COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT BULGARIA : Technical Report Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL on Progress in Bulgaria under the Cooperation and Verification mechanism
Date: 2019-10-22
Institutions: European Commission, Secretariat-General
Subjects: Bulgaria, corruption, criminal law, independence of the judiciary, judicial reform, organised crime, rule of law

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 22.10.2019  SWD(2019) 392 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT BULGARIA : Technical Report Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL on Progress in Bulgaria under the Cooperation and Verification mechanism {COM(2019) 498 final}  
 
 
Benchmarks  to  be  addressed  by  Bulgaria  pursuant  to  Commission  Decision  of  13/XII/2006 
establishing a mechanism for cooperation and verification of progress in Bulgaria to address specific 
benchmarks in the areas of judicial reform and the fight against corruption and organised crime1: 

Benchmark  1:  Adopt  Constitutional  amendments  removing  any  ambiguity  regarding  the 
independence and accountability of the judicial system 

Benchmark  2:  Ensure  a  more  transparent  and  efficient  judicial  process  by  adopting  and 
implementing  a  new  judicial  system  act  and  the  new  civil  procedure  code.  Report  on  the 
impact of these new laws and of the criminal and administrative procedure codes, notably on 
the pre-trial phase 

Benchmark  3:  Continue  the  reform  of  the  judiciary  in  order  to  enhance  professionalism, 
accountability  and  efficiency.  Evaluate  the  impact  of  this  reform  and  publish  the  results 
annually 

Benchmark 4: Conduct and report on professional, non-partisan investigations into allegations 
of  high-level  corruption.  Report  on  internal  inspections  of  public  institutions  and  on  the 
publication of assets of high-level officials 

Benchmark  5:  Take  further  measures  to  prevent  and  fight  corruption,  in  particular  at  the 
borders and within local government 

Benchmark  6:  Implement  a  strategy  to  fight  organised  crime,  focussing  on  serious  crime, 
money laundering as well as on the systematic confiscation of assets of criminals. Report on 
new and ongoing investigations, indictments and convictions in these areas 

List of acronyms:  

BORKOR: Centre for the Prevention and Counteraction of Corruption and Organised Crime 

CIAF: Commission on Illegal Asset Forfeiture 

CPACI: Commission for the Prevention and Ascertainment of Conflicts of Interest 

CVM: Cooperation and Verification Mechanism 

ECtHR: European Court on Human Rights 

ISJC: Inspectorate to the Supreme Judicial Council 

NAO: National Audit Office  

PACE: Monitoring Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe  

SANS: State Agency for National Security 

SJC: Supreme Judicial Council 

SRSS: Structural Reform Support Service 

1   Previous  CVM  reports  can  be  consulted  at  https://ec.europa.eu/info/effective-justice/rule-law/assistance-

bulgaria-and-romania-under-cvm/reports-progress-bulgaria-and-romania_en 

1 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
1.  

INTRODUCTION 

This technical report summarises the information which the Commission has used as the basis for its 
assessment  of  Bulgaria's  progress  under  the  Cooperation  and  Verification  Mechanism  (CVM)  since 
the last CVM report of 13 November 2018.2  

This information has been collected from a variety of sources. The Commission has had the benefit of 
working  closely  with  the  relevant  authorities  in  Bulgaria,  providing  information  on  progress  in 
detailed  reports,  as  well  as  in  face-to-face  meetings.3  Commission  contacts  with  the  Bulgarian 
administration  and  society  across  the  full  range  of  EU  policies  help  to  inform  the  CVM  reports.  In 
addition to official contacts with Bulgarian authorities, the Commission meets with non-governmental 
organisations  active  in  the  area  of  judicial  reform  and  anti-corruption  work,  with  professional 
associations  of  judges  and  prosecutors,  and  with  representatives  of  other  EU  Member  States  in 
Bulgaria. More generally, the Commission draws on the various studies and reports that are available 
from international institutions and other independent observers in the field of judicial reform and the 
fight  against  corruption  and  organised  crime.  The  variety  of  opinions  expressed  by  the  different 
Bulgarian interlocutors is an important element for an open and transparent debate. The Commission 
bases its assessment on all sources available, also taking into account divergent views. 
Since the adoption of the CVM benchmarks in 2006,4 there have been major developments in the case 
law  of  both  the  EU  Court  of  Justice  and  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights,  as  well  as  in 
international standards and best practices, and in comparative information on national justice systems 
in the EU5. These developments have also helped to provide an objective and comparable measure of 
progress  in  the  Bulgarian  judicial  system  and  in  the  fight  against  corruption  and  organised  crime. 
Analysis of these topics have also become a regular feature in the European Semester for economic 
policy coordination in recent years. The CVM was also part of the reflection process underlying the 
Communication adopted by the Commission in July 2019 on Strengthening of Rule of Law within the 
Union – a blueprint for action, in which it announces its intention to establish an annual rule of law 
review cycle covering all Member States.6 

Over the years, Bulgaria has benefited from EU funds as well as bilateral support from EU Member 
States. In the current programming period, the Operational Programme "Good Governance" under the 
European Social Fund has dedicated some €30 million to a separate priority axis for judicial reform in 
Bulgaria.7 Support from the European Structural Reform Support Service (SRSS) also continues to be 
available  for  reforms  in  Bulgaria,  including  in  the  justice  sector.8  For  example,  in  2016  several 
Member  States  provided  experts  for  a  project  led  by  the  Commission’s  Structural  Reform  Support 
Service  (SRSS)  to  carry  out  an  independent  analysis  of  the  Public  Prosecutor's  Office  of  Bulgaria. 
More  recently,  the  SRSS  launched  a  technical  assistance  project  for  the  Bulgarian  judicial 
inspectorate, with assistance from the Council of Europe. 

2   COM(2018) 850 final.  All  the reports under the  Cooperation and  Verification Mechanism are available on 
the  Commission’s  website:  https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/upholding-rule-
law/rule-law/assistance-bulgaria-and-romania-under-cvm/reports-progress-bulgaria-and-romania_en  

3    Commission services carried out full fact-finding missions in Bulgaria in March and June 2019 as well as a 

number of smaller staff missions during 2019. 

4      Commission  Decision  of  13  December  2006  establishing  a  mechanism  for  cooperation  and  verification  of 
progress  in  Bulgaria  to  address  specific  benchmarks  in  the  areas  of  judicial  reform  and  the  fight  against 
corruption and organised crime (notified under document number C(2006) 6570). 

5    Including the EU Justice Scoreboard: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/effective-justice/scoreboard/ 
6   COM/2019/343 final. This Communication was a follow-up to a broader review of the Commission’s work 
in  the  rule  of  law  area,  including  a  call  for  contributions  from  Member  States  and  other  stakeholders: 
https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-19-4169_en.htm 

7   Currently, contracts  for approximately 46 per cent of this amount  have  been  signed,  while 20 per cent has 

been paid to beneficiaries.  
In addition, funding for the Ministry of Interior is available through the Internal Security Fund – Police.   

8  

2 

 
                                                           
On 25 January 2017, the Commission adopted a comprehensive assessment of progress over ten years 
under the CVM and identified a limited number of key remaining steps for Bulgaria to fulfil in order 
to reach the goals of the CVM and address specific shortcomings identified at the time of Bulgaria’s 
accession to to EU. This process resulted in seventeen final recommendations, set out in the January 
2017 CVM report. Many of the recommendations focused on ways to internalise the reform process 
and strengthen the basis for domestic monitoring in Bulgaria. At the same time, they provided a clear 
path  towards  ending  the  monitoring  under  the  CVM:  when  all  the  recommendations  under  each 
benchmark  had  been  followed  up,  the  respective  benchmark  would  be  considered  provisionally 
completed, and when this applied to all benchmarks, the CVM would be closed. Complying with the 
seventeen  recommendations  could  therefore  be  considered  as  sufficient  to  meet  the  CVM  goals  – 
except  if  developments  were  to  clearly  reverse  the  course  of  progress  underlying  the  baseline 
assessment of January 2017.  

