COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Follow-up on recommendations to the Commission report on the protection of the EU’s financial interests – fight against fraud, 2017 Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL 30th Annual Report on the Protection of the European Union's financial interests - Fight against Fraud Annual Report 2018
Date: 2019-10-11
Institutions: European Anti-Fraud Office, European Commission
Subjects: EU programme, EU strategy, activity report, corruption, crime, fight against crime, financial control, fraud, fraud against the EU, illicit trade

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 11.10.2019  SWD(2019) 363 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Follow-up on recommendations to the Commission report on the protection of the  EU’s financial interests – fight against fraud, 2017 Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL 30th Annual Report on the Protection of the European Union's financial interests - Fight against Fraud Annual Report 2018 {COM(2019) 444 final} - {SWD(2019) 361 final} - {SWD(2019) 362 final} - {SWD(2019) 364 final} - {SWD(2019) 365 final}  
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

List of Abbreviations .................................................................................................................. 2 

Executive Summary .................................................................................................................... 3 

1.

FOLLOW UP BY RECOMMENDATION .................................................................. 6 

1.1.

Revenue ........................................................................................................................ 7 

1.1.1.

  Undervaluation ............................................................................................................. 9 

1.1.2.

  Enhancement of Customs Controls ............................................................................. 12 

1.1.3.

  Other Measures .......................................................................................................... 21 

1.2.

Expenditure ................................................................................................................. 28 

1.2.1.

  Use of the 2016 PIF Report Findings in Fraud Risk Assessments ............................. 30 

1.2.2.

  Use of Risk Analysis findings ...................................................................................... 33 

1.2.3.

  Facilitation and Assessment of Spontaneous Reporting of Irregularities - 

Whistleblower Protection ........................................................................................... 37 

1.2.4.

  Cooperation Between Judicial and Administrative Authorities ................................. 42 

2.

2.1.

2.2.

REPLIES OF MEMBER STATES ............................................................................ 45 

Revenue ...................................................................................................................... 45 

Expenditure ............................................................................................................... 132 

1 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 

AEO: Authorised Economic Operator 

AFIS: Anti-Fraud Information System 

B2C: Business to consumer 

BTI: Binding tariff information 

CIS: Customs Information System 

CP 42: Customs procedure 42 

CRMS: Common Customs Risk Management System 

CSM: Container status message 

CUP: Customs Union Performance 

CDV: Countervailing duties 

ENS: Entry summary declaration 

EP: European Parliament 

EU: European Union 

MAAs: Mutual assistance agreements 

PTA: Preferential trade arrangement 

RIF: Risk Information Form 

SAD: Single administrative document 

TARIC: Integrated customs tariff of the Community 

TOR: Traditional Own Resources 

UCC: Union Customs Code 

UCC DA: Union Customs Code delegated act 

UCC IA: Union Customs Code implementing act 

VAT: Value added tax 

2 

 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

In  the  2017  Article  325  TFEU  Report  on  the  protection  of  the  European  Union's  financial 
interests, the Commission made two sets of recommendations to the Member States, one for 
the revenue side and another for the expenditure side of the budget as follows: 

A. REVENUE (Recommendation 1)  

Member States were asked to remain vigilant as regards the risk of undervaluation of 
goods,  in  particular  cheap  products  imported  in  extremely  large  quantities,  such  as 
textiles and footwear.  

In order to enhance customs controls, Member States were requested to ensure that: 

  strategies  are  in  place  and  target  all  types  of  customs  procedure  and  all 

operators;  

  proper  coordination  among  all  customs  services  dealing  with  risk  analysis  and 
controls  exists;  risk  profiles  provide  clear  instructions  and  risk  information  is 
shared with other Member States; 

  close monitoring of the controls results (feedback) and strict follow-up of mutual 

assistance instructions are in place.  

They were also requested to:  

  systematically include an automated random element and take into consideration 
the  time-barring  three-year  period  for  the  communication  of  customs  debt  as  a 
risk indicator in the post-release risk analysis;  

  risk-orient post-release audits and strictly monitor their results; and  
  carry out customs controls on operations made by authorised economic operators 
(AEO)  taking  account  of  the  risk  management  performed  with  respect  to  the 
different elements of these operations. 

B. EXPENDITURE (Recommendation 2)  

Member States were invited to:  

 

 

further  exploit  the  potential  of  risk  analysis,  tailoring  the  approach  to  the 
different types of expenditure and taking advantage of best practices and the risk 
elements highlighted in this report; 
facilitate  and  assess  the  spontaneous  reporting  of  potential  irregularities  and 
strengthen  the  protection  of  whistleblowers,  who  are  also  a  crucial  source  for 
investigative journalism;  and  

  promote  systematic  and  timely  cooperation  between  judicial  and  administrative 

authorities.  

All  these  measures  would  have  a  greater  impact  if  embedded  in  a  national  anti-fraud 
strategy. 

3 

 
The  follow-up  on  the  2017  PIF  Report  recommendations  aims  to  serve  as  a  reference 
document  to  show  the  efforts  made  by  the  EU  Member  States  in  2018.  This  is  achieved 
through an analysis of their replies to illustrate the measures taken by EU Members States at 
national  level  to  combat  fraud  and  irregularities  in  accordance  with  the  recommendations 
included in the 2017 PIF Report. 

The  recommendations'  purpose  is  to  strengthen  a  trend  which  is  already  visible  in  several 
Member States and is supported by the analysis presented in the 2017 PIF report in terms of 
policy  and  legislative  initiatives:  the  correct  and  targeted  use  of  information  is  effective  for 
stepping  up  the  fight  against  fraud  and  keeping  up  with  the  expectations  of  civil  society. 
European citizens not only look at their own country, but increasingly judge the success of the 
European  project  also  on  the  basis  of  what  happens  in  other  Member  States.  This  staff 
working document collects, in a comprehensive manner, updated information and presents the 
measures taken by EU Member States in 2018 in certain areas of revenue and expenditure. 

As a general remark, the continuous efforts made by Member States to provide an informative 
follow  up  to  the  recommendations  were  evident  through  their  replies  and  details  provided. 
The  replies  received  confirmed  the  growing  willingness  to  share  information  and  good 
practices.  The  replies  also  illustrated  the  increasing  commitment  by  Member  States  to 
enhance  their  role  in  the  fight  against  fraud  and  the  protection  of  the  European  Union's 
financial interests. Measures provided by the Member States, as well as examples shared, are 
listed further in this document.   

As regards the first recommendation on revenue, the Member States were guided to report on 
three main issues;  

  undervaluation,  
  enhancement of customs controls, and 
  other measures.  

As concerns 'undervaluation', the majority of Member States provided a positive follow-up as 
most  have  fully  implemented  this  recommendation  and  also  provided  details  with  measures 
taken in 2018 to tackle undervaluation.1  

Regarding  'enhancement  of  customs  controls',  most  Member  States  replies  indicated  full 
implementation  of  the  recommendation,  with  a  small  number  of  Member  States  indicating 
partial implementation. Member States provided details on updates concerning their customs 
strategies  in  place  and  information  about  the  treatment  of  Authorised  Economic  Operators 
(AEOs) in risk management. Also, they provided information on coordination methods among 
customs  services,  as  well  as  on  risk  information  shared  with  other  Member  States.2  The 
replies  to  this  recommendation  show  a  more  uniform  approach  on  risk-selection  criteria  for 

1 See Table 1 Q.1.1 and section 1.1.1 replies on Undervaluation (pages 8-10) 
2 See Table 1 Questions 1.2.a, 1.2.b, 1.2.c, 1.2.d and section 1.1.2 on  Enhancement of Customs Controls (pages 

10-18) 

4 

 
 
                                                 
controls,  supported  by  computerised  systems.  As  a  general  remark,  control  methods  and 
strategies are given much attention by the EU Member States. 

Concerning  'other  measures',  information  collected  by  Member  States  focused  on  the 
description  of  practices  regarding  post-release  audits  and  risk  analysis,  monitoring  of  audit 
results, the operations carried out by AEOs, the use of the customs audit guide and the use of 
the  handbook  on  operational  customs  controls.  About  half  the  Member  States  have  fully 
implemented  the  recommendation  with  regard  to  the  inclusion  of  an  automated  random 
element  and  the  three  year  time-barring  period  for  the  communication  of  customs  debt  in 
post-release risk analysis. The same applied for ensuring risk-oriented post-release audits. The 
majority of Member States indicated that customs controls on operations by AEOs are carried 
out  taking  into  account  risk  management.  Treatment  of  AEOs  varies  across  EU  Member 
States. Most EU Member States make use of the Customs Audit Guide3. The Commission has 
updated the Customs Audit Guide by aligning it to the UCC and the translation in all official 
languages is expected to be available within the end of 2019. 

Regarding  the  second  recommendation,  EU  Member  States  were  invited  to  report  on  four 
different areas:  

 

 

 

 

results  from  the  use  of  findings  from  the  2016  PIF  Report  in  their  fraud  risk 
assessments,  
results deriving from the exploitation of risk analysis concerning elements highlighted 
in the 2017 PIF Report,  
the  facilitation  and  assessment  of  spontaneous  reporting  and  the  protection  of 
whistleblowers and, 
 the  promotion  of  systematic  and 
administrative authorities. 

timely  cooperation  between 

judicial  and 

As concerns the first area, information received focused on sharing results deriving from the 
use of findings from the 2016 PIF Report in the Member States' fraud risk assessments. The 
majority of the Member States were in a position to share their findings, which, among others, 
concerned  different  measures,  risk  indicators  and  red  flags  as  well  as  relevant  updates  in 
various  strategies  related  to  the  protection  of  the  EU's  financial  interests  in  different 
governmental  sectors  managing  EU  funds.  Some  replies  indicated  the  increasing  use  of 
different IT tools such as Arachne for the purpose of fraud risk assessments.4  

The  second  area  concerned  the  exploitation  of  the  potential  of  risk  analysis,  tailoring  the 
approach to the different types of expenditure and taking advantage of best practices and risk 
elements highlighted in last year's PIF report. The results showed that about half the Member 
States  fully  implemented  this  recommendation,  whereas  the  other  half  only  partly 
implemented  it.  Details  provided  focused  on  the  description  and  developments  of  Member 
States' risk management systems, risk assessment methodologies, updates and the adoption of 

3  See Table 1, Questions Q1.3.a, Q.1.3.b, Q.1.3.c, Q.1.3.d and Section 1.1.3 on 'Other Measures' (pages 18-25) 
4  See  Table  2,  Question  2.1  and  Section  1.2.1  on  the  'Use  of  the  2016  PIF  report  findings  in  fraud  risk 

assessments' (pages 27-30) 

5 

 
 
                                                 
measures within their national strategies to better address risk elements enshrined in the 2017 
PIF  Report.5  The  exploitation  of  the  potential  of  risk  analysis  through  available  databases 
such as Arachne or/and IMS was mentioned only by a few Member States. 

The third area concerned the facilitation and assessment of spontaneous reporting of potential 
irregularities  and  strengthening  the  protection  of  whistleblowers.  The  results  showed  that 
about  half  of  the  Member  States  indicated  full  implementation  and  about  half  partial 
implementation  of  this  recommendation.  Details  provided  to  explain  the  actions  undertaken 
and  the  respective  results  were  focused  on  features  such  as  strengthening  the  national  legal 
framework,  facilitating  channels  for  anonymous  reporting  and  providing  safeguards  for 
whistleblowers such as the non-disclosure of personal data, and systematising the obligation 
to report irregularities.6 More Member States should be encouraged to create such safeguards 
and safe channels of reporting, preferably in a computerised form especially after the approval 
of  new  EU-wide  rules  on  the  protection  of  whistleblowers  by  the  European  Parliament  in 
April 2019.7 

Lastly, the fourth area concerned the promotion of systematic and timely cooperation between 
judicial  and  administrative  authorities.  Just  about  half  of  the  Member  States  reported  full 
implementation  of  this  recommendation.  The  details  provided  featured  the  description  of 
various  settings  facilitating  cooperation  regularly  in  the  framework  of  national  agreements 
established  between  judicial  and  administrative  authorities.  Most  Member  States  provided 
information as concerns cooperation between Managing Authorities and other national bodies 
including  judicial  and  police/investigative  bodies.  Examples  of  cooperation  featured 
cooperation  between  courts  and  the  public  prosecutor's  office,  the  organisation  of  training 
sessions for judges on irregularities and fraud related to EU funds and cooperation facilitated 
by  law.  A  positive  remark  was  that  in  a  number  of  cases,  this  cooperation  is  facilitated 
through the national AFCOS. As it could be noted that several Member States indicated the 
need for further strengthening the cooperation between administrative authorities handling EU 
funds  and  judicial  authorities,  as  well  as  law  enforcement  agencies,  the  role  of  the  national 
AFCOS  in  the  facilitation  of  efficient  and  effective  cooperation  has  a  potential  to  be 
strengthened  even  more.  Member  States'  replies  did  not  include  specific  information  on  the 
timeliness of cooperation.8 Therefore, it cannot be easily concluded whether the cooperation 
established is highly effective.  

1. 

FOLLOW UP BY RECOMMENDATION 

This  section looks at  how and at  what  extent Member States have implemented each of the 
recommendations. It aims to provide a holistic view on to what degree each recommendation 

5  See Table 2, Question 2.2 and Section 1.2.2 on the 'Use of risk analysis findings' (pages 30-34) 
6 See Table 2, Question 2.3 and Section 1.2.3 on the  'Facilitation and assessment of spontaneous reporting of 

irregularities – whistleblowers protection' (pages 34-37) 

7 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of persons reporting 

on breaches of Union law 

   COM/2018/218 final - 2018/0106 (COD) 
8  See  Table  2  Question  2.4  and  Section  1.2.4  'Cooperation  between  judicial  and  administrative  authorities' 

(pages 38-40) 

6 

 
                                                 
was  addressed  by  Member  States  and  to  summarise  the  replies  received  for  each 
recommendation.  

This  section  is  divided  into  two  sub-sections  separating  the  recommendations  related  to  the 
revenue  and  expenditure  sides  of  the  budget.  Each  recommendation  is  analysed  firstly  by 
providing  results  illustrating  the  number  of  Member  States  that  addressed  each  of  the 
recommendation questions and secondly by depicting a summary of the  details  provided by 
Member States.  

For the reader's specific reference, the Member States' original replies are listed further in this 
document, under Section 2: "Replies of Member States".  

1.1. 

REVENUE 

The Commission provided the following guiding questions to the Member States with regard 
to formulating structured replies to address the first recommendation: 

Q.1.1 Are you remaining vigilant as regards the risk of undervaluation of goods? 

Q.1.2.a Do you have strategies in place that target all types of customs procedure including 
simplified procedures and all operators taking into account AEOs and other large businesses 
considered compliant? 

Q.1.2.b  Did  you  ensure  proper  coordination  among  customs  services  dealing  with  risk 
analysis  and controls (central, regional, local services involved in  risk analysis  and release 
and post-release departments)? 

Q.1.2.c  Do  risk  profiles  specifically  target  traditional  own  resources  and  provide  clear 
instructions  with  regard  to  the  type  of  control  to  be  carried  out  and  risk  guidance  to  the 
customs release officers? Is risk information shared with other Member States and feedback 
on the response to this information provided in the EU customs risk management system?  

Q.1.2.d  Is  there  close  monitoring  of  the  controls  results  (feedback)  which  is  done  in  a 
structured manner to allow effective follow-up and strict implementation of mutual assistance 
instructions in place? 

Q.1.3.a  Do  you  systematically  include  an  automated  random  element  and  take  into 
consideration the time-barring three-year period for the communication of customs debt as a 
risk indicator in the post-release risk analysis? 

Q.1.3.b Do you  ensure risk-oriented post-release audits  which cover  the  operator's systems 
where this is necessary, apply a random element, guide the auditors and take due account of 
the  results  of  the  pre-authorisation  stage  and  of  specific  standardised  checklists?  Are  the 
results strictly monitored? 

7 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q.1.3.c Are  customs  controls  on operations  made by authorised economic operators  (AEO) 
carried  out  taking  account  of  the  risk  management  performed  with  respect  to  the  different 
elements of these operations? 

Q.1.3.d  Do  national  competent  authorities  make  full  use  of  the  handbook  on  operational 
customs controls based on Member States’ best practices and of the Customs audit guide? 

Overall  results  of  the  implementation  of  recommendation  1  on  revenue  (in  alphabetical 
order): 

Table 1 

8 

 
 
1.1.1.  UNDERVALUATION  

The  Member  States  were  requested  to  give  information  on  whether  they  remain  vigilant 
regarding  the  undervaluation  of  goods,  and  if  yes,  whether  they  target  in  particular  cheap 
products  imported  in  extremely  large  quantities.  Member  States  were  asked  to  provide  any 

9 

 
 
 
useful  detail  to  explain  the  actions  undertaken  in  2018  and  why  specifically  one  or  another 
type of goods has been targeted. 

239 Member States replied that they fully implement this recommendation and five10 reported 
partial implementation. 

The following Member States provided details for their reply (in summary): 

Belgium replied that following the report on the TOR audit on undervaluation in April 2018, 
a national approach was developed for controls for release for Chapters 61 to 64 having China 
as origin. Five selection profiles were created and the selections are based on fair prices found 
in Theseus. With regard to the new selection engine Seda 2.0, additional information can be 
added  to  fields  of  declaration.  That  can  be  used  as  a  criterion  for  more  effective  selection. 
Also, the RIFs relating to textiles and footwear from China are followed up in a separate SPS 
fiche. 

Bulgaria:  The  administration  has  created  risk  profiles  focused  on  checking  the  declared 
customs  value  against  specific  goods  (clothing  and  footwear)  under  procedures  40  and  42, 
country  of  origin,  TR,  VN,  and  CN.  Risk  profiles  have  been  created  for  certain  companies, 
with particular attention being paid during checks to the declared customs value. 

Czech Republic targets  specifically the cheap products such as textiles and footwear. Strict 
measures were applied in 2018. The Czech Republic reported about three court judgments as 
concerns to the appropriate level of national measures against undervaluation. The court cases 
examined  procedural  and  substantive  requirements.  The  customs  valuation  procedure  was 
supported by national courts in three cases. A system of customs valuation procedure in line 
with binding customs legislation and international agreements has been developed. 

Denmark reported that in an attempt to prevent Denmark being used as a country of entry for 
goods  declared  at  very  low  values,  the  Danish  Customs  Authority’s  analysis  units  have 
established  risk  profiles  in  the  electronic  risk  analysis  system  in  order  to  detect 
consignments/goods with obvious signs of under-invoicing. 

Estonia reported the creation of a criterion in 2018 that specifically targets the goods which 
are declared significantly under the EU fair price. 

Ireland reported that their customs risk management unit commended targeted operations in 
2018 to tackle undervaluation. A series of risk operations were mounted using the automated 
monitoring tool set by OLAF as a guide to values declared. 

Greece: Risks in the area of customs valuation remain high on the agenda. Risk profiles have 
been  created  to  indicate  declarations  for  either  physical  or  documentary  controls.  Two 
national operations were conducted in 2018 to combat under-pricing in textiles and footwear 

9   Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Croatia, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg,  Hungary,  Malta,  the  Netherlands,  Austria,  Poland,  Portugal,  Romania,  Slovenia,  Slovakia  and 
the United Kingdom. 

10 Bulgaria, Estonia, Cyprus, Finland and Sweden. 

10 

 
                                                 
originating from China. Greece is also targeting other goods. Risk profiles have been created 
for other products such as tableware, household articles and ceramics etc. 

Spain replied that risk profiles are maintained, and added that analysis carried out by OLAF 
revealed a limited incidence of undervaluation of imports in Spain. 

France replied that the fight against undervaluation is a priority for all the customs services. 
A  specific  instruction  was  circulated  to  the  services  in  2018  to  reinforce  the  role  played  by 
checks carried out at the time of clearance in combating undervaluation. The new instruction 
is  accompanied  by  several  summary  factsheets  to  facilitate  the  work  of  the  inspection 
services. The factsheet's purpose is to enable the inspection services to act autonomously and 
respond rapidly. Valuation fraud is also dealt with in ex post checks. 

Italy replied that in 2018, their methodologies to combat undervaluation were expanded and 
their systems  include risk profiles based on goods that are systematically  undervalued.  Italy 
indicated the use of  THESEUS tool to  control the flow of  goods  and reported to  have been 
using  two  methodologies  on  selected  goods:  the  'fair  price  methodology'  and  the  'Italian 
credibility methodology'. 

Cyprus  replied  that  risk  profiles  have  been  created  taking  into  account  the  risk  of 
undervaluation.  These  profiles  are  re-evaluated  at  least  once  a  year.  In  2018,  specific 
threshold values recommended by OLAF in the context of JCO SNAKE on commodity codes 
under chapters on textile and footwear were applied in the risk analysis system and relevant 
profiles  were  created.  Cyprus  also  created  risk  profiles  for  other  high  risk  goods  on 
undervaluation,  such  as  leisure  boats  and  vehicles  and  makes  use  of  information  through 
CRMS. The customs department is in the process to implement financial risk criteria (FRC), 
one of them relating to undervaluation risk which will be assessed by using threshold values 
as risk indicator. 

Latvia: To reduce the undervaluation risk of clothing and footwear from China, risk profiles 
for goods of chapters 61 to 64 were determined in 2018, with specified risk profiles for the 
goods of each chapter. 

Lithuania  replied  that  both  risk  assessments  are  performed  automatically.  They  reported 
about the main tool used for automated risk assessment, the RIKS. Also, 'fair prices' and data 
mining  technologies  calculated  in  THESEUS  are  used  as  additional  source  for  identifying 
high risk cases. Lithuania's rules on customs valuation are in line with EC recommendations 
and the Guidelines for preventing and detecting irregularities (under invoicing) in imports of 
textiles and footwear.  

Luxembourg  replied  that  in  addition  to  the  daily  risk  assessment  tasks,  they  would  like  to 
highlight that in 2018 hundreds of electronic risk profiles based on OLAF's fair prices have 
been implemented to  target undervalued  goods.  It is  not  a  completed action but  an ongoing 
process. Focus was set on textiles and footwear. 

11 

 
Hungary  replied  that  risks  on  undervaluation  will  persist  and  their  customs  authority  is 
paying close attention to fulfil the Commission's recommendations. Hungary emphasised that 
apart from chapters 61-64, undervaluation is evident for in chapters 50-60 and 95. 

Malta:  imports  of  textiles  and  footwear  are  particularly  being  targeted  since  these  involve 
large quantities. 

The Netherlands implemented necessary measures to assure that irregularities via known and 
described methodology will be detected. The profiles are based on false declarations, values 
below  the  threshold  and  random.  These  profiles  are  regularly  changed  in  detail  and/or  in 
percentage. 

Austria applies a multi-layered approach combining information from local customs offices 
with information/intelligence gathered on central level. Based on this, they use new technical 
solutions such as predictive analytics to dismantle deviations/abnormalities.  

Poland  reported  about  the  activities  of  the  appointed  Customs  Attaché  in  Beijing,  a  post 
created to facilitate communication and cooperation between the Polish and Chinese customs 
administrations under the 'Strategic Framework for customs cooperation between the EU and 
the  Government  of  the  People's  Republic  of  China'  in  close  cooperation  with  the  EU 
delegation in Beijing. As a result of this initiative, requests were received and used as a basis 
for initiating investigations concerning undervaluation. Two requests from 2018 which merit 
attention,  concerned  goods  exported  from  China  as  the  combined  difference  between  the 
declared value and the value provided by the Chinese was over USD 3 million. 

Romania reported on measures taken at national level to monitor the declared customs value. 
In  2018,  two  risk  profiles  were  added:  one  designed  to  combat  undervaluation  based  on 
information from THESEUS and AMT databases and a risk profile based on information from 
RIFs. 

Slovenia reported on the actions taken in 2018 and beginning of 2019 on combating customs 
undervaluation and reported that it is targeting all cheap products imported in extremely large 
quantities through FARS. 

Slovakia reported expanding the risk profiles in automated national risk profiling to combat 
fraud in the area of undervaluation of goods. 

Finland reported that in 2018, the focus was in royalties and licence payments. As concerns 
risk profiles, FI reported some technical challenges, because their risk analysis system used on 
import declarations does not support average price calculation. 

Sweden  reported  increased  number  of  blocks  in  2018  for  clothing  and  footwear.  Sweden  is 
also  targeting  cheap  products  from  China  weighing  over  500  kg  before  2018  and  300  kg 
thereafter. 

United Kingdom employs an end to end approach to tackle customs fraud risks, drawing on 
experience  used  successfully  to  tackle  MTIC  and  alcohol  fraud.  The  UK  provided  a  list  of 
what this comprises. 

12 

 
1.1.2.  ENHANCEMENT OF CUSTOMS CONTROLS 

The Member States were asked to report on measures taken to  enhance customs control via 
providing  information  on  strategies  in  place,  coordination  among  custom  services,  whether 
risk  profiles  target  Traditional  Own  Resources  (TOR),  whether  they  share  information  with 
other  member  states  and  if  there  is  close  monitoring  of  control  results  to  allow  effective 
follow up. 

a)  Information on strategies in place that target all types of customs procedure including 
simplified  procedures  and  all  operators  taking  into  account  AEOs  and  other  large 
businesses considered compliant 

22 Member States11 replied that they fully implement this recommendation and six12 reported 
partial implementation. 

The following Member States provided details for their reply (in summary): 

Belgium  introduced  new  method  for  a  more  targeted  selection  of  profiles  through  the 
'Automated  Deselection  Logic'.  This  method  is  used  to  make  fewer  and  more  targeted 
selections  and  to  reduce  the  application  of  a  selection  percentage  but  to  make  a  targeted 
selection of riskier categories. 

Bulgaria replied that new functionalities are being created to integrate financial risk profiles. 
A random selection is being made on the basis of risk profiles and reports are being prepared 
on  the  control  equipment  available  and  recommendations  are  made  with  regard  to  the 
availability of new resources. 

Denmark  reported  about  its  operational  strategy  that  aims  to  ensure  effective  risk-based 
customs  controls  designed  to  detect  fraud  and  irregularities  involving  imports  from  third 
countries. 

Estonia reported that most of attention is given to procedures that are used to declare goods 
for release into free circulation, because the percentage of the other procedures is very small 
in Estonia. 

Ireland  replied  that  the  Compliance  and  Post  Clearance  Unit  which  oversees  a  national 
compliance  and  post  clearance  programme  for  the  Customs  Customer  Case  base,  including 
AEO and those authorised for Simplifications. From a post clearance perspective, the customs 
audit  and  post  clearance  check  targets  include  a  provision  that  a  specific  percentage  of  the 
cases or declarations chosen must be authorised traders. 

Greece replied that in the context of strategic objectives, targets are set centrally for customs 
controls, for all types of customs procedures, for all operators, without excluding the holders 
of simplified procedures and AEOs. 

11  Czech  Republic,  Denmark,  Germany,  Ireland,  Greece,  Spain,  France,  Croatia,  Italy,  Latvia,  Lithuania, 
Luxembourg,  Hungary,  the  Netherlands,  Austria,  Poland,  Portugal,  Romania,  Slovenia,  Slovakia,  Sweden 
and the United Kingdom 

12   Belgium, Bulgaria, Estonia, Cyprus, Malta and Finland 

13 

 
                                                 
Spain  indicated  that  risk  profiles  can  work  on  any  customs  procedure  and  on  any  kind  of 
operators. 

France  explained  that  their  control  strategy  is  based  on  risk  analysis,  implementing  three 
types  of  checks:  ex  ante  at  the  time  of  clearance,  ex  post  (1  check)  up  to  4  months  after 
clearance  and ex post (2 checks) implemented until  the expiry of the period  concerned. For 
simplified  procedures,  the  ex-ante  check  is  dome  at  the  stage  of  the  Initial  Simplified 
Declaration.  Special  procedures  are  also  checked.  In  general,  the  risk  arising  from  the 
operator's reliability is also considered. The National Risk Analysis Grid is used to determine 
the risk level for almost 20000 operators for import and export flows and makes it possible to 
direct  the  checks.  Lastly,  the  AEO  deemed  to  be  reliable  are  not  excluded  from  targeting 
during checks.  

Italy  replied  that  they  can  target  all  types  of  customs  procedure  and  manage  the  rate  of 
control according to the compliance of the operator (AEO or no AEO). 

Latvia: all established profiles, including the ones on random  selection, also  apply to  AEO 
and to simplified procedures. 

Lithuania:  all  economic  operators  could  be  a  subject  for  customs  control  based  on  risk 
assessment. 

Luxembourg  replied  that  there  are  risk  profiles  in  place  for  targeting  specific  customs 
procedures. Although the hit rate of risk profiles is lowered in  regard of AEOs they are not 
excluded from electronic targeting/customs controls. 

Hungary:  The  annual  control  plan  focusses  primarily  on  economic  operators  with  high 
turnover  (including  AEOs)  while  also  laying  down  rules  for  all  market  participants  in  the 
annual monitoring exercise. Prior to issuing each AEO authorisation, a risk analysis must be 
conducted  in  relation  to  the  economic  operator  in  question.  Also,  the  central  risk  analysis 
department is notified about risk information pursuant to internal rules. Then, it performs an 
analysis  and  according  to  the  risks  identified,  creates  a  built-in  risk  profile  or  proposes 
thematic or operator-based controls. 

Malta  replied  that  IT  simplified  procedures  are  not  implemented  as  yet.  Import  and  export 
consignments by AEOs may be physically inspected through random selection. 

Austria  established  a  national  customs  control  strategy  based  on  the  EU  risk  management 
strategy,  in  which  they  define  high  risk  areas  in  all  customs  and  excise  matters.  Compliant 
companies  and  AEOs  are  taken  into  account,  but  not  automatically  excluded,  especially 
forwarding companies with AEO status are not considered as low risk and do not get a lower 
risk level. 

Poland:  All  customs  procedures  and  operators  are  covered  by  the  National  Revenue 
Administration.  There  is  a  strategic  analysis  centre  in  this  administration  that  carries  out 
activities such as risk analysis, risk profiles establishment, exchange of risk information with 
MS and the Commission via CRMS/RIF, cooperation with OLAF and info transmitted via the 
AFIS system, exchange of info among Visegrad 4.  

14 

 
Romania reported that all customs procedures subject to the granting of an authorisation are 
applied in compliance with the working norms developed at DGV level, the approval of the 
issuance  involving  pre-audit  and  monitoring  actions.  In  2018,  there  were  updated:  a.  the 
norms on the use of simplified customs declarations and entry in the declarant's records and b. 
the technical norms regarding the registration for customs purposes of the economic operators 
and other persons. 

Slovenia replied that all kinds of customs procedures are covered. Also, all kinds of economic 
operators can be selected regardless if AEO or a large business. 

Slovakia replied that their post-release control system is in line with  current legislation and 
recommendations of the Commission. 

Finland replied that this is a development area. E.g. better IT solutions to analyse holder of 
the authorisations of operations. 

The  United  Kingdom  replied  that  controls  include  both  targeted  pre-clearance  checks 
alongside post-clearance audit activity. Checks are undertaken using a whole trader approach 
to assure a range of inherent risks across the Customs activity of a business. 

b)  Ensuring proper coordination among customs services dealing with risk analysis and 

controls  

23 Member States13 replied that they fully implement this recommendation and five14 reported 
partial implementation. 

The following Member States provided details for their reply (in summary): 

Belgium replied that in post release controls, a new work method was developed for checking 
undervaluation  and  greater attention was  given to giving a clear description of the selection 
reason.  On  post  release  audit,  the  proposed  items  for  the  controls  and  audits  for  2019  are 
explained in fiches available by topic to the control departments. 

Bulgaria: proper coordination ensured between all customs units responsible for handling the 
risk  profiles  produced  and  performing  checks  in  their  operation.  Coordination  is  ensured 
between the Customs Agency and other government structures. 

The Czech Republic reported about the coordination activities on two levels: nationwide and 
regional.  Coordination  and  cooperation  takes  place  through  direct  and  day-to-day  contact 
between the staff of individual departments and also through planned meetings. 

Denmark reported that significant control results should be passed on by physical and post-
clearance  control  units  to  the  Financial  Customs  Analysis  Unit  to  optimise  future  risk 
analyses. 

13  Belgium,  Czech  Republic,  Denmark,  Germany,  Estonia,  Ireland,  Spain,  France,  Croatia,  Italy,  Latvia, 
Lithuania,  Luxembourg,  Hungary,  Malta,  the  Netherlands,    Austria,  Poland,  Portugal,  Romania,  Slovenia, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom. 

14   Bulgaria, Greece, Cyprus, Slovakia and Finland. 

15 

 
                                                 
Estonia  reported  that  the  entire  customs  service  is  on  central  level  and  there  is  close 
cooperation among customs officers and tax auditors carrying out post-clearance audit. 

Ireland: risk profiles are set in consultation with the various stakeholders in the EU, Revenue 
and other Government Agencies to ensure protection of EU and national borders. 

Greece: coordination between the customs services involved in the risk analysis is adequate 
and constantly improving. 

Spain  reported  that  there  is  a  central  unit  that  designs  the  risk  profiles  and  coordinates  all 
control activities, which are carried out at a regional level. 

France replied that as part of the 'Customs 2018' project, the General Directorate for Customs 
and  Excise  introduced  an  integrated  chain  of  checks  to  tackle  new  challenges  relating  to 
safety, security and combating fraud. France noted that the creation of a national risk analysis 
and  Targeting  Department  (SARC)  was  ratified  by  an  order  of  29  February  2016.  Also, 
France  introduced  the  CRPC  Guide  (Cellules  de  renseignment  et  de  pilotage  des  contrôles) 
and explained its use. 

The  Italian  customs  control  systems  interfaces  directly  and  in  real  time  each  local  services 
involved  in  risk  analysis,  so  any  customs  officer  in  charge  to  carry  out  customs  control  is 
informed about the risk indicator. 

Cyprus: the regional customs offices and various sections at Headquarters monitor customs 
control  results  according  to  their  field  of  interest  including  valuation  and  re-evaluation  of 
profiles in cooperation with the risk analysis and intelligence section at Headquarters. A more 
enhanced  coordination  is  needed  between  the  relevant  sections  of  the  department  to  assess 
better the risk of undervaluation. 

Latvia: There is constant exchange of risk information between those carrying out controls at 
the time of clearance, carrying out risk analysis and those carrying out post-clearance checks. 

Lithuania: RIKS clearance component and post clearance component are the main tools for 
coordination among central, regional and local services dealing with risk analysis, control and 
monitoring. 

Luxembourg organised information sessions at local customs offices in the framework of EU 
Commission decision C (2018) 3293. Exchange of info between services is regular. 

Hungary:  The  regional  service  is  obliged  to  forward  any  risk  information  to  the  central 
service  which  however,  also  maintains  contact  with  local  services  and  notifies  them  of  all 
relevant risk information. 

Austria  has  an  'Anti-Fraud  Network'  which  consists  of  risk/anti-fraud  experts  on  local, 
regional  and  central  level.  The  central  division  is  responsible  for  information  gathering, 
mutual assistance, investigations, profiling, ex post clearance audits and coordination of cases. 

Poland:  risk  management  is  carried  out  at  all  levels  in  the  national  administration 
organisational  structure  (central, 
in  risk 
management and controls generally takes place automatically via the integrated risk analysis 
system ZISAR. 

local,  regional).  Exchange  of 

information 

16 

 
Romania replied that risk analysis is performed both at the moment of receiving conclusive 
data and info and in the stage of preparation of the control in case of OLAF's financial impact 
alerts.  In  2018,  5  out  of  30  alerts  identified  in  the  DGV  database  of  customs  operation  fell 
under the risk criteria with subsequent controls at the level of territorial structures.  

Slovenia:  proper  coordination  among  customs  services  is  ensured  with  central  risk  profiles 
and  unique  common  view  on  situation  with  developed  special  application  for  monitoring 
valuation of goods.  

Slovakia: Central and local risk analysis are on different section in the Financial Directorate 
organisation structure. 

Finland:  Yearly  audit  planning  process  is  done  in  cooperation  among  audit  control  and 
analysis/intelligence.  All  interest  groups  are  asked  if  they  have  suggestions  for  risk 
management  and  targeting.  Feedback  is  provided  to  the  interest  groups  on  what  happened 
with their suggestions. 

United Kingdom: Co-ordination is centralised within HMRC's Risk & Intelligence Service. 

c)  Risk  profiles  targeting  traditional  own  resources  (TOR)  and  providing  clear 
instructions  with  regard  to  the  type  of  control  to  be  carried  out.  Risk  guidance  to 
customs  release  officers,  sharing  of  information  with  other  Member  States    and 
feedback  on  the  response  to  this  information  in  the  EU  customs  risk  management 
system 

2215 Member States replied that they fully implement this recommendation and six16 reported 
partial implementation. 

The following Member States provided details for their reply (in summary): 

Belgium replied that since the end of 2018, the tax risk management team was organised in 
accordance with  the Commission  Decision on Financial Risk  Criteria, making it possible to 
better target TOR. Significant findings in all risk areas are reported in the CRMS system. 

Bulgaria replied that risk profiles particularly target TOR. The actions to be taken in profiling 
are  clear  and  detailed.  Where  irregularities  are  detected  the  information  is  shared  with 
Member  States  but  only  with  regard  to  major  seizures  or  infringements.  There  is  a  lack  of 
human resources to be able to disseminate information more effectively. Information via RIF 
is processed in full. 

Czech Republic: risk profiles contain specific control instructions for the officers of customs 
office.  Information  on  newly  identified  risks  is  shared  with  other  member  states  by 
registration into the system RIF. 

15  Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Spain, France, Croatia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, 

Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, the Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom. 

16   Belgium, Bulgaria, Estonia, Greece, Italy and Finland. 

17 

 
 
 
                                                 
Denmark replied that the customs authority uses CRMS to share risk information with other 
Member States. Reported receiving information through RIF on new trends of possible areas 
of  fraud  and  assesses  this  information.  Where  necessary,  financial  RIFs  will  lead  to 
establishment  of  risk  profiles  in  the  import  system  indicated  a  type  of  control  to  be  carried 
out. 

Customs checks in Estonia are focused on goods, irrespective of the incurrence and amount 
of duties and taxes (customs duty, VAT, excise duty) applicable to the foods or the status of 
the  consignee/declarant.  Also  RID  –  data  exchange  is  carried  out  systematically  between 
Estonia  and  other  Member  States.  In  2018  Estonia  drew  up  63  RIFs,  one  of  them  being 
undervaluation. 

Ireland reported that clear and concise instructions are given to the control officer carrying 
out the check. Any irregularities are addressed and if necessary shared among other member 
states via the RIF system. 

Greece replied that all risk profiles, including those relating to TOR refer to clear guidelines 
and  guidance  on  the  type  of  control  and  provide  risk  information  to  those  responsible  for 
control  at  the customs  clearance stage. Risk  information  is  shared with  other member states 
and feedback is provided to a satisfactory degree. 

Spain  reported  that  clear  instructions  about  the  actions  to  perform  once  the  declaration  has 
been  selected  for  its  control  are  in  place.  RIF  is  used  to  inform  other  Member  States.  An 
analysis of all information received from other MS is carried out. 

France replied that each selection profile contains a description explaining the reason for the 
profile,  the  type  of  fraud  being  investigated  and  the  action  to  be  taken.  The  services  are 
informed each month of the RIF messages sent by other Member States. The MA cases sent 
by  OLAF  on  TOR  are  given  specific  treatment  by  the  Risk  Analysis  and  Targeting 
Department  (SARC):  the  fraud  mechanism  described  is  studied  and  the  French  traffic 
analysed. The SARC sets up one or more dedicated profiles and gives precise instructions to 
the services on the action to be taken. 

Italy: risk profiles  exist to  fight  against losses in  TOR. They mainly concern anti-damping, 
undervaluation, misclassification and origin. Risk information is shared by CRMS when are 
deemed to be relevant for another Member States. 

Cyprus  replied  that  if  a  declaration  is  selected  for  control,  based  on  a  risk  profile,  then 
customs officer/examiner follows the instructions given by the profile for the type of control 
to be carried out. 

Lithuania reported that 1019 fiscal risk profiles were created in RIKS clearance component 
in 2018. Risk information is shared with other member states and 2 RIF were placed in 2018. 
Feedback on the response is constantly being filled. 

Luxembourg  replied  that  risk  profiles  target  TOR.  There  are  instructions  in  place  and 
Luxembourg considers the exchange of and feedback to risk information as a very important 
element in risk management. They make use of the EU customs risk management system on a 
daily basis. 

18 

 
Hungary continuously monitors the risks to TOR and a risk profile is created for them in the 
risk  management  system.in  all  cases,  specific  instructions  exist  to  indicate  for  what  kind  of 
risk  a  given  control  must  be  conducted  and  possibly  whether  any  sort  of  special  document 
needs to be requested and forwarded to the central service for any potential risk information to 
be further processed. 

Malta replied that TOR is one of the key risk areas incorporated in profiles uploaded on the 
electronic systems. The profiles may incorporate instructions to customs officials conducting 
physical inspection of goods. Potential (new) risks noted are shared with other member states 
through the RIF system. 

In Austria, tax and customs are merged. The central anti-fraud department covers anti-fraud 
measures in the fields of customs, excise duties and taxes. Risk profiles cover customs, tax, 
excise  and  any  combination.  Information  is  shared,  also  with  other  Member  States  and  the 
Commission,  the  full  risk  management  circle  is  implemented  including  monitoring  and 
evaluation. 

Poland:  Risk  profiles  include  guidance  for  the  entity  performing  the  control,  setting  out 
clearly what measures are to be taken and the scope of those measures. There are guidelines 
on  'verifying  the  declared  customs  value  of  textiles  and  footwear  imported  from  far  eastern 
countries  (mainly  China).  Exchange  of  information  takes  place  via  CRMS/RIF,  AFIS, 
Visegrad 4 forum. 

Romania  reported  that  in  2018  the  automatic  selection  of  customs  declarations  based  on 
existing  risk  profiles  in  the  risk  management  IT  module  functioned  at  national  level.  Risk 
profiles can be set to target a heading or a combination of headings in the customs declaration. 
A total of 139 risk profiles were implemented in 2018 of which 30 following OLAF alerts, 1 
profile was updated following the ISPRA database analysis and 1 profile as a result of a RIF 
message analysis. In all cases a feedback to RIFs is entered. 

Slovenia: risk profiles specifically target TOR and provide clear instructions about the type of 
control.  These  profiles  also  give  guidance  at  customs  clearance.  In  some  cases,  the  mutual 
assistance requests are launched. 

Finland: Profiles specifically target TOR. Finland uses both FRC and national profiles. Risk 
profiles  always  contain  guidelines  on  how  to  perform  control  and  use  CRMS  system,  and 
make new RIF message  based on the results of the risk profiles, controls of corporate audit 
unit etc. if there is new element of fraud. 

United  Kingdom:  where  they  consider  that  there  is  an  EU  wide  implication,  details  of  an 
examination  are  passed  to  the  team  responsible  who  will  raise  a  RIF  and  share  the  risk 
identified with OMS. 

d)  Close monitoring of the controls results in a structured manner, to allow effective 

follow up and strict implementation of mutual assistance instructions 

19 

 
23  Member  States17  replied  that  they  fully  implement  this  recommendation  and  four18 
reported partial implementation. One Member State gave a negative reply.19  

The following Member States provided details for their reply (in summary): 

Belgium: feedback for pre-release controls is taken into account by Seda 2.0 and feedback for 
post-release controls (not automated) is less structured but is included in the development of 
data mining models. 

Bulgaria  replied  that  checks  based  on  the  risk  profiles  produced  are  carried  out  at  regular 
intervals  and,  if  necessary,  additional  information  is  requested  or  a  post-release  control  is 
carried out. 

Czech  Republic:  post-release  controls  results  are  regularly  evaluated.  In  2018,  449  post-
release controls were finished from which almost 87% identified breaches of regulations. 

Estonia  replied  that  the  Intelligence  and  customs  departments  are  regularly  monitoring  the 
efficiency of selectivity/risk criteria and make a decision accordingly. 

Ireland reported that control results are regularly monitored and any irregularities identified 
which  would  constitute  infringements  are  dealt  with  locally  by  the  control  officer.  Any 
irregularities  or  fraudulent  activity  detected  is  reported  to  the  investigation  and  prosecution 
division. 

Greece replied that the full content of the instructions and guidelines provided to the member 
states with the AM messages of OLAF is without any delay notified to all customs authorities. 

Spain reported that the central unit performs the proper follow-up. 

France  replied  with  details  about  the  updated  document  on  the  implementation  of  the 
provisions  of  Regulation  517/97  to  improve  the  treatment  of  MA  cases  and  explained  the 
circuit  for  handling  MA  cases  concerning  the  protection  of  the  EU's  financial  interests. 
Further, France informed that the results of checks on MA cases are sent to the SARC which 
draws up a table for monitoring the cases. This table is sent each quarter to OLAF via AFIS 
mail. 

Italy  referred  to  the  monitoring  of  structured  control  results  (feedback)  carried  out  by  the 
Analysis  Office.  The  latter  provides  to  consult  the  results  of  the  controls  arising  from  the 
selections made by the risk profiles developed, to implement new ones or to modify existing 
ones. 

Cyprus reported that a new structure was recently created to have a more effective follow-up 
and  strict  implementation  of  mutual  assistance  instructions.  The  intelligence  and  analysis 

17 Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Ireland, Spain, France,  Croatia, Italy,  Cyprus,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Luxembourg,  
Hungary,  Malta,  the  Netherlands,  Austria,  Poland, Portugal,  Romania,  Slovenia,  Slovakia,  Sweden  and  the 
United Kingdom. 

18   Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic and Greece. 
19   Finland 

20 

 
 
                                                 
section delegates each AM message to the relevant sections and monitors it so that the data 
for the reply are received timely. 

Lithuania: the results of the verification of declarations in RIKS are monitored in a structured 
manner. The effectiveness of risk profiles is continuously assessed and the decisions are made 
on risk profiles correction, their further need or the introduction of the new profiles. 

Luxembourg  set  up  an  IT  tool  to  evaluate  control  results.  Both  local  and  central  services 
have access to this system. The evaluation itself is systematically performed at central level. 

Hungary replied that the controls results are available to all services involved in performing 
the  control  and  to  the  central  service  carrying  out  risk  analysis.  If,  within  the  context  of 
mutual assistance, the national tax and customs administration receives a request to generate a 
risk profile to check some kind of defined turnover, the risk profile is generated. Depending 
on the nature of the request, searches and assessments of profile match results are scrutinised 
daily/weekly/monthly. Also, the internal operating and filing for real time risk analysis is in 
the process of being fully computerised. 

Malta: Feedback is submitted in the 'electronic inspection result' tab by the customs official 
conducting the inspection. A detailed report outlining all endangered taxes and any additional 
anomalies found is also submitted manually and registered in the relevant file which is then 
forwarded to the risk management unit for any necessary action they deem appropriate. 

Austria replied that this question is regulated in an internal rule book. 

Poland reported about the integrated risk analysis system (ZISAR). In addition, in the context 
of  the  tasks  it  carries  out  in  the  area  of  mutual  cooperation,  the  DSCA  implements  and 
monitors/coordinates  the  cases  that  have  been  initiated  in  CRMS/RIF  or  by  OLAF,  and 
ensures that feedback is provided. 

Romania: mutual assistance and customs cooperation are carried out at the central level based 
on  requests  coming  from  local  structures.  All  requests  have  to  be  analysed  in  terms  of  the 
subject  matter  of  the  request,  the  scope  of  action  and  measures  required.  In  2018,  Romania 
updated the OLAF alert methodology, which provides all steps to address these alerts. 

Slovenia:  feedback  at  customs  clearance  is  monitored  in  the  risk  profile  files  and  the  post-
release audit files which allow effective follow-up. 

Finland:  there  is  manual  monitoring  of  the  results  of  risk  profiles  with  the  present  risk 
analysis  system.  For  example,  the  risk  profiles  based  on  AM  messages.  Monitoring  of  the 
control  results  is  a  development  area  in  Finland.  There  are  new  IT  solutions  under 
development. 

United Kingdom: AM messages are received via AFIS mail and are allocated to an Officer to 
establish  what  is  required.  This  is  completed  by  use  of  HMRC  databases  and  CHIEF  MSS. 
Responses are sent to the named Investigating Officer in OLAF via the AFIS mailbox. 

1.1.3.  OTHER MEASURES 

Member  States  were  asked  to  report  on  several  other  measures  on  customs  controls.  These 
included whether they systematically include an automated random element and consider the 

21 

 
time-barring  3  year  period  for  communicating  customs  debt.  Also,  there  was  a  question  on 
whether they ensure risk-oriented post-release audits and if the results are strictly monitored. 
Another question was whether customs controls made by AEO are carried out taking account 
of the risk management. Lastly, whether national authorities make full use of the handbook on 
operational customs controls based on MS best practices, and of the customs audit guide. 

a)  Systematic inclusion of an automated random element taking into account the time-

barring three year period for the communication of customs debt 

16  Member  States20  replied  that  they  fully  implement  this  recommendation  and  seven21 
reported  partial  implementation.  Four  Member  States  gave  a  negative  reply.22  One  did  not 
indicate any information.23 

The following Member States provided details for their reply (in summary): 

Belgium replied that to draw up the proposed items for post-release controls, they go back 2.5 
years to allow sufficient time to carry out the checks within deadlines. Risk management does 
not assign random items for post-release controls. 

Bulgaria  reported  that  5%  of  checks  of  economic  operators  are  carried  out  at  random 
selection. 

The Czech Republic replied that within post-release controls the automated random element 
is not included. The time limit for notification on customs debt is one of the pieces of data that 
are taken into account during the preparatory phase, regarding whether it is possible to carry 
out the post-release control and notify about the debt within the time limit. The length of how 
long a post release control lasts is evaluated twice a year. 

Denmark replied that when carrying out controls, the customs authority applies a statistical 
element to the control selection, and also focuses on the time-barring three year period. 

Estonia carries out random checks regularly and uses random selection. 

Greece  explained  that  the  customs  information  system  is  not  designed  to  indicate  random 
checks in in the context of post-release risk analysis in an automated manner. This function is 
in the process of being re-designed. The time-barring three year period is taken into account. 

Italy explained in detail, the reason that for posteriori controls, the risk analysis system does 
not include randomness.  

Spain indicated that the expiration date is always taken into account. 

France  replied  that  with  regard  to  the  checks  made  at  the  time  of  clearance,  an  automated 
random selection of the declarations is set up. With regard to ex post 1 checks, a schedule is 
implemented  on  the  basis  of  the  general  guidelines  set  by  the  Inspection  Information  and 

20  Bulgaria,  Denmark,  Estonia,  Spain,  France,  Croatia,  Latvia,  Hungary,  Malta,  the  Netherlands,  Austria,    

Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia and Sweden 

21  Belgium, Czech Republic, Germany, Lithuania, Poland, Finland and the United Kingdom 
22  Greece, Italy, Cyprus and Luxembourg 
23  Ireland. 

22 

 
                                                 
Steering  Units  (CRPC)  which  takes  into  account  the  reliability  of  the  operators  (managing 
sensitive traffic and/or procedures). 

Lithuania:  an  automated  random  element  is  not  included  as  a  risk  indicator.  Random 
company selection is not used for the purpose of customs audit. 

Luxembourg  takes  into  account  the  time-barring  period  but  this  is  not  included  as  a  risk 
indicator in  the risk analysis.  The only thing they  do depends on  case by  case basis. A risk 
profile  is  put  into  the  analysis  with  regard  to  either  the  economic  operator  or  the  product 
(tariff/value/origin). 

Hungary  replied  that  selection  is  conducted  at  random  to  make  economic  operators  aware 
that controls can be imposed anytime, irrespective of operators' risk rating with local customs 
services.  When  planning  post-release  controls,  particular  attention  must  be  paid  to  the 
communicability of the customs debt; conducting a planned post-release control at a later date 
may not impede communication of the debt. 

Austria: a random element is used in the electronic profiling system. The three year period is 
an indicator for the risk analysis. 

Poland replied that the  random  element  is  applied in  automated  risk analysis in  IT systems 
when selecting customs declarations for checks. It is not used in the post-release selection of 
goods  for  checks.  The  3  year  period  for  the  communication  of  a  customs  debt  before  it  is 
time-barred is taken into account as a risk factor.  

Romania  provided  extensive  details  on  this  question.  It  is  noted  that  in  2018  the 
implementation  of  a  random  selection  program  for  customs  declarations  with  customs 
clearance was completed in the IT system. 

Slovenia  replied  that  in  post-release  audit  plan,  the  time-barring  3  year  period  and  random 
automated selection are taken into consideration. This kind of economic operators are selected 
and examined. 

Slovakia replied that the limitation of a 3 year period of a customs debt is taken into account 
in the planning phase of post-release controls. When as a result of criminal offence, the time 
limit is extended to 5 years. 

