REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL on Progress in Bulgaria under the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism
Date: 2019-10-22
Institutions: European Commission, Secretariat-General
Subjects: Bulgaria, corruption, criminal law, independence of the judiciary, judicial reform, organised crime, rule of law

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 22.10.2019  COM(2019) 498 final  REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL on Progress in Bulgaria under the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism {SWD(2019) 392 final}  
 
 
1. 

INTRODUCTION 

The  Cooperation  and  Verification  Mechanism  (CVM)  was  established  at  the  accession  of 
Bulgaria  to  the  European  Union  in  2007  as  a  transitional  measure  to  facilitate  Bulgaria’s 
continued efforts to reform its judiciary and step up the fight against corruption and organised 
crime.1 The CVM represented a joint commitment of the Bulgarian State and of the Union to 
remedy  a  number  of  remaining  shortcomings  identified  at  the  time  of  accession,  with  the 
CVM  to  continue  until  the  Commission  considered  that  a  number  of  specified  benchmarks 
were satisfactorily fulfilled.  

The CVM has been working since 2007 to encourage and follow the reform process on these 
issues.  In  January  2017  the  Commission  undertook  a  comprehensive  assessment  of  the 
progress  made by  Bulgaria over the ten  years since the establishment of the CVM.2 On this 
basis, the report set out a clear path towards conclusion of the CVM, based on seventeen key 
recommendations. Given the progress made, the Commission considered that a follow-up to 
these seventeen recommendations by Bulgaria would constitute a sufficient condition to close 
the  CVM,  unless  developments  in  the  meantime  were  to  clearly  reverse  the  course  of 
progress. Many of the recommendations focused on building internal safeguards to ensure the 
irreversibility  of  results  and  to  demonstrate  that  ongoing  projects  would  be  continued  and 
progress consolidated, even without the CVM.  
Since  then,  the  Commission  has  carried  out  two  assessments  of  progress  on  the 
implementation  of  the  final  key  recommendations.  In  the  November  2017  report,3  the 
Commission  concluded  that  significant  progress  had  been  achieved.  While  the  Commission 
could not yet determine that any of the benchmarks were satisfactorily fulfilled, it made clear 
that,  with  a  continued  political  steer  and  a  determination  to  advance  the  reform,  Bulgaria 
should be able to fulfil the remaining outstanding CVM recommendations in the near future. 
The  Council  welcomed  the  significant  positive  steps  made,  while  noting  that  much  still 
needed to be done.4  

In  November  2018,5  the  Commission  welcomed  progress  towards  swift  conclusion  of  the 
CVM  and  concluded  that  benchmarks  one,  two  and  six  could  be  considered  provisionally 
closed. On the remaining three benchmarks, relating to the continued reform of the judiciary 
and  the  fight  against  corruption,  further  efforts  were  still  needed  in  order  to  ensure  full 
implementation  of  the  January  2017  recommendations.  The  Council  took  note  of  the 
Commission’s  conclusions  and  encouraged  Bulgaria  to  build  on  the  positive  momentum  to 
consolidate progress in a conclusive and irreversible manner.6   

This  report  presents  the  Commission’s  assessment  of  the  progress  made  by  Bulgaria  in  the 
context of the CVM since November 2018. As in previous years, the assessment is the result 
of  a  careful  analysis  by  the  Commission,  drawing  on  close  cooperation  with  the  Bulgarian 
authorities as well as on input from civil society and other stakeholders and observers. It also 

1   Commission  Decision  2006/929/EC  of  13  December  2006  establishing  a  mechanism  for  cooperation  and 
verification  of  progress  in  Bulgaria  to  address  specific  benchmarks  in  the  areas  of  judicial  reform  and  the 
fight  against  corruption  and  organised  crime  (C(2006)  6570);  see  also  conclusions  of  the  Council  of 
Ministers of 17 October 2006 (Council document 13339/06) 

2
   Report on Progress in Bulgaria under the Co-operation and Verification Mechanism, COM(2017) 43.  
3   Report on Progress in Bulgaria under the Co-operation and Verification Mechanism, COM(2017) 750. 
4   Council conclusions on the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism of 12 December 2017 (15587/17). 
5   Report on Progress in Bulgaria under the Co-operation and Verification Mechanism, COM(2018) 850 final. 
6   Council conclusions on the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism of 11 December 2018 (15187/18). 

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takes account of the evolution of the EU’s policies and case law in CVM-relevant areas since 
the establishment of the CVM. 

2.   GENERAL SITUATION 

Previous  reports  have  noted  that  contextual  factors  –  outside  the  remit  of  the  the  CVM  but 
with wider rule of law relevance – may, at times, have a negative impact on the progress of 
reforms.  Such  factors  have  included  overall  political  instability,  an  unpredictable  legislative 
process,  and  a  media  environment  recognised  as  raising  serious  concerns.  In  Bulgaria,  the 
period since the report of November 2018 has been characterised by relative political stability, 
though  a  particular  controversy  emerged  around  allegations  concerning  the  acquisition  of 
properties at below-market prices by high-level officials and politicians.7  

The November 2017 report also highlighted issues concerning the legislative process,  citing 
the  example  of  the  adoption  of  amendments  to  the  Judicial  System  Act  in  summer  2017, 
which  led  to  concerns  among  stakeholders  and  leading  to  challenges  at  the  Bulgarian 
Constitutional Court.8 The need for vigilance concerning impacts on the independence of the 
judiciary was highlighted.  