Since  January  2017,  the  Commission  has  made  two  assessments  of  progress  on  the  seventeen 
recommendations.  

The first assessment report adopted on 15 November 2017 concluded that while  significant progress 
had  been  achieved the  Commission  could  not  yet  conclude  that any  of  the  benchmarks  were  at that 
stage satisfactorily fulfilled.9  

The second report adopted on 13 November 2018 concluded that: ‘In line with the assessment set out 
in  this  report,  the  Commission  considers  that  several  recommendations  have  already  been 
implemented and a number of others are very close to implementation. On this basis, the Commission 
has concluded that Benchmarks One, Two and Six can be considered provisionally closed. Given that 
in some cases developments are ongoing, continued monitoring is required to confirm this assessment. 
The Commission is confident that Bulgaria will be able to fulfil all the remaining recommendations.   

With a determined follow-up to the remaining recommendations, Bulgaria will take an important step 
towards  solving  many  of  the  challenges that  it  faces.  Bulgaria  needs to  continue  to  develop  a  track 
record of concrete results so as to consolidate the progress made. This positive trend will need to be 
maintained under the CVM and will need continued monitoring by the Bulgarian authorities after the 
closure of the CVM. Transparent reporting by the Bulgarian authorities and public and civic scrutiny 
will play an important role in internalising monitoring at national level and providing the necessary 
safeguards to maintain the path of progress and reform.    

The  Commission  will  continue  to  monitor  and  follow  progress  closely  and  will  make  a  further 
assessment  of  the  progress  made  before  the  end  of  this  Commission’s  mandate.  The  Commission 
expects that with this the CVM process for Bulgaria will be concluded. In line with this objective, the 
Commission  invites  Bulgaria  to  pursue  the  current  positive  trend  towards  implementation  of  all 
remaining recommendations.’ 10  

2. 

PROGRESS ON KEY REMAINING STEPS 

On the basis of the key remaining steps identified in the January 2017 CVM report, this section will 
describe the actions taken by the Bulgarian authorities to fulfil the recommendations since November 
2018. The benchmarks that were provisionally closed in the November 2018 report are covered in a 
general way only, given the assessment already made in the last report.  

Benchmark  1  (provisionally  closed):  Adopt  Constitutional  amendments  removing  any 
ambiguity regarding the independence and accountability of the judicial system  

The  November  2018  report  concluded  that  under  Benchmark  One,  Bulgaria  had  implemented 
recommendation 1 and recommendations 2 and 3 were close to implementation. The report noted that 
continued monitoring was necessary to confirm the assessment, but the benchmark was nevertheless 

9   COM(2017) 750 final. 
10   COM(2018) 850 final. 

3 

 
                                                           
provisionally  closed.  This  implies  that  the  Commission  continues  to  work  with  Bulgaria  on  general 
issues of independence and accountability of the judicial system as with other EU Member States. 

Recommendation  1:  Ensure  a  transparent  election  for  the  future  SJC,  with  a  public  hearing  in  the 
National  Assembly  before  the  election  of  the  members  of  the  parliamentary  quota,  and  giving  civil 
society the possibility to make observations on the candidates. 

Recommendation 2: Establish a track record of transparent and merit-based appointments to high–
level  judicial  posts,  including  the  upcoming  appointment  of  a  new  President  of  the  Supreme 
Administrative Court. 

Recommendation  3:  To  improve  the  practical  functioning  of  the  ISJC  and  the  follow-up  by  the 
Supreme  Judicial  Council  to  the  inspectorate's  findings,  in  particular  on  integrity  issues,  consider 
soliciting external assistance, for example from the SRSS and/or Council of Europe. 

High-level  judicial  appointments  constitute  a  key  area  of  responsibility  of  the  Supreme  Judicial 
Council in Bulgaria. Since the last report, the council has continued to carry out its responsibilities in 
this area, with a significant number of appointments of court chairs giving rise to no overt controversy. 
Some  key  appointments  have  nevertheless  been  postponed  or  challenged  in  court.  The  November 
report  referred  in  particular  to  the  appointment  of  a  new  chair  of  the  Sofia  City  Court,  which  had 
remained  without  a  permanent  management  for  over  a  year  following  the  decision  of  the  previous 
chair to resign for personal reasons in summer 2017. Shortly after the report, the council appointed a 
new  head  in  a  competitive  procedure  involving  two  candidates.11  Meanwhile,  a  number  of  key 
appointments in the prosecution service have been delayed due to the failure of previous appointment 
procedures to reach a consensus on a preferred candidate. This concerned the specialised prosecutor’s 
office for organised crime and high level corruption, where the appointment was eventually made at 
the end of July 2019, and the corresponding appellate prosecutor’s office, as well as the head of the 
Sofia City appellate prosecutor’s office.  

The  most  prominent  appointment  procedure  to  take  place  in  2019  concerns  the  election  of  the  new 
Prosecutor  General  ahead  of  the  expiry  of  the  incumbent’s  term  in  office  in  January  2020.  This 
procedure was launched in June and will culminate in a vote of the Supreme Judicial Council on 24 
October. The nominee selected by the council will then need to be confirmed by the President of the 
Republic.12 The procedure set out in Article 173 of the Judicial Systems Act provides that candidates 
can  be  put  forward  by  at  least three  members  of  the prosecutorial  chamber  of  the  Supreme  Judicial 
Council, or by the Minister of Justice. In this case, the Minister of Justice had already announced that 
he would not make use of his right to present a candidate. On 22 July the prosecutorial college of the 
Supreme  Judicial  College  unanimously  put  forward  a  single  candidate  for  the  consideration  of  the 
council.13 The vote of the Supreme Judicial Council on the nomination will be preceded by a public 
hearing, informed by written opinions submitted by civil society and other stakeholders as well as a 
written concept paper prepared by the candidate.14 The nomination was seen as controversial by some 

11   The decision was challenged in the Supreme Administrative Court by the failing candidate, who held that it 
had not been sufficiently well motivated, but the new chair was able to take up his functions. A final decision 
of the Supreme Administrative Court is expected in November. 

12   The  nominee  is  elected  by  a  qualified  majority  of  17  votes  within  the  plenary  of  the  Supreme  Judicial 
Council,  which  consists  of  25  members  (6  elected  by  judges,  4  elected  by  prosecutors,  1  elected  by 
investigating magistrates, 11 elected by the National Assembly, as well as the sitting Prosecutor General and 
the Presidents of the Supreme Court of Cassation and the Supreme Administrative Court). The President of 
the Republic can reject a nominee, but will nevertheless have to accept if the nominee supported in a second 
vote of the council.  

13   The  prosecutorial  chamber  is  chaired  by  the  serving  Prosecutor  General  and  consists  of  11  members  (four 
elected by prosecutors, one elected by investigating  magistrates,  five  elected by the  National  Assembly, as 
well as the serving Prosecutor General who is an ex officio member). It is in charge of all personnel matters 
for prosecutors. 

14   The  candidate  submitted  his  concept  paper  on  13  August.  Civil  society  organisations  can  submit  opinions 

until 14 October. 

