Opinion of the European Central Bank of 6 December 2019 on a guarantee scheme for securitisations of loans originated by credit institutions (CON/2019/42)
Date: 2019-12-06
Institutions: European Central Bank
Subjects: Greece, State aid, claim, credit institution, financial stability, guarantee, issue of securities, national law, payment system

EN 

ECB-PUBLIC 

OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 

of 6 December 2019 

on a guarantee scheme for securitisations of loans originated by credit institutions 

(CON/2019/42) 

Introduction and legal basis 

On 20 November 2019 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Greek Ministry of 

Finance  for  an  opinion  on  a  draft  law  on  a  guarantee  scheme  for  securitisations  of  loans  originated  by 

credit institutions (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). 

The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union and the sixth indent of Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC1, as 

the  draft  law  relates  to  rules  applicable  to  financial  institutions  insofar  as  they  materially  influence  the 

stability  of  financial  institutions  and  markets.  In  accordance  with  the  first  sentence  of  Article 17.5  of  the 

Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion. 

1. 

Purpose of the draft law 

1.1  Objective and scope of the draft law  

The draft law provides for the introduction of a State guarantee scheme for securitisations, setting 

out  the  terms  and  conditions  under  which  the  Greek  State  may  guarantee  the  senior  tranche  of 

asset-backed securities (ABS) backed by receivables (the ‘Receivables’) originated by Greek credit 

institutions,  or  subsidiaries  of  foreign  credit  institutions  established  in  Greece,  and  sold  and 

transferred by such institutions (the ‘Originator’ or ‘Seller’) to a special purpose vehicle (SPV) (the 

‘Issuer’ or ‘Acquirer’) under Articles 10 and 14 of Law No 3156/2003 on bond loans, securitisation 
of  claims  and  other  provisions 2.  The  Receivables  are  claims  of  the  Originator  arising  from  loans 

and  other  forms  of  credit  provision,  including  receivables  that  are  in  temporary  or  permanent 

arrears or that have been restructured.  

1.2  Structure of eligible securitisation transactions  

In order for a transaction to benefit from the State guarantee envisaged in the draft law, it must be 

structured as follows: (i) the Issuer must finance the purchase of the Receivables by issuing ABS 

notes  comprising  at  least  two  tranches  (senior  and  junior),  it  being  possible  for  the  securitisation 

transaction  also  to  provide  for  the  issuance  of  a  mezzanine  tranche;  (ii)  the  capital  of  the  junior 

1  

2  

Council  Decision  98/415/EC  of  29 June  1998  on  the  consultation  of  the  European  Central  Bank  by  national 
authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42). 
Law  No  3156/2003  on  bond  loans,  securitisation  of  claims  and  other  provisions,  Government  Gazette  A 
157/25.6.2003), as amended and in force.  

 
 
 
 
                                                 
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tranche  may  only  be  repaid  after  the  repayment  in  full  of  the  senior  tranche  and,  if  issued,  the 

mezzanine  tranche;  (iii)  the  consideration  received  by  the  Seller  for  the  sale  and  transfer  of  the 

Receivables may not exceed the net book value of the transferred Receivables, which is defined in 

the draft law as the nominal value of the Receivables minus the provisions taken by the Originator 

and recorded in the Originator’s accounting books and records on the date of the sale and transfer 

of the Receivables; (iv) the interest rate on the ABS notes is to be floating or fixed and the interest 

period is to be a 3-, 6- or 12-month period; and (v) the ABS notes must be freely transferable and 

capable of being listed for trading on a regulated market or a multilateral trading facility.  

1.3  Subscription restrictions 

The  draft  law  provides  that  the  junior  tranche  and,  if  issued,  the  mezzanine  tranche  may  not  be 

subscribed  by  the  State,  public  law  bodies  or  general  government  entities,  including  companies 

that are directly or indirectly controlled by the State. 