Independent and pluralistic media are of key importance for democratic debate and should be 
able to operate free from undue pressure by economic or political interests.9 Though the media 
environment is outside the benchmarks of the CVM,10 its shortcomings continue to impact on 
the justice system. While fully respecting freedom of expression and the indispensable role of 
the  media  in  holding  authorities  to  account  and  informing  the  public,  the  Supreme  Judicial 
Council  has  an  important  responsibility  to  speak  out  in  defense  of  the  principle  of  judicial 
independence.  The  stronger  policy  adopted  last  year  should  lead  to  more  action  to  address 
misleading coverage in the media or statements by politicians affecting the reputation and the 
credibility  of  the  justice  system  as  a  whole.  This  includes  cases  with  a  pattern  of  targeted 
criticism  against  judges  based  on  the  content  of  their  rulings,  which  could  compromise  the 
independence and impartiality of the judicial process.11  

Mechanisms supporting the sustainability of the rule of law 

Another important facet of the underlying environment is the development of a broader rule 
of law infrastructure at both EU and national level. This is developing in a way which offers 
new tools to give a momentum to consolidating the rule of law – including the issues covered 
by the CVM. At EU level, national judicial systems have for several years been looked at in 

7   The  revelations  led  to  the  resignation  of  a  number  of  high-ranking  officials  and  politicians,  including  the 
former minister of justice, the head of the anti-corruption agency, and the head of the parliamentary group of 
the main governing party.  

8   See section 3.1 below. 
9   Reporters  Without  Borders  has  found  that  threats  against  reporters  have  now  increased  to  an  extent  that 
journalism can be considered dangerous in Bulgaria. In their 2019 Press Freedom Index, Bulgaria retained its 
111th position among 180 countries worldwide, consolidating its position as the worst performer within the 
European Union, following a significant deterioration since 2013: https://rsf.org/en/bulgaria. As an example, 
in September 2019, a surprise dismissal of a news commentator at the national radio raised concerns over its 
independence  from  outside  pressure,  sparking  street  protests  and  calls  for  a  parliamentary  enquiry.  On  27 
September the National Assembly decided to set up an ad hoc commission of enquiry to look in to the affair.  

10   Such issues will be within the scope of the future rule of law mechanism. 
11   A  parole  decision  of  the  Sofia  Appeal  Court  in  a  highly  mediatised  case  in  September  2019  resulted  in  a 
combination  of  commentary  and  steps  taken  against  the  presiding  judges.  This  led  to  criticism  from  the 
Bulgarian  Association  of  Judges  about  the  lack  of  an  effective  reaction  from  the  judicial  members  of  the 
Supreme Judicial Council.  

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the  EU  Justice  Scoreboard,12  and,  together  with  the  anti-corruption  frameworks,  under  the 
European  Semester  of  economic  policy  coordination  and  structural  reform.13  This  will  be 
developed  further  based  on  the  Commission’s  Communication  of  July  201914  setting  out 
concrete  actions  to  strengthen  the  Union’s  capacity  to  promote  and  uphold  the  rule  of  law, 
through promotion of a common rule of law culture, the establishment of a rule of law review 
cycle  to  monitor  developments  in  Member  States,  and  an  effective  response.  The  Political 
Guidelines of the next Commission, setting out the intention to put in place a comprehensive 
rule of law mechanism with an EU-wide scope and objective reporting for all Member States, 
guarantee  continuity  in  this  respect.15  Beyond  the  CVM  benchmarks,  effective  judicial 
protection by independent courts is required by Article 19(1) TEU as a concrete expression of 
the value of the rule of law, as confirmed by the European Court of Justice’s recent case law. 
The  existence  of  these  horizontal  processes  monitoring  the  rule  of  law,  including  anti-
corruption frameworks, in all Member States, and the perspective of their further evolution, 
underline the specific nature of the CVM as a monitoring process limited both in terms of the 
Member States concerned, and the issues covered. 

The development of reform mechanisms at the national level was also central to the January 
2017  recommendations.  These  underlined  the  importance  of  developing  mechanisms  to 
internalise monitoring at the national level, embedding it in domestic processes involving not 
only  the  authorities,  but  also  civil  society.  In  line  with  this  approach,  the  November  2018 
report  underlined  that  Bulgaria  needed  to  continue  to  develop  a  track  record  of  concrete 
results both under the CVM and in the future, and that continued monitoring by the Bulgarian 
authorities  was  an  important  part  of  this,  also  after  any  closure  of  the  CVM.  The  report 
highlighted in particular the importance of transparent reporting and public scrutiny in making 
domestic monitoring a safeguard to maintain the path of progress and reform.  

Bulgaria  has  already  put  in  place  important  elements  of  such  domestic  monitoring  and 
consultation  of stakeholders, including specific  consultative councils in  the areas of judicial 
reform  and  the  fight  against  corruption.16  In  addition,  the  Bulgarian  government  recently 
decided  to  establish  an  additional,  more  comprehensive  mechanism  for  domestic  post-
monitoring centred in a Coordination and Cooperation Council (‘post-monitoring council’).17 
The new post-monitoring council will start its work after an end of the CVM, meeting at least 
every  three  months.18  Its  co-chairs  would  be  a  deputy  Prime  Minister  in  charge  of  judicial 
reform  and  the  representative  of  the  Supreme  Judicial  Council.19  It  will  be  responsible  for 
overseeing the continued progress of reforms and will issue a public report after each meeting, 

12   https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/upholding-rule-law/eu-justice-

scoreboard_en  

13   https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-coordination/eu-economic-

governance-monitoring-prevention-correction/european-semester_en   

14   Strengthening  the  rule  of  law  within  the  Union  -  A  blueprint  for  action,  COM/2019/343  final.  This  will 

complement the 2014 rule of law framework     

15   Political guidelines for the next Commission (2019-2024) - "A Union that strives for more: My agenda for 
Europe"  p.  14-15,  see  https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/political-guidelines-next-
commission_en.pdf.  

