COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS Enhancing the accession process - A credible EU perspective for the Western Balkans
Date: 2020-02-05
Institutions: Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations, European Commission
Subjects: Western Balkans, accession criteria, accession negotiations, administrative reform, democracy, economic reform, rule of law

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  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 5.2.2020  COM(2020) 57 final  COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS Enhancing the accession process - A credible EU perspective for the Western Balkans  
 
 
Enhancing the accession process – A credible EU perspective for the Western Balkans   

I) 

Introduction 

The  European  Union  and  its  Member  States  have  consistently,  since  the  Feira  and 
Thessaloniki  Summits  in  2000  and  2003,  expressed  their  unequivocal  support  for  the 
European  perspective  of  the  Western  Balkans.  The  Council  conclusions  adopted  at  the 
General Affairs Council in June 2019 has also reaffirmed  “its commitment to enlargement, 
which  remains  a  key  policy  of  the  European  Union,  in  line  with  the  renewed  consensus  on 
enlargement  approved  by  the  European  Council  on  14  and  15  December  2006  and 
subsequent  Council  conclusions.”  At  the  Council  in  November  2019,  there  was  a  common 
understanding  of  the  usefulness  of  examining  the  effectiveness  of  the  accession  negotiation 
process. 

This firm, merit-based prospect of full EU membership for the Western Balkans is in the 
Union's  very  own  political,  security  and  economic  interest.  In  times  of  increasing  global 
challenges  and  divisions,  it  remains  more  than  ever  a  geostrategic  investment  in  a  stable, 
strong and united Europe. A credible accession perspective is the key incentive and driver of 
transformation in the region and thus enhances our collective security and prosperity. It is a 
key tool to promote democracy, rule of law and the respect for fundamental rights, which are 
also the main engines of economic integration and the essential anchor for fostering regional 
reconciliation  and  stability.  Maintaining  and  enhancing  this  policy  is  thus  indispensable  for 
the  EU’s  credibility,  for  the  EU’  success  and  for  the  EU’s  influence  in  the  region  and 
beyond - especially at times of heightened geopolitical competition.  

However,  it  is  also  clear  that  the  effectiveness  of  the  overall  accession  process  and  of  its 
implementation  must  be  improved  further.  While  the  strategic  direction  of  the  policy 
remains more valid than ever, it must get much better traction on the ground.  

Despite  successive  reforms,  such  as  the  new  approach  on  the  rule  of  law,  the  focus  on  the 
fundamentals  and  the  improvements  under  the  Commission’s  2018  Western  Balkans 
Strategy1, the process needs to be better equipped to deal with structural weaknesses in the 
countries, in particular in the area of the fundamentals.  

It  is  of  major  importance  to  build  more  trust  among  all  stakeholders  and  to  enhance  the 
accession  process  and  make  it  more  effective.  It  has  to  become  more  predictable,  more 
credible - based on objective criteria and  rigorous positive and negative  conditionality, and 
reversibility - more dynamic and subject to stronger political steering. 

This Communication sets out the Commission’s concrete proposals for strengthening the 
whole  accession  process.  Their  overall  aim  is  to  enhance  credibility  and  trust  on  both  sides 
and  yield  better  results  on  the  ground.  The  proposed  changes  can  be  accommodated  within 
existing negotiating frameworks, ensuring a level playing field in the region. This means that 
the negotiating frameworks for Serbia and Montenegro will not be amended but the proposed 
changes could be accommodated within the existing frameworks with the agreement of these 
two countries. 

1 A credible enlargement perspective for and enhanced EU engagement with the Western Balkans, COM(2018) 
65 final 

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A core objective of the European Union’s engagement with the Western Balkans is to prepare 
them  to  meet  all  the  requirements  of  membership.  This  includes  supporting  fundamental 
democratic, rule of law and economic reforms and alignment with core European values. 
This will in turn foster solid and accelerated economic growth and social convergence.  

