical Coordinator, Fisheries Monitoring 
Regional Programme, Indian Ocean Commission).  

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Study on the interaction between security and wildlife  
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In addition, interviews and literature review were conducted in mid-September and December 
2017 with Northern Rangeland Trust (NRT) Director of Conservation Ian Craig and other NRT 
senior staff and 51 Degrees staff involved in supporting seven community conservancies along 
the coast in Lamu, Garissa, and Tana River counties, which contributed valuable information to 
this Kenya coast case study analysis. 

Key wildlife/security issues identified at this site 
Over-exploitation is a continuing problem on many Kenyan reefs, including illegal activities in 
the protected areas, although policing is increasingly effective in places. Kenya has been 
conducting assessments of the management effectiveness of its MPAs. These assessments have 
helped in revealing serious gaps in Kenya’s MPA management, ranging from threats such as 
poaching and pollution, infrastructural gaps in management planning, and staffing. Poaching 
(illegal, unregulated, unreported, or IUU, fishing) occurs both inshore and offshore. Inshore IUU 
fishing is practised by artisanal fishermen and includes fishing in MPAs, using illegal fishing gear 
(including dynamite), exceeding quotas, fishing out of season or targeting protected species 
(such as turtles). Offshore (high seas) IUU fishing involves industrial fishing vessels under 
foreign flags and includes fishing without a licence (or with a fake one), exceeding quotas or 
using indiscriminate fishing techniques leading to a high level of ‘by-catch’ and the capture of 
protected species (such as sharks or sea mammals).  

The main issues identified are as follows: 

•  Marine conservation: Both inshore and offshore IUU fishing have a strong impact on 
the sustainability of fish stocks and the conservation of coastal ecosystems. Both 
jeopardise plans and strategies designed to manage commercial fish stocks in a 
sustainable way and to conserve critical coastal ecosystems. It is estimated that up to 
40 % of the total catch in the north-eastern Africa area is conducted by IUU vessels. 

•  Fisheries crimes: Not many instances of poaching protected or endangered species 

were reported. Those mentioned concern mainly turtles, sharks and sea mammals. 
However, the huge volume of IUU captures certainly fuels rampant trafficking. IUU 
products are sold illegally (mainly on Asian markets) under fake licences and often after 
being transferred in international waters from the IUU vessel to a transport vessel. 
Europe does not escape this illegal trafficking, as shown by the case of the Kenyan FV 
Alpha Serengeti. When it was caught in Mombasa, the vessel held a variety of fish 
illegally caught in Somali waters, processed and packed in boxes labelled ‘Produce of 
Kenya’ and destined for the European market. Alpha Serengeti was a vessel approved by 
the European Union (EU) as a freezer vessel. 

•  Other organised crime activity: IUU vessels are also engaged in other types of 

trafficking, with IUU vessels engaging in arms and drug smuggling, and human trafficking 
(generally by transfer between a carrier vessel and an IUU vessel, and via the forced 
labour of the IUU vessel’s crew). 

•  Socio-economic impacts: IUU fishing has significant socio-economic impacts, both for 

local communities and for the country, through the depletion of natural resources and the 
destruction of critical habitats. IUU vessels operating offshore during the day have been 
spotted coming inshore during the night and undertaking illegal fishing, including using 
dynamite.  

• 

Impact on the rule of law: Illegal activities revolving around IUU fishing are also a 
threat to the rule of law. An example is the issuing of illegal licences, which is a lucrative 
activity as a licence can cost as much as USD 150 000 per year per vessel. Businessmen 
often based in Dubai, Yemen and South-east Asia but also in Kenya can provide these 
licences. Kenyan Government officials are also said to be part of this licence trafficking, 
which appears to have close links with piracy in the region. A recent trend shows that 
Somali pirates, possibly linked to terrorist groups, become ‘repentant’ and manage to get 
onto coastguard-type training programmes (species identification, boarding techniques, 
surveillance capacity, etc.) funded by international donors in Kenya and then leave at the 
end of the training course, with their acquired knowledge, to offer their services to IUU 
vessels and provide security from control patrols or other fishing vessels. It is a kind of 
‘circular economy’ with the consequence that local populations and governments get 

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increasingly poor, while IUU actors become richer. This increases the capacity of IUU 
actors to pay bribes and gain greater control of local economies, while governments’ 
ability to effectively combat those illegal activities is reduced. 

• 

Insecurity at sea: IUU fishing in the Indian Ocean is also associated with violence. 
Returning to the case of the FV Alpha Serengeti mentioned earlier, a few years before 
being apprehended in Mombasa, the vessel was reported to open fire on two unidentified 
fishing vessels that apparently intruded into her fishing zone. The other vessels 
responded with small firearms before fleeing the area at high speed. No hits were 
reported. A couple of years later, Alfa Serengeti was seen docking at the Port of El Maan, 
25 km north of Mogadishu. Within days, a 20 mm single mark4 anti-aircraft gun was 
mounted on her upper deck. With the involvement of Somali pirates in IUU trafficking, 
this is unlikely to be an isolated case and it is only a matter of time before more serious 
or fatal incidents occur. 

•  Since 2012, an Al-Shabab group has been operating from and transiting through Boni 

Forest Reserve, north of Lamu, on the border with Somalia. From the Boni forest, Al-
Shabab has launched incursions and operations in Lamu county and further along the 
coast. They are involved in poaching to support their members and in in 2015 an Al-
Shabab propaganda video came out depicting Al-Shabab rebels shooting and skinning a 
giraffe, a buffalo and a Topi antelope.   Kenya Defence Force operations were launched in 
2015 against Al-Shabab in the Boni area and continue through to the present with recent 
operations in November 2017 destroying six transit camps. The presence of Al-Shabab 
along the coast has intimidation impact across wide areas. This thus hinders the progress 
of community conservancy development, particularly within the Awer, Pate, Kiunga 
Marine and Lower Tana River Delta conservancies with marine components along the 
coast. There have been no confirmed reports so far of any Al-Shabab involvement in 
elephant poaching and ivory trafficking in this area, though they are heavily involved in 
bushmeat and subsistence hunting. 

Security risks to those involved in wildlife protection 
Offshore patrols in the waters off North-eastern Africa are mainly performed by foreign navies, 
such as the EU Atalanta operation. Rangers and other conservation practitioners involved in 
wildlife protection patrol onshore or in small crafts along the coast. As far as could be 
established, no security risks have been reported. However, the potential for violence and even 
casualties is real and cannot be ignored. 

Management approaches applied to address these issues/threats 
The management of the issues and threats mentioned above has followed a dual approach in 
the South-western Indian Ocean region. At national level this is Kenya’s responsibility; at 
regional level, management falls under the auspices of the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC). 

At the national level, Kenya’s surveillance of the MPAs appears to have a positive impact. 
Although somewhat understaffed, these MPAs are still staffed sufficiently to provide increased 
surveillance within the borders of MPAs compared to outside the MPAs. According to the 
conservation practitioners interviewed, this appears to have affected the behaviour of pirate and 
IUU vessels movements along the Kenyan coast. On their way from Somalia to Mombasa or 
Tanzania and back, these vessels now tend to remain more offshore, avoiding the MPAs. 
Therefore, the slight increase in surveillance within MPAs appears to be enough of a deterrent. 

Over the past decade, the Northern Rangelands Trust has facilitated the establishment of 7 
conservancies (Ishaqbini in 2007; Ndera, 2010; Lower Tana Delta, 2013; Awer, Hanshak-
Nyongoro, Kiunga and Pate in 2013) covering some 5 190 km2 to date along the coast in Lamu, 
Garissa and Tana counties. Kiunga and Pate include marine conservancy programme activities, 
including community-based monitoring, turtle protection, fisheries management, mangrove 
protection and surveillance activities. Awer and Tana Delta include estuarine ecosystems with a 
focus on mangrove protection and surveillance activities. As part of a programme to incentivise 
proactive conservation, Northern Rangelands Trust Trading (NRTT), the investor arm of NRT, is 
investing in a series of initiatives to stimulate economic returns whilst contributing towards job 
creation in the area.  In particular, a programme called OCEAN Works, supported by NRT and 

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The Nature Conservancy (TNC), is working with communities to enable and foster shifts to 
sustainable fishing practices, a virgin coconut oil extraction plant on Pate Island and a 
commercial solar-powered desalinisation plant estimated to provide 70 m3 of fresh water daily 
in Kiunga town. These conservancies along the coast complement the marine protected area 
network complex, and form part of and contribute to the surveillance network and stabilisation 
strategies. This is made possible through the establishment of a complex digital radio system 
that links all 7 conservancies to a central radio room based in Lamu. The conservancies work 
closely with the Kenya Wildlife Service and Kenya Forest Service to enable a more proactive 
level of law enforcement through joint marine and terrestrial patrols. The information gathered 
through this process is reported back to a central Joint Operations Command Centre (JOCC) 
based at the NRT’s headquarters in Isiolo, which is monitored and staffed by a Kenya Police 
liaison officer, ensuring a seamless flow of information from community patrols on the ground 
back to national law enforcement agencies. Community members working as part of the coastal 
conservancies benefit from improved livelihoods and employment opportunities and 
surveillance.  This is an area of planned growth for NRT and NRTT with an aim to help stabilise 
and provide incentives, which act as an alternative to crime and joining bandits or terrorist 
groups. 

At the regional level, the IOC has engaged with or joined several regional programmes related 
to maritime security, fisheries management and combating IUU fishing. Among the most 
relevant of these, three EU-funded programmes are worth mentioning here: the Fisheries 
Surveillance Regional Programme (Programme Régional de Surveillance des Pêches or PRSP), 
the Maritime Security Programme (MASE) and the Monitoring of Environment and Security in 
Africa programme (MESA). 

Within the framework of the PRSP, joint regional patrols are undertaken with a coastguard 
patrol vessel of one of the participating countries (currently one from the Madagascan 
coastguard) carrying a regional crew (participating countries are IOC members plus Kenya, 
Tanzania and Mozambique). Aerial patrols are also undertaken with Dornier planes supplied by 
the Seychelles and Mauritius. Within the span of a few years from initiating this regional effort, 
48 missions were completed for a total of 1 200 days of patrol time, while close to 1 000 hours 
of aerial surveillance identified 430 fishing vessels. A total of 468 fishing vessels were boarded 
and controlled, 72 infringements formally lodged and 10 vessels apprehended and detained. 
While this is undeniably a success story, it is one that comes with limitations and challenges. 

A key challenge is the fact that the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of the South-west Indian 
Ocean (SWIO) countries spans a huge area (millions of square kilometres). Even by pooling 
regional resources through PRSP, it would be impossible to ensure a complete surveillance of 
that magnitude.  

From this point of view, the Potential Fishing Zone (PFZ) maps, a product developed under the 
EU-funded MESA programme could help. The PFZ maps are generated from satellite imagery, 
allowing an estimation of the phytoplankton concentration in surface waters. These areas are 
where fish will congregate and where fishing vessels are most likely to operate. With a forecast 
of 2 to 3 days, these PFZs can allow surveillance to focus on a limited number of specific 
locations, ignoring the rest of the EEZ and therefore significantly increasing the current 
surveillance effort at no additional cost. 

Along the coast, illegal logging continues to negatively impact key areas in the Boni forest after 
which the reserve is named. This covers an area of 1 339 km2 and is an indigenous open canopy 
forest and part of the Northern Zanzibar-Inhambane coastal forest mosaic.1 Harbouring 
densities of plant species that are among the highest in the world, the forest has been declared 
a biodiversity hotspot. With the development of Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia-
Transport (LAPSSET) and the increasing commercial development within Lamu, significantly 
increased pressure is already being seen on the illegal extraction of hardwoods from the Boni 
forest, specifically afzelia quanzens. This is anticipated to increase significantly, and given the 

1 See: http://www.eoearth.org/article/Northern_Zanzibar-Inhambane_coastal_forest_mosaic 

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International Cooperation and Development 
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current insecurity will become a further contributory factor in the connectivity between 
environmental destruction, insecurity and the destabilisation of the northern Kenya coastline. 

Summary 
1.  Where does wildlife trafficking trigger conflicts, fuel existing unrest or lead to 

scaled-up conflicts (from local to national/regional, international)?  

Fishery crimes (mainly in the form of IUU fishing) can certainly be said to be fuelling existing 
banditry and conflicts in the region, particularly in Somali and Kenyan waters, if only in the light 
of the observed scaling up of vessel armament and active involvement of Somali pirates on IUU 
vessels. 

2.  Where have conflicts triggered or fuelled wildlife trafficking or hampered 

conservation?  

By providing armed protection to vessels engaged in illicit activities such as IUU fishing, drugs 
and arms smuggling or human trafficking, pirates contribute to the expansion of these illegal 
activities, which in turn may fuel further or more violent conflicts and jeopardise conservation 
efforts in the area.  Terrestrially along the coast the influence of Al-Shabab, in the Boni forest 
areas and elsewhere along the northern coast of Kenya, negatively impacts the progress of 
community conservancies and protected area management. 

3.  How is socio-economic security undermined by trafficking and poor conservation, 

both at local and national levels?  

As a direct result, the socio-economic security of local communities is at risk, if not right now, 
then in the near future through increased depletion of natural resources and foreseen increased 
violence against fishermen out at sea. All transport of marine products and foodstuffs on land is 
now impossible due to insecurity and the presence of IEDs on the Kiunga to Lamu road, forcing 
all commerce to go by sea. For 5 months of the year this is both dangerous and often 
impossible due to the southeast monsoon. With no alternative route, boats are forced to 
undertake this perilous journey despite the risks. A community-based resolution to the current 
insecurity has the potential to once again open up the land routes for trade. 

4.  How does wildlife trafficking undermine the rule of law and legitimate institutions 

(notably because of the links with corruption)?  

Likewise, these illegal activities undermine the rule of law in the region, particularly in Somalia 
and Kenya, through the corruption of government officials and the enrichment of pirates and 
corrupt businessmen, while impoverishing local populations and ultimately nations themselves. 

5.  How does wildlife-related insecurity (whether in term of conflict or from a socio-

economic point of view) contribute to migration flows (intra-state, inter-state, 
global)?  

Fishery crimes and related illegal activities cannot be said to have triggered population 
movements in East Africa, at least across borders, other than in the form of limited illegal 
immigration. This may however be happening within Somalia but it is difficult to distinguish, at 
least remotely, between population movements directly related to Al-Shabab activities and 
those directly related to IUU fishing and its related illegal activities, the cause of both being the 
same (socio-economic insecurity).  However the activities of Al-Shabab within the Boni forest 
has forced the majority of the Boni community away from their homes, forcing them to live in 
Pate and Kiunga town as refugees until such time as this insecurity is resolved. The illegal 
collection of timber and killing of wildlife by Al-Shabab all contribute to this migration of the 
Boni community away from their historical homes. 

6.  How are approaches being applied to address the wildlife-security nexus as a 

basis for development and improving security? 

July 2019  21 

 
 
 
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The current NRT model of community conservancies is based on a well governed, community-
led institution that is funded to maintain dialogue across the wider community, provide job 
opportunities from within that community, and enabling a broad community to buy in to the 
concept that contributes directly to improved security. This is clearly demonstrated elsewhere in 
Kenya where the NRT model has significantly reduced poaching and enabled peace between 
previously conflicting communities. The north Kenya coastal regions are more complex given 
the deeply rooted issues, religious and political connotations, and the connectivity to radical 
elements from Somalia. However, since the conservancies were in place well before the current 
influx of Al-Shabab, the foundations are there to engage in a grass-roots approach to influence 
change through community pressure and the provision of realistic alternatives. 

Marine protected area network surveillance and management activities directly contribute to 
deterring piracy, IUU fishing and banditry.  Military operations in the area as part of surveillance 
and counter terrorism also have a positive multiplier in reducing threats to conservation areas. 
The solid foundations of the coastal community conservancies, established by the communities 
with support from the NRT, are directly contributing to improved surveillance and therefore 
security, and enhancing the security of local livelihoods, though this progress is hindered by the 
Al-Shabab threat and intimidation in the northern sector of the coast. 

Suggestions for the way forward for the next 5 years 

1. Programmes/activities 
Given the deterrent represented by increased surveillance within MPAs (as opposed to outside 
MPAs) it would seem that actively expanding and supporting the operations of the MPA network 
along Kenya's coast would be recommended. However, some officials in KWS suggest simply 
expanding the surveillance outside the MPAs without the need to create new protected areas. 
Nevertheless, the top priority is to support the MPAs’ operations that complement community 
marine conservancies, which will have a multiplier effect on improving security.   

Support the NRT for the reinforcement and expansion of Coastal Community Conservancies, 
including both marine and terrestrial areas. These approaches have the dual effect of improving 
security: firstly by contributing directly to security through surveillance activities, through 
detecting banditry, wildlife poaching, illegal fishing, illegal logging (including mangroves) and 
other illegal activities; secondly, they contribute to stabilisation by securing the sustainable 
livelihoods of communities, and providing employment and revenue opportunities, which then 
incentivise people to become part of good governance (so that local people are less likely to be 
involved in criminal and insurgent/terrorism groups). 

It is recommended to capitalise on the results of the EU-funded MESA programme, particularly 
the PFZ maps developed by the Mauritius Oceanography Institute (MOI), by supporting a more 
widespread use of these maps in the region. Every country has been equipped to acquire and 
use the satellite imagery necessary to generate the PFZ maps, including training courses 
delivered by the MOI, in the last 4 years. Generating these maps on a regular basis and sharing 
them with the coastguards (where a coastguard force is present), or with other conservation 
practitioners, would give them a 2 to 3-day forecast on the location of the highest productivity 
zones in their EEZ, enabling them to target their surveillance on these zones. The future EU-
funded Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES) & Africa programme, a follow-
up to MESA, could be used to boost that support. 

On a similar front, better and more efficient use of VMS data (Vessel Monitoring System) could 
also be supported. Conservation practitioners interviewed mentioned specifically that they lack 
the necessary training to make full use of VMS data. The combination of MESA-generated PFZ 
maps and a more efficient use of VMS data could become a powerful tool to combat, or at least 
deter, IUU fishing and related illegal activities. In that respect, Mauritius can serve as an 
example since the VMS is already being implemented there in close cooperation between the 
MOI (PFZ maps), the Albion Fisheries Research Centre (VMS data analysis and integration with 
PFZ maps), and the coastguards (surveillance and enforcement). 

In light of the above, it would seem that supporting the creation of a coastguard force in 
countries currently without one should be considered as part of the way forward. However, it 

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Study on the interaction between security and wildlife  
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may be more complicated than simply providing funds and coastguard training programmes. As 
pointed out by some conservation practitioners interviewed, training programmes are hijacked 
by ‘reformed’ pirates. Furthermore, some government officials, in both Somalia and Kenya at 
least, have no interest in supporting such an initiative since it would jeopardise their illegal 
practice of issuing fake fishing licences. However, functional coastguard forces have proven 
their value and impact wherever they exist. 

2. Policy initiatives 
Design policies that guide and support cooperation between marine protected area surveillance, 
Community Coastal Conservancies and fisheries surveillance entities, in synergy with military 
surveillance counter-terrorism efforts. 

Ensure that the policy structure supporting the expansion of network of community 
conservancies along the coast complements the marine protected area system. 

In addition to the community conservancy programme expansion along the coast using the NRT 
model, there are also some other approaches worth exploring. An interesting concept was 
developed a few years back in South Africa. Confronted by the lack of resources necessary to 
manage and undertake efficient surveillance of their mangrove areas, authorities created a 
‘Green Corps’. This corps was formed by training local community members in mangrove 
management and surveillance. Upon returning to their communities, these people could then 
share their knowledge with community members and encourage them to become active actors 
in the management and surveillance of their local mangrove area. They were provided with 
incentives such as exclusive exploitation rights of their area. The concept proved to be 
successful and should be easy to adapt to the surveillance of the East African coastline and the 
management of inshore fisheries where resources are presently insufficient. Incentives offered 
could include exclusive rights to exploit natural resources in the community area, or higher 
quotas for local communities while decreasing the quotas of outsiders. The coastal 
conservancies currently being developed with support from the NRT already provide the tools 
for a community-based management platform to expand. In addition, there may be also some 
lessons learned from the South African success, which would be worth considering. 

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Maps 

Kenya’s marine protected area network 

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Study on the interaction between security and wildlife  
in Sub-Saharan Africa  

Kenya's marine protected areas  

MNP = Marine National Park, MnaR = Marine National Reserve 

NRT coastal conservancies 

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Case study 3. Gabon coastal marine protected areas (Gabon) 

Site name and location: Gabon, coast, Gulf of Guinea  

Introduction  
Gabon has recently created a new marine protected area network of 9 marine parks and 11 
aquatic reserves, covering over 55 000 km2 as part of Gabon Bleu, a presidential marine 
security, conservation, fisheries management initiative that will protect whale, sea turtle and 
other marine species inhabiting the nation's coastal and offshore ecosystems and fisheries 
resources (see Figure 1 in Annex). The announcement was issued in 2014 and has now entered 
into force (Décret No 00161, 1 June 2017). This network of marine protected areas (MPAs) 
covers about 26 % of Gabon's territorial waters and its EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone). This 
represents a massive increase from the 1 % of marine areas previously protected in Gabon and 
puts the country close to having 20 % to 30 % of its waters maintaining biodiversity and 
restoring depleted areas outside parks. The newly protected areas will include a 27 000 km2 
extension of Mayumba National Park, extending out to the limit of the nation’s EEZ. The new 
marine protected area network complements an existing terrestrial protected area system 
anchored by 13 national parks created in 2002 (Gabon Vert) and the Presidential Reserve. 

This means that Gabon will be the first Central African nation to protect its marine resources 
with the establishment of a marine protected area network. It may also be unique in the world. 
Even the EU aims to protect ‘only’ 10 % of its waters through the Marine Natura 2000 Network. 
The MPAs in Gabon will protect more than 20 species of whale and dolphin, including humpback 
whale and Atlantic humpback dolphin, 4 species of marine turtle, including the world’s largest 
breeding leatherback turtle population and the Atlantic Ocean’s largest breeding Olive Ridley 
turtle population. More than 20 species of shark and ray occur in Gabon’s waters, many of 
which are threatened, including great hammerhead shark, manta ray, whale shark and tiger 
shark. 

This marine protected area system will not only help protect the country's marine wildlife, but 
will take significant steps to curtail IUU fishing from the international fleets that exploit much of 
Africa’s coastal waters, therefore guaranteeing the livelihoods of coastal communities by 
ensuring that fisheries are sustained for future generations. Furthermore, surveillance of the 
marine protected area systems will contribute directly to detecting and deterring piracy and 
other potential security threats.  The network was designed following extensive surveys and 
data collection over two decades, performed by the Agence Nationale des Parcs Nationaux 
(ANPN-National Agency of National Parks), Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) Gabon and the 
University of Exeter, in order to identify priority areas for the parks.  

In addition to the MPA system, Gabon has also passed supporting legislation to the fisheries 
code and has significantly increased the application of all aspects of the fisheries code, which 
includes management plans, stock assessments, catch statistics, science-based attribution of 
licences, fisheries technology reform and a significantly increased surveillance, which has 
resulted in notable decreases in IUU fishing and a tripling of declared catches, in particular by 
the foreign tuna fleet. This increase in catch declaration has resulted in the realisation that 
Gabon is the number one producer under the EU tuna accord’s catches and sets the stage for a 
serious consideration of industrialisation of tuna locally. 

A field mission conducted in the context of this case study took place from 22 September to 2 
October, including travel days. Both primary data (interview, direct observation) and secondary 
data (existing and available documents) were collected. Stakeholders contacted include 
international NGOs, government agencies and the judiciary. They include J. Michael Fay (Special 
Counsellor to Gabon's President, Gabon Blue), Gaspard Abitsi (Director, WCS), Emmanuel 
Chartrain (Fisheries Observers Manager, Gabon Blue/WCS), Georges Mba Assoko (National 
Agency for Fisheries and Aquaculture/ Agence Nationale des Pêches et de l'Aquaculture or 
ANPA), Koumba Kombila (ANPN, formerly in charge of anti-IUU Operation Albacore) and 
Magistrate Moukoko (Prosecutor in several IUU cases). 

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Key wildlife/security issues identified at this site 
Gabon’s coastal waters and its marine Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) are biologically and 
economically important, yet have received little investment for development of sustainable 
management. Commercial fishing and wildlife tourism (humpback whales, turtle nesting and 
sport-fishing) are important natural resource uses with considerable potential for contributing to 
the national economy. In addition, the value added of tuna industry development in Gabon 
would quadruple the revenue from this most important fishery in the country, principally 
yellowfin and skipjack tuna. 

Threats to Gabon’s biodiversity, ecosystems services, and marine protected areas include over-
fishing and illegal fishing, causing the depletion of stocks and ecosystem damage: fisheries by-
catch, e.g. marine turtle, coastal dolphin, humpback whale, juvenile fish, shark and ray; risk of 
pollution from offshore oil and gas production and potential impacts from exploration activities; 
and infrastructure development impacts on coastal habitats and species such as turtle, dolphin 
and breeding fish, as well as shipping collisions with whales. Coastal erosion and sea-level rise 
are impacting mangrove forests. 

Global losses to IUU fishing are estimated to be as high as USD 23.5 billion annually. IUU 
fishing is endemic in the Gulf of Guinea, threatening local fisheries, and the food and work 
security of people in the region. Fishery depletion, which can be a direct result of repeated IUU 
fishing activity, has been identified as a contributing factor to instability and to the rising 
incidence of piracy.  

Illegal operators are driven by financial gain and, as a result, large-scale illegal fishing often 
goes hand in hand with other criminal activity. In Gabon, either the criminal activity is a result 
of the illegal fishing operation (e.g. tax evasion, money laundering) or fishing is used as a cover 
for transnational organised crimes, such as trafficking of drugs, humans and wildlife.  

IUU fishing occurs inshore and offshore. Inshore IUU fishing is practised by artisanal fishermen 
and includes fishing in MPAs, using illegal fishing gear. Offshore IUU fishing involves industrial 
fishing vessels under foreign flags (21 flags out of 35 operating in Gabon's waters are European, 
most of the remainder are Caribbean states) and includes under-declaring bycatch and under-
declaring a company’s commercial catch. The main issues identified are as follows: 

• 

IUU fishing: Not many instances of poaching protected or endangered species were 
encountered. Those mentioned concern mainly turtle, shark and ray. However, the huge 
volume of IUU captures certainly fuels rampant trafficking.  

Both inshore and offshore IUU fishing have a strong impact on the sustainability of fish 
stocks and the conservation of coastal ecosystems. Both jeopardise plans and strategies 
designed to manage commercial fish stocks in a sustainable way and to conserve critical 
coastal ecosystems. Of the global catch of fish, 15 % to 40 % is estimated to be caught 
by IUU operators, and 90 % is caught in waters that fall under the authority of a coastal 
state like Gabon. IUU fishing undermines efforts to conserve and manage fish stocks, and 
greatly disadvantages those fishers that follow the laws and fishing guidelines. Industrial 
fishing vessels also capture a large number of protected species. Up to 150 to 200 
captures can happen over a 3-week period, up to 30 000 per fishing season by 35 
vessels, of which 21 are under a European flag. The non-declaration of industrial fishing 
vessels is a serious concern. This is not only done by countries or vessels under flags of 
convenience, but also by tuna fishing vessels under European flags. For example, fishery 
observers report that Spanish vessels systematically report lower catches than French 
tuna fishing vessels. Spanish vessels also show a much larger volume of by-catch, 
probably due to the fact that they fish on fish aggregating devices (FADs), which of 
course attract many more species including juvenile tuna. IUU products are sold illegally 
(mainly on Asian and African markets) but Europe does not escape this illegal trafficking. 
For example, the UK imports a high volume of tuna from West Africa and the high 
incidence of illegal fishing in the Gulf of Guinea means that there is a risk of IUU 
contamination of UK-bound seafood supply chains. It has been highlighted that 
GBP 60 million of tuna products from West Africa have been subject to regulatory 
interventions due to IUU fishing concerns. Shark finning seems to also be a concern in 

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the region. Shark fins attract a premium price on the Asian market and are often cut off 
whilst the rest of the shark is thrown overboard, frequently still alive.  Even European 
boats separate fins from shark carcasses. 

•  Other organised crime activity: IUU vessels are also involved in other types of 

trafficking, with IUU vessels engaging in arms and drug smuggling, and human trafficking 
(generally through transfer between a carrier vessel and an IUU vessel, and the forced 
labour of the crew on the IUU vessel). For further details see below under ‘Impact on the 
rule of law’. However, evidence for this in Gabon is quite limited at this time. 

•  Socio-economic impacts: Socio-economic impacts, through the depletion of natural 

resources and the destruction of critical habitats are significant both for local 
communities and for the country.  

• 

Impact on the rule of law: Illegal activities revolving around or associated with IUU 
fishing are also a threat to the rule of law. As observed in other coastal nations, officials 
in Gabon are involved in various arrangements with local fishing companies. This not only 
fuels IUU fishing but also gives those corrupting greater ability to corrupt, a vicious 
downward spiral that significantly threatens the rule of law and fosters other criminal 
activities in the region. Previous to Gabon Blue, trawlers from Cameroon and Nigeria 
acquired fishing licences and the vessels then fished in illegal zones and exported the 
majority of their catch to their mother country. This fleet has now been completely 
eliminated from Gabonese waters and only 24 trawlers currently operate in these waters, 
all registered and licenced legally. The second form of illegal activity is more of a concern. 
An estimated 1 500 open-deck artisanal fishing boats (‘pirogues’ up to 15 m. long) are 
operating in Gabonese waters. Some are officially owned by Gabonese citizens but most 
are actually owned by West Africans, facilitated by the complicity of government officials. 
These fishing boats also engage in all sorts of trafficking: human trafficking from Nigeria 
(transiting from larger canoes coming out of the Calabar port area and then once in 
Gabonese waters transported to the city by fishing boats), and drug trafficking. Illegal 
immigrants moving to Gabon establish villages in the mangrove areas around Libreville 
and elsewhere, and engage in all sorts of legal and illegal (and very lucrative) activities. 
Amongst these illegal immigrants are unaccompanied teenagers, whose presence here 
could easily translate into a form of modern slavery. The trip back to Nigeria on the 
transport boats is not wasted: these are often loaded with illegal goods, including ivory 
from poaching.  

Another example of the negative impacts on the Gabonese rule of law from illegal fishing 
is observed in the case of illegal fishing by Chinese vessels coming from the Republic of 
Congo and Equatorial Guinea. Each time an IUU vessel is caught in Gabon, the Chinese 
embassy in Libreville usually steps in to facilitate, regardless of protocol, to see the 
vessels go free, thereby establishing a form of impunity for Chinese IUU vessels. 

As a result of these types of crimes at sea, local populations and governments are increasingly 
impoverished and susceptible to corruption, while actors involved in IUU fishing and other illegal 
activities enrich themselves. This increases the capacity of these actors to pay bribes and gain 
increasing control of local economies, while governments’ ability to effectively combat those 
illegal activities is reduced. 

Security risks to those involved in wildlife protection 
Security risks for conservation practitioners or law enforcement personnel are real in the Gulf of 
Guinea: violence and casualties are not uncommon. The year 2016 witnessed a marked increase 
in maritime security incidents over the previous year. For example, Denmark-based Risk 
Intelligence counted 119 verified attacks by criminals on all kinds of vessels in West Africa 
(Senegal to Angola), compared to 82 in 2015. The vast majority of attacks in 2016 were 
perpetrated by Nigerian criminals, including all of the 84 incidents that were concentrated in 
and around Nigerian waters. The wider Gulf of Guinea was less affected by these developments. 
If not addressed, this activity could spread into Cameroon and Gabonese waters as well. By and 
large, when speaking of ‘Gulf of Guinea piracy’ as a problem for international shipping, it 
actually refers to Nigerian piracy. On the other hand, other forms of maritime crime, such as 
IUU fishing, smuggling of oil, drugs, agricultural products, or human trafficking are the more 
pressing day-to-day challenges for coastal nations in the region. Control and surveillance teams 

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are clearly at risk as demonstrated by a recent incident where a coastguard team boarded a 
suspect vessel. As it turned out, it was a pirate-operated vessel and the entire boarding team 
was killed. No such incidents were reported concerning conservation practitioners operating on 
or along the coast, but the risk is not negligible. Arms caches have been discovered in or around 
illegal settlements around Libreville. 

Management approaches applied to address these issues/threats 
As in the West Indian Ocean region (see Kenya marine report), the management of the issues 
and threats mentioned above has followed a dual approach in the Gulf of Guinea region, at 
national level in Gabon and at regional level. 

•  As mentioned in the introduction, Gabon has established a network of MPAs along its 

coast and has significantly increased marine surveillance of its territorial and EEZ waters. 
This has significantly decreased piracy and IUU activities along the Gabonese coast. 
Governmental agency ANPN collaborates with the Gabonese navy to conduct surveillance 
patrols in Gabonese waters; authorities also collaborate with NGOs for this purpose. 
ANPN together with WCS Gabon, for example, operate 7 planes in close collaboration with 
the air force for surveillance purposes. 

•  The Government of Gabon is actively promoting collaboration between NGOs (where the 

technical knowledge lies) and government agencies, such as the ANPN and ANPA (Agence 
Nationale de Pêche et d'Aquaculture). A prominent example is Operation Albacore. Since 
2016, Sea Shepherd Global has been providing the use of its vessel M/Y Bob Barker as a 
civilian offshore patrol vessel to defend, conserve and protect critical tuna habitat in 
Central West Africa. Gabonese marines (Marine Nationale) and fishery inspectors with the 
ANPA work alongside the Sea Shepherd crew to patrol Gabon’s sovereign waters by 
detecting and deterring IUU fishing activity while also monitoring legal compliance by 
licensed fishing operators. The M/Y Bob Barker patrolled the Gulf of Guinea from April to 
September 2016, during which time over 40 inspections and boardings were carried out 
at sea, resulting in the arrest of 5 IUU fishing vessels, including 1 which was discovered 
trawling inside Mayumba National Park, one of Gabon’s marine protected areas. 

•  At the regional level, a number of western Gulf of Guinea countries have also come 

together to form a task force aimed at combatting piracy, IUU fishing and related illegal 
activities more effectively. This West Africa Task Force to stop illegal fishing has been 
established with the six member countries of the Fisheries Committee of the West Central 
Gulf of Guinea (FCWC): Benin, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria and Togo. With 
funding from Norad, the NGO Stop Illegal Fishing forms part of the technical team that 
supports the task force. 

•  Still at the regional level, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and 

Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) regional organisations have 
participated in the Monitoring of Environment and Security in Africa programme (MESA). 
ECOWAS was particularly focused on the marine aspect of the programme in the same 
way the IOC was in the South-west Indian Ocean region, and this could be put to good 
use. Indeed, behind that success hides the fact that the EEZ of the Gulf of Guinea 
countries is huge (millions of square kilometres). Even by pooling regional resources 
through initiatives, such as Operation Albacore or the West Africa Task Force, it would be 
impossible to ensure a complete surveillance of that magnitude. From this point of view, 
a product developed under the MESA programme could help. This product is the PFZ 
maps generated from satellite imagery, allowing an estimation of phytoplankton 
concentration in surface waters. These areas are where fish will congregate and where 
fishing vessels are most likely to operate. With a forecast of 2 to 3 days, these PFZs can 
allow surveillance to concentrate on a limited number of specific locations, ignoring the 
rest of the EEZ and therefore significantly increasing the current surveillance effort at no 
additional cost. 

Summary 
1.  Where does wildlife trafficking trigger conflicts, fuel existing unrest or lead to 

scaled-up conflicts (from local to national/regional, international)?  

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Wildlife trafficking along the coast of Gabon and more broadly in the Gulf of Guinea (mainly in 
the form of IUU fishing, smuggling and human trafficking) can certainly be said to be fuelling 
existing banditry and conflicts in the region. The observed scale of traffic between Nigeria and 
Gabon by a fleet of ‘artisanal fishing boats’ is such an example. 

2.  Where have conflicts triggered or fuelled wildlife trafficking or hampered 

conservation?  

Pirates engaged in illicit activities such as IUU fishing, drug and arms smuggling or human 
trafficking help these illegal activities to get even more widespread, which in turn may fuel 
further or more violent conflicts and jeopardise conservation efforts in the area. 

3.  How is socio-economic security undermined by trafficking and poor conservation, 

both at local and national levels?   

As a direct result of the outlined factors above, socio-economic security is at risk, if not right 
now then in the near future, through increased depletion of natural resources, and increased 
violence against fishermen out at sea and in coastal communities. 

4.  How does wildlife trafficking undermine the rule of law and legitimate institutions 

(notably because of the links with corruption)?  

These illegal activities undermine the rule of law in the region through the corruption of bribed 
officials and the enrichment of pirates and corrupt businessmen, while impoverishing local 
populations and ultimately nations themselves. 

5.  How does wildlife-related insecurity (whether in term of conflict or from a socio-

economic point of view) contribute to migration flows (intra-state, inter-state, 
global)?  

Population movements in the Gulf of Guinea could become a problem, considering the volume of 
illegal immigration from the north of the Gulf of Guinea to the south, particularly in Gabon. The 
illegal immigrants backed by their pirate network and flotilla in turn pose a threat to local 
communities. 

6.  How are approaches being applied to address the wildlife-security nexus as a 

basis for development and improving security? 

The creation of the Gabon marine protected area network and associated marine/ coastal 
surveillance and interagency coordination activities, led by ANPN, together with Sea Shepard, 
WCS and the Gabonese air force and navy and others, have a direct positive impact on 
deterring illegal activities in the zone, including IUU fishing, piracy and banditry. As a result, 
there is a positive impact in better securing local community livelihoods and stability in the 
area. 

