COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT ROMANIA : Technical Report Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL on Progress in Romania under the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism
Date: 2019-10-22
Institutions: European Commission, Secretariat-General
Subjects: Romania, conflict of interest, corruption, criminal law, independence of the judiciary, judicial reform, public procurement, rule of law

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 22.10.2019  SWD(2019) 393 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT ROMANIA : Technical Report Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL on Progress in Romania under the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism {COM(2019) 499 final}  
 
 
Benchmarks to be addressed by Romania pursuant to Commission Decision of 13/XII/2006 establishing a 
mechanism for cooperation and verification of progress in Romania to address specific benchmarks in the areas of 
judicial reform and the fight against corruption:1 

Benchmark 1: Ensure a more transparent and efficient judicial process notably by enhancing the capacity 
and accountability of the Superior Council of Magistracy. Report and monitor the impact of the new civil 
and penal procedures codes 

Benchmark 2: Establish, as foreseen, an integrity agency with responsibilities for verifying assets, 
incompatibilities and potential conflicts of interest, and for issuing mandatory decisions on the basis of 
which dissuasive sanctions can be taken 

Benchmark 3: Building on progress already made, continue to conduct professional, non- partisan 
investigations into allegations of high- level corruption 

Benchmark 4: Take further measures to prevent and fight against corruption, in particular within the local 
government 

List of acronyms 

ANABI: National Agency for the Management of Seized Assets  
ANAF: National Agency for Fiscal Administration 
ANI: National Integrity Agency 
ANAP: National Agency for Public Procurement 
ARO: Asset Recovery Office 
CCJE: Council of Europe Consultative Council of European Judges  
CCR: Constitutional Court 
CVM: Cooperation and Verification Mechanism 
DGA: Anti-corruption Directorate General – Ministry of Internal Affairs 
DIICOT: Directorate for Investigating Organised Crime and Terrorism 
DLAF: Fight against Fraud Department 
DNA: National Anti-Corruption Directorate 
ECHR: European Court of Human Rights 
HCCJ: High Court of Cassation and Justice 
MoJ: Ministry of Justice 
NAS: National Anti-corruption Strategy 
NIM: National Institute of Magistracy 
SCM: Superior Council of the Magistracy 

References  to  "CVM  reports"  refer  to  the  Commission  Progress  Reports  and  the  accompanying  Technical 
Reports. 

CVM report 2016: COM(2016) 41 and SWD(2016) 16 – report of progress in 2015 

CVM report January 2017: COM(2017) 44 and SWD(2017) 25 – report of progress since 2007 and in 2016 

CVM report November 2017: COM(2017)751 and SWD(2017)701 – report of progress in 2017 

CVM report November 2018: COM(2018)851 and SWD(2018) 551 – report of progress from November 2017 
to October 2018 

1       Previous CVM reports can be consulted at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/effective-

justice/rule-law/assistance-bulgaria-and-romania-under-cvm/reports-progress-bulgaria-and-romania_en  

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1. 

INTRODUCTION 

This technical report summarises the information which the Commission has used as the basis for its 
assessment of Romania's progress under the  Co-operation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) since 
the last CVM report of 13 November 2018.2  

This information has been collected from a variety of sources. The Commission has had the benefit of 
working  closely  with  the  relevant  authorities  in  Romania,  providing  information  on  progress  in 
detailed  reports,  as  well  as  in  face-to-face  meetings,  both  in  Brussels  and  Bucharest.  Commission 
contacts with the Romanian administration and society across the full range of EU policies, including 
through the European Semester for economic governance, help to inform the CVM reports. In addition 
to  official  contacts  with  Romanian  authorities,  the  Commission  meets  with  non-governmental 
organisations  active  in  the  area  of  judicial  reform  and  anti-corruption  work,  with  professional 
associations  of  judges  and  prosecutors,  and  with  representatives  of  other  EU  Member  States  in 
Romania.  More  generally, the  Commission further draws  on  the  various  studies  and  reports that are 
available from international institutions and other independent observers in the field of judicial reform 
and  the  fight  against  corruption.3  The  variety  of  opinions  expressed  by  the  different  Romanian 
interlocutors  is  an  important  element for an  open and  transparent debate. The Commission  bases its 
assessment on all sources available, also taking into account divergent views. 

The  Commission  Decision  of  2006 setting  up  the  CVM  defined  four  benchmarks  for  Romania. The 
four benchmarks were conceived in the circumstances of the day and their concrete wording reflects 
this, but the underlying themes have remained fully relevant. Since the time when these benchmarks 
were adopted, there have been major developments in Court of Justice and European Court of Human 
Rights  (ECHR)  case-law,  European  and  international  standards  and  best  practices.4  There  has  also 
been  more readily  available  information  on  national justice  systems  in  the  EU,5  which also  helps  to 
give an objective and comparable measure of the development of the Romanian judicial system and 
the fight against corruption. Analysis of these topics has also become a regular feature in the European 
Semester for economic policy coordination in recent years. A more general debate on the rule of law 
has  also  taken  place:  in  July  2019  the  Commission  adopted  a  Communication  on  Strengthening  of 
Rule of Law within the Union – a blueprint for action, in which it announces its intention to establish 
an annual rule of law review cycle covering all Member States.6 

The  Commission  also  supports  the  efforts  of  Romania  in  achieving  the  CVM  objectives  through 
funding under the European Structural and Investment Funds and the Internal Security Fund–Police.  
In  the  2014-2020  period,  the  European  Social  Fund  (ESF)  Administrative  Capacity  Operational 
Programme will have provided funding of about EUR 100 million for judicial reform projects, linked 
to the development of the strategic management of the judicial system, reinforcing the capacity of the 
institutions  and  improving  their  performance,  and  the  performance  of  practitioners  (judges,  clerks, 
prosecutors  etc.),  information  and  judicial  education  campaigns,  and  improved  transparency  and 
integrity in the judicial system. In addition, the ESF also supports reform and improvements in public 

3  

2   COM(2018)  851  final.  All  the  reports  under  the  Cooperation  and  Verification  Mechanism  are  available  on  the 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/upholding-rule-law/rule-

Commission’s  website: 
law/assistance-bulgaria-and-romania-under-cvm/reports-progress-bulgaria-and-romania_en  
In particular, the Venice Commission adopted an opinion in June 2019 on emergency ordinances GEO No. 7 and GEO 
No.12  amending  the  laws  of  justice  (Opinion  950/2019)  following  up  the  October  2018  opinion  on  the  justice  laws 
(Opinion 924/2018) and the opinion 930/2018 on the amendments to the Criminal Code and Criminal Procedure Code. 
The  Council  of  Europe  Group  of  States  against  Corruption  (GRECO)  issued  two  reports  in  June  2019:  a  follow-up 
report (Greco-AdHocRep(2019)1) on the special report on the amendments on the justice laws of April 2018 (Greco-
AdHocRep(2018)2) and the interim compliance report on the fourth evaluation round (GrecoRC4(2019)11. 

4    The  most  important  being  the  developments  in  the  Court of  Justice  case-law  on  judicial  independence,  the  European 
Court  of  Human  Rights  (ECtHR)  case-law  on  fair  trial  rights,  the  UN  Convention  Against  Corruption,  Venice 
Commission  Reports  on  European  standards  as  regards  the  independence  of  the  judicial  system,  and  the  European 
Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) indicators. 

5       Including the EU Justice Scoreboard: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/effective-justice/scoreboard/. 
6   COM/2019/343 final. This Communication was a follow-up to a broader review of the Commission’s work in the rule 
of law area, including a call for contributions from Member States and other stakeholders: https://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-19-4169_en.htm 

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procurement  (with  around  €  10  million  contracted  so  far),  and  the  implementation  of  the  National 
Anti-Corruption Strategy at local level. European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) resources of 
up to € 15 million will be invested in capacity building and technical assistance in public procurement, 
in fraud prevention for Management Authorities and in the Fight against Fraud Department (DLAF). 
Financing  by  EU  funds  can  also  be  subject  to  the  agreement  of  strategies  and  implementation  of 
actions with the Commission (ex-ante conditionalities for using the Funds). Romania is also benefiting 
from several projects in the justice area with the Structural Reform Support Service (SRSS). Romania 
has also benefited from bilateral support from EU Member States.7 

On 25 January 2017, the Commission adopted a comprehensive assessment of ten years’ progress in 
Romania on judicial reform and the fight against corruption. This report used a long-term perspective 
to  identify  the  key  remaining  steps  to  reach  the  goals  of  the  CVM.  Most  of  them  focus  on  the 
responsibility and accountability required by the Romanian authorities and on the internal safeguards 
needed to ensure that progress achieved is irreversible. When these steps set out under a benchmark 
are taken, the respective benchmark will be considered provisionally completed. When this applies to 
all benchmarks, the CVM will be  closed. This process resulted in twelve final recommendations set 
out in the January 2017 CVM report. Complying with the twelve recommendations could therefore be 
considered as sufficient to meet the CVM goals – except if developments were to clearly reverse the 
course of progress underlying the baseline assessment of January 2017. 

Since the ten-year assessment of January 2017, the Commission has made two further assessments of 
progress on the twelve recommendations. 

The  first  assessment  report  of  15  November  2017  concluded  that  none  of  the  benchmarks  could  be 
considered satisfactorily  fulfilled.  While  progress  in meeting  some  recommendations  was advancing 
well,  the  reform  momentum  in  course  of  2017  was  lost  overall,  slowing  down  the  fulfilment  of  the 
remaining recommendations, and with the risk of re-opening issues which the January 2017 report had 
considered  as  fulfilled.  Challenges  to  judicial  independence  have  also  been  a  persistent  source  of 
concern. 8 

The second report adopted on 13 November 2018 concluded that: 

“Over  the  twelve  months  since  November  2017,  Romania  has  taken  some  steps  to  implement  the 
recommendations set out in the January 2017 report. In line with the assessment set out in this report, 
the  Commission  considers  recommendations  8  and  12  can  be  considered  as  fulfilled,  and  further 
progress has been made on recommendations 5 and 9.  
However,  the  assessment  of  the  January  2017  report  was  always  conditioned  on  the  avoidance  of 
negative steps calling into question the progress made in the past 10 years. The entry into force of the 
amended  Justice  laws,  the  pressure  on  judicial  independence  in  general  and  on  the  National  Anti-
Corruption Directorate in particular, and other steps undermining the fight against corruption have 
reversed or called into question the irreversibility of progress, in particular under Benchmarks One 
and Three.   
As a result, the twelve recommendations set out in the January 2017 report are no longer sufficient to 
close the CVM in line with the objective set out by the President Juncker and to this end additional 
recommendations  are  set  out  in  this  report.  This  will  require  the  key  institutions  of  Romania  to 
demonstrate  a  strong  commitment  to  judicial  independence  and  the  fight  against  corruption  as 
indispensable  cornerstones,  and  to  restore  the  capacity  of  national  safeguards  and  checks  and 
balances to act when there is a risk of a backwards step.  
To remedy the situation the following measures are recommended: 
Justice laws 
• 

Suspend  immediately  the  implementation  of  the  Justice  laws  and  subsequent  Emergency 
Ordinances. 

7       Funding from the European Economic Area (Norway) further complements national and EU funding for judicial reform. 
8       COM(2017)751, p.12. and Council Conclusions on the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism 15587/17  

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• 

Revise  the  Justice  laws  taking  fully  into  account  the  recommendations  under  the  CVM  and 
issued by the Venice Commission and GRECO9.  

Appointments/dismissals within judiciary  
• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

Suspend  immediately  all  ongoing  appointments  and  dismissal  procedures  for  senior 
prosecutors. 
Relaunch a process to appoint a Chief prosecutor of the DNA with proven experience in the 
prosecution  of  corruption  crimes  and  with  a  clear  mandate  for  the  DNA  to  continue  to 
conduct professional, independent and non-partisan investigations of corruption.   
The  Superior  Council  of  Magistracy  to  appoint  immediately  an  interim  team  for  the 
management  of  the  Judicial  Inspection  and  within  three  months  to  appoint  through  a 
competition a new management team in the Inspection.  
Respect  negative  opinions  from  the  Superior  Council  on  appointments  or  dismissals  of 
prosecutors at managerial posts, until such time as a new legislative framework is in place in 
accordance with recommendation 1 from January 2017.  

Freeze  the  entry  into  force  of  the  changes  to  the  Criminal  Code  and  Criminal  Procedure 
Code. 
Reopen  the  revision  of  the  Criminal  Code  and  Criminal  Procedure  Code  taking  fully  into 
account the need for compatibility with EU law and international anti-corruption instruments, 
as well as the recommendations under the CVM and the Venice Commission opinion.  

Criminal Codes 
• 

The  Commission  will  continue  to  follow  closely  and  will  assess  the  situation  before  the  end  of  this 
Commission's mandate. The immediate implementation of the additional measures is essential to put 
the reform process back on track and resume the path towards the conclusion of the CVM as set out in 
the January 2017 report. “10 

These  additional  measures  were  supported  by  the  Council  in  its  conclusions  of  December  2018, 
calling on Romania to fulfil all the recommendations and take prompt action, notably on the additional 
these 
key 
recommendations. 

recommendations.11  This 

implementation  of 

focuses  on 

technical 

report 

the 

2. 