16   See benchmarks three and five below. 
17   Participation of institutions outside the executive branch will be on a voluntary basis.  
18   The new structure was approved by the government on 18 September, see Council of Ministers,  Decree No. 
240 of  24  September  2019  establishing  a  National  Mechanism  for  Monitoring  the  fight  against  corruption 
and organised crime, judicial reform and the rule of law and a Coordination and Cooperation Council.  

  The  Minister  of  Justice  will  act  as  deputy  chair  and  the  Ministry  of  Justice  as  secretariat.  The  decree  also 
states  that  the  secretariat  coordinates  wherever  there  is  a  need  to  send  information  to  the  European 
Commission. 

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as  well  as  an  annual  report  to  the  government  and  the  Supreme  Judicial  Council.  It  will 
receive information  from  a broad range of relevant  institutions and will also include a civic 
council with representatives of civil society and professional associations of the judiciary.20  

This  post-monitoring  council  should  monitor  and  coordinate  policies  in  the  area  of  judicial 
reform  and  the  fight  against  corruption  and  organised  crime.  As  such,  it  should  provide  an 
important  overarching  framework  for  authorities  and  stakeholders  to  evaluate  progress  in  a 
transparent manner and to focus attention on remaining challenges. It could also contribute to 
holding the relevant authorities to account where necessary and appropriate.21 The Bulgarian 
authorities have committed at Prime Ministerial level to give the council a particular role so 
that it acts as an effective tool in monitoring the implementation of reforms and the evolution 
of track record in the fight against corruption and organised crime, as well as in future policy 
coordination.  

The  Commission  welcomes  this  commitment  of  the  Bulgarian  authorities  to  maintain  the 
momentum of reform, in full transparency and with the involvement of civil society, once the 
CVM ends. The post-monitoring council should be an important interlocutor able to provide 
input to the developing dialogue on the rule of law at EU level and the future comprehensive 
rule of law mechanism.  

3.  ASSESSMENT  OF  PROGRESS  ON  THE  FULFILMENT  OF  THE  CVM 
BENCHMARKS ON THE BASIS OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS SET OUT IN 
THE JANUARY 2017 CVM REPORT  

3.1   Benchmarks provisionally closed in the November 2018 report (One, Two, Six) 

Benchmark One: Judicial Independence 

Recommendation 1: Ensure a transparent election for the future Supreme Judicial Council, 
with  a  public  hearing  in  the  National  Assembly  before  the  election  of  the  members  of  the 
parliamentary  quota,  and  giving  civil  society  the  possibility  to  make  observations  on  the 
candidates. 

Recommendation 2: Establish a track record of transparent and merit-based appointments to 
high–level  judicial  posts,  including  the  upcoming  appointment  of  a  new  President  of  the 
Supreme Administrative Court. 

Recommendation 3: To improve the practical functioning of the Judicial Inspection and the 
follow-up  by  the  Supreme  Judicial  Council  to  the  inspectorate's  findings,  in  particular  on 
integrity  issues,  consider  soliciting  external  assistance,  for  example  from  the  Structural 
Reform Support Service and/or Council of Europe. 

Benchmark Two: Legal Framework 

Recommendation  4:  Adopt  amendments  to  the  Criminal  Procedure  Code  and  the  Criminal 
Code to improve the legal framework for the prosecution of high-level corruption and serious 
organised crime. 

20   Its  members  will  participate  in  the  meetings  of  the  post-monitoring  council  as  observers  and  it  may  give 

opinions and make proposals.  

21   The decree explicitly states that the council will work in full respect of the separation of powers and judicial 

independence.  

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Benchmark Six: Organised Crime 

Recommendation 16: Establish  a mechanism for  public reporting on progress in  high-level 
organised crime cases which are in the public domain. General Prosecution to report – whilst 
respecting the presumption of innocence – on investigations and indictments. Supreme Court 
of  Cassation  and  Ministry  of  Justice  to  report  on  convictions  as  well  as  the  enforcement  of 
sentences. 

Recommendation 17: Adopt the necessary amendments to the law on confiscation of criminal 
assets and ensure the Illegal Asset Forfeiture Commission continues to operate independently 
and efficiently. 

This section covers the three benchmarks that were provisionally closed in November 2018. 
They concern the reform of the constitutional and legislative framework and the fight against 
organised crime to answer shortcomings specific to Bulgaria at the time of its accession to the 
European  Union.  The  provisional  closure  meant  that  the  Commission  considered  that  the 
structural  and  legislative  changes  made  had  satisfactorily  fulfilled  the  requirements  of  the 
CVM, while monitoring of implementation continued. 

Past reports noted the progress of Bulgaria since accession in amending its constitutional and 
legislative  framework  to  improve  safeguards  for  judicial  independence,  as  well  as  the 
transparency  and  the  efficiency  of  the  judicial  process.  Among  the  recent  improvements, 
amendments  to  the  constitution  in  2015  brought  about  a  reform  of  the  Supreme  Judicial 
Council and a stronger judicial inspectorate. These amendments have now been in place for a 
number  of  years  and  have  resulted  in  a  more  transparent  and  accountable  process  around 
judicial appointments and integrity.22 Consequently, the November 2018 report concluded that 
the two benchmarks related to the constitutional and legal framework could be provisionally 
closed. Judicial appointments and the functioning of the judicial inspectorate were identified 
as areas for ongoing monitoring, and certain aspects of the legal environment also remained 
open for further consideration in the context of other benchmarks.23  

Since  November  2018,  the  Supreme  Judicial  Council  has  continued  to  perform  its 
responsibilities with regard to judicial appointments. There were some cases of delay due to 
the  failure  of  the  Supreme  Judicial  Council  to  find  a  consensus,  for  example    regarding 
appointments  to  certain  key  posts  within  the  public  prosecutor’s  office.  It  remains  essential 
that  such  appointments  be  carried  out  in  a  transparent  and  merit-based  manner  and  that 
qualified potential  candidates are encouraged to  apply,  with  the certainty that all candidates 
will be assessed solely on their merits.  