1.4  Waterfall of payments 

The  contractual  documentation  for  the  securitisation  transaction  must  stipulate  that  the  proceeds 

received by the Issuer from repayments made under, and from  the servicing of, the Receivables, 

as  well  as  from  any  loan  or  credit  agreements,  hedging  and  security  agreements,  including 

financial  derivatives  agreements,  entered  into  by  the  Issuer  for  the  purposes  of  financing  the 

securitisation transaction will be used for payments in the following order: securitisation transaction 

costs; taxes; servicer’s fees (if not deferred); interest on loans or other liquidity or credit lines which 

the Issuer may enter into for the purposes of the securitisation transaction; claims of the State for 

the  guarantee  premium  payable  by  the  credit  institutions  participating  in  the  scheme;  claims  of 

hedging counterparties for hedging transactions entered into by the Issuer for the purposes of the 

securitisation  transaction;  interest  on  the  senior  notes;  claims  other  than  interest  under  loans  or 

other liquidity or credit lines which the Issuer may enter into for the purposes of the securitisation 

transaction; interest on the mezzanine notes (if not deferred); capital on the senior notes; capital on 

the mezzanine notes (provided that the capital on the senior notes has been fully repaid); capital on 

the  junior  notes  (provided  that  the  capital  on  the  senior  and  the  mezzanine  notes  has  been  fully 

repaid). 

1.5  Servicing 

The  servicing  of  the  transferred  Receivables  must  be  assigned  to  a  servicer  which  must  be 

independent (as per IFRS 10) from the Originator. 

1.6  Deferral of payment of interest on the mezzanine and of servicer’s fee 

The contractual documentation for the securitisation transaction must stipulate that the payment of 
(i) interest on the mezzanine notes and (ii) part of the servicer’s fee will be mandatorily3 deferred if 

the  aggregate  net  proceeds  received  from  the  servicing  of  the  transferred  Receivables  since  the 

beginning  of  the  servicing  are  at  least  20%  less  than  the  net  proceeds  forecast  in  the  servicer’s 

business plan which was taken into account when the senior notes were assigned a credit rating. 

3  

The contractual documentation  for the securitisation transaction may provide for additional cases of deferral where 
deviations from the forecasted net proceeds are lower than 20%.  

2 

                                                 
Net proceeds are defined in the draft law as the aggregate collections made under the transferred 

Receivables  minus  the  securitisation  transaction  costs.  This  deferral  is  triggered  12  months  after 

the entry into force of the State guarantee.  

1.7  Amount, conditions and pricing of the State guarantee 

ECB-PUBLIC 

The maximum amount of the  State guarantee for the entire scheme is capped  at EUR  12  billion, 

but may be  increased  in the future by decision of the Minister for Finance following  a decision of 

the  European  Commission.  The  State  guarantee  is  an  undertaking  by  the  State,  subject  to  the 

conditions  described  below,  to  meet  all  obligations  of  the  Issuer  in  connection  with  the  full 

repayment  of  senior  ABS  notes,  including  claims  for  the  repayment  of  capital  thereof  and  the 

payment of interest thereon throughout the life of said notes.  

The  State  guarantee  enters  into  effect  if  the  following  conditions  are  met:  (i)  at  least  50%  of  the 

junior notes plus one must have been transferred against a positive value; (ii) a sufficient number of 

the junior notes (and of the mezzanine notes, if issued)  must have been  transferred at  a positive 

price  such  that  the  transferred  Receivables  have  been  derecognised,  accounting-wise,  from  the 

financial  statements  of  the  Originator  and  the  Originator’s  group  on  a  consolidated  basis  in 

accordance with the applicable IFRS; (iii) the senior notes must have been assigned at a minimum 

a rating of ΒΒ-, Ba3, ΒΒ-, BBL by at least one external credit assessment institution (ECAI) which 

is  accepted  by  the  ECB  at  the  time  the  guarantee  enters  into  effect;  and  (iv)  the  servicing  of  the 

transferred Receivables must have been assigned to an independent servicer. 

In  addition,  in  order  for  the  guarantee  to  be  granted,  the  contractual  documentation  for  the 

securitisation transaction must provide, among other things, that (i) a delay on the part of the Issuer 

in  paying  interest  on  the  senior  notes  and  the  call  on  the  State  guarantee  to  cover  the  relevant 

amounts will not cause the Issuer’s debt obligations to fall due prematurely; and (ii) certain terms of 
the transaction may not be amended without the prior explicit consent of the Minister for Finance 4.  