4 

 
                                                           
civil society representatives and sparked protests over the summer of 2019.15 On 16 and 17 October 
the appraisals and ethics committees of the Supreme Judicial Council both issued positive opinions on 
the candidate, an important procedural step to inform the final decision of the council.16  

Another  sensitive  issue  in  the  Bulgarian  context  concerns  disciplinary  proceedings  and  checks 
concerning integrity of magistrates. Constitutional and legislative changes in 2015 and 2016 vested the 
independent  Inspectorate  to  the  Supreme  Judicial  Council  with  additional  powers  in  this  area. 
Following  the  recommendation  of  the  January  2017  report  to  seek  outside  assistance  in  order  to 
strengthen  the  capacity  of  the  inspectorate  in  these  areas,  discussions  started  between  the  Bulgarian 
authorities and the European Commission’s Structural Reform Support Service (SRSS) on a technical 
assistance project to be implemented with the assistance of the Council of Europe. After a number of 
delays,17 the operational part of the project was launched in July 2019, and is expected to be concluded 
in spring 2020. The project is intended to provide an analysis of the procedures of the inspectorate for 
the  initation  and  conduct  of  integrity  checks,  a  comparative  analysis  of  similar  institutions  in  other 
Member States, and a study to collect best practices and models of judicial inspection.18  

In the meantime, the inspectorate has continued implementing its new functions, including acting on 
alerts received from the public about possible integrity problems of magistrates,19 as well as the more 
traditional regular and thematic inspections of judicial bodies20 and checks of the property declarations 
of magistrates. 

Benchmark  2  (provisionally  closed):  Ensure  a  more  transparent  and  efficient  judicial 
process  by  adopting  and  implementing  a  new  Judicial  System  Act  and  the  new  Civil 
Procedure  Code.  Report  on  the  Impact  of  these  new  laws  and  of  the  Criminal  and 
Administrative Procedure Codes, notably on the pre-trial phase  

The  November  2018  report  concluded  that  under  Benchmark  Two,  Bulgaria  had  made  significant 
progress on recommendation 4. A number of legislative issues with relevance for Benchmarks Three 
and  Four  were  still  under  consideration,  but  the  Benchmark  was  provisionally  closed,  pending 
continued  monitoring  of  the  follow  up  to  legislative  changes.  This  implies  that  the  Commission 
continues to work with Bulgaria on general issues of transparent and efficient judicial process as with 
other EU Member States. 

Recommendation  4:  Adopt  amendments to the  Criminal  Procedure  Code  and the  Criminal  Code  to 
improve the legal framework for the prosecution of high-level corruption and serious organised crime. 

15   The controversy was related partly to the procedure and the lack of alternative candidates, and partly to the 
candidate’s role in past high profile cases as well as public statements from the candidate voicing speculation 
about political figures as well as views expressed regarding the principle of separation of powers. 

16   Some stakeholders nevertheless continued to voice criticism, including the Bulgarian bar association which 

issued a critical statement on 18 September. 

17   Preparations started in 2017.  
18   The project will in particular draw on expertise and experience of judicial inspectorates of France and Spain.  
19   Since November 2018, the inspectorate received 34 such alerts. Inspections were initiated of nine alerts, one 
of  which  has  led  to  a  proposal  for  discplinary  follow-up,  three  are  pending,  and  five  were  closed  due 
insufficient  evidence.  23  files  were  terminated  without  an  inspection:  20  due  to  the  incompleteness  of  the 
information provided in the alert, two because the limitation period had expired, and one because disciplinary 
proceedings  were  already  ongoing.  Finally,  the  inspectorate  is  still  awaiting  additional  information  on  two 
alerts  in  order  to  determine  if  an  inspection  would  be  warranted.  (Information  provided  by  Bulgaria  in 
August 2019.) 

20   This work also regularly leads to proposals for disciplinary follow-up, typically related to efficiecny issues 
such as systematic non-compliance with deadlines. In addition to the inspectorate, the heads of the various 
judicial  bodies  can  also  propose  the  initiation  of  disciplinary  proceedings.  The  proceedings  are  carried  out 
and  decided  by  the  relevant  chamber  (for  judges  and  prosecutors  respectively)  of  the  Supreme  Judicial 
Council. 

5 

 
                                                           
Where relevant, the continued follow-up on relevant issues is presented under Benchmarks Three and 
Four below. 21  

Benchmark  3:  Continue  the  reform  of  the  judiciary  in  order  to  enhance  professionalism, 
accountability  and  efficiency.  Evaluate  the  impact  of  this  reform  and  publish  the  results 
annually 

The  November  2018  report  concluded  that  under  Benchmark  Three,  Bulgaria  had  made  significant 
progress,  and  recommendations  5,  6,  7,  and  8  were  close  to  implementation.  The  report  noted  that 
some  developments  were  still  ongoing,  and  continued  monitoring  was  necessary  to  confirm  the 
assessment. The benchmark was left open.  

Recommendation  5:  Publish  a  report  for  public  consultation  detailing  the  progress  made 
implementing  the  national  judicial  reform  strategy  and  setting  out  the  remaining  steps  to  be  taken. 
Establish a mechanism for continued public reporting of progress for the remaining duration of the 
strategy's implementation. 

As outlined in the November report, the Bulgarian authorities have set in place a cycle of half-yearly 
public reporting  on  progress  under the  current judicial reform  strategy.22  The  half-yearly  reports  are 
public  and  are  discussed  with  stakeholders  in  a  special  consultative  council  on  judicial  reform, 
established  under  the  Ministry  of  Justice  in  2016.23  This  council  has  held  four  meetings  since 
November 2018, discussing items such as the content of the reports on progress in the implementation 
of  the  judicial  reform,  the  Commission’s  November  2018  CVM  report,  various  proposals  for 
legislative  initiatives,  and  various  projects  with  relevance  for  the  preparation  or  implementation  of 
judicial reforms. In May 2019 the government adopted a revised roadmap for the implementation of 
measures  under  the  judicial  reform  strategy,  with  a  particular  focus  on  measures  funded  by  the 
Operational Programme on Good Governance (OPGG) under the European Social Fund 2014-2020.24 
The revision involves the postponement of deadlines and mean that the current strategy will continue 
to be valid for some time after 2020.  

The  November  2018  report  also  noted  the  importance  of  preparing  priorities  for  a  future  judicial 
reform  strategy  through  broad  public  debate.  The  Bulgarian  authorities  have  indicated  that  their 
planning for a future justice reform strategy is still in a very early stage.  

More generally, in spring 2019, discussions were launched with stakeholders on the establishment of a 
new coordination council with representatives of the relevant institutions, also associating civil society 
representatives, to monitor progress on a regular basis. This initiative of the Bulgarian authorities is 
meant to follow up on the need for continued monitoring in line with the rationale – highlighted in the 
January 2017 report – that monitoring mechanisms need to be embedded in the national framework.25  

21   The  November  report  covered  recent  developments  in  the  criminal  procedural  framework,  including  the 
introduction of the preliminary  hearings and the  transfer of competences  for  high-level corruption cases to 
the specialised court and prosecution. It also highlighted some issues that were still under consideration by 
the  Bulgarian  authorities,  notably  the  accountability  of  a  Prosecutor  General  for  allegations  of  possible 
criminal misconduct and issues related to the more general system for the opening of criminal investigations.  
22   An English version of the current judicial reform strategy adopted in 2014 and endorsed in January 2015 is 

available via this link: www.strategy.bg/FileHandler.ashx?fileId=5570  

23   This  council  brings  together  representatives  of  the  judiciary,  the  executive,  professional  organisations  of 
judges,  prosecutors  and  investigating  magistrates,  representatives  of  the  academic  community,  as  well  as 
non-governmental organisations active in the area of judicial reform.  