Furthermore, for the accession process to be more effective, strategic communication will be 
instrumental.  It  is  critical  to  raise  awareness  in  the  region  of  the  opportunities  closer 
integration and reforms entail, and to tackle malign third country influence. This also requires 
more  credible  efforts  by  the  countries  themselves.  The  public  political  commitment  of their 
authorities to the strategic goal of EU accession will be assessed more clearly in the annual 
reports.  

This policy approach will thus be the cornerstone of a forward-looking agenda. This agenda 
will  support  the  transformation  of  the  Western  Balkans  into  functioning  market  economies 
able  to  integrate  fully  into  the  EU’s  single  market,  to  create  jobs  and  entrepreneurial 
opportunities, to improve the business and investment climate, to promote the rule of law and 
to stop the brain drain from the region. These reforms are essential to boost the economies of 
the Balkans and to anchor them to the EU markets by accelerating the necessary convergence 
with  the  EU.  The  Commission  will  particularly  consider  how  to  bring  forward  investment, 
socio-economic  integration,  and  the  rule  of  law,  enhance  access  to  the  EU  single  market, 
strengthen  connectivity  as  well  as  embrace  the  opportunities  of  the  green  economy.  The 
Commission  will  present  a  Communication  in  this  regard  before  the  May  2020  Zagreb 
Summit.  

II) 

Reinvigorating the accession process 

a)  More credibility 

For the accession process to regain credibility on both sides and deliver to its full potential, it 
needs to rest on solid trust, mutual confidence and clear commitments on both sides.  

It means the Western Balkans leaders must deliver more credibly on their commitment 
to implement the fundamental reforms required, whether on rule of law, fighting corruption, 
the  economy  or  ensuring  the  proper  functioning  of  democratic  institutions  and  public 
administration, and foreign policy alignment. EU Member States and citizens have legitimate 
concerns and need to be reassured of the unequivocal political will of the countries, proven by 
structural,  tangible  reforms.  Western  Balkans  leaders  must  also  show  further  efforts  to 
strengthen  regional  cooperation  and  good  neighbourly  relations  to  bring  stability  and 
prosperity to their citizens, while giving confidence to the EU that the region is addressing the 
legacy of its past. 

This also means the European Union delivers on its unwavering commitment to a merit-
based  process.  When  partner  countries  meet  the  objective  criteria  and  the  established 
objective conditions, the Member States shall agree to move forward to the next stage of the 
process.  All  parties  must  abstain  from  misusing  outstanding  issues  in  the  EU  accession 
process.  In the same vein,  Member States and institutions must speak with  one voice in  the 
region,  sending  clear  signals  of  support  and  encouragement,  and  speaking  clearly  and 
honestly on shortcomings when they occur.   

Credibility  should  be  reinforced  through  an  even  stronger  focus  on  the  fundamental 
reforms  essential  for  success  on  the  EU  path.  These  fundamentals  will  become  even  more 
central in the accession negotiations. Negotiations on the fundamentals will be opened first 

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and  closed  last  and  progress  on  these  will  determine  the  overall  pace  of  negotiations. 
Negotiations on the fundamentals will be guided by: 

  A roadmap for the rule of law chapters equivalent to the previous action plans will 
constitute  the  opening  benchmark.  Interim  benchmarks  will  continue  to  be  set.  No 
other chapter will be provisionally closed before these benchmarks are met. 

  A roadmap on the functioning of democratic institutions and public administration 

reform.   

  A stronger link with the economic reform programme process to help the countries 

meet the economic criteria.  