PROGRESS ON KEY REMAINING STEPS  

This section reports on progress on the 12 recommendations of January 2017 and on the 8 additional 
recommendations  of  November  2018,  as  well  as  relevant  developments  that  have  a  bearing  on  the 
assessment of the fulfilment of the CVM benchmarks. 

Benchmark  1:  ensure  a  more  transparent  and  efficient  judicial  process  notably  by 
enhancing the capacity and accountability of the Superior Council of Magistracy. Report 
and monitor the impact of the new civil and penal procedures codes 

The  November  2018  report  concluded  that  “while  there  has  been  progress  on  recommendation  5 
(execution  of  judgements),  other  steps  taken  by  Romania  have  reversed  or  put  into  question  the 
progress achieved. Recommendations 1, 3 and 4 have not been followed. Recommendations 2, 6 and 7 
have seen no progress towards meaningful results. More broadly, legislative changes undermining the 
guarantees for judicial independence and centralising more power with the Minister of Justice, and a 
series of steps pressuring key judicial institutions, constitute backtracking by the Romanian authorities 
from the basis of the January 2017 assessment. The ongoing amendments of the Criminal Code and 
Criminal  Procedure  Code  also  entail  serious  risks  of  backtracking.  Therefore,  the  Commission 
considers  that  Benchmark  One  cannot  be  considered  as  fulfilled  and  to  achieve  this  objective 
additional recommendations are required, as a set out in the conclusion of this report.” 

Justice laws 

9       Council of Europe Group of States against Corruption 
10      COM(2018)851 
11     15187/18 - Council conclusions on the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism, 12 December 2018.  

4 

 
 
 
                                                           
The  three  Justice  laws  adopted  in  2004  define  the  status  of  magistrates  and  organise  the  judicial 
system  and  the  Superior  Council  of  Magistracy.12  They  are  therefore  central  to  ensuring  the 
independence  of  magistrates  and  the  good  functioning  of  the  judiciary.  The  Justice  laws  were  an 
essential  basis  for  the  positive  assessment  of  the  progress  of  Romania  in  the  January  2017  CVM 
report. 

The  three  laws  were  amended  in  2018  in  a  tense  climate  exacerbated  by  political  criticism  of  the 
judiciary. The November 2018 report set out the concerns expressed by the Commission, the European 
Parliament, the Council, other Member States, the Venice Commission and the Group of States against 
Corruption (GRECO). Concerns by domestic actors including the President of Romania and the High 
Court  of  Cassation  and  Justice,  as  well  as  in  the  Romanian  Parliament,  led  to  referrals  to  the 
Constitutional  Court.  The  outcome  required  amendments  which  addressed  some  of  the  initial  major 
problems but was not sufficient to avoid all serious concerns. 
The  amended  Justice  laws  entered  in  force  in  July  and  October  2018.13  The  November  2018  CVM 
report noted that ’they contain a number of measures which - independently but also in terms of their 
cumulative effect – could result in pressure on judges and prosecutors, and ultimately undermine the 
independence as well as the efficiency and quality of the judiciary’. The report also noted that ’none of 
these changes correspond to CVM recommendations’. 

As a result, the November 2018 report called on Romania to suspend the application of the amended 
laws  and  revise  the  amendments  in  accordance  with  Commission  recommendations  and  the 
recommendations  from  GRECO  and  the  Venice  Commission.  The  Romanian  authorities  expressed 
disagreement with the rationale for the recommendation and stated that it was in any event too late to 
suspend the application of the laws.  

While  the  Government  had  already  adopted  three  emergency  ordinances  in  September  and  October 
2018,  since  the  November  2018  report,  the  Government  has  adopted  two  more  Emergency 
Ordinances14  modifying  further  the  justice  laws.  Only  a  few  of  these  changes,  such  as  the 
postponement  of  the  early  retirement  scheme,  could  be  seen  as  a  partial  step  in  the  direction  of  the 
Venice  Commission  recommendations.  The  majority  of  these  changes  were  not  in  line  with  the 
Commission recommendations or the recommendations from GRECO and the Venice Commission. . 
The speed of adoption, lack of consultation and unclear rationale behind these emergency ordinances 
have sparked very negative reactions, including arguments that they were unconstitutional.  

A  first argument  was  that amending  the  laws  by  government  emergency  ordinances,  without  debate 
and  consultationor  ex-ante  control,  and  the  laws  enter  into  force  before  going  to  Parliament, 
sometimes  modifying  the  same  provisions  repeatedly,  has  affected  the  legal  certainty  and 
predictability of the organisation of the judiciary, of the judicial process and of judicial decisions. One 
issue here was that the approach had further damaged the quality of this legislation, already strained by 
the accelerated parliamentary procedure of 2018, affecting the clarity and readability of the law, for 
citizens and magistrates alike.  

In its opinion 950/2019, the Venice Commission made a thorough critical analysis on the amendments 
of  the  justice  laws  by  emergency  ordinances.  The  opinion  concludes  that:  ‘most  alarmingly,  the 
Government  continues  to  make  legislative  amendments  by  emergency  ordinances.  While  the 
Constitution  clearly  indicates  that  this  should  be  an  exceptional  measure,  legislation  by  the  GEOs 
became  a  routine.  Fundamental  rules  of  the  functioning  of  key  State  institutions  are  changed  too 
quickly and too often, without preparation and consultations, which raises legitimate questions about 

12        Law  303/2004  on  the  Statute  of  magistrates;  Law  304/2004  on  Judicial  organisation;  Law  317/2004  on  the  Superior 

Council of Magistracy 

13     Law 207/2018 amending and completing Law 304/2004 on the judicial organisation entered into force on 20 July; Law 
234/2018 for amending and completing Law no. 317/2004 on the Superior Council of Magistracy entered into force on 
11 October; Law 242/2018 amending and completing Law no. 303/2004 on the statute of judges and prosecutors entered 
into force on 15 October. 

14     Emergency Ordinances No 77/2018 of September 2018, No. 90/2018 of October 2018, No. 92/2018 of 16 October 2018, 

No.7/2019 of 20 February 2019 and No.12/2019 of 5 March 2019,  

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the soundness  of  the  outcomes  and of the  real  motives  behind some  of those  changes.  The resulting 
legal texts are not clear. This practice weakens external checks on the Government, it is contrary to 
the principle of separation of powers and disturbs legal certainty.’15 

In  its  Communications  of  April  and  July  2019  on  strengthening  the  rule  of  law  in  the  Union,  the 
Commission recalled the principles underlying the rule of law as recognised by the European Court of 
Justice and the European Court of Human Rights. These principles include judicial independence and 
impartiality and legality, and it was noted that this includes transparent, accountable, democratic and 
pluralistic process for enacting laws, as well as legal certainty.  

Regarding the content of the amendments, concerns focused on examples including; 

(1)  Accelerating  the  entry  in  operation  of  the  special  section  for  investigating  crimes  committed  by 
magistrates  –  already  identified  in  November  2018  as  a  source  of  concern  –  and  extending  its 
jurisdiction on appeal or even closed cases (see also next section); 

(2)  Further  weakening  the  role  of  the  prosecution  section  of  the  Superior  Council  of  Magistracy 
(SCM), notably in favour of the judges section, in particular the prosecution section had no role in 
the  appointments  of  prosecutors  of  the  special  section  for  investigating  crimes  committed  by 
magistrates at the creation of the section; 

(3)  Increasing from one day to another the seniority requirements for prosecutors (also in management 
positions)  in  the  National  Anti-corruption  Directorate  (DNA)  and  in  the  Directorate  for 
Investigating Organised Crime and Terrorism (DIICOT), without considering the impact on these 
institutions.16  According  to  the  law,  the  new  eligibility  criteria  also  apply  retroactively  to  those 
already appointed, raising issues of retroactive application of the rules.17 

In  the  Emergency  ordinances,  the  Government  has  sometimes  defined rules  which  seemed  rather  to 
have been set by the SCM.18 The SCM does not appear to have objected to this.  
As also highlighted in June by the Venice Commission and GRECO,19 the amendments brought by the 
emergency ordinances did not address the concerns expressed in the November 2018 reports.20  

The  implementation  of  the  amended  laws  has  led  to  continued  concern  about  risks  to  judicial 
independence, for example in the operation of the special section for investigating crimes committed 
by magistrates.21 This  has been identified as exacerbating legal uncertainty and unpredictability.   

Uncertainty has been created by the provisions on early retirement, which were strongly criticised for 
their potential disruption of the judicial institutions. The provisions would allow magistrates to retire 
after  20  years of  service. The  duration  of initial  training  was also increased  from  two  to  four  years. 

15     Venice Commission, Opinion 950/2019, para. 49. 
16     For all prosecutors the seniority requirement went from 6 years before October 2018, to 8 years in the amended justice 
laws adopted by Parliament, and then to 10 years in the emergency ordinance 92/2018. The 10 years criteria also applies 
retroactively (EOG 92/2018). In a press statement, the then Minister of Justice stated that the retroactivity was justified 
in order to ensure that the former Chief of DNA could not access the grade of prosecutor attached at the HCCJ after its 
dismissal. Later a court overturned the decision in its case.  

        For  top  management  posts  (and  heads  of  sector  in  the  DNA),  the  seniority  requirement  was  10  years  before  October 
2018 and remained unchanged in the amended Justice laws adopted by Parliament. It was changed to 15 years by EOG 
92/2018 in October 2018, then not mentioned in the EOG 7/2019 of February 2019 and then back to 15 years in the 
EOG 12/2019 of March 2019. 

17     Whereas the Superior Council of Magistracy made a statement that the new criteria would not apply retroactively, in one 
court case, the judge dismissed the prosecution findings on the basis that the prosecutor who had investigated the case 
did not satisfy the new eligibility criteria.  

        http://portal.just.ro/35/SitePages/Dosar.aspx?id_dosar=8300000000096951&id_inst=35 
18     For example by defining the procedure for organising the competition appointing the management and prosecutors of the 
special section. This was also the case in the emergency ordinance 77/2018, nominating the management of the Judicial 
Inspection ad interim. 

19   Venice Commission Opinion 950/2019 and  GRECO-AdHocRep(2019)1 
20   Venice Commission Opinion 924/2018, GRECO-AdHocRep(2018)2 and CVM report COM(2018) 851 
21        Further  potential  problems  were  identified  in  the  application  of  the  laws,  such  as  the  rules  for  appointments  of  the 

management of the judicial Inspection. 

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With concern that this would result in a gap in essential resources, in particular in the highest courts 
and specialised prosecutor offices22, entry into force of these provisions was postponed until 1 January 
2020.  So  far  the  SCM  has  not  provided  detailed  data  on  how  these  provisions  would  affect  the 
workforce, so  the  concerns  remain  as  the  new  date  of  application  nears. This  concern is  heightened 
due  to  the  potential  cumulative  impact  with  other  new  provisions  such  as  the  introduction  of  larger 
panels of judges and weakened criteria for promotion to the High Court of Cassation and Justice.23 It 
had  been  expected  that  such  broad  ranging  managerial  changes  would  be  discussed  in  the  Strategic 
Judicial Management,24  with a thorough impact assessment on the continuity, celerity and quality of 
justice.  

In  July  2019,  the  Minister  of  Justice  expressed  a  willingness  to  identify  appropriate  legislative 
solutions,  in  consultation  with  the  judiciary  and  the  Parliament.  There  have  been  no  further 
amendments  to  the  justice  laws  on  the  points  raised,  nor  on  the  two  new  relevant  reports  from  the 
Venice Commission and GRECO of June 2019.25 26 

Activity of the Special Section to investigate crimes committed by Magistrates 

One  of  the  most  strongly  criticised  features  of  the  amended  justice  laws  is  the  new  department  for 
investigating  criminal  offences  committed  by  magistrates,  operational  since  23  October  2018.  The 
November  2018  report  concluded  that  the  establishment  of  this  new  department  risked  being  an 
(additional) instrument of pressure on judges and prosecutors.  

The  first  concern  expressed  has  been  that  the  creation  of  the  special  section  specialising  in 
investigating  allegations  of  crimes  (such  as corruption  or  abuse  in  office)  committed  by  magistrates 
would  affect  their  public  standing  and  reputation,  as  it  singles  magistrates  out  as  a  specific  group 
deserving special treatment for crimes allegedly committed, putting them under a general suspicion.27 
In the specific context prevailing at the time of the creation of the section, where political criticism of 
magistrates and claims of systematic abuses was frequent, many magistrates expressed the fear that the 
purpose  of  creating  this  department  was  to  seek  to  pressurise  them  in  their  work.  Conversely, 
proponents  of  the  creation  of  the  special  section,  including  some  in  the  judges  section  of  the  SCM, 
cited in particular a need to take corruption crimes involving magistrates outside the competence of the 
National  Anti-Corruption  Directorate  (DNA).  The  argument  was  that  the  DNA  had  abused  this 
competence by opening ex-officio investigations, with the intention of putting pressure on judges in 
DNA-prosecuted trials to obtain high conviction rates.These claims of systematic abuses by the DNA 
have been strongly disputed by the DNA and by the Public Ministry. 28 29   

The Bureau of the Consultative Council of European Judges adopted an opinion on the Justice laws in 
May 2019. 30 This in particular criticises the special section and calls for its end: ‘“the CCJE Bureau 

22     For details on this issue see Venice Commission Opinion 924/2018 and CVM report of November 2018. 
23     See also Venice Commission opinion 950/2019 and GRECO-AdHocRep(2019)1 
24   Made up of the Minister of Justice, the Superior Council of Magistracy, the High Court of Cassation and Justice and the 

Prosecutor General. 