Finland  has  automated  random  profiles  in  all  operative  declaration  systems.  Also,  they  are 
using  random  element  during  the  audit  planning  process.  Time-barring  period  is  one  risk 
indicator which is used during audit planning process. 

United  Kingdom:  The  UK's  uses  risking  techniques  to  target  their  activities  in  effective 
ways. In certain circumstances, there is coverage across the trader population. 

b)  Ensuring  risk  orientated  post-release  audits  which  cover  the  operator's  systems  and 
the  application  of  a  random  element,  providing  guidance  to  the  auditors  and  taking 
account of the results of the pre-authorisation stage and of standardise checklists 

23 

 
 
 
Fifteen Member States24 replied that they fully implement  this recommendation and seven25 
reported partial implementation.  Three Member  States gave a negative reply.26  Two did  not 
indicate any information.27 

The following Member States provided details for their reply (in summary): 

Belgium:  the  proposed  items  for  post-release  audits  are  in  part  supplied  by  the  risk 
management department and are risk oriented, not random. 

Bulgaria  reported  that  risk-oriented  audits  are  carried  out  using  an  automated  process  for 
selecting economic operators based on data in  customs declarations  for  a period of 3  years. 
Further to the findings of post-release control, import duties and taxes assessed and other state 
receivables  are  entered  in  the  accounts.  Administrative  proceedings  are  initiated  when 
infringements are established. 

The Czech Republic provides post-release audits. Random element is not applied. The audits 
are performed at those subjects where the risks are identified. The control lists are used and 
the results are evaluated. 

Estonia  replied  that  all  the  objects  directed  to  the  Tax  Audit  department  in  2018  had  been 
selected  on  the  basis  of  risk  analysis  and  sent  to  post-release  controls  due  to  their  risk. 
Estonian  companies  are  in  many  cases  small  and  therefore  the  performance  of  post  release 
audit  does  not  bring  any  additional  effect.  All  post-release  audits  are  classified  as  "other 
kinds". There is  a national  manual  for performing controls, called  "Tax Auditor's  Operating 
Procedure". 

Ireland replied that the Irish customs post clearance interventions are based on risk analysis 
using  automated  data  processing  techniques.  Ireland  has  produced  a  national  customs  audit 
and control guide that encompasses standard checklists to assist their officers in carrying out 
their  post-clearance  roles.  A  random  element  is  also  incorporated  to  the  post  clearance 
programme.  The  customs  division  works  closely  with  regional  control  officers  and  customs 
audit personnel to provide advice and guidance. All results from customs post release controls 
are monitored closely and rules, procedures and processes are updated as required. 

Greece:  post  release  audits  are  carried  out  on  the  basis  of  a  non-automated  "local"  risk 
analysis by the competent authorities. 

Spain replied that each actuary decides how to perform the control. Audits are revised by the 
superior  who  may  decide  to  perform  additional  actions.  The  Commission's  guide  is  at  their 
disposal. Company records can usually be assessed and all previous information is taken into 
account. 

France explained how post-release audits are conducted (in a hierarchical manner) in France. 
The  results  of  the  checks  are  incorporated  in  the  anti-fraud  information  system  and  can  be 

24    Belgium,  Bulgaria,  Germany,  Ireland,  France,  Croatia,  Italy,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Hungary,  the  Netherlands, 

Austria,   Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia 

25   Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Spain, Malta, Finland and the United Kingdom 
26   Cyprus, Luxembourg and Romania 
27   Denmark, Sweden 

24 

 
 
                                                 
consulted by all the services responsible for risk analysis and targeting. Random selection is 
not part of the post-release audits mechanisms. 

Italy  explained  the  process  of  ensuring  risk-oriented  post-release  audits  with  continuous 
monitoring of results. 

Lithuania reported that pre-audits and post release cover the operators' systems and for all of 
them instructions, guide and standardised checklists are used. Results of pre-audits and post-
release audits and other verifications are uploaded into the RIKS. This allows monitoring all 
the information in one e-system, RIKS. 

Luxembourg indicated that as they don’t have an IT tool, they cannot conduct risk-oriented 
audits.  They  are  conducted  on  the  experience  of  the  officials  or  by  a  request  from  another 
department. 

Hungary: when drawing up the annual post-release control plan, 87 distinct risk topics were 
taken  into  account  in  selecting  for  the  control,  but  a  random  sample  was  also  taken.  Those 
performing control, received information on the risk topics being investigated in writing. The 
results of the controls are uploaded into an electronic register and are easy to access and may 
serve as a basis for further risk analyses. 

Malta  replied  that  the  relevant  department  carries  out  risk-oriented  post-release  audits  but 
does not have the capacity to carry out system-based audits. 

Austria fully applies the EU audit guide. 

Poland: a provision has been introduced to national law that indicated that controls including 
post-release controls are to be performed on the basis of risk analysis results. The exceptions 
to  this  are  random  checks  or  those  arising  from  a  legal  obligation.  The  control  activities 
carried out use the methodology set out in the customs audit guide. 

Romania  reported  that  up  to  now,  no  further  customs  controls  have  been  carried  out  on 
operators' systems  in  the absence of the national  legal  framework. Currently, the process  of 
amending the ANAF order on the technical norms of customs surveillance and control is in 
progress  and  new  provisions  will  include  this  method  of  customs  control  later  with  the  full 
application of the methodology in the DG TAXUD customs audit guide. 

Slovenia reported that a random element is included in different post-release audits. There is 
use of the customs audit guide and check list where necessary. Auditors also examine minutes 
of previous post-release audits and other information to include the risk areas. 

Slovakia: the unit of post-release control continuously processes the incentives from the unit 
of risk analysis and forwards them to the units of post release control. – Exchange of analysis 
is taking place. 

Finland explained corporate audit. The transactions concerned are chosen to the audit mainly 
with  risk  analysis  and  random  sampling  is  used  less  frequently  in  an  ordinary  audit.  The 
checklists are accessible to all auditors. The results of the audits and the proposed and realised 

25 

 
measures are entered into the monitoring system of the corporate audit and used e.g. in audit 
planning. 

The  United  Kingdom  replied  that  HMRC  undertake  a  3  year  rolling  audit/assurance 
programme of authorised traders. This activity is supplemented with Authorisation & Returns 
Teams monitoring activity on the authorised population. 

c)  Customs controls on operations made by authorised economic operators (AEOs) 

carried out taking into account of risk management performed 

23 Member States28 replied that they fully implement this question and five29 reported partial 
implementation.  

The following Member States provided details for their reply (in summary): 

Belgium: on the basis on the risk assessment in granting or reassessing an AEO authorisation, 
a  selection  percentage  is  awarded  that  is  used  in  the  selection  process  within  SEDA  2.0 
engine. 

Bulgaria:  automated  risk  analysis  is  conducted  for  all  operations,  regardless  of  the  role  of 
economic operators in the supply chain. 

Denmark:  companies  with  AEO  authorisation  will  also  be  monitored  on  the  basis  of 
materiality and risk, although to a lesser extent on account of their status. 

Estonia:  companies  holding  AEO  status  are  controlled  on  the  same  grounds  as  other 
companies. 

Ireland:  AEOs  are  subject  to  the  same  rules  and  regulations  as  other  importers  but  do  not 
come under the same level of customs controls as their status is based on mutual transparency, 
correctness, fairness and responsibility. From a compliance perspective each AEO in Ireland 
is  monitored  within  the  first  12  months  of  being  granted  such  an  authorisation  and  at  least 
every three years after that. 

Greece:  customs  controls  carried  out  on  operations  made  by  AEO  take  into  account  risk 
analysis and apply on all the different elements of these operations. 

Spain: AEOs  are subject  to  customs controls.  However, they might  be adapted to  their risk 
level. 

France replied that the AEO are considered to be trustworthy operators in the context of the 
customs  operations  they  perform.  As  such,  they  have  specific  customs  benefits,  pursuant  to 
EU rules.  France  explained the cases where  AEO have special treatment and explained that 
apart from these cases, the AEO are treated like other operators. The same selection profiles 
are used for them where these profiles are not based on an Economic Operator Registration 
and Identification number and all the data in the declaration can be targeted. 

28  Belgium,  Bulgaria,  Czech  Republic,  Denmark,  Germany,  Ireland,  Greece,  Spain,  France,  Croatia,  Italy, 
Cyprus,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Luxembourg,  Hungary,  Malta,  the  Netherlands,  Portugal,  Romania,  Slovenia, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom 

29   Estonia, Austria, Poland, Slovakia and Finland 

26 

 
                                                 
Italy: The rate of control for an AEO is systematically narrowed down according to the rate 
of compliance of the operator. When a high risk indicator related to  potential losses in  own 
resources  applies,  AEO  is  managed  as  normal  operator  for  a  short  period  and  subjected  to 
normal type of control. 

Cyprus:  an  import  system  at  low  risk  value  is  given  to  all  Cypriot  AEOs.  As  regards  the 
import control system and the export control system, all benefits granted to AEO are based on 
Common Risk criteria. 

Lithuania:  AEOs  operations  are  checked  under  the  same  criteria  as  the  other  economic 
operators. 

Luxembourg: only the risk profile for the financial category is reduced to a 50% rate. 

Hungary:  When  selecting  for  post  release  controls,  AEOs  are  treated  just  like  any  other 
market participants, although when taking customs controls into consideration on the whole, 
there are fewer physical and documentary controls, as a reduction is applied. 

Austria: this question is dealt with on a case by case basis. 

Poland: The DSCA and all other regional revenue administration offices have been instructed 
to take the necessary measures set out in this recommendation with a view to factoring them 
into the risk management process. 

Romania: The selection of controls is based on risk analysis, using a specialised IT module. 
The selection is automatically performed in the system. There is no requirement for the non-
application of the risk criteria to AEO so that they can be selected if there is a risk indicator. 
AEO  is  considered  a  trustworthy  company,  and  therefore  their  operations  are  considered  as 
low  risk  and  in  some  cases,  based  on  local  risk  analysis,  may  not  be  part  of  the  controlled 
sample. 

Slovenia: When AEO authorisation is done, a special monitoring plan applies. 

Slovakia:  AEOs  are  subject  of  risk  analysis  and  only  the  internal  guideline  allowed 
performing less controls. 

Finland:  During  their  risk  management  and  post-release  process  they  treat  AEO  and  other 
operators the same way. 

United Kingdom: AEOs are included in a targeted risk assessment and risk working as part 
of  Large  Businesses  and  RIS  monitoring  of  the  authorisation.  They  are  included  in  pre-
clearance profiling exercises and their consignments checked if appropriate. 

d)  The use of the handbook of operational customs controls based on Member States' 

best practices and of the Customs audit guide 

27 

 
Twenty-four  Member  States30  replied  that  they  fully  implement  this  question  and  four 
Member States31 gave a negative reply.  

The following Member States provided details for their reply (in summary): 

Bulgaria: The customs audit guide is used when performing post release control. 

Estonia  has  its  own  national  guidelines  for  the  verification  of  customs  value  and 
determination of a new value. Likewise, there is a national manual for carrying out controls: 
"Tax Auditor's Operating Procedure". 

Ireland:  The  audits  are  conducted  in  line  with  the  EU  customs  audit  guide.  From  a  post-
clearance perspective, the national customs audit guide takes primary guidance from the EU 
customs audit. The EU documents are an integral part of the control programme formulation. 

Greece a key tool for carrying out post release audits is the customs audit guide. 

Spain: the guides are available to the actuaries who perform the controls. 

France  responded  that  these  guides  are  not  used  directly  by  the  services  although  their 
indications are included and used in national guides. 

Italy replied that both are used for operational customs checks and audit guide.  

Cyprus:  the  handbook  on  operational  customs  control  is  uploaded  on  intranet  departments 
and is available to all customs officers since 2015. 

Lithuania:  the  customs  audit  guide  is  used.  Based  on  info  from  this  guide,  checklists 
(questionnaires) for auditors in  RIKS post-clearance  component are  created. Currently, they 
use  17  checklists  (risky  areas)  for  preparation  phase  for  audit  and  31  for  execution  phase. 
Finally, the auditor is required to assess the company's residual risk. Lithuanian customs are 
familiar with the handbook (2013) and apply its provisions. However, this handbook contains 
references to regulations that are no longer valid and they believe it should be updated. 

Hungary:  Full  use  of  the  customs  audit  guide  is  being  made  at  the  time  of  post-release 
controls. The departments use the handbook when checking declarations, performing physical 
controls, checking the classification of goods, and making recommendations of sampling. 

Malta:  A  'yes'  reply  is  being  submitted  to  this  question  conditionally,  as  the  department 
consults the customs audit guide when conducting any type of audit assignment. 

Poland: For the purpose of performing post-release controls, the KAS uses the methodology 
set out in the customs audit guide. 

Romania: In 2018, both documents were distributed to the specialised personnel within the 
structures  with  control  responsibilities  at  the  local  level  (2014  version  of  the  customs  audit 

30  Belgium,  Bulgaria,  Czech  Republic,  Denmark,  Germany,  Ireland,  Spain,  France,  Croatia,  Italy,  Cyprus, 
Latvia,  Lithuania,  Luxembourg,  Hungary,  Malta,  the  Netherlands,  Austria,  Poland,  Portugal,  Romania, 
Slovenia, Slovakia and Finland 

31   Estonia, Greece, Sweden and the United Kingdom 

28 

 
                                                 
guide) as "savoir faire" for usage of the information in the activity of preparing and carrying 
out control actions. 

Slovenia: national authorities make full use of the handbook on operational customs controls 
and the customs audit guide. 

Slovakia: all the units of post release controls have a customs audit manual available.  

Sweden:  the  Swedish  customs  doesn’t  use  the  handbook  because  they  are  not  sufficiently 
familiar with it. They use the customs audit guide. Unfortunately, the guide has not yet been 
updated by TAXUD to take account of the new legislation. 

United  Kingdom:  the  UK  authorities  apply  the  Customs  Audit  Guide  and  have  national 
guidance  in  place.  The  UK  authorities  would  like  confirmation  of  the  current  status  and 
developments of the handbook on best practices. 

1.2. 

EXPENDITURE 

Under  the  second  recommendation,  the  Member  States  were  invited  to  further  exploit  the 
potential of risk analysis, tailoring the approach to different types of expenditure and taking 
advantage of best practices and the risk elements highlighted in the 2017 PIF report. Also, to 
facilitate  and  assess  the  spontaneous  reporting  of  potential  irregularities  and  strengthen  the 
protection  of  whistleblowers  as  they  are  also  a  crucial  source  for  investigative  journalism. 
Lastly,  the  Member  States  were  invited  to  promote  systematic  and  timely  cooperation 
between  judicial  and  administrative  authorities.  The  summary  of  the  results  in  accordance 
with the Member States' replies are listed in this section. 

The Commission provided the following guiding questions to the Member States with regard 
to formulating structured replies to address the second recommendation: 

Guiding questions: 

Q.2.1  Can  you  share  any  results  deriving  from  the  use  of  the  findings  from  the  2016  PIF 
Report in your fraud risk assessments? 

Q.2.2 Have you further exploited the potential of risk analysis, tailoring the approach to the 
different  types  of  expenditure  and  taking  advantage  of  best  practices  and  the  risk  elements 
highlighted in the 2017 PIF Report? 

Q.2.3 Have you facilitated and assessed the spontaneous reporting of potential irregularities 
and  strengthen  the  protection  of  whistle-blowers,  who  are  also  a  crucial  source  for 
investigative journalism? 

Q.2.4  Have  you  promoted  systematic  and  timely  cooperation  between  judicial  and 
administrative authorities? 

29 

 
 
 
 
 
Overall  results  of  the  implementation  of  recommendation  2  on  expenditure  (in  alphabetical 
order): 

Table 2 

1.2.1.  USE OF THE 2016 PIF REPORT FINDINGS IN FRAUD RISK ASSESSMENTS  

Member States were asked whether they could share any results deriving from the use of the 
findings from the 2016 PIF report in their fraud risk assessments. 22 Member States replied 

30 

 
 
 
 
that  they  were  in  a  position  to  share  such  results32  whereas  six  Member  States33  gave  a 
negative reply to this question.  

The following Member States provided details for their reply (in summary): 

Belgium:  Fraud  prevention  and  detection  in  the  Flemish  paying  agency  is  based  on  the 
principle  of  progressive  insight.  Different  elements  that  are  provided  in  different  for  a, 
including the PIF report, are taken into account in the anti-fraud policy of the paying agency. 

Bulgaria shared results from the use of findings from the PIF Report 2016 at the level of both 
operational programmes  and individual operations. They reported about additional measures 
in  areas  of  priority  in  the  2016  PIF  Report,  (tourism,  RTD,  transport,  investment  in  social 
infrastructure,  technical  assistance  to  fisheries).  They  also  reported  on  additional  checks 
established, the use of Arachne in public procurement procedures, the update of checklists by 
some  authorities,  new  methodology  on  fisheries  in  2018,  an  audit  workshop  in  2018  and 
continuous verification and implementation of Commission recommendations on ESF, ERDF, 
CF and ETC programmes.  They also reported additional controls in the form of red flags, and 
emphasised  the  list  of  red  flags  role  in  the  prevention  of  fraud  and  offering  additional 
protection for the agricultural funds related grants. 

Czech Republic reported about the strategy to fight fraud and corruption in the framework of 
absorption of the CSF 2014-20 and its implementation. Also, about the reporting procedure in 
case  of  suspicion  of  a  criminal  offence  (e.g.  fraud)  to  the  national  monitoring  system 
MS2014+(IRQ3). Also, reported about enhanced cooperation with the Police in case of fraud, 
about the officers of the control and audit unit of EU funds' cooperation with the intermediate 
bodies, and the use of Arachne by managing authorities and intermediate bodies. Lastly, about 
the implementation of recommendation 4 of the 2016 PIF report in changes in the operation of 
the risk management system. 

Denmark  replied  that  the  Agricultural  Agency  reported  that  it  has  held  internal  guidance 
meetings  for  fraud  awareness  raising  in  relation  to  the  rules  on  markets  organisation.  
Compared to 2016 and 2017, 2018 saw an increase in detected cases with red flags under the 
rules on markets organisation. The fisheries agency reported that it has provided information 
on the location and priority area of projects reported for fraud in 2017 and 2018. 

Germany  reported  that  in  the  agricultural  sector  fraud  risks  are  continuously  assessed 
including with reference to the PIF report. If there are an indication of a fraud risk for certain 
measures, appropriate action is taken. In structural and investment funds, Germany reported 
that  the  comprehensive  approaches  devised  and  reviewed  by  managing  authorities  take 
account  of  the  2016  PIF  report's  assessments  and  findings.  Also,  the  Commission  guidance 
note on fraud risk assessment is followed, and the self-assessment instrument provided by the 
Commission  in  the  guidance  note  is  regularly  reviewed  and  adjusted  to  specific  features  of 
local situations. 

32  Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Greece, Croatia, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom 

33   Ireland, Spain, France, Luxembourg and Poland 

31 

 
                                                 
Estonia reported that their audit authority improved the auditing methodology and checklists 
with the fraud indicators provided by in the OLAF public procurement guidelines. 

Greece: the Special Management Service of the 2014-2020 Rural Development Programme is 
implementing a technical support project. The Special Management Service of the Maritime 
and Fisheries Operational Programmes implements a law transposing directives No 24 and 25 
of 2015 and the e-procurement system as recommended by the 2016 PIF report. The results of 
the  report  in  fraud  risk  assessments  have  been  recorded  in  the  FRA  tool  in  the  form  of 
measures. The Fiscal Control Committee (EDEL) reported that taking into account the 2016 
PIF  report  findings,  in  2018,  the  Audit  Authority  reformulated  and  updated  the  audit 
questionnaires  for  transactions,  paying  particular  attention  to  the  incorporation  of  the 
requirements arising from the new directives on public procurement. In 2017, it participated 
in a training programme in Athens on combating fraud and corruption in EU investment and 
structural  funds  organised  by  the  national  centre  for  public  administration  and  HAUS 
(Finland). 

Spain  explained  that  the  report  findings  are  only  one  of  the  multiple  elements  taken  into 
account  in  fraud  risk  assessments  so  it  is  difficult  to  isolate  the  effects  that  each  of  those 
elements has as a result of its inclusion in the fraud risk assessments. 

Croatia  reported  that  fraud  risk  assessment  is  carried  out  for  prevention  and  detection  of 
fraud and corruption. They collect the assessment and the Ministry of Finance is processing 
and analysing the results. The paying agency for agriculture, fisheries and rural development 
in  2017  has  taken  into  account  all  types  of  financing  in  the  frame  of  European  agricultural 
guarantee  fund  and  for  rural  development.  It  has  taken  into  account  the  management  and 
control  system's  weaknesses  in  accordance  with  an  internal  risk  management  procedure. 
Emphasised  that  the  Ministry  of  Finance  requested  identification  of  risks  related  to 
irregularities and fraud in 2017 and provided the basis for risk identification. 

Italy reported that the managing authority has established a fraud risk assessment task force 
and a checks quality review task force in addition to implementing the Arachne system with 
assistance from the Ministry of Economy and Finance/Auditing authority. 

Cyprus reported that risk assessment has been incorporated in all administrative and on the 
spot  procedures  undertaken  by  responsible  bodies  involved  in  programmes  under  shared 
management.  Risk  analysis  is  also  used  to  select  transactions  to  verify  in  terms  of  payment 
claims submitted by beneficiaries with a large number of supporting documents or during on 
the  spot  controls  for  measures  with  a  large  number  of  final  recipients.  Risk  analysis 
incorporates data on the nature of beneficiaries, projects and the type of expenditure, based on 
ex  ante  assessment  of  the  associated  risk  to  each  category  and  incorporating  results  of 
previous verifications and audits. 

Latvia's  Ministry  of  Agriculture  reported  that  they  implemented  the  recommendations  as 
reported in the previous follow-up in 2016 and 2017. 

Lithuania  reported  about  the  analyses  performed  by  the  Ministry  of  Finance  as  managing 
authority  of  the  operational  programme  for  the  EU  investments  2014-2020.  After  the 
analyses,  it  assesses  the  need  for  additional  measures  to  reduce  the  probability  of  possible 
occurrence  of  fraud  and  corruption  manifestations.  Following  the  assessment  in  2018,  the 

32 

 
need  for  additional  preventive  measures  in  evaluations  of  applications,  carrying  out  on  the 
spot  checks,  communication  activities,  public  procurement,  etc.  have  been  established. 
Additional measures to be implemented in 2019 include both various checks and preventive 
actions. 

Luxembourg  explained  that  the  only  European  structural  funds  managed  there  and  falling 
within  the  scope  are  the  ones  covering  the  agricultural  sector.  As  no  fraud  cases  related  to 
market  support  measures  have  occurred  yet  in  the  agricultural  sector,  they  did  not  make 
improvements in this area after the 2016 PIF report. 

Malta reported that with respect to the PIF report's recommendations, the fraud risk registers 
have continued to be reviewed on a regular basis to address new emerging fraud risks.  

The  Netherlands  reported  that  they  organised  workshops  about  the  updated  legislation  on 
public procurement. 

Austria reported that OLAF's fraud risk assessment confirms their own findings derived from 
the Paying Agency administrative and on the spot controls and clearance of accounts as well 
as  audit  findings.  Nevertheless,  Austria  continues  working  to  reduce  the  reasons  for 
irregularity  and  possible  fraud  step  by  step.  Improvements  are  mainly  necessary  in  market 
subsidies  and  rural  development  projects.  In  these  sectors  strict  rules  for  application,  claim 
authorisation and on the spot controls are essential. All these steps may further take advantage 
of professional IT support. 

Poland could not report any findings. The competent national institutions in Poland typically 
use risk analysis to identify the most vulnerable areas to fraud. With regard to the use of the 
risk  elements  discussed  in  the  PIF  report,  the  partnership  agreement  coordinating  authority 
will  bring  this  aspect  to  the  attention  of  all  relevant  cohesion  policy  managing  authorities, 
giving recommendations for drawing up annual control plans for the financial year 2018/19. 

Portugal highlighted that the content of the communications to OLAF is taken into account 
during  risk  assessment,  particularly  when  establishing  the  sample  for  on the  spot  checks  on 
applications and aid requests submitted. 

Romania: the Managing Authority for operational programme for fisheries 2014-20 reported 
that  the  checklist  called  "Fraud  Indicators  checklist"  was  introduced  at  the  levels  of  the 
procedures  in  place  at  Managing  Authority  level  including  questions  related  to  conflict  of 
interests. 

Slovenia reported about the cooperation with the attorney general, better information, better 
cooperation, early detection of fraud, improved system performance and consequently fewer 
corrections. 

Slovakia reported about several points. The Supreme audit office has an obligation to assess 
fraud  risk  when  planning  and  conducting  audits.  The  public  procurement  office  activities 
during the transposition period of the revised directives, for example, enhanced transparency 
via  the  register  of  beneficial  owners.  The  Ministry  of  Environment  of  the  Slovak  Republic 
reported the carrying out of the management of risks/risks of fraud relevant to the Operational 
programme quality of Environment. They listed what the managing authority uses for the risk 
management procedure such as the Arachne system, the IT monitoring system ITMS2014+, a 

33 

 
whistleblowing  system.  The  agricultural  paying  agency  adopted  the  directive  on  solution  of 
irregularities and refunded financial funds of the agricultural payment agency. The ministry of 
Labour, social affairs and family as a MA tries to apply all recommendations and procedures 
for the European Social Fund Program (OP HR) and its tools. The Ministry of Transport and 
Construction as a managing authority of the operational programme integrated infrastructure 
implemented prevention measures of the fraud risk self-evaluation during 2016 in accordance 
with COM regulations. 

Finland  reported  about  a  new  law  concerning  public  procurement  and  cohesion  contracts 
executed from 2017. The functions of the electronic project management system EURA 2014 
include  corrective  measures  and  findings,  which  can  be  marked  as  suspected  fraud.  In  the 
field  of  agriculture,  the  cooperation  between  different  actors  has  increased  with  the 
development  of  risk  assessment.  Also,  fraud  awareness  has  improved  among  regional 
authorities. 

Sweden  reported  that  there  is  still  a  need  to  continue  training  both  management  and 
administrators/economists  in  public  procurement,  something  that  was  detected  in  the  2016 
PIF report. 

The  United  Kingdom  reported  that  potential  or  actual  fraud  cases  relating  to  expenditure 
issues are being considered as part of subsequent reviews of their fraud risk assessment tool, 
with risk and controls revised accordingly. Also, in relation to their risk scoring tool, they are 
currently developing the narrative to clarify their decision making in relation to the scoring of 
risks  (both  gross  and  net  risk),  their  confidence  in  the  controls,  and  the  necessity  for 
considering any additional planned controls. 

1.2.2.  USE OF RISK ANALYSIS FINDINGS 

Under this question, Member States were asked to provide information on whether they have 
further exploited the potential of risk analysis, tailoring the approach to the different types of 
expenditure. Also, whether they have taken advantage of best practices and the risk elements 
highlighted  in  the  2017  PIF  Report.  Thirteen  Member  States34  replied  that  they  were  in  a 
position  to  fully  implement  this  recommendation  whereas  fourteen  Member  States35  could 
implement it only partly. None of the Member States replied negatively to this question. One 
did not indicate any information.36 

The following Member States provided details for their reply (in summary): 

Bulgaria  reported  that  Managing  Authorities  introduced  measures  in  accordance  with  the 
Commission's  guidance  on  the  application  of  Article  125(4)(c)  of  the  Common  Provisions 
Regulation.  They  also  updated  their  risk  assessment  methodology  and  action  plan  for  ESI 
funds.  They  explained  the  practical  use  of  red  flags  carried  out  at  all  stages  of  the  project 

34  Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Ireland, Spain, Croatia, Cyprus, Hungary, Malta, Austria, Poland, Portugal, 

Romania, Slovakia 

35  Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Greece, France, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Slovenia, 

Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom 

36   Lithuania 

34 

 
                                                 
cycle. They also reported about the use of Arachne for programmes financed by structural and 
cohesion  funds.  Bulgaria  reported  about  the  carrying  out  of  checks  based  on  specific 
checklists and the use of a self-assessment tool of the risk of fraud provided by the European 
Commission.  They  reported  taking  account  of  good  practices  and  experience  when 
developing  the  methodology  for  assessing  fraud  risk  for  the  2014-2020  operational 
programmes. Lastly, Bulgaria reported about measures in agricultural funds. 

Czech Republic reported details about 1) the control in the project approval process prior to 
the  issuance  of  a  legal  act  on  grant  provision  and  2)  Control  in  the  project  implementation 
process.  When  identifying  risk  operations,  the  data  from  the  information  systems  are  used 
(e.g.  Arachne  and  others).  In  the  risk  management  system,  the  second  phase  of 
implementation  was  launched,  in  which  the  risk  introduced  would  be  linked  to  the  primary 
assets  of  the  organisation  i.e.  processes.  At  this  stage  Rec.  2  of  2017  PIF  was  taken  into 
account. In order to exploit the potential of risk analysis, it is planned to extend access right to 
the  ARM  system  to  260  users  of  the  ARM  risk  management  system  will  be  performed  in 
IQ/2019.  

Denmark:  the  Danish  agricultural  agency  has  not  analysed  risk  areas  and  introduced 
improvement  measures  in  the  meantime.  The  Agency  has,  however,  allocated  resources  for 
external assistance with risk assessment in 2019, and will take the conclusions of the report 
into  consideration  in  this  context.  The  Fisheries  Agency  is  currently  working  on  fraud 
procedures that are adapted to the EMFF area, including the fraud risks occurring in that area. 
In  2019,  the  Fisheries  Agency  will  receive  a  contribution  commissioned  from  the  Danish 
Government's legal Adviser to develop a method for identifying fraud and irregularities more 
easily.  The  Danish  business  authority,  MA  for  ERDF  and  ESF  has  in  2018  prepared  on 
organising  a  more  risk-based  administrative  verification  of  accounts  based  on  internal  data 
from the fund monitoring system and the company register. It is expected to be implemented 
in 2019. 

Germany  reported  on  measures  under  the  structural  and  agricultural  funds  from  2018  at 
Länder level  and at  Federal  level.  Also they  reported that fraud prevention is  also  a  regular 
item on the agenda of the bi-annual meeting of the Federation-Länder working party on 'EU 
financial controls of the audit authorities in the sphere of structural funds'. 

Estonia reported that the Agricultural Register and Information Board have focussed on risk 
analysis  before  granting  the  decision  to  reduce  the  administrative  burden  and  possible 
financial losses in later phases. 

Greece:  The  special  management  service  of  the  2014-2020  rural  development  programme 
reported  about  the  risk  analysis  carried  out  during  on  the  spot  checks  and  ex  post  controls. 
The special management service of the Maritime and fisheries operational programmes on the 
procedure  for  communicating  irregularities  in  IMS  and  reporting  complaints  to  AFCOS  as 
well  as  the  creation  of  a  fraud  risk  assessment  tool.  The  Directorate  for  financial  controls, 
inspections and cooperatives reported the application of a risk analysis methodology to select 
the  undertakings  to  be  audited.  Proposals  for  the  use  of  risk  analysis  are  presented  to  the 
competent  department  of  the  European  Commission  each  November.    The  risk  analysis 
application selects the undertakings to be audited on the basis of the archives of the computer 

35 

 
system  and  the  scoring  for  each  eligibility  criteria.  The  Fiscal  Control  Committee  (EDEL) 
reported that taking into consideration the 3rd part of the 2017 PIF report recommendation, the 
audit  authority,  as  part  of  the  audit  of  the  2018  accounts,  cooperated  with  the  jointly 
responsible services to assess the complaints submitted on suspected fraud in order to assess 
whether  corrective  measures  are  required  as  part  of  the  accounts  declaration  for  the  4th 
accounting year. 

Spain reported an example 'Research and Technological development (RTD) and 'Transport' 
priorities  which  are  highlighted  in  the  2017  PIF  Report  as  relevant  risk  sectors  will  be 
considered by the ERDF Managing Authority to better focus the scope of its controls. 

France explained that this matter comes under systems audits and operations audits. System 
audits should test the effectiveness and efficiency of management checks during the operation 
selection phase, financial management and control of operation audits as well as the existence 
of risk mapping to target checks on the highest-risk beneficiaries, projects and providers. 

Croatia reported on measures and fraud risk assessment being carried out and the Agency for 
payments  in  agriculture,  fisheries  and  rural  development  taking  account  of  the  weakness  of 
the  management  and  control  system  in  accordance  with  an  internal  risk  management 
procedure. 

Italy reported that risk analysis is carried out by the fraud risk assessment task force and is 
tailored on the specific  needs of the national  operation programme for school  which mostly 
covers state-run schools, and thus does not perfectly mirror the 2017 PIF Report. 

Cyprus reported that information on staff involved in co-financed projects was incorporated 
in the MIS for the management of four shared management programs covering cohesion and 
fisheries policy and aid to the most deprived. Staff cost has been assessed as a high risk area 
for  fraud  during  the  fraud  risk  self-assessment  exercise  undertaken  by  the  responsible 
authorities.  

Latvia  set  up  internal  risk  management  and  anti-fraud  control  system  in  the  managing 
authorities  on  dealing  with  FEAD.  The  institutions  involved  in  the  management  of  FEAD 
shall  take  the  measures  necessary  to  prevent  and  detect  potential  risks  including  fraud.  The 
risk management for expenditure shall be applied uniformly to all types. 

Luxembourg  reported  about  a  continuous  process  as  a  measure,  which  is  still  being 
implemented. The paying agency for agricultural funds services must set up an alert system to 
detect facts that may indicate fraud or attempted fraud (Article 58 of Regulation 1306/2013). 

Hungary reported that fraud risk is identified and assessed by the Managing Authorities on 
the basis of the EGESIF_14-0021-00 model recommended by the Commission and Hungary 
has  drawn  up  methodological  guidelines  for  this.  They  also  reported  on  the  processes 
assessed. 

Malta reported on 2 examples: 1. the responsible authority within the funds and programmes 
divisions  revised  its  anti-fraud  policy  and  anti-fraud  strategy.  The  anti-fraud  strategy 
facilitates embeds further an anti-fraud culture with a zero tolerance to fraud principle. Also, 
Malta  reported  that  in  recent  months,  the  risk  register  of  the  national  authority  of  the  same 

36 

 
programmes  was  reviewed  and  updated  with  special  emphasis  to  the  achievement  of  target 
indicators. 

The Netherlands reported they are in the acceptance phase of an operation they use software 
company-info and testing the use of Arachne. Before the start of an EU financed project they 
organise information meetings with beneficiaries and discuss topics like public procurement 
and conflict of interest. 

Austria    reported  that  in  EAGF  and  EAFRD  a  widespread  set  of  rules  is  applicable  since 
years  for  administrative  and  on  the  spot  controls  including  risk  assessment  and  sample 
selection securing a 20% share of random on the spot check samples. 

Poland: the national institutions are regularly made aware of the need to take into account the 
findings of the Commission in the PIF Reports when implementing and controlling EU funds. 
In addition, the paying agency compiled a document: 'List of signs of fraud' that contains the 
most  frequent  signs  of  fraud  in  the  agency's  area  of  activity  and  was  made  available  to 
relevant staff. This document contains descriptions of fraud that involves artificially creating 
the conditions for obtaining financial assistance, methods of checking the evidence pointing to 
fraud and the procedure to be followed in the event that fraud is confirmed. Also, E-learning 
courses on fraud prevention are provided on an annual basis for all staff and units carrying out 
delegated tasks, and conventional training courses are provided for individual organisational 
units. 

Portugal: Risk assessment is an integral part of the management systems and the checks on 
measures financed by the IFAP; it is also particularly important when establishing the sample 
and  procedures  for  administrative  checks  and  on  the  spot  checks  on  applications  and  air 
requests submitted. 

Romania:  The  managing  authority  for  operational  programme  for  fisheries  and  maritime 
affairs  2014-2020:  having  in  view  the  risk  analysis  system  set  in  place  at  MA  level, 
presentations at decision maker's level and regional centres were organised. National Agency 
for Public Procurement: reported about a methodology introducing a risk analysis in case the 
number of  ex officio  intimations is  greater than  the actual possibility of  performing ex post 
control  on  the  award    of  public  procurement  contracts/agreements,  works  on  concession 
contracts and service concession contract. 

Slovenia: the Office for development and EU cohesion policy reported that cooperation with 
the Attorney-General has been and will be strengthened. Arachne was introduced and will be 
more  spread  to  implement  in  the  future.  Reference  to  the  use  of  Arachne  was  made  on  co-
financing agreements like it is with anti-corruption clauses. More education on Arachne will 
follow, including to intermediate bodies. 

Slovakia:  detailed  reports  received  by  the  supreme  audit  office,  the  public  procurement 
office, the ministry of environment, the Ministry of Agriculture and rural development and the 
agricultural paying agency partly implementing the recommendation, the Ministry of Labour 
(partly  implementing  the  recommendation),  Social  Affairs  and  Family,  and  the  Ministry  of 
Transport and construction. 

37 

 
Finland  reported  about  training  and  education  to  the  intermediate  bodies  on  fraud  risks 
combating  (MA  of  ERDF  and  ESF)  and  plans  to  improve  the  system  of  red  flags.  EMFF 
authorities  carried  out  a  fraud  risk  analysis.  In  agriculture,  disseminating  information  on 
possible methods of fraud has been part of the cooperation between the authorities. 

The United Kingdom reported that good practice is to ensure tighter processes are in place 
for  Grant  Recipients  and  their  delivery  partners  and  that  stricter  tests  are  undertaken  by  the 
managing authority when SME s are providing evidence for payment e.g. checks n companies 
house that the company is active; further evidence and checks to support invoices submitted 
to claim their small grant or voucher. 

1.2.3.  FACILITATION  AND  ASSESSMENT  OF 

SPONTANEOUS  REPORTING  OF 

IRREGULARITIES - WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION 

Under  this  recommendation,  Member  States  were  invited  to  share  information  on  whether 
they  have  facilitated  and  assessed  the  spontaneous  reporting  of  irregularities  and 
strengthened  the  protection  of  whistleblowers.  Thirteen  Member  States37  replied  that  they 
fully  implement  this  recommendation  and  twelve38  reported  partial  implementation.  Two 
Member States replied negatively to this question.39 One did not indicate any information.40 

The following Member States provided details for their reply (in summary): 

Belgium:  The  Walloon  government  has  adopted  a  legal  framework  for  the  protection  of 
whistleblowers within its administrations. 

Bulgaria  reported  that  whistle-blowers  play  an  important  role  in  the  detection  and  timely 
prevention  of  fraud  affecting  agricultural  schemes  and  measures  financed  from  the  EU's 
budget.  Bulgaria  reported,  in  detail,  about  available  platforms  of  reporting  of  irregularities, 
including anonymous reporting and through websites of various Ministries responsible for EU 
funds.  Also,  when  the  report  is  not  anonymous,  they  reported  ensuring  the  whistle-blower's 
personal  data  by  not  disclosing  information.  Bulgaria  provided  details  on  how  Managing 
Authorities  handle  information  on  irregularities  such  as  verification  of  information  and 
potential on the spot checks. Also, they reported on channels of reporting agricultural funds. 

Czech  Republic  has  no  special  act  for  the  protection  of  whistle-blowers,  but  this  act  is 
currently  under  preparation.  The  protection  of  whistle-blowers  is  solved  with  in  the  Civil 
Service Act and on the basis of this Act. Each resort has its own methodological guidelines, 
which solve the protection of whistle blowers, reporting of fraud and corruption. 

Germany reported that the management and control systems of spending programmes include 
the  obligation  to  report  irregularities.  Although  Germany  does  not  yet  have  unified  Federal 
provisions  on  the  protection  of  whistle-blowers,  some  of  the  Federal  Länder  have 

37  Bulgaria, Ireland, Croatia, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, Austria, Portugal, Slovakia, 

Sweden 

38    Czech  Republic,  Denmark,  Germany,  Estonia,  Greece,  Spain,  France,  Poland,  Romania,  Slovenia,  Finland, 

the United Kingdom 

39   Cyprus and the Netherlands 
40   Belgium 

38 

 
                                                 
implemented  such  protection  measures  such  as  for  example  'lawyer  post-boxes'  which 
whistleblowers can use to report information while remaining protected. Germany advocates 
EU-wide  protection  of  whistleblowers  and  supports  the  adoption  of  an  EU  directive  to  this 
effect. 

Estonia reported that whistleblowers have the possibility to contact the Implementing Agency 
directly  and  have  made  use  of  this  possibility.  Two  of  their  Implementing  Authorities 
(Enterprise  Estonia and the Environmental  Investment  Centre) have  added the possibility to 
submit anonymous hints regarding the misuse of support through their webpages. 

Greece  reported  that  whistleblower  protection  was  introduced  by  the  Anti-corruption  Law 
and  the  General  Secretariat  for  anti-corruption  submitted  a  proposal  to  the  competent 
Alternate  Minister  for  justice,  transparency  and  human  rights  to  improve  the  protection 
mechanism  for  whistleblowers.  Also,  the  revised  national  anti-corruption  action  plan  for 
2018-2021 includes the legislative initiative to establish an effective protection mechanism (to 
be implemented by June 2019). 

Spain reported that it established (in mid-2017) a confidential channel for complaints which 
is centralised at the AFCOS, and through which any person aware of facts that may constitute 
fraud  or  irregularities  in  relation  to  projects  or  operations  fully  or  partially  funded  by  EU 
funds  can  report  these  to  the  administration  so  that  the  competent  authorities  can  take  the 
necessary  measures  to  investigate  or  verify  the  information  and  if  applicable,  require 
responsibility to be taken as appropriate in each case. Spain reported about the developments 
in  this  reporting  channel  during  2018  such  as  the  adoption  of  this  practice  by  Managing 
Authorities. AFCOS made presentations to Managing Authorities and Intermediate bodies as 
well  as  antifraud  seminars  on  this  channel.  As  a  result,  the  number  of  allegations  received 
through this channel has increased during 2018. Also, there is a legislative proposal currently 
discussed  in  Parliament,  on  the  protection  of  whistleblowers.  A  number  of  autonomous 
communities  have  adopted  laws  to  protect  whistleblowers  at  regional  level,  covering 
measures similar to the ones included in the legislative proposal at national level. 

France  replied  indicating  the  insertion  of  a  new  line  of  reporting  concerning  conflicts  of 
interest with a question: Has a conflict of interests been detected? This question precedes the 
question relating to cases of suspected fraud as a category of irregularity. 

Croatia:  The  Ministry  of  Regional  development  and  EU  funds  reported  that  the  common 
national  rules  contains  a  procedure  for  submitting  reports  on  suspicion  on  irregularity  and 
fraud  and  consists  protection  measures  for  whistleblowers  in  line  with  national  protection 
rules. The rules apply to employees,  persons not employees of the management  and control 
systems  and  grant  beneficiaries,  as  well  as  representatives  of  the  public  concerned.  The 
Ministry of Justice reported that a whistleblowers law was adopted on 8 February 2019, to be 
entered into force on 1 July 2019. The law foresees 3 channels of reporting (internal, external 
and  exceptionally  public  disclosure).  Croatia  reported  on  the  role  of  the  Ombudsman  in 
dealing  with  external  reporting  and,  among  other  things,  for  providing  legal  information  to 
whistleblowers,  protecting  confidentiality  and  providing  reports  on  the  protection  of 
whistleblowers to the public. Also, Croatia reported that provisional measures are prescribed 
aiming  to  protect  whistleblowers  from  retaliation  during  court  proceedings.  The  law 

39 

 
prescribes  sanctions  for  breaching  rights  of  whistleblowers  and  also  sanction  for  the 
protection against malicious reporting. The Agency for payments in agriculture, fisheries and 
rural  development  reported  that  irregularities  can  be  reported  to  the  paying  agency 
anonymously. The applicant's personal data is protected. 

Italy reported that pursuant to Italian legislation, the Ministry of Education, under which the 
Managing  Authority  operates,  has  implemented  a  comprehensive  whistleblowing  protection 
system.  The  MA  itself  routinely  receives  reports  from  whistleblowers,  which  are  always 
investigated, while ensuring that the identity of the whistleblower is not disclosed. 

Latvia reported that the whistleblowing law was adopted by parliament in final reading on 11 
October  2018  and  will  enter  into  force  on  1  May  2019.  Latvia  reported  about  various  legal 
tools used towards channels of reporting of conflict of interests, corruption and other offences 
and  the  protection  of  whistleblowers  and  anonymity  reports.  The  Competition  council 
endorsed a leniency program that provides the possibility to get full immunity from fines to 
first applicant and significant reduction to next undertakings that admit violation and submit 
additional evidence. 

Luxembourg  reported  that  their  managing  authority  in  charge  of  FEADER  &  FEAGA 
already implemented a whistleblower procedure in 2015 and since then, this authority has not 
changed anything. 

Hungary reported that citizens' complaints are of great assistance in the investigation of cases 
and identification of irregularities. The website http://www.anti-lop.hu/ provides a forum for 
making these complaints. Citizens can signal fraud there anonymously and have their identity 
as whistleblowers respected and protected. 

Although the Netherlands have responded with a negative answer to the recommendation on 
whistleblowers, they already have a ‘House of Whistleblowers’ in place and there is not any 
new initiative in place to further strengthening it. 

Malta reported and gave details on its computerised system for reporting irregularities. They 
reported that the protection of whistleblower act  was already implemented in Malta in 2013 
and  this  act  provides  for  procedures  in  terms  of  which  employees  in  both  the  private  and 
public  sector  may  disclose  information  regarding  improper  practices  by  their  employees  or 
other employees and be protected from detrimental actions. 

Austria reported that there is full implementation of the recommendation in the framework of 
risk based paying agency control procedures. 

Poland  reported  that  the  competent  institutions  are  creating  tools  for  information  on  fraud 
or/and  irregularities  to  be  submitted  electronically,  using  forms  or  mailboxes.  Information 
which whistleblowers give in  good faith is of particular importance, however, the degree of 
willingness with which they share knowledge still depends on the quality of the arrangements 
in  place  and  how  they  ensure  no  repercussions  for  whistleblowers  will  be  there.  This  was 
illustrated  with  examples  from  two  institutions  in  Poland,  and  their  reporting  mechanisms 
procedures.  Also,  Poland  reported  that  works  on  a  draft  law  on  transparency  in  public  life 
including  whistleblower  protection  is  in  draft  phase,  along  with  the  initiative    on  a  citizens 
draft act on the protection of whistleblowers. 

40 

 
Portugal  highlighted  that  IFAP  continuously  monitors  tip-offs  it  receives  (relating  to 
irregularities that may have been committed or attempted in its area of activity) and has put 
procedures in place to assess and deal with such incidents. This is particularly important when 
establishing  the  (risk  based)  sample  for  on  the  spot  checks  on  applications  and  activities 
receiving financial support. 

Romania:  the  Ministry  of  European  Funds  reported  that  at  national  level,  protection  of 
whistleblowers is regulated through law 571/2004. At the level of the Ministry of EU funds, 
the  system  procedure  concerning  the  protection  of  whistleblowers  is  under  internal 
endorsement. The Operational Programme for Fisheries and Maritime Affairs reported that it 
was  not  the  case  up  to  the  present,  but  in  the  procedure  related  to  the  control  unit,  such  a 
reporting tool is included. 

Slovenia:  the  office  for  development  and  EU  cohesion  policy  referred  to  the  Integrity  and 
Prevention of Corruption Act on applicants/reporters of potential irregularities in the field of 
corruption. The Agency for Agricultural Markets and Rural Development reported that they 
encourage the employees to report any irregularities. A mailbox has been put in the hallway 
for  employees  to  anonymously  report  irregularity  or  other  infringements.  The  applicants  or 
other parties can choose a contact in the Agency's website and report irregularities via email.  

Slovakia:  In  2018,  the  Government's  Office  endorsed  an  updated  law  on  the  protection  of 
whistleblowers that includes the EU and OECD recommendations on the improvement of the 
protection of whistleblowers and the latest proposal for a directive of the EU Parliament and 
the Council on the protection of persons reporting on breaches of Union  law. This  law  was 
adopted  by  the  Slovak  Parliament  in  January  2019  and  is  expected  to  come  into  force  in 
March  2019.  The  Public  Procurement  Office,  the  Ministry  of  Agriculture  and  Rural 
Development and the Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family partly implemented this 
recommendation.  The  Ministry  of  Transport  and  construction  follows  the  regulations 
prescribed by law on the protection of whistleblowers and has a register of reporting potential 
irregularities. The Ministry  of Culture amended its  staff  regulations to  introduce procedures 
for reporting fraud, corruption or serious irregularity and the protection of staff from negative 
consequences. 

Finland:  the  Managing  Authority  of  ERDF  and  ESF  is  on  the  stage  of  finalising  decisions 
about  a  system  of  whistleblowing.  The  process  of  dealing  with  the  information  from  the 
system  is  going  to  be  established.  A  clear  guidance  has  been  published  by  the  EMFF 
programme on how to report suspected fraud. Also with the agriculture  funds, the reporting 
methods have been highlighted during training sessions. 

Sweden: several authorities have a whistleblower function in place and policies to strengthen 
the protection of whistleblowers. 

United Kingdom: the fraud referral process within MHCLG European Directorate has been 
established  and  is  functioning  effectively.  A  team  of  trained  Counter  Fraud  Designated 
Officer  are  the  first  point  of  contact.  The  Growth  Delivery  Teams  are  aware  of  the  CFDOs 
rules  and  assurance  of  confidentiality  of  whistleblowing  from  staff  members.  Policy  and 
guidance has been strengthened with the development of the new Counter Fraud and Conflict 

41 

 
of  Interest  Policy.  Good  links  with  Governmental  internal  audit  authority  and  their 
investigation team are being utilised to pursue suspected fraud cases. 

42 

 
 
 
1.2.4.  COOPERATION BETWEEN JUDICIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES 

This  recommendation  invited  Member  States  to  share  information  with  regard  to  the 
promotion  of  systematic  and  timely  cooperation  between  judicial  and  administrative 
authorities.  Fifteen  Member  States  replied  having  fully  implemented  the  recommendation41 
whereas eight replied partial implementation42. Three Member States gave a negative reply to 
this question.43 Two did not indicate any information.44 

The following Member States provided details for their reply (in summary): 

Bulgaria:  All  managing  authorities  enjoy  good  working  relations  with  law  enforcement 
agencies.  Also,  they  regularly  provide  the  judicial  authorities  with  information  concerning 
appeals  against  administrative  decisions  establishing  irregularities  or  refusing  payments  and 
monitor  the  case  law  of  Bulgarian  courts.  All  managing  authorities  are  actively  involved  in 
the  work  of  the  AFCOS  Council  together  with  the  Prosecution’s  Office,  based  on  the 
Agreement  for  interaction  and  cooperation.  The  Action  plan  of  the  National  strategy  for 
preventing  and  combating  irregularities  and  fraud  (2014-2020)  adopted  by  the  AFCOS 
Council,  includes  enhanced  cooperation  at  national  level  between  the  administrative  and 
judicial  authorities  in  charge  of  combating  irregularities  and  fraud  in  the  implementation  of 
operational programmes financed by ESIF. The Executive Agency for the Audit of EU funds 
provides prosecutions services with systematic and prompt cooperation. In 2018, it submitted 
6 final reports containing suspicions of fraud. Also, the Executive Agency 'Certification audit 
of European agricultural funds' submitted 3 final audit reports containing suspicions of fraud. 
Bulgaria  provided  very  detailed  information  about  the  good  cooperation  between  AFCOS 
Directorate and AFCOS Council with Prosecution's Office. 

Czech Republic: Cooperation between the courts and the public prosecutor's office is ensured 
through MS2014+ where all irregularities involving more than 10  000 euro of the EU share 
are reported. All irregularities reported in an external report are subsequently entered in IMS 
which  is  accessible  to  the  public  prosecutor's  office.  This  ensures  early  provision  of 
information on suspected crime related to the ESIF also to judicial authorities. In the event the 
managing authorities detect infringement of public procurement rules, it cooperates with the 
Office for the protection of competition. 

Estonia: ESI Funds managing authority has been conducting legal training for Estonian court 
judges to  clarify the legal  space of the structural funds. AFCOS  Estonia has organised joint 
regular training courses for the participants from judicial and administrative authorities since 
2007. 

Greece: Communications from the Supreme Court were sent to all prosecutors in Greece to 
monitor  cases  of  major  financial  crimes  including  fraud  against  the  EU's  financial  interests 

41  Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Ireland, Croatia, Cyprus , Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, Poland, 

Portugal, Slovakia, Finland, Sweden 

42  Germany, Estonia, Greece, Spain, Italy, Austria, Romania Slovenia 
43  Denmark, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom 
44  Belgium, France 

43 

 
                                                 
with  the  aim  of  establishing  a  monitoring  procedure  and  setting  up  a  reliable  data  archive 
every four months.  