24   The update was discussed in the consultative council on judicial reform in February 2019. 
25   Also, the conclusions of the November 2018 report acknowledged the need for Bulgaria, after the end of the 

CVM, to continue monitoring progress while building a track record of concrete results.   

6 

 
                                                           
The  new  council  will  be  based  on  a  government  decree,  adopted  on  18  September  2019,  and  will 
formally be established once the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism is repealed.26 The council 
will  have  a  coordination  and  advisory  function  and  would  meet  at  least  every  3  months,  with  the 
possibility  of  extraordinary  meetings  being  arranged  upon  request  of  a  the  council’s  members,  to 
monitor developments not only with regard to judicial reform, but also the broader efforts to address 
rule of law, corruption and organised crime. It will be composed of members of government and the 
judiciary,  and  also  include  representation  from  the  National  Assembly  for  issues  with  a  legislative 
dimension. It will be co-chaired by the representative of the Supreme Judicial Council and a Deputy 
Prime Minister in charge of justice reform. Apart from regular publication of updates after each of its 
meetings, the council will also submit an annual report to the government and the Supreme Judicial 
Council. 

The decree envisages that non–profit legal entities registered for public benefit activities and operating 
in  any  of  the  areas  of  competence  of  the  council  will  be  able  to  make  proposals  for  items  to  be 
included in the agenda of its meetings. In addition, the decree includes provisions on the creation of a 
civic  council  with  representatives  of  civil  society,  which  would  be  able  to  attend  meetings  of  the 
coordination council and provide a link to the wider civil society.  

Recommendation 6: Address the workload situation in the busiest courts based on the new workload 
standards, and agree a roadmap for the reform of the judicial map in parallel with the development of 
e-justice. 

The rebalancing of workload between and within courts is a long-standing issue in Bulgaria, with in 
particular the main courts in the major cities experiencing a heavy workload. As detailed in previous 
reports,  efforts  have  been  made  to  address  this  in  different  ways,  including  legislative  changes  to 
reallocate responsibilities between jurisdictions as well as limited transfers of posts between courts.27 
These  measures  have  had a  positive  impact,28  although  there  will  be  a  need for continued efforts to 
ensure a balanced workload in the future.29 This should also be seen in the context of ongoing efforts 
for the introduction of e-justice and a reform of the judicial map, where a project is ongoing with the 
support of EU funds.30  

26   http://www.gov.bg/bg/prestsentar/zasedaniya-na-ms/dneven-red-na-zasedanieto-na-ministerskiya-savet-na-

18-09-2019-g    

27   An  important  workstrand  under  the  previous  Supreme  Judicial  Council  was  the  development  of  more 
objective  workload  standards  as  a  basis  for  the  assessment.  However,  during  their  implementation,  these 
standards have run into criticism and the policy is currently under revision by the new council.  

28   For example, recent legislative changes reallocating responsibility for insurance claims cases has reportedly 
drastically reduced the number of cases handled in the Sofia regional court. The Supreme Judicial Council 
also  reports  that  procedures  initiated  in  2018  for  the  transfer  of  additional  judges’  positions  to  the  Sofia 
courts have now been completed, resulting in the transfer of 7 judges’ positions in the Sofia regional court, 6 
positions in the Sofia City court, and 2 positions in the Specialised Court for organised crime. 

29   The  Supreme  Judicial  Council  reports  that  discussions  have  been  taking  place  on  possible  legislative 
amendments related to, respectively, the system of criminal courts and the regular appeal courts. Discussions 
have also taken place with stakeholders on proposals concerning the boundaries between the jurisdiction of 
key courts around  the capital.  The council can refer  such proposals to the  government or the  legislator for 
further consideration.  

30   The  project  to  prepare  the  implementation  of  e-justice  and  support  a  reform  of  the  judicial  map  has  been 
subject  to  several  delays  and  is  now  expected  to  be  completed  by  the  end  of  2020.  A  separate  project 
focusing on the development of a centralised justice portal is planned for completion by the end of 2019. As 
mentioned under recommendation 5 above, a revised timetable for the relevant operational programme was 
adopted  in  May.  Bulgaria  also  receives  assistance  from  the  Commission’s  Structural  Reform  Support 
Programme for activities related to e-justice.  

7 

 
                                                           
While  the  Supreme  Judicial  Council  continues  to  discuss  specific  aspects  of  the  judicial  map,31  a 
comprehensive reform remains a longer term prospect. In the meantime, the Prosecutor’s Office has 
launched  a  staged  process  of  rationalising  the  structure  of  local  prosecution  offices  throughout  the 
country. A pilot phase involving the closure of 11 local prosecution offices was completed in 2018 and 
a  second  phase  of  mergers  was  confirmed  by  the  plenary  of  the  Supreme  Judicial  Council  in  July 
2019, this time involving the closure of an additional 28 local prosecution offices. By January 2020, 
this reform will therefore have resulted in the consolidation of what used to be 113 local prosecution 
offices into 74 larger units.32  

Recommendation 7: Establish a roadmap for the implementation of the recommendations of the SRSS 
report  concerning  the  reform  of  the  Prosecutor's  Office  and  its  interactions  with  other  institutions, 
including a mechanism for the reporting of progress to the wider public. 

The Prosecutor’s Office in Bulgaria forms part of the judiciary and plays a particular prominent role in 
society.  Traditionally  seen  as  a  very  hierarchical  organisation,  it  has  often  be  the  source  of  tension 
within the judiciary and controversy in the wider public debate.33 The prosecution is also at the centre 
of  the  system  of  criminal  law  enforcement,  playing  a  key  part  in  the  direction  and  supervision  of 
investigations  into  corruption  and  organised  crime.  This  was  the  background  for  a  project  in  2016, 
involving a team of prosecutors with the assistance of the Commission’s Structural Reform Support 
Service,  to  prepare  an  independent  analysis  of  the  challenges  facing  the  prosecution  service  in 
Bulgaria. The analysis included a number of suggestions for follow-up by the Bulgarian authorities, 
which  were  reflected  in  an  interinstitutional  roadmap  established  in  cooperation  between  the 
government and the prosecution service in 2017.  

The  November  2018  report  noted  that  several  of  the  recommendations  had  been  followed  up  with 
concrete  actions,  including  considerations  of  possible  legislative  amendments,  some  of  which  were 
however  still  ongoing.  It  was  acknowledged  that  legislative  changes  would  need  careful  assessment 
with  regard  to their impact  on  the  overall  system  of  criminal  investigation  and the  balance  between 
key  institutions.34  Many  of the  issues raised  in  the independent  analysis  were  related  to  the issue  of 
how  to  ensure  a  more  effective  investigation,  prosecution  and  adjudication  of  cases  involving  high-
level corruption or serious organised crime.35  

One particularly sensitive issue highlighted by the independent analysis relates to the accountability of 
the  position  of  Prosecutor  General  in  a  situation  where  credible  allegations  are  made  of  possible 
criminal misconduct. This is also an issue which was raised by the European Court on Human Rights 
in  a  landmark  case  from  2009,  where  it  ruled  that  due  to  the  highly  centralised  structure  of  the 
prosecution service and its monopoly on criminal prosecution, the Bulgarian system did not provide 
for  an  effective  procedure  ensuring  the  possibility  of  an  independent  criminal  investigation  into  a 
serving Prosecutor General.36 The follow-up by the Bulgarian authorities to this ruling remains under 

31   In July 2019 the judges’ chamber of the council decided to establish a working group to look into a possible 
reduction of the  number of  military courts,  whereas it  was also decided that  matters related to the regional 
courts should continue to be dealt with in the context of a more comprehensive future reform.  