25     See footnote 3. In addition, the Bureau of the Consultative Council of European Judges (CCJE) and the Bureau of the 

Consultative Council of European Prosecutors (CCPE) adopted opinions in 2019.  

         https://rm.coe.int/ccje-bu-2019-4-en-opinion-romania-2019-final-25-april-2019/168094556c 
         https://rm.coe.int/ccpe-bu-2019-3-opinion-romania-2019-final/168094848a 
26        A  proposal  to  dismantle  the  Special  Section  put  forward  by  opposition  parties  is  making  its  way  in  Parliament.  The 

Government’s opinion is that ‘The Parliament will decide on the opportunity to adopt this legislative initiative’.  

27      The specialised prosecution offices in Romania are competent for specific crimes committed by anybody and not just by 

a specific professional group. 

28      In August 2018, numbers entered the public domain without verification, citing thousands of investigations initiated ex-
officio against magistrates by the DNA. Corroboration came from the Judicial Inspection, but this appeared to breach 
the confidentiality of an inspection being carried out in the DNA. The publication of figures from the  DNA itself and 
the Public Ministry did not result in a rectification, even from official sources.  

29     As mentioned in the November 2018 CVM report, there were 2396 cases involving magistrates registered between  by 
2014 and 2018. Less than 8% of these involved criminal judges, and with all complaints from the public registered, less 
than  3%  resulted  in  effective  investigation  and  trial.  This  scale  was  confirmed  by  the  number  of  ex  officio  cases 
transferred to the special section with the transfer of competence (under 40).  

30   https://rm.coe.int/ccje-bu-2019-4-en-opinion-romania-2019-final-25-april-2019/168094556c 

7 

 
 
                                                           
wishes to underline from the outset that it finds it difficult to  identify references to such practices in 
Member  States,  and  moreover  to  standards  in  this  respect  elaborated  in  international  or  regional 
instruments. he specialisation of prosecutors vis-à-vis representatives of specific profession, judges in 
the  case  of  Romania,  immediately  raises  several  questions  about  the  rationale  for  such  a 
discriminatory  approach,  its  effectiveness  and  added  value.  It  also  raises  concerns  as  regards  the 
public  image  of  the  judiciary  because  such  a  step  may  be  interpreted  by  society  as  evidence  of  an 
inclination  of  the  whole  professional  group  to  commit  a  specific  type  of  crime,  for  example, 
corruption. In this way, it will not only be derogatory for this professional group but will also damage, 
possibly severely, the public confidence in the judiciary. .’ 

The way in which the special section was established has also been a source of criticism. In the first 
place, the Government used emergency ordinances to water down the established norms in terms of 
criteria for appointments within the section. Government Emergency Ordinance 90/2018 weakened a 
number  of  guarantees,  including  the  professional,  management  and  ethical  requirements  for  the 
candidates,  and  took  away  the  necessity  that  high-ranking  prosecutors  participated  in  the  selection 
panel and in the final appointment decision. The Ordinance made a one-off modification of the law in 
such a way as to ensure full control of the appointment process to a small panel consisting only of a 
few judges of the SCM.31  The Venice Commission opinion was very critical on this point, stating that 
the approach ‘cannot be explained otherwise than by a strong mistrust of the Government towards the 
current prosecutorial members of the SCM and its wish to reduce their role…..the Government should 
not be able to influence the balance among the members of a constitutional body which has as its main 
function to protect the independence of judges and prosecutors from the executive.’32 The result was 
the  appointment  of  a  management  team  in  a  way  which  could  not  command  the  confidence  of  the 
public  and  the  respect  from  within  the  judicial  sytem,  and  which  inevitably  raised  concerns  about 
vulnerability to political influence.33  

The  broad  and  loosely-defined  jurisdiction  of  the  section  has  also  raised  concerns.  The  rules  on 
hierarchical control of the activity of the section with regard to the Prosecutor General are unclear. The 
law  adopted  in  July  2018  paved  the  way  for  the  transfer  to  the  special  section  of  any  investigation 
which involves a magistrate and the investigation and prosecution of all persons involved in the case, 
even  if  the  magistrate’s  role  in  the  file  is  marginal.34  In  practice,  the  special  section  required  the 
transfer  of  a  number  of  high-level  corruption  investigations  and  prosecutions.  This  confirmed  the 
concerns  highlighted  in the  November  2018  report  that  the  section  creates  an  important  risk  for  the 
effective investigation and prosecution of complex high-level corruption or organised crime cases. The 
Venice Commission argued that ’participants in  the criminal proceedings may be tempted to obtain 
the transferal of the case to the Section by accusing a magistrate of some misbehaviour. Such files will 
then be transferred to the Section, even if the evidence against the magistrate is weak at least, until the 
accusations  are  verified  and  more  evidence  is  obtained.’35  Government  emergency  ordinances  have 

31      Throughout  2018-2019  the  legislator  and  the  Government  oscillated  between  two  models  of  appointment  of  top 
prosecutors:  one  involving  the  Plenary  of  the  SCM  and  another  the  Prosecutors’  Section.  It  is  unclear  why,  for  the 
transitional  scheme  of  appointment  of  top  prosecutors  to  the  Section,  the  Government  entrusted  the  function  to  the 
member of the Judges’ Section. 

32     Venice Commission opinion 950/2019, para. 37. 
33    The appointment of the senior management aroused controversy, with the chief prosecutor of the special section having 
been  subject  to  criticism  on  the  grounds  of  impartiality  in  the  Judicial  Inspection,  and  the  deputy  chief  prosecutor 
having already received a negative opinion by the prosecution section of the SCM when nominated by the  Minister of 
Justice as chief prosecutor of DNA. In June 2019, the Chief Prosecutor became a Constitutional Court judge, appointed 
by  the  Chamber  of  Deputies.  The  deputy  Chief  prosecutor  is  a  candidate  to  become  Chief  prosecutor  of  the  Special 
Section, however so far the SCM plenum has not supported this appointment.  

34    Art 881 and Art 888 of law 304/2004 provide that the special section to investigate magistrates will take over a case and 
the investigation of all other persons involved as soon as a magistrate is involved. Particularly Art 881(2): The Section 
for Investigation of Offences in the Judiciary shall maintain its jurisdiction for prosecution in cases where other persons 
are being investigated together with the persons provided by in paragraph (1) 

35    This concern was borne out when a denunciation against the prosecutor dealing with a corruption file involving fraud 
against the financial interests of the Union led to request by the Section to take over the file. The attempt was eventually 
stopped by the Prosecutor General and the DNA maintained its investigative competence in the file.  

        https://www.csm1909.ro/ViewFile.ashx?guid=7541ddb6-a823-473a-b8ed-e10655e07b7d|InfoCSM 

8 

 
 
                                                           
further aggravated the problem of unpredictability and legal uncertainty of the judicial process and for 
magistrates  (both  judges  and  prosecutors)  by  enlarging  the  competence  of  the  special  section  to  all 
cases  in  court  for  which  the  investigation  is  already  finalised,  including  lodging  and  withdrawing 
appeals  for  cases  on  trial, final  cases and  closed  cases.36  37The  result  has  been the source  of further 
controversy. In May 2019 the Section reopened a corruption investigation concerning a judge of the 
SCM  which  the  DNA  had  closed  in  August  2018.38  The  judge  in  question  had  regularly  spoken 
publicly against the amendments to the justice law, including the special section. The special section 
also lodged appeals in other cases involving magistrates who had been acquitted.39 On the other hand, 
several appeals introduced by the DNA in high-level corruption cases prior to the transfer of the file to 
the special section were dropped.40  
Such examples have led observers both within Romania41 and outside to conclude that the concerns 
expressed at the establishment of the Section have been proved justified,42 and to therefore call for the 
Special Section to be disbanded.  Both the Venice Commission and GRECO in reports of June 2019 
reiterated very serious concerns on the creation of such a section, especially after having witnessed six 
months of its operation.43 

Appointments/dismissals in the judiciary  

Appointment/dismissals of prosecutors 

The November 2018 report had highlighted the risks in a concentration of power in the hands of the 
Minister  of  Justice.  It  pointed  notably  to  the  decisions  of  the  Minister  of  Justice  to  request  the 
dismissal  procedure  of  the  chief  prosecutor  of  the  National  Anti-Corruption  Directorate  (DNA),  to 
propose in September the appointment of a new Chief Prosecutor of DNA despite a negative opinion 
from  the  Superior  Council  of  Magistracy  (SCM),  and  also  to  launch  a  process  to  dismiss  the 
Prosecutor General. In view of these worrying developments, the Commission issued three additional 
recommendations:  

(1) Suspend immediately all ongoing appointments and dismissal procedures for senior prosecutors; 

(2)  Relaunch  a  process  to  appoint  a  chief  prosecutor  of  the  DNA  with  proven  experience  in  the 
prosecution  of  corruption  crimes  and  with  a  clear  mandate  for  the  DNA  to  continue  to  conduct 
professional, independent and non-partisan investigations of corruption;  

(3) Respect negative opinions from the Superior Council on appointments or dismissals of prosecutors 
at  managerial  posts,  until  such  time  as  a  new  legislative  framework  is  in  place  in  accordance  with 
recommendation 1 from January 2017. 

In response, the then Minister of Justice stated that he could not apply these recommendations and he 
pursued both the proposal for appointing the chief prosecutor of the DNA, despite a first refusal by the 
President of Romania, and the dismissal procedure against the Prosecutor General. The proposal for 

36     All prosecution services have sent final and closed cases to the special section after its entry into operation. 
37    The effect of such wide jurisdiction may also increase the number of complaints against magistrates (prosecutors and 
judges) as defendants may want to take advantage of delays caused by transfers including for cases already on trial. 

38     https://www.scj.ro/1094/Detalii-dosar?customQuery%5B0%5D.Key=id&customQuery%5B0%5D.Value=100000000322273 
39      http://www.scj.ro/1094/Detalii-dosar?customQuery%5B0%5D.Key=id&customQuery%5B0%5D.Value=100000000319026 
40      https://www.scj.ro/1094/Detalii-dosar?customQuery%5B0%5D.Key=id&customQuery%5B0%5D.Value=100000000318664 , 
https://www.scj.ro/1094/Detalii-dosar?customQuery%5B0%5D.Key=id&customQuery%5B0%5D.Value=100000000318064 
41     Magistrates associations (Forumul judecatorilor, AMASP, ˝Initiativa pentru justitie), civil society, Opposition parties. 
42     A key example concerned a criminal case against the former Chief Prosecutor of the DNA who is also a candidate to be 
European  Public  Prosecutor.    The  timing  of  the  opening  of  the  criminal  case  and  the  calendar  of  summons  seemed 
specifically  designed  to  frustrate  this  candidacy,  and  a  decision  by  the  High  Court  of  Cassation  and  Justice  on  the 
preventative measures applied qualified them as unlawful. Another example, at the same period, concerns a case opened 
against  the  former  Prosecutor  General  for  forming  an  organised  crime  group  in  relation  to  the  drafting  of  the  CVM 
reports.  

43     Venice Commission opinion 950/2019 and Greco-AdHocRep(2019)1 

9 

 
 
                                                           
the DNA chief prosecutor was refused a second time by the President of Romania in January 2019 and 
has remained in limbo since then.44   

The proposed dismissal of the Prosecutor General first received a negative opinion from the SCM. The 
Minister of Justice nevertheless put the request to the President of Romania, who refused the dismissal 
in  January  2019.  Two  months  later,  the  Minister  of  Justice  started  the  appointment  process  for  the 
prosecutor general post, as his first term mandate was ending in May.45  The Minister of Justice first 
rejected all candidates,  declaring  them  unsuitable for the profile  the  Prosecutor General of  Romania 
needs, and started a new procedure. All candidates had already held senior management positions in 
the  prosecution, including  the  incumbent  Prosecutor General.46  Following  the  change  of  Minister  of 
Justice in April, the procedure for appointing the Prosecutor General was suspended.47 At the time of 
writing this report, there is no Prosecutor General and no chief prosecutor in the DNA. The functions 
are filled ad interim by the corresponding deputies. In September 2019, the issue of top prosecution 
appointments was discussed between the Minister of Justice and the judicial institutions.   

The same appointment procedure applies for all deputy and heads of sector positions within the DNA, 
and the Minister of Justice had initiated several procedures to fill the posts. In the reporting period one 
posts was filled, but many remain filled ad interim.  

Judicial Inspection 

The November 2018 report had expressed concerns both on the activity of the Judicial Inspection and 
on the interim appointment of the management team. Since the last report, the activity of the Judicial 
Inspection  has  continued  to  raise  similar  concerns.  Criticism  focused  on  the  correlation  between 
disciplinary proceedings against magistrates and against the heads of the judicial institutions and that 
fact  that  the  individuals  concerned  had  often  taken  public  stances  against  the  amendments  to  the 
justice laws48 49 A further issue were successive cases of ongoing disciplinary investigation documents 
appearing in the media – with a similar correlation to those critical of the amendments to the justice 
laws  and  the  special  section  to  investigate  crimes  committed  by  magistrates.50  In  July  2019,  the 
President of the SCM informed the Commission that the issue of leaks had been discussed with the 
management of the Judicial Inspection in June, after the nomination of the new chief inspector.  

