Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 : final report.
Date: 2020-01-07
Institutions: Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO)
Subjects: Central Africa, financial aid, food aid, humanitarian aid, regional aid, report

Evaluation of the European 
Union’s humanitarian 
assistance in the Central 
Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 
2014-2018 

Final Report 

Landell Mills International 
December 2019 

Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in 
the Central Africa region, including humanitarian coordination, 
2014-2018 

Directorate-General for Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations 

2019 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa 
region, including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

EUROPEAN COMMISSION 

Directorate-General for Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations 
Directorate E – General Affairs 
Unit E2 – Programming, Control and Reporting  

Contact: echo-eval@ec.europa.eu  

European Commission 
B-1049 Brussels 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa 
region, including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

Evaluation of the European 
Union’s humanitarian 
assistance in the Central 
Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 
2014-2018 

Final Report 

1 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa 
region, including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

Europe Direct is a service to help you find answers  
to your questions about the European Union. 

Freephone number (*): 

00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 

(*) 

The information given is free, as are most calls (though some operators, phone 

boxes or hotels may charge you). 

LEGAL NOTICE 

This document has been prepared for the European Commission however it reflects the views only of the 
authors, and the Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information 
contained therein. 

More information on the European Union is available on the Internet (http://www.europa.eu). 

Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2019 

ISBN 978-92-76-13245-5 
DOI: 10.2795/986777 

© European Union, 2019 
Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. 

Evaluation  of  the  European  Union’s  humanitarian  assistance  in  the 
Central Africa region, including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

Evaluation  Team:  Andrew  Lawday  (Team  Leader),  Glyn  Taylor  (Humanitarian 
Coordination Review), Sharon Truelove, Julian Murray, Herma Majoor, Patrick Reymond, 

2 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa 
region, including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

Simon Hale, with support from  Imogen Mullett (Project Manager), Jacob Lindenbauer 
(Junior  Expert),  Guylaine  Nouwoue  (Junior  Expert)  and  Ellie  McGovern  (Research 
Assistant). 

Date: December 2019 

3 

 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa 
region, including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

Abstract 

This independent evaluation is concerned with the European Union’s humanitarian interventions 
in  Central  Africa,  including  Humanitarian  Coordination,  2014-2018.  During  this  period,  the 
Central  Africa  region  suffered  multiple  humanitarian  crises,  notably  the  Central  African 
Republic’s  conflict  and  protection  crisis,  Cameroon’s  complex  and  multi-layered  crisis,  and 
Chad’s  food,  nutrition  and  refugee  crisis,  together  leaving  7-10  million  people  in  need  of 
assistance.  In  response,  the  EU  provided  humanitarian  funding  worth  €499.9m.  DG  ECHO 
developed and implemented strategies to address both acute and protracted needs, and 317 
actions  were  carried  out.  Meanwhile,  €277.8m  funding  went  to  support  Humanitarian 
Coordination, predominantly to support country-level coordination and global clusters. Overall, 
the evaluation finds that the EU made important contributions to addressing acute needs and 
strengthening humanitarian responses in Central Africa. DG ECHO’s country-based donorship 
activities  and  the  reliable  delivery  of  intended  results  through  partners  and  support  to  UN 
OCHA’s  coordination  function,  particularly  in  filling  coordination  gaps,  were  key  strengths. 
Additionally,  EU  funding  to  Central  Africa  and  Humanitarian  Coordination  was  strong  and 
consistent. The evaluation also highlights several challenges, particularly related to addressing 
chronic needs in Central Africa and coordination gaps that persist and offers recommendations 
to support future EU humanitarian assistance in Central Africa and Coordination. 

4 

 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa 
region, including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

Contents 

Abstract 

Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa 

region, including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

List of acronyms – Part A 

Executive Summary 

Résumé exécutif 

1. 

Introduction 

1.1.  Objectives, purpose and scope 

1.2.  Methodology 

1.3.  Context 

1.4.  EU humanitarian interventions 

2. 

Main Findings 

2.1.  Relevance 

2.2.  Appropriateness 

2.3.  Needs assessment 

2.4.  Alignment 

2.5.  Achievements 

A) Central African Republic 

B) Cameroon 

C) Chad 

2.6.  Advocacy 

2.7.  Cost-effectiveness 

2.8.  Funding 

2.9.  Humanitarian coordination 

2.10.  Donor coordination 

2.11.  EU added value 

2.12.  Sustainability 

2.13.  Humanitarian-Development Nexus (HDN) 

2.14.  EQ assessments 

3. 

Conclusions 

3.1.  Key strengths 

3.2.  Challenges 

4. 

Recommendations 

4 

7 

9 

13 

20 

28 

28 

28 

35 

38 

40 

40 

44 

48 

50 

52 

54 

58 

61 

66 

68 

71 

74 

78 

80 

83 

86 

88 

89 

89 

91 

94 

5 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa 
region, including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

4.1.  Develop a more comprehensive approach 

4.2.  Reinforce humanitarian project quality 

4.3.  Commit to supporting humanitarian coordination 

4.4.  Explore ‘Nexus’ (HDN) opportunities 

4.5.  Streamline donorship processes 

94 

95 

95 

96 

97 

4.6.  Develop more effective monitoring, evaluation and learning (MEL) systems 98 

Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa 

region, including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

List of acronyms – Part B 

Executive Summary 

Résumé exécutif 

1. 

Introduction 

1.1.  Approach, methodology and scope 

2. 

3. 

Methods and limitations 

Background 

3.1.  Overview of EU-funded actions in support of coordination 

4. 

5. 

Main findings 

Conclusions, further questions and recommendations 

Annex 1: Documents Consulted 

Annex 2: Stakeholders Consulted 

Annex 3: Case Study 1 

Annex 4: Case Study 2 

Annex 5: Case Study 3 

Annex 6: Perception Survey Analysis 

Annex 7: Discussion Guide – English 

Annex 8: Discussion Guide – French 

Annex 9: Survey Full Questionnaire 

Annex 10: Evaluation Matrix 

Annex 11: Portfolio Sampling 

Annex 12: Stakeholder Sampling 

Annex 13: Evaluation Terms of Reference 

99 

100 

101 

103 

105 

105 

109 

110 

112 

114 

130 

135 

141 

146 

158 

166 

178 

194 

197 

200 

204 

217 

220 

222 

6 

 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa 
region, including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

Evaluation of the European Union’s 
humanitarian assistance in the 
Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

Part A – Central Africa Region 
Final Evaluation Report 

7 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa 
region, including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

8 

 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa 
region, including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

List of acronyms – Part A 

3W 

AAP 

ACF 

Who does What Where 

Accountability to Affected Populations  

Action Contre la Faim 

ACTED 

Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development 

ADE 

AFD 

AGIR 

AHA 

AIRD 

ALIMA 

ALNAP 

ANE/AL 

CA 

CAR 

ADE Consulting Group 

Agence Française de Développement 

Global Alliance for Resilience  

Agence Humanitaire Africaine 

African Initiatives for Research and Development 

Alliance for International Medical Action 
Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance 

Acteurs non Etatiques et Autorites Locales dans le Developpement  
Central Africa 

Central African Republic 

CAR HF     

CARE 

Central African Republic Humanitarian Fund 
CARE International 

CCO          

Comité de coordination des ONGs internationales 

CH 

CHS 

CRC 

CRF 

CVA 

CwC 

DG DEVCO  

DG ECHO 

DFID 

DIZA 

DRR/EP 

EC 

DG ECHO 

EDF 

EEAS 

EQ 

ERC 

ET 

EU  

EUD 

EUTF  

ExAR 

FAO 

Cadre Harmonisé 

Core Humanitarian Standard 

Cameroon Red Crescent 

Croix-rouge Française  

Cash and Voucher Approach 

Communications with Communities 
Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development  
Directorate-General  for  European  Civil  Protection  and  Humanitarian 
Aid Operation 
UK Department for International Development 

Programme de développement inclusif dans les zones d’accueil 

Disaster Risk Reduction and Emergency Preparedness 
European Commission 
Directorate-General  for  European  Civil  Protection  and  Humanitarian  Aid 
Operations 

European Development Fund 
European External Action Service 

Evaluation Question 
Enhanced Response Capacity  

Evaluation Team 
European Union 

European Union Delegation  
European Union Trust Fund 

External Assigned Revenues 

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 

9 

 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa 
region, including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

FCA 

FCS 

FPA 

FRC 

FSC 

FSL 

FTS 

GAM 

GBV 

GGOP 

GGOPHA 

GHD 

GHO 

GIZ 

HA 

HAR 

HC 

HCT 

HDI 

HDN 

HEA 

HF 

HIP 

HNO 

HNRO 

HPC 

HQ 

HRP 

IAF 

IASC 

ICC 

ICF 

ICRC 

IcSP 

IDA 

IDP 

IFRC 

IGA 

IHL 

IMC 

INFORM 

INGOs 

INSO 

IO 

IOM 

IP 

Forgotten Crisis Assessment 

Food consumption score 

Framework Partnership Agreement 

French Red Cross 

Food Security Cluster 

Food Security and Livelihoods  

UN OCHA Financial Tracking Service 
Global Acute Malnutrition 

Gender-based violence 
General Guidelines on Operational Priorities  

General Guidelines on Operational Priorities for Humanitarian Aid 

Good Humanitarian Donorship 

Global Humanitarian Overview 

Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit 
Humanitarian Assistance  

Humanitarian Aid Regulation 

Humanitarian Coordinator 

Humanitarian Coordination Team 

Humanitarian Development Index 

Humanitarian-Development Nexus 

Household Economic Analysis 

CAR Humanitarian Fund 
Humanitarian Implementation Plan 

Humanitarian Needs Overviews 

Humanitarian Needs and Requirements Overview 

Humanitarian Programme Cycle  
Headquarters  

Humanitarian Response Plan 

Integrated Analysis Framework 

Inter-Agency Standing Committee 

Inter-Cluster Coordination 

ICF Consulting 

International Committee of the Red Cross 

Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace 

International Development Association – World Bank  

Internally displaced person 

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 
Income Generating Activities 

International Humanitarian Law 

International Medical Corps 
Index for Risk Management 

International Non-governmental Organisations 

International NGO Safety Organisation 

International Organisation 

International Organization for Migration 
Implementing Partner 

10 

 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa 
region, including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

IPC 

Integrated Food Security Phase Classification 

ITA 

IYCF 

JAM 

JC 

KII 

LRRD 

LWF 

M&E 

MAM 

MEL 

MENA 

MFF  

MHPSS 

MINUSCA 

MIRA  

MSA 

MSF 

NEAR 

NFI 

NGOs 

NRC 

NWOW 

NWSW 

OECD-DAC 

OFDA 

PARCA 

PLW 

POS 

PRO-ACT 

PUI 

RCPCA 

RPBA 

RRM 

RRRP 

SAIO 

SAM 

SDC 

SI 

SRP 

SSN 

ST 

TA 

IASC Transformative Agenda 

Infant and Young Child Feeding Practices  

Joint assessment missions 

Judgement Criteria  
Key Informant Interview 

Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development 

Lutheran World Funds 
Monitoring and Evaluation 

Moderate acute malnutrition  
Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning 

Middle East and North Africa 
Multi-annual Financial Framework  

Mental Health and Psycho-Social Support 
Mission Intégrée des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en République 
Centrafricaine 
Multi-Sector Initial Rapid Assessment 

Multi-sector assessment  

Médicins Sans Frontieres 

Neighbourhood and Enlargement Region 
Non-food items 

Non-governmental organisations 

Norwegian Refugee Council 

New Ways of Working 

North-West South-West Region in Cameroon  
Organisation  for  Economic  Co-operation  and  Development's  Development 
Assistance Committee 

Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance 

Project d'appui aux réfugiés et aux communautés d'accueil 
Pregnant and lactating women 

Procédures Opérationnelles Standards 
Renforcement des capacités de résilience et amélioration de la 
sécurité alimentaire dans l’Adamaoua et l’est 

Première Urgence Internationale 
(Plan  National  de)  Relèvement  et  de  Consolidation  de  la  Paix  de  la 
République Centrafricaine 
Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment 

Rapid Response Mechanism 

Regional Refugee Response Plan 

Southern African and the Indian Ocean Region 

Severe acute malnutrition 

Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation 

Solidarités Internationale 
Strategic Response Plan 

Social Safety Net 

Short-term 
Technical Annex 

11 

 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa 
region, including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

TL 

ToR  

U5s 

UK 

UN 

UNDP  

UNHAS 

UNHCR 

UNICEF  

UN OCHA 

USA 

WASH 

WB 

WFP 

WHO 

WWDs 

Team Leader 

Terms of Reference 

Children under 5 years 

United Kingdom 

United Nations 

United Nations Development Programme 

United Nations Humanitarian Air Service 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 

United Nations Children's Fund 
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 

United States of America 

Water, Sanitation and Hygiene 

World Bank 

World Food Programme 

World Health Organisation 

Worldwide decisions 

12 

 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

Executive Summary 

This is an independent evaluation of the European Union (EU)’s humanitarian interventions in Central Africa 
(CA) during 2014-2018. It provides a retrospective assessment to inform future work of the Directorate-General 
for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid (DG ECHO). It was conducted in combination with a global 
review of DG ECHO’s humanitarian coordination activity across different crises during 2014-2018.  

Objectives and scope 

The purpose of this evaluation is twofold: (i) to provide accountability through an independent and objective 
assessment of the performance of EU interventions; and (ii) to support learning about current strategies while 
identifying areas for improvement.  

The object of the evaluation is EU humanitarian interventions in CA, in the Central African Republic (CAR), 
Cameroon and Chad from  January  2014  to December  2018.  EU  humanitarian interventions  refer  to:  (i)  EU 
humanitarian funding, including worldwide decisions and ad hoc emergency funding; (ii) DG ECHO strategy, 
as defined in Humanitarian Implementation Plans (HIPs) and implemented by DG ECHO and partners; (iii) EU-
funded actions, as designed, implemented and managed by DG ECHO partners; and (iv) results achieved at 
different levels.  

While  the  analysis  focuses  primarily  on  EU  humanitarian  interventions  at  the  regional  level  of  CA,  it  also 
provides an assessment at the country level, where humanitarian responses are coordinated. Case studies 
developed in the evaluation focus on humanitarian coordination in CAR, refugee self-reliance in Cameroon, 
and the ‘Humanitarian-Development Nexus’ (HDN) in Chad.  

Methodology  

At inception phase, the Evaluation Team (ET) developed a framework with evaluation questions tailored to the 
specific interests of DG ECHO users. Judgement criteria were developed to define ‘what good looks like’ for 
each question and indicators were established to measure achievements. In addition, the ET constructed an 
intervention logic to elucidate how EU humanitarian interventions and DG ECHO activities were expected to 
work in CA, and a process model for how EU inputs would lead to results.  

The  ET  then  used  mixed  methods  for  data  collection  and  analysis,  involving  qualitative  and  quantitative 
techniques: data analysis, document review, stakeholder survey, key informant interviews (KIIs), case studies, 
and user workshops. The ET also used a purposive sample of EU-funded actions (58/317) for analysis and a 
structured sample of stakeholders for consultation including donors, implementers and beneficiaries.  

The  main  limitations  faced  by  the  ET  were  a  lack  of  clear  objectives  established  for  EU  humanitarian 
interventions;  a  lack  of  monitoring,  evaluation  and  learning  (MEL)  systems  to  provide  evidence  about  the 
interventions;  and  the  wide-ranging  scope  and  complexity  of  interventions  covered  within  the  evaluation.  In 
general,  sufficient  evidence  was  generated  to  reach  credible  findings  and  reliable  enough  conclusions  to 
support accountability and learning objectives. 

Context and EU interventions 

The CA region suffered 11 humanitarian crises between 2014 and 2018. These included CAR’s country-wide 
conflict and protection crisis; Cameroon’s complex and multi-layered crisis (including the CAR refugee influx in 
the East, the Lake Chad crisis in the Far North, the food and nutrition crisis in the North, and the ‘Anglophone 

13 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

crisis’ in the Northwest and Southwest); and Chad’s country-wide food, nutrition, and refugee crisis (including 
the food and nutrition crisis in the Sahel belt, the Lake Chad crisis in the West, the CAR refugee crisis in the 
South, and the protracted Darfur Sudanese refugee crisis in the East). These multiple crises could be largely 
attributed to three ‘drivers’: CAR’s conflict and protection crisis; Boko Haram-related violence in Nigeria and the 
Lake Chad region; and structural food insecurity in the Sahel region.  

CA’s humanitarian crises left large numbers of people in need of humanitarian assistance, estimated at 7 million 
people in 2015 and increasing to 10.2 million by 2018. In CA 2014-2018, country-based humanitarian response 
strategies undertook to assist an average of 5.4 million people each year, only 62% of people in need of aid. 
Each year, country-wide strategies were outlined in Humanitarian Response Plans (HRPs); and in 2015 and 
2016 efforts were also made to develop regional refugee response plans.  

During 2014-2018, EU humanitarian funding to CA amounted to a total of EUR 499.9 million. Each year, DG 
ECHO developed strategies in HIPs (in 2014 for each country; and in 2015-2018 for the region) which aimed 
to  address  both  acute  and  protracted  needs  of  populations  affected  by  human-made  crises/complex 
emergencies, food and nutrition crises, and epidemics and natural disasters. A total of 317 EU-funded actions 
were  implemented  by  DG  ECHO  partners,  including  825  distinct  activities  and  results  across  multiple 
humanitarian sectors.  

Main findings  

The main findings and assessments in response to each evaluation question are presented below. 

1. Relevance 

  EU-funded  actions  in  CA  2014-2018  were  consistently  relevant  to  the  needs  of  the  most  vulnerable 
populations in specific crises and situations. The actions were invariably designed on the basis of needs 
assessments; they were usually informed by further needs assessments during implementation; and they 
were largely adaptable to changing needs and situations. Actions mostly considered gender and age and 
consulted beneficiaries, at least in their design.  

  The  relevance  of  actions  was  somewhat  limited  by  questions  about  specific  needs  and  beneficiary 
consultation.  Wider  definitions  of  vulnerability  (e.g.  people  with  disabilities)  were  not  systematically 
considered,  the  quality  of  beneficiary  consultation  was  often  questionable  and  effective  feedback 
mechanisms were often lacking. 

2. Appropriateness  

  DG ECHO strategies were highly appropriate for meeting acute needs in CA 2014-2018. In practice, they 
were developed through iterative processes at the country level involving DG ECHO and its partners, 
allowing maximum flexibility to tailor strategies to needs. Efforts were made to tailor the HIPs to specific 
situations  in  each  country,  but  increasingly  the  HIPs  allowed  flexibility  to  address  evolving  needs  in 
practice and included multiple modifications in response to changing events.  

  However, DG ECHO strategies were not very appropriate for addressing protracted needs or reducing 
them over time. The yearly HIPs offered little in terms of prioritised strategies, clear strategic direction, or 
multi-year planning and funding that could comprehensively address protracted humanitarian situations, 
needs  and  risks.  Frequent  modifications  and  emergency  top-ups  increased  flexibility  for  meeting 
emergency needs as they arose but did not necessarily constitute ‘adaptive management’, in terms of 
learning and continual improvement.   

3. Needs assessment  

  DG  ECHO  did  very  well  to  consistently  promote  joint  and  impartial  needs  assessments.  In  all  three 
countries,  it  supported  the  harmonisation  of  needs  assessments  and  joint  needs  assessments  which 
14 

 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

worked  to  reduce  the  proliferation  of  uncoordinated  assessments.  DG  ECHO  consistently  funded  the 
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) to prepare Humanitarian 
Needs Overviews (HNOs), encouraged implementing partners to participate and actively participated in 
the process itself. DG ECHO also made efforts to promote improved needs assessment quality. These 
efforts led to some promising outcomes, including strengthened assessment capacities and improved 
responses. 

4. Alignment  

  DG ECHO’s response in CA 2014-2018 was consistently well aligned with humanitarian principles and 
EU policy priorities. Stakeholders in each country were convinced that DG ECHO’s strategy was aligned 
with humanitarian principles. It is also clear that DG ECHO acted to uphold fundamental humanitarian 
principles in a number of important ways. For example, it served ‘humanity’ by tailoring its response to 
specific situations and allowing flexibility to address evolving needs. Both HIP priorities and operational 
priorities showed consistency with EU humanitarian policy priorities, and DG ECHO ensured that EU-
funded actions were aligned with its strategy. In practice, however, DG ECHO’s strategy also faced some 
risks related to humanitarian principles and some practical challenges in aligning with EU thematic policy 
priorities;  for  example,  refugee  self-reliance  in  east  Cameroon  was  complicated  by  an  absence  of 
development actors and government services.  

5. Achievements  

  DG ECHO made a very strong contribution to meeting acute needs in CA between 2014 and 2018. Across 
the region, DG ECHO invested in supporting multi-sector emergency responses with a strong emphasis 
on  food  security  and  nutrition.  Additionally,  EU-funded  humanitarian  actions  delivered  most  of  their 
intended  results  and  collectively  ‘reached’  a  majority  of  people  in  need  each  year,  contributed  to  EU 
objectives and made notable contributions in each country.  

  These  achievements  depended  on  a  chain  of  activities  involving  the  EU  as  a  whole,  DG  ECHO, 
implementing  partners  (IPs),  and  beneficiaries,  with  DG  ECHO  providing  strategic  direction,  selecting 
projects and allocating funding, and maintaining monitoring and oversight of implementation. DG ECHO’s 
technical capacities, flexible emergency funding, and partner relationships were key assets.  

  However, DG ECHO contributed little to reducing chronic humanitarian needs and risks in the region, and 
there was little or no evidence that humanitarian needs and risks were actually reduced. This reflected 
larger  challenges  in  addressing  protracted  humanitarian  needs  and  involving  development  actors.  In 
addition,  DG  ECHO  invested  very  little  in  Disaster  Risk  Reduction  and  Emergency  Preparedness 
(DRR/EP) activities to prevent epidemics and natural disasters. 

Achievements in the Central African Republic 

 

In  CAR,  DG  ECHO  did  an  excellent  job  in  meeting  acute  needs.  Their  portfolio  in  CAR  consistently 
delivered  results  across  its  actions  and  activities,  which  were  recognised  for  their  high  quality.  The 
portfolio  was  perceived  to  meet  acute  needs  of  conflict-affected  people  directly  as  well  as  indirectly 
through support to the wider humanitarian response. The case study also showed how DG ECHO worked 
with  UN  OCHA  to  strengthen  the  overall  humanitarian  response.  DG  ECHO’s  project  selection  and 
technical expertise were seen as key factors of success. In general terms, DG ECHO was perceived to 
provide leadership in CAR’s emergency phase 2013-2016 and to strengthen coordination and coherence 
in 2016-2018. DG ECHO was also deemed essential to achieving the EU’s goals of bringing humanitarian 
assistance, peace and stability to CAR in 2013-2016, and to supporting recovery and development from 
2016, through close cooperation with the Bêkou Trust Fund. 

  DG  ECHO  was  less  successful  in  meeting  protracted  needs  in  CAR,  where  wider  results  remained 
modest and needs increased slightly over the period. DG ECHO also did little to strengthen preparedness 
and reduce humanitarian risks. In addition, partners raised several concerns about the efficiency of DG 

15 

 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

ECHO's  project  selection  process  and  heavy  reporting  requirements,  and  it  was  suggested  that  DG 
ECHO  funding  allocations  risked  contributing  to  a  'fragmentation'  of  the  emergency  response  without 
greater strategic coordination. 

Achievements in Cameroon 

 

In  Cameroon,  DG  ECHO  did  a  very  good  job  of  addressing  acute  needs.  The  DG  ECHO  portfolio 
consistently delivered results and was perceived to meet acute needs, thanks to DG ECHO’s oversight 
capacities  and  the  know-how  of  its  IPs.  The  portfolio  was  perceived  to  achieve  significant  results  in 
meeting  the  basic  needs  of  affected  populations,  in  particular  those  of  refugee  and  host  community 
populations. DG ECHO also helped to pave the way for achieving the EU's development objectives, by 
investing in self-sufficiency activity planning and building capacity for resilience.  

  However, the DG ECHO portfolio risked falling below standards in addressing the needs of refugees as 
needs became protracted. It was also perceived to struggle to meet protracted needs in the country more 
broadly,  where  humanitarian needs  and  risks grew  over  the  period.  The  case  study  showed  how  DG 
ECHO  worked  with  the  French  Red  Cross  (FRC)  to  strengthen  self-sufficiency  for  CAR  refugees  in 
eastern Cameroon, although little was achieved beyond the duration of the project. This highlighted the 
limitations of DG ECHO’s support to self-sufficiency activities without greater involvement of development 
actors. 

Achievements in Chad 

 

In  Chad,  DG  ECHO  did  a  very  good  job  of  meeting  acute  needs  and  made  good  efforts  to  address 
protracted  needs.  The  portfolio  consistently  delivered  results  across  its  food  security  and  emergency 
response activities, and was widely perceived to meet acute needs and contribute to addressing severe 
food insecurity. DG ECHO's project selection, expertise, field presence and leadership were considered 
key  factors  of  success.  Significant  achievements  included  DG  ECHO’s  scaling-up  of  the  nutrition 
response  from  2014,  the  rapid  launch  of  the  Lake  Chad  response  with  IPs,  and  the  response  to  the 
cholera  outbreak  in  2017.  DG  ECHO  made multiple  contributions  to  EU  goals  and,  most  importantly, 
through  its  close  relationship  with  the  EU’s  Directorate-General  for  International  Cooperation  and 
Development (DG DEVCO) and the development of a shared vision on resilience and HDN.  

  Along  with  the  wider  response,  however,  DG  ECHO  was  again  perceived  to  do  less  well  in  meeting 
protracted needs, and also in addressing risks of disaster and epidemics. Despite some perceived small-
scale successes in resilience activities, contributing to resilience remained challenging for DG ECHO. 
The case study showed how DG ECHO worked with the World Food Programme (WFP) in 2016-2017 to 
strengthen  resilience  for  vulnerable  populations  in  the  Sahel  belt,  although  some  targeting  required 
prioritising ‘productive potential’ instead of humanitarian needs, and there was little evidence yet, at the 
time of the evaluation, of HDN collaboration with DG DEVCO beyond initial planning. 

6. Advocacy  

  DG ECHO’s advocacy was reasonably successful in CA 2014-2018. DG ECHO promoted advocacy on 
various issues and some signs of success were reported, particularly at times of emergency and acute 
needs. DG ECHO often enjoyed a very strong advocacy position which could be further enhanced through 
links with the EU delegation. Yet DG ECHO advocacy was not always structured or strategic and a mixed 
picture of success emerges across the countries.   

7. Cost-effectiveness   

  The cost-effectiveness of DG ECHO’s portfolio in CA 2014-2018 was adequate, with notable exceptions. 
Without a DG ECHO framework for managing cost-effectiveness, the assessment of cost-effectiveness 
depended on case studies. One case study shows funding to UN OCHA could contribute to increasing 
the efficiency of a humanitarian response by making critical investments in coordination. The other case 

16 

 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

studies  raise  important  questions  about  the  cost-effectiveness  of  some  self-sufficiency  and  resilience 
actions; for example, when they were not followed up by coordinated development actions or their results 
were disappointing.  

 

In a region where delivery costs were relatively high, the efficiency of DG ECHO’s wider portfolio was 
also affected by DG ECHO’s limited investment in local and national responders, use of cash and voucher 
assistance  (CVA),  and  flexible  funding  arrangements  such  as  multi-year  funding.  Although  many 
recurring EU-funded actions were funded repeatedly year-on-year, they remained subject to single-year 
funding and burdensome selection processes. 

8. Funding  

  EU humanitarian funding was sufficient to meet some of the most acute needs in CA 2014-2018. EU 
funding  for  CA  was  allocated  on  the  basis  of  global  needs  assessments  each  year,  fluctuating  and 
generally increasing with needs, and was considered sufficient in some cases to meet the most urgent 
needs in an emergency. Relative to other donors, the EU was the second largest funder of humanitarian 
responses over the period, representing almost a fifth of all funding allocated. Compared to the global 
EU average and funding for other crises, the share of EU funding to CA was relatively high during 2014-
2018.  

  However,  EU  funding  was  not  obviously  proportionate  to  needs  or  appropriate  to  situations  in  each 
country. Humanitarian responses remained consistently underfunded in CA and unable to meet the needs 
of people targeted, let alone the total people in need. In addition, the proportion of EU funding compared 
to people in need of assistance varied significantly by country and by year, and the amount and share of 
EU funding varied considerably among CA countries, with Chad receiving more than double that of CAR 
and triple that of Cameroon. Moreover, stakeholders in all countries were doubtful that DG ECHO funding 
was proportionate to needs, particularly chronic needs that affected each country.   

9. Humanitarian coordination  

  DG ECHO did a very good job of strengthening humanitarian coordination in CA 2014-2018. It provided 
relatively strong and consistent funding to coordination actions across the region and in each country, 
and played a role in filling coordination gaps. DG ECHO allocated around three-fifths of its coordination 
funding to UN OCHA, providing smaller amounts to a few other actors (i.e. the International Organization 
for Migration, the  United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Food and Agriculture 
Organization),  and  was  perceived  to  have  consistently  supported  UN  OCHA’s  role  with  funding  and 
advocacy  at  both  national  and  decentralised  levels.  EU-funded  coordination  actions  contributed  in 
different  ways  to  strengthening  the  humanitarian  response,  while  DG  ECHO’s  contribution  to 
strengthening responses through its support to coordination was widely recognised.  

  Nonetheless,  frequent  gaps  and fluctuations  remained in overall  funding  to humanitarian coordination 
efforts in CA 2014-2018, with considerable variance between countries and over the years. Coordination 
in Cameroon was less well funded on average than in CAR and Chad. 

10. Donor coordination  

  DG  ECHO  was  very  successful  at  coordinating  its  response  with  other  donors  in  CA  2014-2018.  DG 
ECHO made consistent efforts to coordinate activities with humanitarian donors and increasingly with 
development donors. Its efforts often extended to providing informed leadership and advice to donors. 
These efforts helped to reduce duplication, but operational coordination also remained a wider challenge 
in each country, and DG ECHO did not seek to fill outstanding structural gaps or bring together other 
donors where donor coordination mechanisms were absent.    

17 

 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

11. EU added value  

  DG ECHO provided clear added value for EU member states in CA 2014-2018. Beyond the humanitarian 
donorship  capacities  of  any  individual  member  state,  in  each  country  DG  ECHO  offered  a  sustained 
presence, a highly effective portfolio of actions; unique field-based knowledge of needs, situation and 
context; applied field-based technical expertise; and a strong and principled advocacy voice within each 
humanitarian response. Still, EU member states continued to implement their own portfolios across the 
region, which taken together were as large as DG ECHO’s. Member States also invested relatively little 
through DG ECHO’s External Assigned Revenue (ExAR) contribution system. 

12. Sustainability  

  DG  ECHO  was  inconsistent  in  achieving  sustainable  results  in  CA  2014-2018.  Most  EU-funded 
humanitarian  actions  met  DG  ECHO  expectations  for  increasing  resilience,  and  demonstrated  a 
widespread,  wide-ranging  and growing interest in increasing  resilience. However,  these  strong  efforts 
were not always found to be appropriate and raised important questions about the nature of DG ECHO's 
humanitarian  focus,  limited  funding,  and  yearly  planning  and  funding  systems.  Most  importantly,  EU-
funded humanitarian actions across the three countries did not consistently establish exit strategies, and 
wider EU strategies to promote the sustainability of humanitarian actions were most often lacking. 

13. Humanitarian-Development Nexus (HDN) 

  The success of DG ECHO measures to coordinate the EU’s HDN actions cannot be adequately assessed 
in CA 2014-2018. On the positive side, there is evidence that DG ECHO consistently took measures to 
coordinate EU HDN activities, making well-recognised efforts in all three countries, and taking a lead role 
in coordinating Chad’s HDN pilot exercise. At the same time, the division of roles and responsibilities 
between DG ECHO and DG DEVCO was often unclear; shared targets and monitoring frameworks were 
lacking;  and  risks  were  highlighted  about  diverting  resources  from  acute  needs  and  humanitarian 
priorities. No evidence was yet available that measures taken had resulted in reduced needs, vulnerability 
or fragility in CA.  

Conclusions  

Drawing  on  the  main  findings  in  the  evaluation,  the  ET  drew  the  following  conclusions  from  analysis  of 
humanitarian interventions in CA 2014-2018: 

Key strengths   

A number of key strengths can be highlighted in EU humanitarian interventions in CA 2014-2018. The overall 
contribution to addressing acute needs, contributions made to strengthening humanitarian responses in each 
country, and the delivery of intended results through actions implemented by partners were all important. In 
addition, DG ECHO’s country-based donorship activities were a strength, indeed a ‘comparative advantage’, 
and EU humanitarian funding remained relatively strong and consistent over the period. 

Challenges 

The most significant challenge to EU humanitarian interventions in CA 2014-2018 was addressing the chronic 
or protracted needs which remained prevalent across the region. The other important challenges identified were 
increasing  resilience  and  empowering  local  and  national  actors;  inefficiencies  in  DG  ECHO  donorship 
processes;  and  the  absence  of  comprehensive  strategies  to  reduce  humanitarian  needs  in  the  region.  In 
addition to this, stakeholder divergence and some confusion over DG ECHO’s intervention logic and specific 
pathways for achieving results showed that DG ECHO’s strategy could benefit from greater clarity. Finally, MEL 
systems were limited and posed a challenge to managing humanitarian interventions in CA. 

18 

 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

Recommendations  

Based on these conclusions and consultations with DG ECHO, the ET proposes these recommendations: 

1.  DG  ECHO  should  develop  a  more  comprehensive  approach  to  addressing  CA’s  humanitarian 
challenges in 2020-2025, including an updated EU humanitarian intervention logic aimed at meeting 
and reducing humanitarian needs in CA.  

2.  DG  ECHO  should  reinforce  its  role  as  a  quality  humanitarian  donor  in  CA  2020-2025,  ensuring  its 
projects systemically meet required standards, particularly for inclusion, beneficiary consultation and 
resilience.  

3.  DG  ECHO  should  commit  to  supporting  humanitarian  coordination  in  CA  2020-2025,  reinforcing 
country-based  coordinated  humanitarian  responses,  particularly  through  needs  assessments,  UN 
OCHA’s primary role and donor coordination.  

4.  DG  ECHO  should  explore  humanitarian  opportunities  arising 

from  collaborations  between 
humanitarian,  development  and  peacebuilding  actors  in  CA  2020-2025,  learning  about  how  HDN 
approaches can generate improved humanitarian outcomes in terms of needs reduced.  

5.  DG  ECHO  should  ensure  its  donorship  processes  are  streamlined  in  CA  2020-2025,  reviewing  its 
donorship processes in line with Grand Bargain commitments and to address specific issues raised by 
stakeholders in this evaluation concerning project selection, reporting and contracting (see Finding 5). 

6.  DG ECHO should develop more effective MEL systems to guide EU humanitarian interventions in CA 
2020-2025,  providing  information  about  DG  ECHO’s  portfolio  of  actions  in  each  country,  including 
aggregated reporting on results and other important matters. 

19 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

Résumé exécutif 

Il s’agit d’une évaluation indépendante des interventions humanitaires de l’Union européenne en Afrique 
centrale entre 2014 et 2018. Elle offre une analyse rétrospective qui permettra d’orienter les prochains 
travaux de la direction générale pour la protection civile et les opérations d’aide humanitaire européennes 
(DG  ECHO).  Elle  a  été  menée  en  combinaison  avec  un  examen  global  des  activités  de  coordination 
humanitaire de la DG ECHO à travers différentes crises entre 2014 et 2018.  

Objectifs et champ d’application 

L’objectif  de  cette  évaluation  est  double :  (1)  reconnaître  sa  responsabilité  au  moyen  d’une  évaluation 
indépendante  et  objective  de  la  performance  des  interventions  européenne ;  et  (2)  encourager 
l’apprentissage des stratégies actuelles tout en identifiant les sphères d’améliorations.  

L’objet de l’évaluation porte sur les interventions humanitaires européennes effectuées en Afrique centrale 
(AC), en République centrafricaine (RCA), au Cameroun et au Tchad, de janvier 2014 à décembre 2018. 
Les  interventions  humanitaires  européennes  concernent :  (i)  le  financement  humanitaire  européen, 
notamment le financement des décisions mondiales et d’urgence ad hoc ; (ii) la stratégie de la DG ECHO, 
comme  la  définissent  les  Plans  de  mise  en  œuvre  humanitaire  (HIP  en  anglais)  mis  en  œuvre  par  la  DG 
ECHO  et  ses partenaires ;  (iii)  les actions financées  par  l’UE, que  les  partenaires  de  la DG  ECHO ont 
élaborées, mises en œuvre et dirigées ; et (iv) les résultats obtenus à différents niveaux.  

Si l’analyse porte essentiellement sur les interventions humanitaires européennes au niveau de la région 
de  l’AC,  elle fournit  aussi  une évaluation  à  l’échelle du  pays  dans  lequel  les actions  humanitaires sont 
coordonnées. Les études de cas figurant dans l’évaluation se concentrent sur la coordination humanitaire 
en RCA, sur l’autonomie des réfugiés au Cameroun et sur le lien entre l’humanitaire et le développement 
(HDN en anglais) au Tchad.  

Méthodologie  

Lors de la phase de démarrage, l’équipe d’évaluation a élaboré un questionnaire d’évaluation (QE) adapté 
aux  intérêts spécifiques des  utilisateurs  de  la  DG  ECHO.  Elle a mis  en place  des  critères  d’évaluation 
visant à définir pour chaque question les réponses qui semblent convenables ainsi que des indicateurs 
visant  à  mesurer  les  résultats  obtenus.  Elle  a  par  ailleurs  élaboré  une  logique  d’intervention  visant  à 
déterminer  comment  les  interventions  humanitaires  européennes  et  les  activités  déployées  par  la  DG 
ECHO en Afrique centrale seront susceptibles de fonctionner, ainsi qu’un modèle de processus visant à 
déterminer à quels résultats les contributions européennes peuvent conduire.  

L’équipe d’évaluation a ensuite utilisé plusieurs méthodes faisant appel à des techniques qualitatives et 
quantitatives  pour  collecter  et  analyser  les  données :  analyse  de  données,  examen  de  documents, 
rapports des acteurs concernés, entretiens avec des informateurs importants (KII en anglais), études de 
cas  et  ateliers  pour  les  utilisateurs.  L’équipe  d’évaluation  a  également  analysé  un  échantillon  choisi  à 
dessein d’actions financées par l’UE (58/317) et consulté un échantillon structuré des acteurs concernés, 
notamment des donateurs, des responsables de la mise en œuvre et des bénéficiaires.  

Les principaux obstacles rencontrés par l’équipe d’évaluation sont l’absence d’objectifs clairs fixés pour 
les  interventions  humanitaires  européennes ;  l’absence  d’un  système  de  suivi,  d’évaluation  et 
d’apprentissage  (MEL  en  anglais)  permettant  de  constituer  des  preuves  des  interventions ;  et  la 
complexité et la grande diversité des interventions faisant l’objet de l’évaluation. En général, il y a eu assez 
de preuves pour arriver à des constatations crédibles et tirer des conclusions suffisamment fiables dans 
le but d’atteindre des objectifs de responsabilité et d’apprentissage. 

20 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

Contexte et interventions européennes 

La région d’AC a connu 11 crises humanitaires entre 2014 et 2018. Citons la crise sécuritaire et le conflit 
qui touche toute la RCA, la crise complexe et à plusieurs niveaux qui touche le Cameroun (notamment 
l’afflux  de  réfugiés  centrafricains  à  l’est,  la  crise  du  lac  Tchad  à  l’extrême  nord,  la  crise  alimentaire  et 
nutritionnelle au nord, et la « crise anglophone » au nord-ouest et au sud-ouest), les crises alimentaire et 
nutritionnelle ainsi que des réfugiés qui touchent l’ensemble du Tchad (notamment la crise alimentaire et 
nutritionnelle dans la bande du Sahel, la crise du lac Tchad à l’ouest, la crise des réfugiés centrafricains 
au  sud  et  la  crise  qui  perdure  des  réfugiés  soudanais  du  Darfour  à  l’est).  Trois  facteurs  contribuent 
largement  à  la survenue  de  ces  crises multiples :  Le  conflit  et  la crise  sécuritaire  en  RCA ;  la  violence 
causée par Boko Haram au Nigeria et dans la région du lac Tchad ; et l’insécurité alimentaire structurelle 
dans la région du Sahel.  

En  raison  de  ces  crises  humanitaires  en  AC,  un  très  grand  nombre  de  personnes  ont  besoin  d’aide 
humanitaire ; leur nombre a été estimé à 7 millions en 2015 et atteint 10,2 millions en 2018. En AC entre 
2014 et 2018, les stratégies d’actions humanitaires nationales ont permis d’aider environ 5,4 millions de 
personnes chaque année, soit seulement 62 % de celles ayant besoin d’aide. Chaque année, les plans 
d’aide humanitaire (HRP en anglais) ont fait état des stratégies nationales et, en 2015 et 2016, des efforts 
ont aussi été faits pour développer des plans régionaux d’aide pour les réfugiés (RRRP en anglais).  

Entre  2014  et  2018,  le  financement  de  l’aide  humanitaire  européenne  en  faveur  de  l’AC  s’est  élevé  à 
499,9 millions d’euros. Chaque année, la DG ECHO a élaboré des stratégies dans les HIP (en 2014 pour 
chaque pays et entre 2015 et 2018 pour la région) ; le but est de répondre aux besoins à la fois aigus et 
prolongés des populations touchées par les crises d’origine humaine/les situations d’urgence complexes, 
les crises alimentaire et nutritionnelle, les épidémies et les catastrophes naturelles. Les partenaires de la 
DG ECHO ont mené au total 317 actions financées par l’UE, soit 825 activités et résultats distincts au sein 
de plusieurs secteurs humanitaires.  

Constatations principales  

Les principales constatations et évaluations établies d’après le questionnaire d’évaluation sont présentées ci-
dessous. 

1. Pertinence 

  Les actions financées par l’UE en AC entre 2014 et 2018 ont toujours été adaptées aux besoins des 
populations  les  plus  vulnérables  lors  des  crises  et  de  conditions  particulières.  Les  actions  ont 
systématiquement été élaborées d’après les évaluation des besoins ; en général, au cours de leur 
mise  en  œuvre,  on  a  procédé  à  d’autres  évaluations  des  besoins ;  enfin,  les  actions  ont 
majoritairement  été  adaptées  à  l’évolution  des  besoins  et  des  situations.  Les  actions  ont  pour 
l’essentiel, du moins dans leur conception, pris en considération le sexe et l’âge des individus, et les 
bénéficiaires ont été consultés.  

  Les actions menées ont perdu quelque peu de leur pertinence en raison de questions touchant à 
des besoins spécifiques et à la consultation des bénéficiaires. Les définitions plus larges de la notion 
de vulnérabilité (par exemple, des personnes handicapées) n’ont pas toujours été considérées, la 
consultation des bénéficiaires n’a pas toujours été de grande qualité et les mécanismes permettant 
un retour d’information efficace ont souvent fait défaut. 

2. Adéquation  

  Les stratégies mises en place par la DG ECHO ont grandement pu répondre aux besoins aigus en 
AC entre 2014 et 2018. Dans la pratique, la DG ECHO et ses partenaires ont été impliqués dans 
l’élaboration de ces stratégies nationales au moyen de processus itératifs, garantie d’une très grande 
souplesse d’adaptation de ces stratégies aux besoins. Des efforts ont été déployés pour adapter les 
21 

 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

HIP à la situation spécifique de chaque pays, mais, dans la pratique, les plans se sont de plus en 
plus adaptés à l’évolution des besoins et ont été modifiés à plusieurs reprises pour s’adapter aux 
situations nouvelles.  

  Cependant, les stratégies de la DG ECHO n’ont pas vraiment pu répondre aux besoins prolongés, 
ni  les  réduire  au  fil  du  temps.  Les  HIP  annuels  n’ont  pas  été  d’un  grand  intérêt  en  matière  de 
stratégies  prioritaires,  d’orientation  stratégique  claire,  ou  de  planification  et  de  financement 
pluriannuels, ce qui aurait permis de résoudre les situations, les besoins et les risques humanitaires 
prolongés. Les modifications apportées régulièrement et les mesures d’urgence prises ont permis 
une plus grande adaptation des réponses aux besoins urgents qui se présentaient, mais n’ont pas 
pour autant constitué une gestion évolutive en termes d’apprentissage et d’amélioration continue.   

3. Évaluation des besoins  

  La DG ECHO a eu tout à fait raison de promouvoir des évaluations conjointes et  impartiales des 
besoins.  Dans  les  trois  pays,  cela  a  permis  d’harmoniser  les  évaluations  des  besoins  et  les 
évaluations  conjointes  des  besoins,  réduisant  ainsi  la  multiplication  des  évaluations  non 
coordonnées. La DG ECHO a toujours financé le Bureau de la coordination des affaires humanitaires 
des  Nations  Unies  (BCAH)  en  vue  de  préparer  les  aperçus  des  besoins  humanitaires  (HNO), 
encouragé la participation des partenaires de la mise en œuvre et pris une part active au processus 
lui-même.  La  DG  ECHO  a également fait  beaucoup  pour  améliorer  la  qualité de  l’évaluation  des 
besoins.  Ces  actions  ont  abouti  à  des  résultats  prometteurs,  notamment  le  renforcement  des 
capacités d’évaluation et l’amélioration des réactions. 

4. Alignement  

  Les réactions de la DG ECHO en AC entre 2014 et 2018 se sont toujours alignées sur les principes 
humanitaires  et  les  priorités  de  l’UE.  Les  acteurs  concernés  de  chaque  pays  ont  toujours  été 
convaincus  de  l’alignement  de  la  stratégie  de  la  DG  ECHO  sur  les  principes  humanitaires.  Il  est 
aussi évident que la DG ECHO a toujours soutenu les principes humanitaires fondamentaux de bien 
des  façons.  Par  exemple,  elle  a  agi  par  humanité  en  adaptant  sa  réaction  à  des  situations 
spécifiques et en faisant preuve de souplesse pour répondre à de nouveaux besoins. Aussi bien les 
priorités fixées dans les HIP que les priorités opérationnelles ont été cohérentes avec les priorités 
humanitaires de l’UE, et la DG ECHO a veillé à ce que les actions financées par l’UE s’alignent sur 
sa stratégie. Dans la pratique, cependant, la stratégie de la DG ECHO a également été confrontée 
à  des  risques  liés  aux  principes  humanitaires  et  à  des  défis  pratiques  liés  à  l’alignement  sur  les 
priorités  thématiques  européennes.  Par  exemple,  l’absence  d’acteurs  du  développement  et  de 
services gouvernementaux a rendu plus complexe la question de l’autonomie des réfugiés dans l’est 
du Cameroun.  

5. Réalisations  

  La  DG  ECHO  a grandement  contribué  à  répondre  aux  besoins  aigus  en  AC  entre 2014 et  2018. 
Dans toute la région, la DG ECHO s’est engagée dans des actions d’urgence multisectorielles en 
mettant  particulièrement  l’accent  sur  la  sécurité  alimentaire  et  la  nutrition.  En  outre,  les  actions 
humanitaires  financées  par  l’UE  ont  permis  d’atteindre  la  plupart  des  résultats  escomptés  et  ont 
collectivement touché une majorité de personnes dans le besoin chaque année ; ont participé aux 
objectifs de l’UE ; et ont apporté des contributions notables dans chaque pays.  

  Ces réalisations reposaient sur une chaîne d’activités impliquant l’ensemble de l’UE, la DG ECHO, 
les  partenaires  de  mise  en  œuvre  et  les  bénéficiaires,  tandis  que  la  DG  ECHO  fournissait  une 
orientation stratégique, choisissait les projets, allouait des fonds, et assurait le suivi et la supervision 
de la mise en œuvre. Les capacités techniques de la DG ECHO, la souplesse de son système de 
22 

 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

financement  des  situations  d’urgence  et  ses  relations  avec  ses  partenaires  étaient  des  atouts 
essentiels.  

  Cependant, la DG ECHO n’a pas pu réduire efficacement les besoins et les risques humanitaires 
récurrents dans la région ; et il n’y avait que peu de preuves, voire aucune, que les besoins et les 
risques  humanitaires  avaient  diminué.  Cela  reflétait  les  difficultés  plus  grandes  rencontrées  pour 
répondre aux besoins humanitaires prolongés et impliquer les acteurs du développement. En outre, 
la DG ECHO s’est très peu investie dans les actions de réduction du risque de catastrophe et la 
préparation  aux  situations  d’urgence  (DRR/EP  en  anglais)  pour  prévenir  les  épidémies  et  les 
catastrophes naturelles. 

Réalisations en République centrafricaine 

  En  RCA,  la  DG  ECHO  a  accompli  un  excellent  travail  pour  répondre  aux  besoins  aigus.  Le 
portefeuille en RCA a toujours produit de bons résultats, peu importent les actions et les activités, 
d’ailleurs reconnues pour leur grande qualité. Il est apparu que le portefeuille a permis de combler 
les  besoins  urgents  des  personnes  directement  ou  indirectement  touchées  par  un  conflit  en 
soutenant la réaction humanitaire plus large. L’étude de cas a également montré comment la DG 
ECHO a collaboré avec le BCAH pour renforcer la réaction humanitaire globale. Le choix des projets 
par la DG ECHO et ses compétences techniques sont considérés comme des facteurs de réussite. 
De manière générale, il semble que la DG ECHO a joué un rôle majeur dans la phase d’urgence en 
RCA entre 2013 et 2016 et qu’elle a renforcé la coordination et la cohérence entre 2016 et 2018. On 
estime aussi que la DG ECHO a joué un rôle essentiel pour atteindre les objectifs de l’UE visant à 
fournir une aide humanitaire, la paix et la stabilité en RCA entre 2013 et 2016, et pour soutenir la 
reconstruction et le développement à partir de 2016, grâce à une collaboration étroite avec le Fonds 
fiduciaire Bêkou. 

  La  DG  ECHO  a  moins  bien  réussi  à  répondre  aux  besoins  prolongés  en  RCA,  où  les  résultats 
obtenus à grande échelle sont restés modestes et où les besoins ont légèrement augmenté durant 
la période. La DG ECHO n’a pas fait grand chose pour renforcer la préparation et réduire les risques 
humanitaires.  En  outre,  les  partenaires  ont  exprimé  plusieurs  inquiétudes  quant  à  l’efficacité  du 
processus  de  sélection  des  projets  par  la  DG  ECHO  et  à  ses  exigences  élevées  en  matière  de 
rapports. L’idée a été émise que, sans plus grande coordination stratégique, les fonds alloués par 
la DG ECHO pourraient contribuer à une fragmentation de la réaction aux situations d’urgence. 

Réalisations au Cameroun 

  Au  Cameroun,  la  DG  ECHO  a  fait  un  excellent  travail  pour  répondre  aux  besoins  urgents.  Le 
portefeuille de la DG ECHO a toujours produit de bons résultats ; on estime que, grâce aux capacités 
de surveillance de la DG ECHO et au savoir-faire de ses partenaires, des besoins urgents ont pu 
être comblés. Il est apparu que le portefeuille a produit des résultats significatifs en comblant les 
besoins élémentaires des populations touchées, en particulier des réfugiés et des populations des 
communautés d’accueil. La DG ECHO a également permis que les objectifs de développement de 
l’UE soient atteints, car elle s’est engagée dans la planification d’activités autonomes et a renforcé 
la capacité de résilience.  

  Mais le portefeuille de la DG ECHO a failli ne plus répondre aux normes requises face aux besoins 
prolongés des réfugiés. Il semble aussi que, d’une manière plus générale, il ait eu du mal à satisfaire 
les besoins prolongés du pays, où les besoins et les risques humanitaires ont augmenté au cours 
de  la  période.  L’étude  de  cas  a  révélé  comment  la  DG  ECHO  et  la  Croix-Rouge  française  ont 
collaboré pour renforcer l’autonomie des réfugiés centrafricains dans l’est du Cameroun, bien que 
peu de résultats aient été obtenus une fois le projet terminé. Cela a mis en évidence les limites de 

23 

 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

l’aide  apportée  par  la  DG  ECHO  aux  actions  d’autonomie  en  l’absence  d’une  plus  grande 
participation des acteurs du développement. 

Réalisations au Tchad 

  Au Tchad, la DG ECHO a fait un excellent travail pour répondre aux besoins urgents et aux besoins 
prolongés. Le portefeuille a toujours produit de bons résultats dans le cadre des actions entreprises 
en matière de sécurité alimentaire et d’intervention d’urgence, et a été largement perçu comme une 
réponse aux besoins aigus et une contribution à la lutte contre la grave insécurité alimentaire. Le 
choix des projets par la DG ECHO, son expertise, sa présence sur le terrain et son encadrement 
sont considérés comme des facteurs de réussite. Parmi les réalisations importantes de la DG ECHO, 
citons l’intensification des actions entreprises en matière de nutrition dès 2014, la réaction rapide 
apportée à la question du lac Tchad par les partenaires de mise en œuvre et la solution apportée à 
l’épidémie  de  choléra  en  2017.  La  DG  ECHO  a  souvent  contribué  aux  objectifs  de  l’UE  et,  plus 
important  encore,  grâce  aux  relations  étroites  qu’elle  entretient  avec  la  direction  générale  de  la 
coopération internationale et du développement de l’UE (DG DEVCO) ainsi qu’à l’élaboration d’une 
vision commune de la résilience et du lien humanitaire-développement.  

  Mais,  tout  en  élargissant  sa  réaction,  la  DG  ECHO  a  encore  eu  du  mal  à  répondre  aux  besoins 
prolongés ainsi qu’aux risques de catastrophes et d’épidémies. Malgré quelques avancées minimes 
en matière de résilience, il a été difficile pour la DG ECHO d’apporter son concours à ce domaine 
d’activités.  L'étude  de  cas  a révélé  comment  la  DG  ECHO  et  le  Programme  alimentaire  mondial 
(PAM) ont collaboré entre 2016 2017 pour renforcer la résilience des populations vulnérables de la 
bande  du  Sahel,  même  si  certains  ciblages  nécessitaient  de  donner  la  priorité  au  potentiel  de 
production plutôt qu’aux besoins humanitaires ; au moment de l’évaluation, on ne disposait que de 
peu  d’indices  indiquant  que  HDN  et  la  DG  DEVCO  avaient  continué  de  collaborer  une  fois  la 
planification initiale effectuée. 

6. Actions de sensibilisation  

  Les  actions  de  sensibilisation  diligentées  par  la  DG  ECHO  en  AC  en  2014-2018  ont  rencontré 
quelques succès. La DG ECHO a mené des actions de sensibilisation sur divers sujets, ce qui a 
porté quelques fruits, en particulier lors des périodes d’urgence et de besoins aigus. La DG ECHO 
a souvent défendu avec ardeur certaines causes, un rôle que des relations avec la délégation de 
l’UE pourraient renforcer. Mais les actions de sensibilisation de la DG ECHO n’ont pas toujours été 
structurées ni stratégiques, ce qui a contribué à forger une image contrastée des réussites à travers 
les pays.   

7. Rapport coût-efficacité   

  Le rapport coût-efficacité du portefeuille de la DG ECHO en AC en 2014-2018 a été acceptable, à 
quelques exceptions notables près. Sans cadre établi par la DG ECHO pour assurer une meilleure 
rentabilité, l’évaluation du rapport coût-efficacité a reposé sur des études de cas. Une étude de cas 
révèle que, en allouant des fonds au BCAH pour investir de manière décisive dans la coordination, 
on augmenterait l’efficacité d’une intervention humanitaire. Les autres études de cas soulèvent des 
questions importantes concernant le rapport coût-efficacité de certaines actions autonomes et de 
résilience, par exemple lorsqu’elles ne sont pas suivies d’actions de développement coordonnées 
ou que leurs résultats sont décevants.  

  Dans une région où les coûts de livraison étaient relativement élevés, l’efficacité du portefeuille plus 
large de la DG ECHO a aussi été affectée par l’investissement limité de la DG ECHO auprès des 
intervenants  locaux  et  nationaux,  l’utilisation  de  l’aide  aux  liquidités  et  aux  bons  (CVA)  et  la 
souplesse  des  modalités  de  financement,  comme  les contrats  de  financement  pluriannuels.  Bien 
24 

 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

que  de  nombreuses  actions  aient  été  financées  année  après  année  par  l’UE,  elles  sont  restées 
soumises à un financement annuel et à des processus de choix fastidieux. 

8. Financement  

  Le financement humanitaire de l’UE a été suffisant pour répondre à certains des besoins les plus 
pressants en AC entre 2014 et 2018. Le financement annuel de l’UE en faveur de l’AC a été alloué 
sur la base des évaluations des besoins globaux, fluctuant et augmentant généralement avec les 
besoins ; on a estimé que, dans certains cas, ce financement s’était révélé suffisant pour que les 
besoins  les  plus  urgents  lors  de  situations  d’urgence  soient  comblés.  L’UE  a  été  le  deuxième 
donateur le plus important pour financer les interventions humanitaires au cours de la période ; sa 
contribution a représenté près d’un cinquième des fonds alloués. Par rapport à la moyenne globale 
de l’UE et au financement d’autres crises, la participation financière de l’UE en faveur de l’AC a été 
relativement élevée entre 2014 et 2018.  

  Cependant, les fonds alloués par l’UE n’ont manifestement pas été proportionnés aux besoins ni 
adaptés  à  la  situation  de  chaque  pays.  Les  actions  humanitaires  en  AC  ont  toujours  été  sous-
financées et n’ont jamais pu combler les besoins des personnes ciblées, et a fortiori de toutes celles 
qui sont  dans  le besoin.  De plus,  par rapport  aux  personnes  ayant  besoin d’aide,  la  participation 
financière de l’UE a considérablement varié d’un pays à l’autre et d’une année à l’autre : le montant 
et la participation financière de l’UE ont considérablement fluctué entre les pays de l’AC, le Tchad 
ayant reçu plus du double de la RCA et le triple du Cameroun. En outre, tous les acteurs concernés 
dans chaque pays avaient émis des doutes sur la proportionnalité du financement effectué par la 
DG ECHO aux besoins, en particulier aux besoins récurrents de chaque pays.   

9. Coordination humanitaire  

  La DG ECHO a fait un excellent travail pour renforcer la coordination humanitaire en CA entre 2014 
et  2018.  Elle  a  fourni  un  financement  relativement  important  et  régulier  visant  à  coordonner  les 
actions  dans  la  région  et  dans  chaque  pays,  et  a  permis  de  combler  les  lacunes  en  matière  de 
coordination. La DG ECHO a alloué environ trois cinquièmes de ses fonds de coordination au BCAH, 
tout  en  prodiguant  des  sommes  moindres  à  quelques  autres  organismes  (par  exemple, 
l’Organisation internationale pour les migrations [OIM], le Fonds des Nations unies pour l'enfance 
[UNICEF], l’Organisation des Nations unies pour l’alimentation et l’agriculture [ FAO]) ; elle a toujours 
soutenu  les  actions  du  BCAH  en  lui  allouant  des  fonds  et  en  faisant  sa  promotion  aux  niveaux 
national et décentralisé. Si les actions de coordination financées par l’UE ont contribué de différentes 
manières  à  renforcer  la  réaction  humanitaire,  il  est  attesté  que,  en  apportant  son  soutien  à  la 
coordination, la DG ECHO a aussi permis de renforcer la réaction humanitaire.  

  Malgré  cela,  de  fréquents  écarts  et  fluctuations  dans  le  financement  global  des  actions  de 
coordination humanitaire ont perduré au cours de la période 2014-2018, creusant considérablement 
les écarts entre les pays au fil des années. En moyenne, les actions de coordination au Cameroun 
ont été moins bien financées qu’en RCA et au Tchad. 

10. Coordination des donateurs :  

  La DG ECHO a coordonné avec succès sa réaction avec d’autres donateurs en AC entre 2014 et 
2018.  La  DG  ECHO  s’est  toujours  efforcée  de  coordonner  ses  actions  à  celles  des  donateurs 
humanitaires et, de plus en plus, à celles des donateurs pour le développement. Ses actions ont 
souvent  consisté  à  fournir  une  direction  et  des  conseils  éclairés  aux  donateurs.  Ces  efforts  ont 
permis  de  réduire  les  doublons  ;  mais  la  coordination  opérationnelle  est  aussi  demeurée 
problématique  dans  chaque  pays,  et  la  DG  ECHO  n’a  pas  cherché  à  combler  les  lacunes 

25 

 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

structurelles immenses ni à réunir d’autres donateurs en l’absence de mécanismes de coordination 
des donateurs.    

11. Valeur ajoutée de l’Union européenne  

  La DG ECHO a manifestement apporté une valeur ajoutée aux États membres de l’UE en AC entre 
2014  et  2018.  Au-delà  des  capacités de financement  de  l’aide  humanitaire de tout  État  membre, 
dans  chaque  pays  la  DG  ECHO  s’est  révélée  très  présente  avec  un  portefeuille  d’actions  très 
efficace ;  une  connaissance  unique  des  besoins,  de  la  situation  et  du  contexte ;  une  expertise 
technique  de  terrain ;  et  une  voix  qui  s’est  élevée  en  faveur  des  principes  à  chaque  réaction 
humanitaire. Les États membres de l’UE ont toutefois continué de mettre en œuvre leurs propres 
portefeuilles dans la région, qui ensemble se sont avérés aussi importants que celui de la DG ECHO. 
Les États membres ont aussi peu investi dans le système de recette affectée externe (ExAR) de la 
DG ECHO. 

12. Durabilité  

  La DG ECHO n’a pas obtenu de résultats durables en AC entre 2014 et 2018. La plupart des actions 
humanitaires financées par l’UE ont répondu aux attentes de la DG ECHO en démontrant un intérêt 
étendu, varié et croissant en matière de renforcement de la résilience. Cependant, ces importants 
efforts n’ont pas toujours été appropriés, et des questions importantes sur la nature de l’orientation 
humanitaire  de  la  DG  ECHO,  son  financement  restreint  et  ses  systèmes  de  planification  et  de 
financement annuels ont été soulevées. Plus important encore, les actions humanitaires financées 
par  l’UE  dans  les  trois  pays  n’ont  pas  toujours  défini  de  stratégies  de  sortie,  et  les  stratégies 
européennes plus étendues visant à promouvoir la durabilité des actions humanitaires ont souvent 
fait défaut. 

13. Le lien entre l’humanitaire et le développement (HDN) 

  La  réussite  des  mesures  prises  par  la  DG  ECHO  pour  coordonner  les  actions  européennes 
concernant le lien humanitaire-développement ne peut pas être correctement évaluée en AC entre 
2014 et 2018. Point positif, la DG ECHO a systématiquement pris des mesures pour coordonner les 
activités  européennes  concernant  le  lien  humanitaire-développement  en  déployant  dans  les  trois 
pays des efforts qui ont été reconnus et en jouant un rôle de premier plan dans la coordination de 
l’exercice  d’essai  de  ce  lien  au  Tchad.  Dans  le  même  temps,  la  répartition  des  rôles  et  des 
responsabilités  entre  la  DG  ECHO  et  la  DG  DEVCO  n’était  pas  toujours  claire,  il  n’y  avait  pas 
d’objectifs partagés et de cadres de suivi, et on a mis en évidence des risques de détournement des 
ressources destinées à combler les besoins urgents et les priorités humanitaires. Il n’y avait encore 
aucune  preuve  indiquant  que  les  mesures  prises  avaient  permis  de  réduire  les  besoins,  la 
vulnérabilité ou la fragilité des populations en AC.  

Conclusions  

S’appuyant  sur  les  principales  constatations  de  l’évaluation,  l’équipe  en  charge  de  l’analyse  des 
interventions humanitaires en AC entre 2014 et 2018 a tiré les conclusions suivantes : 

Points forts   
Les interventions humanitaires en AC entre 2014 et 2018 ont de nombreux points forts. Que ce soit la 
contribution globale à la satisfaction des besoins urgents, le renforcement de la réaction humanitaire dans 
chaque pays ou les actions réussies des partenaires de la mise en œuvre, tout est important. De plus, 
l’action  humanitaire  de  la  DG  ECHO  au  niveau  des  pays  a  constitué  un  atout,  voire  un avantage 

26 

 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

comparatif, et le financement humanitaire européen est resté relativement important et régulier au cours 
de la période. 

Défis 
La plus grande difficulté rencontrée par l’UE lors des interventions humanitaires en AC entre 2014 et 2018 
a concerné les besoins récurrents et prolongés, qui sont restés très présents dans toute la région. L’autre 
difficulté  identifiée  a  concerné  l’augmentation  de  la  résilience  et  de  la  responsabilisation  des  acteurs 
locaux et nationaux ; l’inefficacité des processus de la DG ECHO en matière de donateurs ; et l’absence 
de stratégies globales visant à réduire les besoins humanitaires dans la région. En outre, les divergences 
entre les acteurs concernés et une certaine confusion quant à la logique d’intervention de la DG ECHO et 
aux actions spécifiques à mener pour réussir ont montré que la stratégie de la  DG ECHO bénéficierait 
grandement de plus de clarté. Enfin, les systèmes de suivi, d’évaluation et d’apprentissage (MEL) n’étaient 
pas suffisants, ce qui a posé des problèmes pour gérer les interventions humanitaires en AC. 

Recommandations  

S’appuyant sur ces conclusions et sur la consultation de la DG ECHO, l’équipe d’évaluation propose ces 
recommandations: 

1.  La DG ECHO doit adopter une approche plus globale pour résoudre les problèmes humanitaires posés 
en  AC  à  l’horizon  2020-2025,  en  recourant  notamment  à  une  logique  d’intervention  humanitaire 
européenne actualisée pour combler et réduire les besoins humanitaires en AC.  

2.  La DG ECHO doit renforcer son rôle en tant que donateur humanitaire de premier ordre en AC entre 
2020 et 2025, en veillant à ce que ses projets correspondent systématiquement aux normes requises, 
particulièrement en ce qui concerne l’implication, la consultation des bénéficiaires et la résilience.  

3.  La  DG  ECHO  doit  s’engager  à  soutenir  la  coordination  humanitaire  en  AC  entre  2020  et  2025,  en 
renforçant  la  coordination  des  réactions  humanitaires  au  niveau  national,  en  particulier  grâce  aux 
évaluations des besoins, au rôle majeur du BCAH et à la coordination des donateurs.  

4.  La DG ECHO doit explorer les opportunités d’ordre humanitaire que permet la collaboration entre les 
acteurs de l’aide humanitaire, du développement et de la consolidation de la paix en AC entre 2020 et 
2025 ; pour ce faire, elle peut tirer leçon de la façon dont l’approche concernant le lien humanitaire-
développement aboutit à de meilleurs résultats humanitaires en termes de réduction des besoins.  

5.  La DG ECHO doit rationaliser ses processus de financement en AC entre 2020 et 2025 en les révisant 
conformément aux engagements pris dans le cadre du Grand Bargain et en s’attaquant aux problèmes 
spécifiques posés par les acteurs concernés de cette évaluation concernant le choix des projets, les 
rapports et les contrats (voir Conclusion 8). 

6.  La DG ECHO doit développer des systèmes MEL plus efficaces pour organiser l’action humanitaire 
européenne  en  AC  entre  2020  et  2025  ;  pour  cela,  elle  doit  fournir  des  renseignements  sur  son 
portefeuille d’actions dans chaque pays, notamment l’ensemble des rapports faisant état des résultats 
et d’autres questions importantes. 

27 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

1.  Introduction 

1.1.  Objectives, purpose and scope  

This is an independent evaluation of the European Union (EU)’s humanitarian interventions in  Central Africa 
(CA)  for  the  period  2014-2018.  It  was  commissioned  to  ‘provide  a  retrospective  assessment  of  the 
Directorate‑General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid’s (DG ECHO) interventions in Central 
Africa,’ which would help with ‘shaping the EU's future approach in the region’ (Evaluation Terms of Reference 
(ToR), p.11). The evaluation was conducted alongside a global review of DG ECHO’s humanitarian coordination 
activity 2014-2018, which is included in Part B.  

The dual purpose of this evaluation is to support EU accountability and learning. First, the evaluation aimed to 
provide  an  independent  and  objective  perspective  to  ‘assess  the  actual  performance  of  EU  interventions 
compared to initial expectations’, ‘engage stakeholders and encourage feedback’, and offer ‘an independent 
and  objective  judgement  based  on  evidence  available’.  Second,  it  aimed  to  support  learning  about  current 
strategies,  identify  areas  for  improvement,  encourage  sharing  of  good  practices,  and  provide  ‘timely  and 
relevant advice to decision-making’. 

The object of the evaluation is ‘EU humanitarian interventions in Central Africa’ (i.e. the Central African Republic 
(CAR),  Cameroon  and  Chad)  from  January  2014  to  December  2018.  EU  humanitarian  interventions  were 
understood to comprise: (i) EU humanitarian funding, including worldwide decisions and  ad hoc emergency 
funding; (ii) DG ECHO strategy, as defined in Humanitarian Implementation Plans (HIPs) and implemented by 
DG  ECHO  and  partners;  (iii)  EU-funded  actions,  as  designed,  implemented  and  managed  by  DG  ECHO 
partners; and (iv) results achieved at various levels, including outputs and outcomes. Please note, the term 
‘EU-funded actions’ is used throughout the report to refer to EU-funded ‘humanitarian’ actions as managed by 
DG ECHO, unless otherwise specified. 

While the analysis in this evaluation was primarily concerned with EU interventions at CA level, much of the 
analysis  was  conducted  at  country  level  where  humanitarian  responses  were  planned  and  implemented  in 
practice.  In  case  studies,  the  evaluation  focused  on  three  themes  agreed  with  DG  ECHO:  humanitarian 
coordination  in  CAR,  promotion  of  self-reliance  among  refugees  in  Cameroon  and  the  Humanitarian-
Development Nexus (HDN) in Chad.  

1.2.  Methodology 

1.2.1.  Evaluation framework 

The evaluation framework required some conceptual effort. At inception phase, an evaluation framework was 
developed based on evaluation questions (EQs) initially provided by DG ECHO. The EQs thus reflected the 
specific interests of DG ECHO users, contained implicit propositions to test, and responded to EU evaluation 
requirements. The EQs were then organised into three ‘lines of enquiry’ to help organise the evaluation: (a) 
Relevance: ‘Did DG ECHO do the right thing?’, (b) Effectiveness: ‘Did DG ECHO do well?’ and (c) Coordination 
and Coherence: ‘Did DG ECHO work with the right actors?’ Finally, an overarching ‘action research’ question 
was developed to frame the evaluation: ‘How could EU humanitarian interventions in Central Africa be improved 
in DG ECHO strategy?’ 

Next, an evaluation matrix (see Annex 10) was prepared to guide the evaluation. It included judgement criteria 
(JCs), indicators, methods and sources. The JCs constitute statements that define ‘what good looks like’ for 
each question, referencing good practices and agreed with evaluation users. The indicators are the means by 
which performance could be measured for each JC, including quantified data, converging stakeholder views 
28 

 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

and qualitative evidence from case studies. The methods and sources cover data analysis, document review, 
stakeholder survey, key informant interviews (KIIs) and case studies.  

Then, an intervention logic was constructed to help understand how EU humanitarian interventions and DG 
ECHO activities were expected to work in CA. First, an ‘intervention logic’ was constructed with a view to making 
explicit  the  underlying  logic  and  assumptions  about  EU  humanitarian  interventions in  CA.  However,  it  soon 
became clear that the implicit logic for EU humanitarian interventions in CA would have evolved during the 
period 2014-2018, influenced by global policy developments defined in the World Humanitarian Summit.  

Before  the  World  Humanitarian  Summit  in  2016,  EU  humanitarian  interventions  would  have  been  most 
significantly  guided  by  Good  Humanitarian  Donorship  (GHD)  principles1  and  a  conventional  ‘coordination 
model’ in line with global policy.2 The coordination model assumes that coordination among humanitarian actors 
is a key driver of effectiveness. After 2016, EU humanitarian interventions would have been increasingly guided 
by efforts to bridge the humanitarian-development divide3 and the related Grand Bargain,4 which was defined 
as a ‘complementarity’ model. The complementarity model aims to address commonly defined problems, and 
sees collaborative programming among humanitarian, development and other actors as a key driver of success. 
The two models are understood to be compatible and the complementarity model is seen as an extension to 
the coordination model.   

A hybrid model was therefore constructed to better reflect the dual logic of EU humanitarian interventions in CA 
2014-2018.  This  model  remained  focused  on  a  coordinated  humanitarian  response,  but  also  aspired  to 
collaborate with development actors to implement the HDN. It considered both coordination and collaborative 
programming as drivers of effectiveness. Therefore the model proposed that: 

 

IF … EU humanitarian funding is provided yearly through HIPs and portfolios of action, in complement with 
other EU and donor instruments, such as EU Trust Funds (EUTFs) and the European Development Fund 
(EDF) 

  AND …  EU-funded actions contribute to coordinated responses, as defined by Humanitarian Response 

Plans (HRPs), and also work in collaboration with other EU actors, in particular the Directorate-General for 
International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO), the European External Action Service (EEAS), 
and Member States 

  THEN … both acute needs and protracted needs of the most vulnerable populations will be addressed 

more effectively.  

1 GHD (2003), 24 Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship 
2 Notably UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182 (1991), the Humanitarian Response Review (2005) and Transformative Agenda (2011) 
3 For example, in 2016, UN humanitarian and development actors committed to implementing a  ‘new way of working’ that meets people’s immediate humanitarian 
needs while at the same time reducing risk and vulnerability, as proposed in the secretary-general (SG)’s report ‘One Humanity: Shared Responsibility’ (paragraphs 
124-142) and its Agenda for Humanity. 
4 In 2016, DG ECHO and other leading donors and aid organisations signed ‘The Grand Bargain – A Shared Commitment to Better Serve People in Need,’ by which 
they made multiple commitments aimed to ‘get more means into the hands of people in need’, on the assumption that greater efficiency and collaboration will create 
a virtuous circle, drawing in more resources from a wider range of stakeholders. 

29 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

Figure 1: A ‘hybrid’ intervention logic for EU humanitarian assistance in Central Africa (2014-2018)5 

In developing the case studies, it also became necessary to develop a hypothetical understanding of DG ECHO 
processes. To this end, a generic hypothesis was constructed for how EU inputs lead to outcomes at the level 
of each project or ‘EU-funded action’. The model proposed that:  

 

IF … the EU humanitarian budget allocated to CA is sufficient and proportionate, and guided by effective 
global policies   

  AND … the DG ECHO country programme is guided by an appropriate strategy, uses good project 

selection processes and funding mechanisms, and manages the programme well 

  AND … IPs and downstream partner/s (DPs) design good projects, implement them well (incl. cost-

effectively), and adapt to significant changes  

  THEN … Beneficiary (and local) capacities will be engaged, needs will be met and vulnerabilities will be 

reduced (resilience strengthened). 

1.2.2.  Approach 

This  evaluation  was  conducted  in  support  of  the  European  Consensus  on  Humanitarian  Aid,  to  which  the 
evaluators are committed. Its implementation was guided by the EU evaluation criteria as defined in the Better 
Regulation  guidelines  and  recognised  standards  of  quality  in  evaluation  of  humanitarian  action  (EHA).6  In 
particular, it sought to promote user participation and inclusion and a vulnerability perspective in analysis.  

The evaluation used a mixed methods approach for data collection and analysis, involving a mix of qualitative 
and quantitative techniques: data analysis, document review, stakeholder survey, KIIs, case studies and user 
workshops. In practice, these mixed methods provided rigorous means for data collection and analysis, allowed 
for triangulation of evidence, and provided a multi-faceted understanding of EU humanitarian interventions in 
CA 2014-2018. 

The evaluation was conducted in sequenced phases. At desk phase, the focus was on making best possible 
use of secondary data and documentation from DG ECHO information systems (EVA and HOPE databases). 
At field phase, the focus was on conducting a structured consultation of stakeholders along with case studies 
at  the  country  level.  At  synthesis  phase,  the  focus  was  on  compiling,  reviewing  and  analysing  evidence 
generated to reach overall findings; and then making higher-level assessments in response to each evaluation 
question. In practice, the desk and field phases overlapped somewhat.  

5 This graphic refers to ‘Good Humanitarian Donorship’ (GHD), ‘Humanitarian Programme Cycle’ (HPC), ‘Humanitarian Response Plan’ (HRP), and ‘New Ways of 
Working’ (NWOW). 
6 ALNAP (2016) Evaluation of Humanitarian Action Guide. ALNAP Guide. London: ALNAP/ODI 

30 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

The evaluation aimed to use a streamlined reporting approach that would prioritise timely evidence and learning 
at  each  phase  over  more  time-consuming  report-writing  processes,  which  risked  overstretching  limited 
resources  for  this  wide-ranging  evaluation.  This  meant  early  preparation  of  emerging  findings,  PowerPoint 
presentations, user workshops that generated further evidence, and rapid reporting of emerging findings and 
evidence based on the discussion. In practice, this led to positive engagement with users during the process, 
but little reduction in the reporting.  

The  evaluation  relied  on  sampling  strategies  to  gain  insights  into  the  wide  range  of  EU  humanitarian 
interventions in CA 2014-2018. For an analysis of EU-funded actions, a purposive sample of 58/317 actions 
was selected taking into account a range of factors, notably whether they were one-year or actions repeated 
yearly, which allowed for a quantitative and qualitative review of detailed project monitoring. For stakeholder 
consultations,  a  structured  sample  was  constructed  of  (n=111-171)  people  directly  involved  with  EU 
humanitarian interventions, divided into donorship actors, implementation actors, and intended beneficiaries, 
and subdivided to include current and former DG ECHO staff. In total, through KIIs and workshops a total of 
142  individuals  at  EU  staff,  donorship  and  implementation  levels  and  148  beneficiaries  were  consulted 
predominantly through focus group discussions.  

1.2.3.  Methods 

The data analysis involved collecting relevant data and conducting analyses in relation to indicators for specific 
EQs. It relied on three datasets: ‘portfolio data’ extracted from DG ECHO’s HOPE data system covering all 
projects in CA; ‘sample data’ compiled from a sample of reporting on EU-funded actions (i.e. projects) in CA 
2014-2018; and ‘response data’ collected from the UN OCHA-managed Financial Tracking Service (FTS). In 
practice,  these  datasets  offered  patchy  evidence  about  the  overall  achievements  and  results  of  EU 
humanitarian  interventions.  Portfolio  data  offered  relatively  weak  evidence,  lacking  aggregate  data  on  HIP 
achievements or any way of determining which activities and results were delivered to which populations or 
crises. The sample analysis provided strong evidence but offered little clarity on DG ECHO judgements (such 
as 'outstanding', 'minor problems' or 'largely achieved') and reporting for 2018 was not available, so for some 
questions reporting only covered 43 actions. Response-wide data offered some useful evidence; although there 
were  gaps  in  reporting  on  HRPs,  inconsistencies  in  response  indicators  used,  and  difficulties  in  credibly 
attributing achievements to DG ECHO.   

The  document  review  involved  selecting  relevant  documents,  conducting  a  qualitative  review  and  seeking 
specific evidence to address EQs. In addition to the context analysis of Global Humanitarian Overviews (GHOs), 
Humanitarian Needs Overviews (HNOs) and HRPs, and Integrated Analysis Framework (IAF) assessments, 
the document review relied on DG ECHO strategy documents (mainly HIPs 2014-2018 and General Guidelines 
on Operational Priorities (GGOPs) for Humanitarian Aid) and relevant DG ECHO evaluations. In practice, the 
strategy documents offered little useful evidence about EU humanitarian achievements in CA 2014-2018, as 
they did not report on HIPs or EU humanitarian interventions at the regional or country levels. The evaluations 
offered a stronger type of evidence, but very few were directly relevant.  

KIIs involved conducting semi-structured interviews with a sample of key informants, summarising key evidence 
contributed, and analysing responses by stakeholder category to generate evidence on specific EQs. The main 
stakeholders were: (i) donorship actors, including DG ECHO; (ii) implementation actors, including IPs; and (iii) 
intended  beneficiaries.  Analysis  involved  identifying  ‘converging  stakeholder  views’  in  relation  to  JCs.  In 
practice,  consultations  with  donors  and  implementers  generated  the  largest  amount  of  useful,  though 
perception-based,  evidence.  The  views of intended  beneficiaries  offered fewer  insights,  as  they  had  limited 
perspectives on EU interventions.  

The  online  survey  involved  preparing  and  fielding  a  short  online  survey  to  a  sample  of  stakeholders  and 
quantifying responses to address specific EQs. Target respondents included all KII respondents and a slightly 

31 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

larger pool of relevant stakeholders, mainly donorship actors such as former EU/DG ECHO staff and others 
unable to do KIIs. Respondents gave ratings on a ten-point scale as to how much they agreed to a bank of 
statements about EU humanitarian interventions in CA. In practice, the survey also provided relatively important 
evidence to complement the KIIs, but relied on a limited number of questions and respondent perceptions. Too 
few responses were received for Cameroon, so findings could not be aggregated at the regional level.    

The case studies involved selecting, preparing and conducting detailed studies that focused on ‘what worked 
where and how’ to provide evidence in relation to various EQs. The case studies focused on key themes agreed 
at inception phase and three specific EU-funded projects were selected accordingly. The case studies sought 
to  investigate  how  EU  funding,  DG  ECHO  activities  and  IP/DP  implementation  contributed  to  outcomes  for 
intended beneficiaries. They addressed these questions: (i) What was expected to happen?; (ii) What really 
happened?; and (iii) What were the implications for DG ECHO’s strategy? In practice, the case studies provided 
relatively strong evidence, but limited in its narrow scope, covering only 3/317 actions.   

The  synthesis  analysis  involved  collating  and  reviewing  evidence,  reaching  findings  for  each  JC,  making 
assessments  for  each  EQ,  extracting  lessons  and  drafting  the  report.  The  evidence  review  was  done  by 
compiling  all  the  evidence  generated  into  an  evidence  tool  and  reviewing  its  quality  (as  explained  below). 
Synthesis analysis was done by aggregating evidence and reaching findings for each JC and EQ. Assessments 
were made for each EQ using an indicative 1-5 scale and presented using qualitative adjectives in the report. 
The conclusions were developed on the basis of all findings and in relation to the intervention logic and process 
model. The recommendations were derived from these and benefited from structured discussions within the ET 
and the evaluation Inter-service Steering Group. The collated evidence and indicative assessments are available 
in the evidence tool submitted with this report.  