The  State  guarantee  is  explicit,  irrevocable,  unconditional  and  payable  on  first  demand,  in 

accordance  with  Articles  213,  214  and  215(1)  of  Regulation  (EU)  No  575/2013  of  the  European 
Parliament and of the Council5, as if the State were the primary obligor. Furthermore, it is governed 

by Greek law and is to be interpreted in accordance with the Commission decision of 10 October 
2019  granting  State  aid  clearance  to  the  scheme6  (the  ‘Commission  State  aid  decision’)  and  the 

State  aid  rules  laid  down  in  primary  and  secondary  EU  legislation.  Lastly,  the  State  guarantee  is 

granted until maturity of the senior notes.  

The State guarantee is granted against a premium payable at the beginning of the interest period 

from  the  entry  into  force  of  the  State  guarantee  and  for  its  entire  duration.  This  premium  is 

4  
5  

6  

These terms are listed in Article 9(1)(b) of the draft law. 

Regulation  (EU)  No  575/2013  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  26  June  2013  on  prudential 
requirements  for  credit  institutions  and  investment  firms  and  amending  Regulation  (EU)  No  648/2012  (OJ  L  176 
27.6.2013, p. 1). 
See  Commission  Decision  C(2019)  7309  final  of  10  October  2019  (Case  SA.53519  –  Greece  –  Hellenic  Asset 
Protection  Scheme  (‘Hercules’),  which  concluded  that  the  guarantee  scheme  contained  in  the  draft  law  does  not 
constitute aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU. 

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calculated  on the basis of Annex B to the draft law  which reflects Section  3.2 of the Commission 

State aid decision.  

1.8  Applications for a State guarantee 

Applications for a State guarantee under the scheme may be submitted within 18 months from the 

date  of  the  Commission  state  aid  decision,  namely  until  10  April  2021.  By  decision  of  the  Greek 

Minister for Finance following a decision by the Commission, this period may be extended, and the 

terms  and  conditions  of  the  guarantee  may  be  amended  for  the  future.  Applications  for  a  State 

guarantee  under  the  scheme  will  be  granted  on  a  first-come  first-served  basis.  If  the  State 

guarantee  does  not  enter  into  effect  within  12  months  from  the  publication  of  the  relevant 

ministerial  decision,  that  decision  will  be  revoked  ipso  jure  and  the  relevant  amount  of  the 

guarantee  will be released and become available again. In that situation no new application for a 

guarantee for the same securitisation may be submitted within 6 months from the revocation of the 

ministerial decision.  

1.9  Calls on the state guarantee 

The  senior  noteholders  (acting  through  their  representative)  may  call  on  the  guarantee  within  a 

window of 9 months beginning 60 days after non-payment of any of the Issuer’s liabilities related to 

the  senior  notes.  The  State  must  pay  the  guarantee  within  30  days  from  receipt  of  the  call 

notification,  whereupon  it  will  be  subrogated  to  the  claims  of  the  senior  noteholders  against  the 

Issuer.  

1.10 

Information requirements and monitoring of the scheme 

The servicer is required to submit to the Ministry of Finance servicing reports based on the ESMA 

template  reports  for  securitisation  transactions.  An  adapted  report  must  also  be  submitted  on  a 

regular  basis  to  the  Bank  of  Greece  and  to  a  special  ministerial  committee  established  for  the 
purposes  of  monitoring  the  State  guarantees  applied  for  or  granted  under  the  draft  law7.  This 

committee will also receive certain information related to payments made under  the securitisation 

transaction.  

The  scheme,  its  implementation  and  the  various  specificities  in  its  setup,  in  particular  the  rating 

requirements and their application, will be subject to regular monitoring by a monitoring trustee, to 

be appointed by the Minister for Finance with the consent of the Commission. 

1.11  Termination of the State guarantee 

The State guarantee will cease to be effective if the terms and conditions of the securitisation are 

amended in a way that breaches the Commission State aid decision. The senior noteholders may 

at any time apply to have the guarantee terminated. If the senior noteholders are the Originator, the 

consent of the competent supervisory authority will also be required.  