In addition, no competition was organised by the Superior Council to appoint a new management of 
the Judicial Inspection, although the mandate of the management team expired end of August 2018. 
The  decision  of  the  Government  to  solve  the  situation  by  adopting  an  Emergency  Ordinance  to 
nominate the current team ad interim – rather than leaving this to the Superior Council – did nothing to 
assuage concerns. The November 2018 report had therefore recommended that the Superior Council of 
Magistracy should appoint immediately an interim team for the management of the Judicial Inspection 
and within three months appoint through a competition a new management team in the Inspection. 

The SCM did not appoint a new interim management team and the management therefore remained in 
place ad interim until the appointment of the chief inspector in May 2019.51 The procedure managed 

44     DNA has therefore worked with ad interim leadership since then.  
45     The mandate is of 3 years, renewable once. 
46    The Prosecutor General’s application for a second mandate was marked by a high level of criticism in the media. When 

his candidacy was rejected by the Minister of Justice, the Prosecutor General retired from the magistracy.  

47      http://www.just.ro/declaratia-de-presa-sustinuta-de-doamna-ana-birchall-ministrul-justitiei-interimar-azi-30-04-2019/ 
48     The Consultative Council of European Judges (CCJE) and the Venice Commission have both underlined the importance 
that judges should be free to comment in relevant public debates. Note also the legal provisions restricting the freedom 
of expression of magistrates criticised by the Venice Commission.  

49      https://cursdeguvernare.ro/asociatia-initiativa-pentru-justitie-inspectia-judiciara-incearca-sa-i-intimideze-pe-magistratii-

care-lupta-pentru-apararea-independentei-justitiei.html,   

         https://www.csm1909.ro/ViewFile.ashx?guid=38b70eb6-641a-4794-9109-e6805dfd778e|InfoCSM,  
         http://portal.just.ro/36/SitePages/Dosar.aspx?id_dosar=200000000361685&id_inst=36,        

https://www.libertatea.ro/stiri/inspectia-judiciara-s-a-autosesizat-in-legatura-cu-informatiile-despre-augustin-lazar-2594108 ,  

          https://revista22.ro/actualitate-interna/ij-l-ancheteaz-pe-procurorul-corbu-care-a-spus-c-agresiunile-jandarmilor-nu-se-justific,  
50        A  judge’s  association  made  an  official  request  to  the  Judicial  Inspection  regarding  the  leaks.  The  Judicial  inspection 

denied any wrongdoing.  

51     The deputy chief inspector was appointed as head of the special section to investigate crimes committed by magistrates.  

10 

 
 
                                                           
by  the  SCM  resulted  in  the  appointment  of  the  same  chief  inspector,  despite  the  prevailing 
controversy.  On  17  July,  the  SCM  decision  to  validate  the  selected  candidate  was  challenged  in 
court.52 More generally, the procedure raises questions on whether the new provisions in the Justice 
laws for appointing the management of the Judicial Inspection offer sufficient guarantees and achieve 
the right balance between judges, prosecutors and the SCM plenum.53  

Criminal Codes 

In 2018, the Romanian Parliament adopted amendments to the Criminal Code and Criminal Procedure 
Code.  These  amendments  raised  significant  legal  and  policy  concerns.  They  constituted  a  profound 
overhaul  of  the  codes  of  2014,  and  notably  in  terms  of  the  balance  between  the  public  interest  of 
sanctioning crime, victim's rights and the rights of the suspects. They clearly went beyond the CVM 
recommendation to improve the stability of the codes and to limit amendments to where specifically 
required by Constitutional Court decisions and transposition of EU Directives. The amendments did 
not enter into force as they were challenged at the Constitutional Court by the High Court of Cassation 
and Justice, the opposition parties and by the President of Romania. The Constitutional Court ruled in 
October  2018  that  a  substantial  number  of  the  amendments  were  unconstitutional.  The  November 
2018 report therefore recommended to:  

(1) Freeze the entry into force of the changes to the Criminal Code and Criminal Procedure Code;  

(2) Reopen the revision of the Criminal Code and Criminal Procedure Code taking fully into account 
the  need  for  compatibility  with  EU  law and  international  anti-corruption instruments,  as  well  as the 
recommendations under the CVM and the Venice Commission opinion54. 

In March 2019, the Government prepared several emergency ordinances modifying the Criminal Code 
and Criminal Procedure Code. One of the drafts aimed at a more limited set of amendments, drafted in 
particular to transpose EU Directives and implement Constitutional Court decisions, but raised other 
issues. Another draft would have allowed an extraordinary review for all final criminal cases ruled by 
the  High  Court  of  Cassation  and  Justice  between  2014  and  2018.  Facing  strong  criticism  on  these 
projects, the Government eventually decided not to take them forward.  

In April 2019, the Parliament revised the draft laws of 2018 following the Constitutional Court rulings 
and adopted revised amendments of the Criminal Code, the Criminal Procedure Code and the special 
law on corruption in an expedited procedure of less than one week. Whereas some of the problematic 
provisions envisaged in the earlier drafts had disappeared from the new laws, others remained. Many 
amendments continued to raise concerns on the grounds of weakening the criminal investigation and 
sanctioning  regime  for  corruption  crimes,  with  severe  consequences  on  the  capacity  of  law 
enforcement  and  the  judiciary  to  combat  all  types  of  crimes.55  The  justification  provided  by  the 
majority  supporting  the  changes  in  Parliament  was  that  the  new  version  maintained  only  those 
amendments  considered  constitutional  after  the  Constitutional  Court  control  of  October  2018.  This 
implies  that  the  desirability  of  the  amendments  in  policy  terms  was  not  considered,  despite  the 

52      http://portal.just.ro/46/SitePages/Dosar.aspx?id_dosar=4600000000042849&id_inst=46 and  
         http://www.scj.ro/1094/Detalii-

dosar?customQuery%5B0%5D.Key=id&customQuery%5B0%5D.Value=100000000323236 

53     Under the old law 317/2004, both the Chief Inspector and the deputy Chief Inspector were selected by the SCM Plenum 
through by a competition including a written test, an interview and the presentation of the management project. Under 
the new law, only the Chief Inspector is appointed by the SCM after an interview before a commission with 3 judges, 1 
prosecutor and one member of civil society. The SCM plenum formally appoints the candidate but can only object on 
the grounds that the rules were not respected.  The deputy Chief Inspector and the Directors of respective Sections are 
selected by the Chief Inspector, whose powers to organise the inspection have also been increased.  

54     In October 2018, the Venice Commission adopted a critical opinion, pointing to rule of law concerns in leaving crimes 
unpunished, to the lack of quality of the legislation, and to shortcomings in its preparation as well as contradictions with 
the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and with the international obligations  of the country, especially 
regarding the fight against corruption. (Opinion 930/2018). 

55    Examples  include  limitations  on  the  collection  and  use  of  evidence  and  financial  data;  the  significant  shortening  of 
prescription periods; mitigating circumstances;  suspending the enforcement of  additional penalties for the duration of 
the  suspension  of  the  penalty  of  imprisonment;  favourable  treatment  for  denunciation  of  the  crime  within  one  year 
maximum; and decriminalisation of negligence in office. 

11 

 
 
                                                           
importance of the laws for the criminal policy of the State. These amendments were again challenged 
to  the  Constitutional  Court  by  the  opposition  parties  and  the  President.  After  eight  consecutive 
deferrals, the Constitutional Court ruled at the end of July that the amended laws are unconstitutional 
as a whole and not in line with its previous decisions.  

As  mentioned  under  recommendation  4,  in  the  referendum  on  justice  of  26  May,  an  overwhelming 
majority  voted  in  favour  of  banning  amnesty  and  pardon  for  corruption  offenses.  In  August,  the 
Parliament  rejected  a  law  on  amnesty  and  pardon  from  February  2017,  which  had  remained  on  the 
parliamentary table. 

Cooperation between the intelligence services and the judicial institutions 

The  past  few  years  have  seen  a  debate  concerning  the  cooperation  in  criminal  cases  between  the 
Romanian  Intelligence  Service  (‘SRI’)  and  various  judicial  institutions,  including  the  DNA  and  the 
General Prosecutor’s Office, and in more general terms on the relationship between the SRI and the 
judicial institutions.  

The November 2018 report noted that ‘The operation of the intelligence services is not a matter for the 
EU  and  falls  outside  the  CVM  benchmarks.  It  is  the  role  of  the  courts  to  establish  whether  or  not 
specific  allegations  of  abuses  are  substantiated  and  an  open  and  impartial  investigation  would  be 
needed to establish whether there were systemic failures such as illegal gathering of evidence or illegal 
influence on magistrates, and whether the existing legal safeguards need to be strengthened.’  

The main development in 2019 relevant for the CVM report is the decision of the Constitutional Court 
on two cooperation protocols signed between the Public Ministry and the SRI in 2009 and in 2016.56 
In short, on the protocol signed in 2016 by the Public Ministry and the SRI, the Constitutional Court 
ruled that the 2016 Protocol is legal. Emergency Ordinance 6/2016 amending the criminal procedure 
code  had  required  a  protocol  of  cooperation  to  establish  the  manner  of  collaboration  between 
services.57  On  the  2009  protocol,  the  Constitutional  Court  ruled  that  the  protocol  went  beyond  the 
constitutional role of the public ministry and that, for all future and pending cases, the courts, together 
with  the  prosecutorial  offices,  should  verify  whether  the  evidence  gathered  in  the  context  of  the 
protocol had been administrated with full respect of the law, and decide on appropriate legal measures. 
The decision does not apply to court decisions which became final before the ruling. 

It is still early to determine the full impact and consequences of the practical implementation of this 
decision, in particular on the fight against corruption.58 59 The High Court of Cassation and Justice will 
have a crucial role to play to ensure consistency of the case law.60 

The  Superior  Council  of  Magistracy  also  informed  the  Commission  that  the  Judicial  Inspection  has 
prepared a report on the protocol between the SRI and the Prosecution services. The report has been 
transmitted to the Council for debate and endorsement, but has not yet been made public.61  

The 2018 November report highlighted that ‘it is clearly important to ensure a framework where the 
intelligence  services  are  under  proper  supervision,  where  crimes  can  be  effectively  investigated  and 
sanctioned while fully respecting fundamental rights, and where the public can have confidence that 

56      CCR  Decision  no  26/2019  of  16  January  2019  admitting  a  legal  conflict  of  constitutional  nature  between  the  Public 

Ministry-POHCCJ and the Parliament. http://www.ccr.ro/jurisprudenta-decizii-de-admitere/  

57      Part of the protocol was declared unconstitutional by the CCR Decision 26/2019 but this does not affect the operational 

part of the protocol. 

58      Preliminary estimates suggest that this may impact on around 400 court cases. 
59     In a recent ruling by the Court of Appeal of Suceava, it was decided not to exclude evidence based on past interceptions. 
Judges  considered  here  that  the  Constitutional  Court  itself  stated  that  offer  of  technical  support  by  the  SRI  is  not 
equivalent to performing the act of criminal investigation. Curtea de Apel Suceava, Încheierea de cameră preliminară nr. 
15 din 19 martie 2019, portal.just.ro 

60        Additional  uncertainty  for  high-level  corruption  cases  comes  from  two  other  constitutional  court  decisions  annulling 
court decisions from the High Court of Cassation and Justice, one opening the possibility for an extraordinary appeal to 
some final decisions issued in 2018; and the second decision annulling the court proceedings in corruption cases held at 
the High Court of Cassation and Justice which were not final on 23 January 2019. (see also benchmark 3) 

61      The report has however been leaked to the media. 

12 

 
 
                                                           
judicial  independence  is  secure’.  The  Constitutional  Court  decision  also  points  to  the  need  for  the 
Parliament to strengthen its control on the intelligence services.62 

Recommendation  1:  Put  in  place  a  robust  and  independent  system  of  appointing  top  prosecutors, 
based on clear and transparent criteria, drawing on the support of the Venice Commission.  

Successive CVM reports had highlighted the need for sufficient checks and balances in the procedure 
to  appoint  top  prosecutors,  as  well  as  the  extent  to  which  the  same  appointment  and  dismissal 
procedure would apply at lower management level within the prosecution. The November 2017 report 
had  underlined  the  lack  of  progress.    The  November  2018  report  concluded  that  the  situation  had 
regressed.63 

Since the last report, Government Emergency Ordinances 92/2018, 7/2019 and 12/2019 have further 
modified  the  article  on  the  appointment  of  top  prosecutors.  The  Ordinances  modified  the  seniority 
requirements from 10 year to 15 years, then was not mentioned anymore and then back to 15 years. 
The endorsement of the prosecution section of the SCM was transferred to the plenum in Ordinance 
7/2019  of  the  SCM  and  then  back  again  to  the  prosecution  section  in  Ordinance  12/2019  (see  also 
above).      The  constant  modifications  created  further  uncertainty  and  a  lack  of  confidence  in  the 
procedure.  Although  the  procedure  was  modified  four  times  in  less  than  six  months,  none  of  these 
changes  addressed  the  issue  of  the  balance  between  the  influence  of  different  institutions  on  the 
process and the concentration of power with the Minister of Justice.64 Both the Venice Commission 
and  GRECO  have  reiterated  their  earlier  recommendations  in  opinions  issued  in  June  2019.  In 
particular the Venice Commission concludes that ’the scheme of appointment and dismissal of the top 
prosecutors remains essentially the same, with the Minister of Justice playing a decisive role in this 
process, without counterbalancing powers of the President of Romania or the SCM. It is recommended 
to develop an appointment scheme, which would give the Prosecutors’ Section of the SCM a key and 
pro-active role in the process of the appointment of candidates to any top position in the prosecution 
system’.   