1.2.4.  Evidence 

An evidence review was conducted at synthesis stage to assess the quality of evidence produced by the various 
methods  and  information  sources.  It  was  reviewed  in  relation  to  six  criteria  developed  by  Christoplos  et  al. 
(2017) for assessing evidence quality in evaluations of humanitarian action (see table below).7   

Table 1: Criteria for assessing evidence in EHA 

Accuracy  

Whether the evidence is a good reflection of the real situation and can be considered a ‘true’ record 
of the thing being measured. 

Representativeness 

The degree to which the evidence accurately represents the condition of the whole population, the 
larger group of interest, the main stakeholders in the intervention, or the diversity that exists within 
the population. 

Relevance 

Generalisability  

The degree to which a piece of information relates to the proposition that it is intended to prove or 
disprove. 

The degree to which evidence from a specific situation can be generalised beyond a specific 
response to other situations (particularly important where evidence from one situation is used to 
create policies applicable to other situations). 

Attribution  

The extent to which the analysis demonstrates a clear causal linkage between two conditions or 
events. 

Clarity around contexts 
and methods 

The degree to which it is clear why, how and for whom evidence has been collected. 

7 See Christoplos, I. with Knox-Clarke, P. Cosgrave, J. Bonino, F. and Alexander, J. (2017) Strengthening the quality of evidence in humanitarian evaluations. ALNAP 
Method Note. London: ALNAP/ODI. 

32 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

Overall,  the  evidence  review  found  that  the  evidence  provided  a  sound  basis  for  reaching  credible  and 
actionable conclusions and recommendations. In particular, it could be considered ‘accurate’ given the use of 
mixed methods and triangulation; ‘representative’ given the use of sampling; ‘relevant’ given the use of primary 
data collected in stakeholder consultations and through case studies; and ‘transparent’ in the case of almost all 
evidence  sources.  It  was  found  to  be  less  strong  in  terms  of  ‘generalisability’  given  the  lack  of  aggregated 
reporting and the diversity of crises across CA; and in terms of ‘attribution’ which was not an expectation for 
this  evaluation.  Inevitably  evidence  for  some  EQs  was  stronger  than  for  others;  and  where  weakness  of 
evidence is considered a limitation, this is indicated in the evaluation findings.  

Table 2: Review of evidence generated by method and source 

Portfolio analysis 

Sample analysis 

Response analysis 

The portfolio analysis generated relatively weak evidence for the evaluation. It was a 
highly representative source because it covered all actions in CA 2014-2018, but its 
ability to reflect the real situation was limited by a lack of relevant reporting fields and 
aggregated results data.  

The sample analysis generated strong evidence. Its accuracy was underscored by 
its reliance on detailed Single Form and Fiche Op documents, which provided 
systematic reporting at each of the design, implementation and completion stages. Its 
representativeness was assured by purposive sample design, covering 18% of 
actions. It was also transparently designed for the evaluation. However, its relevance 
was limited to EU-funded actions, thus offering little specific information about EU 
funding, DG ECHO strategy and wider results.  

The analysis of UN OCHA-managed response information generated some reliable 
evidence for the evaluation. In general, this evidence was representative in that it 
covered most country responses, years and sectors; relevant in that EU funding 
supported a coordinated response and multi-sector responses; and evidently 
transparent in its purpose and methods. However, the accuracy of FTS and HRP 
indicator monitoring was limited by its reliance on quantitative data without consistent 
annual reporting on achievements and collective outcomes.  

DG ECHO strategy documents   The review of HIPs offered little useful evidence for the evaluation. Their context 

DG ECHO evaluations  

Key informant interviews  

Mini-survey  

and methods may have been clear enough, and their accuracy was not questioned, 
but they did not report on EU interventions in a way that was either representative or 
relevant, let alone generalisable or attributional.    

The review of DG ECHO evaluations generated some strong evidence. Its accuracy 
was assured by the quality of evaluations, and its purpose and methods were 
transparent. It was directly relevant in some cases, pointed to some generalisable 
lessons learned and allowed for some limited attribution. However, it was very far 
from representative, because only two evaluations were found to be directly relevant 
to this evaluation: the comprehensive evaluation and the Sahel evaluation.  

The evidence generated by stakeholder consultations through KIIs generated the 
largest amount of strong evidence. Above all, the KII evidence was representative 
of stakeholder views, due to its structured sampling of donors and implementation 
actors, designed to be directly relevant, and transparent in its purpose and methods. 
Its accuracy was underpinned by the converging qualitative views of those most 
concerned, which also allowed some exploration of attribution. However, this 
evidence would suffer from perceptions biases, especially a present perspective bias, 
and included only limited perspectives of intended beneficiaries, who are most 
affected by EU interventions.  

The evidence generated by stakeholder mini-surveys was also relatively strong, but 
slightly less strong than the KIIs. This evidence was representative of stakeholder 
views, due to its structured sampling of donors and implementation actors, designed 
to be directly relevant, and transparent in its purpose and methods. However, it 

33 

 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

Case studies  

allowed less accuracy through its narrow quantitative questions, had no way of 
exploring attribution, and did not cover all countries (e.gg Cameroon).  

The evidence generated by the case studies was strong, albeit limited in scope. Its 
accuracy was underpinned by a reliance on very detailed documentation (Single 
Form and Fiche Op) and specific KIIs. It was very relevant in providing a vertical 
multi-level analysis of one action, and clear in its purpose and methods. It also 
allowed some generalisability in its use of a hypothesis about 'what worked and how', 
and some analysis of attribution. However, it was very limited in its 
representativeness, as it covered only 3/317 actions and the beneficiary voice could 
not be included in the time available.  

1.2.5.  Limitations 

The most important overall limitation in this evaluation was the lack of clear intentions for EU humanitarian 
interventions in CA 2014-18. DG ECHO goes some way towards defining intentions in annual strategic plans 
(HIPs) and operational priorities (Technical Annexes), as well as numerous frameworks to guide its policies and 
practices in sectors and thematic areas. However, only EU-funded humanitarian actions offer clear objectives 
and measurable indicators, and there were no clear and measurable portfolio-wide objectives in each country 
or for the region. Some stakeholders noted that DG ECHO did not have strategic objectives or intended outcome 
results at the country level. As a result, the evaluation relied on constructing intervention models by which to 
assess achievements in terms of EU inputs, activities and results. 

A second overall limitation in the evaluation, and linked to the first, was the lack of suitable MEL systems for 
reviewing  EU  humanitarian  interventions.  EU  interventions  lacked  a  formal  M&E  system  to  report  on  many 
important  aspects  covered  in  this  evaluation:  performance,  advocacy,  cost-effectiveness,  sustainability  and 
coordination. The absence of MEL systems to measure achievements beyond the level of individual actions is 
recognised in other evaluations, including the Comprehensive Evaluation, which found no framework to monitor 
and assess effectiveness of HIPs or any means to systematically identify good practices beyond qualitative and 
quantitative data at project level (ICF, 2018). As a result, the evaluation depended significantly on qualitative 
evidence from stakeholder consultations.  

A third overall limitation was the wide-ranging scope and complexity of EU humanitarian interventions compared 
to resources available. EU humanitarian interventions are more than a series of funded actions. They are the 
interplay  of  funding  decisions,  global  policies,  regional  strategies,  country  strategies,  donorship  activities, 
project designs and implementation, and different types of result. The required scope of this evaluation is broad: 
one region, three countries, five years, 11 crises, multiple sectors, dozens of partners, 317 actions, and 800+ 
activities and results for the evaluation of the CA region alone. To manage the risk of overstretch, diluted quality 
and  delays,  efforts  were  made  to  more  narrowly  define  scope,  apply  sampling  strategies,  systematically 
prioritise based on intervention logic, and engage DG ECHO colleagues in participatory validation sessions. 
However,  such  comprehensiveness  at  times  precluded  in-depth  analysis,  and  some  EQs  were  necessarily 
addressed in a more cursory way than others.  

1.2.6.  Reliability 

This evaluation generated evidence through a mix of methods, which reflects good practice in the evaluation of 
humanitarian  action.  The  overall  mix  of  evidence  provides  a  ‘good  enough’  basis  for  credible  findings  and 
reliable conclusions to support accountability and learning, although in some cases specific limitations in the 
evidence quality are noted in the report. While the nature of credible evidence in evaluation is contested,8 this 
evaluation  holds  itself  to  the  standard  of  ‘good  enough’  evidence,  which  is  appropriate  in  evaluating 

8 See Donaldson, S.I, Christie, C.A, and Mark, M.M. editors (2009). What counts as credible evidence in applied research and evaluation practice? Sage Publications, 
Inc.  

34 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

humanitarian action.9 This evidence is not intended to be absolute or final, but rather offers a reasonably well-
founded  snapshot  of  EU  humanitarian  interventions  that  might  contribute  to  ongoing  evidence  generation, 
learning and decision-making. 

1.3.  Context 

1.3.1.  Multiple crises 

During the period 2014-2018, CAR, Chad, and Cameroon suffered multiple humanitarian crises with large-scale 
impact on populations, according to a review of GHOs 2014-2018, the Index for Risk Management (INFORM), 
and DG ECHO’s IAF sources. Where useful, reference is made to other sources: GGOPs, HIPs, the Forgotten 
Crisis Assessment (FCA), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the  Norwegian 
Refugee Council (NRC). Together, these sources offer an objective overview of the humanitarian needs, risks, 
and situations that EU humanitarian interventions sought to address. 

The region’s multiple crises could be attributed in large part to three main ‘drivers’: CAR’s conflict and protection 
crisis; Boko Haram-related violence in Nigeria and the Lake Chad region; and structural food insecurity in the 
Sahel regions of Chad and Cameroon. In addition, Chad hosted a protracted refugee population from Sudan’s 
Darfur crisis, all countries faced humanitarian risks from natural hazards and epidemic diseases, and Cameroon 
faced the consequences of the evolving ‘Anglophone crisis’.  

CA’s humanitarian crises left large numbers of people in need of humanitarian assistance. In 2015, the regional 
total number stood at 7 million people and that number had increased to 10.2 million by 2018. During this time 
CAR and Chad continually represented ‘very high’ levels of humanitarian risk,10 with particularly high levels of 
‘vulnerability’ and ‘low coping capacity’, whereas Cameroon showed slightly lower levels of humanitarian risk 
(INFORM, 2016-2018).  

In CA 2014-2018, country-based humanitarian response strategies undertook to assist an average of 5.4 million 
people each year. While the numbers of people targeted showed a slight downward trend, they also fluctuated 
yearly. Starting from 6.1 million in 2015, they fell to 4.8 million in 2016, rose again to 5.5 million in 2017 and 
then dropped again to 5.1 million in 2018. Moreover, these figures suggest only 62% of people considered in 
need were targeted with assistance in these countries (GHO, 2015-2018).11  

The  country-based  responses  outlined  each  year  in  HRPs  presented an  array  of  strategies  to meet  needs, 
including  emergency  responses,  resilience  building  and  rights  protection.  In  addition  to  these  humanitarian 
responses, efforts were made to develop regional refugee responses. In 2015, a Regional Refugee Response 
Plan (RRRP) was prepared to address the needs of 461,164 CAR refugees in Cameroon, Chad, DRC and 
Republic  of  Congo.  In  2016,  and  RRRP  was  prepared  to  address  the  needs  of  765,397  CAR  refugees  in 
Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Republic of Congo (GHO, 2015; GHO, 2016).  

To  understand  the  way  in  which  these  crises  affected  the  region,  it  is  possible  to  differentiate  11  specific 
humanitarian crises and situations.  

1.3.2.  The CAR crisis 

CAR was affected by a country-wide conflict and protection crisis, described in GHOs as ‘a protection crisis 
against a background of state and economical failure’. During 2014-2018, the total number of people in need 

9 Emergency Capacity Building Project, Impact Measurement and Accountability in Emergencies: The Good Enough Guide, Oxfam Publishing 2007 
10 The overall INFORM risk index identifies countries at risk from humanitarian crises and disasters that could overwhelm national response capacity. It is made up of 
three dimensions: hazards and exposure, vulnerability and lack of coping capacity. 
11 Note, no data was found in GHOs for Cameroon and Chad in 2014 and 2015, and data was added from HRPs/SRPs where available. The data excludes RRPs for 
CAR in 2015 and 2016: 0.46m and 0.76m, respectively. 

35 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

grew from 2.2 million to 2.5 million (around half of the population), and needs remained at very high levels. 
Compared to its neighbours, CAR showed the highest levels of exposure to hazard during 2014-2018, (i.e. to 
humanmade conflict) and highest levels of vulnerability (INFORM). The HRP focused on ‘integrated life-saving 
assistance’ mainly for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in 2014, growing to include protection and livelihood 
support in 2015. The response remained challenged  by the collapse of public administration, insecurity and 
logistic constraints, reliance on assistance and steep decline in funding 2016-2017.  

1.3.3.  The Cameroon crisis 

Cameroon was affected by a complex and multi-layered humanitarian crisis, described in GHOs as ‘a triple 
humanitarian crisis’. Between 2014 and 2018, the total number of people in need grew from 2 million to 3.3 
million; humanitarian risk indicators rose from 4.3 to 6.2, along with a significant increase in hazard/exposure 
from 2016 to 2017, even if vulnerability levels remained constant and slightly lower than its neighbours. The 
response focused on immediate needs and preventive action in regions affected by conflict and displacement, 
providing food, health and nutritional assistance to 722,000 people in 2016 and treating 48,000 children treated 
for malnutrition in 2017. However, in 2017 food rations were cut by 50% for CAR and Nigerian refugees for 
several  months  due  to  underfunding.  This  reflected  wider  underfunding  issues.  DG  ECHO  referred  to  the 
country-wide crisis as a ‘forgotten crisis’ in 2014-2016 and from 2016-2018, the CAR refugee crisis and the 
situation of other refugees were also deemed to be ‘forgotten’. 

i. The CAR refugee crisis 

Eastern Cameroon was affected by a CAR refugee crisis. In 2014, around 140,000 CAR refugees arrived in the 
eastern region, increasing to 259,145 in 2015. The CAR refugees had few sources of income, were reliant on 
food  aid,  often  destitute  and  in  difficult-to-reach  areas.  By  2017,  the  number  of  refugees  was  recorded  at 
201,753; many of them were registered, and were accommodated both in camps and in local communities. In 
2018, 8,200 new refugees arrived, following a surge of violence in CAR (UNHCR, 2018).   

ii. The Lake Chad crisis  

Northern Cameroon was affected by the Lake Chad crisis and Boko Haram violence, which caused ongoing 
displacement, a refugee crisis, and disruption to livelihoods and services. From 2014, 81,000 IDPs and 42,000 
Nigerian refugees were estimated to be in the Far North region of Cameroon. From 2016-2017, increased Boko 
Haram  violence  caused  some  85,000  more  Nigerian  refugees  to  arrive  and  led  to  displacement  of  another 
223,000  Cameroonians  in  the  Far  North.  Most  of  the  Nigerian  refugees  were  registered  and  supported  in 
Minawao camp, but others remained unregistered and outside camps, facing protection and refoulement risks 
(IAF, 2017). Despite access challenges, humanitarian actors reached more than 266,000 people in the area.  

iii. The food and nutrition crisis  

Northern Cameroon was also affected by the Sahel food and nutrition crisis. In the Far North and North regions, 
more than one million people suffered chronic food insecurity and severe acute malnutrition (SAM) rates were 
at 2% in 2015. Food insecurity persisted, but the population was no longer listed in GHOs as people in need of 
assistance after 2015.  

iv. The ‘Anglophone crisis’  

Northwest and Southwest Cameroon were also affected by the ‘Anglophone crisis’. From October 2017, rising 
tensions  were  reported  in  the  two  English-speaking  regions,  leading  to  the  displacement  of  some  160,000 
people and disruption of social services and economic activities. By 2018, displacement increased to 246,000. 
A humanitarian response was slowly being put in place, although basic needs had yet to be addressed.12 More 
recently, the NRC warned the number of displaced had reached 430,000, including many hiding in the bush 

12 DG ECHO. 30.11.2018. Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP). Year 2018. 

36 

 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

with no support,13 and presented a strong statement to the UN Security Council on the lack of an international 
response.14  

1.3.4.  The Chad crisis 

Chad was affected by a country-wide food, nutrition and refugee crisis. The deteriorating food and nutrition 
crisis in the Sahel, underdevelopment and conflicts in neighbouring countries affected large numbers of people. 
The total number of people in need grew from 2.87 million to 4.4 million over the period, fluctuating from 3 
million to 2.3 million in 2016, sharply rising to 4.6 million in 2017, and then slightly dropping again to 4.4 million. 
Humanitarian risk showed a general increase over the period, but also fluctuation, and improved in 2016 (i.e. a 
significant drop in hazard/exposure). Chad also showed a deteriorating trend in ‘vulnerability’ (until 2018) and 
less  ‘coping  capacity’  compared  to  neighbouring  countries.  Interestingly,  worldwide  Chad  ranked  seventh 
largest refugee hosting country and fourth for refugees hosted per inhabitant.  

Chad  struggled  to  cope  with  multiple  crises  and  assisting  people  in  need.  In  2016,  humanitarians  assisted 
displaced people and vulnerable people, treating 130,000 children for SAM and providing food assistance for 
600,000 people. However, underfunding remained a constant problem, with funding reaching less than 40% 
and limiting coverage in 2017, and less than half of infants targeted with SAM reached. In 2013-2014, the Chad 
crisis  was  designated  by  DG  ECHO  as  a  ‘forgotten  crisis’.  At  the  same  time,  progress  was  reported  in 
humanitarian-development  collaboration,  including  synergies  between  humanitarian  and  development 
interventions in certain areas.  

i. The food and nutrition crisis  

Chad’s Sahel belt was affected by a food and nutrition crisis. In 2015, 2.7 million people were assessed to be 
food insecure and 660,000 required urgent assistance during the lean season (June-September).15 In 2016, 
the number increased to 3.6 million food insecure people and more than 583,000 in a ‘food security crisis’. In 
2017, the increase levelled off, with 3.5 million food insecure and 900,000 facing a crisis in the lean season. 
Most Chadians accessed food via markets which were disrupted by border closures in the West (due to Boko 
Haram violence) and farmers lacked the capacity to mitigate erratic rainfall, drought, locusts, etc. The nutritional 
situation remained a humanitarian concern, with a growing number of under five-year-old children) needing 
treatment for malnutrition (571,000 in 2016), more than 322,000 of them for SAM.  

ii. The Lake Chad crisis  

Western Chad was affected by Boko Haram violence and the Lake Chad crisis. In 2015, the violence caused a 
refugee influx of 8,000 Nigerians, and displaced 8,500 Chadians and returnees. By 2016, more than 116,000 
people  had  been  displaced  in  the  region,  increasing  to  more  than  127,000  in  2017.  This  situation  severely 
disrupted local trade, agriculture and fisheries, with a strong negative effect on the economy and population, 
especially  in  western  regions.  The  state’s  capacity  to  respond  was  also  diminished,  and  pressure  on  host 
populations and protection risks increased.  

iii. The CAR refugee crisis  

Southern Chad was affected by the CAR refugee crisis. In 2013-2014, CAR refugees fled to southern Chad 
and included Chadian ‘returnees’, who were nominally Chadian citizens although with few family links to Chad. 
In 2015, 130,000 people arrived, including 113,000 returnees, although estimated numbers varied. In 2017, it 
was estimated that 71,386 CAR refugees and 82,000 returnees were in Chad, many of them (69,000) unsettled 
in the South. In 2018, 15,500 new CAR refugees arrived in Chad (UNHCR, 2018). Most of the refugees were 
accommodated in five camps in the south or among host communities. Many needed assistance and few were 

13 https://www.nrc.no/news/2018/december/conflict-in-cameroons-anglophone-regions-forces-430000-people-to-flee/ 
14 https://www.nrc.no/news/2019/may/cameroon-unsc-statement/ 
15 According to the Cadre Harmonisé classification, compatible with Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), carried out by Ministry of Agriculture, SISAAP, 
CILSS. 

37 

 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

likely to return to CAR soon, but they received decreased food rations and remained very vulnerable. They also 
added to some 80,000 CAR refugees who had been in Chad since 2004 and were mostly still reliant on external 
assistance.  

iv. The Sudanese refugee crisis  

Eastern Chad continued to be affected by the Darfur refugee crisis. Some 370,000 Sudanese refugees from 
Darfur had remained in Eastern Chad since 2004, with little prospect of return. Chronic malnutrition reached 
above 40% in every camp, according to a UNHCR survey in 2015, and around 80% lived below the poverty 
line. In 2015-2018, Darfur refugees in Eastern Chad, in particular, were deemed to be part of a ‘forgotten crisis’. 

1.4.  EU humanitarian interventions  

This evaluation is focused on ‘EU humanitarian interventions’ in CA from January 2014 to December 2018. 
As stated above, EU humanitarian interventions are understood to include: EU humanitarian funding; DG 
ECHO strategy; EU-funded ‘actions’; and humanitarian results.    

EU humanitarian funding to CA 2014-2018 amounted to EUR 499.9 million, according to an analysis of 
DG ECHO data.16 This total included EUR 422.1 million allocated to Humanitarian Implementation Plans 
(HIPs)17 and EUR 72.6 million from European Development Fund (EDF) allocations.18 According to the 
HIPs, a total of EUR 389.9 million was allocated to HIPs by Worldwide Decisions (WWDs),19 and EUR 
31.08 million through ExAR by the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID).20 
Discrepancies between these figures are attributed by DG ECHO to liquidation of contracts, where funding 
is not fully spent by partners. 

DG  ECHO’s  strategy  in  CA  was  developed  by  DG  ECHO  each  year  in  HIPs  and  Technical  Annexes 
prepared to  guide  EU  humanitarian  interventions.  In  2014,  DG  ECHO  prepared  HIPs  for  each  country 
affected by humanitarian crises: CAR, Cameroon and Chad. However, in 2015-2018 DG ECHO prepared 
regional HIPs each year which focused on ‘addressing both acute and protracted needs of the affected 
populations,’ and on three types of crisis in the region: (i) human-made crises/complex emergencies; (ii) 
food and nutrition crises; and (iii) epidemics and natural disasters. 

EU-funded actions or ‘projects’ were designed and managed by DG ECHO’s implementing partners (IPs). 
In  CA  2014-2018,  the  portfolio  included  317  EU-funded  actions,  with  825  distinct  activities  and  results 
across  multiple  humanitarian  sectors.  The  actions  were  implemented  by  selected  international 
organisations (IOs) and international non-governmental (INGO) partners, with funding split quite evenly 
between them (49% for IOs and 51% for INGOs). However, UN/IO project budgets were often considerably 
larger.  

EU humanitarian results included the outputs of EU-funded actions, outcomes in relation to the needs of 
intended beneficiaries, and the discernible impacts of interventions on humanitarian crises. However, EU 
humanitarian results are monitored at the level of actions, and DG ECHO does not systematically measure 
and report on HIP results in each country or the region.  

16 Data for the portfolio were received from DG ECHO 30 January 2019 and extracted from DG ECHO’s HOPE database, using the EVA retrieval system. The portfolio 
refers to all EU-funded actions in CA budgeted during 2014-2018. 
17 These are intended to cover all humanitarian aid actions that the European Commission (EC) anticipates in the year ahead, and in line with DG ECHO's Annual 
Strategy (DG ECHO website). 
18  The  European  Development  Fund  (EDF)  is  the  EU's  main  instrument  for  providing  development  aid  to  African,  Caribbean  and  Pacific  (ACP)  countries  and  to 
overseas countries and territories (OCTs). 
19  Based  on  international  humanitarian  principles  and  as  set  out  in  the  European  Consensus  on  Humanitarian  Aid,  the  EU  provides  needs-based  humanitarian 
assistance to the people hit by human-made and natural disasters with particular attention to the most vulnerable victims (DG ECHO website). 
20 HIPs 2015-2018 show DFID’s consecutive annual investments of EUR 10.7 million, EUR 4.5 million, EUR 5.08 million, and EUR 10.8 million. 

38 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

The following map has been devised to illustrate the geography, scale and contours of the crises in Central Africa 2014-2018: 
(map refers to INTERMON, an abbreviation for Oxfam INTERMON. The administration divisions given in the map are based on the GADM database (May, 2018)  

Figure 2: Map of Crises  

* 

39 

 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

2.  Main Findings 

This section presents the Evaluation Team’s assessments and the main findings in response to 
each  evaluation  question  (EQ).  For  each  question,  the  assessment  is  presented  first  with  a 
summary of main findings and a brief comment on methodology. It is followed by detailed findings 
in relation to each judgement criterion and evidence synthesised from various sources.  

2.1.  Relevance 

EQ 1. How relevant were EU-funded actions to the needs of the most vulnerable? 

EU-funded actions in Central Africa (CA) 2014-2018 are judged to be consistently relevant 
to  the  needs  of  the  most  vulnerable  populations  in  specific  crises  and  situations.  The 
actions were invariably designed on the basis of needs assessments, usually informed by 
further needs assessments during implementation, and frequently able to adapt to changing 
needs  and  situations.  Actions  most  often  considered  gender  and  age  and  consulted 
beneficiaries in design stages. However, relevance to specific needs was somewhat limited 
because  wider  definitions  of  vulnerability  (e.g.  people  with  disabilities)  were  not 
systematically considered, the quality of beneficiary consultation was often questionable, 
and effective feedback mechanisms were frequently lacking. 

This assessment is concerned with EU-funded humanitarian actions in CA 2014-2018, which were 
designed and implemented by Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian 
Aid (DG ECHO)’s implementing partners (IPs) with technical inputs and oversight from DG ECHO. 
The relevance of DG ECHO strategy is addressed below (EQ 2). The assessment considers how 
well  the  EU-funded  actions  were  aligned  with  needs  in  specific  situations;  informed  by  ongoing 
needs assessments; included vulnerable groups in design and during implementation; consulted 
beneficiaries during project cycles; and were able to adapt to changing needs and situations. The 
findings  rely  on  relatively  strong  evidence  from  both  the  sample  analysis  and  key  informant 
interviews (KIIs).  

2.1.1.  Design and needs    

The  designs  of  EU-funded  humanitarian  actions  in  CA  were  consistently  informed  by  needs 
assessments relating to specific populations and areas. The sample analysis found that all actions 
(58/58) cited needs assessments in proposals within their Single Form documents, and in most 
cases  cited  multiple  needs  assessments.  These  included  assessments  done  by  partners 
themselves,  joint  assessments,  and  assessments  by  national  bodies,  clusters,  Integrated  Food 
Security Phase Classification (IPC), and Humanitarian Needs Overviews (HNOs). For most actions 
(48/58),  DG  ECHO  confirmed  or  ‘approved’  needs  assessments  in  Fiche  Op  documents, 
sometimes  making  comments  about  their  accuracy,  and  in  no  case  found  assessments  to  be 
unsatisfactory.21 The three case studies offered narrative accounts of how United Nations Office 
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’ (UN OCHA), the French Red Cross (FRC) and the 
World Food Programme (WFP) each intended to address specific needs in different situations.  

The  targeting  of  beneficiaries  was  often  guided  by  coordinated  needs  assessments.  In  CAR, 
stakeholders  reported  that  all  humanitarian  actors  decided  where  to  focus  on  the  basis  of  UN 

21 For the minority of actions assessment of ‘humanitarian needs’ were not applicable, because they did not provide ‘direct assistance’ to populations 
(e.g. coordination activities).   

40 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

OCHA’s (cluster-derived) overall mapping of needs; that DG ECHO was very rigorous in insisting 
on use of system-wide needs assessments, and where not available, project-specific assessments; 
and  while  partners  were  trusted  with  targeting, DG  ECHO monitored  the  quality  of  targeting.  In 
Chad,  improved,  harmonised  and  more  impartial  assessments  were  reported  to  have  greatly 
improved the targeting of the poorest and most vulnerable. 

2.1.2. 

Implementation and needs  

EU-funded humanitarian actions in CA were usually further informed by needs assessments during 
implementation.  The  sample  analysis  found  most  actions  (36/58)  clearly  referred  to  needs 
assessments  conducted  during  implementation.  Most  notably,  they  referred  to  external 
assessments  (e.g.  national  surveys,  joint  needs  assessments,  and  monitoring  mechanisms; 
SMART  surveys;  and  less  frequently  to  additional  needs  assessments  by  partners  themselves, 
ongoing monitoring or end-of-project reviews). Only a few actions (6/58) offered no reference to 
ongoing needs assessments or clearly stated that none were conducted, and DG ECHO monitoring 
did not explicitly report on whether actions were aligned with changing needs.    

2.1.3.  Design and vulnerability 

Generally, EU-funded actions gave due consideration to gender and age in design. The sample 
analysis found that the majority of actions (43/58) were judged by DG ECHO to provide ‘adequate 
analysis’ of gender and age. Among the remainder, 7/58 were considered ‘insufficient’ and for the 
rest  such  analysis  was  not  applicable.  DG  ECHO  also  judged  that  most  actions  (42/58)  were 
'adapted to specific needs and capacities of different gender and age groups'. Some actions were 
justifiably designed without targeting specific groups or vulnerabilities, mainly because they were 
‘indirect’  actions  concerned  with  strengthening  the  response,  such  as  coordination  activities  or 
support to logistics, but DG ECHO still required adequate gender and age analysis. For example, 
UN  OCHA’s  EU-funded  response  coordination  action  in  Cameroon  did  not  target  specific 
vulnerabilities, but its analysis and adaptation were considered ‘insufficient’ until deployment of a 
gender adviser.22 

While the designs of actions considered gender and age, they did not systematically consider the 
wider  concept  of  vulnerability.23  Stakeholders  reported  that  vulnerabilities  were  considered  to  a 
varying degree in designs. In CAR, stakeholders reported that specific vulnerabilities were targeted 
by IPs, but this varied according to sector and partner. In Cameroon, stakeholders reported that 
targeting of specific vulnerable groups was the responsibility of IPs, which used their own different 
approaches.  In  Chad,  stakeholders  agreed  that  most  proposals  were  designed  to  include  and 
address vulnerable groups, but the primary focus was on gender, pregnant and lactating women 
(PLW) and children under five years (U5s), and not other vulnerabilities related to age and disability 
or other groups with specific needs, such as adolescents at risk and survivors of gender-based 
violence (GBV). PLWs and U5s were perceived to remain DG ECHO priorities in Chad.  

2.1.4. 

Implementation and vulnerability  

The implementation of EU-funded actions provided for some vulnerable groups, but not consistently 
for all vulnerable groups. In CAR, IPs observed that specific support to the most vulnerable was 
only provided at household level, mostly in nutrition, shelter and non-food item activities, but not in 

22 From the Gender Standby Capacity Project (GenCap), an IASC initiative created in 2007 in collaboration with the Norwegian Refugee Council to 
facilitate and strengthen capacity and leadership of humanitarians to undertake and promote gender-sensitive programming. 
23  Vulnerability is  defined  both in  relation  to communities and to individuals.  For example,  INFORM defines the concept  as ‘the  susceptibility of 
communities to hazards’, and one component of this is ‘vulnerable groups’ i.e. uprooted people, other vulnerable groups (INFORM Guidelines). DG 
ECHO policy  on protection  defines  it  more precisely as  ‘Life circumstances  (e.g. poverty, education)  and/or  discrimination based on physical  or 
social  characteristics  (sex,  disability,  age,  ethnicity,  religion,  sexual  orientation,  etc.)  reducing  the  ability  of  primary  stakeholders  (e.g. 
individuals/households/community) to withstand adverse impact from external stressors (Thematic Policy Document 8 on Humanitarian Protection).   

41 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

activities that targeted the whole community, mostly in water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH), food 
security and education activities. Given very high general levels of vulnerability, DG ECHO staff 
conceded  that  few  actions  provided  for  vulnerable  individuals  and  that  disabilities  were  also 
insufficiently addressed. 

In Cameroon, beneficiaries consulted in the East indicated that actions carried out in camps and 
host villages initially responded to immediate needs (shelter, food distribution, WASH, health) and 
the vulnerable were identified and considered in action designs and implementation. However, the 
situation ‘stagnated’ and there was a drastic drop in humanitarian assistance, which resulted in 
worsening effects on vulnerable groups seen (e.g. in under-nutrition). 

In  Chad,  actions  were  reported  to  be  well  adapted  to  the  specific  needs  of  women  and  young 
children  in  general;  and  there  were  good  signs  that  the  differing  needs  of  returnees,  internally 
displace persons (IDPs), refugees and hosts were considered. At the same time, it was felt that the 
sheer  volume  of  needs  meant  that  nuancing  actions  to  specific  needs  of  diverse  groups  and 
vulnerabilities was a luxury that DG ECHO budgets could not cover. A cursory review of project 
documents for resilience-focused actions suggested implementation was less well adapted to the 
specific needs of other groups, such as female-headed households, people with disabilities, people 
living with HIV/AIDS, older people or child-headed households.   

2.1.5.  Beneficiary consultation 

While  most  EU-funded  actions  consulted  beneficiaries,  particularly  at  design  stage,  repeated 
questions  arose  about  the  quality  of  beneficiary  consultation  during  implementation.  Almost  all 
actions in the sample (54/58) reported consulting beneficiaries, with many involving beneficiaries 
in project design through participatory needs assessments and targeting, establishing committees 
of  beneficiaries,  community  consultation  and  other  activities.  Many  also  reported  involving 
beneficiaries in implementation activities, through awareness raising and community mobilisation, 
monitoring and feedback mechanisms, participation in project implementation, working with local 
authorities and services, and dialogue with local leaders. However, few actions cited complaints 
mechanisms or post-distribution monitoring. In addition, without systematic DG ECHO assessment 
of beneficiary consultation in Fiche Ops, the data provided no insight into what extent beneficiary 
consultation met expectations for accountability to affected populations (AAP), communication with 
communities (CwC), the Core Humanitarian Standard,24 or larger aspirations to empower people 
affected, and local and national actors, as outlined in the Agenda for Humanity and Grand Bargain.  

Across  the  region,  stakeholders  raised  questions  about  beneficiary  consultations.  In  CAR, 
stakeholders admitted that beneficiary consultation was uneven, and the quality varied by partner 
and intervention type. DG ECHO staff claimed to encourage CwC and AAP, and felt beneficiaries 
were often consulted, but recognised that feedback loops remained incomplete with information 
rarely used to inform the action and beneficiaries rarely learning how their feedback was used.  

In Cameroon, stakeholders reported that beneficiary consultation was inconsistent, and sometimes 
low or non-existent. IPs agreed that participatory consultation sessions were restricted or did not 
take place at all due to lack of resources and time. Beneficiaries consulted for this evaluation did 
not feel sufficiently consulted throughout the project cycle, including project design and decision-
making processes.  

In  Chad,  stakeholders  reported  that  actions  consulted  beneficiaries,  mainly  referencing  needs 
assessments  that  occurred  prior  to  projects.  Only  a  few  cited  ongoing  consultations,  and  none 

24 The Core Humanitarian Standard on Quality and Accountability (CHS) sets out Nine Commitments that organisations and individuals involved in 
humanitarian response can use to improve the quality and effectiveness of the assistance they provide; https://corehumanitarianstandard.org/ 

42 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

referred  to  feedback  or  grievance  procedures.  IPs  recognised  DG  ECHO  as  having  facilitated 
improved assessments, but this was not a substitute for good project-level beneficiary consultations 
at  design  stage,  during  implementation  and  good  grievance  and  feedback  systems.  These 
continued to be needed, and particularly for resilience-focused actions.  

2.1.6.  Adaptation to changes 

Stakeholders agreed that actions were generally able to adapt to changing situations within clear 
limitations imposed by DG ECHO funding systems. In CAR, stakeholders stated that most actions 
were able to adapt within the year to evolving needs and operational constraints. Partners agreed 
that DG ECHO allowed budgetary flexibility within the parameters of the agreement and was ‘very 
understanding’ if activities were delayed due to factors beyond IPs’ control. DG ECHO generally 
did not allow for activities to change location or for new activities to be added after approval, but it 
allowed minor changes through e-mail exchanges and some larger changes through modification 
requests.  The  main  mechanism  for  major  changes  mid-year  were  ‘top-up’  processes  by  which 
additional  EU  emergency  funds  were  allocated. Where  necessary,  partners  worked  around  DG 
ECHO’s limitations by using their own funds or other donor funds, but this was easier for larger 
organisations than for smaller ones. 

The CAR case study provided an example of how UN OCHA made some useful adaptions to a 
worsening situation in 2017-2018. The activity was suitably designed, reflecting the Inter-Agency 
Standing  Committee  coordination  model  for  the  humanitarian  response,  and  was  successfully 
implemented due in large part to UN OCHA’s operational presence, human resource capacities, 
and  synergies  built  with  other  actors.  The  project  also  made  strong  efforts  to  adapt  to 
implementation  challenges  by  quickly  responding  to  increased  violence,  using  its  flexible 
coordination  ‘antenna’,25  and  developing  a  CwC  project  to  fill  gaps  in  feedback  and  complaint 
mechanisms. DG ECHO’s funding to UN OCHA was provided mostly in advance (80%), increased 
to  address  potential  gaps  and  allowed  modifications.26  Despite  these  efforts,  the  humanitarian 
response in CAR struggled to adapt to the worsening humanitarian situation, increased aid worker 
insecurity, and significant underfunding of the country’s Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP).  

In Cameroon, stakeholders reported that most actions were able to adapt within the year to evolving 
needs and operational constraints, thanks to Humanitarian Implementation Plans (HIPs) and the 
possibility of modification requests. Because the submission of project proposals to DG ECHO was 
annual, it obliged partners to re-assess the changed context and needs. Nonetheless, beneficiaries 
consulted felt that actions were adapted to the emergency at the beginning of the CAR refugee 
crisis, but not when the volume of assistance declined as the influx stabilised.  

In Chad, stakeholders emphasised that the sheer extent of need limited the capacity of EU-funded 
humanitarian actions to respond in a highly nuanced or adapted way, although DG ECHO’s use of 
reserves or ‘top-ups’ was considered effective in adapting to the fairly limited changes in the context 
and needs during the evaluation period (e.g. responses to the Lakes crisis and epidemics). Some 
expressed concerns that any large-scale emergency response would be delayed by increasingly 
inflexible and slow funding decision-making at DG ECHO headquarters (HQ), increasingly ‘political’ 
decision-making and restricted funding cycles. 

25 The antenna refers to OCHA’s local coordination posts set up in field locations beyond regional field offices. 
26 DG ECHO’s General Conditions allow pre-financing between 50% and 80% depending upon the project design and risk factors. In practice, most 
DG ECHO IPs receive 80% pre-financing. 

43 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

2.2.  Appropriateness 

EQ 2. How appropriate were DG ECHO strategies? 

DG ECHO strategies are judged to be highly appropriate to meeting acute needs in CA 2014-
2018. In practical terms, DG ECHO strategies were developed through iterative processes 
at  the  country  level,  involving  DG  ECHO  experts  and  partners  and  allowing  maximum 
flexibility to tailor strategies to needs. Efforts were made to tailor HIPs to specific situations 
in each country, and the HIPs increasingly allowed flexibility to address evolving needs in 
practice and thereafter included multiple modifications to respond to changing events. In 
contrast, DG ECHO strategies were not very appropriate to addressing protracted needs or 
reducing needs over time. The yearly HIPs offered little in terms of prioritised strategies, 
clear  strategic  direction,  or  multi-year  planning  and  funding  that  could  comprehensively 
address protracted humanitarian situations, needs, and risks. Frequent modifications and 
emergency top-ups increased flexibility for meeting emergency needs as they arose, but did 
not necessarily constitute ‘adaptive management’ defined in terms of learning and continual 
improvement.  

This assessment is focused on DG ECHO strategy for CA 2014-2018, as articulated in the HIPs. It 
considers to what extent HIPs provided clear strategic priorities, were tailored to specific situations, 
and adapted successfully to changing needs. Limitations included difficulty in identifying strategic 
priorities in the HIP documents; lack of monitoring, evaluation and learning (MEL) systems at the 
level of DG ECHO strategy; and reliance on stakeholder perceptions. The findings rely on evidence 
from KIIs and the mini-survey, and to a lesser extent from document review and case studies.  

2.2.1.  Strategic clarity  

DG ECHO prepared annual HIPs to guide EU humanitarian interventions in CA 2014-2018, but 
these documents could not easily be described as clear and prioritised strategies. The HIP and its 
technical annex (TA) are intended ‘to serve as a communication tool for DG ECHO's partners and 
to assist them in the preparation of their proposals.’ Prepared using a standard template, the HIPs 
in  CA  covered:  (i)  context;  (ii)  humanitarian  needs;  (iii)  humanitarian  response;  and  (iv)  Linking 
Relief,  Rehabilitation  and  Development  (LRRD),  coordination,  and  transition.  The  TA  provided 
detailed operational guidance for  partners,  including  information about  how proposals  would  be 
assessed,  allocation  cycles  and  operational  requirements  –  general  guidelines  and  specific 
guidelines both by sector and by country.   

The  document  review  found  that  the  HIPs  and  TAs  described  multiple  and  wide-ranging 
expectations for CA 2014-2018, with notable consistency at a higher level during 2015-2018. In 
2014, the HIPs for three countries at the time outlined DG ECHO’s general intentions for each in 
terms of: (i) funded programmes; (ii) advocacy; and (iii) coordination. During 2015-2018, DG ECHO 
prepared  unified  regional  HIPs  annually,  with  humanitarian  interventions  broadly  aimed  at 
‘addressing  both  acute  and  protracted  needs  of  the  affected  populations.’  In  addition,  the  HIPs 
undertook  to  address  three  types  of  crisis  in  the  region:  (i)  human-made  crises/complex 
emergencies; (ii) food and nutrition crises; and (iii) epidemics and natural disasters.  

The HIPs and TAs provided ‘strategic priorities’ only to a limited degree. Despite evidently strong 
analysis of context, needs and the wider humanitarian response, it is doubtful whether the HIPs 
and TA documents amounted to a ‘strategy’, defined as ‘a plan of action designed to achieve a 

44 

 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

long-term or overall aim’.27 Compared to standard concepts of strategy, the HIPs lacked longer-
term  goals  (e.g.  over  five  years)  and  a  roadmap  for  their  achievement;  a  MEL  framework  and 
system  for  managing  progress;  and  an  explicit  definition  of  comparative  advantage.  They  also 
lacked clear prioritisation, choices (including what not to do) and trade-offs. In 2018, for example, 
the 65 pages of (HIP and TA) documentation read more like an inclusive list of policy commitments 
than a prioritised strategy. Clear objectives were not found beyond broad statements in HIP Section 
3.4 ‘Envisaged DG ECHO responses and expected results of humanitarian aid interventions’, which 
did  not  define  specific  and  measurable  results.  At  a  more  operational  level,  the  TA  in  2018 
presented  ‘Operational  recommendations’  which  comprised  some  30  pages  of  both  general 
guidelines (covering 22 different themes) and more specific guidelines by sector and by country.  

The case studies show how the CA HIP often played a limited role in strategy-setting compared to 
an iterative process at country level involving country-specific TAs, DG ECHO-partner dialogue at 
proposal stage, modifications made during implementation, and inputs from DG ECHO technical 
experts. In the CAR case study, DG ECHO provided formal strategic priorities through the HIP, but 
defined operational priorities through its TA and further refined the UN OCHA programme design 
through dialogue at proposal stage. In the Cameroon case study, DG ECHO provided strategic 
direction for the FRC’s project to support the self-reliance of CAR refugees in eastern Cameroon, 
but, significantly, without also making it an operational priority in the TA. In the Chad case study, 
DG ECHO did not explicitly promote resilience in the HIP and then reduced the scope of the WFP 
project at proposal stage away from resilience, before expanding it once again several months later 
to  include  the  resilience  activity,  when  needs  assessments  showed  a  greatly  increased  food 
security  crisis  and  when  DG  ECHO  experts  validated  WFP’s  approach.  At  this  level,  strategy 
required constant review, decision-making and adaptation.  

In CAR, stakeholders expressed mixed views on the clarity of DG ECHO strategy. On one hand, 
almost  all  respondents  polled  in  CAR  agreed  the  DG  ECHO  programme  was  ‘guided  by  clear 
strategic priorities’, and DG ECHO staff reported that HIPs were more detailed and clearer than 
previously.  On  the  other  hand,  some  DG  ECHO  stakeholders  felt  that  maintaining  maximum 
operational  flexibility  was  more  important  than  strategic  clarity.  In  interviews,  many  CAR 
stakeholders stated that the HIPs did not allow partners to work towards results at outcome level, 
and some felt clear direction from DG ECHO was lacking. ‘DG ECHO needs to drive the programme 
not just follow it and correct it,’ said one donor. For IPs, the HIPs also made it difficult to discern 
clear priorities among a larger menu of eligible sectors and did not help them decide where to invest 
proposal-writing efforts.  

In Cameroon, stakeholders considered the HIP to be clear on the main strategic directions of the 
response, but felt it was more a ‘roadmap’ than a ‘strategic plan’. HIPs were deemed to be precise 
and well developed, providing a good means of communication, coordination and even advocacy. 
Partners also suggested that HIPs were very suitable for implementing actions at the beginning of 
the crisis, but less suitable as a crisis faded, at which time HIPs were seen as too ‘abstract’ to 
provide useful direction. Others suggested HIPs lacked ‘common sense’ or support for prioritisation.  

In Chad, stakeholders tended to be positive about the clarity of DG ECHO’s strategic priorities, but 
once again with some reservations. A third of stakeholders polled strongly agreed that DG ECHO’s 
portfolio was ‘guided by clear strategic priorities’, around half were more reserved and the minority 
remained  clearly  unconvinced.  Donors  tended  to  be  more  favourable  towards  HIPs  than 
implementation actors. In interviews, stakeholders expressed more mixed views about the clarity 
of DG ECHO’s strategic objectives. While some felt HIPs included ‘everything and nothing’, others 
welcomed the good level of consultation around HIP formulation and felt that HIPs allowed a degree 

27 See Lexico.com, an online collaboration between Dictionary.com and Oxford University Press  

45 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

of flexibility to design actions more closely linked to assessed needs. However, implementation 
actors also noted a lack of transparency on why specific agencies and actions were selected, felt 
the  HIP  narrative  was  not  communicated  clearly  enough  to  facilitate  understanding,  and  often 
depended on DG ECHO staff presentations to interpret the HIP and ‘what is actually being asked 
for.’ 

2.2.2.  Tailoring to situations 

The HIPs  were  broadly  tailored  to  specific  humanitarian  situations  in  each country  and  allowed 
increasing flexibility to address evolving needs in practice. The document review found that HIPs 
2014-2018  made  consistent  and  explicit  reference  to  various  humanitarian  situations,  risks  and 
needs assessments. In 2016-2018, HIP strategic priorities were consistently geared towards the 
acute complex emergency in CAR, the mixed protracted crisis in Chad, and the fragile humanitarian 
situation in Cameroon. After 2016, HIPs became broader for the region with shorter narratives and 
recurring overarching objectives and strategies year on year. Many remained broad in character 
with provisions for ‘adjusting the response to evolving needs’ and ‘to be addressed in the identified 
priority sectors, developed in the Annexed technical guidelines’.  

In CAR, virtually all stakeholders agreed that DG ECHO strategy was tailored to specific crises. In 
interviews,  stakeholders  agreed  HIPs  were  aligned  with  country  needs  and  developed  in  a 
participatory  manner,  even  if  they  remained  less  suited  to  addressing  protracted  needs  and 
structural vulnerabilities. First, HIPs were judged to be broadly aligned with HNOs and clusters and 
encouraged  multi-sector  actions  appropriate  to  addressing  CAR’s  widespread  needs  amid 
insufficient  resources.  Second,  the  HIP  drafting  process  was  considered  very  participatory  and 
inclusive of partners (and the Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development 
(DG DEVCO)), even though it did not sufficiently engage local actors and government agencies. 
Third, the project-based HIP process was recognised as favouring small, short-term, stand-alone 
projects by NGOs compared to larger structural responses over multiple years needed to reduce 
vulnerabilities.   

In  Cameroon,  stakeholders  agreed  the  HIP  remained  highly  relevant  to  evolving  needs  and 
situations.  DG  ECHO’s  response  designs  were  considered  largely  relevant,  targeting  the  most 
urgent needs and vulnerable people, and adapted yearly through HIP planning to allow a regular 
review  of  the  situation  and  its  evolution.  The  HIPs  were  also  recognised  to  be  in  line  with 
humanitarian needs synthesised in the HNO and the country strategy outlined in the HRP. The HIP 
was recognised to be informed by what works, based on a yearly reflection on results, indicators 
and projections about the evolution of crises and needs.  

In Chad, almost all stakeholders agreed that DG ECHO’s strategy was ‘tailored to specific crises’. 
In interviews stakeholders agreed the HIPs needed to be focused on life-saving actions, but also 
felt  they  were  not  adequately  tailored  to  the  protracted  crises  and  chronic  needs.  Stakeholders 
perceived that DG ECHO funding decisions remained focused on life-saving emergency needs, 
which  was  appropriate  given  the  scale  of  needs  and  limited  budgets,  and  some  concerns  that 
collaboration  with  development  actors  could  infringe  DG  ECHO’s  lifesaving  mandate.  Second, 
some stakeholders expressed hope that increasing emphasis on resilience and the Humanitarian-
Development  Nexus  (HDN)  in  the  HIP  would  lead  to  increased  investments  in  addressing  the 
underlying causes of humanitarian needs and in promoting resilience. Third, questions were raised 
about the appropriateness of the HIPs’ yearly project cycle to promoting resilience in Chad.  

46 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

2.2.3.  Adaptation to changes 

The  HIPs  consistently  made  frequent  modifications  to  strategies  in  response  to  events  during 
implementation,  even  if  this  did  not  necessarily  constitute  ‘adaptive  management’.28  In  2014,  a 
modification to the CAR HIP cited religiously based violence as cause for immediate aid to over 
half of the 4.6 million of the population. A modification to the Cameroon HIP in February 2014 cited 
the  shortfall  of  support  and  coordination  in  all  sectors,  requiring  increased  funding.  In  Chad,  a 
modification  to  the  HIP  referenced  the  spill-over  from  CAR,  necessitating  further  increases  in 
funding. In 2015, five modifications to the HIP were made to reinforce DG ECHO's actions and 
priorities to changing needs on the ground. In 2016, three such modifications were made. In 2017, 
five  modifications  were  made,  including  in  response  to  effects  of  the  Boko  Haram  crisis  in 
Cameroon  and  Chad.  In  2018,  seven  modifications  were  made,  including  in  response  to  the 
deterioration of the Sahel region regarding the food and nutrition situation of the population.  

In CAR, three-quarters of stakeholders agreed that DG ECHO strategy ‘adapted when situations 
changed’, but a debate over flexible versus predictable funding was in full swing. In interviews, it 
was observed that HIP strategies successfully adapted through the top-up mechanism even while 
some  actions  remained  constant  over  multiple  years.  HIP  responses  were  recognised  to  adapt 
mainly on a yearly basis in TAs and more frequently through emergency top-ups. IPs had different 
views on whether more continuity year to year or more variability was a more appropriate strategy. 
In CAR, large portions of yearly funding were effectively pre-allocated to coordination actors, UN 
OCHA,  the  NGO  coordination  committee  (CCO),  the  International  NGO  Safety  Organisation 
(INSO), the UN Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS) and to ongoing service delivery through the 
Rapid  Response  Mechanism  (RRM),  education  (pre-allocated  EUR  500,000  through  HIP  2018, 
which implies pre-selection of UNICEF and Plan International) and to the International Committee 
of  the  Red  Cross  (ICRC).  These  partners  did  not  need  to  adapt  projects  yearly,  but  were  still 
required to submit full and justified annual proposals.  

In Cameroon, stakeholders recognised the benefits of yearly adaptation of the HIP, but also the 
HIP’s difficulties in adapting over multiple years to changing and volatile situations. It was agreed 
that  the  annual  HIP  process  allowed  adaptation  to  changing  needs  and  evaluations,  mission 
reports,  monitoring  and  partner  reporting  allow  for  regular  tailoring  of  the  response  to  evolving 
needs and the structural and contextual situation. However, some partners considered the HIP’s 
yearly  cycle  to  be  too  short  to  adapt  to  situations,  requiring  (inefficient)  yearly  proposals  and 
contracting but never allowing enough time for an exit strategy. Beneficiaries saw aid decreasing 
each year, without any serious and lasting efforts to ensure their livelihoods.  

In Chad, more than three-quarters of stakeholders agreed that DG ECHO strategy ‘adapted when 
situations changed’. In interviews, it was noted that if the scale of change in a crisis was relatively 
modest,  HIP  implementation  remained  adaptable  and  funding  ‘top-ups’  were  adequate.  In  this 
sense, DG ECHO was seen to respond well to shocks such as displacement and health crises; to 
have  adapted  well  to  different  crises  in  Chad;  and  to  have  supported  partners  in  setting  up 
operations from scratch in the Lake Chad region, where few partners operated before. However, 
the HIPs were perceived to have a limited ability to adapt to the protracted nature of crises affecting 
Chad, where many needs were constant and greater than DG ECHO funding capacities. Some 
stakeholders felt that DG ECHO’s agility was constrained by contracting rules, which limited the 
number of contracts per country and therefore required channelling emergency funds through UN 
agencies.  

28 Adaptive management is defined in terms of learning and continual improvement, i.e. to make strategic and operational decisions (see Obrecht, 
A. with Bourne, S. 2018). 

47 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

The Chad case study showed how DG ECHO made HIP modifications and significantly increased 
funding towards the WFP Sahel project in response to increased needs. In June 2016, DG ECHO 
agreed to fund additional activities to address the greatly increased needs in the Sahel belt and to 
increase  the  number  of  beneficiaries  targeted.  Going  beyond  preventive  targeted  nutrition 
assistance to vulnerable groups and capacity development of national institutions and partners, it 
included lean season food assistance to households, post-lean season asset creation, and cash-
based transfers to refugees. In February 2017, DG ECHO agreed to increase the budget and DG 
ECHO’s contribution from EUR 3 million to EUR 8.85 million accordingly, and contributions by other 
donors (USA, France and the Central Emergency Response Fund) increased from EUR 0 to 21.64 
million. It also agreed to increase targeting from 199,300 to 430,699 individuals, and to increase 
results  from  two  to  five  activities.  In  March  2017,  DG  ECHO  agreed  to  a  three-month  no-cost 
extension for cash-based assistance to refugees in Eastern Chad.  

2.3.  Needs assessment 

EQ 3. To what extent did DG ECHO contribute to establishing joint and impartial needs 
assessments? 

DG ECHO is judged to have done very well to consistently promote joint and impartial needs 
assessments.  In  all  three  countries,  DG  ECHO  supported  the  harmonisation  of  needs 
assessments  and  joint  needs  assessments,  which  worked  to  reduce  the  proliferation  of 
uncoordinated  needs  assessments.  DG  ECHO  consistently  funded  UN  OCHA  to  prepare 
HNOs,  encouraged  IPs  to  participate,  and  actively  participated  in  the  process  itself.  DG 
ECHO also made efforts to promote improved needs assessment quality, leading to some 
promising  outcomes,  including  strengthened  assessment  capacities  and  improved 
responses.  

This assessment is concerned with DG ECHO’s support to needs assessments as a contribution 
to the coordinated humanitarian response. It considers whether DG ECHO contributed funding to 
joint  needs  assessments  and  to  HNOs,  and  whether  these  resulted  in  improved  needs 
assessments. The assessment is limited by a lack of monitoring data collected about DG ECHO 
support  to  needs  assessments,  including  a  lack  of  portfolio  data  on  funding  to  needs 
assessments.29  The  findings  rely  primarily  on  evidence  from  stakeholder  consultations  and  one 
case study.  

2.3.1.  Joint assessments 

In  CA  2014-2018,  DG  ECHO  promoted  harmonised  needs  assessments  and  sometimes  joint 
assessments instead of providing funding for IPs to conduct their own needs assessments. In CAR, 
stakeholders  observed  that  DG  ECHO  provided  regular  funding  to  needs  assessment  actors, 
including UN OCHA for the HNO; INSO for security assessments; the UN Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) for food security assessments; and RRM for rapid needs assessment. In the 
case  of UN  OCHA,  for  example,  this did not mean  funding  needs  assessments  but  rather  their 
aggregation. Early in the evaluation period, DG ECHO reportedly provided more funding to health 
and  food  security  clusters,  and  made  efforts  to  improve  the  coherence  of  food  security 
assessments.  

In Cameroon, stakeholders reported that DG ECHO contributed to establishing joint and impartial 
needs assessments, such as the RRM multi-sector assessment and the Multi-sector Initial Rapid 

29 Of 39 results recorded for OCHA in particular, only one explicitly mentions needs assessment in relation to a sub-sector (feasibility studies and 
needs assessment). 

48 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

Assessment (MIRA). DG ECHO also systematically sought to analyse and cut down on the different 
needs’ assessments. At the same time, funding to cluster co-facilitation was reportedly reduced, 
and DG ECHO did not fund IP needs assessments in preparing project proposal for DG ECHO 
funding, although preliminary needs assessments were required.  

In  Chad,  stakeholders  reported  that  DG  ECHO  funded  harmonised  multi-sector  needs 
assessments, including the Cadre Harmonisé (CH),30 SMART surveys,31 and Household Economic 
Analysis (HEA), and consistently funded UN OCHA and food security cluster coordination, as well 
as the cash working group until 2017. It also supported joint UNHCR/WFP vulnerability and needs 
assessments in the Lake Chad area in 2017 and joint assessment missions (JAM) on nutrition, joint 
DG ECHO and DG DEVCO assessments were reportedly conducted. While DG ECHO promoted 
harmonised data, some implementation actors questioned its reluctance to support rapid project 
set-up related assessments which were needed to identify needs and vulnerabilities.  

2.3.2.  Needs overview 

Across the countries, DG ECHO consistently funded UN OCHA activities which involved preparing 
HNOs, encouraged IPs to participate, and its field staff actively participated in the process. In this 
way, DG ECHO promoted a single, comprehensive, and impartial overall assessment of needs for 
each country.  

2.3.3. 

Improvements 

DG  ECHO  made  efforts  to  promote  improved  needs  assessments  quality  leading  to  some 
successful  humanitarian  outcomes.  In  CAR,  early  in  the  evaluation  period  DG  ECHO  provided 
funding directly to health and food security clusters, but this was reduced in recent years in favour 
of  structural  funding  to  needs  assessment  actors,  including  UN  OCHA  for  the  HNO,  INSO  for 
security assessments, FAO for food security assessments, and RRM for rapid needs assessment.  

In CAR, the case study showed how UN OCHA’s action produced and shared information to enable 
a  coordinated,  evidence-based,  and  prioritised  humanitarian  response.  It  produced  two  needs-
based  data  sets  which  informed  production  of  the  HNO  and  HRP,  based  on  four  regional 
stakeholder consultations held in 2018, strengthened data collection and analysis, strengthened 
secondary  data  use,  and  roll  out  of  sectoral/intersectoral  needs  severity  tools  (i.e.  allowing  for 
prioritisation  by  vulnerability).  These  supported  the  development  of  the  HNO  2019,  enabling  a 
strong evidence-based prioritisation of HRP 2019. In DG ECHO’s words, ‘these refined assessment 
tools  and  process  ultimately  better  informed  the  development  of  both  the  2019  HNO  and  2019 
HRP’. As a result of UN OCHA’s action, it was reported that some 137 humanitarian organisations 
were helped to deliver life-saving assistance to 1 million people.  

In  Cameroon,  stakeholders  reported  that  DG  ECHO  advocated  for  quality  and  coherent  needs 
assessments, consistently advocated for and supported the MIRA, and required IPs to base their 
intervention  projects  on  needs  assessments.  It  was  recognised  that  joint  needs  assessments 
provided a solid base for intervention planning and cross-referencing with other assessments. DG 
ECHO also contributed to needs assessments through needs identified in the annual HIP process. 
DG ECHO participated with UN OCHA in HRP development. 

30 Since 1999, the Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (Comité permanent Inter-Etats de Lutte contre la Sécheresse 
dans le Sahel, CILSS) has been engaged in the development and testing of the Harmonized Framework for the analysis and identification of areas 
at risk and vulnerable groups in the Sahel (Cadre Harmonisé). 
31  Standardised  Monitoring  and  Assessment  of  Relief  and  Transitions  (SMART)  Methodology  is  a  standardised,  simplified,  cross-sectional  field 
survey method designed to aid the collection of quality, up-to-date and timely nutrition data necessary for decision-making. 

49 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

In Chad, stakeholders noted that through its funding, advocacy and leverage, DG ECHO promoted 
a  large-scale,  common,  harmonised  system  for  improved  quality  impartial  assessments. 
Harmonised assessments were reportedly reducing assessment fatigue and improving efficiency. 
While some concerns related to the quality of the Cadre Harmonisé (CH) data and the degree to 
which it was sufficiently localised, stakeholders agreed that these issues were being investigated 
and that the CH and associated SMART and HEA assessments contributed to improved and more 
impartial  targeting.  DG  ECHO  pushed  strongly  with  WFP  and  the  World  Bank  for  vulnerability 
targeting  through  the CH to  promote  quality  and more  impartial  data gathering,  and  there  were 
signs that both organisations were adopting the approach, which should show future gains within 
social safety net programming. Improved nutrition assessments were reported to have contributed 
to ‘scaling up of nutrition response and the ability to care and treat SAM children has doubled in 
three years.’  

2.4.  Alignment 

EQ 4. How well aligned was DG ECHO’s response with humanitarian principles and EU policy 
priorities? 

DG  ECHO’s  response  in  CA  2014-2018  is  judged  to  be  consistently  well  aligned  with 
humanitarian  principles  and  EU  policy  priorities.  Stakeholders  in  each  country  were 
strongly convinced that DG ECHO’s strategy was aligned with humanitarian principles, and 
it is clear that DG ECHO acted to uphold fundamental humanitarian principles in various 
important ways. In addition, the HIPs showed signs of consistency with EU humanitarian 
policy priorities, while EU-funded actions were also systematically aligned with strategy. In 
practice,  however,  DG  ECHO’s  strategy  also  faced  some  specific  risks  with  regard  to 
humanitarian  principles,  and  alignment  with  EU  thematic  priorities  sometimes  proved 
difficult to implement.  

This  assessment  is  concerned  with  the  alignment  of  DG  ECHO’s  strategy  with  humanitarian 
principles and EU policies. It considers whether HIP priorities were consistent with humanitarian 
principles,  EU  humanitarian  policy  priorities  and  thematic  policies  in  humanitarian  coordination, 
refugee  self-reliance  and  the  HDN.  It  is  limited  by  a  lack  of  clear  priorities  and  no  mention  of 
principles in HIPs, and the recognition that DG ECHO’s strategy is not fully reflected in the HIPs, 
making  it  difficult  to  assess  alignment  of  strategy  objectives  without  also  considering 
implementation. It relies on diverse evidence from the mini-survey, document review and findings 
of other EQs.    

2.4.1.  Humanitarian principles 

Stakeholders  were  widely  convinced  that  DG  ECHO’s  strategy  was  aligned  with  humanitarian 
principles in CA 2014-2018. In CAR, more than two-thirds strongly agreed that DG ECHO’s strategy 
was  ‘consistent  with  humanitarian  principles’  and  in  Chad,  three-quarters  strongly  agreed.  In 
Cameroon, the poll did not produce a large enough sample, but similar views were expressed. 

In important ways, DG ECHO’s strategy upheld fundamental humanitarian principles in practice. 
DG ECHO upheld the principle of humanity32 by tailoring its response to specific situations and 
allowing flexibility to address evolving needs (see EQ 2 above) and by strengthening coordinated 
responses in each country (see EQ 9 below). It upheld impartiality33 through EU-funded actions 

32 Humanity is the principle that ‘human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found, with particular attention to the most vulnerable’ (DG ECHO 
website).  
33 Impartiality is the principle that ‘humanitarian aid must be provided solely on the basis of need, without discrimination’ (DG ECHO website). 

50 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

that were consistently relevant to the needs of the most vulnerable populations in specific crises 
(see EQ 1 above) and by consistently promoting joint and impartial needs assessments (see EQ 3 
above). There is further evidence to suggest that DG ECHO’s strategy upheld independence34 and 
no suggestion that DG ECHO’s strategy was anything but neutral.35   

However,  DG  ECHO’s  strategy  also  faced  several  challenges  with  regard  to  humanitarian 
principles. Some stakeholders saw risks to independence and neutrality arising from  the HDN’s 
coordination with development actors and with peacebuilding actors. The case study on resilience 
in Chad showed how some targeting for resilience building required prioritising ‘productive potential’ 
instead of ‘humanitarian needs alone’, which is in tension with impartiality. More broadly, human 
suffering in CA is not confined to acute needs but is more often protracted and rooted in political 
and  development  challenges,  and  humanity  also  requires  such  needs  to  be  addressed;  but  the 
response was not tailored to these needs (see EQ 2 above) and not very effective at addressing 
them (see EQ 5 below).   

2.4.2.  Policy priorities 

In CA 2014-2018, the HIPs and TAs showed signs of consistency with higher-level EU humanitarian 
policy  priorities.  The  document  review  found  that  HIPs  were  consistent  with  various  EU 
humanitarian  policy  priorities,  as defined  in DG  ECHO’s  annual  global  strategy  (GGOPs,  2014-
2018). Each year, HIPs made explicit reference to annual EU global humanitarian priorities. For 
example,  in  2018  the  HIP  mentioned  Education  in  Emergencies,  cash  transfers,  forced 
displacement,  gender-  and  age-mainstreaming,  and  innovation.  In  2018,  the  HIP’s  ‘envisaged 
response  and  expected  results’  also  continued  to  focus  on  resilience  efforts  and  adjustments 
required  to  support  the  evolving  needs  of  conflict-affected  populations  (CAR,  Cameroon),  and 
promoting resilience as well as addressing acute food and nutrition needs in the Sahel. 

DG ECHO ensured that EU-funded actions were consistently relevant to strategy. An enhanced 
sample  analysis  indicated  that  DG  ECHO  judged  almost  all  (97%)  EU-funded  actions  to  be 
‘strategically relevant’, mainly for being in full alignment with DG ECHO's own strategic priorities, 
but also relevant in terms of strategic partnership with certain organisations (e.g. ICRC), relevant 
to a critical situation within the country, or linked to good results from previously funded actions.  

2.4.3.  Thematic policies  

The case studies show how DG ECHO and partners sometimes struggled to align with EU policy 
priorities  for  humanitarian  coordination,  refugee  self-reliance  and  the  HDN.  For  humanitarian 
coordination, the EU lacked clear policies and a common framework, practical guidance or lessons 
learned to support country activities in this area. For refugee self-reliance, the EU provided effective 
policy  guidance  which  required  DG  ECHO-DG  DEVCO  collaboration  and  engagement  of  other 
actors,  but  in  Cameroon  there  was  a  lack  of  development  actors  from  the  start,  an  isolated 
humanitarian  response,  a  lack  of  government  support,  aid  dependency  and  pressure  on  aid 
budgets. For coordination of the HDN to address vulnerabilities, practical EU guidance was not 
provided and there was little evidence of other EU actors working with WFP on this action. In 2012, 
the EU provided a policy on resilience with practical guidance on implementation, including joint 
analysis by humanitarian and development actors, but European Council conclusions on the HDN 
were defined in 2017 and did not yet include practical guidance on application.  

34 Independence is the principle that requires ‘autonomy of humanitarian objectives from political, economic, military or other objectives’ (DG ECHO 
website). 
35 Neutrality is the principle that ‘humanitarian aid must not favour any side in an armed conflict or other dispute’ (DG ECHO website).    

51 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

2.5.  Achievements  

EQ 5. To what extent did DG ECHO achieve its objectives? 

Overall, DG ECHO is judged to have made a very strong contribution to meeting acute needs 
in CA 2014-2018. Across the three countries, DG ECHO invested in supporting multi-sector 
emergency responses with a strong emphasis on food security and nutrition. EU-funded 
humanitarian  actions  delivered  most  of  their  intended  results,  collectively  ‘reached’  the 
majority  of  people  in  need  each  year,  contributed  to  EU  objectives  and  made  notable 
contributions in each country. These achievements were dependent on a chain of actors 
including  the  EU,  DG  ECHO,  IPs  and  beneficiaries,  with  DG  ECHO  providing  strategic 
direction, selection of projects and allocation of funding, and monitoring and oversight of 
implementation.  These  activities  depended  most  notably  on  DG  ECHO’s  technical 
capacities, flexible emergency funding and partner relationships. 

Despite  these  achievements,  DG  ECHO  is  judged  to  have  contributed  little  to  reducing 
chronic humanitarian needs and risks in the region, and there was little or no evidence that 
humanitarian  needs  and  risks  were  actually  reduced.  This  reflected  larger  challenges  in 
addressing protracted humanitarian needs and involving development actors. In addition, 
DG  ECHO  invested  very  little  in  disaster  risk  reduction  and  emergency  preparedness 
(DRR/EP) activities to prevent epidemics and natural disasters.  

This  assessment  is  concerned  with  DG  ECHO’s  strategy  in  the  region  and  each  country.  It 
considers whether HIP objectives were achieved, needs met and contributions made to EU goals, 
as  well  as  notable  achievements  and  key  factors  of  success.  It  is  limited  by  a  lack  of  clear 
measurable objectives in the HIP and related MEL systems to provide information about progress 
above the level of individual actions. Instead it relies on the intervention logic and process models 
as analytical references, and uses mixed methods for generation of evidence, most notably sample 
analysis, stakeholder consultations and case studies.     

2.5.1.  Strategic objectives 

At regional level, DG ECHO supported the delivery of hundreds of successful actions focused on 
emergency response, food security and nutrition in 2014-2018. In total, it supported 317 EU-funded 
actions,  composed  of  825  specific  activities  and  results  implemented  across  a  range  of 
humanitarian  response  sectors,  including  food  security  and  nutrition,  WASH,  shelter  and 
settlements, coordination, protection, health, education in emergencies and child protection.   

In terms of outputs, EU-funded humanitarian actions delivered most of their intended results. During 
2014-2017, the years for which reporting data was available, the  sample analysis found that all 
actions (43/43) reported achievement of results (outputs), ranging from ‘partially’ or ‘largely’ met to 
‘fully’  met  or  ‘surpassed’.  Partner  reporting  in  Single  Forms  showed  that  all  actions  delivered 
against  intended  results,  specifying  whether  operational  results  were  achieved,  and  showed  a 
relatively even split between those fully met and those partially/largely met. Only a few were judged 
to  be  ‘outstanding’.  DG  ECHO  reporting  suggested  that  all  actions  were  delivered  and 
recommended in all cases 43/43 that actions were approved and final payment settled. However, 
partner reports also indicated that outputs were rarely delivered exactly as intended, and that most 
faced  challenges  related  to  context  (such  as  changing  situations,  access  constraints,  lack  of 
development partners, and funding gaps) or programme design and implementation.  

52 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

In terms of inputs, DG ECHO invested most funding in multi-sector emergency responses, with a 
strong  emphasis  on  food  security  and  nutrition.  The  portfolio  analysis  indicated  that  DG  ECHO 
invested the vast majority of EU humanitarian funding, which totalled EUR 499.9 million, in food 
security and nutrition sectors and multiple sectors associated with an emergency response.36 In 
CA 2014-2018, the majority of allocations (58.29%, EUR 291.38 million) were made in food security 
and livelihoods and nutrition sectors and most of the rest (40.01%,  EUR 200.02 million) were made 
across the multiple sectors associated with emergency response. Similarly, DG ECHO invested in 
activities and results that reflected multi-sector emergency responses, with a strong emphasis on 
food security and nutrition. The portfolio analysis found that almost two-thirds (62%) of the 825 EU-
funded activities  and  results  were  carried  out  across  various  emergency  response  sectors,  and 
more than a third in food ‘security, livelihoods and nutrition’ (36%).  

However,  DG  ECHO  invested  very  little  in  DRR/EP  activities  to  prevent  epidemics  and  natural 
disasters. Less than 2% (1.65%, EUR 8.27 million) of the funding went to DRR/EP, and a small 
fraction of activities were in DRR/EP (2.5%).  

2.5.2.  Key factors 

In terms of activities, DG ECHO played an essential role in EU humanitarian interventions in CA 
2014-2018, along with wider EU funding, IPs, beneficiaries and others. The case studies showed 
how  positive  outcomes  depended  on  a  chain  of  actors  including:  (i)  the  EU  providing  sufficient 
funding and overarching policies; (ii) DG ECHO providing strategic direction, selection of projects 
and allocation of funding, and monitoring and oversight of implementation; (iii) partners providing 
design, implementation and adaptation of projects; and, in many cases, (iv) beneficiaries and their 
representatives engaging in programmes. Stakeholders in CA saw a particularly important role for 
DG  ECHO  in  driving  effectiveness,  rating  most  highly  its  technical  oversight  and  advice,  and 
funding modifications in changing situations, followed by its project selection process.  

2.5.3.  Needs met 

In terms of contributions to outcomes, EU-funded actions ‘reached’ the majority of people in need 
in CA during the period 2014-2018. The portfolio analysis found that EU humanitarian assistance 
targeted a total of 36m people in need during 2014-2018, which means an average of 7.2 million 
people each year, a high number considering humanitarian country responses targeted 5.4 million 
people in need on average over the same period. The sample analysis also found that EU-funded 
humanitarian  actions  often  reached  all  beneficiaries  targeted,  with  all  relevant  actions  reviewed 
(29/29) fully reaching or exceeding their intended targets in terms of beneficiaries reached. While 
‘reaching people in need’ does not mean these needs were actually met, and questions may be 
raised about the reliability of data and target-setting, it is clear that EU humanitarian interventions 
made large-scale efforts to meet the needs of populations affected in CA.   

Despite such efforts to meet needs in the region, there was little evidence that humanitarian needs 
and risks were reduced. On the contrary, in 2015-2018 the number of people in need of assistance 
increased from 7m people to 10.2 million, while humanitarian risks and vulnerability remained at 
very  high  levels.  At  the  same  time,  HRPs  only  targeted  62%  of  people  considered  in  need  of 
assistance.  

36 Including WASH, operations support, shelter and settlements, coordination, protection, education in emergencies, child protection, and mine action 
(in  CAR);  health,  WASH,  protection,  shelter  and  settlements,  coordination,  child  protection,  education  in  emergencies,  and  multi-purpose  cash 
transfer (in Cameroon); and health, protection, operational support, WASH, coordination, shelter and settlements, and education in emergencies (in 
Chad). 

53 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

A)  Central African Republic  

In  CAR,  DG  ECHO  did  an  excellent  job  overall  in  meeting  acute  needs.  The  DG  ECHO 
portfolio in CAR consistently delivered results across its actions and activities, which were 
recognised  for  their  high  quality.  The  portfolio  was  perceived  to  meet  acute  needs  of 
conflict-affected people directly, and indirectly through support to the wider humanitarian 
response. In these achievements, DG ECHO’s project selection and technical expertise were 
considered key factors of success, while the case study also showed how DG ECHO worked 
with UN OCHA to strengthen the overall humanitarian response. In general terms, DG ECHO 
was  perceived  to  provide  leadership  in  CAR’s  emergency  phase  (2013-2016)  and  to 
strengthen  coordination  and  coherence  in  recent  years  (2016-2018).  DG  ECHO  was  also 
considered  essential  to  achieving  the  EU’s  goals  of  bringing  humanitarian  assistance, 
peace and stability to CAR in 2013-2016, and to supporting recovery and development in 
CAR from 2016 onwards, through close cooperation with the Bêkou Trust Fund. 

However, DG ECHO was less successful in meeting protracted needs in CAR, where wider 
results remained modest and needs increased slightly over the period. DG ECHO also did 
little to strengthen preparedness and reduce humanitarian risks. In addition, partners raised 
several concerns about the efficiency of DG ECHO's project selection process and reporting 
requirements, and it was suggested that DG ECHO funding allocations risked contributing 
to a 'fragmentation' of the emergency response.  

Strategic objectives  
In CAR, DG ECHO invested in a multi-sector emergency response, with most funding going to food 
security  and  nutrition.  Some  80%  of  the  254  EU-funded  activities  and  results  were  multi-sector 
emergency activities, and 18% were in food security/livelihoods and nutrition. Around two-thirds of 
EU  humanitarian  funding  in  CAR  (EUR  77.81  million)  was  spent  across  multiple  emergency 
response sectors, a third (EUR 35.7 million) on food security and livelihoods and nutrition and a 
small fraction (EUR 1.45 million) on DRR/EP. The most important IPs were WFP, UNICEF, FAO, 
ICRC, Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development (ACTED) and OXFAM/INTERMON.  

The sample analysis offered a snapshot of results delivered by EU-funded actions in 2017. The 
International  Medical  Corps  (IMC)  emergency  assistance  project  in  Ouaka  prefecture  provided 
essential health, mental health, nutrition and GBV services to 113,017 people and supported 17 
fixed  health  facilities.  It  brought  multiple  health  services  to  people  in  Ouaka,  including  waste 
management  construction,  medicines  and  support  to  health  facilities.  The  NGO  coordination 
committee  CCO  project  engaged  with  more  than  75%  of  INGOs  in  CAR,  elected  an  executive 
committee, and participated in the main coordination bodies in Bangui, including all Humanitarian 
Country Team (HCT) and civil-military coordination meetings. It was recognised as an essential 
humanitarian platform, allowing for strong and common positions among INGOs, and facilitating 
information  exchange,  coordination,  communication  and  advocacy.  The  UNICEF  RRM  project 
conducted multi-sector assessments, followed by timely interventions that reached 219,000 people. 
It  reached  significantly  more  crisis-affected  people  (with  assessments  and  interventions)  than 
initially  planned,  showing  its  ability  to  adapt  and  scale  up  during  a  period  of  increased  conflict-
related displacement. 

Stakeholders  in  CAR  generally  agreed  that  EU-funded  projects  delivered  intended  results  and 
represented a high-quality portfolio of projects. While DG ECHO projects mostly delivered intended 
results,  they  faced  serious  constraints  due  to  weak  national  capacities  and  NGOs’  reliance  on 
inexperienced international staff. IPs also reported frequent delays due to logistical and security 
constraints leading to no-cost extensions. In addition, partners felt that, due to the high costs of 

54 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

delivery to isolated locations and the intersectional nature of IDP needs in the development-deficit 
context of CAR, geographically focused multi-sectoral projects obtained the best results. 

Factors of success  
DG ECHO’s project selection and technical inputs were key factors of success in EU-funded actions 
in CAR. In the survey, CAR stakeholders highlighted DG ECHO’s project selection process as the 
most important factor in contributing to DG ECHO's overall performance, followed by its funding 
modifications in changing situations and technical oversight and advice.  

In interviews, stakeholders agreed that DG ECHO’s project selection process resulted in a high-
quality portfolio of well-performing projects, and successful delivery of results was attributed to a 
rigorous selection process and consistent monitoring. The DG ECHO field team was regarded as 
unique among donors and its field staff recognised for their expertise, although the frequency of 
their  rotation  was  questioned.  The  rigour  of  DG  ECHO’s  monitoring  process  was  thought  to 
enhance  performance  and  accountability,  to  the  extent  that  implementation  actors  sought 
partnership with DG ECHO as a ‘seal of approval’ to leverage funding from other donors. The DG 
ECHO team’s ability to travel to field locations gave them a level of contextual understanding and 
credibility which was highly valued by colleagues from wider EU and member state organisations, 
and gave DG ECHO more weight in coordination fora such as the HCT, the CAR Humanitarian 
Fund (HF) Advisory Board and clusters. The contribution of DG ECHO’s regional experts was also 
recognised.  

At the same time, IPs in CAR were often frustrated by the proposal selection process. The process 
of  applying  was  seen as slow  and  cumbersome;  the  electronic Single  Form  was  considered ill-
suited to the poor connectivity environment of CAR (although one IP noted a technical improvement 
in 2019 with the conversion to HTML) and a significant disincentive to first-time applicants, as well 
as an unnecessary step for coordination actors whose proposals vary little from year to year. Most 
major partners have a specialised unit in their HQs or in Brussels handling proposals and reporting, 
which can result in some disconnect between the field reality and the final products. More broadly, 
partners welcomed the streamlining of reporting that had taken place over the past decade, but 
also  questioned  why  an  interim  report  was  necessary  for  projects  of  less  than  one  year.  Many 
partners were frustrated by the ‘blackout period’ when partners could not communicate with DG 
ECHO at proposal submission stage.  

Moreover, the selection of EU-funded actions had some possibly unintended consequences. DG 
ECHO  staff  agreed  the  selection  process  encouraged  project  fragmentation,  although  opinions 
were  split  on  whether  a  proliferation  of  small  projects  was  a  problem.  Consistent  investment  in 
coordination activities left reduced funding for direct delivery activities, and many partner proposals 
were rejected or further cut back in scale, resulting in a DG ECHO portfolio composed of relatively 
small projects. This contributed to fragmented funding across the whole response, even if some 
DG ECHO staff felt that small projects were valuable in meeting specific gaps. 

Case study 
In CAR, the case study showed how DG ECHO worked with UN OCHA to strengthen the overall 
humanitarian  response.  UN  OCHA’s  Action,  ‘Strengthening  Humanitarian  Coordination  and 
Advocacy  in  the  Central  African  Republic  Action’  was  implemented  from  January  to  December 
2018, with total funding of EUR 7.5 million of which DG ECHO provided EUR 1 million. 

The  main  outcome  of  this  action  was  a  more  coherent  humanitarian  response,  but  which  also 
remained unable to meet all needs targeted. For this action, the direct beneficiaries were all 137 
humanitarian  organisations  in  CAR,  which  engaged  with  and  were  supported  by  UN  OCHA’s 

55 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

coordination mechanisms, evidence generation, and resource mobilisation and advocacy activities. 
As a result, humanitarian organisations were able to plan and deliver a more coherent response, 
which  provided  emergency  assistance  to  1  million  people  in  need  of  assistance.  However,  the 
response was not able to assist all 1.9 million people targeted, meet increased protection needs, 
or significantly reduce humanitarian needs and vulnerabilities.  

This action was well designed and implemented, and adapted to changing events. The UN OCHA 
project  design  reflected  the  IASC  coordination  model  for  the  humanitarian  response,  and  its 
successful  implementation  relied  on  UN  OCHA’s  operational  presence,  HR  capacities  and 
synergies built with other actors. Although its information management was undermined by poor 
capacities in clusters, the project made strong efforts to adapt to implementation challenges (e.g. 
by quickly responding to increased violence, using its flexible field-based coordination ‘antenna’, 
and  developing  a  CwC  project  to  fill  gaps  in  collective  feedback  and  complaint  mechanisms). 
Despite UN OCHA’s efforts, the larger humanitarian response still struggled in 2018 to adapt to a 
worsening humanitarian situation, increased aid worker insecurity and significant underfunding of 
the HRP.   