1.12  Replacement of the servicer 

Article 11(1) of the draft law provides that if a State guarantee is called on, the servicer servicing 

the  transferred  loans  may  be  replaced  provided  that,  for  two  successive  interest  periods,  the  net 

7  

The committee is made up of representatives from the Public Debt Management Agency, the  Bank of Greece, the 
Ministry of Finance and the Greek Court of Auditors.  

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proceeds from the servicing of the transferred Receivables has deviated, due to negligence by the 

servicer, by at least 30% from the cumulative net proceeds forecast for the relevant periods in the 

servicer’s business plan which was taken into account by the ECAI that assigned the rating to the 

senior notes. 

1.13  Exemption of the guarantee from the guarantee ceiling 

State guarantees granted under the scheme do not count towards the calculation of the maximum 
guarantee ceiling that the Greek State may provide on an annual basis 8. 

2. 

General observations  

2.1  Effects on the banking sector 

The  ECB  notes  that,  for  a  number  of  reasons,  addressing  high  levels  of  non-performing  loans 

(NPLs)  has  been  one  of  the  ECB’s  supervisory  priorities  since  the  inception  of  the  Single 
Supervisory  Mechanism  (SSM) 9.  First,  NPLs  weigh  on  the  balance  sheets  of  credit  institutions, 

curbing their profits. Second, NPLs are distracting for credit institutions, and represent a drain on 

their  resources.  Third,  NPLs  undermine  investors’  confidence  in  credit  institutions.  In  addition, 

internal analysis conducted by the ECB shows that, over recent years, credit underwriting by credit 

institutions with a high amount of NPLs has consistently been lower than that of credit institutions 

with loans of better credit quality, thereby providing less support to firms and households and the 
economy  in  general10.  Further,  high  stocks  of  NPLs  are  a  macroprudential  issue  and  can  affect 
entire economies 11. From a financial stability point of view, the presence of significant volumes of 

NPLs on credit institutions’ balance sheets reduces their ability to fulfil their function as providers of 

credit  to  the  real  economy  and  hampers  operational  flexibility  and  overall  profitability  which  are 

essential to a well-functioning banking sector.  

2.2 

It is therefore important that NPLs are dealt with in an efficient and effective manner. Risk transfer 

through asset sales, securitisation and other measures is an important part of the toolkit available 

to credit institutions to reduce NPLs in an effective manner, in addition to other tools such as the 

originating credit institutions’ internal procedures for handling the work-out of NPLs. In addition, the 

ECB has been a strong proponent for the development of secondary markets for credit institution 

assets, particularly for NPLs, as reflected in the action plan of the Council of the European Union to 

8  

9  

10  

11  

That ceiling is determined by a decision of the Greek Minister for Finance under Article 104 of Law No 4549/2018 on 
provisions  for  the  completion  of  the  Agreement  on  Fiscal  Targets  and  Structural  Reforms  –  Medium-term  Fiscal 
Strategy Framework 2019-2022 and other provisions, (Government Gazette A 105/14.06.2018) and cannot account 
for more than 1.5% of the primary expenditure of the national budget in the relevant year.    
See  e.g.  the  speech  by  Danièle  Nouy,  former  Chair  of  the  Supervisory  Board  of  the  ECB,  and  Sharon  Donnery, 
Chair  of  the  ECB’s  High  Level  Group  on  non-performing  loans,  ‘Introductory  remarks  to  the  public  hearing  on  the 
draft  addendum  to  the  ECB  guidance  to  banks  on  non-performing  loans’,  Frankfurt  am  Main,  30  November  2017, 
available on the ECB’s Banking Supervision website at www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu.  
See ‘European banking supervision three years on,’ Welcome remarks by Mario Draghi, President of the ECB, at the 
second ECB Forum on Banking Supervision, Frankfurt am Main, 7 November 2017, available on the ECB’s website 
at www.ecb.europa.eu.  
See  paragraph  1  of  Opinion  CON/2018/32  and  paragraph  3.3.3  of  Opinion  CON/2019/14.    All  ECB  opinions  are 
available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.  