Recommendation 2: Ensure that the Code of Conduct for parliamentarians now being developed in 
Parliament  includes  clear  provisions  on  mutual  respect  between  institutions  and  making  clear  that 
parliamentarians and the parliamentary process should respect the independence of the judiciary. A 
similar Code of Conduct could be adopted for Ministers. 

A new Code of Conduct for parliamentarians is in place since the end of 2017.65 The Code of Conduct 
does  not  specifically  mention  respect  for  the  independence  of  the  judiciary  but  includes  a  general 
provision  on  the  respect  of  separation  of  powers.  Although  the  hope  was  that  the  codes  of  conduct 
would be carried through as a practical tool to address the problem, the November 2018 report found 
that with a lack of explicit provisions on the respect for the independence of the judiciary, the Code 
was not yet performing this function.  

In  the  reporting  period,  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  mentions  that  seven  sanctions  were  applied  for 
breaching the code of conduct and the details can be found on the website of the Chamber. 66 From the 
information made available by Parliament, the cases do not appear to refer to criticism of the judiciary 
susceptible  to  undermine  its  independence.  It  has  also  been  noted  that  all  seven  cases  concern 
sanctions against members from opposition parties. 

62      CCR decision 26/2019 
63      COM(2018) 851 and SWD(2018) 551. 
64      In its opinion 950/2019 the Venice Commission notes “GEO no. 92 provided for the web broadcasting of interviews 
conducted  by  the  Minister  of  Justice  with  the  prospective  candidates  to  the  top  positions  in  the  prosecution  system 
(Article 54 (1-1) of Law no. 303). Broadcasting of interviews adds transparency, but it does not remove the inherently 
political nature of the process of appointment and cannot replace the examination of the merits of the candidates by an 
expert body.” 

65      https://www.juridice.ro/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Codul-de-conduită.pdf.  
66      http://www.cdep.ro/pls/dic/site2015.page?id=1046  

13 

 
 
                                                           
In  July  2017,  the  Government  adopted  a  Code  of  Conduct  for  Ministers,67  which  also  includes  a 
general provision on the respect for the separation of powers. In April 2019, the Government amended 
the code of conduct, and this now explicitly mentions the respect of the independence of justice under 
the general principles. 68 

In  the  reporting  period,  criticism  of  the judicial  system  and  individual  magistrates  in  the  media  and 
from the Government and the Parliament representatives has continued to be particularly common, in 
particular against the institutions dealing with high-level corruption.  

Recommendation  3:  The  current  phase  in  the  reform  of  Romania's  Criminal  Codes  should  be 
concluded,  with  Parliament  taking  forward  its  plans  to  adopt  the  amendments  presented  by  the 
government in 2016 after consultation with the judicial authorities. The Minister of Justice, the SCM 
and  the  High  Court  of  Cassation  and  Justice  should  finalise  an  action  plan  to  ensure  that  the  new 
deadline for the implementation of the remaining provisions of the Code of Civil Procedures can be 
respected. 

Criminal Code and Criminal Procedure Code 

For developments regarding the Criminal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code, see above.  

Civil Code and Code for Civil Procedures 

The November 2018 report acknowledged the amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure annulling 
three out of the four provisions which still needed to be implemented. In particular, a major change 
was made in eliminating the preliminary analysis stage in the Council Chamber in the civil procedure. 
The  process  for  amending  the  Code  of  Civil  procedure  was  finalised  in  December  2018.  The 
November 2018 report noted that the amendments should take particular account of the workload of 
the  High  Court  of  Cassation  and  Justice.  No  additional  information  on  the  latter  has  been  received 
from the Romanian authorities.  

Recommendation 4: In order to improve further the transparency and predictability of the legislative 
process,  and  strengthen  internal  safeguards  in  the  interest  of  irreversibility,    the  Government  and 
Parliament should ensure full transparency and take proper account of consultations with the relevant 
authorities  and  stakeholders  in  decision-making  and  legislative  activity  on  the  Criminal  Code  and 
Code  for  Criminal  Procedures,  on  corruption  laws,  on  integrity  laws  (incompatibilities,  conflicts  of 
interest, unjustified wealth), on the laws of justice (pertaining to the organisation of the justice system) 
and  on  the  Civil  Code  and  Code  for  Civil  Procedures,  taking  inspiration  from  the  transparency  in 
decision-making put in place by the Government in 2016. 

The November 2018 report criticised the legislative process amending the justice laws and amending 
the  Criminal  Code  and  Criminal  Procedure  Code,  seen  as  unpredictable  and  rushed  and  lacking 
effective analysis, motivation, consultation and policy debate. 

The  process  used  for  this  legislation  has  continued  to  raise  concerns.  Further  amendments  of  the 
justice  laws,  changing  fundamental  rules  on  the  functioning  of  the  judiciary,  were  made  without 
appropriate preparation and consultation. The process lacked transparency and predictability, and the 
immediate entry into force of the new provisions raised very serious challenges. As mentioned earlier 
in  this  report,  the  amendment  of  the  Justice  laws  by  five  government  emergency  ordinances  in  less 
than six months was strongly criticised by the Venice Commission,69 due to its impact on the quality 
of legislation, legal certainty, external checks on the Government, and the principle of separation of 
powers.  

67      https://sgg.gov.ro/new/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/MEMO-12.pdf.  
68      Article  3  of  the  Code  of  Conduct  for  Minsters,  regarding  the  principles  of  the  Code,  underlines  the  fact  that:  ”The 
Members  of  the  Government  exercise  their  mandate  in  accordance  with  the  checks  and  balances  principles,  in  the 
framework  of  constitutional  democracy,  while  respecting  the  independence  of  justice,  on  the  basis  of  the  loyal 
collaboration between authorities/institutions.” 

69      Venice Commission opinion 950/2019. 

14 

 
 
                                                           
Similarly, the revision of the amendments of the criminal code and criminal procedure code and the 
special law on corruption were passed through the committees and both chambers of Parliament in less 
than one week, with consequently minimal debate. The Constitutional Court rejected both laws in their 
entirety,  as  the  laws  failed  to  take  duly  into  account  previous  Constitutional  Court  decisions  (See 
earlier under Criminal Codes). 

This  was  a  major  reason  why  the  Commission  wrote  to  the  Government,  Parliament  and  to  the 
President of Romania in May 2019 expressing concerns of risks to the rule of law, citing the process 
undertaken for key legislative changes in the justice laws and the criminal codes.   

As the situation continued to deteriorate, on 26 May, the President of Romania called a referendum on 
justice. The participation rate was above 40%. An overwhelming majority (80,9%) voted in favour of 
banning  amnesty  and  pardon  for  corruption  offenses  and  81,12%  voted  in  favour  of  banning  the 
adoption  by  the  Government  of  emergency  ordinances  in  the  area  of  crimes,  punishments  and 
judiciary organisation, also supporting the right to challenge ordinances directly at the Constitutional 
Court.  Although  the  referendum  is  not  legally  binding,  the  Prime  Minister  declared  that  the 
Government would follow the results and would abstain from adopting emergency ordinances in the 
area of justice.70 

The  Parliament  has  also  decided 
the  Special  Parliamentary  Committee  on 
systematisation, unification and ensuring legislative stability in the judiciary, which had initiated the 
amendments  of  the  justice  laws  and  the  criminal  codes  and  was  responsible  for  some  of  the  most 
abrupt procedures used.  

to  dismantle 

Legislative  developments  in  relation  to  the  integrity  legal  framework  (incompatibilities,  conflict  of 
interests, wealth declarations) have created similar concerns. CVM reports have repeatedly highlighted 
the  lack  of  stability  and  clarity  of  the  integrity  legal  framework,  and  regretted  the  difficulty  to 
consolidate  the  rules  in  a  clear  and  predictable  legal  framework,  as  the  rules  are  spread  in  many 
(sometimes contradictory) laws and are continuously being modified. In this reporting period, several 
legislative  amendments  in  different  laws  have  significantly  increased  this  lack  of  clarity  and  legal 
certainty. The recent changes have had a significant impact on the integrity legal framework, but there 
does  not  appear  to  have  been  a  transparent  and  inclusive  legislative  process  or  a  clear  analysis  and 
debate  of the  consequences. The  societal  benefits  of the amendments  are  unclear  and the  laws  were 
adopted despite a negative opinion from the National Integrity Agency (ANI). The risk is that courts 
and  individuals  will  find  it  increasingly  difficult  to  understand  how  and  in  which  circumstances  the 
laws  and  sanctions  for  incompatibilities  or  conflict  of  interests  will  apply,  if  at  all.  (See  also 
benchmark 2). 

Recommendation 5: The Government should put in place an appropriate Action Plan to address the 
issue  of  implementation  of  court  decisions  and  application  of  jurisprudence  of  the  courts  by  public 
administration,  including  a  mechanism  to  provide  accurate  statistics  to  enable  future  monitoring. It 
should also develop a system of internal monitoring involving the SCM and Court of Auditors in order 
to ensure proper implementation of the Action Plan. 

Respect  and  implementation  of  court  decisions  is  an  integral  part  of  the  efficiency  of  the  judicial 
system as set out in Benchmark One.71 Following a condemnation by the European Court of Human 
Rights in 2016, Romania proposed to the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers an action plan to 
address the structural problems of non-enforcement of court decisions against the State.72 This action 

70  

 In August, however, the Government published online for public consultation a draft emergency ordinance modifying 
the criminal codes in the aftermath of a murder case that shook the public opinion in July 2019. Some of the envisaged 
changes  to  the  substantive  and  procedural  criminal  legislation  seek  to  reverse  previous  measures  related  to  the 
conditional release from prison or eliminate certain restrictions on law enforcement action in relation to serious crimes.  

         http://www.just.ro/proiect-pentru-modificarea-legislatiei-penale-si-procesual-penale-in-cazul-infractiunilor-grave-si-

foarte-grave-contra-persoanei-in-special-in-situatiile-in-care-este-afectata-valoarea-sociala-supre/  

71     Guide on Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights – Right to a fair trial (civil limb),  
         http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_6_ENG.pdf.  
72    COM(2017) 44 p.6. The Action plan of structural measures in relation to the Săcăleanu group of cases can be found at 

15 

 
 
                                                           
 
plan  and  the  additional  measures  required  by  the  Council  of  Europe  Committee  of  Ministers  are  of 
direct relevance to addressing this recommendation. 

The November 2018 CVM Report found that there had been progress on this recommendation.  The 
report noted that steps were under way to progress on the action plan and that a list of measures to take 
had been submitted to the Government in September 2018. The report further noted that in parallel the 
Ministry of Justice and the Superior Council of Magistracy were also advancing with an IT registry of 
court decisions in which the State is a debtor or a creditor.73  

In  April  2019,  the  Government  approved  the  list  of  measures  and  tasked  the  responsible  inter-
ministerial  working  group  to  draft  the  legal  proposals.  These  measures  include  amendments  to  the 
legal framework in order to guarantee timely execution and a mechanism to supervise and prevent late 
execution of judgements for which the State is a debtor, to be set up under the auspices of the Ministry 
of Justice.74 The working group and the Ministry of Justice are currently analysing the solutions and 
preparing the measures for adoption by the Government. 

Complementing  the  activity  of  the  working  group,  the  Ministry  of  Justice  with  the  support  of  the 
Superior Council of Magistracy has progressed on the setting up of an IT registry of court decisions in 
which the State is a debtor or a creditor. The IT application has been developed and tested in particular 
in  courts  with  high  volumes  of  activity  until  end  of  June  2019,  which  should  pave  the  way  to 
operationalisation of the registry in all courts, pending final approvals and updates of the courts’ IT 
system (ECRIS). Once operational, the registry will make available statistics on effective enforcement, 
and will allow responsible entities to monitor the execution of judgements. 

Recommendation  6:  The  Strategic  Judicial  Management,  i.e.  the  Minister  of  Justice,  the  SCM,  the 
HCCJ and the Prosecutor-General should ensure the implementation of the Action Plan as adopted 
and  put in  place regular common  public  reporting  on  its  implementation, including  solutions  to  the 
issues of shortages of court clerks, excessive workload and delays in motivation of decisions. 

The  November  2018  CVM  Report  had  seen  no  progress  towards  meaningful  results  on  this 
recommendation. The report  noted that  the  Strategic  Management  Council  has not  developed  into a 
forum able to address major strategic questions for the judicial system.  