Spain: The dispersion from the administrative side has been reduced, as AFCOS has tried to 
centralise cooperation being the focal  point for administrative authorities to  coordinate their 
activities  with  judicial  authorities.  Also,  managing  authorities  include  in  their  training  for 
intermediate bodies the duty to submit to the judicial authorities any irregularity which they 
consider  to  be  fraudulent.  Highlighted  the  initiative  to  create  the  "Advisory  Council  for  the 
prevention  and  fight  against  fraud  affecting  the  EU's  financial  interests"  to  be  finalised  in 
2019. This organ aims to formalise the AFCOS network and will be of crucial importance for 
promoting a systematic cooperation between the administrative and judicial authorities. 

Croatia:  the  Ministry  of  Regional  Development  and  EU  funds:  Managing  Authorities 
cooperation with  all national  bodies in  the fight  against irregularities and fraud. Agency  for 
Payments in Agriculture, Fisheries and Rural Development: provides relevant information to 
judicial authorities upon their requests in duly matter gives their statements upon requests of 
the State Attorney's Office, on the civil actions of beneficiaries against the Republic or paying 
agency and maintains good cooperation with State Attorney's Office. The Legal Service in the 
paying  agency  monitors  and  participates  in  the  civil  and/or  administrative  proceedings  on 
relevant  courts  which  results  in  claims  against  the  Republic  or  the  paying  agency  being 
rejected or dismissed. 

Italy:  The  cooperation  between  administrative  authorities  is  mandated  by  Italian  law.  Italy 
noted  that  Italian  judicial  authorities  are  independent  from  the  Civil  Service;  moreover, 
proceedings will often be classified. 

Cyprus: Enhanced cooperation between judicial and administrative authorities exists in cases 
of detected irregularities which may  result to  a suspicion  of fraud or established fraud. Any 
other  type  is  handled  within  administrative  authorities.  The  Legal  department  of  the 
Government (particularly MOKAS) is involved in the AFCOS composition. 

Latvia  consistently  organises  seminars  and  working  parties  for  institutions  involved  in 
administration  of  EU  financial  interests  and  investigative  bodies  (gave  examples  in  2018). 
Also,  referred  to  the  competition  council  enhanced  cooperation  with  other  judicial  and 
administrative authorities during enforcement and cartel investigation activities. 

Lithuania:  Law  amended  to  provide  access  for  tax  authorities  to  anti-money  laundering 
information. 

Luxembourg:  systematic  cooperation  and  in  conformity  with  the  legal  and  regulatory 
framework.  AFCOS,  despite  not  having  any  investigative  power,  furthers  such  cooperation 
amongst national authorities and between national authorities and OLAF. 

Hungary:  training provided by the Prime Minister's  Office on the relevance of competition 
policy and regularity of public procurement when implementing EU funds.  

Malta: the judiciary gradually enhances cooperation with other authorities as part of the remit 
to  combat  fraud.  The  Funds  and  Programmes  Division  submits  all  irregularities  detected  to 
the  AFCOS  (Malta)  in  computerised  form.  It  continued  to  seek  advice  from  the  lawyers 
within  the  Attorney  General's  Office  on  grey  areas  and  to  liaise  with  the  Department  of 

44 

 
Contracts  on  procurement  issues  and  with  the  VAT  department  on  financial  issues  falling 
within the remit of this department. 

Poland described the cooperation in 2018 between the Paying Agency, the law enforcement 
authorities  and  tax  authorities.  Poland  added  that  the  cooperation  between  judicial  and 
administrative authorities in  cohesion  policy is implemented under a cooperation agreement 
between the national public prosecutor and the minister responsible for regional development. 
Added 4 more agreements concluded in 2017-2018 between the head of the KAS and 4 other 
authorities. 

Portugal: the IFAP maintains strong links with the judicial authorities. 

Romania:  the  Ministry  of  European  Funds  reported  that  cooperation  with  judicial  and 
administrative authorities is  governed by national  legislation and mainly  consists  in  case by 
case data communications. The MA for Fisheries and Maritime affairs fully implements and 
rural  investments  financing  agency  indicated  that  the  control  and  anti-fraud  directorate 
ensures a permanent collaboration with bodies that have attributions in investigating cases of 
irregularities and suspicions of fraud. 

Slovenia  replied  that  there  is  an  institutional  cooperation  between  MA  and  the  Attorney 
General in the field of exchange of information and cooperation when the lawsuit is lodged, in 
interpretation  of  European  cohesion  policy.  The  list  of  open  cases  before  the  courts  is 
actualised  each  year.  The  link  between  judicial  and  administrative  authorities  has  to  be 
strengthened in the future, to have a seminar for court employees to comprehend the logic of 
European cohesion policy. 

Slovakia provided very detailed replies. Firstly, the function of the Central Contact Point for 
OLAF  to  coordinate  legislative,  administrative  and  operative  activities,  to  closely  cooperate 
with  the  Slovak  bodies and  institutions  engaged  in  the system  of  such  protection  –  AFCOS 
network. Several governmental authorities provided information on how and by what means 
they  cooperate  with  judicial  authorities  and  law  enforcement.  It  is  worth  noting  that  the 
Ministry of Finance Certifying Authority perceived as insufficient the cooperation among the 
managing  authorities  and  police  bodies  in  exchange  of  information  about  ongoing  criminal 
investigations in EU funded projects. 

Finland: Both the Managing Authority of the ERDF and the ESF and the intermediate bodies 
are all public authorities obliged by legislation. The administrative and criminal  legislations 
concern public servants. The exchange of information and contacts between the authorities of 
the  agriculture  funds  and  the  judicial  authorities  has  increased  as  this  has  been  highlighted 
during the training. 

Sweden replied that the eight managing authorities (some administrative some judicial) have 
regular networking meetings several times a year. They meet to discuss OLAF reporting, take 
part  in  COCOLAF  meetings  and  are  also  part  of  the  SEFI  Council  headed  by  the  Swedish 
Economic Crime Agency. 

45 

 
2. 

REPLIES OF MEMBER STATES 

2.1. 

REVENUE 

Background information 

In 2017, OLAF investigations highlighted large-scale revenue frauds through the undervaluation of goods imported in the EU. Such fraud results in huge 
losses, not only in customs duties, but also in evaded VAT. OLAF’s investigations underlined that fraudsters will exploit any loopholes and that quantity 
fraud can pay off. OLAF’s experience shows that undervaluation will remain a threat to be dealt with in the coming years. 

To close these loopholes, customs control strategies involving a combination of different controls are pivotal. The customs control strategy should strike 
the right balance between trade facilitation/simplification and the protection of the EU’s financial interests. 

BE 

1.1 UNDERVALUATION  

1.1 Are you remaining vigilant as regards the risk of undervaluation of goods? 
☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
Following the report on the TOR audit on undervaluation in April 2018, a national approach was developed for controls for release for Chapters 
61  to  64  having  China  as  country  of  origin.  To  this  end,  five  selection  profiles  (SPS  fiches)  were  created,  depending  on  the  degree  of 
undervaluation (<10 %, between 10 and 20 %, between 20 and 30 %, between 30 and 40 %, and between 40 and 50 %). The selections are based 
on the fair prices that we found in Theseus. In the new selection engine (Seda 2.0 – active since June 2018), extra information can be added to the 
available fields of the declaration. That information can be used as a selection criterion with the aim of more effective selection. The necessary 
steps are being taken to use the information regarding the average price in this way so that it can easily be used in the selection lines. 
In addition, the RIFs relating to textiles and footwear originating from China are followed up in a separate SPS fiche. Here, too, we are preparing 
to use the fair prices as an extra field in the selection lines. 

46 

 
 
 
 
If  YES  or  YES,  PARTLY,  are  you  targeting  in  particular  cheap  products  imported  in  extremely  large  quantities,  such  as  textiles  and 
footwear? 
☒YES, specifically those goods 

1.2 ENHANCEMENT OF CUSTOMS CONTROL 

1.2.a Do you have strategies in place that target all types of customs procedure including simplified procedures and all operators taking 
into account AEOs and other large businesses considered compliant? 
YES, partly implementing the recommendation. 
Since the new selection engine ‘Seda 2.0’ was implemented on 20 June 2018, we have been applying an automated deselection logic on the basis 
of  the  status  and  profile  of  the  operator  and  we  use  more  information  in  our  selection  profiles  so  that  we  make  a  more  targeted  selection 
(particularly when applying a selection percentage). 
The main objective of automated deselection is to increase the hit rate and reduce the duplication of identical compliance checks, by reducing the 
‘false positives’, with the result that there are also fewer selections which have to be manually refined. 
Automated deselection takes place chiefly in two phases (status and profile): 
a) 
Operators  with  the  AEO  status  or  the  MGO  (medium-sized  operator)  status  can  be  automatically  deselected.  Within  the  AEO  status,  we 
distinguish between three types of AEO (see reply to Question 1b). The MGO status is explained in Question 1c. 
It concerns a random deselection in accordance with the selection percentage proposed. 
b) 
The profile is made up of compliance (determined on the basis of checks prior to release), conduct in relation to declarations, and the findings in 
checks other than these prior to release (e.g. audits, investigations). It involves cumulative criteria, meaning that they must all be met in order to 
be eligible for deselection. It follows from the above that a large compliant operator with a constant supply of goods will be more likely to be 
deselected than an operator with few consignments. 
As regards compliance, we look at whether the operator has traded compliantly during the last three months, taking into account the compliance 

Deselection on the basis of the operator’s status: 

The operator profile: 

47 

 
 
 
 
percentage,  the  number  of  (non-)  compliant  items/MRNs  and  the  date  of  the  last  check.  Compliance  is  recalculated  every  night  and  the  three-
month time period also shifts forward so that the most up-to-date situation is taken into account. 
As regards conduct in relation to declarations, we look at whether or not the operator made other similar shipments in the last year and whether 
this type of shipment is substantial enough to be considered as normal. 
Since the criteria are cumulative, a flow of goods that deviates from the norm in the case of a compliant operator will therefore not be deselected. 
These phases run consecutively, i.e. an AEO can enjoy the benefits on the basis of profile, in addition to the benefits on the basis of status. 
However, which deselection phases are run consecutively is determined by selection profile. It is therefore possible not to  apply deselection for 
certain selection profiles or to apply deselection only on the basis of the status or profile. For instance, no automated deselection is applied for 
random selections or selections on the basis of AM messages. 
The system described above is made possible by the quantity of information added to the declaration before it is assessed for the selection profiles. 
This  also  allows  for  this  extra  information  (enhancements)  to  be  used  in  the  selection  profiles  themselves  to  make  the  selection  even  more 
targeted. We use it in two ways: 
making fewer and more targeted selections by using one or more of the enhancements; 
- 
- 
reducing the application of a selection percentage but making a targeted selection of riskier categories. Example: targeting  operators who 
have not been checked in a long time or who display low compliance. Under standard use of a selection percentage, such operators would not be 
regularly selected, but using this targeted approach, this is not the case. These categories are assessed and adjusted periodically. 
1.2.b Did you ensure proper coordination among customs services dealing with risk analysis and controls (central, regional, local services 
involved in risk analysis and release and post-release departments)?  
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
Pre-release controls: 
The SPS fiches provide the means of communication between the risk management department and the first-line control services. Over the course 
of  2018,  greater  attention  was  given  to  providing  a  clear  description  of  the  reason  for  selection.  A  new  work  method  was  also  developed  for 
checking undervaluation, which is referred to in the SPS fiche. Post-release controls/audit: The proposed items for the controls and audits are in 
part submitted by the risk management department. The proposed items for 2019 are explained in fiches that are available by topic to the control 
departments. The risk management department also presented it to the departments concerned. 

48 

 
 
1.2.c Do risk profiles specifically target traditional own resources and provide clear instructions with regard to the type of control to be 
carried out and risk guidance to the customs release officers? Is risk information shared with other Member States and feedback on the 
response to this information provided in the EU customs risk management system?  
YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
See also Question 1.2.b 
Since the end of 2018, the tax risk management team has been organised in accordance with the Decision on Financial Risk Criteria (Commission 
Implementing Decision C(2018) 3293), making it possible to better target the traditional own resources. 
Significant findings within all risk areas are reported in the CRMS system. 
1.2.d Is there close monitoring of the controls results (feedback) which  is done in a structured manner to allow effective follow-up and 
strict implementation of mutual assistance instructions in place? 
YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
The feedback for pre-release controls, which is automated, is taken into account by the SEDA 2.0 selection engine (see also Question 1.2.a). 
The  feedback  for  post-release  controls  is  not  automated  and  is  less  structured,  however,  it  is  included  in  the  development  of  the  data  mining 
models. 
1.3 OTHER MEASURES 

1.3.a Do you systematically include an automated random element and take into consideration the time-barring three-year period for the 
communication of customs debt as a risk indicator in the post-release risk analysis? 
YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
In order to draw up the proposed items for the post-release controls, we go back 2.5 years to allow sufficient time to carry out the checks within 
the deadline set. Risk management does not assign ‘random’ items for post-release controls. 
1.3.b Do you ensure risk-oriented post-release audits which cover the operator's systems where this is necessary, apply a random element, 
guide  the  auditors  and  take  due  account  of  the  results  of  the  pre-authorisation  stage  and  of  specific  standardised  checklists?  Are  the 
results strictly monitored? 
NO 

49 

 
 
 
BG 

The proposed items for the post-release audits are in part supplied by the risk management department and are therefore risk-oriented, not random. 
1.3.c  Are  customs  controls  on  operations  made  by  authorised  economic  operators  (AEO)  carried  out  taking  account  of  the  risk 
management performed with respect to the different elements of these operations? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
On  the  basis  of  the  risk  assessment  in  granting  or  reassessing  an  AEO  permit,  a  selection  percentage  is  awarded  that  is  used  in  the  selection 
process within the SEDA 2.0 selection engine. 
1.3.d Do national  competent authorities  make  full  use of the handbook on operational  customs  controls  based on Member States’ best 
practices and of the Customs audit guide? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
1.1 UNDERVALUATION  
1.1 Are you remaining vigilant as regards the risk of undervaluation of goods? 
☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
If  YES  or  YES,  PARTLY,  are  you  targeting  in  particular  cheap  products  imported  in  extremely  large  quantities,  such  as  textiles  and 
footwear? 
☒YES, specifically those goods 
Protecting the EU’s financial interests is one of the Customs Agency’s main tasks. In order to prevent attempts to diminish the EU budget and to 
avoid  revenue losses, serious measures are needed to  improve the collection of  import duties as  a traditional  own  resource of the EU. In this 
context, coordinated control actions by customs authorities are needed to counter attempted fraud involving under-invoicing. As regards the risk 
of undervaluation of goods, the administration has created risk profiles focused on checking the declared customs value against specific goods 
(clothing and footwear) under procedures 40 and 42, country of origin, TR, VN and CN. Risk profiles have been created for certain companies, 
with particular attention being paid during checks to the declared customs value. 

1.2 ENHANCEMENT OF CUSTOMS CONTROLS 
To fulfil this obligation in the Customs Agency’s draft annual plan for 2019 and to achieve the objective 2. ‘Increasing State budget revenue by 
effectively preventing and combating customs, currency and excise infringements’, in particular Measure 2.2. ‘Preventing opportunities to evade 
and  avoid  taxes  and  charges  by  improving  legislation,  implementing  more  effective  control,  strengthening  inter-institutional  cooperation  and 

50 

 
 
 
coordination  and  exchanging  information  effectively’,  the  Directorate  for  Customs  Activities  and  Methodology  has  proposed  including  the 
following new tasks in the draft: 
1.  Reinforced  checks  on  goods  being  released  for  free  circulation,  the  documents  accompanying  them,  including  additional  documents  where 
necessary,  checks  on  goods  and  taking  samples  for  analysis,  with  a  view  to  establishing  the  accuracy  of  the  data  declared,  in  particular  the 
taxation elements in the customs declarations accepted, without prejudice to the application of provisions on administrative penalties; 
2. Carrying out documentary checks on the customs declarations accepted, the documents accompanying them, requiring additional documents 
where appropriate, checking goods and taking samples for analysis or detailed examination in the case of products of CN Chapters 61, 62, 63 and 
64 of the EU from China; 
3. Using international cooperation to send invoices used to under-declare customs value for checks; 
4. Tightening  checks  on goods that constitute a potential threat as regards the evasion of  anti-dumping and/or countervailing  duties. Creating 
indicators for the purposes of risk analysis; 
5. The task of establishing unified practice when determining the elements of taxation (tariff classification, origin of goods and customs value) 
and applying customs exemptions has also been included. 
1.2.a Do you have strategies in place that target all types of customs procedure including simplified procedures and all operators taking 
into account AEOs and other large businesses considered compliant? 
☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
A report has been drawn up on the risk of the  under-declaration of the customs value of goods, clothing and footwear. Risk profiles are being 
prepared for certain CN codes (CN Chapters 61, 62, 63, 64) and risk thresholds will be indicated; New functionalities are being created for the 
purposes  of  integrating  financial  risk  profiles  approved  by  European  Commission  decisions.  The  profiles  will  be  available  for  use  after  the 
publication of guidelines for their integration into national systems; A random selection is being made on the basis of the profiles; 
The release for free circulation of goods is being analysed at regular intervals and risk profiles are being created with a particular focus: tariff 
classification, customs value, country of origin, etc.; Reports are being prepared on the control equipment available and recommendations are 
made with regard to the availability of new resources; 
1.2.b Did you ensure proper coordination among customs services dealing with risk analysis and controls (central, regional, local services 
involved in risk analysis and release and post-release departments)?  

51 

 
 
YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
Proper coordination has been ensured between all customs units responsible for handling the risk profiles produced and performing the checks 
required in their operation. Proper coordination has also been ensured between the Customs Agency and other government structures carrying 
out checks on goods released for free circulation: the National Revenue Agency (NAP), the State Agency for National Security  (DANS) and the 
Directorate General for Combating Organised Crime (GDBOP). 
1.2.c Do risk profiles specifically target traditional own resources and provide clear instructions with regard to the type of control to be 
carried out and risk guidance to the customs release officers? Is risk information shared with other Member States and feedback on the 
response to this information provided in the EU customs risk management system?  
YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
The risk profiles are in  particular aimed at  preventing the loss of  traditional  own  resources, focusing mainly on checking for  the wrong tariff 
classification, checking the customs value actually declared, verifying the country of origin, and checking that anti-dumping and countervailing 
duties have not been avoided. The actions to be taken in profiling are clear and described in detail. The instructions in the profiles are specific to 
the actions to be taken. Where necessary, further coordination takes place between different units. Where irregularities are detected in respect of 
the above criteria, the information is shared with the other Member States, but only with regard to major seizures or infringements. We currently 
lack the human resources needed to be able to disseminate this information as effectively as we would like.  With regard to information shared by 
other Member States belonging to the RIF system, it is processed in full, feedback is sent to the originator of a message and, where necessary, 
there are further contacts to clarify specific details or other additional information. 
1.2.d Is there close monitoring of the controls results (feedback) which is done in a structured manner to allow effective follow-up and 
strict implementation of mutual assistance instructions in place? 
YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
Checks based on the risk profiles produced are carried out at regular intervals and, if necessary, additional information is  requested or a post-
release control carried out. 

1.3 OTHER MEASURES 
1.3.a Do you systematically include an automated random element and take into consideration the time-barring three-year period for the 

52 

 
 
 
communication of customs debt as a risk indicator in the post-release risk analysis? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
The  annual  selection  of  economic  operators  to  be  checked  is  made  using  an  automated  process  in  which  5 %  of  checks  are  carried  out  on 
operators selected at random. 
1.3.b Do you ensure risk-oriented post-release audits which cover the operator's systems where this is necessary, apply a random element, 
guide  the  auditors  and  take  due  account  of  the  results  of  the  pre-authorisation  stage  and  of  specific  standardised  checklists?  Are  the 
results strictly monitored? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
Risk-oriented  audits  under  Article  48  of  Regulation  (EU)  No  952/2013  of  the  European Parliament  and  of  the  Council  (UCC)  are  carried  out 
using an automated process for selecting economic operators on the basis of data in customs declarations for a period of 3 years. 5 % of the total 
number of planned checks is selected at random. Further to the findings of post-release control, the import duties and taxes assessed and other 
State receivables are entered in the accounts. Administrative proceedings are initiated when infringements are established. 
1.3.c  Are  customs  controls  on  operations  made  by  authorised  economic  operators  (AEO)  carried  out  taking  account  of  the  risk 
management performed with respect to the different elements of these operations? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
Automated risk analysis is conducted for all operations, regardless of the role of economic operators in the supply chain. 
1.3.d Do national  competent authorities  make  full  use of the handbook on operational  customs  controls  based on Member States’ best 
practices and of the Customs audit guide? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
The Customs Audit Guide is used when performing post-release control under Article 48 UCC. 
1.1 UNDERVALUATION  
1.1 Are you remaining vigilant as regards the risk of undervaluation of goods? 
☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
If  YES  or  YES,  PARTLY,  are  you  targeting  in  particular  cheap  products  imported  in  extremely  large  quantities,  such  as  textiles  and 
footwear? 

CZ 

53 

 
 
☒YES, specifically those goods 
In 2018, these strict measures were applied and are still being applied: 
A) 
Custom Value Control Strategy in the Czech Republic 
Director General Order No. 14/2012 Measures on imports of specific textiles and footwear (This Order repealed and replaced Director General 
Order No. 77/2008) 
Director General Order No. 14/2012 Measures on imports of specific (i.e. subject to taxes and duties) textiles and footwear came into effect on 12 
March  2012.  This  order  describes  individual  steps  to  be  taken  by  customs  offices  in  case  of  a  suspicion  of  undervalued  goods  import  from 
Southeast Asia. The order defines a procedure following automatically generated risk profiles based on threshold values; these indicate that there 
is available information on similar goods imports proving a higher than the declared customs value.  
Article 1 of Director General Order No. 14/2012 is based on the following principle: If there are reasonable doubts based on analytical tools, the 
documents submitted by the declarant shall be verified by means of international administrative assistance based on the Agreement between the 
European Community and the Government  of  the People´s  Republic of China  on cooperation and mutual  administrative assistance in customs 
matters (OJ L 375, 3 December 2004) or based on agreements on cooperation and mutual assistance with other states. All document checks are 
performed within the proceedings on the rejection and determination of declared customs value, which is commenced upon the activation of the 
respective risk profile. Director General Order No. 14/2012 is binding for all customs offices in the Czech Republic.  Electronic risk profiles are 
defined  for  goods  in  chapters  42,  52,  54,  55,  56,  58,  59,  60,  61,  62,  63,  64  and  65  of  the  Common  Customs  Tariff.  (The  list  of  individual 
subheadings  newly  contains  these  as  of  1  July  2014,  when  based  on  an  analysis  of  specific  goods  in  chapters  61,  62,  63  and  64  the  list  also 
contains  goods  from  other  chapters.)  The  Amendment  to  Director  General  Order  No.  14/2012,  i.e.  Director  General  Order  No.  16/2015 
(Measures on imports of specific textiles and footwear) and the initiative preceding this amendment A meeting of V4 (Visegrád Four) countries on 
the goods undervaluation took place in  Prague in March and  April 2015 based on an initiative by the Czech Republic, its objective being  the 
unification of methodology for risk thresholds for the checks of imported textiles and footwear in the V4 countries. The use of OLAF AREP AFIS-
AMT tool was agreed on; this tool was examined from the analytical and legal perspective. The V4 countries identified the shortcomings of AREP 
AFIS-AMT and sent the results to OLAF in April 2015. In the light of the outputs of the Prague meeting as well as of the recommendation by 
OLAF, another V4 meeting was held in Budapest in June 2015. During these meetings, the Trencin Declaration of the V4 customs administrations 
was prepared in relation to the introduction of risk profiles with respect to textiles and footwear imported from Asian countries. Risk profiles were 
defined, the thresholds of which were based on the OLAF AREP AFIS-AMT tool. The Czech Republic is an active member of the OLAF UWG 
(Undervaluation Working Group), where the Czech delegate informed OLAF about the declaration in September 2015. The Trencin Declaration 
came  into  force  on  1  Jan.  2016  and  in  this  respect  the  Director  General  Order  No.  14/2012  was  amended  by  Director  General  Order  No. 

54 

 
 
116/2015 in the Czech Republic. The risk thresholds were defined to reflect OLAF AREP AFIS-AMT tools. Director General Order No. 116/2015 
is binding for all customs offices in the Czech Republic. 
Methodological information No. 13/2016 Customs Valuation: 
Comprehensive  methodological  information  No.  13/2016  Customs  Valuation  effective  as  of  1  May  2016  has  replaced  Internal  Regulation  No. 
11/2004 Customs Valuation. The Regulation has been amended mainly with respect to Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 9 October 2013 laying down the Union Customs Code. The methodology provides for customs valuation, including indices 
and procedures related to doubts of a customs office related to the declared customs value. This methodology applies to all goods listed in the 
Customs Tariff and to all customs offices in the Czech Republic. Methodological information No. 26/2017 Measures on imports of specific textiles 
and footwear and further specific products (further amendment to Order No. 14/2012) On 2 June 2016 Methodological information No. 26/2017 
Measures on imports of specific textiles and footwear and further  specific products,  which has replaced General  Director  Order No. 14/2012, 
came into effect, further stipulating and defining the checks and procedures of customs offices.   In line with the methodological information, if 
there are reasonable doubts based on analytical tools, the documents shall be checked by means of international administrative assistance based 
on  the  Agreement  between  the  European  Community  and  the  Government  of  the  People´s  Republic  of  China  cooperation  and  mutual 
administrative assistance in customs matters (OJ L 375, 3 December 2004) or based on agreements on cooperation and mutual assistance with 
other states. All document checks are performed within the proceedings on the rejection and determination of declared customs value, which is 
commenced upon the activation of the respective risk profile. Director General Order No. 14/2012 is binding for all customs offices in the Czech 
Republic.  Electronic risk profiles are defined for goods in chapters 42, 52, 54, 55, 56, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64 and 65 of the Common Customs 
Tariff. This methodology applies to all customs offices in the Czech Republic. 
B) 
The basic tool for checking customs values is OLAF AREP AFIS-AMT providing for 120 subheadings from chapters 61, 62 and 64 of the Customs 
Tariff, which were also provided for by the Trencin Declaration of V4 customs administrations in relation to the introduction of risk profiles for 
textiles and footwear imported from Asian  countries. Subheadings to  which the threshold  values  are applied in  the Czech Republic and which 
exceed the scope of the Trencin Declaration. It is to point out that the Czech Republic broadened the scope of 120 headings covered by the V4 
Trencin Declaration and applies the procedures of the Declaration to goods from chapters 42, 52, 54, 55, 56, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64 and 65 
too. For the above chapters, the threshold values for the risk profile activation are calculated as at least 50% of the calculated EU fair prices 
based on the source data by OLAF AREP AFIS-AMT. If the declared value equals or is lower than this threshold a risk profile is activated and all 
customs offices in the Czech Republic are obliged to follow the procedure stipulated by Methodological information No. 26/2017 Measures on 
imports of specific textiles and footwear and further specific products.  The above procedure is in accordance with the national system to check 

Threshold Value Systems 

55 

 
 
the  declared  value  applied  as  of  12  March  2012.  As  of  1  Jan.  2016,  risk  thresholds  were  brought  into  line  with  the  OLAF  AREP  AFIS-AMT 
threshold values, which were also used within JCO SNAKE in 2014. The access to the AMT fair price database was for the Czech Rep. allowed in 
2015.  
National System for Threshold Value Determination: 
Thresholds  in  the  national  system  are  determined  as  follows:  The  declared  customs  value  (it´s  unit  price)  in  the  SAD  (single  administrative 
document) is  compared with the unit price of the cleared customs decision for the last 90 days, which represents the middle value of declared 
import unit prices. The middle value is cleared of extreme values and is calculated from the data on goods imported to the Czech Republic in the 
period of 3 months prior to the goods import to the Czech Republic in line with trade practice and market conditions. (By 31 Dec. 2017 the goods 
imports to the EU were reflected, where the data source was Eurostat. Since fair prices from OLAF AREP AFIS-AMT are included in the whole 
process,  the data  from Eurostat  are no longer used because AREP AFIS-AMT has fully replaced these.) The middle value (median) is  thus  an 
objective criterion, since it is the middle value generated from the imports of similar goods to the Czech Republic in the respective period. If the 
decision uses the term  middle value, then it refers  to  the middle value  (median) of  unit prices of  goods imported to  the  Czech Republic in  the 
above period of 3 months. The term middle value (median) is well-known, i.e. the value separating the higher half from the lower half of a data 
sample.    The  national  median  calculation  is  based  on  the  following:  For  the  calculation  only  data  related  to  the  goods  released  for  free 
circulation (domestic consumption) are used, where the customs value was determined by the means of transfer value in accordance with Art. 70 
Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 October 2013 laying down the Union Customs Code. Data on 
air  and  post  shipments  are  not  included  in  the  generated  data  and  in  case  of  other  means  of  transport  the  shipments  under  100  kg  are  not 
included. With regards to the above declared items of the single administrative document the cases with pending procedure on the questioning of 
declared customs value are not included. To the above acts is to add that in case of a lawsuit against this national system the courts accepted it in 
favour of the customs administration. The courts saw the use of the middle value (median) as appropriate and objective. It is not right to decide 
based  on  the  highest  declared  customs  values  to  the  detriment  of  the  declarant  (plaintiff).  It  is  also  not  right  to  decide  based  on  the  lowest 
declared customs values in favour of the declarant (plaintiff).  
C) 
Confirmation that national measures are appropriate 
Court procedures in the Czech Republic  It was  confirmed by the following judgments  that national  measures against  the undervaluation  were 
correct as to the procedural and substantive requirements:   
• 
(the judgment was presented to the representatives of OLAF during the meeting on 26 July 2018)  
• 

Judgment of the national regional court in Plzeň 57 Af 1/2016-43 - an accusation against the entire system of questioning customs values 

Judgment of the national regional court in Hradec Králové 52 Af  39/2016  

56 

 
 
Judgment of the national regional court in Ústí nad Labem 15 Af 115/2015 from 22 August 2018 established obligation of importer to duly 

• 
prove price actually paid.  
The  customs  valuation  procedure  was  in  three  cases  supported  by  the  national  courts  and  measures  taken  can  be  applied  in  the  future 
successfully.  In  the  Czech  Republic  has  been  developed  system  of  customs  valuation  procedure  in  line  with  binding  customs  legislation  and 
international  agreements.  With  regard  to  this  legitimate  approach,  the  valuation  procedure  is  supported  by  national  courts  and  it  is  a  crucial 
point for future work in the field of fight against undervaluation. 

1.2 ENHANCEMENT OF CUSTOMS CONTROLS 
1.2.a Do you have strategies in place that target all types of customs procedure including simplified procedures and  all operators taking 
into account AEOs and other large businesses considered compliant? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
1.2.b Did you ensure proper coordination among customs services dealing with risk analysis and controls (central, regional, local services 
involved in risk analysis and release and post-release departments)?  
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
Coordination of activities takes place at two levels. The first level is nationwide and here there is the cooperation of the  unit 605 Customs and 
International Analysis of the department 60 with the units of the department 2; and the second level is regional, at the level of customs offices 
where there cooperate the dept. 02 Analysis and Information Support of customs offices with department Customs and Controls of the customs 
offices.  Coordination  and  cooperation  takes  place  through  direct  and  day-to-day  contact  between  the  staff  of  individual departments  and  also 
through planned meetings of these departments. At the regional level, the analytical units process, based on a request of departments dealing with 
post-clearance controls, some analysis, incentives or background material for the preparatory phase of the controls. Within the customs office, 
there are information transferred between the units which release the goods and the ones who realise the post-clearance controls. These include, 
for example, handing over of incentives to carry out the control. At the central level, the analysis department also ensures the functionality of the 
risk analysis application that is used in the preparatory phase of the post-clearance controls. It serves both for the central and the regional units 
of post-clearance controls. From the results of the carried out post-clearance controls there is processed a bulletin once in three months, which 
lists the confirmed risks. This bulletin is used on the regional level by the units of post-clearance controls, of analysis and also of the units which 

57 

 
 
 
release  the  goods.  If  one  regional  unit  of  post-clearance  control  identifies  and  checks  some  possible  risk  during  a  control,  for  example 
misclassification, such risk is via the central level of post-clearance control transferred via the bulletin to other regional units of post-clearance 
control, unit which release the goods or analysis units. 
1.2.c Do risk profiles specifically target traditional own resources and provide clear instructions with regard to the type of control to be 
carried out and risk guidance to the customs release officers? Is risk information shared with other Member States and feedback on the 
response to this information provided in the EU customs risk management system?  
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
Risk profiles are connected with risk analysis on import or export of risk commodities; they contain specific control instructions for the officers of 
customs  office.  This  procedure  is  also  applied  in  the  context  of  cases  coordinated  by  OLAF  so  called  AM  messages.  Information  on  newly 
identified risks is shared with other Member States by registration of such risks into the system RIF. The risks registered in the system RIF are 
evaluated regularly, and processed into the national systems of risk analysis. 
1.2.d Is there close monitoring of the controls results (feedback) which is done in a structured manner to allow effective follow-up and 
strict implementation of mutual assistance instructions in place? 
YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
From the point of view of non-tariff measures, the control and evaluation of the activation of the risk profiles in force are carried out. The results 
of controls are recorded by the customs offices into electronic records. Methodological unit of post-clearance controls evaluates the results from 
post-clearance  controls  which  were  carried  out.  Apart  from  assessment  of  the  individual  risk  towards  other  subjects,  the  results  from  post-
clearance controls are used also for internal training activities with the aim to improve the procedures. The results of the post-clearance audits 
(also the conditions of the permit are checked) are transmitted to the relevant departments, which use them for example for re-assessment of the 
conditions. The results of the post-clearance controls are also regularly evaluated, for example in 2018 there were finished 449 post-clearance 
controls, from which almost 87 % identified breaching of regulations.  
1.3 OTHER MEASURES 
1.3.a Do you systematically include an automated random element and take into consideration the time-barring three-year period for the 
communication of customs debt as a risk indicator in the post-release risk analysis? 
YES, partly implementing the recommendation 

58 

 
 
Within  post-clearance  controls  the  automated  random  element  is  not  included.  Before  the  post-clearance  controls  are  carried  out  there  is  the 
preparation phase within which the risk is identified in relation to the particular customs declaration resp. a specific subject. This is a situation 
where the risk is identified and the subjects are sought, or the other way round, the subject is identified  and the risk is sought, which would be 
subsequently verified. The choice of subjects and risks is carried out both at the customs offices and at the methodical unit. If the risk is identified 
by the methodological unit, such information is transferred to customs offices as an incentive to  carry out the control or as so called thematic 
focus.  If  a  new  risk  is  identified  and  confirmed  at  the  customs  office  (verified  within  the  control),  it  is  subsequently  evaluated  by  the 
methodological unit in relation with other subjects. Then, within the preparatory phase, there is used the application for risk assessment (AVR). 
This application identifies risks at an individual subject, and the risks are possible to be verified within the control, for example in relation to 
tariff classification or the customs value. The time limit for notification on customs debt is one of the piece of data which are taken into account 
within the preparatory phase, in relation to the fact whether it is possible to carry out the post-clearance control and notify about the customs 
debt  within  the  set  time  limit.  Within  methodological  unit  the  length  of  how  long  a  post-clearance  control  lasts  evaluated  twice  a  year,  with 
respect to the 3 years' time limit for the notification of customs debt. 
1.3.b Do you ensure risk-oriented post-release audits which cover the operator's systems where this is necessary, apply a random element, 
guide  the  auditors  and  take  due  account  of  the  results  of  the  pre-authorisation  stage  and  of  specific  standardised  checklists?  Are  the 
results strictly monitored? 
YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
Yes,  we  provide  post-clearance  audits  concentrated  on  declarant  systems.  The  random  element  is  not  applied;  post-clearance  audits  are 
preferably  performed  at  those  subjects  where  the  risks  are  identified.  Within  post-clearance  audits,  among  other  things,  there  are  taken  into 
account the results of audits before the permission was granted, and whether the conditions are still met. During the post-clearance audits the 
control lists are used. The results of post-clearance audits carried out are transferred to the relevant departments for further use, for example re-
assessment  of  conditions.  The  results  of  carried  out  post-clearance  audits  are  evaluated  by  the  methodological  unit  and  then  used  in  internal 
training to improve the performance of further audits.   
1.3.c  Are  customs  controls  on  operations  made  by  authorised  economic  operators  (AEO)  carried  out  taking  account  of  the  risk 
management performed with respect to the different elements of these operations? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

59 

 
 
1.3.d Do national  competent authorities  make  full  use of the handbook on operational  customs  controls  based on Member States’ best 
practices and of the Customs audit guide? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
1.1 UNDERVALUATION  

DK 

1.1 Are you remaining vigilant as regards the risk of undervaluation of goods? 
☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
The Danish Customs Authority: In 2018, the inspection topic of under-invoicing generally continued to be an important and prominent focus area 
for  the  Danish  Customs  Authority,  which  must  be  able  to  match  and  optimise  analysis  methods/tools  in  relation  to  risk  information  on 
irregularities  and  patterns  of  fraud  received  at  any  given  time.  Thus,  data  from  a  range  of  sources  —  mainly  declaration  information  in  the 
customs system — are used in connection with risk analyses conducted by the Danish Customs Authority’s Financial Customs Analysis Unit. The 
data are analysed in the Business Intelligence (BI) and Tableau IT systems. An advantage of Tableau is its effectiveness in visually representing 
trends and irregularities in import patterns, and the fact that it is operated in cooperation with OLAF. 
If  YES  or  YES,  PARTLY,  are  you  targeting  in  particular  cheap  products  imported  in  extremely  large  quantities,  such  as  textiles  and 
footwear? 
☒YES, specifically those goods 
The Danish Customs Authority: In an attempt to prevent Denmark being used as a country of entry for goods declared at very low values, the 
Danish  Customs  Authority’s  analysis  units  have  established  risk  profiles  in  the  electronic  risk  analysis  system  in  order  to  detect 
consignments/goods with obvious signs of under-invoicing.  Risk profiles and physical checks are intended to put a stop as early as possible to 
repeated declarations of under-invoiced goods, where necessary by requesting a security as a condition for release. Profiles were created, among 
other things,  for  products under textile Chapters 61 and 62, as well as for footwear under Chapter 64 originating from China.  Precisely such 
goods were involved in the earlier cases in both Denmark and the rest of the EU.  

1.2 ENHANCEMENT OF CUSTOMS CONTROLS 
1.2.a Do you have strategies in place that target all types of customs procedure including simplified procedures and all operators taking 
into account AEOs and other large businesses considered compliant? 

60 

 
 
 
 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
The  Danish  Customs  Authority:  The  Danish  Customs  Authority  sets  priorities  for  the  annual  operation  on  the  basis  of  an  assessment  of 
materiality  and  risk,  using  the  resources  available  for  the  operation.  The  priorities  are  also  based  on  the  collection  and  management  of  the 
customs  duties  that  constitute  the  EU’s  own  resources.  The  general  aim  of  the  operational  strategy  is  to  ensure  effective  risk-based  customs 
controls designed to detect fraud and irregularities involving imports from third countries. 
1.2.b Did you ensure proper coordination among customs services dealing with risk analysis and controls (central, regional, local services 
involved in risk analysis and release and post-release departments)?  
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
The  Danish  Customs  Authority:  Risk  analysis  carried  out  in  the  Customs  Authority’s  Financial  Customs  Analysis  Unit  focused  on  the  legal 
movement of goods in respect of financial customs duties. It was agreed, among other things, that significant control results should be passed on 
by physical and post-clearance control units to the Financial Customs Analysis Unit in order to optimise future risk analyses. 
1.2.c Do risk profiles specifically target traditional own resources and provide clear instructions with regard to the type of control to be 
carried out and risk guidance to the customs release officers? Is risk information shared with other Member States and feedback on the 
response to this information provided in the EU customs risk management system?  
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
The Danish Customs Authority: The Financial Customs Analysis Unit receives risk information (RIF) on new trends concerning possible areas of 
fraud from the Commission or other EU customs authorities via the EU communication system (CRMS). The unit assesses all the RIFs. Where 
necessary,  financial  RIFs  will  lead  to  the  establishment  of  risk  profiles  in  the  import  system,  with  the  profile  indicating  clearly  which  type  of 
control is to be carried out. The Customs Authority uses the CRMS to share risk information with other Member States. 
1.2.d Is there close monitoring of the controls results (feedback) which is done in a structured manner to allow effective follow-up and 
strict implementation of mutual assistance instructions in place? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
See point 1.2.b. 
3 OTHER MEASURES 
1.3.a Do you systematically include an automated random element and take into consideration the time-barring three-year period for the 

61 

 
 
communication of customs debt as a risk indicator in the post-release risk analysis? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
The Danish Customs Authority: When carrying out controls, the Customs Authority applies a statistical element to the control selection, and also 
focuses on the three-year time-barring period. 
1.3.b Do you ensure risk-oriented post-release audits which cover the operator's systems where this is necessary, apply a random element, 
guide  the  auditors  and  take  due  account  of  the  results  of  the  pre-authorisation  stage  and  of  specific  standardised  checklists?  Are  the 
results strictly monitored? 
The Danish Customs Agency cannot answer, as the question is unclear for us. 
1.3.c  Are  customs  controls  on  operations  made  by  authorised  economic  operators  (AEO)  carried  out  taking  account  of  the  risk 
management performed with respect to the different elements of these operations? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
The  Danish  Customs  Authority:  Companies  with  AEO  authorisation  will  also  be  monitored  on the  basis  of  materiality  and  risk,  although to  a 
lesser extent on account of their AEO status. 
1.3.d Do national  competent authorities  make  full  use of the handbook on operational  customs  controls  based on Member States’ best 
practices and of the Customs audit guide? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
1.1 UNDERVALUATION  

DE 

1.1 Are you remaining vigilant as regards the risk of undervaluation of goods? 
☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
If  YES  or  YES,  PARTLY,  are  you  targeting  in  particular  cheap  products  imported  in  extremely  large  quantities,  such  as  textiles  and 
footwear? 
☒YES, specifically those goods. 

1.2 ENHANCEMENT OF CUSTOMS CONTROLS 

62 

 
 
 
 
1.2.a Do you have strategies in place that target all types of customs procedure including simplified procedures and all operators taking 
into account AEOs and other large businesses considered compliant? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
1.2.b Did you ensure proper coordination among customs services dealing with risk analysis and controls (central, regional, local services 
involved in risk analysis and release and post-release departments)?  
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
1.2.c Do risk profiles specifically target traditional own resources and provide clear instructions with regard to the type of control to be 
carried out and risk guidance to the customs release officers? Is risk information shared with other Member States and feedback on the 
response to this information provided in the EU customs risk management system?  
☐YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
1.2.d Is there close monitoring of the controls results (feedback) which is done in a structured manner to allow effective follow-up and 
strict implementation of mutual assistance instructions in place? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation  

1.3 OTHER MEASURES 
1.3.a Do you systematically include an automated random element and take into consideration the time-barring three-year period for the 
communication of customs debt as a risk indicator in the post-release risk analysis? 
YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
1.3.b Do you ensure risk-oriented post-release audits which cover the operator's systems where this is necessary, apply a random element, 
guide  the  auditors  and  take  due  account  of  the  results  of  the  pre-authorisation  stage  and  of  specific  standardised  checklists?  Are  the 
results strictly monitored? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
1.3.c  Are  customs  controls  on  operations  made  by  authorised  economic  operators  (AEO)  carried  out  taking  account  of  the  risk 
management performed with respect to the different elements of these operations? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

63 

 
 
 
1.3.d Do national  competent authorities  make  full  use of the handbook on operational  customs  controls  based on Member States’ best 
practices and of the Customs audit guide? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
1.1 UNDERVALUATION  

EE 

1.1 Are you remaining vigilant as regards the risk of undervaluation of goods? 
☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
In  2018  Estonia  paid  a  lot  of  attention  to  the  goods  the  declared  value  of  which  was  below  the  normal  value  (either  EE  internal  or  from  EU 
databases). In addition to the criteria implemented by COM and delivered via the TARIC database (measures of type 430 and 431), Estonia also 
used  many  national  criteria.  At  the  end  of  2018,  a  criterion  was  created  which  specifically  targets  the  goods  which  are  declared  significantly 
under the EU fair price. The reason for the late introduction of this criterion by EE was the outdated data of the EU database AMT (data was 2 
years old and not updated). The criterion created at the end of 2018 (taken into use in January 2019 due to technical reasons) works on the data 
of the Theseus database. 
If  YES  or  YES,  PARTLY,  are  you  targeting  in  particular  cheap  products  imported  in  extremely  large  quantities,  such  as  textiles  and 
footwear? 
☒YES, but targeting also other goods 
Estonia continues to apply all the national minimum price profiles to all goods from the nomenclature. Moreover, increased attention is paid to 
and checks are carried out on ALL the goods under COM actions 430 and 431. The new criterion introduced in 2018 takes into account all the 
goods which come from China and Vietnam belonging to Chapters 61-64, irrespective of the quantity and consignee of the goods. 

1.2 ENHANCEMENT OF CUSTOMS CONTROLS 
1.2.a Do you have strategies in place that target all types of customs procedure including simplified procedures and all operators taking 
into account AEOs and other large businesses considered compliant? 
☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
Most of attention is given to the procedures which are used to declare the goods for release into free circulation (IM40 and IM42), because the 
percentage of the other procedures is very small in Estonia. COM measure 430 applies to all procedures. The declared value of goods is checked 
to the same extent in respect of all declarants/consignees with no distinction between AEOs and non-AEOs. 

64 

 
 
 
 
1.2.b Did you ensure proper coordination among customs services dealing with risk analysis and controls (central, regional, local services 
involved in risk analysis and release and post-release departments)?  
☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
In Estonia the entire customs service is on the so-called central level. We have very close cooperation among the customs officials in the areas of 
risk  analysis  and  control  (risk  analysis  -  Intelligence  Department,  customs  control  -  Customs  control  officers  (Customs  Department)  and  tax 
auditors (Audit Department) carrying out post-clearance audit). Twice a year the so-called customs valuation round tables take place with the 
participation of the officials from the departments engaged in the field (intelligence/risk, customs control, policy, legal, post-release audit), where 
we share information, give guidance and take decisions on difficult (extraordinary) cases.  When  the Intelligence department  spots a risk, they 
consult  the  Customs  Department  (customs  value,  classification,  origin)  and  the  Tax  Audit  Department.  As  a  result  of  such  cooperation,  it  is 
decided  whether  the  declaration/goods  are  to  be  directed  to  supplementary  checks  in  the  course  of  customs  clearance  and/or  subsequent 
verification  (post-clearance  control).  Please  provide any useful  detail  to  explain the actions undertaken in 2018 and why the recommendation 
have been partially implemented or not implemented. 
1.2.c Do risk profiles specifically target traditional own resources and provide clear instructions with regard to the type of control to be 
carried out and risk guidance to the customs release officers? Is risk information shared with other Member States and feedback on the 
response to this information provided in the EU customs risk management system?  
YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
Customs checks in Estonia are focused on goods, irrespective of the incurrence and amount of duties and taxes (customs duty, VAT, excise duty) 
applicable to the goods or the status of the consignee/declarant. The relevant instructions have been made available to officials through internal 
guidelines and correspondence. In addition, an official responsible for creating a criterion also provides relevant instructions of practise (annex 
to the criterion). For example: Criterion no 9175: the criterion applies to the control of goods’ statistical value. Verification whether the goods’ 
statistical value is correctly indicated (calculated) and comparison of the goods’ declared price per kg (EUR) with the average EU price per kg. 
Please see the tables of average prices under profile 636 in the RIHO database. Please describe the control actions in the CTMS (Control Task 
Management  System)  notebook.  Taking  into  account  the  new  circumstances  revealed,  direct  the  declaration  to  the  red,  green  channel. 
Check/control even if the consignor/consignee and/or declarant is AEO. In case of further questions, contact the expert in the customs value.  RIF 
–  data  exchange  is  carried  out  systematically  between  Estonia  and  other  Member  States.  In  2018  Estonia  drew  up  63  RIFs,  one  of  them  on 

65 

 
 
undervaluation. 
1.2.d Is there close monitoring of the controls results (feedback) which is done in a structured manner to allow effective follow-up and 
strict implementation of mutual assistance instructions in place? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
The Intelligence Department and the Customs Department are regularly monitoring the efficiency of selectivity/risk criteria, and on the basis of 
monitoring  results they make a decision: either to  change or  remove a criterion,  or to  send the object  to  subsequent  verification, or apply the 
criterion to the same extent as before. 
1.3 OTHER MEASURES 
1.3.a Do you systematically include an automated random element and take into consideration the time-barring three-year period for the 
communication of customs debt as a risk indicator in the post-release risk analysis? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
Estonia carries out random checks regularly. In those cases the declarations have been selected randomly for physical check of the goods or/and 
documents. As a result of such controls in most cases no major errors (mistakes) are detected. 
1.3.b Do you ensure risk-oriented post-release audits which cover the operator's systems where this is necessary, apply a random element, 
guide  the  auditors  and  take  due  account  of  the  results  of  the  pre-authorisation  stage  and  of  specific  standardised  checklists?  Are  the 
results strictly monitored? 
YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
All the objects directed to the Tax Audit Department in 2018 had been selected on the basis of risk analysis and sent to post-clearance controls 
due  to  their  risk.  Estonian  companies  are,  in  many  cases,  relatively  small  and  therefore  the  performance  of  post-clearance  audit  (where  also 
internal control systems are audited) does not bring any additional effect. All post-clearance audits in Estonia are classified as “Other kinds of 
post-clearance controls”. As a general rule, in case of all post–clearance controls we request documentary evidence which should prove that the 
transactions  have  been  entered  into  accounts  and  corresponding  payments  have  been  made.  In  other  words,  post-clearance  controls  are  not 
limited to supplementary documents of customs declarations, accounting is checked as well. In Estonia there is a national manual for performing 
controls, called “Tax Auditor’s Operating Procedure. 
1.3.c  Are  customs  controls  on  operations  made  by  authorised  economic  operators  (AEO)  carried  out  taking  account  of  the  risk 

66 

 
 
management performed with respect to the different elements of these operations? 
YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
When  a  risk  criterion  applies,  the  declared  value  of  the  goods  is  verified,  which  is  a  uniform  procedure,  no  matter  whether  the 
declarant/consignee is AEO or not.  Accordingly, companies holding an AEO status and lodging declarations in their own name and on behalf of 
another person (debtors jointly and severally) are controlled on the same grounds as other companies. 
1.3.d Do national  competent authorities  make  full  use of the handbook on operational  customs  controls  based on Member States’ best 
practices and of the Customs audit guide? 
NO 
Estonia  has  its  own  national  guidelines  for  the  verification  of  customs  value  and  determination  of  a  new  customs  value.  Likewise,  there  is  a 
national  manual  in  Estonia  for  carrying  out  controls:  “Tax  Auditor’s  Operating  Procedure”.  Sometimes  we  use  Customs  Audit  Guide  to  get 
ideas. 
1.1 UNDERVALUATION  

IE 

1.1 Are you remaining vigilant as regards the risk of undervaluation of goods? 
☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
DG Budget expressed concern over undervaluation of products from China as to whether the EU’s customs controls protect its financial interests 
and whether the Commission and the Member States have designed robust import procedures that protect those interests.   They identified serious 
weaknesses indicating that there are shortcomings such as ineffective implementation of customs controls on imports and this  adversely affects 
the financial interests of the EU.  In this regard, and with a view to the customs audit in 2019 which will address undervaluation, Customs Risk 
Management  Unit  commenced  targeted  operations  in  2018  to  tackle  undervaluation.  A  series  of  risk  operations  were  mounted  using  the 
Automated Monitoring Tool set by OLAF as a guide to values declared.   
If  YES  or  YES,  PARTLY,  are  you  targeting  in  particular  cheap  products  imported  in  extremely  large  quantities,  such  as  textiles  and 
footwear? 
☒YES, specifically those goods 
As stated in 1.1 above, footwear and textiles were considered to be grossly undervalued coming into the EU from China.  Therefore a number of 
targeted risk operations were mounted to specifically address this issue and verify the values declared for consignments of Chapters 61 - 64. 