An important upcoming appointment is that to the post of Prosecutor General, the term of the 
incumbent  ending  in  January  2020.  The  Supreme  Judicial  Council  opened  the  procedure  in 
June and is expected to nominate a successor on 24 October 2019, who will then have to be 
confirmed  by  the  President  of  the  Republic.24  In  July  2019  a  single  candidate  was 

22   In  2017,  a  new  judicial  council  was  elected  under  the  new  more  transparent  procedures  and  the  judicial 

inspectorate started implementing its new competences in the area of integrity.  

23   This referred specifically to benchmark three on continued judicial reform and benchmark four on the fight 
against high-level corruption, where legislative action remain relevant in relation to the follow-up to the key 
issues  raised  by  the  Council  of  Europe  and  the  independent  expert  analysis  of  the  Bulgarian  public 
prosecutor’s office.  

24   The President can reject a candidate once, but cannot block a nominee if put forward a second time by the 

Supreme Judicial Council.  

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unanimously supported by the members of the prosecutorial chamber of the Supreme Judicial 
Council.25  The  candidate  has  presented  his  written  priorities  for  the  seven-year  term.  The 
procedure  also  provides  for  a  hearing  ahead  of  the  nomination,  in  which  questions  and 
concerns of civil society and other stakeholders can be raised. Over the past weeks, a broad 
debate has  taken place in  the media, with  some stakeholders voicing concerns in  relation  to 
the procedure and the candidate.26 It will be the responsibility of the Supreme Judicial Council 
to ensure a transparent process and show that concerns raised have been addressed and taken 
into account by its decision. 

Apart  from  the  reform  of  the  Supreme  Judicial  Council,  the  other  main  element  of  the 
constitutional amendments of 2015 was a stronger role of the judicial inspectorate in relation 
to the integrity of magistrates. Following a recommendation of the January 2017 report, the 
Bulgarian authorities requested assistance from the Commission’s Structural Reform Support 
Service  and  a  project  was  officially  launched  in  July  2019,  with  the  involvement  of  the 
Council  of  Europe  and  international  experts.  The  project  aims  at  reviewing  the  working 
methods of the judicial inspectorate and providing assistance to the inspectorate to learn from 
best practices in other Member States. It is expected to be completed in spring 2020.  

The broader legislative framework has seen a number of reforms over the years. Recent CVM 
reports have noted in particular the positive effects of amendments of the Judicial System Act 
in  2016  and  of  the  criminal  procedure  code  in  2017.  The  November  2018  report  noted  that 
some  key  aspects  of  the  legislative  framework  were  still  under  consideration.  These 
concerned  in  particular  issues  of  effective  criminal  investigation,  including  of  a  Prosecutor 
General while in office. These issues are closely related to the follow-up on recommendations 
under benchmarks three and four (see below).27  

In a separate development, the Constitutional Court ruled in February 2019 that the provisions 
inserted  in  2017  into  Article  230  of  the  Judicial  System  Act  providing  for  the  automatic 
suspension  of  magistrates  in  case  of  the  initiation  of  a  criminal  investigation  against  them, 
were incompatible with the Bulgarian Constitution.28 On 20 September 2019, the government 
submitted draft amendments to bring the law in conformity with the Constitution by repealing 
these provisions, and committed to pursue its swift adoption in the National Assembly.29  

Finally,  the  November  2018  report  also  provisionally  closed  benchmark  six  related  to  the 
fight  against  organised  crime,  reflecting  the  positive  developments  in  the  institutional 
environment  and  track  record  over  the  years,  in  spite  of  a  challenging  environment. 
Developments since November 2018 have not raised new relevant issues.  

25   Under  Bulgarian  law,  candidates  could  be  presented  on  the  initiative  of  members  of  the  prosecutorial 
chamber of the judicial council or of the Minister of Justice. The Minister of Justice had already indicated his 
intention not to present a candidate.  

26   This also included street protests organised by civil society organisations.  
27   Sections 3.2 and 3.3.  
28   Concerns  have  been  raised  that  provisions  for  the  automatic  suspension  of  magistrates  following  the  mere 
initiation of a criminal investigation could risk undermining judicial independence. The Court ruled that the 
Supreme  Judicial  Council  needs  to  be  able  to  assess  the  necessity  and  proportionality  of  the  suspending 
measure in each case.  

29   Another important amendment passed in 2017 created a requirement for judges, prosecutors and investigating 
magistrates to declare their membership of professional associations to the Supreme Judicial Council, which 
raised concerns over the freedom of association for judges in the Bulgarian context. The draft amendments 
presented on 20 September also include a repeal of this requirement.  

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The analysis of progress over the past year has confirmed the conclusions of November 2018 
which led to the provisional closure of these benchmarks. Whilst there are inevitably relevant 
ongoing  issues  which  will  need  continued  attention  from  the  Bulgarian  authorities,  the 
recommendations made in January 2017 have been satisfactorily addressed.  

3.2   Benchmark Three: Continued Judicial Reform 

Recommendation  5:  Publish  a  report  for  public  consultation  detailing  the  progress  made 
implementing the national judicial reform strategy and setting out the remaining steps to be 
taken.  Establish  a  mechanism  for  continued  public  reporting  of  progress  for  the  remaining 
duration of the strategy's implementation. 