Suggestions for the way forward for the next 5 years 

1.  Programmes/activities 

•  As demonstrated by the regulated shrimp fishery area, and as can already be seen in 
the newly created MPA network, the increase of surveillance is effective in decreasing 
IUU fishing and other criminal activities in the area. Thus it appears that the way 
forward is to support the management of these areas, and not just by funding additional 
staff, but by providing equipment and training courses that would increase management 
effectiveness. There is a clear need expressed by countries like Gabon, which have 
taken the first steps towards better management of their natural resources, and for 
international donors to now step in to help them improve their monitoring, control and 
surveillance (MCS) capabilities. 

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• 

• 

• 

The commitment and progress in marine protected area network management, marine 
surveillance, and the enforcement of fishing regulations and management made thus far 
by the Government of Gabon through its ANPN and ANPA is very significant, and is 
directly, and indirectly, improving security along the coast. Increased international 
funding to support ANPN and ANPA operations and capacity building, and technical 
support to develop their marine programme actions, should be a top priority for the EU 
and other donors and technical partners. 

In light of the above, it would seem that supporting the creation of a coastguard force in 
countries without one should be considered as part of the way forward. However, at 
present, national navies have been called in to fulfil that role (e.g. in Nigeria, Gabon). 
For the Gulf of Guinea region, supporting involvement and cooperation between the 
navy, governmental agencies and conservation NGOs may be the way forward, such as 
Operation Albacore or the involvement of the NGO Stop Illegal Fishing in the West Africa 
Task Force initiative. 

It would seem to be a good strategy to capitalise on the results of the EU-funded MESA 
programme, particularly the PFZ maps developed by the Mauritius Oceanography 
Institute and adopted by their MESA counterpart at the University of Ghana, by 
supporting a more widespread use of these maps in the region. Every country has been 
equipped to acquire and use the satellite imagery necessary to generate those maps, 
including training courses delivered by the MOI, in the last 4 years. Generating these 
maps on a regular basis and sharing them with the coastguards (where a coastguard 
force is present), or with other conservation practitioners, would give them a 2 to 3-day 
forecast on the location of the highest productivity zones in their EEZ, thereby allowing 
them to concentrate their surveillance on these zones rather than hopelessly spreading 
it to try to cover its entirety. The coming GMES & Africa programme, also EU-funded, 
and a follow-up programme to MESA could be used to boost that support. 

•  On a similar front, better and more efficient use of VMS data could also be supported. 

The combination of MESA-generated PFZ maps and a more efficient use of VMS data 
could become a powerful tool to combat, or at least deter, IUU fishing and related illegal 
activities. Here again, the MESA regional centre hosted by the University of Ghana could 
help since they have been working on the use of VMS data for the past 4 years. 

2.  Policy initiatives 

•  As outlined throughout the report, the issues in question are regional and therefore any 
meaningful strategy to tackle them must also be regional. Institutions that already have 
a mandate for regional initiatives, such as the Regional Economic Communities 
(ECOWAS, CEMAC) or the GGC (Gulf of Guinea Countries) are in the best position to 
initiate such collaborative strategies. ECOWAS and CEMAC have recently begun talks 
about this issue, as have the GGC, so it therefore seems to be the right moment to 
support them (regional policy making, technical support, training activities, etc.). 

•  Since many problems regarding IUU fishing and its effects and links on socio-economic 
and security consequences come from fishing licences illegally acquired, a complete 
overhaul of the current licence granting system is needed. It is a complex issue and 
Gabon could certainly use some external support in helping set up a new system that 
would be more secure and transparent (good governance, appropriate safeguard 
systems, etc.). 

•  As reported during this mission, Gabon’s voice (and this must be valid for other GGCs) 
is not heard by international fishery management agencies such as ICAT (International 
Commission for Atlantic Tuna), and international regulations not enforced strongly 
enough. A stronger commitment on the part of the EU could certainly go a long way to 
help those countries being heard, which would help them to more effectively manage 
their natural resources. Until very recently, Gabon was not even aware that they were 
the top Atlantic tuna producers because EU-flagged tuna fishing vessels under-declare 
their catch (and do not declare the by-catch). 

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•  An interesting concept was developed a few years back in South Africa. Confronted by 
the lack of resources necessary to manage and undertake efficient surveillance of their 
mangrove areas, they created what they called a ‘Green Corps’. This corps was formed 
by training local community members in mangrove management and surveillance. Upon 
returning to their communities, these people could then share their knowledge with 
community members and encourage them to become active actors in the management 
and surveillance of their local mangrove area. They were provided with incentives such 
as exclusive exploitation rights of their area. The concept proved to be successful and 
should be easy to adapt to the surveillance of the Gulf of Guinea coastline and 
management of inshore fisheries where the necessary resources are presently not 
sufficient. Incentives offered could be exclusive rights to exploit natural resources in the 
community area, or higher quotas for local communities while outsiders’ quotas would 
be decreased. This kind of community conservancy model is obviously at the policy 
level, but in light of the South African success, would be worth considering and 
supporting in Gabon and other countries in the Gulf of Guinea area. 

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Maps 

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Case study 4. Minkebe National Park landscape (Gabon) 

Site name and location: Minkebe National Park, North-east Gabon 

Introduction  
The Minkebe National Park is one of 13 national parks that emerged in August 2002 in Gabon, 
managed by the ANPN. This park of nearly 757 000 ha was created by Decree 615 / PR / 
MEFEPEPN dated 30 August 2002. It is far from human habitations and is considered relatively 
intact with regard to human activities. It historically contained one of the largest populations of 
forest elephant in the world, estimated at 30 000 in 2004 and down to only 5 000 in 2014! 

Since 2010, an expert has made repeated trips to the urban centres around this park to collect 
information on Minkebe park. Conservation Justice has two permanent offices in the two main 
Gabonese urban centres around this park. Officials of the ANPN, including Minkebe conservator 
Sylvain Mbadou, Executive Secretary Lee White and Special Adviser to the President, Mike Fay, 
were interviewed. Pauwel Dewachter from WWF also provided additional information. 

Key wildlife/security issues identified at this site 
With pressures coming from Cameroon, Minkebe has experienced a considerable increase in 
human activity in the early 2000s and until 2011, when the Gabonese army, working with the 
ANPN, closed a large gold mine inside the park.  Without these actions undertaken by the ANPN 
the situation would inevitably have become catastrophic. These illegal poaching and mining 
activities have had, and still have, significant consequences in terms of safety, illegal 
immigration and governance. On 20 September 2017, at a reception with the ICCF 
(International Conservation Caucus Foundation), President Ali Bongo Ondimba emphasised the 
seriousness of the trafficking of natural resources (ivory, gold, wood) in Gabon.2  He explains 
that  

…in just the last month our National Parks staff have been involved in three gun 
battles, in which the poachers they encountered in the forest fired on them without 
warning. In Gabon we are battling five ivory trafficking networks moving 15 million 
dollars-worth of illegal ivory annually. One of these networks is linked to Boko 
Haram. All five are also dealing in illegal gold and diamonds, to the tune of at least 
25 million dollars per year.  

This shows the great concern and interest of senior Gabonese authorities in addressing these 
threats. The English newspapers Mirror and Independent also relayed information concerning 
links between Boko Haram and ivory trafficking originating in Gabon. The resources at stake 
and the corruption that is developing in parallel pose a clear threat to the security and stability 
of these areas and countries. From the moment the benefits accrue to criminal (or even 
terrorist) networks this in turn can foster large-scale corruption and destabilisation of the justice 
and governance of a country. More precise information on some current sensitive investigations 
cannot be shared publicly at this time due to their sensitivity and confidentiality. 

Mining 
The human population living in the Minkebe gold mining camp has varied considerably over the 
years and is not easy to estimate due to fluctuations caused by non-permanent people using the 
area, such as porters, poachers, vendors and other traffickers. The population was only a few 
hundred in the 1990s and early 2000s. In 2008, it rose to 700 people, reached more than 2 500 
persons in 2009 and then 5 000 in 2010! Most of the people were coming from Cameroon via 
the Transminkebian walking trail that crosses the park from north to south. 

After May 2011 the Gabonese army, at the request of the Head of State following a request 
from ANPN, evacuated this illegal camp, which had become a small town of lawlessness. It is 
estimated that at least 4 000 foreigners were removed from the site where the illegal gold 

2 See: http://www.internationalconservation.org/publications/200917.ali.bongo.ondimba.pdf 

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production could reach 1.8 kg per day.3 An operations base managed by ANPN has been 
installed on the site of the Minkebe mine. 

The profit from the gold mine was such that it guaranteed complete impunity. Such a situation 
can only endure through a system of corruption, with obvious risks in terms of safety, 
trafficking, miscellaneous money laundering and immigration. For example, the passage from 
Cameroon to Gabon via the Transminkebian walking trail was well known to the Cameroonian 
authorities, which forced travellers to pay them at a border post for the passage to Gabon. 
Similarly, the Gabonese authorities of Makokou regularly carried out missions to Minkebe but 
without seeking to put an end to the various forms of illegality. In the end, it was because of 
pressure from the ANPN and other authorities and a decision of the Gabonese Presidency that 
the army was mobilised to undertake the removal of the people and close the mine. So far, the 
mine is still not operational, which shows a very strong and real political will by the Gabonese 
Government. 

Trans-border poaching 
The results of a study published in February 2017 showed an 80 % decline in the elephant 
population in Minkebe National Park within a single decade, from 2004 to 2014.4 This 
corresponds to 25 000 poached elephants! 

The drastic drop in the Minkebe elephant population is mainly due to the development of 
‘industrial-level poaching’ from and to Cameroon. The north of the park, bordering with 
Cameroon, has in fact been emptied of its elephants, and it is important to note that the 
situation is no better for elephants on the Cameroonian side. The results of surveys carried out 
between 2014 and 2016 by WWF over an area of 5.85 million ha in the conservation areas of 
Campo Ma'an, Boumba-Bek, Nki and Lobeke protected areas, published in 2017, show a 66 % 
decline in the number of elephants between 2008 and 2016.5 The estimated elephant 
populations in Lobeke have dropped by 51 % between 2002 and 2015, in Nki by 78 % between 
2005 and 2015, and in Boumba-Bek by 90 % between 2011 and 2015! 

The poaching from Cameroon is organised and financed by criminal networks based in 
Cameroon. Cameroon to has lost a large part of its elephant population, where the remaining 
elephants are very threatened. 

The Cameroonian poachers who enter Minkebe Park are well armed and organised and do not 
hesitate to confront any eco-guards and soldiers they encounter. They are generally equipped 
with satellite telephones, which facilitate communication between the different groups and make 
it possible to organise the supplies to Gabon and the transport of ivory to Cameroon. Douala 
forms a channel of ivory export for the entire sub region, although much of it is sent to Nigeria 
where the legislation is a very weak deterrent. A prison sentence in Nigeria for ivory traffickers 
is only possible after a third conviction! And the basic application of the wildlife law is also weak. 

Senior officials, including Cameroonian military officers, are involved in organising poaching and 
wildlife trafficking activities. Well-known traffickers living in northern Gabon are also directly 
connected to traffickers and officials in Cameroon and Gabon, which allows them to evacuate 
ivory more easily. Two Cameroonian traffickers were arrested in the town of Djoum, in southern 
Cameroon on 11 December 2017 in possession of 216 ivory tusks and 81 elephant tails in the 
car of a gendarmerie colonel. This recent case illustrates the complexity, corruption, implication 
of military elements in ivory trafficking and the severity of the situation. Wildlife authorities 
working with the support of the LAGA (Last Great Ape Association)/EAGLE network undertook 
the operation and are pursuing that all parties involved are brought to justice.6 Djoum is a 

3 Mabaza G. (2011). Gold panning, impacts, challenges and management prospects in the north-east of 
Minkebe National Park. WWF Report. 
4 Poulsen J.R., S.E. Koerner, S. Moore, V.P. Medjibe, S. Blake, C.J. Clark, M. Ella Akou, M. Fay, A. Meier, J. 
Okouyi, R. Cooper and L.J.T. White. 2017. Poaching Empties Central African Wilderness of Forest Elephants. 
Current Biology. 
5 WWF. The status of Forest Elephant and Great Apes in Central Africa priority sites. See: 
http://wwf.panda.org/wwf_news/?uNewsID=314730 
6 https://africasustainableconservation.com/2017/12/20/cameroon-two-charged-after-216-tusks-seized-in-
car-belonging-to-colonel-of-the-gendarmerie/ 

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major trafficking hub for ivory sourced from both southern Cameroon and northern Gabon, 
including Minkebe. 

Another threat concerns illegal immigrants involved in the trafficking of gold and ivory who 
migrate from Cameroon and Congo to Gabon. They cross the border by national roads or 
through the Ayina river that borders Cameroon or the Ivindo river, which borders Congo. 

‘Local’ poaching 
In addition to poaching organised from Cameroon, there is also poaching organised by Gabon 
nationals, but the ivory is exported directly to Cameroon. As an example, the NGO Conservation 
Justice has supported the Gabonese authorities in the arrest and legal follow-up of the cases of 
more than 200 wildlife traffickers between 2010 and 2017 in the provinces of Woleu-Ntem and 
Ogooué-Ivindo, which encompasses the Minkebe National Park. The ANPN also organised the 
arrest of hundreds of poachers during this period. The vast majority are sentenced to prison 
terms through a system of legal monitoring set up with jurists and specialised lawyers who 
verify the proper progress of legal proceedings and improve the governance. However, the weak 
Gabonese legislation provides for only 6 months of maximum imprisonment for poaching or 
trafficking wildlife, which is not at all dissuasive. 

During this period some authorities were also arrested and sentenced to prison terms in Gabon, 
including the Governor of Mitzic and the Under-Governor of Bolossoville, who were involved in 
poaching and ivory trafficking. 

Local poaching is carried out by Bantu populations (Fang and Kota ethnic groups being the most 
present in the area) but also by the remaining forest (‘pygmy’) populations, the latter being 
excellent hunters often exploited by the Bantu, with few compensations. 

Timber harvesting 
The commercial timber companies active around Minkebe Park have been found to be operating 
illegally. Corruption and abusive or even anarchic logging are common. In particular, forest 
roads are generally not closed or really controlled, which facilitates the penetration of organised 
poachers. Another example is that forestry companies are neglecting to fund development 
projects, even though they are have contractual obligations, clearly required by law since 2014. 
This is symptomatic of a situation where illegal and inappropriate behaviour is known but clearly 
tolerated by the local authorities. Corruption plays an important role in illegal logging – several 
water and forests agents have been arrested for corruption – undermining the entire situation. 
Corruption has thus become common in the forestry sector. 

According to the speech of President Ali Bongo Ondimba to the ICCF in September 2017, ‘a 
totally separate illegal forestry mafia has established itself, under our radar in the last 5 years 
and is stealing an estimated 500 million dollars per year through sophisticated tax evasion 
schemes and illegal timber harvesting’. These figures are estimates but the missions carried out 
in 2017 jointly by the Control of Forest Management (CAF) project, ANPN and Conservation 
Justice confirm the gravity of the situation and the ‘anarchy’ of the forestry sector, which 
concerns a large number of logging operations, resulting in huge losses of revenue for Gabon. 
Again, according to President Ali Bongo Ondimba, ‘these criminal cartels have a pervasive power 
to corrupt and coerce government officials, including the judiciary. Only now, thanks to the 
work of our national parks and intelligence agencies, are we piecing together the drama that is 
unfolding in our forests’. This situation with the development of corruption constitutes a clear 
risk in terms of justice, governance and therefore security because the justice system is no 
longer functional. 

Security risks to those involved in wildlife protection 
The removal of over 4 000 foreign miners in 2011 was not easy, and was criticised by some 
media outlets. Nevertheless, given the inaccessibility of the Minkebe gold mine and the number 
of miners to be evacuated, the operation was considered a major success and has reduced the 
security problems in this area of the park. 

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As anti-poaching actions are reinforced, more and more skirmishes take place between the eco-
guards, armed police and soldiers on one side, and the mainly Cameroonian poachers on the 
other. The poachers do not hesitate to use their firearms. So far, there have been several 
poachers wounded and a few killed. 

Ivory, timber and gold trafficking at the national and transnational levels also accentuates 
corruption, with some authorities involved in cases of trafficking and related corruption. 

It is estimated that 50 000 ivory tusks were trafficked between 2004 and 2014, i.e. 
approximately 200 to 250 tons of ivory, or more than EUR 200 m, onto the Chinese market. 
Such trafficking can only exist through significant complicity at all levels and obviously has 
consequences for corruption, governance and security. The risk is also to have criminal groups 
or even terrorists finance themselves with the natural resources of Gabon, and in particular 
Minkebe. The case mentioned by the Gabonese Head of State in September 2017 of Boko 
Haram is particularly worrying. 

Management approaches applied to address these issues/threats 
The closure of the clandestine gold mine at Minkebe was an important turning point in the 
management of Minkebe National Park. Since then, soldiers have been supporting ANPN's eco-
guards and armed police in protecting the park and fighting against poaching. This forms a 
major accomplishment, but unfortunately has not prevented continued elephant poaching in this 
large park with its borders with Cameroon not being sufficiently supervised. Attempts are being 
made to militarise the park's surveillance, which is a positive development. Military training is 
organised by the Gabonese army but also with the support of the USA and UK military. The 
ANPN has also increased its collaboration with Gabonese intelligence agencies to identify the 
criminal networks involved in ivory, gold and timber trafficking. Nevertheless, cross-border 
cooperation between law enforcement agencies and conservation and intelligence agencies 
appears to be inefficient, particularly between Gabon and Cameroon, which is a significant 
challenge to overcome. Finally, the collaboration between the ANPN, the CAF project and 
Conservation Justice has contributed to an improved governance by fighting impunity, the 
various trafficking and corruption. 

Summary 
1.  Where does wildlife trafficking trigger conflicts, fuel existing unrest or lead to 

scaled-up conflicts (from local to national/regional, international)?  

There are no armed conflicts but significant cross-border pressure on natural resources, 
organised by criminal networks. 

2.  Where have conflicts triggered or fuelled wildlife trafficking or hampered 

conservation?  

It is the corruption and complicity that fuel wildlife and timber traffic, and consequently 
insecurity. 

3.  How is socio-economic security undermined by trafficking and poor conservation, 

both at local and national levels? 

The timber trafficking and lack of respect for forestry laws has negative consequences for socio-
economic development. For example, no forestry company in the Woleu-Ntem province has 
signed contractual specifications with the communities and the few specifications that are 
signed in the province of Ogooué-Ivindo are not applied. Villages do not benefit from logging 
and the timber from these provinces is largely illegal. This is symptomatic of a situation where 
violations of the wildlife and forest laws are known but clearly tolerated by local authorities and 
services. As far as mining is concerned, it is clear that the Minkebe mine also accentuated 
corruption and insecurity until its closure in 2011. 

4.  How does wildlife trafficking undermine the rule of law and legitimate institutions 

(notably because of the links with corruption)?  

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The wildlife and timber trafficking is leading to an increase in corruption and impunity without 
any apparent limitations. This is a governance problem and conservation efforts to combat all 
these forms of trafficking are aimed at restoring better governance. 

Several people in authority who were involved in ivory trafficking around Minkebe have been 
exposed, arrested and some were sentenced. Some judges are also known to be involved in 
ivory trafficking, and ivory from courts in Oyem and Makokou was stolen with probable 
complicity. But the real threat comes from Cameroon where well-equipped and organised 
groups of poachers are based, and where ivory is exported with significant complicities on both 
sides of the border. 

5.  How does wildlife-related insecurity (whether in term of conflict or from a socio-

economic point of view) contribute to migration flows (intra-state, inter-state, 
global)?  

The Minkebe gold mine has been a major security threat, effectively becoming a miscellaneous 
traffic zone with nearly 5 000 foreign miners in the country illegally (i.e. with no visas). These 
flows of migrants from West Africa and Cameroon to Minkebe without any control or monitoring 
were stopped with the closure of the mine by the army, in coordination with the National 
Agency of National Parks. 

The collaboration between the ANPN, army, intelligence services and high-level Gabonese 
authorities is a good example that has led in particular to the closure of the Minkebe mine, 
improving conservation and security in this area. The recent statements of the Head of State, 
President Ali Bongo Ondimba, condemning the trafficking of wildlife, timber and gold also move 
in this direction and demonstrate a willingness to fight against corruption, poor governance of 
natural resources and the insecurity. Nevertheless, the corruption remains systemic and 
undermines the rule of law and justice, with undeniable security risks. 

Suggestions for the way forward for the next 5 years 

1. Programmes/activities 
The efforts of the National Parks Agency to deploy mixed eco-guard and military units are 
relevant and should be strengthened, along with intelligence activities. It remains for the patrol 
teams to strengthen their control and inspection systems in order to improve their 
effectiveness. Then increased border surveillance is needed. But all these efforts will not be 
effective if corruption is not strictly fought at all levels and the actions taken are not followed by 
a strong justice system. 

The commitment of the Government of Gabon through its ANPN and the actions of the 
Gabonese army in Minkebe National Park is very significant and has both directly and indirectly 
improved security, though it has not stopped the ivory poaching crisis in the area. Increased 
international funding to support ANPN operations, and capacity building and technical support to 
further professionalise their operations in cooperation with the army are a top priority. 

The support of external structures, in private-public partnerships with specialised park 
management partners, could be envisaged depending on the interest shown by Gabon. It should 
also be noted that some protected areas in Gabon, subject to less pressure, are seeing their 
wildlife populations increase. This is the case of the Wonga-Wongué Presidential Reserve and 
Loango Park, where the management appears to be more efficient thanks to a form of 
delegating power to Special Councillor Mike Fay.  

Cooperation between the militaries of Gabon and Cameroon and ANPN Gabon and MINFOF of 
Cameroon, helped by regional security partners, should be structured and supported. Clearly 
the security concerns along the border and trafficking networks present a major threat to be 
addressed by the Government of Gabon and Cameroon together with their international regional 
security partners. 

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2. Policy initiatives 
Gabon’s political will to tackle serious issues and make major conservation investments has 
been demonstrated. However, strong commitment with serious actions by both Cameroon and 
Congo are critically needed to ensure better governance of natural resources in and around 
Minkebe. This requires frank exchanges between the high-level authorities of these countries, 
structured commitments, and clear actions that are then evaluated and adapted to address the 
threats. 

A harmonisation of the legislation is also necessary knowing that in Gabon, poachers and 
wildlife traffickers risk only a maximum of 6 months in prison! With regard to Cameroon, where 
the main threat to Minkebe elephants originates, the political will thus far has been shown to be 
insufficient to effectively combat wildlife trafficking. The international diplomatic community 
should support Gabon to find solutions to the problem of Minkebe and the neighbouring 
protected areas on the Cameroon side of the border. Information on the major ivory traffickers 
so far identified and their accomplices could be brought together and major arrests made.  
Poaching and trafficking should be condemned at the highest levels and followed with concrete 
action. The results of the recent WWF surveys in Cameroon should be well disseminated, 
alongside the alarming situation shown by the surveys in Minkebe. The international community 
should bring resources and support to a joint Gabon-Cameroon border initiative and broader 
security cooperation to halt the trafficking and stabilise the situation. 

Maps 

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Case study 5. Boma and Badingilo National Park Landscape (South Sudan) 

Site name and location: Boma-Jonglei-Equatoria Landscape, South Sudan (including Boma 
and Badingilo National Parks) 

Introduction  
The Boma-Jonglei-Equatoria Landscape of South Sudan is of tremendous important as regards 
global biodiversity conservation. The 200 000 km2 landscape contains the largest expanse of 
intact savannah in East Africa, forests, plateaus and Africa’s largest wetland, the Sudd. The area 
includes Boma (estimated 20 000 km2), Badingilo (est. 16,000 km2) and Shambe National Parks 
(est. 4 000 km2), and Zeraf Reserve (est. 8 000 km2), interlinked by wildlife movement 
corridors. Extensive aerial surveys undertaken by the WCS with funding assistance from United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID) and US Fish and Wildlife Service 
(USFWS) revealed that the Boma-Jonglei-Equatoria Landscape is home to the world’s second 
largest land mammal migration (>1.2 million white-eared kob, Mongalla gazelle and tiang), an 
estimated 85 % of the country’s elephant, endangered northern giraffe (Kordofan and Nubian 
sub species), endemic Nile lechwe and other key mammal species, along with some 400 bird 
species, including shoebill and black crowned crane. The landscape’s ecosystems also support 
the livelihoods of over 2 million people from >15 ethnic groups. Ecosystem services include 
pasture, timber and non-timber forest products, fisheries, hunting, water and watershed 
regulation, and agricultural lands.  

The 1983-2005 conflict between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Army (SPLA) led to extensive displacement and devastation of human populations 
across much of Southern Sudan. During this time, many wildlife populations (e.g. buffalo, 
zebra, hartebeest and others) were greatly depleted and the northern white rhino declined and 
is now thought to be extinct. However, other wildlife species managed to survive in remote 
zones or by migrating away from poaching pressures. Following the conclusion of the peace 
agreement in 2005, and a period of transition under the Government of Southern Sudan, South 
Sudan received its full independence with the creation of the new country in July 2011.   

In 2007, WCS and the South Sudan National Wildlife Service (SSWS), with support from USAID 
and USFWS, undertook the first aerial surveys of wildlife, human activity, and livestock in and 
around the protected areas of South(ern) Sudan. Based on the results of these surveys, the 
Boma-Jonglei-Equatoria Landscape conservation and conflict mitigation programme was 
designed and launched in 2008 and continues today. Core focal management areas include the 
Boma and Badingilo National Parks, surrounding wildlife migration corridors and proposed 
community conservancies. The programme is managed by WCS in cooperation with the 
Government of South Sudan, civil society and local community partners, and is funded by 
USAID, USFWS, Global Environment Facility (GEF), WCS, Elephant Crisis Fund and private 
donors. Programme operations have been adapted and continued in the landscape despite the 
past 4 years of armed conflict, which broke out in December 2013 and rapidly spread 
throughout the country. The armed conflict re-intensified and further expanded in July 2016, 
and continues through to today.   

The first aerial assessment since the start of the conflict (in December 2013) of wildlife, habitat 
and human activity in Boma, Badingilo, Nimule, Southern and Shambe National Parks and the 
Loelle area of South Sudan, was undertaken by WCS in cooperation with SSWS during 2015 and 
2016, with additional observations in 2017.  These surveys show that significant wildlife 
populations have so far survived, but that poaching and commercial wildlife trafficking are 
increasing as a result of the current civil war, as well as illegal mining, timber harvesting and 
charcoal production. There is, however, still a great hope for securing surviving populations and 
protected areas if immediate action can be taken to halt poaching by armed groups.  

This case study analysis is based on extensive literature review, interviews with key sources, a 
focused wildlife-security review questionnaire working session conducted on 27 and 28 
September 2017 in Juba, South Sudan, and direct observations by the mission team members 
who have extensive experience working in South Sudan. Interviews and the wildlife-security 
session included Brig. General Khamis Adieng Ding (Ministry of Wildlife Conservation and 

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Tourism Director of External Relations), Brig. General Vorgol Oleyo Alan (SSWS Park Warden 
Boma National Park), Brig. General Jackson Miyang (SSWS Park Warden Badingilo National 
Park), Paul Peter Awol (WCS – South Sudan Law Enforcement Coordinator, Opap Ajany (WCS – 
South Sudan Security Coordinator and previous WCS Boma Park Coordinator) and Albert 
Schenk (WCS – South Sudan Country Director).  

Key wildlife/security issues identified at this site 
Political and armed conflicts in South Sudan impacting the Boma-Jonglei-Equatoria 
Landscape 
The 1983-2005 conflict between the SAF and the SPLA led to extensive displacement and 
devastation of human populations across much of Southern Sudan. During this period, over 
2 million people are estimated to have lost their lives, and many thousands more were 
displaced and living in internally displaced person (IDP) camps in neighbouring countries. 
Conservation efforts in the newly created Boma National Park, supported by the Frankfurt 
Zoological Society and the New York Zoological Society, and survey and conservation planning 
in the Jonglei area in the early 1980s had to be completely abandoned with the outbreak of war 
in 1983. No conservation activities took place in Southern Sudan during the decades of war until 
the early 2000s. In 2005, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Khartoum 
Government and the SPLA/Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) established a power-
sharing government, created an interim transitional Government of Southern Sudan, and set 
out a timetable for elections and a referendum for Southern Sudan to determine its future.  

Since its establishment, the Government of South(ern) Sudan, following the signing of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement in January 2005, prioritised wildlife conservation and 
sustainable natural resource management as a key component of its development strategy. 
South Sudan is richly endowed with land, minerals, forests, wildlife and water. These natural 
resources will be critical to developing and driving South Sudan’s economy in the coming 
decades. Access to and control over land and natural resources is one of the most important 
governance issues, especially for rural people, and is at the root of much of the conflict in South 
Sudan. Careful attention to natural resource management and environmental protection is 
fundamental to the success of all development sectors in South Sudan and is the cornerstone of 
sustainable development. 

In March 2007, the Government of South(ern) Sudan (GoSS) Presidency and the Ministry of 
Wildlife Conservation and Tourism (MWCT) signed formal cooperation agreements with WCS, 
establishing a multi-faceted partnership for biodiversity conservation and natural resource 
management in the country. Under these agreements, the strategic and legal frameworks for 
the Boma-Jonglei-Equatoria Landscape (BJEL) initiative has been established with WCS acting 
as the lead technical partner for the GoSS. The GoSS, as well as the State Governments of 
Jonglei, Eastern Equatoria and Central Equatoria, have strongly supported the development of 
the Boma-Jonglei-Equatoria landscape initiative, including structured partnerships between the 
Government and WCS for the long-term management of Boma and Badingilo National Parks and 
the surrounding wildlife migration corridor areas.    

Shortly after gaining full independence in July 2011, the new country of South Sudan was 
plagued with expanded tribal violence in 2012 and 2013, and struggled to control stability and 
control of its army’s disarmament campaigning in the Boma and Jonglei areas. A local rebellion 
led by David Yau Yau (DYY), initially in response to election disputes in 2010, expanded in 2012 
and 2013 and became a Murle tribe-based insurgency against the SPLA and GoSS in protest at 
human rights abuses by the SPLA in the Boma Park area. In early May 2013, the centre and 
east of Boma Park were overrun by the DYY forces, and the Boma Park headquarters and WCS 
operations base in Nyat were completely looted (including 3 WCS and 2 MWCT vehicles, 
extensive communications equipment, supplies, office materials, tents, etc.). The Boma Park 
warden, Brig. Kolor Pinot and 6 wildlife officers of the Murle tribe were executed by retreating 
SPLA forces at Kathangor mountain in the south of the Park. Looting was continued by the 
SPLA, which occupied the area after DYY forces withdrew after holding the zone for only a short 
time. During this period the entire Murle population was displaced from the Nyat and Itti village 
areas (taking refuge in Ethiopia) by to the occupation of the SPLA. The local community 
members stayed away until returning in mid 2014. The WCS and the MWCT, in conjunction with 
the SPLA, re-established basic park operations and began rebuilding the base following 

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assessments and improved government control of the area in August 2013. DYY subsequently 
signed a peace agreement with the Government in early 2014, which provided for the creation 
of a separate Boma Administration Area, which has since become a full state (one of the current 
32 states of South Sudan). David Yau Yau himself then became deputy Minister of Defence and 
is currently Deputy Minister of Labour of the Government of South Sudan. 

In July 2013, the President fired the Vice-President and Cabinet of Ministers, plunging the 
country into political turmoil. Subsequently, severe tensions continued and no progress was 
made within the SPLM political party to resolve the disputes. The fighting that erupted in Juba 
on 15 December 2013 after clashes between rival factions of the presidential guards, triggered 
armed conflict between forces loyal to President Salva Kiir (SPLA-iG) and those aligned with 
former Vice-President Riek Machar (SPLA-IO), resulting in targeted ethnic killings, a 
humanitarian crisis, and armed conflict which spread throughout many parts of South Sudan. 
According to the United Nations, more than 3.8 million people have been forced to flee their 
homes, with over 2 million people internally displaced and 1.8 million living as refugees in 
surrounding countries. More than 10 000 people have been killed, and 5.5 million people are 
reliant on food aid.  

The conflict has also placed tremendous pressure on natural resources, with increased illegal 
wildlife poaching and trafficking, illegal logging, unregulated concession allocations, charcoal 
network expansion, both locally and with links to international markets and entities, which are 
taking advantage of the confusion, corruption and governance vacuum in many areas of the 
country. The signing of the Peace Agreement between President Salva Kiir and Riek Machar in 
August 2015, and the subsequent return of the First Vice-President Riek Machar to Juba in April 
2016 and the formation of the Transitional Government of National Unity, were seen as major 
steps forward towards stabilisation and a normalisation of the country’s situation. However, 
between 7 and 11 July 2016, serious fighting between the armed sides broke out in Juba, which 
has since turned the country into renewed crisis and expanded the conflict. The renewed 
fighting spread throughout the Equatorias, including along the DRC and Uganda borders, and 
re-ignited fronts in the northern parts of the country. 

Poaching and wildlife trafficking (both within the country and transboundary) and other illicit 
natural resource exploitation, including illegal logging, gold mining, and charcoal production and 
trafficking, continue to expand, while elephant poaching and ivory trafficking in particular have 
increased over the past years. To secure South Sudan’s future opportunities for natural 
resource-based sustainable development and to prevent irreversible damage, WCS and Boma-
Jonglei-Equatoria Landscape (BJEL) strategic partners employ an approach that builds on 
current and past work, responds to threats and opportunities, and leverages the ability of local 
communities, in cooperation with wildlife and protected area authorities and other key 
stakeholders, to contribute to conservation, and benefit from stability and resilience in the BJEL 
and South Sudan.  

From July 2016 until the present, parts of the Boma and Jonglei areas have thus far remained 
relatively stable, while conflict and insecurity have spread to many areas of the Equatorias and 
northern parts of the country. WCS and SSWS have continued with basic operations for law 
enforcement and security, community natural resource management (NRM) and security 
partnerships in Boma National Park and Badingilo National Park, as well as anti-trafficking and 
awareness raising on a national level. The WCS and SSWS operations base in Lafon south sector 
of Badingilo Park was overrun, looted and held for 3 days by SPLA-IO fighters in August 2016. 
The SPLA retook the area with helicopters supporting ground troops.  WCS recovered its two 
vehicles and together with SSWS re-established operations as the area stabilised. At the time of 
writing, WCS/SSWS operations are continuing in Boma and Badingilo Parks. 

Threats to security, conservation, natural resource-based livelihoods  
With the drawn-out armed and political conflict over the years, South Sudan’s diverse 
ecosystems and biodiversity of the Boma-Jonglei-Equatoria Landscape are experiencing human-
induced pressures that threaten their long-term viability and ability to support resilient 
community livelihoods and the future development of the country. Foremost among these 
threats are poorly controlled armed groups and civilians involved in commercial wildlife 
poaching and trafficking and other natural resource plundering, the availability of automatic 

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weapons, weak natural resource governance and management, underlying tribal conflicts 
(including conflicts over land, water, grazing areas and other natural resources), and the 
growing political and economic crisis. Indirect threats exacerbate direct threats to natural 
resources and livelihoods including: bushmeat and ivory poaching and trafficking (including by 
armed groups), both within the country and across borders; over-exploitation of wildlife species 
for commercial gain and subsistence; rapidly expanding charcoal production and deforestation; 
uncontrolled natural resource extraction, e.g. minerals (gold), timber; habitat loss and 
fragmentation; community conflicts over land and natural resources; pollution from extractive 
industry, and climate change (see Annex I. Threats and opportunities analysis). These are 
interwoven and exacerbated by the widespread insecurity and banditry; active combat areas 
across large expanses of the country; and internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugee 
crises, both within the country and along its borders, particularly with neighbouring Ethiopia, 
Uganda and DRC. 

Current situation on wildlife/security issues in the Boma and Badingilo Parks and 
Boma-Jonglei-Equatoria Landscape  
The main groups and communities living in and around the Boma and Badingilo Parks areas are 
the Murle, Anuak, Yie, Kachipo, Toposa, Pari, Bari, Mundari, Lokoya, Lotuko, Lopit, Buya, Tenet, 
Dinka and Nuer. Of these, the Toposa and Buya are pastoralists; the Murle, Yie, Kachipo, Pari, 
Mundari, Lotuko, Lopit, Dinka and Nuer are agro-pastoralists; while the Anuak, Bari, Lokoya and 
Tenet are agriculturalists. The socio-economic situation of all these groups have been impacted 
by the ongoing conflict, resulting in reduced economic activity (including agricultural 
production), hunger, displacement and migration (IDPs and refugees). 

Wildlife conservation and wildlife crime in the Boma and Badingilo Parks areas  
Key conservation focal species include elephant, Nubian giraffe, white-eared kob, tiang, 
Mongalla gazelle, common eland, lion, cheetah, leopard, African wild dog, ostrich, shoebill, lulu 
tree, acacia tree species, plus the multiple other fauna and flora species living in the area. 

Key threats for these focus species in the Boma-Badingilo Parks are:  
large-scale poaching with fire arms; large-scale burning (bush fires); commercial charcoal 
production; settlement (encroachment) by civilians (with livestock) and armed forces/groups 
inside protected areas; and mining and possible future oil exploration.  

Wildlife crimes that occur in the area are wildlife poaching (e.g. ivory, bushmeat, leopard and 
python skins, ostrich parts and products) and trafficking; illegal logging/timber trafficking; 
charcoal burning; and illegal fishing inside Boma NP. 

Wildlife crime increased over past years, largely because of the armed conflict in South Sudan 
(the main driver), which started in December 2013. Currently people involved in illegal activities 
target elephants for ivory, antelopes and certain other readily available species for bushmeat, 
and trees (in general) for charcoal production. The main poachers and traffickers are 
government armed forces, particularly the SPLA and occasionally the SSWS, uncontrolled armed 
groups, rebel groups and members of local communities, including the well-armed pastoralists. 
Bushmeat poachers are most often also users (subsistence) while populations of large towns 
(e.g. Juba, Bor, Torit, Pochalla, Pibor) buy bushmeat when available and sell for profit. Ivory is 
sold and bought locally and trafficked to other faraway markets (mainly Asia) through 
neighbouring countries, e.g. Sudan, Ethiopia and Egypt.  Leopard skins are trafficked mainly to 
Sudan. Fish is sold in local and larger settlements. Poaching is both opportunistic (subsistence) 
and commercial for local and internal markets. Trafficking of wildlife products is undertaken by: 
1. local community members by foot, motorbike, vehicles boat, aircraft; 2. the SPLA by truck, 
motorbike, vehicle, aircraft; and 3. by traders (Sudanese, South Sudanese, Lebanese) by 
motorbike, vehicle, boat, aircraft. It is possible that armed rebel groups are also involved but 
there is no concrete evidence available for that due to the inaccessibility of some zones. Cases 
have been reported but need to be confirmed. 