Between  November  2018  and  September  2019,  there  was  no  meeting  of  the  Strategic  Judicial 
Management.  As  noted  earlier  in  this  report,  the  amended  justice  laws,  which  have  brought 
fundamental  changes  in  the  functioning  and  the  organisation  of  the  justice  system,  have  been  taken 
forward  through  unilateral Emergency  Ordinances  and  decisions  from  the judicial  institutions rather 
than through consensual decisions from the Strategic Judicial Management. In July 2019, the Minister 
of  Justice  stated  that  she  will  convene  the  Strategic  Judicial  Management,  to  discuss  subjects  of 
common  interest  for  all  participants  in  the  judiciary,  as  well  as  the  necessary  steps  in  view  of  the 
implementation of CVM, GRECO and the Venice Commission recommendations. The meeting took 
place on 17 September and the Minister proposed to have meetings every six weeks. 

At  technical  level,  the  judicial  institutions  reported  progress  on  some  of  the  ongoing  projects  and 
activities, and in March 2019 the Government adopted a technical revision of the Action Plan for the 
implementation  of  the  Strategy  for  the  Development  of  the  Judiciary  2015-2020,  prepared  in  2018. 
There was also an evaluation of the Strategy by an external contractor.  In Spring 2019, the Minister of 
Justice also unblocked recruitments and resources for the judicial institutions and the National Agency 
for the Management of Seized Assets (ANABI). 

   COM(2018) 851 and SWD(2018) 551. 

         https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016806dda63. 
73  
74      Memorandum on "Measures to Ensure the Execution of Judgments against a Public Debtor, in accordance with the case 
law of the European Court of Human Rights regarding non-execution or execution with delay of the judgments handed 
down against a public debtor (the Scăleanu vs. Romania group of cases)." 

16 

 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Recommendation 7:  The new SCM should prepare a collective programme for its mandate, including 
measures to promote transparency and accountability. It should include a strategy on outreach, with 
regular  open  meetings  with  assemblies  of  judges  and  prosecutors  at  all  levels,  as  well  as  with  civil 
society  and  professional  organisations,  and  set  up  annual  reporting  to  be  discussed  in  courts'  and 
prosecutors' general assemblies. 

Previous CVM reports have underlined the importance for the Superior Council of Magistracy (SCM) 
to maintain the momentum of reform, to articulate clear collective positions and philosophy and take 
measures for increasing its transparency and accountability. The November 2017 report noted that the 
Superior  Council  of  the  Magistracy  (SCM)  had  set  out  its  priorities  for  its  mandate  (2017–2022), 
providing a first basis to promote the accountability of the institution.  

The SCM reports that in 2019 it continued the implementation of its priorities and of the action plan to 
implement the CVM recommendation, including on measures to increase transparency. In June 2019, 
the  SCM  organised  a  public  debate  in  the  context  of  new  provisions  in  the  Justice  laws  aiming  to 
increase the decisional transparency and institutional opening of the SCM.75 

However, as already underlined in the November 2018 report, circumstances have made it increasingly 
difficult for the Council to maintain the approach set out in its priorities. Divisions in the Council had 
made it difficult to react in one voice, in particular on legislative changes or even in more managerial 
areas  (for  example  analysing  the  impact  of  amendments  such  as  the  early  retirement  scheme  and 
delayed entry into the profession). Since the last report, these concerns have been confirmed.  

First,  the  manner  in  which  the  Council  works  raises  concerns  about  institutional  independence  and 
authority. An example of this is in communication. There are many examples where public statements 
issued on behalf of the SCM or on behalf of one of the sections had not in fact been endorsed by the 
Plenum or the corresponding section, but rather reflected only the position of the President of the SCM 
or a subset of members.76 77 There is also a confusion between the roles of the sections and the role of 
the Plenum. Stemming from the Constitution, the defence of the independence of the justice system is 
the responsibility of the Plenum, but the judges section has made a series of public statements in this 
regard, which had not been endorsed by the Plenum.78 This situation is also reflected in the the new 
justice  laws,  and  exacerbated  by  the  government  emergency  ordinances  on  the  justice  laws,  which 
made  it  possible  for  decisions  on  key  issues  to  be  determined  by  only  a  few  SCM  members.79 
Examples  already  mentioned  are  the  appointments  of  the  management  of  the  special  section  to 
investigate  magistrates  and  of  the  chief  inspector.  All  these  elements  risk  weakening  the  public 
confidence in the judiciary.  

The SCM is the defender of the independence of justice. The January 2017 report had noted that a pro-
active approach by the Superior Council was an important element in fulfilling Benchmark One. The 
November 2018 report however pointed that the Council was not able to provide a strong stance in this 
area. Since November 2018, the activity of the Council in defending the independence of the judiciary 
continues to be limited, despite the overall situation in terms of the legal challenges in the justice laws 
and the pressure on the magistracy and judicial institutions. Between November 2018 and June 2019, 
the  SCM  has  taken  only  two  decisions  to  defend  the  independence  of  the  judicial  system  and  19 

75     The meeting was attended by magistrates, journalists, representatives of professional associations, civic associations as 
well  as  public  institutions  in  the  judiciary.  Issues  addressed  included  institutional  transparency  and  access  to  public 
interest information, the protection of personal data, the right to information, the right to privacy, the presumption of 
innocence. 

76      Although a close analysis of the statement shows that the statement only reflects the position of a subset of the members 
of the Council, this nevertheless creates confusion as it can be perceived as an authoritative statement from the SCM. 
Examples include : letter to the Venice Commission  https://cdn.g4media.ro/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Lia-Savonea-
raspuns-Comisia-Venetia.pdf, communique on Greco reports: 
https://www.csm1909.ro/PageDetails.aspx?FolderId=7219 

77      Another example regards the amendment of the Criminal Code and Criminal Procedure Code in Spring 2019 where a 
negative opinion from the SCM had been expressed only by the Section for Prosecutors. However, a collective voice 
was reached when a negative opinion from the SCM Plenum was issued on 5 March 2019 for the EOG 7/2019. 

78      https://www.csm1909.ro/PageDetails.aspx?FolderId=7350;  
79      See also Venice Commission opinion 950/2019 

17 

 
 
                                                           
decisions  to  defend  the  professional  reputation,  independence  and  impartiality  of  magistrates.80 
Furthermore, analysis finds that the time taken to take decisions has increased in the last two years, 
thereby  decreasing  the  impact  of  the  decisions  of  the  SCM.81  The  SCM  has  also  never  clearly 
explained why the conclusions it has voiced on the justice laws are so clearly in opposition to those of 
other stakeholders.82 Where the SCM has cited a defence of the independence of the judiciary, it has 
sometimes raised issues of potential political partiality.83 

In  view  of  these  developments,  Romanian  stakeholders  have  questioned  the  legitimacy  and 
accountability of some members of the SCM.84 

Judicial Inspection 

Developments concerning the Judicial Inspection are explained earlier in the report in relation to the 
additional recommendations of November 2018.  

Benchmark  2:  Establish,  as  foreseen,  an  integrity  agency  with  responsibilities  for 
verifying  assets,  incompatibilities  and  potential  conflicts  of  interest,  and  for  issuing 
mandatory decisions on the basis of which dissuasive sanctions can be taken 

The November 2018 report concluded that ‘the significant progress marked under Benchmark Two in 
November 2017 has stalled. Recommendation 8 is fulfilled as long as PREVENT is consolidated as an 
effective preventative tool. Progress on recommendation 9 requires the current lack of clarity on the 
rules to be resolved.’ 

Amendments to the integrity legal framework 

The National Integrity Agency (ANI) has maintained a steady track record since the last report. In the 
period  November  2018-August  2019,  ANI  identified  173  integrity  issues  out,  with  126  cases  of 
incompatibility,  34  cases  of  administrative  conflict  of  interests,  4  cases  of  unjustified  wealth  and  9 
cases  of  possible  criminal  or  corruption  offences.  During  the  same  period,  223  cases  have  become 
definitive,  either through  final  Court decisions that  confirmed  ANI’s  report,  or  through  the fact that 
there was no legal challenge to the ANI evaluation report.85 

Previous CVM reports had highlighted the continued challenges to the integrity legal framework. In 
the last two and a half years five legislative proposals modifying the integrity laws have been adopted. 
Rather  than  bringing  clarity  to  the  existing  framework,  new  amendments  have  been  adopted  by 
Parliament.  These  have  weakened  certain  provisions  and  the  ability  of  ANI  to  maintain  its  track 
record, and risks exacerbating the fragmented legal landscape. The 2018 CVM report had highlighted 
in particular two legislative proposals adopted by Parliament in July 2018, despite a negative opinion 
from ANI. The first would set a prescription deadline of three years for the deeds that determine the 
existence of the state of conflict of interests or incompatibility.86 The second proposal would amend 

80      At least four decisions concern the same judge.  
81      http://www.forumuljudecatorilor.ro/wp-content/uploads/Analiza-activitatii-CSM-in-privinta-apararii-corpului-

magistratilor.pdf 

82      November 2018 CVM report, two Venice Commission opinions, two GRECO reports, opinion from the CCJE, opinion 
from the Human Rights Commissioner https://rm.coe.int/report-on-the-visit-to-romania-from-12-to-16-november-2018-
by-dunja-mi/1680925d71 

83      For  example  statements  condemning  declarations  (1)  of  the  President  of  the  European  Parliament  criticising  the 
preventive measures taken by the special section to investigate magistrates preventing the EPPO candidate to attend the 
hearing at the European Parliament; (2)  of the President of Romania rejecting the proposal for minister of justice made 
by the Prime Minister in August 2019. 

        https://www.csm1909.ro/PageDetails.aspx?FolderId=6842; 

https://www.csm1909.ro/PageDetails.aspx?Type=Button&FolderId=7350 

84       In  June  2019  civil  society  organisations  request  the  resignation  of  the  SCM President.  End  of August  two  magistrate 

associations make a similar request. 

85      155 cases of incompatibility and 68 cases of administrative conflict of interests. 
86        Law modifying Law 176/2010 regarding integrity in public functions. 

18 

 
 
 
                                                           
the sanctioning regime regarding conflict of interests for local elected officials.87 These amendments 
were  unsuccessfully  challenged  at  the  Constitutional  Court  by  the  President  of  Romania,  and  both 
became law in April 2019.88,89 Further proposals for amendments are pending in Parliament.90 

The  introduction  of a  general statute  of limitations  for  civil,  administrative  and disciplinary  liability 
for conflicts of interests and incompatibilities of three years after the facts have been committed has 
raised serious concerns.91 It will result in the prescription of the cases, if more than three years have 
passed since the integrity incident was committed to the point when an evaluation report is issued by 
ANI.  This  appears  inconsistent  with  other  provisions  of  the  ANI  legal  framework,  which  allow 
investigations until up to three years after the end of the mandate of the official concerned. This new 
statute  of  limitations  has  already  resulted  in  the  automatic  closure  of  119  files  by  the  integrity 
inspectors.92 In addition, it is unclear whether a sanction can still be applied after a final court decision 
upholding  an  ANI  report,  if  the  final  court  decision  is  only  issued  after  the  end  of  the  three  years 
prescription period, as is the case today.  

The  other  amendment  modified  the  list  of  applicable  administrative  sanctions  for  locally  elected 
officials found in conflict of interests. This potentially creates a divergence with the sanctions already 
foreseen in the ANI law, with a new administrative sanctioning regime for conflict of interests which 
ANI considers as not being dissuasive.93  

This situation increases the legal uncertainty as regards the applicable integrity regime and therefore a 
risk that the dissuasive sanctions identified in the benchmark and assessed in the January 2017 report 
no longer apply.  
The budget of ANI was sharply reduced in 201794 and this situation had continued in 2018. For 2019, 
ANI received a budget of 22.5 million RON, 15 % more than the budget implementation for 2018.95 
According  to  ANI,  this amount is sufficient for  the  daily  operation  of  the  agency.  ANI  successfully 
applied for EU funds for a project to improve its investigative IT tools.   

Recommendation 8: Ensure the entry into operation of the PREVENT system. The National Integrity 
Agency  and  the  National  Public  Procurement  Agency  should  put  in  place  reporting  on  the  ex-ante 
checks of public procurement procedures and their follow-up, including ex post checks, as well as on 
cases of conflicts of interest or corruption discovered, and the organisation of public debates so that 
the government, local authorities, the judiciary and civil society are invited to respond. 

As the previous CVM report noted, the PREVENT system is now fully operational. From the start of 
operations  in  June  2017  until  15  August  2019,  PREVENT  has  analysed  33,384  public  procurement 
procedures96  including  4,194  referring  to  European  funds.  Furthermore,  since  the  beginning  of 

87        Law modifying Law 393/2004 on the Statute of locally elected officials. 
88      Even if the final form of text modifying Law 161/2003 addressed some of the identified shortcomings  
89     Modification of Law no 176/2010 regarding integrity in public functions by introducing a prescription deadline for the 
deeds determining the existence  of the conflict of interest or incompatibility  situation and Promulgated by Decree no 
169/2019 

90      In total, seven proposals are currently pending in Parliament, concerning the modification and/or completion of Law No 
176/2010 (3 projects), Law No 161/2003 (2 projects), Law No 95/2006 (1 draft) and Law No 7/2006 (1 draft). Three of 
them are older from 2015, and one from 2019 is currently under CCR scrutiny. 

91      ‘Civil  or  administrative  disciplinary  liability  for  the  acts  that  determine  the  existence  of  conflict  of  interest  or 
incompatibility of persons in the exercise of public dignities or offices is removed, and can not be held in the case of 
expiration of the general prescription period of 3 years since the date of their being committed, in accordance with art. 
2.517 of Law no. 287/2009 on the Civil Code, republished, as subsequently amended.’ 