32   Bulgaria has 113 local court districts, each of which has had a local prosecutor’s office attached. The reform 

involves the merger of local offices into larger units, serving the local districts involved.  

33   These tensions were at the basis of a reform of the Supreme Judicial Council in 2015, establishing separate 

chambers within the council to deal with personnel issues for judges and prosecutors respectively.  

34   The legislative aspects were covered under Benchmark Two in the November report, which however did note 

the close link to Benchmarks Three on judicial reform and Benchmark Four on high-level corruption.  

35   See below under Benchmark Three.  
36   Case  of  Kolevi  vs  Bulgaria,  see  https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"itemid":["001-95607"]}. The  issue  of  lack 
of  effective  accountability  of  the  Prosecutor  has  also  been  raised  in  a  more  general  sense  by  the  Venice 
Commission 
see 
Act,  October 
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2017)018-e  

its  Opinion 

Judicial 

System 

2017, 

the 

on 

in 

8 

 
                                                           
monitoring by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, which has issued several calls for 
Bulgaria to remedy the situation.37  

In June 2019, a roundtable discussion on the issue was held in Sofia with the participation of experts 
from the Council of Europe as well as from Bulgaria.38 In parallel, the Minister of Justice presented a 
set  of  draft  legislative  amendments  for  public  discussion.  The  proposals  of  the  Minister  of  Justice 
provide  for  a  special  procedure  for  the  initiation  of  criminal  investigations  into  alleged  criminal 
misconduct by any of the three highest ranking magistrates in the country: the Prosecutor General as 
well as the presidents of the Supreme Court of Cassation and the Supreme Administrative Court. In 
the initial draft,39 it is envisaged that any pre-trial investigation of these top magistrates would need to 
be authorised by the Supreme Judicial Council. The decision would require a two-thirds majority40 and 
would be considered only on the motion of either the Minister of Justice or of at least three members 
of the relevant chamber of the council.41 The motion would need to be motivated in writing. Crucially, 
any  such  decision  to  initiate  an  investigation  would  automatically  entail  the  temporary  suspension 
from  office  of  the  magistrate  concerned,  in  principle  for  the  duration  of  the  proceedings.42  The 
investigation  would  be  handled  directly  by  prosecutors  at  the  Specialised  Prosecutor’s  Office  for 
organised crime or the Sofia City Prosecutor’s Office, depending on the nature of the crime.  

The initial proposal of the Minister of Justice provoked a broad range of criticism from civil society.43 
The criticism raised in particular two types of general concerns. Firstly, the inclusion within the scope 
of the mechanism of the presidents of the two supreme courts was seen as creating a risk for judicial 
independence, due to the provisions on automatic suspension from office and the lack of clarity about 
the grounds required for such a decision.44 Secondly, doubts were raised over the likely effectiveness 
of  the  proposed  procedure  in  ensuring  independence  at  all  stages  of  a  pre-trial  investigation  into  a 
Prosecutor  General.45  Given  these reactions,  the Minister  pledged  to  continue the  consultations  with 
civil  society  and  relevant  institutions  both  at  national  and  international  level.46  As  part  of  these 

37   Latest in March 2019: https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectID=09000016809372d5  
38   The 

investigations: 
broader 
https://www.coe.int/en/web/execution/-/bulgaria-round-table-on-effective-investigations-into-killings-and-ill-
treatment   

roundtable 

effective 

issues 

dealt 

with 

also 

of 

39   An  English  version 

is  available  at 

the  website  of 

the  Ministry  of  Justice  via 

this 

link:   

https://newweb.mjs.bg/en/2019/07/draft-act-supplementing-the-criminal-procedure-code/  

40   This  means that 17 out of 25  members of the  plenary  would have to vote in  favour of initiating a pre-trial 
investigation.  This  is  the  same  majority  as  is  required  for  a  motion  for  dismissal  on  disciplinary  grounds 
under the current rules.  

41   The prosecutorial chamber for the Prosecutor General and the judges’ chamber for the two court presidents.  
42   Although  this  is  limited  to  the  timelimits  for  custodial  measures:  from  8  to  18  months  depending  on  the 

severity of the charge (Criminal Procedure Code, Article 234(8)).  

43   See for example: https://hudoc.exec.coe.int/eng#{"EXECIdentifier":["DH-DD(2019)766E"]}   
44   Some  also  questioned  whether  a  special  procedure  was  needed  to  ensure  an  independent  pre-trial 
investigation of the President of a Supreme Court, as the special circumstances raising concerns over possible 
interference from a Prosecutor General did not exist in relation to those offices. The recommendations of the 
independent  analysis  of  the  prosecution  from  2016  as  well  as  the  Council  of  Europe  concerned  only  the 
Prosecutor General.  

45   Concerns  were  raised  that  the  proposed  procedure  could  make  the  initiation  of  an  investigation  even  more 
difficult.  Such  concerns  relate  for  example  to  the  view  that  members  of  the  prosecutorial  quota  of  the 
Supreme  Judicial  Council  could  remain  subject  to  influence  by  a  serving  Prosecutor  General.  Similar 
concerns have been raised by the Venice Commission in their opinion of October 2017 (op cit) in the broader 
context  of  disciplinary  proceedings  against  a  Prosecutor  General.  It  should  also  be  noted  here  that  the 
procedure  as  envisaged  would  bar  any  other  avenues  of  launching  an  investigation  which  exist  at  the 
moment, even – in theory at least – with regard to the Prosecutor General. They could therefore potentially 
constitute a form of immunity to general criminal investigation for the top magistrates, to be waived only by 
the Supreme Judicial Council.  

46   The  draft  amendments  were  presented  for  public  debate  by  the  Minister  of  Justice  at  an  early  stage  of  the 
preparation,  before  launching  the  formal  process  of  government  adoption  and  the  associated  process  of 
general public consultations.  

9 

 
                                                           
consultations,  on    24  September,  the  government  submitted  a  request  for  an  opinion  of  the  Venice 
Commission with the aim to guarantee the independence of the judiciary in the context of the proposed 
procedure  for  accountability  of  the  Prosecutor  General  and  the  Presidents  of  the  two  Supreme 
Courts.47  

Recommendation 8: Establish a roadmap for the implementation of the recommendations of the study 
[of European Court on Human Rights rulings], including a mechanism for the reporting of progress to 
the wider public. 

The November report acknowledged the steps already taken by Bulgaria under this recommendation 
and  also  noted  the  close  link  with  measures  taken  under  recommendations  4  and  7,  given  that  the 
issues identified relate in particular to problems of effective investigation of crime, as reflected over 
the years in a number of cases at the European Court of Human Rights.  

In connection with its 2015 decision in the case S.Z. v. Bulgaria, the European Court of Human Rights 
found  that  there  was  a  systemic  problem  of  ineffectiveness  of  criminal  investigations  in  Bulgaria, 
referring  to  shortcomings  affecting  investigations  revealed  by  a  large  number  of  judgements  (more 
than  45)  where  a  violation  was  found  in  relation  to  the  effectiveness  of  the  investigation.48  The 
problem was referred to in the January 2016 CVM report49 and formed the basis of a study carried out 
by the Bulgarian authorities on the relevant case law, which is referred to in this recommendation of 
the January 2017 report.  