Recommendation 6:  Address  the workload situation in  the busiest  courts  based on the new 
workload standards, and agree a roadmap for the reform of the judicial map in parallel with 
the development of e-justice. 

Recommendation 7: Establish a roadmap for the implementation of the recommendations of 
the Structural Reform Support Service report concerning the reform of the Prosecutor's Office 
and  its  interactions  with  other  institutions,  including  a  mechanism  for  the  reporting  of 
progress to the wider public. 

Recommendation 8: Establish a roadmap for the implementation of the recommendations of 
the study on ECtHR rulings, including a mechanism for the reporting of progress to the wider 
public. 

The November 2018 report noted significant progress on the four recommendations related to 
the continuation of judicial reform.  However, important  developments  were still ongoing or 
required continued monitoring to confirm the assessment of progress.  

Since  2017,  the  government  has  established  a  regular  cycle  of  monitoring  and  reporting  on 
progress in the implementation of the judicial reform strategy. A consultative council for the 
continuation  of  the  judicial  reform,  established  under  the  auspices  of  Ministry  of  Justice  in 
2016, plays an important  role in  this.  These processes provide a framework for cooperation 
with  stakeholders  on  ongoing  legislative  files  and  could  also  be  used  in  the  preparation  of 
future updates of the judicial reform strategy. The future post-monitoring council would also 
play a key role in monitoring progress following an end to the CVM. 30  

One  important  challenge  which  will  involve  an  ongoing  effort  in  the  coming  years  is  to 
improve the efficiency and accessibility of the judiciary through the introduction of e-justice 
and a balanced management of workload across the judiciary. While a comprehensive reform 
has been subject to several delays over the years, since 2017 the Supreme Judicial Council has 
taken  important  steps  to  address  these  challenges  through  a  range  of  measures,  and  further 
efforts are ongoing.  

Another  important  challenge  subject  to  ongoing  attention  is  the  functioning  of  the  overall 
system for the investigation and prosecution of high-level corruption. Important progress has 
been  made  over  the  years.  Recently  these  efforts  have  been  informed  by  an  independent 
analysis  of  the  functioning  of  the  Prosecutor’s  Office  carried  out  in  201631  as  well  as  by 

30   See section 2 above.  
31 

  The  analysis  was  assisted  by  the  Commission’s  Structural  Reform  Support  Service  and  involved  senior 
prosecutors from Germany, France, The Netherlands and Spain. The recommendations of the study served as 
a basis for a roadmap drawn up by the Bulgarian authorities in 2017.  

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analysis of case law of the European Court of Human Rights, focussing on issues identified 
by  the  Court  in  2016  as  a  systematic  problem  of  ineffective  criminal  investigations  in 
Bulgaria. This resulted in a number of important steps set out in previous CVM reports. Key 
points  still  under  consideration  include  the  process  for  initiating  criminal  investigations, 
including  the  role  of  preliminary  enquiries,32  and  the  possible  need  for  judicial  review  of 
prosecutorial decisions not to open an investigation.  

A particularly sensitive issue concerns the creation of procedures ensuring the independence 
at  all  stages  of  any  investigations  involving  allegations  of  criminal  misconduct  by  a 
Prosecutor  General  while  still  in  office.33  In  June,  the  Minister  of  Justice  presented  draft 
amendments  to  the  criminal  procedures  code  and  to  the  Judicial  System  Act,  as  a  basis  for 
public debate with stakeholders on a possible government proposal, setting out a mechanism 
for  initiating  criminal  proceedings  against  a  sitting  Prosecutor  General,  and  also  against  the 
Presidents of the Supreme Court of Cassation and of the Supreme Administrative Court.34  

These draft amendments attracted significant public attention, including by civil society and 
judicial stakeholders, which raised a number of concerns but also highlighted the importance 
of  open  and  transparent  consultation  on  such  sensitive  matters.  The  debate  raised  questions 
about  whether  the  proposed  amendments  brought  sufficient  clarity  as  to  how  they  would 
ensure  an  independent  investigation  of  a  sitting  Prosecutor  General.35  In  addition,  the 
envisaged inclusion of the Presidents of the Supreme Court of Cassation and of the Supreme 
Administrative  Court  in  the  scope  of  the  proposed  mechanism  raised  new  concerns  about  a 
possible  risk  for  judicial  independence,36  particularly  given  that  the  requirements  of 
independence are different for prosecutors and judges.37  

32   The  preliminary  enquiries  precede  the  formal  pre-trial  phase  and  aim  to  assess  the  existence  of  sufficient 

evidence for the initiation of a formal criminal investigation.   

33   The Council of Europe is still monitoring the follow-up by Bulgaria on these issues, many of which were also 
reflected in the independent analysis of the Prosecutor’s Office referred to above. In March 2019, the Council 
of Europe  ’invited  the authorities to  submit, before  1 October 2019, information on concrete  proposals for 
measures  in  the  above  three  areas,  all  of  which  are  essential  for  upholding  of  the  rule  of  law,  and  in  this 
connection encouraged them to cooperate closely with the Secretariat and make use of the expertise available 
through the Council of Europe’ and furthermore instructed its secretariat to prepare a draft interim resolution 
for  examination 
is  achieved. 
the  event 
https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectID=09000016809372d5  

in  December  2019, 

tangible  progress 

that  no 

in 

  The draft amendments were presented in a meeting of a working group under the Ministry of Justice, which 

34 

was extraordinarily web streamed online, and the texts were subsequently made public.  