92      ANI forecasts a total number of 200 files to be closed by the end of this year 
93     Instead of  the sanction of “removal from office” in the ANI law and applied so far, the law on local elected officials 
introduces  a  new  explicit  sanctioning  regime  for  conflicts  of  interests  entailing  the  application  of  the  following 
penalties: warning; calling to order;  right to take the floor;  removal from the meeting room; the temporary exclusion 
from the local council and the specialised committee; reduction of the meeting allowance by 10 % for a maximum of six 
months; withdrawal of the meeting allowance for one or two meetings. 

94      From about 33 million RON in 2016 to 22,5 million RON in 2017.  
95      The budget for 2019 is similar than the budget for 2017. 
96      The number doubled since 2018 

19 

 
 
                                                           
PREVENT,  integrity  inspectors  have  issued  100  integrity  warnings97  regarding  public  procurement 
procedures, amounting to over 1.14 billion RON (approx. €243 million). Out of these, in 97 cases, the 
leader of the contracting authority removed the causes that generated potential conflict of interests. In 
addition, the ANI has also notified the National Agency for Public Procurement (ANAP) of 52 cases 
of possible irregularities98 in the public procurement procedures regarding possible conflicts of interest 
between members of the contracting authority and bidders within the tender.99  

The PREVENT system also appears to act as an important deterrent. ANI reports that the number of 
investigations opened in alleged cases of conflict of interests related to public procurement contracts 
has significantly dropped (by almost 50%) since the system is operational. 

Recommendation 9: The Parliament should be transparent in its decision-making with regard to the 
follow-up to final and irrevocable decisions on incompatibilities, conflicts of interests and unjustified 
wealth against its members. 

The November 2018 report had referred to a number of cases of final decisions of incompatibilities or 
conflict  of  interests  against  MPs.  The  report  had  noted  that  in  some  cases,    Parliament  had  not  yet 
reacted  and  for  the  others,  Parliament  had  written  to  ANI  that  no  disciplinary  sanction  would  be 
applied. The argument was that no action was taken because the integrity incident in question came in 
a previous mandate or position. The CVM report pointed that this was not an interpretation applied so 
far  by  the  courts  or  other  public  institutions,  and  therefore  that  there  was  a  need  for  clarity  on  the 
incompatibilities  and  conflict  of  interests  in  a  way  which  fulfils  the  CVM  benchmark  of  securing 
’mandatory decisions on the basis of which dissuasive sanctions can be taken’. 

According  to  progress  reports  submitted  by  the  Parliament,  there  are  no  cases  of  violation  of  the 
incompatibility or conflict of interest regime by MPs in the current mandate. The cases referred to in 
the previous CVM report have been resolved.100 
According  to  ANI,  there  were  no  new  cases  of  incompatibility  or  conflict  of  interests101  concerning 
Members  of  Parliament  since  the  last  CVM  report.  In  the  pending  cases  where  the  Agency  had 
requested  the  Parliament  to  apply  disciplinary  measures  in  cases  of  parliamentarians  found  in 
incompatibility and administrative conflicts of interest, the situation remained unchanged since the last 
CVM report.   

On the preventive side, ANI is running a project with Transparency International giving information 
and  guidelines  to  Members  of  Parliament  regarding  integrity  rules.  Overall,  there  seems  to  be  an 
increased awareness of elected officials on the integrity rules, but subject to the concerns about legal 
certainty mentioned above.  

Benchmark  3:  Building  on  progress  already  made,  continue  to  conduct  professional, 
non- partisan investigations into allegations of high- level corruption 

The November 2018 CVM report concluded that ‘on the basis of an analysis of Benchmark Three, the 
Commission  can  confirm  its  conclusion  from  November  2017  that  more  work  is  needed  on 
recommendation 10. Moreover, the basis for the positive assessment reached in respect of Benchmark 

97        In  addition  to  the  warnings,  the  PREVENT  system  has  also  raised  awareness  among  contracting  authorities  who 
regularly  contact  both  the  National  Integrity  Agency  and  the  National  Agency  for  Public  Procurement  for  advice  on 
conflict of interest and integrity rules when preparing procurement procedures. 

98      In the period 1s November 2018-15 August 2019 and 52 since 27 June 2017 
99     These concern cases of potential conflict of interest as defined by the transposed EU public procurement directives but 

do not fall under ANI competence and are therefore to be followed up by ANAP. 

100     In the Evaluation Report on Romania under the Fourth Evaluation Round by GRECO recommended inter alia that ways 
be found to accelerate and enforce the judicial decisions concerning incompatibilities. On the basis of  the information 
provided  by  the  Romanian  Parliament,  GRECO  decided  to  close  the  recommendation  and  referring  to  the  fact  that 
within  the  framework  of  the  National  Anticorruption  Strategy  for  2016-2020,  further  results  concerning  conflicts  of 
interest  and  incompatibilities  are  expected  later  in  2019,  following  a  project  implemented  by  ANI  together  with 
Transparency International Romania. 

101     No final court decisions upholding ANI report or new report from ANI. 

20 

 
 
                                                           
Three in January 2017 has been reopened by Romania. Therefore recommendation 10 can no longer 
be deemed to suffice in order to close the Benchmark and to this end additional recommendations are 
included in the conclusions of this report.’ 

Since the last report, despite the prevailing circumstances, the judicial institutions involved in fighting 
high-level  corruption  continued  to  investigate  allegations  and  sanction  high-level  corruption  crimes. 
From  September  2018  to  August  2019,  the  National  Anti-Corruption  Directorate  (DNA)  sent  349 
defendants  to  trial  in  182  cases.  213  final  conviction  decisions  were  issued  against  513  defendants. 
Special  confiscation  measures  were  ordered  for  €27  million  and  final  decisions  on  compensation  to 
civil  parties  of  €  95,1  million,  including  EUR  83  million  as  compensation  awarded  to  public 
authorities and institutions.  In the first six months of 2019, the High Court of Cassation and Justice 
(HCCJ) solved three high level corruption cases at first instance and settled four high-level corruption 
cases by final decision.102 Although still strong, this represents some deceleration in track record. 

The  November  2018  report  highlighted  a  number  of  concerns  in  the  fight  against  high-level 
corruption:  

(1)  the  appointment  procedure  for  high-level  prosecutors  and  the  lack  of  checks  and  balances 
discussed under recommendation 1;  

(2) the amendments of the Justice laws;  

(3) pressure on the justice institutions responsible for investigation and sanctioning, likely to damage 
their independence, and finally; 

(4) ongoing changes to the Criminal Code, Criminal Procedure Code and special law on corruption.    

Developments under the reporting period are relevant to all these concerns. 

The  appointment  procedure  for  the  DNA  Chief  Prosecutor  and  the  .  additional  recommendation  of 
November 2018 to appoint a Chief prosecutor of the DNA with proven experience in the prosecution 
of  corruption  crimes  and  with  a  clear  mandate  for  the  DNA  to  continue  to  conduct  professional, 
independent and non-partisan investigations of corruption is covered in other sections.  

With the creation of the Special Section to investigate offences committed by magistrates, part of the 
DNA’s  jurisdiction  was  transferred  (275  cases  were  sent  to  the  special  section  as  a  result).  The 
assessment of the operation of the Special Section will therefore have a direct bearing on the overall 
assessment of action against high-level corruption, particularly given the transfer of corruption cases 
to  the  Special  Section  in  cases  where  the  involvement  of  a  magistrate  was  far  from  the  centre  of 
gravity of the case, and the decision to drop appeals in high-level corruption cases lodged by the DNA. 
Another legal amendment which has made the work of the DNA more challenging makes changes to 
the conditions and the procedure for the appointment and delegation of prosecutors to the DNA. This 
has created difficulties in recruiting and delegating prosecutors within the DNA.  

The public criticism of the DNA continued in 2019. Examples are the allegations of abuses in relation 
to cases of corruption involving magistrates, the collaboration with the Intelligence Services or general 
criticism  on  the  cost  of  DNA.  The  period  of  reference  also  saw  a  sharp  increase  of  pressure  on  the 
HCCJ,  which  is  competent  for  many  high-level  corruption  trials.  Of  particular  significance  was  a  
controversy  started  in  August  2018  in  relation  to  the  High  Court’s  interpretation  of  the  procedural 
rules  on  the  constitution  of  the  appeal  panels  of  5  judges  at  the  HCCJ  in  criminal  cases.  This  was 
challenged  by  the  Minister  of  Justice,  and  eventually  the  Government  invoked  a  Constitutional 
Conflict between the Parliament and the HCCJ to take the issue to the Constitutional Court. This was 
followed  by  a  second  challenge  raised  by  the  President  of  the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  following 
questions initiated by the Chief Prosecutor of the Special Section, in relation to the composition of the 

102    Compared to the period between September 2017 and August 2018, where the DNA sent 854 defendants to trial in 299 
cases.  266  final  conviction  decisions  were  issued  against  659  defendants.  Seizing  measures  were  ordered  for  €  447 
million and final confiscations amount to about € 67,4 million, with final decisions on compensation to civil parties of € 
109  million,  including  €  81  million  (74%)  as  compensation  awarded  to  public  authorities  and  institutions  and  to 
companies with state capital. 

21 

 
 
                                                           
3-judge panels for first instance corruption trials at the HCCJ. The Constitutional Court admitted both 
conflicts. Some commentators considered that it was in the competence of the HCCJ to interpret this 
law and that the decision of the Constitutional Court to rule on the issue has broader consequences.  

The  result  was  legal  uncertainty  concerning  ongoing  and  past  trials  and  a  risk  that  changes  in  the 
working methods of the HCCJ would entail major delays in the administration of justice. Although the 
decisions  of  the  Constitutional  Court  do  not  apply  to  past  cases  where  a  final  judgement  has  been 
rendered, their consequences have to be assessed on a case by case basis on ongoing cases. This can 
entail  delays  and  restart  of  trails,  as  well  as  allowing  for  the  re-opening  of  final  cases  in  certain 
conditions.103  A  few  high-level  corruption cases  have  now  been re-opened  for extraordinary  review. 
The full consequences are not yet known.104  

In addition, the Judicial Inspection filed a disciplinary file against the President of the HCCJ and the 
SCM  judges  section  asked  for  its  revocation  in  relation  to  these  constitutional  conflicts.  These 
disciplinary actions were later dismissed, but in July 2019, the President of the High Court announced 
she would not apply for a second term, explicitly citing the pressure imposed by these steps.  

Another  area  of  concern  is  the  uncertainty  with  regard  the  Criminal  Code  and  Criminal  Procedure 
Code  and  the  special  law  on  corruption.  As  described  under  Benchmark  1,  new  amendments  were 
adopted  in  April  2019  and,  if  taken  forward,  these  would  impact  the  prosecution  and  sanction  of 
corruption  crimes.  Some  of  the  amendments  would  strongly  limit  the  possibility  to  prosecute  and 
sanction  corruption-related  crimes.105  These  amendments  have  been  ruled  unconstitutional  in  July 
2019. In the November 2018 report, the Commission’s recommendations had emphasised the need for 
compatibility  with  EU  law  and  international  anti-corruption  instruments  when  revising  the  Criminal 
Code  and  Criminal  Procedure  Code.  There  is  no  indication  that  this  consideration  was  part  of  the 
debate in the April adoption procedure.  

Recommendation  10:  Adopt  objective  criteria  for  deciding  on  and  motivating  lifting  of  immunity  of 
Members  of  Parliament  to  help  ensure  that  immunity  is  not  used  to  avoid  investigation  and 
prosecution  of  corruption  crimes.  The  government  could  also  consider  modifying  the  law  to  limit 
immunity of ministers to time in office. These steps could be assisted by the Venice Commission and 
GRECO.  The  Parliament  should  set  up  a  system  to  report  regularly  on  decisions  taken  by  its 
Chambers on requests for lifting immunities and could organise a public debate so that the Superior 
Council of Magistracy and civil society can respond. 

The  Parliament  has  reported  that  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  adopted  in  June  2019  changes  to  the 
Regulation  of  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  in  the  sense  of  this  recommendations.  The  Regulation  was 
modified to explicitly refer to the criteria set up in the Venice Commission Report “on the purpose and 
waiver of parliamentary immunity”, when the legal committee makes a decision on requests from the 
prosecution to authorise preventative measures such as searches or arrest and on requests to authorise 
the investigation of an MP when he/she is also or has been a Minister.  Deadlines for the procedures 
have been set.106 The final vote in the Plenary remains secret. 

103    In early 2019, consideration was given to legislation to extend the possibility for extraordinary review to all final court 

decisions at the HCCJ in criminal cases since 2014.  

104    The motivation of the Constitutional Court decision on the three judges panel was published in the Official Journal on 

10 October 2019. 

105    Examples  include  limitations  on  the  collection  and  use  of  evidence  and  financial  data;  the  significant  shortening  of 
prescription periods; mitigating circumstances; suspending the enforcement of  additional penalties for the duration of 
the suspension of the penalty of imprisonment; favourable treatment for denunciation of bribery crime within one year 
maximum; decriminalisation of negligence in office and of aggravated abuse in office; and higher thresholds for proving 
intent and for extended confiscation of criminal assets.  