Discussions continue between the Bulgarian authorities and the Council of Europe. Notably, the Sofia 
roundtable referred to above also explored issues related to the initiation of criminal investigations and 
judicial review of prosecutorial decisions in order to seek solutions to address challenges with regard 
to effective investigations.50 The follow-up continues to be monitored by the Council of Europe.51  

Benchmark  4:  Conduct  and  report  on  professional,  non-partisan  investigations  into 
allegations  of  high-level  corruption.  Report  on  internal  inspections  of  public  institutions 
and on the publication of assets of high-level officials 

The  November  2018  report  concluded  that  under  Benchmark  Four,  Bulgaria  had  made  significant 
progress  on  recommendations  9,  10,  11  and  12.  The  report  also  noted  that  Bulgaria  would  need  to 
show concrete results and build a track record of final convictions in high-level corruption cases, and 
that the new anti-corruption institutional framework required continued monitoring in view of the need 
to consolidate the progress made. The benchmark was kept open. 

Recommendation  9:  Adopt  a  new  legal  framework  on  the  fight  against  corruption  in  line  with  the 
intentions  set  out  in  the  anti-corruption  strategy,  and  ensure  its  implementation.  Set  up  an  effective 
anti-corruption authority. 

Under  this  recommendation,  Bulgaria  adopted  legislation  in  January  2018  that  put  in  place  a 
comprehensive  reform  of  the  legal  framework  for  the  prevention  of  conflicts  of  interest,  illicit 

47   The European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) is an advisory body under the 
Council of Europe, advising its member states on constitutional matters and European standards in the fields 
of democracy, human rights and the rule of law.   

48   In its latest  update  on the case  S.Z. v. Bulgaria, the Council of Europe notes  that  while  some  progress  has 
been achieved, concrete measures are still awaited in several crucial areas. The committee of ministers of the 
Council  of  Europe  may 
the  end  of  2019.  See 
https://hudoc.exec.coe.int/eng#{"EXECIdentifier":["004-1934"]} 

issue  already 

towards 

revert 

the 

49   COM(2016) 40 final, p. 6.  
50   Previous reports have referred to the complexity of these issues, which are also closely linked to the status of 
the so-called preliminary enquiries in the Bulgarian system of criminal investigation. The topic has also been 
discussed  in  a  working  group  under  the  Ministry  of  Justice  looking  into  possible  follow-up  to  the  2016 
independent analysis of the Bulgarian Prosecutor’s Office.  

to 

51   The committee of ministers may revert to the issue already towards the end of 2019. 

10 

 
                                                           
enrichment and corruption. Through the merging of existing structures, the reform established the new 
anti-corruption agency – the Commission for Counterating Corruption and Illegal Assets Forfeiture – 
which  became  operational  in  April  2018.  As  noted  in  the  November  2018  report,  the  new  anti-
corruption  agency  faced  a  number  of  difficult  challenges,  notably  to  effectively  manage  the  broad 
remit of its responsibilities and establishing a reputation of neutrality and impartiality. The agency has 
now been in operation for a year and a half and is beginning to build a basic track record in various 
parts of its work.52  

In  2018,  verifications  of  declarations  of  private  assets  and  interests  were  carried  out  for  over  9  000 
persons. More than 700 declarations were subject to correction or special follow-up. On the basis of 
these  verifications,  the  agency  reported  19  officials  to  the  tax  authorities  for  further  checks  and 
initiated  a  full  check  of  the  asset  status  for  25  officials.  As  of  July  2019,  222  proceedings  for  the 
establishment of the existence or non-existence of a conflict of interest have been initiated by the new 
agency,  and  129  decisions  were  adopted  on  the  merits,  leading  to  the  confirmation  of  a  conflict  of 
interest in 35 cases. The agency has assisted the Prosecutor’s Office with preliminary checks under the 
Judicial  System  Act  in  more  than  600  cases  since  its  creation  and  participated  in  several  joint 
operations with the Specalised Prosecutor’s Office for organised crime.53  

The spring of 2019 saw the start of a series of highly publicised scandals involving various allegations 
linked  to  the  purchases  of  private  properties  at  below  market  values  by  a  number  of  high-level 
officials.54  In  this  context,  allegations  also  appeared  regarding  the  head  of  the  new  anti-corruption 
agency,  leading  to  his  resignation  from  office  in  August  2019,  citing  the  need  to  preserve  the 
reputation  of  the  newly  established  agency.55  Despite  this  controversy,  the  agency  has  for  now 
continued to operate under the leadership of its remaining management.  

It will now be for the National Assembly to elect a new head of the institution, which may reopen past 
debates on the underlying legislation. As noted in the November 2018 report, the procedure defined in 
the law for the appointment of the agency’s management has been subject of controversy.56   

Recommendation 10: Adopt and implement a reform of the law on public administration to strengthen 
the internal inspectorates in the public administration. 

The network of internal inspectorates within national ministries play a pivotal role in preventing and 
detecting corruption within the State administration. Previous reports already noted the revision of the 
law  on  public  administration  to  clarify  the  roles  and  activities  of  the  inspectorates  as  well  as  the 
subsequent  implementation  of  the  new  standards  in  internal  government  regulations.  The  new 
legislation, which sets out more clearly the structure and tasks of the inspectorates including a stronger 
coordinating  role  of  the  chief  inspectorate  under  the  Prime  Minister’s  office,  came  into  force  in 
January 2019 and provided for a significant increase in staff in many of the inspectorates.  

In  the  context  of the  reform  undertaken  at the  beginning  of  2018, the inspectorates  were  also  given 
important new responsibilities with regard to the verification of interest and asset declarations, as well 

52   In  March 

its 
http://www.ciaf.government.bg/web/attachments/Page/56/3148/5c828fe972bb5.pdf 

anti-corruption 

published 

agency 

2019, 

new 

the 

first 

annual 

report: 

53   Information provided by the Bulgarian authorities in July and August 2019.  
54   Dubbed  in  the  media  as  ‘Apartmentgate’,  these  scandals  led  to  the  resignation  of  multiple  government 
officials,  including  ministers.  Various  investigations  are  currently  ongoing  into  the  affair,  led  by  the 
prosecution and tax authorities. The anti-corruption agency already carried out a check under the legislation 
on conflicts of interests and did not identify any circumstances that would fall under those provisions.  

55  He  had  already  been  on  leave  following  a  public  appeal  from  the  Prime  Minister  in  June  for  all  officials 
concerned  by  the  scandal  to  step  down  or  take  leave  to  allow  investigations  to  be  carried  out  free  of  any 
perceived risk of interference.  

56  In the context of the finalisation of the legislation in late 2017 and early 2018, concerns were raised over the 
fact that the management of the agency is elected by a simple majority in the National Assembly, creating a 
possible risk of politicisation of the agency’s management.  

11 

 
                                                           
as  the  assessment  of  concrete  instances  of  potential  conflicts  of  interest  for  lower  level  staff  not 
covered by the new anti-corruption agency.57  

The  implementation  of  the  new  standards  and  the  strengthening  of  capacity  of  the  inspectorates  is 
being  monitored  by  the  National  Anti-corruption  Policy  Council  and  has  reportedly  been  largely 
completed. 

Recommendation 11: Building on the analysis of past cases, establish a roadmap between all relevant 
institutions  to  address  shortcomings  in  the  investigation  and  prosecution  of  high-level  corruption 
cases, including a mechanism for the reporting of progress to the wider public. 