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tackle  NPLs  in  Europe 12.  In  the  context  of  the  large  stocks  of  NPLs  that  remain  on  the  balance 

sheets  of  some  European  credit  institutions,  and  as  part  of  a  comprehensive  solution  to  NPL 
resolution 13, the development of secondary markets may contribute to reducing NPLs. Therefore, a 

carefully  designed  scheme  resulting  in  incentivising  the  transfer  of  the  risks  of  NPLs  off  credit 

institutions’  balance  sheets  would  generally  have  a  positive  effect  on  financial  stability  and  the 

reduction of NPL levels.  

2.3  The elevated level of NPLs in Greece has been one of the key areas of focus in recent years and is 

being  closely  monitored  from  a  supervisory  perspective.  The  four  significant  Greek  credit 

institutions  directly  supervised  by  the  ECB  have  committed  to  achieve  certain  NPL  reduction 

targets  by  2021.  The  Greek  authorities  have  also  committed  to  ‘implement  reforms  aimed  at 

restoring  the  health  of  the  banking  system,  including  NPL  resolution  efforts  by  ensuring  the 
continued effectiveness of the relevant legal framework’14. 

2.4  The ECB understands that the scheme envisaged by the draft law for banks to use in the context of 

NPL securitisations is  voluntary. The ECB notes that  this Opinion does not assess  the regulatory 

treatment of the state guarantee foreseen by the draft law. The ECB suggests that the consulting 

authority  engage  in  meaningful  and  timely  consultations  with  all  relevant  stakeholders,  including 

with the supervisory authorities, as such consultations might shed light on aspects of the draft law 

which may otherwise not be immediately apparent. 

3. 

Specific observations 

3.1 

Legal certainty  

Clear  drafting  of  the  draft  law  is  required  in  order  to  ensure  legal  certainty.  The  ECB  notes  that 

achieving legal certainty is necessary to ensure that: (i) the scheme attracts significant third-party 

investor  interest,  especially  for  the  junior  tranche  and,  if  issued,  the  mezzanine  tranche,  the 

placement  of  which  would  contribute  to  the  banks  achieving  a  significant  risk  transfer  with 

accounting  deconsolidation;  and  (ii)  disputes  and/or  litigation  arising  out  of  the  validity,  amount, 

duration  or  other  features  of  the  State  guarantee  are  avoided.  Some  provisions  in  the  draft  law 

might give rise to legal uncertainty and could be helpfully redrafted to enhance clarity and reduce 
risks15.  

12  

13  

14  

15  

See the Council of the European Union’s press release of 11 July 2017 on the ‘Council conclusions on Action plan to 
tackle  non-performing 
in  Europe’,  available  at:  http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-
releases/2017/07/11/conclusions-non-performing-loans/. See also Opinion CON/2018/31.  

loans 

See, for example, Special features, Section B of the ECB’s November 2016 Financial Stability Review, available at: 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/sfbfinancialstabilityreview201611.en.pdf. 

See  Annex  to  the  Eurogroup  Statement  on  Greece  of  22  June  2018,  available  on  the  Council’s  website  at 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu.  

For example, Article 2(13) defining securitisation costs which in turn affects the definition of net proceeds; Article 3(4) 
determining the conditions for the deferral of payment of interest on the mezzanine tranche and of the servicer’s fee; 
Article 6(1) on increasing the maximum amount of State guarantee that can be granted under the draft law following 
a decision by the Commission; and Article 9(1)(f) read together with Article 14 of Law No 3156/2003 and paragraphs 
2(8) and 3 of Annex C2 to the draft law determining the taxes, fees or charges, if any, payable in respect of the State 
guarantee and the party liable to pay them.  

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Most importantly, the following aspects of the draft law must be sufficiently clarified in the draft law, 

or in secondary legislation to be enacted pursuant to that law, since they all have a bearing on the 

enforceability of the State guarantee and, therefore, an impact on the effectiveness of the scheme 

as a whole: (i) the date of entry into effect and the date of termination of the State guarantee; and 
(ii) the detailed rules for the submission of applications for a State guarantee under the draft law 16. 

It  is  also  crucial  that  the  exact  procedure  from  a  call  on  a  guarantee  to  the  payment  of  said 

guarantee is clearly drafted in the draft law or in secondary legislation enacted pursuant to that law, 

in a way that safeguards the concept of the first demand guarantee as stated in the draft law.  