To this action DG ECHO provided important funding and oversight without much strategic input. 
DG  ECHO’s  funding  to  UN  OCHA  was  helpfully  increased  to  address  potential  gaps,  provided 
mostly in advance (80%), and allowed modifications. In both the HIP and TA, DG ECHO underlined 
the importance of coordination, but provided little in the way of specific strategic direction. On a 
technical level, DG ECHO provided useful technical inputs to the proposal design, and undertook 
to monitor UN OCHA’s efforts to increase engagement with the government and public advocacy 
on the humanitarian mission.  

In  support  of  this  action,  the  EU  made  funding  available  but  also  lacked  explicit  policies  on 
humanitarian coordination. The EU provided adequate funding to UN OCHA’s coordination activity 
in CAR, and broad policy commitments to support humanitarian coordination and UN OCHA’s role 
(in  the  EU  Consensus),  and  on  coordinated  needs  assessments  (in  the  Grand  Bargain).  Since 
neither  the  EU  nor  the  European  Commission  (EC)  has  a  specific  policy  on  humanitarian 
coordination  (i.e.  comparable  to  other  policies  governing  humanitarian  actions),  no  common 
framework, practical guidance or lessons learned were available to support country activities.   

Needs met  
Almost all stakeholders agreed that actions met acute needs and needs arising from conflicts in 
CAR, while the majority also agreed, but more moderately, that EU-funded actions met food and 
nutrition needs. However, stakeholders were less convinced that EU-funded humanitarian actions 
met protracted needs, with almost two-thirds moderately agreeing and one-third responding in a 
neutral way. In addition, EU-funded actions were perceived to be less successful at addressing 
disaster risks and epidemics, with less than half of stakeholders agreeing and more than half of 
them disagreeing or neutral.  

At a broader outcome level, EU-funded actions also contributed to response-wide successes in 
addressing acute needs, as intended in the coordination model (see Introduction). Linked to the 
recurring HRP objective to ‘save lives’ during 2016-2018, data available showed the number and 
percentage  of  people  affected  who  received  direct  food  assistance  increased  steadily,  from 
173,256 in 2016 (48% target) to 741,253 in 2018 (102% of target); and the number of households 
that benefited from emergency shelter increased steadily from 3,078 (14% of target) in 2016 to 
36,225 (70% of target) in 2018, although these remained below targets. At the peak of the crisis 
(2013-2014), the interagency response was found to have made considerable progress towards 

56 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

providing basic services, reinforcing protection and delivering assistance to around 2 million people 
in need in a highly constrained environment, and contributed to preventing higher mortality.37  

However,  EU-funded  actions  contributed  less  to  resilience,  as  results  remained  modest  for  the 
recurring  HRP  objective  to  ‘preserve  human  dignity’  in  the  CAR  response  2016-2018.  Data 
available for this time shows the number of people who participated in income-generating activities 
(IGA)  dropped  from  75,860  in  2016  (63%  of  target)  to  22,225  in  2018  (19%  of  target);  and  the 
number of households with access to basic social services assisted in rebuilding or rehabilitating 
their homes remained way below targets, increasing from 0 in 2016 to 874 in 2018 (3% of target) 
(Periodic Monitoring Report/HRP). Previously, in 2013-2014 the HRP was found to have achieved 
‘poor  results  in  livelihoods,  resilience  and  recovery’,  while  monitoring  data  on  livelihoods  and 
community participation showed under a third of targets had been achieved in the second quarter 
of 2014.38 

If EU-funded actions contributed to meeting acute needs in CAR, the number of people in need 
was  not  reduced.  Indeed  during  2014-2018,  the  total  number  of  people  in  need  grew  from  2.2 
million to 2.5 million, and needs remained at very high levels. Compared to its neighbours, CAR 
showed the highest levels of exposure to hazard, (i.e. to human-made conflict), and highest levels 
of  vulnerability.  The  overall  response  also  remained  challenged  by  the  collapse  in  public 
administration,  insecurity  and  logistic  constraints,  reliance  on  assistance,  and  steep  decline  in 
funding during the period 2016-2017. 

Notable achievements  
In  general  terms,  DG  ECHO  was  perceived  to  have  provided  leadership  in  CAR’s  emergency 
response phase 2013-2016 and strengthened coordination and coherence in recent years (2016-
2018).  In  the  early  years  of  the  response,  DG  ECHO  was  regarded  as  the  lead  donor  and 
instrumental in the achievement of overall results. In this initial full-on emergency phase, which was 
characterised  by  life-saving  actions,  DG  ECHO  was  considered  the  primary  donor,  and  initially 
played a key role in convening other donors and coordinating humanitarian actors.  

From mid-2016, DG ECHO was associated most closely with strengthening response coordination, 
including  the  CCO  and  RRM.  Following  national  elections  and  the  process  of  conducting  the 
Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessments (RPBAs)39 and developing the National Recovery and 
Peacebuilding Plan 2017-2021 (RCPCA),40 there was a sharp increase in development investment 
and  thinking,  which  led  the  humanitarian  community  to  consider  resilience  and  how  they  could 
better link up with development. At the same time, spending by other donor humanitarian donors 
was  perceived  to  increase  while  DG  ECHO’s  decreased.  In  this  later  phase,  DG  ECHO  was 
recognised for its support to some niche coordination bodies, including INSO, the CCO and RRM, 
and was an important advocate for the creation of the Bêkou Trust Fund. Beyond this, DG ECHO 
was not associated with particular sectors or results, and was seen as a relatively minor contributor 
of funding.  

EU goals 
EU stakeholders concurred that DG ECHO was essential to achieving EU goals in CAR, which 
included  bringing  humanitarian  assistance,  peace  and  stability  to  CAR  (2013-2016),41  and 
supporting the recovery and development following the 2016 Brussels donor conference and the 
launch of the RCPCA. First, DG ECHO was regarded as essential to achieving the humanitarian 

37 Lawday, A., Adjibade, K., Dahrendorf, N., Kubwayezu, F., Morinière, L.C. (2016) Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation of the Response to the 
Crisis in the Central African Republic 
38 Ibid. 
39 https://ec.europa.eu/fpi/sites/fpi/files/rpba/rpba_fast_facts.pdf 
40 https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/car_main_report-a4-english-web.pdf 
41 https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/countries/central-african-republic_en; https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/nip-car-fed11-2017_fr.p 

57 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

assistance  objective;  indeed,  some  regarded  DG  ECHO  has  having  led  the  EU  services  in  the 
emergency period, and important in supporting the stabilisation and recovery objectives, acting in 
coordination with DG DEVCO. DG ECHO participated actively in EU Delegation (EUD) coordination 
activities and was highly valued for its contextual understanding and the quality of its information 
about needs and response at field level, while EU interlocutors confirmed that DG ECHO remained 
independent of political direction from the EUD. Second, the recovery and development goals of 
the RCPCA informed DG ECHO’s activities but more explicitly shaped DG DEVCO’s engagement.  

B) Cameroon 

In Cameroon, DG ECHO is judged to have done a very good job of addressing acute needs, 
but it struggled to meet protracted needs. The DG ECHO portfolio in Cameroon consistently 
delivered results and was perceived to meet acute needs, thanks to DG ECHO’s oversight 
capacities and the know-how of its IPs. The portfolio was perceived to achieve significant 
results in meeting the basic needs of affected populations, in particular refugees and host 
communities. DG ECHO also helped to pave the way for achieving the EU's development 
objectives, by investing in planning of self-sufficiency activities and building capacity for 
resilience.  

However, the DG ECHO portfolio risked falling below standards in addressing the needs of 
refugees as they became protracted and was perceived to struggle to meet protracted needs 
in the country more broadly, where humanitarian needs and risks grew over the period. The 
case study showed how DG ECHO worked with the FRC to strengthen self-sufficiency for 
CAR  refugees  in  eastern  Cameroon,  but  little  was  achieved  beyond  the  duration  of  the 
project in meeting chronic needs and reducing vulnerabilities, highlighting the limitations 
of  DG  ECHO  funding  to  self-sufficiency  activities  without  greater  involvement  of 
development actors. 

Strategic objectives  
In Cameroon, EU-funded actions amounted to a multi-sector emergency response portfolio, with a 
particular emphasis on food security and nutrition. Some 68% of the 211 activities and results were 
spread across a multi-sector emergency response, and 30% focused on food security and nutrition 
in particular. Over half of funding (EUR 52.91 million) was spent on multiple sectors, just below half 
(EUR  43.78  million)  on  food  and  nutrition,  and  the  remainder  (EUR  2.02  million)  was  spent  on 
DRR/EP. The largest IPs were WFP, FRC, ICRC, Première Urgence International, UNHCR and 
UNICEF. 

The  sample  analysis  offered  a  snapshot  of  results  delivered  in  2017  by  EU-funded  actions  in 
Cameroon.  The  FRC  project  to  build  the  resilience  of  vulnerable  populations  in  the  Far  North 
screened 1,170 U5s for SAM, discharged 95% of patients as cured and helped 73% of its target 
population achieve an acceptable food consumption score. It provided an integrated health/nutrition 
response  to  people  affected  by  the  insecurity  crisis  in  several  communities  in  the  Far  North, 
contributing  to  an  improved  treatment  of malnutrition  cases,  community  screening,  treatment  of 
PLW  and  U5s,  awareness  raising,  and  support  to  state  structures  in  the  context  of  a  gradual 
strategic  shift  from  emergency  response  (and  withdrawal  of  free  services  and  medicines).  UN 
OCHA’s  Humanitarian  Coordination  and  Advocacy  project  for  multiple  crises  in  Cameroon 
delivered the HNO and HRP for 2018, supported ten working groups or clusters, and helped ten 
humanitarian  organisations  establish  mechanisms  to  prevent  sexual  exploitation  and  abuse  by 
staff. With  sub-offices  in Maroua and Kousseri,  UN  OCHA  supported  humanitarian leaders  and 
partners,  allowing  for  a  more  effective  and  collaborative  response.  It  developed  a  common 
understanding  of  the  situation  (including  needs  assessments  and  underlying  development 
challenges through 16 joint needs assessment missions), created new information management 
58 

 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

products (Humanitarian Bulletin, HRP executive summary, return areas fact sheets), and rolled out 
civil-military coordination mechanisms in the north.  

Stakeholders in Cameroon perceived that projects delivered results in line with key indicators and 
minimum standards. DG ECHO's assistance through IPs helped to reduce the severity of the crisis 
and meet basic humanitarian needs, and to provide protection and assistance. IPs often focused 
on  the  specific  emergency  activities  (food  assistance,  shelters  and WASH),  in  which  they  were 
relatively successful. However, questions were raised about synergy of the actions implemented 
by  IPs,  with  perceived  room  to  improve  effectiveness  and  efficiency  and  avoid  some  gaps.  In 
addition,  it  was  felt  that  interventions  should  focus  on  other  sectors  to  address  the  HDN  and 
emergency/post-emergency exit, and to shape a favourable context for self-sufficiency and AGR 
activities such as agriculture, livestock and small subsistence. A risk of stagnation was identified, 
which could cause minimum standards to fall where the post-emergency response had not evolved 
into further assistance through the humanitarian-development collaboration.  

However, stakeholders indicated that some standards were below or very close to minimum levels 
(education, food self-sufficiency, livelihood/agriculture, basic humanitarian standard of quality and 
accountability, right to identity documents, psychosocial support, etc.). Food needs were no longer 
adequately covered (chronic undernourishment). The situation in the camps and host villages was 
seen by many as stagnating, with populations struggling to be self-sufficient, as they lacked the 
means to access agriculture and mobility to develop livelihoods, including IGA. Education needs 
were also not met, as secondary school pupils were required to travel long distances, partly due to 
a lack of support to livelihoods and housing. There were also significant problems for girls, who for 
the most part could not continue their curriculum. There was chronic undernutrition due to lack of 
access to land and mobility to develop livelihoods.  

Key factors  
In Cameroon, DG ECHO oversight and partner know-how were identified as key factors of success. 
Stakeholders  indicated  two  key  success  factors  in  the  EU-funded  emergency  response  in 
Cameroon: DG ECHO's capabilities in emergency project oversight and the performance of IPs in 
the  implementation  of  emergency  projects.  DG  ECHO's  strength  was  its  approach  to  the 
humanitarian  response,  systematically  taking  into  account  the  state  of  the  needs  of  the 
beneficiaries and surrounding communities, the evolution of situations and the risks, in order to 
better adjust its responses, taking into account the vulnerable groups.  

However, the project proposal process was deemed heavy and slow. DG ECHO's humanitarian 
objectives  were  generally  achieved  through  IPs’  interventions,  particularly  in  the  food/nutrition, 
shelter  and  WASH  sectors,  which  reduced  mortality/morbidity  rates,  and  ensured  protection 
beneficiaries with equitable access to aid in general. 

Case study 
In Cameroon, the case study showed how DG ECHO worked with FRC in an effort to strengthen 
self-sufficiency  for  CAR  refugees  in  eastern  Cameroon.  FRC’s  project  to  reinforce  resilience 
capacities among refugees and vulnerable host populations in the East region of Cameroon42 was 
implemented from 1 February 2017 to 1 February 2018. 

The main outcome of this action was that refugees and host populations benefitted somewhat in 
terms of resilience during the project, but little was achieved to meet chronic needs and reduce 
vulnerabilities. The target populations and local actors engaged in the project albeit insufficiently 

42 Projet de renforcement des capacités de résilience des populations réfugiées et hôtes vulnérables dans la région de l'Est du Cameroun 

59 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

and engagement by state agricultural structures remained very limited. By the end of the action, 
beneficiaries showed modest improvements in food security and nutrition indicators, although fewer 
than intended were assisted and aid-dependent refugees fared less well than host communities. 
Some needs of refugees and local hosts were addressed by the project; but these needs were 
chronic  needs and  remained far  from met  overall and  in  terms  of food  security,  livelihoods  and 
nutrition.  Significant  vulnerabilities  remained  in  both  populations,  with  refugees  showing  a 
downward trend even during the project implementation, and it was not at all guaranteed that the 
resilience benefits from the project would be sustained after its closure.  

The project design was relevant and its implementation was largely effective; but it struggled to 
adapt to the unexpected suspension of WFP food rations to beneficiaries. FRC (and Cameroon 
Red Cross (CRC)) designed the project well, and its appropriateness and range of support provided 
were judged to drive positive outcomes. Implementation was considered to be good and in line with 
DG  ECHO's  expectations,  and  reduced  targets  were  adequately  explained  and  accepted. 
Adaptation to changing events was not done during implementation, and suspension of WFP food 
distribution had a major impact on outcomes.    

For this action, DG ECHO funding alone was too limited to increase self-reliance of CAR refugees 
without the engagement of development actors. DG ECHO provided appropriate strategic direction 
for this action but without making it an operational priority in the context of increased emergency 
needs in the north and insufficient funding to meet all needs. While DG ECHO funding avoided 
duplication  with  other  actions  (UNHCR,  FRC,  Lutheran  World  Federation)  its  allocation  to  the 
project was small in scale compared to protracted needs and unlikely to make a significant or lasting 
impact  on  self-reliance.  Without  follow-up  from  development  and  political  actors  (including  DG 
DEVCO and the European External Action Service (EEAS)) or being part of any larger solution for 
the CAR refugees, DG ECHO funding alone was not an effective mechanism for increasing the 
self-reliance of CAR refugees in eastern Cameroon. Still, DG ECHO monitoring and oversight was 
highly regarded in Cameroon, and evidence suggests it worked well for this project.  

In support of this action, the EU provided constant humanitarian funding and a highly relevant policy 
to  increase  refugee  self-sufficiency.  While  EU  humanitarian  funding  to  Cameroon  remained 
constant, its share and sufficiency were overtaken by increasing needs. In 2016-2017, the EU share 
of  humanitarian  funding  was  relatively  low,  and  it  was  insufficient  to  address  both  acute  and 
protracted  needs  in  Cameroon.  The  EU  policy  for  promoting  self-reliance  for  CAR  refugees  in 
Cameroon,  which  depended  on  DG  ECHO-DG DEVCO  collaboration  and  engagement  of  other 
actors  (EC,  2016),  provided  effective  policy  guidance  and  remained  highly  relevant  to  CAR 
refugees  in  Cameroon.  Most  importantly,  it  highlighted  the  gaps  to  be  addressed:  a  lack  of 
development  actors  from  the  start,  an  isolated  humanitarian  response,  a  lack  of  government 
support, aid dependency and pressure on aid budgets.    

Needs met  
In  Cameroon,  stakeholders  perceived  that  acute  needs  were  being  targeted  and  the  needs  of 
vulnerable groups were being met by EU-funded actions. However, stakeholders perceived that 
protracted needs were not being met. 

In  documentation,  DG  ECHO  recognised  that  acute  needs  were  vast  and  were  anticipated  to 
continue  in  the  areas  of  food  assistance  and  livelihoods,  protection  and  access  to  some  basic 
services (notably health, water supply and education). DG ECHO’s provision of immediate multi-
sectoral  assistance  responding  to  basic  needs  of  CAR  refugees  both  in  camps  and  within  host 
communities  in  East  Cameroon  alleviated  these  needs.  The  same  goes  for  DG  ECHO’s  close 

60 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

monitoring of the humanitarian situation across the country and along the North-West border in 
particular, with a view to respond to possible new needs generated by new refugee influxes.43 

However, EU-funded actions did not result in any significant reduction in needs. During 2014-2018, 
the total number of people in need grew from 2 million to 3.3 million, humanitarian risk indicators 
rose  from  4.3  to  6.2,  along  with  a  significant  increase  in  hazard/exposure  from  2016  to  2017, 
although vulnerability levels remained constant and slightly lower than neighbours. 

Notable achievements 
The  DG  ECHO  portfolio  was  perceived  to  achieve  significant  results  in  Cameroon  2014-2018, 
meeting basic needs of affected populations. In general, DG ECHO’s response to the urgency of 
the situation and its interventions were considered a success and helped to save lives, putting a 
roof over people’s heads and providing access to basic services – this was especially the case for 
refugees, displaced people and host families. DG ECHO and partners were also perceived as key 
lifesavers in camps and areas hosting IDPs. The installation interventions in refugee camps and 
improvement  of  the  life  context  of  the populations were  very  effective.  DG ECHO's  intervention 
prevented the situation from deteriorating. In addition, DG ECHO actions allowed access to health 
care, which helped to counter many health crises. 

EU goals 
DG ECHO helped to pave the way for achieving the EU's development objectives, by investing in 
planning of self-sufficiency activities and building capacity for resilience. DG ECHO tried to work in 
harmony with the EU's development strategy and developed HDN strategies, to bridge emergency 
assistance with development, through developing a system of resilience building for beneficiaries. 
It is difficult to assess how effective this contribution has been (see EQ 13 below).  

C) Chad 
In Chad, DG ECHO is judged to have done a very good job of meeting acute needs and made 
good  efforts  to  address  protracted  needs.  The  DG  ECHO  portfolio  in  Chad  consistently 
delivered  results  across  its  food  security  and  emergency  response  activities,  and  was 
widely perceived to meet acute needs and contribute to addressing severe food insecurity. 
DG ECHO's project selection, expertise, field presence and leadership were considered key 
factors  of  success.  Among  significant  achievements  were  DG  ECHO’s  scaling  up  of  the 
nutrition response from 2014, DG ECHO’s rapid launch of the Lake Chad response with IPs 
from scratch, and DG ECHO’s response to the cholera outbreak in 2017. DG ECHO made 
multiple contributions to EU goals and most importantly, through its close relationship with 
DG  DEVCO,  including  developing  a  shared  vision  with  DG  DEVCO  on  resilience  and  the 
HDN.  

Along with the wider response, however, DG ECHO was perceived to do less well at meeting 
protracted  needs,  and  at  addressing  risks  of  disaster  and  epidemics.  Despite  some 
perceived small-scale successes in resilience activities, contributing to resilience remained 
challenging for DG ECHO. The case study showed how DG ECHO worked with WFP in 2016-
2017  to  strengthen  resilience  for  vulnerable  populations  in  the  Sahel  belt,  but  some 
targeting required prioritising ‘productive potential’ instead of humanitarian needs, and at 
this point there was little evidence of HDN collaboration with DG DEVCO.  

43  European  Commission.  Brussels,  11.12.2017.  Commission  Staff  Working  Document.  General  Guidelines  on  Operational  Priorities  for 
Humanitarian Aid in 2018 

61 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

Strategic objectives  
In  Chad,  EU-funded  actions  shaped  a  largely  food  security  and  nutrition-focused  emergency 
response  with  a  substantial  multi-sector  aspect.  Some  52%  of  the  117  activities  and  results 
implemented were focused on food security/livelihoods and nutrition, and 44% were spread across 
other  emergency  response  sectors.  Around  three-quarters  of  funding  (EUR  211.9  million)  was 
focused on food security/livelihoods and nutrition sectors; most of the rest (EUR 69.3 million) was 
dispersed  across  various  other  sectors,  and  a  small  fraction  (EUR  4.8  million)  was  invested  in 
DRR/EP. The largest IPs were WFP, UNICEF, OXFAM/INTERMON, UNHCR, Action Contre la Faim 
(ACF), CARE and IMC.  

The sample analysis offered a snapshot of results delivered in 2017 by EU-funded actions in Chad. 
The ACF project to strengthen nutritional security in the Kanem and Bahr el Gazel regions treated 
13,390 U5s for malnutrition and helped 77% of households achieve acceptable food consumption 
scores compared to 10% at baseline. It reached almost 120,000 people with integrated nutrition 
assistance.  The  Alliance  for  International  Medical  Action  provided  medico-nutrition  support  to 
women and children in the Lake Chad area, with 96% of patients being discharged as cured from 
treatment facilities and 98.9% of infants U5s successfully treated for SAM. It helped the majority of 
health  centres  to  achieve  self-sufficiency  or  partial  self-sufficiency  in  treating  SAM  and  trained 
health professionals in treating SAM at the national training institute. The FAO action to support 
Food Security Cluster (FSC) coordination was judged to deliver six key functions of the FSC by 
more than 50% of members, and AAP at a good level by 85% members. It enabled FSC to play its 
important  role  in  coordinating  the  humanitarian  response  and  deliver  key  functions,  promoted 
nutrition and resilience in the FSC sector, established a working group on coordinating the HDN 
among members and state actors; and ensured a coordinated response to the lean season crisis 
in 2018.  

Stakeholders  in  Chad  generally  perceived  that  projects  achieved  their  intended  results,  met 
emergency  needs  and  assisted  conflict-affected  people.  The  quality  of  the  portfolio  and  its 
application  to  local  needs  and  vulnerability  were  put  down  in  no  small  part  to  the  increasingly 
rigorous selection and use of improved targeting afforded by the harmonised assessments. Though 
clearly  limited  in  its  scope,  the  responses  of  the  organisations  consulted  triangulated  with 
questioning  in  KIIs.  This  qualitative  analysis  indicates  that  stakeholders  agree  that  there  were 
significant  achievements  in  the  promotion  of  ‘resilience’  approaches  attempting  to  address 
underlying causes and more recently around improved assessment and coordination around the 
HDN,  but  this  remains  contained  within  small  projects,  limited  by  short  timeframes,  and  more 
secure  multi-year  funding  is  lacking.  There  is  some  evidence  that  DG  ECHO  contributed  to 
supporting  and  improving  early  warning  systems,  though  IPs  feel  more  is  needed  to  ‘better 
anticipate crisis by assessing risks’. IPs pointed to effective partner actions and project indicators 
but  saw  difficulties  in  capturing  objective  improvements  (e.g.  the  CH  is  used  in  a  context  of 
structural needs and persistent vulnerability).  

However, many projects were reported to experience annual delays at contract signing (typically 
up to a quarter of the  one-year implementation time), which impacts severely on efficiency and 
smaller IPs’ ability to perform, and on resilience achievements particularly adversely (loss of staff 
continuity). Such delays can negate some of the benefits of multi-year funding when it occurs. DG 
ECHO Chad is considered flexible in granting no-cost extensions and allowing delayed activities to 
be made up later, but such delays disrupted effective and efficient achievement of objectives. 

Key factors  
In Chad, DG ECHO project selection, expertise,  field presence and leadership were considered 
key factors of success. In addition to EU funding, DG ECHO’s consideration of gender and age, 

62 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

project selection process, and technical oversight and expertise were perceived to be key factors 
of  success  in  Chad.  Cash  and  voucher  assistance,  partnerships  with  local  actors,  DG  ECHO 
funding  modifications  in  changing  situations,  and  accountability  to  affected  populations  were 
perceived as less important factors.  

In interviews, stakeholders highlighted several key  factors of success. First, DG ECHO’s strong 
advocacy for Chad in negotiating consistent financial support to the response despite louder crises 
regionally and elsewhere. Second, DG ECHO’s strong field presence with experienced staff, good 
contextual  and  historical  knowledge,  and  strong  technical  capacities  of  staff  (e.g.  protection, 
transition  to  the  HDN).  Other  donors  reported  ‘ground  truthing’  their  own  approaches  with  DG 
ECHO. Third, DG ECHO’s leadership and coordination, including advocacy and good relationship-
building skills with IPs and donors permitted strong coordination and collaboration, including with 
DG DEVCO and EUD. 

Hindering  factors  cited  included  DG  ECHO  not  understanding  partner  priorities,  and  not 
understanding  the  consequences  of  short  funding  cycles  and  detrimental  impacts  of  further 
contracting delays. Moreover, DG ECHO was perceived to have critical reliance on key staff and 
their  networks,  which  risked  being  lost  on  their  departure,  and  there  were  some  complaints  of 
overreach by technical advisers in 'redesigning projects'. Other hindering factors mentioned were 
that  the  HIP  process  is  cumbersome  (but  consultation  is  appreciated);  lack  of  feedback  on 
proposals  submitted  increased  misunderstandings;  the  Single  Form  was  too  long  and  hard  to 
follow, especially for non-native French or English speakers; its interface was frustrating (although 
has improved in 2019 since its conversion to HTML); and that the process favours the best proposal 
writers but not necessarily the best projects.  

Case study 
In  Chad,  the  case  study  showed  how  DG  ECHO  worked  with WFP  to  strengthen  resilience  for 
vulnerable populations in the Sahel belt. WFP’s project titled ‘Providing targeted lean season food 
and nutrition assistance and post-lean season support to food-insecure households and vulnerable 
refugees affected by the El Nino phenomenon in the Sahelian belt of Chad’ was implemented from 
1  February  2016  until  mid-2017,  with  total  funding  of  EUR  20.7  million,  and  targeted  463,199 
beneficiaries. The case study focuses on Result 4 of the project: Cash-based food assistance for 
asset creation activities contributing to strengthening resilience and improving access to assets, 
including community and market infrastructures. The budget for this result was EUR 1.44 million. 

The main outcome of this resilience activity was that the majority of intended beneficiaries engaged 
in  the  action  were  able  to  meet  household  post-lean  season  food  security  needs  and  increase 
access to productive assets, which strengthened their resilience. Vulnerable households showed 
improved food consumption scores and testified to being able to immediately access food stocks 
to feed families thanks to the cash-based transfers, and improved their access to productive assets, 
which improved their prospects for facing the lean season in the medium term, including community 
assets created through the programme. However, a substantial portion of vulnerable communities 
and households initially targeted either did not benefit from the action or not to the extent intended. 
The whole Kanem region was not targeted as intended because it lacked productive capacity, and 
only  60%  of  households  received  post-lean  season  conditional  cash-based  food  assistance, 
because targets were downscaled due to lack of funding, and because fewer beneficiaries than 
expected participated in work programmes (7,720 out of 13,184). 

This resilience activity was designed by WFP through good planning and sequencing with a larger 
Sahel food security project and implemented through exceptional coordination efforts; however, 
some  targeting  required  prioritising  ‘productive  potential’  instead  of  humanitarian  needs.  WFP 

63 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

designed  the  resilience  activity  on  the  basis  of  participatory  planning  exercises  that  allowed  for 
prioritised  multi-year  action  plans  to  address  community  needs  and  build  resilience,  and 
appropriately selected the direct cash distribution modality. It also sequenced the activity to follow 
its much larger lean season food assistance activities, which contributed to improving food security 
in  the  region  by  late  2016.  Moreover,  WFP  implemented  the  activity  in  coordination  with 
communities and other large actors in the region (UNICEF, FAO), with the Food Security Cluster 
partners to reach more people, and with donors whom it mobilised to greatly increase funding for 
the action. However, WFP opted not to invest in resilience in the Kanem region due to a lack of 
productive potential and allowed resources to be focused on regions where resilience was more 
likely  to  succeed. While  this makes  sense  for  resilience  building,  it  poses  risks  to  humanitarian 
principles, which require assistance to be targeted on the basis of need alone.    

For  the  resilience  activity,  DG  ECHO  adapted  to  include  resilience  when  needs  assessments 
showed a greatly increased food security crisis. Initially, the HIP did not clearly promote resilience 
in Chad as a strategy and while the TA emphasised promoting resilience through LRRD, it said this 
should  be  done  only  where  appropriate  in  relation  to  humanitarian  principles  and  cost-
effectiveness. In proposal negotiations, DG ECHO accepted the WFP project’s rationale to prevent 
malnutrition among U5s and PLW as part of DG ECHO’s food security and nutrition response, but 
based  on  previous  WFP  underperformance,  negotiated  a  more  focused  WFP  response  and 
reduced  budget  (EUR  3  million)  without  including  any  resilience-building  activity.  However,  in 
response to greatly increased needs identified in early 2016, DG ECHO accepted three important 
modifications  to  the  project  design,  including  addition  of  the  resilience-building  activity;  these 
modifications increased the project's scope of action, beneficiaries targeted, and funding from DG 
ECHO  (which  increased  from  EUR  3  million  to  EUR  8.8  million)  and  others  (EUR  21.6  million 
contributed by other donors). Meanwhile, DG ECHO thematic experts analysed and approved the 
approach, field experts conducted monitoring visits with partners and DG ECHO noted substantial 
improvements in WFP implementation.      

In support of this resilience activity, the EU provided consistently strong humanitarian funding for 
Chad and an EU-wide policy guidance on resilience; but funding remained low overall, practical EU 
guidance on the HDN was not provided, and EU actors were scarcely mentioned in reporting on 
this  action.  In  2012,  the  EU  provided  a  policy  on  resilience  with  practical  guidance  on 
implementation  including  joint  analysis  by  humanitarian  and  development  actors.  However, 
European Council conclusions on the HDN were only defined in 2017, and these did not include 
practical guidance. The roles of DG DEVCO and the EEAS or the 11th EDF were not mentioned in 
reporting on this resilience action, so there is no evidence of DG ECHO-DG DEVCO collaboration 
to continue this resilience activity.    

Needs met  
A survey among DG ECHO stakeholders in Chad found near complete agreement (97%) that DG 
ECHO-funded actions ‘met acute needs’, and similarly broad agreement (88%) that it ‘met needs 
arising from conflicts' and 'met needs in food and nutrition crises', most of them strongly agreeing 
in both cases. In interviews, stakeholders generally reported that DG ECHO programmes met the 
emergency basic needs of the intended targeted beneficiaries, partly due to improved targeting 
through HEA and the CH. 

The  survey  found  less  agreement  among  stakeholders  that  EU-funded  actions  met  protracted 
needs or addressed disaster risks and epidemic diseases. Respondents gave diverging views on 
whether  actions  ‘met  protracted  needs',  roughly  split  three  ways  between  moderately  agreed 
(41%), strongly agreed (31%), and neutral or disagreeing (28%). They were notably less convinced 
that 'DG ECHO funded actions addressed risks of disasters and epidemics' in Chad, with a slight 

64 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

majority  agreeing  moderately  (44%)  and  a  relatively  large  portion  giving  neutral  responses  or 
disagreeing (34%). The strongest disagreement here came from donorship actors. In interviews, 
stakeholders generally agreed that the scale of needs in the general population and crisis-affected 
populations were such that ending need was not achievable.  

EU-funded  actions  contributed  to  positive  trends  in  meeting  acute  needs  in  line  with  the  HRP 
objective  2016-2018  to  ‘Save  and  preserve  lives  and  dignity  of  populations  affected  through 
integrated  and  multi-sectoral  emergency  assistance,  according  to  basic  rights  and  standards.’ 
According to relevant indicators, the number of people in severe food insecurity (CH phase 3+) fell 
significantly over 2016-2018 from 10.5 million to 5.1 million, and the percentage of ‘people in an 
emergency situation and in need of multi-sector assistance who benefited from a response within 
three months increased from 80% in 2017 to 100% in 2018 (HRP 2016, 2017, 2018). 

However,  EU-funded  actions  contributed  less  to  resilience,  as  indicators  suggest  the  response 
performed  less  well  on  the  Chad  HRP  objective  2016-2018  to  ‘reduce  the  vulnerability  of 
populations affected by reinforcing the resilience of communities and institutions, in order to better 
respond to and resist recurring shocks’. Data showed mixed results in strengthening resilience, 
with the number of people in food insecurity (CH phase 2) showing an increase from 2.8 million to 
3.2  million  and  only  40%  of  target  displaced  people  receiving  support  towards  self-sufficiency, 
although this represented steady progress over 2016-2018 (HRP 2016, 2017, 2018). 

EU-funded  actions  did  not  clearly  contribute  to  significantly  reducing  needs  in  Chad  during  this 
period. In 2014-2018, the total number of people in need of assistance grew from 2.87 million to 
4.4 million, albeit fluctuating from 3 million to 2.3 million in 2016, sharply rising to 4.6 million in 2017, 
and  then  slightly  dropping  again  to  4.4  million.  Humanitarian  risk  showed  an  increase  and 
worsening trend over the period, but also fluctuation and improvement in 2016 (i.e. a significant 
drop in hazard/exposure). Chad also showed a downward trend in ‘vulnerability’ until 2018, and 
less ‘coping capacity’ compared to neighbouring countries. 

Notable achievements 
Overall, a diverse range of DG ECHO achievements were identified in Chad. Some of the most 
significant achievements primarily cited across stakeholders included: DG ECHO’s scaling up of 
the nutrition response since 2014; DG ECHO’s Lake Chad response with IP start-up from scratch; 
DG ECHO’s response to the cholera outbreak in 2017; DG ECHO’s contribution to an improved, 
harmonised questionnaire and improved targeting; DG ECHO’s contribution to progress towards 
the  SSN;  DG  ECHO’s  support  to  some  key  health  facilities;  DG  ECHO’s  improved  vulnerability 
assessments  (particularly  among  refugee  populations);  and  DG  ECHO’s  more  adapted  and 
integrated  refugee,  returnee  and  host  vulnerable  inclusive  responses.  In  addition,  overall 
leadership  and  advocacy  achievements  were  considered  significant,  and  the  development  of  a 
shared  vision  with  DG  DEVCO  on  the  HDN  and  collaboration  with  extensive  stakeholders  to 
develop  the  HDN  pilot  (Programme  de  Développement  Inclusif  des  Zones  d'Accueil  au  Tchad 
(DIZA) and Project d'appui aux réfugiés et aux communautés d'accueil (PARCA)) were reportedly 
valued.  However,  it  was  also  recognised  that  progress  in  operationalising  this  has  been  slow. 
Conversely, key IPs were disappointed by the lack of  progress in expanding cash and voucher 
assistance (CVA) modalities.  

EU goals 
DG  ECHO  made  multiple  contributions  to  EU  goals  and  most  importantly  through  its  close 
relationship with DG DEVCO. Stakeholders indicated that DG ECHO has contributed to EU goals, 
including:  harmonised  and  improved  and  impartial  assessment  goals;  meeting  EU  advocacy 
commitments; development of a shared vision at the country level with DG DEVCO on resilience 

65 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

and the HDN; integrating refugees and returnees, and developing social cohesion through host 
inclusion; and some progress improving national plans and early warning, with support to clusters 
and coordination so that sector plans are more linked to national plans (Plan national de Réponse, 
Food Security and Nutrition, Plan de Développement, etc.). 

Stakeholders reported excellent and close collaborative relationships and a strong and shared DG 
ECHO-DG DEVCO vision, especially around resilience and the HDN at the country level. Indeed, 
the  greatest  progress  to  achieving  EU  goals  may  well  have  occurred  through  DG  ECHO 
encouraging  DG  DEVCO  to  move  closer  to  the  humanitarian  and  recovery  phase  of  the 
humanitarian-development  continuum  and  having  begun  to  trial  more  appropriate  small-scale 
development approaches that more closely impact upon beneficiaries at grassroots level. While 
the majority of DG DEVCO funding was allocated to larger-scale development infrastructure types 
of programmes (e.g. main road and water infrastructures, etc.), this move to test appropriate small-
scale resilience programmes was widely welcomed and applauded. Nonetheless, senior individuals 
at DG DEVCO HQ do not feel DG ECHO’s presence in a protracted development crisis is helpful, 
nor that its one-year funding fits a protracted paradigm, and that promotion of CVA modalities is 
misguided. 

2.6.  Advocacy 

EQ 6. How successful was DG ECHO’s advocacy?  

DG ECHO’s advocacy is judged to be reasonably successful in CA 2014-2018. DG ECHO 
promoted advocacy on various issues and some signs of success were noted, particularly 
at times of emergency and acute needs. DG ECHO often enjoyed a very strong advocacy 
position which at times could be further enhanced through its links to the EU delegation. 
However, DG ECHO advocacy was not always structured or strategic, and a mixed picture 
of success emerges across the countries.   

This assessment is concerned with DG ECHO’s strategy and the advocacy function. It considers 
whether  DG  ECHO  conducted  structured  advocacy  on  issues  in HIPs,  and  whether  there  were 
signs  of  success.  It  is  limited  by  the  absence  of  clear  advocacy  objectives  and  the  means  to 
measure them, as well as diverse meanings given to the term ‘advocacy’ by stakeholders. It relies 
mainly on evidence from stakeholder consultations.    

2.6.1.  Structured advocacy  

DG ECHO’s advocacy was not always structured or strategically conceived in CA. No systematic 
reporting on advocacy progress or results were found and, globally, DG ECHO advocacy at field 
level was found to be ‘individual, flexible and responsive’ but often ‘not joined up’ or ‘strategic’ (ICF, 
2018).  

In the HIPs, DG ECHO promoted advocacy on multiple and evolving issues in CA 2014-2018, such 
as increasing involvement by national governments and development actors in crisis responses, 
humanitarian  coordination,  LRRD  and  resilience,  International  Humanitarian  Law  (IHL)  and 
protection. For example, in 2016, 2017 and 2018 the HIPs mention in Chad and Cameroon that 
advocacy  would  continue  in  respect  to  LRRD/resilience/Global  Alliance  for  Resilience  (AGIR).  In 
2017, the HIP stressed advocacy was needed for IHL protection and regarding the expulsion of 
foreigners  with  no  status  determination.  In  2018,  the  HIP  mentioned  that  in  Chad  advocacy 
initiatives should emphasise the ‘forgotten crisis’ in the country, the Sahel food and nutrition crisis, 
and the CAR and Sudanese protracted refugee crises. In 2018, the HIP specified that ‘Advocacy 

66 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

has to be supported by appropriate resources, visibility and communication initiatives at the national 
and international level.’ 

2.6.2.  Advocacy achievements 

While DG ECHO’s advocacy showed some signs of success, the overall picture of success was 
mixed. In CAR, stakeholders polled tended to agree that DG ECHO advocacy was 'structured and 
effective', although most often agreed moderately (58%) and nearly a quarter (23%) gave neutral 
or negative views. Stakeholders perceived that DG ECHO’s advocacy success depended on its 
standing  as  a  lead  donor,  supported  by  its  field  presence,  its  seat  on  the  HCT  and  its  role  as 
observer on the Advisory Board of the Central African Republic Humanitarian Fund (CAR HF) – both 
of which were valued by HCT members and donors who were not present in country. 

In  CAR,  stakeholders  with  experience  of  DG  ECHO  advocacy  stated  that  its  most  important 
advocacy was to draw global attention to the CAR crisis and galvanise donor engagement, whereas 
more  recent  advocacy  was  centred  on  respect  for  humanitarian  principles.  In  2013-2014,  DG 
ECHO  advocated  firmly  for  the  triggering  of  an  ‘L3  response’,44  for  the  engagement  of  donors 
(through high-level visits and a Brussels  conference in 2014) and for improved coordination by the 
UN  system.  In  this  early  period  of  life-saving  emergency  response,  several  key  initiatives  were 
launched including the creation of the CCO, the mobilisation of RRM and advocacy for the creation 
of an EUTF which became the Bêkou Trust Fund. A consensus among CAR stakeholders was that 
notable  advocacy  successes  included  speaking  up  for  an  overall  increase  in  the  humanitarian 
response, and protecting the operating space for NGOs, which resulted in removing import taxes 
and government influence on NGO staffing. 

In CAR, some stakeholders felt that DG ECHO’s voice in these coordination fora diminished when 
DG  ECHO’s  funding  decreased,  the  situation  became  protracted  and  development  funding 
resumed. With  limited  government  capacities  and few  direct  relations  with  the  government,  DG 
ECHO’s  advocacy  became  directed  more  at  the  UN  peacekeeping  force  MINUSCA  (Mission 
Intégrée  des  Nations  Unies  pour  la  Stabilisation  en  République  Centrafricaine),  the  HCT,  and  IPs 
instead. The main targets were MINUSCA (to provide better security), insisting on the voluntary 
character of IDP returns to their host communities (which were promoted by government and some 
development actors), and improved civil-military coordination. 

In  Cameroon,  stakeholders  perceived  that  DG  ECHO’s  most  important  advocacy  was  to  draw 
attention to the CA refugee crisis and galvanise donor engagement, and centred on respect for 
humanitarian principles and minimum humanitarian standards. Successes were seen in the overall 
increase of the humanitarian response and in protecting the operating environment for INGOs, and 
reducing external government influence on NGO staffing. DG ECHO’s advocacy also showed signs 
of success at the local level in promoting access to care and protection.  

While DG ECHO’s advocacy was seen to be successful in Cameroon, it remained decidedly limited 
in coverage. DG ECHO did not act at the level of state structures, arguing that this was the mandate 
of the EUD, but found it could be effective at the local and regional levels. Two crucial problems 
prevented  real  integration  of  refugees:  first,  lack  of  access  to  land;  and  second,  freedom  of 
movement to use agriculture as a means of subsistence. Similarly, work remained to be done to 
support refugees who could not support themselves due to their lack of recognised status. 

In Cameroon, stakeholders suggested that further advocacy was needed on LRRD/resilience, IHL 
and  principles,  and  refugee  integration.  This  advocacy  would  require  appropriate  resources, 

44  Declaration  of  an  IASC  Humanitarian  System-Wide  Emergency  Response  (‘Level  3/L3’  Response)  activates  a  system-wide  mobilisation  of 
capacity (leadership, staffing and funding) to enable accelerated and scaled-up delivery of assistance and protection to people in need.  

67 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

visibility and communication initiatives at the national and international levels. Advocacy was also 
needed to address the problems of access to land, statelessness, promoting self-sufficiency and 
IGA. Concerted efforts were needed to advocate for principles-based actions, including with regard 
to the possibilities of repatriation or (re)integration of IDPs, as well as forced relocation. In the case 
of reintegration, a strong plea would be necessary on the granting of identification documents and 
for  access  to  land.  It  was  suggested  that  DG  ECHO  should  also  direct  its  advocacy  towards 
institutions and municipalities for the integration of displaced populations, equitable access to land, 
identity referencing to solve the problem of statelessness,  freedom of movement and legal trade.  

In  Chad,  survey  respondents  gave  diverging  views  on  whether  DG  ECHO’s  advocacy  was 
'structured and effective', most stakeholders agreeing moderately (44%) and many giving neutral 
responses or disagreeing, sometimes strongly (38%). In interviews, stakeholders generally gave 
positive views on DG ECHO’s advocacy, acknowledging DG ECHO as a lead advocate across the 
board and appreciating this. Still, there was some suggestion that the overall advocacy strategy 
was unclear and that achievements risked being undermined by DG ECHO staff rotation (without 
adequate planning); and there were some diverging views on advocacy achievements.  

Stakeholders in Chad reported that DG ECHO’s advocacy was focused on vulnerability targeting 
and the HDN. DG ECHO had played a lead role in advocacy efforts through its  IPs to promote 
targeting based on vulnerability criteria using the CH, and was considered a persistent advocate 
for addressing Chad’s protracted crisis as a development challenge, not just a humanitarian one, 
through structured discussions and HDN planning. DG ECHO was also reported to advocate for 
addressing malnutrition through national health systems and within DG DEVCO, and for mobilising 
resources and interest in Chad at regional and HQ levels. There was little advocacy reported for 
the use of cash-based transfers.  

In Chad, stakeholders agreed that DG ECHO’s advocacy to raise malnutrition on the health agenda 
within government and within DG DEVCO (at the country level) was an important step forward, and 
that  use  of  the  CH  across  almost  all  DG  ECHO  partners  was  a  key  achievement  in  advocacy. 
However,  questions  were  raised  about  the  effectiveness  of  DG  ECHO’s  advocacy  on  refugee 
rights, on improving the coordination and effectiveness of UN agencies, and on the use of cash. In 
response to a controversial government INGO tax decree, stakeholders looked to DG ECHO for 
leadership in opposing it.   

2.7.  Cost-effectiveness  

EQ 7. How cost-effective was DG ECHO’s response? 

The cost-effectiveness of DG ECHO’s portfolio in CA 2014-2018 is judged to be adequate 
with notable exceptions. Given the absence of a DG ECHO framework for managing cost-
effectiveness,  it  was  not  possible  to  assess  the  cost-effectiveness  of  EU-funded  actions 
beyond  case  studies.  One  case  study  shows  funding  to  UN  OCHA  can  contribute  to 
increasing  the  efficiency  of  the  humanitarian  response  by  making  critical  investments  in 
coordination.  However,  the  case  studies  also  raise  important  questions  about  the  cost-
effectiveness of some self-sufficiency and resilience actions; for example, when they were 
not followed up by coordinated development actions or their results were disappointing. In 
a  region  where  delivery  costs  were  relatively  high,  the  efficiency  of  DG  ECHO’s  wider 
portfolio  was  also  limited  by  DG  ECHO’s  limited  investment  in  local  and  national 
responders,  use  of  CVA,  and  flexible  funding  arrangements  such  as  multi-year  funding. 

68 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

Although  many  recurring  EU-funded  actions  were  funded  repeatedly  year  on  year,  they 
remained constrained by single-year funding and burdensome selection processes.  

This assessment is concerned with the cost-effectiveness of DG ECHO’s response in CA 2014-
2018.  It  considers  whether  EU-funded  actions  were  cost-effective  using  a  recommended 
methodology45 and, more broadly, it considers the DG ECHO portfolio compared with commitments 
made to strengthen efficiency through the Grand Bargain. It is limited by the absence of agreed 
frameworks for managing and reporting on cost-effectiveness at either project or portfolio levels. It 
relies on evidence from the three case studies, which are not highly representative of the wider 
portfolio, and stakeholder consultations.   

2.7.1.  Cost-effectiveness 

The recommended methodology for assessing cost-effectiveness in a broad sense is composed of 
specific  technical  definitions  of  ‘efficiency’  (‘how  well  inputs  are  turned  into  outputs’)  and  ‘cost-
effectiveness’ (‘the achievement of intended outcomes in relation to costs’). The core efficiency 
question is: ‘Does the project team deliver the outputs well, on time, and at the lowest possible 
cost?’ The bottom-line question in cost-effectiveness analysis is: ‘Was it worth it?’ 

The  CAR  case  study  shows  how  DG  ECHO’s  funding  to  UN  OCHA  in  2018  contributed  to 
increasing  the  efficiency  of  the  humanitarian  response  through  essential  investments  in 
coordination.  In  2018,  DG  ECHO  allocated  EUR  1  million  to  UN  OCHA’s  country  programme, 
representing 12.8% of its overall funding and double the DG ECHO allocation in 2017 – recognising 
that the HRP and UN OCHA’s operations in CAR were particularly poorly funded in 2018 as needs 
increased  in  the  country.  Given  its  mandate  and  Humanitarian  Programming  Cycle  model,  UN 
OCHA alone was capable of playing the required humanitarian coordination role and its costs were 
largely fixed by these mandated responsibilities.46 Without the UN OCHA action, there would have 
been insufficient prioritisation at the local level (sub-national planning) and national level (ICC and 
cluster-level  planning,  and  coordination  with  development  and  security  actors).  In  addition,  the 
HC/HCT  would  not  have  been  able  to  fulfil  its  leadership  mandate,  and  humanitarian  planning 
would  have  been  chaotic  in  the  absence  of  coordinated  needs  assessments  and  joined-up 
humanitarian actions. Further, UN OCHA in CAR was perceived to be notably cost-effective, due 
to the quality of its staff and a focus on ‘priorities within the priorities’ (see Case Study 1, Annex 3). 
If done well, coordination is widely considered to be a worthwhile investment, and this UN OCHA 
action  was  found  to  be  well  run.  On  this  basis,  the  UN  OCHA  operation  is  judged  to  be  cost 
effective. 

The Cameroon case study shows how DG ECHO’s funding to the Cameroon Red Cross/French 
Red Cross (CRC/CRF) in 2017-2018 raises questions about the cost effectiveness of such self-
sufficiency actions. In 2016, DG ECHO allocated EUR 500,000 to a CRC/CRF resilience project in 
the eastern Cameroon communes of Garoua Boulai and Betare Oya, aimed at supporting the self-
sufficiency  of  CAR  refugees  and  the  food  security  of  the  most  vulnerable  members  of  the  host 
population. Ultimately, the scope of the project was reduced to 7/8 villages to avoid 'duplication' 
with a government project, and the budget was reduced accordingly to EUR 472,050. The cost-
effectiveness of this action was greatly limited by the absence of other services available to the 
beneficiary  population.  Stakeholders felt it  was  not  cost  effective  to  provide emergency  support 
activities without exit strategies that allowed for achievements to be sustained’. A cost-effectiveness 
judgement, to the extent that one is possible here, rests on an unquantified comparison with the 

45 Study on Approaches to Assess Cost-Effectiveness of DG ECHO’s Humanitarian Aid Actions, ADE, August 2016. The Judgement Criteria and 
Indicators are taken from Table 9 in Annex A on page 52. The guidance that follows is based on Annex A, Section 2.3.2, and 2.4, pages 57-61. 
46 When considering the value for money of the OCHA action compared to other ECHO investments, it is important to recognise that OCHA’s services 
are not substitutable by other agencies: OCHA is the only organisation doing what it does, and it cannot abrogate that responsibility. So, from this 
perspective, the OCHA action cannot be compared to other IPs. 

69 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

counterfactual:  a  jointly  planned,  multi-year,  adequately  funded  humanitarian  development 
intervention involving sustained WFP support, engaged development actors with long-term plans 
to support self-reliance, and sustained support to local government, in particular, its agricultural 
extension departments. In the absence of such a thought-through, joined-up scenario, self-reliance 
outcomes  generally  were  disappointing  and  unsustainable  and  the  judgement  of  cost-
effectiveness, as it relates to the self-reliance outcomes, is that it was poor.   

The Chad case study shows how DG ECHO’s funding  of a WFP resilience activity in the Sahel 
region was not very cost-effective in itself but played a larger catalytic role in mobilising funding 
from other donors for the intended beneficiary population. In 2016-2017, DG ECHO allocated EUR 
8.5 million to a larger WFP programme to provide lean season food and nutrition assistance to 
food-insecure households and vulnerable refugees in the Sahel region of Chad, of which EUR 1.44 
million  was  allocated  to  a  cash-based  food  assistance  and  asset  creation  activity  aimed  at 
strengthening resilience of food insecure households that had received lean season assistance. In 
some ways, this was a relatively risky investment for DG ECHO, because the resilience outcomes 
were  difficult  to  attribute  to  WFP  resilience  activities  (when  other  factors  appeared  to  be  more 
important,  including  the  impact  of  the  larger  UN/WFP  cash  for  lean  season  intervention). 
Furthermore, investing in the WFP resilience activities achieved relatively mixed results, since a 
portion of initially targeted vulnerable communities and households did not benefit adequately or to 
the extent intended. Finally, the project posed a challenge to humanitarian impartiality, by targeting 
people in need on the basis of productive potential instead of needs alone, which was arguably a 
rational choice for resilience building. While the WFP resilience activities were relatively low in cost 
at EUR 1.44 million, such funding could arguably have been invested in addressing more acute 
needs  and  coordination  gaps  in  the  region  –  an  argument  frequently  made  against  resilience 
programming. However, it is also important to recognise that DG ECHO’s involvement in the larger 
WFP  response  played  an  important  catalytic  role  in  mobilising  larger  investments  from  other 
donors. The cost-effectiveness judgement implied by this analysis is two-fold: that (a) the action 
was not very cost-effective as it stood, but that (b) it influenced the design and funding of follow-on 
programmes which, it was reasonable to anticipate, would be cost effective. 

2.7.2.  Efficiency 

In 2016, DG ECHO and other signatories to the Grand Bargain committed to increase the efficiency 
and  transparency  of  humanitarian  action,  most  notably  by:  (i)  increasing  support  to  local  and 
national  responders  on  the  frontline;  (ii)  improving  the  use  of  cash;  and  (iii)  increasing  flexible 
funding.47 While the document review found no specific reference to cost-effectiveness in the HIPs, 
DG ECHO is known to lack a formal process to weigh the costs and benefits and value for money 
of  its  strategic  portfolio  choices  ex-ante  (e.g.  in  terms  of  types  of  partners,  sectors,  transfer 
modalities, consortium approaches, focus on DRR or LRRD) (ICF, 2018).  

In  CAR,  DG  ECHO  portfolio  efficiency  was  limited  by  funding  modalities  and  the  high  costs  of 
delivery (remote locations and weak local capacity). Stakeholders observed that longer-term and 
multi-year funding would allow for more efficiency, more predictability and reduced management 
costs  for  partners;  but  the  DG  ECHO  office’s  efforts  to  move  towards  two-year  funding  were 
constrained by DG ECHO’s annual HIPs and related funding processes. Stakeholders also noted 
that DG ECHO’s funding of multiple small projects contributed to a costly fragmentation of activity 
in CAR, which drove up management costs in terms of proposals, accounting and reporting for IPs 
(aggravated  by  DG  ECHO’s  tendency  to  reduce  initial  proposals),  while  DG  ECHO’s  efforts  to 
encourage formation of consortia did not produce the desired efficiencies. At the same time, the 
costs of delivery were notably high in CAR, and many partners also carried the fixed costs of stand-

47 The Grand Bargain (2016), A Shared Commitment to Better Serve People in Need, Istanbul 

70 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

alone  logistical  frameworks  and  several  subnational  offices.  Stakeholders  also  stated  that  the 
context in CAR was not yet conducive to wide-scale cash programming, although DG ECHO did 
support a cash experiment in 2018 with UNICEF.  

In Cameroon, DG ECHO’s portfolio efficiency was limited by donorship processes and by reportedly 
high delivery costs. Stakeholders reported that DG ECHO’s one-year funding and contracting cycle 
was  not  efficient,  and  neither  was  the  need  to  reduce  proposal  budgets  downward  for  certain 
activities. Delivery costs are also high in Cameroon and reaching populations in host communities 
was also more costly than in camps.  

In Chad, DG ECHO portfolio efficiency was limited by a lack of cash-based programming and multi-
year programming, and questions remained about whether resilience programming would deliver 
expected efficiencies in the longer term. Some stakeholders also observed that cash and voucher 
programming  remained  low,  whereas  DG  ECHO’s  advocacy  and  support  for  CVA  in  Chad  has 
been minimal; but its expansion could increase efficiency as evidence from elsewhere shows.48 
However,  the  suitability  of  cash-based  approaches  in  reducing  vulnerability  was  questioned  by 
some, with suggestions it could instead create dependencies. Stakeholders also pointed out that 
resilience actions could be more cost effective if attempted over more years, and that short funding 
cycles and annual delays reduced efficiency, in terms of hiring costs, reapplying and adjusting for 
extensions, and loss of essential staff and momentum. Almost all INGOs referred to the impacts 
on  cost-efficiency  and  -effectiveness  of  short  funding  cycles  and  emphasised  how  annual 
contracting delays significantly affected operations. Another factor mentioned was the high cost of 
assistance in Chad.  

2.8.  Funding  

EQ 8. Was the size of the budget allocated by DG ECHO to each country appropriate and 
proportionate? 

EU  humanitarian  funding  is  judged  to  be  possibly  sufficient  for  meeting  the  most  acute 
needs  in  CA  2014-2018.  EU  funding  for  CA  was  allocated  on  the  basis  of  global  needs 
assessments each year, fluctuated and generally increased when needs also fluctuated and 
increased  in  CA,  and  was  considered  sufficient  in  some  cases  to  meet  the  most  urgent 
needs in an emergency. Relative to other donors, the EU was the second-largest funder of 
humanitarian responses over the period, representing almost a fifth of all funding allocated. 
Compared to the global EU average and funding for other crises, the share of EU funding to 
CA was relatively high during 2014-2018.  

However, EU funding was not obviously proportionate to needs or appropriate to situations 
in each country. First, humanitarian responses remained consistently underfunded in CA, 
and unable to meet the needs of people targeted, let alone the total  number of  people in 
need. Second, the proportion of EU funding compared to people in need of assistance varied 
significantly  by  country  and  by  year,  and  the  amount  and  share  of  EU  funding  varied 
considerably among CA countries, with Chad receiving more than double that of CAR and 
triple that of Cameroon. Third, stakeholders in all countries were doubtful that DG ECHO 
funding was proportionate to needs, and in particular the chronic needs that affected each 
country.   

48 ADE (2016), Evaluation of the Use of Different Transfer Modalities in DG ECHO Humanitarian Aid Actions 2011-2014 

71 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

This assessment is concerned with the sufficiency of EU funding. It considers whether DG ECHO 
funding  allocations  were  proportionate  to  needs  and  appropriate  to  crises.  It  is  limited  by  the 
absence  of  a  clear  EU  policy  framework  by  which  to  determine  what  level  of  funding  is 
‘proportionate’  to  needs  or  appropriate  to  crises.  It  relies  on  combined  analyses  of  DG  ECHO 
portfolio data and Financial Tracking Service (FTS) data, as well as stakeholder consultations.   

2.8.1.  Proportionality to need 

EU  funding  for  CA  was  allocated  on  the  basis  of  yearly  global  needs  assessments. Worldwide 
decisions to allocate EU budget to humanitarian assistance in CA were informed by humanitarian 
risk analysis, using Integrated Analysis Framework assessments, and designations of ‘forgotten 
crises’,  using DG  ECHO’s  Forgotten  Crisis  Assessment  Index.  Thus, DG  ECHO  confirmed  that 
budget allocations were relevant to the needs of target populations and to objectives set, and were 
based  on  comprehensive  and  robust  needs  assessments.  In  addition,  16% of EU humanitarian 
funding was assigned to forgotten crises (including those in Cameroon and Chad), which exceeded 
that of all other donors, measured at 12%.49   

EU humanitarian funding to CA fluctuated and generally increased during 2014-2018, when needs 
also  fluctuated  and  increased  in  the  region.  The  portfolio  analysis  indicated  that  DG  ECHO 
allocated  a  total  of  EUR  499.9  million  in  humanitarian  funding,  and  annual  funding  showed  an 
upward trend. At the same time, EU funding clearly fluctuated year by year. From 2014 to 2016, 
the yearly total for CA rose steadily from EUR 76.9 million to EUR 118.1 million. In 2017 and 2018, 
the total fell slightly to EUR 111.4 million. In crude terms, this correlated with the upward trend in 
humanitarian  needs  in  CA,  although  fluctuations  did  not  necessarily  directly  match  fluctuating 
needs.    

The ratio of EU funding compared to people in need of assistance varied significantly by country 
and by year. In Cameroon, FTS data showed EU funding was equivalent to USD 7.25 per person 
in need of assistance over 2014-2018 as identified in HNOs; whereas in CAR the ratio was almost 
double that at USD 14 per person and in Chad it was as high as USD 17.9 per person. EU funding 
per person in need also varied in each country by year, dropping markedly in CAR from USD 19.5 
per person in need in 2014 to USD 8.6 in 2017; in Chad from USD 26.87 in 2016 to USD 13.57 in 
2018; and in Cameroon from USD 8.9 in 2017 to USD 4.73 in 2018.  

In overall terms, humanitarian responses remained consistently underfunded in CA, and unable to 
meet  the  needs  of  people  targeted,  let  alone  the  total  people  in  need.  FTS  data  indicates 
humanitarian responses in CA remained underfunded at less than 50% on average during 2014-
2018. Funding compared to requirements fluctuated in each country response, and seemingly in 
inverse proportion to each other – increases in one country appeared to coincide with decreases 
in another. Notable lows included just 36.6% of funding requirements met for Chad in 2014 and 
just  37.8%  for  CAR  in  2016.  Relative  highs  were  68.2%  met  for  CAR  in  2014  and  68.6%  for 
Cameroon in 2016.  

In CAR, stakeholders were generally doubtful that DG ECHO funding was ‘proportionate to needs’, 
with 63% respondents either neutral or disagreeing on this point and implementing actors notably 
more  doubtful  than  donors.  In  interviews,  stakeholders  agreed  that  DG  ECHO  funding  was  not 
sufficient given the humanitarian needs in CAR, where needs were among the highest in the world 
as a percentage of the population. Explanations given for insufficient DG ECHO funding included: 
that the CAR crisis was not attractive to the global media,  being of little strategic importance to 
Western powers and the EU and a lower priority than other global crises; DG ECHO funding was 

49  European  Commission,  10.01.2019.  Commission  Staff  Working  Document.  Executive  summary  of  the  comprehensive  evaluation  of  the  EU 
humanitarian aid, 2012-2016 

72 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

replaced by development funding, including the Bêkou Trust Fund; and donors were weary with 
the lack of progress (from either humanitarian or development funding). DG ECHO stakeholders 
also pointed to absorption and capacity constraints in CAR, suggesting that increased funding could 
not be disbursed with the same programme quality.  

In Cameroon, stakeholders agreed that DG ECHO funding was insufficient to address acute and 
protracted needs caused by the volatile situation and surrounding conflicts. While funding allocated 
to Cameroon was perhaps proportionate to the most urgent needs, it was not sufficient to address 
all ‘structural’ needs, including the food security and nutrition crisis. The funds allocated for the 
emergency response were sufficient in  the sense that they responded to the influx of displaced 
persons and, initially, to the stress caused by this influx. During the first two years of the crisis, 
camps were established and equipped, basic infrastructure was put in place, and basic services 
provided. The host villages were also serviced. However, later, responses deteriorated for lack of 
an  effective  cost  recovery  system  to  ensure  infrastructure  maintenance  and  service  continuity. 
Decreased funding was seen as a principal cause when assistance was channelled to the poorest 
without having had the time to integrate other beneficiaries and allow them to develop activities that 
would build resilience and livelihoods activities.  

In Chad, stakeholders were doubtful that DG ECHO funding was 'proportionate to needs', with 60% 
expressing neutral views, disagreeing or disagreeing strongly. Donorship actors were often more 
doubtful on this question. In interviews, stakeholders agreed that funding to the Chad response 
was not proportionate to the considerable needs that caused by both emergency and the chronic 
protracted  crisis,  and  responses  were  consistently  underfunded,  including  for  refugees  and 
UNHCR budgets. At the same time, it was acknowledged that DG ECHO managed to maintain a 
reasonable  level  of  funding,  which  increased  yearly  and  remained  comparatively  large,  despite 
appeals from other crises worldwide. Stakeholders attributed this to good advocacy and access, 
trust in the DG ECHO country team and IPs, and the good quality of needs assessments in the 
country.  By  one  view,  Chad  received  comparatively  more  EU  funding  than  neighbouring  crises 
because it was considered more likely to be well spent, a suggestion that raises questions about 
how much funding decisions were influenced by capacity factors compared to needs alone – as 
required by the principle of impartiality.   

2.8.2.  Appropriateness to situations 

Relative to other donors, the EU was the second-largest funder of humanitarian responses in CA 
2014-2018, representing almost one-fifth of all funding allocated. FTS data indicated that the EU 
share of funding to responses in CA 2014-2018 averaged at 17.3% and was second only in size to 
the United States, which on average contributed 39.5%. As a share of humanitarian funding, EU 
funding in CA grew steadily from 2014 to 2017, before dropping sharply in 2018, as a result of 
reductions in Chad and Cameroon. Funding to CAR remained lower and steadier as a portion of 
all humanitarian funding. 

Relative to other crises, the share of EU funding to CA was comparatively high on average during 
2014-2018. FTS data shows that EU funding as a share of the overall response funding was higher 
in CA than the global average, and to responses to crises in Syria and Yemen. While funding to 
CA averaged 17.3%, the global average was 10%, and the average for the Syrian refugee response 
was 13%, but lower for HRP responses in Syria (8%) and Yemen (6%). Still, in absolute terms, the 
EU  provided  notably  larger  funding  to  the  Syria  response  than  to  CA  2014-2018,  so  the 
Comprehensive Evaluation observed that the EU made strategic choices to fund specific regions 
(e.g. MENA and NEAR), leaving other regions with continuous needs with lower funding (ICF 2018).  

73 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

The amount and share of EU funding varied considerably among CA countries, with Chad receiving 
more than double that of CAR and triple that of Cameroon. In CAR, the EU provided a relatively 
small  share  of  overall  humanitarian  funding.  The  portfolio  analysis  shows  total  funding  to  CAR 
during 2014-2018 was EUR 115 million, which was half as much as in Chad (but slightly more than 
Cameroon). Analysis of FTS data indicated that the EU share of funding to responses between 
2014-2018 averaged 10%. In 2015, it peaked at 13%, decreasing to 10-9% in the following three 
years. In most years (2014, 2015 and 2017), EU funding was second largest to that of the United 
States; but in 2016 and 2018, it was third largest after the United Kingdom  (UK) and Germany, 
respectively. In Cameroon, the EU provided the lowest amount of humanitarian funding (EUR 98.76 
million) during 2014-2018. Analysis of FTS data indicated that the EU share averaged 12%, and 
while this share increased steadily during 2014-2017 to peak at 18%, it dropped sharply in 2018 to 
11%. During that time, it grew from fifth-largest source in 2014 to second largest in 2016-2018, 
behind the United States. In Chad, the EU provided the largest amount of funding (EUR 286.15 
million) during 2014-2018. Analysis of FTS data indicated that the EU share averaged 22% during 
2014-2018. It peaked in 2017 at 26%, then dropped to 22% in 2018. The EC share of funding was 
always second only to the United States.  

2.9.  Humanitarian coordination  

EQ9. To what extent did EU-funded coordination actions strengthen coordination? 

DG ECHO is judged to do a very good job of strengthening humanitarian coordination in CA 
2014-2018.  It  provided  relatively  strong  and  consistent  funding  to  coordination  actions 
across the region and in each country and played an active role in filling coordination gaps. 
DG ECHO allocated around three-fifths of its coordination funding to UN OCHA, providing 
smaller  amounts  to  a  few  others,  and  was  perceived  to  have  consistently  supported  UN 
OCHA’s  role  with  funding  and  advocacy  at  both  national  and  decentralised  levels.  EU-
funded  coordination  actions  contributed 
in  different  ways  to  strengthening  the 
humanitarian response, and DG ECHO’s contribution through support to coordination was 
widely recognised. Nonetheless, frequent gaps and fluctuations remained in overall funding 
to humanitarian coordination in CA 2014-2018, varying considerably between countries and 
over the years, with coordination in Cameroon tending to be notably less well funded than 
in CAR and Chad.  

This  is  an  assessment  of  EU-funded  coordination  actions.  It  considers  whether  EU-funded 
coordination actions addressed gaps in humanitarian responses, reinforced UN OCHA’s role and 
contributed  to  a  strengthened  overall  response.  It  is  limited  by  the  absence  of  clear  policy  and 
practical guidance on the EU/DG ECHO’s role in coordination or benchmarks by which this could 
be assessed. It relies on evidence from multiple sources, extends the discussion to consider DG 
ECHO’s  contribution  to coordination,  and  is informed  by  a  global  review  of EU’s  contribution  to 
humanitarian coordination, which is conducted alongside this evaluation.  

2.9.1.  Gaps addressed 

In  CA  2014-2018,  DG  ECHO  provided  relatively  strong  and  constant  funding  to  coordination 
actions. As elsewhere, DG ECHO played an active and purposeful role in filling coordination gaps.50 
Compared to funding required in CA, DG ECHO allocated a relatively large share of EU funding to 
meeting humanitarian coordination requirements compared to meeting direct humanitarian action 
requirements over this period. Data analysis comparing DG ECHO and FTS data found the EU 

50 Gaps are defined here as instances where there was a perceived need to strengthen coordination (geographic, thematic or both) for a specific 
facet of a response (see Part B – Review of DG ECHO’s Support to Humanitarian Coordination). 

74 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

provided a total of EUR 15 million to humanitarian coordination in CA 2014-2018, accounting on 
average for a 24.19% share of all funding for humanitarian coordination. By comparison, the EU 
provided 17% of all funding to the humanitarian response.  

Frequent  gaps  still  remained  in  funding  to  humanitarian  coordination  in  CA  2014-2018.  FTS 
analysis  showed  that  humanitarian  coordination  remained  consistently  underfunded  at  62%  on 
average compared to requirements (EUR 62.84 million vs. EUR 101.71 million) during 2014-2018. 
Moreover,  the  level  of  underfunding  for  ‘coordination  and  support  services’  varied  between 
countries over the period, with Cameroon only half funded on average (54%), largely due to an 
almost  complete  lack  of  coordination  funding  in  2014  and  2015;  and  the  others  around  three-
quarters funded, Chad at 71% and CAR at 78%. Coordination requirements were entirely covered 
(around 100% or more) only at times: CAR in 2014 and 2018; Cameroon in 2016 and 2017; and 
Chad in 2014.  

In CAR, DG ECHO provided relatively strong funding to coordination and was perceived to address 
gaps.  The  FTS  analysis  found  that  DG  ECHO  provided  the  highest  share  of  humanitarian 
coordination  funding  (EUR  5.1  million)  accounting  for  35.76%  of  the  total  during  2014-18.  DG 
ECHO  allocations  to  coordination  were  higher  to  CAR  than  other  CA  countries,  although  these 
fluctuated somewhat to reach a high of EUR 1.84 million in 2014 and a low of EUR 682,753 in 
2015. Stakeholders stated that DG ECHO-funded coordination actions addressed gaps, initially at 
the cluster level and later at the response level. In 2013 and early 2014, when most UN agencies 
and  UN  OCHA  were  evacuated  from  CAR,  DG  ECHO  itself  played  a  lead  role  in  response 
coordination.  

The  case  study  in  CAR  shows  how  DG  ECHO  supported UN  OCHA  in  2018  to  strengthen  the 
humanitarian  coordination  system.  UN  OCHA  activities  included  strengthening  coordination  by 
Inter-Cluster  Coordination,  HCT,  civil-military 
supporting  coordination  mechanisms  (e.g. 
coordination) at the national and decentralised levels and strengthening information management 
and  analysis  to  produce  a  range  of  products  (e.g.  3W  (Who  does What Where),  maps,  sit-reps, 
bulletins, dashboards, contact lists, etc.). In 2018, DG ECHO provided EUR 1 million in funding to 
UN OCHA in CAR out of EUR 7.5 million required, doubling its funding from the previous year in 
recognition  that  the  HRP  and  UN  OCHA  operation  in  CAR  were  comparatively  underfunded. 
According  to  UN  OCHA,  ‘DG  ECHO  funding  enabled  UN  OCHA  to  effectively  carry  out  its 
humanitarian coordination mandate in support of life-saving activities’.  

In Cameroon, DG ECHO provided important funding to coordination and was also perceived to 
address gaps. DG ECHO provided EUR 3.5 million for humanitarian coordination, accounting for 
22.36%  of  the  total  during  2014-2018.  Stakeholders  reported  that  DG  ECHO-funded  actions 
addressed  gaps  by  funding  UNHCR  for  refugee  response  coordination  until  2016;  then  partly 
funded  UN  OCHA  for  humanitarian  response  coordination  from  2016,  which  filled  gaps  in 
humanitarian coordination, and strengthened decentralised crisis-specific/operational coordination 
in the North and Southwest regions of Cameroon. 

In Chad, the EU provided the largest amount of funding to coordination, which was perceived to 
address  coordination  gaps.  DG  ECHO  allocated  the  largest  amount  (EUR  6.3  million)  for 
humanitarian  coordination,  accounting  for  19.21%  of  the  total  during  2014-2018.  Stakeholders 
confirmed that DG ECHO helped address coordination gaps at different levels – strategic, national 
and local – and participated actively in clusters and the HCT. DG ECHO supported and funded UN 
OCHA and cluster coordination, including the Food Security and Livelihoods Cluster throughout 
and the Cash Working Group until 2017. DG ECHO was a trusted and respected leader and advisor 
in  coordination  fora,  including  the  HCT  and  in  civil-military  coordination;  however,  donor 

75 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

coordination was considered to remain weak. DG ECHO was reported to encourage partners to 
coordinate their actions, although coordination between INGOs and UN agencies was limited and 
coordination among UN actors was considered very weak.  

2.9.2.  UN OCHA reinforced 

DG ECHO allocated the largest part of its coordination funding to UN OCHA in CA 2014-2018. 
Analysis of DG ECHO and FTS data indicated the EU provided a total of EUR 8.67 million in funding 
to  UN  OCHA,  accounting  for  57.8%  of  DG  ECHO’s  spending  on  humanitarian  coordination.  In 
contrast, DG ECHO allocated lower amounts to several other coordination actors, including the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM) (9%), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) 
(8%), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) (7%) and the CCO in 
CAR (6%).  

In CA 2014-2018, as elsewhere, DG ECHO was both engaged with and supportive of UN OCHA’s 
role in coordination at all levels (see Review of DG ECHO’s Support to Humanitarian Coordination). 
Across the countries, DG ECHO was perceived to have consistently supported UN OCHA’s role 
with  funding  and  advocacy  at  both  the  national  and  decentralised  levels.  In  CAR,  stakeholders 
concurred that UN OCHA’s role was reinforced by DG ECHO funding and advocacy. DG ECHO 
actively supported UN OCHA and the HNO/HRP processes through participation in the HCT. In 
2014,  DG  ECHO  was  instrumental  in  reshaping  the  CAR  Humanitarian  Fund  and  improving  its 
performance. While DG  ECHO  did  not  fund  the  HF,  its  participation  in  the  Advisory  Board  was 
valued by other donors who were not present in the country and increased their confidence. DG 
ECHO also encouraged UN OCHA to create sub-national coordination hubs.  

In  Cameroon,  stakeholders  reported  that  DG  ECHO  funded  and  supported  UN  OCHA’s 
coordination  role.  The HIPs  report  the  EU  supported  the  opening  of  an  UN  OCHA  office  in  the 
country in 2015 in order to strengthen coordination, although by 2017 efficient coordination of the 
humanitarian response was still an issue, particularly in the Far North region.51 Stakeholders also 
saw room for improvement in coordination between the various coordination roles of UN OCHA, 
UNHCR and IOM. In Chad, stakeholders reported that DG ECHO’s support reinforced UN OCHA's 
role at the national and local levels, including in civil-military coordination. 

2.9.3.  Strengthened response  

In CA 2014-2018, EU-funded coordination actions contributed in different ways to strengthening 
the humanitarian response and DG ECHO’s contribution through support to coordination was also 
widely recognised. This goes beyond most evaluations, which offer little evidence on the extent to 
which DG ECHO’s support to coordination strengthened responses overall, and in large part, this 
is characteristic of a larger attribution problem in humanitarian action (see Review of DG ECHO’s 
Support to Humanitarian Coordination). 

In CAR, the sample analysis found that DG ECHO consistently funded coordination actions that 
supported an improved humanitarian response. For example, from 2014 to 2018, DG ECHO funded 
UNICEF’s Humanitarian Rapid Response Mechanism Project (2014-2018), the only mechanism of 
its type in CAR, which in 2018 reached significantly more crisis-affected people (with assessments 
and interventions) than its initially planned target of 230,000 individuals, showing ability to adapt 
and scale up during periods of increased conflict-related displacement. It also funded the CCO, an 
INGO  coordination  committee  (2016-2018),  which  in  2018  was  recognised  as  an  essential 
humanitarian  platform  allowing for  strong  and  common  positions among  INGOs,  and  facilitating 
information exchange, coordination, communication and advocacy.  

51 DG ECHO. 13.7.2017. Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP). Year 2017. 

76 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

CAR  stakeholders  were  convinced  that  DG  ECHO's  support  to  coordination  strengthened  the 
humanitarian  response,  with  four-fifths  agreeing  and  most  of  them  strongly.  In  interviews, 
stakeholders  explained  the  overall  response  was  stronger  due  to  DG  ECHO  support,  despite 
enduring coordination weaknesses, and that DG ECHO actively helped to create and fund two of 
the most important coordination mechanisms in CAR: the CCO and the RRM. Previous DG ECHO 
support  for  co-facilitation  of  the  food  security  and  health  clusters,  and  for  a  common  logistical 
platform for NGOs, was also valued and was still missed by IPs. More recently, DG ECHO funding 
supported NGO security coordination and UN OCHA response coordination. And while there was 
not as much of a problem with overlapping funding, because there was so little funding, IPs were 
spread too thinly in multiple locations, without a clear, system-wide division of labour to enhance 
their efficiency. There was a continued need for better prioritisation in the HRP.  

The CAR case study showed how DG ECHO funding to UN OCHA contributed to a more coherent 
humanitarian  response.  As  all  137  humanitarian  organisations  in  CAR  engaged  with  and  were 
supported  by  UN  OCHA’s  coordination  mechanisms,  evidence  generation,  and  resource 
mobilisation and advocacy activities, they were able to plan and deliver a more coherent response, 
which provided emergency assistance to around 1 million people in need of assistance. Despite 
these efforts, the humanitarian response was not able to assist all 1.9 million people targeted, meet 
increased protection needs, or significantly reduce humanitarian needs and vulnerabilities. 

In  Cameroon,  the  sample  analysis  found  that  DG  ECHO  helped  to  establish  UN  OCHA’s 
programme in the country in 2015-2016, and consistently supported its humanitarian coordination 
and advocacy activities for multiple crises in the country during 2015-2018. In 2018, UN OCHA, 
now  with  sub-offices  in  Maroua  and  Kousseri,  supported  humanitarian  leaders  and  partners, 
allowing for a more effective and collaborative response. It developed a common understanding of 
the situation (including needs assessments and underlying development challenges, through 16 
joint needs assessment missions), created new information management products and rolled out 
civil-military coordination mechanisms in the North region.  

In Cameroon, stakeholders reported that DG ECHO supported humanitarian coordination through 
UN  OCHA,  which  in  turn  strengthened  the  response  during  2016-2018.  DG  ECHO’s  financial 
support  for  the  coordination  of  activities  by  UN  OCHA  strengthened  the  coordination  system, 
allowing UN OCHA to develop the HNO and HRPs and UNHCR to focus on the refugee response 
in the North region and camp management. IPs reported being more comfortable in the UN OCHA 
coordination system, which had been effective since 2016. During the large influx of refugees in 
Cameroon, UNHCR had struggled to coordinate the humanitarian response inside and outside of 
camps, and which had exceeded its mandate. After 2016, there was better coordination between 
UNHCR and UN OCHA mandates. Intended beneficiaries reported that coordination improved, and 
duplication  was  reduced  after  UN  OCHA’s  operation  began  in  end  2015-early  2016.  During 
interventions in the East region and Adamaoua, coordination by UNHCR had been inconsistent, 
centralised in Bertoua and remote from sites.  

In  Chad,  the  sample  analysis  found  that  DG  ECHO  consistently  funded  important  coordination 
activities. From 2014-2018, DG ECHO funded WFP’s Humanitarian Air Services in the country, 
and FAO’s Food Security Cluster (FSC) coordination support activities. In 2018, DG ECHO funding 
to FAO enabled the FSC to play its important role in the humanitarian response and deliver key 
functions:  it  promoted  nutrition  and  resilience  in  the  food  security  sector,  established  a  working 
group  on  coordinating  the  HDN  among  members  and  state  actors,  and  ensured  a  coordinated 
response to the lean season crisis in 2018.  

77 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

In  Chad,  the  large  majority  of  stakeholders  felt  that  DG  ECHO's  support  to  coordination 
strengthened the humanitarian response, with 91% agreeing and most of them strongly, especially 
implementers.  In  interviews,  stakeholders  specified  that  DG  ECHO  strengthened  the  response 
through: (i) good overall advocacy and involvement in coordination and selective funding of the 
more effective cluster sectors; and (ii) working strongly to push for improved quality, harmonised 
and  impartial  assessment,  and  vulnerability-based  targeting.  Many  suggested  that  coordination 
worked well, with DG ECHO playing an active role in the HCT and coordination advocacy, and a 
reliable  HRP.  DG  ECHO  funding  also  supported  better-performing  clusters  (Food  Security  and 
Livelihoods (FSL), WASH, protection), while weaknesses were pointed to in coordination of health, 
refugee response and latterly CVA.  

2.10.  Donor coordination  

EQ 10. How successful was DG ECHO in coordinating its response with other donors? 

DG ECHO is judged to be very successful at coordinating its response with other donors in 
CA 2014-2018. DG ECHO made consistent efforts to coordinate activities with humanitarian 
donors and increasingly with development donors. Its efforts often extended to providing 
informed leadership and advice to donors. These efforts helped to reduce duplication, but 
operational coordination remained a wider challenge in each country, and DG ECHO did not 
seek  to  fill  outstanding  structural  gaps  or  bring  together  other  donors  where  donor 
coordination mechanisms were absent.    

This  assessment  is  concerned  with  DG  ECHO  strategy  and  donorship  activities.  It  considers 
whether DG ECHO coordinated its response with significant donors, and avoided duplication and 
promoted  synergies.  It  is  limited  by  the  absence  of  clear  intentions  and  reporting  on  donor 
coordination. It relied on evidence from consultations with stakeholders and donors in particular.   

2.10.1.  Significant donors 

In CA 2014-2018, DG ECHO made consistent efforts to coordinate its activities with humanitarian 
donors  and  increasingly  with  development  donors.  DG  ECHO’s  efforts  to  promote  donor 
coordination, as well as its sustained presence and capacity in each country, strong partnerships 
and  operational  relationships,  and  good  information  about  needs,  meant  it  was  perceived  to 
exercise  a  ‘leadership’  role  among  donors.  As  a  result,  DG  ECHO  often  performed  a  de  facto 
advisory  function  to  other  donors,  so  its  inputs  in  terms  of  country  strategy,  partner  selection, 
technical expertise and project monitoring were not limited to DG ECHO’s portfolio, but also served 
a wider range of humanitarian and development donors. Inevitably, this advisory role came at an 
additional cost to DG ECHO field experts in terms of time and effort.  