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1.2 ENHANCEMENT OF CUSTOMS CONTROLS 
1.2.a Do you have strategies in place that target all types of customs procedure including simplified procedures and all operators  taking 
into account AEOs and other large businesses considered compliant? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
Risk profiles are in place to target imports to safeguard the financial interests of the Union, among other interests.  One of these considered risks 
is non-compliance with customs procedures.  In this regard risk profiles regularly target import consignments for documentary checks to verify if 
importers are complying with their obligations.  AEO status is a trade facilitation measure granted on the basis that a business/entity has met 
standards in relation to safety & security, financial solvency and compliance with customs rules.  Therefore priority treatment in customs checks 
is a benefit of AEO status. Similarly simplified procedures are granted on the bases of a clean record of customs compliance.  In this regard, risk 
profiles only target a % of AEOs. 
Customs Division in Ireland have a centralised Compliance and Post Clearance Unit which oversees a national compliance and post clearance 
programme for our Customs Customer Case base, including AEO and those authorised for Simplifications. From a post clearance perspective our 
Customs  Audit  and  Post  Clearance  Check  targets  include  a  provision  that  a  specific  percentage  of  the  cases  or  declarations  chosen  must  be 
authorised traders.   
1.2.b Did you ensure proper coordination among customs services dealing with risk analysis and controls (central, regional, local services 
involved in risk analysis and release and post-release departments)?  
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
The  National  Risk  Analysis  Unit  is  a  centrally  operated  unit.    Risk  profiles  are  set  in  consultation  with  the  various  stakeholders  in  the  EU, 
Revenue and other Government Agencies to ensure protection of our EU and national borders.  These profiles are monitored for effectiveness and 
are updated according to EU Regulations or intelligence received. From a post clearance and compliance perspective Customs Division oversees 
and  coordinates  our  compliance  and  post  clearance  programs.  This  includes  support,  guidance  on  best  practice  and  advice  on  legislation. 
Customs Division also chairs a post clearance and a control officer group which consists of all our post clearance and compliance personnel and 
provides a central forum for discussing relevant issues around this aspect. 
1.2.c Do risk profiles specifically target traditional own resources and provide clear instructions with regard to the type of control to be 

68 

 
 
 
carried out and risk guidance to the customs release officers? Is risk information shared with other Member States and feedback on the 
response to this information provided in the EU customs risk management system?  
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
Risk profiles cover all aspects of customs risk, including fiscal risk.  Our categories of financial risk include origin, valuation, classification, anti-
dumping, quota & customs procedures which are considered to affect the financial budget.  Each profile is specifically designed to target any of 
the above either at the point of importation or at the trader’s premises.  Clear concise instructions are given to the control officer carrying out the 
check.  Any irregularities are addressed and if necessary shared among other Member States via our RIF system (Risk Information Forms) which 
requires feedback from each. 
1.2.d Is there close monitoring of the controls results (feedback) which is done  in a structured manner to allow effective follow-up and 
strict implementation of mutual assistance instructions in place? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
Control  results  are  regularly  monitored  and  any  irregularities  identified  which  would  constitute  infringements  are  dealt  with  locally  by  the 
control officer.  Any irregularities or fraudulent activity detected is reported to our Investigation & Prosecution Division. 

1.3 OTHER MEASURES 
1.3.a Do you systematically include an automated random element and take into consideration the time-barring three-year period for the 
communication of customs debt as a risk indicator in the post-release risk analysis? 
N/a 
1.3.b Do you ensure risk-oriented post-release audits which cover the operator's systems where this is necessary, apply a random element, 
guide  the  auditors  and  take  due  account  of  the  results  of  the  pre-authorisation  stage  and  of  specific  standardised  checklists?  Are  the 
results strictly monitored? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
Ireland’s  Customs  Division  oversees  a  national  Compliance  and  Post  Clearance  Interventions  planning  policy  in  accordance  with  identified 
priorities with relevant monitoring and controls in place, utilising available risk analysis and risk assessment tools. Our Customs post clearance 
interventions are based on risk analysis,  using automated data  processing techniques, with the purpose of  identifying  and mitigating the risks.  

69 

 
 
 
This is an overall strategy which incorporates all aspects of risks identified and/or signalled through various channels including results from pre-
authorisation stage. We have produced a national customs audit and control guide that encompasses standard checklists to assist our officers in 
carrying out their post clearance roles. We also incorporate a random element to our post clearance programme to compliment the electronic risk 
analysis  aspect.  Customs  Division  in  Ireland  work  closely  with  our  Regional  Control  Officers  and  Customs  Audit  personnel  on  all  aspects  of 
Customs  Control  to  provide  support,  advice  and  guidance.  All  our  Divisional  structures  have  responsibility  for  putting  in  place  a  risk-based 
programme  for  customs  post  clearance  controls  around  the  customs  economic  activity  taking  place  within  their  remit.  All  results  from  this 
programme are monitored closely and our rules, procedures and processes updated as required. 
1.3.c  Are  customs  controls  on  operations  made  by  authorised  economic  operators  (AEO)  carried  out  taking  account  of  the  risk 
management performed with respect to the different elements of these operations? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
A.E.O. status and their treatment by customs is set out in 1.2.a above.  AEOs are subject to the same rules and regulations as all other importers 
but do not come under the same level of customs controls as their status is based on mutual transparency, correctness, fairness and responsibility.  
However from a Compliance perspective each AEO in Ireland is monitored within the first 12 months of being granted such an authorisation and 
at least every three years after that. In addition, our compliance programme ensures that relevant information is available and assessed on an on-
going basis in order to provide early signals of any issues with such traders. 
1.3.d Do national  competent authorities  make  full  use of the handbook on operational  customs  controls  based on Member States’ best 
practices and of the Customs audit guide? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
A customs audit is the examination of accounts and business records to verify the compliance of the importer with their obligations with relevant 
legislation  and  Revenue  requirements.  Revenue  operates  a  presumption  of  honesty  that  all  customs  declarations  submitted  contain  the  correct 
information. Therefore it is necessary to validate a selection of declarations by post release checks and audit to confirm compliance. These audits 
are  conducted  in  line  with  the  EU  Customs  Audit  Guide  which  sets  out  the  requirements  of  conducting  the  audit.  From  a  Post  Clearance 
perspective  our  National  Customs  Audit  Guide  takes  primary  guidance  from  the  EU  Customs  Audit  Guide.  On  our  Compliance  side  the  EU 
guidance documents are an integral part of our control program formulation 

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EL 

1.1 UNDERVALUATION  

1.1 Are you remaining vigilant as regards the risk of undervaluation of goods? 
☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
Risks in the area of customs valuation remain high on the agenda.  Risk profiles have been created to indicate declarations for either physical or 
documentary controls. There is a systematic risk assessment and continuous feedback for risk profiling. Greece participated in the joint customs 
operations organized by OLAF. In addition, two national operations were conducted in 2018 to combat underpricing in textiles and footwear 
originating from China. 
If YES or YES, PARTLY, are you targeting in particular cheap products imported in extremely large quantities, such as textiles and 
footwear? 
☒YES, but targeting also other goods 
Apart from targeted risk profiles for particularly cheap products imported in extremely large quantities, such as textiles and footwear, in the 
context of AMs, RIFs and other information sources, risk profiles have been created in order to point out declarations for either physical or 
documentary control also for products, other than textiles and shoes, e.g. ceramics, table ware and kitchen ware etc. 
1.2 ENHANCEMENT OF CUSTOMS CONTROLS 

1.2.a Do you have strategies in place that target all types of customs procedure including simplified procedures and all operators taking 
into account AEOs and other large businesses considered compliant? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
The strategic objectives of the Independent Authority for Public Revenue and the operational objectives of the General Directorate of Customs 
and Excise Duties include the fight against tax evasion and smuggling. In this context, targets are set centrally for customs controls, for all types 
of customs procedures, for all operators, without excluding the holders of simplified procedures and AEOs.  
1.2.b Did you ensure proper coordination among customs services dealing with risk analysis and controls (central, regional, local services 
involved in risk analysis and release and post-release departments)?  
YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
An operational plan is drawn up in order to achieve the objectives set for the controls indicated and conducted on the basis of a risk analysis 

71 

 
 
 
 
(central or local) by all the above mentioned services. Measures taken to improve co-ordination and increase audit effectiveness include 
workshops and meetings on specialized control issues and information use. Coordination between the customs services involved in the risk 
analysis is adequate and constantly improving. 
1.2.c Do risk profiles specifically target traditional own resources and provide clear instructions with regard to the type of control to be 
carried out and risk guidance to the customs release officers? Is risk information shared with other Member States and feedback on the 
response to this information provided in the EU customs risk management system?  
YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
All risk profiles, including those relating to traditional own resources, refer to clear guidelines and guidance on the type of control and provide 
risk information to those responsible for control at the customs clearance stage. Risk information is shared with other Member States and 
feedback is provided to a satisfactory degree. 
1.2.d Is there close monitoring of the controls results (feedback) which is done in a structured manner to allow effective follow-up and 
strict implementation of mutual assistance instructions in place? 
YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
The full content of the instructions and guidelines provided to the Member States with the AM messages of OLAF is without any delay notified to 
all customs authorities. The results of the post clearance controls which may be conducted in compliance with the recommendations of each 
particular AM message are provided by the competent control authorities upon request. There is also the possibility to identify from the records 
kept by the Directorate of Electronic Governance of the Independent Authority for Public Revenue the results of the controls indicated by the 
activation of the risk profile/s which was/were created according to the content of the AM recommendations.  Additionally, the further stages of 
assessment and recovery of the customs debt that may be incurred, as well as the possible judicial evolution of the cases, is monitored in the 
framework of the management of the AM case files. 
1.3 OTHER MEASURES 
1.3.a Do you systematically include an automated random element and take into consideration the time-barring three-year period for the 
communication of customs debt as a risk indicator in the post-release risk analysis? 
NO 
The three-year period for the communication of the customs debt is taken into account by the competent customs authorities, when local risk 

72 

 
 
analysis is carried out. The Customs Information System is not currently designed to indicate random checks in the context of post-release risk 
analysis in an automated manner; however, the function is in the process of being redesigned. 
1.3.b Do you ensure risk-oriented post-release audits which cover the operator's systems where this is necessary, apply a random element, 
guide the auditors and take due account of the results of the pre-authorisation stage and of specific standardised checklists? Are the 
results strictly monitored? 
YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
Post release audits are carried out on the basis of a non-automated “local” risk analysis by the competent authorities. 
1.3.c Are customs controls on operations made by authorised economic operators (AEO) carried out taking account of the risk 
management performed with respect to the different elements of these operations? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
Customs controls carried out on operations made by AEO take into account risk analysis and apply on all the different elements of these 
operations. (The answer is given with caution, because of the unclear -to us- wording of the question). 
1.3.d Do national competent authorities make full use of the handbook on operational customs controls based on Member States’ best 
practices and of the Customs audit guide? 
☐NO 
A key tool for carrying out post clearance audits, according to the instructions provided, is the Customs Audit Guide which has been translated 
into Greek and is available to the competent customs authorities to assist with their audit work. 
1.1 UNDERVALUATION  

ES 

1.1 Are you remaining vigilant as regards the risk of undervaluation of goods? 
☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
Risk profiles are kept. Analyses carried out by OLAF reveal a limited incidence of the current undervaluing of imports in Spain. 
If  YES  or  YES,  PARTLY,  are  you  targeting  in  particular  cheap  products  imported  in  extremely  large  quantities,  such  as  textiles  and 
footwear? 
☒YES, specifically those goods 

73 

 
 
 
Textiles, footwear, handbags and pound shop articles are the main products affected by risk profiles. 

1.2 ENHANCEMENT OF CUSTOMS CONTROLS 

1.2.a Do you have strategies in place that target all types of customs procedure including simplified procedures and all operators taking 
into account AEOs and other large businesses considered compliant? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
Risk profiles can work on any customs procedure and on any kind of operators. 
1.2.b Did you ensure proper coordination among customs services dealing with risk analysis and controls (central, regional, local services 
involved in risk analysis and release and post-release departments)?  
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
There is a central unit that designs the risk profiles and coordinates all control activities, which are carried out at a regional level. 
1.2.c Do risk profiles specifically target traditional own resources and provide clear instructions with regard to the type of control to be 
carried out and risk guidance to the customs release officers? Is risk information shared with other Member States and feedback on the 
response to this information provided in the EU customs risk management system?  
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
There  are  clear  instructions  about  the  actions  to  perform  once  the  declaration  has  been  selected  for  its  control.  RIF  is  used  to  inform  other 
Member States; for instance, in case goods are returned to origin, if someone tried to dispatch them in another Member State. An analysis of all 
information received from other Member States is carried out. 
1.2.d Is there close monitoring of the controls results (feedback) which is done in a structured manner to allow effective follow-up and 
strict implementation of mutual assistance instructions in place? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
 The central unit performs the proper follow-up. 

1.3 OTHER MEASURES 

74 

 
 
 
 
 
1.3.a Do you systematically include an automated random element and take into consideration the time-barring three-year period for the 
communication of customs debt as a risk indicator in the post-release risk analysis? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
The expiration date is always taken into account in the risk analysis process carried out in ex-post controls. 
1.3.b Do you ensure risk-oriented post-release audits which cover the operator's systems where this is necessary, apply a random element, 
guide  the  auditors  and  take  due  account  of  the  results  of  the  pre-authorisation  stage  and  of  specific  standardised  checklists?  Are  the 
results strictly monitored? 
YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
There is not a proper index of tests to be performed in every ex-post control. On the contrary, each actuary decides how to perform the control. 
However, audits are revised by the superior, who may decide to perform additional actions. In any case, the Commission´s Guide is at disposal of 
the actuaries. Also, the company records can usually be accessed and all previous information is taken into account, including the information 
provided in the previous custom authorizations, if there were any. 
1.3.c  Are  customs  controls  on  operations  made  by  authorised  economic  operators  (AEO)  carried  out  taking  account  of  the  risk 
management performed with respect to the different elements of these operations? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
AEOs are subject to customs controls. However, they might be adapted to their risk level. 
1.3.d Do national  competent authorities  make  full  use of the handbook on operational  customs  controls  based on Member States’ best 
practices and of the Customs audit guide? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
They are available to the actuaries who perform the controls. 
1.1 UNDERVALUATION  

FR 

1.1 Are you remaining vigilant as regards the risk of undervaluation of goods? 
☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

75 

 
 
 
 
For several years, the inspection services of the DGDDI [General Directorate of Customs and Excise] has made it a priority to combat customs 
valuation fraud. The background note distributed each year to set the priorities for the following year has made tackling customs valuation fraud 
one of the key points of its inspection actions for 2018. The fight against undervaluation is therefore a priority for all the customs services. 
A  specific  instruction  was  circulated  to  the  services  in  2018  to  reinforce  the  role  played  by  checks  carried  out  at  the  time  of  clearance  in 
combating undervaluation. 
The new instruction is accompanied by several summary factsheets to facilitate the work of the inspection services. 
The factsheets cover the following points: 
– the legal basis for valuation set out in the UCC and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/2447 of 24 November 2015; 
– the performance of ex-ante checks with regard to valuation. This factsheet was prepared on the basis, in particular, of the European inspection 
guide entitled ‘Handbook on Operational Controls’; 
– the arrangements for implementing the guarantees provided for in Article 244 of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/2447 of 24  November 
2015.  This  factsheet  sets  out  the  strict  cumulative  conditions  under  which  a  guarantee  may  be  taken  (existence  of  a  strong  suspicion  of 
undervaluation,  existence  of  a  sudden,  massive  and  suspicious  flow,  the  guarantee  must  be  the  only  way  to  stop  the  flow).  These  specific 
conditions are intended to ensure that guarantees are not systematically set up at the slightest suspicion. The factsheet also indicates  alternative 
methods for determining value. 
The purpose of this factsheet is to enable the inspection services to act autonomously and respond rapidly. Guarantees have already been put in 
place successfully by the DGDDI, but each time the intervention of the General Directorate was required. 
Valuation  fraud  is  also  dealt  with  in  ex-post  checks.  This  is  because  of  the  difficulty  in  rapidly  obtaining  the  documents  needed  to  establish 
whether  the  declared  price  reflected  the  transaction  value  of  the  goods.  During  the  ex-ante  checks  the  invoice  sent  may  be  false  and  may 
correspond exactly to the very low price declared. The ex post checks also serve to identify cases of valuation fraud resulting from the failure to 
include the elements of value specified in Article 71 of the Union Customs Code (UCC). 
If  YES  or  YES,  PARTLY,  are  you  targeting  in  particular  cheap  products  imported  in  extremely  large  quantities,  such  as  textiles  and 
footwear? 
☒YES, but targeting also other goods 
These  goods  are  targeted,  but  not  these  goods  alone.  For  example,  measures  430  and  431  are  taken  into  account.  They  do  not  only  concern 
chapters 61 to 64 of the Customs Tariff. 
The  DGDDI  also  conducted  a  data-mining  experiment  in  2018  in  the  National  Risk  Analysis  and  Targeting  Department  (Service  national 
d’analyse de risque et de ciblage - SARC). The two cases of usage tested concern: 

76 

 
 
– identification of undervaluation through a statistical analysis of the value/mass ratio. The method employed is to carry out a statistical study of 
the distribution of value/mass ratios for a product. This approach makes it possible to identify atypical values that may need to be checked more 
thoroughly. Once the risk has been confirmed by the analysts, the results obtained may give rise to an ex-post check or the creation of selection 
profiles in customs clearance applications;,  
– the study of express freight fraud using a flow chart visualisation tool. The tool put in place makes it possible to observe the distribution of these 
flows  in  time,  their  distribution  in  space  (concentration  of  imports  in  specific  areas  or  even  at  specific  addresses),  and  the  links  between 
consignors/consignees/destination addresses, in order to identify atypical schemes that require ex-post checks or the creation of selection profiles. 

1.2 ENHANCEMENT OF CUSTOMS CONTROL 

1.2.a Do you have strategies in place that target all types of customs procedure including simplified procedures and all operators taking 
into account AEOs and other large businesses considered compliant? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

The  DGDDI  has  a  control  strategy  based  on  a  risk  analysis  and  the  implementation  of  three  types  of  checks,  depending  on  the  challenges 
identified: ex-ante checks are conducted at the time of clearance, ex-post 1 checks (other types of ex-post checks) are conducted up to 4 months 
after  clearance,  and  ex-post  2  checks  (ex-post  audits)  are  implemented  until  the  expiry  of  the  period  concerned).  Checks  are  performed  on  all 
operators  and  procedures  after  a  risk  analysis  has  been  conducted  and  the  targeting  and/or  programming  of  checks  has  been  established.  For 
simplified procedures, the ex-ante targeting of the checks is done at the stage of the Initial Simplified Declaration. The other clearance procedures 
introduced by the UCC are not used, or are only occasionally used, in France. Thus, only two procedures have been issued for registration in the 
declarant’s records: one for export and one for import for goods not  subject  to  customs duties. Special procedures are also  checked. Generally 
speaking, in addition to the risk linked to the goods themselves, the risk arising from the reliability of the operator is also taken into account. The 
National Risk  Analysis  Grid  (GRINAR)  is  used  to  determine  the  risk  level  for  almost  2 000  operators  for  import  and  export  flows.  This  grid 
makes it possible to direct the checks. The AEO deemed to be reliable are not excluded from targeting during checks. However, in line with the 
UCC,  in  the  case  of  certain  ex-ante  controls,  fewer  checks  are  carried  out  on  these  AEO.  A  reduction  of  the  control  rate  is  provided  for  in 
Article 24(1) of the DA and concerns the two authorisations (AEO-C and AEO-S) based on the type of check carried out by the customs authority. 

77 

 
 
 
 
The selection profiles therefore apply to them. 

1.2.b Did you ensure proper coordination among customs services dealing with risk analysis and controls (central, regional, local services 
involved in risk analysis and release and post-release departments)?  
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
As  part  of  the  ‘Customs  2018’  project,  the  General  Directorate  for  Customs  and  Excise  decided  to  introduce  an  integrated  chain  of  checks  to 
tackle the new challenges relating to safety, security and combating fraud. This decision was taken in the context of the increasing move towards 
paperless procedures for the flow of declarations and also the implementation of the new Union Customs Code (UCC). 
In  order  to  rationalise  the  chain  of  controls,  the  control  policy  has  been  made  more  integrated  and  consistent,  and  risk  analyses  have  been 
centralised in a single service in order to improve the quality of targeting and of the control instructions. 
The creation of a national Risk Analysis and Targeting Department (SARC) was ratified by an order of 29 February 2016. 
The decision to centralise in a single service the risk analyses in the areas for which it has responsibility (pre-clearance – safety/security, clearance 
and taxation) was taken in order to better target customs checks to make them more efficient. 
This centralisation makes it possible to: 
– have better expertise and improve the control guidelines; 
– bring together the information needed for the analyses at a single point; 
– avoid duplication; 
– monitor and analyse the results in order to adapt the control guidelines; 
– introduce more consistent arrangements and obtain better results in legal proceedings; 
– optimise the implementation of data mining. 
The SARC is therefore responsible for all risk analyses and operational studies, particularly those which concern clearance. It thus has a monopoly 
on creating national selection profiles (PRONAT) in the RMS (declarations targeting tool) and in planning ex-post checks. 
On  the  basis  of  the  SARC’s  risk  analyses  and  the  national  control  guidelines,  the  Inspection  Information  and  Steering  Units  (Cellules  de 
renseignement et de pilotage des contrôles – CRPC) guide and coordinate the checks in cooperation with the regional supervisor or the supervisors 
at the investigation offices and services. The CRPC were set up in 2018 by reorganising the Units for Information and Planning of Inspections 

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(Cellules de renseignement et d’orientation des contrôles – CROC). 
The CRPC sets out the work objectives for the year and the control priorities. It ensures that the programming of the checks takes account of the 
priorities established in coordination with the other services of the Directorate. 
The CRPC is the regional service in charge of steering all the checks and monitoring their efficiency. It follows up the regional control guidelines 
and draws up the review of the regional action plans. 
The CRPC is the linchpin of all the regional services responsible for conducting checks and following up legal proceedings. It uses the steering 
tools at its disposal to ensure the effectiveness of the measures adopted and suggests the adaptations needed to improve results. Lastly, it ensures 
that the programming of the controls is effectively implemented. 
1.2.c Do risk profiles specifically target traditional own resources and provide clear instructions with regard to the type of control to be 
carried out and risk guidance to the customs release officers? Is risk information shared with other Member States and feedback on the 
response to this information provided in the EU customs risk management system?  
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
The DGDDI’S targeting engine groups together all the selection profiles used by the services in charge of targeting (SARC at national level, the 
Inspection Information and Steering Units (CRPC) at regional level and the supervisor at the level of the customs offices). Each profile contains a 
description explaining the reason for the profile, the type of fraud being investigated and the action to be taken. The services are informed each 
month of the RIF messages sent by the other Member States. Generally speaking, the quality of the RIF sent by the other Member States does not 
always allow a return. Moreover, very few RIF messages are sent by France. The MA cases sent by OLAF concerning traditional own resources 
are given specific treatment by the SARC. The fraud mechanism described is studied and the French traffic analysed. The SARC sets up one or 
more dedicated profiles and gives precise instructions to the services concerning the action to be taken. 
1.2.d Is there close monitoring of the controls results (feedback) which is done in a structured manner to allow effective follow-up and 
strict implementation of mutual assistance instructions in place? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
 The implementation of the provisions of Regulation 517/97 by the DGDDI is detailed in an instruction to the services which was circulated in 
January 2015 (Note 1500032). This document was endorsed by the EU authorities. After 3 years’ experience of implementation and, above all, the 
creation of the SARC, it became necessary to update this document, mainly in order to improve the treatment of MA cases. 

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A new instruction, issued by the JCF2 office of the General Directorate in cooperation with office JCF3, SARC and the National Directorate for 
Customs Information and Investigations (DNRED), was sent to the customs services by a note of May 2018. 
The circuit for handling MA cases concerning the protection of the Union’s financial interests (PFI) is as follows: 
1. Receipt of the MA cases by the SARC and the General Directorate; 
2. The SARC’s PFI team investigates the case in cooperation with the offices of the General Directorate; 
3. Establishment of the selection profiles in the RMS targeting tool; 
4.  Circulation  of  control  instruction  to  the  services  using  an  Investigation  and  Control  Suggestion  Sheet  (SDEC  –  Suggestion  d’enquête  et  de 
contrôle). 
5. Implementation of the checks by the DNRED’s Directorate for Customs Investigations (DED) or the Regional Investigation Departments (SRE) 
and the customs offices via the CRPC, on the basis of the risk analysis with input by the SARC; 
6. Transmission to the SARC of the information and the results of the control and investigation services responsible for MA cases relating to PFI 
for transmission to office JCF2; 
7. Transmission of the information and results of the checks to OLAF. 
Specifically, when an MA case concerning the protection of the EU’s financial interests is sent by OLAF by AFIS mail, it is received by SARC 
and the General Directorate. It is immediately studied so that one or several selection profiles can be set up as quickly as possible. The case is then 
subjected to  extensive analysis by SARC’s PFI  group so  that input and specific details  can be added for France. An  Investigation  and Control 
Suggestion Sheet (SDEC) is drawn up by the SARC. This sheet details the case, the analysis of the case and the input added. It also specifies the 
action to be taken by the control services. The sheet is submitted to the General Directorate for validation before it is circulated to the service. 
The results of checks are sent by the services to the SARC, which draws up a table for monitoring the cases. This table is sent each quarter by the 
JCF2 office to OLAF via AFIS Mail. 

1.3 OTHER MEASURES 

1.3.a Do you systematically include an automated random element and take into consideration the time-barring three-year period for the 
communication of customs debt as a risk indicator in the post-release risk analysis? 

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YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
With regard to the checks made at the time of clearance, an automated random selection of the declarations is set up. 
With  regard  to  ex-post  1  checks,  a  schedule  is  implemented  on  the  basis  of  the  general  guidelines  set  by  the  CRPC.  The  head  of  the  customs 
office, in coordination with the supervisor, draws up a timetable for performance of the checks.This schedule takes into account the reliability of 
the operators. Priority is given to scheduling the weakest operators (managing sensitive traffic and/or procedures). However, the service ensures 
that it performs checks at least once every three years on operators that are subject to few checks during that period. 
1.3.b Do you ensure risk-oriented post-release audits which cover the operator's systems where this is necessary, apply a random element, 
guide  the  auditors  and  take  due  account  of  the  results  of  the  pre-authorisation  stage  and  of  specific  standardised  checklists?  Are  the 
results strictly monitored? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
Post-release audits are called ex-post 2 checks (contrôles ex-post 2) or investigations (enquêtes) in France. Ex-post 2 checks are conducted in a 
hierarchical manner: 
1. Depending on the requests for checks by SARC as part of its investigative responsibilities; 
2. At the initiative of the CRPC in liaison with the Regional Guideline Directives; 
3. At the initiative of the investigative services. 
The  evaluation  sheets  drawn  up  are  always  accompanied  by  explanations  concerning  the  fraud  investigated  and  the  action  to  be  taken  by  the 
services. 
In mutual assistance cases, a specific SDEC (Investigation and Control Suggestions and Guidance) sheet specifies, following input from a national 
traffic  analysis,  the  investigations  to  be  carried  out  following  MA  cases  for  example.  In  this  case  too,  investigations  are  based  on  risk  and 
instructions are given to the investigators. 
The results of the checks are incorporated in the SILCF (Anti-fraud information system). They can be consulted by all the services responsible for 
risk analysis and targeting. 
However, random selection is not part of the ex-post 2 check selection mechanisms. 
In France all investigations are based on programming. Programming is usually reinforced by the increase in importance of the SARC and of the 
programming operated by the CRPC at local level, which must ultimately lead to a reduction in the proportion of own-initiative investigations. 

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1.3.c  Are  customs  controls  on  operations  made  by  authorised  economic  operators  (AEO)  carried  out  taking  account  of  the  risk 
management performed with respect to the different elements of these operations? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
The AEO are considered to be trustworthy operators in the context of the customs operations they perform. As such, in accordance with EU rules, 
they have specific customs benefits. 
Operators  certified  as  AEO  have  differentiated  and  privileged  treatment.  In  addition  to  personalised  monitoring  and  advice,  the  AEO  enjoy 
benefits with regard to checks. 
A reduction of the control rate is provided for in Article 24(1) of the DA and concerns the two authorisations (AEO-C and AEO-S) based on the 
type of check carried out by the customs authority. 
The AEO-C, in particular, have the benefit of fewer ex-ante checks (apart from checks relating to the CAP, health checks or checks concerning 
standards), depending on the operator’s risk level. 
AEOs benefit from fewer checks only in cases of declarations submitted by an AEO on its own account or by an AEO representing another AEO. 
Control  counters  in  the  clearance  system  allow  screen-based  supervisors  to  respect  the  requirement  to  perform  fewer  checks  and  not  to  make 
unnecessary checks of declarations. 
Apart from these cases where fewer checks are performed, the AEO are treated like other operators. The same selection profiles are used for them 
where these profiles are not based on an EORI (Economic Operator Registration and Identification number) and all the data in the declaration can 
be targeted. 
1.3.d Do national  competent authorities  make  full  use of the handbook on operational  customs  controls  based on Member States’ best 
practices and of the Customs audit guide? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
These guides are not used directly by the services. However, practice in the DGDDI’s services is in line with the indications in these guides. The 
instructions in these guides are reiterated or used when specific instructions are sent to the services. This was the case, for example, in 2018 with 
regard to the performance of ex-ante checks of customs value. (See Question 1.1) 
1.1 UNDERVALUATION  

HR 

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1.1 Are you remaining vigilant as regards the risk of undervaluation of goods? 
☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
If  YES  or  YES,  PARTLY,  are  you  targeting  in  particular  cheap  products  imported  in  extremely  large  quantities,  such  as  textiles  and 
footwear? 
☒YES, but targeting also other goods 

1.2 ENHANCEMENT OF CUSTOMS CONTROLS 
1.2.a Do you have strategies in place that target all types of customs procedure including simplified procedures and all operators taking 
into account AEOs and other large businesses considered compliant? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
1.2.b Did you ensure proper coordination among customs services dealing with risk analysis and controls (central, regional, local services 
involved in risk analysis and release and post-release departments)?  
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
1.2.c Do risk profiles specifically target traditional own resources and provide clear instructions with regard to the type of control to be 
carried out and risk guidance to the customs release officers? Is risk information shared with other Member States and feedback on the 
response to this information provided in the EU customs risk management system?  
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
1.2.d Is there close monitoring of the controls results (feedback) which is done in a structured manner to allow effective follow-up and 
strict implementation of mutual assistance instructions in place? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
1.3 OTHER MEASURES 
1.3.a Do you systematically include an automated random element and take into consideration the time-barring three-year period for the 
communication of customs debt as a risk indicator in the post-release risk analysis? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
1.3.b Do you ensure risk-oriented post-release audits which cover the operator's systems where this is necessary, apply a random element, 

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guide  the  auditors  and  take  due  account  of  the  results  of  the  pre-authorisation  stage  and  of  specific  standardised  checklists?  Are  the 
results strictly monitored? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
1.3.c  Are  customs  controls  on  operations  made  by  authorised  economic  operators  (AEO)  carried  out  taking  account  of  the  risk 
management performed with respect to the different elements of these operations? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
1.3.d Do national  competent authorities  make  full  use of the handbook on operational  customs  controls  based on Member States’ best 
practices and of the Customs audit guide? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
1.1 UNDERVALUATION  

IT 

1.1 Are you remaining vigilant as regards the risk of undervaluation of goods? 
☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
Following  the  recommendation  1,  in  2018  we  have  expanded  our  methodologies  to  fight  against  undervaluation,  including  the  “Fair  prices 
methodology”.  
Particularly, we have included in our system risk profiles based on goods that are systematically undervalued, as they are detected by THESEUS, 
a  statistical  data-mining  tool  provided  by  JRC.  Through  this  tool,  we  prioritize  the  flows  of  goods  to  be  checked  on  the  basis  of  the  highest 
estimate of the taxable base loss. 
Once selected the flows of goods to be controlled, we use two methodologies: 
- “Fair price methodology” to target documentary checks, where the percentage of control depends on impact analysis 
- “Italian credibility methodology” to target the physical check at the time of Customs clearance, 100% percentage of control. 
The “Risk Threshold Value” used in the “Fair Price Methodology” is the 50% of Fair Price (statistical value/net mass) related to 8 digits code 
and country of origin as reported in THESEUS. We update the rate of controls on the basis of results of controls. 
The “Risk Threshold Value” used in the “Credibility Methodology” is based on percentiles and quartiles of unit values (statistical value/net mass 
or statistical value/supplementary unit) applied to TARIC 10 digits code, grouping the countries of origin as reported in THESEUS- Cluster of 
Prices Panel.  
We update the thresholds on the basis of results of controls. 

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If  YES  or  YES,  PARTLY,  are  you  targeting  in  particular  cheap  products  imported  in  extremely  large  quantities,  such  as  textiles  and 
footwear? 
☒YES, but targeting also other goods 
Our  reference  to  choose  the  goods  to  be  checked  is  THESEUS  –  Systematic  Undervaluation  Panel,  Among  them,  there  are  also  textiles  and 
footwear,  imported in  small  or large quantities. Particularly, we  target the nature of  transaction 11, to  exclude small sampling  of  textiles and 
footwear.  

1.2 ENHANCEMENT OF CUSTOMS CONTROLS 
1.2.a Do you have strategies in place that target all types of customs procedure including simplified procedures and all operators taking 
into account AEOs and other large businesses considered compliant? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
Italian Customs control System allowed us to create risk indicators taking in account each box of the SAD, for this reason we can target all types 
of customs procedure and managing the rate of control according to the compliance of the operator (AEO or NO AEO). 
1.2.b Did you ensure proper coordination among customs services dealing with risk analysis and controls (central, regional, local services 
involved in risk analysis and release and post-release departments)?  
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
For what concern risk analysis at clearance, our Customs Control Systems interfaces directly and in real time each local services involved in risk 
analysis, so any customs officer in charge to carry out customs control is informed about the risk indicator. 
1.2.c Do risk profiles specifically target traditional own resources and provide clear instructions with regard to the type of control to be 
carried out and risk guidance to the customs release officers? Is risk information shared with other Member States and feedback on the 
response to this information provided in the EU customs risk management system?  
YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
Of course we have risk profiles to fight against losses in traditional own resources. this risk profiles are named financial risk profiles and mainly 
concerning Antidumping, undervaluation, misclassification, origin.  
When  a  risk  indicator  is  hitted  in  a  customs  declaration,  , it will  be  select  for  the  customs  control  according  to  the  rate  of  control  decided  at 
central level. The risk profile establish the kind of control, which ones can not be narrow down by customs officer who is in charge to carry out 

85 

 
 
 
the control. 
Risk information are shared by CRMS when are deemed to be relevant for other member state. 
1.2.d Is there close monitoring of the controls results (feedback) which is done in a structured manner to allow effective follow-up and strict 
implementation of mutual assistance instructions in place? 
YES. There is a monitoring of structured control results (feedback) which is carried out by the Analysis Office. The latter, in particular, provides, 
on  a  daily  and  periodic  basis  (monthly  /  quarterly),  to  consult  the  results  of  the  controls  arising  from  the  selections  made  by  the  risk  profiles 
developed, in order to implement new ones or to modify the existing ones. 

1.3 OTHER MEASURES 
1.3.a Do you systematically include an automated random element and take into consideration the time-barring three-year period for the 
communication of customs debt as a risk indicator in the post-release risk analysis? 
NO. For a posteriori controls, the risk analysis system does not include randomness. The selection criteria for the operations / operators to be 
checked, pursuant to the provisions of art. 48 of EU Reg. 952/2013, are processed through specific risk profiles. These profiles provide for the 
selection for the subsequent control of the declarations previously requested by CA (automated control) from the customs control circuit, without 
overlapping the so-called "on-line" controls, whose operation remains unchanged. This is the specific RA selection (so-called blue channel) with 
which a percentage of the ex-post controls assigned to the individual Customs offices is determined in an automated way by the customs control 
circuit on the basis of the risk analysis carried out at central level. 
The automated selection method of the declarations to be subjected to review of the assessment (a posteriori control) makes it possible to improve 
the qualitative / quantitative relationship of the a posteriori verification activity - as an aid to the Offices also through a constant monitoring of 
the results - and to implement , within the overall effectiveness of the control system, adequate supervision, through the constant calibration of the 
risk profiles carried out at central level also on the basis of the results of the controls communicated by the Offices. 
Finally,  it is  specified  that  the  three-year  prescription  period  for  the  communication  of  the  customs  debt  is  not  taken  into  consideration  as an 
indicator of risk in the analysis of the risks afterwards. 
1.3.b Do you ensure risk-oriented post-release audits which cover the operator's systems where this is necessary, apply a random element, 
guide  the  auditors  and  take  due  account  of  the  results  of  the  pre-authorisation  stage  and  of  specific  standardised  checklists?  Are  the 

86 

 
 
 
results strictly monitored? 
YES. The instructions issued over time on the subject of PCA, both as dissemination of the TAXUD manual, and as a concrete application of the 
principles contained therein, also with the aid of selective lists, as well as taking into account, among other elements, the results of the phase of 
pre-authorization of the operators and standardized checklists, are aimed at a continuous monitoring of the results, also ensured by a change in 
AIDA - Integrated Automation Customs Excise (information system of the Customs and Monopolies Agency) which provided for the introduction 
of the specific PCA trigger in the control panel a posteriori. 
1.3.c  Are  customs  controls  on  operations  made  by  authorised  economic  operators  (AEO)  carried  out  taking  account  of  the  risk 
management performed with respect to the different elements of these operations? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
The rate of  control for an AEO operator is systematically narrow down according to the rate of compliance of the operator.  When a hight risk 
indicator related to potential losses in own resources applies (e.g. INF AM), AEO operator is managed as normal operator for a short period and 
subjected to a normal rate of control. afterword, if no irregularities come, the rate of control is narrow down as usual. 

1.3.d Do national  competent authorities  make  full  use of the handbook on operational  customs  controls  based on Member States’ best 
practices and of the Customs audit guide? 
YES. Both for operational customs checks and as a customs audit guide. 
1.1 UNDERVALUATION  

CY 

1.1 Are you remaining vigilant as regards the risk of undervaluation of goods? 
☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
Risk profiles have been created taking into account the risk on undervaluation. Risk profiles are regularly re-evaluated at least once a year. 
If  YES  or  YES,  PARTLY,  are  you  targeting  in  particular  cheap  products  imported  in  extremely  large  quantities,  such  as  textiles  and 
footwear? 
☒YES, but targeting also other goods 
Specific  Threshold  values  were  recommended  by  OLAF  in  the  context  of  JCO  SNAKE  regarding  20  commodity  codes  under  chapters  61-64 
(textile  &  footwear).  Those  threshold  values  were  applied  in  the  Risk  Analysis  System  and  relevant  profiles  were  created.  AM2015/13 
recommendations were applied for chapters 61-64 in combination with the High Interest Consignors mentioned in the relevant AM without using 

87 

 
 
 
 
fair prices. In addition, Risk Profiles have been created for leisure boats as well as vehicles. These two types of goods have been targeted due to 
the  high  risk  for  undervaluation  and  due  to  the  irregularities  detected  in  the  past.  Moreover,  other  profiles  have  been  created  based  on 
information  received  through  CRMS.  The  Department  is  in  the  process  to  implement  Financial  Risk  Criteria  (FRC)  based  on  the  Decision 
C(2018)3293  of  31/05/2018.  One  of  the  criteria  is  related  to  undervaluation  risk  which  will  be  assessed  by  using  threshold  values  as  risk 
indicator. 

1.2 ENHANCEMENT OF CUSTOMS CONTROLS 
1.2.a Do you have strategies in place that target all types of customs procedure including simplified procedures and all operators taking 
into account AEOs and other large businesses considered compliant? 
YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
1.2.b Did you ensure proper coordination among customs services dealing with risk analysis and controls (central, regional, local services 
involved in risk analysis and release and post-release departments)?  
YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
The Regional Customs Offices and the various sections at Headquarters recommend the creation of profiles and they are responsible to monitor 
customs control results according to their field of interest including valuation as well as to re-evaluate the profiles in cooperation with the Risk 
Analysis and Intelligence Section at Headquarters. A more enhanced coordination is needed between the relevant sections of the Department in 
order  to  assess  better  the  risk  on  undervaluation.  For  this  reason,  the  Department  of  Customs  &  Excise  has  already  initiated  an  action  by 
collecting the irregularities detected by all the sections performing controls  and a process  has been started in order to identify risk indicators 
including country of origin, high risk traders, commodities etc in order to create new risk criteria. 
1.2.c Do risk profiles specifically target traditional own resources and provide clear instructions with regard to the type of control to be 
carried out and risk guidance to the customs release officers? Is risk information shared with other Member States and feedback on the 
response to this information provided in the EU customs risk management system?  
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
If  a  declaration  is  selected  for  control  based  on  a  Risk  Profile,  then  customs  officer/examiner  at  the  Customs  Station,  follows  the  instructions 
given  by  the  profile  for  the  type  of  control  to  be  carried  out.  Usually,  the  instructions  from  the  risk  analysis  results  are  referred  to  specific 

88 

 
 
 
Legislation, Department’s Instructions and circulars. 
1.2.d Is there close monitoring of the controls results (feedback) which is done in a structured manner to allow effective follow-up and 
strict implementation of mutual assistance instructions in place? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
 A new structure has been recently created in order to have a more effective follow-up and strict implementation of mutual assistance instructions. 
More specifically, the Intelligence & Risk Analysis Section has taken the responsibility to delegate each AM message to the relevant sections and 
monitor it accordingly so that the data necessary for the reply are received timely. 

1.3 OTHER MEASURES 
1.3.a Do you systematically include an automated random element and take into consideration the time-barring three-year period for the 
communication of customs debt as a risk indicator in the post-release risk analysis? 
NO 
1.3.b Do you ensure risk-oriented post-release audits which cover the operator's systems where this is necessary, apply a random element, 
guide  the  auditors  and  take  due  account  of  the  results  of  the  pre-authorisation  stage  and  of  specific  standardised  checklists?  Are  the 
results strictly monitored? 
NO 
1.3.c  Are  customs  controls  on  operations  made  by  authorised  economic  operators  (AEO)  carried  out  taking  account  of  the  risk 
management performed with respect to the different elements of these operations? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
In Import System a low risk value is given to all Cypriot AEOs. As regards the Import Control System (ICS) and the Export Control System (ECS) 
all benefits granted to AEO are based on Common Risk Criteria and standards. 
1.3.d Do national  competent authorities  make  full  use of the handbook on operational  customs  controls  based on Member States’ best 
practices and of the Customs audit guide? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
The handbook on operational customs control is uploaded on Departments intranet and is available to all customs officers since 2015. 

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LV 

1.1 UNDERVALUATION  

1.1 Are you remaining vigilant as regards the risk of undervaluation of goods? 
☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
As  in  previous  years,  customs  control  measures  for  imports  of  clothing  and  footwear  originating  in  China  were  continued  in  2018.  In  the 
framework  of  customs  control  measures  were  carried  out  in-depth  controls  of  documents  and  physical  controls  of  certain  goods.  Also  post-
clearance checks were carried out for undervalued goods. 
If  YES  or  YES,  PARTLY,  are  you  targeting  in  particular  cheap  products  imported  in  extremely  large  quantities,  such  as  textiles  and 
footwear? 
☒YES, but targeting also other goods 
In order to reduce the undervaluation risk of clothing and footwear originating in China, customs control measures (risk profiles) for goods of 
Chapters 61 to 64 were determined in 2018. Separate risk profiles were specified for the goods of each chapter. 

1.2 ENHANCEMENT OF CUSTOMS CONTROLS 
1.2.a Do you have strategies in place that target all types of customs procedure including simplified procedures and all operators taking 
into account AEOs and other large businesses considered compliant? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
All established profiles, including profiles on random selection, also apply to AEO and to simplified procedures also. 
1.2.b Did you ensure proper coordination among customs services dealing with risk analysis and controls (central, regional, local services 
involved in risk analysis and release and post-release departments)?  
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
There is a constant exchange of risk information between those who are carrying out controls at the time of clearance, carrying out risk analysis 
and those who carrying out post-clearance checks. 
1.2.c Do risk profiles specifically target traditional own resources and provide clear instructions with regard to the type of control to be 
carried out and risk guidance to the customs release officers? Is risk information shared with other Member States and feedback on the 
response to this information provided in the EU customs risk management system?  

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YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
1.2.d Is there close monitoring of the controls results (feedback) which is done in a structured manner to allow effective follow-up and 
strict implementation of mutual assistance instructions in place? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

1.3 OTHER MEASURES 

1.3.a Do you systematically include an automated random element and take into consideration the time-barring three-year period for the 
communication of customs debt as a risk indicator in the post-release risk analysis? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
1.3.b Do you ensure risk-oriented post-release audits which cover the operator's systems where this is necessary, apply a random element, 
guide  the  auditors  and  take  due  account  of  the  results  of  the  pre-authorisation  stage  and  of  specific  standardised  checklists?  Are  the 
results strictly monitored? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
1.3.c  Are  customs  controls  on  operations  made  by  authorised  economic  operators  (AEO)  carried  out  taking  account  of  the  risk 
management performed with respect to the different elements of these operations? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
1.3.d Do national  competent authorities  make  full  use of the handbook on operational  customs  controls  based on Member States’ best 
practices and of the Customs audit guide? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
1.1 UNDERVALUATION  

LT 

1.1 Are you remaining vigilant as regards the risk of undervaluation of goods? 
☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
In Lithuania, the customs value of the goods (as well as other risk areas) is assessed at the time of customs clearance. In the same manner, the 

91 

 
 
 
 
 
customs  value  of  the  goods  is  assessed  additionally  after  the  goods  have  been  released  (post  clearance).  Both  risk  assessments  are  performed 
automatically. 
The main tool for automated risk assessment, including risk assessment of customs value, is the Risk Assessment and Control System (further – 
RIKS), which consists of two components: 
RIKS Clearance component; 
− 
− 
RIKS Post-clearance component. 
Control applicable in the process of customs clearance: 
The  evaluation  of  declarations  during  the  customs  clearance  is  performed  by  the  RIKS  Clearance  component,  whose  manager  is  Risk 
Management Division of the Customs Criminal Service. This Division creates risk profiles based on information received from various sources - 
EU customs authorities, OLAF, central customs departments of Lithuanian customs, including Customs Valuation Division, territorial and local 
customs units and other. 
RIKS Clearance component contains risk rules, risk profiles and control results.  
The risk profiles automatically direct  appropriate declarations  to  the yellow (control  of  documents), red  (control  of  goods) or green channels. 
When the declaration is directed to the yellow/red channels, the method of control is indicated at the same time, and the RIKS and declaration 
processing  via  transaction  systems  (MDAS/NTCS)  is  suspended  until  the  results  of  the  control  are  entered  into  RIKS  by  responsible  customs 
officers.  
RIKS Clearance component was operated with 70 various risk profiles to protect against undervaluation in 2018. 
Applicable post-release controls: 
The  automated  risk  assessment  for  the  selection of  cleared  declarations  and  the  operators  for  the  post-release  controls  are  carried  out  by  the 
RIKS Post-clearance component, whose manager is the Post-clearance Control Division of the Customs Department.  
The RIKS Post-clearance component assesses risks according to the special rules and the result of the assessment is indicated in the way of the 
scores.  That  helps  to  select  the  economic  operators  and/or  customs  declarations  for  post-clearance  controls  regarding  various  risky  areas 
(including “Customs value of goods“), e.g. there is a rule where the declared customs value of goods is compared with the value of the goods in 
the  national  PREMI  database,  depending  on  the  TARIC  code  and  country  of  origin.  When  the  value  declared  is  lower  than  20  %  -  30  %,  the 
highest risk score is assigned to the area of value and the transactions could be as a subject for verification. 
“Fair prices” and Data Mining technologies calculated in the THESEUS information system of the EC Joint Research Centre (EC JRC) are used 
as additional source for identifying high-risk cases.  
The Customs Valuation Division of the Customs Department systematically participates in the process of updating algorithms (rules) in the field 

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“Customs value of goods”. 
If  YES  or  YES,  PARTLY,  are  you  targeting  in  particular  cheap  products  imported  in  extremely  large  quantities,  such  as  textiles  and 
footwear? 
☒YES, but targeting also other goods 
Customs control measures and procedures, applied by the Lithuanian Customs for the customs valuation of imported goods are in line with the 
2017  European  Commission`s  recommendations  and  European  Commission`s  Guidelines  for  preventing  and  detecting  irregularities  (under-
invoicing) in imports of textiles and footwear.  
In the case of the import of textile and footwear goods, an individual customs valuation model, based on the application of combined national and 
EU-wide  average  values  for  risk  management  purposes,  is  applied.    When  applying  monitoring  after  the  identification  of  goods,  whose  “fair 
prices“ are significantly higher than the average price indicated in the national customs valuation database, and identification that the flows of 
import  are  significant,  the  creation  of  special  risk  profiles  with  the  algorithms  to  compare  the  declared  average  price  of  the  goods  with  the 
determined “fair prices“, is initiated. This measure is foreseen to be implemented by IT means in 2019‒2020. 
The  typical  instruction  of  the  risk  profile  in  the  field  of  customs  valuation:  “High-risk  customs  value.  Ask  to  send  and  check  the  copies  of 
accounts, contracts, payment, transportation documents. If the presented documents are not sufficient for the justification of the customs value, 
ask  to  submit  additional  documents.  In  the  case  of  failure  to  justify,  indicate  customs  value  data  available  to  the  customs  authorities  for  the 
calculation of the guarantee or for the application of other customs valuation methods“ 

1.2 ENHANCEMENT OF CUSTOMS CONTROLS 

1.2.a Do you have strategies in place that target all types of customs procedure including simplified procedures and all operators taking 
into account AEOs and other large businesses considered compliant? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
All  economic  operators  could  be  a  subject  for  customs  control  based  on  risk  assessment.  The  control  of  all  economic  operators,  including 
simplified procedures and the holders of AEO status, is carried out through the development and implementation of risk  profiles at the time of 
customs clearance and after goods are released. At the same time, AEO holders are included in specific risk profiles that minimize risk.  
1.2.b Did you ensure proper coordination among customs services dealing with risk analysis and controls (central, regional, local services 
involved in risk analysis and release and post-release departments)?  

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YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
RIKS  Clearance  component  and  RIKS  Post-clearance  component  are  the  main  tools  for  coordination  among  the  central,  regional  and  local 
services dealing with risk analysis, control and monitoring.  
As  already  mentioned  in  part  1.1,  during  customs  clearance  customs  officers  should  carry  out  all  the  checks  specified  in  RIKS  Clearance 
component. It is not possible to complete the declaration process, if all the actions specified in the RIKS Clearance instructions are not fulfilled.  
In  certain  cases  where  there  is  a  doubt  on  the  information  provided  at  the  time  of  customs  clearance,  the  declaration  shall  be  automatically 
directed to post-clearance verification for the relevant departments carrying out post-clearance control. 
There  are  written  national  instructions  how  to  use  RIKS,  deal  with  risk  analysis  and  risk  analysis  results,  select  companies  and  (or)  cleared 
customs declarations, prepare for and conduct  pre-audits, post-release audits and other controls, record their results and share risk information 
with other departments, Member States, etc. 
1.2.c Do risk profiles specifically target traditional own resources and provide clear instructions with regard to the type of control to be 
carried out and risk guidance to the customs release officers? Is risk information shared with other Member States and feedback on the 
response to this information provided in the EU customs risk management system?  
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
1019 fiscal risk profiles were created in RIKS Clearance component in 2018.  
Each method  of  customs control  is  classified by  code and its  description,  as well as detailed instructions of  inspection are presented in  RIKS. 
Example of instruction of the risk profile in the field of customs valuation is presented under the reply to the question 1.1. (2 part of question).  
Rules for the customs release officers are regulated by national legislation (risk guidance). Risk information is shared with other MS and 2 RIF 
were placed in 2018. Feedback on the response is constantly being filled. 
1.2.d Is there close monitoring of the controls results (feedback) which is done in a structured manner to allow effective follow-up and 
strict implementation of mutual assistance instructions in place? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
The  results  of  the  verification  of  declarations  recorded  in  RIKS  are  monitored  in  a  structured  manner.  The  effectiveness  of  risk  profiles  is 
continuously assessed. The decisions are made on risk profiles correction, their further need or the introduction of the new profiles. 
1.3 OTHER MEASURES 

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1.3.a Do you systematically include an automated random element and take into consideration the time-barring three-year period for the 
communication of customs debt as a risk indicator in the post-release risk analysis? 
YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
RIKS Post-clearance component performs automated risk assessment of the economic operators and released goods/customs declarations in the 
period of last three years. An automated random element is not included as risk indicator. As has been mentioned before, in Lithuania we have an 
IT tool (RIKS Post-clearance component), which is designed to assess the risk in accordance with a whole range of risk criteria. 
In  some  cases,  random  sampling  is  used  by  post  release  officers  to  select  cleared  declarations,  released  goods  and  transactions  relying  on 
competence, knowledge, insights, and suspicions. Random company selection is not used for the purpose of customs audits. 
1.3.b Do you ensure risk-oriented post-release audits which cover the operator's systems where this is necessary, apply a random element, 
guide  the  auditors  and  take  due  account  of  the  results  of  the  pre-authorisation  stage  and  of  specific  standardised  checklists?  Are  the 
results strictly monitored? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
Pre-audits  and  post-release  audits  cover  the  operator's  systems  and  for  all  of  them  we  use  instructions,  methodology  (guide),  standardised 
checklists (more information in part 1.3.d). 
Results  of  pre-audits,  post-release  audits  and  other  post-release  verifications  are  uploaded  into  the  RIKS.    This  allows  monitoring  all  the 
information  of  the  audits  and  other  post  clearance  verifications  in  one  e-system  (RIKS).  The  monitoring  is  strictly  performed  in  regional  and 
central levels. 
Additional information:  
RIKS  Post-clearance  component  is  used  for  risk  assessment,  risk  management  for  the  pre-audit  and  post  clearance  audit  controls,  grouping 
(groups  A,  B  and  C)  and  selection  process  of  the  economic  operators  and  cleared  customs  declarations  and  processing  of  results  of  post-
clearance audits and other inspections. RIKS Post-clearance component performs an automated risk assessment of the economic operators and 
released goods/customs declarations for the last three years.  
Grouping of the operators into groups A, B and C is done according to three criteria: number of import declarations, total statistical value and 
total amount of duties and taxes.  The subject to post clearance control could be the operators from each group A, B and C.  
Risk assessment results are automatically calculated once a month.  