35   The proposed procedure would require the Supreme Judicial Council to authorise the initiation of a criminal 
investigation against the chief magistrates in a similar way to the procedure whereby an authorisation of the 
National Assembly is required for criminal proceedings to be initiated against a Member of Parliament. The 
plenary of the council would take this decision on a motion of three members of the relevant chamber of the 
council  (the  prosecutorial  chamber  in  case  of  the  Prosecutor  General)  or  of  the  Minister  of  Justice.  The 
decision  would  entail  the  automatic  suspension  from  office  and  the  investigation  would  be  carried  out  by 
prosecutors of the  specialised prosecutor’s office  for organised crime or the  Sofia  City  prosecutor’s office, 
depending on the nature of the alleged crime.  

36   The  concerns  with  regard  to  judicial  independence  focused  in  particular  on  the  proportionality  of  the 
envisaged suspension from office, which would follow automatically from a decision of to open a criminal 
investigation.  In  addition,  the  view  was  expressed  that  no  special  procedure  was  needed  for  the  court 
presidents, as the prosecution is already able to conduct an independent investigation within the current legal 
framework.  

37   This aspect is for example recalled in the Venice  Commission’s opinion of October 2017 on the Bulgarian 

Judicial System Act (Opinion No. 855 / 2016, p. 10).  

8 

 
                                                           
While  it  is  welcome  that  the  Bulgarian  authorities  had  initiated  a  public  debate  based  on 
concrete  proposals  on  this  sensitive  topic,  it  will  be  crucial  for  the  maintenance  of  public 
confidence that the concerns raised are adequately addressed. In such cases, the Commission 
considers  that  there  are  great  benefits  in  drawing  on  the  Council  of  Europe  and  other 
independent expertise. To ensure that the amendment as finally adopted will contain adequate 
safeguards  for  judicial  independence,  the  Bulgarian  authorities  have  requested  an  opinion 
from  the  European  Commission  for  Democracy  Through  Law  (Venice  Commission).38  The 
request was sent to the Venice Commission by the Minister of Justice on 24 September 2019, 
and  in  contacts  at  Prime  Ministerial  level  with  the  European  Commission,  Bulgaria  has 
committed to fulfil the recommendations of the Venice Commission in compliance with the 
parameters of the Bulgarian constitutional order. The Commission welcomes the readiness of 
the Bulgarian authorities to draw on outside expertise to help find a measured and balanced 
solution, to guarantee that judicial independence is assured in the future procedure.  

While the proposals already presented concern in particular the issue of effective investigation 
of  top  magistrates,  the  broader  systemic  issue  of  effective  investigations  also  needs  careful 
consideration by the Bulgarian authorities, in due respect of the need for wide consultation of 
stakeholders  and  experts.  The  Bulgarian  government  has  committed  to  continue  its 
cooperation  with  the  Council  of  Europe  to  find  workable  solutions  on  these  matters,  which 
need to be in line with the case law of the European Court of Human Rights.39  

On  the  basis  of  the  analysis  of  benchmark  three,  Bulgaria  has  taken  important  steps  to 
implement  recommendations  5,  6,  7  and  8,  and  these  recommendations  can  be  considered 
satisfactorily  fulfilled.  The  Bulgarian  government  has  also  set  in  train  a  set  of  follow-up 
measures and the Commission welcomes the commitments made by the Bulgarian government 
in this respect. Such follow-up needs to be allowed the necessary time for broad consultation 
of stakeholders and experts, including the relevant bodies of the Council of Europe. It would 
also be a subject matter for examination by the post-monitoring council, and would feed into 
to the future dialogue with the Commission in the framework of the comprehensive rule of law 
mechanism. 

3.3   Benchmark Four: High-level Corruption 

Recommendation 9: Adopt a new legal framework on the fight against corruption in line with 
the intentions set out in the anti-corruption strategy, and ensure its implementation. Set up an 
effective anti-corruption authority. 

Recommendation 10: Adopt and implement a reform of the law on public administration to 
strengthen the internal inspectorates in the public administration. 

Recommendation 11: Building on the analysis of past cases, establish a roadmap between all 
relevant  institutions  to  address  shortcomings  in  the  investigation  and  prosecution  of  high-
level  corruption  cases,  including  a  mechanism  for  the  reporting  of  progress  to  the  wider 
public. 

38   The European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) is an advisory body under the 
Council of Europe, advising its member states on constitutional matters and European standards in the fields 
of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. 

39   A roundtable discussion involving representatives of the authorities, judicial institutions and experts from the 

Council of Europe took place in June 2019.  

9 

 
                                                           
Recommendation 12: Establish  a mechanism for  public reporting on progress in  high-level 
corruption  cases  which  are  in  the  public  domain.  General  Prosecution  to  report  –  whilst 
respecting the presumption of innocence – on investigations and indictments. Supreme Court 
of  Cassation  and  Ministry  of  Justice  to  report  on  convictions  as  well  as  the  enforcement  of 
sentences. 

The  November  2018  report  noted  significant  progress  by  Bulgaria  on 
the  four 
recommendations related to the fight against high-level corruption. At the same time, it also 
noted that a solid track record of final convictions in high-level corruption cases was still to 
be  developed,  and  that  continued  monitoring  of  the  new  anti-corruption  institutional 
framework was needed in order to consolidate the progress made.  

The comprehensive reforms of the general  anti-corruption institutional  framework that were 
carried out over the past two years have started to have an impact. This relates in particular to 
the  January  2018  anti-corruption  law  establishing  a  new  anti-corruption  agency,  the  2017 
amendments to the law on public administration clarifying the legal framework for the work 
of  internal  inspectorates,  and  the  2017  amendments  to  the  criminal  procedural  code,  giving 
the  specialised  prosecutor’s  office  and  court  for  organised  crime  additional  powers  with 
regard to high-level corruption.  