In CAR, DG ECHO promoted donor coordination with significant humanitarian donors, most notably 
the Swiss Agency for Cooperation and Development (SDC), the UK’s Department for International 
Development (DFID) and the United States Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). At the 
country level, DG ECHO promoted operational coordination, division of labour, needs assessments 
and field visits among donors. At its HQ, DG ECHO convened the humanitarian ‘Friends of CAR’ 
group. Given the scale of humanitarian needs, DG ECHO saw its role in CAR as a ‘catalyst’ to 
increase  contributions  from  donors  by  making  use  of  its  good  information  about  humanitarian 
needs. ECHO also coordinated closely with the Bêkou Trust Fund, but its operational coordination 
with the World Bank and other significant development actors remained limited.   

78 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

In CAR, humanitarian donors clearly appreciated DG ECHO’s coordination and ‘leadership’ role, 
often  involving  DG  ECHO  in  project  selection  or  relying  on  DG  ECHO  partners  as  ‘approved’ 
partners. SDC made direct use of the HIP framework for selecting partners and project reporting, 
thus allowing DG ECHO to ‘leverage’ SDC funding worth more than CHF 10 million annually in 
2017 and 2018.52 DFID also highly appreciated DG ECHO’s coordination over the entire response 
period, starting with its lead role in the 2013 crisis; convening donor conferences in Brussels in 
2014 and 2016 and Friends of CAR meetings; reporting from HCT and CAR HF meetings (where 
DG ECHO ‘represented’ DFID interests); and providing logistical support during DFID visits to the 
country. When DG ECHO halved its funding to CAR in 2016, the largest donor, OFDA, tended to 
‘pick up’ IPs that were previously funded by DG ECHO in a process that was described as ‘organic’.  

In Cameroon, DG ECHO coordinated its response with the main humanitarian donors and also 
sought  to  coordinate  with  development  donors.  ECHO,  DFID  and  OFDA  reportedly  shared  a 
humanitarian  vision  for  addressing  the  most  vulnerable  populations  based  on  overall  needs 
assessments,  enabling  them  to  adopt  consistent  approaches  with  UN  agencies,  which  they 
considered to lack a common strategy. From 2016, DG ECHO also increased its efforts to build 
bridges  with  development  donors,  most  notably  DG  DEVCO  and  the  World  Bank,  through  its 
International  Development  Association  (IDA),  18  regional  sub-windows  for  refugees  and  host 
communities. 

In Chad, DG ECHO made considerable efforts to coordinate with humanitarian and development 
donors,  participated  in a wide  range  of fora,  and was  recognised for its  donor  ‘leadership’  role. 
Among humanitarian donors, DG ECHO managed DFID funding for the PHASE Sahel programme 
and coordinated strongly on resilience in the AGIR programme; these activities were considered 
so successful that a strategic joint funding partnership with DFID was discussed. DG ECHO also 
worked closely with USAID to share information about funding and operations. Among development 
donors,  DG  ECHO  coordinated  ever  more  closely  with  DG  DEVCO  and  the  World  Bank. 
Increasingly, a range of humanitarian and development donors consulted DG ECHO at proposal 
and project selection phases. However, DG ECHO’s leadership and advisory role also came at a 
cost in terms of staff time, estimated by one respondent at 10%.    

2.10.2.  Duplication avoided 

DG  ECHO’s  efforts  to  promote  coordination  with  donors  helped  to  reduce  duplication,  but 
operational coordination remained a wider challenge in each country. In CAR, DG ECHO minimised 
duplication  through  its  close  bilateral  relationships  with  the  main  humanitarian  donors,  some 
partners coordinated their own funding applications to donors, and the scale of needs also made 
duplication less likely. At the same time, donor coordination was complicated by the fact that most 
humanitarian donors were not present in CAR and their funding cycles were not aligned. In the 
absence of a division of labour among donors in geographic and operational terms, the response 
risked becoming less than effective and efficient. As the aid agenda shifted towards recovery and 
development, stakeholders reported a fragmented unstructured response, donor ‘cherry-picking’ of 
humanitarian projects, and a proliferation of micro-projects in different sectors.   

In  Cameroon,  ECHO  supported  efforts  to  avoid  duplication,  but  operational  coordination  was  a 
significant challenge over the period. Humanitarian coordination improved with the arrival of UN 
OCHA, but stakeholders highlighted continued duplication among humanitarian donors and across 
sectors; remaining gaps in other regions; and difficulties in harmonising DG ECHO, UNHCR and 
UN OCHA’s coordination systems. Despite weak and shrinking funding,  IPs pointed to frequent 

52 See SDC webpage on CAR: https://www.eda.admin.ch/deza/en/home/countries/central-african-republic.html 

79 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

duplication  in  operations  in  some  areas  (notably  the  East  region)  and  perceived  little  synergy 
among donors.   

In  Chad,  DG  ECHO  may  have  minimised  duplication  with  other  donors.  Donors  perceived 
coordination among humanitarian donors to work well enough, because they were relatively few 
and operationally focused and needs were so extensive. However,  IPs were more doubtful that 
operational  coordination  was  working  well.  Duplication  among  development  donors  was  also 
perceived to be minimised by HDN programming and DG ECHO’s collaboration efforts, but this 
was  not  necessarily  the  case  for  EU  member  states  with  significant  bilateral  portfolios  in  the 
country.  The  arrival  of  new  development  donors,  such  as  Turkey  and  China,  posed  similar 
questions  about  donor  coordination.  ECHO’s  work  to  promote  improved  quality,  harmonised 
assessments and targeting is anticipated to have long-term impacts on improving the targeting and 
reducing the likelihood of duplication of aid efforts. 

2.10.3.  Synergy promoted 

DG ECHO’s efforts to promote coordination did not fill outstanding operational coordination gaps 
or help to establish inclusive donor coordination mechanisms beyond its bilateral interactions with 
other humanitarian donors. In CAR, the absence of a humanitarian donor coordination group or a 
mechanism for joint donor planning was identified as a gap, leading to coordination challenges. It 
was suggested that DG ECHO was best placed to fill this gap by convening humanitarian donors 
with a commitment to Good Humanitarian Donorship.  

In Cameroon, increasing synergies between humanitarian and development actors was considered 
a priority. Gaps remained in terms of joint DG ECHO programming with DG DEVCO and the World 
Bank, and operational coordination by these donors with partners.    

In  Chad,  lack  of  a  mechanism  to  promote  operational  coordination  among  humanitarian  and 
development actors was considered a gap. Development and humanitarian coordination systems 
remained separated, because the main coordination mechanism involving development donors, 
the Committee of Technical and Financial Partners of Chad, focused on macro-economic issues 
and  its  different  thematic  groups  were  not  formally  aligned  with  humanitarian  clusters.  Further 
difficulties  were  reported  in  coordination  between  consortia,  DIZA  and  PARCA,  that  sought  to 
implement the HDN.  

2.11.  EU added value 

EQ 11. What was the EU added value of DG ECHO actions in Central Africa? 

DG ECHO is judged to provide clear added value for EU member states in CA 2014-2018. 
Beyond  the  humanitarian  donorship  capacities  of  any  individual  member  state,  in  each 
country  DG  ECHO  offered  a  sustained  presence;  a  highly  effective  portfolio  of  actions; 
unique field-based knowledge of needs, situation and context; applied field-based technical 
expertise; and a strong and principled advocacy voice within each country’s humanitarian 
response. Still, EU member states continued to implement their own portfolios across the 
region, which, taken together, matched DG ECHO’s in scale of funding. Member states also 
invested  relatively  little  through  DG  ECHO’s  External  Assigned  Revenues  (ExAR) 
contribution system.  

80 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

This assessment is concerned with DG ECHO’s strategy and its EU added value.53 It considers 
whether EU members perceived DG ECHO’s EU added value in terms of donorship processes and 
technical expertise, and whether member states used the ExAR contribution system. It is limited 
by a reliance on consultations with relatively few EU actors. It was enhanced by further analysis of 
DG ECHO and FTS data.   

2.11.1.  Technical expertise 

DG ECHO’s added value was largely defined in terms of know-how and technical expertise at the 
field level in CA. In CAR, EU member states clearly recognised DG ECHO’s added value. DFID in 
particular considered that DG ECHO was ‘central’ to a timely and effective emergency response in 
the country. Member states highlighted DG ECHO’s field capacity, active facilitation of information 
exchange  and  donor  visits,  and  the  availability  and  technical  knowledge  of  regional  advisers. 
Uniquely among donors in CAR, DG ECHO was able to directly monitor field-based projects outside 
of the capital during implementation. After 2016, EU added value also included the role of the Bêkou 
Trust Fund.  

In Cameroon, stakeholders perceived DG ECHO to add value to EU member states through its 
knowledge  of  the  context,  technical  know-how,  and  capacity  to  bridge  the  gap  between 
humanitarian and development actions. In addition, EU added value was perceived in DG ECHO’s 
regional  office established  in  Yaoundé,  its  technical  expertise  and  its  ability  to  adopt  a  regional 
perspective to address crises. 

In Chad, stakeholders perceived DG ECHO to provide significant added value to EU member states 
through its portfolio of actions, field expertise and advocacy role. Its portfolio of actions enabled a 
reliable and timely response with strong results that met basic needs. Its field expertise included a 
strong technical base, local field knowledge, and knowledge of context over time, which allowed 
other donors, including EU members, to use DG ECHO for ground truthing their own projects. Its 
advocacy role included advocating for needs assessment, for addressing underlying development 
issues through the HDN, and for improved quality and harmonised needs assessment for improved 
context analysis (for improved project planning) and more impartial targeting.  

2.11.2.  Funding processes  

While DG ECHO’s in-country technical expertise was highly appreciated, many EU member states 
continued  to  fund  their  own  humanitarian  portfolios  across  the  region,  which,  taken  together, 
matched DG  ECHO’s  in  scale.  According  to  FTS  data,  around  one-third  of EU  countries  (9/28) 
funded humanitarian activities directly in CA 2014-2018, contributing a total of USD 544.3 million, 
which was slightly less than DG ECHO’s USD 551.9 million. FTS data shows that Germany, the 
UK, Sweden, the Netherlands, France, Ireland, Denmark, Belgium and Finland each implemented 
humanitarian portfolios of various sizes across the CA countries. In Chad, total EU member funding 
outside  of DG  ECHO  was  relatively  small  at  USD 138.9 million  compared  to  DG  ECHO’s USD 
289.5 million. In CAR and Cameroon, however, EU funding outside of DG ECHO was relatively 
large at USD 289.6 million and USD 115.8 million compared to DG ECHO’s 146.6 and 79.1 million, 
respectively.  

53 The notion of ‘EU added value’ is derived from the EU principle of ‘subsidiarity’, defined in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. It aims to 
ensure that decisions are taken ‘as closely as possible to the citizen and that constant checks are made to verify that action at EU level is justified 
in light of the possibilities available at national, regional or local level’. Specifically, it is the principle whereby the EU does not take action (except in 
the areas that fall within its exclusive competence), unless it is more effective than action taken at national, regional or local levels. The key normative 
question is, ‘What would have been achieved by member states without DG ECHO/EU?’ 

81 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

2.11.3.  External Assigned Revenues (ExAR) 

Few  countries  availed  themselves  of  the  ExAR  contribution  system.  An  exception  was  the  UK, 
which  provided  around  one-sixth  of  its  funding  through ExAR.  The  document  review  found  that 
EUR 31.08 million was contributed in ExAR funding by DFID during 2015-2018, while FTS data 
showed the UK contributed a total of USD 176.1 million to CA over the period.  

82 

 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

2.12.  Sustainability 

EQ 12. To what extent did DG ECHO manage to achieve sustainable results of its interventions? 

DG ECHO is judged to be inconsistent in achieving sustainable results in CA 2014-2018. 
Most EU-funded humanitarian actions met DG ECHO expectations for increasing resilience, 
and demonstrated a widespread, wide-ranging and growing interest in increasing resilience. 
However, these strong efforts were not always found to be appropriate and raised important 
questions about the nature of DG ECHO's humanitarian focus, limited funding, and yearly 
planning and funding systems. Most importantly, EU-funded humanitarian actions across 
the three countries did not consistently establish exit strategies, and wider EU strategies to 
promote the sustainability of humanitarian actions were most often lacking. 

This assessment is concerned with EU-funded actions and their sustainability beyond DG ECHO 
funding.  It  considers  whether  EU-funded  actions  increased  resilience  where  appropriate  and 
established  appropriate  exit  strategies,  and  whether  DG  ECHO’s  strategy-level  measures  were 
considered to promote sustainability. It is limited by the absence of reporting on exit strategies.54 It 
relies on combined evidence from the sample analysis (including partner reporting on DG ECHO’s 
resilience marker), stakeholder consultations, and the case studies for Cameroon and Chad which 
looked into resilience.  

2.12.1.  Resilience increased 

Most EU-funded actions met DG ECHO requirements for increasing resilience in CA 2014-2018. 
The sample analysis found that the majority of proposals (42/58) included ‘an adequate analysis of 
shocks, stresses and vulnerabilities’, and most of them were ‘marked’ highly on this. A majority of 
projects  (43/58)  included  measures  to  build  local  capacities  (i.e.  of  beneficiaries  and  local 
institutions),  whereas  5/58  were  considered  insufficient.  The  majority  of  projects  (40/58)  took 
opportunities to support long-term strategies to reduce humanitarian needs, underlying vulnerability 
and risks. However, for the minority (8/58) these requirements were considered not applicable.  

The EU-funded actions demonstrated an increasingly prevalent interest in strengthening resilience 
over 2014-2018. The sample analysis showed interest among a diverse range of actors, whether 
focused  on  resilience,  emergency  response  or  coordination,  each  presenting  explanations  – 
sometimes  creative  –  as  to  how  they  increased  resilience  at  different  levels,  including  the 
household, community, local and/or national structures. In most cases, such interest also grew over 
the period. In 2014, for example, the FAO FSC coordination support project in Chad struggled to 
engage  members  in  a  ‘resilience’  working  group,  but  by  2017  it  planned  to  promote  resilience 
among vulnerable households and target 1.3 million people with resilience activities.  

Questions arose about the appropriateness of some of the resilience activities. Most notably, the 
sample  analysis  showed  that  DG  ECHO  frequently  questioned  and  challenged  IPs  on  their 
approaches to resilience, judging resilience claims to be unsustainable (e.g. 'substituting' national 
actors), inappropriate (e.g. in limited emergency response actions), or limited and mixed in their 
results. In some of these cases, adjustments were made and then recognised by DG ECHO as 
contributing to resilience. It is also worth noting that sample actions reported on resilience even 

54 Neither Single Form nor Fiche Op [Ops?] have included a section on LRRD since 2014, although HIPs continue to make systematic reference to 
LRRD under section 4. It is assumed that LRRD reporting requirements by actions were replaced by the resilience marker, although LRRD is often 
conceived as a linear ‘continuous’ process and resilience as complex and ‘contiguous’ one.     

83 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

while  also  stating  resilience  was  ‘not  applicable’.  More  broadly,  it  was  clear  that  resilience  was 
being given a wide range of different practical meanings, begging the question: what are the limits 
to this expansive concept?   

In  CAR,  stakeholders  agreed  that  DG  ECHO  promoted  resilience,  but  some  questioned  its 
‘humanitarian’ appropriateness. In the survey, more than half agreed, often quite moderately, that 
DG  ECHO's  programme  'promoted  resilience  where  appropriate'.  In  interviews,  stakeholders 
explained  that  DG  ECHO  emphasised  resilience  in  the  HIPs  from  2016  onwards,  promoting 
resilience through its funded projects and linkages to the Bêkou Trust Fund. DG ECHO’s support 
to integrated multi-sector projects was also regarded as favouring resilience, as well as support to 
education and efforts to use two-year projects. Stakeholders generally felt that promoting resilience 
was good humanitarian practice, and highly appropriate to CAR where humanitarian needs and 
development deficits were often difficult to differentiate. Some partners even felt DG ECHO was 
too inflexible in allowing resilience activities and engaged too little with the government. However, 
a  notable  minority  of  ‘pure  humanitarian’  stakeholders  felt  that  resilience  was  not  DG  ECHO’s 
comparative advantage, and risked diverting DG ECHO from its humanitarian focus in CAR when 
the  Bêkou  Trust  Fund  and  other  instruments  were  better  placed  to  increase  resilience.  This 
represented an important strategic dilemma for DG ECHO.   

In  Cameroon,  stakeholders  agreed  that  DG  ECHO  promoted  resilience,  but  resilience  proved 
difficult to implement in practice. Stakeholders agreed the DG ECHO strategy encouraged partners 
to  propose  resilience  activities,  which  focused  on  self-sufficiency,  livelihoods,  IGA  and  multi-
sectoral action to address food insecurity. The document review found that by 2017, DG ECHO 
prioritised  self-reliance  activities  for  CAR  refugees  in  eastern  Cameroon,  and  livelihoods  for 
displaced people and affected local communities in the Far North region. However, beneficiaries 
reported  that  livelihoods  and  self-sufficiency  activities  at  the  household  level  were  not  always 
included  in  partner  project  designs  when  beneficiaries  lacked  basic  capacities  for  resilience, 
especially  refugees  without  access  to  land,  mobility  and  identity  documents.  The  case  study 
showed  how  a  DG  ECHO-funded  FRC  project  in  eastern  Cameroon  generated  some  positive 
outcomes to reduce vulnerabilities and increase resilience among host populations and refugees, 
but implementation was undermined by the unexpected suspension of WFP food rations, outcomes 
for refugees were notably less positive than for host populations, and its cost-effectiveness was 
somewhat questionable. 

In  Chad,  most  stakeholders  agreed  that  DG  ECHO's  programme  'promoted  resilience  where 
appropriate',  with  two-thirds  expressing  mostly  moderate  agreement.  For  example,  DG  ECHO 
funded ACTED to implement a project that supported beneficiaries through small-scale IGA, which 
helped them to make a sufficient living, meeting some rent and food needs. The case study in Chad 
also  showed  how  WFP  contributed  to  resilience  in  Chad’s  Sahel  belt  through  cash-based 
assistance  for  asset  creation  targeted  at  food  insecure  households.  However,  a  third  of 
stakeholders  were  clearly  doubtful  that  DG  ECHO  promoted  resilience  appropriately,  stating  in 
interviews that DG ECHO’s limited budget should focus on lifesaving activities and its short-term 
annual  funding  cycles  were  unsuited  to  resilience  activities.  In  the  case  study,  the  DG  ECHO-
funded WFP resilience activity raised questions about appropriateness as it required prioritising 
vulnerable beneficiaries with more ‘productive potential’ than others who were judged to be equally 
vulnerable. Its cost-effectiveness was also questionable.  

2.12.2.  Exit strategies 

EU-funded  humanitarian  actions  did  not  consistently  establish  appropriate  exit  strategies  in  CA 
2014-2018.  In  CAR, EU-funded  actions often  did  not  include  exit  strategies.  Stakeholders  were 
mostly  unconvinced  that  DG  ECHO  partners  established  exit  strategies  with  almost  two-thirds 
84 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

(63%)  expressing  neutral  or  negative  views,  and  most  agreement  being  moderate.  In  some 
situations, DG ECHO planned an orderly handover to the Bêkou Trust Fund, which was seen as a 
good practice, but this was only possible in locations and sectors covered by the Bêkou Trust Fund 
(food security, health, education). Most often, DG ECHO was perceived to leave without handing 
over to another donor; since it focused funding each year on localised ‘hotspots’ and needs were 
rarely fully met, the partner simply sought funding from another donor. In the words of one partner, 
‘DG ECHO is a fire engine and does not really think about follow-up or next steps.’ More broadly, 
CAR stakeholders concurred that it  was too early to speak of any humanitarian exit from CAR, 
because  acute  needs  continued  to  emerge,  protracted  needs  remained  in  stable  areas,  and 
development support remained insufficient.  

In Cameroon, some EU-funded actions sometimes included exit strategies, but this was not always 
the case. Stakeholders pointed to exit strategies for various crises: in the East region, PROACT II, 
an EU programme was expected to provide access to land, freedom of movement, and commune-
based responses with World Bank funding. In the North/Far North regions, DG ECHO’s strategy, 
especially in the health sector, was to handover to EUDs under Acteurs non Etatiques et Autorités 
Locales dans le Développement (ANE/AL) or directly to the Ministry of Health and had reportedly 
mobilised  EUR  20  million  through  the  ANE/AL  and  related  EUTF  instrument.  Nonetheless, 
beneficiaries  consulted  in  the  East  region  felt  insufficiently  informed  about  exit  strategies  and 
transitions towards development projects, and the case study found no evidence of an exit strategy 
for  the  EU-funded  FRC  project  to  strengthen  self-reliance  among  refugees  and  hosts,  and 
demonstrated how DG ECHO funding alone was too limited to increase self-reliance without the 
engagement of development actors.  

In Chad, the need for more effective exit strategies was highlighted. Stakeholders mostly doubted 
that DG ECHO partners 'established exit strategies', with more than half giving neutral responses 
or disagreeing, including some donors who disagreed strongly that exit strategies were in place. In 
interviews, stakeholders reported that DG ECHO had helped to promote and establish improved 
exit strategies through promoting resilience in its funded actions and by encouraging DG DEVCO 
to  target  more  funding  at  beneficiary-level  resilience  activities  that  could  support  effective  exit 
strategies. However, few stakeholders had a detailed understanding of the full extent of the HDN 
or the exit strategies that DG ECHO was promoting. It was also observed that DG ECHO one-year 
project timeframes required ‘exiting too quickly,’ which meant some people could ‘fall through gaps 
or get left behind’, and that even three-year HDN approaches could be too short in Chad, where 
promoting resilience or developing sustainable exit strategies for international humanitarian actors 
remained extremely challenging.  

2.12.3.  Larger measures 

The EU, DG ECHO and partners lacked systematic strategies to promote the sustainability of EU-
funded  humanitarian  actions  in  CA  2014-2018.  Evidence  collected  suggests  that  strategy-level 
measures,  including  targeted  community  development  initiatives  funded  by  the  EU  and  EUTFs, 
were developed from 2016 in each country. While these offered the prospect of more sustainable 
results for EU-funded humanitarian actions, few were during 2016-2018 (see EQ 13 below).  

85 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

2.13.  Humanitarian-Development Nexus (HDN) 

EQ 13. How successful were DG ECHO measures to coordinate the EU's humanitarian and 
development actions? 

The success of DG ECHO measures to coordinate the EU’s humanitarian and development 
actions  cannot  be  adequately  assessed  in  CA  2014-2018.  On  the  positive  side,  there  is 
evidence  that  DG  ECHO  consistently  took  measures  to  coordinate  EU  humanitarian  and 
development activities, making well-recognised efforts in all three countries, and taking a 
lead role in coordinating Chad’s HDN pilot exercise. At the same time, the division of roles 
and responsibilities between DG ECHO and DG DEVCO was often unclear, shared targets 
and  monitoring  frameworks  were  lacking,  and  risks  were  highlighted  about  diverting 
resources  from  acute  needs  and  humanitarian  priorities.  Most  importantly,  there  was  no 
evidence  available  to  show  that  measures  taken  resulted  in  reduced  needs,  reduced 
vulnerability or reduced fragility in CA.  

This  assessment  is  concerned  with  DG  ECHO  strategy.  It  considers  whether  DG  ECHO  took 
measures  to  coordinate  the  EU’s  humanitarian  and  development  actions  and  whether  these 
measures  demonstrated successes  at  reducing  needs,  vulnerability  and  fragility.  It  is  limited  by 
most  HDN  activities  in  CA  remaining  at  nascent  stages,  and  the  absence  of  joint  monitoring 
frameworks and systems to measure their progress. It relies mainly on evidence from stakeholder 
consultations.  

2.13.1.  Measures taken 

DG ECHO consistently took measures to coordinate EU humanitarian and development activities 
in CA 2014-2018. The document review found DG ECHO repeatedly sought to coordinate with EU 
development actions. In 2014, all HIPs pledged to coordinate EU humanitarian and development 
actions. During 2015-2018, HIPs highlighted ongoing efforts in coordinating EU humanitarian and 
development actions. However, the review of HIPs offered little insight into how successful they 
were and little detail about specific interactions with DG DEVCO. 

In  CAR,  stakeholders  tended  to  agree  that  'DG  ECHO  coordinated  its  activities  with  EU 
development actors', with almost two-thirds in agreement. In interviews, stakeholders noted that 
DG ECHO cooperated very constructively in the design and operationalisation of the EU’s Bêkou 
Trust Fund for CAR, which was launched in July 2014 to support the country's exit from crisis and 
reconstruction, and received pledges of EUR 146 million by end 2016, the majority from the EU 
budget and the EDF. From 2014, DG ECHO actively advocated for the creation of the Bêkou Trust 
Fund. It remained engaged and began working more closely with the Bêkou Trust Fund in 2017, 
especially at the country level, and each participated in the upstream annual planning of the other.  

This led to notable examples of activities handed over from DG ECHO to the Bêkou Trust Fund: 
the ALIMA project; planned complementary actions such as the resettlement of IDPs from M’Poko 
camp; preparations in 2018 for the scale-up of the Bêkou Trust Fund in some areas as DG ECHO 
scaled back; and, in early 2019, DG ECHO facilitated joint planning between UN OCHA/CAR HF 
and the Bêkou Trust Fund in the Southeast region. Despite difficult circumstances, the Bêkou Trust 
Fund made positive achievements, with most projects delivering their expected outputs.55 However, 
addressing CAR refugees in neighbouring countries was an area of divergence between DG ECHO 
and DG DEVCO at Brussels level, with DG DEVCO considering that CAR refugees in Chad were 

55 European Court of Auditors, 2017. Special Report. The Bêkou EU trust fund for the Central African Republic: a hopeful beginning despite some 
shortcomings 

86 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

a  humanitarian  caseload  and  DG  ECHO’s  responsibility,  while  DG  ECHO  considered  them  a 
protracted ‘development-like’ situation to be supported by DG DEVCO and possibly via the Bêkou 
Trust Fund.  

In  Cameroon,  HIPs  consistently  reported  DG  ECHO’s  intentions  to  collaborate  with  EU 
development  actors  to  coordinate  humanitarian  and  development  activities.  In  2017  and  2018 
complementarity and coordination between humanitarian and longer-term interventions financed 
by the EUTF continued to be sought, including joint identification of relevant resilience actions. In 
November  2018,  EUR  5  million  was  mobilised  under  the  PRO-ACT  Decision  to  improve  the 
resilience of local communities with income-generating opportunities in regions affected by the CAR 
crisis. Under the EUTF for Africa, four actions to promote resilience and youth employment worth 
a total of EUR 37 million were ongoing in the Far North, North and Adamawa Regions in 2018. In 
the National Indicative Programme (2014-2020), which defines strategic goals and priorities for EU 
development funding, DG ECHO was expected to continue working in complementarity with EU 
development actors, especially in rural development, food security, water and nutrition.56  

Stakeholders in Cameroon noted that DG ECHO strengthened coordination with DG DEVCO and 
other development actors in several areas. Both recognised the absence of refugee self-reliance 
and prospects for solutions, with DG ECHO promoting the HDN approach for strategic solutions to 
vulnerabilities, resilience and livelihood challenges. They also worked to implement EU HDN policy, 
developing  synergies  and  mutually  reinforcing  work,  which  was  partly  enabled  by  DG  ECHO’s 
Regional Office and its strong technical capacities. This also allowed DG ECHO to focus its portfolio 
on emergency responses to evolving emergency needs in the country, while seeking to bridge post-
emergency situations with development assistance. Looking ahead, DG ECHO and DG DEVCO 
intended to collaborate on RPBAs and World Bank IDA 2018 funding flows, although no collective 
implementation and outcome measurement was planned.  

However,  stakeholders  in  Cameroon  felt  that  coordination  between  EU  humanitarian  and 
development actions often remained poor in practice. Stakeholders observed that DG ECHO, DG 
DEVCO and EEAS lacked a shared data platform, did not provide pooled funds and trust funds to 
help partners develop HDN strategies, and that DG ECHO should integrate HDN and IDA 2018-
piloting countries like Cameroon in an ‘integrated approach’. Equally, stakeholders suggested DG 
ECHO should be trying to fund partners to get into this HDN process rather than funding isolated 
actions. According to IPs, DG ECHO and DG DEVCO must be the engine of concerted and joint 
emergency actions and develop a better ‘shift to development’. The case study showed how the 
DG  ECHO-funded  FRC  action  in  the  East  region  struggled  to  strengthen  refugee  self-reliance, 
without political and development actors being involved from the outset in working towards durable 
solutions. 

In Chad, stakeholders were clearly convinced that DG ECHO 'coordinated its activities with EU 
development actors', with three-quarters agreeing and almost half agreeing strongly. Stakeholders 
explained that DG ECHO was involved in multiple HDN-related activities, including the DIZA57 and 
PARCA58 initiatives. The document review also found that in 2015 the HIP spoke of ‘outstanding 
collaboration’ between DG ECHO and the EUD to plan a smooth transition between humanitarian 
projects and projects addressing structural root causes in food security and nutrition sectors, and 

56 République du Cameroun. Union Européenne, 11ème Fonds Européenne de Développement. Programme Indicatif National, 2014-2020. 
57 DIZA is an EUTF-funded programme with a budget of EUR 15 million aimed at improving living conditions for host populations, refugees and 
returnees in southern Chad through support to local inclusive development. It was launched in December 2017 and is implemented through UNHCR 
and NGO partners. https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/sites/euetfa/files/t05-eutf-sah-td-07-diza_vf.pdf 
58 PARCA is a World Bank approved grant of USD 60 million to help Chad improve access to basic social services and livelihoods for refugees and 
host communities, and strengthen national refugee management systems 
https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2018/09/12/chad-a-60-million-world-bank-grant-to-support-refugees-and-host-communities 

87 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

during  2016-2018,  the  HIPs  spoke  of  ongoing  efforts  to  coordinate  LRRD  efforts  with  the 
Resilience/AGIR agenda and interventions financed by the EUTF for Africa.  

In 2017, Chad was selected by the EU as a pilot country for operationalising the HDN. Stakeholders 
reported the pilot was being implemented through the DIZA and PARCA initiatives. In implementing 
the HDN pilot, it was reported that DG ECHO took the lead on advising and coordinating, including 
by funding the FSL cluster and support to an ‘HDN working group’, while DG DEVCO for its part 
provided  most  of  the  funding  for  implementation.  Most  stakeholders  agreed  the  DIZA/PARCA 
approach was ‘a step in the right direction’ towards developing a coordinated HDN approach.  

However, the HDN pilot exercise also raised important questions about humanitarian opportunities 
and risks for DG ECHO. First, some stakeholders considered the EUR 15-million budget for DIZA 
to be too small and limited in geographic scope compared to needs, and some questioned whether 
the approach would work in practice as intended to reduce vulnerability. Second, others noted an 
absence of shared EU HDN targets, unclear division of responsibilities, and continued structural 
barriers between DG ECHO, DEVCO and EEAS. DG ECHO was well placed to ‘lead’ the initiative, 
but it required dedicated resources given the ‘intensive’ efforts involved, and some perceived a low 
level of collaboration by DG DEVCO. Third, humanitarian partners were concerned that DG ECHO 
investment in the HDN agenda would dilute the humanitarian programme, diverting funding from 
acute needs and leading to overstretch of limited EU humanitarian funding.  

2.13.2.  Demonstrated success 

By  early  2019,  there  was  little  evidence  yet  that  DG  ECHO  measures  to  coordinate  with 
development actors have resulted in reduced needs, reduced vulnerability or reduced fragility in 
CA.  Stakeholders  surveyed  in  Chad  were  more  convinced  than  those  in  CAR  that  HDN  efforts 
'helped  to  reduce  needs',  but  the  HDN  pilot  in  Chad  lacked  a  shared  results  framework  or 
mechanism for monitoring progress, and there was no evidence reported to date of reduced needs 
or vulnerabilities. It was suggested that these efforts would show results in years ahead because 
HDN activities in Chad began only in 2018 and required a longer time frame to show results than 
actions to meet acute needs. Some stakeholders would need to be convinced with evidence of 
results that the HDN approach was working in practice.  

2.14.  EQ assessments 

Figure 3: Star graph of EQ assessments 

An  assessment  of  performance  under  each 
EQ has been carried out on the basis of the 
main  findings  presented  above.  Each  EQ 
area has been given a score of 1-5 (5 being 
highest) to highlight areas of strength based 
on the evidence analysed within the scope of 
this  evaluation.  These  scores  have  been 
illustrated in Figure 3 as a star graph below. 
These  should  be  considered  indicative  only 
as they draw on the judgement of qualitative 
and  quantitative  data,  and  evaluation  users 
are  encouraged  to  review  specific  findings 
and analysis in the previous sections, as well 
and 
as 
recommendations  of  the  report,  as  the  ratings  are  only  intended  as  a  graphic  way  of  better 
understanding the qualitative assessments.  

conclusions 

final 

the 

88 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

3.  Conclusions 

This section provides conclusions, drawing on the main findings in the evaluation. It identifies the 
key strengths and challenges for EU humanitarian interventions in CA 2014-2018, addressing the 
question: ‘How could EU humanitarian interventions in CA be improved?’ 

3.1.  Key strengths  

3.1.1.  Addressing acute needs 

A  first  key  strength  of  European  Union  (EU)  humanitarian  interventions  was  their  important 
contribution to addressing acute needs in Central Africa (CA) 2014-2018. This contribution began 
with the annual input of EU humanitarian funding investments worth EUR 499.9 million over the 
period aimed at addressing the needs of the most vulnerable populations in CA, allocated based 
on global needs assessments, and roughly proportionate to meeting acute emergency needs. The 
contribution depended on Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid 
(DG  ECHO)’s  technical  inputs  of:  (i)  strategic  direction  developed  through  an  iterative  and 
consultative process at country level involving partners which allowed maximum flexibility to tailor 
strategies to changing needs; (ii) selection, funding and monitoring of humanitarian actions that 
supported  multi-sector  emergency  responses  in  each  country  with  a  strong  emphasis  on  food 
security  and  nutrition;  and  (iii)  support  to  humanitarian  coordination  over  the  period,  providing 
strong  and  consistent  funding  to  coordination  actions,  addressing  coordination  gaps,  and 
consistently supporting the role of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs  (UN  OCHA)  with  funding  and  advocacy.  It  also  depended  critically  on  the  activities  of 
implementing  partners  (IPs)  who  delivered  intended  results  across  the  region  to  recognised 
standards,  and  on  coordination  actors  who  supported  more  effective  and  efficient  humanitarian 
responses. As a result, DG ECHO enabled humanitarian actors to collectively ‘reach’ the majority 
of people in need each year and meet their acute needs. In each country, DG ECHO also made 
notable contributions to meeting acute needs (e.g. playing a key role in mobilising timely responses 
to the crisis in the Central African Republic (CAR) in 2013-2015, refugee crises in Cameroon’s East 
and North regions, and the ongoing Lake Chad crisis in Chad).   

3.1.2.  Strengthening humanitarian responses 

A  second  key  strength  of  EU  humanitarian  interventions  in  CA  were  contributions  made  to 
strengthening  humanitarian  responses  in  each  country.  DG  ECHO  did  a  very  good  job  of 
strengthening humanitarian coordination over the period, providing strong and consistent funding 
to coordination actions, increasingly addressing coordination gaps at the country response level 
and  local  crisis-specific  level,  and  consistently  supporting  UN  OCHA's  role  with  funding  and 
advocacy.  DG  ECHO  consistently  supported  country-based  response  strategies  outlined  in 
Strategic  Response  Plans  (SRPs)/Humanitarian  Response  Plans  (HRPs)  which  aimed  to  meet 
needs in a coordinated manner, and in Cameroon, DG ECHO helped to establish the UN OCHA 
programme in 2015 when effective coordination was lacking. DG ECHO also provided important 
support to other coordination mechanisms, including the INGO coordination committee (CCO) and 
Rapid Response Mechanism in CAR and the Food and Agriculture Organization-led Food Security 
Cluster in Chad. In CAR, DG ECHO’s support to UN OCHA in 2018 showed how making critical 
investments  in  coordination  could  contribute  to  increasing  the  efficiency  of  the  humanitarian 
response. Similarly, across other humanitarian responses worldwide, DG ECHO invested strong 
and consistent funding in humanitarian coordination activities, most of it in support of Inter-Agency 
Standing Committee coordination mechanisms at the country level, in particular through support to 

89 

 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

UN OCHA’s country programmes, based on the assumption that humanitarian coordination is a 
key  driver  of  effectiveness  in  any  humanitarian  response.  In  addition,  DG  ECHO  consistently 
promoted  joint  and  impartial  needs  assessments,  by  supporting  the  harmonisation  of  needs 
assessments and joint needs assessments above individual needs assessments in each country, 
thereby  reducing  the  proliferation  of  uncoordinated  assessments.  Finally,  DG  ECHO  was  very 
successful at coordinating its response with other donors, making consistent efforts to coordinate 
activities with humanitarian donors and increasingly with development donors, and thereby helping 
to  reduce  duplication.  However,  operational  coordination  remained  a  wider  challenge  in  each 
country, often aggravated by gaps in multilateral donor coordination, including mechanisms that 
could bring together humanitarian and development donors.   

3.1.3.  Delivering results 

A third key strength of EU humanitarian interventions in CA was the delivery of intended results 
through  actions  implemented  by  partners.  DG  ECHO  supported  humanitarian  actions  delivered 
most  of  their  intended  results  fully  or  partially  and  without  exception  in  difficult  contexts  amid 
changing  situations,  access  constraints,  lack  of  development  partners  and  funding  gaps.  The 
actions were consistently relevant to the needs of the most vulnerable people in specific crises and 
situations,  designed  on  the  basis  of  needs  assessments,  usually  informed  by  further  needs 
assessments, frequently able to adapt to changing needs and situations, and most often considered 
gender  and  age  and  consulted  beneficiaries,  at  least  at  design  stage.  The  delivery  of  results 
depended on a chain of actors, with the EU providing sufficient funding and overarching policies; 
DG  ECHO  providing  strategic  direction,  selection  of  projects  and  allocation  of  funding,  and 
monitoring and oversight of implementation; IPs providing design, implementation and adaptation 
of projects; and beneficiaries themselves engaging in programmes. DG ECHO’s role depended 
most notably on its technical capacities, flexible emergency funding and partner relationships. 

3.1.4.  DG ECHO donorship  

A fourth key strength and a ‘comparative advantage’ of EU humanitarian interventions in CA was 
DG ECHO’s country-based donorship activities. DG ECHO played a wider donor leadership role in 
each  country,  going  beyond  overseeing  its  portfolio  to  provide  both  information  and  advice  for 
humanitarian donors and, increasingly, development donors as well, based on its strong country 
presence and capacities, information about needs and situations, and country-based relationships. 
DG ECHO also clearly added value to EU member states and contributed to achieving EU goals in 
each country. Beyond the humanitarian donorship capacity of any EU member, DG ECHO offered 
a highly effective portfolio of actions; unique field-based knowledge of needs, situation and context; 
applied  field-based  technical  expertise;  and  a  strong  advocacy  voice  within  each  humanitarian 
response.  Further,  DG  ECHO’s  response  was  strongly  recognised  for  upholding  humanitarian 
principles, was aligned with relevant EU policies, and projected the EU’s humanitarian values in 
CA more than any other actor.  

3.1.5.  EU humanitarian funding  

A fifth key strength of EU humanitarian interventions in CA was relatively strong and consistent EU 
humanitarian funding. EU humanitarian funding to the region was allocated based on yearly global 
needs  assessments,  generally  increased  along  with  needs,  and  was  strong  compared  to  other 
donors and EU humanitarian funding elsewhere. This was important in the context of consistent 
underfunding to humanitarian responses in CA, where people in need of assistance consistently 
outnumbered  those  targeted  with  assistance.  In  addition  to  yearly  EU  funding  allocations, 
emergency  funding  top-ups  allowed  DG  ECHO  and  partners  important  flexibility  to  adapt  to 
changing  needs  and  situations  and  consistent  modifications  to  Humanitarian  Action  Plan  (HIP) 
strategies during implementation. However, it remained unclear why the proportion of EU funding 

90 

 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

compared to people in need of assistance varied significantly by country and by year, and why the 
amount  and  share  of  EU  funding  varied  considerably  among  the  three  countries,  with  Chad 
receiving more than double that of CAR and triple that of Cameroon.  

3.2.  Challenges  

3.2.1.  Addressing protracted needs 

A primary challenge to EU humanitarian interventions was addressing the chronic or protracted 
needs  that  remained  prevalent  in  CA  2014-2018.  The  challenge  began  with  EU  humanitarian 
funding never being proportionate to the scale of the protracted needs and crises that affected each 
country. In addition, DG ECHO strategies were not appropriate to meeting these protracted needs 
or  reducing  them,  as  the  yearly  HIPs  offered  little  strategic  direction  or multi-year  planning  that 
could comprehensively address protracted humanitarian needs over time. DG ECHO’s efforts to 
increase  resilience  through  funded  actions  did  not  achieve  consistently  sustainable  results  and 
raised  questions  about  humanitarian  focus,  limited  funding,  annual  systems,  and  the  cost-
effectiveness of resilience actions when not followed up by development actions. Reflecting larger 
challenges  in  addressing  protracted  humanitarian  needs  in  each  country,  EU  humanitarian 
interventions struggled to find ways to reduce chronic needs and risks in the region, and there was 
little evidence that needs were in any way reduced. On the contrary, during 2015-2018, the number 
of  Central  Africans  in  need  of  assistance  increased  from  7  million  people  to  10.2  million, 
humanitarian risks and vulnerability levels remained very high, and HRPs could only target 62% of 
needs in the region. 

3.2.2. 

Increasing resilience, local and national ownership 

A  second  challenge  for  EU  humanitarian  interventions  in  CA  was  increasing  resilience  and 
empowering local and national actors. First, DG ECHO was inconsistent in achieving sustainable 
results in CA, and EU-funded humanitarian actions did not consistently establish exit strategies 
across  the  countries,  whereas  wider  EU-level  strategies  to  promote  the  sustainability  of 
humanitarian actions were most often lacking. Despite some perceived small-scale successes in 
resilience activities, contributing to resilience remained clearly challenging for DG ECHO and case 
studies  raised  important  questions  about  the  cost-effectiveness  of  resilience  actions,  especially 
when they were not followed up by coordinated development actions or when their results were 
disappointing. Additionally, repeated questions arose about the quality of beneficiary consultation 
during  implementation;  few  actions  mentioned  complaints  mechanisms  or  post-distribution 
monitoring;  and  reporting  provided  no  insight  into  what  extent  beneficiary  consultation  met 
expectations for accountability to affected populations (AAP) or empowering people affected, local 
and  national  actors.  Further  questions  arose  about  the  extent  to  which  wider  definitions  of 
vulnerability  (e.g.  people  with  disabilities)  were  systematically  considered,  and  implications  for 
commitments in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and 2030 Agenda to ‘leave no one 
behind’. Furthermore, DG ECHO did little to strengthen preparedness and reduce humanitarian 
risks, and invested very little in disaster risk reduction and emergency preparedness activities to 
prevent epidemics and natural disasters (less than 2% of EU humanitarian funding). Finally, the 
efficiency of DG ECHO’s portfolio was partly limited by very limited progress being made towards 
Grand Bargain commitments to empower local and national responders, increasing cash-based 
programming, and flexible funding arrangements such as multi-year funding. 

3.2.3.  DG ECHO donorship processes  

A third challenge for EU humanitarian interventions in CA was inefficiencies in DG ECHO donorship 
processes.  Across  the  region,  partners  saw  DG  ECHO  processes  as  excessively  burdensome, 

91 

 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

especially the Single Form report, which (despite  HTML  improvements) was unsuited to a poor 
connectivity environment and difficult for non-native English or French speakers, and perceived as 
a  process  that  favoured  ‘professionalised  proposals’  over  good  project  designs,  disincentivising 
smaller  non-governmental  organisations  (NGOs)  and  first-time  applicants.  Without  a  two-step 
selection process, the process allowed large numbers of proposals to be prepared and very few 
accepted, thereby unproductively absorbing considerable partner resources. Partners also pointed 
to transparency gaps, linked to the absence of prioritised HIP strategies to guide proposal writers; 
the ‘blackout period’ at proposal stage when partners could not communicate with DG ECHO; and 
a perceived lack of feedback on proposals. Partners further questioned the efficiency of requiring 
yearly  proposal  and  selection  processes  for  the  large  number  of  EU-funded  actions  that  were 
effectively  multi-year  projects,  as  well  as  the  requirement  for  mid-term  reports  for  single-year 
projects.  Finally,  partners  highlighted  growing  annual  delays  to  contract  signing  and  receipt  of 
funding, which posed disproportionate risks to smaller international NGOs that depended on DG 
ECHO funding, with few other sources.  

3.2.4.  Comprehensive strategies 

A fourth challenge for EU humanitarian interventions in CA was the absence of comprehensive 
strategies to reduce humanitarian needs in the region. During 2014-2018, CA suffered around a 
dozen humanitarian crises with large-scale impacts on populations, and clear risks to achievement 
of  SDGs  outlined  in  the  2030  Agenda.  These  humanitarian  crises  are  multiple  but  are  largely 
attributable  to  three  main  ‘drivers’:  CAR’s  conflict  and  protection  crisis;  Boko  Haram-related 
violence in Nigeria and the Lake Chad region; and structural food insecurity in the Sahel regions of 
Chad and Cameroon. Humanitarian responses in each country lacked the power, capacities and 
resources  to  address  these  crises  and  their  drivers  in  a  comprehensive  manner  without  the 
involvement of other actors working towards common objectives. In CA, DG ECHO’s regional HIP 
approach  promised  more  ambitious  upstream  coherence,  and  DG  ECHO  made  considerable 
efforts  to  engage  with  DG  DEVCO,  the  European  External  Action  Service  and  other  actors  in 
supporting larger national strategies to address these crises; but joint problem statements, joint 
programming and joint monitoring remained an aspiration more than a reality, except for the Bêkou 
Trust Fund in CAR. Without larger comprehensive multi-year regional strategies to address these 
crises and their drivers, it seems unlikely that humanitarian needs will be reduced in the coming 
years; and the region will remain a pocket of large-scale humanitarian needs, high humanitarian 
risks, entrenched vulnerability and fragility, and populations ‘left behind’.   

3.2.5.  DG ECHO strategy  

A fifth key challenge for EU humanitarian intervention in CA was notable stakeholder divergence, 
and sometimes confusion, over DG ECHO’s intervention logic and specific pathways for achieving 
results. While DG ECHO strategies were developed through iterative processes at the country level 
and allowed maximum flexibility to tailor strategies to needs, this masked a lack of clarity about the 
intervention logic in CA. DG ECHO’s strategy was riven by tensions between different models that 
coexisted  uncomfortably,  each  model  implying  risks  and  opportunities.  To  what  extent  was  DG 
ECHO a ‘quality donor’ focused on ‘firefighting’ at project level in the short term; or a ‘coordinated 
response builder’ concerned with reinforcing the humanitarian response for the duration of a crisis; 
or an ‘outcome catalyst’ seeking to address and end protracted needs through collaborations with 
larger development actors? The first allowed a strong focus on quality and upholding humanitarian 
principles, but was insufficient and resulted in isolated small projects, and risked fragmenting efforts 
to develop a coordinated humanitarian response. The second was necessary for coherence and 
efficiency, but remained insufficient in itself to meet protracted needs, address vulnerabilities and 
reduce needs in CA. The third promised to meet protracted needs and reduce them, and befitted 
DG ECHO’s donorship leader position in CA, but risked diverting DG ECHO from addressing acute 

92 

 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

needs, posed challenges to humanitarian principles and remained to deliver tangible results. The 
interplay between these different intervention logics, managing related risks and opportunities, and 
prioritising among them, remained a central strategic challenge for DG ECHO.  

3.2.6.  DG ECHO monitoring, evaluation and learning (MEL) 

A sixth key challenge for EU humanitarian interventions in CA was the unsuitability of monitoring, 
evaluation and learning (MEL) systems. DG ECHO’s MEL systems were very strong for EU-
funded actions, relying on the Single Form and Fiche Ops, which provided detailed and timely 
evidence, learning and accountability for each action, and supported a project-based response 
focused on the design, implementation and adaptation of actions by partners. However, MEL 
systems were lacking at the level of DG ECHO strategy, in the absence of measurable HIP 
objectives, related data collection and analysis systems, and opportunities for aggregated data, 
including on cost-effectiveness, portfolio-wide evidence, learning activities and strategic course 
corrections. More broadly, MEL systems for coordinated humanitarian responses across the 
region remained patchy, and suitable MEL systems appeared to be lacking for HDN activities, 
including the EU HDN pilot in Chad, despite the clear need to manage risks, develop good 
practices and share learning in this area.  

93 

 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

4.  Recommendations  

This section presents recommendations based on conclusions and feedback from discussion with 
the evaluation Inter-service Steering Group. Each recommendation is followed by some specific 
and  practical  suggestions  for  consideration.  Since  strategic  decisions  always  imply  risks  and 
limitations, these are listed for each recommendation.  

4.1.  Develop a more comprehensive approach 

The  Directorate  General  for  European  Civil  Protection  and  Humanitarian  Aid  (DG  ECHO) 
should  develop  a  more  comprehensive  approach  to  addressing  Central  Africa  (CA)’s 
humanitarian challenges in 2020-2025. In order to set clear overarching goals and prioritise 
its  yearly  activities,  DG  ECHO  should  develop  an  updated  EU  humanitarian  intervention 
logic  aimed  at  meeting  and  reducing  humanitarian  needs  in  CA.  This  is  necessary  to 
address the protracted needs that prevail in CA. DG ECHO should consider:  

  Goal  setting:  Defining  strategic  multi-year  goals  to  address  humanitarian  needs, 
humanitarian  risks  and  the  primary  factors  that  drive  them  in  CA.  This  would  define 
recurrent longer-term expectations that feature in the Humanitarian Implementation Plans 
(HIPs)  year  after  year,  provide  greater  clarity  about  the  logic  of  EU  humanitarian 
interventions in CA, and reduce divergence and confusion among stakeholders about DG 
ECHO’s strategy.  

  Comparative  advantage:  Making  explicit  DG  ECHO’s  comparative  advantages  and 
responsibilities  in  relation  to  other  actors;  recognising  that  DG  ECHO’s  key  strengths 
include  its  contributions  to  addressing  acute  needs  and  to  strengthening  humanitarian 
responses; delivering intended results through implementing partners (IPs), and its country-
based  donor  leadership  activities.  Such  an  approach  would  need  to  be  engaged  and 
coherent  with  the  goals of key  strategic donors  the  Directorate-General for  International 
Cooperation  and  Development  (DG  DEVCO),  the  European  External  Action  Service 
(EEAS), MS, the World Bank and other actors. 

  Regional  approach:  Exploring  opportunities  offered  by  DG  ECHO’s  regional  office  and 
regional-level HIP planning to strengthen upstream coherence, in line with other regional 
processes, and to explore cross-border approaches. To date, the added value of a regional 
HIP  has  not  been  realised  in  CA  without  genuine  regional  analysis  and  priorities,  and 
consideration of cross-border dynamics.  

  Strategic pathways: Deciding the appropriate level of effort to invest in each of the three 
strategic  pathways  described  in  recommendations  listed  below:  reinforcing  DG  ECHO’s 
role  as  a  quality  humanitarian  donor  (Recommendation  2,  R2);  committing  to  support 
humanitarian  coordination  (R3);  and  exploring  opportunities  arising  from  Humanitarian-
Development Nexus (‘Nexus’, HDN) activities (R4). Each of these offers different pathways 
to achieving humanitarian results. There is a need for strategic clarity among stakeholders 
about EU humanitarian interventions in CA.  

  Progress  indicators:  These  goals  could  be  expressed  in  terms  of  collective  outcomes 
linked  to  achieving  multi-year  humanitarian  objectives  in  each  country  (Humanitarian 
Response  Plans  (HRPs)).  Progress  could  ultimately  be  measured  in  reducing  food 
insecurity  and  malnutrition  (Cadre  Harmonisé),  reducing  forced  displacement  (United 
Nations  High  Commissioner  for  Refugees  and  the  Internal  Displacement  Monitoring 
Centre), reducing the numbers of people in need of assistance and people targeted with 
assistance  (Humanitarian  Needs  Overviews  (HNOs),  HRPs),  and  ultimately  reducing 

94 

 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

humanitarian  risk,  vulnerability  (INFORM)  and  fragility  (Organisation  for  Economic  Co-
operation and Development (OECD)).   

  Risks: Recognising that any effort to develop a more comprehensive strategy would go 
beyond  DG  ECHO’s  current  systems  based  on  HIPs,  that  it  could  become  a  resource-
intensive and abstract undertaking, and that stakeholders in the country would have little 
appetite for this.  

4.2.  Reinforce humanitarian project quality  

DG ECHO should reinforce its role as a quality humanitarian donor in CA 2020-2025. As a 
basic  requirement,  DG  ECHO  should  ensure  its  projects  systemically  meet  required 
standards,  in  particular  for  inclusion,  beneficiary  consultation  and  resilience.  This  is 
necessary to ensure that DG ECHO continues to deliver intended results through EU-funded 
humanitarian  actions  implemented  by  partners;  adds  value  to  the  EU  through  a  highly 
effective portfolio of actions; and guarantees that IPs provide good design, implementation 
and adaptation of projects. DG ECHO should consider:  

  Delivery of results: Ensuring EU-funded humanitarian actions continue to deliver intended 
results across the region to a high standard through the chain of actors including EU funding 
and policy, IPs’ design and implementation, and beneficiaries’ engagement, with DG ECHO 
providing strategic direction, selection of projects, allocation of funding, and monitoring and 
oversight  of  implementation.  This  requires  sustaining  DG  ECHO’s  technical  capacities, 
flexible emergency funding, and strong partner relationships. 

  Vulnerable populations: Ensuring actions remain consistently relevant to the needs of the 
most  vulnerable  populations  in  specific  crises,  designed  on  the  basis  of  needs 
assessments,  informed  by  further  needs  assessments,  and  able  to  adapt  to  changing 
needs and situations. 

  Specific vulnerabilities: Systematically addressing specific vulnerabilities of groups and 
individuals  by  gender,  age,  disability,  displacement  status  and  other  criteria  in  line  with 
commitments to inclusion and the principle of impartiality.  

  Beneficiary consultation: Increasing the quality of beneficiary consultation during design 
and  implementation,  ensuring  complaints  mechanisms  or  post-distribution monitoring,  in 
line  with  expectations  for  accountability  to  affected  populations,  the  Core  Humanitarian 
Standard, and the goal to further empower people affected, and local and national actors.  
  Resilience:  Managing  investments  in  resilience  to  ensure  they  are  needs  led,  capacity 
enhancing, appropriate to the response, cost effective and followed up with coordinated 
development actions. This may involve encouraging partnerships and consortia between 
traditional first responders and IPs with more development experience. 

  Limitations/risks: Recognising that a project-based ‘firefighter’ approach alone risks being 
inefficient  and  not  strategic,  resulting  in ‘cherry-picking’  of  projects  and fragmentation  of 
responses. 

4.3.  Commit to supporting humanitarian coordination  

DG ECHO should commit to supporting humanitarian coordination in CA 2020-2025. As a 
means  of  enhancing  response  effectiveness  and  efficiency,  DG  ECHO  should  commit  to 
continue  reinforcing  country-based  coordinated  humanitarian  responses,  in  particular 
through  needs  assessments,  the  primary  role  of  the  United  Nations  Office  for  the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), and donor coordination. This is necessary 
to uphold EU commitments to humanitarian coordination, address persistent operational 

95 

 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

coordination challenges in each country, and promote cost-effective responses. DG ECHO 
should consider:  

  Needs  assessments:  Continuing  to  promote  coordinated,  collective,  and  high-quality 
needs assessments in each country in line with Grand Bargain commitments, in particular 
by  supporting  the  harmonisation  of  assessments  and  joint  assessments  above  agency-
specific assessments, as a basis for coordinated and appropriate responses. 

  HRPs and implementation: Continuing to strengthen humanitarian coordination in CA by 
supporting  country-based  response  strategies  outlined  in  SRPs/HRPs,  providing  strong 
and consistent funding to coordination actions, addressing coordination gaps at the country 
response level and local crisis-specific level. 

  UN OCHA’s role: Consistently supporting UN OCHA's role with funding and advocacy, and 
where  necessary  other  coordination  mechanisms,  such  as  the  international  non-
governmental  organisation  coordination  committee  (CCO)  and  Rapid  Response 
Mechanism in CAR, and the Food and Agriculture Organization-led Food Security Cluster 
in Chad.  

  Donor coordination: Continuing to exercise a donor coordination leadership role in each 
country, by providing both information and advice for humanitarian donors and development 
donors  as  well,  based  on  its  strong  country  presence  and  capacities,  information  about 
needs and situations, and country-based relationships. In each country, DG ECHO should 
convene humanitarian donors to coordinate their approaches, perhaps in a quarterly forum, 
to ensure donors contribute to operational coordination rather than undermine it.  

  Member states: Encouraging EU member states to invest humanitarian funding in CA, with 
a view to ‘leveraging’ their portfolios towards shared HRP goals in an efficient and effective 
way. EC/ECHO, member states and other humanitarian donors should be implementing 
converging humanitarian strategies in CA countries. 

  Worldwide  opportunity:  More  broadly,  DG  ECHO  should  consider  conducting  a  more 
comprehensive  review  of  its  support  to  humanitarian  coordination  across  interventions 
worldwide to address emerging questions about appropriate funding levels, support to Inter-
Agency  Standing  Committee-led  coordination  mechanisms  and  other  mechanisms,  and 
measuring the results of coordination (see Review of DG ECHO’s Support to Humanitarian 
Coordination).  DG  ECHO  should  also  consider  restating  its  global  commitment  to 
humanitarian coordination in a context where the coordination model is being challenged 
by a more ambitious collaborative ‘Nexus’ (HDN) model. 

  Risks/limitations:  Recognising  that  reinforcing  country-based  humanitarian  responses 
alone cannot adequately address the scale of needs in CA, or provide pathways to reducing 
those  needs,  or  bridge  the  humanitarian-development  divide  to  collectively  address 
humanitarian risk, vulnerability and fragility.  

4.4.  Explore ‘Nexus’ (HDN) opportunities  

DG ECHO should explore humanitarian opportunities arising from collaborations between 
humanitarian, development and peacebuilding actors in CA 2020-2025. As a commitment to 
doing more to address outstanding needs, DG ECHO should explore how HDN approaches 
can generate improved humanitarian outcomes, specifically in terms of needs reduced. This 
is necessary to address the scale and complexity of protracted needs in CA; to implement 
various  EU  commitments  to  promoting  resilience  and  the  HDN,  and  to  increase  the 
possibility of generating sustainable humanitarian outcomes. DG ECHO should consider:  

96 

 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

  Follow  up:  Consistently  establishing  exit  strategies  with  DG  DEVCO  and  other 
development actors to ensure the sustainability of EU humanitarian actions, recognising 
these were often lacking.  

  Donor  leadership:  Exercising  a  donor  leadership  role  to  provide  both  information  and 
advice  to  DG  DEVCO  and  development  donors,  based  on  DG  ECHO’s  strong  country 
presence  and  capacities,  information  about  needs  and  situations,  and  country-based 
relationships.  DG  ECHO  should  continue  to  engage  DG  DEVCO  in  supporting  more 
beneficiary-focused, small-scale resilience and recovery activities.  

  HDN: Reinforcing its donor coordination role to help develop common problem statements, 
joint programming with DG DEVCO, EEAS, the World Bank and others in order to generate 
collective outcomes in terms of reduced needs, risks, vulnerability and fragility. These will 
require joint monitoring, evaluation and learning (MEL) systems.   

  Additional financing: Mobilising additional funding from relevant EU instruments, member 
states and other financing sources to help address humanitarian needs, recognising that 
DG ECHO and humanitarian funding alone will remain insufficient to address the needs of 
more than 10 million people in CA.  

  Joined-up  mechanisms:  Encouraging  the  alignment,  interface  and  integration  of 
humanitarian  coordination  and  development  coordination  mechanisms,  so  that  the 
operations of humanitarian and development actors are more systematically coordinated.  
  Risks/Limitations:  Managing  risks  posed  by  the  HDN  to  DG  ECHO’s  humanitarian 
principles,  the  risk  of  diverting  limited  funding  away  from  acute  needs  and  the  risk  of 
progress towards outcomes being difficult to measure.  

4.5.  Streamline donorship processes 

DG ECHO should ensure its donorship processes are streamlined in CA 2020-2025. As a 
means  to  enhance  efficiency  and  transparency,  DG  ECHO  should  review  its  donorship 
processes  in  line  with  Grand  Bargain  commitments  and  address  issues  raised  by 
stakeholders in this evaluation. DG ECHO should consider:  

  Grand Bargain: Implementing key commitments made in the Grand Bargain, in particular 
those concerned with empowering local and national responders (2); increasing the use 
and  coordination  of  cash-based  programming  (3);  increasing  collaborative  humanitarian 
multi-year  planning  and 
funding  (7);  and  harmonising  and  simplifying  reporting 
requirements (9). In particular, multi-year planning and multi-year funding is needed in CA 
to address protracted needs.  

  Strategic clarity: Providing clearer priorities in HIP strategies, thereby guiding proposal 
writers on what will be selected and not, as well as clear feedback on selection decisions 
and a clear hierarchy of objectives and sectors in a more concise format that is easy to 
communicate to all stakeholders.     

  Selection: Ensuring that good or innovative project designs by smaller non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) are considered on the same terms as highly professional proposals 
prepared  by  larger  organisations,  and  also  considering  a  two-step  selection  process  to 
avoid large numbers of applicants investing in unsuccessful proposals  

  Contracting: Exploring the scope for reducing yearly proposal and selection requirements 
for projects that are currently funded year on year but are in effect multi-year projects. This 
could be done, for example, by making greater use of 24-month contracts. Ideally, some 
contracts could be longer, but that would require changes to DG ECHO’s yearly budgeting 
and planning cycle.  

  Payments:  Ensuring  contract  signing  and  payments  are  not  systematically  delayed, 
especially  if  these  are  caused  by  minor  clarification  requests,  and  that  delays  do  not 
disproportionately affect smaller ECHO-dependent NGOs. 

97 

 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

4.6.  Develop  more  effective  monitoring,  evaluation  and  learning 

(MEL) systems  

DG  ECHO  should  develop  more  effective  MEL  systems  to  guide  EU  humanitarian 
interventions in CA 2020-2025. As a means to reinforce accountability, learning and adaptive 
management,  DG  ECHO  should  develop  MEL  systems  that  effectively  support  EU 
humanitarian interventions and DG ECHO activities in CA. MEL systems currently provide 
information only about projects, not DG ECHO’s portfolio of actions in each country or the 
regional HIP, and do not provide aggregated reporting on results, people reached, needs 
assessments,  coordination,  cost-effectiveness  and  other  important  matters.  DG  ECHO 
should consider:  

  Portfolio-level MEL: Developing a MEL framework and system for the annual HIP, that 
allows for monitoring, evidence and learning at the portfolio level (above the project alone), 
including measurable HIP objectives, portfolio indicators, and related data collection and 
analysis system to inform decision-making. 

  HRP  MEL:  Investing  in  coordinated  MEL  systems  to  support  HRPs  and  humanitarian 
responses in CA, recognising that these systems remained patchy across the region.   
  HDN  MEL:  Developing  MEL  systems  for  HDN  activities,  including  the  EU  HDN  pilot  in 
Chad, with a view to managing risks, identifying good practices and sharing learning in this 
area. 

98 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

Evaluation of the European Union’s 
humanitarian assistance in the 
Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

Part B – Humanitarian Coordination Review 
Final Evaluation Report

99 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

List of acronyms – Part B 

DG ECHO 
ASEAN 
CA  
CAP 
CCO 
CERF 
CivMil 
CPMT 
DPC 
DRC 
DRC-DK 
ERC 
EU 
FMA 
FSC 
GGOPS 
HC 
HCT 
HIP 
HNAP 
HNO 
HPC  
HQ 
HRP 
IASC 
ICCG 
IHL 
INGO 
IOM 
IRC-UK 
ISC 
JOC 
MPC 
OPT 
RRM 
RRPM 
TA 
TAP 
UN 
UNHCR 
UN OCHA 
WoS 

Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
Central Africa 
Consolidated Appeal Process 
NGO Coordination Committee 
Central Emergency Response Fund  
Civil-Military Coordination 
Cluster Performance Monitoring Tool  
Government of Haiti's Civil Protection Department  
Democratic Republic of Congo 
Danish Refugee Council  
Emergency Relief Coordinator 
European Union 
Foreign Military Assets  
Food Security Cluster  
General Guidelines on Operational Priorities for Humanitarian Aid  
Humanitarian Coordinator  
Humanitarian Country Team 
Humanitarian Implementation Plan 
Humanitarian Needs Assessment Programme  
Humanitarian Needs Overview  
Humanitarian Programming Cycle  
Headquarters 
Humanitarian Response Plan 
Inter-Agency Standing Committee 
Inter-Cluster Coordination Group  
International Humanitarian Law 
International Non-Governmental Organisation 
International Organization for Migration  
International Rescue Committee UK  
Inter-Sector Coordination Group  
Joint Operations Center  
Mission Project Cell  
Occupied Palestinian Territories  
Rapid Response Mechanism  
Rapid Response to Population Movements 
Transformative Agenda 
Transitional Appeal  
United Nations 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
Whole of Syria approach 

 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

Executive Summary 

This review offers ‘an evidence-based review of the actions funded by the Directorate-General for 
European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO) in support of humanitarian 
coordination between 2014 and 2018, aimed at informing DG ECHO’s strategic and operational 
approaches to supporting and financing humanitarian coordination. Humanitarian coordination is 
defined  as  ‘the  practice  of  designing,  implementing,  and  monitoring  humanitarian  actions  in 
response  to  a  specific  crisis  in  such  a  way  that  seeks  to  avoid  duplication,  fill  gaps,  maximise 
resources and deliver a more effective and efficient response than would be possible in isolation of 
other actions.’ It was undertaken using a mix of methods: data analysis, sample analysis, document 
review and key informant interviews. The review was undertaken as a limited exercise as a subset 
of the evaluation of the European Union (EU)’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa (CA) 
region, including humanitarian coordination during 2014-2018, with limited resources and evidence, 
and therefore categorised as a review not an evaluation.  

The review reaches these main findings:   

  The review supports the premise that DG ECHO is both engaged with and supportive of the 
role of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) in 
coordination  at  all  levels  and  in  all  contexts  under  review.  In  a  range  of  examples  from 
evaluations, DG ECHO plays a directly supportive role to UN OCHA where it is established and 
seen to be functioning well. In addition, where weaknesses are perceived, DG ECHO (including 
with other donors, as required) is seen to challenge UN OCHA to address these issues with a 
view to improving performance (in addition to its direct support).  

  The review sample supports the premise that DG ECHO plays an active and purposeful role in 
filling coordination gaps. For the purposes of this review, the term ‘coordination gaps’ refers to 
instances where there is a perceived need to strengthen coordination (geographic, thematic or 
both) for a specific facet of a response. Examples included: strengthening specific clusters in 
the event of perceived weakness; Rapid Response Mechanisms, which respond to a defined 
subset  of  the  vulnerable population;  and  geographically  specific  coordination  such as  camp 
coordination or sub-national structures in the event of growing needs.  

  The broader evaluation set does not offer a great deal in the way of conclusions on the extent 
to  which  DG  ECHO’s  support  to  coordination  has  strengthened  responses  overall.  This  is 
principally  characteristic  of  a  larger  attribution  problem  in  humanitarian  action.  However, 
evaluations make numerous references to DG ECHO adding value to coordination at response 
level.  

The review offers these conclusions: 

  DG ECHO invested strong and consistent funding in humanitarian coordination activities across 
humanitarian  responses  worldwide,  totalling  EUR  277.8m  during  the  period  2014-2018,  the 
majority  (58%)  of  which  was  invested  in  country-level  sector  and  inter-sector  coordination 
activities. DG ECHO coordination funding also showed an upward trend (until 2018) in line with 
increasing  humanitarian  needs  worldwide.  It  also  consistently  supported  humanitarian 
coordination  in  ways  other  than  funding  –  through  advocacy,  participation  in  coordination 
mechanisms and donor leadership. 

  DG ECHO invested most of its funding in support of Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) 
coordination  mechanisms  at  country  level,  in  particular  by  support  to  UN  OCHA’s  country 
programmes.  Thus,  DG  ECHO  supports  implementation  of  the  Humanitarian  Programming 
Cycle (HPC), including joint needs assessment and analysis and strategic response planning. 
Over and above support to UN OCHA, DG ECHO utilises its network of field experts to provide 

101 

 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

real  time  analysis of  coordination  (among  other  humanitarian)  needs.  Strong  support  to  UN 
OCHA  notwithstanding,  DG  ECHO  publishes  its  own  annual  planning  document,  the 
Humanitarian  Implementation  Plan  and  also  provides  support  to  humanitarian  coordination 
activities  outside  of  IASC  mechanisms  and  the  HPC,  most  notably  international  non-
governmental  organisation  (INGO)  coordination  platforms.  The  review  outlines  numerous 
instances of DG ECHO supporting alternative coordination structures and/or offering a strong 
challenge to UN OCHA to improve in others.  

  DG ECHO’s support to humanitarian coordination assumes that humanitarian coordination is a 
key driver of effectiveness in any humanitarian response. The review includes multiple pieces 
of anecdotal evidence that humanitarian coordination is strengthening the effectiveness and 
efficiency of humanitarian responses. Coordination is clearly one among many critical elements 
of a response, such as the presence of competent partners,  the quality of their programme 
designs and implementation, and their ability to manage risks and adapt to evolving contexts. 
Although  this  review  looks  at  coordination  alone,  it  is  clear  that  DG  ECHO’s  support  to 
coordination is complementary to its support to programming across a range of humanitarian 
partners.  

The  review  suggests  that  DG  ECHO  should  consider  carrying  out  internal  reflection  on  the 
questions raised in this study. It recommends that priority be given to the following issues: 
  Do the apparent funding trends identified constitute actual trends and are they reflective 

of DG ECHO policy or guidance?  

  How  does  DG  ECHO  balance  funding  and  support  to  IAS-led  structures  (principally  UN 
OCHA) with its role in challenging and complementing those structures? In particular, it should 
review the role of its network of field experts and communication between headquarters and 
the field.  

102 

 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

Résumé exécutif 

Il s’agit d’un examen, preuves à l’appui des actions financées par la Direction générale pour 
la protection civile et les opérations d’aide humanitaire européennes (DG ECHO) en matière 
de coordination humanitaire entre 2014 et 2018 et dont le but est de renseigner les approches 
stratégiques  et  opérationnelles  de  la  DG  ECHO  en  vue  de  soutenir  et  de  financer  la 
coordination humanitaire. La coordination humanitaire se définit comme ’la pratique consistant 
à concevoir, à mettre en œuvre et à suivre les actions humanitaires pour résoudre une crise 
spécifique en évitant les doublons, en comblant les lacunes, en maximisant les ressources et 
en réagissant de manière plus efficace et plus efficiente que si on le faisait indépendamment 
d’autres actions’. Pour réaliser cet examen, plusieurs méthodes ont été utilisées : analyse de 
données, analyse d’échantillons, examen de documents et entretiens avec des informateurs 
importants.  L’examen  a  été  entrepris  comme  un  exercice  restreint,  une  sous-catégorie  de 
l’évaluation de l’aide humanitaire de l’Union européenne dans la région de l’Afrique centrale, 
y compris de la coordination humanitaire pour la période 2014-2018 avec des ressources et 
des preuves limitées ; c’est pourquoi on parle d’examen et non d’évaluation.  

L’examen aboutit à ces constatations principales :   
  L’examen souscrit au principe selon lequel la DG ECHO est à la fois engagée auprès du Bureau 
de la coordination des affaires humanitaires des Nations Unies (BCHA) et qu’elle le soutient 
dans ses activités de coordination à tous les niveaux et dans tous les contextes analysés. Dans 
une série d’exemples tirés des évaluations, la DG ECHO endosse un rôle de soutien direct au 
BCAH là où il est établi et semble fonctionner correctement. En outre, quand des défaillances 
apparaissent,  la  DG  ECHO  (aux  côtés  d’autres  donateurs,  selon  les  besoins)  est  perçue 
comme poussant le BCAH à régler ces questions avec l’objectif d’améliorer les performances 
(en plus de son soutien direct).  

  L’échantillon examiné souscrit au principe selon lequel la DG ECHO joue un rôle actif et utile 
pour ce qui est de combler les lacunes de coordination. Pour les besoins de cet examen, le 
terme ’lacunes de coordination’ désigne les situations où il apparaît nécessaire de renforcer la 
coordination (géographique, thématique ou les deux) sur un aspect spécifique d’une réponse. 
Les  exemples  incluent :  le  renforcement  des  groupes  spécifiques  en  cas  d’apparition  d’une 
défaillance, les Mécanismes de réponse rapide (RRM) qui permettent de répondre aux besoins 
d’une  sous-catégorie  définie  de  la  population  vulnérable ;  la  coordination  géographique 
spécifique,  comme  la  coordination  des  camps  ou  des  structures  infra-étatiques  en  cas 
d’augmentation des besoins.  

  La méthode générale d’évaluation n’a pas été d’une grande utilité pour déterminer jusqu’à quel 
point l’aide fournie par la DG ECHO à la coordination a  globalement renforcé les réactions. 
Cela  est  principalement  caractéristique  d’un  problème  plus  vaste  d’attribution  dans  l’action 
humanitaire. Cependant, les évaluations mentionnent souvent le fait que la DG ECHO ajoute 
de la valeur à la coordination au niveau de la réaction.  

L’examen aboutit à ces conclusions : 
  La  DG  ECHO  a  investi  des  fonds  importants  et  réguliers  dans  les  activités  de  coordination 
humanitaire  dans  de  nombreuses  réactions  humanitaires  dans  le  monde  entier,  pour  une 
somme totale de 277,8 millions d’euros au cours de la période 2014-2018, dont une grande 
partie  (58 %)  a  été  investie  dans  des  activités  de  coordination  nationale  sectorielle  et 
intersectorielle.  Le  financement  de  la  coordination  par  la  DG  ECHO  suit  également  une 
tendance à la hausse (depuis 2018), en adéquation avec les besoins humanitaires mondiaux 
croissants. De plus, elle a toujours soutenu la coordination humanitaire par d’autres moyens 
que le financement – par le biais de la promotion et de la participation aux mécanismes de 
coordination, ainsi qu’en assurant l’encadrement des donateurs. 

103 

 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

  La  DG  ECHO  a  investi  la  majorité  de  ses  fonds  dans  les  mécanismes  de  coordination  du 
Comité permanent interorganisations (CPI) au niveau national, notamment en soutenant les 
programmes nationaux du BCAH. C’est pourquoi la DG ECHO accorde son soutien à la mise 
en  œuvre  du  cycle  de  programme  humanitaire  (HPC),  y  compris  l’évaluation  conjointe  des 
besoins et un calendrier des actions stratégiques et analytiques. Au-delà du soutien accordé 
au BCAH, la DG ECHO se sert de son réseau d’experts du terrain pour fournir en temps réel 
une analyse des besoins en matière de coordination (entre autres humanitaires). Même si elle 
soutient grandement la BCAH, la DG ECHO publie son propre calendrier annuel (le Plan de 
mise  en  œuvre  humanitaire,  ou  HIP  en  anglais)  et  soutient  également  les  activités  de 
coordination humanitaire en dehors des mécanismes du CPI et du HPC, principalement les 
plates-formes de coordination des organisations non gouvernementales (ONG) internationales. 
L’examen expose de nombreux cas où la DG ECHO a soutenu des structures de coordination 
alternatives et/ou a incité le BCAH à en améliorer d’autres.  

  L’aide  qu’apporte  la  DG  ECHO  à  la  coordination  humanitaire  suppose  que  la  coordination 
humanitaire est un élément essentiel pour l’efficacité de toute réaction humanitaire. L’examen 
comprend  de  nombreux  éléments  de  preuves  non  étayés  selon  lesquelles  la  coordination 
humanitaire renforce l’efficience et l’efficacité des réactions humanitaires. De toute évidence, 
la coordination peut figurer aux côtés des nombreux éléments déterminants de la réussite d’une 
action, comme la présence de partenaires compétents, la qualité de la conception et de la mise 
en  œuvre  de  leurs  programmes,  et  leur  capacité  à  gérer  les  risques  et  à  s’adapter  à  des 
situations évolutives. Bien que cet examen ne porte que sur la coordination, il est clair que le 
soutien de la DG ECHO à la coordination complète l’aide qu’elle apporte à la programmation 
parmi un grand nombre de partenaires humanitaires.  

Cet  examen  suggère  que  la  DG  ECHO  devrait  conduire  une  réflexion  en  interne  sur  les 
questions soulevées par cette étude. L’examen recommande que la priorité soit donnée aux 
questions ci-dessous :  

-  Est-ce  que  les  tendances  de  financement  identifiées  sont  effectivement  les  tendances 

actuelles et reflètent-elles la politique ou ligne directrice de la DG ECHO ?  

-  Comment la DG ECHO équilibre-t-elle le financement et l’appui aux structures menées par 
l’IASC  (principalement  le  BCAH de  l’ONU)  et  son  rôle  de  questionnement  et  de 
complémentarité avec ces structures ? En particulier, la DG ECHO devrait revoir son rôle 
dans ce réseau d’experts de terrain et la communication entre le siège et le terrain. 

104 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

1. 

Introduction 

The purpose of this review is to ‘provide an evidence-based review of the actions funded by the 
Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO) in 
support  of  humanitarian  coordination  between  2014  and  2018,  in  order  to  inform  DG  ECHO’s 
strategic and operational approaches to supporting and financing humanitarian coordination. The 
review  is  one  stand-alone  part  of  a  larger  evaluation,  the  ‘Evaluation  of  the  European  Union’s 
humanitarian  assistance  in  the  Central  Africa  (CA)  region,  including  humanitarian  coordination, 
2014-2018’.  The  review  is  tightly  limited  in  scope  (see  approach  and  limitations  below).  The 
review’s  overarching  aim is  to  answer  the  question:  ‘How  did European  Union  (EU)  support  for 
humanitarian coordination actions strengthen humanitarian coordination?’ 

1.1.  Approach, methodology and scope   

1.1.1.  Defining ‘humanitarian coordination’ 

The following summarises the definition of humanitarian coordination that has been used for this 
review and the rationale for its use.  

Humanitarian coordination has remained a central concern in global humanitarian policy in recent 
decades. The foundations of the current international humanitarian coordination system were set 
by United Nations General Assembly Resolution 46/182 in December 1991.59 Resolution 46/182 
created  the  role  of  Emergency  Relief  Coordinator  (ERC),60  with  nine  areas  of  responsibility  ( 
coordinating  humanitarian  assistance, facilitating  access  to  emergency  areas,  organising  needs 
assessment  missions,  preparing  joint  appeals  and  mobilising  resources).  This  resolution  also 
established  the  Inter-Agency  Standing  Committee  (IASC),  the  Central  Emergency  Revolving 
Fund61  and  the  Consolidated  Appeal  Process  (CAP).  It  also  led  directly  to  the  creation  of  the 
Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) in 1992. DHA became the United Nations Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) in 1998 as part of early efforts on UN reform.62  

Almost  15  years  later,  in  2005,  a  major  reform  of  humanitarian  coordination,  known  as  the 
Humanitarian  Reform  Agenda,  introduced  a  number  of  new  elements  to  enhance  predictability, 
accountability and partnership (following weaknesses identified in responses to an earthquake in 
Pakistan  and  Kashmir  and  the  crisis  in  Darfur).  The  reform  approach  was  three-pronged:  (i) 
introducing clusters to better coordinate sectoral responses and identify a lead agency which would 
provide predictable leadership and coordination and act as the provider of last resort; (ii) improving 
the availability of quick-response funding through the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF); 
and (iii) improving humanitarian leadership by strengthening the role and capacity of humanitarian 
coordinators.  

In  2010,  in  an  attempt  to  sustain  and  focus  humanitarian  reform,  the  IASC  launched  its 
Transformative Agenda (TA), a series of actions and protocols aimed at simplifying processes and 
outcomes.  The  TA  focused  on  strengthening  humanitarian  leadership,  and  strengthening  and 
simplifying cluster coordination. Both of these elements were also included in a push to strengthen 
the scaling up of responses in severe emergencies given a ‘Level 3’ designation. IASC principles 
at  that  time  ‘agreed  there  is  a  need  to  restate  and  return  to  the  original  purpose  of  clusters, 
refocusing  them  on  strategic  and  operational  gaps analysis,  planning,  assessment  and  results’. 

59 https://www.unUN OCHA.org/sites/unUN OCHA/files/dms/Documents/120402_OOM-46182_eng.pdf 
60 Significantly upgrading the previous Disaster Relief Coordinator role to include complex emergencies. 
61 Which became the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) in 2006 (below). 
62 Under the leadership of then Secretary-General Kofi Annan.  

105 

 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

The TA restated the aim of the cluster approach as ‘strengthening system-wide preparedness and 
technical capacity to respond to humanitarian emergencies’ and ‘providing clear leadership and 
accountability  in  the  main  areas  of  humanitarian  response’;  in  addition,  at  country  level: 
‘strengthening partnerships, and the predictability and accountability of international humanitarian 
action by improving prioritisation and clearly defining the roles and responsibilities of humanitarian 
organisations.’ A number of additional protocols stemmed from the TA, most of which were directly 
or tangentially relevant to coordination.63 

According  to  UN  OCHA,  ‘Humanitarian  coordination  seeks  to  improve  the  effectiveness  of 
humanitarian response by ensuring greater predictability, accountability and partnership.’64 In this 
context,  UN  OCHA  specifies  its  own  role  as,  ‘leading  the  international  community's  efforts  to 
develop a better architecture for the humanitarian system, including strong in-country humanitarian 
leaders;  representative  and  inclusive  Humanitarian  Country  Teams;  an  effective  and  well-
coordinated framework within which all humanitarian organisations can contribute systematically; 
and predictable funding tools.’ 