Security-wildlife typology  
Insecurity drives wildlife crime as wildlife conservation and protected area management is 
severely hindered by security threats in many areas. Insecurity impacts protected area 
management and law enforcement due to a much-reduced accessibility to key wildlife areas by 

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PA authorities. For example, armed rebel groups survive in remote areas in Boma NP by living 
off the wildlife (bushmeat) and there is information that rebel groups poached more than 10 
elephants in the Boma NP area between 2013 and 2014 and sold the ivory locally (in Pochalla), 
after which it was trafficked to/through Ethiopia. Groups and individuals who believe that the 
law doesn’t apply to them and are engaged in opportunistic poaching are often also 
opportunistically engaged in other illegal activities that create insecurity such as banditry, 
robbery and child abduction.  

Armed groups and arms factors 
The main actors involved in wildlife poaching in the Boma and Badingilo Park areas are 
government armed forces, particularly the SPLA, and occasionally the SSWS, uncontrolled 
armed groups and members of local communities, including pastoralists. 

Government armed forces (SPLA, Police, SSWS, Prisons): They are easy to identify, though 
uniforms are being sold to civilians and armed forces have defected to become rebels so seeing 
a uniform does not always necessarily mean the person wearing it is indeed a member of the 
government armed forces. The WCS engages with these groups, which have always been there. 
Numbers fluctuate but the overall trend is one of increasing forces due to integration of rebel 
groups and militias into the armed forces. They are often involved in poaching and trafficking of 
bushmeat, skins and ivory, and charcoal production. 

Rebels and militias: They are possible to be identified by members of the local communities 
and armed forces but difficult to contact them, though this may be possible through a chain of 
contacts if the situation arises. Since 2010, several rebel groups of different sizes and impact 
have operated in the area. At the moment of writing there is a more than 1 000-person-strong 
rebel group moving through Boma NP. They are (yet) insufficiently armed to engage with 
government forces. The government, at least through the Boma State authorities, are in direct 
contact with the leadership of this group in an attempt to prevent an insurgency. Their 
objectives and (illicit) activities are financial gain, power, change of government, creating 
security for their own communities, poaching and trafficking of bushmeat, skins and ivory, and 
mining. 

Youth (age) groups of pastoralists’ communities: These are well-known and easy to 
identify; WCS and SSWS engages with them as they are from the local communities; they have 
been in the area ‘forever’; their numbers are increasing because many are migrating back to 
their home areas because of the conflict. Their objectives and (illicit) activities are cultural, and 
security for their communities; poaching and trafficking of bushmeat, skins and ivory, cattle 
raiding and child abduction. 

Wider pastoralists’ community: These are also well-known and easy to identify; WCS and 
SSWS engage with them as they are from the local communities; they have been in the area 
‘forever’; their numbers are increasing because many are migrating back to their home areas 
because of the conflict (seeking security in their home areas). Their objectives and (illicit) 
activities are cultural; poaching and trafficking of bushmeat, skins and ivory by individuals, 
killing large predators such as lion, cattle raiding, child abduction, trespassing PAs, burning 
(setting bush fires), cutting trees/bushes for firewood and the creation of bomas. 

Bandits: These are very difficult to identify: fluid composition and opportunistic; no 
engagement as they are difficult if not impossible to identify; relatively new but increasing since 
the start of the conflict in 2013 and the expanding insecurity in the country. Their objectives 
and (illicit) activities are financial gain: robberies, killings. 

Impact of these armed groups: reductions of targeted wildlife species; habitat loss and 
destruction; insecurity and increased conflict; displacement of people and communities. 

Wildlife trafficking 
Over the past years of conflict, the various armed forces across the country have been 
implicated in cases of large-scale wildlife poaching (both for consumption and commercial 
trafficking). There has also been an increase in ivory trafficking that has been registered both 
within the country and across its borders. The movement of armed groups creates widespread 

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insecurity and banditry. Armed poachers, including the SPLA, are involved in ivory and charcoal 
trafficking. SPLA and SPLA-IO and allied militia groups are poaching to feed themselves and for 
commercial trafficking. On 13 February 2016, 19 SPLA soldiers and 11 civilians involved in 
commercial bushmeat poaching and trafficking were arrested by the Badingilo Park Wildlife 
Service with WCS support. Fifteen AK-47 rifles and 15 motorcycles were seized, along with 21 
sacks of dried bushmeat (representing as many as 62 antelopes) destined for commercial sale. 
A rebel (Cobra Faction) soldier was arrested in Boma Park on 29 August 2015 for attempting to 
traffic 2 ivory tusks (with an additional report of other Cobra Faction soldiers reportedly involved 
in trafficking ivory from Boma Park to Ethiopia). There was an incident concerning a reported 4 
ivory tusks being transferred by a Cessna 208 caravan aircraft from Boma to Juba on 26 
November 2015. On a couple of occasions in 2014 and 2015, the SPLA and SPLA-IO traded in 
official statement accusations about the other force being involved in wildlife poaching. 

The WCS supports SSWS in anti-trafficking operations (including awareness raising, monitoring, 
intelligence-led enforcement, targeted operations, arrests, judicial follow-ups and tracking of 
cases, etc. – i.e. a full enforcement approach) in South Sudan, both around the Boma and 
Badingilo Parks and across the BJEL and, more broadly on a national level (significantly 
expanding anti-trafficking efforts nationally since 2012), along the major key trafficking routes 
and hubs. Juba is a key national and regional hub for the trafficking of wildlife products. A major 
component of this work is the deployment of a K9 sniffer dog unit in Juba, which operates at 
Juba International Airport and at key checkpoint locations in Juba.  Since the establishment of 
the K9 unit in early 2016, anti-trafficking operations have been successful in detecting several 
hundreds of kilograms of bushmeat and various other wildlife products, such as ivory bangles. A 
major ivory find and arrests were undertaken on 15 June 2016 when, following a tip-off from 
the anti-trafficking network, the South Sudan Wildlife Service crime unit seized the biggest ever 
ivory stock at Juba International Airport. The shipment of 25 packed cardboard boxes came 
from Uganda onboard a RwandAir aircraft, shipped as dry food. All 25 boxes contained 263 raw, 
unworked ivory cut pieces weighing 512 86 kg and some of them held the original ID ‘BI’ that 
represents the Burundi code, and the year 1989. The shipment was seized at Juba Airport on a 
trailer for loading onboard an Egypt Air cargo plane, destined for Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia) via 
Cairo. 

Other natural resource extractions, in addition to wildlife, include gold, sand, marrum and 
charcoal. In March 2016, the WCS released a report regarding expansion in illegal natural 
resource extraction in the country. This included the following incidents involving armed groups 
and foreign entities in illegal natural resource exploitation. A Sudanese from Darfur was 
implicated in illegal charcoal production in Boma Park and also involved in an ivory trafficking 
incident along with his colleague in early 2016. An international entity (reported to be from the 
United Arab Emirates) with local complicity was found to be illegally exploiting gold inside Boma 
National Park in late 2015. Gold mining in the Boma Park area is becoming a contentious issue 
with local authorities making deals without the approval of central government. Mining is 
currently taking place in Boma National Park by a company using mostly local labour as no 
equipment has yet been able to reach the mining site. The company obtained a mining licence 
from the Boma State authorities; however, mining licences can only be issued by the central 
government’s Ministry of Mining. The Boma park authorities have brought this to the attention 
of the MWCT, which has become involved with the Governor of Boma State and the Ministry of 
Mining on the issue. Despite the order from both the MWCT and the Ministry of Mining to halt 
the mining operations, mining has continued until now. Gold mining in eastern Equatoria is 
expanding and with largely little control. This in turn impacts the security situation, creates 
social tensions and fosters corruption. 

Charcoal production for local commercialisation in Juba and other areas, as well as export (to 
Uganda or further, and even by plane to the Middle East), is a growing factor and involves the 
SPLA as well as foreigners (Somalia) and others. The expansion of unregulated charcoal 
production along the Juba-Bor road inside the Badingilo National Park involving members of the 
SPLA has been documented.  

Conflicts and mitigation efforts  
Wider conflict/civil war: Political power, marginalisation of areas and ethnic groups, unequal 
distribution of resources. 

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Mitigation efforts: Multiple political interventions are tried by the Inter-Governmental Authority 
on Development (IGAD), the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU) and the wider 
international community. 

Conflicts between ethnic groups: Cattle raiding, child abductions, encroachment into each 
other’s territories, access to resources such as pasture and fresh water, political. 

Mitigation efforts: peace conferences and dialogue led by the national government, state 
government, local communities’ leadership, international NGOs, faith-based organisations, civil 
society organisations (CSOs), conflict mitigation through park management processes. 

Conflicts within ethnic groups: Cattle raiding, child abductions, encroachment into each 
other’s territories, access to resources such as pasture and fresh water, political. 

Mitigation efforts: Peace conferences and dialogue let by State and local government, local 
communities’ leadership, international NGOs, faith-based organisations, CSOs, conflict 
mitigation through park management processes. 

Limited success: Conflict on the national level is continuing despite ongoing efforts. At the 
local level, building trust and encouraging and facilitating dialogue can mitigate conflict locally, 
however the wider national conflict can easily reignite local conflict due to the negative influence 
of actors on the national or state levels, a wider lack of rule of law, vacuum in governance, ease 
of inflow of arms, etc. 

Corruption: There are a series of cases where government armed forces, particularly the SPLA 
but also elements within the SSWS, are directly involved in illegal activities in the Boma and 
Badingilo Parks area and the broader BJEL. It is therefore possible and even likely that elements 
within the SPLA and SSWS are involved in illegal activities, and don’t operate in isolation but 
collude with non-armed forces individuals within the area to conduct their illegal activities and 
trafficking. Unregulated charcoal and mining activities and the overall governance vacuum 
create opportunities for corruption at local, state and national levels. There are also cases where 
the SSWS have been documented to be involved in wildlife products trafficking and/or being 
corrupted to release arrested criminals. Furthermore, the overall conflict situation in recent 
years is such that many wildlife cases brought to court are not followed up and the arrested 
suspects are released. Prior to 2014, there was significant judiciary progress in prosecuting 
wildlife cases brought to court and some tough sentences were passed. 

Security risks to those involved in wildlife protection 
Undertaking conservation and wildlife law enforcement in South Sudan between 2007 and 2013 
was already hazardous, yet progress was made with approaches recognising that dialogue with 
armed stakeholders was a critical first step in the law enforcement process. Hazards included 
occasional clashes with armed civilian poaching groups (including pastoralists) in Boma and 
Badingilo Parks, and also with the SPLA involved in poaching and trafficking. Movements in the 
field were, for certain locations, sometimes unsafe, and even the headquarters of the protected 
areas were at times encroached by armed pastoralist cattle raiding groups, while armed large-
scale community ethnic conflicts (e.g. Nuer vs Murle, Murle vs Jie, Murle vs communities inside 
Ethiopia, and intra-tribal conflicts) were and are a repeating pattern in the area. Engagement 
with the SPLA, though at times tense, was mostly resolved in cooperation with local officials and 
few incidents of violence escalated. Even early on in the recent armed conflict, wildlife forces 
have had some cases of success in arresting the SPLA involved in poaching (e.g. Badingilo, 
February 2015 and in Boma in 2015). This is also due to the fact that many of the wildlife 
service personnel senior officers are former SPLA and are not reluctant to engage the SPLA as 
required. However, from 2016 to the present, with the expanded and intensified conflict, there 
have been increased tensions and hazards. With the increase of ivory trafficking and other 
natural resource trafficking alongside the economic crisis and overall insecurity, the hazards for 
wildlife conservation professionals are very serious. Coordinated security efforts, information 
gathering, cooperation with local authorities and community leaders, and careful spatial 
planning of operations in relation to threats is a critical approach to managing risk and 
navigating the situation, and continuing the conservation and protected area management 
efforts. 

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Management approaches applied to address these issues/threats 

Conservation, land and natural resource management for conflict mitigation, 
security and economic growth in Boma-Jonglei-Equatoria Landscape 
Strategic approach  
The WCS Boma-Jonglei-Equatoria Landscape (BJEL) programme was launched in December 
2008, and is implemented by the WCS in cooperation with the local communities, community-
based organisations (CBOs), protected area authorities and the Government of South Sudan. 
The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the Government of South Sudan and the 
WCS, signed in March 2007, provides the formal basis for development and management of the 
BJEL programme, including the long-term management of the Boma and Badingilo National 
Parks. The programme has been funded by USAID (December 2008 to present), with 
complementary funding from the GEF, WCS, USFWS, Elephant Crisis Fund and private donors. 
Work has primarily focused in and around Boma and Badingilo, and also the Sudd (Shambe and 
Zeraf) protected areas and corridors of BJEL. The WCS and SSWS have developed 
complementary national anti-trafficking efforts, including in key transboundary areas with 
Ethiopia, DRC and Uganda. The WCS and SSWS have also developed a conservation 
management initiative in Southern National Park with funding from the GEF and the USFWS, 
and have provided punctual anti-trafficking technical support to the SSWS authorities in Lantoto 
National Park and along the border with DRC in response to poaching in Garamba (though work 
along the DRC border has been heavily disrupted in recent years by the armed conflict) (see 
Garamba Tri-border case study). 

The goal of the BJEL programme is to ensure effective conservation of key wildlife species and 
habitat, improve security and mitigate conflicts, and enhance sustainable and resilient 
livelihoods for local communities in the Boma-Jonglei-Equatoria Landscape, South Sudan. The 
BJEL programme’s strategic objectives focus is on wildlife protection and anti-trafficking, 
protected area management (Boma and Badingilo National Parks and corridors), 
sustainable land and natural resource management, conflict mitigation and security 
and sustainable community-based livelihood options. The programme responds to critical 
threats and opportunities facing the country, securing and expanding the foundations for 
conservation, anti-trafficking, community partnerships, and land and natural resource 
management contributing to conflict mitigation and economic growth in the Boma-Jonglei-
Equatoria Landscape and more broadly across South Sudan. The linkages between wildlife 
trafficking (particularly ivory) and conflict and insecurity have been well documented in the 
region. By putting in place inclusive systems to address illegal wildlife trafficking at a national 
and transboundary level, supported by a network at grass-roots local level, the programme will 
be contributing to improving security for both humans and wildlife in South Sudan, as well as in 
neighbouring countries.   

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Communities, security and conservation are closely interrelated, mutually dependent and 
beneficial. 

Those running the programme also recognise that the political and armed crisis in South Sudan 
has created new and exacerbated previously existing threats to natural resources and local 
communities in the country. The armed conflict has displaced millions of people and put more 
stress on resources and increased conflicts. Competition over access to and use of land and 
natural resources forms the underlying cause of many of the conflicts in the region. Some of 
these conflicts have subsequently been politicised, escalated and developed their own self-
sustaining dynamic. The WCS believes that long-term peace building efforts in the region must 
address the underlying causes and main drivers through the equitable and optimal planning and 
use of land and natural resources. 

Conservation and protected area management is one form of land-use planning and 
management that in natural resource rich areas can play a critical role in development, conflict 
mitigation and improvement of security, in addition to protecting biodiversity and providing a 
sustainable foundation for economic growth. Governance is often weak or non-existent in 
remote areas of African countries, as is the case in South Sudan. Management of the protected 
areas of the Boma-Jonglei-Equatoria Landscape contribute to improving governance, develop 
dialogue with all stakeholders over land and resource management, create monitoring and law 
enforcement presence in remote and sometimes insecure areas, create employment 
opportunities for local communities, and secure the foundation for potential future tourism 
development in the region. This overall approach contributes to improved security for local 
communities and wildlife, creates centres of governance and stability, and stabilises the region. 

Strategic interventions in the Boma-Jonglei-Equatoria Landscape programme 
implemented by WCS, in collaboration with the Ministry of Wildlife Conservation and Tourism, 
that are directly and indirectly addressing the wildlife-security nexus are: 

• 

• 

Protected area management (Boma and Badingilo National Parks and the surrounding 
areas and corridors) contributes to improving the security of people and wildlife 
(including employment in remote zones), securing infrastructures, stabilising areas and 
facilitating delivery of assistance. 

Improved mechanisms for conflict mitigation and management: understand the 
underlying drivers of conflicts (land, grazing, tribal cycles) and politicisation, update 
information about how the current conflict relates to history and other main drivers, 
including taking into account potential climate change factors impacting conflicts, review 

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traditional conflict resolution mechanisms and new ones for peace and reconciliation, 
monitor implementation. 

•  Develop community-based conservation-security partnerships, e.g. future potential 

community conservancies based on the NRT model in Kenya. 

•  Complete judiciary system to secure wildlife from trafficking and poaching, address 

transboundary and security issues, and enhance civil society partnerships. 

•  Monitoring (security, NRM, human activity, wildlife, etc.) and adaptive intervention 

adjustments. 

• 

Integrate NRM and conservation principles and mechanisms in the peace process and 
governance at all levels. 

•  Employ wildlife as a positive neutral entry point to conflict resolution and peace building 

at national, state and local levels. 

•  Awareness raising campaign targeting key groups and stakeholders on wildlife and NRM – 

including peace messages (including elephant protection) and inspiring hope.  

• 

Livelihoods, including fisheries, conservation agriculture, non-timber forest products 
(NTFP) from shea, gum, lulu, stabilisation and food security through community 
cooperations. 

• 

Land-use planning to resolve and avoid land conflicts. 

•  Spatial and thematic inter-sectoral adaptive planning and coordination of inputs. 

•  Transparency and monitoring and management of natural resource sector activities and 

revenue (oil and pipeline, mining, forestry, agriculture, wildlife, etc.). 

•  Extractive industry and development infrastructure planning to ensure sound 

development and avoid conflicts. 

Achievements for conservation, security, and conflict mitigation 
During the years of implementation, the programme has made significant progress in 
establishing the foundation and processes for biodiversity conservation, land and natural 
resource management, and conflict mitigation in the Boma-Jonglei-Equatoria Landscape and 
more broadly in South Sudan. Despite the serious conflict and associated challenges of the past 
4 years, the programme continues to progress and adapt strategies. Selected key progress 
areas so far include the following: 

The programme has developed conservation-security partnerships and real-time natural 
resource conflict surveillance systems with several key communities in and around Boma 
and Badingilo Parks. These included capacity building and training for local leaders, 
sponsorship of a learning trip for local community leaders to visit and learn from the 
community conservancies of the Northern Rangelands Trust in Kenya, 6 months of 
certified training at Mweka Wildlife College in Tanzania on wildlife management for 11 
individuals selected from communities in and around the key protected areas, and ongoing local 
training and in-situ partnership developments. Over 1 000 people have been trained in 
sustainable natural resource management and/or biodiversity conservation under the 
programme, including wildlife forces, community members and national and local authorities. 
Activities of the conservation-security partnerships include joint community-wildlife police 
patrolling to protect wildlife and local communities (including preventing cattle raiding and 
detecting armed group movements), raising awareness, the establishment of communication 
networks to support security and surveillance, and the design of community governance 
structures for the potential creation of community conservancies in key areas of the landscape. 
The community-conservation-security approach of the programme facilitates community 
participation in land-use zoning and planning (including rangelands) and 
infrastructures to mitigate conflict, strengthening traditional peace mechanisms. Key 
areas for these partnerships and conflict mitigation interventions include the Sudd-Badingilo-
Boma corridors; the Boma Juom wetland used by Nuer, Murle and Anyuak pastoralists; the 
Penko plains between Dinka and Murle; and the Kengen river corridor used by Murle, Jiye and 
Toposa. These conservation-security partnerships are facilitating collaboration, dialogue and 
information sharing between local communities, local authorities, the wildlife service, police and 

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SPLA, and contribute directly to conflict mitigation and rapid responses to (potential) conflict 
and insecurity events. 

To improve livelihoods and develop sustainable conservation financing options, the 
programme has established small grant initiatives with 4 South Sudanese community-based 
organisations: Open Source Development Initiative, who changed their name at the end of 2017 
to National Agency for Relief, Peace and Development (NARD), Community Empowerment for 
Progress Organization (CEPO), Anyuak Recovery Trust (ART) and the Peace and Development 
Collaborative Organization (PDCO). Projects have largely focused on sustainable fisheries and 
conservation gardening, improved livelihood security and household income, sustainable 
management of natural resource base and reducing pressures on commercial and subsistence 
hunting of wildlife, around Boma and Badingilo National Parks. So far these livelihood 
interventions have supported 25 000 beneficiaries, both directly and indirectly. 

The USAID-WCS Livelihoods Small Grants Programme has empowered young men and 
women to be involved in productive and sustainable natural resource use, while the focused 
conservation outreach and education campaigns have supported legitimate dialogue between 
communities and MWCT officers and rangers, an improved understanding of wildlife and 
protected area importance, and helped to establish clearer processes for reporting and 
responding to conflicts and insecurity. 

An in-depth investigation and management regimes for the charcoal production and traffic in 
the west and south of Badingilo is underway. The WCS and Wildlife Department public 
awareness campaigns and community outreach efforts in Jonglei, Eastern Equatoria and Central 
Equatoria States, and on a national level, have raised the profile of the BJEL within South 
Sudan, regionally and internationally, raising awareness and support for wildlife protection and 
to reduce wildlife trafficking during the current crisis.  

Landscape ecological and socio-economic surveys, law enforcement monitoring, 
security monitoring, aerial and terrestrial surveys, research and monitoring activities 
by WCS and the local authorities over the years have resulted in a detailed understanding of 
wildlife distribution and movements, livestock and human activity patterns, local livelihood 
needs and priorities, and mapping and understanding local community conflicts (often driven by 
conflict over natural resources and land access). Since the start of the programme more than 
400 000 km. have been patrolled and monitored by ground patrols of wildlife forces and aerial 
surveys and patrols by the WCS. The information generated has been used to produce land-
cover and land-use maps, and to orient law enforcement, conflict mitigation and 
awareness raising interventions targeting high threat areas. The information generated 
by the programme is also used to inform land-use planning exercises, firstly at the protected 
area level (e.g. the Boma and Badingilo National Park management plans) and at the landscape 
level. The ongoing research in the landscape places the programme in an excellent position to 
advise stakeholders (e.g. communities, local authorities) on land-use and decision-making 
processes. For example, in March 2015, the proposed road to be built from Juba to Pibor 
crossing Badingilo National Park was halted, largely due to WCS’s scientific data analysis 
showing the negative impact the road would pose to wildlife and the environment.  

Protected area infrastructure (including headquarter buildings, operations bases and patrol 
posts) for Boma and Badingilo Parks and key areas of the migration corridors have been 
strategically planned and construction activities completed in many key areas, including park 
headquarters, ranger posts, airstrips, and WCS operation bases at key locations around Boma, 
Badingilo and Southern National Parks. These infrastructure developments strengthen local 
governance, justice and security by ensuring a permanent government presence at often 
remote places. Wildlife officers and rangers’ (recruited from the local communities) 
training courses have been held in Boma, Badingilo and Juba over the past years, along with 
the provision of field equipment, high-frequency radios and logistical support, all contributing to 
the implementation of wildlife conservation, law enforcement and anti-poaching operations in 
and around Boma, Badingilo and Southern National Parks. In total, 450 park rangers and 
enforcement officers have received training under the programme. Site-based wildlife protection 
operations and national anti-trafficking efforts over the past years have yielded significant 

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seizures of ivory and bushmeat, and major arrests were made. These include anti-trafficking 
efforts on transboundary routes to DRC, Uganda and Ethiopia.  

Processes for transboundary law enforcement and protected area management were designed 
and initiated with partners working in Ethiopia’s Gambella Park, starting in 2009 and expanding 
in 2011 and 2012, including Ethiopian Wildlife Conservation Agency (EWCA), Horn of Africa 
Regional Environment Centre (HOAREC) and African Parks Network, which formally withdrew 
from the park and Ethiopia overall at the end of 2016. With the outbreak of heavy fighting in 
Boma Park in mid-2013 and the broad conflict expansion starting in December 2013 and 
continuing through to the present, the operationalisation of transboundary activities on the 
ground has been hindered. Transboundary cooperation and coordination remains a high priority, 
both from a conservation and security perspective, and efforts to renew this process are 
underway on both sides of the border. 

In early 2016, a sniffer dog unit, deployed by the WCS and the SSWS was put in place in 
South Sudan to boost the tools for countering anti-trafficking. The dog unit (K9 unit) currently 
has 2 dogs deployed, operating at key entry-exit points in the country (including Juba Airport) 
and security checkpoints around Juba. Since its deployment, the K9 unit has been instrumental 
in seizures of various contraband.  

Through law enforcement and anti-trafficking efforts under the programme, >930 kg of ivory 
and more than 10 tons of bushmeat have been seized in the protected areas, at the borders 
and at Juba International Airport. 

The WCS has provided significant technical support to local authorities over the years. Prior to 
the outbreak of the current violent conflict in December 2013, a preliminary roadmap for multi-
sectoral land-use and conservation planning for the Boma-Jonglei-Equatoria Landscape 
was designed and adopted by the local government and communities in Jonglei, Eastern 
Equatoria and Central Equatoria with technical guidance from the WCS. Progress has been made 
on impact studies of concession developments in the landscape. The project has also supported 
policy and legislation development, including a Natural Resource Policy Review, which 
highlights key policy gaps, conflicts and cross-cutting issues in the natural resource sector; 
Policy Guidelines for Natural Resource Concessions, an Oil and Mining Best Practices Study 
focusing on integrating environmental management principles into oil and mining concession 
management in South Sudan; and an initial revision of the Wildlife Conservation and Protected 
Areas Bill, as well as tourism policy and regulations. 

While the current conflicts have greatly set back plans for ecotourism development, there is 
significant potential for future development of the sector provided that the wildlife resources 
and habitat can still be secured during this crisis period. Before the outbreak of the current 
armed conflict, the WCS provided support to the Tourism Directorate of MWCT to design and put 
in place the strategic framework, regulations and procedures to enable private sector-driven 
tourism development. The WCS has also progressed in designing options for understanding 
the potential impacts of climate change on the landscape and identifying potential mitigation 
and adaptation initiatives. A concept note was finalised for a feasibility study for Reducing 
Deforestation and Supporting Local Livelihoods in the Boma-Jonglei-Equatoria landscape of 
Southern Sudan through REDD Mechanisms. This includes REDD (Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation and Forest Degradation) pilot projects in the Ayod area, Boma plateau and 
Imatong, as well adaptive grazing planning and management in several key areas of the 
landscape. 

Observations on community factors  
People’s perception of the conservation programme efforts is not uniform. Many see these 
efforts as negative because they are restricted from doing the things they have done historically 
when living off the land (such as hunting), and see limited to no immediate benefits nor 
livelihood alternatives arising from conservation. However, those who are directly engaged in 
these conservation efforts taking place in the area have a more positive perception as they 
benefit directly through employment with the parks and management programmes, livelihood 
projects and improved security. 

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Many local community members are involved in some form of hunting, particularly with the 
crisis situation. For many, wildlife is the last means of survival (food, small income, access to 
cheap food) under the current conflict situation in South Sudan, though the benefits from 
wildlife crime might be small for many. As anti-poaching/anti-trafficking policies or laws are no 
longer widely implemented and enforced throughout the country due to the conflict, those 
policies and laws have limited impact on the majority of the people. As wildlife is depleted from 
areas by armed groups and traffickers, local communities will in turn suffer, both directly and 
indirectly. 

Local community members living in those areas where conservation activities are implemented 
benefit directly through direct employment, strengthening the local economy through livelihood 
projects, providing security and other linked services. However, because of the conflict in South 
Sudan, some activities, and thus community benefits, in the Boma – Badingilo Parks area have 
had to be scaled down due to limiting the geographic reach/coverage of the conservation efforts 
in the area/around the parks because of insecurity. Those community members who are directly 
engaged with the parks at least have the perception that the benefits are bigger than the 
benefits (potentially) derived from wildlife crime. In addition to the above-mentioned economic 
benefits resulting from conservation, PA management and law enforcement benefit local 
communities directly by providing localised security from armed groups (including rebels, 
poachers and bandits) in those areas where the PA authorities and wildlife rangers operate and 
conduct law enforcement patrols. In the remote areas where they operate, the PA authorities 
and wildlife rangers are often the main government representatives to enforce the rule of law, 
even beyond only strictly wildlife and environment laws. The security role of the PA 
management has been recognised both by Badingilo and Boma communities on various 
occasions with tangible examples, for example recovered cattle, shielding from cattle raiding, 
increased community confidence in agriculture due to security, park facilitation of humanitarian 
assistance to displaced communities, etc.). 

Challenges and lessons learned 
The main challenges to improving security and wildlife conservation/protected area 
management in the area are: the ongoing armed conflict; multiplying armed groups; 
inadequate financial resource allocation by the Government; inadequate capacity for 
conservation, natural resource management, security and conflict mitigation; ineffective use of 
the limited available SSWS capacity; widespread availability of firearms; negative attitude of 
some communities towards wildlife conservation; certain cultural practices driving insecurity 
(cattle raiding); inaccessibility (due to poor infrastructure and insecurity) of large parts of the 
landscape; and corruption at all levels of and within many departments of government, with 
corruption increasing due to the economic crisis in the country resulting from the armed conflict. 

Main lessons learned 
The political and armed crisis in South Sudan has created new, and exacerbated previously 
existing, threats to natural resources and local communities in South Sudan. 

Illegal exploitation and trafficking expands at times of conflict and involves armed groups and 
international traffickers as well as locals, and contributes to conflict and insecurity. 

The armed conflict has displaced millions of people and put more stress on resources and 
increased conflicts.  

Competition over access to and use of land and natural resources forms the underlying cause of 
many of the conflicts in the region, which are often politicised. 

Long-term peace-building efforts in the region must address the underlying causes and main 
drivers through the equitable and optimal planning and use of land and natural resources. 

Conservation and protected area management is a form of land-use planning and management 
that can play a critical role in the development and improvement of security. 

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Management of the protected areas contributes towards improving governance (creating 
centres of stability), develops dialogue with all stakeholders, creates a monitoring and law 
enforcement presence in remote and sometimes insecure areas, and creates employment 
opportunities for local communities. 

Local communities are key conservation, natural resource management and security 
stakeholders in the South Sudan context. 

There is a critical need for integrated and spatially explicit multi-sectoral programming and 
planning (security, humanitarian, development, conflict mitigation, conservation). Both do no 
harm and are a mutually reinforcing multiplier. 

Key security conflict mitigation points 
Communities, security and conservation are intimately interrelated, mutually dependent and 
beneficial. 

Conservation and sustainable natural resource management are key elements in improving 
security and in reducing conflict in South Sudan, and serve as a foundation for building long-
term stability in post-conflict states and areas of insecurity.  

As centres of stability, protected areas improve governance and justice, build local economies, 
facilitate infrastructure development and enhance transboundary cooperation. 

By building the network and capacity of communities, empowering women, integrating youth, 
and developing local institutions in effective natural resource management and conflict 
monitoring, there is an improvement in the resilience of these human institutions to effectively 
respond to abrupt and sudden violent conflicts and conservation impacts throughout the 
landscape. 

Summary 
1.  Where does wildlife trafficking trigger conflicts, fuel existing unrest or lead to 

scaled-up conflicts (from local to national/regional, international)?  

Wildlife crime helps drive insecurity with armed rebel groups surviving in remote areas and 
living off wildlife (bushmeat). While conflicts are not generally started by wildlife crimes, the 
wildlife poaching supports the armed groups, and provides an incentive for them to continue the 
conflicts in order to benefit from wildlife trafficking and other natural resources. Groups and 
individuals engaged in opportunistic poaching are often also opportunistically engaged in other 
illegal activities that create insecurity such as banditry, robbery and child abduction. 

2.  Where have conflicts triggered or fuelled wildlife trafficking or hampered 

conservation?  

Insecurity and conflict drive wildlife crime as wildlife conservation is severely impaired by 
security threats, which have paralysed protected area management and law enforcement 
because of a much reduced accessibility to key wildlife areas by PA authorities. The impact of 
the past 4 years of conflict has devastated the country and significantly hindered any 
advancement of conservation efforts, though they are continuing despite the war, with relatively 
substantial results considering the situation.   

3.  How is socio-economic security undermined by trafficking and poor conservation, 

both at local and national levels?  

Widespread commercial poaching is depleting the resource base that local communities depend 
on in times of food insecurity. The insecurity linked to wildlife crime hinders and prevents 
people from conducting livelihood activities such as farming and other economic activities, such 
as trade. National and international NGOs are reluctant to operate in areas that endure repeated 
and widespread insecurity. Furthermore, the poaching of key species risks undermining future 
development opportunities for the country (which are/were significant) with several ecotourism 

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operators keen to establish operations in Boma and Badingilo Parks before the armed conflict 
broke out in December 2013. The perpetuation of conflicts and armed groups living off wildlife 
resources and generating revenue from natural resource pillaging, destabilises local 
communities and undermines future NRM-based development opportunities.  

4.  How does wildlife trafficking undermine the rule of law and legitimate institutions 

(notably because of the links with corruption)?   

Corruption in relation to ivory and bushmeat trafficking is a significant factor undermining the 
rule of law at all levels in South Sudan. The involvement of the SPLA and other organised forces 
in trafficking, along with some cases involving the SSWS, further undermines the country’s 
security. Also the trust of local communities in the government and government forces is 
negatively affected. 

5.  How does wildlife-related insecurity (whether in term of conflict or from a socio-

economic point of view) contribute to migration flows (intra-state, inter-state, 
global)? 

There is a great deal of human suffering amongst displaced peoples as a result of the wider 
conflict in South Sudan. Many people have left the Boma NP area because of the wider conflict 
in South Sudan and local conflicts, and are refugees in Ethiopia. People are also leaving the 
Badingilo NP area for the same reasons, moving as IDPs to west of the Nile (including Juba), 
and as refugees into Uganda and Kenya. There are also some cases of people who are originally 
from the Boma area who are returning from other more insecure parts of the country due to the 
relatively safer and more secure situation in the Boma Park area. 

6.  How are approaches being applied to address the wildlife-security nexus as a 

basis for development and improving security? 

The USAID, WCS and the SSWS, and the Boma-Jonglei-Equatoria Landscape programme 
formally and explicitly recognise and integrate the important role the PA management, law 
enforcement and community-based partnerships have for improving security and conflict 
mitigation. These objectives, along with wildlife conservation and NRM objectives, have been 
pursued through a series of carefully designed approaches, which directly address the wildlife-
security nexus. Following the outbreak of widespread armed conflict in late 2013 that still 
continues today, the programme adapted to the situation, continuing operations when and 
where possible with priority given to security, community cooperation, awareness and anti-
trafficking, patrolling where feasible, monitoring activities, adjusting programmes in their 
approach and spatiality as dictated by the heavy security threats (e.g. carefully assessing and 
adjusting efforts to avoid heavy combat areas, and undertaking operations where and when 
feasible from the security-environment perspective), and developing new approaches (including 
expanded anti-trafficking measures along key axes, and critical wildlife awareness messaging to 
inspire peace and hope and to protect wildlife) in order to help address the expanding threats 
brought by the armed conflict. A number of important lessons were learned that can be applied 
to wildlife-security nexus approaches. 

Suggestions for the way forward for the next 5 years 
The Badingilo-Boma landscape is of global biodiversity importance. Effective wildlife 
conservation and protected area management will benefit wildlife and habitats, plus also have a 
direct positive impact on stabilisation, conflict mitigation and eventually peace. If conserved, the 
rich biodiversity resources of the area are projected to contribute substantially to (future) 
sustainable development in the area and to South Sudan. Corruption is a major challenge that 
needs to be a more explicit part of the wildlife crime-security nexus ‘equation’, and needs to be 
addressed if there is to be success. Long-term international support is key to effectively 
engaging in the wildlife-security nexus in this troubled but incredibly important area, and is of 
critical relevance and direct benefit to the people of South Sudan and the international 
community in terms of global conservation and security. 

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Recommendations 

1. Programmes/activities 
Landscape approach to conservation and conflict mitigation with protected areas as 
hubs for security and governance 
Apply the landscape approach to ensure that programme activities address the multiple 
conservation and security themes that transcend the scale of protected areas. 

Focused full support for the management of Boma and Badingilo Parks and key migration 
corridors of the Boma-Jonglei-Equatoria Landscape as hubs of stability and governance, taking 
into account local stakeholders and conflict-sensitive approaches (including zoning, surveillance 
and inter community agreements) to mitigate conflicts between ethnic groups and improve 
security for both wildlife and people. 

Support and expand conservation security partnerships between communities and other 
relevant stakeholders in key areas of the Boma-Jonglei-Equatoria Landscape, resulting in 
improved security, conflict mitigation, reduced poaching, gender equality and community 
benefits. 

Establish pilot community conservancies, based on the model used in northern Kenya by the 
Northern Rangelands Trust (NTR), in strategic areas of the landscape, congruent with and 
reinforcing the protected areas network, in order to conserve wildlife, generate local community 
benefits, and develop conservancy model(s) for South Sudan. 

Engage with the GoSS to upgrade the current WCS-GoSS management agreements to full 
public-private-partnerships (PPPs) for the management of Boma and Badingilo National Parks. 

Engage and build capacity for sustainable management of natural resources and 
conservation 
Contribute more effectively to protected area management, wildlife protection and anti-
trafficking, conservation-security partnerships, conflict mitigation and land-use planning through 
community engagement, training and support. 