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EU institutions, customs administrations of MS or third countries; 
Other state institutions; 
Other customs offices and their structural divisions about possible violations or non-compliance with customs law and other legal acts; 
Information obtained from applications for the issuance of certificates, statuses or permissions for the execution of customs formalities; 
The deadlines for the reassessment of the conditions for the issue of these certificates, statuses or permissions; 
Other selection methods (Data mining technologies, random selection etc.) 

Results of risk assessment are used in all pre-audits, post-release audits and other post-release controls, even when information is received from 
other sources:  
− 
− 
− 
− 
− 
− 
1.3.c  Are  customs  controls  on  operations  made  by  authorised  economic  operators  (AEO)  carried  out  taking  account  of  the  risk 
management performed with respect to the different elements of these operations? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
The operations, made by AEO holders, are checked under the same criteria as the other economic operators. 
1.3.d Do national  competent authorities  make  full  use of the handbook on operational  customs  controls  based on Member States’ best 
practices and of the Customs audit guide? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
Apart from the national legislation, the Customs audit guide (CAG) is used as well. A representative of Lithuanian Customs participated in the 
DG TAXUD International working group on the updating of the CAG. Based on the information provided in CAG, Checklists (questionnaires) for 
auditors in RIKS Post-clearance component are created. The auditors are required to use these Checklists during customs audits and answer the 
questions  by  selecting  the  standard  answer.  If  there  is  more  important  information,  they  should  enter  relevant  information  related  to  the 
appropriate  questions.  Currently  we  use  17  checklists  (17  risky  areas)  for  Preparation  phase  for  audit  and  31  Checklist  (31  risky  area)  for 
Execution  phase  in  Lithuania.  Each  Checklist  consists  of  several  parts:  various  questions,  standard  answers,  and  instructions  for  auditors, 
specifying articles of the regulations, potential risks related to a particular issue, as well as accounting records, bookkeeping, and documents of 
the economic operator which the auditor should check for answers to specific questions. Finally, the auditor is required to assess the company's 
residual risk. These Checklists ensure the high quality of the audits. Even more, all territorial customs audit units perform audits in accordance 
with  uniform  standards.  We  also  are  familiar  with  the  Handbook  (2013)  and  apply  the  provisions  of  this  document.  However,  this  Handbook 

96 

 
 
contains references to regulations that are no longer valid. We believe this document will be updated. 

LU 

1.1 UNDERVALUATION  

1.1 Are you remaining vigilant as regards the risk of undervaluation of goods? 
☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
In addition to the daily risk assessment tasks, we would like to highlight that during 2018, hundreds of electronic risk profiles based on OLAF’s 
fair prices have been implemented in order to target undervalued goods. This is not a completed action but an ongoing process. 
If  YES  or  YES,  PARTLY,  are  you  targeting  in  particular  cheap  products  imported  in  extremely  large  quantities,  such  as  textiles  and 
footwear? 
☒YES, but targeting also other goods 
Any available risk information in the area of undervaluation is assessed. However, the focus in 2018 was set on textiles and footwear.  

1.2 ENHANCEMENT OF CUSTOMS CONTROL 
1.2.a Do you have strategies in place that target all types of customs procedure including simplified procedures and all operators taking 
into account AEOs and other large businesses considered compliant? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
There are risk profiles in place for targeting specific customs procedures (e.g. CP 42 & 63). Although the hit rate of risk profiles is lowered in 
regard of AEO’s, they are not excluded from electronic targeting / customs controls. Hence movements of goods related to AEO’s are still subject 
to customs controls.  
1.2.b Did you ensure proper coordination among customs services dealing with risk analysis and controls (central, regional, local services 
involved in risk analysis and release and post-release departments)?  
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
In the framework of the EU restricted Commission decision C(2018) 3293 from 31/05/2018 on financial risk criteria, we organized information 
sessions at the local customs offices. Relevant information between involved services is exchanged on a regular basis. Example: In case of new 
risk  information  (e.g.  from  CRMS-RIF  or  AM),  a  summary  evaluation  of  historical  data  is  systematically  performed  by  national  risk  analysis 
centre.  Depending  on  the  impact  of  movements,  the  intervention  of  Audit  unit  is  required  for  deeper  analysis  and/or  a  national  risk  profile  is 

97 

 
 
 
 
implemented immediately or based on feedback from Audit unit. 
1.2.c Do risk profiles specifically target traditional own resources and provide clear instructions with regard to the type of control to be 
carried out and risk guidance to the customs release officers? Is risk information shared with other Member States and feedback on the 
response to this information provided in the EU customs risk management system?  
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
Risk profiles  are implemented for targeting risks related to traditional own resources. In terms of  instructions, when a declaration  triggers  an 
electronic hit, guidance on customs controls to be carried out are provided via an electronic risk instruction contained within the risk profile. 
We consider the exchange of and feedback to risk information as a very important element within risk management. We consequently make use of 
the EU customs risk management system on a daily basis. 
1.2.d Is there close monitoring of the controls results (feedback) which is done in a structured manner to allow effective follow-up and 
strict implementation of mutual assistance instructions in place? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
We  set  up  an  IT-tool  in  order  to  evaluate  control  results.  Both  local  and  central  services  have  access  to  this  system.  The  evaluation  itself  is 
systematically performed, at central level.  
1.3 OTHER MEASURES 
1.3.a Do you systematically include an automated random element and take into consideration the time-barring three-year period for the 
communication of customs debt as a risk indicator in the post-release risk analysis? 
NO. We take into account the time-barring three-year period for reporting the customs debt, but this is not included as a risk indicator in the risk 
analysis.  The only thing we do depends on a case-by-case basis, a risk profile is  put  into the risk analysis  with regard to  either the economic 
operator or the product (tariff / value / origin) 
1.3.b Do you ensure risk-oriented post-release audits which cover the operator's systems where this is necessary, apply a random element, 
guide  the  auditors  and  take  due  account  of  the  results  of  the  pre-authorisation  stage  and  of  specific  standardised  checklists?  Are  the 
results strictly monitored? 
NO. Because we do not have an IT tool, we cannot conduct risk-oriented audits. The audits are either based on the experience of the officials or 
by a request from another department ( for reassessment audits / OPRC). 

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1.3.c  Are  customs  controls  on  operations  made  by  authorised  economic  operators  (AEO)  carried  out  taking  account  of  the  risk 
management performed with respect to the different elements of these operations? 
YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
Only the risk profile for the financial category is reduced to a 50% rate. 
1.3.d Do national  competent authorities  make  full  use of the handbook on operational  customs  controls  based on Member States’ best 
practices and of the Customs audit guide? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
1.1 UNDERVALUATION  

HU 

1.1 Are you remaining vigilant as regards the risk of undervaluation of goods? 
☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
The  risk  of  undervaluation  will  persist.  The  Customs  Authority  is  paying  close  attention  to  it  and  endeavouring  to  fulfil  OLAF’s  and  the 
Commission’s recommendations on it. ’Furthermore, checking the accuracy and calculation of declared customs values (with particular attention 
also  being  paid  to  the factors increasing the customs  value and VAT  bases) and verification  of  the terms of delivery/freight  costs are also  key 
areas of concern at the time of compiling the annual post-release control plan.  
If  YES  or  YES,  PARTLY,  are  you  targeting  in  particular  cheap  products  imported  in  extremely  large  quantities,  such  as  textiles  and 
footwear? 
☒YES, but targeting also other goods 
International campaigns and experience of database analyses show that, apart from the products in Chapters 61-64, underevaluation is also very 
evident for products in other chapters. These are, namely, bags, cases and other containers under heading 4202, the textile products referred to in 
Chapters 50-60 and the toys and leisure goods referred to in Chapter 95. 

1.2 ENHANCEMENT OF CUSTOMS CONTROLS 
1.2.a Do you have strategies in place that target all types of customs procedure including simplified procedures and all operators taking 
into account AEOs and other large businesses considered compliant? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

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According to the NTCA procedural order on the conduct of customs and post-release controls, as part of the control strategy, the annual control 
plan focusses primarily on economic operators with high turnover (including simplified procedures and authorised economic operators (AEO)), 
while  also  laying  down  rules  for  all  market  participants  in  the  annual  monitoring  exercise.  According  to  the  provision  on  customs  risk 
management and risk analysis activities issued by the National Tax and Customs Administration, prior to issuing each AEO authorisation, a risk 
analysis must be conducted in relation to the economic operator in question. Should any sort of risk factor emerge in relation to an AEO holding 
an authorisation, however, the authority which granted the authorisation is notified thereof and, in the light of the information received, it reviews 
the authorisation. In addition to the above, all of the risk information which comes to light must, pursuant to internal rules and regulations, be 
notified to  the central risk analysis  department  (the Risk Management  and Selection Department) which, on the basis of  that risk information, 
performs an analysis and, in the light of the risks identified, creates a built-in risk profile or proposes thematic or operator-based controls. The 
provisions of point 1.2.c. apply uniformly across the country to any customs procedure, regardless of the client’s AEO status. 
1.2.b Did you ensure proper coordination among customs services dealing with risk analysis and controls (central, regional, local services 
involved in risk analysis and release and post-release departments)?  
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
On the basis  of the procedure referred in  point 1.2, the regional service is  obliged to forward any risk information to the central  service. The 
central service however also maintains contact with local services via the contact points designated on the basis of the aforementioned internal 
rules and regulations and notifies them of all relevant risk information. 
1.2.c Do risk profiles specifically target traditional own resources and provide clear instructions with regard to the type of control to be 
carried out and risk guidance to the customs release officers? Is risk information shared with other Member States and feedback on the 
response to this information provided in the EU customs risk management system?  
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
We continuously monitor the risks to traditional own resources using the procedure referred in point 1.2 and a risk profile is created for them in 
the  risk  management  system.  Risk  profiles  can  only  be  generated,  amended  or  deleted  centrally  by  the  Risk  Management  and  Selection 
Department, but proposals to generate or amend them may also be made by the directorates. Every single risk profile contains clear information 
on the level of risk (low, moderate or high) and clear instructions to customs officials on the risk analysis approach to be followed, such as, for 
instance:   

100 

 
 
enhanced documentary controls; 
a physical inspection;  
sampling; 
a batch inspection; 
a check of the veracity of the customs value. 

- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
In all cases, these instructions indicate for what kind of risk a given control must be conducted and possibly whether any sort of special document 
needs to be requested and forwarded to the central service for any potential risk information to be further processed. In all cases, a risk analysis 
is  conducted  on  the  basis  of  the  risk  information  obtained  from  the  Anti-Fraud  Information  System  and  Risk  Information  Form  to  determine 
whether an identified risk is relevant in Hungary and whether there is a need to deal with it in some way (by means of a customs procedure or 
post-release control).  In all situations, the organisational unit sharing the risk information is informed of the measures taken in Hungary on the 
basis of  that information. Risk information identified in  Hungary is  shared by means  of  the Risk Information  Form system with other Member 
States and the Commission. 
1.2.d Is there close monitoring of the controls results (feedback) which is done in a structured manner to allow effective follow-up and 
strict implementation of mutual assistance instructions in place? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
The results of the controls are available to all services involved in performing the control and to the central service carrying out the risk analysis. 
The results are trackable and the information needing to be provided can be obtained from them. Where an AEO is concerned, negative control 
results must also be notified separately to the directorate supervising it. If, within the context of mutual assistance, the National Tax and Customs 
Administration receives a request to generate a risk profile to check some kind of defined turnover, the risk profile is generated. Should there be a 
match with the risk profile, the text of the instruction to the customs official performing the customs procedure is drawn up in such a way that the 
control activities required to deal with the risk enable the requested information to be obtained. Depending on the nature of the request, searches 
and  assessments  of  profile  match  results  are  scrutinised  daily/weekly/monthly  to  determine  whether  the  directorate  carrying  out  the  customs 
procedure has sent  all the desired information to  the Risk Management  and Selection  Department.  If not,  the Risk Management  and Selection 
Department  seeks  further  information  from  the  directorate  .  If  the  requested  information  is  available,  it  is  sent  to  the  party  which  requested 
mutual assistance in the form and at the frequency requested via the data transfer interface appropriate to the nature of the case. In addition to 

101 

 
 
the above, the internal operating and filing for built-in risk analysis is in the process of being fully computerised. 

1.3 OTHER MEASURES 
1.3.a Do you systematically include an automated random element and take into consideration the time-barring three-year period for the 
communication of customs debt as a risk indicator in the post-release risk analysis? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
Prior to notifying a proposal for a post-release control, the Risk Management and Selection Department always conducts analyses. These may 
concern a particular operator, a specific theme or specific goods. As a result of the analysis, customs procedures are selected which have given 
rise to suspicion of a VAT or customs debt or any other sort of abuse. The shortcomings identified are prioritised according to their seriousness 
(low-,  moderate-  or  high-risk),  then  transferred,  by  means  of  a  proposal  for  a  post-release  control,  to  customs  experts,  identifying  those 
declarations which are at risk of limitation. According to the National Tax and Customs Administration provision on the performance of customs 
controls and post-release controls, an annual post-release control plan must be drawn up in which selection – i.e. the precise determination of 
verifiably risky thematic issues and operators – takes place on the basis of defined and documented risk criteria. The risk assessment must ensure 
that,  during  the  selection  process,  operators  and  transactions  (declarations,  notifications)  representing  the  greatest  risk  are  selected  for  post 
release controls, and selection of operators or issues representing a moderate or low risk and the random selection of operations are reasonably 
applied. Selection is conducted at random to make economic operators aware that controls can be imposed at any time, irrespective of operators’ 
risk rating with local customs services. When planning post-release controls, particular attention must be paid to the communicability (limitation) 
of the customs debt; conducting a planned post-release control at a later date may not impede communication of the debt. 
1.3.b Do you ensure risk-oriented post-release audits which cover the operator's systems where this is necessary, apply a random element, 
guide  the  auditors  and  take  due  account  of  the  results  of  the  pre-authorisation  stage  and  of  specific  standardised  checklists?  Are  the 
results strictly monitored? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
When drawing up the annual post-release control plan, 87 distinct risk topics were taken into account in selecting for the control, but a random 
sample  was  also  taken.  Those  performing  the  control  received  information  on  the  risk  topics  being  investigated  in  writing.  The  results  of  the 
controls are uploaded into an electronic register and are therefore easy to access, and may serve as a basis for further risk analyses. On the basis 

102 

 
 
 
of the checklists in the Customs Audit Guide and taking these checklists into account, a Handbook was drawn up, which is available as an Annex 
to the National Tax and Customs Administration procedural order on the performance of customs controls and post-release controls. 
1.3.c  Are  customs  controls  on  operations  made  by  authorised  economic  operators  (AEO)  carried  out  taking  account  of  the  risk 
management performed with respect to the different elements of these operations? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
When selecting for post-release controls, AEOs are treated just like any other market participants, although when taking customs controls into 
consideration, on the whole, there are fewer physical  and documentary  controls,  as a reduction is applied. Also,  pursuant  to  the provision  on 
customs risk management and risk analysis activities issued by the National Tax and Customs Administration, when determining  whether there 
are goods declared for a customs procedure which have to be excluded from simplification, AEOs must be considered separately. Therefore, on 
the basis of the procedure referred to, prior to issuing an authorisation, the granting authority always requests that the Risk Management and 
Selection Department analyse those risks. When granting authorisation, the directorate takes into account the results of the control communicated 
in the case to the Risk Management and Selection Department. If, however, any directorate identifies any new risk which could have implications 
for  the AEO’s customs  procedures, the Risk  Management  and Selection  Department  is  informed  thereof,  conducts an analysis  of  that  risk and 
verifies whether the risk indicated does actually emerge in that operator’s case. If it does, the granting directorate is notified and a proposal on 
reviewing the authorisation is drawn up.  
1.3.d Do national  competent authorities  make  full  use of the handbook on operational  customs  controls  based on Member States’ best 
practices and of the Customs audit guide? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
The provision, issued by the National Tax and Customs Administration, on customs controls was drawn up on the basis of the principles enshrined 
in the Customs Audit Guide. Therefore full use is being made of the Guide at the time of post-release controls. The directorate uses the handbook 
when checking declarations, performing physical controls, checking the classification of goods and making recommendations on sampling. For a 
specific field, directorate applies the contents of the handbook to origin mutatis mutandis pursuant to the Union Customs Code. In terms of the 
customs value for a specific field, the handbook is not based on current legislation, so the part of the handbook relating to the provisions of the 
Union Customs Code applies to the directorates in full. The provisions on customs procedures contains the recommendations of the handbook, so 
the directorates apply them during their practice. 

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MT  1.1 UNDERVALUATION  

1.1 Are you remaining vigilant as regards the risk of undervaluation of goods? 
☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
If YES or YES, PARTLY, are you targeting in particular cheap products imported in extremely large quantities, such as textiles and footwear? 
☒YES, specifically those goods 
Note that imports of textiles and footwear are particularly being targeted since these involve large quantities. 

1.2 ENHANCEMENT OF CUSTOMS CONTROLS 
1.2.a Do you have strategies in place that target all types of customs procedure including simplified procedures and all operators taking 
into account AEOs and other large businesses considered compliant? 
YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
IT  simplified  procedures  are  not  implemented  as  yet.  Import  and  export  consignments  by  AEOs  may  be  physically  inspected  through  random 
selection. 
1.2.b Did you ensure proper coordination among customs services dealing with risk analysis and controls (central, regional, local services 
involved in risk analysis and release and post-release departments)?  
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
1.2.c Do risk profiles specifically target traditional own resources and provide clear instructions with regard to the type of control to be 
carried out and risk guidance to the customs release officers? Is risk information shared with other Member States and feedback on the 
response to this information provided in the EU customs risk management system?  
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
Traditional  Own  Resources  are  one  of  the  key  risk  areas  incorporated  in  profiles  uploaded  on  the  electronic  systems.  The  profiles  may 
incorporate instructions to Customs officials conducting physical inspection of goods. Potential (new) risks noted are shared with other Member 
states through the RIF system. 
1.2.d Is there close monitoring of the controls results (feedback) which is done in a structured manner to allow effective follow-up and 
strict implementation of mutual assistance instructions in place? 

104 

 
 
 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
Feedback is submitted in the ‘electronic inspection result’ tab by the Customs Official conducting the inspection. A detailed report outlining all 
endangered taxes and any additional anomalies found is also submitted manually and registered in the relevant file which is then forwarded to the 
Risk Management Unit for their perusal and any necessary action they deem appropriate. 
1.3 OTHER MEASURES 

1.3.a Do you systematically include an automated random element and take into consideration the time-barring three-year period for the 
communication of customs debt as a risk indicator in the post-release risk analysis? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
1.3.b Do you ensure risk-oriented post-release audits which cover the operator's systems where this is necessary, apply a random element, 
guide  the  auditors  and  take  due  account  of  the  results  of  the  pre-authorisation  stage  and  of  specific  standardised  checklists?  Are  the 
results strictly monitored? 
YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
The Department carries out risk-oriented post clearance audits but does not have the capacity to carry out system-based audits. 
1.3.c  Are  customs  controls  on  operations  made  by  authorised  economic  operators  (AEO)  carried  out  taking  account  of  the  risk 
management performed with respect to the different elements of these operations? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
1.3.d Do national  competent authorities  make  full  use of the handbook on operational  customs  controls  based on Member States’ best 
practices and of the Customs audit guide? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
A  ‘yes’  reply  here  is  being  submitted  conditionally  as  the  Department  consults  the  Customs  audit  Guide  when  conducting  any  type  of  audit 
assignment. 
1.1 UNDERVALUATION  

NL 

1.1 Are you remaining vigilant as regards the risk of undervaluation of goods? 

105 

 
 
 
 
☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
The  Netherlands  have  implemented  all  the  necessary  measures  to  assure  that  irregularities  via  the  known  and  described  methodology  will  be 
detected.  We  have  our  profiles  based  on  misdeclarations,  values  below  the  threshold  and  ad  random.  We  do  regularly  change  our  profiles  in 
detail and/or in percentage.   
If  YES  or  YES,  PARTLY,  are  you  targeting  in  particular  cheap  products  imported  in  extremely  large  quantities,  such  as  textiles  and 
footwear? 
☒YES, but targeting also other goods 

1.2 ENHANCEMENT OF CUSTOMS CONTROLS 

1.2.a Do you have strategies in place that target all types of customs procedure including simplified procedures and all operators taking 
into account AEOs and other large businesses considered compliant? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation. 
1.2.b Did you ensure proper coordination among customs services dealing with risk analysis and controls (central, regional, local services 
involved in risk analysis and release and post-release departments)?  
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
1.2.c Do risk profiles specifically target traditional own resources and provide clear instructions with regard to the type of control to be 
carried out and risk guidance to the customs release officers? Is risk information shared with other Member States and feedback on the 
response to this information provided in the EU customs risk management system?  
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
1.2.d Is there close monitoring of the controls results (feedback) which is done in a structured manner to allow effective follow-up and 
strict implementation of mutual assistance instructions in place? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

1.3 OTHER MEASURES 

106 

 
 
 
 
 
1.3.a Do you systematically include an automated random element and take into consideration the time-barring three-year period for the 
communication of customs debt as a risk indicator in the post-release risk analysis? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
1.3.b Do you ensure risk-oriented post-release audits which cover the operator's systems where this is necessary, apply a random element, 
guide  the  auditors  and  take  due  account  of  the  results  of  the  pre-authorisation  stage  and  of  specific  standardised  checklists?  Are  the 
results strictly monitored? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
1.3.c  Are  customs  controls  on  operations  made  by  authorised  economic  operators  (AEO)  carried  out  taking  account  of  the  risk 
management performed with respect to the different elements of these operations? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
1.3.d Do national  competent authorities  make  full  use of the handbook on operational  customs  controls  based on Member States’ best 
practices and of the Customs audit guide? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

AT 

1.1 UNDERVALUATION  
1.1 Are you remaining vigilant as regards the risk of undervaluation of goods? 
☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
We  apply  the  multi  layered  approach,  combining  information  from  the  local  customs  offices  with  information/intelligence  gathered  on  central 
level. Based on this we use new technical solutions (predictive analytics) to dismantle deviations/abnormalities. The products of these analysis are 
either risk profiles or ex post controls (document checks or post clearance audits) or a combination of measures depending on the supposed risk. 
If  YES  or  YES,  PARTLY,  are  you  targeting  in  particular  cheap  products  imported  in  extremely  large  quantities,  such  as  textiles  and 
footwear? 
☒YES, but targeting also other goods 
We  are  also  targeting  other  goods,  always  in  combination  with  other  risk  indicators  as  companies,  countries,  routing,  new  companies,  final 
destination of goods. 

107 

 
 
 
 
1.2 ENHANCEMENT OF CUSTOMS CONTROLS 
1.2.a Do you have strategies in place that target all types of customs procedure including simplified procedures and all operators taking 
into account AEOs and other large businesses considered compliant? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
Based on the EU risk management strategy we have established a national customs control strategy in which we have defined high risk areas in 
all customs and excise matters, applying combinations of several risk indicators. 
Compliant  companies  and  AEOs  are  taken  under  consideration,  but  not  automatically  excluded,  especially  forwarding  companies  with  AEO 
status are not considered as low risk and do not get a lower risk level. 
1.2.b Did you ensure proper coordination among customs services dealing with risk analysis and controls (central, regional, local services 
involved in risk analysis and release and post-release departments)?  
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
In Austria we have a so called “Anti-Fraud Network” which consists of risk/Anti- Fraud experts on local level, regional level and also on central 
level 
On central level (Federal Ministry of Finance) the Central Anti-Fraud Division is responsible for  
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
1.2.c Do risk profiles specifically target traditional own resources and provide clear instructions with regard to the type of control to be 
carried out and risk guidance to the customs release officers? Is risk information shared with other Member States and feedback on the 
response to this information provided in the EU customs risk management system?  
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

Information gathering/intelligence gathering 
Mutual assistance 
Investigations  
Profiling 
Ex post clearance audits 
Coordination of cases 

108 

 
 
 
In Austria Tax and Customs are merged. So the Central Anti-Fraud Department covers anti-fraud measures in the fields of customs, taxes, excise 
duties. Risk profiles cover customs, tax, excise and any combination. Information is shared, also with other member states and the commission, 
the full risk management circle is implemented including monitoring and evaluation. 
1.2.d Is there close monitoring of the controls results (feedback) which is done in a structured manner to allow effective follow-up and 
strict implementation of mutual assistance instructions in place? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
Yes, regulated in an internal rule book. 
1.3 OTHER MEASURES 
1.3.a Do you systematically include an automated random element and take into consideration the time-barring three-year period for the 
communication of customs debt as a risk indicator in the post-release risk analysis? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
A random element is used in the electronic profiling system. The three year period is an indicator for the risk analysis. 
1.3.b Do you ensure risk-oriented post-release audits which cover the operator's systems where this is necessary, apply a random element, 
guide  the  auditors  and  take  due  account  of  the  results  of  the  pre-authorisation  stage  and  of  specific  standardised  checklists?  Are  the 
results strictly monitored? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
We fully apply the EU audit guide. 
1.3.c  Are  customs  controls  on  operations  made  by  authorised  economic  operators  (AEO)  carried  out  taking  account  of  the  risk 
management performed with respect to the different elements of these operations? 
YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
On case by case basis. 
1.3.d Do national  competent authorities  make  full  use of the handbook on operational  customs  controls  based on Member States’ best 
practices and of the Customs audit guide? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

109 

 
 
PL 

1.1 UNDERVALUATION  

1.1 Are you remaining vigilant as regards the risk of undervaluation of goods? 
☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
The  competent  national  departments  are  aware  of  the  irregularities  relating  to  imports  into  the  EU  of  certain  products  originating  in,  for 
example, China, which may be concerned by the issue of customs undervaluation raised in the PIF Report. The activities of the Customs Attaché 
at the Polish Embassy in Beijing, a post created in 2016 in order to facilitate communication and cooperation between the Polish and Chinese 
customs  administrations,  continued  in  2018,  under  the  ‘Strategic  Framework  for  Customs  Cooperation  between  the  European  Union  and  the 
Government of the People’s Republic of China’ and in close cooperation with the European Union Delegation in Beijing. Following the meeting 
of the Polish delegation responsible for international administrative assistance with Chinese partners in November 2017 to discuss problems in 
implementing requests for administrative assistance, and thanks to the support of the Customs Attaché, a number of replies to such requests were 
received and were then  used as a basis for  initiating investigations  concerning undervaluation.  Two requests from 2018  which merit attention 
concerned goods exported from China via Ningbo and Xiamen, as the combined difference between the declared value and the value provided by 
the Chinese was over USD 3 million. 
If  YES  or  YES,  PARTLY,  are  you  targeting  in  particular  cheap  products  imported  in  extremely  large  quantities,  such  as  textiles  and 
footwear? 
☒YES, specifically those goods 
Poland has  implemented a control strategy for  customs  valuation  in respect  of  goods  classified under Chapters 61, 62 and 64 of the Common 
Customs Tariff (CCT) which are the most relevant from the risk analysis point of view. This strategy has been in place since 2014 and is known as 
the Reference Price System (System Cen Referencyjnych, SCR). Automatic risk analysis based on the SCR is carried out centrally. It is possible to 
carry  out  risk  analysis  both  for  customs  declarations  submitted  under  the  standard  procedure  and  for  those  submitted  under  the  simplified 
procedure.  The  SCR  is  applied  to  goods  imported  from  or  originating  in  China,  Bangladesh  and  Turkey.  The  strategy  may  cover  all  types  of 
customs procedures (the elements of the strategy are also described in subsequent sections of the document). In 2018, the scope of the SCR was 
extended to include goods of certain headings of Chapter 63 of the CCT imported from or originating in China. 
In addition, Poland is involved in the work of the V4 Working Group on preventing customs undervaluation of textiles and footwear originating in 
Asia.  The  group  implements  the  joint  declaration  of  the  V4  countries’  customs  administrations  on  introducing  risk  profiles  for  textiles  and 
footwear  imported  from  Asian  countries,  which  was  adopted  by  the  Heads  of  Customs  Administrations  of  the  Visegrad  Group  of  countries  in 

110 

 
 
 
Trenčín in 2016. This declaration provides the basis for the introduction of a common methodology for determining ‘fair prices’ and threshold 
values as a tool for estimating risk in relation to the declared customs values of certain textiles and footwear of Chinese origin. The risk profiles 
make  it  possible  to  automatically  identify  cases  in  which  the  customs  authorities  may  have  reasonable  grounds  to  doubt  the  reliability  of  the 
declared customs value of the above goods. The risk analysis covered goods classified under 120 tariff codes (Chapters 61, 62 and 64) which are 
presented under customs procedures 40, 42 and 63. 

1.2 ENHANCEMENT OF CUSTOMS CONTROLS 

1.2.a Do you have strategies in place that target all types of customs procedure including simplified procedures and all operators taking 
into account AEOs and other large businesses considered compliant? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
The activities carried out by the National Revenue Administration (KAS) in the area of controls and risk management cover all aspects set out in 
EU and national customs legislation, and IT systems and analytical tools cover all customs procedures and operators. 
Within the KAS there is a dedicated Strategic Analysis Centre (Dział Strategiczne Centrum Analiz - DSCA), which among other things carries out 
the activities referred to in Recommendation 1, such as:  
- conducting risk analysis for trade in goods at central level; 
- establishing risk profiles in operational systems (inter alia: AIS, AES, NCTS); 
- exchanging risk information with Member States and the EC via the CRMS/RIF system and providing feedback; 
-  cooperating  with  OLAF  on  the  use  of  risk  information  transmitted  via  MA  communications  in  the  AFIS  system,  implementing  the  OLAF 
recommendations they contain and providing feedback;  
- exchanging information under agreements which Poland has signed with the Visegrad (V4) countries.  
 The activities of the DSCA serve to make use of control units and enhance the effectiveness of controls. 
1.2.b Did you ensure proper coordination among customs services dealing with risk analysis and controls (central, regional, local services 
involved in risk analysis and release and post-release departments)?  
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

111 

 
 
 
 
With  a  view  to  ensuring  that  actions  are  properly  distributed  and  are  coherent  and  coordinated,  risk  management,  including  in  the  area  of 
customs valuation, is carried out at all levels in the organisational structure of the KAS: 
- central – the Strategic Analysis Centre (DSCA); 
- regional – the regional revenue administration offices and customs and revenue offices; 
- local – the customs posts. 
Providing and exchanging information in the area of risk management and controls is standard practice among the KAS organisational units and 
generally takes  place automatically via  the integrated risk analysis  system (ZISAR). In the case  of  IT systems, due to  process  automation, risk 
profiles  (or  post-import  control  instructions)  entered  into  the  systems  contain  guidance  (or  a  recommendation)  for  the  entity  performing  the 
control, clearly stating the control measures to be taken and the scope of those measures.  
1.2.c Do risk profiles specifically target traditional own resources and provide clear instructions with regard to the type of control to be 
carried out and risk guidance to the customs release officers? Is risk information shared with other Member States and feedback on the 
response to this information provided in the EU customs risk management system?  
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
The use of the central tool (SCR) allows risk analysis to be performed at each risk management level, which may ultimately lead to the creation of 
risk profiles with the relevant scope. Risk profiles are also established at central level, at the request of a regional or local unit, where the risks 
identified may not just be local. Risk profiles include guidance for the entity performing the control, setting out clearly what measures are to be 
taken and the scope of those measures.  
The  detailed  procedure,  the  roles  and  duties  of  the  organisational  units  of  the  KAS  responsible  for  tasks  related  to  the  processing  of  customs 
declarations related to the activation of the risk profile concerned, and checks on these customs declarations after the release of the goods, are 
described in the guidelines on ‘Verifying the declared customs value of textiles and footwear imported from Far Eastern countries (mainly from 
China)’. In addition, the SCR includes links to the benchmark database with the average prices of goods classified under the same CCT code on 
the export market. The SCR, a computerised tool which supports risk assessment relating to customs undervaluation, allows ‘reference prices’ 
(threshold values) to be determined on the basis of accepted assumptions. The price level in the SCR is updated on the basis of the findings of a 
systemic risk analysis in the area of customs value. The price levels indicated are variable and are regarded as comparative values or points of 
reference rather than  fixed or mandatory  values. The solutions  adopted make it possible to  focus verification  and control  activities on entities 

112 

 
 
which grossly understate the customs value of imported goods. The reference prices in the SCR are implemented in the operating systems which 
register the customs declarations upon import: CELINA and AIS.  
The Member States and the Commission exchange information on risks and provide feedback via the CRMS/RIF system. We cooperate with OLAF 
on the use of risk information transmitted via MA communications in the AFIS system and OLAF recommendations, and information is exchanged 
under the agreements which Poland has signed with the V4 Visegrad countries. 
1.2.d Is there close monitoring of the controls results (feedback) which is done in a structured manner to allow effective follow-up and 
strict implementation of mutual assistance instructions in place? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
The integrated risk analysis system (ZISAR) is in operation in the KAS. The system was created: 
— to streamline and improve the flow of information between control entities; 
— to provide coherent automated risk analysis services for operating systems;  
— to manage control processes; 
— to support decision-making on information assessment activities, risk analysis, selecting and commissioning control measures and monitoring 
their effects; 
— to streamline control procedures through the use of risk analysis mechanisms. 
The system allows the operation and effectiveness of risk profiles in the operational systems and the results of controls carried out on the basis of 
those profiles to be monitored; at a later stage of the risk management process this is reflected in the assessments of risk profiles carried out as 
part of their periodic reviews. 
In  addition,  in  the  context  of  the  tasks  it  carries  out  in  the  area  of  mutual  cooperation  amongst  others,  the  DSCA  implements  and 
monitors/coordinates the cases that have been initiated in the CRMS/RIF system or by OLAF and ensures that feedback is provided. 

1.3 OTHER MEASURES 

1.3.a Do you systematically include an automated random element and take into consideration the time-barring three-year period for the 
communication of customs debt as a risk indicator in the post-release risk analysis? 

113 

 
 
 
 
YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
The random element is applied in automated risk analysis in IT systems when selecting customs declarations for checks. It is not used in the post-
release selection of goods for checks. 
 The three-year period for the communication of a customs debt before it is time-barred is taken into consideration as a risk factor.  
In addition, the DSCA and all other regional revenue administration offices have been instructed to take the necessary measures set out in this 
recommendation with a view to factoring them into the risk management process. 
1.3.b Do you ensure risk-oriented post-release audits which cover the operator's systems where this is necessary, apply a random element, 
guide  the  auditors  and  take  due  account  of  the  results  of  the  pre-authorisation  stage  and  of  specific  standardised  checklists?  Are  the 
results strictly monitored? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
A provision has been introduced into national law which clearly indicates that controls, including post-release controls, are to be performed on 
the basis of risk analysis results. The exceptions to this are random checks or those arising from a legal obligation. The control activities carried 
out  use  the  methodology  set  out  in  the  Customs  audit  guide.  At  the  same  time,  the  control  activities  and  their  results  are  monitored  using  the 
functionalities of the ZISAR system referred to in points 1.2b and 1.2d. 
1.3.c  Are  customs  controls  on  operations  made  by  authorised  economic  operators  (AEO)  carried  out  taking  account  of  the  risk 
management performed with respect to the different elements of these operations? 
YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
The  DSCA  and  all  other  regional  revenue  administration  offices  have  been  instructed  to  take  the  necessary  measures  arising  from  this 
recommendation with a view to factoring them into the risk management process. 
1.3.d Do national  competent authorities  make  full  use of the handbook on operational  customs  controls  based on Member States’ best 
practices and of the Customs audit guide? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
For the purpose of performing post-release controls, the KAS uses the methodology set out in the Customs audit guide. 
1.1 UNDERVALUATION  

PT 

114 

 
 
 
1.1 Are you remaining vigilant as regards the risk of undervaluation of goods? 
☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
If  YES  or  YES,  PARTLY,  are  you  targeting  in  particular  cheap  products  imported  in  extremely  large  quantities,  such  as  textiles  and 
footwear? 
☒YES, specifically those goods 

1.2 ENHANCEMENT OF CUSTOMS CONTROLS 
1.2.a Do you have strategies in place that target all types of customs procedure including simplified procedures and all operators taking 
into account AEOs and other large businesses considered compliant? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
1.2.b Did you ensure proper coordination among customs services dealing with risk analysis and controls (central, regional, local services 
involved in risk analysis and release and post-release departments)?  
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
1.2.c Do risk profiles specifically target traditional own resources and provide clear instructions with regard to the type of control to be 
carried out and risk guidance to the customs release officers? Is risk information shared with other Member States and feedback on the 
response to this information provided in the EU customs risk management system?  
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
1.2.d Is there close monitoring of the controls results (feedback) which is done in a structured manner to allow effective follow-up and 
strict implementation of mutual assistance instructions in place? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
1.3 OTHER MEASURES 
1.3.a Do you systematically include an automated random element and take into consideration the time-barring three-year period for the 
communication of customs debt as a risk indicator in the post-release risk analysis? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
1.3.b Do you ensure risk-oriented post-release audits which cover the operator's systems where this is necessary, apply a random element, 

115 

 
 
 
guide  the  auditors  and  take  due  account  of  the  results  of  the  pre-authorisation  stage  and  of  specific  standardised  checklists?  Are  the 
results strictly monitored? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
1.3.c  Are  customs  controls  on  operations  made  by  authorised  economic  operators  (AEO)  carried  out  taking  account  of  the  risk 
management performed with respect to the different elements of these operations? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
1.3.d Do national  competent authorities  make  full  use of the handbook on operational  customs  controls  based on Member States’ best 
practices and of the Customs audit guide? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
1.1 UNDERVALUATION  

RO 

1.1 Are you remaining vigilant as regards the risk of undervaluation of goods? 
☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
At national level, measures were taken to monitor the declared customs values by: 
- for the selection at customs control, periodic updating of the database used for under-valuation risk profile existing in the risk management IT 
module (RMF), by updating the threshold values (EFP); 
- methodological guidance to territorial structures which, taking into account the Commission's recommendations, clarify the follow-up of under-
valuation and setting the values considered acceptable for establishing the actual transaction value of the operations that were the subject of  the 
risk profile of OLAF's alert AM 2015/013. 
- methodological guidance to territorial structures which, taking into account the findings of the DG BUGET Report no. 18-27-1 requires that a 
risk analysis be carried out on declarations lodged in the period 01/01/2015-01/09/2019 that have been selected by the risk profiles for under-
valuation to include in the re-verification programs those for which the customs value is less than the LAP value. 
- Carrying out checks at the premises of economic operators as a result of requests from customs offices; 
- In October 2018 territorial structures received the updating of the document "Recommendations for the determination of the customs value of 
goods brought into the customs territory of the Union" for the application of the methods for determining the value in the wake of the Agreement 
on the Application of Article VII of the Agreement general for tariffs and trade. 
If  YES  or  YES,  PARTLY,  are  you  targeting  in  particular  cheap  products  imported  in  extremely  large  quantities,  such  as  textiles  and 

116 

 
 
 
footwear? 
☒YES, but targeting also other goods 
Regardless of the category of goods, any information regarding customs operations carried out at national level suspected of under-valuation, 
transmitted by the system of signaling set up at OLAF level is being subject to an analysis at the level of the specialized structure from the DGV in 
order to update risk profiles in the RMF module database. In the year 2018, acted two risk profiles: 
-  a  risk  profile  designed  to  combat  under-valuation,  which  includes  671  tariff  CN  codes  at  8  digits  for  36  countries  of  origin,  updated  for  a 
number of  91 items, based on the information available in the THESEUS and AMT data bases. 
- A risk profile based on information from RIFs and encompassing both CN codes and companies names (exporters and / or recipients). 

1.2 ENHANCEMENT OF CUSTOMS CONTROLS 

1.2.a Do you have strategies in place that target all types of customs procedure including simplified procedures and all operators taking 
into account AEOs and other large businesses considered compliant? 
☐YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
In accordance with the provisions of Reg. 952/2013, all customs procedures that are subject to the granting of an authorization are applied in 
compliance with the working norms developed at DGV level, the approval of the issuance of authorization  involving pre-audit and monitoring 
actions. In 2018, they were updated: 
-  the Norms on the use of simplified customs declarations and entry in the declarant's records. 
- the Technical Norms regarding the registration for customs purposes of the economic operators and other persons. 
1.2.b Did you ensure proper coordination among customs services dealing with risk analysis and controls (central, regional, local services 
involved in risk analysis and release and post-release departments)?  
☐YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
According  to  the  working  methodologies  in  force,  the  risk  analysis  is  performed  both  at  the  moment  of  receiving  the  conclusive  data  and 
information and in the stage of preparation of the control. Thus, in the case of OLAF's  financial impact alerts, each message has a case officer, 
who analyzes the data and information received, develops the associated risk profile, ask for the start of controls and tracks the results. In 2018, 

117 

 
 
 
 
for  the  30  received  alerts,  for  5  of  them  were    identified  in  the  DGV  database  of  customs  operations  that  fall  under  the  risk  criteria,  with 
subsequent controls at the level of territorial structures, prescription and reporting deadlines for OLAF being taken into account. 
1.2.c Do risk profiles specifically target traditional own resources and provide clear instructions with regard to the type of control to be 
carried out and risk guidance to the customs release officers? Is risk information shared with other Member States and feedback on the 
response to this information provided in the EU customs risk management system?  
☐YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
In  the  year  2018  functioned  at  national  level  the  automatic  selection  of  customs  declarations  based  on  the  existing  risk  profiles  in  the  risk 
management IT module. The risk profiles are set to target the mandatory fields to be filled in the customs declarations.When the data in one of 
these  fields  corresponds  to  the  risk  profile  indicators  /  criteria,  the  declaration  is  selected  for  a  control  lane  (documentary  or  physical)  and 
customs officers have to apply a mandatory procedure described in the risk profile. Risk profiles can be set to target a heading or a combination 
of headings in the customs declaration, using logic combining algorithms. Additionally there is a random selection that directs declarations to 
different customs clearance (without control –green lane, physical control-red line or documentary control- orange line) as well as a risk profile 
that selects the companies that perform the first operation at a customs office and these are automatically directed to the physical control. These 
risk profiles can target any information existing in the customs declaration, from the consignee and the sender to the tariff classification or origin 
declared. A total of 139 risk profiles were implemented in 2018, of which 30 following OLAF alerts, 1 profile was updated following the ISPRA 
database analysis and 1 profile as a result of the RIF message analysis. Romania introduced or updated in 2018 a total of 243 RIF forms, 18 
being updated. 
Regarding  RIF  forms  introduced  by  the  Commission  or  other  States,  they  are  analyzed  by  specialized  services  according  to  the  risk  category 
(financial, safety and security, etc.). In general, for the risks described in RIF forms introduced by the Commission it is established a risk profiles 
and  for  the  RIF  forms  issued  by  other  Member  States  an  analysis  is  made  to  identify  whether  or  not  the  risk  exists  in  Romania.  If  there  are 
identified  operations  in  Romania  containing  data  from  those  RIF  forms  and  their  number  is  significant,  risk  profiles  based  on  the  speciffic 
information in the RIF form are introduced. In all cases a feed-back is sent to the RIF form. 
1.2.d Is there close monitoring of the controls results (feedback) which is done in a structured manner to allow effective follow-up and 
strict implementation of mutual assistance instructions in place? 

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☐YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
In accordance with the internal procedures applicable, mutual assistance and customs cooperation are carried out at the central level based on 
requests coming from local structures. All requests have to be analyzed in terms of the subject, matter of the request, the scope of action and the 
measures required. In 2018, we updated the OLAF alert methodology, a methodology that provides all steps to address these alerts. 
1.3 OTHER MEASURES 

1.3.a Do you systematically include an automated random element and take into consideration the time-barring three-year period for the 
communication of customs debt as a risk indicator in the post-release risk analysis? 
☐YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
In 2018, the implementation of a random selection program for customs declarations with customs clearance was completed in the IT system with 
a view to their inclusion in the subsequent quarterly control program. Starting with the Control Program for the IV quarter 2018  the territorial 
structures  will  include  in  the  post-control  activity  at  the  headquarters  of  the  economic  operator  controls  of  customs  declarations  that  were 
randomly selected by the IT system, control taking into account all possible violations of customs legislation according to the object of activity 
and the specificity of the foreign trade operations carried out by the economic operator, the number of customs declarations selected financial 
impact as well as actions to re-verify at the customs office issuing the customs declarations that have been issued on the green customs clearance 
corridor. 
1.3.b Do you ensure risk-oriented post-release audits which cover the operator's systems where this is necessary, apply a random element, 
guide  the  auditors  and  take  due  account  of  the  results  of  the  pre-authorisation  stage  and  of  specific  standardised  checklists?  Are  the 
results strictly monitored? 
☐NO 
Up to now, no further customs controls have been carried out on operators' systems in the absence of the national legal framework. Currently, the 
process  of  amending  the  ANAF  Order  7521/2006  on  the  Technical  Norms  of  Customs  Surveillance  and  Control  is  in  progress  and  the  new 
provisions will include this method  of  customs  control  later,  with  the full  application of  the methodology contained in  the TAXUD document  - 
Customs Audit Guide. 

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1.3.c  Are  customs  controls  on  operations  made  by  authorised  economic  operators  (AEO)  carried  out  taking  account  of  the  risk 
management performed with respect to the different elements of these operations? 
☐YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
The selection for customs controls is based on the risk analysis using the specialized IT module. The selection is performed automatically in the 
system, based on the existing risk criteria at a given time. There is no requirement in the system for the non-application of the risk criteria to AEO 
operator,  so  that  if  the  operations  performed  by  an  AEO  operator  are  covered  by  a  risk  criterion,  they  are  certainly  selected.  Because  AEO 
operator  is  considered  trustworthy  company,  their  operations  are  considered  as  low-risk  and  in  some  situations,  based  on  local  risk  analysis 
operations may not be part of the controlled sample. Because in the ICS module we implement the CRC information, only authorizations AEO S 
and AEO C+S are not selected by the IT system. 
1.3.d Do national  competent authorities  make  full  use of the handbook on operational  customs  controls  based on Member States’ best 
practices and of the Customs audit guide? 
☐YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
In  2018  both  documents  were  distributed  to  the  specialized  personnel  within  the  structures  with  control  responsibilities  at  the  local  level 
(2014 version of Customs Audit Guide) as “savoir faire” for usage of the contained information in the activity of preparing and carrying out 
the control actions. 

Sl 

1.1 UNDERVALUATION  

1.1 Are you remaining vigilant as regards the risk of undervaluation of goods? 
☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
Undervaluation  and the  fight  against  undervaluation  fraud are one of  the main topics in  Financial  Administration in  the Republic of  Slovenia 
(FARS). To achieve these goal, the indicators of undervalued goods are developed according to the Estimated Fair Prices (EFP), which can  be 
found  in  AFIS  (OLAF)  –  Automated  Monitoring  Tool  (AMT)  and  also  in  Theseus  application  developed  by  Joint  Research  Centre  (JRC). 
According to these specific reference prices (EFP), which take into consideration the 8-digit Tariff Code and Country of Origin, the risk profiles 
are launched to ensure the further activities needed at customs released phase. Furthermore, some analyses are performed in order to monitor the 
stay of play, to plan the post-release audits and sometimes Mutual Assistance requests. Moreover, the special application was developed by FARS 

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customs officers dealing with undervaluation use national application QlikView as a tool for controlling customs value through OLAF-

workshops  on  all  (eight)  Financial  Offices  (follow  up  of  the  Seminar  on  undervaluation,  held  in  2017)  where  different  topics  were 

two trainings for experts in post-release audits, 
creation of a third national risk profile on undervaluation in the risk management system aiming at first time declarants with procedure 40 

to ensure the detailed analyses in real time and to estimate the possible customs debt made by undervaluation. Goods are not released into free 
circulation  unless  declarants  of  potentially  undervalued  goods  remove  the  authorities’  reasonable  doubts  about  the  accuracy  of  the  declared 
value. 
In 2018 and beginning of 2019 the following actions were undertaken: 
• 
discussed: 
a) new Guidelines on the verification of the declared customs value and procedures for determination of a new customs value, No 35/2017,  
b) Protocol for recording the process of a verification of the customs declaration due to undervaluation, and  
c) actual undervaluation cases. 
Support and advice at the moment of assessment of accuracy of the declared value and with implementation of the Protocol was offered. 
• 
JRC clean average prices, 
• 
• 
and/or 42 for chapters 42, 54 to 64, HS codes 3923 and 3926, for goods with Chinese origin, 
• 
creation of a fourth national risk profile on undervaluation in the risk management system aiming at all declarants, all procedures, certain 
origins and only certain goods with which the highest financial effect is estimated, where declared customs value reaches from 21% to 50 % of 
the OLAF-JRC clean average prices. In the risk profile visible to the customs officer actual undervaluation percentage is shown. 
If  YES  or  YES,  PARTLY,  are  you  targeting  in  particular  cheap  products  imported  in  extremely  large  quantities,  such  as  textiles  and 
footwear? 
☐YES, specifically those goods 
 As stated above, the whole set of EFPs are downloaded for whole Chapters of Customs Tariff Code and possible Country of Origin and in this 
way all kind of goods, which are imported into EU in SI can be examined and compared with EFPs. Consequently, the rate of undervaluation of 
particularly imported goods according to EFPs can be established. As can be seen, all kind of goods of different Origin can be targeted against 
undervaluation not only textiles and footwear.    FARS is targeting all cheap products imported in extremely large quantities, such as textiles and 
footwear, but targeting also other goods, through: 
• 

national application QlikView as a tool for controlling customs value through OLAF-JRC clean average prices, 

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four national risk profiles on undervaluation in the risk management system 

• 
1.2 ENHANCEMENT OF CUSTOMS CONTROLS 

1.2.a Do you have strategies in place that target all types of customs procedure including simplified procedures and all operators taking 
into account AEOs and other large businesses considered compliant? 
☐YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
As we said before, our strategies are based on possible customs debt, rate of undervaluation, country of origin or Customs Tariff Code, Economic 
Operator,[…]. In this way, we can cover all kind of customs procedures including simplified procedures and all kind of economic operator no 
matter if there are AEO or large businesses.   
1.2.b Did you ensure proper coordination among customs services dealing with risk analysis and controls (central, regional, local services 
involved in risk analysis and release and post-release departments)?  
☐YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
The  proper  coordination  among  customs  services  is  ensured  with  central  risk  profiles  and  unique  common  view  on  situation  with  developed 
special application for monitoring valuation of goods. Furthermore, some workshops were carried out with local officers to acquaint them with 
best  practice and the strategies and to  get  proper  feedbacks.  A special working group was also  set  up to  deal  and  enhance the activities with 
undervaluation. Moreover, some meetings were also held with the post-release audit inspectors to give them the guidelines about the topics and to 
get some oral feedbacks. Feedbacks can be also monitor with the activation history of particular risk profile or with examination of the minutes in 
post-release audits control.   
FARS ensures proper coordination among General Financial Department`s units dealing with: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
and all Financial Offices` Operational Centres where declared customs value is verified and new one is determined where estimated necessary.” 

customs value, 
financial controls (post-release), 
risk profiles,  
QlikView Application,  

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at the Seminar on undervaluation held in 2017 at which representatives from all stated above have been present, 
at workshops on all Offices` Operational Centres, 
at trainings for experts in post-release audits, 
to customs officers in the text of risk profiles, created in cooperation with Risk Profile Unit. 