Other definitions stress its practical application. According to the International Council of Voluntary 
Agencies,  ‘Coordination  in  humanitarian  contexts  is  vital  at  local,  national,  regional  and  global 
levels’, and involves: 

  Assessing situations and needs; 
  Agreeing common priorities; 
  Filling gaps, preventing duplication and targeting those most in need; 
  Developing common strategies to address issues such as negotiating access; 
  Mobilising funding and other resources; 
  Clarifying consistent public messaging; and 
  Monitoring progress.’65 

In recent years, IASC has developed the Humanitarian Programming Cycle (HPC), a process for 
implementing humanitarian coordination. The HPC is ‘a coordinated series of actions undertaken 
to  help  prepare  for,  manage  and  deliver  humanitarian  response.  It  consists  of  five  elements 
coordinated  in  a  seamless  manner,  with  each  step  logically  building  on  the  previous  one  and 
leading to the next. Successful implementation of the HPC is dependent on effective emergency 
preparedness, effective coordination with national/local authorities and humanitarian actors, and 
information management. The HPC elements are as follows: 

  Needs assessment and analysis 
  Strategic response planning 
  Resource mobilisation 
 
Implementation and monitoring 
  Operational review and evaluation.’66 

In line with these definitions, we understand humanitarian coordination as the practice of designing, 
implementing and monitoring humanitarian actions in response to a specific crisis in such a way as 
to  avoid  duplication,  fill  gaps,  maximise  resources  and  deliver  a  more  effective  and  efficient 

63  Protocol  1.  Humanitarian  System-Wide  Scale-Up  Activation:  Definition  and  Procedures  [replacing  Humanitarian  System-Wide  Emergency 
Activation: definition and procedures]; Protocol 2. ‘empowered Leadership’ in a Humanitarian System-Wide Scale-Up Activation [replacing Concept 
Paper on ‘Empowered Leadership’- revised March 2014]; Responding to Level 3 Emergencies: What ‘Empowered Leadership’ looks like in practice 
(note this protocol is under revision); Reference Module for Cluster Coordination at the Country Level (revised July 2015); Humanitarian Programme 
Cycle Reference Module Version 2.0 (July 2015); Accountability to Affected Populations Operational Framework; Inter-Agency Rapid Response 
Mechanism (IARRM) Concept Note (December 2013. Note this protocol is under revision); Common Framework for Preparedness (October 2013); 
Emergency Response Preparedness (draft for Field Testing, July 2015); Multi-Sector Initial Rapid Assessment Guidance (Revision July 2015) 
64 https://www.unUN OCHA.org/our-work/coordination 
65 
and 
https://www.alnap.org/system/files/content/resource/files/main/topic-1-humanitarian-coordination.pdf 
66 Humanitarian Programme Cycle, https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/programme-cycle/space 

humanitarian 

architecture: 

coordination 

engage? 

NGOs 

global 

IASC 

How 

The 

can 

the 

106 

 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

response than would be possible in isolation from other actions. Such coordination mostly occurs 
in response to a specific crisis at the level of the inter-agency humanitarian response, and typically 
includes coordination activities at the country level, local level and sector level. In refugee crises, it 
may  occur  at  regional  level  and  include  cross-border  coordination  activities.  In  each  case, 
humanitarian coordination aims to develop a structured humanitarian response which goes beyond 
individual projects to be ‘more than the sum of its parts’.  

In keeping with this backdrop and the scope of the review (below), for the purposes of this review 
definitions of ‘coordination’ are aligned to the extent possible with the overarching evaluation.67 The 
CA evaluation describes the evolution of the overall model for EU humanitarian interventions from 
a  ‘coordination’  model  (focused  on  enhancing  effectiveness  among  humanitarian  actors)  to  a 
‘complementary’  model,  which  expands  to  include  greater  coherence  with  development  actors 
post-World Humanitarian Summit68 (a fuller description is given below under ‘Background’).   

1.1.2.  Scope of the review and key research questions 

interventions/actions 

The  scope  of  this  review  is  global.  Here,  ‘global’  infers  that  all  response  contexts  in  which  DG 
ECHO makes an intervention in humanitarian coordination is within its scope (i.e. this is principally 
a  review  of  DG  ECHO’s  support  to  operational  coordination  at  response  level).  This  primarily 
level; 
in  support  of  UN  OCHA  at 
includes: 
interventions/actions designed to strengthen or complement UN OCHA’s coordination role;69 and 
additional  interventions/actions  aimed  at  enhancing  the  coordination  of  the  broader  response.70 
While  the  review  does  not  attempt  to  cover  DG  ECHO’s  funded  actions  and  engagements  in 
coordination at global level, the document sample and key informant interviews do make reference 
to a number of such interventions. Where this is the case, the review seeks to understand how 
interventions at the global level directly support coordination at the response level. It includes the 
results of the CA evaluation as they relate to coordination. 

‘whole  of  response’ 

Analysis71 of DG ECHO’s funding decisions which are tagged with the  ‘coordination’ theme (i.e. 
they relate entirely or partially to ‘coordination’) are sub-categorised as follows: global (sector/inter-
sector)  coordination  including  global  clusters;  country  level  (sector/inter-sector)  coordination; 
camp coordination; civil-military (CivMil) coordination; public awareness and advocacy and 
two ‘miscellaneous’ categories. In order to cover all of these facets within the framework provided 
by the review questions; and in order to align as fully as possible with the judgement criteria used 
for the CA evaluation, each of these ‘coordination categories’ is covered below. 

1)  Reinforcing UN OCHA: To what extent did EU-funded coordination actions reinforce UN 

OCHA’s role wherever appropriate? 

This question is treated first sequentially, simply because it is the most clear-cut of all of the review 
questions.  Drawing  on  all  of  the  information  collected,  this  section  looks  at  all  of  DG  ECHO’s 
actions, advocacy and other support to UN OCHA’s role at the whole of response level. As such, 
this question will cover the majority of DG ECHO’s support to country-level coordination.  

2)  Addressing  gaps:  To  what  extent  did  EU-funded  coordination  actions  address 

(coordination) gaps in overall responses? 

67 Full title: Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 
68 The ‘New Way of Working’  
69 Gap-filling in clusters; NGO coordination groups and other sub-national  coordination structures such as Rapid Response Mechanisms and or 
camp coordination.  
70 CivMil coordination, support to regional and global coordination structures with direct implications for operational coordination.  
71 Table 1 below. 

107 

 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

This question looks at DG ECHO’s targeted support to coordination other than support to UN OCHA 
at the whole of response level. As such, it includes direct interventions designed to fill coordination 
gaps.  These  might  be  non-UN  OCHA-led  coordination  at  the  whole  of  response  level  (such  as 
international  non-governmental  organisation  coordination  or  support  to  the  United  Nations  High 
Commissioner  for  Refugees  (UNHCR)),  but  more  typically  at  sub-national  level.  This  includes: 
support  to  specific  clusters;  ‘operational’  coordination  (such  as  camp  coordination  and  Rapid 
Response  Mechanisms);  and  other  support  to  non-UN  OCHA  structures  and  common  services 
which support strengthened joint responses (e.g. UN joint logistics, UNHAS, etc.).   

3)  Strengthened response: To what extent did EU-funded coordination actions contribute to a 

strengthened overall response? 

This question looks at a range of examples of DG ECHO’s support to coordination in the broadest 
sense, over and above support to UN OCHA at  the country level and measures aimed at filling 
gaps in response-level coordination. As such, this includes engagement in coordination structures 
and  initiatives  at  the  global  and  regional  levels.  It  is  important  to  note  that  the  review  does  not 
include a view of DG ECHO’s engagement in humanitarian coordination at  the global level, but 
does include instances where DG ECHO’s interventions at the global level can be linked directly to 
response-level efforts to strengthen coordination. Examples include CivMil coordination, including 
support at the global level; global support to cluster coordination; support to regional coordination 
bodies; and support to coordination structures in the absence of UN OCHA.  

4)  EU Added value: What is the EU added value of DG ECHO's interventions in the field of 

humanitarian coordination?   

This question takes findings from the evaluation set where there are direct references to DG ECHO 
adding value to coordination. It considers whether member states could have done as much as or 
better than individual member states. This is also taken to include the value of the DG ECHO field 
network (in keeping with the principle of subsidiarity), although this value is common to all of the 
review questions. It includes value added by DG ECHO by virtue of having specific skill sets and 
areas of expertise in coordination (e.g. civil-military coordination). 

5)  Operational  relevance:  To  what  extent  were  EU-funded  coordination  actions  relevant  to 

global needs in coordination? 

‘Relevance’ in this context focuses on the extent to which DG ECHO’s interventions in coordination 
were driven by an understanding of the operational context and/or the extent to which they are in 
line with DG ECHO global policy priorities. The former clearly draws significantly on DG ECHO’s 
efforts  and  its  ability  to  identify  ‘needs’  in  coordination  which  lead  to  interventions  to  fill  gaps 
(question 2). This, in turn relies on the value added by DG ECHO’s field network (question 5).  

Questions 1 to 3 derive from the evaluation framework for the larger study, where they form the 
three  principal  judgement  criteria  under  Evaluation  Question  9:  ‘To  what  extent  did  EU-funded 
coordination action strengthen coordination?’72 As such, these questions are general and broad-
ranging in nature. 

72 During the synthesis phase, the evaluation question order was revised to present analysis in the most logical way – Evaluation Question 9 was 
previously Evaluation Question 5. 

108 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

2.  Methods and limitations  

The review was undertaken using a mix of methods:  

  Data analysis: A quantitative analysis of worldwide actions funded by the Directorate-General 
for  European  Civil  Protection  and  Humanitarian  Aid  Operations  (DG  ECHO)  supporting 
humanitarian coordination between 2014 and 2018, based on the available data provided by 
DG ECHO.  

  Sample analysis: A qualitative review and analysis of a sample of DG ECHO’s funded actions 
in support of coordination (again from DG ECHO’s information systems, EVA and HOPE). 

  Document  review:  A  review  of  DG  ECHO-commissioned  evaluations  (geographic  and 

thematic) of its own work within the review period.  

  Key  informant  interviews:  A  small  number  of  key  informant  interviews  (six  in  total)  were 

undertaken. 

Limitations: There are a number of limitations specific to the design of this exercise, most of them 
as a result of its narrow scope and small sample sizes, but also due to the nature of this being a 
review that is a sub-set of the main evaluation. In this regard, it is important to note that this piece 
is categorised as a review rather than evaluation. Other than acting as a ‘meta-evaluation’ with 
limited scope, it is not possible to triangulate results and opinions from many of the Single Forms 
and the key informant interviews.  

A  limited  number  of  key  informant  interviews  (six  in  total)  were  carried  out  specifically  on 
humanitarian coordination. The quantitative analysis based on ECHO’s data raised a number of 
questions on which it was not possible to follow up. The report does, however, draw on data from 
the main CA evaluation consultations and interviews. 

The Single Forms and Fiche Ops in DG ECHO’s database provide a wealth of information, although 
it was not possible to triangulate the findings from these documents beyond the evidence available 
within  the  limited  sample.  However,  where  there  was  coincidence  between  single  forms, 
evaluations and/or key informant interviews, this enhanced the value of the review.  

The  evaluation  reports  provided  an  extremely  useful  source  of  evidence  overall.  Many  of  the 
evaluations, however, looked at multiple years and, in a number of cases, there were only one or 
two years of coincidence within the time frame for this review. To the extent possible, the reviewer 
selected findings which occur directly within the scope of this evaluation. The very large majority of 
the evidence provided by the evaluations, however, predates any changes made in line with the 
World Humanitarian Summit and Grand Bargain.     

The review relied on sampling to gain insights into the range of European Union (EU) interventions 
in support of humanitarian coordination during 2014-2018. For an analysis of EU-funded actions, a 
purposive sample of 22 was selected with a view to approximating the proportion of funded actions 
by  partners  type  (UN  OCHA,  UN  agency,  international  non-governmental  organisation).  The 
findings from the Central Africa evaluation are utilised in addition to this sample. For consultations 
with DG ECHO staff, the sample was limited to four (as specified in the review design) and based 
on consultations with DG ECHO regarding the most appropriate staff members. In addition to DG 
ECHO colleagues, the opinions of two staff from UN OCHA were sought; names were provided by 
DG ECHO.   

109 

 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

3.  Background  

European  Union  (EU)/Directorate-General  for  European  Civil  Protection  and  Humanitarian  Aid 
Operations (DG ECHO) global policy commitments on humanitarian coordination are articulated in 
the ‘The European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid (2008).’ These commitments are expressed 
annually at global level through DG ECHO’s annual ‘General Guidelines on Operational Priorities 
for Humanitarian Aid (GGOPs)’ and at response level through Humanitarian Implementation Plans 
(HIPs). Their clearly stated aim is to improve the humanitarian response to crises (and, in particular, 
the  delivery  of  aid  to  people  in  need)  through  support  for  better  coherence  and  coordination  of 
actors.  

Throughout the review period, DG ECHO has remained supportive of the prevailing Inter-Agency 
Standing Committee (IASC)-backed, United Nations (UN)-led coordination/response architecture 
in any given year. The GGOPs for 2014, 15 and 16 reflect DG ECHO’s staunch support for  the 
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) and ongoing efforts 
to strengthen the multilateral system. In the lead-up to the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016, 
UN  OCHA’s  efforts  to  strengthen  humanitarian  coordination  were  expressed  through  the  IASC 
Transformative Agenda, launched in 2011.73 As a result of developments via the Transformative 
Agenda,  priorities  included  engagement  with  the  UN  OCHA’s  newly  formed  IASC  Emergency 
Directors Group, and additional focus on crises which had been declared as ‘Level 3’ (including the 
Central African Republic (CAR), South Sudan, Syria and Iraq at this time). Emphasis continues to 
be placed on ‘coordinated needs assessments, the strengthening of humanitarian leadership and 
teams,  effective  humanitarian  coordination  and  rollout  of  the  humanitarian  project  cycle.’ 
Preparations for the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016 and DG ECHO’s role in the UN OCHA 
Donor Support Group (in effect UN OCHA’s Board in the absence of a formal structure) are also 
common features throughout.  

A  number  of  complementary  elements  which  appear  in  the  2014  GGOPs  are  also  consistent 
elements in EU-funded humanitarian coordination actions and the overall approach throughout the 
review period. These include: 

  Support  to  the  development  of  a  ‘framework  for  coordinated  needs  assessments’  as  a 
means of underpinning a shared understanding of humanitarian needs and priorities. 

  Efforts to ‘contribute towards a more inclusive international humanitarian system’ through 
increased  engagement  with  non-EU,  non-DAC  donors,  notably  cooperation  with 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Arab donors.  

  Efforts to strengthen gender- and age-sensitive programming – including the introduction 

of a gender-age marker for humanitarian aid operations.  

  Ongoing commitment to aid effectiveness, improved monitoring of implementation and civil-

military coordination. 

In  2017  and  2018,  following  the  World  Humanitarian  Summit,  DG  ECHO’s  priorities  focused 
squarely on support to the Grand Bargain and UN OCHA’s role within it. The 2018 GGOP stresses 
that  DG  ECHO  will  continue  working  with  UN  OCHA  in  taking  a  global  lead  on  advancing  a 
coordinated approach to needs assessment (Grand Bargain commitment 5). This shift is reflected 
in  an  ‘intervention  logic’  model  presented  in  the  CA  evaluation.  The  evaluation  uses  the  terms 

73 The Transformative Agenda is itself a direct extension of the ‘Humanitarian Reform Agenda’, which dominated global policy discourse following 
its launch in late 2005. The former introduced the ‘cluster approach’, designed to address gaps in coverage, as well as targeted efforts to strengthen 
the HC system. 

110 

 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

‘coordination  model’  pre-2016  and  ‘complementarity  model’  post-2016  to  reflect  the  greater 
emphasis  post-2016  on  coherence  between  humanitarian  and  development  actors,  per  UN 
OCHA’s ‘New Way of Working’. The complementary model is understood to be an extension of the 
‘coordination’ model, and both ‘coordinated’ and ‘principled’ humanitarian action are understood to 
remain central to ‘collective outcomes’.  

In the hybrid model, humanitarian interventions are expected to be highly ‘relevant’ (i.e. targeted at 
the  most  vulnerable  populations  and  vulnerable  groups,  with  strong  local  participation  and 
ownership).  Implementation  is  required  to  be  principled  and  coordinated  among  humanitarian 
actors, but also complementary with development and peacebuilding actors. Effectiveness means 
addressing  prioritised  needs  and  also  contributing  to  building  resilience  where  feasible.  In  the 
context of limited funding and increased needs, humanitarian assistance is also required to become 
more efficient and transparent, as outlined in the Grand Bargain.  

Figure 3: A ‘hybrid’ intervention logic for EU humanitarian assistance 2014-2018 

As part of its coordination function at the whole of response level, UN OCHA’s own definition of 
coordination includes its remit to reduce gaps in the response. As such, DG ECHO’s support to UN 
OCHA at the whole of response level is taken to include gap filling, along with numerous other 
actions designed to improve the effectiveness of humanitarian response:  

  Ensuring greater predictability, accountability and partnership; 
  Leading  the  international  community's  efforts  to  develop  a  better  architecture  for  the 
humanitarian system, including strong in-country humanitarian leaders and representative 
and inclusive Humanitarian Country Teams;  

  An effective and well-coordinated framework within which all humanitarian organisations 

can contribute systematically;  

  Predictable  funding  tools,  including  the  use  of  ‘balancing  instruments’  such  as  Country 

Based Pooled Funds and the Central Emergency Response Fund; and   

  Coordinating the assessment of situations and needs, agreement of common priorities and 
response strategies to address issues such as negotiating access, mobilising funding and 
other resources, and clarifying consistent public messaging.  

111 

 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

3.1.  Overview of EU-funded actions in support of coordination 

This section presents a basic analysis of EU-funded humanitarian coordination globally. It uses 
data extracted from the DG ECHO’s HOPE database (as of 30 January 2019). The analysis offers 
a basis for further definition of scope for the global review of humanitarian coordination. 

Table 3: Sub-sectors analysis 

Sub-sectors (Cleaned) 

# 
Results74 

of 

Sum of contracted amount (€) – 
Coordination 

Country-level (sector/inter-sector) coordination 

Other (coordination) 

Camp coordination 

Civil-military coordination 

N/A 

Global  (sector/inter-sector)  coordination  including 
global clusters 

Public awareness and advocacy 

687 

146 

38 

85 

26 

15 

34 

163,816,725 

40,714,896 

40,185,651 

19,167,377 

5,217,017 

4,531,862 

4,184,083 

Grand total 

1,031 

277,817,610 

Table 1 shows that, between 2014 and 2018, 1,031 results were recorded for coordination actions, 
687  of  which  relate  to  ‘country-level  (sector/inter-sector)  coordination’  and  another  15  of  which 
support ‘global (sector/inter-sector) coordination including global clusters’, including support to the 
global clusters. Of the 1,031 results, 85 refer to CivMil coordination. An additional 38 refer to camp 
coordination and 146 refer to ‘other (coordination)’ types. These categories are reflected throughout 
the summary sections which follow.    

Table  2  (below)  shows  total  EU  investments  in  humanitarian  coordination  through  its  largest 
partners (by ‘# of actions’, ‘# of results and ‘sum of contracted amount’). The data here show that 
UN  OCHA,  compared  to  the  next  largest  coordination  partner,  receives  more  than  double  the 
funding and is responsible for delivering six times as many coordination results. In conjunction with 
the  results  in  Table  1,  it  is  reasonable  to  infer  that  there  is  a  correlation  between  DG  ECHO’s 
support  to  UN  OCHA  and  to  UN-led  coordination  in  both  policy  and  practice.  The  EU’s  largest 
investments in coordination thereafter are undertaken through a less obvious set of partners: the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM), the International Rescue Committee UK (IRC-UK) 
and the Danish Refugee Council (DRC-DK). The amounts invested in these partners are relatively 
large in comparison to the amounts invested in other UN agencies with formal responsibilities for 
coordination and large roles (UNICEF, UNHCR). The scope and time frame for this review did not 
allow for a detailed analysis of the data set required to explain this breakdown.    

Table 4:Top 5 Partners Analysis 

Partner 

# 
actions 

of 

# of results 

Sum  of  contracted  amount  (€)  – 
Coordination 

UN OCHA-CH 

104 

348 

76,734,653 

74 ‘Results’ refers to a measurement of expected achievement in DG ECHO’s ‘single form’ system. For example, an action resulting in funding to a 
rapid response mechanism might have a number of expected results. These might be directly related to better outcomes or outputs for displaced 
populations as well as strengthened coordination.  

112 

 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

IOM-CH 

IRC-UK 

DRC-DK 

UNICEF-US 

UNHCR-CH 

FAO-IT 

ACTED-FR 

Top 5 total 

Grand total 

44 

15 

42 

30 

30 

22 

29 

55 

29 

54 

31 

31 

42 

42 

34,179,213 

32,130,575 

29,688,797 

10,900,029 

8,904,259 

7,215,954 

6,964,676 

316 (51%)  632 (61%) 

206,718,156 (74%) 

622 

1,031 

277,817,610 

Table  3  (below)  shows  total  amounts  of  EU  funding  invested  in  humanitarian  coordination 
worldwide during 2014-2018. It is based on an identification of coordination at the level of ‘results’ 
within  larger  ‘actions’.  The  data  indicate  that  EUR  277.8m  was  invested  in  humanitarian 
coordination over the past five years. However, it also shows a recent downturn in investments, 
falling sharply in 2018 after growing from 2014 to  2017. Meanwhile, the number of actions and 
results involving coordination peaked in 2015, and then dropped yearly until 2018.  

Table 5: DG ECHO funding for coordination 

Contract start year 

# of actions  # of results  Sum of contracted amount (€) – Coordination 

2014 

2015 

2016 

2017 

2018 

Grand total 

114 

151 

132 

115 

110 

622 

197 

240 

211 

201 

182 

1,031 

40,944,314  

47,961,428  

70,769,962  

76,353,242  

41,788,664  

113 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

4.  Main findings 

1) 

To  what  extent  did  EU-funded  coordination  actions  reinforce  UN  OCHA’s  role 
wherever appropriate? 

The review supports the premise that the Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and 
Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO) is both engaged with and supportive of the role of the 
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) in coordination at 
all levels and in all contexts under review. In a range of examples from evaluations, DG ECHO 
plays a directly supportive role to UN OCHA where it is established and seen to be functioning well. 
In addition, where weaknesses are perceived, DG ECHO is seen to challenge UN OCHA to perform 
better (in addition to direct support). In the context of the Syria response, DG ECHO supported UN 
OCHA in each affected country and supported regional coordination and a stronger role for UN 
OCHA to complement the coordination role of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR)  in  refugee-hosting  countries.  Evaluations,  including  the  Comprehensive  Evaluation, 
indicate that DG ECHO’s support, notably in Syria, did not necessarily lead to systemic weaknesses 
or  challenges  being  overcome.  As  noted  throughout  the  review,  DG  ECHO’s  interventions  in 
support of UN OCHA come in multiple forms: funded actions, engagement at country level via the 
field network, and support to information management. It is clear that these elements work best in 
balance (this is explored further below through analysis of EU added value). 

i. Direct support to UN OCHA 

The ‘Comprehensive evaluation of the European Union's humanitarian aid, 2012-2016’ is a meta-
evaluation and the highest-level evaluation in the sample. The evaluation75 shows76 that DG ECHO 
‘increasingly acknowledged’ the importance of contributing to  Inter-Agency Standing Committee 
(IASC) coordination, including the cluster approach (led by UN OCHA) at response level. Overall, 
the  evaluation  found  that  ‘DG  ECHO  improved  its  involvement  in  humanitarian  coordination 
structures at policy and field level during the evaluation period’.  

From UN OCHA’s own perspective,77 DG ECHO is a strong supporter and an influential donor.78 
Most of DG ECHO’s financial support to UN OCHA comes at the response level. The value of DG 
ECHO’s support, however, was seen as multifaceted, coming in the form of financial support and 
advocacy at the response level, and also in the form of strong engagement at global level in donor-
specific and other coordination forums.  

In a number of evaluations, support to UN OCHA (financial support and advocacy) was seen as 
clear  and  unequivocal.  The  evaluation79  of  DG  ECHO’s  response  in Sudan  and  South  Sudan80  
found  that  ‘the  level  of  DG  ECHO  support  to  UN/UN  OCHA  leadership  mechanisms  of 
Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) and Humanitarian Country team (HCT) has been consistent since 
2014.’ This included ‘direct and unambiguous funding to and support of UN OCHA’s role’. For the 
Great  Lakes  Region,  the  evaluation  of  DG  ECHO’s  response  found  that,  overall,  DG  ECHO 
‘encouraged  its  framework  partners  to  coordinate  their  efforts  with  other  humanitarian  actors 

75 Comprehensive evaluation of the European Union's humanitarian aid, 2012-2016. Final Report (2018) 
76 ‘Evaluation of DG ECHO’s role with respect to the IASC coordination mechanisms’ – stand-alone section within the  Comprehensive evaluation 
of the European Union's humanitarian aid, 2012-2016  (p95)   
77 Key informant interviews 
78 UN OCHA noted that DG ECHO’s support was channelled mainly to response level coordination.  
79 Regional and country level evaluations of DG ECHO’s responses typically contain specific sections which consider ‘coherence’. These tend to 
look at ‘internal’ coherence with other Commission bodies (including DG DEVCO) and external coherence with EU and UN member States and via 
IASC coordination bodies.   
80 DG ECHO’s Response to the Humanitarian Crises in Sudan and South Sudan (2011-2015) 

114 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

through the humanitarian coordination structures’. Similarly, the Central Africa (CA) study found 
that ECHO encouraged its partners to participate in UN OCHA led coordination. A deeper analysis, 
however, showed that only about half of the DG ECHO funded actions were included in the HRP.  

In CA, DG ECHO allocated the largest part of its coordination funding to UN OCHA in CA 2014-
2018. Across the three countries (Cameroon, Central African Republic (CAR), Chad), DG ECHO 
consistently  supported  UN  OCHA’s  role  with  funding  and  advocacy  at  both  national  and 
decentralised levels. In CAR, DG ECHO actively supported UN OCHA and the Humanitarian Needs 
Overview (HNO)/Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) processes through participation in the HCT, 
helped to reshape the CAR Humanitarian Fund and improve its performance, and encouraged UN 
OCHA to create sub-national coordination hubs. In 2013 and early 2014, when most UN agencies 
and  UN  OCHA  were  evacuated  from  CAR,  DG  ECHO  itself  played  a  lead  role  in  response 
coordination. In Cameroon, DG ECHO funded and supported UN OCHA’s coordination role, most 
notably  the  opening  of  an  UN  OCHA  office  in  the  country  in  2015  in  order  to  strengthen  the 
coordination.  During  the  large  influx  of  CAR  refugees  to  Cameroon  in  2013-2015,  UNHCR  had 
struggled to coordinate the humanitarian response inside and outside of camps, which exceeded 
its  mandate.  A  number  of  evaluations  demonstrate  that  DG  ECHO  was  a  significant  financial 
contributor to humanitarian coordination. In the Great Lakes Region, the evaluation notes that DG 
ECHO provided 31% of the funding allocated to the coordination and support.   

In other evaluations, DG ECHO’s interventions included direct support to UN OCHA, in parallel with 
challenges to improve performance in each context respectively. Both the Burundi and Democratic 
Republic  of  Congo  (DRC)  cases  demonstrate  the  need  for  balance  of  financial  and  ‘hands-on’ 
engagement and influencing. The DRC case study notes the heavy engagement of DG ECHO staff 
in coordination structures. The study reflects ongoing dissatisfaction with the quality of coordination 
structures.  It  also  describes  the  dual  role  of  DG  ECHO  staff,  supporting  UN  OCHA  while 
simultaneously challenging it to improve.  

In Burundi, this support arguably goes one step further in that DG ECHO was seen to advocate for 
UN OCHA to play a more significant role and made a financial contribution to the re-opening of the 
UN  OCHA  office  in  Bujumbura.  The  DG  ECHO-funded  action  ‘Humanitarian  coordination  and 
advocacy in Burundi’ forms part of the sample for this review. It notes that with DG ECHO’s support, 
UN OCHA was able to: reinforce coordination capacities at all levels; jointly launch the HRP 2017 
with the government, marking the acceptance of the existence of humanitarian needs; and enable 
the HCT to become a stronger decision-making body based on improved inter-sectoral analysis. 
Notwithstanding the success noted in the Single Form results, UN OCHA was seen as having failed 
to reinforce the entirety of the coordination architecture. Most notably, there were weaknesses in 
the clusters below national level. The accompanying fiche notes that UN OCHA Burundi was not 
able to produce a full end of the year report on the 2017 HRP achievements and that the quality 
and  conclusions  of  some  needs  assessments  could  be  debateable  (using  the  MIRA  as  an 
example).  Also  noting  the  improvements  in  coordination  brought  about,  in  part,  by  DG  ECHO’s 
financial contribution, the evaluation81 concludes that DG ECHO’s physical presence was light. A 
number  of  interviewees  ‘considered  that  an  actor  such  as  DG  ECHO  should  have  taken  more 
responsibility and leadership in supporting the coordination of the humanitarian response’.82 

ii. DG  ECHO’s  support  to  coordination  in  contexts  where  UN  OCHA  is  either  weak  or  its  role 
contested 

The Comprehensive Evaluation also noted the complexity of the relationship between UN OCHA 
and  other  UN  agencies.  This  is  especially  the  case  where  UN-led  humanitarian  coordination  is 

81 Evaluation of the EU humanitarian aid intervention in the African Great Lakes region, 2013-2017 Final Report (p.59) 
82 Ibid. 

115 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

weak by virtue of human resource or funding constraints; or when its role or legitimacy is actively 
challenged or suppressed by an unsupportive host government. Under these circumstances, and 
although UN OCHA is the only entity mandated to coordinate, DG ECHO and some member states 
have supported alternative coordination structures (see below under ‘Filling gaps in coordination’) 
in  some  instances  and/or  presented  a  strong  challenge  to UN  OCHA  to  improve  in  others  (this 
issue is discussed below under ‘Relevance).  

The  global  evaluation  notes  that  there  are  two  schools  of  thought:  one  set  of  respondents 
supportive of DG ECHO’s role in challenging UN OCHA to improve its performance or to enhance 
certain coordination functions; and the second stating that this goes beyond their remit. Ultimately, 
the Comprehensive Evaluation finds that ‘DG ECHO should continue its efforts to support the UN 
coordination structures (and challenge them when necessary)’. This issue is explored further under 
‘Relevance’ below.  

The Syria crisis offered an arguably uniquely challenging coordination context. In this instance, DG 
ECHO is seen as having played an  essential role in coordination. An evaluation of DG ECHO’s 
response to the Syria Crisis83 notes the extreme challenges that the context offered. The nature of 
the Syria crisis, a ‘Level 3’84 emergency that included a substantial refugee crisis component, led 
to  tension  between  UNHCR  and  UN  OCHA;  including  ‘confusion…  between  HCR-led  sectoral 
groups and UN OCHA-led cluster systems.’ Overall, the evaluation found that DG ECHO ‘made 
significant efforts to improve strategic coordination’, ‘supporting the coordination role of UN OCHA 
both  inside  Syria  and  in  neighbouring  countries,  including  supporting  the  development  of  UN 
OCHA’s Whole of Syria (WoS) approach’ (which was also supported by a DG ECHO funded action 
through  the  International  Organization  for  Migration  (IOM),  detailed  below).  DG  ECHO  also 
invested  in  the  regional  approach  to  coordination,  supporting  the  regional  humanitarian 
coordinator’s office in Amman and seeking to improve coordination of efforts both inside Syria and 
across neighbouring countries (a number of these points are expanded on below under ‘EU added 
value’).  DG  ECHO  also  encouraged  UNHCR  to  include  non-UNHCR  partner  organisations  in 
coordination in Lebanon with positive effects. Despite these efforts, the evaluation finds that effects 
were  limited.  Ongoing  challenges  between  UNHCR  and  UN  OCHA  continued  to  hamper 
coordination efforts for many actors, DG ECHO included. A number of interviewees argued that 
DG  ECHO  played  too  strong  a  hand  in  promoting  UN  OCHA’s  coordination  role,  ultimately 
exacerbating tensions. Some also questioned the value of the investment in Amman; the task of 
coordination between countries had less obvious relevance. 

An evaluation of DG ECHO’s humanitarian interventions in India and Nepal (2013-2017)85 makes 
no mention of UN OCHA. It is unlikely that UN OCHA had a large role in India (other than support 
from  the  Regional  Office)  during  this  period.  UN  OCHA’s  office  in  Nepal  has  also  opened  and 
closed numerous times, in accordance with conditions on the ground. The evaluation makes a brief 
reference to DG ECHO’s active participation in the UN-led ‘Humanitarian Coordination Team Plus’.  

DG ECHO-funded actions in support of UN OCHA in countries with no evaluative cross-reference 
cited a range of results: the results of DG ECHO’s support in Afghanistan86 include: the successful 
production of an evidence-based and prioritised  HRP; the successful launch of the Afghanistan 
Common Humanitarian Fund87 and its first year of operation.  

83 Evaluation of the ECHO response to the Syrian Crisis (2012-2014) Final Report June 2016. This evaluation covers the period 2012-2014. As 
such, only the final year coincides with the time scope for this review.  In general, however, it appears unlikely that the overall findings would deviate 
significantly. 
84  Declaration  of  an  IASC  Humanitarian  System-Wide  Emergency  Response  (‘Level  3/L3’  Response)  activates  a  system-wide  mobilisation  of 
capacity (leadership, staffing and funding) to enable accelerated and scaled-up delivery of assistance and protection to people in need. 
85 Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian interventions in India and Nepal, 2013-2017 Final Report  
86 Strengthening Humanitarian Field Coordination in Afghanistan 
87 DG ECHO support UN OCHA’s management function of the Fund but does not make contributions (neither in Afghanistan nor typically to other 
UN pooled funds). 

116 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

In  Haiti,  DG  ECHO’s  support  to  UN  OCHA  came  at  a  time  of  transition  in  which  UN  OCHA 
downsized  humanitarian  coordination  in  light  of  the  construction  of  a  transitional  appeal  (TAP), 
which included the UN’s development agencies. The fiche notes that the TAP was undermined 
after a change in staff at UN OCHA, Haiti reinstated a stand-alone humanitarian appeal. Although 
the results note that UN OCHA was engaged in all structures, the final notes from the fiche note 
the weakness of UN OCHA in 2015 having downgraded its footprint in 2014.  

In  Myanmar,88  at  the  highest  level  UN  OCHA  was  seen  to  have  ‘provided  coordination  and 
advocacy activities at Yangon level, with tailored support to the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC), 
the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) and the Inter-Cluster Coordination Group (ICCG), and in 
areas with protracted humanitarian situations’. In addition, UN OCHA ‘used its advisory capacity to 
the HC and other senior humanitarian actors to assure terms of coordination and support to the 
humanitarian community through the HCT’. Weaknesses, however, included a lack of coordination 
with UN colleagues in Bangladesh, undermining UN OCHA’s ability to provide a uniform picture 
cross-border; and issues with weaknesses in coordination at sub-national level, one clear exception 
being the deployment of senior national staff in Shan State, noted as effective support.  

In the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT), results of the DG ECHO -funded action are almost 
universally positive. The Single Form notes that ‘Humanitarian coordination and response in the 
West Bank was continuously strengthened and advanced under the leadership of UN OCHA’; that 
UN  OCHA  OPT  managed  a  major  transition  of  the  cluster  system;  and  played  key  roles  in 
advocacy,  needs  assessment  and  the  management  of  information  related  to  emergency  fuel 
deliveries.  

In Ukraine, the fiche concludes that UN OCHA provided a high level of support to RC/HC and to 
HCT.’  At  the  sub-national  level,  the  results  note  ‘regular  coordination  mechanisms  in  five  field 
locations’ and that these locations were chosen so that UN OCHA could support operations ‘along 
the contact line, as well as non-Government controlled areas. The results and the fiche stress the 
importance of CivMil coordination in this context (detailed below).  

In  Colombia,  results  also  point  to  satisfaction  with  UN  OCHA’s  role,  including  integration  with 
government structures (below). The fiche concludes that ‘UN OCHA's… 5 results… were achieved 
according to the corresponding indicators’. The Single Form notes that ‘humanitarian coordination 
structures were streamlined to better fit the current context, particularly adapting it to geographical 
and sectorial needs’. At the highest level, UN OCHA was seen as successfully implementing its 
core functions: serving as secretariat for the HCT, actively supporting the Transformative Agenda, 
and managing inter-cluster and supporting clusters.  

In summary, the review finds numerous instances in which DG ECHO is both engaged with and 
supportive of UN OCHA’s role in coordination at all levels. This is true in a range of contexts. In the 
examples  which  follow,  DG  ECHO  supports  UN  OCHA  directly  where  it  plays  a  strong  role; 
challenges UN OCHA to perform better (in addition to providing direct support) where weaknesses 
are  perceived;  and  provides  a  broader  coordination  role  where  the  ideal  functioning  of  the 
multilateral system is challenged politically. This broader role (including in cooperation with other 
donors,  as  appropriate)  includes  direct  support  to  UN  OCHA,  as  well  incentivising  and/or 
challenging  UN  OCHA  to  ensure  better  performance.  As  above,  DG  ECHO’s  interventions  in 
support of UN OCHA come in multiple forms, in the form of funded actions and engagement at the 

88 Humanitarian Coordination and Advocacy in Myanmar. 

117 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

country  level  via  the  field  network.  It  is  clear  that  these  elements  work  best  in  balance  (this  is 
explored further below in ‘EU added value’). 

2) 

To  what  extent  did  EU-funded  coordination  actions  address  gaps  in  coordination 
within responses? 

The review sample supports the premise that DG ECHO plays an active and purposeful role in 
filling  coordination  gaps.  For  the  purposes  of  this  review,  coordination  ‘gaps’  refer  to  instances 
where there is a perceived need to strengthen coordination (geographic, thematic or both) for a 
specific facet of a response. Examples would include: strengthening specific clusters in the event 
of perceived weakness; Rapid Response Mechanisms (RRMs), which respond to a defined subset 
of the vulnerable population; and geographically specific coordination such as camp coordination 
or sub-national structures in the event of growing needs. Ultimately, these findings read across 
directly to ‘Relevance’ and ‘EU added value’ below. It is very clear in these instances that the field 
network  adds  value  by  identifying  coordination  gaps  at  the  response  level  and  taking  action  to 
ensure that coordination structures are contextually relevant.   

i. DG ECHO support to cluster coordination at the response level or sub-national level 

Evaluations and Single Forms contain numerous examples of DG ECHO offering direct, targeted 
support to clusters with a view to filling gaps in coordination.  

Specifically, this often came in the form of funding to international non-governmental organisation 
(INGO) co-leads/co-facilitators, to balance or enhance a UN lead, particularly where funding was 
already in place. In Sudan and South Sudan, DG ECHO funded cluster coordinators during this 
period  and  participated  in  cluster  meetings.  The  evaluation  found  a  largely  functioning  cluster 
system, notwithstanding reservations from DG ECHO staff in-country. The evaluation did contain 
criticism around inadequate and infrequent sharing of information, in that some DG ECHO partners 
were  perceived  to  have  been  slow  to  inform  cluster  coordination  structures  of  their  activities, 
increasing the potential for gaps. The specific example of poor information sharing in Sudan was 
raised by UN OCHA,89 where DG ECHO had fallen short of ensuring full support for UN OCHA-led 
coordination (see section 1 above).  

In CAR, DG ECHO provided relatively strong funding to coordination and was perceived to address 
gaps. Stakeholders stated that DG ECHO-funded coordination actions addressed gaps, initially at 
the cluster level and later at the response level. Previous DG ECHO support for co-facilitation of 
the Food Security and Health clusters, and for a common logistical platform for non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), was also valued and was still missed by IPs. In Chad, DG ECHO helped 
address coordination gaps at different levels (strategic, national and local), and participated actively 
in clusters and the HCT. DG ECHO supported and funded UN OCHA and cluster coordination, 
including the Food Security and Livelihoods Cluster and Cash working group until 2017. DG ECHO 
was  reported  to  encourage  partners  to  coordinate  their  actions,  although  coordination  between 
INGOs and UN agencies was limited and coordination among UN actors was considered weak. 

DG ECHO’s support to thematic coordination is exemplified in two actions aimed at strengthening 
coordination in Food Security through the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO): 

  FAO Nigeria Project: ‘Strengthening humanitarian response by improving coordination of 
the food sector and Cadre Harmonisé food security vulnerability assessment to support the 
livelihood of vulnerable households’. 

89 Key informant interview 

118 

 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

  FAO  Bangladesh  Project:  ‘Continue  strengthening  the  Food  Security  Cluster  (FSC)  in 
Bangladesh through capacity building and institutionalising best practices in humanitarian 
responses with a view to fostering future sustainability’. 

Both actions report significant strengthening of coordination as a result of the actions in which DG 
ECHO  was  the  main  financial  partner.  In  Bangladesh,  in  particular,  the  FSC  was  seen  as  an 
example of best practice on collaboration, with the potential at the time for it to be used as a model 
for  multi-cluster  coordination  and  ‘outstanding  among  the  clusters  in  Bangladesh’.  In  Nigeria, 
objectives were ‘largely achieved’ and the fiche notes that with DG ECHO support ‘the partner was 
able to introduce the Cadre Harmonisé in Nigeria and greatly contributed to allow the scale of the 
food security crisis in the NE to become visible, thus directly influencing the level of the 2017 HRP’. 
In Nigeria, the food security sector is noted as being ‘robust’ at the sub-national level although the 
need was seen for ‘intensification and sustenance of the gains’ and institutionalisation across all 
16 states to be achieved.  

In both countries, coordination with the World Food Programme (WFP) was seen as having been 
strengthened. In Bangladesh, both FAO and WFP were seen as cooperating and having a high 
degree  of  separation  of  agency  and  cluster  agendas,  and  as  having  facilitated  interagency 
partnership among a high number of partners’. In Bangladesh, one of the few weaknesses noted 
was that the project did not attain the level of engagement with the government. 

In Chad, DG ECHO provided consistent funding to FAO’s action to support FSC coordination. In 
2018, this enabled the FSC to play its important role in coordinating the humanitarian response; 
and to deliver key functions, promote nutrition and resilience in the food security sector, establish 
a  working  group  on  coordinating  the  Humanitarian-Development  Nexus  (‘Nexus’,  HDN),  among 
members and state actors; and ensure a coordinated response to the lean season crisis. 

Albeit from a very small sample, it appears that DG ECHO has had a particular focus on providing 
support to FSCs through the FAO, which typically involves DG ECHO assuming a large ‘burden 
share’. Supporting the FSCs is typically seen as an example of coordination (in the horizontal sense 
among humanitarian actors) and in supporting coherence in a broader sense by encouraging WFP 
and FAO to work together on food security solutions as a complement to food aid. In the CA study, 
support to FAO and the FSC seemed to be an exception from DG ECHO’s divesting support to 
cluster and co-cluster leads.   

Notwithstanding the high level of support for coordination overall, the Comprehensive Evaluation 
found inconsistencies in this support at the national level and assessed it as ‘insufficient or patchy’ 
in some countries. The global evaluation ultimately called for ‘a more consistent participation of DG 
ECHO  in  existing  clusters  across  sectors  and  a  more  proactive  approach  in  promoting  some 
thematic practices within established structures both at HQ and field level.’ 

iii. DG ECHO support to Rapid Response Mechanisms (RRMs) 

Evaluations and  DG ECHO’s data set also offer numerous examples of DG ECHO’s support to 
geographically or thematically specific RRMs. These both appear to be areas where genuine value 
is added when UN OCHA-led structures at the whole of response level and clusters at sub-national 
level  are  bolstered  by  complementary  structures  with  a  specific  geographic  or  thematic  focus. 
Caution is clearly required, however, not to duplicate or undermine the role of cluster structures 
(the  Rapid  Response  to  Population  Movements  (RRPM)in  DRC  is  a  case  in  point).  While 
operational coordination at this granular level is often beyond the capacity of sub-national clusters, 
it  is  relatively  easy  for  such  ‘operational’  coordination  structures  to  undergo  ‘mission  creep’. 
Evaluations  also  note  the  need  for  DG  ECHO  to  be  aware  of  the  potential  tensions inherent  in 

119 

 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

supporting  alternative  coordination  structures,  specifically  those  parallel  to  UN  OCHA-led 
structures. In all the examples provided, however, DG ECHO has been seen to be sensitive to such 
tensions when raised. 

DG ECHO provides 25% of financial support to the UNICEF-led RRPM in Eastern DRC. This is 
directly supportive of sub-national, operational coordination. In addition, the RRPM has a specific 
role in filling the gap in response for newly displaced populations. The action supports multi-sectoral 
(water sanitation and health (WASH), non-food items, education) rapid response to newly displaced 
people in Eastern DRC displacement. Overall, the results for this action are positive; most refer to 
each individual response component (WASH, education, etc.) rather than the coordination efforts 
of  the  United  Nations  Children’s  Fund  (UNICEF)  or  the  larger  coordination  function  for  the 
mechanism. The RRPM also receives significant attention in the Great Lakes evaluation, with a 
particular focus on coordination. The evaluation notes that the RRPM is very well established and 
that by 2017 the RRPM Comité de Pilotage (CoPil – Pilot Committee) was established to the point 
where it was ‘de facto duplicating some of the functions of the inter-cluster mechanism.’ ECHO was 
reported as being a strong advocate for simplifying RRPM coordination and ensuring that the UN 
OCHA led structures – most importantly, the inter-cluster – played their appropriate role. Ultimately, 
DG ECHO was seen90 as an engaged donor, taking a leading role in negotiations with UNICEF. 
Some  respondents,  however,  questioned  whether  or  not  donors  in  general,  and  DG  ECHO  in 
particular, were fully committed to financial support for the full complement of human resources 
required. The CA study also notes that in interviews in CAR, stakeholders cited DG ECHO’s active 
support in helping to create and fund RRM as having strengthened the overall response.   

In CAR, DG ECHO advocated for a Level 3 response in 2013-2014, and actively helped to create 
and fund the RRM, among other key initiatives. From mid-2016, DG ECHO was closely associated 
with the RRM, which proved successful in conducting multi-sector assessments followed by timely 
interventions that reached hundreds of thousands of people.  

Two of the NGO-led actions in the sample also relate to RRM mechanisms and their specific role 
in encouraging multi-sectoral responses.  

  CARE  Syria  Project:91  ‘To  address  emergency,  protection  and  basic  needs  of  vulnerable 
populations  in  Syria  through  coordinated,  integrated  support.’  This  project  has  four  results, 
including one on coordination.  

  DRC  Libya  Project:92  ‘Integrated  emergency  response  and  protection  assistance  to  conflict 
affected  populations  in  Libya.’  Results  for  the  CARE  project  stress  the  role  of  CARE  in 
coordination. ‘CARE coordinated and collaborated with response actors (i.e. CCCM Cluster, 
UN OCHA etc.) involved in the RRMs in the different hubs to ensure a coordinated and efficient 
response  effort;  ‘Coordination  between  humanitarian  actors  on  rapid  response  has  been 
steadily improving.’ Echoing a similar finding from the global evaluation in Syria, however, the 
Single Form notes that ‘to varying degrees, data sharing, management, and analysis remains 
a challenge in all three 'hubs'/response areas’. Similarly, in Libya, DRC and partners are seen 
as having ‘strengthened the rapid response capacity for Libya through support to coordination 
forums’,  working  with  the  UN  OCHA-led  RRM  taskforce  and  the  Inter-Sector  Coordination 
Group. ACTED, the other partner in this action was acting as lead of the INGO forum, again to 
‘strengthen coordination capacity within the Libyan response.’ In addition, DRC was nominated 
to  coordinate  the  Protection  Sector  (with  UNHCR).  The  results  from  both  country  contexts 
highlight  the  INGO’s  role in  joint  needs  assessments  and  in  working  with  and  through local 

90 Evaluation of the EU humanitarian aid intervention in the African Great Lakes region, 2013-2017 Final Report (p.59) 
91 ECHO contribution: EUR 3,934,645.57; 98.8% of total funding. 
92 ECHO contribution: EUR 1,170,989.18; 90.9% of total funding. 

120 

 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

authorities.  Both  are  held  up  as  reasonably  successful  examples  of  collaborative 
implementation under extremely challenging operating conditions.   

iv. DG ECHO support to INGO coordination structures 

The Sudan evaluation offers one example where DG ECHO and other member states have sought 
to complement IASC structures with INGO-specific coordination structures. In one such example, 
DG ECHO supported the ‘South Sudan NGO Forum Secretariat’. Coherence with the UN OCHA 
structures was sought by ‘ensuring the NGO forum coordinates closely with’ UN OCHA on access 
issues  and  United  Nations  Department  of  Safety  and  Security  on  security  issues.  DG  ECHO 
financed the Secretariat of the NGO forum in Sudan through a partner and it was located within UN 
OCHA. Despite efforts to ensure coherence, the evaluation ultimately cautioned that DG ECHO 
should ‘avoid creating separate coordination mechanisms’. 

In CAR, DG ECHO actively helped to create (and provided) consistent yearly funding to the NGO 
coordination  committee  (CCO),93  which  received  7%  of  all  funding  allocated  to  humanitarian 
coordination activities in CA 2014-2018. In 2017, the CCO engaged with more than 75% of INGOs 
in  CAR,  elected  an  executive  committee,  and  participated  in  the  main  coordination  bodies  in 
Bangui,  including  all  HCT  and  CivMil  coordination  meetings.  It  was  recognised  as  an  essential 
humanitarian  platform,  allowing for  strong  and  common  positions among  INGOs  and facilitating 
information exchange, coordination, communication and advocacy. 

v. DG ECHO support to coordination efforts through improvements to information management  

Another  example  of  support  to  sub-national  coordination  is  offered  by  DG ECHO’s  support94  to 
IOM’s  ‘Rapid  Response  for  Disaster-Affected  Internally  Displaced  Persons  in  Ethiopia’.  This  is 
typical of the thematic coordination projects in that it has a single result which is directly linked to 
coordination (the other, in this case, directly related to the tangible project outputs in shelter and 
settlements). As with the other IOM project in Syria, the coordination element comes from IOM’s 
ability to consolidate, analyse and disseminate data on internally displaced persons, and its ability 
to  coordinate  and  collaborate  with  government  at  all  levels.  The  results  cite  these  as  critical 
elements in the success of the project. In particular, and in keeping with this context, IOM’s ability 
to coordinate with the government and to link national systems to cluster coordination are cited as 
successful. 

In terms of reducing coordination gaps in Syria, the evaluation once again highlights the extent of 
the  challenge,  this  time  given  the  obstacles  to  effective  information  sharing  presented  by  the 
security  and  political  situation.  As  a  result,  the  evaluation  highlights  challenges  to  effective 
information and the identification of gaps. There is a direct link in this instance to an IOM project 
funded  by  DG  ECHO.  The  project  was  directly  aimed  at  filling  the  information  gap  in  Syria,  in 
support  of  the  WoS  approach,  in  full  coordination  with  UN  OCHA.  IOM’s  Humanitarian  Needs 
Assessment Programme (HNAP) supported coordination at whole of response level in the sense 
that worked with and through UN OCHA’s HNO assessments. Both the WoS approach and the 
HNAP  assessments  worked  towards  balancing  the  response  between  operations  run  from 
Damascus, and those run cross border from Turkey and elsewhere. Results were principally at 
output level, training of trainers undertaken, information products delivered, etc. While the report 
has no evaluative judgement, it is reasonable to assume that the HNAP assessments were critical 
IM components of the response. 

93 Comité de Coordination des ONGIs (CCO). 
94 ECHO contribution: EUR 1,000,000; which is 79.28% of total funding. 

121 

 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

In summary, the evaluations and other literature contain numerous examples of DG ECHO offering 
direct, targeted support to cluster coordination structures with a view to filling gaps in coordination. 
Albeit from a very small sample, it appears that DG ECHO has a particular focus on support to 
FSCs  through  the  FAO,  which  typically  involves  a  relatively  large  financial  ’burden  share’. 
Supporting the FSCs is typically seen as an example of coordination (in the horizontal sense among 
humanitarian actors) and in supporting coherence in the broader sense by encouraging WFP and 
FAO to work together on food security solutions as a complement to food aid. In the CA study, 
support to FAO and the FSC seemed to be an exception from DG ECHO’s divesting support to 
cluster and co-cluster leads in the latter stages of the evaluation period. Evaluations also note the 
need  for  DG  ECHO  to  be  aware  of  the  potential  tensions  inherent  in  supporting  alternative 
coordination  structures;  specifically,  those  parallel  to  UN  OCHA-led  structures.  In  all  examples 
provided, however, DG ECHO has been seen to be sensitive to such tensions when raised. Support 
to geographically or thematically specific RRMs appears to be one area where caution is required 
not to duplicate or undermine the role of cluster structures (the RRMP in DRC is a case in point). 
That said, operational coordination at this granular level is often beyond the capacity of sub-national 
clusters.   

3) 

To  what  extent  did  EU-funded  coordination  actions  contribute  to  a  strengthened 
overall response?  

The broader evaluation set does not offer a great deal in the way of conclusions on the extent to 
which DG ECHO’s support to coordination has strengthened responses overall. In large part, this 
is characteristic of a larger attribution problem in humanitarian action.  According to UN OCHA’s 
own  evaluation  synthesis  notes  (with  specific  reference  to  responses  to  conflict),  there  is  an 
‘overarching challenge’ ‘in assessing the effectiveness of a given intervention’.95 Well-coordinated 
responses, in keeping with UN OCHA’s definition, are held to be more effective responses and 
there is a body of opinion which supports this notion anecdotally. Quantifying and attributing the 
effect of coordination on the effectiveness of a given intervention is even more of a challenge. UN 
OCHA’s  own  evaluation  synthesis  offers  that  coordination  efforts  were  beneficial.  The  same 
evaluation, however, notes that the value for money of coordination efforts was questioned (see 
‘Relevance’) below.     

The CA evaluation did undertake surveys of stakeholders in the response and solicited opinions 
on effectiveness. In CAR, stakeholders were strongly of the opinion that DG ECHO's support to 
coordination  had  strengthened  the  humanitarian  response;  80%  ‘agreed’  and  within  these 
respondents the majority ‘agreed strongly’. Similarly, in Chad the large majority of respondents to 
the survey felt that DG ECHO's support to coordination strengthened the humanitarian response, 
with  91%  agreeing  and  most  of  those  agreeing  strongly,  especially  among  implementers.  In 
addition,  stakeholders  in  interviews  in  CAR  and  Chad  believed  that  DG  ECHO’s  support  to 
coordination strengthened the response overall, both through support to UN OCHA and through 
filling gaps in coordination (detailed in section 2).   

Overall,  this  review  takes  the  view  that  it  is  reasonable  to  assume  that  a  range  of  relevant 
coordination actions supports a more effective response. Sections 1 and 2 look at support to UN 
OCHA at whole of response level and other direct support to humanitarian coordination at the whole 
of  response  and  sub-national  levels,  respectively.  In  keeping  with  the  approach  set  out,  the 
remainder  of  this  section  looks  at  examples  of  ECHO’s  support  to  coordination  in  the  broader 
sense. It includes engagement in coordination structures and initiatives at the global and regional 
levels, as well as CivMil coordination, in which DG ECHO has specific technical expertise.   

95 Quadrennial Evaluation Synthesis: Synthesis of Evaluation Findings and Lessons from UN OCHA-managed Evaluations 2014-2017 (Feb 2018)  
122 

 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

i. DG ECHO’s support to CivMil coordination: 

The  collective  set  of  evidence  for  the  review  highlights  the  key  role  of  DG  ECHO  in  CivMil 
coordination.  In  addition,  evaluations  and  interviews  offer  substantial  evidence  of  the  direct 
connections  between  DG  ECHO’s  global  interventions  and  strengthened  coordination  at  the 
response  level.  In  addition,  they  demonstrate  how  these  links  work  in  both  directions.  In  some 
instances, gaps in CivMil coordination at the response level are identified and to some extent filled, 
also thanks to DG ECHO’s advocacy and influence at the global level. Evaluations suggest that 
coordination was strengthened in South Sudan and Haiti as a result of DG ECHO’s intervention 
and in other contexts (e.g. Nigeria) UN OCHA increased its dedicated staff (and its seniority). In 
the case of CivMil coordination, an area in which DG ECHO has specific thematic expertise, global 
policy and the production of guidance material – in particular, internationally agreed Civil-Military 
Coordination  Guidelines  –  appears  to  cascade  quite  directly  to  the  field  level.  Evaluations  and 
Single  Forms  demonstrate  DG  ECHO’s  efforts  to  strengthen  coordination  at  the  response  level 
through  interventions  at  the  level  of  global  clusters.  Given  the  highly  consensual  nature  of 
humanitarian coordination, however, the flow of influence from the global to the local is significantly 
less direct and harder to measure than in the case of CivMil.     

At  the  global  level,  DG  ECHO  (together  with  the  EU  Military  Staff)  is  active  in  shaping  policy 
discussions  on  norms  and  guidance(in  particular,  through  its  engagement  in  the  annual  Civil-
Military  Coordination  Consultative  Group  meetings  in  Geneva).  This  contribution  was  also 
substantial  in  the  case  of  the  latest  guidance  directly  relevant  to  field-level  interventions,  UN 
OCHA’s ‘Recommended Practices for Effective Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination of Foreign 
Military Assets (FMA) in Natural and Man-Made Disasters’, which were operationalised in the EU 
through the dedicated EU ‘Concept on Effective CIVMIL Coordination in Support of Humanitarian 
Assistance and Disaster Relief’,96 developed by the EU Military Staff with the close involvement of 
DG ECHO. 97 

In  the  case  of  Nigeria,  DG  ECHO  experts  at  field  level  highlighted  clear  weaknesses  in  CivMil 
coordination. Thanks in part to DG ECHO’s advocacy efforts, including linking up with other key 
donors,  UN  OCHA  reinforced  its  CivMil  footprint,  including  the  deployment  of  a  senior  staff 
members.  While  this  has  produced  some  positive  outcomes  in  coordination  structures,  CivMil 
coordination needs remain extremely high and there are other gaps in the response.98 In addition, 
DG ECHO directly supported eight CivMil training teams in 2018. In each case, the training included 
a  component  on  International  Humanitarian  Law  (IHL).  DG  ECHO  also  directly  financed 
deployments of UN OCHA CivMil coordination staff in five responses in 2018. At the same time, 
DG ECHO headquarters continues to systematically sensitise EU non-humanitarian staff on core 
CivMil coordination aspects, the humanitarian principles, IHL and the Protection of Civilians. 

The Sudan evaluation99 (also citing links to the Transformative Agenda), finds a direct link between 
DG ECHO’s global-level funding to CivMil coordination and field deployments. It notes that teams 
which were deployed in early 2014 were supported by ECHO and effectively liaised ‘with the military 
contingents from various nationalities to UNMISS in South Sudan… to improve their awareness of 
humanitarian principles’. In Ukraine, CivMil coordination is noted as being of particular importance 
and successfully undertaken by UN OCHA and supported by DG ECHO: ‘UN OCHA provided civil-
military coordination support, including through regularly holding civil-military coordination meetings 
in the government-controlled areas, with the participation of military entities and partners’.  

96 Available online: https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-5536-2019-INIT/en/pdf  
97 Key informant interview 
98 Ibid. 
99 Evaluation of DG ECHO’s Response to the Humanitarian Crises in Sudan and South Sudan  (2011-2015) 

123 

 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

In Haiti, the Single Form notes that DG ECHO’s support has allowed UN OCHA to ‘be an active 
member of the integrated civil-military coordination platforms in Haiti such as the Joint Operations 
Center  (JOC)  and  the  Mission  Project  Cell  (MPC),  advocated  for  requests  of  indirect  and 
infrastructure  support  to  the  Mission  submitted  by  humanitarian  partners,  facilitated  information 
sharing  and  joint  planning  and  provided  support  to  the  Government  of  Haiti's  Civil  Protection 
Department  (DPC)’.  In  Myanmar,  UN  OCHA  was  noted  as  working  closely  with  the  Ministry  of 
Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement to strengthen CivMil coordination. In DG ECHO’s support 
to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the fiche notes that ‘UN OCHA and AHA 
Centre [ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management] have 
also strengthened their cooperation on civil-military coordination’ and have made good progress, 
although the results note that ‘a temporary vacancy in the CMCoord Officer position has delayed 
delivery of the dedicated UN-CMCoord [sic] Courses for ASEAN’. 

In  CA, DG  ECHO  provided  support  to  CivMil coordination, most  notably  through  support  to  UN 
OCHA.  For  example,  in  CAR,  DG  ECHO  supported  UN  OCHA  in  2018  to  strengthen  the 
humanitarian  coordination  system  by  supporting  coordination  mechanisms  (e.g.  inter-cluster 
coordination, HCT, CivMil coordination) at the national and decentralised levels and strengthening 
information management and analysis to produce a range of products (e.g. 3W, maps, sit-reps, 
bulletins, dashboards, contact lists, etc.). In Cameroon, with DG ECHO support in 2017, UN OCHA 
developed a common understanding of the situation (including needs assessments and underlying 
development challenges, through 16 joint needs assessment missions), created new information 
management products (HRPs, etc.), and rolled out CivMil coordination mechanisms in the North 
region. 

vi. Support to response-level coordination via DG ECHO’s support to global clusters 

The  Comprehensive  Evaluation  found  that,  ‘in  the  sectors  investigated  DG  ECHO  is  currently 
systematically  supporting  the  global  clusters  and  does  so  according  to  perceived  need.’  Some 
examples include: financial support to the development and implementation of the Global Shelter 
Cluster Strategy 2013-2018; an active role in the SAG for the Global Logistics Cluster and observer 
status in the Global Nutrition Cluster. Based on a survey of DG ECHO’s framework partners, the 
evaluation also finds that ‘68% of them agree to strongly agree that DG ECHO actively engages 
with relevant global clusters.’ This engagement with global clusters is entirely positive. It is difficult 
overall, however, on the basis of a very small sample, to pinpoint concrete gains at the response 
level as a result of this global engagement.    

This support is demonstrated through the action ‘Enhancing the Response Capacity of the Global 
Shelter Cluster’ via UNHCR. The fiche highlights ‘clear progress on meeting and even exceeding 
all of the targets that were [sic.] been set by the partner’ and satisfactory implementation. A main 
takeaway  from  this  action  has  been  the  ‘effectiveness  of  the  ERC  funding  mechanism’  in 
strengthening  global  clusters.  The  action  focused  on  support  for  the  development  of  a  Cluster 
Performance Monitoring Tool (UN OCHA's CPMT), designed to enable the global cluster to identify 
‘the  main  capacity  gaps  of  ...  national  clusters’.  While  this  tool  requires  further  development, 
progress is cited.   

A second example of a global intervention is IRC’s global project100 ‘Improving Humanitarian Actors’ 
Capacity to Respond to Urban Crises’ The results for this action are all flagged as ‘coordination’ 
related. This is derived from the project’s specific intent to ‘find synergies with the work of other 
organisations  to  ensure  alignment  and  coordination’.  The  project  aimed  to  address  typical 
blindspots for humanitarian actors and to understand with whom to coordinate when designing and 

100 ECHO contribution: EUR 410,535; 51.2% of total funding. 

124 

 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

implementing response to an urban crisis. It did so through the development of a tool to ‘ensure 
that  their  differing  mandates,  roles  and  capacities  is  [sic.]  appropriately  mapped’.  The  action  is 
noted as having been successful through the engagement of multiple technical units within the IRC 
and ‘feedback and guidance provided by the consortium partners from the Global Alliance on Urban 
Crises and the Urban Learning Consortium’ led by Habitat for Humanity. The fiche101 notes a direct 
link to the Grand Bargain and the World Humanitarian Summit and efforts led by DG ECHO  to 
engage key partners around multi-sectoral humanitarian response: ‘a critical question remains with 
regards  the  extent  to  which  the  produced  guidance  will  prove  useful  and  valuable  in  achieving 
meaningful changes’. The fiche tempers the positive results overall by noting that a critical question 
remains about follow-through to field level,  and that reporting “could have focused more thoroughly 
on specifying the (i) demand for such reviews and guidance; (ii) level of uptake and (iii) definition 
of critical steps to be considered to roll out these reviews and guidance among humanitarian staff.’ 

A third example is the STC Global Project102 ‘Global Health Cluster partners support to enhance 
global capacity for humanitarian health’ and includes two results, both for the coordinator sector. 
This  global  initiative  is  an  example  of  DG  ECHO’s  efforts  to  strengthen  coordination  through 
challenging the cluster lead (in this case WHO). It brought together a group of NGO partners in the 
Health Cluster to deploy teams to assist in the coordination and planning of humanitarian health, 
and was ultimately deemed to have been successful to the extent that surge staff were ‘deployed 
in different crises to assist the cluster mechanism in delivering up to their expectations’. The project 
was  deemed  to  have  ‘contributed  directly  or  indirectly  to  the  overall  improvement  of  the  cluster 
mechanisms’, despite the Global Cluster Lead ‘obstructing the deployment of surge teams’. Key 
achievements  noted  were  the  development  of  public  health  standards  and  training  on  Health 
Cluster coordination. Given that this was a relatively new and informal ‘coalition’, the results noted 
the need for ongoing and strengthened management on the part of NGO partners. 

4) 

What is the EU added value of DG ECHO's interventions in the field of humanitarian 
coordination?   

Evaluations make numerous references to DG ECHO adding value to coordination at the response 
level. In the case of Syria, the highly politicised context meant that, among donors, ECHO was best 
able to maintain a presence in Damascus and in Turkey, given faith in its impartial stance, adding 
significant value to cross-border coordination. Again, in a number of evaluations, ECHO is seen to 
add value through its field network. A response-level understanding and analysis of the response, 
while not unique to ECHO, is seen as an asset to other member states. In particular, those who do 
not have the same capacity on the ground see this as providing a framework for their own response. 
By virtue of being the largest donor in a number of contexts, DG ECHO is seen as having convening 
power among other donors.  

As above, this section takes findings from the evaluation reports reviewed where there are direct 
references to DG ECHO adding value to coordination. For the purposes of this review, ‘added value 
in coordination’ is taken to refer to advocacy, leverage or other intervention beyond the purview of 
any individual member state; value added by ECHO by virtue of its particular characteristics (e.g. 
the strength of the field network); and value added by virtue of having specific skill sets and areas 
of expertise in coordination (e.g. CivMil coordination.) 

101 IRC Global Project - Improving Humanitarian Actors' Capacity to Respond to Urban Crises (2015/00474) 
102 ECHO contribution: EUR 1,661,690; 73.8% of total funding. 

125 

 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

i. Specific references to EU added value 

The Comprehensive Evaluation103 finds a number of ‘illustrative examples of results that could not 
have been achieved without a  coordinated effort at the EU level’. In addition to financial added 
value and the direct results of partners, the evaluation cited a focus on forgotten crises, gaps and 
themes – instances where DG ECHO acted as a reference donor and coordinator.  

In  particular.  DG ECHO’s  interventions  in  the  Syrian  crisis  were  seen as  having  added  specific 
value. The Comprehensive Evaluation cites ‘the capacity of DG ECHO to participate in different 
coordination mechanisms’ including donor coordination (at field level and in Brussels); operational 
coordination in each country and ‘whole of Syria coordination’ as having been ‘a critical element in 
its added value’”. In addition, the evaluation noted DG ECHO’s global oversight of the needs arising 
from  the  crisis.  The  highly  charged  political  nature  of  the  Syrian  crisis  and  the  challenges  this 
presented for the multilateral response system  have long  been recognised. ‘In this respect, DG 
ECHO was seen to add value to coordination (particularly coordination of cross border operations) 
over and above each individual member state by virtue of trust in its impartial stance’104.   

ii. DG ECHO’s field network  

The Comprehensive Evaluation finds that the role of the DG ECHO’s field network is perceived as 
a key factor in the EU’s added value by the majority of framework and local partners. In part, this 
was  the  result  of  the  EU’s  proximity  to  the  local  context  and  its  ability  to  target  support  to  the 
implementation of the humanitarian aid, including coordination. This positive view was also echoed 
by the field network staff.105 

DG ECHO’s local presence increased coordination and cooperation with local partners and other 
donors.  Some  stakeholders  highlighted  examples  where  DG  ECHO  has  engaged  with  local 
stakeholders to initiate a dialogue where this is required to deliver aid. It was seen that DG ECHO’s 
ability to do this is strengthened by the presence of strong technical staff in the field.106 This point 
is echoed in the Sahel evaluation,107 which notes that ECHO’s Field Offices were essential in its 
building ‘links with other donors and humanitarian organisations active in the region’, allowing it to 
‘address  the  Sahel  Strategy’s  objective  to  influence  these  actors  and  to  support  LRRD  [Linking 
Relief, Rehabilitation and Development]’. The evaluation notes that its field presence is ‘not unique 
to ECHO as a donor, but it appears to be one of the ways through which ECHO adds value to the 
work it does.’  

In part linked to the field network, evaluations make multiple references to DG ECHO’s provision 
of a basis for donor coordination. In some instances, this was contingent on DG ECHO’s analysis 
of  needs,  risk  and  vulnerability,  which  donors  used  to  support  interventions  in  Nepal.  In  other 
instances, DG ECHO’s ‘convening role’ arose as a result of the scale of its financial contribution in 
comparison to other donors. The Comprehensive Evaluation finds that in Colombia, DG ECHO was 
‘the most important actor in terms of the financial volume of aid amongst the humanitarian donors.’ 
As a result, this conferred ‘leverage to play a key role in terms of coordination between different 
donors’.108 The Sahel evaluation finds that  ‘as a coordinator, ECHO brings great value to other 
stakeholders (NGOs, donors, national authorities) who might otherwise be working in parallel or at 
odds  with  each  other.’  It  found  that  partners  interviewed  were  highly  appreciative  of  ECHO’s 
coordinating  role  and  that  a  number  ‘commended  ECHO  for  formalising  coordination  under  the 
Sahel Strategy by forming alliances of ECHO partners to strengthen advocacy messages.’ ECHO’s 

103 Comprehensive Evaluation of the European Union Humanitarian Aid, 2012-2016 
104 Key informant interview 
105 Comprehensive Evaluation of the European Union Humanitarian Aid, 2012-2016 
106 Ibid. 
107 Evaluation of ECHO’s intervention in the Sahel (2010-2014) 
108 Comprehensive Evaluation of the European Union Humanitarian Aid, 2012-2016 

126 

 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

role in facilitating coordination between partners in Nepal was seen as having improved programme 
effectiveness.  In  the  absence  of  a full  UN-led  coordination framework, DG  ECHO  was  seen  as 
having utilised sector-wide partnerships in support of disaster risk reduction and resilience, as well 
as  improving  harmonisation  of  donor  approaches 
‘in  addition  to  facilitating  knowledge 
management’. This was especially seen to be true in the case of the EU facility109 in Turkey. Here, 
the Comprehensive Evaluation also finds ‘added value of pooling the humanitarian aid resources 
at the EU level and using the DG ECHO architecture (especially the field network)’ for ground-level 
analysis  and  information,  as  well  as  distribution  of  resources.  Such  was  the  central  role  of  DG 
ECHO (as part of the EU facility), that questions were raised about whether this was a mechanism 
parallel  to  multilateral  coordination  structures.110  Ultimately,  as  in  the  other  cases,  DG  ECHO’s 
presence at the response level as well as in regional and global coordination systems allowed an 
appropriate  balance  to  be  struck.  In  particular,  ECHO  took  a  very  clear  stance  that  operational 
coordination (clusters and other thematic coordination) remained entirely the remit of the mandated 
UN and other leads.   

The Comprehensive Evaluation noted a ‘number of factors hindering the maximisation of EU added 
value,  including  complex  EU-UN  coordination  structures,  parallel  implementation  mechanisms 
(above) to clusters, structural challenges to developing medium/long-term strategy, internal staff 
recruitment and development structures’111. The evaluation recommended further improvements to 
maximise the added value through better coordination with UN and global clusters. It recommended 
ECHO establish effective coordination with other donors and humanitarian agencies to ensure that 
all the priority aspects of the response are covered. Given the timing of this evaluation, it is entirely 
likely that these recommendations have been the subject of ongoing work streams in the interim.   

In summary, evaluations make numerous references to DG ECHO adding value to coordination at 
the response level. In the case of Syria, the highly politicised context meant that, among donors, 
ECHO was best able to maintain a presence in Damascus and in Turkey, given faith in its impartial 
stance, adding significant value to cross-border coordination. Again, in several evaluations ECHO 
is seen to add value through its field network. A response-level understanding and analysis of the 
response, while not unique to ECHO, is seen as an asset to other member states. Specifically, 
those who do not have the same capacity on the ground see this as providing a framework for their 
own response.  

As noted above,112 donor coordination was not included as a central element in the scope of this 
review. In part, this is because many humanitarian donors retain a centralised structure and donor 
coordination is seen as primarily a global rather than a response-level/operational undertaking. The 
evaluation  set,  however,  contained  multiple  references  to  DG  ECHO’s  influence  on  donor 
coordination at the response level. In particular, by virtue of being the largest donor in a number of 
contexts, DG ECHO is seen as having convening power among donors. The CA evaluation finds 
that ‘DG ECHO is judged to be very successful at coordinating its response with other donors’ and 
that  ‘DG  ECHO  made  consistent  efforts  to  coordinate  activities  with  humanitarian  donors  and 
increasingly with development donors. Its efforts often extended to providing informed advice to 
donors and playing a leadership role among them.’” It also found that ‘these efforts helped to reduce 
duplications’. The evaluation also notes, however, that: ‘Operational coordination remained a wider 
challenge in each country’; and that: ‘DG ECHO did not seek to fill outstanding structural gaps or 
establish multilateral donor coordination mechanisms.’  

109 The Facility is the funding conduit for the Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) programme. 
110 Key informant interview 
111 Comprehensive Evaluation of the European Union Humanitarian Aid, 2012-2016 
112 1.1.2.  Scope of the review and key research questions 

127 

 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

5) 

To what extent were EU-funded coordination actions relevant to coordination needs 
at the response level?  

This  section  looks  at  the  extent  to  which  DG  ECHO’s  support  to  coordination  structures  were 
aligned  with  needs  of  any  given  context  and/or  supported  the  responses’  ability  to  adapt  to 
changing  needs  and  situations.  It  also  looks  at  the  extent  to  which  DG  ECHO’s  support  to 
coordination structures at the response level were demonstrably in line with global policy priorities. 
Finally, it considers briefly whether the coordination structures themselves were relevant in each 
or any given response context.  

Clearly the extent to which DG ECHO’s support is contextually relevant relies in large part on the 
reach and analytical capacity of the field network, as well as the ability of DG ECHO to provide 
specifically  tailored  support  to  coordination.  Sections  1,  2  and  3  above  look  respectively  at  DG 
ECHO’s support to UN OCHA; to filling coordination gaps at the response and sub-national levels; 
and CivMil, global and regional coordination. Section 4 describes the way in which evaluations and 
partners see specific added value in the role of UN OCHA’s field network, its ability to support an 
appropriate blend of these coordination pieces and ensure relevant support in any given context. 
A  number  of  evaluations  note  the  flexibility  and  breadth  of  DG  ECHO’s  support  in  ensuring  a 
relevant response. As one example, the evaluation of DG ECHO’s support in Sudan and South 
Sudan  notes  that  DG  ECHO's  support  to  coordination,  logistics  and  humanitarian  advocacy 
assisted in ensuring the presence of partners. In very challenging circumstances, the knowledge, 
professionalism,  and  readiness  of  ECHO  staff  to  ‘find  good  solutions  within  regulations’  added 
value to the support by ensuring a continued presence of IPs.113 

The HRP lays out the plan for the collective response by the UN and partners in any given context. 
It is coordinated by UN OCHA on behalf of the HC, and DG ECHO supports both UN OCHA and a 
number of key elements within the planning process. One key component of DG ECHO’s support 
to  UN-led  coordination  is  its  co-lead  of  Grand  Bargain  work  stream  5  on  multi-sectoral  needs 
assessment. This work stream touches on a number of elements addressed in sections 1, 2, 3, and 
4 above. Above all else, however, a strong, collective assessment of needs enables a relevant 
response. The evaluation set presents little evidence of direct links between this global work stream 
and the response level. The CA report notes that in Chad, one element of DG ECHO’s support was 
targeted at improving needs assessment. There was frequent recognition of DG ECHO’s general 
support  in  this  area  as  part  of  DG  ECHO’s  commitment  to  UN-led  coordination  and  the 
humanitarian programme cycle. One significant reason for this is that the majority of evaluation 
findings in the sample predate the Grand Bargain. Interviews, however, cited the roll of eight multi-
sectoral needs assessments in the past 12 months, the first phase of a larger rollout. Uganda and 
Ukraine were cited as concrete examples of progress on the ground, notwithstanding the typical 
lack of total consensus and buy-in from all operational partners.   

Perceptions of the relevance of the response in any given context are tied to an analysis of needs 
and  the  most  effective  strategy  to  meet  those.  While  DG  ECHO  is  supportive  of  joint  needs 
assessment  at  the  heart  of  the  HRP,  DG  ECHO  produces  its  own  situational  analysis  and 
associated annual plan, the HIP. In interviews, UN OCHA staff stated their ongoing questioning of 
the  need  for  an  alternative  plan,  given  DG  ECHO’s  stated  support  for  the  HRP.  On  multiple 
occasions in the evaluation set, including the CA study,114 it is noted that only a proportion (varying) 
of DG ECHO-funded projects are represented in the HRP. 

In  interviews,  UN  OCHA  staff  were  appreciative  of  the  strength,  breadth  and  coverage  of  DG 
ECHO’s network of field experts. In this respect, however, they also noted significant inconsistency. 

113 Evaluation of the DG ECHO’s Response to the Humanitarian Crises in Sudan and South Sudan (2011-2015) 
114 The CA study notes that approximately 41% of DG ECHO funded initiatives were found in the respective HRPs.  

128 

 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

On occasion, UN OCHA staff noted a strong sense that individual field experts have acted in a way 
which is inconsistent with DG ECHO’s global stance of  providing  support to UN OCHA and the 
coordinated response plan. UN OCHA staff cited a number of instances where a strong sense of 
DG ECHO’s function as being ‘independent’ from the UN-led response had driven field experts to 
support  parallel  coordination  structures,  ultimately  undermining  UN  OCHA-led  coordination.  In 
addition, UN OCHA staff cited instances where DG ECHO did not, in their view, make adequate 
efforts to ensure communication between DG ECHO-funded partners and clusters or UN OCHA’s 
information management efforts.  

UN OCHA staff cited instances where intervention from Brussels was required to ensure that field 
experts understood DG ECHO’s global position on providing support to UN OCHA-led coordination, 
the  Humanitarian  Programme  Cycle  and  the  HRP.  This  view  is  consistent  with  views  from  DG 
ECHO staff at HQ who, while recognising the critical function played by the field network, noted 
challenges with the level of autonomy inherent in the relationship between field and HQ, and the 
challenges  of  maintaining  a  consistent  application  of  global  guidance  and  standards.  As  a  final 
note,  it  is  important  to  pick  up  on  a  point  from  UN  OCHA’s  own  evaluation  synthesis.115  The 
synthesis notes that ‘all of the evaluations tend to the view that coordination processes have been 
too heavy, slow or cumbersome, particularly at the strategic or HCT level’. It also notes that at lower 
levels (clusters), ‘heavy demands for information and calls on staff time in attending meetings are 
highlighted  in  particular’. By  implication,  the  evaluation  finds  that  the  ‘benefit  provided  by  these 
processes was (in many cases) not felt to justify the costs’. It is worthy of note that the benefits of 
DG ECHO’s support to coordination are extolled through this review, and the benefit of coordination 
itself. In addition, it was often noted that DG ECHO’s support notwithstanding, gaps in coordination 
structures remained.   

115 Quadrennial Evaluation Synthesis: Synthesis of Evaluation Findings and Lessons from UN OCHA-managed Evaluations 2014-2017 (Feb 2018) 
129 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

5.  Conclusions, further questions and 

recommendations 

These conclusions arise from the ET’s overall analysis and insights and should be seen as wider 
‘discussion points’ more than definitive or ‘linear’ conclusions. They are intended to stimulate further 
reflection and ongoing learning about DG ECHO’s support for humanitarian coordination. Given 
the  relatively  limited  scope  of  this  review,  recommendations  are  typically  framed  as  ‘areas  for 
further analysis and reflection.  

1. Funding humanitarian coordination 

DG ECHO invested strong and consistent funding in humanitarian coordination activities across 
humanitarian responses worldwide. These allocations totalled EUR 277.8m during 2014-2018, a 
majority (58%) of which was invested in country-level sector and inter-sector coordination activities. 
DG ECHO coordination funding also showed an upward trend (until 2018) in line with increasing 
humanitarian needs worldwide. Given the limited nature of this review, several points of interest 
arose for which there was insufficient evidence to draw firm conclusions. Each is worthy of further 
investigation (see ‘further questions/recommendations below’).  

  Although the data set is too limited to demonstrate a trend, it suggests a recent downturn 

in investments, which fell sharply in 2018 after growing from 2014 to 2017.  

  The CA evaluation also notes a perception that DG ECHO is moving away from financial 

support to sectoral cluster leads, towards funding response-wide coordination.  

  Again in the absence of a full data set, the evaluations suggest that DG ECHO typically 
assumes a financial burden share (support to UN OCHA and coordination more broadly) 
which is in keeping with other key donors.  For other funded actions and in specific sectors 
(notably food security), DG ECHO appears to be comfortable with taking on a larger share 
of the financial burden.   

DG ECHO consistently supported humanitarian coordination in other ways than funding, namely 
through  advocacy,  participation  in  coordination  mechanisms,  and  donor  leadership.  However, 
wider  donorship  commitments  are  not  explicit  on  this  point.  The  Good  Humanitarian  Donorship 
principles make little reference to funding for humanitarian coordination as a separate activity and 
the Grand Bargain focuses on a range of other priorities. 

2. Humanitarian coordination activities 

DG ECHO invests most of its funding in support of IASC coordination mechanisms at country level, 
in  particular  by  support  to  UN  OCHA’s  country  programmes.  Thus,  DG  ECHO  supports 
implementation  of  the  Humanitarian  Programming  Cycle,  including  joint  needs  assessment  and 
analysis and strategic response planning. Over and above support to UN OCHA, DG ECHO utilises 
its network of field experts to provide real time analysis of coordination (among other humanitarian) 
needs. Strong support to UN OCHA notwithstanding, DG ECHO publishes its own annual planning 
document (the HIP) and also provides support to humanitarian coordination activities outside of 
IASC mechanisms and the HPC, most notably INGO coordination platforms. The review outlines 
numerous instances of DG ECHO supporting alternative coordination structures and/or offering a 
strong challenge to UN OCHA to improve in others. Opinions are clearly divided on these elements. 
In the positive sense, the field network is seen as a key strength. It is seen as ensuring that DG 
ECHO’s support to coordination is relevant to context, including the filling of gaps in coordination. 
In  the  negative  sense,  DG  ECHO  experts  are sometimes perceived  as pushing  ‘independence’ 

130 

 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

from the UN led response and supporting parallel coordination which undermines UN OCHA led 
coordination. This view is consistent with views from DG ECHO staff in headquarters who, while 
recognising  the  critical  function  played  by  the  field  network,  noted  challenges  with  the  level  of 
autonomy  inherent  in  the  relationship  between  field  and  headquarters  and  the  challenges  of 
maintaining a consistent application of global guidance and standards.   