The Bulgarian authorities report that these reforms have contributed to improving the overall 
conditions  for  the  prevention,  detection,  investigation  and  prosecution  of  corruption.  For 
example,  the  new  anti-corruption  agency  has  been  examining  the  interest  declarations  of 
thousands of officials, identifying where follow-up is needed.40 It is natural that reforms will 
take some time to carry through the various stages of investigation, prosecution and possible 
conviction, but this will need to be a major focus into the future to ensure that a solid track 
record  of  concrete  results.41  Recent  high-profile  allegations  involving  high-ranking  public 
officials and politicians have further highlighted the challenges faced by Bulgaria in this area.  

A particular challenge in the Bulgarian context  – faced by institutions such as the new anti-
corruption agency and the prosecution service – is the need for anti-corruption institutions to 
build  public  trust  and  gain  a  reputation  over  time  for  independence  and  professionalism  in 
their work. Above all, citizens should be able to have full confidence that such institutions act 
in  an  impartial  manner, in  full  respect  of  due  process  and  fundamental  rights,  including  the 
presumption of innocence.42 An important element to build confidence concerns the process of 
appointing the management of such institutions.  

The  anti-corruption  agency  currently  continues  to  function  in  the  absence  of  a  permanent 
head.  As  highlighted  in  the  November  2018  report,  the  procedure  for  the  election  of  the 
management  of  the  anti-corruption  agency  has  been  controversial  due  to  its  reliance  on  a 
simple majority in the National Assembly, raising concerns about a possible politicisation of 
the agency’s management.  The upcoming appointment  of a new head of the anti-corruption 
agency  will  be  an  important  test  of  the  capacity  of  the  National  Assembly  to  organise  the 

40   The report for 2018 states that verification of private assets and interest declarations was carried out for over 

9 000 persons. More than 700 declarations were subject to correction or special follow-up. 

41   Corruption  remains  an  area  of  serious  concern  in  Bulgaria,  as  indicated  by  various  surveys  and  studies  by 

independent observers.  

42   This requires, in addition to the observance of the law in actual practice, also careful communication by such 

institutions to project an image of neutrality and professionalism towards the general public.  

10 

 
                                                           
process in an open and merit-based manner so as to alleviate such concerns and help restore 
confidence in this key institution.  

Two  other  key  areas  for  building  confidence  are  to  draw  on  relevant  outside  expertise  to 
improve the anti-corruption  framework, and the engagement and dialogue with  stakeholders 
on  the  implementation  of  the  anti-corruption  strategy.  Both  will  be  key  to  maintaining  a 
credible forward momentum. In contacts with the Commission, the Bulgarian government has 
committed to continuing its efforts in this area, including by drawing on cooperation with the 
Council  of  Europe  Group  of  States  against  Corruption  (GRECO).43  The  post-monitoring 
council would also play an important role in maintaining public attention on these important 
challenges following an end to the CVM.44  

On  the  basis  of  the  analysis  of  benchmark  four,  the  legal  and  institutional  framework  has 
started  to  consolidate  its  work  in  line  with  recommendations  9,  10,  11  and  12,  and  these 
recommendations can be considered satisfactorily fulfilled. Bulgaria will need time to follow 
this up with a solid track record, notably under new leadership at the anti-corruption agency. 
The  Commission  welcomes  the  Bulgarian  government’s  commitment  to  pursue  the  work  by 
drawing  on  international  experience,  and  by  providing  transparency  and  accountability.  It 
would also be a subject matter for examination by the post-monitoring council and will also 
feed into the future dialogue with the Commission in the framework of the comprehensive rule 
of law mechanism. 

3.4   Benchmark Five: Corruption in General including Local Level and Borders 

Recommendation  13:  Carry  out  an  external  review  of  the  ex  ante  checks  of  public 
procurement procedures and their follow-up, including ex post checks, as well as on cases of 
conflicts  of  interest  or  corruption  discovered  and  remedial  measures  taken  to  address 
identified shortcomings. 

Recommendation  14:  Put  in  place  risk-based  measures  to  address  low-level  corruption  in 
high risk sectors within the public administration, taking inspiration from what has been done 
in the Ministry of Interior. Continue the efforts in the Ministry of Interior. 

Recommendation 15: Establish  a mechanism for  public reporting  on the implementation  of 
the  national  anti-corruption  strategy  covering  the  remaining  duration  of  the  Strategy's 
implementation. 

The November 2018 report acknowledged that Bulgaria had made significant progress on the 
three  recommendations  under  benchmark  5,  but  also  noted  that  these  issues  would  need 
continued follow-up by the Bulgarian authorities over the longer term in order to be able to 
show  concrete  results.  Over  the  past  year,  Bulgaria  has  confirmed  the  progress  made  and 
continued its efforts in these areas.  

Public  procurement  is  a  high-risk  area  for  conflicts  of  interest  and  corruption.  Bulgaria  has 
drawn  upon  assistance  from  the  International  Bank  for  Reconstruction  and  Development 

43   The  Council  of  Europe  Group  of  States  against  Corruption  (GRECO),  a  consultative  body  monitoring  the 
implementation of anti-corruption policies by the members of the Council of Europe, is currently analysing 
aspects  of  the  Bulgarian  anti-corruption  framework  in  the  context  of  its  fourth  evaluation  round  and  is 
expected to launch activities under the fifth evaluation round shortly. In addition, Bulgaria may also draw on 
assistance in the framework of the Commission’s Structural Reform Support Programme.  