Unit dealing with customs value ensures proper coordination with in detail instructions: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
1.2.c Do risk profiles specifically target traditional own resources and provide clear instructions with regard to the type of control to be 
carried out and risk guidance to the customs release officers? Is risk information shared with other Member States and feedback on the 
response to this information  provided in the EU customs risk management system?  
☐YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
Created  risk  profiles  provide  clear  instructions  with  regard  to  the  type  of  control  to  be  carried  out  and  risk  guidance  to  the  customs  release 
officers.  Risk  profiles  specifically  target  Traditional  Own  Resources  (TORs)  and  provide  clear  instructions  about  the  type  of  control.  These 
profiles also give the guidance concerned at customs clearance. Furthermore, special guidance is given to the inspectors at post-release audits in 
order to have the common approach of particular topic. In some cases, the Mutual Assistance requests are launched.      
1.2.d Is there close monitoring of the controls results (feedback)  which is done in a structured manner to allow effective follow-up and 
strict implementation of mutual assistance instructions in place? 
☐YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
Feedback at customs clearance is monitored in the risk profile files and the post-release audit files, which allow effective follow-up. Sometimes 
the  special  analyse  is  made  on  these  findings  in  order  to  set  up  another  risk  profile  or  to  launch  another  post-release  audits  based  on  these 
findings.    
1.3 OTHER MEASURES 
1.3.a Do you systematically include an automated random element and take into consideration the time-barring three-year period for the 
communication of customs debt as a risk indicator in the post-release risk analysis? 
☐YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
In post-release audit plan, the time-barring three-year period for the communication of customs debt and random automated selection are taken 

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into consideration. In this way, these kind of economic operators are selected and examined.   
1.3.b Do you ensure risk-oriented post-release audits which cover the operator's systems where this is necessary, apply a random element, 
guide  the  auditors  and  take  due  account  of  the  results  of  the  pre-authorisation  stage  and  of  specific  standardised  checklists?  Are  the 
results strictly monitored? 
☐YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
We implement different risk-oriented elements in post-release audits including random element. We also use the Customs Audit Guide for auditors 
and check list when necessary. The auditors also examine minutes of previous post-release audits and other information to include the risk areas 
and to ensure the more successful audit.   
1.3.c  Are  customs  controls  on  operations  made  by  authorised  economic  operators  (AEO)  carried  out  taking  account  of  the  risk 
management performed with respect to the different elements of these operations? 
☐YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
When the AEO authorisation is achieved by the economic operator, a special monitoring plan is established, which also contains the risks with 
regard to particular conditions and measures. These plans are published in FURS Intranet, and the risks shall be followed-up by the auditors who 
perform latter audits. After new post-release audit, new findings are entered in the monitoring plan, which are valid until next post-release audit. 
1.3.d Do national  competent authorities  make  full  use of the handbook on operational  customs  controls  based on Member States’ best 
practices and of the Customs audit guide? 
☐YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
Our national competent authorities make full use of the handbook on operational customs controls based on Member States’ best practices and of 
the  Customs  audit  guide.  These  documents  are  adopted  in  our  system.  We  also  use  the  guidelines  or  special  instructions  when  necessary, 
depended on the main topic of the post-release audits.      
1.1 UNDERVALUATION  

SK 

1.1 Are you remaining vigilant as regards the risk of undervaluation of goods? 
☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
Expanding of the „risk profiles" in automated national risk profiling to combat fraud in the area of undervaluation of goods. 

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If  YES  or  YES,  PARTLY,  are  you  targeting  in  particular  cheap  products  imported  in  extremely  large  quantities,  such  as  textiles  and 
footwear? 
☐YES, but targeting also other goods 
Risk profiles  were also  applied to  other risk goods for  which the highest  degree of  undervaluation was  recorded in  relation to the quantity of 
imported goods. 

1.2 ENHANCEMENT OF CUSTOMS CONTROLS 

1.2.a Do you have strategies in place that target all types of customs procedure including simplified procedures and all operators taking 
into account AEOs and other large businesses considered compliant? 
☐YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
The post-release control system for simplified authorization holders is in line with current legislation and is in line with the recommendations of 
the European Commission where the risk analysis for post-clearance checks should take due account of the business risks of the operator, as well 
as the risk of a preclusion of a customs debt notification after three years. 
1.2.b Did you ensure proper coordination among customs services dealing with risk analysis and controls (central, regional, local services 
involved in risk analysis and release and post-release departments)?  
☐YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
Central risk analysis and local risk analysis are on diferent section in the Financial Directorate organisational structure. While the Central risk 
analysis is the part of the Risk analysis section, the local analysis is the part of the Customs Office, which is the part of Customs Section. 
1.2.c Do risk profiles specifically target traditional own resources and provide clear instructions with regard to the type of control to be 
carried out and risk guidance to the customs release officers? Is risk information shared with other Member States and feedback on the 
response to this information provided in the EU customs risk management system?  
☐YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
1.2.d Is there close monitoring of the controls results (feedback) which is done in a structured manner to allow effective follow-up and 
strict implementation of mutual assistance instructions in place? 

125 

 
 
 
 
☐YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
1.3 OTHER MEASURES 

1.3.a Do you systematically include an automated random element and take into consideration the time-barring three-year period for the 
communication of customs debt as a risk indicator in the post-release risk analysis? 
☐YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
Already  in  the  planning  phase  of  post-release  controls,  the  limitation  of  a  three-year  period  for  the  notification  of  a  customs  debt  within  the 
meaning  of  Article  103  (1)  of  the  Union  Customs  Code  have  to  be  taken  into  account.  Where  the  customs  debt  is  established  as  a  result  of  a 
criminal offense, the time limit for the notification of a customs debt, within the meaning of Article 103 (2) of the UCC is, in accordance with 
Slovak law, extended to 5 years. 
1.3.b Do you ensure risk-oriented post-release audits which cover the operator's systems where this is necessary, apply a random element, 
guide  the  auditors  and  take  due  account  of  the  results  of  the  pre-authorisation  stage  and  of  specific  standardised  checklists?  Are  the 
results strictly monitored? 
☐YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
The  Unit  of  Post-Release  Controls  requires  the  Unit  of  Risk  Analysis  (and  some  more  Units)  to  prepare  a  National  Plan  of  Controls  with  a 
requirement to suggest operators to be subject of post-release control. In addition to this, the Unit of Post-Release Control continuously processes 
the incentives from the Unit of Risk Analysis and forward them to the Units of post-release control located on the particular Customs offices to 
perform post-release control. The outcome of the post-release control is get back to the Unit of Risk Analysis. 
1.3.c  Are  customs  controls  on  operations  made  by  authorised  economic  operators  (AEO)  carried  out  taking  account  of  the  risk 
management performed with respect to the different elements of these operations? 
☐YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
AEO´s are subject of risk analysis and only the internal guideline allowed perform less controls. 
1.3.d Do national  competent authorities  make  full  use of the handbook on operational  customs  controls  based on Member States’ best 
practices and of the Customs audit guide? 

126 

 
 
 
☐YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
All the Units of post release controls located on customs offices have a customs audit manual available and should be guided by the post-
release  control  carry-out.  In  2016,  training  on  audit  performance  was  also  carried  out  under  this  manual,  with  representatives  of  all  the 

Units of post release controls located on customs offices. 

FI 

1.1 UNDERVALUATION  

1.1 Are you remaining vigilant as regards the risk of undervaluation of goods? 
☐YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
Regarding the post-release analysis on undervaluation, in 2018 the focus was in royalties and license payments. The Finnish Customs have had 
some  good  results  with  this  kind  of  analysis  (e.g.  RIF  FI/2017/011).  Several  targets  were  included  to  the  annual  audit  plan  for  year  2019.  In 
addition to this, we carried out risk analysis where we used the information on payments regarding the immaterial licenses paid by companies. 
We got this information from tax administration and compered it against the customs import declarations. Two target companies were send to 
company  audit  as  a  result.  Considering  the  risk  profiles  on  undervaluation,  we  have  technical  challenges,  because  our  current  risk  analysis 
system, used on import declarations, does not support average price calculation. Therefore, we are not able to include the threshold prices in our 
risk profiles. 
If  YES  or  YES,  PARTLY,  are  you  targeting  in  particular  cheap  products  imported  in  extremely  large  quantities,  such  as  textiles  and 
footwear? 
☐YES, but targeting also other goods 
During  2018,  we  have  analyzed  more  royalties  and  licences  in  general.  Normally  we  analyse  larger  sector  of  products,  not  only  textiles  and 
footwear. Textiles and footwear has been one target area during the audit planning process.  We use RIF messages and those taric codes that 
appear most frequently in  financial RIF messages, as a guidance for  annual  audit plan. The aim is  to  look at the trends in RIF messages and 
respond to the threats that have been detected in other member states and by Taxud. 

1.2 ENHANCEMENT OF CUSTOMS CONTROLS 

1.2.a Do you have strategies in place that target all types of customs procedure including simplified procedures and all operators taking 

127 

 
 
 
 
 
into account AEOs and other large businesses considered compliant? 
☐YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
Different  kind  of  operators  and  control  areas/procedures  are  taken  into  account  during  real-time  and  audit  planning  process  and  targeting. 
However, this is a development area in Finland e.g. better IT solutions to analyse holder of the authorisations. 
1.2.b Did you ensure proper coordination among customs services dealing with risk analysis and controls (central, regional, local services 
involved in risk analysis and release and post-release departments)?  
☐YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
Yearly  audit  planning  process  is  done  in  cooperation  between  audit  control  and  analysis  and  intelligence.  During  the  process,  we  ask  all  the 
interest groups, if they have any suggestions or initiatives for risk management and targeting. We give feedback to the interest groups, what has 
happened to these initiatives. 
1.2.c Do risk profiles specifically target traditional own resources and provide clear instructions with regard to the type of control to be 
carried out and risk guidance to the customs release officers? Is risk information shared with other Member States and feedback on the 
response to this information provided in the EU customs risk management system?  
☐YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
Yes,  profiles  are  specifically  target  traditional  own  resources.  Finland  participates  commissions  Customs2020  financial  risk  criteria  (FRC)  – 
group. There we create together profiles for import and especially for own resources (anti-dumping, undervaluation etc.). In Finland, we use both 
FRC profiles and national profiles.  Risk profiles contains always guidelines (help text) how to perform the documentary and/or physical control. 
In  case  of  physical  controls  of  more  challenging  goods,  there  can  also  be  more  detailed,  separate  guidelines  to  perform  the  physical  control. 
Finland use CRMS system and make new RIF message based on results of the risk profiles, controls of Corporate audit unit etc. if there is a new 
element of fraud. 
1.2.d Is there close monitoring of the controls results (feedback) which is done in a structured manner to allow effective follow-up and 
strict implementation of mutual assistance instructions in place? 
☐NO 
The monitoring of the results of risk profiles with our present risk analysis system is manual. All the findings and results  of risk profiles has to 

128 

 
 
pick up one by one. We analyse some of the results and some more profound analysis is made because of these results. Eg. The risk profiles based 
on AM messages. Monitoring of the control results is a development area in Finland; we have new IT solutions under development.   

1.3 OTHER MEASURES 

1.3.a  Do  you  systematically  include  an  automated  random  element  and  take  into  consideration  the  time-barring  three-year  period  for  the 
communication of customs debt as a risk indicator in the post-release risk analysis? 
☐YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
We have automated random profiles in all operative declaration systems. We also use random element during the audit planning process. Time-
barring three-year period is one risk indicator, which is used during audit- planning process. 
1.3.b Do you ensure risk-oriented post-release audits which cover the operator's systems where this is necessary, apply a random element, guide 
the  auditors  and  take  due  account  of  the  results  of  the  pre-authorisation  stage  and  of  specific  standardised  checklists?  Are  the  results  strictly 
monitored? 
☐YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
In  the  Corporate  Audit  one  audits  and  investigates  particularly  the  functionality  of  the  firm  i.e.  internal  control  and  information  systems.  The 
transactions concerned are chosen to the audit mainly with risk analysis and random sampling is used less frequently in an ordinary audit. The 
auditors are subject to instructions given by inter alia their supervisors or substance coordinators. The assessment reports of the authorization 
phase  are  accessible  for  the  auditors  and  when  needed,  the  auditor  can  query  for  the  authorization  assessment  details  of  e.g.  an  AEO  while 
auditing other performance of the firm. The checklists are accessible for all auditors and those have been used in some audits. The supervisors 
approve  the  audits.  The  results  of  the  audits  as  well  as  the  proposed  and  realized  measures  are  entered  into  the  monitoring  system  of  the 
Corporate  Audit,  in  where  one  can  monitor  in  real-time,  and  in  where  the  quarter  reports  are  created.  The  results  are  used  e.g.  in  the  Audit 
Planning. 
1.3.c  Are  customs  controls  on  operations  made  by  authorised  economic  operators  (AEO)  carried  out  taking  account  of  the  risk  management 
performed with respect to the different elements of these operations? 

129 

 
 
 
 
☐YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
During our risk management and post-clearance process we treat AEO operators and other operators same.    
1.3.d Do national competent authorities make full use of the handbook on operational customs controls based on Member States’ best practices 
and of the Customs audit guide? 
☐YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
1.1 UNDERVALUATION  

SE 

1.1 Are you remaining vigilant as regards the risk of undervaluation of goods? 
☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
Increased number of  blocks in  2018 for  clothing  and footwear.  Blocking  is  imposed on the basis of  significance and risk and applied to  those 
commodity codes where the risk of loss of duties is deemed to be greatest and where goods are being imported into Sweden. 
If  YES  or  YES,  PARTLY,  are  you  targeting  in  particular  cheap  products  imported  in  extremely  large  quantities,  such  as  textiles  and 
footwear? 
☒YES, but targeting also other goods 
Yes, for consignments under Chapter 61-64 from China weighing over 500 kg before 2018 and 300 kg thereafter, as well as blocks on codes under 
which  large  quantities  are  imported  into  Sweden.  In  2018  Swedish  Customs  revised,  extended  and  increased  the  number  of  blocks  based  on 
threshold values. Customs also has a trade statistics system that selects low value consignments regardless of commodity code. 

1.2 ENHANCEMENT OF CUSTOMS CONTROLS 

1.2.a Do you have strategies in place that target all types of customs procedure including simplified procedures and all operators taking 
into account AEOs and other large businesses considered compliant? 
☐YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
1.2.b Did you ensure proper coordination among customs services dealing with risk analysis and controls (central, regional, local services 
involved in risk analysis and release and post-release departments)?  

130 

 
 
 
 
 
☐YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
1.2.c Do risk profiles specifically target traditional own resources and provide clear instructions with regard to the type of control to be 
carried out and risk guidance to the customs release officers? Is risk information shared with other Member States and feedback on the 
response to this information  provided in the EU customs risk management system?  
☐YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
1.2.d Is there close monitoring of the controls results (feedback) which is done in a structured manner to allow  effective follow-up and 
strict implementation of mutual assistance instructions in place? 
☐YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

1.3 OTHER MEASURES 

1.3.a Do you systematically include an automated random element and take into consideration the time-barring three-year period for the 
communication of customs debt as a risk indicator in the post-release risk analysis? 
☐YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
1.3.b Do you ensure risk-oriented post-release audits which cover the operator's systems where this is necessary, apply a random element, 
guide  the  auditors  and  take  due  account  of  the  results  of  the  pre-authorisation  stage  and  of  specific  standardised  checklists?  Are  the 
results strictly monitored? 
Swedish Customs cannot answer this question because we do not understand what it means. 
1.3.c  Are  customs  controls  on  operations  made  by  authorised  economic  operators  (AEO)  carried  out  taking  account  of  the  risk 
management performed with respect to the different elements of these operations? 
☐YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
1.3.d Do national  competent authorities  make  full  use of the handbook on operational  customs  controls  based on Member States’ best 
practices and of the Customs audit guide? 
☒NO 

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Swedish  Customs  does  not  use  the  handbook  on  operational  customs  control  based  on  Member  States'  best  practices  because  we  are  not 
sufficiently familiar with it. Swedish Customs does use the Customs audit guide. Unfortunately, the guide has not yet been updated by DG TAXUD 
to take account of the new legislation. 

UK 

1.1 UNDERVALUATION  

1.1 Are you remaining vigilant as regards the risk of undervaluation of goods? 
☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
If  YES  or  YES,  PARTLY,  are  you  targeting  in  particular  cheap  products  imported  in  extremely  large  quantities,  such  as  textiles  and 
footwear? 
☒YES, but targeting also other goods 
The UK treats the issue of customs duty undervaluation fraud very seriously. The UK employs an end to end approach to tackling customs fraud 
risks, drawing on experience used successfully to tackle MTIC and alcohol fraud. This comprises of: 
• 
new purpose-equipped sites as the contracts on the previous sites come to an end. 

Physical pre-clearance checks targeted at high risk traders. HMRC is  expanding its capacity for conducting these checks by moving to 

132 

 
 
 
Where appropriate requiring importers to provide security before suspected undervalued foods are released. 
Seizure of mis-described goods 
Trader monitoring to examine supply chains and check documentation 
Post clearance compliance activity including cross tax audits to check the credibility of information provided.   

• 
• 
• 
• 
1.2 ENHANCEMENT OF CUSTOMS CONTROLS 
1.2.a Do you have strategies in place that target all types of customs procedure including simplified procedures and all operators taking 
into account AEOs and other large businesses considered compliant? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
HMRC’s national control approach uses sophisticated risking techniques to target our activities in the most effective ways. Our controls include 
both targeted pre-clearance checks alongside post-clearance audit activity. Our checks are undertaken using a whole trader approach to assure a 
range of inherent risks across the Customs activity of a business such as valuation, classification, origin and customs procedures. 
1.2.b Did you ensure proper coordination among customs services dealing with risk analysis and controls (central, regional, local services 
involved in risk analysis and release and post-release departments)?  
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
Co-ordination is centralised within HMRC’s Risk & Intelligence Service. 
1.2.c Do risk profiles specifically target traditional own resources and provide clear instructions with regard to the type of control to be 
carried out and risk guidance to the customs release officers? Is risk information shared with other Member States and feedback on the 
response to this information  provided in the EU customs risk management system?  
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
Specific  guidance  in  relation  to  Undervaluation  risk  profiles  is  created  within  HMRCs  Risk  &  Intelligence  Service.  Additional  help  cards  are 
available detailing specific guidance per profile.  Where we consider there is an EU wide implication, details of an examination are passed to the 
team responsible who will raise a RIF and share the risk identified with OMS. 
Please provide any useful detail to explain the actions undertaken in 2018 and why the recommendation have been partially implemented or not 
implemented. 
1.2.d Is there close monitoring of the controls results (feedback) which is done in a structured manner to allow effective follow-up and 

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strict implementation of mutual assistance instructions in place? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
AM  Messages  are  received  via  AFIS  mail  to  UK-IDL  mailbox.    We  have  a  system  in  place  which  is  supported  by  a  flow  chart  and  standard 
working instructions, for each message on receipt to be booked onto a register.  The messages are then allocated  to an Officer and triaged to 
establish what is required, this is completed by use of HMRC databases and CHIEF MSS.   Dependent on the message, and the analysis of the 
triage  action,  we  will  consider  the  course  of  action:  e.g.  collection  of  documents,  CHIEF  Profiles,  audit  action.    The  required  work  will  be 
undertaken as appropriate to the message.  Responses are sent to the named Investigating Officer in OLAF via the AFIS mailbox. 

1.3 OTHER MEASURES 
1.3.a Do you systematically include an automated random element and take into consideration the time-barring three-year period for the 
communication of customs debt as a risk indicator in the post-release risk analysis? 
YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
The  UK’s  uses  sophisticated  risking  techniques  to  target  our  activities  in  the  most  effective  ways.  In  certain  circumstances,  there  is  coverage 
across the trader population as mentioned at 1.3.b below.      
1.3.b Do you ensure risk-oriented post-release audits which cover the operator's systems where this is necessary, apply a random element, 
guide  the  auditors  and  take  due  account  of  the  results  of  the  pre-authorisation  stage  and  of  specific  standardised  checklists?  Are  the 
results strictly monitored? 
YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
HMRC undertake a 3 year rolling audit/assurance programme of authorised traders. This activity is supplemented with Authorisation & Returns 
Teams monitoring activity on the authorised population. 
1.3.c  Are  customs  controls  on  operations  made  by  authorised  economic  operators  (AEO)  carried  out  taking  account  of  the  risk 
management performed with respect to the different elements of these operations? 
YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
AEOs supervised by Large Business (LB) and Individuals  & Small  Business Compliance (ISBC)  are required to  be visited a minimum of  once 
every  three  years  as  part  of  the  required  monitoring  programme.  These  visits  include  traditional  own  resources  (TOR)  Post  Clearance  Audit 

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(PCA) controls  taking account  of  the different  elements  of  the operations in  question. AEOs are subject  to  annual  on-going monitoring  by the 
AEO Central Site. This has the potential to generate audit activity if risk assessment deems it necessary. AEOs are also included in targeted risk 
assessment and risk working as part of LB and RIS monitoring of the authorisation. This activity also has the potential to generate further risk-
based  compliance  interventions  where  appropriate.  AEOs  are  included  in  pre-clearance  profiling  exercises  and  their  consignments  checked  if 
appropriate. 
1.3.d Do national  competent authorities  make  full  use of the handbook on operational  customs  controls  based on Member States’ best 
practices and of the Customs audit guide? 
NO 
The UK authorities apply the Customs Audit Guide and have national guidance in place.  The UK authorities would like confirmation of the 
current status and any development of the ‘handbook on operational customs control based on Member States’ best practice.’ 

2.2. 

EXPENDITURE 

Background information 

The analysis in the 2017 PIF report confirms the main trends and patterns highlighted in previous years. Detection rates remain high for programmes in 
the  least-developed  regions  of  Europe  and  in  fisheries,  and  low  in  relation  to  cross-border  programmes.  In  agriculture,  market  support  measures  are 
affected by a limited number of highly costly irregularities, which still require an appropriate level of attention. The focus is shifting towards fraud aimed 
at  artificially  creating  the  conditions  to  access  funding.  Several  Member  States  have  reported  specific  measures  in  this  respect.  Although  fewer 
irregularities and less fraud were reported in 2017, the average financial amounts increased, suggesting that controls are better targeted. Risk analysis, 
tips from informants or whistleblowers, or information from the media can play a role in improving targeting, especially as it seems that their use is still 
not widespread. Information from judicial enquiries led to the discovery of some non-fraudulent irregularities involving high average financial amounts. 
The same was true of controls that started because of information/requests from, or irregularities identified by, an EU body. 

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further exploit the potential of risk analysis,  tailoring the approach to the different types of expenditure and taking advantage of best 

facilitate and assess the spontaneous reporting of potential irregularities and strengthen the protection of whistle-blowers, who are also a 

Recommendation 2: 
Member States are invited to:  
• 
practices and the risk elements highlighted in this report;  
• 
crucial source for investigative journalism; and  
• 
All these measures would have a greater impact if embedded in a national anti-fraud strategy. 

promote systematic and timely cooperation between judicial and administrative authorities.  

BE  On  behalf  of  the  Department  of  Agriculture  and  Fisheries  from  the  Flemish  Authority,  hereby  a  general  statement  about  the 
recommendations in the 2016 and 2017 PIF-reports: “Fraud prevention and fraud detection in the Flemish Paying Agency is based on 
the  principle  of  progressive  insight.  Different  elements  which  are  provided  in  different  fora,  including  the  PIF-report,  are  taken  into 

account in the antifraud-policy of the Paying Agency. The actual state of the play is described in the response for the PIF-report 2018.” 
The Walloon government has adopted a legal framework for the protection of whistleblowers within its administrations. 

2.2 Have you further exploited the potential of  risk analysis, tailoring the approach to the different types of expenditure and taking 
advantage of best practices and the risk elements highlighted in the 2017 PIF Report? 
☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
Development of the new SEDA 2.0 selection engine. 

There is strong investment in attracting data miners to the risk management department. 

BG 

2.1 Can you share any results deriving from the use of the findings from the 2016 PIF Report in your fraud risk assessments? 
☒YES,  
The managing authorities of operational programmes being implemented in the territory of the Republic of Bulgaria have taken the findings of 
the 2016 Commission Report on the Protection of the EU’s Financial Interests — Fight against fraud into account in the process of managing 

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the  risk  of  fraud  at  the  level  of  both  operational  programmes  and  individual  operations.  In  line  with  the  Guidance  Note  on  Fraud  Risk 
Assessment and Effective and Proportionate Anti-Fraud Measures (ARES (2013) 3769073 of 19 December 2013) published by the European 
Commission’s  Directorate-General  for  Regional  and  Urban  Policy,  procedures  for  assessing  the  risk  of  fraud  are  described  in  the 
management  manual  for  each  operational  programme.  Under  these  procedures,  managing  authorities  carry  out  each  year  an  autonomous 
fraud  risk  assessment.  The  2016  Commission  Report  on  the  Protection  of  the  EU’s  Financial  Interests  —  Fight  against  fraud  sets  out  the 
priority  areas  with  the  highest  fraud  indicators,  namely:  ‘Tourism’,  ‘Research  and  technological  development’,  ‘Transport’,  ‘Investment  in 
social  infrastructure’  and  ‘Technical  assistance  for  fisheries’.  Further  to  this  finding,  the  managing  authorities  of  programmes  financing 
operations in these fields implement additional measures for projects financed under the relevant priority axis. Additional checks are carried 
out at the implementation and verification stage, before carrying out on-the-spot checks and verifying expenditure, and a mandatory check on 
the indicators of Group 7 ‘reputation and fraud risks’ is carried out in the ARACHNE system before checks on public procurement procedures. 
Some managing authorities took account of the Report’s findings by identifying the risk of omissions when identifying errors and irregularities, 
optimising the checks on fraud indicators (red flags) in their existing checklists. In 2018 a methodology was approved for assessing the fraud 
risk when planning checks under the Maritime and Fisheries Programme 2014-2020. In 2018 the risks of fraud under the 2014-2020 Maritime 
and Fisheries Programme were assessed using the fraud risk self-assessment tool provided by the European Commission. In 2018 the Audit 
Authority  continued  to  focus  its  efforts  on  the  implementation  of  the  transposed  Directive  2014/24/EU  in  the  area  of  ESIF  inspections  and 
monitoring.  12  workshops  were  held  to  share  the  results  of  the  audit  engagements  and  15  training  sessions  for  managing  authorities  and 
beneficiaries  on  irregularities  and  infringements  under  the  Public  Procurement  Act.  In  2018  the  Executive  Agency  ‘Certification  Audit  of 
European Agricultural Funds’ (IA SOSEZF), as Audit Authority for the Maritime and Fisheries Programme and certification body for the audit 
to certify the truthfulness and accuracy of the financial statements and the control system in place at Bulgaria’s Paying Agency of the Republic 
of Bulgaria, held 14 workshops to share the results of the audit engagements performed. 
The Ministry of Finance’s National Fund Directorate, as certification body for operational programmes financed by the ESF, ERDF and CF 
and  European  territorial  cooperation  programmes,  continues  to  implement  the  actions  set  out  in  the  recommendations  of  the  Article  325 
Report for 2016, namely:  

maintaining and improving the directorate's administrative capacity through training courses, seminars and discussions; 
improving procedures to ensure a reliable control environment for detecting and correcting errors in the financial management and 

control system; 

performing checks to verify fraud indicators (red flags); 
using the ARACHNE system for the certification body’s control functions. 

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In addition to the checks relating to the preparation and submission of a request for payment, the certification body carries out planned checks 
on the compliance with the managing authorities’ procedures and control activities, including an analysis of progress in the implementation of 
the operational programme, accounting documents, procedures for the selection of a contractor, the provision of grants. The purpose of these 
checks is to obtain assurance that the expenditure declared for payment has been verified by the managing authority and that the certification 
body has been duly informed by the managing authority of the procedures applied and the checks carried out. Other types of planned checks 
include  on-the-spot  checks  on  beneficiaries,  including  checks  at  the  site  of  a  project’s  implementation,  for  the  purposes  of  monitoring  and 
obtaining further assurance that the beneficiary is implementing the approved project in accordance with the grant agreement and the EU and 
national  law  applicable,  and  that  the  managing  authority  is  performing  its  duties  and  responsibilities  in  accordance  with  the  rules  and 
procedures  for  monitoring  and  controlling  the  project’s  implementation.  In  certain  circumstances  the  certification  body may  also  carry  out 
exceptional checks: in the event of a suspected irregularity; on the basis of a report; in the event of financial or other risks threatening the 
implementation  of  a  project/priority/operational  programme;  if  the  pace  of  an  operational  programme’s  implementation  deviates  from  the 
norm; where a crisis affecting an operational programme’s implementation obliges the certification body to step up control measures; in the 
event  of  new  guidelines  or  significant  changes  to  the  existing  ones;  in  the  event  of  serious  staff  changes  at  the  managing  authority  of  the 
operational programme, deficiencies in the functioning of the managing authority’s management and control systems, reports in the media; in 
other circumstances playing a significant role in the process of certifying expenditure. In the area of the spending of resources from the EU’s 
Agricultural Funds, working groups have been set up to discuss case studies involving related parties applying  under different schemes and 
measures, using ‘artificially created conditions’ to create an advantage over other funding candidates. In this respect, additional controls have 
been introduced in the form of red flags. When examining aid applications and payment requests, the case-handlers dealing with documents, 
bearing in mind the concepts of ‘suspected fraud’, ‘fraud’ and ‘irregularity’, must carry out further analysis if any of the indicators identified 
as  red  flags  come  up.  The  lists  of  red  flags  play  an  essential  role  in  the  prevention  of  fraud  without  complicating  the  administration  of 
procedures for examining applications for support and payment requests. The red flags offer additional protection for the funding of applicants 
for grants from the EU Agricultural Funds. 
2.2 Have you further exploited the potential of risk analysis, tailoring the approach to the different types of expenditure and taking 
advantage of best practices and the risk elements highlighted in the 2017 PIF Report? 
☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
All competent Bulgarian institutions responsible for the spending of European funds are taking account of the recommendations made in the 
Commission’s  Article  325  report  for  2017  and  implementing  the  actions  referred  to  in  paragraph  2.1  in  respect  of  both  operational 

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programmes financed by the ESF, ERDF and CF and European territorial cooperation programmes, in accordance with the specificities of 
each programme. The managing authorities have introduced proportionate anti-fraud measures based on a thorough fraud risk assessment in 
accordance  with  the  Commission’s  guidance  on  the  application  of  Article  125(4)(c)  of  the  Common  Provisions  Regulation  (CPR),  which 
requires  the  managing  authority  to  establish  effective  and  proportionate  anti-fraud  measures  taking  into  account  the  risks  identified.  An 
updated risk-assessment methodology and action plan including effective and proportionate anti-fraud measures and responsible persons and 
deadlines have been approved for operational programmes funded by ESIF. Screening for red flags is carried out at all stages of the project 
cycle:  selection  of  operations,  technical  and  financial  verification,  verification  of  public  procurement  procedures.  Whenever  a  deviation  is 
recorded  in  accordance  with  the  instructions  in  the  check  list,  the  case-handler  who  identified  it  has  to  carry  out  further  screening  for  the 
presence of irregularities and fraud indicators (red flags). The red flags and the method for carrying out the check are described in detail in 
the operational programmes’ manuals of procedures. If a case-handler finds one or more of the following, they must describe these facts in the 
relevant check list and classify them. The managing authorities of operational programmes financed by the Structural and Cohesion Funds use 
the ARACHNE tool provided by the Commission to  monitor the risk of  irregularities and fraud as a proportionate and adequate anti-fraud 
measure. The system conducts is used for regular checks on the extent of the risks of fraud. The instrument is used for carrying out checks and 
in  the  managing  authorities  main  processes  during:  evaluation  and  negotiations  before  signing  contracts  with  applicants;  monitoring  and 
verification before on-the-spot checks and the verification of expenditure, and during checks on the procedures carried out by beneficiaries’ 
for the selection of contractors. There is currently no access to ARACHNE for programmes financed by the European Agricultural Fund for 
Rural Development and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund. The European Commission has granted access to the ARACHNE fraud 
and irregularities risk assessment system only for programmes financed by the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund and the European 
Regional  Development  Fund.  Checks  are  documented  by  a  specific  check  in  the  check  lists  concerned.  When  carrying  out  checks,  the 
competent directorates/units of the managing authorities are informed of high-risk projects so that they can pay closer attention when handling 
documents  relating to  them or,  if necessary, take appropriate measures.  In addition  to  the cases  described above, any member of  staff  at  a 
managing authority may, if they suspect fraud and lack the information they need to form an opinion, check specific facts in  the ARACHNE 
system as part of their normal duties. A self-assessment of the risk of fraud using the tool provided by the European Commission takes into 
account all internal and external risks specific to the individual programmes that may affect the absorption or loss of funds from the general 
budget of the EU. Account was taken of good practices and experience so far when developing the methodology for assessing the risk of fraud 
when  planning  checks  under  the  2014  2020  operational  programmes.  Documents  provided  by  the  Commission  concerning  red  flags  (fraud 
indicators) and best practices, including forged documents, public procurement fraud, conflict of interest, etc., are annexed to the policy on 
preventing and combating irregularities, fraud and corruption in the implementation of individual programmes with a view to helping to detect 

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fraud. 
The following are just some of the documents taken into consideration when updating the internal rules: 

 structural actions – a practical guide for managers; 

-  A  practical  guide  for  managing  authorities’,  drawn  up  by  a  group  of 

Member States' experts coordinated by OLAF's unit D2 ‘Fraud Prevention, Reporting and Analysis’; 

– A collection of red flags and best practices’, a guide prepared by a group of Member States' experts chaired 

and coordinated by OLAF's unit D2 ‘Fraud Prevention, Reporting and Analysis’; 

essment of the risk of fraud and other serious irregularities to the detriment of the CAP budget’, drawn up by Commission DG AGRI and 

others.  
Furthermore,  at  regular  intervals  each  year,  in  the  course  of  system  audits  and  operation  audits,  the  Executive  Agency  for  the  Audit  of 
European Union Funds (IA OSES), which is the audit authority for operational programmes implemented in Bulgaria, analyses irregularities 
found in public procurement, which is both a tool for sharing best practice and a measure for preventing irregularities and fraud in public 
procurement.  

With regard to the agricultural funds, Bulgarian institutions have taken the following measures: 
1.In March 2018 the certification body prepared an analysis of irregularities in the area of public procurement and suspected fraud identified 
under the 2016 and 2017 European Agricultural Funds certification audits. 
2.The Internal Rules for handling irregularities and infringements under programmes, schemes and measures financed by the EU budget and 
the  national  budget  have  been  updated  and  two  new  binding  instructions  have  been  created.  The  Internal  Rules  for  handling  irregularities 
govern the work of staff of the State Fund for Agriculture involved in handling irregularities and infringements under programmes, schemes 
and  measures  financed  by  the  EU  budget.  The  Internal  Rules  are  used  by  the  staff  of  the  Fund  for  the  purposes  of  preventing,  identifying, 
terminating  and  reporting  irregularities.  The  Internal  Rules  and  the  instructions  applicable  to  them  are  having  a  positive  impact  and 
optimising the process of reporting irregularities at national and European level in an appropriate manner. 
3.From 24 to 26 October 2018, the State Fund for Agriculture hosted a delegation from Croatia’s Paying Agency for Agriculture, Fisheries 
and Rural Development (APPRRR). The purpose of the visit by the Croatian delegation was to exchange experience in the area of preventing 
and combating fraud in the financing and implementation of projects in the agricultural sector. In the course of the meetings between the two 
parties, State Fund for  Agriculture staff  shared their good practices and experience of  preventing and combating  fraud involving  EU funds 
with the Croatian representatives. During the seminar staff from the Fund gave presentations on the following topics: 

140 

 
 
 
cycle); 

-checks on affiliated companies; 

; 

-risk areas; 

tive and control 

4. 

In 2018, 264 State Fund for Agriculture staff were trained on the following topics: 

 Rules for handling irregularities and infringements under programmes, schemes and measures financed by the EU budget and the 

national budget’; 

2.3  Have  you  facilitated  and  assessed  the  spontaneous  reporting  of  potential  irregularities  and  strengthen  the  protection  of  whistle-
blowers, who are also a crucial source for investigative journalism? 
☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
The managing authorities of operational programmes implemented in Bulgaria are applying a policy of zero tolerance with regard to fraud 
and  corruption,  introducing  a  coherent  system  of  controls  aimed  at  preventing  and  detecting  fraud  wherever  possible  and  at  remedying  its 
impact when it does occur. 
The policy covers the following topics: 

Strategies for developing an anti-fraud culture; 
Distribution of responsibilities for fighting fraud; 
Mechanisms for reporting suspected fraud; 
Cooperation between the different actors. 

The managing authorities of the operational programmes are organising information  campaigns featuring the concepts of ‘irregularity’ and 
‘fraud’,  along  with  preventive  measures  and  ways  of  reporting  irregularities  and  suspected  fraud,  the  most  common  errors  in  public 
procurement procedures seen by the Audit Authority and others; 
The  national  Regulation  on  the  handling  of  irregularities  involving  European  Structural  and  Investment  Funds  (NANESIF)  provides  for  an 
authority responsible for handling irregularities to initiate proceedings of its own motion or in response to a report. The managing authorities 
have  made  it  possible  to  submit  reports  via  the  website  for  each  individual  programme,  allowing  people  to  report  irregularities  in  the 

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implementation of projects co-financed by EU funds, instruments and programmes. This can also be done via the website of the Ministry of the 
Interior’s AFCOS Directorate. 
It  is  also  possible  to  report  irregularities  under  all  operational  programmes  financed  by  the  ESF,  ERDF  and  CF  and  European  territorial 
cooperation programmes via a button on the website of the Ministry of Finance. The system is updated and maintained, and reports received 
via this system are handled in accordance with the relevant procedure. The reports obtained through this system primarily concern the work of 
the managing authorities and are therefore sent to the relevant managing authority so that it can examine the substance of the report and reply 
to the person who made the report and to the certification body. 
Under  Section  3(1)  of  the  Additional  Provisions  of  the  Regulation  on  the  handling  of  irregularities  involving  European  Structural  and 
Investment  Funds,  information  on  the  commission  of  a  irregularity  is  deemed  an  irregularity  report,  even  if  the  source  is  anonymous.  The 
possibility of lodging an anonymous report can be interpreted as a measure aimed at protecting whistle-blowers. 
Every  person  has  the  right  and  the  possibility  to  report  cases  of  irregularities,  suspicions  of  fraud  or  fraud  in  connection  with  the 
implementation  of  projects  co-financed  by  ESIF.  Reports  may  be  submitted  anonymously.  Where  reports  are  not  anonymous,  the  managing 
authority does not disclose information on the whistle blowers. 
Managing  authorities  receive  a  large  number  of  reports  from  outsiders  concerning  irregularities  in  the  implementation  of  the  operational 
programme  concerned.  The  information  in  each  report  is  verified  by  the  experts  of  the  managing  authority  and,  where  an  irregularity  is 
suspected,  a  procedure  for  handling  irregularities  is  initiated.  Also,  in  the  event  of  reports  of  breaches  in  the  physical  implementation  of 
projects,  the  managing  authorities  carry  out  on-the-spot  checks  into  the  allegations  made.  Where  allegations  are  found  to  be  justified,  the 
managing authorities establish irregularities and apply financial corrections. If the data in a report concern another operational programme 
or competent authority, they are duly passed on. 
For the purpose of  protection, data  concerning  the person  who submitted a report are not  communicated by the  managing  authority to  the 
persons concerned by the irregularity. On completion of the procedure for handling the irregularity report, the managing authority notifies the 
person who submitted the report in writing of the outcome of the procedure. 
In  particular,  on  10  December  2018  the  head  of  the  managing  authority  of  the  Operational  Programme  ‘Science  and  Education  for  Smart 
Growth’ approved internal rules for the protection of persons reporting corruption and/or conflicts of interest to the managing authority. The 
rules are published on the managing authority's website at: http://sf.mon.bg/?go=page&pageId=248. 
As  regards  the  agricultural  funds,  the  channels  for  making  reports  to  the  State  Fund  for  Agriculture  are  clear  within  the  organisation  and 
ensure confidentiality. 
Fraud and corrupt practices can be reported to the State Fund for Agriculture in a number of ways: 

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by sending an email to the address: SIGNALI@DFZ.BG; 
by telephoning the hotline 0700-106-16; 
by submitting, in the case of an outside source, a written report to the Fund’s registry; 
by oral reports, where data are received by a member of the Fund’s staff by telephone; during on-the-spot checks; in person during an 

open day; 

by a member of the Fund’s staff. 

Any information received by the State Fund for Agriculture, including from anonymous sources, is written up in a document concerning the 
alleged or established act/omission by the economic operator. 
The State Fund for Agriculture has an internal procedure for registering and examining the reports received, which complies with the principle 
of protecting whistle-blowers, and for following up the reports received. 
Whistle-blowers play an important role in the detection and timely prevention of fraud affecting agricultural schemes and measures financed 
from the general budget of the European Union. 
2.4 Have you promoted systematic and timely cooperation between judicial and administrative authorities? 
☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
The  managing  authorities  of  all  operational  programmes  implemented  in  Bulgaria  cooperate  in  a  systematic  and  timely  manner  with  the 
following administrative bodies: 

active cooperation with the Ministry of the Interior’s AFCOS Directorate, which organises trainings for all the managing authorities’ 

case-handlers and specialised trainings for staff handling irregularities; 

exchange of best practices and know-how in fighting ESIF fraud and irregularities with the other operational programmes’ managing 

authorities; 

active participation in the permanent working group of staff handling irregularities chaired by the AFCOS Directorate; 
active  participation  in  the  AFCOS  Council’s  activities:  proposals  for  legislative  changes  and  initiatives  and  for  measures  to  be 
included in the action plan implementing the National Strategy for Preventing and Combating Irregularities and Fraud Affecting the Financial 
Interests of the EU for the period 2014–2020, taking into account the implementation of measures etc. 
It is common practice for managing authorities to receive reports of irregularities that may constitute ‘suspected fraud’ as regards the actions 
of the beneficiary of a grant or its partners during the implementation of an ESIF grant agreement. 
If the administrative investigation carried out  by the member of  the managing  authority’s staff  responsible for  irregularities shows there to 
have been an irregularity warranting the initiation of administrative or judicial proceedings at national level to determine  whether conduct 

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was  intentional, in  particular  fraud, the managing authority provides the Prosecutor’s Office of  the Republic of  Bulgaria with the complete 
dossier, comprising the report on irregularities and all documents collected in the course of the administrative enquiry. The internal rules on 
handling  irregularities  ensure  that  the  managing  authority  immediate  refers  all  cases  of  suspected  criminal  offences  to  the  competent 
authorities, as national law requires. 
All  managing  authorities  enjoy  good  working  relations  with  Bulgaria’s  law-enforcement  agencies:  all  cases  involving  suspected  fraud  are 
promptly passed on to the Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of Bulgaria and any additional information necessary is provided as soon as 
possible. 
The managing authorities also regularly provide the judicial authorities with information concerning appeals against administrative decisions 
establishing  irregularities  or  refusing  payments  as  a  result  of  prior  verification  and  actively  monitor  the  case-law  of  the  Bulgarian  courts. 
Under the Code of Administrative Procedure, any reasoned decision by the head of a managing authority imposing a financial correction that 
could lead to the recovery of funds granted by the EU may be challenged before a court. 
All  managing  authorities  of  operational  programmes  implemented  in  Bulgaria  are  actively  involved  in  the  work  of  the  Council  for 
Coordination in the Fight against Infringements affecting the Financial Interests of the European Union (AFCOS Council). 
In  the  framework  of  the  annual  activities  of  the  AFCOS  Council,  whose  secretariat  is  provided  by  the  Ministry  of  the  Interior’s  AFCOS 
Directorate,  managing  authorities  implement  the  tasks  set  out  in  the  relevant  year’s  action  plan  implementing  the  National  Strategy  for 
Preventing and Combating  Irregularities and Fraud Affecting the Financial Interests of  the EU for the period  2014–2020, reporting  on the 
performance of the tasks within the quarterly period fixed by the AFCOS Council. 
The measures set out in the action plan include enhanced cooperation at national level between the administrative and judicial authorities in 
charge of combating irregularities and fraud in the implementation of operational programmes financed by ESIF. 
The managing authorities also cooperate with the AFCOS Directorate, providing information whenever OLAF requests assistance or carries 
out  on-the-spot  checks  or  in  respect  of  reports  passed  on  to  the  AFCOS  Directorate  concerning  projects  financed  under  the  relevant 
operational programme. 
All managing authorities use the IMS system to report to the AFCOS Directorate all irregularities and fraud that have to be reported under 
European law. 
As Audit Authority, the Executive Agency for the Audit of European Union Funds provides the prosecutions service with systematic and prompt 
cooperation. In 2018 the Agency submitted 6 final audit reports containing suspicions of fraud to the prosecutions service. 
In  2018  the  Executive  Agency  ‘Certification  Audit  of  European  Agricultural  Funds’  (IA  SOSEZF)  provided  the  prosecutions  service  with 
systematic and prompt cooperation, submitting 3 final audit reports containing suspicions of fraud. Additional information requested by the 

144 

 
 
competent authorities on these cases was duly provided. 
All institutions involved in the project cycle for implementing programmes financed under the ESIF regularly attend meetings, training courses 
and seminars with representatives of the judiciary, during which they examine issues relating to the management and control of ESIF funds, 
problems encountered by the judicial and administrative authorities and ways of resolving them. 
With regard to the prevention and investigation of cases of fraud under the agricultural funds, the State Fund for Agriculture works closely 
with representatives of the AFCOS Directorate, the Ministry of the Interior’s Directorate General for Combating Organised Crime (GDBOP), 
the  Ministry  of  the  Interior’s  provincial  directorates,  the  Supreme  Cassation  Prosecutor’s  Office,  the  specialised  unit  of  the  Sofia  City 
Prosecutor’s Office for combating crime against the EU financing system and other law-enforcement agencies. 
Numerous  meetings  have  been  held  with  representatives  of  the  Supreme  Cassation  Prosecutor’s  Office  and  the  AFCOS  Directorate,  which 
have  discussed  important  issues  related  to  the  National  Strategy  for  Preventing  and  Combating  Irregularities  and  Fraud  Affecting  the 
Financial Interests of the EU for the period 2014–2020.  
One measurable result of these meetings was a transfer of competence for handling reports from the State Fund for Agriculture to the Public 
Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of Bulgaria, which achieved the objective of enhancing administrative control by the Supreme Cassation 
Prosecutor’s  Office  over  the  other  prosecutor’s  offices  and  increased  the  effectiveness  of  action  against  fraud  affecting  the  EU’s  financial 
interests. 
All managing authorities responsible for the implementation of operational programmes financed by ESIF are represented on the Council for 
Coordination  in  the  Fight  against  Infringements  affecting  the  Financial  Interests  of  the  European  Union  (AFCOS  Council).  The  AFCOS 
Council was established by Cabinet Decree No 18 of 4 February 2003. 
The AFCOS Council steers, monitors and coordinates the action of the public authorities to prevent and combat fraud, misuse of funds and 
property belonging to the European Union or provided to Bulgaria by European Union funds and programmes, including the related national 
co-financing. 
The AFCOS Council consists of a chair, deputy chair  and members.  The Council is chaired by the Minister of the Interior, who  appoints a 
member of the AFCOS Council as deputy chair. The Council’s members are ministers, deputy ministers and heads of managing authorities of 
programmes co-financed by the EU, heads of audit and inspection authorities, heads of the revenue authorities and law-enforcement agencies. 
The  AFCOS  Council  holds  regular  meetings  twice  a  year  and  can  also  schedule  extraordinary  meetings  at  the  initiative  of  the  chair  or  a 
member. 
At the end of 2015 the Minister for the Interior and the Public Prosecutor signed a new agreement on coordination and cooperation between 
the Council for  Coordination in  the Fight against  Infringements  affecting the Financial Interests of  the European Union  and the Bulgarian 

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CZ 

Prosecutor’s Office. 
This agreement allows the AFCOS Directorate to request, and the Public Prosecutor’s Office to provide, information on measures taken by the 
Prosecutor’s Office in response to recommendations made in final OLAF reports on completed administrative investigations. 
Every year, on the basis of Article 11(6) of Regulation (EU, EURATOM) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 
September  2013  concerning  investigations  conducted  by  OLAF,  a  request  is  made  for  information  on  action  taken  by  the  Bulgaria  Public 
Prosecutor’s  Office  in  response  to  the  recommendations  made  to  judicial  authorities  in  final  OLAF  reports  on  cases  concerning  European 
programmes and projects implemented in Bulgaria. 
The  AFCOS  Directorate,  as  the  anti-fraud  coordination  service,  supporting  effective  cooperation  and  exchange  of  information  with  OLAF, 
receives and processes information on prosecution cases and pre-trial proceedings relating to projects financed by European funds and duly 
provides this information to OLAF. 
2.1 Can you share any results deriving from the use of the findings from the 2016 PIF Report in your fraud risk assessments? 
☒YES,  
The Strategy to Fight Fraud and Corruption in the Framework of Absorption of the Common Strategic Framework (hereinafter referred 
to as the CSF) Funds in the Period 2014–2020“(hereinafter also referred to as the Strategy) is in the force. The implementation of the 

Strategy at the level of implementation structure bodies is coordinated by the National Coordination Authority (hereinafter also referred 
to as the NCA). The implementation structure bodies regularly (twice a year) submit to the NCA the information on managing the risk of 

fraud and corruption and at least once a year, as a part of this information, provide the data on achieving the objectives of the Strategy. 
Based on this information the NCA evaluates the progress in achieving the objectives of the Strategy at the implementation structure level. 
The risk management system builds on the Methodological guideline for risk management of ESI Funds in the programming period 2014–
2020. For the purposes of regular evaluation of efficiency of control mechanisms is used also the manging authority (MA) Self-evaluation 
tool  that  is  based  on  the  Methodological  guideline  for  the  conduct  of  controls  under  the  responsibility  of  the  MAs  in  implementing  the 

European Structural and Investment Funds for the period 2014–2020. This tool deals primarily with the fraud occurrence risks.  
In the case of suspicion of committing a criminal offense (eg. fraud) if criminal proceedings have already been commenced in the given 

case pursuant  to Section 158 (3) of  Act  No. 141/1961  Coll., Criminal Procedure  Code, the  officers  of  the  control  and audit unit of  EU 

146 

 
 
funds report these cases as an irregularity through national monitoring system MS2014 + (IRQ3). This  procedure ensures the awareness 
of other relevant authorities such as Payment and Certification Authority, Audit Authority and others. Irregularities over 10 000 EUR of 

the  ESI  Funds are secured through OLAF  - IMS. The  cooperation  with the  Police of  the  Czech Republic in  the  case  of fraud has been 
gradually intensified by written, electronic or phone communication. The officers of the control and audit unit of EU funds in cooperation 

with the Intermediate body provide them requested information on specific  projects.  The ARACHNE information system is used by MAs 
the Intermediate body, especially before the Grant Decision is issued. Furthermore, the ARACHNE system is also used in other  project 

control activities. The Recommendation 4 of PIF 2016 was taken into account in changes in the operation of the risk management system. 
In  the  end  of  2017,  a  regular  review  of  the  risk  library  was  made  and  the  library  of  risks  of  fraud  and  irregularities  in  Active  Risk 

Management  (ARM)  contains  risks  from  previously  identified  frauds  and  irregularities  and  fully  covers  other  possible  risk  for  the 
organization.   

2.2 Have you further exploited the potential of risk analysis, tailoring the approach to the different types of expenditure and taking 
advantage of best practices and the risk elements highlighted in the 2017 PIF Report? 
☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
When identifying the risk of fraud, the Managing Authorities (MAs) capitalize on its own experience gained in the programming period 

2007–2013.  The  guidelines  of  the  Ministry  of  Finance  on  identification  of  fraud  indicators  have  been  included  by  the  MAs  in  the 
Operational Manuals.  

Throughout the process of programme administration and implementation, the MAs monitor the occurrence of fraud indicators. 
1) 

Control in the project approval process/prior to the issuance of a legal act on grant provision  

Apart  from  monitoring  the  occurrence  of  fraud  indicators  in  the  grant  application  dossier,  the  MAs  check  the  level  of  risk  of  the 
applicant/partner  of  the  project  against  the  list  of  criminal  complaints  resulting  from  the  implementation  of  projects  in  the  past  and 

current programming periods, or his interconnection through proprietary structure with other entities or persons included in  this list. In 
case an increased level of risk of the project is identified, this fact is taken into account in the risk analysis conducted in projects.  

147 

 
 
Control in the project implementation process 

2) 
When identifying risk operations, the data from the information system are used. These information systems are e.g. ARACHNE, Justice.cz 

portal, ARES application, Business Register, Trade Register and other publicly accessible information records and registers.   
During  the  administration  of  monitoring  reports,  the  occurrence  of  fraud  indicators  is  assessed.  The  MAs  keep  the  Register  of  Fraud 

Indicators, which represents an additional input in risk analysis conducted in projects. Another additional input is  the use of ARACHNE 
tool when identifying the projects with the highest risk.  

In  the  event  the  MAs  based  on  theirs  control  activities  suspect  that  a  crime  has  been  committed,  a  criminal  complaint  is  filed  with  the 
public prosecutor´s office.  