While the CA 2014-18 evaluation finds that DG ECHO played a positive role in donor coordination 
in  many  respects  and  other  evaluations  find  that  the  scale  of  DG  ECHO’s  funding  made  it  a 
‘reference donor’, the explicit role of donors in operational coordination remains unclear. It is clear 
that DG ECHO is supportive of UN OCHA’s coordination function and funds coordination structures 
and projects beyond IASC structures and the HRP. Should there be a greater onus on donors to 
better coordinate at the operational level (between each other and with UN OCHA) for projects 
outside of the HRP?  

Recommendation:  
All of these findings need to be seen in light of multiple specific evaluation findings. On the one 
hand, although DG ECHO is seen as playing a key role in filling coordination gaps, multiple gaps 
are  seen  to  persist.  At  the  same  time,  UN  OCHA  evaluations  consistently  find  that  operational 
partners view coordination structures as overly heavy and, while providing benefits, poor value for 
money. While the evaluation in Central Africa finds that investment in UN OCHA supported a more 
efficient response in CAR, there is little evidence in the evaluations reviewed to demonstrate the 
added value of coordination in any quantifiable way (below).   

3. Humanitarian coordination as a driver of effectiveness  

DG ECHO’s support to humanitarian coordination assumes that humanitarian coordination is a key 
driver  of  effectiveness  in  any  humanitarian  response.  The  review  includes  multiple  pieces  of 
anecdotal evidence that humanitarian coordination is strengthening the effectiveness and efficiency 
of  humanitarian  responses.  Coordination  is  clearly  one  among  many  critical  elements  of  a 
response, such as the presence of competent partners, the quality of their programme designs and 
implementation,  and  their  ability  to  manage  risks  and  adapt  to  evolving  contexts.  Although  this 
review  looks  at  coordination  alone,  it  is  clear  that  DG  ECHO’s  support  to  coordination  is 
complementary to its support to programming across a range of humanitarian partners. 

On  the  one  hand  DG  ECHO’s  support  for  humanitarian  coordination  contributes  to  common 
objectives as defined in Humanitarian Response Plans (HRPs). By supporting UN OCHA and IASC 
coordination mechanisms, the review finds that DG ECHO contributed to strengthening the IASC 
led humanitarian response in multiple cases. Nonetheless, monitoring, evaluation and learning at 
HRP level remains patchy in practice, with inconsistent indicators and reporting and falling short of 
good practices in evidence-informed strategy and adaptive management. Quantification of results 
of collective results remains a significant challenge.   

As noted in the CA and other evaluations, not all DG ECHO-funded actions are included in HRPs. 
In addition, the ‘project model’ remains central to DG ECHO’s processes and systems.  Support to 
INGO partners is seen as strengthening the overall response and a positive overall. UN OCHA 
argues,  however,  the  support  to  individual  projects  risks  fragmenting  responses  and  missed 
opportunities to achieve coherent outcomes. Following the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016, 
humanitarian  actors  are  increasingly  expected  to  define  joint  problems,  design  and  implement 
programmes across humanitarian and development actors, and achieve collective outcomes that 
go beyond meeting needs towards ending needs and reducing vulnerabilities. 

131 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

Further questions arising from this analysis  

Funding for humanitarian coordination  

  What  proportion  of  funding  ought  DG  ECHO  and  other  donors  to  allocate  to  humanitarian 

coordination activities compared to ‘direct implementation’ activities?  

  What is an appropriate financial burden or share for DG ECHO? What mechanisms might be 

used to guide such decisions? 

  Do  the  data  accurately  reflect  a  reduction  of  funding  to  humanitarian  coordination  by  DG 

ECHO? Is this part of a deliberate strategy?  

Support to IASC led coordination and complementary mechanisms 

 

In global guidance, how should DG ECHO balance funding and support to IASC led structures 
(principally UN OCHA) with a role in challenging and complementing those structures?  

  Should DG ECHO try to ensure a more consistent approach among the network of field experts 

with regard to supporting coordination; or might this stifle creativity? 

  Beyond  support  to  UN  OCHA,  are  there  specific  humanitarian  coordination  activities  that 
represent ‘good practices’ in a humanitarian response? For example, should ECHO specialise 
further in food security or CivMil coordination?  

  To what extent should DG ECHO encourage IASC coordination mechanisms to interface more 

directly with development coordination structures in line with the H-D Nexus model?  

Quantifying the effects of coordination  

  Are response-wide MEL systems adequate to measure and quantify the effects of coordination 

within HRPs and at the ‘whole of response level?  

  Could DG ECHO do more to measure (or support UN OCHA to measure) and/or quantify the 

effects of coordination, including its cost-effectiveness and collective results?  

  Linking  back  to  the  questions  about  funding,  how  important  a  factor  is  humanitarian 
coordination  compared  to  others  (e.g.  programme  quality,  management,  and  context)  to 
achieving HRP objectives?   

Based on this limited review, DG ECHO should consider carrying out an internal reflection on the 
questions raised in this study. It could also look into current DG ECHO guidance on coordination 
and how this is transmitted to the field network, and the extent to which its practices are consistent. 
Such a study could make use of a fuller data set, a larger sample of actions, and detailed case 
studies.  

It should consider whether there is a need for a formal policy on humanitarian coordination given 
its consistent inclusion in the HIPs and the importance of DG ECHO’s support to coordination.      

Recommendation: As part of a deeper analysis of funding, DG ECHO should consider whether 
these examples do constitute trends and whether or not they are reflective of DG ECHO policy or 
guidance?  

 

In particular, a deeper analysis of DG ECHO’s burden share across a range of scenarios would 
provide a useful basis for reflection. For example, is DG ECHO’s apparent support to Food 

132 

 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

Security coordination representative of an actual trend or pattern?  If so, is this reflective of DG 
ECHO policy or guidance?  

Recommendation:  DG ECHO should reflect on how it balances funding and support to IASC led 
structures (principally UN OCHA) with its role in challenging and complementing those structures? 
In particular, it should review the role of its network of field experts and communication between 
HQ and the field.  

  At structural level, is the relative autonomy of field experts still warranted?   
  Are field experts sufficiently aware (and made regularly aware) of updates from the global level? 
  Should DG ECHO invest in a mechanism to further standardise the approach of field experts?   

133 

 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

Evaluation of the European Union’s 
humanitarian assistance in the 
Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

Annexes

134 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

Annex 1: Documents Consulted 

This annex provides a list of documents consulted and/or referenced during the evaluation.  

1. European Union Documents 

Policy/Strategy 

 ‘The  European  Consensus  on  Humanitarian  Aid’  (2008)  Joint  Statement  by  the  Council  and  the 
Representatives  of  the  Governments  of  the  Member  States  meeting  within  the  Council,  the  European 
Parliament and the European Commission (OJ C 25, 30.1.2008, p. 1–12) 

Council of Europe (2017), Operationalising the Humanitarian-Development Nexus - Council conclusions (19 
May 2017) 

Council of the EU, Press Release (12/05/2016): Council conclusions on the EU approach to forced 
displacement and development  

Council of the European Union (2016), Conclusions of the Council and the Representatives of the Governments 
of the Member States meeting within the Council on the World Humanitarian Summit. Brussels, 12 May 2016 
(OR. en)   

European  Commission  (10/01/2019)  Commission  Staff  Working  Document.  Executive  summary  of  the 
comprehensive evaluation of the EU humanitarian aid, 2012-2016 

European Commission (2012), Communication from The Commission to The European Parliament and The 
Council, The EU Approach to Resilience: Learning from Food Security Crises. Brussels, 3.10.2012  COM(2012) 
586 final 

European Commission (2016), Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the document, Lives in 
Dignity: from Aid-dependence to Self-reliance Forced Displacement and Development {COM 2016) 

European Commission (2016), Lives in Dignity: from Aid-dependence to Self-reliance. Forced Displacement 
and Development. Communication from the Commission to the European parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Brussels, 26.4.2016 COM 
(2016) 

European Commission (21/08/2015) General Annual Report on the European Union's Humanitarian Aid and 
Civil  Protection  Policies  and  their  Implementation  in  2014.  Report  from  the  Commission  to  the  European 
Parliament.  

European  Commission  EC  (2012),  The  EU  Approach  to  Resilience:  Learning  from  Food  Security  Crises, 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council (Brussels 3.10.2012) 

European Commission EC (2016), Lives in Dignity: from Aid-dependence to Self-reliance, Forced Displacement 
and  Development,  Communication  from  The  Commission  to  The  European  Parliament,  The  Council,  The 
European Economic and Social Committee and The Committee of The Regions (Brussels, 26.4.2016)  

European Commission EC  (2017),  Humanitarian-Development  Nexus in Chad,  Note for  the attention  of  Ms 
Androulla Kaminara, Director, Directorate C, DG ECHO 

European Court of Auditors (2017), The Bêkou trust fund for the Central African Republic: a hopeful beginning 
despite some shortcomings, Special report no 11/2017 

European  Parliament  (2012)  Policy  Briefing:  Linking  Relief,  Rehabilitation  and  Development,  Directorate 
General for External Policies: Policy Department, DG EXPO/B/PolDep/Note/2012_74, July 2012  

135 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

République  du  Cameroun.  Union  Européenne,  11ème  Fonds  Européenne  de  Développement.  Programme 
Indicatif National, 2014-2020. 

FicheOps/ Single Forms/ Technical Annexes 

Croix-Rouge FR, Single Form 2016, Rapport finale 

Croix-Rouge FR, Single Form 2018, Rapport intermédiaire 

ECHO  (2016),  Annexe  Technique  Afrique  Centrale,  Information  financiere,  administrative  et  operationnelle 
Dernière mise à jour: 25/08/2016 

ECHO (2016), Fiche Operationelle 2014|FAFA|Y 

ECHO  (2017),  Annexe  Technique  Afrique  Centrale,  Information  financiere,  administrative  et  operationnelle 
Dernière mise à jour: 13/07/2017 

ECHO  (2017),  Annexe  Technique  Afrique  Centrale,  Information  financiere,  administrative  et  operationnelle, 
Dernière mise à jour: 13/07/2017 

ECHO  (2018),  Annexe  Technique  Afrique  Centrale,  Information  financiere,  administrative  et  operationnelle 
Dernière mise à jour: 28/11/2018 

ECHO (2018), Annexe Technique Afrique Centrale. 28/11/2018 Version 7 

ECHO (2018), Strengthen Humanitarian Coordination and Advocacy in the Central African Republic. FicheOp 

Fiche Operationelle 2014|FPA|14-142  

OCHA (2018), Strengthen Humanitarian Coordination and Advocacy in the Central African Republic, Single 
Form 2018/00178/FR/01/01 

WFP  (2017),  Single  Form  for  Humanitarian  Aid  Actions.  Providing  targeted  lean  season  food  and  nutrition 
assistance and post-lean season support to food-insecure households and vulnerable refugees affected by the 
El  Nino  phenomenon  in  the  Sahelian  belt  of  Chad  while  ensuring  the  capacity  development  of  national 
institutions and partners (Final report 10/11/2017) 

Factsheets 

ECHO (2018) Factsheet: Cameroon 

ECHO (2018) Factsheet: Central African Republic 

ECHO (2018) Factsheet: Chad 

Humanitarian Implementation Plans (HIPs) 

EC (2014) Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP) Cameroon: Version 2 

EC (2014) Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP) Central African Republic: Version 2 

EC (2014) Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP) Chad: Version 2 

EC (2015) Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP) Central African Republic, Chad, Cameroon: Version 7 

EC  (2016)  Humanitarian  Implementation  Plan  (HIP)  Central  African  Republic,  Chad,  Cameroon  Ref. 
Ares(2016)4889369 - 31/08/2016 

EC (2017) Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP) Central Africa Ref. Ares(2017)3665586 - 20/07/2017 

EC (2018) Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP) Central Africa Ref. Ares(2018)6140721 - 30/11/2018 

136 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

Integrated Analysis Framework  

ECHO (2015) Integrated Analysis Framework: Cameroon 

ECHO (2016) Integrated Analysis Framework: Cameroon 

ECHO (2017) Integrated Analysis Framework: Cameroon 

ECHO (2018) Integrated Analysis Framework: Cameroon 

ECHO (2015) Integrated Analysis Framework: Central African Republic 

ECHO (2016) Integrated Analysis Framework: Central African Republic 

ECHO (2017) Integrated Analysis Framework: Central African Republic 

ECHO (2018) Integrated Analysis Framework: Central African Republic 

ECHO (2015) Integrated Analysis Framework: Chad 

ECHO (2016) Integrated Analysis Framework: Chad 

ECHO (2017) Integrated Analysis Framework: Chad 

ECHO (2018) Integrated Analysis Framework: Chad 

General Guidelines on Operational Priorities for Humanitarian Aid (GGOPHA) 

European Commission (2012), General Guidelines on Operational Priorities for Humanitarian Aid in 2013 

European Commission (2013), General Guidelines on Operational Priorities for Humanitarian Aid in 2014 

European Commission (2015), General Guidelines on Operational Priorities for Humanitarian Aid in 2016 

European Commission (2016), General Guidelines on Operational Priorities for Humanitarian Aid in 2017 

2. European Commission (2017), General Guidelines on Operational 
Priorities for Humanitarian Aid in 2018, Brussels, 11.12.2017INFORM 

INFORM (2019) Country Risk Profile: Cameroon 

INFORM (2019) Country Risk Profile: Central African Republic 

INFORM (2019) Country Risk Profile: Chad 

3. UNOCHA Humanitarian Needs Overviews (HNOs), Strategic Response 
Plans/Humanitarian Response Plans (SRPs/HRPs) and Humanitarian 
Response Reviews (HRR) 

Cameroon  

UNOCHA (2015) Plan De Réponse Humanitaire : Cameroun Janvier-Décembre 2016 

UNOCHA (2016) Plan De Réponse Humanitaire : Cameroun 2017-2020 

UNOCHA (2018) Plan De Réponse Humanitaire : Cameroun 2017-2020 

137 

 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

UNOCHA (Avril 2014) 2014-2016 Plan De Réponse Stratégique : Cameroun 

UNOCHA (Janvier 2015) 2015 Plan De Réponse Stratégique : Cameroun 

UNOCHA (Novembre 2013) 2014 Résumé des besoins Humanitaires : Cameroun 

UNOCHA (Décembre 2014) 2015 Aperçu des besoins Humanitaires : Cameroun 

UNOCHA (Décembre 2015) 2016 Aperçu des besoins Humanitaires : Cameroun 

UNOCHA (Décembre 2016) 2017 Aperçu des besoins Humanitaires : Cameroun 

UNOCHA (Janvier 2018) 2018 Aperçu des besoins Humanitaires : Cameroun 

Central African Republic 

UNOCHA (October 2013) 2014 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Central African Republic 

UNOCHA (Octobre 2016) 2017 Aperçu des besoins Humanitaires : République Centrafricaine 

UNOCHA CAR : Aperçu des Besoins Humanitaires 2017  

UNOCHA (Nov 2018) 2018 Aperçu des besoins Humanitaires : République Centrafricaine 

UNOCHA (Octobre 2018) 2019 Aperçu des besoins Humanitaires : République Centrafricaine 

UNOCHA (Mars 2016) Plan De Réponse Humanitaire Janvier-Décembre 2016 : République Centrafricaine 

UNOCHA (Nov 2016) Plan De Réponse Humanitaire 2017-2019 : République Centrafricaine 

UNOCHA (Révisé Juin 2017) Plan De Réponse Humanitaire 2017-2019 : République Centrafricaine 

UNOCHA (Dec 2017) Plan De Réponse Humanitaire Janvier-Décembre 2018: République Centrafricaine 

UNOCHA (Dec 2018) Plan De Réponse Humanitaire Janvier-Décembre 2019: République Centrafricaine 

UNOCHA (December 2013) 2014 Strategic Response Plan: Central African Republic 

UNOCHA (Revised January 2014) 2014 Strategic Response Plan: Central African Republic 

UNOCHA (December 2014) Humanitarian Response Plan: Central African Republic 

Chad 

UNOCHA (Dec 2014) 2015 Aperçu des besoins Humanitaires : Tchad 

UNOCHA (Nov 2015) 2016 Aperçu des besoins Humanitaires : Tchad 

UNOCHA (Nov 2016) 2017 Aperçu des besoins Humanitaires : Tchad 

UNOCHA (Dec 2017) 2018 Aperçu des besoins Humanitaires : Tchad 

UNOCHA (Déc 2015) Plan De Réponse Humanitaire Janvier-Décembre 2016: Tchad 

UNOCHA (Juin 2016) Plan De Réponse Humanitaire révisé Janvier-Décembre 2016: Tchad 

UNOCHA (Déc 2016) Plan De Réponse Humanitaire Janvier-Décembre 2017: Tchad 

UNOCHA (Déc 2017) Plan De Réponse Humanitaire Janvier-Décembre 2018: Tchad 

UNOCHA (Juillet 2018) Note Sur La Révision Du HRP 2018 

138 

 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

UNOCHA (Dec 2018) 2019 Aperçu des besoins Humanitaires : Tchad 

UNOCHA (January 2014) 2014-2016 Strategic Response Plan: Republic of Chad 

UNOCHA (August 2014) Mid-Year Review 2014-2016 Strategic Response Plan: Republic of Chad 

UNOCHA (Février 2015) Plan De Réponse Humanitaire 2015: Tchad 

HRRs 

UNOCHA (2014) Global Humanitarian Overview 

UNOCHA (2015) Global Humanitarian Overview 

UNOCHA (2016) Global Humanitarian Overview 

UNOCHA (2017) Global Humanitarian Overview 

UNOCHA (2018) Global Humanitarian Overview 

UNOCHA (2018) Global Humanitarian Overview 2019 

4. Other Documents 

ADE (2014), Evaluation of the implementation of the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid Final Report 

ADE (2016) Evaluation of the Use of Different Transfer Modalities in ECHO Humanitarian Aid Actions 2011-
2014 

ADE (2016) Study on Approaches to Cost-Effectiveness of DG ECHO’s Humanitarian Aid Actions, ADE, August 
2016. 

ADE (June 2017) EU Approach to Building Resilience to Withstand Food Crises in African Drylands (Sahel and 
Horn of Africa) 2007-2015. Final Report. Volume I – Main Report 

Adinolfi C.A. et al. (2005) Humanitarian Response Review, an independent report commissioned by OCHA 

ALNAP (2016) Evaluation of Humanitarian Action Guide. ALNAP Guide. London: ALNAP/ODI. 

Christoplos, I. with Knox-Clarke, P. Cosgrave, J. Bonino, F. and Alexander, J. (2017) Strengthening the quality 
of evidence in humanitarian evaluations. ALNAP Method Note. London: ALNAP/ODI. 

Donaldson,  S.I,  Christie,  C.A,  and  Mark,  M.M.  editors  (2009). What  counts  as  credible  evidence  in  applied 
research and evaluation practice? Sage Publications, Inc 

GHD (2003), 24 Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship 

Grand Bargain Self-Reporting: ECHO (2018), 2018 Grand Bargain Annual Self-Reporting – European 
Commission/ DG ECHO  

IASC (2005) Humanitarian Response Review, New York/Geneva: United Nations 

IASC (2011), Transformative Agenda, UNHCR. 

ICF (2016) Evaluation of ECHO's intervention in the Sahel (2010 - 2014) 

ICF (2018) Comprehensive Evaluation of the European Union’s Humanitarian Aid, 2012-2016 

Lawday, A., Adjibade, K., Dahrendorf, N., Kubwayezu, F., Morinière, L.C. (2016) Inter-Agency Humanitarian 
Evaluation of the Response to the Crisis in the Central African Republic 

139 

 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

Obrecht, A., Bourne, S. (2018) Making humanitarian response more flexible: challenges and questions, ALNAP 
Background Paper, London: ALNAP/ODI 

Oxfam (2007) Emergency Capacity Building Project, Impact Measurement and Accountability in Emergencies: 
The Good Enough Guide, Oxfam Publishing 

The Grand Bargain: A Shared Commitment to Better Serve People in Need (23rd May 2016) Istanbul, Turkey 

UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182 (1991), Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian emergency 
assistance of the United Nations 

UNHCR (2014) Central African Republic Regional Refugee Response Plan, January-December 2015 

Westhorp, G (2014) Realist Impact Evaluation, An Introduction. ODI Methods Lab, September 2014 

1. Web Pages 

Core 
https://corehumanitarianstandard.org/ 

Humanitarian 

Standard 

on  Quality 

and 

Accountability 

(CHS) 

Available 

at: 

Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), (2018), Conflict in Cameroon’s Anglophone regions forces 430,000 people 
to  flee,  News,  19th  December  2018.  Available  at:  https://www.nrc.no/news/2018/december/conflict-in-
cameroons-anglophone-regions-forces-430000-people-to-flee/ 

Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), (2018), NRC Statement to the UN Security Council on Cameroon, 13th May 
2019. Available at: https://www.nrc.no/news/2019/may/cameroon-unsc-statement/  

140 

 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

Annex 2: Stakeholders Consulted 

1. European Union Staff 

Organisation 

Title 

DEVCO 

DEVCO 

ECHO 

ECHO 

DEVCO 

DEVCO 

DEVCO 

ECHO 

ECHO 

ECHO 

DEVCO 

ECHO 

ECHO 

DEVCO 

ECHO 

ECHO 

ECHO 

ECHO 

ECHO 

ECHO 

EEAS 

EEAS 

ECHO 

ECHO 

ECHO 

DEVCO 

ECHO 

ECHO 

ECHO 

Desk DEVCO 

Programme Officer 

Head of Office 

Experte protection et Genre 

Desk Officer DEVCO 

Desk Officer DEVCO 

Chef de Coopération 

Chef de Bureau  

Assistant technique 

Assistante technique  

Country 

CAR 

Chad 

CAR 

Cameroon 

Chad 

CAR 

Chad 

Chad 

Cameroon 

CAR 

Chargée de Programmes | Équipe Agriculture et Environnement  Cameroon 

Desk Géographique – CAR  

Chef de bureau Régional 

Desk DEVCO 

Chef de Secteur 

Programme Officer 

Assistante technique  

Experte Santé/Nutrition 

Desk Géographique – CAR 

Chef de Bureau Régional ECHO 

Chef de Délégation de l'UE, Ambassadeur 

Desk EEAS 

Assistant technique 

Desk Géographique – Cameroon, Chad 

Rapid Response Coordinator 

Head of section, DEVCO 

Programme Assistant 

Chef de Secteur 

Chef de Bureau 

CAR 

Cameroon 

CAR 

Cameroon 

Cameroon 

CAR 

Cameroon 

CAR 

Cameroon 

Chad 

CAR 

Chad 

Cameroon 

Cameroon 

CAR 

Chad 

Cameroon 

CAR 

141 

 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

DEVCO 

Policy Officer 

Chad 

Chad 

CAR 

Chad 

CAR 

CAR 

CAR 

Chad 

Cameroon 

Chad 

CAR 

CAR 

CAR 

Country 

CAR 

CAR 

ECHO 

ECHO 

ECHO 

ECHO 

ECHO 

DEVCO 

DEVCO 

ECHO 

DEVCO 

DEVCO 

ECHO 

ECHO 

ECHO 

AFD 

World Bank 

World Bank 

World Bank 

SDC 

USAID 

DFID 

DFID 

SDC 

USAID 

Desk Géographique – Cameroon 

Programme Assistant 

Desk Géographique – Chad 

Chef de Bureau 

Technical Assistant 

Bekou Programme Manager 

Chef de Secteur, DEVCO C1 

Experte Assistance alimentaire  

Chargée de programme résilience 

Head of Cooperation 

Desk Géographique – CAR 

Technical Assistant 

Chef de Bureau (former Assistant Technique) 

Cameroon 

2. Donorship Actors 

Organisation 

Title 

World Bank 

Chargé des Opérations 

Conseiller coop- culture 

Operations Officer / Conflict & Fragility World Bank 

Cameroon 

Responsable programmes IDA Tchad-Niger 

Consultant FCV 

Chad 

Chad 

Responsable humanitaire Afrique Centrale 

Cameroon/CAR 

Regional Refugee Officer  

Conseiller Humanitaire Régional  

Humanitarian Adviser 

Chad 

Cameroon 

CAR 

Responsible de programme regional aide humanitaire  

Cameroon 

OFDA former country representative 

CAR 

3. Implementation Actors 

Organisation 

Title 

UNHCR 

Coordinateur HCR Yaounde 

NRC 

IMC 

Country Rep a.i. 

Programme Director 

Country 

Cameroon 

CAR 

Chad 

142 

 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

UNICEF 

Deputy Representative 

MSF 

WFP 

WFP 

MSF Adjoint Chef de Mission 

Country Director  

Head of programme  

UN OCHA 

Head of Office  

INSO 

ACTED 

UNHCR 

ICRC 

Head of INSO 

Project development manager 

Administrateur chargé de programme 

Chef de délégation   

Solidarités International  Chef de Mission SI CAM 

DSRSG 

ICRC 

DSRSG-RC-HC  

Chef de délégation régionale 

UN OCHA 

HNO Coordinator 

Oxfam 

ACF 

UNHCR 

IRC 

WFP 

FAO 

Country Director 

ACF Country Director  

Chef de bureau HCR Yaounde 

Country Director 

Country Representative 

Country Representative a.i. 

UNICEF 

Programme Manager 

ACF 

ACF 

Caritas 

Alima 

ICRC 

Directrice pays  

Chef de mission 

Programme Officer 

Grants Manager 

Undisclosed 

Solidarités International  Chef de mission 

UNHCR 

ACTED 

CWW 

UNHCR 

CWW 

UN OCHA 

UN OCHA 

MSF 

Operations Officer HCR 

Chef de mission  

DIZA coordinator 

Chargée des Relations extérieures  

Independent Consultant 

Head of office OCHA 

Humanitarian Affairs Officer UN 

MSF former HOM  

Cameroon 

Cameroon 

Cameroon 

Chad 

CAR 

CAR 

Chad 

Chad 

Chad 

Cameroon 

CAR 

Cameroon 

CAR 

CAR 

Cameroon 

Cameroon 

CAR 

CAR 

CAR 

CAR 

Chad 

CAR 

Chad 

Chad 

Cameroon 

Chad 

Cameroon 

Chad 

Chad 

Chad 

Chad 

Chad 

Cameroon 

Cameroon 

143 

 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

UNICEF 

Reporting and Fundraising 

ACF 

IOM 

CWW 

Oxfam 

UNHCR 

UNHCR 

WFP 

HI 

FRC 

FRC 

IOM 

ACTED 

CWW 

NRC 

UNICEF 

MDM 

DRC 

FAO 

WFP 

Oxfam 

IMC 

IMC 

UNHCR 

UN OCHA 

Undisclosed 

Programme Coordinator 

Consultant 

Program Head 

Operations Officer HCR 

Head of UNHCR office 

Government Partnerships  

Chef de mission  

CRF Cheffe de la Délégation au Cameroun 

CRF In charge of institutional donor relations 

Emergency Coordinator 

Charge de Projet  

Communications and Advocacy Manager 

Country Director 

Deputy Representative 

Country Representative 

Country Representative 

Coordonnateur du cluster sécurité  alimentaire 

Operations Manager  

Country Director 

Technical Coordinator  

Chef de mission 

Chef de bureau Secteur Bartoui 

CAR 

Chad 

CAR 

Chad 

Chad 

Cameroon 

Cameroon 

Chad 

Chad 

Cameroon 

Cameroon 

CAR 

Chad 

Chad 

CAR 

CAR 

CAR 

CAR 

Chad 

Cameroon 

Chad 

Cameroon 

CAR 

Cameroon 

Manager, CAR Humanitarian Fund | Head of Humanitarian Financing 
Unit 

CAR 

UNICEF 

Chef de file sectoriel WASH 

ACF 

PU 

CARE 

ACTED 

LWF 

IRC 

PU 

WFP 

ACF Field Coordinator  

Responsable regional de programme humanitaire 

Country Director  

Country Director 

LWF Country Representative 

Deputy Director of Programs  

Coordinateur médical 

Deputy Country Director 

Cameroon 

Cameroon 

Cameroon 

Cameroon 

CAR 

Cameroon 

Chad 

Chad 

Cameroon 

144 

 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

PU 

Chef de Mission SI CAM 

Solidarités International  PUI HOM  

FRC 

FAO 

FRC 

CRF Desk Sahel Lac Tchad 

Coordinateur des programmes  résilience 

CRF HOP  

UN OCHA 

Head of OCHA office 

Cameroon 

Cameroon 

Cameroon 

Chad 

Cameroon 

Cameroon 

Représentant Résident/ Coordonnateur Humanitaire (RC/HC) 

Chad 

UN 

PU 

WHO 

AHA 

PUI Deputy Country Director 

Representant OMS 

AHA HOP  

UNICEF 

RRM Coordinator 

4. Beneficiaries  

Cameroon 

CAR 

Cameroon 

CAR 

A total of 148 intended beneficiaries were consulted during the field phase of the evaluation. Discussions were 
predominantly through focus group discussions and workshops. However, a small number of individuals (8) 
were interviewed. 

5. Humanitarian Coordination 

A total of 6 Key Informant Interviews took place for the Humanitarian Coordination review – names and titles 
have not been given to ensure confidentiality. Interviewees were both internal to the European Commission 
and  external  (UN  OCHA).  The  coordination  review also drew  on  evidence  drawn  from  the  wider  evaluation 
consultation, in which questions on coordination were posed (see discussion guides). 

145 

 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

Annex 3: Case Study 1 

How the EU supported a coordinated and coherent humanitarian response in 
CAR 2018 

Background  

At inception phase, it was agreed that the ET would conduct a case study in CAR focused on humanitarian 
coordination and adaptive management. We aimed to review how ECHO inputs and IP programming 
interacted to generate beneficiary outcomes.   

This case study looks at the OCHA Action, Strengthen Humanitarian Coordination and Advocacy in the Central 
African Republic, ECHO/-AF/BUD/2017/92050. It was implemented from 1 Jan 2018 to 31 Dec 2018, with total 
funding of EUR 7.5m of which ECHO provided EUR 1m.  

The case study was selected for these features:  
  Example of ECHO’s funding to ‘indirect’ humanitarian action, i.e. strengthening the humanitarian response 

  ECHO support to OCHA, coordination, needs assessments (i.e. relevant to EQs) 

  Similar OCHA activities funded annually over 2014-2018 

  Seeking insights into ECHO adaptive management, multisector humanitarian response, advocacy / 

leadership role, cost effectiveness/efficiency, helping the HC to prioritise the response to focus on the most 
vulnerable    

  Final and complete reporting available  

Method  

The case study approach aims to investigate ‘what worked, how and why?’ It sought to investigate the chain of 
inputs to outcomes including EU funding, ECHO activities, IP/DP implementation, and outcomes for intended 
beneficiaries. It focused on these questions: (i) What was expected to happen? (ii) What really happened? (iii) 
What were the implications for ECHO’s Central Africa strategy? The approach is inspired by ‘realist evaluation,’ 
which recognises that nothing works everywhere for everyone: context makes a big difference to programme 
outcomes.  A  realist  evaluation  asks  not  ‘what  works?’  but  ‘how  or  why  does  this  work,  for  whom,  in  what 
circumstances?’ (Westhorp, 2014). 

This  case  study  used  the  following  generic  hypothesis  for  how  ECHO  actions  are  intended  to  generate 
outcomes, and adds an additional hypothesis (in bold text below) to assess cost-effectiveness, using ECHO’s 
recommended methodology:116  
 

IF … EU’s humanitarian budget to Central Africa is sufficient and proportionate, and guided by effective 
global policies   

  AND … ECHO’s programme is guided by an appropriate strategy, uses good project selection processes, 

uses good funding mechanisms, and manages the programme well 

  AND … Implementing partner/s (IP) and downstream partner/s (DP) design good projects, implement them 

well (including cost-effectively), and adapt to significant changes  

  AND … the OCHA project increases efficiency of the humanitarian response by addressing gaps (and 
duplications), reinforcing OCHA’s role (where appropriate), and contributing to a strengthened overall 
response 

116 ADE (2016), Study on Approaches to Assess Cost-Effectiveness of DG ECHO’s Humanitarian Aid Actions.   

146 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

  THEN … Beneficiary (and local) capacities will be engaged, needs will be met, and vulnerabilities will be 

reduced (resilience strengthened) 

Limitations:  The  case  study  relies  on  information  collected  from  available  documentation  and  two 
supplementary interviews. It was conducted as a relatively rapid exercise.  

1. What was the intention?  

CAR is enduring a profound crisis with complex humanitarian consequences and protection concerns. Rooted 
in insecurity, bad governance, and economic under-development, CAR’s crisis became a sectarian conflict and 
one of the world’s most serious, leaving around half of the population in need of humanitarian assistance to 
survive. In 2017 the crisis intensified further, significantly increasing the numbers of IDPs and refugees fleeing 
the country. The situation was characterised by frequent attacks on civilians, protection challenges, and grave 
risks to aid workers. The response is underfunded at around 35% of requirements and the state is generally 
absent outside of Bangui (SF 2018).   

OCHA’s multiple activities in CAR are concerned with supporting humanitarian organisations present in the 
country, and ‘enabling them to make informed and strategic decisions, in line with best practices.’ Its goals are 
(i) to strengthen the humanitarian coordination system to achieve a more tailored and efficient response; (ii) to 
strengthen the system’s capacity to deliver good situational analysis; and (iii) to advocate to improve funding 
and  the  centrality  of  protection.  Its  activities  include  strengthening  coordination  by  supporting  coordination 
mechanisms (e.g. ICC, HCT, CM-Coord) at national and decentralised levels; using temporary OCHA antennas 
to ‘shrink and expand’ coordination operations; engaging with influential stakeholders to protect humanitarian 
space;  strengthening  information management  and  analysis  to  produce a  range  of  products  (3W, maps,  sit 
reps,  bulletins,  dashboards,  contact  lists  etc);  advocating  for  increased  funding;  managing  the  CAR 
Humanitarian Fund (HF); supporting resource mobilisation and leading the HNO and HRP drafting processes; 
and promoting humanitarian principles, AAP, protection, addressing specific needs, and CWC (SF 2018).  

OCHA’s direct beneficiaries are around 130 humanitarian organisations in CAR (national and international), 
especially members of existing coordination mechanisms: HCT, clusters, inter-cluster, CM-Coord, and working 
groups; as well as the government, which contributes to the humanitarian response and interacts with clusters. 
While OCHA does not provide services directly to populations affected, it expects to contribute to humanitarian 
outcomes  in  several  ways.  First,  by  helping  to  develop  and  monitor  HRP  objectives  (saving  lives  through 
assistance, respecting rights through protection, and preserving dignity through social services and livelihoods) 
with humanitarian organisations whose actions will benefit 2.4 million people in need. Second, by ensuring that 
gender,  protection,  do  no  harm  and  other  cross-cutting  issues  are  considered  in  response  planning  and 
programming, through information and data analysis activities. Third, by effectively managing the CAR HF. 

The action defines specific objectives, results and indicators. Overall, the action is concerned with saving lives 
by  ‘promoting  a  more  enabling  environment’  and  in  particular  ‘fostering  more  effective  and  principled 
humanitarian action that meets the needs of people affected’. Success will be indicated by: (i) 10x coordination 
mechanisms being operational at central and decentralised levels; (ii) 2x needs-based evidence (primary and 
secondary  datasets)  informing  the  HNO  and  HRP;  and  (iii)  1x  review  of  the  HRP  (yearly).  The  action  also 
expects three main results, each to be measured by various indicators.  

Result  1:  The  humanitarian  system  is  strengthened  to  achieve  a  more  efficient  and  tailored  humanitarian 
response. This result will cost EUR 3m.  

It expected the following measurements:  
  75% HCT decisions are effectively implemented 

  75% HCT decisions to ICC are effectively implemented  

  4x (i.e. quarterly) updates on humanitarian response 

147 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

  10x clusters receive technical support to set up functional feedback and complaints mechanisms 

  6x ‘access dashboards’ are produced by OCHA and shared with the humanitarian community  

Result 2: OCHA’s capacity to produce, share, and support dissemination of credible, comprehensive, evidence-
based situation analysis is strengthened. This will cost EUR 2.25m. 

It expected these measurements:  
  300x humanitarian information products are produced by OCHA and shared with the community  

  100% clusters contribute information regularly (i.e. monthly) to the CAR humanitarian website   

Result 3: Increased advocacy and support to mobilise adequate resources, and strategic, predictable and timely 
utilisation of pooled funds for effective and principled action and protection of people affected. This will cost 
EUR 2.25m. 

It expected the following measures:  
  15x advocacy and resource mobilisation events / visits organised by/with OCHA to support HC/HCT 

resource mobilisation efforts 

  75% Humanitarian Fund projects are monitored as per the framework 

  7x areas have active results-oriented humanitarian civil-military coordination cells 

  35x awareness / training sessions on conflict sensitivity, do no harm, CM-Coord and protection 

mainstreaming are organised by/with OCHA 

  100% HCT meetings where strategic protection issues are addressed  

5. How did it work in practice?   

5.1. Notable outcomes 

Humanitarian coordination was strengthened with a view to achieving a more efficient and tailored 
humanitarian response, as indicated by achievement of most targets under Result 1. First, 10 coordination 
mechanisms were maintained in the country, including OCHA’s lead role in Bangui (HCT, ICC), three regional 
sub offices (Bouar, Kaga Bandoro, and Bambari), and six field-based antennas below these.117 Second, 
OCHA actively supported the HC/HCT whose recommendations were monitored and operationalised through 
the ICC group, ensuring that 83% HCT decisions were effectively implemented and 79% of those through the 
ICC. In addition, linkages were reinforced between national and regional ICC groups through regular 
consultations. Third, OCHA produced regular analysis notes and snapshots as expected (SF 2018). The only 
result that was not achieved, was the special initiative to provide technical support to set up functional 
feedback and complaints mechanisms: this was held up by recruitment delays, and in the end,  it was decided 
to transfer responsibility for the CwC component to UNICEF. 

Information was produced and shared to enable a coordinated, evidence-based, and prioritised humanitarian 
response, as indicated by targets exceeded for Result 2. First, two needs-based evidence (data sets) 
informed production of the HNO and HRP, based on four regional stakeholder consultations held in 2018, 
strengthened data collection and analysis, strengthened secondary data use, roll out of sectoral/intersectoral 
needs severity tools (i.e. allowing for prioritisation by vulnerability). These underpinned the development of 
the HNO 2019, enabling a strong evidence-based prioritisation of HRP 2019 (SF 2018). In ECHO’s words, 
‘these refined assessment tools and process ultimately better informed the development of both the 2019 
HNO and 2019 HRP’ (FO 2018). Second, OCHA shared 312 information products and rationalised its 
catalogue following an internal review in August 2018; and OCHA provided dedicated support which enabled 
80% of clusters to contribute information regularly on humanitarianresponse.info. Third, ECHO appreciated 
OCHA’s constant work to undertake and revise needs assessments when necessary, particularly following 

117 In 2018, the antenna for Kouango was closed and one was opened in Alindao. 

148 

 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

major events such as outbreaks of violence in 2018, and to deploy staff to conduct emergency needs 
assessments that allowed for assistance to be channelled to locations affected (FO 2018).   

Resource mobilisation and advocacy activities were undertaken to support the HRP. First, OCHA conducted a 
mid-year review of the HRP 2018 as per target set. It also prepared and published the HNO 2019 and HRP 
2019. Second, OCHA delivered a range of related outputs, including 25 international resource mobilisation 
events, increased (100%) monitoring of the CAR humanitarian fund, eight CM-Coord cells were operational, 
protection mainstreaming training sessions were delivered to more than 1000 people, the protection cluster 
was supported, and protection was a standing item in HCT meetings. As ECHO recognised, ‘OCHA increased 
advocacy, actively supported resource mobilisation, ensured a strategic, predictable and timely use of pooled 
fund (…)’ (FO 2018). Third, OCHA worked with partners (including ECHO) on the HD Nexus the framework of 
the national development strategy (RCPCA), played a key role in discussions on the new Way of Working and 
defining collective outcomes; and strengthened strategic dialogue with development donors (e.g. IMF, World 
Bank, Bêkou Fund).  

Some 137 humanitarian organisations were helped to deliver life-saving assistance to 1m people. The 
organisations were involved in planning and design of the OCHA action, as well as the HNO, HRP, CERF 
funding, and HCT decision-making.  

Two significant shortcomings were reported by OCHA. First, even though the target of 130 partner 
organisations was exceeded (137), these organisations in turn only managed to reach 1 million of the 1.9 
million people in need – mainly due to chronic underfunding. Second, the planned support was not provided 
to clusters to help them establish functional feedback and complaints mechanisms as intended. Instead DFID 
and Sweden provided funding for a system wide Communication with Communities function hosted by 
UNICEF (SF 2018).    

5.2. Project implementation  

OCHA delivered the project largely as expected, achieved most targets and exceeded some. Successful 
implementation depended on multiple factors, of which the following seem to be the most significant enabling 
factors:  
  Operational presence: OCHA, which established an office in the country in 2006, maintained an 

operational presence in all major affected and insecure areas. It also opened an antenna in Alindao when 
20,000 IDPs were displaced by clashes in December 2018. OCHA’s presence allowed it to have a 
comprehensive picture and assessment of needs (KII).  

  Dedicated capacities: despite global budget cuts, OCHA has maintained dedicated capacity in CAR for all 

key functions: ICC, field coordination, information management, and management of the CAR 
Humanitarian Fund (KII). ECHO appreciated OCHA’s deployment of additional capacity when needed, 
notably the GENCAP adviser who strengthened gender equity in the response (FO 2018). 

  M&E function: OCHA’s monitoring work was timely and relevant. Its Mid-Year Review allowed strategic 
adjustments to the evolving context, and it conducted periodic monitoring of the HRP through periodic 
monitoring reports (PMR). In addition, the HRP planning process facilitated by OCHA allowed ECHO and 
other donors to align activities with system-wide agreed priorities. Beyond this, OCHA conducted 
systematic monitoring of CAR HF projects.  

  Optimising synergies: OCHA’s mandate is to optimise synergies between all actions and actors. It was 

committed to improving LRRD and, with ECHO, improving HDN in the context of the national development 
strategy (RCPCA). It strengthened partnerships with NGOs, supporting and collaborating with the CCO, 
held weekly Humanitarian Forum Meetings, and carried out similar work at sub-national level. It sought 
synergies with the government, met regularly with the ministry of humanitarian action and national 
reconciliation. Operationally, it contributed to the RRM and led the CM-Coord platform for coordination of 
civil and military matters.  

149 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

The project was also hindered by several important factors, notably these:  
  Deteriorating situation: OCHA’s ability to foster an effective and principled response was undermined by a 
worsening humanitarian situation, insecurity, and funding. First, an upsurge in violence in several parts of 
the country increased displacement, rights abuses, violations of IHL, and led to a sustained deterioration in 
the humanitarian situation. Second, the country, already one of the most dangerous for aid workers, 
became 18% more dangerous. With six aid workers killed and 396 security incidents; this led to the 
suspension of aid for thousands and limited access for UN agencies.  

  Resource constraints: insufficient funding remained a major constraint with only 49% of HRP funded and 

led to reduced coverage. The lack of funding was further compounded by the very high cost of delivery. As 
a landlocked country reliant upon overland transport through countries themselves in conflict, CAR is 
already a high-cost environment, and this is further compounded by the high costs of sustaining field 
presence in remote areas that can only be supplied by air.  

  Cluster facilitation: OCHA’s information dissemination activities were complicated by an absence of 
capacities in clusters, despite the recruitment of an information officer to assist in this. When ECHO 
identified a need for OCHA to follow up on funding gaps for cluster co-facilitation, OCHA took steps to 
address this through the HF (FO 2018).  

  Feedback mechanisms: a lack of feedback mechanisms complicated the response’s ability to adapt to 

changing needs and priorities. OCHA was not able to provide technical support to clusters as intended, to 
establish and implement functional feedback and complaints mechanisms, due to funding gaps and 
recruitment delays. OCHA worked to overcome this obstacle with funding from Sweden and DFID to 
establish ‘common interagency services for communicating with communities’ hosted by UNICEF. A 
dedicated CwC specialist was recruited for 2019.  

5.3. ECHO inputs  

Funding: ECHO made efforts to strengthen funding to OCHA’s coordination work. ECHO provided EUR 1m in 
funding to OCHA in 2018, including 80% pre-financed in April 2018. ECHO reportedly doubled its funding to 
OCHA in 2018 (from EUR 500,000 in 2016/2017) recognising that the CAR HRP was among the least well-
funded, and that OCHA’s operations in CAR were also among the least well-funded (FO 2018). According to 
OCHA, ‘ECHO funding enabled OCHA to effectively carry out its humanitarian coordination mandate in support 
of  life-saving  activities’  (SF  2018).  Our  data  analysis  shows  ECHO  allocated  EUR  1.14m  in  2018  for 
coordination in CAR, increased from EUR 900,000 in 2017. During 2014-18, ECHO allocations to coordination 
were higher to CAR than other CA countries but fluctuated with a high of EUR 1.84m in 2014 and a low of EUR 
682,753 in 2015. More than half of ECHO funding for ‘coordination’ actions and results went to OCHA (EUR 
3.82m out of EUR 6.32m).  

Strategy: ECHO provided broad guidance on coordination to partners in the HIP and Technical Annex 2018. 
The CA HIP 2018 stresses that ‘coordination is paramount in a complex situation such as CAR’ in order to 
improve quality and relevance of the response; recognises that the humanitarian response is managed by the 
HC/HCT through the HRP and based on the HNO; stresses that ‘effective coordination’ requires partners to 
implement the IASC Transformative Agenda and actively take part in coordination mechanisms; highlights the 
role of OCHA and the cluster system in ensuring coordination; and specifies that in CAR coordination is among 
the ‘priority sectors.’ The Technical Annexe 2018 provides general guidance requiring partners to report on their 
engagement with coordination mechanisms, strategic direction requiring coordination platforms to be assessed 
and reinforced, and sectoral guidance requiring ECHO to continue supporting ‘essential’ common humanitarian 
services, including coordination, while expecting these services to increase their donor bases.  

Technical: ECHO provided a few technical inputs to the OCHA proposal. ECHO requested a revised proposal 
with clarifications on how results linked to the response analysis, more information on antennas and civil military 
coordination, and clarity on impacts related to result 3. It also undertook to monitor OCHA engagement with the 
government and increased advocacy, especially public advocacy on the humanitarian mission in local media 
and in the Sango language.    

150 

 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

5.4. EU/EC enablement  

Coordination commitments: While we found no specific EU or EC policy on humanitarian coordination, the EU’s 
larger humanitarian policy, as articulated in the Consensus 2008, is to improve the humanitarian response to 
crises  (and  in  particular  the  delivery  of  aid  to  people  in  need),  through  support  to  better  coherence  and 
coordination of actors, the ‘cluster approach’ to address gaps, and a strengthened Humanitarian Coordinator 
system. To this end, the EU ‘strongly supports the central and overall coordinating role of the United Nations, 
particularly the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), in promoting a coherent international 
response to humanitarian crises’. It also considers OCHA’s role to be ‘considerably strengthened’ when it has 
an active field presence and an HC deployed (EU Consensus 2008).  

Improved needs assessments: The European Commission has also committed to improving coordinated needs 
assessments through the Grand Bargain, with ECHO and OCHA leading workstream 5 to ‘improve joint and 
impartial  needs  assessments.’  Specific  commitments  include  to  ‘provide  a  single,  comprehensive,  cross-
sectoral, methodologically sound and impartial overall assessment of needs for each crisis to inform strategic 
decisions (…)’ and to ‘prioritise humanitarian response across sectors based on evidence established by the 
analysis’ (Grand Bargain 2016). However, ECHO self-reporting finds that explicit guidance is lacking on what’s 
expected from ECHO regarding needs assessments, e.g. methodology, coordination, involvement and funding 
(ECHO GB Self Reporting 2018). It remains a global ECHO objective to develop ‘a collaborative, pragmatic and 
evidence-based approach to underpin and improve strategic and operational decision-making’ (GGOP 2018). 

Global funding to CAR: In 2018, the EC provided USD 23.8m in humanitarian funding to CAR (FTS), accounting 
for  9.3%  of  the  total.  This  was  less  than  the US  (33.2%)  and  Germany  (10.5%). While  the  EC  contribution 
represents an increase over the previous two years, the increase was not as much as other donors. On average, 
the EC provided 14% humanitarian funding to CAR over the evaluation period.  

Cost-effectiveness of the OCHA action in CAR 

Cost-effectiveness  was  assessed  following  the  recommended  ADE  methodology,118  and  involved  a 
combination of document review as well as additional interviews with two key stakeholders that pursued cost-
effectiveness from several angles.  

OCHA  has  a  distinct  set  of  mandated  responsibilities  for  humanitarian  coordination.  ECHO’s  documents 
regarding the OCHA action (proposal and reporting) described these responsibilities and how well OCHA met 
its various targets but did not really explain if and how OCHA made a difference in the quality of the refugee 
response. Through the cost-effectiveness analysis within the case study, the evaluation team was able to gain 
some insight into how the OCHA action contributed to better humanitarian outcomes.   

The analysis is structured under the following questions: 

  Was the OCHA operation efficient? 
  Was OCHA effective? 
 
  What factors influenced OCHA’s effectiveness? 
  To  what  extent  is  OCHA  able  to  allocate  resources  between  different  outputs  so  as  to  maximise  its 

In what areas was OCHA less effective or ineffective, and for what reasons? 

effectiveness? 

  What areas of OCHA’s work are of most value? 

A cost-effectiveness judgement is proposed in Section 3. Conclusions, below. 

Was the OCHA operation efficient? 

118 ADE (2016), Study on Approaches to Assess Cost-Effectiveness of DG ECHO’s Humanitarian Aid Actions 

151 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

Delivery of outputs to an acceptable standard, on time.  
As set out in Section 2.2 above, OCHA delivered almost all the outputs expected of it to a reasonable standard 
under  testing  circumstances.  As  noted  below  (under  Strong  OCHA  team)  IP/DPs  generally  concurred  that 
OCHA ran a professional operation. This is a minimum standard for assessing OCHA as efficient. 

OCHA’s management of main cost drivers 
CAR is a very high-cost operating context: base costs, additional logistical and security costs, and the absence 
of infrastructure outside Bangui together drive up the costs of service delivery and make the establishment of 
sub-national offices particularly expensive. Wherever possible, OCHA has tried to get efficiencies by combining 
resources and services with other agencies in the field, but nevertheless, a major cost driver in CAR is the very 
high  cost  of  placing  and  supporting  staff  in  the  field;  this  is  well  understood  by  OCHA  and  leads  OCHA  to 
consider very carefully where to place its field offices and which to open/close as circumstances change. 

Adaptive management 
IP/DPs concurred that OCHA was well informed on, and fast to respond to, changes in circumstances, and that 
their responses were appropriate. Thus OCHA may be said to be ‘dynamically efficient’ meaning that OCHA 
was adept at judging where activities and related outputs needed to be dropped or initiated: for example by 
quickly responding to increased violence and using its flexible coordination ‘antennas.’ 

Overall,  on  the  basis  of  these  three  strands  of  evidence,  we  would  judge  OCHA  to  have  been  an  efficient 
operation. 

Was OCHA effective? 

Coordination in CAR was viewed as good.  
The emergency response is mature (launched in 2014) and coordination structures are stable. The ICC was 
described as “disciplined,” and the cluster coordination system is working as designed, although some clusters 
are  weaker  than  others  especially  when  they  lack  dedicated  coordination  staff.  Agencies  involved  in  the 
response follow a rigorous and inclusive annual process of developing the HRP, building the overall plan up 
from cluster-level validated needs and plans, and with agreed common indicators across agencies and sectors. 
All in all, the coordination system at Bangui level is effective at identifying gaps and overlaps, and then agreeing 
on the “priorities within the priorities” in order to derive a focused, feasible and affordable HRP. Civil-Military 
Coordination (CM-Coord) was also seen as strong. 

Needs assessment is also good.  
Notwithstanding  the  difficulties  of  collecting  reliable  data  in  the  CAR  context  of  expensive  logistics,  patchy 
geographical  coverage  and  absent  national  demographic  information,  OCHA  works  with  clusters  and  with 
external experts (REACH) to get the best available data at reasonable cost. The HNO analysis was regarded 
as good (consensus, inclusive, validated), and was reported by stakeholders as being used as the primary tool 
for  internal  processes  of  planning  (at  organisation  and  cluster  levels)  as  well  as  for  resource-mobilisation. 
According to OCHA, in CAR there are many examples of agencies making decisions and changing direction 
based on evidence generated by OCHA. OCHA also produces a supplementary HNO (known as the HNO-lite) 
in mid-year, which is used to inform mid-year course corrections and to inform year-end resource-mobilisation 
(including to inform ECHO’s “top-up” allocations).  

The way the HRP is focused on “priorities within the priorities” informed by a focused HNO, was regarded by 
several stakeholders as key to (a) obtaining a more effective response, a response that gets most value  for 
money because the lower-priority and vague initiatives have been stripped out, and also (b) to obtaining more 
funding: the argument being that a focused and credible HRP increases donor confidence in the quality of the 
plan and also provides assurance that the programme is based upon analysis of needs i.e. “true demand” rather 
than  “organisational  supply,”  and  independent  of  government  political  priorities.  ECHO  was  regarded  as 

152 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

instrumental in establishing a strong and credible HRP in two ways: (a) ECHO was actively engaged in the 
extensive workshop process (described as a “challenge” process and also as a “defence” process) to narrow 
down  the  HRP,  providing  assurance  to  other  donors  not  present  in  CAR  that  there  was  some  donor 
engagement/oversight, and (b) ECHO endorsement of the HRP was similarly seen by donors as a “quality seal 
of approval.” 

Importantly, prioritisation in CAR also involves MINUSCA, who recognise the ICCC protection analysis as an 
important  source  to  identify  protection  hotspots,  and  who  then  use  that  analysis  to  allocate  their  resources 
accordingly.  

Integrated needs assessment also takes place at the local level with OCHA facilitation: for example, after a 
sudden crisis in the IDP camp in Kaga Bandoro, all the relevant agencies did an integrated assessment leading 
to an integrated response. This sort of integration happens more often when there is an incident but less often 
in  “normal  situations”.  It  depends  a  lot  on  who  is  the  lead  agency  on  the  ground,  and  whether  they  have 
surge/last resort capacity to step in and fill gaps. When these take place, there is (in OCHA’s view) a clear 
effectiveness benefit, as well as efficiency benefits of pooled resources and a clearer division of labour in both 
the assessment and the programme. 

CAR Humanitarian Fund helped by ECHO: While the evaluation team did not examine the HF in any depth, the 
team was informed by other donors that donor confidence in the HF was bolstered, and that funding was also 
increased, because of ECHO’s participation in the CAR HF Steering Committee – an example of ECHO adding 
value to the response without themselves providing funding to the HF.  

Support for the Humanitarian Coordinator is good.  
One of the key functions of OCHA, but a function that is not usually separately costed and reported in OCHA’s 
programming, is the secretariat support provided to the Humanitarian Coordinator. Especially since the reform 
of the RC system, the RC/HC depends entirely upon OCHA to implement the humanitarian component of the 
mandate (triple-hatted in CAR - with a peacekeeping mission). 

Performance weaknesses.  
OCHA admits that it could have done better at pushing AAP/CwC: this would translate into a better  quality 
response. But introducing and properly achieving AAP is not quick – it starts slow and takes time to build up to 
a  real  culture  change.  A  second  area  where  OCHA  feels  that  they  could  have  done  better,  and  got  more 
leverage for investment, was in GENCAP. GENCAP was perceived as valuable while an advisor was assigned, 
but since the GENCAP advisor left (mid-2018?) and has not yet been replaced, there is a perception that overall 
results are being limited due to a lack of a full gender perspective. 

In what areas was OCHA less effective or ineffective, and for what reasons? 

OCHA identified three areas in CAR in which there are still shortcomings: 

1) Not all IASC agencies are fully staffed or financed to fulfil their IASC commitments, especially if an agency 
is a cluster lead it has responsibility to provide cluster leadership and also last resort funding to cluster activities 
that  are  critical  for  cluster  effectiveness.  In  addition,  at  the  programming level,  not  all  Agencies  are  able  to 
deliver as promised. In the HRP there is big talk about joint planning and common goals – but implementation 
varies place to place, cluster to cluster, and agency to agency. OCHA can help address this problem by holding 
their hands and producing info products to support the IASC member, the HC can push, and finally EDGs can 
put pressure on. 

153 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

2) CAR needs a coordination platform between humanitarian and development donors: development has “huge 
funding but no accountability or results,”119 and the two communities need a better strategic dialogue. The issue 
here  is  that  the  humanitarian  community  is  ready,  but  development  donors  are  not  perceived  to  be  really 
interested, they are perceived to be all tied up with the peace agreement and also politicise their development 
planning. It is anticipated that the HC/RC will engage on this coordination question, supported in this by OCHA 
(as the technical support agency to the HC function) 

3)  CAR needs more  work  on  preparedness and  response  capacity  especially  locally.  Recently  there  was a 
major crisis in a “safe” area (Bouar - green zone with a development footprint). The actors on the ground were 
totally unready to cope with a new emergency – OCHA had to step in to take over, had to mobilise from Bangui. 
This  worked  but  was  not  efficient.  There  should  be  more  investment  in  readiness/preparedness,  but  this  is 
always difficult to fund-raise for 

What factors influenced OCHA’s effectiveness? 

The humanitarian response is the main game in town 
CAR was one of the first L3 emergencies in the period of the Transformative Agenda, the relative scale of the 
humanitarian emergency is among the highest in the world (% of population displaced and in need), and the 
range of other strategic and political interests in CAR is very low (limited geopolitical interest contributing to 
stunted development investment). As a result, and in contrast to many other situations even in Central Africa, 
the humanitarian response is at the centre of international engagement in CAR – which naturally places OCHA 
in a central role. 

Strong OCHA team 
ECHO and partners concurred that in CAR, OCHA has deployed experienced staff and, importantly, fully staffed 
all the key positions. In comparing with OCHA in other contexts, the ECHO conclusion was that by properly 
investing  in  staffing  in  CAR  (quality  and  quantity),  OCHA  was  able  to  get  significantly  better  results 
(coordination, needs assessment etc) and better overall quality of response, than if they had deployed the bare 
minimum.    Without  being  able  to  quantify  it,  there  was  a  sense  that  OCHA’s  marginal  increase  in  human 
resource investment had achieved a much greater return on that investment in terms of better quality results. 

Humanitarian rotation 
All humanitarian situations suffer from short-term rotation of international staff, leading to problems of continuity 
and gaps in coverage. Although OCHA has made efforts to overcome this, the whole community struggles with 
this in CAR, all the more since – in the absence of a strong cohort of national staff (due to the underlying weak 
human resource capacity of CAR as a result of generations of development underinvestment) – most agencies 
rely upon an unusually high proportion of short-rotation and inexperienced international staff. OCHA was itself 
affected in the areas of AAP and GENCAP, where it had difficulty finding and fielding appropriate experts. 

Funding shortages for key coordination functions 
In  addition  to  general  underfunding,  OCHA  signalled  that  underfunding  for  cluster  coordination  (the 
responsibility of cluster lead agencies) has affected the performance of the response. Underfunding to OCHA 
itself  (which  was  nevertheless  75%  funded  against  its  overall  requirements)  has  resulted  in  delays  in  the 
mobilisation of the AAP/CwC activities and GENCAP support, as well as limited the number of sub-national 
field offices managed by OCHA. 

Funding inflexibility 
OCHA felt that the project funding model used by most donors inhibited flexibility and slowed down adaptation 
in fast-changing situations (i.e. whenever there is a need to return to the donor for agreement to a change). At 

119 Note this is the characterization by OCHA, but in reality the evaluation team believes that (a) the available (allocable) development funding is limited (few donors 
and loan funding is correctly directed by Government priorities), (b) the development community does have both accountability and results, although it is not perhaps 
in a form or a timeframe that OCHA easily identifies with 

154 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

the same time, OCHA felt that implementing agencies themselves can be too rigid and are not always quick 
enough to switch from protracted to sudden onset mode. 

To what  extent  is  OCHA  able  to  allocate  resources  between  different  outputs  so  as  to  maximise  its 
effectiveness? 

OCHA’s costs are largely fixed.  
OCHA has mandated responsibilities that can be fulfilled to a greater or lesser extent, but it cannot change the 
scope of its responsibilities. An NGO or UN IP can scale up or down its regions or its sectors according to 
funding, or leave the country altogether if it is no longer a priority or not funded, but, as OCHA said, “OCHA 
cannot not do what it is mandated to do.”  OCHA argued quite forcefully that OCHA can do some things better, 
but OCHA cannot do anything less – OCHA has accountabilities for all those things, OCHA cannot reduce its 
accountabilities so OCHA cannot de-prioritise anything. 

OCHA’s scope for allocating funding 
The  only  area  of  significant  variability  for  OCHA  is  its  sub-national  field  presence:  the  number  of  field 
coordination units it manages, and how it manages them (the balance between resident capacity and visiting 
resources from Bangui). Field offices improve the quality of the response: in most such cases OCHA is only 
UN agency based in those locations and other UN agencies are only working through NGOs. In those places 
where OCHA is present, OCHA and ECHO both see better, more joined up and more integrated programming. 
Although this component is seen as effective, both ECHO and OCHA stated, independently of each other, that 
this  was  the  only  component  of  OCHA’s  programme  which  was  easily  scalable  –  and  it  is  also  a  high-cost 
component. For this reason, if funding to OCHA is reduced say 10%, OCHA would be less inclined to try to 
scrape 10% off all of its mandated services and would be more inclined to simply cut back two or three of its 
field offices. Similarly, an increase in funding can be easily absorbed by scaling up field presence. 

What areas of OCHA’s work are of most value? 

HPC provides the best value.  
According to OCHA, it is the humanitarian programme cycle (HNO/HRP) that provides the best value: it is the 
pillar  around  which  everything  else  revolves.  It  holds  together  the  needs  assessment,  the  planning,  the 
response monitoring and the advocacy. It is also the key to the effectiveness of the HC.  

CM-Coord provides the second best value.  
CMCOORD is the key link between the Humanitarian system, MINUSCA and national and international security 
forces. In an active conflict context, CM-Coord is key to planning, security, and de-conflicting tense situations 
that could erupt and cause new displacement.  

Globally OCHA does a survey of partners, and they tell each CO what their stakeholders think OCHA is doing 
better or worse. In CAR the stakeholders said they valued most the HPC and the CM-Coord. 

Least value is OCHA engagement on the UNDAF.  
Time on the UNDAF is perceived as time-consuming and unfruitful: OCHA has an obligation to attend but not 
to report. UNDAF is important for ensuring that the humanitarian boundary is respected. It is also important for 
the nexus, but OCHA feels that there is a lot of effort going into the nexus without much result.  

155 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

6. Conclusions  

Comparing project theory to practice allows the following conclusions for ECHO: 

Beneficiary outcomes  

The  main  outcome  was  a  more  coherent  humanitarian  response,  but  which  was  unable  to  meet  all 
needs. The direct beneficiaries of this action were all 137 humanitarian organisations in CAR, who engaged 
with and were supported by OCHA’s coordination mechanisms, evidence generation, and resource mobilisation 
and advocacy activities. As a result, humanitarian organisations were able to plan and deliver a more coherent 
response  which  provided  emergency  assistance  to  1m  people  in  need  of  assistance.  In  addition,  donor 
organisations including ECHO also benefited from OCHA’s work in needs assessment, analysis and planning, 
as they used this information to guide their own processes of planning and reporting. The OCHA action was 
not able to assist all 1.9m people in need, meet increased protection needs, or significantly reduce humanitarian 
needs and vulnerabilities.  

Implementation actors 

OCHA implemented a sound project including some useful adaptions. The OCHA activity appeared to be 
suitably  designed,  reflecting  the  IASC  coordination  model  for  the  humanitarian  response,  and  it  was 
successfully implemented due in large part to OCHA’s operational presence, HR capacities, and synergies built 
with  other  actors.  Although  its  information  management  was  somewhat  undermined  by  poor  capacities  in 
clusters, the project made strong efforts to adapt to implementation challenges, e.g. by quickly responding to 
increased violence and using its flexible coordination ‘antenna,’ although it was not successful in scaling up a 
CwC  project  to  fill  gaps  in  feedback  and  complaint  mechanisms.  Despite  OCHA’s  efforts,  the  larger 
humanitarian  response  struggled  to  adapt  to  a  worsening  humanitarian  situation,  increased  aid  worker 
insecurity, and significant underfunding of the HRP.   

ECHO’s role  

ECHO provided important funding and oversight, although its strategy was not very specific. ECHO’s 
funding to OCHA was helpfully increased to address potential gaps, provided mostly in advance (80%), and 
allowed modifications. In both the HIP and Technical Annex, ECHO underlined the importance of coordination, 
but provided little in the way of specific strategic direction on humanitarian coordination. On a technical level, 
ECHO provided inputs to the proposal design and undertook to monitor OCHA’s efforts to increase engagement 
with the government, as well as public advocacy on the humanitarian mission.  

EC funding, policy 

The EU contributed sufficient and proportionate funding to support coordination, but it lacked clear 
policies on humanitarian coordination. The EU provided adequate funding to OCHA’s coordination activity 
in CAR and demonstrated its broad policy commitments to support humanitarian coordination and OCHA’s role 
(in the EU Consensus), and to strengthen coordinated needs assessments (in the Grand Bargain). Since the 
EU or EC have no specific policy on humanitarian coordination (i.e. comparable to other policies governing its 
humanitarian actions), no common assessment framework, practical guidance or lessons learned are available 
to support country-level investments in coordination.   

Cost-effectiveness 

OCHA does not have a VFM comparator.  
When asked if the OCHA action provided more or less value for money than other ECHO investments, the 
response was that OCHA’s services are not substitutable by other agencies: OCHA is the only organisation 
doing what it does, and it also cannot abrogate that responsibility. So, in this perspective, the OCHA action 
cannot be compared to other IPs. 

156 

 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

Was OCHA cost-effective? Without the OCHA action there would not have been sufficient prioritisation at 
local level (sub-national planning) and national level (ICC and cluster-level planning, and coordination with 
development and security actors). Furthermore, the HC would not have been able to fulfil the HC’s mandate; 
and humanitarian planning would have been chaotic in the absence of coordinated needs assessment and 
coordination humanitarian actions. OCHA in CAR was perceived to be more cost-effective than in some other 
contexts, largely due to the quality of its staff and its focus on “priorities within the priorities.”  

Our hypothesis, supported by experience and in line with ECHO’s own assumptions (see Section 2.3 above), 
is that co-ordination, if done well, is a worthwhile investment; this particular OCHA operation, in our view and 
that of IP/DPs whom we consulted, is very well run. On this basis, we judge this OCHA operation to be cost-
effective. 

Documents consulted 

  Consensus 2008: The European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, Joint Statement by the Council and the 
Representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European 
Parliament and the European Commission. 30.1.2008 

  FO 2018: ECHO (2018), Strengthen Humanitarian Coordination and Advocacy in the Central African 

Republic. FicheOp 

  GGOP 2017: EC (2017), General Guidelines on Operational Priorities for Humanitarian Aid in 2018. 

Commission Staff Working Document 11/12/2017 

  GGOP 2018: ECHO (2018), General Guidelines on Operational Priorities for Humanitarian Aid in 2018. 

Brussels, 11.12.2017  SWD (2017) 464 final  

  Grand Bargain: The Grand Bargain (2016) A Shared Commitment to Better Serve People in Need 

  Grand Bargain Self-Reporting: ECHO (2018), 2018 Grand Bargain Annual Self-Reporting – European 

Commission/ DG ECHO  

  HIP 2018: ECHO (2018), Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP) Central Africa, Updated 28.11.2018 

Version 7 

  SF 2018: OCHA (2018), Strengthen Humanitarian Coordination and Advocacy in the Central African 

Republic, Single Form 2018/00178/FR/01/01 

  TA 2018: ECHO (2018), Annexe Technique Afrique Centrale. 28/11/2018 Version 7 

  Westhorp 2014: Westhorp, G (2014) Realist Impact Evaluation, An Introduction. ODI Methods Lab, 

September 2014 

157 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

Annex 4: Case Study 2 

How the EU supported a refugee response in Cameroon 

Background  

At inception phase it was agreed to conduct a case study to review ECHO’s approach to refugees and forced 
displacement and self-reliance for CAR refugees in East Cameroon. The ET aimed to review how ECHO inputs 
and IP programming interacted to generate beneficiary outcomes.   

This case study looks at the project Projet de renforcement des capacités de résilience des populations 
réfugiées et hôtes vulnérables dans la région de l'Est du Cameroun (Project to reinforce the resilience 
capacity of refugee and vulnerable host populations in the East region of Cameroon) implemented by the French 
Red Cross (FRC) from 1 February 2017 to 1 February 2018. 

It was selected because: 
 

It has a clearly identifiable focus on self-reliance for CAR refugees in East Cameroon  

 

It is as recent as possible, allowing for strategic relevance and stakeholder consultation  

  Final and complete reporting were available (not the case for 2018 project)  

Method  

The case study approach aims to investigate ‘what worked, how and why?’ It sought to investigate the chain of 
inputs to outcomes including EU funding, ECHO activities, IP/DP implementation, and outcomes for intended 
beneficiaries. It focused on these questions: (i) What was expected to happen? (ii) What really happened? (iii) 
What implications for ECHO CA strategy? The approach is inspired by ‘realist evaluation’, which recognises 
that nothing works everywhere for everyone: context makes a big difference to programme outcomes. A realist 
evaluation asks not ‘what works?’ but ‘how or why does this work, for whom, in what circumstances?’ (Westhorp 
2014) 

This  case  study  used  the  following  generic  hypothesis  for  how  ECHO  actions  are  intended  to  generate 
outcomes:  

 

IF … EU humanitarian budget to CA is sufficient and proportionate, and guided by effective global policies   

  AND … ECHO programme is guided by an appropriate strategy, uses good project selection processes, 

uses good funding mechanisms, and pilot s and manages the programme well 

  AND … Implementing partner/s (IP) and downstream partner/s (DP) design good projects, implements 

them well (incl. cost-effectively), and adapts to significant changes  

  THEN … Beneficiary (and local) capacities will be engaged, needs will be met, and vulnerabilities will be 

reduced (resilience strengthened) 

The  case  study  also  sought  to  assess  cost-effectiveness  for  this  action,  using  ECHO’s  recommended 
methodology.120  

Limitations: The case study relies on information collected from available documentation (and 3 KIIs). It was 
conducted as a relatively rapid exercise.  

120 ADE (2016), Study on Approaches to Assess Cost-Effectiveness of DG ECHO’s Humanitarian Aid Actions  

158 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

1. What was the intention?  

In 2016 and 2017, the number of CAR refugees in east Cameroon reached 158,00 and 170,000 respectively, 
with 50% residing in host communities (GGOP 2017, GGOP 2018). Their needs grew as a majority, they had 
no income and were dependent on humanitarian aid 'due to limited self-reliance opportunities and uncertain 
return  prospects'  (HIP  2017,  2018).  In  addition,  some  38%  were  assessed  to  be  'highly  vulnerable';  host 
communities were also affected by pressure on resources and the risk of tensions was identified (HIP 2018).     

In  2016,  CRC/CRf  proposed  a  resilience  project  in  the  east  Cameroon  communities  of  Garoua  Boulai  and 
Betare Oya, aimed at supporting the self-sufficiency of CAR refugees and the food security of most vulnerable 
members of host population. The project focused on increasing access to food, income, and social cohesion 
among  refugees  and  host  populations.  The  project  aimed  to  strengthen  food  security  of  vulnerable 
Cameroonians and CAR refugees in Garoua Boulai and Betare Oya. Results would be measured by baseline 
and end line surveys.  

The project would target 23,157 people overall, including 380 vulnerable households with agricultural support; 
380 households (HH) poultry endowment; and 210 HH in income generation activity (IGA) support, including 
10 in apiculture. Overall, the project expected that 85% of the population targeted would achieve 85% food 
consumption score (FCS) and achieve 20 on coping strategies index. According to the FRC log frame, these 
specific results were expected:   

1.  Agriculture would be improved for 450 vulnerable households; including 2,052 people receiving livelihood 

2. 

assets/resources, 100 getting access to land for cultivation, and 5 months of food rations for those 
assisted with agriculture. Cost: EUR 208,950 
Incomes of target population would be increased and diversified; including 65% HH spending less than 
3/4 income on food, 792 HH increasing livestock capital, and 70% HH receiving IGA support so able to 
cover half HH food needs. Cost: EUR 191,567  

3.  Conflict resolution methods would be strengthened for 20,016 individuals through 33 conflict management 

meetings, etc. Cost: Eur 99,482 

ECHO  technical  staff  judged  that  the  project  would  strengthen  the  populations'  means  and  capacities  for 
resilience  in  multiple  ways.  They  also  welcomed  its  ‘do  no  harm’  and  conflict  reduction  aspect  and  FRC's 
undertaking to work with decentralised government technical structures (ECHO FO 2016). 

7. How did it work in practice?   

7.1. Notable outcomes 

In practice, the project generated some positive outcomes to reduce vulnerabilities and increase resilience. An 
end line review indicated overall improvements in food security and nutrition status. The number of HHs with 
acceptable FCS levels increased from 37.2% (baseline) to 44.4% (end line); host populations increased food 
production  as  a  result  of  project  inputs;  both  refugee  and  host  populations  reduced  resort  to  coping 
mechanisms. The increased CSI showed improved household food security resulting from good food production 
activities  (FRC  SF  2016).  Overall,  ECHO  experts  judged  the  project  reinforced  capacity,  reduced  aid 
dependence,  improved  self-sufficiency  and  living  conditions  through  income-generating  activities  in  target 
populations: host populations and refugees (FO 2016 ECHO). 

However, outcomes for refugees were clearly less positive than for host populations. The number of refugees 
HHs registering acceptable FCS levels dropped from 34% (baseline) to 23% (end line), with 5% HHs in a 'critical' 
situation. The main factor cited for this was the suspension of WFP food distributions for displaced populations 
and  stricter  targeting  of  vulnerable  people  to  supply  food  (CRF  SF  2016).  Additionally,  there  were  the  still 

159 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

existing constraints, such as refugee identity registration, access to rights, access to land to develop agriculture, 
and access to customised trade, despite the support of the programme. 

In addition, these outcomes appeared relatively tenuous and difficult to sustain, especially for CAR refugees. 
The wider CA evaluation found little evidence of longer-term development assistance to the CAR refugees and 
host communities in the East. While ECHO humanitarian funding to the FRC action continued in 2017, the focus 
of humanitarian efforts in Cameroon increasingly shifted towards more acute needs arising, e.g. in the North 
and Far North regions, even though chronic needs in the East showed little sign of improvement. And despite 
promising  engagements  by  development  actors,  including  the  World  Bank,  there  was  little  evidence  that 
development donors were yet providing ‘follow up’ support to these populations or that government services in 
the region were able to address protracted needs of local populations or refugees.  

The positive outcomes follow from project outputs delivered:  

  380 HHs received agricultural support through 17,500 awareness sessions 

  About 100 ha of pastoral land was made available to refugees 

  380 HHs received poultry assets  

  23 veterinary focal points were trained  

  165 vulnerable HHs received IGA support 

  17,500 HH were supported in conflict management 

  820 dialogue group sessions were held 

Shortfalls  compared  to  initial  targets  did  not  appear  to  undermine  positive  outcomes  in  food  security  and 
nutrition status. As compared to targets, 7/8 villages were assisted; 17,500/21,500 people received agricultural 
awareness sessions; 23/25 vet focal points were trained; 165/210 HHs received IGA support; 17,500/20,000 
HHs were supported in conflict management; and 820/4000 dialogue groups were delivered.      

7.2. Project implementation  

The outcomes were attributed to several factors of success:  

  the type of support provided, i.e. agriculture support to vulnerable populations, income diversification 

support, and support for PSS and social cohesion among refugees and hosts (FRC);  

  the wide range of support provided aimed at strengthening self-reliance, most importantly providing 

agricultural and herding support inputs and distribution of livestock (ECHO FO);  

  the appropriateness of activities in a region where agricultural production is the main employment, 

income, and food source for HHs in the region (FRC).  

The  effect  of  these  inputs  was  to  help  'dynamize'  agricultural  production  for  vulnerable  HHs  targeted,  by 
increasing  production  area  and  diversifying  production  strategies  (FRC).  In  addition,  useful  synergies  were 
developed by FRC which implements another FSL project in area and LWF which also does (ECHO FO).  

However, the outcomes were also reported to be hindered by several factors:  
 

Implementational challenges, including difficulties in beneficiary accompaniment and follow up, dispersed 
fields available, and beneficiary engagement challenges (FRC);  

  Beneficiary preferences for more seeds, support and tools for increased agricultural production (FRC);  

  Contextual factors, including poor food preparation and low consumption of available vegetables, fruit, and 
dairy products, so that most HHs consumed their own food produce and did not generate an income from 
it;  

160 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

  Barriers to agricultural production, including ongoing agropastoral conflicts; (treatable) crop diseases; poor 

production techniques; non-use of fertiliser; and  

  Lack of services, including context-specific agricultural production support in the region where state 
agricultural support is not working well (CRF). As a result, a key challenge remains to engage state 
structures in taking forward the approaches developed and future opportunities.  

No strategic analysis of context and opportunities (value chain) to identify the different key value-creating and 
margin-generating activities and to understand how each activity, i.e. each link that creates value for the 
customer and generates margin composes the chain creates or loses value to an activity, a production. This 
analysis would allocate resources and focus efforts on the key activities of the chain.  

During the implementation of its project, FRC was confronted with programming problems as explained and 
more specifically budgetary constraints.  

The project design was relevant and appropriate to address food insecurity, and implementation was largely 
effective, but it was undermined by the unexpected suspension of WFP food rations in addition to EU budgetary 
restraints (declining during implementation). The range of support provided has driven positive outcomes in line 
with ECHO's expectations, but adaptation to changing events was not done during implementation, although 
suspension of WFP food distribution and budget reduction had a major impact on outcomes.   

7.3. ECHO inputs  

At country level, ECHO highlighted the strategic importance of self-reliance for CAR refugees in Cameroon, 
without making it a clear operational priority. In 2016, ECHO highlighted the need to address critical needs of 
CAR refugees and strengthen their self-reliance (reduce aid dependency); to strengthen their livelihoods and 
resilience in the absence of return prospects; and to reduce the 'high' pressure on local resources and reported 
tensions  with  local  populations.  It  envisaged  a  response  that  addresses  protracted  needs  of CAR  refugees 
through support to solutions and self-reliance, with a view to ECHO's gradual exit (HIP 2016). The TA 2016 
notes that self-reliance programming for refugees requires 'strategic' complementarity between humanitarian 
and development actors but provides few specific details or operational priorities.    

In 2017, the ECHO strategy recognised that most CAR refugees intended to stay in Cameroon as long as the 
situation in CAR remained volatile without income and entirely dependent on humanitarian aid. So, the priority 
would be self-reliance initiatives for CAR refugees (HIP 2017). In 2017, ECHO gave partners general guidance 
on  Nexus-approach  strategy  and  the  need  for  strategic  complementarity  between  humanitarian  and 
development activities in order to increase resilience, especially when seeking durable solutions for refugees 
and  displaced  people  (TA  2017).  It  also  noted  that  working  towards  socio-economic  integration  with  an 
emphasis on access to income-generating, commercial activities, employment and services was a priority for 
DEVCO  and  EEAS  and  should  be  supported  by  ECHO-funded  partners  (TA  2017).  However,  in  2017  self-
reliance activities were not listed as specific priorities in the TA for Cameroon, where the emphasis was on 
emergency response to new crises and budget limitations were cited (TA 2017).  

The outcomes benefited from limited ECHO financing for CAR refugees. In 2016, ECHO allocated EUR 500,000 
(out  of  EUR  21.1  million  total)  to  this  project,  which  appears  to  be  the  only  or  among  few  supporting  CAR 
refugee self-reliance in the East. In 2016, ECHO also provided funding to UNHCR activities for CAR refugees, 
which focused on access to protection and documentation (EUR 1 million) and improved access to basic needs 
and  essential  services  (EUR  545,962).  Still,  these  were  emergency  focused  funds  and  contributed  little  to 
support self-reliance.121  Moreover, funding to self-reliance activities for CAR refugees dropped further in 2017 
and 2018, as ECHO refocused funding on emergency needs of Nigerian refugees and IDPs linked to Boko 
Haram violence in the North of the country.  

121 ECHO Fiche Op 2016; Protection and Emergency Response for Nigerian and for Central African Refugees in Cameroon 

161 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

7.4. EC enablement  

The EU  provided  consistent  humanitarian funding to  the  Cameroon  response,  which  nonetheless  remained 
underfunded.  

In 2017, the EU provided USD 20.9 million in humanitarian funding to Cameroon, a slight decrease compared 
to 2016 when it provided USD 21.1 million. This amounted to 17.9% and 13.3% of total humanitarian funding 
in  those  years.  It  corresponded  with  increased  funding  shortfalls  for  the  humanitarian  response,  which  was 
funded at 68.6% in 2016 and 49% in 2017.  

The EU provided a global policy framework to support self-reliance activities for refugees and forced migrants. 
In  2016,  the  EU  published  a  new  policy  framework  on  forced  displacement  and  development  aimed  at 
strengthening  self-reliance  to  end  aid  dependency  and  to  bridge  to  socio-economic  development.  The 
approach, which requires the involvement of development assistance from the outset of a displacement crisis, 
calls  for  humanitarian  and  development  actors  to  develop  a  joint  analysis,  joint  programming,  and  flexible 
funding. It relies on international actors providing external support, including policy and advocacy at national 
government level, and particular capacity support to local authorities (who are most affected), and harnessing 
the productive capacities of refugees and displaced persons themselves. Specific projects may be focused on 
access to labour markets and access to services etc. (EC COM 2016) 

The  project  provides  evidence  that  clearly  justifies  the  rationale  for  the  EU  policy.  Like  in  many  forced 
displacement  crises,  political  and  development  actors  have  not  been  involved  from  the  outset  in  working 
towards durable solutions. Instead, humanitarian assistance has been the only response, and it has not been 
an appropriate response on its own, creating aid dependencies, situations of local stress and further pressure 
on aid budgets. Like elsewhere, the response was constrained by political constraints and the absence of a 
suitable  enabling  political  environment  for  solutions.  EC  responses  have  been  limited  to  strong  micro-level 
projects, but without common strategy and policy objectives (EC COM 2016b).   