The  reform  of  the  criminal  justice  system  to  more  effectively  investigate  and  prosecute  high-level 
corruption has been a long-standing issue under the CVM and a focus of several recommendations of 
the  January  2017  report.  There  is  a  certain  amount  of  overlap  with  the  issues  dealt  with  in  the 
independent analysis of the Prosecutor’s Office and in the case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights.  Many  issues  highlighted  over  the  years  were  directly  related  to the  complex  and  formalistic 
Bulgarian  system  of  criminal  procedural  law  and  the  need  for  more  effective  coordination  and 
specialisation  in  the  investigatory  and  prosecutorial functions. The  November  2018  report  noted  the 
recent reforms of the criminal procedure code, including the transfer of important responsibilitities for 
high-level corruption to the Specialised Proscutor’s Office for organised crime as important steps.  

The Bulgarian authorities report that these reforms are beginning to bear fruit in terms of facilitating a 
more effective coordination of investigations and subsequent prosecution of corruption offences. The 
reform’s positive effects in terms of enabling an improvement of the track record of final convictions 
remains to be seen.58  

Efforts  continue  to  streamline  procedures  and  improve  cooperation  among  the  various  institutions 
involved in the investigation and prosecution of corruption.59 The new coordination council envisaged 
by the Bulgarian authorities could play an important ongoing role in monitoring progress in high-level 
corruption and ensuring a continued dialogue among all institutions involved, as well as reporting to 
the wider public on progress.60  

Recommendation  12:  Establish  a  mechanism  for  public  reporting  on  progress  in  high-level 
[corruption] cases which are in the public domain. General Prosecution to report – whilst respecting 
the  presumption  of  innocence  –  on  investigations  and  indictments.  Supreme  Court  of  Cassation and 
Ministry of Justice to report on convictions as well as the enforcement of sentences. 

As  already  reported  in  the  November  2017  and  November  2018  reports,  a  public  website  at  the 
Supreme  Court  of  Cassation  presents  information  on  ongoing  court  proceedings.  In  addition,  the 
annual reports on the activities of the Supreme Court of Cassation and on the application of the law 
and the activities of the courts include summary lists of decisions in corruption and organised crime 
cases, as well as brief summaries for each case. Similarly, the annual report of the Prosecutor’s Office 
contains information on cases of  high public interest, which includes cases related to corruption and 
serious organised crime.  

57   The anti-corruption agency focusses on high-level officials as set out in the law of January 2018, including 

ministers, parliamentarians, mayors, heads of administrative services, etc.  

58   See also under recommendation 12 below. 
59   For example, in January 2019, amendments to the criminal procedure code simplified the requirements on the 
presentation  of  indictments  in  court,  which  previously  had  allowed  defendants  to  require  a  full  reading  in 
court.  On the operational side, a  permanent contact  group has been set  up between the  Prosecutor’s Office 
and the new anti-corruption agency in order to facilitate cooperation between the two institutions. The group 
may  also  be  attended  by  other  relevant  authorities  such  as  the  revenue  agency  and  the  State  Agency  for 
National Security. Work is also ongoing to improve the system for providing technical experts in courts.  

60   On the coordination council, see under recommendation 5 above.  

12 

 
                                                           
As  regards  the  current  track  record  on  high-level  corruption,  the  Prosecutor’s  Office  reports  that  a 
significant number of investigations into high-level corruption are ongoing. A number of high-ranking 
officials  have  been  charged  or  brought  to  court,  including  senior  staff  in  the  State  or  regional 
administrations,  members  of  parliament,  magistrates,  former  government  ministers  and  deputy 
ministers,  and  a  significant  number  of  mayors.  Several  cases  have  also  progressed  through  the  trial 
phase,  some  resulting  in  convictions.  Despite  a  certain  number  of  sentences  being  imposed  at  first 
instance, however, it remains the case that very few final convictions have been adopted and enforced 
in cases involving high-level corruption. 

This is also an area envisaged by the Bulgarian authorities to be monitored by the new coordination 
council. As mentioned above, previous reports consistently note the need for Bulgaria to build a track 
record in high-level corruption cases. 

Benchmark 5: Take further measures to prevent and fight corruption, in particular at the 
borders and within local government 

The  November  2018  report  concluded  that  on  Benchmark  Five,  Bulgaria  had  made  significant 
progress  on  recommendations  13,  14  and  15.  The  report  also  noted  that  these  issues  would  need 
continued  follow-up  by  the  Bulgarian  authorities  over  the  longer  term  in  order  to  be  able  to  show 
concrete results. The benchmark was kept open.  

Recommendation  13:  Carry  out  an  external  review  of  the  ex  ante  checks  of  public  procurement 
procedures and their follow-up, including ex post checks, as well as on cases of conflicts of interest or 
corruption discovered and remedial measures taken to address identified shortcomings. 

Following this recommendation, the Bulgarian authorities have drawn on the assistance of the World 
Bank  in  2017  to  assess  the  effectiveness  of  their  public  procurement  framework.61  As  noted  in  the 
November  report,  the  project  included  an  assessment  of  the  overall  public  procurement  system, 
including  the  functions  of  the  national  Public  Procurement  Agency  concerning  ex  ante  checks  on 
public procurement procedures and their follow-up, as well as mechanisms to address issues such as 
conflicts of interest and the risk of corruption. 

The  Bulgarian  Public  Procurement  Agency  published  the  World  Bank  report  setting  out  the  main 
results  of  its  project  in  February  2019.62  Overall,  the  assessment  commends  the  progress  which  has 
been made by Bulgaria in modernising its public procurement since the public procurement strategy 
was launched in 2014 and the key legislation adopted in 2016. The progress was largely attributed to 
the leadership of Bulgaria’s Public Procurement Agency, which has been at the helm of reforms on a 
number of fronts.  

Despite  the  reported  progress,  the  World  Bank  sets  out  in  its  assessment  a  wide  range  of 
recommendations that the Bulgarian authorities will need to follow in order to address the remaining 
challenges.63 The review will feed into a future public procurement strategy and has also informed an 
action plan of concrete measures to be implemented over the coming months.64  

61   The  Agreement  with  the  World  Bank  was  signed  at  the  end  of  2017.  The  project  had  three  components: 
functional analysis of the PPA's capacity to effectively and efficiently carry out the assigned tasks (especially 
in  connection  with  the  ex-ante  control);  quantitative  and  qualitative  analysis  of  data  on  procurement 
procedures and contracts in order to establish the effectiveness of procurement processes; and assessing the 
overall functioning of the public procurement system after the entry into force of the new legislation. 

62   The  overall  assessment  of  the  public  procurement  system  in  Bulgaria  (under  the  third  component  of  the 
link:  

project) 
http://www.aop.bg/fckedit2/user/File/bg/agency/Bulgaria%20RAS%20Procurement%20Report%20Compone
nt%203%20(BG).pdf 

available 

this 

via 

is 

63   Recommendations  include  the  development  of  more  targeted  measures  to  deal  with  issues  of  fraud  and 
corruption,  such  as  sector  assessments  of  about  the  presence  of  fraud,  corruption  and  conflicts  of  interest, 
identification of vulnerabilities, and guidance on the application of integreity measures at the various  stages 

13 

 
                                                           
 
Recommendation 14:  Put in place risk-based measures to address low-level corruption in high risk 
sectors within the public administration, taking inspiration from what has been done in the Ministry of 
Interior. Continue the efforts in the Ministry of Interior. 