Implement and apply participatory land-use planning processes for Boma and Badingilo Parks’ 
protected area management plans; design and manage migration corridors, and adopt improved 
conflict mitigation approaches. 

Mainstream biodiversity conservation in development planning, e.g. include roads and all major 
infrastructure by using scientific data to influence decision-makers; develop conservation 
constituencies at local, state, national and international levels, amongst government, the 
private sector, communities, NGOs, CSOs and other relevant stakeholders. 

Design and support a complete system for an intelligence-led law enforcement network, 
focusing on key wildlife poaching and trafficking points and axes in the landscape and across the 
country, including transboundary routes, particularly with Ethiopia, Uganda and DRC, including 
through multi-agency and community participation.  

Community livelihoods and economic enhancement 
Develop sustainable natural resource-based livelihood enterprises and climate change 
adaptation mechanisms within target communities. 

Conduct value-chain feasibility analyses of sustainable natural resource enterprises, e.g. gum 
(Ayod, Lafon, Pibor), shea, Boma wild coffee, and support the development of community pilot 
projects. 

Promote the actions and outcomes of humanitarian, development and conservation actors so 
that they are coordinated and mutually reinforcing contributions to conservation and conflict 
mitigation, and enhancing community benefits. 

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Participatory land-use planning, zoning and resource management 
Support local community-based conservation and natural resource management and conflict 
mitigation programmes as part of the peace process and reconciliation dialogue. 

Support local communities and local authorities in monitoring and supporting transparency and 
governance in natural resource management sectors, including intelligence gathering and 
sharing, law enforcement to halt illegal logging, engaging on charcoal management, concession 
data basing and monitoring, etc. 

Transboundary Ethiopia-South Sudan conservation and security initiative 
Liaise with the relevant government agencies and conservation organisations in Ethiopia to 
strengthen and broaden the collaboration on transboundary issues, including exchanging 
information on the movements of wildlife, traffickers, poachers and armed groups. The WCS is 
currently in the process of developing a partnership programme with the Government of 
Ethiopia for the management of the Gambella and Omo National Parks. 

Develop direct coordination and cooperation between the management of Gambella National 
Park and Omo and Mago National Parks in Ethiopia with Boma Park’s management, pilot 
conservancies, and the proposed Loelle protected area in South Sudan. 

Ensure there is synergy with the plans for land use on both sides of the border in transboundary 
areas, including the creation of new protected areas and conservancies to ensure ecological 
connectivity and protection. 

Finalise the formal transboundary cooperation MoU between South Sudan and Ethiopia, and 
design and implement the action plan. 

Ensure that infrastructure development plans (including roads, oil pipelines) are coordinated 
and take into account the protected areas’ management objectives appropriately, and follow 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) findings and guidance. 

 2. Policy initiatives 
Engage with the peace process and integrate natural resource management and revenue 
management in a transparent manner. 

Employ wildlife conservation (e.g. halting the poaching crisis) as a diplomatic tool for dialogue in 
the peace process and for confidence building between conflicting groups. 

Support GoSS in developing and harmonising a high standard of natural resource management 
and conservation legislation, policies and regulations. 

Support GoSS to become a member of and/or implement relevant conventions on wildlife such 
as CITES, the CMS, Elephant Protection Initiative (EPI) and the Horn of Africa Wildlife Law 
Enforcement Network (HAWEN).  

Ensure that donor programming and the implementation of partner activities are coordinated 
(including humanitarian and development assistance), and that multiple funding streams are 
planned spatially in the Boma-Jonglei-Equatoria Landscape and other key areas of South Sudan 
to maximise positive impact for security, NRM, conservation and protected area management, 
community livelihoods and conflict mitigation.  

Integrate natural resource law enforcement and the protection of wildlife in the UN 
peacekeeping mandate for South Sudan to help prevent and stop the pillaging of natural 
resources by armed groups. 

Create a multi-agency task force (UN, EU, USA, GoSS security organisations) to address critical 
wildlife and other natural resource crimes. 

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Maps 

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Threats and opportunities in the Boma-Jonglei-Equatoria Landscape 

Indirect threats 

Direct threats 

Key opportunities 

•  Ongoing armed conflict 

• 

in some areas 

• 

Natural resources used 
to finance and support 
conflict 

• 

Food insecurity 

•  Displaced people 

Bushmeat and ivory 
poaching and 
trafficking (both 
inside and 
transboundary)  
(including 
involvement of 
armed groups) 

Tribal violence 
(underlying cycles and 
current armed conflict) 

• 

Ivory trafficking (and 
links for armed 
actors) 

• 

• 

•  Over-exploitation of 

wildlife species for 
commercial gain and 
subsistence  

Rapidly expanding 
charcoal production 
/deforestation 
(controlling groups) 

Uncontrolled natural 
resource extraction, 
e.g. minerals (gold), 
timber, ivory, etc. 

Habitat loss and 
fragmentation 

Community conflicts 
over land and natural 
resources 

Pollution from 
extractive industry 
(oil, mining, etc.) 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

Climate change 

Conflict over land and 
water 

•  Governance confusions 
(federal, state, etc.) 

• 

Economic crisis 
(rampant inflation)  

•  Weak land, 

environment and 
natural resource 
management capacity 

Inadequate regulatory 
framework for natural 
resource management 

Poor governance and 
insecurity in remote 
rural areas 

Uncontrolled 
concession allocation 
and poor management 

Poorly planned major 
development projects 
(e.g. dams, road 
networks, etc.) 

Lack of employment 
and economic 
opportunities in rural 
areas 

Lack of transparency 
and monitoring of 
extractive industry 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

Integrate NRM and conservation principles 
and mechanisms in the peace process and 
governance at all levels. 

Employ wildlife as a positive neutral entry 
point to conflict resolution and peace 
building at national, state and local levels. 

Improve mechanisms for conflict 
management: understand the underlying 
drivers of conflicts (land, grazing, tribal 
cycles) and politicisation; update 
information about how current conflict 
relates to history and other main drivers, 
taking into account potential climate change 
factors impacting conflicts; review 
traditional conflict resolution mechanisms 
and new ones for peace and reconciliation. 
Monitor implementation. 

Awareness raising campaign targeting key 
groups and stakeholders on wildlife and 
NRM – include messaging with peace 
messages (including elephant protection). 

Community-based conservation-security 
partnerships (future potential community 
conservancies). 

Protected area management contributing to 
improving security for people and wildlife 
(including employment in remote zones). 
Secure infrastructures, stabilise areas, 
facilitate delivery of assistance. 

Complete system of wildlife law 
enforcement to discourage trafficking and 
poaching and so secure wildlife, keeping 
ivory on the elephants, addressing 
transboundary and security issues, 
enhancing civil society partnerships. 

Livelihoods (including NTFP) stabilisation 
and food security through community 
cooperation.  

•  Monitoring (security, NRM, human activity, 
wildlife, etc.) and adaptive intervention 
adjustments.  

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

Land-use planning to resolve and avoid land 
conflicts. 

Spatial and thematic inter-sectoral adaptive 
planning and coordination of inputs. 

Transparency, monitoring and management 
of the natural resource sector, e.g. oil (and 
pipeline), mining, forestry, agriculture, 
wildlife, etc. – NRM authority. 

Extractive industry and development 
infrastructure planning to ensure sound 
development and avoid conflicts. 

Climate change mitigation (carbon 
sequestration/ REDD) and climate change 
adaptation (sustainable rangeland 
management). 

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Case study 6. Bamingui-Bangoran & Manovo-Gounda St Floris NP Landscape 
(CAR) 

Site name and location: North-east Central African Republic (CAR), Bamingui-Bangoran and 
Manovo-Gouda-St Floris area 

Introduction  
The landscape area of northern CAR, which has received EU support for conservation efforts for 
more than 30 years, covers around 100 000 km2, including the whole Bamingui-Bangoran 
prefecture and part of the Vakaga prefecture. With a population of about 50 000, 93 % of the 
Bamingui-Bangoran prefecture is theoretically protected under different regimes. It includes 2 
national parks (Bamingui-Bangoran and Manovo-Gounda-St Floris, the latter a World Heritage 
Site), the presidential park Avakaba, 2 wildlife reserves (Gribingui-Bamingui and Vassako-Bolo, 
the latter an integral reserve) and hunting zones, including the Sangba ‘pilot area’, zones 
cynégétiques villageoise (ZCV) or community hunting zones, of which 3 are considered as 
‘semi-operational’, hunting zones known as ‘zones amodiées’, allocated by the state to private 
safari hunting operators but currently not operational. Since 2016, the EU has supported the 
Ecofaune+ project, which, due to insecurity, has limited its interventions to 8 000 km2 of the 
southern part of the Bamingui-Bangoran prefecture, including a 50 km-wide strip in the 
southern part of the Bamingui-Bangoran National Park and the 3 ‘semi-operational’ ZCVs 
(Koukourou-Bamingui, Bamingui-Bangoran and Idongo Da Bangoran). The parks were created 
during the colonial period in 1933, the Gribingui-Bamingui and Koukourou-Bamingui reserves in 
1940 (the latter ‘reclassified’ to ZCV in 2000), the presidential park in 1968, the Vassako-Bolo 
reserve in 1979 and the Sangba pilot area in 1988. 

The habitat includes wooded savannah, some tropical forest, river courses, open sahel 
savannah in the north, canyons and inselbergs, with a transition area between savannah and 
forest. Wildlife populations have greatly declined over the decades and have been further 
decimated due to poaching during the past few years of insecurity. Key species include elephant 
(possibly 60 000 in the 1960s, 35 000 in 1977, 4 800 in 1985, 4 000 in 1998, 930 in 2005, 68 
in 2010, and now considered to be either locally extirpated or in only very low numbers), Lord 
Derby eland, roan antelope (10 000 in 1977, currently estimated at 1 000), bushbuck (10 000 
in 1991, currently estimated at 1 150), waterbuck, buffalo and giraffe. All species have 
experienced a sharp decline since the 1970s, with some stabilisation in the 1990s, a period 
when the conservation project, then called PDRN (Programme de development de la région Nord 
or Development Programme of the Northern Region), benefitted from substantive funding. Of all 
the large mammal species surveyed, the roan antelope and bushbuck seem to have been the 
most resilient. 

For this assessment a field mission took place between 15 September and 4 October 2017. 
Semi-directed and informal interviews were held with Ecofaune+ staff (including coordinator 
Antonio Pelosi, other administrators and rangers), other conservation organisations (including 
APN and WWF), government officials (including the Ministers of Waters and Forests, Public 
Works and Energy), rebel and former rebel leaders, official opposition representatives, 
traditional leaders, members of parliament, former rangers (including many who joined the 
rebellion), bushmeat traffickers, diamond dealers, pastoralists’ representatives, Chadian and 
Sudanese representatives, UN officials (including MINUSCA’s deputy head of mission and 
members of the UN Security Council Panel of Experts), EU representatives, French diplomats 
(including the ambassador), former French officers, and international and local researchers. 

Key wildlife/security issues identified at this site 

•  Bushmeat poaching for both local consumption and the commercial bushmeat trade: local 

and foreign (Sudanese); 

• 

Ivory poaching and trafficking predominately by Sudanese and Chadians; 

•  Nomadic pastoralism, with links to foreign poachers; 

•  Since December 2012, the whole area has been under the control of the rebel movement 
FPRC (Front populaire pour la renaissance de la Centrafrique – Popular Front for the 

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rebirth of CAR). The LRA (Lord’s Resistance Army) has also been present sporadically, 
lately in 2016; 

•  Uncontrolled mining: diamonds, gold; 

•  Recently initiated oil exploration north of Bamingui-Bangoran; 

•  Bamboo exploitation in the Vakaga prefecture area. 

Security risks to those involved in wildlife protection 
Since the 1980s, conservation projects as well as private hunting operators have engaged in 
armed anti-poaching operations, in particular against well-armed poachers considered as 
foreigners, mostly originating from Sudan (organised poaching and trafficking ivory, rhino horn 
and bushmeat). Rangers generally describe these operations as a particularly violent war, and 
paid a particularly heavy price, with various incidents where 5 to 6 rangers were killed. Some of 
these losses were attributed to mistakes made by foreign trainers/officers (including French or 
Russian soldiers, former soldiers or mercenaries) considered as too bellicose, and who were 
sending the rangers to fight without sufficient support or reinforcements, or whose violent 
actions were attracting similarly violent, revengeful attacks by poachers and/or pastoralists. The 
risks increased as armed groups appeared, sometimes linked to pastoralists and/or poachers. 
For example in 2007, the rangers, then led by a French officer, attacked pastoralists within the 
Bamingui-Bangoran park, but were then attacked by a rebel group close to the pastoralists. 
Three rangers were killed. 

Management approaches applied to address these issues/threats 
Law enforcement 
Since the beginning of the ‘crisis’ in CAR in December 2012, only a limited number of rangers 
remained in the project area, not the least because the majority of rangers joined the rebel 
Seleka movement in 2012 (some remain with FPRC). A new group of 26 rangers, all from the 
Bamingui-Bangoran prefecture, were recruited in mid 2017 and, together with 20 former 
rangers, are currently being trained by a former French officer. The current strategy is that 
while being trained they should gradually show their presence and retake possession of the 
area, beginning in the immediate neighbourhood of the project's main base in Bamingui. To 
prevent these rangers' empowerment being seen as bellicose by the rebel group FPRC (Front 
populaire pour la renaissance de la Centrafrique – Popular Front for the rebirth of CAR) that 
controls the area, given that the rangers constitute the only non-FPRC armed force in the 
prefecture and are associated with the Government rather than the rebels, the project has 
established relations with the FPRC and will seek to maintain them, while, in the meantime, 
cautiously avoiding being seen by the Government in Bangui as being too close to the rebels.  

In addition, the rangers’ current training should improve their ability to protect themselves. 
They will also be equipped with protection equipment such as bulletproof jackets. Wounded 
rangers benefit from an aerial medical evacuation; disabled rangers and relatives of killed 
rangers receive indemnities. 

Intelligence gathering has reportedly improved since 2012, notably thanks to the provision of 6 
telephones to educated informants. The communication of valuable information is rewarded with 
a fee.  

Community engagement 
Other key approaches include the resumption of activities engaging local communities, which in 
the 1980s and 1990s appear to have benefited large parts of the local population and left 
positive memories. Recently some 100 young adults received training for jobs such as 
construction, mechanics, welding, carpentry and sewing, which was concluded with the 
provision of specific equipment to the trainees. Restoration of the 4 schools in Ndele (the 
prefecture’s capital) has been completed, and should be followed by the restoration of the 
administrative buildings. Micro-projects to promote income-generating activities, such as the 
production of shea butter, moringa, domestic guinea fowl, beef dried meat (sharmout in Arabic) 
and baked goods, are envisaged. It is believed that both the training of young adults and the 
micro-projects will allow people who would otherwise have turned to bushmeat poaching to 
exercise other income-generating activities. More broadly, it may also strengthen the whole 

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population’s positive perception of the conservation project and deter local communities to harm 
wildlife and the project. 

Land-use planning and zoning programme 
In addition, a land-use planning and zoning programme has been designed, based on 
community surveys and the recent aerial surveys, and should be adopted in the near future, 
aiming to allocate specific zones to nomadic pastoralists, limit their encroachment in protected 
areas and mitigate their conflicts with farmers. Since 2014, the Ecofaune+ project has also 
contributed to, and advocated for, the adoption by the parliament of a new law on protected 
areas and wildlife.  

Successes and challenges 
The PDRN's first phases of the project in the northern CAR landscape are generally considered 
to have been the most successful. Substantive funding not only allowed for more effective anti-
poaching (although ultimately not absolutely successful and involved violence, which may have 
been counter-productive), but also generated a number of jobs for local community members 
and income in the region. Furthermore, the PDRN's second phase engaged in relatively 
beneficial interventions toward local communities, in particular with the creation of the ZCV, 
whose hunting profits largely benefited the communities. 

A main (historical) challenge appears to be the (notably financial) discontinuity between the 
different conservation projects (or phases) that succeeded in the area. Because of this, rangers 
were repeatedly fired, or faced months or year-long gaps during which they were not paid, as 
well as reductions in their salaries or other payments, while promises of their integration into 
more permanent bodies such as the Eaux et Forêts (Water and Forestry Service) often remained 
unfulfilled. These are the main reasons why, since the 2000s, many rangers or former rangers 
(sometimes estimated at between 100 and 200) joined successive rebellions.  

Security challenges grew in the 2000s, in particular after Sudanese poachers murdered a local 
traditional leader known as a strong supporter of the conservation project, and who had 
recruited some of his followers as an anti-poaching force. Between 2002 and 2005, the murder 
triggered a series of revengeful attacks between local self-defence groups and Sudanese 
pastoralists in the Vakaga prefecture. The Sudanese side benefitted from the formation by the 
Government of Sudan of the Janjawid Arab militias after the start of the war in Darfur in 2003, 
while the Vakaga self-defence groups felt abandoned by the central government in Bangui, who 
considered them potential rebels against the state. As a result, they formed the UFDR (Union 
des forces démocratiques pour le rassemblement – Union of Democratic Forces for Gathering) 
rebellion, together with disgruntled rangers and similarly unhappy elements of the Bozizé 
regime. The group seized Vakaga’s capital in 2006 and also targeted conservation and safari 
hunting infrastructures. It signed a peace agreement in 2008, but a second rebellion, the CPJP 
(Convention des patriotes pour la justice et la paix – Convention of Patriots for Justice and 
Peace) then emerged in Bamingui-Bangoran, again seizing Birao and targeting conservation 
(see ‘Human, cattle and elephant populations’ diagram in maps section, below). 

Rebellions were present in the region from the 2000s, but in December 2012 they united to 
form the Seleka (‘alliance’) coalition, quickly overrunning the whole Bamingui-Bangoran 
province (including the project's and hunting zones' bases and recruiting more rangers on their 
way (27 joined Seleka in late 2012/early 2013), before marching on Bangui. Since then, the 
whole area has been controlled by the Seleka, then FPRC rebels, who acted as CAR's de facto 
government under the 9-month-long presidency of Michel Djotodia.  

The project managed to maintain a limited presence thanks to negotiations with the rebels. In 
the meantime, balancing relations between the government in Bangui and the rebels locally 
remains precarious. Some interviewees consider the project as sufficiently ‘neutral‘. Others, 
both pro-government and pro-rebel, consider it, whether positively or negatively, as an offshoot 
of the government, since the ‘national conservator’ and his deputy are state civil servants, 
appointed by Bangui. Other state representatives are present in the region, including 2 sous-
préfets in Ndele and Bamingui (the latter being a rebel cadre in spite of being appointed by 
Bangui), the sultan-mayor of Ndele, teachers, medical personnel and inactive forestry agents. 
In fact, the FPRC tolerates an administrative presence and the provision of services, but 

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monopolises any taxation activity as well as armed forces (it has its own police, gendarmerie, 
customs, forestry and tax services). The project's rangers are the only arm-bearers with, in 
principle, law enforcement powers, who are tolerated by the FPRC. This tolerance is also the 
reason why the project is seen by a number of interviewees, both pro-government and pro-
rebels, positively or negatively, as too close to the FPRC; this is also the general belief of the 
government in Bangui, who regularly mentions the fact that rangers joined the Seleka as 
evidence that ‘the project formed, trained and armed the rebels’. However, things have become 
more complicated and nuanced since an FPRC political leader, Lambert Mokove, was appointed 
as Minister of Water and Forests, with authority on the project, in September 2017.  

The fragility of the project’s position (described by some as ‘between a rock and a hard place’) 
has increased with the recent recruitment of new rangers. The criteria for this recruitment (in 
addition to being from Bamingui-Bangoran, candidates had to be less than 26 years old and 
have reading and writing skills, with no ethnic or religious criteria) appear to require de facto 
disadvantaged former rangers who had joined the rebels, as well as lesser educated youths 
from the Runga and Gula ethnic groups, principally Muslim and often Arabic rather than French 
and Sango-speaking. As those communities constitute the core of the FPRC troops and popular 
base, their under-representation has triggered FPRC criticism that the recruitment process was 
biased against ‘their’ ethno-religious communities. 

More substantial difficulties may arise in relation to the FPRC. In late 2016, the rebel movement 
declared a prohibition on poaching and bushmeat trafficking, together with the suppression of 
roadblocks where elements were practising abusive taxation. The interdiction was re-asserted, 
and began to be partly enforced in 2017, possibly after discussions with Ecofaune+ and in the 
hope of obtaining international funding, or at least some political recognition. The interdiction 
was only partially applied, with some bushmeat seized, including on UN (MINUSCA) trucks, and 
partly burned but also distributed to the troops who consumed or resold it. Poachers and 
traffickers, including relatives of FPRC officers, escaped control, while others paid bribes or 
'fines' to the FPRC. This has led to the suspicion that the main objective of the interdiction was 
to raise taxes and fines. As further evidence of this complicity, two attempts by rangers in 2013 
and 2016, the latter in collaboration with official forestry agents, to erect a roadblock near the 
project's Bamingui base were thwarted by the FPRC, notably after the seizure of bushmeat 
trafficked by an FPRC officer's wife. In 2016, FPRC elements also entered the project’s Bamingui 
base at night and tried to seize a ranger’s gun; the rangers managed to retrieve the gun, 
fortunately without casualties. 

Some FPRC officers also hope their troops will be part of joint patrols with the rangers, and be 
paid for this by the project.  

In addition to the FPRC, the MPC (Mouvement patriotique centrafricain or Central-African 
Patriotic Movement), mostly composed of Arabs from Chad or with Chadian origins, and led by 
Mahamat al-Khatim, controls the area immediately south and west of Bamingui-Bangoran. 
While they appear to have good relations with the FPRC, loosely controlled MPC elements have 
made occasional incursions within Bamingui-Bangoran.  

In conclusion, the fact that the EU-funded project has managed to survive ‘against all odds’ is 
generally seen as positive, and has contributed to some sense of stability in Bamingui-
Bangoran, even if it may involve some compromises with the FPRC. All sides commonly view the 
project as a useful link between the Government in Bangui and the rebel-controlled area. In the 
past, it has already played, informally and punctually, a mediating role between the former 
Bozizé Government and the early UFDR rebellion, in 2006 and 2007, contributing to a first 
peace agreement. Later, in 2007 and 2009, during fights between rangers and Sudanese 
pastoralists, UFDR forces reportedly intervened to support the rangers. 

Summary  
1.  Where does wildlife trafficking trigger conflicts, fuel existing unrest or lead to 

scaled-up conflicts (from local to national/regional, international)?  

In the area, the relations between wildlife crime, wildlife conservation and security issues are 
deeply rooted and complex. In the 1990s and 2000s, while local communities were themselves 

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involved in local poaching of bushmeat and ivory, some of them, convinced by the profits 
generated by the ZCV, also engaged in anti-poaching activities on the side of the rangers, 
mostly against poachers and pastoralists from Sudan, specialising in ivory. In the years 2002 to 
2005, this led to a largely unnoticed full-scale war between both sides, with Khartoum-backed 
Janjawid militias involved in the Darfur war since 2003 conducting multiple incursions into 
northern CAR for revengeful attacks against locals, and the local communities, feeling 
abandoned by the distant state, constituting their own self-defence forces. Both these vigilante 
forces and the rangers constituted the first nucleus of the rebel groups in northern CAR.  

2.  Where have conflicts triggered or fuelled wildlife trafficking or hampered 

conservation? 

Not only did the rebels' presence gradually hamper conservation efforts in the region, they also 
repeatedly targeted conservation staff who they perceived as pro-government, and pillaged and 
destroyed conservation infrastructures. Furthermore, rebels, in particular since 2013, have also 
been involved in poaching.  

3.  How is socio-economic security undermined by trafficking and poor conservation, 

both at local and national levels?  

More than trafficking itself and the disappearance of most conservation efforts, it is the 
insecurity generated by the rebellion – no matter how legitimate its political claims – which 
triggered both socio-economic insecurity and the total disappearance of an already limited rule 
of law, with the rebels pretending to replace the – already weak and corrupt – state. The rebel 
presence hampers both the resumption of conservation efforts and more generally, state-
building, services and development efforts. 

4.  How does wildlife trafficking undermine the rule of law and legitimate institutions 

(notably because of the links with corruption)?   

Since 2013, the Seleka then the FPRC rebels have been directly involved in bushmeat poaching 
and trafficking, as well as the exploitation and trafficking of other natural resources, including 
diamond, gold and bamboo. But while some of these activities may be mostly allowing 
individual commanders and troops to obtain personal income, the rebel movement appears to 
be largely funding itself through abusive taxations of private actors (whether rebels themselves 
or civilian poachers, miners or traders, from the region or outside the region) exploiting the 
same natural resources (oil exploration by a Chinese company also involved recruitment and 
payment of FPRC rebels). Payments were also made to avoid taxation and confiscation of 
trafficked resources such as bushmeat, although the corruption phenomenon did not begin with 
the rebellion, which, in the matter, appears to behave much as the state used to. 

5.  How does wildlife-related insecurity (whether in term of conflict or from a socio-

economic point of view) contribute to migration flows (intra-state, inter-state, 
global)?  

Transhumance migrations from Chad and Sudan annually impact the area. In 2017 the northern 
part of the area also saw the arrival of several hundreds of refugees from Chad, mostly fleeing 
abusive practices by Chadian forces, including the army, the paramilitary brigade for the 
protection of the environment, the forestry agents and fake agents known as bogo-bogo, all 
known to harass Chadian communities in order to receive abusive taxes, notably under the 
pretext of environmental protection. 

6.  How are approaches being applied to address the wildlife-security nexus as a 

basis for development and improving security? 

Since the project resumed in 2016, the main approach is to maintain a presence and to re-form 
a rangers’ force that will gradually retake possession of the space. Currently, this presence can 
only maintain itself through negotiations with both government and rebels. 

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Suggestions for the way forward for the next 5 years 

1. Programmes/activities 

•  Human resources: Hire more staff, including rangers. Secure longer-term contracts for 
the staff. Increase salaries and benefits (such as indemnities for killed, disabled or 
wounded rangers). Examine claims over unpaid salaries. Orient funding to combat 
poaching towards human resources rather than costly technological solutions. 

•  Envisage re-hiring some former rangers who joined the rebels, after cautious 

consultations with those who did not join. 

•  Envisage positive discrimination/affirmative action measures (such as hiring new rangers 

who may not perfectly fit with the age and literacy criteria) to address the under-
representation, within the ranger corps, of ethnic-religious communities considered to be 
close to the FPRC (e.g. Runga, Gula, Muslims). 

•  Emphasise, during the rangers' training and practice, the need to give priority to non-

violent and negotiated solutions, preventive measures, respect of international 
humanitarian law and human rights, community engagement and interaction policy, 
intelligence gathering and gaining influence over key actors, rather than violent 
interventions. Emphasise also the importance of a minimal and gradual use of violence. 
Insist, when possible, on the difference between pastoralists and poachers, and, in 
particular with pastoralists, give priority to sensitisation and negotiations, in order to 
avoid killing livestock and humans and triggering larger-scale conflicts. 

•  Gradually re-activate the ZCV, including their safari hunting activities, as soon as wildlife 

populations and security will allow. 

•  Strengthen exchange of information with MINUSCA (UN Multidimensional Integrated 

Stabilization Mission in CAR) while remaining cautious to local perceptions – the rebels 
see the mission, who seconds advisers to local government administrators, as essentially 
pro-government. 

2. Policy initiatives 

• 

Lobby MINUSCA and the UNDPKO (Department of Peace-Keeping Operations) for the 
mission to enforce the part of its mandate relative to ‘illicit exploitation of natural 
resources’. 

•  Strengthen and formalise (possibly through a written chart that could be distributed to 

interlocutors) a balanced relationship with government and the FPRC, asserting principles 
of ethnic, religious and political neutrality such as those promoted by humanitarian 
organisations. 

•  Engage FPRC on the need to gradually stop mining in protected areas. 

• 

Increase engagement with pastoralist communities and their leaders and representatives, 
in particular from Chad. Organise regular meetings, including before and after the dry 
season migration, with local communities’ representatives and representatives of Chadian 
official and customary authorities, as well as representatives of CAR local authorities. 
Such dialogue should ultimately lead to the delimitation and demarcation of official 
migration routes (marahil or masarat in Arabic), leading from the end of the Chadian 
official ones on the Chadian border, to the grazing areas defined by the future zoning. 
Fund water infrastructures on the Chadian side of the corridors, in order to delay the 
arrival of the nomads. Through meetings as described above and possibly through 
permanent committees of farmers and nomads, encourage an ‘early warning’ system to 
prepare for the nomads’ arrival, following the model of the traditional system used in 
Sudan and Chad (and revived in parts of the latter): nomads and farmers fix dates for 
the harvest, allowing nomads to enter the farms only after the date (telga in Arabic), 
while farmers must harvest before the date; nomads regularly update farmers on their 
movements south. Encourage seasonal rather than permanent crops such as manioc. 
Provide joint services for nomads and farmers during the dry season, such as joint 
markets and schools for children and adults, including women (according to the model 

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that was followed in South Sudan). Organise visits by northern CAR community 
representatives to projects for pastoralists in Chad and South Sudan.  

• 

In a second phase, engage with Sudanese community representatives in a similar way. 

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Maps 

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Case study 7. Zakouma National Park Landscape (Chad) 

Site name and location: Zakouma National Park, South-East Chad 

Introduction  
Straddling the Salamat and Guéra regions of south-eastern Chad, the Zakouma area consists of 
a 3 054 km2 national park and an extended periphery covering 25 514 km2. Zakouma faunal 
reserve was created during colonial times, in 1958, and became a national park in 1963 through 
a presidential decree, 3 years after Chad’s independence. Seven of the eight villages initially 
present in the reserve were then displaced, generating controversies. The first Chadian rebellion 
emerged the same year the park was created and in the 1960s and 1970s, successive rebel 
groups with bases in the same south-eastern Chad region, gradually took control of the area, 
leading the park to a state of near total abandon. In 1986, as Chad’s civil war and the war with 
Libya were about to end, an aerial survey by zoologist Pierre Pfeffer found the park still viable, 
which led to a resumption of conservation efforts in 1987. The park has received EU funding 
since 1989, including through successive projects – rehabilitation project from 1989 to 1992, 
CESET (Conservation of the Environment in South-eastern Chad) from 1993 to 2000, and 
CURESS (Conservation and Rational Use of Sudano-Sahelan Ecosystems) from 2000 to 2010. It 
received aviation anti-poaching support from WCS in 2008. Since 2010 it has been managed by 
African Parks Network (APN) under a public-private partnership agreement with the Chadian 
Government, mainly with funding from the European Union.  

The habitat is mostly savannah. Key species include elephant with population estimates of 
1 000 in 1963, 1 000 in 1986, 600 in 1991, 1 750 in 1995, 4 350 in 2002, 3 900 in 2005, 3 000 
in 2006 (see below on elephant massacres, 2005 to 2008), 940 in 2008, 620 in 2009, 450 in 
2010-14, 520 in 2016: slowly recovering, see diagram below; buffalo: 220 in 1986, 11 000 in 
2016: increasing; giraffe: 900 in 1991, 1 000 in 2016: stable; tiang: 200 in 1986, 1 800 in 
2016: increasing; lion: 100 to 125: probably stable; cheetah: 10: increasing; wild dog: 9. All 
figures are based on the 2016 aerial survey of the national park. 

The area was not visited during this research. However the authors visited it on several 
occasions including in 2010, 2012 and 2015. This case study is based on directed and semi-
directed interviews with the park’s manager, Leon Lamprecht, and deputy director, Babakar 
Matar Brémé. In addition, this case study was informed by semi-directed and informal 
interviews with other park staff and former staff (under APN as well as prior management), EU 
Chad delegation and other international actors in N’Djaména, Chad experts, relevant Chadian 
government officials, and traditional leaders and representatives of local communities (including 
nomadic pastoralists). These interviews took place in south-eastern Chad (most recently in 
2016), northern Central African Republic (in March, April, September and October 2017) and 
N’Djaména (in June 2017). 

Key wildlife/security issues identified at this site 

• 

Ivory poaching involving both locals and foreigners (Sudanese).  

•  Bushmeat poaching by locals. 

•  Nomadic pastoralism, party connected with ivory and bushmeat poaching. Herders also 

poison livestock predators (lions, wild dogs). 

• 

Illegal fishing. 

•  Destruction of habitat, including by fires set by honey and Arabic gum collectors. 

•  Climate change, impacting agricultural production and inducing migrations towards the 

south, as well as earlier pastoralist migrations. 

• 

Poverty of local communities, aggravated by climate change. 

•  The security situation in the area has been and is likely to remain extremely sensitive to 

the country’s security situation. The regime has been led by the same president for 27 
years, and is permanently threatened by rebellions, recruiting notably in Salamat and 

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Guéra – and neighbouring regions – with risks of spillover effects of conflicts in 
neighbouring Darfur and CAR involving cross-border communities.  

•  National and local insecurity, including local and cross-border ivory poaching, outline 

decades of rebellion (continuous since 1966, with major rebel raids reaching N’Djaména 
in 2006 and 2008) and violent regime changes (in 1979, 1982 and 1990). 

Security risks to those involved in wildlife protection 
Zakouma staff have paid a particularly heavy toll fighting elephant poachers: a total of 20 
rangers were killed by poachers between 1998 and 2012. Nine fatalities occurred between 2006 
and 2009, at the height of the poaching, which also corresponds to the period when the Chad-
Sudan proxy war allowed the Chadian rebellion to regularly operate within Chad. Since the 
beginning of the war in Darfur in 2003, the Sudanese Government, believing N’Djaména was 
supporting the Darfur rebels due to the common Zaghawa ethnicity of the main rebel leaders 
and the Chadian president, Idriss Déby, gave massive support to various Chadian rebel 
movements. These managed to occupy parts of Chadian territory at the border with Sudan and 
launch several raids on N’Djaména, including two that almost succeeded in toppling Déby, in 
2006 and 2008. Sudanese Janjawid militias raided south-eastern Chad in the wake of Chadian 
rebels, and sometimes alongside some Chadian rebel factions. As Chadian government forces 
were focused on defending the border and the capital, ivory poachers, including possibly 
Chadian security personal and Sudanese Janjawid, killed hundreds of elephants in and around 
Zakouma. 

In 2007, 5 rangers, as well as a Chadian army soldier, were killed in and near Zakouma – the 
year the Chadian rebellion and allied Sudanese militias occupied part of neighbouring Dar Sila 
region. The latest deadly incident to date occurred in 2012, when 6 rangers were killed in 
confrontations with poachers, including poachers partly originating from Darfur, although the 
border has been much less porous to armed groups since 2010.   

Management approaches applied to address these issues/threats 
As mentioned above, the park has a long history of EU funding. However, as in other 
conservation projects, gaps and variations in the funding hampered the project’s ability for 
long-term planning and anticipating difficult times, such as the loss of elephants between 2002 
and 2008. Arguably, the rise in insecurity at the same time as the Chad-Sudan proxy war was 
rather sudden and not fully predictable, and such chaos could happen again. However, one of 
the main assets of the APN’s proposal, when it took over the project in 2010, was its ability to 
secure long-term funding. It also re-asserted the need to correct negative experiences and 
perceptions by local communities, and appears to have had some success in it thanks to 
investing in an education programme, in addition to long-term commitment. Given how 
education rates remained low in the Zakouma area, and how education was long a main local 
demand in south-eastern Chad, this is an interesting first step in the goal of turning the park to 
a hub of governance – if education efforts can turn to a model which can spread to other areas, 
including security, and if benefits from the park can encourage communities to continuously see 
it as an ally and involve into its protection in case there is a new wave of violence in the area. 

Law enforcement 
Anti-poaching has been reinforced by real-time tracking of collared elephants. Intelligence 
gathering reportedly improved, thanks to a better participation of local communities: an early 
warning radio system was set up (18 radios are based in villages around the park). Continuous 
professionalisation and better training of leadership and staff appear to be crucial elements. 

Community engagement 
Until 2010, the park was largely seen as an enemy by local communities, most notably 
pastoralists moving toward the park in the dry season. Pastoralists at that time described how 
they were prevented from crossing into the park and accessing grazing areas and water points, 
with their livestock sometimes killed by rangers. Since then, local perceptions of the park and 
relations between the park and local communities have reportedly improved, thanks to the 
provision of services and development programmes, including, crucially, in schools.  

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The park provides education facilities in the form of both permanent and seasonal schools, 
including innovative boarding schools (supporting students from areas around the park), which 
are built in areas within the elephant migration zone and benefitting both sedentary and 
nomadic communities. In the 2016-2017 school year, the park employed 12 teachers and 
provided education to 1 213 children in 10 schools; 2 schools were added in 2017. In addition, 
the park remains the main employer in the region.  

As a result of these improved relations, members of local communities have been participating 
in anti-poaching efforts, notably through the early warning radio system.  

Although not all the inhabitants of the region directly benefit from the park’s jobs and 
programmes, according to deputy director Babakar Matar, “the benefits for communities are 
more important than the benefits from [wildlife] criminality, since the latter only benefit 
individuals”. 

Land-use planning 
Also, crucially, a land-use planning programme was drafted with the participation of local 
communities. It preserves wildlife migration corridors and limits the encroachment of farms and 
villages on those corridors (nomadic pastoralists are allowed to use these corridors during the 
dry season when most migratory wildlife remains in the park). It thus mitigates human-wildlife 
conflicts. 

Successes and challenges 
Shifts in awareness and policies 
In 2010 and 2011, some park officials were seriously envisaging that elephants could disappear 
from Zakouma, while the presence of other, less targeted, species would ensure the park would 
remain a valuable protected area. The main success appears to be that elephants did not 
disappear but slowly recovered, with the first increase since 2016 observed in their population, 
while most other species appear to be increasing or stable. This seems to be due to the APN 
site-based intervention combined with a new awareness of the Chadian authorities, chiefly 
President Déby, of the value of the park, not least in terms of Chad’s image in the West. This 
new concern allowed the park to benefit from good relations with the Chadian civilian authorities 
and forces. Joint anti-poaching efforts are undertaken with the Chadian military, notably the 
Garde nationale et nomade du Tchad (GNNT, or National Nomadic Guard), one of the regime’s 
elite forces. Small GNNT units are provided with motorbikes and receive per diems from the 
park for patrolling the park’s boundaries jointly with a park ranger.  