Cost-effectiveness of the FRC action in Cameroon 

This  case  study  has  used  the  ECHO  guidance  on  cost  efficiency  and  cost  effectiveness  (CE/CE)  and  the 
recommendations of the ECHO evaluation on transfer modalities122 (ADE 2016). 

The analysis is structured under the following questions: 
  To what extent has the programme proved effective in bringing about self-reliance outcomes? 
  What was the value of the programme? 
  What is the cost-effectiveness issue? 

A cost-effectiveness judgement is proposed in Section 3. Conclusions, below. 

To what extent has the programme proved effective in bringing about self-reliance outcomes? 
Funding for the FRC action enabled ECHO to introduce and develop its self-reliance approach. The planning 
of HIPs is annual, which allows ECHO to regularly review this approach. It also allows imposing a project exit 
strategy  in  the  project  proposals  that  PSIs  must  submit  in  order  to  obtain  implementation  funding.  In  their 
planning, IPs must offer outcomes related to Nexus. 

Before the 2016 FRC action, there was little or no means or very few means to develop income-generating 
activities  to foster  a  context  of  self-sufficiency.  The  problem  was also  that  the  proposed  income generating 
activities were very ad hoc, and the programme was unable to develop real value chain and explore and develop 

122 Evaluation of the Use of Different Transfer Modalities in ECHO Humanitarian Aid Actions 2011-2014 

162 

 
 
 
 
 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

opportunities. The income generating activities therefore faced a market with no real demand or possibility of 
buying inputs. 

ECHO  funding  alone  was  too  limited  to  increase  self-reliance  of  CAR  refugees  without  the  engagement  of 
development actors. 

What was the value of the programme? 
The programme 2014-2018 was valuable in terms of actions in response to emergency, to the immediate and 
recurrent  needs  of  programme  beneficiaries  during  four  years  in  different  regions  of  Cameroon,  requiring 
emergency assistance depending on their evolution and the outbreak of new crises. ECHO's main mission is 
to alleviate suffering and help people in emergencies. Refugees and host populations benefitted from the project 
in  meeting  their  immediate  needs,  but  relatively  little  in  terms  of  meeting  their  chronic  needs  and  reducing 
vulnerabilities. Beneficiaries showed modest improvements in food security and nutrition indicators, and fewer 
than intended were assisted and aid-dependent refugees fared less well than host communities.  

The project was valuable because it helped to finance and implement basic infrastructure in the targeted regions 
(especially in the eastern region), benefiting both displaced populations and host populations, such as water 
points,  rehabilitation,  equipment  and  operationalisation  of  some  health  centres  (in  areas  where  there  were 
none), and the rehabilitation of some schools. The project has also made a significant contribution to building 
the capacity of local organisations and some communities. However, the project has not really contributed to 
the capacity of local authorities or to institutional support for local structures. 

The project was also valuable because in its programming, the project introduced paths to develop a Nexus 
strategy, and prepared exit strategies with a bridge between humanitarian and development.  ECHO funding 
alone, however, was too limited to increase self-reliance of CAR refugees without the engagement of other 
development actors. ECHO provided appropriate strategic direction but assigned limited operational priority to 
this action, to develop activities that can establish an adequate Nexus strategy. Funds allocated to the project 
were small in scale compared to protracted needs and unlikely to make a significant or lasting impact on self-
reliance. ECHO funding alone was not an effective mechanism for increasing the self-reliance of CAR refugees 
in Eastern Cameroon.  

What is the cost-effectiveness issue? 
The  cost-effectiveness  of  this  action  was  greatly  limited  by  the  absence  of  other  services  available  to  the 
beneficiary population. The action was relevant in humanitarian terms i.e. to address protracted needs through 
resilience  activities  aimed  at  supporting  self-sufficiency  in  the  absence  of  much  other  support  to  these 
populations.  But  its  cost  effectiveness  was  undermined  by  several  important  context  factors.  First,  the 
temporary suspension of WFP food distribution led to a worrying reduction in the number of refugee households 
registering acceptable FCS levels, thus significantly undermining the self-sufficiency project which was unable 
to  adapt  to  the  changed  circumstances.  Second,  the  positive  self-sufficiency  outcomes  for  refugees  were 
unlikely to be sustained without continued ECHO funding given the absence of development actors with the 
capacity to follow up. Third, the positive food security outcomes for refugees and host populations were unlikely 
to be sustained without the adequately functioning state agricultural support services in the region. The action 
would have been much more clearly cost effective as part of a well-coordinated exit strategy from humanitarian 
assistance to tailored development assistance, which had involved development actors from the beginning at 
design stage.   

163 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

8. Conclusions 

Comparing project theory to practice allows the following conclusions for ECHO: 

Beneficiary outcomes  

Refugees and host populations benefitted from the project but relatively little in terms of meeting their 
chronic  needs  and  reducing  vulnerabilities.  The  target  populations  and  local  capacities  engaged  in  the 
project  (albeit  insufficiently),  but  engagement  by  state  agricultural  structures  remained  very  limited  or  non-
existent. Beneficiaries showed modest improvements in food security and nutrition indicators, and fewer than 
intended were assisted and aid-dependent refugees fared less well than host communities. Some needs of 
refugees and local hosts were addressed by the project; but these needs are chronic needs and remained far 
from met  overall  and  in  terms  of  food  security,  livelihoods  and  nutrition.  Significant  vulnerabilities  remained 
present in both populations, with refugees showing a downward trend even during the project implementation, 
and it was unclear if resilience benefits from the project would be sustained after its closure.       

Implementation actors 

The project design was relevant, and implementation was largely effective, but it was undermined by 
the  unexpected  suspension  of  WFP  food  rations.  FRC  (and  CRC)  designed  the  project  well,  and  its 
appropriateness and range of support provided were judged to drive positive outcomes. Implementation was 
considered to be good and in line with ECHO's expectations, and reduced targets were adequately explained 
and accepted. Adaptation to changing events was not done during implementation, although suspension of 
WFP food distribution had a major impact on outcomes.   

ECHO’s role  

ECHO funding alone was too limited to increase self-reliance of CAR refugees without the engagement 
of other development actors. ECHO provided appropriate strategic direction, but limited operational priority 
to this action, in the context of increased emergency needs in the North and insufficient funding to meet all 
needs. ECHO funding avoided duplications with other actions (UNHCR, FRC, LWF), but its allocation to the 
project was small in scale compared to protracted needs and unlikely to make a significant or lasting impact 
alone on self-reliance. Without follow up from development and political actors (including DEVCO and EEAS) 
or being part of any larger solution for the CAR refugees, ECHO funding alone was not an effective mechanism 
for increasing the self-reliance of CAR refugees in eastern Cameroon. ECHO monitoring and oversight is highly 
regarded in Cameroon though, and evidence suggests it worked well for this project.  

EC funding, policy 

The EU provided constant humanitarian funding and a highly relevant policy to increase refugee self-
sufficiency. Although EU humanitarian funding to Cameroon remained constant, its share and sufficiency was 
overtaken by increasing needs. Indeed, in 2016 and 2017 the EU humanitarian was relatively low compared to 
other countries and regions, and it was insufficient to address both acute and protracted needs in Cameroon. 
The EU also provided effective policy guidance on refugees and self-reliance which applied to all EU actors, 
and it remained highly relevant to CAR refugees in Cameroon. The EU policy for promoting self-reliance for 
CAR refugees in Cameroon depended on  ECHO-DEVCO collaboration and engagement of other actors (EC 
2016), but its existence also highlighted the gaps that the policy intended to address: a lack of development 
actors from the start, a weak coordination system, isolated humanitarian response, lack of government support, 
aid dependency and pressure on aid budgets.   

Cost-effectiveness 

A cost-effectiveness judgement, to the extent that one is possible here, rests on an unquantified comparison 
with  the  counterfactual  implied  by  the  last  section  of  the  Cost-Effectiveness  box  above.  The  counterfactual 
would  be  a  jointly  planned,  multi-year,  adequately  funded  humanitarian-development  intervention  involving 

164 

 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

sustained  WFP  support,  engaged  development  actors  with  long  term  plans  to  support  self-reliance,  and 
sustained support to local government and in particular its agricultural extension departments. In the absence 
of  such  a  thought-through,  joined-up  scenario,  self-reliance  outcomes  generally  were  disappointing  and 
unsustainable and the judgement of cost effectiveness, as it relates to the self-reliance outcomes, is that it was 
poor.   

Documents consulted  

  Council of the EU, Press Release (12/05/2016): Council conclusions on the EU approach to forced 

displacement and development  

  EC COM (2016): European Commission (2016), Lives in Dignity: from Aid-dependence to Self-reliance. 

Forced Displacement and Development. Communication from the Commission to the European 
parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions, Brussels, 26.4.2016 COM (2016) 

  EC COM (2016b): European Commission (2016), Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying 

the document, Lives in Dignity: from Aid-dependence to Self-reliance Forced Displacement and 
Development (COM 2016) 

  FO 2016: Fiche Opérationnelle  2014|FPA|14-142  

  FO 2018: Fiche Opérationnelle 2014|FPA|14-142 

  GGOP (2017): European Commission (2016), General Guidelines on Operational Priorities for 

Humanitarian Aid in 2017, Brussels, 5.12.2016  

  GGOP (2018): European Commission (2017), General Guidelines on Operational Priorities for 

Humanitarian Aid in 2018, Brussels, 11.12.2017  

  HIP 2016: ECHO (2016), Humanitarian Implementation Plan Central Africa.  

  HIP 2017: ECHO (2017), Humanitarian Implementation Plan Central Africa. Last update 13/07/2017 

  HIP 2018: ECHO (2018), Humanitarian Implementation Plan Central Africa. Last update: 28/11/2018 

  SF 2016: Croix-Rouge FR, Single Form 2016, Rapport finale 

  SF 2018: Croix-Rouge FR, Single Form 2018, Rapport intermédiaire  

  TA 2017: ECHO (2017), Annexe Technique Afrique Centrale, Information financière, administrative et 

opérationnelle Dernière mise à jour: 13/07/2017 

  TA 2018: ECHO (2018), Annexe Technique Afrique Centrale, Information financière, administrative et 

opérationnelle Dernière mise à jour: 28/11/2018  

  Westhorp 2014: Westhorp, G (2014) Realist Impact Evaluation, An Introduction. ODI Methods Lab, 

September 2014 

165 

 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

Annex 5: Case Study 3 

How the EU contributed to resilience in Chad’s Sahel belt 2016-2017 

Background  

At inception phase, the ET agreed with the ECHO steering group to conduct a case study focused on ECHO’s 
approach to the Humanitarian-Development Nexus and resilience in Chad. We aimed to review  how ECHO 
inputs and IP programming interacted to generate beneficiary outcomes.   

This case study looks at the WFP project, entitled: 
Providing targeted lean season food and nutrition assistance and post-lean season support to food-insecure 
households and vulnerable refugees affected by the El Nino phenomenon in the Sahelian belt of Chad while 
ensuring the capacity development of national institutions and partners. 

The project was implemented from February 2016 until July 2018 (17 months) with total funding of €20.7m. It 
targeted 463,199 beneficiaries.  

The case study focuses on the project’s Result 4: 
Cash-based food assistance for asset creation activities contributing to strengthening resilience and 
improving access to assets, including community and market infrastructures. 

The budget for this result and related activities was €1.44m. 

The case study was selected because of these features: 
  Resilience outcomes in Chad’s food security and nutrition crisis  

  Large-scale funding and partnership among humanitarian donors  

  Recent action of strategic relevance and opportunity for stakeholder consultation  

  Final and complete reporting available from IP  

Method  

The case study approach aims to investigate ‘what worked, how and why?’ It sought to investigate the chain of 
inputs to outcomes including EU funding, ECHO activities, IP/DP implementation, and outcomes for intended 
beneficiaries. It focused on these questions: (i) What was expected to happen? (ii) What really happened? (iii) 
What implications for ECHO CA strategy? The approach is inspired by ‘realist evaluation’, which recognises 
that nothing works everywhere for everyone: context makes a big difference to programme outcomes. A realist 
evaluation asks not ‘what works?’ but ‘how or why does this work, for whom, in what circumstances?’ (Westhorp 
2014) 

This case study used the following generic hypothesis for how ECHO actions are intended to generate 
outcomes:  
 

IF … EU humanitarian budget to CA is sufficient and proportionate, and guided by effective global policies   

  AND … ECHO programme is guided by an appropriate strategy, uses good project selection processes, 

uses good funding mechanisms, and manages the programme well 

  AND … Implementing partner/s (IP) and downstream partner/s (DP) design good projects, implements 

them well (including cost-effectively), and adapts to significant changes  

  THEN … Beneficiary (and local) capacities will be engaged, needs will be met, and vulnerabilities will be 

reduced (resilience strengthened) 

166 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

The case study focus of resilience and the Humanitarian and Development Nexus (HDN) will look at the degree 
to which the WFP lean season cash and cash for work/assets approach will ‘contribute to developing longer 
term strategies aimed at reinforcing the capacities of the most vulnerable, while remaining cost-effective and 
without  compromising  humanitarian  principles123‘  and  meets  with  the  relevant  EU  policies  and  strategies  in 
place at the time, those on LRRD and resilience: The common humanitarian-development agenda has long 
been referred to by the EU/ECHO as Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD). In 2012, the EU 
defined resilience as ‘the ability of an individual, a household, a community, a country or a region to withstand, 
to  adapt,  and  to  quickly  recover  from  stresses  and  shocks.’124  It  highlighted  three  key  components  to  the 
resilience approach: (1) anticipating crises by assessing risks; (2) focusing on prevention and preparedness; 
and (3) enhancing crisis response. The LRRD and common humanitarian- development approach evolved in 
the subsequent decade and was reaffirmed in the Agenda for Change in 2011 and reinforced by the 2016 World 
Humanitarian Summit125. However, as the case study action under consideration was implemented in 2016 it 
should  only  be  evaluated  against  the  policies  and  regulations  in  place  prior  to  2016,  those  on  LRRD  and 
resilience, rather than the later approaches summarised in the text boxes below: 

A Strategic Approach to Resilience in the EU’s External Action” of June 2017 

Set out four basic building-blocks to incorporating a resilience approach in a systematic way into the 
EU's external action were proposed: 

1. 

2. 

Improving and sharing analysis of risk at country and regional level so as better to inform 
strategy, political dialogue and programming of assistance;  
Instituting a more dynamic monitoring of external pressures, and working with the Council to 
ensure a more timely political and diplomatic response;  
Integrating the resilience approach in EU programming and financing of external action 

3. 
4.  Developing international policy and practice on resilience. 

The Council Conclusions on Operationalising the Humanitarian-Development Nexus of 19 May 2017 
stressed: 

1.  A joint analysis between the key humanitarian and development actors, where possible lead 

by the government of the host country. 

2.  On the basis of the joint analyses an action plan / recovery framework should be agreed 

(e.g. in the form of a Joint Humanitarian and Development Framework)126. 

3.  The implementation should be implemented via coherent multi-year programming both for 

development and humanitarian actors according to their specific mandates aiming at 
strengthening self-reliance and resilience." 

Limitations of Methodology: The case study relies on information collected from available documentation 
and from a small number of key informant interviews with persons available who may not have been involved 
at the time of the implementation of the action (2016). It was conducted rapidly and assesses an action that 
was implemented when policy on LRRD was well known but in the early days of the understanding of 
resilience and before HDN (2017).  

123 TA 2016: General principle on Résilience: L'objectif d'ECHO est de répondre aux besoins humanitaires aigus des populations les plus vulnérables et les plus 
exposés tout en augmentant leur résilience en ligne avec la stratégie de résilience de l'UE. Lorsque cela est possible, sans compromettre les principes humanitaires 
et avec un coût/efficacité acceptable, le soutien d'ECHO contribuera, tout en gardant le même point d’entrée, à développer des stratégies à plus long terme visant à 
renforcer les capacités des personnes les plus vulnérables. 

124 EC (2012), The EU Approach to Resilience: Learning from Food Security Crises, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council 
(Brussels 3.10.2012) 
125 https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/policies/fragility-and-crisis-management/resilience-building-humanitarian-development-nexus_en (17/4/19) 
126 In a number of countries Joint Humanitarian and Development Frameworks (JHDF) have been developed as a basis for humanitarian and development planning 
and programming, in Chad led in partnership by DG DEVCO & ECHO. 

167 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

2. What was the intention?  

Across the Sahelian Belt, the combined impacts of insufficient and irregular rainfall and insecurity in the Lake 
Chad  Region  severely  affected  vulnerable  communities  and  households  in  2015-2016.  Based  on  needs 
assessments conducted end 2015, WFP estimated that around 1 million people would be in need of food and 
nutrition  assistance  in  the  Sahel  during  the  lean  season  2016.  In  April  2016  further  studies  showed  a 
deterioration of the situation with about 45% of the population, about two million people, food insecure in the 
Sahel and over 400,000 of them severely food insecure. The nutritional status remained worrying particularly 
among food insecure households (WFP SF 2017).  

In response, WFP sought to address the risk of the deteriorating food consumption affecting households in the 
Sahel, especially in the lean season, and deteriorating malnutrition among vulnerable groups (i.e. children under 
5 and PLW). Identifying the need for a large-scale food security and nutrition response in the Sahel belt, WFP 
approached DG ECHO for funding to support the first year of implementation of a LRRD approach that sought 
to replicate the cash for asset and lean season responses widely trialled and implemented by WFP across the 
Sahel: a series of activities to be delivered in a sequenced manner, including: (i) Early response activities; (ii) 
Seasonal assistance; and (iii) Recovery assistance.  

In particular, the project’s recovery assistance activities (result 4) would focus on cash-based assistance for 
community  identified  asset  creation  undertaken  by  households  targeted  for  food  insecure  households  who 
received lean  season assistance.  These  would  then  link  into  other longer-term  resilience  building activities, 
sometimes implemented by other UN partners (e.g. FAO). To this end, it envisaged ‘Cash-based assistance for 
asset  creation  activities,  implemented  in  the  post-harvest  period,  aimed  at  building  resilient  livelihoods  and 
reducing the impact of future food security shocks.’ (WFP SF 2017). 

Individuals taking part in the community works of the ‘cash for assets’ action were households selected on the 
basis of vulnerability among food-insecure households who had been recipients of lean season assistance. The 
conditional  cash-based  transfer  would  be  implemented  over  six  months,  involving  two  cohorts  of  6,592 
households participating in asset-creation activities. Each individual participant (13,184 in total) would work for 
20 days per month over 3 months and receive a family ration covering the needs of 65,920 beneficiaries in total. 
The nature of the types of community cash for assets worked on in the 2016 funded action meant that the 
assets were intended to benefit the wider community as a whole rather than the specific households working 
on the community assets. In subsequent years of the project (Not funded by ECHO but funded principally by 
German and French aid and DEVCO – approximately 20%), this more ‘community asset’ approach was later 
amended in line with the learning and evaluation from across the Sahel127 that recommended that the benefits 
from assets should be more closely linked to the individuals working on creating those assets. 

The following results were expected for this activity:   
  80% of target population will achieve an Acceptable Food Consumption Score (FCS), as verified by 

cooperating partners' reports 

  80% of households (i.e. 10,547 / 13,184 HH) will be able to maintain or increase their productive assets 
(i.e. have at least one asset/activity providing income generating opportunities), as verified by WFP 
assessment of productive assets before and after the activity  

  90% of community assets identified will be created during the activity as verified by cooperating partners’ 

reports  

  65,920 women, men, boys and girls will receive targeted post-lean season food assistance conditional on 

participation of one member of the household in asset creation activities, as verified by cooperating 
partners reports  

127 ICF ‘Evaluation of ECHO’s intervention in the Sahel (2010-2014)’ (2016) 

(WFP Logframe) 

168 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

Targets/Results  
Overall, ECHO judged that WFP was able to implement all planned activities, however this was done in an 
extended period of 17 months rather than the initial 12 months planned. Key informants reported that this was 
partly due to the initial 2 to 3 months of contracting delays, the poor timing of funding cycles in relation to the 
necessary food procurement cycles and to the fact that this was the first time that a cash for asset and resilience 
programme of this nature had been implemented by WFP in Chad which required additional capacity building 
of  staff  and  partners  and the  setting  up  of  adequate  systems  and  procedures.  ECHO  judged  that WFP  did 
ultimately achieve a substantial part of its objectives although many indicators have remained below the targets 
set. In relation to result 4, WFP was judged to have contributed to improved Food Security, to prevention of 
undernutrition and, to a lesser extent, to strengthening resilience to 463,031 beneficiaries in total (99.99% of 
target) in the Sahelian belt of Chad during and after the lean season. ECHO reported that the impact of the 
asset creation activities was not clear at the mid-term and needed to be monitored during the next lean season 
(ECHO FO 2017). 

9. How did it work in practice?   

9.1. Notable outcomes 

Overall, positive outcomes were recorded from the lean season cash response and from the asset creation 
activity (for those households which were able to take part - see later discussion) in terms of food security and 
resilience  for  vulnerable  households.  An  immediate  monitoring  of  households’  situation  showed  an 
improvement in their Food Consumption Score (FCS) and increased access to productive assets; although the 
full potential of the created assets was expected to be reached at the next harvest (2017). Individual testimonies 
also suggested that households were able to immediately purchase food  to feed their families thanks to the 
cash-based transfers; and also that they had much better prospects in facing the lean season and improving 
their livelihoods in the medium term thanks to the asset creation activities (e.g. sufficient stocks to sell when 
prices are most advantageous). 

A majority of beneficiaries achieved acceptable FCS levels. Across the regions of Bahr el Gazal, Batha, and 
Guera, the share of beneficiaries with acceptable FCS increased rose to 78%, an increase of 30% compared 
to baseline (but just short of the 80% target). In Guera, the share increased most (52% to 81%) because it had 
the highest productive potential. However, the increase was more modest in Bahr el Gazal (54% to 67%) and 
remained below the borderline threshold of 80-90% in acute crises.  

Most beneficiaries had access to productive assets. Beyond the 80% target, almost all participating households 
benefitted from access to one or more assets/activities that provided income generating opportunities. Since 
many households already had access to productive assets, a third of these saw increased assets and it was 
expected that some three-quarters would experience such an increase in the months ahead.  

Most of the community assets intended were created. Just over the 90% target (93%) of community assets 
identified by the community were completed. Since these were reportedly identified in consultation with/by the 
most  vulnerable  households,  the  intention  was  that  their  benefits  would  be  shared  beyond  the  wealthiest 
households. They included:  
  Digging artificial water ponds 

  Building small dams/dikes and water waste ways  

  Vegetable/fruit gardening  

  Rehabilitation of dirt roads and building scuppers  

  Tree nursery and set up of protective hedges around arable land  

  Digging wells and building water-catchment areas and irrigation channels  

169 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

  Training on agricultural techniques 

  Construction of stockyards for cattle vaccination 

However, these did not appear to match the full scope of community assets intended to restore the degraded 
ecosystem and enhance local agricultural production. In Guera and Kanem, WFP has successful experience 
in building large haffirs (water-catchment areas), combined with support to agricultural and pastoral activities 
around it. Key informants did however indicate that after the completion of the ECHO funded year of action 
(2016) the approach was improved (based on learning and evaluation rom Chad and elsewhere in the Sahel) 
so that the cash for work activities were aimed more at individual household assets (such as small income 
generation activities and assets such as kitchen gardens) to increase the impact on the most vulnerable and to 
increase take up/involvement and sustainability of the resilience aspects. 

Despite these positive outcomes, not all outcomes occurred as expected. Beneficiaries in one of the four regions 
identified (Kanem) were not targeted by the activity as originally intended for a number of reasons (such as lack 
of strong partners, difficulties in operation and strong ‘traditional reluctances’ and because it was considered 
by WFP to ‘lack productive capacity and potential’). Although Kanem has high levels of food insecurity and 
vulnerable  households,  geo-climatic  factors  made  it  very  difficult  to  conduct  such  activities  without  initial 
investments, so the activity was not implemented there to avoid ‘spreading resources too thin’. Following a 
resource-based  planning  approach,  WFP  focused  on  three  out  of  four  regions  for  the  implementation  of 
resilience-building activities under this result and continued to implement in-kind food distributions in Kanem, 
and reportedly returning in subsequent years to implement other resilience actions. 

Considerably fewer households than expected received conditional cash-based food assistance. Approximately 
38,600 individuals out of 65,920 targeted (60% of target) received targeted post-lean season food assistance. 
Under this result, a total of XAF 560 million or EUR 884,237 were transferred to the households participating in 
asset  creation  activities  in  the  form  a  conditional  cash  transfer  provided  through  WFP’s  contracted  service 
provider. Partly this is because the cash-based assistance target was reduced, and the activity downscaled due 
to  lack  of  funding.  Only  7,720  women,  men,  girls  and  boys  participated  in  the  activities,  and  a  majority  of 
participants were women. This reflects the high involvement of women in such activities in this region, the high 
number  of  women-headed  households  targeted,  and  the  high  proportions  of  migration  of  men  in  search  of 
livelihoods and in search of pasture for livestock in the areas of operation.  

Participants also worked for fewer days over a longer period than expected. On average, participants worked 
for 12 days monthly over 5 months (instead of 20 days monthly over 3 months), and generally preferred to 
spread workdays out to allow for other domestic and livelihood activities.  

Fewer than expected of the participants benefited from both WFP-coordinated food assistance to vulnerable 
households  during  the  lean  season.  Only  20%  of  the  lean  season  food  security  assistance  beneficiaries 
participated in asset creation. This was reportedly because participation required labour inputs that did not suit 
the low labour capacity nature of many of the poorest most vulnerable targeted households (e.g. PLW, FHH 
and  PWD)  ,  site  selection  was  driven  by  vulnerability  of  community  as  much  as  productive  and  livelihood 
potential, and some vulnerable beneficiaries (older people and people with disabilities) lacked the productive 
working capacity to participate.  

The findings of the Sahel ECHO Evaluation (ICF 2016) and learning reported by WFP involved in the amended 
approaches put in place in subsequent years of operation indicate that the nature of the conditional work tasks 
selected and the duration of the work periods originally identified for this action were not well aligned to the 
capacities of the targeting criteria selected nor the other existing domestic and livelihood tasks of the targeted 
vulnerable groups. 

170 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

9.2. Project implementation  

The project results and outcomes depended on multiple implementation factors, of which the following seem 
most significant enabling factors:  

Improving food security linked to larger UN/WFP intervention: In October 2016, an overall improvement was 
recorded in the region’s food security and a decrease in global malnutrition among children. This was partly 
attributed to seasonal interventions by WFP, partners, and the government in the larger project, which provided 
food assistance or cash-based assistance to 370,000 people in eight regions, including the three targeted by 
Result  4,  and  nutrition  interventions  to  69,000  children  under  2  and  28,000  pregnant  and  lactating  women. 
However it is not possible to solely attribute improved food security improvements to the lean season and asset 
response without a detailed assessment of the part played by other humanitarian programmes and production 
trends as a whole that is beyond the scope of this evaluation. 

Prioritisation and participatory project planning: First, WFP decided to focus on 3/4 regions initially targeted 
based on combined criteria of food insecurity and agricultural productive potential; by these Kanem was not 
selected because it lacked productive potential within the resources available. Second, WFP  undertook five 
community-based participatory planning exercises within the regions. These allowed WFP and communities to 
develop multi-year action plans prioritised by communities, based on diagnosed needs, shock risks identified, 
a calendar of shocks, and a socio- economic profile. Through this approach, communities prioritised the asset 
creation actions that were undertaken: investments in agricultural livelihoods to address the net deficit in food 
production; rehabilitation of dirt roads between isolated villages and services (health, schools) and markets and 
building of stockyards for cattle vaccination. However key informants have indicated that in future years more 
emphasis was placed on income generation and small-scale livelihood activities in order to better ensure that 
benefits accrued more directly to the vulnerable target groups that invested their labour in the ‘cash for assets’ 
action.     

Appropriate implementation modalities: First, the cash modality was selected based on assessments in 2016 
and then the February 2017 market survey. This market situation indicated conditions were conducive to the 
use of cash-based assistance during the implementation period. Second, to the extent possible, WFP targeted 
activities to ‘wrap around’ communities where other activities were already occurring (i.e. by UNICEF and FAO), 
and  communities  are  already  a  part  of  the  transformation,  actively  engaged  in  shaping,  implementing  and 
evaluating the hunger solutions that affect them. The activities were to be implemented in close collaboration 
with NGO partners as well as governmental technical institutions. To some extent this increases the attribution 
difficulties and can impact on cost efficiency and effectiveness claims. 

Mobilisation and coordination with multiple donors: Key informant interviews have identified that this 2016 action 
was the first time that the cash for lean season and cash for asset approach was tried in Chad and that ECHO 
played somewhat of a ‘seed-funding’ role in being prepared to fund such a strongly resilient focused approach 
in its first year. It is reported that ECHO was able to advocate for and ultimately hand over the funding of this 
WFP  resilience  action  in  subsequent  years  up  until  2019/present  as  a  multi-donor  action  (20%  funded  by 
DEVCO and the remainder principally by BMZ, GFO & AFD). This demonstrates well the potential of ECHO to 
take risks to lead and encourage others to step up to the resilience policies and strategies that it adheres to 
which can on occasion reach beyond its primary mandate and funding capacities.  

Coordinated planning with food security cluster partners: WFP’s timely engagement with partners contributed 
to reaching more people. WFP played a critical role in the food security cluster and in supporting government 
bodies  doing  early  warning  and  food  security  analysis.  Compared  to  2015,  WFP  engaged  implementing 
partners early through timely food security assessment, early coordination in the FSC, and good use of WFP 
pre-financing mechanisms  to  initiate  partnerships and  pre-position  food  supplies  in  inaccessible  east  Chad. 
According to a WFP review, this allowed the action to reach three times more people than in 2015. However, 
the effectiveness (and efficiency) of coordinated planning was undermined by delays in contract signing with 
ECHO, the need to identify and build the capacities in the new cash for lean season and cash for asset approach 

171 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

within WFP and partner staff as well as by other staff turnover in the WFP (and FSC).  And it was suggested 
that WFP and ECHO could further increase proactive information-sharing with NGOs partners (many are the 
same ones) to increase cost-efficiency e.g. on distribution of nutritional products. (WFP SF 2017) 

WFP combined programming: WFP was able to implement the project across its emergency operations (EMOP) 
and protracted relief and recovery operations (PRRO). WFP Chad's lean season response was a multi-donor 
action implemented through both EMOP 200777 and PRRO 200713, in line with WFP Chad's portfolio. ECHO's 
contribution was used for activities programmed under PRRO 200713, as per contractual agreement. However, 
the budget submitted at proposal stage and thus the interim financial report was based on the PRRO budget 
only. As a result, some inconsistencies exist between the financial and the narrative reports since the narrative 
report includes the full scope of the achievements (and commodities distributed) under both the EMOP and the 
PRRO in line with the multi-donor approach. The adjustment of the budget impacts only the multi-donor contract 
but not the use of the funding provided by ECHO. 

9.3. EU enablement  

Funding 
In 2016, the EU allocated EUR 70m to the Central Africa HIP. In total, FTS recorded USD 61.8m for the Chad 
HRP for 2016, representing 21.8% of humanitarian funding for that year. Funding to Chad remained consistently 
higher than to the neighbouring countries, and this allocation share was higher than the yearly average for CA 
(17%).  

Policy  
In 2012, the EC published a Communication on Resilience. It recognised the need for long term systematic 
approach to build resilience and for life-saving assistance to be supplemented by resilience activity. Based on 
experience, it identified common elements: (i) anticipating crises by assessing risks, e.g. through early warning 
systems; (ii) focusing on prevention and preparedness, i.e. to address underlying causes of vulnerability; and 
(iii) enhancing the emergency response, i.e. through a joint analytical framework by humanitarian-development 
actors, increased short term financing for early recovery phase, and structured donor dialogue. In contexts with 
recurrent crises, resilience is to be a central aim of EU aid. Humanitarian and development actors are to make 
a common operational assessment, covering short to longer term interventions, and HIPs are to systematically 
include resilience. 

The evidence arising from this case study appears to confirm that WFP was able to make gains in ‘anticipating 
crises’ from its strong assessments and is able to make use of its own pre-funding mechanisms to increase 
preparedness and to some extent to offset delays in ECHO funding. Though the original intention of the 2016 
action was to begin to address ‘prevention’ and the ‘underlying causes of vulnerability’ it was acknowledged 
that the approach was better able to achieve this after the amendments in approach that were subsequently 
implemented in the following years after ECHOs initial funding intervention paved the way for this to occur. 

9.4. ECHO inputs  

Strategy 
While the HIP 2016 contains little mention of the Nexus, resilience, or LRRD, ECHO’s Technical Annex 2016 
emphasised collaboration with development actors to address food security and nutrition crisis in Chad’s Sahel 
belt.  (i)  Resilience  policy:  As  a  general  principle,  projects  are  expected  to  meet  acute  needs  and  promote 
resilience where possible in accordance with humanitarian principles and cost-effectiveness; in line with EU’s 
resilience policy, this is to be done through LRRD (collaboration with development actors) and a community-
based approach, and supported by the resilience marker. (ii) For Chad in particular, a strategic partnership was 
expected with the EUD, the government, and development actors in the context of the 11th EDF, which also 
requires local programming and local ownership. (iii) For addressing the food security and nutritional crisis in 
Chad,  projects  were  expected  to  be  guided  by  ECHO’s  Pillar  1  Sahel/AGIR  approach,  and  propose  a 
harmonised approach including joint log frame, beneficiary targeting, and advocacy.  

172 

 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

The Technical Annex 2016 recommended projects to uphold cost-effectiveness and seek efficiency gains. In 
promoting  resilience,  projects  should  do  so  only  when  this  is  possible  within  ‘acceptable’  levels  of  cost-
effectiveness. In collaborating with development actors when present in the same locality, projects should seek 
efficiency gains, including through better use of human resources and integrated multi-sector service provision.     

Selection  
At design stage, ECHO negotiated a smaller and more focused project compared to WFP’s initial proposal. In 
its review, however, ECHO accepted WFP’s initial rationale for the project, as a preventive response to groups 
most vulnerable to malnutrition (under 5 and PLW) among food insecure populations in the Sahel. ECHO found 
the project relevant to improve food security and prevent malnutrition among vulnerable groups, both in line 
with ECHO’s priority focus on food security and nutrition crisis in Chad. But following WFP’s underperformance 
in 2015, ECHO had considered the first version of the proposal too ambitious and not feasible. It called instead 
for  a  more  focused  response  and  a  reduced  budget  (EUR  3m  compared  to  EUR  7.2m  in  2015).  ECHO 
reluctantly accepted this would target children U2 not U5.  

Funding  
ECHO  accepted  important  modifications  to  the  project  design.  (i)  On  21  June  2016,  ECHO  agreed  to  fund 
additional activities to address the greatly increased needs linked to El Nino phenomenon in the Sahel belt and 
to  increase  the  number  of  beneficiaries  targeted.  In  addition  to  preventive  targeted  nutrition  assistance  to 
vulnerable groups and capacity development of national institutions and partners, it included lean season food 
assistance to households, post-lean season asset creation, cash-based transfers to refugees. (ii) On 2 February 
2017,  ECHO  agreed  to  increase  the  budget  including  ECHO’s  contribution  from  EUR  3m  to  8.85m  and 
contributions  by  other  donors  (USA,  France  and  CERF)  from  EUR  0  to  21.64m.  It  also  agreed  to  increase 
targeting from 199.3m to 430,699 individuals, and to increase results from 2 to 5. (iii) On 20 March 2017, ECHO 
agreed to a 3-month no cost extension for cash-based assistance to refugees in eastern Chad, with no cost 
implications for ECHO.  

Monitoring  
ECHO  provided  technical  reviews  and  monitoring  of  the  project.  ECHO  thematic  experts  conducted  a  full 
analysis that ensured its alignment with the food security strategy aimed at preventing malnutrition. ECHO and 
partners conducted three monitoring visits and received full collaboration from WFP. ECHO noted a substantial 
improvement in WFP’s implementation, results, and engagement with partners.  

Cost-effectiveness of the WFP action in Chad 

This  case  study  has  used  the  ECHO  guidance  on  cost  efficiency  and  cost  effectiveness  (CE/CE)  and  the 
recommendations of the ECHO evaluation on transfer modalities128 (ADE 2016). 

The analysis is structured under the following questions: 
  What factors affected the efficiency and effectiveness of the WFP operation? 
  Was WFP efficient and effective and how might it improve? 

A cost-effectiveness judgement is proposed in Section 3. Conclusions, below. 

What factors affected the efficiency and effectiveness of the WFP operation? 
Country ECHO staff and other implementing partners confirm a general assessment that efficiency in Chad 
is impacted by the moderately high cost context in Chad (logistics, distances, poor infrastructure and access, 
insecurity  and  the  need  for  use  of  UNHAS  for  air  access).  In  addition,  WFP  confirmed  that  it  experienced 

128 Evaluation of the Use of Different Transfer Modalities in ECHO Humanitarian Aid Actions 2011-2014 

173 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

particularly high costs incurred from supporting set up costs and increased staff and partner capacity building 
costs in the first year of operation and in implementing one of the earlier CVA approaches in Chad. The use of 
CVA modalities is one factor which evidence from elsewhere has shown can impact upon cost efficiency.129 
Equally though, ECHO studies such as this have indicated that the primary influencer upon cost efficiency is 
the scale of operation and this too is one area where the larger WFP programmes that impact on larger numbers 
of beneficiaries than traditionally their INGO partners achieve, is likely to contribute to the increased efficiency 
of these larger scale types of WFP actions.  

Staff were candid in reporting that the case study year selected was the first year of operation and that this 
strongly impacted upon the degree of efficiency and effectiveness that was achieved. Primary amongst these 
was the low levels of involvement of the most vulnerable households who were not able to provide the types of 
manual labour for the actions selected and the limited effectiveness and sustainability reported of some of the 
community-based assets established in the first year. These deficiencies in approach were amended in the 
following years of operation (not funded by ECHO). In addition, the future efficiency and effectiveness gains 
from use of harmonised assessments (‘Cadre harmonise’) were not able to be capitalised upon in the case 
study year.  

Staff felt that initial delays in ECHO funding and the poor synchronisation of ECHO funding mechanisms with 
seasonal  procurement  cycles  contributed  to  inefficiencies,  but  that  these  were  managed  as  effectively  as 
possible using WFPs fortunate access to pre-funding mechanisms and reserves. The ‘first year of trial’ of the 
cash for lean season and cash for asset approach also contributed to increased investments of funds and time 
inefficiencies  faced  as  WFP  sought  to  build  their  own  and  their  partners  staff  capacities,  systems  and 
procedures for the work to be implemented effectively. Staff have reported that in subsequent years significant 
increases in efficiencies have been achieved and that after the amendments in approach brought about after 
learning from the first year in conjunction with learning from evaluations across the Sahel led to amendments 
in the approach that more closely linked the nature of the asset building activities to the capacities of the most 
vulnerable groups (e.g. more low labour intensive and  household level assets) with positive impacts on the 
vulnerable houses involved in operation.  

Furthermore, stakeholders have triangulated the efficiency and effectiveness benefits that have accrued (to 
donors, communities and beneficiaries) from WFPs developing strategy of integrating the cash for lean season 
and  cash  for  assets  actions  more  closely  with  other  WFP  and  UN  actions  (such  as  the  school  feeding 
programmes, nutritional products distributed, FAO agricultural practices, school feeding gardens that reportedly 
continue in many cases today, nutrition and hygiene awareness raising, capacities and infrastructures and more 
recently the 1000 day approach) and those of other NGO actors present in the region.  

Was WFP efficient and effective and how might it improve? 
Hence though this particular case study action year of operation is recognised as representing low levels of 
cost efficiency, it is valued as having been an essential initial investment in starting a  key approach that has 
gone  on  to  become  more  efficient  and  has  consolidated  the  outcomes  and  impacts  of  a  wider  package  of 
programmes.  

ECHO  studies  (ADE  2016)  further  indicated  that  larger  scale  ‘multi-year  programmes’  also  benefit  from 
economies of scale efficiencies, and though this case study action appears as a ‘standalone’ project in the 
portfolio analysis, on closer examination it represents an example of where ECHO has successfully provided 
the initial ‘seed’ investment that after advocacy has allowed DEVCO and other donors (EU member states – 
France & Germany) to capitalise on future efficiency gains from the more integrated overall approaches.  

When asked what efficiency and effectiveness improvements could have been made to the action, staff were 
able to identify a number of changes that had already been implemented in subsequent years of operation 

129 ADE, ‘Evaluation of the Use of Different Transfer Modalities in ECHO Humanitarian Aid Actions 2011-2014’ 2016 

174 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

(though not ECHO funded). These included: use of improved quality and harmonised assessment and targeting 
of not just the previously targeted IPC 3 most vulnerable, but now also the groups of most vulnerable IPC 3 
individuals  that  would  not  previously  have  been  targeted  because  they  were  resident  in  IPC  2  classified 
geographical areas; more vulnerable household and beneficiary focused assets that are more sustainable (such 
as household vegetable gardens and school feeding gardens, many of which staff report are still operating).  

Stakeholders in Chad recognise that resilience programming of this nature are likely to be slow to demonstrate 
cost efficiencies and effectiveness in the short term but are confident that they will eventually show long term 
impacts on reduced lifesaving costs. The assessment, monitoring and evaluation (and specifically the indicators 
to measure resilience) to provide the evidence to support this are not however clearly in evidence as yet. 

10. Conclusions  

Comparing project theory to practice allows the following conclusions for ECHO: 

Beneficiary outcomes 

A majority of intended beneficiaries engaged in the action were able to meet household lean season 
food security needs, and the action contributed to some increased access to productive assets which 
aimed to contribute to strengthening resilience in the communities in the longer term. However, in this 
first  year  of  operation,  a  portion  of  initially  targeted  vulnerable  communities  and  households  did  not  benefit 
adequately from the action or to the extent intended and this required modifications in approach in future years. 
Vulnerable households showed improved Food Consumption Scores and testified to being able to immediately 
access food stocks to feed families thanks to the cash-based transfers (and potentially to other stakeholders 
projects) and to a lesser degree improved their access to some productive assets which in theory would improve 
their prospects for facing lean season in the medium term, including community assets created through the 
programme. However, the whole of Kanem region was not targeted in this first year as intended partly because 
it lacked productive capacity and other factors conducive to successful operation and only 60% of households 
received post lean season conditional cash-based food assistance, because targets were downscaled due to 
reported lack of funding and because fewer beneficiaries than expected participated in work programmes (7,720 
out of 13,184). 

Implementation actors 

WFP designed the resilience activity through good planning and sequencing with a larger Sahel food 
security  project  and  implemented  it  through  exceptional  coordination  efforts.  But  some  targeting 
required  prioritising  ‘productive  potential’  in  contrast  to  ‘humanitarian  needs  alone’130.  First,  WFP 
designed  the  resilience  activity  on  the  basis  of  participatory  planning  exercises  that  allowed  for  prioritised 
multiyear action plans to address community needs and build resilience, and appropriately selected the direct 
cash distribution modality. It also sequenced the activity to follow its much larger lean season food assistance 
activities, which contributed to improving food security in the region by late 2016. Second, WFP implemented 
the activity in coordination with communities and other large actors in the region (UNICEF, FAO), with the food 
security cluster partners to reach more people, and with donors whom it mobilised to greatly increase funding 
for the action. This may however pose questions related to the attribution to ECHO and cost efficiency claims 
of the outcomes accrued. Third, WFP opted not to invest in resilience in the Kanem region due to a lack of 
productive  potential  and  allowed  resources  to  be  focused  on  regions  where  resilience  was  more  likely  to 
succeed. While this makes sense for resilience building, it poses risks to humanitarian principles which require 
assistance to be targeted on the basis of need alone. However, there is evidence that approaches were adapted 
for use in Kanem in subsequent years.   

130 On questioning, this proved more to be a pragmatic decision to not overstretch and implement in a difficult region in the first year, that was subsequently addressed 
in following years (once WFP had built their and partner capacities). 

175 

 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

ECHO funding, strategy, monitoring  

The HIP did not explicitly promote resilience or the humanitarian development nexus in Chad and ECHO 
reduced the scope of WFP response at proposal stage to preventing malnutrition in vulnerable groups. 
But  ECHO  modifications  expanded  the  action  and  included  the  resilience  activity  when  needs 
assessments  showed  a  greatly  increased  food  security  crisis  and  ECHO  experts  validated  WFP’s 
approach.  The  HIP  did  not  clearly  promote  resilience  or  HDN  in  Chad  as  a  strategy  and  while  the  TA 
emphasises promoting resilience through LRRD, it says this should be done only where appropriate in relation 
to humanitarian principles and cost effectiveness. In proposal negotiations, ECHO accepted the WFP project’s 
rationale to prevent malnutrition among U5 and PLW as part of ECHO food security and nutrition response, but 
based on previous WFP underperformance, negotiated a more focused WFP response and reduced budget 
(3m) without including any resilience-building activity. But in response to greatly increased needs identified in 
early  2016,  ECHO  accepted  three  important  modifications  to  the  project  design,  including  addition  of  the 
resilience-building activity; these modifications increased the project's scope of action, beneficiaries targeted, 
and  funding  from  ECHO  (increased  from  3m  to  8.8m)  and  others  (21.6m  contributed  by  other  donors). 
Meanwhile ECHO thematic experts analysed and approved the approach, field experts conducted monitoring 
visits with partners, and ECHO noted substantial improvements in WFP and partners implementation.      

EC funding, policy  

The EU provided consistently strong humanitarian funding for Chad and EU-wide policy guidance on 
resilience. But  funding remained  low  overall,  practical  EU  guidance on  the  Nexus was  not  provided 
during  this  time,  and  EU  actors  were  scarcely  mentioned  in  relation  to  this  action.  In  2012,  the  EU 
provided  a  policy  on  resilience  with  practical  guidance  on  implementation  including  joint  analysis  by 
humanitarian and development actors, but European Council conclusions on the Nexus were only defined in 
2017 (after the case study action evaluated), and these did not include practical guidance. Moreover, the roles 
of DEVCO and EEAS or the 11th EDF is not mentioned in reporting on this resilience action.   

 Cost Effectiveness 

The  WFP  resilience  activities  to  assist  vulnerable  populations  in  the  Sahel  were  a  relatively  risky  ECHO 
investment.  First,  the  resilience  outcomes  were  difficult  to  attribute  to WFP  resilience  activities,  when other 
factors  appeared  to  be  more  important,  including  the  impact  of  the  larger  UN/WFP  cash  for  lean  season 
intervention. Second, investing in the WFP resilience activities achieved relatively mixed results since a portion 
of initially targeted vulnerable communities and households did not benefit adequately or to the extent intended, 
and also posed risks to humanitarian impartiality in targeting people in need on the basis of productive potential 
instead of needs alone. Third, the WFP resilience activities were relatively low in cost at €1.44m, but still could 
have been invested in addressing more acute needs in the region, which aligned more clearly with ECHO’s 
strategic priorities, or in filling coordination gaps. At the same time, it is important to recognise that ECHO’s 
overall  engagement  in  the  larger  WFP  response  played  an  important  catalytic  role  in  mobilizing  larger 
investments from other donors.  

The cost-effectiveness judgement implied by this analysis is two-fold: that (a) the action was not very cost-
effective as it stood but that (b) it influenced the design and funding of follow-on programmes which, it was 
reasonable to anticipate, would be cost-effective. 

Documents consulted  

  CEU WHS 2016: Council of the European Union (2016), Conclusions of the Council and the 

Representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council on the World 
Humanitarian Summit. Brussels, 12 May 2016 (OR. en)   

  CEU Nexus 2017: Council of Europe (2017), Operationalising the Humanitarian-Development Nexus - 

Council conclusions (19 May 2017) 

176 

 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

  EC Resilience 2012: European Commission (2012), Communication from The Commission to The 

European Parliament and The Council, The EU Approach to Resilience: Learning from Food Security 
Crises. Brussels, 3.10.2012  COM(2012) 586 final  

  FO 2016: ECHO (2016), Fiche Operationelle  2014|FAFA|Y 

  HIP 2016: ECHO (2016), Humanitarian Implementation Plan Central Africa. Last update 25/08/2016 

  HIP 2017: ECHO (2017), Humanitarian Implementation Plan Central Africa. Last update: 13/07/2017 

  SF 2017: WFP (2017), Single Form for Humanitarian Aid Actions. Providing targeted lean season food and 
nutrition assistance and post-lean season support to food-insecure households and vulnerable refugees 
affected by the El Nino phenomenon in the Sahelian belt of Chad while ensuring the capacity development 
of national institutions and partners (Final report 10/11/2017) 

  TA 2016: ECHO (2016), Annexe Technique Afrique Centrale, Information financiere, administrative et 

operationnelle Dernière mise à jour: 25/08/2016  

  TA 2017: ECHO (2017), Annexe Technique Afrique Centrale, Information financiere, administrative et 

operationnelle, Dernière mise à jour: 13/07/2017  

  Westhorp 2014: Westhorp, G (2014) Realist Impact Evaluation, An Introduction. ODI Methods Lab, 

September 2014 

177 

 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

Annex 6: Perception Survey Analysis 

Introduction 

This report presents detailed analysis of the perception survey conducted to contribute to the regional aspect 
of  this  combined  evaluation.  All  interviewees  and  stakeholders  were  invited  in  person  and  electronically  to 
respond to a short questionnaire (see Annex 9).  

After  several  rounds  of  invitations,  a  total  of  64  responses  were  received,  of  which  very  few  came  from 
stakeholders in Cameroon. These responses have therefore not been included in the analysis below as they 
cannot be deemed representative of overall stakeholder perceptions in Cameroon, due to the sample size being 
too small. 

Methodological Note 

Analysis tools used in this report include: 

  Exploratory data analysis – which comprised data cleaning and coding and help to detect inconsistencies; 

  Descriptive analysis- which consisted in cross-tabulations using graphical methods, highlighting main 
findings and comparing subgroups of key actors where relevant.  

1.  General 

This  section  outlines  the  profiles  of  respondents  along  with  overall  findings  for  the  key  areas  of  analysis; 
relevance,  coherence  and  effectiveness.  In  addition,  a  summary  of  findings  on  factors  of  success  for  EU 
humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region are included. 

i. Profile of participants 

Of a total of 64 responses, 60 were deemed to be valid 
for analysis. The remaining 4 observations from 
Cameroon were excluded due to not being a 
representative sample. Of the 60, these were split 
between respondents providing perceptions of Central 
African Republic (33) and Chad (27). 

Data revealed a near even split between donorship actors 
(DG  ECHO,  DEVCO,  DFID,  EEAS,  etc.)  and 
implementation  actors  (UN  agencies,  NGO,  etc.)  in 
Central African Republic whereas implementation actors 
accounted for more than two-thirds (20) in Chad. 

178 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

ii. Overall relevance 

iii. Overall coherence 

iv. Overall effectiveness 

Chad

1

7

16

3

CAR

11

22

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly agree

v. Main factors of success at the regional level 

Overall,  data  shows  broad  agreement 
between  respondents  on  EU  humanitarian 
aid  response  being  moderately  relevant  to 
vulnerability.  

In both countries, more than half of respondents 
declared  DG  ECHO  actions  to  be  ‘somewhat 
relevant’,  compared  to  one  third  who  claimed 
strong relevance of actions implemented by the 
EU-funded response. 

Overall,  EU  humanitarian  support  and 
collaboration  with  other  development  actors 
were  deemed  to  be  moderately  coherent  as 
more  than  half  of  participants 
in  both 
countries 
information 
felt  satisfied  with 
sharing  amongst  other  EU  development 
actors and DG ECHO partner actions. 

Only two respondents in both Chad and Central 
African Republic disagreed with coherence of EU 
funded actions. 

There was a broadly positive perception of the 
cost-effectiveness of DG ECHO action in Chad 
and Central African Republic. 
More  than  half  of  survey  participants  in  both 
regional 
countries 
humanitarian 
expected 
outcomes. 

EU-funded 
achieved 

claimed 

actions 

that 

Donors  and  operational  partners  were  almost 
unanimous 
factors  had  significantly 
contributed to achieve EU humanitarian aid objectives 
in Chad and Central African Republic over the period 
2014-2018:  

three 

 

 

 

Technical expertise 

Consideration of gender and age 

Adaptivity 

179 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

3. Chad 

3.1. Relevance 

In general, EU humanitarian aid response in Chad was relevant to vulnerability. Though it was found to be 
strongly consistent with humanitarian principles, the data revealed that the actions undertaken were 
moderately appropriate and adaptive with limited comprehensive definition of key priorities. 

Q1- ECHO programme was guided by clear strategic priorities (n = 27) 

Almost eight out of ten respondents provided 
positive answers regarding the definition of DG 
ECHO programme. 

A  third  of  respondents  (9  out  of  27)  strongly 
agreed  that  the  aid  programme  was  very 
comprehensive,  as opposed to 17 who agreed 
to  a  lesser extent or  remained  neutral,  which 
may  imply  a  belief  that  there  was  room  for 
improvemement. 

Q2- ECHO strategy was tailored to specific crises in the region (n = 27) 

Collectively,  opinions  were  positive  on 
the 
suitability  of  DG  ECHO  global  strategy.  Almost 
half of interviewees perceived appropriateness of 
EU  intervention  as  moderate.  Four  out  of  ten 
argued  DG  ECHO  programme  was  strongly 
appropriate to specific crises. 

Q3- ECHO strategy was adapted when situations changed (n =27) 

A large proportion of respondents (22 out of 27) 
that  DG  ECHO  global 
were  convinced 
programme in the country was flexible and was 
evolving  with  the  crisis  evolution  even  though 
only  ten  felt  that  the  humanitarian  strategy 
implemented  was  highly  adapted  to  changing 
needs. 

180 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

Q4- ECHO strategy was consistent with humanitarian principles (n = 27) 

The  humanitarian  response  coordinated  by  DG 
regarded  as  consistent  with 
ECHO  was 
humanitarian 
three 
principles,  with 
respondents disagreeing with this statement, and 
four providing a neutral response. 

only 

3.2. Effectiveness 

Overall,  DG  ECHO  strategies  and  actions  fairly  achieved  expected  outcomes.  However,  funders  and 
operational stakeholders provided feedback that ECHO advocacy as well as actions delivered by partners and 
resources allocation were limited. 

Q5- ECHO funded actions met acute needs (n = 27) 

It  was  clear  that  the  humanitarian  program  was 
consistently effective as reported by almost all key 
stakeholders who claimed that EU actions achieved 
expected outcomes. 

Q6- ECHO funded actions met protracted needs (n = 27) 

All  opinions  (bar  one  neutral)  converged  with  the 
fact EU funded actions rapidly met new emerging 
needs. 

Q7- ECHO funded actions met needs arising from conflicts (n = 27) 

1

1

1

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly
agree

12

12

Almost all key stakeholders (24 out of 27) agreed 
on the fact that actions and policies implemented 
contributed to respond rapidly as new conflicts-
based needs emerged. 

181 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

Q8- ECHO funded actions met needs in food and nutrition crises (n = 27) 

There  was  a  wide  agreement  that  EU  funded 
actions consistently contributed to reduce needs in 
food and nutrition. 

Q9- ECHO funded actions addressed risks of disasters and epidemics (n = 27) 

Less than one-thirds (7 out of 27) reported that EU 
aid  response  consistently  addressed  risks  of 
disasters. 

Q10- ECHO advocacy was structured and effective (n = 27)  

According  to  more  than  half  of  key  stakeholders 
surveyed,  the  global  strategy  for  advocacy  was 
effective but limited in many regards. 
Only five respondents were strongly confident that 
DG ECHO advocacy was structured and effective. 

Q11- ECHO partner actions were cost-effective (n = 27) 

Approximately two-thirds of opinions converged 
on  cost-effectiveness  of  DG  ECHO  partners 
actions even though there seemed to be scope 
for improvement. 

182 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

Q12- ECHO funding was proportionate to needs (n = 27) 

Funding  allocation  strategy  in  response  to  needs 
assessments received mixed feedback.  
Less  than  half  of  key  stakeholders  reported  positive 
feedback about resources allocation.  
However, one-third of both donors and implementation 
actors did not provide conclusive opinions. 

Q13- ECHO funding modalities were appropriate (n = 27) 

The  consensus  on  whether  EU  funding  patterns 
were  highly  appropriate  were  mixed  as  less  than 
one-fourth provided very positive feedback.  
One-third of opinions agreed with this function and 
claimed the necessity for some improvements to be 
implemented. A non-neglected share (6 out of 27) of 
both  donors  and  operational  staffs  remained 
hesitant. 

Q14- ECHO supported joint needs assessments (n = 27) 

DG  ECHO’s  contribution  to  joint  activities  that 
assessed  beneficiaries’  needs 
received  very 
positive 
from  nearly  half  of  key 
stakeholders.  
Over a third of respondents were fairly satisfied with 
this function. 

feedback 

Q15- ECHO supported impartial needs assessments (n = 27) 

DG  ECHO  actions  to  ensure  impartiality  provided 
positive feedback from almost all respondents (22 out 
of 27). 
Less than half of opinions were completely satisfied 
with  EU  funded  actions  towards  impartial  needs 
assessments.  

183 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

3.3. Coherence 

Overall, EU funded actions were moderately coherent at both internal level and external levels. 

Q16- ECHO support to coordination strengthened the humanitarian response (n = 27) 

Almost  two-thirds  of  respondents  strongly  believed 
that EU intervention in Chad strengthened the global 
humanitarian response. 

Q17- ECHO coordinated its activities with EU development actors (n = 27) 

Information sharing with others EU partners was clearly 
apparent in Chad as over half of donorship actors and 
implementation  actors  agreed  on  the  high  level  of 
coherence of DG ECHO coordination activities. 

Q18- ECHO collaboration with EU development actors helped to reduce needs (n = 27) 

Information sharing at both strategic and field levels was 
clearly demonstrated between 2014 and 2018, with the 
large  majority  of  respondents  (20  out  of  27)  agreeing 
that  ECHO  collaboration  with  EU  development  actors 
helped to reduce needs.  

Q19- ECHO programme promoted resilience where appropriate (n = 27) 

Only a quarter of stakeholders were strongly convinced 
by  the  appropriateness  of  DG  ECHO  strategy  in 
promoting  resilience.  Though,  nearly  half  believed  that 
activities 
resilience  were  moderately 
appropriate. 

towards 

It  is  worth  noting  that  about  a  quarter  of  stakeholders 
remained doubtful and did not confirm the consistency of 
resilience. 

184 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

Q20- ECHO partner actions established exit strategy (n = 27) 

Sustainability  of  the  humanitarian  response  was  weak 
as only two respondents were completely satisfied with 
mechanisms  put  in  place  to  facilitate  exit  strategy  and 
about one-thirds remained neutral. 

In  addition,  half  of  stakeholders  claimed 
those 
mechanisms were fairly relevant to ensure sustainability 
of results. 

Q21- Humanitarian coordination (n = 27) 

(24  out  of  27)  valued 
Almost  all  stakeholders 
coordination  and  synergy  mechanisms  put  in  place  in 
Chad. 

Q22- Collaboration with development actors (‘Nexus’) (n = 27) 

Opinions were mostly positive (24 out of 27) about solid 
partnership arrangements with other stakeholders. 

Q23- Promotion of resilience (n = 27)  

Overall,  humanitarian  actions  in  favour  of  resilience 
provided positive reactions from stakeholders. 

Indeed, half were moderately convinced about EU-funded 
actions to promote resilience of vulnerable groups and only 
six felt very satisfied with this function. 

Despite these positive opinions, up to one-fourth of survey 
participants  remained  sceptical  or  hesitant  to  provide 
conclusive feedback. 

3.4. Main factors of success 

On average, opinions converged that prioritising gender and age issues, DG ECHO technical expertise, budget 
flexibility along with considering vulnerable population has a positive influence on the overall performance of 
the EU in Chad and strongly contributed to the achievement of targeted goals. 

185 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

Question – How much did these factors affect ECHO’s overall performance? (n = 27) 

4. Central African Republic 

4.1. Relevance 

In general, the EU humanitarian response was found to be strongly relevant. There was a wide agreement that 
the programme implemented was very clear, country-specific and consistent with humanitarian principles. 

Q1- ECHO programme was guided by clear strategic priorities (n = 33) 

Almost  all  respondents  provided  positive  satisfaction 
rates stating that the humanitarian programme was very 
clear. 

Q2- ECHO strategy was tailored to specific crises in the region (n = 33) 

There  was  a  wide  agreement  from  stakeholders  that 
DG  ECHO  actions  accounted  for  specific  country 
needs. 

186 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

Q3- ECHO strategy was adapted when situations changed (n = 33) 

humanitarian principles (n = 33) 

Opinions  were  almost  unanimous  (25  out  of  33)  in 
agreeing  that  the  aid  response  was  adapted  to 
changing situations.  

Indeed,  approximately  half  of  donors  and 
implementation  actors  argued  that  processes  put  in 
place allowed for DG ECHO to respond rapidly as new 
needs  emerged.  Though,  only  nine  were  strongly 
convinced by this function. 

Q4-  ECHO  strategy  was  consistent  with 

All  respondents  (bar  one  neutral  response)  felt 
satisfied  with  this  function.  Two-thirds  of  donors  and 
implementation actors were very convinced about DG 
ECHO  programme  consistency  with  humanitarian 
principles.  

4.2. Effectiveness 

The overall perception of effectiveness was found to be moderate.  

Q5- ECHO funded actions met acute needs (n = 33) 

According the majority of stakeholders surveyed (31 out 
of  33),  activities  implemented  met  expected  outcomes 
regarding acute needs.  

Q6- ECHO funded actions met protracted needs (n = 33) 

There  was  wide  agreement  from  a  large  proportion  of 
stakeholders (20 out of 33) that EU humanitarian actions 
were effective as they moderately met arising needs. 

Though, up to one-thirds felt indifferent with this function.  

187 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

Despite  positive  feedback  from  both  donorship  actors  and 
implementation actors, about one-thirds of the former and half 
of the latter remained hesitant. 

Q7- ECHO funded actions met needs arising from conflicts (n = 33) 

Almost  all 
intervention to be very positive. 

respondents 

judged  EU  conflict-based 

Q8- ECHO funded actions met needs in food and nutrition crises (n = 33) 

The effectiveness of EU intervention towards reduction 
of food and nutrition crises was found to be moderate as 
only  one-third  of  respondents  were  very  satisfied  with 
actions implemented 

Q9- ECHO funded actions addressed risks of disasters and epidemics (n = 33) 

Opinions  on  whether  EU  humanitarian  actions 
addressed  risks  of  disasters  varied  considerably. 
Although  over  half  of 
the 
programme accounted for this function, about one-thirds 
felt dissatisfied with this function. 

respondents 

reported 

188 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

There was a wide consensus amongst donors who tended 
to  value  this  function  compared  to  the  implementation 
actors where only one-thirds were satisfied with actions that 
addressed risks of epidemics. 

Q10- ECHO advocacy was structured and effective (n = 33) 

Almost  two-thirds  of  donorship  stakeholders  and 
implementation  actors  believed  there  was  a 
relatively strong advocacy, albeit limited. 

Q11- ECHO partner actions were cost-effective (n = 33) 

Half  of  respondents  were  somewhat  satisfied  with 
funding,  albeit  one-thirds  were  not  confident  with  this 
function. Only three of them strongly reported high cost-
effectiveness of DG ECHO selected partners. 

This perception did not vary significantly between donors 
and partners in the field. 

Q12- ECHO funding was proportionate to needs (n = 33) 

There  was  a  very  low  agreement  on  whether  financial 
resources  allocated  were  proportionated  to  needs  as 
only one third of stakeholders were satisfied with funding 
allocation.  

In  addition,  about  one  third  of  respondents  clearly 
reported that funding was not proportionate to needs and 
the  same  share  felt  hesitant  to  provide  conclusive 
feedback.  

189 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

Opinions  seemed  to  vary  across  type  of  survey  participants. 
Indeed,  half  of  funder  agencies  tended  to  be  more  optimistic 
than implementation actors (4 out of 17). 

In both groups, about one third were indifferent.  

Q13- ECHO funding modalities were appropriate (n = 33) 

Over  half  of  stakeholders  judged  DG  ECHO  funding 
processes and mechanisms as relatively appropriate and 
only a quarter provided consistent feedback. 

However,  one-thirds  of  beliefs  from  both  donors  and 
implementation actors were not conclusive. 

Q14- ECHO supported joint needs assessments (n = 33) 

Over  half  of  respondents  provided  positive  answers.  
However, only a quarter of respondents strongly agreed that 
EU humanitarian action significantly supported joint needs 
assessments. 

However,  it  is  worth  noting  that  one-thirds  reported  very 
negative feedback. 

Implementation actors seemed to be more pessimistic 
than donorship actors as almost half of them strongly 
disagreed  with  DG  ECHO  actions  supporting  needs 
assessments. 

190 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

Q15- ECHO supported impartial needs assessments (n = 33) 

Approximately  seven  out  of  ten  respondents  reported 
strong support from DG ECHO with regards to impartial 
needs assessment. 

4.3. Coherence 

Overall, the coherence of EU-funded action in Central African Republic was found to be low. Despite the fact 
collective  opinions  seemed  consistent  with  DG  ECHO  contribution  to  the  global  humanitarian  intervention, 
persuasive beliefs in favour of collaboration and resilience were limited. On average, one-thirds of both donors 
and implementation actors did not provide clear feedback on coherence assessment. 

Q16-ECHO support to coordination strengthened the humanitarian response (n = 33) 

A 
large  majority  of  stakeholders  provided  positive 
feedback  that  EU  support  to  intervention  coordination  in 
Central  African  Republic  contributed  to  strengthen  the 
overall humanitarian aid response. 

Q17- ECHO coordinated its activities with EU development actors (n = 33) 

The majority  of actors  surveyed  provided  positive 
feedback,  although  only  one-thirds  argued  that 
partnerships arrangements with other development 
actors were very consistent. 

is  worth  noting 

It 
stakeholders remained hesitant. 

that  about  one-thirds  of 

191 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

Q18- ECHO collaboration with EU development actors helped to reduce needs (n = 33) 

Only a tenth of respondents were strongly convinced 
that collaboration with other EU partners contributed 
to reduce significantly beneficiaries’ needs. 

where appropriate (n = 33) 

Q19-  ECHO  programme  promoted  resilience 

than  half  were  persuaded 

More 
implemented fairly facilitated resilience. 

that  activities 

Nearly  one-thirds  provided  neutral  or  negative 
feedback on this statement. 

Q20- ECHO partner actions established exit strategies (n = 33) 

Opinions  on  sustainability  were  ambiguous  as  half  of 
respondents  did  not  provide  clear  feedback.  Though, 
one-third  moderately  agreed 
that  ECHO  partner 
actions established exit strategies. 

Q21- Humanitarian coordination (n = 33) 

Eight  out  of  ten  actors  approved  EU  humanitarian 
coordination in Central African Republic.  

192 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

Q22- Collaboration with development actors -Nexus (n = 33) 

Partnership  arrangements  and  information  sharing  with 
development  actors  seemed  to  be  limited.  Very  few 
respondents  were  completely  satisfied  with  DG  ECHO 
coordination  and  up  to  one-thirds  of  both  donors  and 
implementation actors remained sceptical about it. 

Q23- Promotion of resilience (n = 33) 

Few survey participants provided very positive answers whereas approximately one-thirds (27%) were sceptical 
about the promotion of resilience.  

More  than  half  of  respondents  were  less  convinced 
that DG ECHO action positively influenced resilience 
in Central Africa Republic. 

4.4. Key factors of success 

Question- How much did these factors affect ECHO’s overall performance? (n = 33) 

Overall,  stakeholders  have  identified  consideration  of  both  gender  and  age  specificities,  and  DG  ECHO 
expertise, as main factors that highly contributed to improve EU humanitarian performance in Central African 
Republic. 

193 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

Annex 7: Discussion Guide – English 

Discussion Guide 
Evaluation of EU humanitarian assistance to Central Africa 2014-18 
Evaluator aim:  
  Semi structured interview on relevant themes below. EQs and bullets only to guide you 
  Collect views on questions (seeking convergence/divergence across respondents) 
  Request explanations ‘why’  
  Capture a few instructive examples i.e. good / not good practice 
  Record ~9-12 ‘pieces of evidence’ from each KII 

Introduction  
  What: Independent evaluation, by EU rules 
  Object of evaluation: EU humanitarian assistance to Central Africa 2014-18 (Chad, CAR, Cameroon)  
  Key themes: Relevance, Effectiveness, Coherence 
  Who: Landell-Mills, an international consulting company 
  Why: Inform strategy, facilitate learning, promote accountability  
  How: Open discussion, space to express your views (i.e. semi-structured interview) 
  Time: 1 hour (or less depending on your time available) 
  Rules: Confidentiality, non-attribution 

A. Relevance 
1. Relevance of actions to needs/vulnerability (ALL) 
EQ1. How consistently relevant were EU-funded actions (i.e. ‘projects’) to the needs of the most vulnerable 
people in country/CA? (Informed by assessments?) 
  Design: action designs included vulnerable groups (i.e. women, children, older people, PWDs, 

adolescents at risk, GBV survivors etc) 
Implementation: action implementation provided for vulnerable groups 

 
  Consultation: actions actively consulted beneficiaries throughout project cycle (i.e. design and 

implementation)  

  Adaptation: actions were able to adapt to changing needs and situations 

2. Appropriateness of strategy (ALL) 
EQ2. How appropriate were ECHO strategies (i.e. HIPs)?  
  Clarity: HIPs provided clear strategic priorities?  
  Tailored: HIPs were tailored to specific humanitarian situations, risks, needs 
  Adapted: HIP strategies successfully adapted to changing needs (i.e. significant shocks, increased 

needs, events) 

3. Contributions to needs assessment (IF RELEVANT, OCHA) 
EQ3. To what extent has ECHO contributed to establishing joint and impartial needs assessments? 
  Funding: ECHO contributed funding to joint needs assessments (e.g. HNO, IASC/HPC, clusters, 

ERC etc) 
Improved: ECHO contributions resulted in collaborative and impartial needs assessments 

 

B. Effectiveness  
10. Achievement of ECHO objectives (ALL) 
EQ10. To what extent did ECHO programme achieve its objectives?  
  Objectives: ECHO programme achieved strategy (HIP) objectives to meet acute and protracted 
needs i.e. of people affected by (i) conflicts, (ii) food and nutrition crises, and (iii) risks of natural 
disasters and epidemics  

  Needs met: ECHO programme met needs of intended beneficiaries 

194 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

  Significant achievements: What most significant achievement (i.e. quantifiable outputs, any 

outcomes?) 

  Factors: What key factor/s of success: e.g. ECHO management, IP implementation, humanitarian 

coordination, national and local capacities?  

  ECHO programme contributed to achieving EU goals (ONLY EU ACTORS) 

11. Success of ECHO advocacy (ALL) 
EQ11. How successful was ECHO advocacy?  
  Structured: ECHO conducted (structured) advocacy on which key issue? 
  Success: ECHO advocacy was successful /showed signs of success 

12. Cost effectiveness of ECHO actions (ALL) 
EQ12. How cost-effective was ECHO’s response?  
  Cost effectiveness: ECHO actions tended to be cost-effective? 
  Key factors: Key factors affecting cost effectiveness of partners 

o  Good partnership with ECHO 
o  Resilience promotion  
o  Cash-based programming  
o  Shared logistics costs  
o  Simplified reporting  
o  Learning about best practices  
o  Local ownership  
o  Ability to mobilise funding quickly as needs arise 

13. Sufficiency of ECHO funding (ALL) 
EQ13. Was the size of the budget allocated by ECHO to each country appropriate and proportionate? 
  Proportionate: ECHO country allocations were ‘proportionate’ to needs (i.e. sufficiency) 
  Appropriate: ECHO country allocations were ‘appropriate’ to situation (i.e. funding mechanisms) 

C. Coordination / Complementarity 
9. Sustainability of results (ALL) 
EQ9. To what extent did DG ECHO manage to achieve sustainable results of its interventions? (promoted 
resilience? Established exit strategies?) 
  Resilience: ECHO strategy promoted resilience (where appropriate)  
  Exit strategies: ECHO strategy established exit strategies 

5. Strengthening coordination (IF RELEVANT, OCHA) 
EQ5. To what extent did EU-funded coordination actions strengthen coordination? 
  Gaps addressed: EU-funded coordination actions addressed (coordination) gaps in overall 

responses 

  Response strengthened: EU-funded coordination actions contributed to a strengthened overall 

response 

  OCHA reinforced: EU-funded coordination actions reinforced OCHA’s role wherever appropriate 

6. Coordination with other donors (IF RELEVANT, DONORS) 
EQ6. How successful was ECHO in coordinating its response with other donors/EU members?  
•  Donor coordination: ECHO response was coordinated with other significant donors, incl. EU 

members 

•  Duplication avoided: ECHO response avoided duplication/overlaps with other significant donors, incl. 

EU members 

•  Synergy promoted: ECHO response promoted synergies with other significant donors, incl. EU 

members 

7. Coordination of Nexus (ONLY EU ACTORS) 
EQ7.  How  successful  were  ECHO  measures  to  coordinate  the  EU's  humanitarian  and  development 
actions?  

195 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

  Measures taken: ECHO took measures to coordinate the EU's humanitarian and development 

actions 

  Needs reduced: ECHO measures to coordinate the EU's humanitarian and development actions 

demonstrated success at reducing needs AND vulnerability 

8. Added value of ECHO actions (ONLY EU ACTORS) 
EQ8. What was the EU added value of ECHO actions in Central Africa?  
•  Donorship processes: EU member states perceived ECHO added value in strong and reliable 

donorship processes 

•  Technical expertise: EU member states perceived ECHO added value in know-how and tech 

expertise at HQ and field 

/Ends 

196 

 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

Annex 8: Discussion Guide – French 

Référentiel de discussion 
Évaluation de l’aide humanitaire de l’UE à l’Afrique centrale entre 2014 et 2018 

Objectif de l’évaluateur :  
  Entretien semi-structuré sur les thèmes pertinents repris ci-dessous. Les QE ainsi que les intitulés 

principaux ne servent qu’à vous orienter. 

  Rassembler les points de vue sur les questions (recherche de convergence/divergence parmi les 

répondants) 

  Demander des explications - « pourquoi ? »  
  Saisir quelques exemples instructifs, c.-à-d. bonnes / mauvaises pratiques. 
  Consigner ~9 à 12 « éléments de preuve » de chaque KII 

Introduction  
  Objet : Évaluation indépendante, selon les règles de l’UE 
  Objet de l’évaluation : Aide humanitaire de l’UE à l’Afrique centrale entre 2014 et 2018 (Tchad, RCA, 

Cameroun)  

  Thèmes clés : Pertinence, efficacité, cohérence 
  Partie prenante : Landell-Mills, une société de conseil internationale 
  Raison : Éclairer la stratégie, favoriser la formation, encourager la responsabilisation.  
  Comment : Discussion ouverte, espace visant à vous permettre d’exprimer votre point de vue (p. ex., 

entrevue semi-structurée) 

  Durée : 1 heure (ou moins selon le temps dont vous disposez) 
  Règles : Confidentialité, anonymat 

A. Pertinence 
1. Pertinence par rapport aux besoins/vulnérabilité (TOUS) 
QE1. Dans quelle mesure les actions financées par l’UE (c’est-à-dire les « projets ») étaient-elles toujours 
pertinentes par rapport aux besoins des personnes les plus vulnérables dans le pays/en Centrafrique ? 
(éclairées par les évaluations ?) 
  Conception du projet : les plans d’action incluaient des groupes vulnérables (femmes, enfants, 
personnes âgées, personnes handicapées, adolescents à risque, survivants de VBG, etc.). 

  Mise en œuvre : mise en œuvre des actions prévues pour les groupes vulnérables. 
  Consultation : les actions ont activement impliqué les bénéficiaires tout au long du cycle du projet 

(c’est-à-dire lors de la conception et de la mise en œuvre du projet).  

  Adaptation : les actions ont su s’adapter à l’évolution des besoins et des situations. 

2. Pertinence de la stratégie (TOUS) 
QE2. Dans quelle mesure les stratégies d’ECHO (c’est-à-dire les Humanitarian implementation plans, HIP 
ou Plans de mise en œuvre humanitaire) étaient-elles appropriées ?  
  Clarté : les HIPs ont-ils établi des priorités stratégiques claires ?  
  Personnalisée : les stratégies des HIPs étaient adaptées efficacement aux contextes humanitaires, 

aux risques, aux besoins. 

  Adaptée : stratégies des HIPs adaptées efficacement à l’évolution des besoins (c.-à-d. chocs 

importants, besoins accrus et événements). 

3. Contributions à l’évaluation des besoins (le cas échéant, OCHA, en français, BCAH - Bureau de 
la coordination des affaires humanitaires) 
QE3. Dans quelle mesure ECHO a-t-il contribué à établir des évaluations conjointes et impartiales des 
besoins ? 
  Financement : ECHO a contribué au financement d’évaluations conjointes des besoins (par 

exemple, HNO - Humanitarian needs overview ou aperçu des besoins humanitaires, IASC - Inter-

197 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

agency committee ou comité interorganisations / HPC - Humanitarian procurement centres ou 
centrales d’achat humanitaires, clusters, ERC - Enhanced response capacity ou renforcement de la 
capacité de réaction, etc.) 

  Renforcement et améliorations : Les contributions d’ECHO ont permis d’évaluer les besoins de 

manière collaborative et impartiale. 

B. Efficacité   
10. Réalisation des objectifs d’ECHO (TOUS) 
QE10. Dans quelle mesure le programme d’ECHO a-t-il atteint ses objectifs ?  
  Objectifs : le programme ECHO a atteint ses objectifs stratégiques (HIP) pour répondre aux besoins 

aigus et prolongés des populations touchées par (i) les conflits, (ii) les crises alimentaires et 
nutritionnelles, et (iii) les risques de catastrophes naturelles et d’épidémies.  

  Besoins satisfaits : le programme d’ECHO a répondu aux besoins des bénéficiaires visés. 
  Réalisations majeures : Quelle est la réalisation majeure (c.-à-d. des extrants quantifiables, des 

résultats ?) ? 

  Facteurs : Quel(s) facteur(s) clé(s) de succès : par exemple, la gestion d’ECHO, la concrétisation du 

plan de mise en œuvre, la coordination humanitaire, les capacités nationales et locales ?  
  Le programme d’ECHO a contribué à la réalisation des objectifs de l’UE (ACTEURS DE L’UE 

UNIQUEMENT). 

11. Efficacité du plaidoyer d’ECHO (TOUS) 
QE11. Dans quelle mesure le plaidoyer d’ECHO a-t-il été efficace ?  
  Structuré : le programme d’ECHO a-t-il mené un plaidoyer (structuré), et le cas échéant, sur quelle 

question clé ? 

  Efficacité : le plaidoyer d’ECHO a été efficace / a montré des signes de réussite. 

12. Rapport coût-efficacité des actions d’ECHO (TOUS) 
QE12. Quel a été le rapport coût-efficacité de la réponse d’ECHO ?  
  Rapport coût-efficacité : la gestion des coûts des actions d’ECHO s’est-elle révélée efficace en 

termes de coûts ? 

  Facteurs clés : facteurs clés influant sur le rapport coût-efficacité des partenaires 

o  Partenariat efficace avec ECHO 
o  Renforcement de la résilience  
o  Programmes faisant appel aux espèces monétaires  
o  Partage des coûts logistiques  
o  Simplification des procédures de rapport  
o  Enseignement sur les bonnes pratiques  
o  Prise en charge locale  
o  Capacité à mobiliser rapidement des fonds à mesure que les besoins se font sentir. 

13. Niveau de financement suffisant d’ECHO (TOUS) 
QE13. Le montant du budget alloué par ECHO à chaque pays était-il approprié et proportionné ? 
  Proportionné : le montant du budget alloué par ECHO à chaque pays était proportionné selon les 

besoins (c’est-à-dire suffisant). 

  Approprié : le budget affecté à chaque pays couvert par le programme ECHO était approprié à la 

situation (c’est-à-dire aux mécanismes de financement). 

C. Coordination / Complémentarité 
9. Durabilité des résultats (TOUS) 
QE9.  Dans  quelle  mesure  la  DG  ECHO  est-elle  parvenue  à  obtenir  des  résultats  durables  pour  ses 
interventions ? (renforcement de la résilience ? Stratégies de sortie établies ?) 
  Résilience : la stratégie d’ECHO a renforcé la résilience (le cas échéant).  
  Stratégies de sortie : la stratégie d’ECHO a établi des stratégies de sortie. 

198 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

5. Renforcement de la coordination (SI PERTINENT, OCHA) 
QE5.  Dans  quelle  mesure  les  actions  de  coordination  financées  par  l’UE  ont-elles  renforcé  la 
coordination ? 
  Lacunes comblées : les actions de coordination financées par l’UE ont comblé les lacunes (de 

coordination) des réponses globales. 

  Réponse globale renforcée : les actions de coordination financées par l’UE ont contribué à une 

réponse globale renforcée. 

  Rôle de l’OCHA : les actions de coordination financées par l’UE ont renforcé le rôle de l’OCHA 

chaque fois que cela s’est avéré approprié. 

avec  d’autres  bailleurs  de 

6.  Coordination 
DONATEURS/BAILLEURS DE FONDS) 
QE6.  Dans  quelle  mesure  le  programme  d’ECHO  a-t-il  réussi  à  coordonner  sa  réponse  avec  d’autres 
bailleurs de fonds et membres de l’UE ?   
•  Coordination avec les bailleurs de fonds : la réponse d’ECHO a été coordonnée avec d’autres 

(LE  CAS  ÉCHÉANT,  DES 

fonds 

bailleurs de fonds importants, dont des membres de l’UE. 

•  Pas de double emploi : la réponse d’ECHO a permis d’éviter les doubles emplois et les 

chevauchements avec d’autres bailleurs de fonds importants, notamment les membres de l’UE. 
•  Synergie renforcée : la réponse d’ECHO a favorisé les synergies avec d’autres bailleurs de fonds 

importants, notamment les membres de l’UE. 

7. Coordination de Nexus (ACTEURS DE L’UE UNIQUEMENT) 
QE7.  Dans  quelle  mesure  les  actions  d’ECHO  visant  à  coordonner  les  actions  humanitaires  et  de 
développement de l’UE se sont-elles avérées efficaces ?  
  Mesures prises : ECHO a pris des mesures visant à coordonner les actions humanitaires et de 

développement de l’UE. 