The  Commission  will  also  further  strengthen  measures  on  the  rule  of  law  and  institution-
building. Results  on these reforms  will be  a requirement  for deeper sectoral  integration and 
progress  overall.  In  addition,  anti-corruption  work  will  be  mainstreamed  through  a  strong 
focus in relevant chapters. Support to regional cooperation will continue unabated. All efforts 
need  to  be  undertaken  to  resolve  bilateral  disputes,  with  a  particular  emphasis  on  the  EU-
facilitated  dialogue  between  Belgrade  and  Pristina,  which  should  be  concluded  with  a 
comprehensive, legally binding normalisation agreement.  

b)  A stronger political steer 

Accession to the European Union is  a process requiring and supporting fundamental reform 
and political and economic change in the countries aspiring to join, and also to demonstrate 
the ability to take on the shared responsibilities as a Member State of the EU. It is not moving 
on autopilot but must reflect an active societal choice on their part to reach and respect the 
highest  European  standards  and  values.  Equally,  the  commitment  of  the  Member  States  to 
share a common future with the Western Balkans as full members of the Union is a significant 
political and not simply technical undertaking.  

This  means  both  sides  should  show  more  leadership  and  live  up  to  their  respective 
commitments in public, while coming in more directly on matters of concern. Given what is 
at  stake,  it  is  time  to  put  the  political  nature  of  the  process  front  and centre  and  ensure 
stronger steering and high-level engagement from the Member States.  

This should include creating new opportunities for high level political and policy dialogue 
with  the  countries,  through  regular  EU-Western  Balkans  summits  and  intensified 
ministerial contacts, especially in areas where alignment is progressing well and key criteria 
are  being  met.  Such  increased  engagement  could  lead  to  the  countries  participating  as 
observers in key European Union meetings on matters of substantial importance to them.  

It  will  be  important  to  ensure  that  all  bodies  under  the  Stabilisation  and  Association 
Agreement (SAA) focus much more on the key political issues and reforms, and allow for 
a real political dialogue. Inter-Governmental Conferences (IGCs) should provide for stronger 
political steering of the accession negotiations process.  

Member States will be invited to contribute more systematically to the accession process, 
including via monitoring on the ground through their experts, through direct contributions to 
the  annual  reports  and  through  sectoral  expertise.  Member  States  will  also  have  the 
opportunity to review and monitor overall progress more regularly.    

The  Commission  will  continue  to  take  stock  of  overall  progress  in  negotiations.  It  will 
propose in its annual enlargement package the way ahead for the following year in greater 
reform detail, for approval by Member States, including proposals for corrective measures.  

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Country-specific IGCs  should take place after publication of the Commission’s annual 
package of reports on each country and provide the fora for political dialogue on reforms, 
take  stock  of  the  overall  accession  process,  and  set  out  the  planning  for  the  year  ahead, 
including  opening  and  closing  of  chapters  /  clusters  of  chapters  and  possible  corrective 
measures. All sides will have to ensure representation in the IGC at the appropriate level to 
allow for a productive political dialogue. 

The  Stabilisation  and  Association  Councils  will  also  provide  an 
important  and 
complimentary moment for political dialogue on reforms. In addition they can allow together 
with the Stabilisation and Association Committees and sub-committees, stronger monitoring 
of progress  and address  aspects of accelerated integration  in  the respective  clusters (see 
below).  

Deeper  political  stocktaking  should  occur  at  key  moments  of  each  partner’s  accession 
process, for example, once interim benchmarks are met on fundamental reforms, at each time 
when  the  Council  decides  whether  the  conditions  for  opening  a  cluster  are  met,  and  once 
overall negotiations are technically ready to close. 

c)  A more dynamic process  

In  order  to  inject  further  dynamism  into  the  negotiating  process  and  to  foster  cross-
fertilisation of efforts beyond individual chapters, the negotiating chapters will be organised 
in thematic clusters. These clusters follow broad themes such as good governance, internal 
market, economic competitiveness and connectivity.  

Clustering chapters will allow a stronger focus on core sectors in the political dialogue and 
provide  an  improved  framing  for  higher  level  political  engagement.  It  will  allow  the  most 
important and urgent  reforms per sector  to be identified.  This  will give overall reform 
processes more traction on the ground, by better incentivizing sectoral reforms in the interests 
of citizens and business. 