In addition, the Government’s new awareness has led to a change in the behaviour of 
administration and security officials who previously engaged in wildlife crime. In the past, 
officials were reportedly supplying poachers with ammunition (and indeed a part of the 
ammunition seized from poachers is consistent with that of the Chadian army), as well as 
pressurising the judiciary to avoid sentencing poachers. This kind of collusion, not uncommon in 
the 2000s, has not been observed in recent years. 

The decline of Zakouma’s elephant population appears to have begun after a demographic peak 
of more than 4 000 individuals in 2002. The war in Darfur began a year after that, but south-
eastern Chad only experienced a direct security vacuum between 2005 and 2009, when it was 
sporadically occupied and even controlled by rebel groups supported by Sudan, as well as 
Sudanese Janjawid militias in their wake. It also corresponds to the height of the ivory poaching 
period in Zakouma but it does not necessarily mean that the rebels and the Sudanese Janjawid 
carried out the poaching. Even if some of the latter were allegedly involved, most of the 
poaching was reportedly done by members of local communities and, to a lesser extent, by 
Chadian security forces, benefitting from the security vacuum. A key factor that ended the 
poaching is the fact that Chadian government forces retook control of their territory after 2009. 
Park manager Leon Lamprecht describes wildlife crime and security issues as “very much 
related” in the area, since “Elephant poaching was at its highest during the Chadian rebellion 
between 2006 and 2009. Security has been restored in the country after the peace deal [i.e. the 
2010 deal between Chad and Sudan to stop supporting their respective rebellions; there was no 
peace agreement between the Chadian government and the rebels].” As a result, while 38 

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elephants were still poached in 2010, only 27 have been poached between 2011 and 2016, and 
none since February 2016. 

In essence, the security situation in the area remains fragile due to the strong links between 
wildlife crime and the national and regional contexts. Armed conflicts have continued all around 
Chad, in particular in Darfur and CAR, very close to Zakouma, but also in Libya, the Lake Chad 
region (Boko Haram) and South Sudan. Regional arms trafficking remains important, with Chad 
traversed by important north-south and east-west smuggling routes. 

Governance issues and government incoherence 
Even with political will at some levels, the Chadian administration, judiciary and security forces 
have continued to suffer from poor structural governance. Many interviewees mentioned that 
wildlife crime was rarely punished, with arrested perpetrators rapidly released and re-offending. 
Park manager Leon Lamprecht mentioned the need for better support, not only from the 
administration but also the judiciary, and for mechanisms to ensure offenders are tried and 
punished with fair but stricter enforced sentences. Deputy director Babakar Matar suggested 
Chadian wildlife laws are too weak and insufficiently dissuasive, and should be updated. 

Governance is also impacting the Chadian authorities’ cooperation with international 
organisations. In April 2017, the Chadian Environment Ministry refused to give permission for a 
project to equip elephants from a small isolated population in the Chari region (outside 
Zakouma) with radio collars. While the APN regretted committing to the project without having 
been delegated ‘entire management’ of it, Chadian authorities appear keen to maintain a level 
of control, in particular in regions impacted by insecurity, which means this kind of difficulty is 
likely to reoccur.  

Another issue that may impact international cooperation with the Chadian Government is that 
Chadian regular forces are known to have been involved in various abuses, including not only 
wildlife crimes but also cases of human rights violations, and for this reason are extremely 
unpopular among the Chadian population, including local communities around Zakouma. Forces 
known to be abusive include the GNNT, but also the recently formed paramilitary unit for the 
protection of the environment, known as the Brigade Mobile, the agents of the Inspection des 
Eaux et Forêts (forestry service) as well as fake agents known as bogo-bogo. Several recent 
reports by an EU-funded development INGO operating in south-eastern Chad noted the “general 
atmosphere of arbitrary governance, especially when it comes to certain institutions highly 
relevant to rural populations, such as the Inspection des Eaux et Forêts and the paramilitary 
Brigade Mobile in charge of environmental protection”. These and other forces appear to use 
environmental and other laws (in particular the Loi 14 that protects the environment) to extort 
abusive taxes or fines from local communities, including farmers accused of cutting trees to 
clear land, and pastoralists. As a result, the Loi 14 (currently the most oft-cited law in south-
eastern Chad), the Inspection des Eaux et Forêts and the paramilitary brigade are extremely 
unpopular among south-eastern Chad’s farmers, who perceive them as the main obstacles to 
the allocation of much needed farming land. In some places, to be able to clear land, farmers 
have had to pay heavy fees to the forestry agents, in addition to the usual tax to the local chief. 
Some had to bribe the agents with even larger sums. Those accused of violating forestry laws or 
failing to pay bribes requested by agents or bogo-bogo are imposed considerable fines (up to 
XAF 1 to 2 million – EUR 1 500 to 3 000 – for a farm), discouraging many to look for land to 
acquire and farm. Such abuses were also mentioned by Chadian refugees originating from the 
Haraz Mangueigne area immediately south of Zakouma, as being the main reason why they fled 
to CAR. These abuses also contributed to the departure of communities from south-eastern 
Chad, in particular Arab pastoralists, toward Sudan. Grievances related to government agents’ 
corruption are widespread among people in south-eastern Chad and carry a high potential for 
civil unrest. 

The same reports note that local communities in south-eastern Chad are confused by incoherent 
state policies. In particular, conservation efforts and laws such as the Loi 14 appear to 
contradict national governmental policies that increasingly encourage agricultural production, 
including industrial farming, especially since the recent drop in oil prices. Boosting agricultural 
production was a central theme of President Déby’s campaign for re-election in 2016. In May 
2016, shortly after his re-election, the President launched the national farming campaign, 

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encouraging people to farm more in Goz Beida, the capital of the Dar Sila region, bordering 
Salamat. Rightly or not, locals interpreted his speech as a call to clear forested land, particularly 
for mechanised farming. Similarly, government policies are encouraging both pastoralists’ 
mobility and commercial herding. Chadian government elites are said to invest large parts of 
their incomes in livestock. Some of these elite livestock are said to migrate to CAR alongside 
traditional pastoralists’ herds, and the need to secure their access to this country is believed to 
be a leading factor behind Chad sometimes destabilising policies toward its southern neighbour. 

National instability 
At the national level, Chad has been suffering in recent years from an acute economic crisis, 
with the inevitable social impact, notably on people (civilians and military) depending on 
government salaries. Together with poor governance and widespread corruption, it led to civil 
unrest episodes, and the potential for new ones remain strong. The regime and the president 
appear to be increasingly unpopular; the country’s power appears increasingly concentrated 
around President Déby and a narrow family circle around him. A confidential French government 
report, supported by a similar assessment by the USA, has speculated about the impact a 
sudden demise of Déby (whose health is rumoured to be fragile) would have on the security 
situation in Chad. The reports suggested that Déby’s departure will likely result in a power 
vacuum that would lead to inter-ethnic violence and allow jihadi groups to settle in Chad, 
necessitating an international military intervention.  

Since 2015, Chad has played a leading role in fighting the originally Nigerian jihadi group Boko 
Haram, both in Chad and outside its borders (Nigeria, Cameroon and Niger). Since then, the 
group has mutated from an armed group holding territory into a purely terrorist group, and 
multiplied revengeful terror attacks on Chadian soil, a threat that Chadian security forces have 
increasing difficulty addressing. Furthermore, there has been increasing evidence of Boko 
Haram’s capacity to recruit and operate within Chad. The French government report quoted 
above also mentioned that if there is a new instability within Chad, Boko Haram would establish 
a more substantial presence in Chad, and that ‘jihadi groups from Libya [would] settle [in Chad] 
and link with Boko Haram’.  

While the Chad-Sudan reconciliation has considerably weakened the Chadian armed opposition, 
it was not coupled with peace talks in Chad, and Chadian rebels were able to relocate from 
Darfur to other conflict areas: some currently reside in Libya (as mercenaries) and CAR (as 
members of, or mercenaries for, local rebel factions), with some individuals and factions still 
present in Sudan (notably within Khartoum-backed Janjaweed militias). A large number of these 
rebels hail from Arab communities from south-eastern Chad, where successive rebellions have 
long recruited supporters, notably because of the perceived marginalisation of local 
communities. These Chadian combatants are now benefitting from the regional instability, but 
their primary agenda remains regime change in Chad. Until now, international players operating 
in Chad, including the EU, have largely failed to engage both armed and unarmed opposition, 
and civil society, although all those actors, including the armed opposition, are open to such 
engagement. 

Regional risks 
While the Chad-Sudan reconciliation has been crucial for Chad’s recent stability, it is 
nevertheless fragile. Firstly, because it largely relies on both the presidents’ goodwill and may 
not survive the departure of either. Secondly, because Chad and Sudan are increasingly taking 
divergent positions in the region and beyond: Chad allying with General Haftar in Libya, Egypt, 
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates; Sudan supporting the successive governments in 
Tripoli, and remaining close to Qatar and Turkey. 

Another risky element for Chad is Sudan’s continued support of Arab Janjaweed militias, 
including their latest, enhanced version, branded the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The RSF and 
other Sudanese militias are led by Arabs of Chadian origin with kin in Chad, and composed of 
large numbers of Chadian combatants, including Chadian rebels, many from south-eastern 
Chad. Since their formation in 2013, many Arab youths from south-eastern Chad, either fleeing 
the lack of opportunities in Chad or attracted by the prospect of easy income or booty in Sudan, 
have crossed the border to join the RSF. They belong notably to some of the main Arab tribes in 
the Salamat region – Salamat, Hemmat, Misseriya and Awlad Rashid – all with kin in Sudan. 

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Some of the current RSF leaders and fighters do not hide the fact that, if the opportunity arose, 
notably in the event of President Déby’s death, they could come back to Chad and again spread 
violence in an attempt to take power. 

Since 2013, Sudan has also experienced particularly deadly episodes of fighting between Arab 
communities and their respective militias, all armed by Khartoum. This includes a conflict at the 
Chad-Sudan-CAR tri-border between the Salamat tribe, on one side, and the allied Hemmat and 
Misseriya communities on the other, who all live in the Salamat region as well. The Chadian 
authorities and the joint Chad-Sudan border force prevented the tensions spreading into Chad, 
but the root causes of the conflict have not been resolved and it resumed in 2017. Fears remain 
that it could, one day, pit the same communities against each other in the Salamat region. 

In addition to persistent border porosity and cross-border risks, many interviewees in both Chad 
and CAR mentioned the weak cooperation on wildlife crimes between Chad and CAR (in contrast 
with the strong cross-border nature of informal networks responsible for such activities), but 
also between Chad and Sudan. Further away from Zakouma, the same concerns also exist at 
the Chad-Cameroon border, where, paradoxically, the fight against Boko Haram appears to lead 
to an improved cooperation, at least on security issues.  

Community challenges 
Even if national and regional security problems can be, to some extent, anticipated by the 
project, their consequences can go far beyond a conservation project’s scope. However, Chad’s 
long history of armed conservation in conflict with local communities, as well as some more 
recent participatory experiences, shows that a park such as Zakouma can play a positive role in 
local co-existence between the park and the communities, and possibly even between 
communities themselves. Deputy director Babakar Matar mentioned, among the challenges, the 
need to strengthen further the “park’s ownership by the communities” and their participation in 
conservation, as well as the fight against poverty. He also mentioned some gaps in the project’s 
knowledge of local communities – that it was “insufficient because of the continuous arrival of 
newcomers” settling among local communities – and in the project’s ability to identify poachers 
and traffickers – for which reason “communities need to be involved further in intelligence 
gathering”.  

Migration 
The area and its porous borderlands with CAR and Sudan have been impacted by various 
migration episodes, some less visible than others. Within Chad, particularly since the big 
droughts of the 1970s and 1980s, there have been important waves of climate change-induced 
migration towards the south, including from the Sahel regions of Guéra, Batha and Ouaddaï 
toward Salamat and neighbouring Dar Sila. It involved sedentary farmers and nomadic 
pastoralists, the latter migrating increasingly further south and spending more time in the 
south. In some areas, these migrations have triggered conflicts between first settlers and 
newcomers, tensions that are still present today. More recently, the 2005 to 2009 proxy war 
between Chad and Sudan also pushed non-Arab people from Dar Sila toward Salamat, while the 
intra-Arab conflicts in Darfur pushed Salamat Arabs from Darfur back to south-eastern Chad 
(although more towards Dar Sila than Salamat). 

Since 2003 there have been constant cross-border, temporary and permanent, movements of 
Arabs from south-eastern Chad to Darfur, notably for recruitment by Sudanese Arab 
paramilitary forces and militias. Many came back disillusioned. Similarly, in 2013, there were 
movements of youths from Salamat to join the Seleka rebels in CAR, and since 2014, a return 
to Salamat of disillusioned ex-Seleka rebels. Many Chadians who have lived some decades in 
CAR, as well as Central Africans of Chadian origin, feel threatened by anti-Muslim persecutions 
and have also returned to Chad, including to the Salamat region. There were also refugees from 
south-eastern Chad in CAR who fled abuses by Chadian government forces.  

All these migrants have increased the pressure on the local environment by cutting wood and 
poaching bushmeat. 

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Summary 
1.  Where does wildlife trafficking trigger conflicts, fuel existing unrest or lead to 

scaled-up conflicts (from local to national/regional, international)?   

No, but conflict certainly fuelled wildlife trafficking (see below). 

2.  Where have conflicts triggered or fuelled wildlife trafficking or hampered 

conservation? 

In the past, Zakouma was an example of how armed conflict fuels wildlife trafficking and 
hampers conservation. Chadian armed insurgencies began just years after the country’s 
independence in the 1960s, and since then have succeeded each other almost continuously. 
Early rebellions fragmented but also remained a common cradle for the majority of the Chadian 
current political elite, both those in power and in opposition. As a result of this history, armed 
insurgency is still seen as the only way to reach power; ‘peace’ appears at best as short periods 
between two wars, during which each side reconstitutes its forces and resources, including, 
sometimes, through wildlife trafficking (particularly ivory). Historically, remote wildlife-rich 
areas such as Zakouma or south-eastern Chad as a whole have attracted rebellions because 
they were good places to hide and escape government control, while the proximity of borders 
allowed for the acquisition of supplies from abroad and provided escape routes in case of 
danger. Furthermore, rebels have been able to sustain themselves on bushmeat as well as by 
exploiting resources such as ivory. In some periods they also managed to establish control on 
whole parts of the region. Remote areas in Chad are inhabited by marginalised populations, 
their grievances against the state preparing them to join the rebellion. In addition, armed 
conservation rangers, historically on the side of the government and sometimes using violence 
against the population (including through forced displacements when Zakouma was created), 
also sometimes prompted locals to join armed movements, and rebels to target conservation 
projects. Even during brief periods of peace, former rebels, left jobless by ill-managed peace 
deals and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) exercises, sometimes became 
poachers, or managed to conserve guns that they then sold on to poachers. Successive wars 
generally made guns and ammunition easily available in south-eastern Chad, notably for 
pastoralists and poachers. 

3.  How is socio-economic security undermined by trafficking and poor conservation, 

both at local and national levels?  

Historically, local communities perceived Zakouma National Park rather negatively, not only 
because they had suffered from law enforcement efforts, but also because the local 
communities benefited little from conservation efforts, while they may have had more benefits 
from ivory and bushmeat poaching. Interestingly, in a context where ivory has become scarce, 
efforts by APN and the Government of Chad to involve communities in conservation have 
increased in recent years and the situation seems to have shifted toward improved relations. 

4.  How does wildlife trafficking undermine the rule of law and legitimate institutions 

(notably because of the links with corruption)?  

In the past, wildlife trafficking has undoubtedly undermined the rule of law locally, not least 
because government and security officials were themselves involved in trafficking and granted 
impunity to whole networks. However, wildlife trafficking is only one of many illegal activities 
where responsible institutions have failed to enforce the law and been affected by corruption. 

5.  How does wildlife-related insecurity (whether in term of conflict or from a socio-

economic point of view) contribute to migration flows (intra-state, inter-state, 
global)?  

As described above, Zakouma has been affected by climate-induced migration towards the 
south by sedentary farmers and nomadic pastoralists, leading to local conflict. More recently, 
Chad has received refugees from anti-Muslim persecutions in CAR, whereas CAR has seen an 
influx of refugees fleeing abuse by Chadian government forces. Old and recent migrants have 

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increased the pressure on the local environment by cutting wood and poaching bushmeat. 
Finally, the Boko Haram crisis has also forced fishermen to abandon Lake Chad, and some of 
them are said to be putting considerable pressure on the fish populations in the water bodies 
around Zakouma. 

6.  How are approaches being applied to address the wildlife-security nexus as a 

basis for development and improving security? 

APN approaches put together a long-term funding commitment with a professionalised anti-
poaching strategy and attempts to change local perceptions and build new links with 
communities in order to benefit from their support. This latter element may prove to be crucial 
if there is further degradation in the national and regional security situation. 

Suggestions for the way forward for the next 5 years 

1. Programmes/activities 

•  Continued positive engagement relative to local communities: continue and increase 

provision of education services, and envisage provision of other services/development.  

• 

Pastoralism: Increase engagement with pastoralist communities and their leaders and 
representatives. Organise regular meetings, including before and after the dry season 
migration, with representatives of sedentary communities, as well as representatives of 
Chadian authorities. Fund, in partnership with relevant national and international 
organisations, water infrastructures on the northern sections of migratory corridors 
heading toward Zakouma, as well as, where needed, the marking of corridors and the 
laying out of stationing areas, in order to slow down the movement of nomads towards 
the south.  

•  Research: Commission specific research both on local (sedentary and nomadic) 

communities and on poachers and their networks in order to better understand past 
poaching dynamics in Zakouma. 

2. Policy initiatives 

•  Crisis prevention: Anticipate future national and regional security crises, and the 

consequences they could have on the park and surrounding areas. Engage in discussions 
on these issues with the donor/diplomatic community, so that they can be ready to 
continue supporting the project, not only in the long term, but also in crisis situations. In 
addition, initiate a dialogue with representatives of local communities with diverse 
political backgrounds (politically neutral, pro-government or pro-opposition), in order to 
garner support from all sides, so that in crisis situations the project can be protected by 
those who would then have enough influence to do so (including anti-government people 
in the case pro-government contacts losing influence). 

•  Updating and harmonising laws: initiate and support a review of existing wildlife laws, 
with recommendations for new, updated laws, harmonised with other existing laws. 
Engage with government officials, organisations and experts involved in similar exercises 
to draft and update other existing laws, including land laws and pastoral codes, to 
encourage harmonisation of these laws and wildlife laws. 

•  Strengthen criminal justice responses: Initiate and support mechanisms and 

organisations, such as the Eagle Network, to ensure offenders are tried and punished 
with fair but stricter and enforced sentences. Sensitise and train the judiciary on wildlife 
crime issues. 

•  Engage with communities in order to strengthen local support to prevent and deter 

abuse.  

•  Cross-border issues and cooperation: Organise regular meetings, including before and 

after the dry season migration, between representatives and leaders of Chadian nomadic 
communities and those of CAR’s sedentary communities. Organise visits by northern CAR 
community representatives to projects for pastoralists in Chad. Formalise and enhance 
the exchange of information and discuss possible cooperation and coordinated activities 

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with conservation projects in northern CAR. Promote cooperation on conservation and 
fighting wildlife crime between Chad and CAR’s governments (even if the latter now has 
little control on northern CAR), and encourage them to harmonise their relevant national 
laws. In the longer term, a Chad-CAR cooperation on conservation, given the importance 
of protected areas in the borderlands between both countries, could help, rather than one 
alternately pushing its insecurity toward the other, so as to stabilise both synergistically. 

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Case study 8. WAP/Arly National Park Landscape (Burkina Faso-Benin-Niger) 

Site name and location: WAP complex, Burkina Faso-Benin-Niger 

Introduction 
The W-Arly-Pendjari (WAP) complex is a vast area of 35 000 km2 (3.5 million hectares) covering 
the shared border area between Burkina Faso, Benin and Niger. It includes 5 national parks and 
16 hunting areas with various statutes and legislation. This vast ensemble contains a multitude 
of animal species belonging to the Sudano-Sahelian domain, including nearly 9 000 elephants, 
which make up more than 75 % of the savannah elephant population of West Africa. The WAP 
complex is also home to lion, cheetah, leopard, buffalo, hippo, 10 species of antelope and 3 
species of monkey. It also contains 460 species of birds, 115 species of fish and many species 
of reptiles and amphibians, as well as 515 species of plants. The Niger part of the W National 
Park in Niger was classified as a World Heritage Site in 1996, the 3 W parks were classified as 
the first Trans-border Biosphere Reserve in 2002 and, since 2017, the whole complex has been 
classified as a World Heritage Site. 

The wildlife populations of a suite of large mammal species are increasing, despite the pressures 
of significant poaching in 2013, 2014 and 2015, particularly in Arly Park and its neighbouring 
protected areas. 

To inform this case study analysis, interviews were carried out with a series of key informants 
during a 2-week mission to Benin and Burkina Faso, along with a literature review and several 
remote interviews. Those interviewed included judicial authorities (prosecutors, judges) in 
several towns bordering Pendjari and W in Benin (Parakou, Kandi, Natitingou), the managers of 
Benin and Pendjari, Beninese civil society, officials of the National Agency of Heritage and 
Tourism in Benin, the US Embassy in Benin, central officials of the ministries in charge of parks 
in Benin and Burkina Faso, Sebastien Regnaut of IUCN and Philippe Bouché, an expert from 
MIKE who has actively worked in the WAP for 20 years, and senior staff of African Parks 
Network. 

Note: This case study has been updated after the field study and analysis, to reflect 
recent changes in the security situation. 

Key wildlife/security issues identified at this site 
Poaching increased in 2013 and 2014 with a peak of poaching in 2015 in Burkina Faso. During 
this period there was also growing banditry acts in the region, against which the Burkinabe 
people organised themselves with a defence and policing response. The road bandits took 
hostages for ransom and even killed villagers. In response, the local communities have revived 
the traditional village police, called Kolgwéogos. In 2015, road bandits who were arrested in 
Nadiagou at the Benin-Burkina border also proved to be elephant poachers. Some radical 
Islamist-type propaganda leaflets also seem to have been found on these poachers. A gang of 
road bandits who killed 16 people were also reported to be involved in the killing of 43 
elephants, as mentioned in several media reports7. 

It was reported in Jeune Afrique, that in 2015, a new jihadist cell was planning to use part of 
Park W as a rear base but this was halted before it could materialise. Park W is still under a red-
no-go zone, according to the French Government, whereas the US Government reclassed the 
zone to green in 2017. According to Jeune Afrique: ‘We received information that jihadists were 
planning to take foreigners’8 indicated a diplomatic source. Straddling Burkina Faso, Niger and 
Benin, this area is attractive to tourists. Road bandits have surrounded this area for a long time, 
but it is only in recent times that other armed men have been detected: ‘The bandits are 

7 http://www.lobservateur.bf/index.php/societe/item/3592-grand-banditisme-un-reseau-a-dessein-apocalyptique-
demantele 
8 http://www.jeuneafrique.com/mag/288180/politique/securite-parc-w-ligne-de-mire/) 

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connected to jihadist groups in Northern Mali’, indicated a Nigerien security source. In mid-
November, Nigerien forces arrested 7 men in contact with Peuls around Tillabéri (north of 
Niamey) who had joined the ranks of the Mouvement pour l’unicité et le jihad en Afrique de 
l’Ouest (Mujao) in 2012. At the time this group was occupying a part of Northern Mali and 
controlling the city of Gao. They wanted to make the park their sanctuary and take foreign 
tourists for the benefit of the terrorist groups, indicates our source. This information was 
confirmed by the security attachés of two embassies.  

The situation changed in 2018 with a series of attacks by armed groups from the north of 
Burkina and Mali. Arly National Park and its neighbouring hunting areas were rapidly targeted 
by armed groups who managed to destroy 3 hunting camps, several bases used by security 
forces and government officials, attacked the park’s accommodation base and put the army 
under pressure. The park and its periphery have since become a refuge for groups described as 
terrorists and jihadists, but including bandits and traffickers of various goods, including gold. 
Park rangers as well as those who run hunting concession around its periphery have had to 
leave the zone. A number of rangers, trackers and informers have been killed and villages have 
been targeted.  

Military missions organised in and around Arly at the start of 2019 seemed to have pushed back 
against the armed groups, but the latter rapidly regained ground. The military finally set up 
around 10 bases around Arly but without managing to retake the central area.  

The Burkina part of W Park used to be popular with tourists but had long been targeted by road 
bandits. Already in 2015, it caught the interest of a jihadist group that intended to target 
tourists, but the plot was foiled by security services. Since early 2018, Burkina W has also been 
threatened by armed groups but to a lesser extent than Arly, and ranger patrols have been 
maintained. 

Another important and persistent threat for many years has been transborder transhumance 
pastoralism. Official transhumance corridors cross the parks of the WAP area but are often not 
respected, especially in the W area and on its borders. In addition, the growing need for land for 
agricultural production (including cotton) is increasing pressure on local people to seek 
cultivation areas in the WAP. The limits of Park W Benin are being violated and chipped away in 
the enclaves in Burkina Faso (Kondio, Samboali, Pama, and Tindangou) and the Tamou area in 
Niger. Buffer zones no longer exist in practice except where there are still some village hunting 
zones, but these are often in poor condition and not at all or poorly monitored. 

Security risks to those involved in wildlife protection 
Several skirmishes have taken place in Park W Benin and W Niger between armed Nigerian 
poachers and teams providing the security and protection of the W (including a mix of soldiers, 
park agents and armed police). For a time, the Governments of Niger and Benin put sufficient 
military means in place to deter and effectively fight against the poachers. Some were 
sentenced to 10 years in prison; others died in the W. 

In Pendjari Park in Benin, 2 French tourists were kidnapped and their guard killed in May 2019. 
In the subsequent rescue mission undertaken by French special forces, 2 French soldiers died, 
while the tourists were freed. 

In Burkina Faso, since early 2019, the W, Arly and almost the entire country have been 
classified as red zones. As noted above, a number of rangers, trackers and informers around 
Arly have been killed since 2018 and park staff, as well as operators of hunting concessions 
around the park’s periphery, have had to leave the area. 

The transhumance in the park may also be a threat, although currently there have been no 
security clashes with transhumance pastoralists. It should be noted that transhumants crossing 
the WAP are generally not armed. 

Gold panning has been developing in recent years in the Tindangou area.  Burkina Faso is the 
fourth largest gold producing country. 

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Management approaches applied to address these issues/threats 
The different countries and types of zones (parks or hunting areas) of the WAP complex are 
affected by different laws and statutes. There are, however, quite similar approaches and 
contexts. 

Border control is a very important factor as cross-border poachers appear to be the most 
dangerous, especially from Nigeria. In the part adjacent to Nigeria there is currently not a 
significant threat of arrest and even less potential for judicial procedures against poachers and 
traffickers.  

Until the recent decline in the security situation, the sound management of hunting areas had 
shown positive results in terms of wildlife population growth in some areas, particularly around 
Arly National Park where hunting areas generally record the higher densities of large wildlife 
throughout the WAP. The three countries use the army to secure the parks, and for some time 
this had been positive for both human and wildlife security. 

In Benin, the Specialised Border Monitoring Units9 are also very useful, and work in 
collaboration with not only communities, national parks and the military, but also with 
embassies, including that of the USA. The ‘Interforce’ that supports Park W is made up of 
soldiers, water and forest officers, and armed police. In total, 57 teams of 6 people are 
operational. 

Also in Benin, African Parks Network has a partnership with the Government for the 
management of Pendjari National Park. Following the kidnapping in Pendjari in May 2019, the 
government reacted rapidly to strengthen security by sending a hundred soldiers to Pendjari, to 
add to the hundred rangers employed by African Parks. W will probably be included in the 
partnership in the near future.  

Finally, the creation of the National Agency for the Promotion of Heritage and Tourism 
Development (ANPT in French) and its programme dedicated to national parks and wildlife is 
positive (the agency has significant human and financial resources mobilised). The National 
Centre for the Management of Wildlife Reserves (CENAGREF in French), whose management 
and conservation results were debatable, seems to be losing importance with the developing 
strength of the ANPT and African Parks Network in the area.  

The Benin Government has asked APN to set up a Special Brigade for the two national parks of 
the north (Pendjari and W Benin). Contacts have also been initiated between Burkina Faso and 
Benin to discuss the potential interest to establish joint management with APN.  

In Burkina, the Arly National Park is managed by the OFINAP (National Office of Protected 
Areas), while the W Burkina National Park is managed directly by the Wildlife Department. The 
traditional Kolgwéogos have also played an important role since 2015. The army supports the 
Water and Forests department when needed. 

In Niger, a joint command unit of forest officers, national guards and armed police is 
operational in Say. A forestry post located in Perelegou, south of W Niger, seems more effective 
in the fight against poaching by Nigerian poachers because of its strategic geographical position. 
Given the tourist and recreational interest in the W Niger Park, security in this park is 
particularly important and has been reinforced by these measures. 

In terms of hunting zones, the system of private management, mainly provided by nationals in 
Burkina Faso, seems more efficient than in Benin, which has resulted in generally higher wildlife 
densities. However, the level of local participation in management seems better developed in 
Benin. In W Niger, the system of paying revenue to town halls with the Park Warden as a 
member of the municipal council is also positive even if the revenues are low. 

9 www.abegief.org 

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An audit of Interforce is planned in Benin to evaluate its results, especially at the level of the W 
park where Interforce has been more active.  

The support and collaboration of African Parks Network and other professional organisations 
should be useful in Pendjari and W in Benin, and in Arly in Burkina Faso. 

The efforts to control the borders with the Unité Spéciale de Surveillance des Frontières (USSF), 
tourism development and participatory management, and support from the military and 
external partners including APN, should be encouraged. The same is true for the development of 
intelligence and anti-trafficking systems in and around the complex. These strategic points must 
ensure long-term security. 

 Summary 
1.  Where does wildlife trafficking trigger conflicts, fuel existing unrest or lead to 

scaled-up conflicts (from local to national/regional, international)?  

In Burkina Faso, the example of road bandits involved in killings and ivory trafficking clearly 
shows the links existing between human security and protection of wildlife. Similarly, the case 
of Islamists who killed between 50 and 80 elephants in 2015 in Gourma in Mali is worrying 
because it confirms another case where radical elements collect and traffic ivory, along with any 
other lucrative traffic. As the situation in Arly demonstrates, protected areas, if they are not 
secured, can constitute bases for criminal networks, terrorists and traffickers. 

Poachers from Nigeria that enter the W Park are also a threat that could be limited by the 
efforts of the Beninese and Nigerian armies. 

2.  Where have conflicts triggered or fuelled wildlife trafficking or hampered 

conservation? 

In early 2019, criminal and terrorist groups were effectively in control of Arly National Park in 
Burkina Faso, and the army had failed to repel them. Conservation activities are severely 
hampered and, at the time of printing (July 2019), the entire area was in the red zone. The May 
2019 kidnapping of tourists and killing of their guard in Pendjari, Benin, and the subsequent 
deaths of 2 French soldiers, extended the threat to Benin. 

For some time, the presence of jihadist Al-Mourabitoun group had been known in the region for 
its involvement in various types of trafficking, including cigarettes, drugs, gold and ivory. They 
had been active mainly in Mali but also in Burkina Faso, Niger and Libya. The group was 
responsible for attacks in Bamako on 7 March and 20 November 2015, in Ouagadougou on 15 
January 2016 and in Grand Bassam on 13 March 2016. 

3.  How is socio-economic security undermined by trafficking and poor conservation, 

both at local and national levels?  

The ranking of the parks and their neighbouring hunting zones as a red zone inevitably has a 
negative influence on the socio-economic security of this area, as tourism is effectively closed.  

4.  How does wildlife trafficking undermine the rule of law and legitimate institutions 

(notably because of the links with corruption)?  

Beninese President Patrice Talon has clearly strengthened the rule of law and put forward the 
sustainable development, protection and upgrading of Benin's national parks. While corruption 
related to wildlife trafficking was historically common and went unpunished, it is being fought 
with great force and rigor in Benin since the election of President Talon and the establishment of 
the new Government. This is clearly demonstrated by the AALF-Benin project, developed by the 
NGO Nature Tropicale, a member of the EAGLE network. It is hoped that this dynamic will be 
shared in Burkina Faso and Niger, where the number of convicted wildlife traffickers remains 
low, but where efforts have been made, including by militarising anti-poaching operations. A 

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meeting initiated between concerned ministers of Benin, Niger and Burkina and specific to the 
WAP complex organised in January 2017 in Cotonou takes this forward. 

5.  How does wildlife-related insecurity (whether in term of conflict or from a socio-

economic point of view) contribute to migration flows (intra-state, inter-state, 
global)?  

The human migration in this area does not seem to be related to wildlife and its protection.  
However by providing sustainable economic opportunities and security in the WAP area there is 
an improved incentive for local communities not to migrate. 

Suggestions for the way forward for the next 5 years 

1. Programmes/activities 
The efforts made by the wildlife and security authorities need to be supported, funded and 
strengthened. These include the strengthening of borders with specialised border monitoring 
units, army support and the organisation of joint patrols, support from external partners such 
as the APN, tourism development and the participatory management, as well as the 
development of intelligence systems in and around the complex. The collaboration with the 
Kolgwéogos is to be envisaged but attention needs to be paid to their legal status and sound 
management.  

The programmes of Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) development and 
those aimed at mitigating and adapting to climate change in the zone have contributed to 
effective management; coordination of efforts is critical in this vast area where many projects 
are developed by various organisations. Government efforts to combat organised crime and 
terrorism must be integrated and supported. These strategic points will ensure better long-term 
security and protection of the complex and its surroundings. The development of strategies and 
collaborations with livestock management projects will be necessary, notably to ensure that 
transhumance pastoralist corridors are respected. 

2. Policy initiatives 
The wildlife laws in Benin, Burkina Faso and Niger are quite strong but their application needs to 
be strengthened. This requires strong political will and action from the highest levels, as 
embodied by the Beninese President Talon. 

Ministers in charge of Protected Areas, Fishery Resources and Tourism of Benin, Burkina and 
Niger have met to discuss harmonising their approaches in terms of protection, security and 
valorisation of the biodiversity of the W-Arly-Pendjari Complex. This must obviously be 
strengthened, as only concerted and coordinated efforts will have a lasting impact and ensure 
stability in the area. 

It is also important to note that in 1980 the three states signed a harmonised anti-poaching 
agreement, allowing the eco-guards of each country to pursue poachers across the border. 
These types of mechanisms should be further explored, designed and operationalised. 

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Case study 9. Virunga National Park Landscape (DRC) 

Site name and location: Virunga National Park (VNP), North-Kivu, eastern Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) 

Introduction 
The Virunga National Park is an area of 7 800 km2 that includes forest, savannah, lava plains, 
swamp, eroded valleys, active volcanoes and the Rwenzori mountains. Belgian King Albert I 
established the park in 1925, and it has been listed as a UNESCO World Heritage since 1979. 
Since 1994 it has been added to the list of World Heritages in Danger. The park can largely be 
described in three zones. The northern zone is characterised by the Rwenzori mountains, the 
central zone covers the area around Lake Edward, renowned for its rich biodiversity, and the 
southern sector is known for its volcanoes and mountain gorillas.   

Mountain gorillas are one of the park’s key species. Thanks to concerted protection efforts, the 
total population of mountain gorillas has increased from 620 individuals in 1989 to around 880 
individuals today. About 480 of them live in the Virunga mountains, located in the Rwanda-
Uganda-DRC border area. Poaching has reduced the number of elephant from some 3 000 in 
the 1960s to less than an estimated 300 today. The population, however, is contiguous with the 
Queen Elizabeth National Park, which had an estimated population of 2 913 elephants in 2014. 
Therefore part of the elephant populations moves across the borders with Uganda. The 
hippopotamus population of VNP also experienced a sharp decrease due to poaching and habitat 
loss as a consequence of human activity. While it numbered 27 000 individuals in the 1990s, 
surveys estimated only 350 in 2005. The surveys from 2016, however, estimated some 2 500 
hippos in the park. ICCN and WCS10 indicate this increase is the result of more enforcement in 
the VNP section around Lake Edward, and improved collaboration with fishermen in both 
Uganda and DRC. Poaching for local consumption and the commercialisation of bushmeat 
continues (such as antelope, buffalo, warthog) for both armed groups hiding in the park and 
local markets. Currently, the main threat to the park’s habitat consists of illegal logging, both 
for charcoal and timber. Between 2001 and 2014 the park has lost an estimated 
23 200 hectares11 of forest cover. 

A field mission to Virunga was conducted in September 2017. Consultations with 17 
interviewees took place through semi-structured interviews, during a week-long visit to North 
Kivu, including Goma, Virunga National Park and some localities in Rutshuru territory. Two more 
interviews took place via telephone. The respondents included a VNP staff member, a Congolese 
consultant, MONUSCO staff, Congolese civil society representatives, traditional authorities, a 
provincial Member of Parliament, an international observer and a representative from an 
international NGO. Reports and papers were also consulted and members of the team have 
visited the VNP area at various times in recent years in other capacities.   

Key wildlife/security issues identified at this site 
The 1990s were a turbulent decade for the DRC. Multiple dramatic events created a highly 
unstable situation, which still persists today in eastern DRC. The Rwandan genocide (1994), the 
subsequent influx of almost 1 million Rwandan refugees in the DRC, the successive Congo Wars 
(1996-1997 and 1998-2003), the Kivu conflict (2004-2013) and continued insurgencies have 
disrupted, and continue to disrupt, eastern DRC. These events have also had great negative 
impact on Virunga National Park, as the influx of Rwandan refugees has increased demographic 
pressure in the area around the VNP, various conflict actors operate(d) in and around the park, 
and the conflicts have weakened local institutions even further.   