  Baisse des besoins : les mesures d’ECHO visant à coordonner les actions humanitaires et de 

développement de l’UE ont permis de réduire les besoins ET la vulnérabilité. 

8. Valeur ajoutée des actions d’ECHO (ACTEURS DE L’UE UNIQUEMENT) 
QE8. Quelle a été la valeur ajoutée des actions d’ECHO en Afrique centrale pour l’UE ?  
•  Processus d’aide financière : les États membres de l’UE ont perçu la valeur ajoutée d’ECHO dans 

les processus d’aide financière solides et fiables. 

•  Expertise technique : les États membres de l’UE ont perçu ECHO comme une valeur ajoutée en 

termes de savoir-faire et d’expertise technique au siège et sur le terrain. 

199 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

Annex 9: Survey Full Questionnaire 

Independent Evaluation of EU humanitarian assistance to Central Africa 2014-2018. Conducted by Landell-
Mills 

Welcome to this mini-survey about EU humanitarian assistance to Central Africa 2014-2018.  

The questions require your opinions, based on evidence or perceptions—anything you have seen, heard, or 
read. Please respond to each statement quickly and from ‘top of mind’. 

Your input will be treated as strictly confidential. Individual responses will not be made available to ECHO or 
any other organisation. Reporting will only include aggregated findings. 

Name: _________________________________________ 
Organisation: ___________________________________ 

Please state the relevant country for you:  
 

Country 
Chad 
Central African Republic 
Cameroon 
Central Africa (region) 

Q1. How much do you agree with these statements about EU humanitarian assistance 2014-2018?  
Note: 1=Completely disagree / 10=Completely Agree 

Statement 

Relevance 
ECHO programme was guided by clear strategic priorities 
ECHO strategy was tailored to specific crises  
ECHO strategy was adapted to changing situations 
ECHO strategy was consistent with humanitarian principles 

Effectiveness  

ECHO programme actions met acute needs  
ECHO programme actions met protracted needs 
ECHO programme actions met needs in complex emergencies 
ECHO programme actions met needs in food and nutrition crises 
ECHO programme actions addressed risks of epidemics and disasters 
ECHO partners met needs of intended beneficiaries 
ECHO advocacy was structured and effective 
ECHO partner actions were cost-effective 
ECHO funding was proportionate to needs 
ECHO funding modalities were appropriate  
Coherence 
ECHO contributed to joint needs assessments 
ECHO contributed to impartial needs assessments 
ECHO coordination support strengthened the overall response 

Rating 1-
10 
x 

x 

x 

200 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

ECHO coordinated programming with EU development actors 
ECHO collaboration with EU development actors contributed to reducing needs 
ECHO programme promoted resilience where appropriate 
ECHO partner actions established appropriate exit strategies 

Q2. How much did these factors contribute to achieving ECHO objectives 2014-2018?   
Note: 1=Hindered a lot / 10=Helped a lot  

Rating 1-
10 

Statement 

humanitarian coordination  
collaborative programming with development actors  
cash-based transfers (including vouchers)  
accountability to affected populations  
consideration of gender and age 
promotion of resilience 
ECHO project selection process 
ECHO technical management and advice 
ECHO modifications to changing situations  
Other ... (please specify)  

Q3. How much did these factors contribute to the cost-effectiveness of ECHO partner activities?   
Note: 1=Hindered a lot / 10=Helped a lot  

Statement 

Close and reliable partnership with ECHO 
Investments in resilience programming  
Cash-based programming  
Shared logistics costs among partners 
Simplified reporting requirements  
Promoting innovations and best practices  
Local ownership of the response 
Ability to mobilise funding quickly as needs arise 
Other ... (please specify)  

Rating 1-
10 

201 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

Évaluation indépendante de l’aide humanitaire de l’UE à l’Afrique centrale entre 2014 et 2018. Par Landell-
Mills 

Merci pour votre participation à cette mini-enquête sur l’aide humanitaire de l’UE à l’Afrique centrale entre 
2014 et 2018.   

Ce questionnaire repose sur vos impressions, sur des preuves ou des perceptions - tout élément vu, entendu 
ou lu. Merci de répondre à chaque énoncé de manière prompte et « spontanée ». 

Vos commentaires seront traités dans la plus stricte confidentialité. Les réponses personnalisées ne seront 
pas mises à la disposition d’ECHO (Service d’Aide humanitaire de la Commission européenne) ni d’aucune 
autre organisation. Les rapports ne comprendront que des résultats globaux. 

Nom : _________________________________________ 
Société/Organisation : _________________________________________ 

Veuillez indiquer le pays concerné  

Pays 
Tchad 
République centrafricaine 
Cameroun 
Afrique centrale (région) 

 

Q1. Dans quelle mesure êtes-vous d’accord avec les énoncés suivants concernant l’aide humanitaire 
de l’UE entre 2014 et 2018 ?  
Remarque : 1 = pas du tout d’accord / 10 = Tout à fait d’accord 

Énoncé 

Pertinence 
Le programme d’ECHO a été éclairé par des priorités stratégiques claires. 
La stratégie d’ECHO a été adaptée aux crises spécifiques.  
La stratégie d’ECHO a été adaptée à l’évolution des situations. 
La stratégie d’ECHO était conforme aux principes humanitaires. 

Évaluation 
1-10 
x 

Efficacité  

x 

Les actions/mesures du programme d’ECHO ont répondu à des besoins aigus.  
Les actions/mesures du programme d’ECHO ont répondu à des besoins 
prolongés. 
Les actions / mesures du programme d’ECHO ont répondu aux besoins de 
situations d’urgence complexes. 
Les actions / mesures du programme d’ECHO ont répondu aux besoins 
spécifiques engendrés par les crises alimentaires et nutritionnelles. 
Les actions / mesures du programme d’ECHO ont porté sur les risques 
d’épidémies et de catastrophes. 
Les partenaires d’ECHO ont répondu aux besoins des bénéficiaires visés. 
Le plaidoyer d’ECHO a été structuré et efficace. 
Les actions / mesures des partenaires d’ECHO ont été économiques. 

202 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including 
humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

Le financement d’ECHO était proportionné aux besoins. 
Les modalités de financement d’ECHO étaient appropriées.  
Cohérence 
ECHO a contribué à des évaluations conjointes des besoins. 
ECHO a contribué à des évaluations impartiales des besoins. 
Le soutien apporté à la coordination d’ECHO a renforcé la réponse globale. 
ECHO a coordonné le programme avec les acteurs du développement de l’UE. 
La collaboration d’ECHO avec les acteurs du développement de l’UE a contribué 
à réduire les besoins. 
Le programme d’ECHO a favorisé la résilience, le cas échéant. 
Les actions / mesures des partenaires d’ECHO ont permis d’établir des stratégies 
de sortie appropriées. 

x 

Q2. Dans quelle mesure ces facteurs ont-ils contribué à la réalisation des objectifs d’ECHO entre 2014 
et 2018 ?   
Remarque : 1 = ont beaucoup nui / 10 = ont beaucoup aidé  

Évaluation 
1-10 

Énoncé 

coordination humanitaire  
programme collaboratif, avec les acteurs du développement  
transferts en espèces (y compris des bons)  
obligation de rendre des comptes aux populations touchées  
prise en compte du sexe et de l’âge 
renforcement de la résilience 
processus de sélection des projets d’ECHO 
gestion technique et conseil d’ECHO 
modifications apportées par ECHO aux situations changeantes  
Autres (préciser).  

Q3. Dans quelle mesure ces facteurs ont-ils contribué à la gestion efficace des coûts inhérents aux 
activités des partenaires d’ECHO ?   
Remarque : 1 = ont beaucoup nui / 10 = ont beaucoup aidé  

Énoncé 

Évaluation 
1-10 

Collaboration étroite et partenariat fiable avec ECHO 
Investissements dans les programmes de résilience  
Programmes fondés sur des liquidités  
Partage des coûts logistiques entre les partenaires 
Exigences simplifiées en matière de rapports  
Valorisation des innovations et des bonnes pratiques  
Prise en charge locale de l’intervention 
Capacité de mobiliser rapidement des fonds au fur et à mesure que les besoins 
se font sentir. 
Autres (préciser).  

203 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

Annex 10: Evaluation Matrix 

This  evaluation matrix  is  the key  tool  to guide  data  collection  and analysis. This  has  been  developed  on the  basis  of the  evaluation  ToR  throughout the 
Inception Phase and further refined throughout the evaluation. During the synthesis and final report phase, it was agreed with DG ECHO that the EQ numbers 
would be adjusted to improve the reading of the final report. The evaluation matrix below remains as agreed with DG ECHO during the Inception and Desk 
phases, as this is how it was used as a tool throughout the evaluation. However, where the evaluation question has subsequently changed in the final report, 
this has been highlighted through the use of footnotes. 

Section 1: Relevance 

EQ 

Judgement Criteria 

Indicators 

Methods / Sources 

Definitions / Assumptions 

1. Relevance of actions to 
vulnerability  

EQ 1. How relevant were EU-
funded actions to the needs of the 
most vulnerable in CA?  

• action/programme objectives 
were aligned with needs of a 
specific population / area covered 

• action/programme 
implementation was informed by 
ongoing assessments of needs 

• % action designs demonstrating 
alignment with needs assessment   

• Data analysis: Portfolio, sample 
(Single Forms, Fiche Ops) 

• % actions reporting on alignment 
with changing needs  

• Stakeholder consultation: IPs, 
ECHO FEs, intended 
beneficiaries 

•Case studies: Field visits 

• action/programme designs 
included vulnerable groups (i.e. 
women, children, older people, 
PWDs, adolescents at risk, GBV 
survivors etc) 

• action/programme 
implementation provided for 
vulnerable groups 

• converging stakeholder views  

• % actions considering 
vulnerability in design 

• convergence of stakeholder 
views 

• EU humanitarian aid 'provide[s] 
a needs-based emergency 
response' (Consensus) 

• The allocations of the EU 
humanitarian aid budget were 
driven by a comprehensive 
needs assessments framework 
(…) including local needs 
assessments in each 
geographical area covered (ICF 
2018) 

• EU humanitarian aid recognises 
'the different needs, capacities 
and contributions of women, 
girls, boys and men' (Consensus) 

• Vulnerability is the susceptibility 
of communities to hazards, 
[including] (…) vulnerable groups 
(i.e. uprooted people, other 

204 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

• actions/programmes actively 
consulted beneficiaries throughout 
programme cycle (i.e. design and 
implementation)  

• % actions reporting beneficiary 
consultation  

• converging stakeholder views 

• action/programme were able to 
adapt to changing needs and 
situations 

2. Appropriateness of strategy  

• HIPs provided clear strategic 
priorities  

EQ 2. How appropriate were 
ECHO strategies? 

• % actions reflecting priorities 

• % positive stakeholder ratings 

• converging stakeholder views  

• document review: HIPs 
(S1,2,3), ICF 2018 

• data analysis: Fiche Op 
(strategic relevance, policy 
coherence) 

• HIPs were tailored to specific 
humanitarian situations, risks, and 
needs  

• strategic priorities linked to 
specific situations, risks, and 
needs  

• Stakeholder consultation: 
ECHO managers, policy, 3P 
implementation actors, intended 
beneficiaries   

• Case study 1: focused on multi 
sector AND adaptive 
management in CAR 

vulnerable groups) (INFORM 
Guidelines) 

• Accountability to affected 
populations includes participation 
through ongoing communication, 
feedback and complaints (IASC 
AAP principles)  

• ECHO 'work[s] to ensure that 
the voices of the most vulnerable 
groups considering gender, age, 
ethnicity, language and special 
needs are heard and acted 
upon.' (Grand Bargain 6) 

• ECHO and agencies commit to 
build systematic links between 
feedback and corrective action to 
adjust programming (Grand 
Bargain 6.4) 

• EU aid is provided 'in an 
appropriate way, to the 
population most affected' (HAR) 

• Appropriateness is the tailoring 
of humanitarian activities to local 
needs, increasing ownership, 
accountability and cost-
effectiveness accordingly 
(ALNAP 2006).  

• The move from national HIPs 
towards regional HIPs was 
considered as appropriate but 
scope for improvement of this 
new regional approach was 

205 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

• explicit references to 
IAFs/INFORM, HRP/HNOs 

• HIP strategies successfully 
adapted to changing needs (i.e. 
significant shocks, increased 
needs, and events) 

• % positive stakeholder ratings 

• converging stakeholder views  

• case study evidence that strategy 
adapted  

3. Contributions to needs 
assessment  

EQ 3. To what extent has DG 
ECHO contributed to establishing 
joint and impartial needs 
assessments? 

• ECHO contributed funding to joint 
needs assessments (e.g. through 
IASC/HPC, clusters, ERC) 

• % funding allocated (joint vs 
individual) 

• portfolio analysis: funding to 
OCHA/needs assessments(?) 

identified, notably in terms of 
execution and suitability for 
regions with largely different 
national contexts. These 
improvements would maximise 
the benefits of a multi country 
approach.  (ICF 2018) 

• Adaptive management is 
defined in terms of learning and 
continual improvement, i.e. to 
make strategic and operational 
decisions (see Obrecht, A. with 
Bourne, S. 2018)  

• Fund[s] flexibly to facilitate 
programme adaptation in 
response to community 
feedback' and 'Invest[s] time and 
resources to fund these activities' 
(GB 6.5 and 5.6) 

• Multi-year planning and funding 
are understood to catalyse more 
responsive programming (Grand 
Bargain 7) 

The EC is committed to 
improving the capacities, quality 
and coordination of needs-
assessment approaches across 
the humanitarian sector. It 
supports: 

• The work of the Inter-agency 
Standing Committee (IASC) 
related to assessment and 
analysis tools and guidance 
(such as the roll-out of the 

206 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

• ECHO contributed funding to 
HNOs for each crisis, i.e. a single, 
comprehensive, cross-sectoral, 
methodologically sound and 
impartial overall assessment of 
needs 

• % funding allocated 

• portfolio analysis: funding to 
OCHA/needs assessments(?) 

• ECHO contributions result in 
collaborative and impartial needs 
assessments 

• % positive stakeholder ratings 

• converging stakeholder views  

• Stakeholder consultation: 
ECHO managers, policy, 3P 
implementation actors, intended 
beneficiaries   

4. Alignment with principles and 
policy priorities 

EQ 4. How well aligned was 
ECHO’s response with 

• HIP priorities and TA 
recommendations were consistent 
with humanitarian principles, HAR, 
consensus  

• % making explicit reference to 
principles, HAR, consensus  

• converging stakeholder views  

• Document review: HIPs, TAs, 
GGOPHAs, 3 sector/thematic 
policies 

Humanitarian Programme 
Cycle). 

• Funding of global needs 
assessment initiatives under the 
Enhanced Response Capacity 
(ERC) mechanism with partner 
organisations. 

• the needs assessment process 
must be coordinated, impartial, 
collaborative and fully 
transparent (with a clear 
distinction between the analysis 
of data and the subsequent 
prioritisation and decision-
making) (Grand Bargain 5) 

• commitments to provide single 
overall needs assessment for 
each crisis to inform strategic 
decisions (Grand Bargain 5) 

• Humanity means that human 
suffering must be addressed 
wherever it is found, with 
particular attention to the most 
vulnerable. 

• Neutrality means that 
humanitarian aid must not favour 

207 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

humanitarian principles and EU 
policy priorities? 

• HIP priorities and TA 
recommendations were consistent 
with EU humanitarian policy 
priorities 

• % making explicit reference to 
annual EU operational priorities 

• HIP priorities and TA 
recommendations in 3 selected 
thematic areas were consistent 
with policy priorities 

• % making explicit reference to 
ECHO policy priorities 

any side in an armed conflict or 
other dispute. 

• Impartiality means that 
humanitarian aid must be 
provided solely on the basis of 
need, without discrimination. 

• Independence means the 
autonomy of humanitarian 
objectives from political, 
economic, military or other 
objectives. (ECHO website) 

• Annual EU humanitarian 
priorities are defined in the 
General Guidelines on 
Operational Priorities for 
Humanitarian Aid  

• EU/ECHO policies on forced 
displacement, food security OR 
resilience, Nexus  

208 

 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

EQ 

Judgement Criteria 

Indicators 

Methods / Sources 

Definitions / Assumptions 

Section 2: Coordination / Complementarity 

5. Strengthening coordination131  

EQ 5. To what extent did EU-
funded coordination actions 
strengthen coordination 

• EU-funded coordination actions 
addressed (coordination) gaps in 
overall responses 

• % HRP coordination 
requirements funded  

• Data analysis: portfolio, 
HRP/FTS 

• converging stakeholder views 

• Stakeholder consultation: 
implementation actors, 3P 

• EU-funded coordination actions 
contributed to a strengthened 
overall response 

• % positive stakeholder ratings 

• converging stakeholder views 

• Stakeholder consultation: 
implementation actors, 3P 

• EU-funded coordination actions 
reinforced OCHA’s role wherever 
appropriate 

• % EU-funded coordination 
support to OCHA vs other actors  

• Data analysis: portfolio, funding 
on coordination / OCHA vs 
others 

• converging stakeholder views 

• Stakeholder consultation: 
implementation actors, 3P 

131 Referred to in the Final Evaluation Report as EQ 9 

intended to avoid confusion, 
conflict, duplication among the 
many different humanitarian 
actors (TOR / ALNAP) 

• For the purpose of filling 
structural and operational gaps in 
humanitarian coordination, the 
EU occasionally takes the role of 
leading, shaping, and 
coordinating the response to 
crises, while respecting and 
supporting the overall 
coordination role of OCHA (TOR) 

• DG ECHO strengthened its role 
vis-à-vis the humanitarian 
coordination structures at policy 
and field level during the 
evaluation period. DG ECHO 
also encouraged the framework 
partners to take part in relevant 
national and local clusters (e.g. 
via funding and reference to 
specific clusters in DG ECHO’s 
thematic guidance). (ICF 2018) 

• DG ECHO is cautious in its 
level of cooperation with national 
and local authorities, given the 
need to maintain the 
humanitarian principles, but 
within these boundaries DG 
ECHO should recognise the 

209 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

need to develop context-specific 
approaches towards involving 
national and local authorities 
whenever possible (ICF 2018) 

• OCHA is responsible for 
bringing together humanitarian 
actors to ensure a coherent 
response to emergencies. It also 
ensures there is a framework 
within which each actor can 
contribute to the overall response 
effort, starting from the 
preparation of Joint Needs 
Assessments. (TOR) 

• OCHA's mission is to: Mobilise 
and coordinate effective and 
principled humanitarian action in 
partnership with national and 
international actors in order to 
alleviate human suffering in 
disasters and emergencies. 
(TOR) 

• DG ECHO clarified its 
objectives in terms of 
contribution to the humanitarian 
coordination structures and 
relations with UN OCHA and 
other UN agencies. DG ECHO 
should therefore continue its 
effort to reinforce its relationship 
with the UN agencies and where 
needed challenge them in 
cooperation with its key partners. 
(ICF 2018) 

• There are coordination 
structures and mechanisms in 
place to promote the coherence 
between the EU and the Member 

210 

• ECHO response was coordinated 
with other significant donors, incl. 
EU members 

• Evidence / examples of 
coordination structures and 
mechanisms used 

• Evidence / examples of 
coordination structures and 
mechanisms used 

 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

6. Coordination with other 
donors132 

EQ 6. How successful was ECHO 
in coordinating its response with 
other donors? 

• ECHO response avoided 
duplication/overlaps with other 
significant donors, incl. EU 
members 

• Evidence / examples of 
duplication avoided  

• ECHO response promoted 
synergies with other significant 
donors, incl. EU members 

• Evidence/ examples of synergies 
promoted  

7. Coordination of Nexus 
(HDN)133 

• ECHO took measures to coordinate 
the EU's humanitarian and 
development actions 

• Evidence reported by IPs 

• Data analysis: Sample (Single 
Form 7.4) 

• Explicit reference to measures in 
MEL reports 

EQ 7. How successful were ECHO 
measures to coordinate the EU's 
humanitarian and development 
actions? 

• Document review: HIPs (S4), 
EUTF/DEVCO/EEAS MEL reports 
on Nexus measures  

• ECHO measures to coordinate the 
EU's humanitarian and development 
actions demonstrated success at 
reducing needs, vulnerability, and 
fragility 

• % positive stakeholder ratings 

• converging stakeholder views 

• positive results reported in MEL 
reports 

• Stakeholder consultation: 
donorship, 3P 

132 Referred to in the Final Evaluation Report as EQ 10 
133 Referred to in the Final Evaluation Report as EQ 13 

States humanitarian aid policies 
and activities. There is however 
scope to use these structures 
more effectively and further 
improve cooperation in terms of 
global resource allocation and 
practical actions at field level. 
(ICF 2018) 

• The European Commission and 
Member States improved 
information sharing at 
headquarter level but operational 
coordination and synergies 
remained weak at field level. 
(Consensus evaluation 2014) 

‘Measures’ may include: e.g. timely 
exchange of information, joint 
context analyses, EC forced 
displacement & development, pilot 
countries, collective outcomes, 
MYP and MYF cycles, joint risk 
and vulnerability analysis, joined-
up planning, coordinated 
programming, lessons learned 
from field. (EC Nexus 2017) 

ECHO has sought coordination 
with DEVCO at HQ level, and is 
translating to field through nexus 
piloting, and EUTFs (ICF 2018) 

Purpose of Nexus is 'investing in 
prevention and addressing the 
underlying root causes of 
vulnerability, fragility and conflict 
while simultaneously meeting 
humanitarian needs and 
strengthening resilience, thus 

211 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

• case study evidence 

• Case study 2: focused Nexus 
pilot in Chad  

reducing risks.' I.e. invest in 
resilience (EC Nexus 2017) 

8. Added value of ECHO actions 

EQ 8. What was the EU added 
value of ECHO actions in Central 
Africa? 

• EU member states perceived 
ECHO added value in strong and 
reliable donorship processes 

• % positive stakeholder ratings 

• converging stakeholder views 

• Stakeholder consultation: 
donorship, 3P 

• Data analysis: ExAR funding 

• % EU state funding through 
ExAR 

• EU member states perceived 
ECHO added value in know-how 
and tech expertise at HQ and field 

• EU member states used External 
Assigned Revenue (ExAR), 
contribution system;  

9. Sustainability of results134 

EQ 9. To what extent did DG 
ECHO manage to achieve 
sustainable results of its 
interventions? 

• EU-funded humanitarian actions 
promoted resilience135 (where 
appropriate) 

• % actions promoting resilience 

• data analysis: portfolio, sample 
(Single Form, Fiche Op)   

•  EU-funded  humanitarian  actions 
established 
exit 
strategies 

appropriate 

•  %  actions  establishing  exit 
strategies  

• Stakeholder consultation: 
implementation actors, 3P 

Added value linked to 
subsidiarity, and may include e.g. 
greater coordination, legal 
certainty, effectiveness or 
complementarity. ECHO added 
value for member states 
includes: (i) ECHO HQ 
coordination and info-sharing 
(incl. expertise from field 
network), (ii) ECHO ‘model’ seen 
as strong and reliable donor (incl. 
processes e.g. Single Form); (iii) 
Effectiveness of External 
Assigned Revenue (ExAR), 
contribution system; (iv) 
Members can rely on ECHO 
know how and tech expertise at 
HQ and field (ICF 2018).  

The key normative question is 
“what would have been achieved 
by MS without ECHO/EU?” 

ECHO uses resilience marker. 
N.B. Resilience defined as (i) 
capacity to resist, (ii) capacity to 
bounce back (from shocks). 
Increasing resilience means 
enhancing strength of entity 
and/or reducing impact of shock. 
It's multifaceted, interfaces HA 
and development aid, and 

134 Referred to in the Final Evaluation Report as EQ 12 
135 Definitions of resilience remain unclear. This is acknowledged and the Evaluation Team will seek to further address this in future reports and analysis. This will be incorporated into tools and confirmed in minor adjustments to the judgement 
criteria in an updated evaluation matrix, as necessary, as the team confirms its consultation tools. 

212 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

•  Further  strategy-level  measures 
were 
to  promote 
sustainability 

considered 

• % positive stakeholder ratings 

• converging stakeholder views 

• Case study 3: e.g. focused on 
refugees in Cameroon, self-
reliance 

requires long term approach (EU 
Resilience 2012) 

• case study evidence 

not all sustainability is promoted 
through resilience, also LRRD 
(15.3) and Nexus work w 
DEVCO in 14 pilot countries. 
Sustainability / Resilience is not 
appropriate for all humanitarian 
actions. Some activities more 
sustainable by nature (e.g. 
demining), others not intended to 
be (e.g. food distribution) (ICF 
2018) 

Difficulties in implementing 
LRRD and exit strategies (no 
framework or guidelines), and 
little evidence of complementary 
approaches w/ development 
actors over this time. 

213 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

EQ 

Judgement Criteria 

Indicators 

Methods / Sources 

Definitions / Assumptions 

Section 3. Effectiveness 

10. Achievement of ECHO 
objectives136  

• ECHO response achieved 
strategy (HIP) objectives 

• % priority objectives achieved by 
portfolio  

EQ 10. To what extent did ECHO 
achieve its objectives? 

•  Factors  of  success  were  (key 
assumptions in intervention logic or 
ICF ones listed for actions)  

• % results achieved by actions 

• % results achieved by responses  

•  ECHO  response  met  needs  of 
intended (targeted) beneficiaries 

• converging stakeholder views 

• % positive stakeholder ratings 

•  ECHO 
concrete 
(outputs 
thematic) 

response 
(quantifiable) 
country, 
by 

achieved 
results 
sector, 

• notable results (outcomes) at 
levels of region, country, sectors.   

• case study evidence 

•  ECHO  response  contributed  to 
achieving EU goals 

• Document review: HIPs (S3.4), 
Consensus, HAR, IASC M&E 
(reporting, evaluations)  

• Data analysis: portfolio, sample 
(Single Form and Fiche Op-
especially Final report, lessons 
learned); IASC data by response 
(?) 

• Case study 3: e.g. focused on 
refugees in Cameroon, self-
reliance 

• Focus will be on qualitative 
evidence available, to show EU 
funded actions were effective, 
and contributed to saving lives 
etc (core objectives) (ICF 2018). 
However, no framework to 
monitor and assess effectiveness 
of HIPs or means to 
systematically identify good 
practices; only qual data and 
quant data at project level (ICF 
2018).137 

• Factors of success: project 
selection process, strong TA 
capacities, timeliness in 
emergencies, support to more 
effective modalities (e.g. cash, 
CWC, gender marker etc) (ICF 
2018) 

• Mission level: EU core 
objectives (reduce mortality, 
suffering, morbidity + ensure 
dignity) realised through: (i) 
emergency response services 
(short term); (ii) building 
resilience, stability, nexus (mid-
longer term) (ICF 2018) 

• Qualitative evidence available 
shows EU funded actions were 
effective, and contributed to 

136 Referred to in the Final Evaluation Report as EQ 5 
137 NB. According to ICF 2018, Factors of success: project selection process, strong TA capacities, timeliness in emergencies, support to more effective modalities (e.g. cash, CWC, gender marker etc). Factors inhibiting EU-funded actions: Fixed 
short funding; lack of comprehensive strategy, root causes etc; Unanticipated budget variations; lack of coordination EU-non-EU funding streams; and limited technical expertise/capacity among partners (esp. shelter/settlement, health). Factors of 
success may include ‘added value’ of EU-funded actions: (i) scale of EU funding, translated into tangible results; (ii) EU focus on forgotten crises, more than all other donors; (iii) EU filled response gaps, e.g. where access difficult, and rapid 
responses to new crises; (iv) EU funded sectors and themes underfunded by other donors (e.g. protection, education in emergencies). 

214 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

11. Success of ECHO 
advocacy138  

ECHO conducted (structured) 
advocacy on issues listed in HIPs  

positive stakeholder ratings 

• Document review: HIPs (S2)  

EQ 11. How successful was DG 
ECHO advocacy? 

ECHO advocacy was successful 
/showed signs of success 

• case study evidence 

• converging stakeholder views 

12. Cost effectiveness of ECHO 
actions139  

Humanitarian actions funded by 
ECHO in each sector were 
efficient (on a case study basis). 

EQ 12. How cost-effective was 
ECHO’s response? 

What factors have affected the 
cost-effectiveness of the response 
and to what extent? 

Efficiency 

Qualitative evidence that the case 
study actions supported were 
efficient. 

Where appropriate: Value of 
transfers reaching populations 
compared to administrative costs. 

Where appropriate: Evidence that 
the largest cost drivers were well-
managed. 

Where appropriate Cost per unit 
and/or per refugee.  

Humanitarian  actions 
funded  by 
ECHO  in  each  sector  were  cost-
effective (on a case study basis). 

Cost-effectiveness 

Qualitative  evidence  that  the  case 
study  actions  supported  were  cost-
effective. 

• Stakeholder consultation: 
implementation actors 

• Case study 3: e.g. focused on 
refugees in Cameroon, self-
reliance 

Study on Approaches to Assess 
Cost-Effectiveness of DG ECHO’s 
Humanitarian Aid Actions (ADE) 
for methodological framework. 

Guidance Note on Cost-
Effectiveness (Simon Hale) 
applying ADE methodology 
proportionately. 

IAFs, HIPs, Dashboards, project 
Single Forms and FichOps.  

External project reviews and 
evaluations. 

DG ECHO staff and partners at all 
levels. 

Other donor and agency staff; 
external sectoral experts. 

Where appropriate: Partner 
budgets, transfer cost analysis, 
cost-driver analysis and unit cost 
analysis. 

138 Referred to in the Final Evaluation Report as EQ 6 
139 Referred to in the Final Evaluation Report as EQ 7 

saving lives etc (core objectives) 
(ICF 2018) 

• ECHO advocacy at field level 
maybe ‘individual, flexible and 
responsive’; but often ‘not joined 
up’, or ‘strategic’. (ICF 2018) 

Identification by sector experts of 
the key efficiency criteria for the 
case study. 

Interviews at the EU in Brussels 
and in CA at country, provincial 
and local levels 

Interviews with partners at Head 
Office, country, provincial and local 
levels. 

Interviews with other donors, 
agencies and sectoral experts. 

Where appropriate: Comparative 
analysis of transfer costs, input 
costs, or unit/refugee costs;   

215 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

13. Sufficiency of ECHO 
funding140 

• ECHO country allocations were 
proportionate to needs (i.e. 
sufficiency)  

EQ 13. Was the size of the budget 
allocated by DG ECHO to each 
country appropriate and 
proportionate? 

• % ECHO funding to responses  

• Data analysis: portfolio funding, 
FTS 

• % responses underfunded  

• % positive stakeholder ratings 

• converging stakeholder views 

• case study evidence 

• Document review: HIPs, WWDs 

• Stakeholder consultation: 
implementation actors 

• Case study 3: e.g. focused on 
refugees in Cameroon, self-
reliance 

ECHO focuses on funding critical 
sectors and addressing gaps in 
global response (TOR).  

EU made strategic choices to fund 
specific regions, i.e. MENA and 
NEAR, leaving other regions (CA?) 
with continuous needs with lower 
funding. (ICF 2018) 

Allocation process (see process 
map). Budget allocated through 
two types of financial decision: (i) 
annual WWD; (ii) emergency 
funding. (TOR). 

Through Grand Bargain, ECHO 
aims to promote efficiency / more 
financing to people in need. E.g. 
commitment 8 aims to reduce 
earmarking (increase flexibility) as 
a means to achieving humanitarian 
collective outcomes; based on 
accountability throughout the 
chain, incl. increase portion of 
appeal funding to UN CBFP to 
15%. Commitments include: to 
reduce earmarking, towards global 
target of 30% unearmarked or soft 
earmarked (definitions for 
earmarking in GB Annex) 

140 Referred to in the Final Evaluation Report as EQ 8 

216 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

Annex 11: Portfolio Sampling  

This  annex  presents  the  sampling  strategy  used  for  analysing  the  portfolio  of  EU-funded 
humanitarian actions in Central Africa 2014-2018. In response to feedback at inception phase, it 
aimed  to  ensure  that  the  sample  selected  is  as  far  as  possible  representative  of  the  variety  of 
actions funded. Below is a description of how we selected the sample, including data cleaning (1), 
sample selection (2), sample refinement (3), and limitations (4). This is followed by the proposed 
sample selection (5).  

1. Data cleaning  
What:  The  first  step  was  to  identify  ‘projects’  among  the  totality  of  EU-funded  ‘actions’  in  the 
portfolio. A project is defined as a distinct action, which is implemented by a partner in a specified 
location and with largely the same characteristics, regardless of whether it is implemented in one 
year  or  over  several  years.  By  classifying  ECHO’s  Actions  as  Projects,  the  selection  of  15  for 
analysis represents some 10% of all EU-funded actions (9.7% of 155).  

How: The ET classified 317 EU-funded actions into distinct ‘projects’, based on quality judgement 
made largely based on the ‘contract title’ and ‘budget allocation’ within the EVA data not individual 
actions. This involved identifying multi-annual (i.e. a project that continues over multiple years, with 
largely the same contract title; geography (country and location, e.g. East, South etc.); sector of 
response (e.g. Food security, WASH, protection etc.); and beneficiary type (e.g. Refugees or IDPs) 
and/or crisis (e.g. Boko Haram or Sahel FS crisis etc.). In contrast, a standalone project is distinct 
and not largely the same as another based on these criteria. 

Why:  The  value  of  this  strategy  is  to  more  accurately  reflect  the  variety  of  EU-funded  actions, 
reducing it from 317 to 155 over the period of evaluation. It is intended to allow fairer representation 
of genuinely different project types; without this, a large number of actions that were funded multiple 
times would appear in the sample, leading to repeated analysis of what is essentially the same 
project. N.B. The classification of projects as standalone or multi-annual projects is available upon 
request.  

2. Sample selection 

What: The second step was to select a sample that offers a variety of projects according to three 
criteria: continuity, scale of funding, and partner type.  

How:  The  ET  identified  how  funding  was  allocated  across  the  following  characteristics  of  the 
population and applied these proportions as filters to ensure that the sample represented similar 
characteristics.  

Why: The purpose of this selection is to ensure that the sample is as far as possible representative 
of the characteristics and variety demonstrated in the total population of Actions. By contrast, a 
purely random sample of the population would contain a large number of similar multi annual, large 
scale actions largely implemented by UN partners and would not represent the real diversity of 
differing project types. 

3. Project continuity 
This criterion is used to select a proportionate number of standalone and multi-year projects, given 
that  82%  of  EU  funding  went  to  multiyear  projects  and  18%  went  to  standalone  projects.  A 
preliminary analysis of the 317 EU-funded actions identified a total of 155 different project types of 
which 75 are multi annual and 80 are standalone project types.  

Table 6: Breakdown by project continuity 

Project Type 

# of Project types Contracted Amount (€) – Signed by partner 

Multi-Annual 

Standalone 

Grand Total 

75 

80  

155 

409.266.114 (82%) 

90.654.958 (18%) 

499.921.072 

 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

4. Scale of funding 
This criterion is used to select a proportionate number of projects by scale of funding received, 
given  that  ‘small’  projects  (<€4m)  represent  35%  of  projects,  ‘medium’  projects  (€4m-€8m) 
represent 21%, and ‘large’ projects (>€8m) represent 44% of the total.  

Sampling Strategy Table 1: Breakdown by funding size 

Funding Size (€) 

# of Projects  Contracted Amount (€) – Signed by partner 

0 < x ≤ 4,000,000 

124 

176.186.504 (35%) 

4,000,000 < x ≤ 8,000,000 

8,000,000 ≤ x 

Grand Total 

19 

12 

155 

104.395.211 (21%) 

219.339.357 (44%) 

499.921.072 

5. Partner type 
This  criterion  is  used  to  select  a  proportionate  number  of  projects  by  partner  type,  given  that 
international organisations (IOs) including UN agencies and the ICRC, make up 49% of the total; 
and international INGOs (INGOs) along with Northern Red Cross societies make up 51%. 

Sampling Strategy Table 2: Breakdown by partner type 

Partner Category 

# of Projects 

Contracted Amount (€) – Signed by partner 

INGO 

IO 

Grand Total 

109 

46 

155 

253.714.757 (51%) 

246.206.315 (49%) 

499.921.072 

6. Sample refinement  

What: The third step was to stratify the sample.  

How:  The  ET  conducted  a  ‘light  touch’  qualitative  review  to  ensure  sufficient  inclusion  of  the 
following: 

  Countries: projects are evenly included from Chad, CAR, and Cameroon  

  Crises: a range of crises identified in the context analysis are covered 

  Sectors: a range of sectors are covered, based on project titles  

  Beneficiaries: a range of target groups are covered, i.e. host populations, refugees, IDPs 

Why: This will ensure a fair spread within the sample to meet evaluation needs. 

7. Limitations  

While this sample is produced by a rigorous and transparent qualitative strategy, it is not intended 
to  be  statistically  representative  of  the  entire  population.  Therefore,  inferences  made  will  be 
qualitative not probabilistic. In addition, we have made judgments about which actions constitute a 
‘project’, when Contract Titles over multiple years indicate similarities within the covered sector; 

218 

 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

geography; Beneficiary type; and/or crises. In most cases, these are easily identified and beyond 
doubt; however, we have retained the original list for verification upon request.  

8. Sample selected  

This table shows the sample of projects to be used for data analysis.  

219 

 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

Annex 12: Stakeholder Sampling 

This annex presents the sample structure for consulting stakeholders involved in EU’s humanitarian 
interventions  in  central  Africa  2014-2018.  By  using  a  purposive  approach,  it  identifies  three 
stakeholder categories, nine subcategories, and proposed stratification within each. This approach 
allowed for consultation of balanced sample of 111-171 people directly involved in EU humanitarian 
interventions  in  central  Africa  2014-2018.  The  stakeholders  were  consulted  mainly  by  a 
combination of key informant interviews (KIIs) at HQ, regional, national and local level, and by an 
online survey to collect quantitative opinions.  

Stakeholder 
categories 

Stakeholder 
subcategories 

Donorship 
actors 

EU 
actors (HQs) 

policy 

ECHO 
managers 

Donorship 
partners 
country) 

(in-

Total n size 

Implementation 
actors 

Contracted 
partners  

N 
totals 

N  Per 
country 

Consultation 
methods  

n=3-6  n=1-2 

KII HQ + 
Survey 

n=30-
45 

n=10-
15 

KII HQ or CO 
+ Survey 

n=3-5 

n=9-
15 

KII CO + 
Survey 

N=42-
66 

n=15-
21 

n=5-7 

KII CO + 
Survey 

Proposed stratification 

• ECHO: tbd  
• EEAS: tbd  
• DEVCO: tbd  

• HQ ECHOD2: section 
chiefs, desk officers (DOs), 
officials vs contracted(?) 
• regional office: 
thematic/sector advisers  
• field office: heads of office, 
technical assistants, 
programme officers, national 
(in-country) staff 

• EU donors: France, UK, 
Germany  
• EU Delegations at country 
level (DEVCO and EEAS 
staff141 and Head of 
Delegation) 
• humanitarian donors: 
USAID/OFDA, Switzerland,  
• IFIs/Nexus donors: World 
Bank, EUTFs, DEVCO    

• INGOs: incl. largest by 
country OXFAM/INTERMON 
(Chad, CAR), ACF (Chad), 
CARE (Chad), IMC (Chad), 
ACTED (CAR), French Red 
Cross (Cameroon), PUI 
(Cameroon) 
• UN agencies: incl. largest 
by country WFP, UNICEF, 
UNHCR, FAO (CAR) 
• ICRC: esp in CAR, 
Cameroon 

Downstream or 
‘local’ partners 

• NNGOs (tbd) 
• CBOs (tbd) 

Response 
partners  

• Leadership: HC/HCT,  
• Inter cluster coordination: 

n=5-7 

n=4-5 

n=15-
21 

n=12-
15 

KII CO + 
Survey 

KII CO + 
Survey 

141 The evaluation team acknowledges that EU Delegations are not the embassies of Member States and are composed of EEAS and DEVCO staff. 
Future reports on consultations will take steps to make this clear in future reports, including, as necessary, separating out ECHO local (in-country) 
staff. 

220 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

Total n size 

Intended 
beneficiaries 

Vulnerable 
populations 

ICC,  
• clusters: focus sectors   
• OCHA: head of office 

• IDPs: by crisis/location 
• refugees / returnees: by 
crisis/location 
• host populations: by 
crisis/location 
• other: by crisis/location 

Vulnerable 
groups  

• women 
• children,  
• older people,  
• other e.g. PWDs 

and 

Local 
national 
leaders 

• municipal leaders: by 
crisis/location 
• traditional leaders: by 
crisis/location 
• women/youth leaders: by 
crisis/location 

Total n size 

N=42-
57 

n=15-
30 

n=5-10  KII/FDG Field 

n=6-9  n=2-3 

KII Field 

n=6-9  n=2-3 

KII Field + 
Survey 

N=27-
48 

221 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

Annex 13: Evaluation Terms of Reference 

EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR CIVIL PROTECTION AND HUMANITARIAN 
AID OPERATIONS – DG ECHO 

 

ANNEX I 

Terms of Reference 

for the evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance 

in the Central Africa region, including humanitarian coordination, 

2014-2018 

222 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

Table of Contents 

1.  EU HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION ........................................................................ 224 

1.1.  Framework .................................................................................................................. 224 

1.2.  Scope & Rationale ....................................................................................................... 226 

2.  CONTEXT OF THE EVALUATION .............................................................................. 228 

2.1.  Humanitarian Needs in Central Africa .......................................................................... 228 

2.2.  DG ECHO's response in Central Africa ....................................................................... 229 

2.3.  DG ECHO's actions in Humanitarian Coordination ...................................................... 229 

3.  PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION........................................................ 230 

3.1.  Purpose and general scope ......................................................................................... 230 

3.2.  Evaluation questions ................................................................................................... 231 

3.3.  Other tasks under the assignment ............................................................................... 233 

4.  MANAGEMENT AND SUPERVISION OF THE EVALUATION .................................... 233 

5.  SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS ...................................................................................... 234 

5.1.  Methodology ................................................................................................................ 234 

5.2.  Evaluation team .......................................................................................................... 234 

6.  CONTENT OF THE OFFER ........................................................................................ 234 

7.  AMOUNT OF THE CONTRACT .................................................................................. 235 

8.  TIMETABLE ................................................................................................................ 235 

9.  PROVISIONS OF THE FRAMEWORK TENDER SPECIFICATIONS .......................... 236 

10.  RAW DATA AND DATASETS ..................................................................................... 236 

223 

 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

1.  EU HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 

1.1. 

FRAMEWORK 

1.  The  legal  base  for  Humanitarian  Aid  is  provided  by  Article  214142  of  the  Treaty  on  the 
Functioning of the European Union, and the Humanitarian Aid Regulation (HAR); Council 
Regulation  No.  1257/96)143.  The  objectives  of  European  Union  (EU)  humanitarian 
assistance are  outlined there  and  could  –  for  evaluation  purposes  –  be  summarized  as 
follows: From a donor perspective and in coordination with other main humanitarian actors, 
to provide the right amount and type of aid, at the right time, and in an appropriate way, to 
the populations most affected by natural and/or manmade disasters, in order to save lives, 
alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity.  

2.  The European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid144 (the Consensus) – which has been 
jointly developed by the Council, the EU Member States, the European Parliament and the 
Commission  –  provides  a  reference for  EU  humanitarian  aid,  and  outlines  the  common 
objectives,  fundamental  humanitarian  principles  and  good  practices  that  the  European 
Union as a whole pursues in this domain. The aim is to ensure an effective, high-quality, 
needs-driven  and  principled  EU  response  to  humanitarian  crises.  It  concerns  the  whole 
spectrum  of  humanitarian  action:  from  preparedness  and  disaster  risk  reduction,  to 
immediate  emergency  response  and  life-saving  aid  for  vulnerable  people  in  protracted 
crises, through to situations  of  transition to  recovery  and longer-term  development. The 
Consensus  has  thus  played  an  important  role  in  creating  a  vision  of  best  practice  for 
principled  humanitarian  aid  by  providing  an  internationally  unique,  forward-looking  and 
common  framework  for  EU  actors.  It  has  set  out  high-standard  commitments  and  has 
shaped policy development and humanitarian aid approaches both at the European and 
Member  State  level.  Furthermore,  with  reference  to  its  overall  aim,  the  Consensus  has 
triggered the development of a number of humanitarian sector policies145. 

3.  The humanitarian aid budget is implemented through annual funding decisions adopted by 
the Commission, which are directly based on Article 15 of the HAR. In general, there are 
two  types  of  financial  decisions:  decisions  adopted  in  the  context  of  non-emergency 
situations  (currently  entitled  World  Wide  Decisions  (WWD)),  and  decisions  which  are 
adopted in emergency situations. The WWD defines inter alia the total budget, and budget 
available  for  specific  objectives,  mechanisms  of  flexibility.  It  is  taken  for  humanitarian 
operations  in  each  country/region  at  the  time  of  establishing  the  budget.  The  funding 
decision  also  specifies  potential  partners,  and  possible  areas  of  intervention.  The 
operational information about crises and countries for which humanitarian aid should be 
granted  is  provided  through  ‘Humanitarian  Implementation  Plans’146  (HIPs).  They  are  a 
reference  for  humanitarian  actions  covered  by  the  WWD  and  contain  an  overview  of 
humanitarian needs in a specific country at a specific moment of time. 

4.  DG ECHO has more than 200 partner organisations for providing humanitarian assistance 
throughout  the  world.  Humanitarian  partners  include  non-governmental  organisations 
(NGOs), international organisations and United Nations agencies. Having a diverse range 
of partners is important for ECHO because it allows for comprehensive coverage of the 
ever-expanding needs across the world – and in increasingly complex situations. ECHO 
has developed increasingly close working relationships with its partners at the level of both 
policy issues and management of humanitarian operations.  

5.  DG ECHO has a worldwide network of field offices that ensure adequate monitoring of 
projects funded, provide up-to-date analyses of existing and forecasted needs in a given 
country  or  region,  contribute  to  the  development  of  intervention  strategies  and  policy 

142 http://www.lisbon-treaty.org/wcm/the-lisbon-treaty/treaty-on-the-functioning-of-the-european-union-and-comments/part-5-external-action-by-the-
union/title-3-cooperation-with-third-countries-and-humantarian-aid/chapter-3-humanitarian-aid/502-article-214.html  
143  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:1996:163:0001:0006:EN:PDF 
144 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:025:0001:0012:EN:PDF 
145 http://ec.europa.eu/echo/what/humanitarian-aid_en 
146 http://ec.europa.eu/echo/funding-evaluations/funding-decisions-hips_en  

224 

 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

development,  provide  technical  support  to  EU-funded  humanitarian  operations,  and 
facilitate donor coordination at field level. 

6.  DG ECHO has developed a two-phase framework for assessing and analysing needs in 
specific countries and crises. The first phase of the framework provides the evidence base 
for prioritisation of needs, funding allocation, and development of the HIPs. 

The first phase is a global evaluation with two dimensions: 

 

Index for Risk Management (INFORM) is a tool based on national indicators and data 
which  allows  for  a  comparative  analysis  of  countries  to  identify  their  level  of  risk  to 
humanitarian crisis and disaster. It includes three dimensions of risk: natural and man-
made  hazards  exposure,  population  vulnerability  and  national  coping  capacity.  The 
INFORM  data  are  also  used  for  calculating  a  Crisis  Index  that  identifies  countries 
suffering  from  a  natural  disaster  and/or  conflict  and/or  hosting  a  large  number  of 
uprooted people. 

  The Forgotten Crisis Assessment (FCA) identifies serious humanitarian crisis situations 
where the affected populations do not receive enough international aid or even none at 
all. These crises are characterised by low media coverage, a lack of donor interest (as 
measured through aid per capita) and a weak political commitment to solve the crisis, 
resulting in an insufficient presence of humanitarian actors. 

The second phase of the framework focuses on context and response analysis: 

 

Integrated  Analysis  Framework  (IAF)  is  an  in-depth  assessment  carried  out  by 
European Commission's humanitarian experts. It consists of a qualitative assessment 
of humanitarian needs per single crisis, also taking into account the population affected 
and foreseeable trends. 

7.  Humanitarian  Coordination:  In  any  situation  where  different  organisations  work 
alongside  each  other  in  emergency  conditions,  the  potential  for  confusion,  conflict  and 
duplication  is  high.  This is  particularly true  in  the  humanitarian  system, where there are 
often  a  large  number  of  different  organisations,  with  differing  mandates  and  missions, 
speaking a variety of languages, responding to the same crisis. As the number of actors in 
the humanitarian sector has grown, and the size, ambition and complexity of responses 
have  increased,  it  has  become  increasingly  important  to  establish  ways  of  ensuring 
coordination among the many actors often engaged in a response147.  

The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) is the part of the United 
Nations  Secretariat  responsible  for  bringing  together  humanitarian  actors  to  ensure  a 
coherent response to emergencies. OCHA also ensures there is a framework within which 
each actor can contribute to the overall response effort, starting from the preparation of 
Joint  Needs Assessments. OCHA's mission  is  to:  Mobilize and coordinate effective and 
principled humanitarian action in partnership with national and international actors in order 
to  alleviate  human  suffering  in  disasters  and  emergencies.  Furthermore,  humanitarian 
coordination  can  play  a  significant  role  in  the  promotion  and  defence  of  humanitarian 
principles  and  in  civil-military  coordination.  For  the  purpose  of  filling  structural  and 
operational  gaps  in  humanitarian  coordination,  the  EU  occasionally  takes  the  role  of 
leading, shaping, and coordinating the response to crises, while respecting and supporting 
the overall coordination role of OCHA. 

8.  In 2016, the Commission endorsed the Grand Bargain, which is an agreement between 
more  than  30  of  the  biggest  donors  and  aid  providers,  with  the  aim  to  close  the 
humanitarian financing gap and get more means into the hands of people in need. To that 
end,  it  sets  out  51  commitments  distilled  into  10  thematic  work  streams,  including  e.g. 
gearing  up  cash  programming,  improving  joint  and  impartial  needs  assessments,  and 
greater funding for national and local responders. 

147 ALNAP 2016: Improving Humanitarian Coordination 

225 

 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

1.2. 

SCOPE & RATIONALE 

9.  The European Union aims at being a reference humanitarian donor148, by ensuring that 
its interventions are coherent with the humanitarian principles149, are relevant in targeting 
the most vulnerable beneficiaries, are duly informed by needs assessments, and promote 
resilience150 building to the extent possible. 

10. Interventions have a focus on funding critical sectors and addressing gaps in the global 
response,  mobilising  partners  and  supporting  the  overall  capacity  of  the  humanitarian 
system.  As  a  consequence  of  the  principled  approach  and  addressing  gaps  in  overall 
response, the EU intervenes in forgotten crises151, i.e. severe, protracted humanitarian 
crisis situations where affected populations are receiving no or insufficient international aid 
and  where  there  is  little  possibility  or  no  political  commitment  to  solve  the  crisis, 
accompanied  by  a  lack  of  media  interest.  This  refers  primarily  to  protracted  conflict 
situations,  but  can  also  refer  to  crises  resulting  from  the  cumulative  effect  of  recurring 
natural disasters, or, a combination of different factors. Although a significant share of EU 
funding goes to major crises like the conflict in Syria, it allocated in 2017 almost 16% of its 
initial humanitarian aid budget to forgotten crises, including the refugees from Darfur in the 
East of Chad, the Central African refugees in Cameroon and Chad, Sahrawi refugees in 
Algeria and the Rohingya people in Myanmar/Burma and Bangladesh. 

11. Actions  funded  by  the  EU  compriserelief  and  protection  operations  on  a  non-
discriminatory  basis  to  help  people  in  third  countries,  particularly  the  most  vulnerable 
among them, and as a priority those in developing countries, victims of natural disasters, 
man-made  crises  such  as  wars  and  outbreaks  of  fighting,  or  exceptional  situations  or 
circumstances comparable to natural or man-made disasters. The actions should extend 
the  time  needed  to  meet  the  humanitarian  requirements  resulting  from  these  different 
situations.  

12. Food and Nutrition: The poorest people carry the greatest exposure to the consequences 
of  disasters,  leading  to  acute  food  insecurity  and  under-nutrition.  Insufficient  food 
production or an inability of vulnerable people to purchase enough nutritious food leads to 
acute malnutrition. Moreover, dramatic interruptions in food consumption heighten risks of 
morbidity  and  mortality.  Addressing  acute  under-nutrition152  requires  a  multi-sector 
approach  and  a  joint  humanitarian  and  development  framework.  Humanitarian  food 
assistance153  aims  to  ensure  the  consumption  of  sufficient,  safe  and  nutritious  food  in 
anticipation  of,  during,  and  in  the  aftermath  of  a  humanitarian  crisis.  Each  year,  the 
European  Commission  allocates  well  over  EUR  100  million  to  humanitarian  assistance 
actions that are explicitly associated with specific nutrition objectives.  

13. Health is both a core sector of humanitarian aid interventions and the main reference for 
measuring overall humanitarian response. With the global trends of climate change and a 
growing  and  population,  together  with  the  increasing  frequency  and  scale  of  natural 
disasters  and  the  persistence  of  conflicts,  humanitarian  health  needs  are  continuing  to 
increase.  Given  the  significance  of  Commission  humanitarian  assistance  in  the  health 
sector, the Commission developed a set of Guidelines154 (operational in 2014) to support 
an improved delivery of affordable health services, based on humanitarian health needs. 

14. Protection is embedded in DG ECHO's mandate as defined by the HAR and confirmed by 
the  European  Consensus  on  Humanitarian  Aid.  Its  objective  is  to  reduce  physical  and 
psychological  insecurity  for  persons  and  groups  under  threat.  When  providing  general 

148 I.e. a principled donor, providing leadership and shaping humanitarian response. 
149 Humanity, Impartiality, Neutrality and Independence 
150 The EU Approach to Resilience: learning from food security crises 
151 See also http://ec.europa.eu/echo/what/humanitarian-aid/needs-assessments_en  
152 Staff Working Document on Undernutrition in Emergencies 
153 Communication on Humanitarian Food Assistance 
154 http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/sectoral/health2014_general_health_guidelines_en.pdf 

226 

 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

assistance,  humanitarian  actors  must  ensure  that  their  actions  do  not  undermine 
protection,  nor  increase  existing  inequalities  (do-no-harm  principle).  The  2009  funding 
guidelines for humanitarian protection activities155 define the framework in which DG ECHO 
may support protection activities, including the type of partners and the kind of activities it 
may finance. DG ECHO supports non-structural activities aimed at reducing the risk, and 
mitigating  the  impact  of  human-generated  violence,  coercion,  deprivation  and  abuse  of 
vulnerable individuals or groups in the context of humanitarian crises.  

15. Education in emergencies is crucial for both the protection and healthy development of 
girls and boys affected by crises. It can rebuild their lives; restore their sense of normality 
and safety, and provide them with important life skills. It helps children to be self-sufficient 
and to have more influence on issues that affect them. It is also one of the best tools to 
invest  in their  long-term future,  and  in the  peace,  stability  and  economic growth  of their 
countries. Yet it has traditionally been one of the least funded humanitarian sectors. With 
the  level  of funding  at  1%  of  its  annual  humanitarian budget  still  in 2015, the  European 
Commission increased this share to 8% in 2018 and aims to reach 10% by 2019. Globally, 
less than 3% of global humanitarian funding is allocated to education. 

16. Strengthening the gender approach within the EU humanitarian aid is a commitment made 
in the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, which highlights the need to integrate 
gender considerations, to promote the active participation of all gender and age groups in 
humanitarian aid and to incorporate protection strategies against sexual and gender-based 
violence. A Commission Staff Working document156 has been established to address this 
issue and a Gender and Age Marker introduced in 2014.  

17. Urban areas are complex settings to implement humanitarian assistance and are different 
from rural areas in terms of needs and vulnerabilities of the affected people. Furthermore, 
capacities,  methods,  and  preparedness  of  local  actors,  institutions,  and  partners  vary 
considerably between cities. Humanitarian actors, including DG ECHO, have developed 
an extensive range of policies, practices, standards and tools for humanitarian work that 
are often adapted to rural areas, but far less to urban areas. In the past few years a number 
of  studies  have  been  conducted  to  explore  the  drivers  of  urbanization  and  its 
consequences  and  implications  to  humanitarian  aid.  Some  of  these  studies  have 
formulated suggestions on how international humanitarian aid can best engage with the 
changing settlement patterns. 

18. Each year millions of people are forced to leave their homes and seek refuge from conflicts, 
violence, human rights violations, persecution or natural disasters. The number of forcibly 
displaced  persons  (refugees,  asylum-seekers  and  internally  displaced  persons)  has 
continued  to rise  in  2017,  calling  for  increased  humanitarian  assistance  worldwide.  The 
majority  of  today's  refugees  live  in  the  developing  world,  which  means  that  they  flee  to 
countries  already  struggling  with  poverty  and  hardship.  In  April  2016,  the  European 
Commission adopted a new development-led approach to forced displacement, aimed at 
harnessing and strengthening the resilience and self-reliance of both the forcibly displaced 
and  their  host  communities.  The  new  approach  stipulates  that  political,  economic, 
development and humanitarian actors should engage from the outset of a displacement 
crisis, and work with third countries towards the gradual socio-economic inclusion of the 
forcibly  displaced.  The  objective  is  to  make  people's  lives  more  dignified  during 
displacement; and ultimately, to end forced displacement. 

19. The  EU  attaches  great  importance  to  the  link  between  humanitarian  aid,  as  a  rapid 
response  measure  in  crisis  situations,  and  more  medium  and  long-term  development 
action.    The  Humanitarian-Development  Nexus  is  complex  and  requires  increased 
coordination  –  leading  to  joint  humanitarian-development  approaches  and  collaborative 
implementation,  monitoring  and  progress 
tracking.  The  Council  Conclusions  on 
Operationalising  the  Humanitarian-Development  Nexus  of  19  May  2017  welcomed 

155 http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/sectoral/humanitarian_protection_funding_guidelines_en.pdf 
156 http://ec.europa.eu/echo/sites/echo-site/files/Gender_SWD_2013.pdf 

227 

 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

cooperation between EU humanitarian and development actors, including in the framework 
of the EU approach to forced displacement and development.  

The EU Trust Funds (EUTF) are a recently introduced coordination instrument, addressing 
issues common to humanitarian aid and development – such as forced migration – which 
provides a potential for better linkages between humanitarian and development activities, 
and are expected to have major benefits in terms of efficiency / cost-effectiveness, pooling 
resources from several donors for specific purposes. The EU humanitarian aid instrument 
has  contributed  with  about  2%  of  the  funds  to  the  Bêkou  EUTF  for  the  Central  African 
Republic. 

20. DG  ECHO  has  been  instrumental  in  establishing  and  funding  Emergency/Rapid 
Response  Mechanisms  (ERMs/RRMs)  in  several  contexts,  enabling  early,  localised 
response  in  conflict  and  natural  disaster  situations.  ERM/RRMs  are  contractual 
arrangements with one or multiple partners in a given country to ensure that humanitarian 
organisations can access sufficient personnel, financial and material resources to respond 
to recurring localised, small-scale emergencies as soon as possible after they occur. They 
allow a network of humanitarian organizations to rapidly assess and respond to recurring 
localized emergencies thanks to pre-positioned relief goods, agreed-upon processes, and 
staff  capacity.  Donors  and  humanitarian  organizations  have  long  recognised  that  timely 
humanitarian action prevents unnecessary suffering and can keep localized or escalating 
emergencies  from  deteriorating.  Yet,  institutional  constraints,  e.g.  long  contracting 
procedures, make it difficult to turn commitments to rapid response into reality. To inform 
an  overall  reflection  on  ERMs,  DG  ECHO  has  commissioned  a  study157  on  five  ERMs 
currently in operation in Afghanistan, the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC), Ethiopia and Iraq. 

21. Humanitarian air services (including ECHO Flights) provide a lifeline for millions of people 
who are caught up in humanitarian emergencies. When a crisis hits, guaranteeing fast and 
safe access to the field is vital to save lives. In contexts where there are no reliable roads, 
ports  or  other  infrastructure,  access  to  crises  by  land  or  water  becomes  difficult,  if  not 
impossible. Humanitarian air services are often the only way to get access to remote places 
and reach people in need. In addition to transporting humanitarian supplies and workers, 
humanitarian air services also carry out medical and security evacuations. 

2.  CONTEXT OF THE EVALUATION 

This is a combined evaluation, consisting of the following two main aspects: 

1.  A geographical aspect, focusing on DG ECHO's interventions in the following countries 

of the Central Africa Region:  

a.  Central African Republic (CAR);  
b.  Chad; and  
c.  Cameroon  
(see  hyperlinked  fact  sheets  for  further  information).  These  countries  will  be 
referred to as 'Central Africa' in this document, although other countries that are not 
covered by this evaluation could also be considered making part of this region; 

2.  A  thematic  aspect,  focusing  on  Humanitarian  Coordination  in  the  region,  and 

including a global portfolio analysis of funded actions. 

2.1. 

HUMANITARIAN NEEDS IN CENTRAL AFRICA 

Currently  about  9½  million  people  in  the  three  countries  are  in  need  of  humanitarian 
assistance, of which a large part remains unaddressed. The countries are at a juncture of major 

157 Available on request 

228 

 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

crises (i.e. in CAR, Nigeria, Libya, Sudan, South Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo), with 
cumulative displacement over time.  

Furthermore, CAR, Chad and, to a certain extent, Cameroon have structural weaknesses in 
common,  linked to  chronic  under-development and significant  exposure to  natural  disasters 
and  epidemics,  although  to  different  degrees.  This  results  in  continuing  humanitarian 
emergencies and political fragility, a situation exacerbated by the conflict in CAR and the spill-
over of the Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria, which have caused large population displacement 
and severely affected local economies. 

Demographic growth is a challenge, notably in Chad where, according to the World Bank, the 
population  doubled  over  the  last  20  years,  and  in  Cameroon  where  a  70%  growth  was 
registered for the same period.  

The Sahel regions of Chad and Cameroon are highly food insecure areas with rates of acute 
malnutrition  close  to  or  exceeding  the  emergency  thresholds.  In  CAR,  where  a  severe 
protection crisis is ongoing, conflict has also significantly affected food security, compounding 
high chronic undernutrition.  

The  security  situation  in  CAR  is  problematic,  and  humanitarians  are  regularly  targeted  by 
attacks of armed groups and criminals. Furthermore, humanitarian access is an issue in the 
region, particularly in some areas of CAR and around Lake Chad.  

The coexistence of different crises and differentiated needs leads to a wide array of response 
strategies, from emergency to Nexus.  

2.2. 

DG ECHO'S RESPONSE IN CENTRAL AFRICA 

The  priorities  and  scope  of  the  humanitarian  intervention  are  defined  in  the  Humanitarian 
Implementation Plans. Since 2015 the three countries are addressed by a common, regional 
HIP, whereas previously the HIPs were at the country level. 

The EU focuses its humanitarian aid activities in the three countries on the most acute needs, 
with the following priority areas (including some country specificities): 

  Relief  assistance  across  the  humanitarian  sectors  (food  assistance, WASH,  shelter, 
etc.)  to  the  most  vulnerable  populations,  e.g.  internally  displaced  people,  refugees, 
returnees and host communities; 

  Protection, either mainstreamed or stand-alone; 
  Livelihood support to forcibly displaced and local population; 
  Basic health care in areas not covered by or in support of government services; 
  Actions against epidemics; 
  Prevention and treatment of severe acute malnutrition; 
  Support to coordination, air transport and security services.  

For  a  more  detailed  description  of  DG  ECHO's priorities  in the  region  during the  evaluation 
period,  see  e.g.  the  2017  HIP.  Furthermore,  some  interventions  were  funded  under  the 
Emergency  Toolbox  (e.g.  epidemics  or  new  influx  of  displaced  populations).  See  e.g.  the 
dedicated 2017 HIP. Based on a provisional extract from DG ECHO's project database, the 
total EU spending in the three countries was about 470 M€ over the evaluation period. 

2.3. 

DG ECHO'S ACTIONS IN HUMANITARIAN COORDINATION 

DG ECHO carries out a wide range of activities in the area of coordination of humanitarian aid, 
at the EU level as well as at the global level.  

At the EU level the European Consensus on humanitarian aid provides a common framework 
to deliver humanitarian aid based on coordination, coherence and complementarity within the 
EU as well as with other humanitarian actors. Furthermore it clarifies the scope of humanitarian 
aid  and  strives  for  greater  coherence  with  other  external  instruments.  An  evaluation  of  the 

229 

 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

Consensus was completed in 2014, which showed that the core added-value of the European 
Consensus lied in promoting humanitarian principles and good practice in humanitarian actions 
funded  by  the  EU  and  its  Member  States.  Furthermore,  regarding  contributions  to  the 
international humanitarian system, the EU and its Member States developed common strategic 
positions  and  increasingly  aligned  their  support  to  a  range  of  “good  practice”  initiatives, 
including innovations to improve the allocation of humanitarian aid on the basis of assessed 
needs. 

At  the  global  level,  based  on  a  provisional  extract  of  DG  ECHO's  humanitarian  project 
database,  the  EU  spent  globally  around  268  M€  during  the  evaluation  period  on  various 
coordination  projects,  whereof  about  15,4  M€  in  Central  Africa.  These  figures  should  be 
confirmed and broken down in the course of the evaluation, as part of Task 3 under sub-section 
3.3  below.  Actions  included  –  among  other  things  –  projects  funded  under  the  Enhanced 
Response  Capacity  (ERC)  funding  mechanism,  which  aims  at  increasing  global  impact, 
facilitating  a  joint  donor  approach  and  providing  a  longer-term  framework  for  strengthening 
systems and overall response capacity of both international humanitarian agencies and NGOs. 
An  evaluation  of  the  ERC  was  completed  in  2014,  which  concluded  that  the  ERC  has 
addressed  important  thematic  gaps  in  the  humanitarian  space,  and  enhanced  the  global 
humanitarian  systems  by  promoting  coordination  and  consistency  –  in  particular  through 
clusters,  OCHA’s  leadership  function,  partnership  and  networking.  It  has  supported  without 
any political agenda and with due flexibility some risky innovative or historically under-funded 
areas of work, as well as implementation in key sectors, such as logistics and cash transfers. 

The  DG  ECHO  engages  with  other  stakeholders  in  the  global  policy  discussions  on 
humanitarian aid, by leading on / participating in relevant events, as well as preparing initiatives 
or  supporting  those  initiated  by  others  and  undertaking  advocacy  at  different  levels,  from 
beneficiary countries to international fora. DG ECHO develops specific policies and guidance 
(e.g. on cash, on protection mainstreaming) and commits to wider international initiatives such 
as  the  World  Humanitarian  Summit  and  the  Grand  Bargain.  The  aim  is  to  improve  on  key 
themes such as Disaster Risk Reduction, Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development, aid 
effectiveness and  uptake of the  recommended practices  by  other  donors  and  implementing 
agencies. The EU also uses advocacy to influence on topics such as humanitarian access, 
respect  for  International  Humanitarian  Law,  adherence  to  the  humanitarian  principles  and 
Good Humanitarian Donorship, etc. 

3.  PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION 

3.1. 

PURPOSE AND GENERAL SCOPE 

Based on Art. 30(4) of the Financial Regulation and Regulation (EC) 1257/96, the purpose of 
this Request for Services is to have an independent evaluation, covering the period of 2014 – 
2018, of the EU's humanitarian interventions in CAR, Chad and Cameroon ("Central Africa"); 
including a review of Humanitarian Coordination. 

The  evaluation  should  provide  a  retrospective  assessment  of  DG  ECHO's  interventions  in 
Central  Africa,  which  should  help  shaping  the  EU's  future  approach  in  the  region.  The 
presentation  of  the  evaluation  results  in  the  Final  Report  must  reflect  the  different 
characteristics and humanitarian needs in the three countries. Thus, some of the evaluation 
questions listed below – and their conclusions/responses – need to be broken down in a way 
that  appropriately  captures  the  specific  features  of  each  country.  The  assessment  should 
include an in-depth review of the EU-funded actions in the region in the area of Humanitarian 
Coordination. 

The evaluation should cover the evaluation criteria of relevance, coherence, EU added value, 
effectiveness,  efficiency  and  sustainability,  as  further  detailed  below  in  the  evaluation 
questions. 

230 

 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

A maximum of 5 prospective, strategic recommendations should be provided. These strategic 
into  further  detailed,  operational 
recommendations  could  possibly  be  broken  down 
recommendations.  

The main users of the evaluation report include inter alia DG ECHO staff at HQ, regional and 
country level, other EU actors, national and regional stakeholders, implementing partners, and 
other humanitarian and development donors including EU Member States and agencies. 

3.2. 

EVALUATION QUESTIONS 

The conclusions of the evaluation will be presented in the report in the form of evidence-based, 
reasoned answers to the evaluation questions presented below. These questions should be 
further tailored by the Evaluator, and finally agreed with the Steering Group in the  inception 
phase.  

Relevance 

1.  To what extent did the design and implementation of DG ECHO-funded actions take into 
account  the  needs  of  the  most  vulnerable  population  in  the  region,  particularly  women, 
children, elderly and disabled people? To what extent were beneficiaries consulted in the 
design and implementation of DG ECHO-funded projects?  

2.  To what extent was a clear and context-adapted strategy provided and applied in Central 
Africa?  To  what  extent  were  DG  ECHO  and  its  partners  successful  in  adapting  and 
adjusting their approach as the needs evolved over time? 

3.  To  what  extent  has  DG  ECHO  contributed  to  establishing  joint  and  impartial  needs 

assessments? 

Coherence 

4.  To what extent was DG ECHO’s response aligned with:  

a.  DG ECHO's mandate as provided by the Humanitarian Aid Regulation,  

b.  The European Consensus on humanitarian aid,  

c.  The humanitarian principles, and 

d.  DG ECHO's relevant thematic/sector policies? 

5.  To  what  extent  were the  EU-funded coordination  actions  addressing gaps  in the  overall 
humanitarian  response?  How  did  these  actions  contribute  to  strengthening  the  overall 
humanitarian response? 

6.  To  what  extent  were  the  EU-funded  coordination  actions  in  the  region  respecting  and 
supporting the UN OCHA's role and mandate of overall coordination of humanitarian aid? 

7.  To what extent was DG ECHO's successful in coordinating its response with that of other 
donors  in  the  region,  including  EU  Member  States,  and  by  that  avoiding  overlaps  and 
promoting synergies?  

8.  In the context of the Nexus and humanitarian-development coordination instruments, what 
measures were taken by DG ECHO to coordinate the EU's humanitarian and development 
actions, and how successful were these measures? 

EU Added Value 

9.  What was the EU added value of DG ECHO's actions in Central Africa during the evaluation 

period?  

Effectiveness 

231 

 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

10. To what extent were DG ECHO’s objectives (as defined in the HAR, the Consensus and 
the  specific  HIPs)  achieved,  and  the  needs  of  the  targeted  end-beneficiaries  satisfied? 
What concrete results were achieved in the region during the evaluation period? 

11. How  successful  was  DG  ECHO  through  its  advocacy  and  communication  measures  in 
influencing other actors by direct and indirect advocacy on issues like humanitarian access 
and  space,  respect  for  IHL,  addressing  gaps  in  response,  applying  good  practice,  and 
carrying out follow-up actions of DG ECHO’s interventions? Was there an ‘advocacy gap’?  

Efficiency  

12. To  what  extent  did  DG  ECHO  achieve  cost-effectiveness  in  its  response? What  factors 
affected  the  cost-effectiveness  of  the  response  and  to  what  extent?  (The  methodology 
applied for responding to this question must be based on the Cost-effectiveness guidance 
for DG ECHO evaluations158, which is to be adapted to and applied proportionally to the 
current exercise.) 

13. Was  the  size  of  the  budget  allocated  by  DG  ECHO  to  each  country  appropriate  and 

proportionate to what the actions were meant to achieve?  

14. Taking into account the regional dimension of crises and population movements, to what 
extent  did  DG  ECHO  achieve  a  sufficient  exchange  of  information  between  its  different 
partners for a coherent humanitarian response in the three countries? 

https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/c0bcc4e2-e782-11e6-ad7c-01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF/source-

158 
45568954 

232 

 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

Sustainability/Connectedness 

15. To what extent did DG ECHO manage to achieve sustainable results of its interventions? 
What could be further done (enabling factors, tools, mechanism, change of strategy, etc.) 
to promote sustainability and strengthen links to interventions of development actors? To 
what extent where appropriate exit strategies put in place and implemented? 

3.3. 

OTHER TASKS UNDER THE ASSIGNMENT  

The Contractor should:  

1.  Draw up an intervention logic for DG ECHO's intervention in Central Africa during the 

evaluation period;  

2.  Define  and  analyse  DG  ECHO’s  portfolio  of  actions  in  Central  Africa  during  the 

evaluation period; 

3.  Define  and  analyse  DG ECHO’s  portfolio  of funded actions  globally  in the  area  of 

Humanitarian Coordination during the evaluation period; 

4.  Carry  out  a  review  of  existing  DG  ECHO  evaluations  that  touch  the  area  of  EU 
humanitarian  coordination  (e.g. 
the  EU's 
humanitarian  aid;  the  Consensus;  the  Enhanced  Response  Capacity;  the  use  of 
different Transfer Modalities; etc.); 

the  Comprehensive  evaluation  of 

5.  For both aspects of the evaluation, to identify main lessons learnt from EU-funded 

actions. What worked and what did not?;  

6.  On the basis of the research carried out for responding to the evaluation questions, and 
at  a  general  level,  identify  the  main  factors  limiting  the  success  of  the  projects 
funded  in  the  region  over  the  period  covered  by  the  evaluation.  COMMENT:  This 
relates  to  an  audit  recommendation;  success-limiting  factors  should  be  identified  in 
order  to  develop  indicators  for  focused  monitoring,  with  the  overall  purpose  of 
strengthening the monitoring system; 

7.  Provide a statement about the validity of the evaluation results, i.e. to what extent it 
has  been  possible  to  provide  reliable  statements  on  all  essential  aspects  of  the 
intervention examined. Issues to be referred to may include scoping of the evaluation 
exercise,  availability  of  data,  unexpected  problems  encountered  in  the  evaluation 
process, proportionality between budget and objectives of the assignment, etc.; 

8.  Make a proposal for the dissemination of the evaluation results; 

9.  Provide  a  French  translation  (in  addition  to  the  English  version)  of  the  executive 

summary of the Final Report; 

10. Provide an abstract of the evaluation of no more than 200 words. 

4.  MANAGEMENT AND SUPERVISION OF THE EVALUATION  

The Evaluation Sector of DG ECHO is responsible for the management and the monitoring of 
the evaluation, in consultation with the Unit responsible for the evaluation subject, ECHO.C.2. 
DG  ECHO's  Evaluation  Sector,  and  in  particular  the  internal  manager  assigned  to  the 
evaluation,  should  therefore  always  be  kept  informed  and  consulted  by  the  evaluator  and 
copied on all correspondence with other DG ECHO staff.  

The DG ECHO Evaluation manager is the contact person for the evaluator and shall assist the 
team during their mission in tasks such as providing documents and facilitating contacts.  

A  Steering  Committee,  made  up  of  Commission  staff  involved  in  the  activity  evaluated,  will 
provide  general  assistance  to  and  feedback  on  the  evaluation  exercise,  and  discuss  the 
conclusions and recommendations of the evaluation.  

233 

 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

5.  SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS 

5.1. 

METHODOLOGY 

In their offer, the bidders will describe in detail the methodological approach they propose in 
order to address the evaluation questions listed above, as well as the tasks requested.  

This will include a proposal for indicative judgment criteria159 that they may consider useful 
for  addressing  each  evaluation  question.  The  judgment  criteria,  as  well  as  the  information 
sources  to  be  used  in  addressing  these  criteria,  will  be  discussed  and  validated  by  the 
Commission during the Inception phase.  

To  the  extent  possible  the  methodology  should  promote  the  participation  in  the  evaluation 
exercise of all actors concerned, including beneficiaries and local communities when relevant 
and feasible. 

The  conclusions  of  the  evaluation  must  be  presented  in  a  transparent  way,  with  clear 
references to the sources on which they are based. 

The  evaluator  must  undertake  field  visits  to  the  three  countries,  to  be  proposed  in  the 
tenderer's offer and agreed in the inception phase. The set of field visits will have to take into 
account the security situation in the countries. Linked to the field visits in Central Africa, a case 
study on Humanitarian Coordination should be carried out. Further case studies could be 
proposed by the tenderer as appropriate.  

5.2. 

EVALUATION TEAM 

In addition to the general requirements of the Framework Contract, the team should include 
experience  of  working  in  unsafe  environments.  The  team  must  include  proficiency  in  both 
French and English. 

6.  CONTENT OF THE OFFER  

A. 

The administrative part of the bidder's offer must include: 

1.  The tender submission form (annex C to the model specific contract); 

2.  A signed Experts' declaration of availability, absence of conflict of interest and not being 
in  a  situation  of  exclusion  (annex  D  to  the  model  specific  contract  –  please  use 
corrected version sent by e-mail on 12 April 2018). 

B.  The  technical  part  of the  bidder's  offer  should  be  presented  in  a maximum of  30  pages 

(excluding CVs and annexes), and must include: 

1.  A description of the understanding of the Terms of Reference, their scope and the tasks 
covered  by  the  contract.  This  should  include  the  bidder's  understanding  of  the 
evaluation  questions,  and  a  first  outline  for  an  evaluation  framework  that  provides 
judgement criteria and the information sources to be used for answering the questions. 
The final definition of judgement criteria and information sources will be agreed with the 
Commission during the inception phase; 

2.  The methodology the bidder intends to apply for this evaluation for each of the phases 
involved,  including  a draft  proposal for  the  number  of  case  studies to be  carried  out 
during the field visit, the regions to be visited, and the reasons for such a choice. The 
methodology will be refined and validated by the Commission during the desk phase; 

159 A judgement criterion specifies an aspect of the evaluated intervention that will allow its merits or success to be assessed. E.g., if the question is 
‘To what extent has DG ECHO assistance, both overall and by sector been appropriate and impacted positively the targeted population?’, a general 
judgement criterion might be ‘Assistance goes to the people most in need of assistance’. In developing judgement criteria, the tenderers may make 
use of existing methodological, technical or political guidance provided by actors in the field of Humanitarian Assistance such as HAP, the Sphere 
Project, GHD, etc.   

234 

 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

3.  A  description  of  the  distribution  of  tasks  in  the  team,  including  an  indicative 

quantification of the work for each expert in terms of person/days; 

4.  A  detailed  proposed  timetable  for  its  implementation  with  the  total  number  of  days 

needed for each of the phases (Desk, Field and Synthesis). 

C. 

The CVs of each of the experts proposed. 

D.  The  financial  part  of  the  offer  (annex  E  to  the  model  specific  contract)  must  include  the 
proposed  total  budget  in  Euros,  taking  due  account  of  the  maximum  amount  for  this 
evaluation.  The  price  must  be  expressed  as  a  lump  sum  for  the  whole  of  the  services 
provided. The expert fees as provided in the Financial Offer for the Framework Contract must 
be respected. 

7.  AMOUNT OF THE CONTRACT  

The maximum budget allocated to this study is EUR 280 000.   

8.  TIMETABLE  

The indicative duration of the evaluation is 8 months. The duration of the contract shall be no 
more than 9 months).  

The evaluation starts after the contract has been signed by both parties, and no expenses may 
be incurred before that. The main part of the existing relevant documents will be provided after 
the signature of the contract. 

In their offer, the bidders shall provide a schedule based on the indicative table below (T = contract 
signature date): 

Indicative Timing 

Event 

T+1 week 

Kick-off 

T+4 weeks 

Draft Inception Report 

T+5 weeks 

Inception meeting 

T+9 weeks 

Draft Desk Report 

T+10 weeks 

Desk Report meeting 

T+12 – 15 weeks 

Field visits 

T+17 

T+18 

Draft Field Report 

Field Report Meeting 

T+26 weeks 

Draft Final Report 

T+28 weeks 

Draft Final Report meeting 

T+32 weeks 

Final Report 

T+33 weeks 

A  presentation  to  DG  ECHO  of 
the evaluation results 

235 

 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in the Central Africa region, 
including humanitarian coordination, 2014-2018 

9.  PROVISIONS 

OF 

THE 

FRAMEWORK 

TENDER 

SPECIFICATIONS  

1)  Team  composition:  The  Team  proposed  by  the  Tenderer  for  assignments  to  be 
contracted  under  the  Framework  Contract  must  comply  with  Criterion  B4  (see  Section 
5.2.4 of the Tender Specifications for the Framework Contract). 

2)  Procedures  and  instructions:  The  procedures  and  instructions  to  the  Tenderer  for 
Specific  Contracts  under  the  Framework  Contract  are  provided  under  Section  6  of  the 
Tender Specifications for the Framework Contract. 

  Sections 6 – 6.4 are fixed and must be fully taken into account for offers submitted 
in response to Requests for Services. E.g. the Award Criteria are presented under 
Section 6.2.2; 

  Section  6.5  is  indicative  and  could  be  modified  in  a  Request  for  Services  or 
discussed and agreed during the Inception Phase under a Specific Contract. 

3)  EU Bookshop Format: The template provided in Annex M of the Tender Specifications 
for the Framework Contract must be followed for the Final Report. Any changes to this 
format,  as  introduced  by  the  Publications  Office  of  the  European  Union,  will  be 
communicated to the Framework Contractors by the Commission. 

10. RAW DATA AND DATASETS 

Any final datasets should be provided as structured data in a machine readable format (e.g. 
in  the  form  of  a  spreadsheet  and/or  an  RDF  file)  for  Commission  internal  usage  and  for 
in  compliance  with  Commission  Decision 
publishing  on 
(2011/833/EU)160. 

the  Open  Data  Portal, 

The data delivered should include the appropriate metadata (e.g. description of the dataset, 
definition of the indicators, label and sources for the variables, notes) to facilitate reuse and 
publication. 

The data delivered should be linked to data resources external to the scope of the evaluation, 
preferably data and semantic resources from the Commission's own data portal or from the 
Open Data Portal161. The contractor should describe in the offer the approach they will adopt 
to facilitate data linking. 

160 If third parties' rights do not allow their publication as open data, the tenderers should describe in the offer the subpart that will be provided to the 
Commission free of rights for publication and the part that will remain for internal use. 
161  For  a  list  of  shared  data  interoperability  assets  see  the  ISA  program  joinup  catalogue  (https://joinup.ec.europa.eu/catalogue/repository/eu-
semantic-interoperability-catalogue) and the Open Data Portal resources. 

236 

 
 
 
 
K
R
-
0
4
-
1
9
-
7
4
2
-
E
N
-
N

237