Negotiations  on  each  cluster  will  be  opened  as  a  whole  –  after  fulfilling  the  opening 
benchmarks - rather than on an individual chapter basis. As a result of the screening process, 
carried  out  per  cluster,  priorities  for  accelerated  integration  and  key  reforms  will  be  agreed 
between  the  EU  and  the  candidate  country.  When  these  priorities  have  been  sufficiently 
addressed, the cluster (covering all associated chapters) is opened without further conditions 
and closing benchmarks are set for each chapter. Where important reforms will already have 
been  implemented  before  opening,  the  timeframe  between  opening  the  cluster  and  closing 
individual chapters should be limited, preferably within a year fully dependent on the progress 
of the reforms, with the focus on remaining measures needed to ensure full alignment.  

The clusters will be aligned with SAA sub-committees, so that progress in the cluster can 
be monitored and specific measures of accelerated alignment taken under the SAA structures. 
This  will  allow  for  targeted  dialogues  and  identification  of  opportunities  for  accelerated 
alignment and integration in all EU policy areas, with clear benefits for European Union and 
candidate countries. 

To  inject  more  dynamism  in  the  negotiations  with  Serbia  and  Montenegro,  work  on 
chapters  can  also  be  organised  around  clusters,  while  respecting  the  existing  negotiating 
frameworks  and  with  the  agreement  of  these  countries.  This  will  also  allow  more  political 
focus  on  key  sectors  and  build  political  momentum  in  the  countries  around  key  issues  for 
alignment.  The  possibility  of  engaging  in  an  exercise  to  identify  areas  of  interest  for 

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accelerated sectoral alignment and integration will be offered, with common roadmaps to be 
agreed and followed-up in the SAA structures. 

d)  Predictability, positive and negative conditionality  

There are strong calls from Member States, as well as from Western Balkans countries for a 
process  that  is  more  predictable  and  which  ensures  greater  clarity  on  what  the  Union 
expects of enlargement countries at different stages of the process, and what the positive and 
negative consequences are of progress or lack thereof.  

The  Commission  will  use  the  enlargement  package  to  check  the  compliance  of  the 
candidates  with  the  acquis  and  provide  clearer  guidance  on  specific  reform  priorities  and 
alignment  criteria  as  well  as  expectations  for  next  steps  in  the  process.  A  stronger  political 
steer and refocused IGCs will increase predictability, with clearer planning for the year ahead. 
The political actors in the countries will thus have a clearer indication of what must be done 
to move ahead. This will include an indication of what clusters / chapters could potentially be 
opened or closed and, where relevant, which conditions would still need to be met for this to 
happen.  

The core element of the merit-based accession process is its conditionality.  However, in 
order to achieve that, conditions must be clear from the outset. It is important that candidate 
countries  know  the  benchmarks  against  which  their  performance  will  be  measured  and  that 
Member States share a clear understanding of what exactly is requested from the candidates. 
The  Commission  will  better  define  the  conditions  set  for  candidates  to  progress,  in 
particular  through  its  annual  reports.  These  conditions  must  be  objective,  precise,  detailed, 
strict  and  verifiable.  The  Commission  will  also  use  third  party  indicators  where  relevant  to 
provide Member States with the broadest possible base for their decisions.  

By  providing  clear  and  tangible  incentives  of  direct  interest  to  citizens,  the  EU  can 
encourage  real  political  will  and  reward  results  arising  from  demanding  reforms  and  the 
process of political, economic and societal change. If countries move on reform priorities 
agreed in the negotiations sufficiently, this should lead to:  

  Closer  integration  of  the  country  with  the  European  Union,  work  for  accelerated 
integration  and  “phasing-in”  to  individual  EU  policies,  the  EU  market  and  EU 
programmes, while ensuring a level playing field.  