In the risk management system,  the second phase of  implementation  was launched, in which the risk introduced would be linked  to  the 
primary  assets  of  the  organisation,  ie  processes.  At  this  stage  Recommendation  no.  2  of  PIF  2017  was  taken  into  account.  In  order  to 

exploit the potential of risk analysis, it is planned to extend access right to the ARM system to 260 users (to the organizational level of the 
head of  unit in).  Subsequently  training  of all users  of the  ARM risk management system will be  performed  in IQ/2019. The  goal of  the 

training is to streamline the process of the risk management and minimize the impact of the risk on the organisation´s processes. 

2.3  Have  you  facilitated  and  assessed  the  spontaneous  reporting  of  potential  irregularities  and  strengthen  the  protection  of  whistle-
blowers, who are also a crucial source for investigative journalism? 
☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
The Czech Republic have no a special act for the protection of whistleblowers, but this act is currently under preparation. The protection 
of  whistleblowers  is  solved  with  in  the  Civil  Service  Act  and  on  basis  of  this  Act;  each  resort  has  its  own  Methodological  Guidelines, 

which solve the protection of whistleblowers, reporting of corruption and frauds. 

2.4 Have you promoted systematic and timely cooperation between judicial and administrative authorities? 
☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
The Managing Authorities (MAs) encourages the cooperation with tax offices involved in addressing irregularities. The meetings of MAs are 
held  with  representatives  of  tax  offices.  Information  on  addressing  irregularities  and  design  of  the  process  is  shared  also  with  the  other 

148 

 
 
authorities, the Paying and Certifying Authority, the Audit Authority and the Central Contact Point of the AFCOS through the platform of the 
Working Group for Controls, Audits and Irregularities.   
Cooperation between the courts and the public prosecutor´s office is ensured through MS2014+, where all irregularities involving more than 
EUR 10,000 of the EU share are reported in an external report. All irregularities reported in an external report are subsequently via the Local 
Contact  Point  of  AFCOS  transferred  to  the  IMS  system,  which  is  accessible  to  the  public  prosecutor´s  office  of  the  Czech  Republic.  This 
ensures early provision of information on suspected crime related to the ESIF also to judicial authorities.   
In the event the MAs detect infringement of public procurement rules, it cooperates with the Office for the Protection of Competition. 

DK 

2.1 Can you share any results deriving from the use of the findings from the 2016 PIF Report in your fraud risk assessments? 
☒YES,  
Danish  Agricultural  Agency  (LBST):  The  recommendation  is  only  partly  relevant  for  agricultural  aid  in  Denmark,  as  Denmark  does  not 
support  wine  production  which,  according  to  the  2016  PIF  report,  is  one  of  the  major  risk  areas  under  the  rules  on  the  organisation  of 
markets. 
The  Danish  Agricultural  Agency  has  held  internal  guidance  meetings  to  raise  awareness  of  the  risk  of  fraud  in  relation  to  the  rules  on the 
organisation of markets. To a large extent, we have been able to apply our focus on red flags for project expenditure, and our other anti-fraud 
measures in relation to EAFRD, to the rules on the organisation of markets as well. Compared with 2016 and 2017, 2018 saw an increase in 
detected cases with red flags under the rules on the organisation of markets. 
Danish Fisheries Agency: The 2016 PIF report does not contain much information on the EMFF, as it was analysed together with the much 
larger  cohesion  fund.  As  recommended  in  the  PIF  report,  the  Danish  Fisheries  Agency  has  provided  information  on  the  location  and  the 
priority area of projects reported for fraud in 2017 and 2018. 
2.2 Have you further exploited the potential of risk analysis, tailoring the approach to the different types of expenditure and taking 
advantage of best practices and the risk elements highlighted in the 2017 PIF Report? 

149 

 
 
☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
Danish Agricultural Agency (LBST): The 2017 PIF report was published in September 2018. The Danish Agricultural Agency has not analysed 
risk areas and introduced improvement measures in the meantime. The Agency has, however, allocated resources for external assistance with 
risk assessment in 2019, and will take the conclusions of the report into consideration in this context. Danish Fisheries Agency: The 2017 PIF 
report recommends that authorities adapt procedures for identifying and combatting fraud in relation to the specific risks  occurring in their 
area.  The  Fisheries  Agency  currently  uses  fraud  procedures  used  by  the  former  AgriFish  Agency,  which  was  divided  into  an  Agricultural 
Agency and a Fisheries Agency in 2017. The Fisheries Agency is currently working on fraud procedures that are adapted to the EMFF area, 
including  the  fraud  risks  occurring  in  the  area.  In  2019,  the  Fisheries  Agency  will  receive  a  contribution  commissioned  from  the  Danish 
Government's legal adviser to develop a method for identifying fraud and irregularities more easily. The Fisheries Agency will also develop the 
administrative basis in the area of subsidies, including the training of case handlers and the establishment of the necessary control set-up to 
enhance the Agency’s ability to identify circumstances requiring examination on account of suspected fraud. Thus, we expect that the Fisheries 
Agency’s adapted fraud procedures will comply with the recommendations in the 2017 PIF report. A recommendation will also be  made on 
arrangements for receiving reports of suspected fraud from members of the public and whistle-blowers. Since 2014 there has been a portal on 
the Fisheries Agency’s website where external parties or whistle-blowers can report fraud and irregularities. The Fisheries Agency has also 
set  up  an  anti-fraud  mail  box  to  which  the  public  can  send  reports  of  suspected  fraud  involving  EU  funds.  Danish  Business  Authority:  The 
Danish  Business  Authority,  MA  for  ERDF  and  ESF  has  in  2018  prepared  on  organizing  a  more  risk-based  administrative  verification  of 
accounts based on internal data from the fund monitoring system and the company register. This more risk-based approach is expected to be 
implemented in 2019. 
2.3  Have  you  facilitated  and  assessed  the  spontaneous  reporting  of  potential  irregularities  and  strengthen  the  protection  of  whistle-
blowers, who are also a crucial source for investigative journalism? 
☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
Danish Agricultural Agency (LBST): Since 2014, the Danish Agricultural Agency has facilitated external  reporting of possible irregularities 
through its website.  The portal was updated in 2018 to take account of new legislation on the use of personal data. Danish Fisheries Agency: 
Since  2014  there  has  been  a  portal  on  the  Fisheries  Agency’s  website  where  external  parties  or  whistle-blowers  can  report  fraud  or 
irregularities. The Fisheries Agency has also set up an anti-fraud mail box to which the public can send reports of suspected fraud involving 
EU funds. Danish Business Authority: The Danish Business Authority, MA for ERDF and ESF have specified further guidance for informers of 
irregularities in the anti-fraud policy. 
2.4 Have you promoted systematic and timely cooperation between judicial and administrative authorities? 

150 

 
 
☒NO 

DE 

 2.1 Can you share any results deriving from the use of the findings from the 2016 PIF Report in your fraud risk assessments? 
☒YES,  
Agricultural Funds: In the field of fraud prevention in the agricultural sector, fraud risks are continuously assessed, including with reference 
to  the  fraud  report.  Should  this  assessment  indicate  that  there  is  an  increased  fraud  risk  for  certain  measures  (including  market  support 
measures), appropriate action is taken. 
Structural  and  Investment  Funds:  The  comprehensive  approaches  devised  and  constantly  reviewed  by  the  managing  authorities,  with 
‘measures  to  prevent,  detect  and  correct  fraud  and  corruption’,  take  account  of  the  assessments  and  findings  on  combating  and  preventing 
fraud in the 2016 PIF report and earlier and later Commission annual reports. The managing authorities’ strategies and measures to combat 
fraud and minimise risk basically follow the Commission Guidance Note on fraud risk assessment and effective and proportionate anti-fraud 
measures. They have four cornerstones: prevention, detection, correction and prosecution and/or recovery. Self-assessment teams have been 
set up with the participation of certifying authorities, managing authorities, intermediate bodies, contracting authorities and anti-corruption 
officials. The self-assessment instrument provided by the Commission in the Guidance Note is regularly reviewed and adjusted to the specific 
features of local situations. In addition, other risks are identified and taken into account. (see also point 2.2) 
2.2 Have you further exploited the potential of risk analysis, tailoring the approach to the different types of expenditure and taking 
advantage of best practices and the risk elements highlighted in the 2017 PIF Report? 
☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
In the current funding period, fraud prevention has been one of the key tasks for the establishment of the management and control system, in 
accordance with Article 125(4)(c) of Regulation EU No 1303/2013 and was also a condition of designation in the field of structural funds and 
one of the eligibility criteria in the field of agricultural funds. 
For example, the following measures under the structural and agricultural funds can be cited from 2018:  
1.  At  Länder  level:  Implementation  at  OP  level  by  the  ERDF  Managing  Authority  of  the  fraud  risk  self-assessment  recommended  in  the 
Commission guidelines  
2. At Federal level:  
In the Federal OP for the European Social Funds (ESF), in 2018 the Managing Authority, in accordance with the Commission Guidance Note 
on fraud risk assessment and effective and proportionate anti-fraud measures, adjusted and updated the self-assessment recommended there 
from 2015/2016. This involved assessing the likelihood of specific risks arising, their potential impact and the counter-measures needed in the 

151 

 
 
following  spheres:  expressions  of  interest  and  application  procedures,  implementation  by  and  accountability  of  beneficiaries,  financial 
instruments, certification and payments, award procedures and procurements. 
3. Payment offices and managing authorities under the agricultural and structural funds applied and developed precautionary measures and 
procedures, which have been set out in the relevant fraud prevention manuals and become part of the management and control system. These 
manuals  are  based  on  the  ‘Guide  for  Federal  and  Länder  payment  offices  on  the  prevention  of  fraud  in  agriculture’  and  comparable 
procedural instructions for fisheries under the EMFF, developed in 2014 by a Federation-Länder working party. Focal points of this guidance 
included  identifying  fraud  risk,  analysing  management  and  control  systems,  drafting  registers  of  fraud  indicators,  setting  up  internal 
arrangements where fraud is suspected and informing and training employees. 
Fraud  prevention  is  also  a  regular  item  on  the  agenda  of  the  bi-annual  meeting  of  the  Federation-Länder  working  party  on  ‘EU  financial 
controls of the audit authorities in the sphere of structural funds’. 
2.3  Have  you  facilitated  and  assessed  the  spontaneous  reporting  of  potential  irregularities  and  strengthen  the  protection  of  whistle-
blowers, who are also a crucial source for investigative journalism? 
☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
In Germany the majority of spending programmes are managed in the Federal Länder, which are required by EU law to establish effective 
management and control systems. These include the fundamental obligation to report internal and external irregularities.  
Although  Germany  does  not  yet  have  unified  Federal  provisions  on  the  protection  of  whistle-blowers,  some  of  the  Federal  Länder  have 
implemented  whistle-blower  protection  measures.  We  know  that  some  individual  Länder  have  set  up  ‘lawyer  post-boxes’,  which  whistle-
blowers can use to report information while remaining protected. Germany advocates EU-wide protection of whistleblowers and supports the 
adoption of an EU Directive to this effect. 
2.4 Have you promoted systematic and timely cooperation between judicial and administrative authorities? 
☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
 2.1 Can you share any results deriving from the use of the findings from the 2016 PIF Report in your fraud risk assessments? 
☒YES,  
The Estonian Auditing Authority improved the auditing methodology and check-lists with the fraud indicators provided by in the OLAF public 
procurement guidelines.  
2.2 Have you further exploited the potential of risk analysis, tailoring the approach to the different types of expenditure and taking 
advantage of best practices and the risk elements highlighted in the 2017 PIF Report? 
☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 

EE 

152 

 
 
The Agricultural Register and Information Board have focused on the risk analysis before granting the decision to reduce the administrative 
burden and possible financial losses in later phases. 
Example: 

153 

 
 
 
2.3  Have  you  facilitated  and  assessed  the  spontaneous  reporting  of  potential  irregularities  and  strengthen  the  protection  of  whistle-
blowers, who are also a crucial source for investigative journalism? 
☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
Whistle-blowers  have  the  possibility  to  contact  the  Implementing  Agency  directly  and  they  have  used  it.  Our  supervision  units  start  to 
investigate the case after that. We follow the news in the all regional newspapers to collect information. With fraud cases we are very proactive 
to give our explanations to the journalists with an aim to clarify to wider the audience that we have a strong fraud control system. It is one part 
of the prevention activities. Two of our Implementing Authorities (Enterprise Estonia and the Environmental Investment Centre) have added 
the possibility to submit anonymous hints regarding the misuse of support through their webpages. 
2.4 Have you promoted systematic and timely cooperation between judicial and administrative authorities? 
☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
ESI Funds Managing Authority has been conducting legal training for Estonian court judges to clarify the legal space of the Structural 

Funds.    AFCOS  Estonia  has  organised  joint  regular  training  courses  for  the  participants  from  judicial  and  administrative  authorities 
since 2007. 

IE 

EL 

2.1 Can you share any results deriving from the use of the findings from the 2016 PIF Report in your fraud risk assessments? 
☒NO 
2.2 Have you further exploited the potential of risk analysis, tailoring the approach to the different types of expenditure and taking 
advantage of best practices and the risk elements highlighted in the 2017 PIF Report? 
☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
2.3  Have  you  facilitated  and  assessed  the  spontaneous  reporting  of  potential  irregularities  and  strengthen  the  protection  of  whistle-
blowers, who are also a crucial source for investigative journalism? 
☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
2.4 Have you promoted systematic and timely cooperation between judicial and administrative authorities? 
☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
2.1 Can you share any results deriving from the use of the findings from the 2016 PIF Report in your fraud risk assessments? 
☒YES,  
1. SPECIAL MANAGEMENT SERVICE OF THE 2014-2020 RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME  

154 

 
 
Fiscal Control Committee (EDEL) 

As regards the irregularities and cases of fraud in photovoltaic systems in the 2016 PIF report, the Special Management Service of the Rural 
Development Programme is implementing a technical support project for updating the method for calculating the energy needs of agricultural 
holdings,  determining  the  reasonable  cost  of  RES  and  waste  management  equipment  and  supporting  the  assessment  of  applications  under 
Action 4.1.3 of the RDP for projects implementing RES and waste management system investment operations. 
2. SPECIAL MANAGEMENT SERVICE OF THE MARITIME AND FISHERIES OPERATIONAL PROGRAMMES 
The Special Management Service of the Maritime and Fisheries Operational Programmes implements Law No 4412/2016, which transposes 
EU Directives No 24 and 25 of 2015. It also implements the e-procurement system in accordance with the 2016 PIF report. With regard to the 
results  of  the  findings  of  this  report  in  fraud  risk  assessments,  these  have  been  recorded  in  the  fraud  risk  assessment  tool  in  the  form  of 
measures, as provided for by the 2014-2020 Management and Control System (MCS) of the Special Management Service of the Maritime and 
Fisheries  OP,  as  approved  in  accordance  with  Decision  No  1177/01.08.2017  (Government  Gazette,  Series  II,  No  3163/12.09.2017)  of  the 
Minister  for  Rural  Development  and  Food.  It  should  be  noted  that  their  application  in  the  PP  2014  2020  began  in  2017,  while  the 
implementation of the e-procurement system by the Special Management Service of the Maritime and Fisheries OP began this year.   
3. 
Based on the conclusions and recommendations included in the 2016 report, in addition to the inclusion of any cases of suspected fraud arising 
in the risk analysis on audit planning carried out regularly by the Audit Authority and taking into account the emphasis on public procurement 
as  part  of  the  2016  PIF  report,  in  2018  the  Audit  Authority  reformulated  and  updated  the  audit  questionnaires  for  transactions,  paying 
particular attention to the incorporation of the requirements arising from the new directives on public procurement.  
In 2017, the Audit Authority participated, also actively (by attending) a training programme organised in Athens by the National Centre for 
Public Administration and HAUS (Finland) on combating fraud and corruption in European Union investment and structural funds. 
2.2 Have you further exploited the potential of risk analysis, tailoring the approach to the different types of expenditure and taking 
advantage of best practices and the risk elements highlighted in the 2017 PIF Report? 
☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
1. SPECIAL MANAGEMENT SERVICE OF THE 2014-2020 RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME 
The  on-the-spot  and  ex-post  controls  of  the  Rural  Development  Programme  are  carried  out  in  accordance  with  Articles  50  and  52  of 
Regulation (EU) No 809/2014 respectively. For both types of controls, part of the sample is extracted using risk analysis (60 % - 70 % for on-
the-spot controls and 75-80 % for ex-post controls). For both on-the-spot and ex post controls sampling with risk analysis is carried out on the 
basis of specific risk criteria which contribute to the occurrence of an error in projects and which have been incorporated into the Parameters 
Subsystem of the Rural Development Integrated Information System. In order to classify projects according risk of error occurrence, a score is 

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DIRECTORATE FOR FINANCIAL CONTROLS, INSPECTIONS AND COOPERATIVES 

SPECIAL MANAGEMENT SERVICE OF THE MARITIME AND FISHERIES OPERATIONAL PROGRAMMES 

given  using  an  appropriate  algorithm  to  which  the  individual  values  of  the  risk  criteria  are  imported.  In  the  risk  analysis,  one  of  the  risk 
criteria used is also the error rate of the projects per category of expenditure. 
2. 
The 2014-2020 Management and Control System (MCS) of the Special Management Service of the Maritime and Fisheries OP describes the 
procedure for communicating irregularities through the IMS and for reporting complaints to the AFCOS, while a fraud risk assessment tool 
has been created which describes a series of measures applicable to all stages (assessment-control-payment) of the projects implemented by 
the Special Management Service of the Maritime and Fisheries OP   
3. 
The  Directorate  for  Financial  Controls,  Inspections  and  Cooperatives  selects  the  undertakings  to  be  audited  within  the  annual  audit 
programme by applying a risk analysis methodology. In this regard, the selection of undertakings for audit to better ensure the effectiveness of 
the measures for preventing and detecting irregularities in the context of  EAGF funding, improves and upgrades the risk analysis computer 
application.   
Proposals for the use of risk analysis are presented to the competent department of the European Commission each November. They include 
the assessment of the previous year’s risk analysis, the weighting of risk factors and all relevant information concerning the approach to be 
followed, the techniques, the criteria and the method of implementation, in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council and the Implementing Measures thereof. 
The selection of undertakings using the risk analysis method is carried out in accordance with the criteria sent to the competent department of 
the European Commission and in general taking into account the following: 
a)  The degree of risk associated with the sector of activity; 
b)  The degree of risk associated with the beneficiary; 
c)  The level of financial support. 
The Risk Analysis application selects the undertakings to be audited on the basis of the archives of the computer system and  the scoring for 
each eligibility criteria. 
The risk analysis methodology calculates the Risk Amount for each undertaking, which is the result of the product of the scoring of criteria 
against the amount of the financial aid. The undertakings associated with the greatest risk are selected first. 
The  undertakings  selected  by  Risk  Analysis  for  scrutiny  under  the  2017  EAGF  scrutiny  programme  came  from  many  different  sectors  of 
activity,  but  special  emphasis  was  placed  on  budget  headings  and  beneficiaries  which  absorb  large  amounts  of  money  and  which  are 
inherently high-risk, in combination with other risk factors.  

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The Service is reforming the audit procedures and checklists for each aid scheme and audited scheme for the better and more effective conduct 
of  the  audit.  In  addition,  it  extended  cross  checks  to  natural  and  legal  persons  related  to  the  undertakings  to  be  audited  to  facilitate  the 
verification of the main data to be inspected and to have a number corresponding to the degree of risk they present. 
The  Directorate  for  Financial  Controls,  Inspections  and  Cooperatives  has  a  structured  form  of  cooperation  with  other  bodies  pursuant  to 
Article 83 of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council, which provides for mutual assistance between the 
Member States where an undertaking or third party is established in a Member State other than that in which a) payment of the amount in 
question has or should have been made or received; b) in which the documents and information required for scrutiny are to be found. Member 
States  shall  send  the  Commission  a  list  of  undertakings  established  in  a  third  country  for  which  payment  of  the  amount  in  question  has  or 
should  have  been  made  or  received  in  that  Member  State.  Moreover,  if  additional  information  is  required  as  part  of  the  scrutiny  of  an 
undertaking in another Member State, and in particular cross-checks, specific scrutiny requests may be made indicating the reasons for the 
request.  
4. Fiscal Control Committee (EDEL) 
All ‘inflows’ concerning fraud risks (included suspected fraud) are brought to the attention of the Audit Authority through the channels of the 
Management and Control System (MCS) and are taken into account in the risk analysis carried out by the Audit Authority when planning its 
audits. Specifically, five (5) system audits were carried out at Management Authorities (MA) and part of the audit work concerned the effective 
application  of  proportionate  measures  to  combat  fraud  arising  from  the  fundamental  requirements  of  the  national  and  EU  regulatory 
framework. 
Taking  into  consideration  the  third  part  of  the  recommendation  for  2017,  the  Audit  Authority,  as  part  of  the  audit  of  the  2018  accounts, 
cooperated with the jointly responsible services to assess the complaints submitted on suspected fraud in order to assess whether corrective 
measures are required as part of the accounts declaration for the 4th accounting year. 
2.3  Have  you  facilitated  and  assessed  the  spontaneous  reporting  of  potential  irregularities  and  strengthen  the  protection  of  whistle-
blowers, who are also a crucial source for investigative journalism? 
☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
Whistleblower  protection  was  introduced  by  the  Anti-Corruption  Law  No  4254/2014  (Government  Gazette,  Series  I,  No  85/7-4-2014).    The 
General  Secretariat  for  Anti-Corruption  (GSAC)  submitted  a  proposal  to  the  competent  Alternate  Minister  for  Justice,  Transparency  and 
Human Rights to improve the protection mechanism for whistleblowers. In addition, the revised national anti-corruption action plan for 2018-
2021 includes the legislative initiative to establish an effective protection mechanism (National Anti-Corruption Action Plan 2018-2021, Action 
11.2.2, to be implemented by June 2019). 

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ES 

2.4 Have you promoted systematic and timely cooperation between judicial and administrative authorities? 
☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
Circulars No 2/ref. 8715Α/21-8-2018 and 2α/ref. 9097/24-8-2018 from the Supreme Court were sent to all prosecutors in Greece to monitor 
specific cases of major financial crimes, particularly cases of corruption, money laundering and cases of fraud against the financial interests 
of  the European Union  with the aim of  establishing a monitoring  procedure and setting  up a reliable data  archive,  every four  months. The 
statistics sent are posted on our website. 
2.1 Can you share any results deriving from the use of the findings from the 2016 PIF Report in your fraud risk assessments? 
☒NO 
The findings from the 2016 PIF Report are only one of the multiple elements which are taken into account in fraud risk assessments, so it is 
difficult to isolate the effects that each of those elements has as a result of its inclusion in such assessments. 
2.2 Have you further exploited the potential of risk analysis, tailoring the approach to the different types of expenditure and taking 
advantage of best practices and the risk elements highlighted in the 2017 PIF Report? 
☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
Fraud  risk  assessments  are  tailored  to  the  different  type  of  expenditures  (public  procurement,  grants,  etc.).  Depending  on  the  MA,  risk 
elements highlighted in the 2017 PIF Report either have been already taken into account in their FRAs or will be taken into account in the 
following  update/revision of  their FRAs, which is  done periodically.  As  an example, ‘Research and technological  development  (RTD)’ and 
‘Transport’  priorities,  which  are  highlighted  in  the  2017  PIF  Report  as  relevant  risk  sectors,  will  be  considered  by  the  ERDF  Managing 
Authority in order to better focus the scope of its controls. 
2.3  Have  you  facilitated  and  assessed  the  spontaneous  reporting  of  potential  irregularities  and  strengthen  the  protection  of  whistle-
blowers, who are also a crucial source for investigative journalism? 
☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
As it was reported last year in the framework of the preparation of the PIF Report 2017, Spain established in mid-2017 a confidential channel 
for complaints which is centralized at the AFCOS, and through which any person aware of facts that may constitute fraud or irregularities in 
relation to projects or operations fully or partially funded by EU funds can report these to the administration so that the competent authorities 
can take the necessary measures to investigate or verify these facts, and, if applicable, require responsibility to be taken as appropriate in each 
case. 
During 2018, the Managing Authorities have increasingly adopted this channel by fulfilling the recommendations made by the AFCOS in its 

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Communication  1/2017,  which  covers  the  most  important  aspects  of  this  channel  (see  in  particular  paragraph  6  -SEXTO-).  This  involves 
specific measures such as including a reference to this channel in the description of their management and control systems and procedures, 
including  a link to  this  channel  on their respective websites (extranet and intranet) or including a “standard paragraph”  -suggested by the 
AFCOS-  in  every  call  for  proposals  (grants)  or  every  contract  to  be  financed  by  EU  funds,  in  order  for  every  potential  whistleblower  (the 
beneficiary,  the  employees  of  the  beneficiary  or  the  contractor,  its  providers  or  subcontractors,  the  public  employees  working  in  the 
management of EU funds, etc.) to know that he/she can make use of this channel in order to report fraud or irregularities. 
The AFCOS has also made specific presentations of this channel to the MAs and IB, and has included an explanation of this channel in all the 
antifraud seminars in which it has participated during 2018. 
As a result of this, the number of allegations received through this channel has increased during 2018 with respect to 2017. 
With  regard  to  the  protection  of  whistleblowers,  there  is  a  legislative  proposal  which  is  at  the  moment  under  discussion  in  the  Spanish 
Parliament. This proposal covers a broad range of measures in order to protect whistleblowers from retaliation, such us the non-validity or 
suspension  of  the  effects  of  any  negative  measures  adopted  against  the  whistleblower,  the  inversion  of  the  burden  of  proof  (in  favor  of  the 
whistleblower), the right of  the whistleblower to receive free legal advice with regard to the consequences of  having  blown the whistle, the 
right to receive psychological assistance, the right to be provisionally assigned to other working post or to be entitled to a period of leave in 
case of retaliation in his/her actual working post, maintaining his/her remuneration, and the right to be compensated for any negative measure 
unduly adopted against him/her due to his/her allegation, among others.  
In addition to this, a number of “Comunidades Autónomas” have adopted laws in order to protect whistleblowers at a regional level, covering 
protection measures which are similar to those included in the legislative proposal at national level. 
2.4 Have you promoted systematic and timely cooperation between judicial and administrative authorities? 
☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
Since AFCOS was created in late 2014, an important effort has been done to put administrative and judicial authorities together in those cases 
where the cooperation between them is needed. The dispersion from the administrative side of this cooperation has been reduced, as AFCOS 
has  tried  to  centralize  this  cooperation  being  the  focal  point  for  administrative  authorities  to  coordinate  their  activities  with  the  judicial 
authorities. 
Managing  authorities  also  include  in  their  training  sessions  for  Intermediate  Bodies  the  duty  to  submit  to  the  judicial  authorities  any 
irregularity which they consider to be fraudulent. 
However, further efforts are to be done in order to make this cooperation more systematic. To this end, it is important to highlight the initiative 

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to create the “Advisory Council for the prevention and fight against fraud affecting the financial interests of the EU ”, which was included in 
the additional provision nº25 of the Law 38/2003, on Public Grants, and which is foreseen to be finally created during 2019 (a Royal Decree of 
the Government is needed to create this Advisory Council). 
The creation of this organ will imply the formalization of the AFCOS network and will be of crucial importance for the purpose of promoting a 
systematic cooperation between judicial and administrative authorities as it is foreseen that both the relevant administrative authorities (MA, 
AA,  AFCOS,  etc.)  and  the  General  Public  Prosecutor´s  Office  and  law  enforcement  authorities,  will  be  members  of  the  Plenary  and  the 
Permanent Commission of such Advisory Council. 
2.1 Can you share any results deriving from the use of the findings from the 2016 PIF Report in your fraud risk assessments? 
☒NO 
2.2 Have you further exploited the  potential of risk analysis, tailoring the approach to the different types of expenditure and taking 
advantage of best practices and the risk elements highlighted in the 2017 PIF Report? 
☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
This matter comes under systems audits (S.A.) and operations audits (O.A.). 
S.A. should test the effectiveness and efficiency of management checks during the operation selection phase, financial management and control 
of O.P., as well as the existence of risk mapping in order to target checks on the highest-risk beneficiaries, projects and providers. 
2.3  Have  you  facilitated  and  assessed  the  spontaneous  reporting  of  potential  irregularities  and  strengthen  the  protection  of  whistle-
blowers, who are also a crucial source for investigative journalism? 
☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
•       In line with previous years, suspected fraud is a sui generis category of irregularity (Category 16) in the list of irregularities for the O.A. 
year 2018/2019. 
•       Insertion in the O.A. model report of a new line concerning conflicts of interest: 4.2 and 6.2 – Question: Has a conflict of interests been 
detected? The verification concerns the application, in the case at hand, of procedures to prevent conflicts of interest. This question is different 
from the question relating to cases of suspected fraud, and precedes it. 
2.1 Can you share any results deriving from the use of the findings from the 2016 PIF Report in your fraud risk assessments? 
☒YES,  
The Ministry of Regional  Development  and EU Funds is  the Managing Authority (MA) for Operational  Programme Competitiveness  & 
Cohesion  2014-2020:  MA  establishes  effective  and  proportionate  measures  to  combat  fraud,  taking  into  account  the  identified  risks.  All 

FR 

HR 

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obligations 

Management and Control Systems (MCS) bodies ( MA, Cooridation body, Intermediate bodies level I (IB I), Intermediate bodies level II (IB I 
and IB II), Certifying body (CB), Audit body) carry zero tolerance policies to fraud and corruption, and accordingly MA, IB I and IB II, CB 
carry  out  Fraud  Risk  assessment  for  the  purpose  of  their  prevention,  detection  and  taking  of  necessary  corrective  measures.  MA  collects 
mentioned assessment, while the Ministry of Finance is responsible for processing and analysing the obtained results, in accordance with the 
designated 
(https://narodne-novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeni/2014_09_107_2070.htmlhttps://strukturnifondovi.hr/wp-
content/uploads/2017/03/Izmjena-uredbe-o-tijelima-ESF-EFRR-i-KF.pdf). 
Agency  for  Payments  in  Agriculture,  Fisheries and  Rural  Development:  In  2017,  the  Paying  Agency  while  identifying  risks  in  relation  to 
irregularities and fraud, has taken into account all types of financing in the frame of European Agricultural Guarantee Fund and the European 
Agricultural Fund for Rural Development, and also has taken account of the weakness of the management and control system in accordance 
with an internal risk management procedure. In addition, we emphasize that the Ministry of Finance requested identification of risks related to 
irregularities and fraud in 2017, and provided the basis for risk identification: "Risk management methodology related to the occurrence of 
irregularities and frauds" and accompanying attachments. The proof of performance can be provided on request. 

2.2 Have you further exploited the potential of risk analysis, tailoring the approach to the different types of expenditure and taking 
advantage of best practices and the risk elements highlighted in the 2017 PIF Report? 
☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
The Ministry of Regional Development and EU Funds: 
In  the  Common  National  Rules  (CNR)  –  obligated  at  the  OP  level  for  all  MCS  bodies;  Part  10:  Risk  Management;    chapters  8-11,  MA 
implemented  Fraud  Risk  assessment  from  Guidance  Note  on  Fraud  Risk  Assessment  and  Effective  and  Proportionate  Anti-Fraud  Measures  
(http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/information/publications/guidelines/2014/fraud-risk-assessment-and-effective-and-proportionate-anti-
fraud-measures)  .  According  to  mentioned  chapter  of  CNR,  MCS  bodies  are  obligate  to  conduct  annual  Fraud  Risk  assessment,  while  the 
Ministry of Finance is responsible for processing and analysing the obtained results. Also, mentioned Fraud Risk Assessment is facilitated with 
supporting documents (guidelines) and forms in CNR to enable more precise definition and recognition any of possible frauds. 
Agency for Payments in Agriculture, Fisheries and Rural Development 
In 2018, the Paying Agency while identifying risks in relation to irregularities and fraud, has taken into account all types of financing in the 
frame of European Agricultural Guarantee Fund and the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development, and also has taken account of 
the weakness of the management and control system in accordance with an internal risk management procedure. 
2.3  Have  you  facilitated  and  assessed  the  spontaneous  reporting  of  potential  irregularities  and  strengthen  the  protection  of  whistle-

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blowers, who are also a crucial source for investigative journalism? 
☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
The Ministry of Regional Development and EU Funds: 
The Common National Rules (CNR); Part 13: Irregularities; chapters 4.2.-4.6. contains the procedure for submitting reports on suspicion on 
irregularity and fraud. Also, mentioned CNR; chapter: 5.6. consist protection measures for whistle-blowers which are in line with the whistle-
blower  national  protection  rules.  Those  rules  apply  appropriately  to  employees,  persons  who  are  not  employees  of  the  Management  and 
Control Systems (MCS) bodies and to grant beneficiaries as well as to representatives of the public concerned. 
(the documents – CNR Part 13 can be sent to you upon request). 

Ministry of Justice: 
Croatia  has adopted WB protection Law  (namely: Law  on protection of  persons who are reporting  irregularities) on 08 February 2019. In 
order for relevant authorities to prepare for implementation, the Law is going to enter into force on 1 July 2019.  
Draft Law was prepared based on the work of special working group, public consultation and opinions of relevant stakeholders has taken in 
consideration recommendations from Council of Europe for the protection of WB from 2014 and Proposal for the protection of people who are 
reporting  breaches  of  Union  law  from  2018.    The  Law  prescribes  protection  to  WB  both  in  private  and  public  sector  for  broader  scope  of 
irregularities (not just criminal offences) and broader scope of persons - not just employees as prescribed in Labour act.  
The  law  foresees  3  channels  of  reporting  (internal,  external,  and  exceptionally  public  disclosure),  right  to  seek  indemnity  through  judicial 
proceedings  (similar  like  labour  disputes)  and  right  for  protection  of  confidentiality.    We  emphasize  that  public  disclosure  is  allowed 
exceptionally in certain cases like if there is an imminent danger to life, health, safety or the occurrence of large scale harm or destruction of 
evidence,  but  whistleblowers  are  primarily  encouraged  to  use  internal  channels  if  they  exist  and  function  properly,  and  if  there  are  not 
functioning or are not established then external channels. All public and private entities which have more than 50 employees are obliged to 
establish internal procedures for protection of WB and nominate confidential person for protection of WB.  
Ombudsman  is  predicted  to  be  competent  authority  for  external  reporting  primarily  with  aim  to  protect  rights  of  WBs  (not  investigate 
irregularities): Thus, investigation of irregularities is in competence of other relevant bodies (like public prosecutors, labour inspection), but 
in Act are prescribed deadlines in which competent authority has to provide feedback to reporting person. Also ombudsman is competent body 
for providing legal information’s to WB, protecting confidentiality and providing reports about protection of WB to public.  
Regarding external reporting it is also prescribed that irregularities can be reported directly to bodies authorized to deal with the content of 
the application in accordance with a special law and established system of detection and handling of irregularities. In that kind of competent 

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authorities are also included bodies which aim is to protect financial interest of EU .  
Regarding court proceedings provisional measures are prescribed which aim is to protect WB from retaliation during procedures.  
Also,  Law foresee sanctions for  breaching  rights of  WBs and also  sanction for  the protection against malicious reporting, because the Law 
forbids the abuse of whistleblowing. 
Agency for Payments in Agriculture, Fisheries and Rural Development: 
Irregularities can be reported to the Paying Agency anonymously within the Paying Agency and / or by a third party, the applicant's personal 
dana and anonymity is protected. 

2.4 Have you promoted systematic and timely cooperation between judicial and administrative authorities? 
☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
The Ministry of Regional Development and EU Funds: 
MA cooperates with all national bodies in the fight against irregularities and frauds. If the Decision on the established irregularity contains 
elements related to suspicion of fraud, according to The Common National Rules (CNR); Part 13: Irregularities; chapter 4: The Decision on 
the irregularity, IBs-level II are obligated, without delay, to send an official letter as well as all relevant documentation to the Croatian State 
Attorney (CSA) and to inform The Anti-Fraud and Fraud Prevention Service (AFFPS) as the organizational unit of the Ministry of Finance of 
the Republic of Croatia, and all bodies involved in MCS. Besides CSA notified in accordance with the preceding paragraph, IB level II carries 
out the procedure for determining the irregularity (chapter 5 of the CNR). Until a decision is made about the existence of an irregularity or 
fraud, member state does not claim funds from EC. 
Agency for Payments in Agriculture, Fisheries and Rural Development: 
In  regards  with  the  promotion  of  systematic  and  timely  cooperation  between  judicial  and  administrative  authorities,  the  Legal  Affairs  and 
Court Proceedings Service in the Paying Agency within their capacity provides relevant information to judicial authorities upon their requests 
in duly matter, gives their statements upon requests of the State’s Attorney Office, on the civil actions of the beneficiaries against the Republic 
Croatia or Paying Agency and maintains good cooperation with the State’s Attorney Office. Finally, the Legal Affairs and Court Proceedings 
Service in the Paying Agency monitors and participates the civil and/or administrative proceedings on relevant courts which results in claims 
against Republic Croatia or Paying Agency been rejected or dismissed. 

IT 

2.1 Can you share any results deriving from the use of the findings from the 2016 PIF Report in your fraud risk assessments? 
☒YES,  

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The  Managing  Authority  has  established  a  Fraud  Risk  Assessment  Task  Force  and  a  Checks  Quality  Review  Task  Force,  in  addition  to 
implementing the ARACHNE system with assistance from the Ministry of Economy and Finance/Auditing Authority. 
2.2 Have you further exploited the potential of risk analysis, tailoring the approach to the different types of expenditure and taking 
advantage of best practices and the risk elements highlighted in the 2017 PIF Report? 
☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
The  risk  analysis  is  carried  out  by  the  Fraud  Risk  Assessment  Task  Force,  under  the  supervision  of  the  Ministry  of  Economy  and 
Finance/Auditing  Authority.  The  analysis  is  tailored  on  the  specific  needs  of  the  National  Operation  Programme  for  School,  which  mostly 
covers State-run schools, and thus does not perfectly mirror the 2017 PIF Report. 
2.3  Have  you  facilitated  and  assessed  the  spontaneous  reporting  of  potential  irregularities  and  strengthen  the  protection  of  whistle-
blowers, who are also a crucial source for investigative journalism? 
☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
Pursuant to Italian legislation, the Ministry of Education, under which the Managing Authority operates, has implemented a comprehensive 
whistleblowing protection system. The MA itself routinely receives reports from whistleblowers, which are always investigated, while ensuring 
that the identity of the whistleblower is not disclosed. 
2.4 Have you promoted systematic and timely cooperation between judicial and administrative authorities? 
☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
The  Managing  Authority  will  always  respond  to  any  request  from  a  national  judicial  authority,  while  at  the  same  time  monitoring  Court 
proceedings  which  are  related  to  irregularities  in  the  Operational  Programme.  It  should  be  noted  that  Italian  judicial  authorities  are 
independent  from  the  Civil  Service;  moreover,  proceedings  will  often  be  classified.  The  cooperation  between  administrative  authorities  is 
mandated by Italian law. 
2.1 Can you share any results deriving from the use of the findings from the 2016 PIF Report in your fraud risk assessments? 
☒YES,  
Risk  assessment  has  been  incorporated  in  all  administrative  and  on  the  spot  procedures  undertaken  by  responsible  bodies  involved  in 
programmes  under  shared  management  in  the  areas  of  Cohesion  Policy,  Fisheries  and  Aid  to  the  Most  Deprived.    E.g.  Risk  assessment 
methodologies are incorporated in procedures for selecting procurement procedures in order to perform administrative verifications regarding 
the  legality  and  regularity  of  the  tender  notice,  evaluation  and  assignment  procedures.    Risk  analysis  is  also  used  in  order  to  select 
transactions to verify in terms of payment claims submitted by beneficiaries with a large number of supporting documents, or  during on the 
spot controls for measures with a large number of final recipients. Risk analysis incorporates data on the nature of beneficiaries, the nature of 

CY 

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projects and the type of expenditure involved, based on ex-ante assessment of the associated risk to each category and incorporating results of 
previous verifications and audits. 
2.2 Have you further exploited the potential of risk analysis, tailoring the approach to the different types of expenditure and taking 
advantage of best practices and the risk elements highlighted in the 2017 PIF Report? 
☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
Information  regarding  staff  involved  in  co-financed  projects  has  been  incorporated  in  the  MIS  used  for  the  management  of  four  shared 
management programmes covering the areas of Cohesion Policy, Fisheries and Aid to the Most Deprived.  Staff cost has been assessed as a 
high risk area for fraud during the fraud risk self-assessment exercise undertaken by the responsible authorities. The information in the MIS 
will be extracted in reports in order to identify trends and used in the framework of administrative and on-the-spot controls. 
2.3  Have  you  facilitated  and  assessed  the  spontaneous  reporting  of  potential  irregularities  and  strengthen  the  protection  of  whistle-
blowers, who are also a crucial source for investigative journalism? 
☒NO 
2.4 Have you promoted systematic and timely cooperation between judicial and administrative authorities? 
☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
Enhanced  cooperation  between  judicial  and  administrative  authorities  exist  in  cases  of  detected  irregularities  which  may  result  to  a 
suspicion  of  fraud  or  established  fraud.  Any  other  types  of  irregularities  are  handled  within  administrative  authorities.  The  Legal 
Department  of  the  Cyprus  Government  (particularly  the  Unit  for  Combating  Money  Laundering  -MOKAS)  is  involved  in  the  AFCOS 
composition. MOKAS and the Legal Department of the Cyprus Government function under the Attorney General of the Republic and in the 
event of legal cases undertake the responsibility to investigate in cooperation with other administrative authorities. 
2.1 Can you share any results deriving from the use of the findings from the 2016 PIF Report in your fraud risk assessments? 
☒YES,  
(Information  given  by  Ministry  of  Agriculture)  Recommendation  given  in  the  2016  PIF  report  has  been  implemented  in  Latvia  and  in  the 
Follow-up to  the recommendations 2017 we have already provided a detailed explanation  as to what  steps we have taken to  implement  the 
recommendation. 
2.2 Have you further exploited the potential of risk analysis, tailoring the approach to the different types of expenditure and taking 
advantage of best practices and the risk elements highlighted in the 2017 PIF Report? 
☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation (Information given by Ministry of Agriculture) 
☒NO  (Information  given  by  Ministry  of  Welfare)  We  set  up  internal  risk  management  and  anti-fraud  control  system  in  the  managing 

LV 

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authority, clearly defining the roles and responsibilities of personnel in the implementation of the activities, avoiding any conflict of interest in 
the  decision-making  process,  ensuring  at  least  two  participation  in  decision  making  and  the  person  responsible  for  the  supervision  of 
operations  to  be  supported  and  ensuring  FEAD  beneficiaries  of  the  awareness  of  the  institutions  involved  in  the  management  of  the  FEAD 
readiness ensure the risk management process and capacity to fight fraud. 
The institutions involved in the management of the FEAD shall take the measures necessary to prevent and detect potential risks, including 
fraud. The risk management established for expenditure shall be applied uniformly to all type. 
2.3  Have  you  facilitated  and  assessed  the  spontaneous  reporting  of  potential  irregularities  and  strengthen  the  protection  of  whistle-
blowers, who are also a crucial source for investigative journalism? 
☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
The Whistleblowing law was adopted by Parliament in final reading on 11 October, 2018 and the law will enter into force on 1  May, 2019 
(https://likumi.lv/ta/id/302465-trauksmes-celsanas-likums)  
Corruption  Prevention  and  Combating  Bureau  (KNAB)  has  developed  appropriate  amendments  to  the  Law  On  Prevention  of  Conflict  of 
Interest in Activities of Public Officials (Law No 150/Lp13, First reading, 13.12.2018.), which provides “If a public official becomes aware of 
conflict of interest situations or possible cases of corruption, including bribery of a foreign official in the performance of his or her duties, it 
informs  the  Head  of  an  institution  of  a  public  person  or  KNAB.  If  a  State  official  working  in  a  State  security  institution becomes  aware  of 
information  regarding  conflict  of  interest  situations  in  the  performance  of  his  or  her  duties,  it  shall  inform the  Director  of  the  Constitution 
Protection Bureau, but regarding possible cases of corruption - the head of the institution or the KNAB or the Prosecutor General (Section 21, 
Paragraph 5). 
However,  the  obligation  of  establishment  of  the  internal  reporting  mechanism  of  State  and  local  government  institutions  and  State  Owned 
Enterprises (SOE) is laid down in the regulations developed by the KNAB and adopted by the Cabinet of Ministers of 17 October 2017. 630 
“Regulations Regarding Basic Requirements for Internal Control System for the Prevention of the Risk of Corruption and Conflict of Interest 
in  Institutions  of  a  Public  Person”  but  recommendations,  methodological  assistance  and  examples  of  internal  controls,  including  the 
establishment of a reporting mechanism, are contained in the guidelines developed by the Bureau and approved on 31 January 2018 regarding 
the basic requirements of the internal control system for the prevention of the risks of corruption and conflict of interest in the institution of a 
public person. 
In  addition,  Competition  Councils  competence  is  to  discover  infringements  resulted  from  collusive  behaviour  of  bidders  also  those 
participating in all public tenders  (also those connected with Competition Council tool build in the webpage provide possibility for whistle-
blowers  inform  unanimously  about  competition  law  infringements  writing  unanimous  report.  The  information  given  by  whistle  blower  may 

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include the information about the cartels (collusive horizontal agreements) between undertakings (also bidders in the procurements). 
Another legal tool Competition Council have to enhance reporting about cartel infringements is leniency program that provides the possibility 
to  get  full  immunity  from  fines  to  first  applicant  and  significant  reduction  to  next  undertakings  that  admit  violation  and  submit  additional 
evidence (more detailed explained here). This program was substantially improved by legislative amendments in 2016. In 2018 Competition 
Council  finished  elaboration  and  published  more  detailed  guidelines  explaining  procedure  and  criteria  for  potential  leniency  applicants 
(available  here).  During  often  educational  activities  to  stakeholders  (sectoral  NGO’s,  undertakings)  CC  besides  presenting  and  explaining 
what is forbidden and constitutes infringement also informs about the possibilities and benefits of leniency program. 
2.4 Have you promoted systematic and timely cooperation between judicial and administrative authorities? 
☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
We  suppose  this  point  should  be  covered  by  measures,  which  are  being  implemented  within  training  programs.  We  consistently  organize 
seminars  and  working  parties  for  institutions  involved  in  administration of  EU  financial  interests  and  investigative  bodies.  For  example,  in 
2018 intermediate body (Central Finance and Contracting agency- CFCA) and Procurement Monitoring Bureau (PMB) organized informative 
workshops  sharing  the  best  practices  in  EU  funds  administration.  One  of  the  seminars,  which  was  led  by  PMB,  was  on  the  request  of 
investigative bodies. 
AFCOS  LV  in  2018  implemented  closure  events  (seminar  and  study  visit)  which  were  co-  financed  by  HERCULE  III  programme.  In  both, 
seminar and study visit participated colleagues from EU funds administrating bodies and investigative bodies.  
(1) 
Seminars  main idea was to  make a dialog between investigative bodies and investigative media.  Using presentations  and discussion 
sessions  participants  tried  to  find  a  compromise  between  those  two  sides.  OCCRP  (https://www.occrp.org/en)    shared  their  experience  in 
fighting fraud and corruption as well.  
(2) 
activities, we see improvement of cooperation between Latvian national institutions and OLAF. 
Competition  Council  consistently  enhances  cooperation  with  other  judicial  and  administrative  authorities  during  enforcement  and  cartel 
investigation  activities  (with  State  Police,  Corruption  Prevention  and  Combating  Bureau  etc.)  exchanging  evidences  and  information, 
advocacy and educational activities. 
Competition  Council  launched  in  2017  and  continued  in  2018  cycle  of  seminars  with  Corruption  Prevention  and  Combating  Bureau  (the 
KNAB) and the Procurement Monitoring Bureau (the PMB) 
2.1 Can you share any results deriving from the use of the findings from the 2016 PIF Report in your fraud risk assessments? 
☒YES,  

Study  visit  was  organised  to  OLAF,  Belgium  AFCOS,  Antwerp  customs  and  other  institutions  with  investigative  powers.  After  those 

LT 

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The  Ministry  of  Finance,  as  Managing  Authority  of  the  Operational  Programme  for  the  European  Union  Investments  for  2014-2020 
(hereinafter - the Operational Programme), in order to minimize as much as possible the probability of occurrence of corruption and fraud in 
administration  and  use  of  assistance  from  the  European  Union  Structural  Funds,  annually  analyses  various  available  and  received 
information: 
- reviews the provisions for reducing the incidence of corruption and fraud manifestations laid down in national legislation and measures for 
transparency  and  for  reducing  the  probability  of  fraud  embedded  in  the  legislation  governing  the  management  of  assistance  from  the  EU 
Structural Funds; 
- analyses recommendations specified in surveys and evaluations of the Special Investigation Service, Financial Crime Investigation Service, 
Transparency International local department in the relevant year, proposals for the improvement of the administration of assistance from the 
European Union Structural Funds, 
- reviews received information on possible cases of inappropriate use of assistance from the European Union Funds and etc. 
In  accordance  with  the  aforementioned  information,  the  Ministry  of  Finance  assesses  the  need  for  additional  measures  to  reduce  the 
probability of possible occurrence of fraud and corruption manifestations. 
Following the assessment in 2018, the need for additional preventive measures in such areas as evaluation of applications, carrying out on-
the-spot checks, communication activities, public procurement, public and private interests and gift policy,  etc. has been established. 
Additional measures to be implemented by the Ministry of Finance in 2019 include both various checks (e.g. quality control of the application 
evaluation) and preventive actions: training for institutions of the Operational Programme (e.g. training on public and private interests and 
gift policy), recommendations to project promoters and employees of the Operational Programme Management and Control System on ethics, 
conflicts of interest and legal liability for criminal offenses, etc. 
2.2 Have you further exploited the potential of risk analysis, tailoring the approach to the different types of expenditure and taking 
advantage of best practices and the risk elements highlighted in the 2017 PIF Report? 
N/A 
2.3  Have  you  facilitated  and  assessed  the  spontaneous  reporting  of  potential  irregularities  and  strengthen  the  protection  of  whistle-
blowers, who are also a crucial source for investigative journalism? 
☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

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On 28 November 2017 the Seimas (Parliament) of the Republic of Lithuania enacted a new Law on the Protection of Whistle-Blowers (No XIII-
804) which provides for the protection of whistle-blowers. The law entered into force on 1 January 2019. The law lays out a mechanism of the 
whistle-blower’s  protection  and  ensures  confidentiality  of  persons  reporting  offenses  of  officers  and  public  servants.  Even  prior  to  the 
enactment of this new legal act, the State Tax Inspectorate (STI) was already undertaking practises to promote whistle-blowing. The STI could 
receive  anonymous  reports  on  possible  tax  violation  via  the  trust  line.  Persons  could  also  submit  the  report  via  the  STI  website  or  by 
downloading the mobile app "Inform “.   
2.4 Have you promoted systematic and timely cooperation between judicial and administrative authorities? 
☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
As regards systematic and timely cooperation between judicial and administrative authorities, Article 33(1) of the Republic of Lithuania Law 
on  Tax  Administration  was  amended  to  provide  the  access  for  tax  authorities  to  anti-money-laundering  information.  When  performing  the 
functions assigned to it, the tax administrator (officer) shall have the right:  to obtain from persons, including credit, payment, and electronic 
money  institutions,  the  data  required  for  the  performance  of  its  obligations,  copies  of  documents,  computer  file  data  (copies  thereof) 
concerning the assets, income, expenses and activities of this or another person, including the beneficial owner as that term  is defined in  Law 
on the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing  and to use information from the registers and databases administered and 
managed by itself or other legal persons. 
2.1 Can you share any results deriving from the use of the findings from the 2016 PIF Report in your fraud risk assessments? 
☒NO 
The only European structural funds managed in Luxembourg and falling within the scope are the ones covering the agricultural  sector (i.e. 
FEADER & FEAGA). We assume that this question refers to recommendation 4 we received last year. According to the latter, Member States 
have to review their fraud risk assessments in relation to market support measures. As no fraud cases related to “market support measures” 
have  occurred  yet  in  the  agriculture  sector,  we  did  not  make  improvements  in  this  area  after  the  2016  report.  Thus,  we  cannot  compare 
national results with those from the PIF report. 
2.2 Have you further exploited the potential of risk analysis, tailoring the approach to the different types of expenditure and taking 
advantage of best practices and the risk elements highlighted in the 2017 PIF Report? 
☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
Following  measure  is  a  continuous  process  and  is  therefore  still  being  implemented:  The  Paying  Agency  for  Agricultural  Funds  Services, 
whose  mission  has  an  impact  on  the  financial  operations  of  the  European  Union,  must  set  up  an  alert  system  (article  58  of  regulation 

LU 

169 

 
 
HU 

1306/2013) to detect facts that may indicate fraud or attempted fraud. The management service defines as a red alert facts or information that 
becomes aware of as part of its daily work and whose content raises a suspicion as to the regularity of the action. 
2.3  Have  you  facilitated  and  assessed  the  spontaneous  reporting  of  potential  irregularities  and  strengthen  the  protection  of  whistle-
blowers, who are also a crucial source for investigative journalism? 
☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
Our managing authority in charge of FEADER & FEAGA already implemented a whistleblower procedure in 2015. Since then, this authority 
has not changed anything. 
2.4 Have you promoted systematic and timely cooperation between judicial and administrative authorities? 
☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
Administrative and judicial authorities cooperate systematically, and in conformity with the legal and regulatory framework.  In this respect, 
AFCOS Luxembourg, despite not having any investigating power, furthers such cooperation amongst national authorities as well as between 
national authorities and OLAF. 
2.1 Can you share any results deriving from the use of the findings from the 2016 PIF Report in your fraud risk assessments? 
☒YES,  
A risk profile was generated for all headings most affected by any undervaluation (a total of more than 90 % of the products in Chapters 61-64 
fall under CN code 492); all profiles were based on the fair market prices maintained by OLAF.  
2.2 Have you further exploited the potential of risk analysis, tailoring the approach to the different types of expenditure and taking 
advantage of best practices and the risk elements highlighted in the 2017 PIF Report? 
☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
Fraud  risk  is  identified  and  assessed  by  the  managing  authorities  on  the  basis  of  the  EGESIF_14-0021-00  model  recommended  by  the 
Commission. Hungary has also drawn up methodological guidelines for this. The main processes assessed were: 
- 
- 
- 
- 
2.3  Have  you  facilitated  and  assessed  the  spontaneous  reporting  of  potential  irregularities  and  strengthen  the  protection  of  whistle-
blowers, who are also a crucial source for investigative journalism? 
☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

selection of applicants; 
implementation and verification of operations; 
certification and payments; 
public procurements carried out directly by the managing authorities. 