44   On the post-monitoring council, see section 2 above.  

11 

 
                                                           
(World  Bank)  to  carry  out  a  comprehensive  review  of  its  public  procurement  system.  This 
project  was  finalised  in  early  spring  2019,  resulting  in  a  number  of  recommendations, 
including  with  regard  to  prevention  of  corruption,  conflict  of  interest,  and  fraud.  The 
authorities  report  that  some  initial  follow-up  on  these  recommendations  is  already  ongoing, 
while  the  entire  review  will  feed  into  the  development  of  a  future  comprehensive  public 
procurement strategy. The broader area of public procurement is governed by EU law and it 
will be important to carry this work through and to draw on additional expertise if needed in 
specific areas.45  

Bulgaria also continued the implementation of specific sector action plans for the prevention 
of corruption in the State administration. A new round of sectorial plans were adopted in early 
2019  as  part  of  an  annual  cycle,  monitored  by  a  national  anti-corruption  policies  council 
chaired by a national anti-corruption coordinator, who is also a high-ranking member of the 
government.46  This  work  needs  continuous  focus  within  all  government  departments  and 
agencies. The post-monitoring council could play an important role in providing visibility and 
support to these efforts.  Together with the national anti-corruption policies council, the new 
council will have a role to play in updating the current anti-corruption strategy from 2015 in 
light  of  current  developments  and  challenges.  An  important  element  will  be  a  broad 
involvement of stakeholders and civil society in the evaluation of the current strategy as well 
as in the definition of new priorities for the future.47 

The analysis of benchmark five confirms the progress noted in the November 2018 report on 
recommendations  13,  14  and  15,  and  these  recommendations  can  now  be  considered 
satisfactorily fulfilled. Many of these are issues which call for ongoing attention and the work 
to  analyse  the  challenges  and  establishing  a  coherent  process  for  addressing  them  on  an 
ongoing basis has provided a good foundation for future work. Issues like public procurement 
are  also  followed  up  in  the  normal  process  of  enforcement  of  EU  law.  These  will  again  be 
important subject matters for examination by the post-monitoring council and will feed into 
the future dialogue with the Commission in the framework of the comprehensive rule of law 
mechanism. 

4.  

CONCLUSION  

In the Decision establishing the CVM, the Commission, whilst noting the considerable efforts 
made  to  complete  Bulgaria's  preparations  for  membership,  had  identified  remaining  issues 
where further progress  was still necessary to  ensure the capacity of judicial system and law 
enforcement  bodies  to  implement  and  apply  the  measures  adopted  to  establish  the  internal 
market  and  the  area  of  freedom,  security  and  justice.48  This  included  the  accountability  and 
efficiency of these bodies.   

This has driven the CVM process, leading to the seventeen key recommendations made by the 
Commission  in  January  2017.  Bulgaria  has  worked  consistently  on  the  implementation  of 
these recommendations, as set out in the November 2017 and November 2018 reports. This 
work has continued over the past year, and Bulgaria has made further progress, including on 

45   This could also include assistance for the good implementation of EU public procurement law.  
46   Currently the deputy Prime Minister for judicial reform and minister for foreign affairs also has the role as 

47 

national anti-corruption coordinator.  

  Both  the  national  anti-corruption  policies  council  and  the  new  post-monitoring  council  has  an  element  of 

civil society involvement and could act as conduits for broader engagement with civil society. 

48   Commission Decision of 13 December 2006 (C(2006) 6570) 

12 

 
 
                                                           
the  recommendations  relating  to  benchmarks  three,  four  and  five,  which  remained  open 
following last year’s assessment.  

The past year has seen the consolidation of the legal and institutional framework put in place 
over previous years. Translating this into results over the long term will require determination 
and follow-up. The steps taken by Bulgaria to put systems in place to monitor this process are 
essential in that respect.  

In addition to the commitment to pursue reforms in relation to the fight against corruption, the 
Commission  notes  in  particular  the  commitment  expressed  by  the  Bulgarian  government  to 
put  in  place  procedures  concerning  the  accountability  of  a  Prosecutor  General,  including 
safeguarding  judicial  independence  in  line  with  Venice  Commission  recommendations.  The 
Bulgarian  government  has  submitted  a  request  for  an  opinion  and  committed  to  fulfil  the 
recommendations  of  the  Venice  Commission  in  compliance  with  the  parameters  of  the 
Bulgarian constitutional order.  

The Commission also notes the commitment of the Bulgarian authorities to adopt legislation 
to repeal provisions in the Judicial System Act requiring automatic suspension of magistrates 
in case of a criminal investigation against them and reporting of membership in professional 
associations.  The  Bulgarian  government  has  already  submitted  a  legislative  proposal  to  the 
National Assembly. 

Finally,  the  Commission  notes  the  commitment  expressed  by  the  Bulgarian  government  to 
ensure  continued  cooperation  with  Council  of  Europe  bodies  to  address  any  remaining 
shortcomings with  regard to  the Bulgarian anti-corruption framework and effective criminal 
investigations.  

The Commission considers that the progress made by Bulgaria under the CVM is sufficient to 
meet Bulgaria’s commitments made at the time of its accession to the EU. Bulgaria will need 
to continue working consistently on translating the commitments specified in this report into 
concrete  legislation  and  on  continued  implementation.  The  monitoring  of  the  continued 
implementation of the reforms put in place by Bulgaria will need to be ensured by the post-
monitoring  council,  and  that  will  feed  into  the  future  dialogue  with  the  Commission  in  the 
framework of the comprehensive rule of law mechanism. Before taking a final decision, the 
Commission will also take duly into account the observations of the Council, as well asof the 
European Parliament.49 

49   Terminating  the  CVM  for  Bulgaria  would  take  the  form  of  a  Commission  decision  revoking  Commission 
Decision 2006/929/EC of 13  December 2006 establishing  a  mechanism  for cooperation and  verification of 
progress  in  Bulgaria  to  address  specific  benchmarks  in  the  areas  of  judicial  reform  and  the  fight  against 
corruption and organised crime (C(2006) 6570). 

13