Several armed groups have passed through, or operated in, North Kivu and have exploited 
some of the resources of the park. Often these groups were originally looking for shelter, but 
soon understood and exploited the potential revenues offered by the VNP’s natural resources. 

10 http://www.newswise.com/articles/after-a-long-demise-due-to-poaching-virunga-s-hippos-
climbing-back 
11 http://www.justicepaix.be/Parc-des-Virunga-entre-preservation-de-la-nature-et-
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These rebel groups include: the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo 
(AFDL); the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD) – which also in turn triggered 
the creation of ‘community based’ self-defence groups (called Mai Mai); the Congrès national 
pour la défense du people (CNDP); and Mouvement du 23 Mars (M23). Today, three main 
groupings exist: the Forces démocratiques pour la libération du Rwanda (FDLR) in the south of 
the Park, Mai Mai militias in the centre and Ugandan Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in the 
north. In all, an estimated 3 000 militias live in or immediately around Virunga National Park, 
and all have been accused of atrocities against the civilian population. Militias have killed about 
160 park rangers since 1996. 

Insecurity 
Eastern DRC, and North Kivu in particular, is plagued by a wide range of issues (armed conflict, 
a wide range of armed groups, banditry and political instability) that seriously affect human 
physical and socio-economic security. These high levels of insecurity negatively impact people’s 
livelihoods and push many to opt for quick cash through the exploitation of the park’s 
resources. 

Banditry – kidnapping  
For many years North Kivu has been plagued by robberies along the province’s roads, which is 
an important obstacle for local trade and local economic development. During the last 1 or 2 
years however, a new phenomenon has created high levels of anxiety among local populations. 
Armed groups residing in the park (bandits as well as rebels) have discovered kidnapping, both 
locals and foreigners, as an important source of revenue. It has a huge impact on socio-
economic life, for example decreasing agricultural production because people are afraid to go to 
their fields. People perceive this threat being heavily linked to the park, as these armed men 
leave their locations in the park to pillage and/or abduct people, and hide again in the bush 
afterwards. Besides bandits and armed rebellions (e.g. FDLR and Nyatura), people also report 
that some regular army soldiers (Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo, 
FARDC) are complicit as kidnapping also occurs near their checkpoints.  

Rebel groups 
Armed groups have been a threat to the park since the 1990s, directly by exploiting the park’s 
resources, and indirectly by creating insecurity and undermining the rule of law. Most of the 
groups mentioned above are no longer operational. Nevertheless, even today a wide range of 
armed groups remain highly active in the Kivu provinces, as well as in the Virunga National Park 
and its surroundings. Many of these groups came into existence as self-defence groups against 
the threat from Rwandan armed groups such as RCD, CNDP, FDLR and M23. Over time, they 
have, however, also developed rent-seeking actions, and all of them are serious sources of 
insecurity for local populations. 

The MONUSCO (United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo) allegedly estimates that there are between 5 000 and 8 000 combatants in North 
Kivu, of whom an estimated 3 000 operate around Lake Edward, often in well-organised armed 
groups. These groups have been heavily armed, for example during their fight against M23. The 
M23 was defeated in late 2013 by a UN-backed FARDC offensive, but local armed groups had 
increased efforts in the previous months to arm themselves against the Kinyarwanda-speaking 
M23. They remain active and well-armed and have profited from a number of defections from 
the army after numerous failed integration processes of armed rebellions. Some of them are 
also known to be active in intelligence gathering, including through bribing local FARDC officers. 

Currently, some of the most notorious groups are: 

•  Mai Mai Charles:  a relatively new armed group composed of former rebels, based south 
of Lake Edward. Over time, its commander ‘Charles’ has come to be perceived as a 
defender of the Nande people’s interests in this part of North Kivu. The Mai Mai appear to 
have acquired this status by supporting and providing protection to peoples’ (illegal) 
livelihood activities. They are currently involved in poaching and illegal logging and 
provide a protection racket for illegal fishing on Lake Edward. 

•  Allied Democratic Forces (ADF): a Ugandan Islamist armed group that settled in the DRC 
more than two decades ago. The ADF are based in Beni territory, on the northern side of 

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VNP, where a resurgence of violence since 2013 is often attributed to them. Some 
ambiguity exists about this group. They are often said to be linked to the illegal 
exploitation of timber. 

• 

Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda (FDLR): The remainder of the 
Rwandan Hutu Rebel group, including some of those involved in the genocide of 1994. 
After more than two decades in the country, the movement has also become more 
anchored in eastern DRC. In the past, the FDLR have been known to profit from gold 
exploitation in the province, while currently one of its most stable sources of income is its 
involvement in illegal charcoal production12. 

•  Armed groups under the umbrella term ‘Nyatura’: Many of them have their roots in local 
conflicts over land and local political power, and/or have been established as a response 
to perceived threats posed by CNDP and M23. 

FARDC 
Another driver for insecurity and illegal exploitation of natural resources in eastern DRC is the 
role of the Congolese national army (FARDC). FARDC elements are notorious for levying illegal 
taxes at roadblocks all over eastern DRC. Around Virunga they levy taxes on actors involved in 
charcoal trade. Even though it usually only concerns small amounts of money, often no more 
than slightly over USD 113 per bag of charcoal, these elements implicitly authorise the illegal 
trade of natural resources and form part of a network of corruption. In addition to the army, the 
DRC Government’s intelligence services, customs, etc. levy (illegal) taxes on the 
transport/exploitation of wildlife products and other natural resources. Illegal taxation is a 
practice that is quite common all over DRC – and covers many activities and streams including 
the exploitation of natural resources. The pervasive corruption actions of these actors contribute 
to the persistence of this exploitation and trade. Besides rent seeking, these elements, as well 
as other state officials, appear to allow illegal wildlife and timber trade out of fear, as they are 
afraid to run into trouble with certain armed group actors (e.g. FDLR). 

In addition to the illegal taxation at roadblocks, the FARDC has also been implicated in illegal 
trade and opportunistic alliances with armed groups. There are, for example, some alleged 
cases of military trucks being used to transport bags of charcoal, which has led some people to 
refer to FARDC as ‘an army of business men’. There is also a well-known case of a military 
commander alleged to be involved in direct support to ADF in the park area14. The FARDC has 
also been reported to be involved in ivory trafficking. For example in 2014, a local NGO reported 
it had discovered three elephant carcasses with their tusks missing15, in the middle of an area 
heavily controlled by FARDC units who had been deployed there to protect petroleum 
exploration activities. 

Inter-community tensions 
Inter-community tensions are also a historically important source of conflict in the VNP area. For 
example, Hutu (mostly living in the south of the province) versus Nande (mostly living in the 
north); and people who consider themselves indigenous as opposed to Kinyarwanda-speakers. 
These tensions are often triggered by competition over access to resources, and most 
commonly arable land. The area around the VNP has a high population density, which results in 
a shortage of land. These tensions are often exploited by politicians and local customary chiefs 
in order to strengthen their popularity and power. Armed groups are also involved in the 
perpetuation of these tensions as they portray themselves as the defenders of particular 
communities’ interests. 

Tensions between the park and local communities 
Despite the armed group-related issues mentioned above, the main long-term challenge for the 
park’s survival may be its coexistence with surrounding communities. The park has a 650 km-
long boundary, and about 4 million people live within a day’s walk of the park. The local 

12 See http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2017/672/Rev.1 
13 Ibid. 
14 See https://www.radiookapi.net/lu-sur-le-web/un-rapport-met-en-cause-un-general-dans-des-tueries-en-rdc 
15 See https://www.radiookapi.net/environnement/2014/05/29/parc-des-virunga-une-ong-soupconne-
empoisonnement-delephants-nyakakoma/#.U44PMXbbio3 

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communities’ perceptions of the park and their relationship with it are influenced by various 
factors. 

Livelihood strategies 
Many people have developed livelihoods strategies that largely depend on the park’s resources, 
including wood, fishing, bushmeat and arable land16. The park’s law enforcement efforts directly 
affect these livelihood strategies. On the other hand, some livelihood strategies, such as fishing, 
also depend on VNP’s health and its effective conservation. 

Communities’ links with armed groups 
As mentioned above, many of the armed groups around Virunga were founded as self-defence 
groups and are linked to particular communities. Communities seek alliances and protection 
from armed groups when they feel their livelihood strategies are being threatened by an 
authority, including the Virunga National Park. In several cases it can be hard to distinguish 
civilians from armed group members, especially when it concerns Mai Mai groups (self-defence 
groups). This confusion creates distrust among park rangers towards neighbouring 
communities, which has been reported to lead to some incidents of harsh behaviour by the 
rangers. 

Historical claims and social exclusion 
Another dimension regarding the illegal exploitation of the park’s resources by local 
communities is based on the recognition that these communities feel excluded from certain 
decision-making processes and that they are victims of social injustice. Several authors of 
recent papers (e.g. Verwijen and Marijnen17 and Hochleithner18) have suggested that people 
silently revolt against the park by cultivating, fishing and logging on its territory, whereas VNP 
management, various international donors and other experts tend to interpret this behaviour as 
being driven by poverty and scarcity.  

Exploitation of the park’s resources 
Deforestation 
Illegal logging activities, for both charcoal and timber, are a key threat to the Virunga National 
Park. Between 2001 and 2014 the park lost an estimated 23,200 hectares of trees19. Hardwood 
timber production reportedly especially takes place at the northern end of the park, in northeast 
Beni territory around Mayangose and the Mbau-Kamango road, which runs through the park. 
Both ADF rebels, as well as various FARDC units have been known to be involved in the illegal 
timber trade for over a decade, by logging themselves as well as levying illegal taxes on actors 
within the supply chain – e.g. USD 300 per chainsaw per year. These activities appear to have 
decreased in recent years, as increasing levels of insecurity around Beni have kept people from 
going into the bush. 

Charcoal production is probably the most notorious form of resource exploitation in Virunga NP 
area. The demand for charcoal is high in neighbouring communities, and most importantly in 
Goma, a town with over 1 million inhabitants. According to study by WWF, 97 % of the 
population depends on charcoal for their energy needs, and an estimated 60 % to 80 % of 
these needs are met with resources from VNP20. Charcoal from Virunga is the preferred choice 
for many, as it is produced from old trees that are very dense. The 3 million inhabitants of 
North Kivu province represent a consumption demand of 1,780,000 tonnes or 3 million cubic 

16 See http://awsassets.panda.org/downloads/the_economic_value_of_virunga_national_park_lr_2.pdf (fishing) and 
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/meas_cons_conf_virunga.pdf (arable land) 
17 http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03066150.2016.1203307 
18 http://www.conservationandsociety.org/article.asp?issn=0972-
4923;year=2017;volume=15;issue=1;spage=100;epage=110;aulast=Hochleithner 
19 http://www.justicepaix.be/Parc-des-Virunga-entre-preservation-de-la-nature-et-developpement-des 
20 https://afrique.lalibre.be/10374/rdc-les-charbonniers-en-premiere-ligne-pour-la-defense-du-parc-des-virunga/ 

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metres of wood annually21. Four-fifths of this quantity is reportedly consumed in Goma, 
representing a total annual value of more than USD 28 million22.  

Both FDLR and Nyatura rebels control charcoal production at various sites inside the park’s 
property. FARDC’s involvement is usually a bit further down the supply chain, at the boundaries 
of the park, where they levy taxes on all passers-by. 

Poaching 
The population numbers of several some priority species are increasing in Virunga23, such as 
those of mountain gorillas and hippopotamus, while others continue to decline, including 
elephants and buffalo. Poaching for consumption of bushmeat continues, e.g. antelope, buffalo 
and warthog. Furthermore, there are reports of poaching and trafficking of ivory, wildlife skins 
and juvenile animals (e.g. chimpanzees) via the Bunagana and Ishasha border posts. In 2015, 
16 elephants were reportedly poached in VNP24, from an already very small population (less 
than a couple of hundred). 

Oil exploration 
The Congolese Government has divided parts of VNP into oil blocks, which had been acquired 
for exploration by French oil company Total and London-headquartered company Soco 
International.  This is in direct violation of Congolese law, which, under Article 215 of the 
Constitution, recognises international laws and conventions such as the World Heritage 
Convention. This particular convention decrees that mining and oil production in the national 
parks is prohibited. Following international protest, in June 2013 Total pledged not to exploit oil 
within the park’s boundaries. Soco International pulled out of Virunga a year later, after 
denunciations by among others WWF, the British Government and UNESCO. In the meantime, 
many accusations had been made about bribery, including payments to army officers and 
rebels25. This includes claims by the NGO Global Witness that Soco had paid a Congolese 
military officer who has been accused of brutally silencing opponents of oil exploration in VNP.26 
Furthermore, in 2014 a local NGO reported that three elephant that had been poached for their 
tusks, in the middle of an area heavily controlled by FARDC units who had been deployed to 
protect petroleum exploration activities.27 

Moreover, Soco has been accused of trying to gain support of local politicians and populations 
through campaigns that promise extremely high levels of benefits to local communities.28 This 
creation of false expectations and high hopes in a volatile security and political context of North 
Kivu, risks contributing to increasing tensions on the ground. Soco’s withdrawal has not ended 
the threat of oil exploration in the park. The Congolese Government is still looking into the 
option of exploiting oil in the area, and is negotiating a deal to reassign Soco’s permit to Oil 
Quest International, a subsidiary of Oil Quest Holdings. According to Congolese law, mining and 
oil production in the national parks is prohibited. Nevertheless, some have argued that the 
Congolese Government’s efforts to get a better idea of the park’s estimated oil reserves are 
legitimate. Many observers are however concerned as members of DRC government have been 
reputed to sign contracts in exchange for attractive commissions.29 It can be questioned as to 
what extent such authorities will make a well-considered decision in weighing the balance of 
benefits of protecting VNP versus the quick cash benefits of oil income. 

21 https://www.wwf.org.uk/updates/economic-value-virunga-national-park 
22 http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03066150.2016.1203307 
23 http://whc.unesco.org/en/documents/157910 
24 http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2016/1102 
25 http://www.investigativecollective.com/machineguns-in-the-mist/ 
26 https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/democratic-republic-congo/soco-in-virunga/ 
27 https://www.radiookapi.net/environnement/2014/05/29/parc-des-virunga-une-ong-soupconne-empoisonnement-
delephants-nyakakoma/#.U44PMXbbio3 
28 http://www.pole-institute.org/publications/d%C3%A9sir-de-conserver-et-n%C3%A9cessit%C3%A9-de-survivre-cas-
des-terres-du-domaine-de-chasse-de 
29 Ibid. 

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Agriculture 
The high population density in the area surrounding the park – 300 inhabitants/km2 compared 
to 37 inhabitants/km2 in parts of the rest of the country30 – has created great pressure on 
arable land. Consequently, access to land is an import source of conflict between communities 
around the park and with the VNP management. Since the 1990s, local armed groups (e.g. 
PARECO31) arose from these local rivalries, leading to more communal violence. These conflicts 
involve inter-ethnic tensions, as well as local strongmen, which is well illustrated by the 
Kahunga case32. The BaNande-led Syndicat Alliance Paysanne (SAP) has mobilised farmers to 
cultivate in the Kahunga area, in a hunting reserve, while a Hutu customary chief of Bwisha 
blames SAP for importing people of the Nande-community into his territory.  

Furthermore, the pressure on land drives many people to look for arable land in the park. 
Encroachment into the park is further fuelled by a lack of clarity concerning the park’s limits and 
communities challenging the VNP’s legitimacy. Moreover, diverging points of view between 
different authorities, an illustration of the poor levels of governance, also contribute to this 
phenomenon. An example is the same case of Kahunga, where the customary authority and a 
syndicate promote agriculture in the park, while the park authority ICCN (Institut Congolais 
pour le Conservation de la Nature) prohibits it. These ‘diverging points of view’ can also be well-
considered strategies to undermine the park’s legitimacy33 and authority. As suggested above, 
some authors have suggested that cultivating the park’s property may represent a means of 
silent revolt. Supporting the redistribution of land within the park by traditional authorities 
represents another method for some local stakeholders to question VNP’s acts, and/or even its 
legitimacy. These actors usually have limited access to debates and decision-making processes.  

Finally, various armed groups have established protection rackets to allow people to continue 
cultivating their farmland on the park’s property, including FDLR and Mai Charles. Agriculture is 
not perceived to be the cash cow of these armed groups, but it can give them legitimacy in the 
eyes of local communities and a perception that they are supporting local community interests. 

Illegal fishing 
In the Lake Edward area, the livelihoods of many households (an estimated 50 000 people) 
depend on fishing. The lake produces an estimated 15 000 tonnes of fish per year34, 
representing an estimated USD 30 million/year industry. These fishermen are not very well 
monitored, which leads to overfishing and the use of harmful fishing techniques. Furthermore, 
the fishing areas are expanding, giving rise to an entire economy around it, which further 
threatens the park. Both Mai Charles as well as elements of the Congolese army’s naval forces 
have provided protection to illegal fishermen on Lake Edward, against rules and regulations on 
fishing. Both actors levy illegal taxes in return. The UN Group of Experts even reported in 2016 
that it has become the primary reason for the existence of this armed group. 

Security risks to those involved in wildlife protection 
The high levels of insecurity that affect North Kivu inevitably affect the security situation of 
people working in and around Virunga. Moreover, the competing interests linked to the various 
elements discussed above have turned those involved in wildlife protection into direct targets of 
violence. 

Insecure working environment  
People involved in wildlife protection and community-based activities operate in a very insecure 
environment, with particular threats to these individuals’ physical security from armed groups, 
banditry and kidnappings. 

30 http://www.justicepaix.be/Parc-des-Virunga-entre-preservation-de-la-nature-et-developpement-des 
31 http://riftvalley.net/publication/pareco#.WhLdKLSdW-o 
32 http://congoresearchgroup.org/trouble-in-virunga-the-challenges-of-conservation-amidst-conflict-violence-and-
poverty/ 
33 http://www.conservationandsociety.org/article.asp?issn=0972-
4923;year=2017;volume=15;issue=1;spage=100;epage=110;aulast=Hochleithner 
34 https://www.wwf.org.uk/updates/economic-value-virunga-national-park 

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Attacks against park staff 
For various actors, park rangers have become yet another armed actor defending an interest 
that threatens their own interest. Consequently, park guards have become a direct target. In 
the recent past several rebel groups have attacked different sectors of the park (the south and 
west coasts of Lake Edward, the northern and southern sectors of Rutshuru). Five ICCN guards 
were killed in 2016. In 2017, armed groups attacked different parts of the park and rangers 
positions, causing several casualties.35 Over the last decade more than 160 park rangers have 
been killed. 

A notorious attack was the failed assassination attempt on the Chief Warden of VNP, Emmanuel 
de Merode, in April 2014 on the road between Goma and the Virunga headquarters.36 

Risks for conservation practitioners and community partners 
Representatives (national and international) of local civil society organisations, ICCN authorities 
and international conservation organizations37 have regularly received serious threats, 
especially during the campaigns against Soco’s exploration activities. Civil society 
representatives explained how they have been threatened by soldiers visiting their house after 
dark, and have often received anonymous messages. They report that these threats were 
issued by representatives of state authorities and the company.  

Management approaches applied to address these issues/threats 
Virunga National Park 
Since 2008, the Virunga National Park has been run as a public-private partnership (PPP) 
between ICCN and the Virunga Foundation, which is a UK-based charity. The PPP aims to 
protect the flora and fauna of the park and to establish a sound development programme for 
local communities living around Virunga. It developed a strategy not only to fight illegal 
activities within the boundaries of the park (see ‘Law enforcement’ below), but also aims to 
create a stable, secure/peaceful and prosperous context in which the park can flourish. The 
latter is mainly envisioned through the activities of its Virunga Alliance programme (see 
‘Community-based conservation’ below). The mission to create a stable and prosperous context 
has proved very challenging to achieve: eastern DRC is characterised by weak governance, 
including failing state institutions and endemic corruption, and high levels of insecurity linked to 
armed conflict. Despite this difficult context, progress is being made in some areas. 

Law enforcement  
After the turbulent 1990s and serious declines in the population numbers of key species, VNP 
has prioritised physical protection of the park against intruders and natural resource exploitation 
in order to secure and restore the park’s integrity. The environment in which the Virunga Park 
has to operate is very insecure, and even hostile to its very existence. Various on-the-ground 
stakeholders have recognised how the current context demands a strong focus on physical 
security. For this task, the park has a corps of 600 rangers that are professionally trained and 
equipped. UNESCO reported that the level of coverage of the 7 800 km2 park was roughly 43 % 
in 2016. Subsequently, the park has to prioritise and focuses its patrols on the key sectors with 
the highest biodiversity. It is forced to avoid some other sectors, due to chronic insecurity (e.g. 
the extreme north and the part in Masisi territory).  

Following dramatic decreases in wildlife population numbers in the 1990s, the law enforcement 
strategy overall has been successful with regards to the protection of some key species of 
wildlife (e.g. mountain gorillas) though less successful with others like elephant. The improved 
security has also enabled the relaunch of the tourist industry to Virunga, which has the potential 
to contribute to park operations, local community development and the country’s gross 
domestic profit (GDP). The fight against habitat destruction is, however, more difficult, as 

35 http://www.creddho-rdc.org/index.php/en/180-le-parc-de-virunga-sous-l-emprise-de-nouvelles-menaces-les-
positions-des-gardes-du-parc-visees-par-des-attaques-criminelles-recurrentes 
36 https://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2014/04/18/nord-kivu-des-ong-reclament-une-enquete-independante-sur-
lattaque-contre-le-conservateur-du-parc-des-virunga/ 
37 http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20140514-parc-virunga-rdc-employes-wwf-menaces-mort-soco-petrole-merode-gorilles-
environneme 

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charcoal production continues in some of the sectors that park management is unable to access 
due to extreme insecurity. While the firm law enforcement strategy has been successful in 
several areas, it has also raised some criticism38. Barriers erected by park rangers and 
expulsions of local people involved in illegal resource activities in the park by rangers 
sometimes create negative sentiments with local community members, and can even drive 
people closer to the armed groups who protect their illegal businesses. 

Inter-agency efforts 
The park has ventured into joint efforts with the FARDC and MONUSCO to fight insecurity in and 
around the park. The park rangers do not directly participate in the big military Sokola 
operations that have been launched over the past years against FDLR and ADF. However, VNP 
actively shares intelligence with the commanders of the military operations as well as a number 
of cooperative actions. These include the organisation of a daily convoy through the park 
between Kiwanja and Kanyabayonga; and the designation of FARDC soldiers to participate in 
VNP’s patrols together with rangers. These mixed units are used to address some illegal 
activities in the park, at times linked to armed group involvement39. 

In Rutshuru, some people have witnessed how the park rangers’ presence with the military has 
a local positive impact on improving security for local communities. These elements are one of 
the few well-trained security actors present in more remote areas. This collaboration can also 
have some destabilizing effects and risks for VNP.40 The absence of an integrated strategy to 
deal with these armed groups, including political and socio-economic measures, leads to military 
operations merely displacing groups only temporarily. As a result, the rangers risk becoming a 
direct party in the conflict with the armed groups. 

Community-based conservation 
The Virunga Alliance is the park’s programme for the economic development of neighbouring 
communities, in order to promote a peaceful and prosperous context in which the park can be 
supported and conserved.41 The Virunga Alliance has selected four areas that it believes can be 
developed in order to help contribute towards peace and prosperity: energy, tourism, agro-
Industry and sustainable fisheries. Tourism can become an important contributor to local 
benefits, park revenue and the country’s GDP; and fishing and agriculture could become more 
productive and sustainable with the right investments, directly benefitting local communities. 
Furthermore, the area’s waterways have significant potential for the development of hydro-
energy. 

The Virunga Alliance community development activities are still quite new, so it is too early to 
assess the impact on peace and prosperity. Nevertheless, it is already clear that they have the 
potential to improve and bolster relations with the local communities. For example, in Rutshuru 
territory, many respondents hailed the park’s active role, led by the Chief Warden de Merode, 
though these positive perceptions seem to be a direct result of tangible activities and results, as 
people from the more neglected areas, such as Masisi, are much more frustrated about the 
park’s strategies. 

Hydro-electricity  
Probably the most striking development project launched by the Virunga Alliance is the 
construction of hydro-electrical power plants on several waterways. The ones at Mutwanga, Beni 
territory and Matebe in Rutshuru territory are already operational. The park sees the hydro-
electrical plants as a trigger to stimulate the local economy and employment opportunities. 
Altogether, the planned power plants should produce a total of 105 MW, which should result in 
100 000 jobs. The increased employment is hoped to negatively impact the recruitment of 
people into armed groups, and thereby improve security. The project furthermore illustrates 

38 http://www.conservationandsociety.org/article.asp?issn=0972-
4923;year=2017;volume=15;issue=1;spage=100;epage=110;aulast=Hochleithner 
39 https://www.radiookapi.net/2017/10/04/actualite/securite/nord-kivu-trois-miliciens-captures-dans-une-operation-
des-forces-de 
40 https://theconversation.com/why-fighting-fire-with-fire-in-drcs-virunga-park-isnt-helping-conservation-72295 
41 https://virunga.org/alliance 

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how a more comprehensive conservation approach can bring tangible benefits to local 
communities and be an economically interesting alternative to oil exploitation. 

The construction of the plant and the creation of a stable energy supply were met with 
appreciation by the local population of Rutshuru. There was, however, some disappointment 
about the relatively high prices of the electricity supply. An older hydro-electrical plant, which is 
managed by a Catholic development organisation, provides cheaper electricity for a monthly 
lump sum. As a result, some local people have claimed the project is too commercial and anti-
social. 

There appears to be a difference between local expectations and the park’s objectives, which 
should be addressed. The park aims to stimulate small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
through the provision of affordable and reliable energy, in order to stimulate the local economy. 
Local communities, however, had perceived the project as a response to their households’ 
energy needs. It illustrates the need for continued communication and consultations, in order to 
manage expectations and improve mutual understanding. These concerns have recently been 
expressed in a list of recommendations issued by a group of civil society representatives.  

Recruitment 
Another important element for local communities is the recruitment of local people. The Matebe 
plant recruits manual labour locally, in order to provide employment and improve people’s 
perception of and direct benefits from conservation. As such, 120 daytime labourers work in the 
plant. This job creation is quite unique in Rutshuru, and this effort has been met with great 
appreciation.  Nevertheless, there have been some complaints about the recruitment process, 
which has been delegated to a local traditional chief. People have complained that the chief 
mainly hires people from his own community, and that people have to pay a small fee to be 
selected. Local recruitment has the potential to increase tensions between communities, if the 
competition is not well managed. Furthermore, some people complain that local people only get 
access to daytime labour and that more senior jobs are still granted to people from, for 
example, neighbouring provinces. These types of elite-capture for CSR activities and 
recruitment processes are not new in eastern DRC. Mining companies, for example, have to deal 
with the same challenges, so strategies are needed to address these. 

Delimitation 
The park’s efforts to limit further encroachment appear to have been successful, as the portion 
of invaded zones (around 25 % of the park) has remained stable over recent years but there 
are still several disputes over the exact boundaries of the park. A wide range of local 
stakeholders stated that participatory demarcation is a key effort to resolve these conflicts. 
Since 2002, the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) has already collaborated with ICCN on 
participatory demarcation, and in 2010 WWF signed a MoU with UN-HABITAT to cooperate on 
this. A mixed commission, including ICCN, WWF, local civil society and the provincial 
government to monitor participatory demarcation, has already been established.42 However, so 
far, actual demarcation activities have been limited, reportedly due to insecurity and conflicting 
agendas between VNP and local actors, such as landowners and farmers. 

In some places the park has also started with the installation of electric wires to enhance 
respect for the boundaries.43 This should also stop wildlife from destroying the fields of local 
farmers and clearly demarcate the park’s property to intruders.  

In 2014, the park launched a zoning process inside the hunting domain Kahunga. Part of the 
domain was reassigned to the population for agriculture (almost 3 000 ha), after the farmers 
association SAP (had lobbied for it for years. Soon after, however, complaints arose about the 
redistribution of the land, based on claims that the traditional chief mainly granted it to allied 

42 https://www.radiookapi.net/2016/06/15/actualite/environnement/nord-kivu-au-moins-17-000-hectares-du-parc-
des-virunga-envahis 
43 https://www.radiookapi.net/2017/09/05/actualite/societe/nord-kivu-lancement-des-travaux-de-la-cloture-
electrique-du-parc 

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strong men44, mainly of his own community45. It disillusioned community members who 
formerly cultivated the area (illegally), as they were chased off or forced to work for large-scale 
landowners. As such, the process appears to have been subject to elite capture, and risks 
further fuelling inter-community tensions. This again illustrates the complexities of working in 
such a poor governance situation, where every well-intentioned management action must be 
carefully structured and monitored in order to prevent distortion, rent capture and manipulated 
corruption. 

Summary 
1.  Where does wildlife trafficking trigger conflicts, fuel existing unrest or lead to 

scaled-up conflicts (from local to national/regional, international)?  

Over the last two decades, various international observers have described in detail how armed 
groups have used the exploitation and trade of DRC’s natural resources (including wildlife) to 
finance their activities, including the Virunga National Park’s natural wealth. These resources – 
most notably through charcoal production and protection rackets provided to illegal fisherman 
and farmers – have enabled various armed groups to survive and insecurity to persist. 
However, the exploitation of natural resources, including wildlife, should not be perceived as 
being at the origins of the conflict. 

2.  Where have conflicts triggered or fuelled wildlife trafficking or hampered 

conservation?  

The implosion of former President Mobutu’s reign, the Rwandan refugee crisis and consecutive 
Congolese wars have created the context in which various armed actors (rebel groups and state 
security actors), as well as civilians, were able to illegally exploit the VNP’s natural wealth. 
Consequently, population numbers of several species in the VNP (including hippopotamus, 
elephant and fish stocks) have decreased dramatically since the beginning of the 1990s. Despite 
the VNP’s firm strategy to regain control over the park and to revive conservation, insecurity 
still prevents the park’s management from effectively protecting about half of the park. 
Deforestation is still ongoing in these areas. Over the last two decades, many armed groups 
appear to have abandoned their original political and social agendas and turned into criminal, 
rent-seeking bands, often involved around illegal natural resource exploitation in the park. Also, 
many communities still link themselves to armed groups to protect their interests. Local inter-
community tensions, often over access to natural resources, are a key element in the 
continuation of insecurity in North Kivu. 

3.  How is socio-economic security undermined by trafficking and poor conservation, 

both at local and national levels? 

Human, physical and socio-economic security are affected and threatened by persistent 
insecurity and armed groups, which survive through the exploitation of natural resources. 
People are afraid to cultivate more isolated plots of land out of fear of being harassed, extorted 
or kidnapped by rebels or bandits hiding in the bush. Furthermore, many people have developed 
livelihood strategies that make use of the park’s resources, including wood, fish and arable land. 
Some of these people also reported that they perceive the VNP’s efforts to regain control over 
its property as a threat to their socio-economic security. 

4.  How does wildlife trafficking undermine the rule of law and legitimate institutions 

(notably because of the links with corruption)?    

Weak levels of governance and a failing rule of law create the context where various actors can 
venture into wildlife exploitation and trafficking. These criminal networks in turn further affect 

44 http://atelier.rfi.fr/profiles/blogs/l-accroissement-des-terres-arables-a-kahunga-l-un-des-resultats-d 
45 http://congoresearchgroup.org/trouble-in-virunga-the-challenges-of-conservation-amidst-conflict-violence-and-
poverty/ 

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the rule of law, as these networks include a wide range of actors from within DRC society and 
government structures, including notably FARDC elements. 

5.  How does wildlife-related insecurity (whether in term of conflict or from a socio-

economic point of view) contribute to migration flows (intra-state, inter-state, 
global)?  

Population movements seriously affect the province of North Kivu, with an estimated 1 million 
IDPs46. These displacements are not directly linked to wildlife crime, but are mainly caused by 
armed attacks and clashes involving the armed groups that have been discussed above. These 
armed groups are often involved in illegal natural resource exploitation so there is a linkage 
between the population movements and the persistence of the armed groups who support 
themselves, among other sources, on the basis of illegal natural resource exploitation and/or 
rent for exploitation. 

Over the last decade, the VNP management has designed and implemented strategies to deal 
with all of the issues that threaten the park’s wildlife, including conflict, insecurity, absence of 
the rule of law and demographic pressure. The investments made by the park and the well-
developed strategy that it implements are unique in the volatile context of North Kivu, and 
contribute to improving security for people and wildlife. The poaching of gorilla, a key species, 
has largely been halted, and the park’s investments in the local economy offer the potential to 
ease tensions with local populations and create significant direct benefits for them.  

Inter-community rivalries, weak governance, the absence of an integrated vision on local 
development and a land-use plan for the province create a very difficult context for the park to 
work in. It is important to note that even though the DRC is considered very weak, there are 
some local actors that do provide governance (e.g. traditional customary authorities), which are 
often perceived as legitimate by local communities, thus providing a governance opportunity for 
the VNP management to engage with and reinforce as a partner.    

The VNP has developed a two-pronged strategy to deal with insecurity and armed groups in and 
around the park. Firstly, it has established an effective law enforcement force, which 
collaborates at times with the FARDC. The VNP shares intelligence, jointly organises a daily 
convoy through the park, and has established mixed patrols with the army to fight armed 
groups’ involvement in illegal activities in the park. Secondly, the VNP aims to provide economic 
incentives to local communities in order for them to benefit economically, which also 
discourages them from joining armed groups. The construction of hydroelectric installations 
stimulates the local economy, creates jobs and subsequently decreases the recruitment base for 
armed groups, mobilising a strong local support base for VNP management. 

Suggestions for the way forward for the next 5 years 

1. Programmes/activities 
The presence of armed groups (rebellions as well as criminal gangs) continues to be a major 
threat to the Virunga National Park’s wildlife and security for local communities and the state. 
The VNP has developed a firm law enforcement strategy and operations system, including a 
professional ranger force, to fight these threats. However, the strength of these armed groups 
goes beyond the exploitation of the park’s resources, and the provision of security is primarily 
the responsibility of the Congolese State and some of its international partners, for example the 
UN. The VNP has already established collaborations with the FARDC, including mixed patrols 
inside the park. It is recommended that this collaboration be strengthened over the next years 
in order to go beyond some joint activities, and to develop a joint comprehensive integrated 
strategy to deal with armed actors in and around the park.  

International donors as well as local civil society organisations should invest in efforts to ease 
inter-community tensions, often linked to access to resources and feelings of social exclusion, 

46 https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/idp_fact-sheet_as_of_30_september_2017_en20102017.pdf 

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and promote peaceful cohabitation. In the present-day context the park, its resources and the 
benefits that conservation can offer are yet another source of inter-community rivalry.   

The VNP management strategy clearly indicates that its local development programme is key to 
the long-term conservation and protection of the park. The long-term strategy and commitment 
that the park has developed provide concrete and significant opportunities for local communities 
around the VNP. Improved communication and consultation with local stakeholders will be 
important in order to guarantee the effectiveness and sustainability of these partnerships. The 
VNP should explore how best to address certain perceptions that the park is not sufficiently 
inclusive, and that there is a need for more structural communication.  

Progress has been significant but the VNP’s local development programme would benefit further 
from being part of an integrated development and land-use plan strategy, created in 
coordination with local civil society, state services, local (traditional) authorities and other, 
international, organisations. Coordination with these other stakeholders should be enhanced, 
together with structured land-use and development planning. The organisation of a Comité de 
Coordination du Site structure, as done in other protected areas in DRC, may also help to 
improve communication and coordination.  

2. Policy initiatives 
It is recommended that an integrated strategy is needed to fight armed groups’ activities and 
insecurity in the park specifically and North Kivu in general. Such a strategy should involve the 
VNP as a relevant stakeholder, together with state security forces (FARDC and police forces), 
local, provincial and national authorities, as well as international partners such as MONUSCO. 
The strategy should address the more general issue of FARDC’s complicity in illegal resource 
exploitation and trade (including wildlife poaching and trafficking), and include socio-economic 
and political approaches towards armed groups. This comprehensive strategy will seek more 
permanent solutions in addition to dealing with proximal threats of armed groups, thus avoiding 
the factor displacement of the problem and the return of armed groups to evacuated areas. 

It is also important to underline that the area around VNP, and North Kivu in general, is not just 
a fertile ground for armed groups because of economic reasons, including poverty and natural 
resource wealth. Addressing the armed groups’ (rebels and bandits) recruitment base should 
include addressing political aspects and feelings of social exclusion, as well as providing 
economic alternatives.   

Furthermore, key threats to the park are posed by the DRC’s current political instability: the 
failing rule of law, impunity, corruption and weak governance. While the VNP management 
helps address governance factors and enhances stability locally, the firm commitment by 
international donors and national authorities is required to address these general issues more 
broadly in eastern DRC. The park has developed a strong strategy for the years to come, which 
needs to be robustly supported, with complementary efforts to foster major governance 
improvements more broadly in the region. 

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Maps 

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Case study 10. Garamba NP (DRC), Tri-border Area Landscape (DRC-South 
Sudan-CAR) 

Site name and location: Garamba National Park, Democratic Republic of Congo 

Introduction  
Garamba National Park (5 133 km2) is part of the Garamba Complex, which also includes 3 
hunting domains: Mondo-Missa (1 831 km2), Azande (4 055 km2) and Gangala-na-Bodio 
(3 777 km2). 

It is located in the Democratic Republic of Congo’s north-eastern province of Haut Uele, on the 
tri-border area with the Central African Republic and the Republic of South Sudan. Bordering 
Garamba to the north is the Lantoto National Park (760 km2) in South Sudan (with Southern 
National Park, 23 000 km2 located further north) and to the west in DRC is the Bili-Uélé Reserve 
(60 000 km2), with Chinko Reserve (19 846 km2) located further north in CAR. A Belgian Royal 
Decree created the Garamba National Park (GNP) in 1938, and it was placed under the DRC’s 
National Institute for Nature Conservation’s (ICCN) management by Presidential Decree 69/72 
from August 1972. GNP was declared a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1980, and has been 
listed as a World Heritage in Danger since 1996 (it had already been listed between 1984 and 
1992) due to the increased poaching and threats of the consecutive wars in the DRC. 