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the role and activities of the GVH in development policy; 
EUTAF’s experience of auditing public procurements carried out using Union funds; 
the Public Procurement Authority’s practice of auditing contracts; 
key amendments to the Public Procurement Act’s provisions on redress. 

Citizens’  complaints  are  of  great  assistance  in  the  investigation  of  cases  and  identification  of  irregularities.  The  website  http://www.anti-
lop.hu/ provides a forum for making these complaints. Citizens can signal fraud there anonymously and have their identity as whistle-blowers 
protected and respected. 
2.4 Have you promoted systematic and timely cooperation between judicial and administrative authorities? 
☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
On  8  March  2018,  the  Prime  Minister’s  Office  provided  training  entitled  ‘The  relevance  of  competition  policy  and  regularity  of  public 
procurement when implementing EU funds’. 
Presentations were made by experts from the Hungarian Competition Authority (GVH), Public Procurement Authority (KH) and Directorate-
General for Audit of European Funds (EUTAF). The training session dealt with the following topics: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
The service currently responsible for coordination with regard to official requests and whistleblowing concerning the use of EU funds is the 
Department of Administration and Security of the Ministry of Innovation and Technology. In this way, enquiries relating to criminality referred 
to all managing authorities are concentrated in one organisational unit. This leads to reinforced personal contacts between the authorities and 
law enforcement services, increases transparency, reduced the number of parallel investigations and promotes the investigation and prevention 
of crimes involving the use of EU funds. 
2.1 Can you share any results deriving from the use of the findings from the 2016 PIF Report in your fraud risk assessments? 
☒YES,  
The 2016 PIR Report had made 4 main recommendations to Member States. Mainly only 2 of these relate to the Funds Programmes Division 
(FPD), namely: (i) Improve the quality of data when reporting irregularities (Please vide reply to question 2.3, in particular to the fact that 
further progress was achieved in the computerised system for reporting of irregularities); (ii) Take into account the risk-analysis findings. 
With respect to point ii above, the Fraud Risk Registers of FPD have continued to be reviewed/fine-tuned (on a regular basis) to address new 
emerging  fraud risks that  necessitate alterations  to  the internal control  system.  (This  leads also  to the verifications/control checklists being 
continually updated to cater for new trends/patterns of the ways in which fraud is committed.) 
The Fraud Risk Register takes into account, amongst others, that: 
(i) The FPD has a specific unit titled ‘Financial Control Unit’ which reports directly to the Director General – FPD and works independently 

MT 

171 

 
 
of the verifications undertaken by the project desk officers. This Unit provides an added level of assurance to the DG – FPD with respect to 
financial management and control of funds. 
(ii) In the case of procurement – a very sensitive area in the ambit of fraud-, the FCU conducts a review of the winning bids for indications 
such as fraudulent behaviour. This is usually performed on a sample of tenders; however, if irregularities are detected, the original sample is 
increased to include related tenders, in line with the sampling methodology. 
(iii) In April 2018, the FCU has issued a circular titled ‘Addressing Fraud and Corruption in Public Procurement’ addressed to beneficiaries 
of EU Funds managed by the FPD. This not to mention the information sessions to beneficiaries. 
(iv) The FPD uploads the ‘requests for quotations’ and ‘call for tenders’ on its website to ensure transparency in the award of contracts. Apart 
from  this,  the  FPD  makes  the  use  of  the  government  gazette  and/or  the  government  IT  procurement  system,  namely  the  government’s  e-
procurement platform. 
(v) The internal auditor within FPD reviews the operation of internal controls over procurement. 
2.2 Have you further exploited the potential of risk analysis, tailoring the approach to the different types of expenditure and taking 
advantage of best practices and the risk elements highlighted in the 2017 PIF Report? 
☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
(In  line  with  section  2.4.1.1  of  2017  PIF  Report  and  section  9.2,  Recommendation  2,  concluding  remark,  also  of  2017  PIF  Report):  The 
Responsible Authority (RA) within the Funds and Programmes Division (FPD) has revised its Anti-Fraud Policy and Anti-Fraud Strategy to 
address more specifically the needs of the Funds managed by it i.e. by the Responsible Authority. These documents were eventually circulated 
amongst all RA officers who had time to go through their contents and eventually signed a statement acknowledging their understanding and 
commitment  to  anti-fraud. Amongst  others, the  Anti-Fraud Strategy facilitates embeds further an anti-fraud culture where  zero tolerance to 
fraud is the principle. 
(In line with section 9.2, Recommendation 2, bullet 1 – 2017 PIF Report). In recent months, the risk register of the National Authority (NAU) 
within  the  Funds  and  Programmes  Division  (FPD)  was  reviewed  and  updated.  (The  NAU  works  with  respect  to  educational  funds  e.g. 
Erasmus+). Special emphasis was assigned to the achievement of target indicators. 
2.3  Have  you  facilitated  and  assessed  the  spontaneous  reporting  of  potential  irregularities  and  strengthen  the  protection  of  whistle-
blowers, who are also a crucial source for investigative journalism? 
☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
The system for reporting of irregularities in computerised form has gathered further momentum. It is deemed pertinent to refer once again to 
the  Manual  of  Procedures  (MoP)  of  the  Responsible  Authority  (RA)  /  Managing  Authority  (MA)  (Funds  and  Programmes  Division)  which 

172 

 
 
stipulate that any one player involved in the implementation of funds, who, at any stage of implementation and / or control procedure, becomes 
aware of an irregularity (whether individual or systemic), has the duty to immediately report the irregularity to the RA/MA by drawing up a 
specific  report.  The  RA/MA  will  then  circulate  the  report  to  all  relevant  stakeholders.  In  the  case  of  public  sector  beneficiaries,  the  report, 
signed by the person reporting the irregularity, is sent to the Project Leader. The Project Leader will forward such information to the RA/MA 
as per preceding paragraph. Though the Manual of Procedures provides also for those circumstances where officers feel constrained to by-
pass the normal system of reporting irregularities, in which case the officer is given the opportunity to report any irregularity directly to the 
RA,  an  officer  can  still  report  the  irregularity  without  worrying  of  having  his/her  identity  known  openly,  in  line  with  the  Protection  of  the 
Whistle-blower Act which was already implemented in Malta in September 2013. This Act provides for procedures in terms of which employees 
in both the private sector and the public administration may disclose information regarding improper practices by their employees or other 
employees and be protected from detrimental actions. 
2.4 Have you promoted systematic and timely cooperation between judicial and administrative authorities? 
☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
The Maltese judiciary is made up of serving Judges and Magistrates who have been appointed to sit in the Superior and Inferior Courts. The 
Funds and Programmes Division (FPD), in handling the management of EU Funds and other Funds allocated to Malta, does not deal directly 
with  the  judiciary,  but  year  in,  year  out,  it  enhances  its  cooperation  with  a  number  of  other  authorities  having  as  part  of  the  remit  the 
combating of fraud. 
Noteworthy  is  the  fact  that  irregular  amounts,  for  both  systemic  and  individual  irregularities,  shall  be  recovered  within  three  months  of 
circulation  of  the  irregularity  report  (vide  point  2.3  above).  In  cases  where  the  beneficiary  does  not  affect  the  payment  as  outlined  in  the 
irregularity report, reminders  will  be sent  to  the beneficiary following  the three  month recovery  period  and failure to  submit  the recovered 
amount, the FPD will institute legal proceedings through the Attorney General, for the recovery of the amounts involved. 
The FPD submits all irregularities detected to the Anti-Fraud Coordination Service (Malta) in computerised form. The FPD continued to seek 
the advice of the lawyers within the Attorney General’s Office on grey areas and to liaise with the Department of Contracts on procurement 
issues and with the VAT department on financial issues falling within the remit of this department. 
2.1 Can you share any results deriving from the use of the findings from the 2016 PIF Report in your fraud risk assessments? 
☒YES,  
The Netherlands organized workshops about the updated legislation on public procurement. 
2.2 Have you further exploited the potential of risk analysis, tailoring the approach to the different types of expenditure and taking 
advantage of best practices and the risk elements highlighted in the 2017 PIF Report? 

NL 

173 

 
 
AT 

☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
In the acceptance phase of an operation we use software Company-info. We are also testing the use of Arachne.  Before the start of an (EU) 
financed  project  we  organize  information  meetings  with  beneficiaries.  Discussed  topics  are  for  instance  public  procurement  and  conflict  of 
interests. On the website of the Managing Authorities the anti-fraud policy is published. Before performing “on the spot checks” or “behind 
desk controls” authorities draw up risk analyses. 
2.3  Have  you  facilitated  and  assessed  the  spontaneous  reporting  of  potential  irregularities  and  strengthen  the  protection  of  whistle-
blowers, who are also a crucial source for investigative journalism? 
☒NO 
2.4 Have you promoted systematic and timely cooperation between judicial and administrative authorities? 
☒NO 
2.1 Can you share any results deriving from the use of the findings from the 2016 PIF Report in your fraud risk assessments? 
☒YES,  
The  fraud  risk  assessment  of  OLAF  confirms  our  own  findings,  derived  from  Paying  Agency  administrative  and  on  the  spot  controls  and 
Clearance of accounts audit findings as well. Nevertheless we continue working to reduce the reasons for irregularity and possible fraud step 
by step. We know that improvements are mainly necessary in ABB02 (market subsidies) and Rural development projects. In these sectors strict 
rules for application, claim authorisation and on the spot controls are essential. All these steps may further take advantage of professional IT 
support. 
2.2 Have you further exploited the potential of risk analysis, tailoring the approach to the different types of expenditure and taking 
advantage of best practices and the risk elements highlighted in the 2017 PIF Report? 
☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
In EAGF and EAFRD a widespread set of rules is applicable since years for  administrative and on the spot controls including risk assessment 
and sample selection securing a 20 % share of random on the spot check samples. 
2.3  Have  you  facilitated  and  assessed  the  spontaneous  reporting  of  potential  irregularities  and  strengthen  the  protection  of  whistle-
blowers, who are also a crucial source for investigative journalism? 
☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
Full implementation of the recommendation in the framework of risk based Paying Agency control procedures. 
2.4 Have you promoted systematic and timely cooperation between judicial and administrative authorities? 

174 

 
 
PL 

☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 

2.1 Can you share any results deriving from the use of the findings from the 2016 PIF Report in your fraud risk assessments? 
☒NO 
The competent national institutions in Poland typically use risk analysis tools to identify the areas most vulnerable to fraud. With regard to the 
use of the risk elements discussed in the PIF Report, the Partnership Agreement Coordinating Authority will bring this aspect to the attention 
of  all  relevant  cohesion  policy  managing  authorities,  giving  recommendations  for  drawing  up  annual  control  plans  for  the  financial  year 
2018/2019. 
2.2 Have you further exploited the potential of risk analysis, tailoring the approach to the different types of expenditure and taking 
advantage of best practices and the risk elements highlighted in the 2017 PIF Report? 
☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
Threats and identified risks of fraud are taken into account by the competent national institutions in subsequent analyses and risk assessments 
drawn  up  under  the  2014-20  programming  period,  with  a  particular  focus  on  those  priority  areas  in  cohesion  policy  and  those  market 
measures in the agricultural sector which have the highest fraud rates. The national institutions are also regularly made aware of the need to 
take into account the findings of the Commission in the PIF Reports when carrying out ongoing tasks related to the implementation and control 
of EU funds.  
For example, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development draws up quarterly plans for controls carried out in the framework of the 
Managing  Authority’s  supervision  of  subordinate  bodies  involved  in  implementing  the  2014-2020  Rural  Development  Programme.  For  the 
purpose of drawing up the above-mentioned control plan, a risk analysis is carried out, taking into account, inter alia: 
• 
• 
Office, Agency for Restructuring and Modernisation of Agriculture, EC, ECA); 
• 
• 
• 
In addition, the Paying Agency has compiled a document entitled ‘List of signs of fraud’ which contains the most frequent signs of fraud in the 
Agency’s areas of activity, and it has made this available for use by staff members and entities carrying out delegated tasks. Amongst other 
things, this document contains descriptions of fraud that involves artificially creating the conditions for obtaining financial assistance, methods 

the steps involved in implementing the individual support instruments, including the amount of public funds spent; 
the results of previous controls and audits (e.g. the results of controls by the competent national and EU institutions — Supreme Audit 

planned checks by the Paying Agency; 
complaints, requests and other signs of irregularities; 
the results of studies and analyses. 

175 

 
 
of checking the evidence pointing to fraud, and the procedure to be followed in the event that fraud is confirmed. The list is updated every year 
based on the results of an annual fraud risk analysis. E-learning courses on fraud prevention are provided on an annual basis for all staff and 
units carrying out delegated tasks, and conventional training courses are provided for individual organisational units. 
2.3  Have  you  facilitated  and  assessed  the  spontaneous  reporting  of  potential  irregularities  and  strengthen  the  protection  of  whistle-
blowers, who are also a crucial source for investigative journalism? 
☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
In  order  to  make  it  easier  for  people  who  have  knowledge  of  potential  irregularities  and  fraud  in  the  use  of  EU  funds,  the  competent 
institutions are creating appropriate tools for this kind of information to be submitted electronically, i.e. using dedicated forms or mailboxes. 
Such arrangements help to ensure that programmes are implemented in an ethical, open and transparent manner. They also allow for a prompt 
response  to  problems  that  could  otherwise  remain  undetected  or  be  identified  too  late,  with  irreversible  consequences.  Information  which 
whistle-blowers provide in good faith on suspected fraud is of particular importance. However, the degree of willingness with which they share 
knowledge  with  the  competent  institution  still  depends  on  the  quality  of  the  arrangements  in  place  and  how  they  ensure  that  there  are  no 
repercussions for whistle-blowers. This may be illustrated by the example of two institutions.  
The Paying Agency responds to all reports of irregularities and fraud received, whether or not they have been signed and whether or not they 
are  anonymous,  as  well  as  to  relevant  information  in  the  press.  An  e-mail  address  dedicated  to  reporting  fraud  committed  by  beneficiaries 
and/or the staff of institutions has been made available on the Agency’s website. When information is received on irregularities or fraud, the 
allegations are analysed in all cases and, where justified, investigations and/or checks are carried out. 
The Managing Authority of the Operational Programme Infrastructure and Environment (OP IE) has developed a mechanism which transmits 
warning signals of irregularities to a dedicated email address or via an electronic form (e-Nieprawidłowość). Managing  Authority staff are 
responsible for the initial verification of the information. In the event that the report concerns the OP IE, the information it contains is sent to 
the competent body with a request for detailed analysis in order to confirm the irregularity. Once the analysis has been carried out, the body 
must inform the Managing Authority of the action taken to resolve the issue, including in particular handing over the case to other authorities 
and  services,  i.e.:  the  Office  of  Competition  and  Consumer  Protection  (UOKiK),  the  Central  Anti-Corruption  Office  (CBA),  the  Internal 
Security  Agency  (ABW)  and  the  public  prosecution  service.  Where  the  report  does  not  concern  the  OP  IE,  it  is  passed  on  to  the  relevant 
authority. This mechanism has resulted in a total of 113 reports, of which 76 were concerned projects under the OP IE 2007-13 or 2014-20.  
With  regard  to  the  protection  of  whistle-blowers,  even  before  the  draft  directive  was  published  Poland  was  working  on  the  draft  law  on 
transparency in public life, which provides both for protection of whistle-blowers and for an obligation for businesses employing 50 or more 
employees  to  introduce  effective  internal  procedures  to  prevent  corruption.  This  entails  ensuring  that  there  are  internal  procedures  for 

176 

 
 
action  taken  by  the  institutions  to  implement  and  check  EU  funds  with  support  from,  and  the  involvement  of,  law  enforcement 

the activities of other institutions, such as the KAS, whose control activities assist in detecting infringements (which may result in 

reporting irregularities. The draft proposes that whistle-blower status would be conferred by the public prosecutor when reliable information 
is  reported  on  offences  committed.  A  whistle-blower's  long-term  contractual  relationship  with  the  entity  concerned  by  the  report  would  be 
protected.  
In addition to the government draft, consultations are under way on a citizen's draft act on the protection of whistle-blowers, which provides 
for comprehensive rules on the legal status of persons who, due to their duties, work or contract, have reported irregularities or have given 
assistance in making such a report.  
Both initiatives are still in the draft phase. 
2.4 Have you promoted systematic and timely cooperation between judicial and administrative authorities? 
☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
Cooperation in this area has been carried out and stepped up for a number of years at central and regional levels. This applies to: 
• 
agencies;  
• 
irregularities or fraud) and thus help to increase the level of protection of the EU’s financial interests. 
For  example,  as  regards  the  promotion  of  cooperation  with  law  enforcement  authorities  in  the  recent  past,  the  Paying  Agency  has 
continued the cooperation with law enforcement authorities that was established a few years ago: the Central Anti-Corruption Office and 
the  Police's  economic  crime  units.  In  2018,  cooperation  was  established  with  the  Organised  Financial  Crime  Division  of  the  Police’s 
Central Bureau of Investigation. In 2018 the Paying Agency also continued to participate in the regional working groups on fighting crime 
that  is  harmful  to  the  European  Union,  in  which  it  developed  cooperation  with  the  tax  authorities,  law  enforcement  agencies  and  other 
institutions involved in the distribution of EU funds.  
The collaboration between the judicial and administrative authorities responsible for cohesion policy is implemented under a cooperation 
agreement between the National Public Prosecutor and the minister responsible for regional development. On the basis of this  agreement, 
regular  exchanges  of  data  take  place  concerning  the  recipients  of  EU  funds  which  have  been  the  subject  of  investigative  measures.  In 
addition,  a  number  of  institutions  make  use  of  the  possibility  to  consult  public  prosecution  service  representatives  when  timely  data  on 
ongoing proceedings are needed. 
The KAS and other institutions, including in particular law enforcement authorities, cooperate on the basis of the principles laid down in 
the official agreements concluded in 2017-2018 between the Head of the KAS and: 
• 

the Commander-in-Chief of the Police; 

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PT 

the head of the Central Anti-Corruption Office; 
the head of the Internal Security Agency; 
the President of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection.  

• 
• 
• 
2.1 Can you share any results deriving from the use of the findings from the 2016 PIF Report in your fraud risk assessments? 
☒YES,  
The Portuguese Institute for the Financing of Agriculture and Fisheries [Instituto de Financiamento da Agricultura e Pescas - IFAP] wished to 
highlight the following: We wish to point out that the content of the communications to OLAF (sent on a quarterly basis) is taken into account 
during risk assessment, particularly when establishing the sample for on-the-spot checks on applications and aid requests submitted. 
2.2 Have you further exploited the potential of risk analysis, tailoring the approach to the different types of expenditure and taking 
advantage of best practices and the risk elements highlighted in the 2017 PIF Report? 
☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
The IFAP wished to highlight the following: 
Risk  assessment  is  an  integral  part  of  the  management  systems  and  the  checks  on  measures  financed  by  the  IFAP;  it  is  also  particularly 
important  when  establishing  the  sample  and  procedures  for  administrative  checks  and  on-the-spot  checks  on  applications  and  aid  requests 
submitted. 
2.3  Have  you  facilitated  and  assessed  the  spontaneous  reporting  of  potential  irregularities  and  strengthen  the  protection  of  whistle-
blowers, who are also a crucial source for investigative journalism? 
☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
The IFAP wished to highlight the following: The IFAP continuously monitors tip-offs it receives (relating to irregularities that may have been 
committed  or  attempted  in  its  area  of  activity)  and  has  put  procedures  in  place  to  assess  and  deal  with  such  incidents.  This  is  particularly 
important when establishing the (risk-based) sample for on-the-spot checks on applications and activities receiving financial support. 

2.4 Have you promoted systematic and timely cooperation between judicial and administrative authorities? 
☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
The IFAP wished to highlight the following: The IFAP maintains strong links with the judicial authorities; this is particularly relevant when 
carrying out investigations to determine criminal liability in cases in which grants are obtained fraudulently, where detailed information on the 
aid schemes and the implementation of measures is crucial to the success of the investigation. 

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RO 

2.1 Can you share any results deriving from the use of the findings from the 2016 PIF Report in your fraud risk assessments? 
☒YES,  
MA for Operational Programme for Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 2014-2020: it was introduced at the levels of the procedures in place at 
MA level the check list called Fraud indicators ’checklist including questions related to the conflict of interests. 
2.2 Have you further exploited the potential of risk analysis, tailoring the approach to the different types of expenditure and taking 
advantage of best practices and the risk elements highlighted in the 2017 PIF Report? 
☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
MA for Operational Programme for Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 2014-2020: 
Together with the above stated check-list, there are also included at all levels the civl servants sign a declaration of impartiality in relation to 
the  projects  verified,  approved,  controlled,  upon  case.  Having  in  view  the  risk  analysis  system  set  in  place  at  MA  level,  there  have  been 
organised presentations at decision takers’ level and regional centers, in order to make them aware of the responsabilities/ tasks they have in 
this respect. 
The National Agency for Public Procurement: 
President of ANAP issued the Order no. 314 on 22.02.2018 for the approval of the Methodology for ex-post control on the award of public 
procurement contracts/ agreements, sectoral framework contracts/ agreements, works concession contracts and service concession contract.  
This  methodology, compared to  the previous  one, introduces a risk analysis in  case the number of  ex officio intimations is greater than  the 
actual possibility of performing ex-post control. The risk analysis is based mainly on the following criteria: the estimated value of the contract, 
the number of rejected offers in relation to the number of offers received, the public procurement procedure used, the history of the ex-post 
control carried out at the contracting authority. This order was in effect until 2nd of June, 2018, when the Government Emergency Ordinance 
no. 45 has entered into force which provides that ANAP has no longer attributions in the ex-post control of public procurement contracts. 
2.3  Have  you  facilitated  and  assessed  the  spontaneous  reporting  of  potential  irregularities  and  strengthen  the  protection  of  whistle-
blowers, who are also a crucial source for investigative journalism? 
☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
Ministry of European Funds: 
At  national  level,  protection  of  whistle-blowers  is  regulated  through  Law  no.  571/2004  concerning  protection  of  the  persons  from  public 
authorities  and  institutions  which  indicate  law  breaching.  At  level  of  Ministry  of  European  Funds  the  system  procedure  concerning  the 
protection of whistle-blowers is under internal endorsement.  
Operational Programme for Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 2014-2020: 

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SI 

It was not the case up to the present, but in the procedure related to the Control Unit, such a reporting tool is included. 
2.4 Have you promoted systematic and timely cooperation between judicial and administrative authorities? 
☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
Ministry  of  European  Funds:  Cooperation  with  judicial  and  administrative  authorities  is  governed  by  national  legislation,  and  it  mainly 
consists in case by case data communications on request from the MA to Courts and/or Prosecutors’ offices. On the other side, communication 
from PO and MA is still limited, Pos being reluctant to communicate judicial files stages. 
MA for Operational Programme for Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 2014-2020: Is fully implementing the recommendation – in all cases that 
they were requested till present. 
The Rural lnvestments Financing Agency: Besides the control missions carried out on the basis of a sample and complaint, the  Control and 
Antifraud  Directorate  ensures  a  permanent  collaboration  with  bodies  that  have  attributions  in  investigating  cases  of  irregularities  and 
suspicions  of  fraud.  In  this  respect,  the  Control  and  Antifraud  Directorate,  through  the  External  Operational  Cooperation  Service, 
collaborates with OLAF, DLAF, DNA, Police and the Prosecutor's Office in order to verify, detect, evaluate and monitor cases of irregularities 
and suspicions of fraud. 
2.1 Can you share any results deriving from the use of the findings from the 2016 PIF Report in your fraud risk assessments? 
☒YES,  
Cooperation  with  the  attorney  general,  better  information,  better  cooperation,  early  detection  of  fraud,  improved  system  performance  and 
consequently fewer corrections. 
2.2 Have you further exploited the potential of risk analysis, tailoring the approach to the different types of expenditure and taking 
advantage of best practices and the risk elements highlighted in the 2017 PIF Report? 
☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
Government Office for Development and EU Cohesion Policy:  Cooperation with the Attorney-General has been/will be strengthened. There is 
still room for improvements. Arachne was introduced. Arachne will be more spread to implement in future. Reference to use of  Arachne was 
made in co-financing agreements like it is with anti-corruption clause. More education on Arachne will follow what will include intermediate 
bodies. 
2.3  Have  you  facilitated  and  assessed  the  spontaneous  reporting  of  potential  irregularities  and  strengthen  the  protection  of  whistle-
blowers, who are also a crucial source for investigative journalism? 
☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
Government Office for Development and EU Cohesion Policy:  Slovenia has ratified UNCAC  – UN Convention against Corruption and has 

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done public debate of the protection of applicants. Integrity and Prevention of Corruption Act protects in Article 23 applicants/reporters of 
potential irregularities in field of corruption.     
Agency  of  the  Republic  of  Slovenia  for  Agricultural  Markets  and  Rural Development  (AKTRP):  We  encourage  the  employees  to  report  any 
irregularities  related  to  the  Agency's  scope  of  work.  We  have  put  a  mailbox  in  the  hallway  for  the  employees  to  anonymously  report 
irregularities or other infringements related to the funding or the administrative procedure. The applicants (or other parties, the public) on the 
other hand can choose a contact in the Agency's website and report irregularities via e-mail. 
2.4 Have you promoted systematic and timely cooperation between judicial and administrative authorities? 
☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
Government Office for Development and EU Cohesion Policy: 
There is an institutional cooperation between Managing authority and Attorney-General in field of exchange of information interpretation of 
European  cohesion  policy  and  cooperation  when  the  lawsuit  is/are  lodged.  MA  provides  information  about  system  of  cohesion  policy. 
Occasionally MA and Attorney-General are meet at meetings to exchange information’s. Every year the list of open cases before law courts 
are actualized. Also the intermediate bodies have the obligation to send information’s about their open cases on law courts. In future the link 
between judicial and administrative authorities has to be strengthened to have a lecture before employees in court that there conquer the logic 
of European cohesion policy. 
2.1 Can you share any results deriving from the use of the findings from the 2016 PIF Report in your fraud risk assessments? 
☒YES,  
I.  The  Supreme  Audit  Office  of  the  SR  (SAO)  is  obliged  to  assess  the  fraud  risk  when  planning  and  conducting  audits.  This  is  a  general 
requirement of the auditing standards – ISSAI. In addition, the SAO has its own internal system of monitoring potential fraud/ fraud risks. 
II.  The  Public  Procurement  Office  (PPO)  has  during  the  transposition  period  fully  implemented  the  Directives  No.  2014/23,  2014/24/  and 
2014/25/  into  the  national  legislative  via  new  public  procurement  act  No.  343/2015,  which  is  effective  since  18.  4.  2016.  To  enhance 
transparency  the  PPO  has  since  2014  implemented  the  electronic  profile  of  contracting  authority,  which  is  free  of  charge  and  publicly 
available on the web site of our Office. It contains the whole documentation of the public procedure and is a very useful tool for the public 
control, because its functionality, which allows a backward control of all public procedures realized by the contracting authority. Another very 
useful tool to enhance transparency of the public sources management in public procurement is the electronical Registry of beneficial owners 
invented and launched by our Office and since 1. February 2017 overtaken and modified by the Slovak Ministry of Justice. The main reason for 
this is to ensure that the public procurement contract is concluded only with economic operators that have a known ownership structure up to 

SK 

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the level of natural persons. The identification and verification of the beneficial owner is carried out by an authorised person, such as by a 
lawyer,  a  notary,  a  bank,  an  auditor  or  a  tax  advisor.  Since  18.  10.  2018  the  PPO  has  implemented  the  fully  electronisation  of  public 
procurement procedure by the upgrade of IS EVO (electronical system for public procurement managed by our Office). IS EVO supports all 
public procurement procedures and DPS; is integrated with profile of contracting authority and IS of data collection; it contains wizard for 
choosing the right tender notice; it supports the conversion of “paper” tenders into electronical form; records all activities in the system; in 
order  to  speed  up  the  access  to  documents,  auditing  records  are  visible  only  for  control  authorities  and  at  the  end  the  system  shortens  the 
delivery of documentation needed in the case of public procurement control. 
III. The Ministry of Environment of the Slovak Republic as the Managing Authority for the Operational Programme Quality of Environment 
(hereinafter “OP QE”) carries out the management of risks / risks of frauds relevant to the OP QE in accordance with EGESIF_14-0021-00 of 
16  June  2014”Fraud  Risk  Assessment  and  Effective  and  Proportionate  Anti-Fraud  Measures”  and  in  line  with  the  Risk  Management 
Procedures of the OP QE. 
The MA for the OP QE uses:  
1)  The  ARACHNE  system,  which  serves  as  a  mandatory  auxiliary  search  engine  of  data  contained  therein,  to  identify  projects  that  could 
potentially be susceptible to  fraud risks, conflict of  interest  and irregularities, and as a source of  information for evaluating  individual risk 
indicators. 
The ARACHNE system is a specific in-depth data analysis tool to identify projects under the ESIF that might be susceptible to fraud, conflict of 
interest  and  irregularities.  ARACHNE  could  increase  the  efficiency  of  project  selection  and  management,  audit,  and  further  strengthen  the 
fraud detection and fraud prevention. 
2) The IT monitoring system ITMS2014+, which serves to document the identified irregularities in the 2014-2020 programming period. 
3) A whistleblowing system, the key element of which is the protection of whistle-blowers in an employment relationship within the meaning of 
Act No. 307/2014 Coll. on certain measures related to the reporting of anti-social activity and on the amendment of certain acts as amended: 
-  Anonymous  or  non-anonymous  reporting  of  potential  risks,  including  suspicion  of  fraud  and  illegal  activities  at  the  email  address: 
rizika_opkzp@enviro.gov.sk, 
-  Anonymous  corruption  reporting  via  a  telephone  line  established  by  the  MoE  SR  in  the  framework  of  the  transparency  policy: 
http://www.minzp.sk/envirospion/, 
-  anonymous  or  non-anonymous  corruption  reporting  via  the  telephone  line  established  by  the  Office  of  the  Government  of  the  Slovak 
Republic, available at: www.bojprotikorupcii.vlada.gov.sk, 
- Non-anonymous reporting of suspected criminal offenses or other illegal activities, with an impact on EU and Slovak Republic finances on 

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the e-mail address: infoirq@minv.sk established by the National Criminal Agency of the Presidium of the Police Force, 
-  Anonymous  reporting  of  suspected  fraud  and  irregularities  with  an  impact  on  EU  funds  to  the  European  Anti-Fraud  Office  (OLAF  EC): 
https://fns.olaf.europa.eu/. 
4) Trainings to raise awareness of fraud, possible fraud and fraud indicators. 
IV.  Agricultural  Paying  Agency  (APA)  adopted  the  Directive  on  solution  of  irregularities  and  refunded  financial  funds  of  the  Agricultural 
payment agency no 4/2017 Coll. which facilitates the whole procedure. 
V. The Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family of the SR as a Managing Authority responsible for European Social Fund Program (OP 
Human Resources) tries to apply all recommendations and procedures relevant for European Social Fund Program (OP Human Resources) 
and its tools. 
VI. The Ministry of Transport and Construction of the SR as a Managing Authority of Operational Programme Integrated Infrastructure (MA 
OP II) implemented prevention measures of the fraud risk self-evaluation during the year 2016 in accordance with regulations of European 
Commission. 

2.2 Have you further exploited the potential of risk analysis, tailoring the approach to the different types of expenditure and taking 
advantage of best practices and the risk elements highlighted in the 2017 PIF Report? 
☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
I. The Supreme Audit Office of the SR has specific role in this field. Risk analysis is required for the whole processes of  auditing (strategic 
planning, annual planning, planning an audit, conducting an audit, follow up etc.) 
II. The Public Procurement Office (PPO) partly implemented the recommendation. In 2018 has the PPO strengthen the cooperation between 
the national control bodies by the signing the Memorandum of Understanding with Antimonopoly Office, Supreme Audit Office and General 
Prosecutors  Office.  The  signed  MoU  stipulates  better  coordination  on  the  national  level  in  the  fight  against  fraud,  corruption  and 
irregularities. In this  year PPO prepares with the cooperation of  Supreme Audit Office a methodological guideline about  the assessment  of 
economy and cost effectiveness in public procurement. 
III.  The  Ministry  of  Environment  of  the  Slovak  Republic  as  the  Managing  Authority  (MA)  for  the  Operational  Programme  Quality  of 
Environment  (OP  QE)  had  partly  implementing  the  recommendation.  MA  analyses  the  risks  in  the  framework  of  the  risk  management.  The 
process  of  the  risk  management  is  a  continuously  ongoing  activity  aimed  at  minimizing  the  negative  impacts  that  could  jeopardize  the 
achievement of the OP QE objectives. The methodology of risk management and tools used for risk management are specified in point 2.1. 
IV.  The  Ministry  of  Agriculture  and  Rural  Development  of  the  SR  and  Agricultural  Paying  Agency  (APA)  partly  implementing  the 

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recommendation. Units implementing direct payments and project support use risk analysis for direct payments and also for project supports. 
Based on the risk analysis, the schedule for ex-post control is made annually. 
V.  The  Ministry  of  Labour,  Social  Affairs  and  Family  of  the  SR  (partly  implementing  the  recommendation)  as  a  Managing  Authority 
responsible for European Social Fund Program (OP Human Resources) analyses all results of controls during this period and outcomes of the 
analysis will be transformed into risk management in the second quarter of 2019 (Q2 2019). 
VI. The Ministry of Transport and Construction of the SR implemented recommendations assigned in the 2017 PIF Report into management 
documentation. Amendments related to enhancement of transparency in grant selection process evaluation procedure, prevention from conflict 
of interests, exploitation of risk-analysis, strengthening of public procurement control. 

2.3  Have  you  facilitated  and  assessed  the  spontaneous  reporting  of  potential  irregularities  and  strengthen  the  protection  of  whistle-
blowers, who are also a crucial source for investigative journalism? 
☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
I. The scope of the Slovak whistle-blower framework is ambitious; it provides for a comprehensive approach to whistle-blower protection that 
extends beyond the public sector. The Slovak Republic adopted Act No. 307 on Whistle-Blowers Protection already in July 2014 and by this 
law  several  aspects  of  the  whistle-blowers  protection  were  introduced  into  the  Slovak  legislation.  These  aspects  include  the  protection  of 
whistle-blowers  in  the  context  of  criminal  proceedings  and  in  the  context  of  delicts  of  administrative  nature,  as  well  the  internal  whistle-
blowers complaint system and the whistle-blower's reward etc. 
In  2018  the  Office  of  Government  of  the  Slovak  Republic  sponsored  the  internal  preparatory  process  of  the  new  revised  whistle-blowers 
protection  law  which  provides  improved  and  more  effective  whistle-blowers  protection.  This  revised  law  includes  the  EU  (and  the  OECD) 
recommendations related to the improvement of protection of whistle-blowers as well as the latest proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the protection of persons reporting on breaches of Union law. 
By  this  new  law,  the  establishment  of  a  dedicated  independent  Office  for  the  whistle-blowers'  protection  is  foreseen.  The  Office  will  also 
oversee  the  compliance  with  that  law,  provide  expert  opinions  and  advice  on  its  application,  advocate  the  provision  of  whistle-blowers' 
protection  and  it  will  also  draft  annual  reports  for  the  National  Council  of  the  Slovak  Republic  in  this  area.  The  Office  will  also  have  the 
competence to draw attention to the deficiencies in addressing the suspicions that have been reported. This revised law was adopted by the 
Slovak Parliament in January 2019 and is expected to come into force in March 2019. 
II.  The  Public  Procurement  Office  (PPO)  partly  implemented  this  recommendation.  PPO  supervises  public  procurement  and  has  adopted 
internal Directive No. 1/2015 on measures related to the reporting of anti-social activities. Any official of PPO may fill a complain related to 

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anti-social activities (Article 2 (2) of Directive 1/2015): 
1. in written form to the responsible person (internal controller) or to the Office Desk of PPO, 
2. verbally in form of record to the responsible person, 
3. electronically 24 hours/day at: podnety@uvo.gov.sk 
To  support  the  public  control  in  the  field  of  public  procurement  PPO  has  created  on  his  web  site  link  for  reporting  of  irregularities  at: 
kontrola@uvo.gov.sk,  nezrovnalosti@uvo.gov.sk,  dohlad@uvo.gov.sk  or  direct  link  for  OLAF:  http://www.uvo.gov.sk/informacny-servis/ 
OLAF 397.html. 
III.  The  management  documentation  (The  Ministry  of  Environment  of  the  Slovak  Republic)  for  the  Operational  Programme  Quality  of 
Environment  (OP  QE)  includes  the  implementation  of  the  fraud  notification  system,  the  key  element  of  which  is  the  protection  of  whistle-
blowers in accordance with the above mentioned Act. Currently, in relation with the OP QE it is possible: 
-  Anonymous  or  non-anonymous  reporting  of  potential  risks,  including  suspicion  of  fraud  and  illegal  activities  at  the  email  address: 
rizika_opkzp@enviro.gov.sk, 
-  Anonymous  corruption  reporting  via  a  telephone  line  established  by  the  MoE  SR  in  the  framework  of  the  transparency  policy: 
http://www.minzp.sk/envirospion/, 
-  Anonymous  or  non-anonymous  corruption  reporting  via  the  telephone  line  established  by  the  Office  of  the  Government  of  the  Slovak 
Republic,  available  at:  www.bojprotikorupcii.vlada.gov.sk,  -  Non-anonymous  reporting  of  suspected  criminal  offenses  or  other  illegal 
activities, with an impact on EU and Slovak Republic finances on the e-mail address: infoirq@minv.sk established by the National Criminal 
Agency of the Presidium of the Police Force, 
-  Anonymous  reporting  of  suspected  fraud  and  irregularities  with  an  impact  on  EU  funds  to  the  European  Anti-Fraud  Office  (OLAF  EC): 
https://fns.olaf.europa.eu/. 
IV. The Ministry of  Agriculture and Rural  Development  of  the SR (partly implementing the recommendation) elaborated internal procedure 
concerning whistle-blowers protection in accordance with act no. 307/2014 Coll. that provides crucial legal base. To protect whistle-blowers it 
is  possible  to  report  anonymously,  no  informants  are  reported  and  cases  are  addressed  based  on  suggestions,  results  of  own  controls  and 
findings  and  published  information.  Pursuant  to  internal  procedure  rules,  informants  are  enabled  to  report  irregularities  electronically  via 
publicized e-mail address. 
V.  The  Ministry  of  Labour,  Social  Affairs  and  Family  of  the  SR  (partly  implementing  the  recommendation)  as  a  Managing  Authority 
responsible  for  European  Social  Fund  Program  (OP  Human  Resources)  set  up  procedures  in  accordance  with  European  and  national 
legislation. 

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VI. The Ministry of Transport and Construction of the SR checks every initiative, information from the media and potential irregularities are 
investigated by approved procedures. All of the initiatives, information from the media mentioned above, are registered. Register is regularly 
audited  and  assessed  by  audit  and  control  bodies,  including  Audit  Authority.  Protection  of  whistle-blowers  is  provided  in  accordance  with 
legal system/ regulations valid and efficient in SR. 
VII.  The  Ministry  of  Culture  of  the  SR  amended  the  Staff  Regulations,  which  introduced,  inter  alia,  procedures  for  reporting  any  fraud, 
corruption  or  serious  irregularity  and  protecting  staff  reporting  infringements  from  negative  consequences  (for  example,  created  a  special 
email address for reporting any fraud, corruption: podnet307@culture.gov.sk). 

2.4 Have you promoted systematic and timely cooperation between judicial and administrative authorities? 
☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
I. For the purposes of fulfilling the obligations resulting from Article 325 TFEU, the Slovak Government charged The Central  Contact Point 
for OLAF (CCP OLAF), which forms an organisational unit of the Section of Control at the Government Office of the SR. The role of the CCP 
OLAF is to coordinate legislative, administrative and operative activities with a view to ensure the protection of the EU’s financial interests 
and  for  the  same  purpose  to  closely  cooperate  with  the  Slovak  bodies  and  institutions  engaged  in  the  system  of  such  protection  -  AFCOS 
network. 
In  order  to  ensure  the  integration  and  cooperation  of  the  AFCOS  network  partners,  the  Government  of  the  SR  established  the  Steering 
Committee  for  the  Protection  of  the  European  Union’s  Financial  Interests  in  the  Slovak  Republic,  associating  members  from  national 
institutions  and  bodies  responsible  for  the  management,  implementation,  control  and  audit  of  expenditures  of  the  EU’s  budget  and,  on  the 
other  hand,  for  the  withdrawal,  control  and  audit  of  financial  resources  representing  a  source  of  income  to  the  EU’s  budget,  as  well  as 
cooperation  with  bodies  and  institutions  responsible  for  recovery  procedures,  the  sanction  imposing  and  penalization  of  the  originators  of 
illegal activities relative to the abuse of the EU’s financial interests. 
II. The  Ministry of  Finance of  the SR, Certifying authority  (CA)  considers close  cooperation with above mentioned authorities as essential, 
especially in relation to managing authorities. The CA does not need to cooperate with mentioned authorities on a regular basis, since all the 
data related to the CA´s work is obtained through managing authorities. However, the CA itself had taken steps to strengthen relationship with 
the Office for Public Procurement and The Antimonopoly Office by closing memorandums of cooperation. What we perceive as insufficient is 
the cooperation among the managing authorities and police bodies in exchange of information about ongoing criminal investigations in EU 
funded  projects.  The  process  of  receiving  relevant  information  from  police  bodies  is  time-consuming,  that  is  why  we  strongly  believe  this 
cooperation  should  be  supported  even  by  legislation.  As  to  the  judicial  authorities,  the  CA  agenda  does  not  require  direct  cooperation, 

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nevertheless the CA is regularly analysing the decisions issued by all types of courts. 
III.  The  Supreme  Audit  Office  of  the  SR  concluded  several  memorandums  with  appropriate  authorities  (investigations,  prosecutor,  public 
procurement, academic community etc.). The cooperation (communication, notice….) with key authorities is annually assessed. Feedback still 
lacks. 
IV. Chairman of the Public Procurement Office (PPO) has since his election launched cooperation with various partners (law, economic and 
technical universities in order to ensure that public procurement will be obligatory subject for students with support of lectors from PPO). In 
2018  –  closer  cooperation  with  key  National  central  government  bodies  on  horizontal  level  –  signed  memorandum  of  understanding  with 
Antimonopoly Office of the Slovak republic, Supreme Audit Office of the Slovak republic, General Prosecutors Office of the Slovak republic, 
Central  Coordination  Body  from  Deputy  Prime  Minister’s  Office  for  Investments  and  Informatization  of  the  Slovak  Republic,  Ministry  of 
Finance of  the Slovak Republic, as Audit Authority, Institute of  Financial  Policy, Department  of  Value for  Money. At regional level  deeper 
PPO  cooperates  with  self-governing  regions  in  Slovak  republic  and  Association  of  Towns  and  Municipalities  of  Slovakia.  PPO  has  many 
meetings with representatives from business sector for example with American, Netherland, Sweden Business Chamber, Business Alliance of 
Slovakia,  Slovak  Trades  Association,  and  The  National  Union  of  Employers.  PPO  strengthening  the  cooperation  on  international  level: 
Chairman of the PPO has initiated the strengthening of cooperation between the PPO and OECD via signed MoU; strategic partnership with 
the  European  Commission  associated  with  regular  meetings  with  representatives  of  DG  GROW  and  DG  REGIO;  strengthening  closer 
cooperation with member states of Visegrad Group in the field of public procurement. 
V. The Ministry of  Environment  of  the SR, the Managing  Authority (MA)  for  the Operational Programme Quality of  Environment  (OP QE) 
carries out regular quarterly monitoring of all ongoing judicial proceedings in which the MoE SR acts as a party (or injured party) and which 
resulted  from  the  implementation  of  the  OP  QE.  At  the  same  time,  the  MA  provides  all  the  cooperation  necessary  for  the  detection  of 
irregularities, incl. fraud, in  relation  to  both  courts and law enforcement agencies.  We would  like to  point out  the fact that  in  line with the 
Manual of Procedures of the MA for the OP QE, the MA employees are obliged to report suspicion of committing a crime to relevant units of 
the Police Force. 
VI. The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development of the SR and Agricultural Paying Agency (partly implementing the recommendation), 
in  particular  their  units  implementing  direct  payments  and  project  support  work  closely  with  law  enforcement  authorities  and  provide 
maximum cooperation during investigations. There were cases, when it was necessary to withdraw from the contract and prosecutions were 
submitted based on suspicion of abusing EU’s financial interests. 
VII. Considering the detection and investigation of crimes committed in the process of project implementation the Ministry of Labour, Social 
Affairs and Family of the SR as a Managing Authority responsible for European Social Fund Program (OP Human Resources) cooperates very 

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closely with the law enforcement authorities and courts of justice. 
VIII.  The  Ministry  of  Transport  and  Construction  of  the  SR  (MA  OP  II)  regularly  contacts  judicial  and  administrative  authorities  to  gain 
information about judicatory and administrative procedures being the progress in term of risk / fraud prevention. MA OP II monitors regularly 
via internet publicly accessible databases of judicial and administrative authorities at the same time, where the information on the actions in 
courts, state´s claims against entities and information on solving protests at the public procurement process are available. 
2.1 Can you share any results deriving from the use of the findings from the 2016 PIF Report in your fraud risk assessments? 
☒YES,  
Finland legislated a new law concerning public procurement and concession contracts, executed from 2017. The functions of the electronic 
project  management  system EURA 2014 include  corrective measures and findings, which can be  marked as suspected fraud. In the field  of 
agriculture,  the  cooperation  between  different  actors  has  increased  with  the  development  of  risk  assessment.  Also  the  fraud  awareness  has 
improved among regional authorities. 
2.2 Have you further exploited the potential of risk analysis, tailoring the approach to the different types of expenditure and taking 
advantage of best practices and the risk elements highlighted in the 2017 PIF Report? 
☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
The Managing Authority of the ERDF and ESF has provided training and education by experts to the intermediate bodies about how to tackle 
fraud risks. The Managing Authority is planning to improve the system of red flags in all fields of fraud risks. The EMFF authorities carried 
out a fraud risk analysis and it will be updated with the information from the findings. The fraud indicators have been defined for the EMFF 
programme.  In the field of agriculture disseminating information on possible methods of fraud has been part of the cooperation between the 
authorities.  
2.3  Have  you  facilitated  and  assessed  the  spontaneous  reporting  of  potential  irregularities  and  strengthen  the  protection  of  whistle-
blowers, who are also a crucial source for investigative journalism? 
☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
During control visits to the intermediate bodies the Managing Authority of the ERDF and the ESF has discussed about the organisation’s own 
whistle  blowing  process  for  the  intermediate  body’s  employees.  The  Managing  Authority  is  on  the  stage  of  making  final  decisions  about  a 
system of whistle blowing. The process of dealing with the information from the system is going to be established. A clear guidance has been 
published  by  the  EMFF  programme  on  how  to  report  suspected  fraud.  Also  with  the  agriculture  funds,  the  reporting  methods  have  been 
highlighted during the training sessions. 
2.4 Have you promoted systematic and timely cooperation between judicial and administrative authorities? 

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☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
Both the Managing Authority of the ERDF and the ESF and the intermediate bodies are all public authorities obliged by legislation. The 
administrative and criminal legislation concern public servants. The exchange of information and contacts between the authorities of the 
agriculture funds and the judicial authorities has increased as this has been highlighted during the training. 
2.1 Can you share any results deriving from the use of the findings from the 2016 PIF Report in your fraud risk assessments? 
☒YES,  
There  is  still  a  need  to  continue  training  both  management  and  administrators/economists  in  public  procurement,  something  which  was 
detected in the 2016 PIF Report. 
2.2 Have you further exploited the potential of risk analysis, tailoring the approach to the different types of expenditure and taking 
advantage of best practices and the risk elements highlighted in the 2017 PIF Report? 
☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
The Risk Assessment teams have taken part of the report and have, to some extent, used the findings in our risk assessment process for 2019.  
2.3  Have  you  facilitated  and  assessed  the  spontaneous  reporting  of  potential  irregularities  and  strengthen  the  protection  of  whistle-
blowers, who are also a crucial source for investigative journalism? 
☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
Several authorities have a whistle-blower function in place and policies to strengthen the protection of whistle-blowers.   
2.4 Have you promoted systematic and timely cooperation between judicial and administrative authorities? 
☒YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
The eight managing authorities (some are administrative and some judicial) have regular networking meetings several times a year. They meet 
to discuss OLAF reporting, take part in COCOLAF meetings and are also part of the SEFI Council which is headed by the Swedish Economic 
Crime Agency.  
2.1 Can you share any results deriving from the use of the findings from the 2016 PIF Report in your fraud risk assessments? 
☒YES,  
Contribution from Ministry for Housing, Communities and Local Government 
Potential or actual fraud cases relating to expenditure issues are being considered as part of subsequent reviews of our fraud risk assessment 
tool, with risk and controls revised accordingly. Also, in relation to our risk scoring tool, we are currently developing the narrative to clarify 
our  decision  making  in  relation  to  the  scoring  of  risks  (both  gross  and  net  risk),  our  confidence  in  the  controls,  and  the  necessity  for 

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considering any additional planned controls. 
2.2 Have you further exploited the potential of risk analysis, tailoring the approach to the different types of expenditure and taking 
advantage of best practices and the risk elements highlighted in the 2017 PIF Report? 
☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
A  current  trend  of  fraud  referrals  are  linked  to  Small  Medium  Enterprises  (SMEs)  receiving  expenditure  in  the  form  of  small  grants  or 
vouchers. These types of projects fall within Priority Axis PA1 & PA3 of the 2014-20 ESIF programme.  An analysis of all PA1 & PA3 live 
projects is currently underway to identify what coverage of compliance (A125) & audit (A127) have been undertaken and any issues identified 
link to grants to SME’s.   Also, a random sample will also be checked by Counter Fraud Designated Officers (CFDOs) to ensure these issues 
are not systemic. 
Good practice is to ensure tighter processes are in place for Grant Recipients & their Delivery Partners and that stricter tests are undertaken 
by  the  Managing  Authority  when  SME’s  are  providing  evidence  for  payment  e.g.  checks  on  Companies  House  that  the  company  is  active; 
further evidence & checks to support invoices submitted to claim their small grant or voucher. 
2.3  Have  you  facilitated  and  assessed  the  spontaneous  reporting  of  potential  irregularities  and  strengthen  the  protection  of  whistle-
blowers, who are also a crucial source for investigative journalism? 
☒YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
The fraud referral process within MHCLG European Directorate has been established and is functioning effectively. A team of trained Counter 
Fraud Designated Officer (CFDOs) are the first point of  contact. The Growth Delivery Teams  (GDTs) are aware of  the  CFDOs roles, and 
assurance of confidentiality of whistle-blowing from staff members. Policy and guidance has been strengthened with the development of the 
new Counter Fraud and Conflict of Interest  Policy, which merges the previous Counter Fraud Policy, Counter Fraud Strategy, Conflicts of 
Interest  Policy  and  Whistleblowing  Policy  into  one  document.  Good  links  with  Government  Internal  Audit  Authority  (GIAA)  and  their 
Investigation Team are being utilised to pursue suspected fraud cases. 
2.4 Have you promoted systematic and timely cooperation between judicial and administrative authorities? 
☒NO 

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