Lastly,  it  is  suggested  that  the  detailed  rules  applying  to  the  monitoring  of  securitisation 

transactions entered into under the draft law would benefit from further clarification in the draft law, 

or  in  secondary  legislation  to  be  enacted  pursuant  to  the  draft  law,  as  would  the  associated 
documentary  requirements  and  frequency  of  the  monitoring 17.  A  qualified  independent  entity  is 

recommended  as  it  would  be  well  positioned  to  monitor  the  compliance  of  the  issued  guarantee 

with  stated  conditions,  servicer  performance  and  events  that  would  trigger  a  call  on  the 
guarantee 18.  

3.2  Clearer wording when allowing full repayment of the senior tranche prior to any payment of interest 

on the mezzanine tranche in the waterfall structure 

Article  3(3)  of  the  draft  law  seems  to  regulate  the  waterfall  in  a  strict,  pre-defined  way.  It  is 

suggested that the draft law should present in a clearer way the ranking of the payment of interest 

on  the  mezzanine  tranche  in  the  waterfall  structure,  in  a  way  that  does  not  preclude  that  full 

repayment of the senior tranche (including principal) may occur prior to any payment of interest on 

the  mezzanine  tranche.  From  a  prudential  point  of  view,  this  will  ensure  faster  repayment  of  the 

senior tranche and could therefore reduce the term of the guarantee. 

3.3  Credit assessment of senior notes 

Article 7(1) of the draft law requires the senior notes to be rated by an ECAI ‘approved by the ECB 

at the time the State guarantee enters into effect’. The ECB notes that it does not approve ECAIs. 

The  Eurosystem  accepts  certain  ECAIs  whose  ratings  are  considered  suitable  for  the  specific 

purpose of its monetary policy operations. Such ECAIs must comply with the general acceptance 

criteria for ECAIs, one of which is that they be registered by the European Securities and Markets 

Authority in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council19. 

16  

17  

18  
19  

See also paragraph 3.2.2 of Opinion CON/2016/17. For example, the date of entry into effect of the State guarantee 
should be uniformly applied in the draft law and be clearly distinguished from the date the guarantee was granted. In 
addition, the date of termination of the State guarantee would be more clearly defined if it were linked to breaches of 
the draft law, as opposed to breaches of the Commission State aid decision. 

For  example,  the  competences  of  the  monitoring  committee  established  by  Article  16  of  the  draft  law  could  be 
drafted more clearly. 

See also paragraph 3.2.4 of Opinion CON/2016/17. 
Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 on credit rating 
agencies (OJ L 302, 17.11.2009, p. 1). See Article 120(1) of Guideline (EU) 2015/510 of the European Central Bank 
of 19 December 2014 on the implementation of the Eurosystem monetary policy framework (General Documentation 
Guideline) (ECB/2014/60) (recast) (OJ L 91, 2.4.2015, p. 3). The list of ECAIs accepted by the Eurosystem can be 
found on the ECB’s website at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/coll/risk/ecaf/html/index.en.html.  

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3.4  Term of the State guarantee 

Article  6(7)  of  the  draft  law  provides  that  the  State  guarantee  will  remain  in  place  until  the  set 

maturity date of the senior notes. It is suggested that the term of the guarantee should endure until 

repayment has been made in full of all amounts owed in respect of the senior notes.  

3.5  Regular reviews 

Finally, it would be advisable to provide for an independent qualified entity to regularly review and 

assess  the  effectiveness  of  the  scheme  envisaged  in  the  draft  law  by  reference  to  its  objectives 

and its impact on the credit institutions covered in the short and medium term. One year following 

its  introduction  might  be  a  reasonable  point  at  which  to  review  the  overall  operation  of  the  new 
scheme20. 

3.6  Compliance with state aid rules  

It is for the Commission to assess the draft law’s compliance with Union State aid rules. 

This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.  

Done at Frankfurt am Main, 6 December 2019. 

[signed] 

The President of the ECB 

Christine LAGARDE 

20  

See paragraph 3.3 of Opinion CON/2013/34 and paragraph 3.9 of Opinion CON/2019/9.  

8