 

Increased  funding  and  investments  –  including  through  a  performance-based  and 
reform-oriented Instrument for Pre-accession support and closer cooperation with IFIs 
to leverage support. 

These  measures  should  help,  through  the  use  of  EU  Funds,  to  create  a  strong  European 
preference that is WTO-compatible, while creating a strong local economy.  

While reform progress needs to be incentivised and rewarded more tangibly, there is equally a 
need  for  more  decisive  measures  proportionally  sanctioning  any  serious  or  prolonged 
stagnation or even backsliding in  reform  implementation  and meeting the requirements of 
the accession process. 

Such  decisions  to  halt  or  even  reverse  the  process  should  be  informed  by  the  annual 
assessment  by  the  Commission  in  its  enlargement  package  on  the  overall  balance  in 
accession negotiations and the extent to which fundamental reforms, in particular on the rule 
of law are being implemented, Member States will continue to be able  to contribute to this 

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process by signalling to the Commission any stagnation or serious backsliding in the reform 
process.  

In serious cases,  the Commission  can make proposals  at  any time on its own or at  the duly 
motivated  request  of  a  Member  State  in  order  to  ensure  a  quick  response  to  the  situation 
through,  whenever  relevant,  simplified  procedures,  including  reverse  qualified  majority 
voting.    

The EU could address potential problems in several ways:  

  Member States could decide that negotiations can be put on hold in certain areas, or in 
the most serious cases, suspended overall. Already closed chapters could be re-opened 
or reset if issues need to be reassessed. 

  The  scope  and  intensity  of  EU  funding  could  be  adjusted  downward,  with  the 

exception of support to civil society.  

  Benefits  of  closer  integration,  e.g.  access  to  EU  programmes,  unilateral  concessions 

for market access could be paused or withdrawn. 

Predictability  and  conditionality  will  also  be  enhanced  through  greater  transparency.  To 
ensure sustainability of reforms and facilitate monitoring of implementation, all key reforms 
in  the  countries  should  be  carried  out  in  a  fully  transparent  and  inclusive  way,  with  key 
stakeholder  involvement.  For  its  part,  the  European  Union  should  endeavour  to  make  the 
process more transparent, with wider publication of key documents.  

The Commission will also continue its communication and information activities, including in 
EU  Member  States,  where  it  is  primarily  for  Member  States  to  inform  their  citizens  and 
provide them with the facts about the strategic opportunities and challenges of the process.  

A  table  setting  out  the  proposed  clusters  of  chapters  is  attached  in  annex.  Chapter  34 
"Institutions" and chapter 35 "Other issues" will be handled separately.  

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Technical annex: clusters of negotiating chapters 

1.  Fundamentals  

2.  Internal Market 

3.  Competitiveness and inclusive growth 

4.  Green agenda and sustainable 

connectivity 

5.  Resources, agriculture and cohesion 

6.  External relations 

23 - Judiciary and fundamental rights  
24 - Justice, Freedom and Security 
Economic criteria 
Functioning of democratic institutions  
Public administration reform  
5 - Public procurement  
18 - Statistics 
32 - Financial control 
1 - Free movement of goods  
2 - Freedom of movement for workers  
3 - Right of establishment and freedom to 
provide services  
4 - Free movement of capital 
6 - Company law 
7 - Intellectual property law 
8 - Competition policy 
9 - Financial services  
28 - Consumer and health protection 
10 - Information society and media  
16 - Taxation  
17 - Economic and monetary policy  
19 - Social policy and employment  
20 - Enterprise and industrial policy 
25 - Science and research  
26 - Education and culture 
29 - Customs union 
14 - Transport policy  
15 - Energy  
21 - Trans-European networks  
27 - Environment and climate change 
11 - Agriculture and rural development 
12 - Food safety, veterinary and 
phytosanitary policy  
13 - Fisheries  
22 - Regional policy & coordination of 
structural instruments  
33 - Financial & budgetary provisions 
30 - External relations  
31 - Foreign, security & defence policy 

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