106    Art.157, (2) (..) The request must be substantiated in fact and in law. The Permanent Bureau of the Chamber of Deputies 
has the obligation to request the Legal, Discipline and Immunities Commission to submit, in maximum 5  days, a first 
evaluation of the respective request and an estimate of the time needed to conduct the hearing of the MP and to study 
the documents submitted by the General Prosecutor. On the basis of the preliminary assessment, the Permanent Bureau 
of the Chamber of Deputies shall set a deadline for submission of the report by the Legal, Discipline and Immunities 
Commission, which may not exceed 14 days.  

22 

 
 
                                                           
 
These new rules do not apply to the Senate. On 3 June 2019, the Senate refused a demand from the 
prosecution  dating  from  November  2018  to  start  an  investigation  against  an  MP  for  allegations  of 
corruption. A few days earlier, the Legal Committee of the Senate had given a positive opinion on the 
request.   

Benchmark  4:  Take  further  measures  to  prevent  and  fight  against  corruption,  in 
particular within the local government 

The November 2018 CVM report concluded that ‘on the basis of an analysis of Benchmark Four, the 
Commission  can  confirm  its  conclusion  from  November  2017  that  more  work  is  needed to  progress 
towards  completing  the  Benchmark.  Corruption  prevention  is  held  back  by  political  developments, 
which  undermine  the  credibility  of  progress  (recommendation  11).  Concerning  recommendation  12, 
the  Commission  can  conclude  this  recommendation  is  fulfilled,  but  it  will  be  important  to  ensure 
sufficient human resources for ANABI.’ 

Recommendation  11:  Continue  to  implement  the  National  Anti-corruption  Strategy,  respecting  the 
deadlines  set  by  the  government  in  August  2016.  The  Minister  of  Justice  should  put  in  place  a 
reporting system on the effective implementation of the National Anti-corruption Strategy (including 
statistics  on  integrity  incidents  in  public  administration,  details  of  disciplinary  procedures  and 
sanctions and information on the structural measures applied in vulnerable areas). 

In  the  reporting  period,  the  technical  secretariat for the  National  Anti-Corruption  Strategy  (NAS)  in 
the  Ministry  of  Justice  continued  to  monitor  the  implementation  of  Strategy  and  to  carry  out  the 
measures  under  its  responsibility.  The  annual  report  for  the  activities  of  2018  was  published  in 
September 2019.107  

A first priority has been to ensure the internal auditing of all institutions adhering to the NAS, which 
should  take  place  every  two  years.  The  objective  of  the  internal  audit  mission  is  to  evaluate  the 
inventory of institutional transparency and corruption prevention measures. The audit missions taking 
place  this  year  focus  in  particular  on  three  themes:  Code  of  ethics/deontology/conduct;  Ethics 
Advisors;  and  sensitive  functions.108  The  internal  public  audit  missions  are  ongoing  and  the  NAS 
Technical Secretariat has already brought together over 500 audit reports. 

A  second  priority  has  been  the  six-monthly  meeting  of  the  cooperation  platforms,  which  took  place 
17-19  April  2019  with  the  representatives  of  central  public  administration  institutions,  independent 
authorities  and  anti-corruption  institutions:  the  Platform  of  the  central  public  administration,  the 
Platform  of  the  independent  authorities  and  anticorruption  institutions,  the  Platform  of  the  business 
environment and the Platform of civil society.109 

An important work strand for 2019 has been the thematic peer review missions within a set of public 
institutions  and  focused  on  common  themes.  Topics  under  evaluation  in  this  thematic  round  are: 
conflicts  of  interest  during  and  after  the  exercise  of  the  function;  transparency  of  public  institutions 
and  access  to  public  information;  incompatibilities;  declaration  of  gifts;  and  protection  of 
whistleblowers. Since the last CVM report, evaluation missions took place at the Ministry of Culture 
and  National  Identity,  the  Competition  Council  and  the  Ministry  of  Economy.  A  series  of  other 
missions are planned.110 As for the local public administration, the NAS secretariat and the Ministry of 

         (3)  The  report  will  contain  all  the  arguments,  both  in  favour  of  the  approval  of  the  application  and  those  against  its 
approval.  (..)  All  the  arguments  will  be  related  to  the  fulfilment  of  the  criteria  and  guidelines  for  the  waiver  of 
parliamentary  immunity  contained  in  Chapter  V  of  the  "Venice  Commission  Report  on  the  scope  and  lifting  of 
parliamentary immunities CDL-AD (2014) 011. 

107    https://sna.just.ro/Rapoarte+de+monitorizare 
108     According  to  the  methodology,  the  12  measures  of  institutional  transparency  and  corruption  prevention  will  be 

evaluated over 8 years, namely 3 measures every 2 years. 

109     The aim of the meeting was to analyse the Methodologies adopted in 2018 and identify possible problems that may arise 

in their interpretation and application by public institutions. 

110     Including at central ministries, ANI, the Permanent Electoral Authority, National Office for the Prevention and Control 
of Money Laundering, High Court of Cassation and Justice, Prosecutor’s Office attached to the High Court of Cassation 

23 

 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
Local Development and Public Administration (MDRAP), with the support of the National Integrity 
Agency, have started a programme of more than 80 evaluation missions for 2019 at the headquarters 
of county councils and city halls of municipalities and cities, half of which have already taken place.  

The authorities also report the continuation of corruption prevention actions in central ministries and 
public  institutions.  The  Permanent  Electoral  Authority  took  measures  to  improve  the  selection  and 
assessment  of  electoral  experts  and  computer  operators,  to  increase  integrity  and  reduce  the 
vulnerabilities and corruption risks during elections. The Ministry of Education reports that since the 
academic year 2018-2019, all masters and doctoral programmes include mandatory courses on ethics 
and  integrity.  On  budgetary  transparency,  since  April  2019,  quarterly  reports  on  the  budget 
commitments  of the  public  institutions  are being  published. The  Ministry  of  Public  Finance  and  the 
Ministry of Economy organised training sessions on strengthening integrity in public enterprises.111   

The General Anti-corruption Directorate (DGA) within the Ministry of Interior (MoIA) continued its 
activity  for  the  prevention  of  corruption  and  investigation  of  integrity  incidents.112  In  particular,  a 
process  of  identifying  and  assessing  the  risks  and  vulnerabilities  to  corruption  within  the  MoIA 
structures was finalised at the end of June 2019. Several thousand employees of the Ministry attended 
anti-corruption  training  sessions.  DGA  is  also  involved  in  several  research  projects  which  will  feed 
reflection on improving its activities.113  

The  National  Integrity  Agency  (ANI)  also  participates  in  prevention  activities  under  the  NAS.  In 
August  2018  ANI  launched  an  EU-funded  project  (’LINC’)  in  partnership  with  Transparency 
International Romania, with the aim of increasing the capacity of the central public administration and 
Parliament  to  identify,  sanction  and  prevent  cases  of  conflicts  of  interest,  incompatibilities  and 
unjustified assets. Several training activities and debates were organised.   

One of the objectives of the Strategy is to improve performance in the fight against corruption, by the 
application of criminal and administrative sanctions. The institutions responsible for this objective are 
the National Integrity Agency (ANI), the National Anti-Corruption Directorate (DNA) and the General 
Prosecution. The Public Ministry has maintained its activity in the fight against corruption not falling 
under DNA’s remit. In the first two semesters of 2019, the Public Ministry pursued the prosecution of 
corruption crimes, with 2065 cases solved, 183 indictments against 353 persons. 114 Another objective 
of the Strategy is to consolidate the confiscation of criminal assets (see recommendation 12). In first 
half  of  2019  the  General  Prosecution  (including  the  Directorate  for  Investigating  Terrorism  and 
Organised Crime (DIICOT) seized more than €1 billion as provisional measures in cases relating to 
tax evasion, € 24 million in money laundering and € 10 million in smuggling cases.  Results for ANI 
and DNA are reported under benchmark 2 and 3 respectively. 

While the technical activity on the Strategy continues in many central and local administrations and 
the  judicial  institutions  continue  to  sanction  corruption,  several  ongoing  legislative  initiatives  have 
raised concerns as regards their potential knock-on effects on the implementation of the strategy.  In 
particular,  as  mentioned  earlier,  the  amendments  to  the  Criminal  Code  and  the  Criminal  Procedure 
Code and amendments to the special corruption law adopted  by Parliament on 25 April 2019 risked 
weakening  the  legislative  framework  for  investigating  and  sanctioning  corruption  crimes.  (See 
benchmarks 1 and 3). In the same vein, the amendments concerning the integrity laws risk weakening 
their impact and the dissuasive effect of sanctions (See Benchmark 2).  

and Justice, the Superior Council of Magistracy. 

111     This is the continuation of a project to strengthen integrity in public enterprises between the Ministry of Justice and the 

American Chamber of Commerce.  

112     Annual Report on the assessment of integrity incidents registered within MoIA,  
         http://www.mai-dga.ro/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Bilant-DGA-2018.pdf 
113    Two research projects in collaboration with the National Anticorruption Directorate (DNA) and the Prosecutor's Office 
attached to the High Court of Cassation and Justice (PHCCJ), to diagnose the corruption activities involving employees 
of the Ministry of Internal Affairs between 2014 and 2018.  
114     As well 119  plea bargains concluded involving 131 persons 

24 

 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Recommendation 12: Ensure that the National Agency for the Management of Seized Assets is fully 
and  effectively  operational  so  that  it  can  issue  a  first  annual  report  with  reliable  statistical 
information  on  confiscation  of  criminal  assets.  The  Agency  should  put  in  place  a  system  to  report 
regularly  on  development  of  administrative  capacity,  results  in  confiscation  and  managing  criminal 
assets. 

Since November 2018, the Agency for the Management of Seized Assets (ANABI) has continued to 
take  its  activities  forward  and  exercices  all  functions  and  duties  provided  by  Law  318/2015.  The 
human resources situation of the agency has improved. In December 2018, the Government approved 
the  organisation  of  competitions  for  ten  vacancies.  In  order  to  complete  the  current  scheme  (27 
employees), three selection procedures are under way to fill 7 vacancies. In the coming months, steps 
will be taken to fill 8 other vacancies, in order to fill 42 posts.115 The Agency had successfully applied 
for technical assistance with EU funds (€1,3 million) in 2018, which will facilitate the externalisation 
of some tasks to support the agency, notably on the organisation of grants and training activities for 
prosecutors. 
In its annual report for 2018 published in April 2019,116 ANABI reports an increase in the amounts of 
money  actually  seized  in  criminal  proceedings117  and  in  the  final  court  decisions  relating  to 
confiscation.118  In  2018,  the  total  amount  resulting  from  the  enforcement  of  special  or  extended 
confiscation  measures  was  approximatively  12,5  million  RON,  out  of  which  6,5  million  RON 
originates from the selling of movable and immovable seized property. In previous years, according to 
the law, ANABI distributed part of the money to public institutions for crime prevention measures, 119 
but  at  the  end  of  2018  the  Government  abrogated  this  article  in  the  ANABI  law,  in  an  emergency 
ordinance. 120 

The  Agency  is  currently  launching  a  second  tender  procedure  for  the  development  of  a  national 
integrated system of for the confiscation and recovery of criminal assets ROARMIS (Romanian Assets 
Recovery  and  Management  Integrated  System),  as  there  were  no  bids  submitted  for  the  first  one 
organised in December 2018 and January 2019. 121  

The  Agency  is  also  operating  as  Asset  Recovery  Office  for  Romania.  During  2018,  the  Romanian 
Asset Recovery Office has dealt with 186 incoming requests (requests from other Member States) and 
103  outgoing  requests  (requests  to  other  Member  States  in  50  requests  from  Romanian  authorities). 
The Member States most frequently requesting information were Hungary, France, Italy and Spain and 
ANABI  sent  the  largest  number  of  requests  to  Germany,  the  United  Kingdom  and  Italy.  Between 
January and May 2019, the Romanian ARO received 92 requests from foreign authorities and sent 23 
requests. 

115     In October 2018 the agency was operating with a staff of only 20 people out of the 35 foreseen. 
116      https://anabi.just.ro/docs/pagini/38/RAPORT%20ANUAL%202018%20actualizat.pdf 
117     In total 875,5 million lei had been seized by the third quarter of 2018. 
118    The  National  Agency  for  Fiscal  Administration  (ANAF)  reports  that  1271  court  decisions  relating  to  confiscation 

remained final during 2018 

119     The CVM November 2018 report noted that ˝the amount to be distributed for 2018 to eligible beneficiaries for social 
and public re-use was 2,2 million lei. Part of this was allocated to funding civil society projects such as legal education, 
criminality prevention, assistance to victims and other projects of public interest.  Because of insufficient administrative 
capacity, the agency was so far unable to launch a call for proposals in this area. ˝ 

120        EOG  114/2018 of  28  December  2018.    The  draft  Law  on  the  approval  of  EOG  114/2018  is under  discussion  in  the 

Chamber of deputies (PL-x no 93/2019) 

121     This IT system will allow monitoring the measures taken by the authorities at each step of the asset recovery process. 
Using its analytical functions ROARMIS may also become a very useful  tool in generating statistics and reports, best 
practices and identifying priority areas for the development of policies, strategies and plans to increase efficiency in the 
process of asset recovery in Romania. 

25