As noted in the November 2018 report, the National Anti-Corruption Policy Council agreed in early 
Spring 2018 a set of comprehensive uniform guidelines with the view of assessing the effectiveness of 
the sectorial anti-corruption plans and identifying ways to improve the system. Under these guidelines 
a  regular  cycle  for  the  implementation  of  the  sectorial  anti-corruption  plans  was  set  up,  with  each 
ministry drawing up and implementing its own plan. The sectorial anti-corruption plans for 2019 have 
already been submitted to the National Council on Anti-Corruption Policies and are publicly available 
on the websites of the relevant institutions.65  

The  National  Anti-Corruption  Policy  Council  provides  an  annual  assessment  of  the  sectorial  anti-
corruption  plans, ensuring  that  the  plans  are  up to date and  prepared  according to the  guidelines.  In 
this  context,  the  analysis  of  the  Council  is  key  in  identifying  weaknessess  and  areas  for  future 
improvement.66  Following  its  latest  assessment  of  the  anti-corruption  plans,  the  Council  adopted  a 
number  of  decisions,  which  include  the  obligation  for  all  competent  bodies  to  address  the 
recommendations in the analysis within one month and to inform the Council of the measures taken 
and their deadlines for implementation. In the event that the measures have not been adopted by the 
relevant authorities, the latter must inform the Council of the reasons.  

Previous reports have highlighted in particular the measures taken in recent years within the Ministry 
of  Interior,  including  measures  to  address  administrative  corruption  in  the  traffic  police  and  at  the 
borders. Recent developments in this regard include the acquisition of additional equipment67 and the 
implementation of integrity checks on staff in the Minister of Interior.68  

Furthermore,  in  the  future  the  new  coordination  council  referred  to  under  recommendation  5  above 
would also have a role to play in ensuring a continued focus on this area of work.69  

Recommendation  15:  Establish  a  mechanism  for  public  reporting  on  the  implementation  of  the 
national anti-corruption strategy covering the remaining duration of the Strategy's implementation. 

Previous  reports  have  noted  the  establishment  of  an  Anti-Corruption  Policy  Council  chaired  by  a 
National Anti-Corruption Coordinator with a broad remit to coordinate the implementation of the anti-
corruption  strategy.70  The  council  brings  together  all  the  key  authorities  involved  in  the  prevention, 
detection and investigation of corruption as well as a number of civil society organisations. It receives 

of the procedures. The World Bank report also recommends strengthening reporting channels on corruption 
and  conflicts  of  interest,  including  a  possibility  to  submit  anonymous  alerts  and  stronger  protection  of 
whistleblowers.  

64   For example, the Public Procurement Agency is to conduct periodic surveys among contracting authorities on 
the  effectiveness  of  its  ex  ante  checks,  and  a  cooperation  agreement  adopted  in  2017  among  relevant 
authorities for the prevention of conflicts of interest is to be reviewed and updated.  

65   Forty government ministries and other State bodies have developed sectorial anti-corruption plans.  
66   In  Spring  of  2019,  it  was  reported  by  the  National  Anti-corruption  Policy  Council  that  some  of  the  anti-
corruption  plans  that  had  been  drawn  up  revealed  an  imprecise  definition  of  the  measures,  with  proposed 
measures that were general or formal or reiterated the obligations under the law, or that the anti-corruption 
orientation was not clear in the plans. In some cases, there was a difficulty in determining the direction of the 
measure and in defining the indicators, making it difficult to assess objectively the effect of the measure. 

67   This includes cameras for police vehicles and border posts. 
68   Integrity  checks  in  the  Ministry  of  Interior  were  applied  for  the  first  time  in  February  2019,  but  has  been 

under preparation for some time.  
69   See also recommendation 15 below.  
70   Currently the anti-corruption coordinator is also deputy Prime Minister in charge of judicial reform.  

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regular  updates  on  the  work  of  the  different  authorities  under  the  national  anti-corruption  strategy71 
and publishes an annual implementation report.   

More recently, as described under recommendation 5 above, the government envisages the creation of 
a  broader  coordination  council  which  would  continue  to  monitor  progress  in  the  future  after  the 
monitoring under the CVM would have been brought to an end. The new council will cover corruption 
and  organised  crime  within  its  remit  in  addition  to  judicial  reform  and  rule  of  law  more  generally. 
Continued monitoring has a particular relevance with regard to the fight against corruption, which is 
an area where Bulgaria continues to face significant challenges.72 

Benchmark  6  (provisionally  closed):  Implement  a  strategy  to  fight  organised  crime, 
focussing on serious crime, money laundering as well as on the systematic confiscation of 
assets of criminals. Report on new and ongoing investigations in these areas 

The  November  2018  report  concluded  that  on  Benchmark  Six,  developments  had  confirmed  the 
conclusion  of  the  previous  report  that  Bulgaria  had  made  significant  progress  on  the  two 
recommendations.  On  this  basis,  the  Benchmark  was  provisionally  closed.  This  implies  that  the 
Commission continues to work with Bulgaria on general issues of fighting organised crime, including 
serious  crime,  money  laundering  as  well  as  on  the  systematic  confiscation  of  assets  of  criminals  as 
with other EU Member States. 

Recommendation  16:  Establish  a  mechanism  for  public  reporting  on  progress  in  high-level 
[organised  crime]  cases  which  are  in  the  public  domain.  General  Prosecution  to  report  –  whilst 
respecting  the  presumption  of  innocence  –  on  investigations  and  indictments.  Supreme  Court  of 
Cassation and Ministry of Justice to report on convictions as well as the enforcement of sentences. 

Recommendation 17: Adopt the necessary amendments to the law on confiscation of criminal assets 
and ensure the Illegal Asset Forfeiture Commission continues to operate independently and efficiently. 

Since November 2018 the Bulgarian authorities have continued their work in this area to consolidate a 
track record in the fight against organised crime.  

With  regard  to  the  confiscation  of  criminal  assets,  a  ruling  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  Cassation  in 
December 2018 necessitated legislative amendments to clarify the legislative framework with regard 
to the civil asset forfeiture regime. The confiscation of illicit assets through a civil law procedure has 
been  seen  as  a  key  element  of  the  Bulgarian  system  since  2012,  but  according  to  the  ruling  of  the 
Supreme  Court  the  law  should  be  interpreted  to  the  effect  that  the  termination  of  the  criminal 
proceedings  constitutes  an  absolute  procedural  obstacle  to  the  continuation  of  the  confiscation 
proceedings.  Following  the  ruling,  targeted  amendments  were  enacted  by  the  National  Assembly  to 
clarify  that  confiscation  through  a  civil  procedure  was  not  dependent  on  the  continuation  of  the 
criminal  proceedings  or  their  outcome.  A  number  of  cases  nevertheless  had  to  be  dropped  in  the 
immediate aftermath of the supreme court ruling. 73  

71   The  current  Bulgarian  anti-corruption  strategy  dates  from  2015.  An  English  version  can  be  found  via  the 
following link: http://rai-see.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Bulgaria_Anti-corruption_strategy_-2015.pdf   
72   The  January  2017  report  highlighted  the  two  benchmarks  concerning  corruption  as  those  where  the  least 
progress had been made over the ten years of the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism. The subsequent 
reports  of  November  2017  and  November  2018  note  several  significant  further  steps  but  continued  to 
highlight the need for Bulgaria to develop a track record of concrete results.  

73   After the ruling and the legislative changes that followed it, criticism was raised by some stakeholders that 
the  civil  procedure  did  not  provide  sufficient  protection  of  fundamental  rights.  In  addition,  a  request  for  a 
preliminary  ruling  by  the  Sofia  City  court  concerning  the  compatibility  of  the  Bulgarian  legislation  with 
European law is pending at the European Court of Justice (Case C-234/18).  

15