Wildlife and conservation in Garamba National Park 
GNP is located in the transition zone between the Congo Basin’s dense tropical forests and the 
Guinea-Sudano savannahs. Grassland savannah with scattered trees mark the southern part of 
the park, while in the north the vegetation is mainly mixed woodland, with dense dry forests 
and riverine and small swamp forests. The hunting domains are predominantly dense bush 
savannah, mixed deciduous woodland and forests. 

GNP’s key priority species are or were:  

•  Northern white rhino: Previously common in GNP but subject to heavy poaching in 1990s 
and 2000s.  Five rhinos were confirmed in 2005, but by 2008 they were thought to have 
been killed.    

•  Elephant: In the 1970s, there were estimated to be as many as 22 000 elephants in GNP. 

Over the decades various groups, including the SPLA in the 1990s during their war 
against the Khartoum regime, poached elephants (as well as rhino) on a large scale in 
GNP. Elephant poaching in Garamba has been a serious problem over the past decade, 
with the involvement of the LRA in the area since 2006, Sudanese poachers and 
transhumance pastoralists also involved in ivory poaching. This coincides also with a peak 
in elephant poaching in much of Africa and high ivory prices from 2011 onwards. In 2012, 
22 elephants were killed in a helicopter attack by poachers who hacked off their ivory and 
genitals. Elephants were reduced to 2 000 in 2012. In 2017, the estimated elephant 
population was 1 200, down from an estimated 1 700 in 2014. Since 2014, 388 elephant 
carcasses have been recorded. The ivory poaching coincides with an increase in armed 
groups entering the park following rising levels of insecurity in South Sudan, caused by 
war breaking out in December 2013 in Juba, which rapidly expanded throughout the 
country, including areas along the border with DRC.  Serious insecurity continues today in 
the border area. 

•  Kordofan giraffe: A few decades ago, the park counted an estimated 300 Kordofan 

giraffe.  Aerial surveys and unique coat identification from 2017 estimated no more than 
47 remaining. Over the last few years, however, their population number has been 
stable, as the park had counted 42 in 2014. Nevertheless, in 2016 3 giraffe carcasses 
were recorded, caused by poaching. Reports say they are mainly killed by South 
Sudanese poachers for their tails and penises.  

•  Buffaloes: poached for bushmeat. Historically, around the 1980s, an estimated 50 000 
buffaloes were in Garamba. In recent years, population estimates show a general 
stability: 5 650, 7 150 and 6 750 buffaloes were counted in 2012, 2014 and 2017 
respectively. 

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•  Hippos: poached for bushmeat, especially during the Congolese wars. Nevertheless, their 

numbers are on the rise again, which indicates progress in protection efforts 

Field mission 
During a week-long visit (14 to 21 September 2017) to the GNP area in Haut-Uele province, 
DRC, 23 informants were consulted via semi-structured interviews. At GNP headquarters in 
Nagero, the team spoke with African Parks’ (AP) GNP general manager, AP’s GNP operations 
manager, AP coordinator for intelligence on anti-poaching, ICCN head of GNP guards, AP staff 
from the Sustainable Development Department, the ICCN representative in GNP and AP’s GNP 
research and monitoring manager. 

In Dungu town, interviews were conducted with the head of office of MONUSCO, customary 
chiefs, the territorial administrator, a representative from Invisible Children and SAIPED 
representatives (local NGO). 

In Faradje town, the team spoke with representatives from APIL, OPED and APVH, all local 
NGOs, and customary authority representatives. 

On 22 September 2017 in Goma, North Kivu province, DRC, they spoke with a former GNP 
Sustainable Development Department employee. And in Antwerp, Belgium on 4 October 2017, 
an academic researcher on security and wildlife trafficking in the Garamba area was 
interviewed. 

In addition, information regarding the Lantoto (bordering Garamba to the north) and Southern 
National Park areas and transboundary factors with neighbouring areas of South Sudan was 
collected through a focused wildlife-security review questionnaire working session conducted on 
5 October 2017 in Juba, South Sudan. Information also came from reports and a literature 
review, and direct observations by the mission team members with extensive experience of 
working in the country. Interviews and the wildlife-security session included Brig. Gen. Khamis 
Adieng Ding (Ministry of Wildlife Conservation and Tourism Director of External Relations), Col. 
Joseph Taban Zakaria (South Sudan National Wildlife Service park warden, Lantoto National 
Park), Col. John Maper Machot (South Sudan National Wildlife Service park warden, Southern 
National Park), Paul Peter Awol (WCS – South Sudan law enforcement coordinator), Opap Ajany 
(WCS – South Sudan security coordinator) and Albert Schenk (WCS - South Sudan country 
director). 

This summary report provides analysis based on these interviews, reports, documents and 
papers, and the team members’ knowledge and experience of the area. 

Key wildlife/security issues identified at this site 
Insecurity 
Over the last two decades, high levels of insecurity and a consequent climate of fear, which 
persists today, have at times affected the Garamba area. Several elements can be listed to 
explain the fragile security context, including the presence of armed groups (e.g. the LRA since 
2006 and the SPLA in the 1990s, heavily armed Sudanese poachers), a regional crisis that 
included cross-border population movements, and a challenging relationship with nomadic 
pastoralist communities. Successive Congo Wars (1996-1997 and 1998-2003) also impacted the 
area, and created the general context of conflict in which various armed actors could thrive and 
poach. 

Consequently, many of the villages north of the two main towns near Garamba, Dungu and 
Faradje, have emptied over the last two decades. While the security situation in Dungu territory 
remains more volatile, many people in Faradje have returned since 2014/2015. Even though 
overall levels of security appear to be improving, security incidents still frequently occur, and 
elements linked to the insecurity still persist, including the LRA, armed pastoralists, gangs of 
poachers and armed groups linked to the South Sudanese crisis. 

Regional crisis 
The situation in and around Garamba cannot be seen in isolation from the wider security 
situation in the region, with the LRA originating from conflict in northern Uganda, and various 

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waves of violence in the DRC-CAR-South Sudan tri-border area: Sudan/South Sudan, including 
the areas neighbouring Garamba, has had full civil war from 1983 until 2005 and from 
December 2013 to the present day; the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) was even 
operating in Garamba in the 1990s; and in the Central African Republic (CAR), the Seleka 
rebellion started in 2013, with insecurity continuing through to the present. The LRA, based in 
Garamba, was the main source of insecurity between 2006 and 2012, after which they shifted 
further west into CAR (including in the Chinko area), though occasionally they still operate in 
the Garamba area.    

In the past few years, most security issues include cross-border dynamics, and most armed 
actors that currently destabilise the Garamba area come from the DRC’s northern neighbours. 
Not only did these conflicts create armed groups that wreak havoc in the DRC (see ‘Armed 
actors’ below), refugee movements also have an important impact on the local context. 
Continuous clashes in South Sudan from 2014 to the present (re-expanding since July 2016) 
have pushed many people to cross the border. In August 2017, a total of 84,000 South 
Sudanese refugees had registered in Haut Uele and Ituri provinces47, of whom more than 
28 000 reside in the refugee site of Meri (Faradje territory, Haut Uele) and about 14,000 in 
various places in Dungu territory48. 

The park management reported that the Meri refugee site, which is close to Mondo Missa 
Hunting Domain, poses a serious security issue for the park’s wildlife and surrounding 
populations. The site creates markets for bushmeat, and allegedly turns traditional trapping into 
commercial poaching at an alarming scale. Some of the poachers are even registered refugees 
at Meri. The park reports that the situation is rapidly getting out of control, but feels that the 
UNHCR is not responsive to its worries about the potential devastating effects. 

Even though the security situation in Faradje territory is relatively calm for the moment, there is 
nonetheless a risk for the South Sudanese conflict to spill over; as the Kakwa people are a 
cross-border community, the area has a porous border and there is no strong Congolese 
military presence. 

In Dungu territory, the border area is currently less stable. For this reason, the UNHCR has 
agreed with the Congolese Government to relocate refugees from the border area, particularly 
from Doruma and Bitima (Dungu territory) to the refugee site Kaka, further south in Dungu49. 
GNP management is worried that the current construction at Kaka will have a devastating 
impact on the park, magnifying the challenges they already face. The site is located only 
15 kms away from the Azande hunting domain. 

Several stakeholders have flagged that an improved monitoring of cross-border movements 
might help to improve the security situation in the area, as well as decreasing wildlife 
trafficking. However, for example, the Congolese national army (FARDC) is unable to secure the 
border with reportedly 1 200 men covering Haut- and Bas-Uele provinces. 

Pastoralism 
Transhumance is yet another regional issue that has triggered conflicts over the last decades. 
The influx of pastoralists in the Uele provinces (including the areas surrounding, but not inside, 
the Garamba Complex) has reportedly increased since the early 2000s. Severe droughts and 
food insecurity in some areas of the Sahel in the early 2000s may have pushed pastoralists and 
their cattle further south. Furthermore, it is reported that the vaccination of cattle (supported 
by NGOs and international donors, including the EU) may have enabled them to move further 
than traditional transhumance routes. In more recent years, the highly volatile security situation 
in CAR pushes pastoralists to the DRC in larger numbers. As in CAR, areas of South Sudan, 
which have been historically used at times by transhumance pastoralists (when the wars in 
South Sudan abated), are not accessible to pastoralists due to the insecurity over the past few 
years. These conflict zones further reduce spatial options for pastoralists, thus DRC has become 
a more attractive zone in the past couple of years. Furthermore, some pastoralists are reported 

47 https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/60022 
48 https://data2.unhcr.org/fr/documents/download/60023 
49 https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/58717_0.pdf 

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to be staying in the tsetse (transmitters of sleeping sickness/Animal Trypanosomiasis) fly-
infested areas throughout the year, rather than being seasonal visitors. This is possibly mainly 
due to an increased access to veterinary supplies. 

To the west of GNP, Mbororo pastoralists are currently considered to be one of the main security 
threats; cohabitation with cultivators is difficult as their cattle destroy farmland. The relationship 
with local communities in general is difficult, due to a range of perceptions, incidents and 
accusations including: 

• 

• 

complaints about pastoralists that refuse to pay the full price for products they acquire; 

accusations of being linked to the LRA and its terror activities50, even though there have 
been reports that the LRA forces Mbororo to help them transport goods, or cover up their 
tracks; 

•  pastoralists carrying guns; 

• 

several incidents51, including murder, committed by Mbororo pastoralists. 

Due to these serious incidents and accusations, several local stakeholders are quite pessimistic 
about potential peaceful cohabitation, and have concluded that the Mbororo pastoralists need to 
leave. 

There is however a lack of clarity on the willingness of authorities to deal with the Mbororo 
presence. In Ango territory (Bas-Uele province), they have allegedly paid some fees to local 
authorities, authorising their entrance and presence, which would have upset Haut-Uele 
stakeholders. 

The environmental threat these large herds of cattle pose to the GNP is also a factor of concern. 
Pastoralists have been accused of lighting bushfires and their cattle polluting water sources. 
When Mbororo started heading east in 2016, starting from Ango (Bas-Uele province), they were 
requested not to enter Garamba, or the 50 km buffer zone. In mid-2017, however, they were 
observed again approaching the Gangala-Na-Bodio hunting domain, further south.  

Armed actors 
Lord’s Resistance Army 
While the LRA’s origins were in northern Uganda in the late 1980s, it was dislodged from there 
by military operations, and also dislodged from its base in the Imatong area of South Sudan in 
2005/2006. The LRA first entered the Garamba area in 2005, with its leader Joseph Kony basing 
himself in Garamba from 2006 for several years. In late 2008, the Ugandan army launched 
operation Lightning Thunder against the LRA, which dispersed the rebel group and provoked 
some horrific retaliation attacks against the local population in Haut-Uele that have been 
labelled the Christmas Massacres52. The GNP headquarters was attacked by the LRA and heavily 
damaged on 2 January 2009. In 2013, the UN Secretary General still reported about 320 000 
IDPs in Bas- and Haut-Uele.53 

Following an order from Kony mid-2011, the LRA shifted towards CAR and into south-western 
South Sudan, but it continued to operate occasionally in GNP and the broader area, still 
inspiring fear over the subsequent years. Since 2014, however, the LRA’s presence and violence 
has decreased considerably in the GNP area, especially in Faradje territory as they moved 
westward and north under pressure from the anti-LRA forces of the Uganda People's Defence 
Force (UPDF), the UN and the USA. Since 2015, people are gradually returning to their villages. 
The security situation in Dungu territory remains more precarious however, and people are 
slower to return in areas such as the Azande hunting domain, to the west of park. 

50 https://www.radiookapi.net/2017/07/12/actualite/securite/haut-uele-ladministrateur-du-territoire-de-dungu-plaide-
pour 
51 https://www.radiookapi.net/2017/10/09/actualite/en-bref/bas-uele-un-eleveur-mbororo-accuse-davoir-blesse-un-
paysan 
52 https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/02/16/christmas-massacres/lra-attacks-civilians-northern-congo 
53 http://undocs.org/S/2013/297 

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The climate of fear persists, and the halting of the African Union Task Force (see ‘Combating the 
LRA’ below) in early 2017 created concerns that it might give the LRA the opportunity to return. 
Between May and July 2017, LRA attacks have been reported to the west and south of GNP. 
Over the following months they moved further west within Haut Uele, away from Garamba, and 
continued to loot goods and abduct people. As a result, the local authorities in Dungu still 
consider the LRA a serious threat to human security and wildlife. 

The LRA’s role in wildlife poaching (particularly ivory poaching) and ivory trafficking has been 
well documented by multiple sources over recent years. The LRA has been involved in poaching 
in Garamba, and has transported ivory northwards via south-eastern CAR to Kafia Kingi. The 
LRA is, however, less of an actor in poaching in GNP54 compared to the South Sudanese actors 
(see below), and FARDC before 2015.   

The LRA’s presence has nevertheless increased elephant poaching and has had a devastating 
impact on the GNP’s biodiversity. However, this impact is only to a limited extent due to LRA 
poaching activities. Much more significant is the fact that the LRA presence contributed to a 
wider militarisation of the area55, which created poaching opportunities for various armed 
actors. Furthermore, LRA insecurity and the local communities’ feelings of insecurity have had a 
devastating impact on the socio-economic situation in the area, which seriously affects 
community engagement with wildlife conservation. 

Over the years there have been various reports indicating that Kony ordered his fighters to 
collect ivory.56  This was also the case during their most recent incursion of the area, in May to 
September 2017. The rebels however did not enter Garamba, allegedly to avoid clashes with 
the park rangers, and moved further south to the Sambia gold mines (see ‘Gold exploitation’ 
below). Hostages that had been released did report that the group had 16 pieces of ivory57, 
probably from old caches, as the LRA had not yet been linked to elephant poaching in 2017. 

North Sudanese armed groups 
In the 1980s, numerous reports surfaced in Darfur and CAR about armed horsemen’s raids, the 
so-called Janjaweed that were composed of a wide range of pastoralist Arab clans. These gangs 
also reached northern DRC in the 1990s, hunting for ivory and bushmeat in Garamba and Bili-
Uélé areas; they wiped out the elephants in Southern Park in South Sudan during the same 
period. While these poaching activities have a long history, they continue to this day. 

Ouda/Mbororo  
More recently there have been several references to the Ouda – the term refers to nomadic 
sheep-herding communities, which originate from south-western Chad. These armed groups of 
poachers are at times linked to the Mbororo, following their tracks to poach and allegedly 
collaborate with them. They are considered a serious threat to the security situation as they 
carry weapons, and at times abduct people to transport their poached wildlife. However, the 
term ‘Ouda’ has increasingly become a catch-all generic word to designate pastoralists and 
Mbororo poachers. Together the Mbororo/Ouda represent a serious security issue and 
sometimes a direct threat. 

South Sudanese armed groups 
The main actors involved in wildlife poaching in the GNP in the past few years are South 
Sudanese armed groups. The UN Group of Experts reported in 2016 that 85 % to 90 % of 
poaching incidents are linked to groups coming from north Sudan (see, for example ‘Ouda’ 
above) and South Sudan.  The armed conflict in South Sudan from late 2013 to the present 
included a major expansion of hostilities in 2015 and also since July 2016, which has impacted 
the overall security situation in large tracts of neighbouring South Sudan, and all along the 
border with DRC.   

54 https://www.uantwerpen.be/images/uantwerpen/container2143/files/Publications/PolicyBriefs/APB/05-Titeca.pdf 
55 Ibid. 
56 https://invisiblechildren.com/blog/2017/09/14/monthly-security-brief-august-2017/ 
57 Ibid. 

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These groups of poachers venture into GNP with military weapons. During these hunting 
missions they pose a serious threat to local communities, especially in Faradje territory. They 
have killed people when they felt threatened and have often looted villages.  

Several of these armed gangs are composed of former SPLA soldiers and fighters of SPLM-in-
Opposition (SPLM-IO). Historically the SPLA hunted elephant and rhino in GNP in the 1990s and 
some soldiers are therefore familiar with the area. In July 2016, renewed fighting in Juba, South 
Sudan, pushed a contingent of SPLM-IO southwards, and in August 2016 an estimated 848 
SPLM-IO affiliated fighters and associated civilians actually crossed the border into Garamba 
with their leader Riek Machar. With help from the UN, they were subsequently evacuated from 
the park with some 500 remaining in detention in Goma, while Riek Machar and his bodyguards 
(totalling 14) were transferred to Khartoum.  

It has also been noted by Garamba park management that the ivory poaching incursions from 
the South Sudanese side have decreased in 2017 compared to previous years, which may be 
related to the severe violence of war raging across the border in South Sudan and to the 
improved law enforcement operations in the northern sector of Garamba National Park. 

FARDC 
The involvement of FARDC soldiers in wildlife poaching in the Garamba area has been a 
relatively more recent factor compared to some other regions in the DRC. Before the start of the 
LRA crisis very few soldiers had been deployed in the area. With the arrival of the LRA, the 
number of FARDC elements increased considerably. In 2009, the Congolese Government 
launched the military operation Rudia II against the rebels58, but the operation was not 
effective, and the soldiers harassed and extorted the local population. 

From then on, FARDC elements became involved in wildlife poaching, including ivory, and were 
often in collaboration with local poachers who knew the terrain much better. Until 2014, FARDC 
was considered to be one of the main threats to the park59, as their wildlife crime activity was 
quite structural and included high-ranking officers60. Reportedly they were mostly involved in 
bushmeat poaching, as well as in the illegal trade of guns, ammunition and ivory. 

Since 2015, however, the FARDC involvement has reportedly been much reduced. The park 
management even states that the army is today one of their most important collaborators for 
the protection of the park. Two main reasons for this change have been reported as: 1) the 
replacement of a notorious FARDC commander, and 2) the secondment of FARDC soldiers to the 
park’s ranger force through a rotational system. (See ‘Inter-agency cooperation’ below) Even 
though the involvement of FARDC elements in wildlife crime around the GNP has diminished, 
FARDC elements are reported to continue to be involved in levying illegal taxes on the local 
population.  

Poaching 
Wildlife poaching is a substantial threat to the GNP and the trans-border area, and has been for 
some decades. There has been extensive poaching for ivory and rhino horn, as well as severe 
pangolin trafficking. Bushmeat hunting has had less of an impact given the low human 
population density and distance to markets, but hunting has been a traditional livelihood 
strategy in the area. However, since traditional techniques got replaced by the introduction of 
military guns, the impact of hunting on wildlife has been devastating. 

Poaching in GNP, especially by armed groups and international ivory trafficking criminal 
networks is highly problematic from both a conservation and security perspective. These include 
the LRA, South Sudanese groups, poachers in helicopters (allegedly from Uganda and registered 
to the UPDF), militias from Sudan Darfur, and professional poaching gangs reportedly coming 
from Chad and the Sudan border areas (e.g. Mbororo, Ouda). The UN Group of Experts reported 
in 2016 that north Sudanese and South Sudanese groups are currently the most problematic, 

58 https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/uganda/lra-regional-strategy-beyond-killing-kony 
59 http://africanarguments.org/2013/05/17/the-lra-conflict-beyond-the-lra-lobby-the-hunt-for-kony-and-towards-
civilian-protection-by-kristof-titeca/ 
60 https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/uganda/lra-regional-strategy-beyond-killing-kony 

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responsible for an estimated 85 % to 90 % of poaching incidents. They often come on 1- or 2-
week missions to obtain ivory and giraffes’ tails. The impact on the elephant population is 
dramatic. Furthermore, they often poach bushmeat for food during their missions. While some 
ivory originating from Garamba has been traced going through CAR and South Sudan towards 
the north, there have also been cases of ivory moving in 2012 through South Sudan and then 
southwards towards Uganda (which was seized by the authorities in South Sudan on the border 
at Nimule). 

These armed groups of poachers are also linked to security issues, as they have been known to 
kill passers-by or people they have abducted for transport. For example in January 2017, 
poachers carrying ivory abducted a man and his two sons, to transport food for them, and 
finally killed two of them in Dungu territory. 

Local poachers are considered much less of a problem. They mainly engage in bushmeat 
hunting, which is often a traditional livelihood strategy for them. Nevertheless, these hunters 
also grasp ‘opportunities’, and have been known to poach key species as well; they are also 
directly involved in elephant poaching for ivory. These local poachers are a direct threat to the 
park, alongside the transboundary poachers. In the Garamba complex and its immediate 
vicinity, 45 % of households engage in hunting, mostly using traditional techniques. Due to the 
low population density and the less devastating hunting techniques, this type of poaching is less 
detrimental to the GNP’s biodiversity in the short term. Nevertheless, local hunters also 
collaborate with other, heavily armed actors, by guiding them into the bush and supporting their 
operations.  

Historically, the Zande people from DRC and South Sudan have accessed the park for ivory and 
bushmeat poaching. While the LRA was occupying the area they may have displaced the Zande 
pressures, but following the shift of the LRA westwards, incidents of elephant poaching were 
recorded involving Zande communities from both sides of the border.    

Gold exploitation 
Until recently mineral exploitation has not been considered a major threat to the GNP. Artisanal 
gold exploitation in the hunting zones is a problematic issue, however, which poses a potential 
risk to the area’s biodiversity. 

In the south of the hunting domain Gangala-na-Bodio, an estimated 20 000 people are involved 
in gold exploitation around Sambia. Furthermore, in Mondo Missa there are some artisanal gold 
mines. Both customary authorities and state services allegedly tolerate and/or permit miners to 
continue mining the area, but the influx of outsiders into the hunting domains is an important 
driver for bushmeat hunting and may also contribute to further insecurity.  

The development of the Kibali industrial gold mine, south of the Garamba complex, also creates 
some challenges but these are more indirect. Kibali’s growth, as well as the development of 
artisanal gold exploitation in the area, is seriously stimulating population growth in and around 
Durba. This increasing demographic density creates pressure on the Garamba complex, as 
people start cutting trees for their energy supply. Moreover, as Kibali chased away a number of 
artisanal gold diggers, some of them moved to Sambia, inside the Garamba complex, thus 
increasing pressures there. But the presence of the well-managed Kibali mine so close to 
Garamba may also assist in security cooperation with the GNP. 

Rule of law 
The DRC struggles with significant governance issues. The Mo Ibrahim Foundation ranks the 
DRC 46th out of 54 African countries in its African Governance Index. Weak governance is also a 
particular characteristic of the Garamba area. It is located far from the centre of power, with a 
low population density. As a result, communities living in the Uele provinces have felt that they 
have been neglected by the Government in Kinshasa for many decades. 

Weak levels of governance are characterised by an absence of rule of law, with little impact on 
the judicial and legislative powers. The power of the territorial administrators, who are the 
representatives of the state authority, is also limited in practice, and it appears that the 

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customary chiefs are considered to hold the actual power in the park’s neighbouring 
communities. 

Security risks to those involved in wildlife protection 
In recent years the park has expanded the area under its control (see ‘Law enforcement’ 
below). Until several years ago, due to concerns for security (largely related to the LRA), GNP 
patrols were limited to the southern sector of the park, with no patrols taking place in the areas 
where many poachers operated to the north.   

The downside of the expansion of the patrol area towards the north is the increasing number of 
deaths and injuries among the ranger force. Since 2015, 13 rangers and seconded FARDC 
members have been killed on duty in the park: 8 in 2015, and 3 in 2016, and 2 in 2017. 

On the other hand, the park has become a safer place as a result of the expanded anti-poaching 
strategy. While the LRA attacked the Nagero headquarters in January 2009, killing at least 8 
people and wounding another 13, nowadays Nagero village has attracted people due to the fact 
that it is considered safe. As an illustration, the latest LRA incursion in 2017 allegedly did not 
enter Garamba in order to avoid confrontations with the park rangers. 

Management approaches applied to address these issues/threats 
Garamba management – public-private partnership 
Since September 2005, the GNP and the surrounding hunting domains have been managed 
through a management agreement between the ICCN and the international NGO African Parks 
Network (APN). The objectives of the management agreement are to re-establish the integrity 
of the ecosystem of Garamba, to improve the management of the park and to establish 
community conservation programmes around the park. The APN renewed its management 
contract with the ICCN for management of Garamba in January 2016, clarifying and improving 
several aspects. 

The park management has defined its aim of running Garamba as a micro-hub of security and 
good governance. The mission is:  

To preserve the biodiversity of the Garamba Complex through sustainable park 
management focused on sound conservation practices, as well as addressing the 
security issues throughout the Garamba Complex; through collaboration with 
regional security stakeholders, obtaining local community support for wildlife 
conservation, promoting sustainable community development throughout the 
surrounding sedentary villages, and developing of the Garamba Complex’ 
infrastructure in a manner consistent with APN’s mandate. 

Under this approach, African Parks is responsible for the execution of operations, management 
and mobilising funding, while the State (through the ICCN), as the owner of the park, is 
responsible for legislation, policy and sustainability. APN indicates that the public-private 
partnership allows them to work to overcome the context of failing governance that 
characterises the DRC.   

African Parks’ strategy is to use a business approach to conserve Garamba’s wildlife. The 
business model is to ensure that the park is protected and well managed while revenue-
generating activities, such as tourism, agriculture and sustainable energy, are promoted and 
able to generate a significant income for the park. This revenue enables the park to alleviate 
donor income and allows sustainability. Furthermore, the management aims to make the GNP’s 
organisation more sustainable, and enhance the efficiency of ICCN and its staff – for example, 
by providing resettlement training and adult education for former park staff that need to leave 
the organisation to make it more efficient. 

Law enforcement 
Combating wildlife poaching 
The park management considers law enforcement amongst the top key priorities, now and in 
the near future. Massive poaching threatens the park’s biodiversity, including endangered 

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species. For this reason, in recent years the park management has increased investments in the 
professionalisation of its ranger corps, which form the core foundation of the GNP’s personnel: 

• 

• 

• 

• 

Increasing the number of rangers from just over 100 to almost 300 over the last 4 years; 

Investing in professional and lifelong training; 

Investing in better equipment, including armament and logistics; 

Investing in intelligence gathering and coordination. 

These investments have allowed the park rangers to patrol a larger area , through deployments 
at ranger posts further north in the park and intelligence-led patrols. Until 2013/2014, the park 
controlled only the southern sector, whereas since 2015 the park has monitored the entire 
property through aerial surveillance. Anti-poaching patrols are also now conducted in hunting 
domains. By 2017, the GNP had expanded its capacity such that it can reach anywhere in the 
Garamba complex operationally. Spatial expansion and projection of surveillance is limited at 
this time only by funding and limits of communication. 

Furthermore, the GNP management mandate provides the right to pursue wildlife perpetrators 
in a 50-kilometer buffer zone around the park and hunting domains (within the DRC). The park 
also gathers and shares regional understanding beyond the limits of the park. Its long-term 
objective is to create a stable corridor between the protected areas of Chinko, Bili Uele and 
Garamba, and to have a stable buffer in the north from Lantoto.  

People from local communities feel that the park’s efforts, and their cooperation with the FARDC 
(see ‘Interagency cooperation between AP and FARDC’ below), have had a positive impact on 
the security situation in the vicinity of the park. At the same time, they expressed interest for 
park rangers to be assigned broader responsibilities to protect neighbouring communities. 

Park representatives have indicated the crucial importance of a long-term commitment when 
developing such a firm law enforcement strategy using paramilitary means to create security 
and fight poachers. Due to the difficult context in which parks like Garamba function, these 
well-trained rangers could turn into a security risk if not sustainably managed. 

The park’s rigorous position with regard to well-armed international poachers also affects local 
poachers. Even though the park is more lenient towards small-scale poachers, it does affect 
their livelihood strategies. Local authorities have already expressed that this is difficult to accept 
for local communities; however this has not turned into violent resistance. People reportedly do 
believe in the potential benefits from the park, and expect job opportunities, infrastructure 
investments, livestock projects and a clear regulatory framework for hunting inside the hunting 
domains. 

Restoring security 
Combating the LRA 
The LRA represents a regional, human security issue. Therefore, combating the LRA is the 
responsibility of the FARDC, MONUSCO and security providers from neighbouring countries. The 
weak presence – as well as limited technical and mobility capacity – of the FARDC in the Uele 
provinces, and particularly the border area, is one of the main factors allowing the circulation of 
the LRA. MONUSCO complains that the Kinshasa Government has not lived up to its promise to 
deploy more units in Haut-Uele, while people from local communities complain that FARDC and 
MONUSCO are not living up to their ‘Protection of Civilians’ responsibility. 

Since 2011, a ‘regional’ strategy had been developed against the LRA. The African Union 
Regional Task Force against the LRA was meant to include soldiers from South Sudan, CAR, 
Uganda and DRC. In the end, the Task Force drew its operational forces largely from the 
Ugandan forces (UPDF) and the US Africa Command (AFRICOM), an American military force that 
strengthened the defence capacities of African states, and provided logistics and intelligence 
support, training and 100 Special Force personnel who served as military advisers to the UPDF. 

In early 2017, the USA and UPDF decided to withdraw, due to the fear of a security vacuum 
threatening communities in the Uele provinces. This fear seems to have materialised as a new 

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LRA incursion happened in May 2017. This has impacted both the Garamba and Chinko areas 
and, more broadly, security in the area. While LRA numbers and capacity have been greatly 
diminished over the years, the LRA is still operating and a deadly threat to local communities 
and other actors, including the protected area of Garamba, Bili-Uele and Chinko. The LRA are 
reported to have largely avoided South Sudan (though they are reportedly moving along the 
CAR-South Sudan border) in recent years due to the mobilisation of South Sudanese defence 
militias (Arrow Bows) and the broader war in South Sudan. 

Mbororo committee 
The provincial governments created committees to discuss and tackle the issue of the difficult 
cohabitation with the Mbororo pastoralists. Such committees were established in Bas-Uele and 
in Haut-Uele; the vice-presidency is held by MONUSCO.  

Some meetings have already been organised, but so far no strategy has been developed to deal 
with the problems. Diverging visions between the two provinces have also hindered a well-
coordinated strategy for the time being. 

Interagency law enforcement-security programmes: cooperation between AP and 
FARDC 
The park has signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the FARDC (operation zone Uele) for 
joint patrols, including FARDC soldiers and the park rangers, to fight poachers and rebel groups. 
The FARDC delegates between 70 and 100 soldiers at a time to the GNP, through a rotational 
system. For 3 months, these soldiers work from the Nagero headquarters, and are sent out 
under Ranger patrol commanders to man the fixed points in the park. Each of these soldiers 
earns a bonus over this 3-month period. 

Consequently, since 2015, a few hundred soldiers have participated directly in the park 
operations. This provides them with a financial incentive to refrain from illegal activities, and the 
training and working experience helps them to better understand the importance of 
conservation. The park management indicated that this has turned the FARDC from one of the 
key perpetrators of poaching into one of the park’s important collaborators. 

Community-based conservation 
Another element of African Parks’ management vision for Garamba is their ‘focus on economic 
development and poverty alleviation of surrounding communities to ensure that each park is 
ecologically, socially, and financially sustainable for the long term’. 

The GNP area has a long history of exploitation of resources, and poaching is a key livelihood 
strategy for many households. The GNP believes it can disincentivise local poaching by investing 
in the surrounding communities. This includes a security – conservation – and development 
strategy for the hunting domains and surroundings, so they can fully function as a buffer zone. 
The GNP’s focus on the economic development of surrounding communities is quite recent, and 
the park is now in the process of developing its local development strategy. Until 2016 the focus 
was mostly on restoring control over the park’s area. The GNP strongly believes that with the 
right strategy it should be able to develop a fruitful collaboration with the surrounding 
communities in the medium to long-term perspective. Under normal circumstances, 
demographic pressure on the park is quite low, which would allow for a sustainable use of its 
natural resources under careful management. However, the influx of South Sudanese refugees, 
and particularly UNHCR’s plans to settle them in camps just a few kilometres from the Garamba 
Complex is a major threat to the park and must be addressed immediately to avoid disastrous 
short, medium, and long-term impacts (see ‘Regional crisis’ above). The main short-term 
threats to the GNP are external, and as such the park is able to develop cooperation with 
neighbouring communities without major tensions.  

Nevertheless, local communities are involved in the exploitation of the park’s resources and do 
experience some impact from the GNP on their livelihoods, for example restrictions on fishing 
and hunting, and the destruction of farmland by wildlife. Furthermore, a 2015 study 
commissioned by GNP revealed that local communities currently do not see the benefits from 
the park, and rather perceive it as a security risk. Convincing them to collaborate more closely 
will require showing clear benefits. Furthermore, the study reveals that many local people do 

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not perceive the GNP as a conservation organisation, but rather as a humanitarian agency. 
Managing expectations through regular communication appears to be another key priority. 

Raising awareness with local communities on the harmful impact of poaching on biodiversity is 
complex. Poaching is a traditional livelihood strategy, and people depend on it for their protein 
needs. Local NGO representatives explained that it will require a great deal of time and effort to 
convince people to leave poaching and engage solely in agriculture and livestock breeding. 
While small-scale agricultural and livestock activities exist, they have not received organised 
development support, and have been hindered historically by insecurity and inaccessibility. 

Since 2011, some community micro-projects have already been implemented, in a partnership 
between African Parks and Fauna and Flora International (FFI). These projects, however, lacked 
close monitoring, and were not part of a comprehensive development strategy but implemented 
in a heavy insecurity context. Currently, the GNP is carrying out consultations with various 
stakeholders in order to develop a more integrated plan as from 2018, including developing 
hydro-electric power, community access to solar energy, road infrastructure, 
agriculture/agroforestry, livestock and a strategy to deal with illegal mining. In 2017, the GNP 
launched several feasibility studies for future local development programmes, and is starting 
with the development of a land-use plan for the park and its surrounding hunting domains and 
buffer zone. A study has been launched and workshops will be organised with the relevant 
communities and authorities. 

The weak levels of governance and education in the area are a key challenge to implementing 
an integrated development strategy. The local administration, for example, is allegedly quite 
powerless and does not perceive Garamba as its responsibility, but rather as a potential source 
of revenue – a perception that is actually shared by many people. Over the last few years, the 
park has been mostly collaborating with traditional authorities, which appear to have more 
legitimacy and authority. 

The weak levels of governance are also illustrated by the absence of a local development 
strategy. There are no real Local Development Plans, which means the (local) government lacks 
a tool to develop a coherent development strategy. In order to ensure that the GNP’s 
community approach has an effective, sustainable impact, it is important that each local 
community develops such a plan, through an inclusive, well-informed, participatory and 
transparent process. At the time of the field visit, the GNP had started to work with local 
authorities on supporting the design of Local Development Plans. 

Transboundary conservation-security coordination 
With regards to conservation and security coordination in the DRC-CAR-South Sudan tri-border 
area, APN and ICCN are managing Garamba under a PPP; Bili-Uélé Reserve receives support 
from African Wildlife Foundation (AWF) and ICCN; African Parks is engaged in Chinko reserve 
with the CAR Government under a PPP arrangement; in South Sudan, Lantoto Park is managed 
by the South Sudan Wildlife Service (SSWS), and the Southern National Park further to the 
north is under a management partnership between SSWS and the Wildlife Conservation Society 
(WCS).   

In response to the increased poaching in Garamba and the trafficking of ivory involving the 
South Sudanese, the WCS provided targeted anti-trafficking and anti-poaching operational 
training, technical support and funding to the SSWS Lantoto Park Warden Joseph Taban and his 
staff for Lantoto operations and transboundary coordination with Garamba from 2012 to 2013, 
along with anti-trafficking and communications support to Yambio and Maridi SSWS operations. 
This resulted in a series of arrests of South Sudanese poachers and traffickers, and seizures of 
arms, ivory, bushmeat, etc. Lantoto operations and support to Yambio and Maridi SSWS, and 
hence transboundary communications, were disrupted and heavily impacted by the spreading of 
the South Sudanese war throughout the area in 2014.  

Between 2015 and 2016, transboundary communication and operational coordination were 
reinitiated between Garamba and Lantoto (with APN and WCS support and involvement). 
Coordination and support to SSWS Yambio and Maridi were also reinitiated. Heavy fighting 
broke out again in July 2016, spreading once more throughout the country and border area with 

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DRC; the South Sudan Peace agreement (signed in August 2015) disintegrated; armed 
combatants looted infrastructure and communications equipment in Lantoto; insecurity in the 
Lantoto area bordering Garamba prevented any field patrolling operations from that time to the 
present. Intelligence gathering and transboundary sharing is feasible; it is being developed, 
although very sensitive given the full war context in South Sudan. As soon as the security 
situation permits, a priority is support to Lantoto anti-trafficking law enforcement operations 
(and Yambio and Maridi SSWS) as a buffer and eventually a protected area extension for the 
Garamba ecosystem. Large mammal wildlife populations in Lantoto itself are reported to have 
been largely wiped out decades ago, though some elephant and other species may return to the 
area with its relatively intact habitat, if it can be secured. 

Despite the war, throughout this period the WCS and SSWS have continued their long-term 
management partnership and basic operations in Southern National Park, as well as in Boma 
and Badingilo National Parks to the east of the Nile River (see the case study on Boma-Badingilo 
Parks, South Sudan). These parks have been generally less impacted directly by the fighting 
than areas along the borders with DRC and Uganda and in the north of South Sudan, though 
the whole country is subject to insecurity and the impacts of the 4-year conflict. 

A meeting held in October 2016 in Brussels between the EU, the USA, security organisations, 
and conservation, development and security actors in the area reviewed the priorities and 
challenges for conservation-security-development. This included representatives of AFRICOM 
and EU military experts. The next steps for enhancing and continuing to develop this initiative in 
the tri-border area are being elaborated. 

Summary 
1.  Where does wildlife trafficking trigger conflicts, fuel existing unrest or lead to 

scaled-up conflicts (from local to national/regional, international)?  

Several local actors perceive Garamba’s natural wealth as a resource exploited by armed groups 
and a significant driver of insecurity. Over the past decades a number of armed groups have 
entered the area for ivory and rhino horn poaching and bushmeat. These armed groups 
historically include north Sudanese poachers, SPLA fighters in the 1990s, armed Mbororo 
pastoralists/poachers, more recently the LRA, and additional armed groups of whom some are 
involved in conflicts in the region (e.g. SPLA-IO from South Sudan). While many of them find 
their origin in conflicts and underdevelopment in neighbouring countries, they are often entering 
the park area for poaching purposes. The increase in the price of ivory globally in the years 
2011 through to the present, and the widespread poaching crisis in Africa, further encourage 
groups and traffickers to extend their reach into the Garamba area. Congolese people see these 
actors crossing the border to exploit Garamba’s wildlife and wreaking havoc in Congolese 
communities. 

2.  Where have conflicts triggered or fuelled wildlife trafficking or hampered 

conservation?  

Civil unrest and severe armed conflict in the DRC’s northern neighbours CAR and South Sudan 
over the past 4 years (and historically at various times over past decades) have seriously 
impacted stability and security in the tri-border area. These conflicts provided easy access to 
arms, and created insecurity and governance vacuums on both sides of the borders. Moreover, 
the absence of the rule of law in this part of the DRC has left Garamba National Park extremely 
vulnerable to wildlife crime, resulting in serious declines in the park’s key species.    

Furthermore, the LRA has been an actor involved in poaching. The situation of insecurity in the 
area that the LRA has contributed to since 2005, as it looked for shelter in north-eastern DRC 
(and before them the SPLA in the 1990s), has made it partly responsible for creating the 
conditions where Garamba’s biodiversity has been easily exploited by numerous actors, 
including the Congolese military, the FARDC and allegedly even the UPDF.  

3.  How is socio-economic security undermined by trafficking and poor conservation, 

both at local and national levels?   

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The fragile security situation around Garamba, partly created by wildlife crime, has definitely 
affected the local populations’ socio-economic and human security. Hundreds of thousands of 
Congolese have been displaced internally in the Uele provinces, to a major extent due to the 
LRA terror. 

4.  How does wildlife trafficking undermine the rule of law and legitimate institutions 

(notably because of the links with corruption)?   

The rule of law has always been weak in this part of the Congo and can even be considered to 
have enabled massive poaching, as we have witnessed over past years. Nevertheless, the 
FARDC’s rent-seeking behaviour, and its misconduct towards local populations, has definitely 
further affected the level of trust in Congolese institutions. 

5.  How does wildlife-related insecurity (whether in term of conflict or from a socio-

economic point of view) contribute to migration flows (intra-state, inter-state, 
global)?  

The LRA settled in Garamba around 2005/2006. The 2008 counter-LRA military operation 
provoked retaliation attacks against Haut-Uele’s local population (the ‘Christmas Massacres’). 
The climate of fear that reigned over the province for the following years caused massive 
displacements. In 2012, the UNHCR reported about 320 000 IDPs in Bas- and Haut-Uele as a 
result of LRA activity, while another 30 000 Congolese refugees had fled to CAR and South-
Sudan. 

6.  How are approaches being applied to address the wildlife-security nexus as a 

basis for development and improving security? 

The Garamba National Park has gone through a major change in the past few years. Although 
African Parks has had a PPP with the GNP since 2005, various factors, including security and the 
very real threat of the LRA, hindered the effective expansion of wildlife protection activities. In 
the past 2 years, significantly increased budgets, cooperation with the military and the 
professionalisation of the law enforcement capability has allowed operations to extend to many 
new areas of the park, particularly the northern sector. A redoubling of serious technical 
management efforts started in 2015 and then major increases in the budget since mid-2016 
have permitted a robust increase in activities and their impact. The renegotiation and signature 
of the renewed management contract for the park in January 2016 also helped to stabilise the 
situation institutionally and eased tensions between ICCN and APN, which had been negatively 
impacting operational abilities. Overall, these factors have greatly helped, in a short time 
period, to help stabilise the park management, and create a renewed strategy to progressively 
project security and governance to much of the GNP, which had not been possible before.   

Suggestions for the way forward for the next 5 years 

1. Programmes/activities 
Garamba’s management as a micro-hub of good governance appears to be an efficient way to 
build conservation in a context of failing governance and insecurity. However, a spillover of 
these good practices from Garamba’s zone of good governance to the wider DRC context should 
not be taken for granted. Long-term success for conservation in the area will require more 
pressure, including by international donors, on general governance issues, such as the 
absence of the rule of law, and the misconduct of state security forces. Furthermore, the park’s 
management should make careful efforts to ensure that its strategy is internalised by its 
Congolese partners, including the ICCN and local authorities. This can be illustrated by the case 
of the FARDC. The integration of some soldiers within the ranger force has decreased their basic 
involvement in wildlife crime, but is not a structural solution. Soldiers, for example, continue to 
levy illegal taxes on the local population. 

The GNP management recognises the need for coordination and conservation-related 
information gathering. The park aims to increase investments in information gathering, also 
beyond the limits of the park. Furthermore, through increasing coordination with neighbouring 

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protected areas (Bili Uele, largely in Bas-Uele province, Chinko in CAR and Lantoto in South 
Sudan), it wants to create synergies and a stable corridor between the protected areas in the 
long term. Indeed, as many of the security issues affecting the GNP are regional issues, they 
cannot be solved at the local, provincial or even national level. Supporting the tri-border 
coordination development process, including with security forces and the UN, is a top priority.  

2. Policy initiatives 
The park’s plan to coordinate with neighbouring parks is therefore a good example for the 
national and regional authorities in the area. The stakeholders should also increase efforts to 
develop a regional strategy to deal with transhumance pastoralists, the LRA, and the (potential) 
spillover of the CAR and South Sudanese crises. Adequate coordination has, however, proved to 
be a challenge between various UN organisations, and between various authorities, which has 
been illustrated by various cases, including the Mbororo and recent refugee crisis. Nevertheless 
these actors do need to be involved in any regional approach to deal with insecurity. 

The park’s renewed commitment to develop a strategy to engage neighbouring communities is 
an interesting and timely development. In order to guarantee local ownership in the programme 
and a sustainable impact, the development of a local development strategy, through an 
inclusive process, is of major importance. 

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Maps 

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Case study 11. Niassa National Reserve Landscape (Mozambique) 

Site name and location: Niassa National Reserve, northern Mozambique  

Introduction  
Niassa National Reserve (NNR) is situated in northern Mozambique and spans 42 300 km2, 
which makes it the country’s largest protected area, and the third largest protected area in 
Africa. The NNR is one of Africa’s most iconic wilderness areas. It is connected to the Selous 
Game Reserve in Tanzania to its north, via the Selous-Niassa corridor, which creates a 
continuous connection for wildlife between the two reserves. Tanzania’s Selous Game Reserve 
lies 160 km north of the Rovuma river, which forms the international border as well as the 
northern border of the Niassa National Reserve. Together, the NNR, the Selous Game Reserve 
and the surrounding protected areas form a massive ~150 000 km2 trans-frontier conservation 
area.  

The region is renowned for having the largest and best-preserved tracts of miombo woodland 
left in Africa, which are globally important for carbon storage and sequestration. These 
woodlands also provide critical habitat for many of Africa’s wide-ranging species and threatened 
mega-fauna, supporting Mozambique’s largest populations of savannah elephant, besides 
important regional populations of Cape buffalo, impala, sable antelope, greater kudu and 
hartebeest. The reserve is particularly important for the protection of the Niassa wildebeest, 
Crawshays zebra, Roosevelt sable, African wild dog, leopard and lion. In addition, the reserve 
hosts over 400 bird species including important vulture and raptor populations, as well as a 
number of species of endemic reptiles and amphibians. 

The NNR also supports a growing population of approximately 45 000 people who live within the 
reserve boundaries in three large district towns, Mecula, Mavago and Negomano, and ~40 
smaller scattered towns and villages. 

The NNR was officially proclaimed a national reserve in 1954, but then largely abandoned when 
Mozambique’s civil conflict started in 1975. The reserve did not receive effective protection until 
the end of the Mozambican Civil War between the governing party FRELIMO and the opposing 
rebel force RENAMO, with the signing of the Rome General Peace Accords in 1992. Since then, 
the Mozambican Government, with significant support from partners, has set up management 
systems in order to protect the ecology of northern Mozambique. Since October 2012, the 
Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) has taken on the responsibility of co-managing the NNR, 
together with the National Administration for Conservation Areas (ANAC) in Mozambique under 
MITADER.  

The NNR is divided into 16 management units, 13 of which are managed under concession 
agreements with 11 different organisations. Nine of the 16 blocks are zoned for hunting, whilst 
the 6 are zoned for photographic tourism. Five of the 16 blocks rely almost completely on 
philanthropy and are managed for conservation outcomes: 3 of these blocks are managed by 
Chuilexi Conservancy with significant FFI support, while the Niassa Carnivore Project and Niassa 
Wilderness each manage 1 block. 

The concession agreements (which predate the ANAC-WCS co-management agreement) mostly 
provide long-term leases of the concession units. The concession holders are responsible for 
anti-poaching, wildlife monitoring, the implementation of community programmes, 
infrastructure development, provision of vehicles and equipment, and the development of 
tourism. Operational plans and activities need to be coordinated with the reserve’s management 
authority. 

Conservation efforts are focused on addressing threats to key conservation targets in the 
reserve. These include miombo woodland, the inselberg systems, the riparian and river 
systems, elephant and large carnivores. Actions to tackle these threats include: i) anti-poaching 
and law enforcement to stop high-value poaching, bushmeat poaching, artisanal mining, illegal 
fishing and illegal logging, ii) implementing community programmes to improve sustainable 

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natural resource management programmes, iii) establishing improved governance and 
management systems to help reconcile conservation and development initiatives over the longer 
term, iv) capacity building programmes, and v) research and monitoring programmes. 

This case study report is based on written information provided by WCS and ANAC Mozambique 
staff, review of reports and documents, and open source research. 

Key wildlife/security issues identified at this site 
The key threats to wildlife species in the Niassa National Reserve are ivory poaching for the 
international illegal trade, poaching for local bushmeat trade, human-wildlife conflict revenge 
killing, poisoning (mostly targeting lion), snaring, illegal logging, unmanaged agricultural 
expansion and habitat/ corridor destruction, illegal artisanal mining, illegal fishing and excessive 
wildfires. Species targeted mostly include wildlife: elephant, lion, leopard, hippo, all bushmeat 
species and pangolin; and hardwoods: blackwood, African teak, pod mahogany, etc. 

These threats are wide-reaching, critically endangering key species and the habitats they 
depend upon. The main groups responsible for creating threats to the reserve are (i) trans-
boundary groups entering the reserve from Tanzania to poach (particularly ivory and timber), 
(ii) groups of foreigners and nationals entering the reserve from within Mozambique to poach, 
and (iii) groups living within the reserve. 

The organised nature of the illegal wildlife trade and the value of the trade mean that the stakes 
are rising. Armed poachers and illegal mining (large groups of artisanal miners) are the main 
security threats, which are interlinked.  

Poaching 

•  Elephant: The main wildlife crime issue in Niassa has been, and continues to be, elephant 
poaching. Ivory poaching increased significantly 10 years ago. In 2016, the elephant 
population experienced its steepest decline and the lowest recorded population estimate 
was recorded since monitoring started in 1998. Whilst the average estimated population 
was around 14 000 animals (with the exception of the 2009 surveys, which are assumed 
to have been overestimated/ incorrect), survey results indicate the population was 
reduced by 60 % between 2011 and 2016. It is estimated that, in the last 5 years, more 
than 8 200 elephants were lost in Niassa and 1 531 elephants in the southern extension. 
The survey results also recorded the highest number of carcasses of any earlier survey. 
With elephant populations going down and poaching levels remaining high, the population 
is in imminent danger of further reduction. The population estimate for NNR elephants in 
October 2016 was 3 675 animals, which indicates a continuing decreasing trend from 
4 441 animals in 2014 and equates to a loss of 766 animals or a reduction of over 17 %.  

Two types of poachers have been identified: i) professional poachers from both inside and 
outside the area, often colluding with local specialists for logistics, guiding, tracking, 
and/or transport; ii) members of local communities within the NNR as well as people from 
communities neighbouring the NNR. These also tend to be professional in that they can 
take down an elephant with a single high-calibre shot. Much less professional groups of 
organised criminals rent arms (AK-47s), sometimes from the police/army, who shoot 
indiscriminately into herds, killing animals without ivory and wounding many that die 
later where the poachers don’t find them. Foreigners, mostly Tanzanians, are involved in 
both types of poaching groups. There is good intelligence naming many alleged local 
poachers, who are heroes in the eyes of many underemployed young men and, along 
with other criminals, are developing into being the patrons of their communities, resulting 
in their protection. Some poachers have been caught and documents apprehended.  

Ivory is mostly trafficked out to the north into Tanzania or east to Balama, Montepuez, 
Magude and then on to Pemba/Nacala and out to Asia. Despite successful efforts to 
gather intelligence about the actors involved, prosecution success has been very limited, 

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apart from the successful prosecution of a gang of 6 poachers in 2014 (including 
‘kingpins’ Antonio Bernardo and Paulo Nyenje)61. 

• 

Lion and leopard: Other wildlife population estimates have remained stable overall, with 
an indication of a possible upward trend for some species over the last 2 years. However, 
threats to various species are increasing as the Asian market for lion and leopard parts 
(bones, claws, canines, skins) develops, leading to an increase in poisoning incidents. 
Leopards are snared for their skins62; lion poisoning has recently started and is getting 
worse63. Those responsible are local community members who are paid to do it. 

•  Bushmeat: Bushmeat poaching, especially in the west of the reserve, is on the increase 
too as the commercial bush trade is expanding. This is facilitated by the meat being 
easily transported (e.g. motorbikes) into the provincial capital (Lichinga). However, there 
has been a major reduction in the frequency and spatial extent of snare lines recorded 
between 2011 and 2016 because of increased patrols and efforts to remove them. There 
is a suspicion that the bushmeat poaching is done by local people who specialise in this. 
Illegal mining, illegal logging and excessive fishing also drive bushmeat poaching, 
evidenced by a preponderance of snares around encampments. 

Illegal logging 
There is some illegal logging along the northern boundary and significant logging specifically in 
the northeast of the NNR where road access is good and the Unity Bridge is situated. Illegal 
logging has increased over the last 5 years in this area. Quantitative reports indicate that along 
the northern-central boundary, commercial loggers, both from Tanzania and Mozambique and 
often backed by the Chinese, are coming into the reserve and targeting select species for 
exploitation. In the east, it is not uncommon to find Chinese loggers operating in the forestry 
blocks abutting the reserve. Extensive logging within the northeast corner of the reserve has 
resulted in habitat degradation in the area and decreases in wildlife populations. 

A recent study on forest loss in NNR found that the reserve lost 0.9 % of its forest between 
2001 and 2014, mostly through agricultural expansion. Although this is substantial, it is lower 
than in the surrounding region, with some adjacent districts losing up to 10 % of their forest 
extent. This suggests that the NNR is performing relatively well at limiting forest loss within its 
boundaries given external pressure, and supports assessments suggesting protected areas are 
effectively conserving habitat and biodiversity. The results also confirm a well-known pattern 
that protected areas on the African continent and globally are becoming increasingly isolated by 
land clearance beyond their boundaries. The authors noted that this is concerning since 
degradation around a protected area strongly predisposes it to future degradation within its 
borders.64 

There are two main groups driving illegal logging. The first is loggers working for Chinese 
companies that have concessions just outside NNR but who are making incursions into the 
reserve and taking complete logs. Trucks have been confiscated and tracks out of the reserve 
can be followed. The other group is more artisanal and involves chain-sawing planks in the 
forest and carrying them out by foot across the Rovuma river to markets in Tanzania. Chinese 
enterprises are known to be involved in trafficking the timber out of Mozambique to destinations 
in Asia. There is evidence to suggest a link between actors involved in both timber and ivory 
trafficking from Mozambique; for example, in 2016 Vietnamese Customs seized half a ton of 
ivory tusks hidden in a timber shipment from Mozambique.65 

61 Blum C. (2016). Transnational Organized Crime in Southern Africa and Mozambique. Friedrich-Ebert- Stifung 
Mozambique. http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/mosambik/13193.pdf  
62 See overview of threats to large carnivores in Niassa: http://www.niassalion.org/threats.php  
63 In 2015 four lions were found poisoned in NNR: 
https://www.facebook.com/niassalionproject/posts/989303987774384 
64 Allan J.R., F. Grossmann, R. Craig, Al Nelson, J. Maina, K. Flower, J. Brampton, J.B. Deffontaines, C. Miguel, B. 
Araquechande and J.E.M. Watson (2017). Patterns of forest loss in one of Africa’s last remaining wilderness areas: 
Niassa National reserve (northern Mozambique). Parks, 23(2), 39-50. DOI: 10.2305/IUCN.CH.2017.PARKS-23-2JRA.en 
65 VN Express (7 October 2016). Vietnam seizes half a ton of illegal ivory. https://e.vnexpress.net/news/news/vietnam-
seizes-half-a-ton-of-illegal-ivory-3480238.html  

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Artisanal mining 
The artisanal mining of gold and precious stones (including rubies in some areas) started 
around 2014 and is increasing significantly; now there are some established settlements where 
large groups congregate – estimates of some settlements exceed 1 000 people. Artisanal mining 
is conducted both by local community members and poor people from all around the area, and 
also by itinerant speculators from all over Africa.  

In the mining camps, all kinds of illegal activities are taking place, including contraband 
smuggling, drugs, prostitution and poaching in all its forms. The camps are also easy bases for 
ivory poachers. As such, mining activities have exacerbated or created new threats to the 
conservation targets of the reserve. In addition to the increased elephant and bushmeat 
poaching these include pollution, burning, land-use change and perhaps the greatest threat 
from mining: mercury pollution of the waterways.  

Illegal mining also poses security risks. The large numbers of people involved in illegal mining 
makes any actions against them dangerous. There was an incident at the end of 2016 when 
local villagers attacked a concession operator's camp after illegal miners were arrested and 
turned over to the competent authorities. Some staff were molested and property damaged. in 
November 2017 there was an incident between the authorities and local illegal miners, during 
which a police officer was badly beaten. In the past, threats were rumoured that a mob would 
attack the reserve’s headquarters if the scouts continued to arrest miners. 

Observations indicate that illegal logging and artisanal mining have so far remained spatially 
contained in well-defined areas within the reserve. 

Organised crime and corruption 
In recent years wildlife crime (centred around ivory) and illegal timber harvesting in the reserve 
has become a great deal more organised, and corruption is significant. Mozambique’s law 
enforcement system is very weak as a result of lack of capacity (human and financial), and 
some incompetence and corruption, thus making it ineffective in responding to the organised 
criminal groups involved in wildlife and associated crimes is limited. Examples include the 
following: 

•  Some border police and environmental police are complicit in allowing the passage of 

illegally trafficked products; 

•  Some corrupt NNR and concession operators’ scouts are passing information to poachers 

on anti-poaching activities, and are involved in illegal bushmeat trade; 

•  Regular police and army staff lend arms to poachers, some of which have been 

apprehended more than once; 

• 

Local politicians and FRELIMO (governing party) veterans are also alleged to be involved 
in different ways; 

•  Some local judicial authorities are also reported to be corrupt. 

Wildlife crime in Niassa does not necessarily have too strong an impact on physical security 
from armed groups or bandits yet, but this is changing. See the discussion on armed robbery 
incidents below. With declining elephant numbers banditry may increase as armed poachers still 
seek to make money. However, it has led to a significant breakdown in governance and the rule 
of law, through money being available for corruption and the wildlife crime networks becoming 
more organised. 

Armed poachers are obviously a direct threat to wildlife. The fact that they have access to arms 
from corrupt authorities is a threat to security as these arms could very easily fall into the 
wrong hands.  

Other wildlife/security factors 

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Local communities 
The main ethnic group residing in the reserve are the Jao people, but there are also Makua, 
Swahili and Makonde. These communities are very poor and lack adequate human and animal 
health resources and services, education, regular access to a clean water supply, sufficient 
sanitation to avoid disease transference, and access to economic opportunities. Their income is 
based on subsistence agriculture (shifting slash-and-burn agriculture), charcoal, small-scale 
livestock, fishing in some areas, collecting non-timber forest products such as honey. Some 
people are trading.  

These communities perceive the reserve negatively because they believe that they derive 
insufficient benefits from it, whereas they see the wildlife as a threat (crop raiding). Some 
benefit from wildlife crime financially – ivory, lion bones, commercial bushmeat. Most 
households consume bushmeat regularly.   

Armed groups 
Mob violence occurs spontaneously and easily in Mozambique. There has been some banditry 
associated with weak governance and the domestic conflict in Mozambique. There are no 
organised armed groups within the limits of the reserve but there seem to be some Renamo 
(opposition party) ‘reservists’ in an area south of the reserve, who blocked a district road in 
2016. Furthermore, there is now a locally established Islamist rebel group to the east, whose 
closest area of operations may be about 100 to 150 km away, but this is near two of the 
centres where ivory, precious stones and gold are trafficked and where there is very poor 
governance. This Islamist group is building support to oppose government legitimacy based on 
high youth unemployment, elite capture of the foreign investment coming to the area (e.g. the 
gas resources and associated benefits on the coast), and very little government investment in 
social services or economic development. The government is now taking some action after 30 
hooded men from this group tried to take over the village of Mocímboa da Praia (Cabo Delgado) 
in October 2017 and between 16 and 20 people were shot dead. There are concerns that 
government intervention if not handled carefully may end up recruiting more people to the 
cause opposing government legitimacy. 

Arms trafficking 
Hunting rifles are trafficked in the area; there are also AK-47s stemming from civil war times 
but which are still circulating en masse in Mozambique.66 This does impact wildlife crimes in the 
area, as specialist poaching groups come in with hunting rifles and some AK-47s in support. 

Migrants 
Mining opportunities and other natural resources in the area have attracted migrants, not only 
in the reserve but also to the ruby mines about 100 km to the east. There is frequent visitation 
and immigration by Tanzanians across the northern border for many reasons, including 
accessing reserve resources. Some stay for only short periods, some take up residence in the 
reserve and others pass through the reserve to more southern destinations. Migrants also come 
from Malawi and Somalia, and some precious stone buyers from Myanmar and Thailand began 
arriving around 2011. 

These migrants have an impact on security and wildlife in the area, as the towns where the 
migrants are (Montepuez and Balama) have become local centres for ivory trafficking, facilitated 
by corrupt police and officials. 

Security risks to those involved in wildlife protection 
The fact that poachers are armed (frequently with AK-47s) makes confrontations dangerous, 
especially for under-armed scouts. Armed confrontations with poachers are not uncommon, with 
gunfire exchanged. Threats are made to scouts and NNR staff to stop but the full extent of this 
is not known. Nevertheless, in December 2017, armed poachers wanting information on scout 
movements allegedly beat up two cooks working at a scout outpost. The links between the 

66 Blum C. (2016). Op cit.  

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various illegal activities and the patronage of some in authority means that organised crime is 
entrenched and therefore difficult to address. Those that try are at personal risk. 

In April 2017, a NNR management vehicle was ambushed, staff salaries stolen by armed bandits 
and one member of staff was shot in the leg. It is suspected that such banditry is linked to 
organised poaching groups. 

As mentioned above, illegal mining also poses security risks to those working to protect the 
reserve, as in the past miners and their supporters have responded violently to actions against 
the camps.  

As with mining camps, the camps of illegal loggers and fishermen can become dens of various 
associated illegal activities. This is especially the case with illegal logging. The amount of money 
and the number of stakeholders involved means that disrupting these interests affects many 
people. Recent law enforcement activities have disrupted illegal logging with considerable 
volumes of pre-cut timber being confiscated, and because various groups have invested in 
cutting the timber, such losses are likely irritating the investors. A real concern is that they will 
take reactive action that threatens the security of law enforcement agents. 

Management approaches applied to address these issues/threats 
The following management approaches are being applied in Niassa National Reserve: 

Co-management of the protected area (government and WCS)  
Co-management of the reserve was formalised through a MoU between WCS Mozambique and 
the Government of Mozambique, dated 9 October 2012 and valid until 9 January 2016. A new 
agreement is in the final stages of negotiation and is proposed to be for 25 years between WCS 
and the MITADER. The agreement format is being standardised as far as possible with those for 
other conservation areas and other co-management partnerships. 

The objectives of this approach are collaboration between the parties in terms of the co-
management of NNR by opening up the potential socio-economic development of the area, and 
ensuring the sustainable flow of benefits and community development through the following: 

•  Strengthen the management of the NNR, including by developing and implementing a 
General Management Plan (GMP), which will be the main mechanism to guide the 
management actions in the NNR; 

• 

Improve the conservation and development of the NNR; 

•  Develop and implement a strategy for the sustainable management of natural resources 

in the NNR, including by supporting and coordinating community development 
programmes; 

•  Develop conservation and management capacity in the NNR, with the objective of 

gradually transferring the additional management responsibilities of WCS NNR staff to 
government staff in the NNR. 

Field level anti-poaching activities (government and NGO-led) 
The reserve’s management has around 90 scouts who are responsible for patrolling the reserve. 
The Law Enforcement Department is bestowed with authority for arrests, etc. through the 
warden, who is currently paid by the WCS. Law enforcement activities involve coordination with 
concession operators' scout teams (more than 150), environmental police, border police and 
regular police. There are joint and/or coordinated patrols and responses to incidents with 
concession operator’s scout teams. The environmental police have been invited to share the 
manning of gates on the main thoroughfare into the NNR.  

Efforts are ongoing to further improve coordination. However, it is known that there are corrupt 
officials in all these forces, so care is always needed when sharing sensitive information.  

Scout units are trained but need continuous refresher courses; firearms and ammunition are 
limited. Newly purchased weapons are being held up by the police due to bureaucracy but 

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reportedly there is an underlying concern that the NNR is not capable of managing them well 
enough. The WCS has noted that this is frustrating, considering that poachers have been found 
in possession of police AK-47s.  

SMART (Spatial Monitoring and Reporting Tool) is used for patrolling to some extent but is 
limited due to a shortage of devices and batteries but new ones are on order. Data on patrol 
efforts and results is still incomplete but improving. Elephant poachers are only occasionally 
caught red-handed but illegal miners, bushmeat poachers and fishermen are regularly 
apprehended and snare lines removed. A simple report is sent to the ANAC quarterly 
summarising the metrics, which are comparable to data from other conservation areas in 
Mozambique. 

Landscape/land-use planning and zoning  
This is being attempted under the current GMP exercise. New regulations to the Conservation 
Law are expected, which will define 4 zones; coarse-level zoning is also expected to be 
required. As the reserve is divided into management units, those allocated for hunting are 
proposed to be primarily controlled use zones, whilst those allocated for ecotourism will be 
primarily total protection zones. In both zones, areas already inhabited with communities will be 
designated as community development zones. The small areas where tourism infrastructure is, 
or will be, developed will be designated as tourism development zones. Around community 
development zones inside total protection zones, controlled use zones will be identified that will 
require more detailed micro-zoning to be undertaken whilst implementing the GMP. Likewise, 
total protection wildlife corridor zones are proposed between community development and 
controlled use zones where ribbon development follows roads.  

The historic buffer zone from the 1999 designation of the reserve will remain in force although it 
is not being used to define the zone’s use or management recommendations as the 
management units that are (mostly) contracted out to concession operators determine 
management decisions. The Conservation, Community and Tourism Department will lead the 
process of micro-zoning with support from colleagues in other departments, consultants and in 
consultation with stakeholders and the NNR leadership 

Micro-zoning initiatives are planned and underway in imminently threatened areas to try and 
control the agricultural sprawl as human pressure increases. 

Community-based programmes and benefit sharing with communities 
Mozambique has a benefit-sharing mechanism for conservation areas that require 80 % of the 
concession and entrance fees to be returned to the NNR. Of this, 80 % (i.e. 64 %) finances the 
NNR management, and 20 % (i.e. 16 %) goes directly to local communities. Local communities 
are represented by elected Natural Resource Management Committees, which have bank 
accounts and make plans and implement the spending of the community portion of the funds. 
This is supported and advised by the NNR and some partner concession operators’ community 
programmes. 

Reportedly, however, these fees take a long time to get to the local communities. Some of the 
concessionaires have community programmes but given the size and scale of the area this is 
not enough to improve the livelihoods of the ~45 000 people living in the reserve.  

The reserve is currently investing in its community team and expects to liaise a lot more with 
local communities in the coming months and years. Local communities were engaged during the 
development of the updated GMP for the NNR and helped define the NNR’s vision for the next 
decade. The NNR’s new GMP, which will run from 2017 to 2027, is the first to explicitly 
acknowledge local community members as key stakeholders and partners in the NNR’s future, 
and to zone sections of the reserve explicitly for community use and development. 

Benefits derived from the reserve by local communities through the reserve’s management and 
concession operators include:  

•  permanent and seasonal employment (between 75 and 80 % are from local villages in 

the NNR; 

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• 

community service contracts for road maintenance, airstrip clearing, etc.; 

•  human-wildlife conflict (HWC) prevention and mitigation by the NNR and some 

concession operators through the provision of electric fences and other wildlife repelling 
technologies, as well as dealing with problem animals; 

• 

community hunting quotas, although this is not as well managed as it should be, as quota 
setting is centralised in the ANAC and isn't always appropriate for the needs of 
communities; 

• 

access beyond public roads and improved infrastructure; 

•  purchase of local goods and other supplies by both NNR management and concession 

operators; 

• 

community development programmes, relating to health, education, agriculture and 
livestock, and alternative livelihoods.  

The intention is to establish a link between these benefits and the communities’ conservation 
performance, for example a community with proportionately more elephant poaching in its 
vicinity should receive less of the 20 % cash benefit than those with less poaching, or 
communities where snaring is rife should get a reduced community quota, etc. One concession 
operator has a successful formal agreement with a local community based on this principle, and 
they and the NNR management are hoping to roll out a similar approach across the reserve. 

Challenges 
According to WCS Mozambique, the success of these management approaches has so far been 
limited: the reserve is still losing wildlife and organised crime is still operating fairly freely and 
undermining the rule of law and governance in the region. Different management approaches 
are being applied at individual management unit level, and at the reserve level most are 
actually only covering a part of the large reserve. In order to enhance the overall consistency 
and effectiveness of the various successful approaches they need to be expanded to key areas 
across the landscape and surrounding areas in northern Mozambique. Co-management, 
combining WCS support to the ANAC for overall reserve management with well-regulated 
concession operator management, of their units is deemed to be a best practice that should be 
continued. 

Summary 
1.  Where does wildlife trafficking trigger conflicts, fuel existing unrest or lead to 

scaled-up conflicts (from local to national/regional, international)? 

There are neither any organised armed groups nor organised armed conflict in or around the 
reserve. However, the easy availability to poachers of AK-47s still present in the country from 
the past historic conflict, as well as through their collaboration with police and army officials, 
has had a negative impact on security. 

Heavily armed poachers pose a security threat to under-armed scouts, with armed 
confrontations not uncommon, and scouts and NNR staff receiving threats to stay clear. Security 
risks are exacerbated by the involvement of organised crime syndicates and the patronage of 
high-level government representatives. Mining camps also pose a threat to those working to 
protect the reserve, where miners have responded violently to actions against the camps, and 
which are havens for various other illegal activities.  

2.  Where have conflicts triggered or fuelled wildlife trafficking or hampered 

conservation? 

Niassa’s wildlife and other natural resources are increasingly threatened by external, criminal 
actors abusing the weak governance in the region. Key threats identified are: 

• 

ivory poaching, which is the main wildlife crime threat in Niassa. Since 2010, the reserve 
has seen a massive surge in ivory poaching, which peaked in 2013/2014, resulting in a 
serious decline of elephant populations, from 20 364 in 2009 to an estimated 3 675 in 

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2016. Recently, poachers have turned to poisoning lions to feed demands for their body 
parts in Asia. 

•  poaching lion parts, which is on the increase. Poachers often use poisoned baits that are 

indiscriminate and may kill juveniles and other carnivores and scavengers. 

• 

the considerable illegal logging of precious timber species. Chinese enterprises are known 
to be involved in trafficking the timber to destinations in Asia, and there is evidence to 
suggest a link between the actors involved in both timber and ivory trafficking from 
Mozambique.  

•  mining of gold and precious stones, which is also a challenge for conservation efforts in 

NNR. Mining camps and their inhabitants have led to an increase in elephant and 
bushmeat poaching, wood burning, land-use change and mercury polluting the 
waterways. 

3.  How is socio-economic security undermined by trafficking and poor conservation, 

both at local and national levels? 

The deterioration of the landscape and the unsustainable use of natural resources are reducing 
the availability of ecosystem services that communities living within the reserve depend upon, 
and therefore impact their socio-economic security. The attraction of getting rich from illegal 
activity is undermining interest in youth to work towards more traditional and sustainable 
livelihood strategies, such as agriculture and livestock rearing. Moreover, the mining camps that 
harbour contraband smugglers and are associated with drug crimes and prostitution are likely to 
attract youth and other vulnerable members of local communities residing in the reserve.  

4.  How does wildlife trafficking undermine the rule of law and legitimate institutions 

(notably because of the links with corruption)?  

The presence of ivory and high-value timber in Niassa in combination with weak governance 
systems, rule of law and endemic corruption has attracted (Asian) organised crime syndicates. 
Ivory poaching and illegal timber logging have spiked and fuelled corruption. Officials in the 
police (border, environmental and regular police) and the army, local politicians, FRELIMO 
veterans and members of the judiciary are facilitating the situation. The impacts of corruption 
and organised crime will be felt in the long term as they destroy state systems and stifle 
development. That this is happening on an international border amplifies these issues. Violent 
protests against law enforcement forces and failure to convict perpetrators further undermines 
legitimate institutions. 

5.  How does wildlife-related insecurity (whether in term of conflict or from a socio-

economic point of view) contribute to migration flows (intra-state, inter-state, 
global)?  

Socio-economic insecurity caused by illegal natural resource extraction has not (yet) been 
observed to be a cause for migration from the area. The reserve’s natural resources, gold and 
precious stones in particular, have however attracted migrants from Tanzania, Malawi, Somalia 
and beyond, and some precious stone buyers from Myanmar and Thailand started arriving 
around 2011.  

Suggestions for the way forward for the next 5 years 

1. Programmes/activities 
The focus of the GMP for the next 10 years is on addressing the threats to the NNR, as detailed 
above. A large part relates to enhanced law enforcement against elephant and lion poaching, 
bushmeat hunting, illegal mining and illegal logging. The second area of work relates to 
community development: zoning where different community development activities can take 
place and making it more productive where it is allowed. Conservation education and alternative 
livelihoods will also be important components. The third area of work revolves around 
concession management development and overall business planning for the NNR to 
increase internal revenues that can support NNR management in the longer term.  

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Long-term support is required to address the ivory poaching surge and other problems in Niassa 
Reserve, which is a crucially important protected area in Sub-Saharan Africa. A consistent 
funding of core salaries for 10 years is needed to improve and expand the impact of 
conservation efforts in the area.  

The following recommendations are made to the ANAC, WCS and other key stakeholders for the 
NNR to address the key wildlife crime-security issues that have been identified: 

• 

(Seek external financial and technical support/expert advice to) Establish a mechanism 
for relevant stakeholders (both NGO and governmental agencies) to coordinate 
intelligence gathering and share intelligence on ivory poaching and ivory trafficking rings 
active in and around the reserve; compile evidence briefs on such key individuals 
involved and push for competent law enforcement bodies to investigate and prosecute 
suspects.  

•  Similarly, concerted efforts should be made to clamp down on illegal logging for 

commercial trade and to push for the investigation and prosecution of businesses fuelling 
the logging. 

•  Multi-agency crackdowns should be conducted to remove illegal mining camps and/or the 

criminal elements identified that operate within the camps. 

Recommendations to central bodies of the Government of Mozambique: 

•  To legitimise the reserve’s co-management through an effective agreement that gives 

power to the Reserve Management Authority to make decisions without interference and 
to be treated as a legal entity that deserves a higher level of respect in relation to what 
happens inside the reserve.  

•  To contribute more financial resources to the reserve, particularly to its law enforcement 

capacity.  

•  To provide greater support from central government level to counter local political power 
plays and patronage, such as the issuing of mining licences inside the reserve to war 
veterans. 

2. Policy initiatives 

•  On a policy level, the Government of Mozambique is recommended to provide a 

consistent policy and legal framework, and create an enabling environment for both 
conservation and efforts to tackle wildlife crime. 

•  More internal policy coherence is also required for other branches of government to 
support conservation through the efficient support of issues such as importation of 
essential goods, release of firearms and ammunition, issuance of visas for staff and 
consultants, aviation licensing, etc. 

•  And crucially important, the Government of Mozambique should launch a zero-tolerance 
policy against the corruption underpinning many of the wildlife crime-security challenges 
that the NNR and Mozambique as a whole face. This includes enlisting the support of the 
judiciary to impose firmer sanctions on those facing corruption charges. 

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in Sub-Saharan Africa  

Maps 

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